i. overview [1] two individuals robbed a subway restaurant in regina, saskatchewan, on july 7, 2016. one wore a mask and brandished a knife, while the other stood watch at the front door. the robbers made off with $400 and a coin dispenser. [2] a police investigation led to the arrest of the accused, jason william cowan. he was subsequently charged with armed robbery, contrary to ss. 343(d) and 344 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. [3] mr. cowan was tried by a judge alone. at trial, the crown advanced two theories of liability: first, that mr. cowan was the masked robber and was therefore guilty as a principal offender; second, and in the alternative, that mr. cowan was guilty as a party to the armed robbery in that he either abetted the commission of the offence under s 21(1)(c) of the criminal code, or counselled its commission under s 22(1). [4] the trial judge rejected both theories of liability and acquitted mr. cowan. in his view, the circumstantial evidence fell short of proving that mr. cowan was one of the principal offenders. as for party liability, he found that mr. cowan could only be convicted as a party if the crown established that two of mr. cowan’s friends — matthew tone and a man known as “littleman” — had committed the robbery. once again, he found that the evidence relied upon by the crown fell short in this regard. [5] the crown appealed from mr. cowan’s acquittal. a majority of the court of appeal for saskatchewan allowed the appeal. in doing so, it found no error in the trial judge’s analysis or conclusion concerning mr. cowan’s role as a principal offender on the issue of party liability, the majority took a different view in its opinion, the trial judge erred in holding that it was incumbent on the crown to prove that mr. tone and littleman were the persons who committed the robbery in order to find mr. cowan guilty of abetting or counselling the commission of the offence. according to the majority, this error was serious and it may well have affected the verdict. hence, the majority allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial. however, because the error related solely to the issue of party liability, the majority ordered that the new trial be limited to the question of “whether mr. cowan is guilty of robbery, as a party, on the basis of abetting or counselling” (ca reasons, 2020 skca 77, 389 ccc (3d) 258, at para. 50) writing in dissent, jackson ja. would have dismissed the appeal in its entirety. [6] this case involves an appeal by both mr. cowan and the crown. on his appeal, mr. cowan relies upon the view of the dissenting judge at the court of appeal that the trial judge did not err in his analysis of party liability and that there was no basis in fact or law for the majority to interfere with the verdict of acquittal. moreover, he agrees with the dissenting judge that even if the trial judge did err in his analysis of party liability, the error was not material and did not meet the high test required for setting aside an acquittal. for its part, the crown appeals, with leave, from the order of the court of appeal, on the issue of whether the majority erred in limiting the scope of the new trial to a single theory of liability. the crown contends that the majority did not have the power to place any limits on the scope of the new trial; rather, it should simply have ordered a full new trial on the charge of armed robbery. [7] for the reasons that follow, i would dismiss mr. cowan’s appeal and allow the crown’s appeal. i am in agreement with the majority of the court of appeal that the trial judge committed an error of law in his analysis of party liability, which had a material bearing on the acquittal. the appropriate remedy is therefore to set aside the acquittal and order a new trial. however, in my respectful view, the new trial must be a full retrial. while appellate courts have broad powers under s 686(8) of the criminal code to “make any order, in addition, that justice requires”, this does not include the power to limit the scope of a new trial to a particular theory of liability on a single criminal charge. ii. facts [8] the events giving rise to these appeals occurred between approximately 9:00 and 9:30 p.m on july 7, 2016 the sole employee working at the subway restaurant at the time of the robbery was in the back area of the restaurant when he heard the front door open. he came out and saw that two individuals had entered — one was standing watch by the front door, while the other was approaching the counter with his face masked and a knife in his hand. the masked robber proceeded to jump over the counter and instruct the employee to place the money from the cash register, totalling $400, into a subway sandwich bag he then noticed a coin dispenser and demanded that the employee give it to him. the employee complied. the robbers left, taking the cash and coin dispenser with them. [9] while the robbers could not be identified by the employee, the masked robber could be seen in the restaurant’s security camera footage wearing distinctive running shoes. [10] a few days later, the police received an anonymous tip implicating mr. cowan in the robbery and placed him under surveillance as part of the surveillance operation, the police took photographs of mr. cowan showing him wearing a pair of running shoes that closely resembled those worn by the masked robber. [11] some weeks later, on august 11, 2016, the police arrested mr. cowan, in relation to the robbery, at a residence on mcdonald street located a few blocks away from the subway restaurant. he was taken to the police station, where he provided a recorded statement denying having any involvement in the robbery and claiming he had an alibi. he explained that he was at the mcdonald street residence on the day of the robbery, but that he had left around 5:00 pm to go to the house of a friend named jenna-lee tiszauer. he then went on to admit that while he was not directly involved in the robbery, on that same day, a group of individuals at the mcdonald street residence were talking about “how they needed money” and that he told them “how to do a robbery what to say how to do it how long to be in there” (trial reasons, 2018 skqb 75, at paras. 24-25 (canlii)). initially, he said this conversation occurred with mr. tone and an individual named dustin fiddler. later, he added that littleman and an individual named bradley robinson were also present. [12] when shown photographs of the robbery from the subway restaurant security camera footage, mr. cowan identified littleman as the robber standing watch at the door and mr. robinson as the masked robber later, he told the police that mr. fiddler and mr. tone had driven littleman and mr. robinson to the restaurant and had waited in mr. fiddler’s vehicle during the robbery. [13] mr. cowan was subsequently charged with “steal[ing] canadian currency and a coin dispenser from subway while armed with an offensive weapon, contrary to section 343(d) . . . of the criminal code” (armed robbery) (ar, vol. i, at p 2).1 at trial, the crown advanced two alternative theories of liability to establish mr. cowan’s guilt — either he was the masked robber and therefore a principal offender, or he was a party in that he abetted or counselled the commission of the offence. 1 mr. cowan was also charged with intending to commit a robbery with his face masked, contrary to s 351(2) of the criminal code. he was acquitted of that charge at trial and the crown did not appeal from it the court of appeal ordered a new trial solely on the charge of armed robbery, albeit restricting the scope of that new trial to the issue of party liability. the parties raised no issues nor did they make submissions relating to the charge of masked robbery with intent. accordingly, any issues relating to or arising from it are not before us. [14] in support of its main theory — that mr. cowan was a principal offender — the crown relied on the available circumstantial evidence, including that mr. cowan’s statement revealed a degree of knowledge regarding the robbery which supported his direct involvement; that the robbery had been committed in a manner consistent with the way mr. cowan described it in his statement; and that mr. cowan’s shoes matched those worn by the masked robber. the crown also tendered evidence from ms. tiszauer to challenge mr. cowan’s alibi. she testified that mr. cowan had approached her and asked if she would provide him with an alibi, even though they had not been together on the evening of the robbery. finally, the crown called an individual named tara regan, who testified that at some point in the summer of 2016, mr. cowan told her that he committed the robbery with littleman. [15] as for its alternative theory — that mr. cowan was a party to the robbery because he abetted or counselled the commission of the robbery — the crown primarily relied on mr. cowan’s statement in which he admitted to having told mr. fiddler, mr. tone, mr. robinson, and littleman “how to do [the] robbery and what to say exactly” (ar, vol. ii, at p 47). [16] for its part, the defence called an individual named nicole miller, who testified that in july 2016, mr. tone told her that three people had committed the robbery, “him, his friend littleman and his other buddy” (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 116 and 120). she did not know who the “other buddy” was. mr. cowan did not testify. iii decisions below a court of queen’s bench for saskatchewan, 2018 skqb 75 (zarzeczny j.) [17] the trial judge acquitted mr. cowan. he found that the crown had failed to establish mr. cowan’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on either theory of liability. [18] with respect to mr. cowan being the principal offender, the trial judge rejected ms. regan’s evidence that mr. cowan had confessed to his involvement in the robbery. according to the trial judge, she was an unsavoury witness, whose evidence was neither reliable nor trustworthy. he then reviewed the remaining circumstantial evidence and concluded that mr. cowan’s guilt as a principal offender was not the only rational inference that could be drawn from it. [19] having rejected the crown’s theory of principal liability, the trial judge turned to consider whether mr. cowan was guilty as a party on the basis of abetting or counselling. he explained that in mr. cowan’s statement, he “clearly admits that he told the persons, which he claimed committed this robbery, namely [mr. tone and littleman] how to do it” (para. 44). while this evidence confirmed that the instructions given by mr. cowan closely compared to the manner in which the robbery was carried out, the trial judge reasoned that he was unable to find mr. cowan guilty, as the evidence did not satisfy him that mr. tone and littleman were the individuals who participated in the commission of the offence as principal offenders. this was essential, in his view, to convict mr. cowan as a party on the basis of abetting or counselling. b court of appeal for saskatchewan, 2020 skca 77, 389 ccc (3d) 258 (jackson (dissenting), ottenbreit and kalmakoff jja) [20] the crown appealed from the acquittal on the charge of armed robbery. it did so on the basis that the trial judge committed legal errors in relation to both the principal and party theories of liability. [21] the court of appeal unanimously agreed that the trial judge did not commit any legal errors in rejecting the crown’s theory that mr. cowan was a principal offender the court was divided, however, on whether he erred in assessing mr. cowan’s guilt as a party on the basis of abetting or counselling. [22] the majority was of the view that the trial judge erred in law by “instructing himself that, as a prerequisite to establishing mr. cowan’s culpability on either the basis of abetting the commission of the robbery, under s 21(1)(c) or on the basis of counselling the commission of that offence under s 22(1) the crown was required to prove that mr. tone and [littleman] were the principal offenders” (para. 25). in its opinion, to establish mr. cowan’s guilt as an abettor, the crown was not required to prove that the individual he had abetted was “the principal offender”, as long as mr. cowan committed the prohibited act with the intention of abetting “a principal offender”, an individual who “participate[d] in the offence as an aider or abettor”, or an individual who “was involved in the commission of the offence in a way that would, on its own, attract criminal liability” (paras. 28-30 (emphasis in original)). similarly, for counselling, the crown was not required to prove that the individual counselled by mr. cowan was the principal offender, as long as that individual participated in the offence, either as a principal or party. [23] applying the test from r v. graveline, 2006 scc 16, [2006] 1 scr 609, the majority found that the error had a material bearing on the acquittal because it led the trial judge to mischaracterize the crown’s position in relation to party liability and overlook important evidence. nowhere in the trial record did the crown assert that it could only have been mr. tone or littleman who committed the robbery. rather, there was evidence in mr. cowan’s statement that mr. fiddler and mr. robinson were also present when mr. cowan was providing instructions on how to carry out a robbery. moreover, in his statement, mr. cowan described how the robbery had been committed by mr. robinson and littleman, while mr. tone and mr. fiddler were waiting in the getaway car. collectively, this evidence was “capable of supporting a conviction on the basis of abetting or counselling if the trial judge had accepted it as fact and applied the correct legal analysis to it” (para. 42 (emphasis in original)). [24] accordingly, the majority allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial. in directing the new trial, however, it held that since the court had rejected the crown’s grounds of appeal concerning mr. cowan’s liability as a principal, the scope of the trial should be limited to “whether mr. cowan is guilty of robbery, as a party, on the basis of abetting or counselling” (para. 50). [25] the dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal entirely and upheld the acquittal. in her opinion, the trial judge did not err by limiting himself to considering mr. tone and littleman as being the principals to the offence. the trial judge named those two individuals because “they were the only . . . likely candidates seriously put forward by anyone as having had any role in the commission of the robbery and their suggested role was as principals only” (para. 62). the trial judge was therefore merely responding to the evidence and submissions before him. [26] the dissenting judge went on to note that even if the trial judge did err, the error was not sufficiently material to have had a bearing on mr. cowan’s acquittal. this was because the trial judge discounted mr. cowan’s statement, which was the only evidence that could have supported the possibility that someone other than mr. tone or littleman was a principal. if mr. cowan’s statement was not sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw the inference that mr. tone or littleman were principals, it would not have supported the “less obvious” inference that anyone else was a principal. iv. issues [27] i would state the issues in these appeals as follows: (1) did the trial judge err in his assessment of mr. cowan’s guilt as a party on the basis of abetting or counselling? (2) if so, could the error reasonably be thought to have had a material bearing on mr. cowan’s acquittal such that a new trial is warranted? (3) if a new trial is required, did the court of appeal err in restricting the scope of the new trial to the question of whether mr. cowan is guilty as a party on the basis of abetting or counselling? v analysis a. the trial judge erred [28] in my respectful view, the trial judge erred in law in assessing mr. cowan’s liability as a party for having abetted or counselled the commission of the offence. specifically, as i will explain, by reasoning that the crown was required to prove that mr. tone and littleman were the principals in the commission of the armed robbery as a prerequisite to establishing mr. cowan’s guilt as a party, the trial judge misdirected himself on the law and, as a result, failed to correctly assess the relevant evidence. (1) the law [29] for the purposes of determining criminal liability, the criminal code does not distinguish between principal offenders and parties to an offence (r v. briscoe, 2010 scc 13, [2010] 1 scr 411, at para. 13) an accused’s guilt is the same regardless of the way in which they participated in the offence –– the person who provides the gun is guilty of the same offence as the person who pulls the trigger (ibid.; r v. huard, 2013 onca 650, 302 ccc (3d) 469, at para. 59). [30] sections 21 and 22 of the criminal code set out the various ways in which an accused may participate in and be found guilty of a particular offence those provisions codify both liability for an accused who participates in an offence by actually committing it, under s 21(1)(a) (principal liability); and liability for an accused who participates in an offence by, for example, abetting or counselling another person to commit the offence, under s 21(1)(c) or s 22(1) (party liability) (r v. pickton, 2010 scc 32, [2010] 2 scr 198, at para. 51). [31] where, as here, an accused is being tried alone and there is evidence that more than one person participated in the commission of the offence, the crown is not required to prove the identity of the other participant(s) or the precise part played by each in order to prove an accused’s guilt as a party (r v. isaac, [1984] 1 scr 74, at p 81, citing r v sparrow (1979), 51 ccc (2d) 443 (ont ca), at p 458) this principle applies where an accused is prosecuted as either an abettor or counsellor. [32] the essential elements of abetting are well established. the actus reus of abetting is doing something or omitting to do something that encourages the principal to commit the offence (briscoe, at paras. 14-15) as for the mens rea, it has two components: intent and knowledge (para. 16). the abettor must have intended to abet the principal in the commission of the offence and known that the principal intended to commit the offence (paras. 16-17). [33] although the jurisprudence setting out the elements of abetting refers to encouraging “the principal”, intending to abet “the principal”, and knowing that “the principal” intended to commit the offence, the crown is not required to prove the identity of “the principal” or their specific role in the commission of the offence for party liability to attach (r v. thatcher, [1987] 1 scr 652, at pp. 687-89). [34] in thatcher, the accused was charged with first degree murder to establish his guilt, the crown presented two alternative theories of liability. it argued that the accused was either the principal offender, in that he personally murdered the victim, or a party to the offence, in that he had the victim murdered by someone else. the trial judge instructed the jury that the crown’s inability to adduce evidence of another specific, identified individual as the person who actually committed the murder did not preclude the jury from finding the accused guilty as a party. the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the offence of first degree murder. the accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that the crown was not required to prove the identity of the principal offender. his appeal was dismissed by the court of appeal for saskatchewan. on further appeal, this court agreed with the court of appeal, holding that the trial judge’s instructions were “perfectly proper”, because “[t]here is, of course, no burden on the crown to point to a specific, identified person as the personal assailant of the victim” (pp. 687-88). [35] similar principles apply to counselling, which is defined in the criminal code to include “procur[ing], solicit[ing] and incit[ing]” (s 22(3)). the actus reus is the “deliberate encouragement or active inducement of the commission of a criminal offence” (r v. hamilton, 2005 scc 47, [2005] 2 scr 432, at para. 29 (emphasis deleted)) the person deliberately encouraged or actively induced by the counsellor must also actually participate in the offence (para 63, per charron j., dissenting on other grounds; criminal code, s 22(1)). as for the mens rea, the counsellor must have “either intended that the offence counselled be committed, or knowingly counselled the commission of the offence while aware of the unjustified risk that the offence counselled was in fact likely to be committed as a result of the accused’s conduct” (hamilton, at para. 29). [36] while one of the requisite elements of counselling is the actual participation in the offence by the person counselled, that person can participate not only as a principal, but also as a party. this is reflected by the wording of s 22(1), which states that an accused is a party if they “counse[l] another person to be a party to an offence and that other person is afterwards a party to that offence” the precise manner of participation is irrelevant, since whether the person counselled is a principal or a party, “[t]he focus on a prosecution for counselling is on the counsellor’s conduct and state of mind, not that of the person counselled” (hamilton, at para. 74). (2) application [37] applying these principles to the case at hand, it is clear that to establish mr. cowan’s guilt as a party on the basis of abetting or counselling, the crown was not required to prove the identity of mr. tone and littleman as the principal offenders or the precise role played by them in the commission of the offence. the crown was only required to prove that any one of the individuals encouraged by mr. cowan went on to participate in the offence either as a principal offender — in which case mr. cowan would be guilty as both an abettor and a counsellor — or as a party — in which case mr. cowan would be guilty as a counsellor.2 [38] despite this, the trial judge reasoned that mr. cowan could not be convicted of either abetting or counselling the commission of the robbery because the crown had not met its burden of proving “that matthew tone and [littleman] were involved as principals in the commission of this robbery” (para. 48). he repeated this point, explaining that “before the accused can be convicted of aiding, abetting or counselling the commission of this subway robbery . . . i must be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it was matthew tone and [littleman] who participated as principals in the commission of this crime” (para. 49). [39] with respect, it is clear from these passages that the trial judge misdirected himself on the applicable legal principles underlying ss. 21(1)(c) and 22(1). he then assessed the evidence in light of these incorrect principles, concluding that “there is not sufficient evidence implicating or proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that matthew tone and [littleman] were the persons involved in committing this robbery”(para. 45). 2 i leave for another day the question of whether an accused can be liable as an abettor under s 21(1)(c) where they are found to have abetted a party to an offence, other than the principal offender this question has no bearing on the outcome of this appeal since, even if s 21(1)(c) applies only to those who abetted a principal offender, the trial judge erred in failing to recognize that he could find mr. cowan guilty if he was satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that mr. cowan encouraged at least one of the individuals who participated in the commission of the offence either as a principal (abetting or counselling) or a party (counselling) accordingly, i should not be taken as endorsing the court of appeal’s comments, at paras. 28-30 of its reasons, suggesting that criminal liability for abetting can attach where an accused abets a non-principal party (eg, an abettor). [40] on this issue, i am unable to endorse the dissenting judge’s opinion in the court of appeal that the trial judge did not err in singling out mr. tone and littleman, because he was simply responding to the evidence and submissions before him. with respect, the record illustrates that other individuals were put forward as potentially being involved in the robbery for instance, in closing submissions at trial, defence counsel began his remarks by explaining that the defence’s theory was that “tara regan, matthew tone and dustin fiddler” had “committed the robbery that is the subject matter of this proceeding” (ar, vol. iii, at p 131) defence counsel also suggested that “matthew tone, tara regan or any number of robbers [could] have worn [the] pair of shoes” seen on the security camera footage of the robbery (p 137). further, he noted that the robbers had likely escaped using a vehicle, and that “dustin fiddler owned a vehicle” (p 138). [41] the crown suggested a similarly broad lens on the party theory, noting in closing submissions that mr. cowan had instructed all of his “friends” how to commit the robbery: so in my respectful submission when mr. cowan, according to his testimony, again this is in our subsidiary argument, when — if he said to his friends, when he know[s] that they’re in need of money, just go — just go do a robbery, it’s easy and then give[s] them further advi[c]e about how to do it, is committing an offence by the way of section 21 (c) of the criminal code. (ar, vol. iii, at p 152) [42] this theory accorded with mr. cowan’s statement, in which he told the police that littleman, mr. tone, mr. robinson, and mr. fiddler were all present at the mcdonald street residence when he explained how to commit the robbery in discussing the admissibility of that statement, the crown pointed out that mr. cowan not only admitted to encouraging mr. tone and littleman, but also to encouraging mr. robinson and mr. fiddler the crown argued that “the accused [admitted to abetting] in the commission of an offence when he sa[id] that he told mr. fiddler and mr. tone, mr. [robinson] and another individual named littleman how to do the . robbery and what to say exactly” (ar, vol. ii, at p 47). [43] the majority of the court of appeal was therefore correct to find that there was “nothing in the trial record to indicate that the crown asserted it could only have been mr. tone and [littleman] who entered the subway restaurant to commit the robbery” (para. 41 (emphasis in original)). [44] in any event, even if the evidence and submissions had, in fact, focused on mr. tone and littleman, this did not insulate the trial judge from legal error. as i have explained, mr. cowan could still have been found guilty of being a party to the offence even if the precise identity or part played by each individual who participated in the commission of the offence was uncertain, so long as mr. cowan had committed the necessary act with the requisite intent (isaac, at p 81, citing sparrow, at p 458; pickton, at para. 58; thatcher, at pp. 687-89). there was therefore no need for the trial judge to focus on the identity of a given principal, whether or not the crown identified specific individuals as principals to the offence. rather, all that was required was for him to find that mr. cowan had encouraged at least one of the individuals who participated in the commission of the offence, be it as a principal (abetting or counselling) or a party (counselling). respectfully, the trial judge erred in failing to recognize this. [45] having found that the trial judge committed an error of law, i must now determine whether that error warranted appellate intervention. b. the legal error had a material bearing on the acquittal [46] acquittals are not overturned lightly (r v. sutton, 2000 scc 50, [2000] 2 scr 595, at para. 2). to have an acquittal set aside due to a legal error, the crown bears the burden of satisfying an appellate court to a reasonable degree of certainty that the impugned error of law might have had a material bearing on the acquittal (graveline, at para. 14). this does not mean that the crown is required to persuade the court that the verdict would necessarily have been different but for the error (ibid). instead, the crown must show that the verdict may well have been affected by it (r v. morin, [1988] 2 scr 345, at p 374). [47] here, i am satisfied that the crown has met its burden of showing that the legal error had a material bearing on the acquittal. the trial judge structured his analysis of the evidence based on the erroneous premise that the crown had to prove that mr. tone and littleman were the principals before mr. cowan could be convicted as an abettor or counsellor. [48] in particular, he analyzed the evidence before him as follows: in his interview statement and those passages of it quoted in this judgment, mr. cowan clearly admits that he told the persons, which he claimed committed this robbery, namely “matthew” (taken to be matthew tone) and “littleman” how to do it. the evidence of [the subway employee] and the subway video confirms that the counselling and instructions that the accused gave respecting how this robbery should be done compares very closely with how it was committed. the language used by the principal robber and the statements he made are virtually identical to the advice mr. cowan says he gave to those he claims committed it. [para. 44] this evidence, as the trial judge summarized it, was reasonably capable of establishing that mr. cowan committed the prohibited act with the requisite intent for party liability on the basis of abetting or counselling failing to recognize this, however, the trial judge went on to ask the wrong question, namely whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the identity and involvement of mr. tone and littleman as principal offenders. he concluded it was not, and, therefore, that he could not find mr. cowan guilty under the party theory. it follows that the verdict may well have been different if the trial judge had considered the evidence in light of the correct legal principles. [49] the trial judge’s concluding remarks bear this out indeed, he directly acquitted mr. cowan on the basis of the lack of evidence tending to show that mr. tone and littleman were the principal offenders: in the circumstances, before the accused can be convicted of aiding, abetting or counselling the commission of this subway robbery by matthew tone and “littleman” as the accused at some point in his statement says they did, i must be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it was matthew tone and “littleman” who participated as principals in the commission of this crime the evidence that i have reviewed does not satisfy me, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they did so and accordingly that the accused aided, abetted or counselled the persons who did commit this crime within the meaning of ss. 21 and 22 of the criminal code. in the result, i find the accused, jason cowan, not guilty . . . . [paras. 49- 50] [50] this passage is a clear indication that the trial judge’s legal error was inextricably intertwined with the verdict of acquittal, and not just a slip of the pen as suggested by the dissenting judge. [51] on this point, the dissenting judge reasoned that even if the trial judge made the legal error alleged, it could not have affected the verdict because mr. cowan’s statement, which was “the source of the evidence to support the named individuals as something other than principals or that someone else was a principal or a party”, was rejected by the trial judge (ca reasons, at para. 53 (emphasis in original)). while the dissenting judge is correct to note that the trial judge had reservations as to the veracity of mr. cowan’s statement, it cannot be said that he rejected it as a whole. rather, his criticisms were aimed predominantly at undermining the strength of mr. cowan’s claims regarding the involvement of mr. tone and littleman in the robbery. as i have explained, the focus on mr. tone and littleman is indicative of the trial judge’s failure to recognize the true nature of the crown’s burden. [52] having found that the legal error played a material role in the outcome, the acquittal must be set aside. (r v. rv, 2021 scc 10, at para. 42, citing graveline, at para. 14). i turn now to the crown’s appeal to determine the appropriate remedy. c. the appropriate remedy is a full new trial [53] where, as here, an appellate court allows an appeal from an acquittal and sets aside that verdict, it has the power, pursuant to s 686(4)(b)(i) of the criminal code, to order a new trial. that is the remedy the crown seeks in this case it maintains, however, that the trial should be a full retrial and not, as the court of appeal ordered, one that “proceed[s] from the footing that the question to be determined is whether mr. cowan is guilty of robbery, as a party, on the basis of abetting or counselling” (para. 50). i agree. in my respectful view, by limiting the new trial in this manner, the court exceeded the scope of its powers under s 686(8) of the criminal code. (1) section 686(8) of the criminal code [54] where an appellate court exercises its powers under s 686(2), (4), (6) or (7), it may also “make any order, in addition, that justice requires” under s 686(8). this power, however, is not limitless. as this court recently explained in rv, for an appellate court to issue an additional order under its s 686(8) residual power, three conditions must be met (para. 74, citing r v. thomas, [1998] 3 scr 535). first, the court must have exercised one of the triggering powers conferred under s 686(2), (4), (6) or (7) second, the order issued must be ancillary to the triggering power in that it cannot be “at direct variance with the court’s underlying judgment” (thomas, at para. 17; see also r v warsing, [1998] 3 scr 579, at paras. 72-74). third and finally, the order must be one that “justice requires”. [55] here, i am of the view that the second and third conditions for exercising s 686(8) were not met, as the ancillary order limiting the scope of the new trial was at variance with the underlying judgment and was not an order that justice required. [56] according to the court of appeal, the scope of the new trial had to be limited to the question of whether mr. cowan was guilty of armed robbery as a party on the basis of abetting or counselling, since the legal error only pertained to the trial judge’s analysis of party liability and the crown’s grounds of appeal relating to principal liability were rejected. with respect, this was an error. the new trial must be on all available modes of committing the offence. [57] as i have explained, ss. 21 and 22 do not create multiple offences; rather, they merely provide alternative paths to the same destination by setting out different ways in which an accused may participate in and be found guilty of an offence. yet, in separating the crown’s theories of liability in its ancillary order, the court of appeal bifurcated the offence of armed robbery into two separate offences: robbery as a principal and robbery as a party, be it as an abettor or counsellor. thus, the effect of the ancillary order restricting the scope of the new trial was to uphold mr. cowan’s acquittal on the single charge of armed robbery in part. this is at odds with the underlying judgment allowing the crown appeal and setting aside the verdict rendered on that charge as a whole. put simply, the ancillary order gave rise to a partial acquittal on a single criminal charge — a two-headed hydra-like creation unknown to canada’s criminal law. [58] on this issue, this court’s decision in r v. mackay, 2005 scc 79, [2005] 3 scr 725, is particularly instructive. there, the accused was acquitted at trial after being charged with aggravated assault. on appeal, the court of appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury with respect to the definitions of assault, set out in s 265(1). specifically, while he had correctly instructed the jury with respect to s 265(1)(a) (assault by applying force), he refused to instruct it on s 265(1)(b) (assault by threatening to apply force). in ordering the new trial, the court ruled that the scope of that trial should be limited to whether the accused was guilty of aggravated assault, as defined in s 265(1)(b). [59] in this court, charron j upheld the court of appeal’s decision on the merits of the appeal, but found that it erred in restricting the scope of the new trial. she explained that since subss. 265(1)(a) and (b) “do not create separate offences but simply define two ways of committing the same offence”, the trial judge’s error meant that the “only avenue open to the court of appeal was to set aside the verdict of acquittal and order a new trial without restriction” (para. 4). she did not suggest, let alone find, that the order restricting the scope of the new trial was wrong because “it was not possible to isolate the potential application of the two legal standards [in subss. 265(1)(a) and (b)] from the facts — the factual and legal issues were interconnected” (rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 90). i find it inconceivable that charron j. would have left out such an important qualifier had it played any role — much less a determinative one — in her decision to set aside the order restricting the scope of the new trial. [60] justice charron’s reasoning in mackay applies equally in this case. the fact that mackay was a jury trial, such that there were no reasons to explain how the jury arrived at its decision, is of no moment. the jury’s reasoning process could not have been clearer it was only instructed on s 265(1)(a) the trial judge made no mention of s 265(1)(b) in his instructions, he told the jury that “[i]f you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [the accused] intentionally applied force to [the victim] you must find [the accused] not guilty” (para. 1). it follows that the jury could only have acquitted on the basis that it was not satisfied that the accused intentionally applied force to the victim under s 265(1)(a). [61] accordingly, just as subss. 265(1)(a) and (b) do not create separate offences, the party liability provisions at issue here also do not; rather, they define different ways of committing the same offence and, as in mackay, the court of appeal here erred in treating modes of committing an offence as if they were distinct verdicts in themselves that could be severed. [62] i am therefore satisfied that the court of appeal’s ancillary order is inconsistent with its underlying order to have the charge retried in its entirety. [63] the ancillary order was also not one that justice required in canadian criminal law, the concept of the “interests of justice” has come to be understood as encompassing the interests of the accused, the interests of the crown, broad-based societal concerns, and the integrity of the criminal process (r v beaulac, [1999] 1 scr 768; r v. m (ps) (1992), 77 ccc (3d) 402 (ont. ca), at paras. 32-36; r. v. owen, 2003 scc 33, [2003] 1 scr 779, at para. 52; r v. last, 2009 scc 45, [2009] 3 scr 146, at para. 16; r v. bernardo (1997), 105 oac 244, at paras. 16 and 20). here, in my view, the ancillary order threatens the integrity of the criminal process by distorting the truth-seeking function of the courts. [64] as one of the purposes of the criminal process is to foster a search for truth, justice cannot require that a trier of fact be restricted in their ability to determine how, if at all, an accused participated in a given offence. rather, a trier of fact must be able to consider any and all theories of liability that have an air of reality based on the evidence adduced at the new trial (huard, at para. 60). to prospectively deny a trier of fact the ability to consider a viable theory of liability would be to undermine their ability to carry out their core function: to determine whether the crown has proven that the accused committed the offence(s) charged this approach is consistent with the court’s reasoning in mackay, where charron j held that the “scope of the appropriate instruction on the definition of assault at the new trial [could] only be determined on the basis of the evidence adduced at th[at] new trial” (para. 4). [65] as a practical matter, upholding the court of appeal’s ancillary order would mean that if, at the new trial, the defence adduced evidence showing that mr. cowan did not abet or counsel anyone because he was, in fact, the principal offender, and the trier of fact believed that evidence or it raised a reasonable doubt, the trier of fact would have no option but to acquit mr. cowan of the charge of armed robbery. such a result would make a mockery of the justice system and cannot be what justice requires. [66] it is important to note that my conclusion that the court of appeal was not permitted to restrict the available theories of liability at the new trial should not be taken to mean that appellate courts do not have the power to limit the scope of a new trial in all circumstances. for instance, courts have held that an appellate court may limit the scope of a new trial to a lesser and included offence where it is satisfied that the reversible error only tainted the verdict on that offence and it sets aside the verdict on that charge only (see, eg,. r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr 579; r v. guillemette, [1986] 1 scr 356; r v. alec, [1975] 1 scr 720; r v. cook (1979), 47 ccc (2d) 186 (ont. ca);. r v. ruptash (1982), 36 ar 346 (ca);. r v. druken, 2002 nfca 23, 211 nfld. & peir 219). the critical distinction, however, is that a lesser and included offence is a separate offence and not, as here, one way of committing a single offence. likewise, in rv, the issue centred on alleged inconsistent verdicts in the context of three separate offences — a far cry from the present case where we are dealing with a single count of armed robbery that could be committed in different ways. nor is this a case where “the crown [is] seeking to overturn acquittals in order to try to change theories or tactics, or to present the same case to a different decision-maker in the hopes of getting a different result” (rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 91). none of those improper motives can be ascribed to the crown in this case. (2) issue estoppel [67] before concluding, i wish to briefly address the matter of issue estoppel. mr. cowan has argued that this court cannot order a full new trial because the doctrine of issue estoppel prevents the re-litigation of the crown’s theory that he is guilty of armed robbery as a principal offender. specifically, he argues that the requirements of issue estoppel are satisfied, since the trial judge’s finding that the crown had not met its burden of proving that he was a principal offender was: (1) a final decision; (2) made in a prior proceeding; (3) that involved the same parties (citing r v. mahalingan, 2008 scc 63, [2008] 3 scr 316, at paras. 52 and 55-56) respectfully, i would reject mr. cowan’s submissions on this point while the doctrine of issue estoppel is available to an accused in the criminal law context, it is not available to mr. cowan here to preclude this court from ordering a full retrial on the charge of armed robbery. [68] issue estoppel does not apply simply by virtue of the fact that a trial has been held. as the court in mahalingan explained, the decision that forms the basis for the issue estoppel must have been made in a prior proceeding that was final (paras. 52-55) that case, however, concerned two separate proceedings and not, as here, a trial and a retrial of the same case following a successful appeal. there is no final decision made in a prior proceeding where an appellate court finds that a verdict of acquittal on a single criminal charge was tainted by legal error and, accordingly, renders that verdict invalid as a whole by setting it aside and ordering a new trial on the relevant charge. this premise was succinctly summarized more than a century ago in the case of gray v. dalgety & co. ltd. (1916), 21 clr 509 (hca), at p 521, where griffith cj stated: “i never before heard it suggested that a grant of a new trial was a final decision upon any point except that the matter should be further investigated”. [69] moreover, as g. spencer-bower and a. k. turner have explained in the doctrine of res judicata (2nd ed 1969), at para. 168 (cited with approval in r v. duhamel (no. 2) (1981), 131 dlr (3d) 352, at p 357 (alta. ca), aff’d [1984] 2 scr 555), no party can be estopped from re-litigating an issue where a verdict is set aside and a new trial ordered: no finding of the court or of a jury of a trial which has proved abortive, a new trial having been directed, will give rise to a valid plea of estoppel. and a decision of the court setting aside the verdict of a jury, or setting aside a judgment entered pursuant thereto, and directing a new trial, will not result in either party being estopped per rem judicatam by anything held on the facts in the judgment in which the new trial is ordered, for the judgment must be read as deciding no more than that, the first trial being unsatisfactory, the issues tried therein should be re-submitted to the court for fresh consideration. [footnotes omitted.] [70] i agree with this statement. when an appellate court orders a new trial in a criminal prosecution, it does so to allow the opportunity “to correct errors in the proceedings at the first trial” (welch v. the king, [1950] scr 412, at p 417). such a new trial is a “re-examination of a case on the same information or indictment”, that “supposes a completed trial, which for some sufficient reason has been set aside, so that the issues may be litigated de novo” (ibid. (emphasis deleted)). [71] these principles were applied by the court of appeal for british columbia in r v. ekman, 2006 bcca 206, 209 ccc (3d) 121. by way of background, in that case, the accused was acquitted at his first murder trial after his incriminating statement to the police was ruled inadmissible. on appeal, the court overturned that ruling and ordered a new trial. in the second trial, the accused was convicted of attempted murder, but acquitted of first degree murder. a crown appeal from that acquittal was allowed and a third trial was directed on the charge of murder. at the third trial, the accused argued that issue estoppel prohibited the crown from proceeding against him as the principal offender in the murder. he asked the trial judge for an order “limiting the scope of the new trial to the charge of first degree murder as a party only” (r v. ekman, 2004 bcsc 900, at paras. 3-4 (canlii)). the trial judge rejected this submission. the third trial did not reopen an issue that had been finally decided as the result from the second trial — the acquittal for murder — was entirely set aside issue estoppel therefore had no application. [72] the trial judge’s reasoning was upheld by the court of appeal: trial no. 3 did not reopen a matter that had been fully litigated between the parties because the result of trial no. 2 was entirely set aside and a new trial was ordered on all issues. there were errors of law in the charge in trial no. 2 that impeached the verdict the crown appeal in appeal no. 2 advanced three grounds for setting aside the jury’s verdict this court found it necessary to decide only one of those grounds but it is implicit in the decision that the whole of the verdict was tainted and had to be set aside. otherwise, it would have been necessary to address the other grounds which attacked the entire verdict all the issues of fact were therefore at large and to be considered afresh in trial no. 3. no “scandal of conflicting decisions” is involved. no issue was finally decided in trial no. 2 and, in my view, the doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel has no application. [para. 22] [73] similarly, in the present case, no issue can be said to have been finally decided in the first trial because the result of that trial — the acquittal on the single charge of armed robbery — has been entirely set aside. as the trial judge committed a legal error that had a material bearing on mr. cowan’s acquittal, the verdict is necessarily invalid. the findings in the first trial that led to his acquittal must therefore be set aside and cannot form the basis of a claim of issue estoppel. vi conclusion [74] in the result, i would dismiss mr. cowan’s appeal and allow the crown’s appeal. the judgment of the court of appeal setting aside the acquittal on the charge of armed robbery and ordering a new trial is upheld, but para. 3 of that judgment, which orders that “the question to be determined [at the new trial] is whether mr. cowan is guilty of robbery, as a party, on the basis of abetting or counselling” is set aside. a full new trial on the armed robbery charge is ordered. the reasons of brown and rowe jj. were delivered by rowe j — [75] i would allow the appeal by mr. cowan and restore his acquittal. i would do so for the dissenting reasons of justice jackson, which i adopt, except for para. 61.3 [76] in light of the foregoing, it is not necessary for me to deal with the appeal by the crown against the order of the court of appeal limiting the scope of the new trial. nonetheless, i will do so in general terms, as i am concerned by what moldaver j. has written in this regard. [77] issue estoppel precludes the crown “from relitigating an issue that has been determined in the accused’s favour in a prior criminal proceeding, whether on the basis of a positive finding or reasonable doubt” (r v. mahalingan, 2008 scc 63, [2008] 3 scr 316, at para. 31; see also r v. punko, 2012 scc 39, [2012] 2 scr 396, at para. 7). as a result of the application of issue estoppel, in such cases, the crown would be precluded not “from leading evidence on any issue raised in a previous trial that resulted in an acquittal” but “from leading evidence which is inconsistent with findings made in the accused’s favour in a previous proceeding” (mahalingan, at paras. 2 and 22 (emphasis in original); see also s. n. lederman, a. w. bryant and m. k. fuerst, sopinka, lederman & bryant: the law of evidence in canada (5th ed 2018), at 3 given the absence of submissions on this issue, i agree with my colleague moldaver j to “leave for another day the question of whether an accused can be liable as an abettor under s 21(1)(c) [of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46] where they are found to have abetted a party to an offence, other than the principal offender” (para. 37, fn. 2). §19.152; m. vauclair and t. desjardins, in collaboration with p. lachance, traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales (27th ed. 2020), at no. 28296). [78] there are three requirements for issue estoppel to apply. first, the issue must have been decided in a prior proceeding, which “requires the court in the second trial to decide whether the issue the crown is seeking to prove is the same as an issue resolved in the accused’s favour in a prior criminal proceeding” (mahalingan, at para. 52 (emphasis added)). second, the decision must be final (para. 55). “findings on particular issues at trial are final, unless overturned on appeal” (ibid). my colleague moldaver j emphasizes in his reasons that the verdict was overturned by the court of appeal, such that the decision is not final. but issue estoppel is concerned with issues decided at trial, not the ultimate result of the litigation (mahalingan, at paras. 17 and 52). thus, even when a new trial is ordered, an accused should not have to relitigate issues decided in his favour that are not tainted by an error. third, the parties to the two proceedings must be the same (paras. 56-57). [79] mr. cowan went to trial accused of committing an armed robbery and having his face masked with intent to commit robbery. at trial, the crown advanced two theories of liability: either mr. cowan perpetrated the robbery himself, or he abetted or counselled those who perpetrated the robbery. he was acquitted. the trial judge explained in his written reasons that he had a reasonable doubt as to the principal liability theory. the court of appeal found that the trial judge erred in law regarding abetting and counselling. but, it found no error as to the acquittal based on mr. cowan having committed the robbery as a principal. in this regard, no legal error is alleged before this court, as the crown did not appeal from this part of the decision. nonetheless, the crown wants to pursue the same avenue to conviction in a second trial. the problem is that “[i]f having a reasonable doubt on a particular issue is not held to be a conclusive finding of fact, then very few issues will fall within issue estoppel’s ambit, and the ends of finality will be poorly served” (mahalingan, at para. 30) as this court stated in mahalingan, in a judge alone trial where reasons explain the decision, “these findings [on critical issues] must be accepted and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent trial, unless set aside on appeal” (para. 53). here, because the findings on mr. cowan’s principal liability were not tainted by an error, they should not be set aside. [80] preventing the crown from relitigating issues resolved in favour of the accused during the first trial is a question of “fairness to the accused, integrity and coherence of the criminal process, and finality” (mahalingan, at para. 59). in my view, even without limiting the scope of the new trial, the accused could raise issue estoppel at the second trial and the trial judge could find that the crown is estopped from relitigating the principal liability issue. [81] issue estoppel exists to protect against relitigation about “specific, underlying elements of the crown’s case” (mahalingan, at para. 41). the importance of this principle is explained because “[o]ther rules of criminal law do not completely meet the fairness concern of not requiring the accused to answer factual and legal issues (short of the ultimate verdict) that have been resolved in his or her favour in a previous proceeding” (para. 40) and because “the criminal law abhors not only inconsistent verdicts, but inconsistent findings on specific issues” (para. 45). [82] in my view, too narrow a view of issue estoppel can result in unfairness to accused persons. as i said at the hearing, the crown’s position seems to be informed by the motto, “if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again” (transcript, at p 26), such that it should get a second chance to obtain a conviction by means of an avenue of liability even where the trial judge acquitted on this basis and no legal error relevant to this was found. for me, the underlying principle is that an accused should not have to relitigate issues on a basis for conviction upon which he was acquitted wherein no error was found. the trial judge’s findings should not be relitigated and the accused should not have to mount a second defence in the absence of a relevant reversible error. during the new trial, the crown will seek to persuade the judge that mr. cowan committed the robbery as a principal will mr. cowan not, thereby, be required to defend himself against the same allegations twice under the same theory of liability for the same factual circumstance? he will and that will be unfair. [83] considering matters in addition to issue estoppel, i cannot agree with the majority’s conclusions relating to the exercise by courts of appeal of their powers under s 686(8) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. [84] i do agree with the majority regarding the three conditions that must be met for an appellate court to make an order pursuant to s 686(8): first, the court must have exercised one of the triggering powers conferred under s 686(2), (4), (6) or (7); second, the order issued must be ancillary to the triggering power, meaning it is not “at direct variance with the court’s underlying judgment”; and, third, the order must be one that “justice requires” (r v. rv, 2021 scc 10, at para. 74). however, i do not agree with the majority’s application of the test in this case, as i shall explain. [85] appellate courts exercise their powers under s 686(8) flexibly, consistent with its broad and remedial purpose it is for the court of appeal to exercise the discretion conferred thereby; it is for this court to review that exercise of discretion. unless the court of appeal erred in principle or the order is clearly wrong, it is not for this court simply to substitute its own view. [86] in my view, no error in principle has been shown and the court of appeal order is not clearly wrong. first, there is nothing to suggest that the order is at direct variance with the court of appeal’s underlying judgment. contrary to the position of the majority, there is no rule that a charge as a whole must be retried if a new trial is ordered on a count alleging an offence which may be committed in different ways. rather, whether or not a full new trial should be ordered depends on the degree to which counts, and modes of committing offences charged as a single count, are “interconnected”. rv, which the majority cites, explained this at paras. 42-44: in cases where the crown has cross-appealed, the acquittal must be set aside if the crown succeeds in proving that it was based on an error of law “which might reasonably be thought . . to have had a material bearing on the acquittal” (graveline, at para. 14). the next question is what should follow from setting aside that acquittal. for the most part, the criminal code provides the answer. section 686(4)(b) of the code instructs appellate courts allowing an appeal from an acquittal entered by a jury to order a new trial generally, all interconnected charges should be returned for retrial (pittiman, at para. 14). in line with the test i have outlined, it may well be difficult for the appellate court to isolate the error to the acquittal, and a conviction cannot stand if it arises from an error of law. unless the appellate court can conclude with a high degree of certainty that the legal error did not taint the conviction, setting aside the acquittal on a charge interconnected with a conviction will require retrial on all charges. where an appellate court can isolate the legal error to the acquittal, that charge should be the only one sent back for a new trial and the conviction should stand. the error did not taint the conviction, so it should remain in place unless, of course, the conviction is found to be unreasonable on a ground other than inconsistency. [87] the question is one of being able to isolate the legal error, not the manner in which the offences are structured in the criminal code. even if an offence can be committed in several different ways, if it is clear, as in this case, that it cannot be proven that it was committed in one of those ways, there is no reason why an appellate court should not be able to limit the issues on new trial. [88] r v. mackay, 2005 scc 79, [2005] 3 scr 725, on which the majority also relies, illustrates my point in that case, an accused was acquitted by a jury of aggravated assault under s 265(1)(a) of the criminal code, but the trial judge refused to instruct them on the definition of assault under s 265(1)(b). the new brunswick court of appeal found that the trial judge had erred by failing to instruct the jury on the definition of assault in s 265(1)(b) and ordered a new trial for aggravated assault based on s 265(1)(b) only. this court overturned the decision and ordered a full new trial. [89] a proper reading of mackay does not support the majority’s position that a full new trial must be ordered any time an offence can be committed in two different ways and an appellate court finds that the trial judge made an error with respect to one mode, but not the other. the majority says that the first jury’s reasoning process in mackay was “clear” in finding the accused did not have the intent to commit assault under s 265(1)(a), yet this court returned it for a full trial on both ss. 265(1)(a) and 265(1)(b). however, the issue is not whether the first trier of fact’s decision is “clear” with respect to one mode of committing the offence, but whether the issue is so interconnected to the error made in respect of the second mode that a future trier of fact would necessarily need to reconsider both modes in order to reach a legally correct conclusion. this was the case in mackay. [90] the ways of committing an assault under ss. 265(1)(a) and 265(1)(b) are similar — s 265(1)(a) concerns the intentional application of force whereas s 265(1)(b) is about attempts or threats to apply force. their application in a particular case may overlap. in mackay, the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on s 265(1)(b) because he concluded force was actually applied and that foreclosed its application. however, the court of appeal concluded that while the jury could have concluded that force may have been applied unintentionally, they also could have concluded that force was indicative of prior threats or attempts to apply force also amounting to an assault. without being instructed on s 265(1)(b), the first jury was missing the necessary context to consider the facts against both legal standards and the requirements of the two subsections as compared to one another in other words, it was not possible to isolate the potential application of the two legal standards from the facts — the factual and legal issues were interconnected where, as here, two modes of committing an offence have entirely different elements and are based on completely different factual foundations, there is no need in the new trial to reconsider how the legal standards of committing the offence as a principal could apply moreover, in this case there are reasons from a trial judge which explain why he rejected the theory that mr. cowan committed the offence as a principal. there is no error in those reasons. thus, there is no principled basis to require that those issues be relitigated. [91] nor was the court of appeal’s order contrary to what “justice requires”. aside from fairness to the accused, the court of appeal properly narrowed the issues to prevent an unnecessary expenditure of the courts’ resources to relitigate matters where there was no error. in rv, at paras. 78-79, this court encouraged the crown to avoid proceeding on duplicative counts and thereby create inefficiency. the court of appeal order in this case is similarly consistent with promoting the expeditious use of court resources and encouraging the crown to put its best foot forward at the first trial. in this sense, the “interests of justice” encompass not only fairness to the accused, but also the public interest in avoiding duplicative litigation in a busy court system. nor is the integrity of the criminal justice system served by the crown seeking to overturn acquittals in order to try to change theories or tactics, or to present the same case to a different decision-maker in the hopes of getting a different result. [92] the majority’s judgment undermines the ability of courts of appeal to make ancillary orders that limit the issues at a new trial pursuant to s 686(8) in a way that not only encourages relitigation, but also risks undermining public confidence in the justice system by increasing the likelihood of inconsistent results. [93] in sum, i am of the view that the court of appeal did not err in limiting the issues on the new trial. this result promoted fairness to mr. cowan, the efficient use of the court’s resources and the integrity of the criminal justice process. there is no reason to return the matter for trial on the issue of whether mr. cowan committed the offence as a principal. appeal by jason william cowan dismissed, appeal by her majesty the queen allowed, brown and rowe jj. dissenting.
[1] legislative bodies in canada have inherent par- liamentary privileges which flow from their nature and function in a westminster model of parliamen- tary democracy. by shielding some areas of legis- lative activity from external review, parliamentary privilege helps preserve the separation of powers. it grants the legislative branch of government the autonomy it requires to perform its constitutional functions. parliamentary privilege also plays an im- portant role in our democratic tradition because it ensures that elected representatives have the freedom to vigorously debate laws and to hold the executive to account. [1] au canada, les organes législatifs disposent de privilèges parlementaires inhérents qui découlent de leur nature et de leur fonction au sein d’une démocra- tie parlementaire basée sur le modèle du parlement de westminster. en protégeant certains domaines d’ac- tivité législative d’une révision externe, le privilège parlementaire contribue à maintenir la séparation des pouvoirs. il accorde à l’organe législatif du gouver- nement l’autonomie dont il a besoin pour exercer ses fonctions constitutionnelles. le privilège parlemen- taire joue aussi un rôle important dans notre tradition démocratique puisqu’il fait en sorte que les représen- tants élus peuvent débattre vigoureusement des lois et demander à l’exécutif de rendre des comptes. [2] however, inherent privileges are limited to those which are necessary for legislative bodies to fulfil their constitutional functions. the inherent nature of parliamentary privilege means that its [2] cependant, les privilèges inhérents se limitent à ceux qui sont nécessaires pour que les organes légis- latifs puissent exercer leurs fonctions constitution- nelles. la nature inhérente du privilège parlementaire [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 699 existence and scope must be strictly anchored to its rationale. because courts cannot review the exer- cise of parliamentary privilege, even on canadian charter of rights and freedoms grounds, they must ensure that the protection provided by privilege does not exceed the purpose of this doctrine. this case illustrates the importance of taking a purposive approach when assessing parliamentary privilege claims. signifie que son existence et sa portée doivent être fermement ancrées dans sa raison d’être. puisque les tribunaux ne peuvent pas réviser l’exercice du pri- vilège parlementaire, même pour des motifs fondés sur la charte canadienne des droits et libertés, ils doivent faire en sorte que la protection que procure le privilège n’excède pas l’objet de cette doctrine. la présente affaire illustre l’importance d’adopter une démarche téléologique lors de l’appréciation des revendications de privilège parlementaire. [3] the appellant, the president of the national assembly of québec, submits that his decision to dismiss three security guards employed by the national assembly is protected by parliamentary privilege; an arbitrator therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the grievances brought by the respondent union to contest the dismissals. the president says that these employees’ dismissals are immune from external review because they fall within the scope of the parliamentary privilege over the management of employees and the privilege to exclude strangers from the national assembly. [3] l’appelant, le président de l’assemblée na- tionale du québec, soutient que sa décision de congédier trois gardiens de sécurité à l’emploi de l’assemblée nationale est protégée par le privilège parlementaire; par conséquent, un arbitre n’a pas compétence pour instruire les griefs déposés par le syndicat intimé afin de contester les congédiements. le président affirme que le congédiement de ces employés est à l’abri d’une révision externe puisqu’il est visé par le privilège parlementaire relatif à la gestion du personnel et par le privilège d’expulser des étrangers de l’assemblée nationale. [4] i conclude that the dismissals are not protected by parliamentary privilege. the president has failed to demonstrate that the management of the secu- rity guards is so closely and directly connected to the assembly’s constitutional functions that the assembly requires immunity from the applicable labour relations regime in order to fulfil these func- tions moreover, the act respecting the national assembly, cqlr, c a-231 (arna), provides that the employees of the national assembly are mem- bers of the civil service and, as such, they are gen- erally subject to a labour relations regime unless they are exempted by regulation under the public service act, cqlr, c f-311, s 64. there is cur- rently no regulatory exemption for the guards or any of the assembly’s other employees. the arna thus demonstrates that the assembly does not need exclusive, unreviewable authority over the man- agement of its security guards in order to perform its constitutional role with dignity and efficiency. further, while the exclusion of strangers is protected by parliamentary privilege, the assembly’s ability to carry out its constitutional mandate does not re- quire the scope of this privilege to extend so far as [4] je conclus que les congédiements ne sont pas protégés par le privilège parlementaire. le président n’a pas réussi à démontrer que la gestion des gar- diens de sécurité est si étroitement et directement liée aux fonctions constitutionnelles de l’assemblée que celle-ci a besoin d’être soustraite du régime de relations de travail applicable afin d’exercer ces fonctions. de plus, la loi sur l’assemblée nationale, rlrq, c a-231 (lan), prévoit que les employés de l’assemblée nationale font partie du personnel de la fonction publique, et à ce titre, ils sont généralement assujettis à un régime de relations de travail, à moins d’en être exemptés par règlement comme le prévoit l’art. 64 de la loi sur la fonction publique, rlrq, c f-311. actuellement, il n’existe aucune exemp- tion prévue par règlement pour les gardiens ou tout autre employé de l’assemblée. il ressort donc de la lan que l’assemblée n’a pas besoin d’un pouvoir exclusif et non susceptible de révision quant à la gestion de ses gardiens de sécurité pour exercer son rôle constitutionnel avec dignité et efficacité. de plus, bien que l’expulsion d’étrangers soit protégée par le privilège parlementaire, la capacité de l’as- semblée de s’acquitter de son mandat constitutionnel 700 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. to protect the decision to terminate employees who assist in excluding strangers. the president has not established that the immunity he claims is necessary. n’exige pas que la portée de ce privilège aille jusqu’à protéger la décision par laquelle sont congédiés des employés qui participent à l’expulsion des étrangers. le président n’a pas établi que l’immunité qu’il re- vendique est nécessaire. [5] for the reasons that follow, i would dismiss the appeal. [5] pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. ii background ii contexte [6] three security guards employed by the national assembly of québec were dismissed by the appel- lant, the president of the national assembly, for using their employer’s cameras to observe activ- ities inside nearby hotel rooms. their union, the respondent, grieved their termination before a labour arbitrator. [6] trois gardiens de sécurité au service de l’as- semblée nationale du québec ont été congédiés par l’appelant, le président de l’assemblée nationale, parce qu’ils ont utilisé des caméras de leur em- ployeur pour observer ce qui se passait à l’intérieur de chambres d’un hôtel voisin. leur syndicat, l’in- timé, a contesté les congédiements par voie de griefs devant un arbitre en droit du travail. [7] the president objected to the grievances on the basis that the decision to dismiss the guards was immune from review because it was protected by the parliamentary privilege over the management of em- ployees and the parliamentary privilege to exclude strangers from the national assembly. [7] le président s’est opposé aux griefs au motif que la décision de congédier les gardiens était à l’abri d’une révision parce qu’elle était protégée par le privilège parlementaire relatif à la gestion du personnel et par celui d’expulser des étrangers de l’assemblée nationale. a arbitral tribunal, 2014 qcta 696, [2014] az- a tribunal arbitral, 2014 qcta 696, [2014] az- 51104370 51104370 [8] the arbitrator, pierre a. fortin, found that the security guards’ dismissals were not protected by parliamentary privilege, and thus that the grievances could proceed. [8] l’arbitre, pierre  a fortin, a conclu que le congédiement des gardiens de sécurité n’était pas protégé par le privilège parlementaire, et que l’ins- truction des griefs pouvait donc avoir lieu. [9] he held that the scope of the privilege to ex- clude strangers from the national assembly did not protect the decision to terminate the security guards. he rejected the president’s argument that the privi- lege to exclude strangers includes the ability to dis- miss employees who implement this privilege. in any case, he found that the security guards do not have the authority to exclude strangers. if a security issue arises, they can signal the issue but cannot otherwise intervene. [9] il a déclaré que la portée du privilège d’expul- ser des étrangers de l’assemblée nationale ne pro- tégeait pas la décision de congédier les gardiens de sécurité. il a rejeté l’argument du président voulant que le privilège d’expulser des étrangers inclue la capacité de congédier des employés qui participent à la mise en œuvre de ce privilège. quoi qu’il en soit, il a conclu que les gardiens de sécurité n’avaient pas le pouvoir d’expulser des étrangers. si un problème de sécurité survient, ils peuvent le signaler, mais ils ne peuvent pas intervenir d’une autre manière. [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 701 [10] further, the arbitrator found that the guards’ dismissals fell outside the scope of the parliamentary privilege over the management of employees. he noted that the verification and surveillance tasks per- formed by the guards are linked to maintaining the security of the national assembly. however, unlike other members of the security team, such as police officers and special constables, the guards cannot intervene when issues arise, do not perform acts that could affect proceedings, and are not in contact with members of the assembly. he concluded that the guards’ functions are not closely and directly con- nected to the assembly’s constitutional functions. as such, their management was not protected by parliamentary privilege. [10] de plus, l’arbitre a conclu que le congédie- ment des gardiens n’était pas visé par le privilège parlementaire relatif à la gestion du personnel. il a souligné que les tâches de vérification et de surveil- lance exercées par les gardiens sont liées au maintien de la sécurité à l’assemblée nationale. cependant, contrairement à d’autres membres de l’équipe qui as- sure la sécurité, comme les policiers et les constables spéciaux, les gardiens ne peuvent pas intervenir en cas de problème de sécurité, ne peuvent pas accom- plir d’actes susceptibles d’avoir une incidence sur le déroulement des travaux et ne sont pas en contact avec les membres de l’assemblée. il a conclu que les fonctions des gardiens ne sont pas étroitement et di- rectement reliées aux fonctions constitutionnelles de l’assemblée. par conséquent, la gestion de ceux-ci n’était pas protégée par le privilège parlementaire. b quebec superior court, 2015 qccs 883 b cour supérieure du québec, 2015 qccs 883 (le (bolduc j.) juge bolduc) [11] bolduc j. allowed the president’s application for judicial review and held that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to decide the grievances. [12] although he agreed with the arbitrator’s reasoning with regards to the privilege to exclude strangers, he found that the decision to dismiss the security guards was protected from review by the privilege over the management of employees. [13] the reviewing judge concluded that the ar- bitrator erred in his assessment of the evidence and gave too little weight to the tasks performed by the guards. he found that the guards are essential to ensuring the security of the parliamentary precinct because they supervise and verify the identity of visitors, and are present in the public gallery dur- ing question period therefore, he held that the guards’ duties are closely and directly connected to the national assembly’s legislative and deliberative functions. decisions about their management are protected by parliamentary privilege and, as such, are not subject to external review. [11] le juge bolduc a accueilli la demande de révision judiciaire présentée par le président et a conclu que l’arbitre n’avait pas compétence pour trancher les griefs. [12] même s’il était d’accord avec le raisonnement de l’arbitre en ce qui a trait au privilège d’expulser des étrangers, il a conclu que la décision de congé- dier les gardiens de sécurité n’était pas susceptible de révision en raison du privilège relatif à la gestion du personnel. [13] le juge saisi de la demande de révision judi- ciaire a conclu que l’arbitre avait commis une erreur dans son appréciation de la preuve et qu’il n’avait pas accordé suffisamment d’importance aux tâches exé- cutées par les gardiens. selon lui, les gardiens sont essentiels pour assurer la sécurité de l’enceinte par- lementaire, puisqu’ils effectuent de la surveillance, vérifient l’identité des visiteurs et sont présents à la tribune du public pendant la période de questions. en conséquence, il a conclu que les tâches des gardiens sont étroitement et directement reliées aux fonctions législatives et délibératives de l’assemblée natio- nale. les décisions relatives à la gestion de ceux-ci sont protégées par le privilège parlementaire, et ne peuvent donc pas faire l’objet d’une révision externe. 702 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. c quebec court of appeal, 2017 qcca 271, 20 admin. lr (6th) 93 (chamberland and bélan- ger jja,. morin ja dissenting) c cour d’appel du québec, 2017 qcca 271 (les juges chamberland et bélanger, le juge morin, dissident) [14] the majority of the court of appeal allowed the union’s appeal. bélanger ja, writing for the ma- jority, held that the arbitrator had correctly concluded that the dismissals of the security guards were not protected by parliamentary privilege. the majority agreed with the arbitrator that the guards do not have the power to exclude strangers. furthermore, the majority held that the privilege over the management of employees did not apply to the guards because their tasks are not closely and directly connected to the national assembly’s deliberative and legislative functions. the majority recognized that preserving the security of the assembly was of great impor- tance, and that the security guards play a significant role in this endeavour. however, it concluded that it was not necessary for the president to have unreview- able authority over the management of the guards in order to ensure the assembly’s work proceeds with efficiency and dignity. it added that the assembly has set out the parameters of the independence it requires to discharge its constitutional mandate in the arna, and that this statute does not limit the ability of the guards to grieve their dismissals. [14] les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont accueilli l’appel interjeté par le syndicat la juge bélanger, s’exprimant au nom des juges ma- joritaires, a statué que l’arbitre avait eu raison de conclure que le congédiement des gardiens de sécurité n’était pas protégé par le privilège parle- mentaire. les juges majoritaires ont convenu avec l’arbitre que les gardiens n’avaient pas le pouvoir d’expulser des étrangers. de plus, ils ont affirmé que le privilège relatif à la gestion du personnel ne s’appliquait pas aux gardiens puisque leurs tâches n’étaient pas étroitement et directement reliées aux fonctions délibératives et législatives de l’assem- blée nationale. les juges majoritaires ont reconnu que le maintien de la sécurité à l’assemblée était de la plus haute importance, et que les gardiens de sé- curité y contribuent de façon importante. cependant, selon eux, il n’était pas nécessaire que le président dispose d’un pouvoir non susceptible de révision à l’égard de la gestion des gardiens pour faire en sorte que l’assemblée puisse accomplir son tra- vail dignement et efficacement. ils ont ajouté que l’assemblée a établi dans la lan les paramètres de l’indépendance dont elle a besoin pour s’acquitter de son mandat constitutionnel, et que cette loi ne limite pas la capacité des gardiens de contester leur congédiement au moyen de griefs. [15] morin ja, dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal. in his view, the termination of the security guards fell within the scope of the privilege over the management of employees. he reasoned that the guards provide front- line security services, without which the assembly could not carry out its constitu- tional mandate with dignity and efficiency. he also found that parliamentary privilege supersedes and cannot be limited by the arna. [15] le juge morin, dissident, aurait rejeté l’appel. à son avis, le congédiement des gardiens de sécurité était visé par le privilège relatif à la gestion du per- sonnel. il a expliqué que les gardiens fournissent des services de sécurité de première ligne, sans lesquels l’assemblée ne pourrait pas s’acquitter de son mandat constitutionnel dignement et efficacement. il a aussi conclu que le privilège parlementaire a préséance sur la lan et qu’il ne peut être limité par celle-ci. iii issues iii questions [16] the issue in this appeal is whether the ar- bitrator can decide the grievances, or whether the dismissals of the security guards are protected by parliamentary privilege the parties have asked [16] la question en litige dans le présent pourvoi est celle de savoir si l’arbitre peut trancher les griefs, ou si le congédiement des gardiens de sécurité est protégé par le privilège parlementaire. les parties ont [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 703 this court to determine: (1) whether the decision to dismiss the guards is protected by a parliamentary privilege over the management of employees; and (2) whether it is protected by the parliamentary priv- ilege to exclude strangers. as i shall explain, i would answer that it is not. i agree with the arbitrator and the majority of the quebec court of appeal that this decision is not subject to parliamentary privilege. demandé à la cour de décider : (1) si la décision par laquelle les gardiens ont été congédiés est protégée par le privilège parlementaire relatif à la gestion du personnel; et (2) si cette décision est protégée par le privilège parlementaire d’expulser des étrangers. comme je l’expliquerai, je répondrais par la négative. je conviens avec l’arbitre et les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel du québec que cette décision n’est pas visée par le privilège parlementaire. iv analysis iv analyse [17] as a preliminary point, the applicable standard of review in this case is correctness. the majority reasons of the court of appeal below were written without the benefit of our court’s reasons in canada (canadian human rights commission) v. canada (attorney general), 2018 scc 31, [2018] 2 scr. 230 (chrc). it suffices to state that the existence and scope of parliamentary privilege is a question of central importance to the legal system and out- side the expertise of the arbitrator (dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, at para. 60; chrc, at paras. 28 and 42). labour arbi- trators do not have specialized expertise in relation to parliamentary privilege. moreover, while this appeal involves only the national assembly of québec, the conclusions regarding parliamentary privilege will affect all other legislative bodies. [17] tout d’abord, la norme de contrôle applicable dans la présente affaire est celle de la décision cor- recte. les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont rédigé leurs motifs sans bénéficier des motifs de la cour dans canada (commission canadienne des droits de la personne) c. canada (procureur géné- ral), 2018 csc 31, [2018] 2 rcs 230 (chrc). il suffit de dire que l’existence et la portée du pri- vilège parlementaire est une question qui revêt une importance capitale pour le système juridique mais qui est étrangère au domaine d’expertise de l’arbitre (dunsmuir c nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, par. 60; chrc, par. 28 et 42). les arbitres en droit du travail ne possèdent pas d’ex- pertise spécialisée quant au privilège parlementaire. de plus, bien que le présent pourvoi ne concerne que l’assemblée nationale du québec, les conclusions relatives au privilège parlementaire toucheront tous les autres organes législatifs. a parliamentary privilege: a purposive approach a privilège parlementaire : une interprétation té- léologique [18] legislative assemblies in canada, including provincial legislative assemblies, received “certain very moderate [parliamentary] privileges” through the common law as an inherent and necessary com- ponent of their legislative function, and by virtue of the preamble of the constitution act, 1867 (new brunswick broadcasting co. v. nova scotia (speaker of the house of assembly), [1993] 1 scr 319, at p. 377, citing r. m. dawson, the government of canada (5th ed. 1970), at p. 338; see also new brunswick broadcasting, at pp. 345 and 374-81; canada (house of commons) v. vaid, 2005 scc 30, [2005] 1 scr 667, at para. 29(3); j. p. j. maingot, [18] les assemblées législatives au canada, y com- pris les assemblées législatives provinciales, reçoivent [traduction] « certains privilèges [parlementaires] très restreints » en application de la common law, les- quels représentent des éléments inhérents et nécessaires à leur fonction législative, et en vertu du préambule de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 (new brunswick broadcasting co. c. nouvelle- écosse (président de l’assemblée législative), [1993] 1 rcs 319, p. 377, citant r m dawson,. the government of canada (5e éd. 1970), p. 338; voir également new brunswick broadcasting, p. 345 et 374- 381; canada (chambre des communes) c. vaid, 2005 csc 30, [2005] 1 rcs 667, 704 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. parliamentary immunity in canada (2016), at pp. 13 and 19). par. 29(3); j. p j maingot,. parliamentary immunity in canada (2016), p. 13 et 19). [19] parliamentary privilege is defined as “the sum of the privileges, immunities and powers enjoyed by the senate, the house of commons and provincial legislative assemblies, and by each member indi- vidually, without which they could not discharge their functions” (vaid, at para 29(2)). these privi- leges, immunities, and powers exceed those afforded to the general population (erskine may’s treatise on the law, privileges, proceedings and usage of parliament (24th ed. 2011), by m. jack, at p 203). therefore, parliamentary privilege “is an exemp- tion from some duty, burden, attendance or liability to which others are subject” (maingot, at p 13). decisions falling within the scope of parliamentary privilege cannot be reviewed by an external body, including a court (stockdale v. hansard (1839), 9 ad. & e. 1, 112 er 1112 (qb), at p. 1168; new brunswick broadcasting, at pp. 350 and 382-84; vaid, at para 29(9)). [20] many countries afford special protections to the legislative branch of government. for instance, numerous civil law and common law jurisdictions guarantee the immunity of elected representatives from liability for speech that relates to their legisla- tive work.1 legislative immunities ensure the proper functioning of a representative democracy. they cultivate a space in which the voices of the people, including those who hold potentially unpopular opin- ions, can be heard and considered.2 [19] le privilège parlementaire s’entend de la « somme des privilèges, immunités et pouvoirs dont jouissent le sénat, la chambre des communes et les assemblées législatives provinciales ainsi que les membres de chaque chambre individuellement, sans lesquels ils ne pourraient s’acquitter de leurs fonc- tions » (vaid, par 29(2)). ces privilèges, immunités et pouvoirs excèdent ceux dont jouit la population en gé- néral (erskine may’s treatise on the law, privileges, proceedings and usage of parliament (24e éd. 2011), par m. jack, p 203). en conséquence, le privilège parlementaire [traduction] « est une exemption d’une certaine obligation, charge, participation ou responsabilité à laquelle d’autres personnes sont as- sujetties » (maingot, p 13). les décisions qui sont visées par le privilège parlementaire ne peuvent être révisées par un organisme externe, ce qui comprend les tribunaux (stockdale c. hansard (1839), 9 ad. & e. 1, 112 er 1112 (br), p. 1168; new brunswick broadcasting, p. 350 et 382- 384; vaid, par 29(9)). [20] dans bien des pays, l’organe législatif du gouvernement jouit de protections particulières. par exemple, de nombreux pays de droit civil et de com- mon law garantissent l’immunité des représentants élus à l’égard de leurs propos qui se rapportent à leur travail législatif1. les immunités législatives assurent le bon fonctionnement d’une démocratie représenta- tive. elles permettent l’existence d’un espace où les voix de tous, y compris de ceux qui ont des opinions susceptibles d’être impopulaires, peuvent être enten- dues et prises en considération2. 1 see eg the united kingdom bill of rights (eng.), 1 will. & mar. sess. 2, c. 2, art. 9; the united states constitution, art. i, § 6(1); the constitution of france, art. 26; the constitution of india, arts. 105 and 194; the constitution of italy, art. 68; and new zealand (see eg. d. mcgee, parliamentary practice in new zealand (4th ed. 2017), by m. harris et al., at pp 722-24). 2 see eg. jerusalem v. austria, no. 26958/95, echr 2001-ii, at para. 36; r. s. mehta, “sir thomas’ blushes: protecting par- liamentary immunity in modern parliamentary democracies” (2012), 17 ehrlr 309, at pp. 309 and 318; république fran- çaise, sénat, direction de l’initiative parlementaire et des déléga- tions, l’immunité parlementaire, étude de législation comparée no 250 (june 2014) (online), at p. 8; council of europe, european commission for democracy through law (venice commission), report on the scope and lifting of parliamentary immunities, study no. 714/2013 (may 14, 2014) (online), at paras 36-37. 1 voir p ex le. bill of rights du royaume- uni, (angl.), 1 will. & mar. sess. 2, c. 2, art. 9; la constitution des états- unis, art. i, § 6(1); la constitution de la france, art. 26; la constitution de l’inde, art. 105 et 194; la constitution de l’italie, art. 68; et la nouvelle- zélande (voir p ex d mcgee,. parliamentary practice in new zealand (4e éd. 2017), par m. harris et autres, p. 722- 724). 2 voir p ex jerusalem c. autriche, no 26958/95, cedh 2001-ii, par. 36; r. s. mehta, « sir thomas’ blushes : protecting par- liamentary immunity in modern parliamentary democracies » (2012), 17 ehrlr 309, p. 309 et 318; république française, sénat, direction de l’initiative parlementaire et des délégations, l’immunité parlementaire, étude de législation comparée no 250 (juin 2014) (en ligne), p. 8; conseil de l’europe, commission eu- ropéenne pour la démocratie par le droit (commission de venise), rapport sur l’étendue et la levée des immunités parlementaires, étude no 714/2013 (14 mai 2014) (en ligne), par 36-37. [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 705 [21] legislative privileges also allow legislative bodies to fearlessly hold the executive branch of gov- ernment to account. they thus help preserve the sep- aration and balance of power between the different branches of government (see eg. gravel v. united states, 408 us 606 (1972), at p. 616; r. s. mehta, “sir thomas’ blushes: protecting parliamentary immunity in modern parliamentary democracies” (2012), 17 ehrlr 309, at p 309). [22] in the uk, the doctrine of parliamentary priv- ilege developed through the struggle of the house of commons for independence from the other branches of government (new brunswick broadcasting, at p. 344 and 379; p. doherty, “what is this ‘mysterious power’? an historical model of parliamentary priv- ilege in canada” (2017), 11 jppl 383, at p 390). historically, “the crown and the courts showed no hesitation to intrude into the sphere of the houses of parliament” (new brunswick broadcasting, at p 344). members of the house of commons were arrested by the sovereign if he disagreed with the members’ conduct or speech in parliament. mem- bers opposed these arrests, asserting that they were inconsistent with their privileges (canada, house of commons, house of commons procedure and practice (2nd ed. 2009), by a. o’brien and m. bosc, at p 64). parliamentary privilege was partly con- firmed in statute in the bill of rights (eng.), 1 will. & mar. sess. 2, c. 2 (new brunswick broadcasting, at p 345). article 9 states that “the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament”. however, parliamentary privilege in the uk extends beyond the protection of free speech (erskine may, at p 206). therefore, parlia- mentary privilege has played a particularly important role in guaranteeing the separation of powers in the uk. it ensures that democratically- elected members of the house of commons can voice their concerns and independently represent the interests of their constituents (see also uk,. house of lords, house of commons, joint committee on parliamentary privilege, parliamentary privilege: report of ses- sion 2013-14 (july 3, 2013), at p. 7; a v the united [21] les privilèges législatifs permettent aussi aux organes législatifs de demander sans crainte au pouvoir exécutif du gouvernement de rendre des comptes ils contribuent donc à maintenir la séparation et l’équilibre des pouvoirs entre les différentes branches du gouvernement (voir p ex. gravel c united states, 408  us  606 (1972), p. 616; r s. mehta, « sir thomas’ blushes : pro- tecting parliamentary immunity in modern par- liamentary democracies » (2012), 17 ehrlr. 309, p 309). [22] au royaume- uni, la doctrine du privilège parlementaire est ressortie de la lutte de la chambre des communes pour l’indépendance vis-à-vis des autres branches du gouvernement (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 344 et 379; p. doherty, « what is this “mysterious power”? an historical model of parliamentary privilege in canada » (2017), 11 jppl 383, p 390). historiquement, « la couronne et les tribunaux n’ont nullement hésité à s’immiscer dans le domaine des chambres du parlement » (new brunswick broadcasting, p 344). des députés de la chambre des communes étaient arrêtés par le souverain lorsque celui-ci était en désaccord avec leur comportement durant les débats de la chambre ou avec les paroles qu’ils avaient prononcées à ce moment. les députés se sont opposés à ces arres- tations en faisant valoir qu’elles étaient incom- patibles avec leurs privilèges (canada, chambre des communes, la procédure et les usages de la chambre des communes (2e éd. 2009), a. o’brien et m. bosc, p 64). le privilège parlementaire a été partiellement confirmé dans le bill of rights (angl.), 1689, 1 will. & mar. sess. 2, c. 2 (new brunswick broadcasting, p 345). l’article 9 de cette loi pré- voit que [traduction] « la liberté de parole et des débats ou travaux au parlement ne devrait être at- taquée ou contestée devant aucun tribunal ni ail- leurs qu’au parlement ». cependant, le privilège parlementaire au royaume- uni s’étend au- delà de la protection de la liberté de parole (erskine may, p 206). en conséquence, le privilège parlementaire a joué un rôle particulièrement important en assu- rant la séparation des pouvoirs au royaume- uni. grâce à lui, les députés démocratiquement élus de la chambre des communes peuvent exprimer leurs 706 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. kingdom, no. 35373/97, echr 2002-x, at paras. 66 and 77). in canada, parliamentary privilege is grounded [23] in the preamble of the constitution act, 1867, which provides canada with “a constitution similar in prin- ciple to that of the united kingdom”. it is an inher- ent and necessary component of the westminster model of parliamentary democracy. as in the uk, the inherent privileges of canadian legislative bod- ies are a means to preserve their independence and promote the workings of representative democracy. it is meant to enable the legislative branch and its members to proceed fearlessly and without inter- ference in discharging their constitutional role, that is, enacting legislation and acting as a check on executive power (new brunswick broadcasting, at p. 354; vaid, at paras. 21 and 41). it guarantees “an independent space for the citizens’ representatives to carry out their parliamentary functions; the freedom to debate and decide what laws should govern, and the unfettered ability to hold the executive branch of the state to account” (s. r. chaplin, “house of commons v. vaid: parliamentary privilege and the constitutional imperative of the independence of parliament” (2009), 2 jppl 153, at p 154). préoccupations et représenter de façon indépendante les intérêts de leurs électeurs (voir aussi r-u,. house of lords, house of commons, joint committee on parliamentary privilege, parliamentary privilege : report of session 2013-14 (3 juillet 2013), p. 7 (rap- port du comité conjoint britannique de 2013); a c. royaume- uni, no 35373/97, cedh 2002-x, par. 66 et 77). [23] au canada, le privilège parlementaire est fondé sur le préambule de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, qui confère au canada une «  constitu- tion reposant sur les mêmes principes que celle du royaume- uni ». il s’agit d’un élément fondamental et essentiel du modèle de démocratie parlementaire du parlement de westminster. comme au royaume- uni, les privilèges inhérents des organes législatifs canadiens constituent un moyen de préserver leur indépendance et de favoriser le fonctionnement des travaux de la démocratie représentative. ils visent à permettre à la branche législative et à ses membres de s’acquitter sans crainte et sans intervention externe de leur rôle constitutionnel, soit adopter des lois et agir comme contrepoids au pouvoir exécutif (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 354; vaid, par. 21 et 41). ces privilèges assurent l’existence d’un [traduc- tion] « espace indépendant pour les représentants des citoyens afin qu’ils puissent mener à bien leurs fonctions parlementaires; la liberté de débattre et de décider des lois qui s’appliqueront, et la capacité absolue de demander à la branche exécutive de l’état de rendre des comptes » (s r. chaplin, « house of commons v. vaid : parliamentary privilege and the constitutional imperative of the independence of parliament » (2009), 2 jppl 153, p 154). [24] when tethered to its purposes, parliamentary privilege is an important part of the public law of canada (see vaid, at para 29(3)). the insulation from external review that privilege provides is a key component of our constitutional structure and the law that governs it. judicial review of the ex- ercise of parliamentary privilege, even for charter compliance, would effectively nullify the necessary immunity this doctrine is meant to afford the legis- lature (new brunswick broadcasting, at pp. 350 and 382-84; vaid, at para 29(9)). however, while legisla- tive assemblies are not accountable to the courts for [24] lorsqu’il est mis en lien avec ses objets, le privilège parlementaire constitue un élément impor- tant du droit public du canada (voir vaid, par 29(3)). l’immunité contre une révision externe qu’assure le privilège est une composante importante de notre structure constitutionnelle et du droit qui la régit. la révision judiciaire de l’exercice du privilège parle- mentaire, même sur le plan de la conformité avec la charte, pourrait dans les faits annuler l’immunité nécessaire que cette doctrine vise à conférer à la législature (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 350 et 382- 384; vaid, par 29(9)). cependant, bien que les [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 707 the ways in which they exercise their parliamentary privileges, they remain accountable to the electorate (chaplin, at p 164). [25] yet, while the independence of the legislature is a necessary aspect of our constitutional structure and is wholly part of our law, so are its limits. the inherent nature of parliamentary privilege means that its existence and scope must be strictly anchored to its rationale. notably, it creates a sphere of decision- making immune from judicial oversight for compli- ance with the charter. it may also impede persons who are not members of the legislature from access- ing recourses available under ordinary law (vaid, at para 30). as this court explained in vaid, “[c]ourts are apt to look more closely at cases in which claims to privilege have an impact on persons outside the legislative assembly than at those which involve mat- ters entirely internal to the legislature” (para. 29(12); see also para 4). [26] the history of parliamentary privilege in the uk demonstrates the importance of defining its scope in accordance with its purpose. indeed, for a time after the passage of the uk. bill of rights of 1689, members of the house of commons sought to use the protection of privilege in their private lives (doherty, at p. 391; see also o’brien and bosc, at p. 65; stockdale, at pp 1116-17). such an appeal to privilege is improper as the protection sought does not help preserve the separation of powers and promote the proper functioning of representative democracy. the scope of parliamentary privilege in the uk has thus narrowed over time (canada, senate standing committee on rules, procedures, and the rights of parliament, a matter of privilege: a discussion paper on canadian parliamentary privilege in the 21st century (june 2015) (online), at pp. 6-7; o’brien and bosc, at p. 67; see also uk. joint committee report (2013), at p 8). assemblées législatives n’aient pas à répondre devant les tribunaux de la façon dont elles exercent leurs privilèges parlementaires, elles doivent en répondre devant l’électorat (chaplin, p 164). [25] toutefois, bien que l’indépendance de la législature soit un élément nécessaire de notre struc- ture constitutionnelle et qu’elle fasse partie inté- grante de notre droit, on peut dire la même chose de ses limites la nature inhérente du privilège parlementaire signifie que son existence et sa por- tée doivent être fermement ancrées dans sa raison d’être. en particulier, il fait en sorte qu’un domaine décisionnel est à l’abri d’un contrôle judiciaire au regard de sa conformité avec la charte il peut également priver des personnes non membres de la législature des réparations prévues par le droit commun (vaid, par.  30) comme l’a expliqué la cour dans vaid, « [l]es tribunaux peuvent examiner de plus près les affaires dans lesquelles la revendi- cation d’un privilège a des répercussions sur des personnes qui ne sont pas membres de l’assemblée législative en cause, que celles qui portent sur des questions purement internes  » (par.  29(12); voir aussi le par 4). [26] l’historique du privilège parlementaire au royaume- uni démontre qu’il est important de dé- finir sa portée conformément à son objet. en effet, pendant un certain temps après l’adoption du bill of rights au royaume- uni en 1689, les députés de la chambre des communes ont cherché à se prévaloir de la protection du privilège dans leur vie privée (doherty, p. 391; voir aussi o’brien et bosc, p. 65; stockdale, p. 1116- 1117). une telle utilisation du privilège est inadéquate puisque la protection solli- citée ne contribue pas au maintien de la séparation des pouvoirs et ne favorise pas le bon fonctionne- ment de la démocratie représentative. la portée du privilège parlementaire au royaume- uni s’est donc réduite au fil du temps (canada, sénat, comité per- manent du règlement, de la procédure et des droits du parlement, une question de privilège : document de travail sur le privilège parlementaire au canada au xxie siècle (juin 2015) (en ligne), p. 6-7; o’brien et bosc, p. 67; voir aussi le rapport du comité mixte britannique de 2013, p 8). 708 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. [27] thus, in canada, the scope of parliamentary privilege is delimited by the purposes it serves (see eg. vaid, at paras 41-46). it inheres to the nature and functions of legislative assemblies as a separate branch of government. the reach of inherent privi- lege extends only so far as is “necessary to protect legislators in the discharge of their legislative and deliberative functions, and the legislative assem- bly’s work in holding the government to account for the conduct of the country’s business” (vaid, at para. 41; see also new brunswick broadcasting, at pp 381-85). otherwise, it would unjustifiably trump other parts of the constitution. [28] where the privilege that is claimed could undermine the charter rights of people who are not members of the legislative assembly, a purposive approach helps to reconcile parliamentary privilege with the charter. neither the charter nor parlia- mentary privilege “prevails over the other” (harvey v new brunswick (attorney general), [1996] 2 scr 876, at para 69). they “enjo[y] the same constitutional weight and status” (vaid, at para. 34 (emphasis deleted)). accordingly, when conflicts between the charter and parliamentary privilege arise, “the proper approach is not to resolve the conflict by subordinating one principle to the other, but rather to attempt to reconcile them” (harvey, at para 69). no doubt it will sometimes be challenging to reconcile these two constitutional imperatives (see eg. c. robert and d. taylor, “then and now: necessity, the charter and parliamentary privilege in the provincial legislative assemblies of canada” (2012), 80 the table 17, at pp. 19 and 42-43; m-a. roy, “le parlement, les tribunaux et la charte cana- dienne des droits et libertés: vers un modèle de pri- vilège parlementaire adapté au xxie siècle” (2014), 55 c de d. 489, at pp. 512 and 521-22). in harvey, mclachlin j. sought to reconcile them by adopting a narrower interpretation of s. 3 of the charter so it was consistent with parliamentary privilege, and limiting the scope of the privilege at issue in light of the charter (paras. 70 and 74). a purposive ap- proach to parliamentary privilege recognizes the charter implications of parliamentary privilege. it strives to reconcile privilege and the charter by ensuring that the privilege is only as broad as is [27] en conséquence, au canada, la portée du privi- lège parlementaire est délimitée par les objectifs qu’il vise (voir p ex vaid, par 41-46). celui-ci est inhérent à la nature et aux fonctions des assemblées législatives en tant que branche distincte du gouvernement. le pri- vilège inhérent ne s’appliquera que dans la mesure où cela est « indispensable pour protéger les législateurs dans l’exécution de leurs fonctions législatives et dé- libératives et de la tâche de l’assemblée législative de demander des comptes au gouvernement relativement à la conduite des affaires du pays » (vaid, par. 41; voir aussi new brunswick broadcasting, p. 381- 385). autrement, il empiéterait de façon injustifiée sur d’autres parties de la constitution. [28] lorsque le privilège revendiqué pourrait por- ter atteinte aux droits que la charte garantit à des personnes qui ne sont pas membres de l’assemblée législative, une interprétation téléologique aide à concilier le privilège parlementaire avec la charte. ni la charte ni le privilège parlementaire « ne l’em- port[e] » sur l’autre (harvey c. nouveau- brunswick (procureur général), [1996] 2 rcs 876, par 69). ils ont « le même statut et le même poids constitu- tionnels » (vaid, par. 34 (italique omis)). en consé- quence, lorsque surviennent des conflits entre la charte et le privilège parlementaire, « il convient non pas de résoudre ces conflits en subordonnant un principe à l’autre, mais plutôt d’essayer de les conci- lier » (harvey, par 69). nul doute qu’il sera parfois difficile de concilier ces deux impératifs constitu- tionnels (voir p ex c robert et d. taylor, « then and now : necessity, the charter and parliamentary privilege in the provincial legislative assemblies of canada » (2012), 80 the table 17, p. 19 et 42-43; m-a roy, « le parlement, les tribunaux et la charte canadienne des droits et libertés : vers un modèle de privilège parlementaire adapté au xxie siècle » (2014), 55 c de d. 489, p. 512 et 521- 522). dans harvey, la juge mclachlin a tenté de les concilier en adoptant une interprétation plus étroite de l’art. 3 de la charte, de sorte qu’il soit compatible avec le privilège parlementaire, et en limitant la portée du privilège en cause à la lumière de la charte (par. 70 et 74). une interprétation téléologique du privilège parlementaire tient compte des incidences relatives à la charte du privilège parlementaire. elle vise à concilier le privilège et la charte en veillant à ce [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 709 necessary for the proper functioning of our consti- tutional democracy. que le privilège n’ait pas une portée plus large que nécessaire pour le bon fonctionnement de notre dé- mocratie constitutionnelle. in order to fall within the scope of parlia- [29] mentary privilege, the matter at issue must meet the necessity test: it must be “so closely and directly connected with the fulfilment by the assembly or its members of their functions as a legislative and deliberative body    that outside interference would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its members to do their work with dignity and efficiency” (vaid, at para 46). [29] pour être visée par le privilège parlementaire, la question en cause doit satisfaire au critère de la né- cessité : elle doit être « si étroitement et directement liée à l’exercice, par l’assemblée ou son membre, de leurs fonctions d’assemblée législative et délibérante [  ] qu’une intervention externe saperait l’autono- mie dont l’assemblée ou son membre ont besoin pour accomplir leur travail dignement et efficacement » (vaid, par 46). [30] the necessity test thus demands that the sphere of activity over which parliamentary privi- lege is claimed be more than merely connected to the legislative assembly’s functions. the immunity that is sought from the application of ordinary law must also be necessary to the assembly’s consti- tutional role. in other words, “[i]f a sphere of the legislative body’s activity could be left to be dealt with under the ordinary law of the land without interfering with the assembly’s ability to fulfill its constitutional functions, then immunity would be unnecessary and the claimed privilege would not exist” (vaid, at para 29(5)). [30] le critère de la nécessité exige donc que la sphère d’activité à l’égard de laquelle est revendi- qué le privilège parlementaire soit plus que simple- ment liée aux fonctions de l’assemblée législative. l’immunité qui est sollicitée à l’égard de l’applica- tion du droit commun doit aussi être nécessaire au rôle constitutionnel de l’assemblée. autrement dit, « [s]i une sphère d’activité de l’organe législatif pouvait relever du régime de droit commun du pays sans que cela nuise à la capacité de l’assemblée de s’acquitter de ses fonctions constitutionnelles, l’im- munité ne serait pas nécessaire et le privilège reven- diqué inexistant » (vaid, par 29(5)). [31] previously recognized categories of par- liamentary privilege serve as examples of matters meeting this requirement. take, for instance, the immunity of members of the legislative assembly for their speech insofar as it relates to their mandate, the legislative assembly’s autonomy in controlling its debates or proceedings, its “power to exclude strangers from proceedings”, and its authority to discipline its members as well as “non- members who interfere with the discharge of parliamentary duties” (vaid, at para 29(10)). that said, given its rationale, the necessity of a privilege must be assessed in the contemporary context. even if a certain area has historically been considered subject to parliamentary privilege, it may only continue to be so if it remains necessary to the independent functioning of our leg- islative bodies today (new brunswick broadcasting, at p. 387; see also vaid, at para 29(6)). [31] les catégories de privilège parlementaire qui ont déjà été reconnues servent d’exemples de questions qui satisfont à cette exigence. prenons, notamment, l’immunité des membres de l’assemblée législative quant à leurs propos se rapportant à leur mandat, l’autonomie de l’assemblée législative quant au contrôle sur ses débats ou travaux, son « pouvoir d’exclure les étrangers des débats » et son pouvoir disciplinaire à l’endroit de ses membres ainsi que des « non- membres qui s’ingèrent dans l’exercice des fonctions du parlement » (vaid, par 29(10)). cela dit, compte tenu de sa raison d’être, il faut établir si le privilège demeure nécessaire dans le contexte contemporain. même si un certain domaine a historiquement été considéré comme étant assujetti au privilège parlementaire, il continuera de l’être seulement s’il demeure, encore aujourd’hui, néces- saire au fonctionnement indépendant de nos organes législatifs (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 387; voir aussi vaid, par 29(6)). 710 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. [32] the party seeking to rely on the immunity from external review conferred by parliamentary privilege bears the burden of establishing its neces- sity. it must demonstrate that the scope of the pro- tection it claims is necessary in light of the purposes of parliamentary privilege. it is the role of the courts to determine whether a category of parliamentary privilege exists and to delimit its scope. though the courts “give considerable deference to [the legislative body’s] view of the scope of autonomy it considers necessary to fulfill its functions”, their role is none- theless to “ensure that a claim of privilege does not immunize from the ordinary law the consequences of conduct by parliament or its officers and employees that exceeds the necessary scope of the category of privilege” (vaid, at paras. 40 and 29(11)). but once the category and its scope are established, “it is for parliament, not the courts, to determine whether in a particular case the exercise of the privilege is nec- essary or appropriate” (vaid, at para. 29(9) (empha- sis in original); see also paras 47-48). admittedly, “[t]he distinction between defining the scope of a privilege, which is the function of the courts, and judging the appropriateness of its exercise, which is a matter for the legislative assembly, may sometimes be difficult to draw in practice” (vaid, at para 47). yet this distinction strikes a compromise between the fundamental purposes served by parliamentary privilege in our constitutional structure, and the need to ensure that the autonomy afforded through privi- lege does not belie its purposes (see new brunswick broadcasting, at pp. 348-50 and 382-84). [32] la partie qui invoque l’immunité contre une révision externe en application du privilège parle- mentaire a le fardeau d’en établir la nécessité. elle doit démontrer que la portée de la protection re- vendiquée est nécessaire à la lumière de l’objet du privilège parlementaire. il appartient aux tribunaux d’établir si une catégorie de privilège parlementaire existe et d’en délimiter la portée. bien que les tri- bunaux « feront certes preuve d’une grande retenue quant au degré d’autonomie dont [l’organe législatif] estime devoir bénéficier pour s’acquitter de ses fonc- tions », leur rôle consiste néanmoins à « s’assurer que la revendication d’un privilège ne permet pas au parlement, à ses représentants ou à ses employés de se soustraire au régime de droit commun en ce qui a trait aux conséquences de leurs actes lorsque leur conduite outrepasse la portée nécessaire de la catégorie de privilège en cause » (vaid, par. 40 et 29(11)). cependant, une fois que la catégorie et sa portée sont établies, « c’est au parlement, et non aux tribunaux, qu’il revient de déterminer si l’exercice de ce privilège est nécessaire ou approprié dans un cas particulier » (vaid, par. 29(9) (en italique dans l’original); voir aussi les par 47-48). certes, « il pourra être difficile dans certains cas d’établir une distinction entre le fait de définir l’étendue d’un pri- vilège, qui ressortit aux tribunaux, et celui d’évaluer l’opportunité de son exercice, qui ressortit à l’as- semblée législative » (vaid, par 47). toutefois, cette distinction établit un compromis entre les objectifs fondamentaux du privilège parlementaire dans notre structure constitutionnelle, et la nécessité de s’assu- rer que l’autonomie que confère le privilège ne soit pas contraire à ses objectifs (voir new brunswick broadcasting, p. 348- 350 et 382- 384). b parliamentary privilege over the management b le privilège parlementaire relatif à la gestion du of employees personnel [33] relying on statements in vaid, both par- ties acknowledge the existence of a parliamentary privilege over the management of some employ- ees. their disagreement concerns the scope of this privilege. the appellant president submits that the national assembly holds a privilege over the man- agement of the security guards because there is both a “sufficient” and “a close and direct” connection between the tasks they perform and the assembly’s [33] se fondant toutes deux sur des énoncés de l’arrêt vaid, les parties reconnaissent l’existence d’un privilège parlementaire relatif à la gestion de certains employés. elles sont toutefois en désaccord quant à la portée de ce privilège. le président appe- lant fait valoir que l’assemblée nationale jouit d’un privilège relativement à la gestion des gardiens de sécurité parce qu’il existe un lien tant « suffisant » qu’« étroit et direct » entre les tâches accomplies [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 711 constitutional functions. the security guards play a key role in ensuring security. they provide a first level of defence and are involved in 80 to 90 percent of the assembly’s security work. security promotes the effectiveness of the assembly’s activities. the respondent union argues that the tasks performed by the security guards are not sufficiently connected to constitutional functions of the assembly for their management to be subject to privilege. the security guards have no real power to intervene if an issue arises and primarily support the work of the special constables and police officers. in vaid, the speaker of the house of commons [34] asserted a sweeping privilege over the management of all employees of the house, which would have immunized the decision to dismiss his chauffeur from external review (para 52). the court noted that, if the privilege claimed by the speaker existed, its scope would include the management of “service employees (such as catering staff) who support mps in a general way, but play no role in the discharge of their constitutional functions” (para 47). it con- cluded that the appellants had failed to establish the existence of this broad privilege, which had not been shown to satisfy the necessity test (paras 75-76). par ces derniers et les fonctions constitutionnelles de l’assemblée. les gardiens de sécurité jouent un rôle important dans le maintien de la sécurité. ils constituent la première ligne de défense et participent au travail lié à la sécurité de l’assemblée à raison de 80 à 90 %; cette sécurité favorise l’efficacité des travaux de l’assemblée. le syndicat intimé soutient que les tâches exécutées par les gardiens de sécurité ne sont pas suffisamment liées aux fonctions consti- tutionnelles de l’assemblée pour que la gestion des gardiens soit assujettie au privilège parlementaire. les gardiens de sécurité n’ont aucun réel pouvoir d’intervention en cas de problème et ils sont princi- palement chargés d’appuyer les constables spéciaux et les policiers dans leurs fonctions. [34] dans vaid, le président de la chambre des communes a fait valoir l’existence d’un privilège général relatif à la gestion de tous les employés de la chambre, qui aurait eu pour effet de mettre la décision de congédier son chauffeur à l’abri de toute révision externe (par 52). la cour a souligné que si le privilège revendiqué par le président exis- tait, il viserait la gestion du « personnel de soutien (comme le personnel de la restauration) qui appuie les membres du parlement d’une manière générale, mais ne contribue aucunement à l’exercice de leurs fonctions constitutionnelles » (par 47). la cour a alors conclu que les appelants n’avaient pas réussi à établir l’existence de ce privilège général et à prou- ver que celui-ci satisfaisait au critère de la néces- sité (par 75-76). [35] although the court stated in vaid that privi- lege “no doubt    attaches to the house’s relations with some of its employees”, vaid itself does not establish the existence of any form of privilege over the management of employees (para. 75 (emphasis deleted); see also para 62). the court concluded that “[t]he definition of a more limited category of privi- lege    must await a case in which the question truly arises for a decision” (para. 101; see also para 76). notably, uk courts have not yet recognized the management of any parliamentary employees to be protected by privilege, and some authors suggest that “management functions relating to the provision of services in either house are only exceptionally subject to privilege” (vaid, at para. 61 (emphasis [35] bien que la cour ait affirmé dans vaid qu’il ne faisait aucun doute que « le privilège protège les relations entre la chambre et certains de ses em- ployés », cet arrêt lui- même n’établit pas l’existence d’un quelconque privilège relatif à la gestion du personnel (par. 75 (italique omis); voir également le par 62). la cour a statué que « [p]our définir une catégorie de privilège parlementaire plus res- treinte, [  ] il faudra attendre que la question se pose véritablement dans le cadre d’un autre pourvoi » (par. 101; voir également le par 76). il convient de souligner le fait que les tribunaux du royaume- uni n’ont toujours pas reconnu la gestion de l’ensemble des employés du parlement comme étant protégée par le privilège parlementaire, et certains auteurs 712 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. deleted), citing uk,. joint committee on parliamen- tary privilege, vol. 1, report and proceedings of the committee (1999), at para. 248; see also g. f. lock, “labour law, parliamentary staff and parliamentary privilege” (1983), 12 indus. lj 28, at p. 29; erskine may, at p 240). [36] thus, vaid did not determine whether a parlia- mentary privilege over the management of some em- ployees exists. as in vaid, we do not need to decide whether this privilege exists, as the management of the security guards — including their dismissals — would fall beyond the scope of any such privilege. as i shall explain, the tasks performed by the guards are important, but subjecting their management to ordinary law would not hamper the autonomy which the national assembly requires to discharge its con- stitutional mandate. [37] the present case highlights the difficulty with trying to recognize a category of privilege that in- cludes all aspects of the management of a group of employees and decisions with regards to all functions these employees perform (see e. fox- decent, “par- liamentary privilege, rule of law and the charter after the vaid case” (2007), 30:3 can. parl. rev. 27, at p 31). the requirements of the necessity test may be more easily fulfilled where the scope of autonomy that is claimed pertains to control and oversight over certain functions performed by some parliamentary employees, or certain aspects of their employment relationship. that said, the parties have not framed this case in that way. the president asserts a par- liamentary privilege over the management of the security guards as a category of employees. this privilege would immunize not only their dismissals, but all of their employment conditions (from salary to seniority) from review on any grounds. indiquent que les [traduction] « fonctions de ges- tion, pour ce qui est de la fourniture de services dans l’une ou l’autre chambre, ne sont qu’exception- nellement assujetties au privilège » (vaid, par. 61 (soulignement omis), citant r-u,. joint committee on parliamentary privilege, vol. 1, report and pro- ceedings of the committee (1999) (rapport du comité mixte britannique de 1999), par. 248; voir également g f lock, « labour law, parliamentary staff and parliamentary privilege » (1983), 12 indus. lj 28, p. 29; erskine may, p 240). [36] c’est donc dire que l’arrêt vaid n’a pas tran- ché la question de savoir s’il existe un privilège par- lementaire relatif à la gestion de certains employés. comme dans vaid, il n’est pas nécessaire en l’espèce de décider si un tel privilège existe ou non puisque la gestion des gardiens de sécurité — y compris leur congédiement — y échapperait comme je l’ex- pliquerai plus loin, les tâches accomplies par les gardiens sont importantes, mais assujettir la gestion de ces derniers au droit commun ne priverait pas l’assemblée nationale de l’autonomie dont elle a be- soin pour s’acquitter de son mandat constitutionnel. [37] la présente affaire fait ressortir les difficultés liées au fait de tenter de reconnaître une catégorie de privilège qui englobe tous les aspects de la gestion d’un groupe d’employés et les décisions relatives à toutes les fonctions qu’exercent ces employés (voir e. fox- decent, « le privilège parlementaire, la pri- mauté du droit et la charte après l’affaire vaid » (2007), 30:3 rev. parl. can. 29, p 33). il pourrait être plus facile de satisfaire aux exigences du critère de la nécessité lorsque la portée de l’autonomie réclamée a trait au contrôle et à la supervision de certaines fonctions exercées par des employés du parlement, ou de certains aspects de leur lien d’emploi. cela dit, les parties n’ont pas formulé l’espèce de cette façon. le président revendique l’existence d’un privilège parlementaire relatif à la gestion des gardiens de sécurité en tant que catégorie d’employés. ce privi- lège aurait pour effet de protéger non seulement leur congédiement de toute révision fondée sur quelque motif que ce soit, mais aussi l’ensemble de leurs conditions de travail (du salaire à l’ancienneté). [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 713 [38] the security of the national assembly is un- doubtedly important. an assembly cannot function without maintaining its security. as the president states, [translation] “a parliament cannot delib- erate without a secure setting” (af, at para 84). secure legislative precincts support an assembly in discharging its constitutional functions. [39] the tasks performed by the security guards support the national assembly in fulfilling its con- stitutional mandate. the arbitrator found that the tasks performed by the security guards include the surveillance of the national assembly’s buildings, controlling access to them, and verifying the identity of people inside them. thus, the security guards play a key role in protecting the national assembly from security threats. additionally, the guards are some- times stationed in the chamber and help maintain decorum. [40] however, many employees support legislative bodies in performing their constitutional functions. considered broadly, many staff play a role in ensur- ing that a legislative assembly can fulfil its mandate. but merely demonstrating that a category of employ- ees performs important tasks that promote the ability of the assembly to discharge its functions does not suffice to establish that decisions about their manage- ment must be protected by parliamentary privilege. [41] the close and direct connection between the tasks performed by the employees and the legislative assembly’s constitutional functions is only part of the equation. the necessity test also requires that the im- munity that is sought from the executive and judicial branches of government — here a privilege over the management of the security guards — be necessary, in that “outside interference would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its members to do their work with dignity and efficiency” (vaid, at para 46). [38] on ne saurait douter de l’importance de la sécurité à l’assemblée nationale. il est impossible pour une assemblée de fonctionner si sa sécurité n’est pas préservée. comme l’affirme le président, « un [p]arlement ne peut pas délibérer sans un cadre sécurisé » (ma, par 84). la sécurité de l’enceinte parlementaire permet à l’assemblée de s’acquitter de ses fonctions constitutionnelles. [39] les tâches accomplies par les gardiens de sécurité aident l’assemblée nationale à s’acquitter de son mandat constitutionnel. l’arbitre a conclu que ces tâches comprennent la surveillance des bâtiments de l’assemblée nationale, le contrôle de l’accès à ceux-ci et la vérification de l’identité des personnes qui s’y trouvent. par conséquent, les gardiens de sécurité jouent un rôle important dans la protection de l’assemblée nationale contre les menaces à la sécurité. de plus, les gardiens sont parfois postés dans la salle de l’assemblée nationale et aident à faire respecter le décorum. [40] toutefois, bon nombre d’employés appuient les organes législatifs dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions constitutionnelles. de façon générale, de nombreux membres du personnel contribuent à la réalisation du mandat de l’assemblée législative. or, il ne suffit pas de démontrer simplement qu’une catégorie d’em- ployés accomplit des tâches importantes qui contri- buent à la capacité de l’assemblée de s’acquitter de ses fonctions pour établir que les décisions relatives à la gestion de ces derniers doivent être protégées par le privilège parlementaire. [41] le lien étroit et direct entre les tâches ac- complies par les employés et les fonctions consti- tutionnelles de l’assemblée législative ne représente qu’une partie de l’équation. suivant le critère de la nécessité, l’immunité demandée relativement au pouvoir exécutif et au pouvoir judiciaire — en l’es- pèce, le privilège relatif à la gestion des gardiens de sécurité — doit également être nécessaire, de sorte qu’une « intervention externe saperait l’autonomie dont l’assemblée ou son membre ont besoin pour accomplir leur travail dignement et efficacement » (vaid, par 46). 714 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. [42] the necessity test is stringent because, as discussed above, parliamentary privilege has the potential to shield parliamentary decision- making from judicial oversight, including for charter com- pliance. here, the privilege sought affects employees who are not members of the national assembly. further, the privilege claimed by the appellant may undermine the right of the security guards to mean- ingfully associate in the pursuit of collective work- place goals, guaranteed under s. 2(d) of the charter (mounted police association of ontario v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 1, [2015] 1 scr 3, at para 67). it is thus particularly important to keep the purposes underlying privilege in mind in assess- ing whether the necessity test is met. the sphere of immunity that is sought must be necessary for the legislative body to have sufficient independence from the other branches of government in order to perform its constitutional functions. [42] comme il est expliqué précédemment, le cri- tère de la nécessité est rigoureux parce que le pri- vilège parlementaire est susceptible de protéger le processus décisionnel parlementaire de tout contrôle judiciaire, y compris le contrôle de la conformité à la charte. en l’espèce, le privilège revendiqué par l’ap- pelant vise des employés qui ne sont pas membres de l’assemblée nationale. de plus, il est susceptible de miner le droit des gardiens de sécurité de vérita- blement s’associer en vue de réaliser des objectifs collectifs relatifs à leurs conditions de travail, lequel est garanti par l’al. 2d) de la charte (association de la police montée de l’ontario c. canada (procureur général), 2015 csc 1, [2015] 1 rcs 3, par 67). ainsi, pour décider si le critère de la nécessité est respecté, il est particulièrement important de garder à l’esprit les objectifs qui sous- tendent le privilège parlementaire. l’immunité demandée doit être d’une portée qui est nécessaire afin que l’organe législatif en question soit suffisamment indépendant des autres branches du gouvernement pour être en mesure d’ac- complir ses fonctions constitutionnelles. [43] in short, the question we must answer in this case is this: is the management of the security guards “so closely and directly connected with the fulfilment by the assembly or its members of their functions as a legislative and deliberative body   . that outside interference would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its members to do their work with dignity and effi- ciency” (vaid, at para. 46)? in other words, does the national assembly require unreviewable authority over the management of security guards in order to maintain its “sovereignty as a legislative and deliber- ative assembly” (vaid, at para. 72 (emphasis added), citing the british joint committee report (1999), at para. 247)? [43] en somme, la question que soulève la présente affaire est la suivante : la gestion des gardiens de sécurité est- elle « si étroitement et directement liée à l’exercice, par l’assemblée ou son membre, de leurs fonctions d’assemblée législative et délibérante [  ] qu’une intervention externe saperait l’autonomie dont l’assemblée ou son membre ont besoin pour accomplir leur travail dignement et efficacement » (vaid, par. 46)? autrement dit, l’assemblée nationale doit- elle détenir un pouvoir non susceptible de révi- sion à l’égard de la gestion des gardiens de sécurité afin d’assurer sa [traduction] « souveraineté [  ] en sa qualité d’assemblée législative et délibérante » (vaid, par. 72 (je souligne), citant le rapport du co- mité mixte britannique de 1999, par. 247)? [44] i agree with the majority of the court of ap- peal that the president has failed to establish the necessity of the immunity it claims, that is, a par- liamentary privilege over the management of the security guards. admittedly, the guards perform some important tasks that are connected to the con- stitutional functions of the national assembly. they contribute to the security of the assembly and to maintaining order and decorum in the part of the [44] je souscris à l’opinion des juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel selon laquelle le président n’a pas réussi à prouver la nécessité de l’immunité qu’il réclame, soit le privilège parlementaire à l’égard de la gestion des gardiens de sécurité. il est vrai que les gardiens accomplissent des tâches importantes qui sont liées aux fonctions constitutionnelles de l’assemblée nationale. ils contribuent à la sécurité de l’assemblée et au respect de l’ordre et du décorum [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 715 assembly’s chamber that is accessible to the public during question period. that said, immunity from outside scrutiny in the general management of the security guards is not such that, without it, the as- sembly could not discharge its functions (vaid, at para 72). the management of the guards could be dealt with under ordinary law without impeding the as sembly’s security or its ability to legislate and deliberate (vaid, at para 29(5)). permitting the en- forcement of basic employment and labour protec- tions for the security guards would not undermine the independence required for the assembly to fulfil its mandate with dignity and efficiency. [45] of course, as the appellant suggests, order and decorum in the chamber is important to a legis- lative body’s ability to discharge its functions (new brunswick broadcasting, at p. 398; af, at paras. 84 and 106; transcript, at pp. 25-27 and 29). hence, it may be necessary, to maintain order in the national assembly’s chamber itself, for the president to have the absolute right to oversee certain functions ex- ercised by a given group of employees or certain aspects of their employment relationship. but it does not necessarily require the recognition of a broad privilege over their management. employees often perform diverse duties and many aspects of manag- ing their employment relationship would have no bearing on the protection of the assembly’s constitu- tional role. unreviewable authority over all functions and absolute power over all aspects of how this group of employees is managed is not necessary in light of the purpose of inherent legislative privileges. [46] the question of necessity can, therefore, be addressed without looking to the arna. however, consideration of the arna does not detract from the above analysis of the necessity test. while nothing in the legislation abrogates inherent parliamentary privilege, the arna does establish that, unless the office of the national assembly indicates otherwise dans la partie de la salle de l’assemblée, auquel le public a accès pendant la période de questions. cela dit, l’immunité contre toute révision externe de la gestion générale des gardiens de sécurité n’est pas telle que, sans elle, l’assemblée ne pourrait pas s’acquitter de ses fonctions (vaid, par 72). les ques- tions liées à la gestion des gardiens pourraient être réglées sous le régime de droit commun sans porter atteinte à la sécurité ou à la capacité de l’assemblée de s’acquitter de ses fonctions législatives et délibé- ratives (vaid, par 29(5)). permettre que les protec- tions habituellement conférées aux employés et aux travailleurs s’appliquent aux gardiens de sécurité ne nuirait pas à l’indépendance dont l’assemblée a besoin pour s’acquitter de son mandat dignement et efficacement. [45] comme l’affirme l’appelant, il va de soi qu’il est important de maintenir l’ordre et le décorum dans la salle de l’assemblée législative pour que l’organe législatif puisse s’acquitter de ses fonctions (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 398; ma, par. 84 et 106; transcription, p. 25-27 et 29). en conséquence, pour assurer le respect de l’ordre dans la salle de l’assemblée nationale, il pourrait s’avérer nécessaire que le président soit investi du pouvoir absolu de superviser certaines fonctions exercées par un groupe d’employés donné ou certains aspects de leur lien d’emploi. cependant, cela ne requiert pas néces- sairement que lui soit reconnu un vaste privilège à l’égard de la gestion de ces employés. les employés exécutent souvent des tâches variées et de nombreux aspects de la gestion de leur lien d’emploi n’auront aucun effet sur la protection du rôle constitutionnel de l’assemblée. compte tenu de l’objectif des pri- vilèges inhérents des législatures, une autorité non susceptible de révision sur l’ensemble des fonctions et un pouvoir absolu à l’égard de tous les aspects de la gestion de ce groupe d’employés ne sont pas nécessaires. [46] on peut donc se pencher sur la question de la nécessité sans examiner la lan. cependant, l’exa- men de la lan n’entrave pas l’analyse qui précède relativement au critère de la nécessité. bien qu’au- cune mesure législative ne supprime le privilège parlementaire inhérent, la lan établit, sauf indi- cation contraire dans un règlement du bureau de 716 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. by regulation, all of its employees are managed in accordance with general law. l’assemblée nationale, que les employés de cette dernière sont tous gérés conformément au droit com- mun. [47] section 110 of the arna reads: [47] l’article 110 de la lan prévoit ce qui suit : subject to this act, the [national] assembly shall con- tinue to be managed within the scope of the acts, regula- tions and rules applicable. sous réserve de la présente loi, la gestion de l’assem- blée [nationale] continue de s’exercer dans le cadre des lois, règlements et règles qui lui sont applicables. the office [of the national assembly] may, however, by regulation, derogate from the applicable acts, regula- tions and rules by specifically indicating the provisions derogated from and the provisions that are to apply in their place and stead. toutefois, le bureau [de l’assemblée nationale] peut, par règlement, déroger à ces lois, règlements et règles en indiquant précisément les dispositions auxquelles il est dérogé et les dispositions qui s’appliqueront en leur lieu et place. [48] section 120 para. 1 states: [48] le premier alinéa de l’art.  120 de la lan énonce ce qui suit : every member of the personnel of the assembly, except a casual employee, is a member of the personnel of the civil service, whether appointed under the public service act (chapter f-311) or by derogation by virtue of the second paragraph of section 110, unless, in the latter case, the office excludes him therefrom. tout membre du personnel de l’assemblée, à l’excep- tion d’un employé occasionnel, fait partie du personnel de la fonction publique, qu’il soit nommé en vertu de la loi sur la fonction publique (chapitre f-311) ou par dérogation en vertu du deuxième alinéa de l’article 110, à moins que, dans ce dernier cas, le bureau ne l’en exclue. [49] employees of the national assembly (except for casual employees) are members of the civil ser- vice (arna, s 120). unless they fall within one of the exceptions set out in s. 64 of the public service act, they are members of the respondent union. their working conditions are negotiated by the respondent and the conseil du trésor (public administration act, cqlr, c a-601, s. 36; arna, s 1102). [49] les employés de l’assemblée nationale (à l’exception des employés occasionnels) font partie du personnel de la fonction publique (lan, art 120). à moins de relever de l’une des exceptions prévues à l’art. 64 de la loi sur la fonction publique, ces employés sont membres du syndicat intimé. l’intimé négocie leurs conditions de travail avec le conseil du trésor (loi sur l’administration publique, rlrq, c a-601, art. 36; lan, art 1102). [50] the office of the national assembly, which is composed of the president, five government mem- bers, and four opposition members, has not exercised its rights under s. 110 of the arna to exclude the management of any of the assembly’s employees, including the security guards, from the applicable general law (see also arna, ss. 87 and 88). it could have done so if it believed that the assembly’s abil- ity to fulfil its constitutional functions required it to have exclusive control over the guards’ manage- ment. thus, as reflected in the arna, the assembly does not appear to view exclusive control over the [50] le bureau de l’assemblée nationale, composé du président, de cinq députés du parti gouverne- mental et de quatre députés de l’opposition, ne s’est pas prévalu du droit que lui confère l’art. 110 de la lan de soustraire la gestion des employés de l’as- semblée, y compris les gardiens de sécurité, à l’ap- plication du droit commun (voir également la lan, art. 87 et 88). il aurait pu le faire s’il avait été d’avis que l’assemblée, pour être en mesure de s’acquitter de ses fonctions constitutionnelles, devait avoir le contrôle exclusif à l’égard de la gestion des gar- diens. par conséquent, comme il ressort de la lan, [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq la juge karakatsanis 717 management of its security guards to be necessary to its autonomy. in short, even if a privilege over the man- [51] agement of some parliamentary employees exists, the management of the security guards would fall outside its scope. moreover, if the president had only claimed a parliamentary privilege over the dismissals of all security guards, i would still conclude that the necessity test was not met. despite the impor- tant functions performed by the security guards, the president has not shown that it requires the unreview- able authority to dismiss this category of employees in order for the assembly to be able to fulfil its con- stitutional duties with efficiency and dignity. l’assemblée ne semble pas percevoir le contrôle exclusif de la gestion des gardiens de sécurité comme étant nécessaire à son autonomie. [51] en bref, même s’il existait un privilège relatif à la gestion de certains employés du parlement, la gestion des gardiens de sécurité échapperait à sa portée. par ailleurs, même si le privilège parlemen- taire revendiqué par le président s’était limité au congédiement de tous les gardiens de sécurité, j’arri- verais néanmoins à la conclusion que le critère de la nécessité n’a pas été respecté. malgré l’importance des fonctions exercées par les gardiens de sécurité, le président n’a pas su prouver qu’il devait disposer du pouvoir non susceptible de révision de congédier des employés appartenant à cette catégorie pour que l’assemblée puisse s’acquitter de ses responsabilités constitutionnelles efficacement et dignement. c parliamentary privilege to exclude strangers c le privilège parlementaire d’expulser des étran- [52] the appellant submits that the security guards’ dismissals are also subject to the parliamentary priv- ilege to exclude strangers. before this court, he does not submit that the security guards are strangers to the national assembly. his argument is that this privilege includes the president’s right to determine who can implement it on his behalf. because the guards exercise the privilege to exclude strangers when they control access to and within the legislative assembly, the president’s decision to terminate their employment is protected from review. if arbitrators and courts were entitled to review the dismissals of the security guards, they could interfere with the president’s determination of who has delegated authority to exclude strangers and, by implication, interfere with the exercise of this parliamentary priv- ilege. gers [52] l’appelant prétend que le congédiement des gardiens de sécurité est également visé par le privi- lège parlementaire d’expulser des étrangers. il n’af- firme pas devant nous que les gardiens de sécurité sont des étrangers pour l’assemblée nationale. il fait plutôt valoir que ce privilège comprend le droit pour le président de décider qui peut l’exercer en son nom. puisque les gardiens de sécurité exercent le privilège d’expulser des étrangers lorsqu’ils contrôlent l’accès à l’assemblée législative et à l’intérieur de celle-ci, la décision du président de les congédier n’est pas susceptible de révision. autoriser les arbitres et les tribunaux à réviser le congédiement des gardiens de sécurité revient à leur permettre d’intervenir dans la décision du président à savoir qui peut exercer le pouvoir délégué d’expulser des étrangers et, en conséquence, d’intervenir dans l’exercice de ce pri- vilège parlementaire. [53] while the respondent does not dispute the existence of the parliamentary privilege to exclude strangers, it submits that this privilege does not apply to the decision to dismiss the security guards. the broad manner in which the president has construed this privilege overshoots its underlying purpose and [53] même si l’intimé ne nie pas l’existence du privilège parlementaire d’expulser des étrangers, il fait valoir que ce privilège ne s’applique pas à la dé- cision de congédier les gardiens de sécurité. la vaste interprétation que le président donne au privilège outrepasse l’objet fondamental de celui-ci et pourrait 718 chagnon v sfpq karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. could significantly affect the rights of people who are not members of the assembly. avoir des répercussions importantes sur les droits de personnes qui ne sont pas membres de l’assemblée. [54] the inherent privilege of legislative assem- blies in canada to exclude strangers from their proceedings and precincts has deep historic roots. the absolute right to eject strangers from parlia- ment has been upheld as a matter of privilege in the uk for centuries (new brunswick broadcasting, at pp. 385-87 and 389; erskine may, at pp 14-15). in canada, this privilege was recognized as early as 1904, in payson v. hubert (1904), 34 scr 400. the existence of this privilege was confirmed in new brunswick broadcasting, where this court found it necessary to ensure that elected representatives are able to effectively debate and carry out their legislative functions uninhibited and undisturbed (pp 387-88). the decision of a legislative assembly to remove or exclude strangers is thus immune from external review. [55] while the existence of the parliamentary privi- lege to exclude strangers is not in question, this court must apply the necessity test to determine whether its scope includes the dismissals of employees who implement it on the president’s behalf. the issue here is not whether the president has the power to delegate the exercise of the inherent parliamentary privilege to exclude strangers to the assembly’s employees. rather, it is whether the dismissals of employees who implement this privilege on the president’s be- half must be immune from external review for the assembly to be able to discharge its legislative man- date (see vaid, at para 56). [54] le privilège inhérent des assemblées légis- latives au canada leur permettant d’expulser des étrangers de leurs débats et de leur enceinte est pro- fondément ancré dans l’histoire. au royaume- uni, le droit absolu d’exclure des étrangers du parlement est reconnu depuis des siècles comme une question de privilège (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 385- 387 et 389; erskine may, p 14-15). au canada, ce privilège a été reconnu dès 1904, dans l’arrêt payson c. hubert (1904), 34 rcs 400. son existence a été confirmée dans l’arrêt new brunswick broadcasting, dans lequel la cour a conclu qu’il était nécessaire de veiller à ce que les représentants élus puissent débattre efficacement et s’acquitter de leurs fonc- tions législatives sans perturbation ou interruption (p. 387- 388). la décision d’une assemblée législative d’exclure ou d’expulser des étrangers est donc à l’abri de toute révision externe. [55] bien que l’existence du privilège parlemen- taire d’expulser des étrangers ne soit pas mise en doute, la cour doit appliquer le critère de la néces- sité pour établir si sa portée vise le congédiement d’employés qui l’exercent au nom du président. la question en l’espèce n’est pas de savoir si le pré- sident dispose du pouvoir de déléguer aux employés de l’assemblée l’exercice du privilège parlementaire inhérent d’expulser des étrangers. il s’agit plutôt d’établir si la décision de congédier des employés qui exercent ce privilège au nom du président doit être à l’abri de toute révision externe pour que l’as- semblée puisse s’acquitter de son mandat législatif (voir vaid, par 56). [56] i conclude that it is not necessary to a leg- islative assembly’s ability to perform its constitu- tional functions that the scope of its privilege to exclude strangers be drawn so broadly as to include the decision to dismiss employees who implement this privilege. this unnecessary sphere of immunity would impact persons who are not members of the legislative assembly, and undermine their access to the labour regime negotiated in accordance with their s. 2(d) charter rights. the appellant has not shown that the application of general labour law [56] j’arrive à la conclusion que, pour qu’une assemblée législative puisse exercer ses fonctions constitutionnelles, il n’est pas nécessaire que son privilège d’expulser des étrangers soit défini large- ment au point d’inclure la décision de congédier des employés qui exercent ce privilège. accorder pareille portée inutile à l’immunité aurait une incidence sur des personnes qui ne sont pas membres de l’assem- blée législative et minerait leur accès au régime de relations de travail négocié conformément aux droits que leur garantit l’al. 2d) de la charte. l’appelant [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq le juge rowe 719 to employees who implement this privilege would jeopardize the autonomy, dignity, and efficiency re- quired for the fulfilment of the assembly’s legislative mandate (see vaid, at para 29(5)). it is true that allowing the union to grieve the dismissals of these employees may delay the finality of these decisions. yet these delays would not impede the assembly’s legislative activities. n’a pas démontré que l’application du droit géné- ral du travail à l’égard d’employés qui exercent le privilège en cause mettrait en péril l’autonomie, la dignité et l’efficacité dont l’assemblée a besoin pour s’acquitter de son mandat législatif (vaid, par 29(5)). il est vrai que le fait de permettre au syndicat de contester par voie de griefs le congédiement de ces employés risque d’occasionner des délais quant au caractère définitif de ces décisions. toutefois, ces délais n’entraveraient pas les activités législatives de l’assemblée. [57] the privilege to exclude strangers does not protect the decision to dismiss employees who ex- ercise this privilege from review. [57] le privilège d’expulser des étrangers ne pro- tège pas d’une révision la décision de congédier les employés qui l’exercent. v conclusion v conclusion [58] obviously, the president is entitled to exercise his management rights and dismiss security guards for a just and sufficient cause. however, parliamen- tary privilege does not insulate the president’s deci- sion from review under the labour regime to which the security guards are subject pursuant to the arna and the public service act. i would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs throughout. as a result, the decision of the labour arbitrator stands. [58] il va de soi que le président est autorisé à exercer ses droits de gestion et à congédier les gar- diens de sécurité pour une cause juste et suffisante. toutefois, le privilège parlementaire ne protège pas la décision du président d’une révision dans le cadre du régime de relations de travail auquel les gardiens de sécurité sont assujettis suivant la lan et la loi sur la fonction publique. je suis donc d’avis de re- jeter le pourvoi avec dépens dans toutes les cours. en conséquence, la décision de l’arbitre en droit du travail est maintenue. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par rowe j. — i overview le juge rowe — i aperçu [59] i accept justice karakatsanis’ statement of the facts, her summary of the judgments below and her conclusion as to the standard of review. i also concur with her in the result, albeit for different reasons. in my view, whatever the scope of parliamentary priv- ilege for management of employees, the national assembly of québec’s governing statute, the act respecting the national assembly, cqlr, c a-231 (“arna”), resolves this case. when a legislative body subjects an aspect of privilege to the operation of statute, it is the provisions of the statute that gov- ern. while the relevant statutory provisions remain [59] je souscris à la description des faits de la juge karakatsanis, à son résumé des jugements des instances inférieures ainsi qu’à sa conclusion sur la norme de contrôle. je souscris également au résultat auquel elle arrive, bien que ce soit pour des mo- tifs différents. à mon avis, quelle que soit la portée du privilège parlementaire relatif à la gestion du personnel, la loi qui régit l’assemblée nationale du québec, soit la loi sur l’assemblée nationale, rlrq, c a-231 (« lan »), résout le litige. lors- qu’un corps législatif assujettit un aspect du privilège à l’application d’une loi, ce sont les dispositions de 720 chagnon v sfpq rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. operative, a legislative body cannot reassert privilege so as to do an end- run around an enactment whose very purpose is to govern the legislature’s operations. thus, for the reasons that follow, i would dismiss the appeal and remit the matter to the grievance arbitra- tor for a determination on the merits. la loi qui s’appliquent. pendant que les dispositions législatives pertinentes sont en vigueur, le corps lé- gislatif ne peut pas se prévaloir du privilège pour contourner une loi dont l’objet même est de régir le fonctionnement de la législature. ainsi, pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de rejeter l’appel et de renvoyer l’affaire à l’arbitre de grief pour qu’il se prononce sur le fond du dossier. ii analysis ii analyse a preliminary question a question préliminaire [60] the power of provincial legislatures to de- fine their privileges was recognized by the judicial committee of the privy council which held that, by means of s. 92(1), “the british north america act itself confers the power (if it did not already exist) to pass acts for defining the powers and privileges of the provincial legislature” (fielding v. thomas, [1896] ac 600, at p 610). the constitution act, 1982 repealed s. 92(1) of the british north america act, 1867 (when it was renamed the constitution act, 1867), which had provided the legislature of a province with authority to amend “the constitution of [a] province”. this was replaced by s. 45 of the constitution act, 1982, to somewhat similar effect. it would seem to follow that what provincial legisla- tures could formerly do under s. 92(1) they can now do under s. 45, including defining their privileges. [60] le comité judiciaire du conseil privé a re- connu le pouvoir des législatures de définir leurs privilèges lorsqu’il a jugé que le par. 92(1) de [tra- duction] « l’acte de l’amérique du nord britan nique lui- même confère la compétence (si elle n’existait pas déjà) d’adopter des lois pour définir les pouvoirs et privilèges des législatures provinciales » (fielding c. thomas, [1896] ac 600, p 610). la loi constitu- tionnelle de 1982 a abrogé le par. 92(1) de l’acte de l’amérique du nord britannique, 1867 (lorsqu’il a été renommé la loi constitutionnelle de 1867), et ce paragraphe avait conféré à chaque législature le pou- voir de modifier « la constitution de la province ». il a été remplacé par l’art. 45 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982, qui confère pour ainsi dire le même pouvoir. il semblerait donc que les législatures peuvent dé- sormais faire en vertu de l’art. 45 ce qu’elles étaient autorisées à faire en vertu du par. 92(1), y compris définir leurs privilèges. [61] the jurisprudence on this point, however, is not entirely clear. in new brunswick broadcasting co. v. nova scotia (speaker of the house of assem- bly), [1993] 1 scr 319, at p. 384, mclachlin j. held that parliamentary privileges “are part of the fundamental law of our land, and hence are con- stitutional”. sopinka j. commented that by rooting inherent parliamentary privileges in the preamble of the constitution act, 1867, “these privileges would arguably not be subject to provincial legislation and any change would require an amendment to the constitution of canada pursuant to s. 43, or indeed s. 38, of the constitution act, 1982” (new bruns- wick broadcasting, at p 396). for sopinka j., the consequence of mclachlin j.’s analysis is that the [61] or, la jurisprudence qui porte sur la question n’est pas totalement limpide. dans new brunswick broadcasting co. c. nouvelle- écosse (président de l’assemblée législative), [1993] 1 rcs 319, p. 384, la juge mclachlin a conclu que les privilèges parle- mentaires « font partie de notre droit fondamental et sont donc constitutionnels ». pour le juge sopinka, si les privilèges parlementaires inhérents tiraient leur origine du préambule de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, on pourrait soutenir qu’ils « ne sont pas as- sujettis aux lois de la province et ne pourraient être modifiés que par modification de la constitution du canada en vertu de l’art. 43, ou encore de l’art. 38, de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 » (new brunswick broadcasting, p 396). ainsi, pour le juge sopinka, [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq le juge rowe 721 provinces would no longer have the legislative pow- ers over privilege recognized in fielding. in obiter, i would be inclined to agree with [62] the view expressed by some commentators that s. 45 of the constitution act, 1982, as did s. 92(1) before it, includes the power to enact laws in relation to the privileges of a provincial legislature (see p. w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at pp. 1-16 and 4-34; h. brun, g. tremblay and e. brouillet, droit constitutionnel (6th ed. 2014), at p 326). this view is supported by comments made by this court which suggest that s. 45, as the suc- cessor to s. 92(1), covers the same subject matter (see opseu v. ontario (attorney general), [1987] 2 scr 2, at p. 33; reference re senate reform, 2014 scc 32, [2014] 1 scr 704, at paras 47-48). [63] this issue is not dealt with by the parties in this appeal; i refer to the issue as it may arise in the future, including if the national assembly or another provincial legislature seeks to amend its privileges. in the facts of this case, the management of em- ployees of the national assembly was dealt with by statute prior to patriation in 1982 (see legislature act, rsq 1964, c. 6, s 55). it seems clear to me that such an enactment in 1964 was authorized by s. 92(1) (see opseu, at p 33). l’analyse de la juge mclachlin avait pour effet que les provinces ne jouiraient plus des pouvoirs légis- latifs, reconnus dans fielding, quant aux privilèges parlementaires. [62] je remarque en obiter que je suis disposé à souscrire à l’opinion exprimée par certains auteurs selon laquelle l’art. 45 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982, comme le par. 92(1) avant lui, inclut le pou- voir d’adopter des lois relatives aux privilèges d’une assemblée législative provinciale (voir p w hogg,. constitutional law of canada (5e éd. suppl.), p. 1-16 et 4-34; h. brun, g. tremblay et e. brouillet, droit constitutionnel (6e éd. 2014), p 326). la cour a étayé ce point de vue en formulant des commen- taires qui suggèrent que l’art. 45, qui a succédé au par. 92(1), couvre le même sujet (voir sefpo c. ontario (procureur général), [1987] 2  rcs  2, p. 33; renvoi relatif à la réforme du sénat, 2014 csc 32, [2014] 1 rcs 704, par 47-48). [63] les parties n’ont pas traité de cette question dans le présent appel; j’en parle ici puisqu’elle pour- rait se poser dans le futur, notamment si l’assemblée nationale ou une autre législature souhaitait modifier ses privilèges. selon les faits de la présente cause, la gestion du personnel de l’assemblée nationale était régie par une loi avant le rapatriement de 1982 (voir la loi de la législature, srq 1964, c. 6, art 55). il me semble clair que l’adoption d’une telle loi en 1964 était autorisée par le par. 92(1) (voir sefpo, p 33). b parliamentary privilege and statutory enact- b le privilège parlementaire et les textes législatifs ments [64] as noted above, i agree with karakatsanis j. that the standard of review is correctness, both for the reasons she gives, and because the scope of par- liamentary privilege is a constitutional question. i would adopt the analysis set out by côté and brown jj. in paras. 86-88 of their reasons. [64] comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, je conviens avec la juge karakatsanis que la norme de contrôle est celle de la décision correcte, tant en raison des motifs qu’elle donne que du fait que la portée du privilège parlementaire est une question constitutionnelle. je ferais mienne l’analyse énoncée par les juges côté et brown aux par. 86-88 de leurs motifs. [65] parliamentary privilege is “one of the ways in which the fundamental constitutional separation of powers is respected” (canada (house of commons) v. vaid, 2005 scc 30, [2005] 1 scr 667, at para 21). [65] le privilège parlementaire est «  un des moyens qui permettent d’assurer le respect du prin- cipe fondamental de la séparation constitutionnelle des pouvoirs » (canada (chambre des communes) 722 chagnon v sfpq rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. it supports the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty to ensure that a legislature is safeguarded a due meas- ure of autonomy from the other two branches of the state, the executive and the judiciary. parliamentary privilege protects the operation of the legislature from outside interference, where such interference would impede the fulfilment of its constitutional role. as described in erskine may’s treatise on the law, privileges, proceedings and usage of parliament: parliamentary privilege is the sum of certain rights enjoyed by each house collectively as a constituent part of the high court of parliament; and by members of each house individually, without which they could not discharge their functions, and which exceed those possessed by other bodies or individuals. c. vaid, 2005 csc 30, [2005] 1 rcs 667, par 21). il permet l’exercice de la souveraineté parlementaire afin d’assurer à la législature une autonomie suffi- sante par rapport aux deux autres organes de l’état, soit les organes exécutif et judiciaire. le privilège parlementaire protège le fonctionnement de la légis- lature de toute ingérence extérieure qui l’empêcherait de s’acquitter pleinement du rôle qui lui est dévolu par la constitution. comme le décrit l’erskine may’s treatise on the law, privileges, proceedings and usage of parliament : [traduction] le privilège parlementaire est la somme de certains droits particuliers dont jouissent chaque chambre dans son ensemble en tant que composante de la haute cour du parlement, et les membres de chacune des chambres, individuellement, sans lesquels ils ne pour- raient s’acquitter de leurs fonctions, et qui excèdent ceux que possèdent d’autres organismes ou particuliers. ((24th ed. 2011), by m. jack, at p. 203) ((24e éd. 2011), par m. jack, p. 203) [66] parliamentary privilege should not, however, be invoked to bypass the application of a statute en- acted by the legislature to govern its own operation. in that regard, i endorse the comments of charles robert, now clerk of the house of commons: [66] par contre, la législature ne peut invoquer le privilège parlementaire pour éviter l’application d’une loi qu’elle a adoptée afin de régir son propre fonctionnement. à cet égard, je souscris aux com- mentaires de charles robert, maintenant greffier de la chambre des communes : the fundamental purpose of any parliamentary or leg- islative privilege is to provide protection against outside interference that is unwarranted and intrusive, or that would impede the legislative assembly in controlling its debates or proceedings. therefore, it seems unreasonable to invoke privilege to disable, and render meaningless, a law which the assembly itself adopted relating to its administrative operations. [traduction] les privilèges parlementaires ou légis- latifs servent essentiellement à protéger l’assemblée légis- lative de toute ingérence extérieure injustifiée et intrusive, ou qui l’empêcherait d’exercer un contrôle sur ses débats ou ses procédures. il semble donc déraisonnable d’invo- quer un tel privilège pour rendre inopérante, et dénuer de tout son sens, une loi portant sur son fonctionnement que l’assemblée a elle- même adoptée. (c. robert, “falling short: how a decision of the northwest territories court of appeal allowed a claim to privilege to trump statute law” (2011), 79 the table 19, at pp. 25-26) (c. robert, « falling short : how a decision of the northwest territories court of appeal allowed a claim to privilege to trump statute law » (2011), 79 the table 19, p. 25-26) in other words, expecting a legislature to comply with its own legislation cannot be regarded as an intrusion on the legislature’s privilege. it is not an impediment to the functioning of a legislature for it to comply with its own enactments. accordingly, when a legislature has set out in legislation how autrement dit, s’attendre à ce qu’une législature res- pecte sa propre législation ne peut être perçu comme une intrusion eu égard à son privilège. le fait qu’elle se conforme à ses propres textes législatifs ne consti- tue pas un obstacle à son fonctionnement. en consé- quence, lorsqu’une législature a prévu dans une loi [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq le juge rowe 723 something previously governed pursuant to privilege is to operate, the legislature no longer can rely on inherent privilege so as to bypass the statute. thus, i would distance myself from stephen j.’s views in bradlaugh v. gossett (1884), 12 qbd 271, at p. 278, to the effect that “the house of commons is not subject to the control of her majesty’s courts in its administration of that part of the statute- law which has relation to its own internal proceedings”. la façon dont doit être régie une question qui était antérieurement régie conformément au privilège, elle ne peut plus se fonder sur son privilège inhérent pour contourner la loi. ainsi, je me dissocie de l’opinion du juge stephen dans bradlaugh c. gossett (1884), 12  qbd  271, p.  278, selon qui [traduction] « la chambre des communes n’est pas assujettie au contrôle des tribunaux de sa majesté lorsqu’elle applique les dispositions législatives portant sur sa procédure interne ». [67] rather, this court has stated that the rela- tionship between statute and privilege is determined through ordinary principles of statutory interpre- tation this approach differs from the approach adopted at common law, the rule in duke of new- castle v morris (1870), lr  4  hl  661, which holds that privilege was not “struck at unless by express words in the statute” (p 668). this court has held that this presumption of non- displacement of privilege is “out of step with modern principles of statutory interpretation accepted in canada” (vaid, at para. 80; see also reference re the final report of the electoral boundaries commission, re, 2017 nsca 10, 411 dlr (4th) 271, at paras 116-19). [67] la cour a plutôt affirmé que la relation entre une loi et le privilège est définie en fonction des prin- cipes ordinaires d’interprétation législative. cette approche diffère de la règle adoptée en common law, soit celle énoncée dans duke of newcastle c. morris (1870), lr 4 hl 661, selon laquelle le privilège [traduction] « reste intact à moins qu’une loi ne le prévoie expressément » (p 668). la cour a statué que cette présomption portant que le privilège n’est pas écarté « va à l’encontre des principes contemporains d’interprétation des lois reconnus au canada » (vaid, par. 80; voir également reference re the final report of the electoral boundaries commission, re, 2017 nsca 10, 411 dlr (4th) 271, par. 116- 119). [68] notwithstanding this, professors brun, tremblay and brouillet have argued that [translation] “[a]lthough it was qualified in vaid    the rule of interpretation referred to here [the rule in duke of newcastle] can still apply in appropriate cases” (droit constitutionnel, at pp 328-29). the quebec court of appeal viewed ss. 110 and 120 of the arna as being such an appropriate case in association des juristes de l’état v. québec (procureur général), 2013 qcca 1900. relying on the comments of professors brun, tremblay and brouillet, it held that [translation] “sections 110 and 120 of the arna did not have the effect of implicitly abrogating the parliamentary privilege over the management of employees of the national assembly of québec” (para. 26 (canlii); see also paras 27-30) (see to a similar effect québec (procureur général) v. confédération des syndicats nationaux, 2011 qcca 1247, at para. 30 (canlii); michaud v. bissonnette, 2006 qcca 775, at para. 59 (canlii).) [68] en dépit de ce qui précède, les profes- seurs brun, tremblay et brouillet ont soutenu que « [m]ême si elle fut nuancée dans vaid, [  ] la règle d’interprétation ici évoquée [énoncée dans duke of newcastle] peut encore jouer dans les cas appro- priés » (droit constitutionnel, p. 328- 329). dans association des juristes de l’état c. québec (pro- cureur général), 2013 qcca 1900, la cour d’appel du québec a jugé que les art. 110 et 120 de la lan constituaient un de ces cas appropriés. en se fondant sur les commentaires des professeurs brun, tremblay et brouillet, elle a conclu que « les articles 110 et 120 de la lan n’ont pas eu pour effet d’abroger implicitement le privilège parlementaire de gestion du personnel de l’assemblée nationale du québec » (par. 26 (canlii); voir aussi les par 27-30) (dans le même ordre d’idées, voir québec (procureur géné- ral) c. confédération des syndicats nationaux, 2011 qcca 1247, [2011] rjdt 690, par. 30; michaud c. bissonnette, 2006 qcca 775, [2006] rjq 1552, par 59) 724 chagnon v sfpq rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. i am inclined to agree with professors brun, [69] tremblay and brouillet that the rule  in duke of newcastle can still operate in certain circumstances. such circumstances, however, do not arise in the face of the legislature’s organizing statute. the arna sets out the administrative structure through which the national assembly is to operate. to the extent that it is an enactment that “determine[s] the composi- tion, powers, authority, privileges and duties of the legislative [branch]” (opseu, at p. 39), it bears “on the operation of an organ of the government of the province” (attorney general of quebec v. blaikie, [1979] 2 scr 1016, at p. 1024), and is constitu- tional in nature within the meaning given in opseu, at p 40. further, the national assembly must be presumed to have had its inherent privileges in mind when enacting the arna. accordingly, i would not apply the rule in duke of newcastle requiring express language to derogate from privilege when dealing with the arna. [69] je suis porté à convenir avec les professeurs brun, tremblay et brouillet que la règle énoncée dans duke of newcastle peut encore s’appliquer dans certaines circonstances. cela dit, la loi qui régit le fonctionnement de la législature ne constitue pas un exemple de telles circonstances. la lan décrit la structure administrative de l’assemblée nationale sur laquelle repose son fonctionnement dans la mesure où il s’agit d’une loi qui « [d]étermine [  ] la composition, les pouvoirs, l’autorité, les privilèges et les fonctions [de l’]organ[e] législatif » (sefpo, p. 39), elle porte « sur le fonctionnement d’un or- gane du gouvernement de la province » (procureur général du québec c. blaikie, [1979] 2 rcs 1016, p. 1024) et est de nature constitutionnelle au sens de l’arrêt sefpo, p 40. en outre, il faut présumer que l’assemblée nationale tenait compte de ses pri- vilèges inhérents lorsqu’elle a adopté la lan. en conséquence, dans le cas de cette loi, je suis d’avis de ne pas appliquer la règle énoncée dans duke of newcastle qui exige que la dérogation au privilège soit expressément prévue dans la loi. c operation of the arna c application de la lan in the arna, the national assembly has de- [70] fined how the management of its employees is to be carried out. section 120 qualifies personnel of the national assembly as civil servants unless they are appointed by regulation derogating from the public service act, cqlr, c f-311, and excluded from its membership. this gives to all employees (save those so excluded) the same rights and obligations as members of the civil service. section 120 also vests in the secretary general the powers and responsi- bilities of a deputy minister for the purposes of the public service act. under that act, a deputy minister is responsible for management of the employees of the national assembly (public service act, s 37). sections 16 and 17 of the public service act grant a deputy minister the authority to discipline employ- ees, including through dismissal, for a contravention of the standards of ethics and discipline. [70] dans la lan, l’assemblée nationale a prévu la façon dont doit être géré son personnel. l’article 120 précise que les employés de l’assemblée nationale font partie du personnel de la fonction publique à moins qu’ils soient nommés par un règlement qui déroge à la loi sur la fonction publique, rlrq, c f-311, ou qu’ils en soient exclus. ainsi, tous les employés (sauf ceux qui sont exclus de cette façon) ont les mêmes droits et obligations que les membres de la fonction publique. l’article 120 confère éga- lement au secrétaire général les pouvoirs et les responsabilités que la loi sur la fonction publique attribue à un sous- ministre. en vertu de cette loi, le sous- ministre est responsable de la gestion du per- sonnel de l’assemblée nationale (loi sur la fonction publique, art 37). les articles 16 et 17 de la loi sur la fonction publique confèrent au sous- ministre le pouvoir d’imposer des mesures disciplinaires aux employés, y compris de les congédier, en cas de manquement aux normes d’éthique et de discipline. in this case, the letters of dismissal by the sec- [71] retary general dated july 17, 2012, are an exercise of [71] en l’espèce, les lettres de congédiement si- gnées par le secrétaire général le 17 juillet 2012 [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq le juge rowe 725 this power. the dismissals were based on breaches of the security guards’ obligations under the public service act and its regulation respecting ethics and discipline in the public service, cqlr, c f-311, r 3. the grievances that followed were brought by virtue of the rights of the guards pursuant to this leg- islative scheme. all of this follows from the choice made by the national assembly when it enacted s. 120 of the arna. [72] if the national assembly wants a group of employees to be removed from this scheme, it can do so through the derogation procedure referred to in s. 120 of the arna. the management of this group of employees would then no longer be subject to the same rules as those applicable to the civil service. privilege would again operate, provided that the employees fell within the scope of privilege. [73] as the derogation procedure under s. 120 has not been exercised with respect to the employees in question, i do not see by what authority the president of the national assembly can now reassert privilege as to the management of the guards. the president cannot rely on privilege to ignore the arna, and thereby insulate the secretary general’s decision to dismiss the guards from the scrutiny of the griev- ance arbitrator. the national assembly set out in the arna that the management of its employees is to be carried out under the public service employment scheme; it also provided the office of the national assembly a mechanism to exclude categories of employees from that scheme. it would be contrary to the decision of the national assembly set out in the arna for the president to exercise authority over the management of employees on a case by case basis, nominally in the exercise of privilege. accordingly, the grievance arbitrator did not err in determining that he could hear the grievances. constituent un exercice de ce pouvoir. les congé- diements étaient fondés sur des manquements aux obligations qui incombent aux gardiens de sécurité en application de la loi sur la fonction publique et du règlement sur l’éthique et la discipline dans la fonction publique, rlrq, c f-311, r 3. les griefs déposés par la suite étaient fondés sur les droits des gardiens au titre de ce régime législatif. tous ces faits découlent du choix qu’a fait l’assemblée nationale lorsqu’elle a adopté l’art. 120 de la lan. [72] si l’assemblée nationale souhaite qu’un groupe d’employés ne soient plus régis par ce ré- gime, elle peut se prévaloir de la procédure de déro- gation à laquelle fait référence l’art. 120 de la lan. la gestion de ce groupe d’employés ne serait donc plus régie par les mêmes règles que celles qui s’ap- pliquent aux employés de la fonction publique. le privilège s’appliquerait de nouveau, à condition que les employés soient visés par celui-ci. [73] comme la procédure de dérogation prévue à l’art. 120 n’a pas été appliquée à l’égard des em- ployés en cause, je ne vois pas en vertu de quel pou- voir le président de l’assemblée nationale pourrait maintenant invoquer le privilège en lien avec la ges- tion des gardiens de sécurité. le président ne peut pas se fonder sur le privilège pour ignorer la lan, et ainsi soustraire la décision du secrétaire général de congédier les gardiens à l’examen par l’arbitre de grief. l’assemblée nationale a prévu dans la lan que la gestion de son personnel serait régie par le régime applicable aux employés de la fonction pu- blique; elle a aussi prévu un mécanisme par lequel le bureau de l’assemblée nationale peut exclure des catégories d’employés de ce régime. il serait donc incompatible avec la décision de l’assemblée natio- nale énoncée dans la lan que le président exerce son pouvoir sur la gestion des employés au cas par cas, en théorie, en application du privilège. l’arbitre de grief n’a donc pas commis d’erreur lorsqu’il a jugé avoir compétence pour entendre les griefs. [74] i would add a final perspective. in my anal- ysis, i look to the arna and find there the basis to resolve the appeal. i do not address the extent of par- liamentary privilege; this is deliberate. in my view, one should have regard to constitutional questions [74] j’ajouterais un dernier point de vue. dans mon analyse, j’examine la lan et j’y trouve le moyen de résoudre l’appel. je n’aborde pas la portée du privilège parlementaire, et ce, de façon délibérée. à mon avis, il ne faut tenir compte des questions 726 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. only when necessary. better to decide matters, where one properly can, by reference to “the ordinary law”. parliamentary privilege, derived from centuries of conflict and diverse experience, should be circum- scribed with great caution and after careful reflec- tion. it is difficult sometimes to see the connections between what is necessary for the autonomy and proper functioning of the legislature and the extent of parliamentary privilege. the legislature is not like a department or a regulatory agency; it is the central pillar of representative democracy. profound defer- ence should be shown as to how it chooses to operate. constitutionnelles que lorsque cela est nécessaire. il vaut mieux, lorsque cela peut être fait à bon droit, trancher les questions selon le « droit commun ». la portée du privilège parlementaire, issu de siècles de conflits et d’expériences diverses, devrait être circonscrite avec une grande prudence et après mûre réflexion. il est parfois difficile de voir les liens entre ce qui est nécessaire pour l’autonomie et pour le bon fonctionnement de la législature et la portée du privilège parlementaire. la législature ne se compare pas à un ministère ou à un organisme de réglementa- tion; il s’agit du pilier fondamental de la démocratie représentative. une grande déférence s’impose quant à la façon dont elle choisit de fonctionner. iii conclusion iii conclusion i would dismiss the appeal. the grievance [75] arbitrator had jurisdiction to hear this matter on the merits. i would remit the matter back to him to do so. [75] je suis d’avis de rejeter l’appel. l’arbitre de grief avait compétence pour se prononcer sur le fond de la présente affaire. je suis d’avis de lui renvoyer l’affaire pour qu’il le fasse. english version of the reasons delivered by les motifs suivants ont été rendus par côté and brown jj. (dissenting) — les juges côté et brown (dissidents) — i. introduction i. introduction [76] on may  8, 1984, denis  lortie, a member of the armed forces, set in motion a plan to kill the members of the sovereignist government led by rené lévesque. three people were shot down in cold blood, and thirteen others were wounded in the parliament building where the national assembly of québec (“assembly”) sits. however, the actions of the sergeant-at- arms and the entire security staff undoubtedly saved the lives of many others. [77] the day after those tragic events, the premier of quebec gave a speech in the assembly to express his thoughts and honour the security staff, especially the sergeant-at- arms, the police officers and the security officers who had been on the front lines: [76] le 8 mai 1984, le militaire denis lortie met à exécution un plan visant à assassiner les dépu- tés du gouvernement souverainiste dirigé par rené lévesque. trois personnes sont froidement abattues et treize autres sont blessées à l’intérieur de l’hôtel du parlement où siège l’assemblée nationale du québec (« assemblée »). toutefois, l’intervention du sergent d’armes et de l’ensemble des employés de sécurité sauve, sans aucun doute, la vie de plusieurs autres personnes. [77] au lendemain des tragiques événements, le premier ministre du québec prononce un discours devant l’assemblée pour livrer ses états d’âme et ho- norer le personnel de sécurité, plus particulièrement le sergent d’armes, les policiers et les « gardiens constables » qui étaient en première ligne : [translation] mr. president, yesterday, which was an inconceivably tragic day and which those present in m le président, cette journée d’hier, qui était tra- gique jusqu’à l’inconcevable et qu’ont eu à subir tout [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 727 this parliament building especially had to endure, has taken a very heavy toll, of which we are unfortunately all too aware. first of all, i too would like — and i’m sure i speak for all of us, as well as for myself personally — to extend our deepest condolences to the families, friends and colleagues of camille lepage, georges boyer and roger lefrançois, the innocent victims of this unprecedented and senseless violence. i also want to offer our best wishes for a full and speedy recovery to all those who were injured, some of whom are still in hospital in serious condition. we had gotten to know these men and women, some of whom worked here at the national assembly for a long time, by interacting with them on a regular basis. they helped us do our work as members. they were among those who contribute daily to the proper functioning of the central institution of our democratic system. there is not a single person in this parliament, or in the government, of course, who does not feel affected by what happened to them and who does not join in the sorrow or worry felt by their loved ones. among these people in parliament, among the invol- untary players in this drama, as you just mentioned — but i think it can be said again; in fact, it will be repeated for a long time — was our sergeant-at- arms, mr. jalbert, who has been with us for a decade now. we were already well aware of his efficiency, tact and courteousness, and also his humour on occasion, but yesterday he showed us some truly heroic qualities. the word has been used, it is not too strong, and everyone is unanimous in recognizing it. through his presence of mind, his absolutely extraor- dinary composure, his sense of duty and responsibility, and a solicitude going beyond the normal performance of the job of protecting others, he changed the course of this incident. he no doubt averted an even greater tragedy. the national assembly is unanimous — as we saw just mo- ments ago — in saluting mr. jalbert’s exemplary courage and in thanking him on behalf of everyone for what he did for his fellow citizens. i am also certain that we will be unanimous in finding a more meaningful and lasting way to express our feelings for him soon. particulièrement ceux et celles qui étaient présents dans cet hôtel du parlement, se solde par un très lourd bilan que nous ne connaissons que trop hélas! étant assuré de m’exprimer en notre nom à tous, à mon tour, et en m’ex- primant également à titre personnel, je tiens tout d’abord à réitérer, moi aussi, nos plus sincères condoléances aux fa- milles, aux amis et aux collègues de mm. camille lepage, georges boyer et roger lefrançois qui sont les victimes innocentes de cette violence inouïe et insensée. je veux aussi assurer tous les blessés, dont certains sont encore dans un état sérieux à l’hôpital, de tous nos vœux pour un prompt et complet rétablissement. ces hommes et ces femmes, dont certains travaillaient ici à l’assemblée natio- nale depuis longtemps, nous avions appris à les connaître pour les avoir côtoyés régulièrement. ils nous aidaient à faire notre travail de député. ils étaient du nombre de celles et de ceux qui, quotidiennement, concourent au bon fonctionnement de l’institution centrale de notre régime démocratique. il n’y a personne dans ce parlement ni au gouvernement, bien sûr, qui ne se sente pas concerné par ce qui leur est arrivé et solidaire aussi de la tristesse ou encore de l’inquiétude qui affligent leurs proches. parmi ces gens du parlement, au nombre des acteurs involontaires de ce drame, comme vous venez de l’évo- quer — mais je crois qu’on peut le répéter; ce sera répété longtemps, d’ailleurs — il y a eu notre sergent d’armes, m. jalbert, qui est avec nous depuis une dizaine d’années maintenant. on lui connaissait déjà bien des qualités d’ef- ficacité, de tact, de courtoisie, d’humour aussi, à l’occa- sion, mais hier, il nous a révélé des qualités proprement héroïques. le mot a été employé, il n’est pas trop fort, et tout le monde est unanime à le reconnaître. par sa présence d’esprit, son sang- froid absolument extraordinaire, son sens du devoir et des responsabilités et un souci qui va au- delà de l’accomplissement normal de la tâche de la pro- tection d’autrui, il a fait dévier le cours de cet événement. il a sans doute évité que cela ne tourne encore davantage au tragique. l’assemblée nationale est unanime — on l’a vu, il y a quelques instants — pour saluer le courage exemplaire de m. jalbert et le remercier au nom de tous de ce qu’il a fait pour les siens. je suis sûr aussi que c’est unanimement que nous trouverons bientôt une façon plus marquante et plus durable de concrétiser nos sentiments à son endroit. i also note, as you did, mr. president, that among those who deserve our recognition as well for their bravery and efficiency, it is important to point out the remarkable work done by the regular officers and the tactical squad of the sûreté du québec as well as by the city’s police officers. it must also be recognized that, given the circumstances, the je souligne à mon tour, comme vous l’avez fait, m. le président, que parmi ceux qui méritent aussi notre re- connaissance pour leur bravoure et leur efficacité, il faut souligner le travail remarquable accompli par les agents réguliers et aussi par la brigade tactique de la sûreté du québec de même que par les policiers de la ville. on doit 728 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. assembly’s security officers did everything they could to carry out their duty, and we know how difficult and trying that must have been. reconnaître également que compte tenu des circonstances, les gardiens- constables de l’assemblée ont fait tout ce qu’ils pouvaient pour remplir leur devoir, et on sait à quel point cela a dû être difficile et éprouvant.   .   . this inevitably leads me for a moment to the issue that keeps coming back to haunt us each time a parliamentary institution is disrupted by acts of violence, namely the is- sue of security. it is clear — you said it yourself yesterday, mr. president — that no democratic parliament, at least as far as we are aware, has yet found a solution that is truly fail- safe, if it must at the same time remain democratic. but one thing is certain: while the lives of parliamentarians and the people around them are absolutely as invaluable as those of all other citizens, parliament, as the very symbol of democracy, must be able to count on having sufficient protection to fulfil its role with the greatest possible se- renity. clearly, this balance is never an easy one to strike. in fact, this is simply a reminder of our fundamental duty to build a society that is increasingly — and ever more firmly — based on respect for others and on non- violence. i say “build” because it has already been said and it still remains true. real democracy can never be taken for granted; it must be earned and, in a way, re- earned and strengthened every day; it must also be respected. let us hope, in any case, that yesterday has made us more aware of the futility, absurdity and inhumanity of violence as a means of expression in a civilized society. [emphasis added.] ce qui m’amène forcément un seul instant à la ques- tion qui revient toujours de façon obsédante, chaque fois que l’institution parlementaire se voit perturbée par des actes violents, soit la question de la sécurité. il est évident — vous l’avez dit vous- même hier, m le pré- sident — que dans aucun parlement démocratique, de ceux que l’on connaisse en tout cas, on n’a trouvé jusqu’à présent la recette qui soit vraiment à toute épreuve si un parlement doit en même temps demeurer démocratique. mais une chose certaine, même si la vie des parlemen- taires et des gens de leur entourage a strictement le même prix inestimable que celle de tous les autres citoyens, le parlement, lui, qui est le symbole même de la démocratie, doit pouvoir compter sur assez de protection pour qu’il puisse remplir son rôle avec le maximum possible de séré- nité. évidemment, c’est un équilibre qui n’est jamais facile à trouver. en fait, cela nous rappelle tout simplement notre devoir fondamental de construire une société de plus en plus — et de plus en plus sûrement — fondée sur le respect des autres et sur la non- violence. je dis bien « construire » parce que cela a déjà été dit et cela reste toujours vrai. la vraie démocratie n’est jamais une chose acquise, elle doit être méritée, d’une certaine façon regagnée et consolidée tous les jours; elle doit être respectée aussi. espérons, en tout cas, que la journée d’hier nous aura rendus plus conscients de l’inutilité, de l’absurdité et de l’inhumanité de la violence comme moyen d’expression dans une société civilisée. [nous soulignons.] (national assembly of québec, journal des débats, vol. 27, no. 90, 4th sess., 32nd leg., may 9, 1984, at pp. 6021-23) (assemblée nationale du québec, journal des dé- bats, vol. 27, no 90, 4e sess., 32e lég., 9 mai 1984, p. 6021- 6023) [78] this historical aside underscores a fact that we must bear in mind in our analysis: in order for any legislative assembly to perform its constitutional functions with dignity and efficiency, it is essential that it operate in a secure environment. a legislative assembly that works under the threat of violence is neither dignified nor efficient. in fact, no legislative assembly whose proceedings are conducted under duress can truly claim to be democratic. this fun- damental imperative ensures that members of the [78] cet aparté historique met en évidence un fait que nous devons garder à l’esprit lors de notre ana- lyse : il est essentiel pour toute assemblée législative d’opérer dans un environnement sécuritaire pour qu’elle s’acquitte de ses fonctions constitutionnelles dignement et efficacement. une assemblée législa- tive qui travaille sous la menace de la violence n’est ni digne ni efficace. en fait, une assemblée législative dont les travaux seraient menés sous la contrainte ne pourrait réellement prétendre être démocratique. [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 729 assembly are able to debate freely in a respectful manner, without violence. ensuring the assembly’s security is the responsibility of its president (the term used in quebec for the speaker), who is free to make any decisions deemed appropriate, including decisions as to who it is that will carry out security measures. this process is protected by absolute par- liamentary privileges. it follows that decisions relat- ing to security cannot be challenged in or reviewed by a court or tribunal. [79] in the constitutional framework of british- style parliamentary democracies, parliamentary priv- ileges effect a modus vivendi between the legislative branch of government and the other two branches, giving the former the legal tools it needs to perform its constitutional functions free from any interfer- ence: m. groves and e. campbell, “parliamentary privilege and the courts: questions of justiciabil- ity” (2007), 7 ouclj 175, at pp. 189-90, citing d. mcgee, “the scope of parliamentary privilege”, [2004] nzlj 84, at p 84. as we will explain be- low, these privileges have deep historical roots. they made it possible to strike the necessary balance for sustaining democracy in the united kingdom and later in its colonies. parliamentary privileges are therefore not an exception to the rule of law, but rather a distinct pillar in canada’s constitutional architecture. cet impératif fondamental assure que les membres de l’assemblée puissent débattre librement dans le respect et la non- violence. la responsabilité d’assu- rer la sécurité de l’assemblée échoit à son président qui est libre de prendre toutes les décisions qu’il juge appropriées, y compris celles liées à l’identité des personnes mettant en œuvre les mesures de sécurité. cet exercice est protégé par des privilèges parlemen- taires absolus. il s’ensuit que les décisions relatives à la sécurité ne peuvent être contestées devant les tribunaux ou révisées par eux. [79] dans le portrait constitutionnel des démocra- ties parlementaires de type britannique, les privilèges parlementaires agissent comme un modus vivendi entre le pouvoir législatif et les deux autres branches du gouvernement, donnant au premier les moyens lé- gaux d’assumer ses fonctions constitutionnelles, libre de toute interférence : m. groves et e. campbell, « parliamentary privilege and the courts : questions of justiciability » (2007), 7 ouclj 175, p. 189- 190, citant d. mcgee, « the scope of parliamentary privilege », [2004] nzlj 84, p 84. comme nous l’expliquerons ultérieurement, ces privilèges ont des racines historiques profondes. ils ont permis d’établir l’équilibre nécessaire pour assurer la pérennité de la démocratie au royaume- uni et, subséquemment, dans ses colonies. dès lors, les privilèges parlemen- taires ne constituent pas une exception à la règle de la primauté du droit, mais plutôt un pilier distinct de l’architecture constitutionnelle canadienne. [80] in the instant case, we are of the opinion that these privileges defeat the grievance arbitrator’s ju- risdiction. security guards exercise an essential part of the privilege conferred onto the president. their employment is therefore closely and directly con- nected with proceedings in the assembly. moreover, these constitutional privileges were not abolished with the coming into force of the act respecting the national assembly, cqlr, c a-231 (“arna”). interference by courts or tribunals would therefore be inconsistent with the assembly’s sovereignty. [80] en l’espèce, nous sommes d’avis que ces pri- vilèges font échec à la compétence de l’arbitre de grief les gardiens de sécurité exercent un volet essentiel du privilège conféré au président. il existe donc un lien étroit et direct entre leur emploi et les travaux de l’assemblée. en outre, ces privilèges de nature constitutionnelle n’ont pas été abolis par l’en- trée en vigueur de la loi sur l’assemblée nationale, rlrq, c a-231 (« lan »). de ce fait, l’intervention des tribunaux serait incompatible avec la souverai- neté de l’assemblée. ii facts ii faits in july 2012, three of the assembly’s security [81] guards were dismissed on the ground that they had [81] en juillet 2012, trois gardiens de sécurité de l’assemblée ont été congédiés au motif qu’ils avaient 730 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. surreptitiously used surveillance cameras to look inside the rooms of the adjacent hotel and that the relationship of trust with their employer had there- fore been severed. grievances were filed in which the guards, represented by the syndicat de la fonc- tion publique et parapublique du québec (“union”), sought reinstatement in their respective positions and reimbursement of the benefits they had lost. the president of the assembly, jacques chagnon (“president”), challenged the arbitrator’s jurisdiction by way of a preliminary exception. he relied on two parliamentary privileges: the privilege over the man- agement of employees and the privilege to exclude strangers from the assembly’s precincts. utilisé clandestinement des caméras de surveillance pour observer l’intérieur des chambres de l’hôtel ad- jacent et que le lien de confiance avec leur employeur a en conséquence été rompu représentés par le syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du québec (« syndicat »), ils réclament au moyen de griefs la réintégration dans leurs emplois respectifs et le remboursement des avantages qu’ils ont perdus. à titre de moyen préliminaire, le président de l’as- semblée, jacques chagnon (« président »), a contesté la compétence de l’arbitre en invoquant l’existence de deux privilèges parlementaires, soit le privilège de gestion du personnel et le privilège d’expulser les étrangers de l’enceinte de l’assemblée. [82] the arbitrator dismissed the preliminary excep- tion and found that he had jurisdiction to decide the grievances: 2014 qcta 696, [2014] az- 51104370. the superior court allowed the president’s appli- cation and set aside the arbitrator’s decision: 2015 qccs 883. the majority of the court of appeal allowed the appeal and restored the arbitrator’s de- cision: 2017 qcca 271, 20 admin. lr (6th) 93. [82] l’arbitre a rejeté le moyen préliminaire et conclu qu’il avait compétence pour décider des griefs : 2014 qcta 696, [2014] az- 51104370. la cour supérieure a accueilli la requête du président et annulé la décision de l’arbitre : 2015 qccs 883. les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont ac- cueilli l’appel et rétabli la décision de l’arbitre : 2017 qcca 271, 20 admin. lr (6th) 93. iii standard of review iii norme de contrôle [83] the president puts three questions to this court: [83] le président pose trois questions à la cour : (1) do the duties of the security guards employed by the assembly fall within a sphere of activity covered by the privilege over the management of employees? what is the applicable test when this privilege is claimed? (1) les fonctions des gardiens de sécurité em- ployés par l’assemblée appartiennent- elles à une sphère d’activité relevant du privilège de gestion du personnel? quel est le test applicable à une revendication de ce privilège? (2) did the general reference to the public service act, cqlr, c f-311, in s. 120 of the arna have the effect of implicitly abolishing the as- sembly’s parliamentary privileges? (2) le renvoi général à la loi sur la fonction pu- blique, rlrq, c f-311, contenu à l’art. 120 de la lan a-t-il eu pour effet d’abolir implicitement les privilèges parlementaires de l’assemblée? (3) does the implementation of [translation] “control over access to parliamentary precincts”, as part of the privilege to exclude strangers from the assembly and its precincts, give the president the power to determine who exercises this privilege, including the right to dismiss a person who no longer exercises it? (3) la mise en œuvre du « contrôle de l’accès à l’enceinte parlementaire » compris dans le pri- vilège d’expulser les étrangers de l’assemblée et de ses environs inclut- elle le pouvoir pour le président de déterminer qui exerce ce privilège, emportant le droit de congédier une personne qui ne l’exercerait plus? (see af, at pp 6-8) (voir ma, p 6-8) [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 731 [84] the union submits that the court must defer to the arbitrator’s findings that the guards’ duties do not fall within the scope of the privilege over the management of employees and that the guards do not exercise the privilege to exclude strangers on the president’s behalf. according to the union, these questions relate to the assessment of the facts in this case, which means that the applicable standard is reasonableness. [84] le syndicat soutient que la cour doit faire preuve de déférence à l’égard des conclusions de l’arbitre voulant que les fonctions des gardiens ne s’inscrivent pas dans la portée du privilège de ges- tion du personnel et que les gardiens n’exercent pas le privilège d’expulsion des étrangers au nom du président. selon le syndicat, ces questions ont trait à l’appréciation des faits en l’espèce. ainsi, la norme applicable serait celle de la décision raisonnable. [85] we cannot accept this argument. in our view, the questions submitted by the president are merely three aspects of the same question, namely the scope of the parliamentary privileges in issue. moreover, the evidence relating to the tasks performed by the guards is not contested. therefore, what we are concerned with is not characterizing the role of the guards at the assembly, but rather defining the scope of the parliamentary privileges — that is clearly a question of law. [86] we agree with justice karakatsanis that the applicable standard of review is correctness because the existence and scope of parliamentary privileges raise a question of general law “that is both of cen- tral importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of ex- pertise”: dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, at para. 60, citing toronto (city) v. cupe,. local 79, 2003 scc 63, [2003] 3 scr 77, at para. 62; smith v. alliance pipeline ltd., 2011 scc 7, [2011] 1 scr 160, at para 26. like justice karakatsanis, we recognize that griev- ance arbitrators do not have specific expertise in relation to parliamentary privileges. we also recog- nize that while this appeal involves only the national assembly of québec, the conclusions regarding par- liamentary privileges could affect other legislative assemblies. the broad and general scope of such a question is clear. it raises the issue of “basic consist- ency in the fundamental legal order of our country”: canada (canadian human rights commission) v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 53, [2011] 3 scr 471, at para. 22; mclean v. british colum- bia (securities commission), 2013 scc 67, [2013] 3 scr 895, at paras 26-27 “because of their im- pact on the administration of justice as a whole, such [85] nous ne pouvons accepter cet argument. selon nous, les questions soumises par le président ne re- présentent que trois facettes d’une même question, soit celle de la portée des privilèges parlementaires en cause. d’ailleurs, la preuve relative aux tâches effectuées par les gardiens n’est pas contestée. la question qui nous concerne n’est alors pas celle de qualifier le rôle des gardiens au sein de l’assemblée, mais plutôt celle de définir la portée des privilèges parlementaires, ce qui est manifestement une ques- tion de droit. [86] nous sommes d’accord avec la juge karakatsanis que la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la décision correcte, puisque l’existence et la portée des privilèges parlementaires soulèvent une question de droit générale « à la fois, d’une im- portance capitale pour le système juridique dans son ensemble et étrangère au domaine d’expertise de l’ar- bitre » : dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, par. 60, citant toronto (ville) c. scfp, section locale 79, 2003 csc 63, [2003] 3 rcs 77, par. 62; smith c. alliance pipeline ltd., 2011 csc 7, [2011] 1 rcs 160, par 26. nous reconnaissons, comme la juge karakatsanis, que l’arbitre de grief ne possède aucune expertise par- ticulière en matière de privilèges parlementaires. nous reconnaissons également que les conclusions relatives aux privilèges parlementaires — bien que le présent pourvoi concerne uniquement l’assemblée nationale du québec — sont susceptibles d’affec- ter d’autres assemblées législatives. la portée large et générale d’une telle question est évidente. elle met en cause la « cohérence de l’ordre juridique fondamental du pays » : canada (commission ca- nadienne des droits de la personne) c. canada (pro- cureur général), 2011 csc 53, [2011] 3 rcs 471, par. 22; mclean c. colombie- britannique (securities 732 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. questions require uniform and consistent answers”: dunsmuir, at para 60. [87] we would add that the existence and scope of parliamentary privileges also raise a constitu- tional issue. this court has previously recognized the constitutional nature of parliamentary privileges: canada (house of commons) v. vaid, 2005 scc 30, [2005] 1 scr 667, at para. 30; new brunswick broadcasting co. v. nova scotia (speaker of the house of assembly), [1993] 1 scr 319, at p 379. it is well established that the standard of review appli- cable to “other constitutional” issues is correctness “because of the unique role of    courts [mentioned in s. 96 of the constitution act, 1867] as interpreters of the constitution”: dunsmuir, at para. 58; nova scotia (workers’ compensation board) v. martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2  scr  504. in vaid, the court noted the importance of the issue relating to the privilege over the management of employees, stating that “[t]here are few issues as important to our constitutional equilibrium as the relationship between the legislature and the other branches of the state on which the constitution has conferred pow- ers, namely the executive and the courts”: vaid, at para 4. the same can be said of issues relating to the assembly’s inherent, historical privilege to exclude strangers from its precincts, as well as the impact of the arna on parliamentary privileges. since all of these issues concern the separation of powers among state institutions, they are constitutional in nature, and the correctness standard must apply. commission), 2013 csc 67, [2013] 3 rcs 895, par 26-27. pareille question « doit être tranchée de manière uniforme et cohérente étant donné ses répercussions sur l’administration de la justice dans son ensemble » : dunsmuir, par 60. [87] nous ajoutons que l’existence et la portée des privilèges parlementaires soulèvent aussi une ques- tion constitutionnelle. la nature constitutionnelle des privilèges parlementaires a été reconnue par la cour : canada (chambre des communes) c. vaid, 2005 csc 30, [2005] 1 rcs 667, par. 30; new brunswick broadcasting co. c. nouvelle- écosse (président de l’assemblée législative), [1993] 1 rcs 319, p 379. il est bien établi que la norme de contrôle applicable aux questions « touchant par ailleurs à la constitu- tion » est celle de la décision correcte « à cause du rôle unique des cours de justice visées à l’art. 96 [de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867] en tant qu’in- terprètes de la constitution » : dunsmuir, par. 58; nouvelle- écosse (workers’ compensation board) c. martin, 2003 csc 54, [2003] 2 rcs 504. dans vaid, la cour a relevé l’importance de la question relative au privilège de gestion des employés. elle a souligné que « [p]eu de questions revêtent autant d’importance pour notre équilibre constitutionnel que le rapport entre la législature et les autres organes de l’état auxquels la constitution a conféré des pou- voirs, soit l’exécutif et les tribunaux judiciaires » : vaid, par 4. cette qualification peut s’appliquer tout autant aux questions relatives au privilège inhérent et historique de l’assemblée d’expulser des étrangers de son enceinte. c’est aussi le cas au sujet de l’effet de la lan sur les privilèges parlementaires. puisque ces questions touchent toutes à la séparation des pouvoirs entre les institutions de l’état, elles sont de nature constitutionnelle, et la norme de la décision correcte doit s’appliquer. [88] however, we prefer to refrain from expressing any opinion on the justification put forward by the majority of the court of appeal, which found that the correctness standard applied because the case also involved a true question of jurisdiction (paras. 33 and 35). given that the court will soon be considering the nature and scope of judicial review — possibly including the concept of “true question of jurisdic- tion” as used in dunsmuir, at para. 59 — we do not [88] par ailleurs, nous préférons nous abstenir de nous prononcer sur la justification mise de l’avant par les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel, selon qui la norme de la décision correcte s’impose, puisqu’il s’agit aussi d’une question touchant véritablement à la compétence (par. 33 et 35). étant donné que la cour examinera prochainement la nature et la por- tée du contrôle judiciaire — incluant possiblement la notion de « question touchant véritablement à la [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 733 think it appropriate to address this issue. nor is it essential to do so, since the reasons stated above are more than sufficient to justify the application of the correctness standard. compétence » au sens de l’arrêt dunsmuir, par. 59 — il nous paraît inopportun d’aborder cette question. en outre, il n’est pas essentiel de le faire, puisque les motifs énoncés précédemment suffisent amplement à justifier le recours à la norme de la décision correcte. iv analysis iv analyse [89] since the origins of parliamentary privileges date back to the beginnings of british parliamen- tary democracy, we believe it will be helpful to start with a historical overview of the legal principles that underlie our reasoning. we will therefore consider the privileges being claimed, which will lead us to conclude that security is a privileged sphere of ac- tivity. since the security guards’ tasks fall entirely within this sphere, and since the guards exercise the privilege to exclude strangers on the president’s behalf, they are covered by the management privi- lege. moreover, the arna does not reveal any clear intention by the assembly to restrict or waive these parliamentary privileges. allowing the grievance arbitrator to rule on the merits of the dismissal would therefore be tantamount to authorizing interference with the exercise of parliamentary privileges. [89] puisque l’origine des privilèges parlemen- taires remonte à la même époque que les balbutie- ments de la démocratie parlementaire britannique, nous croyons utile avant toute chose d’effectuer un survol historique des principes juridiques sur les- quels repose notre raisonnement. nous examinerons donc les privilèges invoqués, ce qui nous amènera à conclure que le domaine de la sécurité est une sphère d’activité privilégiée. puisque les tâches des gardiens de sécurité s’inscrivent entièrement dans cette sphère et que ces derniers exercent le privilège d’expulsion des étrangers pour le compte du président, le privi- lège de gestion couvre les gardiens. en outre, la lan ne révèle aucune intention claire de la part de l’as- semblée de restreindre ces privilèges parlementaires ou d’y renoncer. permettre à l’arbitre de grief de se prononcer sur le bien- fondé du congédiement équi- vaudrait donc à autoriser l’ingérence dans l’exercice des privilèges parlementaires. a historical roots of parliamentary privileges a les racines historiques des privilèges parlemen- taires (1) origins of the privileges of the parliament at (1) l’origine des privilèges du parlement de westminster westminster [90] the precise origins of parliamentary privileges remain uncertain. the assertion of these privileges certainly caused many conflicts, sometimes violent in nature, between the parliament at westminster, the crown and the courts: new brunswick broadcasting, at p. 344 (concurring reasons of lamer cj); see also s. pincus, 1688: the first modern revolution (2009), at p 28. [90] l’origine précise des privilèges parlemen- taires demeure incertaine. certes, l’assertion de ces privilèges fut la cause de plusieurs conflits, par- fois violents, entre le parlement de westminster, la couronne et le pouvoir judiciaire : new brunswick broadcasting, p. 344 (motifs concordants du juge en chef lamer); voir aussi s. pincus, 1688 : the first modern revolution (2009), p 28. [91] in the early years of the westminster system of parliamentary democracy as we know it today, the speaker of the house of commons asked the monarch to recognize the privileges necessary to the proper functioning of the house on the opening day [91] à l’aube de la démocratie parlementaire de westminster telle qu’on la connaît aujourd’hui, le président de la chambre des communes demandait au monarque de reconnaître les privilèges néces- saires à son bon fonctionnement le premier jour où le 734 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. of parliament, in accordance with feudal tradition. the representatives of the lower house — that is, the knights of the shires and the burgesses — met and chose a speaker to represent them before the monarch. that representative went before the upper house, where the lords, their authorized represent- atives, the princes, the barons, the archbishops, the bishops and certain abbots sat. the monarch was usually seated above them in the upper house and was assisted by a chancellor, who spoke on the mon- arch’s behalf. in the centre of the room were the judges of the realm, the master of the rolls and the secretaries of state: w. stubbs, the constitutional history of england in its origin and development (3rd ed. 1884), vol. iii, at pp 486-88. [92] once in the upper house, the speaker of the house of commons began by praising the monarch. the chancellor thanked the commons for choosing a speaker and called upon the representatives to de- bate laws. the speaker then asked for recognition of the commons’ privileges so that its members could debate freely without their words being called into question or offending the monarch. he asked that, should such offence occur, the lower house be per- mitted to judge and punish the offender itself. the speaker promised not to abuse these powers, and the chancellor then agreed on behalf of the monarch: stubbs, at pp 486-88. [93] we note that, from the start, it was customary for certain parliamentary privileges to protect the servants of members of parliament as well. the pro- tection extended from the 40th day before the start of each session until the 40th day after the end of each session. the privileges served primarily as a shield against attacks by the monarch, which typically took the form of wrongful imprisonment. they therefore also prevented collateral attacks against employ- ees of members of the parliament at westminster with respect to all matters except treason, felony or situations endangering public safety: stubbs, at pp 514-15. parlement était convoqué selon la tradition féodale. les représentants de la chambre basse (« knights of the shires » et « burgesses ») se réunissaient et désignaient le président (« speaker ») pour les re- présenter devant le souverain. ce représentant se rendait devant la chambre haute, qui réunissait les lords, leurs représentants autorisés, les princes, les barons, les archevêques, les évêques et certains ab- bés. dans cette chambre haute, surélevé se trouvait habituellement le monarque qui était assisté par un chancelier qui parlait en son nom. au centre de la pièce se trouvaient des juges du royaume, le pré- sident de la cour (« master of the rolls ») ainsi que les secrétaires d’état : w. stubbs, the constitutional history of england in its origin and development (3e éd. 1884), vol. iii, p. 486- 488. [92] rendu à la chambre haute, le président de la chambre des communes faisait d’abord l’éloge du monarque. le chancelier remerciait les commu- nes d’avoir désigné un président et enjoignait les représentants à débattre des lois. c’est alors que le président demandait la reconnaissance des privilèges des communes, afin que ses membres puissent dé- battre librement sans que leur parole ne soit remise en question ou n’offense le monarque. advenant la survenue d’une telle offense, il demandait que la chambre basse puisse juger et punir elle- même le coupable. le président promettait de ne pas abuser de ces pouvoirs. le chancelier acquiesçait alors au nom du monarque : stubbs, p. 486- 488. [93] nous notons que, selon la coutume, dès leur origine, certains privilèges parlementaires pro- tégeaient également les serviteurs au service des membres du parlement, et ce, pour une période s’échelonnant du 40e jour avant le début de chaque session au 40e jour après la fin de chacune d’elles. les privilèges servaient principalement de bouclier contre les attaques du monarque qui prenaient habi- tuellement la forme d’emprisonnements injustifiés. ils prévenaient donc aussi les attaques collatérales visant les employés des membres du parlement de westminster à tous égards, à l’exception des crimes de trahison, de felony ou de situations où la sécurité publique était menacée : stubbs, p. 514- 515. [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 735 [94] around 1400, both houses of parliament began to avail themselves of the services of a sergeant-at- arms to enforce their privileges. the sergeant-at- arms was responsible for protecting the speaker of the house. it is interesting to note that one of the original functions of the sergeant-at- arms was to act as doorkeeper, a role similar to that of the three em- ployees dismissed in this case: e. campbell, current issue paper #68 — the sergeant-at- arms: historical origins and contemporary roles (1987), at pp 3-5. [95] the parliament at westminster gradually be- gan to assert its privileges in a more forceful manner. at first, the house of commons began to exercise its powers of arrest, trial and imprisonment. later, with the assistance of the sergeant-at- arms, it was able to fight for the recognition of its privileges, especially against the courts, since it now had the coercive power to enforce its independence: p. marsden, the officers of the commons 1363- 1978 (1979), at p. 79; erskine may’s treatise on the law, privileges, pro- ceedings and usage of parliament (24th ed. 2011), by m. jack, c 17. [94] vers l’an 1400, les deux chambres du parle- ment ont commencé à bénéficier des services d’un sergent d’armes pour assurer le respect de leurs privi- lèges. ce dernier était responsable de veiller à la pro- tection du président de la chambre. il est intéressant de noter que, à l’origine, le sergent d’armes assumait notamment le rôle de gardien de porte, un rôle simi- laire à celui dont s’acquittaient les trois employés congédiés dans la présente affaire : e. campbell, current issue paper #68 — the sergeant-at- arms : historical origins and contemporary roles (1987), p 3-5. [95] peu à peu, le parlement de westminster a re- vendiqué ses privilèges avec davantage de fermeté. d’abord la chambre des communes a pu exercer ses pouvoirs d’arrestation, de jugement et d’emprisonne- ment. plus tard, avec l’aide du sergent d’armes, elle a été en mesure de s’engager dans une lutte pour la reconnaissance de ses privilèges, notamment face au pouvoir judiciaire, puisqu’elle détenait désormais le pouvoir coercitif de faire respecter son indépen- dance : p. marsden, the officers of the commons 1363- 1978 (1979), p. 79; erskine may’s treatise on the law, privileges, proceedings and usage of parliament (24e éd. 2011), par m. jack, c 17. [96] privileges were asserted against the common law courts in several phases. initially, both houses of parliament claimed exclusive jurisdiction to judge the existence and scope of their privileges because of their historical status as part of the high court of parliament of medieval england:  groves and campbell, at p.  177.3 with the growth of parlia- mentary law, known as lex parliamenti, the houses argued in particular that this law was separate from the common law and that the courts therefore had no jurisdiction to decide disputes relating to priv- ileges: groves and campbell, at p 177. until the 19th century, the courts respected this assertion by parliament and expressed very few doubts about it. [96] l’affirmation des privilèges face aux tribu- naux de common law a connu plusieurs phases. d’abord, les deux chambres du parlement soute- naient qu’elles avaient la compétence exclusive de juger de l’existence et de la portée de leurs privi- lèges en raison de l’appartenance historique de leur chambre à la haute cour du parlement en angleterre médiévale : groves et campbell, p 1773. avec l’es- sor du droit parlementaire, connu sous le nom de lex parliamenti, les chambres faisaient notamment valoir que ce droit ne faisait pas partie de la com- mon law. de ce fait, les tribunaux de droit commun n’avaient pas juridiction pour décider des litiges relatifs aux privilèges : groves et campbell, p 177. 3 it should be noted that this english constitutional feature virtually disappeared with the reform that led to the creation of the supreme court of the united kingdom and to the elimination of the house of lords’ role as a court of appeal: m-a roy, “le parlement, les tribunaux et la charte canadienne des droits et libertés: vers un modèle de privilège parlementaire adapté au xxie siècle” (2014), 55 c de d 489, at pp. 495-96; new brunswick broadcasting, at pp 347-48. 3 il faut noter que ce dernier aspect constitutionnel anglais a pra- tiquement pris fin lors de la réforme ayant mené à la création de la cour suprême du royaume- uni et la fin du rôle de tribunal d’appel de la chambre des lords : m-a. roy, « le parlement, les tribunaux et la charte canadienne des droits et libertés : vers un modèle de privilège parlementaire adapté au xxie siècle » (2014), 55 c de d. 489, p. 495- 496; new brunswick broadcast- ing, p. 347- 348. 736 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. note that the jurisdiction of the common law courts at the time was not as broad as it is today. they did not decide matters relating to equity or ecclesiastical law: groves and campbell, at p. 177 and fn 9. the argument was therefore not as ambitious as it might seem today. [97] the courts subsequently assumed jurisdiction over cases in which the privilege being claimed had an impact on the rights exercised outside parliament: groves and campbell, at pp. 177-78 and fn 10. [98] a turning point in development of privileges was the famous case of stockdale v. hansard (1839), 9 ad & e 1, 112 er 1112 (qb). in that case, mr. stockdale, who had published a medical book that was found in the possession of a prisoner in newgate, brought an action for libel against messrs. hansard, printers to the house of commons. in a report pre- pared by the prison inspector, mr. stockdale’s book was described as “disgusting and obscene”. the re- port was later printed by messrs. hansard under the authority of the house of commons and sold to members of the public. in response to the lawsuit, the house of commons asserted its parliamentary privileges by resolving as follows: jusqu’au 19e siècle, les tribunaux respectaient cette assertion du parlement et n’exprimaient que bien peu de doutes à son sujet. notez bien qu’à l’époque, l’étendue de la juridiction des tribunaux de common law n’était pas aussi vaste qu’aujourd’hui. ils ne décidaient pas des questions d’equity ou de droit ecclésiastique : groves et campbell, p. 177 et note en bas de page 9. l’argument n’était donc pas aussi ambitieux qu’il peut sembler l’être aujourd’hui. [97] par la suite, les tribunaux se sont saisis de dossiers où le privilège invoqué avait une incidence sur les droits s’exerçant à l’extérieur du parlement : groves et campbell, p. 177- 178 et note en bas de page 10. [98] la célèbre affaire stockdale c. hansard (1839), 9 ad. & e. 1, 112 er 1112 (br), a été un mo- ment charnière dans l’évolution des privilèges. dans cette affaire, m. stockdale, qui avait publié un livre de médecine s’étant retrouvé entre les mains d’un prisonnier de newgate, a intenté un recours en dif- famation contre mm. hansard, les imprimeurs de la chambre des communes. dans un rapport rédigé par l’inspecteur de la prison, le livre de m. stockdale était qualifié de [traduction] « dégoûtant et obs- cène ». ultérieurement, ce rapport a été imprimé par mm. hansard sous l’autorité de la chambre des communes et vendu aux membres du public. en ri- poste à cette poursuite, la chambre des communes a invoqué ses privilèges parlementaires au moyen d’une résolution : that the power of publishing such of its reports, votes, and proceedings as it shall deem necessary or conducive to the public interests, is an essential incident to the con- stitutional functions of parliament, more especially of this house, as the representative portion of it. that by the law and privilege of parliament, this house has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine upon the existence and extent of its privileges, and that the institution or prosecution of any action, suit, or other proceeding, for the purpose of bringing them into discussion for decision before any court or tribunal elsewhere than in parliament, is a high breach of such privilege, and renders all par- ties concerned therein amenable to its just displeasure, and to the punishment consequent thereon: that for any court or tribunal to assume to decide upon matters of privilege inconsistent with the determination of either [traduction] que le pouvoir de publier les rapports, votes et délibérations qu’elle estime soit nécessaires dans l’intérêt public soit favorables à celui-ci est un élément essentiel des fonctions constitutionnelles du parlement, plus particulièrement cette chambre, en tant qu’organe représentatif au sein de celui-ci. que par l’effet de la loi et du privilège du parlement, cette chambre a compétence exclusive pour statuer sur l’existence et l’étendue de ses privilèges; et que toute action, poursuite ou autre procé- dure intentée, afin que ceux-ci fassent l’objet de débats ou décisions, devant quelque cour de justice ou tribunal ailleurs qu’au parlement, constitue un manquement grave à ce privilège, auquel cas toutes les parties concernées en- courent le mécontentement légitime du parlement et sont passibles de sanctions en conséquence : que la décision de quelque cour de justice ou tribunal d’assumer compétence [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 737 house of parliament thereon, is contrary to the law of parliament, and is a breach and contempt of the privileges of parliament. [emphasis added.] pour statuer sur des questions relatives au privilège d’une manière incompatible avec les décisions de l’une ou l’autre des chambres du parlement à cet égard va à l’encontre de la loi du parlement, et représente un manquement et un outrage aux privilèges du parlement. [nous soulignons.] (united kingdom, house of commons, parlia- mentary debates, 3rd ser., vol. 49, august 1, 1839, col. 1074-75; see also c g post,. significant cases in british constitutional law (1957), at pp 28-29) (royaume- uni, chambre des communes, parliamen- tary debates, 3e sér., vol. 49, 1er août 1839, col. 1074- 1075; voir aussi c. g. post, significant cases in british constitutional law (1957), p 28-29) [99] however, the court of queen’s bench denied the existence of the claimed privilege. in his reasons, lord denman cj began by rejecting the argument that the house of commons was the sole and con- clusive judge of the existence and scope of its own privileges. for one thing, he found it illogical that the house of commons and the house of lords, which together formed parliament, could claim privileges that might be inconsistent: stockdale, at p. 1154; see also post, at p 31. he also noted that the argument that parliament had incommunicable knowledge of its privileges was ludicrous. clearly, the courts at the time were trying to determine the jurisdictional boundaries of parliamentary privileges. a claim of privilege was not enough to dispose of a case: stockdale, at pp. 1154-56; see also post, at pp 31-32. in the end, lord denman cj found that it [100] was for the court of queen’s bench to decide the matter, holding that it “is no longer optional with me to decline or accept the office of deciding whether this privilege exist[s] in law”: stockdale, at p. 1169; see also post, at pp 33-34. [101] the saga surrounding the case gave rise to seven separate proceedings and led to the impris- onment of mr. hansard, members of his family and certain legal advisors. this dispute concerning the courts’ jurisdiction with respect to privileges caused quite a stir in british society. it was even suggested that there would be armed conflict if tensions esca- lated: groves and campbell, at p 184. [99] pourtant, la cour du banc de la reine a nié l’existence du privilège invoqué. dans ses motifs, le juge en chef lord denman a d’abord rejeté l’argu- ment voulant que la chambre des communes puisse établir l’existence et la portée de ses propres pri- vilèges de façon définitive et exclusive. selon lui, d’une part, le fait que la chambre des communes et la chambre des lords, formant ensemble le parlement, puissent revendiquer des privilèges potentiellement contradictoires était illogique : stockdale, p. 1154; voir aussi post, p 31. d’autre part, il a noté que l’argument voulant que le parlement possède une connaissance secrète relative aux privilèges était saugrenu. de toute évidence, les tribunaux tentaient alors de cerner les contours juridictionnels des pri- vilèges parlementaires. les invoquer ne suffisait pas pour disposer du litige : stockdale, p. 1154- 1156; voir aussi post, p 31-32. [100] en fin de compte, le juge en chef lord denman a jugé qu’il revenait à la cour du banc de la reine de trancher la question, statuant qu’il [traduction] «  ne m’appartient plus de refuser ou d’accepter la charge de décider si ce privilège existe en droit  »  : stockdale, p.  1169; voir aussi post, p 33-34. [101] la saga entourant cette affaire a donné lieu à sept poursuites distinctes et mené à l’emprisonne- ment de m. hansard, de membres de sa famille et de certains conseillers juridiques. ce litige relatif à la compétence des tribunaux à l’égard des privilèges a créé beaucoup de remous dans la société britannique. il a même été suggéré qu’un conflit armé se prépa- rait dans l’éventualité d’une escalade des tensions : groves et campbell, p 184. 738 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. in fact, some have speculated that in case [102] of the sheriff of middlesex (1840), 11 ad & e 273, 113 er 419 (qb), the courts were cautious in or- der to avoid exacerbating the conflict that had deeply divided the public: groves and campbell, at p 184. in that case, the sheriff of middlesex attempted to execute the judgment rendered in stockdale. the house of commons considered this a breach of parliamentary privileges, and its sergeant-at- arms imprisoned the two men who held the sheriff posi- tion. those men sought to free themselves by seek- ing a court order for habeas corpus. in his reasons, lord denman  c.j recognized the power of the sergeant-at- arms to imprison individuals who were guilty of contempt of parliament on the basis that the houses of parliament could not function without the power of protecting themselves: it is unnecessary to discuss the question whether each house of parliament be or be not a court; it is clear that they cannot exercise their proper functions without the power of protecting themselves against interference. the test of the authority of the house of commons in this respect, submitted by lord eldon to the judges in burdett v. abbot (5 dow, 199), was, whether, if the court of common pleas had adjudged an act to be a contempt of court, and committed for it, stating the adjudication generally, the court of king’s bench, on a habeas corpus setting forth the warrant, would discharge the prisoner because the facts and circumstances of the contempt were not stated. a negative answer being given, lord eldon, with the concurrence of lord erskine (who had before been adverse to the exercise of jurisdiction), and without a dissentient voice from the house, affirmed the judgment below. and we must presume that what any court, much more what either house of parliament, acting on great legal authority, takes upon it to pronounce a contempt, is so. [emphasis added.] [102] d’ailleurs, certains ont spéculé que dans case of the sheriff of middlesex (1840), 11 ad. & e. 273, 113 er 419 (br), les tribunaux ont fait preuve de prudence afin d’éviter d’exacerber le conflit qui avait profondément divisé la population : groves et campbell, p 184. dans cette affaire, le shérif de middlesex tentait d’exécuter le jugement rendu dans stockdale. la chambre des communes considérait qu’il s’agissait d’une violation des pri- vilèges parlementaires et son sergent d’armes a em- prisonné les deux hommes qui occupaient le poste de shérif. ceux-ci ont tenté d’obtenir leur libération en demandant à un tribunal judiciaire d’émettre une ordonnance d’habeas corpus. dans ses motifs, le juge en chef lord denman a reconnu le pouvoir du sergent d’armes d’emprisonner les individus qui commettent un outrage au parlement puisque les chambres du parlement ne peuvent pas fonctionner sans détenir le pouvoir de se protéger : [traduction] il n’est pas nécessaire d’examiner la question de savoir si chacune des chambres du parlement constitue ou non un tribunal; il est évident qu’elles ne peuvent exercer les fonctions qui leur incombent si elles n’ont pas le pouvoir de se protéger contre les ingérences. l’analyse permettant de déterminer si la chambre des communes possède ce pouvoir, que lord eldon a soumise aux juges dans burdett c. abbot (5 dow, 199), consistait à se demander, dans le cas où la cour des plaids communs aurait jugé qu’un acte constituait un outrage au tribunal et fait incarcérer l’accusé à cet égard, en formulant sa décision de façon générale, si la cour du banc du roi, sur présentation d’une demande d’habeas corpus faisant état du mandat, pourrait libérer le prisonnier parce que les faits et les circonstances de l’outrage n’étaient pas énoncés. répondant par la négative, avec l’accord de lord erskine (qui s’était montré auparavant défavorable à l’exercice de la compétence) et sans qu’aucune voix dissidente ne s’élève à la chambre, lord eldon a confirmé le jugement de première instance. et nous devons présumer que constitue effectivement un outrage tout ce qu’une cour de justice, et encore davantage l’une ou l’autre des chambres du parlement, s’appuyant sur de solides assises juridiques, déclare être un outrage. [nous soulignons.] (sheriff of middlesex, at p. 426; see also post, at pp 35-36) (sheriff of middlesex, p. 426; voir aussi post, p. 35- 36.) [103] lord denman cj was unable to find any precedent or legal rule that would make it possible to [103] le juge en chef lord denman n’a pu trou- ver de précédent ou de règle de droit permettant [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 739 order the sheriff’s release. the new powers of review conferred on the courts in stockdale were thus rather innocuous if, in the same case, parliament could still exercise its power of imprisonment following a finding of contempt: groves and campbell, at p 184. [104] forty years later, the scope of parliamentary privileges was still a point of contention, as evidenced by bradlaugh v. gossett (1884), 12 qbd 271. in 1883, charles bradlaugh was elected to represent the riding of northampton in the house of commons. the law required him to swear an oath before he could take his seat. in may 1883, mr. bradlaugh asked the speaker of the house to call him to the table because he wanted to comply with the law and take the oath. the speaker refused, presumably because mr. bradlaugh was a professed atheist. in july 1883, the house of commons adopted a reso- lution commanding the sergeant-at- arms to exclude mr. bradlaugh until he agreed not to further disturb its proceedings. mr. bradlaugh brought an action against the sergeant-at- arms seeking, among other things, a declaration that the resolution was void and an injunction to prevent the sergeant-at- arms from enforcing it: post, at p 37. in bradlaugh, stephen j. refused to interfere [105] in the internal affairs of parliament even though, in principle, the parliamentary oaths act, 1866 (uk), 29 vict., c. 19, authorized mr. bradlaugh to take the oath. in his reasons, he explained that he had to show deference. the house of commons had the exclusive power to interpret that statute because the statute governed its internal proceedings: d’ordonner la libération du shérif. les nouveaux pouvoirs de révision conférés aux tribunaux dans stockdale étaient donc plutôt inoffensifs si le parle- ment pouvait malgré tout, dans la même affaire, exer- cer son pouvoir d’emprisonnement à la suite d’une condamnation pour outrage : groves et campbell, p 184. [104] quarante ans plus tard, la portée des privi- lèges parlementaires faisait toujours l’objet de dis- cordes comme en témoigne l’affaire bradlaugh c. gossett (1884), 12 qbd 271. en 1883, m. charles bradlaugh était élu pour représenter le comté de northampton à la chambre des communes. pour qu’il puisse siéger, la loi lui imposait de prêter un serment. en mai 1883, m. bradlaugh a demandé au président de la chambre de l’appeler à la table parce qu’il souhaitait se conformer à la loi et prêter serment. le président a refusé, prétendument en rai- son de l’athéisme notoire de m bradlaugh. en juil- let 1883, la chambre des communes a adopté une résolution enjoignant au sergent d’armes d’exclure m. bradlaugh jusqu’à ce qu’il s’engage à cesser de nuire aux travaux de la chambre. m. bradlaugh a intenté une poursuite contre le sergent d’armes, sollicitant, entre autres, une déclaration d’invalidité de la résolution et l’émission d’une injonction em- pêchant au sergent d’armes d’exécuter cette même résolution : post, p 37. [105] dans bradlaugh, le juge stephen a refusé de s’ingérer dans les affaires internes du parlement, même si la loi intitulée parliamentary oaths act, 1866 (r-u), 29 vict., c. 19, en principe, autorisait m. bradlaugh à prêter serment. dans ses motifs, le juge a expliqué qu’il devait faire preuve de défé- rence. la chambre des communes avait compétence exclusive pour interpréter cette loi, puisque cette loi régissait son fonctionnement interne : this act requires the plaintiff to take a certain oath. the house of commons have resolved that he shall not be per- mitted to take it. grant, for the purposes of argument, that the resolution of the house and the parliamentary oaths act contradict each other; how can we interfere without violating the principle just referred to? surely the right of the plaintiff to take the oath in question is “a matter arising concerning the house of commons,” to use the words of [traduction] la loi exige que le demandeur prête ser- ment. la chambre des communes a décidé qu’il ne peut être autorisé à le faire. il convient de reconnaître, pour les besoins de la discussion, que la décision de la chambre et la prescription de la loi susmentionnée se contredisent; comment pouvons- nous intervenir sans violer le principe que nous venons de mentionner? le droit du deman- deur de prêter le serment en cause est certainement une 740 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. blackstone. the resolution to exclude him from the house is a thing “done within the walls of the house,” to use lord denman’s words. it is one of those “proceedings in the house of which the house of commons is the sole judge,” to use the words of littledale, j. it is a “proceeding of the house of commons in the house,” and must therefore, in the words of patteson, j., “be entirely free and unshack- led.” it is “part of the course of its own proceedings,” to use the words of coleridge, j., and is therefore “subject to its exclusive jurisdiction.” these authorities are so strong and simple that there may be some risk of weakening them in adding to them. nevertheless, the importance of the case may excuse some further exposition of the principle on which it seems to me to depend. the parliamentary oaths act prescribes the course of proceedings to be followed on the occasion of the elec- tion of a member of parliament   . whatever may be the reasons of the house of commons for their conduct, it would be impossible for us to do justice without hearing and considering those reasons; but it would be equally impossible for the house, with any regard for its own dignity and independence, to suffer its reasons to be laid before us for that purpose, or to accept our interpretation of the law in preference to its own. it seems to follow that the house of commons has the exclusive power of interpreting the statute, so far as the regulation of its own proceedings within its own walls is concerned; and that, even if that interpretation should be erroneous, this court has no power to interfere with it directly or indirectly. [emphasis added.] « question concernant la chambre des communes », pour reprendre les mots de blackstone. la résolution visant à exclure le demandeur de la chambre a été prise « à l’intérieur des murs de la chambre », selon les termes utilisés par lord denman. il s’agit de « procédures à l’in- térieur de la chambre des communes à l’égard desquelles celle-ci est le seul juge », pour reprendre les propos du juge littledale. de l’avis du juge patteson, il s’agit d’une « procédure de la chambre des communes à l’intérieur de la chambre », laquelle doit donc être « entièrement libre d’agir sans entrave ». comme l’a affirmé le juge coleridge, il s’agit d’une instance qui « fait partie des procédures propres à la chambre », et qui en conséquence « relève de sa compétence exclusive ». ces assises sont si solides et si simples qu’il pourrait être dangereux de les affaiblir si on y ajoutait. néanmoins, l’importance de l’affaire peut justifier certaines explications additionnelles au sujet du principe sur lequel la solution de l’instance dépend selon moi. la parliamentary oaths act prévoit les procédures qui doivent être suivies lors de l’élection d’un membre du parlement. [  ]. peu importe les motifs invoqués par la chambre des communes à l’égard de leur comportement, il nous serait impossible de rendre justice sans être infor- més de ces motifs et sans les considérer; mais il serait tout aussi impossible pour la chambre, eu égard à sa propre dignité et à son indépendance, de souffrir que ses motifs soient exposés devant nous à cette fin, ou d’accepter notre interprétation du droit de préférence à la sienne. il s’ensuit, semble-t-il, que la chambre des communes possède le pouvoir exclusif d’interpréter la loi [susmentionnée], dans la mesure où la réglementation de ses propres procédures à l’intérieur de ses murs est visée; et que, même si cette interprétation était erronée, la cour n’a pas le pouvoir d’intervenir directement ou indirectement à cet égard. [nous soulignons.] (bradlaugh, at pp. 279-81; see also post, at pp. 39- 40.) (bradlaugh, p. 279- 281; voir aussi post, p 39-40). in short, since the decision concerned a stat- [106] ute dealing with the internal affairs of parliament and with what happened within its walls, the courts had no jurisdiction to rule on it. [106] en somme, puisque la décision concernait une loi touchant aux affaires internes du parlement et à ce qui se déroulait dans son enceinte, les tribu- naux n’avaient pas compétence pour se prononcer à son sujet. (2) parliamentary privileges in canada (2) les privilèges parlementaires au canada in the north american colonies, the issue [107] of parliamentary privileges was relegated to the [107] dans les colonies nord- américaines, la ques- tion des privilèges parlementaires était reléguée au [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 741 background as a result of the absence of respon- sible government and dependency on the imperial parliament: m-a roy, “le parlement, les tribu- naux et la charte canadienne des droits et libertés: vers un modèle de privilège parlementaire adapté au xxie siècle” (2014), 55 c de d. 489, at p 498. even though the imperial laws establishing the first legislative assemblies did not expressly provide for parliamentary privileges, the judicial committee of the privy council ultimately held that the assemblies had such privileges because the privileges were part of the common law. second plan en raison de l’absence de gouvernement responsable et de l’assujettissement au parlement impérial  : m.-a roy, «  le parlement, les tribu- naux et la charte canadienne des droits et libertés : vers un modèle de privilège parlementaire adapté au xxie siècle » (2014), 55 c de d. 489, p 498. même si les lois impériales constitutives des premières assemblées législatives ne prévoyaient pas explici- tement les privilèges parlementaires, le comité judi- ciaire du conseil privé a éventuellement statué que ces assemblées jouissaient de ces privilèges, puisque ces derniers relèvent de la common law. in kielley v. carson (1842), 4 moo. 63, 13 [108] er 225 (pc),. mr. kielley argued that the new- foundland house of assembly did not have the par- liamentary privileges required to arrest and imprison him over a conflict with mr. kent, a member of the house, that had arisen outside its precincts. the issue of whether privileges applied in relation to non- members was therefore raised very early in the history of the legislative assemblies of the north american colonies. although the judicial commit- tee of the privy council held that the newfound- land house of assembly had no power to imprison strangers, it did accept that the house had the in- herent privileges that were necessary to its proper functioning. specifically, it stated that “we feel no doubt that such an assembly has the right of protect- ing itself from all impediments to the due course of its proceeding”: p 234. [109] since confederation, parliamentary privi- leges have been entrenched in the constitution act, 1867, whose preamble provides for “a constitution similar in principle to that of the united kingdom”. the preamble had the effect of incorporating british constitutional principles into our law, including those required for the establishment and proper functioning of a british- style parliamentary system, like the priv- ileges held by legislative assemblies: new brunswick broadcasting, at p 375. to that end, the constitution act, 1867 broadened the scope of the parliamentary privileges recognized prior to confederation: roy, at p 499. [108] en effet, dans kielley c. carson (1842), 4 moo. 63, 13 er 225 (cp),. m. kielley plaidait que l’assemblée législative de terre- neuve ne bénéfi- ciait pas des privilèges parlementaires nécessaires pour l’arrêter et l’emprisonner en raison d’un conflit l’opposant au député kent qui avait éclaté à l’exté- rieur de l’enceinte de l’assemblée. ainsi, très tôt dans l’histoire des assemblées législatives des colonies nord- américaines, la question de l’application des privilèges à l’égard des non- membres fut soulevée. même si le comité judiciaire du conseil privé a jugé que l’assemblée législative de terre- neuve ne béné- ficiait pas du pouvoir d’emprisonner des étrangers, il a tout de même tenu pour acquis qu’elle jouissait des privilèges inhérents nécessaires pour son bon fonctionnement. plus particulièrement, le conseil privé a souligné qu’il [traduction] « ne fait aucun doute pour nous qu’une telle assemblée a le droit de se protéger de tous les obstacles au bon déroulement de ses travaux » : p 234. [109] depuis la confédération, les privilèges parle- mentaires sont consacrés par la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 dont le préambule prévoit «  une consti- tution reposant sur les mêmes principes que celle du royaume- uni ». ce préambule a eu pour effet d’incorporer dans notre droit les principes constitu- tionnels britanniques. ces principes incluent ceux né- cessaires à l’établissement et au bon fonctionnement d’un système parlementaire de type britannique, tels que les privilèges détenus par les assemblées législatives : new brunswick broadcasting, p 375. pour ce faire, la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 a élargi l’étendue des privilèges parlementaires reconnus avant la confédération : roy, p 499. 742 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. in addition, in 1878, the principles laid [110] down in stockdale were adopted by the supreme court of canada. in landers v. woodworth (1878), 2 scr 158, at p. 196, richards cj wrote that “the mere affirmance by that body [the house of commons] that a certain act is a breach of their privileges will not oust the courts from enquiring and deciding whether the privilege claimed really exists”: cited by lamer cj in new brunswick broadcasting, at p 350. this led to the general rule that canadian courts will inquire into the existence and scope of parliamentary privileges, but not their exercise. [111] this is borne out by the subsequent case law, particularly the recent decisions in new brunswick broadcasting, harvey v. new brunswick (attorney general), [1996] 2 scr 876, and vaid. these de- cisions confirmed the constitutional nature of parlia- mentary privileges and sought to define their scope in light of canada’s modern constitutional architecture, especially since the advent of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. we will consider them in greater detail, since they emphasize the fact that parliamentary privileges rest on solid historical foun- dations and are part of a long constitutional tradition inherited by canada and the provinces. [110] en outre, en 1878, la cour suprême du ca- nada a adopté les principes énoncés dans stockdale. dans landers c. woodworth (1878), 2 rcs 158, p. 196, le juge en chef richards écrivait que [traduc- tion] « la simple affirmation par cet organisme [la chambre des communes] qu’un certain acte constitue une violation de ses privilèges n’empêche pas les tribunaux d’examiner et de décider si le privilège re- vendiqué existe réellement » : cité par le juge en chef lamer dans new brunswick broadcasting, p 350. il en découle la règle générale que les tribunaux cana- diens vérifient l’existence et la portée des privilèges parlementaires, mais non leur exercice. [111] c’est ce que révèle la jurisprudence sub- séquente, tout particulièrement les arrêts récents new brunswick broadcasting, harvey c. nouveau- brunswick (procureur général), [1996] 2 rcs 876, et vaid. ces arrêts ont confirmé la nature constitu- tionnelle des privilèges parlementaires et tenté de définir leur portée, eu égard à l’architecture consti- tutionnelle canadienne moderne, notamment depuis l’avènement de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. il convient d’étudier ces décisions plus en détail, puisqu’elles soulignent le fait que les privi- lèges parlementaires reposent sur des assises histo- riques solides et font partie d’une longue tradition constitutionnelle dont le canada et les provinces ont hérité. (3) the modern approach to parliamentary priv- ileges: new brunswick broadcasting, harvey and vaid (3) l’approche moderne relative aux privilèges parlementaires : new brunswick broadcast- ing, harvey et vaid in new brunswick broadcasting, new bruns- [112] wick broadcasting co. limited made an application to the supreme court of nova scotia for an order allowing it to film the proceedings of the nova scotia house of assembly with its own cameras. the ap- plication was based on s. 2(b) of the charter, which guarantees freedom of expression, including freedom of the press. the speaker of the house of assembly opposed the application, relying on the privilege to exclude strangers. [112] dans l’affaire new brunswick broadcasting, la société new brunswick broadcasting co. limited a présenté une requête à la cour suprême de la nouvelle- écosse afin d’obtenir une ordonnance l’au- torisant à filmer les débats de l’assemblée législative de la nouvelle- écosse avec ses propres caméras. cette requête était fondée sur l’al. 2b) de la charte, qui garantit la liberté d’expression, y compris la liberté de la presse. le président de l’assemblée lé- gislative s’y est opposé en se fondant sur le privilège d’exclusion des étrangers. [113] mclachlin j., writing for the majority, found that since privileges have constitutional status, they [113] selon la juge mclachlin, qui a rédigé les motifs des juges majoritaires, puisque les privilèges [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 743 can be neither abrogated nor limited by the charter: new brunswick broadcasting, at pp 368-69. the preamble to the constitution act, 1867 constitution- ally guarantees the continuance of parliamentary governance for both the provincial legislatures and the federal parliament: new brunswick broadcasting, at p 375. it follows that they hold privileges that are absolute and constitutionally entrenched: it has long been accepted that in order to perform their functions, legislative bodies require certain privileges relating to the conduct of their business. it has also long been accepted that these privileges must be held abso- lutely and constitutionally if they are to be effective; the legislative branch of our government must enjoy a certain autonomy which even the crown and the courts cannot touch. [emphasis added.] ont un statut constitutionnel, ils ne peuvent être ni abrogés ni limités par la charte : new brunswick broadcasting, p. 368- 369. le préambule de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 garantit constitutionnel- lement le maintien du gouvernement parlementaire tant pour les législatures provinciales que pour le parlement fédéral : new brunswick broadcasting, p 375. il en découle que ceux-ci jouissent de pri- vilèges absolus et enchâssés dans la constitution : il est accepté depuis longtemps que, pour exercer leurs fonctions, les organismes législatifs doivent bénéficier de certains privilèges relativement à la conduite de leurs af- faires. il est également accepté depuis longtemps que, pour être efficaces, ces privilèges doivent être détenus d’une façon absolue et constitutionnelle; la branche législative de notre gouvernement doit jouir d’une certaine autonomie à laquelle même la couronne et les tribunaux ne peuvent porter atteinte. [nous soulignons.] (new brunswick broadcasting, at pp. 378-79) (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 378- 379) in mclachlin j.’s view, the case law clearly [114] established that the scope of these privileges is de- termined by the test of necessity: new brunswick broadcasting, at p.  381 she cited stockdale, in which it was held that “[i]f the necessity can be made out, no more need be said: it is the foundation of every privilege of parliament, and justifies all that it requires”: new brunswick broadcasting, at p 382. she added that [114] selon la juge mclachlin, la jurisprudence établit sans équivoque que les contours de ces privi- lèges sont définis par le critère de la nécessité : new brunswick broadcasting, p 381. elle a cité stockdale dans lequel il avait été décidé que [traduction] « [s]i la nécessité peut être prouvée, point n’est be- soin d’ajouter autre chose : c’est le fondement de tout privilège du parlement, et c’est tout ce qui est exigé » : new brunswick broadcasting, p 382. elle a ajouté que [t]he test of necessity is not applied as a standard for judging the content of a claimed privilege, but for the purpose of determining the necessary sphere of exclusive or absolute “parliamentary” or “legislative” jurisdiction. if a matter falls within this necessary sphere of matters without which the dignity and efficiency of the house cannot be upheld, courts will not inquire into questions concerning such privilege. all such questions will instead fall to the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative body. [emphasis added.] [l]e critère de nécessité est appliqué non pas comme une norme pour juger le contenu du privilège revendiqué, mais pour déterminer le domaine nécessaire de compétence « parlementaire » ou « législative » absolue et exclusive. si une question relève de cette catégorie nécessaire de sujets sans lesquels la dignité et l’efficacité de l’assemblée ne sauraient être maintenues, les tribunaux n’examineront pas les questions relatives à ce privilège. toutes ces questions relèveraient plutôt de la compétence exclusive de l’orga- nisme législatif. [nous soulignons.] (new brunswick broadcasting, at p. 383) (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 383) [115] in concurring reasons, lamer  c.j stated that the necessity test is applied in a general sense [115] dans ses motifs concordants, le juge en chef lamer a précisé que le critère de nécessité s’applique 744 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. to a category of privilege — so as to avoid having to consider the specific exercise of the privilege: généralement à une catégorie de privilège — de fa- çon à éviter d’en étudier l’exercice précis : it is important to note that, in this context, the justifica- tion of necessity is applied in a general sense. that is, general categories of privilege are deemed necessary to the discharge of the assembly’s function. each specific instance of the exercise of a privilege need not be shown to be necessary. [emphasis added.] il importe de souligner que, dans ce contexte, la justifica- tion de la nécessité s’applique globalement. c’est-à-dire que des catégories générales de privilèges sont réputées nécessaires à l’exercice de la fonction de l’assemblée. il n’est pas nécessaire de démontrer que chaque cas pré- cis d’exercice d’un privilège est nécessaire. [nous souli- gnons.] (new brunswick broadcasting, at p. 343) (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 343) [116] mclachlin j. stated that, in this area, the courts have limited jurisdiction. they can only assess whether the claimed privilege is necessary to the proper functioning of the legislature: new brunswick broadcasting, at p 384. if so, the privilege is ab- solute and the courts must not review its exercise. indeed, she rejected the argument that the courts should be able to review the exercise of the privilege to exclude strangers for the following reasons: in my view, this privilege is as necessary to modern canadian democracy as it has been to democracies here and elsewhere in past centuries. the legislative chamber is at the core of the system of representative government. it is of the highest importance that the debate in that chamber not be disturbed or inhibited in any way. strangers can, in a variety of ways, interfere with the proper discharge of that business. it follows that the assembly must have the right, if it is to function effectively, to exclude strangers. the rule that the legislative assembly should have the exclusive right to control the conditions in which that debate takes place is thus of great importance, not only for the autonomy of the legislative body, but to ensure its effective functioning. [116] la juge mclachlin a affirmé que, dans ce domaine, les tribunaux ont une compétence limitée. ils peuvent uniquement évaluer si le privilège reven- diqué est nécessaire au bon fonctionnement de la législature : new brunswick broadcasting, p 384. si c’est le cas, le privilège est absolu et les tribunaux ne doivent pas en contrôler l’exercice. d’ailleurs, elle a rejeté, pour les motifs suivants, l’argument se- lon lequel les tribunaux devraient pouvoir contrôler l’exercice du privilège d’exclusion des étrangers : à mon avis, ce privilège est tout autant nécessaire pour la démocratie canadienne qu’il l’a été pour les démocraties d’ici et d’ailleurs au cours des siècles passés. l’assemblée législative est l’élément essentiel du système de gouver- nement représentatif. il est de la plus haute importance que les débats qui s’y déroulent ne soient pas perturbés ni paralysés d’aucune façon. des étrangers peuvent, de diverses façons, entraver la bonne marche des travaux de cette assemblée. l’assemblée doit donc avoir le droit d’exclure des étrangers si elle veut être en mesure de fonc- tionner efficacement. la règle selon laquelle l’assemblée législative devrait avoir le droit exclusif de contrôler les conditions dans lesquelles se déroulent ces débats revêt donc une grande importance pour assurer non seulement l’autonomie de l’organisme législatif, mais aussi son fonc- tionnement efficace. but, it is argued, it is not necessary that the right be ab- solute. the courts should be given the power to monitor the exercise of this power to ensure that only those strangers who are truly disruptive are excluded. in my view, a sys- tem of court review, quite apart from the constitutional question of what right the courts have to interfere in the internal process of another branch of government, would bring its own problems. the ruling of the assembly would not be final. the assembly would find itself caught up in toutefois, fait-on valoir, il n’est pas nécessaire que ce droit soit absolu. les tribunaux devraient pouvoir sur- veiller l’exercice de ce droit afin d’assurer que seuls les étrangers véritablement gênants soient exclus. à mon avis, un système de contrôle judiciaire créerait ses propres problèmes, indépendamment de la question constitution- nelle de savoir quel droit les tribunaux ont- ils de s’im- miscer dans le processus interne d’une autre branche du gouvernement. la décision de l’assemblée ne serait pas [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 745 legal proceedings and appeals about what is disruptive and not disruptive. this in itself might impair the proper functioning of the chamber. this lends support to the ven- erable and accepted proposition that it is necessary to the proper functioning of a legislative assembly modeled on the parliamentary system of the united kingdom that the assembly possess the absolute right to exclude strangers from its proceedings, when it deems them to be disruptive of its efficacious operation. [emphasis added.] définitive. l’assemblée se trouverait aux prises avec des poursuites judiciaires et des appels au sujet de ce qui est gênant et de ce qui ne l’est pas, ce qui pourrait en soi entraver son bon fonctionnement. cela vient appuyer la proposition séculaire et acceptée selon laquelle il est nécessaire au bon fonctionnement d’une assemblée légis- lative inspirée du système parlementaire du royaume- uni que cette assemblée possède le droit absolu d’exclure des étrangers de son enceinte lorsqu’elle estime que leur présence l’empêche de fonctionner efficacement. [nous soulignons.] (new brunswick broadcasting, at pp. 387-88) (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 387- 388) in her concurring reasons in harvey, [117] mclachlin j. expanded on the relationship between the charter and parliamentary privileges. in that case, an elected member of the legislative assembly of new brunswick had violated provisions of the elections act, rsnb 1973, c e-3. a provision of the legislative assembly act, rsnb 1973, c. l-3, prevented him from sitting because of that offence. he tried to have the provision struck down on the ground that it infringed his charter rights. [117] dans une opinion concurrente de l’arrêt harvey, la juge mclachlin a davantage traité de la relation entre la charte et les privilèges parlemen- taires. dans cette affaire, un élu provincial membre de l’assemblée législative du nouveau- brunswick avait violé des dispositions de la loi électorale, lrn-b 1973, c e-3. une disposition de la loi sur l’assemblée législative, lrn-b 1973, c. l-3, l’empêchait de siéger en raison de cette infraction. celui-ci a tenté de la faire invalider au motif qu’elle violait ses droits protégés par la charte. [118] writing for the majority, la forest j. refused to consider the argument relating to parliamentary privileges because the issue had not been seriously argued before the court but had only been raised by an intervener: harvey, at para 20. in concurring reasons, mclachlin j., joined by l’heureux- dubé j., saw no good reason to ignore the argument: harvey, at para 56. [118] au nom des juges majoritaires, le juge la forest a refusé d’étudier l’argument relatif aux pri- vilèges parlementaires parce qu’il n’avait pas été plaidé activement devant la cour, mais seulement soulevé par un intervenant : harvey, par 20. dans des motifs concordants, la juge mclachlin, à qui la juge l’heureux- dubé s’est jointe, n’a vu aucune raison valable d’ignorer l’argument : harvey, par 56. [119] this was the context in which mclachlin j. clarified the interaction between the charter and parliamentary privileges, which in case of conflict must be reconciled in the following way: [119] c’est dans ce contexte que la juge mclachlin a donné des précisions sur l’interaction entre la charte et les privilèges parlementaires — ceux-ci devant, en cas de conflit, être conciliés comme suit : because parliamentary privilege enjoys constitutional status it is not “subject to” the charter, as are ordinary laws. both parliamentary privilege and the charter consti- tute essential parts of the constitution of canada. neither prevails over the other. while parliamentary privilege and immunity from improper judicial interference in parliamentary processes must be maintained, so must the fundamental democratic guarantees of the charter. where apparent conflicts between different constitutional vu que le privilège parlementaire jouit d’un statut constitutionnel, il n’est pas «  assujetti  » à la charte, comme le sont les lois ordinaires. le privilège parlemen- taire et la charte constituent tous deux des parties essen- tielles de la constitution du canada. ils ne l’emportent pas l’un sur l’autre. de même qu’il faut maintenir le privilège parlementaire et l’immunité contre l’intervention inappro- priée des tribunaux dans le processus parlementaire, il faut aussi maintenir les garanties démocratiques fondamentales 746 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. principles arise, the proper approach is not to resolve the conflict by subordinating one principle to the other, but rather to attempt to reconcile them. the necessary reconciliation of parliamentary privilege and s. 3 of the charter is achieved by interpreting the dem- ocratic guarantees of s. 3 in a purposive way. the purpose of the democratic guarantees in the charter must be taken to be the preservation of democratic values inherent in the existing canadian constitution, including the fundamental constitutional right of parliament and the legislatures to regulate their own proceedings. express words would be required to overthrow such an important constitutional principle as parliamentary privilege. it follows that s. 3 of the charter must be read as being consistent with parlia- mentary privilege. [emphasis added.] de la charte. lorsque surgissent des conflits apparents entre différents principes constitutionnels, il convient non pas de résoudre ces conflits en subordonnant un principe à l’autre, mais plutôt d’essayer de les concilier. la conciliation nécessaire du privilège parlementaire et de l’art. 3 de la charte est réalisée en donnant aux garanties démocratiques de l’art. 3 une interprétation fon- dée sur l’objet visé. il faut considérer que les garanties démocratiques de la charte visent à préserver les valeurs démocratiques inhérentes à la constitution canadienne actuelle, dont le droit constitutionnel fondamental du parlement et des législatures de réglementer leurs propres débats. un principe constitutionnel aussi important que le privilège parlementaire ne peut être renversé que de façon expresse. il s’ensuit que l’art. 3 de la charte doit être interprété comme étant compatible avec le privilège parlementaire. [nous soulignons.] (harvey, at paras. 69-70) (harvey, par. 69-70) [120] vaid is the most recent case in which this court considered the issue of parliamentary privi- leges. the former speaker of the house of commons was accused of constructively dismissing his chauf- feur for discriminatory reasons and of engaging in workplace harassment against him within the mean- ing of the canadian human rights act, rsc 1985, c.  h-6. the jurisdiction of the canadian human rights tribunal to investigate mr. vaid’s complaint was challenged: para 1. the house of commons claimed a privilege over the management of all its employees. [120] c’est dans l’affaire vaid que la cour s’est penchée le plus récemment sur la question des pri- vilèges parlementaires. il était reproché à l’ancien président de la chambre des communes d’avoir in- directement congédié son chauffeur pour des motifs discriminatoires, en plus de l’avoir harcelé dans le cadre de son emploi au sens de la loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne, lrc 1985, c h-6. la compétence du tribunal canadien des droits de la personne pour examiner la plainte de m. vaid a été contestée : par 1. la chambre des communes a soulevé le privilège de gestion de l’ensemble de ses employés. [121] binnie j., writing for a unanimous court, set out a 12- point summary of the general princi- ples applicable to parliamentary privileges: vaid, at para 29. in particular, he reaffirmed the impor- tance of the necessity test on the basis that necessity is the historical foundation of every parliamentary privilege: para 29(5). necessity is assessed by ref- erence to the legislative body’s “sphere of activity”. in other words, parliamentary privilege attaches to a “sphere of activity” if “the dignity and efficiency of the house” require it. this will be the case if the “sphere of activity” cannot be left to be dealt with under the ordinary law of the land without interfering with the assembly’s ability to fulfill its constitutional [121] le juge binnie, écrivant pour une cour una- nime, a résumé en 12 points les principes généraux concernant les privilèges parlementaires  : vaid, par 29. il y a réaffirmé notamment l’importance du critère de la nécessité, puisqu’il s’agit selon lui du fondement historique de tout privilège parlemen- taire : par 29(5). la nécessité est évaluée en fonc- tion de la « sphère d’activité » de l’organe législatif. c’est-à-dire que le privilège parlementaire se rat- tache à une « sphère d’activité » si « la dignité et l’efficacité de l’assemblée » le requiert. ce sera le cas si cette « sphère d’activité » ne peut pas relever du régime de droit commun du pays sans que cela nuise à la capacité de l’assemblée de s’acquitter de [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 747 functions: para. 29(5) and (7). the necessity test is to be interpreted broadly: para 29(7). binnie j. also noted that while the recognition of a privilege means that the ordinary law of the land does not apply to the sphere of activity, it would be incorrect to say that parliamentary privilege creates a gap in the general public law of canada; rather, it is an important part of that law, inherited from the parliamentary system of the united kingdom by virtue of the preamble to the constitution act, 1867: para 29(3). ses fonctions constitutionnelles : par. 29(5) et (7). le critère de nécessité doit être interprété largement : par 29(7). d’ailleurs, le juge binnie a noté que, bien que la reconnaissance d’un privilège signifie que le régime de droit commun du pays ne s’applique pas à cette sphère d’activité, il serait faux d’affirmer que le privilège parlementaire crée un hiatus dans le droit public général du canada; il en est plutôt une com- posante importante, héritée du régime parlementaire du royaume- uni aux termes du préambule de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 : par 29(3). [122] having affirmed the place of the necessity test in our constitutional order, binnie j. described categories of privilege that had already been recog- nized by the courts and had solid historical foun- dations. some of the noteworthy examples he gave were: “the power to exclude strangers from proceed- ings   ; disciplinary authority over members   ; and non- members who interfere with the discharge of parliamentary duties” (vaid, at para. 29(10) (em- phasis added)). [122] ayant affirmé la place du critère de néces- sité dans notre ordre constitutionnel, le juge binnie a décrit des catégories de privilèges ayant déjà été reconnues dans la jurisprudence et dont les assises historiques sont solides. il a notamment cité à titre d’exemples : « le pouvoir d’exclure les étrangers des débats [  ]; le pouvoir disciplinaire du parlement à l’endroit de ses membres [  ]; et des non- membres qui s’ingèrent dans l’exercice des fonctions du parlement » (vaid, par. 29(10) (nous soulignons)). [123] the issue in vaid was whether a management privilege attaches to all relations between the house of commons and its employees. binnie j. reaffirmed the applicable test: in order to sustain a claim of parliamentary privilege, the assembly or member seeking its immunity must show that the sphere of activity for which privilege is claimed is so closely and directly connected with the fulfilment by the assembly or its members of their functions as a legislative and deliberative body, including the assembly’s work in holding the government to account, that outside interfer- ence would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its members to do their work with dignity and efficiency. [emphasis added.] [123] dans vaid, il est question de savoir s’il existe un privilège de gestion qui s’applique à l’ensemble des relations entre la chambre des communes et ses employés. le juge binnie réaffirme le critère applicable : pour justifier la revendication d’un privilège parlemen- taire, l’assemblée ou le membre qui cherchent à bénéfi- cier de l’immunité qu’il confère doivent démontrer que la sphère d’activité à l’égard de laquelle le privilège est revendiqué est si étroitement et directement liée à l’exer- cice, par l’assemblée ou son membre, de leurs fonctions d’assemblée législative et délibérante, y compris leur tâche de demander des comptes au gouvernement, qu’une in- tervention externe saperait l’autonomie dont l’assemblée ou son membre ont besoin pour accomplir leur travail dignement et efficacement. [nous soulignons.] (vaid, at para. 46) (vaid, par. 46) [124] binnie j. stressed the importance of the view taken by the speaker of the house of commons regarding what is necessary to ensure a sufficient degree of autonomy for a legislative assembly, even where the exercise of powers affects non- members. in this regard, he noted that “[o]f course    the [124] le juge binnie a insisté sur l’importance de l’opinion du président de la chambre des com- munes quant à ce qui est nécessaire pour assurer un degré suffisant d’autonomie à une assemblée légis- lative, et ce, même lorsque l’exercice touche à des non membres. à cet égard, il a souligné que « les 748 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. courts will clearly give considerable deference to our own parliament’s view of the scope of autonomy it considers necessary to fulfill its functions”: vaid, at para 40. tribunaux feront certes preuve d’une grande rete- nue quant au degré d’autonomie dont notre propre parlement estime devoir bénéficier pour s’acquitter de ses fonctions » : vaid, par 40. [125] in reviewing the canadian and british case law, binnie j. was unable to find any decisions sup- porting a privilege for all parliamentary employees: vaid, at paras 55-70. however, he did state that he had no doubt that privilege covers some employees: para 75. the issue is whether “those categories of employees have any connection (or nexus) with [the house’s] legislative or deliberative functions, or its role in holding the government accountable”: vaid, at para. 70; see also para 62. [125] en étudiant la jurisprudence canadienne et britannique, le juge binnie a été incapable de trouver des décisions justifiant l’existence d’un privilège pour l’ensemble des employés du parlement : vaid, par 55-70. il a cependant précisé ne pas douter que le privilège couvre certains employés : par 75. la question est de savoir si les employés visés « appar- tiennent à une catégorie d’employés ayant quelque chose à voir (un lien) avec les fonctions législatives ou délibératives de la chambre ou avec sa tâche de demander des comptes au gouvernement » : vaid, par. 70; voir aussi par 62. [126] as mentioned, once a claim to privilege is made out, the court need not inquire into the merits of its exercise. at para. 48 of vaid, binnie j. sounded a note of caution that is very relevant in the instant case: [126] rappelons que, une fois l’existence d’un privilège établie, la cour n’a pas à évaluer le bien- fondé de son exercice. d’ailleurs au par. 48 de vaid, le juge binnie a émis un avertissement fort pertinent en l’espèce : once the issue of scope is resolved, it will be for the house to deal with the categories of employees who are covered by the privilege, and the courts will not enquire into its exercise in a particular case. the limitation is of great practical importance. if the courts below were correct about a “human rights exception”, for example, any person dealing with the house of commons could circumvent the jurisdictional immunity conferred by privilege simply by alleging discrimination on grounds contrary to the canadian human rights act. such a rule would amount to an invitation to an outside body to review the reasons behind the exercise of the privilege in each particular case. this would effectively defeat the autonomy of the legis- lative assembly which is the raison d’être for the doctrine of privilege in the first place. [emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted.] une fois la question de l’étendue du privilège résolue, il reviendra à la chambre d’agir à l’égard des employés appartenant aux catégories visées par le privilège et l’exer- cice du privilège dans un cas particulier ne sera pas assujetti à l’examen des tribunaux. il s’agit d’une restriction fort importante sur le plan pratique. à supposer, par exemple, que les tribunaux d’instance inférieure aient eu raison de conclure à l’existence d’une « exception fondée sur les droits de la personne », quiconque traite avec la chambre des communes pourrait contourner l’immunité juridiction- nelle conférée par un privilège simplement en alléguant qu’un acte discriminatoire a été commis en violation de la loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne. une telle règle équivaudrait à inviter un organe externe à contrôler les raisons qui sous- tendent l’exercice du privilège dans chaque cas particulier. l’autonomie de l’assemblée légis- lative, qui au départ est la raison d’être de la doctrine du privilège parlementaire, serait ainsi, de fait, réduite à néant. [nous soulignons; soulignement dans l’original omis.] (4) summary (4) sommaire [127] in our opinion, this historical overview high- lights the following principles that guide our analysis of the present case: [127] à notre avis, ce survol historique met en évidence les principes suivants qui guident notre analyse du présent dossier : [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 749 1 since 1867, parliamentary privileges have been entrenched in the constitution. they are abso- lute. because they have equivalent constitutional status, the charter must be read as being consist- ent with them and not as limiting or abrogating them; 1 depuis 1867, les privilèges parlementaires sont consacrés par la constitution. ils sont absolus. vu leur statut constitutionnel équivalent, la charte doit être interprétée comme étant com- patible avec ces privilèges, sans les limiter ni les abroger; 2 because parliamentary privileges flow from the fundamental principles of our constitutional sys- tem, the fact that the ordinary law does not apply to them is not in any way inconsistent with the rule of law; 2 puisque les privilèges parlementaires découlent des principes fondamentaux de notre régime constitutionnel, le fait que le droit commun ne s’applique pas à leur égard n’est pas du tout incompatible avec la primauté du droit; 3 the jurisdiction of the courts with respect to parliamentary privileges is narrow — they can only ascertain the existence and scope of such privileges. even then, they must give consider- able deference to the view taken by legislative assemblies and their speakers or presidents of the scope of autonomy they consider necessary to fulfill their functions; 3 les tribunaux jouissent d’une compétence étroite en ce qui concerne les privilèges parle- mentaires — ils peuvent uniquement constater leur existence et leur portée. même, ce faisant, les tribunaux doivent faire preuve d’une grande retenue quant au degré d’autonomie dont les assemblées législatives et les présidents de ces assemblées estiment devoir bénéficier pour s’ac- quitter de leurs fonctions; 4 only legislative assemblies have jurisdiction over the exercise of their privileges. furthermore, where a statute appears to limit the exercise of a privilege within a protected sphere, the interpre- tation proposed by the speaker or president must be given predominant weight in the analysis; 4 seules les assemblées législatives ont juridiction quant à l’exercice de leurs privilèges. d’ailleurs, lorsqu’une loi paraît limiter l’exercice d’un pri- vilège à l’intérieur d’une sphère protégée, l’in- terprétation proposée par le président doit jouir d’un poids prépondérant dans l’analyse; 5 the courts must rely on the necessity test to ascertain the existence and scope of privileges. the onus is on the legislative assembly to show that the sphere of activity for which privilege is claimed is so closely and directly connected with the fulfilment by the assembly or its members of their functions as a legislative and deliberative body, including the assembly’s work in holding the government to account, that outside inter- ference would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its members to do their work with dignity and efficiency; 5 c’est en fonction du critère de la nécessité que les tribunaux doivent constater l’existence et l’étendue des privilèges. les assemblées légis- latives ont le fardeau de démontrer que la sphère d’activité à l’égard de laquelle le privilège est revendiqué est si étroitement et directement liée à l’exercice, par l’assemblée ou son membre, de leurs fonctions d’assemblée législative et déli- bérante, y compris leur tâche de demander des comptes au gouvernement, qu’une intervention externe saperait l’autonomie dont l’assemblée ou son membre ont besoin pour accomplir leur travail dignement et efficacement; 6 the necessity test is concerned with a “sphere of activity” of the legislative body that will be excluded from the ordinary law. within a sphere, each specific instance of the exercise of a privi- lege need not be shown by the legislative assem- bly to be necessary; 6 le critère de la nécessité s’attache à une « sphère d’activité » de l’organe législatif, qui sera exclue du régime de droit commun. à l’intérieur d’une sphère, il n’est pas nécessaire pour l’assemblée législative de démontrer que chaque cas précis d’exercice d’un privilège est nécessaire; 750 7. chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. it is well established that legislative assemblies have the privilege to exclude strangers from their proceedings. this privilege is necessary for them to protect themselves from any impediment to their proper functioning. the sergeant-at- arms has historically played an important role in the exercise of this privilege and represents the coer- cive power required to enforce the independence of a legislative assembly; 8 though legislative assemblies do not have any privilege over the management of all their em- ployees, a privilege undoubtedly attaches to an assembly’s relations with some of its employees, namely those who have a connection with its legislative or deliberative functions. 7. il est bien établi que les assemblées législatives jouissent du privilège d’exclure les étrangers de leurs débats. celui-ci est nécessaire pour que les assemblées législatives puissent se protéger contre tout obstacle à leur bon fonctionnement. historiquement, le sergent d’armes a joué un rôle important dans l’exercice de ce privilège; il représente le pouvoir coercitif nécessaire pour faire respecter l’indépendance des assemblées législatives; 8 bien que les assemblées législatives ne jouissent d’aucun privilège de gestion sur l’ensemble de leurs employés, il ne fait aucun doute que les relations entre l’assemblée et certains de ses employés sont sujettes au privilège, soit les em- ployés qui ont un lien avec les fonctions légis- latives ou délibératives de l’assemblée. [128] having identified the applicable principles, we turn to a discussion of the case before us. [128] ayant cerné les principes applicables, nous abordons l’analyse du cas d’espèce. b the guards were dismissed in the exercise of the assembly’s parliamentary privilege b le congédiement des gardiens fait partie de l’exercice du privilège parlementaire de l’as- semblée in this court, the president relied on two [129] privileges to ground his jurisdiction: the privilege over the management of employees and the privilege to exclude strangers. in our view, this case lies at the intersection of these two privileges. [129] devant la cour, le président a invoqué deux privilèges pour établir sa compétence : le privilège de gestion des employés et le privilège d’expulsion des étrangers. selon nous, la présente affaire se trouve à l’intersection de ces deux privilèges. [130] we begin by acknowledging that there is some overlap among the different types of privilege. in addition, the privileges claimed in this case are unwritten constitutional principles, which gives them a considerable degree of flexibility. they are subject to just one rule: necessity. [130] d’emblée, nous reconnaissons qu’il existe un certain chevauchement entre les différents types de privilèges. d’ailleurs, les privilèges invoqués en l’es- pèce sont des principes constitutionnels non écrits, ce qui leur confère un degré considérable de flexibilité. ils obéissent à une seule règle : la nécessité. [131] our position is simple. all of the guards’ tasks fall within a sphere of activity that is necessary to the proper functioning of the assembly, namely security. in particular, the guards exercise the priv- ilege to exclude strangers on the president’s behalf. in our view, employees to whom the exercise of a recognized parliamentary privilege is delegated necessarily perform a function that is closely and directly connected with the assembly’s activities. as [131] notre position est simple. l’entièreté des tâches qui relèvent des gardiens fait partie d’une sphère d’activité nécessaire au bon fonctionnement de l’assemblée, soit la sécurité. ils exercent notam- ment, au nom du président, le privilège d’expulsion des étrangers. selon nous, un employé à qui est délé- gué l’exercice d’un privilège parlementaire reconnu exerce nécessairement une fonction présentant un lien étroit et direct avec les activités de l’assemblée. [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 751 a result, their labour relations fall within the scope of the privilege over the management of employees. we are therefore of the opinion that a decision con- cerning their dismissal is made in the exercise of this privilege — and that it is not reviewable by a court or tribunal. par conséquent, ses relations de travail sont visées par le champ d’application du privilège de gestion des employés. ainsi, nous sommes d’avis que la dé- cision relative à son congédiement relève de l’exer- cice de ce privilège — et qu’elle ne peut être révisée par les tribunaux. [132] as we have seen, the cases clearly establish that parliamentary privilege attaches to a sphere of activity that is necessary to the proper functioning of the assembly. in light of the fact that both the assembly [133] and the parliament of canada have been the victims of armed attacks in our recent history, we have no difficulty concluding that security is essential to the proper functioning of legislative assemblies. in a parliamentary democracy, there can be no free de- bate without security. security is one of the spheres of activity necessary to proceedings in an assembly. this view is not controversial. indeed, it is shared by our colleague karakatsanis j. (para. 38), the ma- jority of the quebec court of appeal (para. 79) and morin ja, dissenting (paras 101-2). it should be borne in mind that the coercive power of the as- sembly, which has historically been vested in the sergeant-at- arms, has been recognized by the courts as being essential to its functioning. the guards’ tasks therefore fall within a sphere of activity “so closely and directly connected with the fulfilment by the assembly or its members of their functions as a legislative and deliberative body, including the assembly’s work in holding the government to ac- count, that outside interference would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its members to do their work with dignity and efficiency”: vaid, at para 46. [132] comme nous l’avons déjà constaté, la juris- prudence établit de façon évidente que le privilège parlementaire se rattache à une certaine sphère d’ac- tivité nécessaire au bon fonctionnement de l’assem- blée. [133] considérant que tant l’assemblée que le par- lement du canada ont été victimes d’attaques armées dans notre histoire récente, nous n’avons aucune difficulté à conclure que la sécurité est essentielle au bon fonctionnement des assemblées législatives. dans une démocratie parlementaire, il ne peut y avoir de débats libres sans sécurité. la sécurité est une telle sphère d’activité nécessaire aux travaux de l’assem- blée. cette opinion n’est pas controversée. d’ail- leurs, notre collègue la juge karakatsanis (par. 38), les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel du québec (par. 79) et le juge morin, dissident (par. 101- 102), y souscrivent. rappelons que le pouvoir coercitif de l’assemblée, historiquement attribué au sergent d’armes, a été reconnu par les tribunaux comme essentiel à son fonctionnement. ainsi, les tâches des gardiens s’insèrent dans une sphère d’activité « si étroitement et directement liée à l’exercice, par l’assemblée ou son membre, de leurs fonctions d’as- semblée législative et délibérante, y compris leur tâche de demander des comptes au gouvernement, qu’une intervention externe saperait l’autonomie dont l’assemblée ou son membre ont besoin pour accomplir leur travail dignement et efficacement » : vaid, par 46. [134] only by carving up this sphere of activity have the majority of the court of appeal and our colleague karakatsanis j. been able to find that the guards’ employment is not covered by parliamentary privileges. in particular, karakatsanis j. states that it might be easier to satisfy the necessity test if the management privilege could protect a limited part of the functions performed by a category of employ- ees: para 37. this proposition is unworkable and [134] c’est uniquement en morcelant cette sphère d’activité que les juges majoritaires de la cour d’ap- pel et notre collègue, la juge karakatsanis, peuvent conclure que l’emploi des gardiens n’est pas visé par les privilèges parlementaires. en effet, la juge karakatsanis indique notamment qu’il pourrait être plus facile de respecter le test de la nécessité si une partie limitée des fonctions d’une catégorie d’employés pouvait être protégée par le privilège 752 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. unrealistic: see president of the legislative council v. kosmas, [2008] sairc 41, 175 ir 269, at para 31. vaid, a recent decision of this court, indicates that the analysis must focus on the “sphere of activity” and “categories of employees”, not on each employ- ee’s specific tasks (para. 29(5) and (6) and para 62). in any event, all of the guards’ tasks relate to the sphere of security. since security is a “necessary sphere of matters without which the dignity and efficiency of the house cannot be upheld” (new brunswick broadcasting, at p. 383), courts and tri- bunals have no jurisdiction over it. de gestion : par 37. cette affirmation est imprati- cable et irréaliste : voir president of the legislative council c. kosmas, [2008] sairc 41, 175 ir 269, par 31. vaid, un précédent récent de la cour, indique que c’est la « sphère d’activité » et les « catégo- ries d’emploi » qui font l’objet de l’analyse, pas les tâches précises de chaque employé (par. 29(5), (6) et par 62). de toute façon, l’ensemble des tâches des gardiens sont reliées à la sphère de la sécurité. la sécurité étant une « catégorie nécessaire de sujets sans lesquels la dignité et l’efficacité de l’assem- blée ne sauraient être maintenues » (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 383), les tribunaux n’ont pas com- pétence en la matière. [135] morin ja, dissenting in the court of ap- peal, also noted that the majority of that court had artificially carved up the relevant sphere of activity. he wrote: [135] le juge morin, dissident à la cour d’appel, a également relevé ce morcellement artificiel auquel ont procédé les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel. il a écrit : [translation] even though the guards are not armed and have no power of arrest, they clearly help ensure the security of the national assembly. it is true that special constables and officers of the sûreté du québec are also involved in providing security services. however, this sphere of activity cannot be carved up, as the arbitrator did, in an attempt to play down the importance of the du- ties performed by the national assembly’s guards, at the risk of undermining the coherence and efficiency of the security system established by the assembly. [emphasis added; para 101]. même si les gardiens ne sont pas armés et n’ont pas le pouvoir d’arrestation, ils contribuent de façon évidente à assurer la sécurité de l’assemblée nationale. il est vrai que des constables spéciaux et des agents de la sûreté du québec sont aussi impliqués dans les services de sé- curité. on ne peut toutefois morceler cette sphère d’ac- tivité, comme l’arbitre l’a fait, pour tenter de diminuer l’importance des fonctions exercées par les gardiens de l’assemblée nationale, au risque de nuire à la cohérence et à l’efficacité du système de sécurité mis en place à l’assemblée. [nous soulignons; par 101] [136] the coherence and efficiency of security in general are essentially a matter falling within the exercise of the president’s privilege to ensure the security of the assembly’s precincts. the decisions made on the front lines are often the most important ones. [136] cette cohérence et cette efficacité de la sécu- rité en général sont en somme une question relevant de l’exercice du privilège du président d’assurer la sécurité de l’enceinte de l’assemblée. les décisions qui sont prises en première ligne sont souvent les plus importantes. [137] not only is the sphere of activity, which includes all of the guards’ tasks, necessary to the proper functioning of the assembly — which would be enough in itself to establish the management privilege — but the guards also exercise one of the president’s parliamentary privileges: the privilege to exclude strangers. this is a conclusive reason why the president should succeed; it does not “merely demonstrat[e] that a category of employees per- forms important tasks that promote the ability of [137] non seulement la sphère d’activité, dans laquelle s’inscrivent toutes les tâches des gardiens, est- elle nécessaire au bon fonctionnement de l’as- semblée — ce qui serait suffisant en soi pour établir le privilège de gestion — mais ces gardiens exercent aussi un des privilèges parlementaires du président : soit le privilège d’exclure les étrangers. c’est un motif déterminant pour justifier que le président doit avoir gain de cause; en effet, il ne fait pas que « dé- montrer simplement qu’une catégorie d’employés [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 753 the assembly to discharge its functions”: reasons of karakatsanis j., at para 40. this category of employ- ees does far more than simply promote the assem- bly’s ability to discharge its functions; it exercises, on the president’s behalf, a privilege that is essential to the assembly’s sovereignty. karakatsanis j. errs in disregarding this distinction. it is essential that the assembly be able to [138] perform its constitutional functions with dignity and efficiency, without any disturbance of its proceed- ings. both members of the public and parliamentar- ians themselves may, through their misbehaviour, interfere with the orderly conduct of proceedings. this is why the assembly has the parliamentary priv- ilege to exclude strangers and the exclusive power to discipline its members and non- members who inter- fere with the discharge of its duties. for this purpose, the president may order any person to maintain order and decorum. this inherent privilege was recognized by this court in new brunswick broadcasting and vaid. these functions, historically performed by the sergeant-at- arms, are closely and directly connected with proceedings in the assembly; they are essential to the expression of its sovereignty: h. cauchon, le privilège parlementaire de gestion du person- nel des assemblées législatives au canada (2008) (online), at p. 83; see also thompson v. mclean (1998), 37 ccel (2d) 170 (ont. cj (gen. div.)), at paras 39-41. accomplit des tâches importantes qui contribuent à la capacité de l’assemblée de s’acquitter de ses fonctions » : motifs de la juge karakatsanis, par 40. bien plus que simplement promouvoir la capacité de l’assemblée d’assumer ses fonctions, cette catégorie d’employés exerce au nom du président un privilège essentiel à la souveraineté de l’assemblée. la juge karakatsanis erre en ignorant cette distinction. il est essentiel que l’assemblée puisse s’ac- [138] quitter de ses fonctions constitutionnelles digne- ment et efficacement, sans que le déroulement de ses travaux ne soit perturbé. tant les membres du public que les parlementaires eux- mêmes peuvent, par leur mauvaise conduite, entraver le bon fonction- nement des délibérations. c’est pourquoi l’assem- blée possède le privilège parlementaire d’exclure des étrangers et la compétence exclusive d’assu- rer la discipline à l’égard de ses membres et des non- membres qui s’ingèrent dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. pour ce faire, le président peut ordonner à quiconque de faire maintenir l’ordre et le déco- rum. ce privilège inhérent a été reconnu par notre cour dans new brunswick broadcasting et vaid. ces fonctions, exercées historiquement par le sergent d’armes, ont un lien étroit et direct avec les travaux de l’assemblée; elles sont essentielles à l’expression de sa souveraineté : h. cauchon, le privilège par- lementaire de gestion du personnel des assemblées législatives au canada (2008) (en ligne), p. 83; voir aussi thompson c. mclean (1998), 37 ccel (2d) 170 (cj. ont. (div. gén.)), par 39-41. [139] in our view, there is no doubt that the con- nection required to ground a management privilege (vaid, at paras. 70 and 75) will be established if it is shown that a category of employees exercises or participates in exercising, in whole or in part, a parliamentary privilege that is both recognized and necessary. the reason is obvious. the president cannot exercise the assembly’s privileges alone. for example, the exercise of the privilege to exclude strangers and to maintain discipline within parlia- mentary precincts was historically delegated to the sergeant-at- arms. however, as shown by payson v. hubert (1904), 34 scr 400, at pp. 416-17, where a speaker or president orders that someone be removed, the order can be carried out by another person, such [139] selon nous, il n’y a aucun doute que le lien nécessaire pour établir l’existence d’un privilège de gestion (vaid, par. 70 et 75) est établi s’il est démontré qu’une catégorie d’employés exerce ou participe à l’exercice, en tout ou en partie, d’un des privilèges parlementaires reconnus et nécessaires. cela s’explique aisément. le président ne peut exer- cer seul les privilèges de l’assemblée. par exemple, l’exercice du privilège d’expulsion des étrangers et de discipline dans l’enceinte du parlement était his- toriquement délégué au sergent d’armes. toutefois, comme l’a démontré l’affaire payson c hubert (1904), 34 rcs 400, p. 416- 417, l’ordre d’expul- sion donné par le président peut être exécuté notam- ment par un gardien de portes, qui, en exerçant un 754 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. as a doorkeeper. in exercising a parliamentary privi- lege, that person comes within a protected sphere of activity and therefore has the immunity conferred by the privilege to exclude strangers. conversely, the speaker or president — who has the last word within this protected sphere of activity — can at any time revoke this delegation and prevent a guard from exercising this privilege on his or her behalf. [140] karakatsanis j. argues that it is irrelevant that the employees exercise a delegated privilege in the performance of their duties, since the issue here is whether “the dismissals of employees who imple- ment this privilege on the president’s behalf must be immune from external review for the assembly to be able to discharge its legislative mandate”: para. 55 (emphasis added). this distinction disregards the jurisdictional aspect of the issue. in our view, the dis- missal of an employee to whom a privilege has been delegated is the ultimate exercise of the management privilege. otherwise, the delegation of a privilege would automatically mean its extinction, since the president would lose effective control of it — that is, control over the identity of the employees respon- sible for obeying the orders and instructions given by the president for the benefit of parliamentarians. privilège parlementaire intègre une sphère d’activité protégée et, de ce fait, bénéficie de l’immunité que procure le privilège d’expulsion. inversement, le président — qui a le dernier mot à l’intérieur de cette sphère d’activité protégée — peut à tout moment révoquer cette délégation et empêcher un gardien d’exercer ce privilège en son nom. [140] la juge karakatsanis soutient qu’il n’est pas pertinent que les employés exercent un privilège délégué dans le cadre de leurs fonctions, puisque la question en l’espèce est celle de savoir si « la décision de congédier des employés qui exercent ce privilège au nom du président doit être à l’abri de toute révision externe pour que l’assemblée puisse s’acquitter de son mandat législatif » : par. 55 (nous soulignons). cette distinction ignore l’aspect de la question relatif à la compétence. à notre avis, le congédiement d’un employé à qui un privilège a été délégué est l’exercice ultime du privilège de gestion. autrement, la délégation d’un privilège signifierait automatiquement son extinction puisque le pré- sident en perdrait le contrôle effectif, soit le contrôle sur l’identité des employés ayant la responsabilité d’obéir à ses ordres et directives données au bénéfice des parlementaires. [141] to preserve the integrity of the privileges of the assembly and its members, the president must be able to manage the employees who exercise these privileges without having his or her decisions called into question. the courts cannot dictate to the assembly how it must go about ensuring the security of its members within its walls by forcing it to em- ploy people the president no longer trusts. it would be a subversion of parliamentary privileges to make them subject to judicial discretion. [141] pour préserver l’intégrité des privilèges de l’assemblée et de ses membres, le président doit pouvoir gérer le personnel qui les exerce sans que ses décisions ne soient remises en cause. les tribunaux ne peuvent dicter à l’assemblée la manière dont elle veille à la sécurité de ses membres à l’intérieur de ses murs en lui imposant des employés en qui le président n’a plus confiance. ce serait dénaturer les privilèges parlementaires que de les soumettre au bon vouloir des tribunaux judiciaires. [142] if the president no longer trusts a guard, for whatever reason, and claims privilege, an arbitration tribunal cannot force the president to rely on such an individual to exercise a privilege. in the present case, the employees concerned are seeking rein- statement. this decision directly affects the exercise of the president’s privilege over the management of employees and indirectly affects the president’s privilege to exclude strangers. it has a direct impact [142] si le président n’a plus confiance en un gardien, peu importe le motif, et qu’il invoque son privilège, un tribunal d’arbitrage ne peut le forcer à compter sur un tel individu pour exercer son pri- vilège. dans le présent dossier, les employés visés demandent leur réintégration. cette décision touche directement à l’exercice du privilège de gestion des employés et indirectement au privilège d’expulsion des étrangers du président. en effet, cette décision [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 755 on the exercise of the president’s absolute privilege to determine the identity and conduct of security staff and the manner in which they ensure that par- liamentary proceedings are not unduly interrupted or disturbed. after all, responsibility for the security of the assembly’s precincts rests squarely on the shoulders of its president: s. 116 of the arna. all decisions relating to security — including decisions concerning the employees to whom the exercise of privileges is delegated — therefore fall within this “sphere of activity”. [143] once the courts have found that the sphere of activity and the category of employees are necessary to the proper functioning of the assembly, the in- quiry ends, since the privilege has been established. there is thus no need to consider, as karakatsanis j. does, whether grievance arbitration — a procedure for reviewing a decision that unquestionably con- cerns the exercise of privilege — may interfere with the proper functioning of the assembly: para 4. this is a serious jurisdictional error that distorts the test laid down in vaid. [144] furthermore, karakatsanis j. does not fo- cus her analysis on the existence of a privilege with respect to a category of employees or a sphere of activity, as required by this court’s decisions: new brunswick broadcasting, at p.  383; vaid, at pa- ras. 29(5), (6), (7), (9) and (10) and paras. 62 and 70. she erroneously considers whether grievance arbitration may jeopardize the dignity of the insti- tution, even though this question has nothing to do with the necessity test itself. grievance arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism is certainly not undignified. in truth, this reasoning could always justify interference by a court or tribunal with the labour relations of all of the assembly’s employees, regardless of whether their functions are directly connected with its proceedings. affecte directement l’exercice du privilège absolu du président de décider de l’identité et de la conduite du personnel de sécurité ainsi que de la manière dont celui-ci veille à ce que les travaux parlementaires ne soient pas indûment interrompus ou dérangés. après tout, la responsabilité d’assurer la sécurité de l’enceinte de l’assemblée repose directement sur les épaules de son président : art. 116 de la lan. de ce fait, toutes les décisions relatives à la sécurité — no- tamment celles qui concernent les employés à qui l’exercice des privilèges est délégué — sont com- prises dans cette « sphère d’activité ». [143] une fois que les tribunaux ont conclu que la sphère d’activité et la catégorie d’emploi sont nécessaires au bon fonctionnement de l’assemblée, l’analyse prend fin puisque l’existence du privilège est établie. il n’y a alors pas lieu de se demander, comme le fait la juge karakatsanis, si l’arbitrage de grief — une procédure visant à réviser une dé- cision qui touche sans contredit l’exercice du privi- lège — peut interférer avec le bon fonctionnement de l’assemblée : par 4. il s’agit d’une erreur juri- dictionnelle grave qui dénature le test établi dans l’arrêt vaid. [144] d’ailleurs, la juge karakatsanis ne centre pas son analyse sur l’existence d’un privilège à l’égard d’une catégorie d’emplois ou d’une sphère d’activité, tel que le requiert la jurisprudence de la cour : new brunswick broadcasting, p. 383; vaid, par. 29(5), (6), (7), (9) et (10) et par. 62 et 70. elle se demande erronément si l’arbitrage de grief peut porter atteinte à la dignité de l’institution. pourtant, cette question n’a rien à voir avec le critère de nécessité lui- même. l’arbitrage de grief, comme mécanisme de règlement des différends, n’est certainement pas indigne. en vérité, ce raisonnement pourrait toujours justifier l’ingérence des tribunaux dans les relations de travail de la totalité des employés de l’assemblée, que leurs fonctions aient ou non un lien direct avec ses travaux. [145] in practice, if a grievance arbitrator could re- view the president’s decision to terminate the guards’ employment, this would mean that part of the exer- cise of the president’s own duties becomes de facto reviewable by a court or tribunal. the assembly [145] en pratique, si un arbitre de grief pouvait réviser la décision du président de mettre fin à l’em- ploi des gardiens, cela signifierait qu’une partie de l’exercice des fonctions du président lui- même de- vient de facto sujette au contrôle par les tribunaux. 756 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. would therefore lose control over decisions concern- ing its security. courts and tribunals may not inter- fere in the assembly’s internal affairs in this manner. the sphere of activity relating to security, and most certainly the category of employees that includes the guards, are subject to an absolute privilege. the assembly is sovereign in this regard, and it is not the role of a court or tribunal to assess the exercise of the privilege over the management of employees once it is claimed. l’assemblée perdrait donc le contrôle sur les dé- cisions touchant à sa sécurité les tribunaux ne peuvent s’immiscer ainsi dans les affaires internes de l’assemblée. la sphère d’activité relative à la « sé- curité », et très certainement la catégorie d’emplois qu’occupent les gardiens, est visée par un privilège absolu. l’assemblée est souveraine à cet égard et il ne revient pas aux tribunaux d’évaluer l’exercice du privilège de gestion des employés lorsqu’il est invoqué. [146] we explicitly reject the other grounds that appear to underlie karakatsanis j.’s narrow interpre- tation of parliamentary privileges. [147] karakatsanis j. relies on the concurring rea- sons of mclachlin j. in harvey to adopt a narrow interpretation of these privileges on the basis that they might undermine the guards’ rights under s. 2(d) of the charter (paras. 28 and 56). however, this was not the position taken by mclachlin j. rather, she stated that since the charter and parliamentary privilege are both part of the constitution, “[n]either prevails over the other”, and it is the charter that “must be read as being consistent with parliamentary privilege”: harvey, at paras 69-70. yet the argument that a privilege repeatedly recognized as full and absolute must have its scope determined in light of the charter subordinates parliamentary privileges to the charter. to be clear, the necessity test is entirely unrelated to charter rights. [148] karakatsanis j. readily justifies her narrow analysis of privilege on the basis of the impact that recognizing a privilege over non- members of the assembly would have: paras. 25 and 56. while it is true that courts are apt to look “more closely” at cases in which privilege has an impact on non- members of a legislative assembly, this statement is of little assistance: vaid, at para 29(12). because such issues are especially important to the balance struck by our constitutional system, close scrutiny is required in every case. [146] nous rejetons explicitement les autres motifs qui semblent sous- tendre l’interprétation restreinte donnée par la juge karakatsanis aux privilèges par- lementaires. [147] la juge karakatsanis se fonde sur les mo- tifs concordants de la juge mclachlin dans l’arrêt harvey pour adopter une interprétation restreinte des privilèges parce que ceux-ci pourraient porter atteinte au droit des gardiens protégés par l’al. 2d) de la charte (par. 28 et 56). or, ce n’est pas la position qu’a défendue la juge mclachlin. elle a plutôt af- firmé que, la charte et les privilèges parlementaires étant tous deux des éléments de la constitution, ils « ne l’emportent pas l’un sur l’autre », et c’est la charte qui « doit être interprété[e] comme étant compatible avec le privilège parlementaire  »  : harvey, par 69-70. pourtant, l’argument voulant que la portée d’un privilège, dont le caractère com- plet et absolu a été reconnu à maintes reprises, soit déterminée à la lumière de la charte subordonne les privilèges parlementaires à cette dernière. pour être clair, le critère de la nécessité est totalement indé- pendant des droits protégés par la charte. [148] d’emblée, la juge karakatsanis justifie son analyse restrictive des privilèges à la lumière de l’incidence qu’aurait la reconnaissance du privilège sur les non- membres de l’assemblée : par. 25 et 56. s’il est vrai que les tribunaux peuvent examiner « de plus près » les affaires où le privilège a des ré- percussions sur des non- membres d’une assemblée législative, cette affirmation est d’un secours limité : vaid, par 29(12). puisque ces questions revêtent une importance particulière pour l’équilibre de notre régime constitutionnel, un examen minutieux est de mise dans tous les cas. [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 757 [149] as we have already stated, the fact that par- liamentary privileges may exclude a sphere of activ- ity from the application of the ordinary law does not make them an exception to the rule of law; they are a distinct and undeniably important pillar in canada’s constitutional architecture. binnie j. put this as fol- lows in vaid: parliamentary privilege does not create a gap in the gen- eral public law of canada but is an important part of it, inherited from the parliament at westminster by virtue of the preamble to the constitution act, 1867 and in the case of the canadian parliament, through s. 18 of the same act (new brunswick broadcasting, at pp. 374-78; telezone inc. v. canada (attorney general) (2004), 69 or (3d) 161 (ca), at p. 165; and samson indian nation and band v. canada, [2004] 1 fcr 556, 2003 fc 975). [149] comme nous l’avons déjà affirmé, le fait que les privilèges parlementaires peuvent soustraire une sphère d’activité à l’application du droit commun ne signifie pas que ceux-ci constituent une excep- tion à la primauté du droit; ils sont un pilier distinct de l’architecture constitutionnelle canadienne dont l’importance est indéniable. le juge binnie l’a ex- primé en ces termes dans vaid : le privilège parlementaire ne crée pas un hiatus dans le droit public général du canada; il en est plutôt une com- posante importante, héritée du parlement du royaume- uni en vertu du préambule de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 et, dans le cas du parlement du canada, en vertu de l’art. 18 de cette même loi (new brunswick broadcasting, p. 374- 378; telezone inc. c. canada (attorney general) (2004), 69 or (3d) 161 (ca), p. 165; et nation et bande indienne de samson c. canada, [2004] 1 rcf 556, 2003 cf 975). (vaid, at para. 29(3)) (vaid, par. 29(3)) in fact, the rule of law is upheld by recogniz- [150] ing that courts and tribunals do not have jurisdiction over the exercise of parliamentary privileges, not by creating exceptions that limit the sovereignty of a legislative assembly and by negating constitutional principles. [150] en fait, la primauté du droit est maintenue en reconnaissant que les tribunaux n’ont pas com- pétence sur l’exercice des privilèges parlementaires, plutôt qu’en créant des exceptions limitant la souve- raineté d’une assemblée législative et en réduisant à néant des principes de nature constitutionnelle. [151] we therefore have no choice but to conclude that the guards’ employment falls within a privileged sphere of activity, that they were dismissed in the exercise of a parliamentary privilege and that, as a result, courts and tribunals have no jurisdiction to interfere. [151] nous n’avons donc d’autre choix que de conclure que l’emploi des gardiens appartient à une sphère d’activité privilégiée, que leur congédiement s’inscrit dans l’exercice d’un privilège parlementaire, et que les tribunaux n’ont donc pas compétence pour intervenir à cet égard. c impact of the arna c l’effet de la lan [152] having found that the president has a privi- lege in relation to the employees concerned, we must now consider the impact of the arna and determine whether the assembly waived its privilege by enact- ing this statute. in our view, it did not. [152] maintenant que nous avons conclu que le président détient un privilège à l’égard des employés visés, il y a lieu que nous nous questionnions sur l’incidence de la lan, et que nous nous demandions si l’assemblée a renoncé à son privilège en adoptant cette loi. nous sommes d’avis que non. [153] first, it is important to note the specificity of the arna of quebec as legislation governing the internal affairs of the national assembly, which are [153] d’abord, il importe de souligner que la lan du québec est particulière puisqu’elle régit les af- faires internes de l’assemblée nationale, affaires qui 758 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. outside the scope of the courts’ jurisdiction. it bears repeating that in bradlaugh, the court of queen’s bench held that the house of commons “has the exclusive power of interpreting the [parliamentary oaths act], so far as the regulation of its own pro- ceedings within its own walls is concerned; and that, even if that interpretation should be erroneous, this court has no power to interfere with it directly or in- directly”: pp. 280-81 (emphasis added). in the same case, stephen j. found that the “house of commons is not subject to the control of her majesty’s courts in its administration of that part of the statute- law which has relation to its own internal proceedings”: p. 278; see also post, at p 38. in its report entitled parliamentary privilege: report of session 2013-14 (july 3, 2013), to which karakatsanis j. refers, the house of lords and house of commons joint com- mittee on parliamentary privilege expressed the view that this statement “holds true to this day and should do so in perpetuity”: p. 8, para. 18 (emphasis added). sont hors de la portée juridictionnelle des tribunaux. il faut rappeler que dans bradlaugh, la cour du banc de la reine a jugé que la chambre des communes [traduction] « possède le pouvoir exclusif d’inter- préter la [parliamentary oaths act], dans la mesure où la réglementation de ses propres procédures à l’intérieur de ses murs est visée; et que, même si cette interprétation était erronée, la cour n’a pas le pouvoir d’intervenir directement ou indirectement à cet égard » : p. 280- 281 (nous soulignons). dans cette même affaire, le juge stephen a conclu que « la chambre des communes n’est pas assujettie au contrôle des tribunaux de sa majesté lorsqu’elle applique les dispositions législatives portant sur sa procédure interne » : p. 278; voir aussi post, p 38. dans le rapport intitulé parliamentary privilege : report of session 2013-14 (3 juillet 2013), rédigé par le joint committee on parliamentary privilege de la chambre des lords et de la chambre des communes, rapport auquel la juge karakatsanis fait référence, le comité conjoint a estimé que cette affirmation [traduction] « demeure vraie encore aujourd’hui et devrait le rester perpétuellement » : p. 8, par. 18 (nous soulignons). [154] though not a definitive answer to the ques- tion, the interpretation proposed by the president must certainly be given predominant weight in de- termining whether the assembly intended to limit its privileges. as binnie j. recognized in vaid, the courts must respect the view taken by a speaker or president of a statute dealing with the internal affairs of a legislative assembly: para. 40; telezone inc. v. canada (attorney general) (2004), 69 or (3d) 161 (ca), at para 32. in any event, we come to the same conclusion, namely that the arna does not have the effect of limiting the privileges held by the president, who may assert them when deemed necessary. [154] sans qu’il s’agisse d’une réponse défini- tive sur la question, l’interprétation proposée par le président doit certainement jouir d’un poids prépondérant lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer si l’as- semblée avait l’intention de limiter ses privilèges. comme l’a reconnu le juge binnie dans vaid, les tribunaux doivent faire preuve de respect à l’égard de l’opinion du président sur une loi portant sur les affaires internes d’une assemblée législative : par. 40; telezone inc. c. canada (attorney general) (2004), 69 or (3d) 161 (ca), par 32. dans tous les cas, nous tirons la même conclusion, soit que la lan n’a pas pour effet de limiter les privilèges du président, qui peut les invoquer lorsqu’il l’estime nécessaire. [155] the necessary starting point in interpreting the arna is undoubtedly its preamble, which recog- nizes that the assembly must, among other things, protect its proceedings from all interference: [155] pour interpréter la lan, il faut sans aucun doute commencer par étudier son préambule, qui reconnaît que l’assemblée doit notamment protéger ses travaux de toute interférence : whereas the people of québec have a deep attachment to democratic principles of government; considérant le profond attachement du peuple du québec aux principes démocratiques de gouvernement; [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 759 whereas the national assembly is, through the elected representatives who compose it, the supreme and legiti- mate organ by which those principles are expressed and applied; considérant que l’assemblée nationale, par l’in- termédiaire des représentants élus qui la composent, est l’organe suprême et légitime d’expression et de mise en œuvre de ces principes; whereas it behooves this assembly, as the guardian of the historical and inalienable rights and powers of the people of québec, to defend it against any attempt to despoil it of its rights and powers or to derogate from them; considérant qu’il incombe à cette assemblée, en tant que dépositaire des droits et des pouvoirs historiques et inaliénables du peuple du québec, de le défendre contre toute tentative de l’en spolier ou d’y porter atteinte; whereas it is befitting, therefore, that the perdurance, the sovereignty and the independence of the national assembly be affirmed, and that its proceedings be pro- tected against all interference, considérant qu’il convient, en conséquence, d’af- firmer la pérennité, la souveraineté et l’indépendance de l’assemblée nationale et de protéger ses travaux contre toute ingérence; [156] upon reading this preamble, we must con- sider the scope given by the union to ss. 110 and 120 of the arna. these sections are worded as follows: [156] à la lecture de ce préambule, il y a lieu de se questionner sur la portée que le syndicat donne aux art. 110 et 120 de la lan dont le libellé est le suivant : 110 subject to this act, the assembly shall continue to be managed within the scope of the acts, regulations and rules applicable. 110 sous réserve de la présente loi, la gestion de l’assemblée continue de s’exercer dans le cadre des lois, règlements et règles qui lui sont applicables. the office may, however, by regulation, derogate from the applicable acts, regulations and rules by specifically indicating the provisions derogated from and the provi- sions that are to apply in their place and stead. toutefois, le bureau peut, par règlement, déroger à ces lois, règlements et règles en indiquant précisément les dispositions auxquelles il est dérogé et les dispositions qui s’appliqueront en leur lieu et place. 120 every member of the personnel of the assembly, except a casual employee, is a member of the personnel of the civil service, whether appointed under the public service act (chapter f-311) or by derogation by virtue of the second paragraph of section 110, unless, in the latter case, the office excludes him therefrom. 120 tout membre du personnel de l’assemblée, à l’exception d’un employé occasionnel, fait partie du per- sonnel de la fonction publique, qu’il soit nommé en vertu de la loi sur la fonction publique (chapitre f-311) ou par dérogation en vertu du deuxième alinéa de l’article 110, à moins que, dans ce dernier cas, le bureau ne l’en exclue. the secretary general has, in respect of the personnel of the assembly, the powers vested in a deputy minister by the public service act. le secrétaire général exerce, à l’égard du personnel de l’assemblée, les pouvoirs que la loi sur la fonction publique attribue au sous- ministre. [157] we have two comments on these provisions. first, s. 110 states that the assembly “shall continue to be managed within the scope of the acts, regula- tions and rules applicable”. in our view, this means that the ordinary law that continues to apply to the assembly is necessarily defined by privilege, which has been a constant in canada’s constitutional his- tory. it seems clear to us that, except in cases where the assembly has expressly provided otherwise, the acts, regulations and rules of the ordinary law have [157] nous formulons deux remarques sur ces dis- positions. premièrement, l’art. 110 souligne que la gestion de l’assemblée « continue de s’exercer dans le cadre des lois, règlements et règles qui lui sont applicables ». ainsi, à notre avis, le régime de droit commun qui continue de s’appliquer à l’assemblée est nécessairement défini par le privilège, qui a été une constante dans l’histoire constitutionnelle du canada. il nous semble évident que, sauf dans le cas où l’assemblée l’a expressément prévu, les lois, 760 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. never applied to a sphere of activity that is subject to parliamentary privileges. [158] second, s. 120 of the arna deals with the power of the office of the assembly to exclude cat- egories of employees from the personnel of the civil service, but it does not mention the privileges of the president, the person who holds and exercises priv- ileges on the assembly’s behalf. did the assembly thus implicitly abolish the privilege over the man- agement of employees entirely by incorporating its employees into the public service, even those who have a direct and necessary connection with its leg- islative and deliberative functions? section 120 of the arna also deals with the management powers granted to the secretary general. did this delega- tion just as implicitly have the effect of partially withdrawing the privilege to exclude strangers from the president? it must be acknowledged that the wording of the arna is not clear. moreover, the union did not identify any parliamentary debates or proceedings showing that the members had parlia- mentary privileges in mind when they were studying the provisions of the arna dealing with employ- ees’ conditions of employment. in contrast, when the british house of commons studied a bill that would apply labour legislation to its employees, the deputy speaker stated: “i have to call the attention of the house to the fact that privilege is involved in these amendments”: united kingdom, house of commons, parliamentary debates, 5th ser., vol. 898, october 29, 1975, col 1693-99. the amendments in question clearly indicated that “(3) nothing in any rule of law or the law or practice of parliament shall prevent proceedings under any enactment applied by subsection (1) or (2) above being instituted before an industrial tribunal”: employment protection act 1975 (uk), 1975, c. 71, s 122(3). règlements et règles du droit commun ne se sont jamais appliqués à une sphère d’activité sujette aux privilèges parlementaires. [158] deuxièmement, l’art. 120 de la lan traite des pouvoirs du bureau de l’assemblée d’exclure des catégories d’emploi du personnel de la fonc- tion publique, sans faire mention des privilèges du président — celui qui détient et exerce les privilèges au nom de l’assemblée. cette dernière a-t-elle ainsi implicitement aboli entièrement son privilège de gestion du personnel en intégrant ses employés à la fonction publique, même ceux ayant un lien direct et nécessaire avec ses fonctions législatives et déli- bératives? l’article 120 de la lan traite également des pouvoirs de gestion attribués au secrétaire gé- néral. de façon tout aussi implicite, est-ce que cette délégation a eu pour effet de retirer au président une partie du privilège d’expulsion des étrangers? force est de constater que le libellé de la lan n’est pas clair. le syndicat n’a d’ailleurs identifié ni débats ni travaux parlementaires qui démontreraient que les députés avaient les privilèges parlementaires à l’esprit lorsqu’ils ont étudié les articles de la lan portant sur les conditions d’emploi du personnel. en revanche, lorsque la chambre des communes britannique a étudié un projet de loi visant à assujettir ses employés à une loi du travail, le vice- président (« deputy speaker ») a déclaré : [traduction] « je me dois de porter à l’attention de la chambre le fait que ces amendements mettent en jeu la question du privilège » : royaume- uni, chambre des commu- nes, parliamentary debates, 5e sér., vol. 898, 29 oc- tobre 1975, col. 1693- 1699. les amendements en question indiquaient clairement que : [traduction] « (3) aucune règle de droit ni aucune loi ou pratique du parlement n’a pour effet d’empêcher l’engage- ment devant un tribunal du travail d’une instance fondée sur les textes de loi applicables en vertu du paragraphe (1) ou (2) qui précède » : employment protection act 1975 (r-u), 1975, c. 71, par 122(3). [159] this court has recognized that parliamen- tary privileges have constitutional status. logically, therefore, the statute must be interpreted in such a way that it does not implicitly abrogate some of these privileges: new brunswick broadcasting, at pp 391-92. conversely, it is undesirable to adopt [159] notre cour a reconnu que les privilèges par- lementaires jouissent d’un statut constitutionnel. logiquement, il faut donc interpréter la loi de telle sorte qu’elle n’abroge pas implicitement certains de ces privilèges : new brunswick broadcasting, p. 391- 392. à l’inverse, il n’est pas souhaitable de [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 761 an interpretation to the effect that the assembly im- plicitly considers a privilege unnecessary, thereby denying its existence. yet this is what karakatsanis j. does. she gives with one hand and takes with the other. this criticism also applies to the reasons of justice rowe, who finds that the arna must take precedence in this case, even in respect of privileges that are otherwise necessary. in his view, the fact that the assembly’s employees are members of the public service and that powers to manage employees have been delegated to the secretary general means that the management privilege and part of the privilege to exclude strangers have been implicitly abrogated. [160] considered as a whole, the material before us leads us to adopt the interpretation proposed by the president. in our opinion, more is needed to abrogate a constitutional privilege. in his reasons, rowe j. argues that ss. 110 and 120 of the arna are also constitutional in nature because they are part of the constitution of the province: paras 68-69. in our view, that conclusion has no bearing on the analysis. as in new brunswick broadcasting, it is necessary to reconcile constitutional rights rather than subordinat- ing one to the other. the arna governs labour rela- tions in the event that the assembly does not assert its privileges. as a result, neither privilege nor the provisions of the arna are rendered meaningless. [161] the court of appeal therefore did not err in its decision in association des juristes de l’état v. québec (procureur général), 2013 qcca 1900. while it is true that levesque ja cited with ap- proval brun, tremblay and brouillet, who them- selves cited duke of newcastle v. morris (1870), lr 4 hl 661 — a decision criticized by binnie j. in vaid — he did not err in interpreting the arna in light of constitutional principles of interpretation: privilégier une interprétation selon laquelle, impli- citement, l’assemblée n’estimerait pas ce privilège nécessaire, niant ainsi du même coup son existence. c’est pourtant ce que fait la juge karakatsanis. elle donne d’une main et reprend de l’autre. cette critique s’applique également aux motifs du juge rowe qui retient que la lan doit avoir préséance en l’espèce, même à l’égard de privilèges autrement nécessaires. pour le juge rowe, le fait que les employés de l’as- semblée fassent partie de la fonction publique et que les pouvoirs de gestion des employés aient été délégués au secrétaire général a implicitement abrogé le privilège de gestion et une partie du privilège d’expulsion des étrangers. [160] considérés dans leur ensemble, les éléments dont nous disposons nous poussent à adopter l’inter- prétation proposée par le président. selon nous, il faut plus pour abroger un privilège de nature consti- tutionnelle. dans ses motifs, le juge rowe soutient que les art. 110 et 120 de la lan sont aussi de nature constitutionnelle, en ce sens qu’ils feraient partie de la constitution de la province : par 68-69. selon nous, cette conclusion n’a aucune incidence sur l’analyse. comme dans new brunswick broadcasting, il faut concilier les droits constitutionnels, plutôt que d’en assujettir un à l’autre. la lan régit les relations de travail advenant que l’assemblée n’invoque pas ses privilèges. ni le privilège ni les dispositions de la lan ne sont ainsi vidés de leur sens. [161] l’arrêt de la cour d’appel dans association des juristes de l’état c. québec (procureur géné- ral), 2013 qcca 1900, ne souffre donc d’aucune erreur. certes, le juge levesque cite en approuvant leurs propos les auteurs brun, tremblay et brouillet, qui eux- mêmes citent duke of newcastle c. morris (1870), lr 4 hl 661 — une décision critiquée par le juge binnie dans vaid; il ne commet toutefois pas d’erreur lorsqu’il interprète la lan à la lumière des principes d’interprétation constitutionnels : [translation] these authors clearly illustrate their ces auteurs illustrent bien leur pensée lorsqu’ils thinking when they add: ajoutent : finally, a parliamentary privilege prevails over laws that do not specifically contradict it: duke of newcastle v. morris (1870), lr 4 hl 661. this is why, under enfin, un privilège parlementaire prévaut sur les lois qui n’y contreviennent pas spécifiquement : duke of newcastle c. morris, (1870) lr 4 hl 661. c’est 762 chagnon v sfpq côté and brown jj. [2018] 2 scr. the general provisions of the act respecting public inquiry commissions, rsq, c. c-37, a member can- not be forced to testify while parliament is in session. similarly, general labour legislation was found to be inapplicable to employees of the legislative assem- bly in mgea v. manitoba (legislative assembly management commission) (1990), 63 man. r. (2d) 37 (qb), and house of commons v. canada labour relations board, [1986] 2 fc 372 (ca), at p 384. also, the ontario human rights code could not be used to challenge the recital of a prayer every day the legislative assembly met, as provided for in its standing orders: ontario (speaker of the legislative assembly) v. ontario (human rights commission) (2001), 201 dlr (4th) 698 (ont. ca). although it was qualified in vaid, at pp. 703 and 713-15, the rule of interpretation referred to here can still apply in appropriate cases, in our view. ainsi qu’on ne peut, en vertu des dispositions géné- rales de la loi sur les commissions d’enquête, lrq, c. c-37, forcer un député à témoigner pendant une session du parlement. de même, les lois du travail générales furent jugées inapplicables aux employés d’assemblée législative dans mgea c. manitoba (legislative assembly management commission), (1990) 63 man r.  (2d) 37  (br) et chambre des communes c. conseil canadien des relations du travail, [1986] 2 cf 372 (ca), 384. aussi, le code ontarien des droits de la personne n’a pu permettre d’attaquer la récitation de la prière prévue pour chaque séance par le règlement de l’assemblée législative : ontario (speaker of the legislative assembly) c ontario (human rights commission) (2001), 201 dlr (4th) 698 (ca. ont). même si elle fut nuancée dans vaid, aux p. 703 et 713- 715, nous croyons que la règle d’in- terprétation ici évoquée peut encore jouer dans les cas appropriés. in short, to say that parliamentary privileges prevail over labour legislation does not necessarily mean that sections 110 and 120 of the arna have been stripped of all effect. all aspects of labour relations within the pre- cincts of the national assembly that are not covered by the parliamentary privilege over the management of em- ployees remain subject to these provisions. it is necessary here to adopt an interpretation that is consistent with the application of constitutional principles. [emphasis added.] bref, affirmer que les privilèges parlementaires ont préséance sur les lois du travail ne signifie pas pour autant que l’on purge les articles 110 et 120 de la lan de tout effet. tous les aspects des relations de travail réalisés dans l’enceinte de l’assemblée nationale qui ne relèvent pas du privilège parlementaire de gestion du personnel restent assujettis à ces dispositions. il y a lieu ici de privilégier une interprétation qui respecte l’application des principes constitutionnels. [nous soulignons.] (paras. 30-31 (canlii)) (par. 30-31 (canlii)) [162] contrary to what rowe j. argues, it is not a matter here of requiring express language in the arna; rather, it is a matter of requiring clear, un- equivocal legislative intent. such a requirement is not a retreat from the modern approach to statutory interpretation in our view, the fact that the em- ployees are members of the public service and that management of the assembly’s day-to- day busi- ness has been delegated to the secretary general is not enough to abolish or modify parliamentary privileges that have such deep historical roots and that are still necessary. in fact, the interpretation adopted by rowe j. implies that an express pro- vision in the arna would be required to preserve the assembly’s privileges. in addition, it should be noted that rowe j. deals only with the management privilege and disregards the impact of his interpre- tation on the exercise of the inherent privilege to [162] contrairement à ce que soutient le juge rowe, il ne s’agit pas en l’espèce d’exiger la pré- sence de termes exprès dans la lan, mais plutôt de requérir une intention législative claire et non équivoque. une telle exigence ne constitue pas un abandon de la méthode moderne d’interprétation des lois. nous sommes d’avis que l’intégration des employés à la fonction publique et la délégation de la gestion des activités courantes de l’assemblée au secrétaire général ne sont pas suffisantes pour abolir ou modifier des privilèges parlementaires dont les racines historiques sont aussi profondes et qui sont encore nécessaires. en vérité, l’interprétation du juge rowe sous- entend que la lan devrait contenir une disposition expresse à cet effet pour que les privi- lèges de l’assemblée soient préservés. de surcroît, il faut souligner que le juge rowe traite uniquement du privilège de gestion et ignore l’incidence de son [2018] 2 rcs. chagnon c sfpq les juges côté et brown 763 exclude strangers, an aspect that affects the employ- ment of the security guards. interprétation sur l’exercice du privilège inhérent d’expulsion des étrangers, une particularité qui touche à l’emploi des gardiens de sécurité. in the end, the arna did not abolish any [163] parliamentary privileges. moreover, in view of the real ambiguity in ss. 110 and 120 of the arna, it is preferable to adopt the interpretation proposed by the president. the national assembly of québec is sovereign. courts and tribunals cannot assume juris- diction without a clear indication that the assembly has conferred it on them. [163] en définitive, la lan n’a pas aboli de privi- lèges parlementaires. de plus, compte tenu de l’am- biguïté réelle des art. 110 et 120 de la lan, il est préférable de privilégier l’interprétation proposée par le président. l’assemblée nationale du québec est souveraine. les tribunaux ne peuvent s’arroger une juridiction sans une indication claire que l’as- semblée la leur confère. v conclusion v conclusion [164] over the centuries, parliamentary privileges have gradually taken their place within the broader principle of sovereignty of legislative assemblies. indeed, the assertion of parliamentary privileges, de- fended on parliament’s behalf by a sergeant-at- arms, among others, has enabled parliament to achieve a degree of independence from the other branches of government. parliamentary privileges are not a tool for protecting the independence and sovereignty of legislative assemblies, but are in fact what has al- lowed them to exist. it was the assertion of privileges that ensured the development of a model in which the various branches acquired some independence from one another. recognition of the fact that parliamen- tary privileges are an expression of the assembly’s sovereignty makes it all the more necessary to re- spect the assembly’s jurisdiction. [164] au fil des siècles, les privilèges parlemen- taires se sont progressivement inscrits dans le prin- cipe plus large de la souveraineté des assemblées législatives. en effet, l’affirmation de l’existence des privilèges parlementaires, défendus au nom du parlement notamment par le sergent d’armes, a per- mis au parlement de faire preuve d’un certain niveau d’indépendance par rapport aux autres branches du gouvernement. les privilèges parlementaires ne sont pas un outil pour protéger l’indépendance et la sou- veraineté des assemblées législatives, ils sont bel et bien ce qui leur a permis d’exister. c’est l’affirmation de l’existence des privilèges qui a assuré l’évolution vers un modèle où les différents pouvoirs ont acquis un certain degré d’indépendance les uns vis-à-vis des autres. vu la reconnaissance du fait que les privilèges parlementaires sont une expression de la souverai- neté de l’assemblée, le respect de la compétence de cette dernière est d’autant plus nécessaire. [165] for these reasons, we are of the opinion that the grievance arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. the appeal should be allowed and the grievances dismissed. [165] pour ces motifs, nous sommes d’avis que l’arbitre de grief n’était pas compétent pour entendre l’affaire. il y aurait lieu d’accueillir le pourvoi et de déclarer les griefs irrecevables. appeal dismissed with costs throughout, côté pourvoi rejeté avec dépens dans toutes les cours, and brown jj. dissenting. les juges côté et brown sont dissidents. procureurs de l’appelant  :  langlois avocats, québec; national assembly of québec, québec. québec; assemblée nationale du québec, québec. procureurs de l’intimé : poudrier bradet, québec. québec. 764 chagnon v sfpq [2018] 2 scr. joyal, pc: serge. joyal, ottawa; conway baxter wilson, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenant l’honorable serge joyal, cp : serge. joyal, ottawa; conway baxter wilson, ottawa. legislative assembly of ontario: blake, cassels & graydon, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant le président de l’as- semblée législative de l’ontario : blake, cassels & graydon, toronto.
[1] the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence are fundamental tenets of our criminal jus- tice system. in the pre- trial context, release — at the earliest opportunity and in the least onerous manner — is the default presumption in canadian criminal law. pre- trial detention is the exception, not the rule. [1] le droit à la liberté et la présomption d’inno- cence sont des préceptes fondamentaux de notre système de justice criminelle. lors des procédures préalables au procès, la mise en liberté — à la pre- mière occasion et aux conditions les moins sévères possible — est la présomption qui s’applique par défaut en droit criminel canadien. la détention avant le procès est l’exception et non la règle. [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 111 [2] and yet there are a significant number of in- dividuals in remand custody at any given time in canada. in some cases, accused persons are detained in provincial jails for the entire length of the pre- trial process, which can amount to hundreds of days in custody. this appeal concerns those individuals, and their right to what has become known as the “90- day detention review” under s. 525 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“cr. c”). [3] this court has addressed issues related to bail and detention on several occasions in recent years. in r v. antic, 2017 scc 27, [2017] 1 scr 509, it clarified the ladder principle in the law of bail and the framework for authorizing release under s. 515 cr. c. in r v. oland, 2017 scc 17, [2017] 1 scr 250, the court addressed the issues of release pending appeal under s.  679 cr c and the review under s. 680 cr. c. in r v. st- cloud, 2015 scc 27, [2015] 2 scr 328, it considered the test for detention under s. 515(10)(c) and bail review under ss. 520 and 521 cr. c. [4] in the case at bar, the court is asked to de- termine the correct approach to a detention review under s. 525 cr. c., and to explain the place of such a review within the larger context of pre- trial custody in canada. for the reasons that follow, i find that parliament intended s. 525 to operate as a safeguard. this section imposes an independent responsibil- ity on the reviewing judge to consider whether the continued detention of the accused is justified, and establishes a discretionary mechanism designed to prevent unreasonable delay and to expedite the tri- als of individuals in remand. given that mr. myers’ appeal is moot, i would simply allow the appeal and make no further order. [2] et pourtant, chaque jour, il y a au canada un grand nombre d’individus en détention provisoire. dans certains cas, les prévenus sont détenus dans des prisons provinciales pour toute la durée des étapes préalables au procès, ce qui représente des centaines de jours passés en détention provisoire. le pourvoi concerne ces individus et leur droit à ce qu’on en est venu à appeler le « contrôle des motifs de la détention après 90 jours » dont il est question à l’art. 525 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46 (« c cr »). [3] notre cour s’est penchée à plusieurs reprises au cours des dernières années sur la détention et la mise en liberté sous caution. dans l’arrêt r c. antic, 2017 csc 27, [2017] 1 rcs 509, la cour a clarifié le « principe de l’échelle », qui fait partie des règles régissant la mise en liberté sous caution, et elle a pré- cisé les paramètres en fonction desquels la mise en liberté peut être autorisée en vertu de l’art 515 c cr. dans r c. oland, 2017 csc 17, [2017] 1 rcs 250, la cour a abordé la mise en liberté en attendant la décision sur l’appel en application de l’art 679 c cr. et la révision prévue à l’art 680 c cr. dans l’arrêt r c. st- cloud, 2015 csc 27, [2015] 2 rcs 328, la cour a examiné le motif justifiant la détention énoncé à l’al. 515(10)c) et la révision, prévue aux art. 520 et 521 c cr., des ordonnances sur la mise en liberté sous caution. [4] dans le cas qui nous occupe, la cour est ap- pelée à se prononcer sur la bonne façon d’aborder l’examen de la détention prévu à l’art 525 c cr, et à expliquer la place qu’il occupe dans le contexte plus large de la détention avant le procès au ca- nada. pour les motifs qui suivent, j’estime que le parlement voulait que l’art.  525  c.  cr serve de disposition de garantie. cet article impose au juge saisi de la demande de révision la responsabilité in- dépendante de se demander si le maintien en déten- tion du prévenu est justifié. il prévoit par ailleurs un mécanisme discrétionnaire visant à empêcher tout délai anormal et à accélérer le procès des individus qui se trouvent en détention provisoire. comme le pourvoi de m. myers est théorique, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et de ne rendre aucune autre ordonnance. 112 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. ii background ii contexte a arrest and prior charges a l’arrestation et les accusations antérieures [5] on january 4, 2016, mr. myers was arrested following a high- speed car chase involving gunfire in surrey and delta, british columbia. he was charged with a number of offences, including intentionally discharging a restricted or prohibited firearm; oc- cupying a motor vehicle knowing that there was a firearm in the vehicle; using a firearm in commit- ting an indictable offence; possessing a restricted or prohibited firearm; and possessing a weapon and/ or ammunition contrary to a lifetime firearms ban. [6] mr. myers was already on bail for unrelated break and enter charges when he was arrested. he had various prior convictions, was on probation, and was under multiple court- ordered prohibitions against possessing firearms and ammunition. he was also the subject of a canada- wide warrant for charges that had been laid in alberta in 2015. [7] at the time of his arrest, mr. myers consented to detention without a bail hearing. about four months later, he pled guilty to the outstanding break and enter charges and was sentenced to 14 months incarceration. his release date in relation to those of- fences would have been in october 2016, taking time served into account. as of october 2016, mr. myers was no longer detained on any matter other than the new charges related to his arrest on january 4. b ruling on the judicial interim release applica- tion (sudeyko prov. ct j) [5] le 4 janvier 2016, m. myers a été arrêté à la suite d’une poursuite à haute vitesse en voiture au cours de laquelle des coups de feu ont été échan- gés dans les rues de surrey et de delta (colombie- britannique). il a été accusé de plusieurs infractions, notamment d’avoir délibérément déchargé une arme à feu prohibée ou à autorisation restreinte, d’avoir oc- cupé un véhicule automobile tout en sachant qu’une arme à feu se trouvait à bord, d’avoir utilisé une arme à feu pour commettre un acte criminel, d’avoir eu en sa possession une arme à feu prohibée ou à autorisa- tion restreinte et d’avoir eu en sa possession une arme et/ou des munitions en violation d’une interdiction perpétuelle d’avoir des armes à feu en sa possession. [6] lorsqu’il a été arrêté, m. myers était déjà en liberté sous caution par suite d’accusations d’intro- duction par effraction non liées à celles qui nous intéressent en l’espèce. il faisait l’objet de plusieurs condamnations antérieures, était en probation et était sous le coup de nombreuses interdictions judiciaires de possession d’armes à feu et de munitions. il faisait également l’objet d’un mandat d’arrestation panca- nadien pour des accusations portées contre lui en alberta en 2015. [7] au moment de son arrestation, m. myers avait accepté d’être détenu sans enquête sur sa remise en liberté sous caution. environ quatre mois plus tard, il a reconnu sa culpabilité aux accusations d’intro- duction par effraction et a été condamné à 14 mois d’emprisonnement. la date de mise en liberté de m. myers pour les infractions susmentionnées aurait été en octobre 2016, compte tenu du temps qu’il avait déjà purgé. en octobre 2016, m. myers n’était plus détenu pour d’autres faits, hormis les nouvelles accusations liées à son arrestation du 4 janvier. b décision sur la demande de mise en liberté pro- visoire par voie judiciaire (le juge sudeyko, de la cour provinciale) [8] mr. myers sought bail for the first time in re- spect of those charges on november 9, 2016. he [8] le 9 novembre 2016, m. myers a demandé pour la première fois d’être libéré sous caution [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 113 was in a reverse onus position at the bail hearing: s. 515(6) cr c. the judge considered the relative strength of the crown’s case, mr. myers’ criminal record and, to a lesser extent, his other outstanding charges. the judge noted that mr. myers had a his- tory of failing to follow court orders, and of then committing other offences. defence counsel had submitted that mr. myers, who was only 26, had an opiate addiction and that it was the root cause of his criminal history. the defence proposed that mr. myers therefore be released into a residential drug treatment facility, and suggested cash bail, a daily reporting requirement, an ankle bracelet and electronic monitoring as additional conditions. however, the judge was not satisfied that any terms of release would adequately address the risk that mr. myers would, if released, commit other offences or interfere with the administration of justice. he therefore dismissed the application and ordered that mr. myers be detained on the basis of the ground set out in s 515(10)(b). c ruling on the section  520 detention review (sudeyko prov. ct. j.) [9] at the preliminary inquiry on november 24, 2016, it was revealed that the crown’s key witness was no longer willing to testify and that the crown would need to seek admission of his police statement at trial instead. counsel for mr. myers immediately sought a review of mr. myers’ detention under s. 520 on the basis of this new weakness in the crown’s case. that review application was denied on the basis that the judge saw no significant change that would justify releasing mr. myers at that time. relativement aux accusations précitées. c’était lui qui devait démontrer que sa détention sous garde n’était pas justifiée lors de l’enquête sur sa remise en liberté sous caution : par 515(6) c cr. le juge a examiné la solidité relative de la preuve du minis- tère public, les antécédents criminels de m. myers et, dans une moindre mesure, les autres accusa- tions en instance contre lui. il a fait observer que m.  myers avait l’habitude de ne pas se confor- mer aux ordonnances judiciaires et de récidiver. l’avocat de la défense a fait valoir que m. myers, qui n’avait que 26 ans, était aux prises avec une dé- pendance aux opiacés, ce qui était la cause profonde de ses antécédents criminels. en conséquence, la défense a proposé que m. myers soit mis en liberté et qu’il soit envoyé dans un centre de désintoxi- cation en thérapie fermée, en plus de suggérer, à titre de conditions supplémentaires, le versement d’une caution en argent, l’obligation de se présenter chaque jour à des agents et de porter un bracelet émetteur et un mécanisme de surveillance élec- tronique. toutefois, le juge n’était pas convaincu que des conditions de mise en liberté tiendraient suffisamment compte des risques que m.  myers récidive ou entrave l’administration de la justice. en conséquence, il a rejeté la demande et ordonné la détention de m. myers pour le motif énoncé à l’al 515(10)b). c décision sur la demande de révision présentée en vertu de l’art. 520 (le juge sudeyko, de la cour provinciale) [9] lors de l’enquête préliminaire du 24  no- vembre 2016, il a été révélé que le témoin clé du ministère public n’était plus disposé à témoigner et qu’il faudrait donc que le ministère public sollicite plutôt l’admission en preuve au procès de la décla- ration faite par ce témoin aux policiers. l’avocat de m. myers a demandé sur-le- champ la révision de la détention de ce dernier en vertu de l’art. 520 en invoquant cette nouvelle faille dans la preuve du ministère public. cette demande de révision a été re- jetée car le juge n’avait constaté l’existence d’aucun changement important qui aurait justifié la libération de m. myers à ce moment-là. 114 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. d decision of the supreme court of british colum- bia (riley j.), 2017 bcsc 1717 d décision de la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique (le juge riley), 2017 bcsc 1717 [10] in a letter dated march 14, 2017, crown coun- sel asked the defence whether mr. myers wished to pursue a bail review under s 525. in the resulting hearing on july 21 of that year, given the existence of competing lines of authority, riley j. of the british columbia supreme court heard submissions from both parties on the correct approach to take under s.  525 his reasons for judgment were released on september 27, 2017. [11] riley j. concluded that the correct test at a s. 525 hearing involves a two- step process. he found that the accused must first convince the reviewing judge either that there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings on the crown’s part or that the passage of time has had a material impact on the initial basis for detaining the accused. if either of these thresholds is met, the judge must then deter- mine whether the detention of the accused remains justified within the meaning of s 515(10). [10] dans une lettre datée du 14 mars 2017, le procureur du ministère public a demandé à la défense si m. myers souhaitait demander le contrôle de sa détention en vertu de l’art 525. compte tenu de la jurisprudence contradictoire à ce sujet, le juge riley, de la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique, a entendu, au cours de l’audience tenue le 21 juil- let 2017 qui en a découlé, les observations des deux parties sur la bonne façon d’aborder l’art 525. ses motifs de jugement ont été rendus publics le 27 sep- tembre 2017. [11] le juge riley a conclu que le critère qu’il convenait d’appliquer lors de l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 comportait une démarche en deux étapes. il a conclu que l’accusé doit d’abord convaincre le juge siégeant en contrôle soit qu’il y a eu un délai anormal dans les procédures par la faute du minis- tère public, soit que l’écoulement du temps a eu des conséquences importantes sur les raisons ayant motivé à l’origine la détention du prévenu. si l’un ou l’autre de ces critères préliminaires est satisfait, le juge doit ensuite décider si la détention du prévenu est toujours justifiée au sens du par 515(10). [12] the review proceeded on october 5, 2017. because of the formulation of the test, mr. myers made no submissions and his detention order was confirmed. [12] le contrôle de la détention a eu lieu le 5 oc- tobre 2017. en raison de la formulation du critère, m. myers n’a pas présenté d’observations et son ordonnance de détention a été confirmée. e mootness e caractère théorique [13] mr. myers filed his application for leave to ap- peal while he was still in pre- trial custody. however, he pled guilty on january 29, 2018 to one count of occupying a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm in it under s. 94(1) cr. c., and one count of possessing ammunition contrary to a prohibi- tion under s 11701(1). cr c. the crown entered a stay of proceedings on all the remaining counts on the indictment, and mr. myers was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. as he is no longer in pre- trial custody, the appeal is moot. [13] m. myers a présenté une demande d’autori- sation d’appel alors qu’il était toujours en détention avant son procès. toutefois, le 29 janvier 2018, il a plaidé coupable à l’accusation d’avoir occupé un vé- hicule automobile tout en sachant qu’une arme à feu s’y trouvait, infraction prévue au par 94(1) c cr et il a reconnu sa culpabilité à un chef de possession de munitions, infraction prévue au par 11701(1) c cr. le ministère public a demandé l’arrêt des procédures sur tous les autres chefs de l’acte d’accusation et m. myers a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonne- ment de 30 mois. comme il n’est plus détenu avant son procès, le pourvoi est théorique. [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 115 [14] this court recognized in oland that bail- related matters are inherently “evasive of appellate review” owing to their temporary nature: para 17. despite the fact that pre- trial detention is governed by federal law, there has been a widespread, and systemic, divergence in the approaches taken to 90- day detention reviews by courts across canada. all the parties have made submissions to the effect that guidance from this court is needed in order to deter- mine which of these competing approaches should apply and to establish clarity in the law. the court has therefore exercised its discretion to hear the ap- peal on the merits: see borowski v. canada (attorney general), [1989] 1 scr 342, at pp 358-63. [14] comme notre cour l’a reconnu dans l’arrêt oland, du fait de sa nature temporaire, la mise en liberté sous caution « ne peut être révisée en appel » : par 17. même si la détention avant le procès est régie par le droit fédéral, il existe une divergence de vues généralisée et systémique en ce qui concerne l’approche adoptée par les tribunaux canadiens en matière de contrôle de la détention après 90 jours. toutes les parties ont fait valoir qu’il était nécessaire que notre cour jette des balises pour résoudre ces approches divergentes et clarifier le droit. la cour a donc exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire et décidé d’entendre le pourvoi sur le fond : voir borowski c. canada (procureur général), [1989] 1 rcs 342, p 358-363. iii issue iii question en litige [15] this appeal raises a single question: what is the correct approach to a detention review hearing under s. 525 of the cr. c.? [15] le pourvoi soulève une seule question : quelle est la façon adéquate de procéder à l’examen d’une détention en vertu de l’art. 525 du c cr.? iv analysis iv analyse a two competing approaches to section 525 a les deux façons divergentes d’aborder l’art. 525 [16] the parties suggest that the choice before this court is between two competing approaches to s 525 hearings. according to the first approach, unreasonable delay in getting the case to trial is a threshold condition in the absence of an unrea- sonable delay, the judge at a s. 525 hearing cannot ask whether the detention remains necessary on the basis of the grounds set out in s. 515(10): see, eg,. r v. gill, 2005 canlii 22214 (ont. scj);. r v kissoon, 2006 canlii 40493 (ont scj);. r v jerace, 2012 bcsc 2007; r v. whiteside, 2016 bcsc 131; r v. elmi, 2016 bcsc 376; r v. russell, 2016 nltd(g) 208, 34 cr (7th) 262; r. v. cheeseman, 2017 nltd(g) 114. [16] selon les parties, la cour doit choisir entre deux façons divergentes d’aborder l’audience prévue à l’art 525. selon la première approche, l’existence d’un délai anormal avant que l’affaire n’aboutisse au procès constitue une condition préalable. sans délai anormal, le juge qui préside l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 ne peut se demander si la détention elle- même demeure nécessaire pour les motifs énoncés au par. 515(10) : voir, p ex, r c. gill, 2005 canlii 22214 (csj ont);. r c. kissoon, 2006 canlii 40493 (csj ont);. r c. jerace, 2012 bcsc 2007; r c. whiteside, 2016 bcsc 131; r c. elmi, 2016 bcsc 376; r c. russell, 2016 nltd(g) 208, 34 cr (7th) 262; r c. cheeseman, 2017 nltd(g) 114. [17] under the alternative approach, unreasona- ble delay is not a threshold condition. instead, the judge at a s. 525 hearing simply considers whether the continued detention of the accused is necessary on the basis of s. 515(10), and unreasonable de- lay is one possible factor in that analysis: see, eg, [17] l’autre approche ne considère pas l’existence d’un délai anormal comme une condition préalable. le juge qui préside l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 se demande simplement si le maintien en détention du prévenu est nécessaire suivant le par. 515(10), en consi- dérant le délai anormal comme un facteur potentiel 116 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. r v. thorsteinson, 2006 mbqb 184, 206 man. r (2d) 188; r v. sawrenko, 2008 yksc 27; r v. sarkozi, 2010 bcsc 1410; r v. mccormack, 2014 onsc 7123; r v. vandewater, 2014 bcsc 2502; r v. haleta, 2015 bcsc 850; r v. goudreau, 2015 bcsc 1227; r v. piazza, 2015 qccs 707. [18] whether or not unreasonable delay operates as a threshold condition is clearly of fundamental importance to this appeal. however, this case re- quires the court to do more than simply choose one approach or the other. like antic, it concerns a provision of federal law that has been applied in- consistently across the country: paras. 6 and 65-66. practices vary widely from place to place in terms of when s. 525 hearings happen, whether they are mandatory, what factors are considered and which test is applied. it is up to this court to apply the prin- ciples of statutory interpretation in order to resolve this issue. dans cette analyse : voir, p ex,. r c. thorsteinson, 2006  mbqb 184, 206 man r (2d) 188; r.  c. sawrenko, 2008 yksc 27; r c. sarkozi, 2010 bcsc 1410; r c. mccormack, 2014 onsc 7123; r c. vandewater, 2014 bcsc 2502; r c. haleta, 2015 bcsc 850; r c. goudreau, 2015 bcsc 1227; r c. piazza, 2015 qccs 707. [18] la question de savoir si le délai anormal constitue ou non une condition préalable revêt de toute évidence une importance fondamentale dans le présent pourvoi. toutefois, la présente affaire exige que la cour ne se contente pas de choisir entre l’une de ces deux approches. tout comme dans l’affaire antic, il s’agit d’un cas où les règles de droit fédé- rales ne sont pas appliquées de façon uniforme par- tout au canada : par. 6, 65 et 66. l’usage local varie considérablement en ce qui concerne le moment où se tient l’audience prévue à l’art. 525, la question de savoir si cette audience est obligatoire ou non, quels facteurs doivent être pris en compte et quel critère il faut appliquer. il revient à notre cour de trancher la question en appliquant les principes d’interprétation des lois. [19] the modern approach to statutory interpreta- tion requires the court to read the words of s. 525, ‘“in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordi- nary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament”’: rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21; bell expressvu limited partnership v. rex, 2002 scc 42, [2002] 2 scr 559, at para. 26, both quoting e. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87. when parliament adopted s. 525, its purpose was clear and unambiguous. a straight- forward reading of the provision, viewed properly in its legislative context, is the one which best supports that purpose. [19] la méthode moderne d’interprétation des lois oblige la cour à lire les termes de l’art. 525 « “dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’[économie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur” » : rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27, par. 21; bell expressvu limited partnership c. rex, 2002 csc 42, [2002] 2 rcs 559, par. 26, citant tous deux e.  driedger, construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p 87. lorsque le législateur a adopté l’art. 525, son objectif était clair et sans équivoque. une lecture simple de cette disposition, située dans son contexte législatif, est celle qui favorise le mieux l’atteinte de cet objectif. [20] for reference purposes, s. 525 is reproduced in its entirety in the attached appendix together with ss. 515(10) and 526. while i will generally be refer- ring to the “90- day” review, these reasons apply with equal force, and with any necessary modifications, to the “30- day review”, that is, they apply regard- less of whether the accused is being prosecuted in [20] le texte complet de l’art. 525 ainsi que le par. 515(10) et l’art. 526 sont reproduits à l’annexe ci- jointe aux fins de référence. les présents motifs parlent généralement du contrôle des motifs de la détention « après 90 jours », mais ils concernent tout autant (avec les adaptations nécessaires) le contrôle de ces motifs «  après 30  jours  », donc autant le [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 117 proceedings by way of indictment or by way of sum- mary conviction: s 525(1). prévenu poursuivi par mise en accusation que celui poursuivi par procédure sommaire : par 525(1). b parliament’s intent and the bail reform act b l’intention du parlement et la loi sur la réforme [21] section 525 cr. c was first introduced in the 1972 bail reform act, sc 1970-71-72, c 37. in a speech at second reading in the house of commons, then justice minister john n. turner summarized the purposes of the act as follows: the objectives of this bill are fourfold: first, to avoid unnecessary pre- trial arrest and detention; second, to en- sure that in cases where arrest with or without warrant has taken place, the person accused, whatever his means, is not unnecessarily held in custody until his trial; third, to ensure an early trial for those who have been detained in custody pending trial; fourth, to provide statutory guide- lines for decision making in this part of the criminal law process relating to arrest and bail and thereby preclude the possibility of “discretionary injustice”. du cautionnement [21] l’article 525 c cr a été introduit dans le cadre de la loi sur la réforme du cautionnement de 1972, sc 1970-71-72, c 37. dans un discours prononcé à l’étape de la deuxième lecture devant la chambre des communes, le ministre de la justice de l’époque, john n. turner, résume ainsi les objectifs de la loi : ce bill comporte un quadruple objectif. premièrement, éviter les arrestations et détentions préventives non né- cessaires. deuxièmement, faire en sorte que dans les cas où quelqu’un est arrêté avec ou sans mandat, le prévenu, quelle que soit sa situation financière, ne soit pas détenu sans nécessité jusqu’à son procès. troisièmement, faire en sorte que ceux qui sont détenus en attendant leur procès soient jugés le plus tôt possible. quatrièmement, établir des principes légaux servant à guider les jugements dans ce domaine de la procédure criminelle relatif aux arrestations et aux cautionnements, et prévenir ainsi les « injustices discrétionnaires ». (house of commons debates, vol. iii, 3rd sess., 28th parl., february 5, 1971, at p. 3116) (débats de la chambre des communes, vol.  iii, 3e sess., 28e lég., 5 février 1971, p. 3116) [22] this court has recognized that parliament’s overarching vision of the bail reform act was the creation of ‘“a liberal and enlightened system of pre- trial release”’ in which accused individuals would normally be granted bail: r v. morales, [1992] 3 scr 711, at p. 725, quoting r v. bray (1983), 40 or (2d) 766 (ca), at p. 769; antic, at para 29. the purpose of that act, which was influenced by both the academic work of professor martin l. friedland and the findings of the ouimet report, as delivered by the canadian committee on corrections examining the law on bail, was to reform a system that many experts saw as punitive, arbitrary, and inconsistent with the presumption of innocence: m l. friedland, detention before trial: a study of criminal cases tried in the toronto magistrates’ courts (1965); report of the canadian committee on corrections — toward unity: criminal justice and corrections (1969). there was also particular con- cern regarding the relationship between prolonged [22] notre cour a reconnu que la vision globale qu’avait le parlement en adoptant la loi sur la ré- forme du cautionnement était de créer « “un système libéral et éclairé de mise en liberté avant le pro- cès” » dans le cadre duquel la mise en liberté sous caution est normalement accordée : r c. morales, [1992] 3 rcs 711, p. 725, citant r c. bray (1983), 40 or (2d) 766 (ca), p. 769; antic, par 29. la loi, qui était influencée tant par les travaux universi- taires du professeur martin l. friedland que par les conclusions du rapport ouimet qui ont été présentées par le comité canadien sur les services correctionnels ayant examiné la loi relative à la mise en liberté sous caution, visait à réformer un système que de nom- breux experts percevaient comme répressif, arbitraire et incompatible avec la présomption d’innocence : m l friedland,. detention before trial : a study of criminal cases tried in the toronto magistrates’ courts (1965); rapport du comité canadien de la réforme pénale et correctionnelle— justice pénale et 118 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. pre- trial detentions and induced guilty pleas. in min- ister turner’s words: correction : un lien à forger (1969). on s’inquiétait en particulier des liens entre une détention avant le procès prolongée et l’incitation à plaider coupable. pour reprendre les propos du ministre turner :    there is an indication that those who are held under pre- trial detention will have, on the basis of statistics, a lesser opportunity for an acquittal and, certainly, they will have less of an opportunity to present a reasonable defence and assemble the evidence necessary for that defence. i think that we cannot ignore, either, mr. speaker, the high incidence of guilty pleas by persons who are detained and kept in custody under pre- trial detention. [p. 3115]    les statistiques semblent indiquer que ceux qui sont détenus avant leur procès ont moins de chances d’être acquittés et certainement moins de chance de présenter une juste défense et de rassembler les preuves nécessaires. nous ne pouvons pas oublier non plus, monsieur l’orateur, la forte incidence de personnes qui plaident coupables parmi celles qui sont détenues en attendant leur procès. [p. 3115] [23] the third purpose of the bail reform act as articulated by minister turner — to ensure an early trial for those who have been detained in custody — is of specific relevance to this appeal. it is a long- standing principle of our criminal justice system that individuals in pre- trial custody should be given a cer- tain priority in scheduling trials. this general guiding premise has not been displaced by r v jordan, 2016 scc 27, [2016] 1 scr 631. sections 525(9) and 526, which confer on the reviewing judge a discre- tion to give directions for expediting the trial of and any proceedings in relation to an accused, continue to operate as a reflection of that principle. in discussing these provisions, minister turner stated specifically: [23] le troisième objectif de la loi sur la réforme du cautionnement énoncé par m. turner — faire en sorte que ceux qui sont détenus en attendant leur procès soient jugés le plus tôt possible — nous inté- resse particulièrement en l’espèce. selon un principe de longue date de notre système de justice crimi- nelle, les personnes détenues avant leur procès de- vraient bénéficier d’un certain traitement prioritaire afin d’être jugées rapidement. ce grand principe demeure valable même après l’arrêt r c jordan, 2016 csc 27, [2016] 1 rcs 631. d’ailleurs, le par. 525(9) et l’art. 526, qui confèrent au juge saisi d’une demande de révision le pouvoir discrétionnaire de hâter le déroulement du procès et des procédures concernant le prévenu, continuent de s’appliquer et d’exprimer ce principe. en parlant de ces disposi- tions, le ministre turner a déclaré expressément ce qui suit : [t]here are important new proposals in the bill which provide that where an accused does not achieve bail after an arrest, there are methods for expediting his trial …. the provisions of the bill also ensure that where an accused is being held in custody pending his trial, or pending an appeal of his conviction, the situation must be reviewed by the courts within set periods of time, and directions may be given by the courts for getting the case on to trial    [p 3117]. le bill contient en outre des propositions nouvelles et importantes qui prévoient des méthodes permettant d’ac- célérer le procès d’un accusé auquel la liberté sous cau- tion a été refusée [  ]. les dispositions du bill prévoient également, lorsqu’un accusé est détenu en attendant son procès ou pendant l’appel de sa condamnation, qu’il est nécessaire que la situation soit examinée par les tribunaux dans les délais prévus, et il est possible à ceux-ci de faire procéder au jugement   [p. 3117] [24] regardless of which test is applied, courts across canada share an overarching consensus that the purpose of the s. 525 hearing is to prevent accused persons from languishing in pre- trial custody and to ensure a prompt trial: see, eg,. fraser regional correctional centre v. canada (attorney general), [24] peu importe le critère appliqué, les tribunaux de partout au canada s’entendent pour dire que l’ob- jet des audiences prévues à l’art. 525 est d’éviter que les prévenus ne croupissent en détention avant leur procès et de veiller à ce qu’ils soient jugés rapi- dement : voir, p ex, fraser. regional correctional [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 119 1993 canlii 354 (bcsc), at pp.  2-3; gill, at para. 3; sawrenko, at para. 26 (canlii); sarkozi, at paras. 8-11 (canlii); haleta, at paras 8-10. it is, moreover, clear that parliament sought to achieve this purpose by subjecting lengthy pre- trial deten- tions to judicial oversight at set points in time, by affording an opportunity to have a judge consider whether the continued detention of an accused per- son is justified, and by conferring on the judge a discretion to expedite the trial of an individual in pre- trial detention. centre c. canada (attorney general), 1993 canlii 354 (cs . c-b), p.  2-3; gill, par.  3; sawrenko, par. 26 (canlii); sarkozi, par. 8-11 (canlii); haleta, par 8-10. il est par ailleurs clair que le parlement a cherché à atteindre cet objectif en soumettant les longues détentions avant le procès à un contrôle ju- diciaire à certains intervalles réguliers, en donnant au juge la possibilité de vérifier si le maintien en déten- tion d’un prévenu est justifié et en conférant au juge le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’accélérer le déroulement du procès des individus incarcérés avant leur procès. c current context of pre- trial detention in can- c contexte actuel de la détention avant le procès ada au canada [25] today, the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause, which is enshrined in s. 11(e) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, operates as a key organizing principle of part xvi of the cr. c.: r v. pearson, [1992] 3 scr 665, at p 691. this right has also been affirmed repeatedly by this court, most recently in st- cloud, in which the court held that “in canadian law, the release of ac- cused persons is the cardinal rule and detention, the exception” (para. 70 (emphasis added)), and in antic, in which it stated that ‘“release is favoured at the earliest reasonable opportunity and    on the least onerous grounds”’: para. 29, quoting r v. anoussis, 2008 qccq 8100, 242 ccc (3d) 113, at para 23. [25] de nos jours, le droit de ne pas être privé sans juste cause d’une mise en liberté assortie d’un cau- tionnement raisonnable est consacré à l’al. 11e) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés et constitue un principe fondamental de la partie xvi du c cr. : r c. pearson, [1992] 3 rcs 665, p 691. ce prin- cipe a été confirmé par notre cour à maintes reprises, tout récemment dans l’arrêt st- cloud, où elle écrit qu’« “en droit canadien, la règle cardinale est la mise en liberté de l’accusé et la détention, l’exception” » (par. 70 (je souligne)), et dans l’arrêt antic, dans lequel notre cour a mentionné qu’« on favorise la mise en liberté à la première occasion raisonnable et [  ] aux conditions les moins sévères possible » : par. 29, citant r c. anoussis, 2008 qccq 8100, 242 ccc (3d) 113, par 23. [26] nonetheless, on any given day in canada, nearly half of the individuals in provincial jails are accused persons in pre- trial custody: statistics canada, adult and youth correctional statistics in canada, 2016/2017 (june 2018), at p. 7; statistics canada, trends in the use of remand in canada, 2004/2005 to 2014/2015 (january 2017). in 2016- 2017, approximately 7 percent of those in remand were still in custody after three months, and some spent upwards of 12 or even 24 months awaiting trial in detention: statistics canada, table 35-10-0024-01 — adult releases from correctional services by sex and aggregate time served (online). it must be said that the conditions faced by such individuals are of- ten dire. overcrowding and lockdowns are frequent features of this environment, as is limited access to [26] néanmoins, chaque jour au canada, près de la moitié des individus incarcérés dans les prisons provinciales sont des prévenus qui sont incarcérés avant leur procès : statistique canada, statistiques sur les services correctionnels pour les adultes et les jeunes au canada, 2016-2017 (juin 2018), p. 7; statistique canada, tendances de l’utilisation de la détention provisoire au canada, 2004-2005 à 2014-2015 (janvier 2017). en 2016-2017, environ 7 p. 100 des personnes en détention provisoire étaient toujours détenues après trois mois, et pouvaient être maintenues sous garde dans l’attente de leur pro- cès jusqu’à 12 mois ou même 24 mois : statistique canada, tableau  35-10-0024-01  — libérations d’établissements des adultes en détention aux pro- grammes des services correctionnels, selon le sexe et 120 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. recreation, health care and basic programming: r. v. summers, 2014 scc 26, [2014] 1 scr 575, at paras. 2 and 28; canadian civil liberties association and education trust, set up to fail: bail and the revolving door of pre- trial detention, by a. desh- man and n. myers (2014) (online). moreover, as is the case elsewhere in our criminal justice system, indigenous individuals are overrepresented in the re- mand population, accounting for approximately one quarter of all adult admissions: statistics canada, trends in the use of remand in canada, 2004/2005 to 2014/2015. [27] as this court has recognized, the experience of pre- trial detention can have serious detrimen- tal impacts on an accused person’s ability to raise a defence: see r v. hall, 2002 scc 64, [2002] 3 scr 309, at para 59. it also comes at a signif- icant cost in terms of their loss of liberty, the im- pact on their mental and physical well- being and on their families, and the loss of their livelihoods: friedland, at p. 172; ell v. alberta, 2003 scc 35, [2003] 1 scr 857, at para. 24; antic, at para 66. the high cost of pre- trial detention was recognized at the time the bail reform act was before parliament: house of commons debates, at p 3115. the issue remains just as relevant today. la durée de la peine purgée (en ligne). il importe de signaler que les conditions de détention de ces indi- vidus sont souvent pénibles. le surpeuplement et le confinement dans les cellules sont monnaie courante dans ce milieu, tout comme l’accès limité aux loisirs, aux soins de santé et aux programmes de base : r c. summers, 2014 csc 26, [2014] 1 rcs 575, par. 2 et 28; association canadienne des libertés civiles et fidéicommis canadien d’éducation en libertés civiles, set up to fail : bail and the revolving door of pre- trial detention, par a. deshman et n. myers (2014) (en ligne). comme dans le cas d’autres as- pects de notre système de justice criminelle, les autochtones sont surreprésentés parmi la population en détention provisoire et ils représentent environ le quart de tous les adultes se trouvant dans cette situa- tion : statistique canada, tendances de l’utilisation de la détention provisoire au canada, 2004-2005 à 2014-2015. [27] comme notre cour l’a reconnu, l’expérience de la détention avant le procès peut avoir de graves répercussions négatives sur la capacité de l’accusé d’invoquer un moyen de défense : voir r c. hall, 2002 csc 64, [2002] 3 rcs 309, par 59. elle a également de lourdes conséquences sur sa liberté, son bien- être psychologique et physique, sa famille et ses moyens de subsistance : friedland, p. 172; ell c. alberta, 2003 csc 35, [2003] 1 rcs 857, par. 24; antic, par 66. le coût élevé de la détention avant le procès avait été reconnu au moment où le parlement étudiait la loi sur la réforme du cau- tionnement : débats de la chambre des communes, p 3115. la question est tout aussi pertinente de nos jours. d correct approach to the section 525 detention d la bonne façon d’aborder l’examen de la déten- review tion prévu à l’art. 525 [28] in the sections that follow, i will outline the correct approach to the s. 525 detention review, be- ginning with the application for the hearing. how- ever, it is necessary to first dispose of the argument that a threshold condition of unreasonable delay must be met in order for the judge to review the detention itself. [28] dans les sections qui suivent, je vais exposer la bonne façon d’aborder l’examen de la détention prévu à l’art. 525, en commençant par la demande d’audience. toutefois, il faut d’abord trancher l’argu- ment selon lequel l’existence d’un délai anormal doit avoir été constatée pour que le juge puisse contrôler la détention elle- même. [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 121 (1) unreasonable delay is not a threshold re- quirement for reviewing the detention (1) le délai anormal n’est pas une condition préalable à l’examen de la détention [29] parliament did not intend to restrict the court’s ability to review the detention of an accused at a s. 525 hearing to situations in which there has been an unreasonable delay. in this case, the crown re- lies almost exclusively on the heading under which s. 525 appears (“review of detention where trial delayed”) to support an argument that parliament did intend to do so. in the crown’s view, although the passage of 90 days might have been synony- mous with “unreasonable delay” in 1972, this is no longer the case. the crown suggests that parliament has simply failed to amend the legislation in order to reflect the modern life cycle of a trial, and that s. 525 hearings were only ever intended to be held in exceptional circumstances involving unreasonable delay. [30] in line with this view, some courts have de- veloped a test to the effect that unreasonable de- lay is a precondition to reviewing the detention of the accused at a s. 525 hearing: see, eg,. jerace, at paras. 8-12 (canlii). the crown submits that the result of this interpretation of s. 525 is that the de- tention of the accused should rarely be scrutinized, because there will rarely have been an unreasonable delay when the 90- day mark is reached. the attorney general of ontario argues that the correct approach is one according to which the judge does not schedule a hearing at all unless he or she is satisfied that there has been an unreasonable delay. [29] le parlement n’avait pas l’intention de limiter la capacité du tribunal d’examiner la détention du prévenu dans le cadre d’une audience tenue en vertu de l’art. 525 aux situations dans lesquelles un délai anormal était déjà survenu. en l’espèce, le ministère public se fonde presque exclusivement sur l’intertitre de l’art. 525 (« examen de la détention quand le procès est retardé ») à l’appui de l’argument selon lequel le parlement avait cette intention. d’après le ministère public, même si l’écoulement de 90 jours aurait pu être considéré comme un « délai anormal » en 1972, ce n’est plus le cas aujourd’hui. selon le mi- nistère public, le parlement a tout simplement omis de modifier la loi pour suivre l’évolution du cycle de vie moderne d’un procès, ajoutant que l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 n’est censée avoir lieu que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles mettant en jeu un délai anormal. [30] dans le droit fil de ce raisonnement, cer- tains tribunaux ont élaboré un critère qui considère l’existence d’un délai anormal comme une condition préalable à l’examen de la détention du prévenu dans le cadre de l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 : voir, p ex, jerace, par. 8-12 (canlii). le ministère public affirme que, selon cette interprétation de l’art. 525, la détention du prévenu devrait rarement faire l’ob- jet d’un contrôle, parce qu’il est rare qu’un délai anormal survienne avant l’expiration des 90 jours. la procureure générale de l’ontario soutient que la bonne approche consiste pour le juge à ne pas fixer de date d’audience tant qu’il n’est pas convaincu de l’existence d’un délai anormal. [31] with respect, the view that the judge must consider unreasonable delay but that the operative word for reviewing the detention of the accused is only “may” represents precisely the opposite of what the provision says: [31] soit dit en tout respect, l’idée suivant laquelle le juge doit tenir compte de l’existence d’un délai anormal, mais « peut » contrôler la détention du pré- venu sans en avoir l’obligation contredit carrément le libellé de l’article applicable : 525 (1)    the person having the custody of the accused shall, forthwith on the expiration of those ninety or thirty days, as the case may be, apply to a judge having jurisdic- tion in the place in which the accused is in custody to fix a 525 (1)    la personne ayant la garde du prévenu doit, dès l’expiration de ces quatre- vingt- dix jours ou trente jours, selon le cas, demander à un juge ayant juridiction à l’endroit où le prévenu est sous garde de fixer une date 122 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. date for a hearing to determine whether or not the accused should be released from custody. pour une audition aux fins de déterminer si le prévenu devrait être mis en liberté ou non.   .   . (3) on the hearing described in subsection (1), the judge may, in deciding whether or not the accused should be released from custody, take into consideration whether the prosecutor or the accused has been responsible for any unreasonable delay in the trial of the charge. (3) lors de l’audition visée au paragraphe (1), le juge peut, pour décider si le prévenu devrait être mis en liberté ou non, prendre en considération le fait que le poursuivant ou le prévenu a été responsable ou non de tout délai anor- mal dans le procès sur l’inculpation. (4) if, following the hearing described in subsection (1), the judge is not satisfied that the continued detention of the accused in custody is justified within the meaning of subsection 515(10), the judge shall order that the accused be released    . (4) si, à la suite de l’audition visée au paragraphe (1), le juge n’est pas convaincu que la continuation de la dé- tention du prévenu sous garde est justifiée au sens du paragraphe 515(10), il ordonne que le prévenu soit mis en liberté   . [32] in short, it is perfectly clear from the sec- tion that at the hearing, the judge must consider whether the continued detention of the accused is justified, and may consider whether there has been an unreasonable delay: s. 525(1) and s. 525(3) cr. c.; interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21, s 11. notably, the heading itself refers only to the trial being “delayed”, and not to an “unreasonable delay”, which suggests that parliament simply intended the word “delayed” to refer to situations in which “the trial has not commenced” before the prescribed time. as well, the use of the word “any” in s. 525(3) makes it clear that there may or may not have been an unrea- sonable delay before the s 525 hearing. simply put, it is an error of law to treat unreasonable delay as a precondition for a review of the continued detention of the accused. [32] bref, cet article dispose dans les termes les plus nets qu’à l’audience, le juge doit décider si la continuation de la détention du prévenu est justifiée et il peut se demander s’il y a eu un délai anormal : par. 525(1) et 525(3) c cr;. loi d’interprétation, lrc 1985, c. i-21, art 11. il convient de signaler que l’intertitre lui- même ne parle que du procès « re- tardé » et non de « délai anormal », ce qui donne à penser que le parlement voulait simplement que le mot « retardé » vise les situations dans lesquelles « le procès n’est pas commencé » avant le délai prescrit. l’emploi du mot « tout » au par. 525(3) précise en- core davantage qu’il peut ou non survenir un délai anormal avant l’audience prévue à l’art 525. en ré- sumé, on commet une erreur de droit en considérant l’existence d’un délai anormal comme une condition préalable qui doit être satisfaite avant que l’on puisse se pencher sur le maintien en détention du prévenu. [33] there is no principled basis for this court to “read in” a more restrictive test. it does not frus- trate parliament’s purpose to take the provision at face value, nor does it result in absurdity, waste or redundancy to do so. as the intervener canadian civil liberties association reminds us, “today, as before, three months is a long time for a person who is presumed innocent to be held in jail awaiting trial”: if, at para 1. the crown argues that this timeline is no longer realistic given the increased length and complexity of modern criminal trials. but even if that were true, the appropriate solution would be for parliament to modify these clearly expressed [33] il n’y a pas de raison de principe qui justifie que notre cour « intègre » un critère plus restrictif. on n’ignore pas l’intention du parlement lorsqu’on prend cette disposition au pied de la lettre, et une telle interprétation ne crée pas d’aberration, de gas- pillage ou de redondance. comme l’intervenante l’association canadienne des libertés civiles nous le rappelle, [traduction] « de nos jours, comme jadis, un délai de trois mois est une longue période à passer en prison dans l’attente de son procès quand on est présumé innocent » : mi, par 1. le ministère public fait valoir que ce délai n’est plus pratique vu la lon- gueur et la complexité accrues des procès criminels [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 123 requirements, not for this court to read in a thresh- old that was never intended and that the words of the provision do not support. circumstances that favour the release of the accused, issues related to unreasonable delay, or the need for a court to inter- vene to expedite the trial will not always have arisen when the 90- day mark is reached. instead, 90 days following the last detention order against the accused is simply the point at which parliament has specified that a judge must determine whether the continued detention of the accused is justified. the impact of the passage of time generally (and of unreasonable delay specifically) may be properly considered in the judge’s analysis at that time. modernes. même si ce délai n’était plus pratique, la solution indiquée serait que le parlement modifie ces exigences clairement énoncées, et non que notre cour intègre un seuil qui n’a jamais été souhaité et que le texte de la disposition n’appuie pas. les cir- constances qui militent en faveur de la mise en liberté du prévenu, les problèmes liés au délai anormal et la nécessité d’une intervention judiciaire pour hâter le déroulement du procès n’interviennent pas né- cessairement avant l’expiration du délai de 90 jours. la période de 90 jours écoulée depuis la dernière ordonnance de détention rendue contre le prévenu constitue simplement le délai retenu par le parlement dans lequel un juge doit examiner si le maintien en détention de cet individu est justifié. c’est à ce moment-là que le juge peut, dans le cadre de son analyse, tenir dûment compte des répercussions de l’écoulement du temps en général (et de tout délai anormal en particulier). (2) jailer’s obligation to apply for a hearing (2) l’obligation du geôlier de présenter une de- mande d’audience [34] subsection 525(1) makes it clear that the ob- ligation to apply to a judge for a hearing lies with the person having the custody of the accused. in some provinces, this obligation is fulfilled by the prosecution rather than the correctional facility (“the jailer”) itself. [34] le paragraphe 525(1) indique clairement que c’est à la personne qui a la garde du prévenu qu’il incombe de présenter la demande d’audience au juge. dans certaines provinces, c’est la poursuite plutôt que l’établissement carcéral (« le geôlier ») lui- même qui s’acquitte de cette tâche. [35] in proceedings by way of summary convic- tion, the obligation to make an application is trig- gered at the 30- day mark: s. 525(1)(b) cr c. for indictable offences, as in mr. myers’ case, the rele- vant time is 90 days: s. 525(1)(a) cr c. the precise timing is made somewhat unclear by the use of the word “forthwith” in s. 525(1), which provides that the application must be made “forthwith on the expi- ration of those ninety    days”. the french version of the same passage connotes immediacy — “dès l’expiration de ces quatre- vingt- dix jours” — and indicates more clearly that the obligation to make the application arises as soon as the 90- day period has expired. i would therefore take the provision to mean that the application must be made immediately upon the expiration of 90 days following (i) the date on which the accused was taken before a justice under s. 503, or (ii) the later of the date on which [35] lorsque le prévenu est poursuivi par pro- cédure sommaire, l’obligation de présenter une demande naît à l’expiration du délai de 30 jours : al. 525(1)b) c cr. pour ce qui est des actes criminels, comme dans le cas de m. myers, l’obligation naît à l’expiration d’un délai de 90 jours : al. 525(1)a) c cr. le délai précis est quelque peu flou à cause de l’emploi du mot « forthwith » dans la version an- glaise du par. 525(1), lequel prévoit que la demande doit être présentée « forthwith on the expiration of those ninety [  ] days ». la version française de la même disposition dénote l’immédiateté — « dès l’expiration de ces quatre- vingt- dix jours » — et indique plus clairement que l’obligation de présenter la demande prend naissance dès que la période de 90 jours expire. à mon sens, donc, cette disposition signifie que la demande doit être présentée immédia- tement après l’expiration des 90 jours suivant (i) la 124 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. the accused was taken into custody and the date of a detention order under s. 520, 521 or 524. [36] i would pause to note that it has been sug- gested that an accused person could apply for a s. 520 review at some point before the end of the 90- day period only to have a s. 525 hearing held just weeks or days later, which would be wasteful or redundant: g t trotter,. the law of bail in canada (3rd ed. (loose- leaf)), at pp. 8-51 to 8-55. while this may have been an issue before amendments made to s. 525 in 1997 introduced a reference to s. 520 into s. 525(1)(a)(ii), it is no longer of concern: criminal law improvement act, 1996, sc 1997, c. 18, s 61(1). section 525(1)(a)(ii) now indicates that the 90- day period is determined in relation to any order made pursuant to s. 521, 524 or 520. [37] the rule is therefore as follows: the person having custody of the accused must ordinarily ap- ply to the judge immediately upon the expiration of 90 days following the day on which the accused was initially taken before a justice under s. 503: s. 525(1)(a)(i) cr c. where, however, a new deten- tion order is made against the accused — or a deci- sion is made to continue an existing order — under s. 520, 521 or 524 after the initial appearance of the accused under s. 503, the result of s. 525(1)(a)(ii) is that the 90- day period will effectively begin again. by way of example, if an accused person is taken before a justice under s. 503 and detained in custody on day 1, then applies to a judge for a review of that decision under s. 520 on day 50 and the detention is confirmed, the jailer’s obligation to make the ap- plication will not arise until 140 days following the day on which the accused person was first detained in custody. in addition to conforming to the words of s. 525(1), this interpretation minimizes the risk of redundancy, addresses any concerns related to the scarcity of judicial resources and limits the applica- bility of s. 525 to situations in which the accused has date à laquelle le prévenu a été conduit devant un juge de paix en vertu de l’art. 503, ou (ii) la date de mise sous garde ou, si elle est postérieure, celle de l’ordonnance de détention rendue en vertu des art. 520, 521 ou 524. [36] j’ouvre une parenthèse pour signaler que certains ont avancé l’idée que le prévenu pouvait demander une révision au titre de l’art. 520 avant l’expiration des 90 jours, auquel cas il ferait l’objet de l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 à peine quelques semaines ou quelques jours plus tard, ce qui en- traînerait du gaspillage ou des dédoublements  : g t trotter,. the law of bail in canada (3e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), p. 8-51 à 8-55. bien que cette situation ait pu être problématique avant les modifi- cations apportées en 1997 à l’art. 525, qui ont ajouté une mention de l’art. 520 au sous-al. 525(1)a)(ii), le problème ne se pose plus : loi de 1996 visant à améliorer la législation pénale, lc 1997, c. 18, par 61(1). le sous- alinéa 525(1)a)(ii) précise désor- mais que le délai de 90 jours est calculé en fonction de toute ordonnance prononcée en vertu des art. 521, 524 ou 520. [37] la règle est donc la suivante : la personne qui a la garde du prévenu doit normalement pré- senter la demande au juge dès l’expiration du délai de 90 jours suivant la date à laquelle l’accusé a été conduit à l’origine devant un juge de paix en vertu de l’art. 503 : sous-al. 525(1)a)(i) c cr. toutefois, lorsqu’une nouvelle ordonnance de détention ou une ordonnance de maintien en détention a été ren- due contre le prévenu en vertu des art. 520, 521 ou 524 après sa comparution initiale selon l’art. 503, le compte à rebours de 90  jours recommence à zéro par application du sous-al 525(1)a)(ii). à titre d’exemple, si le prévenu est conduit devant un juge de paix en vertu de l’art. 503 et qu’il est placé en détention le premier jour, puis comparaît devant un juge pour demander la révision de cette décision en vertu de l’art. 520 le cinquantième jour de sa déten- tion (et que sa détention est confirmée), l’obligation du geôlier de présenter la demande ne prend nais- sance que 140 jours après la date à laquelle l’accusé a été placé en détention au départ. en plus d’être conforme au libellé du par. 525(1), cette interpréta- tion minimise le risque de dédoublements, répond [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 125 actually been in custody for a long period without judicial oversight. in r v. acera, 2017 abqb 470, veit j. sug- [38] gested that at least one correctional facility appeared to be systematically failing to meet its obligation under the cr. c to apply for s. 525 hearings, some- times by a margin of several months: paras. 10-17 and appendix a (canlii). the deadlines imposed by parliament for an application under s. 525 are known to and foreseeable by all involved, including the correctional facility, the crown and the court. it may well be that administrative reforms are re- quired in order to ensure that s. 525 applications are made on time every time, for every eligible accused person. delays in routine bail and detention matters are a manifestation of the culture of complacency denounced by this court in jordan, and must be addressed. aux préoccupations exprimées au sujet de la rareté des ressources judiciaires et limite l’applicabilité de l’art. 525 aux situations dans lesquelles le prévenu a effectivement été détenu pendant de longues périodes sans bénéficier d’un contrôle judiciaire. [38] dans le jugement r c. acera, 2017 abqb 470, la juge veit a laissé entendre qu’au moins un établissement correctionnel semblait systématique- ment manquer à l’obligation que lui impose le c cr. en ce qui concerne les demandes visant à obtenir une audience en vertu de l’art. 525, en laissant parfois s’écouler plusieurs mois avant de présenter une de- mande : par. 10-17 et annexe a (canlii). les délais fixés par le parlement pour la présentation de la demande prévue à l’art. 525 sont prévisibles et bien connus de tous les intéressés, y compris de l’établis- sement correctionnel, du ministère public et du tribu- nal. il se peut fort bien qu’une réforme administrative s’impose pour garantir que les demandes fondées sur l’art. 525 sont toujours présentées à temps pour tous les accusés qui y ont droit. les retards dans les affaires ordinaires de détention et de mise en liberté sous caution sont une manifestation de la culture de complaisance que notre cour a dénoncée dans l’arrêt jordan et il faut y remédier. (3) judge’s obligation to fix a date and hold (3) l’obligation du juge de fixer une date et de the hearing tenir l’audience [39] upon receiving the application from the jailer, the judge must fix a date and give notice for the hearing: s. 525(2) cr c. how much time the judge has after receiving the application before the date must be fixed is not specified. in fixing a date, the judge does not have a statutory discretion to refrain from holding the hearing until there has been an un- reasonable delay or until she or he believes that the test for the release of the accused will be met. for a judge to do so would have the effect of creating a threshold condition for the hearing where it is plain that none exists in the language of s 525. moreover, such a practice could easily result in longer periods of unnecessary pre- trial detention than there would have been had the accused simply appeared before the judge at a properly conducted review hearing at the time parliament intended. thus, in order for the s. 525 hearing to fulfill its purpose of meaningfully [39] sur réception de la demande du geôlier, le juge doit fixer une date d’audience et en donner avis : par 525(2) c cr. le c cr. ne précise pas de délai entre la réception de la demande et la date à laquelle le juge doit fixer une date d’audience. lorsqu’il fixe une date, le juge n’a pas de pouvoir discrétionnaire qui lui permettrait, en vertu de la loi, de retarder l’audience jusqu’à ce qu’il constate l’existence d’un délai anormal ou qu’il estime que le critère permet- tant de libérer l’accusé a été respecté. si le juge avait ce pouvoir, on créerait en fait une condition préalable à la tenue de l’audience alors qu’il est évident que l’art. 525 n’en prévoit aucune. de plus, cette pratique pourrait aisément se traduire par des périodes de détention avant le procès qui seraient inutiles et plus longues que si l’accusé avait sim- plement comparu devant le juge lors d’un contrôle de sa détention effectué en bonne et due forme à la 126 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. safeguarding the accused person’s liberty, the jailer must make the application within the appropriate time limit, and the court must fix the date of the hearing without delay. and upon receiving the ap- plication from the jailer, the judge must schedule the hearing for the first available date. [40] on the hearing date, the crown and the ac- cused must appear before the judge. in oral argu- ment in this court, it was suggested that the judge could then routinely exercise his or her discretion to adjourn the s. 525 hearing until a later time. with respect, i disagree with this position. i am prepared to accept that occasionally, and in limited circum- stances, an adjournment could be compatible with the purpose of s. 525 and with parliament’s intent. however, as with the process of fixing a date for the hearing, it would be improper to adjourn merely because the judge does not believe that a full review of the detention would result in the release of the accused or because an unreasonable delay has not yet occurred. [41] that being said, an adjournment should not be precluded where it clearly serves the interests of justice and the underlying purposes of the pro- vision. for example — without limiting the forego- ing — where a key piece of information is missing or a key event is pending, it would be entirely appropriate for the judge to adjourn the hearing until such time as the detention of the accused can be meaningfully assessed. the reviewing judge’s exercise of this supervisory authority must ulti- mately be guided by the overarching purpose of the provision, which is to prevent an accused person from languishing in pre- trial custody and to ensure a prompt trial by subjecting lengthy detentions to judicial oversight. as a result, adjournments must always be used in a manner that safeguards and is consistent with the right of the accused to a prompt and thorough review of his or her deten- tion when the 90- day mark is reached. reviewing judges must rely on good sense and experience in order to ensure that adjournments enhance rather date prévue par le parlement. pour que l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 réalise son objectif de protéger véritablement la liberté du prévenu, le geôlier doit présenter cette demande dans le délai prescrit, et le tribunal doit fixer sans délai la date d’audience cor- respondante. sur réception de la demande du geôlier, le juge doit, en conséquence, fixer l’audience à la première date disponible. [40] à la date d’audience, le ministère public et l’accusé doivent comparaître devant le juge. lors des plaidoiries devant notre cour, on a laissé entendre que le juge pouvait alors exercer couramment son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour ajourner ou remettre l’audience prévue par l’art. 525 à une date ultérieure. soit dit en tout respect, je suis en désaccord avec cette position. je suis disposé à accepter qu’à l’oc- casion et dans certains cas précis, un ajournement peut être compatible avec l’objectif de l’art. 525 et l’intention du parlement. or, et comme dans le cas du processus de fixation de la date de l’audience, il ne serait pas acceptable d’ajourner une audience pour la simple raison que le juge ne croit pas qu’un contrôle complet de la détention se solderait par la mise en liberté du prévenu ou parce qu’il n’y a pas encore eu de délai anormal. [41] cela dit, il ne convient pas d’écarter un ajour- nement s’il sert manifestement l’intérêt de la justice et favorise la réalisation des objets sous- jacents de la disposition. à titre d’exemple — sans limiter la portée de ce qui précède —, lorsqu’il manque un ren- seignement clé ou qu’un événement clé est en cours d’instance, il serait tout à fait opportun pour le juge d’ajourner l’audience jusqu’à ce que la détention du prévenu puisse être évaluée utilement. dans l’exer- cice de ce pouvoir de surveillance, le juge chargé du contrôle de la détention doit se laisser guider en fin de compte par l’objectif général de la disposition : empêcher le prévenu de croupir en détention avant son procès et assurer la tenue rapide du procès en assujettissant les longues incarcérations à la surveil- lance des tribunaux. en conséquence, il faut toujours recourir aux ajournements d’une façon qui protège et respecte le droit de l’accusé à un contrôle rapide et sérieux de sa détention à la suite de l’expiration des 90 jours. le juge siégeant en contrôle doit se fier au bon sens et à son expérience pour veiller à ce [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 127 than undermine the purpose of the s. 525 detention review. que l’ajournement favorise au lieu de contrecarrer l’objectif visé par l’examen de la détention prévu à l’art 525. (a) application of section 525 where there has a) application de l’art. 525 à défaut d’audience been no initial hearing initiale [42] there may be some instances in which an ac- cused person has not had a full provincial court bail hearing that resulted in a detention order, but remains in custody after 90 days. this would primarily be the case for individuals in a reverse onus position who have consented to remand, but it could also arise in other narrow circumstances. there is some disagree- ment over whether such an individual is entitled to a s. 525 hearing: see, eg,. sarkozi, at para. 32; r v. saulnier, 2012 nssc 45, 314 nsr (2d) 203, at paras. 10-11; r v. burgar, 2003 bcca 426, 186 bcac 15, at para 10. [43] in my view, there is no principled basis for holding that individuals in this situation are not en- titled to a hearing under s 525. in theory, every ac- cused person in custody will have been “taken before a justice under section 503” within the meaning of s. 525(1) and is therefore entitled to a hearing under s 525. more to the point, the fundamental purpose of s. 525 is to afford an opportunity to have a judge scrutinize the detention itself, and individuals who find themselves in these exceptional circumstances should not be denied that safeguard. i would echo the view that those who, for whatever reason, do not contest their initial detention “should not be punished for doing so, by depriving them of the potential ben- efits of s. 525 hearings, especially where their liberty and constitutional right to a trial within ‘a reasonable time’ is implicated”: saulnier, at para 10. [42] il peut exister certaines situations où le pré- venu n’a pas fait l’objet devant une cour provinciale d’une enquête en bonne et due forme sur sa mise en liberté sous caution se soldant par une ordon- nance de détention, mais est toujours détenu après 90 jours. cette situation se présente surtout dans le cas des individus aux prises avec l’inversion du fardeau de la preuve qui ont accepté d’être détenus provisoirement, mais elle pourrait également se pré- senter dans certaines circonstances bien précises. la question de savoir si ces individus ont droit à l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 fait l’objet d’un certain débat : voir, p ex, sarkozi, par. 32; r c. saulnier, 2012 nssc 45, 314 nsr (2d) 203, par. 10-11; r c. burgar, 2003 bcca 426, 186 bcac 15, par 10. [43] à mon avis, il n’y a aucune raison de prin- cipe de conclure que les individus se trouvant dans cette situation n’ont pas droit à l’audience prévue à l’art 525. en théorie, tout prévenu qui est détenu aura été « conduit devant le juge de paix en vertu de l’article 503 » aux termes du par. 525(1) et a donc droit à une audience au titre de cette disposition. plus précisément, la raison d’être de l’art. 525 est de donner au juge l’occasion d’examiner la détention elle- même et les individus qui se trouvent dans de telles situations exceptionnelles ne devraient pas se voir privés de cette protection. je reprends à mon compte l’idée selon laquelle ceux qui, pour une raison ou pour une autre, ne contestent pas leur détention ini- tiale [traduction] « ne devraient pas être punis pour autant en se voyant refuser les avantages potentiels de l’audience prévue à l’art. 525, surtout lorsque leur liberté et leur droit constitutionnel d’être jugés “dans un délai raisonnable” sont en jeu » : saulnier, par 10. (b) no request is required for the hearing to b) la tenue de l’audience ne dépend pas de la take place présentation d’une demande it is clear from the cr. c that the s. 525 hearing [44] is an automatic procedure. the mandatory obligations [44] le c cr. est clair : l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 a lieu de plein droit. les obligations impératives de 128 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. to make the application and to fix a date lie with the jailer and the judge, respectively. in this case, the crown sent defence counsel a letter in which it invited him to reply in order “to advise whether [mr. myers] wishes to pursue a bail review at this time, and if so, to arrange a mutually convenient date”: appellant’s condensed book, tab 8. form letters which place the burden on the accused to pursue a s. 525 hearing are inconsistent with the law. such letters may dis- proportionately confuse or discourage unrepresented individuals, who are in particular need of the judicial oversight parliament intended to ensure when it en- acted s 525. there may be circumstances in which an accused person, fully informed of his or her rights and the purpose of the provision, will decline what is intended to be an automatic hearing under s 525. however, the words, the context and the purpose of the provision do not support an interpretation to the effect that s. 525 hearings are an “opt-in” affair. présenter une demande et de fixer une date incombent au geôlier et au juge respectivement. dans le cas qui nous occupe, l’avocat de la défense a reçu une lettre dans laquelle le ministère public lui demandait si m. myers [traduction] « souhaite demander la ré- vision de l’ordonnance de détention à ce moment-ci et, dans l’affirmative, fixer une date qui conviendra aux deux parties » : recueil condensé de l’appelant, onglet 8. les lettres types qui font reposer sur le pré- venu le fardeau de demander la tenue de l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 ne sont pas conformes à la loi. ces lettres risquent de confondre ou de décourager de façon disproportionnée les individus qui ne sont pas représentés par un avocat et qui ont particulièrement besoin de la surveillance judiciaire que souhaitait le parlement lorsqu’il a adopté l’art 525. il peut exister des situations dans lesquelles le prévenu, pleinement conscient de ses droits et de l’objet de cette disposi- tion, refuse l’audience à laquelle il a automatiquement droit en vertu de l’art 525. cependant, le texte, le contexte et l’objet de la disposition n’appuient pas l’interprétation suivant laquelle l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 est purement facultative. (4) overarching question at the hearing (4) la question primordiale à l’audience [45] the overarching question at the s. 525 hear- ing is clear from the words of the provision. sec- tion 525(1) explicitly states that the judge’s role is “to determine whether or not the accused should be released from custody”. section 525(3) provides that the judge may, “in deciding whether or not the ac- cused should be released from custody”, take any un- reasonable delay into consideration. section 525(4) instructs the judge to order the accused person’s release if the judge “is not satisfied that the continued detention of the accused in custody is justified within the meaning of subsection 515(10)”. [45] la question primordiale posée lors de l’au- dience prévue à l’art. 525 ressort du libellé de la disposition. le paragraphe 525(1) énonce explici- tement que le rôle du juge consiste à « déterminer si le prévenu devrait être mis en liberté ou non ». le paragraphe 525(3) précise que le juge peut te- nir compte de tout délai anormal « pour décider si le prévenu devrait être mis en liberté ou non ». le paragraphe 525(4) donne pour instruction au juge d’ordonner que le prévenu soit mis en liberté « s[’il] n’est pas convaincu que la continuation de la déten- tion du prévenu sous garde est justifiée au sens du paragraphe 515(10) ». [46] the question that the judge must answer at a s. 525 hearing is therefore as follows: is the con- tinued detention of the accused in custody justified within the meaning of s. 515(10)? section 515(10) sets out three possible grounds on which the deten- tion of an accused in custody may be justified: where it is necessary in order to ensure the attendance of the accused in court; where it is necessary for the [46] en conséquence, la question que doit trancher le juge lors d’une audience prévue à l’art. 525 est la suivante : le maintien en détention du prévenu sous garde est-il justifié au sens du par. 515(10)? le para- ragraphe 515(10) prévoit que la détention du prévenu sous garde n’est justifiée que dans l’un des trois cas suivants : sa détention est nécessaire pour assurer sa présence au tribunal; sa détention est nécessaire pour [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 129 protection or safety of the public; and where it is necessary in order to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. la protection ou la sécurité du public; sa détention est nécessaire pour ne pas miner la confiance du public envers l’administration de la justice. (5) nature of the detention review (5) la nature du contrôle de la détention [47] the question in the s. 525 review — whether the continued detention of the accused is justified — is somewhat different in nature than the question at the initial bail hearing or in a review under s. 520 or 521. while ss. 520 and 521 exist for the purpose of reviewing a prior order, a review under s. 525 is more properly characterized as a review of the deten- tion itself. yet there is no indication that parliament intended the judge presiding a s. 525 detention re- view hearing to reconduct the original bail hearing in its entirety simply because 90 days have elapsed. mr. myers himself concedes as much: he argues only that a s. 525 hearing requires a “multi- factorial anal- ysis”: af, at para 89. this means that the judge at the s. 525 hearing should in his or her analysis show respect for any findings of fact made by the first- level decision maker if there is no cause to interfere with them. similarly, any balancing exercise or weighing of factors conducted by the initial bail judge must be reviewed in light of the time that has already elapsed and any other relevant considerations, as will be discussed below. [47] la question à trancher lors du contrôle prévu à l’art. 525 — à savoir si le maintien en détention du prévenu est justifié — est de nature quelque peu dif- férente de celle qui se pose durant l’audience initiale de mise en liberté sous caution ou à l’occasion d’un contrôle exercé en vertu des art. 520 et 521. bien que la révision d’une ordonnance antérieure soit la raison d’être de ces deux articles, il est plus juste de considérer que l’examen prévu à l’art. 525 porte sur la détention elle- même. pourtant, rien n’indique que le parlement voulait que le juge chargé du contrôle de la détention selon l’art. 525 reprenne dans son intégralité l’audience initiale sur la mise en liberté sous caution tout simplement parce que les 90 jours se sont écoulés. m. myers l’admet lui- même et a seu- lement fait valoir que l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 requiert une [traduction] « analyse multifacto- rielle » : ma, par 89. il est donc logique que le juge présidant une audience prévue à l’art. 525 effectue son analyse avec déférence envers les conclusions de fait tirées par le juge de première instance quand il n’y a aucune raison de les modifier. dans le même ordre d’idée, toute pondération ou mise en balance des facteurs par le juge saisi au départ d’une demande de mise en liberté sous caution doit être examinée compte tenu du temps déjà écoulé et de toutes les autres considérations pertinentes analysées plus loin. (6) material available to the judge (6) éléments mis à la disposition du juge [48] section 525 offers little guidance on the re- cord available to the judge at the hearing. however, as veale j. pointed out in sawrenko, at para. 31, s. 525(8) serves to incorporate ss. 517 to 519, with any necessary modifications. under s. 518(1), the prosecutor may show the circumstances of the al- leged offence and the judge has a wide discretion to make inquiries, as well as to receive and consider any evidence “considered credible or trustworthy” in the circumstances of the case. the judge at the s. 525 hearing is therefore free to make inquiries about the case, as well as to rely upon the transcript, [48] l’article 525 donne peu d’indications sur le dossier dont dispose le juge à l’audience. toutefois, comme l’a fait observer le juge veale dans sawrenko, par. 31, le par. 525(8) sert à incorporer les art. 517 à 519, avec les modifications nécessaires. le pa- ragraphe 518(1) permet au poursuivant de faire la preuve des faits de l’infraction reprochée et confère au juge un vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire lui permet- tant de faire les enquêtes qu’il estime opportunes et de recevoir toute preuve « qu’il considère plausible ou digne de foi » dans les circonstances de l’espèce. lors de l’examen prévu à l’art. 525, il est donc loisible au 130 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. exhibits and reasons from any initial judicial interim release hearing and from any subsequent review. [49] furthermore, both parties are entitled to make submissions on the basis of any additional “credible or trustworthy” information which is relevant or material to the judge’s analysis. the admissibility of any material that existed at the time of the initial bail hearing but was not presented at that point should also be governed by the criteria of due diligence and relevance discussed in st- cloud, at paras 130-35. in the context of a s. 525 review, the judge must be particularly attentive to any new evidence or material change in the circumstances of the accused and to its impact on the question whether his or her continued detention in custody is justified. for example, the period of pre- trial detention may have afforded the accused person time to make arrangements for a suitable surety, develop a comprehensive release plan or take other steps that would negate the initial basis for his or her detention under s 515(10). juge de se renseigner sur l’affaire et de se fier à la transcription, aux pièces et aux motifs de toute au- dience initiale de mise en liberté provisoire par voie judiciaire, ainsi que sur tout examen ultérieur. [49] en outre, les deux parties ont le droit de présenter des observations fondées sur tous les renseignements « plausibles ou dignes de foi » supplémentaires qui sont pertinents ou importants pour l’analyse du juge. l’admissibilité de tout élément qui existait au moment de l’enquête initiale sur la mise en liberté sous caution mais qui n’a pas été présenté à ce moment-là devrait elle aussi être régie par les critères de diligence et de pertinence expliqués dans l’arrêt st- cloud, par. 130- 135. dans le contexte d’un examen de la détention tenu en application de l’art. 525, le juge doit porter une attention particulière à toute preuve nouvelle ou à tout changement important de la situation du prévenu de même qu’à l’incidence correspondante que cela a sur la question de savoir si le maintien en détention de l’individu est justifié. à titre d’exemple, la période de détention avant le procès peut avoir donné au prévenu le temps de prendre des dispositions pour obtenir une caution adéquate, d’élaborer un plan de mise en liberté complet ou de prendre d’autres mesures qui rendraient caduque la raison d’être initiale de sa détention en application du par 515(10). (7) impact of the passage of time and unreason- (7) l’incidence de l’écoulement du temps et du able delay délai anormal [50] in determining whether the detention remains justified under s. 515(10), the judge should also con- sider whether the time that has already elapsed has had — or the anticipated passage of time will have — an impact on the appropriateness or proportionality of the detention. in particular, it is necessary to be sensitive to whether the continued detention of the accused person could erode public confidence in the administration of justice: see, eg,. mccormack, at para. 29 (canlii). [50] pour décider si la détention est toujours jus- tifiée au sens du par. 515(10), le juge doit aussi exa- miner si le temps déjà écoulé ou prévu influe sur la pertinence ou la proportionnalité de la détention. plus particulièrement, il doit se demander si le maintien en détention du prévenu risque de miner la confiance du public dans l’administration de la justice : voir, p ex, mccormack, par. 29 (canlii). [51] this is ultimately a question of proportion- ality. in some cases, the passage of time will have no impact on the necessity of continued detention. in other cases, it may be a very strong indicator that the accused should be released, with or without conditions. reviewing judges must be particularly il s’agit, en définitive, d’une question de pro- [51] portionnalité. dans certains cas, l’écoulement du temps n’aura aucune incidence sur le besoin de main- tenir ou non le détenu en détention. dans d’autres cas, le retard pourrait être un très bon indice que l’accusé devrait être mis en liberté avec ou sans conditions. [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 131 alert to the possibility that the amount of time spent by an accused in detention has approximated or even exceeded the sentence he or she would realistically serve if convicted: see, eg,. sawrenko, at para 43. the assessment must be informed by the need to reduce the risk of induced guilty pleas, which are profoundly detrimental to the integrity of the crimi- nal justice system. as was noted in r v. white, 2010 onsc 3164, “public confidence in the administra- tion of justice, and in particular in the judicial interim release regime, would be substantially eroded by pre- trial incarceration of presumptively innocent individuals to the equivalency or beyond the term of what would be a fit sentence if [they were] con- victed”: para. 10 (canlii). [52] determining, for the purposes of this analysis, the sentence the accused would potentially receive is not an exact science, nor does it require an exhaus- tive inquiry. however, the judge’s analysis should account for the circumstances of the case that were known at the time of the hearing and reflect the rel- evant sentencing principles: st- cloud, at para 65. in other circumstances, accounting for the [53] elapsed time or anticipated passage of time may require a more nuanced analysis of its impact on the three grounds which justify detention under s 515(10). in st- cloud, the court indicated that a lengthy delay between the hearing and the eventual trial may be considered in determining whether de- tention is necessary to maintain confidence in the ad- ministration of justice, which is the tertiary ground: para 71. in this sense, the analysis is not only retro- spective, but also forward- looking. for example, let us consider a scenario in which an individual is de- tained on the basis of s. 515(10)(c), and at the time of the first detention order his trial is only two months away. if the trial date is then rescheduled for a date two years later and remains many months away at the time of s. 525 hearing, the continued detention of the accused may no longer be proportionate, or nec- essary, for the purposes of this third ground: see also le juge chargé du contrôle doit être particulièrement conscient du risque que le temps passé par l’accusé en détention corresponde à peu près ou soit même supérieur à la peine qu’il purgerait de façon réaliste s’il était reconnu coupable : voir, p ex, sawrenko, par 43. cette évaluation doit tenir compte de la né- cessité d’atténuer le risque que la détention incite l’accusé à inscrire un plaidoyer de culpabilité, ce qui compromettrait gravement l’intégrité du système de justice criminelle. comme le tribunal l’a fait obser- ver dans le jugement r c. white, 2010 onsc 3164, [traduction] « la confiance du public envers l’ad- ministration de la justice, et en particulier à l’égard du régime de mise en liberté provisoire par voie judiciaire, serait considérablement ébranlée par l’in- carcération avant le procès de personnes présumées innocentes pour une durée équivalente ou supérieure à celle de la peine qu’elles devraient purger si elles étaient reconnues coupables » : par. 10 (canlii). [52] la détermination de la peine qui pourrait être infligée à l’accusé dans le cadre de cette réflexion n’est ni une science exacte ni un examen exhaustif. toutefois, le juge doit tenir compte dans son analyse des circonstances de l’espèce qui étaient connues au moment de l’audience, ainsi que des principes de la détermination de la peine applicables : st- cloud, par 65. [53] dans d’autres situations, la prise en compte du temps écoulé ou prévu peut nécessiter une analyse plus nuancée de son incidence sur les trois motifs qui justifient la détention en application du par 515(10). dans l’arrêt st- cloud, la cour a indiqué qu’il est né- cessaire que le juge puisse tenir compte du fait que le procès de l’accusé aura lieu à une date très éloignée pour décider si sa détention est nécessaire afin de ne pas miner la confiance du public envers l’adminis- tration de la justice au regard du troisième motif : par 71. en ce sens, l’analyse est non seulement ré- trospective, mais aussi prospective. à titre d’exemple, prenons le scénario de l’individu qui est détenu en vertu de l’al. 515(10)c) et pour qui il ne reste que deux mois avant son procès au moment du prononcé de la première ordonnance de détention. si la date du procès est ensuite repoussée de deux ans et qu’au mo- ment de l’audience tenue en vertu de l’art. 525, il reste de nombreux mois avant le procès, son maintien en 132 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. r v. whyte, 2014 onca 268, 119 or (3d) 305, at paras. 39-43; piazza, at paras. 71-81 (canlii). in an appropriate case, it may also be possible for the judge to conclude that a hypothetical risk in relation to the primary or secondary ground is simply out- weighed by the certain cost of the accused person’s loss of liberty or of a loss of public confidence in the administration of justice. [54] as part of this analysis, the judge may con- sider whether either party has been responsible for any unreasonable delay in the trial of the charge: s. 525(3) cr. c. if an unreasonable delay in getting the case to trial can be attributed to one of the parties, that factor will be relevant in determining whether the continued detention of the accused is proportion- ate or appropriate. thus, if the accused appears to have engineered an unreasonable delay in his or her own trial, the basis for making a release order will clearly be weaker, but if the crown is responsible for an unreasonable delay, this will weigh in favour of release. while the term “unreasonable delay” in s. 525 clearly cannot have the same meaning as it does in the context of s. 11(b) of the charter, the two can be seen to be conceptually related. that being said, not every delay in getting a matter to trial will be unreasonable, and the accused does not have a right to be at any particular point in the process when the 90- day mark is reached. the judge must therefore rely on his or her judgment and experience in determining what impact, if any, the passage of time and an unreasonable delay should have on the continued detention of the accused. (8) other matters properly considered in a sec- tion 525 detention review détention n’est peut- être plus proportionnel ou néces- saire pour l’application du troisième motif : voir aussi r c. whyte, 2014 onca 268, 119 or (3d) 305, par. 39-43; piazza, par. 71-81 (canlii). dans un cas qui s’y prête, le juge peut aussi conclure que le risque hypothétique visé par le premier ou le second motif est tout bonnement supplanté par ce qu’il en coûtera assurément à la liberté de l’accusé ou à la confiance du public dans l’administration de la justice. [54] dans le cadre de cette analyse, il est loisible au juge de se demander si l’une ou l’autre partie est responsable de tout délai anormal dans le procès sur l’inculpation : par 525(3) c cr. si le délai anormal de renvoi de l’affaire à procès est imputable à l’une des parties, ce facteur sera utile pour décider si le maintien en détention du prévenu est proportionnel ou approprié. à titre d’exemple, si le prévenu semble être responsable du délai anormal dans son propre procès, il disposera alors d’arguments moins solides pour réclamer sa mise en liberté, et lorsque le ministère public est responsable du délai anormal, cela militera en faveur de la mise en liberté. bien que l’expression « délai anormal » figurant à l’art. 525 n’ait de toute évidence pas le même sens que le terme « délai rai- sonnable » à l’al. 11b) de la charte, on peut constater que ces deux termes sont liés sur le plan conceptuel. cela dit, ce ne sont pas tous les retards dans le ren- voi d’une affaire à procès qui sont anormaux, et le prévenu ne peut revendiquer le droit de se trouver à un moment précis du processus à l’expiration des 90 jours. en conséquence, le juge doit faire appel à son jugement et à son expérience pour déterminer quelle incidence, le cas échéant, l’écoulement du temps et la question du délai anormal devraient avoir sur le maintien en détention du prévenu. (8) autres questions pouvant valablement être étudiées lors de l’examen de la détention prévu à l’art. 525 [55] finally, there may be cases in which it is necessary for the reviewing judge to scrutinize the rationale offered for the original detention order against the accused. while any previous bail de- cisions will be relevant and will likely inform the proceedings, reviewing judges must be careful not to simply “rubber- stamp” such decisions. as i noted [55] enfin, dans certains cas, le juge chargé du contrôle de la détention doit examiner attentivement la raison d’être de l’ordonnance initiale de détention visant l’accusé. toute décision antérieure sur la mise en liberté sous caution s’avérera pertinente et aura vraisemblablement des retombées sur la procédure, mais le juge chargé du contrôle doit faire preuve de [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 133 above, s. 525 creates an independent safeguard func- tion that is particularly important for unrepresented individuals, who may not have had the means, the capacity or the awareness to apply for a s. 520 review but are now appearing before a judge at a s. 525 hear- ing. for example, if when the accused appears at the s. 525 hearing it becomes clear that the initial bail judge made an error of law — perhaps by failing to apply the bail principles enunciated by this court in antic, at para. 67, — and that this resulted in an un- necessary detention, it would be wasteful to tell the accused at that point to make a separate application for a different review process under s 520. the need to revisit an initial detention order will not arise in every case, and in the absence of a basis for judicial intervention, there is no need for a s. 525 hearing to become a protracted or formal proceeding. however, the judge must be alive to these issues when they arise, and must be prepared to respond to them ap- propriately. (9) hearing where there has been no initial bail decision prudence en ne se contentant pas d’approuver machi- nalement les décisions. en effet, comme nous l’avons vu, l’art. 525 crée une fonction de sauvegarde indé- pendante qui revêt une importance particulière pour les individus qui ne sont pas représentés et qui n’ont peut- être pas les moyens, la capacité ou les connais- sances nécessaires pour présenter une demande en vertu de l’art. 520, mais qui comparaîtront néanmoins devant un juge lors de l’audience prévue à l’art 525. à titre d’exemple, si, lors de la comparution de l’ac- cusé à l’audience prévue par l’art. 525, il devient évident que le juge saisi au départ de la demande de mise en liberté sous caution a commis une erreur de droit à l’origine d’une détention inutile — comme l’omission d’appliquer les principes en matière de mise en liberté sous caution confirmés par notre cour dans antic, par. 67, — ce serait une perte de temps d’inviter alors l’accusé à présenter une demande dis- tincte pour obtenir un processus d’examen différent en vertu de l’art 520. il n’est pas toujours nécessaire de réexaminer une ordonnance initiale de détention et, faute d’un motif d’intervention judiciaire, point n’est besoin que l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 s’éter- nise ou devienne trop formelle. toutefois, le juge doit être attentif à ces questions lorsqu’elles se présentent et être prêt à y répondre comme il se doit. (9) tenue d’une audience sans qu’il n’ait été statué au départ sur la mise en liberté sous caution [56] since s. 525 calls upon the judge to review the detention itself, the existence of an initial decision is not required in order to achieve the core objective of a s. 525 review. as i mentioned above, there may be certain anomalous situations in which an accused person who appears before a judge under s. 525 did not undergo a full initial bail hearing at the time of his or her arrest. to give proper effect to s. 525 in such situations, the judge is required to conduct the full bail hearing “from the ground up” in accordance with the ladder principle articulated in antic, taking into account the time the accused has already spent in pre- trial custody. i wish to mention here that it has been suggested that allowing a full bail hear- ing to proceed before a superior court judge at the s. 525 stage would encourage “judge shopping” or would afford the accused some kind of procedural [56] puisque l’art. 525 confie au juge la tâche de contrôler la détention elle- même, l’existence d’une décision initiale n’est pas nécessaire pour atteindre l’objectif fondamental du contrôle prévu à cet article. rappelons qu’il peut y avoir certaines situations inu- sitées dans lesquelles le prévenu comparaît devant un juge en vertu de l’art. 525 sans avoir fait l’objet d’une enquête initiale complète sur sa mise en liberté sous caution à l’époque de son arrestation. pour appliquer comme il se doit l’art. 525 en pareil cas, le juge est tenu de mener une enquête complète sur la mise en liberté provisoire « à partir du début » conformément au principe de l’échelle énoncé dans l’arrêt antic, en tenant compte du temps que le prévenu a déjà purgé en détention avant le procès. j’ouvre ici une parenthèse pour souligner qu’on a suggéré que le fait de permettre la tenue d’une enquête complète sur la mise en liberté 134 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. advantage that would for him or her justify spending three months in custody. in my view, this argument strains credulity. to quote o’neill j. in mccormack, “i am not at all sure that many jailed accused would ever resort to paying the 90 day price for that strat- egy”: para 26. (10) discretion to give directions for expediting the trial and proceedings [57] section 525(9) affords the judge a discretion to give directions for expediting the trial of the ac- cused at a s. 525 hearing, and s. 526 confers a more general authority on judges and justices acting under part xvi of the criminal code to give directions for expediting any proceedings in respect of the accused. for these provisions to operate as meaningful safe- guards against unreasonable delay and excessively long pre- trial detention, all stakeholders — includ- ing the prosecution, defence counsel and the courts — must take an active role in ensuring the timely progress of the trial. [58] first, s. 525 hearings take on a heightened im- portance in the post-jordan era, because they afford an opportunity to have a reviewing judge evaluate the progress of the trial at an early stage. if the judge believes that the case is at a point at which an unrea- sonable delay prohibited by s. 11(b) of the charter is likely to result, he or she should consider giving directions for expediting the trial under ss. 525(9) and 526 as a preventative measure. sous caution devant le juge d’une cour supérieure à l’étape de l’art. 525 encouragerait la « recherche du juge le plus accommodant » ou donnerait au prévenu un avantage procédural suffisant pour justifier qu’il passe trois mois en détention. à mon avis, cet argu- ment défie la raison. pour citer les propos du juge o’neill dans l’affaire mccormack, [traduction] « je suis loin d’être certain qu’il y aurait beaucoup d’accu- sés emprisonnés qui seraient prêts à passer 90 jours de plus en prison pour cette stratégie » : par 26. (10) le pouvoir discrétionnaire de donner des di- rectives pour hâter le déroulement du procès et des procédures [57] le paragraphe 525(9) confère au juge le pou- voir discrétionnaire de donner des directives pour hâter le procès du prévenu lors de l’audience prévue à l’art 525. l’article 526 confère au juge et au juge de paix agissant en vertu de la partie xvi du c cr. un pouvoir plus général de donner des instructions pour hâter les procédures qui concernent le prévenu. pour que ces dispositions constituent des garanties utiles contre les délais anormaux et le prolongement de la détention avant le procès, tous les intervenants — y compris la poursuite, les avocats de la défense et les tribunaux — doivent jouer un rôle actif pour veiller au bon déroulement du procès. [58] premièrement, l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 revêt une plus grande importance dans la foulée de l’arrêt jordan parce qu’elle donne au juge saisi de la demande de révision l’occasion de constater l’état d’avancement du procès à un stade plus précoce. lorsque le juge estime que l’état d’avancement du procès est tel qu’un délai déraisonnable interdit par l’al. 11b) de la charte est susceptible de se produire, il devrait envisager la possibilité de donner des di- rectives en vertu du par. 525(9) ou de l’art. 526 pour hâter le procès à titre de mesure préventive. [59] however, s. 525 must be understood as more than just a “jordan check-up”. individuals in pre- trial detention, who are presumed innocent, bear a particularly high cost in terms of loss of liberty while awaiting their day in court. the judge should always determine whether the case presents an ap- propriate occasion to exercise his or her discretion [59] toutefois, l’art. 525 ne peut se résumer à une simple « vérification de la conformité avec l’arrêt jordan ». les individus détenus avant leur procès qui sont présumés innocents paient un prix particu- lièrement élevé sur le plan de leur liberté alors qu’ils attendent d’avoir la possibilité de se faire entendre devant le tribunal. dans tous les cas, le juge devrait [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 135 to give directions for expediting the trial and related proceedings under ss. 525(9) and 526. also, a judge who finds that the continued detention of the accused is justified on the basis of the grounds set out in s. 515(10) must look ahead to ensure that the accused will not be in a “time served” position before the prospective trial date. [60] in deciding whether to give directions under s. 525(9) or 526, the reviewing judge must consider all the circumstances of the case and any relevant submissions by the parties. relevant factors could include the relative complexity of the case, the in- volvement of co- accused individuals, the complete- ness of disclosure, problems related to evidence, the presence of any exceptional circumstances and the typical delay in getting comparable matters to trial in the jurisdiction in question. the analysis should be forward- looking. it should also be realistic, as the purpose of s. 525 is not to provide a pretext for judicial micro- management. usually, the case will be proceeding at an acceptable pace and no direc- tions from the court will be required. however, there may sometimes be a need, for example, to review the state of the crown’s disclosure to the defence, resolve an outstanding procedural issue or inquire into whether an earlier trial date can be secured. in these circumstances, a considered, principled and proactive intervention of a reviewing judge can have a real impact on the fairness and efficiency of the criminal justice process, and meaningfully safeguard the liberty interests of the accused. évaluer s’il y a lieu d’exercer son pouvoir discrétion- naire pour hâter le procès et les procédures connexes en vertu du par. 525(9) et de l’art 526. dans les cas où le juge estime que le maintien en détention du prévenu est justifié pour les motifs énoncés au par. 515(10), il doit faire un examen prospectif pour s’assurer que le prévenu ne se retrouve pas dans une situation où il aura purgé l’entièreté de sa peine avant la date prévue de son procès. [60] pour décider s’il y a lieu de donner des direc- tives en vertu du par. 525(9) ou de l’art. 526, le juge saisi de la demande de révision doit tenir compte de toutes les circonstances de l’espèce, ainsi que des observations pertinentes des parties. parmi les facteurs pertinents, mentionnons, à titre d’exemple, la complexité relative de l’affaire, la participation de coaccusés, l’exhaustivité de la divulgation, les pro- blèmes liés à la preuve, l’existence de circonstances exceptionnelles et le temps habituellement écoulé avant que des affaires comparables ne parviennent au stade de l’instruction dans le même ressort. l’analyse doit être à la fois prospective et réaliste : l’art. 525 n’a pas pour but de servir de prétexte à une microgestion judiciaire. dans la plupart des cas, le déroulement de l’affaire se fera à un rythme acceptable et aucune directive du tribunal ne sera nécessaire. cependant, il faudra parfois, par exemple, vérifier ce que le mi- nistère public a communiqué à la défense, régler une question de procédure en suspens ou déterminer s’il est possible de fixer une date de procès plus rapprochée. dans ces circonstances, l’intervention réfléchie, fondée sur des principes et proactive du juge saisi de la demande de révision est susceptible d’avoir une incidence réelle sur l’équité et l’effica- cité du système de justice criminelle et de protéger efficacement le droit à la liberté du prévenu. (11) right of the accused to know the case to (11) le droit de l’accusé de connaître la preuve à meet charge [61] finally, i would note that in oral argument, the attorney general of ontario remarked that at s. 525 hearings in that province, “[m]ost of the time the accused do not understand why they are there, most of the time they are unrepresented and it simply gets dismissed”: transcript, at p 92. this can hardly be what parliament intended in enacting s.  525. [61] enfin, je tiens à signaler que, durant les plai- doiries, la procureure générale de l’ontario a souligné que, lors des audiences tenues dans cette province en vertu de l’art. 525, [traduction] « [l]a plupart du temps, les accusés ne comprennent pas pourquoi ils sont là, le plus souvent ils ne sont pas représentés et les audiences sont simplement rejetées » : transcription, 136 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. there is no question that accused persons have a right to understand the purpose of the hearing, re- gardless of whether they are represented by counsel. all participants in our criminal justice system bear a fundamental responsibility for ensuring that this is the case. in reality, the individuals who are at the greatest risk of languishing in custody are those who are unrepresented. where an accused is fully informed and supported by counsel, a s. 525 hearing may be a brief formality or may be waived altogether. however where the state has not provided for some form of legal assistance and the rights of an unrep- resented individual are concerned, the judge must take even greater care to safeguard the liberty of the accused in order to maintain public confidence in the justice system. p 92. on est loin de ce que le parlement avait en tête quand il a édicté l’art 525. il ne fait aucun doute que les accusés ont le droit de comprendre à quoi sert l’au- dience, qu’ils soient représentés ou non par un avocat. tous les acteurs de notre système de justice criminelle ont l’obligation et la responsabilité de s’en assurer. en réalité, les personnes qui risquent le plus de croupir en prison sont celles qui ne sont pas représentées par un avocat. dans le cas des individus qui sont bien in- formés et qui bénéficient de l’assistance d’un avocat, l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 peut n’être qu’une brève formalité. certains y renoncent carrément. toutefois, lorsque l’état n’a pas prévu une certaine forme d’as- sistance juridique et que les droits du prévenu non représenté sont en jeu, le juge doit veiller encore da- vantage à protéger sa liberté et à assurer la confiance du public envers le système de justice. (12) summary of the correct approach (12) résumé de la bonne façon d’aborder le con- i would summarize the correct approach to [62] a detention review under s. 525 as follows. first, the jailer has an obligation to apply for the hearing immediately upon the expiration of 90  days fol- lowing the day on which the accused was initially taken before a justice under s 503. where there is an intervening detention order under s. 520, 521 or 524 following the initial appearance of the accused and before the end of the 90- day period, the 90- day period begins again. accused persons who have not had a full bail hearing are nonetheless entitled to one under s 525. upon receiving the application from the jailer, the judge must fix a date and give notice for the hearing. the hearing must be held at the earliest opportunity. in his or her analysis, the judge may refer to the transcript, exhibits and reasons from any initial judicial interim release hearing and from any subsequent review hearings. both parties are also entitled to make submissions on the basis of any additional “credible or trustworthy” information which is relevant or material to the judge’s analysis, and pre- existing material is subject to the criteria of due diligence and relevance discussed in st- cloud, at paras 130-35. trôle [62] je résumerais comme suit la bonne façon d’aborder le contrôle des motifs de la détention prévu à l’art 525. premièrement, le geôlier est tenu de pré- senter une demande d’audience dès l’expiration des 90 jours suivant la date à laquelle le prévenu a été conduit au départ devant un juge de paix en applica- tion de l’art 503. lorsqu’une ordonnance de détention a, dans l’intervalle, été rendue en vertu des art. 520, 521 ou 524 à la suite de la comparution initiale de l’accusé et avant l’expiration du délai de 90 jours, le compte à rebours jusqu’à l’expiration du délai de 90 jours reprend. le prévenu qui n’a pas bénéficié d’une audience complète sur sa mise en liberté sous caution y a néanmoins droit selon l’art 525. sur ré- ception de la demande du geôlier, le juge doit fixer la date de l’audience et en donner avis. l’audience doit se tenir le plus tôt possible. dans son analyse, le juge peut se reporter à la transcription, aux pièces et aux motifs de l’audience initiale de mise en liberté pro- visoire par voie judiciaire, ainsi qu’à toute audience de révision subséquente. les deux parties ont aussi le droit de présenter des observations en se fondant sur tout renseignement « plausible ou digne de foi » qui est pertinent ou important pour l’analyse du juge, et les éléments qui existaient déjà sont assujettis aux critères de diligence raisonnable et de pertinence ex- pliqués dans st- cloud, par 130-135. [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 137 [63] at the hearing, unreasonable delay is not a threshold that must be met before reviewing the de- tention of the accused. the overarching question is only whether the continued detention of the ac- cused in custody is justified within the meaning of s 515(10). in determining whether the detention of the accused is still justified, the reviewing judge may consider any new evidence or change in the circumstances of the accused, the impact of the passage of time and any unreasonable delay on the proportionality of the detention, and the rationale offered for the original detention order, if one was made. if there was no initial bail hearing, the s. 525 judge is responsible for conducting one, taking into account the time the accused has already spent in pre- trial custody. ultimately, s. 525 requires a reviewing judge to provide accused persons with reasons why their continued detention is — or is not —justified. finally, the judge should make use of his or her dis- cretion under ss. 525(9) and 526 to give directions for expediting the trial and related proceedings where it is appropriate to do so. directions should be given with a view to mitigating the risk of unconstitutional delay and expediting the trials of accused persons who are subject to lengthy pre- trial detention. [63] à l’audience, le délai anormal n’est pas une condition préalable à satisfaire avant de pouvoir exa- miner la détention du prévenu. la question primor- diale consiste uniquement à savoir si le maintien en détention de l’accusé sous garde est justifié au sens du par 515(10). pour en décider, le juge chargé du contrôle peut examiner toute preuve nouvelle ou tout changement de la situation du prévenu, l’incidence de l’écoulement du temps et de tout délai anormal sur la proportionnalité de la détention et la raison d’être donnée à l’appui de l’ordonnance de déten- tion initiale rendue, le cas échéant. s’il n’y a pas eu d’enquête initiale sur la mise en liberté sous caution, le juge saisi d’une demande de révision présentée en vertu de l’art. 525 a l’obligation d’en tenir une, en prenant en considération le temps que le prévenu a déjà passé en détention avant le procès. au bout du compte, l’art. 525 exige du juge siégeant en contrôle qu’il fournisse au prévenu les motifs pour lesquels son maintien en détention est justifié ou non. enfin, le juge devrait utiliser le pouvoir discrétionnaire que lui confèrent le par. 525(9) et l’art. 526 pour donner des directives afin de hâter le procès et les procédures connexes lorsqu’il y a lieu de le faire. il faudrait don- ner des directives en vue d’atténuer le risque de délai inconstitutionnel et de hâter le déroulement des pro- cès des accusés détenus longtemps avant leur procès. v application v application [64] i will not carry out the full exercise of ap- plying the foregoing principles to the facts of this case, given that the appeal is moot and the accused has pled guilty. i will, however, make three brief observations. [64] je ne procéderai pas à une application de cette analyse aux faits de la présente affaire, étant donné que le pourvoi est théorique et que l’accusé a re- connu sa culpabilité. je tiens toutefois à formuler trois brèves observations. [65] first, the 90- day period applicable to mr. myers’ s. 525 hearing should have begun on november 24, 2016, which was the date of his s. 520 review. at that point, his sentence for the unrelated break and enter charges had been served, and he was not detained on any other matter: ruling on judicial interim release application, at para 34. however, counsel for mr. myers was not contacted with regard to a s. 525 hearing until 110 days later (on march 14, 2017): appellant’s condensed book, tab 8. the hearing itself did not take place until october 5, 2017, over 300 days after mr. myers’ s. 520 review. [65] premièrement, le délai de 90 jours applicable à l’audience prévue par l’art. 525 aurait dû, dans le cas de m. myers, commencer à courir le 24 novembre 2016, c’est-à-dire à la date de la révision de son ordon- nance en vertu de l’art 520. à ce moment-là, il avait déjà purgé sa peine pour les accusations d’introduc- tion par effraction et il n’était pas détenu relativement à d’autres faits : décision sur la demande de mise en li- berté provisoire par voie judiciaire, par 34. toutefois, son avocat n’a été joint au sujet de l’audience prévue à l’art. 525 que 110 jours plus tard (le 14 mars 2017) : recueil condensé de l’appelant, onglet 8. l’audience 138 r v myers the chief justice [2019] 2 scr. while it is true that this case is exceptional in that riley j. was asked to give a preliminary ruling on s. 525, the fact remains that mr. myers waited a very long time for the hearing to occur. i would reiterate that when an accused is not required to be detained in custody in respect of any other matter for 90 days following a review under s. 520, the application for the hearing must be made immediately upon the ex- piration of 90 days, and the judge has an obligation to schedule that hearing without delay. [66] second, i would note that the parties faced various barriers in fixing a date for trial. dates were offered in march, june, october and november 2017. counsel for mr. myers submits that he offered to re- arrange his caseload to accommodate more dates and proposed to make considerable admissions based on the preliminary inquiry evidence in order to shorten the trial. he also applied unsuccessfully for severance of mr. myers from his co- accused, mr richardson. despite these efforts, a trial that was initially scheduled for late 2016 was ultimately set for march 2018, four months before the pre- sumptive 30- month ceiling: jordan, at para 5. while this type of scheduling challenge is not uncommon, the delays were, as the crown concedes, unfortu- nate. nevertheless, scheduling issues caused by the fact that the crown was proceeding jointly against mr. myers and mr. richardson appeared to have been a more significant factor in the delays than unreasonable behaviour on the part of either the crown or the accused. it is possible that directions given under s. 525(9) or 526 could have prevented or mitigated the delays. elle- même n’a eu lieu que le 5 octobre 2017, soit plus de 300 jours après l’examen demandé par m. myers en vertu de l’art 520. même s’il s’agit sans aucun doute d’un cas exceptionnel en raison du fait que l’on a demandé au juge riley de rendre une décision préli- minaire au sujet de l’art. 525, m. myers a néanmoins dû attendre très longtemps avant que cette audience n’ait lieu. je tiens à répéter que lorsqu’il n’est pas nécessaire que l’accusé soit détenu sous garde relati- vement à d’autres faits pendant 90 jours à la suite de la révision prévue à l’art. 520, la demande d’audience doit être présentée dès l’expiration des 90 jours et le juge a l’obligation de fixer la date de cette audience sans délai. [66] deuxièmement, je tiens à signaler que les par- ties se sont heurtées à divers obstacles dans la fixation d’une date de procès. des dates ont été proposées pour mars, juin, octobre et novembre 2017. l’avocat de m. myers a fait valoir qu’il avait proposé de ré- organiser sa charge de travail pour être disponible à un plus grand nombre de dates et qu’il avait of- fert de faire un nombre considérable d’admissions en fonction des éléments de preuve présentés lors de l’enquête préliminaire pour abréger le procès. il a éga- lement demandé sans succès de faire juger séparément m. myers de son coaccusé m richardson. malgré ces démarches, le procès a d’abord été prévu pour la fin de 2016, pour être finalement fixé en mars 2018, quatre mois avant le plafond de 30 mois au- delà duquel le délai est présumé déraisonnable : jordan, par 5. bien que ce genre de difficulté à fixer une date de pro- cès ne soit pas rare, les retards qui se sont produits en l’espèce étaient regrettables, comme l’a admis le ministère public. il semble toutefois que les conflits d’horaires imputables au fait que le ministère public poursuivait conjointement mm. myers et richardson aient contribué davantage au retard que tout agisse- ment déraisonnable de la part du ministère public ou de l’accusé. des directives données en vertu du par. 525(9) ou de l’art. 526 auraient peut- être permis de prévenir ou de raccourcir ces délais. [67] third, mr. myers was detained exclusively on the basis of the second ground under s. 515(10), despite the fact that he had a release plan involving a closely supervised treatment facility to address his substance abuse problems and multiple proposals [67] troisièmement, m. myers a été détenu ex- clusivement sur la base du second motif énoncé au par. 515(10), même s’il avait soumis un plan de mise en liberté prévoyant son admission dans un centre étroitement surveillé pour traiter ses problèmes de [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers le juge en chef 139 to address the concern that he posed a risk to the public. it was within the bail judge’s discretion to determine whether the release strategies presented by counsel addressed the risk that if released from custody, mr. myers would commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice within the meaning of s 515(10)(b). that being said, judges and justices presiding over bail hearings should al- ways give very careful consideration to release plans that involve supervised treatment for individuals with substance abuse and mental health issues. release into treatment with appropriate conditions will often adequately address any risk raised under s. 515(10), and such a strategy is a less onerous alternative than provincial remand. it may also substantially address the root causes of the accused person’s alleged crim- inal behaviour and reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct. in accordance with the principles articulated in antic, we must not lose sight of the fact that pre- trial detention is a measure of last resort. toxicomanie et de nombreuses propositions visant à dissiper la crainte qu’il présente un risque pour le public. le juge saisi de la demande de mise en liberté sous caution avait toute latitude pour déterminer si les scénarios de mise en liberté présentés par l’avocat de m. myers contraient le risque que son client, s’il était mis en liberté, puisse commettre une infraction criminelle ou puisse nuire à l’administration de la justice au sens de l’al 515(10)b). cela dit, les juges et les juges de paix qui président les enquêtes sur la mise en liberté sous caution devraient toujours examiner très attentivement les plans de mise en liberté qui prévoient un traitement supervisé pour les personnes aux prises avec des problèmes de toxicomanie et de santé mentale. la mise en liberté prévoyant l’admission dans un centre de traitement assortie de conditions appropriées permettra souvent de bien répondre à tout risque soulevé en application du par. 515(10) et constitue une solution de rechange moins onéreuse que la détention dans un établisse- ment provincial. elle peut aussi répondre en bonne partie aux causes profondes du comportement crimi- nel reproché à l’accusé et réduire ainsi la probabilité de récidive. conformément aux principes énoncés dans l’arrêt antic, nous ne devons pas perdre de vue que la détention avant le procès est une mesure de dernier recours. vi disposition vi dispositif [68] as the case is moot, i would simply allow the appeal and make no further order. [68] comme l’affaire est théorique, je suis d’avis de simplement accueillir le pourvoi et de ne rendre aucune autre ordonnance. appendix annexe criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46 justification for detention in custody motifs justifiant la détention 515 (10) for the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on one or more of the following grounds: 515 (10) pour l’application du présent article, la détention d’un prévenu sous garde n’est justifiée que dans l’un des cas suivants : (a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with ac- cording to law; a) sa détention est nécessaire pour assurer sa présence au tribunal afin qu’il soit traité selon la loi; 140 r v myers [2019] 2 scr. (b) where the detention is necessary for the protec- tion or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances includ- ing any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and b) sa détention est nécessaire pour la protection ou la sécurité du public, notamment celle des victimes et des témoins de l’infraction ou celle des personnes âgées de moins de dix- huit ans, eu égard aux circonstances, y compris toute probabilité marquée que le prévenu, s’il est mis en liberté, commettra une infraction criminelle ou nuira à l’administration de la justice; (c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including c) sa détention est nécessaire pour ne pas miner la confiance du public envers l’administration de la jus- tice, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, notam- ment les suivantes : (i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, (i) le fait que l’accusation paraît fondée, (ii) the gravity of the offence, (ii) la gravité de l’infraction, (iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and (iii) les circonstances entourant sa perpétration, y compris l’usage d’une arme à feu, (iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject- matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more. (iv) le fait que le prévenu encourt, en cas de con- damnation, une longue peine d’emprisonnement ou, s’agissant d’une infraction mettant en jeu une arme à feu, une peine minimale d’emprisonnement d’au moins trois ans. review of detention where trial delayed examen de la détention quand le procès est retardé time for application to judge délai de présentation d’une demande à un juge 525 (1) where an accused who has been charged with an offence other than an offence listed in section 469 and who is not required to be detained in custody in respect of any other matter is being detained in custody pending his trial for that offence and the trial has not commenced 525 (1) lorsqu’un prévenu qui a été inculpé d’une infrac- tion autre qu’une infraction mentionnée à l’article 469 et dont la détention sous garde n’est pas requise relativement à une autre affaire est détenu sous garde en attendant son procès pour cette infraction et que le procès n’est pas commencé : (a) in the case of an indictable offence, within ninety days from a) dans le cas d’un acte criminel, dans les quatre- vingt- dix jours : (i) the day on which the accused was taken before a justice under section 503, or (i) à partir du jour où le prévenu a été conduit de- vant un juge de paix en vertu de l’article 503, (ii) where an order that the accused be detained in custody has been made under section 521 or 524, or a decision has been made with respect to a review under section 520, the later of the day on which the accused was taken into custody under that order and the day of the decision, or (ii) lorsqu’une ordonnance enjoignant de détenir le prévenu sous garde a été rendue en vertu des ar- ticles 521 ou 524 ou qu’il a été statué sur la demande de révision visée à l’article 520, à partir de la date de mise sous garde ou, si elle est postérieure, de celle de la décision; [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers 141 (b) in the case of an offence for which the accused is being prosecuted in proceedings by way of summary conviction, within thirty days from b) dans le cas d’une infraction pour laquelle le prévenu est poursuivi par procédure sommaire, dans les trente jours : (i) the day on which the accused was taken before a justice under subsection 503(1), or (i) à partir du jour où le prévenu a été conduit de- vant un juge de paix en vertu du paragraphe 503(1), (ii) where an order that the accused be detained in custody has been made under section 521 or 524, or a decision has been made with respect to a review under section 520, the later of the day on which the accused was taken into custody under that order and the day of the decision, (ii) lorsqu’une ordonnance enjoignant de détenir le prévenu sous garde a été rendue en vertu des ar- ticles 521 ou 524 ou qu’il a été statué sur la demande de révision visée à l’article 520, à partir de la date de mise sous garde ou, si elle est postérieure, de celle de la décision; the person having the custody of the accused shall, forth- with on the expiration of those ninety or thirty days, as the case may be, apply to a judge having jurisdiction in the place in which the accused is in custody to fix a date for a hearing to determine whether or not the accused should be released from custody. la personne ayant la garde du prévenu doit, dès l’expira- tion de ces quatre- vingt- dix jours ou trente jours, selon le cas, demander à un juge ayant juridiction à l’endroit où le prévenu est sous garde de fixer une date pour une audition aux fins de déterminer si le prévenu devrait être mis en liberté ou non. notice of hearing avis d’audition (2) on receiving an application under subsection (1), the judge shall (2) sur réception d’une demande en vertu du paragra- phe (1), le juge doit : (a) fix a date for the hearing described in subsec- tion (1) to be held in the jurisdiction a) fixer une date pour l’audition visée au paragra- phe (1), qui aura lieu dans la juridiction, selon le cas : (i) where the accused is in custody, or (i) où le prévenu est gardé sous garde, (ii) where the trial is to take place; and (ii) où le procès doit avoir lieu; (b) direct that notice of the hearing be given to such persons, including the prosecutor and the accused, and in such manner as the judge may specify. b) ordonner qu’avis de l’audition soit donné à telles personnes, y compris le poursuivant et le prévenu, et de telle manière que le juge peut préciser. matters to be considered on hearing questions à examiner lors de l’audition (3) on the hearing described in subsection (1), the judge may, in deciding whether or not the accused should be released from custody, take into consideration whether the prosecutor or the accused has been responsible for any unreasonable delay in the trial of the charge. (3) lors de l’audition visée au paragraphe (1), le juge peut, pour décider si le prévenu devrait être mis en liberté ou non, prendre en considération le fait que le poursuivant ou le prévenu a été responsable ou non de tout délai anor- mal dans le procès sur l’inculpation. order ordonnance (4) if, following the hearing described in subsection (1), the judge is not satisfied that the continued detention of the accused in custody is justified within the meaning of subsection 515(10), the judge shall order that the accused (4) si, à la suite de l’audition visée au paragraphe (1), le juge n’est pas convaincu que la continuation de la dé- tention du prévenu sous garde est justifiée au sens du paragraphe 515(10), il ordonne que le prévenu soit mis 142 r v myers [2019] 2 scr. be released from custody pending the trial of the charge on his giving an undertaking or entering into a recognizance described in any of paragraphs 515(2)(a) to (e) with such conditions described in subsection 515(4) as the judge considers desirable. en liberté en attendant le procès sur l’inculpation pourvu qu’il remette une promesse ou contracte un engagement visés aux alinéas 515(2)a) à e) et assortis des conditions que prévoit le paragraphe 515(4) et que le juge estime souhaitables. warrant of judge for arrest mandat d’arrestation décerné par un juge (5) where a judge having jurisdiction in the province where an order under subsection (4) for the release of an accused has been made is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused (5) lorsqu’un juge ayant juridiction dans la province où a été rendue une ordonnance de mise en liberté d’un prévenu prévue par le paragraphe (4) est convaincu qu’il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire que le prévenu, selon le cas : (a) has contravened or is about to contravene the un- dertaking or recognizance on which he has been re- leased, or a) a violé ou est sur le point de violer la promesse ou l’engagement en raison duquel ou de laquelle il a été mis en liberté; (b) has, after his release from custody on his undertak- ing or recognizance, committed an indictable offence, b) a, après sa mise en liberté sur sa promesse ou son engagement, commis un acte criminel, he may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. il peut décerner un mandat pour l’arrestation du prévenu. arrest without warrant by peace officer arrestation sans mandat par un agent de la paix (6) notwithstanding anything in this act, a peace officer who believes on reasonable grounds that an accused who has been released from custody under subsection (4) (6) nonobstant toute autre disposition de la présente loi, un agent de la paix qui a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’un prévenu qui a été mis en liberté en vertu du para- graphe (4) : (a) has contravened or is about to contravene the un- dertaking or recognizance on which he has been re- leased, or a) soit a violé ou est sur le point de violer la promesse ou l’engagement en raison duquel ou de laquelle il a été mis en liberté; (b) has, after his release from custody on his undertak- ing or recognizance, committed an indictable offence, b) soit, après sa mise en liberté sur sa promesse ou son engagement, a commis un acte criminel, may arrest the accused without warrant and take him or cause him to be taken before a judge having jurisdiction in the province where the order for his release was made. peut arrêter le prévenu sans mandat et le conduire ou le faire conduire devant un juge ayant juridiction dans la province où a été rendue l’ordonnance de mise en liberté du prévenu. hearing and order audition et ordonnance (7) a judge before whom an accused is taken pursuant to a warrant issued under subsection (5) or pursuant to sub- section (6) may, where the accused shows cause why his detention in custody is not justified within the meaning of subsection 515(10), order that the accused be released on his giving an undertaking or entering into a recognizance described in any of paragraphs 515(2)(a) to (e) with such conditions, described in subsection 515(4), as the judge considers desirable. (7) un juge devant lequel un prévenu est conduit en appli- cation d’un mandat décerné en vertu du paragraphe (5) ou en application du paragraphe (6) peut, lorsque le prévenu fait valoir que sa détention sous garde n’est pas justifiée au sens du paragraphe 515(10), ordonner sa mise en liberté sur remise de la promesse ou de l’engagement visés à l’un des alinéas 515(2)a) à e) et assortis des conditions visées au paragraphe 515(4) qu’il estime souhaitables. [2019] 2 rcs. r c myers 143 provisions applicable to proceedings dispositions applicables aux procédures (8) the provisions of sections 517, 518 and 519 apply with such modifications as the circumstances require in respect of any proceedings under this section. (8) les articles 517, 518 et 519 s’appliquent, compte tenu des adaptations de circonstance, relativement à toutes procédures engagées en vertu du présent article. directions for expediting trial instructions visant à hâter le procès (9) where an accused is before a judge under any of the provisions of this section, the judge may give directions for expediting the trial of the accused. directions for expediting proceedings 526 subject to subsection 525(9), a court, judge or justice before which or whom an accused appears pursuant to this part may give directions for expediting any proceedings in respect of the accused. (9) lorsqu’un prévenu se trouve devant un juge en vertu d’une disposition du présent article, le juge peut donner des instructions pour hâter le déroulement du procès du prévenu. instructions visant à hâter le déroulement des procé- dures 526 sous réserve du paragraphe 525(9), un tribunal, un juge ou un juge de paix devant lequel comparaît un pré- venu en conformité avec la présente partie peut donner des instructions pour hâter le déroulement des procédures qui concernent le prévenu. appeal allowed. pourvoi accueilli. procureurs de l’appelant : myers karp patey & allingham, vancouver. allingham, vancouver. procureur de l’intimée : procureur général de la british columbia, vancouver. colombie- britannique, vancouver. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. liberties association: henein hutchison, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné- rale de l’ontario : procureure générale de l’ontario, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association ca- nadienne des libertés civiles : henein hutchison, toronto.
i. overview [1] section 231(5) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, provides that murder is first degree murder, irrespective of whether the murder is planned and deliberate, when the victim’s death is caused “while committing or attempting to commit” any of several listed crimes of domination, including hijacking an aircraft, any form of sexual assault, kidnapping, hostage taking, or unlawful confinement. at issue in this appeal is whether the appellant, darren sundman, murdered jordan mcleod “while committing” the offence of unlawful confinement. [2] the appellant and mr. mcleod were drug dealers with a mutual animosity. on the day of mr mcleod’s murder, the appellant unlawfully confined him in a moving pickup truck and repeatedly assaulted him by hitting him with a handgun. mr. mcleod jumped from the truck when it slowed to make a turn but was then chased on foot by the appellant and two accomplices. when mr. mcleod ran for his life, the appellant shot him at least three times but did not manage to kill him as he lay wounded, mr. mcleod was shot and killed at close range by one of the accomplices. [3] the appellant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of second degree murder the trial judge accepted that although mr mcleod was unlawfully confined in the truck, he had managed to escape his confinement by jumping from the truck the trial judge held that the appellant murdered mr mcleod but ruled that because of the brief gap in time between when mr. mcleod was confined in the truck and when he was killed, the appellant did not murder him “while committing” the offence of unlawful confinement. the murder was thus in the second degree. [4] the court of appeal for british columbia unanimously allowed the crown’s appeal and substituted a conviction for first degree murder under s 231(5)(e) of the criminal code. the court held that mr. mcleod was still unlawfully confined when he jumped from the truck and was chased before being killed. the unlawful confinement and the murder were temporally and causally connected, making the entire series of events a single transaction. the appellant now appeals to this court as of right. [5] i would dismiss the appeal. in my view, mr. mcleod was still unlawfully confined when he escaped from the truck and ran for his life. even though mr. mcleod was not physically restrained outside the truck, he continued to be coercively restrained through violence, fear, and intimidation. he was deprived of his liberty and was not free to move about according to his inclination and desire. the appellant then murdered him while unlawfully confining him. these two distinct criminal acts were part of a continuous sequence of events forming a single transaction. they were close in time and involved an ongoing domination of mr. mcleod that began in the truck, continued when he escaped from the truck and ran for his life, and ended with his murder. the appellant is therefore guilty of first degree murder under s 231(5)(e) of the criminal code. ii. facts [6] on january 16, 2015, mr. mcleod was shot and killed near prince george, british columbia, soon after he had been assaulted and unlawfully confined in a pickup truck. five people had been in the truck: mr. mcleod; the appellant; the appellant’s girlfriend, staci stevenson; the appellant’s brother, kurtis sundman; and sebastian martin. all five were drug dealers in and around vanderhoof, british columbia. [7] the truck had been travelling from vanderhoof to prince george. mr. kurtis sundman was driving and mr mcleod was in the front passenger seat, while the appellant, ms. stevenson, and mr. martin were in the back. the appellant and mr. kurtis sundman were each carrying a handgun; mr. martin was carrying a shotgun. mr. mcleod was unarmed. [8] during the trip, a conflict arose between the sundman brothers and mr. mcleod the appellant was angry with mr mcleod for many reasons: he suspected that mr. mcleod was having a relationship with ms. stevenson; mr. mcleod was encroaching on the sundman brothers’ turf by supplying drugs to the vanderhoof market; the sundman brothers owed a drug debt to mr. mcleod and he was pressuring them to repay the debt; and the appellant had seen messages on mr. mcleod’s phone that had upset him. at one point, the appellant started hitting mr. mcleod in the head with his handgun. mr. mcleod tried to avoid the blows and promised to forgive the sundmans’ drug debt if they left him alone mr kurtis sundman, who shared the appellant’s anger, encouraged the ongoing assault and drove the truck so fast that mr. mcleod could not jump out. he also taunted mr. mcleod by telling him to jump out, even though realistically this was impossible. [9] when the truck slowed to make a turn, mr. mcleod jumped out of the truck and tried to escape mr kurtis sundman immediately stopped the truck, and the appellant yelled “get him, get him”. the three men quickly left the truck, each carrying their respective firearms, and chased mr. mcleod. [10] mr mcleod tried desperately to escape he waded through deep snow, across a shallow ditch and barbed wire fence, towards the bush. the appellant then shot at mr. mcleod at least four times, hitting him at least three times. although these shots did not kill mr mcleod, they slowed him down and stopped him from escaping. mr. martin said to the appellant something to the effect of, “i got him, boss”, and shot mr. mcleod twice, once in the torso and once in the face at close range, killing him almost instantly. [11] the three men loaded mr. mcleod’s body into the truck and drove to an isolated location where they hid his body under foliage the police found the body about a month later with ms. stevenson’s help. [12] the appellant and his two accomplices, mr. martin and mr. kurtis sundman, were each charged with first degree murder the accomplices were convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter, respectively only the appellant’s case remains before this court. iii. judgments below a. supreme court of british columbia, 2018 bcsc 602 (williams j.) [13] the crown argued that the appellant was guilty of first degree murder because the murder was planned and deliberate. alternatively, the crown argued that, because the appellant murdered mr mcleod “while committing” the offence of unlawful confinement, he was guilty of first degree murder under s 231(5)(e) of the criminal code. the trial judge rejected both arguments and acquitted the appellant of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder. [14] the trial judge held that to prove first degree murder under s 231(5)(e), the crown had to prove that the appellant murdered mr. mcleod while he was under “continuing confinement” at the time of his death (para. 289 (canlii)). the appellant repeatedly assaulted and unlawfully confined mr mcleod in the truck, and mr. mcleod was still “in a situation of vulnerability” when he escaped from the truck as a “consequence of the manner in which he had been dealt with in the truck” (para. 289). however, because mr. mcleod “managed to escape his confinement” by jumping from the truck, when “mr mcleod was shot, his confinement had ended” (para 288) the brief “gap in time” between the end of mr mcleod’s unlawful confinement in the truck and the firing of the fatal shots meant that he was not under “continuing confinement” when he was killed (para. 289). the appellant was thus not guilty of first degree murder under s 231(5)(e) of the criminal code. b court of appeal for british columbia, 2021 bcca 53, 402 ccc (3d) 463 (bauman cj and fitch and grauer jja) [15] the court of appeal unanimously allowed the crown’s appeal on the acquittal of first degree murder under s 231(5)(e), set aside the conviction of second degree murder, and substituted a conviction of first degree murder. [16] the court of appeal identified two legal errors in the trial decision. first, the trial judge erred in law on the scope of unlawful confinement by requiring that “the victim be physically restrained in an enclosed space” (para. 156) unlawful confinement only requires “the intentional deprivation of another person’s liberty or the restriction of that person’s movement in the absence of lawful authority and contrary to the person’s wishes” (para. 153). even after mr. mcleod had jumped from the truck he was “in no sense free to move about according to his own inclination and desire” (para. 159). “his confinement did not, as a matter of law, end as soon as he bailed from the truck” (para. 159) applying the trial judge’s undisputed factual findings to the correct legal test for unlawful confinement, the appellant “was committing the offence of unlawful confinement when he shot [mr.] mcleod” (para. 159). [17] second, according to the court of appeal, the trial judge’s “more fundamental legal error” was in concluding that “the momentary gap in time” between when mr. mcleod jumped from the truck and when the appellant shot him meant that he could not have murdered mr. mcleod “while committing” the offence of unlawful confinement (para. 163). such a “narrow approach” to s 231(5)(e) diverges from this court’s interpretation in r v paré, [1987] 2 scr 618, which asks whether the unlawful confinement and murder were part of a single transaction or were temporally and causally connected. the trial judge erred in law by failing to give legal effect to his factual findings. on the facts found by the trial judge, there was a temporal and causal connection between the unlawful confinement and the murder, making the entire course of conduct a single transaction. the temporal connection was established because the gap in time between the unlawful confinement and the murder was “brief” or “momentary” (para. 171). the causal connection was established because mr. mcleod was still in a situation of vulnerability after he jumped from the truck and tried to escape from his attackers (para. 172) based on these factual findings, the appellant was guilty of first degree murder. iv relevant statutory provisions [18] the relevant portions of ss 231 and 279 of the criminal code read as follows: classification of murder 231 (1) murder is first degree murder or second degree murder. planned and deliberate murder (2) murder is first degree murder when it is planned and deliberate. hijacking, sexual assault or kidnapping (5) irrespective of whether a murder is planned and deliberate on the part of any person, murder is first degree murder in respect of a person when the death is caused by that person while committing or attempting to commit an offence under one of the following sections: (a) section 76 (hijacking an aircraft); (b) section 271 (sexual assault); (c) section 272 (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm); (d) section 273 (aggravated sexual assault); (e) section 279 (kidnapping and forcible confinement); or (f) section 279.1 (hostage taking). second degree murder . (7) all murder that is not first degree murder is second degree murder. forcible confinement 279 . (2) every one who, without lawful authority, confines, imprisons or forcibly seizes another person is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. v. issues [19] the appellant raises two main issues: a the court of appeal had no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion that mr. mcleod’s unlawful confinement ended when he escaped from the truck, and thus the appellant did not murder mr. mcleod “while committing” the offence of unlawful confinement and is not guilty of first degree murder under s 231(5)(e) of the criminal code; and b the court of appeal erred in concluding that mr. mcleod’s unlawful confinement in the truck and his murder formed part of a “single transaction” justifying a conviction for first degree murder under s 231(5)(e). vi analysis [20] i will first review the legal principles for unlawful confinement under s 279(2) of the criminal code and first degree murder under s 231(5). i will then apply those principles to this case. a unlawful confinement [21] to establish unlawful or forcible confinement under s 279(2) of the criminal code, the crown must prove that (1) the accused confined another person; and (2) the confinement was unlawful (r v. magoon, 2018 scc 14, [2018] 1 scr. 309, at para. 64). at its core, unlawful confinement involves a deprivation of a person’s liberty (r v bottineau, [2006] o.j no 1864 (ql), 2006 carswellont 8510 (wl) (scj), at para. 117, per watt j (as he then was), aff’d 2011 onca 194, 269 ccc. (3d) 227). unlawful confinement occurs if, for any significant time period, a person is coercively restrained or directed contrary to their wishes, so that they cannot move about according to their own inclination and desire (r v. luxton, [1990] 2 scr 711, at p 723; r v. pritchard, 2008 scc 59, [2008] 3 scr 195, at para. 24; magoon, at para. 64). the person need not be restricted to a particular place or physically restrained (magoon, at para. 64; r v. gratton (1985), 18 ccc (3d) 462 (ont. ca), at pp. 473 and 475, per cory ja (as he then was); r v. lemaigre (1987), 56 sask. r 300 (ca), at para. 3; m. manning and p. sankoff, manning, mewett & sankoff: criminal law (5th ed. 2015), at p 1037). the restraint can be through violence, fear, intimidation or psychological or other means (magoon, at para. 64). the purpose of the confinement is not relevant (pritchard, at para. 31; r v. kimberley (2001), 56 or (3d) 18 (ca), at para. 107; r v. johnstone, 2014 onca 504, 313 ccc (3d) 34, at para. 45; r v. parris, 2013 onca 515, 300 ccc (3d) 41, at para. 47). [22] for example, a person can be unlawfully confined if an accused’s violent acts lead the person to lock themselves in a room to avoid being attacked (johnstone, at para. 47; k. roach, criminal law (7th ed. 2018), at p 442, fn. 83), or if the person is prevented from escaping from an apartment through the front door (r v. newman, 2016 scc 7, [2016] 1 scr 27, at para. 1; roach, at p 442, fn. 81). b first degree murder under section 231(5) (1) first degree murder [23] first degree murder is the most serious crime in canadian law and requires the highest level of moral blameworthiness, namely subjective foresight of death (r v. arkell, [1990] 2 scr 695, at p 703; luxton, at p 724). it carries the most severe punishment under the criminal code, a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 years (s 745(a); r v. russell, 2001 scc 53, [2001] 2 scr. 804, at para. 46). any murder that is not first degree murder is second degree murder (s 231(7)), which carries a punishment of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole of between 10 and 25 years, at the discretion of the sentencing judge (ss. 745(c) and 7454). [24] first degree murder is murder that is “planned and deliberate” (s 231(2) and (3)) murder is also deemed to be in the first degree, even if not planned and deliberate, if it is committed in connection with specific victims, specific situations, or any of several enumerated offences (s 231(4) to (62)). section 231(5) lists one such group of underlying offences. it provides that murder is first degree murder when the death of a person is caused “while committing or attempting to commit” any of the offences of hijacking an aircraft, any form of sexual assault, kidnapping, hostage taking, or unlawful confinement. section 231(5) can apply even if the murder victim and the victim of the enumerated offence are different persons (russell, at paras. 33 and 43; manning and sankoff, at p 961). (2) section 231(5): a sentencing provision [25] section 231(5) does not create a substantive offence it is essentially a sentencing provision reflecting parliament’s decision to treat murder in connection with the listed offences as involving a heightened degree of moral blameworthiness or an aggravating circumstance warranting a more severe punishment section 231(5) applies only when the offender has been found guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt (r v. harbottle, [1993] 3 scr 306, at p 323; arkell, at pp. 702-3; luxton, at p 720; paré, at p 625; russell, at para. 24; pritchard, at para. 19). [26] this court has held that s 231(5) is neither arbitrary nor irrational and does not infringe ss. 7, 9, or 12 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (arkell, at p 704; luxton, at pp. 719-25; d. stuart, canadian criminal law: a treatise (8th ed. 2020), at p 234; manning and sankoff, at p 958). (3) the organizing principle of illegal domination [27] the organizing principle for the offences listed in s 231(5) — what they have in common — is that they are all crimes involving the illegal domination of victims. parliament has treated murder committed in connection with these crimes of domination as especially serious and as warranting the exceptional punishment for first degree murder (paré, at p 633; luxton, at p 722; r v. nette, 2001 scc 78, [2001] 3 scr 488, at para 62; pritchard, at paras 19-20; magoon, at para 61) illegal domination is not an essential element to be proved under s 231(5) but a principle that helps courts apply the provision purposively, so that the law develops in a principled manner (russell, at para. 43; kimberley, at para. 104; r v. niemi, 2017 onca 720, 355 ccc (3d) 344, at para. 62; r v. imona-russell, 2018 onca 590, at para. 13 (canlii); r v. mcgregor, 2019 onca 307, 145 or (3d) 641, at paras. 58, 67 and 69-74). (4) “while committing”: the single transaction test [28] this court has provided guidance on what it means to commit murder “while committing or attempting to commit” an underlying offence listed in s 231(5). in paré, this court’s leading interpretation of s 231(5), the offender indecently assaulted a young boy, held him down for two minutes, and then strangled him to death when the boy said that he would tell his mother of the assault. wilson j for the court rejected a narrow and literal interpretation of “while committing” under s 231(5) that would require the underlying offence and the murder to be committed simultaneously. such an interpretation would lead to irrational and arbitrary distinctions — in paré, for example, applying the “simultaneous” interpretation would mean that whether the murder was in the first or second degree would turn on whether the offender was viewed as still indecently assaulting the victim when he held him down and strangled him. instead of a “simultaneous” approach to s 231(5), wilson j adopted the broad and purposive “single transaction” approach proposed by martin ja in r v. stevens (1984), 11 ccc (3d) 518 (ont. ca), at p 541, which asks if the listed offence of domination and the killing “all form part of one continuous sequence of events forming a single transaction”. wilson j held that “it is the continuing illegal domination of the victim which gives continuity to the sequence of events culminating in the murder. the murder represents an exploitation of the position of power created by the underlying crime and makes the entire course of conduct a ‘single transaction’” (p 633). applying this test, the offender in paré was guilty of first degree murder because the indecent assault and the killing formed “part of one continuous sequence of events” constituting “the same transaction” (p 634). [29] a few years after deciding paré, this court in harbottle, at p 325, distilled s 231(5) (then s 214(5) of the criminal code) into five elements: (1) [t]he accused was guilty of the underlying crime of domination or of attempting to commit that crime; (2) the accused was guilty of the murder of the victim; (3) the accused participated in the murder in such a manner that he was a substantial cause of the death of the victim; (4) there was no intervening act of another which resulted in the accused no longer being substantially connected to the death of the victim; and (5) the crimes of domination and murder were part of the same transaction; that is to say, the death was caused while committing the offence of domination as part of the same series of events. (see also magoon, at paras. 17 and 63.) [30] section 231(5) thus requires (1) an underlying crime of domination; (2) murder; (3) substantial cause; (4) no intervening act; and (5) the same transaction (parris, at para. 45; mcgregor, at para. 61). (5) “while committing”: the temporal and causal connection approach [31] in some cases, this court has applied the “single transaction” test under s 231(5) by asking whether the underlying offence of domination and the murder have a close “temporal and causal” connection (see paré, at pp. 629 and 634; pritchard, at paras. 19, 25, 33-35 and 38; russell, at paras. 43 and 46-47). [32] in other cases, this court has simply applied the “single transaction” test as enunciated by martin ja in stevens, without expressly inquiring into the presence of a temporal-causal connection (harbottle, at p 326; magoon, at paras. 73-75; see also r v. ganton (1992), 77 ccc (3d) 259 (sask. ca), at p 263; r v. johnson and jensen (1993), 141 ar 184 (ca), at para. 53; r v. plewes, 2000 bcca 278, 144 ccc (3d) 426, at para. 34; r v. westergard (2004), 24 cr (6th) 375 (ont. ca), at para. 30; r v. mullings, 2014 onca 895, 319 ccc (3d) 1, at para. 102). similarly, the canadian judicial council’s model jury instructions on s 231(5) focus solely on whether the underlying offence and the killing form “a continuous series of events that was a single ongoing transaction” (“offence 231(5): first degree murder in the commission of another offence”, may 2019 (online); see also d. watt, watt’s manual of criminal jury instructions (2nd ed. 2015), at pp. 716 and 719). [33] it is usually easy to identify a “temporal connection” between an underlying offence of domination and a murder: it is when the two criminal acts are committed close together in time but it can be harder to articulate the “causal connection” between an underlying offence and a murder the difficulty is largely terminological causation in homicide cases has two aspects: factual causation and legal causation. factual causation asks how the victim died and the role of the accused in effecting that result — whether the victim’s death would have occurred “but for” the actions of the accused when factual causation is established, legal causation asks whether the accused should be held responsible for the victim’s death, based on principles of moral responsibility in criminal law (nette, at paras. 44-45; r v. maybin, 2012 scc 24, [2012] 2 scr 30, at paras. 15-16). under s 231(5), however, a “causal connection” involves neither factual nor legal causation. as the court of appeal for british columbia remarked in another context, “[o]ne can murder someone ‘in the course of’ committing a robbery, but the robbery is only the context of the murder, not its ‘cause’” (grayson v wellington insurance co (1997), 37 bclr (3d) 49, at para. 26, per newbury ja). [34] instead, a causal connection has been found under s 231(5) where the offender’s reason or motivation for the killing arises from, or is linked to, the offender’s unlawful domination of a victim. in paré, wilson j found a causal connection between the underlying offence and the killing because the accused strangled the victim to death after indecently assaulting him to prevent him from telling his mother about the assault (p 634; see also pritchard, at para. 34). the indecent assault was not the factual or legal cause of the murder; it was the reason or motivation for it, marking the beginning of a continuing process of illegal domination culminating in the murder, thus making the entire course of conduct a single transaction (paré, at p 633). likewise, a causal connection has been found under s 231(5) when the murder was committed to facilitate the crime of domination, such as by eliminating a potential witness to the crime (pritchard, at para. 38; russell, at paras. 47-48; r v. alexis, 2020 onca 334, 388 ccc (3d) 226, at para 18) in all cases, a “causal connection” under s 231(5) concerns whether there is a unifying relationship, beyond mere closeness in time, between the act of illegal domination and the act of murder, so as to constitute a single transaction (see alexis, at para. 24). (6) the single transaction test and the temporal-causal connection approach involve the same inquiry [35] i do not read this court’s decisions as suggesting that the “single transaction” test articulated in stevens and the temporal-causal connection approach involve different inquiries they are simply different ways of addressing the “same transaction” element these two approaches have been used interchangeably in our jurisprudence. [36] for example, in paré, at p 634, wilson j concluded that “[t]he murder was temporally and causally connected to the underlying offence. it formed part of one continuous sequence of events. it was part of the same transaction.” [37] similarly, in russell, at para 46, mclachlin c.j referred to the single transaction test and the temporal-causal connection approach interchangeably: the cases of this court dealing with s 231(5) make clear that an accused commits a murder “while committing or attempting to commit” an enumerated offence only if there is a close temporal and causal connection between the murder and the enumerated offence: see, eg,. paré, supra, at p 632 (stating that a murder is committed “while committing” an enumerated offence only “where the act causing death and the acts constituting [the enumerated offence] all form part of one continuous sequence of events forming a single transaction”); r v. kirkness, [1990] 3 scr 74, at p 86. [emphasis added.] [38] lastly, in pritchard, binnie j stated that there must be a “close temporal and causative link” for s 231(5) to apply (para. 33, quoting paré, at p 629) in the same paragraph, he explained that the murder will occur “while committing” a listed offence when the two crimes occur together in the course of a “single transaction”. [39] accordingly, properly applied, the single transaction test and temporal-causal connection approach involve the same inquiry and will result in the same conclusion when a single transaction is found, there will necessarily be a temporal-causal connection likewise, when a temporal-causal connection is found, there will necessarily be a single transaction. (7) distinct criminal acts [40] finally, this court has ruled that the underlying offence of domination and the killing must involve two distinct criminal acts (pritchard, at para 27, citing kimberley, at para. 108, per doherty ja;. magoon, at para. 74; see also manning and sankoff, at pp. 961-62). the underlying offence cannot be “consumed in the very act of killing”; in other words, the underlying offence and the killing must not be one and the same (pritchard, at para. 27). if there is only one criminal act, it cannot be said that the offender exploited the domination inherent in the underlying offence with the act of killing (para. 29). in such cases, the heightened moral blameworthiness required for first degree murder is absent. c application [41] there is no issue before this court that the appellant was guilty of murdering mr. mcleod even though he did not fire the fatal shot. the trial judge found that the appellant shot at mr. mcleod with lethal intent and hit him at least three times. the parties do not dispute that these shots were a substantial cause of mr. mcleod’s death because they prevented him from escaping his captors, before he was shot and killed at close range. the only dispute before this court is whether the murder was in the first or the second degree this turns on (1) whether mr mcleod was still unlawfully confined after he escaped from the truck; and (2) whether the unlawful confinement (inside or outside the truck, or both) and the murder were part of the same transaction. (1) mr. mcleod was still unlawfully confined when he escaped from the truck and ran for his life [42] the trial judge correctly concluded that the appellant unlawfully confined mr. mcleod inside the truck because he was “coercively restrained and unable to move about according to his own inclination and desire” (para 287) he erred in law, however, in concluding that mr mcleod “managed to escape his confinement” by jumping from the truck, and that “at the time mr. mcleod was shot, his confinement had ended” (para 288) the trial judge appears to have concluded that because mr. mcleod was no longer physically restrained outside the truck, he was no longer unlawfully confined. however, physical restraint in a particular place is sufficient but not necessary to establish unlawful confinement. even if mr. mcleod were no longer physically restrained outside the truck, he remained coercively restrained through acts of violence, fear, and intimidation as he ran for his life. he continued to be deprived of his liberty and could not move about according to his inclination and desire. crown counsel made this point vividly during oral argument before this court: if mr. mcleod was free to move about according to his own inclination and desire, the [crown] would hazard to guess that instead of running through deep snow, cutting across fences, poorly dressed in the dead of night in rural prince george, he would have instead sought out the nearest house, sought some shelter and tried to arrange transport back to his rental car in vanderhoof. (transcript, at p 23) [43] the trial judge himself recognized mr mcleod’s continuing loss of liberty, finding that “mr mcleod was still in a situation of vulnerability, and that vulnerability was the consequence of the manner in which he had been dealt with in the truck” (para. 289). [44] the appellant claims that this line of analysis was precluded before the court of appeal and this court, because it (1) does not involve a question of law alone and (2) is a new theory of liability on appeal. i would reject both claims. [45] first, i do not accept that the trial judge’s conclusion that mr. mcleod was no longer unlawfully confined outside the truck is a question of mixed fact and law, falling outside the crown’s right of appeal to the court of appeal on “a question of law alone” under s 676(1)(a) of the criminal code. the crown’s appeal did not challenge the trial judge’s findings of fact or raise a question of how to weigh the evidence and assess whether it meets the standard of proof. rather, it challenged the legal effect of the trial judge’s findings of fact and his misapprehension of the law relating to unlawful confinement, both of which involve “a question of law alone” falling within the crown’s right of appeal (r v. chung, 2020 scc 8, at paras. 10-11; r v. jmh, 2011 scc 45, [2011] 3 scr 197, at paras. 28-30). the trial judge erred in law by viewing unlawful confinement as requiring (1) physical restraint and (2) that the physical restraint be in an enclosed space. as a matter of law, neither element is required. [46] second, i reject the appellant’s assertion that whether mr mcleod remained unlawfully confined after he escaped from the truck was a new theory of liability that was not advanced at trial. like the court of appeal (at paras. 134-38), i accept that the crown’s closing submission urged that “the murder was committed in the course of an unlawful conf[inement]” (ar, vol iii, at p 60; see also p 61 (“a murder in the course of an unlawful confinement”)) the theory of unlawful confinement outside the truck was thus properly raised at trial. [47] as a result, the court of appeal correctly held that mr. mcleod remained unlawfully confined after he escaped from the truck. [48] the remaining issue is whether the appellant murdered mr. mcleod “while committing” the offence of unlawful confinement; that is, whether these two criminal acts were part of the same transaction. (2) the appellant murdered mr. mcleod “while committing” the offence of unlawful confinement [49] like the court of appeal (at paras. 173-74), i have no difficulty concluding that the appellant murdered mr. mcleod “while committing” the offence of unlawful confinement. the unlawful confinement and the murder were part of one continuous sequence of events forming a single transaction the unlawful confinement and the murder were close in time — in fact, mr. mcleod was still unlawfully confined at the time of his death. the unlawful confinement and the murder also involved an ongoing course of domination consisting of intimidation, fear, and violence the course of domination started in the truck, continued when mr. mcleod jumped from the moving truck and was chased by the appellant and his accomplices, and ended with his murder. the two criminal acts were also distinct: the unlawful confinement — including the restriction of mr. mcleod’s freedom of movement inside and outside the truck and the ongoing acts of violence, fear, and intimidation — was distinct from and not consumed by the shooting. these conclusions amply justified a verdict of first degree murder. [50] in view of this conclusion, it is not necessary to also apply the temporal-causal connection approach, as the finding of a single transaction necessarily means that a temporal-causal connection is established in any event, the temporal-causal connection inquiry yields the same conclusion the unlawful confinement and the murder were connected temporally because mr mcleod was unlawfully confined shortly before and at the time of his death they were also connected causally, by sharing a unifying relationship, because the appellant murdered mr. mcleod as he was trying to escape from his unlawful confinement. the first degree murder verdict was thus justified on the basis of the close temporal-causal connection between the unlawful confinement and the murder. [51] i would reject the appellant’s contention that whether the unlawful confinement and the murder of mr. mcleod were temporally and causally connected is a question of fact from which the crown had no right of appeal to the court of appeal like the court of appeal (at paras 169-75), i conclude that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that the “brief gap in time” between the unlawful confinement in the truck and the murder precluded these criminal acts being part of the same transaction. the trial judge erroneously insisted that the unlawful confinement and the murder must be simultaneous, a view that this court has consistently rejected since paré. [52] further, as the court of appeal held (at para. 169), even had the trial judge been correct that the unlawful confinement ended once mr. mcleod jumped from the truck, the trial judge should have considered whether that unlawful confinement and the murder formed a single transaction for the reasons already stated, they undoubtedly did. [53] in conclusion — and to state the obvious — if the appellant had shot and killed mr. mcleod when he was unlawfully confined in the truck, the appellant would unquestionably be found to have murdered mr mcleod “while committing” the offence of unlawful confinement. as a matter of law and common sense, mr. mcleod’s brief escape from the truck cannot mitigate the appellant’s crime. on any sensible view, the appellant’s moral blameworthiness cannot be considered to be lower simply because mr. mcleod managed to jump from a moving truck and was running for his life when he was executed just moments later in both cases, the appellant’s moral blameworthiness is exceptionally high; in both cases, it is equally deserving of “a societal denunciation of those offenders who choose to exploit their position of dominance and power to the point of murder” (luxton, at p 723). [54] the court of appeal was thus correct in finding the appellant guilty of first degree murder under s 231(5)(e) of the criminal code. vii disposition [55] i would dismiss the appeal.
i. introduction la juge côté — i. introduction [1] at issue in this appeal is whether the interest that the appellant, sa, has in a trust that was set up for her care and maintenance should be treated as an “asset”, which would negatively affect her eligibility to participate in a rental subsidy program offered by her landlord, the respondent, metro vancouver housing corporation (“mvhc”). [1] le présent pourvoi porte sur la question de savoir si l’intérêt que l’appelante, sa, détient dans une fiducie constituée pour subvenir à ses besoins devrait être considéré comme un « actif », ce qui aurait une incidence négative sur son admissibilité à un programme de subventions aux logements locatifs offert par sa locatrice, l’intimée, la metro vancouver housing corporation (« mvhc »). [2] resolving this issue requires this court to consider, for the first time, the nature of a specific type of trust — commonly known as the “henson trust” — settled for the benefit of a person with dis- abilities who relies on publicly funded social as- sistance benefits (see: ontario (director of income maintenance branch of the ministry of community and social services) v. henson (1987), 26 oac. 332 (div ct), aff’d in (1989), 36 etr 192 (ont. ca)). the central feature of the henson trust is that the trustee is given ultimate discretion with respect to payments out of the trust to the person with disabilities for whom the trust was settled, the effect being that the latter (a) cannot compel the former to make payments to him or her, and (b) is prevented from unilaterally collapsing the trust under [2] pour trancher cette question, la cour doit, pour la première fois, se pencher sur la nature d’un type particulier de fiducie — communément appelé « fiducie de type henson » — constituée au profit d’une personne handicapée vivant de prestations d’aide sociale provenant des fonds publics (voir : ontario (director of income maintenance branch of the ministry of community and social services) c. henson (1987), 26 oac 332 (c div.), conf. par (1989), 36 etr 192 (ca. ont)). la caracté- ristique principale de la fiducie de type henson est que le fiduciaire possède le pouvoir discrétionnaire ultime de faire des paiements, prélevés sur la fiducie, à la personne handicapée pour laquelle la fiducie a été constituée, de sorte que cette personne a) ne peut obliger le fiduciaire à lui faire des paiements, [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 107 the rule in saunders v. vautier (1841), cr & ph 240, 41 er 482. because the person with disabilities has no enforceable right to receive any property from the trustee of a henson trust unless and until the trustee exercises his or her discretion in that person’s favour, the interest he or she has therein is not generally treated as an “asset” for the purposes of means- tested social assistance programs (d w m. waters, m r. gillen and l d. smith, eds., waters’ law of trusts in canada (4th ed. 2012), at pp 572-73). the henson trust therefore makes it possible to set aside money or other valuable property for the benefit of a person with disabilities in a manner that jeopardizes that person’s entitlement to receive social benefits as little as possible. [3] sa is a person with disabilities for whose ben- efit a henson trust was settled in 2012 (“trust”). she resides in a housing complex operated by mvhc. in addition to providing affordable housing in the greater vancouver area, mvhc offers rental assis- tance in the form of rent subsidies to certain eligible tenants on a discretionary basis. an “eligible ten- ant” is one who, among other things, has less than $25,000 in assets. at issue in this case is whether sa’s interest in the trust should be treated as an “asset” for the purpose of determining whether she is eligible to be considered by mvhc for a rent sub- sidy. both of the courts below answered this question in the affirmative. sa appeals to this court. et b) ne peut mettre fin unilatéralement à la fiducie en se fondant sur la règle établie dans saunders c. vautier (1841), cr. & ph. 240, 41 er 482. comme la personne handicapée ne dispose d’aucun droit exécutoire de recevoir quelque bien que ce soit de la part du fiduciaire d’une fiducie de type henson à moins que ce dernier n’exerce son pouvoir dis- crétionnaire en sa faveur, l’intérêt que cette per- sonne détient dans la fiducie n’est généralement pas considéré comme un « actif » pour les besoins des programmes d’aide sociale fondés sur un examen des ressources (d w m waters,. m r gillen et l d smith, dir., waters’ law of trusts in canada (4e éd. 2012), p 572-573). la fiducie de type henson permet donc de mettre de côté de l’argent ou d’autres biens de valeur au profit d’une personne handicapée d’une manière qui porte atteinte le moins possible au droit de celle-ci de toucher des prestations sociales. [3] sa est une personne handicapée au bénéfice de laquelle une fiducie de type henson (« fiducie ») a été constituée en 2012. elle habite dans un com- plexe d’habitation exploité par la mvhc. en plus de fournir des logements abordables dans la région métropolitaine de vancouver, cet organisme offre de façon discrétionnaire une aide au loyer, sous la forme d’une subvention au loyer, à certains locataires admissibles. un «  locataire admissible  » est une personne qui, entre autres, possède des actifs d’une valeur inférieure à 25 000 $. le présent pourvoi soulève la question de savoir si l’intérêt que détient sa dans la fiducie devrait être considéré comme un « actif » lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer si sa. peut voir sa demande considérée par la mvhc en vue de l’octroi d’une aide au loyer. les deux cours d’instance inférieure ont répondu à cette question par l’affirmative. sa se pourvoit à présent devant notre cour. [4] i would allow the appeal. in my view, sa has no actual entitlement to the trust property under the terms of the trust. although she is a co- trustee, she has no independent, concrete right to compel any payments to be made to her or for her benefit, and cannot unilaterally terminate the trust. her interest in the trust property therefore amounts to a “mere hope” that the trustees will exercise their discre- tion in a manner favourable to her (waters, gillen [4] j’accueillerais le pourvoi. à mon avis, sa ne possède aucun droit actuel sur le bien fiduciaire selon les modalités de la fiducie. malgré sa qualité de cofi- duciaire, elle ne bénéficie d’aucun droit indépendant et concret d’exiger que des paiements lui soient faits ou soient faits à son profit, et elle ne peut mettre fin unilatéralement à la fiducie. son intérêt dans le bien fiduciaire équivaut donc à un [traduction] « simple espoir » que les fiduciaires exerceront leur pouvoir 108 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. and smith, at p. 1204, note 155). for this reason, i conclude that her interest in the trust is not an asset that could disqualify her from being considered by mvhc for a rent subsidy. discrétionnaire en sa faveur (waters, gillen et smith, p. 1204, note 155). pour cette raison, je conclus que l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie ne constitue pas un actif susceptible de faire en sorte que sa de- mande ne puisse être considérée par la mvhc en vue de l’octroi d’une aide au loyer. ii facts ii faits [5] sa is a middle- aged person with disabilities. because her disabilities prevent her from working, she derives her income from benefits paid to her under the employment and assistance for persons with disabilities act, sbc 2002, c. 41 (“eapda”). [6] mvhc is a non- profit corporation that is wholly owned by the metro vancouver regional district. its mandate is to provide affordable housing in the greater vancouver area. to this end, it operates a number of subsidized housing complexes. [7] sa resides in one such complex (“housing complex”) mvhc’s operation of the housing complex is governed by two agreements with the british columbia housing management commission: an agreement on assistance to non- profit corporations (“operating agreement”), which was entered into in 1982 (rr, at pp. 8-14), and an umbrella agreement, which was entered into in 2013 (rr, at pp 21-25). these agreements impose several obligations on mvhc in managing certain properties in its portfo- lio. in particular, the operating agreement provides that persons wishing to enter into tenancy agreements with mvhc must first demonstrate that they meet certain eligibility requirements pertaining to income, number of occupants, health, and other similar crite- ria. both the operating agreement and the umbrella agreement require that mvhc verify the income of tenants at the time of their initial occupancy, and annually thereafter. [5] sa est une personne handicapée d’âge mûr. comme elle ne peut pas travailler en raison de ses handicaps, elle tire son revenu de prestations versées sous le régime de l’employment and assistance for persons with disabilities act, sbc 2002, c. 41 (« eapda »). [6] la mvhc est un organisme à but non lucratif qui appartient exclusivement au metro vancouver regional district. son mandat consiste à fournir des logements abordables dans la région métropoli- taine de vancouver. à cette fin, la mvhc exploite plusieurs complexes d’habitations subventionnées. [7] sa réside dans l’un de ces complexes (« com- plexe d’habitation »). l’exploitation du complexe d’habitation par la mvhc est régie par deux ac- cords avec la british columbia housing manage- ment commission : un accord relatif à l’aide aux organismes à but non lucratif (« accord d’exploi- tation ») conclu en 1982 (di, p. 8-14) et un accord- cadre («  accord- cadre  ») conclu en 2013 (di, p 21-25). ces accords imposent à la mvhc plu- sieurs obligations relativement à la gestion de cer- taines propriétés faisant partie de son portefeuille. plus précisément, suivant l’accord d’exploitation, les personnes qui souhaitent conclure une conven- tion de location avec la mvhc doivent d’abord démontrer qu’elles satisfont à certaines conditions d’admissibilité concernant leur revenu, le nombre d’occupants, leur état de santé et d’autres critères semblables. l’accord d’exploitation et l’accord- cadre exigent que la mvhc vérifie le revenu des locataires au moment de l’occupation initiale ainsi que tous les ans par la suite. [8] the umbrella agreement also requires that mvhc provide rent subsidies to at least 15 percent of the tenants of the housing complex. in order to [8] l’accord- cadre exige également que la mvhc verse une aide au loyer à au moins 15 p. 100 des lo- cataires du complexe d’habitation. pour satisfaire à [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 109 satisfy this obligation, mvhc offers rental assis- tance on a discretionary basis to tenants who meet a separate set of eligibility criteria (“rental assistance program”). tenants wishing to receive rent subsidies must demonstrate, on an annual basis, that they meet these criteria by completing and submitting an ap- plication form entitled “additional rent assistance application” (“assistance application”) given mvhc’s financial limitations, however, not all eli- gible applicants will actually be granted rental assis- tance. in other words, mvhc tenants do not have a universal entitlement to rent subsidies. the amount, if anything, that may be granted to an eligible tenant is determined by mvhc on the basis of such factors as financial considerations and public housing needs. [9] in order to “ensure that limited rental assistance funding is preserved for those who need it most”, mvhc has decided to limit eligibility for rental assistance to applicants who, among other things, have less than $25,000 in assets (ar, at p 105). a document entitled “asset ceiling policy” includes the following non- exhaustive definition of the word “assets”: cette obligation, la mvhc offre, de façon discrétion- naire, une aide au loyer aux locataires qui satisfont à un ensemble distinct de critères d’admissibilité («  programme d’aide au loyer  ») les locataires qui souhaitent recevoir une aide au loyer doivent démontrer annuellement qu’ils satisfont à ces cri- tères en remplissant et en présentant un formulaire intitulé [traduction] « demande d’aide au loyer supplémentaire » (« demande d’aide »). toutefois, compte tenu des limitations financières de la mvhc, les requérants admissibles ne se verront pas tous ac- corder une aide au loyer. autrement dit, les locataires de la mvhc ne jouissent pas d’un droit universel à une aide au loyer. le montant, s’il en est, pouvant être accordé à un locataire admissible est déterminé par la mvhc en fonction de facteurs tels que les considérations financières et les besoins en matière de logement social. [9] pour [traduction] « s’assurer que le finance- ment limité relatif à l’aide au loyer soit réservé aux personnes qui en ont le plus besoin », la mvhc a décidé de limiter l’admissibilité à une telle aide aux requérants dont, entre autres, la valeur des actifs est inférieure à 25 000 $ (da, p 105). un document intitulé « politique sur la valeur maximale des ac- tifs » définit de manière non exhaustive le terme « actifs » : [traduction] assets include, but are not limited to: les actifs comprennent notamment : • stocks, bonds, term deposits, mutual funds, bank de- • posits and cash les actions, obligations, dépôts à terme, fonds communs de placement, dépôts bancaires et argent comptant; • real estate equity, net of debt • l’avoir immobilier, libre de dettes; • assets in which you have a beneficial interest • business equity in a private incorporated company including cash, gics, bonds, stocks, real estate equity, or equity in any other tangible asset • • les actifs dans lesquels vous avez un intérêt bénéfi- ciaire; l’avoir dans une société privée, y compris l’argent comptant, les cpg, les obligations, les actions, l’avoir immobilier ou l’avoir dans tout autre actif corporel; • significant personal assets such as collector or luxury • vehicles. les biens personnels importants, tels que les véhicules de collection ou de luxe. 110 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. assets that may be excluded include: les actifs pouvant être exclus sont les suivants : • personal [e]ffects such as a household vehicle, jewelry and furniture • bursaries or scholarships from educational institutions for any household member that is a current student • registered education savings plans (resps), and reg- istered retirement savings plans (excluded to preserve the intent of these investments) • trade and business tools essential to continue currently active employment, such as equipment, tools and busi- ness use vehicles • assets derived from compensatory packages from government, for example, indian residential schools settlements and japanese canadian redress. • • • • • les effets personnels tels qu’un véhicule du ménage, des bijoux et des meubles; les bourses d’entretien ou bourses d’études d’un éta- blissement d’enseignement accordées à tout membre du ménage qui est aux études; les régimes enregistrés d’épargne- études (reee) et régimes enregistrés d’épargne- retraite (l’exemption à cet égard vise à préserver l’objectif de ces placements); les outils d’entreprise essentiels au maintien d’un em- ploi actif, tels que le matériel, les outils et les véhicules à usage professionnel; les actifs tirés de programmes d’indemnisation du gouvernement, par exemple, les règlements relatifs aux pensionnats indiens et l’entente de redressement à l’égard des canadiens japonais. (ar, at pp. 105-6) (da, p. 105-106) [10] the assistance application requires that ap- plicants disclose whether they have assets in excess of $25,000, although the definition of “assets” from the asset ceiling policy is not incorporated into the form. the assistance application indicates that complete applications will be processed within one week to thirty days, but makes clear that incomplete applications will not be considered at all. applicants must also agree to provide mvhc with any materials that may be requested to support the information provided on the form. [11] s.a has resided at the housing complex since 1992. the terms of her tenancy at all material times were set out in a tenancy agreement dated jan- uary 5, 2015 (“tenancy agreement”). the tenancy agreement required that sa provide an income verification statement to mvhc once a year, or at any time if there was a change in her annual income or in the composition of her household (cl 8(a)). she has complied with this obligation every year since her tenancy began. [10] bien que la demande d’aide n’incorpore pas la définition d’« actifs » contenue dans la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs, ce formulaire exige du requérant qu’il indique s’il possède des actifs dont la valeur est supérieure à 25 000 $. il prévoit que les demandes complètes seront traitées dans un délai de sept à trente jours, mais indique clairement que les demandes incomplètes ne seront pas du tout considérées. les requérants doivent également s’en- gager à fournir à la mvhc tout document demandé à l’appui des renseignements communiqués dans ce formulaire. [11] sa habite le complexe d’habitation depuis 1992. les modalités de la location de son logement pendant toute la période pertinente sont énoncées dans une convention de location datée du 5  jan- vier 2015 (« convention de location »). selon cette convention, sa devait fournir à la mvhc un bilan de vérification de son revenu une fois par année, ou à tout moment advenant une modification de son revenu annuel ou de la composition de son ménage (cl 8a)). sa a respecté cette obligation chaque année depuis le début de son bail. [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 111 [12] after s.a began residing at the housing complex in 1992, she received rental assistance from mvhc every year until 2015 (ar, at pp. 68 and 77). the last time rental assistance was accorded was on may 24, 2014, when mvhc granted her $629 in monthly subsidies, thereby reducing her rent from $894 to just $265 per month (ar, at p 92). as i will explain below, however, mvhc has not provided her with rental assistance since june 2015. [13] after sa’s father passed away, the terms of his will — to the effect that sa was to inherit one third of the residue of his estate — were varied by a court order in 2012 pursuant to the wills variation act, rsbc 1996, c 490. the court order directed that sa’s share of her father’s estate be placed in a trust for her care and maintenance. [14] the terms of the trust (which are reproduced as an appendix to these reasons) provide that the two co- trustees — sa and her sister (“trustees”) — have the discretion to pay so much of the income and capital as they “decide is necessary or advisable for the care, maintenance, education, or benefit of [sa]” (art 1(a)(iv)(a)). should anything remain in the trust upon sa’s death, that remainder is to pass to the person(s) designated by sa in her will or, if she failed to make such a designation, to those who would have inherited sa’s estate if she had died intestate. however, sa cannot appoint either herself or any of her creditors as a remainder beneficiary. the terms of the trust also confer on sa the power to appoint someone to replace her sister as co- trustee, should her sister be unwilling or unable to act in that capacity (art 1(a)(ii)). [12] après avoir commencé à vivre dans le com- plexe d’habitation en 1992, sa a reçu une aide au loyer de la mvhc chaque année jusqu’en 2015 (da, p. 68 et 77). la mvhc lui a accordé une telle aide pour la dernière fois le 24 mai 2014, lui octroyant 629 $ en subventions mensuelles et réduisant ainsi son loyer de 894 $ à seulement 265 $ par mois (da, p 92). toutefois, comme je vais l’expliquer plus loin, la mvhc ne lui a pas versé d’aide au loyer depuis juin 2015. [13] après le décès du père de sa, les clauses du testament de celui-ci — selon lesquelles sa. devait hériter d’un tiers du reliquat de la succes- sion — ont été modifiées en 2012 par ordonnance judiciaire conformément à la wills variation act, rsbc 1996, c 490. suivant cette ordonnance, la part de la succession qui était léguée à sa devait être versée dans une fiducie en vue de subvenir à ses besoins. [14] les modalités de la fiducie (reproduites à l’annexe des présents motifs) prévoient que les deux cofiduciaires  — s.a et sa sœur (les «  fi- duciaires ») — ont le pouvoir discrétionnaire de consacrer la portion du revenu et du capital qu’elles [traduction] « estiment nécessaire ou opportune aux soins, à la subsistance, à l’éducation ou au bénéfice [de sa] » (art 1(a)(iv)(a)). s’il subsiste encore quelque chose dans la fiducie au décès de sa, le solde devra être légué aux personnes dési- gnées par cette dernière dans son testament, ou, en l’absence d’une telle désignation, aux héritiers ab intestat de sa. toutefois, sa ne peut se désigner elle- même ou désigner un de ses créanciers comme bénéficiaire du résidu des fonds en fiducie. les mo- dalités de la fiducie confèrent également à sa le pouvoir de remplacer sa sœur à titre de cofiduciaire si celle-ci refuse ou n’est pas en mesure d’agir en cette qualité (art 1(a)(ii)). [15] in a letter dated february 13, 2015, mvhc requested that sa disclose the current balance of the trust fund, together with details of all disburse- ments that had been made since it was established. this request was made as part of mvhc’s 2014 [15] dans une lettre datée du 13 février 2015, la mvhc a demandé à sa de lui communiquer le solde courant du fonds fiduciaire, ainsi que les détails de toutes les sorties de fonds depuis sa constitu- tion. cette demande a été faite dans le contexte de 112 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. annual income review. sa’s reply, in a letter dated march 11, 2015, reads as follows: in your letter dated february 13, 2015 (attached), you re- quested information about the current balance of the [trust]. as metro vancouver housing corporation (mvhc) is aware, this is not an asset which could affect my eligibility for a housing subsidy. i am not aware of any rationale for mvhc requiring this information from the trustees. i can confirm that no disbursements have been made to me from the [trust] since it was established. this information has previously been provided to ms. lynn lenobel, counsel for the mvhc. l’examen annuel des revenus effectué par la mvhc en 2014. dans une lettre datée du 11 mars 2015, sa. a répondu ce qui suit : [traduction] dans votre lettre du 13 février 2015 (ci- jointe), vous demandez des renseignements sur le solde courant de [la fiducie] la metro vancouver housing corporation (la mvhc) sait qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un actif qui pourrait avoir une incidence sur mon admissibilité à une aide au loyer. à ma connaissance, rien ne saurait justifier que la mvhc exige des renseignements de cette nature des fiduciaires. j’atteste qu’il n’y a eu aucune sor- tie de fonds de [la fiducie] à mon intention depuis sa constitution. ces renseignements ont déjà été transmis à mme lynn lenobel, l’avocate de la mvhc. (rr, at p. 1) (di, p. 1) [16] sa submitted her assistance application for 2015 along with that letter. in response to the ques- tion of whether she had assets in excess of $25,000, she ticked the box labelled “no”, and wrote: “none that affects my eligibility. please see my letter to you dated march 11, 2015 & previous correspondence from my legal representatives” (ar, at p 108). [16] sa a soumis sa demande d’aide pour 2015 avec cette lettre. en réponse à la question de savoir si elle possédait des actifs d’une valeur supérieure à 25 000 $, elle a coché la case [traduction] « non » et a écrit : « aucun actif ayant une incidence sur mon admissibilité. veuillez vous référer à cet égard à la lettre datée du 11 mars 2015 que je vous ai fait parvenir ainsi qu’à la correspondance antérieure pro- venant de mes représentants légaux » (da, p 108). [17] in a letter dated april 13, 2015, mvhc ad- vised sa that it was unable to approve her appli- cation because she had failed to provide specific information regarding her eligibility under the rental assistance program. the relevant portion of that letter reads as follows: [17] dans une lettre datée du 13 avril 2015, la mvhc a avisé sa qu’elle n’était pas en mesure d’approuver sa demande parce que sa ne lui avait pas fourni de renseignements précis concernant son admissibilité au programme d’aide au loyer. la par- tie pertinente de cette lettre se lit ainsi : pursuant to mvhc’s asset ceiling policy, assets in- clude “assets in which you have a beneficial interest”. your discretionary trust is an asset in which you have a benefi- cial interest and is not one of the types of assets listed in the policy as excluded for the purposes of the asset limit. as mvhc has previously advised, further information regarding the trust, including the value of the trust, is required in order for mvhc to make a determination as to whether the asset should nevertheless be excluded in determining your eligibility for additional rent assistance from mvhc. [traduction] comme le prévoit la politique de la mvhc sur la valeur maximale des actifs, ceux-ci com- prennent notamment « les actifs dans lesquels vous avez un intérêt bénéficiaire  ». votre fiducie discrétionnaire constitue un actif dans lequel vous avez un intérêt bénéfi- ciaire et n’est pas un actif du type de ceux énumérés dans la politique qui ne sont pas pris en compte pour vérifier si la valeur maximale est atteinte. comme la mvhc vous l’a déjà dit, il est nécessaire de fournir des renseigne- ments supplémentaires sur la fiducie, notamment sa valeur, afin de permettre à la mvhc de déterminer s’il convient néanmoins de ne pas tenir compte de cet actif lorsqu’il s’agit d’établir si vous êtes admissible à une aide au loyer supplémentaire offerte par la mvhc. [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 113 mvhc has allowed an exceptionally long period of time for you to provide this information, both to respect the grieving period following the loss of your father and to enable you to seek advice from advocates and advi- sors regarding the additional rent assistance program requirements. indeed, your 2014 additional rent assis- tance application review remains open and outstanding; although mvhc has nevertheless continued to provide additional rent assistance on the understanding that the requisite information would ultimately be provided. as we understand that information on the value of the trust will not be provided, mvhc is unable to approve your current application for additional rent assistance. [emphasis added.] la mvhc vous a accordé un délai exceptionnelle- ment long pour fournir ces renseignements, et ce, pour vous permettre à la fois de vivre le deuil de votre père et de demander l’avis d’avocats et conseillers au sujet des exigences du programme d’aide au loyer supplémen- taire. de fait, l’examen de votre demande d’aide au loyer supplémentaire pour l’année 2014 demeure ouvert et en suspens; la mvhc a néanmoins continué de vous accor- der cette aide, étant entendu que vous finiriez par donner les renseignements demandés. puisque nous comprenons que vous ne fournirez pas de renseignements sur la valeur de la fiducie, la mvhc n’est pas en mesure d’approuver votre présente demande d’aide au loyer supplémentaire. [je souligne.] (ar, at p. 98) (da, p. 98) [18] sa ceased receiving rental assistance as of june 1, 2015, and since then she has been paying her full rent under protest. her payments in june and july 2015 were assisted by a “crisis supplement” granted to her under the eapda. counsel for sa. advised this court that payments from the trust have helped sa in covering all other rent shortfalls (tran- script, at pp 23-24). [18] le 1er juin 2015, sa a cessé de recevoir une aide au loyer et, depuis cette date, elle paie le mon- tant intégral de son loyer sous protêt. les paiements effectués en  juin  et en  juillet  2015 comportaient un [traduction] « supplément en cas de crise » accordé sous le régime de l’eapda. l’avocat de sa a informé la cour que des paiements provenant de la fiducie avaient aidé sa à combler toutes les autres insuffisances de fonds pour payer son loyer (transcription, p 23-24). iii judicial history a the petitions iii historique judiciaire a les requêtes [19] in july 2015, sa commenced proceedings against mvhc under rule 2-1(2)(c) of the supreme court civil rules, bc. reg. 168/2009, which pro- vides that a petition may be filed where “the sole or principal question at issue is alleged to be one of construction of    [an] oral or written contract or other document”. the core of sa’s case, as laid out in her amended petition, was that her interest in the trust is not an “asset” within the meaning of that word as it is used in either the tenancy agreement or any agreement created by the completion of the assistance application — the implication being that mvhc had no right to demand that she provide information regarding the value of the trust or to refuse to consider her 2015 assistance application when that information was not forthcoming (ar, at p 70). by way of remedy, sa sought, among [19] en juillet 2015, sa a intenté contre la mvhc la procédure prévue à l’al. 2-1(2)c) des supreme court civil rules, bc. reg. 168/2009, lequel pré- voit la possibilité de déposer une requête lorsque, [traduction] « selon les allégations, l’unique ou la principale question en litige porte sur l’interpré- tation [  ] [d’un] contrat verbal ou écrit ou d’un autre document ». l’essentiel de la thèse de sa, selon sa requête modifiée, est que l’intérêt qu’elle détient dans la fiducie ne constitue pas un « actif » au sens de la convention de location ou de toute autre entente résultant de la demande d’aide dûment remplie, ce qui signifie selon elle que la mvhc n’avait pas le droit d’exiger qu’elle lui fournisse des renseignements quant à la valeur de la fiducie, ni de refuser de considérer sa demande d’aide pour 2015 faute d’avoir obtenu les renseignements en question 114 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. other things, declaratory relief and an order directing mvhc to refund sa “the difference between the market rent of $894 per month [that was] paid by [sa] or on [her behalf] for the months of june and july 2015 and the subsidized rent of $265 for those months” (ar, at p 67). [20] mvhc filed a petition of its own in august 2015, also under rule 2-1(2)(c) of the supreme court civil rules, in which it sought a declaration to the effect that the rental assistance program “requires [the] disclosure of the value of assets in which the ap- plicant for rent assistance has a beneficial interest, in- cluding any type of discretionary or non- discretionary trust” (ar, at p 48). it also sought an order that sa. disclose the value of the trust if she wished to be considered by mvhc for rental assistance. (da, p 70). à titre de réparation, sa a sollicité, entre autres, un jugement déclaratoire et une or- donnance enjoignant à la mvhc de lui rembourser [traduction] « la différence entre le loyer selon le marché, à savoir 894 $ par mois, que [sa a elle- même] versé ou [qui l’a été en son nom] pour les mois de juin et juillet 2015, et le loyer subventionné de 265 $ pour les mois en question » (da, p 67). [20] la mvhc a déposé sa propre requête en août 2015, également fondée sur l’al. 2-1(2)c) des supreme court civil rules, dans laquelle elle a demandé un jugement déclaratoire portant que le programme d’aide au loyer [traduction] « exige [la] communication de la valeur des actifs dans les- quels la personne qui sollicite une aide au loyer a un intérêt bénéficiaire, y compris tout type de fiducie discrétionnaire ou non discrétionnaire » (da, p 48). elle a sollicité aussi une ordonnance enjoignant à sa de révéler la valeur de la fiducie si elle sou- haitait que la mvhc considère sa demande d’aide au loyer. b supreme court of british columbia (2015 bcsc b cour suprême de la colombie­ britannique (2015 2260) bcsc 2260) [21] the two petitions were heard together on october 9, 2015. steeves j. (“chambers judge”) dismissed sa’s petition and denied the order that she sought therein. he allowed mvhc’s petition and ordered that sa was required to disclose the value of the trust if she wished to qualify for rental assistance. [21] les deux requêtes ont été entendues en- semble le 9 octobre 2015. le juge steeves (« juge en chambre ») a rejeté la requête de sa et a refusé de prononcer l’ordonnance sollicitée. il a accueilli la requête de la mvhc et a ordonné que sa révèle la valeur de la fiducie si elle souhaitait satisfaire aux conditions requises pour obtenir une aide au loyer. [22] the chambers judge was of the view that the issue in this case turned on the interpretation of the word “assets” as used in the tenancy agreement. after determining that the asset ceiling policy did not form part of the tenancy agreement, he went on to hold that the meaning of the disputed word was broad enough to encompass sa’s interest in the trust. on this basis, the chambers judge concluded that mvhc was entitled to require that sa disclose the value of the trust before it would consider her application for rental assistance. [22] selon le juge en chambre, la question en litige portait sur l’interprétation du terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la convention de location. après avoir établi que la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs ne faisait pas partie de cette convention, le juge a ajouté que le sens du terme en litige était suffisamment large pour englober l’intérêt de sa. dans la fiducie. sur ce fondement, il a conclu que la mvhc avait le droit d’obliger sa à révéler la valeur de la fiducie avant de considérer sa demande d’aide au loyer. [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 115 c british columbia court of appeal (2017 bcca c cour d’appel de la colombie­ britannique (2017 2, 410 dlr (4th) 198) bcca 2, 410 dlr (4th) 198) [23] the british columbia court of appeal dis- missed sa’s appeal. in the view of goepel ja, writing for a unanimous panel, the fundamental issue in the appeal was whether mvhc could require sa. to provide additional details regarding the trust’s value to determine whether she was eligible for rental assistance and, if so, how much (if anything) she should receive. he also took the position that the chambers judge had erred in analyzing this issue through the lens of the tenancy agreement, observ- ing that the issue instead turned on the interpreta- tion of the word “assets” as used in the assistance application. in light of the definition of “assets” in the asset ceiling policy, goepel ja held that the trust should be characterized as sa’s asset. on that basis, he concluded that “mvhc is entitled, pursuant to the provisions of the assistance application, to the further information it requested concerning the trust to assist it in determining whether to provide rental assistance” (para 56). [23] la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a rejeté l’appel de sa. s’exprimant au nom d’une formation unanime, le juge goepel s’est dit d’avis que la question fondamentale en litige était celle de savoir si la mvhc pouvait obliger sa à fournir des détails supplémentaires concernant la valeur de la fiducie afin de vérifier si sa était admissible à une aide au loyer et, dans l’affirmative, de déterminer quel montant (s’il en est) celle-ci devrait recevoir. il a également exprimé l’avis que le juge en chambre avait commis une erreur en analysant la question sous l’angle de la convention de location, et a fait remarquer que la question en litige portait plutôt sur l’interprétation du terme « actif » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide. à la lumière de la défini- tion que donne à ce terme la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs, le juge goepel a statué que la fiducie devait être considérée comme un actif ap- partenant à sa. il a donc conclu que [traduction] « la mvhc a le droit, conformément à la demande d’aide, d’obtenir les renseignements supplémentaires qu’elle a sollicités au sujet de la fiducie pour pouvoir déterminer s’il y a lieu d’accorder une aide au loyer » (par 56). iv analysis iv analyse a does this appeal raise a justiciable issue? a le présent pourvoi soulève­t­il une question justiciable? [24] the main issue in this appeal is the character- ization of sa’s interest in the trust, and specifically whether mvhc can treat that interest as her “asset” for the purpose of determining whether she meets the eligibility criteria for the rental assistance program. sa submits that it cannot do so, and on that basis takes the position that mvhc had no right to demand that she provide further information as to the value of the trust, or to refuse to consider her 2015 assistance application when she did not provide the requested information. mvhc submits that the asset ceiling policy defines the term “assets” as including assets in which an applicant for rental assistance has a ben- eficial interest. it therefore says that sa’s interest in the trust is indeed an asset and that the value of the [24] le présent pourvoi porte principalement sur la caractérisation de l’intérêt que détient sa dans la fiducie, et plus particulièrement sur la question de savoir si la mvhc peut considérer cet intérêt comme un « actif » lui appartenant afin d’établir si elle sa- tisfait aux critères d’admissibilité du programme d’aide au loyer. sa affirme que la mvhc ne peut pas le considérer ainsi, et fait donc valoir que cette dernière n’avait ni le droit d’exiger qu’elle lui four- nisse des renseignements supplémentaires quant à la valeur de la fiducie, ni celui de refuser de consi- dérer sa demande d’aide pour 2015 du fait qu’elle n’avait pas fourni les renseignements demandés. la mvhc soutient que, suivant la définition contenue dans la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs, 116 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. trust therefore ought to have been disclosed on her 2015 assistance application. because sa did not provide that information either on the form or upon mvhc’s subsequent request, mvhc contends that sa’s 2015 assistance application form was not in fact complete, and that it thus had no obligation to consider her request for rental assistance. [25] as a preliminary matter, however, mvhc submits that sa has not identified a legal basis that would justify awarding her either the declaration or the monetary order that she seeks. put simply, its position is that sa has not demonstrated that she has either a contractual entitlement to receive rental assistance or a right to seek judicial review of mvhc’s decisions respecting the administration of the rental assistance program. [26] this case was not brought as an application for judicial review (ar, at p. 47; transcript, at pp. 13- 14), and i agree that sa does not have a contractual entitlement to a rent subsidy even if she satisfies the eligibility criteria for the rental assistance program. that being said, i am nevertheless of the view that the dispute between the parties is fundamentally con- tractual in nature, as it turns on (a) whether mvhc had a contractual obligation to consider any com- plete assistance application received from sa in accordance with the terms of that application, and (b) whether the assistance application that sa. submitted for the year 2015 was in fact complete and in compliance with the applicable terms, so as to trigger mvhc’s obligation. i will address both of these issues, in turn, below. le terme « actifs » comprend notamment des actifs dans lesquels la personne qui sollicite une aide au loyer a un intérêt bénéficiaire. elle affirme donc que l’intérêt que détient sa dans la fiducie constitue un actif et que sa aurait donc dû révéler la valeur de sa fiducie dans sa demande d’aide pour 2015. comme sa n’a fourni ces renseignements ni dans le formulaire ni lors de la demande subséquente de la mvhc, cette dernière soutient que le formulaire de demande d’aide de sa pour 2015 n’était pas en fait complet et que la mvhc n’était donc pas tenue de considérer sa demande d’aide au loyer. [25] à titre préliminaire, toutefois, la mvhc sou- tient que sa n’a invoqué aucun fondement juridique justifiant le jugement déclaratoire ou l’ordonnance accordant une réparation pécuniaire qu’elle cherche à obtenir. autrement dit, elle fait valoir que sa n’a pas démontré qu’elle avait le droit contractuel de recevoir une aide au loyer ou encore qu’elle avait le droit de demander le contrôle judiciaire des décisions de la mvhc concernant l’application du programme d’aide au loyer. [26] la présente affaire n’a pas été présentée comme demande de contrôle judiciaire (da, p. 47; transcrip- tion, p. 13-14) et je conviens que sa ne dispose pas du droit contractuel de recevoir une aide au loyer même si elle satisfait aux critères d’admissibilité du programme d’aide au loyer. cela dit, j’estime néan- moins que le litige entre les parties est fondamen- talement de nature contractuelle, car il porte sur les questions de savoir a) si la mvhc avait l’obligation contractuelle de considérer toute demande complète d’aide au loyer qu’elle recevait de sa conformément aux modalités de cette demande, et b) si la demande d’aide soumise par sa pour l’année 2015 était en fait complète et en conformité avec les modalités ap- plicables, de manière à déclencher l’obligation de la mvhc. je vais examiner ci- après chacune de ces questions à tour de rôle. b does mvhc have an obligation to consider a complete application for rental assistance submitted by sa?. b la mvhc a­t­elle l’obligation de considérer une demande complète d’aide au loyer soumise par sa? [27] on this first issue, i am of the view that the tenancy agreement imposes an obligation on [27] sur cette première question, je suis d’avis que la convention de location impose à la mvhc [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 117 mvhc to determine whether an adjustment will be made to sa’s base rent in accordance with her current income and the terms of a rental assistance agreement. the existence of this obligation is rooted in cl. 5(a) of the tenancy agreement, which requires that sa pay mvhc a pre- set amount in monthly rent. that clause reads as follows: l’obligation de déterminer si le loyer de base de sa sera rajusté en fonction de son revenu actuel et conformément aux modalités d’une entente d’aide au loyer. cette obligation trouve sa source dans la cl. 5(a) de la convention de location, qui exige que sa verse à la mvhc un montant de loyer mensuel préétabli. voici le libellé de cette clause : [traduction] 5 rent and security deposit 5 loyer et dépôt de garantie (a) the tenant agrees to pay rent calculated as follows: (a) le locataire convient de payer un loyer calculé comme suit : (i) unit rent in the amount of $ 894.00; (i) un loyer unitaire de 894 $; (ii) less the decrease in rent determined in accordance with the tenant’s current income and the terms of a rental assistance agreement, being at the time of this tenancy agreement the amount of $ 629.00; (ii) moins une réduction de loyer déterminée en fonc- tion du revenu actuel du locataire et conformément aux modalités d’une entente d’aide au loyer, soit 629 $ au moment de la conclusion de la présente convention de location; (iii) plus adjustments for a parking fee of $ 0. [em- phasis added.] (iii) plus l’ajustement au titre des frais de stationne- ment, soit 0 $. [je souligne.] (ar, at p. 80) (da, p. 80) the tenancy agreement defines the term “unit rent” as “the monthly rent for the rental unit be- fore any increase or decrease in rent determined in accordance with the tenant’s income and the terms of a rental assistance [a]greement” (cl. 2(a)(xii) (ar, at p 80)). suivant la convention de location, « loyer unitaire » s’entend du « loyer mensuel pour le logement loca- tif avant toute augmentation ou réduction de loyer déterminée en fonction du revenu du locataire et conformément aux modalités d’une entente d’aide au loyer » (cl. 2(a)(xii) (da, p 80)). [28] taken together, these provisions indicate that mvhc has a contractual obligation to deter- mine whether an adjustment will be made to sa’s monthly base rent. this is consistent with the um- brella agreement, which requires that mvhc pro- vide rent subsidies to a minimum of 15 percent of the tenants residing at the housing complex (rr, at pp 23-24). [28] prises ensemble, ces dispositions indiquent que la mvhc a l’obligation contractuelle de décider si le loyer mensuel de base de sa sera rajusté. cette conclusion est compatible avec l’accord- cadre, le- quel exige que la mvhc accorde une aide au loyer à au moins 15 p. 100 des locataires résidant dans le complexe d’habitation (di, p 23-24). [29] it is equally significant that whether sa will get a rent decrease, under cl. 5(a)(ii) of the tenancy agreement, is to be determined by mvhc “in ac- cordance with [her] current income and the terms of a rental assistance [a]greement” (emphasis added) [29] il importe également de souligner que la ques- tion de savoir si sa obtiendra une réduction de loyer, en vertu de la cl. 5(a)(ii) de la convention de location, doit être tranchée par la mvhc [traduc- tion] « en fonction du revenu actuel [de sa] et 118 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. (ar, at p 80). the expression “rental assistance [a]greement” is not defined in the tenancy agree- ment, although cl. 2(a)(vi) defines “rental assis- tance” as “a rent supplement provided by or through [mvhc] to a tenant who meets eligibility criteria related to income, the number of occupants, or other criteria” (ar, at p 79). [30] in order to appreciate what was meant by “the terms of a rental assistance agreement”, it is there- fore necessary to look beyond the four corners of the tenancy agreement, and at the factual matrix sur- rounding the formation of the contract. as this court explained in sattva capital corp. v. creston moly corp., 2014 scc 53, [2014] 2 scr 633, the factual matrix — which includes relevant background facts that the parties clearly knew or ought to have known when they entered into the agreement — can assist in ascertaining what the parties understood the words used in the agreement to mean (paras. 46-47, 58; see also gr. hall, canadian contractual interpretation law (3rd ed. 2016), at p 29). since contractual inter- pretation is an objective exercise, the factual matrix consists only of those facts and circumstances that were or “reasonably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at or before the date of contracting” (sattva, at paras. 49 and 58; hall, at p 29). evidence of one party’s subjective intention therefore “has no independent place” when consider- ing the circumstances surrounding the formation of a contract (eli lilly & co. v. novopharm ltd., [1998] 2 scr 129, at para 54). conformément aux modalités d’une entente d’aide au loyer » (je souligne) (da, p 80). bien que l’ex- pression « entente d’aide au loyer » ne soit pas dé- finie dans la convention de location, la cl. 2(a)(vi) définit l’expression «  aide au loyer  » comme un « supplément au loyer accordé par la [mvhc] ou par son intermédiaire à un locataire qui répond aux critères d’admissibilité liés notamment au revenu et au nombre d’occupants » (da, p 79). [30] pour comprendre ce qu’on l’on entend par [traduction] « les modalités d’une entente d’aide au loyer », il est donc nécessaire d’aller au- delà de la convention de location et d’examiner le fondement factuel de la formation du contrat. comme notre cour l’a expliqué dans sattva capital corp. c. cres­ ton moly corp., 2014 csc 53, [2014] 2 rcs 633, le fondement factuel — qui comprend le contexte factuel pertinent dont les parties avaient clairement connaissance ou dont elles auraient dû avoir connais- sance lorsqu’elles ont conclu l’entente — peut aider à déterminer le sens qu’ont donné les parties aux termes utilisés dans l’entente (par. 46-47 et 58; voir également g r hall,. canadian contractual inter­ pretation law (3e éd. 2016), p 29). étant donné que l’interprétation des contrats est un exercice objectif, le fondement factuel n’est constitué que des faits et circonstances qui « appartenaient ou auraient rai- sonnablement dû appartenir aux connaissances des deux parties à la date de signature ou avant celle-ci » (sattva, par. 49 et 58; hall, p 29). en conséquence, la preuve de l’intention subjective d’une partie « n’oc- cupe aucune place indépendante » dans l’examen des circonstances entourant la formation d’un contrat (eli lilly & co. c. novopharm ltd., [1998] 2 rcs. 129, par 54). [31] since 1992, s.a has successfully applied year after year for tenancy at the housing complex. in addition to her tenancy application, sa has ap- plied for rental assistance each year by filling out an assistance application. the assistance application that she filled out in 2015 — which is identical to the form pursuant to which she had been granted rental assistance in 2014 — requires that tenants provide information about, among other things, their income and assets. it specifically asks that they confirm that the value of their assets does not exceed $25,000. in [31] depuis 1992, sa a, année après année, de- mandé avec succès la location d’un logement dans le complexe d’habitation. elle a également, chaque année, sollicité une aide au loyer en remplissant une demande à cette fin. la demande d’aide qu’elle a remplie en 2015 — laquelle est identique au formu- laire qui lui a permis d’obtenir une aide au loyer en 2014 — exige que les locataires fournissent des ren- seignements au sujet, notamment, de leurs revenus et de leurs actifs. le formulaire requiert expressément de confirmer que la valeur des actifs du locataire [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 119 completing the assistance application, tenants are also required (among other things) to confirm the accuracy of the information provided in it, to agree to provide mvhc with any supporting documents that may be requested, and to sign the bottom of the form. a key portion of the assistance application reads as follows: n’excède pas 25 000 $. lorsqu’ils remplissent la demande d’aide, les locataires doivent aussi (no- tamment) confirmer l’exactitude des renseignements fournis dans celle-ci, accepter de fournir à la mvhc les pièces justificatives susceptibles d’être deman- dées et apposer leur signature à la fin du formulaire. voici un passage clé de cette demande : please complete this form if you are already an mvhc tenant or occupant and you wish to apply for additional rent assistance. [traduction] veuillez remplir le présent formulaire si vous louez ou occupez déjà l’un des logements de la mvhc, et que vous souhaitez demander une aide au loyer supplémentaire. incomplete applications will be re- turned to the applicant unprocessed. toute demande incomplète sera retour- née au requérant sans être traitée. please note that it can take from one week to thirty days to process a form and that mvhc will not process in- complete forms. veuillez noter que le traitement d’une demande peut prendre entre sept et trente jours et que la mvhc ne traitera aucun formulaire incomplet. (ar, p. 107) (da, p. 107) [32] there is also a section at the end of the assis- tance application in which an mvhc staff member is to indicate the amount, if any, of rental assistance for which the tenant qualifies. it is clear from this that mvhc decides whether an applicant will be accorded a rent subsidy on the basis of the infor- mation provided on the assistance application. the assistance application is thus the means through which mvhc obtains the necessary information in relation to “income, the number of occupants [and] other criteria” (tenancy agreement, cl. 2(a)(vi)) for the purpose of determining which tenants will re- ceive rental assistance pursuant to cl. 5(a) of the tenancy agreement. this is evidenced by the fact that the monthly rent subsidy that sa was granted in accordance with the information that she provided on her 2014 assistance application was directly incor- porated into the calculation of her rent under cl. 5(a) of the tenancy agreement signed in 2015. upon en- tering into the tenancy agreement, the parties must therefore have understood that mvhc would have determined whether to make adjustments to sa’s base unit rent in accordance with the terms of and information provided on the assistance application, should sa have chosen to submit one that year. il y a également une section à la fin de la [32] demande d’aide où un employé de la mvhc doit indiquer le montant de l’aide au loyer, s’il en est, au- quel a droit le locataire. cela indique clairement que la mvhc décide si le requérant se verra accorder une aide au loyer en se fondant sur les renseignements fournis dans la demande d’aide. la demande d’aide constitue donc le moyen par lequel la mvhc obtient les renseignements nécessaires en ce qui a trait à des critères liés « notamment au revenu et au nombre d’occupants » (convention de location, cl. 2(a)(vi)), lesquels permettent de déterminer quels locataires re- cevront une aide au loyer conformément à la cl. 5(a) de la convention de location. cette conclusion se dégage du fait que l’aide au loyer mensuelle qui a été accordée à sa selon les renseignements qu’elle a fournis dans sa demande d’aide pour 2014 a été directement incorporée dans le calcul de son loyer conformément à la cl. 5(a) de la convention de lo- cation signée en 2015. lorsqu’elles ont conclu la convention de location, les parties ont donc néces- sairement compris que la mvhc déciderait s’il y avait lieu de rajuster le loyer unitaire de base de sa. à la lumière des modalités de la demande d’aide et des renseignements fournis dans celle­ci, si sa. choisissait d’en présenter une cette année-là. 120 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. it is common ground that individual tenants of [33] mvhc properties do not have a contractual entitle- ment to receive rental assistance and that the amount, if any, that eligible tenants might be granted is deter- mined by mvhc on a discretionary basis. however, i am of the view that the tenancy agreement imposes on mvhc an obligation to consider whether a ten- ant’s rent will be adjusted in accordance with the terms of and information provided on the assistance application. in this way, the provision of rent sub- sidies in accordance with the administration of the rental assistance program forms part of the overall contractual relationship between mvhc and tenants residing at the housing complex. the chambers judge appears to have found as much in his rea- sons, stating that “[t]here is no real dispute that the agreement between the parties includes the tenancy agreement itself as well as the additional rent assis- tance application” (para 35). c does sa’s. interest in the trust form part of her “assets” for the purpose of determining her eligibility to be considered for a rent subsidy from mvhc? [34] as i stated above, the central issue in this appeal is whether sa’s interest in the trust is an “asset” that can negatively affect her eligibility to be considered by mvhc for rental assistance. if her interest does not fall within the meaning of the word “assets” as used in the assistance application, then there was no basis for mvhc to require that sa provide information regarding the value of the trust before considering whether she was eligible for additional rental assistance in 2015. il est bien établi que chaque locataire des [33] immeubles de la mvhc n’a pas de droit contractuel de recevoir une aide au loyer et que le montant, s’il en est, que sont susceptibles de se voir accorder les locataires admissibles est déterminé par la mvhc de façon discrétionnaire. cependant, je suis d’avis que la convention de location impose à la mvhc l’obligation de considérer si le loyer d’un tel loca- taire sera rajusté conformément aux modalités de la demande d’aide et aux renseignements fournis dans celle-ci. ainsi, l’octroi d’une aide au loyer conformé- ment à l’application du programme d’aide au loyer fait partie de la relation contractuelle globale entre la mvhc et les locataires résidant dans le complexe d’habitation. le juge en chambre semble avoir tiré la même conclusion dans ses motifs, affirmant qu’[tra- duction] « [i]l n’est pas véritablement contesté que l’entente entre les parties inclut la convention de location elle- même ainsi que la demande d’aide au loyer supplémentaire » (par 35). c est­ce que l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fi­ ducie fait partie de ses « actifs » lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer si elle a droit de voir sa demande considérée par la mvhc en vue de l’octroi d’une aide au loyer? [34] comme je l’ai mentionné précédemment, la question au cœur du présent pourvoi est celle de savoir si l’intérêt que sa détient dans la fiducie constitue un « actif » susceptible d’avoir une in- cidence négative sur son droit de voir sa demande considérée par la mvhc en vue de l’octroi d’une aide au loyer. si son intérêt n’est pas visé par le terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide, alors rien ne permettait à la mvhc d’exiger que sa fournisse des renseignements concernant la valeur de la fiducie avant de se demander si celle-ci était admissible à une aide au loyer en 2015. (1) what is the nature of sa’s. interest in the (1) quelle est la nature de l’intérêt détenu par trust? sa dans la fiducie? [35] the trust at issue in this case has the essential features of a henson trust. the terms of the trust do not confer any fixed entitlements on sa, and instead provide the trustees with ultimate discretion over any distributions that might be made out of the trust’s [35] la fiducie en cause en l’espèce revêt les carac- téristiques essentielles d’une fiducie de type henson. ses modalités ne confèrent aucun droit déterminé à sa; elles accordent plutôt aux fiduciaires le pouvoir discrétionnaire ultime de faire des distributions sur [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 121 income or capital for sa’s care, maintenance, ed- ucation or benefit (art.  1(a)(iv)(a)). importantly, they specifically provide that the trustees, in exer- cising their discretion, can decide not to make any distributions to sa at all: art. 1(a)(iv)(b) requires that “any income not paid in any year” be added to the capital of the trust fund, and arts. 1(a)(iv)(c) and 1(a)(iv)(d) — which specify how any amount that remains in the trust fund upon sa’s death is to be distributed — contemplate the possibility that sa might not receive all, or even any, of the trust property. [36] it is thus clear that, although the trustees have an obligation to consider whether to make distri- butions out of the trust for sa’s care and mainte- nance, they are not actually required to distribute any of the trust’s assets either to her or for her benefit. unlike the beneficiary of a fixed trust (ie, a trust where the trustee has no discretion as to distributions to the beneficiaries), sa therefore does not have an enforceable right to receive anything unless and until the trustees decide to exercise their discretion in her favour. le revenu ou le capital de la fiducie qui soient consa- crées aux soins, à la subsistance, à l’éducation ou au bénéfice de sa (art 1(a)(iv)(a)). fait important, elles prévoient expressément que, dans l’exercice de leur pouvoir discrétionnaire, les fiduciaires peuvent décider de n’effectuer aucune distribution à sa : l’art. 1(a)(iv)(b) exige que [traduction] « le revenu qui n’est pas versé au cours d’une année » soit ajouté au capital du fonds fiduciaire, et les art. 1(a)(iv)(c) et 1(a)(iv)(d) — qui précisent la manière de distribuer le résidu du fonds fiduciaire au décès de sa — prévoient la possibilité que sa ne reçoive pas la totalité, ni même une partie, du bien fiduciaire. [36] il est donc clair que, bien qu’elles aient l’obli- gation de considérer s’il convient d’effectuer des distributions à partir de la fiducie pour subvenir aux besoins de sa, les fiduciaires ne sont pas tenues d’effectuer de telles distributions, que ce soit à sa. ou à son profit. contrairement au bénéficiaire d’une fiducie fixe (c-à-d une fiducie où le fiduciaire n’a aucun pouvoir discrétionnaire quant aux distributions aux bénéficiaires), sa ne dispose donc d’aucun droit exécutoire de recevoir quoi que ce soit à moins que les fiduciaires ne décident d’exercer leur pouvoir discrétionnaire en sa faveur. [37] i would pause at this point to note that sa’s status as co- trustee is irrelevant to the determination of the nature of her interest in the trust. in this ca- pacity, she is required to reach decisions unanimously with her co- trustee, and must exercise her discretion independently, in accordance with the terms of the trust and in compliance with her fiduciary obliga- tions.1 moreover, the terms of the trust provide sa. with the power to name a new co- trustee in the event that her sister is unwilling or unable to act in that capacity (which is distinct from her sister’s being unwilling to actually make distributions to sa) — and therefore make clear that this office cannot re- main vacant: there must always be two trustees who [37] je tiens ici à souligner que la qualité de cofi- duciaire de sa n’est pas pertinente dans la détermi- nation de la nature de son intérêt dans la fiducie. en cette qualité, elle est tenue de prendre des décisions unanimes avec sa cofiduciaire et elle doit exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire de manière indépendante, conformément aux modalités de la fiducie et à ses obligations fiduciaires1. en outre, les modalités de la fiducie confèrent à sa le pouvoir de nommer un nouveau cofiduciaire si sa sœur refuse ou n’est pas en mesure d’agir en cette qualité (ce qui se distingue du fait pour sa sœur de ne pas être disposée à faire des distributions à sa) — et indiquent donc claire- ment que ce poste ne peut demeurer vacant : il doit 1 while courts have supervisory jurisdiction over the trustee’s exer- cise of discretion (or failure to exercise discretion), they generally do not have the authority to compel the trustees to exercise their discretion in any particular manner (waters, gillen and smith, at pp. 1172-73; a. h. oosterhoff, r. chamber and m. mcinnes, oosterhoff on trusts: text, commentary and materials (8th ed. 2014), at p 972). 1 bien que l’exercice par les fiduciaires de leur pouvoir discré- tionnaire (ou l’omission de l’exercer) soit assujetti au pouvoir de surveillance des tribunaux, ces derniers ne sont généralement pas habilités à contraindre les fiduciaires à exercer leur pouvoir dis- crétionnaire d’une manière particulière (waters, gillen et smith, p. 1172-1173; a h oosterhoff,. r. chambers et m. mcinnes, oosterhoff on trusts : text, commentary and materials (8e éd. 2014), p 972). 122 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. exercise their discretion independently of one another (art 1(a)(ii)). these limitations effectively prevent sa from unilaterally ordering payments out of the trust to herself as she may please. therefore, sa. has no greater access to the trust’s assets than does any person with an interest in a henson trust who is not simultaneously a trustee thereof. for this reason, i would not attach any significance to sa’s status as a co- trustee (see: chambers judge’s reasons, at paras 47-48). [38] another key aspect of the trust is that it is structured so that it cannot be unilaterally collapsed by sa under the rule in saunders v. vautier, ac- cording to which a beneficiary of a trust (or multiple beneficiaries acting jointly) can terminate the trust and demand that the trustee convey legal title over the corpus of the trust to him or her — but only if the beneficiary has capacity and is absolutely enti- tled to all the rights of beneficial ownership in the trust property (see: buschau v. rogers communi­ cations inc., 2006 scc 28, [2006] 1 scr 973, at para. 21; waters, gillen and smith, at pp. 1235-1236; a h. oosterhoff, r. chambers and m. mcinnes, oosterhoff on trusts: text, commentary and ma­ terials (8th ed. 2014), at pp 334-335). analyzing this rule in the context of the present appeal, it is important to observe that under the terms of the trust, any remainder of the trust fund must pass to some third party upon sa’s death: arts. 1(a)(iv)(c) and 1(a)(iv)(d) specifically prohibit her from ap- pointing either herself or her creditors as remain- der beneficiaries. the effect of this “gift over” is that sa’s interest in the trust is not absolute, and therefore prevents her from terminating the trust on her own in accordance with the rule in saunders v. vautier (see: stoor v. stoor estate, 2014 onsc 5684, 5 etr (4th) 207, at paras. 7 and 51-52). toujours y avoir deux fiduciaires qui exercent leur pouvoir discrétionnaire indépendamment l’une de l’autre (art 1(a)(ii)). ces restrictions ont pour effet d’empêcher sa d’ordonner unilatéralement, à son gré, que lui soient faits des paiements prélevés sur la fiducie. par conséquent, sa ne bénéficie pas d’un plus grand accès à l’actif fiduciaire que toute autre personne qui détient un intérêt dans une fiducie de type henson et qui n’est pas en même temps un fi- duciaire. c’est pourquoi je n’accorderais aucune im- portance au fait que sa est une cofiduciaire (voir : les motifs du juge en chambre, par 47-48). [38] un autre aspect important de la fiducie est qu’elle est structurée de manière à empêcher sa d’y mettre fin unilatéralement en se fondant sur la règle de saunders c. vautier, selon laquelle le bénéficiaire d’une fiducie (ou ses bénéficiaires agissant conjoin- tement) peut y mettre fin et exiger du fiduciaire qu’il lui transmette le titre juridique sur le capital de la fiducie, pourvu que ce bénéficiaire ait la capacité juridique et qu’il possède absolument tous les droits de propriété bénéficiaire sur le bien fiduciaire (voir : buschau c. rogers communications inc., 2006 csc 28, [2006] 1 rcs 973, par. 21; waters, gillen et smith, p. 1235-1236; a h oosterhoff,. r. chambers et m. mcinnes, oosterhoff on trusts : text, com­ mentary and materials (8e éd. 2014), p 334-335). en analysant cette règle dans le contexte du présent pourvoi, il importe de signaler que, suivant les mo- dalités de la fiducie, le résidu du fonds fiduciaire doit être transmis à un tiers au décès de sa : en vertu des art. 1(a)(iv)(c) et 1(a)(iv)(d), il est expressément interdit à sa de se désigner elle- même ou de dési- gner ses créanciers à titre de bénéficiaires du résidu de la fiducie. ce « legs subséquent » fait en sorte que l’intérêt que détient sa dans la fiducie n’est pas absolu, ce qui l’empêche donc de mettre fin à elle seule à celle-ci en se fondant sur la règle de saunders c. vautier (voir : stoor c. stoor estate, 2014 onsc 5684, 5 etr (4th) 207, par. 7 et 51-52). [39] the foregoing analysis makes two things clear. first, the terms of the trust provide the trustees with exclusive discretion as to whether payments should be made to sa. while the trustees must periodically consider whether distributions should be made, they are not obliged to exercise this discretion in any [39] l’analyse qui précède établit deux choses clairement. premièrement, les modalités de la fidu- cie confèrent aux fiduciaires le pouvoir discrétion- naire exclusif de décider si des paiements devraient être faits à sa. bien qu’elles doivent périodique- ment se prononcer sur l’opportunité d’effectuer des [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 123 particular manner. second, the structure of the trust prevents sa from terminating the trust on her own under the rule in saunders v. vautier. as a result, sa. has no enforceable right to receive any of the trust’s income or capital: unless and until the trustees exer- cise their discretion in her favour, sa’s interest in the trust is akin to a mere hope that some or all of its property will be distributed to her at some point in the future. (2) how should the word “assets” as used in the assistance application be interpreted? [40] the next issue that must be addressed is the meaning of the word “assets” as it is used in the assistance application, which is the source of sa’s obligation to supply mvhc with information sup- porting the valuation of her assets if she wishes to be considered for rental assistance. to be clear, the issue in this appeal is not the meaning of the word “assets” in the abstract, but rather how that word should be understood in the specific context of mvhc’s rental assistance program. in this respect, i agree with the court of appeal that the chambers judge erred in analyzing this issue at least in part through the lens of the tenancy agreement: “[t]he critical document to determine whether to grant rental assistance is the assistance application” (para 52). distributions, les fiduciaires ne sont pas obligées d’exercer ce pouvoir discrétionnaire d’une manière particulière. deuxièmement, la structure de la fiducie empêche sa de mettre fin unilatéralement à celle-ci en se fondant sur la règle de saunders c. vautier. en conséquence, sa ne dispose d’aucun droit exécu- toire de recevoir tout ou partie du revenu ou du ca- pital de la fiducie : tant que les fiduciaires n’exercent pas leur pouvoir discrétionnaire en faveur de sa, l’intérêt qu’elle détient dans la fiducie s’apparente à un simple espoir qu’une partie ou la totalité des biens de celle-ci lui sera un jour remise. (2) comment devrait-on interpréter le terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide? [40] la question qu’il faut maintenant analyser porte sur le sens à donner au terme « actif » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide, laquelle est à l’ori- gine de l’obligation de sa de fournir à la mvhc des renseignements quant à la valeur de ses actifs si elle souhaite que sa demande soit considérée en vue de l’octroi d’une aide au loyer. pour être clair, le présent pourvoi ne porte pas sur le sens à donner à cette expression dans l’abstrait, mais plutôt sur la façon dont celle-ci devrait être interprétée dans le contexte particulier du programme d’aide au loyer de la mvhc. à cet égard, je partage l’avis de la cour d’appel selon lequel le juge en chambre a commis une erreur en analysant du moins en partie cette question sous l’angle de la convention de location : [traduc- tion] « [l]e document essentiel pour déterminer s’il y a lieu d’accorder une aide au loyer est la demande d’aide (par 52). [41] ascertaining the meaning of the word “as- sets” as used in the assistance application is es- sentially an exercise of contractual interpretation. the objective of such an exercise is to give effect to the agreement struck by the parties, having re- gard to both “the words selected by the parties to set out their agreement, and the context in which those words have been used” (hall, at p.  9). as this court recently explained in sattva, this exer- cise requires that the “decision- maker    read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with [41] déterminer ce que signifie le terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide est essen- tiellement est un exercice d’interprétation contrac- tuelle, qui a pour objectif de donner effet à l’entente conclue entre les parties, compte tenu à la fois [tra- duction] « des termes choisis par les parties pour établir l’entente et du contexte dans lequel ceux-ci sont utilisés » (hall, p 9). comme l’a récemment expliqué notre cour dans sattva, cet exercice exige que le décideur « interpr[ète] le contrat dans son ensemble, en donnant aux mots y figurant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec les 124 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract” (para 47). circonstances dont les parties avaient connaissance au moment de la conclusion du contrat » (par 47). [42] the assistance application requires appli- cants to indicate whether they have assets in excess of $25,000, but does not specify what exactly is en- compassed within the meaning of the word “assets”. however, a non- exhaustive definition of that word is instead set out in a separate mvhc document: the asset ceiling policy. mvhc says that the asset ceiling policy is the document that establishes the eligibility criteria for the rental assistance program, and submits on that basis that the word “assets” should be interpreted as including “assets in which [the applicant has] a beneficial interest” (rf, at paras. 51 and 63). [42] la demande d’aide requiert que les requé- rants indiquent s’ils détiennent des « actifs » d’une valeur supérieure à 25 000 $, mais ne précise pas en quoi consistent exactement ceux-ci. cependant, on trouve plutôt une définition non exhaustive de cette expression dans un document distinct de la mvhc : la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs. la mvhc affirme que cette politique établit les cri- tères d’admissibilité du programme d’aide au loyer et, sur ce fondement, elle fait valoir qu’il convient d’interpréter le terme « actifs » comme englobant les « actifs dans lesquels [le requérant a] un intérêt bénéficiaire » (mi, par. 51 et 63). [43] the court of appeal accepted that the asset ceiling policy could be useful in interpreting the assistance application, stating that the former “es- tablishes eligibility criteria for the [rental assistance program]”, and therefore “provides context for the information sought in the assistance application” (para 53). [44] it is important to note, however, that the assistance application does not refer at all to the asset ceiling policy. in particular, it does not pur- port to import the definition of the word “assets” set out in the latter. as sa pleaded in her petition, the asset ceiling policy “is not incorporated into the [assistance] application, and the [assistance] application does not advise the applicant to have re- gard to the [asset ceiling policy] in completing the [assistance] application” (ar, at p 68. see also sa’s response to mvhc’s petition, ar, at p 73). i agree: nowhere does the assistance application signal to applicants that they should refer to the asset ceiling policy’s definition of the word “as- sets” in calculating whether the value of their assets exceeds $25,000. [43] la cour d’appel a reconnu que la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs pouvait être utile pour interpréter la demande d’aide, affirmant que cette politique [traduction] « établit les critères d’admissibilité du [programme d’aide au loyer] » et fournit donc « un élément contextuel en ce qui a trait aux renseignements sollicités dans la demande d’aide » (par 53). [44] il importe toutefois de signaler que la de- mande d’aide ne fait aucune mention de la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs. plus particuliè- rement, cette demande ne prétend pas incorporer la définition du terme « actifs » énoncée dans la politique. comme l’a plaidé sa dans sa requête, la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs [tra- duction] « n’est pas incorporée dans la demande [d’aide], et la demande [d’aide] n’informe pas le requérant qu’il convient de tenir compte de [la po- litique sur la valeur maximale des actifs] pour la remplir » (da, p 68. voir aussi la réponse de sa à la requête de la mvhc, da, p 73). je suis d’accord; rien dans la demande d’aide n’indique aux requé- rants qu’ils devraient tenir compte de la définition du terme « actifs » énoncée dans la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs dans le calcul visant à vérifier si la valeur de leurs actifs est supérieure à 25 000 $. [45] as explained above, the scope of the relevant factual matrix consists “only of objective evidence [45] comme il a été expliqué précédemment, la por- tée du fondement factuel pertinent consiste uniquement [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 125 of the background facts at the time of the execution of the contract”, or in other words “knowledge that was or reasonably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at or before the date of contracting” (sattva, at para. 58 (emphasis added)). in the case at bar, there is no indication that both mvhc and sa understood the word “assets”, as used in the assistance application, to have the same meaning as in the asset ceiling policy. [46] if the definition in that policy does not ap- ply, what should the word “assets” be understood to mean? the words in the assistance application must be given their ordinary and grammatical meaning in light of the specific context in which they were used (sattva, at paras. 47-48; ledcor construction ltd. v. northbridge indemnity insurance co., 2016 scc 37, [2016] 2 scr 23, at para 27). with this in mind, i would observe that the word “asset” is ordinarily used to denote valuable property that a person can use to discharge debts and other liabil- ities. one of the definitions of the word “asset” in the oxford english dictionary (online) is “an item of value owned; spec. an item on a balance sheet representing the value of a resource, right, item of property, etc., placed under an appropriate head- ing. frequently coupled with liability”. similarly, merriam- webster (online) defines the plural word “assets” as “the entire property of a person, asso- ciation, corporation, or estate applicable or subject to the payment of debts” and the singular word “as- set” as “an item of value owned”. the chambers judge referred to a similar definition from black’s law dictionary (6th ed. 1990), at p. 117 (chambers judge’s reasons, at para. 50): en « une preuve objective du contexte factuel au mo- ment de la signature du contrat », c’est-à-dire « les renseignements qui appartenaient ou auraient raison- nablement dû appartenir aux connaissances des deux parties à la date de signature ou avant celle-ci » (sattva, par. 58 (je souligne)). en l’espèce, rien n’indique que la mvhc et sa aient toutes deux considéré que le terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide avait le même sens que celui qui lui est attribué dans la politique sur la valeur maximale des actifs. [46] si la définition contenue dans cette politique ne s’applique pas, quel sens faudrait-il donner au terme « actifs »? les termes utilisés dans la demande d’aide doivent être interprétés selon leur sens ordi- naire et grammatical eu égard au contexte particu- lier de leur utilisation (sattva, par. 47-48; ledcor construction ltd. c. société d’assurance d’indemni­ sation northbridge, 2016 csc 37, [2016] 2 rcs. 23, par 27). ayant cela à l’esprit, je tiens à souligner que le terme « actifs » est utilisé dans son sens ordi- naire pour désigner des biens de valeur dont une per- sonne peut se servir pour s’acquitter de ses dettes et d’autres engagements. l’une des définitions du terme anglais « asset » (« actif ») figurant dans le oxford english dictionary (en ligne) est la suivante : [tra- duction] « un élément de valeur appartenant à une personne; plus précisément un élément inclus dans le bilan qui représente la valeur d’une ressource, d’un droit, d’un bien, etc., placé sous la rubrique appro- priée. souvent accompagné du mot “liability” (“pas- sif”) ». de même, le dictionnaire merriam webster (en ligne) définit le terme au pluriel « assets » (« ac- tifs ») comme [traduction] « l’ensemble des biens d’une personne, d’une association, d’une société ou d’une succession qui sont susceptibles d’être affectés au paiement de ses dettes », et le terme au singulier « asset » (« actif ») comme « un élément de valeur appartenant à une personne ». le juge en chambre a fait mention d’une définition semblable tirée du black’s law dictionary (6e éd. 1990), p. 117 (motifs du juge en chambre, par. 50) : property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and in- tangible, including inter alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action which belong to any person including a corporation and the estate of a decedent. the entire property of a person, association, corporation, or estate [traduction] biens de toute nature, réels ou personnels, matériels ou immatériels, y compris, à certaines fins, des brevets et causes d’action appartenant à toute personne, notamment une société et la succession d’un défunt. l’en- semble des biens d’une personne, d’une association, d’une 126 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. that is applicable or subject to the payment of his or her or its debts. société ou d’une succession qui sont susceptibles d’être affectés au paiement de ses dettes. [47] this common usage of the word “asset” aligns with the overall purpose of the rental assistance program — which, according to mvhc, is to pro- vide rent subsidies to tenants who are in significant financial need. the idea is that tenants who cannot pay their rent without depleting whatever limited resources they have will be eligible for additional assistance, while tenants who have the means to pay rent will not be eligible. therefore, the eligi- bility criteria associated with the rental assistance program are intended to assist mvhc in identifying as potential recipients of rent subsidies those tenants for whom paying non- subsidized rent is especially burdensome because they do not have access to other financial resources to meet their monthly obligations. [48] for this reason, a reasonable person who in- terprets the assistance application objectively and without reference to the asset ceiling policy would understand the word “assets” to mean an applicant’s property or interest(s) in property that can actually be used to discharge his or her debts and liabilities, including the monthly rent that the applicant owes to mvhc. given the purpose of the rental assistance program, there is no reason why mvhc would con- cern itself with a financial resource — like a contin- gent interest in a trust — that an applicant cannot use in order to pay his or her monthly rent. [47] l’utilisation du terme « actif » dans la langue courante est conforme à l’objectif global du pro- gramme d’aide au loyer, lequel consiste, selon la mvhc, à accorder une aide au loyer aux locataires qui éprouvent des difficultés financières importantes. l’objectif est de faire en sorte que les locataires qui ne sont pas en mesure de payer leur loyer sans épuiser les maigres ressources dont ils disposent aient accès à une aide supplémentaire, alors que les locataires qui disposent des moyens nécessaires pour y parvenir n’y aient pas accès. en conséquence, les critères d’admissibilité du programme d’aide au loyer visent à aider la mvhc à cibler comme bénéficiaires éventuels les locataires pour lesquels il est particulièrement difficile de payer un loyer non subventionné parce qu’ils n’ont pas accès à d’autres ressources financières pour s’acquitter de leurs obli- gations mensuelles. [48] pour cette raison, une personne raisonnable qui interpréterait la demande d’aide de façon objec- tive et sans égard à la politique sur la valeur maxi- male des actifs comprendrait que le terme « actifs » s’entend des biens du requérant, ou de ses intérêts dans des biens, dont il peut effectivement se servir pour s’acquitter de ses dettes et engagements, y com- pris le loyer mensuel qu’il doit à la mvhc. compte tenu de l’objectif du programme d’aide au loyer, il n’y a aucune raison pour laquelle la mvhc s’inté- resserait à une ressource financière — comme un intérêt éventuel dans une fiducie — dont le requérant ne peut pas se servir pour payer son loyer mensuel. (3) does sa’s. interest in the trust fall within the meaning of the word “assets” as used in the assistance application? (3) est-ce que l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie est visé par le terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide? [49] can it therefore be said that sa’s interest in the trust — which, as explained above, is akin to a mere hope of receiving some or all of the trust property at some future point — falls within the meaning of the word “assets” as it is used in the assistance application? my view is that it cannot. because she is unable to compel the trustees to make any distributions to her or for her benefit, and [49] est-il donc possible d’affirmer que l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie — qui, comme il a été expliqué, s’apparente à un simple espoir de recevoir un jour une partie ou la totalité du bien fiduciaire — est visé par le terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide? je suis d’avis que non. puisque sa ne peut obliger les fiduciaires à lui effectuer des distributions ou à effectuer des distributions à [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 127 is prevented from unilaterally collapsing the trust under the rule in saunders v. vautier, sa’s interest in the trust is entirely contingent upon the exercise of the trustees’ discretion. unless and until distri- butions are made in her favour, this interest is there- fore not something she can use to pay the monthly rent that she owes mvhc, or to discharge her other debts and liabilities. in short, the mere fact that she has an interest in the trust does not mean that her financial situation is ameliorated in any meaningful way before distributions are actually, if ever, made for her benefit. [50] the ontario divisional court’s decision in henson, to which the courts below referred, is in- structive in this regard. the respondent in that case — ms. henson — was a person with disabilities who was receiving an allowance under the family benefits act, rso 1980, c 151. before her father passed away, he had settled around $82,000 into trust for ms. henson’s benefit. under the terms of the trust, the three trustees had the “absolute and unfettered” discretion to pay so much of the trust’s income and capital to ms. henson as they considered advisable from time to time. any remainder existing upon ms. henson’s death was to be transferred to the guelph and district association for the mentally retarded, to be used for its general purposes. son profit, et qu’elle ne peut non plus mettre fin unilatéralement à la fiducie en se fondant sur la règle de saunders c. vautier, l’intérêt qu’elle détient dans la fiducie dépend entièrement de l’exercice par les fiduciaires de leur pouvoir discrétionnaire. lorsqu’aucune distribution n’est faite en sa faveur, sa ne peut donc pas se servir de cet intérêt pour payer le loyer mensuel qu’elle doit à la mvhc, ou pour s’acquitter de ses autres dettes et engagements. bref, ce n’est pas parce que sa détient un intérêt dans la fiducie que sa situation financière s’en trouve véritablement améliorée avant que des distributions ne soient effectivement faites à son profit, si tant est que de telles distributions lui soient faites. [50] la décision de la cour divisionnaire de l’on- tario dans henson, à laquelle ont renvoyé les cours d’instance inférieure, est instructive à cet égard. mlle henson, l’intimée dans cette affaire, était une personne handicapée qui recevait une allocation sous le régime de la family benefits act, rso 1980, c 151. avant de mourir, son père avait versé environ 82 000 $ dans une fiducie constituée à son profit. les modalités de la fiducie conféraient aux trois fiduciaires le pouvoir discrétionnaire [traduction] « absolu et illimité » de faire à mlle henson, sur le revenu et le capital de la fiducie, les versements qu’ils estimaient opportuns. le résidu au décès de mlle henson devait être transféré à la guelph and district association for the mentally retarded pour servir à ses fins générales. [51] a regulation made under the family benefits act (“regulation”) provided that a recipient, like ms. henson, would not be eligible for an allow- ance under that statute if he or she had liquid as- sets that exceeded $3,000 in value (regulation 318, rro 1980, s 3(2)(a)). the expression “liquid as- sets” was defined in the regulation as “cash, bonds, stocks, debentures, an interest in real property, a beneficial interest in assets held in trust and available to be used for maintenance, and any other assets that can be readily converted into cash” (s. 1(1)(a) [rep. & sub. 654/82, s 1(a)]). at issue in the divisional court was whether ms. henson’s interest in the trust settled for her benefit fell within the definition of “liquid assets” so as to disqualify her from receiving an allowance under the family benefits act. the [51] suivant un règlement édicté en vertu de la family benefits act (« règlement »), un bénéficiaire, tel que mlle henson, n’avait pas droit à une allocation sous le régime de cette loi s’il détenait des liquidi- tés d’une valeur supérieure à 3 000 $ (regulation 318, rro 1980, al 3(2)a)). par [traduction] « liquidités » on entendait, au sens du règlement, [traduction] « [l’]argent comptant, les obligations, les actions, les débentures, un intérêt dans un bien réel, un intérêt bénéficiaire dans les actifs détenus en fiducie et disponibles aux fins de subsistance, et tout autre actif pouvant rapidement être converti en nu- méraire » (al. 1(1)a) [abr. & rempl. 654/82, al 1a)]). la cour divisionnaire de l’ontario était saisie de la question de savoir si l’intérêt de mlle henson dans la fiducie constituée à son profit tombait sous le coup 128 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. unanimous panel held that it did not, reasoning as follows: in our view, the provision of the will, set out above, gives the trustees absolute and unfettered discretion; the re- spondent could not compel the trustees to make payments to her if there were not funds available to her under the family benefits act, sufficient to meet her needs. there- fore, in our view, miss henson does not have a beneficial interest, as that term is used in the definition of liquid assets. de la définition de « liquidités », ce qui aurait pour effet de l’exclure du bénéfice de l’allocation versée sous le régime de la family benefits act. la cour a conclu à l’unanimité que ce n’était pas le cas, en adoptant le raisonnement suivant : [traduction] nous sommes d’avis que la clause testa- mentaire susmentionnée confère aux fiduciaires un pou- voir discrétionnaire absolu et illimité; l’intimée ne pouvait obliger les fiduciaires à lui faire des paiements si elle ne disposait pas de fonds suffisants sous le régime de la family benefits act pour lui permettre de répondre à ses besoins. en conséquence, nous estimons que mlle henson ne détient pas d’intérêt bénéficiaire au sens dans lequel cette expression est utilisée dans la définition de « liqui- dités ». (henson, at p. 334) (henson, p. 334) [52] the divisional court’s reasoning is highly applicable here, given the similarities between the definition of “liquid assets” in the regulation and the meaning of the term “assets” as used in the as- sistance application, as well as between the structure of ms. henson’s trust and that of the trust at issue in this appeal. in my view, this is true despite the fact that the expression “liquid assets”, as defined in the regulation, included a beneficial interest in assets that were “available to be used for maintenance”. as i mentioned above, the use of the word “assets” in the assistance application must likewise be un- derstood to refer to financial resources on which the tenant can rely in order to pay the rent. in short, trust arrangements such as these cannot be treated as actu- ally enriching the person with disabilities for whom they were settled, because they are structured in a way that puts the trust property beyond that person’s control. this explains why both ms. henson and sa were entitled to receive social assistance bene- fits (under the family benefits act and the eapda, respectively) despite the fact that each of them had a contingent interest in a trust set up to provide for her care and maintenance. this outcome is precisely the reason why the structure of the henson trust is used as a means of setting money aside for persons with disabilities. [52] le raisonnement de la cour divisionnaire s’applique très bien en l’espèce, étant donné les si- militudes entre la définition de « liquidités » prévue par le règlement et le sens du terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide, et compte tenu des ressemblances entre la structure de la fiducie de mlle henson et celle de la fiducie en cause dans le présent pourvoi. selon moi, il en est ainsi malgré le fait que le terme « liquidités » tel que défini par le règlement incluait un intérêt bénéficiaire dans des actifs « disponibles aux fins de subsistance ». comme nous l’avons vu plus tôt, il faut de la même façon considérer que le terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide renvoie à des res- sources financières que le locataire peut utiliser pour payer le loyer. en somme, on ne saurait considérer que de tels actes de fiducie ont pour effet d’enrichir la personne handicapée au profit de laquelle ils ont été conclus, car ils sont structurés de manière à placer le bien fiduciaire hors de son contrôle. cela explique pourquoi mlle henson et sa avaient le droit de tou- cher des prestations d’aide sociale (sous le régime de la family benefits act et de l’eapda, respecti- vement) même si elles détenaient chacune un intérêt éventuel dans une fiducie constituée pour subvenir à leurs besoins. c’est précisément la raison pour laquelle la structure de la fiducie de type henson sert à réserver des fonds à l’intention de personnes handicapées. [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 129 in the case at bar, the chambers judge arrived [53] at the opposite conclusion: that the meaning of the word “assets” is broad enough to include sa’s in- terest in the trust, and that henson does not “[sup- port] a conclusion that [sa’s] interest in the [trust] is not an asset under her agreement with mvhc” (para 57). according to the chambers judge, sa’s circumstances are unlike those of ms. henson — who did not have the power to “compel the trustees to make payments to her” — because sa’s status as a co- trustee empowers her, with her sister’s agreement, “to pay herself discretionary funds from income and capital” in accordance with the terms of the trust (paras 47-48). this appears to be the basis for his conclusion that sa’s interest in the trust amounts to “more than a mere possibility” (para 53). [54] with respect, i am of the view that the chambers judge’s understanding of sa’s interest in the trust represents an error of law. as explained above, sa’s status as a co- trustee does not change the fact that under the terms of the trust, she has no fixed enti- tlement to the assets settled therein, and is precluded from unilaterally collapsing the trust for her benefit (see para. 39 of these reasons). given that the trust only provides her with what is essentially akin to a mere hope of receiving some or all of the property at some point in the future, the chambers judge’s conclusion that sa’s interest in the trust is “more than a mere possibility” — such that it falls within the meaning of the word “assets” as used in the assistance application — cannot stand. [53] en l’espèce, le juge en chambre est arrivé à la conclusion contraire, à savoir que le terme « actifs » est suffisamment large pour englober l’intérêt que détient sa dans la fiducie et que l’arrêt henson [traduction] « [ne] permet [pas] de conclure que l’intérêt détenu par [sa] dans la fiducie n’est pas un actif au sens de la convention qu’elle a conclue avec mvhc » (par 57). selon le juge en chambre, la situation de sa diffère de celle de mlle henson, la- quelle n’avait pas le pouvoir d’[traduction] « obli- ger les fiduciaires à lui faire des paiements », car, en sa qualité de cofiduciaire, sa est autorisée, avec l’accord de sa sœur, à se « verser à elle- même des fonds discrétionnaires provenant du revenu et du capital » conformément aux modalités de la fiducie (par 47-48). cela semble être le fondement de la conclusion du juge selon laquelle l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie est « plus qu’une simple possibilité » (par 53). [54] avec égards, j’estime que le juge en chambre a commis une erreur de droit dans son interprétation de l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie. comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, sa qualité de cofiduciaire ne change rien au fait que, selon les modalités de la fiducie, elle n’a aucun droit déterminé dans le bien fiduciaire et elle n’a pas non plus le droit de mettre fin unilatéralement à la fiducie à son profit (voir par. 39 des présents motifs). vu que la fiducie lui accorde uniquement ce qui s’apparente essentiel- lement à un simple espoir de recevoir un jour une partie ou la totalité du bien fiduciaire, la conclusion du juge en chambre selon laquelle l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie est [traduction] « plus qu’une simple possibilité » — et est donc visé par le terme « actifs » tel qu’il est utilisé dans la demande d’aide — ne peut être maintenue. i would add that these reasons should not be [55] taken to suggest that the interest of a person with disabilities in a properly constituted henson trust can never be treated as an “asset” for any purpose what- soever. as the court of appeal observed, “[w]hether benefits from a discretionary trust must be taken into account will vary from program to program and depend upon the rules and regulations that govern eligibility for any particular program” (para 47). the eligibility criteria associated with any social [55] j’ajouterais qu’il ne faut pas interpréter les présents motifs comme laissant entendre que l’in- térêt détenu par une personne handicapée dans une fiducie de type henson dûment constituée ne saurait jamais être considéré comme un « actif » à quelque fin que ce soit. comme l’a fait observer la cour d’appel, [traduction] « [l]a réponse à la question de savoir si les prestations provenant d’une fiducie discrétionnaire doivent être prises en considération varie d’un programme à l’autre et dépend des règles 130 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. assistance program must be analyzed on their own terms to determine whether and, if so, how an in- terest in a henson trust factors into any applicable means test. [56] a careful reading of documents relevant to the resolution of this appeal leads me to conclude that the word “assets”, as it is used in the assistance ap- plication, is not broad enough to encompass sa’s interest in the trust. given that the discretion over distributions lies exclusively in the trustees’ hands, sa’s interest in the trust property is in the nature of a mere hope of receiving some or all of that property in the future. unless and until the trustees actually decide to make distributions in sa’s favour, that interest is not in practice something on which she can rely to pay the rent (or to offset other debts and liabilities). [57] in the circumstances of this case, there is no question that mvhc can ask sa for information concerning the structure of the trust in order to determine whether her interest in it can be char- acterized as an asset within the meaning of the assis- tance application. sa has in fact already provided mvhc with the court order creating the trust. what she refuses to give mvhc is instead information on the value of the trust. if her interest in the trust could be construed as an asset, such information would need to be disclosed, as it would be relevant to the determination of whether the cumulative value of her assets exceeds the $25,000 ceiling. having found that sa’s interest in the trust cannot be so construed, however, the value of the trust fund is not at all pertinent to the determination of her eligibility to receive rental assistance. et règlements qui régissent l’admissibilité à un pro- gramme particulier » (par 47). les critères d’ad- missibilité à tout programme d’aide sociale doivent être analysés eu égard aux modalités propres au pro- gramme pour déterminer si et, dans l’affirmative, de quelle manière un intérêt dans une fiducie de type henson joue un rôle dans l’examen applicable des ressources. [56] une lecture attentive des documents pertinents pour trancher le présent pourvoi m’amène à conclure que le terme « actifs » au sens de la demande d’aide n’est pas suffisamment large pour englober l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie. comme les distri- butions relèvent exclusivement du pouvoir discré- tionnaire des fiduciaires, l’intérêt détenu par sa. dans le bien fiduciaire est de la nature d’un simple espoir de recevoir une partie ou la totalité de ce bien dans le futur. tant que les fiduciaires ne décident pas effectivement d’effectuer des distributions en faveur de sa, cet intérêt ne lui permet pas, en pratique, de payer le loyer (ou de s’acquitter d’autres dettes et engagements). [57] dans les circonstances de l’espèce, il ne fait aucun doute que la mvhc peut demander à sa. des renseignements concernant la structure de la fiducie afin de vérifier si l’intérêt qu’elle détient dans celle-ci peut être considéré comme un actif au sens de la demande d’aide. en fait, sa a déjà fourni à la mvhc l’ordonnance judiciaire créant la fiducie. elle refuse par contre de lui donner des renseignements quant à la valeur de celle-ci. si l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie pouvait être considéré comme un actif, il serait nécessaire de communiquer les rensei- gnements en question, car ils seraient pertinents pour vérifier si la valeur totale de ses actifs est supérieure à la valeur maximale de 25 000 $. cependant, ayant conclu que l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie ne saurait être interprété ainsi, j’estime que la valeur de la fiducie n’est pas du tout pertinente pour décider si sa est admissible à une aide au loyer. [58] it follows, therefore, that mvhc was not enti- tled to require that sa provide information regard- ing the value of the trust or to refuse to consider her 2015 assistance application when that information was not forthcoming. [58] il s’ensuit donc que la mvhc n’avait pas le droit d’exiger que sa fournisse des renseignements concernant la valeur de la fiducie, ni de refuser, en l’absence de ces renseignements, d’examiner sa de- mande d’aide pour 2015. [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 131 d what is the appropriate remedy? d quelle réparation convient­il d’accorder? [59] having found that mvhc breached its ob- ligation to determine whether sa would receive a rent subsidy in accordance with the terms of the assistance application when she refused to disclose the value of the trust, i turn now to the question of remedy. in this court, sa seeks both declaratory and monetary orders, and i will consider each in turn. [59] ayant conclu que la mvhc a manqué à son obligation de considérer si sa devait recevoir une aide au loyer conformément aux modalités de la demande d’aide après que celle-ci eut refusé de révéler la valeur de la fiducie, je vais me pencher maintenant sur la question de la réparation qu’il convient d’accorder. devant la cour, sa sollicite un jugement déclaratoire et une ordonnance accordant une réparation pécuniaire. je vais examiner chacune de ces demandes à tour de rôle. (1) declaratory relief (1) le jugement déclaratoire [60] sa requests, among other things, that this court issue a declaration that the assets in the trust are not hers for the purpose of the assistance appli- cation. declaratory relief is granted by the courts on a discretionary basis, and may be appropriate where (a) the court has jurisdiction to hear the issue, (b) the dispute is real and not theoretical, (c) the party rais- ing the issue has a genuine interest in its resolution, and (d) the responding party has an interest in oppos- ing the declaration being sought (ewert v. can ada, 2018 scc 30, [2018] 2 scr 165, at para. 81; see also daniels v. can ada (indian affairs and northern development), 2016 scc 12, [2016] 1 scr 99, at para. 11; can ada (prime minister) v. khadr, 2010 scc 3, [2010] 1 scr 44, at para 46). [60] sa demande à notre cour, entre autres, de déclarer que les actifs en fiducie ne constituent pas des actifs lui appartenant en ce qui concerne la de- mande d’aide. un jugement déclaratoire est accordé par le tribunal de façon discrétionnaire et peut être approprié a) lorsque le tribunal a compétence pour entendre le litige, b) lorsque la question en cause est réelle et non pas simplement théorique, c) lorsque la partie qui soulève la question a véritablement intérêt à ce qu’elle soit résolue et d) lorsque la partie intimée a intérêt à s’opposer au jugement déclaratoire sollicité (ewert c. canada, 2018 csc 30, [2018] 2 rcs. 165, par. 81; voir aussi daniels c. canada (affaires indiennes et du nord canadien), 2016 csc 12, [2016] 1 rcs 99, par. 11; canada (premier ministre) c. khadr, 2010 csc 3, [2010] 1 rcs 44, par 46). [61] in my view, all of these criteria are met in this case. as i explained above (in part a of the analysis), the interpretation of the word “asset” as it is used in the assistance application is a justiciable issue that falls within the jurisdiction of this court. moreover, that issue is real, and is one in which both parties clearly have a genuine interest. i am therefore unable to accept mvhc’s submission that no legal purpose would be served by the declaratory relief sought by sa. in these circumstances, a declara- tion that the assets in the trust cannot be treated as sa’s assets for the purpose of the rental assistance program would clearly have practical utility, as it would settle a “live controversy” between the parties (see: operation dismantle inc. v. the queen, [1985] 1 scr 441, at p. 457; daniels, at paras. 11-12; [61] à mon avis, tous ces critères sont respectés en l’espèce. comme je l’ai déjà expliqué (dans la partie a de l’analyse), l’interprétation du terme « ac- tif » au sens de la demande d’aide est une question justiciable qui relève de la juridiction de la cour. de plus, il s’agit d’une question réelle et les deux par- ties ont clairement un intérêt véritable dans celle-ci. je ne puis donc accepter l’argument de la mvhc selon lequel le jugement déclaratoire sollicité par sa ne serait d’aucune utilité sur le plan juridique. dans ces circonstances, un jugement déclaratoire selon lequel les actifs de la fiducie ne peuvent être considérés comme des actifs appartenant à sa en ce qui concerne le programme d’aide au loyer aurait clairement une utilité pratique, puisqu’il réglerait un « litige actuel » entre les parties (voir : operation 132 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. and solosky v. the queen, [1980] 1 scr 821, at p 833). accordingly, i would declare that sa has a right to have her application for a rent subsidy considered by mvhc in accordance with the terms of the assistance application, and that her interest in the trust is not an “asset” for the purpose of such a determination. dismantle c. la reine, [1985] 1 rcs 441, p. 457; daniels, par. 11-12; et solosky c. la reine, [1980] 1 rcs 821, p 833). par conséquent, je suis d’avis de déclarer que s.a a droit de voir sa demande d’aide au loyer considérée par la mvhc conformé- ment aux modalités de la demande d’aide, et que l’intérêt qu’elle détient dans la fiducie ne constitue pas un «  actif  » pertinent pour prendre une telle décision. (2) monetary order (2) l’ordonnance accordant une réparation pé- in addition to declaratory relief, sa seeks an [62] order requiring mvhc to refund her the difference between the rent that she has paid (or that has been paid on her behalf) since june 2015 and the rent that she would have paid (or that would have been paid on her behalf) had she continued to receive rental assistance, and asks that this amount be paid into a trust on the same terms, for the same beneficiaries and with the same trustees as the trust. she submits that a monetary order to this effect would put her in the position that she would have been in had mvhc properly determined whether she should receive a rental adjustment in accordance with the terms of the assistance application. cuniaire [62] outre le jugement déclaratoire, sa sollicite une ordonnance enjoignant à la mvhc de lui rem- bourser la différence entre le loyer qu’elle a elle- même payé (ou qui a été payé en son nom) depuis juin 2015 et le loyer qu’elle aurait payé (ou qui aurait été payé en son nom) si elle avait continué de rece- voir une aide au loyer, et elle demande que ce mon- tant soit versé dans une fiducie assortie des mêmes modalités et qui aurait les mêmes bénéficiaires et les mêmes fiduciaires que la fiducie en cause en l’espèce. elle soutient qu’une telle ordonnance aurait pour effet de la placer dans la situation où elle se serait trouvée si la mvhc avait correctement tran- ché la question de savoir si elle était admissible à un rajustement de loyer conformément aux modalités de la demande d’aide. [63] the interpretation to the effect that the word “assets” as used in the assistance application does not encompass sa’s interest in the trust means that she was in fact eligible to be considered by mvhc for rental assistance in 2015. although she may therefore be entitled to a monetary remedy for mvhc’s failure to consider her 2015 application, there is lingering uncertainty as to whether it would be appropriate for this court to award such a remedy to sa. [63] l’interprétation selon laquelle le terme « ac- tifs » au sens de la demande d’aide n’englobe pas l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie signifie que celle-ci avait droit de voir sa demande considérée par la mvhc en vue de l’octroi d’une aide au loyer en 2015. bien que sa puisse donc avoir droit à une réparation pécuniaire du fait que la mvhc n’a pas considéré sa demande de 2015, une incertitude subsiste quant à savoir s’il conviendrait que la cour lui accorde une telle réparation. [64] as a factual matter, it is important to acknowl- edge that mvhc does not guarantee that eligible tenants will actually receive rent subsidies. as i men- tioned above, how much, if anything, an eligible tenant will be granted is determined by mvhc on a discretionary basis. indeed, the chambers judge made no finding as to what sa might have had to [64] dans les faits, il importe de reconnaître que la mvhc ne garantit pas que les locataires admissibles recevront effectivement une aide au loyer. comme je l’ai mentionné précédemment, le montant, s’il en est, que se verra accorder le locataire admissible relève du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la mvhc. en effet, le juge en chambre n’a tiré aucune conclusion quant [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 133 pay in rent since june 2015 had she continued to receive rental assistance, and in my view, there is insufficient evidence in the record before this court to make such a determination. which applicants will receive rental assistance, and how much they will receive, is determined by mvhc on a discretion- ary basis and having regard to, among other things, financial considerations and public housing needs. i would also point out that mvhc did not actu­ ally exercise its discretion not to grant sa a rent subsidy: it simply declined to consider her 2015 application in response to her refusal to disclose the value of the trust. [65] given the content of the factual record, the most appropriate course of action would be to remit this issue for determination by the court of original ju- risdiction (ie, the british columbia supreme court). doing so will allow both parties to point to specific evidence relating to the amount in subsidies that sa. could have expected to receive since june 2015. and while there is no evidence in the record that sa. applied for rental assistance in 2016, 2017 or 2018, i note that since june 2015, after mvhc made clear that it would not grant her any rental assistance unless and until she provided details about the value of the trust, she has been paying her unit rent under protest. [66] contrary to what my colleague justice rowe seems to suggest at paras. 77, 86-88 and 93 of his reasons, this does not mean that the british columbia supreme court can deal with this issue by simply substituting its view of what sa ought to have re- ceived for that of mvhc. to be clear, it cannot ex- ercise its discretion in place of mvhc by awarding her an amount commensurate to what it thinks sa. should have received. rather, the court at this stage must analyze the evidence and grant an award of damages that would, as far as possible, put sa in the position that she would have been in had mvhc not breached the obligation it owed to her. while the amount that any eligible applicant will receive by way of rent subsidies is decided by mvhc on a dis- cretionary basis, the existence of such discretion does not mean that the court is incapable of determining, au montant que sa aurait pu avoir à payer au titre du loyer depuis juin 2015 si elle avait continué de recevoir une aide au loyer, et à mon avis, la preuve au dossier ne permet pas à notre cour de trancher cette question c’est la mvhc qui décide quels requérants recevront une aide au loyer, ainsi que le montant accordé, et ce, de façon discrétionnaire, eu égard, notamment, à des considérations financières et aux besoins en matière de logement social. je soulignerais également que la mvhc n’a pas dans les faits exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire de ne pas accorder à sa une aide au loyer; elle a simplement refusé de considérer sa demande de 2015 eu égard à son refus de révéler la valeur de la fiducie. [65] vu le contenu du dossier factuel, la meilleure solution serait de renvoyer la question au tribunal de première instance (c-à-d la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique) pour qu’il statue sur celle-ci. les deux parties pourront ainsi indiquer les éléments de preuve précis en ce qui a trait au montant de l’aide au loyer que sa pouvait s’attendre à rece- voir depuis juin 2015. de plus, bien que la preuve au dossier n’indique pas que sa ait demandé une aide au loyer en 2016, en 2017 ou en 2018, je note que depuis juin 2015, après que la mvhc eut bien précisé qu’elle ne lui accorderait aucune aide au loyer tant qu’elle ne fournirait pas de détails quant à la valeur de la fiducie, sa a payé son loyer unitaire sous protêt. [66] contrairement à ce que mon collègue le juge rowe semble affirmer aux par. 77, 86-88 et 93 de ses motifs, cela ne signifie pas que la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique peut se prononcer sur cette question en se contentant de substituer son point de vue à celui de la mvhc au sujet de ce qu’aurait dû recevoir sa. en clair, elle ne peut pas exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire à la place de la mvhc en accordant à sa un montant qui corres- pond à ce que la cour estime que celle-ci aurait dû recevoir. au contraire, elle doit à cette étape analyser la preuve et accorder des dommages- intérêts qui auraient pour effet de placer sa, dans la mesure du possible, dans la situation dans laquelle sa se serait trouvée si la mvhc n’avait pas manqué à l’obligation qu’elle avait envers elle. bien que le montant de l’aide au loyer que reçoit tout requérant 134 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. on the basis of the evidence, the proper amount to be awarded in damages for mvhc’s breach of contract. admissible soit déterminé par la mvhc de façon discrétionnaire, l’existence d’un tel pouvoir discré- tionnaire n’empêche pas le tribunal de déterminer, en se fondant sur la preuve, le montant des dommages- intérêts qu’il convient d’accorder pour inexécution de contrat par la mvhc. v costs v les dépens in addition to declaratory and monetary orders, [67] sa seeks special costs, calculated on a solicitor- and-client basis, in this court and in the courts below. she submits that such a departure from the usual rule on costs is justified both by the public inter- est nature of this appeal and by her limited means. according to sa, her case “unexpectedly brought about [a] change in the law” in british columbia, and she now asks this court to affirm the decision in henson for the benefit of persons with disabilities across canada (af, at para 79). mvhc counters that the issues raised in this case are not sufficiently exceptional to meet the stringent test for an award of special costs in public interest litigation. in carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 [68] scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, this court identified two considerations that can help to guide the exercise of a judge’s discretion on a motion for special costs in a case involving the public interest: [67] outre le jugement déclaratoire et l’ordon- nance accordant une réparation pécuniaire, sa. sollicite des dépens spéciaux, calculés sur la base avocat- client, devant notre cour et les cours infé- rieures. elle soutient qu’une telle dérogation à la règle habituelle en matière de dépens se justifie tant par la nature d’intérêt public du présent pourvoi que par les ressources limitées dont elle dispose. sa. fait valoir que son cas [traduction] « a entraîné de manière inattendue [une] modification du droit » en colombie- britannique, et elle demande mainte- nant à la cour de confirmer, au profit des personnes handicapées partout au canada, la décision dans l’af- faire henson (ma, par 79). la mvhc soutient par contre que les questions à trancher dans la présente affaire ne revêtent pas un caractère suffisamment exceptionnel pour satisfaire au rigoureux critère ap- plicable pour l’octroi de dépens spéciaux dans un litige d’intérêt public. [68] dans carter c. canada (procureur général), 2015 csc 5, [2015] 1  rcs  331, notre cour a énoncé deux considérations susceptibles d’être utiles pour guider l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge saisi d’une requête pour dépens spéciaux dans une affaire mettant en cause l’intérêt public : first, the case must involve matters of public interest that are truly exceptional. it is not enough that the issues raised have not previously been resolved or that they transcend the individual interests of the successful litigant: they must also have a significant and widespread societal im- pact. second, in addition to showing that they have no personal, proprietary or pecuniary interest in the litigation that would justify the proceedings on economic grounds, the plaintiffs must show that it would not have been pos- sible to effectively pursue the litigation in question with private funding. in those rare cases, it will be contrary to the interests of justice to ask the individual litigants (or, more likely, pro bono counsel) to bear the majority of premièrement, l’affaire doit porter sur des questions d’in- térêt public véritablement exceptionnelles. il ne suffit pas que les questions soulevées n’aient pas encore été tranchées ou qu’elles dépassent le cadre des intérêts du plaideur qui a gain de cause : elles doivent aussi avoir une incidence importante et généralisée sur la société. deuxièmement, en plus de démontrer qu’ils n’ont dans le litige aucun intérêt personnel, propriétal ou pécuniaire qui justifierait l’instance pour des raisons d’ordre économique, les demandeurs doivent démontrer qu’il n’aurait pas été possible de poursuivre l’instance en question avec une aide financière privée. dans ces rares cas, il est contraire à l’in- térêt de la justice de demander aux plaideurs individuels [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp la juge côté 135 the financial burden associated with pursuing the claim. [emphasis added; para 140] (ou, ce qui est plus probable, aux avocats bénévoles) de supporter la majeure partie du fardeau financier associé à la poursuite de la demande. [je souligne; par 140] [69] in my view, neither of these considerations supports the awarding of special costs to sa in the circumstances of the instant case. with respect to the first, the issue raised in this appeal is not “truly exceptional”, as it does not have a sufficiently sig- nificant or widespread societal impact. while this case has provided this court with an opportunity to consider the nature of a henson trust for the first time, it concerns one particular social program that is available only to certain tenants of mvhc prop- erties. the issue considered above is whether sa’s interest in the trust can be characterized as an “asset” as that term is used in the assistance application; whether other social assistance programs may define that term differently for the purposes of administer- ing their own means tests is not at issue in this appeal (see para. 55 of these reasons). [70] as to the second consideration, it cannot be said that sa has “no personal, proprietary or pe- cuniary interest in the litigation that would justify the proceedings on economic grounds”. the issue raised in her petition relates directly to her right to be considered by mvhc for rental assistance so as to reduce the amount that she owes mvhc in monthly rent in accordance with cl. 5(a)(ii) of the tenancy agreement. moreover, her pecuniary interest in the litigation is evident in the fact that she seeks an order that mvhc pay the difference between the rent she paid in 2015 and the rent she would have paid had she continued to receive rental assistance. [71] on the basis of carter, therefore, i am not persuaded that it would be appropriate to grant sa’s request for solicitor- and-client costs. however, my view is that sa, as the successful party, should be awarded her costs on a party- and-party basis in this court and in the courts below. [69] à mon avis, ni l’une ni l’autre de ces consi- dérations ne justifie l’octroi de dépens spéciaux en faveur de sa dans les circonstances de l’espèce. en ce qui concerne la première considération, la ques- tion soulevée en l’espèce n’est pas « véritablement exceptionnelle », car elle n’a pas une incidence suf- fisamment importante ou généralisée sur la société. bien qu’elle ait permis à la cour de se pencher pour la première fois sur la nature d’une fiducie de type henson, la présente affaire porte sur un programme social particulier offert uniquement à certains lo- cataires des immeubles de la mvhc. la question examinée précédemment consiste à déterminer si l’intérêt détenu par sa dans la fiducie peut être considéré comme un « actif » au sens de la demande d’aide; la question de savoir si d’autres programmes d’aide sociale pourraient définir cette expression différemment pour l’application de leur propre pro- cessus d’examen des ressources ne se pose pas dans le présent pourvoi (voir par. 55 des présents motifs). [70] pour ce qui est de la deuxième considération, on ne saurait affirmer que sa n’a « dans le litige aucun intérêt personnel, propriétal ou pécuniaire qui justifierait l’instance pour des raisons d’ordre écono- mique ». la question soulevée dans sa requête porte directement sur son droit de voir sa demande consi- dérée par la mvhc en vue de l’octroi d’une aide au loyer, afin que soit réduit le montant du loyer mensuel qu’elle doit verser à cet organisme conformément à la cl. 5(a)(ii) de la convention de location. de plus, son intérêt pécuniaire dans le litige ressort nettement du fait qu’elle sollicite une ordonnance enjoignant à la mvhc de payer la différence entre le loyer qu’elle a versé en 2015 et celui qu’elle aurait versé si elle avait continué de recevoir une aide au loyer. [71] en conséquence, compte tenu de l’arrêt carter, je ne suis pas convaincue qu’il conviendrait d’accor- der les dépens sur la base avocat- client réclamés par sa. cependant, j’estime que, comme elle a gain de cause, sa devrait se voir accorder ses dépens sur la base partie- partie devant la cour et les cours inférieures. 136 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp côté j. [2019] 1 scr. vi motion to strike vi requête en radiation [72] mvhc brought a motion to strike several paragraphs from the factums of two interveners. first, it submits that the canadian association for community living and people first of canada vi- olated the terms of their intervention order by in- troducing new evidence, since their joint factum referenced affidavit evidence that was filed in their joint motion for leave to intervene. those interveners have satisfactorily responded to mvhc’s objection by filing an amended joint factum that no longer ref- erences the affidavits in question. i would therefore dismiss this portion of mvhc’s motion to strike. mvhc also submits that the disability alliance bc society (“dabc”) inappropriately adduced new evidence, raised new issues and argued the merits of the appeal in its factum. dabc has conceded that certain statements and references in its factum with respect to new evidence, or evidence lying outside the record, should be struck, and has amended its factum accordingly. in my view, section e of part iii of its factum (paras. 24-34) should also be struck because it constitutes argument going to the merits of the appeal. i would therefore grant this portion of mvhc’s motion to strike. [72] la mvhc a présenté une requête visant à faire radier plusieurs paragraphes des mémoires de deux intervenantes. premièrement, elle soutient que l’association canadienne pour l’intégration com- munautaire et personnes d’abord du canada ont violé les conditions de l’ordonnance les autorisant à intervenir en présentant de nouveaux éléments de preuve, parce que leur mémoire conjoint faisait ré- férence à une preuve par affidavit déposée à l’appui de leur requête conjointe pour permission d’inter- venir. ces intervenantes ont répondu de manière satisfaisante à l’objection de la mvhc : elles ont déposé un mémoire conjoint modifié ne faisant plus référence aux affidavits en question. je rejetterais donc cette portion de la requête en radiation de la mvhc. cette dernière soutient également que la disability alliance bc society (« dabc ») a à tort présenté de nouveaux éléments de preuve, soulevé de nouvelles questions et défendu le bien- fondé de l’appel dans son mémoire. la dabc a concédé que certaines affirmations et mentions dans son mémoire se rapportant à de nouveaux éléments de preuve ou à des éléments de preuve ne faisant pas partie du dossier devraient être radiées, et elle a modifié son mémoire en conséquence. à mon avis, la section e de la partie iii de son mémoire (par. 24-34) devrait également être radiée, car elle constitue un argument portant sur le bien- fondé de l’appel. j’accueillerais donc cette portion de la requête en radiation de la mvhc. vii conclusion vii conclusion [73] for all of these reasons, the appeal is allowed with costs to sa in this court and in the courts below. i would set aside the declarations made by the court of appeal, and declare that sa has a right to have her application for a rent subsidy consid- ered by mvhc in accordance with the terms of the assistance application, and that her interest in the trust is not an “asset” for the purpose of such deter- mination. the issue of sa’s request for monetary relief is returned to the british columbia supreme court. i would also accede to sa’s request that mvhc pay the costs award into a trust on the same [73] pour tous ces motifs, le pourvoi est accueilli avec dépens en faveur de sa devant la cour et les cours inférieures. je suis d’avis d’annuler les juge- ments déclaratoires prononcés par la cour d’appel, et de déclarer que sa a droit de voir sa demande d’aide au loyer considérée par la mvhc conformé- ment aux modalités de la demande d’aide et que l’intérêt qu’elle détient dans la fiducie ne constitue pas un  «  actif  » pertinent pour prendre une telle décision. la question de la réparation pécuniaire sollicitée par sa est renvoyée à la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique je ferais également [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp le juge rowe 137 terms, for the same beneficiaries and with the same trustees as the trust (ar, at p 21). [74] i would also grant mvhc’s motion to strike in part, and order that section e of part iii of dabc’s factum (paras. 24-34) be struck accordingly. droit à la demande de sa pour que la mvhc verse les dépens accordés dans une fiducie assortie des mêmes modalités et ayant les mêmes bénéficiaires et les mêmes fiduciaires que la fiducie en cause en l’espèce (da, p 21). [74] j’accueillerais aussi en partie la requête en ra- diation de la mvhc et j’ordonnerais que la section e de la partie iii du mémoire de la dabc (par. 24-34) soit radiée en conséquence. the reasons of brown and rowe jj. were deliv- version française des motifs des juges brown et ered by rowe rendus par rowe j (dissenting) — le juge rowe (dissident) — i overview i aperçu [75] i agree with the majority’s statement of the facts and with their analysis with respect to henson trusts. i also agree with their disposition relating to metro vancouver housing corporation’s (“mvhc”) motion to strike portions of disability alliance bc society’s (“dabc”) factum. however, i respectfully disagree as to their analysis relating to mvhc’s rental assistance program. in my view there is no legal basis on which a court can make an order as to the operation of this program, as there is no con- tractual obligation requiring mvhc to approve or even to consider any particular application, a fortiori to do so on the terms that the majority indicates. accordingly, i would allow the appeal in part, setting aside the declaratory relief granted to mvhc by the british columbia court of appeal. i would decline to grant the other relief sought by sa. [75] je souscris à l’exposé des faits et à l’analyse des juges majoritaires en ce qui a trait aux fiducies de type henson. je souscris également à leur dispositif en ce qui concerne la requête de la metro vancouver housing corporation (« mvhc ») visant à faire ra- dier certaines portions du mémoire de la disability alliance bc society (« dabc »). soit dit en tout respect, je suis toutefois en désaccord avec leur ana- lyse portant sur le programme d’aide au loyer de la mvhc. à mon avis, aucun fondement juridique ne permet à un tribunal de rendre une ordonnance rela- tive à l’application de ce programme, car la mvhc n’a aucune obligation contractuelle d’approuver ou même d’examiner une demande en particulier, et à plus forte raison de le faire aux conditions énoncées par les juges majoritaires. par conséquent, j’accueil- lerais le pourvoi en partie, et j’annulerais les juge- ments déclaratoires accordés par la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique à la mvhc. je m’abstiendrais d’accorder les autres réparations demandées par sa. [76] this appeal initially arose from two petitions heard at the supreme court of british columbia. the relief that sa seeks has not fundamentally changed. sa asks for a declaration that her henson trust is not an asset for the purpose of her assistance application. she also seeks an order the effect of which would be that mvhc provide rental assis- tance to her. in particular, sa seeks an order that mvhc pay “the difference between (1) the rent paid [76] le présent pourvoi tire son origine de deux re- quêtes entendues par la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique. les réparations que demandent sa. n’ont pas changé de façon fondamentale. sa sollicite un jugement déclaratoire portant que sa fiducie de type henson ne constitue pas un actif pour les besoins de sa demande d’aide au loyer. elle sollicite également une ordonnance dont l’effet serait d’obliger la mvhc à lui accorder une aide au loyer. plus particulièrement, 138 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp rowe j. [2019] 1 scr. by or on behalf of sa since june 2015 and (2) the rent that would have been paid by or on behalf of sa since june 2015 if she had continued to re- ceive additional rent assistance” (af, at para 82). even though mvhc informed sa on april 13, 2015, that it was “unable to approve” her assistance application, she asks this court to compel mvhc to provide rental assistance to her (ar, at p 98). mvhc seeks an order dismissing the appeal. thus, the key issue in this case is whether a court can make an order or a declaration as to the operation of mvhc’s discretionary rental assistance program. [77] the majority states that the main issue before this court is whether sa’s interest in the trust can be treated as her “asset” for the purpose of deter- mining whether she meets the eligibility criteria as- sociated with the rental assistance program. in the view of sa and the majority, an award of damages is in principle available once it is clarified that “as- set”, as it is used in the assistance application, does not include a discretionary trust like sa’s. while the majority has declined to make an award due to the lack of evidence on the record, they indicate that another court, with this clarification and further evidence, can determine how mvhc ought to have distributed its funds. the majority’s position rests on two related propositions. first, that mvhc has a contractual obligation to consider sa’s. assistance application, and second, that it must do so in accord- ance with the terms of the assistance application. i differ in my view as to both propositions. this is the nub of our difference. sa cherche à obtenir une ordonnance intimant à la mvhc de payer [traduction] « la différence entre (1) le loyer que sa a elle- même versé ou qui l’a été en son nom depuis juin 2015 et (2) le loyer que sa aurait versé ou qui l’aurait été en son nom de- puis juin 2015 s’il elle avait continué de recevoir une aide au loyer supplémentaire » (ma, par 82). bien que la mvhc ait informé sa le 13 avril 2015 qu’elle n’était [traduction] « pas en mesure d’approuver » sa demande d’aide, sa demande à la cour d’obliger cet organisme à lui accorder une aide au loyer (da, p 98). la mvhc sollicite, pour sa part, une ordon- nance rejetant le pourvoi. en conséquence, la question clé en l’espèce est de savoir si un tribunal peut rendre une ordonnance ou un jugement déclaratoire quant à l’application du programme discrétionnaire d’aide au loyer de la mvhc. [77] selon les juges majoritaires, la question princi- pale dont nous sommes saisis est de savoir si l’intérêt que détient sa dans la fiducie peut être considéré comme un « actif » lui appartenant afin d’établir si elle satisfait aux critères d’admissibilité du pro- gramme d’aide au loyer. de l’avis de sa et des juges majoritaires, des dommages- intérêts peuvent en principe être accordés une fois qu’il est bien clair qu’un « actif » au sens de la demande d’aide n’in- clut pas une fiducie discrétionnaire comme celle de sa. bien que les juges majoritaires aient, en raison du manque de preuve au dossier, refusé d’octroyer pareils dommages, ils affirment qu’un autre tribunal, si cette clarification est apportée et que d’autres élé- ments de preuve sont présentés, pourrait déterminer comment la mvhc aurait dû distribuer ses fonds. la position des juges majoritaires repose sur deux propositions connexes. premièrement, la mvhc a l’obligation contractuelle d’examiner la demande d’aide de sa et, deuxièmement, elle doit le faire conformément aux modalités de la demande d’aide. je diffère d’avis avec eux en ce qui a trait à ces deux propositions. c’est là que se situe le nœud de notre désaccord. [78] whether declaratory relief is available is central to the disposition of this appeal. sa seeks it by way of r. 2-1(2)(c) of the british columbia supreme court civil rules, bc. reg 168/2009. the availability of this relief is premised on the [78] la question de savoir s’il est possible d’obte- nir un jugement déclaratoire est fondamentale pour l’issue du présent pourvoi. sa sollicite un tel juge- ment en se fondant sur l’al. 2-1(2)(c) des supreme court civil rules de la colombie- britannique, bc. [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp le juge rowe 139 actual or potential infringement of an applicant’s rights (kaiser resources ltd. v. western canada beverage corp. (1992), 71 bclr (2d) 236 (sc), at para 32). a court has “no jurisdiction to issue a declaration where there exists no right in jeopardy nor in procedural provision for the relief sought” (l. sarna, the law of declaratory judgments (4th ed. 2016), at p 87). absent a legal entitlement to anchor the declaration — like a contractual entitlement to rental assistance — one cannot properly be granted. the majority says that mvhc has a contractual obligation to consider sa’s. assistance application. but there is no provision of the tenancy agreement to this effect. as to what is referred to as a rental assistance agreement, that is a reflection of an ar- rangement entered into by mvhc and a tenant only after mvhc has decided, in its discretion, to make a grant to an eligible tenant under its rental assistance program; in short, it follows from but does not give rise to an obligation on the part of mvhc to de- termine whether any tenant should receive rental assistance. reg.  168/2009 la possibilité d’obtenir cette ré- paration repose sur la violation réelle ou poten- tielle des droits du demandeur (kaiser resources ltd c. western canada beverage corp.  (1992), 71 bclr (2d) 236 (cs), par 32). un tribunal n’a [traduction] « pas compétence pour rendre un jugement déclaratoire lorsqu’il n’y a aucun droit menacé ni aucun droit contenu dans une disposition de nature procédurale sur lequel fonder cette répara- tion » (l. sarna, the law of declaratory judgments (4e éd. 2016), p 87). en l’absence d’un droit sur lequel fonder le jugement déclaratoire — tel un droit contractuel à une aide au loyer — pareil jugement ne peut être accordé à bon droit. les juges majoritaires affirment que la mvhc a l’obligation contractuelle d’examiner la demande d’aide de sa. cependant, la convention de location ne comporte aucune clause à cet effet. en ce qui concerne l’entente dite d’aide au loyer, celle-ci reflète un accord conclu entre la mvhc et un locataire uniquement après que la mvhc a décidé, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, d’octroyer à un locataire admissible une subvention en vertu de son programme d’aide au loyer; en bref, l’entente en question découle d’une obligation de la mvhc de déterminer si un locataire devrait recevoir une aide au loyer, mais ne donne pas naissance à une telle obligation. ii analysis ii analyse [79] it is important to recall the scheme by which mvhc operates. as a non- profit corporation with a mandate to provide affordable rental housing in the greater vancouver region, mvhc provides two forms of “means- tested” assistance to tenants. first, mvhc provides rental units to eligible tenants at favourable rates. second, eligible tenants may apply for rental assistance to further reduce their favourable monthly rent. both components are means- tested in that the disclosure of financial information is re- quired for each (on separate forms). there is also an asset “cut- off” for the rental assistance program. at the time sa applied for rental assistance in 2015, the asset cut- off was set by mvhc at $25,000 (ar, at p 105). as noted, it is mvhc that decides who among eligible applicants will receive rental assis- tance. while drawing on some of the same informa- tion about applicants, mvhc determines eligibility [79] il importe de rappeler le régime qui régit le fonctionnement de la mvhc. en tant qu’organisme à but non lucratif ayant pour mandat de fournir des logements locatifs abordables dans la région métro- politaine de vancouver, la mvhc accorde aux loca- taires deux formes d’aide « modulée en fonction des ressources ». premièrement, elle fournit, à des taux avantageux, des logements locatifs aux locataires admissibles. deuxièmement, ces derniers peuvent demander une aide au loyer afin de réduire davantage leur loyer mensuel avantageux. ces deux compo- santes supposent un examen des ressources en ce que la communication de données financières est requise pour chacune d’elles (sur des formulaires distincts). il y a également une « valeur maximale » des actifs que peut détenir une personne pour être admissible au programme d’aide au loyer. lorsque sa a présenté une demande d’aide en 2015, la valeur maximale des 140 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp rowe j. [2019] 1 scr. for tenancy and for rental assistance separately. those tenants who wish to apply for rental assistance must fill out and submit an assistance application. individuals who are offered rental units are not re- quired to apply for additional rental assistance; and, even if they do and they meet the basic eligibility requirement of not exceeding the $25,000 asset “cut- off”, they are not entitled to rental assistance. [80] the discretionary nature of the rental assis- tance program is evident upon reviewing the tenancy agreement and the assistance application. the latter is not part of the tenancy agreement. under the tenancy agreement, sa has no contractual right to this additional rental assistance. filling out an application for such assistance does not guarantee that it will be provided. the application itself states that “mvhc also offers, but cannot guarantee, ad- ditional rent assistance to eligible tenants” (ar, at p 89). further, the application does not state an- ything to the effect that all completed applications will be considered, nor does it specify how mvhc will take the information provided by applicants into account in determining whether rental assistance will be provided. actifs qu’elle pouvait détenir avait été fixée à 25 000 $ par la mvhc (da, p 105). comme nous l’avons vu, c’est la mvhc qui décide qui parmi les requérants admissibles recevra une aide au loyer. bien qu’elle se fonde en partie sur les mêmes renseignements au sujet des requérants, la mvhc juge séparément les questions relatives au droit de conclure une conven- tion de location et de recevoir une aide au loyer. les locataires qui souhaitent solliciter une aide au loyer doivent remplir et présenter une demande d’aide. les personnes qui se voient offrir des logements locatifs ne sont pas tenues de demander une aide au loyer supplémentaire, et, même si elles le font et qu’elles respectent la condition d’admissibilité de base selon laquelle la valeur de leurs actifs ne doit pas excéder la « valeur maximale » fixée à 25 000 $, elles n’ont pas droit à une aide au loyer. [80] la nature discrétionnaire du programme d’aide au loyer est évidente à l’examen de la convention de location et de la demande d’aide. cette dernière ne fait pas partie de la convention de location, laquelle ne confère à sa aucun droit contractuel à cette aide au loyer supplémentaire. le fait pour une personne de remplir une demande en vue d’obtenir une telle aide ne garantit pas qu’elle l’obtiendra. la demande elle- même précise que [traduction] « la mvhc offre également aux locataires admissibles une aide au loyer supplémentaire, mais elle ne peut en garantir la prestation » (da, p 89). de plus, elle n’indique aucunement que toutes les demandes dûment rem- plies seront examinées et elle ne précise pas non plus comment la mvhc prendra en considération les ren- seignements fournis par les requérants au moment de déterminer si une aide au loyer sera accordée. [81] mvhc’s discretion in respect of its rental assistance program is limited only by its agreements with british columbia housing management com- mission (“bc housing”). the umbrella agreement provides that mvhc must offer rental assistance to a minimum of 15 percent of the units in each of mvhc’s housing projects, and to 37 percent of the units in mvhc’s entire portfolio (rr, at p 23). the umbrella agreement further requires that mvhc verify the asset and income information of individ- uals receiving assistance to ensure that they do not exceed the limits set by bc housing or mvhc. [81] le pouvoir discrétionnaire dont jouit la mvhc à l’égard de son programme d’aide au loyer n’est limité que par les accords qu’elle a conclus avec la british columbia housing management commission (« bc housing »). suivant l’accord- cadre, la mvhc doit offrir une aide au loyer à au moins 15 p. 100 des logements dans chacun de ses projets d’habita- tion et à au moins 37 p. 100 des logements faisant partie de l’ensemble de son portefeuille (di, p 23). l’accord- cadre exige également que la mvhc vérifie les renseignements relatifs aux actifs et au revenu des personnes qui reçoivent une aide afin de s’assurer [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp le juge rowe 141 mvhc is allowed to set its own asset policy as long as the asset limits it chooses do not exceed the limits set by bc housing (rr, at p 29). this has the effect of setting basic eligibility requirements for rental assistance. while bc housing could have insisted on further criteria or rules for the operation of the rental assistance program, the umbrella agreement is otherwise silent on how mvhc may exercise its discretion. for example, it does not outline factors that mvhc is precluded from taking into account when determining which eligible tenants will receive rental assistance. in this respect, the assistance application, [82] which asks for information about income and assets, is a document designed to assist mvhc in running its discretionary rental assistance program. it en- ables mvhc to collect information that is relevant to its determination of whether any applicant meets the basic eligibility requirements for its assistance scheme, something that it is required to collect per its agreement with bc housing. mvhc’s request of information relating specifically to income and assets does not bar it from taking other factors into consideration in deciding how to distribute rental assistance. at most, the terms of the application can be said to provide a means to determine which ap- plicants meet the $25,000 asset cut- off established by mvhc. the majority makes the fundamental error of conflating “eligibility” to be considered with “entitlement” to be awarded rental assistance. in so doing, it negates the discretionary nature of mvhc’s decision that it purports to acknowledge. que ces actifs et ce revenu n’excèdent pas les limites établies par la bc housing ou la mvhc. la mvhc est autorisée à établir sa propre politique en matière d’actifs dans la mesure où les limites d’actifs qu’elle choisit n’excèdent pas celles établies par la bc hous- ing (di, p 29). cela a pour effet d’établir certaines conditions de base pour avoir droit à une aide au loyer. la bc housing aurait pu insister sur d’autres critères ou règles pour l’application du programme d’aide au loyer, mais l’accord- cadre est par ailleurs silencieux sur la façon dont la mvhc peut exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire. à titre d’exemple, l’ac- cord en question n’énonce pas les facteurs dont la mvhc n’a pas le droit de tenir compte lorsqu’elle détermine quels locataires admissibles recevront une aide au loyer. [82] à cet égard, la demande d’aide, dans laquelle la mvhc sollicite des renseignements au sujet du revenu et des actifs, est un document visant à aider la mvhc à administrer son programme discrétion- naire d’aide au loyer. elle permet à cet organisme de recueillir des renseignements pertinents afin de déterminer si un requérant satisfait aux conditions d’admissibilité de base de son régime d’aide, rensei- gnements qu’il est tenu de recueillir conformément à l’accord qu’il a conclu avec la bc housing. le fait que la mvhc demande des renseignements portant précisément sur le revenu et les actifs ne l’empêche pas de prendre d’autres facteurs en considération pour décider comment distribuer l’aide au loyer. on peut dire tout plus que les modalités de la demande permettent de déterminer quels requérants respectent la condition établie par la mvhc en ce qui a trait à la valeur maximale des actifs qu’ils peuvent détenir, à savoir 25 000 $. les juges majoritaires commettent l’erreur fondamentale de confondre le droit à l’exa- men de sa demande d’aide au loyer avec le droit de se voir accorder une telle aide. ce faisant, ils nient la nature discrétionnaire de la décision de la mvhc qu’ils prétendent reconnaître. in this way, individuals who satisfy the ba- [83] sic eligibility requirements are tenants from among whom mvhc may choose to provide additional rental assistance. the tenancy agreement and assistance application are both silent as to how mvhc is to uti- lize its funds. simply put, the choice of who receives [83] ainsi, les personnes qui satisfont aux condi- tions d’admissibilité de base sont des locataires parmi lesquels la mvhc peut décider d’accorder une aide au loyer supplémentaire. la convention de location et la demande d’aide ne prévoient rien quant à la manière dont la mvhc doit utiliser ses fonds. en 142 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp rowe j. [2019] 1 scr. assistance is mvhc’s to make. indeed, within the bounds of applicable human rights legislation, it is open to mvhc to determine who will receive assis- tance in whichever way it chooses, so long as at least 15 percent of the tenants in a given project receive as- sistance, and all tenants receiving assistance meet the basic eligibility requirements set out by bc housing. in short, not being limited by contractual obligations to applicants, mvhc can proceed as it sees fit. termes simples, c’est à cet organisme de déterminer quels locataires se verront accorder une aide. en fait, dans les limites des dispositions sur les droits de la personne applicables, il est loisible à la mvhc d’établir comme elle l’entend qui recevra une aide au loyer, dans la mesure où au moins 15 p. 100 des locataires dans un projet donné reçoivent une aide et où tous les locataires recevant une aide satisfont aux conditions d’admissibilité de base établies par la bc housing. en somme, n’étant pas assujettie à des obligations contractuelles envers les requérants, la mvhc peut procéder comme elle le juge indiqué. [84] the rental assistance agreement marks the conclusion of this discretionary process mvhc only enters into an agreement with tenants in re- lation to its rental assistance program once it has determined that it will provide assistance to them. no contractual obligations in respect of the rental assistance application or agreement exist prior to this conclusion. [84] l’entente d’aide au loyer marque la conclu- sion de ce processus discrétionnaire. la mvhc ne conclut avec ses locataires une entente en ce qui a trait à son programme d’aide au loyer qu’une fois qu’elle a décidé de leur accorder une telle aide. avant cette décision, il n’existe aucune obligation contrac- tuelle relativement à la demande ou à l’entente d’aide au loyer. a there is no contractual obligation to consider a il n’existe aucune obligation contractuelle d’exa­ sa’s. assistance application miner la demande d’aide de sa. [85] my colleagues concede that sa does not have a contractual entitlement to receive rental as- sistance, but they take the view that mvhc has an obligation to consider sa’s. assistance application, and to do so without reference to her trust. they go on to say that if sa’s assets are less than $25,000 then a court can order that she be compensated for rental assistance that, in their view, she ought to have received. the rationale for this seems to be that it is open to a court to make determinations about how mvhc’s discretion should have been exercised and that this is to be arrived at via the assistance application (majority reasons, at para 33). i note that the majority expresses the point differently. in their view, a court would not decide what mvhc should have done, but what mvhc would have done. i fail to see a meaningful difference in the circum- stances. even in conjunction with evidence about other applicants, the direction that an application is to be considered “in accordance with the terms of the assistance application” does not reveal what mvhc would have done. if one accepts, as i do, that mvhc is not limited to consideration of the [85] mes collègues concèdent que sa ne dispose pas du droit contractuel de recevoir une aide au loyer, mais ils estiment que la mvhc a l’obligation d’examiner la demande d’aide de sa et qu’elle doit le faire sans tenir compte de sa fiducie. ils ajoutent que, si la valeur des actifs de sa est inférieure à 25 000 $, un tribunal peut alors ordonner que celle-ci soit indemnisée en ce qui a trait à l’aide au loyer qu’elle aurait dû, à leur avis, recevoir. le raisonne- ment à cet égard semble être qu’il est loisible au tri- bunal de se prononcer sur la manière dont le pouvoir discrétionnaire de la mvhc aurait dû être exercé et qu’il doit le faire au moyen de la demande d’aide (motifs des juges majoritaires, par 33). je constate que les juges majoritaires expriment l’idée diffé- remment. à leur avis, un tribunal ne se prononce pas sur ce que la mvhc aurait dû faire, mais sur ce qu’elle aurait fait. je ne vois aucune différence importante dans les circonstances. même conjoin- tement avec une preuve portant sur d’autres requé- rants, la directive selon laquelle une demande doit être examinée « conformément aux modalités de la demande d’aide » n’indique pas ce que la mvhc [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp le juge rowe 143 information provided in the assistance application or by the manner it distributed assistance in the past, then any compensatory order effectively imposes a court’s view of how its mandate ought to be pursued. [86] my colleagues rely on clauses 5(a) and 2(a)(xii) of the tenancy agreement to support the proposition that mvhc had a contractual obligation to consider whether to adjust sa’s rent in accordance with the assistance application. clause 5(a) of the tenancy agreement sets out the way in which the tenant’s rent will be calculated: a unit rent amount “less the decrease in rent determined in accordance with the tenant’s current income and the terms of a rental assistance [a]greement” (ar, at p 80) “unit rent” is defined as “the monthly rent for the rental unit before any increase or decrease in rent determined in accordance with the tenant’s income and the terms of a rental assistance [a]greement” (clause 2(a)(xii); ar, at p 80). although these clauses contemplate the possibility of a tenant receiving additional rental assistance, respectfully, i do not see how the fore- going provisions impose on mvhc an obligation to consider whether a tenant should receive rental assistance. that a decrease in rent may occur does not mean that mvhc has an obligation to consider whether for any tenant, it will occur. at most the tenancy agreement states that where individuals have entered into a rental assistance agreement with mvhc — that is, have been selected for receipt of rental assistance — mvhc has a responsibility to adjust their rent in accordance with that agreement. aurait fait. si l’on accepte, tout comme moi, que la mvhc n’est pas tenue de prendre uniquement en considération les renseignements fournis dans la demande d’aide ou de s’en tenir à la manière dont elle a distribué cette aide dans le passé, toute ordon- nance compensatoire impose alors effectivement le point de vue d’un tribunal sur la manière dont cet organisme devrait accomplir son mandat. [86] mes collègues se fondent sur les cl. 5(a) et 2(a)(xii) de la convention de location pour étayer la thèse selon laquelle la mvhc avait l’obligation contractuelle de se demander s’il y avait lieu de ra- juster le loyer de sa en conformité avec la demande d’aide. la clause 5(a) de la convention de location énonce la façon dont sera calculé le loyer du loca- taire : un montant de loyer unitaire [traduction] « moins une réduction de loyer déterminée en fonc- tion du revenu actuel du locataire et conformément aux modalités d’une entente d’aide au loyer » (da, p 80). le terme « loyer unitaire » est défini comme le « loyer mensuel pour le logement locatif avant toute augmentation ou réduction de loyer détermi- née en fonction du revenu du locataire et conformé- ment aux modalités d’une entente d’aide au loyer » (cl. 2(a)(xii); da, p 80). bien qu’elles envisagent la possibilité que le locataire reçoive une aide au loyer supplémentaire, je ne vois pas, soit dit en tout respect, de quelle manière ces clauses peuvent obli- ger la mvhc à se demander si un locataire devrait recevoir une aide au loyer. qu’il puisse y avoir une réduction de loyer ne signifie pas que la mvhc a l’obligation de se demander s’il y en aura une pour tout locataire. la convention de location indique tout au plus que, lorsque des personnes ont conclu une entente d’aide au loyer avec la mvhc — soit celles ayant été sélectionnées en vue de l’octroi d’une aide au loyer —, la mvhc a la responsabilité de rajuster leur loyer en conformité avec cette entente. [87] building on their finding that sa is entitled to have her application considered, the majority goes on to conclude that this implies a specific framework binding on mvhc for the exercise of its discretion in deciding whether to grant rental assistance. in their view, mvhc is limited to consideration of the information collected in the assistance application. the result seems to be that if sa meets the basic [87] se fondant sur leur conclusion selon laquelle sa a droit de faire examiner sa demande, les juges majoritaires concluent ensuite que cela signifie que la mvhc est tenue d’appliquer un cadre particulier lorsqu’elle exerce son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour décider s’il y a lieu d’accorder une aide au loyer. à leur avis, la mvhc doit prendre uniquement en considération les renseignements recueillis dans la 144 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp rowe j. [2019] 1 scr. eligibility criteria then, unless mvhc can demon- strate to a court’s satisfaction why sa should not have received assistance, she should be granted it, as she received rental assistance in the past. but is it not for mvhc to set its own priorities in distributing rental assistance? on what basis would a court sub- stitute its view for that of a private entity exercising its discretion? it seems to me that mvhc, within the bounds of its agreements with bc housing and applicable human rights legislation, is free to pursue its mandate as it sees fit. [88] this highlights a further problem with grant- ing declaratory relief in the circumstances. this is that contrary to the suggestion of the majority, a dec- laration as to the meaning of the word “asset” does not settle the “live controversy” between the parties (majority reasons, at para 61). while the parties have disagreed about the meaning of the word “as- set” throughout these proceedings, resolution of this point does not settle the matter of sa’s entitlement to rental assistance, the reason for which declaratory relief is sought by sa and seemingly granted by the majority. this is because it is not for the courts to decide how mvhc utilizes its resources. a declara- tion as to the meaning of the word “asset” only settles the live issue between the parties if one also accepts that, in addition to having a contractual obligation to consider completed applications, mvhc is bound to a particular framework for the determination of who is to receive rental assistance. for the reasons i have set out above, i differ from the majority on the contractual obligation issue. demande d’aide. il semble en résulter que, si elle sa- tisfait aux critères d’admissibilité de base et à moins que la mvhc ne puisse démontrer à la satisfaction d’un tribunal pourquoi elle ne devait pas recevoir une aide au loyer, sa devrait se voir accorder une telle aide, car elle en a reçu une dans le passé. cependant, n’appartient-il pas à la mvhc d’établir ses propres priorités en ce qui a trait à la distribution de l’aide au loyer? sur quelle base un tribunal pourrait-il substi- tuer son point de vue à celui d’une entité privée qui exerce son pouvoir discrétionnaire? il me semble que la mvhc, dans les limites des accords qu’elle a conclus avec la bc housing et des dispositions sur les droits de la personne applicables, est libre d’accomplir son mandat comme elle le juge indiqué. [88] l’octroi d’un jugement déclaratoire dans les circonstances pose donc un autre problème. en effet, contrairement à ce qu’affirment les juges majori- taires, un jugement déclaratoire quant au sens du terme « actif » ne règle pas le « litige actuel » entre les parties (motifs des juges majoritaires, par 61). bien que les parties ne se soient pas entendues sur le sens à donner au terme « actif » tout au long de la présente procédure, la résolution de cette question ne règle pas celle du droit de sa à une aide au loyer, la raison pour laquelle un jugement déclaratoire est demandé par celle-ci et est apparemment accordé par les juges majoritaires. il en est ainsi parce qu’il n’appartient pas aux tribunaux de décider comment la mvhc utilise ses ressources. un jugement décla- ratoire sur le sens à donner au terme « actif » ne règle le litige actuel entre les parties que si l’on accepte également qu’en plus d’avoir une obligation contrac- tuelle d’examiner les demandes dûment remplies, la mvhc est tenue d’appliquer un cadre particulier pour décider qui doit recevoir une aide au loyer. pour les motifs que j’ai exposés précédemment, je ne partage pas l’opinion de mes collègues majoritaires sur la question de l’obligation contractuelle. [89] the situation would be different if mvhc had agreed to provide sa with rental assistance for a given year. if upon learning of her trust, mvhc sought to terminate its agreement with sa and cease providing rental assistance to her for that term on the basis that she no longer met the basic eligibility re- quirements, the definition of “asset” would settle the [89] la situation serait différente si la mvhc avait accepté d’accorder une aide au loyer à sa pour une année donnée. si, en apprenant l’existence de la fiducie de sa, la mvhc avait cherché à mettre fin à son entente avec celle-ci et à cesser de lui accorder une aide au loyer pour cette période au motif qu’elle ne satisfaisait plus aux conditions d’admissibilité [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp le juge rowe 145 matter. in that case, a declaration would relate to the meaning of a term in a contractual agreement, namely the rental assistance agreement. the facts here are, of course, different, as no such agreement exists. de base, la définition du terme « actif » règlerait l’affaire. dans un tel cas, un jugement déclaratoire porterait sur la signification d’un terme contenu dans une entente contractuelle, à savoir l’entente d’aide au loyer. les faits en l’espèce sont, bien entendu, différents, car une telle entente n’existe pas. [90] for any tenant who has merely applied for rental assistance, there is no rental assistance agree- ment, and therefore no contract, until it has been determined that they will in fact receive rental assis- tance. the fact that the tenancy agreement refers to the rental assistance agreement does not thereby incorporate into the tenancy agreement a particular way that applications for rental assistance are to be considered, or that they must be considered at all. in the absence of any contractual entitlement for tenants to receive rental assistance or any obligation (arising from, for example legislative direction) for mvhc to “determine whether sa would receive a rent sub- sidy in accordance with the terms of the assistance application” (majority reasons, at para. 59), there is no basis to grant the relief that sa seeks. [90] dans le cas d’un locataire qui a simplement présenté une demande d’aide au loyer, il n’y a pas d’entente d’aide au loyer et par conséquent aucun contrat, et ce, jusqu’à ce qu’il soit établi qu’il recevra effectivement une telle aide. le fait que la conven- tion de location renvoie à l’entente d’aide au loyer n’incorpore pas pour autant une façon particulière ou l’obligation même d’examiner les demandes d’aide au loyer. en l’absence de tout droit contractuel des locataires de recevoir une aide au loyer ou de toute obligation (découlant par exemple d’une directive législative) de la mvhc de « considérer si sa. devait recevoir une aide au loyer conformément aux modalités de la demande d’aide » (motifs des juges majoritaires, par. 59), rien ne permet d’accorder la réparation demandée par sa. b is mvhc entitled to declaratory relief? b la mvhc a­t­elle droit au jugement déclaratoire? [91] with the foregoing in mind, i turn to the ques- tion of whether mvhc is entitled to the declaratory relief that it was granted in the courts below. if the decision by mvhc of whether to provide rental assistance is not justiciable, then neither sa nor mvhc can receive declaratory relief concerning that decision. [91] compte tenu de ce qui précède, je me penche maintenant sur la question de savoir si la mvhc a droit au jugement déclaratoire qui lui a été accordé par les juridictions inférieures. si la décision de la mvhc d’accorder ou non une aide au loyer n’est pas justiciable, ni sa ni la mvhc ne peuvent alors obtenir un jugement déclaratoire en ce qui a trait à cette décision. [92] again, any declaratory relief must be anchored in an applicant’s legal entitlements. initially, mvhc sought declaratory relief on the basis that it was en- titled to consider information about sa’s. trust as part of its discretionary application process. i note that the chambers judge granted the declaratory re- lief sought by mvhc in part on the basis that the additional rental assistance application was within the agreement between the parties (paras. 35 and 57). however, absent a finding that the assistance application process and obligations pursuant to it are part of an agreement, i fail to see such an anchor. just as sa does not have a right for her application [92] répétons-le, tout jugement déclaratoire doit être fondé sur les droits du demandeur. au départ, la mvhc a sollicité un tel jugement au motif qu’elle avait le droit de prendre en considération des rensei- gnements relatifs à la fiducie de sa dans le cadre de son processus discrétionnaire de traitement des demandes. je souligne que le juge en chambre a ac- cordé le jugement déclaratoire demandé par la mvhc notamment parce que la demande d’aide au loyer sup- plémentaire faisait partie de l’entente entre les parties (par. 35 et 57). cependant, en l’absence d’une conclu- sion selon laquelle le processus de traitement des de- mandes d’aide et les obligations qui en découlent font 146 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp rowe j. [2019] 1 scr. to be considered, mvhc does not have a right to compel sa to apply for rental assistance, nor a right to receive any information from sa that will help it determine whether, in its view, she should receive any assistance. the circumstances preclude declaratory relief for both sa and mvhc. [93] there are potential implications of the ma- jority’s rationale that extend beyond the facts of this case. on the basis of what seems to be an implied contractual entitlement to have one’s application considered — an entitlement which i do not find to exist — the majority opens the door for another court to make an award to sa if that court is of the view that mvhc ought to have exercised its discretion in a particular fashion. it seems to me that this has far- reaching implications. in the future, if a claimant persuades a court, first, that a charitable or other voluntary organization has set criteria and called for applications, would this imply that the organization has an obligation to consider the applications in ac- cordance with the criteria? and, second, if the claim- ant’s application meets the criteria, then might not a court order the organization to provide the benefit or fund the proposed project that was the subject of the application? a fortiori, might not a court do so if the claimant shows there was some “unfairness” on the part of the organization in the application of its criteria? to grant relief in such circumstances, in- cluding declaratory relief, would expand the bound- aries of what is justiciable to include discretionary decisions taken by charitable and other voluntary organizations, which would be unwise. i know of no basis in law to do so. partie d’une entente, je ne puis voir un tel fondement. tout comme sa ne dispose pas du droit à l’examen de sa demande, la mvhc n’a pas le droit d’obliger sa à solliciter une aide au loyer ni le droit de recevoir de sa tout renseignement qui l’aidera à déterminer si, à son avis, celle-ci devrait recevoir une aide. les circonstances empêchent l’octroi d’un jugement dé- claratoire tant à sa qu’à la mvhc. [93] le raisonnement des juges majoritaires peut avoir des répercussions qui débordent les faits de l’es- pèce. sur le fondement de ce qui semble être le droit contractuel implicite d’une personne à l’examen de sa demande — droit qui, à mon avis, n’existe pas —, les juges majoritaires ouvrent la porte à la possibilité qu’un autre tribunal accorde des dommages- intérêts à sa. s’il estime que la mvhc aurait dû exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire d’une manière particulière. cela me semble avoir des répercussions d’une grande portée. à l’avenir, premièrement, si un demandeur convainc le tribunal qu’un organisme de bienfaisance ou autre or- ganisme bénévole a fixé des critères et invité les gens à présenter des demandes, cela tendra-t-il à indiquer que l’organisme a l’obligation d’examiner les demandes en conformité avec les critères en question et, deuxiè- mement, si la demande du demandeur répond à ces critères, le tribunal ne pourra-t-il pas alors ordonner à l’organisme d’accorder la prestation demandée ou de financer le projet proposé visé par la demande? le tribunal ne pourra-t-il pas à plus forte raison le faire si le demandeur démontre que l’organisme a fait preuve d’une certaine « injustice » dans l’application de ses critères? accorder une réparation en pareilles circonstances, y compris un jugement déclaratoire, étendrait les limites de ce qui est justiciable de manière à englober les décisions discrétionnaires prises par des organismes de bienfaisance et autres organismes bénévoles, ce qui serait malavisé. à ma connaissance, aucun principe de droit ne permet de le faire. iii conclusion iii conclusion in conclusion, i would allow the appeal in part [94] and would set aside the declaratory relief granted to mvhc by the british columbia court of appeal. i would decline to grant the other relief sought by sa. i would make no order as to costs. [94] en conclusion, j’accueillerais le pourvoi en partie et j’annulerais les jugements déclaratoires accordés à la mvhc par la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique. je m’abstiendrais d’accor- der les autres réparations sollicitées par sa. je ne rendrais aucune ordonnance concernant les dépens. [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp. 147 appendix annexe [traduction] on the application of the plaintiff, [sa], and on hearing counsel for the plaintiff, lauren blake- borrell, and on reading the materials filed; à la suite de la demande présentée par la de- manderesse, [sa], après avoir entendu les observations de l’avocate de la demanderesse, lauren blake- borrell, et après avoir examiné les documents déposés; this court orders that: la cour ordonne que : 1 the share of the deceased’s estate left to the plaintiff be placed in a discretionary trust, and in particular, an order that paragraphs 3(a) and 3(d) of the last will and testament of [ja], signed may 11, 2004 and admitted to probate by this court on october 18, 2010 be varied as follows: 1 la part de la succession du défunt léguée à la deman- deresse soit placée dans une fiducie discrétionnaire, et plus particulièrement que les paragraphes 3(a) et 3(d) du testament de [ja], signé le 11 mai 2004 et homo- logué par la cour le 18 octobre 2010, soient modifiés comme suit : paragraph 3(a) paragraphe 3(a) “[sa]’s. discretionary trust” « fiducie discrétionnaire de [sa] » (a) if my daughter [sa] survives me: (a) si ma fille [sa] me survit : (i) (ii) i appoint [sa] and my daughter [jw] as the trustees (the “[sa]. discretionary fund trustees”) of [sa]’s. discretionary fund (as defined below); if [jw] is unwilling or unable to act or con- tinue to act as a [sa]. discretionary fund trustee, i appoint such person or corporate trustee as [sa], in writing, appoints to fill the vacancy in the office of [sa]. discre- tionary fund trustee; (iii) any reference to “[sa]. discretionary fund trustee” or “[sa]. discretionary fund trus- tees” includes all genders and the singular or the plural as the context requires; (i) (ii) je désigne [sa] et ma fille [jw] à titre de fiduciaires (les «  fiduciaires du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] ») du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] (défini ci- après); si [jw] refuse ou qu’elle n’est pas en me- sure d’agir ou de continuer d’agir en qua- lité de fiduciaire du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa], je nomme la personne ou le fiduciaire constitué en société que dési- gnera [sa], par écrit, en vue de combler la vacance au poste de fiduciaire du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa]; (iii) toute mention du « fiduciaire du fonds dis- crétionnaire destiné à [sa] » ou des « fi- duciaires du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] » comprend tous les genres ainsi que le singulier ou le pluriel, selon ce qu’exige le contexte; (iv) i direct my trustee to transfer the balance (the “[sa]. discretionary fund”) of my bank ac- count, #xxxx- xxx at bank of montreal, 4395 dunbar street, vancouver, b.c to the [sa]. discretionary fund trustees to (iv) je donne instruction à mon fiduciaire de trans- férer le solde (le « fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] ») de mon compte bancaire, numéro xxxx- xxx, à la banque de mont réal, au 4395, rue dunbar, vancouver, c-b, aux 148 s.a v metro vancouver housing corp. [2019] 1 scr. be held by the [sa]. discretionary fund trustees as follows: fiduciaires du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] qui en disposeront de la façon suivante : a pay so much of the income and capital of [sa]’s. discretionary fund as the [sa]. discretionary fund trustees decide is necessary or advisable for the care, main- tenance, education, or benefit of [sa];. b add any income not paid in any year to the capital of [sa]’s. discretionary fund; c on the date (the “material date”) of [sa]’s death, give what remains of [sa]’s. dis- cretionary fund to the person or persons in such proportions, on such trusts, and sub- ject to such terms and conditions as [sa] may by [sa]’s. will appoint, provided that the power of appointment may not be exercised by [sa] in favour of [sa] or [sa]’s creditors; d if the power of appointment in para- graph 3(a)(iv)c has not been exercised before the material date or to the extent that the power of appointment does not extend or take effect, the [sa]. discre- tionary fund trustees will pay the [sa]. discretionary fund (or that part of the [sa]. discretionary fund to which the power of appointment does not extend or take effect) among those persons who would have inherited [sa]’s estate if [sa] had died leaving only the [sa]. discretionary fund (or that part of the [sa]. discretionary fund to which the power of appointment does not extend or take effect) in her estate, and leaving no creditors, except under no circumstances shall the [sa]. discretionary fund be considered to form part of [sa]’s estate; e the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 in- clusive of this will, included the powers given to my trustee in those provisions, apply to the administration by the [sa]. discretionary fund trustees of [sa]’s. discretionary fund and when being ap- plied, references in those paragraphs to “my estate” and “my trustee” will be a en consacrant la partie du revenu et du capi- tal du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] que les fiduciaires du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] estiment nécessaire ou opportune, aux soins, à la subsistance, à l’éducation ou au bénéfice de [sa];. b en ajoutant au capital du fonds discré- tionnaire destiné à [sa] tout revenu non versé au cours d’une année donnée; c en transférant, à la date du décès de [sa] (la « date pertinente »), le solde du fonds dis- crétionnaire destiné à [sa] à la personne ou aux personnes désignées dans le testament de [sa], selon les proportions et dans les fi- ducies qui y sont indiquées, et selon les mo- dalités du testament, pourvu que le pouvoir de désignation ne soit pas exercé par [sa] en sa faveur ou en faveur de ses créanciers; d si le pouvoir de désignation prévu au para- graphe 3(a)(iv)(c) n’est pas exercé avant la date pertinente, ou dans la mesure où ce pouvoir ne s’applique pas ou ne prend pas effet, les fiduciaires du fonds discré- tionnaire destiné à [sa] verseront ledit fonds (ou la partie dudit fonds à l’égard de laquelle le pouvoir de désignation ne s’ap- plique pas ou ne prend pas effet) aux per- sonnes qui auraient hérité de [sa] si, à son décès, son patrimoine n’avait été consti- tué que du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] (ou de la partie de ce fonds à l’égard de laquelle le pouvoir de désignation ne s’applique pas ou ne prend pas effet) et qu’il n’y avait aucun créancier, étant entendu que le fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] ne sera en aucun cas considéré comme faisant partie de la succession de [sa];. e les paragraphes 4 et 5 du présent testament, y compris les pouvoirs qu’ils confèrent à mon fiduciaire, s’appliquent à la gestion du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] par les fiduciaires dudit fonds, et, lorsqu’ils sont appliqués, les termes « ma succes- sion » et « mon fiduciaire » qui y figurent s’entendent du fonds discrétionnaire [2019] 1 rcs. s.a c metro vancouver housing corp. 149 read as being to [sa]’s. discretionary fund and the [sa]. discretionary fund trustees respectively;” destiné à [sa] et des fiduciaires du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa], respecti- vement; » paragraph 3(d) paragraphe 3(d) “(d) to divide the residue of my estate into three (3) equal shares, one share for each of my children, [sa], [ma] and [jw], and i direct my trustee to transfer the share for [sa] to the [sa]. dis- cretionary fund trustees to be added to [sa]’s. discretionary fund and dealt with as part of it;” « (d) diviser le reliquat de ma succession en trois (3) parts égales entre mes trois enfants, [sa], [ma] et [jw]; je donne instruction à mon fiduciaire de transférer la part de [sa] aux fiduciaires du fonds discrétionnaire destiné à [sa] pour que celle-ci soit ajoutée au fonds discrétionnaire des- tiné à [sa] et gérée comme en faisant partie; » 2 the plaintiff’s special costs of this application be paid from her share of the estate of [ja] 2 les dépens spéciaux de la demanderesse relatifs à la présente demande soient payés sur sa part de la suc- cession de [ja]. appeal allowed, brown and rowe jj. dissenting pourvoi accueilli, les juges brown et rowe sont in part. dissidents en partie. procureurs de l’appelante : mccarthy tétrault, vancouver. vancouver. procureurs de l’intimée : alexander holburn beau­ beaudin & lang, vancouver. din & lang, vancouver. of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. procureurs de l’intervenant le procureur général de la colombie­ britannique : procureur général de la colombie­ britannique, victoria. tion for community living and people first of can­ ada: pooranlaw professional corporation, toronto. procureurs des intervenants l’association cana­ dienne pour l’intégration communautaire et per son­ nes d’abord du canada : pooranlaw professional corporation, toronto. with disabilities:  arch disability law centre, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant le conseil des ca­ na diens avec déficiences : arch disability law centre, toronto. solicitors for the interveners income security advocacy centre and hiv & aids legal clinic ontario: borden ladner gervais, toronto; hiv & aids legal clinic ontario, toronto; income security advocacy center, toronto. procureurs des intervenants le centre d’action pour la sécurité du revenu et hiv & aids legal clinic ontario : borden ladner gervais, toronto; hiv & aids legal clinic ontario, toronto; income security advocacy center, toronto. bc society:  clark wilson, vancouver; conway, baxter, wilson, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenante disability alliance bc society  :  clark wilson, vancouver; conway, baxter, wilson, ottawa.
i. overview [1] this appeal requires this court to decide whether s 12 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms protects corporations from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. like our colleagues, we conclude that it does not, because corporations lie beyond s 12’s protective scope. simply put, the text “cruel and unusual” denotes protection that “only human beings can enjoy”: irwin toy ltd v quebec (attorney general), [1989] 1 scr 927, at p 1004. the protective scope of s 12 is thus limited to human beings. [2] this court’s jurisprudence on s 12, in both its french and english versions, is marked by the concept of human dignity, as our colleagues have noted. and the existence of human beings behind the corporate veil is insufficient to ground a s 12 claim of right on behalf of a corporate entity, in light of the corporation’s separate legal personality. like our colleagues, and contrary to the majority at the court of appeal, we therefore reject the proposition that the effect of a corporation’s bankruptcy on its stakeholders should be considered in determining the scope of s 12. [3] despite our agreement in the result, we find it necessary to write separately in order to assert the proper place in constitutional interpretation of foreign and international sources such as those upon which our colleague abella j relies in her analysis. if these sources are to be accorded a persuasive character, it must be done by way of a coherent and consistent methodology. coherence and consistency in a court’s reasons are important, because they are critical means by which it may account to the public for the manner in which it exercises its powers. this is particularly so on a matter so fundamental as constitutional interpretation. as professor stéphane beaulac notes, a consistently defined methodology of interpretation is a means of promoting the rule of law, notably through legal predictability: “‘texture ouverte’, droit international et interprétation de la charte canadienne” (2013), 61 sclr (2d) 191, at pp. 192-93. [4] we also make a preliminary and more general point on constitutional interpretation. our colleague abella j applies the primacy of constitutional text and considerations of purpose in accordance with the purposive approach adopted in r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at p 344, recently affirmed in r v. poulin, 2019 scc 47, at para. 32. in doing so, however, she makes several remarks which risk minimizing the primordial significance assigned by this court’s jurisprudence to constitutional text in undertaking purposive interpretation. [5] having regard to the decision under appeal, that of the quebec court of appeal, we find justice chamberland’s dissenting reasons difficult to improve upon. his analysis belies any perceived need to dispose of this matter by referring extensively to international and comparative law and his textual analysis ⸺ notably on the meaning of “cruel” ⸺ is compelling as he put it, [translation] “[i]t would completely distort the ordinary meaning of the words . . . to say that it is possible to be cruel to a corporate entity”: 2019 qcca 373, at para. 53 (canlii). his discussion of the other big m drug mart factors was also in keeping with this court’s direction on the proper methodology of charter interpretation. ii analysis [6] a summary of relevant facts and judicial history is found in the reasons of abella j., and we are content to rely on it. [7] to claim protection under the charter, a corporation ⸺ indeed, any claimant ⸺ must establish that “it has an interest falling within the scope of the guarantee, and one which accords with the purpose of that provision”: r v. cip inc., [1992] 1 scr 843, at p 852. in order to make that determination, the court must seek to discern the scope and purpose of the right by way of a purposive interpretation, that is, “by reference to the character and the larger objects of the charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the charter”: big m drug mart, at p 344; see also poulin, at para. 32. the approach is “generous, purposive and contextual” and should be done in a “large and liberal manner”: r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr 353, at para. 15; caron v. alberta, 2015 scc 56, [2015] 3 scr 511, at para. 35. a preliminary observations on purposive interpretation [8] this court has consistently emphasized that, within the purposive approach, the analysis must begin by considering the text of the provision. as this court made clear in british columbia (attorney general) v canada (attorney general), [1994] 2 scr 41 (“vancouver island railway”), “[a]lthough constitutional terms must be capable of growth, constitutional interpretation must nonetheless begin with the language of the constitutional law or provision in question”: p 88 this was reiterated in grant, where the court stated that “[a]s for any constitutional provision, the starting point must be the language of the section”: para. 15 (emphasis added). recently, in poulin, the court yet again affirmed that the first step to interpreting a charter right is to analyze the text of the provision: para. 64. [9] this is so because constitutional interpretation, being the interpretation of the text of the constitution, must first and foremost have reference to, and be constrained by, that text. indeed, while constitutional norms are deliberately expressed in general terms, the words used remain “the most primal constraint on judicial review” and form “the outer bounds of a purposive inquiry”: b. j. oliphant, “taking purposes seriously: the purposive scope and textual bounds of interpretation under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms” (2015), 65 utlj 239, at p 243. the constitution is not “an empty vessel to be filled with whatever meaning we might wish from time to time”: reference re public service employee relations act (alta.), [1987] 1 scr. 313 (“re psera”), at p 394; caron, at para. 36. significantly, in caron, the court reiterated this latter passage and reasserted “the primacy of the written text of the constitution”: para. 36; see also para. 37. [10] moreover, while charter rights are to be given a purposive interpretation, such interpretation must not overshoot (or, for that matter, undershoot) the actual purpose of the right: poulin, at paras. 53 and 55; r v stillman, 2019 scc 40, at paras. 21 and 126; r v. blais, 2003 scc 44, [2003] 2 scr 236, at paras. 17-18 and 40; big m drug mart, at p 344. giving primacy to the text — that is, respecting its established significance as the first factor to consider within the purposive approach — prevents such overshooting. [11] while acknowledging, at para. 71, that language is part of the analysis, and that “the text of the charter matters”, our colleague abella j stresses the direction in hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145 that the task of interpreting a constitution is fundamentally different from interpreting a statute, and that courts ought “not to read the provisions of the constitution like a last will and testament lest it become one”: p 155. this felicitous phrase cannot, however, be taken as minimizing the primordial significance of constitutional text as it has since, and repeatedly, been recognized in this court’s jurisprudence: see, eg,. caron, at para. 36; vancouver island railway, at p 88. it is not the sole consideration, but treating it as the first indicator of purpose is not in the least inconsistent with the principles of charter interpretation; it is in fact constitutive of them. [12] we pause here to emphasize that recognizing the importance of the text in interpreting a charter right purposively does not translate into advocating for what our colleague abella j calls a “[p]urely textual interpretation” of the constitution: para. 76, quoting a. barak, “a judge on judging: the role of a supreme court in a democracy” (2002), 116 harv. l. rev. 19, at p 83. the notion of “textualism” to which she looks for support diverges substantially from the idea — embodied in our jurisprudence and in our reasons — that the purposive inquiry must begin by examining the text for instance, the “new textualism” denounced by aharon barak is a “system [which] holds that the constitution and every statute should be understood according to the reading of a reasonable reader at the time of enactment” and in which “[r]eference to the history of the text’s creation . . . is not allowed”: pp. 82-83. similarly, the kind of interpretation lorne neudorf characterizes as “a purely textual reading” is one where the analysis is strictly restricted to the text of the constitution: “reassessing the constitutional foundation of delegated legislation in canada” (2018), 41 dal. lj 519, at p 544. these conceptions of constitutional interpretation are not remotely consistent with that which we apply and which our law demands. [13] moreover, our colleague abella j draws a false dichotomy between the purposive approach and beginning that analysis with the text of the provision. indeed, beginning with the text is precisely what the precedents of this court direct us to do. her assertion that “considering the text as prime [is] unhelpful in interpreting constitutional guarantees” (at para. 75) discards these precedents and the role they have assigned to the text in delimiting an analysis which, we repeat, must also be conducted by reference to the historical context, the larger objects of the charter, and, where applicable, the meaning and purpose of associated charter rights. [14] returning to the case at bar, the text of s 12, particularly the inclusion of “cruel”, strongly suggests that the provision is limited to human beings justice chamberland quite rightly emphasized that the ordinary meaning of the word “cruel” does not permit its application to inanimate objects or legal entities such as corporations. as he explained, [translation] “[o]ne would not say, it seems to me, that a group of workers who demolish a building using explosives (rather than going about it more gradually, brick by brick, plank by plank) are being cruel to the building. nor would one say that a group of consumers who boycott a business’s products, creating a real risk that it will be driven into bankruptcy, are being cruel to the company that owns the business”: para. 56, fn. 32. we therefore agree with justice chamberland (at paras. 51-56), as with our colleague (abella j.’s reasons, at para. 86), that the words “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment” refer to human pain and suffering, both physical and mental. [15] we note that, in refusing to apply s 7 of the charter to corporations in irwin toy, dickson c.j and lamer and wilson jj reasoned in a similar manner, observing that the text of the provision did not permit corporations to be included within its protective scope: in our opinion, a corporation cannot avail itself of the protection offered by s 7 of the charter. first, we would have to conceive of a manner in which a corporation could be deprived of its “life, liberty or security of the person” we have already noted that it is nonsensical to speak of a corporation being put in jail to say that bankruptcy and winding up proceedings engage s 7 would stretch the meaning of the right to life beyond recognition. . . . a plain, common sense reading of the phrase “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person” serves to underline the human element involved; only human beings can enjoy these rights. “everyone” then, must be read in light of the rest of the section and defined to exclude corporations and other artificial entities incapable of enjoying life, liberty or security of the person, and include only human beings [emphasis added; pp. 1002-4.] [16] relatedly, we also largely agree with our colleague abella j.’s analysis of s 12’s historical origins, subject to our discussion below on the proper role of international and comparative law in the analysis. we would add that an examination of s 12’s historical origins shows that the charter took a different path from its predecessors. following an early, related protection in magna carta (1215), article 10 of the english bill of rights, 1688, 1 will. & mar. sess. 2, c 2 provided that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted using almost identical text, the eighth amendment of the constitution of the united states provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”. in canada, however, the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause was carved off from the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and placed in s 11(e) of the charter. even more significantly, the protection against “excessive fines” was not retained at all, neither in the charter nor in the canadian bill of rights, sc 1960, c 44, as noted by justice chamberland: para. 66. [17] the protection against cruel and unusual punishment under s 12 of the charter therefore exists as a standalone guarantee viewed in light of the historical background noted above, this is highly significant, if not determinative: excessive fines (which a corporation can sustain), without more, are not unconstitutional. for a fine to be unconstitutional, it must be “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency” and “abhorrent or intolerable” to society: r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr. 599, at paras. 45 and 94. this threshold is, in accordance with the purpose of s 12, inextricably anchored in human dignity. it is a constitutional standard that cannot apply to treatments or punishments imposed on corporations. [18] finally, we agree with our colleague’s discussion of related charter rights. b. the proper role of international and comparative law in charter interpretation [19] we differ fundamentally from our colleague abella j on the prominence she gives to international and comparative law in the interpretive process. we see this as a significant and unwarranted departure from this court’s jurisprudence. specifically, her claim that all international and comparative sources have been “indispensable” to canadian constitutional interpretation (at para. 100) does not hold true when considering this court’s jurisprudence and the varying role and weight it has assigned to different kinds of instruments. [20] as a constitutional document that was “made in canada” (prime minister pierre elliot trudeau, federal-provincial conference of first ministers on the constitution (morning session of november 2, 1981), at p 10), the charter and its provisions are primarily interpreted with regards to canadian law and history. [21] this remains unchanged by the purposive approach developed in big m drug mart. that judgment makes no reference to international and comparative law, except inasmuch as it relates to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined in the charter. [22] while this court has generally accepted that international norms can be considered when interpreting domestic norms, they have typically played a limited role of providing support or confirmation for the result reached by way of purposive interpretation. this makes sense, as canadian courts interpreting the charter are not bound by the content of international norms as professor beaulac and dr. bérard explain: [translation] in addition to distorting the relationship between the international and domestic legal orders, the suggestion that domestic courts are bound by the constitutional mandate and the function of the judiciary, which is to exercise decision-making power under the applicable canadian and quebec law. seeing international law as having persuasive authority is a more appropriate, consistent and effective approach. international normativity inconsistent with is . . . even though international normativity is not binding in domestic law, what it can and, indeed, should do in appropriate circumstances is to influence the interpretation and application of domestic law by our courts. except among a few zealous supporters of the internationalist cause, there is general agreement that, in this regard, the criterion for referring to international law in domestic law is that of “persuasive authority”. (s beaulac and f bérard, précis d’interprétation législative (2nd ed. 2014), chapter 5, at paras. 5 and 36 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).) [23] furthermore, even within that limited supporting or confirming role, the weight and persuasiveness of each of these international norms in the analysis depends on the nature of the source and its relationship to our constitution. the reason for this is the necessity of preserving the integrity of the canadian constitutional structure, and canadian sovereignty. as this court cautioned in kazemi estate v. islamic republic of iran, 2014 scc 62, [2014] 3 scr 176, “[t]he interaction between domestic and international law must be managed carefully in light of the principles governing what remains a dualist system of application of international law and a constitutional and parliamentary democracy”: para. 150. [24] although this court has been careful to attach the appropriate weight to international and comparative law in charter interpretation, it has not always explained how or why different international sources are being discussed or relied on, while others are not. the result has been a want of clarity, even confusion, to which, we say with respect, our colleague abella j adds by indiscriminately drawing from binding instruments and non-binding instruments, instruments that pre-date the charter and instruments that post-date it, and decisions of international tribunals and foreign domestic courts, before concluding that, combined, they represent an “international consensus [that] does not dictate the outcome [but] provides compelling and relevant interpretive support”: para. 107. [25] as we will discuss, the various instruments and case law our colleague abella j reviews play different roles in the analysis and receive different weight. treating them all alike — stating that each is “indispensable” and provides “compelling and relevant interpretive support” (at paras. 100 and 107) — actually risks undermining the importance of canada’s international obligations: the temptation may be great to treat all international law, whether binding on canada or not, as “optional information” and to disregard the particular interpretative onus that is placed upon courts by the presumption of conformity with canada’s international obligations. there is a significant difference between international law that is binding on canada and other international norms. the former is not only potentially persuasive but also obligatory this distinction matters — when we fail to uphold our obligations, we undermine the respect for law internationally the distinction also provides the rationale for the traditional common law presumption of conformity with canada’s international obligations as well as for treating differently international norms that do not legally bind canada. (j brunnée and s j toope, “a hesitant embrace: the application of international law by canadian courts” (2002), 40 can. yb. intl law 3, at p 41 (emphasis added); see also j h currie, public international law (2nd ed. 2008), at p 260.) [26] we are not alone in expressing concern about the need for structure when citing international and foreign sources. commentators have called for clarification in this regard, noting that courts should provide “greater analytical rigour” and “approach international law in a principled and coherent manner, providing clarity as to precisely what effect is accorded to international law in a given case and why”: brunnée and toope, at p 8; see also the honourable mr. justice r. g. juriansz, “international law and canadian courts: a work in progress” (2008), 25 njcl 171, at pp. 176 and 178. specific areas calling for clarification include: . . . the standards by which courts will determine whether treaties have been implemented; what role non-binding sources (such as treaties which canada has signed but not ratified, treaties which canada has neither signed nor ratified, or “soft law” instruments) should play in interpreting domestic law; and whether these various categories of non-binding sources should be treated differently from one another or canada’s binding international legal obligations. (currie, at p 262) [27] a principled framework is therefore necessary and desirable, both to properly recognize canada’s international obligations and to provide consistent and clear guidance to courts and litigants setting out a methodology for considering international and comparative sources recognizes how this court has treated such sources in practice and provides guidance and clarity. given the issue raised in this case, our focus is on the use of international and comparative law in constitutional interpretation. [28] this court has recognized a role for international and comparative law in interpreting charter rights. however, this role has properly been to support or confirm an interpretation arrived at through the big m drug mart approach; the court has never relied on such tools to define the scope of charter rights. respectfully, our colleague abella j.’s approach represents a marked and worrisome departure from this prudent practice. [29] this court (generally, albeit not invariably) has been careful to specify the normative value and weight of different kinds of international sources. our colleague abella j.’s approach simply abandons this important practice. [30] a useful starting point is dickson cj’s guidance in re psera. while it appeared in a dissenting opinion, his approach to international and comparative law has since shaped the way this court treats these sources. his consideration of the scope of s 2(d) of the charter looked first to canadian and privy council jurisprudence and then to u.s and international law: p 335 on international sources specifically, he explained: the various sources of international human rights law — declarations, covenants, conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international tribunals, customary norms — must, in my opinion, be relevant and persuasive sources for interpretation of the charter’s provisions. to interpretations of in particular, the similarity between the policies and provisions of the charter and those of international human rights documents attaches considerable relevance those documents by adjudicative bodies, in much the same way that decisions of the united states courts under the bill of rights, or decisions of the courts of other jurisdictions are relevant and may be persuasive. the relevance of these documents in charter interpretation extends beyond the standards developed by adjudicative bodies under the documents to the documents themselves. [emphasis added; pp. 348-49.] [31] continuing, dickson cj then clarified that not all of these sources carry identical weight in charter interpretation, stating that “the charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which canada has ratified”: p 349 (emphasis added). this proposition has since become a firmly established interpretive principle in charter interpretation, the presumption of conformity: ktunaxa nation v british columbia (forests, lands and natural resource operations), 2017 scc 54, [2017] 2 scr 386, at para. 65; india v badesha, 2017 scc 44, [2017] 2 scr 127, at para. 38; saskatchewan federation of labour v. saskatchewan, 2015 scc 4, [2015] 1 scr 245, at para. 64; kazemi, at para. 150; divito v. canada (public safety and emergency preparedness), 2013 scc 47, [2013] 3 scr 157, at para. 23; health services and support ⸺ facilities subsector bargaining assn. v. british columbia, 2007 scc 27, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para. 70. [32] importantly, dickson cj referred to instruments that canada had ratified. in other words, his focus in framing this presumption was on binding international instruments, as ratification is the way in which international instruments become binding internationally: see currie, at pp. 153-54 similarly, dickson c.j explained that in becoming a party to international human rights conventions, “canada has thus obliged itself internationally to ensure within its borders the protection of certain fundamental rights and freedoms which are also contained in the charter” and that “[t]he content of canada’s international human rights obligations is . . . an important indicia of the meaning of ‘the full benefit of the charter’s protection’”: p 349 (emphasis added). [33] subsequent case law has continued to tie the presumption of conformity to the language of canada’s international obligations or commitments: ktunaxa, at para. 65; badesha, at para. 38; saskatchewan federation of labour, at paras. 62 and 64-65; divito, at para. 22; health services, at para. 69. [34] this court has explained that the presumption of conformity “operates principally as an interpretive tool in assisting the courts in delineating the breadth and scope of charter rights”: kazemi, at para. 150 but, being a presumption, it is also rebuttable and “does not overthrow clear legislative intent”: para. 60. [35] dickson cj’s approach to non-binding sources — treating them as relevant and persuasive, but not determinative, interpretive tools — also holds true: united states v. burns, 2001 scc 7, [2001] 1 scr 283, at para. 80. non-binding sources notably include international instruments to which canada is not a party. such instruments do not give rise to the presumption of conformity they therefore have only persuasive value in charter interpretation. [36] this is not to say that such instruments are irrelevant as professors brunnée and toope observe, “[t]here is no reason why canadian courts should not draw upon these [non-binding] norms so long as they do so in a manner that recognizes their non-binding legal quality”: p 53 (emphasis added); see also g van ert, using international law in canadian courts (2nd ed 2008), at p 350 as our colleague notes, “[t]his court has frequently relied on [non-binding] international law sources to assist in delineating the breadth and content of charter rights”: abella j.’s reasons, at para. 99 (emphasis added) respectfully, her subsequent attempt to pull into this jurisdiction the deep divisions that inhabit the jurisprudence of our neighbour is no part of what is at issue here but more importantly, the cases she relies on support the distinctions we draw in these reasons. dickson cj’s articulation of the presumption of conformity in re psera was described as the “template for considering the international legal context” in divito, at para. 22. that passage was similarly cited in slaight communications inc v davidson, [1989] 1 scr 1038, at p 1056. meanwhile, burns and re bc. motor vehicle act, [1985] 2 scr 486, dealt with the meaning of the “principles of fundamental justice,” a point we address below in para. 45. [37] in addition to properly characterizing their use, courts must not allow consideration of such instruments to displace the methodology for charter interpretation set out in big m drug mart. this court has been careful to proceed in this manner. for example, in ktunaxa, the court first reviewed canadian case law on the scope of freedom of religion before confirming that scope with reference to binding international instruments: paras. 62-65 it then briefly looked to non-binding instruments that “also” supported the canadian case law, being careful to specify that the instruments were “not binding on canada and therefore do not attract the presumption of conformity” but were “important illustrations of how freedom of religion is conceived around the world”: para. 66 similarly, in saskatchewan federation of labour, the court began with canadian case law on s 2(d) of the charter and its history: paras. 28-55. it then explained that canada’s international human rights obligations “also” mandated protecting the right to strike, with particular emphasis on binding instruments and the presumption of conformity: paras. 62-70. finally, it noted that its conclusion was “[a]dditionally” supported by foreign domestic law: paras. 71-74. [38] it follows from all this ⸺ and, specifically, from the presumption of conformity ⸺ that binding instruments necessarily carry more weight in the analysis than non-binding instruments. while resort may be had to both, courts drawing from a non-binding instrument should be careful to explain why they are drawing on a particular source and how it is being used. we respectfully say that the distinctions we draw are the very reason that “[t]his court has had no difficulty in the past in deciding which sources it finds to be more relevant and persuasive than others” (abella j.’s reasons, at para. 104) and that stating this framework with clarity will not do “a disservice to our court’s ability to continue to consider them with selective discernment”: para. 102 our methodology is firmly rooted in this court’s jurisprudence. [39] in this case, the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, can t.s 1987 no 36, and the international covenant on civil and political rights, can. ts 1976 no. 47 (“iccpr”), are both binding on canada, thus triggering the presumption of conformity. however, we agree with our colleague that neither extends protection from cruel and unusual punishment to corporations. [40] our colleague’s analysis then flows into a consideration of the american convention on human rights, 1144 unts 123, adopted by mexico and nations in the caribbean and central and south america, and the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 213 unts 221. while we agree that neither instrument has been found to extend protection to corporations against cruel and unusual punishment, we are wary of our colleague abella j.’s approach, which appears to give these non-binding instruments similar weight to binding ones. we therefore highlight that these instruments are merely persuasive here, and that a court relying upon them should explain why it is doing so, and how they are being used (that is, what weight is being assigned to them). [41] another important distinction is between instruments that pre- and post-date the charter. within the big m drug mart approach itself, courts are called on to consider the “historical origins of the concepts enshrined” in the charter when determining the scope of a charter right: p 344. international instruments that pre-date the charter can clearly form part of the historical context of a charter right and illuminate the way it was framed. here, whether canada is or is not a party to such instruments is less important, as the “drafters of the charter drew on international conventions because they were the best models of rights protection, not because canada had ratified them”: l. e. weinrib, “a primer on international law and the canadian charter” (2006), 21 njcl 313, at p 324. in this case, then, the context of the english bill of rights, and the eighth amendment is highly relevant as each contained similar — but, importantly, not identical — protections as s 12, as we have explained above. similarly, it is entirely proper and relevant to consider the universal declaration of human rights, ga. res. 217 a (iii), un. doc. a/810, at 71 (1948), which canada voted to adopt and which inspired the iccpr, the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, can. ts 1976 no. 46, and related protocols canada has ratified: weinrib, at p 317. [42] as for instruments that post-date the charter, however, the question becomes once again whether or not they are binding on canada and, by extension, whether the presumption of conformity is engaged it can readily be seen that an instrument that post-dates the charter and that does not bind canada carries much less interpretive weight than one that binds canada and/or contributed to the development of the charter. [43] finally, we turn to decisions of foreign and international courts in re psera, these decisions were included among those non-binding sources that “are relevant and may be persuasive”: p 348 particular caution should, however, be exercised when referring to what other countries have done domestically, as the measures in effect in other countries say little (if anything at all) about the scope of the rights enshrined in the canadian charter ⸺ a point stated emphatically by this court in frank v. canada (attorney general), 2019 scc 1, [2019] 1 scr 3, at para. 62. as michel bastarache explains, “[t]he logic employed by other courts provides guidance to canadian courts rather than precedents to be followed” and “it is important to note that all foreign decisions ultimately influence canadian law based on persuasive, rather than binding, authority”: “how internationalization of the law has materialized in canada” (2009), 59 unblj 190, at p 196. [44] while our colleague notes that her review of foreign domestic jurisprudence is “not determinative” and “supports” her analysis (abella j.’s reasons, at para. 118), jurisprudence of foreign and international courts seems to infuse her analysis at various points without an explanation of their role in the interpretive process. respectfully, her discussion of these sources fails to explain in what way they are instructive, how they are being used, or why the particular sources are being relied on indeed, she considers various sources of international and comparative law, and gives them unstated, but seemingly equal, interpretive weight. this is made most clear at paras. 99-100 of her reasons, where she says that the court “has frequently relied on international law sources to assist in delineating the breadth and content of charter rights” and that “both those sources which are binding and those which are not have proven to be indispensable in almost all areas of the law” yet, in line with the distinctions we have drawn, the cases our colleague cites in support of this broad statement largely focus on binding instruments: canadian egg marketing agency v. richardson, [1998] 3 scr 157, at para. 58; r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at pp. 120-21; health services, at paras. 70-71; r v. smith (edward dewey), [1987] 1 scr. 1045, at p 1061; ktunaxa, at paras. 64-65; saskatchewan federation of labour, at paras. 65-70. as we have already explained, the discussion of non-binding instruments in saskatchewan federation of labour and ktunaxa properly served a confirmatory function. [45] nor can suresh v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), 2002 scc 1, [2002] 1 scr 3, re bc. motor vehicle act, burns, or kazemi justify relying on non-binding, non-historical instruments for the purposes of charter interpretation in the present case, as those cases required consideration of whether an international consensus existed because of the nature of the questions asked. in suresh, the court was called on to determine if a peremptory norm of customary international law existed, which necessarily required looking to international sources: paras. 59-75. re b.c motor vehicle act, burns, and kazemi, meanwhile, were concerned with the principles of fundamental justice under s 7. determining these principles may call for an examination into international sources as the analysis requires establishing a “societal consensus”: kazemi, at paras. 139 and 150; re b.c motor vehicle act, at p 503; burns, at paras. 79-81. [46] as this court’s jurisprudence amply shows, the normative value and weight of international and comparative sources has been tailored to reflect the nature of the source and its relationship to our constitution. reaffirming this guidance cannot reasonably be characterized as “novel”, howsoever forceful or overstated our colleague abella j.’s charges to the contrary. [47] in all, courts must be careful not to indiscriminately agglomerate the traditional big m drug mart factors with international and comparative law the analysis must be dominated by the former and draw on the latter only as appropriate, accompanied by an explanation of why a non-binding source is being considered and how it is being used, including the persuasive weight being assigned to it in our respectful view, our colleague abella j.’s reasons do not conform to this approach. the result is that foreign and international instruments and jurisprudence dominate her analysis, contrary to this court’s teachings on constitutional interpretation. while this change in approach is not determinative in the case at bar, it could very well be in a different one. we therefore find it crucial to reiterate the proper approach to charter interpretation. iii conclusion [48] we would allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the court of appeal. the reasons of abella, karakatsanis and martin jj. were delivered by abella j — [49] the canadian charter of rights and freedoms constitutionalized protection for human rights and civil liberties in canada, entrusting courts with the responsibility for interpreting the meaning of its provisions using a contextual approach, the court has, over time, decided who and what came within the charter’s protective scope. [50] section 12 of the charter guarantees the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. this is the first case in which the court has been asked to determine the scope of s 12, that is, who or what comes under its protection. this appeal raises the question of whether corporations come within its scope. [51] in my respectful view, s 12’s purpose is to prevent the state from inflicting physical or mental pain and suffering through degrading and dehumanizing treatment or punishment. it is meant to protect human dignity and respect the inherent worth of individuals. its intended beneficiaries are people, not corporations. background [52] the corporation before the court, 9147-0732 québec inc., was found guilty of carrying out construction work as a contractor without holding a current license for that purpose, an offence under s 46 of the building act, cqlr, c. b-1.1: 46. no person may act as a building contractor, hold himself out to be such or give cause to believe that he is a building contractor, unless he holds a current licence for that purpose. no contractor may use, for the carrying out of construction work, the services of another contractor who does not hold a licence for that purpose. [53] pursuant to s 197.1 of the building act, the penalty for an offence under s 46 of this statute is a mandatory minimum fine which varies depending on whether the offender is an individual or a corporation: 197.1 any person who contravenes section 46 or 48 by not holding a licence of the appropriate class or subclass is liable to a fine of $5,141 to $25,703 in the case of an individual and $15,422 to $77,108 in the case of a legal person, and any person who contravenes either of those sections by not holding a licence is liable to a fine of $10,281 to $77,108 in the case of an individual and $30,843 to $154,215 in the case of a legal person.1 [54] applying this provision, the court of québec imposed the then minimum fine for corporations of $30,843 on 9147-0732 québec inc. 1 the current provision states: 197.1 any person who contravenes section 46 or 48 is guilty of an offence and is liable, as the case may be, to a fine (1) of $5,841 to $29,200 in the case of an individual and $17,521 to $87,604 in the case of a legal person if the individual or legal person does not hold a licence of the appropriate class or subclass or uses the services of another person who does not hold a licence of the appropriate class or subclass; or (2) of $11,682 to $87,604 in the case of an individual and $35,041 to $175,206 in the case of a legal person if the individual or legal person does not hold a licence or uses the services of another person who does not hold a licence. [55] the corporation challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum fine in s 197.1 of the building act on the basis that it offended its right to be protected against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment under s 12 of the charter. [56] it did not succeed at the court of québec, where ratté jcq concluded that expanding the protection of rights intrinsically linked to individuals to include corporate rights would trivialize the protection granted by s 12 of the charter. in any event, he concluded that the minimum corporate fine at issue, far from being cruel and unusual, represented the norm in penal regulatory law. at the time, no fine had yet been invalidated as cruel and unusual by a higher court, even in the context of individuals. [57] at the quebec superior court, dionne j similarly held that corporations were not covered by s 12. in his view, s 12’s purpose was the protection of human dignity, a notion clearly meant exclusively for [translation] “natural persons”. [58] a majority at the quebec court of appeal allowed the appeal and held that s 12 can apply to corporations. it found that s 12’s association with human dignity did not prevent its application to corporations, since other charter rights which also protect human dignity — ss 8 and 11(b) of the charter — have been held to apply to corporations rather than looking at the purpose of the provision, it adopted a [translation] “tangible benefit” approach, focusing on whether a corporation could theoretically benefit from the charter protection in question: “a corporation’s ability to derive a tangible benefit from it” this resulted in its conclusion that since corporations could face cruel treatment or punishment through harsh or severe fines, s 12 could apply to them. it remitted to the court of québec the question of whether the particular minimum fine against corporations set out in s 197.1 of the building act amounted to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. [59] in dissent, chamberland ja was of the view that s 12 is concerned with human dignity, a concept inapplicable to corporations. [60] for the following reasons, i agree with chamberland ja that s 12 does not apply to corporations. i would therefore allow the appeal. analysis [61] this case gives us an opportunity to apply this court’s approach to both constitutional interpretation and the role of international and comparative law in its development regrettably, however, the majority has put into question this court’s approach to both. instead of using the text as the beginning of the search for purpose, the majority has given it “primacy” and assigned a secondary role to the other contextual factors, thereby erasing the difference between constitutional and statutory interpretation and instead of only relying on the traditional distinction between binding and non-binding international sources, the majority seems to have added a novel requirement: whenever a canadian court considers non-binding international sources, it must explicitly justify their use, segment them into categories, and attribute a degree of weight to their inclusion, thereby transforming the court’s usual panoramic search for global wisdom into a series of compartmentalized barriers for constitutional, comparative and international law, this apparent change in direction is a worrying setback. [62] section 12 of the charter states: 12. everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. [63] most of this court’s s 12 jurisprudence has dealt with minimum and indeterminate sentences and the harmful effects of incarceration the threshold test developed and applied in these and other cases is whether the treatment or punishment of the individual is so “grossly disproportionate” as to “outrage standards of decency”, and be “abhorrent or intolerable”.2 [64] 9147-0732 québec inc argued that this is the language that we should apply, since it is broader than the language used in the french version of our s 12 jurisprudence, which refers to treatment or punishment that is [translation] “incompatible with human dignity”. this argument, with respect, results from looking at the words literally, in both the english and french versions, without examining them in the context of the cases in which they were decided, thereby creating artificial conceptual schisms instead of linguistic coherence (see michel doucet, “le 2 see, eg,. r v. smith (edward dewey), [1987] 1 scr 1045; r v. lyons, [1987] 2 scr 309; r v. luxton, [1990] 2 scr 711; steele v. mountain institution, [1990] 2 scr 1385; r v. goltz, [1991] 3 scr 485; r v. morrisey, [2000] 2 scr 90; r v. latimer, [2001] 1 scr 3; r v. ferguson, [2008] 1 scr 96; r v. nur, [2015] 1 scr 773; r v lloyd, [2016] 1 scr 130; r v. boudreault, [2018] 3 scr 599. bilinguisme législatif”, in michel bastarache and michel doucet, eds., les droits linguistiques au canada (3rd ed. 2013), 179, at p 281). [65] a review of the language used in our s 12 jurisprudence shows that both the english and french versions capture the same concept, namely, that s 12 prohibits treatment or punishment that is incompatible with human dignity (see r v smith (edward dewey), [1987] 1 scr 1045; kindler v canada (minister of justice), [1991] 2 scr 779, at pp. 811, 815 and 818; r v. boudreault, [2018] 3 scr 599, at paras 43, 67 and 126) i agree with chamberland j.a that [translation] “[t]he assertion that no one is to be subjected to cruel [and unusual] treatment or punishment cannot be dissociated from the concept of human dignity” (para. 59). the french and english versions of how this court has described what is at stake in s 12 are, therefore, not only reconcilable, they are different ways of expressing the same idea. [66] 9147-0732 québec inc. also argued that the scope of s 12 should be seen to include corporations based on this court’s recent decision in boudreault. writing for the majority, martin j found that the mandatory victim surcharge under s 737 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, violated s 12 of the charter because it caused four interrelated harms to individuals: disproportionate financial consequences suffered by the indigent; threat of detention and/or imprisonment; threat of provincial collections efforts; and de facto indefinite criminal sanctions (para. 65). [67] but recognizing the suffering of individuals from harsh economic treatment by the state does not lead to the inference that s 12 protects the economic interests of corporations to answer that question requires a prior assessment of whether s 12 applies to a corporation at all. this in turn requires 9147-0732 québec inc. to “establish that it has an interest falling within the scope of the guarantee, and one which accords with the purpose of that provision” (r v. cip inc., [1992] 1 scr. 843, at p 852). [68] unlike the approach applied by the majority of the court of appeal, with respect, determining the scope requires first determining the purpose of the right a charter right must be interpreted “by an analysis of the purpose of [the] guarantee” (r. v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at p 344 (emphasis deleted); hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at pp 155-57; see also peter w hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at s 368(c)). big m drug mart provides the definitive account of this approach: . . the proper approach to the definition of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the charter was a purposive one. the meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant to protect. in my view this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger objects of the charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the charter the interpretation should be, as the judgment in southam emphasizes, a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the charter’s protection. at the same time it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question, but to recall that the charter was not enacted in a vacuum, and must therefore, as this court’s decision in law society of upper canada v. skapinker, [1984] 1 scr. 357, illustrates, be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts. [underlining in original; italics added; p 344.] [69] most recently, in conseil scolaire francophone de la colombie‑britannique v british columbia, 2020 scc 13, this court endorsed the purposive approach set out in hunter and big m drug mart, describing the interpretive task as follows: before turning to the facts of this appeal, i consider it necessary to review the background to the enactment of s 23 and the principles that must inform the interpretation of that section. the historical and social context at the root of language rights in education makes clear the unique role of s 23 in canada’s constitutional landscape. in an oft quoted passage, dickson cj illustrated the section’s importance by stating that it represents a “linchpin in this nation’s commitment to the values of bilingualism and biculturalism” (mahe v. alberta, [1990] 1 scr 342, at p 350). more recently, in association des parents de l’école rose-des-vents v. british columbia (education), 2015 scc 21, [2015] 2 scr 139 (“rose-des-vents”), karakatsanis j noted that canada has a bicultural founding character and that its commitment to bilingualism sets it apart among nations (para. 25, citing assn. des parents francophones (colombie britannique) v british columbia (1996), 27 bclr (3d) 83 (sc), at para. 24). i would add that in conducting the analysis under s 23, a court must bear in mind that this section has three purposes, as it is at once preventive, remedial and unifying in nature. [paras. 4, 12 and 15] [70] as this passage illustrates, the principles and values underlying the enactment of the charter provision are the primary interpretive tools. [71] this court has always made clear that examining the text of the charter is only the beginning of the interpretive exercise, an exercise which is fundamentally different from interpreting a statute. dickson j explained the reason for this in hunter: the task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute. a statute defines present rights and obligations. it is easily enacted and as easily repealed. a constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. its function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a bill or a charter of rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. it must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. the judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in mind. professor paul freund expressed this idea aptly when he admonished the american courts “not to read the provisions of the constitution like a last will and testament lest it become one”. [p 155] nonetheless, as big m drug mart indicated, the text of the charter matters since the purpose of the right in question is to be sought by reference “to the language chosen to articulate the specific right” (p 344). [72] this court has applied the balanced big m drug mart framework when interpreting the scope of several charter rights, without elevating the plain text of those guarantees to a factor of special significance. the court resolved questions about the scope of s 2(a) of the charter without recourse to a dictionary definition of “religion”, choosing instead to examine the “historical context” and “purpose” of freedom of religion and conscience (big m drug mart, at pp. 344-48; see also syndicat northcrest v. amselem, [2004] 2 scr 551, at paras. 41-42). in interpreting the presumption of innocence in s 11(d), the court focused on the “cardinal values” that the right embodies (r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at p 119). and in marking the boundaries of freedom of expression under s 2(b), the court has always emphasized the “principles and values underlying the freedom”, instead of the plain meaning of the term “expression” (see irwin toy ltd. v. quebec (attorney general), [1989] 1 scr 927, at p 976; see also ford v. quebec (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 712, at pp. 764-67; r v. keegstra, [1990] 3 scr 697, at pp. 727-28; re bc. motor vehicle act, [1985] 2 scr 486, at pp. 499-500; eldridge v. british columbia (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr 624, at para. 53; r v. krj, [2016] 1 scr 906, at paras. 37-38). [73] this purposive approach to interpreting charter provisions continued in r. v. grant, [2009] 2 scr 353, where the court, while acknowledging that the “starting point” for constitutional interpretation is the language of the right being interpreted, proceeded to endorse the contextual approach from big m drug mart, stating that “where questions of interpretation arise, a generous, purposive and contextual approach should be applied” (para. 15; see also para. 16). and more recently in r v. stillman, 2019 scc 40, the court reiterated that: a charter right must be understood “in the light of the interests it was meant to protect” (r v. big m drug mart ltd. . . . at p 344; see also hunter v. southam inc. . . . at p 157), accounting for “the character and the larger objects of the charter itself”, “the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom”, “the historical origins of the concepts enshrined” and, where applicable, “the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the charter” (big m, at p 344) it follows that charter rights are to be interpreted “generous[ly]”, aiming to “fulfi[l] the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the charter’s protection” (ibid). at the same time, it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question (ibid). (para. 21; see also r v. poulin, 2019 scc 47, at para. 32.) [74] the complete lack of support in our jurisprudence for an approach to constitutional interpretation focused on the primacy of the text is hardly surprising. because charter rights — like all constitutional rights — are meant to be capable of growth and adaptation (see hunter, at pp. 155-57; re bc. motor vehicle act, at p 509; law society of upper canada v skapinker, [1984] 1 scr 357, at pp 365-67; reference re prov. electoral boundaries (sask.), [1991] 2 scr 158, at pp. 179-81; hogg, at s 15.9(f)), many of them were drafted with vague, open-ended language (see hunter, at p 154; poulin, at para. 70 (summarizing “evolving, open-ended standards” in the charter, including s 12)). the text of those provisions may accordingly be of comparatively limited assistance in interpreting their scope. [75] not only is considering the text as prime unhelpful in interpreting constitutional guarantees, it could unduly constrain the scope of those rights, or even yield two irreconcilable conclusions leading, for example, to the interpretive triumph of the presence of a comma in expanding gun-owners’ rights under the second amendment of the united states constitution in district of columbia v. heller, 554 u.s 570 (2008) (see brittany occhipinti, “we the militia of the united states of america: a reanalysis of the second amendment” (2017), 53 willamette l. rev. 431, at pp. 438-42, discussing heller). [76] overemphasizing the plain text of charter rights creates a risk that, over time, those rights will cease to represent the fundamental values of canadian society and the purposes they were meant to uphold. as one scholar has noted, a “purely textual reading” of the constitution “cuts against the grain of the living tree” (lorne neudorf, “reassessing the constitutional foundation of delegated legislation in canada” (2018), 41 dal. lj 519, at p 544). aharon barak has similarly warned that “[p]urely textual interpretation severs the constitution . . from the fundamental values of society” (“a judge on judging: the role of a supreme court in a democracy” (2002), 116 harv. l. rev. 19, at p 83). he advocates a broader approach: . . . to arrive at a proper system of interpretation, the horizons of the interpreter need to be widened beyond those of new textualism. the context of the text — the importance of which is noted by new textualism, albeit narrowly — includes society’s principles, values, and fundamental views, both at the time of enactment and at the time of interpretation. these and other changes would be necessary to transform new textualism into a proper system of interpretation. at that point, however, it would cease to be new textualism and become purposive interpretation. (p 84; see also jonathan r siegel, “the inexorable radicalization of textualism” (2009), 158 u. pa. l. rev. 117, at pp. 173-75.) [77] justice susanne baer of the german constitutional court has also urged against a narrow focus on constitutional text: . . . constitutional text matters, but . . . constitutionalism should not be reduced to mere textualism. (“dignity, constitutionalism” (2009), 59 utlj 417, at p 441) liberty, equality: a fundamental rights triangle of [78] a textualist approach would also make canadian constitutional law more insular. canadian constitutionalism “contains characteristics that make it objectively appealing to foreign constitution-makers and interpreters” (adam m dodek, “the protea and the maple leaf: the impact of the charter on south african constitutionalism” (2004), 17 njcl 353, at p 373) our model of constitutional interpretation is one of those characteristics. as professor dodek notes: the . . . interpretation given to the charter by the supreme court of canada has served to reinforce rather than limit its international appeal. specifically, purposive interpretation accompanied by the conception of a constitution as “a living tree” capable of growth and adaptation to new circumstances are doctrines that have captured the constitutional imaginations of other courts around the world. outside of canada, this has to various made circumstances. aspects of the charter have thus proved to be “a living tree” abroad. the canadian constitutional model amendable (“canada as constitutional exporter: the rise of the ‘canadian model’ of constitutionalism” (2007), 36 sclr (2d) 309, at pp. 321-22) [79] professor karen eltis makes the further point that the “living tree” approach helps explain canada’s willingness to consider “foreign jurisprudence and international instruments”, a subject explored later in these reasons: thus, for instance, as distinguished from an enduring attachment to originalism3 or textualism in the us, the living tree approach or the “multicultural values reflected and promoted in canada’s charter of rights and freedoms are in fact indicative of a national experience that embraces looking outward to foreign jurisprudence and international 3 textualism has been described as a theory which shares “both the philosophy and the partisans of the ‘originalist’ method of constitutional interpretation” (see stéphane beaulac, “parliamentary debates in statutory interpretation: a question of admissibility or of weight?” (1998), 43 mcgill lj 287, at p. 300). instruments as a source of domestic jurisprudence” . . . [emphasis added; footnote added.] (“comparative constitutional law and the ‘judicial role in times of terror’” (2010-2011), 28 njcl 61, at pp. 69-70) [80] purpose, in other words, remains the “central” consideration when interpreting the scope and content of a charter right (poulin, at para 85) several factors — including the text — can help inform the exercise. but this court has never endorsed a rigid hierarchy among these interpretative guides. rather, all of them “can offer useful insights, and the best tools are likely to depend on [the] particular circumstances of the case” (david landau, “legal pragmatism and comparative constitutional law”, in gary jacobsohn and miguel schor, eds., comparative constitutional theory (2018), 208, at p 211). [81] this brings me back to the central question in this appeal: whether the right to be free from “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment” in s 12 of the charter extends to corporations. [82] black’s law dictionary defines “cruelty” as “[t]he intentional and malicious infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage” ((11th ed. 2019), at p 475). the term “unusual”, is not central to the analysis, but is nonetheless part of the “compendious expression of a norm” (r v smith (edward dewey), at p 1072) it is defined as “[e]xtraordinary; abnormal” and “[d]ifferent from what is reasonably expected” (black’s law dictionary, at p 1851) together, the words “cruel and unusual punishment” are defined as “[p]unishment that is torturous, degrading, inhuman, grossly disproportionate to the crime in question, or otherwise shocking to the moral sense of the community” (black’s law dictionary, at p 1490). [83] the oxford english dictionary defines “cruel”, in relation to persons, as “[d]isposed to inflict suffering; indifferent to or taking pleasure in another’s pain or distress, destitute of kindness or compassion; merciless, pitiless, hard-hearted” ((2nd ed. 1989), vol. iv, at p 78). it is also used to describe actions that are “proceeding from or showing indifference to or pleasure in another’s distress” (“cruel”, at p 78). when referring to conditions and circumstances, ie treatment or punishment, “cruel” means “[c]ausing or characterized by great suffering; extremely painful or distressing” (p 78). [84] similarly, “cruelty” is defined in the oxford english dictionary as referring to: 1. the quality of being cruel; disposition to inflict suffering, delight in or indifference to the pain or misery of others; mercilessness, hard- heartedness: esp. as exhibited in action. also, with pl., an instance of this, a cruel deed; . 2. severity of pain; excessive suffering; . 3. severity, strictness, rigour; . [p 79] [85] the term “cruel” is also defined in french by reference to the concept of suffering, which, as chamberland j.a noted, cannot be experienced by inanimate entities like corporations: [translation] 1 taking pleasure in inflicting suffering, in witnessing suffering. 2 denoting cruelty; showing the cruelty of humans. 3 inflicting suffering through its harshness, its severity. 4 (of persons). without leniency, merciless. 5 (of personified things). inflicting suffering by manifesting a sort of hostility. 6 (of persons). indifferent, insensitive. (le grand robert de la langue française (2nd ed. 2001), at pp. 864-65) [86] in short, the ordinary meaning of the words cruel and unusual treatment or punishment centers on human pain and suffering as chamberland ja, eloquently stated: [translation] it would completely distort the ordinary meaning of the words, in my view, to say that it is possible to be cruel to a corporate entity. cruelty is inflicted on living beings of flesh and blood, be they human beings or animals. and not on corporations. suffering, whether physical or mental, is unique to living beings, not corporate entities and inanimate objects without a soul or emotional life. [paras. 53-56] [87] the fact that the word “everyone” is found in the text of s 12 cannot, by virtue of its literal meaning, expand the protection to corporations, without any regard for the purpose of the right as protecting human dignity. it is worth remembering that in irwin toy, this court explained that “‘[e]veryone’ . . . must be read in light of the rest of the section and defined to exclude corporations and other artificial entities incapable of enjoying life, liberty or security of the person, and include only human beings” (p 1004). [88] we turn then to the historical origins and values underlying the right, in compliance with dickson cj’s direction in oakes, that the exercise requires “understanding the cardinal values [the provision] embodies” (p 119). [89] the values embodied by s 12 can be traced back to the english bill of rights, 1688, 1 will. & mar. sess. 2, c 2, which, in art. 10, stipulated “[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”. [90] the provision was incorporated almost verbatim into the eighth amendment of the united states constitution in 1791, where its purpose was definitively discussed in furman v. georgia, 408 u.s 238 (1972), dealing with the constitutionality of the death penalty. each of the judges in the majority wrote separate reasons explaining why the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in the cases before the court. marshall j reviewed the english antecedents of the clause and concluded that: whether the english bill of rights prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments is properly read as a response to excessive or illegal punishments, as a reaction to barbaric and objectionable modes of punishment, or as both, there is no doubt whatever that in borrowing the language and in including it in the eighth amendment, our founding fathers intended to outlaw torture and other cruel punishments. [p 319] [91] brennan j.’s reasons described the eighth amendment’s primary purpose as protecting the dignity of human beings he concluded that the state “even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings”, explaining that the reason barbaric punishments have been condemned by history “is that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded” and are “inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity” (pp. 270-73 (emphasis added)). [92] while there is some debate about the underlying purpose of the english bill of rights provision, it seems not to be disputed that in both the english and american contexts, protection for corporations was not contemplated. and, it is safe to say that at least in the united states, the historical purpose of prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment was to protect the inherent worth and dignity of human beings. [93] in canada, similar language first appeared in s 2(b) of the canadian bill of rights, s.c 1960, c 44, which prohibited “the imposition of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment” the canadian bill of rights was adopted in its own historical context, which included a profound emphasis on the need to protect human rights in a post-second world war era as then professor walter tarnopolsky observed, “[n]oticeable interest in, and concern for the protection of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms began to increase in canada during world war ii, possibly as part of a world-wide interest in these values” since “civilized nations could revert to barbarity too easily” (walter surma tarnopolsky, the canadian bill of rights (2nd rev. ed. 1975), at p 3; see also hogg, at s 351). [94] the canadian bill of rights was introduced as an act for the recognition and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms beyond its title, the canadian bill of rights’ preamble included specific references to “the dignity and worth of the human person”: the parliament of canada, affirming that the canadian nation is founded upon principles that acknowledge . . . the dignity and worth of the human person . and being desirous of enshrining these principles and the human rights and fundamental freedoms derived from them . . . [emphasis added.] [95] the wording of the s 2(b) canadian bill of rights provision and s 12 of the charter are almost identical. however, unlike the canadian bill of rights, which is an ordinary statute, albeit of enormous philosophical significance, “the charter must be regarded, because of its constitutional character, as a new affirmation of rights and freedoms and of judicial power and responsibility in relation to their protection” (r v. therens, [1985] 1 scr 613, at p 638). [96] like the canadian bill of rights, the enactment of the charter was influenced by the events of the second world war as pierre elliott trudeau, then minister of justice, observed in 1968, these events were “disturbing proof of the need to safeguard the rights of individuals” (a canadian charter of human rights (1968), at pp. 10-11). discussing “[t]he rights of the individual”, minister trudeau reminded canadians that “man [sic] has distinguished himself from other animals by directing his attention to those matters which affect his individual dignity” (p 9). for trudeau, an entrenched bill of rights would serve to “withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts” (p 11; see also lester b. pearson, “federalism for the future: a statement of policy by the government of canada” (1968), in anne f. bayefsky, canada’s constitution act 1982 & amendments: a document history (1989), vol. 1, 61). [97] world war ii’s shocking indifference to human dignity and the devastating human rights abuses it tolerated, resulted not only in responsive protections in international human rights instruments, but also in domestic rights guarantees such as the canadian bill of rights and, ultimately, the constitutional protection of rights and freedoms in the charter. [98] since canada’s rights protections emerged from the same chrysalis of outrage as other countries around the world, it is helpful to compare canada’s prohibition against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment with how courts around the world have interpreted the numerous international human rights instruments containing provisions that closely mirror the language of s 12. as professor dodek points out, since courts face common problems, considering how other courts have addressed them can assist in determining how to exercise judicial discretion (“comparative law at the supreme court of canada in 2008: limited engagement and missed opportunities” (2009), 47 sclr (2d) 445, at p 454). in other words, “the search for wisdom is not to be circumscribed by national boundaries” (hogg, at s. 369(c)). [99] this court has frequently relied on international law sources to assist in delineating the breadth and content of charter rights (see, eg,. divito v canada (public safety and emergency preparedness), [2013] 3 scr 157, at para. 22; united states v. burns, [2001] 1 scr 283, at paras. 79-81; slaight communications inc. v. davidson, [1989] 1 scr 1038, at pp. 1056-57; reference re public service employee relations act (alta.), [1987] 1 scr 313, at pp. 348-49 (per dickson cj, dissenting); re bc. motor vehicle act, at p 512). as the majority noted in divito, such sources can often be “instructive in defining the right” (para. 22). international human rights law, in particular, has been described by l’heureux-dubé j as a “critical influence on the interpretation of the scope of the rights included in the charter” (baker v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), [1999] 2 scr 817, at para. 70). [100] in fact, both those sources which are binding and those which are not have proven to be indispensable in almost all areas of the law (oakes, at pp 120-21; reference re public service, at pp. 348-49 (per dickson cj, dissenting); r v. smith (edward dewey), at p 1061; canadian egg marketing agency v. richardson, [1998] 3 scr 157, at para. 58; suresh v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), [2002] 1 scr 3, at paras. 59-75; health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn. v. british columbia, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para. 70; kazemi estate v islamic republic of iran, [2014] 3 scr 176, at para 129; saskatchewan federation of labour v. saskatchewan, [2015] 1 scr 245, at paras. 70-71; ktunaxa nation v. british columbia (forests, lands and natural resource operations), [2017] 2 scr 386, at paras 64-67) significantly, this court’s use of international and comparative sources in the interpretation of the charter has been lauded internationally (see, eg,. ran hirschl, “going global? canada as importer and exporter of constitutional thought”, in richard albert and david r. cameron, eds., canada in the world: comparative perspectives on the canadian constitution (2018), 305). [101] consideration of international and comparative sources is a standard and accepted practice in this court’s constitutional interpretation jurisprudence. between 2000 and 2016, this court cited 1,791 decisions from foreign courts (klodian rado, “the use of non-domestic legal sources in supreme court of canada judgments: is this the judicial slowbalization of the court?” (2020), 16 utrecht l. rev 57 (online), at p 61). during the same time period, this court cited treaties on 336 occasions (rado, at p 73). though canada has not signed the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 213 unts 221, this instrument was the second most cited international treaty, and the case law of the european court of human rights — which interprets and applies the european convention — made up one third of the total number of all of this court’s international court citations (rado, at pp 72-75) while international and comparative sources are invaluable to this court’s work in all areas of the law,4 references by this court to these sources occurred in constitutional cases more than in any other field (rado, at p 75). [102] this is not quantum physics non-binding international sources are “relevant and persuasive”, not obligatory. simply put, such sources attract adherence rather than command it (dodek (2009), at p 446) presumptively narrowing the significance of international and comparative sources, as the majority suggests, does a disservice to our court’s ability to continue to consider them with selective discernment. [103] the majority acknowledges that this court has always been willing to treat non-binding international sources as “relevant and persuasive” in charter interpretation (united states v. burns, at para. 80). however, it inexplicably retreats 4 the court has cited comparative legal sources in 50 different fields of both public and private law. the 10 fields of law that have generated the highest number of foreign precedents are: constitutional law, torts, criminal law, insurance, intellectual property, civil procedure, administrative law, evidence, courts and labour law (rado, figure 5, at p 69; see also p 67). beyond comparative legal sources, the court has cited international precedents in 13 different fields of both public and private law: constitutional law, immigration law, criminal law, administrative law, torts, labour law, statutes, civil procedure, intellectual property, courts, evidence, international law, contracts (rado, figure 6, at p 76; see also p 75) as well as international treaties in constitutional law, intellectual property, international law (public and private), immigration law, administrative law, civil procedure, labour law, statutes, arbitration and in 20 other fields of law (rado, figure 7, at p 76). from this long line of jurisprudence and concludes that non-binding sources should only be used to confirm a pre-established interpretation. [104] this court has never required that these sources be sorted by weight before being considered; nor has it ever applied the kind of hierarchical sliding scale of persuasiveness proposed by the majority, segmenting non-binding international and comparative sources into categories worthy of more or less influence. this court has had no difficulty in the past in deciding which sources it finds to be more relevant and persuasive than others without using a confusing multi-category chart. [105] it is true that there are those on the united states supreme court who have sought to curtail the influence and use of international sources by calling for more particularization about why, how and when those sources are applied (see, for instance, antonin scalia, “keynote address: foreign legal authority in the federal courts” (2004), 98 asil. proc. 305, at p 307; roper v. simmons, 543 us 551 (2005), at pp. 622-28 (scalia j., dissenting); cindy g. buys, “burying our constitution in the sand? evaluating the ostrich response to the use of international and foreign law in us. constitutional interpretation” (2007), 21 byu. j. pub. l 1, at pp. 7-8). justice scalia, for example, “argues that interpretation ought to be focused solely on u.s legal materials because of the practical difficulties created by consulting transnational sources” (ryan c. black et al., “upending a global debate: an empirical analysis of the us. supreme court’s use of transnational law to interpret domestic doctrine” (2014), 103 geo l.j 1, at pp 8-9) on the other hand, others, like justice breyer, consider that the use of non-binding sources merely “involves opening your eyes to what is going on elsewhere, taking what you learn for what it is worth, and using it as a point of comparison where doing so will prove helpful” (black, at pp. 8-9). [106] narrowing our approach by putting unnecessary barriers in the way of access to international and comparative sources gratuitously threatens to undermine canada’s leading voice internationally in constitutional adjudication, a role based on its willingness to go wide and deep in the global search for the best intellectual resources it can find, as professor ran hirschl eloquently explains: the rise of a confident, distinctly canadian approach to constitutionalism and a corresponding maturation of the supreme court, all enriched by general appreciation of and selective engagements with comparative constitutional ideas, mainly in the area of constitutional rights, brought about a sharp decline in judicial reliance on british constitutional ideals and jurisprudence . . these changes are closely linked to the 1982 constitutional makeover, but also to broader transformations in canada’s self-perception, sense of collective identity, and the re-conceptualization of its place in the world. . . . a fuller understanding of how canada has emerged from a humble former british colony into its current role as comparative constitutional powerhouse necessitates a broader look at the social and ideational transformation—specifically the profound multicultural and cosmopolitan shift in the national meta-narrative — that canada has witnessed for more than half a century. [emphasis added; pp. 305-6 and 317.] [107] all of the relevant international sources in this case lead to the irrefutable inference that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is about protecting human beings from the infliction of inhuman and degrading punishment. none of them include, or have been held to include, protection for corporations while this international consensus does not dictate the outcome, it provides compelling and relevant interpretive support it is part of the development of an international perspective on how rights should be protected, a perspective developed pursuant to the global commitment made in 1945 to internationalize those protections, and a perspective in whose promotion canada’s jurisprudence has played a leading role. considering what and how laws and decisions have been applied on related questions by other countries and institutions, is part not only of an ongoing global judicial conversation, but of the epistemological package constitutional courts routinely rely on. [108] turning then to the international context for assessing the purpose of “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”, we start with lord bingham’s observation in reyes v. the queen, [2002] 2 ac 235, that while s 12’s international siblings vary in language, a common meaning can be ascribed to their various formulations: despite the semantic difference between the expressions “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment” (as in the canadian charter and the constitution of trinidad and tobago) and “cruel and unusual punishments” (as in the eighth amendment to the united states constitution) and “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (as in the european convention), it seems clear that the essential thrust of these provisions, however expressed, is the same, and their meaning has been assimilated. (para. 30; see also s v. williams, 1995 (3) sa 632 (cc), at para. 35.) [109] the common meaning ascribed by the privy council to the various expressions was the one formulated by lamer j in r v. smith (edward dewey): i would agree with laskin cj in [miller v. the queen, [1977] 2 scr. 680], where he defined the phrase “cruel and unusual” as a “compendious expression of a norm” the criterion which must be applied in order to determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual within the meaning of s 12 of the charter is . . “whether the punishment prescribed is so excessive as to outrage standards of decency”. in other words, though the state may impose punishment, the effect of that punishment must not be grossly disproportionate to what would have been appropriate. (p 1072; see also reyes, at para. 30.) [110] article 5 of the universal declaration of human rights, ga. res. 217 a (iii), un. doc. a/810, at 71 (1948), states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” while there does not appear to be any judicial authority directly considering whether art 5 applies to corporations, there are compelling reasons to believe it does not as a whole, the universal declaration of human rights, as its title suggests, was intended to apply to human beings (max planck institute for comparative public law and international law, who turned multinational corporations into bearers of human rights? on the creation of corporate “human” rights in international law, by silvia steininger and jochen von bernstorff, september 25, 2018 (online), at p 5). moreover, its adoption in a post-second world war context, as well as its preamble which references human dignity, offer no basis to conclude that its art. 5 could apply to corporations. [111] article 7 of the international covenant on civil and political rights, can. t.s 1976 no 47, which canada ratified on may 19, 1976, includes the same prohibition against “torture [and] cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. the united nations human rights committee identified the purpose of article 7 as being “to protect both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the individual” (general comment no. 20: article 7 (prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) (1992), u.n doc. hri/gen/1/rev.9, vol. 1, p 200 (2008), at para. 2). it noted that “[t]he prohibition in art. 7 is complemented by the positive requirements of article 10, paragraph 1, of the [covenant] which stipulates that ‘[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’” (para. 2). [112] since the preamble of the covenant asserts that human rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”, it is not surprising that the human rights committee accepts complaints only from people (a newspaper publishing company v. trinidad and tobago, communication no. 360/1989, reported in un. doc. supp. no. 40 (a/44/40), at para 3.2; a publication and a printing company v trinidad and tobago, communication no. 361/1989, reported in un. doc. supp. no. 40 (a/44/40), at para. 3.2; v.s v. belarus, communication no. 1749/2008, reported in un. doc. ccpr/c/103/d (2011), at para 7.3; general comment no 31; the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on states parties to the covenant, u.n doc. ccpr/c/21/rev1/add13,. may 26, 2004, at para. 9). [113] article 5(2) of the american convention on human rights, 1144 unts. 123, which applies to approximately 24 countries in the americas, similarly provides that: “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”. the language of art. 1(2) states that “for the purposes of this convention, ‘person’ means every human being”. the inter-american court of human rights, the adjudicative body responsible for enforcing the american convention on human rights, has held that the purpose of the american convention was the “protection of the fundamental rights of human beings” (angela b cornell, “inter-american court recognizes elevated status of trade unions, rejects standing of corporations” (2017), 3 intl labor rights case l 39, at p 40, citing titularidad de derechos de las personas juridicas en el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos, advisory opinion oc-22/16, february 26, 2016, at paras. 42-43). [114] the european convention is the only international human rights treaty that has been interpreted to include corporate rights (julian g. ku, “the limits of corporate rights under international law” (2012), 12 chi. j. int’l l 729, at p 754). [115] notably, however, art. 3, which states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, has been held not to apply to corporations. in kontakt-information-therapie v austria, application no. 11921/86, october 12, 1988, dr 57, p 81 “kit”, the european commission of human rights explained this conclusion when it stated that the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment under art 3 was “by [its] very nature not susceptible of being exercised” by a corporation (p 88). [116] more recently, the european court of human rights, applying kit, called it “inconceivable” that a corporation could complain of attacks to its physical and mental integrity under art. 3 (identoba v. georgia, application no. 73235/12, may 12, 2015 (hudoc), at para. 45). [117] article 16(1) of the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, can. ts 1987 no. 36, which provides that state parties “undertake to prevent in any territory under [their] jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1”, has also never been extended to include corporations. not only does the preamble recognize that human rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”, art 1 defines torture with reference to “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental”. [118] a review of foreign domestic law, while not determinative, also supports an interpretation of s 12 of the charter which excludes protections for corporations. section 12(1)(e) of the south african constitution, for example, mirrors the language in s 12 of the charter. interpreting this provision, the south african constitutional court concluded that the right of “everyone . . . not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman, or degrading way”, rests on the foundation of human dignity. in williams, the constitutional court invalidated juvenile whipping provisions, connecting the dots between the eighth amendment of the united states constitution, s 12 of the canadian charter, and other international instruments to unite them in protecting “human dignity”. as langa j observed: whether one speaks of “cruel and unusual punishment” as in the eighth amendment of the united states constitution and in art 12 of the canadian charter, or “inhuman or degrading punishment” as in the european convention and the constitution of zimbabwe, or “cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment”, as in the universal declaration of human rights, the iccpr and the constitution of namibia, the common thread running through the assessment of each phrase is the identification and acknowledgement of society’s concept of decency and human dignity. [para. 35] [119] the constitutional court held that juvenile whipping, “involving as it does the deliberate infliction of physical pain on the person of the accused, offends society’s notions of decency and is a direct invasion of the right which every person has to human dignity” (para. 39; see also s v. makwanyane, 1995 (3) sa 391 (cc);. s v. dodo, 2001 (3) sa 382 (cc)). [120] the new zealand bill of rights act 1990 has a similar provision in s 9, which states: everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. [121] the new zealand supreme court considered this provision in taunoa v. attorney-general, [2008] 1 nzlr 429, dealing with the treatment of prisoners held under a program operated in auckland prison by the department of corrections called the “behaviour management regime”. segregation was at the heart of the program, which was known for imposing the most stringent conditions found in the new zealand prison system while a majority of the court did not find a breach of s 9, both the majority and dissent emphasized that the purpose of the provision was to protect the dignity and worth of humans. tipping j., writing as part of the majority, concluded that while s 9 was not breached, it should be understood as “prohibiting inhuman treatment, that is, treating a person as less than human” (para. 297). similarly, mcgrath j., in the majority, expressed the view that its purpose is “universal protection against any form of treatment by the state which is incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person” (para. 338). [122] elias cj, in dissent, found that s 9, like its equivalents in the united states, canada and europe, is concerned with inhuman treatment, which “amounts to denial of humanity” (paras. 79-80). inhuman treatment, she added, “is treatment that is not fitting for human beings” (para. 80). and in observing that the canadian charter’s s 12 provision is a “compendious expression of a norm”, elias cj viewed this norm “as proscribing any treatment that is incompatible with humanity” (para. 82). [123] internationally, then, it is widely acknowledged that the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment is intended to protect human dignity by prohibiting degrading, inhuman, or dehumanizing treatment or punishment that causes physical or mental pain and suffering. [124] this global unity is not surprising as professor anna grear noted, “international human rights law arguably emerged from an instinct to protect the human — precisely because it is human — as a reaction to the nazi genocide — at the end of the second world war” (anna grear, “human rights — human bodies? some reflections on corporate human rights distortion, the legal subject, embodiment and human rights theory” (2006), 17 law critique 171 (online), at p 173). human rights, read in this light, “represent a mode of archetypal resistance to suffering” (grear, at p 174). in other words, there is a reason they are called human rights. [125] ever since oakes, where the court said it was guided by “respect for the inherent dignity of the human person” as a value essential to a free and democratic society (p 136), it has explicitly stated that “the protection of all of the rights guaranteed by the charter has as its lodestar the promotion of human dignity” (r v. kapp, [2008] 2 scr 483, at para. 21 (emphasis added)). [126] turning to s 12’s purpose by looking at “the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the charter” (big m drug mart, at p 344), s 12 is grouped, along with ss. 7 to 11 and 13 to 14, under the heading “legal rights” (“garanties juridiques”). all legal rights, as lamer j declared, “have been recognized as essential elements of a system for the administration of justice which is founded upon a belief in ‘the dignity and worth of the human person’ (preamble to the canadian bill of rights . . .) and on the ‘rule of law’ (preamble to the canadian charter . . .)” (re bc. motor vehicle act, at p 503). [127] the broad purposes of the legal rights in ss 7 to 14 were described by mclachlin j as being two-fold, “to preserve the rights of the detained individual and to maintain the repute and integrity of our system of justice” (r v. hebert, [1990] 2 scr 151, at p 179). these rights were “designed to ensure that individuals suspected of crime are dealt with fairly and humanely” (robert j. sharpe and kent roach, the charter of rights and freedoms (6th ed 2017), at p 292; see also re b.c motor vehicle act, at p 503). they are, as martin j has recently put it, “the core tenets of fairness in our criminal justice system” (poulin, at para. 5). [128] only ss. 8 and 11(b) within the ss. 7 to 14 grouping have been found by this court to apply to corporations. in hunter, the court accepted, without discussion or explanation, that the s 8 right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure could apply to corporations subsequently, in thomson newspapers ltd v canada (director of investigation and research, restrictive trade practices commission), [1990] 1 scr 425, at pp. 521-22, la forest j noted that an unlawful search or seizure could have a significant impact on the privacy rights of individuals within a corporation. he noted that since “[p]eople . . . think of their own offices as personal space in a manner somewhat akin to the way in which they view their homes, and act accordingly”, the requirement to submit to a search of business premises could “amount to a requirement to reveal aspects of one’s personal life to the chilling glare of official inspection” (pp. 521-22). [129] the inference that breaches of s 8 can have a direct impact on an individual in a corporation, however, is not logically available under s 12. the individuals within the corporation are not the subject of any treatment or punishment imposed on the corporate entity. this is reinforced by the corporation’s separate legal personality, as stressed by lamer cj in r v. wholesale travel group inc., [1991] 3 scr 154: the corporate form of business organization is chosen by individuals because of its numerous advantages (legal and otherwise) those who cloak themselves in the corporate veil, and who rely on the legal distinction between themselves and the corporate entity when it is to their benefit to do so should not be allowed to deny this distinction in these circumstances (where the distinction is not to their benefit). [pp. 182-83] [130] in cip, the court extended the s 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time to corporations on the basis that any accused, corporate or human, has, as stevenson j said, “a legitimate interest in being tried within a reasonable time”, and the right to a fair trial (p 856; see also pp. 857-59). he acknowledged, however, that some of the harms of a pending criminal accusation, such as “‘stigmatization of the accused, loss of privacy, stress and anxiety resulting from a multitude of factors, including possible disruption of family, social life and work’” were not “concerns [that] logically appl[ied] to corporate entities” (p 862 (emphasis added), citing mills v. the queen, [1986] 1 scr 863, at p 920). as a result, he concluded that a corporation could not rely on a presumption of prejudice. [131] just as corporations cannot experience human reactions such as stress or anxiety, neither can they experience suffering, since, as chamberland j.a noted [translation] “suffering, whether physical or mental, is unique to living beings, not corporate entities and inanimate objects” (para. 56). [132] significantly, corporations have been found not to be included under both ss. 7 and 11(c). in r v. amway corp., [1989] 1 scr 21, the court concluded that the s 11(c) right not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings does not apply to corporations. sopinka j concluded that since a corporation cannot testify, the right of an accused person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself in s 11(c) is not available to a corporation. applying a purposive interpretation to s 11(c), sopinka j. was of the view that it was “intended to protect the individual against the affront to dignity and privacy inherent in a practice which enables the prosecution to force the person charged to supply the evidence out of his or her own mouth” (p 40) in his words, “it would strain the interpretation of s 11(c) if an artificial entity were held to be a witness” (p 39). [133] in concluding that s 7, which protects against deprivations of life, liberty and security of the person, does not apply to corporations (irwin toy, at p 1004), dickson cj and lamer and wilson jj., for the court, expressed their resistance to applying s 7 to corporations as follows: in our opinion, a corporation cannot avail itself of the protection offered by s 7 of the charter. first, we would have to conceive of a manner in which a corporation could be deprived of its “life, liberty or security of the person” we have already noted that it is nonsensical to speak of a corporation being put in jail. a plain, common sense reading of the phrase “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person” serves to underline the human element involved; only human beings can enjoy these rights. [pp. 1003-4] [134] the court in irwin toy also concluded that bankruptcy and winding up proceedings did not engage s 7, because that “would stretch the meaning of the right to life beyond recognition” (p 1003). and it rejected the argument that corporations should be protected against deprivations of economic liberty: the intentional exclusion of property from s 7, and the substitution therefor of “security of the person” has, in our estimation, a dual effect. first, it leads to a general inference that economic rights as generally encompassed by the term “property” are not within the perimeters of the s. 7 guarantee. . . . in so stating, we find the second effect of the inclusion of “security of the person” to be that a corporation’s economic rights find no constitutional protection in that section. that is, read as a whole, it appears to us that this section was intended to confer protection on a singularly human level. [underlining in original; italics added; pp. 1003-4.] [135] as in irwin toy, the purpose of s 12 is to confer protection on a “singularly human level”. in line with the global consensus, its purpose is to prevent the state from inflicting physical or mental pain and suffering through degrading and dehumanizing treatment or punishment. it is meant to protect human dignity and respect the inherent worth of individuals. to paraphrase sopinka j in amway corp., it would strain the interpretation of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment under s 12 if a corporation, an artificial entity, could be said to experience it. [136] corporations are, without question, entitled to robust legal protection, constitutional or otherwise. but protection for a quality it does not have, namely, human dignity or the ability to experience psychological or physical pain and suffering, is a remedy without a right. since it cannot be said that corporations have an interest that falls within the purpose of the guarantee, they do not fall within s 12’s scope. [137] accordingly, i would allow the appeal. english version of the reasons delivered by kasirer j — [138] for the reasons given by chamberland ja, and with respect for those of a different opinion, i share my colleagues’ view that the appeal must be allowed. i fully agree with chamberland j.a that the respondent, 9147-0732 québec inc., a corporation, cannot avail itself of the protection of s 12 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms to challenge the constitutionality of s 197.1 of the building act, cqlr, c. b-11. [139] starting, quite rightly, from the language of s 12, as abella j and brown and rowe jj. propose to do in their respective reasons, chamberland ja pointed to the word “cruel” and reasoned that it would distort the ordinary meaning of the words to say that it is possible to be cruel to a corporate entity (2019 qcca 373, at para. 53 (canlii)). i agree. [140] he was careful to adhere to the principle that charter rights must be given a large, liberal and purposive interpretation, a principle whose relevance was emphasized again recently by wagner c.j in conseil scolaire francophone de la colombie-britannique v. british columbia, 2020 scc 13, at para. 4. at the conclusion of his analysis based primarily on the decisions of this court, including r v smith (edward dewey), [1987] 1 scr 1045, chamberland j.a found that, although the scope of s 12 has been broadened over the years, [translation] “its evolution is still concerned only with human beings (human dignity) and provides no basis . . . for extending its application to corporations” (para. 59). he further reasoned that “[t]he assertion that no one is to be subjected to cruel treatment or punishment cannot be dissociated from the concept of human dignity” (para. 59) in arriving at this interpretation of s 12 — unassailable, in my opinion — chamberland ja also relied on sources drawn from domestic law and international law, an approach perfectly in keeping with the principles of charter interpretation. [141] with regard to the ground of appeal that a corporation might enjoy the protection of s 12 through the natural persons closely related to it, chamberland ja. relied on this court’s decisions, but also on english case law and the civil code of québec, to explain in a compelling manner that the respondent was [translation] “asserting rights here that are not its own” (para. 75). again, no error has been shown. [142] in this case, all the relevant factors are to the same effect, indicating that the protection offered by s 12 does not extend to corporations i therefore find it unnecessary to consider questions relating to the proper approach to constitutional interpretation or the place of international law and comparative law in that approach any further. in my view, chamberland ja’s reasons permit us to conclude, without saying more, that the appeal must be allowed. appeal allowed.
i. introduction and background [1] at the conclusion of the hearing of this appeal, the court allowed the appeal with costs throughout, and reinstated the order of judge g smith of the provincial court of british columbia, dated september 26, 2016, with reasons to follow. these are the reasons for that judgment. [2] in dbs v. srg;. ljw v. tar;. henry v. henry; hiemstra v. hiemstra, 2006 scc 37, [2006] 2 scr 231, this court interpreted s 15.1 of the divorce act, rsc 1985, c 3 (2nd supp.), as precluding a court from granting an order on an original application for retroactive child support unless the child beneficiary is a “child of the marriage”, as defined in the divorce act, when the application is made. this appeal raises the issue of whether the court’s authority to grant an order under s 152 of the family law act, sbc 2011, c 25 (“fla”), is similarly confined more particularly, is it possible to vary a child support order under the fla after the order has expired, and after the child support beneficiary ceases to be a “child” as defined in the fla? [3] this question arises from the breakdown of a common law relationship between the parties, danelle michel and sean graydon. they are the parents of ag, born in december 1991. after ms. michel and mr. graydon separated in 1994, ag. lived with ms. michel, and mr. graydon agreed to pay child support of $341/month, based on an annual income of $39,832. this was formalized in a consent order made on march 29, 2001. [4] mr. graydon had, in fact, understated his income. he earned $45,580 in 2001, and — with the exception of 2004 — his actual annual income continued to exceed his disclosed income until his child support obligation was terminated by court order effective april 30, 2012. [5] during ag’s childhood, ms. michel was dependent on income assistance or disability benefits, in return for which she was required to assign her rights to receive child support to the minister under the employment and assistance act, sbc 2002, c 40 while ms michel’s rights were assigned, the minister never authorized an application to review child support for ag. [6] in january 2015, ms michel applied to the provincial court to retroactively vary child support for the period between april 2009 (later amended to april 2001) and april 2012, to reflect mr. graydon’s actual income during that time. in granting that order, smith prov. ct. j rejected mr. graydon’s argument that, because a.g was not a “child” when ms michel brought her application, the court lacked authority to grant the order sought. in his view, and while his authority may have been so restricted under the now-repealed family relations act, rsbc 1996, c 128, no such limitation exists in the fla. applying this court’s decision in dbs, he held that the circumstances of ms michel’s application warranted granting an award for retroactive child support her delay in bringing the application was reasonable; mr. graydon had engaged in blameworthy conduct by failing to accurately disclose his income; ag suffered as a result, as she could not attend her desired post-secondary program; and mr. graydon would not experience hardship from a retroactive award. he therefore ordered mr. graydon to pay $23,000 in retroactive child support — half to ms. michel, and half to ag. [7] the supreme court of british columbia allowed mr graydon’s appeal (2017 bcsc 887), holding that this court’s conclusion in dbs that an application for child support must be made while the child remains a “child of the marriage” was equally applicable where child support is sought under the fla ms michel then appealed to the british columbia court of appeal (2018 bcca 449, 20 bclr (6th) 1). [8] after ms. michel’s appeal was heard, but before judgment was rendered, the court of appeal sat as a five-member division in dring v. gheyle, 2018 bcca 435, 17 bclr (6th) 30. in dring, a majority of the court of appeal held that the fla does not authorize a court to retroactively vary child support if the beneficiary is not a “child” at the time of the application in light of dring, ms michel’s appeal was dismissed. dbs, the court of appeal held, established a general rule precluding all orders for child support where the application is brought after the beneficiary is no longer a “child”. it followed that the hearing judge did not have authority to grant the order for retroactive child support that ms. michel sought. [9] i disagree. section 152 of the fla authorizes a court to retroactively vary a child support order, irrespective of whether the beneficiary is a “child” at the time of the application, and irrespective of whether the order has expired. the order of smith prov. ct. j should therefore not have been disturbed. ii analysis authority to grant a retroactive child support award (1) dbs. [10] in dbs, this court endorsed certain important principles governing orders for child support (including retroactive child support) that merit restating here: - child support is the right of the child, which right cannot be bargained away by the parents, and survives the breakdown of the relationship of the child’s parents (para. 38); - child support should, as much as possible, provide children with the same standard of living they enjoyed when their parents were together (para. 38); - the child support owed will vary based upon the income of the payor parent, and is not confined to furnishing the “necessities of life” (paras. 38-45). - retroactive awards are not truly “retroactive”, since they merely hold payors to the legal obligation they always had to pay support commensurate with their income (para. 2); - retroactive awards are not confined to “exceptional circumstances” or “rare cases” (para. 5); and - in determining whether to make a retroactive award, the payor parent’s interest in certainty in his/her obligations must be balanced with the need for “fairness and . . flexibility” a court should consider whether the recipient parent’s delay in seeking retroactive support was reasonable in the circumstances, the conduct of the payor parent, the circumstances of the child, and the hardship the retroactive award might entail (para. 133). [11] further, this court cautioned that, when deciding an application for retroactive child support, a court must analyze the statutory scheme in which the application was brought (at para. 54): “different policy choices made by the federal and provincial governments must be respected” (para. 55) while a “retroactive” child support award does not impose a new obligation but simply serves to enforce a past unfulfilled obligation, the mechanism for enforcing that obligation must be found in the governing legislative scheme a court can enforce an unfulfilled child support obligation only where the governing legislation provides a mechanism for enforcement, and only in accordance with that mechanism. [12] in dbs, this court examined the enforcement mechanism set out in 15.1 of the divorce act, which addresses original child support orders. this result follows from the language of s 15.1, which permits a court to make an original order compelling child support payments only for “children of the marriage. and s 2 defines “child of the marriage” as “a child of two spouses or former spouses who, at the material time, is under the age of majority and who has not withdrawn from their charge, or is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life” the court concluded in dbs that the “material time” for retroactive child support awards is the time of the application, and therefore that a court has no authority to grant a retroactive award of child support under s 15.1 of the divorce act if the child beneficiary is no longer a “child of the marriage” at the time of the application (paras. 88-89). [13] since dbs, lower courts have grappled with whether the same principle also applies to provincial legislative schemes, or to variation applications under s 17 of the divorce act (see colucci v. colucci, 2017 onca 892, 138 or (3d) 321; dring; brear v brear, 2019 abca 419, 97 alta l.r (6th) 1) in particular, courts have recognized that unjust results can flow from imposing impediments that prevent otherwise deserving parents from seeking retroactive child support (colucci, at para. 26; dring, at paras. 155-56, per hunter ja, concurring; brear, at para. 60). indeed, fairness concerns appear to have animated this court’s approach to jurisdiction in dbs, as it saw fit to create an exception that applies whenever a recipient parent initiates formal proceedings while the beneficiary remains a child of the marriage (para. 130) moreover, and significantly, because women continue to face a disproportionate burden of the economic consequences flowing from marriage breakdown (moge v. moge, [1992] 3 scr 813, at pp. 849-50; if, at para. 20), they are also most affected by barriers that prevent courts from considering applications for retroactive child support. motivated by these concerns, lower courts continue to create exceptions establishing jurisdiction to award support in respect of beneficiaries who are no longer children of the marriage (brear, at para. 63). [14] given this history, i agree with my colleague martin j that this court’s interpretation in dbs of “material time”, as that term appears in s 2 of the divorce act, might merit reconsideration. in my respectful view, however, our deliberations on this point would likely benefit from submissions on-point. further, it is unnecessary to undertake that reconsideration in order to resolve this appeal. the narrow question to be decided here is, ultimately, whether the fla authorizes variation of an existing child support order after the beneficiary ceases to be a “child” mr graydon argues that dbs states a general rule conditioning a court’s authority to grant both original and variation applications for retroactive child support upon the child beneficiary remaining a dependent child he relies heavily upon a single passage from dbs where, in disposing of one of the four appeals addressed in the dbs reasons (henry v. henry), which involved an application to retroactively vary an existing child support order, bastarache j., for the majority, wrote the following: i would add that the eldest child affected by rowbotham j.’s order was no longer a child of the marriage when the notice of motion for retroactive support was filed. in the circumstances of this appeal, however, this fact has no effect on the jurisdiction of the court to make a retroactive child support order under the divorce act. because mr. henry did not disclose his income increases to ms. henry earlier, she was compelled to serve him with a notice to disclose/notice of motion in order to ascertain his income for the years relevant to this appeal. this formal legal procedure, contemplated in the guidelines and a necessary antecedent to the present appeal, sufficed to trigger the jurisdiction of the court under the divorce act because it was completed prior to the time the eldest child ceased being a child of the marriage, the court was able to make a retroactive order for this daughter. [para. 150] mr graydon’s argument is that it is necessarily implicit in this passage that bastarache j would have found that, but for the earlier delivery of the notice to disclose/notice of motion, the court would have lacked authority to make the order sought, since the subject child “was no longer a child of the marriage when the notice of motion for retroactive support was filed.” [15] significantly, however, the henry appeal arose from an application to vary an existing child support order which engaged s 17 of the divorce act. unlike s 15.1, ss. 17(1) and 17(4) do not refer to “children of the marriage”. while it may therefore not have been strictly necessary to address jurisdiction in relation to the henry appeal, it remains that “a case is only an authority for what it actually decides” (quinn v. leathem, [1901] ac 495 (hl), at p 506). by referencing the phrase “child of the marriage”, bastarache j.’s comments were plainly limited to the jurisdictional issue that arises under s 15.1 of the divorce act, which he had already canvassed in his reasons (dbs, at paras. 88-89). i therefore reject mr. graydon’s suggestion that the discussion of jurisdiction in relation to the henry appeal was implicitly intended to apply to retroactive variation orders under s 17 of the divorce act, without any reference to the language of that provision. on my reading, the court did not consider or decide the issue as it was unnecessary to dispose of the appeal. dbs therefore does not stand for the proposition that courts can retroactively vary child support only while the child beneficiary is a “child of the marriage” (see colucci, at paras. 12-14; dring, at paras. 190-200, per hunter ja, concurring; brear, at paras. 46-50). [16] nor do i accept that the court in dbs stated a sweeping principle that transcends the divorce act to embrace all other statutory schemes and operates irrespective of legislative intent. indeed, the court insisted that provinces remain “free to espouse a different paradigm” than that adopted by parliament in the divorce act (para. 54) and where they do so via legislation establishing an application-based regime such as the fla, and where an application for retroactive child support is brought thereunder, it is that legislation which governs a court’s authority to grant retroactive child support (paras. 55-56). [17] moreover, courts should not be hasty to recognize jurisdictional impediments that bar applications for retroactive child support this is because jurisdictional constraints are “inimical to the principles and policy objectives articulated in [dbs]” (brear, at para. 60), and may be imposed only where the legislature has clearly intended that they be imposed. such constraints must therefore be apparent in the statutory scheme, bearing in mind that preventing courts from even considering an award for retroactive child support would prevent enforcement of an unfulfilled legal obligation even in the most appropriate of circumstances. as sharpe ja explained in colucci: i can see no reason why the court should be deprived of jurisdiction to consider the request of a recipient parent who struggled to support the children and to shift part of that burden to the payor parent if there was a change in circumstance that would have justified a variation while the children were still children of the marriage . . . . [a] regime that gave payor parents immunity after the children ceased to be children of the marriage would create a perverse incentive if the payor parent is to be absolved from responsibility once the children cease to be “children of the marriage”, the payor whose income increases might be encouraged not to respond to his or her increased obligations in the hope that the reciprocal spouse will delay making an application for a variation increasing support until the children lose their status to avoid opening the door to an increased obligation . . . . [para. 26] unless compelled by the applicable legislative scheme, courts should avoid creating any incentive whatsoever for payor parents to avoid meeting their child support obligations (dbs, at para. 4) permitting retroactive child support awards, as this court recognized in dbs, is perfectly consistent with the child support system (para. 60). (2) the fla [18] i turn now to interpreting the relevant provisions of the statutory scheme at issue here: the fla. for the purposes of determining who is eligible to receive child support, the fla defines the term “child” in different ways. while “child” is defined in s 1 as meaning “a person who is under 19 years of age”, the fla expands that general definition in relation to a parent or guardian’s duty to provide child support (ss. 146 and 147). in essence, the fla (like the divorce act) says that children who are dependent on their parents are eligible to receive child support. [19] further, the fla authorizes two kinds of applications respecting child support. first, s 149(1) and (2), taken together, authorize a child’s parent or guardian, the child, a person acting on behalf of the child or (if the right to child support has been assigned to a minister) a minister to apply for an order of child support. secondly, s 152 authorizes a court to “change, suspend or terminate an order respecting child support”, and to do so prospectively or retroactively, so long as the court is “satisfied that at least one of the following exists, and take[s] it into consideration”: (a) a change in circumstances, as provided for in the child support guidelines, has occurred since the order respecting child support was made; (b) evidence of a substantial nature that was not available during the previous hearing has become available; (c) evidence of a lack of financial disclosure by a party was discovered after the last order was made. [20] ms. michel relies on s 152 in support of her application — that is, she says she seeks to vary the march 29, 2001 consent order for two reasons, mr. graydon argues that she cannot succeed under s 152. first, he contends that the application must be made while the beneficiary remains a dependent child. and secondly, he says that s 152 can be used only to vary an extant order that imposes continuing child support obligations at the time the application is made. properly interpreted, however, and as i shall explain, s 152 of the fla does not support either of mr. graydon’s arguments. far from erecting barriers, s 152 creates an avenue for courts to retroactively change any child support order, irrespective of the beneficiary’s dependent status and irrespective of whether the order is extant at the time of the application. [21] it is now trite law in canada that statutory interpretation entails discerning legislative intent by examining statutory text in its entire context and in its grammatical and ordinary sense, in harmony with the statute’s scheme and objects. in this case, this court’s task of interpreting s 152 of the fla has been lightened considerably by persuasive judicial analyses at other courts regarding its meaning (see dring, at paras. 133-73, per hunter ja, concurring) and the meaning of similar provisions in other legislation (see brear, at paras. 29-50, per pentelechuk ja;. colucci, at paras. 8-31, per sharpe ja;. buckingham v. buckingham, 2013 abqb 155, 554 ar. 256, at paras. 40-48, per strekaf j (as she then was)). [22] examining s 152 of the fla in the light of this court’s examination in dbs of s 15.1 of the divorce act, what becomes readily apparent is what s 152 does not contain. the fla replaced its predecessor, the family relations act, which stated, for both original and variation applications, that “[a]ny person may apply for an order . . . on behalf of a child” (s 91(3)). relying on dbs, courts have interpreted this language as conditioning a court’s authority to order child support upon the beneficiary’s dependant status, which was the state of the law in british columbia when the fla was enacted (de rooy v. bergstrom, 2010 bcca 5, 4 bclr (5th) 74, at para. 65, citing mcdonald v mcdonald, 2008 bcsc 1203, at para. 34 (canlii)). while it is unnecessary to decide here whether a reference to the defined term “child” should properly be construed as limiting the court’s authority to grant retroactive support, what is clear is that this same language was not included in s 152(1) when the fla was enacted. section 152(1) contains no reference to the defined term “child” that might serve to qualify the authority of a court to vary child support. rather, s 152(1) states simply that “[o]n application, a court may change, suspend or terminate an order respecting child support, and may do so prospectively or retroactively.” while s 152(2) lists preconditions (at least one of which must be present before making a variation order), none of those conditions relate to the dependent status of the beneficiary of a child support order. [23] examining the fla more broadly makes plain that, where the legislature intends to state limitations relating to the types of persons who can bring an application (or on whose behalf an application can be brought), it states such limitations expressly. in this respect, s 152’s bare reference to an “application”, with no conditions upon who may apply, contrasts sharply with other applications authorized by the fla (see, eg, s 45 (“application by a guardian”); s 148(3) (“application by a party”); s 157(1) (“application by a payor or recipient”); s 164(3) (“application by a spouse”)) the absence from s 152 of any limitations comparable to those used throughout the fla implies that they were deliberately excluded (see r sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at p 248). [24] further, s 152 allows the court to “change, suspend or terminate” an order respecting child support. given that s 170(a) of the fla authorizes child support orders of an indefinite duration, payor parents may need to resort to s 152 to terminate an indefinite order after the support beneficiary ceases to be a dependent child. indeed, that is exactly what mr. graydon did to terminate his child support payments in 2012. there would, however, be no way to change or terminate an indefinite child support order after the beneficiary ceases to be a “child”, if s 152 were subject to the limitation advanced by mr graydon (dring, at paras. 142-44) in my view, the legislature is unlikely to have intended that result. [25] as to mr graydon’s argument that s 152’s operation is confined to varying an extant (that is, not expired or terminated) child support order, i reiterate that retroactive child support simply holds payor parents to their existing (and unfulfilled) legal obligations (dbs, at para. 2). modifying a previous court order to reflect the proper measure of support “is in no way arbitrary for the payor parent” (dbs, at para. 68). thus, there is nothing wrong in principle with varying an order that no longer imposes continuing child support obligations at the time the application is made, so long as the statutory text allows for that result. [26] with respect to the language of s 152, i observe that the provision allows the court to vary “an order respecting child support” mr. graydon’s argument therefore rests on the premise that once a child support order expires, it is no longer an order respecting child support such a conclusion is belied, however, by examining s 152 alongside other provisions of the fla that expressly limit the court’s ability to vary orders that are no longer extant. section 167 of the fla, for example, authorizes a court to vary a spousal support order. much of s 167 mirrors s 152, but subs. 167(3) imposes an additional caveat where the variation relates to an expired spousal support order: . . . if an order requires payment of spousal support for a definite period or until a specified event occurs, the court, on an application made after the expiration of that period or occurrence of that event, may not make an order . . . for the purpose of resuming spousal support unless satisfied that (a) the order is necessary to relieve economic hardship that (i) arises from [a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either spouse [that] occurred since the order respecting spousal support was made], and (ii) is related to the relationship between the spouses, and (b) the changed circumstances, had they existed at the time the order was made, would likely have resulted in a different order. to be sure, the text of s 167 confines a court’s ability to vary an expired order. the point here is twofold: s 167 shows that the fla contemplates that a court may vary an expired order; and, s 152 places none of the restrictions upon a court’s authority to vary a child support order which s 167 imposes upon a court’s authority to vary a spousal support order. [27] similarly, while s 187(1) of the fla allows the court to shorten, extend, terminate, or otherwise change an order respecting protection, s 187(2) requires an application under s 187 to be made “before the expiry of the order that is the subject of the application.” this provision further demonstrates that the fla allows expired orders to be varied, subject to the express limitations that it imposes for specific types of orders. mr. graydon is effectively urging this court to read similar limitations into s 152, but that avenue is simply not open to us where the scheme of the fla shows the legislature’s intent to give courts broad discretion in matters of child support. [28] in sum, the text of s 152 and the scheme of the fla indicate that the legislature authorized a court to vary any child support order, irrespective of whether the beneficiary remains a dependent child, and irrespective of whether the order continues to require payment this makes sense given that one of the purposes for replacing the family relations act with the fla was to “expan[d] on the circumstances under which a court may vary a child support order” (british columbia, ministry of attorney general, white paper on family relations act reform: proposals for a new family law act (2010), at p 117). straining to read jurisdictional impediments into s 152 that would prevent a court from ordering retroactive child support in circumstances in which such an order is warranted would defeat that legislative purpose and create a perverse incentive for payor parents to avoid their obligations. is a retroactive award appropriate in this case? [29] having decided that the applicable legislative scheme confers authority on a court to order retroactive child support, the question then arises whether a court should order retroactive child support in the circumstances of the case. to be clear, and as dbs shows, this is a distinct question and entails a distinct analysis a court hearing an application for retroactive child support must consider whether the recipient parent’s delay in seeking variation is reasonable in the circumstances, the payor parent’s conduct, the circumstances of the child, and whether any hardship would result from a retroactive award (dbs, at para. 133). these same considerations are equally applicable after the child support beneficiary ceases to be a dependent child; while the beneficiary may no longer be a dependent child because of the recipient parent’s delay, it remains open to the recipient parent to show that their delay was reasonable. [30] child support awards are highly discretionary, and the hearing judge’s findings and inferences of fact may not be disturbed absent an error on an extricable question of law, a palpable and overriding error, or a fundamental mischaracterization or misapprehension of the evidence (rick v. brandsema, 2009 scc 10, [2009] 1 scr. 295, at para. 30; see also hickey v. hickey, [1999] 2 scr 518, at para. 11). here, as i have explained, the hearing judge was correct to conclude that s 152 gave him authority to order retroactive child support. he also identified and applied the factors i have just recounted from dbs. his conclusion that ag experienced hardship in her childhood as a result of mr. graydon’s neglect of his child support obligations was amply supported on the record. the hearing judge also found that mr. graydon would not experience hardship from a retroactive award. [31] as to mr. graydon’s conduct as the payor parent in this case, it is really this simple. when a payor parent fails to pay the appropriate amount of child support, the recipient parent is left to shoulder the burden. if the recipient parent does not have the means to provide their child reasonable support, the child suffers. both the recipient parent and the child may experience hardship because of a payor parent’s neglect. seen in this light, it bears repeating that retroactive child support is not exceptional relief (dbs, at para. 5): there is nothing exceptional about judicial relief from the miserable consequences that can flow from payor parents’ indifference to their child support obligations this is not to say that hardship is required to ground an award for retroactive child support, as there is also nothing exceptional about relief that creates a systemic incentive for payor parents to meet their obligations in the first place. just as an order of child support is intended to provide children with the same standard of living they enjoyed when their parents were together (dbs, at para. 38), an order of retroactive child support provides an (albeit imperfect) remedy where that does not occur. and as this court recognized in dbs, “courts are not to be discouraged from defending the rights of children when they have the opportunity to do so” (para. 60). [32] retroactive child support awards will commonly be appropriate where payor parents fail to disclose increases in their income. again, dbs is instructive: “a payor parent who knowingly avoids or diminishes his/her support obligation to his/her children should not be allowed to profit from such conduct” (para. 107). and where the strategy for avoiding child support obligations takes the form of inadequate or delayed disclosure of income, the effect on the child support regime is especially pernicious. this is because the methodology adopted by the federal child support guidelines, sor/97‑175, which are expressly incorporated in the fla, results in information asymmetry. apart from shared parenting arrangements, the guidelines calculate child support payments solely from the payor parent’s income. at any given point in time, therefore, the payor parent has the information required to determine the appropriate amount of child support owing, while the recipient parent may not. quite simply, the payor parent is the one who holds the cards. while an application-based regime places responsibility on both parents in relation to child support (dbs, at para. 56), the practical reality is that, without adequate disclosure, the recipient parent will not be well-positioned to marshall the case for variation. [33] failure to disclose material information is the cancer of family law litigation (cunha v cunha (1994), 99 bclr (2d) 93 (sc), at para. 9, quoted in leskun v leskun, 2006 scc 25, [2006] 1 scr 920, at para. 34) and yet, payor parents are typically well aware of their obligation as a parent to support their children, and are subject to a duty of full and honest disclosure — a duty comparable to that arising in matrimonial negotiations (brandsema, at paras. 47-49). the payor parent’s obligation to disclose changes in income protects the integrity and certainty afforded by an existing order or agreement respecting child support absent full and honest disclosure, the recipient parent — and the child — are vulnerable to the payor parent’s non-disclosure. [34] it follows that i agree with the hearing judge that mr. graydon’s failure to accurately disclose his income at the time of the march 29, 2001 order, and failure to disclose material changes in his income for the 11 years that followed, constituted blameworthy conduct, which justifies an order for retroactive child support (and which also eliminates any need to protect mr. graydon’s interest in the certainty of his child support obligations (dbs, at para. 125)) as i have explained, failure to disclose material changes in income undermines the child support regime imposed by the guidelines. the record here also indicates that mr. graydon knew about his daughter’s financial circumstances and made disparaging remarks about her standard of living instead of modifying his child support payments to assist her. [35] the only true dispute before the hearing judge in relation to the factors governing retroactive child support was whether ms michel’s delay in seeking retroactive support was reasonable. the hearing judge accepted her evidence that she did not apply for retroactive support because she had suffered a severe injury and because her right to support was assigned to the minister. i see no basis for interfering with the hearing judge’s conclusion that ms. michel’s delay was reasonable in light of those circumstances. even were it otherwise, the reasonableness of ms. michel’s delay had to be weighed against the other factors canvassed by the hearing judge, all of which showed that a retroactive award would be appropriate. [36] finally, mr. graydon contests the effective date of retroactive child support adopted in the hearing judge’s award the hearing judge awarded retroactive child support dating back to the march 29, 2001 consent order of child support (which he treated as taking effect on april 1, 2001). the hearing judge’s conclusion was based on his finding that the date when ms michel presented a settlement agreement to mr. graydon was the date of effective notice given to him. mr. graydon argues that merely presenting a draft settlement agreement could not serve as effective notice. his argument on this point is immaterial, however, because the date of effective notice is not relevant when a payor parent has engaged in blameworthy conduct (irrespective of the degree of blameworthiness). again, in light of such conduct, there is no need to protect mr. graydon’s interest in the certainty of his obligations beyond the date when circumstances changed materially (dbs, at para. 125) having furnished an inaccurate picture of his income from the start of his child support payments, it does not lie in his mouth to now insist that it was inappropriate for the hearing judge to award support dating back to the march 29, 2001 consent order. indeed, in the circumstances of this case it was clearly appropriate for the hearing judge to do so. iii conclusion [37] for these reasons, the court allowed ms michel’s appeal with costs throughout, and reinstated the hearing judge’s order. the reasons of wagner cj and martin j were delivered by martin j — i. introduction [38] the purpose and promise of child support is to protect the financial entitlements due to children by their parents canadian jurisprudence has not consistently fulfilled that promise when it comes to historical child support, which is the term used to describe when retroactive child support is sought after the child no longer qualifies as a beneficiary under the applicable legislation. this is evidenced by contrary judgments across different provinces about whether applications for historical awards can be considered, a multiplying number of exceptions to principles set out in dbs v srg, 2006 scc 37, [2006] 2 scr 231, and a growing body of jurisprudence and social science findings demonstrating that, sometimes, parents delay their application for child support to protect their children from harm or because making an application is impracticable or inaccessible in their circumstances. [39] in the case at bar, the appellant danelle michel asks this court to recognize that s 152 of british columbia’s family law act, sbc 2011, c 25, does not constrain the courts’ ability to grant retroactive child support once the child beneficiary is no longer a “child” under that legislation. the british columbia court of appeal held that, in dbs, this court imposed a jurisdictional bar preventing such claims from being heard (2018 bcca 449, 20 bclr (6th) 1). [40] in his reasons, my colleague brown j analyzes s 152 of the family law act and concludes that the provincial legislation allows parents to seek retroactive child support even after their child no longer fits the definition of “child” in s 1 of the family law act (brown j.’s reasons, at paras. 19-28). i agree with his conclusion, his analysis of s 152, and that dbs did not decide this question however, there are other compelling considerations and numerous additional reasons why s 152 should be read to permit such applications. the jurisprudence on child support calls for a “fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects” (chartier v chartier, [1999] 1 scr 242, at para. 32) such objects include a consideration of the best interests of the child. the required contextual and purposive reading of s 152 thus requires us to look to its wider legislative purposes, societal implications, and actual impacts. seen in this way, a jurisdictional bar preventing these cases from being heard not only rests on unsound legal foundations, it is inconsistent with the bedrock principles underlying modern child support and contributes to systemic inequalities. [41] child support obligations arise upon a child’s birth or the separation of their parents. retroactive awards are a recognized way to enforce such pre-existing, free-standing obligations and to recover monies owed but yet unpaid. such a debt is a continuing obligation which does not evaporate or fade into history upon a child’s 18th or 19th birthday or their graduation from university. under s 152 of the family law act, a debt exists if the child qualified as a beneficiary at the time the support was due, irrespective of their status at the moment of the application this reading not only accords with the text, legislative scheme, and purpose of s 152, it enhances access to justice, reinforces that child support is the right of the child and the responsibility of the parents, encourages the payment of child support, acknowledges that there are many reasons why a parent may delay making an application, and recognizes how the underpayment of child support leads to hardship and contributes to the feminization of poverty. in short, allowing recipient parents to make claims for historical child support is in the best interests of children and promotes equality and access to justice for all. [42] child support issues rarely make their way to this court due to the high cost of appeals and the comparatively low value of awards. the evasiveness of review attaching to historical child support issues justifies that we begin to discuss and reconcile the deeply divided and confused jurisprudence which prevents the hearing of historical child support claims across canada. [43] in these reasons, i first provide an overview of the purposes and principles of child support in canadian law to lay the groundwork for a fair, large, and liberal interpretation of the british columbia legislation. second, i turn to s 152 and conclude that the family law act allows variation applications for historical child support because the imposition of a jurisdictional bar prevents access to justice for children, fails to account for the reasons why support applications may be delayed, and creates significant financial hardship for children and their caregivers third, i discuss the factors that courts ought to take into account to determine the scope of historical child support awards. my application of these principles to the facts of this case leads me to agree with brown j and allow ms. michel’s appeal. ii the principles of child support [44] child support is the means through which the law ensures that individuals with parental responsibilities provide financial assistance to their children upon separation from their children’s other parent(s), or upon their children’s birth if the parents never cohabitated. the historical evolution of canadian child support law bears on the proper interpretation not only the family law act, but also of the divorce act, rsc 1985, c 3 (2nd supp.), and similar legislation across the country. pre-guidelines jurisprudence and legislation on child support [45] far from being solely moral in nature, the child support obligation “arises out of the common law, equity and statute” (macminn v. macminn (1995), 174 ar. 261 (ca), at para. 15) indeed, child support has found statutory expression as a feature of canadian family law since 1855 (an act to amend the law relating to the custody of infants, suc 1855, 18 vict., c 126, s 1; see also p millar and a h. gauthier, “what were they thinking? the development of child support guidelines in canada” (2002), 17 cjls 139, at pp. 139-40). the law has long recognized that a parent’s obligation of support to their child “arise[s] automatically, upon birth” and that these obligations “have come to be refined, quantified and amplified” through statute (dbs, at para. 37, citing poissant v. barrette (1879), 3 ln 12 (que. ca)). [46] earlier statutory schemes, including the first iterations of the divorce act, treated need and judicial discretion as the governing principles in awards of child support, leaving it to judges to decide upon a reasonable sum to commit for the care of the child. in response, the courts attempted to specify guiding principles for awards of child support (see, eg,. paras v paras, [1971] 1 o.r 130 (ca), at pp. 134-35; levesque v levesque (1994), 155 a.r 26 (ca), at pp 29-42; vincent v vincent (1995), 132 nfld. & peir 181 (nfld. ca), at paras. 38-46; see also wright v. wright (1996), 141 sask. r 44 (ca), at paras. 35-39; c. j. rogerson, “judicial interpretation of the spousal and child support provisions of the divorce act, 1985 (part ii)” (1991), 7 cflq 271, at pp. 276-85). [47] consistent with the primacy of the child’s best interests, the courts thus recognized that “the children of the marriage should be sheltered from the economic consequences of divorce” (willick v. willick, [1994] 3 scr 670, at p 690). since the provisions of the divorce act evinced parliament’s intention that “the children’s needs come first”, neither a delay in enforcing the child’s right to support on the part of the custodial parent nor the putative “retroactivity” of a support order could override the parent’s obligation to support their children (macminn, at para. 15; cherry v. cherry (1996), 24 bclr (3d) 158 (ca), at para. 11). [48] commentators, however, criticized this discretionary approach, which was simultaneously subjective and needs-focussed, for being uncertain, inconsistent, and often resulting in unfair awards. in many cases, the inadequacy of awards resulted from judges, counsel, or parties underestimating the cost of raising a child, coupled with the courts’ insistence on proof of the child’s expenses. one adverse impact of this approach was to place the burden of proof on the custodial parent, though this same parent would often be the least able to afford litigation (federal/provincial/territorial family law committee, child support: public discussion paper (1991), at pp. 1 and 4-5; wang v. wang (1998), 58 bclr (3d) 159 (ca), at para 13; t maisonneuve, “child support under the federal and quebec guidelines: a step forward or behind?” (1999), 16 can j fam l 284, at p 300) in cases where such evidence was not adduced, there existed the concern that any award made under the prevailing approach would “necessarily be subjective and arbitrary” (childs v. childs (1990), 107 nbr. (2d) 176 (ca), at para. 6). core principles, purposes, and objectives in the guidelines era [49] the objective of the federal child support guidelines, sor/97-175 (“guidelines”) was to remedy this situation by maintaining the principles core to child support while providing much-needed certainty, consistency, predictability, and efficiency (francis v. baker, [1999] 3 scr 250, at paras. 39-40). in 1990, the federal, provincial, and territorial governments formed a family law committee with the mandate to study child support in canada. in its initial public discussion paper, the committee acknowledged the criticisms relating to child support awards, proposing a new method that would “[y]ield adequate and equitable levels of child support,” produce “objectively determinable, consistent and predictable” awards, ensure flexibility, and be “understandable and inexpensive to administer” (p 7) following research and consultation, the committee (with a reservation from quebec) ultimately recommended the application of a child support formula under the divorce act, “guided by the principle that both parents have a responsibility to meet the financial needs of the children according to their income” (federal/provincial/territorial family law committee, report and recommendations on child support (1995), at p i). in 1997, parliament gave effect to the committee’s proposals by introducing the guidelines. [50] the guidelines heralded a shift from a “need-based” regime, which focussed on expenses, to one that determines a child’s entitlement to support (dbs v. srg, 2005 abca 2, 361 ar 60, at para. 66 (“dbs (ca)”)). the “federal child support tables” (“tables”, incorporated in sch. i of the guidelines) prescribe the amount of support to which a child is entitled on the basis of the income of the payer parent and the number of children supported because the guidelines determine the amount of child support by reference to the payor parent’s actual income, an accurate assessment of that income is imperative to this effect, the guidelines impose an obligation of disclosure on both the applicant and respondent of a child support order (s 21). [51] these guidelines were not “a complete break from the past” (dbs, at para. 46). rather, as the report and recommendations of the committee indicates, this shift in the child support regime was developed with “[t]he best interest of the children being at the centre of this project” (p 24). therefore, although the implementation of the guidelines simplified the quantification of child support, it was not intended to displace the significance of the best interests of the child. [52] similarly, in contino v. leonelli-contino, 2005 scc 63, [2005] 3 scr. 217, this court observed that the underlying principle of the guidelines is a financial obligation resting jointly on the spouses (see contino, at para. 32, citing divorce act, s 261(2)). the guidelines thus helped shift the focus from the child’s needs to their entitlement to support, embracing in the process the principles of fairness and flexibility, balanced with consistency and efficiency, all in the child’s best interests. while the courts’ fact-specific inquiries and judicial discretion provide fairness and flexibility, the tables provide certainty by determining how much child support a recipient parent is entitled to, based solely on the payor parent’s income and the number of children supported (unless the payor parent’s annual income surpasses $150,000). in addition to applying to all divorced couples, the guidelines and tables have also been adopted or slightly modified to apply to unmarried separated parents in nine provinces, including british columbia. core principles of british columbia laws on child support [53] both the british columbia family law act and its predecessor, the family relations act, rsbc 1996, c 128, embody this same understanding of the nature of child support, animated by the best interests of the child. [54] the provincial regime under the family relations act provided statutory recognition that each parent “is responsible and liable for the reasonable and necessary support and maintenance of the child” (s 88(1)). courts in british columbia have also embraced the fundamental principles under the family relations act that “child support is a right of the child” and “[t]he duty to support children is a duty owed to the children and not to the custodial parent” (innes v. van den ende (1993), 83 bclr (2d) 273 (ca), at para. 11, quoting dickson v. dickson (1987), 21 bclr (2d) 69 (ca), at pp. 90-91; s (l.) v. p (e.), 1999 bcca 393, 67 bclr (3d) 254, at para. 58). [55] after the adoption of the guidelines in 1997, the legislative assembly enacted amendments to the family relations act. referring to those amendments, the attorney general affirmed that: the amendments are consistent with changes to the federal divorce act that came into effect on may 1, 1997 this will ensure that parents’ obligations to support their children are consistent under federal and provincial legislation, so that children will be treated equally regardless of whether their parents were ever married. (british columbia, official report of debates of the legislative assembly (hansard), vol. 5, no. 15, 2nd sess., 36th parl., june 5, 1997, at p 3953) the overriding principle remained, in all cases, the best interests of the child (de rooy v bergstrom, 2010 bcca 5, 4 bclr (5th) 74, at para 71, per chiasson ja. (concurring)). [56] since 2013, the provincial regime of child support has been governed by the family law act. the statute maintains the family relations act’s focus on the best interests of the child, with s 147(1) confirming that “[e]ach parent and guardian of a child has a duty to provide support for the child” unsurprisingly, there is an interpretive cohesion between these two statutes. iii section 152 of the family law act [57] historical child support is a type of retroactive child support. retroactive awards for child support are those which enforce past child support obligations, as opposed to prospective awards such support may be sought either by way of an original order (a first application for child support, per s 149 of the family law act or s 15.1 of the divorce act) or a variation order (an application to vary a previous order for child support, per s 152 of the family law act or s 17 of the divorce act). historical child support requires the performance of pre-existing obligations owed in respect of child beneficiaries who have subsequently become adults. this case arises from a claim for historical child support under provincial legislation which involves an application to vary an existing child support order. [58] the legal issue is whether s 152 of the family law act allows ms. michel to claim the amount of child support that ought to have been paid by mr. graydon even though she commenced her application after the parties’ daughter reached the age of maturity and had finished her post-secondary education, and was therefore no longer a child. to address this issue, particular attention must be paid to this court’s decision in dbs. in the case at bar and in dring v. gheyle, 2018 bcca 435, 17 bclr (6th) 30, a prior decision on which the case at bar was based, the british columbia court of appeal found that s 152 creates a jurisdictional bar on retroactive applications for historical child support because “dbs is binding on this court” (para. 97). i will first set out what was said in dbs and then explain how it was used in the british columbia court of appeal’s reasoning i will also explain why a fair large and liberal interpretation of s 152, which accords with its purpose and the best interests of children, does not support the imposition of a jurisdictional bar. the british columbia court of appeal relies on dbs. [59] dbs is a landmark decision on child support. in that case, four appeals were before this court, implicating two different legislative schemes: dbs v. srg. and tar v. ljw were two original applications for child support between unmarried parents arising under alberta’s repealed parentage and maintenance act, rsa 2000, c. p-1, which had very different wording than the divorce act. henry v henry and hiemstra v. hiemstra were applications seeking the variation of a court order for child support to be paid, under s 17 of the divorce act all four applications involved a claim for retroactive child support by the support recipient. only in henry was one of the children no longer dependent when the application for child support was taken. this court applied the guidelines and the principles of child support that stem from them, without distinction, to all four appeals — whether they arose under provincial family law or federal divorce law (dbs, at paras. 16 and 50-51; dbs (ca), at paras. 43 and 59). [60] in dbs, this court articulated certain bedrock principles which shaped the law on child support responsibilities and deepened society’s understanding of modern child support obligations. they include how: . . . child support is the right of the child; the right to support survives the breakdown of a child’s parents’ marriage; child support should, as much as possible, provide children with the same standard of living they enjoyed when their parents were together; and finally, the specific amounts of child support owed will vary based upon the income of the payor parent. [para. 38] [61] the court ended the jurisprudential debate over whether parents could claim retroactive child support in favour of allowing such claims. it makes clear that awards for past child support “are not truly retroactive” because “a retroactive child support order . . . does not involve imposing an obligation on a payor parent that did not exist at the time for which support is being claimed” (paras. 67-68). instead, in such awards, “the parents who owe support . . . are being ordered to pay what, in hindsight, should have been paid before” (para. 2). that is because in granting retroactive awards, courts are “enforcing an obligation that existed at the relevant time” (para. 82). for this reason, retroactive awards are not confined to “exceptional circumstances” or “rare cases” (para. 5) the court emphasized the guidelines’ objectives of efficiency, consistency, fairness, and flexibility in child support matters. these principles led to finding that, although the child support regimes enacted by parliament and the alberta legislature were application-based regimes, they could still give rise to retroactive awards ( para. 59). [62] the court also set out certain factors which should guide the setting of fair and just awards for retroactive support. in respect of retroactive awards, “[t]he payor parent’s interest in certainty must be balanced with the need for fairness and for flexibility” (para. 133). the court said that to encourage certainty, retroactive awards would generally go back no further than three years prior to the date when effective notice was given to the payor. four factors are weighed to ensure the result in any given case is fair. they include the recipient parent’s reason for delaying their application for child support, the conduct of the payor parent, the circumstances of the child, and the hardship the award creates for the payor parent. [63] the majority further commented on whether a court has “jurisdiction to order support” when an application is brought after its beneficiary is no longer eligible for support (dbs, at paras. 86-90) they expressed the view that courts have no “jurisdiction” to hear original applications for child support brought after a child ceases to be a “child of the marriage”. thus, the notion of a jurisdictional bar for historical claims under the divorce act involved a rule for original orders and was based on the majority’s interpretation of s 15.1 of the divorce act and who qualified as a “child of marriage”. [64] these comments have led some courts, including the british columbia court of appeal, to believe that the same jurisdictional bar also prevents applications to vary historical child support (dring; daoust v. alberg, 2016 mbca 24, 71 rfl. (7th) 274; calver v. calver, 2014 abca 63, 569 ar 170; selig v. smith, 2008 nsca 54, 266 nsr (2d) 102; krivanek v krivanek (2008), 56 rfl (6th) 390 (ont. scj)). these courts read dbs as imposing a jurisdictional bar on original applications under s 15.1 of the divorce act; they then extend this bar to variation applications under s 17 of the divorce act, and from there, sometimes further extend it to similarly-worded provincial legislation, like s 152 of the family law act. the rationale for extending the bar to variation orders under s 17 of the divorce act is based on para. 150 of dbs, in which the court said it had jurisdiction to hear the variation application in the henry case because the child’s mother had filed a notice to disclose the payor’s income before the child became an adult. in this, these courts see a bar on variation applications for historical awards and an exception that applies where a necessary procedural antecedent to the application had alerted the payor to the upcoming application while the child still qualified for support. [65] while some courts have interpreted the exception as applying to variation orders only, others have extended it to original applications as well (see, eg,. dring, at paras. 65, 97 and 195; hnidy v hnidy, 2017 skca 44, 414 dlr (4th) 87, at paras. 62, 70 and 81). yet other courts have allowed variation applications not on the basis of the exception but on the grounds that dbs only barred original applications for historical awards and did not preclude variation orders under s 17 or relevant provincial legislation (see, eg,. brear v. brear, 2019 abca 419, 97 alta. lr (6th) 1; colucci v. colucci, 2017 onca 892, 138 or (3d) 321; maccarthy v. maccarthy, 2015 bcca 496, 380 bcac 102; buckingham v. buckingham, 2013 abqb 155, 554 ar 256; catena v. catena, 2015 onsc 3186, 61 rfl (7th) 463). [66] these courts all question what dbs actually decided, and challenge the premises and sequence of reasoning employed to support the extension of the jurisdictional bar. given that for variation applications neither the exception nor the rule were ever made explicit by the court in dbs, some question the validity of the underlying proposition “that the unexpressed general rule is revealed by the purported exception” (dring, at para 196, per hunter ja). the result has been a muddled jurisprudence: confused, contradictory, and divided. at some point it becomes futile, even impossible to untangle the strands of reasoning supporting the varied results between, or sometimes within provinces on historical child support. [67] i agree with my colleague that dbs did not decide the issue for variations orders under s 17 (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 15): there was no clear statement in dbs about whether the dicta concerning original applications in s 15.1 also apply to the differently-worded s 17 variation applications. [68] i similarly agree with goepel ja in dring, that “[a]lthough the language of [the divorce act and the family law act] is not identical, it is sufficiently similar that they should be interpreted in the same manner” (para. 76). these two provisions share the same purpose, arise from the same social and legislative contexts, and address the same issue. when the focus is on the responsibilities of parents to their children, absent very clear legislative direction, little will turn on whether parents are married or not. there is therefore no binding authority requiring s 152 to be read as imposing a jurisdictional bar on the hearing of variation application for historical child support. section 152 must be interpreted and applied in accordance with first principles. fair, large, and liberal interpretation of section 152 of the family law act [69] determining the meaning of s 152 of the family law act involves an exercise in statutory interpretation. courts must “read [the words of an act] in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, citing e. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87). [70] my colleague brown j has conducted a careful textual analysis of s 152 and i agree with his conclusion. there is no need to repeat all of the strong reasons he gives for finding that applications for historical child support by way of variation order under s 152 are allowed by the terms of british columbia’s family law act. [71] in addition to the reasons provided by brown j., however, there are other strong and equally-compelling reasons that support allowing the consideration of historical child support claims. in chartier, a child support case, this court applied the modern principles of statutory interpretation, articulating a truly purposive and contextual approach for family law issues that weaves the fundamental principles of child support law into the interpretation of the divorce act. the court thus set out the following guidelines: the policies and values reflected in the divorce act must relate to contemporary canadian society . . . . [thus] the proper approach to this issue . . . recognizes that the provisions of the divorce act dealing with children focus on what is in the best interests of the children of the marriage . the interpretation of the provisions of the divorce act relating to “child[ren] of the marriage” should be “given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects” . (paras. 19 and 21; see also para. 32, citing interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i- 21, s 12). [72] grounded in these principles, the court sought the “interpretation that will best serve children” (at para. 32) and chose a measure for child support which allowed recovery from a step-parent. this same approach should also inform the interpretation of s 152 of the family law act. an analysis that takes into account the policies and values of contemporary canadian society, focuses on the best interests of the child, and interprets s 152 in a fair, large, and liberal manner to best ensure the attainment of the objects of child support clearly supports permitting historical child support claims to be heard by a court to determine if monies are owing and what amounts may be fairly recovered. this conclusion is supported by the fact that the jurisdictional bar imposed in this case prevents access to justice, runs counter to the best interest of many children, gives rise to an under-inclusive outcome, and reinforces patterns of socio-economic inequality. (1) access to justice [73] whether seen as statutory authority, referred to as jurisdiction, or redefined as standing, the procedural bar that originated in dbs and is challenged by ms. michel in this appeal prevents access to justice for canada’s children.1 the courtroom doors should not be closed because certain categories of debts owed to children are classified as coming “too late”. as will be described later, keeping whole types of claims from the courts creates hardship for children and their caregivers by contributing to the underfunding of children and the feminization of poverty. but this procedural barrier not only works injustice, it is unnecessary: the present rules in relevant legislation and the guidelines are up to the task of providing guidance to determine which retroactive awards should be granted and in what amount. rather than being forced to wield the blunt instrument of a categorical exclusion, judges should be trusted to use their discretion to determine individual cases fairly. the jurisdictional bar imposed in this case thus creates an unnecessary barrier to access to justice, which operates to prevent applications advanced on behalf of children from ever being heard on their merits. [74] the injustice caused by an exclusionary bar is conveyed by how many courts have developed a proliferating number of exceptions to permit variation awards when appropriate there are many examples of how courts, seeing the hardship an absolute bar creates for children and their caregivers, have found multiple, often creative ways around it so as to decide the claims and do justice in individual cases 1 in my view, the reference to “jurisdiction” in dbs has always been somewhat of a misnomer and has been afforded a much broader meaning than was intended in that case, the term was not used in the general legal sense of “[a] court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree” (black’s law dictionary (11th ed. 2019), at p1017). that type of jurisdiction is addressed in, for example, ss. 3 to 7 of the divorce act. what the court refers to as the courts’ jurisdiction in dbs, in contrast, is simply the authority that they are granted by statute to consider and adjudicate over a claim for child support: the circumstances in which they are properly seized of the matter by means of an authorized person’s application (see dbs, at paras. 56 and 60). (brear, at para. 28; simone v. herres, 2011 onsc 1788; george v. gayed, 2014 onsc 5360; gordashko v boston, 2009 abqb 229; j.p v jap, 2010 abqb 53; maccarthy; hnidy; pitre v. lalande, 2017 onsc 208; vohra v. vohra, 2009 oncj 135, 66 rfl (6th) 216; sp v. rp, 2010 onsc 2247, rev’d 2011 onca 336, 281 oac 263; de rooy; hartshorne v. hartshorne, 2010 bcca 327, 289 bcac 244; maclennan v. maclennan, 2003 nsca 9, 212 nsr (2d) 116). the motive is clear: such exceptions “are born from a desire . . . to grant relief when it is fair and just to do so” (brear, at para. 63). [75] there is another form of unfairness imposed by a jurisdictional bar, which arises when the variation application is made on behalf of more than one child. the bar operates to prevent the recovery of any support for the child who no longer qualifies under the applicable legislation. this means that sums due for the period during which this child qualified are not recovered, but monies owed to the other children are in such cases, the bar creates a disparate treatment among siblings and this inequality between children may negatively affect both family finances and family dynamics. [76] a fair, large, and liberal interpretation of s 152 of the family law act cannot be one which creates exclusion and the type of injustice that invites the manufacture of multiple exceptions yet, this overview of canadian jurisprudence demonstrates how a jurisdictional bar on variation applications for child support unfairly prevents access to child support payments and to the courts the better approach is to interpret s 152 with its underlying purposes in mind; that is, in the best interests of the child who is entitled to child support. [77] arriving at the modern understanding that child support is a right of the child enforceable by court order has taken a great deal of time and is the result of hundreds of years of progress and numerous shifts in thinking about children, human relationships, societal roles, and legal responsibilities the status of children has changed dramatically from the times when children were viewed as property and the payment of monies for their upkeep was grounded more in grace and generosity than legal duty. today, children are viewed as individuals who, as full rights bearers and members of a group made vulnerable by dependency, age, and need, merit society’s full protection. this includes a call on the real resources of their parents, translated into a right to child support based on their parents’ actual incomes. the bedrock principles in dbs both captured and significantly solidified such thinking. [78] when modern family law obligations took shape, it became essential to remove any vestige of the view that child support obligations were a lesser form of debt. allowing variation applications for historical child support to be heard thus not only respects the language of s 152, but also the very nature of the award sought. unmet child support obligations, whether they are in the form of arrears or have not yet been judicially recognized, are “a valid debt that must be paid, similar to any other financial obligation”, regardless of whether the quantum is significant (n. bakht et al., “dbs v. sgr:. promoting women’s equality through the automatic recalculation of child support” (2006), 18 cjwl 535, at p 550) the obligation to support children is not contingent on notice by one party to the other of an intention to seek additional child support (macminn, at para. 15; hunt v. smolis-hunt, 2001 abca 229, 97 alta. lr (3d) 238, at paras. 17-18; dahl v. dahl (1995), 178 ar 119 (ca), at para. 4; s (l) v. p (e.), at para. 55. likewise, the fact that the obligation to pay child support is confirmed in a statute does not imply it is any less of a debt. [79] further, the obligation to support one’s child exists irrespective of whether an action has been started by the recipient parent against the payor parent to enforce it, because child support is a continued obligation owed independently of any statute or court order. while a child support debt may be forgiven by a court, it remains true that such a debt is owed from the moment it ought to have accrued — no matter the length of the delay. [80] before this court, ms michel argued against protecting payors who are deficient in their child support obligations by disallowing claims against them the moment their child becomes independent. i agree. any interpretation of s 152 should support the modern understanding of child support and not encourage behaviour that undercuts its values, efficiency, or effectiveness dbs makes clear that “[a]ny incentives for payor parents to be deficient in meeting their obligations should be eliminated” (para. 4) thus, the court should not create a “perverse incentive” by granting “payor parents immunity after the children ceased to be children of the marriage”. as stated by sharpe ja in colucci: if the payor parent is to be absolved from responsibility once the children cease to be “children of the marriage”, the payor whose income increases might be encouraged not to respond to his or her increased obligations in the hope that the reciprocal spouse will delay making an application for a variation increasing support until the children lose their status to avoid opening the door to an increased obligation. [para. 26]. [81] an additional “perverse incentive” is that the bar on applications for historical child support may also have the effect of discouraging negotiations between parents. as pentelechuk ja points out in brear, custodians wise to the legal effects of a bar might cut negotiations short of an agreement and file an application in order to secure the courts’ jurisdiction prior to their child ceasing to be a child of the marriage (para. 60). [82] in a legal system which takes seriously that child support is an ongoing obligation throughout the child’s life and that retroactive claims are for amounts owed and unpaid, it is difficult to see why s 152 of the family law act should be read to wipe out debts to children. a jurisdictional bar produces a strong disincentive to the payment of child support, which is contrary to the objectives and purposes of child support and goes against a fair, large, and liberal construction of s 152. (2) understanding the reasons for delay [83] in many cases the consequences of an absolute bar may be more than perverse: they may become punitive developments in case law and social science research have shown a multitude of reasons that may justify a parent’s decision to delay seeking or varying an order for child support or which may prevent the parent from seeking such an order earlier. understanding more clearly why applications for child support come to courts delayed, whether as claims for arrears, retroactive, or historical child support, is part of the contextual and purposive interpretation of s 152 or any provision dealing with historical child support. not only that, this understanding also provides insight into where the best interests of children who are owed historical child support may lie. [84] in the case at bar, the trial judge accepted ms. michel’s evidence that she did not apply for retroactive support because she had suffered a severe injury, because her right to support was assigned to the minister, and because she was afraid to raise these concerns with the respondent, mr. graydon (b.c prov ct., port coquitlam, file no. f3319, september 26, 2016). ms. michel also alleged domestic violence but the trial judge made no findings of fact in that regard. [85] jurisprudence similarly shows a vast array of reasons that courts have accepted as justifying a delayed application for child support:2 fear of reprisal/violence from the payor parent;3 prohibitive costs of litigation or fear of protracted litigation;4 2 see also m. l. gordon, “blame over: retroactive child and spousal support in the post-guideline era” (2005), 23 cflq 243; m. l. gordon, “an update on retroactive child and spousal support: five years after s (db) v. g (sr)” (2012), 31 cflq 71. 3 see, eg,. b (tk) v. s (pm), 2008 bcsc 1350; swiderski v. dussault, 2008 bcsc 1629 (“swiderski (sc)”), rev’d in part but not on this point, 2009 bcca 461, 98 bclr (4th) 40 (“swiderski (ca)”);. cbe v. jae, 2003 abqb 961; roseberry v. roseberry, 2015 abqb 75, 13 alta. lr. (6th) 215, rev’d on other grounds, 2015 abca 218, 68 rfl (7th) 30; w (lj) v. h (rl), 2005 abca 252, 18 rfl (6th) 461; burchill v. roberts, 2013 bcca 39, 332 bcac 126. 4 see, eg,. webber v lane, 2008 oncj 672; irving v clouthier, 2008 canlii 48137 (ont scj);. hartshorne v. hartshorne, 2009 bcsc 698, 70 rfl (6th) 106, rev’d in part but not on this point, lack of information or misinformation over the payor parent’s income;5 fear of counter- application for custody;6 the payor leaving the jurisdiction or recipient unable to contact payor;7 illness/disability of a child or the custodian;8 lack of emotional means;9 wanting the child and the payor to maintain a positive relationship or avoid the child’s involvement;10 ongoing discussions in view of reconciliation, settlement negotiations, or mediation;11 and the deliberate delay of the application or the trial by the payor.12 [86] these cases bring two different notions to mind: on the one hand, impracticability and inaccessible justice; and on the other, fear and danger. in neither case should claimants be barred from having their applications heard in the second type of case, custodians who have been victims of domestic violence by the payor may be fearful of asking for support or increased support and may decide to wait prior to bringing an application (cbe v. jae, at para. 36). studies have shown that “many, if not most, battered women will want to pursue child support if they can do so without increased risk to themselves or their children” (a menard and v turetsky, “child hartshorne; de rooy; swiderski; carlaw v. carlaw, 2009 nssc 428, 299 nsr (2d) 1; eadie v. eadie, 2008 bcsc 1380. 5 see, eg,. reis v. bucholtz, 2010 bcca 115, 3 bclr (5th) 71; schick v. schick, 2008 abca 196, 55 rfl (6th) 1; swiderski; trick v trick (2003), 39 rfl (5th) 418 (ont scj);. burchill; goulding v. keck, 2014 abca 138, 572 ar 330. 6 see, eg,. swiderski. this includes fear of losing custody due to discrimination or stereotyping (see s. b. boyd, child custody, law, and women’s work (2003), at p 219). 7 see, eg,. simone; farrell v. oakley, 2008 abqb 422; howard v. cox, 2017 abca 111, 97 rfl (7th) 85; ambrose v. ambrose (1990), 24 rfl (3d) 353 (man. ca). 8 see, eg,. eadie; swiderski; de rooy; larson v. larson, 2014 abqb 560; cmm v. pmm, 2019 abqb 613; roseberry. 9 see, eg,. hartshorne; de rooy; b (tk) v. s (pm);. eadie; w (lj) v. h (rl). 10 see, eg,. swiderski; smith v. lagace, 2017 abqb 394; sp v. rp. 11 see, eg,. chrintz v. chrintz, 41 rfl (4th) 219 (ont. cj (gen. div.)); mcinutly v. dacyshyn, 2013 abqb 538. 12 see, eg,. sk v. ak, 2004 bcsc 37; kaw v. mew, 2019 abqb 563. support enforcement and domestic violence” (1999), 50 juv. fam. court j 27, at p 27). [87] it is generally a good idea to seek child support as soon as practicable, but it is unfair to bar parents from applying for the financial support they are due because they put their safety and that of their children ahead of their financial needs or because they could not access justice earlier. remember, “courts are not to be discouraged from defending the rights of children when they have the opportunity to do so” (dbs, at para. 60) and this requires taking into account the realities of those recipient parents for whom it is impossible, impracticable, or unsafe to apply for child support without some delay. to read s 152 of the family law act as creating a jurisdictional bar fails to take these important realities into account. this is not only problematic, but curious: courts are required under the dbs factors to consider the reasons for the delay and these very same realities when determining whether an award should be made and its amount. the better and more theoretically-consistent approach is to allow the reasons for delay to inform both whether a variation application may be heard under s 152 as well as whether it should be granted or dismissed. (3) relationship between child support and poverty [88] a decision preventing historical claims for child support under s 152 of the family law act also ignores how family law calls for an approach that takes into account the broader social framework in which family dynamics operate (moge v. moge, [1992] 3 scr 813, at p 853; bracklow v. bracklow, [1999] 1 scr 420, at paras. 15-23; miglin v. miglin, 2003 scc 24, [2003] 1 scr 303, at para. 204; rick v. brandsema, 2009 scc 10, [2009] 1 scr 295, at para. 41). [89] in 1994, this court took judicial notice of “the significant level of poverty amongst children in single parent families and the failure of courts to contemplate hidden costs in their calculation of child support awards” (willick, at p 704), and in 1995 that: separated or divorced custodial parents as heads of single-parent families confront economic, social and personal difficulties not faced by non- custodial parents or those in two-parent families. several studies in canada and abroad indicate that the standard of living of the custodial parent and the children is significantly reduced following a divorce, whereas the standard of living of the non-custodial parent increases following the divorce. (thibaudeau v. canada, [1995] 2 scr 627, at p 723) [90] three decades later, it remains true that gender roles, divorce, separation, and lone parenthood contribute to child poverty and place a disproportionate burden on women a bar against applications for historical child support means children have gone without their due, and the law provides no remedy for the hardship this has created for the children and their caregivers, most of whom are still women. [91] the evidence in this case provides but one example of what happens when child support remains unpaid. ms. michel explained how she did her best as a single mother who, at times, required disability income assistance she spoke to the difficulties she faced providing for her child without receiving adequate child support based on mr. graydon’s actual income: . . . but when he was lacking in supporting and not contributing the — in accordance to his income, i was the one who paid and supported and found ways to entertain our child and, you know, whether it was calling people and purchasing items from value village or whatever, it is me who provided (transcript of proceedings before smith j., reproduced in ar, at p 157) [92] the daughter spoke of the situation for her mother and herself: when a young woman is below the poverty line and is being under supported by her co-parent, where is she going to find money for daycare to go out and work a “9-5” job? where is she going to find the money to put her child in extra activities? how could she possibly be expected to provide any more than her child’s basic needs? i grew up thinking that i did not deserve “extra” my dad would drop me off and refer to my childhood neighbourhood as the “ghetto”. eventually my dad and step-mom started a family of their own in a nice house, white picket fence and all. i still lived in “the ghetto”. i listened to stories about how unlike me, my future siblings would play sports, learn to swim, learn whatever they wanted. it is not that i was not interested, i just did not deserve “extra”. (letter from ag, reproduced in ar, at p 91) [93] mr graydon also testified that he was aware that ms michel and his daughter were living in poverty when he was underpaying child support. [94] this case too illustrates how children’s wellbeing and that of their custodian are intertwined parts of the same whole. today, women still bear the bulk of child care and custody obligations and earn less money than men, so women’s poverty remains inextricably linked to child poverty (statistics canada, the gender wage gap in canada: 1998 to 2018 (october 2019), at pp. 4 and 10; statistics canada, maximum insights on minimum wage workers: 20 years of data (september 2019), at p 8. among the canadian population of children aged 14 years and under in 2016, 81.29 percent of children living in a lone-parent family lived with their mother (statistics canada, portrait of children’s family life in canada, 2016 census (august 2017), at p 2). children in lone-parent families live in low-income households at a rate more than three times higher than children in a two-parent household. among these lone-parent families, the low income-rate for such children living with a mother (42 percent) is much higher than those living with a father (25.5 percent) (statistics canada, children living in low-income households, 2016 census (september 2017), at pp. 2-3). in 2018, attorney general wilson-raybould announced that approximately 96 percent of cases registered for enforcement involved female recipients (house of commons debates, vol. 148, no. 326, 1st sess., 42nd parl., september 26, 2018, at p 21867). [95] women in relationships are more likely to suffer intimate partner violence than their male counterparts (see statistics canada, family violence in canada: a statistical profile, 2018 (december 2019), at p 24, indicating that in 2018, women accounted for 79 percent of intimate partner violence victims in police-reported assaults). as a result, they are more likely to leave their home and belongings — and their financial security — behind and to seek shelter or become homeless a 2014 statistics canada analysis reported most women in shelters for abused women in canada identified their abuser as a current or former partner; just over half of these were admitted with their children (shelters for abused women in canada, 2014 (2015), at p 6). the impact of unstable housing and the lack of legal or financial resources on a person’s ability to bring any kind of legal claim is evident. the impact of a history of violence on a person’s emotional health and their consequent potential fear, unwillingness to engage with their past abuser, or inability to do so are just as apparent. in addition to this, “some abusive fathers may use the child support process as a way to continue to exercise dominance and control over their ex-wives” (d bonnet, “recalculating dbs:. envisioning a child support recalculation scheme for ontario” (2007), 23 can. j. fam. l 115, at p 144). [96] given these circumstances, women will often face financial, occupational, temporal, and emotional disadvantages. moreover, access to justice in family law is not always possible due to the high costs of litigation. in this larger social context, women who obtain custody are often badly placed to evaluate their co-parent’s financial situation and to take action against it measures that place further barriers on their ability to claim and enforce their rights, like a jurisdictional bar, inhibit their ability to improve their circumstances and those of their children. yet, as this court stated in hryniak v. mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 scr 87, at para. 1: “without an effective and accessible means of enforcing rights, the rule of law is threatened.” [97] similarly, the principle of statutory interpretation that the legislator is taken to know the social and historical context in which it makes its intention known also supports reading s 152 as allowing such claims to be heard (see moge, at p 857; canada 3000 inc. (re), 2006 scc 24, [2006] 1 scr 865, at para. 37). in moge, for instance, the majority relied on this principle to find that parliament did not intend to adopt a deemed self-sufficiency approach to spousal support because of the social context that showed a link between the feminization of poverty and marriage breakdown. as l’heureux-dubé j reasoned, in light of this social context, “[i]t would be perverse in the extreme to assume that parliament’s intention was to financially penalize women” (p 857) likewise, in this case and in light of the social context showing the link between the underpayment of child support, child poverty, and the feminization of poverty that existed both at the time of the 1986 divorce act and today, it would also be perverse to assume that parliament’s intention was to financially penalize women and children. [98] “[t]he reality that the nurture of children is inextricably intertwined with the well being of the nurturing parent” has previously been acknowledged by this court (pelech v. pelech, [1987] 1 scr 801, at p 845; see also willick, at pp. 724-25, per l’heureux-dubé j.) in 1992, this court recognized in moge that “[w]omen have tended to suffer economic disadvantages and hardships from marriage or its breakdown because of the traditional division of labour within that institution” (p 861). a year later, it added that “women disproportionately incur the social costs of child care” (symes v. canada, [1993] 4 scr 695, at p 763 (emphasis deleted); see also young v. young, [1993] 4 scr 3, at p 62, per l’heureux-dubé j). these long-standing recognitions and the current data bear on how courts should approach child support claims, including historical ones. [99] in historical child support claims, what is really at stake is monies that ought to have been paid for the care and support of children but were directed elsewhere. this means children and their caregivers do without, and this has lasting consequences for each of them as the child in this case poignantly said: “i was a confident, bright and enthusiastically ambitious kid. i am a bright and ambitious adult. somewhere along the line confidence and enthusiasm fell to the wayside” (ar, at p 91). [100] family law’s holistic approach demands that we take account of the interconnected nature of issues of child support, child poverty, and the consequent feminization of poverty. given the gender dynamics in child support law, legal rules cannot ignore the realities that shape women’s lives and opens them up to experiences and risks less likely to be experienced by men: like intimate partner violence, a higher proportion of unpaid domestic work accompanied by less work experience and lower wages, and the burden of most childcare obligations. [101] at the same time, while we take account of women’s marginalization and lived experiences, we must not lose sight of the fact that equality and equity also require us to turn our minds to other forms of marginalization in the courtroom. the gendered dimensions of poverty at different times mirror or obscure its intersections with race, disability, religion, gender modality, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic class, for instance. it is the delicate task of our judiciary to take these differences into account and to give them their due weight in considering the tests at issue. in the end, a system that can account for the social dynamics which act to impoverish certain members of society over others, or to prevent them from accessing the courtroom and reclaiming their rights, is a fairer system for all. [102] the principles of child support also favour the interpretation that is favourable to children such that the best interest of the child is at the heart of any interpretive exercise (chartier, at para. 21; klb v. british columbia, 2003 scc 51, [2003] 2 scr 403, at para 47; paras, at pp 134-35; richardson v richardson, [1987] 1 scr 857, at pp. 869-70; francis, at para. 39; theriault v. theriault (1994), 149 ar 210 (ca), at pp. 212-14). [103] not only is this interpretive approach mandated by canadian jurisprudence, it also results from canada’s international obligations it is presumed that the legislature takes account of canada’s international obligations, which favour an understanding of legislative intent that is in conformity with customary and conventional international law (canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, at para. 182). canada is a party to international conventions that affirm the legal principle of “the best interests of the child” (convention on the rights of the child, can t.s 1992 no. 3, art. 3(1); convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, can. ts 1982 no. 31, art. 16(1)(d)). article 27(2) of the convention on the rights of the child, for instance, thus recognizes that parents and custodians are primarily responsible for securing the conditions of living necessary for the child’s development, and art. 27(4) recognizes the duty of state parties to “take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child”. the principles embodied in these conventions help inform the contextual approach to the interpretation of the family law act, as well as the divorce act and the guidelines, in understanding how to interpret the legislation with a focus on the best interests of the child (baker v canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), [1999] 2 scr. 817, at paras. 69-71). [104] moreover, an interpretation adverse to the pre-existing common law rights of children and to the interests of recipient parents should be avoided absent clear statutory expression. as a debt obligation, which exists independently of any statute, child support benefits from the well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is presumed not to intend to limit a citizen’s right unless the statutory language is unequivocal (morguard properties ltd v city of winnipeg, [1983] 2 scr 493, at p 509; toronto area transit operating authority v. dell holdings ltd., [1997] 1 scr 32, at para 20; royal bank of canada v sparrow electric corp., [1997] 1 scr 411, at para. 110; see also r sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed 2014), at pp 497-98; brear, at para. 50) that is clearly not the case here rather, all the elements reviewed indicate that the best interests of the child, which are intrinsically tied to those of their caregiver, are in favour of reading s 152 of the family law act to allow applications for historical child support. (4) conclusion on section 152 of the family law act [105] for all of the above reasons, a fair, large and liberal reading of s 152 of the family law act means that courts may hear variation applications for historical child support. recognizing that there is no bar preventing the consideration of historical child support for variation applications calls into question whether one should continue to exist for original orders under s 15.1 of the divorce act. as goepel ja compellingly stated in dring: there is no juridical or rational reason to distinguish the two situations. parties are encouraged to settle their disputes outside the court process. when parties have reached an agreement concerning child support it is often pure happenstance whether they take the additional step of having their agreement embodied in a court order. i would suggest this is particularly so in the case of unmarried parents when child support is the only issue they need resolve. [para. 97] [106] it may thus be time to reconsider the obiter comments from dbs that stated that there is a procedural bar preventing courts from hearing original applications for historical child support. [107] this court has been prepared to revisit precedents that are “unsound in principle, that had proven to be unworkable and unnecessarily complex to apply, or that had attracted significant and valid judicial, academic and other criticism” (vavilov, at para. 20). it has also recognized that precedents may be appropriately revisited when they result in unfairness (see r v henry, 2005 scc 76, [2005] 3 scr 609, at paras. 45-46; ontario (attorney general) v. fraser, 2011 scc 20, [2011] 2 scr 3, at para. 135, per rothstein j). none of the four appeals heard in dbs were original applications for historical child support.13 the divided and confused jurisprudence that has followed dbs evinces the unsound bases of the “jurisdictional bar” on original orders for child support, has rendered its application unnecessarily complex and operates to undermine the legislative objectives of clarity, certainty and consistency. the deleterious effects on access to justice and the relationship between child support underpayment and poverty canvassed above reveal the profound unfairness visited upon children and their custodians by this bar. all of these reasons make clear that the question of a “jurisdictional bar” on historical child support sought by original orders under the divorce act is ripe for reconsideration. however, given that reconsidering this issue is unnecessary to resolve this appeal, i leave its determination to a more appropriate case. iv factors affecting awards for retroactive and historical child support and the date of retroactivity 13 the record indicates clearly that henry and hiemstra, the two cases under the divorce act, did not involve an application for an original order under s 151. in both cases there was an existing child support award in the divorce judgment such that both were applications to vary under s 17 of the divorce act. the cases under provincial legislation, although deemed to be original applications, did not involve a claim for historical child support and involved a different provision with express wording which limited claims. [108] removing the jurisdictional bar from variation applications means that courts will be called upon to hear these matters on their merits. courts are well equipped to do justice in individual cases. judges will still have to first determine whether there is a debt outstanding and will then also have to consider what would be a fair award under the dbs factors. in this section, i review the application of the dbs factors to awards of historical child support. the dbs. factors [109] in dbs, the majority presented four factors to help determine when an award for retroactive child support is appropriate: the recipient parent’s reason(s) for delaying their application for child support; the conduct of the payor parent; the circumstances of the child; and the hardship the award creates for the payor parent. no one factor is decisive. these factors must be interpreted and applied in accordance with the fact that, as noted above, retroactive support is for a legally enforceable debt: by default, monies that were owed to the child but were unpaid ought to give rise to an award. in applying the dbs factors, courts should be careful to avoid the past judicial error of treating child support as a lesser form of debt where debtors are entitled to an unusual leniency not present in other areas of creditor-debtor law (see hunt, at para. 19). [110] i now turn to the four dbs factors as they arise in the context of historical claims. (1) the reasons for the delay [111] this factor requires the court to consider why a claimant waited to bring an application. while timely applications are the norm and are to be encouraged, there are many reasons why even a person in need may delay making an application. in light of what the jurisprudence discloses, the focus should be on whether the reason provided is understandable. i do not think we should be looking for a “reasonable excuse” for the recipient parent’s delay (dbs, at paras. 100-3 (emphasis added)). that language, unfortunately, works to implicitly attribute blame onto parents who delay applications for child support. [112] an analysis of canadian case law on historical and retroactive child support awards since dbs shows that courts focused on “excuses” have often been too quick to use this criterion as more of a precondition to an award than as one of many factors to consider. indeed, “[d]elay is invariably raised as a defence to a claim for retroactive child support” (gordon (2012), at p 74), with courts interpreting dbs. as imposing upon recipients a “positive duty. . . to ensure that support was adequate” (d smith, “retroactive child support — an update” (2007), 26 cflq 209, at p 245). at times, courts have considered that a failure to “justify” the recipient’s delay mitigated against a retroactive award (see, eg,. anderson v. laboucan, 2017 abqb 642, at paras 45-55 (canlii); baldwin v. funston (2007), 85 or (3d) 721 (ca), at para. 25; foster v. foster, 2013 bcca 205, at para. 17 (canlii)) or against an enlarged temporal scope, even if blameworthy conduct was present (see, eg,. tepleski v. girardin, 2017 mbca 37, at paras. 24-28 (canlii)). [113] it bears repeating that a delay, in itself, is not inherently unreasonable and the mere fact of a delay does not prejudice an application, as not all factors need to be present for a retroactive award to be granted (dbs, at para. 99; swiderski (ca), at para. 43 (canlii)) rather, a delay will be prejudicial only if it is deemed to be “unreasonable”, taking into account a generous appreciation of the social context in which the claimant’s decision to seek child support was made (dbs, at para. 101). indeed, the courts should not hold constraints and inequalities faced by recipient parents against the child. accordingly, a delay motivated by any one of the reasons set out above, at para 48, should generally not be understood as arbitrary within the meaning of dbs. lastly, an unreasonable basis for the delay does not negate the payor parent’s blameworthy conduct; indeed the blameworthy conduct may sometimes cause or contribute to the delay. [114] courts may pay particular attention to the length of the delay after the beneficiary ceased to be a “child” or “child of the marriage” or after the reason that caused the delay has ceased to be the longer this delay, the more weight may go against the justification (dring, at para. 177, per hunter ja). this tends to uphold the values of certainty and finality, with the goal of encouraging parties to move forward with their lives following family breakdown (see colucci, at para. 28). (2) conduct of the payor parent [115] this factor effectively serves to place the payor’s conduct on a scale of blameworthiness. dbs purposively provided an expansive definition of blameworthy conduct, being “anything that privileges the payor parent’s own interests over [their] children’s right to an appropriate amount of support” (para. 106). [116] despite its intentional breadth, some courts have been hesitant to apply this expansive definition, out of fear that any change in the payor’s income which was not disclosed to the recipient would constitute blameworthy conduct the failure to disclose actual income, a fact within the knowledge of the payor, is a failure of a significant obligation and is often the root cause of a delayed application. indeed, in dbs, the court recognized at para. 124 that “[n]ot disclosing a material change in circumstances — including an increase in income that one would expect to alter the amount of child support payable — is itself blameworthy conduct.” it further commented that “a payor parent cannot use [their] informational advantage to justify [their] deficient child support payments” and at para. 106 that “[a] payor parent cannot hide [their] income increases from the recipient parent in the hopes of avoiding larger child support payments”. [117] the nature and objective of the post-guidelines child support system provide payor parents with the certainty and predictability that any material change in income should be disclosed and lead to a change in child support payments the certainty provided by the guidelines has been acknowledged by this court in miglin, at para. 56, kerr v. baranow, 2011 scc 10, [2011] 1 scr 269, at para. 208, and contino, at paras. 94-95, per fish j. it is also notable that s 3(1)(a) of the guidelines makes the presumptive amount of a child support order the amount set out in the applicable table. therefore, a payor’s conduct may be presumptively reasonable if they conform to an order or agreement, but only if there is no change in their income (see loughlin v. loughlin, 2007 abqb 10, at para. 22 (canlii); baldwin, at paras. 18 and 22-23). [118] while a subjective approach to the reasons for the recipient’s delay in applying for child support should be explicitly endorsed, the same is no longer true of the payor’s conduct. since dbs,. canadian courts have gradually steered away from a focus on what the payor meant by what they did, in light of the problems posed by a “subjective” inquiry into the payor’s intention (see, eg,. cmm v. pmm, at para. 55 (canlii); burchill, at paras. 24-31; koback v koback, 2013 skca 91, 423 sask. r 35, at para. 30; ll v. gb, 2008 abqb 536, 10 alta. lr (5th) 67, at para. 118). intent can be a basis on which to increase blameworthiness but the primary focus needs to be on the payor’s actions and their consequences. today, “[t]he payor’s subjective intention is rarely relevant — the real question is whether the payor’s conduct had the effect of privileging [their] interests over the child’s right to support” (goulding, at para. 44). [119] it bears repeating that the presence of blameworthy conduct is not a necessary trigger to the payor’s obligation to pay the claimed child support where present, blameworthy conduct weighs in favour of an award and may also serve to expand the temporal scope of the retroactive award, to increase its amount by providing for interest or costs, or create an additional consideration for the calculation of child support in cases of income above $150,000 per s 4(b)(ii) of the guidelines. generally speaking, this factor is not evaluated differently in cases involving historical child support than it is in general retroactive child support cases the same expansive definition applies. (3) circumstances of the child [120] although the guidelines heralded a shift from the conception of need as the primary motivator for child support to an understanding of support as the child’s entitlement, a child’s needs may still be relevant in awarding and calculating retroactive child support. if there has been hardship present during their childhood, or if the child needs funds at the time of the hearing, this weighs in favour not only of an award but also of extending the temporal reach of the award. this factor may play a particular role in applications for historical child support. [121] where the child has suffered deprivation, this factor is a significant consideration in favour of relief there is some suggestion in the commentary that courts have been subordinating this factor to others, such as delay (see gordon (2012), at p 74). but as i have discussed, the neglect or refusal to pay child support is strongly linked to child poverty and female poverty as l’heureux-dubé j pointed out in willick: . . . the financial burden of divorce should not be borne primarily by children and their custodial parents. children are our country’s most important resource, our future. their needs cannot be minimized on account of their parents’ divorce. they are entitled to be looked after properly both before and after divorce. i do not mean to imply that they must live in luxury. i strenuously object, however, to situations in which children live at or near the poverty level despite the fact that the means of the non-custodial parent are sufficient to meet their needs. [p 718] [122] at the same time, this does not mean that any kind of need or hardship is a necessary antecedent to an award for retroactive child support. indeed, dbs explicitly indicated at para. 113 that a payor parent’s obligation will not “disappear where [their] children do not ‘need’ [their] financial support” (see also swiderski (sc), at paras. 93- 95). in car v. gfr, 2006 bcsc 1407, the court held that “if this factor were to tip the balance against making a retroactive award, then, in essence, the [payor] will have profited from ‘holding off’ on paying increased child support” (para. 48 (canlii)). [123] additionally, there are plenty of circumstances where a parent will absorb the hardship that accompanies a dearth of child support so as to prioritize their child’s wellbeing (see richardson, at p 869; willick, at pp. 724-25; see also buckingham, at para. 51). there is absolutely no principled reason why this parent should receive less support as a result of choices that protect their child (see dbs, at para. 170, per abella j (concurring); colucci, at para. 26). indeed, it has been recognized that “[t]he fact that the respondent will indirectly benefit is not a reason to refuse to make the award of support” (debora v. debora (2006), 218 oac 237, at para. 70; innes, at para. 11). thus, the fact that a child did not have to suffer hardship because of their custodial parents’ sacrifice is not one that weighs against awarding retroactive or historical child support rather, a recipient parent’s hardship, like that of a child, weighs in favour of the award of retroactive child support and an enlarged temporal scope. (4) hardship the award might entail [124] this factor takes into account the ease with which the payor might be able to pay the award. if the award would cause the payor undue hardship, and if the other factors do not militate against it, this factor may weigh against an award or affect its temporal scope to achieve a fair result it is not necessary that there be no hardship caused by the award for it to be granted. if there is the potential for hardship on the payor’s part, but there is also blameworthy conduct which precipitated or exacerbated the delay, it may be open to the courts to disregard the presence of undue hardship (dbs, at para. 116; tschudi v tschudi, 2010 bcca 170, 86 rfl (6th) 23, at paras. 4-5). in all cases, hardship may be addressed by the form of payment (purba v. purba, 2009 abca 32, 466 ar 175, at para. 15). [125] while the focus is on hardship to the payor, that hardship can only be assessed after taking into account the hardship which would be caused to the child and the recipient parent from not ordering the payment of sums owing but unpaid (see, eg,. cornelissen v. cornelissen, 2003 bcca 666, 21 bclr (4th) 308, at paras. 9 and 38; brear, at para 59; warwoda v warwoda, 2009 abqb 582, at paras 11-12 (canlii); george, at para 55) in dbs, the majority recognized at para. 115 that “courts should recognize that hardship considerations in this context are not limited to the payor parent.” while they referred to the impact on other children, it is clear that hardship cannot be measured in the abstract but must be grounded in the facts and the totality of the circumstances for example, the payor may be able to establish that paying past due child support in the amount of $20,000 would create hardship because the payor does not have the funds on hand and would be required to obtain a loan or sell property to discharge that child support debt however, it must be taken into account that the payor had the benefit of the unpaid child support for the full time in which it was unpaid and such monies may have funded a preferred lifestyle or the very purchase of property which may now need to be sold. [126] if children have gone without the appropriate level of support it often means that the recipient parents have been forced to go into debt themselves or spend all their monies, not on property, but on the child. as ms. michel testified: “it is me who provided”. it may also mean that custodial parents have foregone opportunities, like spending time with the child or pursuing higher education and enhancing their career prospects, because they had to work an additional job or two to provide for the child. the recipient parent may therefore have incurred debt to cover the cost of the child’s essentials or have no savings because all monies were absorbed by monthly outlays. viewing matters in this holistic way places hardship to the payor in its actual factual and legal matrix. while it may appear difficult to ask the payor to obtain a loan for $20,000 to repay the debt of unpaid child support, the recipient may be in debt in a similar amount. thus, the hardship caused to the child and the recipient parent from non-payment is also a crucial part of the equation. with historical awards, there may be a longer period of unpaid child support, resulting in larger amounts and greater hardship on all sides. all of which increases the need to see the full picture and assess hardship based on all the circumstances. date of retroactivity [127] in dbs, the court established that the date to which a child support award should be retroactive is, by default, the date when effective notice was given to the payor (para. 118) this is the date as of which the payor’s child support obligation ought to be enforced. it is explicit in the majority’s judgment that the date of effective notice constitutes a compromise between the date of the recipient’s application for child support and the date the amount of child support ought to have increased (paras. 118 and 121). pre-dbs jurisprudence had similarly embraced effective notice as the date of retroactivity (see, eg,. ennis v ennis, 2000 abca 33, 77 alta l.r (3d) 289, at p 313; wishlow v. bingham, 2000 abca 198, 82 alta. lr (3d) 226, at para. 29; c. davies, “retroactive child support: the alberta trilogy” (2005), 24 clfq 1, at pp. 16-17). the court also established a soft limit or rough guideline of three years’ recovery. [128] the idea behind requiring some form of notice is fairness: it is about having and sharing accurate information so everyone can meet their legal obligations and plan accordingly. payor parents should be able to rely on the fact that the payments made in good faith and based on accurate information are meeting their legal obligations. recipient parents should be able to rely on the fact that the amounts paid are what is owed. [129] while each parent has their own expectations, there is typically an inequality of information that needs to be addressed. each parent knows how much they individually make if payors make less than the previous year, they have the knowledge needed to decide if they wish to seek a reduction in child support. if payors make more, recipients will not always know this and will first be obliged to discover the payor’s actual income before considering whether to seek an increase in child support. these practical realities have led some governments and courts to require the yearly disclosure and exchange of financial information between parents and to arrange for the automatic recalculation of child support (see, eg,. alberta rules of court, alta. reg. 124/2010, r 12.53 and forms fl-26 and fl-27; child support guidelines, o. reg. 391/97, ss. 13(g) and 24.1(1); calver, at para. 33; sawatzky v. sawatzky, 2018 mbca 102, 428 dlr (4th) 247, at para. 58; family law act, s 158(1); family law act, sa 2003, c. f-4.5, s 55.41(1); family maintenance regulations, 1998, rrs, c. f-6.2 reg. 1, s 21.23(1)(c); family maintenance act, ccsm, c. f20, s 3911;. administrative calculation and recalculation of child support, o reg 190/15, s 10.1(1); administrative recalculation of child support regulations, nlr 16/18, s 5(1); see also gordon (2012), at pp. 91-92). [130] effective notice is a broad concept which goes well beyond actual knowledge of a filed variation application in para. 121 of dbs, it was defined as “any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or if it already is, that the current amount of child support needs to be re-negotiated.” in kerr, the court further stated that the distinct features of child support “reduce somewhat the strength of concerns about lack of notice . . . in seeking child support” (para. 208). in some respects, dbs itself provided effective notice of a parent’s responsibilities, by establishing the bedrock principles governing child support based on our shifted understanding of the payor’s certainty interest above, certainty materializes in different ways today than it did 14 years ago. today, it is provided by the tables and the payor parents’ knowledge that they are liable according to their actual income and will be held accountable for missed payments and underpayment, even if the enforcement of their obligations may not always be automatic. [131] it results from this that it is now time to ask why the date of retroactivity of child support awards should not also correspond to the date when the support ought to have been paid. while dbs evinced an attempt to balance certainty to the payor parent and fairness and flexibility to the recipient, and despite its emphasis on the other core principles of child support, it appears that the payor parent’s expectation “that the status quo is fair” remained the main rationale for maintaining effective notice as the default starting point (para. 121). in today’s legal landscape however, the impact of the different potential dates of retroactivity needs to be measured against much more than the payor’s certainty interest, and indeed, in contino this court recognized that the guidelines sometimes privilege fairness to children over predictability (para. 33). who should benefit from an award for historical child support? [132] retroactive child support is a debt; by default, i see no reason why it should not be awarded unless there are strong reasons as between these factors not to do so. historical child support can be awarded in part or in whole to either or both the child or their parent, given findings of fact and depending on whom the hardship — if there was any — was visited upon sometimes the recipient parent bears the bulk of the hardship by making financial sacrifices to support the child beneficiary (see cornelissen, at paras. 9 and 38). in other cases, both the recipient parent and the child beneficiary experience significant hardship (see warwoda, at para 12) it is also conceivable that in certain cases the recipient parent may experience no hardship but the child beneficiary will have undergone hardship courts should be flexible and respond to these realities when determining how to apportion the award between the recipient parent and the child beneficiary however, there should be no general reluctance to put monies into the hands of the recipient parent where the recipient parent and child beneficiary agree on how the award should be divided, as in this case, the court should be reluctant to disturb their agreement. v application [133] as stems from the above analysis of the family law act, i agree that the british columbia provincial court had the necessary statutory authority to grant a variation order for historical child support in the case at bar. [134] the trial judge, smith j., considered ms. michel’s variation application for historical child support from april 2001 to april 2012 (para. 4). he found that ag. had lived with ms. michel for the relevant period and that mr. graydon’s income had surpassed that specified in the original support order every year with the exception of 2004. as a result, mr. graydon had underpaid child support from 2001 to 2003 and 2005 to 2012, and overpaid in 2004 (para. 47). justice smith’s application of the dbs. factors also shows the following: - ms. michel had a reasonable basis for being delayed in seeking child support (paras. 19-20); - mr. graydon’s conduct was blameworthy “to a small degree” (para. 26); - ag’s circumstances were hindered by mr. graydon’s underpayment of child support (para. 37); - mr. graydon would suffer no hardship as a result of the award for historical child support (paras. 38 and 41). given these findings, i agree with the trial judge and my colleague that child support was owed to ms. michel. i also agree that it was appropriate on the facts of this case to award support dating back to march 29, 2001. vi conclusion [135] for these reasons, i allowed ms. michel’s appeal with costs throughout, reinstating smith j.’s order. the reasons of abella and karakatsanis jj. were delivered by abella j — [136] i agree with justice brown’s excellent reasons. i also agree with those of justice martin, which complement his by adding some important policy considerations. appeal allowed with costs throughout. sobkin, ottawa.
[1] freedom of expression is a fundamental right and value; the ability to express oneself and engage in the interchange of ideas fosters a pluralistic and healthy democracy by generating fruitful public discourse and corresponding public participation in civil society. this case is about what happens when individuals and organizations use litigation as a tool to quell such expression, which, in turn, quells participation and engagement in matters of public interest more specifically, this court is being asked to decide whether an action brought by 1704604 ontario limited (“170 ontario”) against the pointes protection association and six of its members (collectively “pointes protection”) can proceed, or whether it must be dismissed under s 137.1 of the courts of justice act, rso 1990, c. c.43 (“cja”). for the reasons that follow, i am of the view that 170 ontario’s lawsuit must be dismissed. i would accordingly dismiss the appeal before this court. i. introduction [2] strategic lawsuits against public participation (“slapps”) are a phenomenon used to describe exactly what the acronym refers to: lawsuits initiated against individuals or organizations that speak out or take a position on an issue of public interest slapps are generally initiated by plaintiffs who engage the court process and use litigation not as a direct tool to vindicate a bona fide claim, but as an indirect tool to limit the expression of others in a slapp, the claim is merely a façade for the plaintiff, who is in fact manipulating the judicial system in order to limit the effectiveness of the opposing party’s speech and deter that party, or other potential interested parties, from participating in public affairs. [3] in light of the increased proliferation of slapps, provincial legislatures (in ontario, british columbia, and quebec) have enacted laws to mitigate their harmful effects. these laws are occasionally referred to as “anti-slapp” legislation (2018 onca 685, 142 o.r (3d) 161; galloway v ab, 2019 bcca 385, 30 bclr (6th) 245; klepper v lulham, 2017 qcca 2069 (canlii); b sheldrick, blocking public participation: the use of strategic litigation to silence political expression (2014)). [4] at issue here is such a law. in november 2015, the ontario protection of public participation act, 2015, s.o 2015, c 23 (“act”), came into force the act amended the cja, by introducing, in relevant part, ss. 137.1 to 1375. [5] in this appeal, the court is effectively being asked to shed light and offer guidance on how to properly apply the framework set out in s 137.1 of the cja. accordingly, i endeavour to do so below, but not without first providing some background on the legislation at issue in part ii. subsequently, in part iii, i set out the proper legal framework for dealing with s 137.1 motions. finally, in part iv, i apply the established legal framework to the facts of this case. ii background [6] before i explain the parameters of the s 137.1 framework, it is necessary, as part of the exercise of statutory interpretation, to outline the legislative background of the bill which brought s 137.1 into effect. such legislative background and history offer contextual clues to and insight into the legislative purpose of the bill, as well as indicia of the proper interpretation of the provisions at issue, which will be explored in turn below indeed, this court has reiterated on numerous occasions that the modern approach to statutory interpretation requires that the words of a statute be read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (e. a. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87, quoted in rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21). [7] in 2010, the attorney general of ontario mandated an anti-slapp advisory panel (“panel”) to advise the government on how to respond to the proliferation of slapps. the panel was chaired by experts and examined a plethora of materials, including legal articles, relevant statutes from other jurisdictions, and advocacy documents the panel also invited comments and submissions from the public and interested parties. all of this culminated in the anti-slapp advisory panel: report to the attorney general (“apr”), which was published in october 2010. [8] the apr “concluded that it is desirable for ontario to enact legislation against the use of legal processes that affect people’s ability or willingness to express views or take action on matters of public interest” (para. 10) the apr looked extensively at the need for such legislation (paras. 6-16), then provided suggestions on the content of the legislation and outlined the concerns underlying that content. [9] the apr advocated a “broad scope of protection” (para. 29) that would “ensure that the full scope of legitimate participation in public matters is made subject to the special procedure” (para. 31) fundamental to the apr’s proposal was the theme of balancing and proportionality while “an adverse effect on the ability of persons to participate in discussion on matters of public interest should not be sufficient to prevent the plaintiff’s action from proceeding” (para. 36), “the fact that a plaintiff’s claim may have only technical validity should not be sufficient to allow the action to proceed” (para. 37). to reconcile these considerations, the apr proposed a multi-step test that ended up being substantively similar to the one later adopted by the legislature. [10] in november 2015, ontario brought into force bill 52, protection of public participation act, 2015, 1st sess., 41st leg., 2015, which, as noted above, amended the cja by introducing ss. 137.1 to 1375. the purposes of those provisions were specified in the legislation itself, in s 137.1(1) of the cja: 137.1 (1) the purposes of this section and sections 137.2 to 137.5 are, (a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest; (b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest; (c) to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and (d) to reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action. [11] this was prompted by the apr, which stated that the “legislation should include a purpose clause for the benefit of judicial interpretation” (summary of recommendations, para. 2) while legislative purpose bears on the exercise of statutory interpretation regardless of whether a purpose clause exists, the fact that the apr explicitly urged legislators to include such a clause for the benefit of judicial interpretation, and that legislators consciously obliged, demonstrates that the purpose clause in s 137.1(1) commands considerable interpretative authority. [12] further indications of legislative intention can be gleaned from the debates in the legislative assembly of ontario at second reading of the bill, the attorney general of ontario at the time, the hon. madeleine meilleur, stated the following: if passed, this legislation will allow courts to quickly identify and deal with strategic lawsuits, minimizing the emotional and financial strain on defendants, as well as the waste of court resources. our proposed legislation strikes a balance that will help ensure abusive litigation is stopped, but legitimate action can continue. this proposed legislation is about preventing strategic lawsuits. anyone who has a legitimate claim of libel or slander should not be discouraged by this legislation. (legislative assembly of ontario, official report of debates (hansard), no. 41a, 1st sess., 41st parl., december 10, 2014, at p 1975) [13] ultimately, the legislative debates preceding the passage of the act echoed the same concerns expressed by the panel in the apr indeed, parliamentarians acknowledged as much: “[t]his bill came forward as a result of a report from 2010” (p 1975 (ms. sylvia jones)); “a made-in-ontario approach to address the issue of strategic lawsuits based on consensus, recommendations of an expert advisory panel and extensive stakeholder consultation” (p 1975 (hon. madeleine meilleur)) accordingly, it should come as no surprise that the final test adopted in the legislation was very similar substantively to the test proposed in the apr. this makes it clear that the apr had a considerable influence on the legislation which was enacted and which is now at issue before this court. [14] for this reason, the panel and its apr are persuasive authority for the purposes of statutory interpretation. it must be remembered that “[l]egislative history includes material relating to the conception, preparation and passage of the enactment”, and this “may often be [an] important par[t] of the context to be examined as part of the modern approach to statutory interpretation” (canada (canadian human rights commission) v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 53, [2011] 3 scr 471, at para. 43 (“chrc”)). indeed, the late peter w. hogg defined legislative history as including the following: 1 [t]he report of a royal commission or law reform commission or parliamentary committee recommending that a statute be enacted; . 3 a report or study produced outside government which existed at the time of the enactment of the statute and was relied upon by the government that introduced the legislation . (constitutional law of canada (5th ed supp (loose-leaf)), vol. 2, at pp. 60-1 to 60-2) while reports like the apr are generally “admissible for any purpose the court thinks appropriate”, the weight accorded to them depends on the circumstances (r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed 2014), at p 685; see also r v. summers, 2014 scc 26, [2014] 1 scr 575, at para. 51). as i have explained, the apr was the clear impetus for the legislation, and was relied upon heavily by the legislature in drafting s 137.1 of the cja. accordingly, it is a persuasive source that “provide[s] helpful information about the background and purpose of the legislation” (chrc, at para. 44). [15] in light of the foregoing, i turn in part iii below to the interpretation of the statutory text of s 137.1(3) and (4), informed by the legislative history and the purposes that animate these provisions as already mentioned, this is in accordance with what this court has referred to as the modern approach to statutory interpretation. iii framework [16] as indicated above, s 137.1 is the provision in the cja that is meant to function as a mechanism to screen out lawsuits that unduly limit expression on matters of public interest through the identification and pre-trial dismissal of such actions the final statutory language adopted makes it clear how the apr and the legislative debates informed the drafting of the provision: there is an invocation of the need for the expression to relate to a matter of public interest; the underlying proceeding must have substantial merit (beyond “technical validity”, as the apr noted, at para. 37); and the public interest in protecting the expression must be weighed against the public interest in permitting the underlying proceeding to continue (echoing the importance of balance repeatedly noted in the apr and the legislative debates). [17] the relevant portions of s 137.1 are reproduced below: (3) on motion by a person against whom a proceeding is brought, a judge shall, subject to subsection (4), dismiss the proceeding against the person if the person satisfies the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression made by the person that relates to a matter of public interest. (4) a judge shall not dismiss a proceeding under subsection (3) if the responding party satisfies the judge that, (a) there are grounds to believe that, (i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and (ii) the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and (b) the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression. [18] in brief, s 137.1 places an initial burden on the moving party — the defendant in a lawsuit — to satisfy the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression relating to a matter of public interest once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the responding party — the plaintiff — to satisfy the motion judge that there are grounds to believe the proceeding has substantial merit and the moving party has no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. if the responding party cannot satisfy the motion judge that it has met its burden, then the s 137.1 motion will be granted and the underlying proceeding will be consequently dismissed. it is important to recognize that the final weighing exercise under s 137.1(4)(b) is the fundamental crux of the analysis: as noted repeatedly above, the apr and the legislative debates emphasized balancing and proportionality between the public interest in allowing meritorious lawsuits to proceed and the public interest in protecting expression on matters of public interest. section 137.1(4)(b) is intended to optimize that balance. [19] in the following section, i offer an explanation of each step of the s 137.1 analysis, including what is expected of each party and how the relevant terms used in the provision must operate. this analysis of the framework is grounded in the words of the statute read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the statute, while remaining mindful of the legislative background and informed particularly by the apr and the legislative debates. a. section 137.1(3) — threshold burden on the moving party [20] section 137.1(3) is reproduced for convenience below, with my own emphasis placed on the terms requiring further illumination: (3) on motion by a person against whom a proceeding is brought, a judge shall, subject to subsection (4), dismiss the proceeding against the person if the person satisfies the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression made by the person that relates to a matter of public interest. [21] fundamentally, this is a two-part analysis. the burden is on the moving party to show that (i) the proceeding arises from an expression made by the moving party and that (ii) the expression relates to a matter of public interest this is a threshold burden, which means that it is necessary for the moving party to meet this burden in order to even proceed to s 137.1(4) for the ultimate determination of whether the proceeding should be dismissed. [22] however, while the term “expression” is expressly defined in the statute, other terms are in need of elaboration in order to understand how the moving party can satisfy its threshold burden. [23] first, what does “satisfies” require? i am in agreement with doherty ja. of the court of appeal for ontario that “satisfies” requires the moving party to meet its burden on a balance of probabilities (c.a reasons, at para. 51) this is in accordance with the jurisprudence interpreting the word “satisfied” (r v. topp, 2011 scc 43, [2011] 3 scr 119, at paras. 24-25; f.h v mcdougall, 2008 scc 53, [2008] 3 scr 41, at paras. 49 and 53; shannon v 1610635 alberta inc., 2014 abca 393, 588 a.r 76, at paras. 14-15; r v driscoll (1987), 79 a.r 298, at paras. 17-18) accordingly, the moving party must be able to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that (i) the proceeding arises from an expression made by the moving party and that (ii) the expression relates to a matter of public interest. [24] second, what does “arises from” require? by definition, “arises from” implies an element of causality in other words, if a proceeding “arises from” an expression, this must mean that the expression is somehow causally related to the proceeding.1 what is crucial is that many different types of proceedings can arise from an expression, and the legislative background of s 137.1 indicates that a broad and liberal interpretation is warranted at the s 137.1(3) stage of the framework. this means that proceedings arising from an expression are not limited to those directly concerned with expression, such as defamation suits a good example of a type of proceeding that is not a defamation suit, but that nonetheless arises from an expression and falls within the ambit of s 137.1(3), is the underlying proceeding here, which is a breach of contract claim premised on an expression made by the defendant (this is explored in further detail in part iv of these reasons). indeed, the 1 i do not believe that a precise level of causation needs to be identified, as courts have consistently been able to grapple with and apply the “arising from” standard (allstate insurance co. of canada v. aftab, 2015 onca 349, 335 oac 172; sheppard v. co-operators general insurance co. (1997), 33 or (3d) 362 (ca);. new brunswick v. o’leary, [1995] 2 scr 967; bracklow v. bracklow, [1999] 1 scr 420). apr explicitly discouraged the use of the term “slapp” in the final legislation in order to avoid narrowly confining the s 137.1 procedure (para. 22), and the legislature obliged. [25] third, what does “expression” mean? the term “expression” is defined broadly in s 137.1(2) of the cja itself: “in this section, ‘expression’ means any communication, regardless of whether it is made verbally or non-verbally, whether it is made publicly or privately, and whether or not it is directed at a person or entity.” this is not in need of further clarification, as the text makes it abundantly clear that “expression” is defined expansively. [26] fourth, and finally, what does “relates to a matter of public interest” mean? these words should be given a broad and liberal interpretation, consistent with the legislative purpose of s 1371(3). indeed, the apr clearly stated that a “broader test will ensure that the full scope of legitimate participation in public matters is made subject to the special procedure” (at para. 31) and that therefore a “broad scope of protection” is preferable (para. 29). [27] in grant v. torstar corp., 2009 scc 61, [2009] 3 scr 640, this court considered the question of how public interest in a matter is to be established. while that case concerned the defence of responsible communication to a defamation action, it also involved determining what constitutes a “matter of public interest”. the same principles apply in the present context the expression should be assessed “as a whole”, and it must be asked whether “some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information on the subject” (paras. 101-2). while there is “no single ‘test’”, “[t]he public has a genuine stake in knowing about many matters” ranging across a variety of topics (paras. 103 and 106). this court rejected the “narrow” interpretation of public interest adopted by courts in australia, new zealand, and the united states; instead, in canada, “[t]he democratic interest in such wide-ranging public debate must be reflected in the jurisprudence” (para. 106). [28] the statutory language used in s 137.1(3) confirms that “public interest” ought to be given a broad interpretation. indeed, “public interest” is preceded by the modifier “a matter of” this is important, as it is not legally relevant whether the expression is desirable or deleterious, valuable or vexatious, or whether it helps or hampers the public interest — there is no qualitative assessment of the expression at this stage the question is only whether the expression pertains to any matter of public interest, defined broadly. the legislative background confirms that this burden is purposefully not an onerous one. [29] nonetheless, expression that relates to a matter of public interest must be distinguished from expression that simply makes reference to something of public interest, or to a matter about which the public is merely curious. neither of the latter two forms of expression will be sufficient for the moving party to meet its burden under s 137.1(3) (see torstar, at para. 102). [30] ultimately, the inquiry is a contextual one that is fundamentally asking what the expression is really about. the animating purpose of s 137.1 should not be forgotten: s 137.1 was enacted to circumscribe proceedings that adversely affect expression made in relation to matters of public interest, in order to protect that expression and safeguard the fundamental value that is public participation in democracy. if the bar is set too high at s 137.1(3), the motion judge will never reach the crux of the inquiry that lies in the weighing exercise at s 137.1(4)(b) thus, in light of the legislative purpose and background of s 137.1, it is important to interpret an “expression” that “relates to a matter of public interest” in a generous and expansive fashion. [31] in conclusion, s 137.1(3) places a threshold burden on the moving party to show on a balance of probabilities (i) that the underlying proceeding does, in fact, arise from its expression, regardless of the nature of the proceeding, and (ii) that such expression relates to a matter of public interest, defined broadly to the extent that this burden is met by the moving party, then s 137.1(4) will be triggered and the burden will shift to the responding party to show that its underlying proceeding should not be dismissed. i proceed to analyze that provision below. b. section 137.1(4) — shifting of the burden to the responding party [32] section 137.1(4) is reproduced for convenience below: (4) a judge shall not dismiss a proceeding under subsection (3) if the responding party satisfies the judge that, (a) there are grounds to believe that, (i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and (ii) the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and (b) the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression. [33] as the text of this provision makes explicit, the burden is on the responding party (ie the plaintiff in the underlying proceeding) to satisfy the motion judge of both (a) and (b). therefore, if either (a) or (b) is not met, then this will be fatal to the plaintiff2 discharging its burden and, as a consequence, the underlying proceeding will be dismissed. however, if the plaintiff can show that both (a) and (b) are met, then the proceeding will be allowed to continue. while (a) directs a judge’s specific attention to the merit of the proceeding and the existence of a valid defence, (b) is open-endedly concerned with what is at the heart of the legislation at issue and anti-slapp legislation generally: the weighing of the public interest in vindicating legitimate claims through the courts against the resulting potential for quelling expression that has already been determined under s 137.1(3) to be related to a matter of public interest. (1) section 137.1(4)(a) — merits-based hurdle 2 i will refer to the “moving party” as the “defendant”, and the “responding party” as the “plaintiff” in these reasons interchangeably this is for convenience and clarity, and should not be taken as restricting the statutory language in any future case. [34] in brief, s 137.1(4)(a) requires the plaintiff to “satisf[y] the judge” that there are “grounds to believe” that (i) its underlying proceeding has “substantial merit” and that (ii) the defendant has “no valid defence”. [35] unlike with s 137.1(3), “satisfies” is statutorily circumscribed in s 137.1(4)(a) by an express standard: “grounds to believe”. in other words, since the statutory language of s 137.1(3) required that the motion judge simply be “satisfie[d]”, this necessitated a determination of what is sufficient to satisfy the motion judge. what is sufficient for the motion judge to be satisfied for the purposes of s 137.1(4)(a)? here, the legislature has expressly answered the question — the motion judge must be satisfied that there are grounds to believe therefore, at this juncture, before i explore what exactly is required by s 137.1(4)(a)(i) and (ii), it must be determined what “grounds to believe” requires. this necessitates a consideration of the words themselves and their statutory context. [36] the words “grounds to believe” plainly refer to the existence of a basis or source (ie “grounds”) for reaching a belief or conclusion that the legislated criteria have been met in the context of a s 137.1 motion, that basis or source must be anchored in the nature of the procedure and record contemplated by the legislative scheme. it must be borne in mind that a s 137.1 motion can be brought at “any time” after a proceeding has commenced (see s 1372(1)). [37] accordingly, in determining whether there exist grounds to believe at the s 137.1(4)(a) stage, courts must be acutely aware of the limited record, the timing of the motion in the litigation process, and the potentiality of future evidence arising. introducing too high a standard of proof into what is a preliminary assessment under s 137.1(4)(a) might suggest that the outcome has been adjudicated, rather than the likelihood of an outcome to be sure, s 137.1(4)(a) is not a determinative adjudication of the merits of the underlying claim or a conclusive determination of the existence of a defence. [38] section 137.1(4)(a) may therefore be interpreted by distinguishing a motion made under s 137.1 from a motion to strike and a motion for summary judgment, both of which are tools that remain available to parties notwithstanding the existence of s 137.1 the very fact that the legislature created s 137.1 as a mechanism indicates that a s 137.1 motion was meant to fulfil a different purpose than these other motions. while a summary judgment motion allows parties to file a more extensive record and a motion to strike is adjudicated solely on the pleadings, s 137.1 contemplates that the parties will file evidence and permits limited cross- examination this suggests that the parties are expected to put forward a record, commensurate with the stage of the proceeding at which the motion is brought, that lends itself to the inquiry mandated under s 1371(4)(a). thus, although the limited record at this stage does not allow for the ultimate adjudication of the issues, it necessarily entails an inquiry that goes beyond the parties’ pleadings to consider the contents of the record (the extent of such consideration will be explored further in the next section). [39] accordingly, i conclude that “grounds to believe” requires that there be a basis in the record and the law — taking into account the stage of litigation at which a s 137.1 motion is brought — for finding that the underlying proceeding has substantial merit and that there is no valid defence. [40] the foregoing conclusion is consistent with the interpretation this court has given to the expression “grounds to believe” in other contexts indeed, this standard has been found to require “something more than mere suspicion, but less than . . proof on the balance of probabilities” (mugesera v canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), 2005 scc 40, [2005] 2 scr 100, at para. 114). this interpretation has been adopted in the regulatory context as well (see, eg,. ontario (alcohol and gaming commission) v 751809 ontario inc., 2013 onca 157, 115 o.r (3d) 24, at paras. 18-24; ontario (environment and climate change) v geil, 2018 onca 1030, 371 ccc (3d) 149). [41] importantly, the assessment under s 137.1(4)(a) must be made from the motion judge’s perspective. with respect, i am of the view that the court of appeal for ontario incorrectly removed the motion judge’s assessment of the evidence from the equation in favour of a theoretical assessment by a “reasonable trier” (para. 82). the clear wording of s 137.1(4) requires “the judge” hearing the motion to determine if there exist “grounds to believe”. making the application of the standard depend on a “reasonable trier” improperly excludes the express discretion and authority conferred on the motion judge by the text of the provision the test is thus a subjective one, as it depends on the motion judge’s determination. [42] taking all of the foregoing together, what s 137.1(4)(a) asks, in effect, is whether the motion judge concludes from his or her assessment of the record that there is a basis in fact and in law — taking into account the context of the proceeding — to support a finding that the plaintiff’s claim has substantial merit and that the defendant has no valid defence to the claim. [43] i turn now to consider what s 137.1(4)(a)(i) and (ii) mean in substantive terms and how the plaintiff can satisfy its burden under s 1371(4)(a). (a) section 137.1(4)(a)(i) — substantial merit [44] the question under s 137.1(4)(a)(i) is whether the underlying proceeding has “substantial merit” i proceed to elucidate what “substantial merit” means and what the responding party (ie plaintiff) needs to show in order to satisfy its burden. [45] i begin with an analysis of the statutory text the legislature’s express choice to use the specific word substantial as a qualifier must be given effect. indeed, the use of the word substantial functions markedly differently than a qualifier such as having some merit, any merit, or just merit absent a qualifier. black’s law dictionary acts as an interpretive aid in discerning the exact meaning of “substantial”, which it defines as follows: 1. of, relating to, or involving substance, material <substantial change in circumstances>. 2. real and not imaginary; having actual, not fictitious, existence <a substantial case on the merits>. 3. important, essential, and material; of real worth and importance <a substantial right>. (black’s law dictionary (11th ed. 2019), at p 1728) [46] this definition of “substantial” must be read in the context of s 137.1(4)(a)(i), in which this word modifies “merit”. accordingly, it must be asked what is meant by “merit” the use of the word “merit” in the context of a s 137.1 motion fundamentally calls for a determination of the prospect of success of the underlying proceeding. indeed, what is at stake here is the potential dismissal of the proceeding without any opportunity to amend it: while the threshold burden under s 137.1(3) is concerned with identifying an expression relating to a matter of public interest for protection, s 137.1(4) engages the competing interest at play — ensuring that a plaintiff with a legitimate claim is not unduly deprived of the opportunity to pursue it; this is why the burden is on the plaintiff to ensure that its claim is not dismissed. thus, given its ordinary meaning and when read in context, “merit” refers fundamentally to the strength of the underlying claim, as a stronger claim corresponds with a weaker justification to dismiss the underlying proceeding. [47] legislative intent provides a further indication of how “substantial merit” ought to be interpreted indeed, “statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone” (rizzo & rizzo shoes, at para. 21). the apr did not offer much guidance on the meaning of “substantial merit” it stated, however, that “the fact that a plaintiff’s claim may have only technical validity should not be sufficient to allow the action to proceed” (para. 37 (emphasis added)) this was echoed in the legislative assembly of ontario: “i do not believe that a mere technical case — without actual harm — should be allowed to suppress the kind of democratic expression that is crucial for our democracy” (at p 1972 (emphasis added) (hon. madeleine meilleur)); “[i]t is also important that we recognize the strain that frivolous lawsuits place on our province’s busy court system” (at p 1973 (emphasis added) (mr. lorenzo berardinetti)); “this legislation protects the people from frivolous lawsuits” (at p 1975 (emphasis added) (mr. randy pettapiece)); “if someone does have a legitimate claim that is not frivolous . . . you can still bring that type of lawsuit” (official report of debates (hansard), no. 112, 1st sess., 41st parl., october 27, 2015, at p 6025 (emphasis added) (mr. jagmeet singh)) while i acknowledge that the above excerpt from the apr is from the “balancing interests” section of that report, the consistency of the language used in the legislative debates shows that the same concern informed the legislature’s understanding of how s 137.1 would operate it was clearly of the view that even if a proceeding was not merely frivolous or vexatious, or was technically valid, this should not be sufficient to allow the proceeding to continue this is fundamentally a question that depends on the merits of the underlying proceeding, which makes the foregoing references well- suited as an interpretive aid under s 137.1(4)(a)(i) given the statutory language ultimately used in the provision. accordingly, it is clear from the legislative context that the words “substantial merit” are animated by a concern with making sure that, at a minimum, neither “frivolous” suits nor suits with only “technical” validity are sufficient to withstand a s 137.1 motion substantial merit must mean something more. [48] however, while frivolous suits are clearly insufficient, “something more” cannot require a showing that a claim is likely to succeed either, as some parties have posited. neither the plain meaning nor the legal definition of “substantial” comports with a “likely to succeed” standard the legislative and statutory context does not support such a standard either if “substantial merit” requires a showing of being likely to succeed, this could unduly prevent cases from proceeding to the crux of the inquiry that is the weighing exercise under s 1371(4)(b). given the importance of the weighing exercise in the legislative history, this cannot possibly be what the legislature contemplated. indeed, nothing in the legislative history — whether in the apr or in the legislative debates — points to a “likely to succeed” standard as the threshold for the plaintiff to prevail at the merits-based hurdle of s 1371. while the plaintiff need not definitively demonstrate that its claim is more likely than not to succeed, the claim must nonetheless be sufficiently strong that terminating it at a preliminary stage would undermine the legislature’s objective of ensuring that a plaintiff with a legitimate claim is not unduly deprived of the opportunity to vindicate that claim. [49] therefore, i conclude from the foregoing exercise of statutory interpretation that for an underlying proceeding to have “substantial merit”, it must have a real prospect of success — in other words, a prospect of success that, while not amounting to a demonstrated likelihood of success, tends to weigh more in favour of the plaintiff. in context with “grounds to believe”, this means that the motion judge needs to be satisfied that there is a basis in the record and the law — taking into account the stage of the proceeding — for drawing such a conclusion. this requires that the claim be legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief. [50] importantly, this standard is more demanding than the one applicable on a motion to strike, which requires that the claim have some chance of success under the “plain and obvious” test (hunt v. carey canada inc., [1990] 2 scr 959). it is also more demanding than requiring that the claim have a reasonable prospect of success, which is a standard that this court has also used to animate the “plain and obvious” test (r v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2011 scc 42, [2011] 3 scr 45, at paras. 17-20) in light of the existence of a record, the substantial merit standard calls for an assessment of the evidentiary basis for the claim — this is why the claim must be supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief. this is consistent with the apr’s references to “substantive” merit, which inherently calls for an assessment of the basis or evidentiary foundation for a claim i reiterate, however, that a claim with merely some chance of success will not be sufficient to prevail. nor will a claim that has been merely nudged over the line of having some chance of success. a real prospect of success means that the plaintiff’s success is more than a possibility; it requires more than an arguable case as i said in the preceding paragraph, a real prospect of success requires that the claim have a prospect of success that, while not amounting to a demonstrated likelihood of success, tends to weigh more in favour of the plaintiff for a judge undertaking this inquiry, it is critical to recall that a s 137.1 motion is not a determinative adjudication of the merits of the proceeding and, rather than having to be established on a balance of probabilities, substantial merit is instead tempered by a “grounds to believe” burden. [51] the substantial merit standard is less stringent, however, than the “strong prima facie case” threshold, which requires a “strong likelihood of success” (r v. canadian broadcasting corp., 2018 scc 5, [2018] 1 scr 196), or the test for summary judgment, under which a legally sound claim supported by evidence reasonably capable of belief may nonetheless raise “no genuine issue requiring a trial” (hryniak v mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 scr 87) while hryniak was admittedly decided in the context of summary judgment motions, which call for an ultimate determination of the merits of a proceeding, that case is relevant at this juncture in order to assess the role of s 137.1 motions: such motions do not exist in a vacuum and must necessarily be fulfilling a function different than other motions. although too low a standard risks defeating the purpose of the distinct process for dismissal established by s 137.1, too high a standard risks promoting a counter- productive culture whereby parties are forced to routinely compile detailed records similar to those expected on summary judgment motions or even trials. [52] it is therefore important to recognize how s 137.1 motions differ from summary judgment motions, as briefly touched on in the preceding section. section 137.1 motions are made at an earlier stage in the litigation process, with much more limited evidence and corresponding procedural limitations (see s 1372). as a result, a motion judge deciding a s 137.1 motion should engage in only limited weighing of the evidence and should defer ultimate assessments of credibility and other questions requiring a deep dive into the evidence to a later stage, where judicial powers of inquiry are broader and pleadings more fully developed. this is not to say that the motion judge should take the motion evidence at face value or that bald allegations are sufficient; again, the judge should engage in limited weighing and assessment of the evidence adduced this might also include a preliminary assessment of credibility — indeed, the legislative scheme allows limited cross- examination of affiants, which suggests that the legislature contemplated the potential for conflicts in the evidence that would have to be resolved by the motion judge. however, s 137.1(4)(a)(i) is not an adjudication of the merits of the underlying proceeding; the motion judge should be acutely conscious of the stage in the litigation process at which a s 137.1 motion is brought and, in assessing the motion, should be wary of turning his or her assessment into a de facto summary judgment motion, which would be insurmountable at this stage of the proceedings. [53] finally, in determining the ambit of “substantial merit”, the statutory context of s 137.1 must be borne in mind: even if a lawsuit clears the merits-based hurdle at s 137.1(4)(a), it remains vulnerable to summary dismissal as a result of the public interest weighing exercise under s 137.1(4)(b), which provides courts with a robust backstop to protect freedom of expression. [54] in summary, in light of the foregoing analysis, to discharge its burden under s 137.1(4)(a)(i), the plaintiff must satisfy the motion judge that there are grounds to believe that its underlying claim is legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that the claim can be said to have a real prospect of success. (b) section 137.1(4)(a)(ii) — no valid defence [55] section 137.1(4)(a)(ii) requires the responding party (i.e plaintiff) to satisfy the motion judge that there are “grounds to believe” that the moving party (ie. defendant) has “no valid defence” in the underlying proceeding. [56] while the burden has admittedly shifted to the plaintiff under s 137.1(4), it would be unreasonable to encumber the plaintiff at the s 137.1(4)(a)(ii) stage with the task of anticipating every defence the defendant might raise and then rebutting those defences instead, s 137.1(4)(a)(ii) operates as a de facto burden-shifting provision in itself, under which the moving party (i.e defendant) must first put in play the defences it intends to present and the responding party (i.e plaintiff) must then show that there are grounds to believe that those defences are not valid. [57] in other words, once the moving party has put a defence in play, the onus is back on the responding party (ie plaintiff) to demonstrate that there are grounds to believe that there is “no valid defence”. [58] the word no is absolute, and the corollary is that if there is any defence that is valid, then the plaintiff has not met its burden and the underlying claim should be dismissed. as with the substantial merit prong, the motion judge here must make a determination of validity on a limited record at an early stage in the litigation process — accordingly, this context should be taken into account in assessing whether a defence is valid. the motion judge must therefore be able to engage in a limited assessment of the evidence in determining the validity of the defence. [59] i interpret the query on validity under s 137.1(4)(a)(ii) as mirroring the query on substantial merit under s 137.1(4)(a)(i) fundamentally, both entail an assessment by the motion judge of the strength of the claim or of any defences as part of an overall assessment under s 137.1(4)(a) of the prospect of success of the underlying claim. having (i) and (ii) mirror each other to the extent possible makes sense given the fact that a prototypical s 137.1 motion will be made in relation to a defamation or tort action and that affirmative defences to such an action normally involve well-articulated tests. the legislative drafting that nests both (i) and (ii) under s 137.1(4)(a) confirms this interpretation indeed, in a defamation action, for example, a claim must be made out, and then the burden shifts to the defendant to identify any affirmative defences to the claim the way that (i) and (ii) are nested under (a) reflects this: the substantial merit of the claim is analyzed and then the validity of any potential defences. for this reason, i interpret (ii) as an extension of (i), and i would analyze both in a similar fashion whereby the motion judge must first determine whether the plaintiff’s underlying claim is legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that the claim can be said to have a real prospect of success, and must then determine whether the plaintiff has shown that the defence, or defences, put in play are not legally tenable or supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that they can be said to have no real prospect of success. in other words, “substantial merit” and “no valid defence” should be seen as constituent parts of an overall assessment of the prospect of success of the underlying claim. [60] in summary, s 137.1(4)(a)(ii) operates, in effect, as a burden-shifting provision in itself: the moving party (i.e defendant) must put potential defences in play, and the responding party (ie plaintiff) must show that none of those defences are valid in order to meet its burden. mirroring the “substantial merit” prong, under which the plaintiff must show that there are grounds to believe that its claim has a real prospect of success, the “no valid defence” prong requires the plaintiff, who bears the statutory burden, to show that there are grounds to believe that the defences have no real prospect of success this makes sense, since s 137.1(4)(a) as a whole is fundamentally concerned with the strength of the underlying proceeding. (2) section 137.1(4)(b) — public interest hurdle [61] at last, i arrive at what is the crux of the analysis section 137.1(4)(b) provides that, to avoid having its proceeding dismissed, the responding party must satisfy the motion judge that the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression. [62] as i have often mentioned in these reasons, this provision is the core of s 1371. the purpose of s 137.1 is to function as a mechanism to screen out lawsuits that unduly limit expression on matters of public interest through the identification and pre-trial dismissal of such actions. while s 137.1(4)(a) directs a judge’s specific attention to the merit of the proceeding and the existence of a valid defence in order to ensure that the proceeding is meritorious, s 137.1(4)(b) open-endedly engages with the overarching concern that this statute, and anti-slapp legislation generally, seek to address by assessing the public interest and public participation implications in this way, s 137.1(4)(b) is the key portion of the s 137.1 analysis, as it serves as a robust backstop for motion judges to dismiss even technically meritorious claims if the public interest in protecting the expression that gives rise to the proceeding outweighs the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue. [63] statutory interpretation is a contextual exercise that requires reading a provision with and in light of other provisions: accordingly, if the bar is set too high at s 137.1(4)(a)(i) or (ii), a motion judge will never reach s 137.1(4)(b) — this cannot possibly be what the legislature contemplated given the legislative history and intent behind s 137.1 the legislature repeatedly emphasized proportionality as the paramount consideration in determining whether a lawsuit should be dismissed. weighing the public interest in freedom of expression and public participation against the public interest in vindicating a meritorious claim is a theme that runs through the entire legislative history, and this informs how s 137.1 should be judicially understood. [64] the import of s 137.1(4)(b) is made abundantly evident by looking at the context in which s 137.1 was enacted for example, the apr urged that “[t]here should be no special safeguards to prevent abuse the balancing of interests at the heart of the remedy will allow appropriate disposition of cases” (summary of recommendations, para. 20 (emphasis added)) this goal of achieving balance was echoed during the readings of the bill in the legislative assembly of ontario at second reading, the attorney general of ontario stated the following: [translation] balance has been a recurring theme: the need to strike a balance that will dismiss abusive lawsuits while permitting legitimate actions. i can assure you that we have heard everything that has been said to us. balance is a key feature of this bill. (legislative assembly of ontario (2014), at p 1971 (hon madeleine meilleur)) the theme of balance was raised frequently throughout the debates by multiple members across party lines (legislative assembly of ontario (2014), at pp. 1972-74 (mr lorenzo berardinetti); p 1974 (mr chris ballard); p 1975 (hon madeleine meilleur)) (see also legislative assembly of ontario (2015), at p 6017 (hon. madeleine meilleur); p 6021 (mr lorenzo berardinetti); pp. 6025-27 (mr. jagmeet singh).) [65] i pause here to explain my use of the expression “weighing exercise” and to briefly address whether there is a substantive difference between a weighing exercise and a balancing exercise, and which exercise s 137.1(4)(b) requires this concern was raised by the british columbia civil liberties association as an intervener before this court. [66] here, the provision expressly requires that one consideration “outweig[h]” the other. i am of the view that this is substantively different than if the statute had required that the two considerations be balanced against one another. the difference can be illustrated by the following quantification of weighing and balancing: where one factor must outweigh the other, the ratio between the two must be at least 51/49; in contrast, where one factor must be balanced against the other, a ratio of 50/50, or even 45/55, might be sufficient for a judge to rule in favour of the former. the word “outweighs” necessarily precludes such a conclusion. [67] while i do not purport to decide for all statutes the definitive difference between weighing and balancing, the fact that the statute here requires that one consideration outweigh the other, and not simply that the considerations be balanced against one another, should be relevant to a motion judge’s consideration of whether the plaintiff has satisfied its burden under s 1371(4)(b). (a) harm analysis [68] harm is principally important in order for the plaintiff to meet its burden under s 137.1(4)(b) the statutory provision expressly contemplates the harm suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression being weighed against the public interest in protecting that expression. as a prerequisite to the weighing exercise, the statutory language therefore requires two showings: (i) the existence of harm and (ii) causation — the harm was suffered as a result of the moving party’s expression. [69] either monetary harm or non-monetary harm can be relevant to demonstrating (i) above. i am in agreement with the attorney general of ontario at the time the legislation was debated, who recognized at second reading “that reputation is one of the most valuable assets a person or a business can possess” (legislative assembly of ontario (2014), at p 1971 (hon. madeleine meilleur)). accordingly, harm is not limited to monetary harm, and neither type of harm is more important than the other. nor is harm synonymous with the damages alleged. the text of the provision does not depend on a particular kind of harm, but expressly refers only to harm in general. [70] further, since s 137.1(4)(b) is, in effect, a weighing exercise, there is no threshold requirement for the harm to be sufficiently worthy of consideration the magnitude of the harm becomes relevant when the motion judge must determine whether it is “sufficiently serious” that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. in other words, the magnitude of the harm simply adds weight to one side of the weighing exercise. [71] this does not mean that the harm pleaded by the plaintiff should be taken at face value or that bald assertions are sufficient but i would not go so far as to require a fully developed damages brief, nor would i require that the harm be monetized, as the question here relates to the existence of harm, not its quantification. the statutory language employed in s 137.1(4)(b) is “harm likely to”, which modifies both “be” and “have been”; this indicates that the plaintiff need not prove harm or causation, but must simply provide evidence for the motion judge to draw an inference of likelihood in respect of the existence of the harm and the relevant causal link. the evidentiary burden might depend on the nature of the substantive law that is applied, although it must be borne in mind that a s 137.1 motion is not an adjudication on the merits: for example, in a defamation action, harm (and therefore general damages) is presumed, but the plaintiff would still have to support a claim for special damages importantly, though, no definitive determination of harm or causation is required. [72] i add that, naturally, evidence of a causal link between the expression and the harm will be especially important where there may be sources other than the defendant’s expression that may have caused the plaintiff harm (c.a reasons, at para. 92). causation is not, however, an all-or-nothing proposition, in the sense that while the causal chain between the defendant’s expression and the harm suffered by the plaintiff may be weaker for some elements of the harm suffered, it might nonetheless be strong for other elements this is a case-by-case inquiry undertaken by the motion judge. (b) weighing of the public interest [73] once harm has been established and shown to be causally related to the expression, s 137.1(4)(b) requires that the harm and corresponding public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue be weighed against the public interest in protecting the expression therefore, as under s 137.1(3), public interest becomes critical to the analysis. [74] however, the term “public interest” is used differently in s 137.1(4)(b) than in s 137.1(3) under s 137.1(3), the query is concerned with whether the expression relates to a matter of public interest. the assessment is not qualitative — i.e it does not matter whether the expression helps or hampers the public interest. under s 137.1(4)(b), in contrast, the legislature expressly makes the public interest relevant to specific goals: permitting the proceeding to continue and protecting the impugned expression therefore, not just any matter of public interest will be relevant instead, the quality of the expression, and the motivation behind it, are relevant here. [75] indeed, “a statement that contains deliberate falsehoods, [or] gratuitous personal attacks . . . may still be an expression that relates to a matter of public interest. however, the public interest in protecting that speech will be less than would have been the case had the same message been delivered without the lies, [or] vitriol” (c.a reasons, at para. 94, citing able translations ltd v express international translations inc., 2016 onsc 6785, 410 dlr (4th) 380, at paras. 82-84 and 96- 103, aff’d 2018 onca 690, 428 dlr (4th) 568). [76] while judges should be wary of the inquiry descending into a moralistic taste test, this court recognized as early as r v. keegstra, [1990] 3 scr 697, that not all expression is created equal: “while we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity, it is equally destructive of free expression values, as well as the other values which underlie a free and democratic society, to treat all expression as equally crucial to those principles at the core of s 2(b)” (p 760). [77] the weighing exercise under s 137.1(4)(b) can thus be informed by this court’s s 2(b) canadian charter of rights and freedoms jurisprudence, which grounds the level of protection afforded to expression in the nature of the expression (r v sharpe, 2001 scc 2, [2001] 1 scr 45, at para. 181) for example, the inquiry might look to the core values underlying freedom of expression, such as the search for truth, participation in political decision making, and diversity in forms of self-fulfilment and human flourishing (sharpe, at para. 182; thomson newspapers co. v. canada (attorney general), [1998] 1 scr 877, at para. 24). the closer the expression is to any of these core values, the greater the public interest in protecting it. [78] i outline below some further factors that may bear on the public interest weighing exercise under s 137.1(4)(b) i note that in platnick v. bent, 2018 onca 687, 426 dlr (4th) 60, at para. 99, doherty j.a made reference to recognized “indicia of a slapp suit” (emphasis omitted) he recognized four indicia in particular: (1) “a history of the plaintiff using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics”; (2) “a financial or power imbalance that strongly favours the plaintiff”; (3) “a punitive or retributory purpose animating the plaintiff’s bringing of the claim”; and (4) “minimal or nominal damages suffered by the plaintiff” (para. 99). doherty j.a found that where these indicia are present, the weighing exercise favours granting the s 137.1 motion and dismissing the underlying proceeding. the court of appeal for ontario has since applied these indicia in a number of cases (see, eg,. lascaris v. b’nai brith canada, 2019 onca 163, 144 or (3d) 211). [79] i am of the view that these four indicia may bear on the analysis only to the extent that they are tethered to the text of the statute and the considerations explicitly contemplated by the legislature. this is because the s 137.1(4)(b) stage is fundamentally a public interest weighing exercise and not simply an inquiry into the hallmarks of a slapp therefore, for this reason, the only factors that might be relevant in guiding that weighing exercise are those tethered to the text of s 137.1(4)(b), which calls for a consideration of: the harm suffered or potentially suffered by the plaintiff, the corresponding public interest in allowing the underlying proceeding to continue, and the public interest in protecting the underlying expression. [80] accordingly, additional factors may also prove useful. for example, the following factors, in no particular order of importance, may be relevant for the motion judge to consider: the importance of the expression, the history of litigation between the parties, broader or collateral effects on other expressions on matters of public interest, the potential chilling effect on future expression either by a party or by others, the defendant’s history of activism or advocacy in the public interest, any disproportion between the resources being used in the lawsuit and the harm caused or the expected damages award, and the possibility that the expression or the claim might provoke hostility against an identifiably vulnerable group or a group protected under s 15 of the charter or human rights legislation. i reiterate that the relevance of the foregoing factors must be tethered to the text of s 137.1(4)(b) and the considerations explicitly contemplated by the legislature to conduct the weighing exercise. [81] fundamentally, the open-ended nature of s 137.1(4)(b) provides courts with the ability to scrutinize what is really going on in the particular case before them: s 137.1(4)(b) effectively allows motion judges to assess how allowing individuals or organizations to vindicate their rights through a lawsuit — a fundamental value in its own right in a democracy — affects, in turn, freedom of expression and its corresponding influence on public discourse and participation in a pluralistic democracy. [82] in conclusion, under s 137.1(4)(b), the burden is on the plaintiff — ie. the responding party — to show on a balance of probabilities that it likely has suffered or will suffer harm, that such harm is a result of the expression established under s 137.1(3), and that the corresponding public interest in allowing the underlying proceeding to continue outweighs the deleterious effects on expression and public participation this weighing exercise is the crux or core of the s 137.1 analysis, as it captures the overarching concern of the legislation, as evidenced by the legislative history it accordingly should be given due importance by the motion judge in assessing a s 137.1 motion. iv application to this case [83] in the following section, i apply the s 137.1 framework to the facts of this case i provide first an overview of the facts and procedural history, and subsequently apply the s 137.1 framework to those facts i ultimately reach the conclusion that pointes protection’s s 137.1 motion should be granted and consequently that 170 ontario’s underlying action should be dismissed. a factual overview [84] the appellant, 170 ontario, wanted to develop a 91-lot subdivision in the city of sault ste. marie. in order to do so, it was necessary for 170 ontario to obtain the approval of both the sault ste marie region conservation authority (“ssmrca”) and the sault ste. marie city council (“city council”). [85] pointes protection association and six members of its executive committee are the respondents before this court. pointes protection association is a not-for-profit corporation created to provide a coordinated response to 170 ontario’s development proposal on behalf of affected residents. pointes protection opposed the proposed development, particularly on environmental grounds. [86] 170 ontario successfully obtained the ssmrca’s approval, which pointes protection then contested by bringing an application for judicial review of the ssmrca’s decision while that application was pending, 170 ontario sought approval from the city council. its application to the city council was rejected, and it appealed to the ontario municipal board (“omb), which granted pointes protection standing to participate. [87] this context is important, because while pointes protection’s application for judicial review of the ssmrca’s decision and 170 ontario’s appeal to the omb were both pending, the parties settled the judicial review proceeding by way of minutes of settlement (“agreement”). [88] under the terms of the agreement, pointes protection’s judicial review application was to be dismissed on consent without costs crucial to this appeal, however, is the fact that the agreement also imposed limitations on pointes protection’s future conduct. in particular, arts. 4 and 6 of the agreement provided as follows: committee members 4) the pointes protection association (hereinafter the “ppa”) and its comprised of peter gagnon, executive lou sim[i]onetti, pat gratton and gay gartshore together with rick gartshore, and glen stortini (the named individuals hereinafter referred to collectively as the “ppa members”) undertake and agree not to take any further court proceeding seeking the same or similar relief as set out in the within notice of application; . that the resolutions passed by 6) the ppa and the ppa members undertake and agree that in any hearing or proceeding before the ontario municipal board (omb) or any other subsequent legal proceeding that they will not advance the position the ssmrca on december 13th 2012 in regards to the pointe estates development under subsection 3(1) of ontario reg. 176/06 are illegal or invalid or contrary to the provisions of the conservation authorities act rso. 1990 c. c.27 and ontario reg. 176/06 being the regulation of development, to shorelines and watercourses or that the ssmrca exceeded its jurisdiction by passing the above noted resolutions with no reasonable evidence to support its decision and considered factors extraneous to those set out in subsection 3(1) of ont reg. 176/06 . . . [emphasis added.] interference with wetlands and alterations (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 196-97) [89] at the omb hearing of 170 ontario’s appeal from the city council’s refusal, peter gagnon, the president of pointes protection association and a signatory of the agreement, testified. this testimony is the root of the breach of contract action later initiated by 170 ontario against pointes protection, which gives rise to this appeal mr. gagnon testified that 170 ontario’s proposed development would result in a loss of wetland area and in environmental damage to the region though 170 ontario objected at the time to mr. gagnon’s testimony, the omb member hearing the appeal permitted him to give evidence on the wetland issue insofar as it was relevant to the planning merits question and not to the conservation question, which was within the purview of the ssmrca following the hearing, the omb eventually dismissed 170 ontario’s appeal and thereby upheld the city council’s refusal of its development plan. 170 ontario has accordingly not moved forward with that plan. [90] what gives rise to this appeal is what followed the omb’s dismissal of 170 ontario’s appeal: 170 ontario initiated a breach of contract action against pointes protection. in its statement of claim, 170 ontario took the position that mr. gagnon’s testimony at the omb hearing on behalf of pointes protection breached the agreement because (1) the defendants sought the same relief as in their judicial review application, (2) the defendants gave evidence regarding the wetland issue, which had been “[i]mplicit[ly]” (ar, vol. ii, at p 33) settled by the agreement, and (3) the defendants advanced the position that the ssmrca approval was contrary to the conservation authorities act, rso 1990, c. c.27 170 ontario claimed $6 million in damages, that is, $5 million in general damages and $1 million in punitive and aggravated damages. [91] pointes protection, for its part, did not file a statement of defence, but instead brought a motion under s 137.1 of the cja to have the action dismissed. b procedural history (1) ontario superior court (gareau j.), 2016 onsc 2884, 84 cpc (7th) 298 [92] the motion judge, gareau j., dismissed pointes protection’s s 137.1 motion and allowed 170 ontario’s action to proceed. first, on the threshold burden, he concluded that mr. gagnon’s testimony concerning the potential environmental impact of the proposed development constituted an expression relating to a matter of public interest as required by s 137.1(3) (paras. 29-40) however, turning to the merits-based and public interest hurdles in s 137.1(4)(a) and (b), gareau j found that 170 ontario had met its burden (paras. 41-56). (2) court of appeal for ontario (doherty, brown and huscroft jja) [93] pointes protection’s appeal was heard together with five other appeals3 before a single panel of the court of appeal for ontario. this was in light of the fact that the court of appeal had not previously considered s 137.1 of the cja and that each of the appeals involved the proper interpretation of the s 137.1 framework. therefore, while each of the appeals raised discrete issues, the court of appeal’s 3 those appeals were fortress real developments inc v rabidoux, 2018 onca 686, 426 dlr. (4th) 1; platnick; veneruzzo v. storey, 2018 onca 688, 23 cpc (8th) 352; armstrong v. corus entertainment inc., 2018 onca 689, 143 or (3d) 54; and able translations (ca). reasons in pointes protection’s appeal were controlling as regards the appropriate analysis of the s 137.1 framework. [94] doherty ja, writing for a unanimous court, allowed pointes protection’s appeal, granted its s 137.1 motion, and dismissed 170 ontario’s lawsuit (para. 124). first, on the threshold burden, he noted that 170 ontario was not challenging gareau j.’s finding that mr. gagnon’s testimony constituted an expression relating to a matter of public interest under s 137.1(3), and therefore it was not in dispute that pointes protection had met its burden on this prong. [95] doherty ja disagreed with the motion judge’s findings on s 137.1(4)(a) and (b) with regard to substantial merit, doherty j.a found that the motion judge had erred by not examining the record and considering the relevant principles of contractual interpretation turning to substantial merit himself, he held that 170 ontario’s action lacked substantial merit (paras. 113-17) acknowledging that this alone would be sufficient to dismiss the action, he nonetheless analyzed the other prongs of s 137.1(4) for completeness (para. 117). he quickly disposed of the motion judge’s finding that there was no valid defence by pointing out that the judge had “wrongly put the onus on pointes [protection]” (para. 119) finally, on the public interest hurdle, doherty j.a identified no harm to 170 ontario aside from interference with its reasonable expectation of finality in the litigation, an expectation that was dependent entirely on the correctness of its interpretation of the agreement (paras. 120-21) therefore, doherty j.a found that 170 ontario could not meet its burden on any of the s 137.1(4) prongs. [96] the court of appeal for ontario accordingly allowed pointes protection’s appeal, set aside the motion judge’s order, and entered an order dismissing 170 ontario’s action (para. 124). c application of the section 137.1 framework [97] applying the framework set out in part iii of these reasons, i ultimately reach the same conclusion as the court of appeal: 170 ontario’s action lacks substantial merit, and the harm likely to be or have been suffered by 170 ontario and the corresponding public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue do not outweigh the public interest in protecting pointes protection’s expression i review the findings of both the motion judge and the court of appeal on a standard of correctness because — as the reasons outlined in part iii made clear — their interpretation of the s 137.1 framework raises questions of law (housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at paras. 8 and 36; teal cedar products ltd. v. british columbia, 2017 scc 32, [2017] 1 scr 688, at para. 78). (1) section 137.1(3) — threshold burden [98] mr. gagnon’s testimony constitutes an expression that relates to a matter of public interest, and 170 ontario’s breach of contract action arises from that expression. therefore, pointes protection meets its threshold burden under s 137.1(3) with little difficulty. [99] first, mr. gagnon’s testimony is captured by the statutory definition of expression, as it is a verbal communication made publicly (s 1371(2)). [100] second, the materials before the motion judge support a finding that the expression relates to a matter of public interest. mr. gagnon’s testimony focused on the environmental impact of a proposed private development a large group of residents and voters was deeply invested in the ecological consequences of the pointe estates development there was extensive evidence in the record concerning the broad local media coverage of the development proposal itself, as well as the proceedings of the ssmrca, the city council, and the omb. this was a matter that affected “people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or what may happen to them or to others” (per lord denning in london artists, ltd v littler, [1969] 2 all e.r 193 (ca), at p 198, cited in torstar, at para. 104). [101] accordingly, i am in agreement with both the motion judge and the court of appeal that mr. gagnon’s testimony at the omb constitutes an expression on a matter of public interest. [102] i also agree with the courts below that the proceeding brought by 170 ontario “arises from” that expression. it is a breach of contract action premised on an alleged breach of the agreement resulting from mr. gagnon’s testimony at the omb there is thus a clear nexus between mr. gagnon’s expression and the underlying proceeding. [103] therefore, i am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that 170 ontario’s breach of contract action arises from an expression that relates to a matter of public interest. (2) section 137.1(4)(a) — merits-based hurdle [104] since pointes protection has met its onus on the threshold question, the burden now shifts to 170 ontario to show that there are grounds to believe that its breach of contract action has substantial merit and that pointes protection has no valid defence. [105] i agree with the court of appeal’s conclusion that 170 ontario’s action lacks substantial merit 170 ontario’s claim is based solely on a breach of the agreement accordingly, whether or not the action has “substantial merit” rests solely on the interpretation of the agreement, which is fundamentally a contract. applying the customary principles of contractual interpretation, which the motion judge failed to do, i find that 170 ontario’s action is not legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that its claim can be said to have a real prospect of success; it thus does not have substantial merit. [106] it is well established that the interpretation of a written contractual provision must be grounded in the text and that the provision must be read in light of the entire contract. the surrounding circumstances can be relied on in the interpretive process, but not to the point that they distort the explicit language of the agreement (sattva capital corp. v. creston moly corp., 2014 scc 53, [2014] 2 scr 633, at para. 57). [107] in this case, the interpretation advanced by 170 ontario does not flow from the plain language of the agreement or from the factual matrix surrounding it. the reading urged by 170 ontario would distort the ordinary meaning of the words in a manner that exceeds the bounds of appropriate judicial intervention in matters of contractual interpretation. [108] the language of the agreement is clear on its face: it restricts pointes protection’s expression only as it relates to the ssmrca’s decision and to judicial review of that decision. 170 ontario’s argument is tantamount to asking this court to read in ex post a term that does not exist in the agreement. the agreement expressly bars pointes protection from “advanc[ing] the position” that the ssmrca’s decision was “illegal or invalid or contrary to” the conservation authorities act (ar, vol. ii, at p 197). the agreement also prohibits pointes protection from “seeking the same or similar relief as set out in the within notice of application”, in which it was alleged that the ssmrca had erred in the course of its decision-making process (p 196). the agreement is expressly limited to settling and foreclosing the foregoing. there is nothing in its plain language which could possibly foreclose pointes protection from advancing an argument, as here, that does not pertain to the ssmrca’s decision. that argument might admittedly depend on the same evidence, but there is nothing in the agreement that suggests that the evidentiary foundation of pointes protection’s challenge to the ssmrca’s decision is precluded from being used in a proceeding unrelated to that decision. [109] 170 ontario’s submission that any argument raised with the ssmrca is covered by an implied term of the agreement stretches the agreement beyond any reasonable parameter pointes protection specifically sought to preserve its right to participate in the omb proceeding during the negotiations leading to the agreement (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 192-93). common sense indicates that its purpose in participating in the omb proceeding would have been to advance its ultimate position against 170 ontario’s proposed land development it is unclear what pointes protection would have raised at the omb hearing other than the issues that were its primary concern: wetland destruction, flooding, drainage, and other environmental impacts. the agreement expressly settled the application for judicial review of the ssmrca’s decision and, correspondingly, prevented any future use of arguments to the effect that the ssmrca had erred in that decision; the agreement did not contemplate or preclude pointes protection’s advancement of its concerns generally. [110] in my view, doherty ja’s characterization of the situation at para. 114 of his reasons was apt and correct: 170 ontario’s reliance on an “implicit” term in the agreement to preclude the defendants from raising the wetlands issue in testimony before the omb is not, in my view, an interpretation of the agreement that flows reasonably from the language or the factual context of the agreement. when the parties entered into the agreement, pointes had standing at the omb and 170 ontario knew that the defendants would oppose the development at the omb nothing in the agreement touched on the defendants’ participation in the omb proceedings. specifically, nothing in the agreement suggested that pointes could not oppose 170 ontario’s development at the omb. 170 ontario must be taken to have known full well the range of factual issues that could be raised on its appeal before the omb. those issues included some that had been considered, albeit in a different regulatory context, by the ssmrca. [emphasis added.] [111] accordingly, 170 ontario’s breach of contract action cannot be seen as legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that its claim can be said to have a real prospect of success. [112] i therefore reach the conclusion under s 137.1(4)(a)(i) that there is no substantial merit to 170 ontario’s action. given this conclusion, it is not necessary to consider s 137.1(4)(a)(ii) and the defences raised by pointes protection (absolute privilege and estoppel) this is because 170 ontario’s failure to satisfy s 137.1(4)(a)(i) is sufficient to say that it has failed to satisfy s 137.1(4)(a) as a whole. in any case, the conclusion that 170 ontario’s interpretation of the agreement has no substantial merit inevitably leads to the conclusion that it would not be able to show that pointes protection’s interpretation of the agreement is not valid (ca. reasons, at para. 119). (3) section 137.1(4)(b) — public interest hurdle [113] even if there were grounds to believe that 170 ontario’s action has substantial merit, and setting aside the issue of whether there are grounds to believe that pointes protection has no valid defence available, i would nonetheless conclude independently that the action should be dismissed because the harm, if any, to 170 ontario resulting from the expression and the corresponding public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue do not outweigh the public interest in protecting pointes protection’s expression in this particular case. (a) harm allegedly suffered and public interest in permitting 170 ontario’s action to continue [114] 170 ontario claims two sources of harm that arise from mr. gagnon’s testimony at the omb. the first harm alleged is financial. not only has 170 ontario claimed $6 million in damages, but it also points out that it gave up its right to costs on the security for costs motion when it settled the judicial review application. the second harm is non-pecuniary and rests on the importance of courts fostering the principle of finality of litigation through contractual mechanisms, such as the agreement here. [115] turning first to the financial damages alleged to have been suffered, i note that 170 ontario has not provided any theory concerning the nature or quantum of those damages i acknowledge that a fully developed damages brief is not necessary on a s 137.1 motion i also acknowledge that a motion judge is not required to make definite findings of fact on issues of causation however, in this case, there is simply a dearth of evidence on the motion linking mr. gagnon’s testimony to any of the undefined damages that are claimed. [116] assuming quantifiable and demonstrable harm, 170 ontario’s argument presupposes that 170 ontario suffered a loss as a result of mr. gagnon’s testimony at the omb (i.e the expression) however, it is nearly impossible to conjecture that mr. gagnon’s testimony was the reason why the omb upheld the city council’s refusal of 170 ontario’s development application. indeed, mr. gagnon was only one of six witnesses who testified in opposition to the development (ar, vol. iii, at p 31). moreover, the omb identified several grounds for dismissing the appeal in its entirety: the development application did not have appropriate regard for matters of provincial interest, was not consistent with the provincial policy statement, was contrary to the official plan of the city of sault ste. marie, did not have appropriate regard for the provisions of s 51(24) of the planning act, rso 1990, c. p.13, and the development application in its entirety did “not represent good planning” (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 13-14). though the omb explicitly accepted mr. gagnon’s evidence, that evidence was merely one of many contributing factors in its ultimate dismissal of 170 ontario’s appeal, and may not have been a factor at all in the constellation that comprise of why the city council refused 170 ontario’s development plan in the first place. [117] to be absolutely clear, the preceding paragraph should not be taken to be an affirmation of the reasonableness of the omb’s decision, which is not before this court and in respect of which leave to appeal to the divisional court was denied (avery v. pointes protection assn., 2016 onsc 6463, 60 mplr (5th) 70). rather, it is simply meant to demonstrate that 170 ontario cannot convincingly show that any harm it might have suffered as a result of mr. gagnon’s expression was in fact sufficient to establish any significant public interest in allowing its breach of contract action to proceed. [118] the second harm alleged by 170 ontario has to do with finality in litigation, which is undoubtedly an important value. however, the value of finality in litigation is relevant at the s 137.1(4)(b) stage only to the extent that it relates to harm suffered by the plaintiff, not harm in general. here, i am willing to accept that this is the case, since 170 ontario alleges that it is being deprived of a benefit for which it bargained in settling the judicial review proceeding with pointes protection. nonetheless, in my view, finality in litigation is not compromised by dismissing 170 ontario’s breach of contract action: the agreement continues to be binding between the parties, and pointes protection continues to be foreclosed from advancing the position that the ssmrca’s decision was invalid or illegal i am in agreement with the court of appeal that “170 ontario’s reasonable expectation of finality is dependent entirely on the correctness of its interpretation of the agreement” (para. 120) as i discussed above, the agreement cannot reasonably be read as precluding mr. gagnon’s testimony before the omb. therefore, finality in litigation is not squarely engaged and cannot be given any significant weight at this stage. [119] in summary, in light of the foregoing, i must conclude that the harm likely to be or have been suffered by 170 ontario as a result of mr. gagnon’s expression lies at the very low end of the spectrum and, correspondingly, so too does the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue. (b) public interest in protecting pointes protection’s expression [120] the public interest in protecting mr. gagnon’s expression is significant for two reasons first, the public has a strong interest in the subject matter of the expression, which relates to the ecological impact and environmental degradation associated with a proposed large-scale development second, the form of the expression, namely testimony before an adjudicative tribunal, militates in favour of protecting it. [121] first, with respect to the subject matter of the impugned expression in this case, it must be borne in mind that mr. gagnon was providing evidence regarding a matter of local and ecological significance the express purpose of s 137.1 is to “encourage” and “promote” public participation in debates on matters which invite this kind of public attention. [122] further, the omb is required to carry out its obligations under the planning act with regard to “matters of provincial interest”, which are defined as including the protection of ecological systems, the conservation of features with significant interest, and the orderly development of safe and healthy communities (s 2). these “matters of provincial interest” intersect to a large degree with the public interest, and the opportunity to express an opinion on these issues during what is a public deliberative process ought to be encouraged. [123] second, with respect to the form of expression, courts have closely guarded the principle of participation in the process of tribunal decision making. where a claim is founded on evidence to be provided before a tribunal, there is a risk that witnesses will be deterred from participating in the adjudicative process because of a fear of legal retaliation for this reason, courts recognize, for example, an absolute privilege that attaches to testimony given “in the ordinary course of any proceedings”, regardless of whether it is relevant or irrelevant, malicious or not (amato v welsh, 2013 onca 258, 362 dlr (4th) 38, at para. 34, citing halsbury’s laws of england (4th ed 1997), vol. 28, at para. 97) indeed, here, reducing the “risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action” is an express statutory purpose set out in s 1371(1). [124] strengthening the integrity of the justice system by encouraging truthful and open testimony is inextricably linked to the freedom of participants to express themselves in the forums concerned without fear of retribution. i accordingly consider that the public interest in protecting pointes protection’s expression falls at the higher end of the spectrum. (c) weighing of the public interest [125] as i have discussed, the harm likely to be or have been suffered by 170 ontario lies at the very low end of the spectrum, and so too then does the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue. on the other hand, the public interest in pointes protection’s expression is at the higher end of the spectrum. [126] it is thus clear that 170 ontario cannot establish on a balance of probabilities that the harm suffered as a result of pointes protection’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression. (4) conclusion on the application of the framework [127] for the foregoing reasons, i would grant pointes protection’s s 137.1 motion on either of the independent grounds that 170 ontario’s action lacks substantial merit and that 170 ontario is unable to demonstrate that the weighing of the public interest favours permitting the proceeding to continue accordingly, the court of appeal for ontario was correct in dismissing 170 ontario’s underlying breach of contract action. v conclusion [128] the appeal is dismissed. [129] with regard to costs, the legislature expressly contemplated a costs regime for s 137.1 motions indeed, s 137.1(7) sets out an award of costs as the default rule if a s 137.1 motion is granted, unless a judge determines that “such an award is not appropriate in the circumstances.” that would not be the case here i would therefore simply award party-and-party costs to the respondents, as per this court’s ordinary practice.
i. introduction [1] this appeal is about the proper approach to interpreting the scope of a release, whether there is any special interpretive rule that applies specifically to releases, and if not, how the general principles of contractual interpretation this court set out in sattva capital corp. v. creston moly corp., 2014 scc 53, [2014] 2 scr. 633, apply to the release at issue here. [2] the respondent mary bailey struck david temple, an employee of the appellant city of corner brook, with her husband’s car. mr. temple sued mrs. bailey. in a separate action, mrs. bailey sued the city. mrs. bailey and the city settled, and mrs. bailey released the city from liability relating to the accident and discontinued her action years later, mrs. bailey brought a third party claim against the city for contribution or indemnity, in the action brought against her by mr. temple. the city says the release bars mrs. bailey’s third party claim. mrs. bailey says it does not. [3] there is no special interpretive principle that applies to releases the decisions below refer to the rule from the house of lords decision in london and south western railway co. v. blackmore (1870), lr 4 hl 610, in which lord westbury stated, at p 623: “the general words in a release are limited always to that thing or those things which were specially in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the release was given.” as i will explain, this “blackmore rule” has been overtaken by the general principles of contract law in sattva. the blackmore rule has outlived its usefulness and should no longer be referred to any judicial tendency to interpret releases narrowly is not a function of any special rule, but rather a function of releases themselves. [4] in the instant case, the application judge interpreted the release broadly to include mrs. bailey’s third party claim in accordance with sattva, and his reasons should have been reviewed on a palpable and overriding error standard as the application judge made no reviewable error in his interpretation of the release, i would allow the appeal and reinstate his order. ii. facts [5] on march 3, 2009, mrs. bailey struck mr. temple while driving a car owned by her husband. mr. temple was an employee of the city of corner brook, and was performing road work at the time. the baileys commenced an action against the city for property damage to the car and physical injury suffered by mrs. bailey (“bailey action”). [6] meanwhile, mr. temple commenced a separate action against mrs. bailey seeking compensation for the injuries he sustained in the accident (“temple action”). mrs. bailey was served with the statement of claim in the temple action on march 24, 2011 once served, mrs. bailey brought the statement of claim to her insurance representative. [7] subsequently, the baileys and the city entered into settlement discussions via their counsel. on august 10, 2011, counsel for the baileys wrote to counsel for the city by email. after discussing mrs. bailey’s lingering injuries from the accident, the baileys’ counsel stated that he would be prepared to advise his client to accept $10,000 in full settlement of their claims. on august 12, 2011, counsel for the city replied. he rejected the $10,000 settlement offer, noting that his client “feels strongly on liability”, but explained that his client was “aware that all litigation carries risks and costs” and was therefore prepared to make an offer of $7,500 to resolve the matter, contingent on discontinuance and execution of a full and final release to the city’s satisfaction. on august 16, 2011, counsel for the baileys said that his clients accept. the baileys signed the release on august 26, 2011. the relevant excerpt of the release reads as follows: . . . the [baileys], on behalf of themselves and their heirs, dependents, executors, administrators, successors, assigns, and legal and personal representatives, hereby release and forever discharge the [city, its] servants, agents, officers, directors, managers, employees, their associated, affiliated and subsidiary legal entities and their legal successors and assigns, both jointly and severally, from all actions, suits, causes of action, debts, dues, accounts, benefits, bonds, covenants, contracts, costs, claims and demands whatsoever, including all claims for compensation, loss of use, loss of time, loss of wages, expenses, disability, past, present or future, and any aggravation, foreseen or unforeseen, as well as for injuries presently undisclosed and all demands and claims of any kind or nature whatsoever arising out of or relating to the accident which occurred on or about march 3, 2009, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing from all claims raised or which could have been raised in the [bailey action] . . . . [emphasis added.] [8] later, on march 16, 2016, mrs. bailey commenced a third party claim against the city in the temple action, claiming contribution or indemnity from the city in the event she is found liable to mr. temple in his claim against her. [9] the city brought a summary trial application pursuant to rule 17a of the rules of the supreme court, 1986, snl 1986, c 42, sch. d. the city’s position was that the release barred the third party claim. mrs. bailey’s position was that it did not, because the third party claim was not specifically contemplated by the city and the baileys when they signed the release. iii decisions below a. supreme court of newfoundland and labrador, 2018 nlsc 177, 37 cpc (8th) 40 [10] justice george l. murphy concluded that the release barred mrs. bailey’s third party claim against the city and stayed the claim. he began by acknowledging that whether mrs. bailey’s third party claim against the city was barred depended on the interpretative approach applied to releases: the blackmore rule. he explained that in interpreting a release, the goal is to ascertain the intention of the parties. the court must first look to the words of the release. it may also look to the context in which the release was signed to interpret those words. the review must be carried out from an objective perspective. [11] the application judge concluded that based on the words of the release alone, it covers mrs. bailey’s third party claim. however, this did not end his analysis, because the blackmore rule required him to consider what was in the contemplation of the parties at the time the release was signed and the specific context in which it was signed. the application judge noted that mrs. bailey had already been served with the temple action when she signed the release, and that the statement of claim in the bailey action demonstrated that she was aware of the facts underlying the third party claim when she signed the release he then reviewed the correspondence between counsel leading up to the release, and concluded that the parties contemplated any and all types of claims relating to the accident. b court of appeal of newfoundland and labrador, 2020 nlca 3, 443 dlr (4th) 633 [12] the court of appeal unanimously allowed the appeal. the court of appeal concluded that the blackmore rule has, over time, been subsumed into the principles of contractual interpretation affirmed by this court in sattva and ledcor construction ltd. v. northbridge indemnity insurance co., 2016 scc 37, [2016] 2 scr 23. rather, it is a particular application of the general approach to contractual interpretation. whether one approaches the appeal based on the blackmore rule or not, the result in this case would be the same. [13] the court of appeal concluded that the application judge made three extricable errors of law, in holding that: (1) what was in the contemplation of the city was determinative of mutual intent, (2) it was not necessary to determine what was “specially” in the contemplation of the parties, and (3) it was sufficient that the broad general wording of the release covered the third party claim when the surrounding circumstances suggested otherwise. the court of appeal concluded that these errors had a material effect on the result, entitling the court of appeal to review the decision below on a correctness standard. it reasoned that the broad phrases in the release should be considered against the more specific references to the bailey action, and that the pre-contract exchange of correspondence made no reference to the temple action or any future third party action the court of appeal concluded that the words, the context, and the exchange of correspondence were all consistent with the release being interpreted as a release only of the baileys’ claims in the bailey action. the court of appeal reinstated the third party notice. iv submissions of the parties [14] the city argues that the blackmore rule is no longer applicable and that the release should be interpreted in accordance with the normal rules of contractual interpretation. it submits that the words of the agreement plainly describe its subject matter as all claims arising from the accident, and that there is nothing in the factual matrix that could narrow this subject matter without departing from the words of the agreement. [15] mrs. bailey agrees the blackmore rule has been subsumed into the general principles of contractual interpretation articulated in sattva, and submits that whether the release is interpreted using the blackmore rule or not, the result is the same. the release foreclosed the baileys’ right to make any claim for injuries suffered by them arising from the accident, but the release was not intended to allocate to the baileys the city’s responsibility for mr. temple’s injuries. v. issues a) what is the law governing the interpretation of releases? b) what is the standard of review? c) did the application judge make a reviewable error in his interpretation of the release? vi analysis a. the law governing the interpretation of releases [16] in order properly to consider the issues in this case, i will begin the analysis that follows with an outline of the guiding rule for the interpretation of contracts as set out by this court in sattva. [17] sattva marked a significant change in the jurisprudence. traditionally, the interpretation of contracts was a matter of law, not mixed fact and law this was because interpretation was seen primarily as an exercise in giving meaning to words. circumstances were generally relevant to interpretation only where there was an ambiguity. [18] the blackmore rule was formulated in the traditional period to which i have just referred in that view, courts were reluctant to have regard to the facts surrounding the formation of a contract, as an aid to its interpretation. the words of a contract were given their “black letter” meaning. this was problematic from the view of releases; the blackmore rule addressed this problem. [19] but 150 years after the blackmore decision, things have changed. the facts surrounding the formation of a contract are relevant to its interpretation the jurisprudential concerns that gave rise to the rule in blackmore no longer exist. it is no longer needed. it has outlived its usefulness and should no longer be referred to. (1) the blackmore rule has been overtaken by sattva [20] this court set out the current approach to contractual interpretation in sattva. sattva directs courts to “read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract”: para. 47. this court explained that “[t]he meaning of words is often derived from a number of contextual factors, including the purpose of the agreement and the nature of the relationship created by the agreement”, but that the surrounding circumstances “must never be allowed to overwhelm the words of that agreement”: paras. 48 and 57. “while the surrounding circumstances are relied upon in the interpretive process, courts cannot use them to deviate from the text such that the court effectively creates a new agreement”: para. 57 this court also clarified that the relevant surrounding circumstances “consist only of objective evidence of the background facts at the time of the execution of the contract. . . , that is, knowledge that was or reasonably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at or before the date of contracting”: para. 58. [21] a release is a contract, and these general principles of contractual interpretation apply: g. r hall, canadian contractual interpretation law (4th ed. 2020), at p 286; f. d. cass, the law of releases in canada (2006), at p 71. however, in the 1870 house of lords blackmore decision, lord westbury set out a particular approach to the interpretation of releases, at pp. 623-24: the general words in a release are limited always to that thing or those things which were specially in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the release was given but a dispute that had not emerged, or a question which had not at all arisen, cannot be considered as bound and concluded by the anticipatory words of a general release. [22] the appellant refers to this as the “blackmore rule” in canadian contractual interpretation law, hall describes it as a “special rule which is superadded onto the regular ones”: p 286. this rule has deep roots, as reviewed by lord bingham in bank of credit and commerce international sa v. ali, [2001] ukhl 8, [2002] 1 ac 251, at paras. 9-16, and the high court of australia in grant v. john grant & sons pty ltd (1954), 91 clr 112; see also d whayman, “the modern rule of releases” (2021), ls 1 (online), at pp. 5-11; p. h. winfield, pollock’s principles of contract (13th ed. 1950), at pp. 412-13; chitty on contracts, vol. i, general principles (33rd ed 2018), at pp. 1642-44 it is not necessary to repeat the history of the blackmore rule here. suffice it to say that “[i]t is a principle long sanctioned in courts of equity, that a release cannot apply, or be intended to apply to circumstances of which a party had no knowledge at the time he executed it, and that if it is so general in its terms as to include matters never contemplated, the party will be entitled to relief”: lyall v. edwards (1861), 6 h & n 337, 158 er 139, at p 143, per pollock cb. [23] lord hoffmann observed in ali that judges in the 18th and 19th centuries were “less sensitive to context” and “were reluctant to admit what was called ‘extrinsic evidence’, that is to say, evidence of background which would put the language into context”: para. 54; see also cass, at pp. 74 and 87; chitty on contracts, at pp. 1041-43. while the blackmore rule would no doubt have had utility within that “black letter” framework, this is no longer the case. in sattva, this court directed judges to look to the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of contract in interpreting the meaning of the words of a contract: para. 47 the blackmore rule, which allowed courts to consider factual context when that was not the general rule, has been overtaken by a general rule that factual context is considered in interpreting contracts. [24] the blackmore rule was adopted in canada, but as i will explain, it was interpreted narrowly it no longer adds anything new to the regular repertoire of contractual interpretation principles in the wake of sattva. there are two ways in which the blackmore rule was narrowly interpreted. [25] first, the blackmore rule does not allow consideration of the subjective intention of the parties while it is not immediately obvious what “specially in the contemplation of the parties” means, la forest ja (as he then was) held in white v. central trust co (1984), 54 nbr (2d) 293 (ca), that this does not refer to the subjective intention of the parties, but merely permits courts to look to the surrounding circumstances to give meaning to the words the parties used he stated that “[b]y referring to what was in the contemplation of the parties, lord westbury was, of course, not opening the door to adducing evidence of what was actually going on in their minds, still less to making inferences about it”: para. 33 it is well-established that the blackmore rule does not allow courts to consider the subjective intentions of the parties: see hill v. nova scotia (attorney general), [1997] 1 scr 69, at paras. 18- 22; strata plan bcs 327, owners v. ipex inc., 2014 bcca 237, 358 bcac 124, at paras. 22-23; biancaniello v dmct llp, 2017 onca 386, 138 o.r (3d) 210, at para. 28; hall, at pp. 291-92; ca reasons, at paras. 22 and 66. [26] second, the blackmore rule does not preclude parties from releasing unknown claims. it is not immediately obvious what “a question which had not at all arisen, cannot be considered as bound and concluded by the anticipatory words of a general release” means. however, this too has been interpreted narrowly in a way that is consistent with ordinary contract law principles. in biancaniello, the court of appeal for ontario applied the blackmore rule and held that where sufficiently clear wording is used, releases can include claims unknown to the parties: para. 42, point 2 in reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the house of lords decision in ali. in that case, lord bingham reviewed the jurisprudence from english and australian courts, and concluded that “[a] party may . . . agree to release claims or rights of which he is unaware and of which he could not be aware, even claims which could not on the facts known to the parties have been imagined, if appropriate language is used to make plain that that is his intention”: para. 9. lord nicholls agreed, and wrote, at para. 27: the wording of a general release and the context in which it was given commonly make plain that the parties intended that the release should not be confined to known claims. on the contrary, part of the object was that the release should extend to any claims which might later come to light. the parties wanted to achieve finality when, therefore, a claim whose existence was not appreciated does come to light, on the face of the general words of the release and consistently with the purpose for which the release was given the release is applicable the mere fact that the parties were unaware of the particular claim is not a reason for excluding it from the scope of the release. the risk that further claims might later emerge was a risk the person giving the release took upon himself it was against this very risk that the release was intended to protect the person in whose favour the release was made. [emphasis added.] [27] a release can cover an unknown claim with sufficient language, and does not necessarily need to particularize with precision the exact claims that fall within its scope. in entering into a release, the parties bargain for finality, or as lord nicholls put it, “to wipe the slate clean”: ali, at para. 23 the releasor takes on the risk of relinquishing the value of the claims he or she might have had, and the releasee pays for the guarantee that no such claims will be brought. the uncertainty or risk that is allocated to the releasor is precisely what the releasee pays for. of course, difficulty can arise in deciding what wording is sufficient to encompass the unknown claim at issue in a given case. however, it is clear that releases can encompass such claims, and the blackmore rule has not been interpreted to hold otherwise. [28] in light of the narrow manner in which the blackmore rule has been interpreted, and in light of sattva which explicitly directs decision-makers to consider the meaning of the words in the surrounding circumstances when interpreting any contract, the blackmore rule no longer adds to or deviates from the general principles of interpretation that apply to all contracts. i agree with hall that the blackmore rule “is entirely consistent with the law of contractual interpretation generally”: p 286. [29] while some canadian appellate courts have purported to apply the blackmore rule, the way in which the rule is expressed in these cases is no different from ordinary principles of contractual interpretation. for example, the court of appeal for british columbia summarized the interpretive principles that apply to releases in bank of british columbia pension plan, re, 2000 bcca 291, 137 bcac 37, at para. 17, quoting chitty on contracts, vol. i, general principles (27th ed 1994), at pp. 1074-75 among the principles summarized, the court mentioned that a release “will not be construed as applying to facts of which the party making the release had no knowledge at the time of its execution or to objects which must then have been outside his contemplation”. this resembles the blackmore rule, but it is applied in a way that is entirely consistent with the approach set out in sattva. in bank of british columbia, the court interpreted a release between a bank and a former ceo broadly to include any rights the ceo might have had to a staff pension plan, even though his rights to the staff pension plan were not explicitly mentioned in the release. in other words, the staff pension plan was held to be within the contemplation or mutual intention of the parties, even though that intention was not made explicit in the release. [30] more recently, in biancaniello, the court of appeal for ontario, drawing on ali, distilled the principles of contractual interpretation that apply to releases, some of which also echo the blackmore rule. for example, the court of appeal noted that “[g]eneral language in a release will be limited to the thing or things that were specially in the contemplation of the parties when the release was given”: para. 42, point 3. however, as in bank of british columbia, the court of appeal for ontario interpreted the release at issue in biancaniello broadly. the release was between an accounting firm and its client, signed in the context of a dispute over fees, but the court of appeal interpreted it to include subsequently discovered negligence on the part of the firm. in other words, negligence that was unknown to the parties at the time of contract was held to be within their contemplation or mutual intention given that the claim fell within the “subject matter” covered by the release: para. 49. the way the blackmore rule is formulated and applied in both these cases reveals no inconsistency with the general principles of contractual interpretation. [31] it is true that the application of the blackmore rule can yield a narrow interpretation of releases, because courts can rely on it to hold that a claim that arose after the release was signed was not in the contemplation of the parties and is therefore not covered: see hall, at pp. 288-89 for example, in privest properties ltd v. foundation co of canada (1997), 36 bclr (3d) 155, the court of appeal for british columbia applied the blackmore rule to interpret a release narrowly and hold that it did not apply to all potential future litigation. it stated, at para. 13: “. . . it appears to have been the parties’ intention that by inserting the words ‘from the beginning of the construction to the date of these presents’, claims which later came to their knowledge would be excluded”. similarly, in hill, this court relied on the blackmore rule in reading a release narrowly and held that “[c]onsidering this release in the context of the expropriations proceedings it becomes clear that an essential and integral element of the consideration was the equitable interest in [the] land”, and the release therefore could not constitute a bar to compensation to the appellants for the taking of their equitable interest in the land: para. 21. however, it seems to me that the same conclusion could have been reached in these cases by simply applying the principles set out in sattva. [32] therefore, as the court of appeal concluded in the present case, whether one approaches the matter on the basis of the blackmore rule or not, the result is the same, and the application judge’s reliance on the blackmore rule is of no moment. as i read the application judge’s reasons, his conclusion about what the parties “contemplated” is synonymous with the language from sattva about what the parties mutually, objectively intended: sattva, at para. 57. [33] the blackmore rule and the jurisprudence pursuant to it should no longer be referred to, as the function that it had served has been subsumed entirely by the approach set out in sattva there is no principled reason to have a special rule applicable only to releases, in light of the contemporary approach to contract interpretation. as lord nicholls put it in ali, at para. 26: . . there is no room today for the application of any special “rules” of interpretation in the case of general releases there is no room for any special rules because there is now no occasion for them. a general release is a term in a contract the meaning to be given to the words used in a contract is the meaning which ought reasonably to be ascribed to those words having due regard to the purpose of the contract and the circumstances in which the contract was made. this general principle is as much applicable to a general release as to any other contractual term. why ever should it not be? [34] this uniform understanding of the principles of contractual interpretation is consistent with this court’s guidance in sattva that “the interpretation of contracts has evolved towards a practical, common-sense approach not dominated by technical rules of construction”: para. 47. there is no special rule of contractual interpretation that applies only to releases. (2) any judicial tendency to interpret releases narrowly is not a function of any special rule, but rather a function of releases themselves [35] releases tend to have certain features that may give rise to careful interpretations. contractual interpretation requires courts to give the words of a contract their ordinary and grammatical meaning, in a way that is consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of contract formation: sattva, at paras. 47-48 sometimes the ordinary meaning of the words and the surrounding circumstances come into tension, and courts must decide whether to rely on the surrounding circumstances to refine the meaning of the words, or whether doing so would impermissibly overwhelm the words of the agreements, in which case the words must override: para. 57. this tension may more often arise when interpreting releases, for two reasons. [36] first, as cass observes, “a distinctive feature of releases is that they are often expressed in the broadest possible words”: p 83 (footnote omitted). a general release, if interpreted literally, could prevent the releasor from suing the releasee for any reason, forever. while such a release may not be enforceable for other reasons (eg, unconscionability), the circumstances may also often indicate that such extreme consequences are not what the parties objectively intended. as the court of appeal for british columbia put it in strata plan bcs 327, “while releases signed in the course of a settlement of a dispute are often worded in a broad and general fashion, appearing to cover the end of the world, they must be considered in the context of the dispute”: para. 26. this context can serve as a limiting factor to the breadth of wording found in a release. [37] second, parties to a release are often trying to account for risks that at the time of contract are unknown. there is an imprecision inherent in this task; this can give rise to disagreement as to what was intended. as lord nicholls wrote in ali, parties settling a dispute want “to wipe the slate clean”, but it is not unusual for a claim to come to light whose existence was not known or suspected by either party the emergence of such an unsuspected claim gives rise to the question of “whether the context in which the general release was given is apt to cut down the apparently all- embracing scope of the words of the release”: para. 23. [38] for these reasons, releases may tend to lead to dissonance between the words of the agreement on their face and what the parties seem to have objectively intended based on the surrounding circumstances, with greater regularity than other types of contracts: see cass, at p 89. in resolving this tension, courts can be persuaded to interpret releases narrowly more so than other types of contracts, not because there is any special rule of interpretation that applies to releases, but simply because the broad wording of releases can conflict with the circumstances, especially for claims not in contemplation at the time of the release. the broader the wording of the release, the more likely this is to be so. [39] in ali, the house of lords unanimously agreed that it is possible for a release to include claims of which the parties were not aware at the time they signed the release. however, lord bingham, referencing the line of authority that includes the blackmore rule, stated that “in the absence of clear language, the court will be very slow to infer that a party intended to surrender rights and claims of which he was unaware and could not have been aware”: para. 10. he explained that the authorities provide “not a rule of law but a cautionary principle which should inform the approach of the court”: para. 17. [40] similarly, lord nicholls warned that while a release can include unknown claims, this approach “should not be pressed too far” as “the circumstances in which the release was given may suggest, and frequently they do suggest, that . . . the parties are reasonably to be taken to have intended . . . that the release should apply only to claims, known or unknown, relating to a particular subject matter”: para. 28 lord nicholls gave the example of a mutual general release on a settlement of final partnership accounts, and explained that depending on the circumstances, such a release may be properly confined to claims arising out of the partnership, and could not be taken to preclude a claim that later came to light that tree roots from one partner’s property had damaged the foundations of a neighbouring partner’s house. [41] while the house of lords was unanimous that it is possible to release unknown claims, they did not make clear what language would be sufficient. as lord hoffmann pointed out in dissent, the answer is not to encourage “grosser excesses of verbiage”: para. 38. cass agrees, and writes, at p 99: “one hopes that it is not to be expected that the release will catalogue with specificity all possible claims . . . .” cass suggests that the drafter of a release might consider wording that makes clear whether the release will cover unknown claims and whether the claims must be related to a particular area or subject matter. this is a sensible approach. i would add that releases that are narrowed to a particular time frame or subject matter are less likely to give rise to tension between the words and what the surrounding circumstances indicate the parties objectively intended. [42] biancaniello, discussed above, provides an example. in that case, the court of appeal for ontario applied the principles from ali to interpret a release broadly to include unknown claims. at issue was a release between an accounting firm and its client signed in the context of a fee dispute. the release barred “any and all claims arising from any and all services” provided by the firm to its client through to a certain date, and “without limiting the generality of the foregoing” any and all claims, counterclaims or defences that could have been pleaded in the fee dispute action: para. 6 (emphasis deleted). feldman ja, writing for the court, interpreted the release broadly to include claims arising from the firm’s subsequently discovered negligence. she noted that the release was limited to claims that existed up to a certain date, and to claims arising from the services provided by the accountants to their client. there was no need to further specify the types of claims that were included. she explained, at para. 49: “there is no need, for example, to say ‘including tort claims, negligence claims, breach of contract claims, cost claims’, etc they are all included unless specifically excluded. the same analysis applies to unknown claims. . . . had it said ‘including known and unknown claims’, that would just have been another way of saying that the release includes all claims.” [43] distinctions can be drawn between claims based on facts known to both parties (as in this case) and claims based on facts that were not known to both parties (as in biancaniello). such distinctions may be relevant when interpreting a release and assessing whether the claim at issue is the kind of claim the parties mutually intended to release. the ultimate question is whether the claim is of the type of claim to which the release is directed. this will depend on the wording and surrounding circumstances of the release in each case. lord bingham’s cautionary principle from ali should be understood not as a rule of interpretation, but rather an observation as to the issues that releases will tend to give rise to given their subject matter. any judicial tendency to narrow the meaning given to broad wording is not the function of any special rule, but rather a function of the context in which releases are given. thus, the ordinary rules for contract interpretation set out in sattva apply to releases as they do to other contracts. b. standard of review [44] in sattva, this court also explained that contractual interpretation is a fact specific exercise, and should be treated as a mixed question of fact and law for the purpose of appellate review, unless there is an “extricable question of law” the exception is standard form contracts, which is not relevant here: see ledcor construction. extricable questions of law in the context of contractual interpretation include “the application of an incorrect principle, the failure to consider a required element of a legal test, or the failure to consider a relevant factor”: sattva, at para. 53, quoting king v. operating engineers training institute of manitoba inc., 2011 mbca 80, 270 man. r (2d) 63, at para. 21. the circumstances in which a question of law can be extracted will be uncommon. whether something was or should have been within the common knowledge of the parties at the time the contract was entered into is a question of fact: sattva, at paras. 49-55 and 58. [45] in the present case, the court of appeal held that the application judge made three errors on extricable questions of law, at paras. 50-52: firstly, what was in the contemplation of the city in drafting the release is not determinative of mutual intent. secondly, it was in fact necessary to determine what was “specifically” contemplated by both parties. thirdly, it was not sufficient that the broad general wording of the release potentially covered a subsequent third party action for contribution if the surrounding circumstances suggested otherwise. [46] i disagree that any of these constitutes an error warranting appellate intervention. while this first point may describe an error as to an extricable question of law, it is not an error that the application judge made the application judge did consider what was objectively contemplated or intended by the city, but it is clear that he did not consider this to be determinative of mutual intent the application judge explicitly considers what was in the contemplation of both parties beginning at para. 29. he explains that the baileys could have negotiated the terms of the release, but that they chose not to, and he concludes that “what was in the contemplation of the parties was that mrs. bailey could no longer bring any claim or demand whatsoever against the city relating to the accident”: para. 43; see also paras. 41-42 and 44. with respect, the court of appeal mischaracterized what the application judge did. [47] the second and third points are not extricable questions of law. this court held in sattva that whether something was or reasonably should have been within the common knowledge of both parties at the time a contract was entered into is a question of fact. the court of appeal treated the question of how the surrounding circumstances inform the words of a contract as an “extricable question of law”. this undermines the deferential approach to appellate review of contractual interpretation urged by this court in sattva the court of appeal simply disagreed with the application judge’s interpretation of the surrounding circumstances, characterized it as a question of law, and then substituted its own factual conclusions. this does not accord with sattva. [48] the application judge considered the surrounding circumstances, and he made a finding about what was in the contemplation or mutual intention of both parties: paras. 23 and 43. the application judge went on to conclude that it was not “necessary that the parties be specifically contemplating a particular type of claim. instead . . . it is sufficient [that] the parties were contemplating any and all types of claims relating to a particular event such as the accident”: para. 44. that is to say, he determined that the parties were specifically contemplating any and all claims relating to the accident, including mrs. bailey’s third party claim. even though they may not have explicitly turned their minds to the possibility of a third party claim in particular, it was their objective, mutual intent to cover such a claim within the scope of the release this holding is a fact-specific application of the principles of contractual interpretation, and it was owed deference. [49] although it is not one of the three extricable errors of law identified by the court of appeal, i also point out that the court of appeal criticizes the application judge for failing to consider “the baileys’ continuing knowledge of the temple action and whether it could realistically be said to continue to have been in their contemplation when the release was signed” given that they had delivered the statement of claim in the temple action to their insurers: para. 39 but this is not an error either. mrs. bailey’s subjective knowledge of the temple action, or lack thereof, is irrelevant under an objective theory of contract law, because unless that knowledge was communicated to the city, it is not a “surrounding circumstance” within the “common knowledge” of the parties: sattva, at para. 58. what is privately in the mind of one party could not affect how that party’s conduct would appear to a reasonable observer in the position of the other: see owners, strata plan lms 3905 v. crystal square parking corp., 2020 scc 29, at para. 33. i make no comment on the possibility that the law may provide a remedy for the sharp practice of a releasee who intentionally does not disclose the existence of a claim to the releasor, as noted by lord nicholls in ali, at paras. 32-33, and by lord hoffmann, at paras. 67-71 however, the fact that mrs. bailey, the releasor, may have had private knowledge of a claim is irrelevant in interpreting the release to determine whether or not she accidentally released that claim. as lord hoffmann observed in ali, at para. 49: “it would be contrary to basic principles of construction for the meaning of a document to be affected by facts which were known to one party but not reasonably available to the other.” [50] the application judge did not rely on mrs. bailey’s subjective knowledge of the temple action in assessing the parties’ mutual intent he did find it “noteworthy” that mrs. bailey was aware or ought to have been aware of the temple action when she signed the release, having already been served with the statement of claim, but this observation did not form part of his analysis of “what was in the contemplation of the parties”: para. 29 while not a model of clarity, he therefore avoided falling into the same error as the court of appeal. c application [51] i see no reviewable error in the application judge’s conclusion that the wording of the release encompasses mrs. bailey’s third party claim the release includes “all actions, suits, causes of action . . . foreseen or unforeseen . . . and claims of any kind or nature whatsoever arising out of or relating to the accident which occurred on or about march 3, 2009”. this wording encompasses mrs. bailey’s third party claim, arising out of mr. temple’s damages from the accident. if this wording is held to be insufficient to include a claim arising out of the accident, it is hard to imagine what wording would be sufficient, aside from listing every type of claim imaginable one by one (third party claims, cross claims, counter claims, subrogated claims, claims in equity and common law, statutory claims, etc.) there is no principled reason to require parties to particularize the scope of the release in this fashion. [52] the next clause of the release affirms this broad interpretation the contract does specifically reference “claims raised or which could have been raised in the [bailey action]”, but it references these claims in the context of specifying that the foregoing generality of the release is not limited to them this indicates that the “foregoing” is more general than claims that were or could have been raised in the bailey action. otherwise the portion of the release that precedes “without limiting the generality of the foregoing” would be redundant. the application judge makes these points at paras. 21-22. there is no palpable and overriding error in his reading. [53] there is also no palpable and overriding error in the application judge’s finding that the surrounding circumstances are consistent with this reading. both the city and the baileys were aware that mrs. bailey had struck a city employee with her car, and both were aware that the other knew this is obvious from the pleadings exchanged by the city and the baileys in the bailey action both the city and mrs bailey therefore knew, or ought to have known on an objective basis, that the city employee who had been hit may have an outstanding claim against mrs. bailey, or the city, or both, and that such a claim could put the city and mrs. bailey in an adverse position to one another, where it would be to both of their advantages to blame the damage on the other this aspect of the factual matrix weighs in favour of interpreting the words of the release as including mrs. bailey’s third party claim in the temple action. the application judge explains this at paras. 27-28 of his reasons. [54] the application judge concluded that “it is sufficient [that] the parties were contemplating any and all types of claims relating to a particular event such as the accident” in other words, because the parties narrowed the subject matter of the release to claims arising out of a particular event, the application judge found no tension between the words and the surrounding circumstances. as in biancaniello, the release was circumscribed, and nothing in the surrounding circumstances indicated to the application judge that the words of the release should be interpreted to depart from what on a plain reading they would mean. [55] in its own interpretation of the release, the court of appeal observed that the quantum of “only $7,500” was “not inconsistent” with the conclusion that the parties intended to release only the baileys’ claims: paras. 63-64. this may be true, but the settlement quantum of $7,500 is also not inconsistent with the application judge’s interpretation, and in any case, there is no evidence in the record of the city’s liability against which to compare the settlement quantum. [56] i make one final observation the application judge also considered the pre-contract negotiations in reaching his conclusion that the parties mutually intended to release mrs. bailey’s claim: paras. 30-38. the court of appeal did too, but reached a different conclusion: paras. 67-68 neither party argued that there was anything wrong with this approach by the courts below however, there is a longstanding, traditional rule that evidence of negotiations is inadmissible when interpreting a contract: see resolute fp canada inc. v. ontario (attorney general), 2019 scc 60, at para. 100, per côté and brown jj., in dissent; chartbrook ltd. v. persimmon homes ltd., [2009] ukhl 38, [2009] 1 ac 1101; hall, at pp. 423-32; a. swan, j. adamski and a. y. na, canadian contract law (4th ed. 2018), at pp. 745-48; k. lewison, the interpretation of contracts (7th ed. 2020), at pp. 117-31; j. d. mccamus, the law of contracts (3rd ed. 2020), at pp. 809-13. justices côté and brown observed in resolute that this rule “sits uneasily” next to the approach from sattva that directs courts to consider the surrounding circumstances in interpreting a contract: para. 100. hall and the authors of canadian contract law both emphasize the difficulty in drawing a principled distinction between the circumstances surrounding contract formation and negotiations. [57] i leave for another day the question of whether, and if so, in what circumstances, negotiations will be admissible in interpreting a contract that issue needs to await a case where it has been fully argued and is necessary in order to decide the appeal. in this case, the application judge did not consider the negotiations to be determinative in interpreting the contract one way or the other: see paras. 37-38 and 41. [58] to conclude, there is no reviewable error in the application judge’s conclusion that the release includes mrs. bailey’s third party claim. the claim comes within the plain meaning of the words of the release, the surrounding circumstances confirm that the parties had objective knowledge of all the facts underlying mrs. bailey’s third party claim when they executed the release, and like biancaniello, the parties limited the scope of the release to claims arising out of a particular event. vii disposition [59] the appeal is allowed, the court of appeal’s order is set aside and the order of the application judge is reinstated. the appellant will have its costs throughout. appeal allowed with costs throughout.
i. overview [1] this case is about whether police can conduct a random sobriety stop on private property under s 48(1) of the highway traffic act, rso 1990, c. h.8 (“hta”). a constable of the ontario provincial police (“opp”) formed the intention on a highway to randomly stop the respondent to ascertain his sobriety, and followed him onto a private driveway to do so. once the constable approached the respondent, he observed obvious signs of intoxication and the respondent indicated that he might have had 10 beers. two subsequent breathalyzer tests revealed that the respondent’s blood alcohol concentration was above the legal limit. [2] in our view, the police officers did not have statutory authority under s 48(1) of the hta to follow the respondent onto the private driveway to conduct the random sobriety stop. accordingly, the police officers breached the respondent’s rights under s 9 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms nonetheless, for the reasons that follow, we would not exclude the evidence under s 24(2) of the charter. accordingly, we would allow the appeal. ii. facts [3] at around 12:30 am on march 26, 2016, constables jeff lobsinger and laura hicks of the opp were on general patrol in the vicinity of the thessalon first nation. while on patrol, cst. lobsinger spotted an all-terrain vehicle (“atv”) parked outside a convenience store. the respondent, walker mccolman, drove the atv out of the parking lot and onto the highway, at which point cst. lobsinger directed cst. hicks to follow the atv in their cruiser. [4] the trial judge found as a matter of fact that cst. lobsinger formed the intention on the highway to conduct a random sobriety stop of mr. mccolman pursuant to s 48(1) of the hta. at trial, cst. lobsinger conceded that mr. mccolman had not manifested signs of impaired driving that would have otherwise warranted a stop. that is, the police officers did not have reasonable and probable grounds to stop him. [5] by the time the officers caught up to mr. mccolman, he had pulled off the highway onto a private driveway that served his parents’ home as well as a commercial establishment there was no suggestion at trial that mr. mccolman pulled onto the driveway to avoid the police officers approximately one minute elapsed between when cst. lobsinger spotted the atv and when the police officers stopped him. [6] after stopping mr. mccolman, cst. lobsinger spoke with him and observed obvious signs of impairment, ranging from a strong odour of alcohol to his inability to stand up straight. according to cst. lobsinger’s testimony, mr. mccolman stated that he “might’ve had 10” beers that evening: ar, at p 154. cst. lobsinger arrested mr. mccolman for impaired driving at 12:36 a.m and brought him to the police station. [7] at the police station, the breathalyzer test was delayed because mr. mccolman vomited due to his alcohol consumption. a police officer eventually conducted 2 breathalyzer tests, which recorded his blood alcohol concentration level as 120 and 110 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood the police charged mr. mccolman with impaired driving contrary to s 253(1)(a) and with operating a motor vehicle with an excess of 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to s 253(1)(b) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. section 253 was repealed and replaced in 2018. iii relevant provisions [8] section 1(1) of the hta defines a “driver” as “a person who drives a vehicle on a highway”. it further defines a “highway” as including: . . a common and public highway, street, avenue, parkway, driveway, square, place, bridge, viaduct or trestle, any part of which is intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles and includes the area between the lateral property lines thereof; [9] section 48(1) of the hta furnishes police officers with the statutory authority to randomly stop a motor vehicle to ascertain the sobriety of the driver. it provides: a police officer, readily identifiable as such, may require the driver of a motor vehicle to stop for the purpose of determining whether or not there is evidence to justify making a demand under section 320.27 or 320.28 of the criminal code (canada). [10] section 48(18) provides that, within s 48, a driver “includes a person who has care or control of a motor vehicle”. [11] lastly, s 216(1) of the hta sets out the broader police power to stop vehicles and the corresponding duty on drivers. it provides: a police officer, in the lawful execution of his or her duties and responsibilities, may require the driver of a vehicle, other than a bicycle, to stop and the driver of a vehicle, when signalled or requested to stop by a police officer who is readily identifiable as such, shall immediately come to a safe stop. iv. judicial history a ontario court of justice [12] mr. mccolman brought a charter application alleging, among other things, that the random sobriety stop was unlawful and breached his rights under s 9 of the charter. he maintained that the police did not have the authority to conduct the stop on private property. [13] the trial judge dismissed the application, concluding that s 48(1) of the hta provided lawful authority for the random sobriety stop. he found that the officers intended to stop mr. mccolman’s vehicle for the purpose of checking the driver’s sobriety, and that they had formed the intention to stop him while he was operating a vehicle on a highway. the trial judge reasoned: the mere fact that [cst. lobsinger] did not effect this stop until [mr. mccolman] had turned into a private driveway and was thus on private property did not eliminate or invalidate the officer’s authority under s 48 of the highway traffic act. (voir dire reasons, at para. 54, reproduced in ar, at p 8.) [14] in light of his conclusion on s 48(1) of the hta, the trial judge declined to consider whether the officers had authority under the common law to stop mr. mccolman on his private driveway. [15] the trial judge subsequently found mr. mccolman guilty of impaired driving contrary to s 253(1)(a) and operating a motor vehicle with an excess of 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to s 253(1)(b) of the criminal code. the trial judge conditionally stayed the impaired driving conviction pursuant to this court’s guidance in kienapple v. the queen, [1975] 1 scr 729, and sentenced mr. mccolman to the mandatory minimums of a $1,000 fine (plus a $300 victim surcharge) and a 12-month driving prohibition. b ontario superior court of justice, 2019 onsc 5359, 381 ccc (3d) 375 [16] mr. mccolman appealed to the ontario superior court of justice, arguing, among other things, that the trial judge erred in finding that police officers are authorized to conduct random sobriety stops on private property pursuant to s 48(1) of the hta. [17] the summary conviction appeal judge allowed the appeal, finding that neither s 48(1) nor s 216(1) of the hta permitted police officers to conduct sobriety or highway safety stops on private property absent reasonable and probable grounds. once mr. mccolman’s vehicle left the highway and entered the private driveway, he was no longer a “driver” within the meaning of the hta. as a result, the police officers did not have the statutory authority to randomly detain mr. mccolman to check his sobriety the appeal judge also found that the stop was not authorized under the common law. [18] since the random sobriety stop was unlawful, the appeal judge found that the police breached s 9 of the charter. in his analysis under s 24(2) of the charter, the appeal judge found that the actions of the police were serious, as the officers “pursued [mr. mccolman] onto private property when they had neither the statutory [nor] common law authority to do so”: para. 49 the impact of the breach was also significant, as mr. mccolman had a high expectation of privacy on his own property. while society clearly had an interest in the adjudication of the matter on its merits, the balancing exercise favoured exclusion under s 24(2) of the charter. c court of appeal for ontario, 2021 onca 382, 156 or (3d) 253 [19] the crown appealed the acquittal entered by the appeal judge, arguing that police are authorized to effect random sobriety stops on private property if they form the lawful intention to stop a driver on a highway. [20] a majority of the court of appeal for ontario (per tulloch ja, as he then was, feldman j.a concurring) dismissed the appeal the court held that the plain language of s 48(1) and the related definitions of “driver” and “highway” did not authorize random sobriety stops off the highway. the majority also held that the police did not have the common law authority to randomly check mr. mccolman’s sobriety on private property. as a result, the stop was unlawful and breached mr. mccolman’s rights under s 9 of the charter. [21] the majority agreed with the appeal judge that the evidence obtained from the unlawful stop should be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter. in assessing the seriousness of the charter-infringing state misconduct, while the majority was not prepared to find that the police acted in bad faith, it found that their conduct was “brazen” and that a “lack of clarity in the law . . . does not give officers free licence to assume that they have authority”: paras. 84-85 as for the impact of the breach, the majority found that there was a significant impact on mr. mccolman’s liberty and privacy interests because the police questioned him and obtained evidence against him in the course of an unlawful detention in an area in which he had a reasonable expectation of privacy finally, while excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function of the trial, the majority concluded that, in the interest of having a justice system that is beyond reproach, the court should not condone conduct that tests the limits of police authority. accordingly, the majority excluded the evidence and upheld mr. mccolman’s acquittal. [22] justice hourigan, dissenting, held that both s 48(1) of the hta and the common law authorized the random sobriety stop. he maintained that the majority’s interpretation of the hta runs counter to its public protection purpose because the legislature could not have intended for drivers to evade investigation by pulling over onto private property. justice hourigan adopted the crown’s interpretation of the hta and found that the officers had the authority to make the stop in the circumstances. [23] in the alternative, hourigan j.a held that the evidence should not be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter and urged trial courts to conduct a more meaningful analysis of the grant factors: r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr. 353 he held that the first line of inquiry militated against excluding the evidence because the state misconduct was minor or technical in nature, and the law was not well settled, as there was jurisprudence supporting the officers’ interpretation of their authority. the second line of inquiry similarly weighed against excluding the evidence because mr. mccolman’s privacy expectations were minimal. the stop took place on a driveway shared with a commercial business, thereby giving the police an implied licence to enter finally, the third line of inquiry militated against excluding the evidence because the evidence was reliable and constituted overwhelming proof of mr. mccolman’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on both counts accordingly, hourigan ja would not have excluded the evidence under s 24(2) of the charter. v. issues [24] the crown’s appeal raises two issues. [25] first, the crown argues that the random sobriety stop was authorized under s 48(1) of the hta. it submits that police may conduct a random sobriety stop off a highway if the police officer forms the intention on a highway to check the driver’s sobriety. in support of this submission, the crown notes that unlike s 216(1) of the hta, s 48(1) does not include language pertaining to the communication of the decision to stop the driver. the crown also suggests that the definition of “driver” in s 48(18) may oust the general definition of “driver” in s 1(1) for the purpose of s 48. this would authorize police to conduct a random sobriety stop whenever a person has care or control of a motor vehicle, regardless of whether the intention to stop was formed on a highway. [26] second, if the hta did not authorize the police stop, resulting in a breach of s 9 of the charter, the crown submits that admission of mr. mccolman’s impairment and blood alcohol concentration evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. it maintains that the charter-infringing state conduct was not serious, since the police acted in good faith in the context of legal uncertainty about the geographic limitations of the power to conduct random sobriety stops the crown argues that the impact of the breach was neither intrusive nor significant. the crown submits that driving is a regulated activity and the sobriety stops are brief and limited to their purpose finally, the crown maintains that there is significant public interest in adjudicating these charges on their merits given the reliability and centrality of the evidence. [27] it must be noted that this court did not grant leave on the issue of whether the police had the common law authority to conduct the stop. vi analysis a was the random sobriety stop authorized by section 48(1) of the hta? [28] this case presents the first opportunity for this court to address whether police officers can conduct random sobriety stops on private property pursuant to s 48(1) of the hta. [29] on several occasions, this court has stated that various forms of random vehicular stops violate s 9 of the charter but are justified under s 1. in r v. hufsky, [1988] 1 scr 621, this court held that statutorily authorized spot checks — random police checks conducted at stationary, predetermined locations — violate s 9 but are justified under s 1. shortly after, this court held in r v. ladouceur, [1990] 1 scr. 1257, that statutorily authorized roving stops — random police stops to check licences, proof of insurance, the mechanical fitness of vehicles and the sobriety of drivers — violate s 9 but are justified under s 1. [30] police officers conducting random vehicular stops must exercise their powers vigilantly and ensure that they do not overstep the limits of their powers. since these random stops constitute “arbitrary detention”, the “detention will only be justified under s 1 of the charter if the police act within the limited highway-related purposes for which the powers were conferred”: r v. nolet, 2010 scc 24, [2010] 1 scr 851, at para. 22 (citations omitted). [31] the question of whether police officers can effect random sobriety stops on private property has been addressed by various appellate courts across the country under their versions of the hta: see, eg,. r v. lux, 2012 skca 129, 405 sask. r 214; r v anderson, 2014 skca 32, 433 sask. r 255; scott v r., 2021 qccs 3866. however, ontario’s hta differs in important ways from the other provincial statutes that regulate driving and drivers in analyzing a provision of the hta, a court must keep its focus on the text, context, and purpose of the provision at issue. [32] both the appellant crown and the court of appeal for ontario drew heavily upon jurisprudence of the court of appeal for saskatchewan. in lux, police officers observed a motor vehicle driving in a private parking area and conducted a random sobriety stop of the vehicle while it was still within the private parking area. the court of appeal held that s 209.1 of the traffic safety act, s.s 2004, c. t-18.1, did not authorize peace officers to conduct random sobriety stops on private property: para. 31. two years later, in anderson, a case factually similar to the case at bar, the court of appeal held that a police officer who had formed his intention on a highway to randomly stop the vehicle could lawfully complete the stop on private property pursuant to s 209.1 of the traffic safety act: paras. 24-25. [33] despite the seeming relevance of lux and anderson, ontario’s hta differs in relevant respects from the traffic safety act from saskatchewan. notably, the latter does not define the term “driver”; in contrast, as we shall discuss, the hta’s definition of driver places sharp limits on police officers’ authority to conduct random sobriety stops under s 48(1) of the hta given that lux and anderson focus closely on the specific wording of s 209.1 of the traffic safety act, neither judgment sheds much light on how this court should approach s 48(1) of ontario’s hta. (1) the meaning of section 48(1) of the hta [34] we turn now to s 48(1) of the hta, which states: a police officer, readily identifiable as such, may require the driver of a motor vehicle to stop for the purpose of determining whether or not there is evidence to justify making a demand under section 320.27 or 320.28 of the criminal code (canada). [35] under the modern approach to statutory interpretation, “the words of a statute must be read ‘in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament’”: canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, [2019] 4 scr 653, at para. 117, citing rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, and bell expressvu limited partnership v. rex, 2002 scc 42, [2002] 2 scr 559, at para. 26, both quoting e. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87; see also canada v. alta energy luxembourg sarl, 2021 scc 49, at para. 37 in determining the meaning of the text, a court cannot read a statutory provision in isolation, but must read the provision in light of the broader statutory scheme: rizzo, at para. 21. [36] in its written submissions and during oral argument, the crown placed great weight on the broader purposes underlying the hta. but a purposive analysis does not grant the interpreter licence to disregard the clear meaning of the statute: see r v. dai, 2012 scc 5, [2012] 1 scr 149, at para. 26. [37] the key question in this case is whether mr. mccolman was a “driver” for the purpose of s 48(1) of the hta at the time of the random sobriety stop. the hta contains two definitions of the word “driver” that may apply to mr. mccolman. section 1(1) of the hta states that “‘driver’ means a person who drives a vehicle on a highway”. by contrast, s 48(18) provides that, within s 48, “‘driver’ includes a person who has care or control of a motor vehicle”. in its factum, the crown suggests that it is possible to interpret s 48(1) such that it authorizes police to conduct random sobriety stops whenever they see someone in the care or control of a motor vehicle, irrespective of whether they intended to check the person’s sobriety on a highway. in other words, the crown submits that s 48(18) sets out essential elements of what constitutes a “driver”. this argument must fail for two reasons. [38] first, not all statutory definitions are exhaustive: r sullivan, the construction of statutes (7th ed. 2022). exhaustive definitions “declare the complete meaning of the defined term and completely displace whatever meanings the defined term might otherwise bear in ordinary or technical usage”, whereas non-exhaustive definitions “do not purport to displace the meaning that the defined term would have in ordinary usage; they simply add to, subtract from or exemplify that meaning”: pp. 69-70 exhaustive definitions are generally introduced using the verb “means”, while non-exhaustive definitions are introduced with the verb “includes”: pp. 69-70. [39] here, the definition in s 1(1) is exhaustive and specifies the scope of the word “driver”, whereas the definition in s 48(18) is non-exhaustive and expands the ordinary meaning of the defined term. indeed, the definition of “driver” in s 1(1) is two-pronged; it targets both an activity and the locus of such activity. to be a driver, one must be driving a vehicle (activity) and must do so on a highway (locus) the definition in s 48(18) seeks only to expand the activity prong of the definition and not the locus element. [40] second, this court has stated that, while the relative effects of ordinary meaning, context, and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, courts must seek to read the provisions of an act as a harmonious whole: canada trustco mortgage co. v canada, 2005 scc 54, [2005] 2 scr 601, at para. 10 as stated above, a non-exhaustive definition does not necessarily oust other definitions. depending on the context, exhaustive and non-exhaustive definitions can be read together under a harmonious reading of the two definitions of “driver”, for the purpose of s 48(1), “driver” refers to a person who is driving, or has care or control of, a motor vehicle on a highway. a person who has care or control of a motor vehicle but who is no longer on a highway would not be a “driver” under the hta. [41] in the present case, mr. mccolman was not a “driver” for the purpose of s 48(1) when he was stopped by the police. even if it can be said that he had care or control of the atv, he was not on a highway when the police effected the stop. therefore, the police stop was unauthorized by s 48(1) of the hta. [42] the crown suggests that a core question in this appeal is whether police must communicate their intention to effect a random sobriety stop on a highway in order to fall under s 48(1) of the hta the crown argues that s 48(1) authority is triggered when police form the intention to effect a random sobriety stop of a driver who is on a highway, and not when police communicate that intention to the driver. the crown maintains that this interpretation is supported by s 216(1) of the hta. [43] on the crown’s view, s 216(1) exhibits a legislative choice to put communication of intent to stop a driver at issue since the legislature chose not to include the language of “signalled or requested to stop” in s 48(1), that section does not require the police to communicate their decision to stop a driver. so long as the driver was on the highway at the time the police officer formed the subjective intention to stop them, the officer can avail themselves of s 48(1) authority to carry out a random sobriety stop on private property. in our view, this argument must also fail. [44] sections 48(1) and 216(1) do not speak to differing legislative choices because the two provisions need not be read apart. in fact, the provisions are often cited together to furnish the statutory authority to conduct random sobriety stops: see, eg,. r v. sivarasah, 2017 onsc 3597, 383 crr (2d) 1, at para. 108; r v. holland, 2017 oncj 948, at para. 11 (canlii); r v. warha, 2015 oncj 214, at para. 5 (canlii); r. v vander griendt, 2015 onsc 6644, 331 ccc (3d) 135, at paras. 4 and 21. section 216(1) sets out the mechanics of the general police power to stop vehicles, including the corresponding duty on drivers to stop “when signalled or requested to stop” by contrast, s 48(1) sets out the circumstances under which police can stop drivers without reasonable and probable grounds to ascertain sobriety the two provisions fit together to supply a police power to conduct random sobriety stops on highways and a corresponding duty on drivers to stop when signalled or requested to stop. [45] on this reading, the absence of the phrase “when signalled or requested to stop” in s 48(1) does not speak to any legislative choice to privilege the point in time when police form the intention to conduct a random sobriety stop section 216(1) supplies a “communication” requirement, such that a police officer seeking to invoke s 48(1) authority must, at a minimum, signal or otherwise request that the driver stop their vehicle on a highway. [46] moreover, the inclusion of the word “require” in s 48(1) implies the communication of an expectation or order to someone. the oxford english dictionary (online) defines “require” as “[t]o order, instruct, or oblige (a person) to do something” (emphasis in original) one cannot require someone to do something by merely subjectively intending it, as the crown is arguing. [47] here, the police waited until mr. mccolman had pulled onto his parents’ driveway before they signalled their intention to stop him. accordingly, they did not properly invoke their authority to conduct a random sobriety stop under s 48(1). [48] finally, the crown submits that maintaining the majority of the court of appeal’s reading of s 48(1) of the hta would create a sanctuary problem the sanctuary problem refers to the idea that in the future, impaired drivers will simply pull onto private property whenever they spot a police cruiser. the dissenting judge below suggested that “[i]n many cases, this sanctuary will be fleeting, as the impaired driver will stay on the private property only for as long as the police cruiser is in the area. once it is out of sight, the driver will be free to re-enter the public highway and continue to endanger public safety”: para. 96, per hourigan j.a in our view, the sanctuary problem is overstated. [49] first, random sobriety stops are not the only tool available to police to combat impaired driving. while police officers may not conduct random sobriety stops of drivers on private property pursuant to s 48(1) of the hta, they may stop drivers if they have reasonable and probable grounds: ladouceur, at p 1287. this judgment does not constitute a blanket ban on police stops of drivers on private property various factual scenarios might give rise to reasonable and probable grounds. for example, if a driver is driving erratically, a police officer may have reasonable and probable grounds to pursue the driver onto private property. in addition, as the majority at the court of appeal noted, a “true case of flight might well contribute to reasonable grounds to detain the accused, depending on the circumstances”: para. 42. thus, police officers are not barred from stopping drivers on private property in all circumstances. [50] second, absent a successful constitutional challenge, this court must respect the will of the legislature as expressed in valid legislation. it is not this court’s role to rewrite the law or to ask what law it would have enacted itself when read contextually, s 48(1) of the hta does not authorize police officers to conduct random sobriety stops on private property. this court is duty-bound to respect the legislature’s will. if the legislature believes that police officers ought to wield wider powers under s 48(1), it may amend the provision. (2) the random sobriety stop breached mr. mccolman’s section 9 charter rights [51] while s 48(1) of the hta furnished the police officers with the legal authority to conduct random sobriety stops of drivers of motor vehicles, they did not have the authority to stop mr. mccolman because he was not a “driver” within the meaning of the hta at the time of the stop. since the stop was unlawful, the police officers breached mr. mccolman’s rights under s 9 of the charter, which proclaims that “[e]veryone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned”. this court has affirmed that “a detention not authorized by law is arbitrary and violates s 9”: grant, at para. 54. given the above finding that the police officers did not have the legal authority to randomly stop mr. mccolman, it follows that they arbitrarily detained him. [52] the next question is whether the evidence the police officers obtained on the driveway and later at the police station should be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter. b. should the evidence obtained have been excluded under section 24(2) of the charter? [53] section 24(2) requires that evidence obtained in a manner that infringes the charter rights of an accused be excluded from the trial if it is established that “having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” the s 24(2) analysis is an objective one, evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person, and the burden to persuade a court that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute rests on the party seeking exclusion: grant, at para. 68. [54] section 24(2) is focused on maintaining the long-term integrity of, and public confidence in, the justice system. accordingly, the exclusion of evidence under s 24(2) is directed not at punishing police misconduct or compensating the accused, but rather at systemic and institutional concerns: grant, at para. 70. in grant, this court explained that the s 24(2) analysis engages three lines of inquiry: (1) the seriousness of the charter-infringing state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the charter-protected interests of the accused; and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. courts are tasked with balancing the assessments under each of these lines of inquiry, but as recognized in grant, “[t]he balancing mandated by s 24(2) is qualitative in nature and therefore not capable of mathematical precision”: para. 140. [55] trial courts must evaluate each of the three lines of inquiry thoroughly. a cursory review of the grant test prevents appropriate appellate review and transforms s 24(2) from a contextual inquiry into a bright-line rule. [56] in the current case, the trial judge did not conduct a grant analysis, since he found that s 48(1) of the hta authorized the random sobriety stop and there was no s 9 violation. accordingly, this court must conduct the grant analysis afresh. (1) the seriousness of the charter-infringing conduct [57] the first line of inquiry focuses on the extent to which the state conduct at issue deviates from the rule of law. as this court stated in grant, at para. 72, this line of inquiry “requires a court to assess whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute by sending a message to the public that the courts, as institutions responsible for the administration of justice, effectively condone state deviation from the rule of law by failing to dissociate themselves from the fruits of that unlawful conduct”. or as this court phrased it in r v. harrison, 2009 scc 34, [2009] 2 scr 494, at para. 22: “did [the police conduct] involve misconduct from which the court should be concerned to dissociate itself?” [58] in evaluating the gravity of the state conduct at issue, a court must “situate that conduct on a scale of culpability”: r v. paterson, 2017 scc 15, [2017] 1 scr. 202, at para. 43. as justice doherty observed in r v. blake, 2010 onca 1, 251 ccc. (3d) 4, “the graver the state’s misconduct the stronger the need to preserve the long-term repute of the administration of justice by disassociating the court’s processes from that misconduct”: para. 23 to properly situate state conduct on the “scale of culpability”, courts must also ask whether the presence of surrounding circumstances attenuates or exacerbates the seriousness of the state conduct: grant, at para. 75. were the police compelled to act quickly in order to prevent the disappearance of evidence? did the police act in good faith? could the police have obtained the evidence without a charter violation? only by adopting a holistic analysis can a court properly situate state conduct on the scale of culpability. [59] it should be noted at the outset that the first and second lines of inquiry are distinct. the first line of inquiry evaluates the state conduct itself, while the second line of inquiry goes further and assesses the impact of the state conduct on the accused’s charter-protected interests. this court has noted that “[w]hile the first two lines of inquiry typically work in tandem in the sense that both pull towards exclusion of the evidence, they need not pull with identical degrees of force in order to compel exclusion”: r v. le, 2019 scc 34, [2019] 2 scr 692, at para. 141. as noted in r v. lafrance, 2022 scc 32, at para. 90, “it is the cumulative weight of the first two lines of inquiry that trial judges must consider and balance against the third line of inquiry when assessing whether evidence should be excluded” (emphasis in original). in certain situations, only one of the first two lines of inquiry will pull towards exclusion of the evidence. state conduct that is not particularly serious may nonetheless heavily impact the accused’s charter-protected interests. conversely, state conduct that is egregious may minimally impact the accused’s charter-protected interests courts must be careful not to collapse the first two lines of inquiry into one, unstructured analysis. [60] in the case at bar, the first line of inquiry pulls slightly in favour of exclusion. although there was relevant case law to support the police officers’ sobriety stop, given the legal uncertainty that existed at the time, the police officers should have acted with more prudence. when faced with legal uncertainty, “the police would do well to err on the side of caution”: r v. telus communications co., 2013 scc 16, [2013] 2 scr 3, at para. 80. [61] at the time of the random sobriety stop, the applicable case law was in a state of uncertainty: see r v. vu, 2013 scc 60, [2013] 3 scr 657, at para. 71. the dissenting judge below pointed to several ontario cases in support of his proposition that “there was jurisprudence that supported the officers’ authority to make the stop on the shared driveway”: para. 178, per hourigan ja. see especially r v. alrayyes, 2013 onsc 7256; r v. calder (2002), 29 mvr (4th) 292 (ont. sc), aff’d (2004), 47 mvr (4th) 20 (ont. ca);. r v. mcgregor, 2015 oncj 692, 92 mvr (6th) 333; and warha. for example, in alrayyes, the ontario superior court of justice held that under s 48(1) of the hta, a police officer’s authority to stop a vehicle driving on a highway did not evaporate merely because the vehicle had entered onto private property: para. 31 (ql, wl). [62] however, not all of the applicable case law supported cst. lobsinger’s decision to conduct a random sobriety stop. in r v. george, 2004 oncj 316, the trial judge held that the police officer did not have the authority under s 48(1) of the hta to conduct a random sobriety stop of a person who had pulled off the highway onto his private driveway: paras. 15-16 (canlii). similarly, in r v. nield, 2015 onsc 5730, 88 mvr (6th) 274, the ontario superior court of justice held that s 48(1) of the hta did not apply to a person who was driving a vehicle, but who was not situated on a highway: paras. 26 and 29. see also r v. hajivasilis, 2013 onca 27, 114 or (3d) 337, at para. 13; r v. larocque, 2014 oncj 601, at para. 11 (canlii); and vander griendt, at paras. 19-21. [63] ultimately, however, the police officers in this case acted without legal justification. as outlined above, the hta did not furnish them with authority to conduct a random sobriety stop on private property. nor did they have reasonable and probable grounds given the legal uncertainty at play, the police officers had a duty to act cautiously and to question the limits of their authority. as dickson cj noted in dissent in dedman v the queen, [1985] 2 scr 2, at p 10, “[i]t has always been a fundamental tenet of the rule of law in this country that the police, in carrying out their general duties as law enforcement officers of the state, have limited powers and are only entitled to interfere with the liberty or property of the citizen to the extent authorized by law”. although dickson cj was speaking in the context of the police common law power, his remarks apply equally to the police exercise of statutory power. police officers can only exercise the powers granted to them by the law. in situations marked by legal uncertainty, police officers should not rely on that uncertainty but instead should err on the side of caution. [64] under the first line of inquiry, courts must also ask whether there are other extenuating circumstances that affect their view of the gravity of the state conduct. in the current case, the police could have conducted the random sobriety stop on the highway by activating the cruiser’s lights or sirens as soon as mr. mccolman had departed from the convenience store on his atv. thus, the “evidence could have been obtained without a charter violation”: r v. jacoy, [1988] 2 scr 548, at p 559. in short, the police officers could have conducted the random sobriety stop before mr. mccolman pulled onto private property. [65] in our view, on the whole, the first line of inquiry pulls slightly in favour of exclusion. the police acted without statutory authority in effecting the stop, and a body of case law confirmed their lack of authority to stop mr. mccolman. on the other hand, another body of case law supported their conduct. given the legal uncertainty that existed at the time of the random sobriety stop, the breach was accordingly not so serious as to require this court to disassociate itself from the police actions. in light of that same legal uncertainty, however, the police officers should have acted with more prudence in our view, on balance, these two effects of the legal uncertainty pull in favour of exclusion, but only slightly. (2) the impact of the breach on the charter-protected interests of mr. mccolman [66] the second line of inquiry is aimed at the concern that admitting evidence obtained in violation of the charter may send a message to the public that charter rights are of little actual avail to the citizen. courts must evaluate the extent to which the breach “actually undermined the interests protected by the right infringed”: grant, at para. 76. like the first line of inquiry, the second line envisions a sliding scale of conduct, with “fleeting and technical” breaches at one end of the scale and “profoundly intrusive” breaches at the other: para. 76. [67] for example, in r v. tim, 2022 scc 12, the impact on the accused’s s 9 interests was found to fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. the impact of the accused’s arbitrary arrest was mitigated to some degree because although he was arrested on the basis of a mistake of law about the legal status of a drug, he was lawfully detained for a traffic collision investigation: para. 92 by contrast, in harrison, this court found that the impact was more significant because the accused was stopped and his vehicle was subjected to a search without lawful justification: para. 31; see also r. v. mann, 2004 scc 52, [2004] 3 scr 59, at para. 56. [68] in the current case, the second line of inquiry moderately favours exclusion of the evidence the stop impacted mr. mccolman’s liberty interests because the police questioned him in the course of an unlawful detention. although the police had the power to randomly stop mr. mccolman to check his sobriety, they did not act within the legal limits of that power. in addition, the fact that the arbitrary detention occurred on private property is relevant because “[r]etreat to a private residence (even if not one’s own residence) will sometimes be the only practical way for individuals to exercise their right to be left alone”: le, at para. 155. as a result of the unlawful stop, mr. mccolman was arrested and brought to the police station, where he was detained for several hours. the police obtained significant evidence against him, including the officer’s observations of signs of impairment, mr. mccolman’s statements about his alcohol consumption, and the results of two breathalyzer tests. therefore, the unlawful police stop constituted a marked, although not egregious, intrusion on mr. mccolman’s charter-protected interests. (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits [69] the third line of inquiry asks whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion this inquiry requires courts to consider both the negative impact of admission of the evidence on the repute of the administration of justice and the impact of failing to admit the evidence: grant, at para. 79. in each case, “it is the long-term repute of the administration of justice that must be assessed”: harrison, at para. 36. [70] under this third line of inquiry, courts should consider factors such as the reliability of the evidence, the importance of the evidence to the crown’s case, and the seriousness of the alleged offence, although this court has recognized that the final factor can cut both ways: grant, at paras. 81 and 83-84 while the public has a heightened interest in a determination on the merits where the offence is serious, it also has a vital interest in maintaining a justice system that is above reproach: para. 84. [71] while there is an obvious impact upon the administration of justice in admitting evidence obtained in contravention of s 9 of the charter, admitting the evidence in the case at bar would not damage the long-term repute of the administration of justice first, the evidence collected by the police was reliable and crucial to the crown’s case cst. lobsinger observed several signs of impairment at the scene, including a strong odour of alcohol and mr. mccolman’s inability to stand up straight. mr. mccolman admitted to the officers that he “might’ve had 10” beers that evening. two breathalyzer tests, conducted some time after he vomited due to his alcohol consumption, revealed that mr. mccolman’s blood alcohol concentration level was significantly above the legal limit. [72] second, impaired driving is a serious offence. this court has recognized that society has a vital interest in combatting drinking and driving. in r v. bernshaw, [1995] 1 scr 254, at para. 16, cory j noted: every year, drunk driving leaves a terrible trail of death, injury, heartbreak and destruction. from the point of view of numbers alone, it has a far greater impact on canadian society than any other crime. in terms of the deaths and serious injuries resulting in hospitalization, drunk driving is clearly the crime which causes the most significant social loss to the country. (see also r v. lacasse, 2015 scc 64, [2015] 3 scr 1089, at para. 8.) [73] in light of the reliability and importance of the evidence as well as the seriousness of the alleged offence, the third line of inquiry pulls strongly in favour of inclusion. admission of the evidence in this case would better serve the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process and would not damage the long-term repute of the justice system. (4) balancing the grant factors [74] when balancing the grant factors, the cumulative weight of the first two lines of inquiry must be balanced against the third line of inquiry: lafrance, at para. 90; r v. beaver, 2022 scc 54, at para. 134. here, the first line of inquiry slightly favours exclusion of the evidence and the second line of inquiry does so moderately. however, the third line of inquiry pulls strongly in favour of inclusion and, in our view, outweighs the cumulative weight of the first two lines of inquiry because of the crucial and reliable nature of the evidence as well as the important public policy concerns about the scourge of impaired driving. on the whole, considering all of the circumstances, the evidence should not be excluded under s 24(2). vii conclusion [75] we would allow the appeal on the basis that the evidence obtained from the unlawful police stop should not have been excluded under s 24(2) of the charter. accordingly, we would set aside the acquittal entered below and restore the conviction and kienapple stay entered at trial. the crown is granted leave to appeal the sentence. we would eliminate the victim surcharge (r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr 599) and otherwise restore the sentence imposed. appeal allowed. office, criminal, toronto.
[1] in ontario (attorney general) v. g, 2020 scc 38, this court provided a framework for identifying those exceptionally rare cases where a declaration of constitutional invalidity should be temporarily suspended to permit the legislature to respond. a suspended declaration is only justified where a compelling public interest, grounded in the constitution, outweighs the harms of temporarily maintaining the unconstitutional law this case requires us to determine the legal consequences of suspending declarations of invalidity of a criminal offence. in particular, can persons who commit that offence prior to the expiry of the suspension be convicted once the suspension expires and the declaration takes effect? the answer depends on whether the declaration (or any remedial legislation) has retroactive or purely prospective application. [2] retroactive declarations change the law for all time, both reaching into the past and affecting the future. once the declaration takes effect, the law is deemed to have been invalid from the moment of its enactment. conversely, when the declaration is purely prospective, the law was valid from its enactment but is invalid once the declaration takes effect. [3] in canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr. 1101, this court found s 212(1)(j) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, which prohibited living on the avails of sex work, to be unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized non-exploitative actions that could enhance the safety and security of sex workers by criminalizing, for example, legitimate bodyguards, the offence violated the rights of sex workers under s 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. this declaration did not take immediate effect but rather was suspended for one year the court did not explicitly state whether this declaration would apply retroactively or purely prospectively at the conclusion of the period of suspension. [4] parliament enacted remedial legislation before the suspension expired. the former s 212(1)(j) was replaced with a new provision that prohibits obtaining a material benefit from sexual services but exempts legitimate, non-exploitative conduct. the new legislation did not include any transitional or retroactive provisions. [5] the appellants were found by the trial judge to be parasitic, exploitative pimps during the one-year period of suspension, contrary to s 212(l)(j) the prosecution proceeded after the suspension expired the appellants successfully applied to quash the resulting charges at trial. the british columbia court of appeal allowed the crown’s appeals, set aside the trial judge’s order and entered convictions on each count. the appellants now ask this court to set aside the court of appeal’s order and restore the trial judge’s order quashing the counts. [6] i would dismiss the appeals and affirm the appellants’ convictions the purpose animating the suspension in bedford was to avoid the deregulation of sex work (thus maintaining the protection of vulnerable sex workers) while parliament crafted replacement legislation in light of that purpose, i conclude that the declaration of invalidity was purely prospective, effective at the end of the period of suspension. thus, the appellants were liable under s 212(1)(j) for their conduct during the suspension period, and could be charged and convicted under this provision even after the suspension expired. [7] the temporal application of a declaration is grounded in foundational constitutional principles and the presumptions to which they give rise. [8] as i shall explain, judicial declarations are presumptively retroactive but that presumption is rebutted when retroactivity would defeat the compelling public interests that required the suspension. however, this does not leave those who may be personally prejudiced by a charter breach during the suspension without a remedy. where the remedial declaration operates prospectively, the findings of unconstitutionality by this court can operate retroactively in individual cases, giving remedial effect to both s 24(1) of the charter and s 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982 such a result respects the constitutional roles of both the legislature and the judiciary, ensures that the public and vulnerable persons maintain the protections of the criminal law, ensures that parliament has the option to design a specific regime, and gives remedial protection to those whose charter rights have been violated. [9] as the bedford declaration applied purely prospectively, the appellants could be charged and convicted after the suspension expired and the declaration took effect for committing the offence of living on the avails during the suspension period. because the trial judge found them to be abusive and exploitative, it cannot be said that they were prejudiced by the constitutional infirmity identified in bedford i would dismiss the appeals. i. background a bedford and responding legislation [10] on december 20, 2013, this court released its decision in bedford the bedford applicants had challenged three provisions of the criminal code that criminalized various activities related to sex work. one of those provisions, the former s 212(1)(j), criminalized living on the avails of sex work while this offence was intended to prevent the exploitation of sex workers by “the person who lives parasitically off a [sex worker’s] earnings” (r v. downey, [1992] 2 scr 10, at p 32; see also bedford, at para. 142), it also prevented sex workers from accessing security- enhancing safeguards, such as drivers and bodyguards the offence was therefore overbroad and a violation of the s 7 rights of the sex workers that was not saved under s 1 of the charter: bedford, at paras. 66-67, 142, 145 and 162-63. [11] this court declared the living on the avails offence, as well as the two other challenged offences, to be inconsistent with the charter and hence void: bedford, at para. 164. however, because “moving abruptly from a situation where prostitution is regulated to a situation where it is entirely unregulated would be a matter of great concern to many canadians”, the declaration of invalidity was suspended for a period of one year: bedford, at paras. 167 and 169 the court did not state whether this declaration was to operate retroactively or purely prospectively. [12] two weeks before the suspension expired, parliament enacted remedial legislation, replacing the living on the avails offence with the offence of obtaining a material benefit from sexual services provided for consideration: criminal code, s 2862. the new offence includes a number of exceptions but they do not apply in abusive or exploitative situations: criminal code, s 2862(5). parliament did not state whether the amendments were to apply retroactively or prospectively. b. supreme court of british columbia, 2018 bcsc 736 (masuhara j.) [13] about two years after the declaration took effect, the appellants, tamim albashir and kasra mohsenipour, were charged with numerous offences arising out of an “escort” operation. they managed practically all aspects of the operation — clients, service locations, advertising, supplies, and transportation. [14] the trial judge found that the appellants were abusive towards the sex workers in their employ. one of the complainants, kc, testified that albashir was repeatedly violent towards her. the trial judge found that albashir’s “use of violence for the purpose of controlling [kc’s] conduct was normalized”: para. 228. another complainant, sc, testified that mohsenipour had pointed a gun at her and threatened to kill her, and that albashir had threatened to kill her son. [15] thus, far from providing safety and security-enhancing services, on the trial judge’s findings the appellants were precisely the type of “controlling and abusive pimps” that were the legitimate targets of the living on the avails offence: bedford, at para. 142. [16] despite that, the trial judge quashed the charges against both appellants for living on the avails of the sex work of kc and sc. the trial judge found that both offences had been established by the crown but he quashed the charges because, once the bedford suspension expired, the offence was unconstitutional. [17] the trial judge relied on this court’s decision in canada (attorney general) v hislop, 2007 scc 10, [2007] 1 scr 429, as saying that suspended s 52(1) declarations have a “delayed retroactive effect”, unless the court clearly states otherwise: para. 345. thus, “[o]nce the suspension expires, the law will always have been unconstitutional” and the effect of the bedford suspension expiring was that “s 212(1)(j) has always been invalid”: paras. 345 and 350. c court of appeal for british columbia, 2020 bcca 160, 389 ccc (3d) 163 (bennett ja,. saunders and groberman jja concurring) [18] the british columbia court of appeal allowed the crown’s appeals. in the court of appeal’s view, hislop stood for the proposition that a suspended declaration operates retroactively if the legislature fails to enact remedial legislation during the suspension. however, if the legislature does enact such remedial legislation then “the retroactive effect of a suspended declaration of invalidity is pre-empted”: para. 90. therefore, the bedford declaration never came into effect and the trial judge should not have quashed the counts. d positions of the parties [19] albashir submits that the trial judge was right to quash the charges because the bedford declaration operated retroactively once the suspension expired. in his view, the “blackstonian” theory posits that because the legislature never had authority to enact an unconstitutional law, a declaration of constitutional invalidity nullifies the law from the outset. a suspension is only a temporary limit on the retroactive effect of the declaration to give parliament time to cure the constitutional defect. if the impugned provision is a criminal offence, nobody may be prosecuted for that offence once the declaration comes into effect because no one can be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional law otherwise, the crown could use the former s 212(1)(j) to indefinitely prosecute anybody who was paid to provide legitimate security services to sex workers prior to the expiry of the suspension. [20] mohsenipour similarly argues that, unless expressly stated otherwise, declarations of invalidity have retroactive effect, including when they are suspended. it is then up to the legislature to determine how best to respond, whether through purely prospective or retroactive remedial legislation as the bedford declaration was not explicitly prospective, it must have applied retroactively, rendering s 212(1)(j) void ab initio once the suspension ended. [21] the crown submits that because parliament enacted remedial legislation, the bedford declaration never came into force and those who committed the offence of living on the avails under s 212(1)(j) prior to the remedial legislation may still be prosecuted for that conduct to the extent that legitimate bodyguards, drivers, or accountants could also be prosecuted, s 24(1) is sufficiently flexible to provide them a remedy this remedy is not available to the appellants, however, because their exploitative conduct did not fall within the unconstitutional overbreadth of s 212(1)(j). [22] the intervener the attorney general of canada argues in favour of a different approach: that the bedford declaration was prospective this court should take a purposive approach to the temporal application of suspended s 52(1) declarations, looking to the purpose of the suspension to determine whether the declaration must logically operate retroactively or purely prospectively. the bedford declaration must be purely prospective because the purpose of its suspension would be undermined by a retroactive declaration. this is because criminal offences during the suspension would be unenforceable unless a prosecution could be entirely disposed of before the suspension expired. in other words, a retroactive declaration would result in sex work being effectively unregulated during the suspension period — despite the very purpose of the suspension being to maintain the regulation of sex work. ii analysis [23] for the reasons that follow, i agree with the attorney general of canada that the bedford declaration operated prospectively. accordingly, the appellants could be tried and convicted under s 212(1)(j) after the declaration took effect. [24] as a preliminary matter, the parties were invited to make submissions on whether this court has jurisdiction to hear these appeals as of right the parties all agreed that the reinstatement of quashed counts by the court of appeal was tantamount to the reversal of an acquittal. because the factual guilt of the appellants was established at trial, i agree that a reversal on appeal would result in findings of guilt on the quashed counts. there needs to be at least one level of court that can review the questions of law arising from the convictions: r v. li, 2020 scc 12, at para. 1, citing r v. magoon, 2018 scc 14, [2018] 1 scr 309, at para. 38 for this reason, this court has jurisdiction to hear these appeals as of right. [25] the key issue on appeal is whether s 212(1)(j) was retroactively invalid such that it could not subsequently ground a conviction. the answer to this turns on the temporal nature of judicial remedies. i will then consider the relationship between a declaration of invalidity under s 52(1) and individual remedies under s 24(1). a. temporal nature of remedies [26] when a court makes a declaration of invalidity under s 52(1), the temporal effect of that constitutional remedy is rooted in the nature of the remedy itself. constitutional remedies must be purposively interpreted in their “proper linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts”: r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at p 344. they must also be interpreted in a “generous and expansive” manner that is sensitive to evolving circumstances: doucet-boudreau v nova scotia (minister of education), 2003 scc 62, [2003] 3 scr 3, at para. 24; see also r v. comeau, 2018 scc 15, [2018] 1 scr 342, at para. 52. [27] when legislation violates a charter right, three foundational constitutional principles guide the interpretation of constitutional remedies: constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the separation of powers (reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3 (pei. judges reference (1997)), at paras. 90-95; reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at para. 54; g, at paras. 153-59). [28] constitutionalism requires that all laws comply with the constitution as the supreme law of canada. section 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982, reads: the constitution of canada is the supreme law of canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. [29] this supremacy clause has existed in other forms since canada’s original constitution, the constitution act, 1867: operation dismantle inc v the queen, [1985] 1 scr 441, at p 482 the canadian judiciary’s role in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation thus has a considerable history: p. w hogg and w. k. wright, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at § 5:20. in manitoba language reference, the court explained that “[s]ection 52 of the constitution act, 1982 does not alter the principles which have provided the foundation for judicial review over the years”: reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721, at p 746. [30] when a court finds legislation to be inconsistent with the constitution, it must consider not only the principle of constitutional supremacy in s 52(1), but other — at times competing — constitutional imperatives to determine an appropriate remedy: k roach, “principled remedial discretion under the charter” (2004), 25 sclr (2d) 101, at pp. 105 and 111-13. in this way, courts are also guided in their remedial discretion by the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. they can take into account, for example, the entitlement of the public to the benefit of legislation, as well as the different institutional roles that courts and legislatures are called to play: g, at para 94 as lebel and rothstein jj stated for the majority in hislop, “[t]he text of the constitution establishes the broad confines of the supreme law, but it is up to the courts to interpret and apply the constitution in any given context”: para. 114. [31] thus, despite the absolute language of s 52(1), when a court exercises its remedial jurisdiction to grant a declaration of unconstitutionality, it has discretion to give the principle of constitutional supremacy immediate effect or to suspend the declaration for a given period of time: g, at paras. 120-21 in rare circumstances, a compelling public interest will warrant a suspension, although this suspension must not last longer than is necessary for the government to address the constitutional infirmity: g, at paras. 132 and 135. [32] in the face of unconstitutional legislation, s 52(1) is not the only remedial provision in the constitution act, 1982. section 24(1) may also provide a remedy: anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. [33] unlike a formal declaration under s 52(1) that renders the legislation invalid, s 24(1) is an entirely personal remedy that can only be invoked by a claimant alleging a violation of their own constitutional rights: r v. ferguson, 2008 scc 6, [2008] 1 scr 96, at para. 61. [34] thus, the principles of constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the separation of powers shape the remedial relief for legislation that is inconsistent with the constitution. these foundational principles also establish strong — but rebuttable — presumptions that legislation is prospective and judicial declarations are retroactive. [35] there is a strong presumption against retroactive application of legislation because the rule of law requires that people be able to order their affairs in light of an established legal order: r. sullivan, statutory interpretation (3rd ed. 2016), at p 354. as professor sullivan aptly puts it, when legislation is retroactive, “the content of the law becomes known only when it is too late to do anything about it”: p 354. even so, the rule of law does not prohibit retroactive legislation. when they can do so within the confines of the charter (for example, when it does not offend the protections of s 11(g) or (i)), legislatures can decide how and when their laws will apply. it may thus be open to them to correct a constitutional infirmity retroactively. [36] choudhry and roach posit that legislatures have internalized the principles underlying the presumption against retroactivity and are reluctant to enact retroactive legislation as a result: s. choudhry and k. roach, “putting the past behind us? prospective judicial and legislative constitutional remedies” (2003), 21 sclr (2d) 205, at pp. 241-42. especially when working with remedial legislation that is a direct response to a court’s declaration of constitutional invalidity, i agree with those authors that it would be helpful for the legislatures to turn their mind to the temporal application of their laws and explicitly explain what provision will govern during the transitional period in order to provide certainty and clarity. [37] no one in this case has argued that the remedial legislation was intended to be retroactive. thus, in the absence of retroactive legislative intent either explicitly or by necessary implication, the strong presumption that legislation is prospective is not challenged. [38] whereas the rule of law dictates a presumption that legislation is prospective, the inverse is true for judicial remedies. generally, legal determinations of this court are effective immediately, and all courts are bound to apply this court’s decisions about the constitutional infirmities of legislation in outstanding matters before them. in this sense, this court’s decisions are retroactive, applying even to cases arising before the decision. as one author notes, “it is the basic role of courts to decide disputes after they have arisen. that function requires that judicial decisions operate (at least ordinarily) with retroactive effect”: r. j traynor, “quo vadis, prospective overruling: a question of judicial responsibility” (1977), 28 hastings lj 533, at p 536, quoting p. mishkin, “the high court, the great writ, and the due process of time and law” (1965), 79 harv. l. rev. 56, at p 60. [39] when a court makes a s 52(1) declaration of invalidity, the same presumption of retroactivity arises the appellants say that this arises from the blackstonian theory that judges do not create but merely discover the law so that a constitutionally invalid law is “invalid from the moment it is enacted”: hogg and wright, at §58:1, quoting nova scotia (workers’ compensation board) v. martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2 scr 504, at para. 28; see also w. blackstone, commentaries on the laws of england (1765), book 1, at pp. 69-70; hislop, at para. 79. [40] a strict blackstonian theory, however, cannot easily be reconciled with modern constitutional law many fundamental principles that are essential to our constitutional system curtail the retroactive reach of judicial remedies res judicata, for example, prevents the reopening of settled matters due to later judicial pronouncements, even maintaining convictions for offences later declared unconstitutional if the accused has exhausted their appeals such that they are no longer “in the judicial system”: r v. wigman, [1987] 1 scr 246, at p 257; see also r v. thomas, [1990] 1 scr 713. similarly, the de facto and qualified immunity doctrines validate and preclude financial liability for government actions taken under laws that are later found to be unconstitutional: k. roach, constitutional remedies in canada (2nd ed (loose-leaf)), at ¶ 14.1980; hislop, at para. 102, citing guimond v quebec (attorney general), [1996] 3 scr 347, and mackin v. new brunswick (minister of finance), 2002 scc 13, [2002] 1 scr 405. these doctrines balance the generally retroactive nature of judicial remedies with the need for finality and stability. finally, it is also difficult to square the blackstonian view with the judicial discretion to suspend a declaration of invalidity: g, at paras. 87-89. thus, the theory is subject to numerous exceptions and qualifications it cannot preclude purely prospective constitutional remedies indeed, this has been recognized in many other jurisdictions that have grappled with the blackstonian theory: in re spectrum plus ltd, [2005] ukhl 41, [2005] 2 ac 680, at paras. 17, 35, 41-42, 74 and 161-62; johnson v. new jersey, 384 us 719 (1966); constitution of south africa, s 172(b); semenyih jaya sdn bhd v. pentadbir tanah daerah hulu langat, [2017] 3 mlj 561 (federal court of malaysia); india cement ltd. v. state of tamil nadu, air 1990 sc 85. [41] that said, the general presumption that declarations of constitutional invalidity have retroactive effect is firmly rooted in principles of constitutional interpretation and s 52(1). [42] section 52(1), the cornerstone of constitutionalism, enshrining the supremacy of the constitution, must be read in light of all constitutional principles. a s 52(1) declaration will generally be both immediate and retroactive retroactive remedies that immediately apply to everybody who is still “in the system” maximize the protection and vindication of charter rights, as a general system of delayed prospective remedies would risk leaving those harmed in the past by an unconstitutional law without a remedy: choudhry and roach, at pp. 247-48. furthermore, legislatures would have lesser incentives to ensure that new legislation complies with the charter if they could rely on the second chances provided by consequence-free prospective declarations: see r leckey, “the harms of remedial discretion” (2016), 14 int’l j. const. l 584, at pp. 595-96. [43] however, that judicial declarations are generally immediate and retroactive does not mean they are necessarily so: hislop, at para. 86. as i will explain, the rare circumstances and constitutional considerations that warrant a suspended declaration can justify an exception to the retroactive application of declarations where necessary to give effect to the purpose of the suspension. b. temporal nature of suspended declarations [44] when compelling public interests outweigh the continued violation of charter rights, courts may suspend a declaration of invalidity: g, at paras. 117 and 126. the tool of a suspended declaration allows courts to temper the retroactive effects of a declaration however, a court’s decision to suspend a declaration does not alter the presumptively retroactive application of the declaration but merely changes when it comes into effect. the presumption of retroactivity persists, although it may be rebutted explicitly or by necessary implication for example, this court’s first experience issuing a suspended declaration of invalidity was in manitoba language reference. nearly all of manitoba’s legislation was found to be unconstitutional because it was enacted in english only. because an immediate retroactive remedy would have created a legal vacuum in manitoba, with catastrophic consequences for the rule of law, the court suspended its declaration of invalidity to give the legislature time to pass new, constitutionally sound laws: p 758. nonetheless, the declaration was retroactive. [45] in hislop, this court explained some circumstances where “judges may rule prospectively”: para. 96. in these circumstances, the presumption of retroactivity is rebutted and a s 52(1) declaration will operate prospectively. a prospective remedy could be appropriate if there is a “substantial change in the law”: para. 99. hislop set out some further factors that courts should consider in determining whether to issue a prospective remedy, including good faith government reliance, fairness to the litigants, and whether a retroactive remedy would unduly interfere with the allocation of public resources: para. 100. hislop was clear that this was not an exhaustive list: para. 100. the question then becomes what other “conditions will justify the crafting of judicial prospective remedies”: para. 86. [46] in my view, a suspended declaration of invalidity may provide another exception to the presumption of retroactivity where the purpose of the suspension, by necessary implication, requires a purely prospective declaration suspended declarations will only issue where the government demonstrates that compelling public interests, grounded in the constitution, outweigh the continued breach of constitutional rights and require that the legislature have an opportunity to remedy the constitutional infirmity: g, at paras. 133 and 139 furthermore, declarations of invalidity will be issued only if more tailored remedies, such as reading in, reading down, or severance, are inappropriate: g, at paras. 112 and 114 when these rare and exceptional circumstances arise, a retroactive application of the declaration at the conclusion of the suspension could frustrate the purpose — the compelling public interests — that required a period of transition, creating uncertainty and removing the protection that justified the suspension in the first place. the necessary implication of the suspension may be that the declaration, when it comes into effect, must operate purely prospectively so that it does not defeat the very purpose of the suspension. [47] the appellants suggest that concerns with self-defeating retroactive declarations can be alleviated by parliament enacting retroactive remedial legislation. ultimately, however, the choice of whether to make remedial legislation retroactive belongs to the legislature. the suggestion that the courts should rely on this legislative choice fails to give full effect to the separation of powers and the responsibility of the courts as “guardians of the constitution”: hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at p 169. the judiciary must give effect to the supremacy clause in s 52(1) through judicial declarations that stand on their own. [48] similarly, i cannot accept the proposition of the court of appeal and the crown that remedial legislation can somehow amend a court’s declaration or “pre-empt” its retroactive effect. remedial legislation may impact the ultimate state of the law but it cannot change the court’s order nothing in hislop (at para. 92) says otherwise. furthermore, the legislature may legitimately choose to not enact remedial legislation thus, the courts must exercise their duty to craft coherent, principled s 52(1) remedies that give effect to the interests and the various foundational principles of the constitution at stake — including when establishing the temporal application of a declaration. [49] the appellants further submit that a declaration cannot be prospective unless the court explicitly directs. while such precision is strongly advised, this court has rarely stated explicitly when a declaration will apply purely prospectively. reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1998] 1 scr 3 (pei. judges reference (1998)), appears to stand alone in this regard, where this court clarified the temporal nature of the declaration in pei. judges reference (1997), which was silent on the issue: para. 18 however, pei. judges reference (1998) is not the only purely prospective judgment in this court’s history. more frequently, the necessary implications of transition periods or suspended declarations of invalidity demonstrate that, even in the absence of explicit language, the court’s declaration operates purely prospectively.1 [50] for example, in r v. brydges, [1990] 1 scr 190, this court found that the right to counsel under s 10(b) of the charter includes the right to be informed of the existence and availability of legal aid and duty counsel: p 211. recognizing that police officers generally fulfilled their informational duties by reading from printed caution cards, the declaration was suspended for 30 days to allow police departments across canada to prepare new caution cards that included information about legal aid and duty counsel: p 217. the prospective application of this declaration is necessarily implied from the reason for the suspension. it would have defeated the purpose of the suspension to suspend the declaration because police officers could not realistically comply with the judgment for the next 30 days, only to then have the declaration apply retroactively to everybody detained in the previous 30 days. [51] suspended declarations invalidating legislation have also operated in this way. for example, in r v. bain, [1992] 1 scr 91, this court held that the crown’s disproportionate number of juror stand-asides was unconstitutional, but suspended that declaration for six months to “avoid a hiatus”: p 104. again, the necessary implication 1 in this regard, while some have read the words “transition period” to indicate prospective remedies and “suspension period” to indicate retroactive ones (choudhry and roach, at pp. 216-17), the language used by this court has varied over cases and years and the two expressions have similar effects in evaluating the temporal application of judicial remedies, the focus ought not to be placed on the terminology used but rather on the purpose and effects of the remedy. of the suspension was that the declaration applied purely prospectively. a retroactive application, invalidating any juries selected during the suspension period, would have defeated the very purpose of the suspension. [52] in sum, i agree with the attorney general of canada that the court should look to the purpose of a suspension in determining whether the declaration must logically operate retroactively or purely prospectively. the purpose of a suspension is to protect a compelling public interest that would be endangered by an immediate declaration to such an extent that it outweighs the harms of continuing the violation of charter rights for a limited period: g, at para. 83. if retroactivity would undermine that purpose, the declaration must apply purely prospectively. [53] this court has not always explained why a declaration is suspended, nor explained the temporal application of that declaration. g emphasized the importance of transparently explaining the reasons for suspending a s 52(1) declaration: paras. 125- 26 and 159. while those explanations will assist in deducing the necessary temporal implications of suspended declarations, i would expect courts in the future to explicitly state the temporal application of their s 52(1) declarations to avoid any confusion. where the court has been explicit, it is unnecessary to consider the necessary implications of a suspension. c. temporal nature of the bedford suspended declaration [54] this brings us to the temporal application of the bedford declaration. bedford represented a substantial change in the law, with this court revisiting its conclusion in reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the criminal code (man.), [1990] 1 scr 1123: see hislop, at para. 99 the key issue in this case is whether, in the absence of explicit language, the presumption of retroactivity is rebutted by necessary implication. in my view, the purpose of the bedford suspension required the declaration to operate purely prospectively. [55] the bedford suspension emanated from a concern about immediately leaving sex work entirely unregulated: para. 167. a retroactive declaration would have rendered the regulatory system of criminal offences that was maintained by the suspension entirely unenforceable once the suspension expired, undermining the protection of the vulnerable victims that was at the root of the finding of unconstitutionality and defeating the purpose of the suspension. [56] nor would a retroactive declaration have given effect to and vindicated charter rights the bedford provisions were found unconstitutional because their overbreadth imperiled the security of sex workers. for example, the offence of living on the avails protected sex workers from parasitic, exploitative pimps but was unconstitutionally overbroad because it prevented them from accessing security- enhancing services such as legitimate drivers and bodyguards: paras. 137-45. however, the court issued a declaration of invalidity rather than reading the provisions down, recognizing that a judicially crafted exclusion for non-exploitative protective services could have unforeseen impacts on other aspects of the regulatory scheme: para. 165. the suspension temporarily maintained in effect both the constitutional “protection” and unconstitutional “prevention” aspects of the offence if the declaration was retroactive, then not only would sex workers have their rights continually violated by the “prevention” measures during the suspension, but they would also lose the protective aspect of the living on the avails offence as parasitic and exploitative pimps would enjoy practical criminal immunity for their actions during the suspension. far from vindicating the charter rights of sex workers, as bedford sought to do, a retroactive declaration would have gravely imperiled those rights. [57] conversely, prospective application is far more consonant with the purpose of the bedford suspension and more protective of sex workers’ rights as bedford intended, the status quo regulation continued for one year. in that time, sex workers retained the full protection of the criminal law against parasitic and exploitative conduct, thus providing them the benefit of the law. [58] given the purely prospective nature of the declaration in bedford, the specific challenge in this case is to determine what happens to those who committed the bedford offences prior to the expiry of the suspension. any answer involves some degree of legal uncertainty. this uncertainty reinforces why suspensions must be rare. where suspensions are necessary, the court should also consider whether any measures during the suspension may minimize the impact of the ongoing charter breaches. for example, in r v swain, [1991] 1 scr 933, this court suspended its declaration striking down the automatic indefinite detention provisions, but dictated that any detentions during the interim be capped at 30 to 60 days: p 1021. in carter v. canada (attorney general), 2016 scc 4, [2016] 1 scr 13, this court provided guidelines for constitutional exemptions for physician-assisted death during the extended suspension period: para. 6. of course, the legislature can always legislate a different approach, including retroactively, within the confines of the constitution. d protection of rights under prospective remedies [59] the appellants’ submissions that the bedford declaration must be retroactive emphasize the potential unfairness to accused persons charged for engaging in non-exploitative conduct under s 212(1)(j) prior to the declaration taking effect. however, a prospective declaration does not deprive these people of individual remedies and would not contravene the principle from big m drug mart that nobody may be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional law. [60] the principle that nobody may be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional law was described by this court in big m drug mart as a corollary to the supremacy of the constitution: p 313 however, this court noted that neither s 52(1) nor s 24(1) are the only recourse in the face of an unconstitutional law: p 313. rather, they coexist to offer relief from an unconstitutional offence. [61] it does not follow from big m drug mart that s 52(1) remedies must always be retroactive in the criminal law first, the big m drug mart principle has never been absolute: the doctrine of res judicata has always tempered its application. indeed, by preventing collateral attacks on final judgments once a law has been declared unconstitutional, the doctrine allows people to remain convicted — and potentially deprived of liberty — for an offence under an unconstitutional law. second, as i will explain, when a s 52(1) declaration is prospective, a person whose charter rights are breached by the law declared to be unconstitutional may still apply for a personal remedy under s 24(1). i must therefore reject the appellants’ arguments. remedies available following a prospective declaration [62] while s 52(1) is the usual remedy against unconstitutional laws and s 24(1) is “generally used” against unconstitutional acts, both can be combined to provide relief in cases where it is appropriate to do so: ferguson, at paras. 59-60 and 63 a declaration under s 52(1) provides general relief against the law, whereas an individual remedy under s 24(1) — such as an exemption or a stay of proceedings — can mitigate the effects of that law or of actions taken under the law in specific cases. in ferguson, this court held that, while constitutional exemptions under s 24(1) are not appropriate substitutes for s 52(1) challenges to the unconstitutionality of legislation, s 24(1) can be combined with s 52(1) when additional relief is necessary to provide an effective remedy in a specific case: para. 63. [63] similarly, in g, this court held that there was no rule against granting both a suspended s 52(1) declaration and a retroactive s 24(1) remedy. there are numerous examples in our jurisprudence of a personal constitutional remedy being granted during the period of suspension of a declaration under s 52(1): see carter, at paras. 5-6; g, at para. 182; martin, at paras. 120-21; r v. guignard, 2002 scc 14, [2002] 1 scr 472, at paras. 32-34; mackin, at paras. 75-76; bain, at pp. 105 and 165. in that sense, the practice of this court has often been to apply the findings of unconstitutionality retroactively to the claimant before them, even when the temporal application of the declaration itself was suspended. [64] the same reasoning holds when the suspended declaration is prospective. this is because there is a conceptual distinction between the legal findings as to the constitutional validity of a law and the particular relief ordered — between the substantive conclusions and the appropriate remedy: m-s. kuo, “between choice and tradition: rethinking remedial grace periods and unconstitutionality management in a comparative light” (2019), 36 ucla pac. basin lj 157, at p 160. while the legal finding that the legislation breaches a charter right is a necessary condition for the granting of a general s 52(1) declaration, that finding can also be the basis for a personal remedy under s 24(1). [65] a s 52(1) declaration is simply the means by which a court with the jurisdiction to do so makes its findings on the constitutionality of a law opposable to the world, including government: martin, at para. 28. however, even in the absence of a declaration, judges must assess charter compliance in specific cases when an issue is appropriately raised before them, though their findings may remain applicable only to that case: r v. lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr 130, at paras. 15 and 19; martin, at para. 3; roach (2nd ed.), at ¶ 6200. when a judge is asked to consider whether a particular accused’s charter rights have been breached under s 24(1), the constitutional findings of this court are binding, even when the declaration itself is not operative. while this court’s decision to suspend the declaration or to make it purely prospective keeps the law temporarily alive so as not to create a legal vacuum that would compromise compelling public interests, this does not preclude personal remedies for violations of charter rights before the coming into force of the declaration whether a remedy is appropriate in the circumstances is a separate question. [66] generally, recourse to s 24(1) will be limited so as not to undermine the compelling public interests that required suspending the declaration a personal remedy that undermined compelling public interests would indeed not be “appropriate and just” in the circumstances. however, where compelling public interests would not be undermined, s 24(1) is a flexible vehicle for someone whose charter rights are breached. carter is an example where compelling interests to permit physician-assisted death justified a broad interim remedy that granted personal relief to people whose rights were jeopardized by the extended suspension. in that case, the court fashioned a detailed transitional remedy that mitigated irreparable harm, based on the criteria arising from its findings of unconstitutionality. similarly, in g, although widespread individual exemptions would have undermined the purpose of the suspension by significantly impairing the legislature’s ability to enact remedial legislation, this court was able to grant the applicant a s 24(1) exemption because in his circumstances it did not undermine the purpose of the suspension. [67] thus, s 24(1) remedies may be available even during the period of suspension if the accused can demonstrate that conviction under the legislation found to be constitutionally infirm would be a breach of their own charter rights, and if granting an individual remedy would not undermine the purpose of suspending the s 52(1) declaration. [68] applying this reasoning to this case, a person charged under s 212(1)(j) for conduct prior to or during the suspension may seek an individual remedy under s 24(1). unlike ferguson, in this context the living on the avails offence has already been found to be unconstitutional pursuant to s 52(1) but because the court’s declaration of invalidity was suspended, both the law and decisions by officials to lay charges or prosecute continued to affect the rights of an accused: see r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr 599, at para. 106. the court in bedford found that by punishing both those who exploit sex workers and those who enhance their safety, the living on the avails offence infringed the security of sex workers in a manner that bore no relation to its purpose and was therefore overbroad: paras. 142 and 144. while the constitutional flaw related to the s 7 rights of sex workers, this finding has direct implications for providers of security-enhancing services who are charged under s 212(1)(j) the liberty of these accused is put in jeopardy, despite the finding in bedford that this aspect of the living on the avails offence bears no relation to its purpose. [69] this risk may be mitigated through a personal remedy under s 24(1). following the findings of bedford, if an accused is charged with conduct that bears no relation to the purpose of the living on the avails offence — for example because they were a legitimate driver or bodyguard — an application judge may find a breach of that accused’s s 7 rights and grant a s 24(1) remedy. however, if the trial judge finds that the accused’s conduct did not fall within the unconstitutional overbreadth, for example because they were an exploitative pimp, then the accused’s s 7 rights are not violated and no remedy lies in s 24(1) furthermore, granting individual remedies for non- exploitative conduct within the bounds of the constitutional defects as identified by this court in bedford is unlikely to undermine the purpose of the bedford suspension. the suspension maintains the protection of the law for vulnerable victims and the public by allowing sex workers recourse against parasitic or exploitative behaviour the suspension allows the law to continue temporarily to target those whose conduct may legitimately be criminalized. however, when an application judge finds as a fact that the accused before them acted within the safety-enhancing unconstitutional overbreadth, s 24(1) may be available to stay the charges doing so upholds the constitution fully and maximizes rights protection. [70] finally, while this court has often stated that prosecutorial discretion is not a solution to a constitutionally defective situation, it is highly unlikely that the crown would prosecute someone in the face of the court’s determination that to do so would likely be a violation of their charter rights: r v. anderson, 2014 scc 41, [2014] 2 scr 167, at para. 17; r v. nur, 2015 scc 15, [2015] 1 scr 773, at para. 86. in the unlikely event that they do, a person in non-exploitative position can seek a s 24(1) remedy. [71] in sum, the fact that the bedford declaration was purely prospective does not mean someone will be convicted of s 212(1)(j) in violation of their charter rights. while the law remains valid and can ground legal convictions, no one should be convicted of the offence if its overbreadth violates their rights however, where the conduct does not fall within the area of overbreadth identified by this court, individuals may be charged, prosecuted, and convicted under s 212(1)(j) for conduct that occurred while the law still governed. iii conclusion [72] a suspended declaration of invalidity may be purely prospective where the purpose of the suspension requires such a temporal application. in bedford, this court’s remedy was purely prospective, because the purpose of the suspension — avoiding deregulation that would leave sex workers vulnerable — would be frustrated by a retroactive remedy as the remedy was purely prospective, the appellants could be charged for their conduct prior to the declaration taking effect. thus, an accused could be convicted for conduct caught by s 212(1)(j) before the effective date of the declaration however, an accused who could demonstrate that their personal rights were prejudiced by the constitutional infirmity could seek relief under s 24(1), provided their conduct did not undermine the public interests the suspension was designed to protect. [73] because the appellants engaged in exploitative and parasitic conduct, the exact conduct that was always legitimately criminalized, a s 24(1) remedy is not available to them. i would dismiss the appeals. the reasons of brown and rowe jj. were delivered by rowe j — i. introduction [74] the law relating to the suspension of declarations of invalidity has been bedeviled by a lack of doctrinal clarity. this, in turn, has given rise to sustained ad hockery the first key question, in what circumstances should a declaration of invalidity be suspended, was addressed in a structured way three decades ago in schachter v canada, [1992] 2 scr 679 unhappily, the test for granting a suspension set out there was honoured so consistently in the breach that the whole issue had to be revisited in 2020 in ontario (attorney general) v. g, 2020 scc 38. [75] in this case, we deal with a second key question: if a suspension of a declaration of invalidity is to be made, then how should it be structured and operate? again, what is needed is doctrinal clarity, in the absence of which will arise yet more ad hockery. i seek to provide an overall framework for the structuring and the operation of such suspensions. in my view, what is needed is to tailor the terms of the suspension to the purpose for which the suspension is given in other words, the terms of the suspension should be set, deliberately and explicitly, based on the state of the law that the declaration is intended to achieve, both during and following the expiry of the suspension. that did not happen in canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101. as a result, we are asked in these appeals to do a post facto patch up. tempting as it is in order to avoid an unhappy result, we should not be drawn into doing so. [76] applying this framework to the specific facts of this case, i agree with justice karakatsanis that the approach of the court of appeal for british columbia is flawed however, i part ways with justice karakatsanis in her interpretation of the effect of the declaration of invalidity in bedford. [77] while this court in bedford could have issued a prospective declaration of invalidity, on my reading, it did not do so. therefore, the declaration of invalidity in bedford rendered s 212(1)(j) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, void ab initio. it follows that the appeals must be allowed, the convictions of the appellants set aside and the trial judge’s decision quashing the counts restored. ii legal framework a. temporal operation of constitutional declarations of invalidity [78] ordinarily, constitutional declarations of invalidity are retroactive, and have immediate effect. section 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982, provides that “any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect”. if a law is “of no force or effect” to the extent that it is inconsistent with the constitution, then it has always been of no force and effect, from the moment it was enacted, or from the moment the provision of the constitution with which it is inconsistent came into effect, whichever came second this is the logical implication of s 52(1) this court in canada (attorney general) v hislop, 2007 scc 10, [2007] 1 scr 429, referred to this as the “declaratory approach”, and explained that “[i]f the law was invalid from the outset, then any government action taken pursuant to that law is also invalid, and consequently, those affected by it have a right to redress which reaches back into the past” (para. 83). [79] the retroactive nature of constitutional declarations of invalidity also flows from the nature of judicial remedies generally as this court explained in hislop, because courts generally decide the legal consequences of events that occurred in the past, “they generally grant remedies that are retroactive” such that the successful litigant will benefit from the ruling (para. 86, citing s choudhry and k roach, “putting the past behind us? prospective judicial and legislative constitutional remedies” (2003), 21 sclr (2d) 205, at pp. 211 and 218). [80] in the criminal context, this is demonstrated by the fact that accused persons may defend themselves against convictions by arguing that the law under which they are convicted is unconstitutional. this is foundational. in r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, dickson j (as he then was) explained that the “undoubted corollary to be drawn” from s 52(1) and the principle that the constitution is supreme is that “no one can be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional law” and that “[a]ny accused . . . may defend a criminal charge by arguing that the law under which the charge is brought is constitutionally invalid” (pp. 313-14). it follows from this that constitutional declarations are typically retroactive, so as to provide a remedy to the litigant before the court, who is seeking relief from the effects of an unconstitutional law that occurred in the past, prior to the hearing and ruling. [81] this is borne out by this court’s case law in nova scotia (workers’ compensation board) v martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2 scr 504, this court explained that “[t]he invalidity of a legislative provision inconsistent with the [canadian charter of rights and freedoms] does not arise from the fact of its being declared unconstitutional by a court, but from the operation of s 52(1) thus, in principle, such a provision is invalid from the moment it is enacted” (para. 28) in reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721, this court held much of manitoba’s legislation to be unconstitutional for being enacted in english only. the result was that all unilingually enacted acts of manitoba “are, and always have been, invalid and of no force or effect” (p 767 (emphasis added)). this court made clear that this declaration affected laws enacted since 1890, some 95 years in the past (p 747). as bastarache j pointed out in his concurring reasons in hislop, “[t]he general norm of retroactivity has been reaffirmed many times by this court”, citing reference re manitoba language rights, miron v trudel, [1995] 2 scr 418, and r v hess, [1990] 2 scr 906, as a few examples among many (para. 140). [82] many academics agree that retroactive and immediate declarations of unconstitutionality are the norm according to sujit choudhry and kent roach, “[u]nder the charter, retroactivity is the default position” (p 211). they explain that a s 52(1) declaration means that the legislature never had the authority to enact the law, such that “the law no longer exists and never did exist” (pp. 211-12 (emphasis in original), quoting k roach, constitutional remedies in canada (loose-leaf), at para. 14920). similarly, peter w. hogg and wade k. wright explain that “[a] judicial decision that a law is unconstitutional is retroactive in the sense that it involves the nullification of the law from the outset” (constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at p 58-2). according to robert leckey, “[o]n the understanding of nullity prevailing in the commonwealth tradition, a law declared invalid should cease to have effect immediately” and this theory “implies that legislative invalidity reaches back to the law’s purported enactment or to the entry into force of the superior norm rendering it invalid, such as a bill of rights” (“the harms of remedial discretion” (2016), 14 int’l j. const l 584, at p 586 (emphasis in original); see also l. sarna, the law of declaratory judgments (4th ed. 2016), at p 151). [83] the retroactive effect of declarations of invalidity can be limited by legal doctrines such as the de facto doctrine, res judicata, and the law of limitations (see g, at para. 121, citing hislop, at para. 101). these doctrines limit the retroactive effect of a declaration of invalidity, but they do not change the fact that a retroactive declaration is retroactive, in the sense that it deems a law invalid ab initio and applies to events in the past. [84] although this court recognized the predominance of the retroactive approach in hislop, it also recognized two important exceptions: prospective declarations and suspended declarations. prospective declarations of invalidity apply only forward in time from the moment of the declaration, but do not render a law invalid back in time from the moment of its enactment, as though the law never existed. for example, in reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1998] 1 scr 3, this court stated that the s 52(1) remedy would “apply prospectively” only (para. 18; see also hislop, at para. 88) suspending a declaration of invalidity means that the moment when the effects of a declaration of invalidity — whether retroactive or prospective — become operative is delayed. it does not change the effect of a declaration of invalidity — it just delays its coming into effect. [85] when a declaration comes into effect (immediate or suspended) and what the temporal effect of the declaration is once it does come into effect (retroactive or prospective) are two separate questions. thus, there are four possible temporal effects of a declaration of constitutional invalidity: a) an immediate retroactive declaration of invalidity renders the law invalid from the date of the declaration, back to the date the law was enacted (or to the date the constitutional provision under which it is invalid came into force, whichever came after). b) a suspended retroactive declaration of invalidity does the same thing, but not until the suspension period expires: the law is treated as valid for the period of the suspension, but when the suspension period expires, it is as though the law had always been invalid. c) an immediate prospective declaration of invalidity renders a law invalid from the date of the declaration forward into the future, but not back into the past when there is a prospective declaration of invalidity, the law was and remains valid from the date it was enacted until the date of the prospective declaration. d) a prospective declaration of invalidity with a suspension, often called a “transition period”, works in a similar way to an immediate prospective declaration, except that the declaration becomes effective only when the transition period ends. b guidance for courts [86] when a court issues a declaration of constitutional invalidity, it must consider the consequences of each option, craft a remedy that is appropriate in the circumstances, and be explicit about the temporal effect of the remedy imposed if it is to be other than retroactive and immediate. [87] suspended declarations of invalidity are “deeply controversial, because they allow an unconstitutional state of affairs to persist, thereby posing a threat to the very idea of constitutional supremacy” (choudhry and roach, at p 230; see also leckey, at p 602; schachter, at p 716). prospective declarations, which fail to address any past unconstitutional effects of a law, raise similar concerns. [88] in g, a majority of this court endorsed a principled approach to determining when suspending a declaration of invalidity is appropriate the government bears the onus of demonstrating that a compelling public interest, such as public safety or the rule of law (as set out in schachter) supports a suspension (para. 126) in hislop, this court set out a list of considerations that may justify a declaration that is prospective only. a substantial change in the law is required, but is not sufficient. other factors that may, together with a substantial change in the law, justify a purely prospective remedy, include good faith reliance by governments, unfairness to the litigants, or interference with the constitutional role of legislatures (paras. 99-100). [89] in considering these factors, courts must have regard to the effect that a suspended or prospective declaration of invalidity will actually have in the particular case. for example, if suspending a declaration of invalidity will not significantly further public safety or the rule of law, the suspension may be inappropriate tailored remedies, like reading down, severance, or reading in, may also be available as alternatives to a full declaration of invalidity, and may mitigate the rule of law or public safety concerns of declaring an entire law to be retroactively invalid, as set out in g, at paras. 113 and 116. [90] when a court does make a declaration of invalidity, and when a court intends that declaration of invalidity to be other than immediate and retroactive, it must say so deliberately and explicitly, in order to avoid confusion. i say this for two reasons. [91] first, only a clear statement that a declaration is prospective, suspended, or prospective with a transition period, will suffice, because of the strong presumption that constitutional declarations are retroactive and immediate. while prospective and suspended remedies are available, it must be borne in mind that they are not explicitly authorized by the text of s 52(1), as a majority of this court recognized in g. rather, the “immediate and retroactive effect to the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the charter must, at times, yield to other imperatives” (g, at para. 121). suspended and prospective declarations are deviations from the “traditional and widespread understanding of the role of the judiciary” in which “courts grant retroactive relief applying existing law or rediscovered rules which are deemed to have always existed” (hislop, at paras. 84 and 91; see also choudhry and roach, at p 219). [92] second, too much guess work is involved in trying to infer what a court meant to do after the fact, given the array of remedial options available to courts, and the multiple kinds of declarations. while it may be possible to infer in some cases that a court probably meant to impose a certain remedy, or that it would have been more sensible to have done so, in my view it would be inappropriate to essentially read into a court order something that is not there ex post facto. litigants are entitled to know where they stand without engaging in a second round of litigation, and where the court making the declaration is an appellate court, lower courts cannot be left to infer — essentially guess — the result by which they are bound. for both of these reasons, when a court imposes a remedy that deviates from the traditional norm of retroactivity and immediacy, it must say so explicitly. c guidance for legislatures [93] when a legislature enacts new legislation in order to correct the unconstitutional effects of a law during a period of suspension of invalidity, the temporal effect of the new law should be stated explicitly. this is so because whether a law is prospective or retroactive has different implications. a prospective law will have effect from the moment of its coming into force and for the future (r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at §25.24 and §25106). a law has retroactive effect when “a new statute applies in such a way as to prescribe the legal regime of facts entirely accomplished prior to its commencement” (p.-a côté, in collaboration with s. beaulac and m. devinat, the interpretation of legislation in canada (4th ed. 2011), at p 135; see also sullivan, at §2524). [94] there is a strong presumption that laws are of prospective, and not of retroactive, effect (r v. dineley, 2012 scc 58, [2012] 3 scr 272, at para. 10; see also gustavson drilling (1964) ltd. v. minister of national revenue, [1977] 1 scr. 271, at p 279; tran v canada (public safety and emergency preparedness), 2017 scc 50, [2017] 2 scr 289, at para. 43; côté, at p 123; sullivan, at §2551). this presumption exists for good reason. as sullivan explains, “[i]t is obvious that reaching into the past and declaring the law to be different from what it was is a serious violation of rule of law, [because] the fundamental principle on which rule of law is built is advance knowledge of the law” (§25.50, citing j. raz, the authority of law (1979), at pp. 210 et seq). [95] in the context of whether certain criminal code provisions were void for vagueness under s 7 of the charter, lamer j (as he then was) explained in reference re ss 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the criminal code (man.), [1990] 1 scr 1123, at p 1152, that “there can be no crime or punishment unless it is in accordance with law that is certain, unambiguous and not retroactive”. he explained the rationale as follows: it is essential in a free and democratic society that citizens are able, as far as is possible, to foresee the consequences of their conduct in order that persons be given fair notice of what to avoid, and that the discretion of those entrusted with law enforcement is limited by clear and explicit legislative standards (see professor l. tribe, american constitutional law (2nd ed. 1988), at p 1033). this is especially important in the criminal law, where citizens are potentially liable to a deprivation of liberty if their conduct is in conflict with the law. [emphasis added; p 1152.] [96] however, this presumption that legislation applies prospectively can be rebutted by either (1) express words, or (2) necessary implication, as in campbell v. campbell (1995), 130 dlr (4th) 622 (man ca) (sullivan, at §25.52; see also gustavson drilling, at p 279; acme village school district (board of trustees of) v. steele-smith, [1933] scr 47, at pp. 50-51; british columbia v imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2005 scc 49, [2005] 2 scr 473, at para. 71; tran, at para. 43; côté, at p 132; hogg and wright, at §51:26). where a legislature wishes legislation to be retroactive, so as to avoid a legal gap that would arise when the period of suspension of invalidity of a retroactive declaration of invalidity expires, it should make this explicit in the legislation. [97] that said, retroactive criminal legislation could be expected to be challenged under s 11(g) of the charter. section 11(g) of the charter reads as follows: any person charged with an offence has the right . . . not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under canadian or international law or was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations; [98] section 11(g) is “a limitation of the power of parliament or a provincial legislature to create new offences with a retroactive application” or, in other words, it is “an authorization to create such an offence if, at the time of the act or omission complained of, it constituted an offence ‘under . . . international law or was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations’” (r. m. mcleod et al., the canadian charter of rights: the prosecution and defence of criminal and other statutory offences (loose-leaf), vol. 4, at p 18-2; see also hogg and wright, at §51:26; r v. finta, [1994] 1 scr 701, at pp. 873-74, per cory j). therefore, this section of the charter simply expresses the idea “that an act or omission [must] constitute an offence at the time it was committed” (r. j. sharpe and k. roach, the charter of rights and freedoms (7th ed. 2021), at p 355). it has been held that “the absence of codification does not mean that a law violates this principle” because “[f]or many centuries, most of our crimes were uncodified and were not viewed as violating this fundamental rule” (united nurses of alberta v alberta (attorney general), [1992] 1 scr 901, at p 930). [99] however, authors roach and choudhry advance the position taken by the crown and the attorneys general that “[i]n terms of criminal and quasi-criminal laws, legislatures may understandably be unwilling to enact an offence with retroactive application, given that this may be a prima facie violation of section 11(g) of the charter” (p 242) i express no view as to the merits of such a challenge nor as to arguments that might be advanced in response under s 1 of the charter. [100] finally, i would also add a word on transitional provisions, which concern “temporal dimension of legal rules” (côté, at p 116) in general, “[t]ransitional provisions are enacted to catch those who fall between the cracks created by two pieces of legislation. they ensure that these individuals are not left in legal limbo, uncertain of their rights and with no applicable law” (medovarski v canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), 2005 scc 51, [2005] 2 scr 539, at para. 17). when a legislature enacts a law in response to a declaration of invalidity, it should consider including transitional provisions on the temporal effect of the law so as to avoid confusion. d. suspending a retroactive declaration of invalidity of a criminal law [101] suspending a retroactive declaration of invalidity can be an uneasy fit in the criminal law context, because criminal prosecutions take time. complainants may take years to come forward, and criminal charges can take years to prosecute. in order to understand the effect of a suspended retroactive declaration in the criminal context, it is important to appreciate the difference between repealing a criminal law and declaring a criminal law void ab initio. [102] when an offence is repealed by the legislature, a charge may be laid after the repeal of a crime for an offence committed prior to the repeal, so the fact that criminal prosecutions take time is of no moment. a recent example of this can be found in r v. poulin, 2019 scc 47, at para. 58: at common law, the general rule is that an accused must be tried and punished under the substantive law in force at the time the offence was committed, rather than the law in force at any other time — such as at trial or sentencing (r v. kelly, [1992] 2 scr 170, at p 203, per mclachlin j.; johnson, at para. 41; krj, at para. 1; r v. hooyer, 2016 onca 44, 129 or (3d) 81, at para. 42. . . .) this explains why, in this case, the state was able to charge mr. poulin in 2014 for an offence that had been repealed from the criminal code in 1987. while the offence no longer existed when mr poulin was charged, convicted and sentenced, it existed when he committed his offences of gross indecency between 1979 and 1983 (see also interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21, s 43). [emphasis added.] (see also côté, at p 149; sullivan, at §25.44; e. g. ewaschuk, criminal pleadings & practice in canada (2nd ed (loose-leaf)), vol. 5, at para. 33:4150.) [103] in contrast, when an offence is declared void ab initio by a court, no one can thereafter be convicted of that offence, even for conduct that occurred prior to the declaration. this is because the offence will be deemed to have never existed and no one can be found guilty of an unconstitutional (and non-existing) law. in this case, the fact that criminal prosecutions take time matters very much. [104] this is why a suspended retroactive declaration of invalidity can be an uneasy fit in the criminal context: while accused persons can be convicted of the offence during the brief window of the suspension, as soon as the suspension expires, the law will be deemed to have been void ab initio, such that, thereafter no one can be convicted of that offence, no matter when the offence occurred. this is true regardless of whether or not the law is repealed before the suspension expires. the suspension therefore accomplishes little, precisely because criminal prosecutions take time to move through the system. [105] further, because criminal prosecutions take time, a suspension can have idiosyncratic effects. this is so for two reasons. first, it creates a somewhat arbitrary distinction between prosecutions that happen to be concluded before the suspension expires such that the accused is no longer “in the system”, and prosecutions that are still ongoing or where the accused still has an avenue of appeal (see r v thomas, [1990] 1 scr 713, at p 716). this incentivizes an accused to delay until the date when the offence for which they are charged is scheduled to “become” unconstitutional. this creates disparity on a temporal level, between individuals charged under the unconstitutional offence late enough in the suspension period to escape a conviction, and those who are not. it also creates disparity on a financial level, between individuals who can afford legal advice and know to wait out the suspension period instead of pleading guilty or going to trial, and those who cannot (leckey, at p 592). [106] second, suspended declaration of invalidity may create disparity on how the law is applied during the period of suspension throughout the country by police officers and crown prosecutors. as professor leckey puts it, “[p]olice practices and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion often vary from one administrative zone or province to another” (p 595). therefore, “it is rash to suppose that a suspension assures legal stability”, because [a] declaration of invalidity might well intensify uncertainty in what was probably already a legal grey zone. that is, the criminal prohibition apt to succumb to constitutional attack likely no longer represents a social consensus. uneven enforcement and punishment might already reflect that fact upstream of the measure disproportionately limits rights. in any event, the prospect of incarcerating individuals convicted under an interdiction known to violate rights intensifies concerns for the rule of law and for justice generally. [emphasis added; p 595.] judgment declaring that the [107] therefore, courts should consider whether this is the intended effect, and if not, select another remedy. iii application [108] in bedford, the attorney general of canada asked the court to suspend any declaration of constitutional invalidity it might grant “so that parliament has an opportunity to consider legislative options that respond to the constitutional infirmities identified by the court” (agc factum, at para. 129). a legislative void would, as the attorney general of canada saw it, place sex workers and neighbourhoods affected by sex work at risk of harm. [109] the attorney general of canada did not, however, seek a prospective declaration. nor did he invoke any of the considerations cited in hislop as supporting a prospective declaration nor did he offer other considerations that might have supported a prospective declaration. nor did he suggest that a retroactive declaration would be inappropriate in this case. [110] in granting a suspended declaration of invalidity, mclachlin cj reasoned for the court that “immediate invalidity would leave prostitution totally unregulated while parliament grapples with the complex and sensitive problem of how to deal with it” (bedford, at para. 167 (emphasis added)) in her view, “moving abruptly from a situation where prostitution is regulated to a situation where it is entirely unregulated would be a matter of great concern to many canadians” (para. 167 (emphasis added)). significantly, she did not state the declaration to be purely prospective this makes sense, since the court was not asked to do so. she merely stated that s 212(1)(j) is “declared to be inconsistent” with the charter and “hence [is] void”, and that “the declaration of invalidity should be suspended for one year” (paras. 164 and 169). [111] this court could have issued a prospective declaration in bedford, but on my reading, it did not. first, bedford did not say that the declaration was prospective and as i have explained above, retroactivity is the default position. we could infer that the bedford court intended to impose a remedy that is prospective only, but we could also infer, for example, that the court intended only to declare s 212(1)(j) of no force or effect “to the extent” of the s 7 violation, as in carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para. 147. but that is not what the bedford court said. it is not clear to me that it is possible to definitively infer one intended remedy over another. this is why courts must be explicit where the intention is to impose a declaration that is other than the default of retroactive and immediate. [112] second, prospective declarations should be justified, and bedford provided no justification. this court stated in hislop that “[a] substantial change in the law is necessary, not sufficient, to justify purely prospective remedies” and listed a variety of other factors that can, in conjunction with a substantial change in the law, justify a prospective ruling (paras. 99-100, as discussed above). post-hislop, the absence of any explicit justification for a prospective ruling, which, as per hislop, requires justification, weighs against interpreting a declaration as having a prospective effect only. [113] i am aware there are instances of this court having interpreted declarations as purely prospective even where they were not explicitly stated to be so (choudhry and roach, at pp. 214-18). but these cases are of no assistance here. [114] in r v. brydges, [1990] 1 scr 190, the court, having found that the right to counsel includes the right to be informed of the existence of duty counsel and of the ability to apply for legal aid, ordered a “transition period” of 30 days within which the police could prepare proper cautions (pp. 211-12 and 217). no consideration was given to the effect of this transition period. in reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, at para. 20, however, the court cited brydges as an example of a prospective remedy — which might be taken as suggesting that a declaration can be prospective, even absent specific language to that effect. [115] in my view, brydges (and similar cases such as r v. bartle, [1994] 3 scr. 173, and r v. feeney, [1997] 2 scr 13) are distinguishable from these appeals. at the time brydges and bartle were decided, the jurisprudence on s 52(1) relief was still in its infancy. indeed, they are the earliest examples of prospective remedies found in this court’s jurisprudence. in hislop, the court rationalized this line of jurisprudence and created a specific set of criteria for granting a prospective remedy. unlike the court in brydges and bartle, the court in bedford was operating in a post-hislop world. given that history, it strains credulity to say that the court failed to grasp the distinction between suspensions and prospective remedies, or that it would have granted a prospective remedy without engaging in the analytical process mandated by hislop. [116] finally, prospective declarations are especially in need of justification in the criminal context, because of the general rule that no one should be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional law. it is one thing to decline to award retroactive monetary relief for an unconstitutional pension exclusion that occurred in the past, as in hislop it is quite another to actively authorize the continued enforcement of an offence that is unconstitutional indefinitely into the future. this is because convicting and sentencing an accused person under an unconstitutional law requires active enforcement. [117] this court found this point significant in r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr 599. having found the mandatory victim surcharge unconstitutional under s 12 of the charter, in discussing the remedial options for offenders no longer “in the system”, this court stated that the rule of law will also not suffer the continued infliction of cruel and unusual punishment that cannot be justified in a free and democratic society. the mandatory victim surcharge violates s 12 when it is imposed and when it is enforced. each time a convicted person shows up to court or is arrested and brought to court to provide an update on their financial status, the presiding judge is, in effect, confirming the operation of the victim surcharge [emphasis added; para. 106.] [118] while these statements were made in support of a point about the operation of res judicata that has no relevance here, the observation that the rule of law will not suffer the continued, active enforcement of a law that has been deemed unconstitutional is apt in my view, the potential for continued, active enforcement of an unconstitutional criminal law gives rise to rule of law concerns and weighs against imposing a declaration that is prospective only as such, it also weighs against interpreting an ambiguous declaration as prospective, after the fact. [119] for these reasons, i understand the declaration from bedford to have retroactive effect, as of the date the suspension expired. [120] i agree with justice karakatsanis that the legislation was not retroactive, and that the coming into force of s 286.2 of the criminal code did not “pre-empt” the retroactive effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality remedial legislation that brings an infirm law into constitutional compliance can render a declaration of invalidity obsolete, because the target of the declaration has dissipated however, s 286.2 did nothing to cure the constitutional defect in s 212(1)(j) as it existed in the past, and of course could do nothing to alter this court’s declaration that s 212(1)(j) is unconstitutional. as such, s 212(1)(j) was unconstitutional at the time the appellants were found guilty, and the s 212(1)(j) counts must accordingly be quashed. [121] this result is not entirely satisfying, because it means that the appellants, who were found factually guilty of exploitative conduct that does not seem to fall within the overbreadth identified in bedford, cannot be convicted. this result is the product of a (perhaps unnecessarily) blunt remedy in bedford, and replacement legislation that did not (but perhaps could have) applied retroactively to capture a subset of the conduct that was criminal under the old, overbroad s 212(1)(j). [122] however, while i acknowledge that the result is an unsatisfying one, especially for the victims of the appellants’ crimes, i disagree with the court of appeal that it is “absurd” (2020 bcca 160, 389 ccc (3d) 163, at para. 90) during the period of the suspension, individuals could still be charged and convicted under s 212(1)(j). further, parliament could have enacted remedial legislation that operated both retroactively and prospectively, as long as such legislation was constitutionally compliant while i make no comment here on whether criminal legislation of this nature could survive scrutiny under s 11(g) of the charter, it is arguable that where a criminal prohibition is overbroad, the legislature could create retroactive exceptions to an offence, thus leaving the constitutionality compliant aspects of the law in place while eliminating its infringing effects, without violating s 11(g). alternatively, it is arguable that such legislation could be justifiable under s 1. [123] my interpretation therefore does not undermine or fail to give any effect to the suspension ordered in bedford. on the contrary, my interpretation gives full effect to the bedford court’s clear decision to strike down the entirety of s 212(1)(j) rather than a more tailored remedy, such as declaring it of no force or effect only to the extent of the s 7 violation, as this court did in carter. the whole provision was declared unconstitutional thus, interpreting the declaration as operating only prospectively means that the appellants — and anyone else who committed the offence set out in s 212(1)(j) before it was declared unconstitutional, including offences that fall within the “overbreadth” identified in bedford — can be convicted under a now unconstitutional law in the absence of any explicit indication of prospectivity in bedford, i cannot agree with this result. iv disposition [124] i would therefore allow the appeals, set aside the convictions, and restore the order of the trial judge quashing counts 6 and 13 of the indictment. appeals dismissed, brown and rowe jj. dissenting. vancouver.
i. overview [1] the importance of the principle of open court proceedings is no longer a matter of controversy today. it will readily be agreed that, as one early author elegantly stated, justice is [translation] “a work of light and not of darkness”: j. frain du tremblay, essais sur l’idée du parfait magistrat où l’on fait voir une partie des obligations des juges (1701), at pp. 139-40. this is not in question here. but however important a principle may be, it is not without limits. this appeal calls upon us to clarify the limits of the openness of court proceedings. what must be determined, in essence, is how far the aspiration for transparency in the judicial process should lead and at what point secrecy can prevail. [2] in quebec, the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“ccp”), gives members of the public the right to have access to court records: art. 11 ccp1. no prior authorization is required: anyone can examine the content of such records. the code also contains a provision dealing with the retrieval of exhibits filed in a court record: art. 108 ccp. in the course of a proceeding, the parties are authorized to retrieve their exhibits if all of them consent; once the proceeding has ended, they are obliged to do so, otherwise the exhibits may be destroyed by the court clerk after one year. the question at the centre of this appeal is whether art. 11 ccp allows members of the public to consult exhibits that have been retrieved by the parties in accordance with art. 108 ccp. in my view, the right to have access to court records set out in art. 11 ccp does not extend beyond what is in these records at the time they are consulted this means that once the parties retrieve their exhibits at the end of a 1 the relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in an appendix. proceeding, members of the public will still be able to consult the record but will no longer have access to the exhibits that have been removed from it. ii background [3] on october 6, 2016, the respondent centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’ouest-de-l’île-de-montréal (“ciusss”) instituted court proceedings against one of its former managers, the respondent magdi kamel the originating application alleged misappropriation of funds in the amount of $410,266 and sought the repayment of that sum as well as $100,000 in damages it was accompanied by an application for a norwich order to obtain the identity of the holder of the four bank accounts to which that sum had allegedly been diverted between april 1, 2009 and march 31, 2015. the ciusss filed four exhibits in support of its applications, including an expert forensic accounting report produced by pwc on october 7, 2016, the superior court made the norwich order and ordered that the entire record be sealed. [4] seizures before judgment were carried out at mr. kamel’s residences on october 17 and november 22, 2016. the journal de montréal, a newspaper published by the appellant, mediaqmi, devoted two articles to the seizures on october 31 and december 13, 2016 wishing to find out the details of the court proceedings, mediaqmi filed its [translation] “motion to unseal” on march 29, 2017 in order to have access to the court record and the exhibits that might be in it. in that motion based on art. 11 ccp and s 23 of the charter of human rights and freedoms, cqlr, c. c-12 (“quebec charter”), mediaqmi sought only a single conclusion: [translation] terminate any order whose purpose is to restrict the access of the public and the applicant to the court record for file 500-17-095861-160. [5] the hearing of the motion, scheduled for april 5, 2017, was postponed to april 25, 2017. in the meantime, the ciusss discontinued its originating application. it filed a notice of discontinuance on april 19, 2017 and, over the next few days, tried to retrieve the four exhibits filed in support of its application. however, the staff of the court office could not find the record. [6] on april 21, 2017, mr. kamel applied to the superior court for authorization to withdraw the originating application from the court record or, in the alternative, for an order preventing the public from having access to it. the ciusss did not oppose mr. kamel’s application, but mediaqmi indicated its opposition on april 24, 2017. [7] on april 25, 2017, gagnon j heard mediaqmi’s motion in camera. at the hearing, counsel for the ciusss made an oral request to retrieve the exhibits filed in the court record, emphasizing that the expert forensic accounting report produced by pwc was private. mediaqmi opposed that request to retrieve the exhibits. gagnon j. took the case under advisement after extending the sealing order until his judgment was rendered. no other conservatory measure was sought by any of the parties. iii. judicial history a quebec superior court, 2017 qccs 4691 (gagnon j.) [8] gagnon j rendered his decision on july 20, 2017 after noting that mediaqmi was neither a party to the litigation nor, strictly speaking, an intervenor, he decided the motion to unseal on the basis of the test set out in dagenais v. canadian broadcasting corp., [1994] 3 scr 835, and r v. mentuck, 2001 scc 76, [2001] 3 scr 442 (“dagenais/mentuck test”). finding that the evidence was insufficient to depart from the principle of open court proceedings, he observed that the mere desire to avoid embarrassment for mr. kamel and negative publicity for the ciusss did not justify keeping the record confidential he therefore ordered that the record be unsealed. [9] with regard to the oral request to retrieve the exhibits, gagnon j stated that the rights of journalists and the media do not override the application of the ordinary rules of the code of civil procedure he added that the efficiency of civil procedure is based in part on out-of-court settlements and discontinuances. as soon as a proceeding ends, he wrote, the parties have complete freedom to retrieve all exhibits from the record and to shield them from public scrutiny; indeed, art. 108 ccp. requires them to do so. because the proceeding in this case had been terminated by a discontinuance, gagnon j authorized the ciusss to remove its exhibits from the court record counsel for the ciusss retrieved them the day after the judgment was rendered, on july 21, 2017 after reading mediaqmi’s notice of appeal, he sent its counsel an email written [translation] “[w]ithout prejudice” in which he confirmed, “without any admission, that we are keeping a copy of the exhibits . . . until the appeal is decided or settled”: ar, at p 82. b quebec court of appeal, 2019 qcca 814 (marcotte and schrager jj.a and samson j (ad hoc)) [10] the three quebec court of appeal judges wrote separate reasons to dispose of mediaqmi’s appeal from the conclusion relating to the retrieval of exhibits. [11] citing lac d’amiante du québec ltée v 2858-0702 québec inc., 2001 scc 51, [2001] 2 scr 743, samson j noted that quebec courts may not create positive rules of civil procedure, much less rules that would be contrary to the code of civil procedure in his view, mediaqmi’s motion was ancillary to the litigation between mr. kamel and the ciusss by terminating the proceeding, the discontinuance had also resulted in a loss of jurisdiction over that ancillary motion. since the parties controlled the course of their case, the ciusss could retrieve its exhibits as soon as the discontinuance was filed. the dagenais/mentuck test did not apply, because that test presupposes a discretion that did not exist in this case. first, there was no longer any litigation between the parties; second, art. 108 ccp confers no discretion. samson j was therefore of the view that the appeal should be dismissed. [12] schrager ja arrived at the same result, but for different reasons. in his opinion, discontinuance creates a legal fiction that puts the parties back in the position they were in prior to the court proceedings; it takes exhibits out of the public domain and returns them to the private sphere. the justification for dismissing mediaqmi’s application lies in the fact that there were no active court proceedings and that the documents were private; it does not lie in art. 108 ccp. schrager ja described that provision as being purely procedural and intended to reduce the costs associated with court records; as a result, he did not regard it as a valid basis for a decision to deny access to the exhibits. the dagenais/mentuck test could not apply in the absence of active court proceedings. schrager ja nonetheless observed, in obiter, that that test might permit access to documents relating to litigation that had ended in the limited case where the purpose of the motion was to scrutinize the judicial process as such, but this was not the case here: mediaqmi was seeking information about the parties themselves, not about the judicial process that had led to the discontinuance. [13] in her dissenting reasons, marcotte ja, like her colleague schrager ja, found that art. 108 ccp sets out an administrative rule whose purpose is to declutter court records; such a rule cannot be used to circumvent the fundamental principle of open court proceedings. in her view, the superior court judge had erred by disregarding the fact that the motion to unseal had been filed before the ciusss’s discontinuance, that is, before the end of the proceeding. in light of the importance of the principle of open proceedings and the specific context of the motion, which concerned litigation relating to the management of public funds, marcotte ja found that the superior court judge should have determined whether the exhibits were confidential before authorizing the ciusss to retrieve them. she would therefore have referred the case back to the superior court so that it could decide that issue on the basis of the dagenais/mentuck test. iv parties’ arguments [14] it is important to note from the outset that mediaqmi is not challenging the constitutionality of art. 11 or art. 108 ccp. nor is it contesting the ciusss’s discontinuance in this court, it essentially argues that the scope of the principle of open proceedings must be analyzed in light of s 2(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms and the analogous guarantees set out in the quebec charter, and that its application for access to exhibits should therefore be decided on the basis of the dagenais/mentuck test. relying on the legislative history of art. 108 ccp, it argues that this provision does not override the exercise of its constitutional rights. it maintains that the ciusss’s discontinuance and the subsequent retrieval of the exhibits in issue did not make its application for access to the exhibits obsolete: the filing of its motion to unseal allegedly crystallized its rights by giving it an acquired right to argue its application. according to it, art. 11 ccp guarantees a right of access to exhibits that is not limited to what is found in the court record concerned in oral argument, it qualified the acquired rights argument by stating that the principle of open proceedings protects the right to have applications for access to exhibits decided even several years after a proceeding has ended (transcript, at pp. 21-22). applying the dagenais/mentuck test to the facts of the case, mediaqmi takes the position that there is no reason for the exhibits in issue to be confidential, and it therefore asks the court to declare that they are public and to order the ciusss to provide it with a copy of them. [15] the ciusss argues that the public nature of a court record does not necessarily mean that exhibits will continue to be part of it. the right to consult records is limited to what is contained within the records at the time they are consulted. that content is circumscribed by the guiding principle of procedure that the parties control the course of their case as well as by art. 108 ccp. the ciusss takes the view that art. 108 ccp creates an exception to the principle of open proceedings given that it is an instance where “the law . . . restricts access . . . to certain documents filed in a court record” (art. 11 para. 2 ccp). as art. 108 ccp confers no discretion on a judge, it follows that the dagenais/mentuck test does not apply. [16] mr. kamel argues that the position taken by mediaqmi implies the creation of a new procedural rule that would be contrary to the rules set out in the code of civil procedure he submits that the preliminary provision of the code and the principles of statutory interpretation prevent art. 108 ccp from being reduced to a purely administrative provision; the words of that article are clear, and the legislature would have used different language if it had intended to limit the freedom of parties to retrieve their exhibits. mr. kamel adds that because mediaqmi was never a party to the proceeding, it cannot contest the discontinuance or the consequences it may have had for its rights like the ciusss, he argues that art. 108 ccp determines the outcome of the application for access to exhibits and makes the dagenais/mentuck test inapplicable. v. issues [17] this appeal raises two questions: a what is the extent of the right conferred by the code of civil procedure to have access to the content of court records? b is mediaqmi entitled to have access to the exhibits that were in the court record at the time it filed its motion? vi analysis a what is the extent of the right conferred by the code of civil procedure to have access to the content of court records? [18] article 11 ccp sets out the principle of open court proceedings and gives members of the public the right to “have access to court records and entries in the registers of the courts”. this provision guarantees access to court records and to what they contain at the time they are consulted, aside from confidential information. where an exhibit is retrieved from a record pursuant to art. 108 ccp, it generally returns to the private sphere. article 11 ccp therefore does not confer a specific right to access exhibits that were once part of court records. a number of considerations favour this interpretation: the text, object and scheme of the code of civil procedure, the legislative history, the guiding principles of civil procedure, and practical considerations relating to the resolution of disputes. [19] in their reasons, my colleagues suggest that the result i reach would make it possible for parties to circumvent the principle of open court proceedings, which they characterize as being of public order. that criticism is unfounded. article 11 ccp. gives access to a record whose content is governed in part by art. 108 ccp. the retrieval of exhibits from a record in the circumstances described in art. 108 ccp, when an application to consult the record is pending, does not “infring[e] a rule of public order” (reasons of the chief justice and kasirer j., at para. 123); it simply constitutes the exercise of a right provided for in the code of civil procedure. with great respect for my colleagues’ view, emphasizing the importance of the principle of open proceedings is not sufficient to extend its implications beyond what is authorized by law fundamental though it may be, this principle remains circumscribed by the limits set out in the code of civil procedure. specifically, it does not give members of the public the right to have access to exhibits that have been removed from a court record in accordance with art. 108 ccp. [20] in the context of quebec civil procedure, it is therefore impossible, in my view, to give the principle of open proceedings the interpretative scope given to it by mediaqmi and my colleagues without also rewriting several rules expressly set out in the code of civil procedure but as former chief justice fauteux wrote, [translation] “[t]he constitution contemplates only one system for making laws, not two systems that can function simultaneously, in a diverging manner”: le livre du magistrat (1980), at p 125. whatever protection the principle of open proceedings may have under the charters, the legislature remains free to fix the scope of that principle in the rules it enacts. it is not the role of the courts to conduct that exercise in its place. accordingly, in the absence of a constitutional challenge, the rules clearly stated in the code of civil procedure are what apply. (1) interpretation of the code of civil procedure [21] in lac d’amiante, the court noted that in quebec, “[t]he fundamental law concerning civil procedure is the law enacted by the national assembly . . . in a code that is expressed in general terms”: para. 35. in the civil law context, creating the law remains the legislature’s prerogative: ibid. the courts perform “only . . . a secondary or interstitial function” in this regard by making rules of practice or exercising the inherent or ancillary powers provided for in arts. 25 and 49 ccp: paras. 36-38. [22] this delimitation of the role of judges reflects a specifically civilian conception of the separation of judicial and legislative functions: lac d’amiante, at paras. 37-39; l. lebel, “la méthode d’interprétation moderne: le juge devant lui-même et en lui-même”, in s. beaulac and m. devinat, eds., interpretatio non cessat — mélanges en l’honneur de pierre-andré côté (2011), 103, at p 112; fauteux, at pp. 123-26. this conception dates back at least to montesquieu, who described judges as “the mouth that pronounces the words of the law”: the spirit of laws (1777), vol. 1, at p 208. that is an eloquent turn of phrase, though too rigid; the inclination today would rather be to view judges as giving life to the dead letter of the law: p. b. mignault, “le code civil de la province de québec et son interprétation” (1935), 1 utlj 104, at p 111. apart from exceptional situations in which civil law judges are called upon to state the law that emerges from the interstices of the code, their creative activity involves [translation] “discover[ing] the potentialities of the [statutory] language” and “thus complet[ing] the legislature’s work”: l. lebel, “la loi et le droit: la nature de la fonction créatrice du juge dans le système de droit québécois” (2015), 56 c de d 87, at pp. 92-93; cie immobilier viger ltée v. giguère inc., [1977] 2 scr 67, at pp. 75-77 in so doing, they must avoid two opposite pitfalls: [translation] “counter[ing] the letter with the spirit, and the spirit with the letter” (h. f d’aguesseau, discours de m le chancelier d’aguesseau (new ed. 1822), vol. 1, at p 287, cited in fauteux, at p 14). [23] the quebec legislature has reiterated these principles relating to the role of judges in a preliminary provision whose normative value is now well established: lac d’amiante, at para. 40; prud’homme v prud’homme, 2002 scc 85, [2002] 4 scr 663, at para. 30; l. chamberland, ed., le grand collectif: code de procédure civile — commentaires et annotations, vol. 1, articles 1 à 309 (5th ed 2020), at pp. 1-5. the third paragraph of that provision sets out the framework within which the code of civil procedure must be interpreted: this code must be interpreted and applied as a whole, in keeping with civil law tradition. the rules it sets out are to be interpreted in the light of the specific provisions it contains or of those of the law, and in the matters it deals with, the code compensates for the silence of the other laws if the context so admits. [24] the preliminary provision also states that the code of civil procedure “governs” procedure before the courts “in harmony with the charter of human rights and freedoms”. in quebec (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. communauté urbaine de montréal, 2004 scc 30, [2004] 1 scr 789, this court commented on a similar provision in the civil code of québec, stating that “[t]he interpretation of legislation must draw on [the] principles” set out in that charter: para. 20 but there is a difference — and it is a significant one — between an interpretation that draws on certain principles and an interpretation that deviates, in the name of those principles, from the legislative intent clearly expressed in the wording of a law. [25] the charters are instruments that protect rights and freedoms; they are not large procrustean beds designed to stretch laws to the desired size. on the contrary, they preserve the legislature’s autonomy by means of justificatory provisions like s 1 of the canadian charter: t. a. cromwell, s. anstis and t. touchie, “revisiting the role of presumptions of legislative intent in statutory interpretation” (2017), 95 can. bar rev. 297, at p 322. in quebec, the legislature made this very clear by enacting ss. 9.1 and 51 of the quebec charter: 9.1 in exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, state laicity, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of québec. in this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by law. 51. the charter shall not be so interpreted as to extend, limit or amend the scope of a provision of law except to the extent provided in section 52. [26] it is also important to note that in bell expressvu limited partnership v. rex, 2002 scc 42, [2002] 2 scr 559, this court rejected the argument that courts should interpret statutes so as to make them consistent with the principles or values of the canadian charter, except to resolve an ambiguity that persists after applying the contextual approach to interpretation: . . a blanket presumption of charter consistency could sometimes frustrate true legislative intent, contrary to what is mandated by the preferred approach to statutory construction. . to reiterate what was stated in symes, supra, and willick, supra, if courts were to interpret all statutes such that they conformed to the charter, this would wrongly upset the dialogic balance every time the principle were applied, it would pre-empt judicial review on charter grounds, where resort to the internal checks and balances of s 1 may be had. in this fashion, the legislatures would be largely shorn of their constitutional power to enact reasonable limits on charter rights and freedoms, which would in turn be inflated to near absolute status. quite literally, in order to avoid this result a legislature would somehow have to set out its justification for qualifying the charter right expressly in the statutory text, all without the benefit of judicial discussion regarding the limitations that are permissible in a free and democratic society before long, courts would be asked to interpret this sort of enactment in light of charter principles. the patent unworkability of such a scheme highlights the importance of retaining a forum for dialogue among the branches of governance. as such, where a statute is unambiguous, courts must give effect to the clearly expressed legislative intent and avoid using the charter to achieve a different result. [emphasis deleted; paras. 64 and 66.] (see also pharmascience inc. v. binet, 2006 scc 48, [2006] 2 scr 513, at para. 29; r v clarke, 2014 scc 28, [2014] 1 scr 612, at paras. 12-15.) [27] this approach accords with the interpretative provisions of the quebec charter, including s 53: 53. if any doubt arises in the interpretation of a provision of the act, it shall be resolved in keeping with the intent of the charter. there is therefore no doubt that the quebec charter can be used to interpret the code of civil procedure in appropriate circumstances however, this possibility is not an invitation to ignore the language of the statute and the intention expressed in it. (2) the principle of open court proceedings in quebec civil procedure [28] quebec has had four codes of civil procedure, those of 1867, 1897, 1965 and 2016. the codification of the principle of open court proceedings dates back to the code of civil procedure, sq 1897, c 48, which provided that only “sittings of a court or of a judge” were public, other than in exceptional cases where secrecy was necessary: art. 16. the 1897 codifiers drew inspiration from similar provisions found in the french and genevan codes of civil procedure: o. p. dorais and a. p. dorais, code de procédure civile de la province de québec, comprenant les observations spéciales des commissaires chargés de la révision et modification du code de procédure civile du bas-canada (1897), at p 97. it is noteworthy that those provisions focused primarily on the public nature of oral argument: code de procédure civile (france), 1806, art. 87; loi sur la procédure civile du canton de genève, 1837, s 84. like its predecessor, the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25, enacted in 1965 (“former code of civil procedure” or “former ccp”), stated that “sittings of the courts” were public: art. 13. section 23 of the quebec charter, enacted in 1975, was along the same lines, although it extended the application of the principle beyond the courts. [29] the open court principle was originally extended to court records not by legislation, but by the rules of practice made in the exercise of the power conferred on the courts by art. 47 of the former code of civil procedure. the quebec superior court had made rules authorizing the public to have access to its records and registers during business hours, subject to exceptions relating to confidential documents: rules of practice of the superior court of québec in civil matters, rrq 1981, c. c-25, r 8, rules 2 and 3. the court of québec had adopted rules of practice to the same effect: regulation of the court of québec, cqlr, c. c-25, r 4, ss. 3, 4, 18 and 19. it was clear at the time that this right of access concerned the physical court records in which parties filed their exhibits and from which they retrieved them once a proceeding had ended. [30] in its 2001 report, the civil procedure review committee made note of the change to the principle of openness introduced by the courts’ rules of practice: [translation] the importance of the open court principle in the administration of justice, both for parties and for the public, justifies continuing to codify it and structuring its application, including to specify the criteria for limiting or excluding it. all of the rules on the subject should also be harmonized, including those made by various courts concerning access to and the keeping and consultation of their records, such as section 3 of the rules of practice of the superior court of québec in civil matters. these fundamental matters in the administration of justice should be dealt with by the code in this regard, it is appropriate here to draw inspiration from the rules of practice in force while updating them to take account of information technologies or adding to them to ensure better protection of information. on another note, the current wording of article 13 of the code with respect to the openness of proceedings is imprecise given that, according to the majority opinion in the case law, the term “audiences” in the french version refers only to the trial. yet the public nature of justice encompasses the whole of the proceeding and the record. [emphasis added.] (une nouvelle culture judiciaire (2001), at pp. 42-43) the committee therefore recommended “[s]tating that civil justice is public, both with regard to the proceeding and with regard to the record”: p 43. [31] in 2016, a new code of civil procedure came into force. in arts. 11 to 16, it sets out the general scheme relating to the public nature of civil justice. article 11 incorporates the committee’s recommendation and frames the principle of open proceedings as a twofold principle involving two distinct rights. it gives members of the public the right to “attend court hearings wherever they are held” and the right to “have access to court records and entries in the registers of the courts”. the legislature thus followed the courts’ lead by including in art. 11 ccp a right to access records similar to the one provided for in the rules of practice, but it did not go so far as to create a specific right to access the exhibits filed in the course of a proceeding. [32] the code of civil procedure also indicates that the law may “restric[t] access to the court records or to certain documents filed in a court record”: art. 11 para. 2 ccp. article 12 ccp states, for example, that a court may make an exception to the principle of open proceedings if “public order . . . requires . . . that access to a document . . . be prohibited or restricted”. in addition, there are exceptions to the principle for records involving sensitive matters and for certain documents filed in a sealed envelope: art. 16 ccp. [33] this last point, which relates to the form in which documents must be filed, is echoed in art. 108 para. 1 ccp, which requires parties to file exhibits and other documents that contain personal and confidential information in a form that protects the confidentiality of that information the explicit reference to the general scheme relating to the public nature of civil justice set out in arts. 11 to 16 ccp is clear from the text of art. 108 ccp. this is confirmed by the parliamentary record and the commentary of the minister of justice: national assembly of quebec, standing committee on institutions, “étude détaillée du projet de loi no 28 — loi instituant le nouveau code de procédure civile”, journal des débats, vol. 43, no. 79, 1st sess., 40th leg., october 29, 2013, at pp. 73-77; ministère de la justice, commentaires de la ministre de la justice: code de procédure civile, chapitre c-25.01 (2015), at pp. 106-8. [34] this reference to the general scheme is clear both from the language used in art. 108 and from the holistic reading of the code of civil procedure called for by the third paragraph of its preliminary provision and by s 41.1 of the interpretation act, cqlr, c. i-16. the term “dossier” (record or case) is used many times in the french version of the code of civil procedure and generally refers to the court record, except where it is used metonymically to refer to the court proceeding associated with that record: see, for example, art. 19 ccp (the parties control the course of their dossier (case)) or art. 205 ccp (a judge who grants an application for recusation must withdraw from the dossier (case)). article 108 para. 2 ccp refers to documents filed “au dossier” (in the record). in this specific case, the dossier in question can only be the court record mentioned in art. 107 ccp to which the general scheme set out in arts. 11 to 16 ccp applies. [35] it therefore seems to be beyond question that art. 108 ccp concerns the content of the records contemplated in arts. 11 to 16 ccp, that is, the records that are subject to a court’s supervisory power and control. as i will explain, art. 108 ccp. governs the keeping, retrieval and preservation of the exhibits filed in the record to which art. 11 ccp gives access. (3) rules set out in article 108 ccp. [36] schrager and marcotte jj.a accepted mediaqmi’s argument that significantly limited the scope of art. 108 ccp on the basis of certain passages from parliamentary debates, including statements made spontaneously in answer to questions raised before a committee of the whole house and statements made by opposition members. in her dissenting reasons, marcotte ja wrote the following: [translation] . . . the scope of article 108 ccp must be brought back to its context, which is that this article reiterates the rule previously set out in article 331.9 of the former code of civil procedure, which was enacted to reduce the costs of the judicial system and to streamline court records. this is certainly a laudable goal, but it still cannot justify circumventing the fundamental principle that court proceedings are public. [para. 54] (see also the reasons of schrager ja, at para. 42.) [37] with respect, some nuance is required. no rule of statutory interpretation justifies neutering a legal rule stated in clear terms on the basis of statements made during parliamentary debates. otherwise, more weight would be given to spontaneous individual statements than to the text enacted by the legislature, each word of which must be presumed to have been chosen with care. this court has said repeatedly that “statutory interpretation entails discerning legislative intent by examining statutory text in its entire context and in its grammatical and ordinary sense, in harmony with the statute’s scheme and objects”: michel v. graydon, 2020 scc 24, at para. 21; see also rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21. parliamentary debates can certainly inform the interpretation process, but they must not make us forget the caveats our court has attached to the admission of this type of extrinsic evidence: construction gilles paquette ltée v entreprises végo ltée, [1997] 2 scr 299, at para. 20; rizzo shoes, at para. 35; canadian national railway co. v. canada (attorney general), 2014 scc 40, [2014] 2 scr 135, at para. 47. [38] the information obtained from parliamentary debates is particularly useful when it “confirm[s] that the interpretation given is correct”: construction gilles paquette, at para. 20; see also canada 3000 inc. (re), 2006 scc 24, [2006] 1 scr. 865, at para. 57, and p-a. côté, in collaboration with s. beaulac and m. devinat, the interpretation of legislation in canada (4th ed. 2011), at pp. 466-68. this is a matter of predictability in the law. as one author notes, “arguments from parliamentary history must not result in the refusal to apply a clear rule, as doing so would unduly compromise the reader’s right to rely on the letter of the law interpreted in its context”: côté, at pp. 467-68. with respect, the approach proposed by mediaqmi, and accepted by schrager and marcotte jja, does the exact opposite of that recommendation. [39] in these circumstances, i think it is appropriate to highlight that courts do not have to interpret — let alone implement — the objective underlying a legislative scheme or provision; what they must interpret is the text through which the legislature seeks to achieve that objective the objective may be defined at various levels of abstraction: care must therefore be taken not to define it too generally by remembering that the goal of the interpretative exercise is to find harmony between the words of the statute and the intended objective, not to achieve the objective “at all costs”: sun indalex finance, llc v. united steelworkers, 2013 scc 6, [2013] 1 scr 271, at para. 174 (per cromwell j). in addition, this exercise may bring several objectives into play at the same time, all of which must be taken into account: telus communications inc. v. wellman, 2019 scc 19, [2019] 2 scr 144, at paras. 82-83; r v. rafilovich, 2019 scc 51, at paras. 29-30 in my view, this is the case of art. 108 ccp. i will explain. [40] it is inaccurate to say that art. 108 ccp merely “reiterates the rule previously set out in article 331.9 of the former code of civil procedure”: ca. reasons, at para. 54 it does much more than that the first and third paragraphs of art. 108 ccp are new law: commentaires de la ministre de la justice, at p 107. the second paragraph reiterates not one rule, but two complementary rules: those set out in arts. 83 and 331.9 of the former ccp. [41] under art. 83 of the former ccp, exhibits had to remain in the record until the end of the proceeding, but it was possible to take them out “with the consent of the opposite party or the authorization of the clerk”. retrieval of exhibits with the clerk’s authorization did not make its way into the new code of civil procedure. as for retrieval with consent, the consent of all the parties is now required. apart from this, the rule has not changed: exhibits must remain in the record until the end of the proceeding once the proceeding has ended, however, it is no longer necessary for exhibits to remain in the record. article 331.9 of the former ccp set out a second rule: it required parties to retrieve their exhibits within one year after the end of the proceeding, failing which the exhibits would be destroyed. this second rule is found in virtually the same form in art. 108 ccp. [42] article 331.9 of the former ccp was enacted in 1994 as part of bill 24, an act to amend the code of civil procedure, 3rd sess., 34th leg. that bill, which also affected art. 83 of the former ccp, reformed the general scheme for the communication and filing of exhibits and introduced mechanisms for the retrieval and destruction of exhibits. first, it encouraged parties to exchange information with regard to their respective evidence and to communicate their exhibits to one another directly, without first filing them in the court record. second, it contemplated that, from then on, exhibits would be filed and kept on the basis of usefulness and necessity. it therefore delayed the filing of exhibits until the date closest to the start of the trial when the court would need them, and it provided for the streamlining of records when keeping the exhibits no longer served any purpose in the proceeding: arts. 331.7 and 331.9 of the former ccp; see also national assembly of quebec, “adoption du principe — projet de loi 24 — loi modifiant le code de procédure civile”, journal des débats, vol. 33, no. 30, 3rd sess., 34th leg., june 1, 1994. [43] that scheme, of which arts. 83 and 331.9 of the former ccp were two key components, was incorporated in substance into the new code of civil procedure. its effect was to eliminate the role of the court office and court record as an intermediary between the parties for forwarding their respective exhibits. in doing so, it made the parties and their lawyers more accountable for the conduct of the proceeding and the fairness of the debate: civil procedure review committee, at p 138; imperial oil v. jacques, 2014 scc 66, [2014] 3 scr 287, at para. 26 it thus gave effect to two principles that were later made guiding principles of civil procedure: the parties’ control over the course of their case (art. 19 ccp) and their duty to cooperate and to keep one another informed (art. 20 ccp). [44] the scope of arts. 83 and 331.9 of the former ccp should not be narrowed on the ground that the legislature’s underlying objective was purportedly to reduce the costs associated with the judicial system an objective defined in such a general manner is, in fact, of quite limited assistance for the purposes of statutory interpretation: a very large part of civil procedure could be said to be intended to reduce the costs of the judicial system. while economic considerations related to the storage of court records may have motivated the enactment of art. 331.9 of the former ccp, the fact remains that the legislature inserted that provision into a general scheme designed to increase the parties’ responsibility, and lessen that of the courts, for the communication, filing and preservation of exhibits. [45] as the successor of the scheme introduced by bill 24 in 1994, art. 108 ccp is anything but a “purely procedural (if not mechanical)” measure that can be displaced by the principle of open proceedings: c.a reasons, at para. 42 (per schrager ja). on the contrary, it revises and unifies the rules on the keeping, retrieval and preservation of the exhibits filed in the court record to which art. 11 ccp gives access. it also deals, albeit incidentally, with the filing of exhibits, although most of the rules on that subject have been grouped together in arts. 246 to 252 ccp. insofar as it governs the content of court records, art. 108 ccp has a direct impact on the information to which the public can have access under art. 11 ccp. [46] i note in passing that the civil procedure review committee recommended the creation of a computerized system for storing court documents and records: p 107. had it been implemented, that recommendation might have made it possible for the public to have access to documents that had been retrieved from court records under art. 108 ccp. however, nothing ever came of the recommendation. it would be an encroachment on the sphere of the legislature to implement it indirectly by ordering a party to a proceeding that has ended to provide a copy of the exhibits retrieved by that party to a member of the public who wishes to consult them. (4) respective scope of articles 11 and 108 ccp. [47] the exhibits filed in a court record are intrinsically related to the evidence the parties intend to adduce in support of their allegations: h. reid, with s. reid, dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien (5th ed. 2015), at p 474, “pièce” (exhibit); s. guillemard and s. menétrey, comprendre la procédure civile québécoise (2nd ed. 2017), at pp. xviii, “pièce” (exhibit), and 234. just as the parties control the course of their case and have control of their evidence, they necessarily also have control of their exhibits: art. 19 ccp;. imperial oil, at para. 25. they can therefore retrieve them at any stage of the proceeding, subject to the consent of the other parties; the code of civil procedure does not require any prior authorization from the court. article 108 ccp. thus implicitly recognizes that, even after they are filed in the court record, exhibits remain the property of the parties. indeed, if the filing of exhibits transferred ownership to the court, the code would not allow the parties to retrieve them at any stage of the proceeding, and it certainly would not require the parties to retrieve them once the proceeding has ended. while the exhibits are in its possession, the court merely has “custody” of them: vickery v. nova scotia supreme court (prothonotary), [1991] 1 scr 671, at pp. 681-82 this is why it does not keep the exhibits in its records indefinitely. [48] article 11 ccp gives the public the right to have access to court records with the documents and exhibits they contain at the time they are consulted, subject to exceptions for confidential information. it gives “access to exhibits” only to the extent that they are in the record. where parties are slow to retrieve their exhibits at the end of a proceeding, the exhibits will remain accessible to the public until they have been retrieved from the record or destroyed by the court clerk. but once the exhibits have been retrieved or destroyed, the public no longer has access to them. [49] the conclusion at which i arrive is in keeping with the intention expressed by the legislature through the words of arts. 11 and 108 ccp, with the legislative objectives underlying those provisions, with the general scheme of the code of civil procedure and with civil law principles of interpretation it also avoids giving the principle that civil justice is public set out in art. 11 ccp a scope that might distort that principle, just as it avoids undermining other important objectives of the code of civil procedure, such as the prevention and resolution of disputes: preliminary provision, para. 2, arts. 1, 9 para. 2 and 19 para. 3 ccp. [50] in civil matters, parties generally go before the courts because they need [translation] “the operation of social constraints” to enforce their rights and resolve their conflict: h. motulsky, principes d’une réalisation méthodique du droit privé (la théorie des éléments générateurs des droits subjectifs) (1948), at p 35 (emphasis deleted). but the code of civil procedure does not chain parties to the proceedings they have initiated; on the contrary, it reminds them that they may, at any time, settle their dispute and thereby terminate a proceeding: art. 19 para. 3 ccp. it therefore subordinates the judicial resolution of disputes to the restoration of social peace: preliminary provision, para. 2; s. guillemard, “réflexions autour des sept premiers articles du code de procédure civile”, in s. guillemard, ed., le code de procédure civile: quelles nouveautés? (2016), 123, at pp. 128-29. [51] several considerations may lead to the resolution of a dispute brought before a court. one of them is a desire for confidentiality: sup. ct. reasons, at para. 119. as my colleague abella j once noted, a climate of confidentiality “promotes settlements”: sable offshore energy inc. v. ameron international corp., 2013 scc 37, [2013] 2 scr 623, at para. 12. article 4 ccp recognizes this as well. the objective of facilitating the resolution of disputes would surely be undermined if parties who wished to come to an agreement after taking a matter to court could not bring the documents they had filed with the court back into the private sphere when parties decide to terminate a proceeding, they must be free to retrieve their exhibits. indeed, the code of civil procedure requires them to do so. [52] exhibits filed in a court record may reveal various aspects of parties’ private lives, but they are accessible to the public nonetheless. the fact that civil justice is public means that those who bring court proceedings must waive, in part, their right to privacy: lac d’amiante, at para. 42. however, they waive that right temporarily. by arguing that any application for access to exhibits removed from a record should be decided on the basis of the dagenais/mentuck test, even when the exhibits in question were removed several years earlier, mediaqmi seeks instead to make the waiver a permanent one.2 it would impose a burden as heavy as it is unjustified on those who were parties to litigation that has now ended and who would like to preserve the confidentiality of the exhibits they have retrieved. if by chance a journalist or member of the public applied for access to those exhibits, the parties would in fact be required to show that confidentiality is “necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk” and — given that the two branches of the test are cumulative — that the salutary effects of confidentiality outweigh its deleterious effects on freedom of expression and the public interest in open proceedings: mentuck, at para. 32; see also dagenais, at p 878. [53] that position is inconsistent with the legislative intention reflected in art. 11 ccp, with the general scheme of the code of civil procedure and with the objective of facilitating the resolution of disputes. it also strikes me as unworkable in light of the situation contemplated by art. 108 para. 2 ccp in which the court clerk 2 in support of their position, mediaqmi and the interveners drew our attention to some cases from common law jurisdictions, including ctv television inc v ontario superior court of justice (toronto region) (2002), 59 or (3d) 18 (ca), and hong v. lavy, 2019 nssc 271, 46 cpc (8th) 327. without expressing any opinion on the merits of those decisions, i note that they are readily distinguishable from this case. both of them were rendered in a context in which there was no statutory or regulatory provision that controlled access to exhibits and the content of court records, as arts. 11 and 108 ccp do. may destroy exhibits that are not retrieved after one year the principle of open proceedings would thus vary in scope depending on whether or not exhibits have been destroyed. [54] in my view, the position advanced by mediaqmi must be rejected. the right to have access to court records set out in art. 11 ccp is not meant to ensure perpetual access to exhibits that were in a court record at some point openness as conceived of by the code of civil procedure does not relate to the parties and the private exhibits through which they intend to prove their arguments it is first and foremost a guarantee of [translation] “due process, the impartiality of judges and the proper conduct of proceedings”: r. perrot, institutions judiciaires (1978), at p 366, cited in n. fricero, “audience et débats”, in jurisclasseur france — procédure civile, by p. carillon and r. perrot, eds., 2020, fasc. 800-50, at no. 17 (available on lexis/nexis) in this regard, it is closely related to judicial accountability: attorney general of nova scotia v. macintyre, [1982] 1 scr 175, at pp. 183-84. [55] it is true that, with the advent of the canadian charter, judges relied on freedom of expression and freedom of the press to give the openness of proceedings a new dimension involving public access to information held by courts: canadian broadcasting corp v new brunswick (attorney general), [1996] 3 scr 480, at paras. 18-26; sierra club of canada v. canada (minister of finance), 2002 scc 41, [2002] 2 scr 522, at paras. 36 and 52; s. menétrey, “l’évolution des fondements de la publicité des procédures judiciaires internes et son impact sur certaines procédures arbitrales internationales” (2008), 40 ottawa l. rev. 117, at pp. 130-39. but whatever its scope, the principle of open court proceedings has limits. this court has recognized, for example, the confidential nature of examinations on discovery (lac d’amiante, at paras. 75-77) and the constitutionality of limits on filming and taking photographs in courthouses and on using audio recordings of court proceedings: canadian broadcasting corp. v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 2, [2011] 1 scr 19. the secrecy afforded to judicial deliberations is also well established: british columbia (attorney general) v. provincial court judges’ association of british columbia, 2020 scc 20, at para. 66; tremblay v. quebec (commission des affaires sociales), [1992] 1 scr 952, at p 966. as three authors note: [translation] it is fair to acknowledge that the principle of openness does not clearly apply at every stage of a trial. for example, it is difficult to see what safeguard a high degree of openness could provide when parties draft their application or when judges deliberate. at certain times during a trial, secrecy even comes to be thought of as preferable by far if the aim is to make justice more impartial. on this point, everyone agrees that, at its various stages, the justice system can live with a certain lack of openness and can even involve some secrecy. (r. perrot, b. beignier and l. miniato, institutions judiciaires (18th ed. 2020), at p 442) [56] to summarize, art. 11 ccp gives the public the right to have access to court records, subject to exceptions for confidential information this right applies during and after a proceeding. it allows the public to consult the exhibits filed in the record, but only if they are in the record at the time it is consulted. the content to which it gives access is governed in part by art. 108 ccp. that provision authorizes the parties to retrieve their exhibits by consent in the course of a proceeding, and requires them to retrieve their exhibits once the proceeding has ended. even after the proceeding has ended, the exhibits can be consulted as long as they remain in the record. but once the parties retrieve them or the court clerk destroys them, they cease to be part of the record to which the public can have access. [57] articles 11 and 108 ccp do not give rise to any judicial discretion. this is why the dagenais/mentuck test should not be used to decide an application under art. 11 ccp. that test was developed in a very different context from the one in question here, a context in which a comprehensive scheme enacted by parliament served as a framework for the principle of openness dagenais established that the discretion to make an order limiting the openness of proceedings must be exercised within the boundaries set by the canadian charter: p 875. to determine the correct balance between the competing constitutional rights engaged by this type of order — in that case, ss. 2(b) and 11(d) of the canadian charter — the court proposed a two-part test designed to reflect the substance of the test in r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103: dagenais, at p 878. subsequent decisions have fleshed out the test without changing the context in which it applies, that is, where a discretion must be exercised and the court has to seek a correct balance between rights and interests that pull in opposite directions: mentuck; sierra club; globe and mail v. canada (attorney general), 2010 scc 41, [2010] 2 scr 592. in the absence of such a discretion, the test simply does not apply: named person v. vancouver sun, 2007 scc 43, [2007] 3 scr 253, at paras. 35-36; canadian broadcasting corp v the queen, 2011 scc 3, [2011] 1 scr 65, at para. 13. this is because where the law fixes the scope of the principle of open proceedings without conferring any discretion on judges, there is no reason to seek a correct balance between competing rights and interests that is within the boundaries set by the canadian charter. given that the constitutionality of arts. 11 and 108 ccp has not been challenged, it is unnecessary to say any more on the subject. [58] that being said, i will add that the concern expressed by schrager ja. seems entirely legitimate to me: ca reasons, at paras. 43-44. i am of the view that if a motion, supported by persuasive evidence, called the very integrity of the judicial process directly into question in a context where exhibits had been retrieved from a record, a different conclusion about the application of the dagenais/mentuck test might be necessary. but such a motion could not be based solely on art. 11 ccp; it would have to be based on provisions that confer a discretion, such as those dealing with the courts’ inherent powers: arts. 25 and 49 ccp;. lac d’amiante, at para. 37. because this question does not arise in the present case, however, i will refrain from providing any definitive answer to it it is sufficient to note that civil procedure is “flexible”: bisaillon v. concordia university, 2006 scc 19, [2006] 1 scr 666, at para. 63. it therefore does not lack resources to deal with situations that are contrary to the fundamental principles of our justice system. [59] now that the respective scope of arts. 11 and 108 ccp has been defined, these provisions should be applied to the facts of this case. b. is mediaqmi entitled to have access to the exhibits that were in the court record at the time it filed its motion? [60] mediaqmi filed its “motion to unseal” on march 29, 2017. at that time, it did not know what was in the record for the litigation between mr. kamel and the ciusss; it was also unaware of the existence of the exhibits of which it now seeks a copy, precisely because of the sealing order it was applying to lift. its motion was not heard until april 25, 2017. in the meantime, the ciusss discontinued its application and tried to retrieve its exhibits. the only reason it was unable to do so was that the staff of the court office could not find the record. [61] that combination of circumstances prompted the ciusss, at the hearing on april 25, 2017, to make the oral request that led to this appeal. the superior court’s judgment [translation] “authorizes the ciusss to remove exhibits p-1 to p-4 from the record”: para. 137. that conclusion certainly had the merit of clarifying the state of affairs, but it was not, strictly speaking, necessary in law. as i have explained, the rules set out in art. 108 para. 2 ccp do not require any authorization from a court. [62] the ciusss’s discontinuance terminated the proceeding and restored matters to the state they were in before the application was brought: art. 213 ccp. this means that [translation] “[t]he parties’ rights are as they were, as if no court proceeding had taken place”: h. maillette, “incidents qui mettent fin à l’instance”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — procédure civile i (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), by p-c. lafond, ed., fasc. 21, at no. 9. because the proceeding had been terminated, the documents and real evidence filed as exhibits no longer had to remain in the superior court’s record: this is what follows from reading a contrario the first of the two rules set out in art. 108 para. 2 ccp. the second of those rules requires the parties to retrieve their exhibits within one year. the ciusss did not wait that long. since it was unable to retrieve its exhibits when it filed its discontinuance, it did so the day after the superior court’s judgment was rendered. [63] as counsel for the ciusss acknowledged in oral argument, the record and the exhibits in it were accessible to the public during the time between the rendering of gagnon j.’s judgment and the ciusss’s retrieval of its exhibits (transcript, at p 55). this was because the sealing order that had kept the record confidential until then came to an end when that judgment was rendered. i therefore do not agree with schrager ja. that the effect of the discontinuance was to put the ciusss’s exhibits back in the private sphere through the legal fiction of restoring matters to their former state: ca. reasons, at para. 37. that position is contradicted by the undisputed fact that, in spite of the discontinuance, the exhibits remained accessible to the public between the date gagnon j rendered his judgment and the date they were retrieved from the record; that position would also create an undesirable imbalance in the way that different methods of terminating a proceeding affect the openness of records and of their content. it is unclear why exhibits relating to a proceeding terminated by a discontinuance would be confidential even before the parties retrieved them, whereas exhibits relating to a proceeding terminated in a context not involving the legal fiction of restoring matters to their former state, such as the context of a settlement under art. 220 ccp, would remain public until they were retrieved by the parties. [64] in this case, therefore, mediaqmi could have consulted the exhibits in issue if it had applied for access to the record during the time when the exhibits were available, since no conservatory measure had been sought by the parties. mediaqmi did not do so. i agree that these rather unusual circumstances seem to make this case look like a race against time. but that is not a consequence of the parties’ speed in going to the office of the superior court. it is a consequence of the rules in the code of civil procedure. the situation would have been the same if the ciusss had waited weeks before retrieving its exhibits and mediaqmi had gone to the court office to consult the record after the exhibits had already been retrieved. this is because the right to “have access to court records” set out in art. 11 ccp gives access to the public content of those records and to the exhibits that are in them at the time they are consulted; it does not give general access to everything that was ever part of the records. [65] mediaqmi’s right to “have access to court records” was never compromised. only the terms of access to the court record and the content of that record changed between the filing of the “motion to unseal” and the retrieval of the exhibits. however, that situation was beyond the reach of art. 11 because it fell within art. 108 ccp. [66] like mediaqmi, my colleagues characterize the “motion to unseal” as an “application for access to exhibits”. in their view, the fact that such an application was filed prior to the ciusss’s discontinuance is determinative in the analysis. i disagree. this alone cannot give mediaqmi any [translation] “acquired right to argue its demand”3 (af, at p 17) within the dagenais/mentuck framework. i note as well that mediaqmi’s application has already been argued, albeit not within the legal framework it would like. but this is the case only because the dagenais/mentuck test did not apply in the absence of any judicial discretion. [67] asserting an acquired right is not enough to make one magically appear. the filing of a motion under art. 11 ccp does not give the moving party any right to require that the content of the court record remain unchanged until the motion is decided. although my colleagues accept mediaqmi’s arguments on this point, they do not identify any concrete, individualized legal situation that would have enabled mediaqmi to acquire a right to argue its application on the basis of the dagenais/mentuck test and, correspondingly, a right to require that the content of the court record be frozen on the day the application was filed as i understand their reasons, they argue rather that because of that pending application, the ciusss’s discontinuance could not be invoked against mediaqmi, which was not a party to the 3 this expression, which my colleagues adopt, comes from the very specific context of classic fabrics corp. v. b. rawe gmbh & co., 2001 canlii 7221 (que. ca). in that commercial case, a quebec company had tried to sue a german company, but the quebec courts had declined jurisdiction based on the rules of private international law. the german company had countered by suing the quebec company in quebec, but had filed a discontinuance after the quebec company tried to amend its defence to add a cross demand. the discontinuance would have prevented the quebec company from having its claim decided by the quebec courts. because this was unquestionably prejudicial to the rights and advantages to which the state of the proceedings had given rise in its favour, the quebec company applied to set aside the discontinuance. the court of appeal ruled in its favour; it set aside the discontinuance and allowed the cross demand to be added. those were the unusual — to say the least — circumstances that led the court to speak of an [translation] “acquired right to argue its demand, which the [german company] could not prejudice through a discontinuance of its action” (para. 39). i see nothing in that decision that would establish that any incidental application, even one that is brought by a person who is not a party to the proceeding and that is unconnected with the parties’ arguments on the merits, confers a real acquired right to argue the application notwithstanding the filing of a discontinuance. proceeding, with the result that the proceeding did not end with regard to mediaqmi and that the parties could not raise the effects of art. 108 ccp against it. [68] with respect, it seems to me that my colleagues’ position takes some concerning liberties with the statutory language. it takes a roundabout path to avoid the legal consequence attached by the code of civil procedure to a notice of discontinuance filed with the court office and notified to the parties this legal consequence, which is not conditional on the absence of pending applications, is the termination of the proceeding: art. 213 ccp. yet the termination of the proceeding entitles — indeed requires — the parties to retrieve their exhibits: art. 108 ccp. the legal consequence from which the power to retrieve the exhibits in the record arises can therefore be avoided only by contesting the discontinuance itself. [69] again with respect, my colleagues’ line of reasoning is essentially based on decontextualized quotations from decisions that are contrary to the position they adopt: reasons of the chief justice and kasirer j., at paras. 109-15 and 139 they disregard the legal consequence of a discontinuance, even though mediaqmi never applied to set it aside, on the ground that a unilateral act of renunciation cannot adversely affect the rights of others but the sources they rely on for this novel proposition instead establish that an application to set aside a discontinuance can be made if the rights of others are adversely affected. if alleging some kind of prejudice were enough to negate the extinctive effect of a discontinuance on a proceeding, it would not have been necessary to contest the prejudicial discontinuances in those cases. in my view, my colleagues’ reasoning makes all of the jurisprudence flowing from l’espérance v atkins, [1956] b.r 62, superfluous and, at the same time, rewrites art. 213 ccp to dissociate the notice of discontinuance from its legal consequences for the proceeding under way. i note that their reasoning is also contrary to french law, under which persons who are not parties to a proceeding must seek to have a discontinuance set aside if they wish to prevent it from extinguishing the proceeding:4 n. fricero, “désistement”, in jurisclasseur france — procédure civile, by p. carillon and r. perrot, eds., 2018, fasc. 800-40, at no. 105 (available on lexis/nexis). finally, even if it were assumed that mediaqmi could show that its rights were adversely affected because it was unable to consult the exhibits in issue, this would not have resulted from the discontinuance itself: the discontinuance had no effect on the rights conferred on mediaqmi by art. 11 ccp. it would instead have resulted from the retrieval of the exhibits that followed the discontinuance. this is why, even if, for the 4 french law conceives of discontinuance as [translation] “an offer made by the plaintiff to the defendant, who accepts it, to stop the trial without waiting for the judgment”: j. vincent and s. guinchard, procédure civile (27th ed. 2003), at p 878 (emphasis deleted). in principle, the plaintiff is free [translation] “in any matter” to discontinue an application: art. 394 of france’s nouveau code de procédure civile but the plaintiff’s unilateral manifestation of will is not sufficient to extinguish the procedural legal relationship created between the parties by the plaintiff’s judicial application; the discontinuance must also be “perfected” by the defendant’s acceptance however, acceptance is “not necessary if the defendant has not pleaded any defence on the merits or peremptory exception at the time of the plaintiff’s discontinuance”: art. 395. in cases where acceptance is required, it may be refused only for a legitimate reason: art. 396. where there are several parties or interveners, the procedural legal relationship is extinguished only for those who have accepted the discontinuance: fricero, “désistement”, at no. 106. persons who are not participating in the proceeding, and whose acceptance is therefore not required by france’s code de procédure civile, cannot prevent a perfected discontinuance from extinguishing the procedural legal relationship but if the discontinuance adversely affects their rights, they can seek to have it set aside: ibid., at no. 105. unlike french civil procedure, quebec civil procedure does not distinguish between a discontinuance that has been “perfected” and one that has not. it regards a discontinuance as extinguishing the proceeding, but it allows the discontinuance to be set aside if there is prejudice to the rights of a party (atkins; 175809 canada inc. v 2740478 canada inc., 2000 canlii 9254 (que. ca)) or a third person (such as a child in whose interests a judge must rule under art. 33 of the civil code of québec: droit de la famille — 092038, 2009 qccs 3822, [2009] rdf 646). purposes of discussion, my colleagues’ reasoning were to be accepted, it would not lead to the conclusion that the ciusss’s discontinuance prejudiced mediaqmi’s rights. [70] in short, the discontinuance of a proceeding is not a unilateral act of renunciation like any other because it is a way of forgoing a trial, it nullifies the parties’ procedural legal relationship arising from the judicial application this explains why a defendant or intervener can contest a discontinuance that is prejudicial to it the situation is different for a third person whose rights and interests are not affected by the parties’ arguments on the merits. prima facie, the extinguishment of the procedural legal relationship has no effect on that person. if prejudiced by it for any reason, the third person may apply to set aside the discontinuance in this case, if mediaqmi wanted to prevent the exercise of the power given by art. 108 ccp to the parties to a terminated proceeding, it had to contest the discontinuance extinguishing the proceeding it did not do so there was therefore nothing that prohibited the ciusss from retrieving its exhibits. [71] i also note that my colleagues do not explain how remanding the case to the superior court “so that it can decide the application for access to the exhibits in accordance with the applicable law” (that is, in their view, in accordance with the dagenais/mentuck test) would help mediaqmi access exhibits that were retrieved from the record the day after the superior court’s judgment was rendered: para. 143. in light of the code of civil procedure, and given that mediaqmi’s motion was based on a provision giving it the right to have access to a court record, i fail to see how the motion would enable it to consult exhibits that had in fact already been retrieved from the record in accordance with art. 108 ccp. although counsel for the ciusss agreed as a courtesy to keep a copy of the exhibits until the case was over, he did so “[w]ithout prejudice” and “without any admission” (ar, at pp. 82 and 85): this did not create any legal fiction that would make it possible to proceed as if the exhibits had never been retrieved finally, i note that my colleagues’ position departs from what mediaqmi has asked this court to do, which is to declare that the exhibits that were once in the record are public and to order the ciusss to provide it with a copy of them. i agree with schrager j.a that mediaqmi is confusing the access to information mechanisms and the principle of open proceedings: ca reasons, at para. 44. [72] i therefore conclude that mediaqmi cannot obtain a copy of the exhibits that were in the superior court’s record at the time its “motion to unseal” was filed. vii conclusion [73] for these reasons, i would dismiss the appeal with costs. english version of the reasons of wagner c.j and rowe, martin and kasirer jj. delivered by the chief justice and kasirer j — i. introduction [74] we have had the advantage of reading the reasons of our colleague côté j. we agree with her that the right to have access to court records arising from the principle of open court proceedings, which is set out in art. 11 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“ccp”), does not confer a right to access exhibits once they have been validly removed by the parties or destroyed by the court clerk. however, with respect, we differ with her on the outcome of this appeal our disagreement concerns the time at which it should be determined whether the exhibits are in the court record. in our opinion, the state of the record must be assessed at the time the appellant asserted its right to have access to the exhibits. [75] in this case, the respondent centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’ouest-de-l’île-de-montréal (“ciusss”) — the plaintiff in the principal litigation — filed a judicial application alleging misappropriation of public funds by the respondent magdi kamel. in a proceeding conducted ex parte, that is, in the absence of the other party, the ciusss obtained an order from a judge sealing its application and the exhibits filed in support of it. the appellant, a publisher of daily newspapers and not a party to the principal litigation, applied for access to the exhibits, relying on art. 11 ccp and freedom of the press. it did so while the exhibits were in the court record. the ciusss subsequently discontinued its judicial application. [76] while the law authorizes a plaintiff to discontinue an action at any time, we are of the view that such a procedure cannot allow the plaintiff to circumvent an application already brought against it for access to sealed exhibits. from the moment the appellant applied to unseal the court record and have access to the exhibits, the litigation took on a different colour a second proceeding arose, connected to but distinct from the principal litigation. it not only concerned the plaintiff, the defendant and their private dispute, but was also of concern to the public and, it should be emphasized, the judiciary itself if the plaintiff’s discontinuance had the effect of preventing the appellant from having access to the court record, it would interfere with the proper functioning of the judicial institution, the legitimacy of which depends on its openness and, as we know, on media scrutiny. once the appellant applied to unseal the record, the exhibits covered by its application were necessarily part of that new proceeding, which meant that the parties no longer had control over them while the matter was being argued. [77] said respectfully, this appeal cannot be reduced to a routine application of a rule set out in the code of civil procedure; it concerns matters well beyond the strict confines of art. 108 ccp, which allows parties to litigation to remove their exhibits from the court record on certain conditions. the dispute highlights the need to reconcile competing principles: first, the openness of court proceedings (art. 11 ccp), a rule of public order to which courts may make exceptions (art. 12 ccp), and second, the parties’ “control [over] the course of their case” (maîtrise de leur dossier), including the power to terminate a proceeding at any time (art. 19 ccp). where a member of the public — here, the publisher of the daily newspapers le journal de montréal and le journal de québec — challenges a sealing order and seeks access to a court record, prior to a discontinuance and while the exhibits are still in the record, these two principles must be reconciled in our view, the plaintiff’s ability to discontinue an action cannot deprive the appellant, in the circumstances of this case, of its right to argue its motion for access to the exhibits in the record and, if the court grants that motion, of its right to have access to the record. the parties’ control over the course of their case may not be exercised contrary to the existing and legitimate interests of a third person, let alone contrary to a rule of public order requiring that civil justice administered by the courts be public. [78] accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we would allow the appeal and remand the case to the superior court so that it can decide the merits of mediaqmi’s application for access to exhibits on the basis of the analytical framework established in dagenais v. canadian broadcasting corp., [1994] 3 scr 835, and r v. mentuck, 2001 scc 76, [2001] 3 scr 442, which was affirmed for civil proceedings in sierra club of canada v. canada (minister of finance), 2002 scc 41, [2002] 2 scr 522. ii background [79] on october 6, 2016, the ciusss filed a legal action seeking an award of $510,266 against one of its former managers, mr. kamel, for alleged misappropriation of public funds earmarked for health services. in its judicial application, the ciusss alleged that mr. kamel had used a [translation] “scheme” to steal public funds intended for health care from the ciusss and the hospital it ran. among other things, the ciusss stated the following: [translation] by virtue of the position he held and the trust placed in him, kamel fraudulently obtained reimbursement for personal expenses unrelated to the activities of [st mary’s hospital center], thereby misappropriating a total of $410,266 during the period of april 1, 2009 to march 31, 2015 (“period”), by taking advantage of loopholes in the implementation of the ciusss/smhc policies on the reimbursement of expenses, as can be seen more fully from the pwc report (see section 4 for a summary of pwc’s findings); two main modus operandi were used by kamel: (a) expense claims with no voucher attached, and (b) expense claims with certain vouchers attached that, upon analysis, proved to be unfounded; (ar, at p 37) [80] in its application, the ciusss stated that it had hired the pwc firm to get to the bottom of the irregularities alleged against mr. kamel. claiming reimbursement of the amounts supposedly stolen by mr. kamel, the ciusss filed four exhibits in support of its application, including a confidential forensic accounting investigation report prepared by pwc. [81] it should be noted that mr. kamel was initially suspended and that he ultimately resigned from his managerial position with the ciusss before the proceedings were filed his resignation letter was also one of the exhibits filed in support of the ciusss’s application. [82] in connection with its action, the ciusss filed an application for a norwich order against a financial institution in order to obtain bank records concerning mr. kamel. the fraud allegations made against mr. kamel were based mainly on the forensic accounting investigation report prepared by pwc. we note that the ciusss is a legal person established in the public interest and “is responsible for ensuring the development and smooth operation of th[e] local health and social services networks” (act to modify the organization and governance of the health and social services network, in particular by abolishing the regional agencies, cqlr, c. o-7.2, s 38)  crucial services provided to the public in quebec. [83] on october 7, 2016, the superior court made a norwich order. it ordered that the entire record be sealed for a period of 120 days, which was later extended until april 18, 2017. [84] on march 29, 2017, the appellant filed an application for access to the court record entitled [translation] “motion to unseal”, relying in part on art. 11 ccp. noting that it published daily newspapers in montréal and québec, the appellant stated in its motion that it was “entitled to have access to the court’s record, in accordance with art. 11 of the code of civil procedure and s 23 of the charter of human rights and freedoms [cqlr, c. c-12 (“quebec charter”)], pursuant to the principle of accessibility of the court’s records, the openness of court proceedings, and freedom of the press and its corollary, news gathering” (ar, at p 50). [85] the conclusions sought by the appellant were set out as follows: [translation] grant this motion; terminate any order whose purpose is to restrict the access of the public and the applicant to the court record for file 500-17-095861-160. without legal costs unless this motion is contested. [emphasis added.] (ar, at p 51) [86] the appellant specified at para. 7 of its motion that it was seeking access to the record, including the exhibits filed in it: [translation] . . . obtain access to the court’s record, including but not limited to the originating application, the various pleadings that followed, and the exhibits that may have been filed by the parties. [emphasis added.] (ar, at p 50) the objective behind the conclusions sought is therefore plain. [87] the notice of presentation indicated that the motion was to be heard on april 5, 2017 on that date, counsel for the ciusss asked the superior court to postpone the hearing to april 18, the date on which the order sealing the record and making it confidential was to expire because counsel for the appellant was not available on april 18, the respondents and the appellant agreed that the matter would be argued on april 25 and the order was renewed until that date. [88] on april 19, 2017 — more than three weeks after mediaqmi filed its motion to unseal and to obtain the pleadings and exhibits — the ciusss discontinued its judicial application. during the days that followed, the ciusss tried unsuccessfully to remove the exhibits filed in the court record, but the record could not be found. [89] two days later, on april 21, 2017, mr. kamel applied to withdraw the originating application or, in the alternative, to have it sealed. that proceeding was not contested by the ciusss, but mediaqmi opposed it, relying once again on the open court principle and freedom of the press. [90] the matter was heard on april 25, 2017. at that time, the ciusss made a request to retrieve the exhibits, notably exhibit p-1, the forensic accounting investigation report by pwc the appellant objected to that request, noting that the purpose of its motion was not only to unseal the record but also to obtain the exhibits that were in it at that time. at the hearing, counsel for the appellant expressly reiterated the request for access to the exhibits: [translation] with respect, what i am telling you is . . . that a right was crystallized the exhibits are in the record we were there, [we] applied in a timely manner while the exhibits were in the record. it would be unfair to turn around today and say: “well, i’m removing the exhibits” even though we had . . . we have a constitutional right to access. (ar, at p 165) [91] on july 20, 2017, the superior court judge ordered that the record be unsealed. however, the judge did not decide the appellant’s application for access to exhibits, as he found that parties have [translation] “complete freedom to remove all exhibits from the record and to shield them from public scrutiny” once a proceeding is terminated by a discontinuance (2017 qccs 4691, at para. 119 (canlii)) he therefore authorized the ciusss to remove the exhibits filed in the record, but held that, under the code of civil procedure, the originating application had to remain in the record (para. 121). on july 21, 2017, the ciusss removed the exhibits from the court record. counsel for the ciusss kept a copy of the exhibits until such time as the appellant’s appeal was decided or settled (ar, at pp. 82-85). [92] the majority of the court of appeal dismissed mediaqmi’s appeal (2019 qcca 814). marcotte ja, dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the superior court and referred the case back to that court so that it could decide the application for access to exhibits. iii applicable legal framework a parties’ control over the course of the case and openness of proceedings [93] this appeal provides the court with an opportunity to consider the interplay between some general principles of quebec civil procedure. the principles in question in this case are as follows: first, the principle that the parties have control over the course of their case, including the essential right to resolve their disputes in private, free from public scrutiny; second, the principle of open court proceedings, a principle of public order based on the transparency of justice and, correlatively, on public access to what takes place in the courts. when there is tension between these principles, as in this case, it will of course be important to identify a manner in which they might be reconciled. [94] the code of civil procedure contains principles that circumscribe the application and interpretation of the rules it sets out in 2001, the civil procedure review committee proposed that the principles of the precedence of substantive law over procedure, the adversarial process, control over the course of cases and proceedings, judicial intervention to ensure the orderly conduct of proceedings, the openness of proceedings and the proportionality of proceedings be grouped together [translation] “[t]o emphasize them and ensure their primacy” (une nouvelle culture judiciaire (2001), at p 38, cited in charland v. lessard, 2015 qcca 14, at para. 169 (canlii)). these principles are now gathered together in arts. 8 to 28 ccp under the title “principles of procedure applicable before the courts”, which has four chapters: mission of the courts, public nature of procedure before the courts, guiding principles of procedure, and rules of interpretation and application of the code. [95] the parties’ control over the course of their case is a guiding principle set out in art. 19 ccp. the parties thus have a [translation] “circumscribe[d]” freedom to choose the appropriate proceedings and the grounds of fact and law they will raise (ministère de la justice, commentaires de la ministre de la justice: code de procédure civile, chapitre c-25.01 (2015), art. 19; imperial oil v. jacques, 2014 scc 66, [2014] 3 scr 287, at para. 25). this principle extends to the parties’ right to agree “at any stage of the proceeding” to settle their dispute or otherwise terminate the proceeding (para. 3). they may therefore decide to remove their dispute from the judicial arena in order to resolve it privately. [96] this ability to withdraw a case from the courts is consistent with the general approach taken by the code of civil procedure, which places a [translation] “spectacularly” high value on private civil justice (c. piché, “la disposition préliminaire du code de procédure civile” (2014), 73 r du b 135, at p 152). as its preliminary provision indicates, the code of civil procedure “is designed to provide, in the public interest, means to prevent and resolve disputes”, and it sets out general principles in this regard in arts. 1 to 7. in this way, the legislature expressly recognizes that when parties enter into a dispute prevention and resolution process by mutual agreement, civil justice is possible, even desirable, without the intervention of the courts facilitating the resolution of disputes is a public objective of undeniable importance, both for the parties and for our overburdened justice system (union carbide canada inc. v. bombardier inc., 2014 scc 35, [2014] 1 scr 800, at para. 32; l. chamberland, ed., le grand collectif: code de procédure civile — commentaires et annotations, vol. 1, articles 1 à 390 (5th ed. 2020), at p 9). private dispute resolution processes have several advantages, including [translation] “their confidentiality, their more informal nature, their flexibility, better conflict management by the parties, lower costs and the possibility of arriving at individualized solutions” (p-c. lafond, “introduction”, in p-c. lafond, ed., régler autrement les différends (2nd ed. 2018), 1, at p 20; see also m. thériault, “le défi du passage vers la nouvelle culture juridique de la justice participative” (2015), 74 r du b 1, at pp. 9-12). [97] however, the parties’ control over the course of their case is not absolute: it cannot be exercised contrary to rules of public order or to the existing and legitimate interests of third persons. in exercising this power, the parties must “comply with the principles, objectives and rules of procedure” (art. 19 para. 1 ccp). the latitude given to the parties in conducting the proceeding is therefore limited by the general principles of civil procedure, including the rules found in the code of civil procedure, which confer on judges a role as [translation] “protectors of the judicial process and the various parties’ rights” (j. plamondon, “les principes directeurs et le nouveau code de procédure civile (art. 17 à 24 cpc)”, in s. guillemard, ed., le code de procédure civile: quelles nouveautés? (2016), 27, at pp. 38-39) as professor piché notes, the code of civil procedure [translation] “gives the judge’s duties priority over the parties’ rights” (p 166) having chosen to go before the courts, the parties must therefore comply with the established rules and principles. [98] the parties’ control over the course of their case, for example, is subject to the “duty of the courts to ensure proper case management and the orderly conduct of proceedings” (art. 19 para. 1 ccp). the courts are therefore required to play an active role in the management of cases, thereby incidentally limiting the parties’ control over the conduct of a proceeding (f. bachand, “les principes généraux de la justice civile et le nouveau code de procédure civile” (2015), 61 mcgill l.j 447, at p 458; homans v gestion paroi inc., 2017 qcca 480, at paras. 92-93 (canlii)) the principle of proportionality set out in art. 18 ccp is also a good example of a restriction on [translation] “the parties’ freedom to conduct their case as they see fit” (jg v. nadeau, 2016 qcca 167, at para. 40 (canlii); see also y-m. morissette, “gestion d’instance, proportionnalité et preuve civile: état provisoire des questions” (2009), 50 c de d 381, at p 412). in short, the parties can have only [translation] “incomplete” control over the course of the case given the interplay between that control and the competing and divergent principles set out in the code of civil procedure (see d. ferland and b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (6th ed. 2020), vol. 1, at no. 1-164). s. guillemard and s. menétrey conclude from this that, especially since the enactment of the new 2016 code of civil procedure, [translation] “a kind of dilution” of the power given to the parties to control the course of their case may be observed, in comparison with the “lead role” they had prior to the revision (comprendre la procédure civile québécoise (2nd ed. 2017), at no. 100). [99] similarly, the parties’ control over the course of their case does not allow them to override the judge’s discretion to ensure compliance with the rule of public order arising from the principle of open proceedings, nor does it allow them to exercise their powers at the expense of the existing and legitimate interests of third persons in seeking the application of that rule. this fundamental principle is affirmed in art. 11 ccp, which provides that anyone may attend court hearings and have access to court records. this principle also guarantees rights protected in ss. 3 and 23 of the quebec charter and s 2(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (see, eg,. lac d’amiante du québec ltée v 2858-0702 québec inc., 2001 scc 51, [2001] 2 scr. 743, at para. 62; globe and mail v. canada (attorney general), 2010 scc 41, [2010] 2 scr 592, at para. 87) as the court reiterated in canada (citizenship and immigration) v harkat, 2014 scc 37, [2014] 2 scr 33, the openness of court proceedings is an important hallmark of a free and democratic society such as ours (para. 24). [100] in the chapter entitled “public nature of procedure before the courts”, the legislature provides for two specific exceptions to this fundamental principle first, art. 11 para. 2 ccp states that an exception to this principle applies if the law provides for in camera proceedings (art. 15 ccp) or restricts access to court records (art. 16 ccp), which is notably the case in family matters (see ferland and emery, at nos. 1-108 and 1-109) in the absence of a constitutional challenge, these limits on openness in family matters may not be disturbed. second, art. 12 ccp provides for a so-called “judicial” exception by codifying the principles established by this court in sierra club, thereby giving the court a discretion to make an exception to the fundamental principle of open proceedings “if, in its opinion, public order . . . or the protection of substantial and legitimate interests [so] requires” (see commentaires de la ministre de la justice, art. 12). [101] important though it may be, the parties’ control over the course of their case does not extend so far as to allow them to directly or indirectly shield the content of their record from public scrutiny and thereby circumvent the fundamental principle of open proceedings as baudouin j.a explained in b (b.) v québec (procureur général), [1998] rjq 317 (ca), this principle is of public order and [translation] “the courts, the guardians of public order, have not only the right but the strict duty to intervene proprio motu to uphold it” (p 320). this is why parties cannot agree to take part in judicial proceedings anonymously or to have a record sealed. such an agreement could not bind the court and oblige it to disregard a rule of public order (see, eg,. rosei v. benesty, 2020 qccs 1795, at paras. 97-100 (canlii); marcovitz v. bruker, 2005 qcca 835, [2005] rjq 2482, at paras. 109-10, rev’d on other grounds, 2007 scc 54, [2007] 3 scr 607). a court seized of an application under art. 12 ccp to limit the openness of court proceedings must exercise its discretion in accordance with the analytical framework developed in dagenais, mentuck and sierra club, even if the application is unopposed (see, eg,. mentuck, at para. 38; sirius services conseils en technologie de l’information inc. v boisvert, 2017 qcca 518, at para. 4 (canlii); horic v. nepveu, 2016 qccs 3921, at para. 166 (canlii)). [102] the public, and in particular the news media, have the interest required to seek the application of the principle of open proceedings set out in art. 11 ccp, and thereby put the rights guaranteed by the quebec and canadian charters into play. as cory j noted in edmonton journal v alberta (attorney general), [1989] 2 scr. 1326, “members of the public have a right to information pertaining to public institutions and particularly the courts” (p 1339). as “surrogates for the public”, the media therefore play a vital role in the exercise of this right (p 1360, per wilson j., citing richmond newspapers, inc. v virginia, 448 u.s 555 (1980), at p 573) for example, in 3834310 canada inc. v. rc, 2004 canlii 4122 (que. ca), the court of appeal recognized that the interests of the press are affected by a judgment authorizing a party to institute a proceeding anonymously the appellant, a daily newspaper publisher, could avail itself of the rules on revocation of a judgment on application by a third person (art. 349 ccp), because the impugned judgment affected its interests with respect to the openness of proceedings and the public’s right to be informed (paras. 13, 18 and 33). [103] when parties decide to have recourse to the civil justice system, which is a public service, they do so knowing that members of the public may exercise their fundamental right to information about court proceedings. it is true that public scrutiny may encourage parties to prevent or resolve a dispute, including by withdrawing a case from the courts. however, this form of incentive alone cannot ipso facto supplant the principle of open proceedings when invoked in accordance with procedural rules while a proceeding is still under way on the other hand, where parties opt for a private resolution process, the principle of open proceedings does not apply and, as a general rule, the confidentiality “of anything said, written or done during the process” must be preserved (art. 4 ccp). [104] it is important to emphasize that the fundamental principle of open proceedings is not concerned solely with scrutiny of judicial action, as the respondents argue, but also extends to the subject matter of disputes. article 11 ccp expressly provides that “[a]nyone may . . . have access to court records and entries in the registers of the courts” in canadian broadcasting corp. v. the queen, 2011 scc 3, [2011] 1 scr 65, this court in fact explained that “[a]ccess to exhibits is a corollary to the open court principle” (para. 12). the media and members of the public do not have to justify their presence at court hearings or their desire to consult a court record. the burden of satisfying the criteria set out in dagenais, mentuck and sierra club lies on the party applying for an order to limit the principle of open proceedings (canadian broadcasting corp. v new brunswick (attorney general), [1996] 3 scr 480, at para. 71). [105] in short, it is true that the parties control the course of their case and that they may terminate a proceeding at any time. however, this power exists in a context where civil justice before the courts is, in principle, open and where the public and the media can seek the application of this fundamental principle during the course of a proceeding. b article 213 ccp:. discontinuance and its limits [106] the principle that the parties’ control over the course of their case may not be exercised contrary to the rules of public order and the existing and legitimate interests of third persons is also based on the jurisprudence relating specifically to the effect of a discontinuance, which is dealt with in the code as an incidental proceeding that terminates a civil action. [107] article 213 ccp provides that a plaintiff’s discontinuance of an application terminates the proceeding and “restores matters to their former state”. in principle, art. 213 ccp therefore entitles a party to discontinue a judicial application unilaterally at any time (see, eg,. georgiadis v. angelopoulos, 2008 qccs 6890, at para. 8 (canlii), per gascon j). the rules on discontinuance flow from the principle that the parties control the course of their case (art. 19 para. 3 ccp). to be set up against the other parties, the unilateral discontinuance need only be notified to those parties in accordance with art. 213. [108] this being the case, it is often said, and properly so, that the right of discontinuance is not absolute (see, eg,. classic fabrics corp. v. b. rawe gmbh & co., 2001 canlii 7221 (que ca), at para. 38) first of all, when a plaintiff discontinues an application, it does so only for itself; in the case of a joint application, art. 214 ccp provides that the other plaintiff may continue the proceeding. we would add that, as a general rule, a discontinuance has no effect on a cross-application made by the defendant the court of appeal explained this in 175809 canada inc. v. 2740478 canada inc., 2000 canlii 9254, before the recent reform of civil procedure: [translation] technically, “[d]iscontinuance replaces matters in the state in which they would have been had the suit to which it applies not been commenced” (art. 264 ccp). this is an outcome that cannot be achieved where the proceeding sought to be discontinued is itself a source of damages. while a litigant may be authorized to discontinue an action at any time, this procedure cannot be used to avoid a suit already brought against it. a claim for damages is analogous to a cross demand. it subsists notwithstanding the discontinuance of the principal action [emphasis added; para. 6.] [109] the principle that the parties control the course of their case is therefore subject to a qualification, developed and consistently applied by the courts: a discontinuance may not prejudice the rights of the other parties or of third persons, including the right to have an application filed prior to the discontinuance decided. in l’espérance v. atkins, [1956] br 62, pratte j explained this qualification by saying that a discontinuance involves a renunciation by the plaintiff of its own rights. as a result, it may not be effected to the prejudice of third persons’ rights: [translation] the word “discontinuance” conveys the idea of renouncing some right or withdrawing a case or proceeding. but because only one’s own rights can be renounced, the discontinuance of a proceeding that has given rise to rights for others should not be permitted: discontinuance may not be effected to the prejudice of third persons’ rights. [emphasis added; p 66.] [110] in graham-albulet v albulet, [1977] c.a 323, at p 324, the court of appeal confirmed the existence of this intrinsic limit on the effects of a discontinuance: [translation] discontinuance is therefore a renunciation of a right, an advantage, which presupposes that this right, this advantage, belongs to the person who purports to renounce it, for it is not possible, through a unilateral act, to renounce for others and deprive them of a right or advantage they possess. [emphasis added.] [111] this qualification of the effects of a discontinuance makes sense. discontinuance constitutes a [translation] “voluntary renunciation of a right, of a claim” (h. reid, with s. reid, dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien (5th ed. 2015), at p 206, “désistement” (discontinuance)). the renunciation of a right allows the holder to relinquish the right if it is no longer wanted, which presupposes that the holder has full disposition of the right it intends to give up (see, generally, m. lamothe, la renonciation à l’exercice des droits et libertés garantis par les chartes (2007), at p 10). since this is a unilateral act by the renouncing party, only that party’s will is needed for the act to produce legal effects (lamothe, at p 10; d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (3rd ed. 2018), at no. 256). if art. 213 ccp seems to provide that a plaintiff is free to discontinue an application, this is because, in principle, [translation] “those who wish to relinquish a right can do so without the need for anyone’s approval, because they are prejudicing only themselves” (see, on the concept of renunciation, p. raynaud, “la renonciation à un droit: sa nature et son domaine en droit civil” (1936), 35 rtd civ. 763, at p 773). [112] this idea of renunciation shows that a discontinuance affects only the rights of the renouncing party, that is, the party that discontinues proceedings or waives a right or claim given that it is not possible to renounce the rights of others, the renouncing party [translation] “affects only its own legal sphere through its act, without having any effect on that of others” (lamothe, at p 11, fn. 47, citing g. grammatikas, théorie générale de la renonciation en droit civil (1971), at p 11; see also f. dreifuss-netter, les manifestations de volonté abdicatives (1985), at pp. 31 and 103) in other words, a party may validly renounce a right or claim, but this unilateral act does not affect the rights of third persons. a discontinuance may therefore be valid yet ineffective against the rights of third persons (barzelex inc. v. mecs. international inc (1989), 29 qac 63, at para. 22; constructions panthéon inc. v. clinique altermed inc., 2015 qcca 50, at paras. 4, 12 and 15-16 (canlii); taran furs (mtl) inc. v. tuac, local 501, 2005 canlii 11669 (que. sup. ct.), at paras. 30-32 and 59-60, per gascon j). [113] this principle has been applied on a number of occasions to recognize that courts remain seized of pending incidental applications — including cross-applications — for damages, for dismissal or for a declaration that a judicial application or pleading is abusive, even where the party bringing the initial application later discontinues it (see, eg, 175809 canada inc., at para. 6; constructions panthéon, at paras. 10-12; taran furs; 7006098 canada inc. v. sobeys canada inc., 2020 qccs 897, at paras. 37 and 43 (canlii)). in such a case, the discontinuance cannot adversely affect the right to argue an application before a court and to have it decided by the court. as justice louis-philippe pigeon explained, writing extra-judicially, “[e]ven in the realm of procedure, vested rights exist. a person who has instituted proceedings before a court has a vested right to the competence of the court” (drafting and interpreting legislation (1988), at p 79). [114] classic fabrics is an instructive example of this limit on the right of discontinuance the defendant had filed a motion to amend its defence and make a cross demand the plaintiff had then discontinued its claim and argued that it had terminated the proceeding. the court of appeal set aside the discontinuance and held, at paras. 38-39, that it could not adversely affect the defendant’s acquired right to argue its cross demand: [translation] the right of discontinuance is not absolute, however. a party may not use it to prejudice rights or advantages that another party may have acquired under the law or as a result of proceedings instituted. at the time the appellant served the respondent with its motion to amend its pleading in order to add a cross demand, the state of the proceedings allowed the appellant to present that motion. the appellant had an acquired right to argue its demand, which the respondent could not prejudice through a discontinuance of its action. [emphasis added.] (on the acquired right to argue an application, see also berenbaum v. berenbaum reichson, 2014 qcca 1630, at para. 15 (canlii); constructions panthéon, at para. 12.) [115] accordingly, the purpose or effect of a party’s discontinuance cannot be “to avoid a suit already brought against it” (175809 canada inc., at para. 6). in such circumstances, the court may take note of the discontinuance but should declare that it cannot cause the loss of rights claimed through a prior motion that is pending (see, eg,. taran furs, at paras. 30-32 and 59-60). [116] it is in fact entirely coherent that a discontinuance cannot defeat an application filed prior to it, because in principle, renunciation does not have retroactive effects. it [translation] “produces its effects from the moment it is made. in other words, the effects of renunciation are produced ex nunc and do not reach into the past” (grammatikas, at p 147). c article 108 ccp:. removal of exhibits and its limits [117] the second paragraph of art. 108 ccp provides that exhibits filed in the record must remain in the record until the end of the proceeding. they may be removed in two situations: (1) at the end of the proceeding, by the parties that filed them; and (2) with the consent of all the parties. [118] in the present case, the parties and the courts below attached great importance to the nature of this rule. upon reading the judgment under appeal, we note that two of the court of appeal judges concluded that art. 108 para. 2 ccp sets out a rule of an administrative nature (para. 42, per schrager ja; para. 54, per marcotte ja). it is true that the wording of this paragraph and the parliamentary debates preceding its enactment confirm that its purpose is to reduce the costs of the justice system (national assembly, “adoption du principe — projet de loi 24 — loi modifiant le code de procédure civile”, journal des débats, vol. 33, no. 30, 3rd sess., 34th leg., june 1, 1994, at pp. 1573-79, roger lefebvre, minister of justice). we take note of the differing reading of art. 108 ccp proposed by our colleague. however, for the purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to decide this question even assuming that art. 108 para. 2 ccp sets out a substantive rule, the parties cannot make use of this provision in a manner that adversely affects acquired rights given the circumstances of the discontinuance, which occurred after mediaqmi filed its application to unseal and to access the superior court’s record. [119] it follows that, in the circumstances, the logic behind qualifying the principle that the parties control the course of the case also applies, by extension, to the removal of exhibits under art. 108 para. 2 ccp. if the discontinuance of a proceeding cannot be relied on at the expense of third persons’ existing legitimate interests or contrary to the rules of public order, including the openness of court proceedings, then parties cannot avail themselves of art. 108 para. 2 ccp in order to remove exhibits from the record after an application has been made under art. 11 ccp. as art. 19 ccp provides, the control that the parties have over the course of their case must be exercised in compliance with the principles of civil procedure. [120] as the cases considered above show, parties may not infringe rules of public order like that of the openness of proceedings, even on consent (see, eg,. marcovitz). they certainly do not “control the course of their case” to such an extent that they can circumvent a rule of public order, including through the actions they can take with respect to exhibits under art. 108 para. 2 ccp. the judicial process cannot condone a form of private justice in which parties decide between themselves how a court proceeding will be conducted without regard for the open court principle. in short, the parties cannot displace a rule of public order by mutual consent (see, eg,. berenbaum, at para. 16, citing entreprises de béton fern leclerc ltée v bourassa, [1990] rdj 558 (ca), at p 561). [121] the right to remove exhibits that are in a court record with the consent of all parties must also be interpreted in the same way as the unilateral right to discontinue an application: it cannot adversely affect the existing and legitimate interests of third persons for example, the superior court recognized in a family law case that a discontinuance by the plaintiff that adversely affected a child’s rights could be set aside even though the defendant had consented to it (droit de la famille — 092038, 2009 qccs 3822, [2009] rdf 646, at paras. 14-15 and 34). in other words, because it is not possible to renounce the rights of others, a discontinuance, whether unilateral or by mutual consent, cannot defeat a third person’s rights. [122] the reason why art. 108 para. 2 ccp makes the right to remove exhibits in the court record subject to the consent of all the parties is that, in principle, the removal of exhibits affects only the parties, as it may deprive them of relevant exhibits in support of their arguments. where only the parties have a legitimate interest in the exhibits, their decision to remove them by mutual consent does not prejudice anyone. in such a case, they have complete freedom to remove the exhibits from the record, including in order to protect the confidentiality of the documents involved (sirius, at para. 4). the purpose of the consent requirement in this situation is to ensure that the removal of exhibits does not have prejudicial effects. in fact, as long as the unilateral removal of an exhibit is not prejudicial to the other parties, this breach of the obligation to obtain the consent of all the parties cannot be fatal (wetherall v. macdonald (1903), 9 r de j 381 (sup. ct.), at p 383). [123] the situation is entirely different where the removal of exhibits, even by mutual consent, infringes a rule of public order or adversely affects an existing and legitimate interest of a third person if a party’s discontinuance cannot unilaterally extinguish the right of others to advance their applications, it would be inconsistent if parties could, even by mutual consent, “renounce for others and deprive them of a right or advantage they possess” (graham-albulet, at p 324). [124] moreover, the court of appeal has recognized that the principle that procedural acts may not prejudice the rights of a party or a third person who has already brought an application also obtains where a pleading is withdrawn or amended under art. 206 ccp (9163-5771 québec inc. v. bonifier inc., 2017 qcca 1316, at para. 43 (canlii)) this principle running through the code of civil procedure therefore clarifies the scope of the right to remove exhibits by mutual consent provided for in art. 108 para. 2 ccp. [125] applying the principle that the parties control the course of their case as if it were an end in itself would be contrary to quebec jurisprudence and to the general scheme of the code of civil procedure. it would also conflict with the well-established principle that the code’s provisions must be interpreted in harmony with the quebec charter and the general principles of law (preliminary provision of the ccp;. lac d’amiante, at para. 40; globe and mail, at para. 45). to do so would be to disregard the principle that the parties’ control over the course of their case is subject to limits and that, in exercising it, parties must “comply with the principles, objectives and rules of procedure” (art. 19 para. 1 ccp), including the rules of public order and the existing and legitimate interests of third persons. iv application of the law to the facts [126] it should be noted at the outset that mediaqmi’s application was brought in a case in which a judge had issued an order limiting the principle of open court proceedings as soon as the legal action was filed. on the application of the respondent ciusss, a judge had rendered a discretionary norwich order on an ex parte basis and had ordered the sealing of the judicial application and of the exhibits filed to support it. we are therefore not in a purely private sphere of the case; the justice system was engaged, and a judge was asked, on the application of the respondent ciusss, to shield the record from public view the appellant’s application under art. 11 ccp to determine whether the exception to the principle of open proceedings had been adhered to should, from the start, be regarded as prima facie legitimate. [127] it is clear that the position of the ciusss and mr. kamel is premised in part on the idea that the character of private dispute resolution processes must be respected and that, on the basis of the principle that the parties control the course of their case, they can therefore resolve their private dispute out of public view. they are not entirely wrong on this point. because the parties control the course of their case, they can, in principle, agree to terminate their litigation through a negotiated discontinuance or otherwise and, in many cases, to remove their exhibits but this freedom to withdraw from the court process once the dispute has arisen, as in this case, can produce effects only in relation to the principal litigation. [128] here, the court record was sealed from the outset, including the exhibits filed by the respondent ciusss in support of its application. from the moment the appellant mediaqmi applied to unseal the record and access the exhibits, a new proceeding began. that second proceeding went beyond the strictly private interests of the parties to the principal litigation: it was of concern to the public and concerned the legitimacy of the judicial institution and the functioning of the justice system itself. the discontinuance filed following the application brought under art. 11 ccp could not defeat that new proceeding, which was separate from the principal litigation and related to the proper functioning of the judicial institution, whose legitimacy depends on its openness and in part, as we know, on media scrutiny. once the appellant applied to unseal the record and access the exhibits, these exhibits were subject to that new proceeding and, it must be concluded, the parties no longer had complete control over them. [129] mediaqmi’s application for access to exhibits was notably based on art. 11 ccp, which gives it the right to “have access to court records” although the application was called “motion to unseal”, its express purpose was to gain access to the exhibits. it is well established that the name of a juridical act is not what determines or defines its nature (ditomene v. syndicat des enseignants du cégep de l’outaouais (seco), 2012 qcca 1296, at para. 43 (canlii)). mediaqmi was seeking access to exhibits that were in fact in the court record at the time. [130] with an application for access to exhibits before it, validly made under art. 11 ccp, the court had to exercise the discretion conferred on it by art. 12 ccp. because of the respondents’ opposition. mediaqmi was thus seeking to play its role as a “surrogat[e] for the public” and to inform readers of what was taking place in the courts (edmonton journal, at pp. 1339-40 and 1360), a crucial role in a context where it was alleged that fraud had been committed within a public body responsible for ensuring the proper functioning of regional health institutions the public has a legitimate interest in obtaining information about a court proceeding involving allegations of misappropriation of public funds by a manager working for that public body. [131] had the ciusss not filed a discontinuance, the superior court would have had to decide mediaqmi’s application and exercise its discretion by applying the analytical framework established in dagenais, mentuck and sierra club the discontinuance could not be set up against mediaqmi to deprive it of its right to argue its motion and, if the court had granted that application, of its right to have access to the exhibits in the record. that right arose when its application was filed, which was several weeks before the ciusss’s discontinuance mediaqmi was therefore “entitle[d] to the court’s pronouncement on the legal issues thus raised that even [a] desistment cannot now remove” (byer v. québec (inspecteur général des institutions financières), [2000] rl 615 (sup. ct.), at p 623; see also sobeys, at para. 37). [132] accordingly, the court retained its jurisdiction under art. 11 ccp to decide mediaqmi’s application the appellant had “an acquired right to argue its demand, which the respondent could not prejudice through a discontinuance of its action” (classic fabrics, at para. 39). the principle that the parties control the course of the case could not adversely affect mediaqmi’s existing and legitimate interests in seeking the application of a rule of public order like the openness of proceedings. [133] we also note that mediaqmi’s motion was originally supposed to be argued on april 5, 2017, prior to the ciusss’s discontinuance the hearing was postponed at the request of the ciusss if the hearing had been held on that date, mediaqmi’s application for access to exhibits would have been subject to the discretion of the superior court, which would have had to apply the analytical framework developed in dagenais, mentuck and sierra club. it would be incongruous, to say the least, to conclude that the appellant could lose its right to argue its application solely because of the date on which the hearing of that application was scheduled. the analytical framework established in dagenais, mentuck and sierra club would clearly have been applicable if the hearing had been held prior to the discontinuance. this latter procedure could not adversely affect the right to have an application decided when that application had already been filed. [134] it is useful to recall that norwich orders can be made in camera and ex parte and may be the subject of a sealing order, as was the case here (see, eg,. fers et métaux américains, sec v. picard, 2013 qcca 2255, at paras. 3 and 7 (canlii); m. piché-messier and a. bussières mcnicoll, “développements récents en matière de propriété intellectuelle dans le cadre des ordonnances de type anton piller, mareva et norwich”, in service de la qualité de la profession du barreau du québec, vol. 464, développements récents en droit de la propriété intellectuelle (2019), 89, at pp. 127 and 129). if a discontinuance could defeat an application for access to a record, then norwich orders could be obtained in a justice system that would, in many respects, be private the principle of open proceedings could thus be circumvented, despite the exceptional and draconian nature of such orders. [135] contrary to the submission of the respondent ciusss, mediaqmi was therefore not required to bring an application to set aside the discontinuance in order to be heard. although the discontinuance was valid and produced its effects in relation to the ciusss and mr. kamel, it could not extinguish the rights asserted by mediaqmi through an application filed earlier in other words, the discontinuance quite simply could not be set up against mediaqmi in any event, counsel for mediaqmi specifically objected to the removal of the exhibits at the hearing and stated that the discontinuance had no effect on its application for access to exhibits because its right to have its application decided had “crystallized”. [136] the ciusss in fact concedes that the court still had jurisdiction to decide mediaqmi’s motion to unseal even though the proceeding had ended as a result of the discontinuance. it also acknowledges that a discontinuance has no impact on the right to argue a prior application. it follows that the ciusss has implicitly confirmed that the discontinuance could not adversely affect mediaqmi’s right to have the merits of its application — which is, among other things, an application for access to exhibits — decided, which the superior court judge failed to do the superior court therefore erred in law in concluding that the discontinuance could be set up against mediaqmi and in allowing the ciusss to remove the exhibits. [137] the ciusss argues that the purpose of mediaqmi’s motion was not to have access to the exhibits, but solely to have the court record unsealed, and that the superior court judge granted its motion. this argument is without merit: the purpose of a motion to unseal is to gain access to the content of the record as it stood at the time the motion was filed. in other words, mediaqmi was applying to unseal the superior court’s record in order to have access to the exhibits that were in it at the time. in any event, the motion specifically stated that mediaqmi was seeking access to the exhibits, and counsel for the appellant reiterated that request at the hearing on april 25, 2017. the superior court did not deal with it. [138] the respondents submit that the discontinuance could produce its effects against the appellant’s application given that the appellant was not a party to the principal litigation. it is clear from art. 11 ccp and the applicable jurisprudence that the appellant’s status has no bearing on this appeal. a party that files a discontinuance renounces rights held by that party, as discontinuance is, as we have seen, a unilateral act given that it is not possible to renounce the rights of others, it would be inappropriate if the principle that the parties control the course of their case could adversely affect rights not held by the renouncing party simply because the rights in question are those of third persons rather than those of a party. [139] pratte j explained in atkins that “discontinuance may not be effected to the prejudice of third persons’ rights” (p 66). this is all the more true given the issue of public order raised by the application in this case. it has consistently been held that this rule applies both to the parties’ rights and to the existing and legitimate rights of third persons (barzelex, at para. 18; georgiadis, at para. 9; banque commerciale italienne du canada v. magas development corp., [1992] rdi 246 (que. sup. ct.), at p 248; 9163-5771 québec inc., at para. 33; portnoff (syndic de), [2000] rjq 1290 (sup. ct.); see also ferland and emery, at nos. 1-1702 and 1-1703). if the media have an interest in applying for the revocation of a judgment that is contrary to the principle of open proceedings (3834310 canada inc., at paras. 13, 18 and 33), then a fortiori they have an interest in obtaining a decision on an application for access to exhibits that was filed prior to a discontinuance, even if they are “third persons” in relation to the proceeding. [140] our conclusion that the superior court judge should have decided mediaqmi’s application is based on the fact that it came before him prior to the ciusss’s discontinuance. in contrast, the discontinuance would have produced its full effects against an application filed subsequently. if mediaqmi had filed its application after the ciusss’s discontinuance and had sought access to the exhibits when they were no longer in the record, its appeal would have failed on that basis unless it challenged the constitutionality of art. 108 ccp. like our colleague, we therefore do not accept the appellant’s argument that the principle of open proceedings protects the right to have applications for access to exhibits decided years after a proceeding has ended and the exhibits have been removed. [141] in short, the ciusss and mr. kamel cannot, even by mutual consent, prevent mediaqmi from having its application for access to exhibits decided, circumvent the principle of open proceedings and extinguish a right not held by them. with respect for those who hold the contrary view, we believe that to conclude otherwise would allow parties to remove their exhibits, even in the course of a proceeding, despite the fact that a prior application has been made this could undermine the fundamental principle of public access to court records affirmed by the legislature in art. 11 ccp. in the circumstances of this case, art. 108 ccp cannot have this effect. v conclusion [142] for the foregoing reasons, the appeal should be allowed with costs. [143] however, we cannot grant the appellant’s application for access to exhibits, because the respondents have not had an opportunity to present their arguments on this point. moreover, the exhibits are not in the court record and it is thus impossible to apply the analytical framework developed in dagenais, mentuck and sierra club in the abstract. we agree with marcotte ja that the case must be remanded to the superior court so that it can decide the application for access to the exhibits in accordance with the applicable law and make the orders it considers necessary, given that, in our respectful view, the superior court judge erred in allowing the ciusss to remove the exhibits from the record. appendix — relevant statutory provisions charter of human rights and freedoms, cqlr, c. c-12: 23. every person has a right to a full and equal, public and fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, for the determination of his rights and obligations or of the merits of any charge brought against him. the tribunal may decide to sit in camera, however, in the interests of morality or public order. code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25: 83. prior to the end of the proceedings, filed exhibits cannot be taken out of the record, except with the consent of the opposite party or the authorization of the clerk, and upon giving a receipt; the parties may, however, obtain copies from the clerk. 331.9 once proceedings are terminated, the parties must retrieve the exhibits they have filed, failing which the exhibits are destroyed by the clerk one year after the date of the judgment or of the proceeding terminating the proceedings, unless the chief justice or chief judge decides otherwise. where a party, on whatever grounds, seeks a remedy against a judgment, the exhibits that have not been retrieved by the parties are destroyed by the clerk one year after the date of the final judgment or of the proceeding terminating the proceedings, unless the chief justice or chief judge decides otherwise. the child support determination forms attached to the judgment under article 825.13 are excepted from the above rules. code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01: preliminary provision this code establishes the principles of civil justice and, together with the civil code and in harmony with the charter of human rights and freedoms (chapter c-12) and the general principles of law, governs procedure applicable to private dispute prevention and resolution processes when not otherwise determined by the parties, procedure before the courts as well as procedure for the execution of judgments and for judicial sales. this code is designed to provide, in the public interest, means to prevent and resolve disputes and avoid litigation through appropriate, efficient and fair-minded processes that encourage the persons involved to play an active role it is also designed to ensure the accessibility, quality and promptness of civil justice, the fair, simple, proportionate and economical application of procedural rules, the exercise of the parties’ rights in a spirit of co-operation and balance, and respect for those involved in the administration of justice. this code must be interpreted and applied as a whole, in keeping with civil law tradition. the rules it sets out are to be interpreted in the light of the specific provisions it contains or of those of the law, and in the matters it deals with, the code compensates for the silence of the other laws if the context so admits. 11. civil justice administered by the courts is public. anyone may attend court hearings wherever they are held, and have access to court records and entries in the registers of the courts. an exception to this principle applies if the law provides for in camera proceedings or restricts access to the court records or to certain documents filed in a court record. exceptions to the principle of open proceedings set out in this chapter apply despite section 23 of the charter of human rights and freedoms (chapter c-12). 16. in family matters or in matters regarding a change of designation of sex as it appears in a minor child’s act of birth, access to the court records is restricted in all other matters, especially those relating to personal integrity or capacity, access to documents pertaining to a person’s health or psychosocial situation is restricted if they have been filed in a sealed envelope. access-restricted records or documents may only be consulted or copied by the parties, by their representatives, by lawyers and notaries, by persons designated by law, and by any person, including journalists, who has been authorized by the court after proving a legitimate interest, subject to the access conditions and procedure determined by the court. in adoption matters, access to the court records is restricted to the parties, their representatives and any person having proven a legitimate interest, and is subject to the authorization of the court and to the conditions and procedure it determines. the minister of justice is considered, by virtue of office, to have a legitimate interest to access records or documents for research, reform or procedure evaluation purposes. no person who has had access to a record in a family matter or in a matter regarding a change of designation of sex as it appears in a minor child’s act of birth may disclose or circulate any information that would allow a party or a child whose interests are at stake in a proceeding to be identified, unless authorized by the court or by law or unless the disclosure or circulation of the information is necessary for the purpose of applying a law. 19. subject to the duty of the courts to ensure proper case management and the orderly conduct of proceedings, the parties control the course of their case insofar as they comply with the principles, objectives and rules of procedure and the prescribed time limits. they must be careful to confine the case to what is necessary to resolve the dispute, and must refrain from acting with the intent to cause prejudice to another person or behaving in an excessive or unreasonable manner, contrary to the requirements of good faith. they may, at any stage of the proceeding, without necessarily stopping its progress, agree to settle their dispute through a private dispute prevention and resolution process or judicial conciliation; they may also otherwise terminate the proceeding at any time. 20. the parties are duty-bound to co-operate and, in particular, to keep one another informed at all times of the facts and particulars conducive to a fair debate and make sure that relevant evidence is preserved. they must, among other things, at the time prescribed by this code or determined in the case protocol, inform one another of the facts on which their contentions are based and of the evidence they intend to produce. 108. the parties and the lawyers, or in non-contentious proceedings, the notaries representing the parties, must see to it that exhibits and other documents that contain identifying particulars generally held to be confidential are filed in a form that protects the confidentiality of the information. any document or real evidence that is filed in the record as an exhibit must remain in the record until the end of the proceeding, unless all the parties consent to its being removed. once the proceeding has ended, the parties must retrieve the exhibits they have filed; otherwise, the court clerk may destroy them one year after the date on which the judgment becomes final or the date of the pleading terminating the proceeding. in either case, the chief justice or chief judge, if of the opinion that the exhibits can still be useful, may stay their destruction. however, in reviewable or reassessable matters and, in non-contentious cases, notices, certificates, minutes, inventories, medical and psychosocial evidence, affidavits, statements, declarations and documents made enforceable by a judgment, including any child support determination form attached to a judgment, cannot be removed from the record or destroyed. 213. discontinuance by the plaintiff of the whole of a judicial application terminates the proceeding on the notification of a notice of discontinuance to the other parties and its filing with the court office. it restores matters to their former state, and is effective immediately if it takes place before the court and in the presence of the parties. the legal costs are borne by the plaintiff, subject to an agreement between the parties or a decision of the court. appeal dismissed with costs, wagner c.j and rowe, martin and kasirer jj. dissenting. montréal. solicitors for the respondent centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’ouest-de-l’île-de-montréal: lavery, de billy, montréal. québec: gowling wlg (canada), montréal. presse inc and ad idem/canadian media lawyer association: fasken martineau dumoulin, montréal.
i. overview 164 171 173 176 181 191 192 194 [1] the criminal trial process can be invasive, humiliating, and degrading for victims of sexual offences, in part because myths and stereotypes continue to haunt the criminal justice system historically, trials provided few if any protections for complainants. more often than not, they could expect to have the minutiae of their lives and character unjustifiably scrutinized in an attempt to intimidate and embarrass them, and call their credibility into question — all of which jeopardized the truth-seeking function of the trial. it also undermined the dignity, equality, and privacy of those who had the courage to lay a complaint and undergo the rigours of a public trial. [2] over the past decades, parliament has made a number of changes to trial procedure, attempting to balance the accused’s right to a fair trial; the complainant’s dignity, equality, and privacy; and the public’s interest in the search for truth this effort is ongoing, but statistics and well-documented complainant accounts continue to paint a bleak picture. most victims of sexual offences do not report such crimes; and for those that do, only a fraction of reported offences result in a completed prosecution. more needs to be done. [3] these appeals concern the constitutionality of bill c-51, a recent ameliorative effort by parliament to remove the barriers that have deterred complainants from coming forward. this bill, which was enacted in 2018 (an act to amend the criminal code and the department of justice act and to make consequential amendments to another act, sc 2018, c 29), introduced ss. 278.92 to 278.94 into the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“impugned provisions”). these provisions were designed to protect the interests of complainants in their own private records when an accused has possession or control of the records and seeks to introduce them at a hearing in their criminal proceeding. specifically, they create procedures and criteria to assist the judge in deciding whether the records should be admitted, balancing the rights and interests of the accused, the complainant, and the public some of the procedural elements of the impugned provisions also apply to s 276 evidence applications, as parliament repealed the prior procedural provisions governing such applications. [4] prior to bill c-51, there was no statutory procedure governing the admissibility of complainants’ private records held by accused persons. there were, however, procedures governing the admissibility of evidence of complainants’ prior sexual activity or history (“s 276 regime”) and of complainants’ private records in the hands of third parties (“third party production regime”). this court has affirmed the constitutionality of both regimes (see r v. mills, [1999] 3 scr 668; r v. darrach, 2000 scc 46, [2000] 2 scr 443). in order to contextualize bill c-51, it is helpful to consider the regime changes that preceded it in further detail. [5] the first set of legislative changes sought to expose and eliminate two insidious myths — commonly referred to as the “twin myths” — which allowed the use of complainants’ prior sexual history to suggest that they were (1) less worthy of belief and/or (2) more likely to have consented to the alleged assault. these myths had long been used to attack the credibility and dignity of complainants, tarnish their reputations, and sideline the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial. recognizing the harm caused by them, parliament enacted legislation to govern the use of evidence relating to complainants’ prior sexual history while parliament’s first iteration of s 276 was found to be overbroad in r v seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577, revised provisions were found by this court to be constitutionally compliant in darrach. this general framework remains in place today, albeit in amended form. [6] the second set of legislative changes sought to restrict what had become a routine practice — defence counsel seeking production of complainants’ private records in order to engage in invasive attacks on their character. for example, defence counsel often sought production of medical records in order to advance myth-based arguments impugning the credibility and reliability of complainants who had previously consulted with psychiatrists or counsellors this problem was first addressed in r v o’connor, [1995] 4 scr 411, resulting in the creation of a common law procedure governing the production of complainants’ private records by third parties. parliament subsequently legislated its own procedure (ss. 278.1 to 278.91 of the criminal code), which drew upon but modified the o’connor procedure. this court affirmed the constitutionality of that regime in mills, finding that it struck a reasonable balance between the rights of the accused, the rights of the complainant, and the public interest. [7] a third problem emerged. in r v. osolin, [1993] 4 scr 595, the court addressed a situation where the defence cross-examined the complainant on the basis of her personal medical records, which had come into the accused’s possession. similarly, in r v shearing, 2002 scc 58, [2002] 3 scr 33, the court was confronted with a situation where the accused sought to cross-examine the complainant based on entries in her own private diary, which happened to be in the accused’s possession since the accused already had the diary, there was no need to seek production through the third party production regime the main issue was the admissibility of the diary. in the absence of legislation, the court endorsed the use of motions brought at the instance of complainants to protect against the improper use of their private documents already in the hands of accused persons. [8] following osolin and shearing, it became clear that there was no legislation governing the admissibility of a complainant’s private records in the hands of the accused, rather than a third party — even though the complainant’s privacy and dignity interests are similar in both contexts a 2012 senate report recommended creating legislation designed to address this gap: a regime governing the admissibility of complainants’ private records in the hands of the accused, using similar factors to those in the third party production regime (standing senate committee on legal and constitutional affairs, statutory review on the provisions and operation of the act to amend the criminal code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings): final report (“2012 senate report”), at p 19). [9] bill c-51 was parliament’s response among other features, it extended the protections provided to complainants in sexual offence trials in two ways. first, it created a new procedure to determine whether the complainant’s private records in the hands of the accused are admissible as evidence at trial (“record screening regime”). second, it provided complainants with additional participation rights in admissibility proceedings under the new record screening regime and the pre-existing s 276 regime for prior sexual history evidence (“complainant participation provisions”). [10] in the two appeals presently before the court, each accused (jj and shane reddick) brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutionality of the impugned provisions, arguing that parliament had moved too far in favour of protecting the interests of complainants, and in the process, had jeopardized three fundamental rights guaranteed to accused persons under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, namely: the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination under ss. 7 and 11(c); the right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d); and the right to make full answer and defence under ss. 7 and 11(d) the judges in both cases granted the applications and found the provisions unconstitutional, in whole or in part (see the charter breach analysis in r v. jj, 2020 bcsc 29, and the s 1 analysis and decision on remedy in r v. jj, 2020 bcsc 349; and see r v. reddick, 2020 onsc 7156, 398 ccc (3d) 227). in mr. reddick’s case, part of the application judge’s ruling included a finding that s 278.92 was overbroad under s 7 of the charter. [11] in jj’s case, this court granted the crown’s application for leave to appeal from the application judge’s interlocutory constitutional ruling, which held that part of the record screening regime was unconstitutional. the court also granted jj’s later application for leave to cross-appeal on the issue of the constitutionality of the regime in its entirety. in mr. reddick’s case, the complainant, as, sought to challenge the application judge’s interlocutory constitutional ruling that effectively prevented her from participating in the record screening process and declared the regime unconstitutional in its entirety. this court granted as the right to be added as a party to the proceedings because, being a complainant, she would not normally have been a party. the court then granted as’s application for leave to appeal. mr. reddick is a respondent on the appeal. the crown is also a respondent, despite arguing (like as) that the regime as a whole is constitutionally valid. [12] the main arguments of the respondents j.j and mr. reddick were as follows. first, the impugned provisions force the defence to disclose both its strategy and the details of its proposed evidence to the crown prior to trial, thereby violating the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. second, the impugned provisions provide complainants with advanced notice of defence evidence and the purposes for which it is being adduced. as a result, complainants will be able to tailor their responses during examination-in-chief and cross-examination. this detracts from the right to make full answer and defence and from the truth-seeking function of trial. finally, complainant participation in voir dires threatens trial fairness, as it disrupts the structure of a criminal trial, inserts a third-party adversary into the process, and undermines the role of the crown. [13] for the reasons that follow, we would not give effect to these arguments. properly construed, ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code do not infringe upon ss. 7, 11(c), or 11(d) of the charter. in the result, we would allow the crown’s appeal and dismiss jj’s cross-appeal; we would also allow as’s appeal. [14] we have had the benefit of reading the dissenting reasons prepared by our colleague côté j. with respect, we cannot accede to her interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, as we consider it to be unduly narrow and restrictive. we have also read the separate dissenting reasons of our colleagues brown j and rowe j. respectfully, they have mischaracterized our reasons and their effect and disregarded the principle of stare decisis — sweeping aside decades of this court’s binding jurisprudence as “judicial ad hoc-ery” quite simply, their approach to the constitutional analysis must be rejected. ii relevant statutory provisions [15] the following provisions of the criminal code are relevant to these appeals: evidence of complainant’s sexual activity 276(1) in proceedings in respect of an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1 or 155, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 170, 171, 172, 173, 271, 272 or 273, evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant (a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject matter of the charge; or (b) is less worthy of belief. conditions for admissibility (2) in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (1), evidence shall not be adduced by or on behalf of the accused that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any other person, unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice determines, in accordance with the procedures set out in sections 278.93 and 278.94, that the evidence (a) is not being adduced for the purpose of supporting an inference described in subsection (1); (b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and (c) is of specific instances of sexual activity; and (d) has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. factors that judge must consider (3) in determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection (2), the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall take into account (a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence; (b) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences; (c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case; (d) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias; (e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury; (f) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy; (g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and (h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers relevant. interpretation (4) for the purpose of this section, sexual activity includes any communication made for a sexual purpose or whose content is of a sexual nature. definition of record 278.1 for the purposes of sections 278.2 to 278.92, record means any form of record that contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and includes medical, psychiatric, therapeutic, counselling, education, employment, child welfare, adoption and social services records, personal journals and diaries, and records containing personal information the production or disclosure of which is protected by any other act of parliament or a provincial legislature, but does not include records made by persons responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence. admissibility — accused in possession of records relating to complainant 278.92(1) except in accordance with this section, no record relating to a complainant that is in the possession or control of the accused — and which the accused intends to adduce — shall be admitted in evidence in any proceedings in respect of any of the following offences or in any proceedings in respect of two or more offences at least one of which is any of the following offences: (a) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 170, 171, 172, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 286.1, 286.2 or 286.3; or (b) any offence under this act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this paragraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in paragraph (a) if it occurred on or after that day. requirements for admissibility (2) the evidence is inadmissible unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice determines, in accordance with the procedures set out in sections 278.93 and 278.94, (a) if the admissibility of the evidence is subject to section 276, that the evidence meets the conditions set out in subsection 276(2) while taking into account the factors set out in subsection (3); or (b) in any other case, that the evidence is relevant to an issue at trial and has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. factors that judge shall consider (3) in determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection (2), the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall take into account (a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence; (b) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences; (c) society’s interest in encouraging the obtaining of treatment by complainants of sexual offences; (d) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case; (e) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias; (f) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury; (g) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy; (h) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and (i) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers relevant. application for hearing — sections 276 and 278.92 278.93(1) application may be made to the judge, provincial court judge or justice by or on behalf of the accused for a hearing under section 278.94 to determine whether evidence is admissible under subsection 276(2) or 27892(2). form and content of application (2) an application referred to in subsection (1) must be made in writing, setting out detailed particulars of the evidence that the accused seeks to adduce and the relevance of that evidence to an issue at trial, and a copy of the application must be given to the prosecutor and to the clerk of the court. jury and public excluded (3) the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall consider the application with the jury and the public excluded. judge may decide to hold hearing (4) if the judge, provincial court judge or justice is satisfied that the application was made in accordance with subsection (2), that a copy of the application was given to the prosecutor and to the clerk of the court at least seven days previously, or any shorter interval that the judge, provincial court judge or justice may allow in the interests of justice and that the evidence sought to be adduced is capable of being admissible under subsection 276(2), the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall grant the application and hold a hearing under section 278.94 to determine whether the evidence is admissible under subsection 276(2) or 27892(2). hearing — jury and public excluded 278.94(1) the jury and the public shall be excluded from a hearing to determine whether evidence is admissible under subsection 276(2) or 27892(2). complainant not compellable (2) the complainant is not a compellable witness at the hearing but may appear and make submissions. right to counsel (3) the judge shall, as soon as feasible, inform the complainant who participates in the hearing of their right to be represented by counsel. judge’s determination and reasons (4) at the conclusion of the hearing, the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall determine whether the evidence, or any part of it, is admissible under subsection 276(2) or 278.92(2) and shall provide reasons for that determination, and (a) if not all of the evidence is to be admitted, the reasons must state the part of the evidence that is to be admitted; (b) the reasons must state the factors referred to in subsection 276(3) or 278.92(3) that affected the determination; and (c) if all or any part of the evidence is to be admitted, the reasons must state the manner in which that evidence is expected to be relevant to an issue at trial. record of reasons (5) the reasons provided under subsection (4) shall be entered in the record of the proceedings or, if the proceedings are not recorded, shall be provided in writing. iii. issues [16] these appeals call into question the constitutionality of ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code. it is alleged that the impugned provisions violate the rights of accused persons under ss. 7, 11(c) and 11(d) of the charter and should be struck down. iv analysis a. statutory interpretation of the provisions [17] before determining the constitutionality of the impugned provisions, it is first necessary to interpret them. the modern principle of statutory interpretation assists us in this exercise: “. . . the words of an act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (e driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87, quoted in rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21). [18] as a rule, “[c]ourts must presume that parliament intended to enact constitutional, [charter-compliant] legislation and strive, where possible, to give effect to this intention” (mills, at para. 56; see also r. sullivan, statutory interpretation (3rd ed 2016), at pp. 307-8; r v ahmad, 2011 scc 6, [2011] 1 scr 110, at paras. 28-29). furthermore, this court stated in mills that “if legislation is amenable to two interpretations, a court should choose the interpretation that upholds the legislation as constitutional” (para. 56, referring to slaight communications inc v davidson, [1989] 1 scr 1038, at p 1078). (1) overview of the impugned provisions [19] with these interpretive tools in mind, we begin by providing an overview of the provisions to set the foundation for the more detailed interpretation of each section. [20] as a preliminary matter, the procedures outlined in ss. 278.92 to 278.94 apply to two types of evidence: (1) evidence of complainants’ prior sexual history under s 276 (“s 276 evidence”), which was previously subject to its own procedure. this type of evidence requires “s 276 applications” prior to bill c-51, s 276 evidence was subject to the procedures in ss. 276.1 to 276.5 of the criminal code, which have since been repealed. (2) other records in the possession or control of the accused that fall within the definition of s 278.1, which do not concern prior sexual history. this type of evidence requires “private record applications”. [21] the procedure set out in the impugned provisions operates in two stages, as follows. (a) stage one [22] pursuant to s 278.93(2), the accused must prepare an application which “set[s] out detailed particulars of the evidence that the accused seeks to adduce and the relevance of that evidence to an issue at trial”. [23] at stage one, the presiding judge reviews the accused’s application to determine whether the evidence sought to be adduced is capable of being admissible having regard to the threshold tests set out in s 278.92(2)(a) and (b) and the applicable factors in ss. 276(3) or 278.92(3), depending on the type of evidence. [24] we note what is, in our view, a drafting error in the english text of s 27893(4). as written, this section requires the judge at stage one to assess whether the proposed evidence is “capable of being admissible under subsection 276(2)”. however, it is clear that s 276(2) only applies to evidence of complainants’ prior sexual history this leaves no “capable of being admissible” threshold for private records at stage one. this sentence must be meant to refer to s 278.92(2), which sets out both the threshold for evidence of prior sexual history (s 278.92(2)(a)) and the threshold for private records (s 278.92(2)(b)) this is consistent with the attorney general of ontario’s explanation of the stage one process in its factums. moreover, it is consistent with the french text of the provision, which does not refer to s 276(2) when setting out the threshold for determining whether a record is “capable of being admissible” in s 27893(4). [25] the use of s 276(2) as the only threshold in the english version is a drafting error that leads to “a glaring absurdity, the origin of which is evident” (sullivan (2016), at p 298) specifically, it is evident that the phrase “capable of being admissible under subsection 276(2)” is a holdover from the prior procedural regime, which only applied to s 276 evidence. as a result, we proceed on the understanding that the “capable of being admissible” threshold in s 278.93(4) is intended to refer to evidence that is “capable of being admissible” under s 27892(2). [26] section 278.93(4) stipulates that the accused must provide a copy of the application to the court and the crown, at least seven days before the presiding judge reviews the application, unless otherwise ordered. advanced disclosure to the crown is necessary to provide the crown with an opportunity to consider its position regarding whether the evidence is capable of being admissible. [27] the legislation does not specify how the stage one inquiry is to be conducted. in our view, this is a matter left to the discretion of the presiding judge, in accordance with their trial management powers. the stage one inquiry may proceed as an application in writing, an oral hearing, or both, as the judge sees fit. the jury and public are excluded from the stage one inquiry, no matter how it proceeds, under s 27893(3). [28] for s 276 evidence applications, if the judge determines that the proposed evidence is not s 276 evidence, the application will terminate. if the proposed evidence is s 276 evidence but the judge concludes that it is not capable of being admissible under s 276(2) (as directed by s 278.92(2)(a)), the application will be denied. if the s 276 evidence is capable of being admissible, the application proceeds to a stage two hearing pursuant to s 27893(4). [29] for private record applications, if the judge determines that the proposed evidence is not a “record” under s 278.1, the application will terminate. if the proposed evidence is a “record” under s 278.1 but the judge concludes that it is not capable of being admissible under s 278.92(2)(b), the application will be denied. if the evidence is a “record” and it is capable of being admissible, the application proceeds to a stage two hearing pursuant to s 27893(4). (b) stage two [30] at the stage two hearing, the presiding judge decides whether the proposed evidence meets the tests for admissibility set out in s 27892(2). [31] for s 276 evidence applications, the governing conditions are set out in s 276(2), as directed by s 27892(2)(a). this determination is made in accordance with the factors listed in s 276(3). [32] for private record applications, the test for admissibility is set out in s 278.92(2)(b), namely: the evidence is admissible if it “is relevant to an issue at trial and has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice” this determination is made in accordance with the factors listed in s 27892(3). [33] complainants are permitted to appear at the stage two hearing and make submissions, with the assistance of counsel, if they so choose (s 278.94(2) and (3)). (c) overlap between section 276 evidence and private records under section 278.1 [34] section 276 of the criminal code prohibits the use of evidence of complainants’ prior sexual history to support the “twin myths” in sexual offence trials. at some point in the process, the presiding judge may determine that the proposed evidence is both s 276 evidence and a private record under s 278.1 (eg, an email containing an explicit photo of a prior sexual interaction). if the judge determines that the evidence falls under both categories, then it should be treated as s 276 evidence. (2) what is a record? [35] to determine what qualifies as a “record” for private record applications, the starting point is s 2781. it reads as follows: 278.1 for the purposes of sections 278.2 to 278.92, record means any form of record that contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and includes medical, psychiatric, therapeutic, counselling, education, employment, child welfare, adoption and social services records, personal journals and diaries, and records containing personal information the production or disclosure of which is protected by any other act of parliament or a provincial legislature, but does not include records made by persons responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence. [36] the definition of “record” in s 278.1 applies to ss. 278.2 to 278.92 of the criminal code, which includes both the third party production regime (ss. 278.2 to 278.91) and the record screening regime (ss. 278.92 to 27894). [37] in this section, we first provide a brief overview that explains the two general groups of records under s 278.1: enumerated records and non-enumerated records. we then provide guidance on what qualifies as a non-enumerated record. to do so, we consider parliament’s intent, the statutory text, and relevant jurisprudence, from which we derive a methodology for determining whether evidence falls within the definition of “record” for purposes of the record screening regime finally, we provide guidance on two specific types of records: (1) communications; and (2) records of an explicit sexual nature related to the subject matter of the charge. (a) two groups of records [38] the definition of “record” creates two distinct groups: (1) records that fall within the enumerated categories (“enumerated records”); and (2) records that do not fall within the enumerated categories but otherwise contain personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (“non-enumerated records”). [39] enumerated categories of records, as defined in s 278.1, include “medical, psychiatric, therapeutic, counselling, education, employment, child welfare, adoption and social services records, personal journals and diaries, and records containing personal information the production or disclosure of which is protected by any other act of parliament or a provincial legislature” in our view, these categories were enumerated in the definition because they are the types of records likely to contain personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. should an accused wish to tender a record that falls within an enumerated category, they must proceed with a s 278.93(1) application, regardless of the specific content of the record. [40] however, parliament’s use of the word “includes” in the definition signals that the list of enumerated categories was not meant to be exhaustive. this is confirmed in r v. quesnelle, 2014 scc 46, [2014] 2 scr 390, where karakatsanis j., writing for the court, stated that the list of enumerated records in s 278.1 “provides an illustrative list of some of the types of records that usually give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. however, documents that do not fall into the listed categories will still be covered by the mills regime if they contain [personal] information that gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy” (para. 22). [41] in other words, records that do not fall within one of the enumerated categories but are nevertheless included within the scope of the regime are records which contain personal information about complainants for which they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. we expand on this below. (b) identifying non-enumerated records [42] ultimately, we conclude that a non-enumerated record will only be captured by s 278.1, in the context of the record screening regime, if the record contains information of an intimate or highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant’s overall physical, psychological or emotional well-being such information will have implications for the complainant’s dignity. as we will explain, this threshold is informed by interpreting the text and scheme of the record screening regime we then provide a framework for assessing whether a piece of evidence qualifies as a non-enumerated record that must be vetted under the record screening regime. (i) text and scheme of the record screening regime [43] the text and scheme of the record screening regime reveal parliament’s intention to narrow the scope of records. parliament deliberately limited the regime to “personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” both elements of this phrase — “personal information” and “reasonable expectation of privacy” — serve to delimit the scope of records and shed light on the nature of the privacy interests at issue, as do the factors set out in s 27892(3). 1. personal information [44] the term “personal information” invokes the concept of informational privacy informational privacy protects the ability to control the dissemination of intimate and personal details about oneself that go to one’s “biographical core” (r v. plant, [1993] 3 scr 281, at p 293; see also r v. cole, 2012 scc 53, [2012] 3 scr. 34, at paras. 45-48) as this court held in r v dyment, [1988] 2 scr 417, informational privacy is “based on the notion of the dignity and integrity of the individual” (p 429). [45] complainants have privacy interests in highly sensitive information about themselves, the disclosure of which can impact on their dignity as this court has observed in the past, the “dissemination of highly sensitive personal information” can result “not just in discomfort or embarrassment, but in an affront to the affected person’s dignity” (sherman estate v. donovan, 2021 scc 25, at para. 7). to reach the level of an impact on dignity, an intrusion on informational privacy must “transcen[d] personal inconvenience by reason of the highly sensitive nature of the information that might be revealed” (sherman estate, at para. 75; see also para. 73). 2. reasonable expectation of privacy [46] the term “reasonable expectation of privacy” has an established meaning in common law, most frequently considered in the s 8 charter jurisprudence. when parliament uses a common law term or concept in legislation, those terms and concepts “inform the content and meaning of these words in [the] section” (r v. jarvis, 2019 scc 10, [2019] 1 scr 488, at para. 56; r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed 2014), at p 543) as a result, the jurisprudence regarding a “reasonable expectation of privacy” informs our interpretation as this court recognized in jarvis, “the s 8 case law represents a rich body of judicial thought on the meaning of privacy in our society” (para. 59) we refer to s 8 jurisprudence for its foundational principles, but our interpretation of a reasonable expectation of privacy here is specific to s 278.1: what it means and how it applies in the context of the record screening regime contrary to our colleague brown j.’s dissenting reasons (at para. 201), our context-specific interpretation of a reasonable expectation of privacy cannot be “applied across the board” with the potential to interfere with the s 8 jurisprudence. [47] in particular, two principles from the s 8 jurisprudence are instructive in determining whether complainants have a reasonable expectation of privacy under s 278.1, as it applies to the record screening regime: (1) the person claiming a privacy right must have a subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable in the circumstances (r v edwards, [1996] 1 scr 128, at para. 45; see also jarvis, at paras. 35-43); and (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy only engages legally recognized privacy interests (mills, at para. 99). both of these principles establish that the privacy interests at issue must meet a high threshold. [48] however, we do not adopt the content-neutral approach from the s 8 jurisprudence. under s 8, a content-neutral approach ensures that an accused may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy regardless of the legal or illegal nature of the items sought (r v. spencer, 2014 scc 43, [2014] 2 scr 212, at para. 36; r v. wong, [1990] 3 scr 36, at pp. 49-50). section 8 protects against unreasonable state search and seizure, therefore, the state is not permitted to engage in ex post facto reasoning to justify unconstitutional searches. this rationale does not apply in the present context as state search and seizure is not at issue. [49] furthermore, some interveners have submitted that certain mediums of communication (eg, text messages) should be categorically excluded from the record screening regime, regardless of their content however, it would be difficult to meaningfully assess or protect complainants’ privacy interests within the strictures of a content-neutral approach, as in s 8 of the charter the definition of “record” in s 278.1, as it applies in the context of the record screening regime, does not focus on the medium by which the information was shared. it clearly specifies that “any form of record” is captured under the record screening regime if there is personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy records do not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy simply because of the medium used to convey them. the more important consideration is the sensitivity of the information contained in the record. [50] nor is a reasonable expectation of privacy for the purposes of the record screening regime exactly the same as it is for the third party production regime. we acknowledge that the definition of “record” in s 278.1 is also used in the third party production regime; however, a reasonable expectation of privacy is always context-specific. as this court has made clear, the privacy interests in a record being produced to the accused are different from the privacy interests at play when the accused seeks to have the record admitted as evidence in court (shearing, at para. 96). in sum, while our interpretation of a reasonable expectation of privacy is informed by the s 8 jurisprudence, including the third party production regime which impacts the s 8 charter rights of complainants, our analysis of this term only applies to the record screening regime context. 3. factors in section 278.92(3) [51] the factors outlined in s 278.92(3) shed light on the interests implicated by the record screening regime, reinforcing our conclusion that parliament intended to safeguard highly personal information related to complainant dignity these factors include: (a) (b) (c) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence; society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences; society’s interest in encouraging the obtaining of treatment by complainants of sexual offences; (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case; the need discriminatory belief or bias; to remove from the fact-finding process any the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury; the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy; the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers relevant. [52] a complainant’s privacy interests in the information contained in a record are meant to be assessed against these competing factors. if the information in a record does not engage the factors designed to protect the complainant’s personal dignity and privacy interests, or does so only marginally, this would be a clear indication that the document is not a record at all. [53] in our view, s 278.1 presupposes that a certain level of privacy must be engaged; namely, this provision concerns only records that could cause “potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity”. these factors suggest that the scheme is not intended to catch more mundane information, even if such information is communicated privately. moreover, given the accused’s right to make full answer and defence, mere discomfort associated with lesser intrusions of privacy will generally be tolerated. in this context, a complainant’s privacy in open court “will be at serious risk only where the sensitivity of the information strikes at the subject’s more intimate self” (sherman estate, at para. 74). (ii) framework to apply [54] in light of parliament’s intent, the relevant jurisprudence and the statutory scheme, a non-enumerated record will fall within the definition of s 278.1 if it contains information of an intimate and highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant’s overall physical, psychological or emotional well-being such information will have implications for the complainant’s dignity. as previously stated, this interpretation is specific to the record screening regime. to determine whether a record contains such information, a presiding judge should consider both the content and context of the record. 1 content [55] when determining whether proposed evidence constitutes a non- enumerated record, the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind”) applies. in other words, general words in a definition take their meaning from the more specific words — in this case, the records that are specifically enumerated (canada v. canada north group inc., 2021 scc 30, at para. 63). therefore, if the information in a non-enumerated record is similar to what would be contained in an enumerated record, this is a useful indicator that it raises significant privacy interests and should be subject to the record screening regime the common thread weaving through the enumerated records is that they contain information of an intimate and highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant’s overall physical, psychological or emotional well-being this type of content could include, but is not limited to, discussions regarding mental health diagnoses, suicidal ideation, prior physical or sexual abuse, substance abuse or involvement in the child welfare system. [56] for example, if complainants communicate details about their own medical history, this is the kind of information that would be found in a medical record over which they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. it would therefore be subject to the record screening regime in contrast, mundane information such as general emotional states, everyday occurrences or general biographical information would typically not give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 2 context [57] a court should also consider the context in which the record came into existence. when assessing context, courts must apply a normative and common-sense approach. whether a communication or document is a “record that contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” must reflect societal understandings about the fundamental right to be free from unwanted intrusion into our personal lives as this court recognized in jarvis, at para. 68, “[w]hether a person reasonably expects privacy is necessarily a normative question that is to be answered in light of the norms of conduct in our society” (emphasis in original). expectations of privacy are contextual and must be assessed in light of the “totality of the circumstances” (r v. patrick, 2009 scc 17, [2009] 1 scr 579, at para. 26; see also edwards, at para. 45) three contextual factors, which are non-exhaustive, may be relevant to this analysis. [58] first, a court may consider the reason why the complainant shared the private information in question. this court has recognized that a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to information will vary depending on the purpose for which the information is collected (dagg v. canada (minister of finance), [1997] 2 scr 403, at para. 75). for example, in quesnelle, this court accepted that a person may divulge information to an individual or organization with the expectation that it be used only for a specific purpose. [59] second, the relationship between the complainant and the person with whom the information was shared informs the context. as wagner cj wrote in the context of a complainant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in jarvis, at para. 29, “[r]elevant considerations may include whether the relationship was one of trust or authority and whether the observation or recording constituted a breach or abuse of the trust or authority that characterized the relationship.” that said, it must be understood that “[t]he circumstances (or nature of the relationship) in which information is shared are not determinative: the reasonable expectation of privacy is not limited to trust-like, confidential, or therapeutic relationships” (quesnelle, at para. 27) in other words, a relationship of trust is not necessary, but in some cases it may be sufficient, to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. [60] third, courts may consider where the record was shared and how it was created or obtained records produced in the private domain (eg, one-on-one communications between the complainant and accused) may attract an enhanced reasonable expectation of privacy; records created or obtained in the public domain, where they could be accessed by multiple people or the general public (eg, social media or news media), are less likely to attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. that said, the fact that certain information is already available somewhere in the public sphere does not preclude further harm to the privacy interest through additional dissemination that would increase access to the information (sherman estate, at para. 81). in other words, there are different degrees of publicity, and in some cases a complainant may have a reasonable interest in preventing information from being disseminated in court proceedings, even if it was not perfectly private before. similarly, the fact that a record was created or obtained surreptitiously by the accused, without the complainant’s knowledge, would also be relevant as part of the contextual analysis. such a record would be more likely to attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. (iii) specific types of records 1 communications [61] communications form the most contentious type of evidence. given that “any form of record” is captured under the record screening regime, electronic or non-electronic communications relating to complainants will fall within the definition of “record” if they contain “personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” indeed, communications may contain precisely the kind of information parliament intended to safeguard. [62] justice côté in dissent maintains that complainants have no reasonable expectation of privacy in communications with the accused (unless they are in confidential/professional relationships); on the contrary, they should expect the accused to rely on such evidence to defend themselves at trial (para. 463). with respect, we disagree. complainants should not “lose” their expectation of privacy the moment they step forward to report a sexual offence. the fact that they may have chosen the wrong person to trust should not be determinative of their privacy interest in the context of alleged sexual violence our colleague’s approach is antithetical to parliament’s objective of protecting complainant privacy and dignity during the course of a criminal trial (s 278.92(3)(g)), as well as the objective of encouraging reporting (s 27892(3)(b)). under our approach, we take into account the trial context while also considering the nature of the communication at the time it took place. [63] as a baseline, to be caught by the record screening regime, the communication must “relat[e] to [the] complainant” in some manner (s 27892(1)). the complainant may be the sender or recipient of the communication, or the content of the communication pertains to the complainant. [64] if the communication in question falls within a category of enumerated records, it is unnecessary to inquire further regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy. for example, e-mails exchanged between an accused who is a psychologist and their client regarding therapeutic goals for treatment would properly fall within the definition of s 278.1 as therapeutic records — a category of enumerated records. if the communication does not fall within an enumerated category, the content- and context-based analysis set out above applies to determine whether the communication contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 2. records of a sexual nature (not covered by section 276) [65] one type of non-enumerated record that will often engage a reasonable expectation of privacy is a record of an explicit sexual nature that is not covered by s 276 (for example, explicit communications, videos or photographs of a sexual nature relating to the subject matter of the charge) complainants may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in these types of records, given the dignity concerns that can arise. [66] it is helpful to clarify why evidence of an explicit sexual nature that relates to the subject matter of the charge may be caught by the record screening regime even if it is not s 276 evidence in addition to creating the record screening regime for private records, bill c-51 also added s 276(4), which specifies that sexual activity “includes any communication made for a sexual purpose or whose content is of a sexual nature” this provision applies to sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject matter of the charge (s 276(2)). any communication regarding such sexual activity would fall within the s 276 regime. [67] accordingly, the only records of an explicit sexual nature that could be subject to the record screening regime outside of the s 276 context would be records pertaining to the complainant, in the possession or control of the accused, that relate to the sexual activity which forms the subject matter of the charge. for clarity, “subject matter of the charge” refers to the components of the actus reus of the specific charge that the crown must prove at trial these types of records are likely to engage the complainant’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the content and context framework described above. (iv) summary of the analytical process [68] having defined the scope of “records”, we will now provide an outline of the analytical process that should be applied by a court to determine if evidence constitutes a “record”. [69] the presiding judge should first determine if the proposed evidence contains information that falls under s 276. if the evidence falls under both ss. 276 and 278.1, as stated above, the judge should assess the evidence as s 276 evidence. [70] if the proposed evidence does not fall under s 276, the judge should then determine whether it is a “record” under s 2781. if the evidence does not come within one of the enumerated categories, the inquiry should focus on whether it contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. where the evidence is found to be an enumerated or non-enumerated record, the record screening regime is engaged. [71] a non-enumerated record will be caught by the record screening regime if it contains information of an intimate and highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant’s overall physical, psychological or emotional well-being such information will have implications for the complainant’s dignity this assessment considers the content and context of the record. electronic communications are subject to this analysis like all forms of records. in addition, records of an explicit sexual nature not covered by s 276 because they concern the subject matter of the charge will often attract a reasonable expectation of privacy and fall under the record screening regime. [72] when it is unclear whether the evidence is a “record”, counsel should err on the side of caution and initiate stage one of the record screening process. to be clear, under the record screening regime, the accused will be in possession or control of the evidence at issue, and they will know the context in which the evidence arose. for this reason, the accused will be well equipped to discern whether the evidence is a “record” and to make submissions on this point, if need be. (3) who do the impugned provisions apply to? [73] section 278.92(1) states that the record screening regime is intended to apply to records in the accused’s control or possession, which the accused intends to adduce accordingly, the crown is not bound by the record screening regime when seeking to admit private records relating to complainants. had parliament intended for the crown to be bound by the regime, it would have signalled this in the text of ss. 278.92 to 27894. [74] in so concluding, we recognize that in r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr 579, this court held that s 276(1) applies to the crown based on the common law principles of seaboyer, even though s 276(2) refers only to the accused (para. 80; see also r v. rv, 2019 scc 41, [2019] 3 scr 237, at para. 78; r v. goldfinch, 2019 scc 38, [2019] 3 scr 3, at para. 142). but parliament signalled its intention that the crown be bound through the text of s 276(1). as barton explains, the language of s 276(1), “which confirms the irrelevance of the ‘twin myths’, is categorical in nature and applies irrespective of which party has led the prior sexual activity evidence” (para. 80). accordingly, in the context of s 276 evidence, the crown remains obliged to bring the equivalent common law application (commonly referred to as a seaboyer application) where it seeks to introduce evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual history. there is no analogue to s 276(1) in the record screening regime for private records — throughout, the text refers only to the accused. unlike in the s 276 context, the crown is not required to bring a screening application for private records it seeks to introduce into evidence. [75] our colleague brown j criticizes the fact that the record screening regime applies only to the accused and not the crown, should the crown seek to adduce the same records. leaving aside the statutory language, which is clear on the issue, trial fairness “[does] not guarantee defence counsel the right to precisely the same privileges and procedures as the crown” (quesnelle, at para. 64, citing mills, at para. 111). in our view, such is the case here. these statutory procedures do not apply to the crown. (4) when is evidence “adduced” such that an application is required? [76] the parties and interveners disagree about the meaning of “adduce” in ss. 278.92(1), 278.93(2) and 27893(4). the disagreement focuses on whether “adduce” only includes entering evidence as an exhibit at trial, or if it applies as well to the use of the information contained within the record for the purposes of cross-examination. justice côté in dissent would adopt the narrow interpretation in contrast, our interpretation of “adduce” is not limited to circumstances where evidence is entered as an exhibit instead, we adopt a purposive approach that includes references to the content of a record made in defence submissions or the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. specifically, under the record screening regime, the accused must screen records when they seek to use information during a hearing that they specifically learned from those records. if they have independent knowledge of the information, gathered from sources that do not rely on the complainant’s private records, they may use this information without invoking the record screening regime (subject to other applicable evidentiary rules and trial procedures). [77] we reject the narrow interpretation of “adduce” for several reasons. first, limiting “adduce” to entering an exhibit at trial would create a loophole in the regime, as the accused could simply refer to the evidence in their submissions or cross-examination this loophole would not serve to meaningfully protect complainants’ dignity and privacy interests as contemplated by the impugned provisions. [78] second, a narrow interpretation would not address the concern in shearing, where the central issue was the accused’s ability to cross-examine the complainant on the contents of her diary, even though he did not enter the diary itself as an exhibit. since the 2012 senate report identified the shearing situation as one of the motivating factors for its recommendations, it would be illogical to interpret the impugned provisions in a manner that would not address the very situation at issue in that case. [79] third, the 2012 senate report contemplated a broad application for the record screening regime, to account for circumstances where the accused is in possession of a complainant’s records “and wishes to use these records for the purposes of cross-examination or seeks to introduce them into evidence” (p 19). the accused could use the record to advance groundless myths and stereotypes not just by entering it as an exhibit but, for example, by using it in cross-examination. parliament intended to include these situations. [80] finally, the french version of s 278.92(1) translates “intends to adduce” to “se dispose à présenter en preuve” and points towards a broader interpretation where evidence is presented in the trial proceeding, regardless of whether it is formally entered as an exhibit similarly, the term “la preuve” in the french version of ss. 278.93(2) and 278.93(4) refers to evidence broadly and is not limited to exhibits. had parliament intended a more narrow interpretation, the statutory language in french or english would have reflected such an intention. [81] in conclusion, the use of the word “adduce” in the impugned provisions captures the content of the record that is referenced by the accused during the trial, even if the record is not formally entered as an exhibit. (5) what is the appropriate timing of an application? [82] there is also disagreement about the timeframe, specified in the record screening regime, in which an application must be provided to the crown and to the court. more specifically, s 278.93(4) stipulates the following: (4) if the judge, provincial court judge or justice is satisfied that the application was made in accordance with subsection (2), that a copy of the application was given to the prosecutor and to the clerk of the court at least seven days previously, or any shorter interval that the judge, provincial court judge or justice may allow in the interests of justice and that the evidence sought to be adduced is capable of being admissible under subsection 276(2), the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall grant the application and hold a hearing under section 278.94 to determine whether the evidence is admissible under subsection 276(2) or 27892(2). [83] lower courts have come to different conclusions on whether the word “previously” refers to seven days before the stage one inquiry, the stage two hearing, or the trial. the purpose of the seven-day notice period, as explained in the house of commons debates, is to “ensure that all parties have adequate time to prepare” for the application process (vol. 148, no. 195, 1st sess., 42nd parl., june 15, 2017, at p 12789 (marco mendicino)). [84] properly interpreted, “previously” refers to the stage one inquiry where the presiding judge determines whether a stage two hearing is necessary. the crown and clerk of the court must have at least seven days’ notice of the application before it is reviewed by the judge at stage one. however, s 278.93(4) states that the judge can exercise their discretion to truncate the notice period in the “interests of justice”. [85] while the statutory language does not specify that these applications must be conducted pre-trial, in our view, this should be the general practice the encouragement of pre-trial applications in the record screening regime mirrors the approach endorsed previously under the s 276 regime (see, for example, goldfinch, at para. 145) there should be consistency between s 276 evidence applications and private record applications because both now proceed under ss. 278.92 to 27894. [86] there may be situations that require a trial judge to either revisit a prior admissibility determination under s 278.92 or to allow a new application mid-trial (see rv, at para. 75; barton, at para. 65). judges maintain this discretion as part of their inherent trial management power furthermore, in light of s 278.93(4), judges have discretion to allow an application to be brought at a shorter interval than seven days before the stage one hearing when it is in the “interests of justice” however, as a general rule, private record applications should be brought at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. there is good reason for this if mid-trial applications become routine, this would result in frequent adjournments, significant delays, scheduling difficulties ⸺ particularly in jury trials ⸺ and potential unfairness to the accused. mid-trial applications could also harm complainants and discourage the reporting and prosecution of sexual offences. one example of where a mid-trial application may be in the “interests of justice” is if the record was only discovered during the course of the trial. (6) what is the scope of complainant participation? [87] complainant participation is a new procedural component introduced by the impugned provisions, and its scope has not been comprehensively defined by bill c-51 accordingly, we look to parliament’s purpose in enacting bill c-51 to inform what we consider to be the proper approach. [88] section 278.94(2) provides that a complainant is “not a compellable witness” at the stage two hearing, but may “appear and make submissions”. section 278.94(3) directs that “[t]he judge shall, as soon as feasible, inform the complainant who participates in the [stage two] hearing of their right to be represented by counsel.” [89] where the presiding judge decides to hold a stage one oral hearing to determine whether the record is capable of being admissible, the complainant’s participatory rights do not apply. similarly, the complainant is not entitled to provide written submissions if the stage one inquiry proceeds only as a written application. parliament did not incorporate complainants’ participatory rights in s 278.93 when referring to the stage one inquiry. complainants’ participatory rights are specifically attached to parliament’s use of the word “hearing”, which refers to a stage two hearing. [90] the complainant participation provisions, ss. 278.94(2) and 278.94(3), apply to both s 276 and private record applications. within the statutory parameters we discuss below, the presiding judge retains significant discretion to determine the appropriate procedure in each case. (a) complainant’s receipt of application [91] while the complainant participation provisions do not directly address a complainant’s receipt of the application, it can be reasonably inferred that the complainant must have sufficient knowledge of the record to meaningfully participate in the stage two hearing pursuant to s 278.93(4) (if the presiding judge determines that such a hearing is necessary). [92] section 278.93(4) provides that the accused must provide a copy of the application to the prosecutor and clerk of the court when the crown receives the application prior to the stage one inquiry, it should provide a general description of the nature of the record and of its relevance to an issue at trial to the complainant and/or the complainant’s counsel. the seven-day notice period prior to stage one provides the complainant with time to retain counsel in anticipation of the accused’s application being granted under s 278.93(4) at the same time, only a general description is required at this stage because it is not yet clear whether a stage two hearing involving the complainant will be required. [93] if the presiding judge determines that the record is capable of being admissible under stage one, the crown should typically disclose the contents of the application to enable the complainant and/or the complainant’s counsel to prepare for the stage two hearing this facilitates the complainant’s meaningful participation. this process is similar to the prior procedure for s 276 applications in which the crown had the discretion to consult with the complainant (darrach, at para. 55). [94] receipt of the application after the presiding judge determines that the process should continue to stage two also allows the complainant to make an informed decision about the extent to which they wish to participate in the stage two hearing. [95] a complainant’s receipt of the application where a stage two hearing is required is a reflection of one of the components of the audi alteram partem principle: that those who will be affected by a proceeding be informed of the proceeding in addition to having an opportunity to be heard (telecommunications workers union v. canada (radio-television and telecommunications commission), [1995] 2 scr 781, at para. 29; a (ll) v. b (a.), [1995] 4 scr 536, at para. 27). it would be difficult for a complainant to “appear and make submissions” on the issue of the admissibility of their private records without information about what records are at issue and the purpose for which the accused proposes to adduce them. [96] importantly, the presiding judge retains the discretion to direct that the application not be disclosed to the complainant or that portions of it be redacted. this may arise based on a party’s or the judge’s own concerns about the impact of disclosure on trial fairness. (b) complainant’s attendance and submissions [97] the complainant participation provisions do not specify the extent to which complainants and/or their counsel can participate in the stage two hearing. in our view, both can attend the entire stage two hearing to facilitate meaningful participation. if there are concerns at the stage two hearing that a complainant’s attendance would compromise trial fairness, the judge may, in their discretion, exclude the complainant as required. [98] the provisions also do not specify the scope of complainants’ submissions. in our opinion, subject to the judge’s discretion to ensure trial fairness, meaningful participation allows complainants or their counsel to make oral and written submissions at the stage two hearing. there may be circumstances where complainants wish to provide either oral or written submissions, but not both. the presiding judge retains the discretion to permit this. [99] importantly, a complainant’s right to make submissions does not extend to the trial itself. complainants’ participatory rights are strictly confined to the stage two hearing, and only regarding the admissibility of the evidence which the accused seeks to adduce. (c) complainant’s ability to cross-examine and lead evidence [100] there are two reasons why, in our view, complainants do not have the right to cross-examine the accused in the stage two hearing, either directly or through counsel. first, the legislation makes no mention of a right to cross-examine. in other parts of the criminal code where parliament has decided to confer a right of cross-examination, it has done so expressly (see, for example, ss. 117.13(2), 145(10), 347(6), and 6725(11)). [101] second, prohibiting cross-examination does not prevent complainants or their counsel from participating meaningfully at the stage two hearing. meaningful participation can occur through complainants’ written or oral submissions. where it is thought to be necessary to cross-examine the accused at the stage two hearing, it is within the sole prerogative of the crown to do so. [102] similar principles apply to prevent complainants from leading evidence at the stage two hearing. absent clear statutory language, complainants may not do so. other criminal code provisions expressly grant third parties the right to lead evidence, such as victims in the victim impact statement process (ss. 722(3) and 722(9)). should complainants have relevant evidence they wish to tender, this can be disclosed to the crown and presented by the crown if it so chooses. (7) are motions for direction permitted, and can complainants participate? [103] in light of the uncertainty regarding the scope of records, some defence counsel have on occasion brought a motion for directions before engaging in the procedure under ss. 278.92 to 278.94, to determine whether the particular evidence comes within the definition of a “record” under s 2781. motions for directions are not explicitly contemplated by the statutory language of the record screening regime: they are purely a discretionary exercise of the presiding judge’s trial management power. [104] the test we have articulated for interpreting s 278.1 is designed to assist counsel and judges in reducing the need for motions for directions. however, in cases where the accused does bring a motion for directions, the presiding judge must decide whether the proposed evidence is a “record”. where, in the opinion of the judge, the evidence is clearly a “record”, the judge should deal with the matter summarily and order the accused to proceed with a private record application. equally, where the judge is uncertain whether the proposed evidence is a “record”, they should instruct the accused to proceed with an application. only if the judge is clearly satisfied that the proposed evidence does not constitute a “record” should they direct that the accused need not bring an application. [105] in deciding the motion for directions, we are of the view that the presiding judge retains the discretion to provide notice to complainants and allow them to participate. this discretion is available to the judge because the motion for directions itself involves an exercise of the trial management power. (8) do complainants have appeal rights under the impugned provisions? [106] complainants are only participants at the stage two hearing, not parties to the trial proceeding itself. in the vast majority of cases, there will be no further recourse if they are unsatisfied with a decision to admit s 276 evidence or a private record at trial parliament did not contemplate appeal rights for complainants in the statutory language of ss. 278.92 to 27894. [107] however, complainants do have the ability to appeal a stage two hearing decision using the two limited appeal routes that already exist for third party interlocutory appeals in criminal cases: (1) challenging a provincial court order through an application for certiorari in superior court; or (2) seeking leave to appeal to this court pursuant to s 40(1) of the supreme court act, rsc 1985, c. s-26 (a (ll), at para. 24). [108] as with all interlocutory criminal appeals, these appeal routes are extremely limited. certiorari applications by third parties are limited to jurisdictional errors and errors of law on the face of the record, if the order has a final and conclusive character (r v. awashish, 2018 scc 45, [2018] 3 scr 87, at para. 12). since the determination of whether to admit the evidence is a discretionary decision made by the judge, absent exceptional circumstances, complainants are unlikely to succeed on certiorari applications. [109] leave to appeal to this court is similarly narrow as an appeal route for complainants we granted leave to appeal to a.s in this matter because novel constitutional issues were raised. interlocutory appeals of criminal matters before this court, absent clear constitutional issues, are exceedingly rare. [110] judges must always be mindful of the challenges inherent in interlocutory criminal appeals, having particular regard to the principle of judicial economy, the potential disruption of jury trials, and the risk of running afoul of the accused’s s 11(b) charter rights accordingly, interlocutory appeals arising out of s 276 or private record applications should be rare and restricted to clearly exceptional circumstances. b charter analysis [111] having interpreted the relevant provisions, we turn now to their constitutionality. our constitutional analysis focuses on the new elements introduced by the impugned provisions: the record screening regime and the complainant participation provisions the constitutionality of the general procedure for s 276 applications is not before us and was resolved by this court in darrach. [112] the respondents j.j and mr. reddick contend that the impugned provisions violate three fundamental rights guaranteed to accused persons under the charter: the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination under ss. 7 and 11(c); the right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d); and the right to make full answer and defence under ss. 7 and 11(d). we begin with the relevant framework under which the charter analysis must be conducted. (1) analytical framework [113] in mills, the court used s 7 of the charter as the governing analytical framework to assess the constitutionality of the third party production regime for complainant records. similarly, in darrach, this court assessed the constitutionality of the s 276 regime under s 7 of the charter. while violations under s 11 of the charter were also alleged in these cases, the s 7 analysis was dispositive. similarly, in these appeals, ss. 7 and 11(d) are co-extensive with the exception of jj’s arguments regarding overbreadth of the record screening regime, which must be properly analyzed under s 7. any concerns regarding self-incrimination due to defence disclosure can be addressed through the concepts of full answer and defence and trial fairness rights embodied in the ss. 7 and 11(d) analysis. concerns about testimonial compulsion fall under s 11(c), but they pose no problem here because accused persons are not compelled to testify. [114] our colleagues brown j and rowe j object to our analytical framework on the basis that s 11(d) should be analyzed before s 7, which is more “general”. our charter analysis considers the relevance of both ss. 7 and 11(d), which this court has long recognized are “inextricably intertwined” (mills, at para. 69, quoting seaboyer, at p 603) following the approach adopted by this court for decades, we assess these rights together where they are co-extensive and separately where a concern falls specifically under one of the rights (see thomson newspapers ltd. v. canada (director of investigation and research, restrictive trade practices commission), [1990] 1 scr 425, at pp. 536-38; r v l (do), [1993] 4 scr 419, at p 460; r v. levogiannis, [1993] 4 scr 475, at p 494; r v. fitzpatrick, [1995] 4 scr 154, at para. 19; darrach; mills, at para. 69). accordingly, we consider the rights to a fair trial and to make full answer and defence separately from overbreadth, which is specifically enshrined as a principle of fundamental justice within s 7. moreover, we agree with our colleagues’ assertion that s 7 should not be used to “limit” the specific guarantees in ss. 8 to 14. our conclusion that the ss. 7 and 11(d) analysis is co-extensive in these appeals should not be misconstrued as an “internal limiting” of s 11(d) using s 7 principles. [115] further, our approach in these appeals should not be interpreted as a principle of broader application when accused persons raise both ss. 7 and 11(d) in future charter cases the appropriate methodology for assessing multiple charter breaches alleged by the accused may depend on the factual record, the nature of the charter rights at play, and how they intersect. this court has repeatedly affirmed that the methodology for assessing multiple alleged charter breaches is highly context- and fact-specific (r v. mentuck, 2001 scc 76, [2001] 3 scr 442, at para. 37; m (a.) v. ryan, [1997] 1 scr 157, at para. 36; mills, at para. 63; f. iacobucci, “‘reconciling rights’ the supreme court of canada’s approach to competing charter rights” (2003), 20 sclr (2d) 137, at p 156). (2) key principles of section 7 of the charter [116] a claimant must follow two analytical steps to establish that a law breaches s 7 of the charter: they must demonstrate that (1) the impugned provisions result in the deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person; and that (2) the deprivation violates principles of fundamental justice these appeals engage both procedural principles of fundamental justice (the rights to a fair trial and to make full answer and defence, and the privilege against self-incrimination) and substantive principles of fundamental justice (overbreadth). [117] as stated in mills, we accept that the right to liberty in the first stage of the s 7 analysis is engaged because the accused “faces the possibility of imprisonment” (para. 62). accordingly, our s 7 analysis focuses on the second analytical step — the alleged breaches of the principles of fundamental justice. [118] section 7 requires the principles of fundamental justice to be balanced relationally. the emphasis on an accused’s fair trial rights under s 7 should be primary (shearing, at paras. 130-32; mills, at para. 94; d. stuart, charter justice in canadian criminal law (7th ed. 2018), at pp. 284-86; k. roach, “the protection of innocence under section 7 of the charter” (2006), 34 sclr (2d) 249, at pp. 280-81). but the spectrum of interests reflected in the principles of fundamental justice requires a court to avoid viewing any particular principle in isolation from the others (mills, at para. 73). and “[n]o single principle is absolute and capable of trumping the others; all must be defined in light of competing claims” (mills, at para. 61). [119] unlike in mills, complainants’ s 8 rights are not engaged in these appeals because the state does not compel production of complainants’ records. however, like in darrach, the privacy, dignity, and equality interests of complainants are at play in the course of a criminal trial for a sexual offence. [120] in darrach, this court further recognized that encouraging the reporting of sexual violence and protecting the security and privacy of witnesses were relevant principles of fundamental justice in the context of protecting complainants in sexual offence trials (para. 25). elaine craig explains the uniquely invasive nature of sexual offence trials and the privacy implications that result: “simply put, sex, and all things related, are socially constructed as deeply private. the impact of an intrusion into the privacy of a sexual offence complainant will often be qualitatively worse than a similar breach with respect to the alleged victim of a fraud or theft, for example” (“private records, sexual activity evidence, and the charter of rights and freedoms” (2021), 58 alta. l. rev. 773, at pp. 801-2; see also mills, at para. 91, citing m (a.), at para. 30). as a result, darrach adopted a similar approach to mills, despite the fact that the s 276 regime was about admissibility of evidence rather than state-compelled production and thus s 8 was not engaged (paras. 23-24 and 28). [121] accordingly, our analysis of the principles of fundamental justice under s 7 adopts the balancing process that was applied in mills and darrach. like s 11(d), the right to make full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial are considered from the perspectives of the accused, the complainant, the community and the criminal justice system at large (o’connor, at paras. 193-94, per mclachlin j., as she then was). in this manner, ss. 7 and 11(d) are complementary as previously mentioned, the framework for analyzing multiple charter breaches is context- and fact-specific. the court recently demonstrated the highly context-specific nature of this assessment in r. v brown, 2022 scc 18, at para. 70 in these appeals, the correct approach to “balancing” under s 7 is similar to mills and darrach, due to the nature of the alleged charter infringements and the highly invasive privacy consequences for complainants that follow directly from their participation in a trial for a sexual offence in open court. [122] this approach is not contrary to this court’s jurisprudence in canada (attorney general) v bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, and carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, which indicate that “competing moral claims and broad societal benefits are more appropriately considered at the stage of justification under s 1” rather than under s 7 (carter, at para. 79). here, we are not balancing “competing moral claims” but rather assessing the fairness of trial procedures. nothing in those decisions prohibits the “full appreciation of [the relevant] principles of fundamental justice as they operate within a particular context” (mills, at para. 63). (3) key principles of section 11(d) of the charter [123] section 11(d) states that any person charged with an offence has the right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal”. the principles of trial fairness and the accused’s right to make a full answer and defence are expressions of procedural principles of fundamental justice under s 7, and are also embodied in s 11(d) (r v. ns, 2012 scc 72, [2012] 3 scr 726, at para. 15; mills, at para. 69). [124] the key principles of s 11(d) that apply in the present case are as follows: (1) an individual must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the state must bear the burden of proof; and (3) criminal prosecutions must be carried out in accordance with due process (r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at p 121). [125] section 11(d) does not guarantee “the most favourable procedures imaginable” for the accused, nor is it automatically breached whenever relevant evidence is excluded (goldfinch, at para. 30; quesnelle, at para. 64) as this court affirmed in darrach, an accused is not “entitled to have procedures crafted that take only [their] interests into account. still less [are they] entitled to procedures that would distort the truth-seeking function of a trial by permitting irrelevant and prejudicial material at trial” (para. 24). nor is the broad principle of trial fairness assessed solely from the accused’s perspective. crucially, as this court stated in mills, fairness is also assessed from the point of view of the complainant and community (para. 72, citing r v e (aw), [1993] 3 scr 155, at p 198) we now turn to consider the constitutionality of each of the impugned provisions. (4) section 278.92 — threshold for admissibility [126] as a preliminary point, we emphasize that the record screening regime clearly does not render essential evidence inadmissible, such as prior inconsistent statements for the purpose of credibility or reliability assessments. where the balance tips in favour of admitting the evidence because of its significance to the defence, it will be admitted for that purpose by the same token, the record screening regime prohibits the accused from using the evidence for impermissible, myth-based purposes — just like the s 276 regime this is not a novel proposition indeed, no evidence can be admitted unless it meets the relevance and materiality thresholds for admissibility (seaboyer, at p 609; goldfinch, at para. 30). (a) section 278.92 does not impair fair trial rights [127] section 278.92(2)(b) establishes that private records are only admissible if “the evidence is relevant to an issue at trial and has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice” similarly, this admissibility threshold is one of the conditions for s 276 evidence, codified in s 276(2)(d) (as directed now by s 278.92(2)(a)) and constitutionally upheld in darrach. [128] the respondents jj and mr. reddick argue that the admissibility threshold for private records violates the accused’s right to a fair trial because it impairs their right to make full answer and defence. specifically, the concern is that the accused will be prevented from adducing relevant and probative evidence in their defence. [129] the record screening regime embodies the fundamental principle governing the law of evidence: “. . . relevant evidence should be admitted, and irrelevant evidence excluded, subject to the qualification that the value of the evidence must outweigh its potential prejudice to the conduct of a fair trial” (seaboyer, at p 631). an accused’s right to a fair trial does not include the unqualified right to have all evidence in support of their defence admitted many exclusionary rules exist in canadian criminal law to prevent the crown or defence from distorting the truth-seeking function of the trial process, which is an integral component of trial fairness (mills, at para. 74). [130] moreover, when assessing the prejudicial effect, or the “costs”, of admitting potential evidence, trial judges should consider its effect on all aspects of trial fairness, including “the practicalities of its presentation, the fairness to the parties and to witnesses, and the potentially distorting effect the evidence can have on the outcome of the case” (d. m. paciocco, p. paciocco and l. stuesser, the law of evidence (8th ed. 2020), at p 47 (emphasis added)). in the present context, trial judges must consider the “prejudicial effect” of admitting a record as evidence at trial, which includes the effect on complainants whose private information is implicated. [131] in darrach, at para. 39, this court found that the phrase “significant probative value” in the s 276 context simply requires that the evidence not “be so trifling as to be incapable, in the context of all the evidence, of raising a reasonable doubt”. the court used language that specified that its analysis on the threshold was specific to s 276, noting: “in light of the purposes of s 276, the use of the word ‘significant’ is consistent with both the majority and the minority reasons in seaboyer” (para. 41 (emphasis added)). however, at para. 26, darrach recognized the analogous legislative purposes behind the s 276 regime and the third party production regime, which relies on s 278.1: the court in mills upheld the constitutionality of the provisions in the criminal code that control the use of personal and therapeutic records in trials of sexual offences. the use of these records in evidence is analogous in many ways to the use of evidence of prior sexual activity, and the protections in the criminal code surrounding the use of records at trial are motivated by similar policy considerations. [emphasis added.] the similarity between the use of s 276 and s 278.1 evidence recognized in darrach supports our view that the admissibility threshold in s 278.92(2)(b) is constitutional. [132] an important similarity between s 276 evidence and private records is that they both seek to protect complainants against harmful myths and stereotypes. specifically, a key purpose of s 276 is to prevent the accused from adducing evidence that engages the “twin myths” about sexual offence complainants: that complainants are more likely to have consented or are less worthy of belief by reason of past sexual activity that they engaged in (darrach, at para. 32). while the enumerated records in s 278.1 do not necessarily engage the twin myths, which relate specifically to prior sexual activity, this court has recognized that many other problematic myths and stereotypes may be at play — eg, individuals who consult with mental health professionals are not credible and reliable; failure to immediately report a sexual offence means that it did not occur; drug and alcohol use demonstrates bad character; a “real victim” will avoid all contact with the perpetrator after the fact (mills, at para. 119; see also r v. lavallee, [1990] 1 scr 852, at pp. 871-72; r v. w (r.), [1992] 2 scr 122, at p 134). our colleague brown j.’s dissenting reasons focus only on the “twin myths” implicated specifically by s 276 evidence; they fail to meaningfully recognize the risks posed by other myths, including those listed above. [133] in sum, the right to make full answer and defence will only be violated if the accused is prevented from adducing relevant and material evidence, the probative value of which is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. section 278.92 does no such thing with respect to private record applications, the admissibility threshold in s 278.92(2)(b) and the factors in s 278.92(3) require the judge to weigh the potential prejudice arising from the proposed evidence, including whether it is myth-based or unjustifiably intrusive on a complainant’s privacy, against the extent of its probative value. it follows, in our view, that the admissibility threshold in s 278.92(2) does not breach ss. 7 or 11(d) of the charter. (b) section 278.92 procedure is not overbroad [134] the respondent jj argues that s 278.92 violates the accused’s rights under s 7 of the charter because it is overbroad specifically, he says that the record screening regime forces the accused to disclose a wide range of records to the crown and the complainant, going beyond what is necessary to accomplish parliament’s objectives. furthermore, in mr. reddick’s case, the application judge concluded that s 278.92 was overbroad because it subjected all “records” under s 278.1 to the record screening regime, even if the records would not perpetuate myths and stereotypes about sexual offence complainants (paras. 43-49 and 77). [135] to be clear, the constitutionality of the definition of “record” set out in s 278.1 is not in issue. the concern is the application of the definition in the context of the record screening regime in s 278.92 — specifically, with respect to the resulting impacts on self-incrimination and cross-examination. [136] it is a principle of fundamental justice that a law cannot be overbroad. a law is overbroad when it is “so broad in scope that it includes some conduct that bears no relation to its purpose” (bedford, at para. 112 (emphasis in original)) for an impugned provision to be overbroad, there must be “no rational connection between the purposes of the law and some, but not all, of its impacts” (bedford, at para. 112 (emphasis in original)). [137] overbreadth must be understood relative to the legislative purpose, which can be discerned from three factors: (1) statements of purpose in the legislation; (2) the text, context and scheme of the legislation; and (3) extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history and evolution (r v. safarzadeh-markhali, 2016 scc 14, [2016] 1 scr 180, at para. 31, citing r v. moriarity, 2015 scc 55, [2015] 3 scr 485, at para. 31). the “appropriateness” of the legislative purpose has no place in this inquiry, and this court must start from the presumption that the legislation is appropriate and lawful (safarzadeh-markhali, at para. 29, citing moriarity, at para. 30). [138] we have already discussed these factors in extensive detail above, so we will not duplicate the analysis here however, we note that the relevant factors for discerning the purpose of the provisions are the following. first, the legislative history demonstrates that the record screening regime was intended to fill a legislative gap to ensure statutory protection of complainants’ privacy and dignity, where the accused is in possession or control of their highly private records. second, the legislative text and scheme — including the specification of “personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” and the factors set out in s 278.92(3) — provides further guidance on the relevant objectives. [139] taking these factors into account, we conclude that parliament enacted this regime with a view to (1) protecting the dignity, equality, and privacy interests of complainants; (2) recognizing the prevalence of sexual violence in order to promote society’s interest in encouraging victims of sexual offences to come forward and seek treatment; and (3) promoting the truth-seeking function of trials, including by screening out prejudicial myths and stereotypes. section 278.92 is not overbroad relative to this legislative purpose because it does not go further than is reasonably necessary to achieve these three goals (safarzadeh-markhali, at para. 50). [140] the definition of “record” will only capture materials that come within the enumerated categories, or that otherwise contain information of an intimate and highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant’s overall physical, psychological, or emotional well-being screening records that meet this definition is rationally connected to parliament’s objective of protecting the privacy and dignity interests of complainants this narrow definition does not include evidence that does not have implications for complainants’ dignity — for example, communications containing scheduling matters. [141] of course, there will be cases where it is unclear whether evidence falls into the definition of “record”. but this, alone, does not render the regime overbroad. it is important to emphasize that just because a record is subject to screening does not mean it will be excluded at trial. records that meet the admissibility threshold can be adduced at trial further, requiring an accused to bring an application to adduce materials that might contain information of an intimate and highly personal nature is consistent with the objective of the regime, since it respects both the accused’s fair trial rights and the complainant’s privacy and equality interests. [142] protecting complainants’ privacy rights in such circumstances requires a preventative approach, that is, an approach that guards complainants’ reasonable expectation of privacy at the point of admission. as this court observed in o’connor, once privacy is invaded, “it can seldom be regained” (para. 119) it is necessary to determine the nature and gravity of what is at stake before it is adduced at trial. the requirement on accused persons to disclose these records in advance — even where it is unclear to what extent the evidence would have a bearing on complainants’ dignity — is still rationally connected to the overarching objective of the regime. [143] while it is possible that not every record tendered in practice will fall neatly within this definition, parliament was alive to this concern and enacted several procedural safeguards to ensure that any resulting impact was not divorced from the law’s broader objective these include, as discussed above, judges’ discretionary ability to limit the disclosure of applications to complainants before hearings, as well as the ability to hold mid-trial applications where necessary in the interests of justice. where there is ambiguity regarding the application of the record screening regime, these discretionary aspects of the procedure ensure that any impact on the accused’s rights is consistent with parliament’s objective. (5) section 278.93 — stage one application to hold hearing (a) general principles: the right to silence and the principle against self- incrimination [144] the principle against self-incrimination imposes limits on the extent to which an accused can be used as a source of information about his or her own criminal conduct (r v. sab, 2003 scc 60, [2003] 2 scr 678, at para. 33). the right to silence is closely entwined with the principle against self-incrimination (r v. white, [1999] 2 scr 417, at para. 44). as this court explained in r v. henry, 2005 scc 76, [2005] 3 scr 609, at para. 2, the right to “stand silent before the accusations of the state” is “intimately linked to our adversarial system of criminal justice and the presumption of innocence”. both preserve the “basic tenet of justice” that the crown must establish a case to meet before the accused is expected to respond (r v. p (mb), [1994] 1 scr 555, at p 579). [145] the principle against self-incrimination is manifested in several specific constitutional and common law rules that apply both before and during trial. before trial, the law protects an accused from being conscripted into assisting their own prosecution. it does so through the confessions rule, the right to remain silent when questioned by state agents, and the absence of a general duty to disclose (p (mb), at p 578; r v. singh, 2007 scc 48, [2007] 3 scr 405, at para. 21). during the conduct of a trial, the principle against self-incrimination is reflected in (1) the s 11(c) prohibition against testimonial compulsion; (2) the s 11(d) presumption of innocence and the burden on the crown to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the s 13 protection against self-incrimination in other proceedings. [146] residual protection against self-incrimination is also provided under s 7 of the charter (p (mb), at p 577) the residual s 7 protection, however, is context-dependent and does not provide “absolute protection” against “all uses of information that has been compelled by statute or otherwise” (white, at para. 45); nor should one “automatically accept that s 7 comprises a broad right against self-incrimination on an abstract level” (thomson newspapers, at p 538). [147] together, these rights inform the underlying principle “that it is up to the state, with its greater resources, to investigate and prove its own case, and that the individual should not be conscripted into helping the state fulfil this task” (p (mb), at p 579). [148] the parties and interveners in this case have raised the specific issues of testimonial compulsion and “defence disclosure” in support of their contention that the record screening regime violates the principle against self-incrimination. we would not give effect to these arguments for the following reasons. (b) no self-incrimination under section 11(c) due to testimonial compulsion [149] we first turn to s 11(c) of the charter, which guarantees that “[a]ny person charged with an offence has the right . . not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the offence” this right is limited to testimonial compulsion and applies only where a person is (1) compelled to be a witness (2) in proceedings against that person (3) in respect of the offence (martineau v. mnr, 2004 scc 81, [2004] 3 scr 737, at para. 68). it does not apply to protect against the disclosure of physical evidence (r v. beare, [1988] 2 scr 387), including documentary evidence that is not created due to state compulsion (r v anderson (2002), 57 or (3d) 671 (ca), at paras. 17-18). [150] the record screening regime places no burden on the accused to submit an affidavit and undergo cross-examination. if an affidavit is submitted in support of the application, “[i]t need not be the accused [themselves] who presents evidence; it can be anyone with relevant information who can personally testify to its truth” (darrach, at para. 53) nor does it require the accused to testify the accused is simply not compelled to be a witness within the meaning of s 11(c) by the operation of ss. 278.92 to 27894. (c) no defence disclosure undermining right to a fair trial [151] continuing on to ss. 7 and 11(d), the record screening regime does not require compelled “defence disclosure” in a manner that would violate an accused’s right to a fair trial. [152] section 278.93 requires that an accused bring an application setting out detailed particulars of the evidence they seek to adduce and its relevance to the case. the respondent jj submits that this, in effect, compels the defence to disclose evidence and reveal its strategy. he submits that this runs afoul of the principle that an accused has no disclosure obligations this principle, in jj’s view, flows from the related principles of the right to silence, the presumption of innocence, and the right against self-incrimination. the respondent jj and the intervener the criminal trial lawyers’ association (“ctla”) both submit that the record screening regime violates the principle against defence disclosure, therefore forcing defendants to self-incriminate. we would not give effect to this argument. [153] to be clear, this concern is separate from the argument about full answer and defence, in which the predominant concern is that disclosure of evidence to a complainant will impede effective cross-examination. here, the argument is that it is inappropriate to require the defence to disclose its case to the crown, regardless of any subsequent disclosure to witnesses. (i) the right to silence does not entail an absolute rule against “defence disclosure” [154] there is no absolute rule against requiring the defence to disclose evidence to the crown before the prosecution closes its case. [155] the respondent jj and the intervener ctla cite cory j.’s comment in r. v chambers, [1990] 2 scr 1293, that “[a]s a general rule there is no obligation resting upon an accused person to disclose either the defence which will be presented or the details of that defence before the crown has completed its case” (p 1319). they also rely on this court’s comment in r v. stinchcombe, [1991] 3 scr 326, that “the defence has no obligation to assist the prosecution and is entitled to assume a purely adversarial role toward the prosecution” (p 333). [156] we do not agree that these statements, read in their proper context, establish a general rule against defence disclosure. in chambers, the court held that an accused is entitled to remain silent in the face of questioning by police officers, and that it is inappropriate for the crown to ask the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference against an accused who exercises this right this does not support j.j and ctla’s position that there is a general rule against “defence disclosure”. understood properly, it means that where there is no disclosure required, the trier of fact cannot draw an adverse inference from the defence choosing not to disclose. it does not stand for the proposition that the defence can never be required to disclose its theory or the evidence in support of it before the crown has closed its case. [157] furthermore, stinchcombe did not close the door on the possibility of defence disclosure the court commented that a duty on the defence to disclose evidence — reciprocal to the duty of the crown — “may deserve consideration by this court in the future” (p 333). the court clearly did not contemplate the absolute rule against defence disclosure which jj and ctla espouse. [158] there are many examples in the criminal trial process where the defence is required to disclose aspects of its defence theory and evidence in support of it for example, if the defence wishes to adduce evidence of an alibi, it must provide advance disclosure to the crown in “a timely way”, and the disclosure must be “sufficiently particular to enable the authorities to meaningfully investigate” (r v. tomlinson, 2014 onca 158, 307 ccc (3d) 36, at para. 121) where the defence fails to provide timely and sufficient notice (which will typically be before trial), the trier of fact “may draw an adverse inference” when assessing the worth of the alibi (tomlinson, at para. 122). [159] in addition, if an accused wants to lead evidence of a deceased victim’s propensity for violence, they must bring a scopelliti application. a screening procedure for this type of evidence is permitted because it “is likely to arouse feelings of hostility against the [victim]” (r v. scopelliti (1981), 34 or (2d) 524 (ca), at pp. 538-39). as such, “there must inevitably be some element of discretion in the determination whether the proffered evidence has sufficient probative value for the purpose for which it is tendered to justify its admission” (scopelliti, at p 539). [160] finally, evidence of complainants’ prior sexual history must be screened before it can be admitted under s 276. parliament required this process because such evidence may mislead the trier of fact by invoking discredited myths about the credibility of sexual offence complainants, thus distorting the truth-seeking function of the trial (see darrach, at paras. 21, 32, 35 and 42) all three of these screening mechanisms are permitted because of the potential prejudice that could result from the admission of the evidence. [161] the respondent jj contends that the record screening regime applies to a broader range of evidence than the examples discussed above. further, he argues that the logic underlying the record screening regime could apply to all defence evidence, which could mean the defence may be required to disclose its entire case. [162] we do not accept this “slippery slope” argument the record screening regime does not apply to all defence evidence; it is specifically tied to the legislative purpose of protecting complainants’ highly private records in sexual offence trials. like the former s 276 regime, s 278.92 screening in the context of private record applications applies to a narrow set of evidence that implicates important interests of complainants in sexual offence cases and has the potential to create serious prejudice. private records are analogous to s 276 evidence, as they can also implicate myths that are insidious and inimical to the truth-seeking function of the trial (darrach, at paras. 26 and 28). like s 276 evidence, private records encroach on the privacy and dignity of complainants. they too require screening to ensure trial fairness under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. [163] in sum, to encourage the reporting of sexual offences and promote the truth-seeking function of a trial, the record screening regime is designed to catch records which both implicate complainants’ privacy and dignity in sexual offence cases and which have the potential to engage truth-distorting myths. interpreted properly, the class of records subject to screening is tailored to parliament’s objective, and the logic underlying the record screening regime does not apply more broadly to other types of defence evidence. it is permissible to require screening of this evidence because of the potential prejudice that could result from its admission. (ii) the p (mb). concern about crown advantage does not apply [164] the respondent j.j and the intervener ctla have also raised a related concern that, under the record screening regime, the crown is given notice of the defence theory and the evidence in support of it, which the crown can then use to improve its case in advance of trial. in this way, the accused is conscripted into assisting in their own prosecution. to support this argument, jj and ctla rely on p (mb), in which this court discussed the dangers of allowing the crown to reopen its case after an accused has embarked on their defence. [165] in p (mb), the court held that “the crown should not, as a general rule, be permitted to reopen [its case] once the defence has started to answer the crown’s case” (p 580). the rationale for this general rule is as follows: what is so objectionable about allowing the crown’s case to be reopened after the defence has started to meet that case is that it jeopardizes, indirectly, the principle that an accused not be conscripted against him- or herself. . . . [t]here is a real risk that the crown will, based on what it has heard from the defence once it is compelled to “meet the case” against it, seek to fill in gaps or correct mistakes in the case which it had on closing and to which the defence has started to respond. [emphasis in original; pp. 579-80.] the respondent jj and the intervener ctla submit that the record screening regime raises similar concerns to those identified in p (mb). specifically, the regime requires the defence to disclose some evidence, which the crown can use to “fill in gaps or correct mistakes” in its case this, they say, constitutes self-incrimination as contemplated in p (mb). [166] in our view, jj and ctla have taken p (mb) out of context. the court in that case discussed the specific concerns arising from the crown reopening its case after the defence had started to give evidence at trial. at that point, the crown is not permitted to correct its own error or omission — “enough is enough” (p (mb), at p 580). once the crown has closed its case, it generally cannot move the goalposts after the accused has embarked on their defence (see r v. g (sg), [1997] 2 scr. 716, at para. 38). as such, the trial judge’s discretion to allow the crown to reopen its case is very much constrained. [167] the “ambit” of that discretion also falls on a scale: it “becomes narrower as the trial proceeds because of the increasing likelihood of prejudice to the accused’s defence as the trial progresses” (g (sg), at para. 30) the trial judge has broad discretion before the crown has closed its case; more limited discretion after the crown has closed but before the defence has elected whether or not to call evidence; and extremely narrow discretion once the defence has already begun to answer the crown’s case (g (sg), at para. 30). [168] these concerns from p (mb) and g (sg) do not arise in the context of private record applications. the record screening process generally takes place before trial, well before the crown has begun — let alone finished — making its case. following the logic of g (sg), at this juncture, the likelihood of prejudice to the accused is at the lower end of the scale. we considered these authorities bearing in mind the context in which they were decided — i.e the crown was reopening its case — instead of considering them to be abstract and undefined statements of principle relating to the pre-trial screening of evidence. [169] while an application must disclose the evidence at issue and its relevance to the case, this is not tantamount to revealing the entire defence theory in response to which the crown could, hypothetically, tailor its prosecution. the application process is limited to the admissibility of the highly private records sought to be adduced. the guilt or innocence of the accused is not at issue in the record screening regime; the proceedings relate solely to the admissibility of a particular class of evidence sought to be adduced by the accused. the risk of the crown co-opting this evidence to strengthen its case is accordingly limited. as such, the defence cannot be said to be assisting the crown’s prosecution. [170] in conclusion, we are satisfied that s 278.93 is constitutional under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. first, the accused is not compelled to testify and, therefore, s 11(c) of the charter is not engaged. second, there is no absolute rule against defence disclosure. the screening of private records is appropriate because the evidence has a high potential for prejudice; it does not constitute a disguised form of self- incrimination. (6) section 278.94 — stage two hearing procedure [171] section 278.94 governs the procedure for the stage two hearing the regime provides for complainant participation in s 278.94(2) and (3). section 278.94(2) permits complainants to appear and make submissions, and s 278.94(3) stipulates that judges must, as soon as feasible, inform complainants who participate in the hearing of their right to be represented by counsel. [172] the respondent mr. reddick submits that these provisions violate the accused’s fair trial rights protected by ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. in particular, he argues that (1) accused persons will be deprived of relevant information regarding complainants’ initial reaction to the proposed evidence, thereby violating their right to make full answer and defence; (2) prosecutorial independence will be jeopardized by adding an additional adversary against the accused; and (3) complainants will tailor their evidence at trial in response to the application. for the reasons that follow, we would not give effect to these submissions. (a) no deprivation of relevant evidence [173] as discussed above, if the judge determines that a stage two hearing is required, complainants must be informed of the relevant information in the application to enable their meaningful participation. mr. reddick argues that complainants’ receipt of this information through counsel will deprive the defence of relevant crown disclosure the argument assumes that the complainant will be provided with information about the contents of the application in the absence of the crown (ie the defence will send the application to the complainant’s counsel directly). therefore, the accused will be deprived of crown disclosure about the complainant’s “initial reaction” to the application, including their emotional responses. [174] there is no statutory support for the assumption that the application will be sent directly to complainants without the involvement of the crown. the legislation is silent about complainants’ entitlement to receive the application. consistent with the former practice under s 276, the crown is responsible for consulting complainants regarding the application therefore, there is no change from the s 276 regime. accused persons have not “lost” any crown disclosure to which they were originally entitled moreover, complainants have always had the ability to consult counsel regarding s 276 evidence applications. [175] in any event, mr. reddick has not given any reason to believe that “initial reaction” evidence of complainants’ emotional state is inherently valuable, outside of myth-based reasoning that relies on the stereotype that there is only one “appropriate reaction” to the disclosure of private information of course, if any new relevant information arises during the crown’s consultation with a complainant, then it has a duty to disclose this information to the accused. the provisions granting participatory rights to complainants have not in any way altered the crown’s stinchcombe obligations. (b) no impact on prosecutorial independence [176] mr. reddick argues that a complainant’s participation in the stage two hearing violates the right to a fair trial because it disrupts the general structure of a criminal trial as a bipartite proceeding between the crown and the accused. mr. reddick also argues that the participation of complainants and their counsel interferes with prosecutorial independence. we disagree. [177] complainant’s participation is justified because they have a direct interest in whether their records, for which they have a reasonable expectation of privacy, are adduced in open court. in a (ll),. l’heureux-dubé j (writing for the majority on this point) found that a sexual assault complainant had standing to appeal a decision regarding the production to the accused of her private records in the hands of a third party (either through certiorari with respect to provincial court orders or through s 40 of the supreme court act for superior court orders, both of which were discussed above in paras. 111-12). she found that complainants had a “direct and necessary interest in making representations” and would be “directly affected by a decision regarding the production of [their] private records” (para. 28). that reasoning applies equally in this context and underlies complainants’ standing to participate in the admissibility hearing. [178] this limited standing on the issue of admissibility, however, does not turn complainants or their counsel into parties, much less quasi-prosecutors, usurping the role of the crown. participation by complainants does not change the bipartite nature of the criminal trial. there is no issue of a complainant acting as a “second prosecutor” on the ultimate issue of guilt where, as here, the complainant has no participatory rights in the trial itself as this court noted at para. 66 of darrach, the purpose of an evidentiary voir dire is not to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. instead, the complainant is bringing their unique perspective on the impact that the admission of the evidence will have on their privacy and dignity, which is directly relevant to the issue of admissibility. the presiding judge remains the final arbiter on admissibility and is entitled to accept or reject the complainant’s submissions and weigh them against the competing considerations. [179] an important justification for complainants’ participation is that they have a unique perspective on the nature of the privacy interest at stake in their own records. far from becoming a “second prosecutor”, a complainant’s contributions are valuable exactly because they are different from the crown’s this may also strengthen the appearance of prosecutorial independence because the crown no longer bears the burden of representing or conveying to the judge the complainant’s perspective on whether the records should be admitted this is especially significant where the complainant and crown differ on the issue of admissibility. [180] there are other situations in which third parties are permitted to participate in criminal trials where they have interests at stake. for example, victims providing victim impact statements at sentencing hearings or media participants making submissions regarding publication bans both have participatory rights in the courtroom. these participatory rights do not distort the bipartite nature of the criminal proceeding. (c) no violation of the right to cross-examine [181] as explained above, complainants will receive information about the application from the crown in order to facilitate their participation in the hearing. given that most applications should be made before trial, complainants will generally receive this information before they testify. section 278.94 also confers participation rights at the stage two hearing, which allows complainants to hear the defence’s oral arguments regarding relevance and probative value of the evidence (unless the judge decides that some exclusion is necessary to protect trial fairness). [182] both jj and mr. reddick submit that a complainant’s knowledge of the evidence in the application, as well as the defence theory as to why it is relevant, will impair the defence’s right to cross-examine without significant and unwarranted restraint. they submit that by participating in the stage two hearing, complainants will be able to tailor their responses in cross-examination at trial to explain away discrepancies and diminish the impact of the defence’s line of questioning since credibility and reliability will often be central to the trial of a sexual offence, complainant participation violates the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. we disagree with this submission for several reasons. [183] first, the right to cross-examine is not unlimited. the accused is not entitled to proceed with an unfair or irrelevant cross-examination only because they consider it to be their most effective strategy. this is both unfair to complainants and contrary to the interests of justice. in osolin, l’heureux-dubé j., dissenting, but not on this point, noted that “[t]he rights of the accused to both adduce evidence and cross-examine are not unlimited but must be first, circumscribed by the question of relevance and second, balanced by countervailing factors such as the privacy interests of the witness and the prejudice to both the witness and the trial process” (pp. 631-32) in this case, ambushing complainants with their own highly private records at trial can be unfair to complainants and may be contrary to the search for truth. [184] ultimately, the right to a fair trial does not guarantee “the most advantageous trial possible from the accused’s perspective” nor does it guarantee “perfect justice” (r v. find, 2001 scc 32, [2001] 1 scr 863, at para. 28; see also o’connor, at para. 193) rather, the guarantee is fundamentally fair justice, which requires consideration of the privacy interests of others involved in the justice system (o’connor, at paras. 193-94, per mclachlin j.) even if it would be ideal from the accused’s perspective to cross-examine complainants on “every scintilla” of information in an attempt to discredit or shake them, the charter guarantees no such right (o’connor, at paras. 193-94). in the present case, the impugned provisions strike a balance that protects fundamental justice for accused persons and complainants. [185] second, it is incorrect to assume that advanced disclosure prevents effective cross-examination or impairs the search for truth. accused persons receive extensive disclosure from the crown, yet there is no assumption that their testimony is less reliable or credible as a result. indeed, this court in stinchcombe soundly rejected this suggestion: refusal to disclose is also justified on the ground that the material will be used to enable the defence to tailor its evidence to conform with information in the crown’s possession. for example, a witness may change his or her testimony to conform with a previous statement given to the police or counsel for the crown. i am not impressed with this submission. all forms of discovery are subject to this criticism. there is surely nothing wrong in a witness refreshing his or her memory from a previous statement or document. the witness may even change his or her evidence as a result. this may rob the cross-examiner of a substantial advantage but fairness to the witness may require that a trap not be laid by allowing the witness to testify without the benefit of seeing contradictory writings which the prosecutor holds close to the vest. the principle has been accepted that the search for truth is advanced rather than retarded by disclosure of all relevant material. [emphasis added; p 335.] therefore, contrary to the submission of j.j and mr. reddick, there is no absolute principle that disclosure of defence materials inevitably impairs cross-examination and trial fairness. [186] in civil proceedings, both parties participate in extensive pre-trial discovery and disclosure of documents and witnesses, without raising the issue of “witness tainting”. although surprise was historically a “weapo[n] in the arsenal” of adversarial trials in general, its decline has resulted from the acceptance of the principle that “justice was better served when the element of surprise was eliminated from the trial and the parties were prepared to address issues on the basis of complete information of the case to be met” (stinchcombe, at p 332). this court applied that principle in darrach, holding that “[t]he right to make full answer and defence does not include the right to defend by ambush” (para. 55) similarly, in the third party production regime, complainants receive a copy of the production application and have the ability to participate in the hearing concerning the likely relevance of that evidence in advance of cross-examination. [187] “witness tainting” is not a concern that precludes effective cross-examination with respect to crown disclosure in criminal trials or civil proceedings. for the same reasons, complainant participation in a stage two hearing does not create a risk of “witness tainting” that impermissibly impairs the search for truth or the effectiveness of cross-examination providing advance notice to complainants that they may be confronted with highly private information in open court is likely to enhance their ability to participate honestly in cross-examination. specifically, they are likely to be better equipped to respond rather than being blindsided with the use of their private records. in addition, the requirement that an application be disclosed in advance of trial ensures that sexual offence complainants are informed about the implications of participating in the trial process (craig, at pp. 808-9; r v. ms, 2019 oncj 670, at para. 92 (canlii)). this in turn promotes just and fair trials. [188] third, the accused will still be able to test a complainant’s evidence by comparing it to prior statements made to the police. these statements are available to the defence under the crown’s stinchcombe obligations. if the complainant’s evidence has changed significantly between the police statement and the trial, this will be readily apparent to the trier of fact, and the accused will be able to cross-examine on that basis (whether or not the police statement was made under oath) (see craig). triers of fact can assess whether they believe the complainant and adjust the weight they give to the complainant’s evidence. [189] fourth, complainants can be cross-examined on their access to the private record application the accused can impugn the credibility and reliability of the complainant by suggesting that they tailored their evidence to fit what they learned in the application. to the extent that our colleague brown j suggests that ss. 645(5) and 648 of the criminal code render such cross-examination impermissible, we disagree. [190] finally, s 278.93(4) provides judges with the discretion to hear applications at a shorter interval than seven days before the hearing if it is in the “interests of justice” trial judges also have the discretion to hear an application mid-trial in the interests of justice. the respondents jj and mr. reddick are concerned about “witness tainting” because complainants generally receive the application and participate in the stage two admissibility hearing before they take the stand at trial. however, if there is a situation where advanced disclosure of the application to a complainant would genuinely negate the efficacy of cross-examination, the accused may choose to bring the application during cross-examination to avoid the risk of “witness tainting”. the trial judge is then responsible for determining whether it is in the interests of justice to allow such an application. in doing so, trial judges should be mindful of the trial delay risks that will arise due to the bifurcation of trial. to be clear, mid-trial applications should not be the norm. (7) final conclusions regarding constitutionality [191] in the absence of a finding that ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code breach either ss. 7 or 11(d) of the charter, it is unnecessary for us to canvass s 1 of the charter. and as discussed earlier, there are no s 11(c) issues at play. v disposition [192] sections 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code are constitutional in their entirety, as they apply to both s 276 evidence applications and private record applications. [193] accordingly, we would allow the crown’s appeal and dismiss jj’s cross- appeal; we would also allow as’s appeal the application judges’ constitutional rulings in both matters are hereby quashed. vi costs [194] in jj’s case, there will be no order as to costs, whether with respect to the crown’s appeal or to jj’s cross-appeal, as this is a criminal matter without exceptional circumstances. [195] in the other appeal, as brought a motion to appoint counsel pursuant to s 694.1 of the criminal code section 694.1 does not contemplate appointments of counsel for parties other than accused individuals and, accordingly, as’s motion must be denied. [196] however, a.s provided an important perspective before this court on behalf of complainants on a novel constitutional question at her own expense. pursuant to this court’s costs jurisdiction under s 47 of the supreme court act, we exercise our discretion in these exceptional circumstances to order the attorney general of ontario to pay as’s costs before this court. as such, as’s appeal is allowed with costs to as in this court, in accordance with the tariff of fees and disbursements set out in schedule b of the rules of the supreme court of canada, sor/2002-156. the following are the reasons delivered by brown j — i. introduction [197] in r v seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577, at p 625, this court held that parliament, in rightly seeking to abolish the “outmoded, sexist-based use” of evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual activity, “oversho[t] the mark” by rendering inadmissible “evidence which may be essential to the presentation of legitimate defences and hence to a fair trial”. in so doing, the court added, parliament created “the real risk that an innocent person may be convicted” (p 625). [198] these appeals arise from a measure that also imposes precisely that risk. the records screening regime enacted under ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, represents an unprecedented and unconstitutional erosion by parliament of the fair trial rights of the presumptively innocent ⸺ who, it should be borne in mind, will sometimes be actually innocent. it seriously impedes the ability of such persons to prove that innocence, by making presumptively inadmissible all private records relating to the complainant that are in the possession of the accused and which the accused intends to adduce in a sexual offence prosecution. it is the only evidentiary rule that mandates pre-trial disclosure of defence evidence and strategy, before the crown has made out a case to meet, and even where the evidence sought to be relied on is neither irrelevant nor inherently prejudicial. [199] in upholding this regime as constitutional, the majority points reassuringly to supposed “similarities” between the records screening regime and two related statutory schemes: s 276’s provisions restricting admissibility of other sexual activity evidence ⸺ initially struck down in seaboyer but then narrowed by parliament and upheld in r v. darrach, 2000 scc 46, [2000] 2 scr 443; and ss. 278.1 to 278.91’s framework for production of third-party records ⸺ upheld in r v mills, [1999] 3 scr 668. since the accused’s right to full answer and defence and the rule against defence disclosure are not absolute, the logic goes, parliament can go even further in departing from them. the majority’s analysis is thus reducible to a simple syllogism: (1) these rights are not absolute and have been limited in similar ways; (2) those limits were judged constitutional; (3) therefore, this new limit is constitutional. [200] but casting these two schemes as “similar” miscasts both them and our jurisprudence. the majority fails to account for the actual mechanics and effects of the records screening regime it is broader in its purpose, scope, and impact on the accused’s rights it goes further than s 276 and ss. 278.1 to 278.91 by giving the complainant a right to advance notice and to “appear and make submissions”, and applies to a wider range of records, many of which will often be highly relevant and probative. it is not limited to materials that were created in a confidential context or wrongly fell into the accused’s hands, such as a complainant’s psychiatric report. and, crucially, it also captures the accused’s own digital communications with the complainant about the subject matter of the charge ⸺ including, but not limited to, messages in which the complainant denies the offence ever occurred, indicates a motive to fabricate, suggests an inability to remember core events, or provides an inconsistent version of the alleged incident. that is a difference in kind, not in degree. [201] in short, and in a field which calls for a context-specific analysis, the majority cannot plausibly claim that regimes which are designed to deal with production, or with evidence that is inherently prejudicial, can be applied across the board to deal with admissibility or with evidence that will often be relevant and highly probative. nor for that matter can the attorney general of canada credibly maintain that parliament struck the right balance where it has crudely jammed procedures from one regime onto another. [202] responding to arguments that no one made, the majority emphasizes that the right to cross-examination is “not unlimited” (para. 183) and that no one has a right to a “perfect” trial (para. 184). but this trivializes the concerns about this regime. and it skates around a certain reality of our criminal justice system, being that these rights, while not absolute, are of the most fundamental order and have been departed from only in particular, constrained circumstances. [203] my reasons focus on the constitutional infirmities of this specific legislation properly interpreted, the records screening regime limits the accused’s rights under ss. 11(c), 11(d) and 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms in four ways: 1. it forces accused persons to reveal their defence before the crown has made out a case to meet, contrary to the principle against self-incrimination, the right to silence, and the presumption of innocence accused persons must disclose not only their cross-examination strategy and potential impeachment material, but also their own prior statements, even before the crown has opened its case while the majority’s analysis fails to answer whether the accused’s communications with the complainant about the subject matter of the charge qualify as “records”, as i will explain, they are clearly captured accused persons cannot therefore even refer to the contents of those communications in their own defence without first bringing an application. even if the records are ultimately admitted, the accused’s rights have been limited. this alone is fatal to the regime’s constitutionality. 2. it restricts the accused’s ability to cross-examine crown witnesses by giving the complainant a role in pre-trial admissibility determinations the defence must generally disclose its application to the crown and complainant at least seven days before the admissibility hearing, which risks tainting the complainant’s evidence and restricts the accused’s ability to impeach the complainant at trial cross-examination remains a core component of the right to full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial. in sexual assault cases, it is often the only way to expose falsehoods, memory issues, and inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony. 3. it makes private records presumptively inadmissible when tendered by the defence, but presumptively admissible when tendered by the crown the prosecution is not bound by the records screening regime and can freely adduce private records in support of a conviction, without pre-trial screening. it is only when the defence wants to use the same private information to raise a reasonable doubt that it becomes dangerous. this undermines the purpose of the regime and is contrary to the right to a fair trial. 4. it sets a stricter test for admitting defence evidence than is warranted or constitutionally permissible the accused must establish, in advance of the complainant’s testimony, that the records have significant probative value, meaning some relevant and probative evidence will necessarily be excluded combined with the broad scope of “record”, this limits the presumption of innocence and the right to full answer and defence. [204] these limits are disproportionate and cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society in pursuing a legitimate purpose, parliament has proceeded in a ham-fisted manner, without regard for fundamental rights of accused persons the regime is not merely disadvantageous to the defence; it interferes significantly with the accused’s ability to avoid self-incrimination, effectively cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and adduce relevant and probative evidence during a proceeding that will decide their liberty while the regime may advance parliament’s objective of protecting complainants’ privacy, dignity, and equality, it does so only marginally, and at the expense of core fair trial rights. [205] parliament has legislated a formula for wrongful convictions. indeed, it has all but guaranteed them. like the court that decided seaboyer, i would not tolerate that inevitability. and like the regime at issue in seaboyer, the records screening regime ought to be returned to parliament to be narrowed. parliament could have achieved its objective in a charter-compliant way. ii legislative background [206] two related legislative schemes preceded the records screening regime: 1. the s 276 regime, enacted in 1992, limits the use of evidence of a complainant’s other sexual activity during trials for sexual offences. prior to the enactment of s 278.92, s 276 was the only evidentiary rule that imposed a presumption of inadmissibility exclusively on defence evidence, which it did by categorically prohibiting evidence of a complainant’s sexual history when used to support one of two general inferences (darrach, at para. 2). this court upheld its constitutionality in darrach, explaining that s 276 is “designed to exclude irrelevant information and only that relevant information that is more prejudicial to the administration of justice than it is probative” (para. 43). 2. the ss. 278.1 to 278.91 regime, enacted in 1997, regulates the production of third-party records to accused persons in sexual offence proceedings this court upheld its constitutionality in mills, concluding that the regime was “carefully tailored to reflect the problem parliament was addressing” ⸺ preserving an accused’s access to private records that may be relevant, while protecting the privacy rights of complainants and witnesses (para. 99). [207] following the enactment of those regimes, it became apparent that admissibility of documents in the possession of the accused in which the complainant has a privacy interest raised a “quite different problem” (r v. shearing, 2002 scc 58, [2002] 3 scr 33, at para. 133). in r v. osolin, [1993] 4 scr 595, and shearing, this court stated a common law process for admissibility of records in the accused’s possession. [208] in 2012, the standing senate committee on legal and constitutional affairs reviewed the third-party record regime it recommended that parliament consider creating “a procedure governing the admissibility and use during trial of a complainant’s private records, as defined in section 278.1 of the criminal code, which are not wrongfully in the hands of the accused” (statutory review on the provisions and operation of the act to amend the criminal code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings): final report, at p 20) in response, on december 13, 2018, parliament enacted the records screening regime. [209] as i have already noted more generally, the records screening regime makes presumptively inadmissible any record in the accused’s possession relating to the complainant for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and which the accused intends to adduce (ss. 278.1 and 278.92(1)) the proposed evidence is inadmissible, unless (1) it is admissible under s 276, where s 276 applies (s 278.92(2)(a)); or in any other case, (2) it is “relevant to an issue at trial and has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice” (s 278.92(2)(b)) further, s 278.92(3) enumerates nine factors that the judge shall consider in determining admissibility, including “any other factor that the judge . . considers relevant” (s 27892(3)(i)). [210] under s 278.93(1), the accused must make an application to determine whether such evidence is admissible under ss. 276(2) or 27892(2). section 278.93(2) sets out the form and content of the application the application “must be made in writing, setting out detailed particulars of the evidence that the accused seeks to adduce and the relevance of that evidence to an issue at trial”. that application must be filed and given to the crown and the clerk of the court “at least seven days previously, or any shorter interval that the judge . . may allow in the interests of justice” (s 27893(4)). if the judge is satisfied that the application has been properly served and that the evidence is “capable of being admissible”, the judge shall hold a threshold screening hearing to determine whether the evidence is admissible under ss. 276(2) or 27892(2). [211] the admissibility hearing is held in camera (s 278.94(1)) the complainant is not compellable at the hearing but may appear and make submissions (s 278.94(2)) the complainant has the right to be represented by counsel (s 27894(3)). iii analysis a preliminary points regarding the majority’s analytical structure [212] i first offer this brief comment on the proper analytical framework to be applied where both ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter are raised. [213] i concur with rowe j.’s reasons the jurisprudence on s 7 and its relationship to other sections of the charter, including (as here) s 11, is doctrinally obscure and methodologically incoherent, being the product of 40 years of accumulated judicial ad hoc-ery the majority’s reasons regrettably extend this trajectory in a particularly regressive manner by using s 7 not to protect the fair trial and due process guarantees under the charter, but to erode them this, in form and effect, makes rowe j.’s case that our s 7 jurisprudence is increasingly “being used as the instrument to imperil [fair trial] protection” (rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 431). that our law has come to this curious point is, to put it mildly, remarkable and unfortunate. [214] that said, in order to fully respond to the submissions and the majority’s reasons, i apply the framework from mills and darrach that they invoke. the majority dismisses the dissenting reasons out of hand, saying that we disregard the principle of stare decisis (para. 14). this is simply incorrect: in finding the regime unconstitutional, i apply the governing framework. more to the point, however, the majority’s plea of stare decisis is no answer to the extraordinary convolutions in the s 7 jurisprudence that rowe j recounts and which, as i say, the majority’s judgment perpetuates. [215] i also observe, respectfully, that the majority provides no useful guidance for courts that will in future cases have to apply the existing framework. my colleagues describe the “methodology” for assessing multiple alleged charter breaches as “highly context- and fact-specific” and say that it “may depend on the factual record, the nature of the charter rights at play” and “how they intersect” (whatever that means) (para. 115) similarly, they urge a “full appreciation of the relevant principles of fundamental justice as they operate within a particular context” (para. 122, citing mills, at para. 63). none of this can plausibly be described as a “methodology”. it is, rather, quite the opposite, and instead makes the case that the exercise is indeed pure ad hoc-ery, and will continue to be so. [216] secondly, we heard submissions regarding the framework to be applied where a complainant’s constitutionally protected rights are at stake ⸺ that is, whether “balancing” under dagenais v. canadian broadcasting corp., [1994] 3 scr 835, and r v. mentuck, 2001 scc 76, [2001] 3 scr 442, or “reconciling” under mills and darrach is the appropriate framework it is not necessary for me to decide this since, in my view, the accused’s rights are not in competition with any other set of rights here unlike the evidence under ss. 278.1 to 278.91 considered in mills, the records at issue here are already in the accused’s hands, leaving no s 8 concern for invasion of privacy by the state to be shown (shearing, at para. 95). and unlike s 276 evidence considered in darrach, there is nothing categorically prejudicial about the records captured by ss. 278.92 to 278.94, and thus it is not obvious that “the privacy, dignity, and equality interests of complainants” are “at play” (again, whatever that means) (majority reasons, at para. 119) there is therefore nothing to balance, or reconcile. further, while the majority peremptorily announces that “encouraging the reporting of sexual violence and protecting the security and privacy of witnesses” are principles of fundamental justice (at para. 120), that proposition is simply not borne out on closer inspection. as rowe j observes at para. 370 of his reasons, seaboyer did not recognize those goals as principles of fundamental justice and it is unlikely they would meet the current test. [217] even if this case did “engage” competing charter rights, darrach and mills would not be determinative of the constitutionality of the records screening regime by way of background, various attorneys general say that parliament extended the criminal code’s existing protections simply to fill a “gap” where the defence already possesses private records relating to the complainant and so the crown characterizes the records screening regime as “a principled extension of the common law and related codified procedural and evidentiary schemes that have already survived constitutional scrutiny” (a.f in jj’s case, at para. 1) the majority indiscriminately embraces this view, saying the same conclusion should follow here. [218] i disagree. the records screening regime is unlike the s 276 and ss. 278.1 to 278.91 regimes as counsel for j.j explained, “[i]t raises a different problem, requiring a different solution” (transcript, day 1, at p 45) those regimes govern situations where the accused attempts to secure or adduce material that is presumptively irrelevant by nature, and whose production or use is inherently prejudicial to trial fairness. in contrast, the records screening regime governs the use of materials in the accused’s possession that are often relevant, probative, and not inherently prejudicial. there will, for example, rarely be a risk of prejudice to the trial process (in the sense of misleading the trier of fact) where an accused impeaches the complainant using a text message that the complainant sent to the accused, and which is not relied on for myth-based reasoning. [219] as to s 276, this court has emphasized more than once that it captures a narrow category of evidence, and for good reason. in seaboyer, the court explained that its purpose was to abolish the old common law rules permitting admission of the complainant’s sexual conduct which is of little probative value and calculated to mislead the jury (p 604) and in darrach, gonthier j repeatedly emphasized that s 276 aims to exclude only irrelevant and misleading evidence (paras. 19, 21, 25, 37, 42, 45 and 58). that justification was definitively expressed in the following passages: an accused has never had a right to adduce irrelevant evidence nor does he have the right to adduce misleading evidence to support illegitimate inferences: “the accused is not permitted to distort the truth-seeking function of the trial process” (mills, supra, at para. 74). because s 276(1) is an evidentiary rule that only excludes material that is not relevant, it cannot infringe the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. . prior sexual activity is, like hearsay, character evidence and similar fact evidence, restricted in its admissibility. if the defence seeks to adduce such evidence, it must establish that it supports at least some relevant inference. evidence of prior sexual activity will rarely be relevant to support a denial that sexual activity took place or to establish consent. [emphasis added; paras. 37, 46 and 58.] [220] but none of this is true of records captured by the regime established under ss. 278.92 to 278.94 before us, the crown argued that private records are “equally capable of raising the same concerns that animate section 276” including “the potential for myth-based reasoning . . . that extend[s] beyond the twin myths” (transcript, day 1, at p 11) counsel did not clarify which myths she was referring to the majority similarly asserts that private records are “analogous to s 276 evidence, as they can also implicate myths that are insidious and inimical to the truth-seeking function of the trial” (para. 162) this is another entirely peremptory assertion there is no basis in the evidence or jurisprudence for concluding that all material engaging the complainant’s privacy interest that is in the accused’s possession will distort the truth-seeking function of the trial. moreover, it is belied by the case law applying the records screening regime to date, which demonstrates that “records” will often be highly relevant, probative, and unrelated to myths and stereotypes this is all quite apart from the regime’s broad application to “records” in the hands of the defence but not in the hands of the crown, which further highlights the differences between the impugned legislation and the s 276 regime. [221] as for ss. 278.1 to 278.91, that regime is concerned with production of records from third parties, not the admissibility of records already in the accused’s possession. the former are highly private and often confidential records that were never intended for the accused’s eyes in mills, the court explained that the scope of the accused’s right to full answer and defence must be determined in light of the competing privacy and equality rights of complainants and witnesses. this exercise is necessarily context-specific. where the accused seeks to rely on information “that will only serve to distort the truth-seeking purpose of a trial”, privacy and equality concerns are paramount (para. 94). on the other hand, “where the information contained in a record directly bears on the right to make full answer and defence, privacy rights must yield to the need to avoid convicting the innocent” (para. 94 (emphasis added)). this court in shearing made clear that the same rationales governing production do not apply to admissibility (paras. 105-7). [222] i therefore cannot agree that the constitutionality of the records screening regime flows from this court’s statements in mills and darrach indeed, it would appear that those statements militate against the regime’s constitutionality. the records screening regime renders presumptively inadmissible the same types of records that would be produced to the accused under the mills regime as being necessary for full answer and defence at a preliminary stage. [223] rather, the analysis turns on the interpretation of the specific provisions, particularly the following phrases: 1. “record”; 2. “which the accused intends to adduce”; 3. the complainant may “appear and make submissions”; 4. “seven days previously, or any shorter interval that the judge . may allow in the interests of justice”. [224] i would find that the records screening regime violates both s 11 and s 7. for that reason, applying the existing charter framework and responding to the parties’ submissions, i proceed to consider the records screening regime element by element rather than duplicating the analysis by considering ss. 11 and 7 breaches separately. [225] with those structural points in mind, i now turn to consider the constitutionality of the records screening regime by, first, discerning its scope, then showing the four ways in which the regime limits the accused’s charter rights. b. the records screening regime limits sections 11(c), 11(d) and 7 of the charter the accused’s rights under (1) overbreadth [226] the records screening regime renders presumptively inadmissible a remarkably broad range of records in the hands of the defence, capturing not only records that are sensitive or prejudicial ⸺ contrary to the majority’s view. further, it regulates their use in any manner these conclusions flow, respectively, from the proper interpretation of the terms “record” and “adduce”. (a) “record” [227] as i will explain, properly interpreted, the definition of “record” is not limited to records created in a confidential context ⸺ such as therapeutic or medical records. nor is it limited to materials containing “information of an intimate or highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant’s overall physical, psychological or emotional well-being” (majority reasons, at para. 42). crucially, as explained below and conceded by the crown, it may capture digital communications sent between the accused and complainant about the subject matter of the charge. [228] my colleagues in the majority attempt to rein in the definition of “record”, promising “guidance” on that matter (para. 37). but instead, recognizing that including all digital communications would render the regime overbroad, the majority reads limits into s 278.1 that do not appear in the text, were not argued by the parties, and are inconsistent with parliament’s intent four main problems with the majority’s interpretive exercise arise. [229] first, as côté j also observes (at para. 466), the majority’s interpretation gives no helpful guidance on the central question: whether communications between the accused and complainant about the subject matter of the charge are captured by the definition of “record”. my colleagues declare that s 278.1 captures only records that could cause “potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity” (para. 53), which may include “discussions regarding mental health diagnoses, suicidal ideation, prior physical or sexual abuse, substance abuse or involvement in the child welfare system” (para. 55) according to the majority, “the scheme is not intended to catch more mundane information” such as “general emotional states, everyday occurrences or general biographical information” (paras. 53 and 56). [230] no explanation is offered of how these limits are implicit in the text (which is unsurprising, since they are not) the majority claims to “consider parliament’s intent” (para. 37), but completely absent from my colleagues’ interpretive exercise is any explanation of how that intent, as they see it, is to be drawn from the text. nor do my colleagues even refer to the legislative proceedings, aside from their (paradoxical) observation that “the 2012 senate report contemplated a broad application for the record screening regime” (para. 79 (emphasis added)). we are simply left with a vague, unelaborated contextual analysis, and no practical guidance under the majority’s approach, it is unclear, for instance, whether the following communications between the accused and complainant would be subject to the screening regime: 1. messages from the complainant after an alleged sexual assault indicating she did not remember the events or providing an inconsistent version of events as compared to her police statement; 2. angry or abusive messages sent between the parties during a breakdown of their relationship referring back to the alleged sexual assault; 3. sexualized or flirtatious text conversations before or after the alleged sexual assault, arranging plans to meet again. [231] do any of these records contain information “of an intimate and highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant’s overall physical, psychological or emotional well-being”? are they records “of an explicit sexual nature” that “concern the subject matter of the charge” (majority reasons, at para. 71)? the answer is not obvious (or even discernible) on the majority’s analysis, yet knowing this is critical to the accused’s ability to mount a defence if those communications are captured, the accused cannot refer to them when responding to the crown’s case, without having disclosed them in advance as the majority observes, communications between the complainant and accused are the most contentious and litigated aspect of the records screening regime. (for instance, see r v. ac, 2020 onsc 184 (emails between the accused and the complainant regarding the breakdown of their marriage); r v. navaratnam, 2021 oncj 272, 488 crr (2d) 214 (records of communications with the complainant from before and after the alleged assault); r v whitehouse, 2020 nssc 87, 61 cr (7th) 400 (records of communications between the accused and the complainant and the complainant and third parties); r v. mcknight, 2019 abqb 755, 7 alta. lr (7th) 195 (text messages sent by the complainant to the accused); r v. am, 2020 onsc 8061, 397 ccc (3d) 379 (whatsapp messages sent between the accused and the complainant during their marriage); r v. sr (2021), 488 crr (2d) 95 (ont. scj) (whatsapp messages between the accused and his former spouse).) [232] secondly, the majority’s definition of “personal information” and “reasonable expectation of privacy” is inexplicably narrow sherman estate v. donovan, 2021 scc 25, was a civil case addressing the specific situation where “[p]roceedings in open court can lead to the dissemination of highly sensitive personal information that would result not just in discomfort or embarrassment, but in an affront to the affected person’s dignity” (para. 7 (emphasis added)) the majority uses that “narrower dimension of privacy” to define all “personal information” under s 2781. this definition is, however, inconsistent with privacy legislation that uses the same phrase. for instance, the personal information protection and electronic documents act, sc 2000, c 5, s 2(1), defines “personal information” broadly as any “information about an identifiable individual” my colleagues’ interpretation also creates different tiers of reasonable expectations of privacy under s 8 and under s 278.1, despite their own observation that s 8’s “terms and concepts ‘inform the content and meaning of the words in [the] section’” (para. 46) and the majority’s definition leaves unanswered questions regarding the third-party records regime, which they acknowledge is governed by the same definition (para. 36). though the majority emphasizes that their interpretation is “specific to the record screening regime” (para. 54), they do not explain how the same words can logically be interpreted in two different ways while remaining true to the legislative intent. [233] thirdly, the majority’s interpretation contradicts shearing the complainant’s diary recorded only “mundane” entries ⸺ yet the court held that the nature of the content did “not at all eliminate her privacy interest” (para. 148; see also paras. 85 and 112). as the complainant in shearing put it: “whether it’s mundane or exciting or boring, it’s still mine” (para. 87 (emphasis added)) while the majority acknowledges, at para. 78, that the circumstances of shearing represented “one of the motivating factors” for the senate committee’s recommendations, that evidence would likely not be captured under their definition. ironically, while my colleagues recognize that “it would be illogical to interpret the impugned provisions in a manner that would not address the very situation at issue in that case” (para. 78), that is precisely what they have done. this contradiction reveals how far they have strayed from parliament’s intent it also leaves important questions unanswered will other records containing more “mundane” information be governed by the common law under shearing, or admitted without screening? if a digital conversation contains both sensitive and mundane information, will the defence still have to disclose the entire string of messages? [234] finally, the majority’s analytical process will prove complex and time-consuming. the upshot of the contextual analysis is that the net is cast extremely wide. the majority directs that, “[w]hen it is unclear whether the evidence is a ‘record’, counsel should err on the side of caution and initiate stage one of the record screening process” (para. 72) with respect, given the majority’s treatment of the meaning of “record”, this will be unclear in most cases, and most accused persons will as a consequence be forced to disclose early and often. the majority’s own reasons confirm this. they contemplate that accused persons may bring motions for directions to avoid having to disclose everything, but this adds a further procedural step not contemplated by the legislation. further, the majority recognizes this may not resolve the issue, since the presiding judge may still be “uncertain” about “whether the proposed evidence is a ‘record’” (para. 104) where that occurs, the majority also says, the judge “should instruct the accused to proceed with an application” (para. 104). in the result, accused persons will have to disclose all the communications in their possession so the trial judge can sift through each message to determine if it contains “information of an intimate and highly personal nature”. [235] if, then, the majority’s legislative refinements to parliament’s broad definition of “record” are unsustainable, what does that definition capture? a “record” is defined for the purposes of the records screening regime as anything that “contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” (s 2781). while this court in mills (at paras. 78 and 97-101) approved substantially the same definition of “record” as applied to the third-party record regime, it does not follow that it can be endorsed as applied to the records screening regime. the principles underlying the regimes are different; in mills, the court considered the scope of “record” in the context of production of records ⸺ such as personal health and counselling records ⸺ from third parties, not admissibility of records already in the accused’s possession. further, neither parliament when enacting this definition in 1997, nor the court when upholding its constitutionality in 1999, considered digital communications. [236] an interpretive question therefore arises: when parliament borrowed the definition of “record” from s 278.1, did it intend to capture digital communications in the records screening regime? the provision does not refer to electronic communications or personal correspondence the enumerated types of records are those either subject to professional confidentiality obligations (such as medical and child adoption records) or intended exclusively for the complainant’s own use (such as diaries). that said, the phrase “and includes” indicates that the list is not exhaustive. this court in r v. quesnelle, 2014 scc 46, [2014] 2 scr 390, rejected the argument that s 278.1 was meant to capture only records shared in the context of “trust-like, confidential, or therapeutic relationships”, and confirmed that documents not falling within the enumerated list are nonetheless included if they contain information giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy (paras. 22-23 and 27). [237] while the majority’s analysis is painstakingly non-committal on this point, the legislative proceedings suggest that parliament did indeed intend to capture digital conversations between the accused and complainant.1 significantly, during debate on the records screening regime in the senate, the hon. murray sinclair referenced the trial of r v ghomeshi, 2016 oncj 155, 27 c.r (7th) 17, where defence counsel impeached the complainants using text messages exchanged with the accused (debates of the senate, vol. 150, no. 233, 1st sess., 42nd parl., october 3, 2018, at p 6419). parliament received a proposal from defence lawyers to exclude from the bill’s ambit digital correspondence between the complainant and accused in which there is a joint privacy interest, but parliament did not accede to that request (r v. rmr, 2019 bcsc 1093, 56 cr (7th) 414, at para. 34; crown’s submissions in as’s case, transcript, day 1, at p 128). [238] alongside the legislative debates emphasizing the protection of privacy and equality rights for all sexual assault complainants must also be read this court’s jurisprudence recognizing that electronic communications often contain highly private content (r v marakah, 2017 scc 59, [2017] 2 scr 608) while the ultimate concern under s 8 is whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy as against the state, the jurisprudence contemplates that individuals may also have a reasonable 1 remarks of the director general and senior general counsel, criminal law policy section, department of justice canada (carole morency), proceedings of the standing senate committee on legal and constitutional affairs, no. 47, 1st sess., 42nd parl., june 20, 2018, at p 82 (“the provision in bill c-51 seeks to do something similar, with respect to communications such as emails and texts that were previously prepared, sent to the accused, are of a sexual purpose or about sexual activity in the past, to restrict and prevent their use for irrelevant purposes, which the supreme court has held applies to the case of twin myths. that’s not probative and it’s irrelevant to the consideration before the court” (emphasis added)). expectation of privacy as against other individuals, and that these expectations may arise from some of the same concerns (r v. jarvis, 2019 scc 10, [2019] 1 scr 488, at para. 58). the weight of the jurisprudence applying s 278.92 has concluded that the complainant retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic communications sent to the accused (see, eg,. r v ms, 2019 oncj 670, at para. 68 (canlii); mcknight, at paras. 13 and 25; rmr, at para. 33; r v. dlb, 2020 yktc 8, 460 crr (2d) 162, at paras. 76-77). [239] all of this compels the conclusion that an electronic communication (such as an email or text message) is a “record” if it contains personal information giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, as that term has been interpreted in the s 8 jurisprudence. this would include any communication concerning the subject matter of the charge, whether of an “explicit sexual nature” or not. (b) “adduce” [240] i agree with the majority that the records screening regime applies both to material in the accused’s possession, and the information contained in that material. it therefore regulates not only the use of the record itself but the information it contains (majority reasons, at para. 76) meaning, accused persons must apply if they intend merely to refer to the contents of any communication with the complainant, even in their own defence, contrary to the principle against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, and the right to silence. [241] on the point of its constitutionality, there should be no misunderstanding as to the consequences of the breadth of meaning to be given to “adduce”. accused persons must now bring a s 278.92 application anytime they intend to refer to the contents of a private record relating to the complainant, even if they do not seek to enter it into evidence or use it to impeach the complainant, but instead simply wish to refer to it in their own defence. in contrast, the crown would be free to use the same text message exchange from the accused to support the complainant’s narrative as the defence argues, the resulting breadth of the regime’s application is not a reason to read it down, but “rather an indicator of its inaptness (s 278.1 was never intended to be a ‘defence disclosure’ metric) and ultimate unconstitutionality” (r.f in jj’s case, at para. 41). (c) conclusion on overbreadth [242] the focus in an overbreadth analysis is properly directed to the relationship between the law’s purpose and its effects (r v moriarity, 2015 scc 55, [2015] 3 scr 485, at para. 24). the analysis proceeds in two steps. first, a court must identify the purpose of the law. then, it must determine whether the law deprives individuals of life, liberty or security of the person in cases that do not further the object of the law (assuming a lawful legislative objective) (r v. safarzadeh-markhali, 2016 scc 14, [2016] 1 scr 180, at paras. 24-31; canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at paras. 58, 93, 101, 108 and 111-12; r v. appulonappa, 2015 scc 59, [2015] 3 scr 754, at paras. 26-27). [243] the purpose of the records screening regime, based on the text and legislative history, is threefold: (1) ensuring that a complainant’s privacy, dignity and equality interests are considered when determining whether private records are admissible; (2) improving victim and community confidence in the justice system, which will likely encourage victims to report sexual crimes; and (3) maintaining the integrity of the trial process by refusing to admit evidence potentially rooted in myths and stereotypes which risk jeopardizing the truth-seeking function of the trial. [244] the breadth of this regime suggests two possible justifications, being either that every record in the hands of the accused has the inherent potential to engage myths and stereotypes; or, the risk that some private records might advance myths and stereotypes is sufficiently severe to justify capturing all kinds of material that will not have this effect. since no evidence of the relationship between private records in the hands of the accused and myth-based reasoning has been presented, the first justification cannot stand it follows that parliament must have relied on the second justification, which is by its terms demonstrative of overbreadth. as jj’s counsel put it, “[i]f the purpose of the regime is to exclude presumptively irrelevant and prejudicial records, then reasonable expectation of privacy is an inapt indicator of that type of danger” (transcript, day 1, at p 51). [245] the majority concludes that the “requirement on accused persons to disclose these records in advance — even where it is unclear to what extent the evidence would have a bearing on complainants’ dignity — is still rationally connected to the overarching objective of the regime” (para. 142) but that conclusion is only possible because of two flaws, upon which their entire analysis rests: their departure from legislative intent as to the meaning of “record”; and their refusal to squarely (and thus meaningfully) address obvious concerns raised by the parties and interveners about advance disclosure, the right to silence, and the right to cross-examine. [246] it is this simple the records screening regime requires disclosure of defence evidence that would not distort the truth-seeking process or significantly interfere with the complainant’s privacy, all before the crown makes out a case to meet. since it captures all private records relating to the complainant that are in the accused’s possession, which the accused intends to adduce or rely on in any manner, and which may include the accused’s own digital conversations with the complainant about the subject matter of the charge, it could deprive individuals of liberty in situations that have no connection whatsoever to the object of the law. it follows that it goes too far and interferes with some conduct that bears no connection to its objective (bedford, at para. 101; application judge’s reasons in as’s case (r v. reddick, 2020 onsc 7156, 398 ccc (3d) 227), at para. 49). (2) disclosure of detailed particulars of evidence [247] the records screening regime compels accused persons to disclose “detailed particulars of the evidence that the accused seeks to adduce and the relevance of that evidence to an issue at trial” to the crown “seven days previously, or any shorter interval that the judge . . . may allow in the interests of justice” (s 278.93(2) and (4)). in effect ⸺ and there was really no dispute about this at the hearing of these appeals ⸺ this requires accused persons to disclose, in detail, particulars of their own prior statements and strategy, even before the crown has laid out a case to be answered. this is contrary to the principle against self-incrimination, the right to silence, the presumption of innocence, and the principle that the crown must establish a case to be met before the accused can be reasonably expected to respond. [248] the phrase “seven days previously” has been interpreted both strictly and flexibly in decisions that have considered the records screening regime. i agree with the majority that the strict interpretation is the correct one and that an application should be brought pre-trial in the vast majority of cases (majority reasons, at para. 86). while the majority offers one example of where mid-trial applications should be permitted in “the interests of justice” (para. 86), such instances should, properly understood, be exceptional. the notice period may be abridged only where the accused can point to an exceptional circumstance and where the court finds it is “in the interests of justice” to do so ⸺ for example, where identity is at issue or new and unanticipated information is elicited through cross-examination. [249] the effect on the liberty of the subject represented by the records screening regime is unprecedented. never before has the state compelled disclosure of defence evidence that is neither presumptively irrelevant nor prejudicial, before the close of the crown’s case. this is not some tinkering around the edges of the rules of evidence. it shifts away from foundational principles of our criminal trial process, violating the principle against self-incrimination, the right to silence, the presumption of innocence, and the related principle that the crown must establish a “case to meet” before the accused can be expected to respond (r v p (mb), [1994] 1 scr 555, at pp. 577-78). [250] section 11(c) of the charter provides that any person charged with an offence has the right “not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the offence” this denotes, inter alia, that no duty rests on an accused to disclose the details of its defence before the crown has completed its case (r v. chambers, [1990] 2 scr 1293, at p 1319). the defence has no obligation to assist the prosecution, and the absence of a reciprocal disclosure obligation is an expression of the principle against self-incrimination (r v stinchcombe, [1991] 3 scr 326, at p 333; p (mb), at pp. 577-78). these principles, which the majority skates over, were explained by lamer cj in p (mb):. perhaps the single most important organizing principle in criminal law is the right of an accused not to be forced into assisting in his or her own prosecution. . . . [a]n accused is under no obligation to respond until the state has succeeded in making out a prima facie case against him or her. in other words, until the crown establishes that there is a “case to meet”, an accused is not compellable in a general sense (as opposed to the narrow, testimonial sense) and need not answer the allegations against him or her. the broad protection afforded to accused persons is perhaps best described in terms of the overarching principle against self-incrimination, which is firmly rooted in the common law and is a fundamental principle of justice under s 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. as a majority of this court suggested in dubois v. the queen, [1985] 2 scr. 350, the presumption of innocence and the power imbalance between the state and the individual are at the root of this principle and the procedural and evidentiary protections to which it gives rise. before trial, the criminal law seeks to protect an accused from being conscripted against him- or herself by the confession rule, the right to remain silent in the face of state interrogation into suspected criminal conduct, and the absence of a duty of disclosure on the defence: r v. hebert, [1990] 2 scr 151 with respect to disclosure, the defence in canada is under no legal obligation to cooperate with or assist the crown by announcing any special defence, such as an alibi, or by producing documentary or physical evidence. . all of these protections, which emanate from the broad principle against self-incrimination, recognize that it is up to the state, with its greater resources, to investigate and prove its own case, and that the individual should not be conscripted into helping . . . fulfil this task. [emphasis added; pp. 577-79.] [251] the majority attempts to distinguish p (mb), saying it addressed only specific concerns arising from the crown re-opening its case after the defence began giving evidence at trial (para. 166). but this ignores the very rationale behind limiting reopening of the crown’s case: because “the right of accused persons not to be conscripted against themselves will be compromised” (r v. g (sg), [1997] 2 scr. 716, at para. 38). the majority further says the likelihood of prejudice to the accused is lower before trial (at para. 168), but neither p (mb) nor g (sg) contemplated pre-trial defence disclosure. significantly, however, each case confirmed that “the most significant concern is that the accused will have responded to the crown’s case without knowing the full case to be met” (g (sg), at para. 42 (emphasis added)). this same concern arises with the records screening regime. in light of all this, the very suggestion there is no possibility of prejudice where the accused is required to disclose trial evidence and strategy before the crown has even opened its case is extraordinary. [252] the crown in jj’s case makes three arguments supporting the records screening regime’s compliance with the right to silence and principle against self-incrimination. [253] first, the crown says that the records screening regime is substantially identical to the procedures governing s 276 and ss. 278.1 to 278.91 applications (af. in jj’s case, at para. 116), adding that this court upheld the requirement to file a detailed affidavit in darrach. while those provisions do not provide for formal notice to the complainant, the court assumed that the crown would likely consult with the complainant (darrach, at paras. 9 and 55) and in mills, the court upheld the requirement to serve a written application on the complainant detailing why the record is likely relevant. [254] the majority accepts this argument, remarking that the records screening regime does not apply to all defence evidence but “to a narrow set of evidence that implicates important interests of complainants . . . and has the potential to create serious prejudice” (para. 162) but simply asserting it to be so does not make it so as discussed, it applies to a broad swathe of evidence that is not inherently prejudicial or irrelevant the majority further asserts that, like s 276 evidence, s 278.92 evidence can implicate “insidious” myths and encroach on the privacy and dignity of the complainant, so “[private records] too require screening to ensure trial fairness” (para. 162). but this ignores that evidence relying on the twin myths will already be captured under s 276. while the majority criticizes my analysis for not “meaningfully” recognizing “other problematic myths and stereotypes” aside from the twin myths (at para. 132), my colleagues miss the point. nobody disputes that records in the accused’s possession could implicate other myths. my point is that it cannot be assumed that such records inherently do so ⸺ which distinguishes them from third-party records and evidence of other sexual activity. this is a point for which my colleagues steadfastly fail to account ⸺ an omission which in my respectful view should cast serious doubt upon their entire analysis. [255] darrach and mills are no answer to the self-incrimination problems raised by the records screening regime. while this court approved advance disclosure to the crown and complainant in darrach for evidence of other sexual activity, the principles stated in darrach are limited to the application of s 276, which is designed to exclude only irrelevant information, and relevant information that is more prejudicial to the administration of justice than it is probative (darrach, at paras. 43 and 45). compelling the accused to bring an application with particulars did not impact the right to silence in darrach because no one has an unfettered right to adduce irrelevant or prejudicial evidence (criminal trial lawyers’ association factum in jj’s case (“ctla factum”), at para. 12). that same rationale does not apply here (see, eg,. r v. js, [2019] aj. no. 1639 (ql) (qb), at para. 23; r v. am, 2019 skpc 46, 56 cr (7th) 389, at para. 39). moreover, the s 276 regime only requires an affidavit to explain the relevance of evidence, not potential disclosure of evidence that could assist the crown in proving its case ⸺ a fundamental difference for which, again, the majority fails to account. [256] similarly, the mills decision was concerned with compelled production of confidential materials from third parties, not admissibility, and raises different sensitivity and privacy concerns compared to records in the accused’s possession (dlb, at paras. 73-74). for that reason, this court in mills did not consider the impact of advance document disclosure on the accused’s cross-examination rights (r v. farah, 2021 yksc 36, at para. 78 (canlii)). [257] secondly, the crown emphasizes that the right to silence and case-to-meet principle are not absolute the crown refers to eight circumstances in which the accused “may be required to provide disclosure of some aspect of their defence if they wish to raise a reasonable doubt” (af in jj’s case, at para. 117). the majority adopts this argument, offering two examples ⸺ aside from the s 276 regime ⸺ where the defence is required to provide advance disclosure: alibi evidence and scopelliti applications (majority reasons, at paras. 158-59). it is true that the law imposes limited obligations on parties to provide disclosure so as to justify questioning or admission of evidence in three situations that do not unconstitutionally limit the right to silence: 1. as part of a voir dire where the accused bears the burden of proof (for instance, a notice of constitutional question or garofoli application); 2. after the crown has closed its case (for instance, expert evidence, corbett applications, and alibi evidence); or 3. in respect of evidence that is presumptively inadmissible because of its inherently prejudicial qualities (for instance, s 276, hearsay, and bad character evidence) (ctla factum, at paras. 6-8). [258] none of these instances remotely support the majority’s conclusion that the right to silence is unaffected by the records screening regime. the examples in category (1) are not about raising a reasonable doubt, since the voir dire has no impact on the accused’s guilt or innocence (ctla factum, at para. 7) further, when the accused brings a charter challenge, it is not required to disclose particulars of evidence or trial strategy, and certainly not its own prior statements. two of the examples in category (2) ⸺ expert evidence and corbett applications ⸺ do not require the accused to disclose anything until the prosecution’s witnesses have testified and the crown has made out a case to meet. the third example (alibi evidence) is truly a tactical choice because there is no legal requirement to disclose an alibi (ctla factum, at para. 8). the examples in category (3) ⸺ evidence of other sexual activity, hearsay, or bad character ⸺ are, by their nature, typically unreliable, misleading, or pose a serious risk of prejudicing the trial if admitted without screening (ctla factum, at para. 9). since no one has an unfettered right to adduce irrelevant or prejudicial evidence, the law quite rightly requires the accused to show a basis for admissibility in those situations. [259] these situations relied upon by the crown and the majority are simply not comparable the records screening regime requires the accused to disclose, to the complainant and to the crown before the crown has made out a case to meet, detailed particulars of the accused’s evidence and its relevance to an issue at trial. none of it need be irrelevant or inherently prejudicial, and much of it will not be so. certainly, some records will be highly sensitive, while others might invite improper reasoning, such as counselling records used to establish that the complainant is the sort of person who would require therapy or to compare the complainant’s behaviour to that of a “true” victim. given the broad range of records captured by the screening regime, each record could fall somewhere differently on the probative-prejudicial spectrum; it is impossible to determine in the abstract. yet parliament has attempted to do exactly that by treating, from the outset, an entire category of evidence as sufficiently dangerous to warrant limiting the right to silence. [260] the crown’s final argument on the right to silence and principle against self-incrimination relies on a passage from darrach where the court held that the right to silence was not impacted because the “compulsion” to provide disclosure was only “tactical” (a.f in jj’s case, at para. 99; darrach, at para. 47) but the court in darrach never concluded that tactical burdens to provide pre-trial disclosure are automatically charter-compliant. gonthier j.’s comments must be considered in the context of the type of evidence at issue, which was s 276 evidence, and his conclusion that tactical pressure to disclose was not “premature or inappropriate” was largely premised on its inherently prejudicial and irrelevant nature (paras. 46, 55 and 59). [261] moreover, confronting an accuser with all relevant evidence is quite different than making tactical choices such as challenging a search warrant. i accept jj’s argument that, if bringing a s 278.92 application to rely on the accused’s own communications about the subject matter of the charge to challenge the crown’s case or raise a defence can be minimized as a “tactical” decision, the same could apply to all defence evidence, such that the accused could, constitutionally, be compelled to reveal all potential evidence or questioning material prior to trial (rf, at paras. 115-117; see also ctla factum, at para. 17). as the ctla emphasizes, “the right to silence cannot yield in other circumstances or it would effectively cease to exist” (para. 17) such a result would be contrary to this court’s precedents in chambers and p (mb) and cannot be what the court envisioned in darrach the majority dismisses this as a “slippery slope” argument (para. 162). i say with respect that, in doing so, the majority minimizes legitimate and obvious concerns raised by these parties and interveners about the impacts of its ruling, as if these concerns were unworthy of taking seriously. it is no answer simply to impugn a concern as a “slippery slope” argument. after all, some slopes are slippery. [262] the limits to the protection from self-incrimination and the right to silence are, on their own, fatal to the constitutionality of the records screening regime. while the crown argues that the regime is simply a screening device through which highly relevant and probative evidence may pass, the violations to the self-incrimination principle are in no way attenuated by their later admission: “the harm is done by conscription” (transcript, day 2, at p 73). even where defence evidence is ultimately admitted, the regime still limits an accused’s s 11(c) and (d) and s 7 rights. i turn now to another aspect of that concern. (3) restrictions on cross-examination of crown witnesses [263] as already noted, the records screening regime compels accused persons to give advance notice to the complainant and crown seven days before the hearing, and to provide detailed particulars of the evidence they wish to rely on, complete with an explanation of why it is relevant to an issue at trial. where that relevance pertains to the frailties in the crown’s case or theory of the defence case, the accused must therefore reveal them. the regime also permits the complainant to appear and make submissions at the admissibility hearing taken together, these provisions limit the accused’s ability to effectively cross-examine the complainant, contrary to the presumption of innocence, the right to make full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial. [264] as a preliminary point, i do not see the complainant’s entitlement under s 278.94(2) and (3) to retain counsel and to appear and make submissions at the admissibility hearing as necessarily a concern the question is how far those participatory rights extend. [265] i agree with the majority’s interpretation that the complainant should have access to the application record once it passes the threshold screening (that is, once a judge determines the evidence is capable of being admissible) (majority reasons, at para. 93). a provision entitling the complainant to retain counsel and make submissions should be interpreted in a manner that permits counsel to make meaningful submissions. while the majority suggests that complainants have only limited standing to address the impacts on their privacy and dignity interests (para. 178), in point of fact the legislation permits them to make submissions on admissibility, which is broader than complainant participation in the mills regime nevertheless, i agree with the majority that the regime does not contemplate a right to cross-examine the accused, or to adduce evidence at the hearing (paras. 100-102). it follows, then, that i would not accept the application judge’s conclusion in as’s case that the regime threatens prosecutorial independence and effectively makes the complainant a second prosecutor (paras. 91 and 102). [266] i return, then, to my point that the advance disclosure requirement and complainant’s participatory rights operate together to limit the accused’s right to cross-examine the complainant. the analysis necessarily starts with the presumption of innocence, which is no mere legal nicety. it is the most elementary manifestation of society’s commitment to a fair trial, grounded in the precept, “basic to our concept of justice”, that “the innocent must not be convicted” (seaboyer, at p 606) it is “a hallowed principle lying at the very heart of criminal law” that “confirms our faith in humankind” (r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at pp. 119-20; see also r v. myers, 2019 scc 18, [2019] 2 scr 105, at para. 1). such breathless statements can often be safely dismissed as mere judicial puffery but not these the significance of the presumption of innocence to our system of criminal justice simply cannot be understated and, while it is expressly protected in s 11(d), it is also “inextricably intertwined” with the broader protection of life, liberty and security of the person contained in s 7 (r v rose, [1998] 3 scr 262, at para. 95, citing seaboyer, at p 603). [267] giving meaning and operation to the presumption of innocence is the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. this extends to calling the evidence necessary to establish a defence, and challenging the evidence called by the prosecution (seaboyer, at p 608). full answer and defence is not unqualified; relevant evidence can be excluded where the exclusion is justified by a ground of law or policy, such as where the evidence is unduly prejudicial or likely to distort the fact-finding process (seaboyer, at p 609; mills, at paras. 74-75) but a rule which “prevents the trier of fact from getting at the truth by excluding relevant evidence in the absence of a clear ground of policy or law justifying the exclusion runs afoul of our fundamental conceptions of justice and what constitutes a fair trial” (seaboyer, at p 609). [268] the accused’s right to cross-examine crown witnesses without significant and unwarranted constraint is a key element of the right to make full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial (r v. ns, 2012 scc 72, [2012] 3 scr 726, at para. 24; r v rv, 2019 scc 41, [2019] 3 scr 237, at para. 39) unwarranted constraints on cross-examination may undermine the fairness of the trial (r v. lyttle, 2004 scc 5, [2004] 1 scr 193, at para. 2; ns, at para. 24), and increase the risk of convicting the innocent. as this court recognized in lyttle, cross-examination is often the only way to expose the truth: cross-examination may often be futile and sometimes prove fatal, but it remains nonetheless a faithful friend in the pursuit of justice and an indispensable ally in the search for truth. at times, there will be no other way to expose falsehood, to rectify error, to correct distortion or to elicit vital information that would otherwise remain forever concealed. that is why the right of an accused to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution — without significant and unwarranted constraint — is an essential component of the right to make full answer and defence. [emphasis in original; paras. 1-2.] [269] the importance of cross-examination was recently restated in rv:. generally, a key element of the right to make full answer and defence is the right to cross-examine the crown’s witnesses without significant and unwarranted restraint: r v. lyttle, 2004 scc 5, [2004] 1 scr 193, at paras. 1 and 41; osolin, at pp. 664-65; seaboyer, at p 608 the right to cross-examine is protected by both ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. in certain circumstances, cross-examination may be the only way to get at the truth. the fundamental importance of cross-examination is reflected in the general rule that counsel is permitted to ask any question for which they have a good faith basis — an independent evidentiary foundation is not required: lyttle, at paras. 46-48. [emphasis added; para. 39.] [270] as these statements recognize, cross-examination may be the only way for an accused to avail itself of its right to make full answer and defence ⸺ that is, to challenge the crown’s case, and to raise a reasonable doubt in the trier of fact’s mind. this is particularly so in sexual assault cases, where the complainant will often be the only witness to testify (farah, at para. 74). this court in lyttle, at para. 70, cited with approval the reasons of the manitoba court of appeal in r v wallick (1990), 69 man. r (2d) 310, at para. 2: cross-examination is a most powerful weapon of the defence, particularly when the entire case turns on credibility of the witnesses. an accused in a criminal case has the right of cross-examination in the fullest and widest sense of the word as long as he does not abuse that right. any improper interference with the right is an error which will result in the conviction being quashed. [271] as this court has also recognized, reasonable limits may be placed on the cross-examination of a complainant in a sexual assault trial to prevent it from being used for improper purposes (osolin, at pp. 665-66). but the court has also recognized that cross-examination in respect of consent and credibility should be permitted where the probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that may flow from it (osolin, at p 671) and so, the court has understood that allowing the accused “wide latitude” to cross-examine the complainant in sexual offence cases is crucial to achieving trial fairness (lyttle, at para. 50, citing shearing, at paras. 121-22). [272] to all this, the majority says only that the right to cross-examine is not violated here because there is no right to “ambus[h]” the complainant with highly private records at trial or cross-examine the complainant on “every scintilla” of information (paras. 183-84) their analysis assumes that any cross-examination on s 278.92 records would be unfair or irrelevant, which is demonstrably not so. it also mischaracterizes the defence arguments the common law already protects complainants from unfair or irrelevant cross-examination. jj and mr. reddick seek merely to preserve their remaining right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses “without significant and unwarranted constraint” (lyttle, at para. 2) this court in darrach did not remove the right to contemporaneous cross-examination on private information gonthier j simply confirmed that the defence cannot “ambush” complainants with inherently prejudicial and irrelevant evidence: section 276 does not require the accused to make premature or inappropriate disclosure to the crown for the reasons given above, the accused is not forced to embark upon the process under s 276 at all. as the trial judge found in the case at bar, if the defence is going to raise the complainant’s prior sexual activity, it cannot be done in such a way as to surprise the complainant. the right to make full answer and defence does not include the right to defend by ambush. [emphasis added; para. 55.] [273] those comments were clearly intended to apply only to presumptively inadmissible evidence of prior sexual activity they cannot be divorced from their context. the issue in darrach was whether the complainant could be cross-examined about her sexual history extrinsic to the allegations. the proposed cross-examination was intensely intimate and potentially embarrassing, and the evidence was presumptively irrelevant. thus, gonthier j.’s statement was “a s 276-specific reminder that extrinsic sexual activity is always prejudicial, and ⸺ because it is often temporally distant, intimate and historically prone to misuse ⸺ likely to cause undue confusion and distress if brought up without warning” (rf in jj’s case, at para. 57). to suggest that it was an unqualified statement that the right to make full answer and defence excludes the right to surprise the complainant is baseless and, further, corrosive of the accused’s right to make full answer and defence (see majority reasons, at paras. 183- 84). [274] the majority minimizes the defence concerns by echoing that the right to a fair trial does not entitle the accused to the most favourable procedures imaginable (see paras. 125 and 184). and, as this court has repeatedly intoned, accused persons are not entitled to a “perfect trial” (r v. white, 2011 scc 13, [2011] 1 scr 433, at para. 194; r v. carosella, [1997] 1 scr 80, at para. 74; r v. cook, [1998] 2 scr. 597, at para. 101; r v. khan, 2001 scc 86, [2001] 3 scr 823, at para. 72; g (sg), at para. 101; r v. lyons, [1987] 2 scr 309, at p 362; r v. harrer, [1995] 3 scr. 562, at paras. 14 and 45; r v. orbanski, 2005 scc 37, [2005] 2 scr 3, at para. 97; r v. find, 2001 scc 32, [2001] 1 scr 863, at para. 28; r v. bjelland, 2009 scc 38, [2009] 2 scr 651, at para. 22). but, and with respect, this “answers” an argument that nobody has made. nobody is seeking “perfection” here; we are already a long way from the most favourable trial eventually, at some point on the long road that the majority has taken from “perfect trial” to “unfair trial”, the refrain that there can be “no perfect trials” wears thin. it cannot be used ad infinitum to chip away at fair trial guarantees. [275] the majority offers a second reason that the right to cross-examine is not violated here. they say that, since “witness tainting” is not a concern where the crown provides disclosure to the accused under stinchcombe, or where both parties in civil proceedings disclose their records, it follows that it is not a concern here (paras. 185-86). this assertion is thwarted by basic organizing principles of criminal law the search for the truth is not the only relevant consideration when defence disclosure is at issue. unlike the crown or a defendant in civil proceedings, the accused faces the greater power of the state and a potential loss of liberty. for those reasons, the accused has (until now) benefited from the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent until the crown makes out a case to meet (see, eg,. p (mb), at pp. 577-79). further, neither stinchcombe nor civil procedure rules require the other party to disclose its strategy or theory of the case. [276] the majority further declares that the notice and disclosure requirements enhance trial fairness. they assert that providing advance notice to complainants that they may be confronted with highly private information in open court will better equip them to respond (para. 187) the crown in jj’s case, the complainant as, and several intervenors made similar arguments, saying “ambush”-style cross-examination that aims to “disorient and discombobulate” a witness hinders rather than promotes the truth-seeking function, and that a prepared complainant is less likely to be emotional and more likely to provide logical and coherent responses (a.f in jj’s case, at para. 131; af in as’s case, at para. 55; if of ago, at paras. 27-35; if of agns in jj’s case, at paras. 81-82; i.f of leaf, at paras. 27 and 29; i.f of wcleaf- wavaw in as’s case, at para. 19). [277] there is a certain unreality to the crown’s claims as this court has observed, “trials are not — nor are they meant to be — tea parties”, particularly where the right of an accused to make full answer and defence is at stake (groia v. law society of upper canada, 2018 scc 27, [2018] 1 scr 772, at para. 3). at the very least, this submission relies on social science “evidence” that is not properly before this court. and it completely ignores the witness exclusion rule, which is itself grounded on the premise that advance disclosure of counsel’s dossier or strategy comes with the significant risk that complainants’ evidence will as a consequence be tailored or tainted (application judge’s reasons in as’s case, at para. 57). the requirement to provide detailed particulars requires accused persons to reveal frailties in the crown’s evidence that they seek to prove through the record and through its subjection to cross-examination. [278] this speaks to why we have the witness exclusion rule: to preserve testimony in its original state (r v. lindsay, 2019 abqb 372, 95 alta. lr (6th) 163, at para. 10, citing s. n. lederman, a. w. bryant and m. k. fuerst, sopinka, lederman & bryant: the law of evidence in canada (5th ed. 2018), at §1634). to elaborate, it addresses a basic feature of human nature: witnesses who learn, in advance of testifying, of certain accounts that are inconsistent with their own version of events, may, consciously or unconsciously, change their own evidence to conform to what they have learned or to otherwise reconcile them, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the cross-examination they will ultimately face. in other words, “[r]evealing the evidence, defence theory, or the direction of the cross-examination to an anticipated witness creates the risk that the witness, upon hearing the evidence, will ‘alter, modify or change what [it] would otherwise state’” (rf in jj’s case, at para. 46, citing r v. green, [1998] oj. no. 3598 (ql), 1998 carswellont 3820 (wl) (cj (gen. div.)), at para. 21, re collette and the queen (1983), 6 ccc (3d) 300 (ont. hc), at p 306, r v latimer, 2003 canlii 49376 (ont scj), at para. 27, per o’connor j., r v. spence, 2011 onsc 2406, 249 crr (2d) 64, at para. 38, and r v. white (1999), 42 or (3d) 760 (ca), at pp. 767-68). [279] the concerns of jj and mr. reddick about witnesses tailoring evidence do not, contrary to arguments raised by the crown, rely on stereotypical assumptions about the untrustworthiness of sexual assault complainants there is no mystery or stigmatization at work here. as i say, these concerns speak more generally to a trait of human nature, and therefore to a temptation which most if not all witnesses would feel in these circumstances. while there is no right to “ambush” or “whack” a complainant with misleading or abusive cross-examination, confronting a complainant with inconsistencies that have not previously been disclosed is a well-established and often exceedingly effective aspect of cross-examination used to test the complainant’s credibility the court in dlb, at paras. 68-69, reached the same conclusion, explaining that proper impeachment through cross-examination is not the equivalent of defence by ambush but rather “an entirely legitimate and appropriate tactic in defending an accused on a criminal charge”. in many cases, advance disclosure may improperly shape complainants’ testimony, consciously or unconsciously, in a manner that cannot be readily exposed or mitigated at trial (farah, at paras. 83-88). [280] it is true, as the attorney general of canada observes, that complainants often become aware of defence strategy after a mistrial has occurred or where a retrial is ordered (if in jj’s case, at paras. 47-48; see also af in jj’s case, at para. 120). but this comparison is not well taken. in such situations, accused persons will have had an opportunity to confront complainants before their strategy in doing so becomes apparent. and the transcript of those confrontations can be put to the complainants if their evidence changes at the retrial. compelling advance defence disclosure before the complainant has given evidence at all is a different situation entirely. [281] the majority’s third reason for finding no violation of the right to cross-examine is that the accused will still be able to test the complainant’s evidence by comparing it to prior police statements (para. 188). the crown similarly argued that complainants can be cross-examined about their access to materials or participation in the application, as occurred at jj’s trial complainants can still be discredited by suggestions that they tailored their evidence or that their credibility is undermined by the knowledge they gained from reviewing the accused’s application in advance. the crown in jj’s case and the complainant as add that, where the complainant provided a statement to the police or testified at a preliminary hearing, any modifications in their evidence will be ripe for cross-examination (af in jj’s case, at para. 118; af in as’s case, at para. 61). [282] as jj observes, however, preliminary inquiries are no longer available for sexual assault cases involving adults (rf, at para. 67; an act to amend the criminal code, the youth criminal justice act and other acts and to make consequential amendments to other acts, sc 2019, c 25, s 238). and statements to the police are not always given under oath. in many cases, then, there will not be any pre-trial sworn statements on which the accused can impeach the complainant. [283] where the application is brought before a jury trial, there is a further limit on the accused’s ability to cross-examine the complainant on her knowledge of the defence case section 648(1) of the criminal code provides that “no information regarding any portion of the trial at which the jury is not present shall be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way before the jury retires to consider its verdict” combined with s 645(5), that provision has been interpreted as automatically banning publication of any pre-trial motion that ordinarily must be dealt with in the absence of the jury, “to ensure that a jury would not be potentially exposed to, or biased by, the content or rulings of proceedings conducted by the trial judge in their absence” (r v stobbe, 2011 mbqb 293, 277 man. r (2d) 65, at para. 13 (emphasis added)) the majority says, without explanation, that s 648 would not prevent cross-examination here (para. 189), but that is just not so. again, it prohibits, inter alia, “transmi[ssion] in any way” and if counsel could transmit that same information by questioning the complainant about a pre-trial motion, it would defeat the purpose of a publication ban. the crown may well therefore argue that the accused cannot cross-examine the complainant or make closing submissions at trial about the circumstances in which the complainant received notice of the defence evidence and anticipated cross-examination. [284] to summarize, then the advance notice and disclosure requirement, combined with the complainant’s participation, interferes with cross-examination contrary to ss. 7 and 11(d). the requirement to provide detailed particulars means that accused persons may have to disclose frailties in the complainant’s evidence that they seek to prove by relying on the record at issue. even witnesses seeking to give truthful testimony could subconsciously tailor their evidence. the risks go beyond the explicit fabrication of evidence, and include the subtle manipulation of testimony by a witness to address the frailties or inconsistencies disclosed in advance by the defence (rf in jj’s case, at para. 48, citing m. d. tochor and k. d. kilback, “defence disclosure: is it written in stone?” (2000), 43 clq 393). again, and contrary to the assertions of many attorneys general and interveners, this concern is not based on stereotypical reasoning about the untrustworthiness of sexual assault complainants, but simply a recognition of human nature. even where the accused can establish an inconsistency against the complainant’s police statement, the complainant will be given an opportunity to reconcile competing accounts. [285] and that is where the danger of wrongful conviction lies. impeachment of a crown witness, including impeachment by surprise, is a legitimate and valuable defence tactic, which the regime eviscerates the comments of rothery j in r v. anderson, 2019 skqb 304, 61 cr (7th) 376, are apt: the reality is that the defence may not even know what records may be useful on cross-examination until the crown has concluded the complainant’s examination-in-chief. the defence may not be able to prove that a record has “significant probative value” as required by s 278.92(2)(b), or any probative value at all, in a vacuum these procedural screening requirements eviscerate the most valuable tool available to the defence in a sexual assault trial. the nature of this offence is one that usually occurs in private, without any witnesses other than the complainant and the accused. often, it is a case of “she said, he said” (or in this trial, “he said, he said”). the defence must be permitted to test the veracity of a complainant, within the constraints of cross-examination as articulated in lyttle and rv. that is, the complainant’s questions must be relevant, and their prejudicial effect must not outweigh their probative value. the complainant’s privacy rights associated with records in the accused’s possession must give way to the accused’s rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter, that is, an unencumbered cross-examination. the balance is incontrovertibly in the accused’s favour. [paras. 21-22] [286] all this, i stress, applies where the information being disclosed (and potentially excluded) is part of the crown’s case to meet, has probative value, and carries no inherent prejudicial effect. full answer and defence is centrally implicated here. it is almost certain that tying the defence’s hands in this way will result in the conviction of innocent persons and because that “threat of convicting an innocent individual strikes at the heart of the principles of fundamental justice”, “where the information contained in a record directly bears on the right to make full answer and defence”, this court has maintained that “privacy rights must yield to avoid convicting the innocent” (mills, at paras. 89 and 94). (4) all private records are presumptively inadmissible by the defence but presumptively admissible by the crown [287] the records screening regime is triggered not by the nature or content of a record, but by the identity of the party seeking to use it. the crown can freely adduce private records in support of a conviction, without complainant participation or pre-trial screening. it is only when the defence seeks to use the same private information to raise a reasonable doubt that it becomes “dangerous” in this way, the records screening regime differs from the s 276 and ss. 278.1 to 278.91 regimes, and limits the right to a fair trial. [288] the s 276 regime, of course, applies to the crown and the accused. this logically follows from s 276’s focus on the nature and content of records. simply put, the nature and content of the record are the nature and content of the record; they do not change, depending on who possesses it. not so with the records screening regime. if, as the crown says, the nature and content of the record justify limits on admissibility, then the crown would be similarly bound by its restrictions. instead, the crown is free from the strictures of disclosure and pre-screening to use private records and digital communications between the complainant and the accused, while the accused is precluded from using the selfsame records in its defence (r.f in jj’s case, at para. 17). [289] as to the regime for production of third-party records, s 278.2(2) extends the application of the regime to “any person”, including the crown. and so, s 278.2(3) requires the crown to notify the accused of any private records in the prosecutor’s possession (see mills, at para. 103). [290] in contrast, the records screening regime applies only where accused persons are in possession of records that they intend to adduce in their own defence. this limits the accused’s right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d). the majority stresses that trial fairness does not guarantee the defence “precisely the same privileges and procedures as the crown” (para. 75), a point that no one disputes. but my colleagues fail to squarely address the questions raised: whether the fact that this regime applies only to the defence renders the trial unfair, whether the purpose of the records screening regime is undermined by its one-sidedness, and whether this divergence from the s 276 and ss. 278.1 to 278.91 regimes weakens the majority’s reliance on darrach and mills. i would answer all three questions in the affirmative. the majority’s response does not even begin to account for this glaring unfairness. (5) heightened standard of “significant probative value” [291] my colleagues in the majority ignore the heightened evidentiary standard imposed by s 278.92 and its implications for full answer and defence indeed, they misstate it by asserting that “the right to make full answer and defence will only be violated if the accused is prevented from adducing relevant and material evidence, the probative value of which is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect” (para. 133). that is manifestly not the standard parliament adopted; and even if it were, it would not conform to the charter. [292] while crown evidence should be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the prejudice which may flow from it, “[t]he presumption of the accused’s innocence leads us to strike a different balance where defence-led evidence is concerned” (r v. grant, 2015 scc 9, [2015] 1 scr 475, at para. 19). a judge may exclude evidence relevant to a defence allowed by law only where the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence (grant, at para. 19, citing seaboyer, at p 611) the differential approach flows from the presumption of innocence and is crucial to safeguarding the right to a fair trial and the right to make full answer and defence (seaboyer, at pp. 611-12). it has, as such, been identified as a principle of fundamental justice (see, eg,. seaboyer, at p 611; r v. samaniego, 2020 onca 439, 151 or (3d) 449, at para. 147, aff’d 2022 scc 9; r v. pereira, 2008 bcsc 184, 247 ccc (3d) 311, at para. 106). the seaboyer standard was affirmed in shearing, where the court considered whether the potential prejudice of allowing the accused to cross-examine the complainant on her diary substantially outweighed its probative value to the defence (paras. 107-9 and 150; see also osolin, at p 671). [293] section 278.92(2)(b) does violence to this principle by allowing admission of evidence only where it is of “significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. this is not an unknown standard in darrach, this court upheld the “significant probative value” standard in the s 276 context, concluding that it serves only “to exclude evidence of trifling relevance that, even though not used to support the two forbidden inferences, would still endanger the ‘proper administration of justice’” (para. 41). but this must be understood in light of the court’s actual reasoning. section 11(d) was not breached in darrach because the regime served to protect the trial from the distorting effects of evidence of prior sexual activity (paras. 41-42) the court held that the heightened test “serves to direct judges to the serious ramifications of the use of evidence of prior sexual activity for all parties in these cases” (para. 40). [294] the same rationale does not apply mutatis mutandis to the records screening regime while s 276 addresses inherent “damages and disadvantages” in admitting sexual history evidence (seaboyer, at p 634), the records screening regime captures evidence that may well not have any distorting or damaging effect on the trial. in other words, it applies, distorting effects or not notably, the third-party records regime, which uses the same definition of “record”, does not apply the same heightened standard, instead allowing the judge to order production if the records are “likely relevant” and if production is necessary to the interests of justice (mills, at para. 139). [295] combined with the broad scope of “record” and advance notice requirement, the effect of the heightened standard for admissibility of defence evidence limits the rights to a fair trial and to make full answer and defence under ss. 7 and 11(d). the records screening regime makes all private records in the hands of the accused presumptively inadmissible accused persons must, in their written applications, provide sufficient particulars of the records and of how they intend to use the evidence at trial, in order for the judge to conclude the evidence is capable of meeting the heightened standard for admissibility these detailed particulars will often include defence strategy and prior statements of the accused, and must be provided to both the crown and complainant, before the complainant has testified and before the crown has made out a case to meet and because of the advance notice requirement in s 278.93(4), the accused cannot establish the significant probative value of a record via cross-examination. failure by the accused to meet any of these hurdles, including the seven-day notice requirement, could result in exclusion of relevant and probative evidence. [296] the crown in oral submissions emphasized that the accused can meet this high threshold because “in the vast majority of cases an inconsistency will have arisen before trial” (transcript, day 1, at p 17). counsel referred to the facts in jj’s case, where an inconsistency crystallized at the preliminary inquiry where that does not occur, the crown said the trial judge may have discretion to hear the application after the complainant’s direct or cross-examination. [297] for three reasons, these reassurances are hollow. first, as discussed above, preliminary inquiries are no longer available for many sexual offences, meaning there will be few opportunities for an inconsistency to crystallize before trial. secondly, the interference with cross-examination goes beyond prior inconsistencies. for instance, a private record may disclose a motive to fabricate, and the regime would require the defence to explain in advance how they intend to use that information to show a motive. thirdly, most defence counsel will not take the risk of waiting until mid-trial to bring an application they will be forced to disclose early and often, even where an inconsistency has not arisen. c. the limits on the accused’s rights under sections 11(c), 11(d) and 7 are not demonstrably justified (1) overview of the section 1 analysis [298] the majority interprets the accused’s rights narrowly and balances them against the complainant’s interests to avoid any conflict, but this does not account for the obvious limits under s 11(c) and (d) and s 7. the only question should be whether the crown has proven those limits are demonstrably justified. [299] to constitute a reasonable limit justified under s 1 of the charter, the impugned provision must first have a pressing and substantial objective. further, the means chosen to achieve that objective must be (1) rationally connected to the objective; (2) minimally impairing of the charter right; and (3) proportionate as between the objective and the limit it imposes (including a balancing of its salutary and deleterious effects). [300] limits on the principles of fundamental justice are not easily justified, but this court has left open that possibility (bedford, at para. 129; carter v canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para. 95) an impugned provision “may be saved under s 1 if the state can point to public goods or competing social interests that are themselves protected by the charter . . . . courts may accord deference to legislatures under s 1 for breaches of s 7 where, for example, the law represents a ‘complex regulatory response’ to a social problem” (safarzadeh-markhali, at para. 57, citing alberta v hutterian brethren of wilson colony, 2009 scc 37, [2009] 2 scr 567, at para. 37). [301] for the reasons that follow, the limits on the accused’s rights occasioned by the records screening regime cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. while the regime has a pressing and substantial objective, it fails at the rational connection, minimal impairment, and final balancing stages. (2) pressing and substantial objective [302] i accept the crown’s submissions that the records screening regime has a pressing and substantial objective. that objective, as i have already mentioned and as revealed by the statutory text and the legislative history, is threefold: 1. ensuring that a complainant’s privacy, dignity and equality interests are considered when determining whether private records are admissible; 2. improving victim and community confidence in the justice system, which will likely encourage victims to report sexual crimes; and 3. maintaining the integrity of the trial process by refusing to admit evidence potentially rooted in myths and stereotypes which risk jeopardizing the truth-seeking function of the trial. (3) rational connection [303] to establish a rational connection, the crown must show, on the basis of reason or logic, that there is a causal connection between the limit on the right and the objective (carter, at para. 99, citing rjr-macdonald inc v canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at para. 153). [304] if the records screening regime rendered all records containing personal information of the complainant presumptively inadmissible, irrespective of which party seeks to rely on them, the causal connection between the regime and its objective would be clear. doing so might well ensure that a complainant’s privacy, dignity and equality interests are considered when determining whether private records are admissible, promote confidence in the justice system and preserve the integrity of the trial process. but that is not what the records screening regime does purported concerns for a complainant’s privacy, dignity and equality interests, confidence in the justice system and integrity of the trial process are cast aside when those private records are sought to be adduced by the crown. the one-sided nature of the obligations under the records screening regime is not, therefore, demonstrative merely of the rights-limiting nature of the regime; it also shows that it is not rationally connected to its objective. (4) minimal impairment [305] resting on the crown is the burden of showing that the limit on the right is reasonably tailored to the objective, such that there is no less rights-limiting means of achieving the objective “in a real and substantial manner” (hutterian brethren, at para. 55). the point is that the limit on charter rights should be confined to what is reasonably necessary to achieve the state’s object (carter, at para. 102). [306] the attorneys general and the complainant a.s note that the records screening regime does not absolutely exclude any evidence; rather, it merely provides procedural rules allowing a complainant to be heard they say the complainant’s participation is limited and that any tailoring of evidence can be exposed at trial. the crown says that the regime is minimally impairing because it (1) applies only to sexual offence prosecutions; (2) captures only private records; (3) provides flexibility to ensure protection of the accused’s rights; (4) gives complainants a voice in the process; and (5) “fills a gap but goes no further” (rf in as’s case, at para. 76). [307] these submissions severely understate the impact on the accused’s rights. they also avoid the question to be answered: whether the records screening regime, with its heavy impact on the accused’s rights under s 11(c) and (d) and s 7, is the least drastic means of achieving the legislative objective (carter, at para. 103). for three reasons, it is not. [308] first, the records screening regime applies to all private records, including the accused’s own communications with the complainant about the subject matter of the charge, and not to a subset of records that were created in a confidential context or wrongly fell into the accused’s hands, as in shearing. the broad definition of “record”, combined with the heightened admissibility threshold, will result in the exclusion of defence evidence that is not prejudicial (because it does not inherently rely on myths or distort the truth-seeking process) and is highly relevant this is not minimally impairing of the right to full answer and defence. [309] secondly, by requiring disclosure of potential defence evidence, strategy, and lines of cross-examination before the crown has made out a case to meet, and by depriving the accused of establishing the relevance of that evidence based on the complainant’s testimony, the regime does not minimally impair the right to silence, the presumption of innocence, or the principle against self-incrimination. the list of factors to be judicially balanced in deciding to admit the evidence are considered only after the evidence passes the initial screening stage. by that point, accused persons will have already given up their right to silence by providing detailed particulars, which may well impact the crown’s witness preparation and, as a consequence, the complainant’s testimony. [310] thirdly, by mandating advance notice and disclosure to both the crown and complainant, and by giving the complainant a role in the admissibility determination before trial, the regime allows the crown’s key witnesses to reconcile inconsistencies and potentially alter their evidence in subtle ways that are difficult to test or expose in court. this is not minimally impairing; rather, it potentially eviscerates the effectiveness of cross-examination, particularly in sexual assault trials where the complainant will often be the only witness and, i repeat, it raises the near certain prospect of innocent persons being convicted. [311] that last point deserves special emphasis. rather than effecting a minimal impairment, this ham-fisted measure is an instance of legislative overkill. it shows little to no regard for the rights of accused persons, some of whom will be not only presumptively innocent, but actually so ⸺ although, in many such cases, no longer provably so, since their sole tool for demonstrating their innocence has been statutorily neutered. and yet, there are obvious and less harmful means of achieving parliament’s goals a narrower regime could further the goals of empowering and protecting complainants in a real and substantial manner, while impairing the accused’s rights to a lesser extent. without seeking to limit parliament’s discretion, but merely to show that its objective could be achieved in charter-compliant ways, i note that a constitutional regime might include the following features: 1. “record” would be expressly defined to include only categories of documents containing personal information relating to the complainant for which there is a high expectation of privacy, a risk to dignity, and an inherent risk of prejudice ⸺ for instance, records that the accused obtained illegally or by virtue of a position of authority and records subject to professional confidentiality obligations importantly, this definition would exclude the accused’s own communications. 2. an admissibility voir dire would be held at the time the record becomes relevant. a voir dire would be required irrespective of which party seeks to adduce the record. 3. the adducing party would have to alert the court to the need for a voir dire before introducing the record. 4. trial judges would consider common law rules to protect against unnecessary privacy invasions and improper reasoning. 5. trial judges would have discretion to grant the witness participatory rights on the voir dire when it would be in the interests of justice. (5) proportionality of effects [312] the final stage of the proportionality inquiry entails making a judgment call, requiring courts to examine the broader picture by “balanc[ing] the interests of society with those of individuals and groups” (r v krj, 2016 scc 31, [2016] 1 scr 906, at para. 58 (text in brackets in original), citing oakes, at p 139). when balancing the salutary and deleterious effects, the courts must accord the legislature a measure of deference (carter, at para. 97). [313] the deleterious effects on individual accused persons are substantial. the records screening regime severely limits the right to silence, the privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, full answer and defence, and the right to a fair trial. rather than concentrating on records that inherently invoke myths and stereotypes, the records screening regime compels advance disclosure of all material for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, with no regard to its probative value or whether it would actually advance improper myth-based reasoning the potential list of examples could include electronic communications from the complainant that deny the offence ever occurred, that provide proof of alibi, that indicate a motive to fabricate, that suggest an absence of memory regarding core events, or that provide an inconsistent version of the alleged incident. in the face of this, the crown’s submission in as’s case that “the impact on the accused is not substantial” because they retain their ability to adduce relevant evidence capable of raising a reasonable doubt and to meaningfully challenge the complainant’s evidence through cross-examination cannot really be taken seriously (para. 77). [314] this is all quite independent of significant deleterious effects on the criminal justice system, including increased trial complexity and delay it is not difficult to foresee the confusion that will abound in sexual assault trials involving s 276, ss. 278.1 to 278.91 and s 278.92 evidence, where multiple applications will be required at different stages, all applying different standards of proof and potentially prompting separate appeals, at which the complainant may have standing to appear or to cross-appeal. consider the following scenario: 1. the accused was in a caregiver relationship with the complainant, who alleges that he sexually assaulted her multiple times over several years. as an aggravating factor, the crown argues that he was in a position of trust as evidenced by the fact that he paid her rent the accused seeks production of her lease documents and banking records from third parties under ss. 278.1 to 278.91, using the broader definition of “record” that now applies only to the mills regime. 2. further, there are thousands of text messages between the complainant and the accused spanning the relevant years. most of the messages contain mundane content, but some directly discuss the alleged offences, while others discuss prior sexual activity that was consensual the accused brings a motion for directions to determine which text messages (or parts of messages) are captured by the narrower definition of “record” that now applies only to the ss. 278.92 to 278.94 regime the complainant is permitted to appear on the motion to make submissions regarding her privacy interest. the motions judge rules that most messages do not meet the definition of “record” but is uncertain about 100 messages with varying degrees of sensitivity. the judge orders the accused to bring a s 278.92 application to determine the admissibility of those messages. the accused is unsure how to provide “detailed particulars” of the text messages without disclosing their content. since the messages are crucial to his defence and he believes the complainant will tailor her evidence if he discloses them in advance, he decides to wait until mid-trial to bring the s 278.92 application. 3. in the meantime, before trial, the accused brings a separate s 276 application for the messages containing sexual history evidence, some of which is contained in the same messages as the evidence relevant to the charges this requires the accused to disclose particulars of several key messages relating to his defence of consent to the crown and complainant. 4. after the complainant testifies at trial, the accused files a s 278.92 application and argues it is “in the interests of justice” to admit the records mid-trial. the trial judge disagrees, ruling that the accused should have brought the application pre-trial and that the accused cannot refer to the content of those statements at the trial. in the accused’s testimony, he refers to different parts of text message conversations that were found to be “mundane” the crown objects because other related messages were ruled inadmissible under s 278.92 and it would be prejudicial to discuss those conversations at all the judge adjourns to hear argument and provide further instructions. [315] to be sure, this is just one illustration of the deleterious effects that this regime will visit on the criminal justice system. [316] the parties supporting the records screening regime, however, assert many benefits: (1) protecting the complainants’ privacy, equality and security rights; (2) allowing complainants to participate in the admissibility process; (3) encouraging reporting of sexual offences; and (4) preventing the introduction of evidence that may distort the truth-seeking function of the trial. i accept that the regime slightly increases the common law protections provided by osolin and shearing with respect to the complainants’ privacy, equality and security. it also gives complainants a formal right to participate in decisions impacting those interests. but the other purported benefits are not made out. there is no evidence that the regime increases reporting of sexual assaults. further, there is no reason to believe that it would, since the regime is not aimed at excluding distorting or misleading evidence, allowing as it does the crown to adduce private records without screening. [317] while i am mindful of the need to accord deference to parliament’s choice of means and legislative objective, this is not a close call. the harmful impacts and risk of wrongful convictions outweigh any potential benefits of the regime. i agree with the reasoning of other courts that have concluded the records screening regime impairs the accused’s right to silence, right to a fair trial, and right to make full answer and defence to such an extent that the crown has not demonstrated that the law’s salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects (see, eg,. r v. anderson, 2020 skqb 11, 461 crr. (2d) 128, at para. 13; dlb, at para. 87). iv conclusion [318] i end where i began, with seaboyer, and in particular the reasons given by mclachlin j (as she then was) for striking down the earlier iteration of s 276: i conclude that the operation of s 276 of the criminal code permits the infringement of the rights enshrined in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. in achieving its purpose ⸺ the abolition of the outmoded, sexist-based use of sexual conduct evidence ⸺ it overshoots the mark and renders inadmissible evidence which may be essential to the presentation of legitimate defences and hence to a fair trial. in exchange for the elimination of the possibility that the judge and jury may draw illegitimate inferences from the evidence, it exacts as a price the real risk that an innocent person may be convicted. the price is too great in relation to the benefit secured, and cannot be tolerated in a society that does not countenance in any form the conviction of the innocent. [emphasis added; p 625.] [319] for the same reasons, i say the price of the records screening regime is too great i earlier described the rights at stake here, while not absolute, as being of the most fundamental order that have been limited only in particular and constrained circumstances that will not necessarily arise here (and, where they do, they will be captured by those earlier restrictions ⸺ that is, by the s 276 regime). in light of the majority’s unfortunate judgment to the contrary, i dissent. [320] to be clear, i would strike down ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code, with immediate effect, but only as those sections relate to the records screening regime. this would preserve the existing s 276 regime and the definition of “record” in the ss. 278.1 to 278.91 regime i agree with counsel for j.j that “reading down” the provisions would not respect parliament’s intent and could have unexpected effects on the related legislative regimes. it falls to parliament to consider how best to bring the regime into compliance with the charter. the following are the reasons delivered by rowe j — i. overview [321] the accused persons j.j and shane reddick brought separate constitutional challenges in british columbia and ontario to ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, arguing these provisions violate ss. 7, 11(c) and 11(d) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. the british columbia supreme court and the ontario superior court agreed and struck the provisions down in whole or in part (see the charter breach analysis in r v. jj, 2020 bcsc 29, and the s 1 analysis and decision on remedy in r v. jj, 2020 bcsc 349; and see r v. reddick, 2020 onsc 7156, 398 ccc (3d) 227). [322] on the merits of these appeals, i agree with brown j that ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code are unconstitutional and therefore of no force and effect except in so far as they apply to the existing s 276 regime. the legislation in this case restricts the fair trial rights of accused persons by placing limits on how they can conduct the cross-examination of crown witnesses and what evidence they can introduce in support of their own defence, even if that evidence is highly probative and not prejudicial to the complainants. the screening process introduced by the legislation violates ss. 11(c) and 11(d) by requiring the accused to disclose all records relevant to their defence before the crown has established the case to meet. [323] in my view, the main issue in these appeals is that the crown and a number of interveners invite the court to rely on s 7 to limit the rights protected by s 11 of the charter on the basis that this approach has previously been adopted in r v mills, [1999] 3 scr 668, and r v. darrach, 2000 scc 46, [2000] 2 scr 443. for the reasons that follow, i decline to do so. [324] during these appeals, the crown has maintained that the constitutional questions in this case, regardless of the section considered, can be resolved through an ad hoc balancing of rights, interests and values that leads to the conclusion that the impugned provisions are constitutional. the key to this argument is that a limit on trial fairness justified under s 7 also limits fair trial rights under s 11. in essence, the court is urged to introduce internal limits on s 7 rights into s 11. [325] this approach to ss. 7 and 11 does not conform with the text or purposes of those provisions or with the structure of the charter the scope of rights under ss. 11(c) and 11(d) is to be ascertained by the text and purposes of those provisions. any limits on those rights must then be justified under s 1 and not through an interpretation of s 7. to do otherwise inverts the proper role of s 7, which is a broad, rights-conferring provision. to construe it as a limit on other charter rights is wrong in principle and, in this case, undermines the longstanding, fundamental right to a fair trial. [326] in these reasons, i first examine the purpose and content of the constitutional right to a fair trial. second, i outline the purpose and content of s 7 and examine how the problems in that jurisprudence are distorting the interpretation and application of s 11. third, i explain why this is inappropriate. [327] finally, i set out an approach that gives proper effect to ss. 7, 11 and 1. where a specific charter guarantee (here, s 11) is pleaded along with the broader guarantee in s 7, the specific guarantee should be addressed first. if a violation of the specific charter guarantee is found, there is no reason to proceed to s 7. if there is no violation of the specific guarantee, or the violation is found to be justified under s 1, the courts must then look to s 7 this approach accords with the structure of the charter, and with the text and purposes of the “legal rights” in ss. 7 to 14 and s 1. ii there is a constitutional right to a fair trial [328] i begin by examining the scope of the right to a fair trial. a. introduction to the right to a fair trial [329] the need to ensure that a criminal trial is fair has long been recognized in our justice system as key to guarding against wrongful conviction and against arbitrary deprivation of liberty an impartial and independent justice system exists to ensure trials are fair. [330] section 11 of the charter sets out the right of every accused person to a fair trial. [331] section 11 is part of the section of the charter entitled “legal rights”, which also contains ss. 7 to 10 and 12 to 14. section 11 sets out the rights of a person “charged with an offence”, including the right to a trial within a reasonable time (s 11(b)), the right not to be compelled as a witness in proceedings against oneself (s 11(c)), the presumption of innocence (s 11(d)), the right to reasonable bail (s 11(e)), and the right to the benefit of the lesser punishment (s 11(i)). [332] these appeals concern primarily the rights protected by s 11(d) and, to a lesser extent, s 11(c). b. scope of rights protected by section 11(d) [333] section 11(d) provides: 11 any person charged with an offence has the right . (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; [334] as with all charter rights, s 11(d) is to be interpreted purposively (r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at p 119; r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr. 295, at p 344; hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at p 156; re bc. motor vehicle act, [1985] 2 scr 486, at p 499; law society of british columbia v. trinity western university, 2018 scc 32, [2018] 2 scr 293, at paras. 178-85). [335] section 11(d) provides for interlocking substantive and procedural protections including: 1) the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; 2) the right to fair procedures; 3) the right to cross-examine crown witnesses without significant and unwarranted restraint; and 4) the right to silence before a case to meet is made out, which is common to ss. 11(c) and 11(d). together, they protect the fair trial rights of the accused. i expand on these rights below. (1) right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty [336] the right to be “presumed innocent until proven guilty” appears in the text of s 11(d). [337] the presumption of innocence has long been considered a central organizing idea of a fair criminal justice system this court has held that the presumption of innocence is the “golden thread of criminal justice” (r v lifchus, [1997] 3 scr 320, at para. 27). [338] the presumption of innocence means that an accused charged with an offence must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. the state bears the burden of proof (oakes, at p 121). (2) right to fair procedures [339] in addition to its substantive content, s 11(d) provides for certain procedural guarantees that flow from the presumption of innocence in order to secure trial fairness. these requirements include proof of guilt according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal (oakes, at p 121). (3) right to cross-examine crown witnesses without significant and unwarranted restraint [340] another procedural guarantee protected by s 11(d) is the right of the accused to cross-examine adverse witnesses without significant or unwarranted restraint (r v. lyttle, 2004 scc 5, [2004] 1 scr 193, at paras. 41-43). as this court explained in r v. osolin, [1993] 4 scr 595, at p 663: “there can be no question of the importance of cross-examination. . . . it is the ultimate means of demonstrating truth and of testing veracity. . . . the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses is fundamental to providing a fair trial to an accused.” [341] the right to cross-examine without significant and unwarranted restraint must “be jealously protected and broadly construed”; it can extend to protection for the “rhythm” or scope of cross-examination (lyttle, at paras. 44 and 7). but it “must not be abused counsel are bound by the rules of relevancy and barred from resorting to harassment, misrepresentation, repetitiousness or, more generally, from putting questions whose prejudicial effect outweighs their probative value” (para. 44). (4) right to silence before a case to meet is made out [342] finally, the presumption of innocence is closely linked to the right to silence and the protection against self-incrimination. sections 11(c) and 11(d), as well as s 13 of the charter, recognize and reinforce the state’s burden to establish a criminal case against accused persons before they need respond either by testifying or by calling other evidence (dubois v. the queen, [1985] 2 scr 350, at pp. 357-58). c. scope of rights protected by section 11(c) [343] section 11(c) provides: 11 any person charged with an offence has the right . (c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the offence; [344] as explained above, the purpose of s 11(c) is to protect against self- incrimination and preserve the accused’s right to silence. the accused has a right not to furnish testimonial information which the prosecutor can use in presenting the case to meet (d. m. paciocco, “self-incrimination: removing the coffin nails” (1989), 35 mcgill lj 73, at p 90; s. coughlan and r. j. currie, “sections 9, 10 and 11 of the canadian charter”, in e. mendes and s. beaulac, eds., canadian charter of rights and freedoms (5th ed. 2013), 793, at p 845). this would apply, for example, to records that contain the accused’s own words about the subject matter of the charge. aspects of the accused’s right to silence before a case to meet is made out are protected by both ss. 11(c) and 11(d). d permissible limits on sections 11(c) and 11(d) [345] having examined the content of ss. 11(c) and 11(d), it is necessary to review how these rights may be limited. [346] ordinarily, a charter right can only be limited in one of two ways: 1) internally, through its own text; or 2) by undertaking the balancing required in s 1 of the charter (p. w. hogg and w. k. wright, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at § 38:1; see, for example, fleming v. ontario, 2019 scc 45, [2019] 3 scr. 519, at para. 111). i expand on each type of limitation below. (1) internal limits: definition of fair trial [347] qualifying words used in the text of the charter are the starting point for the interpretation of the scope of charter rights and any internal limits. [348] sections 11(c) and 11(d) have few internal limits they apply only to persons “charged with an offence”. section 11(c) protects an accused only from being compelled as a “witness” in “proceedings against that person in respect of the offence”, usually meaning proceedings with true penal consequences. section 11(d) provides that the presumption of innocence ceases to operate following conviction there is no indication in the text of either provision that they can be limited by operation of s 7. (2) section 1 [349] other than internal limits that appear in the text of the charter provisions themselves, the only other limits provided for are in s 1 of the charter. section 1 reads: rights and freedoms in canada 1 the canadian charter of rights and freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. [350] section 1 establishes that the only external limits applicable to charter rights are those prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. this means that the rights protected by ss. 11(c) and 11(d) cannot be altered by statute. however, a statute may limit s 11 rights, if those limitations meet the criteria of s 1. [351] this court set out the proper analysis to be undertaken under s 1 in oakes. the oakes analysis is rigorous. if an infringement of a charter right is established, the onus of justifying it is on the party seeking to uphold the limitation (pp. 136-37). [352] what has been offered to the court in this case in no way conforms to the thorough examination of the legislation, its effects and consequences that is required under oakes simply put, no oakes analysis tailored to the particular operation or elements of ss. 11(c) or 11(d) was placed before the court; that is to say, the crown offered no s 1 analysis that focused on exactly how an infringement of ss. 11(c) or 11(d) could be justified. this is extraordinary. the crown not only failed to meet the high standard required by s 1 and the oakes test; rather it denied that it needed to do so. the majority has adopted a similar view. iii a limit on section 11 based on section 7 does not conform either to the architecture of the charter or to the purposes of those provisions, or section 1 [353] instead of relying on the permissible limits on s 11 rights described above, the crown submitted that this case can be resolved under s 7 and that the s 7 finding would also be determinative of the s 11 issues. [354] there is simply no foundation for an analytical approach whereby ss. 11(c) and 11(d) rights can be limited by reference to internal limits in s 7. this involves a grave distortion of s 7, which is a broad, rights-conferring provision. instead, s 7 is used here as a limit on other constitutional rights. this departs fundamentally from the view that s 7 is broader than the other “legal rights” in ss. 8 to 14, such that it can supplement those rights. [355] yet, the crown urges this court to find that, based on our jurisprudence, s 7 can be used to undercut other “legal rights” to address this argument it is necessary to review s 7 in some detail. [356] below i review the content of s 7 and how its inconsistent interpretation has given rise to doctrinal difficulties that the court has on occasion introduced into the interpretation of s 11. as i explain, this court’s jurisprudence on defining the scope and proper application of s 7 is inconsistent. the court has been unclear on how to identify and define the principles of fundamental justice. there is no clear guidance on how to undertake internal balancing in s 7, nor even as to whether such balancing is appropriate i then review how those uncertainties are being introduced into s 11. finally, i explain why such an approach constitutes a fundamental undermining of the right to a fair trial and, in so doing, departs from the text and architecture of the charter. a. section 7 [357] section 7 provides that: 7 everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. [358] this court described the purpose of s 7 in gosselin v. quebec (attorney general), 2002 scc 84, [2002] 4 scr 429, at para. 77: . . the dominant strand of jurisprudence on s 7 sees its purpose as guarding against [those] deprivation[s] of life, liberty and security of the person . . “that occur as a result of an individual’s interaction with the justice system and its administration”: new brunswick (minister of health and community services) v. g (j.), [1999] 3 scr 46, at para. 65. “[t]he justice system and its administration” refers to “the state’s conduct in the course of enforcing and securing compliance with the law” (g (j.), at para. 65). [359] in order to determine whether there is a violation of s 7, the court applies a three-step analysis (r v. white, [1999] 2 scr 417, at para. 38): 1) is there a real or imminent deprivation of life, liberty, security of the person, or a combination of these interests? 2) if so, one must identify and define the relevant principles of fundamental justice. 3) is the deprivation in accordance with the relevant principle or principles of fundamental justice? [360] although this test is well-established, applying it in practice has proven difficult. the reach of s 7 can extend beyond the administration of justice, which may “be implicated in a variety of circumstances” (gosselin, at para. 78), and its boundaries remain unsettled for this reason, s 7 has been described by commentators as “elusiv[e]” and “mysterious” (t. lipton, “all charter rights are equal, but some are more equal than others” (2010), 52 sclr (2d) 449, at p 449). [361] unlike ss. 11(c) and 11(d), s 7 contains significant internal limits. once a deprivation of life, liberty or personal security is established, it can nonetheless be shown that the deprivation is in accordance with the “principles of fundamental justice”. it is at this stage of the analysis where many difficulties arise. b. the content of the principles of fundamental justice in section 7 [362] the first difficulty with interpreting s 7 is in giving concrete meaning to the “principles of fundamental justice”. the foundational case on the meaning of s 7 remains re b.c motor vehicle act at p 509, this court commented that the interpretation of s 7 and all charter rights should preserve the opportunity for “growth, development and adjustment to changing societal needs” to ensure the charter continues to be a “living tree” that is capable of responding to the needs of the moment. this court stated that the principles of fundamental justice “cannot be given any exhaustive content or simple enumerative definition, but will take on concrete meaning as the courts address alleged violations of s 7” (p 513). (1) the principles of fundamental justice have substantive and not only procedural content [363] in re bc. motor vehicle act, the court was asked whether the “principles of fundamental justice” have both procedural and substantive content. some extrinsic evidence indicated that when the charter was drafted, the intended meaning of the term “principles of fundamental justice” was similar to that connoted by the phrase “procedural due process” (minutes of the proceedings and evidence of the special joint committee of the senate and of the house of commons on the constitution of canada, no. 46, 1st sess., 32nd parl., january 27, 1981, at pp. 32 and 42, and pp. 33- 36 (mr. strayer, assistant deputy minister, public law); see also the evidence of the minister of justice, the hon. j. chrétien, at p 43). nonetheless, the court adopted a broad definition of the principles of fundamental justice and decided that they include not only procedural protections, but also substantive ones (re bc. motor vehicle act, at pp. 498-500). [364] this expansive approach to the principles of fundamental justice gave rise to considerable uncertainty; it has contributed to s 7 jurisprudence marked by indeterminacy and an ongoing lack of doctrinal clarity (see, for example, n. r. hasan, “three theories of ‘principles of fundamental justice’” (2013), 63 sclr (2d) 339, at p 341). (2) difficulties identifying the principles of fundamental justice [365] one consequence of re bc. motor vehicle act is persistent incoherence in identifying the principles of fundamental justice. [366] for years after re b.c motor vehicle act, there was no settled methodology for identifying the principles of fundamental justice. many principles of fundamental justice that were recognized were stated in broad generalizations which risked “transform[ing] s 7 into a vehicle for policy adjudication” (canadian foundation for children, youth and the law v. canada (attorney general), 2004 scc 4, [2004] 1 scr 76, at para. 9). [367] with time, it became clear that a greater degree of clarity with respect to the meaning of the principles of fundamental justice was needed for the interpretation of s 7 to be workable in practice this court sought to provide greater structure in rodriguez v. british columbia (attorney general), [1993] 3 scr 519, at pp. 591-92, and subsequently in r v malmo-levine, 2003 scc 74, [2003] 3 scr 571, at para. 113. the court finally settled on the current criteria for identifying a principle of fundamental justice in canadian foundation for children, youth and the law, at para. 8. the court adopted the following three-pronged test: jurisprudence on s 7 has established that a “principle of fundamental justice” must fulfill three criteria: r v. malmo-levine, [2003] 3 scr 571, 2003 scc 74, at para. 113. first, it must be a legal principle. this serves two purposes. first, it “provides meaningful content for the s 7 guarantee”; second, it avoids the “adjudication of policy matters”: re b.c motor vehicle act, [1985] 2 scr 486, at p 503 second, there must be sufficient consensus that the alleged principle is “vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice”: rodriguez v british columbia (attorney general), [1993] 3 scr 519, at p 590. the principles of fundamental justice are the shared assumptions upon which our system of justice is grounded they find their meaning in the cases and traditions that have long detailed the basic norms for how the state deals with its citizens. society views them as essential to the administration of justice. third, the alleged principle must be capable of being identified with precision and applied to situations in a manner that yields predictable results. examples of principles of fundamental justice that meet all three requirements include the need for a guilty mind and for reasonably clear laws. [emphasis added.] [368] nonetheless, the definition of the principles of fundamental justice remains malleable, particularly given the need to identify a “sufficient consensus” about the importance of a legal principle. [369] the consequences and potentially idiosyncratic applications of an unsettled definition of the principles of fundamental justice can readily be seen in this case. [370] for example, the majority continues to rely on the unexplained assertions in mills and darrach that “protecting the security and privacy of witnesses” qualifies as a principle of fundamental justice (para. 120). mills and darrach claim to rely on r. v seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577 (mills, at para. 72; darrach, at para. 25) yet, seaboyer does not support this proposition. in that case, mclachlin j (as she then was) noted that the goals of an earlier version of s 276 of the criminal code — the avoidance of unprobative and misleading evidence, the encouraging of reporting and the protection of the security and privacy of the witnesses — “conform to our fundamental conceptions of justice” (p 606) these goals were not themselves recognized as principles of fundamental justice. moreover, seaboyer pre-dates the test set out in canadian foundation for children, youth and the law. it is doubtful that this test would be met if it were applied to the goals of “protecting the security and privacy of witnesses” these aims, while laudable, are neither legal principles, nor sufficiently precise to be principles of fundamental justice. [371] the majority also refers to “dignity” and “equality”, even where neither have ever been recognized as principles of fundamental justice. the role these concepts play in the majority’s reasoning is unclear i would note, parenthetically, that the recognition of “equality” as a principle of fundamental justice under s 7 would have far reaching implications that extend far beyond the matters at issue in this case. [372] another difficulty with the malleable definition of the “principles of fundamental justice” is that it is not always clear in what circumstances “societal interests” may be relevant to identifying principles of fundamental justice. “societal interests” are considered in more depth below, in relation to internal balancing within s 7. however, a different (and preliminary) question is whether any societal interests are themselves principles of fundamental justice. there remains no settled answer to this question, as among others. c how do the principles of fundamental justice operate to limit section 7 rights? (1) the methodological approach for how the principles of fundamental justice operate to limit section 7 rights is inconsistent [373] there is a lack of coherence not only in the definition of the principles of fundamental justice, but also in the methodology for how principles of fundamental justice are balanced with competing considerations to arrive at the scope of s 7 rights, or whether such a balancing is appropriate. [374] the court has on occasion dealt with s 7 cases where one or more parties argued that finding a violation of s 7 would undermine the rights or interests of third parties or societal interests. in such circumstances, the court has previously considered that all of these competing considerations should be internally balanced under s 7, to define them so they do not conflict with each other (mills, at para. 21; seaboyer, at pp. 603-4). [375] when engaging in an internal balancing under s 7, the court has occasionally categorized competing considerations as charter rights, charter values, and societal interests, but has not adopted a systematic or consistent approach to how these are to be weighed against one another, or even whether the considerations applicable to each category are different it is not clear: 1) how charter values and societal interests as opposed to charter rights are defined; 2) whether these rights, values or interests must engage s 7 or at least amount to principles of fundamental justice in order to be part of the balancing in s 7; or 3) in the event of conflict between rights, interests and values, how one should decide which consideration prevails. [376] the lack of a sound methodology is evident when one considers how the court has dealt with conflicts between charter rights, charter values (an open and malleable category) and societal interests (an even more open and more malleable category). (a) one party’s charter rights vs. other charter rights [377] it is argued by the crown and a number of interveners that this case engages the charter rights of multiple persons, including the accused and complainants — referred to by counsel for as in the hearing as “three-dimensional” charter rights. (one wonders whether such metaphors do more to obscure than illuminate doctrinal questions.) it is submitted, on this basis, that all of these competing rights should be reconciled under s 7. [378] the court has determined that where giving effect to a s 7 right may conflict with a competing charter right of another party, courts should engage in a “balancing” approach as set out in mills. the majority of the court in that case said, at para. 21: as this court’s decision in dagenais, supra, makes clear, charter rights must be examined in a contextual manner to resolve conflicts between them therefore, unlike s 1 balancing, where societal interests are sometimes allowed to override charter rights, under s 7 rights must be defined so that they do not conflict with each other the rights of full answer and defence, and privacy, must be defined in light of each other, and both must be defined in light of the equality provisions of s 15. [379] mills concerned the third party records regime, which engaged the complainant’s s 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure because the criminal code provisions at issue authorized the seizure of the complainant’s records. the court noted, at para. 62, that both the complainant’s s 8 rights and the accused’s s 7 right to make full answer and defence were engaged and that “both of these rights are instances of the ‘principles of fundamental justice’ enshrined in s 7”. [380] the court in mills relied on dagenais v. canadian broadcasting corp., [1994] 3 scr 835, despite the fact that dagenais did not involve s 7. instead, in that case, the court relied on the charter values of a fair trial and freedom of expression to interpret the common law rule governing publication bans. mills interpreted dagenais to suggest that charter rights considered under s 7 “must be examined in a contextual manner to resolve conflicts between them [and] must be defined so that they do not conflict with each other” (para. 21). [381] however, subsequent decisions of the court confirm that dagenais did not concern balancing under s 7, and in fact “incorporates the essence of s 1 of the charter and the oakes test” (r v. mentuck, 2001 scc 76, [2001] 3 scr 442, at para. 27; see also r v. ns, 2012 scc 72, [2012] 3 scr 726, at para. 35). these pronouncements are consistent with this court’s decision in canada (attorney general) v bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at paras. 123 and 125, and carter v canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at paras. 79-80, which confirm that s 7 should focus on those who allege that they have been deprived of life, liberty or security of the person in a manner that does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice. [382] in fact, this court has asserted on multiple occasions that competing rights should be balanced under s 1 of the charter — a framework “especially well suited to the task of balancing” (r v. keegstra, [1990] 3 scr 697, at pp. 733-34, referring to edmonton journal v. alberta (attorney general), [1989] 2 scr 1326, per wilson j., concurring; see also b (r.) v. children’s aid society of metropolitan toronto, [1995] 1 scr 315, at pp. 383-84; ross v. new brunswick school district no. 15, [1996] 1 scr 825, at paras. 73-75; harvey v. new brunswick (attorney general), [1996] 2 scr 876, at para. 30; multani v. commission scolaire marguerite‑bourgeoys, 2006 scc 6, [2006] 1 scr 256, at para. 26; saskatchewan (human rights commission) v. whatcott, 2013 scc 11, [2013] 1 scr 467, at para. 154; r v. sharpe, 2001 scc 2, [2001] 1 scr 45, at para. 154, per l’heureux-dubé, gonthier and bastarache jj., concurring; trinity western university v. british columbia college of teachers, 2001 scc 31, [2001] 1 scr 772, at para. 94, per l’heureux-dubé j., dissenting; law society of british columbia, at para. 188, per rowe j., concurring). as these precedents demonstrate, the mills approach is a clear outlier in prescribing that charter rights be “defined so that they do not conflict with each other” (para. 21). [383] in any event, the majority does not explain why mills is relevant in this case. mills did not find that balancing was required merely because the records in that case engaged the complainant’s privacy interest. in that case the privacy interest was a charter-protected right that was also an instance of the principles of fundamental justice. as the majority acknowledges (at para. 119), the complainants’ charter rights are not engaged in this case. it is therefore not clear why or how the framework for “analyzing multiple charter breaches” applies (para. 121; see also para. 115). (b) charter rights vs. charter values [384] the crown argues that even if it cannot be found that complainants’ charter rights are engaged, courts can balance “charter values” because they are relevant to the scope of the principles of fundamental justice under s 7. [385] the concept of “charter values” originated in civil and administrative law cases, where charter rights are not engaged, but the subject matter is similar to cases to which the charter applies, for example defamation and free speech (see rwdsu v. dolphin delivery ltd., [1986] 2 scr 573, at p 603; r v. salituro, [1991] 3 scr. 654, at p 675; dagenais, at p 876; hill v. church of scientology of toronto, [1995] 2 scr 1130, at paras. 91-98; m (a.) v. ryan, [1997] 1 scr 157, at paras. 22-23; wic radio ltd. v. simpson, 2008 scc 40, [2008] 2 scr 420, at paras. 2 and 16; grant v. torstar corp., 2009 scc 61, [2009] 3 scr 640, at paras. 44 and 46; law society of british columbia, at para. 41). since then, charter values have been applied to develop the common law, as a tool of statutory interpretation, and as a constraint on administrative discretion (see m. horner, “charter values: the uncanny valley of canadian constitutionalism” (2014), 67 sclr (2d) 361, at pp. 364, 367 and 371). [386] as noted, charter values were first used in rwdsu to interpret the common law, rather than to affect internal balancing under s 7. however, in darrach, at para. 25, the court appeared to introduce charter values into the internal “balancing” in s 7 when it relied on the notion of “rights or values” articulated in mills, at paras. 61, 72 and 89, to limit the accused’s fair trial rights. the majority follows this approach while also adding into the mix other amorphous values like dignity and equality. how these should be considered is unclear. [387] when introduced into the principles of fundamental justice, charter values are used to limit the accused’s charter rights without a clear basis being set out for doing so. as the ontario court of appeal recently commented in mckitty v. hayani, 2019 onca 805, 439 dlr (4th) 504, at para. 90: “charter values, unlike charter rights, are not taken from a canonical text. there is no methodology to guide the degree of abstraction at which they are formulated, or to resolve claims of priority when they conflict.” charter rights are constrained by their text and purposes values are potentially boundless, with few indications of their parameters. as i have noted in law society of british columbia, at paras. 171-72, weighing values against rights is a subjective exercise that lends itself to conclusory reasoning. this lack of clarity is an impediment to applying a structured and consistent approach to adjudicating charter claims. [388] a finding that values supersede rights risks arbitrarily undermining those rights and poses serious risks to the rule of law. that is the case here. the majority advances somewhat abstract justifications for serious procedural limitations on fair trial rights the majority states that “highly private” records implicate complainants’ “privacy and dignity” and “have the potential to engage truth-distorting myths” (paras. 162-63). these concerns are formulated at a very high level of generality. the majority does not specify the weight these considerations should be given in the s 7 balancing, and why. [389] it is beyond the scope of this case to consider what role charter values should be accorded in civil and administrative proceedings however, a proper and careful reading of this court’s jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that charter values have no place in the analysis of constitutional issues under s 7. charter values are the kinds of “moral claims” referred to in carter, at paras. 79-81 (see also bedford, at para. 125), that should properly be considered under s 1. in saying this, i do not say that the result in darrach is incorrect rather, i make the simple point that the methodology employed under the analysis in s 7 should be clear, transparent and consistent with the structure of the charter. (c) charter rights vs. societal interests [390] another concept the court has referred to in delineating the principles of fundamental justice under s 7 is that of “societal interests”. [391] the place of “societal interests” in the s 7 balancing analysis has been a controversial subject since the earliest days of the charter the court has been inconsistent as to how societal interests are weighed within s 7 (see, in particular, thomson newspapers ltd v canada (director of investigation and research, restrictive trade practices commission), [1990] 1 scr 425; r v. wholesale travel group inc., [1991] 3 scr 154; r v swain, [1991] 1 scr 933; rodriguez), attracting criticism for analytical instability and a lack of coherence different approaches have been taken by the court and described in the literature (see t. j. singleton, “the principles of fundamental justice, societal interests and section 1 of the charter” (1995), 74 can. bar rev. 446, at pp. 449 and 473; lipton, at pp. 452- 53). [392] one approach holds that “societal interests” should not be considered at all when determining whether there has been a rights violation under s 7. this was the court’s view in re bc. motor vehicle act, at p 517. however, if a violation of s 7 is found, “societal interests” may be considered in the subsequent balancing exercise under s 1 (r v. morgentaler, [1988] 1 scr 30; carter, at paras. 79-80 and 95; r v. brown, 2022 scc 18, at para. 70; singleton, at p 448; lipton, at pp. 452-53 and 479). [393] a second approach holds that, when considering whether there is a deprivation of “life, liberty and security of the person” in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, those principles should only be balanced against other principles of fundamental justice any “other interests” should be considered under s 1 mills is widely considered to be an example of this approach, assuming, as discussed above, the benefits of the legislation referenced there legitimately qualified as principles of fundamental justice (see also r v. jarvis, 2002 scc 73, [2002] 3 scr. 757, at para. 68; lipton, at p 478). [394] a third approach holds that “societal interests”, whether principles of fundamental justice or not, may be considered when delineating the scope of the principles of fundamental justice under s 7 examples of “societal interests” may include administrative efficiency or the effectiveness of law enforcement. often there is no further balancing under s 1 (see r v. beare, [1988] 2 scr 387, at pp. 402-3; r v. hebert, [1990] 2 scr 151, at p 180; kindler v. canada (minister of justice), [1991] 2 scr 779, at pp. 833 and 852-54; chiarelli v canada (minister of employment and immigration), [1992] 1 scr 711, at p 733; malmo-levine, at paras. 98-99; r v. demers, 2004 scc 46, [2004] 2 scr 489, at para. 45; charkaoui v canada (citizenship and immigration), 2007 scc 9, [2007] 1 scr 350, at paras. 20 and 63; r v singh, 2007 scc 48, [2007] 3 scr 405, at paras. 45-47; singleton, at p 448; lipton, at p 477). [395] a fourth approach holds that “societal interests” should be balanced against the s 7 right itself (that is liberty, life, or personal security) and not just the principle of fundamental justice that sets boundaries on the application of the right (see cunningham v. canada, [1993] 2 scr 143, at pp. 151-52; lipton, at pp. 452-53 and 476). [396] finally, the court adopted a fifth approach in bedford. when considering whether there has been a violation under s 7 and the principles of overbreadth, arbitrariness or gross disproportionality are at issue, it should be determined whether the effect on an individual’s life, liberty or personal security is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice in a particular case. whether such a deprivation is justified in light of the “overarching public goal” of the legislation may be considered under s 1 (bedford, at paras. 124-29; r v. smith, 2015 scc 34, [2015] 2 scr 602, at para. 29). [397] in carter, at paras. 79-80, the court responded to longstanding and continuing criticism of its various approaches to “societal interests” in s 7 by affirming that societal interests should only be considered under s 1. the court explicitly stated that when “determining whether the deprivation of life, liberty and security of the person is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice under s 7, courts are not concerned with competing social interests or public benefits conferred by the impugned law” (para. 79 (emphasis added)). similarly, in brown, our court held that “[t]he equality and dignity interests of women and children . . are appropriately understood as justification for the infringement by the state. . . . [t]he equality, dignity and security interests of vulnerable groups informed the overarching social policy goals of parliament; they are best considered under s 1” (para. 70 (emphasis added)). [398] in their reasons, the majority seeks to distinguish carter on the basis that they are not “balancing ‘competing moral claims’ but rather assessing the fairness of trial procedures” (para. 122, citing carter, at para. 79). with respect, the majority is balancing the s 11(d) rights of accused persons with “the privacy, dignity, and equality interests of complainants” (para. 119 (emphasis added)) to define the parameters of the accused’s entitlement to trial fairness under s 7. [399] in sum, in the present case, the court is being asked to return to the method adopted in the specific context arising in darrach and mills, which does not otherwise conform to the court’s recent pronouncements and, as explained below, is inconsistent with the structure of the charter. these cases cannot support the propositions for which they are advanced by the crown. (2) conclusions on section 7 [400] the ambiguities and lack of consistent structure in the court’s s 7 jurisprudence make it a grab-bag of “rights, values, and societal interests” — unclear and amorphous concepts of uncertain legal origin and status that can be chosen, à la carte, by a decision maker to arrive at a given result the outcomes provide little certainty about the law for citizens and little predictability for litigants. this opens the door widely to conclusory decision-making. d. the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 are being relied upon to limit section 11 (1) how permissible internal limits on section 7 rights are being relied on to introduce limitations into section 11 [401] not only are there difficulties in the court’s s 7 jurisprudence, the court is now being invited to rely on the content of s 7 to limit the rights protected by s 11. [402] protections under s 7 have been held to overlap with protections under ss. 11(c) and (d). for example, s 7 rights that are also protected under s 11 include: - the right of the accused to make full answer and defence (dersch v. canada (attorney general), [1990] 2 scr 1505, at p 1514; r v. stinchcombe, [1991] 3 scr 326, at p 336; r v carosella, [1997] 1 scr 80, at para. 29; r v. mcclure, 2001 scc 14, [2001] 1 scr 445, at para. 3; seaboyer); - the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (r v. pearson, [1992] 3 scr 665, at p 682); - the right of the accused to cross-examine crown witnesses without significant and unwarranted restraint (lyttle, at para. 43); - the right of the accused to call evidence in their own defence (seaboyer; r v. rose, [1998] 3 scr 262, at para. 2); - the right of the accused to fair procedures (r v. levogiannis, [1993] 4 scr 475; rose, at para. 99; dersch, at pp. 1514-17); - the right of the accused to take a completely adversarial stance to the prosecution (stinchcombe, at p 333). [403] there are three ways through which limits in s 7 are introduced into s 11, all of which rely on similar theoretical underpinnings and all three of which the majority relies on here. [404] the first approach finds that ss. 11(c) and 11(d) protect rights that illustrate principles of fundamental justice (re bc. motor vehicle act, at p 502), and therefore these may be balanced against other considerations under s 7 when s 7 is given priority in the analysis, it subsumes ss. 11(c) and 11(d) and the latter can be limited without a s 1 analysis. this was the approach adopted in mills and subsequently, in darrach. [405] the second approach is somewhat similar to the first. however, ss. 11(c) and 11(d) are not balanced against other principles of fundamental justice under s 7, but are themselves defined following consideration of other interests because they are “inextricably intertwined” with s 7 (seaboyer, at p 603). this analysis can be seen in seaboyer, where mclachlin j stated for the majority, at pp. 603-4, that “[t]he principles of fundamental justice reflect a spectrum of interests, from the rights of the accused to broader societal concerns”, and implied that the content of ss. 7 and 11(d) is equivalent and ascertained by looking to the scope of s 7. [406] the third approach holds that, because it is so closely related to s 7, the definition of “fairness” in the s 11(d) right to a fair trial includes considerations of the interests of the state and other parties. this methodology is exemplified by the reasons of chief justice mclachlin in r v. find, 2001 scc 32, [2001] 1 scr 863, where she stated, at para. 28: the ultimate requirement of a system of jury selection is that it results in a fair trial. a fair trial, however, should not be confused with a perfect trial, or the most advantageous trial possible from the accused’s perspective as i stated in r v o’connor, [1995] 4 scr 411, at para. 193, “[w]hat constitutes a fair trial takes into account not only the perspective of the accused, but the practical limits of the system of justice and the lawful interests of others involved in the process. . . . what the law demands is not perfect justice, but fundamentally fair justice”. see also r. v. carosella, [1997] 1 scr 80, at para. 72; r v. lyons, [1987] 2 scr. 309, at p 362; r v. harrer, [1995] 3 scr 562, at para. 14. at the same time, occasional injustice cannot be accepted as the price of efficiency: m (a.) v. ryan, [1997] 1 scr 157, at para. 32; r v. leipert, [1997] 1 scr 281. [407] all of the above approaches have common features, which have at their core the conflation of s 7 with the other “legal rights” in ss. 8 to 14 and the tendency to channel the entire constitutional analysis through s 7 such an analysis operates almost entirely outside the constitutional text, structure, and purposes of the various provisions. [408] although the majority states that they are not importing the limits of s 7 into s 11 in this case, that is how their analysis proceeds. notably, the majority defines the right to a fair trial by reference to the perspectives of the accused, the complainant, the community and the criminal justice system at large (paras. 121 and 125). however, the right to a fair trial under s 11(d) is one that appertains to the accused only. i do not see how this right of the accused can be limited by consideration of societal interests unless it is through the vehicle of the principles of fundamental justice under s 7. i note again that, having regard to the architecture of the charter, the proper methodology by which to have regard to such societal considerations is under s 1 and not by using s 7 as a mechanism to limit rights under s 11. (2) confusion whether to proceed first under the specific (section 11) or the general (section 7) [409] because of the lack of coherence in the approach to defining ss. 7 and 11, when courts are presented with a specific case, there is no clear methodology for choosing to deal with the general (s 7) or the specific (s 11) right first, or to deal with one but not the other. [410] the court’s approach to this issue has been inconsistent in canada (attorney general) v whaling, 2014 scc 20, [2014] 1 scr 392, at para. 76, the court favoured proceeding with the specific right first, yet some cases continue to proceed ad hoc. sometimes cases proceed under the general right — s 7 — first (see, for example, r v cawthorne, 2016 scc 32, [2016] 1 scr 983, at para. 35). sometimes, the court’s approach varies within the same case. for example, in r v. st- onge lamoureux, 2012 scc 57, [2012] 3 scr 187, the court dealt with some claims under s 7 and some claims under s 11 on the basis that some rights “most directly engage[d]” one section or the other (para. 125) this also appears to have been the approach followed in r v boutilier, 2017 scc 64, [2017] 2 scr 936, and r v. morrison, 2019 scc 15, [2019] 2 scr 3. [411] the lack of a settled approach is problematic, because by choosing to proceed under one or the other section, one may arrive at inconsistent results, or, as seen above, import irrelevant considerations from one section into another for example, here the majority asserts (without explanation) that s 7 and s 11(d) are “co- extensive” (paras. 113-14), while giving primacy to s 7 and avoiding s 1 altogether. (3) the specific example of evidence in which a complainant has a reasonable expectation of privacy [412] the court has a line of jurisprudence addressing situations that arise when an accused wishes to obtain or use evidence in which a complainant has a reasonable expectation of privacy and where restrictions on the use of this evidence are alleged to affect the accused’s fair trial rights. due to their particular difficulty, these cases tend to demonstrate all of the above methodological problems, often at the same time. they illustrate the gradual blending of charter rights, charter values and societal interests within the principles of fundamental justice and how they have come to influence the interpretation of s 11 and impose limits on its scope that are not found in its text and are not justified under the rigorous oakes analysis of s 1. [413] in seaboyer, the court addressed parliament’s first effort to regulate the use of evidence of complainants’ prior sexual history under s 276 of the criminal code complainants’ privacy and security rights were not directly engaged by the legislation, but the arguments made in favour of the legislation contended that these goals needed to be considered when determining whether the legislation violated s 7. as described above, mclachlin j imported consideration of societal interests into s 7 when she stated on behalf of the majority, at pp. 603-4: a final point must be made on the ambit of s 7 of the charter. it has been suggested that s 7 should be viewed as concerned with the interest of complainants as a class to security of person and to equal benefit of the law as guaranteed by ss. 15 and 28 of the charter: yola althea grant, “the penetration of the rape shield: r v seaboyer and r v gayme in the ontario court of appeal” (1989-1990), 3 cjwl 592, at p 600. such an approach is consistent with the view that s 7 reflects a variety of societal and individual interests. crucially, mclachlin j finished that statement by writing: “however, all proponents in this case concede that a measure which denies the accused the right to present a full and fair defence would violate s 7 in any event” (p 604). [414] in r v. o’connor, [1995] 4 scr 411, the court considered the common law rules governing production of third party records in sexual assault trials. in dissent on this issue, l’heureux-dubé j opined that “values that are fundamental to our common law” are the basis for the “principles of fundamental justice” and that complainants’ privacy and security of the person are such principles (paras. 61 and 113) she would have found that these charter values should have been balanced against the accused’s right to a fair trial within s 7. [415] i note, parenthetically, that even l’heureux-dubé j.’s o’connor dissent, while finding that complainants’ privacy and security may be weighed against the accused’s right to a fair trial, recognized that some documents are exempt from this weighing because they are necessary for the accused to defend against the subject matter of the charge. l’heureux-dubé j commented that “witnesses have a right to privacy in relation to private documents and records (i.e documents and records in which they hold a reasonable expectation of privacy) which are not a part of the crown’s ‘case to meet’ against the accused” (para. 130 (emphasis added)). this crucial point has been eliminated in ss. 278.92 to 27894. in this case the majority appears to suggest that introducing information relating to the subject matter of the charge is merely a tactical burden, rather than crucial to determining the truth of the matters in issue (paras. 66-67, 79 and 151-63). [416] in mills, the privacy and security interests of complainants were elevated to the status of principles of fundamental justice to be balanced against the right to a fair trial within s 7 (para. 62). however, it should not be overlooked that the court in mills also considered that the legislation directly engaged complainants’ charter rights because there was a seizure of records under s 8 the privacy and security of complainants in that case were not merely charter values or societal interests. [417] in darrach, the court blended consideration of charter rights and charter values under the principles of fundamental justice. in that case, the legislation did not directly engage any of the complainant’s charter rights nonetheless, the court concluded, at para. 25, that “[i]n seaboyer, the court found that the principles of fundamental justice include the three purposes of s 276 identified above: protecting the integrity of the trial by excluding evidence that is misleading, protecting the rights of the accused, as well as encouraging the reporting of sexual violence and protecting ‘the security and privacy of the witnesses’ (p 606). this was affirmed in mills, supra, at para. 72.” the court reached this finding despite the distinctions between the status of complainants’ rights and interests in those prior cases. the holding in darrach that charter values are relevant to internal balancing under s 7 finds no support in mills or seaboyer, on a careful reading of those cases. [418] as well, darrach blended s 7 and ss. 11(c) and 11(d) at para. 23, the court explained: in r v. mills, [1999] 3 scr 668, the court dealt with a claim that s 11(d) was violated in combination with s 7, and the court analysed the issues under the rubric of s 7 on the grounds that the fair trial specifically protected by s 11(d) was itself a principle of fundamental justice under s 7. in r v. white, [1999] 2 scr 417, at paras. 40 and 44, iacobucci j. described s 11(c) as a procedural protection that underlies the principle against self-incrimination, which is also a principle of fundamental justice under s 7 in both cases, the court analysed the rights involved in the context of s 7. [emphasis added.] [419] the court in darrach then proceeded to import the limits of s 7 into ss. 11(c) and 11(d) so as to find no constitutional violation. an analysis under s 1 was therefore not required (see para. 30). [420] the majority states they are applying the current approach to the analysis. however, they reference mills and darrach and adopt the “blended” methodology i have described above, thereby defining s 11 through s 7. this is problematic for two reasons. first, the approach as to the order in which ss. 7 and 11 should be addressed was settled in whaling, at para. 76. second, the court confirmed in carter, at paras. 79- 80, and even more recently in brown, at para. 70, that consideration of “societal interests” should not be factored into the s 7 balancing, but rather should be dealt with under s 1 i do not see how the methodology adopted in mills and darrach can be reconciled with these subsequent authorities. [421] i emphasize that, regardless of the methodology used, no case from this court has held that protecting a complainant’s privacy interests always justifies limiting the accused’s right not to respond before the crown has established the case to meet. nor has any case from this court found that access to, or the use of, evidence in which a complainant has a reasonable expectation of privacy never engages the accused’s fair trial rights (see seaboyer; o’connor; mills; darrach; osolin; r v. shearing, 2002 scc 58, [2002] 3 scr 33) to do so, the majority asserts that leading information to defend oneself is merely a tactical burden (see paras. 151-63 and 173-74) and appears to authorize compelled defence disclosure (see paras. 162-69) no judgment of this court has undercut the accused’s right to a fair trial in so serious a way. e. section 7 cannot operate to limit section 11 rights as this is inconsistent with the architecture of the charter [422] there is no basis in the constitution for the approach whereby s 7 can limit rights in ss. 8 to 14 this becomes evident when one examines the structure of the charter and the places of ss. 7 and 11 within it. (1) the relationship between section 7 and section 11 of the charter [423] both ss. 7 and 11 appear under the heading “legal rights”. as explained by e. colvin in his article “section seven of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms” (1989), 68 can. bar rev. 560, at p 574: . . . “legal rights” cannot simply mean rights which are recognized in law. all charter rights would be legal rights in this sense. the use of the term to describe a sub-category of charter rights suggests that the included rights are of a special kind, different from the rights respecting the substantive content of law which are conferred in some other parts of the charter. [424] the grouping of ss. 7 and 11 into one subsection of the charter suggests a relationship between their purposes and the purposes of other rights within that same grouping usually, “legal rights” are associated with the administration of justice (reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the criminal code (man.), [1990] 1 scr. 1123, at pp. 1172-73, citing colvin, at pp. 573-74). [425] in re b.c motor vehicle act, the court concluded that ss. 8 to 14 “are illustrative of deprivations of those rights to life, liberty and security of the person in breach of the principles of fundamental justice” (p 502) however, they are not exhaustive of s 7, which is broader (p 502; malmo-levine, at para. 169, referring to hebert, and thomson newspapers ltd.; see also r v. généreux, [1992] 1 scr 259, at p 311). section 7 provides residual rights protections, where the specific rights in ss. 8 to 14 do not apply. however, the analysis cannot work in reverse to rely on any internal limits under s 7 to limit the scope of the rights in s 11. there is simply no basis in the constitution for doing so. (2) limiting section 11 on the basis of section 7 is inconsistent with the structure of the charter, the purposes of both provisions and section 1 [426] limiting s 11 on the basis of s 7 is inconsistent with the text and structure of the “legal rights” section of the charter, the purposes of both provisions and s 1. [427] textually, there is an internal balancing using the principles of fundamental justice in s 7, but there are no corresponding textual limits in ss. 11(c) and 11(d). the text of the sections is not the same. [428] structurally, s 11 rights can only be limited if the outcome is justified following a proportionality assessment under s 1. [429] as a practical matter, balancing s 7 internally and using the outcome to limit s 11 leads to a reversal of the burden of proof and a dilution of charter protections. under s 11, an accused alleging a violation must prove it; if proven, the onus shifts to the state to justify the violation under s 1 (oakes, at pp. 136-37) by contrast, when there is a balancing of charter rights, charter values and societal interests under the principles of fundamental justice in s 7, the burden is on the accused throughout accused persons must establish not only the content of the principle of fundamental justice that they allege is violated, but also that it is not outweighed by other considerations. such an approach undermines the purpose of the broad protection of the right to a fair trial under s 11 and the purpose of s 1 to hold the state to the burden of proof to show that any limit is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. [430] a further potentially anomalous result is that s 11 may first be limited by s 7 and then, when the usual s 1 analysis is undertaken, s 11 rights may be further limited. this implies that s 11 rights may be limited once, importing limits from s 7, and then again under s 1. yet does this result not follow logically from the majority’s approach? [431] most fundamentally, limiting s 11 protections through s 7 is contrary to the purposes of both ss. 7 and 11. sections 11(c) and 11(d) are cast broadly in order to provide strong protections for fair trial rights. section 7 is meant to be a broad, rights- conferring provision that provides residual protection to fair trial rights that may not be captured by s 11. yet in these appeals, the crown and various interveners urge on the court an approach whereby s 7 operates to limit the broad rights in s 11. this is not the proper function of s 7 it undermines the charter’s purpose as a counter- majoritarian instrument intended to protect accused persons from the excesses of state power. rather than protecting the rights of accused persons, s 7 is being used as the instrument to imperil that protection. iv suggested interpretive approach [432] in order to bring coherence to the application of s 7 and ss. 8 to 14 when constitutional claims allege violations of s 7 as well as other sections of the charter, the court should adopt and consistently apply an interpretive approach that is in line with the structure and purpose of the charter. doing so is a matter of constitutional imperative. [433] where a specific charter guarantee is pleaded along with the broader guarantee in s 7, the specific guarantee should be addressed first. unless a right is not captured under the specific charter guarantee, there is no reason to proceed to s 7. there is nothing new to this proposition. the court has previously set out this approach in whaling, at para. 76, citing r v harrer, [1995] 3 scr 562, at para. 13, and généreux, at p 310 (see also pearson). [434] in the present case, specific charter guarantees — ss. 11(c) and 11(d) — are pleaded along with the broader guarantee in s 7 the first step is therefore to determine whether there is a violation of ss. 11(c) and 11(d), and, if so, whether it is justified under s 1. if there is a violation that is not justified under s 1, then the analysis stops there. [435] if, however, there is no violation of the specific provisions, or there is a violation but it is found to be justified, the courts then look to s 7. as noted at para. 425 above, violations of ss. 8 to 14 are illustrative of deprivations of s 7 rights, but s 7 is broader. in these circumstances, the courts must examine whether the rights protected under s 7 are more extensive or different from those protected under the specific provision. if the answer is no, then no analysis is required under s 7, since the result under s 7 remains the same as the result under the specific provision. if the answer is yes, however, courts need to explain in what way it is more extensive or different. this analysis will define the scope of the right protected under s 7 and the analysis that is required in order to find an infringement. [436] when determining the scope of s 7, courts should focus on the rights alleged by the rights claimant. for the reasons set out above, there is no place for values and societal interests in the internal balancing in s 7. such moral considerations should be weighed using the transparent proportionality analysis in s 1 (carter, at para. 79; brown, at para. 70). [437] this construction of s 7, s 11 and s 1 conforms to the architecture of the charter, provides for interpretation of the relevant provisions by reference to their own text and purposes, and offers clarity as to which party has the onus of proof at each stage of the analysis. v conclusion [438] the limitation on the fair trial right is unjustified in this case. i agree with justice brown on the merits and would therefore hold that ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code are unconstitutional and, therefore, of no force or effect, except as they apply to the existing s 276 regime. the following are the reasons delivered by côté j — i. overview [439] i have had the benefit of reading the majority’s reasons as well as the dissenting reasons of brown j and rowe j i endorse the constitutional analyses of brown j and rowe j. i agree with brown j that the record screening regime does not come close to passing constitutional muster i am also in agreement with rowe j.’s analytical approach in respect of s 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. however, i disagree with the analyses and the conclusions of both the majority and brown j on the interpretation of “record” and “adduce”. [440] i readily concede that there are issues with any interpretation of both of these words. unfortunately, this is an inevitable consequence of the “ham-fisted” nature of the record screening regime (brown j.’s reasons, at paras. 204 and 311). but in my view there are strong reasons to prefer narrow interpretations of both words. even with narrow interpretations, however, i am of the view that the record screening regime remains unconstitutional it is simply more constitutionally defective if either the majority’s interpretations or brown j.’s interpretations are adopted. [441] my reasons proceed in two parts first, i explain why narrow interpretations of “record” and “adduce” should be adopted. second, i briefly explain why, even if my narrower interpretations were adopted, brown j.’s constitutional analysis remains overwhelmingly applicable. ii. statutory interpretation a. the definition of “record” excludes communications between the complainant and the accused [442] in my view, a proper interpretation of “record” as defined in s 278.1 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, excludes any communications — electronic or otherwise — between the accused and the complainant other than communications made in the context of a professional relationship in which there was an expectation of some degree of confidentiality. such an interpretation is preferable because: (1) it better accords with the text of s 278.1; (2) it better reflects the intention of parliament; (3) it better aligns with the jurisprudence on the interpretation of the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy”; and (4) it avoids many of the absurd results that inevitably follow from a broad interpretation. (1) text of section 278.1 [443] i begin my analysis with the text section 278.1 does not refer to communications — electronic or otherwise — in defining “record”. communications between the complainant and the accused are not specifically enumerated as records in that section. there is no dispute that communications between the complainant and the accused may be captured by the enumerated categories (eg communications between a physician and a patient). the main interpretive question at issue, however, is whether communications between the complainant and the accused are included among the types of records that are not enumerated in the definition. that is, are they covered by the definition of “record” because they nonetheless contain personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy? in my view, any communications between the accused and the complainant that were not exchanged in the context of a professional relationship in which there was an expectation of some degree of confidentiality would not constitute a record. [444] i agree with the majority that the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind”) applies (para. 55). however, and with respect, i believe that the majority does not apply this principle properly. the majority relies on it to conclude that “[t]he common thread weaving through the enumerated records is that they contain information of an intimate and highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant’s overall physical, psychological or emotional well-being”, explaining that this “could include, but is not limited to, discussions regarding mental health diagnoses, suicidal ideation, prior physical or sexual abuse, substance abuse or involvement in the child welfare system” (para. 55) with respect, the majority conflates the concept of “personal information” with that of a “reasonable expectation of privacy”. as brown j correctly notes at para. 233 of his reasons, although the diary in question in r v. shearing, 2002 scc 58, [2002] 3 scr 33, contained only “mundane” entries, that did not eliminate the complainant’s privacy interest. [445] in my view, a proper application of the ejusdem generis principle leads to the conclusion that communications between the complainant and the accused would not be included in the definition of “record”. all the enumerated records fall into one of two distinct categories: (1) records created in a professional context for which there is an expectation of some degree of confidentiality (i.e medical, psychiatric, therapeutic, counselling, education, employment, child welfare, adoption, and social services records); or (2) records that are intended for the complainant’s exclusive personal use and review (ie personal journals and diaries). the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” must be interpreted in this context. [446] the common thread weaving through the enumerated records, therefore, is the complainant’s reasonable expectation that such records will not be publicly disclosed. in short, the defining feature of the enumerated records is not the “highly personal nature” of the information; rather it is the complainant’s reasonable expectation that the information will remain private accordingly, unenumerated records will be documents containing personal information (broadly defined) that the complainant expects not to be disclosed. these could be either (1) records created in a professional context for which there is an expectation of some degree of confidentiality, even if the relationship is not strictly confidential, or (2) records that are intended for the complainant’s exclusive personal use and review. [447] this interpretation of “record” is consistent with r v. quesnelle, 2014 scc 46, [2014] 2 scr 390, in which this court held that the court of appeal had erred “in concluding that the complainant could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the information was disclosed outside the context of a ‘trust-like, confidential or therapeutic relationship’” (para. 38) karakatsanis j., writing for the court, emphasized the principle that a person may reveal information to an individual or an organization on the understanding that it will be used only for a specific purpose, commenting that “[w]hether a person is entitled to expect that their information will be kept private is a contextual inquiry” (para. 38). [448] the relationship between the police and individuals reporting information to the police cannot be strictly classified as a “trust-like, confidential or therapeutic relationship”. nevertheless, karakatsanis j rightly stressed that, given the context in which the information had been divulged in that case, there was in effect an expectation of some degree of confidentiality. she stated the following: people provide information to police in order to protect themselves and others. they are entitled to do so with confidence that the police will only disclose it for good reason. the fact that the information is in the hands of the police should not nullify their interest in keeping that information private from other individuals. [emphasis added; para. 43.] ultimately, a strictly confidential relationship is not required; however, in quesnelle, it was the relationship between the complainant and the police that grounded the expectation of some degree of confidentiality. that relationship formed the basis of a reasonable expectation that the police would only disclose the information for a good reason, and the complainant retained an interest in keeping the information private from others. (2) legislative context [449] in addition to being consistent with the text of s 278.1, a narrower interpretation of “record” is more consistent with other contextual factors — such as the section’s legislative evolution and legislative history legislative evolution “consists of the successive enacted versions of [a] provision from its inception to the version in place when the relevant facts occur” (r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at § 2318). legislative history, on the other hand, can be more narrowly construed as “the range of extrinsic materials relating to the conception, preparation and passage of a provision, from the earliest proposals for legislative change to royal assent” (sullivan, at § 2319). [450] with respect to the section’s legislative evolution, the definition of “record” remains largely unchanged from the original definition that applied to the regime for the production of records by third parties.2 this weighs heavily in favour of an interpretation that would exclude communications — electronic or otherwise — between a complainant and an accused. given the absence of an explicit modification, the record screening regime introduced by the act to amend the criminal code and the department of justice act and to make consequential amendments to another act, s.c 2018, c 29 (“bill c-51”), cannot have changed the meaning of “record” as defined in s 2781. prior to the enactment of bill c-51, communications between the accused and the complainant were not contemplated as falling within the meaning of “record” under the regime for third party records. such communications were already in the possession of the accused. in my view, by importing a definition of “record” from the regime for the production of third party records, which did not contemplate or include communications between the accused and the complainant, parliament signaled an intention that such communications do not constitute records for the purposes of the record screening regime. 2 with the enactment of bill c-51, there were some minor, non-substantive changes to the text of s 2781. the statutory definition of “record” was modified to the extent that the phrase “without limiting the generality of the foregoing” was removed. as was noted in r v. ms, 2019 oncj 670, at paras. 33-36 (canlii), this was not a substantive change. [451] with respect to legislative history, it is important to consider the mischief bill c-51 was intended to remedy the majority mentions that bill c-51 was “parliament’s response” to a 2012 report of the standing senate committee on legal and constitutional affairs (para. 9) the report acknowledged the existence of a legislative gap apparent after this court’s decision in shearing. the report included the following recommendation: “that the government of canada consider amending the criminal code to set out a procedure governing the admissibility and use during trial of a complainant’s private records, as defined in section 278.1 of the criminal code, which are not wrongfully in the hands of the accused” (statutory review on the provisions and operation of the act to amend the criminal code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings): final report, at p 20 (emphasis added)). [452] ultimately, bill c-51 was enacted to address a gap in the law that arose where an accused legally came into possession of a record such as a diary or a counselling record. this was the mischief parliament sought to address. the mischief to be remedied was not the admission at trial of voluntary communications — such as text messages or emails — between the complainant and the accused this again weighs heavily in favour of an interpretation of “record” that excludes electronic communications between an accused and a complainant. [453] i acknowledge that there is other evidence regarding the legislative history, from the legislative proceedings, for example, that “suggest[s] that parliament did indeed intend to capture digital conversations between the accused and [the] complainant” (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 237) this includes references in the parliamentary debate to the trial in r v. ghomeshi, 2016 oncj 155, 27 cr (7th) 17, and a proposal from defence lawyers to explicitly exclude electronic communications between the complainant and the accused from the record screening regime. [454] although this other evidence of parliament’s intent is relevant, i would not give much weight to it in rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 35, this court stated: “although the frailties of hansard evidence are many, this court has recognized that it can play a limited role in the interpretation of legislation.” in my view, the frailties of this evidence of parliament’s intent are apparent in the case at bar. notwithstanding the stray and marginal remarks about the ghomeshi trial and submissions made to parliament by defence lawyers on the potential implications of language in a draft bill and how it could be improved, i am unconvinced that parliament intended the record screening regime to apply to communications — electronic or otherwise — between the complainant and the accused. the countervailing evidence of parliament’s intent that i have discussed — such as the section’s legislative evolution and the 2012 senate report — is quite simply more conclusive. (3) jurisprudence on the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” [455] the definition of “record” must also be interpreted in light of this court’s jurisprudence on the meaning of “reasonable expectation of privacy”, a phrase that has been of particular significance in the jurisprudence relating to s 8 of the charter. in r v. jarvis, 2019 scc 10, [2019] 1 scr 488, the court concluded that the s 8 jurisprudence may be instructive when it comes to interpreting privacy interests in non-charter contexts (paras. 58-59) in my view, the interpretations of “record” by both the majority and brown j are less consistent with this court’s jurisprudence and with the common law meaning of the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy”. the balance of this court’s jurisprudence favours a narrow interpretation. [456] to be clear, i do not dispute that “[e]xpectations of privacy are contextual and must be assessed in light of the ‘totality of the circumstances’” (majority reasons, at para. 57, citing r v. patrick, 2009 scc 17, [2009] 1 scr 579, at para. 26, and r v. edwards, [1996] 1 scr 128, at para. 45). however, the key contextual factor is this: an individual does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in communications vis-à-vis the recipient of the message. in the context of a trial in which the accused’s liberty is at stake, a complainant therefore does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications with the accused as a result, communications between the accused and the complainant — including communications relating to the subject matter of the charge — do not constitute records for the purposes of the record screening regime the only exception to this category-based approach relates to messages exchanged in the context of a professional relationship in which there is an expectation of some degree of confidentiality. (a) meaning of “reasonable expectation of privacy” [457] in r v. marakah, 2017 scc 59, [2017] 2 scr 608, a majority of this court held that individuals can retain a reasonable expectation of privacy over the contents of their electronic communications. however, mclachlin cj distinguished the risk of dissemination to a private citizen from the risk of dissemination to the state (paras. 40-41) as she mentioned, “[t]he issue is not who owns the device through which the electronic conversation is accessed, but rather whether the claimant exercised control over the information reflected therein” (para. 43 (emphasis in original)). mclachlin cj acknowledged that by sharing information, mr. marakah had accepted the risk that the information might then be shared with third parties, but she concluded that, “by accepting this risk, mr. marakah did not give up control over the information or his right to protection under s 8” (para. 41). [458] in my view, this court’s decision in marakah must be read in light of s 8 of the charter. as mclachlin cj explicitly stated: “the risk that the recipient could have disclosed it, if he chose to, does not negate the reasonableness of mr. marakah’s expectation of privacy against state intrusion” (para. 45 (emphasis added)). moreover, by acknowledging that the recipient could have disclosed the information, mclachlin c.j implicitly recognized that some control over the information had effectively been ceded to the recipient this is a natural consequence of sharing information with others. [459] this court’s decision in r v. mills, 2019 scc 22, [2019] 2 scr 320, likewise supports my narrower interpretation of “record” the issue in mills was whether the police had breached the accused’s right under s 8 of the charter by posing online as a 14-year-old girl and capturing the accused’s messages to the fictional child. brown j concluded that the accused’s expectation of privacy was objectively unreasonable, noting that the police were “simply responding to messages sent directly to them” (para. 29). in concurring reasons, karakatsanis j wrote: “. . . an individual cannot reasonably expect their words to be kept private from the person with whom they are communicating” (para. 42; see also para. 51). moldaver j concurred with the reasons of both brown j and karakatsanis j., stating that they were both “sound in law” (para. 66). martin j., in separate concurring reasons, did not dispute the general proposition that an individual cannot reasonably expect their words to be kept private from the person with whom they are communicating, but she instead held: “that general proposition does not and cannot apply when the state has secretly set itself up as the intended recipient” (para. 101). [460] both marakah and mills support my narrower interpretation of “record”. although my interpretation is more category-based, it nonetheless remains consistent with the fundamental premise in the jurisprudence that expectations of privacy are contextual. to reiterate, the key contextual factor is that an individual does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in communications vis-à-vis the recipient of the message. [461] the only exception to this category-based approach relates to messages exchanged in the context of a professional relationship in which there is an expectation of some degree of confidentiality. it is reasonable to conclude that a complainant has a reasonable expectation of privacy — vis-à-vis an accused psychologist or doctor, for example — in communications exchanged in the context of such a relationship. in such circumstances, the professional relationship and the corresponding expectation of some degree of confidentiality ground a reasonable expectation of privacy. this approach is therefore consistent with the principle that privacy interests include a “reasonable expectation that private information will remain confidential to the persons to whom and restricted to the purposes for which it was divulged” (r v. mills, [1999] 3 scr. 668, at para. 108). [462] in any event, i note that communications exchanged in the context of a professional relationship (e.g emails with a psychologist) are clearly included in s 278.1 as enumerated records. they would therefore automatically be subject to the record screening regime. [463] i recognize that a distinction can be made between a complainant sharing private information with an accused and the accused disseminating that information in the context of a public trial. however, in the context of a trial for a sexual offence, it is difficult to see how — based on an objective assessment — a complainant can reasonably expect the accused not to rely on information the complainant had freely shared with the accused if the information is relevant to an issue at trial context matters. where the accused’s liberty is at stake, a complainant’s expectation of privacy in communications with the accused is objectively unreasonable unless the information was disclosed in the context of a professional relationship in which there was an expectation of some degree of confidentiality. [464] it is helpful, in my view, to highlight the implications of the majority’s approach to the complainant’s privacy interests, specifically as it relates to communications with the accused that pertain to the subject matter of the charge. according to the majority, a complainant “will often”, but not always, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records of an explicit sexual nature, including communications with the accused relating to the subject matter of the charge (para. 65). the majority’s “content and context framework” (para. 67) is equivocal and indeterminate, as “evidence of an explicit sexual nature that relates to the subject matter of the charge may be caught by the record screening regime even if it is not s 276 evidence” (para. 66 (emphasis added)). [465] with respect, the majority’s approach fails fundamentally to assess whether the complainant’s expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable in the circumstances it gives undue weight to the content of the communications, while simultaneously disregarding or minimizing other significant contextual factors, such as the fact that the accused is a party to the communications, the fact that the communications in question may relate to the subject matter of the charge and the fact that the accused’s liberty is at stake. in this way, the majority conflates the assessment of the complainant’s (possible) subjective expectation of privacy with the assessment of whether that expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable in the circumstances. the result of the majority’s confounding approach is twofold. [466] first, no meaningful guidance is provided to counsel or to trial judges. counsel for the accused must simply discern — with reference to the majority’s ill-defined “type of content” (para. 55) and other “non-exhaustive” contextual factors (para. 57) — whether a message relating to the subject matter of the charge may or may not be subject to the record screening regime. contrary to the majority’s statement, the test they have articulated for interpreting s 278.1 will not “reduc[e] the need for motions for directions” (para. 104). [467] second, the majority’s conception of and approach to privacy is inconsistent with the idea that a reasonable expectation of privacy standard is normative rather than simply descriptive (r v. tessling, 2004 scc 67, [2004] 3 scr 432, at para. 42; r v. spencer, 2014 scc 43, [2014] 2 scr 212, at para. 18; jarvis, at para. 68). subject to the single exception i have discussed above, i fail to see how a complainant can have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in any messages exchanged with the accused that include information — whether explicit or inexplicit — pertaining to the subject matter of the charge the trial context is determinative: the complainant has stepped forward with an accusation against the accused; the accused is being prosecuted in open court; the accused faces a loss of liberty; the accused has the right to make full answer and defence; the communications at issue were between the complainant and the accused; and the communications at issue contain information that directly pertains to the criminal accusation (i.e the subject matter of the charge) against the accused in these circumstances, the complainant does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications the mere statement by the majority that its approach “take[s] into account the trial context” does not make it so (para. 62). (b) content-neutral analysis [468] with respect, i am of the view that the majority is wrong to abandon the content-neutral approach from the s 8 jurisprudence. i say this for five reasons. [469] first, there is nothing in the text of s 278.1 that suggests that doing so is necessary. there is quite simply no reason to depart from the common law meaning of the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” and the content-neutral approach that has been developed in relation to it. [470] second, a content-neutral approach facilitates the operation of the record screening regime: it allows lawyers and judges to more easily assess whether a document is a “record” on its face this would render the majority’s convoluted approach to records unnecessary and would have the significant benefit of largely averting the need for motions for directions. [471] third, the majority’s justification for jettisoning the content-neutral approach is unpersuasive. the majority states that “it would be difficult to meaningfully assess or protect” (para. 49) a complainant’s privacy interests using a content-neutral approach however, as i explained above, the common thread weaving through the records enumerated in s 278.1 is not the sensitivity of their content, but the expectation that they will not be publicly disclosed. all of the enumerated records are either (1) records created in a professional context for which there is an expectation of some degree of confidentiality or (2) records that are intended for the complainant’s exclusive personal use and review the content of such records can vary dramatically — from information that is mundane to information that is deeply personal yet all of them are included in the record screening regime because the complainant’s expectation that they will not be disclosed is reasonable the focus should therefore be on the expectation of privacy rather than on the content of the information. [472] fourth, the majority’s justification for jettisoning the content-neutral approach is internally inconsistent with their own reasons as well as being inconsistent with shearing. the majority states: “records do not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy simply because of the medium used to convey them” (para. 49). the majority also notes, however, that “mundane information such as general emotional states, everyday occurrences or general biographical information would typically not give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy” (para. 56) this is clearly inconsistent with shearing. the diary in shearing contained only “very mundane” entries, yet this did not extinguish the complainant’s privacy interest (shearing, at paras. 87 and 112). as well, the majority in the case at bar later emphasizes that “courts may consider where the record was shared and how it was created or obtained”, juxtaposing mediums like text messages that “may attract an enhanced reasonable expectation of privacy” with other mediums like social media that would attract a lower expectation of privacy (para. 60 (emphasis added)). clearly, records can attract a reasonable expectation of privacy — regardless of their content — based on the medium used to convey the information. [473] fifth, the majority’s justification for abandoning the content-neutral approach is inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the record screening regime. this regime specifically concerns records it does not, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, concern “information of an intimate and highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant’s overall physical, psychological or emotional well-being” (para. 54) if, for example, the accused learns that the complainant is dealing with “suicidal ideation” or “substance abuse” (para. 55) in the course of an oral conversation in which no record was created, the record screening regime would not apply this entirely undermines the majority’s rationale for abandoning the content-neutral approach to assessing whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the record screening regime, the medium — and the expectation of privacy that exists in the context of that medium — is determinative. (4) absurd results [474] as this court observed in rizzo & rizzo shoes, “[i]t is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences” (para. 27). there are three absurd results that would be averted by adopting a narrow category-based approach to the interpretation of “record”. [475] first, a category-based approach would have significant practical benefits in terms of trial efficiency if electronic communications between an accused and a complainant fall within the ambit of the record screening regime, an accused seeking to adduce hundreds of electronic communications into evidence will be required to contextually assess each message in order to determine whether it constitutes a “record”. some of these messages may meet the majority’s threshold for “record” and some may not the status of many messages, however, will remain ambiguous. continual recourse to motions for directions — not contemplated in the regime — will be necessary this added procedure will inevitably have an adverse impact on trial efficiency, thereby making trials for sexual offences even more unwieldly and complicated. [476] second, the majority’s interpretation of “record” will result in an absurd two-tiered system of admissibility that favours the crown: the crown can adduce any communications provided to it by the complainant, while the accused cannot adduce communications in its possession that were freely exchanged with the complainant. the majority purports to draw on the common law meaning of the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy”. however, the majority interprets the phrase in a manner that affords the complainant greater protection than the accused in their electronic communications with each other, despite the fact that the accused’s communications will have been disclosed to the state. this is an absurd, and needless, consequence of the majority’s interpretation. [477] third, a broad interpretation of “record” will lead to the absurd consequence of having the record screening regime — needlessly and without a principled justification — create a distinction between information exchanged orally and information exchanged through electronic means in marakah, mclachlin cj. characterized text messages as “part of an electronic conversation”, which, she observed, “reflects the technological reality of text messaging” (para. 17) the majority’s broad interpretation of “record” will now result in the record screening regime treating electronic communications differently than oral conversations merely because the electronic conversations were recorded. this is absurd. it is unclear how an individual retains more control (or why they should do so) over information shared with an accused individual via electronic means than they would over information shared orally. (5) conclusion on the interpretation of “record” [478] for the foregoing reasons, a narrow interpretation of “record” should be adopted with respect, the majority’s approach to the interpretation of “record” is needlessly ambiguous, complicated and confusing it is neither principled nor pragmatic. b plain meaning of “adduce” should be adopted [479] sections 278.92 and 278.93 of the criminal code together are clear: they require an application only where an accused intends to introduce a copy of the actual record into evidence — “adduce” simply means adduce. an application is not required where an accused intends only to ask questions about the information contained in the record, and not to adduce the record in evidence. there are three reasons to prefer a narrow interpretation of “adduce”. [480] first, the record screening regime is ultimately about the admissibility of “records”, in contrast to other statutory or common law schemes that govern the admissibility of a category of evidence (such as evidence under s 276 of the criminal code or scopelliti character evidence) given that the record screening regime is focused on physical records rather than on a category of evidence, the plain meaning of “adduce” should be adopted, as it relates directly to the physical record it is incongruous for the record screening regime to make all personal information presumptively inadmissible merely because the information happens to be documented in a record, and regardless of whether there was ever an intention to introduce — that is, adduce — that record in evidence. [481] second, interpreting “adduce” more broadly to include using the information contained in the record means that an accused who kept a record will be subject to the regime, whereas an accused who forgot about the existence of a record, lost the record, destroyed the record or learned about the information contained in it through an oral conversation will not be subject to the regime there is an inherent incongruity in an interpretation of “adduce” that prevents one accused from using relevant information contained in a record merely because this accused possesses the best evidence of the information in question, whereas another accused will be permitted to use the same information (eg by asking questions during cross-examination of the complainant) because the second accused does not possess a record containing the information. [482] third, the majority’s interpretation of “adduce” is, in my respectful view, highly problematic given their broad interpretation of “record”. witnesses are generally permitted to give evidence about things said to them in conversations, provided the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible. given mclachlin cj’s description of text messaging as an “electronic conversation” (marakah, at para. 17), it follows that an accused should be permitted to ask the complainant questions about any electronic conversations between them that are relevant to an issue at trial. barring an evidentiary rule (like the one in s 276) that prohibits the accused from producing certain types of evidence, an accused should also be permitted to testify about electronic conversations with the complainant. in r v. fliss, 2002 scc 16, [2002] 1 scr 535, this court held that the jury was entitled to hear from a police officer about a conversation with the accused, and that the officer was entitled to refresh his memory by any means, including a stimulus that would constitute inadmissible evidence (para. 8, per arbour j.; paras. 43-45, per binnie j.) similarly, in mills (2019), karakatsanis j. explained that, even if screenshots of messages between an accused and an undercover police officer could not be tendered as evidence, “the crown could still call the officer to testify about what the accused said and the written record could be used to refresh the officer’s memory” (para. 54). in my view, the same approach must be taken with the record screening regime. iii record screening regime remains unconstitutional [483] brown j concludes that the record screening regime limits the accused’s rights under ss. 11(c), 11(d) and 7 of the charter in four ways: (1) it forces accused persons to reveal their defence before the crown has made out a case to meet, contrary to the principle against self-incrimination, the right to silence, and the presumption of innocence; (2) it restricts the accused’s ability to cross-examine crown witnesses by giving the complainant a role in pre-trial admissibility determinations; (3) it makes private records presumptively inadmissible when tendered by the defence, but presumptively admissible when tendered by the crown; and (4) it sets a stricter test for admitting defence evidence than is warranted or constitutionally permissible (para. 203). [484] even with my narrower interpretations, brown j.’s constitutional analysis remains overwhelmingly applicable the record screening regime is simply more constitutionally defective based on the broader interpretations adopted by the majority. i briefly explain why brown j.’s analysis remains applicable. [485] first, the record screening regime continues to force accused persons to reveal their defence before the crown has made out a case to meet even if my narrow interpretations of “record” and “adduce” were adopted. thus, the regime continues to require pre-trial disclosure — before the crown has made out a case to meet — for various records and it continues to apply to “a broad swathe of evidence that is not inherently prejudicial or irrelevant” (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 254). [486] second, it remains the case that the record screening regime restricts the accused’s ability to cross-examine crown witnesses by giving the complainant a role in pre-trial admissibility determinations. once again, brown j.’s analysis applies even if my narrower interpretations were adopted. the record screening regime operates to give advance notice to the complainant and the crown, providing them with detailed particulars of the evidence the accused wishes to adduce accordingly, the record screening regime limits “the accused’s ability to effectively cross-examine the complainant, contrary to the presumption of innocence, the right to make full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial” (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 263). [487] third, the record screening regime still makes private records presumptively inadmissible when tendered by the defence, but presumptively admissible when tendered by the crown. my narrower interpretations of “record” and “adduce” do not affect this glaring issue with the regime. the record screening regime therefore continues to limit “the accused’s right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d)” (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 290). [488] fourth, nothing in my interpretations of “record” and “adduce” affects how the record screening regime sets a stricter test for admitting defence evidence than is warranted or constitutionally permissible brown j.’s constitutional analysis on the heightened standard of “significant probative value” continues to apply (brown j.’s reasons, at paras. 291-97). [489] none of these limits on the accused’s charter rights can be justified under s 1 of the charter. i agree that the objective of the record screening regime is pressing and substantial however, even with my narrower interpretations of “record” and “adduce”, the regime is not rationally connected to its objective, it is not minimally impairing, and its salutary effects do not outweigh its deleterious effects. i acknowledge that brown j.’s analysis under s 1 is not entirely applicable, as my narrower interpretations render the regime less broad and mitigate some of its deleterious consequences. nevertheless, the bulk of brown j.’s s 1 analysis continues to apply. [490] in conclusion, i concur with brown j.’s constitutional analysis i also concur with brown j.’s analysis on the features a record screening regime might include in order to minimally impair the rights of accused persons and, therefore, be constitutional (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 311). iv disposition [491] in light of the foregoing reasons, i agree with the disposition of the appeals proposed by brown j and by rowe j (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 320; rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 438). appeal of her majesty the queen allowed, cross-appeal of jj dismissed and appeal of as allowed, côté, brown and rowe jj. dissenting in part. solicitor for the appellant/respondent on cross-appeal her majesty the queen: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. solicitors for the appellant as:. dawne way, toronto; david butt, toronto; david m. reeve, toronto. solicitors for the respondent/appellant on cross-appeal jj:. peck and company, vancouver; savard foy, toronto. ontario, toronto. toronto. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of canada: attorney general of canada, montréal. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of quebec: attorney general of quebec, québec. general of nova scotia, halifax. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of manitoba: attorney general of manitoba, winnipeg. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of saskatchewan: attorney general of saskatchewan, regina. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of alberta: attorney general of alberta, edmonton. fund and the women against violence against women rape crisis centre: gloria ng law, vancouver; west coast legal education and action fund, vancouver. birenbaum law, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the criminal trial lawyers’ association: bottos law group, edmonton. stockwoods, toronto; daniel brown law, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the canadian council of criminal defence lawyers: gerrand rath johnson, regina. society: greg delbigio, vancouver. solicitors for the intervener the women’s legal education and action fund inc.: perez bryan procope, toronto. manitoba: simmonds and associates, winnipeg.
i. introduction le juge brown — i. introduction [1] the proposed representative plaintiff, neil godfrey, applied for certification of a class proceed- ing under the british columbia class proceedings act, rsbc 1996, c 50. the defendants manu- facture optical disc drives (“odds” — a memory storage device that uses laser light or electromag- netic waves near the light spectrum to read and/or record data on optical discs), and odd products (products that contain odds). godfrey alleges that [1] le représentant proposé des demandeurs, neil godfrey, a demandé l’autorisation d’un recours col- lectif en vertu de la class proceedings act, rsbc. 1996, c. 50, de la colombie- britannique. les défen- deresses fabriquent des lecteurs de disques optiques (« ldo » — un dispositif de stockage de la mémoire qui utilise la lumière laser ou les ondes électroma- gnétiques près du spectre optique pour lire ou en- registrer des données sur un disque optique), et des [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 311 the defendants conspired to fix prices of odds and odd products. [2] the certification judge granted godfrey’s application. two sets of defendants — one led by pioneer corporation, and the other by toshiba cor- poration — each appealed from that decision, unsuc- cessfully, to the british columbia court of appeal. at stake in these appeals is, principally, whether it is plain and obvious that the claim under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act, rsc 1985, c. c-34, of so- called “umbrella purchasers” who bought odds or odd products manufactured and supplied by someone other than the defendants, but who allege that the defendants’ price- fixing conduct raised the market price of the product, cannot succeed. this depends on whether these umbrella purchasers have a cause of action under s 36(1)(a). for the reasons that follow, i agree with the courts below that they do, and it therefore follows that it is not plain and obvious that their claim cannot succeed. [3] these appeals also present an occasion to clar- ify the operation of the statutory limitation period for claims under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act, to affirm the availability of common law and equi- table actions in respect of claims also brought under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act, and to reiterate the standard required to certify loss- related questions as common issues in class proceedings. [4] as i will explain below, my disposition of all these matters would lead me to dismiss the appeals. produits munis de ldo (produits qui contiennent des ldo). m. godfrey allègue que les défenderesses ont comploté pour fixer les prix des ldo et des produits munis de ldo. [2] le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation de m. godfrey a accueilli celle-ci. deux groupes de dé- fendeurs — l’un dirigé par pioneer corporation, et l’autre par toshiba corporation — ont tous deux fait appel sans succès de cette décision à la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique. les présents pourvois soulèvent principalement la question de savoir s’il est évident et manifeste que la demande fondée sur l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence, lrc 1985, c. c-34, de ceux qu’on appelle les « acheteurs sous parapluie », qui ont acheté des ldo ou des produits munis de ldo fabriqués et fournis par quelqu’un d’autre que les défenderesses, mais qui allèguent que la fixation des prix par les défenderesses s’est traduite par une hausse du prix du produit sur le marché, ne peut être accueillie. la réponse à cette question dé- pend de la question de savoir si les acheteurs sous pa- rapluie ont une cause d’action fondée sur l’al 36(1)a). pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis, à l’instar des tribunaux d’instance inférieure, qu’ils en ont une, si bien qu’il n’est pas évident et manifeste que leur demande ne peut être accueillie. [3] en outre, les présents pourvois donnent à la cour l’occasion d’apporter des précisions sur les délais de prescription applicables aux actions fon- dées sur l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence, de confirmer qu’il est possible de se prévaloir des recours de common law et d’equity alors qu’une demande a également été introduite sous le régime de l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence, et de rappeler la norme applicable à l’autorisation des questions liées à la perte en tant que questions com- munes à trancher dans un recours collectif. [4] comme je l’expliquerai plus loin, les conclu- sions auxquelles j’arrive sur ces questions m’amènent à rejeter les pourvois. ii background ii contexte [5] godfrey applied for certification of a class pro- ceeding against 42 defendants (collectively, “toshiba”), [5] m. godfrey a demandé l’autorisation d’un re- cours collectif visant 42 défenderesses (collectivement, 312 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. alleging a conspiracy to raise, maintain, fix and/or stabilize the price of odds between january 1, 2004 and january 1, 2010 (“class period”). he deposed that he purchased odd products during the class period, and that he seeks to bring the proposed class proceed- ing on behalf of all british columbia residents who purchased an odd or an odd product during the class period. the proposed class consists of: (a) direct purchasers, whose odd or odd product was manufactured or supplied by a defendant and purchased from that defendant, (b) indirect purchasers, whose odd or odd prod- uct was manufactured or supplied by a defendant and purchased from a non‑ defendant; and (c) umbrella purchasers, whose odd or odd prod- uct was manufactured and supplied by a non‑ defendant. « toshiba »), alléguant que celles-ci avaient comploté pour augmenter, maintenir, fixer ou stabiliser le prix des ldo entre le 1er janvier 2004 et le 1er janvier 2010 (« période visée par le recours collectif »). il a déclaré avoir acheté des produits munis de ldo au cours de la période visée par le recours collectif, et qu’il cherche à intenter le recours collectif projeté au nom de tous les résidents de la colombie- britannique qui ont acheté un ldo ou un produit muni de ldo durant la période visée. le groupe projeté est composé des acheteurs suivants : a) acheteurs directs dont les ldo ou les produits munis de ldo ont été fabriqués ou fournis par une défenderesse et achetés de cette défende‑ resse, b) acheteurs indirects dont les ldo ou les produits munis de ldo ont été fabriqués ou fournis par une défenderesse et achetés d’une personne qui n’est pas une défenderesse; c) acheteurs sous parapluie dont les ldo ou les produits munis de ldo ont été fabriqués et four- nis par une personne qui n’est pas une défende‑ resse. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire a british columbia supreme court, 2016 bcsc a cour suprême de la colombie‑ britannique, 2016 844 — masuhara j. bcsc 844 — le juge masuhara [6] the certification judge certified the action as a class proceeding, subject to certain exceptions and conditions (para. 221 (canlii)). one condition was that the class definition be amended so as to satisfy s. 4(1)(b) of the class proceedings act. the certi- fication judge held that the class definition (“[a]ll persons resident in british columbia who purchased [odds and odd products] in [the class period]”) was insufficiently precise, as it was unclear which products were included (paras 128-31). [6] le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a autorisé l’action comme recours collectif, sous ré- serve de certaines exceptions et conditions (par. 221 (canlii)). par exemple, il fallait modifier la définition du groupe pour qu’elle respecte l’al. 4(1)(b) de la class proceedings act. le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a conclu que la définition du groupe [traduction] (« [t]outes les personnes résidant en colombie- britannique qui ont acheté [des ldo et des produits munis de ldo] durant [la période visée par le recours collectif] ») n’était pas suffisamment précise, en ce qu’elle ne permettait pas de savoir quels produits étaient visés (par. 128- 131). [7] in his reasons, the certification judge resolved a number of matters, only two of which are relevant to these appeals: whether the pleadings disclose a cause [7] dans ses motifs, le juge saisi de la demande d’au- torisation a tranché plusieurs questions, dont seule- ment deux sont pertinentes pour les présents pourvois : [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 313 of action, and whether godfrey’s proposed questions relating to loss suffered by the class are certifiable as common questions. les actes de procédure révèlent- ils une cause d’action et les questions proposées par m. godfrey relativement à la perte subie par le groupe peuvent- elles être auto- risées en tant que questions communes? (1) do the pleadings disclose a cause of action? (1) les actes de procédure révèlent- ils une cause [8] the certification judge first considered whether godfrey’s pleadings satisfy s. 4(1)(a) of the class proceedings act, which conditions certification upon the pleadings disclosing a cause of action. d’action? [8] le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation s’est d’abord demandé si les actes de procédure produits par m. godfrey respectaient l’al. 4(1)(a) de la class proceedings act, qui impose comme condition à l’autorisation que les actes de procédures révèlent une cause d’action. (a) the pioneer claim a) l’action contre pioneer [9] a subset of the named defendants (“pioneer”) opposed godfrey’s certification application, argu- ing that the action was bound to fail because it was barred by the two- year limitation period in s. 36(4) of the competition act (although the action against the other defendants was filed on september 27, 2010, the action against pioneer was not filed un- til august 16, 2013). the certification judge held, however, that this argument could not be considered at the certification stage (para 46). further, it was not plain and obvious in any event that the limita- tion period could not be extended in this case by applying principles of discoverability or fraudulent concealment. [9] un sous- groupe faisant partie des défenderesses désignées (« pioneer ») s’est opposé à la demande d’au- torisation de m. godfrey, soutenant que l’action était vouée à l’échec parce qu’elle était prescrite en raison de l’écoulement du délai de prescription de deux ans prévu au par. 36(4) de la loi sur la concurrence (bien que l’action contre les autres défenderesses ait été dé- posée le 27 septembre 2010, l’action contre pioneer a seulement été déposée le 16 août 2013). le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a conclu, cependant, qu’il ne pouvait pas tenir compte de cet argument à l’étape de l’autorisation (par 46). il a ajouté que, de toute façon, il n’était pas évident et manifeste que, dans la présente affaire, le délai de prescription ne pouvait pas être prorogé par application des principes de la possibilité de découvrir ou de la dissimulation frauduleuse. (b) umbrella purchasers b) acheteurs sous parapluie [10] toshiba argued that the umbrella purchas- ers had no cause of action under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act, because their inclusion would ex- pose it to indeterminate liability. for four reasons, however, the certification judge held that the um- brella purchasers had a cause of action: [10] toshiba a fait valoir que les acheteurs sous parapluie n’avaient pas de cause d’action suivant l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence, car leur participation au recours collectif exposerait toshiba à une responsabilité indéterminée. le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a toutefois conclu, pour quatre motifs, que les acheteurs sous parapluie avaient une cause d’action : 1 while “allowing umbrella claims is incon- sistent with restitutionary law”, restitution- ary law does not determine the scope of the competi tion act claims, since s. 36 exists to 1 s’il est vrai [traduction] « qu’autoriser l’ins- truction des demandes présentées par les ache- teurs sous parapluie est incompatible avec le droit de la restitution », il reste que le droit de la 314 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. compensate for losses, not to restore wrongful gains (para 73). 2 the possibility of indeterminate liability does not militate against affording umbrella purchas- ers a cause of action, since the defendants’ lia- bility exposure, while significant, would not be indeterminate (paras 75-76). 3 while umbrella claims expose the defendants to li- ability for the pricing decisions of non- defendants, the pricing decisions of non- defendants, under the theory of umbrella effects, are not truly “inde- pendent” (para 77). 4 the umbrella purchaser claims would further the goals of the competition act, including compen- sation and deterrence (para 78). restitution ne définit pas la portée des demandes fondées sur la loi sur la concurrence, puisque l’art. 36 vise l’indemnisation des pertes, non la restitution des gains illicites (par 73). 2 l’éventualité d’une responsabilité indéterminée n’empêche pas de reconnaître une cause d’ac- tion aux acheteurs sous parapluie, étant donné que la responsabilité à laquelle s’exposent les défenderesses, quoiqu’importante, ne serait pas indéterminée (par 75-76). 3 bien que les demandes présentées par les ache- teurs sous parapluie puissent exposer les dé- fenderesses à une responsabilité quant à des décisions d’établissement des prix prises par des tiers, il reste que, selon la théorie de l’effet pa- rapluie, ces décisions ne sont pas véritablement « indépendantes » (par 77). 4 les réclamations des acheteurs sous parapluie favoriseraient l’atteinte des objectifs de la loi sur la concurrence, notamment l’indemnisation et la dissuasion (par 78). (c) “unlawfulness” element c) élément d’« illégalité » [11] the certification judge then considered toshiba’s argument that a breach of the competition act could not constitute the “unlawful” element of civil causes of action, such as the tort of unlaw- ful means conspiracy (para 83). he held that he was bound by watson v. bank of america corp., 2015 bcca 362, 79 bclr (5th) 1, such that it could. while, for other reasons, the pleadings did not disclose a cause of action for the unlawful means tort, godfrey was permitted to amend his pleadings (paras 109-10). and, while finding that godfrey’s pleadings did disclose a cause of action in civil con- spiracy (both predominant purpose conspiracy and unlawful means conspiracy), unjust enrichment and waiver of tort (paras. 100, 102, 115 and 119), the certification judge also found that the umbrella pur- chasers’ claims in unjust enrichment and waiver of tort were bound to fail (paras. 116 and 120). [11] le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a ensuite examiné l’argument de toshiba suivant lequel une infraction à la loi sur la concurrence ne pouvait constituer l’élément [traduction] « illégal » d’une cause d’action civile, telle que le complot qui prévoit le recours à des moyens illégaux (par 83). il a conclu qu’il était lié par l’arrêt watson c. bank of america corp., 2015 bcca 362, 79 bclr (5th) 1, et que cela se pouvait donc. bien que, pour d’autres raisons, les actes de procédure n’aient pas révélé de cause d’action pour délit d’atteinte par un moyen illégal, m. godfrey a été autorisé à les modifier (par. 109- 110). et bien qu’il ait conclu que les actes de pro- cédure de m. godfrey révélaient une cause d’action pour complot civil, à la fois pour complot visant principalement à causer un préjudice et complot d’atteinte par un moyen illégal, enrichissement sans cause et renonciation au recours délictuel (par. 100, 102, 115 et 119), le juge saisi de la demande d’au- torisation a également conclu que les actions pour enrichissement sans cause et renonciation au recours délictuel intentées par les acheteurs sous parapluie étaient vouées à l’échec (par. 116 et 120). [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 315 (2) do the claims raise common issues? (2) les demandes soulèvent- elles des questions [12] godfrey sought to have 25 questions certified as common questions under s. 4(1)(c) of the class proceedings act (several of which related to loss alleged to have been suffered by the proposed class (para 143)). godfrey’s expert, dr. keith reutter, opined that (1) all the proposed class members would have been impacted by toshiba’s alleged conspiracy, and (2) there are methods available to estimate any overcharge that resulted from the alleged conspiracy, as well as aggregate damages (paras 151-52). some of the defendants, however, retained their own ex- pert, dr. james levinsohn, who opined that it would not be possible to determine the fact of injury for the proposed class members using common evidence and analysis (para 153). [13] after examining dr. reutter’s opinion in de- tail, the certification judge concluded that his was a plausible methodology which satisfied the standard set in pro‑ sys consultants ltd. v. microsoft corpo‑ ration, 2013 scc 57, [2013] 3 scr 477, for evi- dence to support certifying loss as a common issue. specifically, it could establish that overcharges were passed on to the indirect purchaser level (paras. 167 and 179). [14] the certification judge therefore certified all of the common issues with respect to the direct purchas- ers and indirect purchasers, except those relating to the unlawful means tort (para 199). with respect to the umbrella purchasers, he certified all of the common issues except those relating to the unlawful means tort, unjust enrichment, waiver of tort (para. 200) and aggregate damages (para 188). communes? [12] m. godfrey a demandé que 25 questions soient autorisées en tant que questions communes au titre de l’al. 4(1)(c) de la class proceedings act (plu- sieurs de ces questions portent sur la perte que le groupe projeté aurait subie (par 143)). l’expert de m. godfrey, m. keith reutter, s’est dit d’avis que (1) tous les membres du groupe projeté ont été tou- chés par le complot auquel aurait participé toshiba, et que (2) des méthodes permettent d’estimer la valeur de toute majoration ayant découlé du complot et le montant des dommages- intérêts globaux (par. 151- 152). certaines défenderesses ont cependant fait ap- pel à leur propre expert, m. james levinsohn, selon qui il ne serait pas possible d’établir le préjudice subi par les membres du groupe proposé au moyen d’une preuve et d’analyses communes (par 153). [13] après avoir examiné en détail l’opinion de m. reutter, le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a conclu que la méthode qu’il proposait était une méthode acceptable qui respectait la norme établie dans l’arrêt pro‑ sys consultants ltd. c. microsoft corporation, 2013 csc 57, [2013] 3 rcs 477, et qui justifiait l’autorisation de la question liée à la perte en tant que question commune. plus parti- culièrement, cette méthode permettait d’établir que la majoration a été refilée aux acheteurs indirects (par. 167 et 179). [14] le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a donc autorisé toutes les questions communes concer- nant les acheteurs directs et les acheteurs indirects, à l’exception de celles portant sur le délit d’atteinte par un moyen illégal (par 199). quant aux ache- teurs sous parapluie, il a autorisé toutes les questions communes à l’exception de celles portant sur le délit d’atteinte par un moyen illégal, l’enrichissement sans cause, la renonciation au recours délictuel (par. 200) et les dommages- intérêts globaux (par 188). b british columbia court of appeal, 2017 bcca 302, 1 bclr (6th) 319 — per savage ja. b cour d’appel de la colombie‑ britannique, 2017 bcca 302, 1 bclr (6th) 319 — le juge savage [15] pioneer appealed, arguing the certification judge erred in holding: (1) that the limitation period [15] pioneer s’est pourvue en appel, soutenant que le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation avait 316 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. defence cannot be considered at the certification stage; (2) that it is not plain and obvious that the discoverability rule never applies to the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the competition act; and (3) that it is not plain and obvious that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment cannot toll the limitation period in this case (para 45). [16] toshiba also appealed, arguing the certifica- tion judge erred by: (1) recasting the standard for certifying loss as a common issue; (2) holding that a breach of s. 45 of the competition act can furnish the “unlawfulness” element for common law actions; and (3) allowing the umbrella purchasers’ causes of action to proceed (para 44). commis une erreur en concluant : (1) que la défense de prescription ne peut pas être prise en compte à l’étape de l’autorisation; (2) qu’il n’est pas évident et manifeste que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique jamais au délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) de la loi sur la concurrence; et (3) qu’il n’est pas évident et manifeste que la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse ne permet pas de repousser le point de départ du délai de pres- cription en l’espèce (par 45). [16] toshiba s’est également pourvue en appel, soutenant que le juge saisi de la demande d’autori- sation s’était trompé : (1) en reformulant le critère d’autorisation de la question liée à la perte à titre de question commune; (2) en concluant qu’une infrac- tion à l’art. 45 de la loi sur la concurrence peut offrir l’élément d’« illégalité » requis pour les actions en common law; et (3) en laissant les causes d’action des acheteurs sous parapluie suivre leur cours (par 44). [17] the court of appeal dismissed both sets of appeals. [17] la cour d’appel a rejeté les deux appels. (1) pioneer’s appeal (1) appel de pioneer [18] agreeing with the certification judge, the court of appeal held that limitations arguments should, generally, not be considered at the certification stage. further, and that aside, the limitations issue in this case was “intimately connected with the facts of the alleged conspiracy” and should be reserved for trial (paras 67-68). alternatively, were discoverability properly considered at the certification stage, it would not be plain and obvious that discoverability does not apply to delay the running of the limitation pe- riod in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the competition act. while recognizing that some courts have declined to apply discoverability to s. 36(4)(a)(i) (para. 72), the court of appeal read this court’s decision in ryan v. moore, 2005 scc 38, [2005] 2 scr 53, as directing that discoverability applies where the limitation period is explicitly linked to the injured party’s knowledge or the basis of the cause of action (para 89). [18] souscrivant à l’opinion du juge saisi de la de- mande d’autorisation, la cour d’appel a conclu que, de façon générale, il ne convenait pas de tenir compte des arguments sur la prescription à l’étape de l’auto- risation. qui plus est, la question de la prescription en l’espèce était [traduction] « étroitement liée aux faits sous- tendant l’allégation de complot » et elle devait être tranchée au procès (par 67-68). sub- sidiairement, même si l’on tenait compte du principe de la possibilité de découvrir de manière adéquate au stade de l’autorisation, il ne serait pas évident et manifeste que ce principe ne permet pas de repor- ter le point de départ du délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) de la loi sur la concurrence. tout en reconnaissant que certains tribunaux ont re- fusé d’appliquer ce principe au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) (par. 72), la cour d’appel a jugé qu’il se dégage de l’arrêt ryan c. moore, 2005 csc 38, [2005] 2 rcs. 53, que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’ap- plique lorsque le délai de prescription est expressé- ment lié à la connaissance de la partie lésée ou au fondement de la cause d’action (par 89). [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 317 [19] further, the certification judge was correct, said the court of appeal, to conclude that it is not plain and obvious that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment could not apply (para 110). equitable fraud was sufficient to invoke the doctrine, and a purely commercial relationship could support the re- quirement for a “special relationship” (paras. 102-3) between the parties so as to toll the applicable limita- tion period. accordingly, godfrey’s failure to plead a “special relationship” would not preclude the doc- trine’s application here (para 104). [19] en outre, aux dires de la cour d’appel, le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a eu raison de conclure qu’il n’était pas évident et manifeste que la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse ne pouvait s’appliquer (par 110). l’existence d’une fraude en equity suffit pour invoquer la doctrine, et l’existence d’un lien purement commercial per- met de satisfaire à l’exigence d’une [traduction] « relation spéciale » (par. 102- 103) entre les parties de manière à repousser le point de départ du délai de prescription applicable. ainsi, l’omission de m. godfrey de faire état d’une « relation spéciale » n’empêcherait pas l’application de la doctrine en l’espèce (par 104). (2) certifying loss as a common issue (2) autorisation de la question de la perte en tant [20] toshiba argued that, since dr. reutter’s pro- posed methodology could neither demonstrate that loss was suffered by each class member nor identify the class members who did not suffer harm, the cer- tification judge erred in certifying questions relating to harm as common questions (para 113). it also saw error in the certification judge’s reference (at para. 169) to the class proceedings act’s aggregate damages provisions as supporting the possibility of liability, even where some class members have not demonstrated actual loss. que question commune [20] toshiba a fait valoir que, puisque la méthode proposée par m. reutter ne permettait pas de dé- montrer que la perte a été subie par chacun des membres du groupe, ni d’identifier ceux du groupe qui n’ont pas subi de préjudice, le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation avait commis une erreur en autorisant les questions liées au préjudice en tant que questions communes (par 113). elle considère également que le juge a commis une erreur en men- tionnant (par. 169) que les dispositions de la class proceedings act portant sur l’octroi de dommages- intérêts globaux peuvent étayer une déclaration de responsabilité, même si certains membres du groupe n’ont pas démontré qu’ils avaient réellement subi une perte. [21] the court of appeal rejected these argu- ments, noting that microsoft allows loss to be cer- tified as a common issue if “the methodology [is] able to establish that the overcharges have been passed on to the indirect- purchaser level in the distribution chain” (para. 149, citing microsoft, at para 115). certifying an issue as common does not create an ultimate right to recovery; it is merely a procedural step that does not change the substan- tive rights of the parties (para.  158). and, while the aggregate damages provisions in the class pro‑ ceedings act are applicable only once liability is established, they do indeed demonstrate that the statute contemplates recovery where certain class [21] la cour d’appel a rejeté ces arguments, sou- lignant que selon l’arrêt microsoft, les questions liées à la perte peuvent être autorisées en tant que questions communes si « la méthode [permet d’]éta- blir que la majoration a été transférée à l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution » (par. 149, citant microsoft, par 115). autoriser une question en tant que question commune ne crée au- cun droit ultime d’indemnisation; il s’agit simple- ment d’une étape procédurale qui ne change rien aux droits substantiels des parties (par 158). et, bien que les dispositions relatives aux dommages- intérêts globaux contenues dans la class proceedings act ne s’appliquent qu’une fois la responsabilité établie, 318 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. members have not proven that they suffered loss (paras 160-61). elles démontrent que la loi envisage la possibilité d’indemnisation si certains membres du groupe n’ont pas démontré qu’ils avaient subi une perte (par. 160- 161). (3) unlawfulness element (3) élément d’illégalité [22] the court of appeal agreed with the certifica- tion judge that a breach of s. 45 of the competition act could represent the unlawfulness element of the various causes of action advanced by godfrey (para 186). [22] la cour d’appel a convenu avec le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation qu’une infraction à l’art. 45 de la loi sur la concurrence pouvait consti- tuer l’élément d’illégalité des diverses causes d’ac- tion avancées par m. godfrey (par 186). (4) the umbrella purchasers (4) les acheteurs sous parapluie [23] here, too, the court of appeal found no error in the certification judge’s reasons. umbrella pur- chasers have a cause of action under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act based on a breach of s. 45(1) (paras 247-48). toshiba’s arguments that the certi- fication judge did not expressly consider whether the umbrella purchasers have claims at common law, and that the certification judge erred in his interpretation of s. 36, were rejected (paras 188-89). [24] finally, the court of appeal agreed with the certification judge that toshiba’s concerns about indeterminate liability did not support denying cer- tification of the umbrella purchasers’ claims. an action under s. 36(1)(a) based on a breach of s. 45(1) is subject to internal limitations within ss. 36(1) and 45(1) which address indeterminacy such that it does not arise as a concern in this case (paras 230-31). further, toshiba’s additional potential liability to the umbrella purchasers would be significantly less, relative to its potential liability to non- umbrella pur- chasers (para 236). [23] là encore, la cour d’appel n’a relevé aucune erreur dans les motifs du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation. les acheteurs sous parapluie ont une cause d’action suivant l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence, laquelle est fondée sur une infrac- tion au par. 45(1) (par. 247- 248). les arguments de toshiba, selon lesquels le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation n’aurait pas expressément examiné si les acheteurs sous parapluie disposaient de recours en common law et le juge aurait commis une erreur dans son interprétation de l’art. 36, ont été rejetés (par. 188- 189). [24] enfin, la cour d’appel a partagé l’avis du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation selon lequel la crainte d’une responsabilité indéterminée manifestée par toshiba ne justifiait pas le refus d’autoriser les demandes des acheteurs sous parapluie. toute action fondée sur l’al. 36(1)a) au titre d’un manquement au par. 45(1) est assujettie aux restrictions inhérentes aux par. 36(1) et 45(1), qui circonscrivent la respon- sabilité de sorte qu’une telle crainte ne se pose pas en l’espèce (par. 230- 231). qui plus est, la respon- sabilité supplémentaire à laquelle toshiba pourrait être tenue à l’égard des acheteurs sous parapluie serait substantiellement moindre comparativement à sa responsabilité éventuelle à l’égard des autres acheteurs (par 236). iv issues on appeal iv questions en litige [25] pioneer’s appeal raises the issue of whether it is plain and obvious that the claim against it will not [25] le pourvoi de pioneer soulève la question de savoir s’il est évident et manifeste que la demande [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 319 succeed because it is statute- barred by s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the competition act. in answering this question, we must decide: 1 whether the principle of discoverability applies to the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the competition act; and 2 whether, for fraudulent concealment to toll the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the com‑ petition act, a special relationship between the parties must be established. contre elle ne sera pas accueillie parce qu’elle est prescrite par le sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) de la loi sur la concurrence. pour répondre à cette question, nous devons trancher les questions suivantes : 1 le principe de la possibilité de découvrir s’ap- plique-t-il au délai de prescription prévu au sous-al.  36(4)a)(i) de la loi sur la concur ‑ rence? 2 pour que la dissimulation frauduleuse repousse le point de départ du délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) de la loi sur la concur‑ rence, faut-il établir une relation spéciale entre les parties? [26] the appeals, taken together, raise three com- mon issues: [26] pris ensemble, les pourvois soulèvent trois questions communes : 1 whether it is plain and obvious that the um- brella purchasers’ claim under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act cannot succeed; 1 est-il évident et manifeste que la demande des acheteurs sous parapluie fondée sur l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence ne peut être accueil- lie? 2 whether it is plain and obvious that s. 36(1) of the competition act bars a plaintiff from bringing concurrent common law and equitable claims; and 2 est-il évident et manifeste que le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence empêche le demandeur d’exercer concurremment des recours de com- mon law ou d’equity? 3. the required standard to certify loss as a com- mon issue, and whether dr. reutter’s evidence satisfies that standard. 3 quelle est la norme requise pour autoriser la question de la perte en tant que question com- mune et le témoignage de m. reutter satisfait-il à cette norme? v analysis v analyse [27] section 4(1) of the class proceedings act contains the requirements for certification of a class proceeding in british columbia. at issue is whether godfrey has satisfied s.  4(1)(a), which requires that the pleadings disclose a cause of action, and s.  4(1)(c), which requires that the claims of the class members raise common issues. the former re- quirement is satisfied unless, assuming all the facts pleaded to be true, it is plain and obvious that the plaintiff’s claim cannot succeed (alberta v. elder advocates of alberta society, 2011 scc 24, [2011] 2 scr 261, at para. 20; hollick v. toronto (city), 2001 scc 68, [2001] 3  scr  158, at para.  25; microsoft, at para 63). the latter is satisfied where [27] le paragraphe 4(1) de la class proceedings act énonce les conditions d’autorisation d’un recours collectif en colombie- britannique. il s’agit de savoir si m. godfrey a respecté l’al. 4(1)a), qui exige que les actes de procédure révèlent une cause d’action, et l’al. 4(1)c), qui exige que les réclamations des membres du groupe soulèvent des questions com- munes. la première condition est respectée à moins que, en tenant tous les faits allégués pour avérés, il soit évident et manifeste que la réclamation du de- mandeur au fond est insoutenable (alberta c. elder advocates of alberta society, 2011 csc 24, [2011] 2 rcs 261, par. 20; hollick c. toronto (ville), 2001 csc 68, [2001] 3 rcs 158, par. 25; micro soft, 320 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. there is “some basis in fact” to support a common issue (hollick, at para. 25; microsoft, at paras. 99- 100). [28] although at certification the plaintiff must sat- isfy s. 4(1)’s requirements that i have just described, the standard of review on appeal for each particular question depends on the nature of the question, and will be identified in turn. par 63). la dernière condition est respectée lors- qu’il existe un « certain fondement factuel » pou- vant étayer une question commune (hollick, par. 25; microsoft, par. 99- 100). [28] au stade de l’autorisation, le demandeur doit satisfaire aux exigences du par. 4(1) que je viens de décrire; toutefois, la norme de contrôle en appel ap- plicable à chaque question en particulier dépend de la nature de la question et je préciserai quelle norme s’applique dans chaque cas. a pioneer’s appeal a appel formé par pioneer [29] noting that the alleged conspiracy is said to have ended on january 1, 2010, and that the action against pioneer was not commenced until august 16, 2013, pioneer argues that godfrey’s claim is statute- barred, as it was commenced after the two- year lim- itation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the competition act expired. as i will explain, i agree that the dis- coverability rule  applies to extend the limitation period in s 36(4)(a)(i). it is not plain and obvious that godfrey’s claim against pioneer will fail on this basis. although it is therefore unnecessary to opine on whether the doctrine of fraudulent concealment would apply, i take this opportunity to briefly discuss why its application is not conditioned upon a special relationship between the parties. [30] determining whether discoverability applies to the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) is a question of law subject to a standard of correctness, as is the question of whether fraudulent concealment requires a special relationship to be established between the parties. the applicability of either doctrine is, how- ever (and as noted by the court of appeal), “bound up in the facts” and must be left to the trial judge to decide (ca reasons, at para 68). [29] soulignant que le complot allégué aurait pris fin le 1er janvier 2010 et que l’action intentée contre elle n’a été introduite que le 16 août 2013, pioneer soutient que la demande de m.  godfrey est prescrite parce qu’elle a été introduite après l’expiration du délai de prescription de deux ans prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) de la loi sur la concur‑ rence. comme je vais l’expliquer, je reconnais que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique de façon à prolonger le délai de prescription établi au sous-al 36(4)a)(i). il n’est pas évident et manifeste que la demande de m. godfrey contre pioneer doit être rejetée pour ce motif. bien qu’il ne soit donc pas nécessaire que je me prononce sur la question de savoir si la doctrine de la dissimulation fraudu- leuse s’applique, je saisis l’occasion d’examiner brièvement les raisons pour lesquelles son applica- tion ne tient pas à l’existence d’une relation spéciale entre les parties. [30] la question de savoir si la possibilité de dé- couvrir s’applique au délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) est une question de droit contrôlée suivant la norme de la décision correcte, tout comme la question de savoir si la dissimulation frauduleuse oblige à établir l’existence d’une relation spéciale entre les parties. toutefois, comme l’a souligné la cour d’appel, l’applicabilité de ces deux doctrines est [traduction] « intimement liée aux faits » et il appartient au juge du procès de trancher cette ques- tion (motifs de la ca, par 68). [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 321 (1) discoverability (1) possibilité de découvrir (a) limitation periods run from the accrual or knowledge of the cause of action [31] this court has recognized that limitation peri- ods may be subject to a rule of discoverability, such that a cause of action will not accrue for the purposes of the running of a limitation period until “the mate- rial facts on which [the cause of action] is based have been discovered or ought to have been discovered by the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable diligence” (central trust co. v. rafuse, [1986] 2 scr 147, at p. 224; ryan, at paras. 2 and 22). [32] this discoverability rule does not apply auto- matically to every limitation period. while a “rule”, it is not a universally applicable rule of limitations, but a rule of construction to aid in the interpretation of statutory limitation periods (peixeiro v. haberman, [1997] 3 scr 549, at para 37). it can therefore be displaced by clear legislative language (ermineskin indian band and nation v. canada, 2006 fca 415, [2007] 3 fcr 245, at para. 333, aff’d 2009 scc 9, [2009] 1 scr 222). in this regard, many provincial legislatures have chosen to enact statutory limitation periods that codify, limit or oust entirely discovera- bility’s application, particularly in connection with ultimate limitation periods (see, eg,. limitations act, 2002, so 2002, c. 24, sch. b, ss. 4, 5 and 15; limitations act, rsa 2000, c. l-12, s. 3(1); limitation act, sbc 2012, c. 13, ss. 6 to 8 and 21; the limitations act, ss 2004, c l-161, ss. 5 to 7; limitation of actions act, snb 2009, c l-85, s. 5; limitation of actions act, sns 2014, c. 35, s. 8; see also bowes v. edmonton (city), 2007 abca 347, 425 ar 123, at paras 146-58). a) le délai de prescription commence à courir à compter de la naissance ou de la connais‑ sance de la cause d’action [31] notre cour a reconnu que les délais de pres- cription peuvent être assujettis à la règle de la pos- sibilité de découvrir, de sorte que la cause d’action prendra naissance, pour les besoins de l’écoulement du délai de prescription, « lorsque les faits importants sur lesquels repose cette cause d’action ont été dé- couverts par le demandeur ou auraient dû l’être s’il avait fait preuve de diligence raisonnable » (central trust co. c. rafuse, [1986] 2 rcs 147, p. 224; ryan, par. 2 et 22). [32] la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’ap- plique pas automatiquement à chaque délai de pres- cription. c’est une « règle », certes, mais ce n’est pas une règle de prescription d’application univer- selle; c’est plutôt une règle d’interprétation visant à faciliter l’interprétation des délais de prescription fixés par la loi (peixeiro c haberman, [1997] 3 rcs 549, par 37). elle peut donc être écartée par un texte législatif clair (bande et nation indienne d’ermineskin c. canada, 2006 caf 415, [2007] 3 rcf 245, par. 333, conf. par 2009 csc 9, [2009] 1 rcs 222). à cet égard, plusieurs législatures provinciales ont choisi d’établir au moyen de lois des délais de prescription qui codifient, limitent ou écartent complètement l’application de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir, notamment en ce qui concerne les délais de prescription maximum (voir, p ex, la loi de 2002 sur la prescription des actions, lo 2002, c. 24, ann. b, art. 4, 5 et 15; limitations act, rsa 2000, c. l-12, par. 3(1); limitation act, sbc 2012, c.  13, art.  6 à 8 et 21; the limita‑ tions act, ss 2004, c l-161, art. 5 à 7; loi sur la prescription, ln-b 2009, c l-85, art. 5; limita‑ tion of actions act, sns 2014, c. 35, art. 8; voir aussi bowes c. edmonton (city), 2007 abca 347, 425 ar 123, par. 146- 158). [33] further, absent legislative intervention, the discoverability rule  applies only where the limi- tation period in question runs from the accrual of the cause of action, or from some other event that [33] de plus, en l’absence d’intervention de la législature, la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique que si le délai de prescription en cause commence à courir à compter de la naissance de la 322 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. occurs when the plaintiff has knowledge of the in- jury sustained: in my opinion, the judge- made discoverability rule is nothing more than a rule of construction. whenever a stat- ute requires an action to be commenced within a specified time from the happening of a specific event, the statutory language must be construed. when time runs from “the accrual of the cause of action” or from some other event which can be construed as occurring only when the in- jured party has knowledge of the injury sustained, the judge- made discoverability rule applies. but, when time runs from an event which clearly occurs without regard to the injured party’s knowledge, the judge- made discover- ability rule may not extend the period the legislature has prescribed. [emphasis added.] cause d’action ou de tout autre événement survenant au moment où le demandeur prend connaissance du préjudice subi : [traduction] à mon avis, la règle prétorienne de la possibilité de découvrir le dommage n’est rien de plus qu’une règle d’interprétation. dans tous les cas où une loi indique que l’action en justice doit être intentée dans un certain délai après un événement donné, il faut interpréter les termes de cette loi. lorsque ce délai court à partir du « moment où naît la cause d’action » ou de tout autre événement qui peut être interprété comme ne survenant qu’au moment où la [partie lésée] prend connaissance du dommage, c’est la règle prétorienne de la possibilité de découvrir le dommage qui s’applique. toutefois, si le délai court à compter de la date d’un événement qui sur- vient clairement, et sans égard à la connaissance qu’en a la [partie lésée], cette règle ne peut prolonger le délai fixé par le législateur. [je souligne.] (fehr v. jacob (1993), 14 cclt (2d) 200 (man. ca), at para. 22, cited in peixeiro, at para 37) (fehr c. jacob (1993), 14 cclt (2d) 200 (ca. man.), par. 22, cité dans peixeiro, par 37) [34] two points flow from this statement. first, where the running of a limitation period is contin- gent upon the accrual of a cause of action or some other event that can occur only when the plaintiff has knowledge of his or her injury, the discovera- bility principle applies in order to ensure that the plaintiff had knowledge of the existence of his or her legal rights before such rights expire (peixeiro, at para 39). [34] deux points se dégagent de cet énoncé. pre- mièrement, lorsque le point de départ du délai de pres- cription dépend de la naissance de la cause d’action ou de quelque autre événement ne pouvant survenir qu’au moment où le demandeur prend connaissance de son préjudice, le principe de la possibilité de dé- couvrir s’applique de manière à garantir que le de- mandeur avait connaissance des droits que la loi lui confère avant qu’ils expirent (peixeiro, par 39). [35] secondly (and conversely), where a statutory limitation period runs from an event unrelated to the accrual of the cause of action or which does not require the plaintiff’s knowledge of his or her injury, the rule of discoverability will not apply. in ryan, for example, this court held that discoverability did not apply to s. 5 of the survival of actions act, rsnl 1990, c. s-32, which stated that an action against a deceased could not be brought after one year from the date of death. as the court explained (para. 24): [35] deuxièmement (et inversement), lorsqu’un dé- lai de prescription légal commence à courir à compter d’un événement qui n’a rien à voir avec la naissance de la cause d’action ou qui n’exige pas que le de- mandeur ait connaissance du préjudice qu’il a subi, la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’appliquera pas. dans l’arrêt ryan, par exemple, la cour a conclu que la règle ne s’appliquait pas à l’art. 5 de la survival of actions act, rsnl 1990, c. s-32, qui dispose qu’aucune action ne peut être intentée contre une personne décédée après un an suivant la date de son décès. comme la cour l’a expliqué (par. 24) : the law does not permit resort to the judge- made discov- erability rule when the limitation period is explicitly linked by the governing legislation to a fixed event unrelated to il n’est pas permis, en droit, de recourir à la règle pré- torienne de la possibilité de découvrir le dommage dans les cas où la loi applicable lie expressément le délai de [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 323 the injured party’s knowledge or the basis of the cause of action. [emphasis added; citation omitted.] prescription à un événement déterminé qui n’a rien à voir avec le moment où la partie lésée en prend connaissance ou avec le fondement de la cause d’action. [je souligne; référence omise.] by tying, then, the limitation period to an event un- related to the cause of action, and which did not necessitate the plaintiff’s knowledge of an injury, the legislature had clearly displaced the discoverability rule (ryan, at para 27). en rattachant, alors, le délai de prescription à un évé- nement qui n’a aucun rapport avec la cause d’action et qui n’exige pas que le demandeur ait connaissance d’un préjudice, la législature a clairement écarté la règle de la possibilité de découvrir (ryan, par 27). [36] in determining whether a limitation period runs from the accrual of a cause of action or knowl- edge of the injury, such that discoverability applies, substance, not form, is to prevail: even where the statute does not explicitly state that the limitation period runs from “the accrual of the cause of ac- tion”, discoverability will apply if it is evident that the operation of a limitation period is, in substance, conditioned upon accrual of a cause of action or knowledge of an injury. indeed, clear statutory text is necessary to oust its application. in peixeiro, for ex- ample, this court applied the discoverability rule to s. 206(1) of the highway traffic act, rso 1990, c. h.8, which stated that an action must be commenced within two years of the time when “damages were sustained” (para 2). the use of the phrase “damages were sustained” rather than “when the cause of ac- tion arose” was a “distinction without a difference”, as it was unlikely that the legislature intended that the limitation period should run without the plaintiff’s knowledge (para 38). [37] it is therefore clear that the “the judge- made discoverability rule will apply when the requisite limitation statute indicates that time starts to run from when the cause of action arose (or other word- ing to that effect)” (g. mew, d. rolph and d. zacks, the law of limitations (3rd ed. 2016), at p. 103 (emphasis added)). and, while my colleague côté j. claims to disagree with my analysis, i am fortified by the endorsement in her reasons of this formulation of discoverability (paras. 140 and 149). [36] pour décider si un délai de prescription com- mence à courir à la date de la naissance de la cause d’action ou lorsque le demandeur a connaissance du préjudice qu’il a subi, de sorte que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique, le fond, non la forme, doit prévaloir : même si la loi ne précise pas que le délai de prescription commence à courir à compter de « la naissance de la cause d’action », le principe de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique s’il est évident que le point de départ du délai de prescription dépend, en substance, de la naissance de la cause d’action ou de la connaissance d’un préju- dice. en fait, pour écarter l’application du principe, il faut un texte législatif clair. dans l’arrêt peixeiro, par exemple, notre cour a appliqué la règle de la possibilité de découvrir au par. 206(1) du code de la route, lro 1990, c h8, selon lequel l’action devait être intentée dans les deux ans de la date à laquelle les « dommages ont été subis » (par 2). l’utilisation des mots « où les dommages ont été subis » plutôt que « date où la cause d’action a pris naissance » est une « distinction sans importance », puisqu’il est peu probable que la législature ait voulu que le délai de prescription commence à courir à l’insu du demandeur (par 38). [37] il est donc clair que [traduction] « la règle prétorienne de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique quand la loi de prescription voulue indique que le délai commence à courir à la date de la naissance de la cause d’action (ou qu’il utilise d’autres mots en ce sens) » (g. mew, d. rolph et d. zacks, the law of limitations (3e éd. 2016), p. 103 (je souligne)). et, bien que ma collègue prétende être en désaccord avec mon analyse, elle me conforte dans mon opinion en cautionnant cette formulation de la règle de la pos- sibilité de découvrir (par. 140 et 149). 324 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. [38] the issue raised by this appeal is what consti- tutes sufficiently clear legislative expression in this regard, such that discoverability will apply. in my view, where the event triggering the limitation period is an element of the cause of action, the legislature has shown its intention that the limitation period be linked to the cause of action’s accrual, such that discoverability will apply. as this court stated in m (k) v. m (h), [1992] 3 scr 6, the accrual of a cause of action is a “gradatio[n]” (p 34). where all the elements of a cause of action occur simulta- neously, the cause of action accrues contemporane- ously with the occurrence of each element (m (k), at p 34). where, however, the occurrence of each element is separated in time, the accrual of the cause of action is a continuing (but not continual) process. that is, the cause of action will continue to accrue as each element of the cause of action occurs. [39] this was what the court in ryan was referring to when it said that discoverability does not apply where the limitation period “is explicitly linked by the governing legislation to a fixed event unrelated to the injured party’s knowledge or the basis of the cause of action” (para. 24 (emphasis added)). in ryan, discoverability did not apply because the ac- tion was “complete in all its elements” before the operation of the event triggering the limitation period (para 18). the limitation period was not dependent upon the accrual of the cause of action and thus the limitation period would begin to run independent of the accrual of the cause of action (see ryan, at paras. 16, 18, 20, 29 and 32). citing the trial judge with approval, the court added this: il s’agit en l’espèce de savoir ce qui constitue [38] une expression suffisamment claire de la législature en ce sens pour que la règle de la possibilité de dé- couvrir s’applique. à mon avis, lorsque l’événement marquant le point de départ du délai de prescription est un élément de la cause d’action, la législature a manifesté son intention que le délai de prescription soit lié à la naissance de la cause d’action, déclen- chant du même coup l’application de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir. comme l’a affirmé notre cour dans m (k) c. m (h), [1992] 3 rcs 6, la cause d’action « peut prendre naissance [à différents moments] » (p 34). si tous les éléments d’une cause d’action apparaissent simultanément, la cause d’ac- tion prend naissance au moment où survient chaque élément (m (k), p 34). en revanche, si les éléments ne surviennent pas tous en même temps, la naissance de la cause d’action est un processus en cours (mais non continu). en d’autres termes, la cause d’action continue de prendre naissance à mesure que survient chacun de ses éléments. [39] c’est ce dont parlait la cour dans ryan quand elle a dit que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas lorsque « la loi applicable lie ex- pressément le délai de prescription à un événement déterminé qui n’a rien à voir avec le moment où la partie lésée en prend connaissance ou avec le fonde- ment de la cause d’action » (par. 24 (je souligne)). dans ryan, cette règle ne s’appliquait pas car « tous les éléments » de l’action « [étaient] présents » avant que ne survienne le fait qui marque le point de dé- part du délai de prescription (par 18). le délai de prescription ne dépendait pas de la naissance de la cause d’action et il commencerait donc à courir in- dépendamment de la naissance de la cause d’action (voir ryan, par. 16, 18, 20, 29 et 32). citant le juge de première instance avec approbation, la cour a ajouté ceci : the fact of death is of no relevance to the cause of action in question. it is not an element of the cause of action and is not required to complete the cause of action. whatever the nature of the cause of action, it is existing and complete before the survival of actions act operates, in the case of a death, to maintain it and provide a limited time window within which it must be pursued. the fact of the death is irrelevant to the cause of action and serves [traduction] le décès en tant que tel n’a aucune pertinence en ce qui concerne la cause d’action en ques- tion. il ne constitue pas un élément de la cause d’action et n’est pas nécessaire pour compléter la cause d’action. quelle que soit la nature de la cause d’action, elle existe et est complète avant que la survival of actions act s’ap- plique, en cas de décès, pour la maintenir et fixer un délai limité dans lequel l’action devra être intentée. le décès [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 325 only to provide a time from which the time within which to bring the action is to be calculated. [emphasis added; para 32] [40] had, however, the event triggering the limi- tation period been an element of the cause of action, or had it been required to occur before the cause of action could accrue, discoverability could apply (ryan, at paras. 29-30, citing burt v. lelacheur, 2000 nsca 90, 189 dlr (4th) 193). i do not see my colleague côté j. as disagreeing on this point: she is quite right when she says that “the words ‘basis of the cause of action’ in para. 24 of ryan should be understood as essentially synonymous with the ‘aris- ing or accrual of the cause of action’” (para 148). as this court held in peixeiro, where the limitation period is based on an event that can be construed as synonymous with the accrual of the cause of action, discoverability will apply (para 38). [41] from all this, it is evident that discoverability continues to apply where the legislature has shown its intent that a limitation period shall run from “when the cause of action arose (or other wording to that effect)” or where the event triggering the limitation period requires the plaintiff’s knowledge of his or her injury (mew et al., at p 103). conversely, discover- ability does not apply where that triggering event does not depend on the plaintiff’s knowledge or is independent of the accrual of the cause of action. this is not, as my colleague suggests, a modified test for discoverability (reasons of côté j., at para. 154), but rather is the product of this court’s application of fehr in peixeiro (regarding when discoverability does apply) and ryan (regarding when discoverability does not apply). en tant que tel n’est pas pertinent en ce qui concerne la cause d’action et sert seulement de point de départ pour calculer le délai dans lequel l’action devra être intentée. [je souligne; par 32] [40] si en revanche le fait déclencheur du délai de prescription constituait un élément de la cause of action, ou s’il devait se produire avant que la cause d’action puisse prendre naissance, la règle de la possibilité de découvrir pourrait s’appliquer (ryan, par. 29-30, citant burt c. lelacheur, 2000 nsca 90, 189 dlr (4th) 193). je ne pense pas que ma collègue la juge côté est en désaccord sur ce point : elle a parfaitement raison de dire que « l’expression “fondement de la cause d’action” figurant au par. 24 de l’arrêt ryan devrait être considérée comme étant essentiellement synonyme de l’expression “nais- sance de la cause d’action” » (par 148). comme l’a conclu la cour dans pexeiro, lorsque le délai de prescription découle d’un fait susceptible d’être jugé synonyme de la naissance de la cause d’action, la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique (par 38). [41] il ressort clairement de tout ce qui précède que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir continue de s’appliquer lorsque la législature a manifesté son intention que le délai de prescription commence à courir [traduction] « à la naissance de la cause d’action (ou utilisé d’autres mots en ce sens) », ou encore lorsque le fait déclencheur du délai de pres- cription exige du demandeur qu’il ait connaissance du préjudice qu’il a subi (mew et autres, p 103). en revanche, la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas lorsque le fait déclencheur ne dépend pas de la connaissance du demandeur ou est indépen- dant de la naissance de la cause d’action. il ne s’agit pas là, contrairement à ce que laisse entendre ma collègue, d’un critère modifié relatif à la possibilité de découvrir (motifs de la juge côté, par 154). il s’agit plutôt de la conséquence de l’application par notre cour de l’arrêt fehr dans peixeiro (à propos des circonstances où la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique) et dans ryan (au sujet des cir- constances où la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas). 326 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. (b) the statutory scheme, and the objects of b) le régime législatif et les objectifs des délais statutory limitation periods de prescription légaux [42] bearing in mind that, as i have explained, the discoverability rule is a rule of construction, its ap- plication depends on an examination of the pertinent statutory text to assess what triggers the running of the limitation period in question, supplemented by consideration of the statutory scheme within which it operates, and of the legislature’s purpose in enacting limitation periods (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para 21). [43] turning first to the statutory text, the relevant provisions of s. 36 of the competition act state: [42] compte tenu du fait que, comme je l’ai ex- pliqué, la règle de la possibilité de découvrir est une règle d’interprétation, son application dépend d’un examen du texte législatif pertinent visant à déter- miner ce qui marque le point de départ du délai de prescription en question, complété par un examen du régime législatif dans lequel ladite disposition s’ins- crit et de l’intention qu’avait la législature quand elle a fixé ce délai de prescription (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27, par 21). [43] passons d’abord au texte législatif. les dis- positions pertinentes de l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence prévoient : 36 (1) any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of 36 (1) toute personne qui a subi une perte ou des dom- mages par suite : (a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of part vi,   . a)    d’un comportement allant à l’encontre d’une disposition de la partie vi;   .   . may, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue for and recover from the person who engaged in the conduct or failed to comply with the order an amount equal to the loss or damage proved to have been suffered by him, together with any additional amount that the court may allow not exceeding the full cost to him of any investi- gation in connection with the matter and of proceedings under this section. peut, devant tout tribunal compétent, réclamer et recouvrer de la personne qui a eu un tel comportement ou n’a pas obtempéré à l’ordonnance une somme égale au montant de la perte ou des dommages qu’elle est reconnue avoir subis, ainsi que toute somme supplémentaire que le tribunal peut fixer et qui n’excède pas le coût total, pour elle, de toute enquête relativement à l’affaire et des procédures engagées en vertu du présent article.   .   . (4) no action may be brought under subsection (1), (4) les actions visées au paragraphe (1) se prescrivent : (a) in the case of an action based on conduct that is contrary to any provision of part vi, after two years from a) dans le cas de celles qui sont fondées sur un com- portement qui va à l’encontre d’une disposition de la partie vi, dans les deux ans qui suivent la dernière des dates suivantes : (i) a day on which the conduct was engaged in, or (i) soit la date du comportement en question, (ii) the day on which any criminal proceedings relating thereto were finally disposed of, (ii) soit la date où il est statué de façon définitive sur la poursuite; whichever is the later;   .   .   . [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 327 [44] the text of s. 36(4)(a)(i) provides that no ac- tion may be brought under s. 36(1)(a) after two years from a day on which conduct contrary to part vi occurred. from this, it is clear that the event trig- gering this particular limitation period is an element of the underlying cause of action. that is, the lim- itation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) is triggered by the occurrence of an element of the underlying cause of action — specifically, conduct contrary to part vi of the competition act. therefore, it is subject to discoverability (fanshawe college of applied arts and technology v. au optronics corp., 2016 onca 621, 132 or (3d) 81, at para 18). [45] the scheme of s. 36(4) also supports the view that discoverability was intended to apply to the lim- itation period in s 36(4)(a)(i). section 36(4)(a) sets out two limitation periods — s. 36(4)(a)(i), which runs from the day on which the conduct occurred and s. 36(4)(a)(ii), which runs from the day on which criminal proceedings are disposed of. the applicable limitation period is whichever event occurs later. pioneer argues that parliament enacted s. 36(4)(a)(ii) to revive a cause of action where the limitation period has expired under s. 36(4)(a)(i), which revival would mitigate any unfairness created by the operation of the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) (af (pioneer), at para 92). i do not view s. 36(4)(a)(ii)’s operation in this way. it is simply an example of a limitation period to which discoverability does not apply be- cause, as the court of appeal for ontario said in fanshawe, the event triggering the limitation period under s. 36(4)(a)(ii) — the disposition of criminal proceedings  — is “not connected to a plaintiff’s cause of action or knowledge” (para.  47). when s. 36(4)(a)(i) is contrasted with s. 36(4)(a)(ii), it is likely that parliament intended that discoverability apply to the former limitation period and not the latter. further, where criminal proceedings are not brought against a wrongdoer, the putative mitigating effect of s. 36(4)(a)(ii) would be of no assistance to plaintiffs whose right of action has expired by oper- ation of s 36(4)(a)(i). [44] le texte du sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) prévoit que les ac- tions visées à l’al. 36(1)a) se prescrivent dans les deux ans qui suivent la date du comportement qui va à l’en‑ contre de la partie vi. partant, il est évident que le fait déclencheur de ce délai de prescription est un élément de la cause d’action sous- jacente. en d’autres termes, le délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) court à compter de la survenance d’un élément de la cause d’action sous- jacente — plus précisément, le com- portement qui va à l’encontre de la partie vi de la loi sur la concurrence. par conséquent, il est assujetti à la règle de la possibilité de découvrir (fanshawe college of applied arts and technology c. au optronics corp., 2016 onca 621, 132 or (3d) 81, par 18). [45] le régime établi par le par. 36(4) appuie égale- ment la thèse selon laquelle la règle de la possibilité de découvrir est censée s’appliquer au délai de prescrip- tion du sous-al 36(4)a)(i). l’alinéa 36(4)a) prévoit deux délais de prescription : celui du sous-al. 36(4)a)(i), qui commence à courir à la date du comportement en ques- tion, et celui du sous-al. 36(4)a)(ii), qui commence à courir à la date où il est statué sur la poursuite. le dé- lai de prescription applicable est celui qui commence à courir à la dernière de ces dates. pioneer soutient que le parlement a adopté le sous-al. 36(4)a)(ii) en vue de faire renaître une cause d’action qui est prescrite sui- vant le sous-al. 36(4)a)(i), et que cette renaissance at- ténuerait toute iniquité créée par l’application du délai de prescription du sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) (ma (pioneer), par 92). selon moi, ce n’est pas ainsi que fonctionne le sous-al 36(4)a)(ii). cette disposition n’est qu’un exemple de délai de prescription auquel la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas parce que, comme l’a dit la cour d’appel de l’ontario dans l’ar- rêt fanshawe, le fait déclencheur du délai de prescrip- tion prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(ii) — la date à laquelle il est statué sur la poursuite — n’est [traduction] « pas lié à la cause d’action ou à la connaissance du deman- deur » (par 47). si l’on compare le sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) au sous-al. 36(4)a)(ii), le législateur voulait probable- ment que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’ap- plique au premier délai de prescription, mais non au deuxième. qui plus est, lorsqu’aucune poursuite n’est intentée contre le contrevenant, le soi- disant effet d’at- ténuation attribué au sous-al. 36(4)a)(ii) ne serait d’au- cun secours au demandeur dont le droit d’action a expiré par application du sous-al 36(4)a)(i). 328 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. [46] so much for the statutory text and scheme. i turn, then, to consider this limitation period’s re- lation to the overall object of the competition act, which is to “maintain and encourage competition in canada in order to promote the efficiency and ad- aptability of the canadian economy    and    pro- vide consumers with competitive prices and product choices” (competition act, s 11). anti- competitive agreements  — which represent “conduct that is contrary to  .  .  part  vi” (s.  36(1)(a))  — are in- variably conducted through secrecy and deception (fanshawe, at para. 46; ca reasons, at para. 93), meaning that they are, by their very nature, un‑ known to s. 36(1)(a) claimants. parliament would have known this when enacting the limitation pro- vision contained in s 36(4)(a)(i). it would therefore be absurd, and would render the cause of action granted by s. 36(1)(a) almost meaningless, to state that parliament did not intend for discoverability to apply, such that the plaintiff’s right of action would expire prior to his or her acquiring knowledge of the anti- competitive behaviour. i agree with the court of appeal that “it cannot be said that parliament intended to accord such little weight to the inter- ests of injured plaintiffs in the context of alleged conspiracies so as to exclude the availability of the discoverability rule in s. 36(4)” (ca reasons, at para 93). [46] voilà pour le texte législatif et le régime qu’il établit. je passe maintenant à l’examen du lien qui unit le délai de prescription à l’objet général de la loi sur la concurrence, qui est de « préserver et de favoriser la concurrence au canada dans le but de stimuler l’adaptabilité et l’efficience de l’écono- mie canadienne [  ] de même que [  ] d’assu- rer aux consommateurs des prix compétitifs et un choix dans les produits » (loi sur la concurrence, art 11). les ententes anticoncurrentielles — qui participent des «  comportement[s] allant à l’en- contre [  ] de la partie vi » (al. 36(1)a)) — font invariablement appel au secret et à la tromperie (fanshawe, par. 46; motifs de la ca, par. 93), ce qui veut dire qu’elles sont, de par leur nature même, inconnues des demandeurs visés par l’al 36(1)a). le législateur devait le savoir lorsqu’il a établi le délai de prescription du sous-al 36(4)a)(i). il serait non seulement absurde d’affirmer qu’il n’était pas dans l’intention du législateur que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique, de sorte que le droit d’action du demandeur expirerait avant qu’il prenne connaissance du comportement anticoncur- rentiel, mais affirmer cela reviendrait à dénuer pra- tiquement de son sens la cause d’action reconnue par l’al 36(1)a). je conviens avec la cour d’appel [traduction] « [qu’]il est impossible de dire que le législateur a voulu accorder si peu d’importance aux intérêts des demandeurs lésés, dans les cas d’allégation de complot, qu’il a écarté le recours à la règle de la possibilité de découvrir au par. 36(4) » (motifs de la ca, par 93). [47] the application of discoverability to the lim- itation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) is also supported by the object of statutory limitation periods. this court has recognized that three rationales underlie limi- tation periods (m (k), at pp. 29-31), which courts must consider in deciding whether the discovera- bility rule applies to a particular limitation period. the first is that limitation periods foster certainty, in that “[t]here comes a time    when a potential defendant should be secure in his reasonable expec- tation that he will not be held to account for ancient obligations”(m (k), at p 29). this concern must be balanced against the unfairness of allowing a wrongdoer to escape liability while the victim of injury continues to suffer the consequences (m (k), [47] l’application de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir au délai de prescription prévu au sous- al. 36(4)a)(i) est également étayée par l’objet sous- tendant les délais de prescription légaux. notre cour a reconnu que les délais de prescription reposent sur trois justifications (m (k), p. 29-31), dont les tribunaux doivent tenir compte pour décider si la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique à un délai de prescription donné. la première est que les délais de prescription favorisent la certitude, en ce qu’« [i]l arrive un moment [  ] où un éventuel défendeur devrait être raisonnablement certain qu’il ne sera plus redevable de ses anciennes obligations » (m (k), p 29). ce souci de certitude doit être sou- pesé en regard de l’iniquité qui consiste à permettre à [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 329 at p 29). the second rationale is evidentiary: limi- tation periods are intended to help prevent evidence from going stale, to the detriment of the plaintiff or the defendant (m (k), at p 30). finally, limitation periods serve to encourage diligence on the part of plaintiffs in pursuing their claims (m (k), at p 30). [48] consideration of these rationales for limitation periods affirms discoverability’s application here. even recognizing that shorter limitation periods in- dicate that parliament put a premium on the certainty that comes with a limitation statute’s function of repose (peixeiro, at para. 34), balancing all of the competing interests underlying s. 36(4)(a)(i) weighs in favour of applying discoverability. the ability of plaintiffs to advance claims for loss arising from conduct contrary to part vi of the competition act outweighs defendants’ interests in barring them, espe- cially where such conduct is, as i have already noted, concealed from plaintiffs (fanshawe, at para. 46) (such that the evidentiary rationale — that is, the concern about evidence going “stale” — has no place in the analysis). to hold otherwise would create per- verse incentives, encouraging continued concealment of anti- competitive behaviour until the two- year limi- tation period has elapsed. it would therefore not only bar plaintiffs from pursuing their claims, but reward concealment that has been “particularly effective” (fanshawe, at para 49). un contrevenant d’échapper à sa responsabilité alors que la victime du préjudice continue à en subir les conséquences (m (k), p 29). la deuxième justifi- cation se rattache à la preuve : les délais de prescrip- tion visent à empêcher que des éléments de preuve deviennent périmés, au détriment du demandeur ou du défendeur (m (k), p 30). enfin, les délais de prescription servent à encourager les demandeurs à faire preuve de diligence dans la poursuite de leurs actions (m (k), p 30). [48] l’examen des justifications qui sous- tendent les délais de prescription confirme que le principe de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique en l’espèce. même si je reconnais que la brièveté d’un délai de prescription tend à indiquer que le législateur attache une grande importance à la certitude qui découle de toute loi visant à assurer la tranquillité d’esprit (peixeiro, par.  34), j’estime que la mise en balance de l’ensemble des intérêts divergents sur lesquels repose le sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) milite en faveur de l’application de la règle de la possibi- lité de découvrir. la capacité des demandeurs de poursuivre en justice pour les pertes découlant d’un comportement allant à l’encontre de la partie vi de la loi sur la concurrence l’emporte sur l’intérêt des défendeurs à les en empêcher, surtout lorsqu’un tel comportement a lieu, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, à l’insu des demandeurs (fanshawe, par. 46) (de sorte que la justification rattachée à la preuve — la crainte que la preuve devienne « périmée » — n’a pas sa place dans l’analyse). conclure autrement aurait pour effet indésirable d’inciter l’auteur du comportement anticoncurrentiel à continuer de gar- der le secret jusqu’à l’expiration du délai de pres- cription de deux ans. non seulement les demandeurs ne pourraient pas intenter leurs recours, mais l’on se trouverait à récompenser l’auteur d’une trom- perie qui a été [traduction] « particulièrement efficace » (fanshawe, par 49). [49] in contrast, applying discoverability to s. 36(4)(a)(i) would not unduly affect the defend- ant’s interests, as discoverability does not excuse the plaintiff from moving matters along, such that the rationale of encouraging diligence is still served (peixeiro, at para 39). where plaintiffs sleep on their rights or otherwise do not diligently pursue their [49] par contraste, l’application de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) ne nuirait pas indûment aux intérêts des défendeurs, car la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne dispense pas le demandeur de faire avancer sa cause, de sorte que l’objectif d’encourager la diligence demeure atteint (peixeiro, par 39). le demandeur qui tarde 330 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. claims, discoverability will not operate to extend the limitation period (mew et al., at p 83). [50] for all of these reasons, i find that the dis- coverability rule applies to the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i), such that it begins to run only when the material facts on which godfrey’s claim is based were discovered by him or ought to have been dis- covered by him by the exercise of reasonable dili- gence. à exercer ses droits ou qui n’agit pas avec diligence dans la poursuite de son action ne pourra bénéficier de l’application de la règle de la possibilité de dé- couvrir pour faire prolonger le délai de prescription (mew et autres, p 83). [50] pour toutes ces raisons, j’estime que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique au délai de prescription du sous-al. 36(4)a)(i), de sorte que ce délai n’a commencé à courir qu’à la date à la- quelle m. godfrey a découvert les faits importants sur lesquels repose sa demande ou encore à la date à laquelle il les aurait découverts s’il avait fait preuve de diligence raisonnable. (2) fraudulent concealment (2) dissimulation frauduleuse in light of my finding that discoverability applies [51] to s. 36(4)(a)(i), it is, strictly speaking, unnecessary to consider the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. given, however, the submissions and attention given to this issue at the courts below, i will comment briefly here on whether fraudulent concealment requires es- tablishing a special relationship between the parties. [52] fraudulent concealment is an equitable doc- trine that prevents limitation periods from being used “as an instrument of injustice” (m.  (k.), at pp 58-59). where the defendant fraudulently con- ceals the existence of a cause of action, the limitation period is suspended until the plaintiff discovers the fraud or ought reasonably to have discovered the fraud (guerin v. the queen, [1984] 2 scr 335, at p 390). it is a form of “equitable fraud” (guerin, at p. 390; m (k), at pp. 56-57), which is not confined to the parameters of the common law action for fraud (m (k), at p 57). as lord evershed, mr explained in kitchen v. royal air forces association, [1958] 2 all er 241 (ca), at p. 249, cited in m (k), at pp. 56-57: [51] étant donné ma conclusion que la règle de la pos- sibilité de découvrir s’applique au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i), il est pour ainsi dire inutile d’examiner la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse. toutefois, compte tenu de l’attention accordée à cette question devant les juridictions inférieures, ainsi que des observations qui ont été présentées à ce sujet, je me prononcerai brièvement sur la question de savoir si la dissimu- lation frauduleuse exige la preuve d’une relation spéciale entre les parties. [52] la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse est une doctrine d’equity qui vise à empêcher que les délais de prescription servent « à créer une injus- tice » (m (k), p 58-59). si le défendeur a dissimulé frauduleusement l’existence d’une cause d’action, le délai de prescription est suspendu jusqu’au mo- ment où le demandeur découvre, ou aurait raison- nablement dû découvrir, la fraude (guerin c la reine, [1984] 2 rcs 335, p 390). il s’agit d’une forme de « fraude d’equity » (guerin, p. 390; m (k), p. 56-57), qui n’est pas limitée par les paramètres de l’action pour fraude de la common law (m (k), p 57). comme l’a expliqué le maître des rôles lord evershed dans l’arrêt kitchen c. royal air forces association, [1958] 2 all er 241 (ca), p. 249, cité dans l’arrêt m (k), p. 56-57 : it is now clear    that the word “fraud” in s. 26(b) of the limitation act, 1939, is by no means limited to common law fraud or deceit. equally, it is clear, having regard to [traduction] il est maintenant évident [  ] que le terme « fraude » employé à l’al. 26b) de la limitation act, 1939, n’est aucunement limité à une tromperie ou à une fraude de [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 331 the decision in beaman v. arts,. ltd., [1949] 1 all er 465, that no degree of moral turpitude is necessary to establish fraud within the section. what is covered by eq- uitable fraud is a matter which lord hardwicke did not attempt to define two hundred years ago, and i certainly shall not attempt to do so now, but it is, i think, clear that the phrase covers conduct which, having regard to some special relationship between the two parties concerned, is an unconscionable thing for the one to do towards the other. [emphasis added in m (k)] [53] while it is therefore clear that equitable fraud can be established in cases where a special relation- ship subsists between the parties, lord evershed, mr did not limit its establishment to such circum- stances, nor did he purport to define exhaustively the circumstances in which it would or would not apply (see tp v. ap, 1988 abca 352, 92 ar 122, at para 10). indeed, he expressly refused to do so: “what is covered by equitable fraud is a matter which lord hardwicke did not attempt to define two hundred years ago, and i certainly shall not attempt to do so now” (kitchen, at p. 249 (emphasis added)). [54] when, then, does fraudulent concealment arise so as to delay the running of a limitation period? re- calling that it is a form of equitable fraud, it becomes readily apparent that what matters is not whether there is a special relationship between the parties, but whether it would be, for any reason, unconscionable for the defendant to rely on the advantage gained by having concealed the existence of a cause of action. this was the court’s point in performance industries ltd. v. sylvan lake golf & tennis club ltd., 2002 scc 19, [2002] 1 scr 678, at para. 39: [equitable fraud] “   refers to transactions falling short of deceit but where the court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the ad- vantage obtained” (p 37). fraud in the “wider sense” of a ground for equitable relief “is so infinite in its varieties that the courts have not attempted to define it”, but “all kinds of unfair dealing and unconscionable conduct in matters of contract come within its ken”     [emphasis added.] common law. il est également clair, compte tenu de l’arrêt beaman c. arts,. ltd., [1949] 1 all er 465, qu’aucun degré de turpitude morale n’est nécessaire pour prouver qu’il y a fraude au sens de l’article. ce que vise la fraude d’equity est une chose que lord hardwicke n’a pas tenté de définir il y a deux cents ans et que je ne tenterai certainement pas de définir maintenant; toutefois, j’estime qu’il est clair que cette expression vise une conduite qui, compte tenu de la relation spéciale qui existe entre les parties concernées, est une iniquité de la part de l’une envers l’autre. [souligné dans m (k)] [53] s’il est donc évident que la fraude d’equity peut être établie dans les cas où il existe une relation spéciale entre les parties, le maître des rôles lord evershed ne l’a pas limitée à ces cas, non plus qu’il n’a tenté de définir de façon exhaustive les cas où elle pourrait, ou non, s’appliquer (voir tp c. ap, 1988 abca 352, 92 ar 122, par 10). il a d’ailleurs refusé expressément de le faire : [traduction] « ce que vise la fraude d’equity est une chose que lord hardwicke n’a pas tenté de définir il y a deux cents ans et que je ne tenterai certainement pas de définir maintenant » (kitchen, p. 249 (je souligne)). [54] mais alors quand la présence d’une dissimu- lation frauduleuse permet- elle de retarder le point de départ d’un délai de prescription? rappelons qu’il s’agit d’une forme de fraude d’equity. partant, il devient évident que ce qui importe, ce n’est pas de savoir s’il existe une relation spéciale entre les par- ties, mais si, pour quelque raison que ce soit, il serait abusif pour le défendeur de profiter de l’avantage ob- tenu en dissimulant l’existence d’une cause d’action. c’est ce qu’a expliqué la cour dans performance industries ltd. c. sylvan lake golf & tennis club ltd., 2002 csc 19, [2002] 1 rcs 678, par. 39 : [la fraude d’equity] «    s’entend également d’opérations qui ne sont pas dolosives, mais à l’égard desquelles le tribunal estime qu’il serait abusif de laisser une personne profiter de l’avantage obtenu » (p 37). au « sens plus large » de fraude donnant ouverture à une réparation en equity, la fraude se présente sous [traduction] « un nombre tellement infini de formes que les tribunaux n’ont pas tenté de la définir », mais « elle vise toutes sortes de manœuvres déloyales et de conduites abusives en matière contractuelle »    [je souligne.] 332 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. it follows that the concern which drives the applica- tion of the doctrine of equitable fraud is not limited to the unconscionability of taking advantage of a special relationship with the plaintiff. nor is the doc- trine’s application limited, as my colleague suggests, to cases where there is something “tantamount to or commensurate with” a special relationship be- tween the plaintiff and the defendant (paras. 171 and 173-74). while a special relationship is a means by which a defendant might conceal the existence of a cause of action, equitable fraud may also be estab- lished by pointing to other forms of unconscionable behaviour, such as (for example) “some abuse of a confidential position, some intentional imposition, or some deliberate concealment of facts” (m (k), at p. 57, citing halsbury’s laws of england (4th ed. 1979), vol. 28, at para 919). in short, the in- quiry is not into the relationship within which the conduct occurred, but into the unconscionability of the conduct itself. [55] the question of whether pioneer’s alleged conduct amounts to fraudulent concealment will, of course, fall to be decided by a trial judge. neverthe- less, i agree with the court of appeal and the certi- fication judge that it is not “plain and obvious” that fraudulent concealment could not delay the running of the limitation period in this case (ca reasons, at para 110). b umbrella purchasers’ cause of action under section 36(1) of the competition act [56] toshiba argues that the certification judge erred by certifying the umbrella purchasers’ claims brought under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act. for the following reasons, i disagree. il s’ensuit que ce n’est pas seulement l’iniquité qui découle du fait de laisser une personne profiter de l’avantage d’une relation spéciale avec le demandeur qui justifie l’application de la doctrine de la fraude d’equity. l’application de la doctrine n’est pas non plus restreinte, comme le suggère ma collègue, aux cas où il y a quelque chose d’« équivalen[t] ou corres- pondant à » une relation spéciale entre le demandeur et le défendeur (par. 171 et 173- 174). bien qu’une relation spéciale soit pour le défendeur un moyen de dissimuler l’existence d’une cause d’action, la fraude d’equity peut aussi être établie en invoquant d’autres formes de conduite abusive, par exemple [traduction] « que l’on [a] abusé d’une situation de confiance, que l’on [a] délibérément abusé de la bonté de quelqu’un ou délibérément caché des faits » (m (k), p. 57, citant halsbury’s laws of england (4e éd. 1979), vol. 28, par 919). bref, l’examen ne porte pas sur la relation dans le cadre de laquelle le comportement a eu lieu, mais sur le caractère abusif du comportement lui- même. [55] la question de savoir si le comportement re- proché à pioneer constitue de la dissimulation frau- duleuse devra, bien sûr, être tranchée par le juge de première instance. néanmoins, je conviens avec la cour d’appel et le juge saisi de la demande d’autori- sation qu’il n’est pas « évident et manifeste » que la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse ne pouvait retarder le point de départ du délai de prescription en l’espèce (motifs de la ca, par 110). b la cause d’action que reconnaît le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence aux acheteurs sous parapluie [56] toshiba soutient que le juge saisi de la de- mande d’autorisation a commis une erreur en auto- risant les réclamations présentées par les acheteurs sous parapluie sur le fondement de l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence. pour les motifs qui suivent, je ne suis pas d’accord avec elle. [57] whether umbrella purchasers have a cause of action under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act is a question of law, reviewable on a standard of cor- rectness. since, as i explain below, i have concluded that umbrella purchasers do have a cause of action [57] la question de savoir si les acheteurs sous pa- rapluie ont une cause d’action fondée sur l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence est une question de droit susceptible de contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. puisque, comme je l’explique plus loin, j’ai [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 333 under s. 36(1)(a), it is not plain and obvious that their claim cannot succeed. godfrey’s pleadings disclose a cause of action for umbrella purchasers, thereby satisfying the conditions under s. 4(1)(a) of the class proceedings act for certification. [58] the theory behind holding price- fixers liable to umbrella purchasers — who, it will be recalled are in this case persons who purchased odds or odd products neither manufactured nor supplied by the defendants — is that the defendants’ anti- competitive cartel activity creates an “umbrella” of supra- competitive prices, causing non- cartel man- ufacturers to raise their prices (shah v. lg chem, ltd., 2015 onsc 6148, 390 dlr (4th) 87 (“shah (ont. scj)”), at para 159). additionally, the eu- ropean court of justice in kone ag and others v. öbb‑ infrastruktur ag, [2014] euecj c-557/12, explained umbrella pricing as: conclu que les acheteurs sous parapluie ont effecti‑ vement une cause d’action fondée sur l’al. 36(1)a), il n’est pas manifeste et évident que leur demande ne peut être accueillie. les actes de procédure de m. godfrey révèlent une cause d’action dont sont ti- tulaires les acheteurs sous parapluie, répondant ainsi aux conditions d’autorisation prévues à l’al. 4(1)a) de la class proceedings act. [58] la logique qui sous- tend la recherche de la responsabilité des participants à un accord de fixa- tion des prix envers les acheteurs sous parapluie — qui, rappelons-le, sont en l’espèce les personnes qui ont acheté des ldo ou des produits munis de ldo qui n’ont été ni fabriqués, ni fournis par les défende- resses — est que les activités anticoncurrentielles des défenderesses créent un « parapluie » ou une « omb- relle » de prix supraconcurrentiels qui provoque une hausse des prix chez les fabricants ne faisant pas partie du cartel (shah c. lg chem, ltd., 2015 onsc 6148, 390 dlr (4th) 87 (« shah (csj. ont.) »), par 159). en outre, la cour de justice de l’union européenne a expliqué en ces termes dans kone ag et autres c. öbb‑ infrastruktur ag, [2014] euecj c-557/12, l’ef- fet d’ombrelle (ou effet parapluie) sur les prix : where a cartel manages to maintain artificially high prices for particular goods and certain conditions are met, relat- ing, in particular, to the nature of the goods or the size of the market covered by that cartel, it cannot be ruled out that a competing undertaking, outside the cartel in ques- tion, might choose to set the price of its offer at an amount higher than it would have chosen under normal conditions of competition, that is, in the absence of that cartel. in such a situation, even if the determination of an offer price is regarded as a purely autonomous decision, taken by the undertaking not party to a cartel, it must none the less be stated that such a decision has been able to be taken by reference to a market price distorted by that cartel and, as a result, contrary to the competition rules. [emphasis added; para 29]. lorsqu’une entente parvient à maintenir un prix artificiel- lement élevé pour certains produits et que certaines condi- tions du marché sont réunies, tenant, notamment, à la nature du produit ou à la taille du marché couvert par cette entente, il ne peut être exclu que l’entreprise concurrente, extérieure à celle-ci, choisisse de fixer le prix de son offre à un montant supérieur à celui qu’elle aurait choisi dans des conditions normales de concurrence, c’est-à-dire en l’absence de ladite entente. dans un tel contexte, même si la détermination d’un prix d’offre est considérée comme une décision pure- ment autonome, adoptée par l’entreprise ne participant pas à une entente, il y a lieu cependant de constater que cette décision a pu être prise par référence à un prix du marché faussé par cette entente et, par conséquent, contraire aux règles de concurrence. [je souligne; par 29] [59] in short, a rising tide lifts all boats; under the theory of umbrella pricing, the entire market for the subject product is affected: [59] bref, la marée monte également pour tous les bateaux; selon la théorie de l’effet parapluie sur les prix, c’est l’ensemble du marché du produit en cause qui est touché : umbrella effects typically arise when price increases lead to a diversion of demand to substitute products. [traduction] l’effet parapluie se produit habituel- lement lorsqu’une augmentation des prix donne lieu à 334 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. because successful cartels typically reduce quantities and increase prices, this diversion leads to a substitution away from the cartels’ products toward substitute products produced by cartel outsiders    [t]he increased demand for substitutes typically leads to higher prices for the sub- stitute products. such price increases are called umbrella effects and may arise either in the same relevant market   . or in neighboring markets. un détournement de la demande vers des produits de substitution. comme les participants à un cartel pros- père s’entendent en général pour réduire les quantités et augmenter les prix, ce détournement se traduit par un abandon des produits du cartel au profit des produits fabriqués par des non participants au cartel. [   ] [l]a demande accrue pour les produits de substitution entraîne habituellement une hausse des prix de ces produits. cette hausse est appelée l’« effet parapluie » et cet effet peut se produire sur le même marché pertinent [  ] ou sur des marchés voisins. (r. inderst, f. maier- rigaud and u. schwalbe, “um- brella effects” (2014), 10 j. competition l & econ. 739, at p. 740) (r. inderst, f. maier- rigaud et u. schwalbe, « um- brella effects » (2014), 10 j. competition l & econ. 739, p. 740) [60] several decisions of lower courts have cer- tified umbrella purchaser actions brought under s. 36(1)(a) without expressly considering whether such purchasers had a cause of action (see: fair‑ hurst v. anglo american plc, 2014 bcsc 2270; pro‑ sys consultants ltd v. infineon technologies ag, 2009 bcca 503, 98 bclr (4th) 272; irving paper ltd. v. atofina chemicals inc. (2009), 99 or. (3d) 358 (scj);. crosslink technology inc. v. basf canada, 2014 onsc 1682, 54 cpc (7th) 111). appellate decisions in british columbia and on- tario have, however, expressly considered the issue and concluded that they do (see: ca reasons, at para. 247; shah v. lg chem, ltd., 2018 onca 819, 142 or (3d) 721 (“shah (onca)”), at para 52). [61] whether umbrella purchasers have a cause of action under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act is a question of statutory interpretation. the text of s. 36(1)(a) must therefore be read in its entire context and in its grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme and objects of the competition act. [60] dans plusieurs décisions, les juridictions in- férieures ont autorisé des actions intentées par des acheteurs sous parapluie en vertu de l’al. 36(1)a) sans se demander explicitement si ces acheteurs avaient une cause d’action (voir : fairhurst c. anglo ame rican plc, 2014 bcsc 2270; pro‑ sys consult‑ ants ltd c. infineon technologies ag, 2009 bcca 503, 98 bclr (4th) 272; irving paper ltd. c. atofina chemicals inc. (2009), 99 or (3d) 358 (csj);. crosslink technology inc c basf ca‑ nada, 2014 onsc 1682, 54 cpc (7th) 111). des tribunaux d’appel de la colombie- britannique et de l’ontario ont toutefois expressément abordé la ques- tion et conclu qu’ils en avaient une (voir : motifs de la ca, par. 247; shah c. lg chem, ltd., 2018 onca 819, 142 or (3d) 721 (« shah (onca) »), par 52). [61] la question de savoir si les acheteurs sous pa- rapluie ont une cause d’action fondée sur l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence est une question d’in- terprétation législative le texte de l’al.  36(1)a) doit donc être lu dans son contexte global et en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’har- monise avec l’économie et les objets de la loi sur la concurrence. (1) text of section 36(1) (1) texte du par. 36(1) [62] as already noted, s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act creates a statutory cause of action which allows for the recovery of damages or loss that resulted from [62] comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence crée une cause d’action qui permet l’indemnisation d’une perte ou des dommages [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 335 conduct contrary to part vi. the relevant portion states: qui découlent d’un comportement allant à l’encontre de la partie vi. voici les passages pertinents : recovery of damages recouvrement de dommages- intérêts 36 (1) any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of 36 (1) toute personne qui a subi une perte ou des dom- mages par suite : (a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of part vi   . a)    d’un comportement allant à l’encontre d’une disposition de la partie vi;   .   . may    sue for and recover from the person who engaged in the conduct    an amount equal to the loss or damage proved to have been suffered by him, together with any additional amount that the court may allow not exceeding the full cost to him of any investigation in connection with the matter and of proceedings under this section. [63] godfrey relies on “conduct that is contrary to   . part vi” (“offences in relation to competi- tion”), since he alleges that toshiba acted contrary to s. 45(1)(b), (c), and (d) of the competition act. during the class period,1 s. 45(1) stated: peut [  ] réclamer et recouvrer de la personne qui a eu un tel comportement [  ] une somme égale au montant de la perte ou des dommages qu’elle est reconnue avoir subis, ainsi que toute somme supplémentaire que le tribunal peut fixer et qui n’excède pas le coût total, pour elle, de toute enquête relativement à l’affaire et des procédures engagées en vertu du présent article. [63] m. godfrey se fonde sur les termes « com- portement allant à l’encontre [  ] de la partie vi » (« infractions relatives à la concurrence »), puisqu’il allègue que toshiba a agi en contravention des al. 45(1)b), c), et d) de la loi sur la concurrence. durant la période visée par le recours collectif1, le par. 45(1) était rédigé comme suit : conspiracy complot 45. (1) every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person 45. (1) commet un acte criminel et encourt un empri- sonnement maximal de cinq ans et une amende maximale d’un million de dollars, ou l’une de ces peines, quiconque complote, se coalise ou conclut un accord ou arrangement avec une autre personne :   .   . (b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production of a product or to enhance unreasonably the price thereof, b) soit pour empêcher, limiter ou réduire, indûment, la fabrication ou production d’un produit ou pour en élever déraisonnablement le prix; (c) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the pro- duction, manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply of a product, or in the price of insurance on persons or property, or c) soit pour empêcher ou réduire, indûment, la concur- rence dans la production, la fabrication, l’achat, le troc, la vente, l’entreposage, la location, le transport ou la fourniture d’un produit, dans le prix d’assurances sur les personnes ou les biens; 1 section 45(1) was amended by the budget implementation act, 2009, sc 2009, c. 2, s 410. the amendments are not material to these reasons for judgment. 1 le paragraphe 45(1) a été modifié par la loi d’exécution du budget de 2009, lc 2009, c. 2, art 410. les modifications ne sont pas importantes pour les présents motifs. 336 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. (d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly, d) soit, de toute autre façon, pour restreindre, indû- ment, la concurrence ou lui causer un préjudice indu. is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprison- ment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding one million dollars or to both. [64] the text of s. 36(1)(a) supports the view that umbrella purchasers have a cause of action thereun- der for conduct contrary to s. 45(1) of the competi‑ tion act. section 36(1)(a) provides a cause of action to any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of conduct contrary to s 45. significantly, parliament’s use of “any person” does not narrow the realm of possible claimants. rather, it empowers any claimant who can demonstrate that loss or damage was incurred as a result of the defendant’s conduct to bring a claim. on this point, the following paragraph from the court of appeal for ontario’s decision in shah (onca) (at para. 34) is apposite, and i adopt it as mine: on a plain reading, if the umbrella purchasers can prove loss resulting from a proven conspiracy under s. 45, s.  36(1) grants those purchasers a statutory means by which to recover those losses. taking the language at face value, the umbrella purchasers’ right of recovery is limited only by their ability to demonstrate two things: (1) that the respondents conspired within the meaning of s. 45; and (2) that the losses or damages suffered by the appellants resulted from that conspiracy. [64] le texte de l’al. 36(1)a) étaye le point de vue selon lequel, sous son régime, les acheteurs sous parapluie ont une cause d’action pour tout compor- tement allant à l’encontre du par. 45(1) de la loi sur la concurrence. l’alinéa 36(1)a) accorde un droit d’action à toute personne qui a subi une perte ou des dommages par suite d’un comportement allant à l’encontre de l’art 45. fait important, l’emploi, par le législateur, de l’expression « toute personne » n’a pas pour effet de restreindre les catégories de deman- deurs éventuels. cette expression a plutôt pour effet d’habiliter à intenter un recours tout demandeur ca- pable de démontrer que la perte ou le dommage a été subi en raison du comportement du défendeur. sur ce point, le paragraphe suivant tiré de l’arrêt shah (onca) de la cour d’appel de l’ontario (par. 34) est pertinent et je le fais mien : [traduction] suivant le sens ordinaire des mots uti- lisés, si les acheteurs sous parapluie peuvent démontrer qu’ils ont subi une perte par suite d’un complot établi sur le fondement de l’art. 45, le par. 36(1) leur accorde un moyen de recouvrer cette perte. interprété au pied de la lettre, le par. 36(1) confère aux acheteurs sous parapluie un droit de recouvrement qui n’est limité que par leur capacité à démontrer deux choses : (1) que les intimés ont comploté au sens de l’art. 45; et (2) que la perte ou les dommages subis par les appelants découlent de ce complot. (2) purpose of the competition act (2) objet de la loi sur la concurrence [65] as i have already recounted, the purpose of the competition act is to “maintain and encourage competition in canada” with a view to providing consumers with “competitive prices and product choices” (s 11). a conspiracy to price- fix is the “very antithesis of the competition act’s objective” (shah (onca), at para 38). monetary sanctions for such anti- competitive conduct therefore further the competition act’s purpose. this court has also recognized two other objectives of the competition [65] comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, l’objet de la loi sur la concurrence est de « préserver et de favoriser la concurrence au canada » dans le but d’assurer aux consommateurs « des prix compétitifs et un choix dans les produits » (art 11). comploter en vue de fixer les prix va [traduction] « totalement à l’en- contre de l’objet de la loi sur la concurrence » (shah (onca), par 38). les sanctions pécuniaires imposées dans de tels cas de conduite anticoncurrentielle fa- vorisent ainsi l’atteinte de la fin visée par la loi sur [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 337 act of particular relevance here, being deterrence of anti- competitive behaviour, and compensation for the victims of such behaviour (infineon technologies ag v. option consommateurs, 2013 scc 59, [2013] 3 scr 600 (“infineon”), at para. 111; sun‑ rype products ltd. v. archer daniels midland company, 2013 scc 58, [2013] 3 scr 545 (“sun‑ rype”), at paras. 24-27; microsoft, at paras 46-49). interpreting s. 36(1)(a) so as to permit umbrella purchaser actions furthers both of these objectives. [66] allowing umbrella purchaser actions furthers deterrence because it increases the potential liability falling upon those who engage in anti- competitive behaviour (shah (onca), at para 38). here, god- frey alleges that four of the named defendants con- trolled 94 percent of the global odd market (ar, vol. ii, at para 70). while this means that toshiba’s potential liability to the umbrella purchasers would only marginally increase its existing liability to non- umbrella purchasers, i accept that any increase in potential liability will likely carry a correspondingly deterrent effect. [67] the objective of compensation is also fur- thered by allowing umbrella purchaser actions, be- cause doing so affords umbrella purchasers recourse to recover from loss arising from what, for the pur- poses of these appeals, is assumed to have been anti- competitive conduct. barring a class of purchasers who were, on the theory pleaded, intended by the defendants to pay higher prices as a result of their price- fixing is inconsistent with the compensatory goal of the competition act. la concurrence. notre cour a reconnu deux autres objectifs de la loi sur la concurrence qui revêtent en l’espèce une importance particulière : la dissuasion des comportements anticoncurrentiels et l’indemni- sation des victimes de ces comportements (infineon technologies ag c. option consommateurs, 2013 csc 59, [2013] 3 rcs 600 (« infineon »), par. 111; sun‑ rype products ltd. c. archer daniels midland company, 2013 csc 58, [2013] 3 rcs 545 (« sun‑ rype »), par. 24-27; microsoft, par 46-49). interpréter l’al. 36(1)a) de façon à autoriser les actions des ache- teurs sous parapluie favorise l’atteinte de ces deux objectifs. [66] autoriser les actions des acheteurs sous pa- rapluie favorise la dissuasion, en ce que le risque de responsabilité auquel s’exposent ceux qui se livrent à des comportements anticoncurrentiels augmente (shah (onca), par 38). en l’espèce, m. godfrey al- lègue que quatre des défenderesses désignées contrô- laient 94 p. 100 du marché global des ldo (da, vol. ii, par 70). bien que cela signifie que la responsa- bilité potentielle à laquelle s’expose toshiba à l’égard des acheteurs sous parapluie ne ferait qu’augmenter légèrement la responsabilité qu’elle a envers les autres acheteurs que ceux sous parapluie, je reconnais que toute augmentation de sa responsabilité éventuelle aura probablement un effet dissuasif correspondant. [67] autoriser les actions des acheteurs sous pa- rapluie favorise également l’atteinte de l’objectif d’indemnisation, parce que ces acheteurs auraient ainsi la possibilité de recouvrer les pertes découlant de ce qui, pour les besoins des présents pourvois, est présumé être un comportement anticoncurren- tiel. exclure une catégorie d’acheteurs qui, selon la thèse avancée, devaient payer des prix plus élevés par suite du stratagème de fixation des prix établi par les défenderesses est incompatible avec l’objectif d’indemnisation de la loi sur la concurrence. [68] relatedly, and while far from determinative, departmental and parliamentary statements fortify my view that parliament intended that the cause of action in s. 36(1)(a) be broadly available, such that anyone who suffers a loss from anti- competitive behaviour could bring a private action. the brief- ing document accompanying the first stage of the [68] dans le même ordre d’idées, bien que ce soit loin d’être concluant, certaines déclarations minis- térielles et parlementaires me confortent dans mon opinion que le législateur entendait que la cause d’action prévue à l’al. 36(1)a) soit largement acces- sible, de sorte que quiconque subit une perte par suite d’un comportement anticoncurrentiel peut intenter 338 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. modernization amendments (which introduced the original civil remedies provision) stated: une action privée. on peut lire ce qui suit dans le document d’information préparé à l’occasion de la première étape des modifications visant à moderni- ser la loi (qui ont mené à l’adoption de la première disposition relative aux recours civils) : under the existing law there is no civil recourse un- der the act for persons injured by reason of the fact that others have participated in violation of the combines investigation act. the provision dealing with civil dam- ages, although it is expected to be of particular value to small businessmen who have been hurt by conduct con- trary to the act, will be equally available to consumers and to any other members of the public who have been so damaged. en vertu de la loi actuelle, il n’existe pas de recours possible en dommages- intérêts pour les personnes lésées du fait que d’autres ont participé à des infractions à la loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions. la disposition visant les dommages- intérêts sera d’une valeur particulière pour les petites entreprises lésées par des actions contraire (sic) à la loi mais ladite disposition pourra également être invoquée par les consommateurs et par toutes personnes ayant été ainsi lésées. the amendment provides that anyone who has suffered loss or damage because of such a violation    may   . sue for and be awarded damages equal to the actual loss incurred     [emphasis added.] la modification stipule que toute personne qui a subi des pertes ou un préjudice à cause d’une telle infrac- tion [  ] peut intenter des poursuites et recevoir des dommages- intérêts équivalents à la perte réelle subie   . [je souligne.] (consumer and corporate affairs canada, proposals for a new competition policy for canada (1973), at pp. 48-49) (consommation et corporations canada, proposi‑ tions pour une nouvelle politique de concurrence pour le canada (1973), p. 45) this is further supported by parliamentary commit- tee discussions on the introduction of a private cause of action. in committee, the responsible minister explicitly stated that there was no reason to limit con- sumers’ recourse under the private cause of action to direct loss or damage (house of commons, standing committee on finance, trade and economic affairs, minutes of proceedings and evidence, issue no. 45, 1st sess., 30th parl., may 8 1975, at p 45:18). cette opinion est de plus étayée par les délibérations du comité parlementaire sur la création d’une cause d’action en droit privé. en comité, le ministre respon- sable a expressément déclaré qu’il n’y avait aucune raison de limiter le recours par les consommateurs à la cause d’action en droit privé pour recouvrer la perte ou les dommages directement subis (chambre des communes, comité permanent des finances, du commerce et des questions économiques, procès‑ verbaux et témoignages, fasc. no 45, 1re sess., 30e lég., 8 mai 1975, p 45:18). (3) indeterminate liability (3) responsabilité indéterminée [69] toshiba argues that recognizing the umbrella purchasers as having a cause of action would ex- pose toshiba to a “potentially limitless scope of liability” (af (toshiba), at para 97). this raises the question, first of all, of whether indeterminate liability is relevant at all to deciding the scope of possible s. 36(1)(a) claimants for conduct contrary to s. 45(1) of the competition act. on this point, the court of appeal considered that it might be relevant [69] toshiba soutient que la reconnaissance d’une cause d’action aux acheteurs sous parapluie aurait pour effet de l’exposer à une [traduction] « respon- sabilité potentiellement illimitée » (ma (toshiba), par 97). ce qui nous amène, premièrement, à la ques- tion de savoir si la responsabilité indéterminée est un facteur d’une quelconque pertinence pour décider qui sont les demandeurs susceptibles de se prévaloir de l’al. 36(1)a) par suite d’un comportement allant à [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 339 (on the express assumption that concerns about in- determinate liability might properly be considered outside the context of a negligence action) (ca. reasons, at para 227). i note, parenthetically, that whether that assumption is valid — that is, whether indeterminate liability might properly be considered at all in the context of a claim under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act — i am content to leave for another day since, for the reasons that follow, i am of the view that indeterminate liability would not arise in this case in any event. [70] toshiba argues that indeterminate liability is a relevant consideration here because the um- brella purchasers seek to recover for pure economic loss. toshiba relies upon this court’s statement in r v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2011 scc 42, [2011] 3 scr 45, that “[t]he risk of indeterminate liability is enhanced by the fact that the claims are for pure economic loss” (para 100). in imperial tobacco, a class proceeding was brought against imperial tobacco by persons who purchased “light” or “mild” cigarettes. imperial tobacco issued third- party notices to the government of canada, alleging it was liable to tobacco companies for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation. this court held that “the prospect of indeterminate liability is fatal to the tobacco companies’ claims of negligent mis- representation”, since “canada had no control over the number of people who smoked light cigarettes” (para 99). similarly, toshiba argues that it had no control over the quantity of odds sold to the um- brella purchasers by non- defendant manufacturers or the number of purchasers to whom it may be liable, such that the extent of its liability is indeterminate (af (toshiba), at para 102). l’encontre du par. 45(1) de la loi sur la concurrence. sur ce point, la cour d’appel a jugé (en supposant expressément que les préoccupations au sujet de la responsabilité indéterminée pourraient valablement être examinées dans un contexte autre que celui d’une action pour négligence) qu’il pourrait s’agir d’un fac- teur pertinent (motifs de la ca, par 227). je signale incidemment qu’il vaut mieux reporter à une autre occasion l’analyse de la question de savoir si cette hypothèse est valide — c’est-à-dire si la responsabi- lité indéterminée est susceptible d’être valablement examinée dans le contexte d’une demande fondée sur l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence — puisque, pour les motifs qui suivent, j’estime que la question de la responsabilité indéterminée ne se poserait pas en l’espèce de toute façon. [70] toshiba soutient que la responsabilité illimitée est une considération pertinente en l’espèce, parce que les acheteurs sous parapluie cherchent à être indem- nisés d’une perte purement économique. toshiba se fonde à cet égard sur une affirmation de notre cour dans l’arrêt r c. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2011 csc 42, [2011] 3 rcs 45 : « le risque de responsa- bilité indéterminée est aggravé par le caractère pure- ment financier de la perte alléguée » (par 100). dans imperial tobacco, un recours collectif avait été intenté contre imperial tobacco par des consommateurs de cigarettes « légères » ou « douces ». imperial tobacco avait mis en cause le gouvernement du canada, allé- guant qu’il était responsable envers les compagnies de tabac, entre autres, pour avoir fait des déclarations inexactes par négligence. la cour a conclu que « la possibilité d’une responsabilité indéterminée porte un coup fatal aux allégations des compagnies de ta- bac relatives aux déclarations inexactes faites par négligence », puisque le « canada n’exerçait aucun contrôle sur le nombre de fumeurs de cigarettes lé- gères » (par 99). de même, toujours selon toshiba, elle n’exerçait aucun contrôle sur le nombre de ldo vendus aux acheteurs sous parapluie par des fabri- cants autres que les défenderesses ou sur le nombre d’acheteurs envers qui elle risque d’être tenue respon- sable, de sorte que l’étendue de sa responsabilité est indéterminée (ma (toshiba), par 102). [71] several features of this case, however, lead me to the view that recognizing the umbrella purchasers’ [71] toutefois, plusieurs éléments de la présente affaire m’amènent à conclure que la reconnaissance 340 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. cause of action under s. 36(1)(a) does not risk expos- ing toshiba to indeterminate liability. [72] first, toshiba’s liability is limited by the class period, and by the specific products whose prices are alleged to have been fixed. whereas in imperial tobacco, canada had no control over who smoked light cigarettes (para. 99), the theory of umbrella ef- fects links the pricing decisions of the non- defendant manufacturers to toshiba’s anti- competitive behav- iour (ca reasons, at para 239). i have already noted that godfrey’s pleadings allege that, during the class period, four of the named defendants collectively controlled 94 percent of the global odd market. godfrey also alleges that toshiba intended to raise prices across that market (ar, vol. ii, at pp 21-22). this allegation is rooted in the theory that, in order for toshiba to profit from the conspiracy, the entire market price for odds had to increase. otherwise, toshiba would have lost market share to non- defendant manufacturers (transcript, at pp. 56-57, ar, vol. iii, at p 166). [73] this supports the submission made before us by godfrey’s counsel that umbrella effects are “not just a known and foreseeable consequence of what the defendants are doing, it’s an intended conse- quence” (transcript, at p 61). the point is that the results of toshiba’s alleged anti- competitive behav- iour are not indeterminate. intended results are not indeterminate, but pre‑ determined. i therefore agree with the court of appeal that there is “no reason why defendants who intend to inflict damage on umbrella purchasers should be exonerated from liability on the basis that they exercised no control over their liability” (ca reasons, at para 241). de la cause d’action des acheteurs sous parapluie fon- dée sur l’al. 36(1)a) ne risque pas d’exposer toshiba à une responsabilité indéterminée. [72] premièrement, la responsabilité de toshiba est limitée par la période visée par le recours collectif et par les produits dont les prix auraient été fixés. alors que dans l’affaire imperial tobacco, le canada n’exerçait aucun contrôle sur le nombre de fumeurs de cigarettes légères (par. 99), la théorie de l’effet parapluie établit un lien entre les décisions prises par les fabricants autres que les défenderesses quant à l’établissement des prix et le comportement anti- concurrentiel de toshiba (motifs de la ca, par 239). j’ai déjà mentionné que m. godfrey allègue dans ses actes de procédure que, durant la période visée par le recours collectif, quatre des défenderesses désignées contrôlaient à elles seules 94 p. 100 du marché global des ldo. m. godfrey a aussi allégué que toshiba entendait augmenter les prix dans l’ensemble de ce marché (da, vol. ii, p 21-22). cette allégation tire son origine de la thèse voulant que, pour que toshiba puisse tirer profit du complot, les prix du marché global des ldo devaient augmenter. sinon, toshiba aurait perdu une part de marché en faveur des fa- bricants autres que les défenderesses (transcription, p. 56-57, da, vol. iii, p 166). [73] cela étaye l’observation faite devant nous par l’avocat de m. godfrey selon qui l’effet parapluie n’est [traduction] « pas juste une conséquence connue et prévisible des agissements des défende- resses, c’est une conséquence voulue » (transcription, p 61). le fait est que les résultats du comportement anticoncurrentiel de toshiba ne sont pas indétermi- nés. des résultats voulus ne sont pas indéterminés, mais déterminés à l’avance. je suis donc d’accord avec la cour d’appel pour dire qu’il n’existe [tra- duction] « aucune raison pour que les défenderesses, dont l’intention était de causer un préjudice aux ache- teurs sous parapluie, soient dégagées de toute respon- sabilité parce qu’elles n’exerçaient aucun contrôle sur leur responsabilité » (motifs de la ca, par 241). [74] secondly, and as i have already recounted, s. 36(1)(a) limits recovery to only those purchasers who can show that they suffered a loss or damage “as a result of” the defendants’ conspiratorial conduct. in [74] deuxièmement, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, l’al. 36(1)a) limite le recours en indemnisation aux seuls acheteurs qui peuvent démontrer qu’ils ont subi une perte ou des dommages « par suite » du complot [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 341 order to recover under s. 36(1)(a), then, the umbrella purchasers will have to demonstrate that toshiba engaged in anti- competitive behaviour, that the um- brella purchasers suffered “loss or damage”, and that such loss or damage was “as a result of” such behav- iour. the statutory text “as a result of” imports both factual and legal causation into s 36(1). recovery under s. 36(1) is therefore limited to claimants with a loss that is not too remote from the conduct. [75] thirdly, the text of s. 45(1) in force during the class period is instructive. the elements of the wrongful conduct outlined therein were described by the british columbia court of appeal in watson (at paras. 73-74): des défenderesses. pour être indemnisés en vertu de l’al. 36(1)a), les acheteurs sous parapluie devront démontrer que toshiba a eu un comportement an- ticoncurrentiel, qu’ils ont subi une « perte ou des dommages » et que cette perte ou ces dommages ont été subis « par suite » du comportement en question. l’expression « par suite » intègre tant la causalité factuelle que la causalité juridique au par 36(1). seuls les demandeurs ayant subi une perte qui n’est pas trop éloignée du comportement peuvent donc être indemnisés en vertu du par 36(1). [75] troisièmement, le libellé du par. 45(1) qui était en vigueur durant la période visée par le recours collectif est instructif. les éléments constitutifs du comportement répréhensible sont décrits par la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique dans l’arrêt wat‑ son (par. 73-74) : [t]he actus reus elements of former s. 45 are: [traduction] [l]es éléments constitutifs de l’actus reus requis par l’ancien art. 45 sont : i) the defendant conspired, combined, agreed, or arranged with another person; and i) le défendeur a comploté, s’est coalisé ou a conclu un accord ou un arrangement avec une autre personne; ii) the agreement was to enhance unreasonably the price of a product, to lessen unduly the supply of a product, or to otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly. ii) l’accord visait à élever déraisonnablement le prix d’un produit, ou à réduire indûment la fourniture d’un pro- duit ou, de toute autre façon, à restreindre indûment la concurrence ou à lui nuire indûment. the mens rea element of former s. 45 as defined in [r.] v.  nova scotia pharmaceutical society, [1992] 2 scr 606 (scc) at 659- 660, (1992), 93 dlr (4th) 36 (scc), requires: la mens rea de l’infraction prévue à l’ancien art. 45, telle que définie dans l’arrêt [r.] c. nova scotia pharma‑ ceutical society, [1992] 2 rcs 606 (csc), p. 659- 660, (1992), 93 dlr (4th) 36 (csc), exige ce qui suit : i) the defendant had a subjective intention to agree and was aware of the agreement’s terms; and i) le défendeur avait une intention subjective de conclure un accord et il était au courant des modalités de l’accord; ii) the defendant had the required objective intention, that is, a reasonable business person would or should be aware that the likely effect of the agreement would be to lessen competition unduly. ii) le défendeur avait l’intention objective requise, c’est-à- dire qu’un homme ou une femme d’affaires raisonnable saurait ou devrait savoir que l’accord aura vraisemblable- ment pour effet de restreindre indûment la concurrence. (see also: shah (onca), at para. 50; r c. proulx, 2016 qcca 1425, at para. 20 (canlii).) (voir aussi : shah (onca), par. 50; r c. proulx, 2016 qcca 1425, par. 20 (canlii).) while the subjective mens rea does not require that the defendants’ conduct be directed specifically to- wards the claimant, s.  45(1) “limits the reach of bien que la mens rea subjective n’exige pas que le com- portement des défendeurs soit dirigé directement contre le demandeur, le par. 45(1) [traduction] « limite 342 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. liability to those who, at a minimum, specifically in- tend to agree upon anti- competitive conduct” (shah (onca), at para 51). l’étendue de la responsabilité à ceux qui, au minimum, ont eu l’intention expresse de convenir d’un compor- tement anticoncurrentiel » (shah (onca), par 51). [76] taken together, these features of ss. 36(1)(a) and 45(1) of the competition act limit the availa- bility of this cause of action to those claimants who can demonstrate: (1) a causal link between the loss suffered and the conspiratorial conduct; and (2) that the defendants’ conduct satisfies the actus reus and mens rea elements of s. 45(1) of the competition act. [77] this is not to say that umbrella purchasers’ actions will not be complex or otherwise difficult to pursue. marshalling and presenting evidence to sat- isfy the conditions placed by parliament on recovery under ss. 36(1)(a) and 45(1) — showing a causal link between loss and conspiratorial conduct, and proving the actus reus and mens rea of s. 45(1) — represents a significant burden. that said, this court’s statement in microsoft (at paras. 44-45) regarding indirect pur- chaser claims is, in my view, equally applicable to claims brought by umbrella purchasers: indirect purchaser actions, especially in the antitrust context, will often involve large amounts of evidence, complex economic theories and multiple parties in a chain of distribution, making the tracing of the overcharges to their ultimate end an unenviable task. however,    these same concerns can be raised in most antitrust cases, and should not stand in the way of allowing indirect purchasers an opportunity to make their case    . [76] considérés ensemble, ces éléments de l’al. 36(1)a) et du par. 45(1) de la loi sur la concurrence ont pour effet de limiter cette cause d’action aux demandeurs qui peuvent démontrer : (1) un lien de causalité entre la perte subie et le complot; et (2) que le comportement des défendeurs satisfait à l’actus reus et à la mens rea requis par le par. 45(1) de la loi sur la concurrence. [77] cela ne veut pas dire qu’il ne sera pas com- pliqué ou autrement difficile pour les acheteurs sous parapluie de poursuivre leurs actions. rassembler et présenter suffisamment d’éléments de preuve pour satisfaire aux conditions d’indemnisation imposées par le législateur à l’al. 36(1)a) et au par. 45(1) — éta- blir un lien de causalité entre la perte et le complot, ainsi que l’actus reus et la mens rea de l’infraction prévue au par. 45(1) — représente un lourd fardeau. cela dit, la déclaration de notre cour dans l’arrêt microsoft (par. 44-45) au sujet des recours des ache- teurs indirects s’applique, à mon avis, tout autant aux actions intentées par les acheteurs sous parapluie : l’action intentée par un acheteur indirect, surtout sur le fondement des dispositions antitrust, comporte souvent une preuve volumineuse, la formulation de théories éco- nomiques complexes et l’existence de nombreuses parties le long de la chaîne de distribution, de sorte qu’il est d’autant plus ardu de retracer le parcours de la majoration d’un maillon à l’autre jusqu’à son aboutissement final. toutefois, [  ] il s’agit de caractéristiques communes à la plupart des affaires antitrust et elles ne devraient donc pas empêcher l’acheteur indirect de prouver ses allégations   . in bringing their action, the indirect purchasers will- ingly assume the burden of establishing that they have suffered loss. this task may well require expert testimony and complex economic evidence. whether these tools will be sufficient to meet the burden of proof, in my view, is a factual question to be decided on a case-by- case basis. indirect purchaser actions should not be barred altogether solely because of the likely complexity associated with proof of damages. l’acheteur indirect qui intente une action contracte volontairement l’obligation d’établir qu’il a subi une perte, ce qui peut fort bien nécessiter le témoignage d’experts et une preuve complexe de nature économique. à mon avis, la question de savoir si ces éléments lui permettront de s’acquitter de cette obligation tient aux faits de l’espèce. il n’y a pas lieu de faire totalement obstacle à l’action de l’acheteur indirect pour la seule raison qu’il sera ardu d’établir le préjudice subi. and, of course, in this case it will be for the trial judge to determine whether the umbrella purchaser bien entendu, il appartiendra au juge de première instance de décider en l’espèce si les acheteurs sous [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 343 claimants have presented sufficient evidence to es- tablish that, in the circumstances of the case and in the relevant market, toshiba caused umbrella pricing. parapluie ont présenté suffisamment d’éléments de preuve pour établir que, dans les circonstances, toshiba a entraîné un effet d’ombrelle sur les prix. in view of the foregoing, it is not plain and [78] obvious that the umbrella purchasers’ cause of ac- tion under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act cannot succeed, and i would reject this ground of appeal. c section 36(1) of the competition act does not bar common law or equitable claims [78] compte tenu de ce qui précède, il n’est pas évident et manifeste que la cause d’action des ache- teurs sous parapluie fondée sur l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence ne peut être accueillie et je rejetterais ce moyen d’appel. c le paragraphe 36(1) de la loi sur la concur‑ rence ne fait pas obstacle aux recours de com‑ mon law ou d’equity [79] in addition to his statutory claims under the competition act, godfrey advances claims in, inter alia, civil conspiracy. [79] outre le recours qu’il a intenté sous le régime de la loi sur la concurrence, m. godfrey a intenté, entre autres, une action pour complot civil. [80] toshiba argues that the courts below erred in two respects concerning the relationship between a statutory claim under the competition act and the tort of civil conspiracy. first, it says that the tort of civil conspiracy based on a breach of the predeces- sor statute to the competition act (the combines investigation act, rsc 1970, c. c-23) was never available to plaintiffs prior to the enactment in 1975 of the private right of action. secondly, and in any event, the courts below failed to recognize that, by legislating ss. 36(1) and 45(1) of the competition act, parliament intended to oust the common law tort of civil conspiracy (af (toshiba), at para 119). [81] these arguments raise questions of law, and are therefore reviewed on a standard of correctness. for the reasons below, i reject both arguments, and it is therefore not plain and obvious that godfrey’s common law and equitable claims cannot succeed, except as was otherwise held by the certification judge.2 [80] toshiba soutient que les tribunaux d’ins- tance inférieure ont commis deux erreurs en ce qui concerne le lien entre une action intentée sous le régime de la loi sur la concurrence et le délit de complot civil. premièrement, elle fait valoir qu’un demandeur, avant l’adoption, en 1975, du droit d’ac- tion privé, ne pouvait jamais avoir recours au délit de complot civil fondé sur une violation de la loi qu’a remplacée la loi sur la concurrence (la loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions, src 1970, c c-23). deuxièmement, en tout état de cause, les tribunaux d’instance inférieure ont eu tort de ne pas reconnaître que, par l’adoption des par. 36(1) et 45(1) de la loi sur la concurrence, le législateur entendait écarter le délit de common law qu’est le complot civil (ma (toshiba), par 119). [81] ces arguments soulèvent des questions de droit, et ils sont donc contrôlés suivant la norme de la dé- cision correcte. pour les motifs qui suivent, je rejette les deux arguments, si bien qu’il n’est pas évident et manifeste que les recours de common law ou d’equity exercés par m. godfrey ne peuvent être accueillis, sauf indication contraire dans les conclusions du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation2. 2 as recounted at para. 11, the certification judge held that the pleadings did not disclose a cause of action for unlawful means tort, or (in respect of the umbrella purchasers) for unjust enrich- ment and waiver of tort. 2 comme je l’ai mentionné au par. 11, le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a statué que les actes de procédure n’avaient pas révélé une cause d’action pour délit d’atteinte par un moyen illégal ou (à l’égard des acheteurs sous parapluie) pour enrichissement sans cause et renonciation au recours délictuel. 344 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. (1) the tort of civil conspiracy based on the breach of a statute existed prior to the en- actment of the statutory cause of action (1) le délit de complot civil fondé sur la viola- tion d’une loi existait avant l’adoption de la disposition conférant une cause d’action [82] to be clear, i do not dispute toshiba’s submis- sion that the 1975 amendments were significant. the predecessor to the competition act (the combines investigation act) was exclusively penal — indeed, its constitutionality as an exercise of parliament’s legislative authority over the criminal law was upheld in proprietary articles trade association v. attorney general for canada, [1931] ac 310 (pc). in 1975, parliament supplemented this penal function with regulatory and civil enforcement provisions, includ- ing a civil remedy provision (now s. 36(1)) (watson, at para 36). [83] all this said, our law had recognized the tort of civil conspiracy based on the breach of a statute long before parliament legislated a civil right of ac- tion in 1975. in international brotherhood of team‑ sters v. therien, [1960] scr 265, and gagnon v. foundation maritime ltd., [1961] scr 435, this court imposed liability on trade unions for un- lawful means conspiracy for conduct prohibited by statute (therien, at p. 280; gagnon, at p 446). and, in cement lafarge v. bc. lightweight aggregate, [1983] 1 scr 452, which was decided on the ba- sis of the combines investigation act, this court affirmed not only the existence of the tort of civil conspiracy, but also that a breach of the combines investigation act could satisfy the “unlawful” ele- ment of unlawful means conspiracy (pp 471-72). any question on this point was settled when lafarge was cited in ai. enterprises ltd. v. bram enterprises ltd., 2014 scc 12, [2014] 1 scr 177, at para. 64, for the same proposition — that a breach of statute could satisfy the “unlawful means” component of the tort of unlawful means conspiracy. [82] pour être clair, je ne conteste pas l’argument de toshiba selon lequel les modifications de 1975 étaient importantes. la loi ayant précédé la loi sur la concurrence (la loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions) était de nature exclusivement pénale — en effet, comme elle résultait de l’exercice du pou- voir législatif fédéral en matière de droit criminel, sa constitutionnalité a été confirmée dans l’arrêt proprietary articles trade association c. attorney general for canada, [1931] ac 310 (cp). en 1975, le législateur a suppléé à la fonction pénale de cette loi en adoptant des dispositions d’exécution de nature réglementaire et civile, dont une disposi- tion prévoyant un recours civil (l’actuel par. 36(1)) (watson, par 36). [83] tout cela étant dit, notre droit avait reconnu le délit de complot civil fondé sur la violation d’une loi bien avant que le législateur ait adopté une disposi- tion créant un droit d’action au civil en 1975. dans les arrêts international brotherhood of teamsters c. therien, [1960] rcs 265, et gagnon c. foundation maritime ltd., [1961] rcs 435, notre cour a tenu les syndicats responsables de complot exécuté par des moyens illégaux car ils avaient agi en contravention de la loi (therien, p. 280; gagnon, p 446). et dans l’arrêt cement lafarge c. bc. lightweight aggregate, [1983] 1 rcs 452, qui repose sur la loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions, notre cour a non seule- ment confirmé l’existence du délit de complot civil, mais elle a aussi reconnu qu’une violation de cette loi pouvait constituer l’élément d’« illégalité » du délit de complot exécuté par des moyens illégaux (p. 471- 472). s’il subsistait le moindre doute sur ce point, il a été écarté lorsque, dans l’arrêt ai. enterprises ltd. c. bram enterprises ltd., 2014 csc 12, [2014] 1 rcs 177, par. 64, la cour a cité l’arrêt lafarge à l’appui de la même proposition — qu’une violation de la loi pouvait satisfaire à l’élément « moyens illégaux » du délit de complot exécuté par des moyens illégaux. [84] the law admits of no ambiguity on this point. prior to the enactment of the cause of action con- tained in what is now s. 36(1) of the competition act, [84] le droit ne laisse place à aucune ambiguïté sur ce point. avant l’adoption de la disposition conférant une cause d’action qui se trouve dans ce qui est [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 345 a breach of s. 45(1) of the competition act was, as it still is, able to satisfy the “unlawful means” element of the tort of civil conspiracy. devenu le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence, une infraction au par. 45(1) de la loi sur la concur‑ rence pouvait, et peut encore, satisfaire à l’élément « moyens illégaux » du délit de complot civil. (2) the enactment of the statutory cause of ac- tion did not oust common law and equitable actions (2) l’adoption de la disposition conférant une cause d’action n’a pas écarté les recours de common law [85] turning to toshiba’s other argument, the start- ing point in deciding whether a common law right of action has been legislatively ousted is the pre- sumption that parliament does not intend to abrogate common law rights (r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at p 538). while s. 36(1) does not by its express terms oust common law causes of action, legislation may rebut this presumption by ousting the common law either expressly or by necessary implication (gendron v. supply and services union of the public service alliance of canada, local 50057, [1990] 1 scr. 1298, at pp 1315-16). in gendron, this court held, for three reasons, [86] that the canada labour code, rsc 1970, c. l-1 (as amended by sc 1972, c. 18; sc 1977-78, c. 27) ousted the common law duty of fair representation by necessary implication. first, the content of the duty in the canada labour code was co- extensive with the common law duty such that “[t]he common law duty is    not in any sense additive; it is merely duplicative” (p 1316). secondly, in enacting the canada labour code, parliament enacted a compre- hensive and exclusive code, which indicated an in- tention for the canada labour code to “occupy the whole field in terms of a determination of whether or not a union has acted fairly” (p 1317). finally, the canada labour code provided a “new and superior method of remedying a breach” of the duty of fair representation (p 1319). [85] en ce qui concerne l’autre argument de toshiba, le point de départ pour déterminer si un recours de common law a été écarté par une loi est la présomption que le législateur n’a pas l’intention d’abroger des droits reconnus par la common law (r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of stat‑ utes (6e éd. 2014), p 538). si le par. 36(1) n’exclut pas expressément les causes d’action fondées sur la common law, il reste qu’une loi peut réfuter cette présomption en écartant la common law de façon expresse ou par déduction nécessaire (gendron c. syndicat des approvisionnements et services de l’al‑ liance de la fonction publique du canada, section locale 50057, [1990] 1 rcs 1298, p. 1315- 1316). [86] dans l’arrêt gendron, notre cour a conclu, pour trois motifs, que le code canadien du travail, src 1970, c. l-1 (modifié par sc 1972, c. 18; sc 1977-78, c. 27) avait écarté, par déduction néces- saire, le devoir de juste représentation reconnu par la common law. premièrement, le contenu du devoir im- posé par le code canadien du travail correspond à ce- lui de common law, de sorte que « ce devoir n’ajoute rien; il fait simplement double emploi » (p 1316). deuxièmement, en adoptant le code canadien du travail, le législateur a adopté un code complet et exclusif, ce qui témoignait de son intention que le code canadien du travail « occupe tout le champ lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer si un syndicat a agi de façon juste » (p 1317). enfin, le code canadien du travail prévoit « une nouvelle façon, [  ] supérieure [au devoir de common law], de remédier à un man- quement » au devoir de juste représentation (p 1319). [87] none of these considerations apply to s. 36(1) of the competition act, relative to the common law tort of civil conspiracy. section 36(1) is neither du- plicative of the tort of civil conspiracy nor does it provide a “new and superior” remedy. claims under [87] aucune de ces considérations ne s’applique au par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence relative- ment au délit de complot civil en common law. le paragraphe 36(1) ne fait pas double emploi avec le délit de complot civil et il ne prévoit pas non plus de 346 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. s. 36(1) are subject to the limitation period stated in s. 36(4), whereas the tort of civil conspiracy is sub- ject to provincial limitations statutes. additionally, the tort of civil conspiracy allows for a broader range of remedies than is available under s. 36(1), such as punitive damages (watson, at para 57). [88] nor does s.  36(1) represent a comprehen- sive and exclusive code regarding claims for anti- competitive conspiratorial conduct. that this is so is made plain by s. 62 of the competition act (“civil rights not affected”) which contemplates the subsist- ence of common law and equitable rights of action by providing that “nothing in this part [which in- cludes s. 45(1), in respect of which s. 36(1) creates a statutory right of action] shall be construed as de- priving any person of any civil right of action”. this is also consistent with this court’s conclusion in infineon (at para. 95) that it was open for a plaintiff to proceed with its claim under art. 1457 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”) for the alleged violation of s. 45(1) of the competition act. were s. 36(1) a complete and exclusive code, no such claim under the ccq would have been possible. [89] i therefore would reject this ground of appeal. the courts below correctly decided that it is not plain and obvious that godfrey is precluded from bringing common law and equitable causes of action along- side his s. 36(1)(a) claim. additionally, a breach of s. 45(1) of the competition act can supply the “unlawful” element of the tort of civil conspiracy. i see nothing in my colleague’s reasons (at paras. 193- 203) that deviates in any respect from my own on this point. « nouvelle façon [  ] supérieure » de remédier à un manquement. les actions fondées sur le par. 36(1) sont visées par le délai de prescription du par. 36(4), alors que le délit de complot civil est assujetti aux lois provinciales en matière de prescription. de plus, le délit de complot civil offre un éventail plus large de réparations que le par. 36(1), telles que les dommages- intérêts punitifs (watson, par 57). [88] le paragraphe 36(1) n’est pas non plus un code complet et exclusif régissant les actions pour comportement ou complot anticoncurrentiel. c’est ce qui ressort clairement de l’art. 62 de la loi sur la concurrence (« droits civils non atteints »), qui prévoit le maintien des droits d’action en common law et en equity : «    la présente partie [dont le par. 45(1), à l’égard duquel le par. 36(1) crée un droit d’action] n’a pas pour effet de priver une per- sonne d’un droit d’action au civil ». cela s’accorde également avec la conclusion de notre cour dans l’arrêt infineon (par. 95) qu’un demandeur pouvait choisir de se fonder sur l’art. 1457 du code civil du québec (« ccq ») pour faire valoir ses droits par suite d’une violation du par. 45(1) de la loi sur la concurrence. si le par. 36(1) avait constitué un code complet et exclusif, aucun recours n’aurait été pos- sible sous le régime du ccq. [89] je rejetterais donc ce moyen d’appel. les tri- bunaux d’instance inférieure ont à juste titre décidé qu’il n’est pas évident et manifeste que m. god- frey ne peut exercer des recours de common law et d’equity en même temps qu’une action fondée sur l’al.  36(1)a) j’ajouterai qu’une violation du par. 45(1) de la loi sur la concurrence peut fournir l’élément d’« illégalité » du délit de complot civil. je ne vois rien dans les motifs de ma collègue (par. 193- 203) qui s’écarte d’une façon ou d’une autre de mon opinion sur ce point. d certifying loss as a common issue d autorisation de la question de la perte en tant [90] toshiba’s final ground of appeal relates to the requirement in s. 4(1)(c) of the class proceedings act that class members’ claims raise common issues. que question commune [90] le dernier moyen d’appel avancé par toshiba se rapporte à l’exigence imposée par l’al.  4(1)c) de la class proceedings act que les demandes des membres du groupe soulèvent des questions com- munes. [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 347 [91] godfrey sought to certify several loss- related questions as common issues, principally whether the class members suffered economic loss (sup. ct. reasons, at para 143). these questions were stated broadly enough that they could be taken as asking whether all class members suffered economic loss or whether any class members suffered economic loss. and, because they could be taken in two different ways they might, following the common issues trial, be answered in different ways. [92] the certification judge certified the common issues relating to loss on the basis that the standard outlined in microsoft requires that a plaintiff’s expert methodology need only establish loss at the indirect- purchaser level (sup. ct. reasons, at paras. 167 and 179). the questions, therefore, of whether any class members suffered loss and of whether all class mem- bers suffered loss, fulfill the requirements of a com- mon question. toshiba says that he erred, and argues that microsoft requires, for loss to be certified as a common issue, that a plaintiff’s expert’s methodology be capable either of showing loss to each and every class member, or of distinguishing between those class members who suffered loss from those who did not (af (toshiba), at para 63). dr. reutter’s meth- odology, toshiba says, does not meet this standard (af (toshiba), at para 76). [93] godfrey responds that the courts below cor- rectly held that microsoft requires, as a condition of certifying loss as a common issue, only a method- ology capable of establishing that overcharges were passed on to the indirect- purchaser level (rf (toshiba appeal), at para 93). this standard is consistent with the principles underlying the commonality require- ment, since a single answer to whether loss reached the indirect- purchaser level significantly advances the litigation. dr. reutter’s methodology meets this standard (rf (toshiba. appeal), at para 94). [91] m. godfrey a demandé qu’un certain nombre de questions relatives à la perte soient autorisées en tant que questions communes, principalement celle de savoir si les membres du groupe avaient subi une perte économique (motifs de la cs, par 143). ces questions sont formulées de façon suffisamment large pour qu’elles puissent être interprétées comme de- mandant si tous les membres du groupe ont subi une perte économique ou si l’un d’entre eux a subi une perte économique. parce que ces questions peuvent être interprétées de deux façons différentes, elles pourraient donc, à la suite de l’audition des questions communes, appeler des réponses différentes. [92] le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a autorisé les questions communes liées à la perte au motif que, selon le critère établi dans l’arrêt micro‑ soft, la méthode proposée par l’expert d’un deman- deur doit seulement permettre d’établir la perte subie par l’acheteur indirect (motifs de la cs, par. 167 et 179). les questions de savoir si un des membres du groupe a subi une perte et si tous les membres du groupe en ont subi une remplissent les condi- tions d’une question commune. toshiba affirme qu’il s’agit là d’une erreur et que selon l’arrêt microsoft, pour que la question de la perte puisse être autorisée en tant que question commune, la méthode propo- sée par l’expert d’un demandeur doit permettre soit d’établir la perte subie par chacun des membres du groupe, soit de faire la distinction entre les membres du groupe qui ont subi une perte et ceux qui n’en ont pas subi (ma (toshiba), par 63). la méthode proposée par m. reutter, affirme toshiba, ne respecte pas ce critère (ma (toshiba), par 76). [93] m. godfrey répond que les juridictions infé- rieures ont conclu à bon droit que l’arrêt microsoft assujettit l’autorisation d’une question de perte en tant que question commune à la condition que la mé- thode proposée permette d’établir que la majoration a été refilée à l’acheteur indirect (mi (pourvoi de toshiba), par 93). ce critère respecte les principes qui sous- tendent l’exigence du caractère commun, puisque la moindre réponse à la question de savoir si la perte a été refilée à l’acheteur indirect fait avancer substantiellement l’instance. la méthode proposée par m. reutter satisfait à ce critère (mi (pourvoi de toshiba), par 94). 348 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. [94] the appropriate standard for certifying loss as a common issue at the certification stage is a question of law, to be reviewed on appeal for correctness. if i conclude that the certification judge identified the correct standard, then the certification judge’s decision to certify the issues as common may not be disturbed absent a palpable and overriding error. [94] la norme qu’il convient d’appliquer pour autoriser la question de la perte en tant que question commune au stade de l’autorisation est une question de droit qui doit être contrôlée en appel suivant la norme de la décision correcte. si je conclus que le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a identifié la bonne norme, la décision du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation ne peut être modifiée en l’absence d’une erreur manifeste et dominante. (1) dr. reutter’s methodology (1) méthode proposée par m. reutter [95] application of the microsoft standard here requires some review of dr. reutter’s report. in that report, he drew two conclusions: [95] l’application du critère de l’arrêt microsoft à la présente affaire nous impose d’examiner le rapport de m reutter. dans ce rapport, m. reutter tire deux conclusions : [traduction] (1)    all members of the proposed class would have been impacted by the actions of defendants as alleged in the amended notice of civil claim, and (1)    tous les membres du groupe projeté auraient été touchés par les actes des défenderesses, ainsi qu’il est allégué dans l’avis de poursuite civile modifié. (2)    there are accepted methods available to estimate any overcharge and aggregate damages that resulted from the alleged wrongdoing using evidence common to the proposed class. (2)    des méthodes acceptables permettent d’estimer la valeur de toute majoration et de tout préjudice global qui ont découlé des actes fautifs reprochés, et ce, au moyen de la preuve commune du groupe projeté. (ar, vol. iii, at p. 119) (da, vol. iii, p. 119) [96] these conclusions were based on the presence of four economic factors during the period of the al- leged conspiracy that suggest that the odd industry was vulnerable to collusive conduct (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 122-23 and 136). these factors are: [96] ces conclusions reposaient sur la présence, du- rant la période du complot allégué, de quatre facteurs économiques tendant à indiquer que l’industrie des ldo était vulnérable aux comportements collusoires (da, vol. iii, p. 122- 123 et 136). voici ces facteurs : [traduction] (1) [odds] are commodity- like and manufactured to conform to industry standards, (1) les [ldo] s’apparentent à des produits de base et sont fabriqués selon les normes de l’industrie, (2) during the proposed class period [the] defendants accounted for a majority of all [odds] manufactured worldwide, (2) durant la période visée par le recours collectif projeté, les défenderesses fabriquaient la majorité des [ldo] à l’échelle mondiale, (3) there are no economic substitutes for [odds], and; (3) il n’existe aucun substitut économique aux ldo, et (4) the manufacture of [odds] exhibits barriers to entry. (4) la fabrication de ldo se heurte à des barrières à l’entrée. (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 119-20) (da, vol. iii, p. 119- 120) [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 349 because of the presence of these four factors, and the laws of supply and demand, dr. reutter concluded that “any conspiratorial overcharge would have been absorbed in part and passed- through in part at each level of the distribution chain, thus impacting all members of the proposed class” (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 120 and 148). à cause de la présence de ces quatre facteurs, ainsi que des lois de l’offre et de la demande, m. reutter a conclu que [traduction] « toute majoration décou- lant d’une collusion aurait été absorbée en partie et refilée en partie à chacun des niveaux de la chaîne de distribution, de sorte que tous les membres du groupe projeté ont été touchés » (da, vol. iii, p. 120 et 148). [97] in order to estimate overcharges and aggre- gate damages arising from the alleged price- fixing, dr. reutter developed a methodology to estimate the “but- for” price of the products subject to the an- ticompetitive conduct (ar, vol. iii, at p 150). this involves use of mainstream and accepted economic methodologies based on multiple regression (sup. ct. reasons, at para 158). in particular, it entails three steps: first, for the matter at hand, an economic model describing the interaction of the supply of and demand for [odds] must be developed. second, based on the economic model, data will need to be collected from various sources, includ- ing defendants (when available), as well as public and third party vendors. third, standard statistical and econometric techniques are used to determine the extent to which the alleged conspiracy resulted in supra- competitive prices for [odds]. [97] afin d’estimer la valeur de la majoration et du préjudice global ayant découlé de la fixation des prix alléguée, m. reutter a conçu une méthode per- mettant d’évaluer le prix des produits en cause en l’absence de tout comportement anticoncurrentiel (da, vol. iii, p 150). il faut pour cela recourir aux méthodes économiques courantes et reconnues fon- dées sur la régression multiple (motifs de la cs, par 158). la méthode comporte, plus précisément, trois étapes : [traduction] premièrement, s’agissant de l’affaire qui nous occupe, il faut élaborer un modèle économique qui décrit l’interaction entre l’offre et la demande de [ldo]. deuxièmement, à partir de ce modèle économique, des données devront être recueillies auprès de diverses sources, notamment des défenderesses (si de telles don- nées sont disponibles), ainsi que du public et des vendeurs autres que les défenderesses. troisièmement, grâce à des techniques normalisées d’analyse statistique et écono- métrique, il faudra déterminer la mesure dans laquelle le complot allégué a mené à des prix supraconcurrentiels pour les [ldo]. (ar, vol. iii, at p. 150) (da, vol. iii, p. 150) [98] in order to quantify the aggregate damages suf- fered by the proposed class, dr. reutter proposes to quantify the damages suffered by direct and indirect purchasers in the proposed class, which quantifica- tion can occur on a class- wide basis, using accepted economic and statistical methods (sup. ct. reasons, at para 159). overcharge, once estimated, can then be allocated among the class members (ar, vol. iii, at p 167). both aggregate damages and overcharge can be estimated using defendant transaction data, supplemented with data collected from public and private sources (ar, vol. iii, at p 120). [98] afin de quantifier le préjudice global subi par le groupe proposé, m. reutter propose de quantifier les dommages subis par les acheteurs directs et les acheteurs indirects du groupe proposé, ce qui peut se faire à l’échelle du groupe au moyen de méthodes reconnues d’analyse économique et statistique (mo- tifs de la cs, par 159). une fois estimée, la ma- joration peut être répartie entre les membres du groupe (da, vol. iii, p 167). le préjudice global et la majoration peuvent être estimés à l’aide des données relatives aux opérations commerciales des défenderesses, ainsi que de renseignements recueil- lis auprès du public et de sources privées (da, vol. iii, p 120). 350 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. [99] the question of whether a plaintiff’s meth- odology must show loss at the indirect purchaser level or loss to each and every class member ap- pears to be moot, since dr. reutter opines that all class members were impacted by toshiba’s anti- competitive behaviour; his methodology therefore satisfies either standard. toshiba, however, points to its cross- examination of dr. reutter at the certi- fication hearing as obtaining the concession that his methodology cannot demonstrate that all class mem- bers suffered a loss (af (toshiba), at paras 86-87). at the hearing before this court, counsel for godfrey argued that toshiba’s counsel mischaracterized what emerged from that cross- examination (transcript, at p 59). because of this dispute, it is important to examine what actually occurred. [99] la question de savoir si la méthode proposée par un demandeur doit démontrer que l’acheteur in- direct a subi une perte ou bien que chaque membre du groupe a subi une perte semble être devenue théo- rique, puisque m. reutter s’est également dit d’avis que tous les membres du groupe ont été touchés par le comportement anticoncurrentiel de toshiba; la mé- thode qu’il propose satisfait donc aux deux critères. toshiba signale toutefois que, lorsqu’elle a contre- interrogé m. reutter lors de l’audition de la requête en autorisation, celui-ci aurait admis que sa méthode ne permet pas d’établir que tous les membres du groupe ont subi une perte (ma (toshiba), par 86-87). devant nous, l’avocat de m. godfrey a fait valoir que l’avocat de toshiba s’était mépris sur ce qui s’est dé- gagé de ce contre- interrogatoire (transcription, p 59). vu ce différend, il importe d’examiner ce qui s’est vraiment produit. [100] after confirming that dr. reutter would use an average selling price across the odd market to estimate overcharge, the following exchange took place: [100] après que m.  reutter eut confirmé qu’il utiliserait le prix de vente moyen des ldo dans l’ensemble du marché afin d’estimer la valeur de la majoration, l’échange suivant a eu lieu : [traduction] 399 q and implicit in the average is the fact that some class members may not have suffered any loss, but they would be compensated by the amount of the average overcharge in relation to the purchase that they made? 399 q et il ressort implicitement de la moyenne que cer- tains membres du groupe pourraient n’avoir subi aucune perte, mais qu’ils seraient indemnisés du montant de la majoration moyenne par rapport à l’achat qu’ils ont fait? a it’s an empirical question and i don’t want to sound flippant, but it depends. there may be some -- there may be some small subset or subset, i don’t want to put an adjective in front of it. there may be some subset that were not impacted. i don’t, from an economic standpoint, understand how that would be if there was, in fact, a conspiracy that fixed the price at the upstream and then that was, in fact, passed through. r c’est là une question empirique et, sans vouloir paraître facétieux, je dirais que ça dépend. il se pourrait que -- il se pourrait que quelques petits sous- groupes ou des sous- groupes, je ne veux pas les qualifier. il se pourrait que certains sous- groupes n’aient pas été touchés. d’un point de vue économique, je ne comprends pas comment cela pourrait arriver si, dans les faits, il y a eu complot pour fixer le prix en amont et puis si ce prix a été transféré en aval.   .   . 403 q   . but if you conclude that some members were not impacted once you do the analysis, then they would be compensated even though they suffered no loss? 403 q    mais si, après analyse, vous concluez que cer- tains membres n’ont pas été touchés, ils seraient alors indemnisés même s’ils n’ont subi aucune perte? [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 351 a again, it depends on how finely or where we want to draw the line of what we’re analyzing or what we’re measuring. r encore là, ça dépend du soin avec lequel nous voulons tracer la ligne ou encore de l’endroit où nous voulons la tracer pour ce qui est de ce que nous analysons ou de ce que nous mesurons.   .   . a someone could -- the average is an average and if you want to throw a zero in there, as dr. levinsohn does, and say that there could be zero damages, i can’t deny that, you know, if you average zero with some other numbers you get something other than zero by the definition of mathematics. r quelqu’un pourrait -- la moyenne est une moyenne et si vous voulez y mettre un zéro, comme le fait m. levinsohn, et dire qu’il se pourrait qu’il n’y ait aucun préjudice, je ne peux pas nier que, vous savez, si vous faites la moyenne entre zéro et cer- tains autres chiffres, vous obtenez autre chose que zéro, c’est ce que sont les mathématiques.   .   . 407 q   . does the methodology which produces an av- erage, is that average overcharge then applied to all class members irrespective of whether the average reflects the overage that they, in fact, incurred? 407 q .  .  selon la méthode utilisée pour faire une moyenne, est-ce que la majoration moyenne s’ap- plique à tous les membres du groupe peu importe si cette moyenne reflète l’excédent qu’on leur a, en fait, refilé? a yes. r oui. 408 q all right. and is there anything in the methodology that you are proposing that allows one to deter- mine who those people are that suffered more or less? they’re simply compensated on average? 408 q très bien. et y a-t-il quelque chose dans la mé- thode que vous proposez qui permet de savoir qui sont ceux pour qui le préjudice est plus grand ou moins grand? ils sont simplement indemnisés selon la moyenne?   .   . 410   . 410   . a in identifying him, no. [emphasis added.] r de les identifier, non. [je souligne.] (ar, vol. v, at pp. 216-19) (da, vol. v, p. 216- 219) dr. reutter went on to explain that his methodology is capable of creating subgroups within the class. for example, if the evidence after discovery suggests that toshiba stopped price- fixing for a few months and then resumed again, the class members who purchased odds during that time would be excluded from the model (ar, vol. v, at pp 220-21). m. reutter a ensuite expliqué que sa méthode per- mettait de créer des sous- groupes au sein du groupe. par exemple, si après l’interrogatoire, la preuve dé- montre que toshiba a cessé de fixer les prix pour ensuite recommencer à le faire quelques mois plus tard, les membres du groupe qui auraient acheté un ldo au cours de cette période seraient exclus du modèle (da, vol. v, p. 220- 221). it is not at all apparent that this exchange [101] shows dr. reutter resiling from his opinion that all il n’est absolument pas évident que cet [101] échange démontre que m. reutter est revenu sur 352 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. class members would be impacted. on the contrary, he stated that he did not understand, from an eco- nomic standpoint, how it would be possible for some members of the class not to have suffered a loss if there was a conspiracy and the fixed price was passed through. dr. reutter’s methodology therefore satisfies both the standards argued for by toshiba and godfrey. son opinion que tous les membres du groupe avaient été touchés. au contraire, il a dit qu’il ne comprenait pas, d’un point de vue économique, comment il serait possible que certains membres du groupe n’aient subi aucune perte alors qu’il y avait eu complot et que le prix établi leur avait été transféré. la méthode de m. reutter satisfait donc aux normes proposées par toshiba et par m godfrey. in any event, even were dr. reutter’s meth- [102] odology incapable of showing loss to every class member, as i explain below, it is not necessary, in order to support certifying loss as a common ques- tion, that a plaintiff’s expert’s methodology establish that each and every class member suffered a loss. nor is it necessary that dr. reutter’s methodology be able to identify those class members who suffered no loss so as to distinguish them from those who did. rather, in order for loss- related questions to be certified as common issues, a plaintiff’s expert’s methodology need only be sufficiently credible or plausible to establish loss reached the requisite pur- chaser level. this leaves the only question being whether the courts below were correct in finding that dr. reutter’s proposed methodology satisfies that re- quired standard of commonality (ca reasons, at pa- ras. 125 and 149). i see no reason to interfere with the certification judge’s determination that dr. reutter’s methodology satisfies this standard. (2) what is the standard required to certify loss as a common issue? [102] quoi qu’il en soit, même si la méthode de m. reutter ne permettait de démontrer que chaque membre du groupe a subi une perte, comme je l’ex- pliquerai plus loin, il n’est pas nécessaire, pour jus- tifier l’autorisation de la question de la perte en tant que question commune, que la méthode proposée par un expert du demandeur établisse que chaque membre du groupe a subi une perte. il n’est pas non plus nécessaire que la méthode de m. reutter per- mette d’identifier les membres du groupe qui n’ont subi aucune perte de manière à les distinguer de ceux qui en ont subi une. pour que les questions relatives à la perte soient autorisées en tant que questions communes, la méthode de l’expert du demandeur n’a qu’à être suffisamment fiable ou acceptable pour éta- blir que l’acheteur du niveau requis a subi une perte. il reste seulement à déterminer si les juridictions inférieures ont eu raison de conclure que la méthode proposée par m. reutter satisfait à la norme de com- munauté requise (motifs de la ca, par. 125 et 149). je ne vois aucune raison de modifier la décision du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation portant que la méthode de m. reutter satisfait à cette norme. (2) quelle est la norme applicable à l’autorisa- tion d’une question liée à la perte en tant que question commune? [103] the class proceedings act provides that in order for an issue to be common, the issue need not “predominate over issues affecting only individ- ual members” (s 4(1)(c)). section 1 of the class proceedings act defines “common issues” as mean- ing: [103] la class proceedings act dispose que, pour qu’une question soit commune, elle n’a pas à [tra- duction] « l’emporter sur les questions qui touchent uniquement les membres individuels » (al 4(1)(c)). selon l’art. 1 de la class proceedings act, « question commune » (« common issues ») s’entend, selon le cas : [traduction] (a) common but not necessarily identical issues of fact, or (a) d’une question de fait commune, mais pas néces- sairement identique; [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 353 (b) common but not necessarily identical issues of law that arise from common but not necessarily identical facts (b) d’une question de droit commune, mais pas néces- sairement identique, qui découle de faits qui sont communs, mais pas nécessairement identiques; in microsoft, at para. 108, this court reaf- [104] firmed the principles of “common issues” for the purpose of certification, as they were explained in western canadian shopping centres inc. v. dutton, 2001 scc 46, [2001] 2 scr 534: [104] au paragraphe 108 de l’arrêt microsoft, la cour a rappelé les principes relatifs à la « question commune » aux fins d’autorisation qu’elle avait ex- pliqués dans western canadian shopping centres inc. c. dutton, 2001 csc 46, [2001] 2 rcs 534 :. in [dutton] this court addressed the commonality ques- tion, stating that “[t]he underlying question is whether al- lowing the suit to proceed as a [class proceeding] will avoid duplication of fact- finding or legal analysis” (para 39). i list the balance of mclachlin cj’s instructions, found at paras. 39-40 of that decision: dans l’arrêt [dutton] notre cour aborde la notion de communauté et conclut que « [l]a question sous- jacente est de savoir si le fait d’autoriser le recours collectif per- mettra d’éviter la répétition dans l’appréciation des faits ou l’analyse juridique » (par 39). j’énumère les autres paramètres établis par la juge en chef mclachlin et qui figurent aux par. 39-40 de l’arrêt : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) the commonality question should be approached purposively. an issue will be “common” only where its reso- lution is necessary to the resolution of each class member’s claim. it is not essential that the class members be iden- tically situated vis‑à‑vis the opposing party. it [is] not necessary that common issues predomi- nate over non- common issues. however, the class members’ claims must share a substantial com- mon ingredient to justify a class [proceeding]. the court will examine the significance of the common issues in relation to individual issues. success for one class member must mean success for all. all members of the class must benefit from the successful prosecution of the action, although not necessarily to the same extent. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) il faut aborder le sujet de la communauté en fonc- tion de l’objet. une question n’est « commune » que lorsque son rè- glement est nécessaire au règlement des demandes de chacun des membres du groupe. il n’est pas essentiel que les membres du groupe soient tous dans la même situation par rapport à la partie adverse. il n’est pas nécessaire que les questions communes l’emportent sur les questions non communes. les demandes des membres du groupe doivent toute- fois partager un élément commun important afin de justifier le recours collectif. le tribunal évalue l’importance des questions communes par rapport aux questions individuelles. le succès d’un membre du groupe emporte né- cessairement celui de tous. tous les membres du groupe doivent profiter du dénouement favorable de l’action, mais pas nécessairement dans la même proportion. in vivendi canada inc. v. dell’aniello, 2014 [105] scc 1, [2014] 1 scr 3, this court clarified that the “common success” requirement in dutton should be applied flexibly. “common success” denotes not that success for one class member must mean success for all, but rather that success for one class member must not mean failure for another (para 45). a question is [105] dans l’arrêt vivendi canada inc. c. dell’aniello, 2014 csc 1, [2014] 1 rcs 3, la cour a précisé que le critère du « succès commun » dégagé dans dutton devait être appliqué avec flexibilité. le « succès com- mun » suppose non pas que le succès d’un membre du groupe entraîne celui de tous les membres du groupe, mais plutôt que le succès d’un membre du groupe 354 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. considered “common”, then, “if it can serve to ad- vance the resolution of every class member’s claim”, even if the answer to the question, while positive, will vary among those members (para 46). in microsoft, the representative plaintiff [106] sought to certify a class proceeding wherein the pro- posed class members consisted of the end consumers of products whose prices were allegedly fixed (“in- direct purchasers”). after concluding that indirect purchasers have a cause of action for price- fixing, the court considered the standard of expert methodology required to certify loss- related questions as common issues for indirect purchaser class proceedings. the key passage from the court’s reasons states: one area in which difficulty is encountered in indirect purchaser actions is in assessing the commonality of the harm or loss- related issues. in order to determine if the loss- related issues meet the “some basis in fact” standard, some assurance is required that the questions are capable of resolution on a common basis. in indirect purchaser actions, plaintiffs generally seek to satisfy this requirement through the use of expert evidence in the form of economic models and methodologies. the role of the expert methodology is to establish that the overcharge was passed on to the indirect purchas- ers, making the issue common to the class as a whole (see chadha [v. bayer inc. (2003), 63 or (3d) 22], at para 31). the requirement at the certification stage is not that the methodology quantify the damages in ques- tion; rather, the critical element that the methodology must establish is the ability to prove “common impact”, as described in the us antitrust case of in re: linerboard antitrust litigation, 305 f.3d 145 (3rd cir 2002). that is, plaintiffs must demonstrate that “sufficient proof [is] available, for use at trial, to prove antitrust impact common to all the members of the class” (ibid., at p 155). it is not necessary at the certification stage that the methodology establish the actual loss to the class, as long as the plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a methodology capable of doing so. in indirect purchaser actions, this means that the methodology must be able to establish that the overcharges ne doit pas provoquer l’échec d’un autre membre (par 45). une question sera considérée comme « com- mune », donc, « si elle permet de faire progresser le règlement de la réclamation de chacun des membres du groupe », même si la réponse qu’on lui donne, bien que favorable, peut différer d’un membre à l’autre du groupe (par 46). [106] dans l’arrêt microsoft, le représentant des demandeurs a demandé l’autorisation d’un recours collectif pour lequel le groupe proposé était composé des consommateurs finaux des produits dont le prix aurait été fixé (« acheteurs indirects »). après avoir conclu que les acheteurs indirects avaient une cause d’action en raison de la fixation des prix, la cour s’est penchée sur la norme applicable pour déter- miner si la méthode d’expert permet d’autoriser les questions liées à la perte en tant que questions com- munes aux acheteurs indirects d’un recours collectif. voici le passage clé des motifs de la cour : l’une des difficultés que pose le recours d’acheteurs indirects a trait à l’appréciation du caractère commun des questions liées au préjudice ou à la perte. pour que ces questions puissent satisfaire à la norme d’« un certain fondement factuel », il doit être assez certain qu’elles peuvent faire l’objet d’un règlement commun. dans le cadre d’actions intentées par des acheteurs indirects, les demandeurs tentent généralement de satisfaire à cette exigence en offrant une preuve d’expert qui revêt la forme de modèles et de méthodes économiques. la méthode proposée par l’expert vise à établir que la majoration a été transférée aux acheteurs indirects, ce qui rend la question commune au groupe dans son en- semble (voir chadha [c. bayer inc. (2003), 63 or (3d) 22], par 31). à l’étape de [l’autorisation], la méthode n’a pas à déterminer le montant des dommages- intérêts, mais doit plutôt — et c’est là l’élément crucial — être susceptible de prouver « les conséquences communes », comme le conclut un tribunal américain dans une affaire antitrust, in re : linerboard antitrust litigation, 305 f.3d 145 (3rd cir 2002). les demandeurs doivent démontrer qu’une [traduction] « preuve permettra d’établir, lors du procès, les conséquences antitrust qui sont communes à tous les membres du groupe » (ibid., p 155). à l’étape de [l’autorisation], point n’est besoin que la méthode établisse la perte réellement subie par le groupe dans la mesure où le demandeur démontre qu’une méthode permet de le faire. dans le cadre d’actions d’acheteurs indirects, [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 355 have been passed on to the indirect- purchaser level in the distribution chain. la méthode doit donc pouvoir établir que la majoration a été transférée à l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution. the most contentious question involving the use of expert evidence is how strong the evidence must be at the certification stage to satisfy the court that there is a method by which impact can be proved on a class- wide basis. the bcca in infineon [technologies ag v. option consommateurs, 2013 scc 29, [2013] 3  scr  600] called for the plaintiff to show “only a credible or plausi- ble methodology” and held that “[i]t was common ground that statistical regression analysis is in theory capable of providing reasonable estimates of gain or aggregate harm and the extent of pass- through in price- fixing cases” (para 68)   . la question la plus vivement débattue au chapitre de l’utilisation de la preuve d’expert est celle de savoir à quel point la preuve doit être concluante à l’étape de [l’autori- sation] pour convaincre le tribunal qu’une méthode per- met d’établir les conséquences communes à l’échelle du groupe. dans l’affaire infineon [technologies ag c. option consommateurs, 2013 csc 29, [2013] 3 rcs 600], la cac-b a invité la demanderesse à ne présenter [tra- duction] « qu’une méthode valable ou acceptable » pour ensuite conclure qu’« [i]l est bien établi que l’analyse de régression statistique offre en principe une estimation rai- sonnable du bénéfice ou du préjudice global et de l’étendue du transfert de la perte lorsqu’il y a eu fixation des prix » (par 68)  .   .   . in my view, the expert methodology must be suffi- ciently credible or plausible to establish some basis in fact for the commonality requirement. this means that the methodology must offer a realistic prospect of establish- ing loss on a class- wide basis so that, if the overcharge is eventually established at the trial of the common issues, there is a means by which to demonstrate that it is com- mon to the class (ie that passing on has occurred). the methodology cannot be purely theoretical or hypothetical, but must be grounded in the facts of the particular case in question. there must be some evidence of the availability of the data to which the methodology is to be applied. [emphasis added; paras 114-18]. à mon avis, la méthode d’expert doit être suffisamment valable ou acceptable pour établir un certain fondement factuel aux fins du respect de l’exigence d’une question commune. elle doit donc offrir une possibilité réaliste d’établir la perte à l’échelle du groupe, de sorte que, si la majoration est établie à l’issue de l’examen des questions communes au procès, un moyen permette de démontrer qu’elle est commune aux membres du groupe (c-à-d que le transfert a eu lieu). or, il ne peut s’agir d’une méthode purement théorique ou hypothétique; elle doit reposer sur les faits de l’affaire. l’existence des données auxquelles la méthode est censée s’appliquer doit être étayée par quelque preuve. [je souligne; par. 114- 118.] [107] while there may be some room for debate arising from the references to “class- wide basis” in the above passages, in my view, the court was em- ploying the term “class- wide basis” synonymously with “indirect- purchaser level”. microsoft, there- fore, directs that, for a court to certify loss- related questions as common issues in a price- fixing class proceeding, it must be satisfied that the plaintiff has shown a plausible methodology to establish that loss reached one or more purchasers — that is, claimants at the “purchaser level”. for indirect purchasers, this would involve demonstrating that the direct purchas- ers passed on the overcharge. [107] bien que la mention de la « perte à l’échelle du groupe » dans les passages précités puisse prê- ter à controverse, j’estime que la cour a utilisé cette expression dans le même sens que « [niveau des] acheteurs indirects ». en conséquence, l’arrêt microsoft prescrit que, pour autoriser les questions liées à la perte en tant que questions communes dans un recours collectif pour fixation du prix, le tribunal doit être convaincu que le demandeur a présenté une méthode valable pour établir que la perte a été transférée à un ou à plusieurs ache- teurs, c’est-à-dire des demandeurs du « [niveau de] l’acheteur ». dans le cas des acheteurs indirects, cela implique de démontrer que les acheteurs di- rects ont refilé la majoration. 356 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. [108] additionally, showing that loss reached the indirect purchaser level satisfies the criteria for cer- tifying a common issue, since it will significantly advance the litigation, is a prerequisite to imposing liability upon toshiba and will result in “common success” as explained in vivendi, given that success for one class member will not result in failure for an- other. showing loss reached the requisite purchaser level will advance the claims of all the purchasers at that level. [108] qui plus est, démontrer que la perte a été transférée aux acheteurs indirects satisfait au critère d’autorisation d’une question commune, puisqu’une telle démonstration permettra de faire progresser substantiellement l’instance, qu’elle est essentielle pour imposer une responsabilité à toshiba et qu’elle débouche sur un « succès commun » tel que l’ex- plique l’arrêt vivendi, car le succès d’un membre du groupe ne se traduira pas par l’échec d’un autre membre. démontrer que la perte a été transférée aux acheteurs du niveau requis fera progresser les récla- mations de tous les acheteurs de ce niveau. [109] when thinking about whether a proposed common question would “advance the litigation”, it is the perspective of the litigation, not the plaintiff, that matters. a common issues trial has the poten- tial to either determine liability or terminate the litigation (w. k. winkler et al., the law of class actions in canada (2014), at p 108). either scenario “advances” the litigation toward resolution. here, if it cannot be shown that loss was suffered by any purchasers at the indirect purchaser level, then none of the indirect purchasers have a cause of action and the action with respect to all the indirect purchasers would fail. i endorse, in this regard, this statement of the ontario superior court in shah (ont. scj) (at para. 69): [109] lorsqu’on pense à la question de savoir si une question commune proposée ferait « avancer l’instance », c’est le point de vue de l’instance et non celui du demandeur qui compte. l’audition des ques- tions communes peut soit déterminer la responsabi- lité soit mettre fin au litige (w. k. winkler et autres, the law of class actions in canada (2014), p 108). les deux scénarios « contribuent » au règlement du litige. en l’espèce, si l’on ne peut démontrer que la perte a été subie par quelque acheteur indirect que ce soit, aucun acheteur indirect n’a une cause d’action et l’action à l’égard de tous les acheteurs indirects échouerait. je souscris à cet égard à l’affirmation qui suit de la cour supérieure de l’ontario dans shah (csj. ont.) (par. 69) : thus, for the purposes of certification, the methodol- ogy about the existence of loss need only be shown to be a plausible one that the passing-on reached the indirect purchaser level of the distribution channel and that there might be individual issues about whether any particular class member experienced illegal price- fixing. if the plain- tiff’s expert’s methodology failed in proof at trial, then the class members’ claim would fail across the indirect class members’ class because each and every one of them would have failed to prove a constituent element of their cause of action; ie, that the price- fixing penetrated their place or “level” of the distribution channel, and the defendants would secure a discharge of liability against all the class members. conversely, if the methodology proved sound to show that overcharges reached the indirect purchaser place in the distribution channel, then there might have to be individual issues trials to determine each class mem- ber’s entitlement. [traduction] ainsi, aux fins d’autorisation, il faut seulement démontrer que la méthode permettant d’établir l’existence d’une perte est une méthode acceptable, que la perte a été transférée à l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution et que des questions indivi- duelles quant à savoir si certains membres ont été touchés par la fixation illégale des prix peuvent être soulevées. si la méthode d’expert du demandeur ne permet pas d’en faire la preuve au procès, alors la demande du groupe sera rejetée à l’égard de la catégorie des membres indirects parce que chacun d’eux aura échoué à prouver un élément constitutif de sa cause d’action; c-à-d que la fixation des prix s’est rendue à eux ou à leur « niveau » dans la chaîne de distribution, et les défenderesses seront déchargées de toute responsabilité à l’égard de l’ensemble des membres du groupe. à l’inverse, si la méthode se révèle valable pour démontrer que la majoration a été transférée à l’acheteur indirect situé en aval de la chaîne de distribution, il pourrait alors être nécessaire de tenir des audiences individuelles pour statuer sur le droit de chaque membre de faire partie du groupe. [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 357 (3) does dr.  reutter’s methodology meet the (3) la méthode proposée par m. reutter satisfait- standard? elle à la norme? [110] the certification judge identified the correct standard to certify commonality of loss as a common issue. as toshiba acknowledges, the issue of whether the certification judge erred in applying that standard to dr. reutter’s evidence is “subject to    deference from an appellate court” (af (toshiba), at para 42). the certification judge’s analysis of dr. reutter’s methodology as supporting certification should not be overturned absent a palpable and overriding error. i agree with the court of appeal that the [111] reasoning of the certification judge reveals no basis for interfering with his common issues determina- tion (ca reasons, at para 163). there is no palpa- ble and overriding error in the certification judge’s conclusion that godfrey showed some basis in fact for finding the loss issues to be common (sup. ct. reasons, at para 180). i would therefore reject this ground of appeal. [110] le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a arrêté la norme applicable à l’autorisation, en tant que question commune, de la question de la communauté de la perte. toshiba le reconnaît : la question de savoir si le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation s’est trompé en appliquant cette norme au témoignage de m. reutter [traduction] « oblige la cour d’appel à faire preuve de déférence » (ma. (toshiba), par 42). l’analyse de la méthode propo- sée par m. reutter sur laquelle repose la décision du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation ne devrait pas être annulée en l’absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante. [111] je conviens avec la cour d’appel que le rai- sonnement du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation ne révèle aucune raison de modifier la décision qu’il a rendue au sujet des questions communes (motifs de la ca, par 163). il n’y a aucune erreur manifeste et déterminante dans sa conclusion que m. godfrey a établi un certain fondement factuel permettant de qualifier de communes les questions liées à la perte (motifs de la cs, par 180). je rejetterais donc ce moyen d’appel. (4) availability of aggregate damages (4) possibilité d’obtenir des dommages- intérêts globaux [112] i turn, finally, to toshiba’s final argument, which goes to the availability of the aggregate dam- ages provisions found in division 2 of the class proceedings act, s. 29(1)(b), which states: [112] je passe finalement au dernier argument de toshiba, qui intéresse la possibilité d’invoquer les dispositions sur les dommages- intérêts globaux qui figurent à l’al. 29(1)(b) de la class proceedings act, lequel prévoit : [traduction] aggregate awards of monetary relief octroi global d’une réparation pécuniaire 29 (1) the court may make an order for an aggregate monetary award in respect of all or any part of a defendant’s liability to class members and may give judgment accordingly if 29 (1) le tribunal peut accorder une réparation pécuniaire pour tout ou partie de la responsabilité du défen- deur à l’endroit des membres du groupe et rendre jugement en conséquence si   .   . 358 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. (b) no questions of fact or law other than those relating to the assessment of monetary relief remain to be determined in order to establish the amount of the defendant’s monetary lia- bility   . (b) il ne reste à trancher que des questions de fait ou de droit touchant à la détermination de la réparation pécuniaire afin de quantifier la responsabilité pécuniaire du défendeur   . [113] because all other issues of fact and law must be decided before the aggregate damages provisions could apply, it is plain that aggregate damages under s. 29(1)(b) are purely remedial, available only after all other common issues have been determined, includ- ing liability (see microsoft, at para 134). irrespective, then, of whether aggregate damages are certified as a common issue, it is for the trial judge to deter- mine, following the common issues trial, whether the statutory criteria are met such that the aggregate damages provisions can be applied to award damages (microsoft, at para. 134; winkler et al., at p 121). [114] here, the certification judge certified the fol- lowing common issues related to aggregate damages for the non- umbrella purchasers (para. 143): [113] comme il faut trancher toutes les questions de fait et questions de droit avant que les dispositions sur les dommages- intérêts globaux puissent s’appli- quer, il est clair que les dommages- intérêts globaux au sens de l’al. 29(1)(b) ont un objectif purement réparateur et ne peuvent être octroyés qu’après le règlement de toutes les autres questions communes, y compris la responsabilité (voir microsoft, par 134). peu importe, donc, si les dommages- intérêts globaux sont autorisés en tant que question commune, il re- vient au juge du procès de décider, au terme de l’au- dition des questions communes, si les critères établis par la loi sont respectés de sorte que les dispositions sur les dommages- intérêts globaux peuvent s’ap- pliquer pour octroyer ceux-ci (microsoft, par. 134; winkler et autres, p 121). [114] en l’espèce, le juge saisi de la demande d’au- torisation a autorisé les questions communes suivantes liées à l’octroi de dommages- intérêt globaux aux ache- teurs qui ne sont pas sous parapluie (par. 143) : [traduction] (k) can the amount of damages be determined on an aggregate basis and if so, in what amount? (k) le montant des dommages- intérêts peut-il être arrêté globalement et, dans l’affirmative, quel est ce montant?   .   . (w) can the amount of restitution be determined on an aggregate basis and if so, in what amount? (w) le montant de la restitution peut-il être arrêté globalement et, dans l’affirmative, quel est ce montant? as i will explain below, i would not disturb the cer- tification judge’s decision to certify these issues as common issues. again, it is important to remember that the certification of these issues in relation to the non- umbrella purchasers and the lack of certifica- tion in relation to the umbrella purchasers neither mandates nor forecloses the possibility of the trial judge awarding aggregate damages following the common issues trial. as this court said in microsoft comme je vais l’expliquer plus loin, je ne suis pas d’avis de modifier la décision du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation d’autoriser ces questions en tant que questions communes. là encore, il importe de se rappeler que l’autorisation de ces questions à l’égard des acheteurs qui ne sont pas sous parapluie et l’absence d’autorisation à l’endroit des acheteurs sous parapluie ne commande ni n’exclut la possibilité que le juge du procès accorde des dommages- intérêts [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 359 (para. 134): “   the failure to propose or certify aggregate damages, or another remedy, as a common issue does not preclude a trial judge from invoking the provisions if considered appropriate once liability is found”. [115] toshiba has not appealed the certification of these issues as common issues. rather, it takes issue with the certification judge’s statement when discussing certification of the loss- related common issues that “the aggregate damage provisions [  ] allow for an aggregate award even where some class members have suffered no financial loss” (sup. ct. reasons, at para 169). toshiba argues that this state- ment contradicts this court’s direction in microsoft regarding the purely procedural quality of rights con- ferred by the class proceedings act (af (toshiba), at para 54). more particularly, toshiba says that, by not confining its liability to class members who are able to show actual loss, the certification judge used the class proceedings act to confer substantive (and not merely procedural) rights so as to grant a rem- edy to persons who cannot prove a loss. in this way, toshiba argues that the certification judge treated the indirect and umbrella purchasers as “juridical enti- ties” and eliminated the distinction between proof of harm and aggregate damages (af (toshiba), at para 7). globaux au terme de l’audition des questions commu- nes. comme l’a mentionné notre cour au par. 134 de l’arrêt microsoft : «    l’omission de proposer ou d’autoriser à titre de question commune l’opportunité d’accorder des dommages- intérêts globaux ou une autre réparation n’empêche pas le juge de se fonder sur les dispositions s’il l’estime indiqué ». [115] toshiba n’a pas porté en appel l’autorisation des questions précitées en tant que questions com- munes. elle s’inscrit plutôt en faux contre ce que le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a dit au moment d’analyser l’autorisation des questions com- munes liées à la perte : [traduction] «    les dis- positions relatives aux dommages- intérêts globaux [  ] permettent d’adjuger ceux-ci même si certains membres du groupe n’ont subi aucune perte finan- cière » (motifs de la cs, par 169). selon toshiba, cette affirmation contredit l’orientation qu’a donnée notre cour dans l’arrêt microsoft au sujet du carac- tère purement procédural des droits conférés par la class proceedings act (ma (toshiba), par 54). plus particulièrement, toshiba affirme que, en ne restrei- gnant pas la responsabilité aux membres du groupe capables d’établir qu’ils ont subi une véritable perte, le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a utilisé la class proceedings act pour conférer des droits subs- tantifs (et pas simplement procéduraux) de manière à accorder réparation aux personnes qui ne sont pas en mesure de prouver qu’elles ont subi une perte. toshiba plaide ainsi que le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a traité les acheteurs indirects et sous parapluie comme des [traduction] « entités juri- diques » et a éliminé la distinction entre la preuve du préjudice et les dommages- intérêts globaux (ma. (toshiba), par 7). [116] on this point, i agree with toshiba that the certification judge’s statement that the aggregate damages provisions allow for an award of damages for class members that suffered no loss is inconsist- ent with this court’s jurisprudence. this court has repeatedly affirmed that the advantages conferred by class proceeding legislation are purely proce- dural, and that they do not confer substantive rights (see: hollick, at para. 14; bisaillon v. concordia university, 2006 scc 19, [2006] 1 scr 666, at para. 17; microsoft, at para. 131-32; sun‑ rype, at [116] sur ce point, je partage l’avis de toshiba que l’affirmation du juge saisi de la demande d’au- torisation — selon laquelle les dispositions sur les dommages- intérêts globaux permettent d’en adju- ger aux membres du groupe qui n’ont subi aucune perte — est incompatible avec la jurisprudence de notre cour. cette dernière a maintes fois répété que les avantages offerts par les lois en matière de re- cours collectifs sont purement procédurales et ne confèrent pas de droit substantiels (voir : hollick, par. 14; bisaillon c. université concordia, 2006 csc 360 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. para 75). in microsoft, this court could not have been clearer that the aggregate damages provisions cannot be used to establish liability: with respect, i do not agree with this reasoning. the aggregate damages provisions of the cpa relate to remedy and are procedural. they cannot be used to establish liabil- ity (2038724 ontario ltd. v. quizno’s canada restaurant corp., 2010 onca 466, 100 or (3d) 721, at para 55). the language of s. 29(1)(b) specifies that no question of fact or law, other than the assessment of damages, should remain to be determined in order for an aggregate mon- etary award to be made. as i read it, this means that an antecedent finding of liability is required before resorting to the aggregate damages provision of the cpa. this in- cludes, where required by the cause of action such as in a claim under s. 36 of the competition act, a finding of proof of loss. i do not see how a statutory provision designed to award damages on an aggregate basis can be said to be used to establish any aspect of liability. i agree with feldman ja’s holding in chadha that aggregate damages provisions are “applicable only once li- ability has been established, and provid[e] a method to as- sess the quantum of damages on a global basis, but not the fact of damage” (para 49). i also agree with masuhara j. of the bcsc in infineon that “liability requires that a pass- through reached the class members”, and that “[t]hat question requires an answer before the aggregation provi- sions, which are only a tool to assist in the distribution of damages, can be invoked” (2008 bcsc 575 (canlii), at para 176). furthermore, i agree with the ontario court of appeal in quizno’s, that “[t]he majority clearly recognized that s. 24 [of the ontario class proceedings act, 1992, so 1992, c. 6] is procedural and cannot be used in prov- ing liability” (para 55) [emphasis added; paras 131-32] 19, [2006] 1 rcs 666, par. 17; microsoft, par. 131- 132; sun‑ rype, par 75). dans l’arrêt microsoft, notre cour n’aurait pas pu dire plus clairement que les dispositions sur les dommages- intérêts globaux ne peuvent servir à établir la responsabilité : soit dit en tout respect, je n’adhère pas à ce raisonne- ment. les dispositions de la cpa sur l’octroi de dommages- intérêts globaux ont trait à la réparation, sont de nature procédurale et ne peuvent permettre d’établir la responsabi- lité (2038724 ontario ltd. c. quizno’s canada restaurant corp., 2010 onca 466, 100 or (3d) 721, par 55). le libellé de l’al. 29(1)(b) veut qu’il ne reste à trancher que des questions de fait ou de droit touchant à la détermina- tion de la réparation pécuniaire pour qu’une réparation pécuniaire globale puisse être accordée. à mon sens, il faut une conclusion préalable de responsabilité avant d’appli- quer les dispositions de la cpa sur l’octroi de dommages- intérêts globaux, ce qui comprend, lorsque l’exige une cause d’action comme celles prévues à l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence, une conclusion sur la preuve de la perte. je ne vois pas comment une disposition visant à ac- corder des dommages- intérêts de manière globale pourrait être le fondement d’une conclusion sur quelque volet de la responsabilité. je souscris à la conclusion de la juge feldman dans chadha, à savoir  que  les dispositions sur l’octroi de dommages- intérêts globaux [traduction] « s’appliquent seulement une fois la responsabilité établie et offrent une méthode d’évaluation globale des dommages- intérêts, mais ne permettent pas d’établir le préjudice » (par 49). je conviens également avec le juge masuhara de la cour su- prême de la colombie- britannique qu’[traduction] « éta- blir la responsabilité exige de prouver que le transfert de la perte a atteint les membres du groupe. il faut statuer sur ce point avant d’appliquer les dispositions sur l’évaluation globale des dommages- intérêts, lesquelles n’offrent qu’un moyen d’attribuer l’indemnité » (voir infineon, 2008 bcsc 575 (canlii), par 176). aussi, je partage l’avis de la cour d’appel de l’ontario dans quizno’s selon lequel [traduc- tion] « [l]es juges majoritaires reconnaissent clairement que l’art. 24 [de la loi de 1992 sur les recours collectifs de l’ontario, lo 1992, ch. 6] est de nature procédurale et ne peut servir d’assise à l’établissement de la responsabilité » (par 55) [je souligne; par. 131- 132.] [117] the foregoing signifies that, where (as here) loss is an element of the cause of action, using the aggregate damages provisions to distribute damages to class members who did not suffer a loss would be [117] les passages précités signifient que lorsque la perte est un élément de la cause d’action (comme c’est le cas en l’espèce), le fait de recourir aux dis- positions sur les dommages- intérêts globaux pour [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey le juge brown 361 inconsistent with the purely procedural quality of the advantages conferred by the class proceedings act. it follows that the reliance by the courts below (sup. ct. reasons, at para. 169; ca reasons, at para. 161) on s. 31(1)(a)(i) of the class proceedings act (which provides that the court may order an aggregate dam- ages award where it would be impractical or ineffi- cient to identify the class members entitled to share in the award) as indicating that the plaintiff need not establish loss to each and every class member was, in my respectful view, mistaken. section 31(1)(a)(i) is applicable only once liability has been established; otherwise, it would effectively confer substantive rights. [118] to be clear, i agree that the class proceed‑ ings act permits individual members of the class to obtain a remedy where it may be difficult to demon- strate the extent of individual loss. what the juris- prudence of this court maintains, however, is that, in order for individual class members to participate in the award of damages, the trial judge must be satisfied that each has actually suffered a loss where proof of loss is essential to a finding of liability (as it is for liability under s. 36 of the competition act). therefore, ultimately, to use the aggregate dam- ages provisions, the trial judge must be satisfied, following the common issues trial, either that all class members suffered loss, or that he or she can distinguish those who have not suffered loss from those who have. accorder ceux-ci aux membres du groupe qui n’ont subi aucune perte serait incompatible avec le carac- tère purement procédural des avantages conférés par la class proceedings act. soit dit en tout respect, il s’ensuit que les juridictions inférieures (motifs de la cs, par. 169; motifs de la ca, par. 161) ont eu tort de s’appuyer sur le sous-al. 31(1)(a)(i) de la class proceedings act (lequel prévoit que le tribunal peut ordonner l’octroi de dommages- intérêts globaux lorsqu’il serait irréaliste ou inefficace d’identifier les membres du groupe qui ont droit à une part du montant global des dommages- intérêts adjugés) pour conclure que le demandeur n’a pas à établir que chacun des membres du groupe a subi une perte. le sous-al. 31(1)(a)(i) ne s’applique qu’une fois la responsabilité établie; autrement, il se trouverait à conférer des droits substantiels. [118] pour dissiper toute équivoque, je conviens que la class proceedings act permet aux membres du groupe d’obtenir une réparation dans les cas où il peut être difficile d’établir l’ampleur de la perte individuelle. toutefois, il ressort de la jurisprudence de la cour que, pour que les membres du groupe participent à l’octroi des dommages- intérêts, le juge du procès doit être convaincu que chacun d’eux a réellement subi une perte lorsque la preuve de la perte est essentielle à une conclusion de responsa- bilité (comme c’est le cas de la responsabilité fon- dée sur l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence). par conséquent, au bout du compte, pour se prévaloir des dispositions relatives aux dommages- intérêts globaux, le juge du procès doit être convaincu, à l’issue de l’audition des questions communes, que tous les membres du groupe ont subi une perte, ou qu’il peut distinguer ceux qui n’ont pas subi de perte de ceux qui en ont subi une. [119] at this stage, it therefore remains possible that issues will arise, once it is determined that loss reached the indirect purchaser level, that affect individual class members’ claims (microsoft, at para 140). in other words, while it was sufficient for the purposes of cer‑ tifying loss as a common issue for dr. reutter’s meth- odology to show merely that loss reached the indirect purchaser level, whether this methodology is sufficient for the purposes of establishing toshiba’s liability to all class members will depend on the findings of [119] à ce stade, il se peut donc toujours que des questions touchant les demandes de membres du groupe se posent, une fois qu’il est établi que la perte a été refilée à l’acheteur indirect (microsoft, par 140). autrement dit, bien qu’il ait été suffisant, aux fins de l’autorisation de la perte en tant que question commune, que la méthode de m. reutter établisse simplement que la perte a été refilée aux acheteurs indirects, la réponse à la question de savoir si cette méthode suffit pour établir la responsabilité 362 pioneer corp v godfrey brown j. [2019] 3 scr. the trial judge. in this case, godfrey intends to use dr. reutter’s methodology to prove that all class mem- bers suffered loss. it follows from the foregoing that, if he is successful in doing so, the same methodology can be used to establish both that toshiba is liable to all class members and that aggregate damages are available to be awarded. [120] it should be borne in mind that the trial judge, following the common issues trial, might reach any one of numerous possible conclusions on the question of whether the class members suf- fered loss. for example, the trial judge might ac- cept dr. reutter’s evidence that all class members suffered a loss, in which case it would be open to the trial judge to use the aggregate damages pro- visions to award damages to all class members. alternatively, the trial judge might conclude that no purchasers suffered a loss  — for example, if the trial judge does not accept that dr. reutter’s methodology demonstrates that loss reached the direct and indirect purchaser levels. were that the case, the action would fail or, it might be that the trial judge finds that an identifiable subset of class members did not suffer a loss, in which case the trial judge could exclude those members from participating in the award of damages, and then use the aggregate damages provision in respect of the remaining class members’ claims. finally, the trial judge could accept toshiba’s argument that some class members suffered a loss and some did not, but that it is impossible to determine on the ex- pert’s methodology which class members suffered a loss. in such a case, individual issues trials would be required to determine the purchasers to whom toshiba is liable and who are therefore entitled to share in the award of damages. at the certification stage, no comment can or should be made about the potential conclusions that the trial judge may reach. i outline these possibilities and the availability of aggregate damages merely to provide guidance. de toshiba envers tous les membres du groupe dé- pend des conclusions du juge du procès. en l’es- pèce, m. godfrey compte employer la méthode de m. reutter pour prouver que tous les membres du groupe ont subi une perte. il s’ensuit de ce qui pré- cède que, s’il parvient à faire cette démonstration, on peut employer la même méthode pour établir à la fois que toshiba est responsable envers tous les membres du groupe et qu’il est possible d’accorder des dommages- intérêts globaux. [120] il convient de garder à l’esprit qu’après l’au- dition des questions communes, le juge du procès peut tirer l’une ou l’autre de nombreuses conclusions sur la question de savoir si les membres du groupe ont subi une perte. par exemple, le juge du procès pourrait retenir le témoignage de m. reutter selon lequel tous les membres du groupe ont subi une perte, auquel cas il serait loisible au juge du pro- cès de recourir aux dispositions sur les dommages- intérêts globaux pour adjuger les dommages- intérêts à tous les membres du groupe. le juge du procès pourrait aussi conclure qu’aucun acheteur n’a subi de perte — par exemple, s’il n’accepte pas que la méthode de m. reutter démontre que la perte a été transférée aux acheteurs directs et indirects. dans un tel cas, l’action échouerait. peut- être encore que le juge du procès conclura qu’une sous‑ catégorie identifiable de membres du groupe n’a pas subi de perte, auquel cas il exclura ces membres de l’oc- troi des dommages- intérêts et recourra ensuite à la disposition sur l’octroi de dommages- intérêts glo- baux à l’égard des demandes de membres restants du groupe. enfin, le juge du procès pourrait retenir l’argument de toshiba selon lequel certains membres du groupe ont subi une perte tandis que d’autres n’en ont pas subie, mais conclure qu’il est impossible d’établir avec la méthode de l’expert quels membres du groupe ont subi une perte. dans un tel cas, des procès portant sur des questions individuelles se- raient nécessaires pour identifier les acheteurs envers qui toshiba est responsable et qui ont donc le droit de prendre part à l’octroi des dommages- intérêts. au stade de l’autorisation, il n’est pas possible ou indiqué de se prononcer sur les conclusions éven- tuelles du juge du procès. je signale ces possibilités et l’ouverture à des dommages- intérêts globaux uni- quement en vue de fournir des directives. [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 363 [121] but again, to be clear — neither the range of possible findings of the trial judge following the common issues trial, nor the unavailability of ag- gregate damages for class members that suffered no loss, is relevant to the decision to certify aggregate damages as a common issue. as was the case in microsoft, “[t]he aggregate damages questions [the certification judge] certified relate solely to whether damages can be determined on an aggregate basis and if so in what amount” (para 135). the certifica- tion judge’s decision to certify the questions related to aggregate damages for the non- umbrella purchas- ers should therefore not be disturbed. [121] mais là encore, soyons clairs : ni l’éventail des conclusions que pourra tirer le juge du procès à l’issue de l’audition des questions communes, ni la possibilité d’accorder des dommages- intérêts glo- baux aux membres du groupe qui n’ont subi aucune perte, ne sont pertinents pour la décision d’autoriser les dommages- intérêts globaux en tant que ques- tion commune. tout comme dans microsoft, « [l]es questions [liées aux dommages- intérêts globaux que le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation] certi- fie consistent seulement à savoir si le montant des dommages- intérêts peut être arrêté globalement et, dans l’affirmative, quel est ce montant » (par 135). il ne convient donc pas de modifier la décision du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation d’autoriser les questions concernant l’octroi de dommages- intérêts globaux aux acheteurs qui ne sont pas sous parapluie. vi conclusion vi conclusion [122] i would dismiss the appeals. [122] je rejetterais les pourvois. [123] section 37(1) of the class proceedings act provides that “neither the [british columbia] su- preme court nor the court of appeal may award costs to any party to an application for certification”. the parties appear to take this as precluding this court from awarding costs at those courts, and seek only their costs at this court. i would therefore award godfrey costs in this court only. [123] le paragraphe 37(1) de la class proceedings act dispose que [traduction] « ni la cour suprême [de la colombie- britannique] ni la cour d’appel ne peuvent accorder des dépens à une partie à une demande d’autorisation ». les parties semblent en avoir conclu que notre cour ne peut octroyer des dépens devant ces cours et elles n’ont sollicité que leurs dépens devant notre cour. j’accorderais donc à m. godfrey ses dépens devant notre cour seulement. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [124] côté j. (dissenting in part) — these appeals raise a fundamental question: are courts at a stage where the balance struck by parliament in canada’s competition law should be upset by applying new principles of liability for price- fixing cases, resulting in near- automatic certification of class actions? in doing so, are courts going a bridge too far? [124] la juge côté (dissidente en partie) — les présents pourvois soulèvent une question fondamen- tale : le moment est-il venu pour les tribunaux de rompre l’équilibre établi par le législateur dans les lois canadiennes sur la concurrence en appliquant de nouveaux principes de responsabilité dans des affaires de fixation des prix, de sorte que les recours collectifs seraient presque automatiquement autori- sés? ce faisant, les tribunaux iraient- ils trop loin? i overview i aperçu [125] these appeals concern the certification of a proposed class action brought in british columbia by [125] les présents pourvois concernent l’auto- risation d’un recours collectif projeté intenté en 364 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. representative plaintiff neil godfrey (the “plaintiff”, respondent in these appeals) against a number of defendants (the “defendants”, appellants in these appeals) that manufacture or supply devices known as optical disc drives (“odds”). the plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to fix the prices of odds between january 1, 2004 and january 1, 2010 (the “class period”). he relies on five causes of ac- tion against the defendants: a contravention of s. 45 of the competition act, rsc 1985, c. c-34 (which is actionable pursuant to s. 36(1) of that statute), the tort of unlawful means conspiracy, the tort of predominant purpose conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and waiver of tort. [126] the proposed class is essentially comprised of three groups. direct purchasers are the class mem- bers who purchased an odd or an odd product manufactured or supplied by a defendant from that defendant. indirect purchasers are the class mem- bers who purchased an odd or an odd product manufactured or supplied by a defendant from a non‑ defendant. neil godfrey is one of those indi- rect purchasers. finally, class members who pur- chased from a non- defendant an odd or an odd product that was not manufactured or supplied by a defendant are known as “umbrella purchasers”. the plaintiff alleges that all of the class members in these three groups have claims against the defendants in respect of the alleged price- fixing conspiracy. [127] the plaintiff’s action against most of the defendants was commenced on september 27, 2010. he brought a separate action against certain addi- tional defendants — pioneer corporation, pioneer north america, inc., pioneer electronics (usa) inc., pioneer high fidelity taiwan co., ltd. and pioneer electronics of canada inc. (the “pioneer defend- ants”) — on august 16, 2013, roughly three and a half years following the end of the class period. colombie- britannique par le représentant des de- mandeurs, neil godfrey (le « demandeur », l’intimé dans les présents pourvois), contre plusieurs défen- deresses (les « défenderesses », les appelantes dans les présents pourvois) qui fabriquent ou fournissent des dispositifs appelés lecteurs de disques optiques (« ldo »). le demandeur allègue que les défende- resses ont comploté dans le but de fixer les prix des ldo entre le 1er janvier 2004 et le 1er janvier 2010 (la « période visée par le recours collectif »). il s’appuie sur cinq causes d’action contre les défenderesses : contravention à l’art. 45 de la loi sur la concurrence, lrc 1985, c. c-34 (qui ouvre droit à une action fondée sur le par. 36(1) de cette même loi), délit civil de complot exercé par des moyens illégaux, délit civil de complot visant principalement à causer un préjudice, enrichissement sans cause et renonciation au recours délictuel. [126] le groupe projeté est constitué essentiel- lement de trois catégories d’acheteurs. les ache- teurs directs sont les membres du groupe qui ont acheté un ldo ou un produit muni de ldo fabriqué ou fourni par une défenderesse de cette défende‑ resse. les acheteurs indirects sont les membres du groupe qui ont acheté un ldo ou un produit muni de ldo fabriqué ou fourni par une défenderesse d’une personne qui n’est pas une défenderesse. neil godfrey est l’un de ces acheteurs indirects. enfin, les membres du groupe qui ont acheté, d’une personne qui n’est pas une défenderesse, un ldo ou un pro- duit muni de ldo qui n’a pas été fabriqué ou fourni par une défenderesse sont appelés les « acheteurs sous parapluie ». le demandeur allègue que tous les membres du groupe faisant partie de ces catégories disposent de recours contre les défenderesses rela- tivement au complot allégué de fixation des prix. [127] le recours du demandeur contre la plupart des défenderesses a été intenté le 27 septembre 2010. le 16 août 2013, soit environ trois ans et demi après la fin de la période visée par le recours collectif, le demandeur a intenté une action distincte contre cer- taines autres défenderesses : pioneer corporation, pioneer north america, inc., pioneer electronics (usa) inc., pioneer high fidelity taiwan co., ltd. et pioneer électronique du canada, inc. (appelées collectivement les « défenderesses pioneer »). [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 365 [128] at the certification stage, masuhara j. (the “certification judge”) consolidated the two actions and conditionally certified them as class proceedings, in accordance with the criteria set out in s. 4(1) of british columbia’s class proceedings act, rsbc. 1996, c. 50 (2016 bcsc 844). the defendants’ ap- peals to the british columbia court of appeal were unanimously dismissed (2017 bcca 302, 1 bclr. (6th) 319). [129] the defendants that challenge the court of appeal’s order before this court in file no. 37810 (the “toshiba appeal”) contend that both the cer- tification judge and the court of appeal erred in three respects: (a) by permitting the umbrella pur- chasers to claim under the statutory cause of action in s. 36(1) of the competition act; (b) by allowing common law and equitable relief based on a breach of the anti- competitive prohibitions in part vi of the competition act; and (c) by finding that loss- related issues were common among the indirect purchasers based on the expert methodology proposed by the plaintiff. [130] the appeal brought by the pioneer defend- ants in file no. 37809 (the “pioneer appeal”) raises those same issues, as well as two unique issues pertaining to the treatment of the limitation defence by the courts below. the pioneer defendants argue that the certification judge erred in holding that the action against them can proceed — notwithstand- ing that it was commenced more than two years following the end of the class period — based on the application of the discoverability rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. in this court, the pioneer defendants submit (a) that the discov- erability rule does not apply to postpone the com- mencement of the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the competition act, and (b) that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment cannot toll that limitation period unless the plaintiff can establish that he and the other class members stand in a “special rela- tionship” with the pioneer defendants. it follows, in their submission, that the plaintiff’s pleadings do not disclose a cause of action against them in [128] à l’étape de l’autorisation, le juge masuhara (le « juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation ») a réuni les deux actions et les a conditionnellement au- torisées à titre de recours collectif conformément aux critères énoncés au par. 4(1) de la class proceedings act, rsbc 1996, c 50 (2016 bcsc 844). les pourvois interjetés par les défenderesses devant la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique ont été rejetés à l’unanimité (2017 bcca 302, 1 bclr. (6th) 319). [129] les défenderesses qui contestent l’ordon- nance de la cour d’appel devant notre cour dans le dossier no 37810 (le « pourvoi de toshiba ») sou- tiennent que le juge saisi de la demande d’autori- sation et la cour d’appel ont commis trois erreurs : a) en autorisant les acheteurs sous parapluie à se prévaloir de la cause d’action prévue au par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence, b) en autorisant les recours de common law et d’equity fondés sur une violation des prohibitions de comportement anti- concurrentiel prévues à la partie vi de la loi sur la concurrence, et c) en concluant, d’après la mé- thode proposée par l’expert du demandeur, que les questions liées à la perte étaient communes aux acheteurs indirects. [130] le pourvoi interjeté par les défenderesses pioneer dans le dossier no 37809 (le « pourvoi de pioneer ») soulève les mêmes questions, de même que deux questions uniques liées au traitement par les tribunaux d’instance inférieure de leur défense fondée sur la prescription. les défenderesses pioneer soutiennent que le juge saisi de la demande d’au- torisation a commis une erreur en concluant que l’action intentée contre elles pouvait procéder — malgré le fait qu’elle avait été intentée plus de deux ans après la fin de la période visée par le recours collectif — compte tenu de l’application de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir et de la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse. devant notre cour, les défenderesses pioneer font valoir : a) que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas de façon à retarder le début du délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) de la loi sur la concurrence, et b) que la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse ne permet pas de repousser le point de départ du délai de prescription à moins que le demandeur puisse 366 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. accordance with s. 4(1)(a) of the class proceedings act. [131] i would allow both appeals in part. with respect to the limitations issues raised in the pioneer appeal, my view is that the discoverability rule does not apply to the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) because the event that triggers the commencement of the limitation period occurs without regard to the state of a plaintiff’s knowledge. as for the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, my view is that it is not plain and obvious that it will toll the operation of the limitation period in this case only if the plaintiff is capable of demonstrating a special relationship existed. it may be that something tantamount to or commensurate with the existence of a special rela- tionship would be sufficient to toll the limitation period. however, simply establishing the existence of the conspiracy will not suffice. [132] with respect to the issues raised in the toshiba appeal, which are common to both appeals, i agree with my colleague brown j. — although for differ- ent reasons — that the competition act does not prevent a plaintiff from advancing a claim at com- mon law or in equity together with, or instead of, a claim pursuant to the statutory cause of action in s. 36(1) in respect of the same anti- competitive prohibitions. i disagree with my colleague on the other two issues raised in that appeal, however. in my view, the umbrella purchasers cannot succeed in their claims against the defendants under s. 36(1) of the competition act. likewise, i cannot accept that a methodology capable of proving only that loss reached the indirect purchaser level in the dis- tribution chain (and incapable of establishing loss in any individualized manner) is sufficient for the purpose of certifying the loss- related questions pro- posed by the plaintiff as “common issues”, pursuant to s. 4(1)(c) of the class proceedings act. établir que lui et les autres membres du groupe en- tretiennent une « relation spéciale » avec les défende- resses pioneer. par conséquent, selon elles, les actes de procédure du demandeur ne révèlent aucune cause d’action contre elles en conformité avec l’al. 4(1)(a) de la class proceedings act. [131] je suis d’avis d’accueillir les deux pourvois en partie. en ce qui concerne les questions relatives aux délais de prescription soulevées dans le pourvoi de pioneer, j’estime que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas au délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i), puisque l’événement qui marque le point de départ du délai de prescription se produit peu importe si un demandeur a connaissance du préjudice. en ce qui a trait à la dissimulation frau- duleuse, il ne me semble pas évident et manifeste que cette doctrine repoussera le point de départ du délai de prescription en l’espèce seulement si le demandeur arrive à démontrer qu’il existait une relation spéciale. il se peut que quelque chose d’équivalent ou correspon- dant à une relation spéciale suffise à reporter le point de départ du délai de prescription. cependant, le simple fait d’établir l’existence du complot ne suffira pas. [132] pour ce qui est des questions soulevées dans le pourvoi de toshiba, lesquelles sont communes aux deux pourvois, je conviens avec mon collègue le juge brown — quoique pour des motifs diffé- rents — que la loi sur la concurrence n’empêche pas le demandeur d’intenter un recours en common law ou en equity en même temps, ou au lieu, d’un recours fondé sur la cause d’action prévue au par. 36(1) à l’égard des mêmes pratiques anticoncurrentielles. toutefois, je ne souscris pas à l’opinion de mon collègue quant aux deux autres questions soulevées dans ce pourvoi. à mon sens, les acheteurs sous parapluie ne peuvent avoir gain de cause contre les défenderesses dans leurs réclamations fondées sur le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence. de même, je ne puis accepter qu’une méthode permettant uni- quement de prouver que la perte a atteint le niveau des acheteurs indirects dans la chaîne de distribution (et qui ne permet pas d’établir la perte de manière individuelle) suffit à l’autorisation des questions liées à la perte proposées par le demandeur en tant que « questions communes » au titre de l’al. 4(1)(c) de la class proceedings act. [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 367 ii the pioneer appeal ii le pourvoi de pioneer [133] the two unique issues raised in the pioneer appeal are as follows: [133] les deux questions uniques soulevées dans le pourvoi de pioneer sont les suivantes : (a) does the discoverability rule apply to the limi- tation period established by s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the competition act? a) la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’ap- plique-t-elle au délai de prescription établi au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) de la loi sur la concurrence? (b) must there be a special relationship between the parties to an action in order for the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to toll the limitation period? b) pour que la doctrine de la dissimulation frau- duleuse repousse le point de départ du délai de prescription, doit-il y avoir une relation spéciale entre les parties à une action? [134] the statutory cause of action under s. 36(1)(a) of the competition act, which allows a claimant to re- cover for loss or damage resulting from conduct con- trary to any provision of part vi of that act, is subject to the limitation period established by s 36(4). these two provisions read as follows: [134] la cause d’action prévue à l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence, qui permet à une personne ayant subi une perte ou des dommages par suite d’un comportement allant à l’encontre d’une disposition de la partie vi de cette loi de se faire indemniser, est assujettie au délai de prescription établi au par 36(4). ces deux dispositions sont ainsi libellées : 36 (1) any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of 36 (1) toute personne qui a subi une perte ou des dom- mages par suite : (a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of part vi, or a) soit d’un comportement allant à l’encontre d’une disposition de la partie vi; (b) the failure of any person to comply with an order of the tribunal or another court under this act, b) soit du défaut d’une personne d’obtempérer à une ordonnance rendue par le tribunal ou un autre tribunal en vertu de la présente loi, may, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue for and recover from the person who engaged in the conduct or failed to comply with the order an amount equal to the loss or damage proved to have been suffered by him, together with any additional amount that the court may allow not exceeding the full cost to him of any investi- gation in connection with the matter and of proceedings under this section. peut, devant tout tribunal compétent, réclamer et recouvrer de la personne qui a eu un tel comportement ou n’a pas obtempéré à l’ordonnance une somme égale au montant de la perte ou des dommages qu’elle est reconnue avoir subis, ainsi que toute somme supplémentaire que le tribunal peut fixer et qui n’excède pas le coût total, pour elle, de toute enquête relativement à l’affaire et des procédures engagées en vertu du présent article.   .   . (4) no action may be brought under subsection (1), (4) les actions visées au paragraphe (1) se prescrivent : (a) in the case of an action based on conduct that is con- trary to any provision of part vi, after two years from a) dans le cas de celles qui sont fondées sur un com- portement qui va à l’encontre d’une disposition de la partie vi, dans les deux ans qui suivent la dernière des dates suivantes : (i) a day on which the conduct was engaged in, or (i) soit la date du comportement en question, 368 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. (ii) the day on which any criminal proceedings relating thereto were finally disposed of, (ii) soit la date où il est statué de façon définitive sur la poursuite; whichever is the later   .   . [135] the plaintiff’s action against the pioneer defendants, which is based in part on s. 36(1) of the competition act, was commenced on august 16, 2013 — more than two years following the end of the class period, which is the period during which the al- leged price- fixing conspiracy took place. the pioneer defendants take the position that the plaintiff’s claim for recovery under s. 36(1) of the competition act is time- barred by the limitation period in s 36(4)(a)(i). the plaintiff, for his part, says that both the discovera- bility rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment apply to toll that limitation period. if either applies, then the limitation clock will have begun ticking on the date that he discovered, or ought to have discov- ered, the existence of the alleged conspiracy. in order to succeed, therefore, the pioneer [136] defendants must persuade this court that neither the discoverability rule nor the doctrine of fraudulent concealment has any application in this case. a does the discoverability rule apply to the lim‑ itation period contained in the statutory cause of action in section 36 of the competition act? [137] on this first limitations issue raised in the pioneer appeal, my colleague takes the view that the discoverability rule postpones the commencement of the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) until the time at which the potential claimant discovers, or is reasonably capable of discovering, the existence of the impugned conduct that forms the basis of a claim under s 36(1). i respectfully disagree, for the reasons that follow. [135] fondée en partie sur le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence, l’action du demandeur contre les défenderesses pioneer a été intentée le 16 août 2013, plus de deux ans après la fin de la période visée par le recours collectif, soit la période durant la- quelle le complot allégué de fixation des prix a eu lieu. les défenderesses pioneer sont d’avis que le recours en indemnisation intenté par le demandeur au titre du par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence est prescrit en raison du délai de prescription prévu au sous-al 36(4)a)(i). le demandeur, quant à lui, affirme que tant la règle de la possibilité de découvrir que la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse s’appliquent de manière à repousser le point de départ de ce délai de prescription. si l’une ou l’autre s’applique, alors le délai de prescription aura commencé à courir à la date à laquelle le demandeur a découvert, ou aurait dû découvrir, l’existence du complot allégué. [136] donc, pour obtenir gain de cause, les défen- deresses pioneer doivent convaincre notre cour que ni la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ni la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse ne s’appliquent en l’espèce. a la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’ap‑ plique‑t‑elle au délai de prescription applicable à la cause d’action prévue à l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence? [137] en ce qui concerne la première question rela- tive aux délais de prescription soulevée dans le pour- voi de pioneer, mon collègue se dit d’avis que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir reporte le début du délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) jusqu’au moment où le demandeur éventuel découvre, ou est raisonnablement capable de découvrir, l’existence du comportement reproché qui constitue le fonde- ment de l’action intentée au titre du par 36(1). avec égards, je ne partage pas cet avis pour les motifs qui suivent. [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 369 (1) the discoverability rule (1) la règle de la possibilité de découvrir [138] limitation clauses are statutory provisions that place temporal limits on a claimant’s ability to institute legal proceedings. the expiry of a limitation period has the effect of “extinguish[ing] a party’s legal remedies and also, in some cases, a party’s legal rights” (g. mew, d. rolph and d. zacks, the law of limitations (3rd ed. 2016) (“mew et al.”), at p 3). as this court explained in m (k) v. m (h), [1992] 3 scr 6, statutory limitation clauses re- flect the balance struck by the legislature between three distinct policy rationales: granting repose to defendants, avoiding evidentiary issues relating to the passage of time, and encouraging diligence on the part of plaintiffs. [139] as statutory provisions, limitation clauses give rise to a number of interpretative issues. one important issue is the point at which the limitation period begins running — and in particular, whether the legislature intended that it commence only when the plaintiff has knowledge that the event which sets the clock ticking (sometimes referred to as the “triggering event”) has in fact occurred. this is key, because a determination of when a limitation period expires depends on both its duration and its com- mencement (mew et al., at pp 69-70). [138] les dispositions de prescription sont des dispositions statutaires qui visent à fixer des limites temporelles à la faculté du demandeur de se pour- voir devant les tribunaux. l’expiration d’un délai de prescription a pour effet [traduction] « d’éteindre les recours en justice d’une partie et, dans certains cas, d’éteindre ses droits » (g. mew, d. rolph et d. zacks, the law of limitations (3e éd. 2016) (« mew et autres »), p 3). comme l’a expliqué la cour dans m (k) c. m (h), [1992] 3 rcs 6, les dispo- sitions législatives en matière de prescription re- flètent l’équilibre établi par le législateur entre trois justifications d’ordre public distinctes : procurer la tranquillité d’esprit aux défendeurs, éviter les pro- blèmes de preuve liés à l’écoulement du temps, et encourager les demandeurs à être diligents. [139] à titre de dispositions statutaires, les dispo- sitions de prescription soulèvent plusieurs questions d’interprétation. une question importante concerne le moment où le délai de prescription commence à courir; plus particulièrement, il s’agit de savoir si le législateur voulait que le délai commence à courir uniquement au moment où le demandeur sait que l’événement qui marque le point de départ du délai (parfois appelé le « fait déclencheur ») s’est effec- tivement produit. il est crucial de répondre à cette question puisque, pour déterminer quand un délai de prescription expire, il faut d’abord établir sa durée et la date de son début (mew et autres, p 69-70). [140] discoverability is a judge- made rule of statu- tory interpretation that assists in determining whether the event triggering the commencement of a limita- tion period depends upon the state of the plaintiff’s knowledge. in central trust co. v. rafuse, [1986] 2 scr 147, this court recognized a “general rule that a cause of action arises for the purposes of a limi- tation period when the material facts on which it is based have been discovered or ought to have been discovered by the plaintiff by the exercise of reason- able diligence” (p 224). what this means is that a limitation period that commences upon “the accrual of the [plaintiff’s] cause of action”, or wording to that effect, will begin running only when the plaintiff discovers, or is reasonably capable of discovering, [140] la règle de la possibilité de découvrir est une règle prétorienne d’interprétation statutaire qui aide à déterminer si l’événement qui marque le point de départ du délai de prescription dépend de la connais- sance qu’en avait le demandeur. dans central trust co. c. rafuse, [1986] 2 rcs 147, la cour a reconnu une « règle générale selon laquelle une cause d’action prend naissance, aux fins de la prescription, lorsque les faits importants sur lesquels repose cette cause d’action ont été découverts par le demandeur ou au- raient dû l’être s’il avait fait preuve de diligence rai- sonnable » (p 224). cette règle signifie qu’un délai de prescription qui commence quand [traduction] « la cause d’action [du demandeur] prend naissance », ou toute autre formulation allant dans le même sens, 370 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. the facts giving rise to the cause of action (mew et al., at p 69). that is the point at which that plaintiff’s ability to sue the defendant crystalizes. [141] this court expanded upon the principles applicable to the discoverability rule  in peixeiro v haberman, [1997] 3  scr  549 in that case, major j. clarified that discoverability is not a general rule that applies despite the wording of a legislative enactment, but rather an “interpretive tool for the construing of limitations statutes which ought to be considered each time a limitations provision is in issue” (para 37). in so doing, he endorsed the approach to this rule  that had been taken by the manitoba court of appeal in fehr v. jacob (1993), 14 cclt (2d) 200: in my opinion, the judge- made discoverability rule is nothing more than a rule of construction. whenever a stat- ute requires an action to be commenced within a specified time from the happening of a specific event, the statutory language must be construed. when time runs from “the accrual of the cause of action” or from some other event which can be construed as occurring only when the in- jured party has knowledge of the injury sustained, the judge- made discoverability rule applies. but, when time runs from an event which clearly occurs without regard to the injured party’s knowledge, the judge- made discover- ability rule may not extend the period the legislature has prescribed. [para. 22] ne commencera à courir qu’à partir du moment où le demandeur découvre, ou peut raisonnablement découvrir, les faits à l’origine de la cause d’action (mew et autres, p 69). il s’agit du moment où la capacité du demandeur d’intenter une action contre le défendeur se concrétise. [141] la cour a expliqué plus en détail les prin- cipes applicables à la règle de la possibilité de décou- vrir dans peixeiro c. haberman, [1997] 3 rcs 549. dans cet arrêt, le juge major a précisé que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne constitue pas une règle générale qui s’applique malgré le libellé d’un texte de loi, mais constitue plutôt un « outil qui sert à interpréter les textes de loi établissant des délais de prescription et qui doit être pris en considération chaque fois qu’une telle disposition est en litige » (par 37). ce faisant, il a souscrit à la conception de cette règle qui avait été adoptée par la cour d’ap- pel du manitoba dans l’arrêt fehr c. jacob (1993), 14 cclt (2d) 200 : [traduction] à mon avis, la règle prétorienne de la possibilité de découvrir le dommage n’est rien de plus qu’une règle d’interprétation. dans tous les cas où une loi indique que l’action en justice doit être intentée dans un délai précis après un événement donné, il faut interpréter les termes de cette loi. lorsque le délai court à partir du « moment où naît la cause d’action » ou de tout autre événement qui peut être interprété comme ne survenant qu’au moment où la [partie lésée] prend connaissance du dommage, c’est la règle prétorienne de la possibilité de découvrir le préjudice qui s’applique. toutefois, si le délai court à compter de la date d’un événement qui sur- vient clairement, et sans égard à la connaissance qu’en a la [partie lésée], cette règle ne peut prolonger le délai fixé par le législateur. [par. 22] [142] the limitation period in peixeiro ran for two years from the time when “damages were sustained” by the plaintiff (para 2). applying the test in fehr, major j. found it “unlikely that by using the words ‘damages were sustained’, the legislature intended that the determination of the starting point of the lim- itation period should take place without regard to the injured party’s knowledge” (para 38). in his view, “[t]he use of the phrase ‘damages were sustained’ rather than ‘cause of action arose’    is a distinction without a difference” (ibid). he therefore concluded [142] dans l’arrêt peixeiro, le délai de prescription a couru durant deux ans à compter de la date où les « dommages ont été subis » par le demandeur (par 2). après avoir appliqué le critère établi dans l’arrêt fehr, le juge major a conclu qu’il était « peu probable qu’en utilisant les mots “où les dommages ont été subis” le législateur entendait que l’on dé- termine le point de départ du délai de prescription sans égard au moment où la personne blessée prend connaissance du préjudice » (par 38). à son avis, « [l]’utilisation des mots “date où les dommages ont [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 371 that the discoverability rule applied to the limitation period at issue in that case. [143] a different conclusion was reached by this court on the facts in ryan v. moore, 2005 scc 38, [2005] 2 scr 53. that dispute turned, in part, on the interpretation of a limitation period that “prohib- its an action brought six months after letters of pro- bate or administration of the estate of the deceased have been granted, and after the expiration of one year from the date of death” (para. 18, referring to s. 5 of the survival of actions act, rsnl 1990, c.  s-32) bastarache  j., writing for a unanimous court, once again affirmed the test set out in fehr and reiterated that discoverability is not a general rule but rather an “interpretative tool for construing limitation statutes” (para 23). applying the fehr test to the limitation provision at issue in that case, bastarache j. concluded as follows: pursuant to the survival of actions act, the limitation period is triggered by the death of the defendant or the granting by a court of the letters of administration or probate. the section is clear and explicit: time begins to run from one of these two specific events. the act does not establish a relationship between these events and the injured party’s knowledge. i agree with the appellants that knowledge is not a factor: the death or granting of the let- ters occurs regardless of the state of mind of the plaintiff. we face here a situation in respect of which, as recognized by this court in peixeiro, the judge- made discoverability rule does not apply to extend the period the legislature has prescribed. thus, i agree with the court of appeal that by using a specific event as the starting point of the “limitation clock”, the legislature was displacing the discoverability rule in all the situations to which the survival of actions act applies. [emphasis added; para 27] été subis” au lieu des mots “date où la cause d’ac- tion a pris naissance” [  ] est une distinction sans importance » (ibid). il a donc conclu que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’appliquait au délai de prescription en cause dans cette affaire. [143] notre cour a tiré une conclusion différente au vu des faits dans l’arrêt ryan c. moore, 2005 csc 38, [2005] 2 rcs 53. le litige portait en par- tie sur l’interprétation d’un délai de prescription se- lon lequel « aucune action ne peut être intentée après les six mois qui suivent la délivrance de lettres d’ho- mologation ou d’administration de la succession de la personne décédée et après l’expiration d’un délai d’un an suivant la date du décès » (par. 18, renvoyant à l’art. 5 de la survival of actions act, rsnl 1990, c s-32). s’exprimant au nom d’une cour unanime, le juge bastarache a de nouveau confirmé le critère établi dans l’arrêt fehr et a réaffirmé que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir n’est pas une règle géné- rale, mais plutôt un « outil d’interprétation des lois qui établissent des délais de prescription » (par 23). après avoir appliqué le critère établi dans l’arrêt fehr au délai de prescription en cause dans cette affaire, le juge bastarache a conclu ce qui suit : aux termes de la survival of actions act, le délai de prescription court à compter du décès du défendeur ou de la délivrance, par un tribunal, de lettres d’administration ou d’homologation. l’article est clair et explicite : le délai commence à courir au moment où survient l’un de ces deux faits particuliers. la loi n’établit aucun lien entre ces faits et le moment où la partie lésée en prend connais- sance. je conviens avec les appelants que la connaissance n’est pas un facteur à considérer : le décès ou la délivrance des lettres survient indépendamment de l’état d’esprit du demandeur. en l’espèce, nous nous trouvons devant une situation où, comme notre cour l’a reconnu dans l’arrêt peixeiro, la règle prétorienne de la possibilité de découvrir le dommage ne s’applique pas pour prolonger le délai fixé par le législateur. je suis donc d’accord avec la cour d’appel pour dire qu’en désignant un fait particulier comme élément déclencheur du « compte à rebours de la prescription », le législateur se trouvait à écarter la règle de la possibilité de découvrir le dommage dans tous les cas où la survival of actions act s’applique. [je souligne; par 27] [144] the plaintiff in the instant case agrees that fehr sets out the test for whether a limitation period [144] le demandeur en l’espèce convient que l’ar- rêt fehr établit le critère à appliquer pour décider si 372 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. is subject to the discoverability rule (rf (pioneer. appeal), at para. 29), and my colleague affirms this approach at paras. 31-35 of his reasons. however, he goes on to opine that “where the event triggering the limitation period is an element of the cause of action, the legislature has shown its intention that the limitation period be linked to the cause of ac- tion’s accrual, such that discoverability will apply” (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 38 (emphasis added)). in other words, he equates language referring to the accrual or arising of the cause of action in its entirety with language referring to the occurrence of an element of the cause of action; in his view, both evidence a legislative intent that the discoverability rule apply. un délai de prescription est assujetti à la règle de la possibilité de découvrir (mi (pourvoi de pioneer), par. 29), et mon collègue confirme cette approche aux par. 31-35 de ses motifs. il ajoute cependant que « lorsque l’événement marquant le point de départ du délai de prescription est un élément de la cause d’ac- tion, la législature a manifesté son intention que le délai de prescription soit lié à la naissance de la cause d’action, déclenchant du même coup l’application de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir » (motifs du juge brown, par. 38 (je souligne)). autrement dit, il assimile les mots désignant la naissance de la cause d’action dans son ensemble à ceux qui désignent la survenance d’un élément de la cause d’action; selon lui, les deux témoignent de l’intention du législateur que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique. [145] although this approach accords with the view expressed by the british columbia court of appeal in this case (paras. 89-90), as well as by the ontario court of appeal in fanshawe college of applied arts and technology v. au optronics corp., 2016 onca 621, 132 or (3d) 81, at paras. 40, 43 and 45, my respectful view is that it expands the scope of the discoverability rule in a manner that is neither consistent with precedent nor justifiable in principle. [145] bien que cette approche concorde avec l’avis exprimé par la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique en l’espèce (par. 89-90), ainsi qu’avec celui de la cour d’appel de l’ontario dans l’arrêt fanshawe college of applied arts and technology c. au optronics corp., 2016 onca 621, 132 or. (3d) 81, par. 40, 43 et 45, à mon humble avis, cette approche étend la portée de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir d’une manière qui n’est ni conforme à la jurisprudence ni justifiable en principe. [146] first, the suggestion that discoverability ap- plies in all cases where the triggering event is “the occurrence of an element of the underlying cause of action” (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 44) broadens the test set out by the manitoba court of appeal in fehr — a test which my colleague purports to endorse at paras. 33-35 of his reasons. in that case, twaddle ja was very clear in explaining that the discoverability rule applies “[w]hen time runs from ‘the accrual of the cause of action’ or from some other event which can be construed as occurring only when the injured party has knowledge of the injury sustained” (para 22). only these two situations were identified; there was no indication whatsoever that the discoverability rule ought to apply automatically in circumstances where the triggering event is merely the occurrence of a component element of the cause of action (and not the accrual of the cause of action in its entirety). [146] d’abord, l’idée selon laquelle la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique dans tous les cas où le fait déclencheur est « la survenance d’un élé- ment de la cause d’action » (motifs du juge brown, par. 44) étend la portée du critère établi par la cour d’appel du manitoba dans l’arrêt fehr — un critère auquel mon collègue semble souscrire aux par. 33-35 de ses motifs. dans cette affaire, le juge twaddle a expliqué très clairement que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique [traduction] « [l]orsque le délai court à partir du “moment où naît la cause d’action” ou de tout autre événement qui peut être interprété comme ne survenant qu’au moment où la partie lésée prend connaissance du préjudice qu’elle a subi » (par 22). seules ces deux situations ont été mentionnées; rien n’indiquait que la règle de la pos- sibilité de découvrir doit s’appliquer automatique‑ ment dans les cas où le fait déclencheur n’est que la survenance d’un élément de la cause d’action (et non la naissance de la cause d’action dans son ensemble). [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 373 [147] not only did this court endorse fehr in both peixeiro and ryan, but both appeals were resolved on a fairly straightforward application of this approach to discoverability. in peixeiro, this court reasoned that the limitation period — which commenced when “damages were sustained” — fell within the first cat- egory outlined in fehr (to which the discoverability rule applies), given that this triggering event did not occur without regard to the plaintiff’s knowledge. likewise, ryan was decided on the basis that the events triggering the commencement of the limi- tation period at issue — the death of the defendant or the granting of letters of administration or pro- bate — occurred regardless of the plaintiff’s state of mind and therefore fell within the second category in fehr, to which the discoverability rule has no application (para 27). put simply, neither case was resolved by determining whether the triggering event was “related to”, “linked to the basis of” or “an ele- ment of” the plaintiff’s cause of action. it is true that this court in ryan stated that [148] the discoverability rule does not apply where the limitation period “is explicitly linked by the gov- erning legislation to a fixed event unrelated to the injured party’s knowledge or the basis of the cause of action” (para. 24 (emphasis added)). the court of appeal in the present case characterized this as an “unequivocal statement . . . that the rule can apply where the limitation period is linked to ‘the basis of the cause of action’” (para 89). with respect, the court of appeal’s narrow focus on this specific statement ignores the broader context in which it was made. in the immediately preceding paragraph in ryan (ie para. 23), bastarache j. reaffirmed — and reproduced in full — the approach to discoverability set out in fehr, and the statement in question appears to be nothing more than a paraphrased summary of this well- accepted approach. moreover, in the same paragraph (ie para. 24), bastarache j. explained that the discoverability rule does apply where the commencement of the limitation period is “related by the legislation to the arising or accrual of the cause [147] non seulement notre cour a souscrit à l’arrêt fehr dans peixeiro et ryan, mais les deux pourvois ont été tranchés en appliquant, de façon relativement simple, la règle de la possibilité de découvrir. dans l’arrêt peixeiro, la cour a jugé que le délai de pres- cription — qui avait commencé à courir au moment où les « dommages ont été subis » — appartenait à la première catégorie énoncée dans l’arrêt fehr (à laquelle s’applique la règle de la possibilité de découvrir), puisque ce fait déclencheur n’était pas survenu indépendamment de la connaissance qu’en avait le demandeur. de même, dans l’arrêt ryan, le pourvoi a été tranché à partir du principe que les événements qui ont marqué le point de départ du délai de prescription en question — soit le décès du défendeur ou la délivrance de lettres d’homologation ou d’administration — étaient survenus indépendam- ment de l’état d’esprit du demandeur et appartenaient donc à la deuxième catégorie énoncée dans l’arrêt fehr, à laquelle la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas (par 27). autrement dit, aucun des deux pourvois n’a été tranché en décidant si le fait déclencheur avait « un rapport avec » la cause d’ac- tion du demandeur, était « lié au fondement » de cette cause d’action ou « en constitu[ait] un élément ». il est vrai que dans l’arrêt ryan, notre cour a [148] déclaré que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas dans les cas où « la loi applicable lie expressément le délai de prescription à un événement déterminé qui n’a rien à voir avec le moment où la partie lésée en prend connaissance ou avec le fonde- ment de la cause d’action » (par. 24 (je souligne)). en l’espèce, la cour d’appel a estimé que ces pro- pos équivalaient à une [traduction] « déclaration sans équivoque [  ] que la règle peut s’appliquer lorsqu’un délai de prescription est lié au “fondement de la cause d’action” » (par 89). avec égards, par son interprétation étroite de cette phrase précise, la cour d’appel ne tient pas compte du contexte plus large dans lequel elle a été formulée. au paragraphe précédent dans l’arrêt ryan (soit le par. 23), le juge bastarache a réitéré — et reproduit en entier — la conception de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir établie dans l’arrêt fehr, et l’énoncé en question semble n’être rien de plus qu’un résumé paraphrasé de cette approche bien acceptée. en outre, dans le même paragraphe (soit le par. 24), le juge bastarache 374 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. of action”. from my reading of ryan, i see no intent on the part of this court to broaden the traditional approach to discoverability, and for this reason, my view is that the words “basis of the cause of action” in para. 24 of ryan should be understood as essen- tially synonymous with the “arising or accrual of the cause of action”. [149] in any event, principle also commands that the discoverability rule apply only where the limi- tation period runs from the “accrual of the cause of action” (or wording to that effect) or from the occur- rence of some event that is related to the state of the plaintiff’s knowledge. this is because discoverability is nothing more than a tool of statutory interpretation. where a legislature provides that a limitation period is triggered by an event whose occurrence depends on the plaintiff’s knowledge, courts give effect to this legislative direction by calculating the running of the limitation period from the point at which the plaintiff acquired or was capable of acquiring such knowl- edge. conversely, where the legislature provides that a limitation period is triggered by an event that occurs without regard to the plaintiff’s state of mind, the courts do not — and indeed, cannot — apply the discoverability rule to postpone the commence- ment of the limitation period until such time as the plaintiff discovered, or ought to have discovered, that the event had taken place. courts are bound to interpret and apply statutory law; they cannot rewrite it (reference re pan‑ canadian securities regulation, 2018 scc 48, [2018] 3 scr 189, at paras. 54-55 and 58). a expliqué que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique lorsque « la loi lie le point de départ du délai de prescription à la naissance de la cause d’ac- tion ». à la lecture de l’arrêt ryan, je ne puis discer- ner, de la part de la cour, une quelconque intention d’étendre la conception traditionnelle de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir et, pour cette raison, je suis d’avis que l’expression « fondement de la cause d’ac- tion » figurant au par. 24 de l’arrêt ryan devrait être considérée comme étant essentiellement synonyme de l’expression « naissance de la cause d’action ». [149] quoi qu’il en soit, le principe commande également que la règle de la possibilité de décou- vrir s’applique uniquement dans les affaires où le délai de prescription commence à courir au moment où « la cause d’action prend naissance » (ou toute autre formulation allant dans le même sens) ou au moment où survient un événement qui a un rapport avec la connaissance du demandeur. il en est ainsi parce que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir n’est rien d’autre qu’un outil d’interprétation statutaire. lorsque le législateur précise que le point de départ d’un délai de prescription est marqué par un événe- ment dont la survenance dépend de la connaissance qu’en a le demandeur, les tribunaux donnent effet à cette intention législative en calculant la durée du délai de prescription à partir du moment où le demandeur a pris connaissance, ou pouvait prendre connaissance, de l’événement. à l’inverse, lorsque le législateur prévoit que le point de départ d’un délai de prescription est marqué par un événement qui sur- vient indépendamment de l’état d’esprit du deman- deur, les tribunaux n’appliquent pas — et, en fait, ne peuvent appliquer — la règle de la possibilité de découvrir pour reporter le point de départ du délai de prescription jusqu’à ce que le demandeur découvre, ou aurait dû découvrir, la survenance de l’événement. les tribunaux sont tenus d’interpréter et d’appliquer la loi; ils ne peuvent pas la réécrire (renvoi relatif à la réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobi‑ lières, 2018 csc 48, [2018] 3 rcs 189, par. 54-55 et 58). [150] limitation periods that begin running upon the accrual of the plaintiff’s cause of action evi- dently fall within the first category outlined in the preceding paragraph. mew et al. note that a cause [150] les délais de prescription qui commencent à courir lorsque prend naissance la cause d’action du demandeur appartiennent évidemment à la première catégorie énoncée au paragraphe précédent. selon [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 375 of action arises only “when all of the elements of a wrong existed, such that an action could be brought” (p. 69), and conversely, that “no cause of action can be said to have accrued unless there is a plaintiff available who is capable of commencing an action and a defendant in existence who is capable of being sued” (p. 70 (footnotes omitted)). because a cause of action cannot accrue before the plaintiff discovers that they have the right to commence proceedings against the defendant, a legislature which provides for a limitation period that begins running at that point in time necessarily intends the discoverability rule to apply. this explains the reasoning behind the “general rule” set out by this court in central trust (see para. 140 above) and affirmed in m (k). it is essential to recognize that the limitation period in each case was triggered by the accrual or arising of the plaintiff’s cause of action. [151] conversely, “the occurrence of an element of the underlying cause of action” (brown j.’s reasons, at para. 44) will not always fit within either cate- gory outlined above at para 149. it may be that the occurrence of such an event does in fact depend on the state of the plaintiff’s knowledge, but unlike the accrual of a cause of action, this does not invariably follow as a matter of logical necessity. in peixeiro, for example, this court held that the point at which damages are sustained — a constituent element of (among other things) the tort of negligence — de- pends on when the plaintiff actually has knowledge of his or her injury. knowledge will not form part of every element of the cause of action in negligence, however. a breach of a standard of care, for example, may occur years or even decades before the plain- tiff first learns about it. although such a breach is a prerequisite to a successful claim in negligence, it is also something that takes place without any regard to the plaintiff’s state of mind. mew et autres, une cause d’action prend naissance uniquement [traduction] « lorsque sont survenus tous les éléments constitutifs d’une faute, de sorte qu’une action pourrait être intentée » (p. 69) et, inver- sement, « aucune cause d’action n’est réputée avoir pris naissance à moins qu’il existe un demandeur disponible et capable d’intenter une action et un défendeur qui puisse être poursuivi » (p. 70 (notes en bas de page omises)). puisque la cause d’action d’un demandeur ne peut prendre naissance tant que celui-ci n’a pas découvert qu’il est en droit d’intenter une action contre le défendeur, le législateur qui pré- voit qu’un délai de prescription commence à courir à ce moment précis entend nécessairement que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique. cela explique le raisonnement qui sous- tend la « règle gé- nérale » établie par la cour dans l’arrêt central trust (voir le par. 140 précité) et confirmée dans m (k). il est essentiel de reconnaître que la naissance de la cause d’action du demandeur a marqué le point du délai de prescription dans tous les cas. [151] par contre, « la survenance d’un élément de la cause d’action » (motifs du juge brown, par. 44) ne cadrera pas toujours avec l’une ou l’autre des catégories énoncées ci- dessus au par 149. il se peut que la survenance d’un tel élément dépende de la connaissance du demandeur, mais contrairement à la naissance de la cause d’action, cela ne constituera pas invariablement une nécessité logique. dans l’ar- rêt peixeiro, par exemple, la cour a déclaré que le moment où les dommages sont subis — un élément constitutif du délit de négligence (entre autres) — dépend du moment où le demandeur a connaissance de son préjudice. toutefois, la connaissance ne fera pas partie intégrante de chaque élément de la cause d’action dans un cas de négligence. un manquement à la norme de diligence, par exemple, peut avoir eu lieu des années, voire des décennies, avant que le demandeur n’en ait pris connaissance. bien que ce manquement constitue une condition préalable à remplir pour qu’une action pour négligence soit accueillie, il s’agit également d’un événement qui survient indépendamment de l’état d’esprit du de- mandeur. it is for this reason that i disagree in principle [152] with the proposition that the discoverability rule must [152] c’est pour cette raison que je suis en désac- cord, en principe, avec la proposition selon laquelle 376 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. always apply where the triggering event “is related to”, “is linked to the basis of” or “constitutes an ele- ment of” the plaintiff’s cause of action. my position is instead consistent with that stated by marshall ja. of the newfoundland court of appeal in snow v. kashyap (1995), 125 nfld. & peir 182:. where the limitation period is set by the terms of the stat- ute to run from the time when an action arises or accrues, as in kamloops [v. nielsen, [1984] 2 scr 2,] and central trust, there is room to imply that the legislation does not intend the period to commence until the injured party has, or ought to have, an awareness of the claim’s existence. the criteria under such legislation provisions, therefore, imports a mental element. however, when the limitation statute explicitly ties the prescription period to a specific occurrence, such as the termination of professional ser- vices, knowledge of the claimant cannot be construed as a factor. in such instances it is the happening of the factual event which is explicitly relevant and any interpretation implying the period to be related to the claimant’s con- sciousness of the circumstances is precluded. no scope exists to imply the discoverability rule into the legislative intent. [emphasis added; para 38] [153] with this in mind, i am respectfully of the view that my colleague’s approach is undermined by the well- settled principle that the discoverability rule is fundamentally a rule of statutory interpreta- tion. the fact that a limitation period begins running upon the occurrence of an element (and not upon the accrual or arising) of the plaintiff’s cause of action is not, on its own, indicative of any legislative intent regarding the applicability of the discoverability rule. as i have already indicated, my colleague’s con- clusion is the same as the one reached by the court of appeal in this case and by the ontario court of appeal in fanshawe: in such circumstances, accord- ing to him, discoverability applies automatically. this, however, creates an arbitrary distinction be- tween triggering events that are related to the cause of action and those that are not, despite the fact that both may occur independently of the plaintiff’s state of mind. how can it fairly be said that the legislature la règle de la possibilité de découvrir doit toujours s’appliquer lorsque le fait déclencheur « a un rapport avec », « est lié au fondement de » ou « constitue un élément de » la cause d’action du demandeur. ma position concorde plutôt avec celle exprimée par le juge marshall, de la cour d’appel de terre- neuve, dans l’arrêt snow c. kashyap (1995), 125 nfld. & peir 182 : [traduction] lorsque le libellé de la loi prévoit que le délai de prescription doit commencer à courir au moment où la cause d’action prend naissance, comme dans les arrêts kamloops [(ville de) c. nielsen, [1984] 2 rcs 2,] et central trust, il y a lieu de présumer que le législateur ne souhaitait pas que le délai de prescription ne commence à courir qu’une fois que la partie lésée a découvert, ou aurait dû découvrir, l’existence de la faute. par conséquent, le critère prévu par ces dispositions législatives suppose un élément mental. cependant, lorsque la loi en matière de prescription lie expressément le délai de prescription à un événement précis, comme la résiliation de services professionnels, la connaissance du demandeur ne peut être considérée comme un facteur. dans de tels cas, c’est la survenance de l’événement qui importe expressément, et toute interprétation donnant à penser que le délai de prescription est lié à la connaissance qu’a le demandeur des circonstances est exclue. la règle de la possibilité de découvrir le dommage ne doit en aucun cas être interprétée comme une intention du législateur. [je souligne; par 38] [153] compte tenu de ce qui précède, je suis res- pectueusement d’avis que l’approche de mon col- lègue est sapée par le principe bien établi selon lequel la règle de la possibilité de découvrir constitue fon- damentalement une règle d’interprétation statutaire. le fait qu’un délai de prescription commence à cou- rir au moment où survient un élément de la cause d’action du demandeur (et non au moment où celle-ci prend naissance) n’indique pas, à lui seul, que le législateur avait une quelconque intention quant à l’applicabilité de la règle de la possibilité de décou- vrir. comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, la conclusion de mon collègue est la même que celle tirée par la cour d’appel en l’espèce, et la même que celle tirée par la cour d’appel de l’ontario dans l’arrêt fanshawe : en pareilles circonstances, selon lui, la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique automatiquement. cela crée toutefois une distinction arbitraire entre les faits déclencheurs ayant un rapport avec la cause [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 377 intended the discoverability rule to apply to one and not the other? although knowledge is necessary for a cause of action to fully accrue to the plaintiff, it does not follow that an element of the cause of action also occurs only when the plaintiff has knowledge thereof. [154] a preferable approach is instead one that considers each statutory limitation clause on its own terms, recognizing that a triggering event that relates to a cause of action can, but need not, be dependent upon the plaintiff’s state of mind. this approach is faithful to this court’s jurisprudence, and respectful of the notion of discoverability as an interpretative tool and not a general rule that allows clear statutory wording to be disregarded. for my part, i would reaffirm the approach laid out in fehr without any modification. (2) application of the discoverability rule to the limitation period in section 36(4)(a)(i) [155] given the foregoing, it is no surprise that i disagree with my colleague that the discoverability rule applies to the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the competition act on the basis that “the event triggering this particular limitation period is an ele- ment of the underlying cause of action” (brown j.’s reasons, at para 44). rather, the conclusion that results from applying the law as i explained it in the preceding section is that this limitation period com- mences on the day on which the conduct contrary to part vi actually takes place, and not the day on which a potential claimant discovers, or is reasonably capable of discovering, that it took place. d’action et ceux qui n’en ont pas, même si les deux peuvent se produire indépendamment de l’état d’es- prit du demandeur. comment peut-on dire en toute équité que la législature souhaitait que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique à l’un et non à l’autre? bien que la connaissance soit nécessaire pour qu’une cause d’action soit pleinement dévolue au demandeur, il ne s’ensuit pas qu’un élément de la cause d’action survient uniquement lorsque le demandeur en a connaissance. [154] il vaut mieux plutôt examiner chaque dis- position statutaire de prescription selon ses propres termes, en tenant compte du fait qu’un fait déclen- cheur ayant un rapport avec une cause d’action peut, mais ne doit pas nécessairement, dépendre de la connaissance du demandeur. cette approche est fi- dèle à la jurisprudence de la cour et respecte l’idée selon laquelle la règle de la possibilité de découvrir constitue un outil d’interprétation et non une règle générale qui permet de passer outre au texte clair de la loi. pour ma part, je suis d’avis de réitérer l’approche adoptée dans l’arrêt fehr sans aucune modification. (2) application de la règle de la possibilité de découvrir au délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) [155] compte tenu de ce qui précède, il n’est guère étonnant que je sois en désaccord avec mon collègue que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique au délai de prescription prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) de la loi sur la concurrence au motif que « le fait dé- clencheur de ce délai de prescription est un élément de la cause d’action sous- jacente » (motifs du juge brown, par 44). en fait, comme je l’ai expliqué dans la section précédente, l’application du droit mène à la conclusion que le délai de prescription commence à courir à la date à laquelle le comportement allant à l’encontre de la partie vi se produit, et non à la date où le demandeur éventuel découvre ou est raisonna- blement capable de découvrir que le comportement en question s’est produit. [156] section 36 of the competition act was “care- fully constructed” to create a limited cause of action in respect of serious criminal offences under part vi [156] l’article 36 de la loi sur la concurrence a été « soigneusement défini », de manière à créer une cause d’action limitée à l’égard de certaines 378 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. of the competition act (general motors of canada ltd. v. city national leasing, [1989] 1 scr 641, at p 689). for example, parliament limited recovery to an amount “equal to the loss or damage proved to have been suffered” by the plaintiff as a result of the prohibited conduct, thereby foreclosing the availa- bility of other types of damages, such as aggravated or punitive damages. section 36(2) provides plain- tiffs with a shortcut to proving conspiracy where the defendant was convicted of the underlying offence. and of significance for our purposes is the fact that this cause of action is circumscribed by a complex twofold limitation period at s. 36(4) that reflects the balance struck by parliament among the certainty, evidentiary and diligence rationales that underlie this area of the law. [157] the wording of the limitation period set out in s. 36(4)(a)(i) provides ample support for the prop- osition that the two- year period commences inde- pendently of when the plaintiff first learns of the wrongdoing. rather than having the limitation period commence upon the accrual of the cause of action (as was the case in central trust and m (k)),. parliament decided that it would instead commence on “a day on which the conduct was engaged in” — which, contrary to the position taken by my colleague, is not “wording to [the same] effect” as “accrual of the cause of action” (paras. 37 and 41). there is simply no link between this triggering event and the plain- tiff’s state of mind; it is, in short, an “event which clearly occurs without regard to the injured party’s knowledge”. the certification judge’s reading of this provision led him to the same conclusion (para. 54 (canlii)). it was the existence of conflicting juris- prudence on this point that caused him “not [to be] satisfied that it is plain and obvious that the discov- erability principle can never apply to the limitation period in s. 36(4)” (para 58). infractions criminelles graves visées par la partie vi de la loi sur la concurrence (general motors of can‑ ada ltd. c. city national leasing, [1989] 1 rcs. 641, p 689). par exemple, le parlement a restreint le recouvrement des dommages- intérêts à une somme « égale au montant de la perte ou des dommages [que le demandeur est reconnu] avoir subis » par suite du comportement reproché, écartant ainsi la possibi- lité d’obtenir d’autres types de dommages- intérêts, comme des dommages- intérêts majorés ou punitifs. le paragraphe 36(2) prévoit un raccourci qui permet au demandeur de prouver l’existence d’un complot lorsque le défendeur est déclaré coupable de l’infrac- tion sous- jacente. je tiens également à souligner que la présente cause d’action est circonscrite par un délai de prescription complexe à deux volets au par. 36(4) qui illustre l’équilibre établi par le parlement entre les justifications propres à ce domaine de droit, soit la certitude, la preuve et la diligence. [157] le libellé du sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) justifie am- plement d’affirmer que le délai de prescription de deux ans commence à courir sans égard au moment où le demandeur apprend l’existence de l’acte fau- tif. au lieu de prévoir que le délai de prescription commence à courir à la date où la cause d’action prend naissance (comme dans les affaires central trust et m (k)), le parlement a décidé qu’il com- mençait plutôt à courir à la « date du comportement en question » — ce qui, contrairement à la position de mon collègue, ne sont pas des « mots [utilisés dans le] sens » de « naissance de la cause d’action » (par. 37 et 41). il n’existe tout simplement aucun lien entre ce fait déclencheur et l’état d’esprit du demandeur. il s’agit, en bref, d’un « événement qui survient clairement, et sans égard à la connaissance qu’en a la [partie lésée] ». l’interprétation que le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation donne à cette disposition l’a amené à tirer la même conclusion (par. 54 (canlii)). la jurisprudence contradictoire sur ce point a fait en sorte que le juge [traduction] « n’était pas convaincu qu’il est évident et manifeste que le principe de la possibilité de découvrir ne peut jamais s’appliquer au délai de prescription prévu au par. 36(4) » (par 58). i acknowledge that the “discoverability rule [158] has been applied by this court even to statutes of [158] je conviens que la « règle de la possibilité de découvrir le dommage a été appliquée par la cour [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 379 limitation in which plain construction of the lan- guage used would appear to exclude the operation of the rule” (peixeiro, at para 38). however, a con- sideration of the context surrounding s. 36(4)(a)(i) lends further support to the conclusion that the dis- coverability rule does not apply. même à l’égard de textes de loi établissant des délais de prescription dont le libellé, interprété littérale- ment, semblait exclure l’application de la règle » (peixeiro, par 38). toutefois, l’examen du contexte entourant le sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) étaye davantage la conclusion que cette règle ne s’applique pas. [159] first, the cause of action in s. 36(1)(a) is based on two essential elements: (i) the defendant engaging in conduct contrary to any provision of part vi, and (ii) the plaintiff suffering loss or damage as a result of such conduct. it is only upon the occur- rence of both events that the plaintiff can commence proceedings on the basis of this statutory cause of action. cognizant of this, and of the fact that conspir- acies of this nature take place in secret, parliament decided that the limitation period would not begin when the plaintiff actually sustained loss or damage, but rather when the defendant engaged in the prohib- ited conduct. it is important to keep in mind that the point at which the conduct is engaged in necessarily precedes the point at which a claimant will suffer loss or damage as a result of such conduct. i would also note that the offence under s. 45 is complete as soon as an unlawful agreement is made, meaning that the “conduct” is “engaged in” even if the agreement is not actually implemented or prices do not actually increase. it follows as a direct consequence of this legislative choice that the limitation period can in fact expire before the plaintiff is in a position to commence proceedings under s 36(1)(a). [159] premièrement, la cause d’action prévue à l’al. 36(1)a) est fondée sur deux éléments essen- tiels : (i) le défendeur dont le comportement va à l’encontre d’une disposition de la partie vi, et (ii) le demandeur qui subit une perte ou des dommages par suite d’un tel comportement. ce n’est que lorsque ces deux événements se produisent que le deman- deur peut engager des poursuites sur le fondement de cette cause d’action prévue par la loi. ainsi, et compte tenu de la nature secrète des complots de ce genre, le parlement a décidé que le délai de prescription ne commencerait pas à courir à la date à laquelle le demandeur subit réellement une perte ou des dommages, mais plutôt à la date à laquelle le défendeur adopte le comportement reproché. il est important de se rappeler que le moment où se produit le comportement en question précède for- cément le moment où le demandeur subit une perte ou des dommages par suite d’un tel comportement. je tiens également à faire remarquer que l’infraction prévue à l’art. 45 est commise dès la conclusion de l’accord illégal, ce qui signifie que le « comporte- ment » a eu lieu même si l’accord n’est pas mis en œuvre ou il n’y a pas véritablement de majoration des prix. le choix du législateur entraîne comme conséquence directe la possibilité que le délai de prescription expire avant que le demandeur soit en mesure d’intenter une action sur le fondement de l’al 36(1)a). [160] second, s. 36(4)(a)(ii) provides a mecha- nism for the plaintiff to advance a claim that may be barred by s. 36(4)(a)(i): even if two years have expired from the day on which the prohibited con- duct was engaged in, the limitation period will restart on the day on which criminal proceedings relating to the impugned conduct are finally disposed of. while s. 36(4)(a)(ii) applies only where the alleged conduct contrary to part vi is the subject of crimi- nal prosecution, it nevertheless provides an indica- tion that parliament was aware of the strictness of [160] deuxièmement, le sous-al. 36(4)a)(ii) prévoit un mécanisme permettant au demandeur d’intenter une action prescrite par le sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) : même s’il s’est écoulé deux ans depuis la date où le com- portement prohibé a eu lieu, le délai de prescription recommence à courir à la date où il est statué de façon définitive sur la poursuite criminelle visant le com- portement reproché. bien que le sous-al. 36(4)a)(ii) s’applique seulement dans les cas où le comporte- ment reproché contraire à la partie vi fait l’objet d’une poursuite criminelle, ce sous- alinéa révèle 380 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. s. 36(4)(a)(i) and chose to enact this provision as the only means of relieving against it. [161] third, and unlike claims subject to the gen- eral limitation period in british columbia’s limita‑ tion act, sbc 2012, c. 13, s. 21, parliament has not subjected claims under s. 36(1)(a) to any ultimate limitation period. interpreting s. 36(4)(a)(i) as com- mencing only when the underlying conduct becomes discoverable will therefore have the effect of leaving defendants at risk of lawsuit indefinitely. as paul- erik veel helpfully observes, the result would be that “[c]ompanies could face claims decades later, well after the employees involved in the alleged con- spiracy may have left and documents lost, without any ability to defend themselves” (waiting forever for the axe to drop? discoverability and the limita‑ tion period for competition act claims, lenczner slaght, august 12, 2016 (online)). this runs contrary to the certainty and evidentiary rationales that under- lie the law of limitations. [162] fourth, the two- year limitation period was enacted by parliament at a time when limitation periods were comparatively much longer. for ex- ample, the provincial limitations statutes that were in force at the time in ontario and british columbia set out a general limitation period of six years (the limitations act, rso 1970, c. 246, s. 45(1); statute of limitations, rsbc 1960, c. 370, s 3). the rel- atively short limitation period at issue here, which commences even before the cause of action fully crystalizes, provides a further indication of the pre- mium that parliament placed on granting repose to defendants and encouraging diligence by potential plaintiffs. néanmoins que le parlement était conscient de la rigueur du sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) et a choisi de l’édicter parce qu’il s’agissait du seul moyen d’établir une exception à la règle. [161] troisièmement, contrairement aux demandes assujetties au délai de prescription général prévu par la limitation act, sbc 2012, c. 13, art. 21, de la colombie- britannique, le parlement n’a aucunement assorti le recours fondé sur l’al. 36(1)a) d’un délai de prescription ultime. si l’on tient pour acquis que le dé- lai prévu au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) ne commence à courir que lorsque le comportement visé peut être découvert, il va sans dire que les défendeurs risquent de se faire poursuivre indéfiniment. comme paul-erik veel le fait observer à juste titre, il s’ensuivrait que [traduc- tion] « [l]es entreprises risqueraient de se faire pour- suivre des décennies plus tard, longtemps après que les employés ayant participé au complot allégué aient quitté leur poste et que les documents aient été égarés, et sans que les employés ne puissent se défendre » (waiting forever for the axe to drop? discoverability and the limitation period for competition act claims, lenczner slaght, 12 août 2016 (en ligne)). cela va à l’encontre des justifications en matière de certitude et de preuve qui constituent le fondement du droit en matière de prescription. [162] quatrièmement, le parlement a fixé le délai de prescription à deux ans à une époque où les délais étaient comparativement beaucoup plus longs. par exemple, les lois provinciales sur la prescription en vigueur à l’époque en ontario et en colombie- britannique prévoyaient un délai de prescription gé- néral de six ans (the limitations act, rso 1970, c. 246, par. 45(1); statute of limitations, rsbc. 1960, c. 370, art 3). le délai relativement court en cause dans la présente affaire, qui commence à courir avant même que la cause d’action ne prenne entièrement forme, révèle là encore la grande im- portance que le parlement a attachée aux objec- tifs d’assurer la tranquillité d’esprit des défendeurs et d’encourager les demandeurs potentiels à faire preuve de diligence. [163] the statutory provision at issue here is therefore akin to s 13814 of ontario’s securities act, rso 1990, c. s.5, which this court recently [163] la disposition statutaire en cause dans l’af- faire qui nous occupe s’apparente donc à l’art 13814 de la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, lro 1990, [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 381 considered in canadian imperial bank of commerce v. green, 2015 scc 60, [2015] 3 scr 801; because there is no suspension mechanism built into that statutory limitation clause, “the limitation period begins to run regardless of knowledge on the plain- tiff’s part, be it on when a document containing a misrepresentation is released, when an oral state- ment containing a misrepresentation is made, or when there is a failure to make timely disclosure” (para 79). under both provisions, the limitation pe- riod is triggered by an event that is unrelated to the state of the plaintiff’s knowledge. this is consistent with a number of judicial decisions that considered this issue as it pertains to s. 36 of the competition act (see: ccs corp. v. secure energy services inc., 2014 abca 96, 575 ar 1, at para. 4; laboratoires servier v. apotex inc., 2008 fc 825, 67 cpr (4th) 241, at para. 488; garford pty ltd. v. dywidag sys‑ tems international, canada, ltd., 2010 fc 996, 88 cpr (4th) 7, at paras. 28-33; eli lilly and co. v. apotex inc., 2009 fc 991, 80 cpr (4th) 1, at para. 729; fairview donut inc. v. the tdl group corp., 2012 onsc 1252, at paras. 643-46 (canlii)). [164] on a different note, i am not persuaded that a short limitation period, to which the discoverabil- ity rule does not apply, will defeat the purpose for which parliament enacted s. 36 and the rest of the competition act. civil liability under s. 36 is not the exclusive means by which persons are held to account for anti- competitive conduct: the statute also provides for a variety of penal and administrative consequences for activities that reduce competition in the marketplace. moreover, as i will explain later in these reasons, alleged wrongdoers may also be liable at common law or in equity for conduct that constitutes an offence under part vi. a short limi- tation period for the cause of action under s. 36(1) therefore does not defeat parliament’s objective of “maintain[ing] and encourag[ing] competition in canada    in order to provide consumers with com- petitive prices and product choices” (competition act, s 11). c s5, de l’ontario, sur lequel s’est penché récem- ment notre cour dans banque canadienne impé‑ riale de commerce c. green, 2015 csc 60, [2015] 3 rcs 801. faute de mécanisme interne de sus- pension prévu par la loi, « le délai de prescription commenc[e] à courir sans égard à la connaissance du demandeur, que ce soit lors de la publication d’un document contenant une déclaration inexacte de faits, lors d’une déclaration orale contenant une déclaration inexacte de faits, ou en cas de défaut de divulgation en temps utile » (par 79). selon les deux dispositions, le point de départ du délai de prescription est déclenché par un événement étran- ger à la connaissance du demandeur. ce principe est conforme à plusieurs décisions judiciaires portant sur cette question, qui concerne l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence (voir : ccs corp. c. secure energy services inc., 2014 abca 96, 575 ar 1, par. 4; laboratoires servier c. apotex inc., 2008 cf 825, 67 cpr (4th) 241, par. 488; garford pty ltd. c. dywidag systems international, canada, ltd., 2010 cf 996, 88 cpr (4th) 7, par. 28-33; eli lilly and co. c. apotex inc., 2009 cf 991, 80 cpr (4th) 1, par. 729; fairview donut inc. c. the tdl group corp., 2012 onsc 1252, par. 643- 646 (canlii)). [164] dans un autre ordre d’idée, je ne suis pas convaincue qu’un court délai de prescription, au- quel la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’ap- plique pas, viendra contrecarrer l’objectif que visait le parlement par l’adoption de l’art. 36 et du reste de la loi sur la concurrence. la responsabilité civile prévue à l’art. 36 n’est pas le seul moyen de tenir une personne responsable d’un comportement anti- concurrentiel : la loi prévoit également un éventail de conséquences pénales et administratives pour des activités qui diminuent la concurrence sur le marché. en outre, comme je l’expliquerai plus loin, l’auteur allégué d’une faute risque d’être tenu responsable en common law ou en equity d’un comportement qui constitue une infraction visée à la partie vi. par conséquent, le court délai de prescription applicable à la cause d’action prévue au par. 36(1) ne vient pas contrecarrer l’objectif du parlement de « préserver et de favoriser la concurrence au canada [  ] dans le but d’assurer aux consommateurs des prix com- pétitifs et un choix dans les produits » (loi sur la concurrence, art 11). 382 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. [165] as a result, i disagree with my colleague that the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) begins to run on the date that the conduct contrary to part vi is either discovered or discoverable by the plain- tiff. properly interpreted, the triggering event in this statutory provision “clearly occurs without regard to the injured party’s knowledge”, and the provision does not contain “wording to [the same] effect” as “accrual” of the s. 36 cause of action. a proper ap- plication of the fehr test therefore leads to the con- clusion that the discoverability rule does not apply. applying discoverability would make the limitation period chosen by parliament virtually meaningless and create uncertainty around the likelihood and timing of significant litigation. [165] par conséquent, je suis en désaccord avec la conclusion de mon collègue selon laquelle le délai de prescription établi au sous-al. 36(4)a)(i) commence à courir à la date à laquelle le demandeur a décou- vert ou aurait pu découvrir le comportement allant à l’encontre de la partie vi. si l’on interprète cette disposition correctement, le fait déclencheur dont il est question « survient clairement, et sans égard à la connaissance qu’en a la [partie lésée] » et la dispo- sition en cause ne contient pas des « mots [dans le] sens » de « naissance » de la cause d’action fondée sur l’art 36. l’application correcte du critère de l’arrêt fehr mène à la conclusion que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas. si cette règle s’appli- quait, le délai de prescription choisi par le parlement perdrait pratiquement tout son sens et laisserait pla- ner l’incertitude quant à la probabilité d’engager de nombreuses poursuites et au moment de les engager. b must there be a special relationship between the parties to an action in order for the doc‑ trine of fraudulent concealment to toll the lim‑ itation period? b pour que la doctrine de la dissimulation frau‑ duleuse reporte le point de départ du délai de prescription, doit‑il y avoir une relation spéciale entre les parties à une action? [166] the fraudulent concealment doctrine is a doctrine that operates to prevent a limitation clause from being used as an instrument of injustice in cir- cumstances where a defendant conceals the facts giv- ing rise to a potential cause of action from a plaintiff. because it would be unconscionable for that defend- ant to then rely on the limitation clause as a defence to the claim, equity “suspend[s] the running of the limitation clock until such time as the injured party can reasonably discover the cause of action” (giroux estate v. trillium health centre (2005), 74 or (3d) 341 (ca), at para 28). the canadian approach to this doctrine has its origin in the england and wales court of appeal’s decision in kitchen v. royal air forces association, [1958] 2 all er 241 (ca), in which lord evershed, mr, wrote as follows: [166] la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse vise à empêcher que le délai de prescription serve à créer une injustice lorsque le défendeur cache au demandeur les faits à l’origine d’une cause d’action potentielle. puisqu’il serait abusif pour le défendeur d’invoquer la prescription comme défense, l’equity [traduction] « permet de suspendre l’écoulement du délai de prescription jusqu’à ce que la partie lésée puisse raisonnablement découvir l’existence de la cause d’action » (giroux estate c. trillium health centre (2005), 74 or (3d) 341 (ca), par 28). la conception canadienne de cette doctrine tire son ori- gine de la décision de la cour d’appel d’angleterre et du pays de galles, kitchen c. royal air forces association, [1958] 2 all er 241 (ca), où le maître des rôles lord evershed s’est exprimé ainsi : it is now clear    that the word “fraud” in s. 26(b) of the limitation act, 1939, is by no means limited to common law fraud or deceit. equally, it is clear    that no degree of moral turpitude is necessary to establish fraud within the section. what is covered by equitable fraud is a matter which lord hardwicke did not attempt to define two hundred years ago, and i certainly shall not attempt to [traduction] il est maintenant clair [  ] que le mot « fraude » employé à l’al. 26b) de la limitation act, 1939, ne désigne pas uniquement une tromperie ou une fraude en common law. il est également clair [  ] qu’aucun degré de turpitude morale n’est nécessaire pour prouver qu’il y a fraude au sens de la disposition. ce que vise la fraude en equity est une chose que le lord hardwicke [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 383 do so now, but it is, i think, clear that the phrase covers conduct which, having regard to some special relationship between the two parties concerned, is an unconscionable thing for the one to do towards the other. [emphasis added; p 249] [167] the pioneer defendants, relying on kitchen and the jurisprudence that followed, argue that the existence of a “special relationship” between the plaintiff and the defendant is a necessary precondi- tion to the application of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. because such a relationship was not pleaded by the plaintiff, they say that this doctrine cannot operate to toll the limitation period and that the claim against them must fail accordingly. [168] i would note that this court has only ever considered the operation of fraudulent concealment in the context of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. this court applied that doctrine in guerin v. the queen, [1984] 2 scr 335, after dickson j. (as he then was) found that the con- duct of the indian affairs branch of the federal gov- ernment was “unconscionable, having regard to the fiduciary relationship between the branch and the [musqueam indian] band” (p 390). likewise, this court recognized the existence of a special relation- ship between a parent and a child in m (k), a case concerning incest. there, la forest j. explained that such cases necessarily involve “a grievous abuse of a position of confidence”, since “incest is really a double wrong — the act of incest itself is followed by an abuse of the child’s innocence to prevent rec- ognition or revelation of the abuse” (p 58). canadian courts have also found special relationships to exist between lawyers and clients, physicians and patients, employers and terminated employees, and trustees and beneficiaries (mew et al., at p 234). n’a pas tenté de définir il y a deux cents ans et que je ne tenterai certainement pas de définir maintenant; toutefois, il m’apparaît clair que cette expression vise une conduite qui, compte tenu de l’existence d’une relation spéciale entre les parties concernées, est un abus de la part de l’une envers l’autre. [je souligne; p 249] [167] s’appuyant sur l’arrêt kitchen et la jurispru- dence subséquente, les défenderesses pioneer font valoir que l’existence d’une « relation spéciale » entre le demandeur et le défendeur est une condition préalable nécessaire à l’application de la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse. vu que le demandeur en l’espèce n’a pas allégué l’existence d’une telle relation, elles affirment que cette doctrine ne permet pas de repousser le point de départ du délai de pres- cription et que la demande déposées contre elles est donc vouée à l’échec. [168] je ferais observer que notre cour n’a toujours examiné l’application de la dissimulation frauduleuse que dans le contexte d’une relation spéciale entre le demandeur et le défendeur. notre cour a appli- qué cette doctrine dans guerin c. la reine, [1984] 2 rcs 335, à la suite de la conclusion du juge dickson (plus tard juge en chef) qui qualifiait la conduite de la direction des affaires indiennes du gouvernement fédéral, de « peu scrupuleuse, compte tenu du rapport fiduciaire qui exist[ait] entre la direction et la bande [indienne musqueam] » (p 390). de même, notre cour a reconnu l’existence d’une relation spéciale entre un parent et son enfant dans m (k), une af- faire d’inceste. le juge la forest y a expliqué que, forcément, dans de tels cas, « on abuse gravement d’une situation de confiance », puisque « l’inceste est réellement un double méfait — l’acte d’inceste est lui- même suivi d’un abus de l’innocence de l’enfant vi- sant à l’empêcher de se rendre compte de l’agression ou d’en révéler l’existence » (p 58). les tribunaux canadiens ont également conclu à l’existence d’une relation spéciale entre les avocats et leurs clients, les médecins et leurs patients, les employeurs et les employés congédiés, ainsi que les fiduciaires et les bénéficiaires de la fiducie (mew et autres, p 234). [169] that said, i am not prepared to go so far as to say that a special relationship — which i understand to be one that is based on trust and confidence — is [169] cela dit, je ne suis pas disposée à aller jusqu’à affirmer que l’existence d’une relation spéciale — fon- dée, selon moi, sur la confiance — constitue toujours 384 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. always a prerequisite or a necessary element for the operation of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. in performance industries ltd. v. sylvan lake golf & tennis club ltd., 2002 scc 19, [2002] 1 scr 678,. binnie j. explained that fraud in equity is broader than it is at common law, as it captures “transactions falling short of deceit but where the court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the advantage obtained” (para. 39 (em- phasis added), citing first city capital ltd. v. bc. building corp. (1989), 43 blr 29 (bcsc), at p 37). he further noted that this ground for equitable relief “is so infinite in its varieties that the courts have not attempted to define it”, adding that “all kinds of unfair dealing and unconscionable conduct in matters of contract come within its ken” (ibid. (emphasis added), citing mcmaster university v. wilchar construction ltd. (1971), 22 dlr (3d) 9 (ont hc), at p 19). what constitutes “unconscion- able conduct” for the purposes of the doctrine of equitable fraud will vary from case to case and will depend in part on the connection between the parties. this is helpfully explained by ian spry in his leading textbook, the principles of equitable remedies: specific performance, injunctions, rectification and equitable damages (9th ed. 2014): fraud in this sense includes, not only fraud in the sense of active dishonesty that gave rise to an action of deceit at law, but also the taking of active steps with the intention of concealing the existence of the material cause of action. the better view is that it includes also, in cases where the defendant is under a special duty to the plaintiff, a failure to disclose the events which have taken place and which give rise to the cause of action in question. so it was said by lord evershed that in this context fraud includes “con- duct which, having regard to some special relationship between the two parties concerned, is an unconscionable thing for the one to do towards the other”. [p. 440] une condition préalable ou un élément nécessaire à l’application de la doctrine de la dissimulation frau- duleuse. dans performance industries ltd. c. sylvan lake golf & tennis club ltd., 2002 csc 19, [2002] 1 rcs 678, le juge binnie a expliqué que le terme « fraude » comporte un sens plus large en equity qu’en common law, car il s’entend également [traduc- tion] « d’opérations qui ne sont pas dolosives, mais à l’égard desquelles le tribunal estime qu’il serait abusif de laisser une personne profiter de l’avantage obtenu » (par. 39 (je souligne), citant first city capital ltd. c. bc. building corp. (1989), 43 blr 29 (cs c-b), p 37). le juge binnie a également fait remarquer que la fraude donnant ouverture à une réparation en equity se présente sous « un nombre tellement in- fini de formes que les tribunaux n’ont pas tenté de la définir », et ajouté [traduction] « [qu’]elle vise toutes sortes de manœuvres déloyales et de conduites abusives en matière contractuelle » (ibid. (je souligne), citant mcmaster university c. wilchar construction ltd. (1971), 22 dlr (3d) 9 (hc ont), p 19). déterminer en quoi consiste « une conduite abusive » pour l’application de la doctrine de la fraude en eq- uity varie d’une affaire à l’autre et dépend en partie du lien qui unit les parties. c’est ce qu’explique de manière utile ian spry dans son ouvrage qui fait au- torité, the principles of equitable remedies : specific performance, injunctions, rectification and equitable damages (9e éd. 2014) : [traduction] dans ce sens, la fraude ne s’entend pas uniquement d’une activité malhonnête qui ouvre droit à une action pour dol, mais aussi de la prise de mesures concrètes dans le but de dissimuler l’existence de la cause d’action réelle. de fait, la fraude s’entend également, dans les cas où le défendeur assume un devoir particulier envers le demandeur, du défaut de révéler les faits qui se sont produits et qui donnent naissance à la cause d’action en question comme l’expliquait lord evershed, dans ce contexte, le mot « fraude » vise « une conduite qui, compte tenu de la relation spéciale qui existe entre les parties concernées, est un abus de la part de l’une envers l’autre ». [p. 440] [170] in effect, in the commercial context, limiting the application of the fraudulent concealment doc- trine to only those situations where there is a special relationship between the parties presupposes that, in that context, there can be no injustice resulting [170] en fait, dans le contexte commercial, appli- quer la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse uni- quement dans les cas où il existe une relation spéciale entre les parties suppose que, dans ce contexte, il ne peut y avoir d’injustice découlant de l’application [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 385 from the application of a limitation period unless a special relationship exists. put differently, insofar as there may be situations in which the fraudulent con- cealment doctrine would rectify an injustice caused to a plaintiff by the application of a limitation pe- riod, even though there exists no special relationship between the parties, then limiting the doctrine by requiring such a relationship could be seen as con- tradicting the very spirit of a doctrine that aims to protect against unconscionable conduct. d’un délai de prescription sauf en présence d’une relation spéciale. autrement dit, dans la mesure où il peut exister une situation dans laquelle cette doctrine corrigerait une injustice que fait subir à un deman- deur l’application d’un délai de prescription, malgré l’absence de relation spéciale entre les parties, l’on pourrait considérer que restreindre l’application de la doctrine en exigeant la présence d’une telle relation contredit l’esprit même d’une doctrine qui vise à prévenir les comportements abusifs. [171] based on this understanding of fraudulent concealment, my view is that it is not plain and ob- vious that equity can intervene to toll the applicable limitation period only in cases where there exists a special relationship; it may be that it can also inter- vene in cases — at least in the commercial context, as here — where the plaintiff can demonstrate some- thing commensurate with or tantamount to a special relationship. [171] vu cette conception de la dissimulation frau- duleuse, il ne me semble pas évident et manifeste que l’equity peut intervenir pour repousser le point de départ du délai de prescription uniquement dans les cas où il existe une relation spéciale; il se peut qu’elle puisse aussi intervenir dans les cas — du moins en matière commerciale, comme dans le cas présent — où le demandeur peut démontrer quelque chose cor- respondant ou d’équivalent à une relation spéciale. [172] to be sure, the mere allegation of a price- fixing agreement among defendants is not sufficient on its own for the fraudulent concealment doctrine to toll the applicable limitation period. if it were, the limitation period for which parliament specifically provided in s. 36(4) of the competition act would be meaningless in these circumstances, given the fact that price- fixing agreements are, in practice, carried out in secret. [173] in the case at hand, the plaintiff did not plead that there was a special relationship between the class members and the pioneer defendants. however, as i explained above, it is not plain and obvious that this is fatal to the plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim, since a special relationship may not be a neces- sary precondition to the application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. while the mere allegation of a price- fixing agreement among the pioneer defend- ants is not sufficient on its own for this doctrine to toll the applicable limitation period, in the commercial context, a showing of fraud in equity tantamount to or commensurate with the existence of a special relationship could be enough. [172] à n’en pas douter, la simple allégation que des défendeurs se sont entendus pour fixer les prix ne suffit pas en soi pour que la doctrine de la dissimula- tion frauduleuse repousse le point de départ du délai de prescription applicable. si cette allégation était suffisante, le délai de prescription que le parlement a expressément prévu au par. 36(4) de la loi sur la concurrence serait dénué de sens dans les circons- tances, vu que les ententes de fixation des prix sont, en pratique, mises en œuvre en secret. [173] en l’espèce, le demandeur n’a pas invoqué l’existence d’une relation spéciale entre les membres du groupe et les défenderesses pioneer. toutefois, comme je l’ai expliqué précédemment, il n’est pas évi- dent et manifeste que cette omission porte un coup fatal à l’allégation de dissimulation frauduleuse faite par le demandeur, car une relation spéciale ne saurait être une condition préalable à l’application de la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse. bien que la simple alléga- tion qu’un accord de fixation des prix a été conclu entre les défenderesses pioneer ne suffise pas, à elle seule, pour que cette doctrine repousse le point de départ du délai de prescription applicable, dans un contexte com- mercial, la démonstration qu’il y a eu fraude au sens de l’equity équivalente ou correspondant à l’existence d’une relation spéciale pourrait suffire. 386 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. [174] the plaintiff pleaded that the pioneer de- fendants “took active steps to, and did, conceal the unlawful conspiracy from their customers” (rf. (pioneer appeal, at para 11)). given that we are at the certification stage, i am prepared to conclude that it is not “plain and obvious” that the fraudulent concealment doctrine has no application in this case. whether or not the plaintiff will be successful in re- lying on this doctrine to toll the applicable limitation period in these circumstances, however, will depend on what he can prove at trial — that is, whether he can establish a special relationship, or maybe something tantamount to or commensurate with one could suffice. [175] on the basis of the foregoing, while the dis- coverability rule does not apply to toll the limitation period, it may be that the fraudulent concealment doctrine does, and, accordingly, i would dismiss the pioneer appeal regarding that question. however, there remain three more issues, common to all de- fendants, and because the pioneer defendants have adopted the submissions of the toshiba appeal with regards to these common issues, i will consider them together in the subsequent section. for the afore- mentioned reasons and for the reasons that follow, i would allow the pioneer appeal in part. [174] le demandeur a fait valoir que les défen- deresses pioneer [traduction] « ont pris des me- sures concrètes pour dissimuler, et ont effectivement dissimulé, le complot illégal à leurs clients » (mi. (pourvoi de pioneer), par 11). comme l’affaire se trouve à l’étape de l’autorisation, je suis disposée à conclure qu’il n’est pas « évident et manifeste » que la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse ne trouve pas application en l’espèce. toutefois, le point de savoir si le demandeur réussira à faire reporter le point de départ du délai de prescription applicable dans ces circonstances dépendra de ce qu’il peut prouver au procès; autrement dit, sera-t-il en me- sure d’établir une relation spéciale, ou peut- être que quelque chose d’équivalent ou de correspondant à cette relation suffira. [175] compte tenu de ce qui précède, même si la règle de la possibilité de découvrir ne s’applique pas de manière à reporter le point de départ du délai de prescription, il se peut que la doctrine de la dissi- mulation frauduleuse s’applique et, par conséquent, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi de pioneer quant à cette question. il reste cependant à trancher trois autres questions, communes à toutes les défende- resses, et, comme les défenderesses pioneer ont fait leurs les arguments du pourvoi de toshiba sur ces questions communes, je les examinerai ensemble dans la prochaine section. pour les motifs qui pré- cèdent et ceux qui suivent, j’accueillerais le pourvoi de pioneer en partie. iii the toshiba appeal iii le pourvoi de toshiba [176] the issues in the toshiba appeal, which are common to both appeals, are threefold: [176] le pourvoi de toshiba soulève trois ques- tions communes aux deux pourvois : (a) is it plain and obvious that the umbrella pur- chasers’ claims under s. 36(1)(a) of the compe‑ tition act cannot succeed? (b) is it plain and obvious that s. 36(1) bars a plaintiff from alleging common law and equitable causes of action in respect of conduct that breaches the prohibitions in part vi of the competition act? a) est-il évident et manifeste que les réclamations présentées par les acheteurs sous parapluie sur le fondement de l’al. 36(1)a) de la loi sur la concurrence ne peuvent être accueillies? b) est-il évident et manifeste que le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence empêche le deman- deur d’exercer des recours de common law et d’equity à l’égard d’un comportement qui en- freint les prohibitions prévues à la partie vi de la loi sur la concurrence? [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 387 (c) what standard must a representative plaintiff meet in order to have loss- related questions cer- tified as “common issues” among indirect pur- chasers, and has the plaintiff met this standard in the present case? c) quelle est la norme à laquelle doit satisfaire le re- présentant des demandeurs pour que les questions liées à la perte soient autorisées en tant que « ques- tions communes » aux acheteurs indirects? le demandeur satisfait-il à cette norme en l’espèce? [177] i write separately because my views diverge from those of my colleague on all three of these issues. i will address each in turn. [177] je rédige ces motifs distincts parce que mon opinion et celle de mon collègue divergent sur toutes ces trois questions. je les examinerai à tour de rôle. a is it plain and obvious that the umbrella pur‑ chasers’ claims under section 36(1) of the com‑ petition act cannot succeed? [178] the first issue in the toshiba appeal is whether the certification judge erred in holding that the umbrella purchasers can advance claims under s. 36(1) of the competition act against the defend- ants. the defendants submit that the certification judge did so err, and that upholding his conclusion on this point will have the effect of opening up “a potentially limitless scope of liability that could not have been contemplated by parliament and is contrary to the scheme of the competition act” (af (toshiba. appeal), at para 97). i agree with my colleague that resolving this [179] issue requires an exercise in statutory interpretation, under which the words of the competition act are to “be read in their entire context and in their grammati- cal and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (bell expressvu limited partnership v. rex, 2002 scc 42, [2002] 2 scr 559, at para. 26, citing e. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87). however, we must not lose sight of the fact that our contextual approach to statutory interpretation also draws on the relevant legal princi- ples and norms (see r v. alex, 2017 scc 37, [2017] 1 scr 967, at para. 31; mclean v. british colum‑ bia (securities commission), 2013 scc 67, [2013] 3 scr 895, at para. 43; atco gas and pipelines ltd. v. alberta (energy and utilities board), 2006 scc 4, [2006] 1 scr 140, at para 48). a est‑il évident et manifeste que les réclamations présentées par les acheteurs sous parapluie sur le fondement du par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concur‑ rence ne peuvent être accueillies? [178] la première question soulevée dans le pourvoi de toshiba est de savoir si le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation a commis une erreur en concluant que les acheteurs sous parapluie peuvent poursuivre les dé- fenderesses en justice sur le fondement du par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence. les défenderesses font valoir que le juge a commis une telle erreur et que la confirmation de sa conclusion sur ce point aura pour effet d’établir une [traduction] « responsabilité po- tentiellement illimitée qui ne saurait figurer parmi les objectifs du parlement et qui va à l’encontre du régime établi par la loi sur la concurrence » (ma (pourvoi de toshiba), par 97). [179] à l’instar de mon collègue, j’estime que pour trancher cette question, il faut se livrer à un exercice d’interprétation statutaire consistant à lire les termes de la loi sur la concurrence [traduction] « dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’[économie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législa- teur » (bell expressvu limited partnership c. rex, 2002 csc 42, [2002] 2 rcs 559, par. 26, citant e. driedger, construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p 87). cependant, nous ne devons pas perdre de vue le fait que notre méthode contextuelle d’inter- prétation des lois s’appuie également sur les normes et principes juridiques pertinents (voir r. c. alex, 2017 csc 37, [2017] 1 rcs 967, par. 31; mclean c. colombie‑ britannique (securities commission), 2013 csc 67, [2013] 3 rcs 895, par. 43; atco gas and pipelines ltd. c. alberta (energy & utilities board), 2006 csc 4, [2006] 1 rcs 140, par 48). 388 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. [180] on its face, s. 36(1) appears to be worded broadly enough to capture claims by umbrella pur- chasers, so long as they can prove that they “suffered loss or damage as a result of” the conduct specified in para. (a) or (b). according to the defendants, how- ever, this statutory provision must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the principles that limit the extent of liability at common law (af (toshiba. appeal), at paras 97-99). they point specifically to two legal principles that are relevant for the purposes of liability to umbrella purchasers: indeterminacy and remoteness. at its core, therefore, the issue un- der this heading raises the question of whether those principles can inform our interpretation of s. 36(1) of the competition act — and in particular, the extent of a defendant’s liability thereunder in the context of a price- fixing claim brought by persons whose odd or odd product was manufactured or supplied by a non- defendant. indeterminacy is a policy consideration that [181] negates the imposition of a duty of care in negligence where it would expose the defendant to “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class” (ultramares corp. v. touche, 174 ne 441 (nyca 1931), at p. 444, per cardozo cj). this concern arises where finding a duty of care between a plaintiff and a defendant would open the floodgates, resulting in “massive, un- controlled liability” (a. m. linden et al., canadian tort law (11th ed. 2018), at p 278). remoteness is a related principle that limits the scope of liability in negligence where “the harm [is] too unrelated to the wrongful conduct to hold the defendant fairly liable” (mustapha v. culligan of canada ltd., 2008 scc 27, [2008] 2 scr 114, at para. 12, citing a. m. linden and b. feldthusen, canadian tort law (8th ed. 2006), at p 360). according to the authors of the 11th edition of that text: [180] à première vue, le libellé du par. 36(1) semble suffisamment général pour englober les réclamations des acheteurs sous parapluie, pourvu qu’ils puissent établir qu’ils ont « subi une perte ou des dommages par suite » des comportements énumérés aux al. a) et b). les défenderesses affirment cependant qu’il faut interpréter cette disposition conformément aux prin- cipes qui limitent l’étendue de la responsabilité en common law (ma (pourvoi de toshiba), par 97-99). elles invoquent précisément deux principes de droit pertinents pour la responsabilité envers les acheteurs sous parapluie : l’indétermination et le caractère éloi- gné. essentiellement, la question à trancher sous cette rubrique consiste donc à savoir si ces principes peuvent guider notre interprétation du par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence — en particulier l’étendue de la responsa- bilité des défenderesses dans le contexte d’une action pour fixation des prix intentée par des acheteurs de ldo et de produits munis de ldo fabriqués ou fournis par une personne qui n’est pas une défenderesse. [181] l’indétermination correspond à une consi- dération de politique générale qui vient écarter l’im- position d’une obligation de diligence en droit de la négligence lorsque le défendeur serait exposé à [traduction] « une responsabilité pour un montant indéterminé, pour un temps indéterminé et envers une catégorie indéterminée » (ultramares corp. c. touche, 174 ne 441 (ca. ny 1931), p. 444, le juge en chef cardozo). ce risque existe dans le cas où la reconnaissance d’une obligation de diligence entre le demandeur et le défendeur favoriserait la multiplication des actions en justice et entraînerait une [traduction] « responsabilité massive, échap- pant à tout contrôle » (a. m. linden et autres, cana‑ dian tort law (11e éd. 2018), p 278). le caractère éloigné est un principe connexe qui a pour effet de limiter l’étendue de la responsabilité pour négli- gence si [traduction] « le préjudice a trop peu de lien avec l’acte fautif pour que le défendeur puisse raisonnablement être tenu responsable » (mustapha c. culligan du canada ltée, 2008 csc 27, [2008] 2 rcs 114, par. 12, citant a. m. linden et b. feld- thusen, canadian tort law (8e éd. 2006), p 360). selon les auteurs de la 11e édition de cet ouvrage : the losses or injuries incurred by plaintiffs must not be “too remote” a consequence of the defendants’ negligent [traduction] les pertes ou les préjudices que subissent les demandeurs ne doivent pas constituer une conséquence [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 389 act, in order for compensation to ensue. in other words, to use the older language, negligent defendants who owe a general duty of care are not liable unless their conduct is the “proximate cause” of the plaintiff’s losses. causation alone is not enough; it must be demonstrated that the con- duct was the proximate cause of the damage. this issue is better described as the scope or extent of liability issue. [emphasis in original; p 307] [182] although both indeterminacy and remote- ness relate primarily to liability in negligence, i agree with the defendants that the same under- lying concerns can inform our analysis of the is- sue at hand, which involves claims under s. 36 of the competition act for pure economic losses. in taylor v. 1103919 alberta ltd., 2015 abca 201, 602 ar 105, at para. 50, for example, the alberta court of appeal discerned “no principled reason why [the principle of remoteness] ought not to ap- ply” to the statutory cause of action in alberta’s land titles act, rsa  2000, c.  l-4. in pro‑ sys consultants ltd v microsoft corporation, 2013 scc 57, [2013] 3  scr  477, rothstein  j con- sidered the principle of remoteness, among other legal norms, in his analysis of whether indirect purchasers have a cause of action under s. 36 of the competition act (paras 42-45). « trop éloignée » de la négligence des défendeurs pour qu’il puisse y avoir indemnisation. autrement dit, pour reprendre l’ancien libellé, les défendeurs négligents qui ont une obli- gation générale de diligence n’engagent leur responsabilité que si leur conduite est la « cause immédiate » des pertes subies par les demandeurs. la causalité à elle seule ne suffit pas; il faut établir que la conduite était la cause immédiate du préjudice. cette question concerne davantage l’étendue ou la portée de la responsabilité. [en italique dans l’original; p 307] [182] bien que l’indétermination et le caractère éloigné se rapportent principalement à la respon- sabilité pour négligence, je suis d’accord avec les défenderesses pour dire que les mêmes préoccupa- tions sous- jacentes peuvent guider notre analyse de la question à trancher, qui concerne les réclamations fondées sur l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence pour des pertes purement économiques. dans l’arrêt taylor c. 1103919 alberta ltd., 2015 abca 201, 602 ar 105, par. 50, par exemple, la cour d’ap- pel de l’alberta n’a relevé [traduction] « aucune raison logique de ne pas appliquer [le principe du caractère éloigné] » à la cause d’action prévue par la land titles act, rsa 2000, c. l-4, de l’al- berta. dans pro‑ sys consultants ltd. c. microsoft corporation, 2013 csc 57, [2013] 3 rcs 477, le juge rothstein a examiné le principe du caractère éloigné, parmi d’autres normes juridiques, dans son analyse de la question de savoir si l’acheteur indirect avait une cause d’action au titre de l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence (par 42-45). [183] similarly, in associated general contrac‑ tors v. carpenters, 459 us 519 (1983), the united states supreme court held that common law prin- ciples  —  including foreseeability and proximate cause, directness of injury, certainty of damages and privity of contract — can operate to limit the scope of a defendant’s liability under the statutory cause of action for anti- competitive conduct in § 4 of the clayton act, 15 usc § 153. in that case, the [183] de même, dans associated general con‑ tractors c. carpenters, 459 us 519 (1983), la cour suprême des états- unis a statué que les principes de common law — dont la prévisibilité et la cause immédiate du préjudice, son caractère direct, la cer- titude du dommage et le lien contractuel — peuvent avoir pour effet de limiter l’étendue de la responsa- bilité du défendeur au regard du droit d’action prévu à l’art. 4 de la clayton act, 15 usc § 153 pour 3 that provision read as follows: “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the united states in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 3 cette disposition était ainsi rédigée : [traduction] « toute personne qui a subi un préjudice dans ses activités commerciales ou relative- ment à ses biens par suite d’un comportement allant à l’encontre des lois antitrust peut engager des poursuites devant tout tribunal de district des états- unis dans le district où le défendeur réside, se trouve ou dispose d’un mandataire, sans égard au montant en litige, et elle peut recouvrer le triple des dommages subis, ainsi que les dépens relatifs à l’instance, y compris les honoraires d’avocats raisonnables. » 390 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. majority held that a plaintiff could not recover under that provision for harm allegedly suffered by reason of the defendants’ coercion of third parties. although stevens j. recognized that “[a] literal reading of the statute is broad enough to encompass every harm that can be attributed directly or indirectly to the consequences of an antitrust violation” (p. 529), he nevertheless held that the question whether the [plaintiff] may recover for the injury it allegedly suffered by reason of the defendants’ coercion against certain third parties cannot be answered simply by reference to the broad language of [the applica- ble statutory provision]. instead    the question requires us to evaluate the plaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between them. [p. 535] [184] the issue in the instant case turns on whether the defendants can be held liable for loss or dam- age of an economic nature suffered by the umbrella purchasers, a group of claimants who bought from non- defendants odds that were manufactured or supplied by non- defendants. can the umbrella pur- chasers recover as against the defendants — compa- nies with which they have no commercial relationship whatsoever? in my view, the answer is no. any over- charges that those claimants may have incurred were ultimately the direct result of pricing choices made by those non‑ defendant manufacturers and suppli‑ ers, regardless of whether or not those choices were influenced by broader trends in the market. in short, the defendants have control over their own business decisions, but not over those of non- defendant man- ufacturers and suppliers. for this reason, and bearing in mind the principles underlying indeterminacy and remoteness, i am of the view that it would be unfair to hold the defendants liable to the umbrella pur- chasers where they had no control over such liability. indeed, interpreting s. 36(1) in the manner suggested by the plaintiff might well expose the defendants to unbounded liability — capable of encompassing not only the losses of those umbrella purchasers themselves, but also the losses of “[a]nyone who comportement anticoncurrentiel. dans cette affaire, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que le demandeur ne pouvait obtenir réparation en vertu de cette dis- position pour un préjudice qu’il aurait subi par suite de la coercition exercée par le défendeur à l’endroit de tiers. bien que le juge stevens ait reconnu [tra- duction] « [qu’une] interprétation littérale de la loi est suffisamment large pour englober tout préjudice attribuable directement ou indirectement aux consé- quences d’une violation des lois antitrust » (p. 529), il a néanmoins conclu ce qui suit : [traduction]    pour trancher la question de savoir si le [demandeur] peut obtenir réparation pour le préjudice qu’il aurait subi par suite de la coercition exercée par les défendeurs à l’endroit de certains tiers, il ne suffit pas de faire uniquement mention du libellé général [de la dispo- sition statutaire applicable]. en fait, [  ] nous sommes appelés à évaluer le préjudice subi par le demandeur, la faute reprochée aux défendeurs, ainsi que la relation entre eux. [p. 535] [184] la question en litige dans le cas présent consiste à savoir si les défenderesses peuvent être tenues responsables de la perte ou des dommages de nature économique subis par les acheteurs sous parapluie, un groupe de demandeurs qui ont acheté d’autres personnes que les défenderesses des ldo fabriqués ou fournis par des personnes qui ne sont pas les défenderesses. ces acheteurs peuvent- ils se faire indemniser par les défenderesses — des entre- prises avec lesquelles les acheteurs sous parapluie n’ont aucune relation commerciale? à mon avis, il faut répondre à cette question par la négative. toute majoration que ces demandeurs auraient pu absorber était en fin de compte la conséquence directe des choix en matière de prix effectués par ces fabri‑ cants et fournisseurs autres que les défenderesses, que ces choix aient ou non été influencés par des tendances générales du marché. bref, les défende- resses exercent un contrôle sur leur propres décisions d’affaires, mais non sur celles des autres fabricants et fournisseurs. pour ce motif, et gardant à l’esprit les principes qui sous- tendent l’indétermination et le caractère éloigné, je suis d’avis qu’il serait injuste de tenir les défenderesses responsables envers les ache- teurs sous parapluie alors qu’elles n’avaient aucun contrôle sur cette responsabilité. en effet, interpréter [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 391 was affected by the economic ripples downstream of umbrella purchasers” (af (toshiba. appeal), at para 105). in my opinion, this provision must be construed in a manner that prevents such a cascade of liability. [185] this is consistent with the views expressed by perell j. of the ontario superior court of justice in shah v. lg chem, ltd., 2015 onsc 6148, 390 dlr  (4th) 87, and by a unanimous divisional court in shah v. lg chem, ltd., 2017 onsc 2586, 413 dlr (4th) 546. shah involved the certification of a price- fixing class action brought by direct, indi- rect and umbrella purchasers of lithium ion batteries (“libs”) manufactured by various defendants. on the question of whether the umbrella purchasers in that case could succeed in their claim under s. 36(1) of the competition act, perell j. held as follows:    the umbrella purchasers’ claim would impose in- determinate liability on the defendants and the claim would be unfair because the law, generally speaking, does not impose liability on one person for the conduct of others, and in the instance of the umbrella purchasers, the plaintiffs seek to make the defendants liable for the advertent, inadvertent, voluntary or involuntary conduct of the non- defendants in taking advantage of the price- fixing. [para. 175] the divisional court unanimously upheld perell j.’s conclusion on this point. as nordheimer j. (as he then was) explained: le par. 36(1) de la manière suggérée par le demandeur pourrait fort bien exposer les défenderesses à une responsabilité illimitée — susceptible de viser non seulement les pertes subies par les acheteurs sous parapluie, mais aussi les pertes de [traduction] « [t]oute personne qui a subi les conséquences de nature économique en aval des acheteurs sous pa- rapluie » (ma (pourvoi de toshiba), par 105). à mon sens, il y a lieu d’interpréter cette disposition de manière à prévenir une telle responsabilité en cascade. [185] cette conclusion cadre avec le point de vue exprimé par le juge perell, de la cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario, dans shah c. lg chem, ltd., 2015 onsc 6148, 390 dlr (4th) 87, et par la cour divisionnaire à l’unanimité dans shah c. lg chem, ltd., 2017 onsc 2586, 413 dlr (4th) 546. cette affaire concernait l’autorisation d’un recours collectif en matière de fixation des prix, intenté par les acheteurs directs, indirects et sous parapluie de piles au lithium- ion (« pli ») fabriquées par diverses défenderesses. s’agissant de la question de savoir si les acheteurs sous parapluie pouvaient obtenir gain de cause dans leur recours fondé sur le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence, le juge perell a conclu ce qui suit : [traduction]    le recours des acheteurs sous parapluie imposerait aux défenderesses une responsabilité indéter- minée et entraînerait une iniquité, car, de manière gé- nérale, le droit ne tient pas une personne responsable de la conduite d’autrui. dans le cas des acheteurs sous parapluie, les demandeurs cherchent à tenir les défende- resses responsables de la conduite adoptée délibérément ou non en tirant un avantage volontairement ou non, par des personnes qui ne sont pas les défenderesses, car elles ont tiré parti de la fixation des prix. [par. 175] la cour divisionnaire a confirmé à l’unanimité la conclusion du juge perell sur ce point. comme l’ex- pliquait le juge nordheimer (maintenant juge à la cour d’appel de l’ontario) : what is alleged here is that the non- defendant [lib] man- ufacturers took advantage of the higher market prices being set by the [defendants] through their conspiracy, to similarly increase the prices of their libs or lib products. assuming that that occurred, the [defendants] had no [traduction] il est allégué en l’espèce que les fabricants de [pli] autres que les défenderesses ont tiré avantage de la hausse des prix sur le marché fixés par les [défenderesses] à la suite du complot qu’elles ont formé pour faire ainsi augmenter le prix de leurs pli et de leurs produits munis 392 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. control over the actions of the non- defendant manufactur- ers. first and foremost, they had no control over whether the non- defendant manufacturers chose to match prices. second, they had no control over the volume of libs or lib products, that the non- defendant manufacturers chose to produce and sell. [para. 34] [186] both perell j. and nordheimer j. analogized the issue of liability to umbrella purchasers in shah to the issue of indeterminacy that had arisen in r. v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2011 scc 42, [2011] 3 scr 45. in that case, a number of to- bacco companies were facing lawsuits relating to the sale of “light” or “mild” cigarettes. those com- panies, in turn, brought third- party claims against the government of canada, alleging that if they were found liable to the plaintiffs, they would be enti- tled to compensation from canada for (among other things) negligent misrepresentation. the argument was that canada had negligently misrepresented the health attributes of low- tar cigarettes to consumers and to those tobacco companies. canada countered that allowing the tobacco companies’ claims in neg- ligent misrepresentation “would result in indetermi- nate liability”, as “canada had no control over the number of cigarettes being sold” (para 97). this court accepted canada’s argument; mclachlin cj, writing for a unanimous court, explained as follows: i agree with canada that the prospect of indeterminate liability is fatal to the tobacco companies’ claims of negli- gent misrepresentation. insofar as the claims are based on representations to consumers, canada had no control over the number of people who smoked light cigarettes   . de pli. si l’on tient cela pour avéré, les [défenderesses] n’exerçaient aucun contrôle sur les actes des autres fabri- cants. d’abord et avant tout, les défenderesses n’avaient aucun contrôle sur le choix des autres fabricants de fixer des prix identiques. ensuite, les défenderesses n’avaient aucun contrôle sur la quantité de pli et de produits munis de pli que les autres fabricants avaient choisi de fabriquer et de vendre. [par. 34] [186] les juges perell et nordheimer ont fait une analogie entre la question de la responsabilité en- vers les acheteurs sous parapluie soulevée dans l’ar- rêt shah et la question de l’indétermination soulevée dans l’arrêt r c. imperial tobacco canada ltée, 2011 csc 42, [2011] 3 rcs 45. dans cette affaire, des compagnies de tabac ont fait l’objet de pour- suites pour avoir vendu des cigarettes « légères » ou « douces ». à leur tour, ces compagnies ont mis en cause le gouvernement du canada, alléguant que, si elles étaient tenues responsables envers les deman- deurs, elles auraient le droit d’être indemnisées par le canada, entre autres, pour déclarations inexactes faites par négligence. elles ont fait valoir que le canada avait fait preuve de négligence en déclarant faussement aux fumeurs et aux compagnies de tabac que la cigarette à teneur réduite en goudron serait moins nocive pour la santé. le canada s’est opposé à cet argument en soutenant que, si l’on acceptait les allégations des compagnies de tabac en matière de déclaration inexacte faite par négligence, « cela entraînerait une responsabilité indéterminée de sa part » puisque « le nombre de cigarettes vendues était indépendant de sa volonté » (par 97). notre cour a accepté l’argument du canada, et la juge en chef mclachlin, rédigeant les motifs unanimes, a expliqué ce qui suit : je suis d’accord avec le canada pour dire que la pos- sibilité d’une responsabilité indéterminée porte un coup fatal aux allégations des compagnies de tabac relatives aux déclarations inexactes faites par négligence. dans la mesure où les allégations reposent sur des déclarations faites aux consommateurs, le canada n’exerçait aucun contrôle sur le nombre de fumeurs de cigarettes légères  . the risk of indeterminate liability is enhanced by the fact that the claims are for pure economic loss. in design services ltd. v. canada, 2008 scc 22, [2008] 1 scr. 737, the court, per rothstein j., held that “in cases of le risque de responsabilité indéterminée est aggravé par le caractère purement financier de la perte alléguée. dans design services ltd. c. canada, 2008 csc 22, [2008] 1 rcs 737, sous la plume du juge rothstein, la cour a [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 393 pure economic loss, to paraphrase cardozo cj, care must be taken to find that a duty is recognized only in cases where the class of plaintiffs, the time and the amounts are determinate” (para 62). if canada owed a duty of care to consumers of light cigarettes, the potential class of plain- tiffs and the amount of liability would be indeterminate. [emphasis added; paras. 99- 100.] [187] although that case concerned indeterminacy in relation to the imposition of a duty of care in negligence, i agree with nordheimer j. that “the fun- damental principle is the same” (para. 32): s. 36(1) should not be interpreted in a manner that makes the defendants liable to an indeterminate class of people for losses of an indeterminate nature that occurred as a result of business decisions over which they had no control. this accords with the approach taken by the united states supreme court in respect of a similar statutory cause of action for anti- competitive conduct: “an antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow through the nation’s economy; but ‘despite the broad wording of § 4 [of the clayton act] there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable’” (asso‑ ciated general contractors, at pp. 534-35, citing blue shield of virginia v. mccready, 457 us 465 (1982), at pp. 476-77, citing illinois brick co. v. illi‑ nois, 431 us 720 (1977), at p. 760, per brennan j. dissenting). in my view, a preferable reading of the statutory cause of action in s. 36(1) of the compe‑ tition act is one that, consistent with the principles underlying indeterminacy and remoteness which operate at common law, limits the potential scope of liability faced by defendants of price- fixing claims to losses flowing from their own pricing decisions, not those of third parties. this promotes the value of certainty so that commercial enterprises “have some appreciation of what risk is to be borne by whom” (canadian national railway co. v. norsk pacific steamship co., [1992] 1 scr 1021, at p 1139). mentionné que « dans les cas de perte purement financière, il faut, pour paraphraser le juge en chef cardozo, prendre soin de ne reconnaître une obligation que dans la mesure où l’on peut déterminer la catégorie des demandeurs, la période et les montants en cause » (par 62). si le canada avait une obli- gation de diligence envers les fumeurs de cigarettes légères, le nombre potentiel de demandeurs et l’ampleur de la res- ponsabilité seraient indéterminés. [je souligne; par. 99- 100.] [187] même si cet arrêt concernait l’indétermina- tion en lien avec l’imposition d’une obligation de diligence en négligence, je suis d’accord avec le juge nordheimer pour dire que [traduction] « le principe fondamental est le même » (par. 32) : le par. 36(1) ne devrait pas être interprété de manière à ce que les défenderesses soient tenues responsables envers une catégorie indéterminée de personnes pour des pertes de nature indéterminée découlant de décisions d’af- faires qui étaient indépendantes de leur volonté. cette approche concorde avec celle adoptée par la cour suprême des états- unis à propos d’une cause d’action similaire conférée par la loi pour comportement anti- concurrentiel : [traduction] « on peut s’attendre à ce qu’une violation des lois antitrust ait des répercus- sions en chaîne sur l’économie de la nation; toutefois, “en dépit du libellé général de l’art. 4 [de la clayton act], le contrevenant ne peut être tenu responsable au- delà d’un certain point” » (associated general contractors, p. 534- 535, citant blue shield of virginia c. mccready, 457 us 465 (1982), p. 476- 477, citant illinois brick co. c. illinois, 431 us 720 (1977), p. 760, le juge brennan, dissident). à mon avis, il est préférable d’interpréter la cause d’action prévue au par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence conformément aux principes sous- tendant l’indétermination et le caractère éloigné qui s’appliquent en common law, de manière à limiter l’étendue de la responsabilité des défendeurs dans des recours en matière de fixation des prix aux pertes découlant de leurs propres déci- sions, et non de celles prises par des tiers. cette inter- prétation promeut la notion de certitude, de sorte que les entreprises commerciales ont « une idée du risque qui doit être assumé et par qui » (cie des chemins de fer nationaux du canada c. norsk pacific streamship co., [1992] 1 rcs 1021, p 1139). [188] the ontario divisional court’s decision in shah was subsequently overturned by the court of [188] la décision shah de la cour divisionnaire de l’ontario a été infirmée subséquemment par la cour 394 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. appeal, for reasons substantially similar to those set out by my colleague (shah v. lg chem, ltd., 2018 onca 819, 142 or (3d) 721). the unanimous panel in that case took the position that “normative concerns about indeterminate liability” in negligence do not apply in the context of the statutory claim under ss. 36 and 45 of the competition act, since those concerns “have already been taken care of by parliament” (para 47). like my colleague, the panel stated that, first, the scope of s. 36(1) limits recovery to persons who can prove that they suffered loss or damage “as a result of” the alleged conspiratorial conduct and that, second, the subjective mens rea in s. 45 “limits the reach of liability to those who, at a minimum, specifically intend to agree upon anti- competitive conduct” (ibid., at para.  51, cited in brown j.’s reasons, at para 75). in my respectful view, neither of those consid- [189] erations actually protects against the risk of limitless liability that would flow from recognizing the availa- bility of umbrella purchaser claims under s 36(1). on the first point, the fact that the text of this provision reads as permitting recovery for any person capable of proving that their loss was sustained “as a result of” an alleged price- fixing conspiracy does not end the interpretative exercise. as i explained above, the dispute here concerns whether those words should be taken as allowing recovery for any and all losses that can conceivably be linked to the alleged wrongdoing, or whether relevant legal norms and principles can as- sist in construing the provision so as to circumscribe what might otherwise be potentially indeterminate liability. and on the second point, while i accept that the mens rea in s. 45 limits liability to defendants who intend to agree upon anti- competitive conduct, this still tells us nothing about the scope of their liability under s. 36(1) — in other words, it tells us who is liable but not for what they are actually liable. d’appel, pour des motifs en substance semblables à ceux exposés par mon collègue (shah c. lg chem, ltd., 2018 onca 819, 142 or (3d) 721). dans cet arrêt, la formation unanime était d’avis que les [traduction] « préoccupations normatives quant à la responsabilité indéterminée » dans les causes de négligence ne s’appliquent pas dans le contexte des actions fondées sur les art. 36 et 45 de la loi sur la concurrence, car « le législateur a déjà répondu à ces préoccupations » (par 47). à l’instar de mon collègue, la formation unanime a affirmé, d’une part, que la portée du par. 36(1) limite l’indemnisation aux personnes qui peuvent démontrer avoir subi une perte ou des dommages « par suite » du complot allégué et, d’autre part, que la mens rea subjective requise à l’art. 45 [traduction] « limite l’étendue de la responsabilité à ceux qui, au minimum, ont eu l’intention expresse de convenir d’un comportement anticoncurrentiel » (ibid., par. 51, cité dans les motifs du juge brown, par 75). [189] avec égards, aucune de ces considérations ne protège réellement les fabricants contre le risque de responsabilité illimitée qui découlerait du fait de re- connaître que les acheteurs sous parapluie peuvent dé- poser des réclamations sur le fondement du par 36(1). en ce qui concerne le premier point, le fait que le libellé de cette disposition soit interprété comme per- mettant à toute personne pouvant démontrer qu’elle a subi une perte « par suite » du complot allégué de fixation des prix d’être indemnisée ne met pas fin à l’exercice d’interprétation. comme je l’ai déjà ex- pliqué, le litige en l’espèce porte sur la question de savoir s’il faut interpréter cette disposition comme autorisant l’indemnisation pour toute perte qui peut vraisemblablement être associée aux fautes repro- chées ou si les normes et principes juridiques appli- cables peuvent aider à interpréter cette disposition de manière à circonscrire ce qui pourrait autrement être une responsabilité indéterminée. en ce qui concerne le deuxième point, bien que j’admette que la mens rea prévue à l’art. 45 limite la responsabilité aux défen- deurs qui ont l’intention de s’entendre sur un compor- tement anticoncurrentiel, ceci ne nous apprend rien à propos de l’étendue de leur responsabilité prévue au par 36(1). autrement dit, il indique qui doit être tenu responsable, mais pas de quoi ces défendeurs sont réellement responsables. [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 395 [190] before concluding, i will add one final thought. permitting umbrella purchaser claims un- der s. 36(1) opens up the possibility of recovery for overcharges that result from “conscious parallel- ism” — a phenomenon which occurs when parties not involved in a price- fixing conspiracy deliber- ately choose to adjust their prices in order to match those of their competitors, in the absence of any actual collusion between them. as recently observed by the quebec court of appeal in r v. proulx, 2016 qcca 1425, at para. 32 (canlii), “[a]dopting a comparable or identical pricing policy without an agreement — which by definition requires a meet- ing of minds — does not fall within the scope of s. 45 of the competition act”.4 an interpretation of s. 36(1) that allows umbrella purchaser claims for these kinds of independent pricing decisions would effectively grant a right to recover (a) in circum- stances where those decisions — to which the um- brella purchasers’ alleged overcharges are directly attributable — are neither criminally prohibited nor actionable in and of themselves, and (b) from par- ties who neither made nor benefitted from those decisions. [190] avant de conclure, j’ajouterai une dernière réflexion. laisser libre cours aux réclamations fon- dées sur le par. 36(1) des acheteurs sous parapluie ouvre la possibilité d’un recouvrement des hausses de prix découlant d’un « parallélisme conscient » — un phénomène qui se produit lorsque les parties ne participant pas à un complot de fixation des prix choisissent délibérément d’ajuster leurs prix à ceux de leurs concurrents, sans qu’on puisse parler de col- lusion. comme l’a récemment fait remarquer la cour d’appel du québec dans l’arrêt r c. proulx, 2016 qcca 1425, par. 32 (canlii), « [l]’adoption d’une politique de prix comparables ou identiques, sans l’existence d’une entente qui par définition nécessite l’accord de deux volontés, ne tombe donc pas sous le coup de l’article 45 de la loi sur la concurrence »4. interpréter le par. 36(1) de façon à permettre aux acheteurs sous parapluie d’intenter une action pour ce type de décision indépendante quant à l’établisse- ment des prix conférerait un droit de recouvrement a) dans les cas où ces décisions — auxquelles la ma- joration alléguée qui aurait été refilée à ces acheteurs est directement attribuable — ne sont ni interdites par le droit criminel ni susceptibles de poursuites en soi, et b) auprès de parties qui n’ont pas pris ces décisions et n’en ont pas tiré profit. [191] all of this leads me to conclude that s. 36(1) of the competition act should not be interpreted in a manner that would permit claimants to recover from defendants for any losses that in some way flowed from the alleged conspiracy. doing so would have the undesirable effect of exposing defendants to li- ability that is potentially limitless in scope for loss and damage that are too remote from any price- fixing that occurred. i do not think that this could have been [191] tout cela m’amène à conclure que le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence ne devrait pas recevoir une interprétation qui permettrait aux demandeurs de se faire indemniser par des défendeurs pour toute perte découlant d’une façon ou d’une autre du complot allégué. cela aurait pour effet indésirable d’exposer des défendeurs à une responsabilité potentiellement illimitée, ainsi qu’à une responsabilité à l’égard de pertes et de dommages qui sont trop éloignés de toute 4 in its competitor collaboration guidelines (december 2009), the competition bureau of canada explains that it 4 dans ses lignes directrices sur la collaboration entre concur‑ rents (décembre 2009), le bureau de la concurrence du canada explique qu’il does not consider that the mere act of independently adopting a common course of conduct with awareness of the likely response of competitors or in response to the conduct of competitors, commonly referred to as “conscious parallel- ism”, is sufficient to establish an agreement for the purpose of subsection 45(1). however, parallel conduct coupled with facilitating practices, such as sharing competitively sensitive information or activities that assist competitors in monitoring one another’s prices, may be sufficient to prove that an agree- ment was concluded between the parties. [p. 7] ne considère pas que le simple fait d’adopter indépendamment un comportement commun en connaissant la réaction probable des concurrents ou en réponse au comportement des concur- rents, qu’on appelle communément « parallélisme conscient », suffit à établir qu’il y a eu entente au sens du paragraphe 45(1). cependant, lorsqu’il est combiné à des pratiques facilitantes comme la mise en commun de renseignements délicats sur le plan de la concurrence ou des activités qui aident les concur- rents à surveiller réciproquement leurs prix, le comportement parallèle peut suffire à prouver qu’une entente a été conclue entre les parties. [p. 7] 396 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. parliament’s intention when it enacted this statutory right of action. in light of the principles to which i have [192] referred above, my view is that the line should be drawn at loss and damage that flowed from the pric- ing decisions of the defendants themselves (that is, the loss claimed by the direct and indirect purchas- ers), and not those that are attributable to third parties who did not participate in — but who nevertheless would have benefitted from — the alleged price- fixing conspiracy. because the umbrella purchasers’ losses are indeed attributable to the pricing decisions of non- defendant odd manufacturers and suppliers, i find it plain and obvious that their claims in this action under s. 36(1) of the competition act cannot succeed. fixation des prix. je ne crois pas que cela ait pu être l’intention du parlement lorsqu’il a édicté la disposi- tion de la loi qui confère ce droit d’action. [192] compte tenu des principes susmentionnés, je suis d’avis qu’une ligne de démarcation doit être tracée entre les pertes et dommages qui découlent des décisions des défenderesses elles- mêmes quant à la fixation des prix (c’est-à-dire les pertes déplorées par les acheteurs directs et indirects) et les pertes et dommages qui sont attribuables aux tiers qui n’ont pas participé au complot allégué de fixation des prix, mais qui en auraient néanmoins bénéficié. comme les pertes des acheteurs sous parapluie sont attri- buables aux décisions relatives à la fixation des prix prises par des fabricants et fournisseurs de ldo autres que les défenderesses, je suis d’avis qu’il est évident et manifeste que leurs réclamations fondées en l’espèce sur le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concur‑ rence ne peuvent être accueillies. b is it plain and obvious that section 36(1) bars a plaintiff from alleging common law and equitable causes of action in respect of conduct that breaches the prohibitions in part vi of the competition act? b est‑il évident et manifeste que le par. 36(1) em‑ pêche le demandeur d’exercer des recours de common law et d’equity à l’égard d’un compor‑ tement qui enfreint les prohibitions prévues à la partie vi de la loi sur la concurrence? [193] the second issue raised in the toshiba appeal turns on whether the cause of action in s. 36(1) of the competition act is the exclusive civil remedy for conduct that breaches the criminal offence pro- visions in part vi of that statute. the defendants argue that it is, and that allowing claims in respect of such conduct under common law and equitable causes of action undermines the principle of parlia- mentary sovereignty. the plaintiff, by contrast, says that parliament did not intend to preclude private law remedies for such conduct when it enacted s. 36(1) of the competition act. [193] la deuxième question soulevée dans le pour- voi de toshiba consiste à savoir si la cause d’action fondée sur le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concur‑ rence est le seul recours civil possible contre un comportement allant à l’encontre des dispositions de la partie vi de cette loi relativement aux infractions criminelles. les défenderesses répondent par l’affir- mative et soutiennent qu’autoriser les réclamations liées à un tel comportement sur le fondement de la common law et de l’equity mine le principe de la souveraineté parlementaire. le demandeur soutient plutôt que le parlement n’avait pas l’intention d’écar- ter la possibilité d’exercer des recours en droit privé à l’encontre d’un tel comportement lorsqu’il a édicté le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence. [194] at its core, the issue under this heading is whether a claimant can rely on the common law and equity as a supplement to the right of action under s. 36(1) of the competition act — or put differently, whether a claimant can advance a common law or [194] la question à trancher sous cette rubrique consiste essentiellement à savoir si un demandeur peut se prévaloir de la common law et de l’equity en sus du droit d’action reconnu par le par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence. autrement dit, il s’agit de [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 397 equitable cause of action instead of, or together with, the statutory cause of action in respect of the same allegation of anti- competitive conduct. in her leading textbook, sullivan on the con‑ [195] struction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), professor ruth sullivan explains that “[t]he issue of supplementa- tion arises when there is overlap between legislation and the common law such that both may apply to a particular set of facts and also when legislation is incomplete in that it says nothing of, or does not fully address, a matter relating to the subject of the legisla- tion” (p 549). on this point, she adds the following: when the issue of supplementing legislation arises, the focus may be on the application of common law rules, entitlement to common law remedies or access to common law courts. although rules, remedies and jurisdiction raise distinct concerns, in each case the fundamental question is the same: is it permissible in the circumstances to sup- plement the legislation by resorting to the common law? if there is a conflict, the answer is clearly no. in the ab- sence of conflict, the answer to the question depends first of all on legislative intent, which is discovered using the usual methods of interpretation. however, the courts pay particular attention to whether the legislation in question constitutes a complete or exhaustive code. the adequacy of the legislation and the continuing usefulness of the common law rule, remedy or jurisdiction are important considerations. [emphasis added; p 549] [196] as with the umbrella purchasers issue, re- solving this issue requires an exercise in statutory in- terpretation: it must be determined, based on a proper reading of the competition act, whether parliament intended s. 36(1) to provide the exclusive civil rem- edy for persons claiming to have suffered loss or damage as a result of conduct contrary to part vi. déterminer si un demandeur peut invoquer une cause d’action fondée sur la common law ou l’equity au lieu d’une cause d’action prévue par la loi, ou les deux, à l’égard d’une même allégation de compor- tement anticoncurrentiel. [195] dans son ouvrage de premier plan intitulé sullivan on the construction of statutes (6e éd. 2014), la professeure ruth sullivan explique que [traduc- tion] « [l]a question de la complémentarité se pose lorsqu’il existe un chevauchement tel entre la loi et la common law que les deux peuvent s’appliquer à un ensemble de faits donné et également lorsque la loi est incomplète parce qu’elle ne fait aucune mention, ou ne traite pas entièrement, d’une question relative à l’objet du texte législatif » (p 549). à cet égard, la professeure sullivan ajoute ce qui suit : [traduction] lorsque la question de la complémen- tarité de la loi se pose, l’accent peut être mis sur l’appli- cation des règles de common law, sur le droit aux recours de common law ou sur l’accès aux tribunaux de common law. bien que les règles, les recours et la compétence soulèvent des préoccupations distinctes, dans chaque cas, la question fondamentale est la même : est-il permis dans les circonstances de compléter la loi en ayant recours à la common law? s’il y a conflit, la réponse est manifestement non. en l’absence de conflit, la réponse à cette question dépend d’abord de l’intention du législateur, que l’on discerne par les méthodes habituelles d’interprétation. toutefois, les tribunaux accordent une attention particu- lière à la question de savoir si la loi en question constitue un code complet ou exhaustif. le caractère suffisant de la loi et l’utilité continue de la règle, du recours ou de la compétence de common law sont des considérations importantes. [je souligne; p 549] [196] tout comme pour la question des acheteurs sous parapluie, un exercice d’interprétation législa- tive s’impose pour trancher la question en cause : il faut déterminer, suivant une juste interprétation de la loi sur la concurrence, si le parlement voulait que le par. 36(1) réserve exclusivement le recours civil possible aux personnes qui prétendent avoir subi une perte ou un préjudice par suite d’un comportement allant à l’encontre de la partie vi. [197] like my colleague, i begin my analysis with the presumption against interpreting legislation in a [197] à l’instar de mon collègue, je me pencherai d’abord sur la présomption selon laquelle il ne faut 398 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. manner that would interfere with common law rights. according to professor sullivan, such a presumption allows “the courts to insist on precise and explicit direction from the legislature before accepting any change”, so as to shield the law “from inadvertent legislative encroachment” (p 539). such an intention can be found either in the express wording of the stat- ute or by necessary implication (gendron v. supply and services union of the public service alliance of canada, local 50057, [1990] 1 scr 1298, at pp 1315-16). i agree with my colleague that the competi‑ [198] tion act does not expressly preclude claimants from supplementing the right of action in s. 36(1) with claims based on causes of action at common law or in equity. however, i am not convinced that the rea- soning in gendron applies to the case at hand; while that case dealt with a statutory provision that codified a common law right, s. 36 of the competition act is distinguishable in that it created a new right that did not exist before. instead, i would resolve this issue simply on the basis that the coexistence of statutory and common law or equitable claims arising from conduct contrary to part vi of the competition act is in fact contemplated by s. 62 of that statute, which reads as follows: pas interpréter une loi d’une manière qui porte at- teinte aux droits reconnus par la common law. selon la professeure sullivan, une telle présomption permet aux [traduction] « tribunaux de mettre l’accent sur des directives précises et explicites formulées par le législateur avant d’accepter tout changement » afin d’éviter tout « empiétement législatif involontaire » sur la loi (p 539). pareille intention peut être dégagée du libellé explicite de la loi ou par inférence néces- saire (gendron c. syndicat des approvisionnements et services de l’alliance de la fonction publique du canada, section locale 50057, [1990] 1 rcs 1298, p. 1315- 1316). [198] je suis d’accord avec mon collègue pour dire que la loi sur la concurrence n’empêche pas expres- sément les demandeurs de présenter, en sus du droit d’action prévu au par. 36(1), des réclamations fon- dées sur des causes d’action reconnues en common law ou en equity. je ne suis toutefois pas convain- cue de l’applicabilité en l’espèce du raisonnement adopté dans gendron; si cette affaire portait sur une disposition statutaire qui codifiait un droit issu de la common law, on peut distinguer l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence en ce qu’il a créé un nouveau droit qui n’existait pas auparavant. je suis plutôt d’avis de régler cette question en affirmant simplement que la coexistence des recours fondés sur la loi et des recours fondés sur la common law ou l’equity découlant d’un comportement allant à l’encontre de la partie vi de la loi sur la concurrence est en fait prévue à l’art. 62 de la loi, qui est ainsi rédigé : 62 except as otherwise provided in [part vi], nothing in [part vi] shall be construed as depriving any person of any civil right of action. 62 sauf disposition contraire de la [partie vi], celle-ci n’a pas pour effet de priver une personne d’un droit d’action au civil. [199] in my view, this provision evinces a legislative intention that the provisions of part vi (which is titled “offences in relation to competition”) not abrogate any right of action a claimant has — which might in- clude a right of action founded on the tort of unlawful means conspiracy or in unjust enrichment — that is predicated upon a breach of the offence provisions of the competition act. as the manitoba court of appeal recognized in westfair foods ltd. v. lippens inc. (1989), 64 dlr (4th) 335, the inclusion of this provision in the statutory framework suggests [199] à mon avis, cette disposition illustre une in- tention du législateur de prévoir que les dispositions de la partie vi (intitulée « infractions relatives à la concurrence ») n’abrogent pas les droits d’action dont jouit un demandeur — y compris les droits fondés sur le délit de complot exercé par des moyens illégaux ou sur l’enrichissement sans cause — qui reposent sur une violation des dispositions de la loi sur la concur‑ rence en matière d’infractions. comme l’a reconnu la cour d’appel du manitoba dans l’arrêt westfair foods ltd. c. lippens inc. (1989), 64 dlr (4th) 335, [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 399 that parliament did not intend the provisions of the competition act to intrude upon the provinces’ juris- diction over civil rights and liberties. [200] the fact that s. 62 applies only to part vi of the competition act — and therefore is not directly applicable to s. 36(1), which is instead located in part iv — is not, in my view, consequential. the cause of action created by s. 36(1)(a) is expressly tied to conduct that would constitute an offence un- der part vi of the statute. this court recognized in general motors, at p. 673, that the purpose of this remedial provision is to “help enforce the substantive aspects of the act”, such as the prohibitions against anti- competitive conduct. [201] it is also essential to note that s. 62 uses the phrase “any civil right of action”, which suggests that parliament contemplated the preservation of the various civil rights of action that may exist in respect of conduct prohibited under part vi, beyond the one provided for in s 36(1). indeed, the former provision would be redundant and pointless if it merely af- firmed what the latter already states: that perpetrators of conduct prohibited by part vi are subject both to criminal prosecution and to civil proceedings under s 36(1)(a). this is especially the case given that s. 36(2) and s. 36(4)(a)(ii) indicate that statutory claims can be brought against defendants even after any criminal proceedings against them were finally disposed of. l’inclusion de cette disposition dans le cadre législatif donne à penser que le parlement ne voulait pas que les dispositions de la loi sur la concurrence portent atteinte à la compétence des provinces sur les droits et libertés civils. [200] le fait que l’art. 62 s’applique seulement à la partie vi de la loi sur la concurrence — et qu’il ne s’applique donc pas directement au par. 36(1), qui se trouve plutôt à la partie iv — me paraît sans consé- quence. la cause d’action créée par l’al. 36(1)a) est expressément liée au comportement qui constituerait une infraction sous le régime de la partie vi de la loi. dans l’arrêt general motors, p. 673, notre cour a reconnu que l’objet de cette disposition réparatrice est de « faciliter l’exécution des aspects fondamen- taux de la loi », comme les prohibitions visant le comportement anticoncurrentiel. [201] il est également essentiel de souligner que l’art. 62 contient l’expression «  un droit d’action au civil », ce qui donne à penser que le parlement a envisagé de préserver les différents droits d’action au civil qui peuvent être exercés par suite d’un compor- tement interdit par la partie vi en plus de celui prévu au par 36(1). en effet, l’art. 62 serait redondant et inutile s’il confirmait simplement ce que dit déjà le par. 36(1), à savoir que les auteurs d’un comporte- ment prohibé par la partie vi peuvent faire l’objet à la fois de poursuites criminelles et de poursuites civiles en vertu de l’al 36(1)a). cela est d’autant plus vrai puisque le par. 36(2) et le sous-al. 36(4)a)(ii) prévoient qu’une action peut être intentée contre un défendeur même après qu’il eut été statué de façon définitive sur la poursuite au criminel. [202] therefore, when i read the words of s. 62 “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordi- nary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act and the intention of parliament” (driedger, at p. 87; bell expressvu, at para. 26), i am led to the conclusion that this provision has the effect of preserving all civil rights of action that a claimant may have — over and above the right of action available under s. 36(1) of the competition act — in respect of anti- competitive conduct that would constitute an offence under part vi of that act. indeed, s. 62 would be meaningless if s. 36(1) [202] par conséquent, lorsque je lis les termes de l’art. 62 [traduction] « dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’har- monise avec l’[économie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du [parlement] » (driedger, p. 87; bell expressvu, par. 26), j’en arrive à la conclusion que cette disposition a pour effet de préserver tous les droits d’action au civil que peut exercer le deman- deur — en sus du droit d’action prévu au par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence — relativement à un comportement anticoncurrentiel qui constituerait une infraction sous le régime de la partie vi de cette loi. 400 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. were to be interpreted as exhaustive in respect of civil claims for such conduct. [203] on the basis of this reasoning, i agree with the result reached by my colleague: the courts below did not err in permitting the plaintiff to advance the pleaded common law and equitable causes of action together with the statutory cause of action under s. 36(1) in this case. c what standard must a representative plaintiff meet in order to have loss‑ related questions certified as “common issues” among indi‑ rect purchasers, and has the plaintiff met this standard in the present case? [204] the final issue on appeal relates to the re- quirement of common issues in s. 4(1)(c) of the class proceedings act. what is it that the plaintiff must be capable of establishing at the certification stage in order to provide the necessary assurance that his loss- related questions are capable of resolution on a common basis, and does his proposed methodology for establishing loss satisfy this requirement? en effet, l’art. 62 serait vide de sens si le par. 36(1) était interprété comme une disposition exhaustive en ce qui concerne les recours civils relatifs à ce type de comportement. [203] sur le fondement de ce raisonnement, je souscris au résultat auquel arrive mon collègue : les tribunaux d’instance inférieure n’ont pas commis d’erreur en permettant au demandeur de faire valoir les causes d’action en common law et en equity ainsi que la cause d’action fondée sur le par. 36(1) en l’espèce. c quelle est la norme à laquelle doit satisfaire le représentant des demandeurs pour que les ques‑ tions liées à la perte soient autorisées comme des « questions communes » aux acheteurs in‑ directs? le demandeur satisfait‑il à cette norme en l’espèce? [204] la dernière question à trancher dans le pour- voi concerne l’exigence des questions communes énoncée à l’al. 4(1)(c) de la class proceedings act. à l’étape de l’autorisation, que doit être en mesure d’établir le demandeur pour convaincre le tribunal que ses questions liées à la perte peuvent être réso- lues sur une base commune, et est-ce que la méthode qu’il propose pour prouver la perte respecte cette exigence? (1) background (1) contexte [205] the existence of common issues among the individual class members lies at the very heart of a class proceeding. the procedural ability to aggregate these issues and to consider them at once, and for all class members, during a common issues trial is what alleviates the need for each class member to seek re- dress via separate actions (m. a. eizenga et al., class actions law and practice (2nd ed. (loose- leaf)), at p 3-101). the authors of the law of class actions in canada explain the importance of commonality in the following terms: [205] l’existence de questions communes aux membres individuels du groupe est au cœur même d’un recours collectif. la capacité, sur le plan pro- cédural, de regrouper ces questions communes et de les étudier une seule fois, et ce pour l’ensemble des membres du groupe, lors de l’audition des ques- tions communes élimine la nécessité que chacun des membres du groupe demande réparation en intentant des actions distinctes (m. a. eizenga et autres, class actions law and practice (2e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), p 3-101). les auteurs de the law of class actions in canada expliquent l’importance de la notion de caractère commun en ces termes : the presence of significant common issues provides the access to justice and judicial economies that ultimately [traduction] l’existence de questions communes im- portantes favorise l’accès à la justice et l’économie des [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 401 justify certifying a class proceeding. common issues are what actually unite and define the class. the mere fact that a group of people suffers a wrong does not justify certifying a class proceeding unless there are common issues to be decided for the defendant and the members of the group. ressources judiciaires, ce qui, au bout du compte, justifie l’autorisation d’un recours collectif. en fait, les questions communes unifient et définissent le groupe. le simple fait qu’un groupe de personnes subisse un tort ne justifie pas l’autorisation d’un recours collectif, à moins qu’il faille se prononcer sur des questions communes au défendeur et aux membres du groupe. (w. k. winkler et al. (2014), at p. 107) (w. k. winkler et autres (2014), p. 107) for this reason, the determination of what constitute the common issues in any proposed class action is a key aspect of a certification motion. pour ce motif, dans le contexte d’une requête en autorisation d’un recours collectif projeté, il est es- sentiel d’identifier les questions communes. [206] in his proposed litigation plan, the plaintiff submitted a number of questions for resolution on a common basis at trial (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 125-27), including questions that essentially relate to whether the class members suffered a loss in connection with the alleged price- fixing conspiracy. in order to satisfy the certification judge [207] that these loss- related questions were capable of res- olution on a common basis, the plaintiff adduced evidence from an expert economist named dr. keith reutter. in his expert report, dr. reutter took the po- sition that “all members of the proposed class would have been impacted” by the alleged price- fixing con- spiracy and that “there are accepted methods available to estimate any overcharge and aggregate damages that resulted from the alleged wrongdoing using evi- dence common to the proposed class” (ar, vol. iii, at p 119). his methods would involve constructing an economic model to estimate the “but- for” price of the odds, that is, their price if the alleged anti- competitive conduct had not occurred (certification judge’s reasons, at para. 156), and would include “econometric methods based on multiple regression to determine the overcharge and pass- through rates” (ibid., at para 158). [206] dans le plan de déroulement de l’instance qu’il a proposé, le demandeur a énoncé plusieurs questions qui peuvent faire l’objet d’une résolution commune (da, vol. ii, p. 125- 127). certaines de ces questions visaient essentiellement à savoir si les membres du groupe ont subi une perte liée au complot allégué de fixation des prix. [207] dans le but de convaincre le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation que ces questions liées à la perte pouvaient faire l’objet d’une résolution commune, le demandeur a produit le rapport d’un économiste expert, m. keith reutter. dans son rap- port d’expert, m. reutter soutient que [traduction] « tous les membres du groupe projeté auraient été touchés » par le complot allégué de fixation des prix et que « certaines méthodes permettraient d’esti- mer la valeur de toute hausse et de tout préjudice global ayant découlé des actes fautifs reprochés au moyen de la preuve commune au groupe projeté » (da, vol. iii, p 119). ses méthodes supposeraient l’élaboration d’un modèle économique servant à évaluer le prix hypothétique des ldo s’il n’y avait pas eu comportement anticoncurrentiel (motifs du juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation, par. 156), de même que l’utilisation de [traduction] « méthodes économétriques fondées sur la régression multiple pour calculer la majoration et le montant de la perte transférée » (ibid., par 158). [208] the suggestion that dr. reutter’s methodol- ogy could establish that all class members would have been impacted by the alleged price- fixing conspiracy was called into question during his cross- examination, [208] toutefois, la suggestion selon laquelle la mé- thode de m. reutter permettrait de prouver que tous les membres du groupe ont été touchés par le complot allégué de fixation des prix a été mise en question 402 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. however (see ar, vol. v, at pp 210-25). the defend- ants therefore resisted certification of the loss- related questions, arguing that the plaintiff’s methodology could not address the issue of loss on a class‑ wide basis because it would not make it possible to answer the plaintiff’s proposed questions at trial in respect of every class member — either by establishing that all of them were overcharged for their odds, or by iden- tifying those who were, and distinguishing them from those who were not. in the defendants’ submission, unless it could be determined at the common issues trial that a loss had actually been incurred by at least some specific indirect purchasers, then those loss- related questions could not be decided on a common basis at trial and should therefore not be certified as common issues. [209] for his part, the plaintiff argued that, from a factual standpoint, his expert’s methodology would be capable of establishing that all class members (including the indirect purchasers) had suffered a loss. as an alternative legal argument, he submit- ted that he was not required to demonstrate to the certification judge that, using his expert’s method- ology, he would be able to prove at trial that all class members were harmed or to distinguish those who were from those who were not in an individualized fashion (rf (toshiba. appeal), at para 96). instead, his position was that it would be sufficient, at the certification stage, if the methodology were simply capable of proving that loss had reached the indirect purchaser level in the distribution chain — that is, that some overcharges were passed on to some in- direct purchasers, without having to identify which ones. [210] what is key, for the purposes of the common- ality issue, is the difference between demonstrating that loss reached the indirect purchaser level — that is, that some overcharges were passed on to some unidentified indirect purchasers — and proving that loss reached all or an identified group of indirect purchasers. pendant son contre- interrogatoire (da, vol. v, p. 210- 225). les défenderesses se sont donc opposées à l’autorisation des questions liées à la perte. elles ont fait valoir que la méthode du demandeur ne pouvait aborder la question de la perte subie à l’échelle du groupe, car elle ne permettra pas de répondre aux questions proposées par le demandeur au procès à l’égard de chacun des membres du groupe — que ce soit en prouvant que tous les membres du groupe ont payé un prix trop élevé pour leurs ldo ou en iden- tifiant les membres qui ont payé un prix trop élevé et en les distinguant de ceux qui ont payé un juste prix. selon les arguments des défenderesses, à moins qu’il ne soit déterminé lors de l’audition des questions communes qu’une perte a effectivement été subie par au moins quelques acheteurs indirects précis, ces questions liées à la perte ne peuvent être tranchées sur une base commune au procès et ne devraient donc pas être autorisées en tant que questions communes. [209] pour sa part, le demandeur a fait valoir que, du point de vue factuel, la méthode proposée par son expert permettrait de prouver que tous les membres du groupe (y compris les acheteurs indirects) ont subi une perte. à titre d’argument juridique subsidiaire, il a affirmé qu’il n’était pas tenu de démontrer au juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation que la méthode proposée par son expert lui permettrait de prouver au procès que tous les membres du groupe ont subi un préjudice ou d’établir de manière individuelle une distinction entre ceux qui ont subi un préjudice et ceux qui n’en ont pas subi (mi (pourvoi de toshiba), par 96). le demandeur était plutôt d’avis qu’il lui suffirait de démontrer, à l’étape de l’autorisation, que sa méthode permet d’établir que la perte a atteint le ni‑ veau de l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution. autrement dit, il lui suffirait d’établir qu’une certaine majoration atteint certains acheteurs indirects, sans avoir à les identifier individuellement. [210] en ce qui concerne la question du carac- tère commun, l’élément clé est la différence entre la démonstration que la perte a atteint le niveau de l’acheteur indirect — c’est-à-dire qu’une certaine majoration a atteint quelques acheteurs indirects non identifiés — et la preuve que la perte a atteint la totalité des acheteurs indirects ou un groupe précis d’acheteurs indirects. [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 403 [211] my colleague seems to accept that there is some basis in fact for finding that dr. reutter’s meth- odology will have a reasonable prospect of establish- ing, at the common issues trial, that all of the indirect purchasers suffered a loss. in his view, however, noth- ing turns on this given his conclusion as to the law:    it is not necessary, in order to support certifying loss as a common question, that a plaintiff’s expert’s methodology establish that each and every class member suffered a loss. nor is it necessary that dr. reutter’s methodology be able to identify those class members who suffered no loss so as to distinguish them from those who did. rather, in order for loss- related questions to be certified as common issues, a plaintiff’s expert’s methodology need only be sufficiently credible or plausible to establish loss reached the requisite purchaser level. [emphasis added; para 102] [212] for the purposes of my analysis, i am pre- pared to accept that there is some basis in fact on which the certification judge could have found that the proposed methodology would be capable of prov- ing at trial that loss had reached the indirect purchaser level. my disagreement with my colleague lies else- where. in my view, a methodology that is incapable of establishing at trial that at least some identifiable in- direct purchasers actually suffered a loss, but that can instead show only that loss occurred somewhere at the indirect purchaser level in the distribution chain, does not allow any of the loss- related questions pro- posed by the plaintiff in this case to be answered on a “common” or “class- wide” basis. [211] mon collègue semble accepter qu’il existe un certain fondement factuel pour conclure que la méthode de m. reutter permettra raisonnablement d’établir, lors de l’audition des questions communes, que tous les acheteurs indirects ont subi une perte. il estime cependant que cela n’est pas pertinent compte tenu de sa conclusion à l’égard du droit :    il n’est pas nécessaire, pour justifier l’autorisation de la question de la perte en tant que question commune, que la méthode proposée par un expert du demandeur établisse que chaque membre du groupe a subi une perte. il n’est pas non plus nécessaire que la méthode de m. reutter permette d’identifier les membres du groupe qui n’ont subi aucune perte de manière à les distinguer de ceux qui en ont subi une. pour que les questions relatives à la perte soient certifiées en tant que questions communes, la méthode de l’expert du demandeur n’a qu’à être suffisamment valable ou acceptable pour établir que l’acheteur du niveau requis a subi une perte. [je souligne; par 102] [212] aux fins de mon analyse, je suis disposée à accepter qu’il existe un certain fondement factuel permettant au juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation de conclure que la méthode proposée permettrait d’établir au procès que la perte a atteint le niveau des acheteurs indirects. mon désaccord avec mon collègue porte sur un autre point. à mon sens, une méthode qui ne permet pas d’établir au procès qu’au moins un certain nombre d’acheteurs indirects iden‑ tifiables ont effectivement subi une perte et qui per- met seulement de démontrer que la perte a atteint le niveau de l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution ne peut être utilisée pour résoudre l’une ou l’autre des questions relatives à la perte proposées par le demandeur en l’espèce de façon commune ou à l’échelle du groupe. (2) analysis (2) analyse in microsoft, this court affirmed that, in [213] order to have a question certified as a common issue, the representative plaintiff must show that there is some basis in fact for the commonality requirement in s. 4(1)(c) of the class proceedings act — that is, that the question be capable of resolution on a class‑ wide basis (see paras. 99- 114). what the “some basis in fact” standard requires in any given case de- pends on what it is that the proposed question asks; [213] dans l’arrêt microsoft, notre cour a affirmé que pour qu’une question soit autorisée en tant que question commune, le représentant des demandeurs doit établir l’existence d’un certain fondement fac- tuel pour respecter l’exigence de la question com- mune énoncée à l’al. 4(1)(c) de la class proceedings act, c’est-à-dire que la question doit pouvoir faire l’objet d’une résolution à l’échelle du groupe (voir par. 99- 114). dans un cas donné, la norme fondée 404 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. different questions will impose different require- ments upon the representative plaintiff. in the case at hand, the loss- related questions [214] proposed by the plaintiff include the following: what damages, if any, are payable to the class members pursuant to s. 36 of the competition act? did the class members suffer economic loss? have the class members suffered a corresponding deprivation in the amount of the overcharges on the sale of odds? [215] the term “class member” or “class mem- bers” is defined in the plaintiff’s proposed litiga- tion plan as “one or more members of the proposed class”, which is comprised of: sur l’existence d’« un certain fondement factuel » dépend de la teneur de la question proposée; des exigences différentes seront imposées au représen- tant des demandeurs selon les questions soulevées. [214] en l’espèce, les questions liées à la perte propo- sées par le demandeur sont notamment les suivantes : quel est le montant des dommages- intérêts, s’il en est, payables aux membres du groupe conformément à l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence? les membres du groupe ont- ils subi une perte financière? les membres du groupe se sont- ils appauvris d’un montant égal à celui de la majoration du prix de vente des ldo? [215] les termes [traduction] «  membre du groupe » et « membres du groupe » sont définis dans le plan de déroulement de l’instance proposé par le demandeur comme « un ou plusieurs membres du groupe projeté », qui est composé de : all persons resident in british columbia who, during the period commencing at least as early as january 1, 2004 and continuing through january 1, 2010 (the “class period”), purchased optical disc drives (“odd”) or products that contained odd. [ar, vol. ii, at p. 114] [traduction] tous les résidents de la colombie- britannique qui, pendant la période allant au moins du 1er janvier 2004 au 1er janvier 2010 (la « période visée par le recours collec- tif ») ont acheté des lecteurs de disques optiques (« ldo ») ou des produits munis de ldo. [da, vol. ii, p. 114] [216] the broad definition of the term “class mem- bers”, and the use of that term in stating the proposed loss- related questions, reflects the possibility that the plaintiff might not be able to prove at trial that everyone who purchased an odd or an odd product actually suffered a loss in connection with the alleged price- fixing conspiracy. rather, the evidence might be such that loss is provable only in respect of some class members. my colleague says that these questions are stated in such a way that they “could be taken as asking whether all class members suffered economic loss or whether any class members suffered economic loss”, and adds that “because they could be taken in two different ways they might, following the common issues trial, be answered in different ways” (para. 91 (emphasis in original)). [216] la définition large du terme « membres du groupe », et l’utilisation de ce terme pour formuler les questions proposées liées à la perte, démontrent la possibilité que le demandeur ne soit pas en mesure de prouver au procès que toutes les personnes ayant acheté un ldo ou un produit muni d’un ldo ont effectivement subi une perte à cause du complot al- légué de fixation des prix. en fait, la preuve pourrait être telle que seule la perte qu’auraient subie certains membres du groupe est susceptible d’être prouvée. mon collègue affirme que ces questions sont formulées de manière à ce qu’elles « puissent être interprétées comme demandant si tous les membres du groupe ont subi une perte économique ou si l’un d’entre eux a subi une perte économique » et il ajoute que, « [p]arce que ces questions peuvent recevoir deux interprétations différentes, elles pourraient donc, à la suite de l’au- dition des questions communes, appeler des réponses différentes » (par. 91 (en italique dans l’original)). [217] regardless of how flexible these questions might be, however, they cannot be answered on a “class- wide” or “common” basis at trial if the [217] aussi souples ces questions soient- elles, ce- pendant, elles ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une réso- lution commune ou d’une résolution à l’échelle du [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 405 plain tiff’s methodology is incapable of establishing loss in any identifiable manner. this is because mere proof that some loss reached the indirect purchaser level in the distribution chain does not dispose of any element of liability for any indirect purchaser, nor does it otherwise advance the litigation in any meaningful way. groupe au procès si la méthode du demandeur ne per- met pas d’établir la perte d’une manière identifiable. il en est ainsi parce que la simple preuve qu’une partie de la perte a atteint le niveau de l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution ne permet pas de démontrer l’existence d’une responsabilité quelconque envers les acheteurs indirects ou de faire progresser l’instance d’une manière utile. (a) proof at trial that loss reached the indirect purchaser level, without anything more, does not dispose of any element of liability for any indirect purchaser a) la simple démonstration au procès que la perte a atteint le niveau de l’acheteur indirect ne prouve pas l’existence d’une responsabi‑ lité quelconque envers les acheteurs indirects [218] as my colleague seems to implicitly acknowl- edge in his reasons, proof that loss reached the in- direct purchaser level is insufficient for any finding of liability to be made at the common issues trial. this is because loss or deprivation suffered by the claimant is an essential element of the causes of action under s. 36 of the competition act, under the common law tort of civil conspiracy, and in unjust enrichment. this is key: the defendants can be held liable under these causes of action only to those class members who (among other things) are found to have suffered a loss in connection with the price fixing.5 for this reason, the common issues trial judge cannot impose any liability on the defendants if the plaintiff cannot show which class members actually suffered a loss. individual trials will then be necessary (see brown j.’s reasons, at para. 120; ca reasons, at para. 158; shah (ont. scj), at para 69). indeed, the plaintiff acknowledges as much in his proposed litigation plan, when he states the following: [218] comme semble le reconnaître implicitement mon collègue dans ses motifs, la preuve que la perte a atteint le niveau d’acheteurs indirects est insuffisante pour tirer une conclusion de responsabilité lors de l’audition des questions communes. cela tient au fait que la perte ou l’appauvrissement subi par le deman- deur est un élément essentiel des causes d’actions fondées sur l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence, fondées sur le délit de complot civil reconnu en com- mon law et en matière d’enrichissement sans cause. ceci est un élément clé : les défenderesses peuvent être tenues responsables relativement à ces causes d’action seulement envers les membres du groupe à l’égard desquels (notamment) il est conclu qu’ils ont subi une perte liée à la fixation des prix5. pour cette raison, le juge saisi des questions communes ne peut imputer une quelconque responsabilité aux défende- resses si le demandeur n’est pas en mesure d’identifier les membres du groupe qui ont effectivement subi une perte. des procès individuels seraient donc nécessaires (voir les motifs du juge brown, par. 120; motifs de la ca, par. 158; shah (csj. ont.), par 69). en effet, le demandeur le reconnaît dans son plan de déroulement de l’instance proposé, où il affirme ce qui suit : the common issues trial will determine the existence and scope of the alleged conspiracy. the common issues trial [traduction] l’audition des questions communes per- mettra de déterminer l’existence et l’ampleur du complot 5 the degree of “connection” varies among the different causes of action. for example, the cause of action under s. 36 of the competition act is for loss or damage that has occurred “as a result of” anti- competitive conduct. recovery in unjust enrich- ment is available to a claimant who suffered a deprivation that “corresponds” to the defendant’s enrichment in circumstances where there is no juristic reason for either the enrichment or the deprivation. 5 le degré d’un « lien » varie parmi les différentes causes d’ac- tion. par exemple, la cause d’action fondée sur l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence concerne la perte ou les dommages subis « par suite » d’un comportement anticoncurrentiel. un demandeur ayant subi un appauvrissement qui « correspond » à l’enrichissement du défendeur peut demander un recouvrement pour enrichissement sans cause lorsqu’aucun motif juridique ne justifie l’enrichissement ou l’appauvrissement. 406 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. may also determine on a class- wide basis whether class members were injured, leading to a finding of liability and a determination of aggregate damages. if the common issues trial does not determine injury on a class- wide basis, liability and damages will be determined on an individual basis in a manageable process. [emphasis added; ar, vol. ii, at p 118] [219] this, of course, makes sense when we con- sider the fact that a class action is essentially an aggregation of individual actions that share common issues of fact and law (western canadian shop‑ ping centres inc. v. dutton, 2001 scc 46, [2001] 2 scr 534, at para 27). in bou malhab v. dif‑ fusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 scc 9, [2011] 1 scr 214, this court reiterated that the class proceeding is merely a procedural vehicle which “cannot be used to make up for the absence of one of the constituent elements of the cause of action”, adding that such a proceeding “can succeed only if each claim it covers, taken individually, could serve as a basis for court proceedings” (para. 52 (empha- sis added)). by way of illustration, a claimant in an individual trial would not be entitled to a remedy under s. 36(1) of the competition act merely upon establishing that loss had reached some unidentified persons at his or her level in the distribution chain; that claimant would likewise have no such entitle- ment in a class proceeding (see sun‑ rype products ltd. v. archer daniels midland company, 2013 scc 58, [2013] 3 scr 545, at para 75). [220] moreover, and again as my colleague’s rea- sons make clear, the aggregate damages provisions of the class proceedings act (ss. 29 to 34) cannot be of any assistance to the plaintiff in establishing liability to all of the class members in a case like this, where proof of loss is a constituent element of the cause(s) of action. as rothstein j. explained in microsoft: allégué. elle permettra également de déterminer à l’échelle du groupe si les membres du groupe ont subi un préjudice, ce qui mènera à une conclusion de responsabilité et à la fixation des dommages- intérêts globaux. si l’audition des questions communes ne permet pas de déterminer qu’un préjudice a été subi à l’échelle du groupe, la responsabilité et les dommages- intérêts seront établis individuellement au moyen d’un processus fonctionnel. [je souligne; da, vol. ii, p 118] [219] bien sûr, cela est logique lorsque nous tenons compte du fait qu’un recours collectif est essentiel- lement un regroupement d’actions individuelles qui partagent des questions communes de fait et de droit (western canadian shopping centres inc. c. dutton, 2001 csc 46, [2001] 2 rcs 534, par 27). dans l’arrêt bou malhab c. diffusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 csc 9, [2011] 1 rcs 214, notre cour a réaffirmé que le recours collectif ne constitue qu’un mécanisme procédural dont « on ne peut s’autoriser [  ] pour suppléer à l’absence d’un des éléments constitutifs du droit d’action », ajoutant qu’une telle procédure « ne pourra réussir que si chacune des réclamations prises individuellement justifiait le re- cours aux tribunaux » (par. 52 (je souligne)). à titre d’exemple, le demandeur qui intente une action à titre individuel n’aurait pas droit à une réparation au titre du par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence simplement en établissant qu’une perte a été subie par des personnes non identifiées situées à son niveau de la chaîne de distribution; ce demandeur n’aurait pas non plus droit à une telle réparation dans un recours collectif (voir sun‑ rype products ltd. c. archer daniels midland company, 2013 csc 58, [2013] 3 rcs 545, par 75). [220] de plus, et comme mon collègue l’indique clairement dans ses motifs, les dispositions de la class proceedings act relatives aux dommages- intérêts glo- baux (art. 29 à 34) ne peuvent être d’aucune utilité au demandeur pour établir la responsabilité envers tous les membres du groupe dans une affaire comme celle qui nous occupe, où la preuve de la perte est un élé- ment constitutif de la ou des causes d’action. comme l’a expliqué le juge rothstein dans microsoft : the aggregate damages provisions of the cpa relate to remedy and are procedural. they cannot be used to estab- lish liability (2038724 ontario ltd. v. quizno’s canada les dispositions de la cpa sur l’octroi de dommages- intérêts globaux ont trait à la réparation, sont de nature pro- cédurale et ne peuvent permettre d’établir la responsabilité [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 407 restaurant corp., 2010 onca 466, 100 or (3d) 721, at para 55). the language of s. 29(1)(b) specifies that no question of fact or law, other than the assessment of damages, should remain to be determined in order for an aggregate monetary award to be made. as i read it, this means that an antecedent finding of liability is required before resorting to the aggregate damages provision of the cpa. this includes, where required by the cause of action such as in a claim under s. 36 of the competition act, a finding of proof of loss. i do not see how a statutory provision designed to award damages on an aggregate basis can be said to be used to establish any aspect of liability. [emphasis added; para 131] [221] the aggregate damages provisions of the class proceedings act therefore cannot be inter- preted and applied in such a way as to give a remedy to class members who could not obtain a remedy in an individual trial due to their inability to show that they suffered a loss in connection with the alleged conspiracy. it is important not to conflate the assess- ment of aggregate damages with the rationale for awarding them. [222] what all of this means is that a determination at a common issues trial of whether loss reached the indirect purchaser level in the distribution chain is of no assistance in resolving the question of whether the defendants are actually liable to any or all of the indirect purchasers under the causes of action listed above. from the plaintiff’s perspective, the best case scenario is that there is a need for individual trials on the question of which indirect purchasers actually suffered a loss. his worst case scenario is that it cannot be proved that any indirect purchas- ers suffered a loss at all, which would terminate the litigation altogether as it pertains to those class members. contrary to what the certification judge stated in his reasons (at para. 168), establishing at trial that “the defendants took part in a conspiracy, that they sometimes or always overcharged direct purchasers, and that at least some direct purchasers passed on these overcharges” to the indirect pur- chasers will not be “sufficient to establish the fact of the defendants’ liability”. it follows, therefore, that the certification judge did not identify the correct (2038724 ontario ltd. c. quizno’s canada restaurant corp., 2010 onca 466, 100 or (3d) 721, par 55). le libellé de l’al. 29(1)(b) veut qu’il ne reste à trancher que des questions de fait ou de droit touchant à la détermina- tion de la réparation pécuniaire pour qu’une réparation pécuniaire globale puisse être accordée. à mon sens, il faut une conclusion préalable de responsabilité avant d’appli- quer les dispositions de la cpa sur l’octroi de dommages- intérêts globaux, ce qui comprend, lorsque l’exige une cause d’action comme celles prévues à l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence, une conclusion sur la preuve de la perte. je ne vois pas comment une disposition visant à ac- corder des dommages- intérêts de manière globale pourrait être le fondement d’une conclusion sur quelque volet de la responsabilité. [je souligne; par 131] [221] les dispositions de la class proceedings act relatives aux dommages- intérêts globaux ne peuvent donc être interprétées et appliquées de manière à accorder une réparation aux membres du groupe qui ne pouvaient en obtenir une dans un procès indivi- duel en raison de leur incapacité à démontrer qu’ils ont subi une perte par suite du complot allégué. il est important de ne pas confondre l’évaluation des dommages- intérêts globaux avec la justification de leur octroi. [222] compte tenu de tout ce qui précède, lors de l’audition des questions communes, déterminer si la perte a atteint le niveau d’acheteurs indirects situés en aval dans la chaîne de distribution ne permet pas d’établir si les défenderesses sont responsables envers l’ensemble ou une partie des acheteurs indirects relati- vement aux causes d’action énumérées ci- dessus. du point de vue du demandeur, dans le meilleur des cas, il faudrait tenir des procès individuels afin de déter- miner qui, parmi les acheteurs indirects, a réellement subi une perte. le pire des cas serait de ne pas pouvoir démontrer que l’un ou l’autre des acheteurs indirects a subi une perte, ce qui mettrait carrément fin au litige visant ces membres du groupe. contrairement à ce qu’a indiqué le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisa- tion dans ses motifs (par. 168), démontrer au procès que [traduction] « les défenderesses ont participé à un complot, qu’elles ont parfois ou toujours imposé une majoration aux acheteurs directs et qu’au moins certains de ces acheteurs directs ont refilé ces majo- rations » aux acheteurs indirects « [ne] suffira [pas] à établir la responsabilité des défenderesses ». par 408 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. standard for certifying loss as a common issue (see brown j.’s reasons, at para 110). (b) proof at trial that loss reached the indirect purchaser level, without anything more, does not allow for any loss‑ related determination that would advance the litigation in a manner that satisfies the commonality requirement [223] my colleague states that the loss- related ques- tions proposed by the plaintiff in this case satisfy the commonality requirement in s. 4(1)(c) of the class proceedings act, based on a methodology that is capa- ble of proving that overcharges were passed on some- where at the indirect purchaser level, even though such a methodology cannot allow any finding of liability to be made at trial (see paras. 109 and 120). similarly, the plaintiff takes the position that a “single analysis of whether there was an overcharge and whether that overcharge was passed on to the indirect purchaser level would significantly advance the claim for all class members by avoiding repetition of the collection and analysis of large quantities of economic data” (rf (toshiba. appeal), at para 106). [224] in light of the legal principles set out by my colleague at paras. 103-5 of his reasons, however, i cannot agree. to begin with, the fact that losses might have occurred somewhere at the indirect purchaser level in the distribution chain does not assist us in de- termining which specific indirect purchasers suffered losses in order to identify the class members to whom the defendants might be liable. if the common issues trial judge finds that overcharges were passed on to at least one unidentifiable indirect purchaser, there would still be a need for individual trials; therefore, duplication of fact- finding would not be eliminated (dutton, at para 39). and if such individual trials are indeed required, then proof that loss occurred somewhere at the indirect purchaser level is not truly “necessary to the resolution of each class member’s claim”, is not a “substantial common ingredient” of their causes of action, and cannot in fact result in conséquent, le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation n’a pas appliqué la bonne norme pour autoriser la question de la perte en tant que question commune (voir les motifs du juge brown, par 110). b) la simple démonstration au procès que la perte a atteint le niveau de l’acheteur indi‑ rect ne permet pas de rendre une décision sur la perte qui ferait progresser l’instance d’une manière qui respecte l’exigence d’une question commune [223] mon collègue affirme que les questions de perte proposées par le demandeur en l’espèce ré- pondent à l’exigence d’une question commune pré- vue à l’al. 4(1)(c) de la class proceedings act, sur le fondement d’une méthode qui permet de prouver qu’une majoration a été refilée au niveau de l’ache- teur indirect, même si cette méthode ne permet pas de tirer une conclusion de responsabilité au procès (voir par. 109 et 120). de même, le demandeur sou- tient que [traduction] « une seule analyse visant à déterminer s’il y a eu majoration et si celle-ci est passée au niveau de l’acheteur indirect ferait considérablement progresser la demande pour tous les membres du groupe, car elle aurait pour effet d’éviter de répéter la collecte et l’analyse de grandes quantités de données économiques » (mi (pourvoi de toshiba), par 106). [224] compte tenu des principes de droit énoncés par mon collègue aux par. 103- 105 de ses motifs, cependant, je ne puis être d’accord. premièrement, le fait que des acheteurs indirects situés en aval dans la chaîne de distribution pourraient avoir subi une perte ne nous aide pas à déterminer précisément de quels acheteurs indirects il s’agit, d’une manière qui nous permettrait d’identifier les membres du groupe envers lesquels les défenderesses pourraient être responsables. si le juge appelé à statuer sur les questions communes conclut qu’une majoration a atteint le niveau d’au moins un acheteur indirect non identifiable, il serait tout de même nécessaire de tenir des procès individuels; la répétition de l’appré- ciation des faits ne serait donc pas éliminée (dutton, par 39). et si de tels procès individuels sont vrai- ment nécessaires, la preuve qu’une perte a été subie quelque part au niveau des acheteurs indirects n’est [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 409 “success” for any of those indirect purchasers (ibid., at paras. 39-40 (emphasis added)). [225] my colleague nevertheless opines that the requisite commonality derives from the fact that failure to show that loss was suffered by any in- direct purchasers would mean that none of them could succeed against the defendants (para 108). with respect, however, the function of the common issues trial is not to screen out unmeritorious claims; it is to allow issues of fact and law that are common among many claimants to be determined at once, so as to avoid the need for individual determinations for each and every class member. furthermore, it is unclear why any representative plaintiff would seek the certification of a question that can meaningfully “advance the litigation” only if it results in failure for all indirect purchasers (see brown j.’s reasons, at para 109). in any event, i agree that “it would be a gross waste of private and public resources to litigate if the only prospective ‘benefit’ was to show that there was no point bringing the case in the first place” (k. wright, t. shikaze and e. snow, “on the ‘level’ after godfrey: proving liability in canadian price fixing class actions” (2017), 12 cadq 13, at p 18)6 [226] all of this leads me to the conclusion that proof that loss reached the indirect purchaser level in the distribution chain would not, without more, allow the common issues trial judge to make any loss- related determinations on a class- wide basis so as to permit the proposed questions to be certified as common issues for trial. pas réellement « nécessaire pour la résolution des demandes de chaque membre du groupe », n’est pas un « élément commun important » de leurs causes d’action et ne peut en fait entraîner le « succès » d’aucun de ces acheteurs indirects (ibid., par. 39-40 (je souligne)). [225] mon collègue estime néanmoins que l’exi- gence d’une question commune découle du fait que si l’on ne peut démontrer que la perte a été subie par quelque acheteur indirect que ce soit, aucun d’entre eux ne peut obtenir gain de cause contre les défen- deresses (par 108). avec égards, cependant, l’audi- tion des questions communes n’a pas pour fonction d’écarter les demandes non fondées; elle sert plutôt à permettre de trancher simultanément des questions de fait et de droit qui sont communes à un grand nombre de demandeurs, de manière à éviter de devoir juger individuellement de ces questions pour chacun des membres du groupe. qui plus est, on ne sait pas avec certitude pourquoi le représentant des deman- deurs solliciterait l’autorisation d’une question qui peut uniquement « faire avancer l’instance » de façon utile si elle entraîne un échec pour tous les acheteurs indirects (voir les motifs du juge brown, par 109). quoi qu’il en soit, je conviens que [traduction] « ce serait un énorme gaspillage de ressources pri- vées et publiques d’intenter une poursuite si le seul “avantage” éventuel était de démontrer que, dès le départ, il n’y avait pas lieu de porter l’affaire devant les tribunaux » (k. wright, t. shikaze et e. snow, « on the “level” after godfrey : proving liability in canadian price fixing class actions » (2017), 12 cadq 13, p 18)6. [226] tout ce qui précède m’amène à conclure que la preuve selon laquelle la perte a atteint le niveau de l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution, à elle seule, ne permettrait pas au juge appelé à statuer sur les questions communes de tirer une conclusion sur la perte à l’échelle du groupe, de manière à permettre l’autorisation des questions proposées en tant que questions communes pour audition. 6 one of the authors of this article served as counsel for certain defendants in this litigation (although not before this court) and in shah. 6 l’un des auteurs de cet article était l’avocat de certaines défen- deresses en l’espèce (mais non devant notre cour) et dans shah. 410 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. (c) microsoft does not indicate that loss‑ related questions are certifiable in indirect purchaser class actions so long as the representative plaintiff has a plausible methodology for prov‑ ing solely that some overcharges were passed on to the indirect purchaser level [227] like the courts below, my colleague relies on this court’s decision in microsoft to support his conclusion that loss- related questions in indirect pur- chaser class actions are certifiable even if the repre- sentative plaintiff’s methodology can show only that loss reached the indirect purchaser level (but cannot establish loss on any individualized basis). because that case raised a number of issues that are similar to those in the case at hand, it is worth analyzing it in some depth. [228] as in this case, the class action in microsoft was based on an allegation of price manipulation by the defendants, microsoft corporation and microsoft canada co./microsoft canada cie (collectively, “microsoft”). the representative plaintiffs — pro- sys consultants ltd. and neil godfrey (collectively, “pro- sys”) — specifically alleged, on behalf of all class members, that microsoft had engaged in un- lawful conduct by overcharging for its operating sys- tems. the class was made up of indirect purchasers who had acquired microsoft products from resellers that had themselves purchased the products from microsoft or another reseller higher up in the distri- bution chain. pro- sys pleaded causes of action under the common law torts of intentional interference with economic interests and conspiracy, sought damages pursuant to ss. 36, 45 and 52 of the competition act, and claimed in unjust enrichment and waiver of tort. c) microsoft n’indique pas que les questions de perte peuvent être autorisées dans des recours collectifs formés par des acheteurs indirects dès que le représentant des demandeurs em‑ ploie une méthode acceptable pour prouver uniquement qu’une majoration a atteint le niveau de l’acheteur indirect [227] à l’instar des tribunaux d’instance infé- rieure, mon collègue se fonde sur l’arrêt microsoft de notre cour à l’appui de sa conclusion que les questions de perte dans des recours collectifs formés par des acheteurs indirects peuvent être autorisées même si la méthode proposée par le représentant des demandeurs permet seulement de démontrer que la perte a été refilée à l’acheteur indirect (sans prouver la perte de façon individuelle). comme cette affaire a soulevé plusieurs questions semblables à celles en l’espèce, elle vaut la peine d’être examinée en profondeur. [228] comme dans le cas présent, le recours col- lectif dans microsoft reposait sur une allégation de manipulation des prix de la part des défenderesses, microsoft corporation et microsoft canada co./ microsoft canada cie (appelées collectivement « microsoft »). les représentants des demandeurs, pro- sys consultants ltd. et neil godfrey (appelées collectivement « pro- sys »), avaient précisément allégué, au nom de tous les membres du groupe, que microsoft avait agi illégalement en majorant le prix de ses systèmes d’exploitation. le groupe était composé d’acheteurs indirects qui avaient acheté des produits de microsoft de revendeurs qui les avaient eux- mêmes achetés de microsoft ou d’autres reven- deurs situés en amont dans la chaîne de distribution. pro- sys invoquait des causes d’action pour délits d’atteinte intentionnelle aux intérêts financiers et de complot reconnus en common law, sollicitait des dommages- intérêts sur le fondement des art. 36, 45 et 52 de la loi sur la concurrence et demandait restitution pour enrichissement sans cause et renon- ciation au recours délictuel. [229] although the loss- related questions in that case are very similar to those proposed in the case at hand, they explicitly asked whether losses or over- charges had been passed on to all of the indirect [229] bien que les questions de perte dans cette affaire ressemblaient beaucoup à celles proposées en l’espèce, elles visaient expressément à savoir si la perte ou la majoration avait été transférée à tous [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 411 purchaser class members.7 among the issues at the certification stage was “whether pro- sys’ proposed methodology will be able to show the initial over- charges and the pass- through to the proposed class members” (pro‑ sys v. microsoft, 2010 bcsc 285 (“microsoft (bcsc)”), at para. 8 (canlii) (emphasis added)). [230] rothstein j., writing for a unanimous court, clarified that the onus on the representative plaintiff at the certification stage is to establish that there is some basis in fact for the commonality require- ment. in the context of loss- related questions, he observed that this requires the proposed method- ology to “offer a realistic prospect of establishing loss on a class- wide basis” (para. 118 (emphasis added)). importantly, rothstein j. also expanded on how commonality can be established in indirect purchaser class actions where expert evidence is adduced to show that the issue of loss is resolvable on a class- wide basis: les acheteurs indirects du groupe7. au nombre des questions soulevées à l’étape de l’autorisation, il y avait celle de savoir [traduction] « si la méthode proposée par pro- sys permettra d’établir la majora- tion initiale ainsi que son transfert aux membres du groupe projeté » (pro‑ sys c. microsoft, 2010 bcsc 285 («  microsoft (bcsc)  »), par.  8 (canlii) (je souligne)). [230] rédigeant l’arrêt unanime de la cour, le juge rothstein a précisé qu’à l’étape de l’autorisation, il incombe au représentant des demandeurs d’établir un certain fondement factuel aux fins du respect de l’exigence d’une question commune. dans le cas des questions de perte, il a fait remarquer que la méthode proposée doit « offrir une possibilité réaliste d’établir la perte à l’échelle du groupe » (par. 118 (je souligne)). fait important, le juge rothstein a également donné des précisions sur la manière dont le caractère commun de la perte peut être établi dans le cadre de recours collectifs formés par des ache- teurs indirects où une preuve d’expert est présentée pour démontrer que la question de la perte peut être résolue à l’échelle du groupe : the role of the expert methodology is to establish that the overcharge was passed on to the indirect purchasers, making the issue common to the class as a whole (see chadha, at para 31). the requirement at the certification stage is not that the methodology quantify the damages in question; rather, the critical element that the methodology must establish is the ability to prove “common impact”, as described in the us antitrust case of in re: linerboard antitrust litigation, 305 f.3d 145 (3rd cir 2002). that is, plaintiffs must demonstrate that “sufficient proof [is] available, for use at trial, to prove antitrust impact common la méthode proposée par l’expert vise à établir que la majoration a été transférée aux acheteurs indirects, ce qui rend la question commune au groupe dans son ensemble (voir chadha, par 31). à l’étape de la certification, la méthode n’a pas à déterminer le montant des dommages- intérêts, mais doit plutôt  — et c’est là l’élément cru- cial — être susceptible de prouver «  les conséquences communes », comme le conclut un tribunal américain dans une affaire antitrust, in re : linerboard antitrust litigation, 305  f.3d 145  (3rd cir.  2002) les deman- deurs doivent démontrer qu’une [traduction] « preuve 7 the loss- related questions proposed by pro- sys included the following: are the class members entitled to losses or damages pursuant to s. 36 of the competition act, and, if so, in what amount? did the class members suffer economic loss? did the class members suffer economic loss as a result of the defendants’ interference? have the class members suffered a corresponding deprivation in the amount of the overcharge? (see microsoft, appendix.) the term “class members” was defined in pro- sys’s proposed litigation plan to mean “all persons resident in british columbia who, on or after january 1, 1994, indirectly acquired a license for microsoft operating systems and/or microsoft applications software for their own use, and not for purposes of further selling or leasing” (pro- sys ar, vol. iii, at p. 196 (emphasis added)). 7 les questions de perte proposées par pro- sys étaient notamment les suivantes : les membres du groupe ont- ils droit, suivant l’art. 36 de la loi sur la concurrence, au recouvrement des pertes ou des dommages subis et, dans l’affirmative, à raison de quel montant? les membres du groupe ont- ils subi une perte finan- cière? les membres du groupe ont- ils subi une perte financière par suite de cette atteinte? les membres du groupe se sont- ils appauvris d’un montant égal à celui de la majoration? (voir microsoft, annexe.) selon le plan de déroulement de l’instance proposé par pro- sys, le terme « membres du groupe » signifie [traduction] «  toutes les personnes résidant en colombie- britannique qui, depuis le 1er janvier 1994, ont acquis indirecte- ment une licence pour un système d’exploitation ou un logiciel d’application de microsoft à leur usage personnel, et non aux fins de revente ou de location » (da. pro- sys, vol. iii, p. 196 (je souligne)). 412 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. to all the members of the class” (ibid., at p 155). it is not necessary at the certification stage that the methodology establish the actual loss to the class, as long as the plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a methodology capable of doing so. in indirect purchaser actions, this means that the methodology must be able to establish that the overcharges have been passed on to the indirect- purchaser level in the distribution chain. [emphasis added; para 115] [231] in the case at hand, the courts below inter- preted this passage as meaning that loss- related ques- tions will always be certifiable as common issues in the context of indirect purchaser class actions so long as the representative plaintiff’s methodology is ca- pable of showing loss at the indirect purchaser level of the distribution chain. respectfully, this reading of microsoft — which focuses almost exclusively on the final sentence in the above- reproduced pas- sage — is not consistent with the reasons as a whole, when read alongside those of the motion judge in that case. [232] for our purposes, it is significant that the loss- related questions in microsoft concerned whether all of the indirect purchasers had suffered a loss. rothstein j. agreed that the class members’ claims raised common issues because the resolution of those issues “would appear to advance the claims of the entire class and to answer them commonly will avoid duplication in legal and factual analysis” (para 111). he also declined to interfere with the motion judge’s finding that pro- sys “has a credible or plausible meth- odology to show that all class members were harmed by microsoft’s alleged illegal activities” (microsoft (bcsc), at para. 122 (emphasis in original); see also microsoft, at para 126). this led rothstein j. to con- clude as follows: permettra d’établir, lors du procès, les conséquences an- titrust qui sont communes à tous les membres du groupe » (ibid., p 155). à l’étape de la certification, point n’est besoin que la méthode établisse la perte réellement subie par le groupe dans la mesure où le demandeur démontre qu’une méthode permet de le faire. dans le cadre d’actions d’acheteurs indirects, la méthode doit donc pouvoir établir que la majoration a été transférée à l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution. [je souligne; par 115] [231] dans le cas présent, les tribunaux d’instance inférieure ont interprété cet extrait comme signifiant que les questions de perte pourront toujours être au- torisées en tant que questions communes dans le contexte de recours collectifs formés par des ache- teurs indirects dans la mesure où la méthode propo- sée par le représentant des demandeurs permet de démontrer que la perte a atteint le niveau de l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution. avec égards, cette interprétation de microsoft — axée presque exclusivement sur la dernière phrase de l’extrait reproduit ci- dessus — ne cadre pas avec les motifs dans leur ensemble, lorsqu’ils sont lus conjointement avec ceux du juge saisi de la requête dans cette affaire. [232] pour les besoins du présent dossier, il est ré- vélateur que les questions de perte dans microsoft vi- saient à établir si tous les acheteurs indirects avaient subi une perte. le juge rothstein a convenu que les réclamations des membres du groupe soulevaient des questions communes, car la résolution de ces questions « permettrait de faire progresser l’exa- men des allégations du groupe dans son ensemble et d’éviter la répétition dans l’analyse du droit et des faits » (par 111). il a également refusé de modifier la conclusion du juge saisi de la requête selon laquelle pro- sys [traduction] « [a] adopt[é] une méthode valable ou acceptable pour démontrer que tous les membres du groupe ont été lésés par les activités il- légales reprochées à microsoft » (microsoft (bcsc), par. 122 (souligné dans l’original); voir également microsoft, par 126). le juge rothstein a donc conclu ce qui suit : unlike hollick, here the loss- related issues can be said to be common because there is an expert methodology that has been found to have a realistic prospect of establishing contrairement à l’affaire hollick, on peut dire en l’es- pèce que la perte constitue une question commune car il a été déterminé qu’une méthode proposée par un expert [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 413 loss on a class- wide basis. if the common issues were to be resolved, they would be determinative of microsoft’s liability and of whether passing on of the overcharge to the indirect purchasers has occurred. because such deter- minations will be essential in order for the class members to recover, it can be said, in this case, that a resolution of the common issues would significantly advance the action. while it is possible that individual issues may arise at the trial of the common issues, it is implicit in the reasons of [the motion judge] that, at the certification stage, he found the common issues to predominate over issues affecting only individual class members. [emphasis added; para 140] [233] a careful reading of microsoft therefore makes it clear that pro- sys’s loss- related questions were found to be resolvable on a “class- wide” basis because there was a credible and plausible method- ology capable of answering them in respect of all of the class members at the common issues trial. rothstein j. most likely referred to a methodology that is “able to establish that the overcharges have been passed on to the indirect purchaser level in the distribution chain” (para. 115) because of the motion judge’s observation that, in order to succeed, pro- sys “must show that the alleged increased charges to the direct customers were not absorbed by any subsequent level in the distribution channel” before reaching the indirect purchasers who formed part of the class (microsoft (bcsc), at para 6). indeed, rothstein j. went so far as to say that “[t]he role of the expert methodology is to establish that the overcharge was passed on to the indirect purchasers, making the issue common to the class as a whole”, and that what the plaintiff “must demonstrate [is] that ‘sufficient proof [is] available, for use at trial, to prove antitrust impact common to all the members of the class’ ([in re: linerboard antitrust litigation, 305 f.3d 145 (3rd cir. 2002)], at p. 155)” (para. 115 (emphasis added)). permettrait assez certainement d’établir la perte à l’échelle du groupe. le règlement des questions communes de- vrait permettre de statuer sur la responsabilité de mi- crosoft et sur le transfert de la majoration aux acheteurs indirects. puisqu’il est essentiel de statuer sur ces points afin que les membres du groupe puissent recouvrer le montant de la perte, on peut soutenir en l’espèce que le règlement des questions communes fera progresser substantiellement l’instance bien qu’il soit possible que des questions individuelles soient soulevées à l’au- dition des questions communes, le juge myers indique implicitement dans ses motifs que, à l’étape de la cer- tification, les questions communes l’emportent sur les questions qui ne touchent que des membres individuels. [je souligne; par 140] [233] il ressort donc d’une lecture attentive de l’arrêt microsoft que notre cour a conclu que les questions de perte soulevées par pro- sys pouvaient être réglées à « l’échelle du groupe », car il existait une méthode valable et acceptable permettant d’y répondre pour tous les membres du groupe lors de l’audition des questions communes. la mention, dans les motifs du juge rothstein, d’une méthode pouvant « établir que la majoration a été transférée à l’acheteur indirect situé en aval dans la chaîne de distribution » (par. 115) reprend fort probablement la remarque du juge saisi de la requête selon laquelle, pour avoir gain de cause, pro- sys [traduction] « doit démontrer que la majoration alléguée transfé- rée aux clients directs n’a pas été absorbée par un ni- veau subséquent de la chaîne de distribution » avant d’être refilée aux acheteurs indirects qui faisaient partie du groupe (microsoft (bcsc), par 6). en ef- fet, le juge rothstein est allé jusqu’à dire que « [l]a méthode proposée par l’expert vise à établir que la majoration a été transférée aux acheteurs indirects, ce qui rend la question commune au groupe dans son ensemble », et que le demandeur « [doit] démontrer qu’une [traduction] “preuve permettra d’établir, lors du procès, les conséquences antitrust qui sont communes à tous les membres du groupe” ([in re : linerboard antitrust litigation, 305 f.3d 145 (3rd cir. 2002)], p. 155) » (par. 115 (je souligne)). [234] microsoft is therefore a case in which the representative plaintiffs obtained the certification of questions asking whether all indirect purchasers had suffered a loss, by providing the motion judge with [234] ainsi, microsoft est une affaire où les repré- sentants des demandeurs ont obtenu l’autorisation de questions visant à déterminer si tous les acheteurs indirects ont subi une perte, en fournissant au juge 414 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. some basis in fact on which to find that the represent- ative plaintiffs would be capable of proving at trial that they all had. because the methodology made it possible for the common issues trial judge to resolve a necessary component of everyone’s claim at once, without the need for individual trials, the commonal- ity requirement was clearly met. as i have explained, however, microsoft does not support the proposition that loss- related questions concerning indirect pur- chasers are certifiable, as a matter of course, so long as the plaintiff’s methodology can show that some loss reached their level in the distribution chain. my colleague provides no reason for reading microsoft in any other way (see brown j.’s reasons, at para 107). saisi de la requête un certain fondement factuel sur lequel s’appuyer pour conclure que les représentants des demandeurs seraient en mesure de prouver au procès qu’ils avaient tous subi une perte. comme la méthode a permis au juge appelé à statuer sur les questions communes de régler en même temps un élément nécessaire des demandes de tous, sans la te- nue de procès individuels, l’exigence d’une question commune a manifestement été respectée. cependant, comme je l’ai expliqué, microsoft ne permet pas d’affirmer que les questions de perte subie par les acheteurs indirects peuvent être automatiquement autorisées, dès que la méthode proposée par le de- mandeur permet de démontrer qu’une perte a été refilée à leur niveau dans la chaîne de distribution. mon collègue n’indique pas pourquoi il y a lieu d’interpréter autrement cet arrêt (voir les motifs du juge brown, par 107). (3) conclusion on the commonality issue (3) conclusion sur la question du caractère com- mun [235] the legal dispute between the parties turns on whether loss- related questions that pertain to in- direct purchasers in a price- fixing class action can be certified as common issues even if the representative plaintiff’s methodology is capable only of establish- ing at trial that loss was occasioned somewhere at the indirect purchaser level of the distribution chain. i would respectfully answer this question in the neg- ative. if the methodology is such that the common issues trial judge will be unable to make any findings as to which class members actually suffered a loss (for the purpose of making determinations as to li- ability), then those loss- related questions proposed by the plaintiff will not be capable of resolution on a “class- wide” or “common” basis. indeed, this court explained in sun‑ rype that “where the proposed certified causes of action require proof of loss as a component of proving liability, the certification judge must be satisfied that there is some basis in fact that at least two persons can prove they incurred a loss” (para. 76 (emphasis added)). no two per- sons can prove that they are the ones who incurred a loss if a representative plaintiff’s methodology can demonstrate only that loss reached some unidenti- fied persons at their level in the distribution chain; by itself, such a methodology does not establish an [235] le litige juridique opposant les parties porte sur la question de savoir si les questions de perte visant les acheteurs indirects dans un recours col- lectif en matière de fixation des prix peuvent être autorisées en tant que questions communes même si la méthode proposée par le représentant des deman- deurs permet seulement d’établir au procès qu’une perte a été subie quelque part au niveau de l’acheteur indirect dans la chaîne de distribution. avec égards, je réponds à cette question par la négative. si la mé- thode proposée est telle que le juge appelé à statuer sur les questions communes sera incapable de tirer des conclusions quant à l’identité des membres du groupe ayant réellement subi une perte (afin de tran- cher la question de la responsabilité), ces questions de perte proposées par le demandeur ne pourront donc pas être résolues « à l’échelle du groupe » ou en « commun ». en effet, dans sun‑ rype, notre cour a expliqué que « dans les cas où les causes d’action proposées assujettissent la preuve de la responsabi- lité notamment à celle de la perte, le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation doit être convaincu qu’il existe un certain fondement factuel pour dire qu’au moins deux personnes sont en mesure de démontrer avoir essuyé une perte » (par. 76 (je souligne)). deux personnes ne peuvent prouver qu’elles sont celles qui [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey la juge côté 415 essential element of liability for anyone. the need for individual trials in those circumstances is indicative of the absence of commonality. [236] that being said, what is required of the plain- tiff in this case is a methodology capable of answering the loss- related questions on an individualized basis, either by showing that all of the indirect purchasers suffered a loss or at least by identifying those who did and separating them from those who did not or those about whom we cannot be sure (and for whom indi- vidual hearings will therefore be necessary). in light of “dr. reutter’s admissions on cross- examination that there may be some subset of class members who were not impacted, and that it would not be possible, using his methodology, to determine which class members were actually harmed” (ca reasons, at para. 125), the loss- related questions should not have been certified as common issues under s. 4(1)(c) of the class proceedings act. ont subi une perte si une méthode du représentant des demandeurs permet seulement de démontrer qu’une perte a été transférée à des personnes non identifiées situées à leur niveau dans la chaîne de distribution; à elle seule, cette méthode ne permet pas d’établir un élément essentiel de la responsabilité pour qui que ce soit. la nécessité de tenir des procès individuels dans ces circonstances témoigne de l’absence de caractère commun. [236] cela dit, il incombe au demandeur en l’espèce de proposer une méthode permettant de répondre aux questions liées à la perte de façon individuelle : en démontrant que tous les acheteurs indirects ont subi une perte ou, à tout le moins, en identifiant ceux qui ont subi une perte et en les distinguant de ceux qui n’en ont pas subi, ou de ceux à l’égard de qui il est impossible d’affirmer avec certitude qu’ils en ont subi une (et pour qui il sera donc nécessaire de tenir des audiences individuelles). à la lumière des [traduction] « admissions faites par m. reutter en contre- interrogatoire voulant qu’il existe peut- être un certain sous- groupe au sein du groupe qui n’a pas été touché et qu’il soit impossible, à l’aide de sa méthode, d’identifier les membres du groupe qui ont réellement été lésés » (motifs de la ca, par. 125), ces questions de perte n’auraient pas dû être autorisées en tant que questions communes en application de l’al. 4(1)(c) de la class proceedings act. iv conclusion iv conclusion [237] regarding the limitations issues raised in the pioneer appeal, i respectfully disagree that the dis- coverability rule has any application to s 36(4)(a)(i). as for the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff did not plead that there is any special re- lationship between the pioneer defendants and the class members, but did plead that the pioneer de- fendants took active steps to conceal the existence of the alleged conspiracy. while these pleadings are sufficient for the purposes of s. 4(1)(a) of the class proceedings act, whether any such steps are sufficient to trigger the operation of this equitable doctrine will depend on what the plaintiff actually proves at trial. as i explained earlier, what is neces- sary in the commercial context, such as here, could be the demonstration of the existence of either a [237] en ce qui a trait aux questions de prescription soulevées dans le pourvoi de pioneer, avec égards, je ne suis pas d’accord que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir s’applique au sous-al 36(4)a)(i). pour ce qui est de la doctrine de la dissimulation frauduleuse, le demandeur n’a pas invoqué l’existence d’une re- lation spéciale entre les défenderesses pioneer et les membres du groupe, mais il a plaidé que ces défenderesses ont pris des mesures concrètes pour dissimuler l’existence du complot allégué. bien que ces arguments soient suffisants pour l’application de l’al. 4(1)(a) de la class proceedings act, la question de savoir si de telles mesures suffisent à déclencher l’application de cette doctrine d’equity dépendra de ce que le demandeur réussira à prouver au procès. comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, ce qu’il faut peut- être 416 pioneer corp v godfrey côté j. [2019] 3 scr. special relationship, or something tantamount to or commensurate with one. [238] regarding the issues in the toshiba appeal, which are common to both appeals, i agree with my colleague — though for different reasons — that the existence of the statutory cause of action in s. 36(1) of the competition act does not preclude claim- ants from also advancing claims at common law or in equity based on the same conduct prohibited by part vi. however, i part ways with my colleague in two important respects. first, i do not agree that the umbrella purchasers have a claim against the defendants under s. 36(1) of the competition act. second, i cannot accept that the questions proposed by the plaintiff that pertain to the commonality of loss among indirect purchasers can be certified where his proposed methodology will be capable of show- ing nothing more than the fact that some overcharges reached the indirect purchaser level of the distribu- tion chain. in class actions where loss is an essential element of liability (as here), my view is that loss- related questions can be certified as common issues only if the representative plaintiff will be able to actually identify which class members suffered a loss at trial — either by proving that they all did or by distinguishing those who did from those who did not. because dr. reutter admitted on cross- examination that his methodology would be incapable of allowing the plaintiff to make such an identification at trial, it follows that the loss- related questions proposed by the plaintiff in this case should not have been certified. [239] i would therefore allow the appeals in part. accomplir en matière commerciale, comme en l’es- pèce, c’est de démontrer l’existence d’une relation spéciale ou de quelque chose d’équivalent ou de correspondant à une telle relation. [238] en ce qui concerne les questions soulevées dans le pourvoi toshiba qui sont communes aux deux pourvois, je conviens avec mon collègue — bien que pour des motifs différents — que l’exis- tence de la cause d’action prévue au par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence n’empêche pas les deman- deurs d’intenter des recours en common law ou en equity qui visent le même comportement interdit par la partie  vi cependant, je ne suis pas d’ac- cord avec mon collègue sur deux aspects impor- tants. premièrement, je ne suis pas d’avis que les acheteurs sous parapluie ont un recours contre les défenderesses en vertu du par. 36(1) de la loi sur la concurrence. deuxièmement, je ne saurais accepter que les questions proposées par le demandeur quant au caractère commun de la perte entre les acheteurs indirects peuvent être autorisées si la méthode qu’il propose permettra seulement de démontrer qu’une majoration a atteint le niveau des acheteurs indi- rects de la chaîne de distribution. dans des recours collectifs où la perte constitue un élément essentiel pour établir la responsabilité (comme en l’espèce), je suis d’avis que les questions de perte ne peuvent être autorisées en tant que questions communes que si le représentant des demandeurs est capable d’identifier les membres du groupe qui ont subi une perte — soit en prouvant qu’ils ont tous subi une perte ou en distinguant ceux qui ont subi une perte de ceux qui n’en ont pas subi. comme m. reutter a admis en contre- interrogatoire que sa méthode ne permettrait pas au demandeur de procéder à une telle identifica- tion au procès, il s’ensuit que les questions de perte proposées par le demandeur en l’espèce n’auraient pas dû être autorisées. [239] je suis donc d’avis d’accueillir les pourvois en partie. appeals dismissed with costs, côté j. dissenting pourvois rejetés avec dépens, la juge côté est in part. dissidente en partie. pioneer north america, inc., pioneer electronics procureurs des appelantes pioneer corporation, pioneer north america, inc., pioneer electronics [2019] 3 rcs. pioneer corp c godfrey 417 (usa) inc., pioneer high fidelity taiwan co., ltd. and pioneer electronics of canada inc.: cassels brock & blackwell, toronto. (usa) inc., pioneer high fidelity taiwan co., ltd. et pioneer électronique du canada, inc. : cassels brock & blackwell, toronto. toshiba samsung storage technology corp., toshiba samsung storage technology corp. korea, toshiba of canada ltd. and toshiba america information systems, inc.: fasken martineau dumoulin, toronto. procureurs des appelantes toshiba corporation, toshiba samsung storage technology corp., toshiba samsung storage technology corp. korea, toshiba du canada limitée et toshiba america informa‑ tion systems, inc. : fasken martineau dumoulin, toronto. co., ltd., samsung electronics canada inc. and samsung electronics america, inc.: blake, cassels & graydon, toronto. procureurs des appelantes samsung electronics co., ltd., samsung electronics canada inc. et sam‑ sung electronics america, inc. : blake, cassels & graydon, toronto. electronics nv,. lite‑on it corporation of taiwan, philips & lite‑on digital solutions corporation, philips & lite‑on digital solutions usa, inc. and philips electronics ltd.: mcmillan, toronto. procureurs des appelantes koninklijke philips electronics nv,. lite‑on it corporation of taiwan, philips & lite‑on digital solutions corporation, philips & lite‑on digital solutions usa, inc. et philips electronics ltd. : mcmillan, toronto. tion, panasonic corporation of north america and panasonic canada inc.: bennett jones, toronto. procureurs des appelantes panasonic corpora‑ tion, panasonic corporation of north america et panasonic canada inc. : bennett jones, toronto. benq america corporation and benq canada corp.: shapray cramer fitterman lamer, vancouver. procureurs des appelantes benq corporation, benq america corporation et benq canada corp. : shapray cramer fitterman lamer, vancouver. solicitors for the respondent: camp fiorante matthews mogerman, vancouver; siskinds, london. procureurs de l’intimé : camp fiorante matthews mogerman, vancouver; siskinds, london. procureurs de l’intervenante option consomma‑ teurs: belleau lapointe, montréal. teurs : belleau lapointe, montréal. procureurs de l’intervenant consumers council cil of canada: harrison pensa, london. of canada : harrison pensa, london. ber of commerce: davies ward phillips & vineberg, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante la chambre de com‑ merce du canada : davies ward phillips & vineberg, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association des sociation of canada: sotos, toronto. consommateurs du canada : sotos, toronto.
i. overview [1] in 1985, parliament enacted s 686(1)(b)(iv) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, to allow courts of appeal to uphold a conviction where, despite a procedural irregularity at trial, the “trial court had jurisdiction over the class of offence” and the court of appeal was of the opinion that “the appellant suffered no prejudice” as a result of the error (criminal law amendment act, 1985, rsc 1985, c 27 (1st supp.), s 145(1)). [2] in r v. khan, 2001 scc 86, [2001] 3 scr 823, this court explained that parliament’s aim in enacting s 686(1)(b)(iv) was to broaden the powers of appellate courts to cure certain procedural errors that had formerly been viewed as incurable as a result of their effect on the “jurisdiction” of the court (paras. 13 and 16). the purpose of the provision was to move from characterizing such jurisdictional errors as automatically fatal to a conviction, toward a process by which appellate courts could uphold a conviction where, despite the procedural error, the accused person had suffered no prejudice (paras. 16 and 18). [3] at issue in this appeal is whether the curative proviso in s 686(1)(b)(iv) can be applied to cure procedural errors that occur during the jury selection process. [4] in april 2013, the respondents, chiheb esseghaier and raed jaser, were charged with a series of terrorism offences under the criminal code. in light of the seriousness of the allegations and the high-profile nature of the case, the parties agreed that challenges for cause were necessary to ensure the impartiality of the jury. [5] at the time, the criminal code provided two procedures for trying challenges for cause — rotating triers and static triers. mr. jaser wanted rotating triers. he also wanted the trial judge to exercise his common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors from the courtroom during the challenge for cause process. if his request could not be satisfied, he wanted static triers. [6] the trial judge refused mr. jaser’s request, concluding that trial judges no longer had the authority to exclude unsworn jurors where the rotating triers process was being used. in any event, he would not have exercised the discretion even if he had it. to grant mr. jaser’s request would be to expose the sworn jurors — members of the jury — to the potentially partial comments of prospective jurors and, thereby, risk undermining trial fairness. the trial judge thus imposed static triers in accordance with mr jaser’s alternate position mr esseghaier, who rejected the authority of the criminal code in its entirety, made no submissions as to the appropriate procedure for trying the challenges for cause. [7] mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser were subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. they appealed on a number of grounds, including whether the trial judge had erred in denying mr jaser’s request for rotating triers prior to the hearing, however, it was decided to bifurcate the appeal and have the court address the jury selection issue first. [8] on the basis of the jury selection issue, the court of appeal for ontario overturned the convictions and directed a new trial (2019 onca 672, 57 cr (7th) 388). in the court’s opinion, the trial judge retained the common law authority to grant mr jaser’s request, and he should have exercised it the imposition of static triers against mr jaser’s wishes meant that the jury — and thus the court — had been improperly constituted the convictions could not stand, and the error could not be cured by the operation of the curative proviso in s 686(1)(b)(iv). [9] the crown obtained leave to appeal to this court after hearing oral argument, the court allowed the appeal with reasons to follow. these are those reasons. [10] in our view, the curative proviso in s 686(1)(b)(iv) can be applied to cure jury selection errors. and, as we will explain, the proviso can cure the particular error in this case, as both statutory requirements in s 686(1)(b)(iv) are met: (1) the trial court had jurisdiction over the class of offence, as the offences at issue were indictable and the ontario superior court of justice has jurisdiction over all indictable offences; and (2) there was no prejudice to either mr. esseghaier or mr. jaser. the procedure used, though technically incorrect, was one of two alternatives by which parliament sought to ensure that an accused person’s right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial jury was protected. while mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser did not receive the specific jury selection process they wanted, our law does not demand procedurally perfect justice, but fundamentally fair justice (r v o’connor, [1995] 4 scr 411, at para. 193). this is what they received. ii background [11] on april 22, 2013, mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser were arrested and charged with various terrorism offences under part ii.1 of the criminal code. specifically, both men were charged with conspiracy to damage transportation infrastructure with intent to endanger safety for the benefit of a terrorist group (ss. 83.2, 248 and 465(1)(c)), conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group (ss. 83.2 and 465(1)(a)), and two counts each of participating in or contributing to the activity of a terrorist group (s 8318(1)). mr. esseghaier was also charged with a further count of participating in or contributing to the activity of a terrorist group. [12] in substance, the various charges alleged that mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser were members of a terrorist group planning a series of “plots” designed to kill people. the primary plot, the “train plot”, was to derail a via passenger train traveling between toronto and new york, with the ultimate aim of killing the passengers. an alternate plot, the “sniper plot”, was to use a rifle to assassinate prominent persons. [13] the joint trial began on january 23, 2015. by then, the trial judge had heard a series of pre-trial motions, two of which are relevant to this appeal. [14] first, on march 14, 2014, after it had become clear that mr esseghaier would likely be self-represented, the crown moved for the appointment of amicus curiae the trial judge granted this motion, finding that there were “specific and exceptional circumstances” that justified the appointment of amicus in a limited role (2014 onsc 2277, at para. 41 (canlii), quoting ontario v criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr 3, at paras. 47 and 115). [15] secondly, on december 9, 2014, the trial judge heard a joint motion from the crown and mr. jaser on issues related to jury selection. in light of the high public profile of the case and the “climate where public concerns about terrorism offences and islamic extremism ha[d] become pronounced”, the parties agreed that challenges for cause were necessary and appropriate to ensure the impartiality of the jury (2014 onsc 7528, at para. 8 (canlii)) the precise method for determining the challenges for cause, however, remained at issue. [16] as we have already noted (at para. 5), the criminal code provided at the time two methods for trying challenges for cause — rotating triers and static triers. rotating triers involved two random members of the jury panel serving as triers until the first jury member was chosen. the first juror would then replace one of the triers (who would be excused) and assume the role of trying whether the next prospective juror was impartial. this rotational pattern would continue until the full petit jury was selected. [17] in 2008, parliament introduced a second procedure for determining challenges for cause — static triers. this procedure involved the appointment of two persons who, instead of rotating, would decide all challenges themselves until the entire petit jury had been sworn in, after which they would not themselves become members of the jury. [18] even after the 2008 amendments, rotating triers remained the default procedure. the static triers procedure would be applied only where the accused person sought the exclusion of all sworn and unsworn (prospective) jurors, and where the trial judge agreed that exclusion was “necessary to preserve the impartiality of the jurors” (an act to amend the criminal code (criminal procedure, language of the accused, sentencing and other amendments), sc 2008, c 18, s 26).1 [19] an additional wrinkle is that, prior to the 2008 amendments, it was accepted that trial judges had a common law discretion to order the exclusion of prospective jurors when rotating triers were being used. this discretion was exercised 1 as of september 19, 2019, challenges for cause are now tried exclusively by the trial judge pursuant to s 640(1) of the criminal code (an act to amend the criminal code, the youth criminal justice act and other acts and to make consequential amendments to other acts, sc 2019, c 25, s 272). where necessary to preserve the impartiality of prospective jurors by ensuring that they did not hear the questions put to, or answers given by, other prospective jurors. after the 2008 amendments, however, a live question arose in ontario — as seen in contrasting lines of authority at the superior court of justice (see, eg,. r v riley (2009), 247 ccc (3d) 517; r v sandham (2009), 248 ccc (3d) 46) — as to whether the introduction of static triers had removed trial judges’ ability to use their discretion to exclude prospective jurors where rotating triers were being used (the theory being that exclusion could now occur only through the static triers process). [20] at the motion hearing, mr jaser sought to use the default method of rotating triers. he also asked the trial judge to exercise his common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors during the challenge for cause process there was, as mr. jaser saw it, “important” value in having members of the jury involved in one another’s selection (ar, vol. iii, at p 51). excluding prospective jurors would “ensure their convenience” and “ensure that they [we]ren’t exposed to the process in terms of the challenge for cause ahead of time and be able to tailor answers” (p 51) while recognizing that having the sworn jurors stay in the courtroom ran the risk of tainting, he saw this as a risk worth taking in order to have the jury “participate in the process” (p 53) if, however, the common law discretion was unavailable — or if it was available but the trial judge declined to exercise it — mr. jaser indicated that he would move for static triers. [21] mr esseghaier expressed no view regarding the procedure for deciding challenges for cause, exclusion of jurors, or mr. jaser’s motion. amicus was not present at the hearing. iii decisions below a ontario superior court of justice (code j.), 2014 onsc 7528 [22] the trial judge denied mr. jaser’s request. in his view, the introduction of static triers had ousted the common law discretion to order the exclusion of prospective jurors as a means of preserving impartiality where rotating triers were being used. as juror impartiality was the fundamental reason for the need to exclude prospective jurors in this case, the common law discretion no longer existed (paras. 41-42) he thus accepted mr jaser’s alternative position, agreeing that a static triers process was appropriate (para. 43). [23] the trial judge added that, if he were wrong about the effect of the 2008 amendments, such that the common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors still existed for rotating triers where impartiality was the issue, he would nevertheless not exercise that discretion (para. 45) in his view, an order protecting only prospective jurors from tainting, but not the sworn jurors, would be an “improper” exercise of his discretion (at para. 45), as it would not “fulfil the judicial function of administering justice . . . in an . . . effective manner” (para. 46, quoting r v. caron, 2011 scc 5, [2011] 1 scr 78, at para. 24) in particular, “it would be wrong to make such a limited and ineffective common law order, when a full and effective statutory remedy was readily available, pursuant to s 640(2.1)” (para. 46). [24] the trial judge therefore made an order to exclude all jurors, both sworn and unsworn, and for the appointment of static triers. b. interim proceedings (trial, sentencing, and bifurcation) [25] after a two-month trial, the jury returned verdicts convicting mr. esseghaier on all counts and mr. jaser on all counts but one. both were sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility set at 10 years from the date of their arrest. [26] mr esseghaier and mr jaser appealed their convictions and sentences. prior to the appeal hearing, however, mr jaser and amicus brought a motion for a bifurcated hearing, in which the jury selection issue could be heard and determined in advance of the other grounds of appeal the case management judge granted the request, noting that the record was sufficient to allow the jury selection ground to be argued separately, and that success could result in the quashing of the convictions (bifurcation ruling, reproduced in ar, vol. ii, at pp. 85-86). he therefore directed that it be argued in advance of the main appeal (p 86). c court of appeal for ontario (rouleau, hourigan, and zarnett jja), 2019 onca 672, 57 cr (7th) 388 [27] in light of the decision to bifurcate, the only issue before the court of appeal was whether the trial judge had erred in denying mr. jaser’s request for rotating triers with prospective jurors excluded and, if so, whether that error could be cured by application of the curative proviso in s 686(1)(b)(iv) of the criminal code. [28] in allowing the appeal and ordering a new trial, the court of appeal determined that the trial judge had erred in concluding that the common law discretion did not exist (paras. 9 and 27, citing r v. grant, 2016 onca 639, 342 ccc (3d) 514, at paras. 34, 37 and 39; r v. husbands, 2017 onca 607, 353 ccc (3d) 317, at paras. 35-36). the trial judge had also erred in alternatively deciding that he should not exercise his discretion, even if he had it. the trial judge had denied mr. jaser’s request on the basis that the statutory process he was electing — rotating triers — was incompatible with the need to preserve the impartiality of the jury in a case where there was a significant risk of tainting. this reasoning effectively rendered the common law discretion, as well as the very process of rotating triers, unavailable. as mr. jaser had not sought static triers, the risk of tainting was inevitable mr jaser’s request was intended to reduce that risk (paras. 54-56). [29] this error — the denial of mr jaser’s application to exclude unsworn jurors with rotating triers — could not be saved by the curative proviso, for two reasons: (1) errors affecting the composition of the jury lead to an improperly constituted court, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over the class of offence (for both mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser) (at paras. 70 and 75-77, citing r v. noureddine, 2015 onca 770, 128 or (3d) 23, at paras. 52-53 and 61; see also r v. wv, 2007 onca 546, at para. 26 (canlii)); and (2) even if the trial court had jurisdiction, the error caused prejudice to the accused person as a result of its negative effect on the appearance of the fairness of the proceedings and the due administration of justice (para. 71, citing noureddine, at para. 64). iv. issues [30] this appeal presents three issues: (1) did the court of appeal err in finding that the jury was improperly constituted? (2) if the jury was improperly constituted, did the court of appeal err in finding that the error could not be cured by the curative proviso in s 686(1)(b)(iv) of the criminal code? (3) if the appeal is allowed, what is the appropriate remedy? v analysis a. the jury was improperly constituted [31] we agree with the court of appeal that the jury for both mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser was improperly constituted. the trial judge erred in both his primary and alternative conclusions with respect to mr. jaser’s application. [32] with respect to the trial judge’s primary finding, it was not disputed before us that the trial judge erred in concluding that the introduction of static triers in 2008 ousted the common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors while using rotating triers. the discretion existed. [33] turning to the trial judge’s alternative conclusion — that even if the discretion existed, he would not have exercised it — we agree with the court of appeal that the trial judge’s refusal to exercise his discretion was unreasonable in light of mr. jaser’s desire to use rotating triers, the risk of tainting was inevitable. he accepted that risk, but wanted it reduced through the exercise of the common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors. while the trial judge may have thought this unwise, there was no basis for him to refuse the request. in our respectful view, he erred in doing so. [34] as a result of the error, the jury was improperly constituted for mr. jaser, as it was incorrectly selected by static triers instead of rotating triers with prospective jurors excluded. the jury was also improperly constituted for mr. esseghaier, as he was improperly denied his right to rotating triers, the default procedure under the criminal code. b. the curative proviso in section 686(1)(b)(iv) of the criminal code [35] section 686(1)(b)(iv) of the criminal code states the following: 686 (1) on the hearing of an appeal against a conviction . . . the court of appeal . (b) may dismiss the appeal where . (iv) notwithstanding any procedural irregularity at trial, the trial court had jurisdiction over the class of offence of which the appellant was convicted and the court of appeal is of the opinion that the appellant suffered no prejudice thereby; [36] this appeal calls upon this court to clarify the meaning of the phrase “jurisdiction over the class of offence” in s 686(1)(b)(iv) and to consider whether mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser “suffered no prejudice” such that the curative proviso may be applied in this case. [37] we turn first to the issue of jurisdiction. (1) jurisdiction over the class of offence [38] the phrase “jurisdiction over the class of offence” is not defined in the criminal code and its meaning has not yet been fully explored by this court. the first steps to understanding its meaning, however, were taken by arbour j in khan. [39] in reviewing the legislative history of s 686(1)(b)(iv), arbour j explained that, at the time of the proviso’s enactment, criminal procedure was replete with jurisdictional complexities that restricted the capacity of appellate courts to uphold convictions despite an absence of prejudice to the accused person (paras. 11-16) in introducing the proviso, parliament’s purpose was to “expan[d] the remedial powers of courts of appeal” to cure these serious procedural irregularities that had previously been deemed fatal to a conviction (para. 11). in order to give proper effect to this purpose, arbour j adopted the analysis of the court of appeal for ontario in r v cloutier (1988), 43 ccc (3d) 35, in which “jurisdiction over the class of offence” was taken to refer to the capacity of the trial court to deal with the “subject-matter of the charge” at issue (p 47). this approach had been adopted nine years earlier by gonthier j., in dissent, in r v. bain, [1992] 1 scr 91. with its scope conceptualized in this way, the proviso would have broad application, enabling appellate courts to engage with jurisdictional errors and determine whether they had caused any prejudice to the appellant. [40] we agree with this approach. we would, however, take this opportunity to expand on khan’s discussion of the proviso’s scope in order to give greater clarity to the meaning of the phrase “jurisdiction over the class of offence” in our view, its meaning is properly understood in light of the jurisdictional provisions in the criminal code. [41] the criminal code contains three provisions stating the jurisdiction of courts to try specific classes of offences — ss. 468, 469 and 785: 468 every superior court of criminal jurisdiction has jurisdiction to try any indictable offence. 469 every court of criminal jurisdiction has jurisdiction to try an indictable offence other than [treason, intimidating parliament or a legislature, inciting to mutiny, seditious offences, piracy, piratical acts, murder, accessory after the fact to high treason or treason or murder, bribery by the holder of a judicial office, an offence under ss. 4 to 7 of the crimes against humanity and war crimes act, s.c 2000, c 24, attempting to commit treason, intimidating parliament or a legislature, inciting to mutiny, seditious offences, piracy, or piratical acts, and conspiracy to commit treason, intimidating parliament or a legislature, inciting to mutiny, seditious offences, piracy, piratical acts, or murder]. 785 . . . summary conviction court means a person who has jurisdiction in the territorial division where the subject-matter of the proceedings is alleged to have arisen and who (a) is given jurisdiction over the proceedings by the enactment under which the proceedings are taken, (b) is a justice or provincial court judge, where the enactment under which the proceedings are taken does not expressly give jurisdiction to any person or class of persons, or (c) is a provincial court judge, where the enactment under which the proceedings are taken gives jurisdiction in respect thereof to two or more justices; [42] in combination, these provisions delineate three classes of offences and the courts’ powers to try persons charged with those offences: (1) indictable offences listed in s 469 of the criminal code, which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior court; (2) indictable offences not listed in s 469, which are within the jurisdiction of both the provincial court and the superior court; and (3) summary conviction offences, which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial court. in our view, the requirement in s 686(1)(b)(iv) that the “trial court had jurisdiction over the class of offence” refers to these three classes of offences and the jurisdictional capacity of the superior and provincial courts to try them. [43] beyond the connection between the language of the proviso and the jurisdictional provisions in the criminal code, interpreting the phrase “jurisdiction over the class of offence” in accordance with those jurisdictional provisions aligns with this court’s prior guidance as to the purpose and intent of s 686(1)(b)(iv). as noted above, in khan, arbour j explained that s 686(1)(b)(iv) was “enacted in the face of a body of case law that was becoming increasingly technical and complex and which had restricted considerably the possibility for appellate courts to conclude that an error at trial” did not require setting aside the verdict (para. 16). in this context, the introduction of this provision was meant to put an end to the notion that “procedural errors having caused a loss of jurisdiction in the trial courts could not be cured, even on appeal” (para. 12). no longer was a loss of jurisdiction to be seen as automatically fatal to a conviction. rather, appellate courts were to be able to cure errors where the appellant had suffered no prejudice, save only where the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the class of offence. [44] mr esseghaier and mr jaser argue, however, that simply interpreting “jurisdiction over the class of offence” in line with the jurisdictional provisions cannot be correct. even, they say, where the trial court was empowered by parliament to try the offences at issue, that court can be said to have had “jurisdiction” only where it was properly constituted. as the proviso applies only to save a loss of jurisdiction, it cannot apply where the court had never obtained jurisdiction. in the context of errors occurring during the jury selection process, therefore, the proviso cannot apply because the jury — and therefore the court — was improperly constituted and, consequently, lacked jurisdiction to try any class of offence (rf (esseghaier), at paras. 67-70; rf (jaser), at paras. 64-68). put differently, they submit that a trial court’s “jurisdiction over the class of offence” is contingent on the successful application of certain procedural safeguards, such as an accused person’s election and choice as to which procedure should be used to try challenges for cause. their argument on this point echoes the approach adopted by the court of appeal in this case, following its line of authority originally established in noureddine and wv (see above, at para. 29). [45] the origin of this line of argument can be found in the court of appeal for ontario’s reasons in r v. bain (1989), 31 oac 357. in that case, the trial judge went outside the bounds of the criminal code and effectively legislated a jury selection process which precluded the crown from exercising its stand aside power, and which restricted both the crown and defence to their four peremptory challenges. according to the court of appeal, such a procedural error could not be cured by means of the proviso: if the jury selection process fails to comply with the provisions of the criminal code, “the court never obtains jurisdiction to proceed to trial” (para. 6). the issue with such errors is not whether they result in a loss of jurisdiction, but rather “whether . the court was properly constituted in the first place” (para. 6). on appeal to this court, the majority dispensed with the case on other grounds and did not address the potential application of s 686(1)(b)(iv). writing in dissent, however, gonthier j agreed with the court of appeal — the proviso could not cure the error because “[i]f the jury is not constituted according to the rules, the court exists no more than if the judge had been unlawfully appointed” (p 136) it is on the basis of this restrictive approach to the proviso that the court of appeal for ontario — and now the respondents on appeal — reasoned that, where an error in jury selection renders the jury improperly constituted, the trial court will never have obtained jurisdiction and the proviso will thus be inapplicable (noureddine, at paras. 50-53 and 61). [46] we disagree. to limit the proviso’s application to cases where the jury was properly constituted would be plainly inconsistent with the purpose of s 686(1)(b)(iv), which is to “expan[d] the remedial powers of courts of appeal” to engage with jurisdictional errors and assess any prejudice that may have flowed from them. accepting the respondents’ submissions would be to permit the kind of unnecessary complexity that was rife prior to the enactment of the provision indeed, in khan, arbour j noted that, among the various jurisdictional errors contributing to the problem were “irregularities in jury selection” (para. 14) the correct approach, as outlined above, is to interpret the proviso’s scope in line with the jurisdictional provisions in the criminal code. to achieve its purpose, parliament intended the proviso to be flatly inapplicable only where the trial court was not statutorily empowered to try the class of offence, or where the accused had suffered prejudice. [47] we therefore depart from the approach espoused by the respondents and the court of appeal on the scope of the jurisdictional inquiry under s 686(1)(b)(iv). for the purposes of the proviso, “jurisdiction” is concerned only with the trial court’s capacity to deal with the “subject-matter of the charge”, as it is only a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (“ratione materiae”) that [translation] “deprive[s] the court ab initio of all jurisdiction” (r v. primeau, [2000] rjq 696 (ca), at para. 31; see also r v c.n (1991), 52 qac 53, at para. 38, per brossard ja, dissenting, rev’d substantially for the reasons of brossard ja, [1992] 3 scr 471). to this end, the jurisdictional question under s 686(1)(b)(iv) is directed solely to the trial court’s capacity to try the relevant class of offence, as defined by parliament it is not concerned with the timing of the procedural error, nor with its consequences for the appellant’s trial. such inquiries into the nature and consequence of the error, including whether it was one of application of the rules of the criminal code or an error arising from the application of judicially legislated rules, are best left to the prejudice analysis. [48] in summary, the phrase “jurisdiction over the class of offence” is to be interpreted in accordance with the jurisdictional provisions established by parliament in the criminal code. jurisdiction can therefore be understood as follows: (1) where the appellant was convicted of an indictable offence listed in s 469, the jurisdictional requirement will be met only where the trial court was the superior court. (2) where the appellant was convicted of an indictable offence not listed in s 469, the jurisdictional requirement will be met where the trial took place in either the provincial court or superior court.2 (3) where the appellant was convicted of a summary conviction offence, the jurisdictional requirement will be met only where the trial court was the provincial court. hybrid offences will fall into categories (2) or (3) once the crown has made a valid decision as to how to proceed. [49] in this case, mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser were both tried and convicted under ss. 83.18(1), 83.2, and 465(1)(a) of the criminal code mr esseghaier was further convicted under ss. 248 and 465(1)(c) an offence under s 465(1)(a) — conspiracy to commit murder — is considered a s 469 offence pursuant to s 469(e). only the superior court has jurisdiction to try such an offence. the remaining offences are indictable offences not listed in s 469, meaning that, for the purposes of the proviso in s 686(1)(b)(iv), they can be tried in either the provincial or superior court. in this case, all the convictions were rendered by a trial court of the superior court. the trial 2 under the proviso, therefore, election errors (eg, where an accused person elects to be tried in the provincial court but is mistakenly tried in the superior court, or where an accused person elects to be tried by a judge and jury and is mistakenly tried by a judge alone (ss. 536 and 536.1)) will not automatically lead to a new trial. whether the error can be cured will depend on whether the accused suffered any prejudice. court thus had “jurisdiction over the class of offence” of which mr esseghaier and mr. jaser were convicted. the proviso can apply, absent prejudice. (2) mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser suffered no prejudice [50] if an appeal court is satisfied that the trial court had jurisdiction over the class of offence of which the appellant was convicted, the proviso inquiry turns to the second requirement — whether the appellant “suffered no prejudice”. [51] in khan, arbour j stated that, under s 686(1)(b)(iv), “an analysis of prejudice must be undertaken, in accordance with the principles set out in s 686(1)(b)(iii)” (para. 18 (emphasis added)) with respect, it is not clear to us precisely what was meant by analysing prejudice “in accordance with the principles set out in s 686(1)(b)(iii)” while s 686(1)(b)(iv) allows an appellate court to cure a procedural irregularity at trial where “the appellant suffered no prejudice thereby”, s 686(1)(b)(iii) applies to instances where the trial judge erred on a question of law but where the appellate court is of the opinion that such error occasioned “no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”. in other words, these two subparagraphs each state a distinct test for curing a distinct kind of error. [52] in the result, we have concerns about how, if it is indeed possible, s 686(1)(b)(iv) can be applied “in accordance with the principles set out in s 686(1)(b)(iii)”, as parliament is presumed to use language carefully, such that different words are to be taken as imparting a different meaning (marche v. halifax insurance co., 2005 scc 6, [2005] 1 scr 47, at para. 95, per bastarache j., dissenting, but not on this point, citing r sullivan, sullivan and driedger on the construction of statutes (4th ed. 2002), at pp. 162-66). that being so, we query whether a stricter standard might be required under s 686(1)(b)(iv). [53] in this case, however, it is not necessary for us to definitively resolve this puzzle since, on either approach, the crown has satisfied its burden in this case as, in our view, there is clearly no prejudice to mr. esseghaier or mr. jaser for two reasons: (1) the static triers procedure used, though incorrect, was enacted by parliament specifically for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial by an independent and impartial jury; and (2) both the trial judge and static triers performed their duties with the requisite care and attention to protect mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser’s rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. it follows that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred. [54] the first reason reflects that, in the context of applying s 686(1)(b)(iv) to a procedural error in jury selection, the prejudice inquiry is focused solely upon the risk of depriving accused persons of their right, under s 11(d) of the charter, to a fair trial by an independent and impartial jury where the appellant is able to show that a procedural error led to an improperly constituted jury, the onus shifts to the crown to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant was not deprived of their right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial jury and, consequently, suffered no prejudice. here, we are satisfied that the crown has discharged that onus. although the use of static triers was incorrect in the circumstances, it was one of the two legally sanctioned procedures for trying challenges for cause at the time of the trial. the jury was not selected by a procedure concocted outside of the bounds of the criminal code (see, eg,. bain and wv), but rather by one that parliament had enacted specifically for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial by an independent and impartial jury. further, in the particular circumstances of this case — where the risk of juror tainting was palpable — the static triers process removed that risk by having both the sworn and unsworn jurors excluded from the courtroom. [55] secondly, the actual implementation of the procedure in this case, by both the trial judge and the static triers, was handled with the requisite care and attention to ensure that the fair trial rights of mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser were protected. at the motion hearing and in advance of the selection of the triers, the trial judge explained that his intention was to undertake “a really serious vetting of the triers” (ar, vol. iii, at p 50) to make sure that the two people chosen “would take up th[e] role effectively” (ar, vol. iv, at p 83). he indicated that his practice was to ask prospective triers a broad range of questions, including about their “background”, “values”, “experience in multicultural situations” (ar, vol. iii, at p 50), and about issues “related to the actual questions in the challenge for cause” (ar, vol. iv, at p 83). the trial judge followed through with his stated intention. he conducted a thorough vetting of prospective triers, in which he inquired as to their backgrounds, experiences, and ability to be impartial in the particular circumstances at hand. in the course of his vetting process, he excused three prospective triers the two individuals he selected were approved by both the crown and counsel for mr. jaser. [56] the triers also exercised care in discharging their duties they were properly instructed on their duties by the trial judge. they took their role seriously and, during the process, refused 25 prospective jurors. midway through the challenges, they were reinstructed at the behest of crown counsel. counsel for mr. jaser agreed to the reinstruction, but noted that he “ha[dn’t] seen anything that caused [him] concern” (ar, vol. iv, at p 195) the triers disagreed at one point with respect to the acceptability of one prospective juror, but eventually agreed to accept her though perhaps unusual, this temporary disagreement, without more, is insufficient to raise a concern about improper reasoning or intentional tampering by the triers. indeed, there is no suggestion that any of the jurors eventually chosen to try the case were partial, and each one was approved by counsel for mr. jaser. this was not a case where the behaviour of actors within the trial process raised a concern about misconduct or unfairness to the accused (see, eg,. r v. yumnu, 2012 scc 73, [2012] 3 scr 777, where the crown was alleged to have engaged in an improper vetting of the jury, or r v latimer, [1997] 1 scr 217, where, at the behest of the crown, the police approached prospective jurors and asked them to complete a questionnaire related to issues pertinent to the case). [57] we have no doubt that, on the basis of this information, a reasonable person would perceive mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser to have received a fair trial before an independent and impartial jury. while mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser did not receive the exact trial they wanted, our law does not demand perfect justice, but fundamentally fair justice (o’connor, at para. 193). this is what they received. accordingly, there was no infringement of the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial jury, no prejudice, and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. [58] the proviso can cure the error, and we therefore apply it here. c remedy [59] as we would allow the appeal, we must address the issue of remedy. [60] the crown asks that the convictions be restored. mr. esseghaier asks the court to exercise its discretion under s 46.1 of the supreme court act, rsc 1985, c. s-26, to remit the outstanding grounds of appeal to the court of appeal for determination in slight variation, mr jaser asks that, if this court finds that the curative proviso can apply to cure the error, the court remit the matter to the court of appeal to consider the jury selection issue along with the other grounds of appeal. in mr. jaser’s view, even were this court to find that the curative proviso can apply, the question of whether it should ultimately be applied in this case cannot be properly determined until the court of appeal has assessed the remaining grounds of appeal. [61] as we have concluded that the trial judge’s error can be cured by operation of the curative proviso in s 686(1)(b)(iv), it follows that the convictions for mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser must be restored. [62] as to the question of whether this court should remit the remaining grounds of appeal back to the court of appeal, s 46.1 of the supreme court act states that: 46.1 the court may, in its discretion, remand any appeal or any part of an appeal to the court appealed from or the court of original jurisdiction and order any further proceedings that would be just in the circumstances. [63] the discretion in s 46.1 is to be exercised “in the interests of justice” (wells v. newfoundland, [1999] 3 scr 199, at para. 68; see also saadati v. moorhead, 2017 scc 28, [2017] 1 scr 543, at para. 45). [64] in our view, it is “in the interests of justice” to remand the outstanding grounds of appeal to the court of appeal for determination. the remaining grounds were not abandoned; they were simply bifurcated from the issue decided here, and they remain unexamined. [65] we cannot accept, however, mr. jaser’s argument that this court should refrain from applying the proviso in order to allow the court of appeal to consider the error alongside any other potential errors to determine whether, on the whole, the proviso should or should not be applied. part of the reason why the jury selection issue was bifurcated from the other grounds of appeal was because it could be assessed in isolation and because, if successful, it would be determinative. our conclusion that the respondents’ ground of appeal is unsuccessful stands in isolation, and has no effect on the remaining grounds of appeal, which should now be assessed together as would occur in the normal course of appellate proceedings. [66] we would, therefore, allow the appeal, restore the convictions, and remit the remaining grounds of appeal to the court of appeal. appeal allowed. solicitor for the appellant: public prosecution service of canada, toronto. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. solicitor general, appeals, education & prosecution policy branch, calgary. gorham vandebeek, toronto.
i. introduction la cour — i. introduction [1] in 1867, the british north america act, 1867 (uk), 30 & 31 vict., c. 3, united individual brit- ish colonies into one new country, the dominion of canada. prior to this, each colony had its own power to impose tariffs at its borders. part viii of that act (now the constitution act, 1867) contains provisions for the transfer of this power to levy tariffs to the dominion government. at the heart of part viii is s. 121, the provision at issue in this appeal: [1] en 1867, l’acte de l’amérique du nord britan- nique, 1867 (r-u), 30 & 31 vict., c. 3, a unifi é des colonies britanniques distinctes en un nouveau pays, le dominion du canada. avant l’adoption de cette loi, chaque colonie disposait de son propre pouvoir d’imposer des tarifs à ses frontières. la partie viii de cet acte (maintenant la loi constitutionnelle de 1867) contient des dispositions prévoyant le trans- fert de ce pouvoir au gouvernement du dominion. au cœur de cette partie viii se trouve l’art. 121, la disposition en cause dans le présent pourvoi : all articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of any one of the provinces shall, from and after the union, be admitted free into each of the other provinces. tous articles du crû, de la provenance ou manufacture d’aucune des provinces seront, à dater de l’union, admis en franchise dans chacune des autres provinces. 352 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. [2] the respondent, mr. gerard comeau, contends that s. 121 is essentially a free trade provision — in his view, no barriers can be erected to impede the passage of goods across provincial boundaries. on the other side of the debate, the appellant, her majesty the queen in right of new brunswick (“the crown”), argues that s. 121 was only intended to dismantle the power to impose tariffs or tariff- like charges at provincial boundaries. the trial judge agreed with mr comeau. the question before us is whether he erred in doing so. what does it mean for articles to be “admitted free” as stated in s. 121? how does that requirement constrain state action? fundamentally, does s. 121 constitutionalize some particular form of economic union? these questions lie at the core of this appeal. [3] the answers to these questions have broad im- plications. if to be “admitted free” is understood as a constitutional guarantee of free trade, the potential reach of s. 121 is vast. agricultural supply manage- ment schemes, public health- driven prohibitions, environmental controls, and innumerable compa- rable regulatory measures that incidentally impede the passage of goods crossing provincial borders may be invalid. [4] the dispute arises out of mr. comeau’s asser- tion that s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867 prevents the province of new brunswick from legislating that new brunswick residents cannot stock alcohol from another province. the appeal asks whether s. 134(b) of the liquor control act, rsnb 1973, c. l-10, infringes s 121. section 134(b) of the liquor control act provides: 134 except as provided by this act or the regulations, no person, within the province, by himself, his clerk, employee, servant or agent shall [2] l’intimé, m.  gerard comeau, soutient que l’art. 121 est essentiellement une disposition de libre- échange — à son avis, aucune barrière ne peut être érigée pour entraver la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre. la partie adverse, appelante, sa majesté la reine du chef du nouveau- brunswick (« ministère public »), fait valoir que l’art. 121 ne vi- sait qu’à supprimer le pouvoir d’imposer des tarifs ou des charges semblables aux frontières provinciales. le juge du procès a donné raison à m comeau. la question dont nous sommes saisis est celle de savoir s’il a eu tort de le faire. quel sens faut-il donner, en ce qui a trait aux articles, à l’expression « admis en franchise » qui fi gure à l’art. 121? de quelle fa- çon cette exigence limite-t-elle l’action de l’état? fondamentalement, l’art. 121 constitutionnalise-t-il une forme particulière d’union économique? voilà ce qui est au cœur du présent pourvoi. [3] les réponses à ces questions ont de vastes réper- cussions. si l’on considère que l’expression « admis en franchise » représente une garantie constitution- nelle de libre- échange, l’art. 121 pourrait avoir une large portée. les systèmes de gestion de l’approvi- sionnement agricole, les interdictions fondées sur la santé publique, les contrôles environnementaux et d’innombrables mesures réglementaires similaires qui entravent accessoirement la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre pourraient être invalides. [4] le litige découle de l’affi rmation de m. comeau selon laquelle l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 empêche la province du nouveau- brunswick d’adopter des mesures législatives interdisant à ses résidents de faire des provisions de boissons alcoo- liques provenant d’une autre province. il s’agit en l’espèce de décider si l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools, lrn-b 1973, c. l-10, contrevient à l’art 121. cette disposition est ainsi libellée : 134 sauf dans les cas prévus par la présente loi et les règlements, nul ne doit, dans la province, soit person- nellement, soit par l’entremise de son commis, employé, préposé ou représentant,   .   . [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 353 (b) have or keep liquor, b) avoir ou garder des boissons alcooliques not purchased from the corporation. achetées ailleurs qu’à la société. [5] together with ss. 43(c) and 148(2) of the liq- uor control act, s. 134(b) makes it an offence to “have or keep liquor” in an amount that exceeds a prescribed threshold purchased from any canadian source other than the new brunswick liquor cor- poration. [6] in holding that s. 134(b) of the liquor control act is invalid because it offends s. 121 of the con- stitution act, 1867, the trial judge departed from binding precedent from this court on the basis of historical and opinion evidence tendered by an expert witness. [7] the appeal therefore raises two issues. first, did the trial judge err in departing from precedent, and second, what is the proper interpretation of s. 121? both issues go to the primary question in this appeal: does s. 134(b) of the liquor control act infringe s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867? [8] we conclude that the trial judge erred in depart- ing from previous decisions of this court. going on to interpret s. 121, we conclude that it prohibits laws that in essence and purpose impede the passage of goods across provincial borders and, therefore, does not prohibit laws that yield only incidental effects on interprovincial trade. the impediment to trade posed by s. 134(b) of the liquor control act is an incidental effect of a regulatory scheme that does not, as its primary purpose, thwart interprovincial trade. thus, s. 134(b) does not infringe s 121. we would therefore allow the appeal. [5] conjugué à l’al. 43c) et au par. 148(2) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools, l’al. 134b) de cette dernière érige en infraction le fait « [d’]avoir ou [de] garder des boissons alcooliques » en quantité supérieure à la limite prescrite de celles pouvant être achetées d’une source canadienne autre que la société des alcools du nouveau- brunswick. [6] en concluant que l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools est invalide parce qu’il contrevient à l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, le juge du procès s’est écarté, sur le fonde- ment du témoignage d’opinion livré par un témoin expert et de sa présentation du contexte historique de l’adoption de l’art. 121, de précédents de la cour qui font autorité. [7] le pourvoi soulève donc deux questions. pre- mièrement, le juge du procès a-t-il eu tort de rompre avec les précédents? deuxièmement, quelle est l’in- terprétation qu’il convient de donner à l’art. 121? ces questions se rapportent toutes deux à l’enjeu principal dans le présent pourvoi : l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools contrevient-il à l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867? [8] nous concluons que le juge du procès a eu tort de s’écarter de décisions antérieures de la cour. quant à l’interprétation de l’art. 121, nous concluons qu’il proscrit les mesures législatives qui, de par leur essence et leur objet, entravent la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre, et qu’il ne proscrit donc pas les lois qui n’ont que des effets accessoires sur le commerce interprovincial. l’entrave au com- merce que met l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglemen- tation des alcools est un effet accessoire d’un régime de réglementation qui n’a pas pour objet principal de contrecarrer le commerce interprovincial. cette disposition ne contrevient pas à l’art.  121 nous sommes donc d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi. 354 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. ii factual history ii les faits [9] the respondent mr. comeau is a resident of the tracadie- sheila region on the acadian peninsula in northeastern new brunswick. on october 6, 2012, mr.  comeau drove to campbellton in the north- west of the province, crossed the restigouche river, and entered quebec. mr. comeau did what many canadians who live tantalizingly close to cheaper alcohol prices across provincial boundaries probably do. he visited three different stores and stocked up. [10] mr. comeau was being watched. the camp- bellton rcmp had become concerned with the frequency by which enterprising new brunswick residents were sourcing large quantities of alcohol in quebec in contravention of the law. in response, the rcmp started monitoring new brunswick visitors to commonly frequented liquor stores on the quebec side. offi cers in quebec would record visitors’ infor- mation and pass it on to their new brunswick col- leagues, who were waiting across the border. during his october 6, 2012 trip, mr. comeau was so tracked. [11] returning from quebec to new brunswick, mr. comeau was stopped by the rcmp. the po- lice found a large quantity of beer and some bot- tles of spirits in his vehicle. it is not in dispute that mr. comeau purchased quantities of alcohol in ex- cess of the applicable limit prescribed by s. 43(c) of the liquor control act. mr. comeau was charged under s. 134(b) and consequently issued a fi ne in the amount of $240 plus administrative fees and the victim surcharge levy. [9] l’intimé, m. comeau, est un résident de la région de tracadie- sheila située dans la péninsule acadienne, au nord- est du nouveau- brunswick. le 6 octobre 2012, il s’est rendu en voiture à campbell- ton dans le nord- ouest de la province, a traversé la rivière restigouche et est entré au québec. ensuite, il a fait ce que font probablement de nombreux ca- nadiens habitant si près d’une province où le prix de l’alcool est moins élevé que dans leur province de résidence : il s’est rendu dans trois magasins diffé- rents et a fait des provisions. [10] m. comeau était surveillé. le détachement de la grc de campbellton jugeait préoccupante la fréquence à laquelle des résidents entreprenants du nouveau- brunswick se procuraient de grandes quan- tités d’alcool au québec en contravention de la loi. en réaction, ses agents ont commencé à surveiller les néo- brunswickois qui se rendaient à des points de vente d’alcool très fréquentés du côté du québec. les agents du québec consignaient les renseignements relatifs à ces visiteurs et les transmettaient à leurs collègues du nouveau- brunswick, qui attendaient de l’autre côté de la frontière. c’est de cette façon que m. comeau a été suivi lorsqu’il s’est rendu au québec le 6 octobre 2012. [11] alors qu’il revenait au nouveau- brunswick, m. comeau a été arrêté par la grc. les policiers ont trouvé une grande quantité de bière et des bou- teilles de spiritueux dans son véhicule. il n’est pas contesté que m. comeau s’est procuré des quantités d’alcool excédant la limite applicable prescrite par l’al. 43c) de la loi sur la réglementation des al- cools. il a été accusé, en application de l’al. 134b), et a été condamné à payer une amende de 240 $, en plus des frais d’administration et de la suramende compensatoire. [12] mr. comeau challenged the charge on the basis that s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867 ren- ders s. 134(b) of the liquor control act unconsti- tutional and therefore of no force and effect. it is not controversial that the beer and liquor at issue in this case are the “articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture” of a canadian province  — that [12] m. comeau a contesté l’accusation, faisant valoir que l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 rend l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementa- tion des alcools inconstitutionnel et, par conséquent, inopérant la bière et les spiritueux en cause en l’espèce sont, sans conteste, des « articles du crû, de la provenance ou manufacture » d’une province [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 355 is, they were produced in quebec or elsewhere in canada. the question of whether s. 121 concerns non- canadian goods imported into one province and then shipped across the country either intact or as inputs in new manufactured goods is not before the court and therefore we do not address it. canadienne — c-à-d qu’ils ont été produits au qué- bec ou ailleurs au canada. la cour n’est pas saisie de la question de savoir si l’art. 121 vise les biens pro- duits à l’étranger, importés dans une province, puis expédiés ailleurs au pays, soit tels quels soit comme composants de nouveaux biens manufacturés; nous nous abstiendrons donc d’y répondre. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire [13] the new brunswick provincial court, per leblanc j., agreed with mr. comeau that s. 134(b) infringed s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867. the trial judge found s. 134(b) to be of no force and ef- fect against mr. comeau and therefore dismissed the charge: 2016 nbpc 3, 448 nbr (2d) 1. [14] the trial judge accepted that this court’s 1921 decision in gold seal ltd. v. attorney- general for the province of alberta (1921), 62 scr 424, was binding authority. he noted that this court in gold seal held that s. 121 prohibits direct tariff barriers (ie customs duties) on goods moving between prov- inces. he found that s. 134(b) of the liquor control act imposed no tariff and therefore would not violate s. 121 under gold seal. [15] the trial judge went on to hold, however, that gold seal was wrongly decided and should not be applied, given the evidence on the origins of s. 121 called by mr comeau. this evidence, presented by an historian whom the trial judge accepted as an expert, comprised historical information about the intentions of the drafters of s. 121, and the expert’s opinion as to the import of that historical evidence for the interpretation of s 121. the trial judge ac- cepted the expert’s opinion “without hesitation”: para 52. [13] le juge leblanc, de la cour provinciale du nouveau- brunswick, a souscrit à l’opinion de m. comeau selon laquelle l’al. 134b) contrevient à l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. il a conclu que l’al. 134b) était inopérant contre m. co- meau, et a donc rejeté l’accusation : 2016 nbcp 3, 448 rn-b (2e) 1. [14] le juge du procès a reconnu que la décision gold seal ltd. c. attorney- general for the province of alberta (1921), 62 rcs 424, rendue par la cour en 1921, est un précédent qui fait autorité. il a noté que, suivant cet arrêt, l’art. 121 interdit l’imposition de barrières tarifaires directes (c-à-d les droits de douane) sur les biens qui circulent entre les pro- vinces. il a conclu que, suivant l’analyse prescrite par l’arrêt gold seal, l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools n’impose pas de tarif et ne contrevient donc pas à l’art 121. [15] cependant, le juge du procès a ensuite conclu que l’arrêt gold seal était erroné et que, à la lumière de la preuve que m. comeau avait soumise quant à l’origine de l’art. 121, il ne devrait pas être appliqué. cette preuve, présentée par un historien reconnu comme expert par le juge du procès, comprenait des renseignements historiques sur les intentions des rédacteurs de l’art. 121 ainsi que l’opinion du témoin à titre d’expert sur le sens de cette preuve historique pour l’interprétation de cette disposition. le juge du procès a accepté cette opinion [traduction] « sans hésiter » : par 52. [16] on the basis of this evidence, the trial judge concluded that the drafters were highly motivated to open up trade between the provinces. this was a direct response to trade barriers that had been erected by the united states of america in response [16] sur la foi de ces éléments de preuve, le juge du procès a conclu que les rédacteurs étaient déter- minés à ouvrir le commerce entre les provinces, en réaction directe aux obstacles commerciaux érigés par les états- unis d’amérique face au sentiment 356 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. to anti- british sentiment in that country during the american civil war. the trial judge accepted that the drafters would have been preoccupied with the con- tinued economic prosperity of british north america after the american civil war and that this depended on the availability of new barrier- free markets. the trial judge concluded that this motivation could be extracted from the expert’s description of the polit- ical climate at the time, but also more specifi cally from the speeches of some of the fathers of con- federation. on this basis, the trial judge agreed with the expert that the phrase “admitted free” in s. 121 alluded to free trade, and that, in the minds of the drafters, this meant barrier- free borders. [17] the trial judge fi rst concluded that the fail- ure of the court to consider this historical evidence and “embark on a large, liberal or progressive in- terpretation” of s. 121 in gold seal rendered that decision suspect: para 116. he then concluded that the new evidence adduced at trial allowed him to depart from gold seal under the evidence- based ex- ception to vertical stare decisis approved in canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101. the trial judge held, at para. 125: anti- britannique qui régnait dans ce pays pendant la guerre de sécession. le juge du procès a reconnu que les rédacteurs devaient vouloir assurer la continuité de la prospérité économique de l’amérique du nord britannique après la guerre de sécession, et que de nouveaux marchés libres d’obstacles commerciaux étaient essentiels à cette prospérité. selon le juge du procès, la description que l’expert a faite du climat politique de l’époque, mais aussi, plus particulière- ment, les discours prononcés par certains pères de la confédération, donnent à penser que telle était la motivation des rédacteurs. ainsi, il a souscrit à l’opi- nion de l’expert voulant que l’expression « admis en franchise » qui fi gure à l’art. 121 se rapportait au libre- échange et que, dans l’esprit des rédacteurs, cela signifi ait des frontières exemptes d’obstacles. [17] selon le juge du procès, le fait que, dans gold seal, la cour n’ait pas tenu compte de cette preuve historique et ne se soit pas [traduction] « engagée dans une interprétation large, libérale ou progres- siste » de l’art. 121 rend cette décision suspecte : par 116. en outre, à son avis, la nouvelle preuve pré- sentée au procès lui permettait de rompre avec l’arrêt en cause conformément à l’exception au stare deci- sis vertical fondée sur la preuve et approuvée dans canada (procureur général) c. bedford, 2013 csc 72, [2013] 3 rcs 1101. il a conclu, au par. 125 : what has occurred is that there has been a signifi cant change in evidence, one that i believe has fundamentally shifted the parameters of the debate. to my knowledge, in none of the cases dealing with section 121 has there been any evidence presented to the trier of fact, or to the appellate court, addressing the issues presented before me respecting the following topics: the drafting of the british north america act, 1867, the legislative history of the act, the scheme of the act and its legislative context. it has been the presentation of evidence on these issues that changed in a substantial way the parameters of the debate on the correct interpretation of the expression “admitted free” in section 121 of the constitution act, 1867. in my opinion, this allows this court to proceed with its analysis and indeed mandates that it do so. [traduction] ce qui est arrivé, c’est qu’il y a eu un changement important dans la preuve, changement qui, selon moi, a changé radicalement la donne. à ma connais- sance, dans aucune des affaires qui ont porté sur l’art. 121, une preuve n’a été présentée au juge des faits ou au tribu- nal d’appel au sujet des questions qui m’ont été soumises concernant la rédaction de l’acte de l’amérique du nord britannique, 1867, l’historique législatif de l’acte, son régime et son contexte législatif. c’est la présentation de la preuve sur ces questions qui a changé considérablement la donne concernant l’interprétation qu’il convient de donner à l’expression « admis en franchise » à l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. à mon avis, cela per- met à notre cour de procéder à son analyse; en fait, cela l’oblige à le faire. [18] after concluding that he was entitled to depart from binding precedent on the basis of the expert’s evidence, the trial judge then held that this evidence of the “original purpose of the provision at issue” [18] après avoir conclu qu’il pouvait rompre avec le précédent qui fait autorité au vu du témoignage de l’expert, le juge du procès a statué que cette preuve de [traduction] l’« objectif original de la [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 357 is “elemental and fundamental” in the analysis and should not be “displaced” by other considerations stemming from a “long- standing misinterpretation of the intent of the fathers of confederation”: para 165. [19] the trial judge held that, given his conclusions regarding the drafters’ intent, s. 121, correctly con- strued, prohibits all barriers to interprovincial trade. as s. 134(b) of the liquor control act discourages cross- border purchases and therefore limits access to extra- provincial liquor, the trial judge determined that it infringed s 121. [20] the crown sought leave to appeal directly to the new brunswick court of appeal, as it was authorized to do in this case by virtue of s. 116(3) of the provincial offences procedure act, snb 1987, c p-221. the court of appeal dismissed the appli- cation for leave: 2016 canlii 73665. [21] the crown now appeals to this court. al- though the court of appeal’s decision was limited to the question of leave, the substantive constitutional question is properly before this court: macdonald v. city of montreal, [1986] 1 scr 460;. roberge v. bolduc, [1991] 1 scr 374; s. 40 of the supreme court act, rsc 1985, c s-26. disposition en litige » est « élémentaire et fondamen- tale » pour l’analyse et ne devrait pas être « écartée » par d’autres facteurs découlant d’une « fausse inter- prétation donnée depuis longtemps à l’intention des pères de la confédération » : par 165. [19] pour le juge du procès, à la lumière de ses conclusions concernant l’intention des rédacteurs, l’art. 121, interprété correctement, proscrit tout obs- tacle au commerce interprovincial. puisque l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools vise à dé- courager les achats transfrontaliers et qu’il limite donc l’accès à l’alcool se trouvant dans d’autres pro- vinces, le juge du procès a conclu qu’il contrevenait à l’art 121. [20] le ministère public a demandé l’autorisation d’interjeter appel directement à la cour d’appel du nouveau- brunswick, comme l’autorisait à le faire le par. 116(3) de la loi sur la procédure applicable aux infractions provinciales, ln-b 1987, c p-221. la cour d’appel a rejeté cette demande d’autorisation : 2016 canlii 73665. [21] le ministère public interjette maintenant ap- pel devant la cour. bien que la décision de la cour d’appel n’a porté que sur la question de l’autorisa- tion, la cour est saisie à bon droit de la question constitutionnelle de fond : macdonald c. ville de mont réal, [1986] 1 rcs 460;. roberge c. bolduc, [1991] 1 rcs 374; art. 40 de la loi sur la cour suprême, lrc 1985, c s-26. iv issues iv questions [22] the main issue is whether s. 134(b) of the liquor control act infringes s. 121 of the constitu- tion act, 1867. this raises the following subsidiary issues: [22] la principale question en litige est celle de savoir si l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools contrevient à l’art. 121 de la loi constitu- tionnelle de 1867. cette question soulève à son tour les questions subsidiaires suivantes : (a) did the trial judge err in departing from binding precedent and providing his own interpretation of s. 121? and a) le juge du procès a-t-il eu tort de rompre avec les précédents qui font autorité et de donner sa propre interprétation à l’art. 121? (b) what is the proper interpretation of s. 121? b) quelle interprétation convient-il de donner à l’art. 121? 358 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. v analysis v analyse a did the trial judge err in departing from bind- ing precedent and providing his own interpre- tation of section 121 of the constitution act, 1867? a le juge du procès a-t-il eu tort de rompre avec les précédents qui font autorité et de donner sa propre interprétation à l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867? [23] the trial judge accepted that this court’s de- cision in gold seal was binding authority and that, applying gold seal, s. 134(b) of the liquor con- trol act does not violate s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867. he went on to hold, however, that gold seal had been wrongly decided and that therefore he should not follow it. [23] le juge du procès a reconnu que la décision de la cour dans gold seal était un précédent qui fait autorité et que, selon cet arrêt, l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools n’enfreint pas l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. il a toutefois conclu que cet arrêt était erroné et qu’il ne devait donc pas le suivre. [24] the decision of this court in gold seal was expressly affi rmed by the judicial committee of the privy council in atlantic smoke shops ltd. v. conlon, [1943] 4 dlr 81, at pp. 91-92, and by a majority of this court in murphy v. canadian pacifi c railway co., [1958] scr 626, at p 634. it has never been overruled, although some justices of this court have interpreted it to apply not only to tariffs, but to tariff- like burdens on goods crossing pro- vincial boundaries: murphy, at p. 642, per rand j.; reference re agricultural products marketing act, [1978] 2 scr 1198, at p. 1268, per laskin cj;. black v. law society of alberta, [1989] 1 scr 591, at p. 609, per la forest j.; canadian pacifi c air lines ltd. v. british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 1133, at p. 1153, per la forest j.; canadian egg marketing agency v. richardson, [1998] 3 scr 157, at pa- ras. 123 and 171, per mclachlin j. (as she then was). [25] for the stare decisis issue, we need not decide between these interpretations (although we address them later in these reasons). the trial judge’s reading of s. 121 — that it precludes any laws that impede goods crossing provincial boundaries — is incom- patible with both interpretations. [24] la décision de la cour dans gold seal a été expressément confi rmée par le comité judiciaire du conseil privé dans l’arrêt atlantic smoke shops ltd. c. conlon, [1943] 4 dlr 81, p. 91-92, ainsi que par les juges majoritaires de la cour dans murphy c. canadian pacifi c railway co., [1958] rcs 626, p 634. elle n’a jamais été infi rmée, bien que, se- lon l’interprétation de certains juges de la cour, elle s’applique non seulement aux tarifs, mais aussi aux charges semblables à des tarifs imposées sur des biens qui traversent les frontières provinciales : murphy, p. 642, le juge rand; renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’or- ganisation du marché des produits agricoles, [1978] 2 rcs 1198, p. 1268, le juge en chef laskin; black c. law society of alberta, [1989] 1 rcs 591, p. 609, le juge la forest; lignes aériennes canadien paci- fi que ltée c. colombie- britannique, [1989] 1 rcs. 1133, p. 1153, le juge la forest; offi ce canadien de commercialisation des œufs c richardson, [1998] 3 rcs 157, par. 123 et 171, la juge mclachlin (main- tenant juge en chef). [25] pour ce qui est de la question du stare decisis, nous n’avons pas à trancher entre ces interprétations (bien que nous les abordions plus loin). en effet, la lecture qu’a faite le juge du procès à l’art. 121 — selon laquelle ce dernier proscrit toute mesure lé- gislative entravant la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre — est incompatible avec les deux interprétations. [26] common law courts are bound by authorita- tive precedent. this principle — stare decisis — is [26] les tribunaux de common law sont liés par les précédents faisant autorité. ce principe — celui [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 359 fundamental for guaranteeing certainty in the law. subject to extraordinary exceptions, a lower court must apply the decisions of higher courts to the facts before it. this is called vertical stare decisis. without this foundation, the law would be ever in fl ux — subject to shifting judicial whims or the introduction of new esoteric evidence by litigants dissatisfi ed by the status quo. [27] the question before us is whether the trial judge erred in rejecting this court’s precedent, which he acknowledged was binding, and re- interpreting s 121. in doing so, he relied on one historian’s ev- idence of the drafters’ motivations for including s. 121 in the constitution act, 1867 and that expert’s opinion of what those motivations tell us about how s. 121 should be interpreted today. [28] the trial judge relied on one of the narrow exceptions to vertical stare decisis identifi ed by this court in bedford. the respondent argues that the trial judge was entitled to do so on the basis of the expert’s evidence. the appellant demurs. we agree with the appellant. [29] in bedford, this court held that a legal prece- dent “may be revisited if new legal issues are raised as a consequence of signifi cant developments in the law, or if there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate”: para 42. the trial judge, relying on the evidence- based exception identifi ed in that excerpt from bedford, held that the historical and opinion evidence he accepted “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate” over the correct inter- pretation of s. 121, referring to this court’s treatment of the question in gold seal. du stare decisis — est fondamental pour assurer la certitude du droit. sous réserve d’exceptions extraor- dinaires, une juridiction inférieure doit appliquer les décisions des juridictions supérieures aux faits dont elle est saisie. c’est ce qu’on appelle le stare deci- sis vertical. sans ce fondement, le droit fl uctuerait continuellement, selon les caprices des juges ou les nouveaux éléments de preuve ésotériques produits par des plaideurs insatisfaits du statu quo. [27] la question dont nous sommes saisis est celle de savoir si le juge du procès a eu tort de rejeter des précédents établis par la cour, auxquels il a reconnu être lié, et de réinterpréter l’art 121. ce faisant, il s’est fondé sur le témoignage d’un historien quant aux motivations des rédacteurs qui auraient justifi é l’inclusion de l’art. 121 dans la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 et sur l’opinion de cet expert quant à ce que ces motivations nous indiquent relativement à la façon dont l’art. 121 devrait être interprété au- jourd’hui. [28] le juge du procès s’est fondé sur une des ex- ceptions restreintes au principe du stare decisis ver- tical que la cour a énoncée dans bedford. l’intimé soutient que le juge du procès pouvait invoquer cette exception sur le fondement du témoignage de l’ex- pert. l’appelante affi rme le contraire. nous parta- geons l’avis de cette dernière. [29] dans bedford, la cour a affi rmé qu’un pré- cédent juridique « peut être réexaminé lorsque de nouvelles questions de droit sont soulevées par suite d’une évolution importante du droit ou qu’une mo- difi cation de la situation ou de la preuve change radicalement la donne » : par 42. le juge du procès, invoquant l’exception fondée sur la preuve établie dans cet extrait de bedford, a conclu, faisant réfé- rence au traitement de la question par la cour dans gold seal, que la preuve historique et le témoignage d’opinion qu’il a acceptés « change[nt] radicalement la donne » à l’égard de l’interprétation qu’il convient de donner à l’art 121. [30] the new evidence exception to vertical stare decisis is narrow: bedford, at para. 44; carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] [30] l’exception relative à la nouvelle preuve s’ap- pliquant au principe du stare decisis vertical est res- treinte : bedford, par. 44; carter c. canada (procureur 360 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. 1 scr 331, at para 44. we noted in bedford, at para. 44, that a lower court is not entitled to ignore binding precedent, and the threshold for revisiting a matter is not an easy one to reach   . this balances the need for fi nality and stability with the recognition that when an appropriate case arises for revisiting precedent, a lower court must be able to perform its full role. [31] not only is the exception narrow — the ev- idence must “fundamentally shif[t] the parameters of the debate” — it is not a general invitation to reconsider binding authority on the basis of any type of evidence. as alluded to in bedford and carter, ev- idence of a signifi cant evolution in the foundational legislative and social facts — “facts about society at large” — is one type of evidence that can fundamen- tally shift the parameters of the relevant legal debate: bedford, at paras. 48-49; carter, at para 47. that is, the exception has been found to be engaged where the underlying social context that framed the original legal debate is profoundly altered. [32] in carter, for example, new evidence about the harms associated with prohibiting assisted death, public attitudes toward assisted death, and measures that can be put in place to limit risk was relevant. this evidence was unknowable or not pertinent, given the existing legal framework, when rodriguez v. british columbia (attorney general), [1993] 3 scr 519, was decided. these new legislative and social facts did not simply provide an alternate answer to the question posed in rodriguez. instead, the new ev- idence fundamentally shifted how the court could assess the nature of the competing interests at issue. général), 2015 csc 5, [2015] 1 rcs 331, par 44. dans bedford, nous avons souligné ce qui suit au par. 44 :    la juridiction inférieure ne peut faire abstraction d’un précédent qui fait autorité, et la barre est haute lorsqu’il s’agit de justifi er le réexamen d’un précédent. [  ]. cette approche met en balance les impératifs que sont le carac- tère défi nitif et la stabilité avec la reconnaissance du fait qu’une juridiction inférieure doit pouvoir exercer plei- nement sa fonction lorsqu’elle est aux prises avec une situation où il convient de revoir un précédent. [31] non seulement l’exception est- elle restreinte — la preuve doit « change[r] radicalement la donne » —, mais il ne s’agit pas d’une invitation générale à réexaminer les précédents qui font autorité sur le fon- dement de n’importe quel type de preuve. comme le laisse entendre les arrêts bedford et carter, la preuve d’une évolution importante des faits législa- tifs et sociaux fondamentaux — « qui intéressent la société en général » — constitue un type de preuve qui peut radicalement changer la donne dans le débat juridique visé : bedford, par. 48-49; carter, par 47. ainsi, il a été jugé que l’exception s’applique lorsque le contexte social sous- jacent qui encadrait le débat juridique original examiné a profondément changé. [32] dans carter, par exemple, de nouveaux élé- ments de preuve relatifs aux préjudices associés à l’interdiction de l’aide médicale à mourir, aux atti- tudes du public envers cette aide et aux mesures qui peuvent être mises en place pour limiter le risque étaient pertinents. compte tenu du cadre juridique qui existait alors, il était impossible de connaître cette preuve, ou alors celle-ci n’était pas pertinente, au mo- ment où l’arrêt rodriguez c. colombie- britannique (procureur général), [1993] 3 rcs 519, a été rendu. ces nouveaux faits législatifs et sociaux n’ont pas simplement fourni une autre réponse à la question posée dans rodriguez. ils ont plutôt changé radicale- ment la donne quant à la façon dont la cour pouvait évaluer la nature des intérêts opposés en jeu. [33] this focus on shifting legislative and social facts is conceptually linked to lord sankey’s famous “living tree” metaphor, which acknowledges that interpretations of the constitution act, 1867 evolve [33] mettre ainsi l’accent sur la mutation des faits législatifs et sociaux est lié sur le plan conceptuel à la célèbre métaphore de l’« arbre vivant » de lord sankey, qui reconnaît que les interprétations de la [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 361 over time, given shifts in the relevant legislative and social context: edwards v. attorney- general for canada, [1930] 1 dlr 98 (pc), at pp 106-7. in edwards, both legal and social changes that had opened the door to women’s increased integration into public life after confederation confi rmed that it was no longer appropriate to read the term “person” in the impugned constitutional provision as any- thing other than its plain gender- neutral meaning: pp 110-12. [34] to reiterate: departing from vertical stare decisis on the basis of new evidence is not a ques- tion of disagreement or interpretation. for a binding precedent from a higher court to be cast aside on the basis of new evidence, the new evidence must “fundamentally shif[t]” how jurists understand the legal question at issue. it is not enough to fi nd that an alternate perspective on existing evidence might change how jurists would answer the same legal question. [35] this high threshold was not met in this case. [36] the trial judge accepted the expert’s evidence in question on two points — one of history, the other of law. he accepted (1) the expert’s description of the drafters’ motivations for including s. 121 in the constitution act, 1867, and (2) the expert’s opin- ion that those motivations drive how s. 121 is to be interpreted. neither class of evidence constitutes evidence, for example, of evolving legislative and social facts; the evidence is simply a description of historical information and one expert’s assessment of that information. this does not evince a profound change in social circumstances from the time gold seal was decided. it is evidence of one perspective of events that occurred decades before the gold seal company brought its case to the courts and a century before this court’s discussion of s. 121 in murphy. historical evidence can be helpful for interpreting constitutional texts: r v. big m drug mart ltd., loi constitutionnelle de 1867 évoluent au fil du temps, compte tenu des changements qui surviennent dans les contextes législatifs et sociaux pertinents : edwards c. attorney- general for canada, [1930] 1 dlr 98 (cp), p 106-107. dans cet arrêt, les changements juridiques et sociaux qui avaient ouvert la porte à l’intégration accrue des femmes à la vie publique après la création de la confédération ont confi rmé qu’il ne convenait plus de donner au mot « personne » fi gurant dans la disposition constitu- tionnelle contestée un sens autre qu’un sens neutre sur le plan du genre : p 110-112. il convient de rappeler qu’on ne peut déroger [34] au principe du stare decisis vertical sur le fonde- ment de nouveaux éléments de preuve en raison d’un désaccord ou d’une interprétation différente. pour qu’un précédent contraignant d’une juridiction supérieure puisse être écarté sur le fondement de nouveaux éléments de preuve, ces derniers doivent « change[r] radicalement la donne » pour ce qui est de la façon dont les juristes comprennent la question juridique en jeu. il ne suffi t pas de conclure qu’une perspective différente sur la preuve existante pourrait changer la réponse des juristes à la même question juridique. [35] en l’espèce, ce seuil exigeant n’a pas été at- teint. [36] le juge du procès a accepté la preuve de l’ex- pert en cause sur deux points — l’histoire et le droit. il a accepté (1) la description qu’a donnée cet expert quant aux motivations des rédacteurs à l’appui de l’inclusion de l’art. 121 dans la loi constitution- nelle de 1867, et (2) son opinion selon laquelle ces motivations indiquent la façon dont l’art. 121 doit être interprété. or, aucun de ces types de preuve ne constitue une preuve, par exemple, de l’évolution des faits législatifs et sociaux; il s’agit simplement d’une description de renseignements historiques et de l’évaluation de ces renseignements par un expert. cette preuve ne démontre pas qu’un changement profond des circonstances sociales est survenu de- puis l’époque où l’arrêt gold seal a été rendu. c’est la preuve d’un point de vue quant à des événements qui ont eu lieu des décennies avant que la compa- gnie gold seal soumette son dossier aux tribunaux 362 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. [1985] 1 scr 295, at p. 344; r v. blais, 2003 scc 44, [2003] 2 scr 236. however, a re- discovery or re- assessment of historical events is not evidence of social change. [37] because the historical evidence accepted by the trial judge is not evidence of changing legislative and social facts or some other fundamental change, it cannot justify departing from vertical stare decisis. differing interpretations of history do not fundamen- tally shift the parameters of the legal debate in this case. while one’s particular collection of historical facts or one’s view of that historical evidence may push in favour of a statutory interpretation different from that in a prior decision, the mere existence of that evidence does not permit the judge to depart from binding precedent. [38] the trial judge held otherwise. he concluded that this court in gold seal did not conduct a broad and purposive interpretation of the provision — the approach established by edwards about a decade after gold seal was decided. he went on to conclude that this gap meant that the expert’s “new” evidence of historical context could open the door to a re- interpretation: paras. 42 and 116. et un siècle avant que la cour ne traite de l’art. 121 dans murphy. la preuve historique peut être utile à l’interprétation des textes constitutionnels : r c. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 rcs 295, p. 344; r c. blais, 2003 csc 44, [2003] 2 rcs 236. une redécouverte ou un nouvel examen d’événements historiques ne constitue toutefois pas une preuve de changement social. [37] puisque la preuve historique acceptée par le juge du procès n’est pas une preuve que les faits lé- gislatifs et sociaux ont changé ou qu’un autre change- ment fondamental est survenu, elle ne peut justifi er la dérogation au principe du stare decisis vertical. les interprétations divergentes de l’histoire ne changent pas radicalement la donne en l’espèce. bien que la description particulière de faits historiques ou la perspective de quiconque à l’égard de cette preuve puisse militer pour une interprétation législative dif- férente de celle adoptée dans une décision antérieure, la simple existence de cette preuve ne permet pas au juge de rompre avec un précédent qui fait autorité. [38] le juge du procès en a conclu autrement. il a statué que, dans gold seal, la cour n’avait pas réalisé une interprétation large et téléologique de la disposi- tion, et qu’elle n’avait donc pas appliqué l’approche établie dans edwards environ une décennie après que l’arrêt gold seal a été rendu. pour lui, cette lacune signifi ait que la « nouvelle » preuve de l’expert quant au contexte historique pouvait ouvrir la porte à une nouvelle interprétation : par. 42 et 116. [39] although it is true that gold seal was decided prior to edwards and was arguably interpreted un- der a different rubric than constitutional provisions under the shadow of the living tree, it does not fol- low that the historical evidence permitted the trial judge to bypass an existing binding interpretation on the basis of a new understanding of the legisla- tive context and history. first, atlantic smoke shops and murphy, which applied gold seal, were decided after edwards. second, the trial judge’s interpreta- tion was limited entirely to the words and context of the provision in light of the historical evidence. this methodology does not conform to the purpo- sive approach to constitutional interpretation that has grown out of edwards and decades of subsequent [39] il est vrai que l’arrêt gold seal a été rendu avant edwards, et qu’il a sans doute été interprété se- lon un angle différent de celui adopté pour interpréter les dispositions constitutionnelles sous l’infl uence de la théorie de l’arbre vivant. cela ne signifi e pas pour autant que la preuve historique permettait au juge du procès de contourner une interprétation contrai- gnante existante sur le fondement d’une nouvelle interprétation du contexte législatif et de l’histoire. premièrement, les arrêts atlantic smoke shops et murphy, dans lesquels gold seal a été appliqué, ont été rendus après edwards. deuxièmement, l’in- terprétation du juge du procès a porté uniquement sur les mots et le contexte de la disposition à la lu- mière de la preuve historique. or, cette méthode ne [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 363 jurisprudence: hunter v southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at pp.  155-56; big m drug mart, at p. 344; reference re same- sex marriage, 2004 scc 79, [2004] 3 scr 698, at paras. 29-30; reference re employment insurance act (can.), ss. 22 and 23, 2005 scc 56, [2005] 2 scr 669, at para. 9; ref- erence re supreme court act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 scc 21, [2014] 1 scr 433, at para 19. in addition to the historical evidence of the [40] founders’ intentions, the trial judge also relied on the expert’s opinion of the correct interpretation of s 121. this reliance was erroneous. as a prelimi- nary observation, it is diffi cult if not impossible to contemplate a situation where evidence on domestic law (eg interpreting a canadian statute) would ever be admissible as expert opinion evidence under r v. mohan, [1994] 2 scr 9. the application of con- textual factors, including drafters’ intent, to the in- terpretation of a statutory provision is not something that is “outside the experience and knowledge of a judge”: mohan, at p 23. to depart from precedent on the basis of such opinion evidence is to cede the judge’s primary task to an expert. [41] more to the point in the present matter: to rely on such evidence to rebut vertical stare decisis is to substitute one expert’s opinion on domestic law for that expressed by appellate courts in binding judgments. this would introduce the very instability in the law that the principle of stare decisis aims to avoid. this is precisely why the exceptions provided in bedford and carter are narrow. if a constitutional provision could be reinterpreted by a lower court whenever a litigant fi nds an expert with an alternate interpretation, the common law system would be left in disarray. this is not what bedford and carter teach. the approach to stare decisis is strict. bedford and carter do not alter that principle. cadre pas avec l’approche téléologique applicable à l’interprétation constitutionnelle qui a découlé de l’arrêt edwards et de la jurisprudence qui a suivi pendant des décennies : hunter c. southam inc., [1984] 2 rcs 145, p. 155-156; big m drug mart, p. 344; renvoi relatif au mariage entre personnes du même sexe, 2004 csc 79, [2004] 3 rcs 698, par. 29-30; renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’assurance- emploi (can.), art. 22 et 23, 2005 csc 56, [2005] 2 rcs 669, par. 9; renvoi relatif à la loi sur la cour suprême, art. 5 et 6, 2014 csc 21, [2014] 1 rcs 433, par 19. [40] en plus de s’être fondé sur la preuve historique des intentions des fondateurs, le juge du procès s’est appuyé sur l’opinion de l’expert concernant l’inter- prétation qu’il convient de donner à l’art 121. ce faisant, il a commis une erreur. à titre préliminaire, disons qu’il est diffi cile, voire impossible, d’imaginer une situation où des éléments de preuve sur le droit interne (p ex l’interprétation d’une loi canadienne) pourraient être admissibles à titre d’opinion d’ex- pert sur le fondement de l’arrêt r c. mohan, [1994] 2 rcs 9. l’application de facteurs contextuels, y compris l’intention des rédacteurs, à l’interprétation d’une disposition législative n’est pas quelque chose qui « dépasse [  ] l’expérience et la connaissance d’un juge » : mohan, p 23. déroger à un précédent sur le fondement d’une telle preuve d’opinion revient à céder la principale tâche du juge à un expert. [41] plus précisément, en l’espèce, se fonder sur une telle preuve pour réfuter le stare decisis vertical revient à substituer l’opinion de l’expert sur le droit interne à celle exprimée par les tribunaux d’appel dans des jugements qui font autorité. une telle ap- proche entraînerait l’instabilité du droit, ce que le principe de stare decisis vertical vise spécifi quement à éviter. c’est précisément la raison pour laquelle les exceptions défi nies dans bedford et dans carter sont restreintes. si une juridiction inférieure pouvait réinterpréter une disposition constitutionnelle chaque fois qu’une partie à un litige soumet une interpréta- tion différente avancée par un expert, le système de common law sombrerait dans le chaos. ce n’est pas ce qu’enseignent les arrêts bedford et carter. l’approche relative au principe du stare decisis est stricte. les arrêts bedford et carter ne changent pas ce principe. 364 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. [42] moreover, a difference in opinion about the interpretation of a statutory provision does not evince a fundamental shift in the parameters of the debate. the debate and its parameters remain unchanged. the only change is the answer provided. [42] de plus, une différence d’opinions concernant l’interprétation d’une disposition législative ne fait pas la preuve d’un changement radical de la donne. le débat et ses paramètres demeurent les mêmes. seule change la réponse donnée. [43] the trial judge erred in departing from binding precedent on the basis of the historical evidence and the expert’s opinion of how that evidence should inform the interpretation of s 121. neither is new evidence that meets the threshold of fundamentally shifting the parameters of the debate about how to interpret s 121. the historical evidence is one non- dispositive ingredient in the multi- faceted statutory interpretation exercise. the opinion evidence is sim- ply one unique articulation of an alternate resolution fl owing out of a particular appreciation of those in- gredients — the recipe remains the same. [43] le juge du procès a eu tort de déroger aux précédents qui font autorité sur le fondement de la preuve historique et de l’opinion de l’expert concer- nant la façon dont cette preuve devrait guider l’in- terprétation de l’art 121. aucun de ces nouveaux éléments de preuve n’atteint le seuil requis, soit de changer radicalement la donne concernant l’in- terprétation que doit recevoir l’art 121. la preuve historique constitue un ingrédient non décisif de la démarche d’interprétation législative à multiples facettes. le témoignage d’opinion n’est qu’une for- mulation d’une solution différente découlant d’une appréciation particulière de ces ingrédients — la recette reste la même. b what is the proper interpretation of section b quelle est l’interprétation qu’il convient de don- 121? ner à l’art. 121? [44] the trial judge refused to apply binding prec- edent and instead adopted a different conclusion on the basis of an expert witness’ evidence about the intention of the founding fathers at the time of confederation and the impact of that intention on how we are to understand s 121. as just discussed, he erred in doing this. the appeal could be allowed on this ground alone. [45] however, this court has been invited to offer guidance on the scope of s 121. we take up this invi- tation in this section. first, we lay out the competing interpretations of s 121. then, we consider these competing interpretations of s. 121 in light of its text, its historical context, its legislative context, and the principles that guide the interpretation of constitu- tional provisions in the federal- provincial context. finally, we consider the existing jurisprudence and how it accords with our purposive interpretation of s. 121 in the aim of defi ning the ambit of the prohi- bition provided in s 121. [44] le juge du procès a refusé d’appliquer les précédents qui font autorité et a plutôt adopté une conclusion différente sur le fondement du témoi- gnage d’un expert concernant l’intention des rédac- teurs de la constitution au moment de la création de la confédération et des répercussions de cette intention sur la façon dont nous devrions comprendre l’art 121. comme nous venons de le voir, il a eu tort de le faire. pour ce seul motif, le pourvoi pourrait être accueilli. [45] la cour a toutefois été invitée à donner des in- dications sur la portée de l’art 121. nous répondons à cette invitation dans la présente section de nos motifs. d’abord, nous exposerons les interprétations diver- gentes de l’art 121. ensuite, nous examinerons ces interprétations compte tenu du libellé de cette dispo- sition, de ses contextes historique et législatif et des principes qui guident l’interprétation des dispositions constitutionnelles dans le contexte fédéral- provincial. enfi n, nous examinerons la jurisprudence actuelle et la façon dont elle s’accorde avec notre interprétation téléologique de l’art. 121, dans le but de défi nir la portée de l’interdiction prévue par ce dernier. [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 365 (1) “admitted free”: the competing interpreta- (1) « admis en franchise » — interprétations tions divergentes [46] section 121 of the constitution act, 1867, provides: [46] l’article 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 dispose : all articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of any one of the provinces shall, from and after the union, be admitted free into each of the other provinces. tous articles du crû, de la provenance ou manufacture d’aucune des provinces seront, à dater de l’union, admis en franchise dans chacune des autres provinces. [47] section 121 is found in part viii of the con- stitution act, 1867, which deals with how revenues, debts, property, and fi scal authority were to be trans- ferred between existing legislatures and the new federal government upon confederation. the scheme specifi cally provides for the power to levy border tariffs to be transferred from the former colonies to the new dominion, as described in ss. 122 and 123. [48] the appellant crown submits that “admitted free” in s. 121 should be read as prohibiting laws that, like tariffs, place burdens on the price of goods crossing interprovincial boundaries. there are two versions of this position, one slightly broader than the other, which we will discuss in due course. at this point it suffi ces to note that on either version, mr. comeau would not succeed. even on the sec- ond broader version of this position — that s. 121 prohibits laws that in essence and purpose impede the passage of goods across provincial borders (see murphy, per rand j.) — s. 134(b) would stand, be- cause it is part of a comprehensive scheme to control liquor in the province of new brunswick and is not directed to impeding interprovincial trade in both essence and purpose. [47] cette disposition se trouve dans la partie viii de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, qui porte sur la façon dont les revenus, les dettes, les propriétés et les autorités fi scales devaient être répartis entre les corps législatifs existants et le nouveau gouvernement fé- déral une fois la confédération créée. le régime prévoit expressément que le pouvoir de percevoir des tarifs douaniers allait être transféré des anciennes colonies au nouveau dominion, conformément aux art. 122 et 123. [48] selon le ministère public appelant, l’expres- sion « admis en franchise » utilisée à l’art. 121 devrait être interprétée comme proscrivant les mesures légis- latives qui, comme les tarifs, imposent des charges sur le prix des biens qui traversent les frontières in- terprovinciales. il existe deux versions de cette posi- tion, une légèrement plus large que l’autre, que nous aborderons plus loin. pour le moment, il suffi t de no- ter que, peu importe la version, m. comeau n’ob- tiendrait pas gain de cause. même selon la deuxième interprétation plus large de cette position — soit que l’art. 121 proscrit les mesures législatives qui, de par leur essence et leur objet1, entravent la circula- tion des biens d’une province à une autre (voir mur- phy, le juge rand) —, l’al. 134b) demeurerait valide, parce qu’il fait partie d’un régime complet de régle- mentation de l’alcool dans la province du nouveau- brunswick et ne vise pas, de par son essence et son objet, à entraver le commerce interprovincial. [49] mr. comeau does not quibble about the fi ne points of precisely what kind of charge or burden is [49] m. comeau ne tatillonne pas sur les détails quant au type précis de frais ou de charge qui est 1 dans le contexte de l’interprétation de l’art. 121 de la loi consti- tutionnelle de 1867, la cour a rendu antérieurement l’expression anglaise « in essence and purpose » par « dans sa nature ou son but » et par « en droit et en fait ». dorénavant, par souci d’exacti- tude et d’uniformité, c’est l’expression « de par son essence et son objet » qui sera utilisée dans la version française des jugements. 366 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. caught by s. 121 on the basis of the jurisprudence. he advances a new and much more radical propo- sition — that “admitted free” in s. 121 means that provincial laws cannot do anything that impedes, or makes more diffi cult, the fl ow of goods across provincial borders, directly or indirectly. in his view, s. 134(b) of the liquor control act impedes the fl ow of goods across the new brunswick border by pro- hibiting new brunswickers from stocking liquor from other provinces at home. therefore, it violates s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867. [50] mr. comeau essentially contends that s. 121 is a “free trade” provision that bars any impediment to interprovincial commerce. the purpose of s. 121, he says, was to foster the full unimpeded economic integration of the new federation. [51] the implications of these competing interpre- tations of s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867 are signifi cant. if mr. comeau’s broad interpretation of s. 121 is correct, federal and provincial legislative schemes of many types — environmental, health, commercial, social — may be invalid. if a narrower interpretation is correct, the legal force of s. 121 is circumscribed to tariffs, or their functional equiva- lents. visé par l’art. 121 selon la jurisprudence. il avance une nouvelle proposition beaucoup plus radicale, soit que l’expression « admis en franchise » utili- sée à l’art. 121 signifi e que les lois provinciales ne peuvent d’aucune façon entraver, ou compliquer, la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre, directement ou indirectement. à son avis, l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools entrave le libre passage des biens à la frontière du nouveau- brunswick en interdisant aux néo- brunswickois de faire des provisions chez eux d’alcool provenant d’autres provinces. par conséquent, il contreviendrait à l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. [50] m. comeau prétend essentiellement que l’art. 121 est une disposition de « libre- échange » qui proscrit toute entrave au commerce interprovincial. selon lui, l’objet de l’art. 121 était de favoriser l’in- tégration économique intégrale sans entrave de la nouvelle fédération. [51] les répercussions de ces interprétations di- vergentes de l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 sont considérables. si l’interprétation large que préconise m. comeau est celle qui convient, des régimes législatifs fédéraux et provinciaux dans de nombreux domaines — environnement, santé, commerce, politiques sociales — pourraient être invalides. si c’est une interprétation plus étroite qui convient, l’effet juridique de l’art. 121 se limite aux tarifs, ou à ses équivalents fonctionnels. [52] the modern approach to statutory interpre- tation provides our guide for determining how “ad- mitted free” should be interpreted. the text of the provision must be read harmoniously with the con- text and purpose of the statute: r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at §26. constitutional provisions must be “placed in [their] proper linguistic, philosophic and histori- cal contexts”: big m drug mart, at p 344. con- stitutional texts must be interpreted in a broad and purposive manner: hunter, at pp. 155-56; big m drug mart, at p. 344; reference re supreme court act, at para 19. constitutional texts must also be interpreted in a manner that is sensitive to evolv- ing circumstances because they “must continually adapt to cover new realities”: reference re same- sex [52] la méthode moderne d’interprétation légis- lative nous fournit les paramètres pour décider de quelle façon l’expression « admis en franchise » devrait être interprétée. selon r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6e éd. 2014), §2.6, le texte de la disposition doit être interprété d’une manière qui s’accorde avec le contexte et l’objet de la loi. les dispositions constitutionnelles doivent être « située[s] dans [leurs] contextes linguistique, phi- losophique et historique appropriés » : big m drug mart, p 344. les textes constitutionnels doivent être interprétés généreusement en fonction de leur objet : hunter, p. 155-156; big m drug mart, p. 344; renvoi relatif à la loi sur la cour suprême, par 19. ils doivent également être interprétés d’une façon qui tient compte de l’évolution des circonstances [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 367 marriage, at para. 30; see also reference re em- ployment insurance act, at para 9. this is the living tree doctrine: edwards, at pp 106-7. finally, the underlying organizational principles of the constitu- tional texts, like federalism, may be relevant to their interpretation: reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at para. 32; reference re sen- ate reform, 2014 scc 32, [2014] 1 scr 704, at para. 25; reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721. [53] applying this framework to s. 121 of the con- stitution act, 1867, we conclude — as detailed be- low  — that the interpretation of “admitted free” proposed by mr. comeau should be rejected. sec- tion 121 does not impose absolute free trade across canada. we further conclude that s. 121 prohibits governments from levying tariffs or tariff- like meas- ures (measures that in essence and purpose burden the passage of goods across a provincial border); but, s. 121 does not prohibit governments from adopting laws and regulatory schemes directed to other goals that have incidental effects on the passage of goods across provincial borders. puisqu’ils « doi[vent] être continuellement adapté[s] à de nouvelles réalités » : renvoi relatif au mariage entre personnes du même sexe, par. 30; voir aussi renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’assurance- emploi, par 9. il s’agit de la doctrine de l’arbre vivant : edwards, p.  106-107 enfi n, les principes organisationnels sous- jacents des textes constitutionnels, comme le fédéralisme, peuvent être utiles à leur interpréta- tion : renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, [1998] 2 rcs 217, par. 32; renvoi relatif à la réforme du sénat, 2014 csc 32, [2014] 1 rcs 704, par. 25; renvoi relatif aux droits linguistiques au manitoba, [1985] 1 rcs 721. [53] appliquant ce cadre d’analyse à l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, nous concluons — comme nous l’expliquerons plus loin — que l’in- terprétation de l’expression « admis en franchise » proposée par m.  comeau doit être rejetée l’ar- ticle 121 n’impose pas de libre- échange absolu dans l’ensemble du canada. nous concluons aussi que cette disposition interdit aux gouvernements de per- cevoir des tarifs ou de mettre en place des mesures semblables (qui entraveraient de par leur essence et leur objet la circulation de biens d’une province à une autre), mais qu’elle n’interdit pas aux gouver- nements d’adopter des mesures législatives et des ré- gimes de réglementation visant d’autres objectifs et qui ont des effets accessoires sur la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre. (2) text (2) texte [54] the introductory words of s. 121 of the con- stitution act, 1867 are broad; the phrase “all articles of growth, produce, or manufacture of any one of the provinces” comprehensively covers all articles of trade of canadian origin. (we need not decide in this case whether s. 121 applies to articles coming into canada and then moved around the country.) this text on its own does not answer the question of how “admitted free” should be interpreted. that phrase remains ambiguous, and falls to be interpreted on the basis of the historical, legislative and constitutional contexts. [54] les premiers mots de l’art.  121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 sont généraux; l’expres- sion « tous articles du crû, de la provenance ou ma- nufacture d’aucune des provinces » vise tous les articles du commerce d’origine canadienne, de fa- çon exhaustive. (nous n’avons pas à décider en l’es- pèce si l’art. 121 s’applique aux articles importés au canada et qui circulent ensuite à l’intérieur des frontières.) ce texte, pris isolément, ne répond tou- tefois pas à la question de savoir comment l’expres- sion « admis en franchise » doit être interprétée. elle demeure ambiguë, et il convient de l’interpré- ter en fonction des contextes historique, législatif et constitutionnel. 368 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. (3) historical context (3) contexte historique [55] historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of s. 121 form part of the contextual inter- pretation of the provision. historical evidence serves to put a provision in its “proper linguistic, philo- sophic and historical contex[t]”: big m drug mart, at p 344. evidence of the intent of the drafters for the purpose of interpreting constitutional texts is not conclusive: r v. tessling, 2004 scc 67, [2004] 3 scr 432, at paras. 61-62; daniels v. canada (in- dian affairs and northern development), 2016 scc 12, [2016] 1 scr 99, at para 44. [55] les circonstances historiques dans lesquelles l’art. 121 a été adopté font partie de l’interprétation contextuelle de la disposition. la preuve historique sert à situer une disposition dans ses « contextes lin- guistique, philosophique et historique appropriés » : big m drug mart, p 344. aux fi ns d’interprétation des textes constitutionnels, la preuve de l’intention des rédacteurs n’est toutefois pas concluante : r c. tessling, 2004 csc 67, [2004] 3 rcs 432, par. 61- 62; daniels c. canada (affaires indiennes et du nord canadien), 2016 csc 12, [2016] 1 rcs 99, par 44. [56] for our purposes, the relevant historical con- text can be summarized as follows. economic issues were among the most important drivers of confed- eration — the union in the dominion of canada of certain colonies of the maritimes and the province of canada. the economies of the colonies were driven by resource exports. [56] pour les besoins du présent pourvoi, le con- texte historique pertinent peut être résumé de la fa- çon suivante. les questions de nature économique faisaient partie des plus importants moteurs de la confédération — l’union de certaines colonies des maritimes et de la province du canada pour former le dominion du canada. les économies des colo- nies reposaient sur les exportations de ressources. [57] for a long period, england was a predicta- ble and lucrative market for these colonial exports. however, by 1850, british preferences for canadian exports had declined: j. h. perry, taxes, tariffs, & subsidies: a history of canadian fi scal development (1955), at p 24. [57] pendant longtemps, l’angleterre a représenté un marché prévisible et lucratif pour ces exportations des colonies. cependant, en 1850, la préférence des britanniques pour les exportations canadiennes était en baisse : j h. perry, taxes, tariffs, & subsidies : a history of canadian fi scal development (1955), p 24. [58] loss of british markets provoked two devel- opments. first, lord elgin, governor general of the province of canada (now ontario and quebec) was pushed to negotiate a trade agreement between brit- ish north america and the united states of amer- ica. the result was the 1854 reciprocity treaty, 10 stat. 1089, which opened new markets for canadian exports that mimicked the provinces’ earlier access to british demand: perry, at p 25. under the treaty, prescribed products fl owed across the international border free from customs duties. [58] la perte des marchés britanniques a entraîné deux conséquences. d’abord, lord elgin, gouverneur général de la province du canada (maintenant l’onta- rio et le québec) a été poussé à négocier une entente commerciale entre l’amérique du nord britannique et les états- unis d’amérique, ce qui a donné lieu en 1854 au reciprocity treaty, 10 stat. 1089 (« traité de réciprocité »). celui-ci prévoyait l’ouverture de nou- veaux marchés pour les exportations canadiennes, à l’image de l’accès au marché britannique dont bénéfi ciaient auparavant les provinces : perry, p 25. selon le traité de réciprocité, les produits visés cir- culaient d’un pays à l’autre sans que des droits de douane soient imposés. [59] second, the colonies began negotiating re- ciprocal trade agreements with each other. many of these arrangements meant “substantial freedom [59] ensuite, les colonies ont commencé à né- gocier des accords commerciaux réciproques entre elles bon nombre de ces accords avaient pour [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 369 from duty” for interprovincial “natural” imports: perry, at p 25. [60] for a while, the economies of the colonies de- veloped with the aid of reciprocity with the united states and the other intercolonial agreements. how- ever, in 1866 the united states abrogated the rec- iprocity treaty once again the colonies found themselves cut off from an accessible and profi t- able market for their exports. forced to look for a new solution, they plotted their continued economic growth by looking to increased economic integration. [61] however, that integration faced a roadblock: the colonies’ general power to impose tariffs like customs duties and other burdens on goods crossing borders for the purpose of generating revenues. the pre- confederation colonies could not rely solely on exports. by the early 1850s, the colonies had consid- erable autonomy over tariffs, particularly for manu- factured goods. they controlled their own tariff- based income- generating activities, which were important revenue- generating measures: perry, at pp. 26-28; j. a. mclean, essays in the financial history of can- ada (1894), at pp 33-34. [62] these regional tariff powers were incompati- ble with economic integration. to achieve economic union, the framers agreed that individual provinces needed to relinquish their tariff powers. as this court stated in black, at pp. 608-9, per la forest j.: conséquence que les importations interprovinciales de produits [traduction] « naturels » étaient « en grande partie exemptes de droits de douane » : perry, p 25. [60] pendant un certain temps, les économies des colonies se sont épanouies grâce à la réciprocité avec les états- unis et à d’autres accords conclus entre elles. cependant, en 1866, les états- unis ont aboli le traité de réciprocité. encore une fois, les colonies se sont retrouvées coupées d’un marché accessible et profi table pour leurs exportations. forcées de trouver une nouvelle solution, elles ont cherché à poursuivre leur croissance économique en se tournant vers une intégration économique accrue. [61] cette intégration s’est toutefois heurtée à un obstacle : le pouvoir général des colonies d’impo- ser des tarifs semblables à des droits de douane et d’autres charges sur les biens qui franchisaient les frontières en vue de la production de recettes. avant la création de la confédération, les colonies ne pou- vaient pas dépendre uniquement des exportations. au début des années 1850, elles jouissaient d’une autonomie considérable à l’égard des tarifs, notam- ment quant aux biens manufacturés. elles dirigeaient leurs propres activités génératrices de revenus fon- dées sur les tarifs qui constituaient d’importantes mesures génératrices de recettes : perry, p. 26-28; j a mclean,. essays in the financial history of canada (1894), p 33-34. [62] ces pouvoirs régionaux en matière de tarifs étaient incompatibles avec l’intégration économique. pour que cette union se réalise, les auteurs de la constitution ont reconnu que chaque province devait renoncer à son pouvoir en cette matière. comme l’a affi rmé la cour sous la plume du juge la forest dans black, p. 609 : the attainment of economic integration occupied a place of central importance in the scheme. “it was an enterprise which was consciously adopted and deliberately put into execution.”: [d. creighton, british north america act at confederation: a study prepared for the royal commis- sion on dominion- provincial relations (1939)]; see also lawson v. interior tree fruit and vegetable committee of direction, [1931] scr 357, at p 373. the creation la réalisation d’une intégration économique occupait une place de premier plan dans le programme. [traduction] « il s’agissait d’une initiative adoptée consciemment et mise en œuvre volontairement. » : [d. creighton, british north america act at confederation : a study prepared for the royal commission on dominion- provincial relations (1939)]; voir également l’arrêt lawson v. interior tree fruit and vegetable committee of direction, [1931] rcs 357, 370 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. of a central government, the trade and commerce power, s. 121 and the building of a transcontinental railway were expected to help forge this economic union. the concept of canada as a single country comprising what one would now call a common market was basic to the confederation arrangements and the drafters of the british north america act attempted to pull down the existing internal barriers that restricted movement within the country. section 121 of the constitution act, 1867, was one of the pillars of the confederation scheme for achieving the economic union sought by the fathers of confederation. [63] excerpts from speeches given by political leaders at the time of confederation provide a sense of their vision of economic union as the new nation was forged. in some passages, leaders refer to abol- ishing customs houses that existed on provincial boundaries pre- confederation: trial reasons, at pa- ras 97-98. other passages, however, indicate con- cern for impediments on interprovincial trade beyond formal tariffs: trial reasons, at para 93. still other passages refer more generally to unencumbered trade across boundaries: trial reasons, at paras. 92, 96 and 100. [64] the framers of the constitution were familiar with tariffs and charges on goods crossing borders. but, in drafting s. 121, they chose the broad phrase “admitted free” rather than a narrower phrase like “free from tariffs”. we do not know why they chose this broader, and arguably ambiguous, phrase. we do know there were debates on the issue, and those that wanted a more expansive term than “tariffs” or “customs duties” won the day. à la p 373. la création d’un gouvernement central, le pouvoir en matière d’échanges et de commerce, l’art. 121 et la construction d’un chemin de fer transcontinental devaient permettre de réaliser cette union économique. l’idée d’un canada formant un seul pays comportant ce que l’on appellerait aujourd’hui un marché commun était fondamentale aux arrangements de la confédération et les rédacteurs de l’acte de l’amérique du nord britannique ont tenté de supprimer les barrières internes existantes qui limitaient les déplacements à l’intérieur du pays. l’article 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 consti- tuait l’un des piliers du pacte confédératif qui permettrait de réaliser l’union économique recherchée par les pères de la confédération. [63] des extraits de discours prononcés par des dirigeants politiques à l’époque de la création de la confédération nous aident à comprendre leur vision de l’union économique au moment où la nouvelle nation est née. dans certains passages, les dirigeants parlent de l’abolition des bureaux de douane qui existaient aux frontières provinciales avant la confé- dération : motifs de première instance, par 97-98. dans d’autres passages, ils se disent par ailleurs préoccupés par les obstacles au commerce inter- provincial autres que les tarifs offi ciels : motifs de première instance, par 93. d’autres extraits enfi n abordent de façon plus générale le commerce sans entraves par- delà les frontières : motifs de première instance, par. 92, 96 et 100. [64] les auteurs de la constitution étaient bien au fait des tarifs et des charges imposés sur les biens qui circulaient d’une province à une autre. cependant, lorsqu’ils ont rédigé l’art. 121, ils ont choisi l’expres- sion générale « admis en franchise » plutôt qu’une expression plus restreinte comme « libres de tout tarif ». nous ignorons pourquoi ils ont choisi cette expression plus large et, dans une certaine mesure, ambiguë. nous savons que ces questions ont suscité des débats, et que ce sont ceux qui voulaient une expression plus large que « tarifs » ou « droits de douane » qui l’ont emporté. [65] what light does this history shed on the ques- tion that divides mr. comeau and the crown? was s. 121 conceived to eradicate all impediments on trade at provincial borders, direct and indirect, as [65] quel éclairage ces éléments historiques donnent- ils à la question qui oppose m. comeau et le ministère public? l’article 121 a-t-il été conçu pour supprimer toutes les entraves au commerce [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 371 mr. comeau contends? or was it conceived as a provision to eradicate tariffs and charges at provin- cial borders, and to otherwise allow the adoption of valid laws that may have the incidental effect of impeding trade across interprovincial boundaries, as the crown argues? [66] mr. comeau’s expert witness acknowledged that what he interprets as the drafters’ broad view of “free trade” was not specifi cally grounded in how fi scal measures were operating on the ground at the time of confederation. he characterizes what he sees as the drafters’ intent to eliminate all barriers to trade as anticipatory and prescient in light of how certain observers understand the benefi ts of free trade in our time: ar, vol. v, at pp. 129 and 151. he also notes that “[t]he fathers of confederation saw no contradiction between supporting [free trade] with a pragmatic willingness to adopt forms of state intervention” that implicated the economy: ar, vol. v, at p 135. [67] we conclude that the historical context sup- ports the view that, at a minimum, s. 121 prohibits the imposition of charges on goods crossing provin- cial boundaries — tariffs and tariff- like measures. at the same time, the historical evidence nowhere suggests that provinces, for example, would lose their power to legislate under s. 92 of the constitu- tion act, 1867 for the benefi t of their constituents even if that might have impacts on interprovincial trade. the historical evidence, at best, provides only limited support for the view that “admitted free” in s. 121 was meant as an absolute guarantee of trade free of all barriers. interprovincial, directes et indirectes, comme le sou- tient m. comeau, ou a-t-il été conçu comme une disposition visant à supprimer les tarifs et les charges aux frontières provinciales, et à permettre par ailleurs l’adoption de lois valides qui peuvent avoir pour effet accessoire d’entraver le commerce entre les provinces, comme le fait valoir le ministère public? [66] le témoin expert appelé par m. comeau a reconnu que ce qui représente, selon son interpré- tation, la conception large du « libre- échange » des rédacteurs n’était pas fondée précisément sur la fa- çon dont les mesures fi scales s’appliquaient sur le terrain lors de la création de la confédération. il a qualifi é ce qu’il considère être l’intention des ré- dacteurs d’éliminer tous les obstacles au commerce d’anticipatif et de prescient compte tenu de la façon dont certains observateurs voient les avantages du libre- échange à notre époque : da, vol. v, p. 129 et 151. il a également souligné que [traduction] « [l]es pères de la confédération ne voyaient aucune contradiction entre le soutien [au libre- échange] et la volonté pragmatique d’adopter certaines formes d’intervention de l’état » qui portaient sur l’écono- mie : da, vol. v, p 135. [67] nous concluons que le contexte historique appuie l’avis selon lequel, à tout le moins, l’art. 121 interdit l’imposition de tarifs et d’autres mesures semblables sur les biens qui circulent d’une province à une autre. parallèlement, la preuve historique n’in- dique nullement que les provinces, par exemple, per- draient leur pouvoir de légiférer en vertu de l’art. 92 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 dans l’intérêt de leurs citoyens, même si cela pouvait avoir une incidence sur le commerce interprovincial. tout au plus, la preuve historique n’offre qu’un appui limité à l’avis selon lequel l’expression « admis en fran- chise » à l’art. 121 se voulait une garantie absolue de commerce libre de tout obstacle. (4) legislative context (4) contexte législatif [68] section 121 is found in part viii of the con- stitution act, 1867, which is entitled “revenues; debts; assets; taxation”. its provisions de- scribe the establishment of canada’s consolidated revenue fund; the timing for the cessation of certain [68] l’article 121 fi gure dans la partie viii de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, qui a pour titre « re- venus; dettes; actifs; taxe ». les disposi- tions qui s’y trouvent décrivent la création du fonds consolidé de revenu du canada; le moment où allait 372 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. provincial revenue- generating activities, like tariffs, inconsistent with consolidation; the terms by which the federal government would assume provinces’ debts; and stipulations about provincial fi scal matters that would continue after confederation. the place- ment of s. 121 within part viii of the constitution act, 1867 is signifi cant for three reasons. [69] first, s. 121 is part of a trio of provisions that concern interprovincial trade. section 122 states that the excise and customs laws of the provinces are to be maintained until otherwise determined by canada. section 123 provides that where more than one prov- ince has comparable excise and customs laws, proof of payment in one province constitutes payment in the other. read together, it is apparent that ss. 121, 122 and 123 address the shifting of customs and excise levies from the provincial level to the federal level. sections 122 and 123 are concerned with how the shift is accomplished; s. 121 refl ects the new arrangement once the shift is accomplished. [70] sections 121, 122 and 123 may be read to- gether as covering the field with respect to re- arranging customs and excise duties upon union. interprovincial tariffs would be abandoned and in- ternational tariffs would become the responsibility of canada. the reference to excise laws suggests that the provisions were drafted in recognition that other fi scal tools like excise taxes could operate to impede trade in a manner equivalent to customs duties. [71] second, part viii is concerned with revenue- generating instruments and their consolidation: ex- cise taxes, customs duties, levies. all of these are measures that attach to commodities and function by increasing the price of goods. nothing in part viii suggests that s. 121 should be read to capture merely incidental impacts on demand for goods from other provinces; the focus of part viii is direct burdens on the price of commodities. cesser l’application de certaines mesures provin- ciales génératrices de recettes, comme les tarifs, parce qu’elles étaient incompatibles avec la conso- lidation; les modalités selon lesquelles le gouverne- ment fédéral allait assumer les dettes des provinces; et les dispositions portant sur les questions fi scales provinciales qui se poseraient toujours après la créa- tion de la confédération. l’insertion de l’art. 121 dans cette partie de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 est importante pour trois raisons. [69] premièrement, l’art. 121 fait partie d’un trio de dispositions portant sur le commerce interpro- vincial. l’article 122 prévoit que les lois de douane et d’accise de chaque province allaient demeurer en vigueur jusqu’à ce que le canada en décide autre- ment. selon l’art. 123, lorsque deux provinces ont des lois de douane et d’accise comparables, la preuve du paiement dans une province constitue le paiement dans l’autre. interprétés conjointement, il est évident que les art. 121, 122 et 123 visaient le transfert des droits de douane et d’accise du palier provincial au palier fédéral; les art. 122 et 123 portant sur la façon dont ce transfert allait se faire, et l’art. 121 rendant compte du nouveau régime une fois le transfert fait. [70] lus conjointement, les art. 121, 122 et 123 prévoyaient la façon dont les droits de douane et d’accise allaient être imposés à la suite de l’union. les tarifs interprovinciaux seraient abandonnés, et les tarifs internationaux relèveraient du canada. le renvoi aux lois d’accise donne à penser que les dis- positions ont été rédigées en reconnaissance du fait que l’application d’autres mesures fi scales, comme les taxes d’accise, pourrait entraver le commerce comme le font les droits de douane. [71] deuxièmement, la partie viii porte sur les instruments générateurs de recettes et leur consoli- dation : les taxes d’accise, les droits de douane, les taxes perçues. ce sont toutes des mesures qui se rap- portent aux marchandises et qui ont pour effet d’aug- menter le prix des biens. rien dans la partie viii ne suggère que l’art. 121 devrait être interprété de telle sorte qu’il vise seulement les répercussions acces- soires sur la demande de biens provenant d’autres provinces; cette partie de la loi vise principalement les charges directes sur le prix des marchandises. [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 373 [72] third, s. 121’s position in part viii, as well as its text, make it clear that it does not confer power, but limits the exercise of the powers conferred on legislatures by ss. 91 and 92 of the constitution act, 1867. the federal and provincial heads of power delineated in ss. 91 and 92 are exhaustive: reference re same- sex marriage, at para 34. limits on these powers by provisions like s. 121 must be interpreted in a way that does not deprive parliament and provin- cial legislatures of the powers granted to them to deal effectively with problems that arise. otherwise, there would be constitutional hiatuses — circumstances in which no legislature could act. this is something constitutional interpretation does not countenance: see, eg,. murphy, at p. 642, per rand j. prohibition of impediments to interprovincial trade engages sev- eral of these heads of power, including trade and commerce (s. 91(2)), taxation (ss. 91(3) and 92(2)), property and civil rights (s. 92(13)), provincial sanc- tions (s. 92(15)), and local matters (s 92(16)). it follows that s. 121 should be interpreted in a way that allows governments to enact proactive policies for the good of their citizens and in a way that maintains an appropriate balance between federal and provin- cial powers — even if the exercise of those powers may have an incidental effect on other matters, like bringing goods across provincial boundaries. [73] we conclude that the legislative context of s. 121 indicates that it was part of a scheme that enabled the shifting of customs, excise, and similar levies from the former colonies to the dominion; that it should be interpreted as applying to measures that increase the price of goods when they cross a provincial border; and that it should not be read so expansively that it would impinge on legislative powers under ss. 91 and 92 of the constitution act, 1867. before leaving the legislative context, we deal with an additional argument. [72] troisièmement, la position de l’art. 121 dans la partie viii, ainsi que son libellé, indiquent claire- ment qu’il ne confère pas de pouvoir, mais qu’il li- mite l’exercice des pouvoirs que confèrent les art. 91 et 92 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 aux as- semblées législatives. les champs de compétences fédéraux et provinciaux énoncés aux art. 91 et 92 sont exhaustifs : renvoi relatif au mariage entre personnes du même sexe, par 34. l’interprétation des limites que des dispositions comme l’art. 121 imposent à ces pouvoirs doit être telle qu’elle ne prive pas le parlement et les législatures des pouvoirs qui leur sont conférés pour traiter effi cacement les problèmes qui se posent. autrement, il y aurait des lacunes constitutionnelles — c’est-à-dire des situa- tions dans lesquelles aucune assemblée législative ne pourrait agir —, ce que ne peut autoriser l’interpré- tation constitutionnelle : voir, p ex, murphy, p. 642, le juge rand. l’interdiction d’entraves au commerce interprovincial fait intervenir plusieurs champs de compétences, notamment : le trafi c et le commerce (par. 91(2)), l’imposition (par. 91(3) et 92(2)), la pro- priété et les droits civils (par. 92(13)), les sanctions provinciales (par. 92(15)) et les matières d’une nature locale (par 92(16)). l’article 121 doit donc être inter- prété de façon à ce que les gouvernements puissent adopter des politiques préventives pour le bien de leurs citoyens et qu’un juste équilibre soit assuré entre les pouvoirs fédéraux et provinciaux, même si l’exercice de ces pouvoirs peut avoir un effet acces- soire dans d’autres domaines, comme le transport de biens d’une province à une autre. [73] nous concluons que le contexte législatif de l’art. 121 indique qu’il faisait partie d’un régime permettant que les droits de douane et d’accise ainsi que les taxes semblables passent des anciennes co- lonies au dominion; qu’il doit être interprété comme s’appliquant aux mesures qui ont pour effet d’aug- menter le prix des biens lorsqu’ils franchissent une frontière provinciale; et qu’il ne doit pas recevoir une interprétation large au point qu’il empièterait sur les pouvoirs législatifs prévus aux art. 91 et 92 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. avant de clore la section sur le contexte législatif, nous aborderons un argument supplémentaire. 374 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. it is suggested by some that the legislative [74] context shows that s. 121 was a purely transitional provision and was “spent” once the transfer of pow- ers from the former colonies to the new canada was accomplished. some of s. 121’s neighbouring provisions — ss. 119 and 122 for example — are clearly transitional and time- limited. [75] declaring a constitutional provision to be “spent” amounts to judicial excision of the provi- sion from the constitutional text in question. absent clear language, a court should not hold that a con- stitutional provision is of no continued application. to do so would overstep the court’s interpretive role, and would instead confer on it a legislative one. [76] comparison of the text of s. 121 to the text of ss. 119 and 122 undermines the argument that s. 121 is spent. the required clear language is absent. section 121 is not only transitional. both ss. 119 and 122 impose explicit temporal limits on their con- tinued operation. section 119 establishes a 10- year scheme for debt reconciliation between canada and new brunswick from the time of confederation — the provision is clearly spent. section 122 includes a condition by which the provision becomes spent: “the customs and excise laws of each province shall [  ] continue in force until altered by the parliament of canada”. [74] pour certains, le contexte législatif indique que l’art. 121 était une disposition purement transitoire, et qu’elle est devenue « périmée » une fois accom- pli le transfert des pouvoirs des anciennes colonies au nouveau canada. certaines dispositions voisines de l’art. 121 — les art. 119 et 122, par exemple — étaient manifestement transitoires et d’une durée li- mitée. [75] déclarer qu’une disposition constitutionnelle est « périmée » équivaut à une suppression judiciaire de la disposition du texte constitutionnel en ques- tion. en l’absence d’un libellé clair, il ne convient pas qu’un tribunal juge qu’une disposition constitu- tionnelle n’a pas d’application continue. une telle conclusion outrepasserait son rôle interprétatif, et lui confèrerait plutôt un rôle législatif. [76] la comparaison du texte de l’art. 121 à ceux des art.  119 et 122 affaiblit l’argument selon le- quel le premier est périmé. en effet, il n’a pas le libellé clair requis. l’article 121 n’est pas unique- ment transitoire. les articles 119 et 122 imposent des limites temporelles expresses à leur application continue. l’article 119 crée un régime décennal pour le rapprochement des dettes entre le canada et le nouveau- brunswick une fois la confédération créée; cette disposition est donc manifestement périmée. l’article 122 comprend pour sa part une condition par laquelle la disposition devient périmée : « les lois de douanes et d’accise de chaque province de- meureront en force [  ] jusqu’à ce qu’elles soient modifi ées par le parlement du canada ». (5) foundational principles (5) principes fondamentaux [77] in reference re secession of quebec, at para. 32, this court held that foundational principles un- derlying the constitution may aid in its interpreta- tion. three of these — the federalism principle, the democratic principle and the protection of minorities principle — were raised in this case. the latter two do not shed much light on how s. 121 should be interpreted, in our view. however, the federalism principle is vital. [77] dans le renvoi relatif à la sécession du qué- bec, par. 32, la cour a conclu que les principes fon- damentaux à la base de la constitution peuvent aider à son interprétation. dans le cas qui nous occupe, trois de ceux-ci, soit le fédéralisme, la démocratie et la protection des minorités, ont été invoqués. à notre avis, les deux derniers ne nous éclairent pas beau- coup sur l’interprétation que doit recevoir l’art 121. le principe du fédéralisme est toutefois primordial. [78] federalism refers to how states come together to achieve shared outcomes, while simultaneously [78] le fédéralisme se rapporte à la façon dont certains états s’unissent pour atteindre des résultats [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 375 pursuing their unique interests. the principle of federalism recognizes the “autonomy of provincial governments to develop their societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction”: reference re se- cession of quebec, at para. 58; see also caron v. al- berta, 2015 scc 56, [2015] 3 scr 511, at para 5. the tension between the centre and the regions is regulated by the concept of jurisdictional balance: reference re secession of quebec, at paras 56-59. the federalism principle requires a court interpret- ing constitutional texts to consider how different in- terpretations impact the balance between federal and provincial interests. the same concern has led to, for example, the development of doctrines like the nec- essarily incidental doctrine and the ancillary pow- ers doctrine. [79] an expansive interpretation of federal powers is typically met with calls for recognition of broader provincial powers, and vice versa; the two are in a symbiotic relationship. many of the doctrinal tools used by courts in division of powers cases refl ect the tension between federal and provincial capacity: see, eg,. h. l. kong, “republicanism and the divi- sion of powers in canada” (2014), 64 utlj 359, at pp 393-97. as this court noted in reference re securities act, 2011 scc 66, [2011] 3 scr 837, at para. 7: it is a fundamental principle of federalism that both federal and provincial powers must be respected, and one power may not be used in a manner that effectively eviscerates another. rather, federalism demands that a balance be struck, a balance that allows both the federal parliament and the provincial legislatures to act effectively in their respective spheres. communs, tout en poursuivant leurs intérêts uniques. le principe du fédéralisme reconnaît « l’autonomie dont les gouvernements provinciaux disposent pour assurer le développement de leur société dans leurs propres sphères de compétence » : renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, par. 58; voir aussi caron c. alberta, 2015 csc 56, [2015] 3 rcs 511, par 5. le concept de l’équilibre des compétences régit les tensions entre le centre et les régions : renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, par 56-59. le principe du fédéralisme exige que le tribunal qui interprète des textes constitutionnels tienne compte des répercus- sions des différentes interprétations sur l’équilibre entre les intérêts du fédéral et ceux des provinces. cette considération a donné lieu, par exemple, à l’élaboration de théories comme celle du caractère nécessairement accessoire et celle des pouvoirs ac- cessoires. [79] une interprétation large des pouvoirs fédéraux s’accompagne habituellement d’appels à la recon- naissance de pouvoirs provinciaux plus larges, et vice versa; ces pouvoirs sont en symbiose. d’ailleurs, un grand nombre des théories élaborées par la doctrine qu’utilisent les tribunaux dans les causes relatives au partage des compétences refl ètent la tension entre les pouvoirs du fédéral et des provinces respectivement : voir, p ex, h l kong, « republicanism and the di- vision of powers in canada » (2014), 64 utlj 359, p 393-397. comme l’a noté la cour dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, 2011 csc 66, [2011] 3 rcs 837, par. 7 : la proposition suivant laquelle tant les pouvoirs fé- déraux que ceux des provinces doivent être respectés et qu’un pouvoir ne peut être utilisé d’une manière telle que cela revienne en réalité à en vider un autre de son essence constitue un principe fondamental du fédéralisme. en effet, ce dernier exige plutôt d’établir un équilibre qui permet tant au parlement qu’aux législatures d’agir effi - cacement dans leurs sphères de compétence respectives. [80] this court has consistently interpreted the scope of economic powers under the constitution act, 1867 through the lens of jurisdictional balance. an example is the development of the “necessarily incidental” indicator for tolerated provincial/fed- eral overlap under the trade and commerce power: [80] la cour a toujours interprété la portée des pouvoirs économiques prévus dans la loi consti- tutionnelle de 1867 sous l’angle de l’équilibre des compétences. en est un exemple l’élaboration de la théorie du caractère «  nécessairement acces- soire » relativement au chevauchement acceptable 376 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. general motors of canada ltd. v. city national leasing, [1989] 1 scr 641;. canadian western bank v. alberta, 2007 scc 22, [2007] 2 scr 3;. reference re securities act. [81] much has been written on the principle of federalism as an interpretive aid. some say it leads to divergent outcomes and is inherently policy driven: see, eg,. p. j. monahan, “at doctrine’s twi- light: the structure of canadian federalism” (1984), 34 utlj 47, at p 48. others argue that it boils down to a principle of effi ciency that favours cen- tralization and privileges federal heads of power: see, eg,. j. leclair, “the supreme court of canada’s understanding of federalism: efficiency at the expense of diversity” (2003), 28 queen’s lj 411, at p 423. still others counter by pointing to the vast scope of regional autonomy promised by the powers conferred on the provinces by ss. 92(13) and 92(16): see, eg,. s. wexler, “the urge to idealize: viscount haldane and the constitution of canada” (1984), 29 mcgill lj 608, at pp 641-42. [82] for our purposes, it suffi ces to state that the federalism principle reminds us of the careful and complex balance of interests captured in constitu- tional texts. an interpretation that disregards regional autonomy is as problematic as an interpretation that underestimates the scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction. we agree with professor scott that “[t]he canadian constitution cannot be understood if it is approached with some preconceived theory of what federalism is or should be”: f. r. scott, “centraliza- tion and decentralization in canadian federalism” (1951), 29 can. bar rev. 1095, at p. 1095; see also p w. hogg and w. k. wright, “canadian federal- ism, the privy council and the supreme court: re- fl ections on the debate about canadian federalism” (2005), 38 ubc. l. rev. 329, at p 350. des compétences provinciales et fédérales dans le domaine des échanges et du commerce : general motors of canada ltd. c. city national leasing, [1989] 1 rcs 641;. banque canadienne de l’ouest c. alberta, 2007 csc 22, [2007] 2 rcs 3;. renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières. [81] le principe du fédéralisme en tant qu’ou- til d’interprétation a fait couler beaucoup d’encre. certains affi rment qu’il mène à des résultats diver- gents et qu’il repose par sa nature même sur des consi- dérations de principe : voir, p ex,. p j monahan, « at doctrine’s twilight : the structure of canadian feder- alism » (1984), 34 utlj 47, p 48. d’autres font valoir qu’il s’agit essentiellement d’un principe d’ef- fi cacité qui favorise la centralisation et qui privilégie les compétences fédérales : voir, p ex, j leclair, « the supreme court of canada’s understanding of federalism : effi ciency at the expense of diversity » (2003), 28 queen’s lj 411, p 423. d’autres encore répliquent en invoquant la vaste portée de l’autono- mie régionale que promettent les pouvoirs conférés aux provinces par les par. 92(13) et 92(16) : voir, p ex, s wexler, « the urge to idealize : viscount haldane and the constitution of canada » (1984), 29 rd. mcgill 608, p 641-642. [82] pour les besoins du présent pourvoi, il suffi t de préciser que le principe du fédéralisme nous rappelle l’équilibre juste et complexe des intérêts visés par les textes constitutionnels. l’interprétation qui fait fi de l’autonomie régionale est tout aussi problématique que celle qui sous- estime la portée de la compétence du gouvernement fédéral. à l’instar du professeur scott, nous estimons qu’on [traduction] « ne peut pas comprendre la constitution canadienne si on l’aborde avec une idée préconçue de ce que le fédéra- lisme est ou devrait être » : f r scott, « centraliza- tion and decentralization in canadian federalism » (1951), 29 r du b can. 1095, p. 1095; voir aussi p w hogg et w k wright, « canadian federalism, the privy council and the supreme court : refl ec- tions on the debate about canadian federalism » (2005), 38 ubc. l. rev. 329, p 350. [83] thus, the federalism principle does not im- pose a particular vision of the economy that courts must apply. it does not allow a court to say “this [83] ainsi, le principe du fédéralisme n’impose pas une vision précise de l’économie que les tri- bunaux doivent appliquer. il ne permet pas à une [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 377 would be good for the country, therefore we should interpret the constitution to support it.” instead, it posits a framework premised on jurisdictional bal- ance that helps courts identify the range of economic mechanisms that are constitutionally acceptable. the question for a court is squarely constitutional compliance, not policy desirability: see, eg,. refer- ence re securities act, at para. 90; operation dis- mantle inc. v. the queen, [1985] 1 scr 441, at pp. 471-72, per wilson j.; reference re anti- infl ation act, [1976] 2 scr 373, at pp. 424-25, per laskin cj. similarly, the living tree doctrine is not an open invitation for litigants to ask a court to constitution- alize a specifi c policy outcome. it simply asks that courts be alert to evolutions in, for example, how we understand jurisdictional balance and the considera- tions that animate it. [84] with these cautions in mind, we turn to the parties’ submissions on the principle of federalism. both mr. comeau and the crown refer to the federal- ism principle to support their own particular views of desirable policy outcomes — in mr. comeau’s case, the policy of no impediments, direct or incidental, on trade across provincial borders; in the crown’s submission, a view of cooperative federalism that poses few, if any, limits on provinces’ authority to impose such impediments. asserting what they see as the contemporary goals of federalism by pointing to the living tree doctrine (edwards, at pp. 106-7), the parties urge the court to interpret s. 121 in ac- cordance with their preferred visions of how fed- eralism functions. we will consider each of these arguments in turn. cour d’affi rmer que « ceci serait bon pour le pays et il faudrait interpréter la constitution en consé- quence ». il pose plutôt en principe un cadre fondé sur l’équilibre des compétences, qui aide les cours de justice à cerner l’éventail des mécanismes écono- miques qui sont constitutionnellement acceptables. il s’agit strictement pour les cours d’une question de respect de la constitution et non de l’oppor- tunité de la mesure en cause sur le plan des prin- cipes : voir, p ex, renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 90; operation dismantle inc. c. la reine, [1985] 1 rcs 441, p. 471-472, la juge wilson; renvoi relatif à la loi anti- infl ation, [1976] 2 rcs 373, p. 424-425, le juge en chef laskin. de la même façon, la doctrine de l’arbre vi- vant n’équivaut pas à une invitation générale pour que les plaideurs demandent aux tribunaux de consti- tutionnaliser un résultat de principe en particulier. elle requiert seulement que les tribunaux tiennent compte de l’évolution, par exemple, de la façon dont nous interprétons l’équilibre des compétences et les facteurs qui le sous- tendent. [84] avec ces mises en garde à l’esprit, nous allons maintenant examiner les observations des parties sur le principe du fédéralisme. tant m. comeau que le ministère public renvoient au principe du fédéralisme pour soutenir leur vision respective particulière des résultats souhaitables sur le plan des principes — dans le cas de m. comeau, le principe de l’absence d’obstacles, directs ou accessoires, au commerce interprovincial; dans le cas du ministère public, une vision du fédéralisme coopératif qui n’impose que peu de limites, voire aucune, au pouvoir des pro- vinces d’imposer de tels obstacles. faisant valoir ce qu’elles considèrent être les objectifs contemporains du fédéralisme en invoquant la doctrine de l’arbre vivant (edwards, p. 106-107), les parties exhortent la cour à interpréter l’art. 121 conformément à la vision qu’elles préconisent du fonctionnement du fédéralisme. nous analyserons chacun de ces argu- ments à tour de rôle. [85] we begin with mr. comeau’s submission that the principle of federalism supports full economic integration. we cannot accept this submission. the federalism principle emphasizes balance and the ability of each level of government to achieve its [85] examinons d’abord la prétention de m. comeau selon laquelle le principe du fédéralisme appuie une pleine intégration économique. nous ne pouvons souscrire à ce point de vue. ce principe met l’accent sur l’équilibre et sur la capacité de chaque 378 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. goals in the exercise of its powers under ss. 91 and 92 of the constitution act, 1867. full economic integra- tion would “curtail the freedom of action — indeed, the sovereignty — of governments, especially at the provincial level”: k. swinton, “courting our way to economic integration: judicial review and the canadian economic union” (1995), 25 can. bus. lj 280, at p. 291; see also d. schneiderman, “eco- nomic citizenship and deliberative democracy: an inquiry into constitutional limitations on economic regulation” (1995), 21 queen’s lj 125, at p 152. reading s. 121 to require full economic integration would signifi cantly undermine the shape of canadian federalism, which is built upon regional diversity within a single nation: reference re secession of quebec, at paras. 57-58; canadian western bank, at para 22. a key facet of this regional diversity is that the canadian federation provides space to each province to regulate the economy in a manner that refl ects local concerns. [86] the federalism principle supports the view that provinces within a federal state should be al- lowed leeway to manage the passage of goods while legislating to address particular conditions and pri- orities within their borders. for example, the north- west territories and nunavut have adopted laws governing the consumption of liquor, which include controls on liquor coming across the border into their territories. the primary objective of the laws is pub- lic health, but they have the incidental effect of cur- tailing cross- border trade in liquor. the northwest territories and nunavut argue that these sorts of laws do not fall under the spectre of s 121. we agree that to interpret s. 121 in a way that renders such laws in- valid despite their non- trade- related objectives is to misunderstand the import of the federalism principle. ordre de gouvernement d’atteindre ses objectifs en exerçant les compétences que lui confèrent les art. 91 ou 92 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. une pleine intégration économique reviendrait à [traduction] « restreindre la liberté d’action — voire la souverai- neté — des gouvernements, particulièrement au pa- lier provincial » : k. swinton, « courting our way to economic integration : judicial review and the canadian economic union » (1995), 25 rev. can. dr. comm. 280, p. 291; voir aussi d. schneiderman, « economic citizenship and deliberative democ- racy : an inquiry into constitutional limitations on economic regulation » (1995), 21 queen’s lj 125, p 152. une interprétation de l’art. 121 qui exigerait une pleine intégration économique minerait considé- rablement la nature du fédéralisme canadien, qui re- pose sur la diversité des régions au sein d’une même nation : renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, par. 57-58; canadian western bank, par 22. d’ail- leurs, une facette clé de cette diversité régionale est précisément que la fédération canadienne confère à chaque province le pouvoir de réglementer l’écono- mie à l’image des préoccupations locales. [86] le principe du fédéralisme étaye l’opinion se- lon laquelle les provinces d’un état fédéral devraient avoir la marge de manœuvre leur permettant de gérer le passage des biens tout en adoptant des lois qui tiennent compte de conditions ou de priorités particu- lières sur leur territoire. par exemple, les territoires du nord- ouest et le nunavut ont adopté des lois qui régissent la consommation de boissons alcooliques et assurent le contrôle de celles qui arrivent sur leur territoire. la santé publique constitue certes l’objet principal de ces lois, mais elles ont comme effet ac- cessoire de restreindre le commerce transfrontalier des boissons alcooliques. les territoires du nord- ouest et le nunavut font valoir que les lois de ce type ne tombent pas sous le coup de l’art 121. nous sommes d’accord pour dire qu’une interprétation de l’art. 121 qui invaliderait de telles lois malgré leurs objectifs étrangers au commerce serait le fruit d’une compréhension erronée de l’importance du principe du fédéralisme. [87] the crown and other intervening attorneys general, for their part, advocate interpreting s. 121 narrowly to give governments expansive scope to [87] le ministère public et certains procureurs gé- néraux intervenants ont plaidé pour une interpréta- tion étroite de l’art. 121 afi n que les gouvernements [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 379 impose barriers on goods crossing their borders. this interpretation, they argue, is a natural consequence of their position that “cooperative federalism” is a distinct foundational principle for constitutional interpretation, as such principles are understood in reference re secession of quebec. cooperative fed- eralism describes situations where different levels of government work together on the ground to lev- erage their unique constitutional powers in tandem to establish a regulatory regime that may be ultra vires the jurisdiction of one legislature on its own. in division of powers cases where interlocking reg- ulatory schemes have been impugned, the concept of cooperative federalism has often informed this court’s assessment of vires: see, eg,. fédération des producteurs de volailles du québec v. pelland, 2005 scc 20, [2005] 1 scr 292;. nil/tu,o child and family services society v. bc. government and service employees’ union, 2010 scc 45, [2010] 2 scr 696. however, that is a distinct inquiry from the interpretative question raised here. the founda- tional principle that forms part of the architecture of constitutional texts as we described in reference re secession of quebec is federalism — and that prin- ciple does not mandate any specifi c prescription for how governments within a federation should exercise their constitutional authority. [88] we cannot therefore accept either the argu- ments of mr. comeau or the crown on the principle of federalism. this does not mean, however, that the principle is unhelpful to the interpretation of s 121. the need to maintain balance embodied in the federalism principle supports an interpretation of s. 121 that prohibits laws directed at curtailing the passage of goods over interprovincial borders, but allows legislatures to pass laws to achieve other goals within their powers, even though the laws may have the incidental effect of impeding the passage of goods over interprovincial borders. disposent d’une importante latitude pour imposer des charges sur les biens qui traversent leurs frontières. à leur avis, cette interprétation découle naturelle- ment de leur position selon laquelle le « fédéralisme coopératif » est un principe fondamental distinct d’interprétation constitutionnelle, tel que ces prin- cipes sont interprétés dans le renvoi sur la séces- sion du québec. le fédéralisme coopératif décrit des situations où différents ordres de gouvernement travaillent de concert au départ pour tirer parti en tandem des pouvoirs constitutionnels qui leur sont propres afi n d’établir un régime réglementaire qui pourrait outrepasser la compétence d’une assemblée législative à elle seule. dans les causes portant sur le partage des compétences où des régimes réglemen- taires communs étaient contestés, le concept du fédé- ralisme coopératif a souvent aidé la cour à analyser la question relative à la compétence : voir, p ex,. fé- dération des producteurs de volailles du québec c. pelland, 2005 csc 20, [2005] 1 rcs 292;. nil/ tu,o child and family services society c. bc. gov- ernment and service employees’ union, 2010 csc 45, [2010] 2 rcs 696. il s’agit toutefois d’un exa- men distinct de celui auquel nous devons procéder en l’espèce pour répondre à la question d’interpréta- tion qui se pose. le principe fondamental qui s’ins- crit dans la structure des textes constitutionnels que nous avons décrite dans le renvoi sur la sécession du québec est le fédéralisme — et, selon ce principe, aucune prescription précise n’est requise quant à la façon dont les gouvernements au sein de la fédéra- tion devraient exercer les pouvoirs que leur confère la constitution. [88] nous ne pouvons donc souscrire ni aux argu- ments de m. comeau ni à la position du ministère public quant au principe du fédéralisme. ce dernier est néanmoins utile pour interpréter l’art 121. la nécessité de maintenir l’équilibre consacré par le principe du fédéralisme appuie l’interprétation de l’art. 121 qui interdit les lois visant à restreindre la circulation des biens entre les provinces, mais qui permet aux législatures d’en adopter qui visent la réalisation d’autres objectifs dans les limites de leurs pouvoirs, même si ces lois peuvent avoir comme effet accessoire d’entraver la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre. 380 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. (6) defi ning the ambit of section 121: the ju- (6) défi nir la portée de l’art. 121 : la jurispru- risprudence dence [89] we have established in the preceding sections that the text, historical context, legislative context, and underlying constitutional principles do not sup- port mr. comeau’s contention that s. 121 should be interpreted as prohibiting any and all burdens on the passage of goods over provincial boundaries, essentially imposing an absolute free trade regime within canada. rather, these considerations support a fl exible, purposive view of s. 121 — one that re- spects an appropriate balance between federal and provincial powers and allows legislatures room to achieve policy objectives that may have the inciden- tal effect of burdening the passage of goods across provincial boundaries. [90] this established, the next question to be an- swered is: what does s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867 actually prohibit? before us, the debate was framed as a confl ict between two lines of author- ity — the gold seal line of authority, which is said to confi ne s. 121 to the prohibition of tariffs, and the line of authority based on the judgment of rand j. in murphy, which sets out the view that s. 121 prohibits not only tariffs, but extends to laws that in essence and purpose are directed to impeding the passage of goods across provincial boundaries. [89] nous avons établi dans les sections précé- dentes des présents motifs que le libellé, les contextes historique et législatif de même que les principes constitutionnels sous- jacents n’étayent pas la pré- tention de m. comeau selon laquelle l’art. 121 doit s’interpréter comme interdisant toute entrave à la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre, ce qui équivaudrait pour l’essentiel à forcer l’existence d’un régime de libre- échange absolu au canada. les éléments mentionnés précédemment appuient plutôt une conception souple et téléologique de l’art. 121, une conception qui respecte un juste équilibre entre les compétences fédérales, d’une part, et provin- ciales, d’autre part, et qui donne aux législatures la possibilité d’atteindre des objectifs de politique gé- nérale qui peuvent avoir pour effet accessoire d’en- traver la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre. [90] cela étant établi, il faut ensuite répondre à la question suivante  : qu’est-ce qu’interdit au juste l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867? le débat que nous avons à trancher a été décrit comme un confl it entre deux courants jurispru- dentiels — celui fondé sur l’arrêt gold seal, selon lequel l’art. 121 interdirait uniquement les tarifs, et celui fondé sur la décision du juge rand dans l’arrêt murphy, où celui-ci exprime l’avis que l’art. 121 interdit non seulement les tarifs, mais aussi les lois qui visent, de par leur essence et leur objet, à entraver la circulation de biens d’une province à une autre. [91] for the reasons that follow, we do not see these lines of authority to be in confl ict. properly understood, they represent a single, progressive un- derstanding of the purpose and function of s. 121 in the broader constitutional scheme. this understand- ing is entirely consistent with our earlier conclusion that s. 121 — understood through the lens of its text, its historical and legislative contexts and the princi- ple of federalism — is best conceived as preventing provinces from passing laws aimed at impeding trade by setting up barriers at boundaries, while allowing [91] pour les motifs qui suivent, nous sommes d’avis qu’il n’y a pas de confl it entre ces courants jurisprudentiels. interprétés correctement, ils repré- sentent une seule conception progressive de l’objet et de la fonction de l’art. 121 dans le régime constitu- tionnel général. cette conception cadre parfaitement avec la conclusion que nous avons déjà tirée selon laquelle il vaut mieux interpréter l’art. 121 — vu à la lumière de son libellé, de ses contextes historique et législatif et du principe du fédéralisme — comme empêchant les provinces d’adopter des lois qui visent [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 381 them to legislate to achieve goals within their juris- diction even where such laws may incidentally limit the passage of goods over provincial borders. [92] gold seal, decided in 1921, was the fi rst case to interpret s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867. it concerned a federal statute that prohibited the importation of liquor into any dry province. the federal law was complementary to provincial prohi- bition laws, passed because the provinces were not competent under the division of powers to regulate interprovincial trade — an early example of coop- erative federalism. the gold seal liquor company argued that the trade barrier installed by the federal law violated s 121. the court’s discussion of s. 121 in gold seal was cursory. duff and mignault jj., in the majority, each held that the law at issue was not caught by s. 121 because it was not a tariff on goods crossing provincial borders. mignault j. added that this was consistent with a similar provision in the united states constitution addressing the same concerns: gold seal, at p 470. anglin j. agreed, but offered no analysis: gold seal, at p 466. à entraver le commerce en érigeant des obstacles aux limites de leur territoire, tout en leur permettant de légiférer pour des objectifs principaux valides à l’intérieur de leur champ de compétence, même dans les cas où les lois en question risquent de restreindre accessoirement la circulation des biens d’une pro- vince à une autre. [92] c’est dans l’arrêt gold seal, rendu en 1921, que la cour a interprété la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 pour la première fois. il porte sur une loi fé- dérale qui interdisait l’importation d’alcool dans toute province prohibitionniste. cette loi complé- tait les mesures législatives provinciales instituant la prohibition et avait été adoptée parce que le par- tage des compétences n’habilitait pas les provinces à réglementer le commerce interprovincial — un exemple ancien de fédéralisme coopératif. le fa- briquant de boissons alcooliques gold seal faisait valoir que l’obstacle commercial établi par la loi fé- dérale contrevenait à l’art 121. l’analyse de cette disposition à laquelle s’est livrée la cour dans gold seal était sommaire. dans des motifs majoritaires, les juges duff et mignault ont chacun statué que la loi en cause n’était pas visée par l’art. 121, car elle n’établissait pas un tarif sur des biens qui traver- saient les frontières provinciales. le juge  mignault a ajouté que cette conclusion était compatible avec une disposition analogue de la constitution des états- unis répondant aux mêmes préoccupations : gold seal, p 470. le juge anglin était du même avis, mais il n’a procédé à aucune analyse : gold seal, p 466. [93] gold seal was endorsed by the judicial com- mittee of the privy council in atlantic smoke shops, at p 92. at issue was a new brunswick law that made tobacco importers liable to a tax on tobacco brought into the province. the tobacco retailer ar- gued that the tax constituted a trade barrier contrary to s 121. viscount simon lc accepted this court’s analysis in gold seal and concluded that s. 121, read in the context of part viii, was the death knell for provincial tariffs. however, the tax was held not to infringe s. 121 on the ground it was a general consumption tax, and thus did not impose a burden [93] l’arrêt gold seal a été entériné par le comité judiciaire du conseil privé dans atlantic smoke shops, p 92. il était question d’une loi néo- brunswickoise qui assujettissait les importateurs de tabac à une taxe lorsque ce produit était importé dans la province. le détaillant de tabac soutenait que la taxe constituait un obstacle commercial contraire à l’art 121. le vicomte simon, lord chancelier, a retenu l’analyse effectuée par la cour dans gold seal et conclu que, interprété eu égard au contexte de la partie viii, l’art. 121 sonnait le glas des tarifs provinciaux. la taxe a toutefois été jugée conforme à cette disposition 382 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. on the basis of a provincial border: atlantic smoke shops, at pp 91-92. [94] in 1958, the majority of this court in murphy adopted gold seal and atlantic smoke shops: at p 634. a grain producer had attempted to arrange an interprovincial shipment of wheat contrary to the canadian wheat board act, rsc 1952, c 44. the question was whether the act’s prohibition on cross- border shipments violated s 121. the majority, en passant, held it did not because it did not impose a tariff. murphy was decided primarily on the basis of the division of powers. nevertheless, this court briefl y addressed s 121. [95] rand j. in his concurring reasons in murphy undertook a more substantive, purposive analysis of s 121. he did not criticize gold seal, which he accepted as the foundational case, but sought to draw out the rationale underlying gold seal, s. 121, and its constitutional implications. his reasons read like a series of refl ections on the nature and purpose of s 121. he began by noting that apart from matters of purely local and private concern, the country was one economic unit: murphy, p 638. he went on, how- ever, to explain why provincial marketing schemes that may enable different charges in different regions do not violate s 121. such schemes “embody an accumulation” of various charges because they are concerned with realizing objects for all producers across the relevant sector — from transportation to wages to insurance. charges that are merely “one item in a scheme that regulates their distribution” do not have cross- border trade as their object or purpose and therefore do not violate s 121. they are “items in selling costs and can be challenged only if the scheme itself is challengeable”: murphy, at pp 638-39. section 121 “does not create a level of trade activity divested of all regulation i have no doubt; what is preserved is a free fl ow of trade regulated in subsidiary features which are or have come to be looked upon as incidents of trade. what is forbidden is a trade regulation that in its essence puisqu’il s’agissait d’une taxe générale à la consom- mation et qu’elle n’entravait donc pas le commerce sur le fondement d’une frontière provinciale : atlantic smoke shops, p 91-92. [94] en 1958, les juges majoritaires de la cour dans murphy ont suivi les arrêts gold seal et atlan- tic smoke shops : p 634. un producteur de céréales avait tenté d’organiser une livraison interprovinciale de blé en contravention de la loi sur la commission canadienne du blé, lrc 1952, c 44. il s’agissait de savoir si l’interdiction des livraisons interprovin- ciales prévue par cette loi contrevenait à l’art 121. les juges majoritaires ont conclu en passant que ce n’était pas le cas, car cette loi n’imposait pas de tarif. l’arrêt murphy a été décidé principalement sur le fondement du partage des compétences. la cour y a néanmoins brièvement discuté de l’art 121. [95] toujours dans l’arrêt murphy, le juge rand a procédé dans ses motifs concordants à une analyse plus poussée de l’art. 121 et plus axée sur son objet. il n’a pas critiqué gold seal, qu’il a reconnu comme l’arrêt fondamental en la matière, mais il a cherché à dégager le raisonnement qui sous- tend cet arrêt, ainsi que l’art. 121 et ses ramifi cations constitutionnelles. les motifs du juge rand s’apparentent à une série de réfl exions sur la nature et l’objet de l’art 121. il a commencé par signaler que, à l’exception des matières purement locales et à caractère privé, le pays formait une seule entité économique : murphy, p 638. il a cependant expliqué ensuite pourquoi les régimes provinciaux de mise en marché susceptibles de permettre l’imposition de charges différentes dans des régions différentes ne contreviennent pas à l’art 121. ces régimes [traduction] « incarnent une accumulation » de diverses charges parce qu’ils s’attachent à la réalisation d’objets pour tous les producteurs du secteur en question, qu’il s’agisse du transport, de la rémunération ou des assurances. les charges qui constituent simplement « un élément d’un régime qui réglemente la distribution de biens » n’ont pas pour objet le commerce interprovincial, ils ne contreviennent donc pas à l’art 121. ce sont des « éléments des frais de vente qui ne peuvent être contestés que si le régime lui- même est contes- table » : murphy, p 638-639. l’article 121 « ne fait [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 383 and purpose is related to a provincial boundary”: murphy, at p. 642, per rand j. [96] finally, rand j. explained that schemes that restrict goods crossing borders only incidentally can- not be held to violate s. 121 because this would create a constitutional hiatus, which constitutional con- struction abhors. a prohibition barring even inciden- tal impacts on the passage of goods over a provincial border would render provinces incapable of dealing with important matters within their jurisdictions. at the same time, the federal government could not fi ll the void because the matter would not fall within its power given the division of powers — “the two jurisdictions could not complement each other by co- operative action”: murphy, at pp. 642-43, per rand j. [97] these excerpts refl ect many of the themes that emerge in our earlier discussion of historical con- text, legislative context, and federalism. however, they can be distilled into two related propositions. first, the purpose of s. 121 is to prohibit laws that in essence and purpose restrict or limit the free fl ow of goods across the country. second, laws that pose only incidental effects on trade as part of broader regulatory schemes not aimed at impeding trade do not have the purpose of restricting interprovincial trade and hence do not violate s 121. pas disparaître pour autant toute réglementation des activités commerciales. il vise à assurer la liberté du commerce, tout en permettant la réglementation dans ses aspects secondaires, qui sont les à-côtés du com- merce. ce qui est interdit, c’est une réglementation du commerce qui serait reliée, en droit et en fait, à l’existence des frontières provinciales » : murphy, p. 642, le juge rand. [96] enfi n, le juge rand a expliqué qu’on ne sau- rait dire des régimes limitant de façon purement accessoire la circulation transfrontalière de marchan- dises qu’ils contreviennent à l’art. 121 parce que cela créerait un vide constitutionnel, ce dont a horreur l’interprétation constitutionnelle. si l’on interdisait même les répercussions accessoires sur la circula- tion de biens au- delà d’une frontière provinciale, les provinces seraient incapables de s’occuper de ques- tions importantes dans leur ressort. parallèlement, le gouvernement fédéral ne serait pas en mesure de combler le vide parce que ces questions ne relève- raient pas de sa compétence suivant le partage des compétences : [traduction] « les deux ressorts ne pourraient se compléter par une action concertée » : murphy, p. 642-643, le juge rand. [97] ces extraits illustrent bon nombre des thèmes qui ressortent de notre examen antérieur des contextes historique et législatif ainsi que du fédéralisme. il est toutefois possible de les regrouper en deux proposi- tions connexes. premièrement, l’objet de l’art. 121 est d’interdire les lois qui, de par leur essence et leur objet, restreignent ou limitent la libre circulation des biens dans tout le pays. deuxièmement, les lois qui n’ont qu’un effet accessoire sur le commerce dans le contexte de régimes réglementaires plus larges qui ne visent pas à entraver le commerce n’ont pas pour objet de restreindre le commerce interprovincial et n’enfreignent donc pas l’art 121. [98] these propositions are consistent with the de- cisions in gold seal and atlantic smoke shops. first, while the court in these cases spoke of s. 121 forbid- ding tariffs, and while rand j. in murphy spoke of s. 121 forbidding laws that purposely act like tariffs (ie laws that in essence burden the passage of goods over provincial borders), this is a distinction without a difference. constitutional limits must operate on [98] ces propositions sont compatibles avec les décisions gold seal et atlantic smoke shops. tout d’abord, s’il est vrai que dans ces affaires la cour a affi rmé que l’art. 121 interdit les tarifs, et s’il est vrai que, dans murphy, le juge rand a précisé que cette disposition interdit les lois qui agissent comme des tarifs de par leur objet (c-à-d les lois qui, de par leur essence, entrave le passage des biens entre les 384 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. the level of principle and function, not on what label is applied to a particular kind of law. constitutional compliance is not a matter of semantics. clearly, traditional tariffs would offend the purpose of s. 121, as rand j. describes it. but so might other measures that function in the same way. it follows that s. 121 applies not only to tariffs, but also to the functional equivalents of tariffs. [99] second, gold seal and murphy support the proposition that s. 121 was not intended to catch bur- dens on goods crossing provincial borders that were merely incidental effects of a law or scheme aimed at some other purpose, holding that because the re- strictions on the shipment of goods over provincial borders were part of a larger valid federal scheme, they did not offend s 121. as rand j. pointed out in murphy, to prohibit incidental impacts on cross- border trade would allow s. 121 to trump valid ex- ercises of legislative power, and create legislative hiatuses where neither level of government could act: pp. 638 and 642-43. the federalism principle militates against such an interpretation — the aim is balance and capacity, not imbalance and constitu- tional gaps. the federal government and provincial governments should be able to legislate in ways that impose incidental burdens on the passage of goods between provinces, in light of the scheme of the constitution act, 1867 as a whole, and in particular the division of powers: murphy, at pp. 638 and 641, per rand j. this is illustrated by gold seal. if the federal government had not been able to enact its law prohibiting liquor from crossing the borders of the dry provinces, there would have been a legislative hiatus, and the cooperative scheme aimed at allowing these provinces to keep liquor out would not have been possible. provinces), il s’agit d’une distinction vide de sens. les limites constitutionnelles doivent s’appliquer au niveau des principes et de la fonction, et non de la désignation donnée à un certain type de loi. le respect de la constitution n’est pas une question de sémantique. il est évident que les tarifs traditionnels contreviendraient à l’objet de l’art. 121, comme l’a décrit le juge rand, mais d’autres mesures qui fonc- tionnent de la même façon pourraient tout autant y contrevenir l’article  121 s’applique donc non seulement aux tarifs, mais aussi à leurs équivalents fonctionnels. [99] ensuite, les arrêts gold seal et murphy ap- puient la proposition selon laquelle il n’était pas prévu que l’art. 121 vise les entraves au passage des biens d’une province à une autre qui sont simplement accessoires à un régime législatif visant un autre ob- jet, et concluent que, puisque les restrictions en cause relatives à l’envoi de biens par- delà les frontières provinciales faisaient partie d’un régime fédéral plus large valide, elles ne contrevenaient pas à l’art 121. comme l’a souligné le juge rand dans murphy, l’interdiction des effets accessoires sur le commerce transfrontalier permettrait à l’art. 121 de primer sur l’exercice valide d’un pouvoir législatif et créerait des lacunes législatives à l’égard desquelles aucun ordre de gouvernement ne pourrait agir : p. 638 et 642-643. le principe du fédéralisme milite contre une telle interprétation — l’objectif est l’équilibre et la capacité, non pas le déséquilibre et les lacunes constitutionnelles les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux devraient pouvoir adopter des lois qui imposent des charges accessoires sur les biens qui circulent d’une province à une autre, compte tenu du régime de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 dans son ensemble, et plus particulièrement du partage des compétences : murphy, p. 638 et 641, le juge rand. c’est ce qu’illustre l’arrêt gold seal. si le gouvernement fédéral n’avait pas pu adopter sa loi interdisant que des boissons alcooliques passent les frontières des provinces prohibitionnistes, il y aurait eu un hiatus législatif et le régime coopératif qui vi- sait à permettre à ces provinces de faire en sorte que l’alcool ne franchisse pas leurs frontières n’aurait pas pu voir le jour. [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 385 [100] put another way, s. 121 allows schemes that incidentally burden the passage of goods across pro- vincial boundaries, but does not allow them to im- pose such impediments only because they cross a provincial boundary. in rand j.’s view, the gravamen of s. 121 was to prohibit laws directed to erecting barriers to trade at provincial boundaries — whether customs duties or other measures that are intended to fi ll the role of such tariffs: murphy, at p 642. [101] one may argue about whether rand j.’s view states the logical underpinning of gold seal, or ex- tends it. but if one accepts the underlying principle that animates s. 121 — that s. 121 prohibits laws that in essence and purpose seek to set up trade barriers between the provinces — the debate is sterile. gold seal, atlantic smoke shops and murphy are all con- sistent with this basic proposition, even if they did not explicate it. none of them endorsed a law that was directed in essence and purpose to impeding goods crossing provincial borders. [102] rand j.’s description of the ambit of s. 121 has found favour with subsequent jurists. laskin j. (as he then was) in his concurring reasons in attor- ney- general for manitoba v. manitoba egg and poultry assn., [1971] scr 689, at p. 717, noted that s. 121 is meant to address measures that lead to the “fi gurative sealing of [  ] borders”. as chief justice in his concurring reasons in reference re agricultural products marketing act, at p. 1268, he adopted rand j.’s interpretation of s. 121 and noted that s. 121 is about identifying whether the “essence and purpose” of the impugned law is to erect a trade barrier at a provincial boundary. the majority in the fi rst case did not comment on s 121. in reference re agricultural products marketing act, the ma- jority concluded that the impugned law did not of- fend s. 121, and while it offered no analysis of its own, it indicated no disagreement with chief justice laskin’s discussion of s 121. [100] autrement dit, l’art. 121 permet l’adoption de régimes qui entravent accessoirement la circula- tion des biens d’une province à une autre, mais ne permet pas d’imposer de tels obstacles seulement parce que les biens franchissent une frontière pro- vinciale. de l’avis du juge rand, le fondement de l’art. 121 était d’interdire les lois visant à ériger des obstacles au commerce entre les provinces, que ce soit des droits de douane ou d’autres mesures des- tinées à jouer le rôle de tels tarifs : murphy, p 642. [101] on pourrait débattre de la question de sa- voir si l’opinion du juge rand énonce le fondement logique de gold seal, ou si elle en élargit la portée. cela dit, si l’on accepte le principe qui sous- tend l’art. 121 — c’est-à-dire l’interdiction des lois visant, de par leur essence et leur objet, à ériger des obstacles au commerce entre les provinces —, le débat est stérile. les arrêts gold seal, atlantic smoke shops et murphy sont tous compatibles avec cette proposition de base, même s’ils ne l’explicitent pas. d’ailleurs, aucun de ces arrêts n’a confi rmé la validité d’une loi visant, de par son essence et son objet, à entraver la circulation des biens d’une province à une autre. [102] en outre, des juristes ont subséquemment retenu la description qu’a faite le juge rand de la portée de l’art 121. le juge laskin (plus tard juge en chef), en rédigeant ses motifs concordants dans l’arrêt procureur général du manitoba c. manitoba egg and poultry assn., [1971] rcs 689, p. 717, a souligné que l’art. 121 est censé viser des mesures entraînant « la fermeture (au sens fi guré) [des] frontières ». en tant que juge en chef dans ses motifs concordants dans l’arrêt renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’organisation du marché des produits agricoles, p. 1268, il a adopté l’interprétation que le juge rand a donnée à l’art. 121 et noté que cette disposition pose la question de sa- voir si, « en droit et en fait », la loi contestée a pour objet d’ériger des obstacles au commerce entre les provinces. les juges majoritaires dans la première de ces décisions n’ont émis aucun commentaire sur l’art 121. dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’orga- nisation du marché des produits agricoles, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que la loi n’enfreignait pas l’art. 121 et, bien qu’ils n’ont procédé eux- mêmes à aucune analyse de la question, ils n’ont pas exprimé de désaccord avec les propos du juge en chef laskin. 386 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. in obiter comments in two subsequent deci- [103] sions, la forest j., writing for the court, similarly noted that the functional approach articulated by rand j. stemmed from the view established in gold seal: black, at p. 609; canadian pacifi c air lines, at p 1153. [104] most recently in richardson, iacobucci and bastarache jj. for the majority and mclachlin j. (as she then was) in dissent, agreed (though, again, in obiter) that rand j.’s interpretation of s. 121 was the operative authority for that provision: paras. 63-65, per iacobucci and bastarache jj., paras. 123 and 171, per mclachlin j. in dissent but not on this point, mclachlin j. noted, at paras. 123 and 171: in broad outline, s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867 permits legislation which incidentally impinges on the fl ow of goods and services across provincial boundaries, but prohibits legislation that in “essence and purpose is related to a provincial boundary”: murphy v. canadian pacifi c railway co., [1958] scr 626, at p. 642, per rand j.; reference re agricultural products marketing act, [1978] 2 scr 1198, at p. 1268, per laskin cj. interpreting s 121   . [103] dans des remarques incidentes formulées dans deux décisions subséquentes, le juge la forest, au nom de la cour, a lui aussi souligné que l’ap- proche fonctionnelle formulée par le juge rand tirait son origine du point de vue exprimé dans gold seal : black, p. 609; lignes aériennes canadien pacifi que, p 1153. [104] plus récemment, dans richardson, les juges iacobucci et bastarache, au nom des juges majo- ritaires, et la juge mclachlin (maintenant juge en chef), dissidente, ont reconnu (bien que ce soit, en- core une fois, dans des remarques incidentes) que l’interprétation de l’art. 121 donnée par le juge rand constituait l’autorité applicable pour cette disposi- tion : par. 63-65, les juges iacobucci et bastarache, par. 123 et 171, la juge mclachlin. dissidente, mais non sur ce point, cette dernière a affi rmé, aux par. 123 et 171 : en gros, l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 permet d’adopter des mesures législatives qui touchent, de manière accessoire, à la circulation des biens et services d’une province à l’autre, mais il interdit celles [traduc- tion] « reliée[s], en droit et en fait, à l’existence des fron- tières provinciales » : murphy c. canadian pacifi c railway co., [1958] rcs 626, à la p. 642, le juge rand; renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’organisation du marché des produits agricoles, [1978] 2 rcs 1198, à la p. 1268, le juge en chef laskin qui interprétait alors l’art 121  .   .   .   . provinces and the federal government are permitted to impose disadvantages on the basis of provincial bounda- ries so long as this effect is incidental to another purpose within their proper legislative sphere. they are not permit- ted, however, to create interprovincial barriers which are not incidental to such a higher purpose. the primary/in- cidental distinction in s. 6(3)(a) mirrors the jurisprudence under s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867, which bars trade laws aimed primarily at impeding the fl ow of goods on the basis of provincial boundaries: murphy v. canadian pacifi c railway, supra; reference re agricultural products marketing act, supra.   . on permet aux provinces et au gouvernement fédéral de créer des désavantages fondés sur des frontières pro- vinciales, pourvu qu’un tel effet découle accessoirement d’un autre objectif relevant de leur domaine de compé- tence législative légitime. cependant, il ne leur est pas permis d’ériger des barrières interprovinciales qui ne soient pas une conséquence accessoire de cet objectif supérieur. la distinction de l’al. 6(3)a) entre principal et accessoire refl ète la jurisprudence relative à l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, qui interdit les lois commerciales qui visent principalement à entraver la circulation de biens en raison de frontières provinciales : murphy c. canadian pacifi c railway et renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’organisation du marché des produits agricoles, précités. [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 387 [105] the comments of justices of this court on s. 121 in the post-gold seal jurisprudence have never acquired the status of binding law, being made with- out majoritarian status or in obiter. but they do not confl ict with gold seal and atlantic smoke shops; rather, they offer a principled and robust articulation of the holdings from those earlier decisions. [106] we conclude that a purposive approach to s. 121 leads to the following conclusion: s. 121 pro- hibits laws that in essence and purpose restrict trade across provincial boundaries. laws that only have the incidental effect of restricting trade across pro- vincial boundaries because they are part of broader schemes not aimed at impeding trade do not offend s. 121 because the purpose of such laws is to support the relevant scheme, not to restrict interprovincial trade. while gold seal did not undertake a purpo- sive analysis of s. 121 and hence did not describe the ambit of s. 121 precisely in these terms, it is entirely consistent with it. the earlier jurisprudence of this court on s. 121 and the broader articulation adopted by rand j. stand as different moments on a progressive jurisprudential continuum, all consistent with the text of s. 121, its historical and legislative contexts, and the principle of federalism. [105] les commentaires formulés par des juges de la cour sur l’art. 121 dans la jurisprudence pos- térieure à gold seal n’ont jamais obtenu le caractère de ceux qui font autorité, soit parce qu’ils ont été énoncés par les juges minoritaires soit parce qu’ils ont pris la forme de remarques incidentes. ils ne sont toutefois pas incompatibles avec gold seal et atlantic smoke shops, et constituent plutôt une for- mulation forte et fondée sur des principes des conclu- sions tirées dans ces décisions antérieures. [106] ainsi, l’interprétation téléologique de l’art. 121 mène à la conclusion suivante : l’art. 121 pros- crit les lois qui, de par leur essence et leur objet, entravent le commerce entre les provinces. les lois qui n’ont que l’effet accessoire de restreindre le com- merce interprovincial, parce qu’elles font partie de régimes plus larges n’ayant pas pour objet d’entraver le commerce, ne contreviennent pas à l’art. 121 parce qu’elles visent à soutenir le régime pertinent, et non pas à restreindre ce commerce. bien que l’arrêt gold seal ne comprenait pas une analyse téléologique de l’art. 121 et qu’il ne décrivait donc pas la portée de ce dernier précisément de cette façon, il cadre parfaitement avec cette interprétation. la jurispru- dence antérieure de la cour sur l’art. 121 et le sens plus large adopté par le juge rand marquent plutôt différents jalons sur le continuum progressif de la jurisprudence, des jalons tous compatibles avec le libellé de l’art. 121, ses contextes historique et légis- latif ainsi que le principe du fédéralisme. [107] it follows that a party alleging that a law violates s. 121 must establish that the law in es- sence and purpose restricts trade across a provincial border. “[e]ssence” refers to the nature of the meas- ure — “‘what a thing is’;    [its] character”: the oxford english dictionary (2nd ed. 1989), at p 400. “purpose” focuses on the object, or primary purpose, of the measure. [107] une partie qui plaide qu’une loi enfreint l’art. 121 doit donc démontrer que cette loi, de par son essence et son objet, restreint le commerce inter- provincial. le terme « essence » renvoie à la nature de la mesure : « ce qui fait qu’une chose est ce qu’elle est et ce sans quoi elle ne serait pas » : le petit robert (nouv. éd. 2012), p 932. le terme « objet » vise l’objectif, ou l’objet principal, de la mesure. [108] the fi rst question is whether the essence or character of the law is to restrict or prohibit trade across a provincial border, like a tariff tariffs, broadly defi ned, are “customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with impor- tation or exportation”: general agreement on tar- iffs and trade (world trade organization), can. [108] la première question est celle de savoir si, de par son essence, la loi vise à restreindre ou à interdire le commerce d’une province à une autre, comme le font les tarifs. ces derniers, au sens large, sont « les droits de douane et les impositions de toute nature qui frappent les importations ou les exporta- tions » : accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et 388 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. ts 1948. no. 31, part i, article i. the claimant must therefore establish that the law imposes an ad- ditional cost on goods by virtue of them coming in from outside the province. put another way, a claim- ant must establish that the law distinguishes goods in a manner “related to a provincial boundary” that subjects goods from outside the province to addi- tional costs: murphy, at p. 642, per rand j. a pro- hibition on goods crossing the border is an extreme example of such a distinction. [109] the additional cost need not be a charge physically levied at the border, nor must it take the form of an actual surcharge; all that is required is that the law impose a cost burden on goods crossing a provincial border. a law that provides that “rum produced in the maritime provinces will be subject to a 50% surcharge upon entering newfoundland” has the same effect, in principle, as a law that states that “any person who brings rum produced in the maritime provinces into newfoundland is guilty of an offence and liable to a fi ne”. both laws impose a burden on the cost of goods that cross a provincial boundary. in some cases, evidence may be required to [110] determine if an impugned law imposes a charge on the basis of a provincial border. consider a fi ctional law that requires alberta distillers to get a special licence to import rye. it is not plain on the face of the law whether the law (1)  imposes any sort of charge on the movement of rye or (2) whether any such charge is linked to a distinction between goods related to a provincial boundary. if the cost of the li- cence is substantial or if it is very diffi cult to acquire, the measure may impede cross- border trade in rye. similarly, if the only rye available to alberta distill- ers is from saskatchewan, the licence requirement may function like a tariff against a saskatchewan good. on the other hand, if the licence is not burden- some to acquire or if the licensing requirement ap- plies equally where alberta enterprises have access to rye from within alberta, the law may not impose le commerce (organisation mondiale du commerce), rt. can. 1948 no 31, partie i, art i. le demandeur doit donc établir que la loi augmente le coût des biens du fait qu’ils proviennent de l’extérieur de la province. autrement dit, le demandeur doit établir que la loi établit une distinction entre les biens [tra- duction] « reliée à l’existence des frontières provin- ciales » et à l’origine d’un coût supplémentaire pour ceux qui proviennent de l’extérieur de la province : murphy, p. 642, le juge rand. interdire que des biens traversent la frontière constitue un exemple extrême de distinction de ce type. [109] le coût supplémentaire n’a pas à prendre la forme d’une charge prélevée physiquement à la frontière, ni d’ailleurs celle d’une suramende compensatoire véritable; il suffi t que la loi impose un fardeau fi nancier sur les biens qui traversent une frontière provinciale une loi selon laquelle « le rhum produit dans les provinces maritimes fera l’objet d’une surtaxe de 50 % au moment où il entre à terre- neuve » a le même effet, en principe, qu’une loi qui prévoit que « quiconque importe à terre- neuve du rhum produit dans une des provinces maritimes est coupable d’une infraction et passible d’une amende ». les deux lois imposent un fardeau sur le coût des biens qui traversent une frontière provinciale. [110] dans certains cas, il pourrait être nécessaire de produire certains éléments de preuve pour qu’il soit possible de déterminer si la loi contestée im- pose une charge fondée sur une frontière provinciale. envisageons le cas d’une loi fi ctive qui exigerait des distillateurs albertains qu’ils obtiennent un permis particulier pour importer du seigle. on ne peut dire de la loi, à sa face même, (1) si elle impose une quel- conque charge sur la circulation du seigle ou (2) si une telle charge est liée à une distinction entre les biens fondée sur une frontière provinciale. si le prix du permis est considérable et s’il est très diffi cile de s’en procurer un, il est possible que la mesure entrave le commerce interprovincial de seigle. de même, si le seul seigle que peuvent se procurer les distillateurs albertains provient de la saskatchewan, l’exigence quant à la détention d’un permis peut agir comme un tarif à l’encontre d’un bien de la saskatchewan. par [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 389 a burden or charge based on a provincial border and s. 121 is not violated. [111] if the law does not in essence restrict the trade of goods across a provincial border, the inquiry is over and s. 121 is not engaged. if it does, the claim- ant must also establish that the primary purpose of the law is to restrict trade. a law may have more than one purpose. but impeding trade must be its primary purpose to engage s 121. the inquiry is objective, based on the wording of the law, the legislative con- text in which it was enacted (ie if it is one element of a broader regulatory scheme), and all of the law’s discernable effects (which can include much more than its trade- impeding effect). if the purpose of the law aligns with purposes traditionally served by tar- iffs, such as exploiting the passage of goods across a border solely as a way to collect funds, protecting local industry or punishing another province, this may, depending on other factors, support the conten- tion that the primary purpose of the law is to restrict trade: see, eg,. murphy, at pp. 638-39, per rand j.; reference re agricultural products marketing act, at p. 1268, per laskin cj;. d. hill, ed., national trade and tariff service (loose- leaf), at §1.3; black’s law dictionary (9th ed. 2009), at pp 1593-94. contre, s’il est facile de se procurer le permis et si la détention d’un tel permis s’applique tout autant si les entreprises albertaines ont accès à du seigle produit en alberta, il est possible que la loi n’impose pas un fardeau ou une charge fondés sur une frontière provinciale et qu’il n’y ait pas violation de l’art 121. [111] si la loi, de par son essence, ne restreint pas le commerce des biens d’une province à une autre, l’examen est terminé et l’art. 121 n’est pas en cause. si, au contraire, elle restreint ce commerce, le de- mandeur doit donc aussi établir que la loi vise prin- cipalement, de par son objet, une telle restriction. une loi peut avoir plus d’un objet. il faut toutefois que son objet principal soit d’entraver le commerce pour que l’art. 121 soit en jeu. l’examen est objec- tif, fondé sur le libellé de la loi, sur le contexte lé- gislatif dans lequel elle a été adoptée (c-à-d qu’il faut se demander si elle fait partie d’un régime ré- glementaire plus large) et sur tous ses effets discer- nables (qui peuvent inclure bien davantage que son effet d’entrave au commerce). si l’objet de la loi est de même nature que les objets traditionnellement vi- sés par les tarifs — comme exploiter le passage de biens à la frontière dans le seul but de collecter des fonds, protéger l’industrie locale ou sanctionner une autre province —, cela pourrait, dépendant d’autres facteurs, étayer la prétention que l’objet principal de la loi consiste à restreindre le commerce : voir, p ex, murphy, p. 638-639, le juge rand; renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’organisation du marché des produits agricoles, p. 1268, le juge en chef laskin; d. hill, dir., national trade and tariff service (feuil- les mobiles), §1.3; black’s law dictionary (9e éd. 2009), p 1593-1594. [112] stand- alone laws that have the effect of re- stricting trade across provincial boundaries will not violate s. 121 if their primary purpose is not to im- pede trade, but some other purpose. thus a law that prohibits liquor crossing a provincial boundary for the primary purpose of protecting the health and welfare of the people in the province would not vi- olate s 121. more commonly, however, the primary purpose requirement of s. 121 fails because the law’s restriction on trade is merely an incidental effect of its role in a scheme with a different purpose. the primary purpose of such a law is not to restrict trade [112] les lois qui, sans faire partie d’un régime plus large, ont pour effet de restreindre le commerce interprovincial n’enfreignent pas l’art. 121 si leur objet principal n’est pas d’entraver le commerce, mais un autre objet valide. ainsi, une loi qui interdit la circulation de boissons alcooliques d’une province à une autre avec pour objectif principal de protéger la santé et le bien- être des personnes qui habitent dans la province n’enfreindrait pas l’art 121. cela dit, plus souvent, il n’est pas satisfait à l’exigence relative à l’objet principal applicable dans l’ana- lyse d’une loi au regard de l’art. 121 parce que la 390 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. across a provincial boundary, but to achieve the goals of the regulatory scheme. [113] however, a law that in essence and purpose impedes cross- border trade cannot be rendered con- stitutional under s. 121 solely by inserting it into a broader regulatory scheme. if the primary pur- pose of the broader scheme is to impede trade, or if the impugned law is not connected in a rational way to the scheme’s objective, the law will violate s 121. a rational connection between the impugned measure and the broader objective of the regulatory scheme exists where, as a matter of reason or logic, the former can be said to serve the latter: see, eg,. rjr- macdonald inc. v. canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at para. 153, per mclachlin j. (as she then was), and at para. 184, per iacobucci j. the scheme may be purely provincial, or a mixed federal- provincial scheme: gold seal; see also ref- erence re agricultural products marketing act. [114] in summary, two things are required for s. 121 to be violated. the law must impact the inter- provincial movement of goods like a tariff, which, in the extreme, could be an outright prohibition. and, restriction of cross- border trade must be the primary purpose of the law, thereby excluding laws enacted for other purposes, such as laws that form rational parts of broader legislative schemes with purposes unrelated to impeding interprovincial trade. restriction au commerce qui découle de cette loi n’est qu’un effet accessoire de son rôle dans le contexte d’un régime valide dont l’objet est différent. l’objet principal d’une telle loi n’est pas la restriction du commerce d’une province à une autre, mais l’atteinte des objectifs du régime réglementaire. [113] toutefois, on ne peut valider sur le plan cons- titutionnel au regard de l’art. 121 une loi qui, de par son essence et son objet, entrave le commerce interprovincial uniquement en l’insérant dans un ré- gime réglementaire plus large. si l’objet principal du régime plus large est d’entraver le commerce, ou si la loi contestée n’est pas reliée logiquement à l’objet du régime, elle contrevient à l’art 121. il existe un lien rationnel entre la mesure contestée et l’objectif plus large du régime réglementaire lorsque, sur le plan de la raison ou de la logique, on peut dire de la première qu’elle sert le deuxième : voir, p ex, rjr-. macdonald inc. c. canada (procureur général), [1995] 3 rcs 199, par. 153, la juge mclachlin (maintenant juge en chef), et au par. 184, le juge iacobucci. le régime peut être purement provincial ou il peut être à la fois provincial et fédéral : gold seal; voir également le renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’organisation du marché des produits agricoles. [114] bref, il ne sera enfreint à l’art. 121 qu’en pré- sence de deux éléments. la loi doit avoir, comme un tarif, une incidence sur la circulation interprovinciale de biens, une incidence qui, à la limite, peut consister en une interdiction pure et simple. il faut en outre que la restriction au commerce interprovincial constitue l’objet principal de la loi, de sorte que ne sont pas visées les lois adoptées pour l’atteinte d’autres ob- jets, comme des lois qui font rationnellement partie de régimes législatifs plus larges dont les objets ne sont pas liés à l’entrave au commerce interprovincial. [115] the decided cases, while not numerous, il- lustrate how the essence and purpose test works. in gold seal, a federal law aimed at assisting dry provinces in keeping liquor out of their territories was held not to infringe s 121. the law did not im- pede the fl ow of goods across provincial boundaries as its primary purpose; rather, it was part of a larger federal- provincial scheme to facilitate provinces’ de- cisions, as informed by local referendums, to impose [115] les décisions rendues, bien que peu nom- breuses, illustrent comment fonctionne le test fondé sur l’essence et l’objet de la loi. dans gold seal, la cour a conclu qu’une loi fédérale visant à aider les provinces prohibitionnistes à faire en sorte que des boissons alcooliques ne se retrouvent pas sur leur ter- ritoire n’était pas contraire à l’art 121. la loi n’avait pas pour objet principal d’entraver la libre circula- tion des biens d’une province à une autre; elle faisait [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 391 temperance to avoid harms associated with alcohol consumption. therefore, it did not violate s 121. similarly, in murphy, a federal law prohibiting farm- ers from shipping grain across provincial boundaries was held not to violate s. 121 because it was part of a larger marketing scheme to enable the distribution of grain. the impugned tax in atlantic smoke shops failed because it did not distinguish between local and extra- provincial tobacco. in other words, it was not in essence tariff- like. [116] there is debate about whether s. 121 applies equally to provincial and federal laws. while this court has in previous decisions proceeded on the basis that federal laws may engage s. 121 (see, eg,. gold seal and murphy), no federal law is properly at issue in the present appeal and so the question need not be resolved here. we agree with laskin c j.’s statement in reference re agricultural products mar- ket ing act, at p. 1267, that “the application of s. 121 may be different according to whether it is provincial or federal legislation that is involved because what may amount to a tariff or customs duty under a pro- vincial regulatory statute may not have that character at all under a federal regulatory statute”. plutôt partie d’un régime fédéral provincial plus large visant à faciliter la mise en œuvre des décisions des provinces, fondées sur des référendums locaux, d’in- terdire la consommation d’alcool pour éviter les préjudices découlant de cette pratique. ainsi, elle n’enfreignait pas l’art 121. de même, dans murphy, il a été conclu qu’une loi fédérale interdisant aux fer- miers d’expédier des céréales au- delà des frontières provinciales ne contrevenait pas à l’art. 121 parce qu’elle faisait partie d’un régime plus large de mise en marché pour la distribution de ces produits. la contes- tation de la loi dans atlantic smoke shops a échoué parce que le texte législatif en cause n’établissait pas de distinction entre le tabac local et celui provenant d’une autre province. autrement dit, elle n’établissait pas, de par son essence, une charge du type d’un tarif. [116] la question de savoir si l’art. 121 s’applique autant aux lois provinciales qu’aux lois fédérales fait l’objet de débats. certes, dans des décisions anté- rieures, la cour a tranché les litiges en tenant pour acquis que les lois fédérales peuvent faire intervenir l’art. 121 (voir, p ex, gold. seal et murphy); aucune loi fédérale n’est toutefois réellement en cause dans le présent appel, de sorte qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de trancher ici la question. nous souscrivons aux propos du juge en chef laskin dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’organisation du marché des produits agricoles, lorsqu’il affi rme à la p. 1267 que « l’application de l’art. 121 peut être différente selon qu’il s’agit de législation fédérale ou provinciale, parce que ce qui peut équivaloir à un tarif ou à un droit de douane sous l’empire d’une réglementation provinciale peut ne pas avoir du tout ce caractère sous l’empire d’une réglementation fédérale ». vi application vi application [117] does s. 134(b) of the liquor control act contravene s. 121? we conclude that it does not. to reiterate, s. 134(b) provides: 134 except as provided by this act or the regulations, no person, within the province, by himself, his clerk, employee, servant or agent shall [117] l’alinéa 134b) de la loi sur la réglemen- tation des alcools contrevient-il à l’art. 121? nous concluons qu’il n’y a pas contravention. il convient de reproduire l’al. 134b) : 134 sauf dans les cas prévus par la présente loi et les règlements, nul ne doit, dans la province, soit person- nellement, soit par l’entremise de son commis, employé, préposé ou représentant,   .   . 392 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. (b) have or keep liquor, b) avoir ou garder des boissons alcooliques not purchased from the corporation. achetées ailleurs qu’à la société. [118] our task is to determine if the essence and purpose of s.  134(b) is to restrict trade in liquor across new brunswick’s border. [119] the fi rst question is whether s. 134(b), in its essence or character, functions like a tariff by impeding cross- border trade. section 134(b), in con- junction with other provisions, makes it an offence to stock excessive amounts of liquor obtained from any- where other than the new brunswick liquor corpo- ration. liquor from the corporation can be stocked for free, while liquor from elsewhere cannot, without running the risk of incurring a fi ne and having the alcohol confi scated. these penalties act to burden the cost of such liquor both directly and indirectly. first, the penalties imposed for stocking liquor purchased from outside the corporation function to directly increase the cost of acquiring such liquor. second, the risk of fi ne and confi scation indirectly acts as a general disincentive for new brunswickers who would otherwise seek lower- priced liquor than that available through the corporation, where it exists. [120] by making people who stock liquor acquired from outside the provincial corporation pay fi nes and thus more generally depriving them of cheaper goods, the law burdens the cost of the targeted liquor. if the authorities seize any liquor identifi ed when a charge is laid under s. 134(b) — as occurred in mr. comeau’s case — the law, in practical terms, prohibits, and therefore completely bars access to, non- corporation liquor. this prohibition functions like a tariff at the extreme end of the spectrum. with respect to out-of- province liquor, the liquor is not just prevented from being “admitted free”; it cannot be admitted at all. [118] notre tâche consiste à déterminer si, de par son essence et son objet, l’al. 134b) vise à res- treindre le commerce des boissons alcooliques entre le nouveau- brunswick et les autres provinces. [119] premièrement, nous devons déterminer si, de par son essence, l’al. 134b) agit comme un tarif de sorte qu’il entrave le commerce interprovincial. considéré conjointement avec d’autres dispositions, l’al. 134b) érige en infraction le fait de faire des provisions de quantités excessives de boissons alcoo- liques obtenues ailleurs qu’à la société des alcools du nouveau- brunswick. il est possible de faire, sans coût additionnel, provision de boissons alcooliques provenant de la société; pour celles provenant d’ail- leurs, cela n’est pas possible sans courir le risque de se voir infl iger une amende et de se faire confi squer les produits en question. ces sanctions augmentent le coût de ce type de boissons alcooliques à la fois directement et indirectement. d’abord, les sanctions infl igées pour avoir fait provision de telles boissons provenant d’ailleurs que de la société ont pour effet d’en augmenter directement le coût d’acquisition. ensuite, le risque d’infl iction d’une amende et de confi scation a indirectement un effet dissuasif géné- ral sur les nouveaux- brunswickois qui, autrement, pourraient chercher à se procurer des boissons alcoo- liques à meilleur prix qu’à la société, là où il y en a. [120] en forçant ceux qui font provision de boissons alcooliques achetées ailleurs qu’à la société de la pro- vince à payer des amendes, et en les privant par le fait même de biens moins chers, la loi augmente le coût des boissons alcooliques visées. si les autorités saisissent des boissons identifi ées lorsqu’une accusation est por- tée en application de l’al. 134b) — comme cela s’est passé dans le cas de m. comeau — la loi, sur le plan pratique, interdit et empêche totalement l’accès à des boissons alcooliques obtenues ailleurs qu’à la société. cette interdiction agit comme un tarif à l’extrême de l’éventail des possibilités. en ce qui a trait à l’alcool provenant d’une autre province, il n’est pas simple- ment empêché qu’il soit « admis en franchise » au nouveau- brunswick, il ne peut carrément pas y entrer. [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 393 [121] this restriction is related to a provincial boundary. section 134(b) impedes liquor purchases originating outside of the provincial corporation above a certain threshold. the law thus has two ef- fects. the fi rst effect is to restrict access to liquor from other provinces. the other effect is to restrict access to liquor within the province that is not con- trolled by the corporation. but although the fi ne functions to restrict purchases of liquor from the black market within new brunswick, this does not negate the fact that it also imposes a burden on bring- ing liquor across a provincial boundary. the pres- ence of the fi rst effect — restricting access to liquor from other provinces — is suffi cient to establish that s. 134(b), in essence, functions like a tariff, even though it may have other purely internal effects. [122] the next question is whether this restric- tion on trade is the primary purpose of s 134(b). as discussed, the text, the effects and the legis- lative context assist in identifying the primary purpose of s.  134(b) here, the text and effects are aligned and suggest the primary purpose of s. 134(b) is not to impede trade. section 134(b) pro- hibits “hav[ing] or keep[ing]” liquor above a certain threshold “not purchased from the corporation”. in effect, it restricts holding liquor obtained from non- corporation sources within new brunswick and re- stricts holding liquor from non- corporation sources coming into new brunswick. the text and effects of s. 134(b) indicate that its primary purpose is to re- strict access to any non- corporation liquor, not just liquor brought in from another province like que- bec. this is reinforced when one reads s. 134(b) in conjunction with s. 43(c), the provision that sets the maximum amount of allowable non- corporation liquor that can be kept by someone within new brunswick. the existence of a statutory threshold, as opposed to an absolute prohibition, suggests that the purpose of s. 134(b) is not to specifi cally target out-of- province liquor, but to more generally pre- vent defi ned quantities of non- corporation liquor [121] la restriction est liée à une frontière provin- ciale. l’alinéa 134b) entrave l’achat au- delà d’un certain seuil de boissons alcooliques provenant d’ail- leurs que de la société de la province. la loi a donc deux effets d’abord, elle restreint l’accès à des boissons alcooliques provenant d’autres provinces. ensuite, elle restreint dans la province l’accès aux boissons alcooliques qui ne sont pas sous le contrôle de la société s’il est vrai que les amendes sont conçues de telle sorte qu’elles restreignent l’achat de boissons alcooliques du marché noir au nouveau- brunswick, elles constituent néanmoins également une entrave à l’entrée de boissons al cooliques dans la province. l’existence du premier de ces effets — soit la restriction de l’accès aux boissons alcooliques provenant d’autres provinces — est suffi sante pour établir que l’al. 134b), de par son essence, fonctionne comme un tarif, et ce, même s’il peut avoir d’autres effets strictement liés au commerce qui a cours dans la province. [122] nous devons ensuite déterminer si cette res- triction au commerce constitue l’objet principal de l’al 134b). comme nous l’avons mentionné, le li- bellé, les effets et le contexte législatif aident à cerner quel est cet objet. en l’espèce, le libellé et les effets pointent dans la même direction et laissent croire que l’objet principal de l’al. 134b) n’est pas d’entraver le commerce. cette disposition interdit « [d’]avoir ou [de] garder » plus qu’une certaine quantité de boissons alcooliques « achetées ailleurs qu’à la so- ciété ». en fait, elle restreint le droit de détenir des boissons alcooliques obtenues de sources autres que la société et restreint le droit de détenir des boissons alcooliques obtenues de sources autres que la société et importées au nouveau- brunswick. le libellé et les effets de l’al. 134b) indiquent que l’objet principal de ce dernier consiste à restreindre l’accès à toutes les boissons alcooliques obtenues de sources autres que la société et non pas uniquement à celles qui proviennent d’une autre province comme le qué- bec. ce point de vue est renforcé par une lecture conjointe des al. 134b) et 43c), ce dernier étant celui qui établit le seuil maximal de boissons alcooliques provenant d’ailleurs que de la société que peut dé- tenir une personne au nouveau- brunswick. en effet, 394 r v comeau the court [2018] 1 scr. from entering the liquor supply within new brun- swick’s borders. [123] this conclusion is confi rmed when one con- siders the broader scheme of which s. 134(b) forms part — a scheme that governs new brunswick’s capacity to regulate how liquor is managed within the province. the liquor control act sets out diverse and extensive rules and prohibitions aimed at controlling access to liquor in new brunswick. a companion statute, the new brunswick liquor corporation act, snb 1974, c n-61 (now rsnb 2016, c. 105), establishes the province’s public liquor supply man- agement monopoly. together, these statutes set out a comprehensive and technical scheme to ensure that the liquor trade within the province is monitored. section 3 of the federal importation of intoxicating liquors act, rsc 1985, c. i-3, endorses provinces’ capacity to enact such schemes. l’existence d’un seuil fi xé par la loi, plutôt que d’une interdiction pure et simple, suggère que l’al. 134b) ne vise pas spécifi quement les boissons alcooliques provenant de l’extérieur de la province, mais plus généralement l’interdiction d’intégrer aux réserves de boissons alcooliques du nouveau- brunswick une quantité défi nie de ces boissons provenant d’ailleurs que de la société. [123] l’examen du régime plus large dont l’al. 134b) fait partie — un régime qui réglemente la capacité du nouveau- brunswick de régir la gestion de l’alcool dans la province — confi rme cette conclusion. la loi sur la réglementation des alcools énonce des règles diverses et détaillées ainsi que des interdictions vi- sant le contrôle de l’accès à l’alcool au nouveau- brunswick. une loi connexe, la loi sur la société des alcools du nouveau- brunswick, ln-b 1974, c n-61 (maintenant lrn-b 2016, c. 105), établit le monopole public de la gestion de l’approvisionne- ment d’alcool de la province. considérées conjointe- ment, ces lois mettent en place un régime complet et technique pour garantir la surveillance du commerce des boissons alcooliques dans la province. l’article 3 de la loi sur l’importation des boissons enivrantes, lrc 1985, c. i-3, consacre le droit des provinces d’adopter de tels régimes. [124] the objective of the new brunswick scheme is not to restrict trade across a provincial bound- ary, but to enable public supervision of the produc- tion, movement, sale, and use of alcohol within new brunswick. it is common ground that provinces are able to enact schemes to manage the supply of and demand for liquor within their borders: air canada v. ontario (liquor control board), [1997] 2 scr. 581, at para. 55, citing r v. gautreau (1978), 21 nbr (2d) 701 (sc (app. div)). governments manage liquor prices, storage and distribution with a view to diverse internal policy objectives. although the crown conceded that new brunswick gener- ates revenue from its legislative scheme, this is not the primary purpose of the scheme, but an offshoot of it. finally, s. 134(b) is not divorced from the ob- jective of the larger scheme. it plainly serves new [124] en effet, le régime du nouveau- brunswick ne vise pas à restreindre le commerce interprovin- cial. il vise plutôt à permettre la supervision par des entités publiques de la production, de la circulation, de la vente et de l’utilisation de l’alcool au nouveau- brunswick. il est bien connu que les provinces ont le pouvoir d’adopter des régimes de gestion de l’appro- visionnement et de la demande des boissons alcoo- liques à l’intérieur de leurs frontières : air canada c. ontario (régie des alcools), [1997] 2 rcs 581, par. 55, citant r c. gautreau (1978), 21 rn-b (2e) 701 (cs (div. d’app)). les gouvernements gèrent le prix, l’entreposage et la distribution des boissons alcooliques afi n d’atteindre divers objectifs de poli- tique interne. même si le ministère public a admis que ce régime permet au nouveau- brunswick de générer des revenus, là n’est pas l’objet principal du [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau la cour 395 brunswick’s choice to control the supply and use of liquor within the province. [125] we conclude that the primary purpose of s. 134(b) is to prohibit holding excessive quantities of liquor from supplies not managed by the province. new brunswick’s ability to exercise oversight over liquor supplies in the province would be undermined if non- corporation liquor could fl ow freely across borders and out of the garages of bootleggers and home brewers. the prohibition imposed in s. 134(b) addresses both. while one effect of s. 134(b) is to impede interprovincial trade, this effect is only in- cidental in light of the objective of the provincial scheme in general. therefore, while s. 134(b) in essence impedes cross- border trade, this is not its primary purpose. régime, ce n’en est qu’une conséquence collatérale. enfi n, l’al. 134b) n’est pas dissocié de l’objet du ré- gime plus large. il contribue clairement au choix de la province de contrôler l’approvisionnement et l’uti- lisation des boissons alcooliques sur son territoire. [125] nous concluons que l’objet principal de l’al. 134b) consiste à interdire la garde de quantités exces- sives de boissons alcooliques provenant de réserves qui ne sont pas régies par la province. la capacité du nouveau- brunswick d’exercer un contrôle sur les réserves de boissons alcooliques dans la pro- vince serait minée si de telles boissons provenant d’ailleurs que de la société pouvaient entrer libre- ment dans la province ou provenir de garages de trafi - quants et de brasseurs privés. l’interdiction prévue à l’al. 134b) s’attaque à ces deux cas de fi gure. certes, cette disposition a notamment pour effet d’entraver le commerce interprovincial, mais cet effet n’est qu’ac- cessoire compte tenu de l’objet du régime provincial pris dans son ensemble. ainsi, bien que, de par son essence, l’al. 134b) entrave le commerce transfron- talier, il ne s’agit pas de son objet principal. [126] section 134(b) does not violate s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867. [126] l’alinéa 134b) ne contrevient pas à l’art. 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. vii conclusion vii conclusion [127] for the foregoing reasons, the crown’s ap- peal is allowed. the court answers the appellant’s constitutional question as follows: [127] pour les motifs qui précèdent, le pourvoi du ministère public est accueilli. la cour répond ainsi à la question constitutionnelle de l’appelante : does s. 121 of the constitution act, 1867 (uk), 30 & 31 vict., c. 3, render unconstitutional s. 134(b) of the liquor control act, rsnb 1973, c. l-10, which along with s. 3 of the importation of intoxicating liquors act, rsc 1985, c. i-3, establishes a federal- provincial regu- latory scheme in respect of intoxicating liquor? l’article 121 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 (r-u), 30 & 31 vict., c. 3, rend-il inconstitutionnel l’al. 134b) de la loi sur la réglementation des alcools, lrn-b 1973, c. l-10, qui, avec l’art. 3 de la loi sur l’importation de boissons enivrantes, lrc 1985, c. i-3, établit un régime de réglementation fédéral- provincial à l’égard des bois- sons enivrantes? answer: no. réponse : non. [128] this court has already ordered that the ap- pellant will bear the costs of this appeal: leave to appeal judgment, [2017] scc. bull 778. [128] la cour a déjà condamné l’appelante aux dépens du présent pourvoi : jugement sur la demande d’autorisation d’appel, [2017] bull. csc 778. 396 r v comeau [2018] 1 scr. appeal allowed with costs to the respondent. pourvoi accueilli avec dépens en faveur de l’in- timé. procureur de l’appelante : procureur général du new brunswick, fredericton. nouveau- brunswick, fredericton. toronto; matchim bernard law group, campbell- ton, nb;. arnold schwisberg, markham, ontario. procureurs de l’intimé : gardiner, roberts, to- ronto; matchim bernard law group, campbellton, n-b;. arnold schwisberg, markham, ontario. of canada: attorney general of canada, mont réal. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général du canada : procureur général du canada, mont réal. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. of quebec: attorney general of quebec, québec. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’ontario : procureur général de l’ontario, toronto. procureure de l’intervenante la procureure géné- rale du québec : procureure générale du québec, québec. of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de la colombie- britannique : procureur général de la colombie- britannique, victoria. of prince edward island: stewart mckelvey, char- lottetown. procureurs de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’île-du- prince- édouard : stewart mckelvey, charlottetown. of saskatchewan: attorney general of saskatche- wan, regina. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de la saskatchewan : procureur général de la saskatchewan, regina. of alberta: attorney general of alberta, edmonton. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’alberta : procureur général de l’alberta, edmonton. of newfoundland and labrador: attorney general of newfoundland and labrador, st. john’s. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de terre- neuve-et- labrador : procureur général de terre- neuve-et- labrador, st. john’s. of the northwest territories: attorney general of the northwest territories, yellowknife. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général des territoires du nord- ouest : procureur général des territoires du nord- ouest, yellowknife. nunavut as represented by the minister of justice: attorney general of nunavut, iqaluit. procureur de l’intervenant le gouvernement du nunavut, représenté par le ministre de la justice : procureur général du nunavut, iqaluit. [2018] 1 rcs. r c comeau 397 painted rock estate winery ltd., 50th parallel estate limited partnership, okanagan crush pad winery ltd. and noble ridge vineyard and winery limited partnership: coulson litigation, vancouver; gud- mundseth mickelson, vancouver. procureurs des intervenantes liquidity wines ltd., painted rock estate winery ltd., 50th parallel estate limited partnership, okanagan crush pad winery ltd. et noble ridge vineyard and winery limited partnership : coulson litigation, vancou- ver; gudmundseth mickelson, vancouver. procureur de l’intervenante artisan ales consult- ing inc.: university of alberta, edmonton. ing inc. : university of alberta, edmonton. nomic institute: osler, hoskin & harcourt, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant l’institut économique de mont réal : osler, hoskin & harcourt, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante federal express ca- ada corporation: mcmillan, toronto. nada corporation : mcmillan, toronto. ber of commerce and the canadian federation of independent business: borden ladner gervais, to- ronto. procureurs des intervenantes la chambre de com- merce du canada et la fédération canadienne de l’entreprise indépendante : borden ladner gervais, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante cannabis culture : tousaw law corporation, abbotsford, bc. tousaw law corporation, abbotsford, c-b. canadian distillers, operating as spirits canada: power law, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association des distillateurs canadiens, faisant affaire sous le nom spiritueux canada : power law, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante canada’s national brewers: gowling wlg (canada), toronto. brewers : gowling wlg (canada), toronto. of canada, the egg farmers of canada, the chicken farmers of canada, the turkey farmers of canada and the canadian hatching egg producers: conway baxter wilson, ottawa. procureurs des intervenants les producteurs lai- tiers du canada, les producteurs d’œufs du canada, les producteurs de poulet du canada, les éleveurs de dindon du canada et les producteurs d’œufs d’incu- bation du canada : conway baxter wilson, ottawa. cil of canada: siskinds, london and toronto; michael sobkin, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenant consumers council of canada : siskinds, london et toronto; michael sobkin, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association des ners association: bennett jones, toronto. vignerons du canada : bennett jones, toronto. brewers association: burnet, duckworth & palmer, calgary. procureurs de l’intervenante alberta small brew- ers association : burnet, duckworth & palmer, cal- gary.
i. overview [1] the principal issue in these appeals concerns a court’s jurisdiction to render, vary or vacate orders — sealing orders, publication bans and the like — that limit the open court principle. the question is whether a court retains jurisdiction over these ancillary matters after it has decided the merits of the case and has entered its formal judgment. does the doctrine of functus officio — the notion that once a court has performed its function, it has exhausted its authority — preclude that court from revisiting a publication ban that it had ordered or a sealing order put in place in the course of criminal proceedings? [2] an affidavit filed in a criminal matter before the court of appeal of manitoba had been held under seal and subject to a publication ban pending a decision as to its admissibility as new evidence. in its reasons allowing the appeal on the merits, the court dismissed the motion for new evidence because it was not relevant to the issue at hand. it nevertheless ordered that the publication ban remain in place indefinitely. [3] relying on the open court principle and the constitutionally-protected right of freedom of the press with which it is bound up, the appellant canadian broadcasting corporation (“cbc”) brought a motion in which it sought access to the affidavit and asked to have the publication ban set aside. it had been covering the proceedings as a representative of the media. lifting the publication ban, said the cbc, would shed light on the principal matter before the court of appeal and its conclusion on the merits that a miscarriage of justice had occurred at trial. the crown opposed the motion to disturb the ban, however, arguing that the affidavit was not relevant and the court of appeal had no continuing authority over the matter family members of a deceased person mentioned in the affidavit under seal also opposed lifting the ban since, they said, doing so would result in an unjustifiable violation of their privacy. [4] the court of appeal declined to consider the cbc’s motion, citing its rule of practice against rehearings and the doctrine of functus officio. the court reasoned that its jurisdiction was exhausted once it had decided the merits of the case and entered its formal judgment disposing of the appeal it concluded that it had no authority to hear the motion and said the cbc should turn to this court, on appeal, to seek redress. [5] in point of fact, this court is seized of two appeals. in the first, leave was granted from the court of appeal’s refusal to hear the motion in which it was asked to reconsider its own publication ban and, in addition, to grant the cbc access to the affidavit. this first appeal raises preliminary issues about the court of appeal’s powers to reconsider such decisions after it had entered the formal order on the merits of the miscarriage of justice case, including consideration of the doctrine of functus officio. in the second appeal for which leave was also granted, the cbc challenges the publication ban directly. this second appeal is taken directly from the publication ban itself, and unlike the first appeal, it does not concern the order granting access to the affidavit also sought in the cbc’s motion. it raises the sole issue of whether the court of appeal was correct to order the final, indefinite publication ban made in the judgment which disposed of the merits of the appeal. [6] as to the first appeal, and so said with great respect, i do not share the court of appeal’s view that it was without jurisdiction to consider the motion brought by the cbc. it is true that, in the exercise of its appellate authority, the court of appeal could not rehear the appeal on the merits and that the doctrine of functus officio precludes it from reconsidering the substance of the appeal but after a court loses jurisdiction over the merits, it generally retains the authority to supervise access to the record of its own proceedings. even after the formal judgment on the merits is filed, this ongoing authority allows the court to ensure compliance with the constitutionally-protected open court principle and the protection of other important public interests against which it must be weighed. indeed, it is critical to upholding the responsibility all courts have to manage their records in accordance with the canadian charter of rights and freedoms and the proper administration of justice. as ancillary court openness issues have no bearing on the judgments on the merits, there was no reason for the court of appeal to tie its own hands in service of the finality of the underlying judgment that was not at risk. [7] moreover, the court of appeal had ordered the continuing publication ban in its judgment on the merits without a hearing to determine whether the open court principle should be limited in the circumstances. the court of appeal ought to have considered whether it was appropriate to set aside its publication ban on motion by the cbc in these circumstances. [8] for the reasons that follow, to dispose of the first appeal i propose that the matter should be remanded to the court of appeal to decide the cbc’s motion. that court is best placed to decide the discretionary and fact-specific issues raised, including whether the cbc should be granted standing to challenge the publication ban, whether the motion was unreasonably delayed such that it is not in the interests of justice to hear it and whether the lifting of the publication ban is justified here taking into account this court’s decision in sherman estate v. donovan, 2021 scc 25. [9] given that i propose to dispose of the first appeal by returning the matter to the court of appeal to decide the cbc’s motion, in my respectful view it would be inappropriate for this court to decide the second appeal challenging the ban directly now, before the court of appeal has had a chance to reconsider the matter. accordingly, i would adjourn the second appeal sine die. ii background and proceedings below a. the miscarriage of justice reference [10] following a jury trial in 1987, stanley ostrowski was convicted of first degree murder. he appealed the conviction unsuccessfully to the court of appeal and later this court (r v. ostrowski and correia (1989), 57 man. r (2d) 255, aff’d r v. ostrowski, [1990] 2 scr 82). [11] in 2014, the minister of justice referred the matter to the court of appeal pursuant to ss. 696.1 and 696.3(3)(a)(ii) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. these provisions allow matters to be referred back to the court of appeal in circumstances where, in the minister’s view, there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice has likely occurred. [12] certain new evidence relating to the conviction at trial in 1987 was proposed for consideration by the court of appeal upon joint motion of the crown and mr. ostrowski unusually, this included the live testimony of 12 witnesses heard before a panel of appellate justices. the crown conceded this evidence was admissible, that it proved a miscarriage of justice had occurred and, accordingly, that the 1987 conviction should be set aside. the concession was based on evidence pointing to the existence of a deal made between prosecutors and a witness whose testimony had linked mr. ostrowski to the murder the evidence had not been disclosed to mr. ostrowski at trial, violating his right to make full answer and defence. [13] the parties did not agree on the appropriate remedy for the miscarriage of justice. the crown sought a new trial order and a judicial stay of those proceedings, while mr. ostrowski asked that an acquittal be entered by the court of appeal. [14] mr. ostrowski also sought to introduce further new evidence, specifically an affidavit sworn by his lawyer, richard posner (“posner affidavit”) the affidavit contained details of certain events that had occurred after one of the 12 witnesses, md, had testified before the court of appeal in this matter. unlike the material relating to the other motion for new evidence, the crown did not consent to the posner affidavit being admitted into evidence. [15] the court of appeal heard oral argument from the parties on may 28, 2018, including submissions regarding the admissibility of the posner affidavit the affidavit was sealed, pursuant to the court of appeal rules, man. reg. 555/88r, relating to motions for new evidence, but the court of appeal nevertheless reviewed it on the consent of the parties (r 21(4)) it also ordered a publication ban respecting this material at the outset of the may 28 hearing: the court: . . . [i]n our view, unless counsel feel otherwise, there must be a publication ban. there’s no point in having the sealed material to the extent that it’s referred to in argument without a publication ban. so there will be a publication ban as well unless counsel wish to address that? ban on publication (rr (crown), at p 137) [16] as it would later concede before the court of appeal, the cbc was reporting on the proceedings, and its journalists could have attended any of the hearings, including the may 28 hearing. b. the 2018 publication ban judgment (2018 mbca 125, 369 ccc (3d) 139 — beard, burnett and pfuetzner jja) [17] the court of appeal found a miscarriage of justice as a result of the non-disclosure based on material revealed by the first motion for new evidence, accepting the concession of the crown noted above. this was sufficient to conclude the conviction should be set aside the court of appeal ultimately quashed the conviction, ordered a new trial and entered a stay of any further proceedings, and continued the publication ban indefinitely (“2018 publication ban judgment”). [18] the court declined to admit the posner affidavit as further new evidence, because it concluded that it was not relevant to the determination of the only live issue of the appropriate remedy for mr. ostrowski. instead, the evidence went to “the issue of whether there was crown misbehaviour, which was relevant to whether there had been a miscarriage of justice” (para. 82). beard ja wrote the following in concluding: “i am of the view that the evidence is not relevant to the issues to be determined and the motion should be dismissed. i would order that the publication ban regarding this evidence should remain in effect” (ibid). [19] for our purposes, it bears emphasizing that the publication ban that the court of appeal had ordered at the hearing was, in para. 82 of the court’s reasons on the merits, ordered to “remain in effect.” this was done without either a motion to that end or particularized pleadings on the appropriateness of the continuing order in light of the open court principle. the posner affidavit had been sealed pursuant to a rule of court during the proceedings on appeal (court of appeal rules, r 21(4)). that sealing order is not mentioned in the 2018 publication ban judgment. [20] a formal certificate of decision of this judgment was entered in january 2019, recording the orders on the appeal and the two new evidence motions. the certificate made no reference to a sealing order or a publication ban. c. the 2019 jurisdiction judgment (2019 mbca 122 — beard, burnett and pfuetzner jja) [21] following the disposition of the appeal on the miscarriage of justice, the cbc petitioned the court of appeal to obtain access to the posner affidavit and to ask the court to set aside the publication ban referred to in the 2018 publication ban judgment the cbc’s motion was brought in may 2019, following the release of reasons on the merits of mr. ostrowski’s appeal and the filing of the formal judgment in that matter. [22] the cbc had contacted the registrar at the court of appeal seeking access to the posner affidavit. evidence suggests the cbc received word from the court of appeal’s media relations officer alerting it to the existence of the publication ban in the days following the release of the 2018 reasons on the merits of mr. ostrowski’s appeal. however, it was over five months later that the cbc filed the above-mentioned motion. [23] the cbc relied on s 2(b) of the charter and alleged that the evidence did not support “any continued restriction on the right of the media and the public to access and report upon the full record of these [p]roceedings” (ar, at p 75). in its motion brief, the cbc emphasized its purpose to render transparent the circumstances that led to the miscarriage of justice, arguing that it was of the utmost importance that material in the posner affidavit concerning md, one of the 12 witnesses at the miscarriage of justice proceeding, be open to public scrutiny. in an affidavit filed in support of the motion, the cbc’s director of investigative journalism: regions observed that there had been no formal motion filed requesting a publication ban of the material and there was no notice to the public or the media that a ban was being sought. [24] md’s spouse, bb, and the executor of his estate, j.d (collectively, “interested parties”) opposed the cbc’s motion on jurisdictional grounds, as did the crown. noting that the certificate of decision had already been entered, the interested parties and the crown argued that the court of appeal had no authority to decide the motion by reason of the rule against rehearing in the court of appeal rules. [25] the court of appeal dismissed the motion, citing a lack of jurisdiction (“2019 jurisdiction judgment”). it explained that the cbc was seeking a rehearing of a publication ban order made as part of the final disposition of mr. ostrowski’s appeal. “[n]o rehearing of an appeal, or any issue dealt with on an appeal, can occur once the certificate of decision has been entered”, wrote pfuetzner ja for the court, relying on r 46.2 of the court of appeal rules and the common law doctrine of functus officio (para. 17 (canlii)) the certificate had been entered well before the motion was brought. the fact that the certificate did not mention the publication ban was held not to be determinative because it was “subsidiary” to the ruling on the new evidence motion and the final disposition of the appeal it was further barred by r 46.2(12), which provides a motion cannot be reheard. the court of appeal concluded that the “proper route for a third party . . . to challenge a publication ban issued by a superior court (including one issued by an appellate court) is to seek leave to appeal to the supreme court of canada” (para. 21) it dismissed the motion on this jurisdictional basis alone. iii. issues [26] as is plain from the cbc’s two applications seeking leave, the terms of the leave judgment and the arguments of the parties before us, this matter raises two distinct appeals. the cbc is appealing both from the 2019 jurisdiction judgment dismissing the motion for reconsideration, and from the 2018 publication ban judgment, which made the indefinite publication ban at issue in this case. [27] in these two appeals, the cbc seeks three orders from this court. first, the cbc asks for an order setting aside the 2019 jurisdiction judgment. it argues the court of appeal erred in concluding it had no jurisdiction to hear its motion and should have addressed the issues of whether to reconsider the publication ban and of whether the public and the press have the right to access the posner affidavit. notably, the cbc argues that neither the rule against rehearings in the court of appeal rules nor the doctrine of functus officio deprived the court of appeal of jurisdiction to consider the motion based in constitutional principles of court openness. it says that the publication ban could be reconsidered on the basis of a change in circumstances or because, as an affected party, it did not have notice of the making of this order. [28] the cbc also asks this court for a second order setting aside the continuing publication ban in the 2018 publication ban judgment and a third giving it access to the posner affidavit as part of the court record it argues the open court principle applies to material that is tendered as new evidence even if, at the end of the day, it is not admitted in this instance, it says the publication ban fails the test for discretionary limits on this principle set forth in dagenais v. canadian broadcasting corp., [1994] 3 scr 835, and r v. mentuck, 2001 scc 76, [2001] 3 scr 442. it contends further that the public is legally entitled to access the posner affidavit because the applicable rules do not provide for continued sealing of this material. mr. ostrowski adopts the cbc’s position and adds that the orders of the court of appeal preclude the proper accountability of public officials whose actions he alleges contributed to his wrongful conviction. [29] the crown takes the position that the court of appeal was right to conclude that it had no jurisdiction to consider the cbc’s motion. the crown says, however, that if the court of appeal had authority to consider these issues, this court does not have jurisdiction with respect to the publication ban and, if it does, it should decline to exercise its authority. should this court proceed to consider the merits, the crown’s position is that the court of appeal’s decision to impose a continuing publication ban was correct, even if it might have given more fulsome reasons. the material in the posner affidavit is deeply personal and speaks to intimate details about m.d that would re-traumatize the family, such that a discretionary limit on court openness was justified here. similarly, the interested parties argue that the limits on court openness are necessary to protect the privacy of md’s family and that the limit is justified given the inadmissible, irrelevant and unreliable nature of the proposed new evidence. [30] the parties raise a broad series of questions before this court bearing on jurisdiction over and the appropriateness of a publication ban or sealing order in the circumstances it is sufficient to answer the following questions to dispose of this matter: 1 did the court of appeal err in concluding it had no jurisdiction to consider the cbc’s motion to reconsider the publication ban and gain access to the posner affidavit? 2 should the matter be remanded to the court of appeal to hear the merits of that motion? [31] for the reasons that follow i am respectfully of the view, in the first appeal from the 2019 jurisdiction judgment, that the court of appeal did err on the issue of jurisdiction and that as a result the matter should be remanded to that court. this ends the analysis. the second appeal from the 2018 publication ban judgment would best not proceed until the court of appeal decides the cbc’s motion. iv analysis a. jurisdiction to make, vary and set aside orders concerning court openness (1) supervisory jurisdiction over the court record survives entering a judgment on the merits [32] in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to vary or set aside the relevant orders concerning court openness, the court of appeal relied, in part, on the doctrine of functus officio. the term functus officio — often rendered as “having performed his or her office” — has traditionally been understood to mean that once a judge decided a matter, they had discharged their office and did not have the ability to return to and correct their decision (a. s. p. wong, “doctrine of functus officio: the changing face of finality’s old guard” (2020), 98 can bar rev 543, at pp. 546-47; see a. mayrand, dictionnaire de maximes et locutions latines utilisées en droit (4th ed. 2007), at p 193, who also uses the term functa officio). [33] in its contemporary guise, functus officio indicates that a final decision of a court that is susceptible of appeal cannot, as a general rule, be reconsidered by the court that rendered that decision (see chandler v. alberta association of architects, [1989] 2 scr 848, at p 860; reekie v. messervey, [1990] 1 scr 219, at pp. 222-23; doucet-boudreau v nova scotia (minister of education), 2003 scc 62, [2003] 3 scr 3, at paras. 77-79) a court loses jurisdiction, and is thus said to be functus officio, once the formal judgment has been entered (r v. adams, [1995] 4 scr 707, at para. 29; r v. smithen-davis, 2020 onca 759, 68 cr (7th) 75, at paras. 33-34). after this point, the court is understood only to have the power to amend the judgment in very limited circumstances, such as where there is a statutory basis to do so, where necessary to correct an error in expressing its manifest intention, or where the matter has not been heard on its merits (chandler, at p 861, citing paper machinery ltd. v. jo. ross engineering corp., [1934] scr 186; r v. h (e.) (1997), 33 or (3d) 202 (ca), at pp. 214-15, citing the queen v jacobs, [1971] scr 92; see also r v. burke, 2002 scc 55, [2002] 2 scr 857, at para. 54). [34] this rule serves goals of finality and, by stabilizing judgments subject to review, of an orderly appellate procedure (chandler, at p 861; h (e.), at p 214). as doherty ja wrote in tsaoussis (litigation guardian of) v. baetz (1998), 41 or (3d) 257 (ca), for the parties to litigation, finality meets both an economic and psychological need as well as serving as a practical necessity for the system of justice as a whole (pp. 264-65) more specifically, if lower courts could continuously reconsider their own decisions, litigants would be denied a reliable basis from which to launch an appeal to a higher court (doucet-boudreau, at para. 79; see also ayangma v. french school board, 2011 peca 3, 306 nfld. & peir 103, at paras. 11-12). the appeal record would be written on “shifting sand”, ultimately inhibiting effective review (wong, at p 548). [35] that said, functus officio is only one of several legal principles designed to promote the goal of finality. indeed, given it is inherently tied to the entering of the formal judgment and its exceptions are relatively restrictive, this court has described the doctrine of functus officio as narrow in scope (reekie, at pp. 222-23; see also wong, at pp. 555-56). so, while it is an important norm recognized in our jurisprudence to serve this necessary purpose, no one rule has a monopoly on finality. [36] it is useful to distinguish between jurisdiction over the merits lost by operation of the doctrine of functus officio and jurisdiction that exists to supervise the court record. as i will endeavour to explain, even when a court has lost jurisdiction over the merits of a matter as a result of having entered its formal judgment, it retains jurisdiction to control its court record with respect to proceedings generally understood to be an ancillary but independent matter (see, eg,. gea refrigeration canada inc. v. chang, 2020 bcca 361, 43 bclr (6th) 330, at paras. 185-86). [37] supervisory authority over the court record has long been recognized as a feature of the jurisdiction of all courts (attorney general of nova scotia v. macintyre, [1982] 1 scr 175, at p 189; see also canadian broadcasting corp. v. the queen, 2011 scc 3, [2011] 1 scr 65, at para. 12) as goudge j.a observed in ctv television inc. v. ontario superior court of justice (toronto region) (2002), 59 or. (3d) 18 (ca), “it is important to remember that the court’s jurisdiction over its own records is anchored in the vital public policy favouring public access to the workings of the courts” (para. 13). specifically, courts must ensure compliance with the robust and constitutionally-protected principle of court openness, while also remaining responsive to “competing important public interests” that may be put at risk by that openness (vancouver sun (re), 2004 scc 43, [2004] 2 scr 332, at paras. 26 and 28). [38] the need to attend to the appropriate balance between these fundamental public interests does not disappear merely because the order on the merits is final and could have been appealed. court records may be accessed even when proceedings have come to an end. indeed, important decisions about the openness of the court record may need to be taken after the proceeding on the merits is over (see, eg,. r v. wagner, 2017 onsc 6603; r v. henry, 2012 bcca 374, 327 bcac 190). if jurisdiction over court openness ceased when the formal order on the merits were entered, courts would lose control over their own record without good reason. consider, for example, a case where no order limiting court openness is made before the formal judgment on the merits is entered, and a need to protect an important public interest is later discovered. in my respectful view, to conclude that this power is wholly lost once the formal order on the merits is entered would risk undermining the proper administration of justice in service of a reading of the doctrine of functus officio unconnected with its purpose. [39] recognizing that this jurisdiction survives the end of the underlying proceeding is not inconsistent with the purposes of finality and stability of judgments associated with the doctrine of functus officio. relief granted pursuant to this power leaves the substance of the underlying proceeding and the reasons that support it undisturbed while some interlocutory motions, such as motions relating to the admissibility of evidence, may have an impact on the final decision on the merits, deciding public access to the court record has no bearing on the underlying proceeding or its appeal. the doctrine of functus officio reflects the transfer of the decision-making authority in respect of final judgments from the court of first instance to the appellate court (chandler, at p 860, citing in re st. nazaire co. (1879), 12 ch. d 88). it was never intended to restrict the ability of those lower courts to control their own files in respect of these decisions. [40] to be clear, this does not mean that functus officio never applies to publication bans or sealing orders. the point is simply that a court is not precluded from deciding a motion concerning court openness merely because it is functus officio with respect to the merits of the underlying proceeding. (2) decisions regarding court openness may be reconsidered in limited circumstances [41] that courts retain supervisory jurisdiction over their court records is not to say that once decisions concerning court openness have been made they are open to reconsideration at any time or for any reason where a decision concerning court openness is formalized in an order, functus officio may apply, regardless of whether or not it is ancillary to some other proceeding. even where, as here, a decision concerning court openness is not formalized in an order, finality remains an important value in the making of publication bans and sealing orders. indeed, in this case the cbc has in fact appealed an ancillary publication ban that has never been formalized in an order. the need to provide litigants with a stable basis from which to launch an appeal — a central rationale underpinning functus officio (see doucet-boudreau, at para. 79) — can apply, even where functus officio technically does not. [42] therefore, regardless of whether a court is deprived of jurisdiction by the doctrine of functus officio, the importance of finality will mean courts will be rightly reluctant to reconsider questions of court openness. a publication ban or sealing order is, however, susceptible to reconsideration by the issuing court, albeit on narrow grounds. this will include cases where an affected party not given notice proposes to make novel submissions that could affect the result, or on the basis of a material change in circumstances this applies to both publication bans and sealing orders that are formalized in an order and those that are not. [43] central to the cbc’s claim that the court of appeal had jurisdiction to vary the 2018 publication ban is that it was made without proper notice to the press as an affected party. [44] one basis for revisiting a publication ban or sealing order may indeed arise when an affected person who was not given notice of the making of the order later seeks to vary it or have it set aside natural justice is understood to require that whenever a person is affected by a decision, they generally have the right to appropriate notice of that decision and an opportunity to be heard (supermarchés jean labrecque inc. v. flamand, [1987] 2 scr 219, at pp. 233-34). when an order is made without the submissions of an affected person because that person was not given proper notice, such as an ex parte order, the law recognizes that the court that made that order generally has authority to review it on motion of that affected person (wilson v. the queen, [1983] 2 scr 594, at p 607, citing dickie v. woodworth (1883), 8 scr. 192) this ensures that affected persons are not unfairly subjected to orders made without the benefit of their submissions (see, generally, f-o. barbeau, “rétractation du jugement”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — procédure civile i (2nd ed (loose-leaf)), by p-c. lafond, ed., fasc. 31, at no. 39) this principle also finds expression in various rules of court procedure (see, eg,. court of queen’s bench rules, man. reg. 553/88r, r 37.11 (“queen’s bench rules”)). similar principles apply to orders concerning court openness: i note for example that courts in ontario have relied on the rules of civil procedure, rro 1990, reg. 194, to decide challenges to sealing orders brought by media representatives who were not given proper notice of the hearing at which the order was made (hollinger inc. v. the ravelston corp., 2008 onca 207, 89 or (3d) 721, at para. 43, per juriansz ja, dissenting in part but not on this point). [45] to challenge an existing order concerning court openness, the moving party must qualify as an affected person to whom standing should be granted. further, where so required, that party must have acted with due dispatch in seeking to set aside the impugned order. both of these points merit brief comment in view of arguments made here. [46] first, it is important to recognize that applying this principle to publication bans or sealing orders requires some consideration of standing, because of the broad effects of such an order. insofar as a publication ban or a sealing order impinges on the open court principle, such orders can, for example, affect the public’s right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press under s 2(b) of the charter (vancouver sun, at para. 26). court openness is understood as a public good, not an interest that belongs to a particular individual or entity. further, the risks to competing important interests which justify limits on court openness must also reflect public values, even if they might be aimed at protecting particular persons (sierra club of canada v canada (minister of finance), 2002 scc 41, [2002] 2 scr 522, at para. 55) yet, in the interest of the orderly administration of justice, it cannot be that every member of the public or media entity has standing to bring an individual motion to set publication bans aside in the absence of such notice. this would make the number of parties entitled to reconsideration potentially endless. instead, as this court held in dagenais, with regard to publication bans in criminal matters, standing in these cases should be thought of as a matter of the court’s discretion (pp. 869 and 872; see also r v. white, 2008 abca 294, 93 alta. lr (4th) 239, at para. 12, aff’d toronto star newspaper ltd. v. canada, 2010 scc 21, [2010] 1 scr 721). [47] in respect of standing, an order limiting court openness engages the constitutionally-protected right of a free press to report on judicial proceedings (canadian broadcasting corp. v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 2, [2011] 1 scr 19, at para. 2; vancouver sun, at para. 26). when that order has been made in the absence of notice to the media, a representative of the media should generally have standing to challenge an order that threatens the open court principle where they are able to show that they will make submissions that were not considered in its making that could affect the result (see, generally, hollinger, at paras. 36-39). in practice, and properly in my view, standing is seldom refused to the media to participate in open court proceedings where it is sought (j. rossiter, law of publication bans, private hearings and sealing orders (loose-leaf), s 8110). equally, a person directly affected by an order concerning court openness because it might harm their individual interests should, as a matter of course, have standing to challenge that order (see, generally, ivandaeva total image salon inc. v. hlembizky (2003), 63 or (3d) 769 (ca), at para. 27). courts should nevertheless retain some residual discretion to deny standing where hearing the motion would not be in the interests of justice, as in the case, for example, that it would unduly harm the parties or merely duplicate argument that is already before the court (dagenais, at p 869; white, at para. 12; see, eg,. canadian transportation accident investigation and safety board v. canadian press (2000), 184 nsr (2d) 159 (sc), at paras. 18-21) the requirement of standing, therefore, by limiting who may challenge a publication ban or sealing order, serves the goals of finality and mirrors the discretionary approach to standing that this court has previously endorsed. [48] second, as to delay, courts may decline to hear a motion to vary or set aside an order dealing with court openness made without notice if the moving party was unreasonably slow in bringing that motion after becoming aware of the order, such that it is no longer in the interests of justice to hear it. once the moving party has become aware the order exists, they are then expected to take prompt action to challenge the order or otherwise acquiesce to its existence (see, eg, 9095-7267 québec inc. v. caisse populaire ste-thérèse-de-blainville, 2001 canlii 14878 (que. ca), at para. 46; see also rules of civil procedure, r 37.14 (ontario); code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01, art. 349 (quebec); alberta rules of court, alta reg. 124/2010, r 9.15; queen’s bench rules, r 37.11 (manitoba)). strathy j., as he then was, explained that a timeliness requirement reflects the common sense presumption that “a party who sits on his or her rights in the face of a court order has accepted the legitimacy of the order” (attorney general of ontario v 15 johnswood crescent, 2009 canlii 50751 (ont. sc), at para. 43). [49] in some instances, the legislature will provide indications of the appropriate period of delay in the absence of legislative direction, courts must be guided by the purpose of the rule and the circumstances of each case (see, generally, johnswood, at para. 45) as in other cases where courts are asked not to hear proceedings by reason of an unacceptable delay, the task is not a mechanical calculation, but rather a contextual balancing of finality and timely justice against the importance of the matter being heard on its merits (marché d’alimentation denis thériault ltée v giant tiger stores ltd., 2007 onca 695, 87 o.r (3d) 660, at para. 34; 1196158 ontario inc. v 6274013 canada ltd., 2012 onca 544, 112 or. (3d) 67, at para. 19). by way of example, under the rules of civil procedure, a period of three months to bring a motion to set aside an order dismissing the action for delay was held to be reasonable in the context of one dispute (toronto standard condominium corporation no. 2058 v. cresford developments inc., 2019 onsc 801, 97 clr (4th) 306, at para. 36), but a largely unexplained ten-month delay meant in another case that the applicant had not moved forthwith (1202600 ontario inc v. jacob, 2012 onsc 361, at paras. 102 and 121 (canlii)). in one manitoba case, a delay of five months in moving to set aside a judgment was found not to be unreasonable in the circumstances (585430 alberta ltd. v. trans canada leasing inc., 2005 mbqb 220, 196 man. r (2d) 191, at para. 56). i stress, however, that this determination is inherently tied to the facts of each particular case and the nature of the issue raised. especially where this delay has caused meaningful prejudice to the responding parties, courts may conclude it is not in the interests of justice to hear a motion this requirement safeguards finality by circumscribing reconsideration in the temporal dimension. [50] on the basis of these principles, then, and in the absence of explicit legislation to the contrary, a court may vary or set aside an order concerning court openness it has made on timely motion by an affected person who was not given notice of the making of that order and to whom it is appropriate to grant standing for this purpose. [51] to be clear, limits on court openness, such as a publication ban, can be made without prior notice to the media given the importance of the open court principle and the role of the media in informing the public about the activities of courts, it may generally be appropriate to give prior notice to the media, in addition to those persons who would be directly affected by the publication ban or sealing order, when seeking a limit on court openness (see jane doe v. manitoba, 2005 mbca 57, 192 man. r (2d) 309, at para. 24; m (a.) v. toronto police service, 2015 onsc 5684, 127 or (3d) 382 (div. ct.), at para. 6). but whether and when this notice should be given is ultimately a matter within the discretion of the relevant court (dagenais, at p 869; m (a.), at para. 5) i agree with the submissions of the attorneys general of british columbia and ontario that the circumstances in which orders limiting court openness are made vary and that courts have the requisite discretionary authority to ensure justice is served in each individual case. [52] indeed this court has explicitly recognized the discretion of courts to decide when notice to the media is required in the case of search warrants and production orders. in r v. national post, 2010 scc 16, [2010] 1 scr 477, this court held that granting a search warrant in the absence of the affected media organization was not a jurisdictional error; the issuing judge had discretion regarding the timing and modality of notice to the media (paras. 83-84). similarly, in r v. vice media canada inc., 2018 scc 53, [2018] 3 scr 374, moldaver j considered a media organization’s argument that notice of an application for a production order affecting it was required (para. 59). he rejected that submission because the criminal code explicitly provided for ex parte proceedings and the negative impact on the media was mitigated by the statutory right to apply to have the order varied or revoked at a later stage (paras. 61-62). it follows from these authorities that giving notice is not a pre-requisite to the issuance of a valid order in these circumstances at the same time, this jurisprudence does not exclude the possibility of providing notice after an order has been granted or entertaining a motion to vary or set aside an order by an affected person who was not given prior notice. [53] i also agree with the cbc that courts may exercise discretion to vary or set aside a publication ban or sealing order where the circumstances relating to the making of the order have materially changed in accordance with the principle set out by this court in adams. as sopinka j observed in that case, “[a]s a general rule, any order relating to the conduct of a trial can be varied or revoked if the circumstances that were present at the time the order was made have materially changed” (para. 30). this rule applies to orders involving court openness (see, eg,. british columbia v. bctf, 2015 bcca 185, 75 bclr (5th) 257, at paras. 15-22; morin v. r (1997), 32 or (3d) 265 (ca), at pp. 272-73). [54] i hasten to say, however, that i do not read adams to bear the meaning the cbc attributes to it in their factum. the cbc says the case was about “whether the doctrine of functus officio prevented a trial judge from rescinding a publication ban it had previously issued” and suggests that it is a case about how the doctrine of functus officio applies to ancillary orders (af, at paras. 82-83). on my understanding, adams dealt simply with the question as to when a judge could reconsider a previous order made in the course of trial. the impugned order, which purported to lift a publication ban previously made, was decided as the trial judge dismissed the charges against the accused (adams, at para. 5). this court concluded that the trial judge did not have the power to revoke the order because the circumstance that made the order mandatory had not changed (para. 31) subsequent appellate jurisprudence has interpreted the judgment to provide a general rule about varying such orders, rather than a rule about functus officio (see, eg,. bctf, at para. 22; r v. b (h.), 2016 onca 953, 345 ccc. (3d) 206, at para. 51; r v. le, 2011 mbca 83, 270 man. r (2d) 82, at para. 123). the principles in adams balance finality and flexibility even when the court is not functus officio, by permitting the reconsideration of such orders where there has been a material change of circumstances. [55] in deciding whether this rule from adams applies, i do agree that a first question for the court will be whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the making of the initial order (para. 30). the burden of establishing this change falls to the party seeking a variation in the order (see, by analogy, lmp v. ls, 2011 scc 64, [2011] 3 scr 775, at para. 31). that party must establish both that a change of circumstances has occurred and that the change, if known at the time of the initial order, would likely have resulted in an order on different terms (lmp, at para. 32; droit de la famille — 132380, 2013 qcca 1504, 37 rfl (7th) 1, at paras. 75-76; r. v. baltovitch (2000), 47 or (3d) 761 (ca), at para. 6). the correctness of the initial order is presumed and is not relevant to the existence of a material change of circumstances (lmp, at para. 33; droit de la famille — 132380, at para. 78). [56] instances in which a court may reconsider a decision respecting its court record are distinct from an appeal or application for certiorari made to a higher court from such decisions (see, generally, dagenais, at pp. 870-72). in a motion to reconsider on both grounds described above, the original court is not being asked to reconsider its decision because it is wrongly decided, but rather because it was made without relevant submissions from an affected party or on the basis of a material change in the circumstances that justified the initial decision. [57] finally, i note that the general principles considered here can, of course, be displaced by legislation, such as the applicable rules of court, designed to determine more exactly when it is appropriate to reconsider orders concerning court openness. b application to the facts of this case (1) the court of appeal erred in concluding it had no jurisdiction to consider the cbc’s motion [58] in answer to the preliminary question raised by the first appeal from the 2019 jurisdiction judgment, i turn now to whether the court of appeal erred in concluding it did not have jurisdiction to hear the cbc’s motion to gain access to the posner affidavit and set aside the publication ban. [59] the cbc submits that the court of appeal was mistaken when it declined jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of functus officio. for the cbc, the flexible approach to functus officio spoken to in adams requires ancillary orders, such as the publication ban here, to be treated separately from the merits of the main proceeding. moreover, the circumstances in which the ban was ordered had changed. it was made without notice to the affected parties and no mention in a certificate of decision of the publication ban had been entered the cbc maintains that it was not asking for a “rehearing” of the appeal or of the motion which, it recognizes, is prohibited by the court of appeal rules. in the alternative, even if the prohibition against rehearings does apply, it must be interpreted flexibly as is the case with the doctrine of functus officio. [60] the crown answers that the court of appeal rightly held it was without jurisdiction given that the formal judgment had been entered in its view, the only exception to the doctrine of functus officio that might conceivably apply here is that the cbc’s arguments were never heard on their merits. that exception, says the crown, does not apply here. while the cbc did not make submissions, it was covering the case and could have challenged the ban anytime between when the initial publication ban was made in may 2018 and when the certificate of decision was entered in january 2019. the cbc provides no proper explanation for its delay in taking action to set aside the publication ban. even if a material change of circumstances would allow the court of appeal to reconsider its order, there was no such change in this case. the court of appeal’s jurisdiction over the matter was exhausted. [61] i agree with the cbc that the court of appeal did have the authority to uphold, vary or vacate the 2018 publication ban and grant or withhold access to the court record. [62] it is best to note at the outset that appellate jurisdiction, such as that being exercised by the court of appeal in the proceeding below, must be grounded in legislation (r v. smith, 2004 scc 14, [2004] 1 scr 385, at para. 21). in addition to any explicit grant, statutory and appellate courts should be understood to have the implicit power to control their own process and exercise other powers that are practically necessary to accomplish the role the law assigns them (r v. cunningham, 2010 scc 10, [2010] 1 scr 331, at para. 19; lochner v. ontario civilian police commission, 2020 onca 720, at para. 27 (canlii)). i agree with the attorney general of british columbia that it may be unhelpful to describe this implicit authority as “inherent jurisdiction” given that appellate powers are, ultimately, rooted in statute (transcript, at pp. 100-1). [63] the legislative foundation for the court of appeal’s jurisdiction over the motion on court openness is plain here. as i have said, the supervisory jurisdiction over the court record is a feature of all courts (macintyre, at p 189) and this is no less true of an appellate court. as part of the court’s authority to control its own process, the power over the openness of proceedings and over the court record arises here by necessary implication from the legislative grant of the appellate court’s adjudicative authority (see, generally, cunningham, at para. 19). as a matter of procedural necessity — a publication ban or a sealing order may remain in place long after the substance of the appeal has been decided — this jurisdiction continues even after the formal judgment on the merits of a given appeal has been entered unless ousted by legislation. the court of appeal therefore had continuing, ancillary jurisdiction to consider the cbc’s motion regarding sealing orders and publication bans. this included implied jurisdiction to vary or vacate its orders limiting court openness in accordance with the common law principles considered above. the only remaining question is whether any applicable legislation limits this jurisdiction for the court of appeal in this case. [64] the court of appeal rules do prohibit a “rehearing of an appeal” (in french, “appel . . entendu de nouveau”) after the certificate of decision has been entered, a rule on which the court of appeal relied in this case (r 46.2(1) and (2), applicable by virtue of r 45 of the manitoba criminal appeal rules, si/92-106). this rule also prohibits the “rehearing” of motions (in french, “faire l’objet d’une nouvelle audience”) (r 462(12)). relevant portions of r 46.2 are as follows: 46.2(1) there shall be no rehearing of an appeal except by order of the court or at the instance of the court. 46.2(2) a rehearing of an appeal may be ordered before the certificate of decision has been entered. 46.2(12) there shall be no rehearing on an application for leave or a motion. [65] it is true that the certificate of decision referred to in r 46.2(2) has been entered here in respect of the appeal bearing on the miscarriage of justice. accordingly, a rehearing of mr. ostrowski’s appeal on the merits is precluded in accordance with r 46.2 similarly, any motion that had been heard in the course of the proceeding cannot now be reheard, as this is foreclosed by r 462(12). [66] but these rules did not deprive the court of appeal of the ability to hear the cbc’s motion concerning court openness. this is certainly not a “rehearing of an appeal” as contemplated by r 46.2(1) and (2). the cbc brought a motion concerning access to the court file and did not seek to reopen the miscarriage of justice proceeding itself. interpreting the prohibition against rehearing an appeal as precluding the court of appeal from hearing a motion concerning court openness, distinct from the merits of the appeal, is not plain from the text. the appeal is not to be “entendu de nouveau”, to advert to the french text of r 46.2(1) and (2). nor does it accord with the purpose of rules prohibiting rehearings of the appeal that reflect the same core objectives of finality and stability of judgments associated with the doctrine of functus officio (see doucet-boudreau, at para. 79). there is nothing in r 46.2 that prevents the cbc from seeking ancillary orders related to court openness after the certificate of decision has been entered on the merits. [67] similarly, the prohibition on the rehearing of motions in r 46.2(12) cannot be interpreted to prohibit the cbc from moving to set aside the publication ban made without notice and which affects the open court principle. the impugned order was made of the court of appeal’s own accord, with the consent of the parties, at the oral hearing and then continued indefinitely in para. 82 of the 2018 publication ban judgment. the court heard no submissions on point and provided no prior notice to anyone, including the media, notably the cbc who learned of the impugned ban shortly after the reasons were released. the cbc was not asking the court of appeal for a “rehearing” of a motion the idea of a “rehearing” spoken to in r 46.2 necessarily implies there was an original hearing and that the court would be hearing the same motion again, as the french (“nouvelle audience”) in r 46.2 makes plain. [68] instead, the cbc brought an altogether new motion to set aside the 2018 publication ban made in its absence this may engage, as the cbc suggests, a fundamental principle of the administration of justice that parties affected by orders be given the opportunity to be heard. there is nothing in the text of r 46(12) that modifies the generally applicable rule allowing the court of appeal to vary or rescind its publication ban or sealing order on motion from an affected person not given notice of the making of the order. [69] the cbc also argued that the court of appeal should have taken up its rightful jurisdiction to vary the publication ban covering the posner affidavit because there had been a material change of circumstances. [70] i disagree i think it should be recorded that the cbc did not, in the proceedings below, establish a material change of circumstances. [71] while it may be the case that the finding of a miscarriage of justice by the court of appeal increased the public interest in the materials, that conclusion was made in the 2018 publication ban judgment in which the continuation of the publication ban was ordered. it cannot, therefore, be a change of circumstances that has occurred since the impugned order was made, as is required (adams, at para. 30; lmp, at para. 31). [72] equally, the subsequent appearance of the cbc in the proceedings as a party did not constitute, in itself, a material change in circumstances assuming the initial order was correctly made, as one must at this stage (lmp, at para. 33), and recognizing that the cbc did not make submissions on the initial order, in my view the cbc’s mere presence would not likely have resulted in a different outcome for the purposes of the applicable test. this is not to exclude the possibility that, had the cbc made submissions, the result might have been different but acknowledging this possibility requires one to consider whether the court of appeal may have erred in applying the relevant test without the benefit of the cbc’s argument. this is contrary to the well-established principle that one must not consider the possibility that the original court erred when determining whether a material change has occurred (lmp, at para. 33). the court of appeal is therefore presumed at this stage to have balanced the interest of the media in open court proceedings with competing public interests even in the absence of a representative of the press, as is required (mentuck, at para. 38). the cbc’s absence at the making of the initial order is more properly considered in reference to the principles relating to orders made without notice to an affected party, since it is a lost opportunity to make submissions, and not in reference to a change in the circumstances relied on by the court of appeal. [73] in sum, the court of appeal erred in concluding that r 46.2 or the doctrine of functus officio deprived it of jurisdiction to hear the cbc’s motion. said respectfully, the court of appeal’s interpretation of these principles was unnecessary to protect the values of finality and orderly appellate review it had an adverse impact on the opportunity of the media to make representations in respect of this order limiting the open court principle. the better view is that the court of appeal retained jurisdiction to oversee its record even after the certificate of decision in the underlying proceeding on the merits was entered. (2) the matter should be remanded to the court of appeal [74] that the court of appeal had jurisdiction to consider the cbc’s motion and its request for access to the posner affidavit, does not mean, of course, that the cbc is entitled to the relief it sought the availability of relief turns on the proper application of the law to the facts here, a determination that would be best made at first instance by the court of appeal. [75] in respect of the publication ban, the cbc will rely on the court of appeal’s power to rescind an order on the basis that it was made without notice to an affected party. as a preliminary matter, the court of appeal must determine, in keeping with the principles sketched above, whether the cbc has standing to challenge the relevant order. this initial hurdle, which the cbc must clear, serves to restrict the scope of those who are able to challenge an order made without notice to the media to those representatives who were deprived of the ability to make useful submissions that may have affected the result. [76] the cbc will also be required to show that the delay from the time it became aware of the impugned order to the time it filed its motion in may 2019 was not unreasonable i note that the crown argues the cbc ought to have brought its motion earlier in response to questions from my colleagues at the oral hearing, the cbc rightly conceded it knew of the publication ban shortly after the 2018 publication ban judgment was released. its delay in bringing the motion was in the order of six months. while the matter was not advanced by the crown as a basis for dismissing the appeal, at the hearing before this court the cbc did say the delay was justified in the circumstances, pointing to initial confusion as to the nature of the order, and asserted the public interest in deciding this open court issue that affects the rights of all canadians. [77] turning to the substance of the cbc’s motion, any discretionary limits on access to and publication of the contents of the court record must be understood in reference to the test from sierra club as recently recast by this court in sherman. court proceedings are presumptively open to the public (ab v. bragg communications inc., 2012 scc 46, [2012] 2 scr 567, at para. 11). a court can order discretionary limits on openness only where (1) openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest, (2) the order sought is necessary to prevent that risk and (3) the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects (sherman, at para. 38, citing sierra club, at para. 53). [78] before this court, both the crown and md’s family invoke the privacy and dignity of the interested parties as an important public interest that would be threatened if the publication ban was lifted. the cbc answers that the interests raised are merely personal, without the public component required to displace the open court principle. much like in sherman, the parties’ disagreement is rooted in the inherent tension between the open court principle and what dickson j., as he then was, once described as competing “superordinate” values (macintyre, at pp. 186-87) both privacy and court openness have been recognized in law as pillars of a free and democratic society (canadian broadcasting corp v new brunswick (attorney general), [1996] 3 scr 480, at para. 23; lavigne v canada (office of the commissioner of official languages), 2002 scc 53, [2002] 2 scr 773, at para. 25). if open courts are to remain the rule rather than the exception, some degree of privacy loss for those whose lives are the subject of litigation is inevitable. but circumstances do exist where openness poses a serious risk to an aspect of privacy that evinces an important public interest. [79] the court of appeal did not have the advantage of considering the judgment of this court in sherman where it was held that there is an important public interest in a narrower dimension of privacy concerning the protection of individual dignity. in order to show a serious risk to this interest, an individual must establish that the information about them that would be disseminated as a result of court openness is sufficiently sensitive such that it strikes at their biographical core, revealing something “intimate and personal about the individual, their lifestyle or their experiences” (sherman, at paras. 73-77, 79 and 85). if they succeed, the question becomes whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, court openness poses a risk to individual dignity that strikes meaningfully at this important public interest. a serious risk need not be supported by direct evidence but may be reasonably inferred on the basis of available circumstantial facts (bragg, at paras. 15-16) if the party succeeds in establishing this serious risk, they must then show that the order they seek is necessary to prevent the risk and that the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects, including the effects on constitutionally-protected court openness (sierra club, at para. 53). [80] the parties disagree about the extent to which the test for discretionary limits on court openness applies to determine access to and publication of the posner affidavit the cbc argued that the sealing order that applied to the affidavit by operation of the court of appeal rules ended once the new evidence motion was dismissed. the crown took the position that the relevant rule is silent on what happens to material under seal after a new evidence motion is dismissed such that the court of appeal was entitled not to enter the proposed evidence into the public record. as for the publication ban covering the details of this evidence, the cbc argued that it fails the test for discretionary limits on court openness, which it says applies even though the posner affidavit was ultimately not admitted into evidence the crown and the interested parties stressed instead the posner affidavit’s alleged irrelevance as a factor in this analysis. [81] for two reasons, i conclude that any limits on access to or publication of the posner affidavit in this case must meet the generally applicable test for discretionary limits on court openness. first, i agree with the cbc that r 21(4) of the court of appeal rules does not provide for a permanent sealing order over the posner affidavit. rule 21(4), which specifies that the new evidence remains sealed “until the motion is decided”, explicitly anticipates that the sealing prescribed by this rule will cease once there is a decision this decision occurred when the new evidence motion was dismissed there is nothing in the rule to indicate that the seal is to protect the information from public dissemination and that this is meant to extend indefinitely after the motion is decided. in my view, r 21 does not continue to seal the posner affidavit. [82] second, the fact that the posner affidavit was not admitted as new evidence for the purposes of the miscarriage of justice proceeding should not shield the publication ban from review. the crown submits that the court of appeal’s “practice” not to admit such evidence into the court registry fills the silence in r 21(4). but an administrative practice cannot have the effect of taking this matter outside the scope of the test for discretionary limits on the open court principle. court openness serves to maintain the legitimacy of the exercise of judicial power — including the decision to dismiss the motion for new evidence — by allowing the public to scrutinize this exercise in service of ensuring that justice is being dispensed fairly (vancouver sun, at para. 25). public access to the court record facilitates this scrutiny (edmonton journal v. alberta (attorney general), [1989] 2 scr 1326, at p 1339, per cory j). [83] consistent with this purpose, all materials that are made available to the court for the purposes of deciding the case — in other words, for the purposes of exercising its judicial power — are subject to the open court principle (see canadian broadcasting corp. v. r., 2010 onca 726, 102 or (3d) 673, at paras. 42-44; see also aboriginal peoples television network v alberta (attorney general), 2018 abca 133, 70 alta. lr (6th) 246, at para. 48). in this case, the court of appeal had before it a motion to admit the posner affidavit as new evidence. with the consent of the parties, the court reviewed that affidavit in considering the motion. while the court ultimately declined to admit it, the affidavit was considered in deciding the new evidence motion. it follows that any discretionary limit on access to or publication of the posner affidavit must meet the requirements affirmed in sierra club and sherman. [84] in sum, to the extent the requested relief required it to reconsider its publication ban, the court of appeal should have asked whether it was appropriate to vary or set aside that decision on motion by the cbc given it was made without notice. on the substance of the motion, the court of appeal should have considered whether any discretionary limits it imposed on publication of the court record, which includes the posner affidavit, complied with the test for discretionary limits on court openness. [85] the remaining question is which court should decide these issues raised in the context of the first appeal from the 2019 jurisdiction judgment. i recall that the crown suggests that if the court of appeal had jurisdiction to hear the motion for reconsideration, it follows that this court does not. it argues that in this scenario the publication ban is not a “final or other judgment of . . . the highest court of final resort” for the purposes of s 40(1) of the supreme court act, rsc 1985, c. s-26, under which leave to appeal in this matter was granted. [86] i disagree. the court of appeal’s reconsideration of its publication ban is not, as we have seen, an appeal of the publication ban order. the only route of appeal from either the court of appeal’s 2018 publication ban judgment or the 2019 jurisdiction judgment was to this court with leave pursuant to s 40(1) of the supreme court act (see, generally, dagenais, at p 872) accordingly, i have no difficulty concluding that both were “final or other judgment[s] of . . . the highest court of final resort” from which this court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal with leave (see, generally, mentuck, at paras. 20-21). [87] that said, i am of the view that fairness to all the parties requires that we remand the motion that resulted in the 2019 jurisdiction judgment to the court of appeal. the remaining issues raised are best decided by the court of appeal. the court of appeal ended its analysis after concluding it was functus officio and we do not have the benefit of any reasons below on these issues. as i have noted above, the motion required the court of appeal to make several discretionary decisions: whether to grant the cbc standing, whether to hear the motion given the delay, and ultimately whether to uphold a discretionary limit on the openness of its own record. these are decisions the court of appeal is best placed to make given they are intimately connected to the facts and procedural history of this case, in which that court effectively acted as a court of first instance. [88] in my view, it is not in the interests of justice for this court to step into the court of appeal’s shoes and decide these matters at first instance. this is quite different from considering such issues on appeal through the deferential lens this court would take in reviewing the exercise of discretion below (see r v regan, 2002 scc 12, [2002] 1 scr 297, at para. 117). other appellate courts have been rightly cautious to dictate to lower courts in this way (see, eg,. gea refrigeration, at para. 184). [89] i note as well that the issue of delay was not fully argued before this court and we are therefore not well placed to come to the appropriate balance in this case in any event. this court has remanded matters to the court of appeal where a question was not addressed below and the record and arguments are “too sparse to . . . resolve the matter confidently” (see, eg,. galambos v. perez, 2009 scc 48, [2009] 3 scr. 247, at para. 46). the cbc did not raise the issue in its factum because it considered the issue to have been resolved when we granted its motions for extensions of time to seek leave to appeal. while the crown pointed to the delay in passing, it never argued the appeal bearing on the motion for reconsideration could be dismissed on that basis alone. this further militates towards remanding the matter. [90] even if this court were to exercise its jurisdiction to decide these issues, it does not have the benefit of submissions from the parties on how the principles from sherman outlined above apply to these facts. that decision was released only after this matter had been heard and, in my view, fairness would require further submissions from the parties with respect to its impact on the issue at hand this court had previously considered privacy in the context of this test in bragg, but was clear that it was not a question of privacy without more but was combined with “the relentlessly intrusive humiliation of sexualized online bullying” (para. 14). [91] sherman provided an opportunity for this court to confront this issue directly from a distinct perspective the court of appeal had identified privacy interests as mere personal concerns that could not “without more” justify a limit on court openness (sherman, at para. 18) this court concluded on appeal that it was “inappropriate . . to dismiss the public interest in protecting privacy as merely a personal concern” (para. 52), and went on to recognize that “privacy understood in relation to dignity is an important public interest for the purposes of the test” (para. 86). [92] of course, it is not uncommon that this court clarifies the law in an appeal, or series of appeals heard together, and then applies that clarified law to those appeals. but the situation here is different because these parties were not heard in settling the approach taken in sherman. that they would also not be heard on how this approach applies on the facts of their case would be fundamentally unfair to them, not to mention a disadvantage to this court in deciding the matter the need for these further submissions on sherman attenuates any judicial economy that would be gained by deciding the matter here rather than remanding it below. [93] i recognize, as the crown argued at the hearing, that remanding the matter will prolong the period of uncertainty for the interested parties as to whether the publication ban will ultimately be set aside. it is important to remember, however, that the interested parties will continue to benefit from the publication ban they say is necessary to protect their privacy in the interim. [94] this is a completely different situation from cases such as saadati v. moorhead, 2017 scc 28, [2017] 1 scr 543, and wells v. newfoundland, [1999] 3 scr 199, where it had been approximately a decade since the impugned conduct that was the subject of the litigation and this court had the benefit of a reasonable decision supported by the record and made by the appropriate first instance decision-maker (saadati, at para. 45; wells, at para. 68) in this case, the publication ban that is the subject of these proceedings was made less than three years ago and we have no decision from a first instance decision-maker on the motion, let alone a reasonable one. [95] in the circumstances, the value of shortening this period of uncertainty does not outweigh the importance of fairness to all parties, served by ensuring the matter is decided by the appropriate first instance decision-maker and with the benefit of appropriate submissions. [96] i would therefore allow the appeal from the 2019 jurisdiction judgment and remand the matter to the court of appeal to decide the cbc’s motion in accordance with these reasons (supreme court act, s 461). [97] the second appeal from the 2018 publication ban judgment itself presents a procedural complication. as i mentioned above, the cbc sought and was granted leave not only from the dismissal of its motion for reconsideration, but also directly from the publication ban this is plain from the leave judgment and the parties specifically argued both appeals before this court. that appeal raises a single remaining issue concerning the legality of the publication ban as an exception to the open court principle. [98] in light of my conclusion that the court of appeal did have jurisdiction to hear the cbc’s motion, i would not decide the issues raised in the appeal from the 2018 publication ban judgment before the court of appeal has decided the motion for reconsideration i note that appellate courts in similar circumstances have generally insisted that recourse be sought at the original court before hearing an appeal (see, eg,. secure 2013 group inc. v. tiger calcium services inc., 2017 abca 316, 58 alta. lr. (6th) 209, at paras. 54-55; gea refrigeration, at para. 184). similarly, in this case, it is not in the interests of justice to consider the appeal from the 2018 publication ban judgment before the cbc’s motion is decided, given this appeal could be rendered moot as a consequence of that proceeding we are accordingly not in a useful or informed position to dismiss or allow the second appeal. [99] nor would it be appropriate to remand this appeal in whole to the court of appeal. unlike remanding the 2019 jurisdiction judgment to the court of appeal to reconsider the publication ban following submissions from an affected party not given notice, which as i noted earlier is distinct from an appeal, returning the 2018 publication ban judgment to the court of appeal would require it to sit in appeal of its own publication ban. [100] it follows, in the unusual circumstances of this case, that the appeal from the 2018 publication ban judgment should be adjourned sine die pending determination of the motion for reconsideration at the court of appeal (see, eg,. canadian planning and design consultants inc. v. libya (state), 2015 onca 661, 340 oac 98, at para. 61). i note that if the court of appeal engages with the merits of the publication ban and the 2018 publication ban judgment appeal is then reopened, then those reasons will be before this court and it will benefit from them as it decides this appeal. [101] this court heard appeals thus both directly from a judgment and, simultaneously, from the denial of reconsideration of that same judgment. leave was granted from both judgments here, a fact that has created the procedural difficulty, but this difficulty is not insurmountable appellate courts have used the sine die adjournment to deal with appeals identified as premature due to ongoing proceedings below which ought to be completed before the appeal is heard (libya, at para. 83; gray v. gray, 2017 onca 100, 137 or (3d) 65, at para. 33; mk engineering inc. v. assn. of professional engineers and geoscientists of alberta appeal board, 2014 abca 58, 68 admin l.r (5th) 135, at para. 22; aleong v aleong, 2013 bcca 299, 340 bcac 44, at para. 47). this is more than a procedural concern here: we cannot, in my respectful view, dismiss the second appeal now without conflating the issues at stake on reconsideration of the 2019 jurisdiction judgment and those at play in a direct appeal of the 2018 publication ban judgment. [102] finally, even if it were appropriate for this court to decide the reasonableness of the cbc’s delay in bringing its motion, and even if its view was that the motion should have been dismissed on this basis, that conclusion alone would be insufficient to dismiss the appeal directly from the 2018 publication ban judgment. this court granted leave to appeal, and an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, directly from this separate judgment i am of the respectful view that it would be inappropriate to effectively reverse these decisions or retroactively limit their scope. if this court sought only to dispose of the reconsideration issues raised in the appeal from the 2019 jurisdiction judgment, it could have granted leave from that judgment alone. but it granted leave from both judgments. [103] the cbc has not acquiesced in the 2018 publication ban judgment from which it appeals directly to this court and, with respect for other views, this second appeal has not “lost its raison d’être” (canadian cablesystems (ontario) ltd v. consumers’ association of canada, [1977] 2 scr 740, at pp 744 and 747) the question it raises is whether the publication ban should be set aside, which is an ongoing issue of live controversy between the parties, and which is distinct from the appropriateness of the reconsideration raised in the appeal from the 2019 jurisdiction judgment. there is no basis to say this second appeal has become moot. [104] unlike in the first appeal bearing on the reconsideration motion, in the direct appeal from the 2018 publication ban judgment there is no preliminary issue about the delay in bringing the motion, a motion that was not even filed before this judgment was rendered. the only issue in this second appeal is the validity of the final and indefinite publication ban imposed in the 2018 publication ban judgment, which requires the application of the test for discretionary limits on court openness. to resolve this issue now, this court would have to advert to and apply this test, including, with proper submissions, the recent judgment of this court in sherman. in my respectful view, that task should not be undertaken until the motion for reconsideration is resolved by the court of appeal. v conclusion [105] i would allow the appeal from the 2019 jurisdiction judgment of the court of appeal, set aside that judgment, and remand the matter to that court to decide the cbc’s motion in accordance with these reasons. [106] i would adjourn the appeal from the 2018 publication ban judgment of the court of appeal sine die. i would order that if no motion for directions is filed in this court within 30 days after the date of the judgment of the court of appeal deciding the matter remanded to it in accordance with these reasons, the appeal will be dismissed as abandoned. [107] the cbc does not request costs of these appeals and i would make no order as to costs. the following are the reasons delivered by abella j — [108] these appeals involve a request by a member of the media to reconsider a publication ban after the underlying proceedings have ended. while i generally agree with justice kasirer’s analysis of the “notice” issues, i do not share his view that the appeal should be remanded to the manitoba court of appeal for disposition. [109] as this court has repeatedly stressed, the media is a crucial voice in protecting and promoting the openness of courts that is why the media’s right to challenge orders like publication bans is undisputed and why the courts have the discretion to give them notice of publication ban hearings. in dagenais v. canadian broadcasting corp., [1994] 3 scr 835, this court clearly stated that members of the media are “third parties” and that notice remains “in the discretion of the judge to be exercised in accordance with the provincial rules of criminal procedure and the relevant case law” (p 869). [110] but once the underlying proceedings are over, the doctrine of functus officio means as a general rule that a final decision cannot be reconsidered by the court that rendered the decision. in r v. adams, [1995] 4 scr 707, sopinka j recognized that the application of functus officio is “less formalistic and more flexible” in respect of ancillary orders including publication bans (para. 29). it is therefore imperative to maintain circumscribed avenues through which the media can ask a court to reconsider a publication ban after the underlying proceedings are over. [111] the rationales underlying the doctrine of functus officio show that it has a role to play in respect of publication ban orders, even when those orders are ancillary to the underlying proceedings. functus officio is “commonly described as a ‘rule about finality’” (a. s. p wong, “doctrine of functus officio: the changing face of finality’s old guard” (2020), 98 can bar rev 543, at p 549, citing nova scotia government and general employees union v capital district health authority (2006), 246 nsr (2d) 104 (ca), at para. 36). as doherty ja observed in tsaoussis (litigation guardian of) v. baetz (1998), 41 or (3d) 257 (ca):. finality is an important feature of our justice system, both to the parties involved in any specific litigation and on an institutional level to the community at large. for the parties, it is an economic and psychological necessity. for the community, it places some limitation on the economic burden each legal dispute imposes on the system and it gives decisions produced by the system an authority which they could not hope to have if they were subject to constant reassessment and variation . the parties and the community require that there be a definite and discernible end to legal disputes. there must be a point at which the parties can proceed on the basis that the matter has been decided and their respective rights and obligations have been finally determined. without a discernible end point, the parties cannot get on with the rest of their lives secure in the knowledge that the issue has finally been determined, but must suffer the considerable economic and psychological burden of indeterminate proceedings in which their respective rights and obligations are revisited and reviewed as circumstances change. [pp. 264-65] [112] finality is important, in part, because it provides a stable basis for an appeal (doucet-boudreau v nova scotia (minister of education), [2003] 3 scr 3, at para. 79). but finality is also important because it provides economic and psychological security to parties who are dragged into the justice system, including those impacted by publication ban decisions. [113] it has been settled since adams that publication ban orders, which are ancillary to the underlying proceedings, “can be varied or revoked if the circumstances that were present at the time the order was made have materially changed” (para. 30; r v. henry (2012), 327 bcac 190, at para. 11; british columbia v. bctf (2015), 75 bclr (5th) 257 (ca), at para. 22) the change must “relate to a matter that justified the making of the order in the first place” and the moving party must act “at the earliest opportunity” after the change in circumstances occurs (adams, at para. 30, citing r v. khela, [1995] 4 scr 201, at pp. 210-11). i agree with the majority that a material change in circumstances cannot be established in this case. [114] in the absence of a material change, trial and appellate courts have recognized that the media are “affected by” orders relating to court openness, meaning that they can generally apply for reconsideration when such an order is issued without notice (see eg. hollinger inc. v. the ravelston corp. (2008), 89 or (3d) 721 (ca), at para. 43, and cases cited therein). as justice kasirer confirms, this approach applies if the media can show that their submissions are made with “due dispatch” and “prompt action”, could make a material difference to the outcome and that the nature of those submissions was not originally considered by the court that issued the ban. the courts have discretion to decide whether it is in the interests of justice to reopen a publication ban under such circumstances. [115] these two avenues for after-the-fact media challenges to publication bans reflect the fact that the media is indispensable to court openness but the applicable tests also take the concept of finality seriously. at a certain point, the parties are entitled to move on with their lives and to be protected from the psychological and financial costs of being dragged back into the justice system when a case is over. [116] that is why reconsideration of a publication ban must be sought in a timely manner, and why a publication ban should not generally be reconsidered after the main proceedings have ended unless there is a sound basis for believing the media’s application is in the public interest and could reasonably lead to a different result. it is a balancing exercise, not a hierarchical grid, between the interests underlying finality and the interests in support of the open court principle. [117] in balancing these principles, and with great respect, i come to a different conclusion from the majority on whether to remand the matter to the manitoba court of appeal. [118] as noted, the cbc is unable to establish a material change in circumstances under adams. as a result, the only basis on which it could move for reconsideration once the proceedings are over is by showing that the publication ban was issued without notice, that its submissions could make a material difference to the outcome, and that it moved for reconsideration in a timely manner. none of these conditions has been met in this case. [119] to start, the cbc’s argument that the publication ban was issued without notice is difficult to accept in the circumstances. at the hearing before the manitoba court of appeal, counsel for the cbc candidly admitted that the cbc was reporting on the ostrowski case throughout the course of the proceedings. and before this court, counsel confirmed that the cbc had a representative in the courtroom when the publication ban was originally ordered on may 28, 2018. at no point in the intervening period between the original publication ban order and its continuation in the court of appeal’s reasons of november 27, 2018 did the cbc attempt to assert its interests. [120] in any event, it is not clear to me what further “notice” would be required in such circumstances. courts do not issue formal invitations to their hearings — the courtroom is, and should be, open to all, including and especially the media if the media is present in the courtroom when a publication ban is issued, it follows that it knows of its existence. that is what notice is supposed to be for. [121] nor has the cbc discharged its burden of showing that its proposed submissions could make a material difference in the outcome. it is well-established that courts issuing publication bans are expected to consider the importance of the open court principle, even in the absence of a media representative making submissions (r. v. mentuck, [2001] 3 scr 442, at para. 38). there is no reason to assume that did not happen in this case. the cbc does not propose to advance a new or unique position or to introduce evidence of which the court of appeal was unaware. it simply wishes to argue that the open court principle outweighs the interests supporting the ban, a foundational submission that the court of appeal is presumed to have already considered. furthermore, having heard the cbc’s complete argument on the propriety of the publication ban in this court, i find it difficult to see how its submissions could make a difference in the result. [122] more significantly, and relatedly, the cbc’s failure to act in a timely manner is, in my respectful view, determinative. the publication ban was originally ordered on may 28, 2018 and was continued by the court of appeal in its reasons for judgment on november 27, 2018 but the cbc did not file its motion for reconsideration until may 10, 2019, over five months later and it did not file its application to this court for leave to appeal the original publication ban until january 27, 2020, nearly two years after the ban was first imposed and well over a year after it was continued in the november 2018 reasons for judgment. [123] the cbc has suggested that its delay can be explained in part by its confusion as to the nature and scope of the publication ban, resulting in communications with the court of appeal to determine precisely what was prohibited. [124] the correspondence between the cbc and the manitoba court of appeal following the november 27, 2018 reasons demonstrates clearly that this is hardly a robust explanation on november 30, 2018, the executive assistant to the chief justices and the chief judge informed the cbc that the media was entitled to review the material “protected by the ban on publication”, but that the actual fresh evidence affidavit was not available for review because the fresh evidence was not filed with the court after the motion was dismissed. after some further clarifying correspondence, by january 21, 2019, the registrar had spelled out in unmistakeable terms that “at the outset of proceedings on may 28, 2018, the [c]ourt imposed a publication ban preventing the publication of any of the details of the proposed fresh evidence in paragraph 82 of the reasons, the [c]ourt ordered that the publication ban would remain in effect”. yet it took the cbc another four months to file a motion for reconsideration. [125] it is useful to put this delay in perspective by reference to some timelines provided for by manitoba’s court of appeal rules, man. reg. 555/88r. if a party to an appeal before the court of appeal wants a rehearing before the certificate of decision has been entered, they presumptively have 30 days to file a motion after reasons for judgment are delivered (r 462(4)). if the appellant fails to file its factum in accordance with the timelines set out in the rules, its appeal will be deemed to be abandoned 30 days after the appellant receives notice from the registrar (r 33(4)). these timelines are a legislated acknowledgement of the importance of timeliness in the resolution of court cases. [126] an unexplained six month delay for filing a motion to have a publication ban reconsidered — even a four month delay, on a charitable interpretation of when the cbc had full and complete notice of the nature of the publication ban — is inordinate. under no definition of “due dispatch” or “prompt action” can this delay be justified, particularly since the cbc was fully aware — and present — from the outset of the proceedings, the ban, and the ban’s continuation. on the other hand, the delay in this case causes acute harm to the family, who reasonably expected that their privacy and dignity interests were protected by the finality of the proceedings and that they would not be brought back to court. i see no reason to prolong their distress further. [127] while it is true that the cbc’s appeal directly from the publication ban technically came to this court on a separate application for leave to appeal from that of its appeal from the court of appeal’s refusal to reconsider that ban, both appeals ultimately seek the same relief: that the publication ban be set aside in the unique context of this case, it makes sense that leave was granted concurrently in both appeals since the ultimate relief sought in both was the same. moreover, the legal question of when the media can reopen a publication ban order after the case is over raised an issue of “public importance” requiring this court’s guidance (supreme court act, rsc. 1985, c. s-26, s 40(1)). [128] since, in my respectful view, the cbc was not entitled to reconsideration of the publication ban as a result of its undue and unjustified delay, it would be incongruous to conclude that the impact of the cbc’s delay is different for its appeal from the ban itself and for the appeal from the reconsideration motion the reconsideration appeal is an appeal of that same ban it would be the triumph of procedural formalism over substantive reality to pretend that these are two different and unrelated legal issues requiring separate conceptual consideration. an undue delay in one is an undue delay in the other. [129] as for how to deal with this court’s recently released decision in sherman estate v donovan, 2021 scc 25, it was open to the majority to seek further submissions based on the sherman reasons. this would have been more consistent with this court’s usual practice in dealing with appeals of publication bans, namely, deciding them in our court rather than remanding them back to the issuing court. it would also have curtailed the prolongation of these proceedings in any event, with respect, i do not see anything in the sherman decision of such determinative relevance to the cbc’s interests that it justified ignoring the unjustified delay. [130] this court retains a narrow discretion to refuse to entertain the merits of an appeal even after leave has been granted as laskin c.j wrote for the court in canadian cablesystems (ontario) ltd. v. consumers’ association of canada, [1977] 2 scr 740, although it will be rarely that this court, leave having been granted, will thereafter refuse to entertain the appeal on the merits, its power to do so is undoubted . . . . [p 742] this is one of those rare cases where the interests of justice warrant a refusal to entertain the appeal on the merits. [131] i would dismiss the appeals. appeal from motion to set aside publication ban allowed appeal from publication ban adjourned sine die. abella j dissenting.
[1] rowe j. — the appellants, mr. ramy and rody yared, are the liquidators of the succession of their sis- ter, ms. taky yared, who passed away in april 2015. in july 2016, they sought a declaration in superior court that the value of the family residence should be included in the division of the family patrimony. at the time of ms. yared’s death, this residence was held under a trust controlled by her husband, the re- spondent mr. roger karam. version française du jugement du juge en chef wagner et des juges abella, brown, rowe et martin rendu par [1] le juge rowe — les appelants, mm. ramy et rody yared, sont les liquidateurs de la succes- sion de leur sœur, mme taky yared, qui est décédée en avril 2015. en juillet 2016, ils ont sollicité auprès de la cour supérieure un jugement déclaratoire se- lon lequel la valeur de la résidence familiale devrait être incluse dans le partage du patrimoine familial. au moment du décès de mme yared, cette résidence était détenue par une fiducie contrôlée par son mari, m. roger karam, l’intimé. [2] the question raised by this case concerns the proper interaction between these two institutions of quebec civil law: the family patrimony created by art. 414 of the civil code of québec (“ccq” or “civil code”) and the trust under art 1260 ccq. in substance, this court must decide if the value of a family residence held under a trust controlled by one of the spouses is included in the family patri- mony, even in the absence of fraud or bad faith. the trial judge declared that the value of the residence was to be included in the family patrimony, relying on an analogy with the lifting of the corporate veil at art 317 ccq and on the “rights which confer use” of art 415 ccq. the court of appeal reversed [2] la question soulevée en l’espèce concerne l’in- teraction appropriée entre les deux institutions du droit civil québécois que sont le patrimoine familial créé par l’art. 414 du code civil du québec (« ccq » ou « code civil ») et la fiducie décrite à l’art. 1260 du ccq. essentiellement, la cour doit décider si la valeur d’une résidence familiale détenue par une fiducie contrôlée par l’un des époux est incluse dans le patrimoine familial, même en l’absence de fraude ou de mauvaise foi. se fondant sur une analogie entre la levée du voile corporatif dont il est question à l’art. 317 du ccq et la mention à l’art. 415 du ccq des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage », le juge de première instance a déclaré que la valeur de 506 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. that decision and declared that no value from the family residence ought to be included in the family patrimony. [3] the trial judge did not err in his conclusion. although i would not rely on art 317 ccq by analogy, in my view the “rights which confer use” of the family residence at art 415 ccq provided a sound basis for him to declare that the value of the residence ought to be included in the family patri- mony. absent an overriding and palpable error in his determination that mr. karam held “rights which confer use” within the meaning of art 415 ccq, it was not open to the court of appeal to overturn this decision on appeal. i would therefore set aside the decision of the court of appeal and reinstate the declaratory relief granted by the trial judge. la résidence devait être incluse dans le patrimoine familial. la cour d’appel a infirmé cette décision et déclaré qu’aucune valeur attribuable à la résidence familiale ne devait être incluse dans le patrimoine familial. [3] le juge de première instance n’a pas tiré de conclusion erronée. bien que je ne m’appuierais pas sur l’art. 317 du ccq par analogie, j’estime que les « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » de la résidence familiale dont il est question à l’art. 415 du ccq. constituaient une assise solide pour conclure que la valeur de la résidence devait être incluse dans le patrimoine familial. en l’absence d’une erreur ma- nifeste et dominante dans la conclusion du juge de première instance selon laquelle m. karam détenait des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq, il n’était pas loisible à la cour d’appel d’infirmer cette décision en appel. je suis donc d’avis d’annuler l’arrêt de la cour d’appel et de rétablir le jugement déclaratoire rendu par le juge de première instance. i facts i faits [4] the respondent, mr.  karam and ms.  yared were married in 1998. they had four children, born between 2001 and 2010. in august 2011, the karam family moved to montreal following the announce- ment of tragic news. ms. yared was diagnosed with an incurable cancer and her days were numbered. in light of this, mr. karam set up a trust to protect the family assets for the benefit of the four children. it is not contested that at the time, mr. karam acted in good faith and had no intention to avoid the rules of family patrimony. [4] l’intimé, m. karam, et mme yared se sont ma- riés en 1998. ils ont eu quatre enfants, nés entre 2001 et 2010. en août 2011, la famille karam s’est installée à montréal après l’annonce d’une nouvelle tragique. mme yared a reçu un diagnostic de can- cer incurable, et ses jours étaient comptés. dans ce contexte, m. karam a constitué une fiducie au profit des quatre enfants pour protéger les actifs familiaux. personne ne conteste que, à ce moment-là, m. karam a agi de bonne foi et qu’il n’avait aucune intention d’éluder les règles du patrimoine familial. [5] the [translation] “taki family trust” (“the trust”) was constituted before a notary on october 4, 2011 (exhibit a-1, ar, vol. ii, at p 110). the settlor is ms. tammie dion, the wife of one of the appel- lants and sister-in- law of mr karam. the trustees are mr. karam himself and his mother, ms. amal hanache- karam. the trust deed also conferred exten- sive powers of “appointer” on mr. karam, providing for him inter alia to name new beneficiaries, includ- ing himself. the initial beneficiaries were ms. yared and the four children. [5] la « fiducie famille taki » (« la fiducie ») a été créée devant un notaire le 4 octobre 2011 (pièce a-1, da, vol. ii, p 110). le constituant est mme tammie dion, l’épouse d’un des appelants et la belle- sœur de m karam. les fiduciaires sont m. karam lui- même et sa mère, mme amal hanache- karam. de plus, l’acte de fiducie nomme m. karam « électeur », ce qui lui confère d’importants pouvoirs, notam- ment la faculté d’élire de nouveaux bénéficiaires, y compris lui- même. les bénéficiaires initiaux étaient mme yared et les quatre enfants. [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 507 [6] upon the constitution of the trust, the sett- lor transferred a silver ingot valued at $45 to the trust patrimony. in june 2012, the trust acquired a residence on docteur- penfield avenue in montreal for $2,350,000 with funds transferred by the spouses to the trust patrimony. mr. karam stated that his in- tention was to acquire a house that would serve both as the family residence and as an investment pro- tected under the trust for the benefit of his children. the family moved in and it is not contested that at the relevant times, this house was a residence of the family within the meaning of art 415 ccq. indeed, regardless of the potential investment value of the property, if either of the spouses had been owner in title there would be no dispute that the house would be part of the family patrimony. in fact, mr. karam conceded that the furniture in the residence was in- cluded in the family patrimony as movable property furnishing or decorating the family residence. [6] au moment de la constitution de la fiducie, la constituante a transféré au patrimoine fiduciaire un lingot d’argent d’une valeur de 45 $. en juin 2012, la fiducie a acquis une résidence sur l’avenue du docteur- penfield, à montréal, pour la somme de 2 350 000 $ en utilisant des fonds transférés par les époux au patrimoine fiduciaire. m. karam a affirmé que son intention était d’acquérir une maison qui servirait de résidence familiale et qui constituerait un investissement protégé par la fiducie au profit de ses enfants. la famille y a emménagé, et il n’est pas contesté que, à l’époque pertinente, cette maison était une résidence de la famille au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. en effet, indépendamment de la valeur d’investissement potentielle de la résidence, si l’un ou l’autre des époux en avait été le propriétaire en titre, l’inclusion de la maison dans le patrimoine fa- milial n’aurait pas été contestée. en fait, m. karam a reconnu que les meubles dans la résidence étaient inclus dans le patrimoine familial à titre de meubles la garnissant ou l’ornant. [7] two years later, in june 2014, ms. yared left the residence and filed for divorce. in august of the same year, she divided her estate by notarial will by way of four trusts established for the benefit of each of the four children. in april 2015, ms. yared died without having obtained a divorce. [7] deux ans plus tard, soit en juin 2014, mme yared a quitté la résidence et a demandé le divorce. en août de la même année, elle a partagé son patrimoine par testament notarié en établissant quatre fiducies au profit de chacun des quatre enfants. en avril 2015, mme yared est décédée sans avoir obtenu le divorce. [8] following ms. yared’s death, mr. karam com- menced proceedings to contest the validity of her will. a few months later, he unilaterally renounced his powers to elect new beneficiaries under art 42 of the trust deed in a notarized document, the [trans- lation] “act of renunciation and cancellation by the appointer concerning the ‘taki family trust’”. according to his testimony, mr. karam proceeded to this renunciation after the appellants expressed some concerns about the children’s interest in the trust. in july 2016, the appellants filed for a dec- laration that the value of the residence held by the trust should be included in the division of the family patrimony, half of which would therefore go to the estate of ms yared. if the appellants do not obtain such a declaration, the estate of ms. yared will be of little value. [8] après le décès de mme yared, m. karam a en- tamé des procédures en vue de contester la validité du testament de cette dernière. quelques mois plus tard, dans un acte notarié intitulé « acte de renoncia- tion et radiation par l’électeur concernant la “fiducie famille taki” », il a unilatéralement renoncé à sa faculté d’élire de nouveaux bénéficiaires en vertu de l’art 42 de l’acte de fiducie. selon son témoignage, m. karam a signé cette renonciation après que les appelants eurent exprimé certaines craintes quant aux droits des enfants à l’égard de la fiducie. en juil- let  2016, les appelants ont sollicité un jugement déclarant que la valeur de la résidence détenue en fiducie devrait être incluse dans le partage du patri- moine familial et que la moitié de cette valeur devrait donc faire partie de la succession de mme yared. si les appelants n’obtiennent pas le jugement déclaratoire demandé, la valeur de la succession de mme yared sera modeste. 508 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. ii decisions below ii décisions des tribunaux d’instances inférieures a superior court of quebec (gaudet j., 2016 qccs a cour supérieure du québec (le juge gaudet, 5581) 2016 qccs 5581) [9] the trial judge decided that the value of the res- idence ought to be included in the family patrimony despite the fact that it was held under a trust and not owned directly by one of the spouses. in his view, this follows from the fact that spouses cannot con- tract out of the public order rules regarding the fam- ily patrimony, regardless of their intentions (para. 55 (canlii)). if one of them has effective control of a family residence even where that is through a trust or a corporation, its value must be divided as part of the patrimony upon dissolution of the marriage (paras 52-53). [9] le juge de première instance a conclu que la valeur de la résidence devait être incluse dans le patrimoine familial, même s’il s’agissait d’un bien détenu en fiducie et qui n’appartenait pas directement à l’un des époux. selon lui, une telle conclusion dé- coule du fait que des époux ne peuvent se soustraire par contrat à l’application des règles d’ordre public relatives au patrimoine familial, et ce, peu importe leurs intentions (par. 55 (canlii)). si l’un d’entre eux exerce un contrôle effectif sur une résidence familiale — même lorsque ce contrôle est exercé par l’intermédiaire d’une fiducie ou d’une société —, la valeur de cette résidence doit être incluse dans le calcul aux fins du partage du patrimoine au moment de la dissolution du lien matrimonial (par 52-53). [10] the trial judge relied on two provisions of the civil code to arrive at this conclusion. first, he considered that the lifting of the corporate veil cod- ified at art 317 ccq could be applied by analogy when the constitution of a trust would have the effect of trumping or displacing the rules of the family patrimony (paras 30-36). second, he relied on the wording of art 415 ccq, which provides that “the residences of the family or the rights which confer use of them” are included in the family patrimony. in his view, these rights are not strictly limited to the rights of use defined by art 1172 ccq and can include any arrangement by which the spouses can occupy a residence as if they are the owners (paras 39-41). [10] le juge de première instance s’est appuyé sur deux dispositions du code civil pour tirer cette conclusion. premièrement, il a estimé que la levée du voile corporatif codifiée à l’art. 317 du ccq pou- vait s’appliquer par analogie lorsque la constitution d’une fiducie a pour effet de supplanter les règles du patrimoine familial (par 30-36). deuxièmement, il s’est appuyé sur le libellé de l’art. 415 du ccq, qui prévoit que « les résidences de la famille ou les droits qui en confèrent l’usage » font partie du patri- moine familial. selon lui, ces droits ne se limitent pas strictement aux droits d’usage définis à l’art. 1172 du ccq et peuvent comprendre tout arrangement per- mettant aux époux d’occuper une résidence comme s’ils en étaient les propriétaires (par 39-41). [11] critical to his conclusion was the trial judge’s factual finding that mr. karam had effective, almost complete control of the family residence as the trus- tee and appointer of the trust under which it was held (para 51). this finding was based on the fol- lowing discretionary powers granted to mr. karam under the trust deed: (1) the power to appoint new beneficiaries, including himself; (2) the power to destitute any beneficiaries; and (3) the power to de- cide to which beneficiaries and in what proportion the revenues and capital of the trust would be paid [11] le juge de première instance a conclu — et c’est là un facteur déterminant dans sa conclusion de fait — que m. karam avait le contrôle effectif, quasi total, de la résidence familiale à titre de fiduciaire et d’électeur de la fiducie par l’intermédiaire de laquelle elle était détenue (par 51). cette conclusion de fait reposait sur les pouvoirs discrétionnaires suivants accordés à m. karam par l’acte de fiducie : (1) la fa- culté d’élire de nouveaux bénéficiaires, y compris lui- même; (2) le pouvoir de destituer tout bénéficiaire; et (3) le pouvoir de déterminer les bénéficiaires pouvant [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 509 (paras 44-47). in this regard, the trial judge further held that mr. karam’s subsequent renunciation of his power to elect new beneficiaries under art 42 of the trust deed was immaterial as this was invalid per art 1294 ccq, as well as because it had been done after the dissolution of the marriage and, in any case, it left unaffected the other important powers granted to mr. karam (paras 58-60). recevoir une partie des revenus ou du capital de la fiducie, ainsi que les parts de chacun (par 44-47). à cet égard, le juge de première instance a également conclu que la renonciation ultérieure de m. karam à sa faculté d’élire de nouveaux bénéficiaires en vertu de l’art 42 de l’acte de fiducie n’était pas pertinente, puisqu’elle était invalide selon l’art. 1294 du ccq, et puisqu’elle avait eu lieu après la dissolution du mariage et puisque, de toute façon, elle n’avait aucune incidence sur les autres pouvoirs importants qui lui avaient été accordés (par 58-60). b court of appeal of quebec (2018 qcca 320) b cour d’appel du québec (2018 qcca 320) [12] writing for a unanimous court, st- pierre ja. allowed the appeal and declared that no value from the residence on docteur- penfield avenue ought to be included in the family patrimony of ms. yared and mr karam. in her view, in the absence of an inten- tion to avoid the rules of the family patrimony, the contractual freedom of spouses who decide to reside in a property held in a trust for investment purposes ought to be respected (paras. 51-59 (canlii)). in this regard, st- pierre ja concluded that [13] the trial judge committed various reviewable er- rors (para 50). in her reasons, she focused on three issues: (1) the analogy with art.  317 ccq; (2) the application of existing rules governing both the family patrimony and the trust, including “rights which confer use” per art 415 ccq; and (3) the determination that the value of these rights was equal to the value of the house. [12] dans un arrêt unanime, la juge st- pierre a ac- cueilli l’appel et déclaré qu’aucune valeur attribuable à la résidence de l’avenue du docteur- penfield ne devait être incluse dans le patrimoine familial de mme yared et m karam. selon elle, en l’absence d’une intention d’éluder les règles du patrimoine familial, il faut respecter la liberté contractuelle des époux qui décident d’habiter dans une résidence détenue par une fiducie à des fins d’investissement (par. 51-59 (canlii)). [13] à cet égard, la juge st- pierre a conclu que le juge de première instance avait commis diverses erreurs susceptibles de révision (par 50). dans ses motifs, la juge a mis l’accent sur trois éléments : (1) l’analogie avec l’art. 317 du ccq; (2) l’application de règles existantes régissant le patrimoine familial et la fiducie, y compris la mention à l’art. 415 du ccq. des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage »; et (3) la conclusion que la valeur de ces droits équivalait à la valeur de la résidence. [14] with regards to the “lifting of the trust veil” based on art 317 ccq,. st- pierre ja expressed the view that this analogy was [translation] “prob- lematic, unsound and inappropriate” (at para. 74) and that the concept ought to be rejected from the outset (para 75). in her view, the fact that a trust is not endowed with juridical personality and that it involves a relationship between different parties — the settlor, trustee and beneficiary — is a bar to the application, by analogy, of art 317 ccq to a trust (paras 71-73). [14] en ce qui a trait à la « levée du voile fidu- ciaire » fondée sur l’art. 317 du ccq, la juge st- pierre a indiqué que l’analogie était « problématique, boiteuse et non indiquée » (par. 74) et que ce concept devait être rejeté dès le départ (par 75). selon elle, le fait que les fiducies ne possèdent pas de person- nalité juridique et qu’elles reposent sur l’interaction entre des parties différentes — le constituant, le fi- duciaire et le bénéficiaire — empêche l’application, par analogie, de l’art. 317 du ccq à une fiducie (par 71-73). 510 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. [15] rather than relying on this analogy, st- pierre ja held that the trial judge was required to apply existing rules governing the family patrimony and trusts. in her view, the value of a family residence held under a trust that is legally constituted should not be included in the family patrimony, unless it belonged to one of the spouses prior to the consti- tution of the trust. in this case, it is possible that the “rights which confer use” of the residence may be included in the family patrimony per art 415 ccq. when constitution of the trust had no impact on the living arrangements of the family (paras 90-91). furthermore, st- pierre ja noted that arts. 421 and 422 ccq already allowed for corrective measures in the division of the family patrimony where there has been misappropriation or some other injustice (para 92). [16] on this basis, st- pierre ja determined that the record did not provide a basis for the trial judge to conclude that mr. karam held “rights which confer use” of the residence, let alone that he was the sole holder of these rights (paras 103-4). although it was not necessary to dispose of the appeal, st- pierre ja. further held that the trial judge ruled beyond the conclusions sought in the application when he deter- mined that the value of the rights of use was equal to the full value of the residence (para 108). [15] la juge st- pierre a conclu que le juge de pre- mière instance, plutôt que de s’appuyer sur cette analogie, aurait dû appliquer les règles relatives au patrimoine familial et aux fiducies. selon elle, la valeur d’une résidence familiale détenue par une fiducie légalement constituée ne devrait pas être in- cluse dans le patrimoine familial, à moins que cette résidence n’ait appartenu à l’un ou l’autre des époux avant la constitution de la fiducie. dans ce cas, il est possible que les « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » de la résidence soient inclus dans le patrimoine fa- milial en application de l’art. 415 du ccq, si la constitution de la fiducie n’a eu aucune répercussion sur les arrangements de la famille quant à son lieu de résidence (par 90-91). de plus, la juge st- pierre a noté que les art. 421 et 422 du ccq permettaient déjà de prendre des mesures correctives au moment du partage du patrimoine familial en cas de détour- nement ou de toute autre injustice (par 92). [16] pour ces motifs, la juge st- pierre a conclu que la preuve ne comportait pas d’assise permettant au juge de première instance de conclure que m. karam détenait des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » de la résidence, et encore moins qu’il était l’unique ti- tulaire de ces droits (par. 103- 104). même s’il n’était pas nécessaire qu’elle tranche la question pour dispo- ser du pourvoi, la juge st- pierre a également conclu que le juge de première instance s’était prononcé au- delà des conclusions recherchées dans la demande en jugeant que la valeur des droits d’usage équivalait à la totalité de la valeur de la résidence (par 108). iii analysis iii analyse a the trust in quebec civil law a la fiducie en droit civil québécois [17] the civil code defines a trust as a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of them has any real right (art 1261 ccq). the concept of a patrimony without a holder was introduced in quebec law following the adoption of the civil code, in an effort to adapt the common law trust to the framework of civil law (see s. normand, introduction au droit des biens (2nd ed. 2014) at pp 26-28). in short, contrary to a common law trust, the trust in quebec civil law does not result from the [17] le code civil définit la fiducie comme étant un patrimoine d’affectation autonome et distinct de ceux du constituant, du fiduciaire ou du bénéfi- ciaire, sur lequel aucun d’entre eux n’a de droit réel (art. 1261 du ccq). le concept de patrimoine sans titulaire a été introduit dans le droit québécois après l’adoption du code civil, dans le but d’adapter le concept de fiducie de common law au système de droit civil (voir s. normand, introduction au droit des biens (2e éd. 2014), p 26-28). essentiellement, contrairement à une fiducie de common law, celle [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 511 division of ownership but rather from the transfer of property in a patrimony created for a particular purpose and not held by anyone. the transferred property is administered by the trustee for this pur- pose, yet neither the trustee, the beneficiary nor the settlor own what has been transferred into the trust patrimony. [18] upon the trust’s creation, the trustee has con- trol and exclusive administration of the patrimony (art. 1278 para 1 ccq). he or she is charged with the full administration of the property held in the trust (art. 1278 para 2 ccq). by virtue of this, the trustee is vested with extensive powers that he is required to use to secure appropriation of the patri- mony, as defined by the trust deed (arts. 1260, 1278 and 1306 ccq). he may inter alia sell the property, charge it with a real right or change its destination in order to perform his obligations as administrator of the trust (art 1307 ccq). hence, although the trustee is not the owner of the property, his control over the trust patrimony is similar to ownership, as the minister of justice explained upon the adoption of art 1261 ccq: [translation] moreover, the property making up the trust patrimony is not property without an owner that can be appropriated by simple occupation, since the trustee has control and detention of it. nor is the property liable to be paralyzed as a result of having no owner. the broad powers of the trustee, acting in that capacity, will in fact allow the trustee to ensure not only the preservation of the property, but also its free movement, as if he or she were its owner. these powers will also allow the trustee to perform any kind of act relating to the managed property, including exercising the rights attached to it. de droit civil québécois ne découle pas d’un partage de la propriété d’un bien, mais plutôt du transfert de biens à un patrimoine créé à une fin particulière et dépourvu de titulaire. les biens transférés sont administrés par le fiduciaire à cette fin. pourtant, ni ce dernier, ni le bénéficiaire, ni le constituant ne sont propriétaires de ce qui a été transféré dans le patrimoine fiduciaire. [18] à la création de la fiducie, le fiduciaire a la maîtrise et l’administration exclusive du patrimoine (art. 1278 al. 1 du ccq). il est chargé de la pleine administration des biens en fiducie (art. 1278 al. 2 du ccq). de ce fait, le fiduciaire est investi de vastes pouvoirs qu’il doit utiliser afin de veiller à l’affecta- tion du patrimoine, comme il est prévu dans l’acte de fiducie (art. 1260, 1278 et 1306 du ccq). il peut notamment vendre les biens, les grever d’un droit réel ou en changer la destination pour exécuter ses obligations d’administrateur de la fiducie (art. 1307 du ccq). ainsi, bien que le fiduciaire ne soit pas le propriétaire des biens, le contrôle qu’il exerce sur le patrimoine fiduciaire s’apparente à celui qu’autorise le droit de propriété, comme l’a expliqué le ministre de la justice au moment de l’adoption de l’art. 1261 du ccq :. par ailleurs, les biens composant le patrimoine fidu- ciaire ne sont pas des biens sans maître susceptibles d’être appropriés par simple occupation, puisque le fiduciaire en a la maîtrise et la détention. ils ne sont pas non plus susceptibles d’être paralysés du fait qu’il n’y a pas de propriétaire. les pouvoirs étendus du fiduciaire agissant ès qualités, vont en effet lui permettre non seulement d’en assurer la conservation, mais aussi la libre circulation, comme s’il en était propriétaire. ces pouvoirs lui permet- tront, d’ailleurs, d’accomplir toute espèce d’actes relatifs aux biens gérés, y compris l’exercice des droits qui leur sont rattachés. (ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. i, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), at p. 750) (ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, t. i, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), p. 750) [19] if provided by the trust deed, the trustee may also have the power to appoint beneficiaries and de- termine what they receive from the trust (art. 1282 para 1 ccq). this power of appointment is exer- cised as the trustee (or settlor) sees fits; however, he [19] si l’acte de fiducie le prévoit, le fiduciaire peut également avoir la faculté d’élire des bénéficiaires et de déterminer la part qu’ils reçoivent de la fiducie (art 1282 al 1 du ccq). le fiduciaire (ou le consti- tuant) use de cette faculté d’élire comme il l’entend. 512 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. may not do so in a completely arbitrary manner or in a way that runs counter to purpose or stipulations of the trust deed (j. beaulne, droit des fiducies (3rd ed. 2015), at p. 229; gb v. sib, 2015 qcca 1223, at para. 53 (canlii)). furthermore, art 1283 ccq. provides that the person having the power to appoint the beneficiaries or determine their shares cannot exercise this power for his or her own benefit, which would normally preclude him from electing himself as a beneficiary (miller (succession de), 2013 qccs 5184, at para. 88 (canlii)). authors are of the view that this limitation at art 1283 ccq can however be set aside when a trustee having the power to ap- point is himself a beneficiary under the trust deed (beaulne, at pp. 229-30; d. bruneau, “la fiducie et le droit civil” (1996), 18 rpfs 755, at p. 776; j e c. brierley, “powers of appointment in quebec civil law” (1992), 95 r du n. 131, at p 161-62). il ne peut cependant pas l’exercer d’une façon totale- ment arbitraire ou d’une manière qui va à l’encontre de l’objet ou des stipulations de l’acte de fiducie (j. beaulne, droit des fiducies (3e éd. 2015), p. 229; gb c. sib, 2015 qcca 1223, par. 53 (canlii)). de plus, l’art. 1283 du ccq prévoit que celui qui a la faculté d’élire les bénéficiaires ou de déterminer leur part ne peut exercer cette faculté à son propre avantage, ce qui l’empêcherait normalement de se désigner lui- même bénéficiaire (miller (succession de), 2013 qccs 5184, par. 88 (canlii)). selon cer- tains auteurs, cette restriction prévue à l’art. 1283 du ccq peut toutefois être contournée lorsqu’un fiduciaire ayant ce pouvoir est lui- même bénéficiaire aux termes de l’acte de fiducie (beaulne, p. 229- 230; d. bruneau, « la fiducie et le droit civil » (1996), 18 rpfs 755, p. 776; j e c. brierley, « powers of appointment in quebec civil law » (1992), 95 r. du n. 131, p. 161- 162). b the family patrimony b patrimoine familial [20] per art 414 ccq, marriage results in the establishment of a family patrimony, which consists of property described in art 415 ccq and owned by one or the other spouses. upon dissolution of mar- riage, the value of this family patrimony is divided in equal shares between the spouses (art 416 ccq), unless the court exercises the remedial power pro- vided by art 422 ccq to order unequal partition. as baudouin ja explained in droit de la famille — 977, [1991] rjq 904, at p. 909, we must bear in mind that the family patrimony entails the creation, upon dissolution of marriage, of a personal claim against the other spouse rather than a competing right of ownership. [20] aux termes de l’art. 414 du ccq, le mariage emporte constitution d’un patrimoine familial formé des biens décrits à l’art. 415 du ccq appartenant à l’un ou l’autre des époux. en cas de dissolution du mariage, la valeur de ce patrimoine familial est divisée à parts égales entre les époux (art. 416 du ccq), à moins que le tribunal exerce le pouvoir de réparation prévu à l’art. 422 du ccq afin d’or- donner un partage inégal. comme l’explique le juge baudouin dans droit de la famille — 977, [1991] rjq 904, p. 909, nous devons garder à l’esprit que le patrimoine familial emporte la création, à la dis- solution du mariage, d’un droit de créance personnel à l’encontre de l’autre époux plutôt qu’un droit de propriété concurrent. [21] article 415 ccq provides that residences of the family owned by one of the spouses or the rights which confer use of them are included in the value of the family patrimony. as explained in the above section, neither a beneficiary nor a trustee owns the property held under a trust. in my view, the question before this court is in what circumstances a family residence held under a trust can nonetheless be included in the value of the family patrimony on the basis of the “rights which confer use” within the [21] selon l’art. 415 du ccq, les résidences de la famille dont l’un des époux est propriétaire ou les droits qui en confèrent l’usage sont inclus dans la valeur du patrimoine familial. comme il est expliqué dans la section précédente, ni le bénéficiaire ni le fi- duciaire n’est propriétaire des biens en fiducie. selon moi, la question que la cour est appelée à trancher est celle de savoir dans quelles circonstances une résidence familiale faisant partie du patrimoine d’une fiducie peut néanmoins être incluse dans la valeur du [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 513 meaning of art 415 ccq. before turning to this matter, i find it necessary to restate two core princi- ples of law on the family patrimony. [22] the first relates to the approach that a court should take when interpreting and applying the rules relating to the family patrimony in ambiguous cases. as lebel j. wrote for a unanimous court in mt. v.  j-yt, 2008 scc 50, [2008] 2  scr  781, at para. 16, the introduction of the family patrimony in quebec family law is “consistent with a general trend in canada to protect vulnerable spouses”. as a remedial set of rules that aims to foster economic equality between spouses, it should therefore be given a generous and liberal interpretation to favour the inclusion of property in the value to be parti- tioned between the spouses (droit de la famille — 112948, 2011 qcca 1744, [2011] rjq 1729, at para. 60; droit de la famille — 977, at p. 909; droit de la famille — 172765, 2017 qcca 1844, at pa- ras. 102-13 (canlii)). patrimoine familial sur le fondement des « droits qui en confèrent l’usage » au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. toutefois, avant de me pencher sur cette question, je juge qu’il est nécessaire de rappeler deux principes fondamentaux du droit applicable en matière de pa- trimoine familial. [22] le premier principe concerne l’approche qu’un tribunal devrait adopter lorsqu’il interprète et applique les règles du patrimoine familial dans des cas ambigus. comme l’a écrit le juge lebel au par. 16 de l’arrêt unanime mt c j-yt, 2008 csc 50, [2008] 2 rcs 781, l’introduction du patrimoine familial dans le droit de la famille québécois « s’ins- crit dans un mouvement général de protection des conjoints vulnérables au canada ». en tant qu’en- semble de règles correctives visant à promouvoir l’égalité économique entre les époux, elles devraient recevoir une interprétation généreuse et libérale de manière à favoriser l’inclusion des biens dans la valeur à partager entre les époux (droit de la fa- mille — 112948, 2011 qcca 1744, [2011] rjq. 1729, par. 60; droit de la famille — 977, p. 909; droit de la famille — 172765, 2017 qcca 1844, par. 102- 113 (canlii)). [23] this principle should guide our interpretation of art 415 ccq and its application in this and similar cases, even if the record does not demon- strate that one of the spouses was in a position of economic vulnerability. contrary to what counsel for mr. karam suggested in his oral submissions (transcript, at pp. 55-58), the fact that this case does not raise issues of inequality between spouses is immaterial for the resolution of the larger question raised by the appeal. indeed, we should be careful not to adopt an interpretation of the rules governing the family patrimony that would create a breach in the protection guaranteed by the law to vulnerable spouses. [23] ce principe devrait guider notre interprétation de l’art. 415 du ccq ainsi que son application en l’espèce et dans des cas semblables, même si la preuve ne démontre pas que l’un des époux est vulnérable sur le plan économique. contrairement à ce qu’a soutenu l’avocat de m. karam dans ses observations orales (transcription, p. 55-58), le fait que la présente affaire ne soulève aucune question relativement à l’inégalité entre les époux est sans importance pour répondre à la question plus large soulevée par le pourvoi. en effet, nous devons veiller à ne pas adopter une interprétation des règles régis- sant le patrimoine familial pouvant porter atteinte à la protection que la loi garantit aux époux vulnérables. [24] the second principle relates to the public order character of the rules governing the family patrimony. the civil code is clear: spouses cannot contract out of these rules. article 391 ccq pro- vides that spouses cannot derogate from the provi- sions of chapter iv on the effect of marriage, which includes the provisions on the family patrimony. [24] le deuxième principe concerne le fait que les règles régissant le patrimoine familial sont d’ordre public. le code civil est clair : les époux ne peuvent s’y soustraire par contrat. aux termes de l’art. 391 du ccq, les époux ne peuvent pas déroger aux dispositions du chapitre iv portant sur les effets du mariage, lesquelles comprennent les dispositions sur 514 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. article 423 ccq further specifies that spouses may not renounce in advance, by contract of marriage or otherwise, their rights in the family patrimony, while allowing them to do so in certain circum- stances, notably upon the dissolution of marriage, and under stringent conditions. on this basis, quebec courts have consistently held that the rules of the family patrimony are of public order and cannot be avoided by spouses through various kinds of con- tractual arrangements (see, for example, droit de la famille — 977, at p. 908; droit de la famille — 1463, [1991] rjq 2514 (ca), at pp. 2516-17; droit de la famille — 121301, 2012 qcca 1018, at para. 46 (canlii); droit de la famille — 162780, 2016 qccs 5562, at paras. 54-55 (canlii)). this well- settled principle is not disputed by the parties. rather, it is the scope and the effect of these public order rules that is at the heart of the debate. [25] mr. karam correctly points out that the public order character of the rules governing the family patri- mony does not eliminate the freedom of spouses to ac- quire, sell or choose never to own the property included in the family patrimony per art 415 ccq (rf, at paras 23-29). indeed, neither the constitution of the family patrimony nor its partition alters the rights of ownership held by each spouse in relation to their property. it follows that spouses generally remain free to manage and dispose of their property included in the family patrimony, keeping in mind that certain specific rules will nonetheless limit their freedom to do so (droit de la famille — 977, at p 908). le patrimoine familial. l’article 423 du ccq pré- cise en outre que les époux ne peuvent pas renoncer à l’avance, par contrat de mariage ou autrement, à leurs droits dans le patrimoine familial, bien qu’une telle renonciation soit permise dans certaines cir- constances, notamment à la dissolution du mariage, et sous réserve de conditions strictes. sur ce fon- dement, les tribunaux québécois ont jugé de façon constante que les règles du patrimoine familial sont d’ordre public et qu’elles ne peuvent être éludées par les époux au moyen de divers types d’ententes contractuelles (voir, par exemple, droit de la fa- mille — 977, p. 908; droit de la famille — 1463, [1991] rjq 2514 (ca), p. 2516- 2517; droit de la famille — 121301, 2012 qcca 1018, par. 46 (canlii); droit de la famille — 162780, 2016 qccs 5562, par. 54-55 (canlii)). les parties ne contestent pas ce principe bien établi. ce sont plutôt la portée et l’effet de ces règles d’ordre public qui sont au cœur du litige. [25] avec raison, m. karam souligne que si les règles régissant le patrimoine familial sont bien d’ordre public, cela n’élimine pas pour autant la liberté des époux d’acquérir ou de vendre les biens inclus dans le patrimoine familial aux termes de l’art. 415 du ccq ou de choisir de ne jamais en devenir propriétaire (mi, par 23-29). en effet, ni la constitution du patrimoine familial ni son partage ne modifient les droits de propriété de chaque époux relativement à ses biens. par conséquent, les époux demeurent habituellement libres de gérer leurs biens inclus dans le patrimoine familial et d’en disposer, tout en gardant à l’esprit que certaines règles parti- culières limitent néanmoins leur liberté de le faire (droit de la famille — 977, p 908). [26] as pointed out by justice côté, spouses are free to arrange their personal affairs as they see fit; they need not acquire property falling under the fam- ily patrimony provisions. thus, as st- pierre ja. remarked, neither spouse is obligated to own the property enumerated in art 415 ccq (para 58). a married couple can lease rather than own their family residence or their car. it is trite that such living arrangements do not per se offend the public order rules of family patrimony. the question raised by this appeal is whether this logic extends to a family [26] comme le note la juge côté, les époux sont libres d’organiser leurs affaires personnelles comme bon leur semble; ils ne sont pas tenus d’acquérir des biens visés par les dispositions relatives au patri- moine familial. ainsi, comme l’a souligné la juge st- pierre, rien n’oblige les époux à posséder les biens énumérés à l’art. 415 du ccq (par 58). un couple marié peut louer plutôt qu’acheter sa résidence fami- liale ou sa voiture. il est par ailleurs bien établi que de tels arrangements ne contreviennent pas en soi aux règles d’ordre public relatives au patrimoine familial. [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 515 residence acquired by way of a trust controlled by one or both spouses. because the legislator included the “rights which confer use” of a family residence in addition to direct ownership, in my view it does not. [27] before discussing the “rights which confer use” per art 415 ccq,. i wish to make a few com- ments on the “lifting of the trust veil” by analogy with art 317 ccq, since the trial judge and the court of appeal disagreed on the applicability of this notion. first, i agree with st- pierre ja that the analogy with art 317 ccq is, on its face, tenuous (para 74). as she explains, this provision [transla- tion] “is intended to prevent a person from making improper use of a legal person, of which he or she is in fact the directing mind, in such a way as to inter- pose the existence of that legal person as a defence to try to avoid personal liability” (para 69). but in quebec law, trusts are not legal persons endowed with juridical personality. rather, they are the result of a relationship among three actors — the settlor, trustee and beneficiary — who gravitate around a distinct and autonomous patrimony. it follows that, contrary to a corporation, there is in the case of a trust no veil to lift nor any mastermind hiding behind a distinct juridical personality. in this regard, i agree with the general proposition set out by st- pierre ja. that when the constitution of a trust conflicts with the operation of the family patrimony, the court should resolve the matter by relying on the rules pertaining to both of these institutions rather than by analogy with art 317 ccq (paras. 50, 76 and 87). la question que soulève le présent pourvoi est celle de savoir si cette logique vaut également pour une résidence familiale acquise par l’intermédiaire d’une fiducie contrôlée par un des époux ou par les deux. comme le législateur mentionne les « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » d’une résidence familiale en plus de la propriété directe, j’estime qu’il faut répondre par la négative à cette question. [27] avant de traiter des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » mentionnés à l’art. 415 du ccq, je tiens à formuler quelques remarques sur la « levée du voile fiduciaire » invoquée par analogie à l’art. 317 du ccq, puisque le juge de première instance et la cour d’appel étaient en désaccord quant à l’applica- bilité de cette notion. tout d’abord, je suis d’accord avec la juge st- pierre que l’analogie avec l’art. 317 du ccq est, à première vue, boiteuse (par 74). comme elle l’a expliqué, cette disposition « vise à empêcher qu’une personne utilise à mauvais escient la personne morale, dont elle est par ailleurs l’âme dirigeante, de manière à interposer l’existence de celle-ci comme moyen de défense pour tenter de se soustraire à sa responsabilité personnelle » (par 69). or, en droit québécois, les fiducies ne sont pas des personnes morales dotées de la personnalité juri- dique. elles découlent plutôt d’une relation entre trois acteurs — le constituant, le fiduciaire et le béné- ficiaire — qui gravitent autour d’un patrimoine d’af- fectation autonome et distinct. ainsi, contrairement au cas où une société est en cause, dans le cas d’une fiducie, il n’y a aucun voile à lever ni aucun cerveau dirigeant caché derrière une personnalité juridique distincte. à cet égard, je souscris à la proposition générale énoncée par la juge st- pierre selon laquelle lorsque la constitution d’une fiducie entre en conflit avec le fonctionnement du patrimoine familial, le tribunal devrait régler ce conflit en s’appuyant sur les règles relatives à ces deux institutions, plutôt qu’en procédant par analogie avec l’art.  317 du ccq. (par. 50, 76 et 87). in the case of a family residence, issues arising [28] from indirect ownership or de facto control of the property can, as i will explain in the section below, be resolved with the notion of “rights which confer use” set out in art. 415  ccq. for this category of property, there is therefore no need to rely on [28] dans le cas d’une résidence familiale, les questions découlant d’un droit de propriété indi- recte ou de l’exercice d’un contrôle de fait sur le bien peuvent, comme je l’expliquerai ci- après, être réglées en s’appuyant sur la notion de « droits qui en confèrent l’usage » énoncée à l’art. 415 du ccq. 516 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. art 317 ccq by analogy so as to order an equitable partition of the family patrimony. [29] also, more generally when property listed in art.  415  ccq is held in trust, arts.  421 and 422 ccq may allow the court to correct a poten- tial inequity created by the operation of the trust. again, it is not necessary to rely on an analogy with art 317 ccq to reach an equitable result in these circumstances. if property listed at art 415 ccq is trans- [30] ferred to a trust, the court can order a compensatory payment based on art 421 ccq, provided that the transfer occurred within a year of various reference points (institution of proceedings for either divorce, separation from bed and board or annulment of mar- riage, or death) or earlier in the case of fraud or bad faith. this is the case because, as we have seen, property transferred to a trust is removed from the patrimony of the original owner and held in a distinct and autonomous patrimony. the property is therefore alienated within the meaning of art 421 ccq and is thus subject to a compensatory payment. this would apply to furniture and family vehicles (as well as residences of the family) transferred to a trust. pour cette catégorie de biens, il n’est donc pas né- cessaire de s’appuyer sur l’art. 317 du ccq par analogie pour ordonner un partage équitable du pa- trimoine familial. [29] en outre, plus généralement, lorsque des biens énumérés à l’art. 415 du ccq sont détenus en fi- ducie, les art. 421 et 422 du ccq permettent au tribunal de corriger une possible injustice créée par le mécanisme de la fiducie. encore une fois, il n’est pas nécessaire de s’appuyer sur une analogie avec l’art. 317 du ccq pour arriver à un résultat équi- table dans ces circonstances. [30] si des biens énumérés à l’art. 415 du ccq. sont transférés à une fiducie, le tribunal peut or- donner un paiement compensatoire en application de l’art. 421 du ccq, pourvu que le transfert ait eu lieu dans l’année précédant divers points de réfé- rence (l’introduction d’une instance en divorce, en séparation de corps ou en annulation de mariage, ou le décès de l’un des époux) ou, plus tôt, en cas de fraude ou de mauvaise foi. il en est ainsi, car, comme nous l’avons vu, les biens transférés à une fiducie ne font plus partie du patrimoine du propriétaire initial et font partie d’un patrimoine d’affectation autonome et distinct. les biens ont donc été aliénés comme le prévoit l’art. 421 du ccq et peuvent donner lieu à un paiement compensatoire. cette disposition s’appliquerait aux meubles et aux voitures familiales (ainsi qu’aux résidences de la famille) transférés à une fiducie. [31] if such property is not transferred but rather ac- quired directly through a trust, the court cannot order a compensatory payment based on art 421 ccq. since there is strictly speaking no alienation. in such cases, art 422 ccq would nonetheless allow the court to order an unequal partition in order to com- pensate for the loss of value in the family patrimony, provided that the operation amounts to an economic fault (mt v j-yt, at para 28). as i will explain below, what is often the most valuable items listed at art 415 ccq — the residence(s) of the family — can be included in the family patrimony whether the residence is transferred into or acquired directly by the trust. thus, in such cases, there will be sufficient value in the patrimony for an unequal partition to [31] si de tels biens ne sont pas transférés, mais sont plutôt acquis directement par l’intermédiaire d’une fiducie, le tribunal ne peut pas ordonner un paiement compensatoire en application de l’art. 421 du ccq, puisque, à proprement parler, il n’y a eu aucune aliénation. dans de tels cas, l’art. 422 du ccq permettrait tout de même au tribunal d’or- donner un partage inégal pour compenser la perte de valeur dans le patrimoine familial, pourvu qu’il s’agisse d’une faute économique (mt c j-yt, par 28). comme je l’expliquerai plus loin, les ob- jets énumérés à l’art. 415 du ccq ayant souvent la plus grande valeur — soit la ou les résidences de la famille — peuvent être inclus dans le patrimoine familial, que la résidence soit transférée à la fiducie [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 517 constitute a meaningful remedy when furniture or family vehicles are acquired directly by a trust. [32] as indicated above, the idea of a “lifting of the trust veil” as envisioned by analogy to art 317 ccq. ought to be rejected by this court. however, this is not to say that the existence of a trust is a bar to the operation of the three remedies listed above — the rights which confer use, the compensatory payment and the unequal partition — in the context of property held in trust. in all three situations, the effects of the trust will be effectively “lifted” to enable the opera- tion of the remedy. however, given that the analogy to art 317 ccq is faulty, the court should refrain from referring to the operation of theses remedies as a “lifting of the trust veil”. the legal basis for consider- ing the value of such property in an equitable partition of the family patrimony is not art 317 ccq but rather the relevant provisions relating to the family patrimony. ou directement acquise par celle-ci. ainsi, dans de tels cas, la valeur du patrimoine sera suffisante pour qu’un partage inégal constitue une réparation adé- quate lorsque les voitures familiales ou les meubles sont acquis directement par une fiducie. [32] comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, le concept de « levée du voile fiduciaire » envisagé par analogie à l’art. 317 du ccq doit être rejeté par la cour. cela ne signifie pas pour autant que l’existence d’une fiducie empêche d’appliquer les trois mesures de réparations mentionnées précédemment — soit la prise en compte des droits qui confèrent l’usage, le paiement compensatoire et le partage inégal — dans le contexte d’une résidence dont une fiducie est propriétaire. dans les trois situations, les effets de la fiducie seront « levés » dans les faits pour permettre l’application de la mesure de réparation. toutefois, comme l’analogie avec l’art. 317 du ccq est fau- tive, la cour devrait s’abstenir de faire référence à l’application de ces mesures de redressement comme à une « levée du voile fiduciaire ». le fondement juridique pour tenir compte de la valeur d’une telle résidence dans le contexte d’un partage équitable du patrimoine familial n’est pas l’art. 317 du ccq, mais bien les dispositions pertinentes relatives au patrimoine familial. c the rights which confer use per article 415 c droits qui confèrent l’usage visés à l’art. 415 du ccq. ccq. [33] by referring to the “rights which confer use” of a family residence at art 415 ccq, the legisla- tor intended to include in the family patrimony the type of living arrangement where spouses, without being owners in title, nonetheless are in control of the family residence. although the legislative debates leading to the adoption of art 4622 of the civil code of québec (ccq (1980)) (which became art 415 ccq) do not discuss the notion of rights which confer use, the context in which this provi- sion was adopted suggests that the intention was to cover a broad range of situations beyond owner- ship. indeed, the notion of rights which confer use of a family residence was debated on the same day in relation to another provision, art 454 ccq (1980) (which became art 406 ccq), which limits the faculty to alienate a family residence owned by one [33] en mentionnant les « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » d’une résidence familiale à l’art. 415 du ccq, le législateur a voulu inclure dans le patri- moine familial le type d’arrangement où les époux, sans être les propriétaires en titre, exercent néan- moins le contrôle sur la résidence familiale. bien que les débats législatifs ayant mené à l’adoption de l’art 4622 du code civil du québec de 1980 (« ccq (1980) ») (devenu l’art. 415 du ccq) ne traitent pas du concept des droits qui confèrent l’usage, le contexte dans lequel cette disposition a été adoptée donne à penser que l’intention était de couvrir un large éventail de situations allant au- delà de la détention d’un droit propriété. en effet, le concept des droits qui confèrent l’usage d’une rési- dence familiale a bien fait l’objet d’un débat au cours de la journée où ont eu lieu les débats législatifs, 518 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. of the spouses. at the time, legislators were con- cerned by the fact that corporations were sometimes used to avoid these restrictions on the sale of a family residence. to counter this practice, the reference to the notion of “rights which confer use” was added to art 454 ccq (1980) (now art 406 ccq) to protect family residences indirectly owned through a corporation (as to the foregoing, see b. lefebvre, “les droits qui confèrent l’usage des résidences fa- miliales: quelques difficultés lors de la liquidation du patrimoine familial” (2014), 116 r du n. 389, at pp. 392-94; j-p senécal,. le partage du patri- moine familial et les autres réformes du projet de loi 146 (1989), at p 38). [34] since the adoption of art 4622 ccq (1980) (now 415 ccq),. quebec courts have often relied on the “rights which confer use” to partition the value of family residences held through corpora- tions controlled by one of the spouses. for example, in dl v. lg, 2006 qcca 1125, at paras. 22-29 (canlii), the quebec court of appeal ruled that the value of a family farm that had been transferred to a corporation for fiscal reasons ought to be included in the partition of the family patrimony based on the rights of use. see also droit de la famille — 142245, 2014 qcca 1660, at paras. 13-14 (canlii); droit de la famille — 1931, [1994] rjq 378 (sup ct), at p. 381, aff’d [1996] rdf 6 (ca);. droit de la famille — 10174, 2010 qccs 312, at para. 48-52 (canlii), aff’d droit de la famille — 102269, 2010 qcca 1586 (canlii). mais relativement à une autre disposition, à savoir l’art. 454 du ccq (1980) (devenu l’art. 406 du ccq), qui limite la faculté d’aliéner une résidence familiale dont l’un des époux est propriétaire. à cette époque, les législateurs étaient préoccupés par le fait que l’on avait parfois recours à des sociétés pour se soustraire à ces restrictions relatives à la vente d’une résidence familiale. pour contrer cette pratique, la référence à la notion de « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » a été ajoutée à l’art. 454 du ccq (1980) (devenu l’art. 406 du ccq) afin de protéger les ré- sidences familiales détenues indirectement par l’in- termédiaire d’une société (en ce qui concerne ce qui précède, voir b. lefebvre, « les droits qui confèrent l’usage des résidences familiales : quelques diffi- cultés lors de la liquidation du patrimoine familial » (2014), 116 r. du n. 389, p. 392- 394; j-p senécal,. le partage du patrimoine familial et les autres ré- formes du projet de loi 146 (1989), p 38). [34] depuis l’adoption de l’art 4622 du ccq. (1980) (devenu l’art. 415 du ccq), les tribunaux québécois se sont souvent appuyés sur les « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » pour partager la valeur des résidences familiales détenues par l’intermé- diaire de sociétés contrôlées par l’un des époux. par exemple, dans l’arrêt dl c. lg, 2006 qcca 1125, par. 22-29 (canlii), la cour d’appel du québec a conclu que la valeur d’une ferme familiale qui avait été transférée à une société à des fins fiscales devait être prise en compte lors du partage du patrimoine familial en raison des droits d’usage. voir aussi droit de la famille — 142245, 2014 qcca 1660, par. 13-14 (canlii); droit de la famille — 1931, [1994] rjq 378 (cs), p. 381, conf. par [1996] rdf 6 (ca);. droit de la famille — 10174, 2010 qccs 312, par. 48-52 (canlii), conf. par droit de la famille — 102269, 2010 qcca 1586 (canlii). [35] quebec courts have applied the same logic in the case of family residences held in trust. in droit de la famille — 071938, 2007 qccs 3792, [2007] rdf 711, the superior court relied on the “rights which confer use” of art 415 ccq to conclude that a family residence transferred to a trust con- trolled by both spouses was included in the family patrimony. in this case, the court ruled that as trus- tees, the spouses had conferred upon themselves an [35] les tribunaux québécois ont appliqué la même logique dans le cas de résidences familiales détenues par une fiducie. dans la décision droit de la famille — 071938, 2007 qccs 3792, [2007] rdf 711, la cour supérieure s’est appuyée sur les « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » mentionnés à l’art. 415 du ccq. pour conclure qu’une résidence familiale transférée à une fiducie contrôlée par les deux époux faisait partie du patrimoine familial. dans cette affaire, la cour a [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 519 implicit and non- written right of use of the residence within the meaning of art 415 ccq (paras. 71, 81 and 100). see also droit de la famille — 10977, 2010 qcca 892, at para. 16 (canlii); droit de la famille — 3511, [2000] rdf 93 (sup ct), at p. 97, aff’d on this point 2000 canlii 2002 (ca). [36] in other instances, courts have determined that certain rights to use a residence were not captured by arts. 415 or 406 ccq. this was so for a residence provided by an employer through an employment contract, even where the employee was a minority shareholder of the employer (droit de la famille — 2225, [1995] rdf 465 (sup ct);. j-yh v. cb, 2005 canlii 14832 (que. sup ct), at para 25). similarly, courts usually do not include rights con- ferred by a lease agreement within art 415 ccq, although the issue has been debated in doctrine and jurisprudence (droit de la famille — 171064, 2017 qccs 2076, at para. 176; droit de la famille — 2420, [1996] rdf 363 (sup ct)). in these cases, while the spouses had a right to use the family resi- dence, they did not control it in any meaningful way. [37] what may or may not constitute a “right which confers use” within the meaning of art 415 ccq. is therefore dependent on the circumstances and will generally be determined in relation to the level of con- trol exercised by either spouse with respect to the resi- dence. as such, i agree with my colleague that simple occupation of a property not owned by the spouses will not automatically give rise to “rights which confer use” within the meaning of art 415 ccq. however, given the purpose of the family patrimony and the rationale for including the “rights which confer use” in the text of art 415 ccq, it is preferable to accord wide discretion to the trier of fact when making such a determination. rather than providing a formal defi- nition of the “rights which confer use”, i would make the following remarks in relation to the arguments raised in the present case. jugé que, à titre de fiduciaires, les époux s’étaient implicitement conféré à eux- mêmes un droit d’usage non écrit de la résidence au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. (par. 71, 81 et 100). voir aussi droit de la famille — 10977, 2010 qcca 892, par. 16 (canlii); droit de la famille — 3511, [2000] rdf 93 (cs), p. 97, conf. sur ce point par 2000 canlii 2002 (ca). [36] dans d’autres cas, les tribunaux ont déter- miné que certains droits qui confèrent l’usage d’une résidence n’étaient pas visés par les art. 415 ou 406 du ccq. cela a été le cas pour une résidence four- nie par un employeur suivant un contrat de travail, même si l’employé était un actionnaire minoritaire de l’employeur (droit de la famille — 2225, [1995] rdf 465 (cs);. j-yh c cb, 2005 canlii 14832 (cs qc), par 25). de même, les tribunaux considèrent habituellement que les droits conférés par un bail ne sont pas visés par l’art. 415 du ccq, même si la question a fait l’objet de débats dans la doctrine et la jurisprudence (droit de la famille — 171064, 2017 qccs 2076, par. 176; droit de la famille — 2420, [1996] rdf 363 (cs)). dans ces affaires, bien que les époux avaient le droit d’utiliser la résidence familiale, ils n’exerçaient aucun véritable contrôle sur elle. [37] ce qui peut constituer ou non des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » d’une résidence familiale au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq dépend donc des cir- constances et sera généralement déterminé en fonc- tion du niveau de contrôle exercé par l’un ou l’autre des époux à l’égard de la résidence en cause. ainsi, je suis d’accord avec ma collègue pour dire que la simple occupation d’une résidence qui n’appartient pas aux époux ne donnera pas automatiquement lieu à des « droits qui [  ] confèrent [un] usage » au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. cependant, compte tenu de l’objectif du patrimoine familial et de la raison de l’inclusion des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » dans le libellé de cette disposition, il est préférable d’accorder au juge des faits un large pouvoir discré- tionnaire lorsqu’il s’agit de rendre une telle décision. plutôt que de proposer une définition formelle des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage », je formulerai les remarques suivantes concernant les arguments soulevés en l’espèce. 520 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. (1) rights which confer use are not limited (1) les droits qui confèrent l’usage ne se limitent to real rights pas aux droits réels [38] mr. karam argues that given the particular char- acteristics of patrimonies by appropriation, the rights which confer use under art 415 ccq cannot be re- lied on to partition the value of a family residence held under a trust. in his view, art 415 ccq refers to the right of use within the meaning of art 1172 ccq, that is a dismemberment of the right of ownership by which one can temporarily use the property of another and take its fruits and revenues, to the extent of one’s needs. since art 1261 ccq clearly establishes that neither the trustee, nor the settlor, nor the beneficiaries have any real right in the trust patrimony, it follows that a family residence held under a trust cannot fall within the scope of art 415 ccq on the basis of the “rights which confer use” (rf, at paras. 46 and 51-52). with respect, this narrow interpretation of art 415 ccq cannot be accepted. [39] first, it runs contrary to the approach the court should take in interpreting the rules of the family patrimony. rather than fostering a broad applica- tion of the regime, requiring a proof of rights of use within the meaning of art 1172 ccq (or any other dismemberments of the right of ownership) would significantly restrict the ability of a trial judge to order an equitable partition of the family patrimony in cases where one spouse, while not the owner in title of a residence, has the authority to exercise control over the other spouse’s use of the residence. moreover, such an interpretation of “rights which confer use” would have the effect of legitimizing the trust as a vehicle to avoid the application of art 415 ccq to family residences, which is pre- cisely the type of result the legislature sought to avoid with similar wording in art 406 ccq. [38] m. karam fait valoir que, compte tenu des caractéristiques particulières des patrimoines d’af- fectation, les droits qui confèrent l’usage mentionnés à l’art. 415 du ccq ne peuvent être invoqués pour partager la valeur d’une résidence familiale détenue par une fiducie. selon lui, l’art. 415 du ccq renvoie au droit d’usage au sens de l’art. 1172 du ccq, soit à un démembrement du droit de propriété qui permet à une personne de se servir temporairement du bien d’autrui et d’en percevoir les fruits et reve- nus, jusqu’à concurrence de ses besoins. il ajoute que l’art. 1261 du ccq établit expressément que ni le fiduciaire, ni le constituant, ni les bénéficiaires n’ont de droit réel sur le patrimoine fiduciaire; une résidence familiale détenue par une fiducie ne saurait donc être visée par l’art. 415 du ccq du fait de la mention des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » qui s’y trouve (mi, par. 46 et 51-52). avec égards, cette interprétation étroite de l’art. 415 du ccq ne peut être retenue. [39] premièrement, elle va à l’encontre de l’ap- proche que le tribunal doit adopter pour interpréter les règles relatives au patrimoine familial. plutôt que de favoriser une application large du régime, exiger la preuve de l’existence de droits d’usage au sens de l’art. 1172 du ccq (ou de tout autre démembre- ment du droit de propriété) restreindrait considéra- blement la capacité du juge des faits d’ordonner un partage équitable du patrimoine familial dans les cas où un époux, même s’il n’est pas propriétaire d’une résidence, détient le pouvoir de contrôler l’usage qu’en fait l’autre époux. de plus, une telle interpré- tation des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » aurait pour effet de légitimer la fiducie comme moyen de soustraire les résidences familiales à l’application de l’art. 415 du ccq, ce qui est précisément le type de résultat que le législateur a cherché à éviter en utilisant un libellé semblable à l’art. 406 du ccq. [40] second, when read alongside art 406 ccq, it is clear that the rights which confer use referred to in art 415 ccq are not limited to dismemberments of the right of ownership. in art 406 ccq, the first paragraph provides that holders of real rights of [40] deuxièmement, lorsqu’ils sont interprétés conjointement avec l’art. 406 du ccq, il est évi- dent que les droits qui confèrent l’usage dont il est question à l’art. 415 du ccq ne se limitent pas aux démembrements du droit de propriété. le premier [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 521 usufruct, emphyteusis or use are subject to arts. 404 and 405 ccq, which protect the family residence. in the second paragraph, the legislature specified that similar protection applies to other rights which confer use of the family residence, ie not the real rights listed in the previous paragraph: alinéa de l’art. 406 du ccq prévoit que les titulaires des droits réels que constituent l’usufruit, l’emphy- téose ou l’usage sont assujettis aux règles des art. 404 et 405 du ccq qui protègent la résidence familiale. au deuxième alinéa, le législateur précise qu’une pro- tection semblable s’applique à la résidence familiale dans le cas d’autres droits qui en confèrent l’usage, c-à-d les droits réels qui ne sont pas énumérés à l’alinéa précédent : 406 the usufructuary, the emphyteuta and the user are 406 l’usufruitier, l’emphytéote et l’usager sont sou- subject to the rules of articles 404 and 405. mis aux règles des articles 404 et 405. neither spouse may, without the consent of the other, dispose of rights held by another title conferring use of the family residence. l’époux autrement titulaire de droits qui lui confèrent l’usage de la résidence familiale ne peut non plus en dis- poser sans le consentement de son conjoint. [41] the interpretation of the “rights which con- fer use” at art.  415  ccq based on the text of art 406 ccq is supported by doctrine and juris- prudence (see senécal, at pp. 38-39; c. labonté, “le patrimoine familial”, in droit de la famille québécois (loose- leaf), vol. 3, by j-p senécal, at pp. 3/2282 to 3/2286; droit de la famille — 3511 (sup ct), at p 96). i would add that it is consist- ent with the presumption that the same expres- sion within a statute conveys the same meaning (p-a. côté, in collaboration with s. beaulac and m devinat, the interpretation of legislation in canada (4th ed. 2011), at pp 353-54). [41] l’interprétation des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » dont il est question à l’art. 415 du ccq en fonction du libellé de l’art. 406 du ccq trouve appui dans la doctrine et la jurisprudence (voir senécal, p. 38-39; c. labonté, « le patrimoine familial », dans droit de la famille québécois (feuilles mobiles), vol. 3, par j-p senécal, p. 3/2282 à 3/2286; droit de la famille — 3511 (cs), p 96). j’aimerais ajouter que cette interprétation est conforme à la présomption qu’une même expression utilisée dans une même loi revêt la même signification (p-a côté, en collabora- tion avec s. beaulac et m. devinat, l’interprétation des lois (4e éd. 2011), p. 353- 354). [42] the “rights which confer use” under art. 415 ccq are therefore not limited to rights of use within the meaning of art 1172 ccq or other real rights listed at art 1119 ccq. it follows that family residences held in trust are not, in principle, outside the scope of art 415 ccq. (2) whether the residence is acquired directly or transferred to a trust is not determinative [42] les « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » dont il est question à l’art. 415 du ccq ne se limitent donc pas aux droits d’usage tel qu’ils sont décrits à l’art. 1172 du ccq ou aux autres droits réels énumérés à l’art. 1119 du ccq. par conséquent, les résidences familiales détenues par une fiducie ne sont pas, par principe, hors de la portée de l’art. 415 du ccq. (2) la question de savoir si la résidence est ac- quise directement ou transférée à une fiducie n’est pas déterminante [43] while my colleague and st- pierre ja share the view that the “rights which confer use” at art. 415 ccq can apply to a residence held in trust by one of the spouses, their reasons suggest that this would [43] bien que ma collègue et la juge st- pierre soient toutes deux d’avis que les « droits qui [  ] con fèrent l’usage » visés à l’art. 415 du ccq peuvent s’appli- quer à une résidence détenue par une fiducie contrôlée 522 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. be the case only when the residence is transferred to the trust, rather than acquired directly by it (ca. reasons, at para 91). such an approach gives rise to the question: why should the consequences of ac- quiring a family residence through a trust in order to avoid undesirable tax treatment be any different than transferring the property from the spouse’s estate for the same purpose? with respect, i see no meaningful difference between these two situations. par un des époux, leurs motifs donnent à penser qu’il en serait ainsi seulement lorsque la résidence est transférée à la fiducie, et non lorsqu’elle est acquise directement par celle-ci (motifs de la ca, par 91). une telle approche soulève la question suivante : pourquoi les conséquences de l’acquisition d’une résidence familiale par l’entremise d’une fiducie afin d’éviter un traitement fiscal indésirable devraient- elles être différentes de celles du transfert d’une telle résidence du patrimoine d’un conjoint dans le même but? avec égards, je ne vois aucune différence signi- ficative entre ces deux situations. in most cases cited by the appellants on this [44] particular issue, the family residence had been the property of the spouses prior to its transfer to either a trust or a corporation (dl;. droit de la famille — 10174; droit de la famille — 13681, 2013 qcca 501). in dl, the court of appeal insisted on the occupation of the residence prior to its transfer to show that, despite the lack of formal arrangement with the corporation that owned the residence, the couple enjoyed “rights which confer use” within the meaning of art 415 ccq (paras 23-26). [44] dans la plupart des cas relevés par les appelants quant à cette question précise, la résidence familiale a appartenu aux époux avant son transfert à une fiducie ou à une société (dl;. droit de la famille — 10174; droit de la famille — 13681, 2013 qcca 501). dans l’arrêt dl, la cour d’appel a insisté sur l’occupation de la résidence avant son transfert pour montrer que, malgré l’absence d’une entente formelle avec la so- ciété propriétaire de la résidence, le couple jouissait de « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq (par 23-26). i agree that prior ownership and occupation [45] of a family residence can be relevant to show that the spouses hold a right which confers use within the meaning of art 415 ccq. this will be the case when, as in dl, the record shows that the transfer of the property to either a trust or a corporation had no impact on the living arrangements of the spouses, who continue to occupy the residence as if they were still the owners. however, prior ownership is not, as a matter of law, a necessary condition for a finding of “rights which confer use” within the meaning of art 415 ccq. if the trial judge is satisfied, based on the evidence before him or her, that the spouses are in control of the residence, not merely by way of exercising control over the entitlement to the value of the assets but by controlling whom may benefit from the use of the property, it is open to him or her to include the value of the residence in the fam- ily patrimony based on art 415 ccq, even when such residence was acquired directly by a trust or a corporation. [45] je conviens que le droit de propriété antérieur et l’occupation d’une résidence familiale peuvent être pertinents pour démontrer que les époux détiennent un droit qui en confère l’usage visé par l’art. 415 du ccq. ce sera le cas lorsque, comme dans l’affaire dl, la preuve démontre que le transfert du bien à une fiducie ou à une société n’a eu aucune réper- cussion sur les arrangements de vie des époux, qui ont continué d’occuper la résidence comme s’ils en étaient encore les propriétaires. cependant, le droit de propriété antérieur d’une résidence ne constitue pas, en droit, une condition nécessaire pour conclure à l’existence de « droits qui en confèrent l’usage » au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. si le juge des faits est convaincu, compte tenu de la preuve dont il dispose, que les époux exercent un contrôle sur la résidence, non seulement en exerçant le contrôle sur le droit à la valeur des biens, mais en contrôlant qui peut béné- ficier de l’usage de la propriété, il peut en inclure la valeur dans le patrimoine familial par application de l’art. 415 du ccq, et ce, même lorsque la résidence a été acquise directement par une fiducie ou par une société. [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 523 (3) the absence of intention to avoid the fam- ily patrimony is irrelevant with respect to the “rights which confer use” at arti- cle 415 ccq. (3) l’absence d’intention d’éluder les règles du patrimoine familial n’a pas d’incidence sur les « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » d’une résidence familiale visés à l’art. 415 du ccq. [46] central to mr. karam’s submissions is the fact that the trust was set up for a legitimate objective and that at no time was he acting with the inten- tion of avoiding the rules of the family patrimony. according to him, to include the value of the resi- dence in the family patrimony in the absence of bad faith or fraudulent intention would be to transform unduly a rule of protective public order into a rule of directive public order (rf, at para 36). in my view, this reasoning is based on a misunderstanding of the difference between protective and directive public order rules and on the operation of such mandatory rules more generally. [46] le fait que la fiducie ait été créée à des fins légitimes et qu’il n’a, en aucun temps, eu l’intention d’éluder les règles du patrimoine familial est un élé- ment central des observations de m karam. selon lui, inclure la valeur de la résidence dans le patrimoine familial en l’absence de mauvaise foi ou d’intention frauduleuse reviendrait à transformer indûment une règle d’ordre public de protection en une règle d’ordre public de direction (mi, par 36). à mon avis, ce raisonnement est fondé sur une incompréhension de la différence entre les règles d’ordre public de direc- tion et celles de protection ainsi que, de manière plus générale, de l’application de ces règles impératives. [47] i would agree with mr. karam that the rules of the family patrimony are protective public order rules, in that they are imposed by the legislature to safeguard the interests of vulnerable parties and to insure a certain equity within the institution of mar- riage (c. dubreuil and b. lefebvre, “l’ordre public et les rapports patrimoniaux dans les relations de couple” (1999), 40 c de d. 345, at p 351). however, it does not follow from this characterization that the operation of these rules will depend on the behavior, intention or good faith of the parties during their con- tractual relationship, as mr. karam suggests (rf, at para 32). [47] je conviens avec m. karam que les règles du patrimoine familial sont des règles d’ordre public de protection, en ce qu’elles sont prescrites par le législateur pour protéger les intérêts des parties vul- nérables et pour assurer une certaine équité au sein de l’institution du mariage (c. dubreuil et b. lefebvre, « l’ordre public et les rapports patrimoniaux dans les relations de couple » (1999), 40 c de d. 345, p 351). toutefois, cette qualification ne signifie pas que l’application de ces règles dépend du compor- tement, de l’intention ou de la bonne foi des parties pendant leur relation contractuelle, comme le laisse entendre m. karam (mi, par 32). in garcia transport ltée v. royal trust co., [48] [1992] 2 scr 499, at pp. 528-30, justice l’heureux- dubé explained that the difference between protective and directive public order rules arises from the possi- bility, in the case of protective public order rules, to re- nounce the protection offered by the law once the right is acquired. this is consistent with art 423 ccq, which provides that spouses can renounce their rights in the family patrimony only upon the death of the other spouse, the judgment of divorce, separation from bed and board or nullity of marriage. as the court of appeal recently stated, [translation] “[t]he courts recognize that ‘any renunciation made otherwise than in the form prescribed by article 423 ccq is prohib- ited and contrary to public order’. such a renunciation [48] dans l’arrêt garcia transport ltée c cie trust royal, [1992] 2 rcs 499, p. 528- 530, la juge l’heureux- dubé a expliqué que la différence entre les règles d’ordre public de protection et les règles d’ordre public de direction réside dans la possibi- lité, dans le cas des règles d’ordre public de pro- tection, de renoncer à la protection offerte par la loi une fois le droit acquis. cette distinction s’accorde avec l’art. 423 du ccq, qui prévoit qu’un époux ne peut renoncer à ses droits dans le patrimoine familial qu’à compter du décès de son conjoint ou du juge- ment de divorce, de séparation de corps ou de nullité du mariage. comme l’a récemment indiqué la cour d’appel, « [l]a jurisprudence reconnaît que “toute renonciation autrement que selon la forme prescrite à 524 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. ‘must be clear, precise and explicit’. moreover, a spouse may withdraw his or her renunciation as long as the court has not recorded it” (droit de la famille — 19582, 2019 qcca 647, at para. 24 (canlii) (foot- notes omitted); see also droit de la famille — 131166, 2013 qccs 2194, at paras. 70-76, aff’d droit de la famille — 1487, 2014 qcca 123, at paras. 60-62 (canlii); droit de la famille — 112467, 2011 qccs 4229, at paras. 45-48 (canlii), aff’d droit de la fa- mille — 121301, at paras. 44-48 (canlii)). it does not follow, as mr. karam suggests, [49] that spouses are free to organize their affairs in a way that displaces the mandatory rules imposed by the legislature, provided that they did not intend to avoid these rules or did not act in bad faith. if we were to include this subjective element as a require- ment for the operation of mandatory rules, it would necessarily put the burden on the party claiming the protection of the law to demonstrate that the co- contracting party knew about this rule and was trying to evade it. this would run contrary to the purpose of protective public order rules. i am not aware of any authority, jurisprudential or doctrinal, suggesting that mandatory rules are triggered only by one’s intention to evade them. [50] i therefore share the view of the trial judge when he writes that the [translation] “question is thus not so much what the defendant’s objective was in creating the trust, but rather whether the in- terposition of the trust patrimony would here have the consequence of avoiding the imperative family patrimony rules” (para. 55 (emphasis in original)). having regard to the contrary opinion, this is also how we should understand the comment made by the court of appeal in droit de la famille — 13681, at para. 31 (canlii), where fournier ja writes that [translation] “[t]he creation of a trust must not have the consequence of avoiding the application of public order provisions, such as those pertaining to the family patrimony”. in this case, the spouses had transferred all their assets to two trusts consti- tuted based on the advice of their accountant and their tax lawyer in an effort to protect their assets l’article 423 ccq est interdite et contraire” à l’ordre public. une telle renonciation “doit être claire, pré- cise et explicite”. de plus, l’époux peut rétracter sa renonciation tant que le tribunal n’en a pas donné acte » (droit de la famille — 19582, 2019 qcca 647, par. 24 (canlii) (notes en bas de page omises); voir aussi droit de la famille — 131166, 2013 qccs 2194, par. 70-76, conf. par droit de la famille — 1487, 2014 qcca 123, par. 60-62 (canlii); droit de la famille — 112467, 2011 qccs 4229, par. 45-48 (canlii), conf. par droit de la famille — 121301, par. 44-48 (canlii)). [49] cela ne veut pas dire pour autant, comme le prétend m. karam, que les époux sont libres d’or- ganiser leurs affaires de manière à écarter les règles obligatoires prescrites par le législateur, pourvu qu’ils n’aient pas eu l’intention d’éluder ces règles ou qu’ils n’aient pas agi de mauvaise foi. si cet élément subjec- tif devait constituer une exigence pour l’application des règles obligatoires, il incomberait forcément à la partie qui demande la protection de la loi de démon- trer que la partie cocontractante était au courant de cette règle et qu’elle cherchait à l’éluder. une telle interprétation irait à l’encontre de l’objet des règles d’ordre public de protection. je ne connais d’ailleurs aucun précédent jurisprudentiel ou doctrinal indi- quant que les règles obligatoires ne s’appliquent que lorsqu’une personne tente de les éviter. [50] je partage donc le point de vue du juge de première instance lorsqu’il écrit que la « question n’est donc pas tant de savoir quel était l’objectif du défendeur en créant la fiducie, mais plutôt de savoir si l’interposition du patrimoine fiduciaire aurait ici pour conséquence d’éviter les règles impératives du patri- moine familial » (par. 55 (en italique dans l’original)). avec égard pour l’opinion contraire, nous devrions accorder la même signification à la remarque formulée par la cour d’appel dans l’arrêt droit de la famille — 13681, par. 31 (canlii), lorsque le juge fournier écrit que « [l]a constitution d’une fiducie ne doit pas avoir pour conséquence d’éviter l’application de dispositions d’ordre public telles que celles relatives au patrimoine familial ». dans cette affaire, les époux avaient trans- féré la totalité de leurs actifs à deux fiducies constituées suivant les recommandations de leur comptable et de leur fiscaliste dans le but de protéger ces actifs et [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 525 and minimize their taxes (see droit de la famille — 121905, 2012 qccs 3977, at paras. 48, 54 and 71 (canlii)). the remark of fournier ja was made in that context and is not limited, as st- pierre ja sug- gests, to spouses who deliberately attempt to avoid the rules of the family patrimony (ca reasons, at para 81). de réaliser des économies d’impôt (voir droit de la famille — 121905, 2012 qccs 3977, par. 48, 54 et 71 (canlii)). la remarque du juge fournier a été for- mulée dans ce contexte et ne se limite pas, comme le donne à penser la juge st- pierre, aux époux qui tentent délibérément d’éluder les règles du patrimoine familial (motifs de la ca, par 81). [51] in fact, in other cases where the courts have included in the family patrimony the value of a resi- dence not directly owned by the spouses, the record did not show an intention to avoid these mandatory rules. in dl, the family residence had been trans- ferred to a corporation controlled by the spouses for purely fiscal reasons and at no point did the court of appeal or the trial judge suggest that there was an attempt to avoid the operation of the family patri- mony (paras. 23-26; lg v. dl, 2005 canlii 22738 (que. sup ct), at paras. 22-24 and 47). the same is true in droit de la famille — 133443, 2013 qccs 6099, where the trial judge applied dl to partition the value of a family residence held by a farmers’ association. in this case, the record was clear that the association was created for fiscal purposes and to facilitate a transfer of property from a father to his son (paras. 28-31 (canlii), aff’d droit de la fa- mille — 142245, at paras 13-14). again, at no point was intention, behavior or good faith relevant for the application of art 415 ccq. [52] when applying art 415 ccq to a family residence not directly owned by the spouses, the question is therefore relatively simple: does the re- cord support a finding of rights which confer use of the residence? if so, the fact that the spouses were pursuing a legitimate objective in organizing their af- fairs the way that they did is not a bar to inclusion of the residence in the partition of the family patrimony. [51] en fait, dans d’autres affaires où les tribunaux ont inclus la valeur d’une résidence dont les époux n’étaient pas directement propriétaires dans le patri- moine familial, la preuve ne montrait pas une intention d’éluder ces règles obligatoires. dans l’arrêt dl, la résidence familiale avait été transférée à une société contrôlée par les époux à des fins purement fiscales. la cour d’appel et le juge de première instance n’ont jamais donné à penser que les époux avaient tenté d’éviter l’application des règles du patrimoine familial (par. 23-26; lg c. dl, 2005 canlii 22738 (cs. qc), par. 22-24 et 47). il en va de même dans la déci- sion droit de la famille — 133443, 2013 qccs 6099, où la juge de première instance a appliqué l’arrêt dl. pour partager la valeur d’une résidence familiale dé- tenue par une société agricole. dans cette affaire, la preuve démontrait clairement que la société avait été créée pour des raisons fiscales et pour faciliter le trans- fert d’un bien d’un père à son fils (par. 28-31 (canlii), conf. par droit de la famille — 142245, par 13-14). encore une fois, l’intention, le comportement ou la bonne foi n’étaient pas pertinents pour l’application de l’art. 415 du ccq. [52] lorsque l’on applique l’art. 415 du ccq à une résidence familiale dont les époux ne sont pas di- rectement propriétaires, la question à trancher est re- lativement simple : la preuve permet- elle de conclure à l’existence de droits qui en confèrent l’usage? si tel est le cas, le fait que les époux avaient un objectif légitime pour organiser leurs affaires comme ils l’ont fait n’empêche pas l’inclusion de la résidence dans le partage du patrimoine familial. [53] this is not to say that the intention of the spouses is never relevant when applying art 415 ccq to a family residence. in fact, the intention of the spouses is essential to characterize a property as a “residence of the family” within the meaning of art 415 ccq. (see, for example, j (y) v. b (m), 1999 canlii 10838 il ne faut pas croire pour autant que l’intention [53] des époux n’est jamais pertinente lorsqu’il s’agit d’appliquer l’art. 415 du ccq à une résidence fa- miliale. en fait, l’intention des époux est essentielle pour considérer un bien comme une « résidence[  ] de la famille » au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq (voir, 526 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. (que. sup ct), at paras. 32-39, aff’d 2000 canlii 10021 (ca), at paras 17-19). but in so far as the intention to use a property as a residence of the family has been established, art 415 ccq does not require any further demonstration of intention. par exemple, j (y) c b (m), 1999 canlii 10838 (cs. qc), par. 32-39, conf. par 2000 canlii 10021 (ca), par 17-19). cependant, dans la mesure où il est établi que les époux avaient l’intention d’utiliser un bien à titre de résidence de la famille, l’art. 415 du ccq n’exige aucune autre manifestation de l’intention. d application to this case d application à l’espèce [54] applying the principles stated above to the facts of this case, i find that the trial decision did not contain a reviewable error that justified the interven- tion of the court of appeal. while i agree with st- pierre ja that the application of art 317 ccq by analogy is not appropriate to dispose of the matter, the trial judge also anchored his decision in the “rights which confer use” of art 415 ccq (paras 39-40). thus, insofar as the reference to art 317 ccq was an error of law, this was of no consequence for the result. [55] furthermore, it was open to the trial judge to consider whether or not the circumstances of the case, and in particular the content of the trust deed, supported a finding of rights which conferred use of the family residence. as explained above, that the residence on docteur- penfield avenue was acquired directly by the trust and partly for investment pur- poses is not a bar to a finding of rights which confer use. the main question remaining is whether the trial judge erred in his determination that mr. karam was the sole holder of rights which confer use of a fam- ily residence within the meaning of art 415 ccq. absent a finding of palpable and overriding error in this determination, the court of appeal could not intervene and substitute its own view. [54] je conclus de l’application des principes men- tionnés précédemment aux faits de l’espèce que la décision de première instance ne contenait aucune erreur susceptible de révision justifiant l’interven- tion de la cour d’appel. bien que je sois d’accord avec la juge st- pierre pour dire que l’application par analogie de l’art. 317 du ccq n’est pas appropriée pour trancher l’affaire, le juge de première instance a également fondé sa décision sur les « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » visés à l’art. 415 du ccq. (par 39-40). par conséquent, même si la référence à l’art. 317 du ccq constituait une erreur de droit, celle-ci n’a eu aucune incidence sur le résultat. [55] de plus, il était loisible au juge de première instance de se demander si les circonstances de l’es- pèce, et en particulier le contenu de l’acte de fiducie, permettaient ou non de conclure à l’existence de droits qui conféraient l’usage de la résidence fa- miliale. comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, le fait que la résidence sur l’avenue du docteur- penfield a été acquise directement par la fiducie, et en partie à des fins d’investissement, n’empêche pas de conclure à l’existence de droits qui en conféraient l’usage. la principale question qu’il reste à trancher est celle de savoir si le juge de première instance a commis une erreur en concluant que m. karam était l’unique titulaire de droits qui conféraient l’usage d’une ré- sidence familiale au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. en l’absence d’une erreur manifeste et dominante relativement à cette conclusion, la cour d’appel ne pouvait intervenir et substituer sa propre conclusion. (1) the finding of rights which confer use (1) conclusion à l’existence de droits qui con- fèrent l’usage in my view, the factual determinations of the [56] trial judge were amply supported by the evidence. [56] j’estime que les conclusions de fait tirées par le juge de première instance étaient amplement [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 527 the trial judge based his conclusions on the interpre- tation of the trust deed, and in particular the clauses relating to the power of mr. karam as a trustee and “appointer” of the trust. in his view, [translation] “it is clear that the entire trust deed is structured so as to give the defendant almost total control over the trust and the property held by it. this emerges clearly from all of its provisions” (para 51). more specifically, the trial judge relied on paras 42 and 4.3 of the trust deed, which granted the following discretionary powers to mr. karam (paras. 45-47; ar, vol. ii, at pp. 117-19): étayées par la preuve. il les a fondées sur l’interpréta- tion de l’acte de fiducie, et plus particulièrement sur les dispositions relatives au pouvoir de m. karam à titre de fiduciaire et d’« électeur » de la fiducie. selon lui, « il est clair que tout l’acte de fiducie est struc- turé de manière à conférer au défendeur un contrôle quasi total sur la fiducie et sur les biens détenus par celle-ci. cela ressort clairement de l’ensemble de ses dispositions » (par 51). plus précisément, le juge de première instance a invoqué les art 42 et 4.3 de l’acte de fiducie, lesquels accordaient à m. karam les pouvoirs discrétionnaires suivants (par. 45-47; d a., vol. ii, p. 117- 119) : • appoint new beneficiaries, including himself. • élire de nouveaux bénéficiaires, y compris lui- même. • destitute any beneficiaries, including his chil- • destituer tout bénéficiaire, y compris ses enfants dren and wife. et son épouse. • determine how the revenues and capital of the • déterminer comment les revenus et le capital de trust would be distributed. la fiducie seraient distribués. [57] the trial judge referred to other stipulations that reinforced his view that mr. karam was in full control of the trust, and by extension of the house ac- quired through it (paras 49-50). he noted, inter alia, that para 24 indicated the intention of the settlor to see the decisions of the appointer (mr. karam) re- spected by the beneficiaries and the other trustee, his mother. furthermore, while my colleague is of the view that the sole purpose of the trust was to invest in the property for the benefit of the four children, it is clear that the family promptly moved in and used the property as a family residence, and that the trust gave mr. karam extensive powers over the property. i concede that certain stipulations of the trust deed listed by the trial judge are of questionable validity, more specifically art. 6, by which the trustee is under no obligation to maintain or increase the capital of the trust, or art 810 by which the trustee can con- tinue to perform his duty despite a conflict of interest. the validity of these stipulations was, however, not challenged before any court; they are immaterial, given the other aspects of the trust deed analyzed by the trial judge. it is not for this court to speculate whether mr. karam’s powers as drafted would have sustained the scrutiny of the trial judge’s review had this issue been litigated. i see no basis to conclude [57] le juge de première instance a fait référence à d’autres dispositions qui renforçaient son opinion selon laquelle la fiducie et, par extension, la maison acquise par son intermédiaire étaient entièrement contrôlées par m.  karam (par.  49-50) il a entre autres souligné que, selon l’art 24, l’intention du constituant était de faire en sorte que les décisions de l’électeur (m. karam) soient respectées par les bénéficiaires et par l’autre fiduciaire, la mère de m karam. en outre, bien que ma collègue soit d’avis que la fiducie n’a été créée qu’à des fins d’investisse- ment dans la propriété au bénéfice des quatre enfants, il est clair que la famille y a rapidement emménagé et l’a utilisée comme résidence familiale, et que la fiducie conférait à m. karam des pouvoirs étendus à l’égard de la propriété. je conviens que la validité de certaines des dispositions de l’acte de fiducie énumérées par le juge de première instance est dou- teuse, plus particulièrement l’art. 6, selon lequel le fiduciaire n’est aucunement tenu de maintenir ou d’accroître le capital de la fiducie, ou l’art 810, qui prévoit que le fiduciaire peut continuer d’exercer sa fonction, même s’il se trouve en conflit d’intérêts. cependant, aucune partie n’a contesté la validité de ces clauses devant un tribunal. elles ne sont en outre pas pertinentes, étant donné les autres aspects de 528 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. that the trial judge committed a palpable and over- riding error in determining that mr. karam possessed “rights which confer use” within the meaning of art 415 ccq and was in full control of the resi- dence, not only as to its use, but also as to entitlement to the value of the property. [58] st- pierre ja’s understanding of the record is diametrically opposed to this. in her view, there was no evidence on the record to prove either the exist- ence of rights which conferred use or that mr. karam was the sole holder of these rights. in her view, the evidence before the trial judge regarding the relation- ship between the trust and the spouses was limited to the following elements (para. 98): • the trust was constituted by both spouses for a common purpose to which they had freely consented. l’acte de fiducie sur lesquels a porté l’analyse du juge de première instance. il n’appartient pas à la cour de spéculer quant à la question de savoir si les pouvoirs de m. karam, tels qu’ils sont énoncés, auraient passé le test d’un examen par le juge du procès si elle avait été débattue. je ne vois par ailleurs aucune raison de conclure que le juge de première instance a commis une erreur manifeste et dominante en concluant que m. karam détenait des « droits qui [  ] confér[aient] l’usage » au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq et qu’il avait le plein contrôle de la résidence, non seulement quant à son usage, mais également quant au droit à la valeur de la propriété. [58] la compréhension qu’a eue la juge st- pierre du dossier est diamétralement opposée. selon elle, aucune preuve au dossier ne démontrait l’existence de droits qui conféraient l’usage de la résidence ou le fait que m. karam était l’unique titulaire de ces droits. à son avis, la preuve dont disposait le juge de première instance quant à la relation entre la fi- ducie et les époux se limitait aux éléments suivants (par. 98) : • la constitution de la fiducie était le résultat d’une démarche conjointe des époux afin de réaliser un objectif commun à l’égard duquel chacun avait donné un consentement libre et éclairé. • the trust deed reflected the intention of the spouses who had received professional advice on the matter. • le contenu de l’acte de fiducie reflétait l’inten- tion des époux, qui avaient reçu des conseils professionnels en ces matières. • the property on docteur- penfield avenue was acquired by the trust as an investment. • la résidence de l’avenue du docteur- penfield avait été acquise par la fiducie à titre d’investis- sement. • this property was eventually occupied by the spouses and their children, but the record says no more on this. • cette résidence avait finalement été occupée par les époux et leurs enfants, mais sans que la preuve en révèle davantage. [59] if we set aside the interpretation of the trust deed for a moment, the view by st- pierre ja that the record did not contain any proof of rights which confer use is somewhat surprising. who else, if not mr. karam and his family, would have had a right to use this property? the reality is that the occupa- tion of the residence on docteur- penfield avenue by mr. karam and his family was neither illegal, nor based on the tolerance of a third party nor precarious [59] si nous mettons de côté pendant un instant l’interprétation de l’acte de fiducie, l’opinion de la juge st- pierre voulant que le dossier ne contienne aucune preuve de l’existence de droits qui confèrent l’usage de la résidence est quelque peu surprenante. qui d’autre, si ce n’est m. karam et sa famille, aurait eu un droit d’usage à l’égard de cette résidence? en réalité, l’occupation de la résidence sur l’avenue du docteur- penfield par m. karam et sa famille n’était [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 529 in any other way. the record is clear, and the trial judge so found, that their occupation of the house was legitimate and firmly grounded in the rights that resulted from a trust that mr. karam controlled entirely. in fact, according to mr. karam himself, the acquisition of a residence for the family was pre- cisely what they intended when they constituted the trust (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 66 and 82-84). in this con- text, it was entirely reasonable for the trial judge to infer that the trust controlled by mr. karam granted rights which conferred use of the residence within the meaning of art 415 ccq. [60] in short, it was in fact their residence and they could stay there as long as mr. karam, who was in full control of the trust, saw this arrangement as a good way to manage the assets of the family. therefore, i cannot subscribe to the views of st- pierre jca when she writes that [translation] “[t]he evidence adduced provides no basis for affirm- ing the existence of such ‘rights which confer use of [it]’ on a balance of probabilities” (para 104). the record as a whole amply supports the trial judge’s findings and conclusion. [61] as for the determination of the trial judge that mr. karam was the sole holder of these rights, this resulted from his interpretation of the trust deed and more specifically of the extended powers of ap- pointer granted to mr karam. again, i see no review- able error. the fact that ms. yared and her children were beneficiaries of the trust does not change this as there was no assurance, under the trust deed, that they would receive anything at all or even remain beneficiaries of the trust. the status of the benefi- ciaries was precarious. once again, it depended on the exercise of mr. karam’s discretionary powers. while my colleague seems assured that the rights of ms. yared and her children would have been pro- tected had mr. karam decided to remove them and/ or name himself as beneficiary, this was not part of the pleadings before us nor before the courts below. i will refrain from speculating as to what might have been. ni illégale, ni fonction de la tolérance d’un tiers, ni par ailleurs précaire. il ressort clairement du dos- sier, et le juge de première instance l’a reconnu, qu’ils occupaient la maison en toute légitimité en vertu de droits qui leur étaient clairement conférés par une fiducie dont m. karam avait totalement le contrôle. en fait, selon m. karam lui- même, ils ont constitué la fiducie avec l’intention précise de faire l’acquisition d’une résidence familiale (d a., vol. ii, p. 66 et 82-84). dans ce contexte, il était tout à fait raisonnable que le juge de première instance déduise que la fiducie contrôlée par m. karam lui accordait des droits qui conféraient l’usage de la résidence au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. [60] bref, c’était en fait leur résidence, et ils pou- vaient y rester aussi longtemps que m. karam, qui avait le contrôle total de la fiducie, considérait cet arrangement comme une bonne manière de gérer les actifs de la famille. par conséquent, je ne peux sous- crire au point de vue de la juge st- pierre lorsqu’elle écrit que « [l]a preuve administrée ne comporte pas d’assises permettant d’affirmer par prépondérance des probabilités l’existence de tels “droits qui en confèrent l’usage” » (par 104). dans son ensemble, le dossier appuie amplement les conclusions et la décision du juge de première instance. [61] la conclusion du juge de première instance selon laquelle m. karam était l’unique titulaire de ces droits a découlé pour sa part de son interprétation de l’acte de fiducie et, plus précisément, des vastes pouvoirs accordés à m. karam à titre d’électeur. encore une fois, je ne vois aucune erreur susceptible de révision. le fait que mme yared et ses enfants étaient les bénéficiaires de la fiducie n’y change rien, car l’acte de fiducie ne garantissait pas qu’ils rece- vraient quelque chose ou même qu’ils conserveraient leur statut de bénéficiaires de la fiducie. ce statut était précaire. encore là, il dépendait de l’exercice des pouvoirs discrétionnaires de m karam. même si ma collègue semble convaincue que les droits de mme yared et de ses enfants auraient été protégés si m. karam avait décidé de leur retirer leur statut ou de se nommer lui- même bénéficiaire, cette question n’a été plaidée ni devant nous ni devant les cours d’instances inférieures. je vais donc m’abstenir de spéculer sur ce qui aurait pu arriver. 530 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. (2) mr. karam’s renunciation to his powers as (2) renonciation par m. karam à ses pouvoirs à appointer titre d’électeur [62] according to the court of appeal, the trial judge erred by failing to consider that mr. karam never used his powers of appointer to the benefi- ciaries’ detriment and later renounced those powers (para 100). without discussing the arguments raised by the trial judge in relation to mr. karam’s renun- ciation, st- pierre ja then proceeded in her conclu- sions to confirm this modification of the trust deed (para 111). at the hearing in this court, both parties agreed that at no point had the court of appeal been asked to confirm the validity of the [translation] “act of renunciation” of july 12, 2016 (transcript, at pp. 20-21 and 81). [63] as the trial judge noted, the renunciation by mr. karam of his powers as appointer amounted to a modification of the constituting act of the trust. according to art. 1294 and 1295 ccq, this can be done only by a court after notice is given to the in- terested parties, including the settlor, the trustees and the beneficiaries, except in certain narrow circum- stances that do not apply here (para 58). in my view, it was not open to the court of appeal to modify the trust deed according to the [translation] “act of renunciation”, given that neither party had asked the courts below to do so and given that the conditions provided in art 1295 ccq were not met. thus, the trial judge did not err when he attached no sig- nificance to mr. karam’s renunciation of his powers as appointer in his interpretation of the trust deed. [62] selon la cour d’appel, le juge de première ins- tance a commis une erreur en ne tenant pas compte du fait que m. karam n’a jamais usé de ses pouvoirs d’électeur au détriment des bénéficiaires et qu’il a ensuite renoncé à ces pouvoirs (par 100). sans ana- lyser les arguments avancés par le juge de première instance relativement à la renonciation de m. karam, la juge st- pierre a ensuite confirmé dans ses conclu- sions cette modification apportée à l’acte de fiducie (par 111). à l’audience devant la cour, les deux par- ties ont convenu que personne n’a jamais demandé à la cour d’appel de confirmer la validité de l’« acte de renonciation » du 12 juillet 2016 (transcription, p. 20-21 et 81). [63] comme l’a souligné le juge de première ins- tance, la renonciation de m. karam à ses pouvoirs à titre d’électeur représentait une modification de l’acte constitutif de la fiducie. selon les art. 1294 et 1295 du ccq, une telle modification ne peut être apportée que par le tribunal, après qu’un avis a été donné aux parties intéressées, y compris le constituant, les fiduciaires et les bénéficiaires, sauf dans certaines circonstances bien précises qui ne s’appliquent pas en l’espèce (par 58). j’estime que la cour d’appel n’était pas habilitée à modifier l’acte de fiducie conformément à l’«  acte de renoncia- tion », puisqu’aucune des parties n’avait demandé aux tribunaux d’instances inférieures de le faire et puisqu’il n’était pas satisfait aux conditions énoncées à l’art. 1295 du ccq. ainsi, le juge de première instance n’a pas commis d’erreur lorsque, dans son interprétation de l’acte de fiducie, il n’a pas accordé d’importance à la renonciation de m. karam à ses pouvoirs à titre d’électeur. (3) the valuation of the rights which confer (3) évaluation des droits qui confèrent l’usage use [64] the court of appeal also held that the trial judge could not declare that the value of the rights which confer use was equal to the full value of the residence, since this question was not before him (paras 108-9). on this, i am persuaded by the ap- pellants that given the nature of the problem before [64] la cour d’appel a également conclu que le juge de première instance ne pouvait pas déclarer que la valeur des droits qui confèrent l’usage équivalait à la totalité de la valeur de la résidence, puisqu’il n’avait pas été saisi de cette question (par. 108- 109). à cet égard, je suis convaincu par l’argument des [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam le juge rowe 531 him, it was well within the jurisdiction of the trial judge to slightly modify the declaration sought in the application in order to properly dispose of the issue (af, at paras 131-34). in the context of an applica- tion for declaratory judgement, this does not amount to ruling ultra petita (poulin v. dumas, 2014 qcca 676, at para. 3 (canlii)). of course, this reasoning does not apply to the question raised in the above section on mr. karam’s renunciation. the exercise of the power granted by art 1294 ccq to modify an act constituting a trust is beyond the authority of a court if it is not expressly asked to do so by one of the parties. [65] we should also remember that the parties are waiting for a definitive answer on the current issue in order to decide how they will conduct a parallel liti- gation on the validity of ms. yared’s will. if the trial judge had failed to declare how the value of these rights which confer use was to be determined, the value of ms. yared’s estate would remain impossible to estimate and the parties would perhaps have had to seek another declaratory judgement on this narrow issue. since the trial judge had all the evidence he needed to determine how the rights which confer use ought to be valued, it was justified for him to make a declaration to this effect. based on the jurispru- dence on this issue and on the circumstances of this case, it was also open to the trial judge to conclude that the rights which confer use were equal to the full value of the residence (droit de la famille — 142245, at paras. 13-14; droit de la famille — 10174, at para 52). i see no basis for appellate intervention on this question. appelants qui soutiennent que, compte tenu de la nature du problème qui lui était soumis, le juge de première instance avait la compétence requise pour modifier légèrement le jugement déclaratoire sollicité de manière à statuer convenablement sur la question en litige (ma, par. 131- 134). dans le contexte d’une demande de jugement déclaratoire, une telle modi- fication ne revient pas à statuer ultra petita (poulin c. dumas, 2014 qcca 676, par. 3 (canlii)). bien entendu, ce raisonnement ne s’applique pas à la ques- tion soulevée au paragraphe précédent concernant la renonciation de m karam. l’exercice du pouvoir accordé par l’art. 1294 du ccq permettant de mo- difier un acte constituant une fiducie outrepasse la compétence d’un tribunal si aucune des parties ne demande expressément au tribunal de le faire. [65] rappelons- nous également que les parties at- tendent une réponse définitive à la question en litige afin de décider de la manière dont ils procéderont dans le cadre d’une instance parallèle concernant la validité du testament de mme yared. si le juge de première instance n’avait pas déterminé la façon dont la valeur des droits qui confèrent l’usage de la résidence devait être évaluée, il serait toujours impossible d’estimer la valeur de la succession de mme yared, et les parties auraient peut- être été obli- gées de solliciter un autre jugement déclaratoire sur cette question précise. comme le juge de première instance disposait de tous les éléments de preuve dont il avait besoin pour déterminer comment évaluer les droits qui confèrent l’usage de la résidence, il était légitime qu’il se prononce à cet égard. selon la jurisprudence sur cette question et les circonstances de l’espèce, le juge de première instance pouvait aussi conclure que la valeur des droits qui confèrent l’usage équivalait à la totalité de la valeur de la ré- sidence (droit de la famille — 142245, par. 13-14; droit de la famille — 10174, par 52). je ne vois au- cune raison d’intervenir en appel sur cette question. (4) the fairness of the result for mr. karam (4) caractère équitable du résultat pour m. karam [66] as a final point, i wish to address the issue of fairness that was raised by the respondent and by the court of appeal. as they both point out, if we determine that the full value of the residence is to be included in the family patrimony, it could follow [66] en dernier lieu, j’aimerais me pencher sur la question de l’équité qui a été soulevée par l’intimé et par la cour d’appel. comme tous deux l’ont sou- ligné, si nous concluons que la totalité de la valeur de la résidence doit être incluse dans le patrimoine 532 yared v karam rowe j. [2019] 4 scr. that the children of mr. karam, theoretically, could inherit half of that value while remaining the sole beneficiaries of the trust (ca reasons, at para. 101; rf, at paras 119-20). in such a way, they could claim 150 percent of the value of the residence, while mr. karam would end up with nothing other than a large debt. that result would indeed be unfair for mr karam. [67] this eventuality, however, is premised on the assumption that mr. karam would be unable to ex- ercise his powers as trustee and appointer to dispose of the property in order to pay the debt that would result from the partition of the family patrimony and recuperate the other half of that value. this was briefly discussed during the hearing, but i would note that the validity of the trust deed, the powers of mr. karam or his faculty to exercise those powers was not addressed fully before any court. in the end, i am of the view that, should mr. karam and his children find themselves unable to reach a common solution that is equitable and respectful of the rights of each other, the courts will be able to avoid the unfair result noted above, notably by using the power granted by art 1294 ccq, to modify the trust deed. [68] my colleague, in her reasons at paras. 132- 38, has taken issue with the foregoing. in my col- league’s view, art.  1294  ccq cannot be relied on by mr. karam to avoid the possibility of being obliged to transfer half the value of the property to ms. yared’s estate, while also being liable to the ben- eficiaries for the property. in the end, this is a matter for the superior court to deal with should mr. karam bring an application before it. i leave it to that court to dispose of it properly under the civil code. familial, il pourrait s’ensuivre que les enfants de m. karam, en théorie, héritent de la moitié de cette valeur tout en demeurant les seuls bénéficiaires de la fiducie (motifs de la ca, par.  101; mi, par. 119- 120). de cette manière, ils pourraient ré- clamer 150 p 100 de la valeur de la résidence, alors que m. karam ne se retrouverait avec rien d’autre qu’une dette substantielle. ce résultat serait effec- tivement injuste pour m karam. [67] une telle éventualité repose toutefois sur l’hy- pothèse selon laquelle m. karam ne pourrait pas exercer ses pouvoirs à titre de fiduciaire et d’électeur lui permettant de disposer de la résidence afin de payer la dette qui découlerait du partage du patri- moine familial et de récupérer l’autre moitié de la valeur de la résidence. une telle situation a fait l’ob- jet d’une brève discussion pendant l’audience, mais j’aimerais souligner qu’aucun tribunal n’a examiné en profondeur la validité de l’acte de fiducie, les pou- voirs de m. karam ou sa faculté d’exercer ces pou- voirs. en définitive, je suis d’avis que si m. karam et ses enfants ne réussissent pas à trouver une solution commune qui est équitable et respectueuse des droits de chacun, les tribunaux seront en mesure d’éviter le résultat injuste décrit précédemment, notamment en utilisant le pouvoir que leur confère l’art. 1294 du ccq de modifier l’acte de fiducie. [68] aux paragraphes  132- 138 de ses motifs, ma collègue conteste ce qui précède selon elle, m.  karam ne peut se fonder sur l’art.  1294 du ccq pour éviter la possibilité qu’il soit obligé de transférer la moitié de la valeur de la propriété à la succession de mme yared, tout en étant respon- sable de la propriété envers les bénéficiaires. en définitive, il appartiendra à la cour supérieure de statuer sur cette question si m. karam y présente une demande à ce sujet je laisse donc le soin à cette cour de trancher correctement la question suivant les règles prévues au code civil. [69] what is relevant to a proper disposition of the matter before this court is that the point made by my colleague focuses on what is an ancillary question. the issue in this appeal is whether ms. yared (or her estate) is entitled to a half interest in the property by virtue of the division of the family patrimony. that [69] ce qui est pertinent pour trancher correcte- ment la question dont la cour est saisie, c’est que l’argument de ma collègue porte sur une question ac- cessoire. il s’agit en l’espèce de savoir si mme yared (ou sa succession) a droit à la moitié de la valeur de la propriété en conséquence du partage du patrimoine [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 533 does not depend on the operation of art 1294 ccq. rather it turns on art 415 ccq, which is a rule of public order under the civil code. a rule of public order cannot be undermined or denied based on a point of the nature made by my colleague. familial. cela n’est pas tributaire de l’application de l’art. 1294 du ccq, mais dépend plutôt de l’art. 415 du ccq, une règle d’ordre public suivant le code civil. une telle règle ne peut être minée ou niée sur la base d’un argument de la nature de celui qu’exprime ma collègue. [70] taken to its logical conclusion, my colleague’s reasoning at para. 137 would seem to suggest that because it is awkward for mr. karam to unwind the arrangement by which ms. yared would be cut out of the family patrimony, one should therefore give ef- fect to the arrangement that would cut out ms. yared (in this instance her estate) from her share of the family patrimony. that is not how my colleague puts it, but that is the implication of her position. [70] poussé à sa conclusion logique, le raisonne- ment de ma collègue au par. 137 de ses motifs semble indiquer que, parce qu’il serait peu commode pour m. karam de se défaire de l’arrangement en vertu duquel mme yared serait retranchée du patrimoine fa- milial, il faudrait donner effet à l’arrangement qui la priverait (en l’occurrence sa succession) de sa part du patrimoine familial. ce n’est pas ce que dit ma col- lègue, mais c’est ce que laisse entendre sa position. i would recall the wording of art 9 ccq: “in [71] the exercise of civil rights, derogations may be made from those rules of this code which supplement in- tention, but not from those of public order.” what is at issue here is whether such derogation is to be given effect. i would say no. in my view ms. yared’s right to a share of the family patrimony cannot be denied by the use of a trust, essentially for the same reasons that it could not be denied by the interposition of a corporation. neither of these devices should be allowed to circumvent a rule of public order, in this case the division of the family patrimony between husband and wife. [71] je rappellerais le libellé de l’art. 9 du ccq : « dans l’exercice des droits civils, il peut être dérogé aux règles du présent code qui sont supplétives de volonté; il ne peut, cependant, être dérogé à celles qui intéressent l’ordre public. » en l’espèce, il s’agit de savoir s’il serait bien fondé de donner effet à une telle dérogation. je suis d’avis que non. selon moi, le droit de mme yared à une part du patrimoine familial ne peut lui être nié au moyen d’une fiducie, essentiel- lement pour les mêmes raisons qu’il ne pourrait lui être nié en interposant une société. il serait mal avisé que ces instruments puissent servir à contourner une règle d’ordre public, en l’occurrence le partage du patrimoine familial entre des époux. iv conclusion iv conclusion [72] for these reasons, i would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the court of appeal and restore the judgment of the superior court with costs to the appellants throughout. [72] pour ces motifs, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi, d’annuler le jugement de la cour d’appel et de rétablir celui de la cour supérieure, avec dépens en faveur des appelants devant toutes les cours. the reasons of côté and karakatsanis jj. were version française des motifs des juges côté et delivered by karakatsanis rendus par côté j. (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i overview i aperçu [73] this appeal concerns the interaction between the provisions of the civil code of québec (“ccq”) [73] le présent pourvoi concerne l’interaction entre les dispositions du code civil du québec (« ccq ») 534 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. governing the institution of the family patrimony and those governing the institution that is the civil law trust. this court is asked to determine whether the family patrimony can include a family resi- dence or the “rights which confer use” of it under art 415 ccq when the residence is owned by a discretionary trust controlled by one of the spouses. régissant l’institution du patrimoine familial et celles régissant l’institution de la fiducie de droit civil. la cour est appelée à décider si le patrimoine fami- lial peut comprendre une résidence familiale ou les « droits qui en confèrent l’usage » au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq, lorsque la résidence appartient à une fiducie discrétionnaire contrôlée par un des époux. [74] in 2011, roger karam and taky yared, a married couple, established the fiducie famille taki (taki family trust) (“trust”). the purpose of the trust was to provide for the couple’s four children in light of ms. yared’s recent terminal cancer di- agnosis: [translation] “   for the benefit and welfare of the beneficiaries, the whole shielded from the vagaries of life” (ar, vol. ii, at p 110). mr.  karam was named both as co- trustee of the trust, along with his elderly mother, and as the sole “électeur”, or appointer, under the trust, while ms.  yared and the four children were named as beneficiaries. although mr. karam had the power to appoint and remove beneficiaries under the trust deed, at no point did he exercise that power during the relevant period. [74] en 2011, roger karam et taky yared, un couple marié, ont constitué la fiducie famille taki (« fiducie »). cette dernière avait pour objet de pour- voir aux besoins des quatre enfants du couple étant donné le diagnostic de cancer terminal reçu par mme yared peu de temps auparavant, et existait donc « pour le bénéfice et le bien- être des bénéficiaires, le tout à l’abri des aléas de la vie » (da, vol. ii, p 110). m. karam a été désigné cofiduciaire de la fiducie, conjointement avec sa mère âgée, ainsi que seul « électeur » de la fiducie, alors que mme yared et les quatre enfants ont été nommés bénéficiaires. même si, selon l’acte de fiducie, m. karam avait le pouvoir d’élire et de destituer les bénéficiaires, il n’a exercé ce pouvoir à aucun moment au cours de la période visée. in 2012, the trust purchased a mixed- purpose [75] property allowing for both residential and commer- cial uses (“residence”), in which the family resided from the time of purchase and for the remainder of the spouses’ cohabitation. in june 2014, ms. yared left the residence and shortly thereafter served di- vorce proceedings on mr karam. in august 2014, she executed a last will and testament bequeath- ing the entirety of her estate to the four children.1 ms. yared died on april 6, 2015. [75] en 2012, la fiducie a acheté une propriété à usages mixtes permettant l’utilisation commerciale et résidentielle (« résidence »). la famille y a habité à compter de la date d’achat jusqu’à la fin de la cohabitation des époux. en juin 2014, mme yared a quitté la résidence et a, peu après, signifié des procédures de divorce à m karam. en août 2014, elle a signé un testament, léguant la totalité de ses biens aux quatre enfants1. mme yared est décédée le 6 avril 2015. [76] on july 19, 2016, the appellants, in their ca- pacity as liquidators of ms. yared’s estate, served an application for a declaratory judgment to have the residence declared part of the family patrimony under the civil code of québec. the trial judge con- cluded that the value of the residence formed part of the family patrimony, relying on an analogy with the lifting of the corporate veil under art 317 ccq. and on the notion of “rights which confer use” at [76] le 19 juillet 2016, les appelants, à titre de liquidateurs de la succession de mme yared, ont pré- senté une demande en jugement déclaratoire afin de faire déclarer que la valeur de la résidence était incluse dans le patrimoine familial suivant le code civil du québec. s’appuyant sur une analogie avec la levée du voile corporatif codifiée à l’art. 317 du ccq ainsi que sur la notion de « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » visée à l’art. 415 du ccq, le 1 the validity of this will is disputed in proceedings that are sus- pended pending this decision (que sup ct, 500-17- 093260- 167). 1 la validité de ce testament est contestée dans des procédures fai- sant l’objet d’un sursis jusqu’au prononcé de la présente décision (cs. qc, 500-17- 093260- 167). [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 535 art 415 ccq (2016 qccs 5581). the court of appeal overturned that decision and declared that neither the residence nor any rights which conferred use of it formed part of the family patrimony (2018 qcca 320). [77] i would dismiss the appeal i share in my colleague’s rejection of the trial judge’s reliance on the “lifting of the corporate veil”, and would agree that questions arising from a conflict between the establishment of a trust and the operation of the family patrimony provisions should be resolved by referring to the rules pertaining to both of those in- stitutions (reasons of rowe j., para 27). however, i disagree with my colleague’s interpretation of those rules and his conclusion that mr. karam held rights which conferred use of the residence pursuant to art 415 ccq. juge de première instance a conclu que la valeur de la résidence faisait partie du patrimoine familial (2016 qccs 5581). la cour d’appel a infirmé cette décision et déclaré que ni la résidence ni les droits qui en conféraient l’usage n’étaient inclus dans le patrimoine familial (2018 qcca 320). [77] je rejetterais le pourvoi. je partage l’avis de mon collègue selon lequel le juge de première ins- tance s’est appuyé à tort sur la « levée du voile cor- poratif », et je conviens que les questions découlant d’un conflit entre la constitution d’une fiducie et le fonctionnement des dispositions portant sur le patri- moine familial devraient être tranchées à la lumière des règles relatives à ces deux institutions (motifs du juge rowe, par 27). toutefois, je suis en désaccord avec l’interprétation de ces règles faite par mon col- lègue et avec sa conclusion selon laquelle m. karam détenait des droits prévus à l’art. 415 du ccq qui lui conféraient l’usage de la résidence. [78] to determine whether a right which confers use exists where a residence is owned by a trust, courts must consider the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the trust, its intended purpose, and the rights and obligations of the trustees and ben- eficiaries under the terms of the trust deed. while it is important to keep in mind that the family patrimony provisions are intended to protect economically dis- advantaged spouses, courts must not overlook the fact that spouses are free to acquire and dispose of property as they wish, even if this means that they do not acquire property falling within the family patrimony. [78] pour déterminer s’il existe un droit qui confère l’usage d’une résidence lorsque celle-ci appartient à une fiducie, les tribunaux doivent examiner les circons- tances de la constitution de la fiducie, le but qu’elle est censée atteindre et les droits et obligations des fidu- ciaires et des bénéficiaires prévus par l’acte de fiducie. bien qu’il ne faille pas perdre de vue que les disposi- tions portant sur le patrimoine familial visent à pro- téger les époux désavantagés sur le plan économique, les tribunaux ne doivent pas oublier que les époux sont libres d’acquérir des biens et d’en disposer à leur guise, même si cela signifie qu’ils n’en acquièrent aucun qui fasse partie du patrimoine familial. [79] in the instant case, the trial judge committed a reversible error by focusing solely on mr. karam’s powers under the trust deed, conflating those powers with rights, and failing to consider the purpose of the trust and the rights of its beneficiaries. consequently, he erred in finding that mr. karam held rights which conferred use of the residence, in failing to find that if such rights conferring use of the residence existed, they were held either by ms. yared or jointly by both spouses, and in assigning to those rights a value equal to the value of the residence. [79] dans la présente affaire, le juge de première instance a commis une erreur révisable en se fondant uniquement sur les pouvoirs conférés à m. karam par l’acte de fiducie, en confondant ces pouvoirs avec des droits, et en omettant de tenir compte du but de la fiducie et des droits de ses bénéficiaires. par conséquent, il a commis une erreur en décidant que m. karam détenait des droits qui lui conféraient l’usage de la résidence, en omettant de conclure que si de tels droits conférant l’usage existaient, ceux-ci étaient détenus soit par mme yared soit par les deux époux conjointement, et en attribuant à ces droits une valeur égale à celle de la résidence. 536 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. ii analysis ii analyse a family patrimony provisions a dispositions portant sur le patrimoine familial [80] the provision that is primarily at issue in this case is art 415 ccq, which provides as follows: [80] la disposition qui est plus particulièrement en cause en l’espèce est l’art. 415 du ccq qui est ainsi libellé : 415 the family patrimony is composed of the follow- ing property owned by one or the other of the spouses: the residences of the family or the rights which confer use of them, the movable property with which they are furnished or decorated and which serves for the use of the household, the motor vehicles used for family travel and the benefits accrued during the marriage under a retirement plan. the payment of contributions into a pension plan entails an accrual of benefits under the pension plan; so does the accumulation of service recognized for the purposes of a pension plan. 415 le patrimoine familial est constitué des biens suivants dont l’un ou l’autre des époux est propriétaire : les résidences de la famille ou les droits qui en confèrent l’usage, les meubles qui les garnissent ou les ornent et qui servent à l’usage du ménage, les véhicules automobiles utilisés pour les déplacements de la famille et les droits ac- cumulés durant le mariage au titre d’un régime de retraite. le versement de cotisations au titre d’un régime de retraite emporte accumulation de droits au titre de ce régime; il en est de même de la prestation de services reconnus aux termes d’un régime de retraite. [81] under the civil code of québec, the family patrimony includes, namely, the residence owned by one or the other of the spouses or a right which con- fers use of it at the time of separation from bed and board or of the dissolution or nullity of the marriage (arts. 415 and 416 ccq). marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse — as was the case here — or by divorce (art 516 ccq). [81] selon le code civil du québec, le patrimoine familial comprend, entre autres, la résidence dont l’un ou l’autre des époux est propriétaire ou un droit qui en confère l’usage, au moment de la séparation de corps, de la dissolution ou de la nullité du mariage (art. 415 et 416 du ccq). le mariage est dissous par le décès de l’un ou l’autre des époux — comme cela fut le cas en l’espèce — ou par un divorce (art. 516 du ccq). [82] in this case, it is not disputed that neither of the spouses ever owned the residence, as it was di- rectly acquired by the trust (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 110 and 149). thus, it is only the notion of “rights which confer use” that would allow the inclusion of some or all of the value of the residence in the family patrimony. [83] i am in agreement with my colleague that the family patrimony provisions of the civil code of québec are of protective public order and that spouses cannot renounce in advance, by marriage contract or otherwise, their rights in the family patrimony (art 423 ccq; reasons of rowe j., at para 24). the purpose of these provisions is to protect economically disadvantaged spouses at the time of separation from bed and board or of the dissolution or nullity of the marriage. [82] en l’espèce, il n’est pas contesté que ni l’un ni l’autre des époux n’a été propriétaire de la résidence, puisque celle-ci a été acquise directement par la fiducie (da, vol. ii, p. 110 et 149). par conséquent, seule la notion de « droits qui en confèrent l’usage » est susceptible de mener à l’inclusion d’une partie ou de la totalité de la valeur de la résidence dans le patrimoine familial. [83] je suis d’accord avec mon collègue pour dire que les dispositions portant sur le patrimoine familial contenues dans le code civil du québec sont des règles d’ordre public de protection et que les époux ne peuvent renoncer à l’avance, par contrat de ma- riage ou autrement, à leurs droits dans le patrimoine familial (art. 423 du ccq; motifs du juge rowe, par 24). ces dispositions ont pour objet de protéger les époux désavantagés sur le plan économique en cas de séparation de corps, de dissolution ou de nul- lité du mariage. [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 537 [84] however, while the family patrimony pro- visions are rules of public order, they only apply to property held by the spouses which falls under art 415 ccq. the civil code of québec does not oblige spouses to acquire property falling under the family patrimony provisions: [84] cependant, bien que les dispositions portant sur le patrimoine familial soient des règles d’ordre public, elles ne s’appliquent qu’aux biens que pos- sèdent les époux et qui sont visés par l’art. 415 du ccq. le code civil du québec n’oblige aucune- ment les époux à acquérir des biens visés par les dispositions portant sur le patrimoine familial : [translation]    nothing obliges spouses to have a principal or secondary residence, movable property or motor vehicles that they own, or even retirement plans. in addition, spouses are not obliged to have the same family patrimony throughout their marriage. it is only the family patrimony as it exists on the date of one of the situations giving rise to partition that is the parties’ true family patrimony.    rien n’oblige les époux à posséder une résidence prin- cipale ou secondaire, des meubles ou véhicules automo- biles dont ils sont propriétaires, ou même des régimes de retraite. de plus, les époux ne sont pas obligés d’avoir le même patrimoine familial tout au long de leur mariage. ce n’est que le patrimoine familial tel qu’il existe à la date d’un des cas d’ouverture au partage qui est le véritable patrimoine familial des parties. (c. labonté, “le patrimoine familial”, in droit de la famille québécois (loose- leaf), vol. 3, at pp. 3/2234 to 3/2235) (c. labonté, « le patrimoine familial », dans droit de la famille québécois (feuilles mobiles), vol. 3, p. 3/2234 à 3/2235) [85] in establishing the family patrimony rules, the legislature did not intend to compel spouses to possess any of the property listed at art 415 ccq. spouses retain the freedom to acquire and dispose of property as they see fit, and are in no way required to own or otherwise acquire property that could be subject to the family patrimony provisions: [translation] usually, spouses will    individually or together, purchase and sell various residences and sev- eral motor vehicles, and carry out various transactions to the credit or the debit of their retirement plans. the legis- lator did not want to impede these common occurrences of married life; it did, however, put some safeguards in place. [85] en établissant les règles en matière de patri- moine familial, le législateur n’a pas voulu obliger les époux à posséder les biens énumérés à l’art. 415 du ccq. les époux demeurent libres d’acquérir des biens et d’en disposer comme ils l’entendent, et ils ne sont aucunement tenus d’être propriétaires ou d’autrement acquérir des biens qui pourraient être visés par les dispositions portant sur le patrimoine familial : couramment, les époux vont [  ] individuellement ou ensemble, acheter et vendre diverses résidences et plusieurs véhicules automobiles, et procéder à diverses opérations au crédit et au débit de leurs régimes de retraite. le législateur n’a pas voulu contrecarrer ces phénomènes courants de la vie conjugale; il a par contre aménagé des balises. (droit de la famille — 071938, 2007 qccs 3792, [2007] rdf 711, at para. 60) (droit de la famille — 071938, 2007 qccs 3792, [2007] rdf 711, par. 60) [86] article 423 ccq aims to prevent a spouse from renouncing his or her rights in the family patri- mony during the marriage. however, the choice not to own property does not amount to such a renunci- ation. in practical terms, spouses may choose to rent rather than own a family residence and to lease rather than purchase a vehicle, and may never contribute to [86] l’article 423 du ccq vise à empêcher un époux de renoncer à ses droits dans le patrimoine familial durant le mariage. la décision de ne pas de- venir propriétaire ne constitue toutefois pas une telle renonciation. en pratique, les époux peuvent choisir de louer plutôt que d’acheter une résidence familiale ou un véhicule, et ils peuvent ne jamais cotiser à un 538 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. a pension plan during the marriage. consequently, they may actually possess little property that would otherwise be part of the family patrimony. régime de retraite durant le mariage. par conséquent, il se peut qu’ils possèdent en fait peu de biens qui seraient autrement inclus dans le patrimoine familial. included in spouses’ freedom to choose how [87] they arrange their affairs is the option to live in a residence held by a trust. where spouses opt for the various advantages and disadvantages associated with the legal institution of the trust, it may be that they will not acquire property that is subject to the family patrimony. [87] le choix de vivre dans une résidence qui ap- partient à une fiducie relève aussi de la liberté des époux de choisir de quelle façon ils gèrent leurs affaires. en choisissant de recourir aux divers avan- tages et désavantages associés à l’institution légale qu’est la fiducie, il se peut que les époux n’acquièrent aucun bien régi par les règles du patrimoine familial. [88] of course, where spouses reside in a property owned by a trust, there may be situations in which this arrangement gives rise to “rights which con- fer use” of the property under art 415 ccq. as the court of appeal observed, when such questions arise, the situation must be analyzed on the basis of the legislative provisions governing both the institu- tions of the trust and the family patrimony, and the evidence surrounding the terms of the trust and any arrangement between the trust and the family mem- bers must be considered (paras. 87-88 (canlii)). [89] mr. karam submits that the notion of “rights which confer use” in art. 415 ccq is limited to real rights such as those referred to in art. 1119 ccq. (rf, at paras. 46-48; see also arts. 911, 912, and 1172 ccq). as such, in mr. karam’s view, given that no real rights were granted here, there is no right which confers use that could be included in the family patrimony. this position is not without merit. in droit de la famille — 071938, at paras. 70-79, the superior court held that a right which confers use under art. 415 ccq must be in the nature of a right of use within the meaning of art. 1172 ccq. and the articles that follow it (see also b. lefebvre, “les droits qui confèrent l’usage des résidences fa- miliales: quelques difficultés lors de la liquidation du patrimoine familial” (2014), 116 r du n. 389, at pp 398-99). [88] évidemment, lorsque des époux habitent une résidence dont une fiducie est propriétaire, il peut arriver que cet arrangement donne lieu à des « droits qui en confèrent l’usage » au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. comme l’a fait observer la cour d’appel, lorsque de telles questions se posent, la situation doit être analysée en fonction des dispositions législatives qui régissent les deux institutions que sont la fidu- cie et le patrimoine familial, et conformément aux éléments de preuve entourant l’acte de fiducie et à tout arrangement conclu entre cette dernière et les membres de la famille (par. 87-88 (canlii)). [89] m. karam soutient que la notion de « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » prévue à l’art. 415 du ccq ne vise que les droits réels, comme ceux men- tionnés à l’art. 1119 du ccq (mi, par. 46-48; voir aussi les art. 911, 912 et 1172 du ccq). ainsi, selon m. karam, étant donné qu’aucun droit réel n’a été accordé dans le cas présent, il n’existe aucun droit conférant l’usage de la résidence susceptible d’être inclus dans le patrimoine familial. cette position n’est pas sans fondement. aux paragraphes 70-79 de la décision droit de la famille — 071938, la cour supérieure a conclu qu’un droit qui confère l’usage de la résidence comme le prévoit l’art. 415 du ccq, doit être de la nature d’un droit d’usage au sens de l’art. 1172 du ccq et des articles subséquents (voir aussi b. lefebvre, « les droits qui confèrent l’usage des résidences familiales : quelques difficultés lors de la liquidation du patrimoine familial » (2014), 116 r du n. 389, p. 398- 399). [90] my colleague rejects this interpretation of art 415 ccq, favouring a broader approach to sup- port his conclusion that, as trustee, mr. karam does [90] mon collègue rejette cette interprétation de l’art. 415 du ccq, favorisant une interprétation plus large pour appuyer sa conclusion selon laquelle [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 539 hold rights which confer use in the residence. his approach rests on the understanding that rights con- ferring use of the residence flow from mr. karam’s control over the trust (reasons of rowe j., at pa- ras 56-61). without deciding whether art 415 ccq. should be read in such a broad fashion or should be limited to real rights, i am of the view that a trustee’s control over a trust that owns a residence does not automatically give rise to a right which confers use in the residence within the meaning of art 415 ccq. where a residence is owned by a trust, the trust deed and the surrounding circumstances must be analyzed, in accordance with the trust provisions of the civil code of québec, to determine whether the terms of the trust deed actually bestow upon one or both of the spouses a right which confers use pursuant to art 415 ccq. m. karam, en tant que fiduciaire, détient bel et bien des droits qui lui confèrent l’usage de la résidence. son approche repose sur l’interprétation portant que ces droits découlent du contrôle exercé par m. karam sur la fiducie (motifs du juge rowe, par 56-61). sans décider si l’art. 415 du ccq devrait être interprété d’une manière aussi large, ou si sa portée devrait être limitée aux droits réels, je suis d’avis que le contrôle d’un fiduciaire sur une fiducie à laquelle appartient une résidence ne donne pas automatiquement lieu à un droit qui en confère l’usage au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. lorsque la résidence appartient à une fi- ducie, il faut procéder à l’analyse de l’acte de fiducie et des circonstances ayant entouré sa constitution, à la lumière des dispositions du code civil du québec portant sur la fiducie, pour déterminer si le libellé de l’acte en question accorde réellement un droit qui confère à l’un des époux ou aux deux l’usage de la résidence en cause selon l’art. 415 du ccq. b trust provisions b dispositions portant sur la fiducie [91] under the civil code of québec, “[a] trust results from an act whereby a person, the settlor, transfers property from his patrimony to another patrimony constituted by him which he appropriates to a particular purpose and which a trustee under- takes, by his acceptance, to hold and administer” (art 1260 ccq). the constituting act of a trust may be a contract (art 1262 ccq). the assets held by a trust form a trust patrimony, which is “autono- mous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of them has any real right” (art 1261 ccq). [91] aux termes du code civil du québec, « [l]a fiducie résulte d’un acte par lequel une personne, le constituant, transfère de son patrimoine à un autre patrimoine qu’il constitue, des biens qu’il affecte à une fin particulière et qu’un fiduciaire s’oblige, par le fait de son acceptation, à détenir et à administrer » (art. 1260 du ccq). l’acte constitutif d’une fiducie peut être un contrat (art. 1262 du ccq). les biens détenus par une fiducie constituent un patrimoine fiduciaire « autonome et distinct de celui du consti- tuant, du fiduciaire ou du bénéficiaire, sur lequel aucun d’entre eux n’a de droit réel » (art. 1261 du ccq). [92] unlike trusts under the common law, civil law trusts do not involve a separation of legal and beneficial ownership, rather, they consist of an ag- gregate of assets that falls within the trust patrimony, in which none of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary has any real right. civil law trusts therefore have no element of “split ownership” as is the case in common law trusts (see trust général du canada v. service alimentaire exclusif inc., [1984] ca 145, at p. 148, per nichols j.; j. beaulne, droit des fiducies (3rd ed. 2015), at pp 37-38). [92] contrairement aux fiducies de common law, celles de droit civil ne donnent pas lieu à une distinc- tion entre la propriété sur le plan juridique et la pro- priété bénéficiaire; elles sont plutôt constituées d’une seule universalité de biens compris dans le patrimoine fiduciaire sur lequel ni le constituant, ni le fiduciaire, ni le bénéficiaire n’ont de droit réel. ainsi, le concept de « dédoublement de propriété » ne s’applique pas dans le cas des fiducies de droit civil comme il le fait pour les fiducies de common law (voir trust général du canada c. service alimentaire exclusif inc., [1984] ca 145, p. 148, motifs du juge nichols; j. beaulne, droit des fiducies (3e éd. 2015), p 37-38). 540 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. [93] moreover, while civil law trusts have a sep- arate and distinct patrimony, known as a patrimony by appropriation, they have no separate legal person- ality. in this way, they differ from corporations. in short, a trust can only exist if its patrimony is distinct from the patrimony of a natural or legal person (rf, at para 50). [93] en outre, bien que les fiducies de droit civil détiennent un patrimoine autonome et distinct, ap- pelé le patrimoine d’affectation, elles n’ont pas de personnalité juridique distincte. à cet égard, elles diffèrent des personnes morales. bref, une fiducie ne peut exister que si son patrimoine est distinct de celui d’une personne physique ou morale (mi, par 50). [94] upon creation of the trust, the trustee is charged with seeing to the administration of the trust patri- mony, and the beneficiary’s right is established “with certainty” (art 1265 ccq). among other things, the beneficiary has the right to require, pursuant to the constituting act, the provision of a benefit granted to him or her, or the payment of the fruits and revenues and of the capital (art 1284 ccq). [94] dès la constitution de la fiducie, le fiduciaire est chargé de veiller à l’administration du patrimoine fiduciaire, et le droit du bénéficiaire est « [rendu] certain » (art. 1265 du ccq). les droits du bé- néficiaire comprennent notamment celui d’exiger, suivant l’acte constitutif, soit la prestation d’un avan- tage qui lui est accordé, soit le paiement des fruits et revenus et du capital (art. 1284 du ccq). [95] the trustee has the control and exclusive administration of the trust patrimony, exercises all the rights pertaining to the patrimony, and may take any proper measure to secure its appropria- tion (art 1278 ccq). such a role, however, im- poses duties and obligations. as madeleine cantin cumyn discusses, for the trustee, “may” is often accompanied by “shall”: [95] le fiduciaire a la maîtrise et l’administration exclusive du patrimoine fiduciaire, il exerce tous les droits afférents à ce dernier, et il peut prendre toute mesure propre à en assurer l’affectation (art. 1278 du ccq). un tel rôle est toutefois assorti de devoirs et d’obligations. comme l’exprime madeleine cantin cumyn, pour le fiduciaire, l’« autorisation » s’ac- compagne souvent de l’« obligation » : [translation] we are also unable to identify any right held by the trustee in the trust property. the trustee’s situa- tion appears rather to be the very antithesis of a right. the trustee is imposed with a charge in which the authorization to perform an act is often coupled with the obligation to perform the authorized act. nous sommes, de plus, incapables de discerner un droit quelconque chez le fiduciaire quant aux biens de la fiducie. sa situation apparaît plutôt être l’antithèse même d’un droit. il est titulaire d’une charge en vertu de laquelle l’autorisation de poser un acte se double souvent de l’obli- gation de poser l’acte autorisé. (les droits des bénéficiaires d’un usufruit, d’une substitution et d’une fiducie (1980), at p. 69) (les droits des bénéficiaires d’un usufruit, d’une substitution et d’une fiducie (1980), p. 69) the trustee thus performs his or her duties in the interest of the beneficiary and in keeping with the purpose of the trust (arts. 1278 and 1306 ccq). to fulfill these obligations, the trustee may alienate the property by onerous title, charge it with a real right or change its destination and perform any other neces- sary or useful act, including any form of investment (art 1307 ccq). le fiduciaire exerce donc ses devoirs dans l’intérêt du bénéficiaire et en veillant à la poursuite du but de la fiducie (art. 1278 et 1306 du ccq). pour s’acquitter de ces obligations, il peut aliéner le bien à titre onéreux, le grever d’un droit réel ou en chan- ger la destination et poser tout autre acte nécessaire ou utile, y compris toute forme d’investissement (art. 1307 du ccq). [96] it should be noted that the person having the power to appoint beneficiaries or determine their shares cannot exercise that power for his or her own benefit (art 1283 ccq). as my colleague observes, [96] je précise que la personne qui détient le pou- voir d’élire les bénéficiaires ou de déterminer leur part ne peut exercer cette faculté à son propre avan- tage (art. 1283 du ccq). comme l’a souligné mon [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 541 the limitation in art.  1283  ccq providing that this person cannot exercise that power for her own benefit may be set aside where the trustee is himself or herself a beneficiary under the trust deed (reasons of rowe j., at para. 19; beaulne, at pp 229-30). nevertheless, it is generally accepted that a trustee having the power to appoint or remove beneficiaries cannot exercise that power in an arbitrary manner: [translation] second, article 1283 ccq estab- lishes, in an admittedly very general manner, the scope of the power to appoint by giving its holder broad lati- tude in exercising it. indeed, the holder may appoint the beneficiaries or determine their shares without any real constraints, that is to say, without outside interference and without any control. what is more, the article even allows the holder to change or revoke his or her decision in the course of the trust. despite the apparent absolute freedom of the rule, it is clear that the holder of the power to appoint may not, however, exercise it in a completely arbitrary manner. in fact, he or she must use it in strictest compliance with the constituting act. collègue, cette restriction prévue à l’art. 1283 du ccq. qui empêche cette personne d’exercer ce pouvoir à son propre avantage peut être contournée lorsque le fidu- ciaire est lui- même bénéficiaire aux termes de l’acte de fiducie (motifs du juge rowe, par. 19; beaulne, p. 229- 230). il est néanmoins généralement reconnu qu’un fiduciaire qui détient le pouvoir d’élire les béné- ficiaires ou de les destituer de leur statut ne peut exercer ce pouvoir de façon arbitraire : deuxièmement, l’article 1283 ccq fixe, d’une ma- nière très générale il faut l’avouer, le cadre de la faculté d’élire, en accordant à son titulaire une grande latitude quant à son exercice. en effet, celui-ci peut élire les béné- ficiaires ou déterminer leur part sans véritables contraintes, c’est-à-dire sans intervention extérieure et sans aucun contrôle. bien plus, l’article lui permet même de modifier ou de révoquer sa décision en cours de fiducie. malgré l’apparente liberté absolue de la règle, il est évident que celui qui jouit de la faculté d’élire ne peut cependant pas l’exercer d’une façon totalement arbitraire. en effet, il doit l’employer dans le plus strict respect de l’acte constitutif. (j. beaulne, at pp. 228-29; see also québec (curateur public) v. an (succession de), 2014 qccs 616, at para. 53; miller (succession de), 2013 qccs 5184, at para. 88 (canlii).) (j. beaulne, p. 228- 229; voir aussi québec (curateur public) c. an (succession de), 2014 qccs 616, par. 53; miller (succession de), 2013 qccs 5184, par. 88 (canlii).) [97] as author julie loranger notes, art. 1283 ccq. would seem to be a rule of public order: [97] comme le souligne l’auteure julie loranger, l’art. 1283 du ccq semblerait être une règle d’ordre public : [translation] article 1283 ccq adds that a trustee who is entitled to exercise a power to appoint may not do so for his or her own benefit. this provision seems to us to be of public order. this requirement is consistent with article 1275 ccq, which requires the presence of a trustee who is not a beneficiary at all times. l’article 1283 ccq ajoute que le fiduciaire ayant le pouvoir d’exercer une faculté d’élire ne peut le faire à son avantage. cette disposition nous semble d’ordre public. cette exigence est cohérente avec l’article 1275 ccq. exigeant la présence d’un fiduciaire non bénéficiaire en tout temps. (“le fiduciaire: entre le tyran et le serviteur”, in déve- loppements récents en successions et fiducies (2010); see also ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. 1, le code civil du qué- bec — un mouvement de société (1993), at p. 765; art 1310 ccq) (« le fiduciaire : entre le tyran et le serviteur », dans développements récents en successions et fi- ducies (2010); voir aussi ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. 1, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), p. 765; art. 1310 du ccq) [98] from the above, we may conclude that the trustee is charged with significant powers under the [98] nous pouvons conclure de ce qui précède, d’une part, que le fiduciaire est investi de pouvoirs 542 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. civil code of québec and that these powers must be exercised in the best interest of the beneficiaries and in keeping with the purpose of the trust. but can these powers constitute a right which confers use? as a general rule, i would answer this question in the negative. the distinction between “rights” and “powers” is supported in academic literature: importants en vertu du code civil du québec et, d’autre part, que ces derniers doivent être exercés dans le meilleur intérêt des bénéficiaires et confor- mément au but de la fiducie. ces pouvoirs peuvent- ils toutefois constituer un droit qui confère l’usage? en règle générale, je répondrais à cette question par la négative. la distinction entre « droits » et « pou- voirs » est appuyée par la doctrine : [translation]    the very concept of a trust requires recognition of the difference that exists between “rights” and “powers”, given that the trustee has no real right in the trust property while being the administrator thereof. indeed, [professor cantin cumyn] explains that a right is a “legal prerogative recognized to its holder in his or her own interest”, whereas a power can be defined rather as a “prerogative exercised in the interest of another”. [citation omitted.]    la notion même de fiducie oblige à reconnaître la différence qui existe entre « droits » et « pouvoirs », étant donné que le fiduciaire n’a aucun droit réel dans les biens fiduciaires tout en en étant l’administrateur. en effet, [la professeure cantin cumyn] explique que le droit consiste en une « prérogative juridique reconnue à son titulaire dans son intérêt propre », tandis que le pouvoir se défini- rait plutôt comme la « prérogative exercée dans l’intérêt d’autrui ». [référence omise.] (beaulne, at p. 44) (beaulne, p. 44) indeed, this dichotomous view of powers and rights existed before the trust provisions as they currently read were enacted as part of the civil code of québec: en effet, cette vision dichotomique des pouvoirs et des droits existait avant l’adoption des dispositions sur la fiducie telles qu’elles se lisent actuellement dans le code civil du québec : [translation] the trustee’s legal situation must be analyzed in terms of powers over the trust property rather than in terms of rights. the civil code itself uses this designation.2 it authorizes the trustee to perform certain acts and imposes certain obligations on the trustee. la situation juridique du fiduciaire doit s’analyser en termes de pouvoirs sur les biens de la fiducie plutôt qu’en termes de droits. le code civil utilise lui- même cette dé- signation2. il autorise le fiduciaire à poser certains actes et lui impose des obligations. (cantin cumyn, at p. 71) (cantin cumyn, p. 71) [99] it is on this point that i disagree with my col- league, who would hold that the level of control attributed to mr. karam as trustee will determine whether there is a right which confers use (reasons of rowe j., at para 59). in my view, it is rather the interests of the beneficiary that are more likely to give rise to such a right under art 415 ccq. [99] c’est sur ce point que je me dissocie de l’avis de mon collègue qui affirme que le niveau de contrôle attribué à m. karam à titre de fiduciaire détermine s’il existe un droit qui confère l’usage (motifs du juge rowe, par 59). à mon avis, ce sont plutôt les intérêts des bénéficiaires qui sont les plus susceptibles de don- ner lieu à un tel droit au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. in addition to the civil code of québec pro- [100] visions governing trusts, we must consider the nature [100] outre les dispositions du code civil du québec régissant les fiducies, nous devons examiner la nature 2 the provision referenced in this quotation (art. 981e of the civil code of lower canada) reads as follows: “the powers of a trustee do not pass to his heirs or other successors, but the latter are bound to render an account of his administration”. 2 le libellé de la disposition à laquelle renvoie cette citation (soit l’art. 981e du code civil du bas- canada) est le suivant : « les pouvoirs du fiduciaire ne passent pas à ses héritiers ou autres successeurs; mais ces derniers sont tenus de rendre compte de sa gestion. » [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 543 of the trust deed and the circumstances in which it was established (art 1426 ccq). indeed, as a contract, the trust deed is subject to the usual rules of contractual interpretation found in the civil code of québec, including art 1426 ccq. thus, the in- terpretation of the trust deed pursuant to these rules must include an analysis of the parties’ objectives in establishing the trust, along with the trustee’s obligations and the rights of beneficiaries under the terms of the deed. [101] this brings me to an additional point of dis- agreement with my colleague, who finds that the in- tention of the spouses should have no bearing on the determination of whether there are any rights which confer use (reasons of rowe j., at paras 52-53). with respect, i disagree with my colleague’s assertion that the fact that the trust was set up for a legiti- mate purpose — and not with a view to evading the family patrimony rules — is irrelevant. in my view, the intention in establishing a trust will be relevant insofar as it informs the purpose of the trust. given that the trustee’s powers and control are constrained by the purpose of the trust, the parties’ objectives in establishing the trust must be taken into considera- tion. for instance, where a trust has no legitimate purpose beyond evading the family patrimony rules, the powers actually exercised by the trustee might exceptionally be construed, on the facts of that case, as a right which confers use. de l’acte de fiducie et les circonstances dans les- quelles il a été conclu (art. 1426 du ccq). en effet, à titre de contrat, l’acte de fiducie est assujetti aux règles habituelles d’interprétation des contrats pré- vues au code civil du québec, y compris à l’art. 1426 du ccq. l’interprétation de l’acte de fiducie à la lumière de ces règles doit donc inclure une analyse des objectifs poursuivis par les parties au moment de constituer la fiducie, ainsi que des obligations du fiduciaire et des droits des bénéficiaires prévus à l’acte de fiducie. [101] cela m’amène à un autre point sur lequel je ne partage pas l’avis de mon collègue, qui estime que l’intention des époux ne devrait avoir aucune incidence sur la détermination de l’existence ou non de droits qui confèrent l’usage (motifs du juge rowe, par 52-53). avec égards, je ne suis pas d’accord avec l’affirmation de mon collègue voulant que le fait que la fiducie a été créée à des fins légitimes — et non dans le but d’éluder les règles du patrimoine fami- lial — n’est pas pertinent. à mon avis, l’intention au moment de constituer la fiducie est pertinente dans la mesure où elle clarifie l’objet de la fiducie. puisque les pouvoirs du fiduciaire et le contrôle qu’il exerce sont limités par l’objet de la fiducie, les objectifs des parties au moment de constituer la fiducie doivent être pris en compte. par exemple, si une fiducie n’a aucun objet légitime autre que celui d’éluder les règles du patrimoine familial, les pouvoirs réellement exercés par le fiduciaire peuvent exceptionnellement être considérés, selon les faits de l’affaire, comme un droit qui confère l’usage de la résidence familiale. c treatment of article 415 ccq in jurispru- c application de l’art. 415 du ccq dans la ju- dence risprudence [102] an analysis of the case law involving resi- dences held by trusts or corporations in the context of partition of the family patrimony reveals that the main concern of the courts has been to prevent spouses from evading the family patrimony rules and to avoid an economic imbalance, rather than to recognize sim- ple occupation as a right under art 415 ccq. courts have considered it appropriate to intervene where the evidence shows that there is a right which confers use of the residence, particularly in cases where the residence is transferred by the spouses to a company [102] une analyse de la jurisprudence portant sur des résidences détenues par des fiducies ou par des personnes morales dans le contexte du partage du patrimoine familial révèle que les tribunaux ont prin- cipalement cherché à empêcher les époux d’éluder les règles du patrimoine familial et à éviter un déséqui- libre économique, plutôt que de considérer la simple occupation comme étant un droit visé à l’art. 415 du ccq. les tribunaux ont jugé approprié d’inter- venir dans les cas où la preuve révélait l’existence d’un droit qui conférait l’usage de la résidence, et 544 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. in which one or both of them are shareholders, or to a trust, with the use of the residence continuing as it had before the transfer. in droit de la famille — 3511, [2000] rdf. [103] 93 (sup ct), the spouses established a trust and, the same day, transferred the family residence, in which they were already living, and vehicles to the trust. gendreau j. concluded that despite the hus- band’s claim that the purpose of the transfer was to shield these assets from seizure, the evidence indi- cated that the true purpose was to evade the family patrimony provisions. specifically, the spouses had transferred only the assets falling under the family patrimony rules to the trust, and not the husband’s personal property, which he presumably would also have wished to protect from creditors. additionally, the parties continued to make regular payments on the residence following the transfer, as they had in the years preceding. in droit de la famille — 071938, a case to [104] which i will return in greater detail below, the evi- dence revealed that the spouses’ occupation of the residence remained the same despite the transfer of ownership to a trust. gagnon j. found that a joint right which conferred use existed by virtue of an unwritten contract between the trust and the spouses, pursuant to art 1121 ccq. particulièrement dans les affaires où une résidence avait été transférée par les époux à une personne mo- rale dont l’un ou l’autre des époux ou les deux étaient actionnaires ou à une fiducie, sans modification de l’usage de la résidence après le transfert. [103] dans l’affaire droit de la famille — 3511, [2000] rdf 93 (cs), les époux ont créé une fi- ducie. le même jour, ils y ont transféré la résidence familiale, dans laquelle ils habitaient déjà, de même que leurs véhicules. le juge gendreau a conclu que, malgré l’affirmation de l’époux selon laquelle le transfert avait pour seul but de mettre ces actifs à l’abri de toute saisie, la preuve révélait que l’objectif véritable était d’éluder les dispositions relatives au patrimoine familial. plus précisément, le juge a souli- gné que les époux n’avaient transféré à la fiducie que les biens visés par les règles du patrimoine familial, et non les biens personnels de l’époux que celui-ci aurait normalement aussi dû vouloir protéger contre les créanciers. en outre, les parties ont continué à faire des paiements réguliers pour la résidence après le transfert, comme ils le faisaient au cours des an- nées précédentes. [104] dans l’affaire droit de la famille — 071938, sur laquelle je me pencherai davantage plus loin, la preuve révélait qu’il n’y avait eu aucun changement quant à l’occupation de la résidence par les époux malgré le transfert de la propriété à une fiducie. le juge gagnon a conclu qu’un droit conjoint qui confé- rait l’usage existait en vertu d’un contrat non écrit intervenu entre la fiducie et les époux en application de l’art. 1121 du ccq. [105] similarly, in dl v. lg, 2006 qcca 1125, the court of appeal upheld the trial judge’s deter- mination that a right which conferred use existed. this conclusion was based on the fact that the family residence had been transferred to a corporation in which both spouses were shareholders, without any change in the spouses’ occupation of the residence. the court of appeal was of the view that the trans- fer of the residence to the corporation was artificial and motivated solely by tax considerations (para. 23 (canlii)). it found that the spouses appeared to have wanted to perpetuate their existing rights as users of the residence (para 26). [105] de même, dans la décision dl c. lg, 2006 qcca 1125, la cour d’appel a confirmé la décision du juge de première instance selon laquelle il existait un droit qui conférait l’usage. cette conclusion était fon- dée sur le fait que la résidence familiale avait été trans- férée à une société par actions dont les deux époux étaient actionnaires, sans aucun changement quant à leur occupation de la résidence. la cour d’appel a jugé que le transfert de la résidence à cette société était artificiel et n’était motivé que par des considérations fiscales (par. 23 (canlii)). elle a conclu que les époux semblaient avoir voulu perpétuer leurs droits en tant qu’usagers de la résidence (par 26). [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 545 in droit de la famille — 2225, [1995] rdf. [106] 465 (sup. ct.), at p. 468, goodwin j. considered the concept of “rights which confer use” in the context of art 406 ccq and noted that the mere fact of having lived in a house owned not by the spouses, but by a corporation of which one spouse was vice- president, does not confer a right of use on any of the occupants: [106] dans la décision droit de la famille — 2225, [1995] rdf 465 (cs), à la p. 468, le juge good- win s’est penché sur la notion de « droits qui [  ] con fèrent l’usage » dans le contexte de l’art. 406 du ccq, et il a souligné que le simple fait d’avoir habité une maison qui n’appartient pas aux époux, mais à une personne morale dont l’un des époux est vice- président, ne confère de droit d’usage à aucun des occupants : [translation] the court notes that this provision must be interpreted broadly to protect the family, including the children. le tribunal souligne qu’on doit donner à ce texte une interprétation large pour protéger la famille, incluant les enfants. but the mere fact of having stayed and even lived with one’s spouse in a house or dwelling provided, in the cir- cumstances described, does not confer a right on any of the occupants. mais le seul fait d’avoir séjourné et même habité avec son conjoint dans une maison ou un logement fourni, dans les circonstances exposées, ne confère pas un droit à l’un ou l’autre des occupants. [107] the situation might be different if there were a formal arrangement or agreement concern- ing the occupation of the residence in droit de la famille — 1646, [1992] rdf 463 (sup ct),. frappier j. held that the husband had a right which conferred use in a residence held by a corporation that he owned with his father. in that case, the judge inferred from the evidence that the husband’s father had granted the husband and his family the right to live in the residence for free. frappier j. concluded that a right of use must necessarily result from an agreement between one or both of the spouses and the owner of the residence, such as that between the spouses and the husband’s father (see also nr v. rp, [2003] rdf 831 (sup ct)). [107] la situation pourrait être différente s’il exis- tait un arrangement ou une entente formelle quant à l’occupation de la résidence. dans la décision droit de la famille — 1646, [1992] rdf 463 (cs), le juge frappier a déclaré que l’époux avait un droit qui lui conférait l’usage d’une résidence détenue par une personne morale dont son père et lui étaient propriétaires. dans cette affaire, le juge a inféré de la preuve que le père de l’époux avait accordé à ce dernier et à sa famille le droit d’habiter la résidence gratuitement. le juge frappier a conclu qu’un droit qui confère l’usage doit nécessairement découler d’une entente entre les époux, ou l’un d’eux, et le propriétaire de la résidence, comme celle conclue entre les époux et le père de l’époux (voir aussi nr. c. rp, [2003] rdf 831 (cs)). [108] the appellants rely on droit de la famille — 13681, 2013 qcca 501, at para. 31 (canlii), in which the quebec court of appeal held that it is not possible to avoid the application of public order provisions, such as those pertaining to the family patrimony, as a consequence of the establishment of a trust: [108] les appelants se fondent sur la décision droit de la famille — 13681, 2013 qcca 501, par. 31 (canlii), dans laquelle la cour d’appel du québec a conclu qu’il n’est pas possible d’éviter l’application de dispositions d’ordre public, comme celles portant sur le patrimoine familial, du fait de la constitution d’une fiducie : [translation] the creation of a trust must not have the consequence of avoiding the application of public order provisions, such as those pertaining to the family patrimony. la constitution d’une fiducie ne doit pas avoir pour conséquence d’éviter l’application de dispositions d’ordre public telles que celles relatives au patrimoine familial. 546 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. [109] on this point, i would agree with the court of appeal in the present case (paras 80-84). while the appellants’ argument may, on its face, seem to have some merit because of the use of the word [trans- lation] “consequence” in the quote above, it cannot withstand a more rigorous analysis. the court of appeal did not find in droit de la famille — 13681 that a trust can never acquire a residence without the residence automatically being incorporated into the family patrimony. in fact, that case did not deal with the question of “rights which confer use” under art 415 ccq. rather, the words “consequence of avoiding” refer to the purpose or objective pursued at the time the trust is established. indeed, rather than justifying a consequentialist approach, this case illustrates the importance of carefully considering intent and the trust deed itself in order to ascertain the trust’s purpose. [109] sur ce point, je suis d’accord avec la cour d’appel dans la présente affaire (par 80-84). à pre- mière vue, l’argument des appelants peut sembler avoir un certain fondement en raison de la présence du mot « conséquence » dans la citation qui pré- cède. il ne résiste toutefois pas à une analyse plus rigoureuse. la cour d’appel n’a pas conclu dans la décision droit de la famille — 13681 qu’une fi- ducie ne peut jamais acquérir une résidence sans que celle-ci soit automatiquement incluse dans le patrimoine familial. en fait, cette affaire ne portait pas sur la question des « droits qui [  ] confèrent l’usage » visés à l’art. 415 du ccq. l’utilisation des mots « conséquence d’éviter » renvoie plutôt au but ou à l’objectif poursuivi au moment de la constitution de la fiducie. en effet, plutôt que de justifier une approche fondée sur les conséquences, cette affaire illustre l’importance d’examiner attenti- vement l’intention et l’acte de fiducie lui- même afin de déterminer l’objet d’une fiducie. d application to this case d application en l’espèce (1) rights which confer use (1) droits qui confèrent l’usage i turn now to the facts of this case. the evi- [110] dence does not demonstrate a right which conferred use of the residence in mr karam. an analysis of the trust deed shows that mr. karam had significant powers as trustee, but it does not reveal any right to the family residence. as to the purpose of the trust, mr. karam’s unchallenged testimony indicates that the spouses had the common objective of investing in this property for the benefit of their four children, which purpose is reflected in the deed itself. any ex- ercise of mr. karam’s powers over the property must be consistent with this purpose. it would therefore be impossible for him to remove the beneficiaries for his own benefit without failing to honour his obligations under the trust. consequently, it cannot be said that the trust deed and the surrounding evidence show any right which conferred use in mr. karam pursuant to art 415 ccq. [110] je me penche maintenant sur les faits de la présente affaire. la preuve ne démontre pas l’exis- tence d’un droit qui conférait l’usage de la résidence à m karam. une analyse de l’acte de fiducie révèle que ce dernier avait des pouvoirs importants en tant que fiduciaire, mais elle ne révèle pas l’existence d’un quelconque droit à la résidence familiale. quant à l’objet de la fiducie, le témoignage non contesté de m. karam indique que les époux poursuivaient l’ob- jectif commun d’investir dans la résidence pour le bénéfice de leurs quatre enfants, un objectif qui res- sort de l’acte lui- même. tout exercice des pouvoirs de m. karam à l’égard de la résidence doit se faire dans le respect de cet objectif; il ne pourrait donc pas destituer les bénéficiaires à son propre avantage sans manquer à ses obligations au regard de la fiducie. on ne peut donc dire que l’acte de fiducie et la preuve qui l’entoure démontrent que m. karam détenait un droit qui conférait l’usage au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq. [111] however, as i will discuss below, assuming without deciding that a right of use such as the one [111] cela dit, comme je l’expliquerai ultérieure- ment, à supposer — sans trancher la question — qu’un [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 547 provided for in art 1172 ccq may be conferred by tacit agreement, i believe it was open to the trial judge to find a joint right held by mr. karam and ms. yared based on a tacit agreement between them and the trust. it was also open to the trial judge to find a right which conferred use on ms. yared alone as a result of her status as beneficiary of the trust. droit d’usage comme celui défini à l’art. 1172 du ccq puisse être conféré par une entente tacite, j’estime que le juge de première instance pouvait conclure que m. karam et mme yared possédaient un droit conjoint qui découle d’une entente tacite intervenue entre eux et la fiducie. le juge pouvait également conclure à l’existence d’un droit d’usage qui revenait uniquement à mme yared en raison de son statut de bénéficiaire de la fiducie. i will begin with the trust deed, which pro- [112] vides as follows: je vais d’abord me pencher sur l’acte de [112] fiducie, qui prévoit ce qui suit : a) the beneficiaries are the late ms. yared and the a) les bénéficiaires sont feu mme yared et les quatre four children (article 41). enfants (article 41). b) the trustees are mr.  karam and his elderly mother. as “électeur”, or appointer, mr. karam had the sole discretion to appoint a new ben- eficiary to the trust, including himself, or to remove any existing beneficiaries (article 42). b) les fiduciaires sont m. karam et sa mère âgée. en tant qu’« électeur », m. karam avait le pou- voir, à sa seule discrétion, d’élire un nouveau bénéficiaire, y compris lui- même, ou de destituer les bénéficiaires existants (article 42). c) the trustees have the discretion to determine in what proportion the capital and revenue of the trust are provided to the beneficiaries as well as to determine which beneficiaries are to receive, in whole or in part, the capital and revenue of the trust (articles 4.3 and 44). c) les fiduciaires ont le pouvoir de déterminer la proportion du capital et des revenus de la fiducie qui revient aux bénéficiaires, ainsi que de déter- miner à quels bénéficiaires doivent revenir, en tout ou en partie, le capital et les revenus de la fiducie (articles 4.3 et 44). d) there are a variety of methods by which the trustees may determine how best to utilize the funds of the trust and to allow them to grow (article 5). d) les fiduciaires peuvent employer divers moyens pour déterminer la meilleure façon d’utiliser les fonds de la fiducie et de les faire fructifier (article 5). e) the trustees have broad powers of administra- tion over the trust’s assets as well as additional powers to make purchases, sales, contracts and loans, to pay for consulting services and to take out insurance policies under the trust (article 6). e) les fiduciaires disposent de vastes pouvoirs quant à l’administration des biens de la fiducie, ainsi que de pouvoirs supplémentaires pour acheter et vendre des biens, conclure des contrats, contracter des prêts, solliciter des conseils et souscrire des polices d’assurance sous le régime de la fiducie (article 6). [113] again, the terms of the trust deed confer significant powers and responsibilities on mr. karam as trustee. this is consistent with the powers of trustees set out in the civil code of québec provi- sions outlined above. however, on the terms of the trust deed alone, which does not grant mr. karam any right to the property held by the trust or to the use of it, it is difficult to identify the source [113] je le répète, les clauses de l’acte de fiducie en l’espèce confèrent à m. karam, à titre de fiduciaire, des responsabilités et des pouvoirs importants. cela est conforme aux pouvoirs conférés aux fiduciaires en vertu des dispositions précitées du code civil du québec. toutefois, en s’appuyant uniquement sur les clauses de l’acte de fiducie — qui ne confèrent à m. karam aucun droit à la résidence appartenant à 548 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. or existence of any right that he might have to the residence. [114] rather, in my view, it is ms. yared who, as beneficiary, has a stronger claim to rights conferring use of the residence. she had the right to require, pursuant to the trust deed, the provision of any benefit granted to her (art 1284 ccq). while it is widely accepted that a beneficiary’s rights in a trust are personal rights (d-c lamontagne,. biens et propriété (8th ed. 2018), at p. 145; beaulne, at pp.  232-33), the notion of “benefit” allows for a broader conception of the content of the beneficiary’s rights, which may not be limited to receiving reve- nue or capital from the trust. this right to a benefit, albeit personal, may not be purely monetary and may instead relate to specific property (beaulne, at p 234). such a right might be akin to the notion of a jus ad rem, which requires the debtor (or the debtor patrimony) to provide the property to the beneficiary (see cantin cumyn, at p. 64; h. roland and l. boyer, locutions latines du droit français (4th ed. 1998), at p. 239; private law dictionary and bilingual lexicons: property (2012), “jus ad rem”, at pp 97-98). this right to a benefit, corresponding to specific property held by the trust, remains in the nature of a personal rather than a real right. as such, it is analogous yet distinct from, for example, rights under a lease. la fiducie ou à l’usage de celle-ci —, il est difficile d’établir la source ou l’existence d’un quelconque droit que m. karam aurait pu avoir à l’égard de la résidence. [114] à mon avis, c’est plutôt mme yared qui, en tant que bénéficiaire, est en meilleure position pour revendiquer les droits qui confèrent l’usage de la résidence. elle avait le droit d’exiger, suivant l’acte de fiducie, la prestation de tout avantage qui lui était accordé (art. 1284 du ccq). s’il est largement reconnu que les droits d’un bénéficiaire dans une fiducie constituent des droits personnels (d-c. lamontagne, biens et propriété (8e éd. 2018), p. 145; beaulne, p. 232- 233), la notion d’« avantage » donne ouverture à une conception plus large du contenu de ces droits, qui peuvent ne pas être limités à recevoir un revenu ou du capital de la fiducie. ce droit à un avantage, bien qu’il soit personnel, peut ne pas être purement pécuniaire et peut plutôt avoir trait à un bien en particulier (beaulne, p 234). un tel droit peut s’apparenter à la notion de jus ad rem, qui re- quiert que le débiteur (ou le patrimoine de ce dernier) remette le bien au bénéficiaire (voir cantin cumyn, p. 64; h. roland et l. boyer, locutions latines du droit français (4e éd. 1998), p. 239; private law dictionary and bilingual lexicons : property (2012), « jus ad rem », p 97-98). ce droit à un avantage, correspondant à un bien particulier détenu par la fiducie, demeure un droit personnel plutôt que réel. à ce titre, il est analogue, par exemple, aux droits qui découlent d’un bail, mais en reste distinct. [115] in any case, what remains clear is that mr. karam had no such right in the assets of the trust such a right flows from the beneficiaries’ rights under the trust, and mr. karam was not a beneficiary. [115] quoi qu’il en soit, il demeure évident que m. karam ne détenait aucun droit de ce type sur les actifs de la fiducie. un tel droit découle des droits des bénéficiaires suivant la fiducie, et m. karam n’était pas bénéficiaire. [116] the following portions of mr. karam’s tes- timony are also relevant: [116] les passages suivants du témoignage de m. karam sont également pertinents : a) the spouses’ objective in establishing the trust was to protect and provide for the children in light of ms. yared’s diagnosis and the fact that mr. karam would soon become a single parent (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 65, 82 and 84). a) l’objectif des époux, au moment de constituer la fiducie, était de protéger les enfants et de sub- venir à leurs besoins étant donné le diagnostic reçu par mme yared et le fait que m. karam allait bientôt devenir chef de famille monoparentale (da, vol. ii, p. 65, 82 et 84). [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 549 b) the residence was chosen as a result of its mixed commercial and residential uses and its potential to generate revenue to provide for the children. the family intended, if the need arose in the future, to rent or sell the space (ar, vol. ii, at pp 84-85). c) the idea of establishing the trust came from mr. karam’s brothers-in- law (the appellants in the instant case), one of whom made the sug- gestion after arranging his own affairs in a sim- ilar manner. mr. karam and ms. yared used the same lawyer and notary that mr. yared had used, and the trust deeds were similarly formatted (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 65, 66 and 83). b) la résidence a été choisie en raison de ses usages mixtes à caractère commercial et résidentiel et de sa capacité éventuelle à générer des revenus pour subvenir aux besoins des enfants. la fa- mille avait l’intention, si le besoin s’en faisait sentir ultérieurement, de louer ou de vendre l’es- pace (da, vol. ii, p 84-85). c) l’idée de constituer une fiducie est venue des beaux- frères de m. karam (les appelants en l’es- pèce). l’un d’entre eux en avait fait la suggestion après avoir organisé ses propres affaires d’une façon semblable. m. karam et mme yared ont fait affaire avec le même avocat et le même notaire auxquels m. yared avait fait appel, et les actes de fiducie étaient structurés de semblable manière (da, vol. ii, p. 65, 66 et 83). d) both mr. karam and ms. yared were advised on the establishment of the trust, and the content of the trust deed accurately reflects their inten- tions (ar, vol. ii, at p 72). d) m. karam et mme yared ont tous deux reçu des conseils sur la constitution de la fiducie, et le contenu de l’acte de fiducie traduit fidèlement leurs intentions (da, vol. ii, p 72). [117] these facts have some similarities to those in droit de la famille — 071938, which was relied on by the quebec court of appeal in the instant case. in that case, the spouses acquired joint ownership of the family residence during the marriage. a few years later, the residence was transferred to a trust. the beneficiaries of the trust were the wife and the couple’s children, and both spouses were trustees. as in the instant case, the superior court found that the residence did not form part of the family patri- mony, given that it was no longer the property of the spouses, and relied instead on rights which confer use pursuant to art 415 ccq. the superior court held that there was a right which conferred use as a result of an unwritten contract between the trust and the spouses pursuant to art 1121 ccq. [117] il existe certaines similarités entre ces faits et ceux de l’affaire droit de la famille — 071938, sur laquelle s’est appuyée la cour d’appel du québec en l’espèce. dans cette affaire, les époux ont conjoin- tement fait l’acquisition de la résidence familiale durant le mariage. quelques années plus tard, la rési- dence a été transférée à une fiducie. les bénéficiaires de la fiducie étaient l’épouse et les enfants du couple, et les deux époux étaient fiduciaires. comme dans la présente affaire, la cour supérieure a conclu que la résidence ne faisait pas partie du patrimoine familial puisqu’elle n’appartenait plus aux époux; elle s’est plutôt fondée sur les droits qui en confèrent l’usage prévus à l’art. 415 du ccq et jugé qu’il existait bel et bien un tel droit, lequel était le fruit d’un contrat non écrit intervenu entre la fiducie et les époux en application de l’art. 1121 du ccq. [118] in the present case, assuming without de- ciding that a right of use may be conferred without any formality, or in other words, that tolerance may constitute a basis for such a right, i believe it was open to the trial judge to similarly find that a right which conferred use of the residence existed by way of a tacit agreement between the trust and the spouses. the spouses and their children moved into [118] dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, à supposer, sans en décider, qu’un droit d’usage puisse être conféré sans formalité, ou, autrement dit, à supposer que la tolérance puisse constituer le fondement d’un tel droit, je crois que le juge de première instance pouvait aussi conclure qu’un droit qui conférait l’usage de la résidence existait du fait d’une entente tacite intervenue entre la fiducie et les époux. ces 550 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. the residence following its purchase, and the family would presumably have had the trustees’ consent to reside in the home. the practical result of such an agreement would be a joint right which conferred use held by both spouses. [119] my colleague is skeptical of the level of protection enjoyed by the beneficiaries pursuant to the trust deed (reasons of rowe j., at para 61). however, it is important to look both to the trust deed and to the civil code of québec in order to gain a full picture of the protections afforded to the ben- eficiaries. while the deed may entrust mr. karam with significant powers, these are circumscribed by the trust provisions of the civil code of québec. it is thus not necessary to speculate on what might follow the purported removal of ms. yared and the children as beneficiaries. quite simply, the law does not allow mr. karam to exercise his powers arbitrar- ily (art 1283 ccq; see also beaulne, at p. 228-29; an (succession de), at para 53). [120] to address my colleague’s position that the trial judge did not err in finding rights which confer use in mr. karam alone, i would reiterate that, as trustee, mr. karam must perform his duties in keep- ing with the purpose of the trust and cannot do so for his own benefit (arts. 1260, 1283 and 1306 ccq). as the purpose of the trust was stated, yet not ex- pressly defined in the trust deed, we must look to the circumstances surrounding its establishment. mr. karam’s unchallenged testimony confirms that the spouses’ objective in constituting the trust was to create an asset protection vehicle to provide for the children. accordingly, despite the broad powers conferred upon mr. karam in the trust deed, his discretion as “électeur”, or appointer, and co- trustee was constrained by this purpose. moreover, as trus- tee, mr. karam holds no right, real or personal, in the trust’s assets: derniers et leurs enfants se sont installés dans la résidence après l’achat, et la famille aurait vraisem- blablement obtenu le consentement des fiduciaires pour y habiter. le résultat pratique d’une telle en- tente serait un droit conjoint qui conférait l’usage, détenu par les deux époux. [119] mon collègue doute du degré de protection dont jouissent les bénéficiaires aux termes de l’acte de fiducie (motifs du juge rowe, par 61). il est tou- tefois important d’examiner à la fois cet acte de fiducie et le code civil du québec pour avoir un portrait d’ensemble des protections accordées aux bénéficiaires. si l’acte de fiducie confère effective- ment d’importants pouvoirs à m. karam, ceux-ci sont circonscrits par les dispositions du code civil du québec sur la fiducie. il n’est donc pas néces- saire de spéculer sur ce qui pourrait découler du retrait des statuts de bénéficiaires de mme yared et des enfants. dit simplement, la loi n’autorise pas m. karam à exercer ses pouvoirs de façon arbitraire (art. 1283 du ccq; voir aussi beaulne, p. 228- 229; an (succession de), par 53). [120] en ce qui concerne la position de mon col- lègue selon laquelle le juge de première instance n’a pas commis d’erreur en concluant que les droits qui confèrent l’usage reviennent à m. karam unique- ment, je rappelle que, en tant que fiduciaire, ce der- nier est tenu d’exercer ses fonctions dans le respect du but de la fiducie et qu’il ne peut pas les exercer pour son propre bénéfice (art. 1260, 1283 et 1306 du ccq). comme l’objet de la fiducie était énoncé dans l’acte de fiducie, sans toutefois y être expres- sément défini, nous devons nous pencher sur les cir- constances entourant la constitution de la fiducie. le témoignage non contesté de m. karam confirme que, en constituant la fiducie, les époux visaient à proté- ger leurs actifs de manière à subvenir aux besoins de leurs enfants. par conséquent, malgré les vastes pouvoirs conférés à m. karam par l’acte de fiducie, son pouvoir discrétionnaire en tant qu’« électeur » et cofiduciaire était limité par cet objet. en outre, à titre de fiduciaire, m. karam ne détient aucun droit, réel ou personnel, dans les biens de la fiducie : [translation] [the trustee] is not only required to per- form the acts necessary for sound management, which [le fiduciaire] est non seulement tenu de poser les actes nécessaires à une saine gestion, ce qui exclut toute faculté, [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 551 excludes any freedom, but also has the duty not to de- rive any personal benefit from the trust property. it may be added to the foregoing that real rights and personal rights necessarily represent assets in the patrimony of their holder. this is not the case for the trustee. [emphasis added.] mais il a aussi le devoir de ne tirer aucun avantage person- nel des biens de la fiducie. à cela, on peut ajouter que le droit réel et le droit personnel représentent nécessairement un actif dans le patrimoine de leur titulaire. il n’en est rien pour le fiduciaire. [je souligne.] (cantin cumyn, at p.  69; see also beaulne, at pp 266-67) (cantin cumyn, p. 69; voir aussi beaulne, p. 266- 267.) [121] as an example, the trust deed does grant mr. karam the power to appoint beneficiaries, which may include himself (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 117-18; reasons of rowe j., at paras. 5, 11 and 56). however, he could not appoint himself beneficiary of the trust to the detriment of his wife and children, as he cannot exercise the power of appointment for his own ben- efit (art 1283 ccq). given that art 1283 ccq. is a rule of public order, it therefore seems impossi- ble that mr. karam could name himself beneficiary, despite the fact that the trust deed grants him that power. as the minister of justice explained upon the enactment of article 1283 ccq: [121] à titre d’exemple, l’acte de fiducie accorde bel et bien à m. karam le pouvoir d’élire des béné- ficiaires, ce qui peut comprendre lui- même (da, vol. ii, p. 117- 118; motifs du juge rowe, par. 5, 11 et 56). toutefois, il ne pouvait pas s’élire lui- même bénéficiaire au détriment de son épouse et de leurs enfants, puisqu’il ne peut exercer la faculté d’élire les bénéficiaires à son propre avantage (art. 1283 du ccq). comme l’art. 1283 du ccq est une règle d’ordre public, il semble donc impossible que m. karam ait pu s’élire lui- même bénéficiaire, même si l’acte de fiducie lui conférait ce pouvoir. comme l’a expliqué le ministre de la justice au moment de l’adoption de l’art. 1283 du ccq : [translation] this article is new and completes the preceding one. it gives the person having the power to appoint or to determine shares the assurance of enjoying a broad enough latitude to be able to change or revoke his or her decision where the achievement of the purpose of the trust depends on it. cet article est nouveau et complète le précédent. il accorde à la personne qui a la faculté d’élire ou de déter- miner les parts, l’assurance d’une marge de manœuvre suffisamment large pour lui permettre de modifier ou de révoquer sa décision lorsqu’il y va de l’accomplissement de la fin poursuivie. the article makes it possible to change a decision that, for example, granted a scholarship enabling a deserving student to pursue a university education, where it is proved that the chosen student has abandoned his or her studies, in order to use the scholarship for a different purpose. il permet de modifier une décision qui aurait attribué, par exemple, une bourse d’études permettant à un étu- diant méritant de poursuivre des études universitaires, sur preuve que l’étudiant choisi a abandonné ses études, pour employer cette bourse à une autre fin. moreover, the article states that the power to appoint or to determine shares may not be exercised for the benefit of the person on whom it has been conferred. if it were otherwise, the person with this power would be breaching his or her obligations. [emphasis added.] en outre, l’article précise que la faculté d’élire ou de déterminer les parts ne peut être exercée à l’avantage de celui à qui elle a été conférée. s’il en était autrement, ce serait, de la part de celui qui a cette faculté, un manque- ment à ses obligations. [je souligne.] (commentaires du ministre, at p. 765; see also beaulne, at pp 228-29) (commentaires du ministre, p. 765; voir aussi beaulne, p. 228- 229.) [122] my colleague places weight on the fact that the family resided in the residence (reasons [122] mon collègue accorde de l’importance au fait que la famille habitait la résidence (motifs du juge 552 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. of rowe j., at para 59). while the family began to reside in the home following its acquisition by the trust, the evidence is silent as to the nature of any relationship between the family and the trust (ca. reasons, at para 55). all that the evidence discloses is the occupation of the residence and the intention of the spouses to use it as an investment given its mixed residential and commercial uses. there is no evidence of a formal arrangement between the spouses and the trust, as was the case in droit de la famille — 1646. if, indeed, we were to accept that mere oc- [123] cupancy could give rise to a right which confers use, the necessary conclusion would be that both spouses held that right, given that they both resided in the residence. i do not conclude as such, and find rather that the likely source of the legitimacy of the occupancy is an agreement between the trust and the residence’s occupants. [124] unlike the cases in which courts have con- cluded that spouses had rights which conferred use by virtue of the transfer of the residence to a trust, the arrangement in the instant case is anything but artificial (droit de la famille — 3511; droit de la famille — 071938; see also dl). the record dis- closes no intention to evade the family patrimony provisions. on the contrary, there is unchallenged evidence that the trust was established for the long- term benefit of the children. [125] there is no reason to construe the powers exercised by mr. karam as trustee as anything but powers to be exercised for the benefit of his wife and children. no rights of occupancy existed prior to the establishment of the trust, as the residence was purchased by the trust directly, and so it cannot be said that the spouses’ rights continued as they had prior to the trust’s inception. rowe, par 59). bien que la famille se soit installée dans la résidence à la suite de son acquisition par la fiducie, la preuve est muette quant à la nature d’un quelconque arrangement entre la famille et la fiducie (motifs de la ca, par 55). la preuve ne démontre que l’occupation de la résidence et l’intention des époux d’utiliser celle-ci comme un investissement, étant donné ses usages mixtes à caractère commer- cial et résidentiel. rien n’indique l’existence d’un arrangement formel entre les époux et la fiducie, comme c’était le cas dans l’affaire droit de la fa- mille — 1646. [123] si nous devions effectivement reconnaître que la simple occupation puisse donner lieu à un droit qui confère l’usage, nous n’aurions d’autre choix que de conclure que ce droit revenait aux deux époux, puisqu’ils habitaient tous deux la résidence. je ne conclus pas en ce sens. je considère plutôt que la source probable de la légitimité de l’occupation est une entente entre la fiducie et les occupants de la résidence. [124] contrairement aux affaires dans lesquelles les tribunaux ont conclu que les époux détenaient des droits qui conféraient l’usage suivant le trans- fert d’une résidence à une fiducie, l’arrangement en cause en l’espèce n’a rien d’artificiel (droit de la famille — 3511; droit de la famille — 071938; voir aussi dl). le dossier ne révèle aucune inten- tion d’éluder les règles du patrimoine familial. au contraire, la preuve non contestée démontre que la fiducie a été constituée dans l’intérêt à long terme des enfants. [125] il n’y a aucune raison d’interpréter les pou- voirs exercés par m. karam en tant que fiduciaire autrement que comme des pouvoirs exercés pour le bénéfice de son épouse et de ses enfants. aucun droit d’occupation n’existait avant la constitution de la fiducie puisque la résidence a été achetée directement par cette dernière. on ne peut donc pas dire que les droits des époux ont continué d’exister comme ils existaient avant la constitution de la fiducie. [126] i would agree with the court of appeal that where a residence owned by a trust previously be- longed to one of the spouses and there has been no [126] je conviens avec la cour d’appel que lors- qu’une résidence appartenant à une fiducie a anté- rieurement appartenu à l’un ou l’autre des époux [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 553 change in circumstances in the intervening years apart from the transfer to the trust, a right which con- fers use may exist under art 415 ccq (ca rea- sons, at para 91). such a situation may indicate that the transfer to the trust had the purpose of evading the family patrimony provisions. however, where, as in the instant case, the trust has a valid purpose and acquires the residence directly, a closer analysis of the terms of the trust deed and the surrounding circumstances will be necessary. in his interpretation of the trust deed, the [127] trial judge failed to consider several relevant factors. his determination was based on the powers vested in mr. karam as trustee and “électeur”, or appointer, which, as i have established above, are not equiva- lent to rights. in making his findings, the trial judge ignored the beneficiary rights vested exclusively in ms. yared and the four children, which would give ms. yared a stronger claim to any rights which conferred use than mr. karam could hold as trustee. nor did the trial judge take into account the evidence demonstrating that mr. karam had never exercised his powers as trustee and appointer in any way, let alone for the purpose of reducing or modifying the rights of any of the original beneficiaries. the trial judge also failed to consider that mr. karam’s pow- ers must be exercised in a manner consistent with the purpose of the trust, and not for his own benefit (arts. 1283 and 1306 ccq). [128] the trial judge’s failure to observe the com- mon intention of the parties and to take into account the nature of the contract and the surrounding circum- stances was contrary to arts. 1425 and 1426 ccq. it is accepted that these factual elements should be central to courts’ interpretation of contracts: et que les circonstances n’ont pas changé au cours des années qui ont précédé et suivi le transfert de la résidence à la fiducie, il peut exister un droit qui confère l’usage de la résidence familiale au sens de l’art. 415 du ccq (motifs de la ca, par 91). une telle situation peut indiquer que le transfert à la fidu- cie avait pour but d’éluder les règles du patrimoine familial. cependant, lorsque, comme en l’espèce, la fiducie a un objet valable et acquiert la résidence di- rectement, il est nécessaire de procéder à une analyse plus approfondie des modalités de l’acte de fiducie et des circonstances qui l’entourent. [127] dans son interprétation de l’acte de fiducie, le juge de première instance a omis de tenir compte de plusieurs facteurs pertinents. sa conclusion était fondée sur les pouvoirs conférés à m. karam à titre de fiduciaire et d’« électeur », pouvoirs qui, comme je l’ai déjà dit, n’équivalent pas à des droits. en ti- rant ses conclusions, le juge de première instance a négligé de tenir compte des droits des bénéficiaires conférés exclusivement à mme yared et aux quatre en- fants, lesquels droits placeraient mme yared en meil- leure position que m. karam, à titre de fiduciaire, pour revendiquer les droits qui confèrent l’usage. le juge de première instance n’a pas non plus tenu compte de la preuve démontrant que m. karam n’a jamais exercé ses pouvoirs de fiduciaire ou d’élec- teur, et encore moins pour réduire ou modifier les droits de l’un ou l’autre des bénéficiaires initiaux. il a aussi omis de tenir compte du fait que les pouvoirs de m. karam devaient être exercés conformément à l’objet de la fiducie et non à son propre avantage (art. 1283 et 1306 du ccq). [128] en omettant de prendre en compte l’intention commune des parties, de même que la nature du contrat ou les circonstances qui l’entourent, le juge de première instance n’a pas respecté les art. 1425 et 1426 du ccq. il est reconnu que ces éléments factuels devraient être au cœur de l’interprétation des contrats par les tribunaux : [translation] [a]rticle [1426 ccq] adopts, in part, the rules in articles 1016 and 1017 cclc concerning the nature of the contract and usage, but it adds a certain number of new elements that must be considered in in- terpreting the contract, such as the parties’ conduct in the [l’]article [1426 ccq] reprend, en partie, les règles des articles 1016 et 1017 ccb-c concernant la nature du contrat et les usages, mais il ajoute un certain nombre d’éléments nouveaux qui doivent être considérés lors de l’interprétation du contrat, telle la conduite des parties 554 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. performance of the contract or, more generally, the inter- pretation they seem to have given to the contract through their acts and their own subsequent conduct. dans l’exécution du contrat ou, plus généralement, l’in- terprétation qu’elles semblent donner au contrat, par leurs faits et leurs propres comportements subséquents. it is very rare for article 1426 ccq to be used sepa- rately from article 1425 and vice- versa. these two provi- sions are complementary and essential to the interpretative process. indeed, in seeking the parties’ true intention, the courts must review the factual elements relating to the nature of the contract, the circumstances and the conduct of the parties, as well as usage. il est très rare que l’article 1426 ccq soit utilisé sé- parément de l’article 1425 et vice- versa. ces deux dispo- sitions sont complémentaires et essentielles au processus interprétatif. en effet, dans la recherche de l’intention réelle des parties, les tribunaux se doivent de passer en revue les éléments factuels reliés à la nature du contrat, aux circons- tances et au comportement des parties, ainsi que les usages. it should be noted that courts generally tend to give this article a broad interpretation. this allows them to take into account as many elements and indicia as possible that can be helpful to them in determining the solution to the legal problem. [emphasis added.] il convient de noter que les tribunaux ont généralement tendance à accorder une interprétation large à cet article. ils se permettent ainsi de prendre en compte le plus d’élé- ments et d’indices possibles qui pourront leur être utiles à la détermination de la solution au problème juridique. [je souligne.] (v. karim, les obligations (4th ed. 2015), vol. 1, at pp. 1713-15) (v.  karim, les obligations (4e  éd.  2015), vol.  1, p. 1713- 1715) [129] the trial judge was content with a literal reading of the trust deed. as a result, he disre- garded the very nature of a trust and the relevant provisions of the civil code of québec, thereby con- flating powers with rights. in my view, this miscon- ception of the evidence constitutes a material error that affected the trial judge’s conclusion (housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at para. 72; van de perre v. edwards, 2001 scc 60, [2001] 2 scr 1014, at para 15). [129] le juge de première instance s’est contenté d’une interprétation littérale de l’acte de fiducie. en conséquence, il a fait abstraction de la nature même d’une fiducie et des dispositions pertinentes du code civil du québec, confondant ainsi les pouvoirs et les droits. à mon avis, cette mauvaise compréhension de la preuve constitue une erreur importante qui a eu une incidence sur la conclusion du juge de première instance (housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, par. 72; van de perre c. edwards, 2001 csc 60, [2001] 2 rcs 1014, par 15). i would emphasize again that the civil code [130] of québec does not oblige spouses to acquire prop- erty which would fall under the family patrimony. the effect of the trial judgment is to deprive the spouses of the characteristics and benefits of the legal institution of the trust, of which they freely chose to avail themselves. [130] je souligne une fois de plus que le code civil du québec n’oblige pas les époux à acquérir des biens qui feraient partie du patrimoine familial. le jugement de première instance a pour effet de priver les époux des caractéristiques et des avantages que présente l’institution de la fiducie, une institution juridique qu’ils ont librement choisie. [131] to sum up, the trial judge erred in finding that mr. karam alone held a right which conferred use in the residence. if such a right existed, it was held only by ms. yared, as a beneficiary of the trust, or was jointly held by both spouses as a result of a tacit agreement between them and the trust. [131] en résumé, le juge de première instance a commis une erreur en concluant que seul m. karam détenait un droit qui conférait l’usage de la résidence. si un tel droit existait, il était détenu soit exclusi- vement par mme yared, à titre de bénéficiaire de la fiducie, soit conjointement par les deux époux suivant une entente tacite intervenue entre eux et la fiducie. [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 555 (2) fairness concerns (2) préoccupations en matière d’équité [132] article 416 ccq provides that in the event of the dissolution or nullity of a marriage, the value of the family patrimony is divided equally between the spouses, or, as in the instant case, between the surviving spouse and the heirs. everything form- ing part of the family patrimony must therefore be evenly divided, with each spouse or his or her estate receiving 50 percent of the value (subject to some exceptions not applicable in this case). [132] l’article 416 du ccq prévoit que, en cas de dissolution ou de nullité d’un mariage, la valeur du patrimoine familial est divisée à parts égales entre les époux ou, comme en l’espèce, entre l’époux sur- vivant et les héritiers. tout ce qui fait partie du pa- trimoine familial doit donc être divisé à parts égales, chacun des époux ou leur succession ayant droit à 50 p. 100 de sa valeur (sous réserve de certaines ex- ceptions qui ne s’appliquent pas en l’espèce). [133] consequently, should any rights conferring use of the residence exist, the value of those rights must be divided equally between mr. karam and ms. yared’s estate. [133] ainsi, s’il existe des droits qui confèrent l’usage de la résidence, la valeur de ces droits doit être divisée à parts égales entre m. karam et la suc- cession de mme yared. [134] as my colleague acknowledges, the inclusion of the rights which conferred use of the residence in the family patrimony would unfairly impoverish mr. karam (reasons of rowe j., at para 66). not only would he be required to pay 50 percent of the value of the residence into ms. yared’s estate, despite the fact that the title to the residence remains in the trust patrimony, but he would be left with nothing. in other words, he would not get his 50 percent of the value of the rights conferring use of the residence — to which he is entitled pursuant to art 416 ccq — while the children would receive up to 150 percent of the value of the residence. indeed, under the terms of ms. yared’s will, the children would inherit 50 per- cent of the family patrimony’s value as ms. yared’s heirs, in addition to being the sole beneficiaries of the trust. the result is a legal and mathematical in- coherence. [134] comme le reconnaît mon collègue, l’inclu- sion des droits qui confèrent l’usage de la résidence dans le patrimoine familial aurait pour effet d’ap- pauvrir injustement m. karam (motifs du juge rowe, par.  66) non seulement serait-il tenu de verser 50 p. 100 de la valeur de la résidence à la succession de mme yared (malgré le fait que le titre de propriété de la résidence demeure dans le patrimoine de la fiducie), mais il ne lui resterait rien. autrement dit, il n’obtiendrait pas sa part de 50 p. 100 de la valeur des droits qui confèrent l’usage de la résidence — part à laquelle il a droit au titre de l’art. 416 du ccq — tandis que les enfants recevraient jusqu’à 150 p. 100 de la valeur de la résidence. en effet, selon le tes- tament de mme  yared, les enfants hériteraient de 50 p. 100 de la valeur du patrimoine familial à titre d’héritiers de leur mère, en plus d’être les seuls bé- néficiaires de la fiducie. il en résulte une incohérence juridique et mathématique. [135] my colleague proposes a solution in the event that the parties are unable to reach an agreement. i would note in passing that while a peaceful resolu- tion of the dispute may be hoped for, it is not for the courts to assume that parties will reach agreements; parties remain free to negotiate as they wish, but if no agreement is reached, it is then up to the courts to resolve the dispute. my colleague suggests that the courts should be able to avoid an unfair result by using the power granted by art 1294 ccq to amend the trust deed in order to allow mr. karam to sell the [135] mon collègue propose une solution advenant que les parties n’arriveraient pas à trouver un ter- rain d’entente. je signale au passage que bien qu’on puisse souhaiter qu’un litige se règle à l’amiable, les tribunaux ne peuvent tenir pour acquis que les parties s’entendront; elles demeurent libres de né- gocier comme elles l’entendent, mais en l’absence d’une entente, il appartient ensuite aux tribunaux de résoudre le litige. mon collègue laisse entendre que les tribunaux devraient être en mesure d’éviter un ré- sultat injuste en utilisant le pouvoir que leur confère 556 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. property, pay his debt to ms. yared’s estate and keep 50 percent of the value of the residence (reasons of rowe j., at para 67). [136] respectfully, i do not agree that the answer lies in art 1294 ccq, which reads as follows: l’art. 1294 du ccq de modifier l’acte de fiducie, pour permettre à m. karam de vendre la résidence afin qu’il puisse payer sa dette à la succession de mme yared et conserver sa part de 50 p 100 de la valeur de la résidence (motifs du juge rowe, par 67). [136] avec égards, je ne suis pas d’accord pour dire que la réponse se trouve à l’art. 1294 du ccq, qui est ainsi libellé : 1294 where a trust has ceased to meet the original intent of the settlor, particularly as a result of circum- stances unknown to him or unforeseeable and which make the pursuit of the purpose of the trust impossible or too onerous, the court may, on the application of an interested person, terminate the trust; the court may also, in the case of a social trust, substitute, for the original purpose of the trust, a purpose as nearly like it as possible. 1294 lorsqu’une fiducie a cessé de répondre à la volonté première du constituant, notamment par suite de circonstances inconnues de lui ou imprévisibles qui rendent impossible ou trop onéreuse la poursuite du but de la fiducie, le tribunal peut, à la demande d’un intéressé, mettre fin à la fiducie; il peut aussi, dans le cas d’une fidu- cie d’utilité sociale, lui substituer un but qui se rapproche le plus possible du but original. where the trust continues to meet the intent of the sett- lor but new measures would allow a more faithful compli- ance with his intent or facilitate the fulfilment of the trust, the court may amend the provisions of the constituting act. [137] i note that any amendment to the trust deed pursuant to art 1294 ccq would still have to be consistent with the purpose of the trust. in fact, amendments must prove better at fulfilling the trust’s purpose than the original terms of the trust deed it- self. to allow mr. karam to sell the property and use some of the proceeds to pay his debts arising from the inclusion of the value of the residence in the family patrimony would result in a deprivation to the children of a portion of that value. this would cer- tainly run contrary to the trust’s purpose to provide for the children, as well as to mr. karam’s obligation to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries. it is far from clear that an obstacle has arisen in this case which prevents the trust from continuing to fulfill the purpose for which it was originally established, namely to provide for the children of ms. yared and mr. karam (ar, vol. ii, at p 110). thus, it is diffi- cult to imagine that an amendment to the trust deed such as is suggested by my colleague is available in these circumstances. si la fiducie répond toujours à la volonté du constituant, mais que de nouvelles mesures permettraient de mieux respecter sa volonté ou favoriseraient l’accomplissement de la fiducie, le tribunal peut modifier les dispositions de l’acte constitutif. [137] je souligne que la modification de l’acte de fiducie, par application de l’art. 1294 du ccq, doit être conforme à l’objet de la fiducie. en fait, toute mo- dification doit s’avérer plus efficace pour atteindre cet objet que ne le faisait son libellé original. permettre à m. karam de vendre la résidence et d’utiliser une partie du produit de la vente pour payer la dette dé- coulant de l’inclusion de la valeur de la résidence dans le patrimoine familial aurait pour effet de priver les enfants d’une portion de cette valeur. cela irait certainement à l’encontre de l’objet de la fiducie, soit de subvenir aux besoins des enfants, ainsi que de l’obligation de m. karam d’agir dans le meilleur intérêt des bénéficiaires. il est loin d’être évident qu’il y ait un obstacle dans la présente cause qui empêcherait la fiducie de continuer à réaliser l’objet pour lequel elle a été créée au départ, soit de subvenir aux besoins des enfants de mme yared et de m. karam (da, vol. ii, p 110). il est donc difficile d’imaginer qu’il soit possible dans les circonstances de modifier la fiducie comme le suggère mon collègue. [138] as the parties, the court of appeal and my colleague have noted, the purpose of the family [138] comme l’ont noté les parties, la cour d’ap- pel et mon collègue, les dispositions portant sur le [2019] 4 rcs. yared c karam la juge côté 557 patrimony provisions is to prevent economic ine- quality and undue hardship to spouses, a hardship that will surely befall mr. karam should the rights conferring use of the residence be included in the family patrimony. patrimoine familial ont pour objet de protéger les époux contre les inégalités économiques et les pré- judices indus, préjudices qui guetteraient assuré- ment m. karam si les droits conférant l’usage de la résidence devaient être inclus dans le patrimoine familial. (3) valuation (3) évaluation [139] as for the value of the rights which confer use of the residence, i would agree with the court of appeal that if such rights were held jointly by the spouses, they would cancel each other out at the time of partition (ca reasons, para 105). a similar con- clusion was reached in droit de la famille — 071938, in which gagnon j. found that the spouses had equal rights of use which cancelled each other out and that it was therefore unnecessary to assign a dollar value to those rights (paras 110-12). [140] even assuming that either mr.  karam or ms. yared alone held rights which conferred use, i highly doubt that those rights could have the same value as the residence itself, as the trial judge found. neither spouse could have sold the residence and retained the proceeds under the terms of the trust or the relevant provisions of the civil code of québec. insofar as they derived a benefit, it was merely from occupation of the residence. [141] in any event, there was no evidence before the trial judge to support his finding that the rights which conferred use of the residence were equiv- alent to the market value of the property. expert evidence would have been required to value such rights, and no such evidence was proffered at trial. as the court of appeal stated, the question of valu- ation was not one of the subjects of debate on which counsel and the trial judge had agreed at the outset of the hearing, and the trial judge should have re- frained from making a determination on this point (paras 107-10). [139] en ce qui concerne la valeur des droits qui confèrent l’usage de la résidence, je conviens avec la cour d’appel que si ces droits étaient détenus conjointement par les époux, ils s’annuleraient au moment du partage (motifs de la ca, par 105). une conclusion semblable a été tirée dans la déci- sion droit de la famille — 071938, dans laquelle le juge gagnon a conclu que les époux détenaient des droits d’usage égaux qui s’annulaient et qu’il était donc inutile de leur attribuer une valeur en dollars (par. 110- 112). [140] même en supposant que soit m. karam seul soit mme yared seule détenait des droits d’usage, je doute fortement que ces droits puissent avoir une valeur équivalente à la valeur de la résidence elle- même, comme l’a déclaré le juge de première ins- tance. ni l’un ni l’autre des époux n’aurait pu vendre la résidence et conserver le produit de la vente aux termes de l’acte de fiducie et des dispositions per- tinentes du code civil du québec. s’ils ont tiré un quelconque avantage, ils l’ont simplement tiré de l’occupation de la résidence. [141] quoi qu’il en soit, le juge de première ins- tance ne disposait d’aucune preuve pour appuyer sa conclusion selon laquelle la valeur des droits qui conféraient l’usage de la résidence était équi- valente à la valeur marchande de la résidence. une preuve d’expert aurait été nécessaire pour établir la valeur de ces droits; or, aucune preuve du genre n’a été présentée au procès. comme la cour d’ap- pel l’a déclaré, la question de l’évaluation n’était pas l’un des sujets de débat dont, dès le début de l’audience, les avocats et le juge de première ins- tance avaient convenu de traiter. ce dernier aurait dû s’abstenir de se prononcer sur cette question (par. 107- 110). 558 yared v karam côté j. [2019] 4 scr. iii conclusion iii conclusion [142] for these reasons, i would dismiss the appeal with costs throughout. [142] pour ces motifs, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi avec dépens devant toutes les cours. appeal allowed with costs throughout, côté and karakatsanis jj. dissenting. pourvoi accueilli avec dépens devant toutes les cours, les juges côté et karakatsanis sont dis- sidentes. procureurs des appelants : robinson sheppard shapiro, montréal. shapiro, montréal. procureurs de l’intimé  :  fasken martineau dumoulin, montréal. dumoulin, montréal.
i. introduction la juge martin — i. introduction [1] do the proceeds of crime provisions of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“code”), re- quire courts to give with one hand, only to take away with the other? the appellant, yulik rafilovich, ap- plied for and was returned funds that the state had initially seized from him as potential proceeds of crime, because he needed the funds to pay for his legal defence to charges related to drug trafficking. after he pled guilty, the crown asked the sentencing judge to impose a fine on mr. rafilovich under the forfeiture provisions of the code, on the basis that by using his returned funds for his defence, he had thereby benefitted from the proceeds of crime. in my view, parliament did not intend these provisions to operate in such an inconsistent manner. [1] les dispositions du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46 (« code »), relatives aux produits de la cri- minalité obligent- elles les tribunaux à retirer d’une main ce qu’ils donnent de l’autre? l’appelant, yulik rafilovich, a réclamé les fonds que l’état lui avait saisis au départ parce qu’il s’agissait peut- être de produits de la criminalité et a obtenu leur restitution, car il en avait besoin pour payer sa défense contre des accusations liées au trafic de drogue. après qu’il eut plaidé coupable, le ministère public a demandé à la juge chargée de déterminer la peine d’infliger à m. rafilovich une amende en vertu des disposi- tions du code en matière de confiscation, au motif qu’en se servant des fonds qui lui ont été restitués pour assurer sa défense, il avait bénéficié par le fait même des produits de la criminalité. à mon avis, le législateur ne souhaitait pas que ces dispositions s’appliquent de façon aussi incohérente. [2] in 1988, parliament enacted a comprehensive and distinct legal regime to address proceeds of crime, which now forms part xii.2 of the code. the overall [2] en 1988, le législateur a adopté un régime ju- ridique exhaustif et distinct pour traiter des produits de la criminalité, lequel régime constitue maintenant [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 849 goal of this complex and multi- factored regime was to ensure that “crime does not pay”, and to deter offenders by depriving them of their ill- gotten gains. [3] under this regime, the state may seize property from accused persons where the property is believed, on reasonable and probable grounds, to be proceeds of crime.1 the seized property is then held for pos- sible forfeiture to the crown at a future sentencing hearing (ss.  462.32(1), 462.33(1), 462.33(2) and 46233(3))2. this initial seizure means that accused persons, who are presumed innocent and have not been found guilty of any crime, may nevertheless have their property taken away and held by the state prior to and throughout trial. if their property had not been seized, these accused persons would have had unfettered access to their property to finance their defence. but, when some or all of their assets have been seized, many accused persons will not be able to afford to hire lawyers to answer the charges against them. parliament was alive to the serious problems created by such a situation and recognized the need to alleviate them. la partie xii.2 du code. ce régime complexe et mul- tidimensionnel avait pour objectif général de veiller à ce que le « crime ne paie pas » et de dissuader les contrevenants en les privant de leurs gains mal acquis. [3] suivant ce régime, l’état peut saisir les biens de l’accusé que l’on croit, pour des motifs raison- nables et probables, être des produits de la crimi- nalité1. le bien saisi est alors détenu en vue de sa possible confiscation au profit de sa majesté lors d’une éventuelle audience sur la détermination de la peine (par 46232(1), 462.33(1), 462.33(2) et 462.33(3))2 en raison de cette saisie initiale, l’accusé, qui est présumé innocent et n’a été re- connu coupable d’aucun crime, risque néanmoins de voir ses biens lui être enlevés par l’état, qui les conservera avant le procès et pendant toute la durée de celui-ci si ses biens n’avaient pas été saisis, cet accusé aurait pu les utiliser librement pour financer sa défense or, un grand nombre d’accusés dont tout ou partie des biens ont été saisis n’ont pas les moyens d’engager des avocats pour répondre aux accusations portées contre eux. conscient des graves problèmes que posait une telle situation, le législateur a reconnu la nécessité d’y remédier. [4] in response, parliament created a specific pro- cedure within the code’s proceeds of crime regime that allows accused persons to seek the return of some or all of the seized property for certain desig- nated purposes if the accused has “no other assets [4] le législateur a réagi en établissant une pro- cédure précise dans le régime des produits de la criminalité prévu au code qui permet à l’accusé de réclamer la restitution de quelques- uns ou de l’en- semble des biens saisis à certaines fins désignées 1 the code provides two mechanisms by which the state can take control of property believed to be the proceeds of crime. the mechanism at issue in this appeal — seizure — is authorized by warrant issued under s 46232 of the code. the second mecha- nism is a restraint order issued under s 46233 of the code, which prohibits “any person from disposing of, or otherwise dealing with any interest in, the property specified in the order otherwise than in the manner that may be specified in the order” (s 46233(3)). for simplicity, these reasons will use the term “seized” to mean “seized or restrained”. 2 as discussed in para. 27, forfeiture can occur even if the accused is not convicted, if the crown can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that property is the proceeds of crime. in this case, there will be a “forfeiture hearing” rather than a “sentencing hearing”. these reasons will use the term “sentencing hearing” to mean “sentencing or forfeiture hearing”. 1 le code prévoit deux mécanismes permettant à l’état de prendre le contrôle d’un bien que l’on croit être un produit de la crimi- nalité. le mécanisme en cause dans le présent pourvoi — la saisie — est autorisé par mandat délivré en vertu de l’art 46232 du code. le second mécanisme est l’ordonnance de blocage prévue à l’art 46233 du code, qui interdit à « toute personne de se départir des biens mentionnés dans l’ordonnance ou d’effectuer des opérations sur les droits qu’elle détient sur ceux-ci, sauf dans la mesure où l’ordonnance le prévoit » (par 46233(3)). pour simplifier les choses, j’utilise le terme « saisi » au sens de « saisi ou bloqué » dans les présents motifs. 2 tel qu’il est expliqué au par. 27, il peut y avoir confiscation mal- gré l’absence de déclaration de culpabilité si le ministère public réussit à prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que le bien en question est un produit de la criminalité. dans un tel cas, il y aura une « audience de confiscation » plutôt qu’une « audience de détermination de la peine ». j’emploie ce deuxième terme au sens d’« audience de détermination de la peine ou de confiscation » dans les présents motifs. 850 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. or means available” (s 46234(4))3. parliament’s list of approved purposes expressly includes reasonable legal expenses (s 46234(4)(c)(ii)). under this pro- cedure, which occurs early in a criminal proceeding, an accused applies to a judge to ask for the return of seized property to pay for a lawyer (s 46234(1)). thereafter, two separate hearings are held, evidence is tendered, and the judge determines: (1) whether the accused actually needs any of the seized property to pay for reasonable legal fees (ss 46234(4) and 462.34(5)); (2) what amount may be returned; and (3) the appropriate terms related to the return of the funds (s 46234(4)). the return of any seized funds is, therefore, done under the authority of a judicial order. returned funds are normally held in trust by legal counsel, to be used only for the defence of the accused, and such funds are no longer considered to be seized property held by the state. [5] the criminal process will then proceed. if the accused person is convicted or pleads guilty, there will be a sentencing hearing to impose a fit and pro- portionate criminal penalty. the sentencing judge will also determine what, if any, of the offender’s property (including property previously seized) has been proven to be proceeds of crime. as a general rule, property proven to be proceeds of crime must be forfeited to the crown (s 46237(1)). s’il ne « possède pas d’autres biens ou moyens » (par 46234(4))3. la liste des fins approuvées par le législateur comprend expressément les frais juri- diques raisonnables (sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii)). selon cette procédure, qui se déroule au début d’un procès criminel, l’accusé demande au juge la restitution des biens saisis pour se payer un avocat (par 46234(1)). par la suite, deux audiences distinctes ont lieu, de la preuve est produite, et le juge décide : (1) si l’accusé a bel et bien besoin d’un des biens saisis pour payer des frais juridiques raisonnables (par 46234(4) et (5)); (2) de la somme à restituer; et (3) les condi- tions indiquées relativement à la restitution des fonds (par 46234(4)). la restitution des fonds saisis se fait donc en vertu d’une ordonnance judiciaire. les fonds restitués sont normalement détenus en fiducie par un avocat et ils ne peuvent servir qu’à la défense de l’accusé, et ces fonds ne sont plus considérés comme des biens saisis que détient l’état. [5] le processus pénal suit ensuite son cours. si l’accusé est reconnu ou plaide coupable, le tribu- nal tiendra une audience de détermination de la peine pour lui infliger une sanction pénale juste et proportionnelle. le juge chargé de déterminer la peine décide aussi lesquels, s’il en est, des biens du contrevenant (y compris les biens saisis auparavant) s’avèrent être des produits de la criminalité. en règle générale, les biens dont il a été prouvé qu’il s’agit de produits de la criminalité doivent être confisqués au profit de sa majesté (par 46237(1)). [6] parliament has also addressed the situation in which property proven to be proceeds of crime at sentencing is not available for forfeiture to the crown, such as situations where the money has been [6] le législateur a également prévu la situation dans laquelle un bien dont il a été prouvé qu’il s’agit d’un produit de la criminalité à l’étape de la dé- termination de la peine ne peut être confisqué au 3 section 462.34(4) of the code allows a judge to order the return of property that was seized under a warrant issued pursuant to s 46232. where property was the subject of a restraint order made under s 46233(3), the judge may “revoke the order, vary the order to exclude the property or any interest in the property or part thereof from the application of the order or make the order subject to such reasonable conditions as the judge thinks fit”. for simplicity, these reasons will use the term “return” to refer to both situations. when referring specifically to the return provision for reasonable legal expenses under s 46234(4)(c)(ii), these reasons will use the term “legal expenses return provision”. 3 le paragraphe 462.34(4) du code autorise le juge à ordonner la restitution de biens saisis au moyen d’un mandat délivré en vertu de l’art 46232. dans le cas d’un bien faisant l’objet d’une ordonnance de blocage rendue en vertu du par 46233(3), le juge peut « annuler ou modifier l’ordonnance de blocage [  ] de façon à soustraire, en totalité ou en partie, ces biens ou un droit sur ceux-ci à son application, selon le cas, ou rendre l’ordonnance de blocage sujette aux conditions qu’il estime indiquées ». par souci de simplicité, j’emploie dans les présents motifs le terme «  restitution  » pour parler de ces deux situations quand je parle plus particulièrement de la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables au titre du sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii), j’utilise le terme « disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques ». [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 851 spent or given to a third person. in such a case, the sentencing judge may order a “fine instead of forfei- ture” equal to the amount proven to be proceeds of crime (s 46237(3))4. the offender’s failure to pay the fine may result in imprisonment (s 46237(4)). [7] this case concerns the legal relationship be- tween a judicial order returning funds to pay for reasonable legal fees and the sentencing judge’s discretion to order a fine instead of forfeiture. this court is, for the first time, being asked to address when, if ever, a sentencing judge should use the statutory discretion to order a fine instead of for- feiture in respect of property that was used, with prior judicial authorization, to pay for the reasonable costs of an accused’s legal defence. parliament has provided no express response to this question. the courts below have reached opposing conclusions and the limited jurisprudence across the country on these two provisions is similarly divided (r v. appleby, 2009 nlca 6, 282 nfld. & peir 134;. r v. wilson (1993), 15 or (3d) 645 (ca);. r v. smith, 2008 skca 20, 307 sask. r. 45; r v. maclean (1996), 184 nbr (2d) 26 (ca)). profit de sa majesté, comme dans le cas où l’argent a été dépensé ou donné à un tiers. en pareil cas, le juge chargé de déterminer la peine peut infliger une « amende en remplacement de la confiscation » égale à la somme dont il a été prouvé qu’il s’agit d’un produit de la criminalité (par 46237(3))4. le contrevenant qui ne paie pas l’amende est passible d’un emprisonnement (par 46237(4)). [7] la présente affaire concerne le rapport juridique entre une ordonnance judiciaire portant restitution de fonds pour permettre à l’intéressé de payer des frais juridiques raisonnables et le pouvoir discrétion- naire du juge chargé de la détermination de la peine d’infliger une amende en remplacement de la confis- cation. la cour est appelée pour la première fois à déterminer les circonstances dans lesquelles, le cas échéant, le juge chargé de déterminer la peine devrait exercer le pouvoir discrétionnaire que lui confère la loi pour infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation à l’égard de biens utilisés, avec l’auto- risation préalable du tribunal, pour payer les frais juridiques raisonnables de la défense de l’accusé. le législateur n’a donné aucune réponse explicite à cette question. les juridictions inférieures sont parvenues à des conclusions opposées et la jurisprudence peu abondante partout au pays sur les deux dispositions en cause est tout aussi partagée (r c. appleby, 2009 nlca 6, 282 nfld. & peir 134;. r c. wilson (1993), 15 or (3d) 645 (ca);. r c. smith, 2008 skca 20, 307 sask. r. 45; r c. maclean (1996), 184 nbr (2d) 26 (ca)). [8] in my view, the application of the principles of statutory interpretation leads to the conclusion that, generally speaking, sentencing judges should not impose a fine instead of forfeiture in relation to funds that have been judicially returned for the payment of reasonable legal fees associated with an accused’s criminal defence. this approach is most faithful to parliament’s intent. [8] à mon avis, l’application des principes d’in- terprétation législative mène à la conclusion qu’en général, le juge chargé de déterminer la peine ne doit pas infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation à l’égard de fonds qui ont été restitués par le tribunal pour le paiement des frais juridiques raisonnables associés à la défense d’un accusé. cette approche est la plus fidèle à la volonté du législateur. [9] the statutory discretion afforded to sentenc- ing judges to impose a fine must be exercised in [9] le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’infliger une amende que la loi accorde au juge chargé de déterminer la 4 some of the jurisprudence refers to this as a “fine in lieu of for- feiture”. for clarity, these reasons use the word “instead”, which is consistent with the language of s 46237(3) of the code. 4 dans certaines décisions, les tribunaux parlent d’« amende infligée au lieu de la confiscation ». par souci de clarté, j’utilise dans les présents motifs les mots « en remplacement » qui font partie du texte du par 46237(3) du code. 852 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. accordance with the purposes of the provisions in the proceeds of crime regime (r v. lavigne, 2006 scc 10, [2006] 1 scr 392, at para 28). those purposes can be found by examining the code to discern parliament’s intent about how the legal ex- penses return provision and the fine instead of forfei- ture provision should operate together. by enacting the return provision, parliament not only foresaw the possibility that seized funds may be needed to mount a defence, but explicitly allowed individuals to spend returned funds for this purpose. while it is true that the proceeds of crime regime as a whole seeks to ensure that crime does not pay or benefit the offender, the legal expenses return provision pursues secondary purposes, namely: (1) providing access to counsel and (2) giving meaningful weight to the presumption of innocence. underlying both of these objectives is a desire to ensure fairness to the accused in criminal prosecutions. clawing back reasonable legal fees as a fine instead of forfeiture would, in most cases, undermine these equally valid purposes. [10] at the same time, where it turns out that the offender did not have a real financial need or the funds were not used to alleviate that need, it would be appropriate for a judge to impose a fine instead of forfeiture, as this would align with parliament’s intent. for example, this might occur where there is wrongdoing in the return of funds application, such as the misrepresentation of the accused’s financial position. it might also occur where there is wrongdo- ing in the administration of the return order, such as funds not being applied in the manner contemplated, expenditures for purposes outside the scope of the return order, or fees in excess of judicially authorized limits. further, it might occur where the accused experiences an unexpected change in circumstances after the funds have been returned but before sen- tencing, such that recourse to returned funds is no longer necessary after the accused became aware of the changed circumstances. these are examples of the kinds of situations that undermine the basis of peine doit s’exercer conformément aux objets des dispositions du régime des produits de la criminalité (r c. lavigne, 2006 csc 10, [2006] 1 rcs 392, par 28). ces objets se dégagent d’un examen du code visant à cerner l’intention du législateur quant à la coexistence de la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques et de celle sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation. en adoptant la disposition sur la restitution, le législateur a non seulement prévu la possibilité que l’accusé ait besoin des fonds saisis pour préparer sa défense, mais a aussi permis explicitement que les fonds restitués soient consacrés à cette fin. s’il est vrai que l’en- semble du régime des produits de la criminalité a pour objet de s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas ni ne béné- ficie au contrevenant, la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques vise la réali- sation d’objets secondaires, à savoir : (1) permettre l’accès aux services d’un avocat et (2) accorder une importance suffisante à la présomption d’innocence. le désir d’assurer l’équité à l’accusé dans les pour- suites criminelles sous- tend ces deux objectifs. dans la plupart des cas, récupérer les sommes versées pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables au moyen d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation aura pour effet de miner la réalisation de ces objets tout aussi valables. [10] par contre, s’il s’avère que le contrevenant n’avait pas un véritable besoin financier ou que les fonds n’ont pas été utilisés pour atténuer ce besoin, il serait indiqué pour le juge d’infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation, car cela concorde- rait avec l’intention du législateur. par exemple, cela pourrait survenir en présence d’agissements répré- hensibles relativement à la demande de restitution (telle la présentation inexacte de la situation finan- cière de l’accusé) ou à l’occasion de l’exécution de l’ordonnance de restitution (p ex, l’utilisation des fonds d’une manière non prévue dans l’ordonnance, pour des dépenses à des fins qui ne sont pas visées par l’ordonnance ou pour des dépenses qui dépassent les limites autorisées par le tribunal). en outre, cela pourrait se produire si la situation financière de l’ac- cusé change de façon imprévue après la restitution des fonds, mais avant la détermination de la peine, de sorte qu’il ne soit plus nécessaire d’avoir recours aux fonds restitués dès que l’accusé prend connaissance [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 853 the return order such that parliament would have intended to recover the returned monies by way of a fine. [11] in the context of this case, because ordering a fine would undermine parliament’s intent in enacting the legal expenses return provision, i would allow the appeal and set aside the court of appeal’s order, which imposed a fine and imprisonment in default of payment. de la nouvelle situation. ce sont là des exemples du genre de situation qui mine le fondement même de l’ordonnance de restitution de telle sorte que le légis- lateur aurait souhaité recouvrer les sommes d’argent restituées au moyen d’une amende. [11] dans le contexte de la présente affaire, puisque l’infliction d’une amende aurait pour conséquence de miner l’intention qu’avait le législateur en édictant la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et d’annuler l’ordonnance de la cour d’appel, qui a imposé une amende et une peine d’emprisonnement pour défaut de paiement. ii facts and judicial history ii faits et historique judiciaire [12] the appellant, mr. rafilovich, was arrested for possession of cocaine for the purpose of traffick- ing twice in fourteen months. the police searched mr. rafilovich’s car and two apartments, and seized, among other things, a fake social insurance number identification card, about $47,000 worth of cocaine, and about $42,000 in cash. the cash was seized by the crown as potential proceeds of crime. [13] in 2009, before his trial, mr.  rafilovich’s counsel brought an application under s.  462.34 of the code for the return of some of the seized funds to pay for reasonable legal fees associated with the case. justice macdonald of the ontario superior court of justice granted the application pursuant to s.  462.34(4)(c)(ii) he was satisfied that mr. rafilovich met the financial need require- ment in s.  462.34(4) of the code (ar, vol.  ii, at p.  1) he ordered that the returned funds be held by mr.  rafilovich’s counsel in an interest- bearing trust account and imposed the following conditions: the returned funds were to be used only for the payment of legal fees and, before any fees could be paid, mr. rafilovich’s counsel had to provide “an itemized account justifying such fees to mr. rafilovich and he [had to] sign that account acknowledging his agreement as to the reasona- bleness of the fees and his consent to payment” (ar, vol.  ii, at p.  2) justice macdonald also determined the hourly rate and maximum court [12] l’appelant, m. rafilovich, a été arrêté à deux reprises en quatorze mois pour possession de cocaïne en vue d’en faire le trafic. après avoir fouillé le vé- hicule de m. rafilovich et perquisitionné ses deux appartements, la police a saisi entre autres une fausse carte d’assurance sociale, de la cocaïne valant envi- ron 47 000 $ et près de 42 000 $ en argent comptant. l’argent a été saisi par sa majesté en tant que biens constituant peut- être des produits de la criminalité. [13] en 2009, avant l’ouverture du procès de m. rafilovich, son avocat a présenté en vertu de l’art 46234 du code une demande visant à obtenir la restitution d’une partie des fonds saisis aux fins de paiement des frais juridiques raisonnables associés à l’affaire. le juge macdonald, de la cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario, a fait droit à la demande en vertu du sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii). il était convaincu que m. rafilovich avait répondu à l’exigence du besoin financier énoncée au par 46234(4) du code (da, vol. ii, p 1). il a ordonné que les fonds restitués soient détenus par l’avocat de m. rafilovich dans un compte en fiducie portant intérêt et a imposé les conditions suivantes : les fonds restitués devaient ser- vir uniquement au paiement des frais juridiques et, avant que le moindre paiement de cette nature puisse être fait, l’avocat de m. rafilovich devait fournir [traduction] « un relevé détaillé justifiant ces frais auprès de m. rafilovich et il [devait] signer ce relevé pour reconnaître que les frais étaient raisonnables et consentir au paiement » (da, vol. ii, p 2). le 854 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. hours that could be billed up to the conclusion of the preliminary inquiry. [14] at trial, mr. rafilovich pled guilty to: pos- session of a counterfeit mark (a social insurance number card); two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking; and two counts of possession of property exceeding $5,000, know- ing that it was obtained or derived directly or indi- rectly as a result of the commission in canada of an offence punishable by indictment. the sentencing judge sentenced mr. rafilovich to 36 months in cus- tody, which was reduced by 13 months for pretrial custody and by another 9  months to account for the terms of his interim release. in addition to this sentence, mr. rafilovich was required to forfeit to the crown his 50 percent interest in an apartment that was “offence- related property” as defined in s. 2 of the controlled drugs and substances act, sc 1996, c. 19 (“cdsa”). mr. rafilovich’s term of imprisonment and the forfeiture of the interest in the apartment are not at issue in this appeal. while the interest in the apartment was forfeited under the cdsa, the parties agree that the forfeiture provisions applicable to the funds at issue in this case are those found in the code. for the purposes of this appeal i accept, without deciding, that the governing provi- sions are those in the code, not the cdsa. juge macdonald a également fixé le taux horaire et le nombre maximal d’heures d’audience qui pourraient être facturées jusqu’à la fin de l’enquête préliminaire. [14] au procès, m. rafilovich a plaidé coupable à : un chef de possession d’une marque contrefaite (une carte d’assurance sociale); deux chefs de possession de cocaïne en vue d’en faire le trafic; et deux chefs de possession de biens de plus de 5 000 $, sachant qu’ils avaient été obtenus ou qu’ils provenaient, directe- ment ou indirectement, de la perpétration au canada d’une infraction punissable sur acte d’accusation. la juge chargée de déterminer la peine a condamné m.  rafilovich à une peine d’emprisonnement de 36 mois, qui a été écourtée de 13 mois en raison de la période de détention préventive, ainsi que d’une autre période de 9 mois, eu égard aux conditions de sa mise en liberté provisoire. en plus de cette peine, la juge a ordonné que le droit de m. rafilovich sur 50 p. 100 d’un appartement, qui constituait un « bien infractionnel » au sens de l’art. 2 de la loi ré- glementant certaines drogues et autres substances, lc 1996, c. 19 (« lrcdas »), soit confisqué au profit de sa majesté. la peine d’emprisonnement infligée à m. rafilovich et la confiscation du droit sur l’appartement ne sont pas en litige dans le présent pourvoi. bien que le droit sur l’appartement ait été confisqué en application de la lrcdas, les parties conviennent que les dispositions sur la confiscation qui s’appliquent aux fonds en cause dans la présente affaire sont celles qui figurent dans le code. pour les besoins du présent pourvoi, j’accepte, sans trancher la question, que les dispositions déterminantes sont celles du code et non celles de la lrcdas. [15] at the sentencing hearing, the crown also sought a fine instead of forfeiture under s 46237(3), equal to the amount seized and then returned to mr. rafilovich to pay for his legal counsel. the sen- tencing judge declined to impose the discretionary fine for four reasons. first, as the application judge found, mr. rafilovich did not have any funds to pay for legal representation and did not qualify for legal aid. therefore, “[i]t was necessary for the seized funds to be released” (2013 onsc 7293, at p. 20 (canlii)). second, mr. rafilovich did not obtain a benefit from the returned funds except to have legal representation. this was not a situation where [15] à l’audience de détermination de la peine, le ministère public a également sollicité, en vertu du par 46237(3), une amende en remplacement de la confiscation, soit une amende égale à la somme sai- sie, puis restituée à m. rafilovich pour qu’il puisse payer son avocat. la juge chargée de déterminer la peine a refusé d’infliger l’amende discrétionnaire, et ce, pour quatre raisons. premièrement, comme l’a conclu le juge saisi de la demande, m. rafilovich n’avait pas les moyens d’être représenté par un avo- cat et il n’était pas admissible à l’aide juridique. en conséquence, [traduction] « [i]l était nécessaire d’accorder la mainlevée de la saisie des fonds  » [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 855 an offender profited from criminal conduct. third, mr. rafilovich did not squander or divert any of his other assets. fourth, the non- payment of the fine would lead to the imposition of a further sentence of imprisonment of 12 to 18 months — an outcome that offenders who have access to funds or legal aid would not have to face. [16] the crown appealed. the court of appeal for ontario unanimously held that the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion in this case was inap- propriate. while it recognized that sentencing judges have a statutory discretion to not impose a fine, the exercise of this discretion, according to lavigne, cannot hinder the achievement of the objectives that the proceeds of crime regime seeks to achieve. one of these objectives is that offenders cannot profit from their criminal conduct, and the court of appeal considered mr. rafilovich to be profiting from his criminal conduct by having access to seized funds to pay for his legal fees. it viewed the fact that the code allows judges to return seized funds for payment of reasonable legal fees as compatible with the impo- sition of a fine instead of forfeiture at a later stage in the criminal proceedings. [17] the court of appeal also held that the sen- tencing judge erred in considering the possibility of imprisonment for non- payment of a fine. it consid- ered that, according to this court’s decision in r v. wu, 2003 scc 73, [2003] 3 scr 530, an offender cannot be imprisoned for failing to pay a fine if the offender has a reasonable excuse. since inability to pay constitutes a reasonable excuse, mr. rafilovich would not face any risk of additional imprisonment if he were ultimately unable to pay the fine. (2013 onsc 7293, p. 20 (canlii)). deuxièmement, m. rafilovich n’avait retiré aucun bénéfice de la restitution des fonds, si ce n’est la possibilité d’être représenté par un avocat. il ne s’agissait pas d’une situation où le contrevenant avait tiré profit d’une conduite criminelle. troisièmement, m. rafilovich n’avait pas dilapidé ou détourné l’un de ses autres biens. quatrièmement, le défaut de payer l’amende mènerait à l’imposition d’une nouvelle peine d’em- prisonnement de 12 à 18 mois — conséquence que ne subiraient pas les contrevenants disposant de fonds ou ayant droit à l’aide juridique. [16] le ministère public s’est pourvu en appel. la cour d’appel de l’ontario a jugé à l’unanimité que la juge chargée de déterminer la peine avait mal exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire en l’espèce. même si elle a reconnu que les juges chargés de déterminer la peine sont investis par la loi du pouvoir discrétion- naire de ne pas infliger d’amende, la cour a rappelé que ce pouvoir ne peut, suivant l’arrêt lavigne, être exercé de manière à faire obstacle à la réalisation des objectifs que le régime des produits de la criminalité cherche à atteindre. un de ces objectifs consiste à empêcher les contrevenants de tirer profit de leur conduite criminelle, et la cour d’appel a estimé que m. rafilovich avait bénéficié de sa conduite crimi- nelle en disposant de fonds saisis pour payer ses frais juridiques. de l’avis de la cour d’appel, le fait que le code autorise les juges à restituer les fonds saisis pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables était compatible avec l’infliction d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation plus tard au cours de la poursuite criminelle. [17] la cour d’appel a également décidé que la juge chargée de déterminer la peine avait commis une erreur en envisageant la possibilité d’une peine d’emprisonnement en cas de défaut de paiement d’une amende. elle a considéré que, selon l’arrêt de notre cour dans r c. wu, 2003 csc 73, [2003] 3 rcs 530, le contrevenant ne peut être incar- céré pour défaut de paiement d’une amende s’il a une excuse raisonnable étant donné que l’inca- pacité de payer constitue une excuse raisonnable, m. rafilovich ne risquerait aucunement de se voir infliger une autre peine d’emprisonnement s’il était incapable en fin de compte de payer l’amende. 856 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. [18] on the basis of the above analysis, the court of appeal imposed a fine instead of forfeiture of $41,976.39, equal to the amount of the seized and returned funds. it further ordered that, in the event that mr. rafilovich did not pay the fine and did not have a reasonable excuse, he would be sentenced to an additional 12 months of imprisonment over and above the 14 months that remained in his prison sentence. mr. rafilovich now appeals to this court by leave. [18] en se fondant sur l’analyse qui précède, la cour d’appel a infligé une amende de 41 976,39 $, soit le montant des fonds saisis et restitués, en remplacement de la confiscation. elle a également ordonné qu’à défaut de payer cette amende sans excuse raisonnable, m. rafilovich serait condamné à une autre peine de 12  mois d’emprisonnement en sus des 14 mois de la peine qu’il lui restait à purger. après avoir obtenu l’autorisation de notre cour, m. rafilovich se pourvoit de cette décision devant nous. iii issue iii question en litige [19] the issue before this court is: how should a sentencing judge, who has discretion whether to im- pose a fine instead of forfeiture under s 46237(3) for property proven to be proceeds of crime, treat prop- erty that has been judicially returned for the payment of reasonable legal expenses under s 46234(4)(c)(ii)?. stated otherwise, what is the intended relationship between the return provision and the fine instead of forfeiture provision in the context of reasonable legal fees? [19] la question que notre cour doit trancher est la suivante : comment le juge chargé de déterminer la peine, qui est investi du pouvoir discrétionnaire d’infliger ou non une amende en remplacement de la confiscation en vertu du par.  462.37(3) à l’égard du bien dont il est démontré qu’il s’agit d’un produit de la criminalité, devrait-il traiter le bien qui a été restitué par voie judiciaire pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables aux termes du sous-al.  462.34(4)c)(ii)? en d’autres termes, quelle est l’interaction souhaitée entre la disposition sur la restitution et celle concernant l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation dans le contexte de frais juridiques raisonnables? iv analysis iv analyse [20] as the code does not expressly indicate whether judicially returned funds ought to be sub- ject to a fine instead of forfeiture, the resolution of this issue requires recourse to well- established rules of statutory interpretation. this analysis, which is concerned with legislative intent, is guided by the words that parliament has chosen to use, the way it intended to achieve its objectives, and the scheme it has put in place (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para 21). under the modern approach to statutory interpretation, the meaning of words and phrases are interpreted in their con- text and within the scheme of the act in which they are found (atco gas and pipelines ltd. v. alberta (energy and utilities board), 2006 scc 4, [2006] 1 scr 140, at para 48). parliament also is presumed to intend for its provisions to be read [20] étant donné que le code n’indique pas ex- pressément si les fonds restitués par voie judiciaire doivent faire l’objet d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation, il faut s’en remettre aux règles bien établies d’interprétation législative pour tran- cher cette question. cette analyse, qui s’intéresse à l’intention du législateur, est guidée par les mots que le législateur a choisi d’employer, par la façon dont il souhaitait atteindre ses objectifs et par le régime qu’il a mis en place (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27, par 21). selon la mé- thode moderne d’interprétation législative, le sens des mots et expressions est interprété en contexte et eu égard à l’économie de la loi dans laquelle ils sont employés (atco gas and pipelines ltd. c. alberta (energy and utilities board), 2006 csc 4, [2006] 1 rcs 140, par 48). de plus, le législateur est [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 857 harmoniously, and to be interpreted and applied so they fit together in a way that respects parliament’s multiple objectives and gives purpose and meaning to each provision. in the present case, where the dispute involves multiple legislative objectives and the inter- relationship between two or more statutory provisions, the scheme of the act and the objectives underlying each of the relevant provisions are par- ticularly significant. [21] to engage in that analysis, i will therefore proceed as follows. first, i summarize the overall framework in which this narrow issue arises and highlight the two provisions at the heart of the con- troversy. second, i review the multiple objectives of the proceeds of crime regime, the return process, and the fine instead of forfeiture provision, and discuss how courts should interpret schemes with multi- ple purposes. third, i consider whether interpreting the return provision as something akin to a loan to the accused person would honour and uphold those objectives. fourth, i examine whether returned property constitutes the kind of benefit targeted by the regime. fifth, i consider whether judicially re- turned funds are analogous to the examples listed in the fine instead of forfeiture provision. sixth, i suggest when the discretion to impose a fine instead of forfeiture should be exercised. finally, i respond to the suggestion that this court should impose the criteria for providing state- funded counsel set out in r v. rowbotham (1988), 41 ccc (3d) 1 (ont. ca), on judges’ discretion to order a fine instead of forfeiture for reasonable legal expenses, over and above parliament’s requirements for the return of funds for reasonable legal expenses. présumé vouloir que les dispositions qu’il adopte soient interprétées de façon harmonieuse et qu’elles soient interprétées et appliquées de manière à former un tout cohérent qui respecte les multiples objectifs du législateur et donne un objet et un sens à chacune d’elles. dans la présente affaire, où le litige concerne de multiples objets de la loi et l’interaction entre au moins deux dispositions législatives, l’économie de la loi et les objectifs qui sous- tendent chacune des dispositions applicables revêtent une importance particulière. [21] pour entreprendre cette analyse, je procé- derai donc ainsi. en premier lieu, je résumerai le cadre général dans lequel se pose cette question restreinte et exposerai les deux dispositions au cœur de la controverse. en deuxième lieu, j’exami- nerai les multiples objectifs du régime des produits de la criminalité, la procédure de restitution ainsi que la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation, et j’expliquerai la façon dont les tribunaux devraient interpréter les régimes aux objets multiples. en troisième lieu, je me deman- derai si le fait d’interpréter la disposition sur la restitution comme quelque chose de semblable à un prêt à l’accusé permettrait d’atteindre et de protéger ces objectifs. en quatrième lieu, je m’at- tarderai à la question de savoir si les biens resti- tués constituent le genre d’avantage visé par le régime en cinquième lieu, je me demanderai si les fonds restitués par voie judiciaire s’apparentent aux exemples énumérés dans la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation. en sixième lieu, j’indiquerai dans quel cas le pou- voir discrétionnaire d’infliger une amende en rem- placement de la confiscation devrait être exercé. enfin, je répondrai à l’affirmation selon laquelle notre cour devrait imposer les critères de presta- tion des services d’un avocat rémunéré par l’état qui sont énoncés dans r c rowbotham (1988), 41 ccc (3d) 1 (ca. ont.), à l’exercice par le juge de son pouvoir discrétionnaire d’infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables en sus des exigences fixées par le législateur pour la resti- tution de fonds servant à payer des frais juridiques raisonnables. 858 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. a the statutory scheme, the return process and the fine instead of forfeiture provision [22] under the scheme of the proceeds of crime regime in the code, the issue before this court only arises in limited circumstances when five pre- conditions are met. a l’économie de la loi, la procédure de restitution et la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation [22] selon l’économie du régime des produits de la criminalité établi dans le code, la question dont la cour est saisie se pose uniquement dans des circons- tances limitées lorsque cinq conditions préalables sont réunies. [23] first, the accused is charged with a “desig- nated offence”, as defined under s 4623(1). [23] premièrement, l’inculpé est accusé d’une « in- fraction désignée » au sens du par 4623(1). [24] second, property is seized. parliament has allowed the state to take property from an accused on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds that the property may eventually be proven to be proceeds of crime (ss 46232(1) and 46233(1)). this seizure oc- curs at a time when the accused is presumed innocent and, in law, remains the legal owner of the seized property unless and until the property is forfeited at sentencing. the seizure of property from persons still presumed to be innocent was quite extraordinary at the time the proceeds of crime regime was enacted in 1988 (g. j. rose, “non- part xii.2 warrants and proceeds of crime” (1996), 38 crim. lq 206, at pp 210-11). [25] third, the accused makes an application for the return of the seized property to pay for reasonable legal fees under s 46234(4) to (6). for our purposes, the relevant portions of the section read: [24] deuxièmement, un bien est saisi. le législa- teur a permis à l’état d’enlever un bien à l’accusé sur le fondement de motifs raisonnables et probables de croire qu’il sera éventuellement prouvé qu’il s’agit d’un produit de la criminalité (par.  462.32(1) et 46233(1)). cette saisie survient alors que l’accusé est présumé innocent et qu’il demeure légalement, aux yeux de la loi, le propriétaire du bien saisi, tant que celui-ci n’est pas confisqué lors de la détermi- nation de la peine. le fait de saisir les biens de per- sonnes encore présumées innocentes constituait une mesure vraiment extraordinaire lors de la création du régime des produits de la criminalité en 1988 (g. j. rose, « non- part xii.2 warrants and proceeds of crime » (1996), 38 crim. lq 206, p. 210- 211). [25] troisièmement, l’accusé demande, au titre des par 46234(4) à (6), la restitution des biens saisis en vue de payer ses frais juridiques raisonnables. pour les besoins du présent dossier, voici le texte des dis- positions pertinentes du paragraphe : (4) on an application made to a judge under para- graph (1)(a) in respect of any property and after hearing the applicant and the attorney general and any other person to whom notice was given pursuant to para- graph (2)(b), the judge may order that the property or a part thereof be returned to the applicant or, in the case of a restraint order made under subsection  462.33(3), revoke the order, vary the order to exclude the property or any interest in the property or part thereof from the application of the order or make the order subject to such reasonable conditions as the judge thinks fit, (4) le juge saisi d’une demande d’ordonnance présentée en vertu du paragraphe (1) peut, après avoir entendu le demandeur, le procureur général et, éventuellement, les personnes à qui le préavis mentionné au paragraphe (2) a été remis, ordonner que les biens soient restitués en tout ou en partie au demandeur, annuler ou modifier l’ordonnance de blocage rendue en vertu du paragraphe 462.33(3) de façon à soustraire, en totalité ou en partie, ces biens ou un droit sur ceux-ci à son application, selon le cas, ou rendre l’ordonnance de blocage sujette aux conditions qu’il es- time indiquées dans les cas suivants :   .   . [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 859 (c) for the purpose of c) afin de permettre :   .   . (ii) meeting the reasonable business and legal ex- penses of a person referred to in subparagraph (i)   . (ii) à l’une des personnes mentionnées au sous- alinéa (i) de faire face à ses dépenses commerciales courantes et de payer ses frais juridiques dans la mesure où ces dépenses et frais sont raisonnables,   .   . if the judge is satisfied that the applicant has no other assets or means available for the purposes set out in this paragraph and that no other person appears to be the lawful owner of or lawfully entitled to possession of the property. [26] in these return provisions, parliament has al- lowed for tight judicial control over if, when, and how seized property may be returned to pay for rea- sonable legal expenses. seized property can only be returned “if the judge is satisfied that the applicant has no other assets or means available” to pay for legal expenses (s 46234(4)(c)(ii)). these return pro- visions and process, as well as parliament’s purpose in enacting them, will be explored in further detail in a subsequent section. [27] fourth, the crown proves that certain property meets the statutory definition of proceeds of crime under ss 46237(1) or 46237(2). only property de- termined to be “proceeds of crime” at the end of the process, whether at sentencing or a forfeiture hearing, is subject to forfeiture or a fine instead of forfeiture. lorsque le juge est convaincu que l’auteur de la demande ne possède pas d’autres biens ou moyens pour ce faire et que nulle autre personne ne semble être le propriétaire légitime de ces biens ou avoir droit à leur possession légitime. [26] en adoptant ces dispositions sur la restitu- tion, le législateur a ouvert la voie à un encadre- ment judiciaire rigoureux des modalités pour ce qui est de savoir si, quand et comment les biens saisis peuvent être restitués en vue du paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables. les biens saisis ne peuvent être restitués que « lorsque le juge est convaincu que l’auteur de la demande ne possède pas d’autres biens ou moyens » pour payer ses frais juridiques (sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii)). ces dispositions et cette procédure en matière de restitution, ainsi que le but qu’avait le législateur en les adoptant, seront étudiés plus en détail dans une prochaine section. [27] quatrièmement, le ministère public prouve que certains biens sont visés par la définition légale de produits de la criminalité au sens du par 46237(1) ou (2). seuls les biens dont on a jugé qu’ils consti- tuent des « produits de la criminalité » à l’issue de l’instance, qu’il s’agisse d’une audience de déter- mination de la peine ou de confiscation, peuvent faire l’objet d’une confiscation ou d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation. [28] fifth, some or all of the property proven to be proceeds of crime at sentencing is no longer available for forfeiture to the crown. in such cases, the sen- tencing judge may order a “fine instead of forfeiture” according to s 46237(3) and (4). the imposition of a fine is a discretionary decision and s 46237(3) sets out a non- exhaustive list of circumstances when a fine may be imposed instead of forfeiture, including [28] cinquièmement, une partie ou la totalité des biens dont il est prouvé qu’ils constituent des produits de la criminalité à l’étape de la détermination de la peine n’est plus confiscable au profit de sa majesté. en pareil cas, le juge chargé de déterminer la peine peut infliger une « amende en remplacement de la confiscation » en conformité avec les par 46237(3) et (4). l’infliction d’une amende participe d’une 860 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. where property “has been transferred to a third party” (s 46237(3)(b)). subsection 462.37(3) reads: (3) if a court is satisfied that an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) or (2.01) should be made in respect of any property of an offender but that the property or any part of or interest in the property cannot be made subject to an order, the court may, instead of ordering the property or any part of or interest in the property to be forfeited, order the offender to pay a fine in an amount equal to the value of the property or the part of or interest in the property. in particular, a court may order the offender to pay a fine if the property or any part of or interest in the property décision discrétionnaire et le par 46237(3) dresse une liste non exhaustive de circonstances dans les- quelles il est possible d’infliger une amende en rem- placement de la confiscation, notamment en cas de « remise [du bien] à un tiers » (al 46237(3)b)). le paragraphe 462.37(3) est rédigé ainsi : (3) le tribunal qui est convaincu qu’une ordonnance de confiscation devrait être rendue à l’égard d’un bien — d’une partie d’un bien ou d’un droit sur celui-ci — d’un contrevenant peut, en remplacement de l’ordonnance, in- fliger au contrevenant une amende égale à la valeur du bien s’il est convaincu que le bien ne peut pas faire l’objet d’une telle ordonnance et notamment dans les cas suivants : (a) cannot, on the exercise of due diligence, be located; a) impossibilité, malgré des efforts en ce sens, de re- trouver le bien; (b) has been transferred to a third party; b) remise à un tiers; (c) is located outside canada; c) situation du bien à l’extérieur du canada; (d) has been substantially diminished in value or ren- dered worthless; or d) diminution importante de valeur; (e) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty. e) fusion avec un autre bien qu’il est par ailleurs dif- ficile de diviser. when imposed, the fine must be equal to the amount proven to be proceeds of crime. an offender who fails to pay the fine is liable to an additional term of imprisonment (s 46237(4)). l’amende infligée, le cas échéant, doit être égale au montant des fonds dont il a été prouvé qu’ils consti- tuent des produits de la criminalité. le contrevenant qui ne paie pas l’amende est passible d’une peine d’emprisonnement supplémentaire (par 46237(4)). b the multiple purposes of the proceeds of crime b les multiples objets du régime des produits de regime la criminalité (1) general principles (1) principes généraux [29] i accept that parliament had several objectives in mind when it enacted this comprehensive pro- ceeds of crime regime: what professor sullivan refers to as “the desired mix of goals” (sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at p 409). [29] je reconnais que le législateur avait plusieurs objectifs en tête au moment où il a instauré ce régime exhaustif des produits de la criminalité, ce que la professeure sullivan qualifie de [traduc- tion] « combinaison souhaitée d’objectifs » (sul- livan on the construction of statutes (6e éd. 2014), p 409). [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 861 [30] when interpreting a complex scheme such as this one, it is necessary to avoid fixating on one objective to the exclusion of others. as professor sullivan explains, secondary purposes must be given an active role in the statutory interpretation analysis: while legislation may be enacted to promote a primary policy or principle, the primary goals of legislation are almost never pursued single- mindedly or whole- heartedly; various secondary principles and policies are inevitably included in a way that qualifies or modifies the pursuit of the primary goals. observing the principles of fairness or natural justice, for example, may preclude adopting the most efficient and cost- effective means of pursuing a policy like national security    . [30] pour interpréter un régime complexe tel que celui qui nous intéresse en l’espèce, il est essentiel de ne pas s’attarder à un seul objectif au détriment des autres. comme l’explique la professeure sullivan, les objets secondaires doivent jouer un rôle actif dans une entreprise d’interprétation législative : [traduction] bien que la promulgation d’un texte législatif puisse viser une politique ou un principe premier, les objectifs premiers d’une loi que vise le législateur ne le sont presque jamais de façon absolue ou résolue; diverses politiques ou divers principes secondaires sont inévitable- ment inclus de telle sorte que la poursuite des objectifs premiers s’en voit nuancée ou modifiée. par exemple, le respect des principes d’équité ou de justice naturelle pourrait empêcher l’adoption de la mesure la plus efficace et la moins coûteuse permettant de mettre en œuvre une politique générale comme la sécurité nationale   . secondary purposes are not often mentioned in the preamble to legislation or in formal purpose statements. it is through analysis of the legislative scheme, and more particularly through analysis of the relation of each provi- sion to the others in the act, that these secondary purposes are revealed. [footnotes omitted; p 271]. les objets secondaires sont rarement mentionnés dans le préambule de la loi ou dans l’énoncé de l’objet qu’elle renferme. c’est grâce à une analyse de l’économie de la loi, et plus particulièrement du rapport qu’entretiennent ses différentes dispositions, qu’il est possible de dégager ces objets secondaires. [notes en bas de page omises; p 271]. likewise, in sun indalex finance, llc v. united steelworkers, 2013 scc 6, [2013] 1 scr 271,. cromwell j. cautioned that primary legislative pur- poses, however important, “are not pursued at all costs and are clearly intended to be balanced with other important interests within the context of a care- fully calibrated scheme” (para 174). in other words, the overarching purpose of a legislative scheme in- forms, but need not be the decisive factor in the interpretation of a particular provision within that scheme. [31] keeping these principles in mind, it is nec- essary to: address both the decision of this court in lavigne and how it does not provide the answer to the issue in this case; assess how the return process was intended to work given that a sentencing judge subsequently has a discretion to impose a fine instead of forfeiture; and canvass the particular purposes animating the return provisions. de même, dans l’arrêt sun indalex finance, llc c. syndicat des métallos, 2013 csc 6, [2013] 1 rcs. 271, le juge cromwell a signalé que, tout aussi im- portants soient- ils, « le législateur n’entend pas at- teindre [les objectifs premiers de la loi] à n’importe quel prix, son intention étant clairement de [les] mettre en balance avec d’autres intérêts importants dans le cadre d’un régime soigneusement conçu » (par 174). autrement dit, sans que cela doive être un facteur déterminant, l’objet prépondérant d’un régime législatif éclaire l’interprétation d’une dis- position donnée de ce régime. [31] eu égard à ces principes, il faut traiter de l’ar- rêt lavigne de notre cour et du fait qu’il ne fournit pas la réponse à la question en litige dans la présente affaire, et examiner la façon dont était censée fonc- tionner la procédure de restitution vu que le juge chargé de déterminer la peine jouit par la suite du pouvoir discrétionnaire d’infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation. il faut également passer en revue les objectifs précis qui sous- tendent les dispositions sur la restitution. 862 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. (2) the lavigne decision (2) l’arrêt lavigne [32] this court addressed the general objectives of the proceeds of crime regime and the fine instead of forfeiture provision in lavigne. the legal issue in lavigne was whether sentencing judges could take an offender’s ability to pay into account when deter- mining whether to impose a fine instead of forfeiture, and the amount of the fine. mr. lavigne admitted he had received $150,000 from his criminal enterprise, but argued that he did not benefit from the money because it was spent “on his friends and family” (para 3). this court held that parliament had not intended for mr. lavigne’s inability to pay a fine to be a factor considered by the sentencing judge when deciding whether to impose a fine instead of forfeiture. to allow him to claim impecuniosity, and to reduce the amount of that fine by what he chose to spend on gifts and other purchases for his friends and family, would effectively allow mr. lavigne to bene- fit from his crimes in a manner that would defeat the purposes underlying the proceeds of crime regime. in lavigne, this court found that sentencing [33] judges should exercise their discretion to order a fine instead of forfeiture in a way that does not under- mine the objectives of the proceeds of crime regime. this court held that parliament’s primary, or overall, goal in the proceeds of crime regime was to ensure that profit- generating offences do not “benefit the offender”, and “to ensure that crime does not pay” (para 10). the forfeiture provision was intended “to deprive the offender and the criminal organization of the proceeds of their crime and to deter them from committing crimes in the future” (lavigne, at para. 16; also see para 23). in order to accomplish this, it was necessary to prevent accused persons from avoiding forfeiture by hiding or dissipating property. thus, the seizure provisions allow the state to take control of property believed to be proceeds of crime before trial and sentencing, to ensure it remains available for possible forfeiture. likewise, the fine instead of forfeiture provision ensures that, if accused persons were able to keep proceeds of crime from the state throughout the criminal proceedings, [32] notre cour a examiné dans l’arrêt lavigne les objectifs généraux du régime des produits de la criminalité ainsi que de l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation. la question de droit à trancher dans cette affaire était de savoir si le juge chargé de déterminer la peine pouvait tenir compte de la capa- cité de payer d’un contrevenant au moment d’infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation et de fixer le montant de l’amende. monsieur lavigne a admis avoir reçu 150 000 $ de son entreprise crimi- nelle, mais il a fait valoir qu’il n’avait pas bénéficié personnellement de l’argent, « mais en aurait fait profiter ses proches » (par 3). notre cour a conclu que le législateur ne souhaitait pas que ce juge tienne compte de l’incapacité de payer de m. lavigne lors- qu’il a décidé d’infliger une amende en remplace- ment de la confiscation. autoriser ce contrevenant à invoquer l’impécuniosité et retrancher au montant de l’amende l’argent qu’il a choisi de dépenser en ca- deaux ou autres achats pour ses proches équivaudrait effectivement à lui permettre de tirer profit de ses crimes d’une manière qui irait à l’encontre des objets sous- jacents du régime des produits de la criminalité. [33] dans l’arrêt lavigne, notre cour a conclu que les juges chargés de déterminer la peine doivent exercer leur pouvoir discrétionnaire d’infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation sans miner les objectifs du régime des produits de la cri- minalité. elle a statué qu’en adoptant le régime des produits de la criminalité, le législateur avait pour objectif premier — ou global — de s’assurer que l’infraction génératrice d’un profit ne « bénéfici[e] [pas] au contrevenant » et que « le crime ne paie pas » (par 10). la disposition sur la confiscation avait pour objectif de « priver le contrevenant et l’organisation criminelle des produits de leur crime et de les dissuader de perpétrer d’autres infractions » (lavigne, par. 16; voir également par 23). pour y arriver, il fallait empêcher les accusés de se soustraire à la confiscation en dissimulant ou en dilapidant les biens. ainsi, les dispositions sur la saisie permettent à l’état de prendre le contrôle des biens qu’il croit être des produits de la criminalité avant le procès et la détermination de la peine, afin de veiller à ce qu’ils demeurent confiscables. dans le même ordre [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 863 they must in the end pay a fine equivalent to the value of the property that is not available to be forfeited. as observed in lavigne, this ensures “that the pro- ceeds of a crime do not indirectly benefit those who committed it” (para 18). [34] however, lavigne did not involve the return provision at all. thus, for our purposes, lavigne addressed some of parliament’s objectives, and did not consider the separate purposes underpinning the return provision. this appeal, in contrast, turns on the return provision and its interaction with the other parts of the proceeds of crime regime; espe- cially its relationship with the fine instead of forfei- ture provision. it is therefore necessary in this case for the court to determine how a judge’s discretion should be exercised in order to balance the objec- tives underlying the proceeds of crime regime as a whole and the specific additional objectives of the legal expenses return provision. the return provision shows that parliament intended that other secondary objectives would have to be balanced against the primary objective of ensuring that “crime does not pay”. as a result, the purposes behind the express and distinct return provision are now of crucial signifi- cance as they will inform how the return provision can be read harmoniously with the fine instead of forfeiture provision. d’idées, la disposition relative à l’infliction d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation fait en sorte que l’accusé qui a pu conserver des produits de la criminalité hors de la portée de l’état tout au long de l’instance criminelle est tenu, en fin de compte, de payer une amende égale à la valeur du bien qui n’est pas confiscable. comme la cour l’a fait remarquer dans l’arrêt lavigne, cela permet d’éviter « que le produit d’un crime profite indirectement à ses au- teurs » (par 18). [34] cependant, il n’était pas du tout question de la disposition sur la restitution dans l’arrêt lavigne. donc, pour les besoins du présent dossier, cet arrêt ne portait que sur certains des objectifs du légis- lateur et il ne traitait pas des objets distincts qui sous- tendent la disposition sur la restitution le présent pourvoi, en revanche, porte sur la disposi- tion relative à la restitution et sur son interaction avec les autres parties du régime des produits de la criminalité, surtout son rapport avec la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation. il est donc nécessaire en l’espèce que la cour décide de la manière dont un juge doit exercer son pou- voir discrétionnaire pour concilier les objectifs qui sous- tendent le régime des produits de la criminalité dans son ensemble et les objectifs supplémentaires particuliers de la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques. la disposition sur la restitution démontre que le législateur voulait que l’on pondère les autres objectifs secondaires au regard de l’objectif premier de s’assurer que « le crime ne paie pas ». en conséquence, les objectifs de la disposition expresse et distincte sur la restitution revêtent aujourd’hui une importance cruciale car elles indiquent de quelle manière on peut l’interpré- ter en harmonie avec la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation. (3) the return process for reasonable legal (3) la procédure de restitution pour le paiement expenses de frais juridiques raisonnables [35] through the return provision, parliament cre- ated a distinct and special process that allows an accused to reclaim seized property for specific pur- poses listed in s 46234(4), which include reasonable legal expenses. parliament prescribed a particular application procedure, which involves two hearings [35] en édictant la disposition sur la restitution, le législateur a créé un mécanisme distinct et par- ticulier qui permet à l’accusé de récupérer un bien saisi aux fins énumérées au par.  462.34(4), no- tamment pour les frais juridiques raisonnables. le législateur a prescrit une procédure de demande 864 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. before a judge; required applicants to show that they had no other assets or means; prohibited the return of the funds where a third party appeared to be the lawful owner or lawfully entitled to possession of the property; allowed a judge to decide what amount should be returned; ensured that any return is ef- fected by judicial order that can specify amounts, number of counsel, etc.; and provided for a subse- quent review of these amounts to ensure they were in fact reasonable. [36] often, a proposed budget is submitted to the court in camera (as in r v. davidson, 2016 onsc 7440, at para. 21 (canlii)), but where this is not done, the judge may fix the allowable hours and incidental fees (r v. alves, 2015 onsc 4489, at paras. 46-51 (canlii)). further, s 46234(5) requires the judge to “take into account the legal aid tariff of the province” and, under s 46234(52), the legal fees may be taxed (that is, reviewed or audited). the judge’s inquiry into the financial situation of the accused “must be more than cursory” and “[a] sig- nificant and in- depth review of the facts is required” (r v. borean, 2007 nbqb 335, 321 nbr (2d) 309, at para 8). the seized funds will then be returned in accordance with the terms of the judicial order. [37] the wording of the relevant provisions and the elaborate and detailed nature of the return provi- sion indicate that parliament clearly and deliberately sought to address an accused’s need for legal coun- sel, but only in limited and narrow circumstances: (1) where the accused has “no other assets or means” and, therefore, access to the funds is truly necessary; and (2) where “no other person appears to be the lawful owner of or lawfully entitled to possession of the property” (s 46234(4)). the return provision is thus intended to provide a safety net for those accused persons who are in financial need. particulière, qui comporte la tenue de deux au- diences devant un juge; il a obligé les demandeurs à prouver qu’ils ne possédaient pas d’autres biens ou moyens; il a interdit la restitution de fonds dans le cas du tiers qui semble être le propriétaire légitime des biens ou avoir droit à leur possession légitime; il a autorisé le juge à décider du montant à restituer; il s’est assuré que toute restitution soit effectuée par la voie d’une ordonnance judiciaire suscep- tible de préciser les montants, le nombre d’avocats, etc.; et il a prévu le réexamen subséquent de ces montants pour s’assurer qu’ils sont effectivement raisonnables. [36] dans bien des cas, un projet de budget est présenté à huis clos au tribunal (comme dans l’af- faire r c davidson, 2016  onsc 7440, par.  21 (canlii)); sinon, le juge peut fixer le nombre d’heu- res admissibles et les frais accessoires (r c. al- ves, 2015 onsc 4489, par. 46-51 (canlii)). en outre, le par 46234(5) oblige le juge à « t[enir] compte du barème d’aide juridique de la province » et, aux termes du par 46234(52), les frais juri- diques peuvent être taxés (c-à-d qu’ils peuvent être contrôlés ou vérifiés). le juge doit faire [traduc- tion] « davantage qu’un examen rapide » de la si- tuation financière de l’accusé; de plus, un « examen approfondi des faits est nécessaire » (r c. borean, 2007 nbqb 335, 321 nbr (2d) 309, par 8). les fonds saisis seront ensuite restitués conformément aux modalités de l’ordonnance judiciaire. [37] la formulation des dispositions pertinentes ainsi que la complexité et le caractère détaillé de la disposition sur la restitution indiquent que le légis- lateur a clairement et délibérément tenté de traiter la question de la nécessité pour l’accusé d’obtenir les services d’un avocat, mais seulement dans des circonstances circonscrites : (1) lorsque l’accusé « ne possède pas d’autres biens ou moyens » et, par conséquent, qu’il est absolument essentiel d’avoir recours aux fonds; et (2) lorsque « nulle autre per- sonne ne semble être le propriétaire légitime de ces biens ou avoir droit à leur possession légitime  » (par 46234(4)). la disposition sur la restitution vise donc à offrir un filet de sûreté aux accusés qui ont besoin d’une aide financière. [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 865 (4) the purposes of the return provision (4) les objectifs de la disposition sur la restitu- [38] a review of the parliamentary debates during the enactment of the proceeds of crime regime re- veals two objectives that underpin the legal expenses return provision under s 46234(4)(c)(ii): (1) pro- viding access to counsel; and (2) giving meaningful weight to the presumption of innocence. these ob- jectives reflect an underlying intention to promote fairness in criminal prosecutions that runs through the proceeds of crime scheme established by par- liament. tion [38] une revue des débats parlementaires sur le régime des produits de la criminalité permet de constater que deux objectifs sous- tendent la dispo- sition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques qui figure au sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii) : (1) permettre l’accès aux services d’un avocat; et (2)  accorder une importance suffisante à la pré- somption d’innocence ces objectifs témoignent de l’intention sous- jacente de promouvoir l’équité dans les poursuites criminelles qui se dégage du régime des produits de la criminalité établi par le législateur. [39] in testimony before the legislative committee studying the bill that introduced the proceeds of crime regime in the code, the minister of justice indicated that: [39] lorsqu’il a témoigné devant le comité légis- latif chargé d’étudier le projet de loi qui incorpore le régime des produits de la criminalité au code, le ministre de la justice a fait remarquer ce qui suit : [t]hese measures guarantee the rights of innocent third parties and ensure safeguards for the accused person   . there is nothing in the bill to change the guarantees of the presumption of innocence or the requirement that guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt at the time of trial. la loi garantira [  ] les droits des tiers innocents et assurera certaines protections aux accusés [  ]. ce projet de loi n’entame en rien les garanties de présomption d’in- nocence ni la nécessité de prouver la culpabilité au- delà de tout doute raisonnable. (house of commons, minutes of proceedings and evidence of the legislative committee on bill c-61: an act to amend the criminal code, the food and drugs act and the narcotic act, no. 1, 2nd sess., 33rd parl., november 5, 1987, at p. 1:8) (chambre des communes, procès- verbaux et témoi- gnages du comité législatif sur le projet de loi c-61 : loi modifiant le code criminel, la loi des aliments et drogues et la loi sur les stupéfiants, no 1, 2e sess., 33e lég., 5 novembre 1987, p. 1:8) in later testimony, the minister underscored the goal of fairness: dans un témoignage livré à une date subséquente, le ministre a souligné le but de l’équité : [t]his proposal is intended to be a tough and effective tool against enterprise crime. i would, however, remind every- one of my continued intention to create a fair procedure in relation to accused persons as well as to innocent third parties who become involved with crime proceeds. [l]e projet de loi vise à nous permettre de lutter énergi- quement et efficacement contre la criminalité organisée. toutefois, j’aimerais vous rappeler que j’entends instituer une procédure qui soit juste pour les accusés et les tiers innocents touchés par les produits de la criminalité. (house of commons, minutes of proceedings and evidence of the legislative committee on bill c-61: an act to amend the criminal code, the food and drugs act and the narcotic act, no. 5, 2nd sess., 33rd parl., may 10, 1988, at p. 5:5) (chambre des communes, procès- verbaux et témoi- gnages du comité législatif sur le projet de loi c-61 : loi modifiant le code criminel, la loi des aliments et drogues et la loi sur les stupéfiants, no 5, 2e sess., 33e lég., 10 mai 1988, p. 5:5) 866 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. [40] the minister went on to explain the legal expenses return provision: [40] par la suite, le ministre a expliqué la disposi- tion sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques : i believe that this provision does strike a reasonable bal- ance between the right to counsel of choice and the interest of state and forfeiture of the illicit proceeds of crime   . the provision of allowing an application for reasonable legal fees is in fact a notable improvement to the present law, and one which i think we have to acknowledge will ensure the constitutional right to retain and instruct counsel. je crois que cette disposition établit un juste équilibre entre le droit à un avocat de son choix et l’intérêt de l’état dans la confiscation des produits de la criminalité. [  ]. cette disposition [permettant de réclamer des fonds pour les frais juridiques raisonnables] est une amélioration du droit actuel et aidera à concrétiser la garantie constitution- nelle du recours à l’aide d’un avocat. (house of commons, minutes, may 10, 1988, at p. 5:9) (chambre des communes, procès- verbaux, 10 mai 1988, p. 5:9) [41] at third reading, the minister of justice ex- plained how these objectives underpinned the return and fine instead of forfeiture provisions: a process of immediate judicial review of these powers [of seizure and restraint], upon application by the persons concerned, has been provided for and includes an oppor- tunity for an accused person to claim the payments of reasonable living, business, and legal expenses out of the seized or restrained property. [41] lors de la troisième lecture, le ministre de la justice a expliqué que les dispositions sur la resti- tution et celles sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation s’appuyaient sur ces objectifs : les intéressés peuvent demander une révision judiciaire immédiate de cette action judiciaire [en saisie ou blocage] pour se faire rembourser des dépenses personnelles, com- merciales et légales raisonnables qu’ils ont subies. i must point out that these types of safeguards are unprecedented in canadian law. in addition, the rights of third parties are recognized throughout the entire process of seizure, restraint, and forfeiture. the legislation has balanced an effective forfeiture mechanism with the con- stitutionally protected right to counsel in a manner that is characteristic of the government’s approach to criminal matters and avoids the criticisms that have been levied at similar american legislation in this area. je rappelle que ces moyens de protection sont uniques dans notre droit pénal. sans compter que les droits des tierces parties sont reconnus pendant toute la procédure de saisie, de blocage et de confiscation. l’équilibre qu’on a pris soin d’apporter entre cette procédure de confiscation et le droit constitutionnel aux services d’un avocat est ty- pique de la politique du gouvernement actuel qui ne tient pas à s’exposer aux critiques que des mesures analogues ont soulevées aux états- unis. (house of commons, debates, vol. 14, 2nd sess., 33rd parl., july 7, 1988, at p. 17258) (chambre des communes, débats, vol. 14, 2e sess., 33e lég., 7 juillet 1988, p. 17258) [42] the “criticisms    levied at similar american legislation” referred to provisions that retroactively vested proceeds of crime in the state with no excep- tion for legal fees. as justice veit observed in r v. gagnon (1993), 80 ccc (3d) 508 (alta. qb), at p. 512: [42] les mots « critiques que des mesures analo- gues ont soulevées aux états- unis » évoquaient les dispositions qui attribuaient rétroactivement les pro- duits de la criminalité à l’état, sans prévoir d’excep- tion pour les frais juridiques. comme la juge veit l’a fait remarquer dans la décision r c. gagnon (1993), 80 ccc (3d) 508 (br. alb.), p. 512 : it is noteworthy that parliament, presumably knowing of the american model using blanket seizures and the [traduction] il convient de souligner que le législa- teur, connaissant sans doute le modèle américain fondé [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 867 american case- law, modified the american approach by allowing moneys to be spent by an accused person for such expenses as reasonable living expenses, reasonable business expenses, lawyers’ fees and recognizances. [43] the minister’s statements indicate that en- suring an accused’s ability to access legal counsel is a main objective of the legal expenses return pro- vision. while seizing funds helps protect the state’s contingent interest in the property, parliament has signalled that this contingent interest should take a back seat where it imperils an accused’s ability to access counsel. [44] parliament’s chosen safeguard builds upon the fact that the ability of accused persons to hire a lawyer to defend themselves in criminal proceedings has been a part of english law since 1836 (an act for enabling persons indicted of felony to make their defence by counsel or attorney (uk), 1836, 6 & 7 will. 4, c. 114, s. 1), although it existed in a more limited form for treason and some other serious crimes much earlier (j. h. langbein, the origins of adversary criminal trial (2003), at pp 101-2). it is undoubtedly a fundamental tenet of the criminal justice system. [45] the minister’s statements indicate that par- liament was also concerned with the presumption of innocence, “the cornerstone of our criminal jus- tice system” (r v. chaulk, [1990] 3 scr 1303, at p 1368). the return provision reflects the fact that, in canada, property can be seized based only on a reasonable belief it may be proceeds of crime, and it presumptively belongs to a person who is presumed to be innocent (b a. macfarlane, r. j. frater and c. michaelson, drug offences in canada (4th ed. (loose- leaf)), § 14:18040120). indeed, the accused may never be convicted, or the property may never be proven to be proceeds of crime. thus, when accused persons spend returned funds on reasonable legal fees, they are spending their own money on their legal defence. parliament was clearly concerned with the harshness of a scheme that seized the property of sur l’utilisation des saisies générales, ainsi que la juris- prudence américaine correspondante, a choisi pour sa part d’adapter ce modèle afin de permettre à l’accusé d’avoir accès à des fonds pour le paiement de ses frais de subsistance raisonnables, de ses dépenses d’entreprise raisonnables, de ses frais d’avocats et de ses engagements. [43] il appert des propos tenus par le ministre que garantir à l’accusé la possibilité d’avoir accès aux services d’un avocat est un objectif principal de la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques. bien que la saisie des fonds aide l’état à protéger son éventuel droit sur les biens, le législateur a voulu que ce droit éventuel passe au second plan lorsqu’il met en péril la capacité d’un accusé à avoir accès aux services d’un avocat. [44] la protection choisie par le législateur s’ap- puie sur le fait que la capacité d’un accusé de rete- nir les services d’un avocat pour se défendre dans un procès criminel fait partie du droit anglais de- puis 1836 (an act for enabling persons indicted of felony to make their defence by counsel or attorney (r-u), 1836, 6 & 7 will. 4, c. 114, art. 1) même si ce droit existait bien avant, dans une forme plus limitée, dans le cas de la trahison ou d’autres crimes graves (j. h. langbein, the origins of adversary criminal trial (2003), p. 101- 102). il s’agit sans aucun doute d’un précepte fondamental de notre système de justice pénale. [45] les propos du ministre donnent à penser que le législateur se souciait également de la présomption d’innocence, « la clé de voûte de notre système de justice pénale » (r c. chaulk, [1990] 3 rcs 1303, p 1368). la disposition sur la restitution tient égale- ment compte du fait qu’au canada, les biens peuvent être saisis sur le seul fondement d’une croyance raison- nable qu’il pourrait s’agir de produits de la criminalité, alors que ces biens appartiennent en principe à une personne présumée innocente (b. a. macfarlane, r j. frater et c. michaelson, drug offences in canada (4e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), § 14:18040120). en effet, il se peut que l’accusé ne soit jamais reconnu coupable ou qu’il ne soit jamais prouvé que les biens en cause sont des produits de la criminalité. par conséquent, lorsqu’un accusé utilise les fonds restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables, il dépense 868 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. persons still presumed to be innocent, and took steps to protect their interests. [46] finally, the minister’s statements reflect an underlying concern for fairness to the accused in criminal prosecutions. the principle of fairness in criminal trials is foundational to our justice system (r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at p. 121; r v. whyte, [1988] 2 scr 3, at p. 15; r v. hodgson, [1998] 2 scr 449, at para 18). the minister em- phasized the importance of the “fair procedure” that was being created via the “safeguar[d]” of access to counsel. further, the minister stated that “[t]his bill is a balanced and fair piece of legislation which does not contain some of the excesses seen in previous legislation   . we want to make sure, when we are attacking the proceeds of crime, that we do so in a fair way” (debates, at p 17259). [47] as justice doherty put it, the return provi- sion “recognizes that the state should not be allowed to beggar a person who will often need to retain the assistance of counsel in order to defend himself or herself against state action directed at depriving that person of their property and liberty” (wilson, at p 659). the return provision was intended to respect the principle of fairness in criminal prosecutions: an individual should not be left unable to hire legal representation because the state seized the funds with which they could have paid counsel. son propre argent pour payer sa défense. le législateur était manifestement préoccupé par la sévérité d’un régime qui emporterait la saisie des biens de personnes encore présumées innocentes, et il a pris des mesures pour protéger leurs droits. [46] enfin, les propos tenus par le ministre témoi- gnent d’une préoccupation sous- jacente à l’égard de l’équité procédurale envers l’accusé dans les poursuites criminelles. le principe de l’équité procédurale dans les procès criminels est à la base de notre système de justice (r c. oakes, [1986] 1 rcs 103, p. 121; r c. whyte, [1988] 2 rcs 3, p. 15; r c. hodgson, [1998] 2 rcs 449, par 18). le ministre a souligné l’im- portance de la « procédure [  ] juste » que l’on était en train d’instaurer au moyen de la « protection » de l’accès aux services d’un avocat. de plus, le ministre a mentionné que « [le projet de loi] est une mesure équilibrée et juste qui ne contient pas de dispositions excessives comme c’était le cas d’autres lois. [  ]. nous tenons à nous assurer que lorsque nous cherchons à nous emparer des produits de la criminalité, nous le faisons d’une façon équitable » (débats, p 17259). [47] ainsi que l’a affirmé le juge doherty, la dis- position sur la restitution [traduction] « reconnaît que l’état ne devrait pas être autorisé à appauvrir une personne qui aura souvent besoin de retenir les services d’un avocat afin de se défendre contre une mesure de l’état visant à la priver de ses biens et de sa liberté » (wilson, p 659). la disposition sur la restitution visait donc à faire respecter le principe de l’équité dans les poursuites criminelles : il ne faut pas priver une personne de la possibilité d’embaucher un avocat pour la représenter au motif que l’état a saisi les fonds avec lesquels elle aurait payé son avocat. [48] parliament’s intention was to create a “fair procedure” to allow for accused people to apply for the judicially authorized return of seized funds for specific purposes. this principle of fairness, in- cluding concepts of fair notice and reliance, should therefore inform the interpretation of the return pro- vision, especially recognizing its designated role in the larger proceeds of crime regime. [48] le législateur voulait créer une « procédure [  ] juste » pour permettre aux accusés de demander au tribunal d’autoriser à certaines fins la restitution des fonds saisis. ce principe d’équité, y compris les notions d’avis suffisant et de fiabilité, devrait par le fait même éclairer l’interprétation de la disposition sur la resti- tution, surtout compte tenu du rôle qui lui est attribué dans le régime plus large des produits de la criminalité. [49] this review illustrates that, while parliament was clearly motivated by the desire to remove the [49] l’examen qui précède montre que, même si le législateur souhaitait indéniablement supprimer [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 869 financial incentive from certain crimes, it also wanted to ensure that accused persons would have access to legal representation and that the presumption of innocence would be protected, in order to maintain a procedure that is fair to the accused. these pur- poses constrain the pursuit of the primary objective. judicial interpretation should foster, not frustrate, the balance of rights and interests in this part of the code. in my view, the correct interpretation does not ignore or minimize the secondary purposes in order to achieve the primary goal of ensuring crime does not pay. rather, all parts of parliament’s scheme and its multiple objectives must be read together, “construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest” (greenshields v. the queen, [1958] scr 216, at p 225). [50] although the appellant and two interveners, the british columbia civil liberties association and criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, made arguments in constitutional terms, it is unnecessary to delineate the parameters of a constitutional right of accused persons to spend their own money on legal counsel in order to decide this appeal. this court has stated that access to effective legal representation is anchored in the presumption of innocence, the prin- ciple of fair criminal prosecutions, and the principles of fundamental justice (r v. gdb, 2000 scc 22, [2000] 1 scr 520, at paras 24-25). it suffices to say that parliament crafted its proceeds of crime regime to establish fair safeguards for the accused, notably the opportunity to pay legal expenses out of seized or restrained property when necessary. [51] with these purposes in mind, i turn now to the fine instead of forfeiture provision itself. c imposing a fine instead of forfeiture on judi- cially returned funds would undermine the purposes of the return provision l’attrait financier de certains crimes, il voulait aussi s’assurer que les accusés puissent être représentés par un avocat et que la présomption d’innocence soit protégée afin de maintenir une procédure qui est juste envers l’accusé. ces objets viennent restreindre la poursuite de l’objectif premier. l’interprétation ju- diciaire devrait favoriser la conciliation des droits et intérêts en jeu dans cette partie du code, et non la compromettre. à mon avis, l’interprétation juste ne né- glige pas les objets secondaires, ni n’en minimise l’im- portance, dans le but de réaliser l’objectif premier de s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas. le régime établi par le législateur, ainsi que ses multiples objectifs, doivent plutôt être lus ensemble, [traduction] « interprétés globalement, chaque partie de ce texte ou article éclai- rant au besoin le reste de celui-ci » (greenshields c. the queen, [1958] rcs 216, p 225). [50] bien que l’appelant et deux intervenantes, la bri- tish columbia civil liberties association et la criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, aient formulé des arguments constitutionnels, il n’est pas nécessaire, pour trancher le présent pourvoi, de délimiter les paramètres du droit constitutionnel d’un accusé de dépenser son propre argent pour retenir les services d’un avocat. notre cour a mentionné que l’accès à une bonne re- présentation par avocat est ancrée dans la présomption d’innocence, le principe des poursuites criminelles équitables et les principes de justice fondamentale (r c. gdb, 2000 csc 22, [2000] 1 rcs 520, par 24-25). il suffit de dire que le législateur a conçu son régime des produits de la criminalité pour établir des mesures de protection équitables envers l’accusé, notamment la possibilité de payer les frais juridiques à même les biens saisis ou bloqués lorsque cela est nécessaire. [51] en gardant ces objets à l’esprit, je me penche maintenant sur la disposition relative à l’infliction d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation comme telle. c l’infliction d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation à l’égard de fonds restitués par voie judiciaire minerait les objectifs de la disposition sur la restitution [52] the appellant, mr. rafilovich, argues that the fine instead of forfeiture provision does not apply [52] l’appelant, m.  rafilovich, soutient que la disposition relative à l’infliction d’une amende en 870 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. to funds returned under a court order by a judge for the payment of reasonable legal fees. the respond- ent crown says that unless the judge imposes a fine instead of forfeiture for amounts returned for legal fees, the accused benefits in a manner that under- mines the goals of forfeiture. the crown advanced the theory that the return provision was meant to provide only interim relief to an accused person, to be recouped later as a fine instead of forfeiture. on this reasoning, the return of seized funds is a tem- porary advance of funds, to be recovered as a fine at a subsequent sentencing hearing. at the hearing the respondent crown characterized a return order as “something akin to a loan, the source of the loan being the tainted funds” (transcript, at p 78). [53] overall, i agree with mr.  rafilovich. the judge’s exercise of discretion to impose a fine in- stead of forfeiture should be “consistent with the spirit” and “compatible with the objectives” of the scheme as a whole (lavigne, at paras. 28 and 52). the objectives of the legal expenses return provision are to ensure access to counsel and uphold the pre- sumption of innocence and such must be balanced with the primary objective of the proceeds of crime regime, which is to ensure that crime does not pay. applying these objectives to this exercise of judicial discretion results in the conclusion that, generally, judges should not impose a fine for amounts re- turned under judicial authorization for the payment of reasonable legal fees. remplacement de la confiscation ne s’applique pas aux fonds restitués en application d’une ordonnance qu’un juge a rendue pour permettre le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables. le ministère public intimé répond qu’à moins que le juge n’inflige une amende en remplacement de la confiscation à l’égard des sommes restituées pour le paiement des frais juridiques, l’accusé est avantagé d’une façon qui mine les objectifs de la confiscation. le ministère public a formulé la théorie que la disposition sur la restitution visait à accorder à l’accusé une avance provisoire qui sera récupérée plus tard par l’infliction d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation. d’après ce raisonnement, la restitution des fonds saisis constitue une avance temporaire de fonds, qui seront récupérés par l’infliction d’une amende lors d’une audience subséquente sur la détermination de la peine. à l’audience, l’avocat du ministère pu- blic intimé a qualifié l’ordonnance de restitution de [traduction] « mesure semblable à un prêt, lequel provient de fonds associés à la criminalité » (trans- cription, p 78). [53] tout compte fait, je partage l’avis de m. ra- filovich. l’exercice par le juge de son pouvoir dis- crétionnaire d’infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation doit être « conforme à l’esprit » et « compatible avec les objectifs » du régime dans son ensemble (lavigne, par. 28 et 52). la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques a pour objectifs d’assurer l’accès aux services d’un avocat et de faire respecter la présomption d’inno- cence, lesquels doivent être pondérés au regard de l’objectif premier du régime des produits de la cri- minalité, qui consiste à s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas. l’application de ces objectifs dans l’exercice de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire mène à la conclusion qu’en général, les juges ne doivent pas infliger une amende correspondant à la somme restituée en vertu d’une autorisation judiciaire pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables. [54] conversely, the crown’s interpretation un- dermines the objectives of the return provision for reasonable legal expenses — providing access to counsel and giving meaningful weight to the pre- sumption of innocence — and fails to promote par- liament’s intention of establishing a “fair procedure”. [54] à l’inverse, l’interprétation du ministère pu- blic aurait pour effet de miner les objectifs de la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables — soit permettre l’accès aux services d’un avocat et accorder une importance suffisante à la présomption d’innocence — et ne [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 871 in so doing, it fails to properly balance the rights and interests in this part of the code and should not, therefore, be adopted. for this reason, and to respect the multiplicity of parliament’s objectives, generally speaking, sentencing judges should not impose a fine instead of forfeiture in relation to funds that have been judicially returned for the payment of reasonable legal fees associated with an accused’s criminal defence. [55] access to legal counsel is a main objective of the legal expenses return provision. if the return order is viewed as a loan, and a fine instead of for- feiture is imposed on judicially returned funds as a matter of course, then the accused’s ability to ac- cess legal counsel is largely illusory. fearing a fine or additional imprisonment, accused persons may choose not to apply for the return of funds at all and to represent themselves instead. thus, instead of facilitating an accused person’s access to legal coun- sel, the provision would do precisely the opposite: it would dissuade accused persons from accessing legal representation. the return provision was intended to ensure that individuals whose funds have been seized by the state will not be left unable to hire legal counsel. however, accused persons who understand that the judicially returned funds will be clawed back later, through the imposition of a fine, and possibly imprisonment, will likely choose to represent them- selves. as a result, individuals whose funds have been seized by the state will often be without the benefit of legal counsel. favorise pas la réalisation de l’intention du législateur d’établir une « procédure [  ] juste ». ce faisant, cette interprétation ne permet pas d’établir un juste équilibre entre les droits que prévoit cette partie du code et elle ne devrait pas être adoptée pour cette raison. c’est pourquoi, et afin de respecter la mul- tiplicité des objectifs du législateur, en général le juge chargé de déterminer la peine ne devrait pas infliger une amende en remplacement de la confis- cation à l’égard de fonds qui ont été restitués par voie judiciaire pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables liés à la défense de l’accusé en matière criminelle. [55] l’accès aux services d’un avocat est un ob- jectif principal de la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques si l’on voit l’ordonnance de restitution comme un prêt et une amende en remplacement de la confiscation est infligée automatiquement à l’égard de fonds restitués par voie judiciaire, la capacité d’un ac- cusé d’avoir accès aux services d’un avocat devient largement illusoire. craignant une amende ou une peine d’emprisonnement additionnelle, les accusés pourraient renoncer complètement à solliciter la restitution de fonds et se représenter plutôt eux- mêmes. par conséquent, au lieu d’aider les accusés à avoir accès aux services d’un avocat, la dispo- sition aurait exactement l’effet contraire : elle les découragerait de retenir les services d’un avocat. la disposition sur la restitution était censée faire en sorte que les personnes dont les fonds ont été saisis par l’état ne soient pas incapables d’embaucher un avocat. toutefois, les accusés qui comprennent que les fonds restitués par voie judiciaire seront récu- pérés plus tard, par l’infliction d’une amende, voire d’un emprisonnement, risquent fort bien de choisir de se représenter eux- mêmes. en conséquence, les personnes dont les fonds ont été saisis par l’état se verront souvent dans l’impossibilité de retenir les services d’un avocat. [56] when an accused person cannot access legal counsel, the presumption of innocence suffers. this is because, in facilitating the accused’s right to make full answer and defence, defence counsel helps to en- sure that the case remains the crown’s to prove. it is difficult for lay persons accused of criminal offences [56] lorsqu’un accusé ne peut avoir accès aux services d’un avocat, la présomption d’innocence en souffre. il en est ainsi puisqu’en favorisant l’exercice du droit de l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière, l’avocat de la défense fait en sorte que la preuve à établir incombe toujours au ministère 872 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. to effectively navigate “the increased complexity of criminal cases” that this court has described as affecting “most cases” in our criminal justice system (r v. jordan, 2016 scc 27, [2016] 1 scr 631, at paras. 53 and 83). [57] nor is the importance of the presumption of innocence “spent” once an accused person is found guilty (at para 159). the criminal justice system does not, and should not, retroactively dilute the presumption of innocence after an accused is found guilty, nor does it attach preconditions or penalties to reliance on the presumption. imposing retroac- tive penalties on accused persons who rely on the presumption of innocence can have no effect but to undermine the presumption and the protections it affords to accused persons. for example, the pre- sumption of innocence underlies the concept of bail (r v. antic, 2017 scc 27, [2017] 1 scr 509, at para 1). the time spent free on bail is not added back at sentencing; to the contrary, restrictive bail conditions can be a mitigating factor at sentencing. [58] just as there is no statutory mechanism to “recover” time spent free on bail in the judicial interim release regime because such a mechanism would be at cross- purposes with the regime’s en- trenchment of the presumption of innocence, the fine instead of forfeiture provision cannot repre- sent, as a matter of course, a retroactive dilution of the presumption of innocence in respect of prop- erty that has been judicially returned for the pay- ment of reasonable legal expenses. although there is a statutory mechanism to recover spent proceeds of crime through the fine instead of forfeiture re- gime, this analogy to bail emphasizes that offend- ers generally are not punished for reliance on the presumption of innocence. by enacting the legal expenses return provision, parliament sought to give meaningful weight to the fundamental princi- ple of the presumption of innocence, in part by en- suring that accused persons could access counsel. interpreting the return provision as merely tem- porary, thereby dissuading accused persons from public. il est difficile pour le profane inculpé d’ap- précier correctement « la complexité accrue des af- faires criminelles  » qui, selon ce qu’a affirmé la cour, touche « la plupart des causes » dans notre système de justice pénale (r c. jordan, 2016 csc 27, [2016] 1 rcs 631, par. 53 et 83). [57] l’importance de la présomption d’innocence n’est pas non plus « épuisé[e] » dès qu’il y a déclara- tion de culpabilité (par 159). le système de justice pénale ne limite pas rétroactivement la présomption d’innocence — et il ne doit pas le faire —, pas plus qu’il en assortit l’exercice de conditions préalables ou de sanctions. imposer des sanctions rétroactives à des accusés qui invoquent la présomption d’inno- cence ne peut avoir d’autre effet que de saper cette présomption et les protections qu’elle confère aux accusés. par exemple, la présomption d’innocence sous- tend le concept de mise en liberté sous caution (r c. antic, 2017 csc 27, [2017] 1 rcs 509, par 1). le temps passé en liberté sous caution n’est pas ajouté au moment de la détermination de la peine; au contraire, des conditions de mise en liberté sous caution rigoureuses peuvent être un facteur atténuant lorsque vient le moment de déterminer la peine. [58] tout comme la loi ne prévoit aucun mécanisme de « récupération » du temps passé en liberté sous caution en vertu du régime de mise en liberté provi- soire parce qu’un tel mécanisme irait à l’encontre de la présomption d’innocence consacrée par ce régime, la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation ne saurait représenter, en temps normal, une dilution rétroactive de la présomption d’inno- cence à l’égard des biens que le tribunal a restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables. bien que la loi prévoie un mécanisme permettant de récupérer les produits de la criminalité dépensés par le truchement du régime de l’amende en rem- placement de la confiscation, cette analogie avec la mise en liberté sous caution fait ressortir que les contrevenants en général ne sont pas punis pour avoir invoqué la présomption d’innocence. en adoptant la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques, le législateur voulait accorder une importance significative au principe fondamental de la présomption d’innocence, notamment en veillant à [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 873 retaining and instructing counsel, undermines the very objective that parliament sought to achieve. [59] further, imposing a fine on judicially returned funds raises concerns of notice and reliance that are rooted in the principle of fairness to the accused in criminal prosecutions. it can be expected that accused people will rely on a court order author- ized by a specific statutory scheme. those accused persons cannot reasonably know that doing so will lead to additional punishment. yet “[t]he rule of law requires that laws provide in advance what can and cannot be done” (r v. mabior, 2012 scc 47, [2012] 2 scr 584, at para. 14; r v. levkovic, 2013 scc 25, [2013] 2 scr 204, at para 3). the general imposition of a fine instead of forfeiture on judicially returned funds would not respect principles of fair notice, further undermining parliament’s intent to create a fair procedure that enables access to counsel and ensures the presumption of innocence. [60] my colleague minimizes these concerns by stating that while the “choice” to retain counsel in the face of having a fine imposed on the judicially returned funds “may not be an easy one, our criminal justice system does not promise an experience free of difficult choices” (para 142). with respect, there is a difference between a difficult choice and no real choice at all. the “choice” faced by an accused person in this instance is a hobson’s choice — an apparently free choice in which there is effectively only one option. in this case, that option is to go without legal representation. this court has cau- tioned against creating a hobson’s choice like this in the criminal law context (r v. taylor, 2014 scc 50, [2014] 2 scr 495, at para 40). ce que l’accusé puisse retenir les services d’un avo- cat. considérer que la disposition sur la restitution est simplement temporaire et dissuade par le fait même l’accusé de recourir aux services d’un avocat mine l’objectif même que le législateur cherchait à atteindre. [59] de plus, l’imposition d’une amende à l’égard de fonds restitués par voie judiciaire suscite des pré- occupations de préavis et de fiabilité qui sont ancrées dans le principe de l’équité envers l’accusé dans les poursuites criminelles. on peut s’attendre à ce que l’accusé se fonde sur une ordonnance judiciaire auto- risée par un régime légal en particulier. cet accusé ne peut raisonnablement pas savoir qu’en faisant cela, il s’expose à une sanction additionnelle. pourtant, « [l]a règle de droit exige que les lois délimitent à l’avance ce qui est permis et ce qui est interdit » (r c. mabior, 2012 csc 47, [2012] 2 rcs 584, par. 14; r c. levkovic, 2013 csc 25, [2013] 2 rcs. 204, par 3). l’imposition générale d’une amende en remplacement d’une confiscation à l’égard de fonds restitués par voie judiciaire ne respecterait pas les principes de notification raisonnable, ce qui mine davantage l’intention du législateur de créer une pro- cédure équitable qui permet le recours aux services d’un avocat et assure la présomption d’innocence. [60] mon collègue minimise ces préoccupations en affirmant que même si le « choix » de retenir les services d’un avocat quitte à faire face à une amende à l’égard des fonds restitués en application d’une ordonnance judiciaire « peut ne pas s’avérer facile à faire, mais notre système de justice criminelle ne garantit à personne une expérience exempte de choix difficiles » (par 142). soit dit en tout respect, il y a une différence entre un choix difficile et un choix qui n’en est pas un du tout. le « choix » auquel est confronté un accusé en pareille situation est un faux choix : un choix apparemment libre quand il n’existe en réalité qu’une seule option. dans ce cas, l’option est de ne pas être représenté par avocat. la cour a souligné qu’il faut se garder de donner un faux choix dans le contexte du droit criminel (r c. taylor, 2014 csc 50, [2014] 2 rcs 495, par 40). [61] for all of the above reasons, interpreting the ju- dicially authorized return of funds as a loan from the [61] pour l’ensemble des raisons qui précèdent, traiter la restitution de fonds autorisée par le tribunal 874 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. state to the accused of the accused’s own money — effectively turning it into a baited trap — would dis- suade its use and ultimately frustrate parliament’s objectives in enacting the legal expenses return pro- vision. d is the return of funds for reasonable legal expenses a benefit? [62] the crown also argues that mr. rafilovich re- ceived a “benefit” — the payment of his legal fees — that he must be deprived of through the imposition of a fine instead of forfeiture in order to uphold the purpose of the proceeds of crime regime (rf, at para 49). i disagree. [63] although this court in lavigne found that the primary purpose of the proceeds of crime regime and the fine instead of forfeiture provision is to prevent offenders from directly or indirectly benefitting from crime (paras. 10 and 18), this purpose is not under- mined by allowing for accused persons to use seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses. in one limited sense, an accused person with [64] access to funds for legal counsel has a benefit that other accused persons may not have. in my view, however, the judicial return of funds to pay for a law- yer is not the type of benefit that parliament sought to take away from offenders by way of a fine. rather, it is a benefit that parliament expressly intended them to have, which is evident from the very existence of the return provision. as discussed above, the al- ternative, which would amount to a temporary loan of the seized funds, would tilt the balance sharply towards the state and marginalize parliament’s im- portant secondary purposes behind the protections and principles of the legal expenses return provision. comme étant l’argent de l’accusé prêté à ce dernier par l’état — faisant ainsi de la restitution un piège à appât — découragerait ceux tentés de s’en prévaloir et, au final, compromettrait les objectifs que visait le législateur lorsqu’il a édicté la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques. d les fonds restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables constituent- ils un avan- tage? [62] le ministère public soutient par ailleurs que m. rafilovich a néanmoins reçu un [traduction] « avantage » — le paiement de ses frais juridiques — dont il doit être privé par l’infliction d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation pour assurer le respect de l’objectif du régime des produits de la criminalité (mi, par 49). je ne suis pas de cet avis. [63] bien que notre cour ait conclu dans l’arrêt la- vigne que l’objectif premier du régime des produits de la criminalité et de la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation est d’empêcher les contrevenants de tirer profit directement ou non de leur crime (par. 10 et 18), on ne compromet pas cet objectif en permettant aux accusés d’utiliser les fonds saisis pour payer des frais juridiques raison- nables. [64] en un sens restreint, l’accusé qui a accès à des fonds pour retenir les services d’un avocat jouit d’un avantage qu’un autre accusé pourrait ne pas avoir. cependant, les fonds restitués par voie judiciaire aux fins de paiement des frais d’avocat ne constituent pas, à mon avis, le type d’avantage que le législateur souhaitait retirer aux contrevenants au moyen d’une amende. il s’agit plutôt d’un avantage que le législateur souhaitait expressément leur ac- corder, comme en témoigne l’existence même de la disposition sur la restitution. comme il est indiqué ci- dessus, l’autre option  —  qui serait en réalité un prêt temporaire des fonds saisis — avantage- rait grandement l’état et marginaliserait les objets secondaires importants du législateur sur lesquels prennent appui les protections et les principes de la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques. [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 875 instead of a temporary loan, parliament bal- [65] anced the multiple objectives by tightly controlling the extent of any benefit. the code requires appli- cants to show that they have no other means to pay a lawyer before a judge returns funds for that pur- pose. “other means” has been interpreted broadly to include support entitlements or other sources of financial assistance (r v. keating (1997), 159 nsr. (2d) 357 (ca), at para. 28), help from family mem- bers (r v. hobeika, 2014 onsc 5453, at para. 24 (canlii); r v. kizir, 2014 onsc 1676, 304 crr. (2d) 287, at paras. 16-18), as well as the accused’s access to credit, so long as that credit is capable of being serviced (r v. ro, [2006] oj. no. 3347 (ql) (sup. ct.), at paras 35-39). even if an accused has no other means, funds cannot be returned unless the judge is satisfied that “no other person appears to be the lawful owner of or lawfully entitled to possession of the property”. as well, accused persons often cannot receive legal aid because the seized property is attributed to them and effectively disqualifies them from receiving assistance, even though they cannot actually access their seized property.5 this occurred with mr rafilovich. the legal expenses return pro- vision, therefore, achieves a balance by providing a safety valve for a narrow category of accused persons in need while still depriving offenders from access- ing the proceeds of crime in most other cases. [66] this conclusion is consistent with lavigne’s statements on how a sentencing judge should exer- cise discretion to impose a fine. in lavigne, imposing a fine instead of forfeiture advanced the purpose of the proceeds of crime regime; in mr. rafilovich’s case, imposing a fine would undermine the purpose of the legal expenses return provision that parliament included in that same regime. [65] au lieu de consentir un prêt temporaire, le lé- gislateur a pondéré les multiples objectifs en contrô- lant strictement la portée de tout avantage. selon le code, le demandeur doit prouver qu’il ne possède pas d’autres moyens de s’offrir les services d’un avocat avant qu’un juge ordonne la restitution de fonds à cette fin. les mots « autres moyens » ont reçu une interprétation large qui englobe le droit à des aliments ou à d’autres sources d’aide financière (r c. keating (1997), 159 nsr (2d) 357 (ca), par. 28), l’aide de membres de la famille (r c. hobeika, 2014 onsc 5453, par.  24 (canlii); r c kizir, 2014 onsc 1676, 304 crr (2d) 287, par. 16-18), ainsi que l’accès de l’accusé au crédit, pourvu que ce crédit puisse être consenti (r c. ro, [2006] oj. no. 3347 (ql) (cs), par 35-39). même si l’accusé n’a pas d’autres moyens, les fonds ne peuvent être restitués que si le juge est convaincu que « nulle autre personne ne semble être le propriétaire légitime [des] biens ou avoir droit à leur possession légitime ». de plus, dans bien des cas, les accusés ne peuvent pas recevoir de l’aide juridique, parce que le bien saisi leur est attribué et les rend inadmissibles à recevoir cette aide, même s’ils ne peuvent effectivement avoir accès au bien saisi en question5. c’est ce qui s’est produit dans le cas de m rafilovich. la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juri- diques permet donc d’atteindre un équilibre entre le fait d’offrir une soupape à un groupe restreint d’accusés dans le besoin et celui de priver les contre- venants d’un accès aux produits de leurs crimes dans la plupart des autres cas. [66] cette conclusion s’accorde avec les énoncés de l’arrêt lavigne sur la manière dont le juge chargé de déterminer la peine devrait exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour infliger une amende. dans l’ar- rêt lavigne, l’infliction d’une amende en rempla- cement de la confiscation favorisait la réalisation de l’objectif du régime qui était en jeu; dans le cas de m. rafilovich, cette mesure minerait l’objet de la disposition sur la restitution que le législateur a intégrée à ce même régime. 5 there is debate in the jurisprudence about whether an accused must apply for legal aid before obtaining a return order. this issue was not argued on this appeal and i do not intend to resolve it here. 5 des décisions contradictoires ont été rendues quant à savoir si l’accusé doit présenter une demande d’aide juridique avant d’obtenir une ordonnance de restitution. la question n’a pas été débattue en l’espèce et je n’ai pas l’intention d’y répondre. 876 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. in my view, the court of appeal over- [67] emphasized the broad objective of the fine instead of forfeiture provision to prevent indirect benefit to the accused and gave inadequate attention to the important objectives in the detailed return process enacted by parliament. the legal expenses return provision allowed mr. rafilovich, who had no other assets or means to pay for his defence, an oppor- tunity to access seized funds (which remained his property) under close judicial scrutiny and tight conditions. this “benefit” is not the kind of benefit that the fine instead of forfeiture provision is aimed at preventing. as veit j. observed in gagnon, i do not agree with the crown’s contention that lawyers’ fees are like hairdressers’ fees: that they represent the exercise by an accused of discretion in relation to dis- posable income. although parliament’s intention is to strip a convict of the right to exercise that general kind of discretion, it characterized lawyers’ fees as a special type of expenditure     [p. 512] [68] it is undeniable that because mr. rafilovich used the returned funds to finance his legal defence, there is less money available to be forfeited to the crown. but this by- product of accused persons ex- ercising their rights is not unusual. a fundamental purpose of the criminal justice system is to provide a fair process to achieve just results, not to extract maximum retribution at any cost. [67] à mon avis, la cour d’appel a accordé trop d’importance à l’objectif général de la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation pour empêcher que l’accusé obtienne indirectement un avantage et n’a pas suffisamment tenu compte des objectifs importants du mécanisme de restitution détaillé adopté par le législateur. la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques offrait à m. rafilovich, qui ne possédait pas d’autres biens ou moyens de payer les frais de sa défense, une possibilité d’avoir accès à des fonds saisis (qui lui appartenaient toujours) qui étaient assujettis à une surveillance judiciaire étroite et à des conditions rigoureuses. il ne s’agit pas là du type d’« avantage » que la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation vise à prévenir. ainsi que l’a fait remarquer la juge veit dans gagnon, [traduction] contrairement au ministère public, je ne crois pas que les honoraires d’avocats s’apparentent à ceux des coiffeurs et que leur paiement découle de l’exercice par l’accusé d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire relativement à un revenu disponible. même si l’intention du législateur était de retirer au contrevenant le droit d’exercer ce type général de pouvoir discrétionnaire, il a considéré les frais d’avocat comme un type spécial de dépense    [p. 512] [68] comme m. rafilovich a affecté les fonds res- titués au paiement de sa défense, il reste indéniable- ment moins d’argent qui pourrait être confisqué au profit de sa majesté. cette conséquence du fait pour les accusés d’exercer leurs droits n’a toutefois rien d’inhabituel. l’un des objectifs fondamentaux du système de justice pénale est d’offrir un processus équitable permettant d’arriver à des résultats justes et non d’imposer le plus de représailles à tout prix. e the payment of reasonable legal fees is not the kind of transfer to a third party contem- plated in section 462.37(3) e le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables ne constitue pas le type de remise à un tiers visé par le par 46237(3) [69] the purposes of the fine instead of forfei- ture provision further support the interpretation that judges are not to use their discretion to generally impose fines on funds returned by court order for reasonable legal expenses. section 462.37(3) sets out two conditions before a fine may be imposed. first, there must be “property or any part of or interest [69] les objectifs de la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation renforcent la thèse que les juges ne doivent pas utiliser leur pou- voir discrétionnaire pour imposer généralement des amendes à l’égard des fonds restitués par ordon- nance judiciaire pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables. le paragraphe 462.37(3) énonce deux [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 877 in the property [that] cannot be made subject to an order”. if this precondition is met, the analysis con- tinues to the list of examples: conditions à l’imposition d’une amende. en pre- mier lieu, il doit s’agir « d’un bien — d’une partie d’un bien ou d’un droit sur celui-ci — [qui] ne peut pas faire l’objet d’une telle ordonnance ». si cette condition est remplie, l’analyse passe à une série d’exemples :   . in particular, a court may order the offender to pay a fine if the property or any part of or interest in the property le tribunal [  ] peut [  ] infliger au contrevenant une amende [  ] notamment dans les cas suivants : (a) cannot, on the exercise of due diligence, be located; a) impossibilité, malgré des efforts en ce sens, de retrou- ver le bien; (b) has been transferred to a third party; b) remise à un tiers; (c) is located outside canada; c) situation du bien à l’extérieur du canada; (d) has been substantially diminished in value or rendered worthless; or d) diminution importante de valeur; (e) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty. e) fusion avec un autre bien qu’il est par ailleurs difficile de diviser. the phrase “in particular” implies a non- exhaustive list of circumstances in which a fine may be appro- priate. le mot « notamment » implique une liste non ex- haustive de circonstances dans lesquelles il est indi- qué d’infliger une amende. in lavigne, justice deschamps acknowledged [70] that the use of “in particular” in s 46237(3) suggests there “are other circumstances that do not appear on the list. however, those circumstances must be similar in nature to the ones that are expressly men- tioned” (para 24). this determination requires us to consider the unifying features behind the examples that parliament has provided as situations that would attract the imposition of a fine instead of forfeiture. [70] dans l’arrêt lavigne, la juge deschamps a reconnu que l’emploi du mot «  notamment  » au par 46237(3) laisse entendre que « d’autres cir- constances ne sont pas énumérées. ces circonstances doivent cependant être de même nature que celles qui sont explicitement mentionnées » (par 24). pour établir s’il est question d’une telle circonstance non énumérée, il nous faut analyser les traits qu’ont en commun les exemples donnés par le législateur quant aux situations qui donneraient lieu à l’infliction d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation. in this case, the crown’s argument focussed [71] on the notion that the property judicially returned to the accused for legal expenses had “been transferred to a third party” — mr. rafilovich’s lawyer — and thus fell within s 46237(3)(b). even if the judicial return of funds to pay legal fees constitutes a “trans- fe[r]” to a third party, judges retain a discretion to nevertheless decline to order the fine where it would be contrary to the objectives of the return provision. [71] dans la présente affaire, l’argumentation du ministère public portait en grande partie sur le fait que les biens restitués à l’accusé par voie judiciaire aux fins du paiement des frais juridiques avaient été « remi[s] à un tiers », l’avocat de m. rafilovich, de sorte qu’ils étaient visés par l’al 46237(3)b). même si la restitution de fonds par voie judiciaire pour permettre le paiement de frais juridiques rai- sonnables constitue une « remise » à un tiers, les 878 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. in my view, the judicially authorized payment of reasonable legal fees is not the kind of “transfer” that parliament intended to capture in this subsection. [72] the key distinguishing feature here is judicial authorization. the returned funds are never held or transferred by the accused person: they are sent directly from the state — with judicial permission — to a designated person for permitted purposes under strict judicial supervision. the accused’s lawyer is not some unknown person receiving the funds by way of an entirely uncontrolled, private transaction, as was the case in lavigne. rather, they have been specifically authorized by a judge through a return order to be paid at a stipulated hourly rate for spec- ified services in aid of the accused’s defence. as the newfoundland and labrador court of appeal held in appleby, it is inappropriate “to treat the transfer of funds upon the order of a judge, specifically au- thorized to so order for a purpose and in the limited circumstances expressly authorized by the statute, as being activities of the same character as” funds that are transferred privately to third parties with no judicial oversight (para 53). [73] nor is the judicially authorized use of property for reasonable legal fees thematically analogous to any of the other listed reasons for ordering a fine in- stead of forfeiture. all of the circumstances listed in s 46237(3) reflect parliament’s concern that an ac- cused person — not a judge — might hide, dissipate or distribute property that may later be determined to be proceeds of crime. indeed, this was the prevailing interpretation at the time the provision was enacted. in his testimony before the legislative committee, the minister of justice explained the concern that underpins the fine instead of forfeiture provision: juges ont quand même le pouvoir discrétionnaire de refuser d’infliger l’amende si cette sanction va à l’encontre des objectifs de la disposition sur la res- titution. à mon avis, le paiement des frais juridiques raisonnables autorisé par le tribunal n’est pas le type de « remise » à laquelle ce paragraphe était censé s’appliquer. [72] la principale distinction ici est l’autorisation judiciaire. les fonds restitués ne sont jamais détenus ou remis par l’accusé : l’état les envoie directement (sur autorisation judiciaire) à une personne désignée pour des fins précises sous la supervision stricte du tribunal. l’avocat de l’accusé n’est pas une personne inconnue qui reçoit les fonds dans le cadre d’une tran- saction privée non supervisée, comme c’était le cas dans l’affaire lavigne. il a plutôt été spécifiquement autorisé, par un juge au moyen d’une ordonnance de restitution, à être rémunéré à un taux horaire établi en échange de services précis visant à assurer la défense de l’accusé. ainsi qu’en a décidé la cour d’appel de terre- neuve-et- labrador dans l’arrêt appleby, il ne convient pas [traduction] « de considérer les fonds transférés suivant l’ordonnance d’un juge précisément autorisé à ordonner ce transfert pour une fin et dans les circonstances restreintes expressément prévues par le texte législatif, comme des fonds de même nature » que ceux qui auraient été remis à un tiers sans la supervision du tribunal (par 53). [73] l’utilisation de biens pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables avec l’autorisation du tribunal ne relève pas non plus d’un sujet semblable à ceux figurant à la liste des raisons d’infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation. toutes les circonstances énumérées au par 46237(3) tra- duisent la crainte du législateur que l’accusé — et non un juge — dissimule, dilapide ou distribue des biens dont on pourrait conclure plus tard qu’il s’agit de produits de la criminalité. en effet, il s’agit de l’interprétation couramment admise au moment de l’édiction de la disposition. dans son témoignage de- vant le comité législatif, le ministre de la justice a ex- pliqué la préoccupation à l’origine de la disposition sur l’amende en remplacement de la confiscation : to encourage offenders to deliver up their proceeds of crime, courts will be entitled to impose special fines with pour encourager les criminels à renoncer aux produits de leur crime, les tribunaux pourront imposer des amendes [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 879 jail terms in default representing the value of illicit assets intentionally placed beyond the reach of the authorities. spéciales et, si elles ne sont pas payées, des peines d’em- prisonnement en rapport avec la valeur des biens illicite- ment obtenus et qui ont été intentionnellement mis hors de la portée des autorités. (house of commons, minutes, november 5, 1987, at p. 1:8) (chambre des communes, procès- verbaux, 5 no- vembre 1987, p. 1:8) later, in third reading debate, the minister said: plus tard, lors du débat en troisième lecture, le mi- nistre a ajouté ce qui suit : the bill also provides that a court may order the pay- ment of a fine when forfeiture is impossible either because the offender has hidden his [or her] illicit gains or has removed them from the jurisdiction of canadian courts. le projet de loi prévoit également l’imposition d’une amende lorsque la confiscation est impossible, soit parce que le contrevenant a caché ses gains illicites, soit parce qu’il les a retirés de la juridiction des tribunaux canadiens. (house of commons, debates, at p. 17258) (chambre des communes, débats, p. 17258) [74] thus, in my view, the payment of judicially returned funds to the accused’s lawyer is not the kind of “transfer” that parliament intended to capture with the fine instead of forfeiture provision. therefore, even if the transfer of funds to a lawyer is technically a transfer to a third party, judges generally should not exercise their discretion to fine an accused for their use of returned funds to pay for their reasonable legal expenses. f a fine instead of forfeiture can be imposed when the rationale for the return provision is undermined [74] c’est pourquoi, à mon avis, la remise à l’avo- cat de l’accusé de fonds restitués par voie judiciaire n’est pas le type de « remise » à laquelle le législateur voulait que la disposition sur l’amende en remplace- ment de la confiscation s’applique. par conséquent, même si la remise de fonds à un avocat constitue, techniquement parlant, une remise à un tiers, les juges ne doivent généralement pas exercer leur pou- voir discrétionnaire pour infliger une amende à un accusé qui s’est servi de fonds restitués pour payer ses frais juridiques raisonnables. f. il est possible d’infliger une amende en rem- placement de la confiscation lorsque la raison d’être de la disposition sur la restitution n’est pas respectée [75] if, generally speaking, parliament did not in- tend to impose a fine instead of forfeiture in respect of judicially returned funds spent on reasonable legal expenses, how should the discretion provided in s 46237(3) be exercised? this court in lavigne held that the discretion must be exercised in a man- ner consistent with the objectives of the proceeds of crime regime. justice deschamps acknowledged in lavigne that “a court may face circumstances in which the objectives of the provisions do not call for a fine to be imposed” (para 28). for example, a fine would be inappropriate if “the offender did not profit from the crime and if it was an isolated crime [75] si, d’une manière générale, le législateur n’avait pas l’intention d’imposer une amende en remplace- ment de la confiscation à l’égard des fonds restitués par voie judiciaire qui ont été dépensés en frais juri- diques raisonnables, de quelle façon le pouvoir dis- crétionnaire prévu au par 46337(3) devrait-il être exercé? dans l’arrêt lavigne, notre cour a statué que ce pouvoir discrétionnaire doit s’exercer conformé- ment aux objectifs du régime des produits de la cri- minalité. la juge deschamps a reconnu dans l’arrêt lavigne que « le tribunal pourrait être en présence de circonstances où la poursuite des objectifs de ces dis- positions ne requiert pas l’infliction d’une amende » 880 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. committed by an offender acting alone” (para 28). based on the foregoing analysis, i add the further example: that the accused was authorized by court order to spend returned funds on reasonable legal expenses. [76] the circumstances under which it is possi- ble to impose a fine instead of forfeiture on funds returned for reasonable legal expenses must be an- chored to parliament’s intent, and sentencing judges must consider whether the offender’s use of funds advanced or undermined the purposes of the return provision. if it turns out that the financial need was not real, or the funds were not used to alleviate that need, the imposition of a fine instead of forfeiture might be appropriate. i can foresee three situations where this could occur, although there may be others. [77] the first is some kind of wrongdoing in the re- turn of funds application, such as the misrepresenta- tion of the accused’s financial position. the second is wrongdoing by the offender in the administration of the return order, such as funds not being applied in the manner contemplated, expenditures for purposes outside the scope of the return order, or fees in excess of judicially authorized limits. the third is where the accused experiences an unexpected change in finan- cial circumstances after the funds have been returned but before sentencing, such that recourse to returned funds is no longer necessary after the accused be- came aware of the changed circumstances. indeed, counsel for mr. rafilovich conceded that judicial discretion to impose a fine should be exercised “[i]f there had been an unforeseen enrichment in between the period of the making of the [return] order and the conclusion of the trial, [such as] the person wins the lottery” (transcript, at p. 24, lines 16-19). (par 28). ainsi, l’amende serait inappropriée si « le contrevenant n’a pas bénéficié du crime et s’il s’agit d’un crime isolé commis par un contrevenant agis- sant seul » (par 28). compte tenu de l’analyse qui précède, j’ajoute l’exemple qui suit : l’accusé a été autorisé par ordonnance judiciaire à utiliser les fonds restitués pour payer des frais juridiques raisonnables. [76] les circonstances dans lesquelles il est pos- sible d’infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation à l’égard des fonds restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables doivent être rattachées à l’intention du législateur, et le juge chargé de déterminer la peine doit se demander si l’utilisation des fonds par le contrevenant a favorisé ou miné la réalisation de l’objet de la disposition sur la restitution. s’il s’avère que le besoin financier n’était pas réel ou que les fonds n’ont pas servi à atténuer ce besoin, l’infliction d’une amende en rem- placement de la confiscation pourrait être indiquée. j’envisage trois situations dans lesquelles l’infliction d’une amende serait indiquée, mais il pourrait y en avoir d’autres. [77] la première serait le cas d’agissements répré- hensibles commis dans le cadre de la présentation de la demande de restitution des fonds, comme la présentation inexacte de la situation financière de l’accusé. la deuxième serait le cas d’agissements répréhensibles du contrevenant lors de l’exécution de l’ordonnance de restitution, comme l’utilisation des fonds d’une manière non prévue dans l’ordonnance ou pour des dépenses à des fins dépassant la portée de celle-ci, ou le paiement d’honoraires dépassant les montants autorisés par cette même ordonnance. la troisième serait le cas où la situation financière de l’accusé change de façon imprévue après la res- titution des fonds, mais avant la détermination de la peine, de telle sorte que les fonds restitués ne sont plus nécessaires après que l’accusé ait pris connais- sance du changement de situation. en effet, l’avocat de m. rafilovich a concédé que le tribunal devrait exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire [traduction] « [s]’il y avait eu enrichissement imprévu entre le prononcé de l’ordonnance [de restitution] et la fin du procès, comme un gain à la loterie » (transcription, p. 24, lignes 16-19). [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 881 [78] these are examples of situations where the accused has obtained something beyond what parlia- ment intended, and the sentencing judge may honour that intent by recovering the returned monies by way of a fine. by ordering a fine in such circumstances, courts will respect the balance between parliament’s objectives in ensuring access to counsel and pro- tecting the presumption of innocence through the legal expenses return provision, and its objective of depriving offenders of proceeds of crime through the forfeiture provision. [78] ce sont là des exemples de situations dans lesquelles l’accusé a obtenu davantage que ce que le législateur voulait lui offrir, et le juge chargé de déterminer la peine peut donner suite à cette inten- tion en recouvrant les sommes d’argent restituées au moyen d’une amende. en infligeant une amende en pareilles circonstances, les tribunaux respectent l’équilibre recherché entre les objectifs du législa- teur consistant à permettre l’accès aux services d’un avocat et à protéger la présomption d’innocence au moyen de la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques, et son autre objectif de priver les contrevenants des produits de leurs crimes au moyen de la disposition sur la confiscation. g rowbotham and fines instead of forfeiture g l’arrêt rowbotham et l’amende en remplace- [79] my colleague holds that the discretion not to impose a fine instead of forfeiture can be exer- cised only if an offender was constitutionally en- titled to state- funded legal counsel. this should be determined by “applying the test set out in r v. rowbotham” (para 93). he says this approach gives “proper effect to parliament’s objective of ensuring an effective forfeiture regime while still vindicat- ing the constitutionally protected right to counsel” (para 141). i disagree. [80] rowbotham is an exceptional constitutional regime that addresses when an accused can insist upon state- funded counsel because there would oth- erwise be a breach of the accused’s right to a fair trial. it operates only in very discrete circumstances, and leads to a stay of proceedings unless funding is provided by the state. under rowbotham, the right to a fair trial is not engaged unless three precondi- tions are met: (1) legal aid is denied, (2) the accused does not have other financial means, and (3) “rep- resentation of the accused by counsel is essential to a fair trial” (rowbotham, at p 66). to some extent, it might appear that the first and second elements of the rowbotham test are conceptually similar to the s 46234(4) requirement that “the applicant has no other assets or means available”. however, the mere existence of seized funds will generally lead a court ment de la confiscation [79] mon collègue juge que le pouvoir discrétion- naire de refuser d’infliger une amende en remplace- ment de la confiscation ne peut être exercé que si le contrevenant avait le droit constitutionnel d’obtenir l’assistance d’un avocat financée par l’état. pour éta- blir si c’est le cas, il faut « appliqu[er] le test énoncé dans l’arrêt r c. rowbotham » (par 93). selon lui, cette approche donne « l’effet voulu à l’objectif du législateur d’assurer à la fois un régime de confisca- tion efficace et le respect du droit constitutionnel à l’assistance d’un avocat » (par 141). je ne suis pas de cet avis. [80] l’arrêt rowbotham prévoit un régime consti- tutionnel exceptionnel par lequel un accusé peut insister pour que l’état paie les services de son avocat à défaut de quoi il y aurait atteinte à son droit à un procès équitable. ce régime ne s’applique que dans des cas restreints et il mène à un arrêt des procédures à moins que l’état ne fournisse des fonds. suivant l’arrêt rowbotham, le droit à un pro- cès équitable n’entre en jeu que si trois conditions préalables sont réunies  : (1)  la demande d’aide juridique a été refusée, (2) l’accusé ne dispose d’au- cun autre moyen financier et (3)  [traduction] «  il est essentiel à l’équité du procès que l’ac- cusé soit représenté par un avocat » (rowbotham, p.  66) dans une certaine mesure, il semblerait que les deux premiers éléments du test de l’arrêt rowbotham se rapprochent, sur le plan conceptuel, 882 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. to find an accused person ineligible for a rowbotham order because the seized funds are available through the return provision. most obviously, it is the third element, that legal counsel be “essential to a fair trial”, that my colleague would effectively import, as an additional requirement, into the proceeds of crime regime. [81] in my view, parliament has set out its de- sired statutory requirements for the judicial return of seized funds. returning the funds only where it is “essential to a fair trial” is not one of them. moreover, the rowbotham criteria are designed to respond to a very different set of circumstances than the legal expenses return provision. the legal ex- penses return provision does not involve a request for state- funded counsel; rather, it allows a court to return seized monies, which still belong to the accused, when necessary to pay for reasonable legal expenses. the return provision respects the accused’s access to, and choice of, legal representation, which is very different from the right to state- funded coun- sel. rowbotham, conversely, is geared towards the right to a fair trial (see rowbotham, at pp. 65-67 and 69-70). there is nothing in the proceeds of crime regime that indicates any intention to also require the accused to demonstrate that the nature of the proceedings are such that it is “essential” to have counsel. de l’exigence prévue au par 46234(4) que « l’au- teur de la demande ne possède pas d’autres bien ou moyens ». toutefois, du simple fait qu’il existe des fonds saisis, les tribunaux vont généralement déclarer l’accusé inadmissible suivant le test de l’arrêt rowbotham puisque les fonds saisis sont accessibles au moyen de la disposition relative à la restitution. de toute évidence, c’est le troisième élément du test, à savoir que la représentation par avocat soit « essentiel[le] à l’équité du procès », que mon collègue importerait effectivement, en guise de condition supplémentaire, dans le régime des produits de la criminalité. [81] à mon avis, le législateur a précisé les exi- gences légales qu’il souhaitait appliquer à la resti- tution par voie judiciaire de fonds saisis. et le fait de restituer les fonds seulement lorsque cela s’avère « essentiel à l’équité du procès » n’en fait pas partie. par ailleurs, les critères de l’arrêt rowbotham ont été conçus dans le but de répondre à des circonstances très différentes de celles visées par la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juri- diques. cette disposition n’emporte pas présentation d’une demande en vue de faire payer les services d’un avocat par l’état; elle permet plutôt au tribunal de restituer des sommes saisies, qui appartiennent toujours à l’accusé, lorsque celles-ci sont néces- saires pour payer des frais juridiques raisonnables. la disposition sur la restitution respecte le droit de l’accusé de se faire représenter par l’avocat de son choix, ce qui est fort différent du droit aux services d’un avocat rémunéré par l’état. l’arrêt rowbotham, quant à lui, s’intéresse au droit à un procès équitable (voir rowbotham, p. 65-67 et 69-70). rien dans le régime des produits de la criminalité n’indique que l’accusé est censé prouver que la nature des procé- dures est telle qu’il est « essentiel » qu’il obtienne l’assistance d’un avocat. [82] while both rowbotham orders and the legal expenses return provision operate to ensure proper representation, they do so in different contexts. in rowbotham, judges are required to assess the com- plexity of the case and consider whether proceeding without counsel would jeopardize the accused’s fair trial rights. this is the high bar that triggers the state’s obligation to fund legal representation. conversely, [82] si les ordonnances fondées sur l’arrêt row- botham et la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques opèrent pour as- surer une représentation convenable, elles le font dans des contextes différents. selon rowbotham, les juges doivent évaluer la complexité de l’affaire et se demander si le fait de poursuivre l’instance sans avocat mettrait en péril le droit de l’accusé à [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich la juge martin 883 in the legal expenses return provision, the judge is not directing the payment of public funds, but is or- dering the return of presumptively private property to permit access to legal representation. this is a very different purpose, and if parliament intended these further criteria to be a precondition for the exercise of the discretion not to impose a fine, it would have said so explicitly. [83] my colleague’s approach would essentially limit the legal expenses return provision to those accused persons who can satisfy the stricter row- botham requirements. because the determination of whether an accused would have qualified for a rowbotham order is made at the sentencing stage, even an accused who believes that he or she could satisfy the rowbotham criteria may shy away from applying for a return of the seized funds out of fear that the sentencing judge may ultimately disagree. this means that accused persons who cannot be certain that their rowbotham application will be successful at some later time may act with even greater caution and represent themselves, even if legal counsel is in fact constitutionally “essential” to their fair trial rights. un procès équitable. tel est le critère exigeant au- quel il faut satisfaire pour obliger l’état à financer la représentation de l’accusé par avocat. en revanche, sous le régime de la disposition relative à la resti- tution, le juge n’ordonne pas l’affectation de fonds publics, mais bien celle de fonds réputés privés afin de permettre l’accès aux services d’un avocat. il s’agit là d’un objectif fort différent, et si le législateur avait voulu imposer ces critères additionnels comme conditions préalables à l’exercice du pouvoir discré- tionnaire de ne pas imposer une amende, il l’aurait fait explicitement. [83] le raisonnement de mon collègue aurait es- sentiellement pour effet de limiter l’application de la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques aux accusés qui peuvent répondre aux exigences plus strictes de l’arrêt rowbotham. puisque la question de savoir si un accusé a droit à une ordonnance de type rowbotham est tranchée au stade de la détermination de la peine, même l’accusé qui croit satisfaire aux critères de l’arrêt rowbotham pourrait s’abstenir de demander la restitution des fonds saisis de peur que, ultimement, le juge chargé de déterminer la peine refuse. par conséquent, l’ac- cusé qui ne peut être certain que sa demande fondée sur l’arrêt rowbotham sera accueillie à un moment donné risque de se montrer encore plus prudent et de se représenter lui- même, même si les services d’un avocat sont en fait « essentiel[s] », sur le plan constitutionnel, au respect de son droit à un procès équitable. h summary h résumé [84] the discretion to order a fine must be exer- cised in a manner consistent with all of parliament’s objectives of the proceeds of crime regime including, where applicable, the return provision. the purposes of the legal expenses return provision include provid- ing access to counsel and giving meaningful weight to the presumption of innocence. underlying these two purposes is an intent of parliament to create a fair procedure for the return of funds for reasonable legal expenses while also allowing for the seizure, return, and forfeiture of proceeds of crime. in most cases, clawing back reasonable legal fees as a fine in- stead of forfeiture would undermine these purposes. [84] le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’infliger une amende doit être exercé conformément à tous les objectifs recherchés par le législateur au moyen du régime des produits de la criminalité, y compris la disposition sur la restitution lorsqu’elle s’ap- plique. la disposition sur la restitution en vue du paiement des frais juridiques a notamment pour objet de permettre l’accès aux services d’un avocat et d’accorder suffisamment d’importance à la pré- somption d’innocence. ces deux objectifs reposent sur l’intention du parlement de créer une procédure équitable de restitution de fonds en vue du paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables tout en permettant 884 r v rafilovich martin j. [2019] 3 scr. moreover, the payment of reasonable legal fees is neither the type of benefit at which the provisions are aimed nor the kind of “transfer” to a third party con- templated in the fine instead of forfeiture provision. [85] for all of these reasons, generally speaking, a fine instead of forfeiture should not be imposed on funds that have been judicially returned for the pay- ment of reasonable legal expenses. there remains, however, discretion to order a fine in cases where the offender did not have a real financial need for the returned funds, or the offender did not use the funds to alleviate that need. in this way, courts can give full effect to parliament’s intended purposes. la saisie, la restitution et la confiscation des produits de la criminalité. dans la plupart des cas, récupérer les sommes restituées pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables au moyen d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation minerait la ré- alisation de ces objets. par ailleurs, le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables ne constitue ni le type d’avantage visé par les dispositions, ni le type de « remise » à un tiers envisagée dans la disposition sur l’infliction d’une amende en remplacement de la confiscation. [85] c’est pourquoi, d’une manière générale, il ne convient pas d’infliger une amende en rempla- cement de la confiscation à l’égard de fonds qui ont été restitués par voie judiciaire pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables. toutefois, les juges conservent le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’infliger une telle amende si le contrevenant n’avait pas réellement besoin, au plan financier, des fonds ou ne les a pas utilisés pour atténuer ce besoin. en agissant ainsi, les tribunaux peuvent donner pleinement effet aux objectifs recherchés par le législateur. v application v application [86] in this case, the sentencing judge exercised her discretion not to impose a fine instead of forfeiture. there is no evidence that mr. rafilovich misrepre- sented his financial position, misused the returned funds, or experienced any change in circumstances. therefore, the sentencing judge’s exercise of dis- cretion was appropriate and should not be interfered with. [86] dans la présente affaire, la juge chargée de déterminer la peine a exercé son pouvoir discré- tionnaire de ne pas infliger d’amende en rempla- cement de la confiscation. aucune preuve n’établit que m. rafilovich a présenté faussement sa situa- tion financière, a fait un mauvais usage des fonds restitués ou a connu un changement quelconque de situation. en conséquence, la juge chargée de déterminer la peine a exercé correctement son pou- voir discrétionnaire et il n’y a pas lieu d’intervenir à cet égard. vi conclusion vi dispositif [87] i would, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the court of appeal’s variance of the sentenc- ing judge’s order adding a fine instead of forfeiture and 12 months imprisonment in default of payment of this fine. the appellant did not seek costs and none are ordered. [87] je suis donc d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et d’écarter la modification de l’ordonnance de la juge chargée de déterminer la peine par la cour d’appel imposant au surplus une amende en remplacement de la confiscation et une peine d’emprisonnement de 12 mois en cas de défaut de paiement. l’appelant n’a pas sollicité les dépens et aucuns ne sont ad- jugés. [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 885 the reasons of wagner cj and moldaver and version française des motifs du juge en chef côté jj. were delivered by wagner et des juges moldaver et côté rendus par moldaver j. (dissenting in part) — le juge moldaver (dissident en partie) — i overview i aperçu [88] part xii.2 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46,6 which governs the seizure, restraint, and forfeiture of proceeds of crime, seeks to ensure that crime does not pay (see r v. lavigne, 2006 scc 10, [2006] 1 scr 392, at para. 10; quebec (attorney general) v. laroche, 2002 scc 72, [2002] 3 scr. 708, at para 25). to further this objective, it permits the state to seize and detain property believed on reasonable grounds to be proceeds of crime, thereby preserving it and facilitating the enforcement of any future forfeiture order. it also provides that a court must, when sentencing an offender for an indictable offence, order the forfeiture of property determined to be proceeds of crime. alternatively, where the property cannot be made subject to a forfeiture order, the court may order a fine in lieu of forfeiture (“fine in lieu”). [89] parliament recognized, however, that the sei- zure and detention of property that is reasonably believed, though not yet proven, to be proceeds of crime may have a significant financial impact on accused persons, including by limiting their ability to access counsel. to address this concern, part xii.2 permits accused persons to apply to a judge for a “restoration order” authorizing the release of seized property to pay for various expenses — one being reasonable legal expenses — where they have no other means available. in this way, parliament struck a balance between ensuring an effective forfeiture re- gime and permitting otherwise impecunious accused persons to access funds for certain purposes. [88] la partie xii.2 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-466, qui régit la saisie, le blocage et la confisca- tion des produits de la criminalité, vise à s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas (voir r c. lavigne, 2006 csc 10, [2006] 1 rcs 392, par. 10; québec (pro cureur général) c. laroche, 2002 csc 72, [2002] 3 rcs. 708, par 25). afin d’atteindre cet objectif, elle permet à l’état de saisir et de retenir des biens que l’on croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, être des produits de la criminalité, de manière à préserver ces biens et à faci- liter la mise à exécution d’éventuelles ordonnances de confiscation. la partie xii.2 prévoit également que, lorsqu’il est appelé à déterminer la peine à infliger au contrevenant reconnu coupable d’un acte criminel, le tribunal doit ordonner la confiscation des biens dont il a été conclu qu’il s’agit de produits de la criminalité. subsidiairement, lorsque les biens ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une ordonnance de confiscation, le tribu- nal peut infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation (« amende de remplacement »). [89] cependant, le législateur a reconnu que la sai- sie et la rétention des biens dont on croit pour des motifs raisonnables, mais sans l’avoir encore prouvé, qu’il s’agit de produits de la criminalité peuvent avoir d’importantes répercussions financières sur les accu- sés, notamment en limitant leur capacité d’avoir accès aux services d’un avocat. afin de répondre à cette préoccupation, la partie xii.2 permet à l’accusé de demander au juge une « ordonnance de restitution » autorisant la mainlevée de la saisie pour lui permettre de payer différentes dépenses — dont des frais ju- ridiques raisonnables — lorsqu’il ne possède pas d’autres moyens de s’en acquitter. en procédant ainsi, le législateur a établi un équilibre entre la nécessité d’assurer l’efficacité du régime de confiscation et celle de permettre à des accusés par ailleurs impé- cunieux d’avoir accès à des fonds pour certaines fins. 6 unless otherwise indicated, all section number references are to 6 sauf indication contraire, toutes les dispositions législatives citées the criminal code. renvoient au code criminel. 886 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. [90] but appellate courts have reached different conclusions about what this balance requires when seized funds that have been released to an accused to pay for reasonable legal expenses are later found to be proceeds of crime. can a sentencing judge order a fine in lieu in respect of those funds? if so, under what circumstances should a judge decline to do so? these are the issues raised on appeal. [91] my colleague martin j. concludes that where a court has authorized the release of seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses, a fine in lieu should not “generally” be imposed, subject to two exceptions: “where it turns out that the offender did not have a real financial need or the funds were not used to alleviate that need” (paras. 8 and 10). she maintains that this conclusion flows from a combina- tion of the two “secondary purposes” pursued by the restoration provision — providing access to counsel and giving meaningful weight to the presumption of innocence — and parliament’s underlying intention to ensure fairness in criminal prosecutions (paras. 9 and 38). these purposes, she says, “constrain the pursuit of the primary objective” of ensuring that crime does not pay (para 49). [90] cependant, les juridictions d’appel en sont arrivées à des conclusions différentes quant à la façon d’atteindre cet équilibre lorsqu’il est conclu par la suite que les fonds saisis qui ont été restitués à l’ac- cusé pour lui permettre de payer ses frais juridiques raisonnables sont des produits de la criminalité. le juge chargé de déterminer la peine peut-il infliger une amende de remplacement à l’égard de ces fonds? dans l’affirmative, dans quelles circonstances le juge devrait-il refuser de le faire? ce sont là les questions que soulève le présent pourvoi. [91] ma collègue la juge martin arrive à la conclu- sion que, lorsque le tribunal a autorisé la restitution de fonds saisis pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables, une amende de remplacement ne de- vrait, « en général », pas être infligée, sous réserve de deux exceptions : « s’il s’avère que le contre- venant n’avait pas un véritable besoin financier ou que les fonds n’ont pas été utilisés pour atténuer ce besoin » (par. 8 et 10). elle soutient que cette conclu- sion découle d’une combinaison des deux « objets secondaires » visés par la disposition sur la restitu- tion — fournir l’accès aux services d’un avocat et accorder une importance suffisante à la présomption d’innocence — ainsi que de l’intention sous- jacente du législateur d’assurer l’équité dans les poursuites criminelles (par. 9 et 38). ces objectifs, selon elle, « viennent restreindre la poursuite de l’objectif pre- mier » consistant à s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas (par 49). [92] with respect, i reject this approach. stripped of the legal niceties in which it is couched, the approach taken by my colleague sends a clear and unmistakeable message — crime does indeed pay. for reasons that follow, i am of the view that the statutory regime’s primary objective of ensuring that crime does not pay need not and should not be sacrificed on the altar of the “secondary pur- poses” relied on by my colleague. imposing a fine in lieu where an offender has used proceeds of crime to pay for his or her own defence achieves the regime’s primary objective of ensuring that crime does not pay; and it does not undermine the utility of the restoration provision, which facilitates access to counsel in a manner that is both fair and consistent with the presumption of innocence. in [92] en toute déférence, je rejette cette approche. dépouillée des subtilités juridiques sur lesquelles elle repose, l’approche de ma collègue envoie un message clair et sans équivoque : le crime paie bel et bien. pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis qu’il n’est ni nécessaire, ni opportun de sacrifier l’objectif premier du régime légal consistant à s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas sur l’autel des « objets secon- daires  » invoqués par ma collègue l’imposition d’une amende de remplacement au contrevenant qui s’est servi de produits de la criminalité pour payer sa propre défense permet d’atteindre l’objectif premier du régime de s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas; en outre, elle ne sape pas l’utilité de la disposition sur la restitution, soit de faciliter l’accès aux services d’un avocat de manière équitable et conforme à la [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 887 this way, all of the statutory scheme’s objectives can be achieved. présomption d’innocence. de cette façon, tous les objectifs du régime légal peuvent être réalisés. [93] however, there is in my view an important exception to the general rule that a fine in lieu should be imposed where an offender has used proceeds of crime to pay for his or her own defence. where a sentencing judge is satisfied, applying the test set out in r v. rowbotham (1988), 41 ccc (3d) 1 (ont. ca), that representation by counsel was essential to the offender’s constitutional right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, the judge should exercise his or her limited discretion not to impose a fine in lieu in re- spect of the released funds. this interpretation gives proper effect to parliament’s objective of ensuring an effective forfeiture regime while still vindicating the constitutionally protected right to counsel, and more particularly, the constitutional right to state- funded counsel in limited circumstances. [94] in this instance, the sentencing judge did not consider whether representation by counsel was es- sential to mr. rafilovich’s constitutional right to a fair trial before exercising her limited discretion not to impose a fine in lieu. as the record before this court is insufficient to decide this issue, i would remit the case to the sentencing judge for determi- nation. [93] j’estime toutefois qu’il y a une exception im- portante à la règle générale voulant qu’une amende de remplacement soit imposée au contrevenant qui s’est servi de produits de la criminalité pour payer sa propre défense. lorsque le juge chargé de déterminer la peine est convaincu, en appliquant le test énoncé dans l’arrêt r c. rowbotham (1988), 41 ccc (3d) 1 (ca. ont.), que la représentation du contrevenant par avocat est essentielle pour assurer le respect de son droit constitutionnel à un procès équitable garanti par l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés, le juge devrait exercer son pou- voir discrétionnaire limité de refuser d’infliger une amende de remplacement à l’égard des fonds resti- tués. cette interprétation donne l’effet voulu à l’ob- jectif du législateur d’assurer l’efficacité du régime de confiscation tout en respectant le droit constitutionnel à l’assistance d’un avocat et, plus particulièrement, le droit constitutionnel aux services d’un avocat rému- néré par l’état dans quelques situations. [94] en l’espèce, la juge chargée de déterminer la peine ne s’est pas demandé si le fait pour m. rafilo- vich d’être représenté par avocat était essentiel pour assurer le respect de son droit constitutionnel à un procès équitable avant de refuser de lui infliger une amende de remplacement en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire limité. étant donné que le dossier soumis à la cour n’est pas suffisamment étoffé pour nous permettre de trancher cette question, je renver- rais l’affaire à la juge chargée de déterminer la peine pour qu’elle rende une nouvelle décision. ii background ii contexte [95] my colleague has set out the relevant facts and judicial history, and i see no need to duplicate her work. [95] ma collègue a exposé les faits pertinents et l’historique judiciaire, et je ne vois pas la nécessité de répéter son travail. iii issue iii question en litige [96] the issue on appeal centres on the relationship between the restoration provision and the fine in lieu provision in part xii.2: under what circumstances, if any, should a fine in lieu be imposed in respect of [96] la question à trancher dans le présent pour- voi est axée sur le lien qui unit la disposition sur la restitution et celle concernant l’amende de rempla- cement qui figurent à la partie xii.2 : dans quelles 888 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. seized funds that have been released to an accused to pay for reasonable legal expenses but later deter- mined to be proceeds of crime? circonstances, le cas échéant, une amende de rem- placement devrait- elle être infligée à l’égard des fonds saisis qui ont été restitués à un accusé pour lui permettre de payer ses frais juridiques raisonnables mais dont il est plus tard conclu qu’il s’agit de pro- duits de la criminalité? iv analysis iv analyse a statutory interpretation — the modern approach a interprétation législative — la méthode moderne [97] the issue on appeal is one of statutory inter- pretation. accordingly, the analysis is to be guided by the modern approach to statutory interpretation: “the words of an act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (e a. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87; bell expressvu limited partnership v. rex, 2002 scc 42, [2002] 2 scr 559, at para 26). [97] la question à trancher en l’espèce en est une d’interprétation législative. en conséquence, l’ana- lyse doit être guidée par la méthode moderne d’inter- prétation législative : [traduction] « il faut lire les termes d’une loi dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’économie de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’inten- tion du législateur » (e. a. driedger, construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p. 87; bell expressvu limited partnership c. rex, 2002 csc 42, [2002] 2 rcs. 559, par 26). b overview of the part xii.2 regime b aperçu du régime de la partie xii.2 (1) overall objective (1) objectif général [98] as this court stated in lavigne, the overall objective of the proceeds of crime regime under part xii.2 is two- fold: (1) to deprive offenders and criminal organizations of the proceeds of crime; and (2) to deter them from committing crimes in the future (see paras. 16, 28, and 36). stated succinctly, this regime seeks to ensure that crime does not pay (see lavigne, at para. 10; laroche, at para 25). [98] ainsi que la cour l’a mentionné dans l’arrêt lavigne, le régime des produits de la criminalité prévu à la partie xii.2 poursuit un double objectif général : (1) priver les contrevenants et les organi- sations criminelles des produits de leurs crimes et (2) les dissuader de perpétrer d’autres infractions (voir par. 16, 28 et 36). en résumé, ce régime vise à garantir que le crime ne paie pas (voir lavigne, par. 10; laroche, par 25). (2) “property” and “proceeds of crime” — sec- (2) « biens » et « produits de la criminalité » — tions 2 and 462.3(1) art. 2 et par 4623(1) [99] “[p]roceeds of crime” is defined in s 4623(1) as “any property, benefit or advantage” obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of a “designated offence”, which in- cludes any federal indictable offence. “[p]roperty” is defined in s. 2 as including “real and personal property of every description”, as well as “property originally in the possession or under the control of [99] selon le par 4623(1), les « produits de la criminalité » s’entendent d’un « [b]ien, bénéfice ou avantage » qui est obtenu ou qui provient, directe- ment ou indirectement, de la perpétration d’une « in- fraction désignée », ce qui comprend toute infraction punissable par mise en accusation sous le régime d’une loi fédérale. suivant la définition énoncée à l’art. 2, le mot « biens » englobe les « biens meubles [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 889 any person, and any property into or for which it has been converted or exchanged and anything ac- quired at any time by the conversion or exchange”. as these definitions demonstrate, the proceeds of crime provisions apply to “the widest possible range of property” (lavigne, at para 15). et immeubles de tous genres », ainsi que « des biens originairement en la possession ou sous le contrôle d’une personne, et tous biens en lesquels ou contre lesquels ils ont été convertis ou échangés et tout ce qui a été acquis au moyen de cette conversion ou de cet échange ». comme le montrent ces définitions, les dispositions sur les produits de la criminalité s’appliquent à « la plus vaste gamme possible de biens » (lavigne, par 15). (3) the seizure provision — section 462.32 (3) la disposition sur la saisie — art 46232 [100] section 462.32(1) and (4) permit the state to seize and detain property believed on reasonable grounds to be proceeds of crime. like a restraint or- der (see laroche, at para. 55), a warrant authorizing seizure and detention preserves the property and facilitates the enforcement of any future forfeiture order. in doing so, it furthers the objective of de- priving offenders and criminal organizations of the proceeds of crime. [100] les paragraphes 462.32(1) et (4) permettent à l’état de saisir et de retenir des biens que l’on croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, être des produits de la criminalité. à l’instar de l’ordonnance de blocage (voir laroche, par. 55), le mandat autorisant la saisie et la rétention garantit la préservation des biens et facilite la mise à exécution d’éventuelles ordonnances de confiscation. ce faisant, il favorise la réalisation de l’objectif consistant à priver les contrevenants et les organisations criminelles des produits de leurs crimes. (4) the restoration provision  — section (4) la disposition sur la restitution  — par. 462.34(4) 462.34(4) [101] parliament recognized, however, that the seizure and detention of property that is reasonably believed, though not yet proven, to be proceeds of crime may have a significant financial impact on accused persons, including by limiting their ability to access counsel. to address this concern, s 46234 permits any person with an interest in the property, including accused persons, to apply for a “restoration order” authorizing the release of seized property to pay for various expenses — one being reasonable legal expenses — where they have no other means available and no other person appears to be the lawful owner of or lawfully entitled to possession of the property: [101] le législateur a reconnu toutefois que la sai- sie et la rétention des biens dont on croit pour des mo- tifs raisonnables, mais dont on n’a pas encore prouvé, qu’il s’agit de produits de la criminalité pouvaient avoir d’importantes répercussions financières sur les accusés, notamment en limitant leur capacité d’avoir accès à l’assistance d’un avocat. afin de répondre à cette préoccupation, l’art 46234 permet au détenteur d’un droit sur le bien saisi, y compris un accusé, de solliciter une « ordonnance de restitution » autorisant la mainlevée de la saisie afin d’utiliser les biens saisis pour payer différentes dépenses — dont des frais juridiques raisonnables — lorsqu’il ne possède pas d’autres moyens de le faire et que personne d’autre ne semble être le propriétaire légitime des biens ou avoir droit à leur possession légitime : application for review of special warrants and re- straint orders demande de révision 462.34  (1) any person who has an interest in prop- erty that was seized under a warrant issued pursuant to 462.34 (1) le détenteur d’un droit sur un bien saisi en vertu d’un mandat délivré sous le régime de l’article 462.32 890 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. section 462.32 or in respect of which a restraint order was made under subsection 462.33(3) may, at any time, apply to a judge (a) for an order under subsection (4); or (b) for permission to examine the property. ou d’un bien visé par une ordonnance de blocage rendue sous le régime du paragraphe 462.33(3) peut en tout temps demander à un juge de rendre une ordonnance en vertu du paragraphe (4) ou de lui accorder l’autorisation d’exami- ner le bien.   .   . order of restoration of property or revocation or var- iation of order restitution ou modification de l’ordonnance de blocage (4) on an application made to a judge under paragraph (1)(a) in respect of any property and after hearing the applicant and the attorney general and any other person to whom notice was given pursuant to paragraph (2)(b), the judge may order that the property or a part thereof be returned to the applicant or, in the case of a restraint order made under subsection 462.33(3), revoke the order, vary the order to exclude the property or any interest in the property or part thereof from the application of the order or make the order subject to such reasonable conditions as the judge thinks fit, (4) le juge saisi d’une demande d’ordonnance présentée en vertu du paragraphe (1) peut, après avoir entendu le demandeur, le procureur général et, éventuellement, les personnes à qui le préavis mentionné au paragraphe (2) a été remis, ordonner que les biens soient restitués en tout ou en partie au demandeur, annuler ou modifier l’ordonnance de blocage rendue en vertu du paragraphe 462.33(3) de façon à soustraire, en totalité ou en partie, ces biens ou un droit sur ceux-ci à son application, selon le cas, ou rendre l’ordonnance de blocage sujette aux conditions qu’il es- time indiquées dans les cas suivants :   .   . (c) for the purpose of c) afin de permettre : (i) meeting the reasonable living expenses of the person who was in possession of the property at the time the warrant was executed or the order was made or any person who, in the opinion of the judge, has a valid interest in the property and of the de- pendants of that person, (i) au détenteur des biens bloqués ou saisis — ou à toute autre personne qui, de l’avis du juge, a un droit valable sur ces biens — de prélever, sur les biens ou certains de ceux-ci, les sommes raisonnables pour ses dépenses courantes et celles des personnes à sa charge, (ii) meeting the reasonable business and legal ex- penses of a person referred to in subparagraph (i), or (iii) permitting the use of the property in order to enter into a recognizance under part xvi, (ii) à l’une des personnes mentionnées au sous- alinéa (i) de faire face à ses dépenses commerciales courantes et de payer ses frais juridiques dans la mesure où ces dépenses et frais sont raisonnables, (iii) à une personne d’utiliser ces biens pour con- tracter un engagement sous le régime de la par- tie xvi, if the judge is satisfied that the applicant has no other assets or means available for the purposes set out in this paragraph and that no other person appears to be the lawful owner of or lawfully entitled to possession of the property. lorsque le juge est convaincu que l’auteur de la de- mande ne possède pas d’autres biens ou moyens pour ce faire et que nulle autre personne ne semble être le propriétaire légitime de ces biens ou avoir droit à leur possession légitime. [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 891 in creating this provision, parliament struck [102] a balance between ensuring an effective forfeiture re- gime and permitting otherwise impecunious accused persons to access funds for certain purposes. more particularly, as the minister of justice explained when the bill that would later become part xii.2 was introduced, “[t]he legislation has balanced an effective forfeiture mechanism with the constitu- tionally protected right to counsel in a manner that is characteristic of the government’s approach to crim- inal matters and avoids the criticisms that have been levied at similar american legislation in this area” (house of commons, debates, vol. 14, 2nd sess., 33rd parl., july 7, 1988, at p 17258). the “criti- cisms    levied at similar american legislation” re- fer to the fact that, at the time the bill was introduced, accused persons in the united states could not use seized funds to pay for legal fees under any circum- stances (see r. w. hubbard et al., money laundering and proceeds of crime (2004), at pp. 118-20; united states v. monsanto, 491 us 600 (1989)). [102] en adoptant cette disposition, le législateur a établi un équilibre entre la nécessité d’assurer un régime de confiscation efficace et celle de permettre aux accusés par ailleurs impécunieux d’avoir accès à des fonds à certaines fins. plus précisément, ainsi que l’a expliqué le ministre de la justice lors du dépôt du projet de loi qui deviendra plus tard la partie xii.2, « [l]’équilibre qu’on a pris soin d’apporter entre cette procédure de confiscation et le droit constitutionnel aux services d’un avocat est typique de la politique du gouvernement actuel qui ne tient pas à s’exposer aux critiques que des mesures analogues ont soulevées aux états- unis » (chambre des communes, débats, vol. 14, 2e sess., 33e lég., 7 juillet 1988, p 17258). les mots « critiques que des mesures analogues ont soule- vées aux états- unis » renvoient au fait qu’à l’époque où le projet de loi a été déposé, il était interdit aux accusés, aux états- unis, d’utiliser des fonds saisis pour payer leurs frais juridiques, quelles que soient les circonstances (voir r. w. hubbard et al., money laundering and proceeds of crime (2004), p. 118- 120; united states c. monsanto, 491 us 600 (1989)). (5) the forfeiture provision — section 462.37(1) (5) la disposition sur la confiscation  — par. [103] under s 46237(1), a court must, when sen- tencing7 an offender for a designated offence, order the forfeiture of property determined to be proceeds of crime obtained through the commission of the designated offence. alternatively, if the court is not satisfied that the property was obtained through the commission of the designated offence, but it is sat- isfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is proceeds of crime, then the court may order its forfeiture pursuant to s 46237(2). 462.37(1) [103] selon le par.  462.37(1), le tribunal doit, lorsqu’il détermine la peine7 à infliger au contreve- nant reconnu coupable d’une infraction désignée, ordonner la confiscation des biens dont on a établi qu’ils constituent des produits de la criminalité ob- tenus par la perpétration de cette infraction désignée. subsidiairement, si le tribunal n’est pas convaincu que les biens ont été obtenus par la perpétration de l’infraction désignée en question, mais qu’il est convaincu, hors de tout doute raisonnable, qu’il s’agit de produits de la criminalité, il peut alors en ordonner la confiscation en vertu du par 46237(2). (6) the fine in lieu provision  — section (6) la disposition sur l’amende de remplace- 462.37(3) ment — par 46237(3) [104] where a court is satisfied that a forfeiture order should be made under s 46237(1) in respect [104] lorsque le tribunal est convaincu qu’une ordonnance de confiscation devrait être rendue en 7 a conviction is not a prerequisite to a forfeiture order, as such an order may also follow a discharge under s 730. 7 une déclaration de culpabilité n’est pas une condition préalable au prononcé d’une ordonnance de confiscation, laquelle peut également être rendue après qu’une absolution ait été prononcée en vertu de l’art 730. 892 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. of any “property of an offender”, but the property (or any part of or interest in the property) cannot be made subject to such an order, the court “may” order a fine in lieu under s 46237(3): vertu du par 46237(1) à l’égard d’« un bien [  ] d’un contrevenant », mais que le bien (ou une partie du bien ou un droit sur celui-ci) ne peut pas faire l’objet d’une telle ordonnance, il « peut », en vertu du par 46237(3), infliger une amende en remplace- ment de celle-ci : fine instead of forfeiture amende (3) if a court is satisfied that an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) or (2.01) should be made in respect of any property of an offender but that the property or any part of or interest in the property cannot be made subject to an order, the court may, instead of ordering the property or any part of or interest in the property to be forfeited, order the offender to pay a fine in an amount equal to the value of the property or the part of or interest in the property. in particular, a court may order the offender to pay a fine if the property or any part of or interest in the property (3) le tribunal qui est convaincu qu’une ordonnance de confiscation devrait être rendue à l’égard d’un bien — d’une partie d’un bien ou d’un droit sur celui-ci — d’un contrevenant peut, en remplacement de l’ordonnance, in- fliger au contrevenant une amende égale à la valeur du bien s’il est convaincu que le bien ne peut pas faire l’objet d’une telle ordonnance et notamment dans les cas suivants : (a) cannot, on the exercise of due diligence, be located; a) impossibilité, malgré des efforts en ce sens, de re- trouver le bien; (b) has been transferred to a third party; b) remise à un tiers; (c) is located outside canada; c) situation du bien à l’extérieur du canada; (d) has been substantially diminished in value or ren- dered worthless; or d) diminution importante de valeur; (e) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty. e) fusion avec un autre bien qu’il est par ailleurs dif- ficile de diviser. [105] this provision was considered in lavigne, which examined whether an offender’s inability to pay a fine could be used as a basis for declining to impose a fine in lieu. justice deschamps, writ- ing for a unanimous court, stated that a fine in lieu “is not regarded as punishment specifically for the designated offence”; rather, “its purpose is to re- place the proceeds of crime” (para. 25; see also r. v. dieckmann, 2017 onca 575, 355 ccc (3d) 216, at para. 88; r v. angelis, 2016 onca 675, 133 or (3d) 575, at para 39). [105] cette disposition a été examinée dans l’arrêt lavigne, où notre cour s’est demandé si l’incapa- cité du contrevenant de payer une amende pouvait constituer un motif valable pour refuser d’infliger une amende de remplacement. dans un jugement unanime, la juge deschamps a affirmé, au nom de la cour, que l’amende de remplacement «  n’est pas considérée comme la punition prévue spécifi- quement pour l’infraction désignée »; « elle vise [plutôt] à remplacer le produit du crime » (par. 25; voir également r c. dieckmann, 2017 onca 575, 355 ccc (3d) 216, par. 88; r c. angelis, 2016 onca 675, 133 or (3d) 575, par 39). [106] justice deschamps clarified that although s 46237(3) provides that the court “may” order a fine in lieu, this permissive language does not confer [106] la juge deschamps a précisé que même si le par 46237(3) prévoit que le tribunal « peut » infliger une amende de remplacement, cette formulation [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 893 a broad discretion not to do so. rather, the discretion is “limited” (paras. 1, 23, 27, 29, 34, and 44). in particular, it is limited by “the objective of the pro- vision, the nature of the order and the circumstances in which the order is made” and must be exercised in a manner “consistent with the spirit of the whole of the provisions in question” (paras 27-28). optionnelle ne confère pas un large pouvoir discré- tionnaire de refuser de le faire. le pouvoir discré- tionnaire en question est plutôt « limité » (par. 1, 23, 27, 29, 34 et 44). plus précisément, il est limité par « l’objectif de la disposition, par la nature de l’ordonnance et par les circonstances dans lesquelles celle-ci doit être rendue » et il doit être exercé d’une manière qui est « conforme à l’esprit de l’ensemble des dispositions concernées » (par 27-28). [107] these considerations led deschamps j. to conclude that an offender’s inability to pay cannot be taken into account when deciding whether to impose a fine (see paras. 1, 37, and 48).8 further, the mere fact that property has been used cannot justify a refusal to impose a fine (see para 32). nor does the provision leave any room to reduce the value of a fine; rather, the quantum is fixed at the value of the property (or the part of or interest in the property, as applicable) (see paras 34-35). [107] ces facteurs ont amené la juge deschamps à conclure que l’incapacité de payer du contrevenant ne peut être prise en considération dans la décision d’infliger ou non l’amende (voir par. 1, 37 et 48)8. de plus, le simple fait que le bien a été utilisé ne peut justifier le refus d’infliger une amende (voir par 32). la disposition ne permet pas non plus de diminuer le montant de l’amende, laquelle est égale à la valeur du bien (ou de la partie du bien ou du droit sur celui-ci, selon le cas) (voir par 34-35). [108] that said, deschamps j. acknowledged that there may be cases where the objectives of part xii.2 do not call for the imposition of a fine. an example would be “if the offender did not profit from the crime and if it was an isolated crime committed by an offender acting alone” (para 28). in that case, “none of the objectives [of part xii.2] would be furthered or frustrated by a decision not to impose a fine instead of forfeiture” (ibid). justice deschamps did not expressly consider whether the objectives of part xii.2 would call for the imposition of a fine in lieu where seized funds that have been released to pay for reasonable legal expenses are later deter- mined to be proceeds of crime. [108] cela dit, la juge deschamps a reconnu qu’il peut y avoir des cas où la poursuite des objectifs de la partie xii.2 ne requiert pas l’infliction d’une amende. il en serait ainsi, par exemple, « si le contrevenant n’a pas bénéficié du crime et s’il s’agit d’un crime isolé commis par un contrevenant agissant seul » (par 28). dans ce cas, « aucun des objectifs [de la partie xii.2] ne serait servi ou contrecarré par le refus d’infli- ger une amende de remplacement » (ibid). la juge deschamps ne s’est pas penchée sur la question de savoir si la poursuite des objectifs de la partie xii.2 nécessiterait l’infliction d’une amende de remplace- ment dans l’éventualité où les fonds saisis, dont on a jugé par la suite qu’ils constituaient des produits de la criminalité, seraient restitués pour permettre le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables. (7) the default provision — section 462.37(4) (7) la disposition sur le défaut de paiement — par 46237(4) [109] if a fine in lieu is imposed, but the offender defaults on payment, then the court must order a term of imprisonment, which varies based on the amount owing (s 46237(4)(a)). this term of [109] si une amende de remplacement est infligée, mais que le contrevenant ne la paie pas, le tribunal devra lui imposer une peine d’emprisonnement dont la durée varie en fonction du montant de l’amende 8 it can, however, be taken into account when determining how much time an offender should be given to pay the fine (see pa- ras 47-48). 8 elle peut toutefois être prise en compte dans la détermination du délai accordé au contrevenant pour payer l’amende (voir par 47-48). 894 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. imprisonment must be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed on the offender (s 46237(4)(b)). [110] a term of imprisonment imposed for default- ing on a fine in lieu is not regarded as a punishment for the designated offence, but rather as an enforce- ment mechanism to encourage payment by those who have the resources (see angelis, at para. 50, citing r v. khatchatourov, 2014 onca 464, 313 ccc (3d) 94, at paras. 55-56; r v. bourque (2005), 193 ccc (3d) 485 (ont. ca), at para 20). [111] pursuant to this court’s decision in r v. wu, 2003 scc 73, [2003] 3 scr 530, a warrant of com- mittal cannot be issued for a default on a fine if the offender has a genuine inability to pay (paras. 3 and 60-66; see also lavigne, at para 47). thus, only an offender who has the means to pay, but refuses to do so in the time allotted (which is determined by refer- ence to “what is reasonable in all the circumstances” (wu, at para. 31)), can be imprisoned. (al.  462.37(4)a)) cette peine d’emprisonnement doit être purgée consécutivement à toute autre peine d’emprisonnement infligée au contrevenant (al 46237(4)b)). [110] la peine d’emprisonnement infligée pour défaut de paiement d’une amende n’est pas considé- rée comme une sanction pour l’infraction désignée, mais plutôt comme un mécanisme d’exécution visant à inciter les contrevenants qui en ont les moyens à payer l’amende (voir angelis, par. 50, citant r c. khatchatourov, 2014 onca 464, 313 ccc (3d) 94, par. 55-56; r c. bourque (2005), 193 ccc (3d) 485 (ca. ont.), par 20). [111] suivant l’arrêt rendu par notre cour dans r. c. wu, 2003 csc 73, [2003] 3 rcs 530, un mandat d’incarcération pour défaut de paiement d’une amende ne peut être délivré lorsque le contrevenant est effec- tivement incapable de la payer (par. 3 et 60-66; voir également lavigne, par 47). en conséquence, seul le contrevenant qui a les moyens de payer l’amende, mais qui refuse de le faire dans le délai imparti (lequel est établi « selon ce qui est raisonnable eu égard à toutes les circonstances » (wu, par. 31)), peut être incarcéré. c the relationship between the restoration pro- c rapport entre la disposition sur la restitution et vision and the fine in lieu provision celle sur l’amende de remplacement [112] the parties take different views of the rela- tionship between the restoration provision and the fine in lieu provision. mr. rafilovich submits that where the court has authorized the release of seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses, those funds are presumptively exempt from a fine in lieu. he further submits that this presumption can be re- butted only where there has been a material change in circumstances between the release of the funds and sentencing (eg, an unforeseen enrichment or new evidence of a fraud on the court). the crown, by contrast, submits that the release of funds is of no moment from a sentencing perspective: the funds should generally be subject to a fine in lieu, subject only to a limited discretion. [112] les parties interprètent différemment le rapport qui existe entre la disposition sur la restitu- tion et celle concernant l’amende de remplacement. monsieur rafilovich soutient que, lorsque le tribunal a autorisé la restitution des fonds saisis pour le paie- ment de frais juridiques raisonnables, ces fonds sont réputés ne pas pouvoir faire l’objet d’une amende de remplacement. il ajoute que cette présomption ne peut être réfutée que lorsqu’un changement important de situation survient entre la restitution des fonds et la détermination de la peine (p ex, un enrichissement imprévu ou la présentation de nouveaux éléments de preuve établissant une fraude envers le tribunal). pour sa part, le ministère public fait valoir que la restitution des fonds n’est envisagée à aucun moment sous l’angle de la détermination de la peine : les fonds devraient généralement pouvoir faire l’objet d’une amende de remplacement, sous réserve uniquement de l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire limité. [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 895 [113] my colleague’s conclusion aligns with mr. rafilovich’s position. she concludes that where a court has authorized the release of seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses, a fine in lieu should not “generally” be imposed, subject to two exceptions: “where it turns out that the offender did not have a real financial need or the funds were not used to alleviate that need” (paras. 8 and 10). [114] with respect, i would adopt a distinct ap- proach. for reasons that follow, i conclude that of- fenders who have used proceeds of crime to pay for their own defence, thereby deriving a benefit from their crime, should generally be required to repay that benefit through a fine in lieu. this follows from a straightforward application of the primary objective of the proceeds of crime regime — namely, ensuring that crime does not pay. however, where a sentenc- ing judge is satisfied that representation by counsel was essential to the offender’s constitutional right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter, the judge should exercise his or her limited discretion not to impose a fine in lieu in respect of the released funds. [113] la conclusion de ma collègue s’accorde avec la position de m rafilovich. elle conclut que, lorsque le tribunal a autorisé la restitution de fonds saisis pour le paiement de frais juridiques raison- nables, une amende de remplacement ne devrait, « en général », pas être infligée, sous réserve de deux exceptions : « s’il s’avère que le contrevenant n’avait pas un véritable besoin financier ou que les fonds n’ont pas été utilisés pour atténuer ce besoin » (par. 8 et 10). [114] en toute déférence, je préconise un raisonne- ment différent. pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclus que les contrevenants qui se sont servis de produits de la criminalité pour payer leur propre défense et, de ce fait, tiré profit de leur crime devraient généra- lement être tenus de rembourser ce profit au moyen d’une amende de remplacement. cette mesure dé- coule d’une simple application de l’objectif premier du régime des produits de la criminalité, à savoir garantir que le crime ne paie pas. cependant, lorsque le juge chargé de déterminer la peine est convaincu que le fait d’être représenté par avocat était essentiel pour assurer le respect du droit constitutionnel du contrevenant à un procès équitable garanti par l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte, le juge devrait exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire limité de refuser d’infliger une amende de remplacement à l’égard des fonds restitués. (1) released funds transferred to a lawyer are “property of an offender” under section 462.37(3) (1) les fonds restitués qui sont remis à un avocat constituent un « bien [  ] d’un contreve- nant » visé par le par 46237(3) [115] as indicated, s 46237(3) provides that a fine in lieu may be imposed in respect of any “property of an offender” that would ordinarily be made subject to a forfeiture order but cannot. in r v. appleby, 2009 nlca 6, 282 nfld. & peir 134, the newfound- land and labrador court of appeal concluded that where seized funds are transferred to a lawyer pur- suant to a restoration order, they lose their character as “property of an offender” and therefore cannot be subject to a fine in lieu (see para 65). [115] comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, le par 46237(3) prévoit qu’une amende de remplacement peut être in- fligée à l’égard « d’un bien [  ] d’un contrevenant » qui serait habituellement visé par une ordonnance de confiscation, mais qui ne peut faire l’objet d’une telle ordonnance. dans l’arrêt r c. appleby, 2009 nlca 6, 282 nfld. & peir 134, la cour d’appel de terre- neuve-et- labrador a conclu que, lorsque les fonds saisis sont remis à un avocat en applica- tion d’une ordonnance de restitution, ils cessent de constituer un « bien [  ] d’un contrevenant » et, par conséquent, ils ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une amende de remplacement (voir par 65). 896 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. [116] with respect, i cannot agree. the definition of “property” in s. 2 includes “property originally in the possession or under the control of any person”. by virtue of this broad definition, seized funds that have been released to an offender, but then subse- quently transferred to a lawyer, are still “property of an offender” because they were “originally” in the offender’s possession or control. [117] this conclusion finds support in the juris- prudence. courts have interpreted “property of an offender” under s 46237(3) as requiring that, at some point, the offender must have had possession or control of the property (see p. m. german, proceeds of crime and money laundering (2nd ed. (loose- leaf)), vol. 1, at § 96(a2); see, eg,. r v. dwyer, 2013 onca 34, 296 ccc (3d) 193, at para 24). it is also consistent with this court’s observation in lavigne that the proceeds of crime provisions apply to “the widest possible range of property” (para 15). [116] avec égards, je ne peux être de cet avis. la définition de « biens » énoncée à l’art. 2 englobe des « biens originairement en la possession ou sous le contrôle d’une personne ». suivant cette large définition, les fonds saisis qui ont été restitués à un contrevenant, mais subséquemment remis à un avo- cat constituent toujours « un bien [  ] d’un contre- venant », parce qu’ils étaient « originairement » en la possession ou sous le contrôle du contrevenant. [117] cette conclusion trouve appui dans la ju- risprudence. les tribunaux ont interprété les mots « bien [  ] d’un contrevenant » qui figurent au par 46237(3) comme exigeant que, à un moment donné, le bien ait été en la possession ou sous le contrôle du contrevenant (voir  p.  m german, proceeds of crime and money laundering (2e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), vol. 1, § 96(a2); voir, p ex, r. c. dwyer, 2013 onca 34, 296 ccc (3d) 193, par 24). elle est par ailleurs conforme aux propos tenus par la cour dans l’arrêt lavigne selon lesquels les dispositions sur les produits de la criminalité s’appliquent à « la plus vaste gamme possible de biens » (par 15). [118] this conclusion also finds support in aca- demic commentary. as the authors of drug offences in canada write: [118] cette conclusion trouve également appui dans la doctrine. ainsi que l’expliquent les auteurs de l’ouvrage drug offences in canada : property of an offender that has been seized or restrained is the offender’s property until it is ordered forfeited. if an of- fender brings an application under s 46234, a judge may order that all or part of the seized property be “returned” to the applicant, or may vary or revoke the restraint order, for the purpose of paying his or her reasonable legal ex- penses (s 46234(4)(c)). the funds remain the property of the offender, even after they are released for that purpose. [traduction] les biens du contrevenant qui ont été saisis ou bloqués continuent d’appartenir à ce dernier jusqu’à ce qu’ils soient confisqués par ordonnance. le juge saisi d’une demande présentée par le contrevenant en vertu de l’art 46234 peut ordonner que les biens saisis lui soient restitués, en tout ou en partie, ou encore modifier ou ré- voquer l’ordonnance de blocage, afin de lui permettre de payer ses frais juridiques raisonnables (al 46234(4)c)). les fonds demeurent la propriété du contrevenant, même après qu’ils lui ont été restitués à cette fin. (b. a. macfarlane, r. j. frater and c. michaelson, drug offences in canada (4th ed. (loose- leaf)), at § 14:18040120) (b a macfarlane,. r j frater et c. michaelson, drug offences in canada (4e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), § 14:18040120) [119] further, to accept that a transfer to a third party strips the property of its status as “property of an offender”, thereby placing it beyond the reach of the proceeds of crime regime, would be to ignore that the act of transferring the property to a third [119] qui plus est, accepter que le bien remis à un tiers cesse d’être un « bien [  ] d’un contrevenant » et se trouve ainsi soustrait à l’application du régime des produits de la criminalité reviendrait à ignorer que la remise du bien à un tiers constitue la raison [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 897 party is the very rationale for imposing a fine in lieu in the first place (s 46237(3)(b)). this reasoning would transform a rationale for imposing a fine into a rationale for not imposing a fine, contrary to this court’s statement in lavigne that courts “cannot transform circumstances in which a fine may be ordered instead of forfeiture into circumstances that justify not imposing a fine” (para 24). more point- edly, it would make it impossible to impose a fine in lieu where the offender has transferred the property to a third party, thereby blowing a hole in the forfei- ture regime and undermining its effectiveness. [120] in addition, that proceeds of crime have been released to an offender pursuant to a court order does nothing to change the fact that the property was “ob- tained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of” the commission of a designated offence. as such, the property retains its character as “proceeds of crime” under s 4623(1). d’être de l’infliction d’une amende de remplacement au départ (al 46237(3)b)). ce raisonnement trans- formerait la raison de condamner le contrevenant à une amende en une raison de ne pas lui infliger cette même amende, contrairement à l’affirmation de notre cour, dans l’arrêt lavigne, que les tribunaux ne peuvent « transformer des circonstances donnant ouverture à l’ordonnance de remplacement en cir- constances justifiant de ne pas infliger l’amende » (par 24). plus précisément, ce raisonnement ne per- mettrait pas d’infliger une amende de remplacement lorsque le contrevenant a remis le bien à un tiers, ce qui créerait une brèche dans le régime de confisca- tion et en diminuerait l’efficacité. [120] de plus, même si les produits de la crimina- lité ont été restitués au contrevenant conformément à une ordonnance judiciaire, il n’en demeure pas moins que les biens en question ont été « obtenu[s] ou [  ] provien[nent], [  ] directement ou indirecte- ment », de la perpétration d’une infraction désignée. par conséquent, ils demeurent des « produits de la criminalité » au sens du par 4623(1). [121] for these reasons, i conclude that seized funds that have been released to an offender and then transferred to a lawyer remain “property of an offender” for purposes of s 46237(3). [121] pour ces motifs, je conclus que les fonds saisis qui ont été restitués à un contrevenant, puis remis à un avocat demeurent un « bien [  ] d’un contrevenant » pour l’application du par 46237(3). (2) a transfer of released funds to a lawyer is a “transfe[r] to a third party” under section 462.37(3)(b) (2) la remise à un avocat de fonds restitués à un contrevenant constitue une « remise à un tiers » aux termes de l’al 46237(3)b) [122] a further issue is whether a judicially au- thorized transfer of released funds to a lawyer is a “transfe[r] to a third party” under s 46237(3)(b). as i will explain, it clearly is. [122] il faut aussi décider si la remise autorisée par voie judiciaire de fonds restitués à un avocat constitue une « remise à un tiers » aux termes de l’al 46237(3)b). comme je vais l’expliquer, elle en constitue manifestement une. [123] section  462.37(3) provides that where a court is satisfied that a forfeiture order should be made, but the property “cannot be made subject to an order [of forfeiture]”, it may impose a fine in lieu. this language, which is followed by a non- exhaustive list of example circumstances where property “cannot be made subject to an order [of for- feiture]” (see lavigne, at para. 24), is broad. as one author points out, it “does not distinguish between [123] le paragraphe  462.37(3) dispose que le tribunal qui est convaincu qu’une ordonnance de confiscation devrait être rendue à l’égard d’un bien, alors que celui-ci « ne peut pas faire l’objet d’une telle ordonnance », peut infliger une amende en rem- placement de celle-ci. cette formulation, qui est sui- vie d’une liste non exhaustive de circonstances dans lesquelles un bien « ne peut pas faire l’objet d’une [  ] ordonnance [de confiscation] » (voir lavigne, 898 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. innocent transfers and those intended to defeat for- feiture” (german, § 96(a3) (footnote omitted)). in fact, two attempts were made to amend s 46237(3) during committee proceedings on bill  c-61, the legislation that introduced part xii.2, to require that an offender must have wilfully attempted to avoid a forfeiture order before a fine in lieu may be imposed. but both proposed amendments were defeated (see house of commons, minutes of proceedings and evidence of the legislative committee on bill c-61: an act to amend the criminal code, the food and drugs act and the narcotic act, no. 1, 2nd sess., 33rd parl., june 1, 1988, at pp. 9:22-9:24; june 2, 1988, at pp 10:17-10:18). par. 24), est vaste. comme le souligne un auteur, cette disposition [traduction] « n’établit pas de distinction entre les remises faites de bonne foi et celles visant à contrecarrer la confiscation » (german, § 96(a3) (note en bas de page omise)). en fait, on a par deux fois tenté de modifier le par 46237(3) au cours des travaux du comité parlementaire chargé du projet de loi c-61, qui a introduit la partie xii.2, afin d’exiger que le contrevenant ait délibérément tenté d’éviter une ordonnance de confiscation avant qu’une amende de remplacement puisse être infligée. les deux amendements proposés ont toutefois été re- jetés (voir chambre des communes, procès- verbaux et témoignages du comité législatif sur le projet de loi c-61 : loi modifiant le code criminel, la loi des aliments et drogues et la loi sur les stupéfiants, no 1, 2e sess., 33e lég., 1er juin 1988, p. 9:22-9:24; 2 juin 1988, p 10:17-10:18). [124] section 462.37(3)(b) contemplates the im- position of a fine in lieu where any property that would otherwise be subject to forfeiture “has been transferred to a third party”. parliament could have limited the class of transfers caught by this provision. for example, it could have referred to situations in which the property “has been transferred to a third party, other than a lawyer” or to situations in which the property “has been transferred to a third party, except where authorized by court order under s 46234(4)(c)”, thereby creating a safe harbour for such transfers. but it did not. in the absence of any such limiting language, the grammatical and ordi- nary sense of “transfer” — to move a thing from one place to another — must prevail. [124] l’alinéa 462.37(3)b) envisage la possibilité d’infliger une amende de remplacement en cas de « remise à un tiers » de tout bien qui aurait par ail- leurs fait l’objet d’une confiscation. le législateur aurait pu restreindre la catégorie de remises visées par cette disposition. ainsi, il aurait pu viser les cas de « remise [du bien] à un tiers qui n’est pas avo- cat » ou les cas de « remise à un tiers, sauf si cette remise a été autorisée par ordonnance du tribunal en vertu de l’al 46234(4)c) », de façon à protéger ces remises. or, il ne l’a pas fait. à défaut de formulation restrictive de cette nature, c’est le sens grammatical et ordinaire du mot « remise » — action de remettre, de transférer quelque chose à quelqu’un — qu’il faut retenir. [125] the weight of appellate jurisprudence fa- vours the conclusion that a judicially authorized transfer of released funds to a lawyer is a “transfe[r] to a third party” under s 46237(3)(b) and may give rise to a fine in lieu (see, eg,. r v. wilson (1993), 15  or  (3d) 645  (ca);. r v maclean (1996), 184 nbr (2d) 26 (ca);. r v. smith, 2008 skca 20, 307 sask. r. 45 (“smith”)). the only outlier is appleby, which, for reasons i have already explained, is undermined by an erroneous interpretation of the words “property of an offender” in s 46237(3)(b). [125] la jurisprudence dominante des cours d’ap- pel appuie la conclusion selon laquelle la remise autorisée par voie judiciaire de fonds restitués à un avocat constitue une « remise à un tiers » visée à l’al 46237(3)b) et peut donner lieu à l’infliction d’une amende de remplacement (voir, p.  ex.,  r. c. wilson (1993), 15  or  (3d) 645  (ca);. r c. maclean (1996), 184 nbr (2d) 26 (ca);. r c. smith, 2008 skca 20, 307 sask. r. 45 (« smith »)). la seule exception est l’arrêt appleby, dont la portée est affaiblie, comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, par une interprétation erronée des mots « bien [  ] d’un contrevenant » à l’al 46237(3)b). [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 899 [126] as for my colleague’s insistence that a ju- dicially authorized transfer of released funds to a lawyer is not “thematically analogous” to any of the examples listed in s 46237(3) because it bears the court’s stamp of approval (paras. 72-73), this reason- ing must be rejected. the consistent “theme” running through these examples is that the property cannot be made subject to a forfeiture order (see lavigne, at paras. 23 and 32). it is that simple. a judicially authorized transfer of released funds to a lawyer — a third party — fits comfortably within this “theme”, as a court has no ability to reach into the pockets of a lawyer who lawfully came into possession of the funds. this is consistent with s 46234(7), which shields third parties who come into possession of released property from being charged with certain proceeds of crime offences. [127] in my view, the mere fact that a court has given its blessing to the release of seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses does not offer a sound basis for declining to impose a fine in lieu. this view is shared by the authors of drug offences in canada, who write: “[i]t strains the meaning of ss 46234 and 462.37(3)(b) to suggest that, just be- cause the transfer has occurred with the imprimatur of a judicial official, a fine in lieu of forfeiture cannot be ordered” (macfarlane, frater and michaelson, at § 14:18040120). in sum, i conclude that a judicially au- [128] thorized transfer of released funds to a lawyer is a “transfe[r] to a third party” under s 46237(3)(b). as such, a sentencing judge may impose a fine in lieu in respect of such funds. but this conclusion does not end the analysis. while it opens the door to a fine in lieu, it will not always be appropriate for sentencing judges to walk through that door. in particular, as i will develop, the constitutionally protected right to state- funded counsel in limited circumstances may require otherwise. [126] et bien que ma collègue insiste pour dire que la remise autorisée par voie judiciaire de fonds restitués à un avocat ne relève pas d’un « sujet sem- blable » à ceux figurant dans la liste d’exemples du par 46237(3) parce qu’elle porte le sceau d’ap- probation du tribunal (par. 72-73), il faut rejeter ce raisonnement. le « sujet » récurrent dans tous ces exemples est que le bien en question ne peut faire l’objet d’une ordonnance de confiscation (voir la- vigne, par. 23 et 32). c’est aussi simple que cela. le fait de remettre, en application d’une ordonnance ju- diciaire, des fonds restitués à un avocat — qui est un tiers — s’inscrit fort bien dans ce « sujet », puisque le tribunal ne peut aucunement fouiller dans les poches d’un avocat ayant légitimement pris possession des fonds. cela est conforme au par 46234(7), qui em- pêche les tiers prenant possession de biens restitués d’être accusés de certaines infractions relatives aux produits de la criminalité. [127] à mon avis, le simple fait qu’un tribunal a donné sa bénédiction à la mainlevée de fonds saisis pour le paiement des frais juridiques raisonnables ne fournit pas une assise valable pour refuser d’im- poser une amende de remplacement. cet avis est partagé par les auteurs de l’ouvrage drug offences in canada qui écrivent : [traduction] « [l]’affir- mation selon laquelle le tribunal ne peut infliger une amende en remplacement de la confiscation pour la simple raison que la remise a reçu l’aval d’un officier de justice met à rude épreuve le sens de l’art 46234 et de l’al 46237(3)b) » (macfarlane, frater et michaelson, § 14:18040120). [128] en résumé, je conclus que la remise au- torisée par voie judiciaire de fonds restitués à un avocat constitue une « remise à un tiers » visée à l’al 46237(3)b). en conséquence, le juge chargé de déterminer la peine peut infliger une amende de remplacement à l’égard de ces fonds. mais l’analyse ne s’arrête pas là. bien que cette conclusion donne ouverture à l’infliction d’une amende de rempla- cement, il ne sera pas toujours indiqué que le juge chargé de déterminer la peine emprunte cette voie. en particulier, comme je l’explique plus loin, il se peut que le droit constitutionnel à l’assistance d’un avocat rémunéré par l’état commande une autre avenue. 900 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. (3) the limited discretion not to impose a fine in lieu (3) le pouvoir discrétionnaire limité de refuser d’infliger une amende de remplacement (a) the discretion not to impose a fine in lieu should be exercised where legal representa- tion was essential to the offender’s right to a fair trial under sections 7 and 11(d) of the charter [129] as indicated, s 46237(3) provides that where a sentencing judge is satisfied that a forfeiture order should be made in respect of any property of an of- fender, but the property cannot be made subject to such an order, the judge “may” order a fine in lieu. this language is permissive and confers a “limited” discretion not to impose a fine (see lavigne, at pa- ras. 1, 23, 27, 29, 34, and 44). this discretion must be exercised in a manner consistent with the spirit of part xii.2 as a whole (see ibid., at para 28). [130] as the debates leading up to the enactment of the proceeds of crime regime reveal, part xii.2 seeks to balance the need to ensure an effective forfeiture regime and the “constitutionally protected right to counsel”. to properly understand this balance, how- ever, it is first necessary to examine what the con- stitutionally protected right to counsel does — and does not — entail. [131] under s. 10(b) of the charter, “[e]veryone has the right on arrest or detention    to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right”. the purpose of this right is to provide arrestees and detainees with the opportunity, upon arrest or detention, to access legal advice relevant to their situation (see r v. sinclair, 2010 scc 35, [2010] 2 scr 310, at paras. 24-26; r v. manninen, [1987] 1 scr 1233, at pp 1242-43). a) il y a lieu d’exercer le pouvoir discrétionnaire de refuser d’infliger une amende de rempla- cement si la représentation par avocat était essentielle au respect du droit à un procès équitable que garantissent au contrevenant l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte [129] comme nous l’avons vu, le par 46237(3) dispose que, lorsque le tribunal chargé de déter- miner la peine est convaincu qu’une ordonnance de confiscation devrait être rendue à l’égard d’un bien d’un contrevenant, mais que ce bien ne peut faire l’objet d’une telle ordonnance, le juge « peut » infliger une amende de remplacement. ce texte a un caractère permissif et confère le pouvoir discrétion- naire « limité » de ne pas infliger d’amende (voir lavigne, par. 1, 23, 27, 29, 34 et 44). il faut exercer ce pouvoir discrétionnaire conformément à l’esprit de l’ensemble de la partie xii.2 (voir ibid., par 28). [130] comme le révèlent les débats qui ont précédé l’instauration du régime des produits de la crimi- nalité, la partie xii.2 vise à atteindre un équilibre entre la nécessité d’assurer un régime de confiscation efficace et celle de respecter le « droit constitutionnel à l’assistance d’un avocat ». cependant, afin de bien comprendre cet équilibre, il est impératif d’examiner d’abord ce que ce droit protégé par la constitution suppose et ce qu’il ne suppose pas. [131] suivant l’al. 10b) de la charte, « [c]hacun a le droit, en cas d’arrestation ou de détention [  ] d’avoir recours sans délai à l’assistance d’un avocat et d’être informé de ce droit ». ce droit vise à fournir aux personnes arrêtées ou détenues la possibilité, au moment de l’arrestation ou de la détention, d’avoir accès à des conseils juridiques propres à leur si- tuation (voir r c. sinclair, 2010 csc 35, [2010] 2 rcs 310, par. 24-26; r c. manninen, [1987] 1 rcs 1233, p. 1242- 1243). [132] but as this court noted in british columbia (attorney general) v. christie, 2007 scc 21, [2007] 1 scr 873, neither s. 10(b) nor any other char ter right postulates “a general right to legal assistance” [132] cependant, comme l’a fait remarquer la cour dans l’arrêt colombie- britannique (procureur géné- ral) c. christie, 2007 csc 21, [2007] 1 rcs 873, ni l’al. 10b) ni quelque autre droit garanti par la [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 901 (paras 24-25). to be clear, s. 10(b) does not contem- plate a general entitlement to legal representation throughout a criminal proceeding, much less rep- resentation paid for by the state. this is reinforced by the fact that s. 10(b)’s focus is fixed squarely at the time of “arrest or detention”. as this court ex- plained in sinclair, s. 10(b) has consistently been defined “in terms of the right to consult counsel to obtain information and advice immediately upon detention”, not as providing a right to ongoing legal assistance thereafter (para. 31 (emphasis added); see also r v. willier, 2010 scc 37, [2010] 2 scr 429, at para 28). [133] my colleague hints at “a constitutional right of accused persons to spend their own money on le- gal counsel” (para 50). frankly, i have no idea what this means. for my part, the question is not whether accused persons can spend their own money on legal counsel — they clearly can, and they do not need a constitutional right to do so. rather, the question is whether offenders who have secured the benefit of le- gal representation by using proceeds of crime — the unlawful possession of which constitutes a criminal offence (s. 354(1)) — are excused from having to pay back that benefit through a fine in lieu. much as my colleague might wish it were otherwise, neither s. 10(b) nor any other section of the charter provides for a right to use proceeds of crime to pay for legal counsel without consequence. charte ne crée « un droit général à l’assistance ju- ridique » (par 24-25). en termes clairs, l’al. 10b) n’envisage pas l’existence d’un droit général à la re- présentation par avocat pour toute la durée du procès criminel et encore moins que cette représentation soit payée par l’état. ce point de vue est renforcé par le fait que l’al. 10b) a nettement pour point de mire le moment de l’« arrestation » ou de la « détention ». comme la cour l’a expliqué dans l’arrêt sinclair, l’al. 10b) a constamment été défini comme « le droit de consulter un avocat pour obtenir renseignements et conseils dès le début de la détention » mais pas le droit à l’assistance continue d’un avocat par la suite (par. 31 (je souligne); voir également r c. willier, 2010 csc 37, [2010] 2 rcs 429, par 28). [133] ma collègue fait allusion au « droit consti- tutionnel d’un accusé de dépenser son propre argent pour retenir les services d’un avocat » (par 50). pour être franc, je n’ai pas la moindre idée de ce que cela veut dire. pour ma part, il ne s’agit pas de savoir si l’accusé peut dépenser son propre argent pour retenir les services d’un avocat — il peut évidemment le faire et il n’a pas besoin d’un droit constitutionnel à cette fin. il s’agit plutôt de savoir si les contrevenants ayant obtenu le bénéfice d’une représentation par avocat en utilisant des produits de la criminalité — dont la possession illégale constitue une infraction criminelle (par. 354(1)) — sont dispensés de l’obli- gation de rembourser ce bénéfice au moyen d’une amende de remplacement. autant ma collègue sou- haite peut- être qu’il en soit autrement, ni l’al. 10b) ni aucune autre disposition de la charte n’accorde le droit d’utiliser des produits de la criminalité pour retenir les services d’un avocat sans conséquence. [134] the right to state- funded legal counsel in criminal proceedings does exist, but it is limited in scope and grounded in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. in rowbotham, the ontario court of appeal recog- nized a limited right to state- funded counsel where legal aid has been denied, the accused lacks other means, and representation by counsel is essential to the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter (see pp. 65-66 and 69-70). where the application judge is satisfied that all three criteria are met, he or she may, pursuant to s. 24(1) of the charter, stay the proceeding against [134] le droit aux services d’un avocat rémunéré par l’état dans un procès criminel existe bel et bien, mais sa portée est limitée et repose sur l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte. dans l’arrêt rowbotham, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a reconnu l’existence d’un droit limité aux services d’un avocat rémunéré par l’état lorsque l’aide juridique a été refusée, que l’accusé n’a pas d’autres moyens et que le fait d’être représenté par un avocat est essentiel pour assurer le respect du droit constitutionnel à un procès équi- table garanti à l’accusé par l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte (voir p. 65-66 et 69-70). lorsque le juge des 902 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. the accused until the necessary funding is provided (see p 69). this leaves the crown with a choice: fund the defence, or see the proceeding stayed. on the other hand, if any of the criteria are not met (eg, the accused is capable of handling the matter without the assistance of counsel), then the accused will be left with no other option but to self- represent. [135] mr. rafilovich submits that the rowbotham requirements are implicit in the restoration provi- sion. in particular, he suggests that the words “rea- sonable    legal expenses” in s 46234(4)(c)(ii) incorporate the requirement that representation by counsel be essential to a fair trial. accordingly, he maintains that where a court has authorized the re- lease of seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses, that entails a finding that counsel was es- sential to a fair trial. requêtes est convaincu que les trois conditions sont réunies, il peut, en vertu du par. 24(1) de la charte, ordonner l’arrêt des procédures intentées contre l’ac- cusé jusqu’à ce que le financement nécessaire soit fourni (voir p 69). deux possibilités s’offrent alors au ministère public : soit il finance la défense, soit il se résigne à l’arrêt des procédures. en revanche, si l’une des conditions n’est pas remplie (p ex, l’ac- cusé est en mesure de se défendre sans l’assistance d’un avocat), l’accusé n’aura d’autre choix que de se représenter lui- même. [135] monsieur rafilovich soutient que les exi- gences de l’arrêt rowbotham sont sous- entendues dans la disposition sur la restitution. plus précisément, il affirme que les mots « frais juridiques [  ] raison- nables » que l’on trouve au sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii) comportent l’exigence que le fait d’être représenté par un avocat soit essentiel à la tenue d’un procès équitable. en conséquence, affirme-t-il, lorsque le tribunal a autorisé la restitution de fonds saisis pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables, cela si- gnifie qu’il estimait que le fait d’être représenté par un avocat était essentiel à la tenue d’un procès équitable. [136] respectfully, for at least three reasons, i cannot agree. [136] en toute déférence, je ne puis me rallier à cette opinion, et ce, pour au moins trois raisons. [137] first, on its terms, s 46234(4)(c)(ii) author- izes accused persons to seek the release of seized funds to pay for “reasonable” legal expenses. the scope of what is “reasonable” is clearly broader than the scope of what is strictly “necessary” or “essen- tial”. accordingly, the provision permits the release of funds where representation by counsel may be preferable, but not essential. in such circumstances, the accused’s right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter would not be engaged. [137] d’abord, de par son libellé, le sous-al. 462.34(4)c)(ii) autorise l’accusé à solliciter la main- levée des fonds saisis pour le paiement de frais ju- ridiques « raisonnables ». la portée de ce qui est « raisonnable » est manifestement plus large que celle de ce qui est strictement «  nécessaire  » ou « essentiel ». par conséquent, la disposition permet la mainlevée des fonds lorsque la représentation par avocat peut être préférable sans être essentielle. dans ces circonstances, le droit à un procès équi- table garanti à l’accusé par l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte ne serait pas en jeu. [138] second, to read a full rowbotham analysis into the word “reasonable” in s.  462.34(4)(c)(ii) would be to stretch the meaning of that term be- yond what it can reasonably bear. if the legislature had intended to embed a rowbotham analysis in s 46234(4)(c)(ii), it would have done so expressly. the more plausible interpretation is that the word [138] ensuite, faire une analyse exhaustive fondée sur l’arrêt rowbotham lorsqu’on interprète le mot « raisonnables » au sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii) aurait pour effet d’étendre indûment la portée de ce mot. si le législateur avait voulu intégrer une analyse fondée sur rowbotham à cette disposition, il l’aurait fait de façon explicite. suivant l’interprétation la plus [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 903 “reasonable” simply imports a requirement of pro- portionality for example, it would not be “rea- sonable” to pay counsel an exorbitant hourly rate or to seek the return of hundreds of thousands of dollars to defend against straightforward drug traf- ficking charges releasing such disproportionate sums would unduly jeopardize the objectives of pre- serving potential proceeds of crime and facilitating the enforcement of any future forfeiture order. this interpretation finds support in s 46234(5), which requires courts to take into account legal aid tariffs when determining the “reasonableness” of legal expenses under s 46234(4)(c)(ii). [139] third, the word “reasonable” qualifies both “business” and “legal” expenses in s 46234(4)(c)(ii). yet the rowbotham test has no application to business expenses. it would defy logic, not to mention basic principles of statutory interpretation, to think that the same word in the same provision can mean two com- pletely different things depending on whether the ex- penses are “business” expenses or “legal” expenses. [140] accordingly, i conclude that s 46234(4)(c)(ii) permits accused persons to access funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses even where representation by counsel is not essential to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. the question that remains, however, is whether sentencing judges should exer- cise their limited discretion not to impose a fine in lieu in respect of funds that have been released to pay for reasonable legal expenses where representation by counsel was essential to the offender’s right to a fair trial. in my view, the answer is “yes”. plausible, le mot « raisonnables » introduit simple- ment une exigence de proportionnalité. ainsi, il ne serait pas « raisonnable » de payer un taux horaire exorbitant pour les services d’un avocat ou de solli- citer la restitution de centaines de milliers de dollars pour contester des accusations de trafic de stupéfiants peu complexes. la restitution de sommes d’argent aussi élevées aurait pour effet de contrecarrer les objectifs qui consistent à préserver les produits de la criminalité potentiels et à faciliter la mise à exécution d’éventuelles ordonnances de confiscation. cette in- terprétation trouve appui dans le par 46234(5), qui oblige le tribunal à tenir compte du barème d’aide juridique lorsqu’il se prononce sur le « caractère raisonnable » des frais juridiques en application du sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii). [139] en troisième lieu, le mot « raisonnables » s’applique tant aux « dépenses commerciales » qu’aux « frais juridiques » visés au sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii). or, le critère de l’arrêt rowbotham ne s’applique pas aux dépenses commerciales. il serait contraire à la logique, ainsi qu’aux principes élémentaires d’interprétation législative, de croire que le même mot figurant dans la même disposition peut avoir deux sens complètement différents selon qu’il s’agit des « dépenses commerciales » ou des « frais juri- diques ». [140] je conclus donc que le sous-al 46234(4)c)(ii) permet à l’accusé d’avoir accès à des fonds pour payer des frais juridiques raisonnables même lorsque le fait d’être représenté par un avocat n’est pas es- sentiel pour assurer le respect du droit à un procès équitable qui lui est garanti par l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte. cependant, il reste à savoir si le juge chargé de déterminer la peine devrait exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire limité de refuser d’infliger une amende de remplacement à l’égard des fonds qui ont été restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables lorsque le fait d’être représenté par un avocat était essentiel pour assurer le respect du droit de l’accusé à un procès équitable. à mon avis, la réponse est « oui ». [141] where an offender can show that he or she was constitutionally entitled to state- funded legal counsel, it would in my view be inconsistent with [141] si le contrevenant arrive à démontrer qu’il avait le droit constitutionnel d’obtenir l’assistance d’un avocat rémunéré par l’état, l’infliction d’une 904 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. that constitutional entitlement to order the offender to pay back his or her legal expenses through a fine in lieu. this approach to the limited discre- tion afforded by s 46237(3), which responds to situations in which the availability of the seized funds is the only thing standing between the of- fender and a rowbotham order, gives proper effect to parliament’s objective of ensuring an effective forfeiture regime while still vindicating the constitu- tionally protected right to counsel. it also recognizes that if legal representation was in fact essential to the offender’s constitutional right to a fair trial, then he or she would have derived no net benefit from being able to use seized funds to pay for counsel, since such funds would simply be a substitute for state funds to which the person would otherwise have been entitled. but to go further as my colleague does and exempt all funds that have been released to pay for reasonable legal expenses from a fine in lieu, whether or not the offender was constitution- ally entitled to state- funded counsel, would not only upset the careful balance struck by parliament, it would effectively grant a constitutional entitlement where none exists. [142] at the time an accused has to make a choice about whether to seek a release of seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses, it will not always be clear whether representation by counsel is essential to the accused’s right to a fair trial, and a rowbotham application would generally be denied due to the availability of the seized funds. this places the ac- cused in the position of having to choose between: (a) seeking a release of funds to pay for counsel and, if convicted, potentially having to pay that money back through a fine in lieu; and (b) not seeking a release of funds and instead self- representing. but making difficult choices is not an uncommon fea- ture of the criminal justice system. on the contrary, accused persons are often called upon to make dif- ficult calls. for example, some may have to decide whether to plead guilty and receive a lighter sen- tence, or maintain their innocence and risk a more severe sentence if convicted. others may have to amende de remplacement pour le contraindre à rem- bourser ses frais juridiques me semblerait incompa- tible avec ce droit constitutionnel. cette conception du pouvoir discrétionnaire limité accordé par le par.  462.37(3), qui répond à des situations où la disponibilité des fonds saisis est la seule chose qui sépare le contrevenant d’une ordonnance fondée sur l’arrêt rowbotham, donne l’effet voulu à l’objectif du législateur d’assurer à la fois un régime de confis- cation efficace et le respect du droit constitutionnel à l’assistance d’un avocat. cette conception reconnaît également que, si la représentation par avocat était en fait essentielle au droit constitutionnel du contre- venant à un procès équitable, il n’aurait tiré aucun bénéfice net de la faculté d’utiliser les fonds saisis pour retenir les services d’un avocat, car ces fonds se substitueraient simplement à ceux fournis par l’état auxquels aurait droit par ailleurs le contreve- nant. mais aller plus loin comme le fait ma collègue et soustraire à l’amende de remplacement tous les fonds qui ont été restitués aux fins de paiement des frais juridiques raisonnables, indépendamment de la question de savoir si le contrevenant avait le droit constitutionnel d’obtenir les services d’un avocat rémunéré par l’état, non seulement perturberait le juste équilibre que le législateur a établi, mais confé- rerait en fait aussi un droit constitutionnel alors qu’il n’en existe aucun. [142] lorsque l’accusé doit choisir de solliciter ou non la restitution des fonds saisis pour payer ses frais juridiques raisonnables, il ne sera pas toujours possible de savoir si le fait d’être représenté par un avocat est essentiel pour assurer le respect de son droit à un procès équitable, et une demande fondée sur l’arrêt rowbotham serait généralement refusée étant donné la disponibilité des fonds saisis. l’accusé se trouvera alors confronté à un choix : a) ou bien il sollicite la restitution des fonds pour payer son avocat, auquel cas il devra peut- être rem- bourser cet argent au moyen d’une amende de rem- placement s’il est déclaré coupable; b) ou bien il ne demande pas la restitution des fonds et décide de se représenter lui- même. toutefois, faire des choix difficiles n’est pas une caractéristique inhabituelle du système de justice criminelle. au contraire, les accusés sont souvent appelés à prendre des décisions épineuses. par exemple, certains peuvent avoir à [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 905 decide whether to make financial sacrifices at great personal hardship or represent themselves. yet others may have no choice at all but to self- represent. one thing is certain. accused persons with access to a pool of funds that may be used to pay for counsel are clearly in a more advantageous position than those who have no choice at all. while that choice may not be an easy one, our criminal justice system does not promise an experience free of difficult choices. [143] my colleague notes that the statutory re- quirements for a restoration order do not require accused persons to demonstrate that legal representa- tion is essential to their right to a fair trial (para 81). to be clear, i do not suggest otherwise. as i have explained, the inquiry into whether legal representa- tion was essential to ensure a fair trial is relevant to the question of whether a fine in lieu should be imposed, not whether a restoration order should have been granted. in sum, i conclude that where a sentencing [144] judge is satisfied that representation by counsel was essential to the offender’s constitutional right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter, the judge should exercise his or her limited discretion not to impose a fine in lieu in respect of the re- leased funds. however, where no such right arises, it will generally be appropriate to impose a fine in lieu. this follows from a straightforward appli- cation of the primary objective of the proceeds of crime regime — namely, ensuring that crime does not pay. as my colleague acknowledges, accused persons who have access to seized funds to pay for legal counsel enjoy a benefit that others do not (see para. 64; see also smith, at para 106). where this benefit was derived from proceeds of crime, offenders who were not constitutionally entitled to state- funded counsel should generally be required to repay that benefit through a fine in lieu. otherwise, décider de plaider coupable et d’être condamnés à une peine plus clémente, ou de clamer leur in- nocence et de s’exposer à une peine plus lourde s’ils sont reconnus coupables. d’autres pourraient avoir à décider de consentir de lourds sacrifices financiers ou de se représenter eux- mêmes. en re- vanche, d’autres n’auront peut- être d’autre choix que de se représenter eux- mêmes. une chose est sûre. l’accusé ayant accès à une réserve de fonds susceptibles de servir au paiement des services d’un avocat se trouve manifestement dans une situation plus avantageuse que ceux qui n’ont aucun choix. ce choix peut ne pas s’avérer facile à faire, mais notre système de justice criminelle ne garantit à personne une expérience exempte de choix difficiles. [143] ma collègue signale que les conditions lé- gales d’une ordonnance de restitution n’obligent pas l’accusé à démontrer que la représentation par avocat est essentielle au respect de son droit à un procès équitable (par 81). par souci de clarté, je ne prétends pas le contraire. comme je l’ai expli- qué, l’analyse du point de savoir si la représentation par avocat était essentielle pour assurer l’équité du procès est pertinente lorsqu’il s’agit de juger s’il convient d’infliger une amende de remplacement, et non de décider s’il y avait lieu de rendre une ordonnance de restitution. [144] en résumé, je conclus que, lorsque le juge chargé de déterminer la peine est convaincu que le fait d’être représenté par un avocat est essentiel pour assurer le respect du droit constitutionnel à un pro- cès équitable garanti au contrevenant par l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte, le juge devrait exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire limité de refuser d’infliger une amende de remplacement à l’égard des fonds restitués. cependant, lorsqu’aucun droit de ce genre ne prend naissance, il conviendra généralement d’infliger une amende de remplacement. cette mesure découle d’une simple application de l’objectif premier du régime des produits de la criminalité, à savoir faire en sorte que le crime ne paie pas. comme le reconnaît ma collègue, l’accusé qui dispose de fonds saisis pour retenir les ser- vices d’un avocat jouit d’un avantage dont ne peuvent profiter les autres (voir le par. 64; voir également smith, par 106). lorsque cet avantage provient de produits de la criminalité, le contrevenant qui n’avait pas 906 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. contrary to the overall purpose of the statutory re- gime, crime would indeed pay. constitutionnellement droit aux services d’un avocat rémunéré par l’état devrait généralement être obligé de rembourser cet avantage au moyen d’une amende de remplacement. sinon, contrairement à l’objectif général du régime légal, le crime paierait bel et bien. (b) issues arising out of the majority’s approach b) problèmes que pose l’approche des juges [145] having set out my own analysis of how sentencing judges should exercise their limited dis- cretion not to impose a fine in lieu in respect of funds that were released to pay for reasonable legal expenses, i wish to address three fundamental flaws in my colleague’s approach to this issue. first, it sacrifices the statutory regime’s primary objective of ensuring that crime does not pay in order to achieve the two “secondary purposes” of the restoration pro- vision and to give effect to parliament’s underlying intention to ensure fairness in criminal prosecutions. yet, as i will explain, all of the statutory scheme’s objectives can be achieved, and imposing a fine in lieu where an offender has used proceeds of crime to pay for his or her own defence does not undermine the utility of the restoration provision. second, the notion that parliament was prepared to give offend- ers the benefit of using proceeds of crime to pay for their own defence without consequence, and that it was content to simply wave goodbye to any released funds even if they were later proven to be proceeds of crime, defies logic and common sense. third, it turns the “limited discretion” not to impose a fine on its head. i will address these points in turn. (i) the statutory regime’s primary objective of ensuring that crime does not pay need not and should not be sacrificed in order to achieve the “secondary purposes” of the restoration provision majoritaires [145] maintenant que j’ai énoncé ma propre ana- lyse de la façon dont les juges chargés de déterminer la peine devraient exercer leur pouvoir discrétionnaire restreint de refuser d’infliger une amende de rempla- cement à l’égard de fonds restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables, je souhaite aborder trois lacunes fondamentales dont souffre l’approche de ma collègue sur ce point. premièrement, cette approche sacrifie l’objectif premier du régime légal consistant à s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas afin de réaliser les deux « objets secondaires » de la disposi- tion sur la restitution et de donner effet à l’intention sous- jacente du législateur d’assurer l’équité dans les poursuites criminelles. pourtant, comme je vais l’expliquer, il est possible de réaliser tous les objec- tifs du régime légal, et le fait d’infliger une amende de remplacement au contrevenant qui s’est servi de produits de la criminalité pour payer sa propre dé- fense ne sape pas l’utilité de la disposition sur la res- titution. deuxièmement, l’idée que le législateur était prêt à procurer au contrevenant l’avantage d’utiliser des produits de la criminalité pour payer sa propre défense sans conséquence, et qu’il se contentait de faire tout simplement une croix sur tous fonds resti- tués même s’il était démontré par la suite que ceux-ci constituaient des produits de la criminalité, va à l’en- contre de la logique et du bon sens. troisièmement, cela dénature le « pouvoir discrétionnaire limité » de refuser d’infliger une amende de remplacement. j’aborderai ces points à tour de rôle. (i) il n’est ni nécessaire ni opportun de sacrifier l’objectif premier du régime des produits de la criminalité afin de réaliser les « objets se- condaires » de la disposition sur la restitution [146] my colleague maintains that beyond the pri- mary objective of the proceeds of crime regime as a [146] ma collègue soutient qu’au- delà de l’objectif premier du régime des produits de la criminalité dans [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 907 whole — namely, depriving offenders and criminal organizations of the proceeds of crime and deter- ring them from committing crimes in the future (see lavigne, at paras. 16, 28, and 36) — there are two “secondary purposes” that underpin the restoration provision in particular: providing access to counsel and giving meaningful weight to the presumption of innocence (paras. 9 and 38). she adds that underlying these “secondary purposes” is a “desire” or “inten- tion” to ensure fairness to the accused in criminal prosecutions, and that this underlying intention “runs through the proceeds of crime scheme established by parliament” (ibid). she stresses that the court in lavigne did not address these separate purposes and that they “constrain the pursuit of the primary objective” (paras. 34 and 49). ultimately, this leads her to conclude that, as a general rule, sentencing judges should not impose a fine in lieu in respect of funds that were released to pay for reasonable legal expenses. [147] much as my colleague purports to distin- guish the two identified “secondary purposes” of the restoration provision from the underlying intention to ensure fairness to the accused that, in her view, “runs through the proceeds of crime scheme established by parliament” (para. 38), all three of these appear to play exactly the same role in her interpretation of the restoration provision. indeed, this underlying intention might easily have been a third secondary purpose. whatever the case, as i see it, the distinc- tion my colleague purports to draw is a distinction without a difference. in the end, it does not affect the analysis i bring to bear on the issue before this court. son ensemble — à savoir, priver les contrevenants et les organisations criminelles des produits de la cri- minalité et les dissuader de perpétrer d’autres crimes (voir lavigne, par. 16, 28 et 36) —, il existerait deux « objets secondaires » qui sous- tendent tout particu- lièrement la disposition sur la restitution : fournir l’accès aux services d’un avocat et accorder une importance suffisante à la présomption d’innocence (par. 9 et 38). elle ajoute qu’à la base de ces « objets secondaires » réside le « désir » ou l’« intention » d’assurer l’équité envers l’accusé dans les poursuites criminelles, et que cette intention sous- jacente « se dégage du régime des produits de la criminalité établi par le législateur » (ibid). elle insiste sur le fait que la cour, dans l’arrêt lavigne, ne s’est pas penchée sur ces objets secondaires, qui « restrei[gnent] la poursuite de l’objectif premier  » (par.  34 et 49). elle en conclut ultimement que, en règle générale, les juges chargés de déterminer la peine devraient s’abstenir d’infliger une amende de remplacement à l’égard de fonds restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables. [147] même si ma collègue prétend distinguer, d’une part, les deux « objets secondaires » identifiés de la disposition sur la restitution et, d’autre part, l’in- tention sous- jacente d’assurer l’équité envers l’accusé qui, selon elle, « se dégage du régime des produits de la criminalité établi par le législateur » (par. 38), tous les trois semblent jouer exactement le même rôle dans son interprétation de la disposition sur la restitution. en effet, cette intention sous- jacente pourrait aisé- ment avoir constitué un troisième objet secondaire. quoi qu’il en soit, à mon sens, la distinction que fait ma collègue est sans importance. au bout du compte, cela n’influe pas sur l’analyse à laquelle je soumets la question dont est saisie notre cour. [148] as i will demonstrate, the answer to my colleague’s analysis is that the statutory regime’s primary objective of ensuring that crime does not pay need not and should not be sacrificed either to achieve the “secondary purposes” of the restoration provision or to give effect to the intention underlying them. once the respective roles of the restoration provision and the fine in lieu provision are properly understood, it becomes clear that all of the statutory scheme’s objectives can be achieved. [148] comme je l’établirai plus loin, la réponse à l’analyse de ma collègue est qu’il n’est ni nécessaire ni opportun de sacrifier l’objectif premier consistant à s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas soit pour pouvoir réaliser les « objets secondaires » de la disposition sur la restitution, soit pour donner effet à l’intention qui les sous- tend. une fois les rôles respectifs de la disposition sur la restitution et de celle sur l’amende de remplacement bien compris, il est évident que tous les objectifs du régime légal peuvent être atteints. 908 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. [149] the restoration provision facilitates access to counsel in a manner that is both fair and consistent with the presumption of innocence. the alterna- tive — withholding seized funds from presumptively innocent accused persons who have no other means and thereby depriving them of their ability to access counsel — would do the opposite. [149] la disposition sur la restitution facilite l’ac- cès aux services d’un avocat de manière équitable et conforme à la présomption d’innocence. l’autre option — refuser les fonds saisis à l’accusé présumé innocent qui ne dispose d’aucun autre moyen, le pri- vant ainsi de la possibilité d’avoir accès à l’assistance d’un avocat — aurait l’effet contraire. [150] but where a restoration order is followed by a conviction, the situation takes on a very different hue. upon conviction, an “accused” becomes an “offender”, and funds that were once presumed to be legitimate are now known to have been proceeds of crime all along. at this point, seeing that the offender has used proceeds of crime to pay for his or her own defence, the statutory regime’s primary objective of ensuring that crime does not pay takes centre stage. [151] yet my colleague’s approach turns this objec- tive on its head and creates situations in which crime does pay. for cases where there is no constitutional right to state- funded counsel, it creates a clear ine- quality between accused persons who do have access to a pool of funds to pay for their defence and those who do not. those who are fortunate enough to fall within the former category are permitted to draw upon this pool of resources to fund their own defence with almost no strings attached. this is no doubt a benefit, as my colleague acknowledges (para 64). by comparison, those who have the misfortune of falling within the latter category — of whom there are many — may often be left with no choice but to represent themselves. [150] or, la situation prend une tout autre tournure lorsque l’ordonnance de restitution est suivie d’une dé- claration de culpabilité. dès qu’il est déclaré coupable, « l’accusé » devient un « contrevenant », et on sait alors que les fonds jusque-là présumés être légitimes ont toujours été des produits de la criminalité. à ce stade, quand on s’aperçoit que le contrevenant a utilisé des produits de la criminalité pour payer sa propre défense, l’objectif premier du régime légal consistant à s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas passe au premier plan. [151] pourtant, l’approche de ma collègue déna- ture cet objectif et crée des situations dans lesquelles le crime paie dans les cas où il n’existe aucun droit constitutionnel aux services d’un avocat ré- munéré par l’état, elle crée une inégalité évidente entre les accusés qui ont accès à une réserve de fonds pour payer leur défense et les accusés qui n’y ont pas accès. ceux qui ont la chance d’appartenir à la première catégorie sont autorisés, presque sans la moindre condition, à puiser les fonds nécessaires au paiement de leur propre défense à même cette réserve de ressources. il s’agit indéniablement d’un avantage, comme le reconnaît ma collègue (par 64). en comparaison, les accusés qui ont le malheur d’appartenir à la deuxième catégorie — lesquels sont fort nombreux — pourraient souvent n’avoir d’autre choix que de se représenter eux- mêmes. [152] rewarding offenders for procuring proceeds of crime by allowing them to spend those funds on their own defence without consequence is hardly consistent with the two- fold purpose of the proceeds of crime regime. it does nothing to deprive offend- ers and criminal organizations of the benefits they derived from crime, nor does it deter them from committing crimes in the future. on this latter point, sending a strong and unequivocal message that crime does not pay is far more likely to achieve specific and general deterrence than sending the opposite [152] récompenser les contrevenants qui se pro- curent des produits de la criminalité en leur permet- tant de dépenser ces fonds sur leur propre défense sans la moindre conséquence n’est guère compatible avec le double objectif du régime des produits de la criminalité. cela ne fait rien pour priver les contre- venants et les organisations criminelles des bénéfices qu’ils tirent du crime, ni ne les dissuade de récidiver à l’avenir. sur ce dernier point, communiquer le mes- sage fort et sans équivoque que le crime ne paie pas est beaucoup plus susceptible de produire un effet [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 909 message. more pointedly, from a common sense perspective, ordinary canadians would no doubt find it troubling, if not wholly unacceptable, that someone could commit robbery and then use part of the stolen money to fund his or her own defence without ever having to pay it back. in short, my colleague’s approach under- [153] mines the overall purpose of the proceeds of crime regime. while she insists that courts must not “ig- nore or minimize the secondary purposes in order to achieve the primary goal of ensuring crime does not pay” (para. 49), her solution is to do precisely that, but in reverse: sacrificing the primary objective of ensuring that crime does not pay in order to achieve the “secondary purposes” of the restoration provi- sion. but as i will explain, this zero- sum approach is unnecessary because it is possible to ensure that crime does not pay while still providing access to counsel, giving meaningful weight to the presump- tion of innocence, and giving effect to the underlying intention to ensure fairness to the accused in criminal prosecutions. dissuasif spécifique et général que de communiquer le message contraire. plus précisément, du point de vue du bon sens, les canadiens ordinaires estime- raient sans doute qu’il est troublant, voire tout à fait inacceptable, qu’une personne puisse commettre un vol qualifié pour ensuite se servir d’une partie de l’argent volé pour financer sa propre défense sans jamais devoir le rembourser. [153] en résumé, l’approche de ma collègue mine l’objectif général du régime des produits de la crimi- nalité. si elle insiste pour dire que les tribunaux ne doivent pas « néglige[r] [  ] les objets secondaires, ni [  ] en minimise[r] l’importance, dans le but de réaliser l’objectif premier de s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas » (par. 49), sa solution consiste justement à faire cela, mais à l’envers : abandonner l’objectif premier de s’assurer que le crime ne paie pas pour réaliser les « objets secondaires » de la disposition sur la restitution. mais comme je vais l’expliquer, il ne sert à rien d’effectuer cette opération à somme nulle car il est possible de veiller à ce que le crime ne paie pas tout en fournissant l’accès aux services d’un avocat, d’accorder une importance suffisante à la présomption d’innocence et de donner effet à l’intention sous- jacente d’assurer l’équité envers l’accusé dans les poursuites criminelles. 1 providing access to counsel 1 fournir l’accès aux services d’un avocat [154] beginning with the objective of providing access to counsel, my colleague’s main concern is that if funds that have been released to pay for rea- sonable legal expenses must generally be paid back upon conviction, then some accused persons, out of a fear of having to pay a fine in lieu on pain of imprisonment if convicted, may choose not to seek a restoration order and to represent themselves instead (para 55). she maintains that imposing a fine in lieu in these circumstances would render the restoration provision “largely illusory” and leave accused per- sons with a “hobson’s choice” in which the only real option is to proceed without legal representation (paras. 55 and 60). [154] commençons par l’objectif de fournir l’ac- cès aux services d’un avocat. le principal souci de ma collègue est que, si les fonds restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables doivent généralement être remboursés après la déclaration de culpabilité, certains accusés, par crainte d’avoir à payer une amende de remplacement sous peine d’em- prisonnement s’ils sont reconnus coupables, pour- raient décider de ne pas solliciter une ordonnance de restitution et de se représenter eux- mêmes (par 55). selon elle, infliger une amende de remplacement dans ces circonstances rendrait « largement illusoire » la disposition sur la restitution et donnerait à l’accusé un « faux choix » pour lequel sa seule véritable option est de ne pas être représenté par avocat (par. 55 et 60). [155] with respect, i cannot agree. the prospect that an accused may, if convicted, have to repay [155] avec égards, je ne peux souscrire à cette opi- nion. la possibilité que l’accusé soit obligé, s’il est 910 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. funds that have been released to pay for reasonable legal expenses does not render the restoration provi- sion “largely illusory” or leave accused persons with no choice but to represent themselves. accused per- sons who have access to seized funds to pay for rea- sonable legal expenses can either use those funds or leave them. at bottom, having this choice puts them in a better position than those who have no means whatsoever of accessing counsel. while some who have the option may decide not to seek a restoration order, others will. déclaré coupable, de rembourser les fonds restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables ne rend pas « largement illusoire » la disposition sur la restitution ni ne laisse à l’accusé d’autre choix que de se représenter lui- même. l’accusé qui dis- pose de fonds saisis pour payer des frais juridiques raisonnables peut soit utiliser ces fonds, soit ne pas y toucher. au final, le fait d’avoir ce choix le place dans une situation plus enviable que ceux n’ayant pas du tout les moyens d’obtenir l’assistance d’un avocat. alors que les personnes ayant le choix pour- raient décider de ne pas demander d’ordonnance de restitution, d’autres la demanderont. [156] as for my colleague’s suggestion that the risk of imprisonment for non- payment of a fine in lieu may deter accused persons from invoking the restoration provision, this concern is mitigated by this court’s decision in wu, which makes clear that a warrant of committal cannot be issued for non- payment of a fine if the offender has a genuine ina- bility to pay (paras. 3 and 60-66; see also lavigne, at para 47). consequently, the risk of imprisonment arises only where an offender has the means to pay but refuses to do so. [156] quant à la suggestion de ma collègue que le risque d’être emprisonné pour non- paiement d’une amende de remplacement dissuade l’accusé d’invoquer la disposition sur la restitution, cette préoccupation est tempérée par l’arrêt wu, dans lequel notre cour af- firme clairement qu’un mandat d’incarcération ne peut être décerné pour non- paiement d’une amende si le contrevenant est réellement incapable de payer (par. 3 et 60-66; voir aussi lavigne, par 47). par conséquent, le risque d’emprisonnement n’existe que si le contre- venant a les moyens de payer mais refuse de le faire. [157] finally, the case law recognizes that the ob- jective of providing access to counsel need not come at the expense of the primary objective of the pro- ceeds of crime regime. in wilson, doherty ja stated in obiter that imposing a fine in lieu in respect of funds that were released to pay for reasonable legal expenses would serve the “ultimate purpose” of the proceeds of crime regime “while at the same time allowing the accused access to the seized property for the purposes of paying reasonable legal expenses” (p 660). in short, the primary objective of the pro- ceeds of crime regime is not incompatible with the goal of facilitating access to counsel. [157] en dernier lieu, la jurisprudence reconnaît que la réalisation de l’objectif de faciliter l’accès aux services d’un avocat n’a pas à se faire au détri- ment de l’objectif premier du régime des produits de la criminalité. dans l’arrêt wilson, le juge d’appel doherty a affirmé, dans une remarque incidente, que l’infliction d’une amende de remplacement à l’égard de fonds qui ont été restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables favoriserait la réalisa- tion de [traduction] « l’objet ultime » du régime des produits de la criminalité « tout en permettant à l’accusé d’avoir accès aux biens saisis dans le but de payer des frais juridiques raisonnables » (p 660). en résumé, l’objectif premier du régime des produits de la criminalité n’est pas incompatible avec le but de faciliter l’accès aux services d’un avocat. 2 giving meaningful weight to the presump- 2 accorder une importance suffisante à la pré- tion of innocence somption d’innocence [158] turning to the presumption of innocence, i respectfully do not share my colleague’s view that [158] passons à la présomption d’innocence. soit dit en tout respect, je ne partage pas l’avis de ma [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 911 if offenders are generally required to pay back funds that they have used to pay for their own defence, then the presumption of innocence will suffer. the presumption of innocence prevents the state from requiring accused persons to immediately forfeit property that is reasonably believed, though not yet proven, to be proceeds of crime. this presumption also finds expression through the restoration provi- sion, which allows accused persons to “receiv[e] the benefit of the presumption of innocence    in the most meaningful way — through ready access to the funds seized” (smith, at para 106). [159] but the presumption of innocence does not exist in perpetuity. as this court stated in r v. smith, 2004 scc 14, [2004] 1 scr 385, “the presump- tion of innocence does not survive [a] conviction” (para 16). it is at this point, after both the released funds and the presumption of innocence have been spent, that the fine in lieu provision comes into play. there is nothing inconsistent about allowing accused persons, who are presumed innocent, to access seized funds to pay for legal counsel but requiring offenders, who are proven guilty, to pay back those funds once they are determined to be proceeds of crime. doing so does not, contrary to my colleague’s contention, “retroactively dilute the presumption of innocence” (para. 57), as that presumption remains in full force until the point of conviction. stated succinctly, the presumption of innocence does not shield offenders from the consequences of a conviction, including the obligation to forfeit any proceeds of crime or pay a fine in lieu. collègue selon lequel, si les contrevenants sont gé- néralement tenus de rembourser les fonds qu’ils ont utilisés pour payer leur propre défense, la pré- somption d’innocence en souffrira la présomp- tion d’innocence empêche l’état d’obliger l’accusé à renoncer sur-le- champ à des biens dont on croit pour des motifs raisonnables, sans l’avoir encore prouvé, qu’ils sont des produits de la criminalité. cette présomption trouve aussi son expression dans la disposition relative à la restitution qui permet à l’accusé de [traduction] « bénéficier de la pré- somption d’innocence [  ] de la manière la plus concrète possible — par un accès aisé aux fonds saisis » (smith, par 106). [159] mais la présomption d’innocence n’est pas perpétuelle. comme l’a dit la cour dans r c. smith, 2004 csc 14, [2004] 1 rcs 385, « la présomption d’innocence cesse en cas de déclaration de culpa- bilité » (par 16). c’est à ce stade, une fois que les fonds restitués et la présomption d’innocence ont été épuisés, que la disposition relative à l’infliction d’une amende de remplacement entre en jeu. permettre aux accusés, qui sont présumés innocents, d’avoir accès à des fonds saisis pour payer les services d’un conseiller juridique n’a rien d’incompatible avec le fait d’exiger des contrevenants, qui ont été reconnus coupables, de rembourser ces fonds une fois qu’il est établi que ce sont des produits de la criminalité. contrairement à ce que prétend ma collègue, cette mesure ne « limite pas rétroactivement la présomp- tion d’innocence » (par. 57), car la présomption en cause demeure entièrement en vigueur jusqu’à la déclaration de culpabilité. en résumé, la présomp- tion d’innocence n’a pas pour effet de protéger les contrevenants des conséquences d’une déclaration de culpabilité, notamment l’obligation de renoncer à tout produit de la criminalité ou de payer une amende de remplacement. [160] my colleague also attempts to draw an anal- ogy between the present context and the bail context. she suggests that “recover[ing]” time spent free on bail would “retroactively dilute” the presumption of innocence, and that “recover[ing]” proceeds of crime spent by an offender on his or her defence would have the same effect (paras 57-58). with respect, the bail context is far removed from the present context, [160] ma collègue tente aussi d’établir une ana- logie entre le contexte qui nous occupe et celui de la mise en liberté sous caution. elle suggère que la « récupération » du temps passé en liberté sous cau- tion « dilu[erait] rétroactive[ment] » la présomption d’innocence, et que la « récupér[ation] » des produits de la criminalité dépensés par un contrevenant pour sa défense produirait le même effet (par 57-58). en 912 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. and the considerations at play are very different. setting aside the simple fact that there is no statu- tory provision authorizing the “recovery” of time spent free on bail, one of the crucial differences that my colleague overlooks is that, unlike the ability to retain counsel using proceeds of crime, time spent free on bail is not a benefit derived from crime. thus, while there is a rational basis for requiring offenders to “pay back” proceeds of crime spent on legal coun- sel, there is no rational basis whatsoever for requiring offenders to “pay back” time spent free on bail. put simply, spending time free on bail is nothing like spending proceeds of crime on legal counsel. the analogy, with respect, is inapt. toute déférence, le contexte de la mise en liberté sous caution n’a rien à voir avec le présent contexte, et les considérations en jeu sont fort différentes. mis à part le simple fait qu’aucune disposition législative n’autorise la « récupération » du temps passé en liberté sous caution, l’une des différences cruciales que ma collègue néglige est que, contrairement à la capacité de retenir les services d’un avocat au moyen de produits de la criminalité, le temps passé en liberté sous caution n’est pas un bénéfice tiré du crime. donc, s’il existe un motif rationnel d’obliger le contrevenant à « rembourser » les produits de la criminalité dépensés pour l’assistance d’un avocat, il n’y a absolument aucun motif rationnel de l’obli- ger à « rembourser » le temps passé en liberté sous caution. autrement dit, passer du temps en liberté sous caution n’est pas comparable au fait de dépenser des produits de la criminalité pour l’assistance d’un avocat. avec égards, l’analogie est inappropriée. 3. intention to ensure fairness to the accused in criminal prosecutions 3 l’intention d’assurer l’équité envers l’accusé dans les poursuites criminelles [161] finally, concerns over the potential unfair- ness — procedural or otherwise — of withholding seized funds from presumptively innocent accused persons in a way that limits or removes their ability to access counsel are addressed through the restoration provision, and there is nothing unfair about requiring offenders who have used proceeds of crime to pay for their own defence to repay that benefit. [162] my colleague claims that imposing a fine in lieu in respect of funds that have been released to pay for reasonable legal expenses would raise “concerns of notice and reliance that are rooted in the principle of fairness to the accused in criminal prosecutions” (para 59). she maintains that accused persons “will rely on a court order authorized by a specific statutory scheme” and that “[t]hose accused persons cannot reasonably know that doing so will lead to additional punishment” (ibid). [161] en dernier lieu, la disposition sur la restitu- tion répond aux craintes concernant l’injustice qu’il peut y avoir — sur le plan procédural ou autre — à refuser des fonds saisis à des accusés présumés in- nocents de manière à restreindre leur capacité de retenir les services d’un avocat, ou à leur retirer cette capacité, et obliger les contrevenants qui ont utilisé des produits de la criminalité pour payer leur propre défense à rembourser ce bénéfice n’a rien d’inéquitable. [162] ma collègue prétend qu’infliger une amende de remplacement à l’égard de fonds qui ont été resti- tués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables susciterait des « préoccupations de préavis et de fiabilité qui sont ancrées dans le principe de l’équité envers l’accusé dans les poursuites criminelles » (par 59). selon elle, l’accusé « se fonde[ra] sur une ordonnance judiciaire autorisée par un régime légal en particulier » et « [c]et accusé ne peut raisonna- blement pas savoir qu’en faisant cela, il s’expose à une sanction additionnelle » (ibid). [163] respectfully, i reject the suggestion that the relevant provisions of the criminal code, coupled [163] soit dit en tout respect, je rejette la thèse selon laquelle les dispositions pertinentes du code [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 913 with a decision of this court explaining the proper effect of those provisions, would leave accused per- sons with no notice about the potential adverse con- sequences of using seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses in the event of a conviction. my col- league’s reasoning is fundamentally incompatible with the well- established maxim in criminal law that ignorance of the law is no excuse (ignorantia juris non excusat). as chief justice lamer explained in r v. mcintosh, [1995] 1 scr 686, “[o]ur criminal justice system presumes that everyone knows the law” (para. 38; see also r v. macdougall, [1982] 2  scr  605; r v.  nova scotia pharmaceutical society, [1992] 2 scr 606, at p 633). unlike my colleague, i am not prepared to upend this well- established presumption. criminel, conjuguées à une décision où la cour explique l’effet qu’elles doivent avoir, laisserait l’accusé dans l’ignorance des conséquences préju- diciables que peut entraîner l’utilisation de fonds saisis pour payer des frais juridiques raisonnables en cas de déclaration de culpabilité. le raisonne- ment de ma collègue est fondamentalement in- compatible avec la maxime bien établie en droit criminel : l’ignorance de la loi n’est pas une excuse (ignorantia juris non excusat). comme l’a expliqué le juge en chef lamer dans r c. mcintosh, [1995] 1 rcs 686, « [n]otre système de justice criminelle repose sur le principe que nul n’est censé ignorer la loi » (par. 38; voir aussi r c. macdougall, [1982] 2 rcs 605; r c. nova scotia pharmaceutical so- ciety, [1992] 2 rcs 606, p 633). contrairement à ma collègue, je ne suis pas disposé à dénaturer cette présomption bien établie. [164] lastly, i note my colleague’s reliance on r v. gdb, 2000 scc 22, [2000] 1 scr 520, where this court stated that “the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to all accused persons” and ex- plained that this right is a principle of fundamental justice (para 24). it is important to recognize, how- ever, that the right to effective assistance of counsel does not equate to a right to counsel. the right to effective assistance of counsel protects against in- competent performance by counsel that results in a miscarriage of justice (gdb, at para. 26); it does not, however, guarantee all accused persons the right to counsel. with respect, my colleague takes gdb. out of its proper context. [164] en dernier lieu, je souligne que ma collègue invoque l’arrêt r c. gdb, 2000 csc 22, [2000] 1 rcs 520, où la cour a affirmé que « tout in- culpé a droit à l’assistance effective d’un avocat » et expliqué que ce droit constitue un principe de justice fondamentale (par 24). il importe toutefois de reconnaître que le droit à l’assistance effective d’un avocat n’équivaut pas au droit à l’assistance d’un avocat. le premier protège l’accusé du travail incompétent de son avocat qui entraîne une erreur judiciaire (gdb, par. 26); il ne garantit cependant pas à tout inculpé le droit à l’assistance d’un avocat. avec égards, ma collègue isole l’arrêt gdb du contexte qui lui est propre. (ii) parliament did not intend to give offenders the benefit of using proceeds of crime to pay for their defence without consequence [165] my colleague acknowledges that accused persons who have access to funds to pay for legal counsel enjoy a benefit that others do not (para. 64; see also smith, at para 106). yet she maintains that this “is not the type of benefit that parliament sought to take away from offenders” and is instead “a benefit that parliament expressly intended them to have” (ibid). (ii) le législateur n’avait pas l’intention de don- ner aux contrevenants l’avantage de payer leur défense au moyen de produits de la cri- minalité sans conséquence [165] ma collègue admet que les accusés qui disposent de fonds pour payer les services de leur conseiller juridique jouissent d’un avantage dont ne peuvent profiter les autres (par. 64; voir aussi smith, par 106). pourtant, elle soutient qu’il ne s’agit pas là du « type d’avantage que le législateur souhaitait retirer aux contrevenants », mais bien « d’un avan- tage que le législateur souhaitait expressément leur accorder » (ibid). 914 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. [166] with respect, i disagree. my colleague con- flates two distinct concepts: (1) parliament’s inten- tion as to the circumstances in which accused persons may access seized funds; and (2) parliament’s in- tention as to the circumstances in which offenders may be required to pay them back. again, there is nothing inconsistent about allowing accused persons to access seized funds to pay for legal counsel but requiring offenders to pay them back in the event that they are determined to be proceeds of crime. while parliament intended to give accused persons the benefit of having access to seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses, it did not, in my view, intend to give offenders the benefit of never having to pay them back. [167] had that been parliament’s intent, it could easily have enacted a provision stipulating that any funds released pursuant to a restoration order would be exempt from forfeiture or a fine in lieu, or that such funds would be exempt unless “it turns out that the [offender’s] financial need was not real, or the funds were not used to alleviate that need”, as my colleague proposes (para 76). but it did not. in the absence of any such provision, there is no compelling basis on which to conclude that parliament was pre- pared to simply write off any funds released to pay for legal counsel — which may amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars (see smith) — as a gift. [166] en toute déférence, je ne suis pas de cet avis. ma collègue confond deux concepts distincts : (1) l’intention du législateur concernant les circons- tances dans lesquelles un accusé peut avoir accès aux fonds saisis; et (2) l’intention du législateur concer- nant les circonstances dans lesquelles un contreve- nant peut être tenu de les rembourser. je le répète, permettre aux accusés d’accéder à des fonds saisis pour payer les services de leur conseiller juridique n’a rien d’incompatible avec le fait d’exiger des contrevenants qu’ils remboursent ces fonds s’il est établi que ce sont des produits de la criminalité. bien que le législateur ait voulu donner aux accusés l’avantage d’avoir accès à des fonds saisis afin de payer leurs frais juridiques raisonnables, il n’avait pas l’intention, à mon avis, de donner aux contreve- nants l’avantage de ne jamais avoir à les rembourser. [167] si cela avait été l’intention du législateur, il aurait pu aisément édicter une disposition portant que les fonds restitués par application d’une ordonnance de restitution seraient soustraits à la confiscation ou à une amende de remplacement, ou qu’ils le se- raient sauf « [s]’il s’avère que le besoin financier [du contrevenant] n’était pas réel ou que les fonds n’ont pas servi à atténuer ce besoin », comme le propose ma collègue (par 76). le législateur n’a toutefois pas édicté une telle disposition, en conséquence de quoi aucun motif impérieux ne permet de conclure qu’il était prêt à simplement traiter les fonds restitués pour la rémunération d’un conseiller juridique — ce qui peut représenter des centaines de milliers de dollars (voir smith) — comme un don. [168] of course, if an accused is acquitted and the funds are not found to be proceeds of crime, then the accused has simply paid for his or her own defence using his or her own money. in that event, the state has not been deprived of any property that would otherwise have been forfeited. but where an accused is convicted and the funds are found to be proceeds of crime, every dollar that was spent on the offender’s defence using proceeds of crime is a dollar that would otherwise have been forfeited to the state — a fact which my colleague acknowledges is “undeniable” (para 68). in those circumstances, it is unthinkable that parliament would have been content to simply absorb the loss. [168] évidemment, si l’accusé est acquitté et il est établi que les fonds ne sont pas des produits de la cri- minalité, l’accusé aura tout simplement payé pour sa propre défense au moyen de son propre argent. le cas échéant, l’état n’a pas été privé de biens qui auraient autrement été confisqués. toutefois, si l’accusé est reconnu coupable et il est établi que les fonds étaient bel et bien des produits de la criminalité, chaque dol- lar consacré à la défense du contrevenant au moyen de produits de la criminalité est un dollar qui aurait autrement été confisqué au profit de l’état — un fait qui, de l’aveu de ma collègue, est « indéniabl[e] » (par 68). dans les circonstances, il est impensable que le législateur se soit contenté d’absorber la perte. [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 915 [169] while parliament enacted statutory safe- guards that control the amount of funds released, this cannot be taken as an indication that it was pre- pared to let those funds go for good. the purpose of controlling the amount of funds released to accused persons is to protect the state’s legitimate interest in preserving property that is reasonably believed to be proceeds of crime to the greatest extent pos- sible, thereby facilitating the enforcement of any subsequent forfeiture order. releasing the entirety of the seized funds, regardless of whether the accused actually needs the full amount, would create an un- necessary risk that the funds may be long gone by the time of any future sentencing hearing. furthermore, while a fine in lieu may be imposed where some or all of the funds have been spent, an offender may take years to pay the fine and in some cases may never pay it, either because the offender refuses to pay or because the offender has a genuine inability to pay. hence, the constraints placed on the amount released serve a legitimate purpose and cannot be taken as a signal that parliament was prepared to let those funds go for good. [169] bien que le législateur ait édicté des garanties légales qui circonscrivent le montant des fonds resti- tués, on ne saurait y voir là une indication qu’il était prêt à renoncer à ces fonds pour de bon. l’objectif de circonscrire les fonds restitués à un accusé sert à protéger l’intérêt légitime de l’état à préserver dans la mesure du possible les biens dont on croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, qu’il s’agit de produits de la criminalité de manière à faciliter l’exécution d’éventuelles ordonnances de confiscation. restituer la totalité des fonds saisis, que l’accusé ait besoin ou non de la totalité du montant, créerait un risque inutile que les fonds disparaissent bien avant la tenue d’une éventuelle audience relative à la détermination de la peine. qui plus est, bien qu’une amende de remplacement puisse être infligée lorsqu’une partie ou l’ensemble des fonds ont été dépensés, un contre- venant pourrait prendre des années pour la payer ou même ne pas la payer du tout, soit parce qu’il refuse de le faire, soit parce qu’il est réellement incapable de le faire. aussi les limites imposées aux sommes restituées visent- elles un but légitime et ne peuvent être considérées comme un signal que le législateur était prêt à renoncer à ces fonds pour de bon. (iii) the majority’s approach is inconsistent with the “limited discretion” described in lavigne (iii) l’interprétation des juges majoritaires ne cadre pas avec le « pouvoir discrétionnaire limité » décrit dans l’arrêt lavigne [170] finally, with respect, my colleague’s ap- proach to the exercise of a sentencing judge’s limited discretion not to impose a fine in lieu is inconsistent with this court’s decision in lavigne, which reiter- ated on a number of occasions that the discretion not to impose a fine in lieu is “limited” (see paras. 1, 23, 27, 29, 34, and 44). my colleague’s approach turns this concept on its head by transforming this limited discretion not to impose a fine into a presumptive rule against imposing a fine, at least in respect of funds that have been released to pay for reasonable legal expenses. [170] enfin, soit dit en tout respect, l’interpréta- tion qu’adopte ma collègue quant à l’exercice par un juge chargé de déterminer la peine de son pou- voir discrétionnaire limité de refuser d’infliger une amende de remplacement n’est pas conforme avec l’arrêt lavigne, dans lequel notre cour a rappelé plu- sieurs fois que le pouvoir discrétionnaire de refuser d’infliger l’amende de remplacement est « limité » (voir par. 1, 23, 27, 29, 34 et 44). le raisonnement de ma collègue a pour effet de dénaturer ce concept en transformant ce pouvoir discrétionnaire limité de refuser d’infliger une amende en une règle interdi- sant à première vue l’adoption de cette mesure, du moins à l’égard des fonds qui ont été restitués pour le paiement de frais juridiques raisonnables. [171] having explained why i reject the approach taken by my colleague, i turn to the application of the relevant principles to the case at hand. [171] ayant expliqué pourquoi je rejette l’interpré- tation adoptée par ma collègue, je passe à l’applica- tion des principes pertinents en l’espèce. 916 r v rafilovich moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. v application v application [172] in this instance, the police seized funds that were later determined to be proceeds of crime upon mr. rafilovich’s guilty pleas. these funds were re- leased to him to pay for reasonable legal expenses pursuant to s 46234(4). those funds, which quali- fied as “property of an offender”, were subsequently transferred to a third party — mr. rafilovich’s law- yer — such that they could not be made subject to a forfeiture order. consequently, the authority to order a fine in lieu under s 46237(3) was engaged. [173] but the sentencing judge exercised her limited discretion not to invoke this authority. she reasoned that mr. rafilovich “did not profit from his crime” (2013 onsc 7293, at p. 20 (canlii)). she stressed that he “obtained no benefit from these funds other than enabling him to pay for legal representation to which he [was] constitutionally entitled” (ibid). she also expressed concern about exposing mr. rafilovich to a term of imprisonment in the event of default, which similarly situated offenders who had alternative means or who qualified for legal aid would not face. [174] with respect, i am unable to agree with the learned sentencing judge’s analysis. mr. rafilovich did, in fact, receive a benefit from his crime: he re- tained an experienced lawyer of his choice through the use of about $42,000 derived from the com- mission of criminal offences. unlike many accused persons, mr. rafilovich had the benefit of a pool of resources to draw upon to fund his defence. more- over, the sentencing judge’s concerns about the pros- pect of imprisonment were misplaced. pursuant to this court’s decision in wu, a warrant of committal would be issued only if mr. rafilovich had the means to pay a fine in lieu but refused to do so within the time allotted. [172] dans la présente affaire, la police a saisi des fonds dont on a plus tard jugé, lors de l’inscription des plaidoyers de culpabilité de m. rafilovich, qu’il s’agissait de produits de la criminalité. ces fonds lui ont été restitués pour lui permettre de payer ses frais juridiques raisonnables suivant le par 46234(4). ces fonds, qui constituaient un « bien [  ] d’un contrevenant », ont subséquemment été remis à un tiers — l’avocat de m. rafilovich — de sorte qu’ils ne pouvaient pas faire l’objet d’une ordonnance de confiscation. en conséquence, le pouvoir d’in- fliger une amende de remplacement en vertu du par 46237(3) était en jeu. [173] cependant, la juge chargée de déterminer la peine a, en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire limité, décidé de ne pas imposer cette sanction. elle a souligné que m. rafilovich [traduction] « n’avait pas tiré profit de son crime » (2013 onsc 7293, p. 20 (canlii)). de plus, a-t-elle ajouté, « il n’a tiré aucun avantage de ces fonds, hormis celui de les utiliser pour payer la représentation par avocat à laquelle il [avait] droit en vertu de la constitution » (ibid). la juge a également exprimé sa crainte d’ex- poser m. rafilovich à l’incarcération pour défaut de paiement, un sort que ne risqueraient pas de subir des contrevenants se trouvant dans une situation semblable qui posséderaient d’autres moyens ou qui seraient admissibles à l’aide juridique. [174] en toute déférence, je ne peux souscrire à l’analyse de la juge chargée de déterminer de la peine. monsieur rafilovich a effectivement tiré profit de son crime : il a retenu les services d’un avocat expérimenté de son choix grâce à l’utilisation d’une somme d’environ 42 000 $ découlant de la perpé- tration d’infractions criminelles. contrairement à de nombreux accusés, m. rafilovich a eu accès à une réserve de ressources pour financer sa défense. de plus, les craintes de la juge chargée de déterminer la peine au sujet du risque d’incarcération n’étaient pas fondées. suivant l’arrêt rendu par notre cour dans wu, un mandat d’incarcération ne serait délivré que si m. rafilovich avait les moyens de payer l’amende de remplacement, mais aurait refusé de le faire dans le délai imparti. [2019] 3 rcs. r c rafilovich le juge moldaver 917 [175] finally, although the sentencing judge stated that mr. rafilovich used the released funds to ob- tain “legal representation to which he [was] con- stitutionally entitled” (p. 20), she did not consider whether representation by counsel was essential to his constitutional right to a fair trial. this inquiry was, as a matter of law, a prerequisite to a finding that mr. rafilovich was constitutionally entitled to state- funded legal counsel and, in turn, the proper exercise of the limited discretion not to impose a fine in lieu in this instance. [176] as the record before this court is insufficient to decide this issue, i would set aside the order of the court of appeal and remit the case to the sentencing judge for determination. [175] enfin, même si la juge chargée de déterminer la peine a affirmé que m. rafilovich avait utilisé les fonds restitués pour obtenir [traduction] « une représentation par avocat à laquelle il [avait] droit en vertu de la constitution » (p. 20), elle ne s’est pas demandé si le fait d’être représenté par un avocat était essentiel pour assurer le respect du droit consti- tutionnel de m. rafilovich à un procès équitable. or, elle se devait, en droit, d’analyser cette question avant de conclure que m. rafilovich avait droit, en vertu de la constitution, aux services d’un avocat rémunéré par l’état et d’exercer correctement le pouvoir discrétionnaire limité de refuser d’infliger une amende de remplacement en l’espèce. [176] comme le dossier dont la cour est saisie n’est pas suffisamment étoffé pour nous permettre de trancher cette question, j’annulerais l’ordonnance de la cour d’appel et je renverrais l’affaire à la juge chargée de déterminer la peine pour qu’elle rende une nouvelle décision. appeal allowed, wagner c.j and moldaver and côté jj. dissenting in part. pourvoi accueilli, le juge en chef wagner et les juges moldaver et côté sont dissidents en partie. procureurs de l’appelant : lafontaine & asso- ciates, toronto. ciates, toronto. procureur de l’intimée : service des poursuites service of canada, toronto. pénales du canada, toronto. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’ontario : procureur général de l’ontario, toronto. liberties association: brauti thorning, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana- dienne des libertés civiles : brauti thorning, toronto. association of ontario: alan d. gold professional corporation, toronto; brauti thorning, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association of ontario : alan d. gold professional corporation, toronto; brauti thorning, toronto. civil liberties association: thorsteinssons, vancou- ver; arvay finlay, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante british columbia civil liberties association : thorsteinssons, vancou- ver; arvay finlay, vancouver.
i. overview [1] on june 23, 2014, the province of new brunswick (“province”) filed a statement of claim against grant thornton llp, kent m. ostridge and grant thornton international ltd. (collectively, “grant thornton”), seeking damages for negligence. in response, grant thornton brought summary judgment motions to have the province’s claim dismissed as statute-barred by virtue of the two-year limitation period under s 5(1)(a) of the limitation of actions act, snb 2009, c. l-8.5 (“laa”). [2] the motions judge granted summary judgment in favour of grant thornton. he found that s 5(1)(a) barred the claim because the province knew or ought to have known that it had prima facie grounds to infer that it had a potential claim against grant thornton more than two years before commencing its claim. the court of appeal overturned that decision. it rejected the “prima facie grounds” standard used by the motions judge and held instead that the governing standard is whether a plaintiff knows or ought reasonably to have known facts that confer a legally enforceable right to a remedy. that right, the court explained, only exists if the plaintiff has knowledge of each constituent element of the claim. applying this standard, the court held that the two-year limitation period in s 5(1)(a) had not been triggered because the province had not yet discovered its claim (even though the province had issued a 106-paragraph statement of claim almost six years before receiving the reasons of the court of appeal). grant thornton now appeals to this court. [3] this case turns on the standard to be applied in determining whether a plaintiff has the requisite degree of knowledge to discover a claim under s 5(2), thereby triggering the two-year limitation period in s 5(1)(a). respectfully, the court of appeal adopted too high a standard. in my view, a claim is discovered when the plaintiff has knowledge, actual or constructive, of the material facts upon which a plausible inference of liability on the defendant’s part can be drawn. it follows from this standard that a plaintiff does not need knowledge of all the constituent elements of a claim to discover that claim. [4] in the present case, i am satisfied that the province discovered its claim against grant thornton on february 4, 2011. by then, the province knew or ought to have known that a loss occurred and that the loss was caused in whole or in part by conduct which grant thornton had been retained to detect. this was sufficient to draw a plausible inference that grant thornton had been negligent. although the province had this knowledge by february 4, 2011, it did not bring its claim until june 23, 2014, more than two years later. the claim is therefore statute-barred by s 5(1)(a) of the laa. i would accordingly allow the appeal brought by grant thornton llp and kent m. ostridge and the appeal brought by grant thornton international ltd., set aside the court of appeal’s judgment, and restore the motions judge’s judgment. ii. statement of facts [5] in the fall of 2008, the atcon group of companies (“atcon”) — a new brunswick-based provider of construction, energy, industrial and waste management services — was having difficulties meeting its financial obligations. the company sought loans from the bank of nova scotia, but it needed loan guarantees from the province to obtain them. [6] on april 24, 2009, the province agreed to a total of $50 million in loan guarantees, conditional upon atcon subjecting itself to an external review of its assets by an auditing firm. the province agreed that atcon’s auditor, grant thornton, could perform the external review. [7] a month later, on may 19, 2009, grant thornton delivered a letter to the province (“opinion letter”) detailing the work it had done in performing its audit of atcon’s consolidated financial statements for the fiscal year ending january 31, 2009 (“f2009”) in the letter, grant thornton stated that it was carrying out its audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and that it had some outstanding matters to complete before issuing its audit report (“unqualified auditors’ report”). [8] the unqualified auditors’ report was delivered to the province on june 18, 2009. in it, grant thornton confirmed that it had reviewed atcon’s financial statements for f2009 in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, which among other things, required it to “plan and perform [the] audit to obtain reasonable assurance whether the financial statements [were] free of material misstatement” (rr, at p 26). having done so, grant thornton opined that atcon’s statements presented “fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of [atcon] as at january 31, 2009 and the results of its operations and its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with canadian generally accepted accounting principles” (ibid). grant thornton attached atcon’s audited financial statements for f2009 to the report. [9] that satisfied the province. on june 30, 2009, relying upon the opinion letter, the unqualified auditors’ report and the audited financial statements for f2009, the province executed and delivered the loan guarantees in the amount of $50 million to atcon, which, in turn, enabled the company to borrow funds from the bank of nova scotia. [10] atcon’s financial difficulties persisted. operating losses and the shutdown of the company’s western canada operations resulted in atcon running out of working capital by october 2009 — a mere four months after receiving the loan guarantees from the province. [11] shortly thereafter, the bank of nova scotia applied for a receivership order with respect to atcon under the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3, and sought relief under the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36. on march 1, 2010, the new brunswick court of queen’s bench granted the bank’s applications. a few days later, the bank called on the province to pay out the loan guarantees. on march 18, 2010, the province did — all $50 million. [12] the proceedings against atcon and the bank’s call on the loan guarantees concerned the province accordingly, in june 2010, it retained rsm richter inc. (“richter”), an accounting and auditing firm, to review atcon’s financial position for f2009, and to issue a report on its findings (“richter report”). [13] the richter report was issued in draft on february 4, 2011, and finalized on november 30, 2012. save for some grammatical corrections, the final report was identical to the draft report. [14] the findings in the richter report differed from those in the unqualified auditors’ report produced by grant thornton importantly, unlike grant thornton, richter opined that atcon’s financial statements for f2009 had not, in fact, been prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles richter formed this opinion based on what it described to be a “systematic approach” by atcon’s management to “overstate assets, revenues and profits, [and] understate liabilities, expenses and losses” (ar, vol ii, at p 207) specifically, the report identified various errors in the financial statements, which were considered to be “material” because it is “probable” that the errors would have influenced the decision of the person relying on the financial statements (ibid., at p 136 (emphasis deleted)). in that regard, richter estimated that atcon’s f2009 assets and net earnings were overstated by a material amount, ranging between $28.3 million and $35.4 million. notably, in grant thornton’s audit of atcon, materiality was set at $1.2 million, which placed the misstatements identified by richter far in excess of the materiality set by grant thornton for its audit. those misstatements, however, had not been identified by grant thornton in the unqualified auditors’ report. [15] this information triggered a response from the deputy minister of economic development in a letter to the new brunswick institute of chartered accountants dated december 21, 2012, the deputy minister advised the institute that the province was proceeding with a formal complaint against grant thornton. a copy of the richter report was attached. [16] a year and a half later, on june 23, 2014, the province commenced its claim alleging negligence against grant thornton. in its defence, grant thornton denied the allegations. further, it moved to have the province’s claim summarily dismissed on the basis that it was barred by the two-year limitation period under s 5(1)(a) of the laa. iii relevant statutory provisions [17] the relevant provisions of the laa are: definitions and interpretation 1(1) the following definitions apply in this act. “claim” means a claim to remedy the injury, loss or damage that occurred as a result of an act or omission. general limitation periods . 5(1) unless otherwise provided in this act, no claim shall be brought after the earlier of (a) two years from the day on which the claim is discovered, and (b) fifteen years from the day on which the act or omission on which the claim is based occurred. 5(2) a claim is discovered on the day on which the claimant first knew or ought reasonably to have known (a) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred, (b) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission, and (c) that the act or omission was that of the defendant. iv proceedings below a court of queen’s bench of new brunswick, 2019 nbqb 36 (grant j.) [18] the main issue before the motions judge was when, if ever, the province discovered its claim against grant thornton under s 5 of the laa. the answer, in his view, lay in the proper interpretation of s 5(2). [19] under s 5(2), the question, as he saw it, was whether the province “knew or ought to have known that it had prima facie grounds to infer that it had a potential cause of action against the defendants” (para. 108 (canlii)). if the province had this knowledge more than two years before commencing its claim on june 23, 2014, then the claim was statute-barred by operation of the two-year limitation period applicable under s 5(1)(a). [20] in the opinion of the motions judge, the province had the requisite knowledge by march 18, 2010. by then, it had suffered a loss by paying $50 million to the bank of nova scotia and it could reasonably have inferred that grant thornton caused or contributed to the act or omission giving rise to this loss. this, in the motions judge’s view, gave the province prima facie grounds to infer the existence of a potential claim against grant thornton. in the alternative, he found that the province had the requisite knowledge after it received the draft richter report on february 4, 2011. either way, he concluded that the province had failed to commence its claim within the two-year limitation period applicable under s 5(1)(a). hence, the claim was statute- barred. [21] in the result, the motions judge granted summary judgment in favour of grant thornton and dismissed the province’s claim. b court of appeal of new brunswick, 2020 nbca 18, 54 cpc (8th) 271 (drapeau, quigg and green jja) [22] the court of appeal unanimously allowed the appeal it held that the motions judge “applied the wrong legal test for s 5(1)(a) purposes” and “made a palpable and overriding error in finding the province discovered its claim more than two years before proceedings were commenced” (paras. 81 and 127). [23] regarding the legal test, the court rejected the motions judge’s test — “prima facie grounds to infer . . . a potential cause of action” — on the basis that it was not stringent enough (paras. 6-7 (emphasis deleted), quoting trial reasons, at para. 108). instead, the court set out what it believed to be the correct and “more exacting” test, namely that “the two-year limitation period begins to run the day after the plaintiff knows or ought reasonably to have known facts that confer a legally enforceable right to a remedy” (para. 7). in claims for negligence, the court explained, “that right only exists if the defendant was under a relevant duty of care and its loss-causing act or omission fell below the applicable standard of care” (para. 7). [24] applying that test, the court found that the two-year limitation period under s 5(1)(a) had not been triggered because the province had not yet discovered its claim. specifically, the province could not know whether grant thornton’s audit of atcon’s financial statements for f2009 fell below the applicable standard of care by failing to comply with generally accepted auditing standards according to the court, this essential component of the province’s negligence claim could not be known unless and until grant thornton produced its audit-related files for the province’s inspection — something it had consistently refused to do without those files, “the province may suspect and allege, but it does not know, actually or constructively, the f2009 audit was non-compliant with generally accepted auditing standards” (para. 8) the motions judge’s failure to consider the absence of evidence on that issue constituted a “palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidential record” (ibid). this accounted for his erroneous finding that the province discovered its claim on either march 18, 2010, or february 4, 2011. [25] on this basis, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the summary judgment order. v. issues [26] i would state the main issues in this case as follows: (1) what is the standard to be applied in determining whether a plaintiff has the requisite degree of knowledge to discover a claim under s 5(2), so as to trigger the limitation period in s 5(1)(a)? (2) when, if ever, did the province discover its negligence claim against grant thornton? vi analysis a. the applicable standard [27] section 5(1)(a) of the laa sets out the limitation period that controls this case: a claim must be commenced two years from the day on which the claim is discovered. as the text of s 5(2) makes plain, a claim is discovered when a plaintiff knows or ought reasonably to have known that an injury, loss or damage occurred, which was caused or contributed to by an act or omission of the defendant. [28] this case turns on the standard to be applied in determining whether and when a plaintiff has the requisite degree of knowledge to discover a claim under s 5(2), thereby triggering the two-year limitation period under s 5(1)(a). in order to properly set the standard, two distinct inquiries are required. first, in assessing if the limitation period in s 5(1)(a) has been triggered, is the plaintiff’s state of knowledge to be assessed in the same manner as the common law rule of discoverability? second, what is the particular degree of knowledge required to discover a claim under s 5(2)? (1) codification of the common law rule of discoverability [29] section 5 of the laa operates against the backdrop of a common law discoverability rule that is well-established. under that rule, “a cause of action arises for purposes of a limitation period when the material facts on which it is based have been discovered or ought to have been discovered by the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable diligence” (central trust co v rafuse, [1986] 2 scr 147, at p 224, citing kamloops (city of) v. nielsen, [1984] 2 scr 2; see also ryan v. moore, 2005 scc 38, [2005] 2 scr 53, at paras. 2 and 22). this rule has its origins in equity. in particular, it seeks to balance the three rationales for imposing limitation periods — the guarantee of repose, the desire to foreclose claims based on stale evidence and the expectation that a plaintiff will start a claim in a timely manner (m (k.) v. m (h.), [1992] 3 scr 6, at pp. 29-30) — with the need to avoid the injustice of precluding a claim before the plaintiff even has knowledge of its existence (peixeiro v. haberman, [1997] 3 scr 549, at para. 36). [30] though a “general rule”, the common law rule does not apply to every statutory limitation period (ryan, at para. 23, quoting rafuse, at p 224). rather, it is an interpretive tool for construing limitations statutes and, as such, it can be ousted by clear legislative language (pioneer corp. v. godfrey, 2019 scc 42, at para. 32). in that regard, “many provincial legislatures have chosen to enact statutory limitation periods that codify, limit or oust entirely discoverability’s application” (ibid.) assessing whether a provincial legislature has codified, limited or ousted the common law rule is a matter of statutory interpretation (ibid., at para. 42, citing rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21). [31] in this case, grant thornton argues that s 5(1)(a) and (2) ousts or, at least, limits the common law discoverability rule. in its view, the new brunswick legislature provided for the limitation period set out in s 5(1)(a) to begin running when a plaintiff has a lower degree of knowledge than the common law rule requires, namely “a sufficient basis, including by making reasonable inferences based on their knowledge of having suffered a loss, to plead an action against the defendant and start the civil litigation process” (af,. grant thornton llp and kent m. ostridge, at para. 87). [32] with respect, i disagree. in my view, the new brunswick legislature chose to codify the common law rule in s 5(1)(a) and (2) of the laa. this interpretation is supported by the words of s 5, read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the laa, the object of the laa, and the intention of the legislature (see rizzo & rizzo, at para. 21). [33] as set out at para. 17 above, the text of s 5 of the laa reads as follows : general limitation periods 5(1) unless otherwise provided in this act, no claim shall be brought after the earlier of (a) two years from the day on which the claim is discovered, and (b) fifteen years from the day on which the act or omission on which the claim is based occurred. 5(2) a claim is discovered on the day on which the claimant first knew or ought reasonably to have known (a) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred, (b) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission, and (c) that the act or omission was that of the defendant. [34] the plain words of this provision are unambiguous section 5(1)(a) provides that no claim shall be brought after two years from the day on which the claim is “discovered”. section 5(2) further specifies that a claim is discovered on the day that a claimant knew or ought reasonably to have known the facts that are material, namely the occurrence of an injury, loss or damage that was caused or contributed to by an act or omission of the defendant. as evidenced by the words of the provision, there is no clear legislative language ousting or limiting the common law rule; in fact, quite the opposite. the event triggering the limitation period in s 5(1)(a) is linked to the state of the plaintiff’s knowledge in the same manner as the common law rule. [35] moreover, there is nothing in the legislative scheme or the object of the laa that alters the governing principles set out in the common law rule the new brunswick legislature enacted the general limitation period scheme in s 5 to simplify the law of limitation periods. in doing so, it expressly modeled s 5 on similar limitation provisions found in ontario, saskatchewan and alberta (new brunswick, office of the attorney general, commentary on bill 28: limitation of actions act, january 2009 (online), at pp. 1 and 4), all of which have been found to codify the common law rule of discoverability (see, eg,. galota v. festival hall developments ltd., 2016 onca 585, 133 or (3d) 35, at para. 15; de shazo v. nations energy co., 2005 abca 241, 48 alta l.r (4th) 25, at para. 26; jardine v saskatoon police service, 2017 skqb 217, at para. 36 (canlii)). the legislature’s express intention to replicate provisions that codify the common law rule is compelling evidence that new brunswick intended to follow suit. [36] in arguing that the legislature ousted the common law rule, grant thornton points to some linguistic differences between the common law rule and s 5 it emphasizes the fact that the common law rule uses the term “cause of action”, whereas s 5 uses the term “claim”. according to grant thornton, these concepts are distinct: the former refers to a set of facts entitling a plaintiff to a remedy from the court, while the latter is “purely a limitations concept” with “only two factual components (wrongful conduct and resulting damage)” (af,. grant thornton llp and kent m. ostridge, at para. 65, quoting d zacks, “claims, not causes of action: the misapprehension of limitations principles” (2018), 48 advocates’ q 165, at p 165). [37] i recognize that the distinction between “claim” and “cause of action” could be meaningful in some circumstances; but in my view, it is not so here. in fact, the laa’s own wording shows that the use of “claim” does not rule out a shared meaning with “cause of action”. section 1(1) defines a claim as a “claim to remedy the injury, loss or damage that occurred as a result of an act or omission”. in short, s 1(1) indicates that the legislature’s use of the term “claim” focuses on a set of facts giving rise to a remedy, which is the same meaning that grant thornton attributes to the term “cause of action”. [38] this interpretation is supported by the french text of s 5(2) of the laa, which reads in part as follows: “[l]es faits ayant donné naissance à la réclamation sont découverts le jour où le réclamant a appris ou aurait dû normalement apprendre”. in addition, the french text of s 1(1) defines “réclamation” as “[r]éclamation pour obtenir réparation de préjudices, de pertes ou de dommages survenus par suite d’un acte ou d’une omission”. as is apparent, the wording of the french text supports my interpretation of the english text, and confirms that “claim” in s 5 means “cause of action”, namely: discovering the facts giving rise to a claim to obtain relief for the injury, loss or damage that resulted from an act or omission. this is the legal equivalent of “a set of facts entitling a plaintiff to a remedy”, the definition of a “cause of action” put forward by grant thornton. [39] more probative are the hansard debates preceding the enactment of the laa. when asked why the statute uses the term “claim” instead of “cause of action”, the minister of justice explained: in a sense, it is really just semantics. tim rattenbury, who works for the office of the attorney general, and i had a good discussion the word “claim” is just another way to characterize bringing forward your matter for purposes of litigation “cause of action” is the same thing the standardization of these particular ways of characterizing an action before the courts is simply semantics. (new brunswick, legislative assembly, journal of debates (hansard), 3rd sess., 56th assem., june 17, 2009, at p 50 (hon. mr. burke)) in other words, according to the minister, using “claim” instead of “cause of action” amounts to a distinction without a difference while not in itself determinative, the minister’s statement can hardly be taken as evidencing the “clear legislative language” needed to oust or limit the common law rule (see godfrey, at para. 32). if anything, it demonstrates the opposite. [40] in sum, i am satisfied that s 5(1)(a) and (2) codifies the common law rule of discoverability as established by that rule and the laa, the limitation period is triggered when the plaintiff discovers or ought to have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence the material facts on which the claim is based. having so found, i turn now to ascertaining the particular degree of knowledge required to discover a claim under s 5. (2) the requisite degree of knowledge [41] as noted, the court of appeal disagreed with the motions judge on the extent of knowledge required to discover a claim under s 5. the motions judge held that a plaintiff needs to know only enough facts to have prima facie grounds to infer the existence of a potential claim. the court of appeal, on the other hand, held that discovery of a claim requires actual or constructive knowledge of facts that confer a legally enforceable right to a judicial remedy, which includes knowledge of every constituent element of the cause of action being pled. thus, on the court of appeal’s interpretation, in addition to knowledge of a loss and causation, a claim in negligence would include knowledge of a duty of care as well as knowledge of a breach of the standard of care. [42] in my respectful view, neither approach accurately describes the degree of knowledge required under s 5(2) to discover a claim and trigger the limitation period in s 5(1)(a). i propose the following approach instead: a claim is discovered when a plaintiff has knowledge, actual or constructive, of the material facts upon which a plausible inference of liability on the defendant’s part can be drawn. this approach, in my view, remains faithful to the common law rule of discoverability set out in rafuse and accords with s 5 of the laa. [43] by way of explanation, the material facts that must be actually or constructively known are generally set out in the limitation statute. here, they are listed in s 5(2)(a) to (c). pursuant to s 5(2), a claim is discovered when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge that: (a) the injury, loss or damage occurred; (b) the injury loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission; and (c) the act or omission was that of the defendant this list is cumulative, not disjunctive for instance, knowledge of a loss, without more, is insufficient to trigger the limitation period. [44] in assessing the plaintiff’s state of knowledge, both direct and circumstantial evidence can be used moreover, a plaintiff will have constructive knowledge when the evidence shows that the plaintiff ought to have discovered the material facts by exercising reasonable diligence. suspicion may trigger that exercise (crombie property holdings ltd v mccoll-frontenac inc., 2017 onca 16, 406 dlr (4th) 252, at para. 42). [45] finally, the governing standard requires the plaintiff to be able to draw a plausible inference of liability on the part of the defendant from the material facts that are actually or constructively known. in this particular context, determining whether a plausible inference of liability can be drawn from the material facts that are known is the same assessment as determining whether a plaintiff “had all of the material facts necessary to determine that [it] had prima facie grounds for inferring [liability on the part of the defendant]” (brown v. wahl, 2015 onca 778, 128 or (3d) 583, at para. 7; see also para. 8, quoting lawless v anderson, 2011 onca 102, 276 oac 75, at para. 30) although the question in both circumstances is whether the plaintiff’s knowledge of the material facts gives rise to an inference that the defendant is liable, i prefer to use the term plausible inference because in civil litigation, there does not appear to be a universal definition of what qualifies as prima facie grounds. as the british columbia court of appeal observed in insurance corporation of british columbia v. mehat, 2018 bcca 242, 11 bclr (6th) 217, at para. 77: as noted in sopinka, lederman & bryant: the law of evidence in canada, some cases equate prima facie proof to a situation where the evidence gives rise to a permissible fact inference; others equate prima facie proof to a case where the evidence gives rise to a compelled fact determination, absent evidence to the contrary. [citation omitted.] since the term prima facie can carry different meanings, using plausible inference in the present context ensures consistency. a plausible inference is one which gives rise to a “permissible fact inference”. [46] the plausible inference of liability requirement ensures that the degree of knowledge needed to discover a claim is more than mere suspicion or speculation. this accords with the principles underlying the discoverability rule, which recognize that it is unfair to deprive a plaintiff from bringing a claim before it can reasonably be expected to know the claim exists. at the same time, requiring a plausible inference of liability ensures the standard does not rise so high as to require certainty of liability (kowal v shyiak, 2012 onca 512, 296 oac 352) or “perfect knowledge” (de shazo, at para. 31; see also the concept of “perfect certainty” in hill v south alberta land registration district (1993), 8 alta. lr (3d) 379, at para. 8). indeed, it is well established that a plaintiff does not need to know the exact extent or type of harm it has suffered, or the precise cause of its injury, in order for a limitation period to run (hoopp realty inc. v. emery jamieson llp, 2018 abqb 276, 27 cpc (8th) 83, at para. 213, citing peixeiro, at para. 18). [47] in my respectful view, endorsing the court of appeal’s approach that to discover a claim, a plaintiff needs knowledge of facts that confer a legally enforceable right to a judicial remedy, including knowledge of the constituent elements of a claim, would move the needle too close to certainty a plausible inference of liability is enough; it strikes the equitable balance of interests that the common law rule of discoverability seeks to achieve. [48] it follows that in a claim alleging negligence, a plaintiff does not need knowledge that the defendant owed it a duty of care or that the defendant’s act or omission breached the applicable standard of care. finding otherwise could have the unintended consequence of indefinitely postponing the limitation period after all, knowledge that the defendant breached the standard of care is often only discernable through the document discovery process or the exchange of expert reports, both of which typically occur after the plaintiff has commenced a claim. as the court stated in klb v. british columbia, 2003 scc 51, [2003] 2 scr 403, at para. 55: since the purpose of the rule of reasonable discoverability is to ensure that plaintiffs have sufficient awareness of the facts to be able to bring an action, the relevant type of awareness cannot be one that it is possible to lack even after one has brought an action. [emphasis added.] although the court in klb was dealing with discoverability in a different context, the basic principle is relevant here the standard cannot be so high as to make it possible for a plaintiff to acquire the requisite knowledge only through discovery or experts. and yet, that is precisely the standard endorsed by the court of appeal in the instant case. with respect, that standard sets the bar too high. by the same token, the standard is not as low as the standard needed to ward off an application to strike a claim. what is required is actual or constructive knowledge of the material facts from which a plausible inference can be made that the defendant acted negligently. b application to the facts [49] with this approach in mind, i turn to the question of determining when, if ever, the province discovered its claim against grant thornton. [50] grant thornton submits that the province discovered its claim on february 4, 2011, when it received the draft richter report. i agree. at that point, the province had actual or constructive knowledge of the material facts — namely, that a loss occurred and that the loss was caused or contributed to by an act or omission of grant thornton. nothing more was needed to draw a plausible inference of negligence. (1) the province had knowledge of the material facts [51] the first aspect of the governing standard requires an assessment of the province’s knowledge of the material facts. it is undisputable that by february 4, 2011, the province knew that it had suffered a loss. in fact, it knew on march 18, 2010, when it paid out the loan guarantees to the bank of nova scotia — all $50 million. moreover, based on the record, i am able to conclude that on february 4, 2011, the province knew or, at least, ought reasonably to have known, that the loss was caused or contributed to by an act or omission of grant thornton. [52] the province’s willingness to go along with atcon’s request for loan guarantees totalling $50 million was conditional on grant thornton’s external audit of atcon’s consolidated financial statements for f2009. after completing its audit, grant thornton represented to the province in the unqualified auditors’ report that it had audited atcon’s financial statements in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and that, having done so, it was of the opinion that they presented “fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of [atcon] as at january 31, 2009 and the results of its operations and its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with canadian generally accepted accounting principles” (rr, at p 26) the province relied on those representations to execute the loan guarantees. [53] just over four months after receiving the loan guarantees, atcon ran out of working capital, which led the bank of nova scotia to commence bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings against it. counsel for the attorney general of new brunswick attended some of the hearings and, as a result, the province became privy to those proceedings. indeed, the province was aware that on march 1, 2010, the court granted the bank’s applications and placed atcon into receivership. [54] shortly thereafter, on march 18, 2010, the bank called upon the province to pay out on the loan guarantees. this raised alarm bells for the province about the true state of atcon’s financial affairs because a few months later, it retained richter to review and comment on atcon’s financial position for f2009. [55] richter undertook this review and on february 4, 2011, issued the 88-page draft richter report. in my view, the province’s knowledge about its potential claim crystallized at this point. [56] in this report, richter opined that atcon’s financial statements for f2009 had not been prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles in all material respects. richter formed this opinion based on what it described to be a “systematic approach” by atcon’s management to “overstate assets, revenues and profits, [and] understate liabilities, expenses and losses” (ar, vol ii, at p 207). specifically, richter identified various errors in the financial statements, which, as richter explained, were considered to be “material” because they would likely have influenced the decision of the person relying on the financial statements. in that regard, richter estimated that atcon’s f2009 assets and net earnings were overstated by an amount ranging between $28.3 million and $35.4 million since richter set the materiality for atcon’s financial statements in the range of $1.3 million to $2.6 million, this placed the misstatements approximately 14 to 22 times greater than the acceptable materiality that was set for grant thornton’s audit of atcon, materiality was set at $1.2 million, which also clearly placed the misstatements well in excess of materiality. [57] while richter’s mandate did not include commenting on whether grant thornton’s audit had been performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, its mandate was similar to grant thornton’s: both were retained by the province to determine whether atcon’s financial statements had been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles grant thornton’s conclusion that the statements had been prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, which indicated its belief that they were not materially misstated, stands in stark contrast to richter’s findings that not only were the financial statements misstated, those misstatements significantly exceeded the materiality threshold established for the audit. the magnitude of the misstatements — assets and net earnings were overstated by an amount ranging between $28.3 million and $35.4 million — is even more striking when they are considered in the context of loan guarantees totalling $50 million. [58] it stands to reason from the findings made in the richter report, considered in light of all the surrounding circumstances, that the province knew or ought to have known that grant thornton’s act or omission caused or contributed to its loss. specifically, grant thornton’s act or omission was issuing the unqualified auditors’ report with respect to atcon’s financial statements for f2009, despite those statements not being prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and not fairly representing, in all material respects, atcon’s financial position for f2009. this act or omission caused or contributed to the province’s loss because the province executed the $50 million loan guarantees in reliance on grant thornton’s representations. (2) the province could have drawn a plausible inference of negligence [59] based on all of the material facts that the province knew or ought to have known, i am able to conclude that by february 4, 2011, the province had sufficient knowledge to draw a plausible inference that grant thornton had been negligent. [60] the province maintains that the limitation period did not begin to run on february 4, 2011. it contends that, to this day, the limitation period has not yet started to run because it does not have access to grant thornton’s audit-related files and thus, it cannot know whether grant thornton breached the applicable standard of care by failing to conduct the audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. this, despite the fact that the province went ahead and filed its claim many years ago, on june 23, 2014, and despite its concession that it did so without learning any new information about grant thornton’s conduct between that date and february 4, 2011, the date it received the draft richter report. [61] with respect, i disagree with the province’s position. as i have explained, a plaintiff does not need knowledge of all the constituent elements of negligence to discover its claim. all that is required is knowledge of the material facts, as set out in the laa, from which a plausible inference of liability can be drawn. contrary to its assertions, the province did not need access to grant thornton’s audit-related files to plausibly infer that grant thornton had breached the applicable standard of care by failing to conduct the audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. in particular, from the material misstatements identified in the richter report, referred to above at paras. 56-57, the province could have inferred that the loss was the fruit of an audit that fell below the applicable standards, which require auditors to “plan and perform an audit to obtain reasonable assurance whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement” (rr, at p 26). [62] in sum, having regard to the material facts that i have identified, which the province knew or ought to have known, the province had ample knowledge as of february 4, 2011, to draw a plausible inference that grant thornton had acted negligently this does not mean that grant thornton was in fact negligent that question would have been for trial, had the province brought its claim within the limitation period. vii conclusion [63] in conclusion, i am satisfied that the province discovered its claim on february 4, 2011, more than two years before commencing it on june 23, 2014. the province’s claim is therefore statute-barred by s 5(1)(a) of the laa. [64] accordingly, the appeal brought by grant thornton llp and kent m. ostridge and the appeal brought by grant thornton international ltd. are both allowed. the judgment of the court of appeal is set aside and the judgment of the motions judge in the court of queen’s bench is restored.1 the appellants are entitled to their costs throughout. 1 since i am disposing of these appeals on the basis of evidence that was properly before the motions judge, i decline to consider the province’s proposed disposition (see rf, at para. 145), to remit the matter back to the court of appeal to address the alternative grounds of appeal relating to the motions judge’s evidentiary rulings, which were raised before that court but not decided (see ca reasons, at paras. 80-81). appeals allowed with costs throughout. solicitors for the appellants grant thornton llp and kent m. ostridge: lenczner slaght royce smith griffin, toronto; mcinnes cooper, fredericton. company, fredericton.
i. overview [1] this appeal calls upon the court to affirm and apply its holdings in r v. le, 2019 scc 34, [2019] 2 scr 692, and r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr. 353, respectively, on two points: (1) evaluating whether an individual has been detained by the police; and (2) applying the framework in r v. sinclair, 2010 scc 35, [2010] 2 scr 310, in the purposive and generous manner required by our jurisprudence. [2] the police suspected that nigel vernon lafrance might have been involved in the death of an individual that took place on march 17, 2015. in the early morning of march 19, 2015, a team of armed police officers entered his home to execute a search warrant. they awoke mr. lafrance, a recent high school graduate described by the trial judge as “youthful, [i]ndigenous and ha[ving] minimal police exposure” (2017 abqb 746, 399 crr (2d) 184, at para. 79), and by the court of appeal as “19 years old, indigenous, [with] very limited prior exposure to the police and . . . of much smaller stature than . . . the armed and uniformed officers” (2021 abca 51, 20 alta. lr (7th) 211, at para. 29). ordered to dress and leave the premises, he was then led to a police officer who asked him to identify himself and come to the police station to provide a statement regarding the alleged murder. the police drove him to the police station, took him to a secure environment therein, and interviewed him for over three hours. [3] on april 7, 2015, the police arrested mr. lafrance for murder after allowing him to call legal aid, they interviewed him. several hours into the interview, mr. lafrance asked to call his father because that would be his “only chance of getting a lawyer” (ar, vol. v, at p 137) the police refused the request and pushed for answers. mr. lafrance eventually confessed to killing the victim. [4] mr. lafrance sought to exclude this confession by arguing that the police had detained him on march 19 and breached his right to counsel pursuant to s 10(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms on march 19 and april 7.1 the trial judge admitted the evidence, finding that mr. lafrance had not been detained on march 19 (thereby also disposing of the s 10(b) argument related to that date), and that police were not required to allow him a second opportunity to call a lawyer on april 7. mr. lafrance was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder. the majority of the court of appeal of alberta allowed his appeal, excluded the evidence under s 24(2) of the charter and ordered a new trial the crown appeals, asking us to restore the conviction. [5] i would dismiss the appeal. the police detained mr. lafrance on march 19, then breached s 10(b) by failing to inform him of his right to counsel. they committed another breach of s 10(b) on april 7 by refusing to allow him to contact a lawyer in circumstances which showed that his initial conversation with legal aid was insufficient for the purposes of s 10(b), being “to allow the detainee not only to be informed of his rights and obligations under the law but, equally if not more important, to obtain advice as to how to exercise those rights” (sinclair, at para. 26, citing r v. manninen, [1987] 1 scr 1233, at pp. 1242-43) these were serious breaches, substantially impacting mr. lafrance’s charter-protected interests, and admitting the evidence thereby obtained would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. ii. facts 1 mr. lafrance also argued that his s 8 rights were breached. given my disposition of this appeal on ss. 10 and 24(2) of the charter, it is unnecessary for me to decide this point. [6] on march 17, 2015, anthony yasinski was stabbed in the neck and died. the police suspected mr. lafrance’s involvement, as he was the last person to have contacted mr. yasinski prior to his death. [7] two interactions between the police and mr. lafrance followed, on march 19, 2015, and april 7, 2015, respectively. a march 19, 2015 [8] the police sought and obtained a search warrant to search mr. lafrance’s place of residence on the morning of march 19. a police search team of 11 ⸺ many of which were wearing bulletproof vests and carrying firearms, including at least one “assault rifle” ⸺ arrived in marked and unmarked police vehicles at 6:50 am, blocked off surrounding roads and entered the residence, making their way to mr. lafrance’s room and waking him. when he opened the door, they directed him to dress and leave his house immediately when he asked the police for permission to look for his cat (which had run outside when the police entered the residence), they permitted him to do so, led him outside, and accompanied him as he chased after it at all times, mr. lafrance remained “in sight of police officers” and did not venture past the police cordon (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 93-94). [9] shortly after retrieving the cat, mr. lafrance was approached by sergeant (then corporal) eros who, unbeknownst to mr. lafrance, had been assigned to interview him and had been waiting for him outside sgt. eros was accompanied by staff sergeant (then cpl.) zazulak, armed and wearing a bulletproof vest it is undisputed that, at that time, sgt. eros did not have reasonable and probable grounds to proceed to arrest mr. lafrance. [10] sgt. eros asked mr. lafrance to confirm his identity (which mr. lafrance did), advised him that he wanted to speak about an incident that occurred down the road — referring, of course, to mr. yasinski’s death — and asked him to come to the police station and provide a statement. sgt. eros told mr. lafrance that doing so would be a “completely voluntary” choice. mr. lafrance agreed to give a statement. [11] sgt. eros and mr. lafrance discussed how he could make his way to the police station — whether by public transit, a ride with sgt. eros and s/sgt. zazulak in an unmarked police van, or by some alternative means. having no money for bus fare, mr. lafrance chose to ride with sgt. eros and s/sgt. zazulak. [12] after a 20- to 25-minute ride to the police station, mr. lafrance was escorted by sgt. eros and s/sgt. zazulak through two controlled access key-carded doors to an interview room at the back of the station he was then left alone in the closed room for at least 17 minutes, unaware (because he had not been told) that the door was unlocked. when sgt. eros returned to the interview room and mr. lafrance asked to use the washroom, sgt. eros escorted him to the washroom, stood by while mr. lafrance used the washroom, then escorted him back to the interview room. [13] sgt. eros then proceeded to interview mr. lafrance for approximately three and a half hours. he began by telling mr. lafrance that he did not need to speak with him, that the door to the interview room was unlocked and that he could leave at any time but sgt. eros also informed him that they were currently in a “secure environment” and that, should mr. lafrance want to leave, use the washroom or take a smoke break, he would have to let sgt. eros know. [14] sgt. eros then informed mr. lafrance that he was a suspect in mr. yasinski’s murder, and asked him about “what [his] days have been filled with and what [he had] been doing” prior to the police search of his home (ar, vol. iv, at p 82) mr. lafrance gave answers, some of which were relayed to the search team, leading them to seize items of interest. sgt. eros also took mr. lafrance’s fingerprints and dna (prior to which he was offered a chance to speak with a lawyer) and seized his cellphone along with his clothes — all of which were taken after obtaining mr. lafrance’s consent at the interview’s conclusion, police drove mr. lafrance home. b april 7, 2015 [15] on april 7, the police arrested mr. lafrance for the murder of mr. yasinski. shortly after the arrest, the arresting officer informed mr. lafrance of his right to counsel and that he would be given an opportunity to call a lawyer. mr. lafrance indicated that he understood this and asked to contact a “free lawyer”. [16] at the police station, mr. lafrance was escorted to a telephone room and spoke on the phone with a legal aid lawyer this short conversation was mr. lafrance’s first time ever speaking with a lawyer, having never before been arrested or otherwise required to obtain legal services. when he finished the call, the arresting officer asked mr. lafrance if he had spoken to a lawyer and understood the advice, to which mr. lafrance answered yes mr. lafrance was then moved to an interview room to be interviewed by sgt. eros. [17] several hours into the interview, sgt. eros told mr. lafrance that he did not believe his version of the events and that there was no doubt in his mind that mr. lafrance was responsible for killing mr. yasinski as the tone of the interview shifted, mr. lafrance asked to speak with his father before continuing to answer sgt. eros’ questions. when sgt. eros asked him why, mr. lafrance explained that his father was his “only chance of getting a lawyer” and that he wanted a lawyer before going forward with anything else. he said that legal aid told him “to get a lawyer before [he] continue[s] talking” to sit down and talk about his situation (ar, vol. v, at p 139). in response, sgt. eros explained that he “ha[d] no problem” letting him talk to his father (ar, vol. v, at p 138), but that mr. lafrance had already spoken to a lawyer. mr. lafrance, he said, may have misinterpreted2 the advice and so he explained to mr. lafrance that he could not have a lawyer present in the room with him during 2 i glean this from sgt. eros’ testimony: “there’s a person that ah you know what – and the way that that kinda goes ah – i won’t say it’s, it’s bad advice but it’s maybe miss – a little bit miss ah – miss ah – interrupted” (ar, vol. v, at p 139). the custodial interview sgt. eros testified, however, that he was satisfied that mr. lafrance understood his right to silence and his legal advice. [18] sgt. eros pressed ahead with his questioning and, shortly thereafter, mr. lafrance confessed to stabbing mr. yasinski. iii. issues [19] this appeal presents three issues: 1 did the police detain mr. lafrance and breach his s 10(b) right to counsel on march 19, 2015? 2 did the police breach mr. lafrance’s s 10(b) right to counsel by refusing to allow him to have a further consultation with a lawyer on april 7, 2015? 3. if the answer to either or both of the foregoing is “yes”, would the evidence obtained therefrom bring the administration of justice into disrepute, such that it must be excluded under s 24(2)? iv analysis a march 19, 2015 [20] mr. lafrance’s straightforward argument regarding the march 19 encounter is this: he was detained when the police executed their search warrant, and that detention persisted during his interview at the police station as he felt, in the circumstances, obliged to comply with the request to speak with police. it follows that the police breached s 10(b) by failing to advise him of his right to retain and instruct counsel upon detention (grant, at para. 28). (1) detention [21] detention refers to “a suspension of an individual’s liberty interest by virtue of a significant physical or psychological restraint at the hands of the state” (r. v. suberu, 2009 scc 33, [2009] 2 scr 460, at para. 21; le, at para. 27). in the heat of the moment, it is not always easy for ordinary citizens, who may be uninformed of their rights or the scope of the police’s powers, to know whether they have a choice to comply with a request by the police. an individual may perceive “a routine interaction with the police as demanding a sense of obligation to comply with every request” (le, at para. 26, referring to s. penney, v rondinelli and j stribopoulos, criminal procedure in canada (2nd ed 2018), at p 83) for that reason, this court has recognized that, “even absent physical restraint by the state, a detention exists in situations where a reasonable person in the accused’s shoes would feel obligated to comply . . . and that they are not free to leave” (le, at para. 26 (emphasis added)). even so, not every encounter between state and citizen effects a detention (suberu, at para. 3; le, at para. 27); no detention is effected, and therefore s 10(b) rights are not breached, where an individual voluntarily assists the police by, for example, freely agreeing to provide a statement. [22] in this case, mr. lafrance says that his choice to cooperate with the police on march 19 was, in substance, imposed by way of psychological constraints. psychological detention exists where an individual is legally required to comply with a direction or demand by the police, or where “a reasonable person in [that individual’s] position would feel so obligated” and would “conclude that he or she was not free to go” (grant, at paras. 30-31; le, at para. 25) it is that latter category which mr. lafrance says describes his circumstances. three factors — identified in grant and expanded upon in le — are to be considered and balanced: 1. the circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they would reasonably be perceived by the individual; 2. the nature of the police conduct; and 3. the particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual where relevant (grant, at para. 44; le, at para. 31). [23] the applicable standard of review here is that of correctness; the existence of a detention is a question of law (r v. shepherd, 2009 scc 35, [2009] 2 scr 527, at paras. 18 and 20; grant, at para. 43; le, at para. 23). no deference is owed to the trial judge’s analysis and conclusion thereon. this is not to say that the voir dire is irrelevant, since the trial judge’s findings of facts receive deference, absent a palpable and overriding error (grant, at paras. 43 and 45). (2) r v. moran [24] a jurisprudential point should be addressed before proceeding further. the court of appeal criticized the trial judge for not considering the factors pertinent to identifying a detention in r v. moran (1987), 36 ccc (3d) 225 (ont. ca). in my view, however, the trial judge did not err in this respect, since grant has displaced the authority of moran as stating the test for detention. [25] in moran, an issue before the court of appeal for ontario was whether the trial judge had erred in concluding that mr. moran, who had been interviewed twice by police in connection with the murder of which he was eventually convicted, had not been detained during those interviews. in dismissing this ground of appeal, martin ja. identified a series of non-exhaustive factors to assist in determining whether a person is detained at the time of questioning at a police station. [26] i recognize that lower courts continue to refer to these factors when assessing detention under grant (see, eg,. r v. seagull, 2015 bcca 164, 323 ccc. (3d) 361, at para. 38; r v tessier, 2020 abca 289, 12 alta l.r (7th) 55, at paras. 66-69, leave to appeal granted, bulletin of proceedings, march 4, 2021, at p 2; r v. eaton, 2019 onca 891, at para. 12 (canlii); r v. nb, 2018 onca 556, 362 ccc (3d) 302, at para. 121) the view, whether stated explicitly or necessarily implicit in these judgments, is that the moran factors are “useful” benchmarks when assessing detention per grant (seagull, at para. 38; nb, at para. 121). [27] respectfully, the better view is that, as a result of grant, moran is no longer good law (s. coughlan and g. luther, detention and arrest (2nd ed. 2017), at p 287), and it should no longer be applied or relied upon in grant, the test for detention was restated to direct the inquiry to the perspective of the reasonable person in the accused’s shoes in contrast, the moran factors focus principally on police conduct and information that will not be readily available to the accused at the time of detention (such as the stage of the police investigation). and, while the test in grant is objective, moran encourages courts to consider the subjective perceptions and beliefs of the accused, thereby emphasizing considerations that play a limited (if any) role in an objective assessment (le, at paras. 111-17). [28] further, and as noted, the scope of moran is, by its own terms, confined to deciding whether a person who is questioned at a police station is detained. by design, then, moran applied in limited circumstances grant is comprehensive in scope, applying to every instance of alleged detention by police by addressing the full breadth of circumstances that engage the right against self-incrimination protected by s 10 of the charter, including investigative detentions (r v. folker, 2016 nlca 1, 373 nfld. & peir 49, at paras. 74-79, per white ja (dissenting in part)). (3) applying grant to the events of march 19, 2015 (a) the circumstances giving rise to the encounter [29] at this stage, the court must consider how the circumstances of the encounter would have been reasonably perceived by mr. lafrance ⸺ more specifically, “whether the police were providing general assistance; maintaining general order; making general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or, singling [him out] for focused investigation” (le, at para. 31(a); grant, at para. 44(2)(a)). [30] i observe that the trial judge began by looking to the background information available to sgt eros and the police during the initial steps of their investigation, including his assignment to speak to mr. lafrance outside the home. in le, however (which i note was unavailable to the trial judge at the time of decision), the court explained that “investigative purposes are important when assessing whether the detention was arbitrary and whether the police were acting in good faith”, but “are less relevant” when reviewing the first grant factor (paras. 37-38). behind-the-scenes knowledge of a police investigation would not be known by a reasonable person in the accused’s position. [31] the analysis properly begins at the moment the encounter itself begins — in this case, when the police arrived at mr. lafrance’s home in marked and unmarked police vehicles, and at an early hour when mr. lafrance was asleep armed and wearing bulletproof vests, they entered the house, knocked on his bedroom door, and ordered him to dress and get out. they monitored him inside and outside the house. [32] in my view, it is inconceivable that a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s shoes — woken and confronted by armed police officers in his home telling him to leave — would believe that they had arrived to “provid[e] general assistance”, “maintai[n] general order” or make “general inquiries”. the reasonable person would immediately understand that he or she is being singled out for investigation. while, of course, the police were authorized by warrant and as such had “legitimate reasons” for the steps they took, this is not determinative of — and indeed is unlikely to affect — how a reasonable person perceives his or her interactions with the police (le, at paras. 37-38) indeed, the warrant itself, by authorizing the police to search mr. lafrance’s home, reveals a targeted investigation. [33] while the trial judgment recounts the facts of this initial police encounter (at para. 37), little consideration is given to the possibility that they gave rise to a detention the trial judge’s focus, rather, was on the initial interaction between mr. lafrance and sgt. eros. but again, it is the moment that the interaction with police begins that must be considered mr. lafrance’s interaction with sgt. eros was an extension of a series of events that began when the police entered mr. lafrance’s home, woke him up and ordered him to dress and leave in any event, even had the conversation between sgt. eros and mr. lafrance corresponded to the moment that detention arose, my conclusion would be the same: a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position would have felt singled out for investigation purposes when sgt. eros approached him, asked him to confirm his identity, and informed him that the police wanted to speak with him about a murder. this weighs in favour of a finding of detention. (b) the nature of the police conduct [34] the second grant factor directs a court’s attention to the nature of the police conduct throughout the encounter. specifically, their actions and language used, their use of physical contact, the place where the encounter occurred, the presence of others, and the duration of the encounter, may all play a role in shaping the perceptions of the reasonable person in the accused’s shoes (grant, at para. 44(2)(b); le, at paras. 31(b) and 43). (i) actions and language of the police [35] a central feature of the crown’s position is its argument that an encounter is prima facie voluntary where the police explicitly inform an individual that he or she need not cooperate this, the crown says, functions as an intervening event that informs the interpretation of preceding and subsequent events so as to eliminate any possibility of police detention. the crown relies particularly on these passages from grant: the objective nature of this inquiry recognizes that the police must be able to know when a detention occurs, in order to allow them to fulfill their attendant obligations under the charter and afford the individual its added protections however, the subjective intentions of the police are not determinative (questions such as police “good faith” may become relevant when the test for exclusion of evidence under s 24(2) is applied, in cases where a charter breach is found.) while the test is objective, the individual’s particular circumstances and perceptions at the time may be relevant in assessing the reasonableness of any perceived power imbalance between the individual and the police, and thus the reasonableness of any perception that he or she had no choice but to comply with the police directive. to answer the question whether there is a detention involves a realistic appraisal of the entire interaction as it developed, not a minute parsing of words and movements. in those situations where the police may be uncertain whether their conduct is having a coercive effect on the individual, it is open to them to inform the subject in unambiguous terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go. it is for the trial judge, applying the proper legal principles to the particular facts of the case, to determine whether the line has been crossed between police conduct that respects liberty and the individual’s right to choose, and conduct that does not. effective law enforcement is highly dependent on the cooperation of members of the public the police must be able to act in a manner that fosters this cooperation, not discourage it. however, police investigative powers are not without limits the notion of psychological detention recognizes the reality that police tactics, even in the absence of exercising actual physical restraint, may be coercive enough to effectively remove the individual’s choice to walk away from the police. this creates the risk that the person may reasonably feel compelled to incriminate himself or herself. where that is the case, the police are no longer entitled simply to expect cooperation from an individual. unless, as stated earlier, the police inform the person that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go, a detention may well crystallize and, when it does, the police must provide the subject with his or her s 10(b) rights. that the obligation arises only on detention represents part of the balance between, on the one hand, the individual rights protected by ss. 9 and 10 and enjoyed by all members of society, and on the other, the collective interest of all members of society in the ability of the police to act on their behalf to investigate and prevent crime. [emphasis added; paras. 32 and 39.] [36] on their own, these passages might support the crown’s position. but in light of the entire judgment in grant, they do not support the view that such a police statement precludes finding a detention in grant, the court conceived the test for detention so that no single consideration — including a statement from the police that the individual need not speak to them or could leave — would be determinative. rather, what is required, as the first of these passages also states, is “a realistic appraisal of the entire interaction as it developed” (para. 32 (emphasis added)). the passages in grant relied on by the crown were, therefore, immediately coupled with the caution that it is ultimately “for the trial judge, applying the proper legal principles to the particular facts of the case, to determine whether the line has been crossed between police conduct that respects liberty and the individual’s right to choose, and conduct that does not” (para. 32) in other words, the assessment requires a broad view directed to all circumstances of the case, from which view a court should not be distracted by a police officer’s statement that might, taken in isolation, militate against the finding of a detention. it is entirely possible that such an assurance, given at a very specific point and time of the interaction with the police, might lose any significance to a reasonable person in the detainee’s circumstances once the entirety of the encounter is accounted for. [37] so understood, the test in grant is premised upon a practical reality of interactions between police and citizen, especially where the interaction concerns a criminal investigation while words uttered by the police may hold a certain significance to trained and experienced police officers or to those trained in the law or otherwise already aware of their rights and how to exercise them, they may hold less significance, or different significance, to vulnerable individuals unfamiliar with their charter rights. this particular instance of the imbalance of power between state and citizen that characterizes our criminal justice system is exacerbated by the psychological dynamics of police interrogation, where even repeated assurances that a detainee is free to leave may be disregarded, especially by innocent persons seeking to absolve themselves of any wrongdoing. [38] none of this is undermined by the appellate caselaw relied upon by the crown, which either predates grant (eg. r v. rajaratnam, 2006 abca 333, 397 ar. 126), or confirms that all the circumstances of a case must be examined to determine whether a detention occurred (e.g seagull, at paras. 49-60; r v van wissen, 2018 mbca 110, 367 ccc (3d) 186) i therefore reject the crown’s submission that a detention prima facie cannot arise where police state that the individual may decline to speak with them or may leave whenever a statement is presented. in this regard, my colleagues also place substantial weight upon such statements. indeed, they treat them as all but determinative (as one might in considering the words used by police under the moran framework), rather than focussing on the contextual factors that would affect the perception of the reasonable person in the accused’s shoes (as required by grant and le). [39] to summarize: no single consideration, including a police statement to an individual that he or she is “not detained” or otherwise under any obligation to cooperate or may leave, is determinative of whether a detention has occurred. where present, it is a single consideration among others for which a court should account in deciding whether a reasonable person in the shoes of the accused would feel obliged to cooperate. it does not automatically turn the tide, and may not turn the tide at all, where other factors point to a finding of detention. [40] indeed, sgt. eros’ statements to mr. lafrance3 do not turn the tide here. while they militate against a finding of detention, they are outweighed by circumstances that support the opposite conclusion, namely that a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to comply and unfree to leave. for example:  mr. lafrance awoke to 11 police officers at his residence, with vans, firearms and bulletproof vests, ordering him to dress and get out of the house;  the police accompanied mr. lafrance while he searched for his cat;  sgt. eros approached mr. lafrance after he went outside, asked him to confirm his identity and told him that he wanted to ask him questions relating to mr. yasinski’s death; 3 ie, “you don’t have to provide me a statement . . . that it would be completely voluntary on your point”, “you don’t hafta sit here and speak with me today”, “you are at any time nigel free to leave”, “we (unintelligible) responsibility to ensure that you’re aware of – of your rights and . . . and like i said that – that includes the ability to leave whenever you want to”, “[v]oluntary that you don’t have to sit here and speak with me”, “you say you’re willing to talk now . . right in half an hour, 20 minutes, two hours you’re – you decide that – that you no longer wanta speak with me . . . um you just have to let me know . . . okay and at that point in time, we’ll stop and we’ll move on”, and “some people think well now that i’ve agreed to it . . . i’m stuck here right . . . and – that’s absolutely not the case” (ar, vol. iv, at pp. 56, 64 and 72-74).  the only practical means available to mr. lafrance for getting to the police station was for him to be driven, which he was in an unmarked police vehicle accompanied by two police officers;  at the station, the police brought mr. lafrance to an interview room at the back of the police station that was behind two sets of locked doors;  the police left mr. lafrance in the interview room for at least 17 minutes, having closed the door behind them, and did not inform him that the doors were unlocked; and  the police told mr. lafrance that he was in a secure environment, controlled his access to the outside of the interview room, and kept him under surveillance during the course of the interview, including escorting him to the bathroom. (ii) the use of physical contact [41] as is evident from the analysis in le (at para. 50) and grant (at paras. 50-52), considering the use by police of physical contact with a subject extends to their physical proximity to a subject even where, strictly speaking, there is no physical contact, deliberate physical proximity within a small space can create an atmosphere that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that leaving is not possible (le, at para. 50; grant, at para. 50). this makes sense, since physical proximity can indicate the possibility of physical contact and so, while nothing suggests that the police made any physical contact with mr. lafrance on march 19, that is not exhaustive of this consideration. for example, a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s shoes might, particularly after he was escorted to the bathroom, view the investigating officers’ constant proximity as suggesting that any attempt to leave, at least on his own, would be met with physical resistance. [42] all that said, and while the police chose to interview mr. lafrance in what sgt. eros described as the “secure environment” of an interview room, their conduct here is a far cry from le, where the police officers intentionally positioned themselves in a way to block the exit from the backyard (para. 50). neither the evidence here nor the trial judge’s findings suggest that the police sought to take advantage of the physical proximity in such a way. in my view, considerations of physical proximity alone would have little if any impact on whether a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position would feel free to decline to speak to police or to leave. (iii) the presence of others [43] this is a significant consideration here. except while he was left alone in the interview room and in the bathroom, mr. lafrance was in the presence of at least one police officer throughout his interaction with the police, from the moment they awoke him in his home initially, he was under the supervision of an armed police search team that executed the warrant and monitored him while he was in and out of the home. following this, sgt. eros and s/sgt. zazulak were present throughout, from their initial encounter outside the home, to the ride to the police station, and the interview. these officers weighed approximately 220 lb. to 245 lb., respectively (while mr. lafrance weighed 130 lb.), and s/sgt. zazulak was armed and wearing a bulletproof vest. their continued presence and supervision would tend to contribute to the perception of a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s shoes that he or she was not free to decline to speak or to leave. [44] my colleagues appear to understand this consideration, as it was stated in le, as applying only to the presence of witnesses, as opposed to the police (para. 152). putting aside that the police were witnesses here, i see no good reason to keep to such a narrow purview. the “presence of others” was not a novel consideration in le. it is one of the factors listed in grant to evaluate “[t]he nature of police conduct” (para. 44(2)(b) (emphasis added)). for that reason, the court, in support of its finding of psychological detention in grant, pointed to the presence of other police at the time of the encounter (paras. 49-52). the point is that all police conduct relevant to whether a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s shoes would have understood himself or herself as free to leave must be considered. indeed, that the witnesses were police, if anything, weighs more heavily in finding a detention than if they were mere bystanders. (iv) the place and duration of the encounter [45] the entirety of mr. lafrance’s encounter with the police spans several locations and various periods of time. in my view, considerations of place and time would lead a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s shoes to believe he had to cooperate with the police. [46] the initial early morning encounter occurred inside mr. lafrance’s home. any police intrusion into a home “is reasonably experienced as more forceful, coercive and threatening than when similar state action occurs in public” (le, at para. 51). this remains true, irrespective of whether the intrusion is authorized by warrant, although depending on the circumstances of the intrusion, its impact may be mitigated where, as here, police inform the occupant that they have a search warrant. [47] even where that happens, however, the mode of entry into the household, while authorized by law, may be reasonably perceived as intimidating. it is to my mind indisputable that this would have been so in the circumstances of this intrusion. no reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s shoes would have had all misgivings just melt away with the assurance that the 11 police officers who had just awoken him inside his home and ordered him out had first obtained a search warrant. thus, the impact of a police intrusion into a home may be mitigated where they inform the occupant that they have a search warrant but police and reviewing courts must also be alive to the possibility that the execution of a warrant at a residence — being a means by which the police exercises control of the home — can itself support the finding of a detention where it is also applied in such a manner as to take control of the person this is precisely what occurred here: police ordered mr. lafrance to get dressed and leave, then monitored him as he made his way outside to a pre-arranged encounter with a waiting sgt. eros. [48] the encounter continued after sgt. eros took over and made the request for a statement, and during the ride to the police station i note that, in concluding that mr. lafrance was not detained at that time, the trial judge considered that he had agreed to go to the detachment to allay suspicion my colleagues do the same, stressing mr. lafrance’s subjective perceptions as “particularly significant” (para. 162). the test is principally objective (le, at para. 114). undue focus on an individual’s subjective perception detracts from the rationales underlying the objective test (para. 115). therefore, rather than focusing on “what was in the accused’s mind at a particular moment in time”, the inquiry is into “how the police behaved and, considering the totality of the circumstances, how such behavi[our] would be reasonably perceived” (para. 116). [49] this is not to suggest that police are to be taken as detaining an individual by giving them a ride to the police station. the question is whether a reasonable person in the passenger’s shoes would believe that he or she could cease cooperating by asking the police to stop the vehicle and leave; the answer will depend on all the circumstances of the case (coughlan and luther, at p 291), including what has already transpired. and given what had already transpired in this case, a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position would not in my judgment have felt remotely free to do so. [50] the encounter then persisted through a three-and-a-half-hour interview at the police station, in an interview room described by sgt eros as a “secure environment”, accessible as i have already noted through two sets of locked doors. the “security” of that environment — comprising both the interview room and the surrounding facility through which it was accessed — would tend to affirm in the mind of someone in mr. lafrance’s position that he or she is not free to leave at will. [51] in sum, this was a single, lengthy police encounter while it spanned several locations, each of them have features — the overwhelming show of force in the intrusion into the home, the long ride to the police station and the secure environment for a lengthy interview — that, taken as a whole, support the view that someone in mr. lafrance’s position would reasonably have perceived that he or she could not leave (le, at para. 66). this supports a finding of detention. (c) the particular circumstances of the accused [52] the final grant factor requires a court to consider, where relevant, the individual’s “age[,] physical stature[,] minority status[, and] level of sophistication” (grant, at para. 44(2)(c); le, at para. 31(c)). [53] while the trial judge acknowledged that mr. lafrance was young, indigenous and had minimal police exposure at that time (para. 79), in my respectful view more was required to properly account for how the characteristics he quite rightly identified — mr. lafrance’s youth, his indigenous background and his inexperience — might shape the perspective of the reasonable person in his shoes, imbued with those characteristics. these are not factors to be checked off a list; grant requires more than a straightforward acknowledgement of their presence, but actual consideration of how these various characteristics might impact the reasonable view of the matter as held by someone in like circumstances. i turn now to doing just that. (i) youth [54] mr. lafrance’s youth — he was 19 years old — is a crucial consideration that i say, again respectfully, should have received more attention a reasonable person’s perceptions are inevitably shaped by the knowledge and powers of discernment that comes with age and life experience (le, at para. 122). youth — even the youth of early adulthood — aggravates the power imbalance between the state and the individual, making it “more pronounced, evident and acute” (para. 122). it is simply unrealistic to suggest that a reasonable 19-year-old will, even in the presence of police statements to the contrary, feel anything but constrained to respond positively to the request to give a statement, following immediately upon the sort of police entry into his home that occurred here. (ii) race [55] this court in le emphasized that the objective analysis in grant must be applied in a manner that accounts for the distinct experiences and particular knowledge of racialized communities in canada: in grant, this court recognized how the legal standard on which a detention is measured is based on a reasonable person in like circumstances and that this norm needs to account for diverse realities by expressly including the race of the accused as a potentially relevant consideration, this court acknowledged that, based on distinct experiences and particular knowledge, various groups of people may have their own history with law enforcement and that this experience and knowledge could bear on whether and when a detention has reasonably occurred. thus, to truly engage in the “realistic appraisal of the entire interaction”, as required in grant (at para. 32), courts must appreciate that individuals in some communities may have different experiences and relationships with police than others and such may impact upon their reasonable perceptions of whether and when they are being detained. [para. 73] [56] the question that trial judges must answer is “how a reasonable person of a similar racial background would perceive the interaction with the police” (le, at para. 75) to answer this question, courts must take into consideration “the larger, historic and social context of race relations between the police and the various racial groups and individuals in our society” (le, at para. 75). the reasonable person in an accused’s shoes is presumed to be aware of this (le, at para. 75) moreover, this consideration is to be undertaken with sensitivity and prudence. even in the absence of testimony on the point, trial judges assessing whether a racialized person was detained must be alive to the potential significance of this consideration (le, at paras. 98 and 106; r v. theriault, 2021 onca 517, 157 or (3d) 241, at para. 143). [57] as recognized by the trial judge, mr. lafrance is indigenous. as such, he is a member of a population that continues to be disproportionally subjected to police encounters and overrepresented in the criminal justice system (r v. gladue, [1999] 1 scr 688, at paras. 58-65; r v ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1 scr 433, at paras. 57-60; le, at paras. 90-97 and 108). the assessment of whether an indigenous person was detained must be mindful of “[g]enerations of systematic racism, discriminatory policies and practices directed at indigenous people” and of the role of police in implementing these policies and practices (statistics canada, perceptions of and experiences with police and the justice system among the black and indigenous populations in canada (february 2022), at p 12). this has fostered mistrust, confirmed by the finding of a february 2022 study that “[a] higher proportion of indigenous people under 40 felt police were doing poorly at enforcing the laws, promptly responding to calls, ensuring the safety of citizens, and treating people fairly compared to the similarly aged non-indigenous, non-visible minority population” (statistics canada, at p 11). this finding applied equally to older indigenous people (statistics canada, at p 11). [58] this consideration will often weigh in favour of finding a detention, but not invariably. a court cannot simply assume that all indigenous people’s experiences with the police are charter non-compliant or otherwise oppressive and not all indigenous people will be vulnerable, at all or in the same way, when interacting with police (k. g. watkins, “the vulnerability of aboriginal suspects when questioned by police: mitigating risk and maximizing the reliability of statement evidence” (2016), 63 crim. lq 474, at p 479). the point is not that grant or le leave no room for nuance in evaluating interactions between indigenous people and the police; it is, rather, that trial judges must be alive to (1) “the relational aspect” between the police and indigenous persons (le, at para. 81), characterized as it has been by an overwhelming power imbalance and history of discrimination; and (2) the resulting possibility that their interactions would reasonably be perceived by indigenous persons as depriving them of choice to cooperate. [59] taking the foregoing and the record of this case into account, it would appear that mr. lafrance’s indigenous background played no significant role in shaping his perception of his obligation to cooperate with the police on march 19. but, to be clear, that is not the question. again, the inquiry is objective, not grounded in his subjective impressions the question, then, is whether the reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position would understand his or her options as limited to cooperating by reason of an indigenous background on this slender record, and absent any evidence to the contrary regarding mr. lafrance’s circumstances, his indigenous background is a factor that weighs somewhat in favour of detention, albeit not heavily. this accounts for what i have already described as the overrepresentation of indigenous peoples in the criminal justice system, and the “relational aspect” of the interaction between indigenous people and police that must always be borne in mind. (iii) level of sophistication [60] the trial judge held that mr. lafrance was a “not unsophisticated” individual with minimal exposure to the police (paras. 79 and 81). he characterized mr. lafrance, a high school graduate who had studied power engineering, as intelligent. i see no palpable and overriding error in these findings. [61] my point of respectful departure from the trial judge is in applying these findings to decide how a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position would perceive his options in his interactions with the police. “sophistication”, without elaboration, may be an unhelpful ascription; here, the trial judge noted only that “[a]t best, the accused was naïve in deciding his participation would counter police suspicion” (para. 81), which tends to undermine, not explain, the ascription. “intelligence”, while more precise, does not necessarily connote an understanding of legal rights, including the right to refuse to cooperate with the police. mr. lafrance, for example, had never before found himself in circumstances requiring him to know his rights (which, if anything, suggests a lack of sophistication in a crucial respect here). [62] all told, the trial judge’s finding of mr. lafrance’s sophistication (or, more accurately, lack of unsophistication) does not undermine the case for finding a detention rather, his lack of experience with the police and unfamiliarity with his charter rights bolsters it. (4) conclusion regarding the encounter of march 19, 2015 [63] all three grant factors — the circumstances giving rise to the encounter, the nature of the police conduct, and the particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual — weigh decisively here, on the facts of this case, in favour of finding that mr. lafrance was first detained when he, a young indigenous man with minimal police exposure, was awoken in the early morning by the police inside his home, and commanded to get dressed and leave he continued to be detained throughout the encounter, including outside the home, in the police van and in the interview room of the police station, all of which involved the near-continuous supervision and presence of the police, until the conclusion of his interview on march 19, and i so find. [64] it follows that police were required to inform mr. lafrance of his s 10(b) right to counsel and to afford him the opportunity of exercising it, and breached that right by failing to do so my colleagues say that this conclusion means that the combination of an accused young person and the execution of a search warrant will always result in a finding of detention (para. 160). but that is not so; it is only where the police execute a warrant in a way that leads the reasonable person in the accused’s shoes to believe that, in the entirety of the circumstances, he or she is not free to leave, that a detention would arise. such was the case here: given the overwhelming force in which a team of police officers arrived at mr. lafrance’s home, ordered him to get dressed and leave his home, and monitored his every movement, the officers should have recognized that a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s shoes would feel obliged to comply with their demands and would conclude that he or she was not free to go. in such situations, the police should have informed him of his rights under s 10(b) of the charter i will turn to the consequences of this breach below, after considering his encounter with police on april 7. b april 7, 2015 [65] mr. lafrance says that he could not properly exercise his right to counsel under s 10(b) on april 7, after he was arrested. sgt. eros, he says, should have allowed him to speak with his father so he could obtain his own lawyer and receive further legal advice. [66] citing sinclair, the trial judge concluded that the charter did not compel sgt. eros to accede to mr. lafrance’s request for a further consultation. the majority of the court of appeal, however, viewed mr. lafrance’s request to speak with his father as falling within what sinclair described as a “change in circumstances” suggesting a significant alteration of the choice to be made by the accused. mr. lafrance’s request, said the majority, “show[ed] that [he] may not have understood the initial s 10(b) advice he received from legal aid counsel [. . .], that he needed the opportunity to pose further questions of counsel and have those questions answered, and that the initial advice he received, viewed contextually, was no longer sufficient” (para. 53). alternatively, the majority would have held that mr. lafrance’s case would “fall within an open category, one not expressly defined in sinclair” (paras. 53 and 64). [67] for the reasons that follow, i am closer to the court of appeal’s view of the matter as i will explain, this matter falls within the “change in circumstances” category described in sinclair. given this conclusion, i need not address the court of appeal’s alternative position that this case falls within an open-ended sinclair category. (1) the purpose of section 10(b) and the sinclair framework [68] in sinclair, the accused was arrested for second-degree murder, advised of his right to counsel and allowed two three-minute conversations with a lawyer of his choice. he was then interviewed for five hours, during which time his repeated requests to have his lawyer present or to speak with him again were refused eventually, he confessed after the interviewing officer made him believe that police had found incriminating evidence confirming his involvement. the accused sought to have his confession excluded, alleging a breach of s 10(b). [69] this court ruled his confession admissible. section 10(b) does not confer the right to have a lawyer present during a police investigation and, a single consultation with a lawyer is constitutionally sufficient, absent a change in circumstances or new developments that suggest that the choice faced by the accused has been “significantly altered, requiring further advice on the new situation, in order to fulfill the purpose of s 10(b) of providing the accused with legal advice relevant to the choice of whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not” (sinclair, at para. 65). such a change in circumstances or new development is not demonstrated, the court added, where police engage in “the common . . . tactic of gradually revealing (actual or fake) evidence to the detainee in order to demonstrate or exaggerate the strength of the case against [them]” (para. 60). [70] this followed, said the court, from the purpose of s 10(b), being “to provide a detainee with an opportunity to obtain legal advice relevant to his legal situation” (sinclair, at para. 24) or, more particularly, “to allow the detainee not only to be informed of his rights and obligations under the law but, equally if not more important, to obtain advice as to how to exercise those rights” (para. 26, citing manninen, at pp. 1242-43). in the context of a custodial interrogation, the court added that s 10(b) seeks “to support the detainee’s right to choose whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not, by giving him access to legal advice on the situation [they are] facing” (para. 32). [71] so understood, s 10(b) reminds police of the constitutional limits to their interrogation of detainees. as this court also recognized in clarkson v the queen, [1986] 1 scr 383, at pp. 394-95, underlying s 10(b) is a concern to mitigate the unfairness that prevails where the police understand the accused’s right to choose whether to speak to them, but the accused may lack that understanding. key to realizing s 10(b)’s promise to detainees of fair treatment is furnishing access to legal advice, since that advice is meant to level the playing field by ensuring, first of all, that detainees do understand their rights, “chief among which is [the] right to silence” (r. v. hebert, [1990] 2 scr 151, at p 176); and, secondly, that they understand how to exercise those rights (sinclair, at para. 29). this includes knowing of “the benefits and drawbacks of cooperating with the police investigation, as well as strategies to resist cooperation should that be the detainee’s choice” (ca reasons, at para. 48). [72] properly understood and applied, sinclair gives effect to s 10(b) and achieves its purpose. it identifies within s 10(b) an informational component (requiring police to advise detainees of their right to counsel), and an implementational component (requiring police to allow detainees to exercise their right to consult counsel), which implicitly includes “a duty on the police to hold off questioning until the detainee has had a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel” (para. 27). and, as just noted, sinclair also recognized that the implementational component of s 10(b) imposes upon police a further obligation: to provide a detainee with a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel again if a change in circumstances or a new development makes this necessary to fulfill s 10(b)’s purpose (para. 53) three non-exhaustive categories of exceptional circumstances triggering this duty were identified (at paras. 49-52): (1) the police invite the accused to take part in non-routine procedures that counsel would not consider at the time of the initial consultation; (2) there is a change in jeopardy that could affect the adequacy of the advice received during the initial consultation; and (3) there is reason to question the detainee’s understanding of his rights. it is that third category which the court of appeal thought applicable here. i agree. [73] in sinclair, this category was “broadly” stated as covering, inter alia, “circumstances indicating that the detainee may not have understood the initial s 10(b) advice of his right to counsel”, which “impose on the police a duty to give him a further opportunity to talk to a lawyer” (para. 52) this raises the question of how such circumstances are to be identified ⸺ that is, what it means for a detainee to not understand “the initial s 10(b) advice” such that a second legal consultation is necessary. i note, parenthetically, that the third category also covers a different type of potential s 10(b) breach, ie, where “the police undermine the legal advice that the detainee has received [in a way that] may have the effect of distorting or nullifying it” (para. 52; see r v. dussault, 2022 scc 16, at para. 35). the court’s recent judgment in dussault comprehensively reviews the kind of police conduct that could be said to “undermine” the legal advice that a detainee receives (paras. 36-45). [74] the caselaw reveals two general approaches to assessing detainees’ understanding of s 10(b) advice. the first — narrower, relative to the second — tends to focus on the fact of the earlier consultation or, where applicable, on a detainee’s assertion of his or her right to silence (see, eg,. r v pagé, 2018 qccs 5553, at paras. 20-21 (canlii); r v. smith, 2015 abqb 624, at paras. 66-68 (canlii); r v. ejigu, 2012 bcsc 1673, at para. 58 (canlii); and r v. jongbloets, 2017 bcsc 740, at paras. 109-10 and 113 (canlii)) the second approach inquires into “the overall context”, or “the situation ‘on the ground’” (r v. arm, 2011 abca 98, 599 ar. 343, at paras. 25 and 40) that properly inform the reasonable perceptions of police of whether detainees understand their right to silence and how to exercise it (see, eg,. r. v laquette, 2021 mbqb 177, at para. 93 (canlii): “perhaps, in this case, the applicant, because of her youth and inexperience in engaging with law enforcement, should have been afforded [a further consultation with legal counsel]” (emphasis added); r v. hunt, 2020 oncj 627, at para. 51 (canlii): “in most cases, it can be inferred from the circumstances that the detainee understands what he or she has been told, but where there are circumstances where the detainee may not understand his or her [right to counsel], the police must take steps to facilitate that understanding [including] giving consideration to the detainee’s understanding and capacity to understand” (emphasis added); and r v. fedoseev, 2014 abpc 192, 597 ar 1, at paras. 55-63). [75] bearing in mind that the third sinclair category was “broadly” stated by this court by reference to “circumstances” indicating that “the detainee may not have understood the initial s 10(b) advice”, two points merit emphasizing (sinclair, at para. 52) first, the inquiry is into circumstances, stated broadly this connotes an examination not merely of whether the detainee consulted legal counsel, but of the entire context in which the police-detainee interaction occurred (as in arm), including the circumstances of the detainee (as in laquette and hunt). secondly, and therefore, an inquiry strictly into whether a detainee understood that he or she could remain silent is not sufficient. the issue, after all, is not merely whether the detainee was advised; the third category presumes that to have occurred. section 10(b) requires much more than that (a point repeatedly stressed in sinclair: see paras. 2, 24-26, 28-29, 32, 47-48, 53, 57 and 65). rather, it is that the detainee may not have understood the legal advice he or she received including, as the court of appeal correctly noted, whether and how to exercise the right to silence, which itself includes “the benefits and drawbacks of cooperating” and “strategies to resist cooperation” where that is the detainee’s choice. [76] such an approach is not only more faithful to sinclair; it is also consistent with this court’s direction in grant that “[c]onstitutional guarantees such as ss. 9 and 10 should be interpreted in a ‘generous rather than . . legalistic [way], aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the charter’s protection’” (para. 16, citing r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr. 295, at p 344). i have already stressed that s 10(b)’s purpose is not achieved merely by allowing the detainee an opportunity to be advised of the right to silence, but also extends to advice regarding how to exercise that right in the face of police interrogation. and coupled with sinclair’s concern for the circumstances of the detention, which i have explained include the circumstances of the detainee, it follows that the purposive and generous understanding of s 10(b) mandated by grant recognizes that the exercise by accused persons of that right depends on access to legal advice regarding “the [particular] situation [they are] facing”, conveyed in a manner that they understand (sinclair, at para. 32 (emphasis added)). [77] absent that understanding, the work done by our jurisprudence (notably, in grant and le) on detention under s 9 to account for and mitigate the power imbalance between the state and a detainee would be undone by an impoverished understanding of s 10(b)’s protections, inconsistent with sinclair itself and corrosive of the liberty of the subject. a purposive and generous understanding of s 10(b) and, by extension, of the third sinclair category, also reflects that practical reality of police-citizen interactions of which i have already spoken, and which obtains a fortiori in circumstances of arrest or detention: the detainee is in a position of disadvantage relative to the state (v. a. macdonnell, “r v sinclair: balancing individual rights and societal interests outside of section 1 of the charter” (2012), 38 queen’s lj 137, at p 156). this disadvantage is no small matter, particularly given that the police may employ tactics such as lying during an interrogation it is only by ensuring that detainees obtain legal advice that accounts for the particular situation they face, conveyed in a manner they can understand, that s 10(b) can meaningfully redress the imbalance of power between the state (whose agents know the detainee’s rights) and the detainee (who may not). [78] my colleagues say it is inaccurate to describe s 10(b)’s purpose as being “to mitigate the imbalance between the individual and the state” (para. 168) with respect, this proposition is uncontroversial despite my colleagues’ view to the contrary, it follows from this court’s statement in r v. willier, 2010 scc 37, [2010] 2 scr 429, at para 28, that “s 10(b) provides detainees with an opportunity to contact counsel in circumstances where they are deprived of liberty and in the control of the state, and thus vulnerable to the exercise of its power and in a position of legal jeopardy”, and that “[t]he purpose of s 10(b) is to provide detainees an opportunity to mitigate this legal disadvantage” while my colleagues claim that sinclair, at paras. 30-31, rejects this view, this is, again said respectfully, a misreading of sinclair. at issue in those passages was not whether s 10(b)’s purpose is to cure that power imbalance, but how it does so. the dissenters lebel and fish jj. maintained that it does so by conferring a continuing right to counsel throughout the accused’s police interview (paras. 30 and 154). the majority, however, held that it does so by conferring a right to consult counsel “to obtain information and advice immediately upon detention” (para. 31) in order to fulfill “the purpose of s 10(b) . . to support the detainee’s right to choose whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not, by giving [them] access to legal advice on the situation he is facing” (para. 32 (emphasis added)). [79] the degree of imbalance between police and detainee will of course vary from case to case, depending on the particular circumstances of the detainees themselves specific characteristics of individual detainees (described as “vulnerabilities” in the context of police interrogation) can influence the course of custodial interviews. investigating officers and reviewing courts must be alive to the possibility that these vulnerabilities, which may relate to gender, youth, age, race, mental health, language comprehension, cognitive capacity or other considerations, coupled with developments that may occur in the course of police interrogation, will have rendered a detainee’s initial legal advice inadequate, impairing his or her ability to make an informed choice about whether to cooperate with the police in such situations, sinclair requires that an accused is entitled to an additional consultation to even the playing field. (2) the need for a second consultation on april 7, 2015 [80] with the foregoing in mind, i turn now to consider whether the police breached mr. lafrance’s s 10(b) right to counsel by refusing to allow him to seek a second consultation with a lawyer. [81] the police fulfilled the informational component of s 10(b) having arrested mr. lafrance for murder, they told him of the reason for his arrest, and of his right to silence likewise, the police also, initially at least, satisfied the implementational component: upon arrival at the police station, mr. lafrance was taken to a telephone room and was able to speak with a lawyer from legal aid. sgt. eros deferred starting the interview until mr. lafrance confirmed that he had received and understood the advice given to him by legal aid. [82] the question therefore arises whether any of the exceptions in sinclair applied to require the police to allow mr. lafrance another opportunity to consult with counsel. i do not agree with mr. lafrance that his circumstances would fit into any of the three sinclair categories of exceptional circumstances that require an additional consultation the first category — where police invite the accused to take part in non-routine procedures that counsel would not consider at the time of the initial consultation — does not apply, because the police here did not employ any new or unusual investigative techniques likewise, the second category — a change in jeopardy which could affect the adequacy of the advice received during the initial to the actual situation — is inapplicable because there was no change in jeopardy during the interview. mr. lafrance had been informed that he was accused of murder and that remained true at all times during the interview on april 7. [83] the difficulty arises, however, from mr. lafrance’s request in the course of the police interview to speak with his father because that was his “only chance of getting a lawyer”. the crown argues that there is no constitutional right to speak to a detainee’s father, but that is not a fair characterization of mr. lafrance’s request, which drew an explicit connection between talking to his father and talking to a lawyer: q. alright so what happens nigel? a. well –. q. what – what went on? a. well i would – ah i want to talk to my dad before i continue. q. ok wh – why do you say that? a. cause well he’s – well he’s my only chance of getting a lawyer and i just – i don’t know. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. v, at p 137) it is also inaccurate to describe mr. lafrance, as the crown and trial judge do, as simply requesting that a lawyer be present with him during the interview he clarified to sgt. eros that what he really sought was an opportunity to get, and speak to, a lawyer: a. well no they told me – they told me to get a lawyer before i continue talking. q. ok what do you mean by told you to get a lawyer? a. like someone that can come down and sit with me. q. ok. a. instead of just over the phone. q. there’s a person that ah you know what – and the way that that kinda goes ah – i won’t say it’s, it’s bad advice but it’s maybe miss – a little bit miss as – miss ah – interrupted um there’s not any time or any process during our interview –. a. um? q. where we’re gonna have a lawyer sitting in the room with us. a. no, no i – i mean, no mean like so –. q. ok. a. like for me to sit down with them personally. q. ok. a. to talk to. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. v, at p 139) [84] sgt. eros then questioned mr. lafrance about his conversation with legal aid. while mr. lafrance acknowledged that he was told that he did not have to say anything, there were also clear signs that either the legal advice he obtained was incorrect, or he did not understand how his s 10(b) rights applied to his current circumstances. mr. lafrance explained to sgt. eros that the advice he obtained from legal aid was to “get a lawyer before [he] continue talking” and get “someone that can come down and sit with [him]” (ar, vol. v, at p 139) — indicating either that mr. lafrance had incorrectly interpreted the advice he received or, as sgt. eros hinted at, that he had received “bad advice”. [85] this represents, to my mind, a critical moment in mr. lafrance’s encounter with the police faced with a detainee who was obviously ignorant as to his rights, sgt. eros had a choice: to press ahead with the interview, whether despite or because of that ignorance; or, to allow the subject an opportunity to clarify his rights and how to exercise them in his circumstances sgt. eros chose the former course; the constitution demanded the latter. [86] there was ample reason here to question mr. lafrance’s understanding of his s 10(b) right, bringing his circumstances within the third sinclair category. while it is true that general confusion or a “nee[d for] help” is not a ground for further consultation with counsel (sinclair, at para. 55), mr. lafrance was not, as my colleagues say, experiencing “mere confusion” or “discomfort” (paras. 177-83 (emphasis deleted)) to explain, and as my colleagues acknowledge, a “changed circumstance” can arise “[w]hen there is reason to question the detainee’s understanding of his s 10(b) right” (para. 172). that is this case. his confusion was an “objective indicat[or] that renewed legal consultation was required to permit him to make a meaningful choice as to whether to cooperate with the police investigation or refuse to do so” (sinclair, at para. 55). and this is because the information to which he had a right under s 10(b) had not been conveyed, either at all or in a manner he understood (para. 52). [87] the concern that should reasonably have arisen in the mind of the investigating officer that mr. lafrance may not have understood his rights and how to exercise them is affirmed, if not heightened, when considered in light of mr. lafrance’s particular characteristics it is entirely plausible that a 19-year-old with no previous experience of detention or custodial interviews might have difficulty understanding his or her rights, not ever having had to exercise them or even speak with a lawyer before. while the trial judge found him “not unsophisticated”, as i have already explained he was obviously unsophisticated in ways that matter here. finally, and while, as i have explained, it is not clear that this was a present factor in this case, in view of mr. lafrance’s indigenous heritage i note that investigating officers and reviewing courts should be alive to the pronounced power imbalance that arises from the unique, historical vulnerability of indigenous people in their encounters with the criminal justice system (watkins, at pp. 493-95). all these considerations — none of which are taken into consideration by my colleagues — further support the conclusion that mr. lafrance’s circumstances fall within the third sinclair category. (3) conclusion on breach of section 10(b) on april 7, 2015 [88] the police breached mr. lafrance’s s 10(b) right to counsel by refusing to provide another opportunity to consult with a lawyer despite there being reason to conclude that he had not understood his s 10(b) advice, even after having spoken with legal aid. i now turn to the consequences that follow from this breach and from the march 19 breach of mr. lafrance’s s 10(b) right. c. section 24(2) of the charter [89] section 24(2) of the charter is remedial: its purpose is to uphold charter rights by providing effective remedies to those whose rights have been breached (r v. 974649 ontario inc., 2001 scc 81, [2001] 3 scr 575, at paras. 19 and 21). and its text is categorical: where evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed a charter right or freedom, that evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute (le, at para. 139). the standpoint to be adopted throughout is, therefore, that of the administration of justice. as this court emphasized in le: where the state seeks to benefit from the evidentiary fruits of charter-offending conduct, our focus must be directed not to the impact of state misconduct upon the criminal trial, but upon the administration of justice courts must also bear in mind that the fact of a charter breach signifies, in and of itself, injustice, and a consequent diminishment of administration of justice. what courts are mandated by s 24(2) to consider is whether the admission of evidence risks doing further damage by diminishing the reputation of the administration of justice — such that, for example, reasonable members of canadian society might wonder whether courts take individual rights and freedoms from police misconduct seriously. we endorse this court’s caution in grant, at para. 68, that, while the exclusion of evidence “may provoke immediate criticism”, our focus is on “the overall repute of the justice system, viewed in the long term” by a reasonable person, informed of all relevant circumstances and of the importance of charter rights. [emphasis in original; para. 140.] [90] would, then, allowing the crown to rely on the evidence obtained on march 19 and april 7 in breach of mr. lafrance’s charter rights bring the administration of justice into disrepute? deciding this entails considering and balancing the three lines of inquiry identified in grant: (1) the seriousness of the charter-infringing conduct; (2) the impact on the charter-protected interests of the accused; and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits (para. 71; le, at paras. 139-42; r v. tim, 2022 scc 12, at para. 74). while the first two lines of inquiry typically work in tandem, it is not necessary that both of them support exclusion in order for a court to determine that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute (le, at para. 141). as the court said in le, “[i]t is the sum, and not the average, of those first two lines of inquiry that determines the pull towards exclusion” (para. 141). in other words, it is the cumulative weight of the first two lines of inquiry that trial judges must consider and balance against the third line of inquiry when assessing whether evidence should be excluded. that is why the third line — which typically pulls towards a finding that admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute — will seldom tip the scale in favour of admissibility when the two first lines, taken together, make a strong case for exclusion (le, at para. 142; r v. paterson, 2017 scc 15, [2017] 1 scr 202, at para. 56). [91] an analysis pursuant to s 24(2) — which is an exercise in judicial discretion by the trial judge — attracts deference as to the supporting findings of fact (grant, at paras. 43 and 86). but the application of the law to the facts is a question of law (grant, para. 43). further, an appellate court owes no deference where it disagrees with the trial judge’s conclusions on the charter breaches (le, at para. 138; grant, at para. 129; paterson, at para. 42). [92] here, the trial judge did not consider s 24(2), given his conclusion that the police did not breach mr. lafrance’s charter rights. instead, it was the court of appeal that considered the grant factors and held that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute this court does not lack jurisdiction to consider alleged errors in the s 24(2) analysis of the court of appeal (r v. reilly, 2021 scc 38) but we must bear in mind that this court and the court of appeal are, essentially, on identical footing for an analysis under s 24(2), neither court having had the benefit of observing the witnesses or hearing testimony first-hand. i will therefore conduct a fresh s 24(2) analysis. as i will explain, however, i largely agree with the court of appeal’s analysis. (1) seriousness of the charter-infringing conduct [93] the first grant inquiry speaks to the importance of courts dissociating themselves from evidence obtained as a result of police failure to meet charter standards, because of its negative impact on the reputation of the administration of justice (le, at para. 143). in deciding whether this is necessary, they must “situate that conduct on a scale of culpability” (paterson, at para. 43; see also tim, at para. 82). inadvertent or minor violations tend only to minimally undermine public confidence in the rule of law and, consequently, bear only slightly upon the reputation of the administration of justice, while evidence obtained “through a wilful or reckless disregard of charter rights will inevitably have a negative effect on the public confidence in the rule of law” (paterson, at para. 43; grant, at para. 74; see also le, at para. 143; r v harrison, 2009 scc 34, [2009] 2 scr 494, at para. 22) and evidence obtained by police negligence in meeting charter standards does not qualify as a “good faith” error, but instead supports a conclusion that a court should dissociate itself from such evidence (le, at para. 143; tim, at para. 85). [94] the court of appeal described the denial of the right to counsel on march 19 and april 7 as “particularly serious given the grave nature of the offence under investigation, the potential consequences of conviction on [mr. lafrance] and his particular vulnerability given his young age and circumstances in life” (para. 79). while it did not believe that these breaches “occurred through a willful or reckless disregard of charter rights”, the court of appeal nevertheless held that the charter-infringing conduct remained serious (para. 80). [95] i agree entirely. that the charter infringing conduct here was not reckless does not mean that police acted in “good faith” or that the absence of recklessness is a mitigating factor (le, at para. 143; paterson, at para. 44; harrison, at para. 25; r v. buhay, 2003 scc 30, [2003] 1 scr 631, at para. 59). on both march 19 and april 7, the police conduct resulted in serious breaches of mr. lafrance’s charter rights. this favours a finding that admission of the resulting evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. (2) impact of the breaches on the charter-protected interests of the accused [96] the second grant inquiry requires the court to consider whether, from the standpoint of society’s interest in respect for charter rights, the admission of evidence tainted by the charter breach would bring the administration of justice into disrepute (le, at para. 151). like the first inquiry, this inquiry is into the degree of seriousness. as a general rule, “[t]he more serious the impact on the accused’s protected interests, the greater the risk that admission of the evidence may signal to the public that charter rights, however high-sounding, are of little actual avail to the citizen, breeding public cynicism and bringing the administration of justice into disrepute” (grant, at para. 76; le, at para. 151). [97] this case involved two breaches of s 10(b). while not determinative, i am alive to the court’s description of the right guaranteed by s 10(b) as “the single most important organizing principle in criminal law” (r v. p (mb), [1994] 1 scr 555, at p 577). any breach of this provision “undermines the detainee’s right to make a meaningful and informed choice whether to speak, the related right to silence, and, most fundamentally, the protection against testimonial self-incrimination” (grant, at para. 95). as the court of appeal’s analysis makes plain, those particular consequences were of a serious nature here: “[mr. lafrance] was led to confess to killing a person without having an opportunity for a thorough, reflective discussion with a lawyer fully apprised of his jeopardy” (para. 82) i see no basis to diverge from the court of appeal’s assessment that this had “a serious impact” on mr. lafrance’s charter rights (para. 82) the second line of grant supports the view that admitting this evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. (3) society’s interest in the adjudication for the case on its merits [98] the third grant line is concerned with the societal interest in “an adjudication on the merits”, coupled with a focus on the impact of state misconduct upon the reputation of the administration of justice (le, at para. 158). society’s interest in an adjudication of the case on its merits typically pulls towards a finding that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, but not all considerations will pull in this direction (le, at paras. 142 and 158). as the court explained in le: while this inquiry is concerned with the societal interest in “an adjudication on the merits” (grant, at para. 85), the focus, as we have already explained, must be upon the impact of state misconduct upon the reputation of the administration of justice. while disrepute may result from the exclusion of relevant and reliable evidence (grant, at para. 81), so too might it result from admitting evidence that deprives the accused of a fair hearing or that amounts to “judicial condonation of unacceptable conduct by the investigatory and prosecutorial agencies” ([r v.] collins[, [1987] 1 scr 265], at p 281). an “adjudication on the merits”, in a rule of law state, presupposes an adjudication grounded in legality and respect for longstanding constitutional norms. [para. 158] [99] the court of appeal did not explicitly state whether this line of inquiry favours admission or exclusion, but the majority’s reasons tend to suggest that it only slightly favours admission (paras. 83-84) while the evidence appeared prima facie reliable given its nature as a confession, it was “largely extraneous to the core of the crown’s case”, given that mr. lafrance confessed only to having caused mr. yasinski’s death and not to having planned or intended to kill him (para. 84). the remaining evidence, the majority observed, did not leave the crown without a case on either manslaughter or second degree murder. [100] i agree with what i understand to be the court of appeal’s conclusion that the third grant line supports admission, but not heavily so. the evidence relates to a serious criminal offence, but society’s interests are not strongly affected given the other evidence available to the crown on re-trial. (4) admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute [101] taken together, the three grant lines of inquiry confirm that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. these were two serious breaches with a correspondingly significant impact on the s 10(b) rights of mr. lafrance. the first and second lines of inquiry therefore present a strong case for exclusion of the evidence. on the other hand, society’s interest favours admission of the evidence, but not strongly. taken cumulatively, the strength of the first two lines of inquiry overwhelms the moderate impact on society’s interest in the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process. [102] it follows that the evidence obtained as a result of the breaches of mr. lafrance’s charter rights on march 19 and april 7 must be excluded. v conclusion [103] i would dismiss the appeal. the reasons of wagner c.j and moldaver, côté and rowe jj were delivered by côté and rowe jj. — i. introduction [104] this case involves what should be a straightforward application of this court’s jurisprudence under ss. 9 (the right against arbitrary detention), 10(b) (the right to retain and instruct counsel on detention) and 24(2) (exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence when its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. the majority of this court begins its analysis by acknowledging this, but proceeds to adopt interpretations of those sections that depart from that jurisprudence. we cannot agree with that approach and the proposed outcome of this case. ii. facts and decisions below [105] we do not find it necessary to repeat all the facts and issues as set out by our colleagues, but we wish to comment briefly on the findings of the trial judge and the analysis applied to those findings by the court of appeal. [106] the respondent, nigel vernon lafrance, an indigenous man who was 19 years old at the time, was linked to the killing of anthony yasinski, his drug dealer, on march 17, 2015. mr. lafrance was the last person mr. yasinski communicated with on his cellphone therefore, police quickly identified mr. lafrance as a person of interest. [107] police obtained a search warrant for mr. lafrance’s residence and, while executing it on march 19, 2015, asked him if he would provide a statement at the police station. mr. lafrance was informed that his participation was voluntary and that he did not have to provide a statement. nonetheless, he chose to do so and accompanied police officers to the station where he was interviewed by sgt. eros. he was not informed of his s 10(b) rights at this interview. [108] almost three weeks later on april 7, 2015, mr. lafrance was arrested for the murder of the victim and interviewed at the police station again. when mr. lafrance arrived at the rcmp detachment, he was supplied with telephone books and a telephone number for legal aid alberta mr. lafrance spoke to a lawyer for approximately 15 minutes after that conversation, an officer asked whether mr. lafrance understood the advice, to which he responded “yes”. the officer asked, then, if the lawyer would be attending the rcmp detachment, to which he responded “no” (see trial reasons, 2017 abqb 746, 399 crr (2d) 184, at para. 124; rf, at para. 7 (emphasis added)). [109] the questioning did not begin until after sgt. eros was informed that mr. lafrance had consulted counsel. during the interview, five and a half hours after speaking with legal aid, mr. lafrance asked to call his father who, according to him, would be able to help him get a lawyer to come to the station. police refused that request on the basis that he had already spoken to a lawyer mr. lafrance subsequently confessed to the killing. [110] at trial, mr. lafrance challenged the admission of the evidence obtained as a result of the march 19, 2015 statement and the april 7, 2015 statement, confession and evidence obtained as a result. [111] the trial judge found that there were no breaches of mr. lafrance’s s 10(b) or other charter rights. regarding the march 19, 2015 interview, the trial judge found mr. lafrance was not detained within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10(b). police repeated several times that he could leave whenever he liked, and he understood these statements. any statement to the contrary was not credible as it was belied by his “at ease” and “cooperative” manner in the interview (para. 73). mr. lafrance was “naïve”, but “not unsophisticated” (para. 81) in fact, the trial judge found that mr. lafrance tactically participated in the interview because he believed this could counter police suspicion. [112] further, the trial judge found that police properly implemented mr. lafrance’s s 10(b) rights on april 7, 2015. mr. lafrance was not entitled in law to a further consultation with a lawyer after his conversation with legal aid. the trial judge found that none of the circumstances that would require a further consultation under r v. sinclair, 2010 scc 35, [2010] 2 scr 310, arose in this case. [113] the trial judge commented that even assuming there was a breach of s 10(b) on march 19, 2015, its effect on the admissibility of evidence had to be considered. he found that since the crown did not seek to introduce any evidence or the statement obtained on march 19, 2015, the issue of exclusion of this evidence under s 24(2) was moot the trial judge also found an insufficient causal, temporal or contextual connection between the march 19, 2015 statement and the april 7, 2015 statement such that any breach on march 19, 2015, did not taint the confession or other evidence obtained as a result of the april 7, 2015 interrogation in reaching this conclusion, the trial judge relied on mr. lafrance’s own testimony that the march 19, 2015 statement “had nothing to do with” him providing the april 7, 2015 statement (para. 99). [114] consequently, the trial judge did not exclude any evidence and dismissed mr. lafrance’s charter application. mr. lafrance was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. [115] mr. lafrance appealed his conviction based in part on the s 10(b) charter rulings the majority of the alberta court of appeal found the trial judge erred in concluding there were no s 10(b) charter breaches (2021 abca 51, 20 alta lr. (7th) 211). the majority stated that the trial judge did not appreciate the stage of the police investigation and undervalued mr. lafrance’s perceptions as a young indigenous man and, therefore, erred in his analysis of whether there was a detention on march 19, 2015 the majority concluded that he was detained and, accordingly, should have been provided with his s 10(b) rights. [116] as for april 7, 2015, mr. lafrance was confused by the legal aid lawyer’s advice. the majority of the court of appeal concluded that a second consultation was required under sinclair because the advice was insufficient or, arguably, as a result of new procedures it also concluded that even if no category expressly described in sinclair applied, a new consultation was necessary to fulfill the purpose of s 10(b). failure to provide mr. lafrance with a further consultation was a s 10(b) breach. the majority of the court of appeal therefore allowed the appeal, held that the evidence obtained as a result of the march 19, 2015 statement and the april 7, 2015 statement be excluded and ordered a new trial. [117] wakeling ja, in dissent, concluded that the trial judge did not commit any errors and there were no s 10(b) breaches. regarding march 19, 2015, he was of the view that there was no detention because the police told mr. lafrance several times that he was free to leave. absent exceptional circumstances, which did not arise, that should be a bright line test that is determinative of detention with regard to april 7, 2015, mr. lafrance received and understood the legal aid lawyer’s advice. he had no right to talk to his father or to further consult a lawyer. wakeling ja would have dismissed the appeal. iii analysis [118] we disagree with the majority on three key issues. first, we are of the view that mr. lafrance was not detained within the meaning of s 10(b) of the charter on march 19, 2015. second, we conclude that mr. lafrance was not entitled to a second consultation with counsel under s 10(b) during the april 7, 2015 interrogation. third, if mr. lafrance was detained on march 19, 2015, there is an insufficient link between the resulting charter breach and the evidence relating to the april 7, 2015 interrogation that he sought to exclude under s 24(2). a mr. lafrance was not detained within the meaning of sections 9 and 10(b) of the charter on march 19, 2015 [119] we are of the view that mr. lafrance was neither psychologically nor physically detained by police on march 19, 2015. our disagreement with the majority turns on three keys points. [120] first, while the majority states that the trial judge’s findings of fact are entitled to deference (at para. 23), it then goes on to substitute its own view of the evidence for that of the trial judge. the majority pays scant attention to the trial judge’s findings as to the interactions between police and mr. lafrance. further, the evidence that the majority relies on for its findings that the police engaged in coercive behaviour — except as necessary for the proper execution of the search warrant — was rejected by the trial judge. in our view, a deferential approach leads to the conclusion that police did not engage in coercive behaviour toward mr. lafrance, but rather acted in a professional, non-confrontational manner on march 19, 2015. [121] second, we consider that the majority overemphasizes the perspective of a reasonable person in the particular circumstances of the accused this approach provides little to no guidance to police in determining whether they have psychologically detained someone in carrying out their regular duties. it risks turning every common police encounter into a detention and creating situations where police are unable to control whether they breach charter rights. for example, what reasons for the detention should the police provide to an individual, as required by s 10(a), where they have no intention to detain him or her, but a reasonable person may nonetheless conclude a detention exists? how can the police avoid infringing the right under s 9 against arbitrary detention when they are seeking to obtain information? it does a disservice to the administration of justice if we put police in a “catch-22” situation regarding psychological detention when they want to put questions to an individual. [122] third, we accord greater weight than does the majority to the police officers’ testimony that they made clear to mr. lafrance that he did not need to speak to them and was free to leave. we agree with the majority that a finding of detention is not precluded by such statements by police. however, the interaction between police and the individual must be considered in light of all relevant circumstances thus, coercive behaviour or accusatory questioning may negate police assurances that the individual need not speak to them and is free to go. [123] but police statements to such effect are not merely “a single consideration among others”, as the majority suggests (para. 39). in our view, as the new brunswick court of appeal stated in r v. way, 2011 nbca 92, 377 nbr (2d) 25, “detention will certainly be much more difficult to establish when such information has been genuinely provided” (para. 40). this is consistent with the role of unambiguous police statements that an individual is free to leave as contemplated by this court in r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr 353, at paras. 32 and 39. [124] our position is supported by numerous cases decided since grant. the vast majority of decisions applying the grant framework have held that individuals are not detained within the meaning of s 9 or s 10(b) of the charter where they are unambiguously informed by police that they are free to go (see r v. todd, 2019 skca 36, [2019] 9 wwr 207, at paras. 63-69; r v. tran, 2010 abca 211, 482 ar 357, at paras. 25-30; r v. schrenk, 2010 mbca 38, 255 man. r (2d) 12, at para. 56; r v. hermkens & moran, 2021 abqb 885, at paras. 223-34 (canlii); r v. heppner, 2017 bcsc 894, at paras. 125 and 127 (canlii); r v. roach, 2012 nltd(g) 21, 319 nfld. & peir 231, at paras. 44-45; r v. bristol, 2011 abqb 73, at paras. 22-23 (canlii); r v bucknell, 2021 bcpc 308, at paras. 99-109 (canlii); r v giulioni, 2011 nltd(g) 117, 313 nfld. & peir 220, at para. 29; r v. wheeler, 2010 yktc 7, at para. 11 (canlii); r v rodh, 2010 skpc 150, 364 sask r 96, at para. 25). consequently, unambiguous police statements that an individual is under no obligation to comply should weigh heavily against a finding of psychological detention, absent police conduct undermining this message (see r v. jackman, 2011 nltd(g) 116, 313 nfld. & peir 203, at paras. 42-43). [125] this is not to say that statements by police that the individual is free to go are “all but determinative” or that they justify turning the focus away from contextual factors, as the majority suggests in describing our position (para. 38). we acknowledge that the particular circumstances of the individual are pertinent in determining whether a reasonable person could consider that police by their conduct have undermined such statements a person subject to accusatory questioning or coercive behaviour could reasonably feel detained by police regardless of statements to the contrary the threshold may be lower for vulnerable individuals who are unfamiliar with their charter rights. this is particularly true in cases of “intensive interrogation” (s. penney, “police questioning in the charter era: adjudicative versus regulatory rule-making and the problem of false confessions” (2012), 57 sclr (2d) 263, at p 287 (emphasis added)). [126] none of these concerns apply here although mr. lafrance is a young, indigenous person with no experience akin to that on march 19, 2015, the police did not undermine their statements that he was free to go and under no obligation to cooperate. in dealing with mr. lafrance, police repeatedly reminded him that he was under no obligation to cooperate and could leave at any time; they also ensured that he understood his charter right to silence at the beginning of the interview of march 19, 2015. mr. lafrance was eager to cooperate in order to allay suspicion. [127] applying the grant framework, we conclude that mr. lafrance was not psychologically or otherwise detained at any point during his dealings with the police on march 19, 2015; thus, there was no requirement that he be advised by police of his right to counsel under s 10(b) of the charter. (1) circumstances giving rise to the encounter [128] according to the majority, “little consideration is given to the possibility that [the facts of the initial police encounter] gave rise to a detention” (para. 33). in the majority’s view, the overwhelming force manifested by police in the execution of the search warrant of the residence, combined with mr. lafrance’s personal characteristics, are determinative (para. 51). [129] but the majority’s critique is unfounded, as the trial judge did consider the context in which police first interacted with mr. lafrance and its relevance to whether or not he was detained. the trial judge explained that the encounter began when police awoke mr. lafrance in the course of executing the search warrant, at para. 37: before encountering sgt. eros, mr. lafrance had been awakened by three police officers executing the search warrant. [mr.] lafrance was told he could not remain in the home while the search warrant was being executed this was standard police practice and applied to all residence occupants. outside the residence [mr.] lafrance, in the vicinity of police, retrieved his cat which had escaped from inside the residence. sergeant eros approached [mr.] lafrance in the garage area after confirming [mr.] lafrance’s identity they had a brief conversation concerning the stabbing nearby sergeant eros told [mr.] lafrance he wanted to speak with him about his involvement in an incident that had occurred down the road. indeed, the brief remarks of the trial judge on the initial encounter, read in context, indicate that the search warrant was executed professionally and disclosed no signs of unnecessary coercion with respect, the majority’s assertion concerning “the overwhelming show of force in the intrusion into the home” (para. 51) plainly contradicts the trial judge’s assessment of the initial encounter. [130] after verifying mr. lafrance’s identity, “sergeant eros testified he asked whether [mr.] lafrance would be willing to provide a voluntary statement. sergeant eros explained that [mr.] lafrance was free to leave, and that it was up to him to decide whether he would accompany sgt. eros or make a statement” (trial reasons, at para. 38) at that point, police were only “in the preliminary stages of an investigation into [mr.] yasinski’s homicide” (para. 78). [131] we agree with the majority that a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position would feel singled out for investigation. however, “[f]ocussed suspicion, in and of itself, does not turn the encounter into a detention” (grant, at para. 41). the significance of this consideration is diminished in these circumstances by statements by the police that mr. lafrance was free to leave — as did all the other occupants of the house. (2) police conduct [132] key to our conclusion on detention are the police statements on several occasions that mr. lafrance was under no obligation to cooperate, and he was free to leave at any time. the passages highlighted by the majority bear repeating: “you don’t have to provide me a statement . . that it would be completely voluntary on your point”, “you don’t hafta sit here and speak with me today”, “you are at any time nigel free to leave”, “we (unintelligible) responsibility to ensure that you’re aware of – of your rights and . . . and like i said that – that includes the ability to leave whenever you want to”, “[v]oluntary that you don’t have to sit here and speak with me”, “you say you’re willing to talk now . . . right in half an hour, 20 minutes, two hours you’re – you decide that – that you no longer wanta speak with me . . . um you just have to let me know . . . okay and at that point in time, we’ll stop and we’ll move on”, and “some people think well now that i’ve agreed to it . . . i’m stuck here right . . . and – that’s absolutely not the case” (fn. 3, quoting ar, vol. iv, at pp. 56, 64 and 72-74). [133] the question, in our view, is whether police by their conduct undermined their statements. the record demonstrates that they did not. (a) actions and language of police [134] conspicuously absent from the majority’s list of factors relating to police actions and language (at para. 40) is the evidence as to how police actually interacted with mr. lafrance the record demonstrates that sgt. eros did not pressure mr. lafrance to come to the police station. not only did sgt. eros specify that coming to the station was “completely voluntary”, but he also mentioned that the interview did not need to take place that day. indeed, sgt. eros asked mr. lafrance whether he had to go to work or to “any appointments or anything like that”, stressing that he did not “wanna hold [mr. lafrance] up from anything” (ar, vol. iv, at p 57). sergeant eros’ approach preserved mr. lafrance’s freedom of choice. [135] in his own words, mr. lafrance “had no problems with how anybody treated [him] that day” because police treated him “respectfully and politely” at every stage of the interaction; “everything went smooth” (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 220-21). thus, the trial judge found that mr. lafrance “was comfortable with what occurred that day” (para. 56). police did not undermine their various statements that he was free to leave, either before or after the interview in fact, in relation to the collection of physical evidence subsequent to the interview, the trial judge noted that “[mr.] lafrance and sgt. eros continue[d] their banter” (para. 58). [136] in such circumstances, we do not find any reviewable error in the trial judge’s decision. with respect, a careful and deferential review of the record requires a rejection of the factors that — according to the majority — “outweig[h]” the police statements that mr. lafrance was free to go (para. 40). to further demonstrate why, we will address the conduct of the police in greater detail. (i) execution of the search warrant [137] apart from the instructions by police relating to the execution of the search warrant — which were authorized by law — there is no evidence of any “conduct [giving] rise to an impression of control” (grant, at para. 51). we acknowledge that police exercised control over the home, thereby ordering all its occupants — including mr. lafrance — to leave their residence under supervision. but it does not follow from this that mr. lafrance was psychologically detained. [138] in our view, it is appropriate to distinguish between control over the home and control over the person. however, the majority collapses the distinction between the two this is particularly manifest in its conclusion, which refers only to police actions necessary and proper for the execution of the search warrant: “given the overwhelming force in which a team of police officers arrived at mr. lafrance’s home, ordered him to get dressed and leave his home, and monitored his every movement, the officers should have recognized that a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s shoes would feel obliged to comply with their demands and would conclude that he or she was not free to go” (para. 64 (emphasis added)). [139] it is uncontroversial that mr. lafrance had to comply with these demands because they pertained to the proper execution of the search warrant. indeed, all the occupants of the residence were subject to such orders, as the trial judge duly noted (para. 37). police monitoring of the residents inside the home was also closely related to the integrity of their search, rather than specific to mr. lafrance. [140] the majority’s remark that mr. lafrance’s every movement was monitored outside the home (see paras. 8, 31, 43, 47 and 63-64) attests to its lack of deference to the trial judge’s findings of fact the only basis in the record for this conclusion is mr. lafrance’s claim that police “chaperoned” him while he was attempting to retrieve his cat (r.f, at paras. 7 and 32; ar, vol. iii, at pp. 91-93). the trial judge, we stress, expressed “insurmountable concerns about the credibility of [mr.] lafrance’s evidence” (para. 34). the trial judge found mr. lafrance to be generally “dishonest”, highlighting several “implausible” and “unreasonable and self-serving” statements from his testimony (paras. 28, 31 and 34). more specifically, mr. lafrance’s testimony was rejected “where it [was] not consistent with that of police officers” (para. 34). [141] by contrast, sgt. eros — a “credible and reliable witness” whose testimony the trial judge found to be “honest and accurate” (paras. 19 and 24) — said that “the officers that were outside at that time were assisting [mr. lafrance] to try to locate the cat” (ar, vol. ii, at p 103 (emphasis added)). furthermore, sgt. eros could not recall seeing officers in the immediate proximity of mr. lafrance while he was trying to get the cat (at p 103), but simply noted that “[h]e would have been in sight of police officers” (p 93) sergeant eros’ testimony is reflected in the trial judge’s findings that police were merely “in the vicinity” of mr. lafrance at the time (at para. 37) and that he “was not being told to stay with police; he was simply instructed to leave the residence” (para. 43). these findings by the trial judge do not support a conclusion that mr. lafrance was subject to psychological detention. (ii) ride to the police station [142] the initial interaction at mr. lafrance’s residence was followed by a 20-minute ride to the police station in an unmarked police vehicle. we disagree with the majority’s assertion that this militates in favour of detention; in doing so, we are mindful of police conduct relating to the ride and the fact that mr. lafrance chose this option. [143] the majority states that “[t]he only practical means available to mr. lafrance for getting to the police station was for him to be driven, which he was in an unmarked police vehicle accompanied by two police officers” (para. 40). yet, this contradicts the trial judge’s factual findings. the trial judge found that “[mr.] lafrance agreed he had transportation ‘options of people who had vehicles at home’” (para. 39), based on his statement in cross-examination the other occupants of the residence present at the time — mr. lafrance’s girlfriend and his father as well as one of the downstairs tenants — “all left the house and went their different ways” (ar, vol. iii, at p 214). stated differently, mr. lafrance had multiple transportation options, but he chose to accompany sgt. eros to the station in the police car (trial reasons, at para. 39). [144] the conversation on the way to the police station was “lighthearted”, and mr. lafrance’s “comfortable demeanour and engagement indicate his participation was entirely voluntary and a produc[t] of deliberate choice” (trial reasons, at paras. 42 and 44). from the parking lot to the interview room, mr. lafrance “was not held, or in any sense physically controlled or guided” by police (para. 42). (iii) interview [145] at the outset of the interview, sgt. eros “stresses something that is ‘important’: the statement is voluntary and [mr.] lafrance can leave at any time” (trial reasons, at para. 47). the trial judge noted that sgt. eros devoted “[a]pproximately the first 15 minutes of the interview [to] explaining the process and the related legal rights of [mr.] lafrance” (para. 51). [146] what is more, the nature of the interview militates against a finding of psychological detention. as the trial judge pointed out, sgt. eros’ “interview style was deliberately non-accusatory”, and his “questioning [was] focused on information-gathering” (paras. 75 and 77). sergeant eros provided mr. lafrance with an “opportunity to answer questions ‘freely and flexibly’ and of his ‘free will’” (para. 75). mr. lafrance “was not confronted with evidence pointing to his guilt. he was not accused of an offence” (para. 77). these findings indicate that police carefully avoided anything akin to accusatory interrogation. (iv) collection of physical evidence [147] after the interview, police asked mr. lafrance whether he would consent to provide dna and fingerprint samples, as well as some of his clothes and his cellphone, which he did without reservation mr. lafrance also agreed to have the police photograph his hands it is noteworthy that police expressly gave him an opportunity to speak to a lawyer prior to the dna testing, but he declined the offer. [148] the evidence demonstrates mr. lafrance was keen to collaborate. the trial judge noted that mr. lafrance “volunteer[ed] for fingerprinting even before sgt. eros completed his request” (para. 57) moreover, mr. lafrance voluntarily provided additional, unsolicited information on his cellphone, as the trial judge noted, at para. 68: i note [mr.] lafrance did not merely provide the rcmp with the cell phone and assured them it was not locked with a password or passcode, [mr.] lafrance also explained a quirk of that cell phone to assist the rcmp investigators. the cell phone had a bent battery, and that meant the cell phone would reset implication behind itself unexpected[ly] the [mr.] lafrance sharing that fact is he wanted the rcmp to be able to fairly evaluate whatever kind of information they might obtai[n] from the cell phone. [149] a further indication of police conduct is the nature of the communication between sgt. eros and mr. lafrance during collection of the physical evidence. the trial judge noted that “[mr.] lafrance and sgt. eros continue[d] their banter”. nothing in the foregoing supports the conclusion that a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position would feel detained. (b) physical contact [150] physical contact is particularly significant in determining whether individuals informed by police they are free to go are nevertheless psychologically detained statements about freedom to leave would not be reasonably perceived as genuine where police, directly or indirectly, restrict the subject’s liberty of movement. this can include situations where physical proximity has an objectively oppressive effect on the individual — for example, where police officers deliberately position themselves within a small space “in a manner to block the exit” (r v. le, 2019 scc 34, [2019] 2 scr 692, at para. 50). [151] we agree with the majority that there was no evidence of physical contact or oppressive proximity that could support a finding of psychological detention in this case on the contrary, the trial judge found no evidence of physical obstruction by police at any stage of the encounter (paras. 43, 45 and 70). (c) presence of others [152] the majority uses the presence of others as a “significant consideration” (para. 43) in that mr. lafrance was in the presence of police throughout the interaction. we disagree. nothing in the record indicates the police brought in more officers than reasonably necessary to ensure police and public safety and the effectiveness of the search. moreover, le makes clear, at para. 63, that the “presence of others” refers to witnesses, not police officers: in this case, the presence of others would likely increase, not decrease, a reasonable person’s perception that they were being detained. each man witnessed what was happening to them all. the presence of others clearly did not prevent the police entry in the first place or provide any privacy, security or protection against incursions thereafter. each man saw that the police asked each of them who they were and what they were doing. indeed, an assessment of the presence of police officers throughout the encounter at this stage, although relevant, is redundant with the considerations already assessed by the majority in discussing the actions and language of police as well as their proximity to mr. lafrance. [153] in any event, the presence of other police officers (in addition to sgt. eros) is of no consequence in this case given how the police conducted themselves. as well, there were no other members of the public around mr. lafrance from the moment he accepted to go to the police station. (d) place and duration of the encounter [154] the interview at the police station and the taking of physical evidence at the end of the interview warrant close attention at the outset, sgt. eros informed mr. lafrance that the door of the interview room was unlocked and that he was “at any time . . . free to leave” (trial reasons, at para. 47). at the same time, sgt. eros indicated that they were in a “secure environment”, so that mr. lafrance would need to be accompanied by police for “smoke or bathroom breaks” (para. 48) given that mr. lafrance knew he could leave at any time, we agree with the trial judge that the fact that he would need to be accompanied while in the secured area of the station is “inconsequential” (para. 70). this is further supported by the trial judge’s statement that “this procedure was not a product of the [non-accusatory] interview process and was not unique to [mr.] lafrance” (para. 71). simply put, an individual is not detained just because he or she is the subject of a police interview (grant, at para. 26, quoting from r v. mann, 2004 scc 52, [2004] 3 scr 59, at para. 19). [155] regard must be had to the duration of the interview — about 3 and a half hours, including “approximately 30 min[utes] (involving two separate occasions) during which [mr.] lafrance was alone in the interview room” (trial reasons, at para. 46). intensive interrogation, particularly if it lasts for a long time, can reasonably lead to the conclusion that the individual is being detained. [156] the trial judge, however, was alive to this issue he noted that the “interview was lengthier than generally occurred in non-accusatory sessions” (para. 19; see also para. 89). the trial judge commented on the nature of the interview as follows: the march 19, 2015 interview recordings indicate there is a steady dialogue exchange between sgt. eros and [mr.] lafrance sergeant eros intended this be a conversation, and not an interrogation his interview style was deliberately non-accusatory it was designed to offer [mr.] lafrance the opportunity to answer questions “freely and flexibly” and of his “free will”. his interview style was deliberately non-accusatory. the manner in which the march 19, 2015 interview was conducted was also not oppressive. instead, it was a conversation. sergeant eros directed his inquiries in an open-ended and non-accusatory manner. in effect, this interview was a direct, fair information gathering procedure. [paras. 75 and 90] in these circumstances, having regard to the conversational interview style and the absence of any confrontation, we see no basis to differ from the trial judge’s conclusion that the length of the interview does not suffice to turn it into a coercive interrogation or, ultimately, constitute (alone or with earlier events) the basis of a psychological detention. (e) summary [157] in assessing police conduct, the majority substitutes its own view of the evidence for that of the trial judge, relying in part on the controverted evidence of mr. lafrance — a witness found to be dishonest there is no credible evidence that police gave orders or closely monitored mr. lafrance for purposes other than the execution of the search warrant. [158] rather, the events — viewed in their entirety in line with the trial judge’s findings of fact — indicate that police asserted control over the home without coercing mr. lafrance, except to the extent necessary for the execution of the search warrant. in dealing with mr. lafrance, sgt. eros repeatedly reminded him that he was under no obligation to cooperate and could leave at any time, as well as ensuring that he understood his charter right to silence at the beginning of the interview far from disclosing coercive behaviour, the evidence suggests sgt. eros had a lighthearted conversation with mr. lafrance during the ride to the police station, and the pair continued to banter after the conversational, non-confrontational interview. nothing in the foregoing constitutes a basis to contradict the trial judge’s conclusion that mr. lafrance was not subject to psychological detention. (3) particular circumstances of the individual [159] the trial judge “acknowledge[d] mr. lafrance was youthful, [i]ndigenous and had minimal police exposure at that time” (para. 79). as to physical stature, “[i]t is clear [mr.] lafrance is physically smaller than sgt. eros and his partner” (para. 73). moreover, the trial judge found that mr. lafrance was “demonstrably intelligent” and “not unsophisticated”, although he “was naïve in deciding his participation would counter police suspicion” (paras. 80-81 and 91). [160] an individual’s youth, indigenous background, lack of experience, and small stature are all material in determining whether police undermined statements that the subject was free to go but such factors are not determinative yet the majority seems to say (at para. 54) that detention automatically arises where police interview a young adult after executing a search warrant at his or her residence. that the detention inquiry is objective does not mean the reviewing court must conduct an abstract analysis unsupported by evidence (grant, at para. 32; r v suberu, 2009 scc 33, [2009] 2 scr 460, at para. 28). contrary to the majority’s claim (at para. 64), there is no evidentiary support for the assertion that the execution of the search warrant in this case was conducted in a manner that would make a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position feel detained. it follows that the majority’s conclusions appear to be based on the circumstances of mr. lafrance only. [161] having regard to mr. lafrance’s particular circumstances, we acknowledge that police needed to tread carefully, but they did so, such that even having regard to mr. lafrance’s personal characteristics, he was not psychologically detained. [162] this conclusion is buttressed by the trial judge’s factual determinations as to mr. lafrance’s perceptions of the events. such subjective considerations, although not determinative, help to assess whether a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position would have perceived the police conduct as coercive (grant, at para. 32; suberu, at paras. 28 and 32). the following findings of fact are particularly significant in this regard:  mr. lafrance “agreed he went to the detachment and then interviewed so he could allay suspicions and be discounted as a suspect his comfortable demeanour and engagement indicate his participation was entirely voluntary and a produc[t] of deliberate choice” (trial reasons, at para. 44);  “[t]hroughout the process [mr.] lafrance never appears to be compelled, frightened or intimidated he appears at ease. [mr.] lafrance is cooperative throughout the interview. his manner is friendly and open. there is no indication of defensive body language. instead, at points [mr.] lafrance leans forward, into the conversation” (para. 73);  mr. lafrance “understood police direction that he was free to leave at any time he also acknowledged tactically answering questions to counter police suspicion” (para. 74). [163] these findings of fact confirm what is otherwise objectively ascertainable: a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s shoes would not have perceived the police conduct as a significant deprivation of his liberty police did not exert pressure or control over him. indeed, mr. lafrance himself was eager to cooperate so as to allay suspicions. this, too, militates against a finding of psychological detention. (4) conclusion [164] we conclude mr. lafrance was not detained within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10(b) of the charter in his interactions with police on march 19, 2015. based on a deferential approach to the trial judge’s findings of fact, a reasonable person in mr. lafrance’s position would not have felt compelled to go to the police station and participate in the interview. this conclusion is reinforced by the fact that he chose to cooperate, seeking to allay police suspicion mr. lafrance’s objective personal characteristics, although significant to the inquiry, do not turn the tide in these circumstances. b mr. lafrance’s section 10(b) right to counsel was not violated on april 7, 2015, when he was not permitted a second consultation with counsel [165] mr. lafrance’s next argument is that when he was interviewed on april 7, 2015, the police should have permitted him to have a second consultation with counsel he argues that when police did not permit this, his s 10(b) rights were infringed. the majority agrees. with respect, we do not. (1) legal principles [166] this issue is governed by this court’s decisions in sinclair and its companion cases r v. mccrimmon, 2010 scc 36, [2010] 2 scr 402, and r v. willier, 2010 scc 37, [2010] 2 scr 429. [167] section 10(b)’s purpose is to provide a detainee with an opportunity to obtain information and legal advice relevant to his or her legal situation upon detention (sinclair, at paras. 25 and 31). the protection offered by s 10(b) ensures “that a suspect is able to make a choice to speak to the police investigators that is both free and informed” (sinclair, at paras. 25 and 32, citing r v. hebert, [1990] 2 scr 151, at pp. 176-77). [168] the majority suggests that s 10(b)’s purpose is to mitigate the imbalance between the individual and the state, similar to the purposes of s 9 (see the majority’s reasons, at paras. 76-77). this is not accurate. to the contrary, this court in sinclair expressly rejected this view, stating at paras. 30-31: mr. sinclair argues that the purpose of s 10(b) is broader than this. in his view, accepted by our colleagues lebel and fish jj., the purpose of s 10(b) is to advise the detainee on how to deal with police questions. the detainee, it is argued, is in the power of the police. the purpose of s 10(b) is to restore a power-balance between the detainee and the police in the coercive atmosphere of the police investigation. on this view, the purpose of the right is not so much informational as protective. we cannot accept this view of the purpose of s 10(b) as will be discussed more fully below, this view of s 10(b) goes against 25 years of jurisprudence defining s 10(b) in terms of the right to consult counsel to obtain information and advice immediately upon detention, but not as providing ongoing legal assistance during the course of the interview that follows, regardless of the circumstances. [emphasis added.] [169] there is no basis to depart from sinclair on this point, or to find that s 10(b) is intended to shield the detainee from legitimate interrogation by police (sinclair, at para. 25). nor does willier say that the purpose of s 10(b) is to protect a detainee from an exercise of state power rather it is to “provide [the detainee] an opportunity to mitigate [the] legal disadvantage” relative to the state and “to support the detainee’s right to choose whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not, by giving him access to legal advice on the situation he is facing” (willier, at para 28; sinclair, at para. 32). [170] section 10(b)’s purpose is achieved in two ways. it imposes on the police a duty to advise the detainee of his or her right to counsel (informational component) and to give the detainee an opportunity to exercise his or her right to consult counsel (implementational component) it is not in issue that in this case, the informational component was met. [171] the implementational component is “[n]ormally . . . achieved by a single consultation at the time of detention or shortly thereafter” (sinclair, at para. 47). a few minutes on the phone with counsel may suffice, even for serious charges (see willier). sinclair is clear that s 10(b) does not provide a constitutional right “to ongoing legal assistance during the course of the interview”, or to have counsel present throughout the interview (paras. 31 and 36). [172] sometimes, however, a second consultation with counsel will be required. in sinclair, this court described three categories of “changed circumstances” that will require a second consultation, at paras. 2 and 50-54: 1) when there are new procedures involving the detainee; 2) when there is a change in the detainee’s jeopardy; or 3) when there is reason to question the detainee’s understanding of his or her s 10(b) right. [173] where the circumstances do not fall into a previously recognized category, the question is whether a further opportunity to consult a lawyer is necessary to fulfill s 10(b)’s purpose of providing the detainee with advice in the new or emergent situation. the principle underlying the cases is that to require a second consultation, there must be a change in circumstances such that the choice faced by the detainee has been “significantly altered, requiring further advice on the new situation, in order to fulfill the purpose of s 10(b)” (sinclair, at paras. 54 and 65). (2) application to the case [174] the majority concludes that mr. lafrance’s situation fits within the third sinclair category, ie that there was reason to question mr. lafrance’s understanding of his s 10(b) right the police should have permitted him to have a second consultation with counsel, but did not. therefore, his 10(b) rights were infringed, the majority concludes. [175] the third category is engaged in circumstances such as when a detainee who has waived his or her right to counsel may not have understood this right when he or she waived it (sinclair, at para. 52; r v prosper, [1994] 3 scr 236, at pp. 282-84) it can also apply if police undermine the advice provided by counsel (sinclair, at para. 52; r v. dussault, 2022 scc 16). more generally, it applies when circumstances indicate that the “detainee may not have understood the initial s 10(b) advice of his right to counsel” (sinclair, at para. 52). there is no basis for the foregoing in this case. [176] the fact that a detainee demonstrates hesitancy or concern during an interview or interrogation is not, on its own, sufficient to establish that he or she did not have a full opportunity to consult with counsel. it is assumed that the legal advice received was sufficient in relation to how the detainee should exercise his or her rights in the context of the police investigative interview (sinclair, at para. 57; mccrimmon at paras. 23-24). as the court held in willier, at para. 42, “unless a detainee indicates, diligently and reasonably, that the advice he or she received is inadequate, the police may assume that the detainee is satisfied with the exercised right to counsel and are entitled to commence an investigative interview” only where there is an objective change in circumstances, or objective reason to believe the initial consultation was deficient, will the need for a second consultation arise. [177] when his interactions with police are reviewed, it cannot seriously be questioned that mr. lafrance’s choice to speak to the investigators was both free and informed. [178] the majority refers to two portions of the april 7, 2015 interview in support of its conclusion that mr. lafrance’s 10(b) rights were infringed first, the majority points out that, as the discussion between mr. lafrance and sgt. eros progressed, sgt. eros’ questions became more pointed he began asking specific questions about the murder at that point, mr. lafrance mentioned his father and a lawyer for the first time: q. alright so what happens nigel? a well –. q what – what went on? a well i would – ah i want to talk to my dad before i continue. q ok wh – why do you say that? a cause well he’s – well he’s my only chance of getting a lawyer and i just – i don’t know. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. v, at p 137) [179] we accept that, in the circumstances, mr. lafrance’s request to speak to his father was an implicit request for a second consultation with a lawyer. it does not follow, however, that his 10(b) rights were breached because this request was denied. the detainee merely asking for a second consultation is not enough to engage any sinclair category that would support a right to a second consultation to decide otherwise would be to depart fundamentally from sinclair. [180] the second interview excerpt referred to by the majority, which it concludes demonstrates “clear signs” that either the legal advice mr. lafrance obtained was incorrect, or he did not understand how his s 10(b) rights applied to his current circumstances, reads as follows: a well i – i just – i want a lawyer before i go forward with anything else. q ok you’ve had your opportunity nigel right? like i – like i explained to you, you’ve had an opportunity to speak to a lawyer – we don’t ah – . a well no they told me – they told me to get a lawyer before i continue talking. q ok what do you mean by told you to get a lawyer? a like someone that can come down and sit with me. q ok. a instead of just over the phone. q there’s a person that ah you know what – and the way that that kinda goes ah – i won’t say it’s, it’s bad advice but it’s maybe miss – a little bit miss as – miss ah – interrupted um there’s not any time or any process during our interview –. a um? q where we’re gonna have a lawyer sitting in the room with us. a no, no i – i mean, no mean like so –. q ok. a like for me to sit down with personally. q ok. a to talk to. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. v, at p 139) [181] we disagree that this excerpt demonstrates that mr. lafrance misunderstood his s 10(b) rights in the discussion which immediately follows, sgt. eros confirmed mr. lafrance understood and exercised his right to counsel: q part of the ah – part of the – the process right, is that we need to insure that you were provided some legal advice right. a ya. q and that you spoke to a lawyer and that you understood that legal advice right? a ya. q um and that we’ve gone through that process right? a um. q so what has to happen now is we have to kinda evaluate that and see where we’re at with respect to that ok. a ya. q but there is ah we – we still need to have this conversation right nigel? a. well – well ah the advice that was given to me is i don’t have to say anything. q. ya and – and that’s excellent advice right. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. v, at p 140) [182] the above excerpt demonstrates that mr. lafrance fully understood his rights under s 10(b). mr. lafrance knew the legal jeopardy that he was facing. he knew he did not have to say anything to sgt. eros his discomfort in the face of difficult police questioning is not, on its own, grounds for a second consultation it bears repeating that right after his first consultation, an officer had asked mr. lafrance if he understood the advice, to which mr. lafrance answered “yes” he did not indicate reasonably and diligently that the advice he received was inadequate, or was not conveyed in a manner he understood contrary to the majority’s statements (at para. 86), there is no basis in the evidence for such a conclusion. the officer then asked him whether the lawyer he spoke to was attending the rcmp detachment, to which mr. lafrance answered “no”. mr. lafrance knew no one was coming. [183] even if one accepts that mr. lafrance incorrectly believed that he had a constitutional right to have a lawyer present, mere confusion on this point is not enough to trigger a constitutional obligation under s 10(b). sinclair expressly held that there must be an objective basis for a second consultation to be permitted (para. 55; see also mccrimmon, at paras. 22-23). [184] in fact, the circumstances here are similar to those in sinclair. in sinclair, the accused also appeared to misunderstand what his s 10(b) rights involved, stating during the interview that he had nothing to say “until my lawyer’s around and he tells me what’s going on” (sinclair, at para. 8 (emphasis added)). the police explained to him that he had the right to consult a lawyer, but not to have a lawyer present during questioning mr. sinclair then confessed a majority of this court found no infringement of mr. sinclair’s s 10(b) rights. [185] contrary to the majority’s holdings, there is no basis to conclude that the choice faced by mr. lafrance was significantly altered so as to require further advice in order to fulfill the purpose of his s 10(b) rights. [186] while mr. lafrance is indigenous, nothing on these facts suggests that these circumstances alone bring the case into the third sinclair category. [187] while purporting to follow sinclair, the majority unduly expands its reach so as to undermine fundamentally the framework for analysis set out in that case. without saying so directly, the majority’s logic seems to be that a detainee is entitled to further consultation with counsel, upon request, or upon a mere confusion about his or her rights. this court has never interpreted s 10(b) in that manner. the detainee has a right to make a decision to cooperate with the investigation or to decline to do so in a free and informed manner. however, the state is entitled to rely on legitimate means of interrogation to investigate crimes (sinclair, at para. 25). there was no breach of mr. lafrance’s s 10(b) rights on april 7, 2015. c whether or not mr. lafrance’s right to counsel was violated on march 19, 2015, such that his statements and other evidence obtained should be excluded under section 24(2) [188] as we explain above, we conclude that on march 19, 2015, mr. lafrance was not detained the trial judge’s conclusions on the issue of detention are owed deference and there is no basis to depart from them. however, even if it could be said that the trial judge erred, and that mr. lafrance was detained on march 19, 2015, without being afforded his right to counsel, we conclude that the evidence was not sufficiently connected to that charter breach. there is therefore no basis on which to exclude such evidence under s 24(2). [189] under s 24(2) of the charter, a court may exclude evidence obtained “in a manner” that violates charter rights if its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. “whether evidence was ‘obtained in a manner’ that infringed an accused’s rights under the charter depends on the nature of the connection between the charter violation and the evidence that was ultimately obtained” (r v. mack, 2014 scc 58, [2014] 3 scr 3, at para. 38; r v. tim, 2022 scc 12, at para. 78). [190] in r v. wittwer, 2008 scc 33, [2008] 2 scr 235, at para. 21, this court found that “[t]he required connection between the breach and [the evidence obtained] may be ‘temporal, contextual, causal or a combination of the three’: r v. plaha (2004), 189 oac 376, at para. 45. a connection that is merely ‘remote’ or ‘tenuous’ will not suffice.” the requisite connection must be shown before a court considers whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute (grant, at para. 131). the burden of proving that a remedy should be granted under s 24(2) is on the party who seeks the remedy, here mr. lafrance (r v. collins, [1987] 1 scr 265, at p 280). [191] during the march 19, 2015 interview, mr. lafrance provided police with general information, a blood sample, fingerprints, cellphone and some of his clothing. the crown did not seek to introduce any of this evidence, nor mr. lafrance’s march 19, 2015 police statement, at trial there is therefore no need to consider whether this evidence should be excluded. [192] as to the april 7, 2015 statement, the trial judge found it was not sufficiently connected to the march 19, 2015 statement. the majority of the court of appeal disagreed, holding that some information obtained as a result of the march 19, 2015 interview formed the basis of questions in the april 7, 2015 interview. in our view, the majority of the court of appeal should not have substituted its view for the view of the trial judge. the trial judge found that the march 19, 2015 statement did not substantially contribute to the april 7, 2015 statement he based this on mr. lafrance’s testimony that the first statement “had nothing to do with” the second. there is no proper or principled basis to interfere with the trial judge’s findings in this regard. [193] mr. lafrance has not shown that any evidence presented at trial has the requisite link with the alleged march 19, 2015 detention and any resulting breach of the right to counsel. iv conclusion [194] for the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that there was no basis upon which the court of appeal, nor the majority in this court, should interfere with the ruling of the trial judge. the appeal should be allowed and mr. lafrance’s conviction for second degree murder restored. appeal dismissed, wagner c.j and moldaver, côté and rowe jj. dissenting. solicitor for the appellant: justice and solicitor general, appeals, education & prosecution policy branch, edmonton. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the canadian civil liberties association: addario law group, toronto. barristers, toronto.
[1] in today’s information age, canadian life is increasingly playing out in the digital realm. the internet, social media, and sophisticated mobile de- vices — now fixtures in our everyday lives — have transformed the way in which we live, work, and interact with one another. this opens up a world of new opportunities and allows us to connect instantly with friends and family across the world, whenever and wherever we want, and at relatively little cost. [1] en cette ère de l’information, la vie des cana- diens se déroule de plus en plus dans l’univers nu- mérique. internet, les médias sociaux et les appareils mobiles perfectionnés — qui font désormais partie de notre quotidien — ont transformé la façon dont nous vivons, travaillons et interagissons les uns avec les autres. cette technologie ouvre tout un monde de possibilités et nous permet de nous connecter instan- tanément avec des amis et des membres de la famille partout dans le monde, n’importe quand et n’importe où, à un coût relativement peu élevé. 16 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. [2] but the internet revolution — and the internet itself — has a darker side. increasingly, sexual pred- ators are using electronic means to prey upon one of the most vulnerable groups within canadian society: our children. access to the internet among canadian children is now almost universal, and many are con- tinuously connected, whether through a computer, a smartphone, or another device. this has led to the new and distressing phenomenon of predators lurking in cyberspace, cloaked in anonymity, using online communications as a tool for meeting and grooming children with a view to sexually exploiting them. [3] in response, parliament has enacted provisions in the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“code”), aimed at prohibiting child luring through telecom- munications and ensuring that those who breach this prohibition receive a punishment that reflects the gravity and seriousness of the offence and the high degree of moral blameworthiness associated with it. these provisions were the subject of this court’s decisions in r v legare, 2009 scc 56, [2009] 3 scr 551, and r v. levigne, 2010 scc 25, [2010] 2 scr 3, although in neither case was their constitutionality in issue. here, however, the ques- tion on appeal is whether these provisions infringe the accused’s rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (“charter”). [2] cependant, la révolution internet — et internet lui- même — a également un côté sombre. les pré- dateurs sexuels se servent de plus en plus de moyens électroniques pour s’en prendre à l’un des groupes les plus vulnérables de la société canadienne : nos enfants. de nos jours, les enfants canadiens ont prati- quement tous accès à internet, et bon nombre d’entre eux sont connectés en permanence, que ce soit au moyen d’un ordinateur, d’un téléphone intelligent ou d’un autre appareil. cette révolution numérique a mené à un nouveau phénomène inquiétant, où des prédateurs qui rôdent dans le cyberespace, sous le couvert de l’anonymat, utilisent les communications en ligne pour rencontrer et manipuler des enfants afin de les exploiter sexuellement. [3] pour contrer ce phénomène, le législateur a édicté des dispositions dans le code criminel, lrc. 1985, c. c-46 (« code »), visant à interdire le leurre au moyen de télécommunications et à s’assurer que les personnes qui contreviennent à cette interdic- tion reçoivent une peine qui reflète la gravité et le sérieux de l’infraction, ainsi que le niveau élevé de culpabilité morale qui y est associé. la cour s’est penchée sur ces dispositions dans les arrêts r c. legare, 2009 csc 56, [2009] 3 rcs 551, et r. c. levigne, 2010 csc 25, [2010] 2 rcs 3, bien que leur constitutionnalité n’y ait pas été contestée. en l’espèce, toutefois, la cour doit juger si ces dis- positions portent atteinte aux droits garantis à l’ac- cusé par la charte canadienne des droits et libertés (« charte »). [4] the respondent, douglas morrison, posted an advertisement in the “casual encounters” section of craigslist, with the title “daddy looking for his little girl – m4w – 45 (brampton)”. a police officer, pos- ing as a 14- year-old girl named “mia”, responded to the ad. in conversations taking place over the span of more than two months, mr. morrison invited “mia” to touch herself sexually and proposed that they meet to engage in sexual activity. these communications led to mr. morrison being charged with child luring under s 1721(1)(b) of the code. that provision prohibits communicating, by means of telecommu- nication, with a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 16 for the purpose of facilitating the commission of certain designated [4] l’intimé, douglas morrison, a publié une an- nonce sur craigslist, dans la section [traduction] « brèves rencontres », portant le titre « papa re- cherche sa petite fille — h ch f — 45 (brampton) ». une policière, se faisant passer pour une fille de 14 ans dénommée « mia », a répondu à l’annonce. lors de conversations qui ont eu lieu sur une période de plus de deux mois, m. morrison a invité « mia » à se toucher de manière sexuelle et lui a proposé qu’ils se rencontrent pour se livrer à des activités sexuelles. ces communications ont conduit à des accusations de leurre portées contre m. morrison au titre de l’al 1721(1)b) du code. cette disposition interdit à quiconque de communiquer, par un moyen de télécommunication, avec une personne âgée de [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 17 offences against that person — here, the offence of invitation to sexual touching directed at a person under the age of 16 contrary to s. 152 of the code. [5] at trial, mr. morrison challenged the consti- tutionality of three subsections of the child luring provisions: s 1721(2)(a), (3), and (4). his position on each is set out below in capsule form. moins de 16 ans ou qu’il croit telle, en vue de faciliter la perpétration à son égard de certaines infractions énumérées — en l’espèce, l’infraction d’incitation à des contacts sexuels visant un enfant âgé de moins de 16 ans en contravention de l’art. 152 du code. [5] au procès, m. morrison a contesté la constitu- tionnalité de trois dispositions de l’article portant sur le leurre : l’al 1721(2)a) et les par 1721(3) et (4). sa position sur chacune des dispositions est énoncée brièvement dans les paragraphes qui suivent. [6] first, s 1721(3) provides that if the person with whom the accused was communicating (hereinafter referred to as “the other person”) was represented to the accused as being underage, then the accused is presumed to have believed that representation, absent evidence to the contrary. mr. morrison argued that this subsection violated his right to be presumed innocent under s. 11(d) of the charter. [6] premièrement, le par 1721(3) prévoit que si la personne avec qui l’accusé communiquait (ci- après, « l’autre personne ») a été présentée à l’accusé comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé, ce dernier est présumé l’avoir crue telle, sauf preuve contraire. monsieur morrison a fait valoir que cette disposition violait son droit à la présomption d’innocence garanti par l’al. 11d) de la charte. [7] second, s 1721(4) bars an accused from rais- ing, as a defence, that he or she believed the other person was of legal age, unless the accused took rea- sonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age. at trial, mr. morrison asserted that s 1721(4) violated ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. before the court of appeal and this court, he argued that s 1721(4) was unconstitutional because it allows for a conviction on the basis of objective fault, notwithstanding the high stigma and severe punishment attached to a convic- tion for child luring, thereby violating the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the charter. [7] deuxièmement, le par 1721(4) interdit à l’ac- cusé d’invoquer en défense qu’il croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal, à moins d’avoir pris des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne. au procès, m. morrison a affirmé que le par 1721(4) violait l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte. devant la cour d’appel et la présente cour, il a fait valoir que le par 1721(4) était inconstitution- nel parce qu’il permettait de déclarer l’accusé cou- pable sur le fondement d’une faute objective, sans égard à la forte stigmatisation et à la peine sévère associées à une déclaration de culpabilité pour leurre, violant ainsi les principes de justice fondamentale consacrés par l’art. 7 de la charte. [8] third, s 1721(2)(a) prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence of one year’s imprisonment if the crown proceeds by way of indictment — the election made by the crown in mr. morrison’s case. mr. morrison argued that this mandatory minimum violated his right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the charter. [8] troisièmement, l’al 1721(2)a) fixe une peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire d’un an si la couronne procède par mise en accusation, ce qu’elle a choisi de faire dans le cas de m morrison. ce der- nier a soutenu que cette peine minimale obligatoire violait son droit à la protection contre toutes peines cruelles et inusitées garanti par l’art. 12 de la charte. [9] the trial judge agreed with mr. morrison that the presumption under s 1721(3) violated his right to be presumed innocent under s. 11(d) of the charter. he disagreed, however, that the reasonable steps [9] le juge du procès était d’accord avec m. mor- rison pour dire que la présomption établie au par 1721(3) violait son droit à la présomption d’in- nocence garanti par l’al. 11d) de la charte. toutefois, 18 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. requirement under s 1721(4) was constitutionally invalid. despite being left with a reasonable doubt as to whether mr. morrison believed “mia” was un- der the age of 16, the trial judge held that subs. (4) provided an independent pathway to conviction and convicted mr. morrison on the basis that he had not taken reasonable steps to ascertain “mia’s” age. at sentencing, the trial judge concluded that the man- datory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) was grossly disproportionate when applied to mr. morrison and therefore violated s. 12 of the charter. in the result, he sentenced mr. morrison to four months’ imprison- ment and probation for a year. on appeal, the ontario court of appeal upheld mr. morrison’s conviction and sentence and each of the trial judge’s conclusions on the three constitutional questions outlined above. [10] before this court, the crown appeals from the decision of the court of appeal, submitting that the court erred in holding that the presumption un- der s 1721(3) violates s. 11(d) of the charter and that the mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) infringes s. 12 of the charter. mr. morrison cross- appeals, asserting that the court of appeal erred in finding that the reasonable steps requirement under s 1721(4) does not infringe s. 7 of the charter. [11] for the reasons that follow, i would dismiss the crown’s appeal on the s.  172.1(3) issue and mr. morrison’s cross- appeal on the s 1721(4) is- sue. in my view, the presumption under subs. (3) infringes s. 11(d) of the charter and cannot be saved under s 1. further, i agree with the courts below that subs. (4) does not violate s. 7 of the charter. il n’était pas d’avis que l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) était in- constitutionnelle. bien que la question de savoir si m. morrison croyait que « mia » était âgée de moins de 16 ans ait soulevé un doute raisonnable dans son esprit, le juge du procès a conclu que le par. (4) ou- vrait à lui seul la voie à une déclaration de culpa- bilité et a déclaré m. morrison coupable, au motif qu’il n’avait pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de « mia ». lors de la détermina- tion de la peine, le juge du procès a conclu que la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) était exagérément disproportionnée dans le cas de m. morrison et violait ainsi l’art. 12 de la charte. par conséquent, il a condamné m. morrison à une peine d’emprisonnement de quatre mois et à une proba- tion d’un an. en appel, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a confirmé la déclaration de culpabilité et la peine de m. morrison, ainsi que chacune des conclusions du juge du procès sur les trois questions constitution- nelles décrites précédemment. [10] la couronne se pourvoit devant la cour con- tre l’arrêt de la cour d’appel, affirmant que celle-ci a commis une erreur en concluant que la présomp- tion établie au par 1721(3) viole l’al. 11d) de la charte et que la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) contrevient à l’art. 12 de la charte. monsieur morrison interjette un pourvoi incident, dans lequel il fait valoir que la cour d’appel a commis une erreur en concluant que l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) ne contrevient pas à l’art. 7 de la charte. [11] pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi de la couronne sur la question du par 1721(3) et le pourvoi incident de m. morrison sur la question du par 1721(4). à mon sens, la pré- somption établie au par. (3) contrevient à l’al. 11d) de la charte et ne saurait être justifiée au regard de l’article premier. en outre, je conviens avec les cours de juridictions inférieures que le par. (4) ne viole pas l’art. 7 de la charte. [12] however, unlike the courts below, i do not read the reasonable steps requirement under subs. (4), in the absence of the presumption under subs. (3), as providing an independent pathway to conviction. [12] toutefois, contrairement aux cours de juridic- tions inférieures, je ne crois pas que l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par. (4), en l’absence de la présomption établie au par. (3), [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 19 instead, it simply bars accused persons from raising, as a defence, that they believed the other person was of legal age when they did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age. [13] consequently, in order to convict mr. morri- son, the crown would have had to satisfy the trial judge beyond a reasonable doubt that mr. morrison believed “mia” was under the age of 16. but because the trial judge was left with a reasonable doubt in this regard, mr. morrison’s conviction cannot stand. ouvre à elle seule la voie à une déclaration de culpa- bilité. en fait, elle interdit simplement à l’accusé d’invoquer en défense qu’il croyait que l’autre per- sonne avait atteint l’âge légal dans le cas où il n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de son âge. [13] par conséquent, pour que le juge du procès déclare m. morrison coupable, il aurait fallu que la couronne le convainque hors de tout doute raison- nable que m. morrison croyait que « mia » était âgée de moins de 16 ans. or, comme le juge du procès avait un doute raisonnable à cet égard, la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée contre m. morrison ne peut être maintenue. [14] as for the question of remedy, given that the trial judge entertained a reasonable doubt on the issue of mr. morrison’s belief, mr. morrison would ordinarily be entitled to an acquittal. but in this case, for reasons i will develop, i am of the view that fairness considerations militate in favour of a new trial — one conducted in accordance with the correct legal framework. [14] pour ce qui est de la réparation, comme le juge du procès avait un doute raisonnable sur la question de la croyance de m. morrison, ce dernier aurait normalement droit à un acquittement. toutefois, en l’espèce, pour les motifs que j’aborderai plus loin, je suis d’avis que des considérations d’équité militent en faveur d’un nouveau procès, qui devra se dérouler conformément au bon cadre juridique. [15] finally, the courts below proceeded on an incorrect understanding that s 1721 allows for a conviction based on a failure to take reasonable steps. the parties’ arguments before this court concern- ing the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum reflect the erroneous assumption flowing from this: namely, that mere negligence is sufficient to support a conviction (something that the trial judge gave ef- fect to in sentencing mr morrison). in light of this, i am of the view that it would be unwise to decide whether the one- year mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) runs afoul of s. 12 of the charter on this appeal. accordingly, i would set aside that as- pect of the court of appeal’s decision and remit the matter to the presiding judge at the new trial, should mr. morrison be convicted again. [15] enfin, les cours de juridictions inférieures sont parties du principe erroné que l’art 1721 permet de déclarer l’accusé coupable en raison du fait qu’il n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables. les arguments que les parties ont invoqués devant la cour concernant la constitutionnalité de la peine minimale obligatoire reflètent l’hypothèse erronée qui en découle, à savoir que la simple négligence suffit à étayer une déclara- tion de culpabilité (une hypothèse à laquelle le juge du procès a donné effet dans la détermination de la peine de m morrison). cela étant, je suis d’avis qu’il serait peu judicieux de décider, dans le présent pour- voi, si la peine minimale obligatoire d’un an prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) va à l’encontre de l’art. 12 de la charte. par conséquent, je laisserais de côté cet aspect de l’arrêt de la cour d’appel et renverrais l’affaire au juge présidant le nouveau procès, dans l’éventualité où m. morrison serait de nouveau déclaré coupable. ii statutory provisions ii les dispositions législatives [16] section 172.1 of the code contains four com- ponents, each housed in its own subsection. those [16] l’article 172.1 du code comporte quatre élé- ments, répartis chacun dans leur propre paragraphe. 20 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. components, and the corresponding subsections, are: (1) a prohibition against child luring; (2) the pun- ishments available on conviction; (3) a presumption regarding the accused’s belief in the other person’s age; and (4) a limitation on the defence that the ac- cused believed the other person was of legal age. ces éléments, et les paragraphes correspondants, sont les suivants : (1) l’interdiction de commettre un leurre; (2) les peines qui peuvent être infligées en cas de déclaration de culpabilité; (3) la présomption concernant la croyance de l’accusé relativement à l’âge de l’autre personne; (4) une restriction imposée au moyen de défense selon lequel l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal. luring a child leurre 172.1 (1) every person commits an offence who, by a means of telecommunication, communicates with 172.1 (1) commet une infraction quiconque communique par un moyen de télécommunication avec : (a) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 18 years, for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence with respect to that per- son under subsection 153(1), section 155, 163.1, 170, 171 or 279.011 or subsection 279.02(2), 279.03(2), 286.1(2), 286.2(2) or 286.3(2); a) une personne âgée de moins de dix- huit ans ou qu’il croit telle, en vue de faciliter la perpétration à son égard d’une infraction visée au paragraphe 153(1), aux articles 155, 163.1, 170, 171 ou 279.011 ou aux paragraphes 279.02(2), 279.03(2), 286.1(2), 286.2(2) ou 286.3(2); (b) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 16 years, for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under section 151 or 152, subsection 160(3) or 173(2) or section 271, 272, 273 or 280 with respect to that person; or b) une personne âgée de moins de seize ans ou qu’il croit telle, en vue de faciliter la perpétration à son égard d’une infraction visée aux articles 151 ou 152, aux paragraphes 160(3) ou 173(2) ou aux articles 271, 272, 273 ou 280; (c) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 14 years, for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under section 281 with respect to that person. c) une personne âgée de moins de quatorze ans ou qu’il croit telle, en vue de faciliter la perpétration à son égard d’une infraction visée à l’article 281. punishment peine (2) every person who commits an offence under sub- section (1) (2) quiconque commet l’infraction visée au paragra- phe (1) est coupable : (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or a) soit d’un acte criminel passible d’un emprisonne- ment maximal de quatorze ans, la peine minimale étant de un an; (b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months. b) soit d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de deux ans moins un jour, la peine minimale étant de six mois. presumption re age présomption (3) evidence that the person referred to in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) was represented to the accused as being under (3) la preuve que la personne visée aux alinéas (1)a), b) ou c) a été présentée à l’accusé comme ayant moins de [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 21 the age of eighteen years, sixteen years or fourteen years, as the case may be, is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that the accused believed that the person was under that age. dix- huit, seize ou quatorze ans, selon le cas, constitue, sauf preuve contraire, la preuve que l’accusé la croyait telle. no defence moyen de défense (4) it is not a defence to a charge under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) that the accused believed that the person referred to in that paragraph was at least eighteen years of age, sixteen years or fourteen years of age, as the case may be, unless the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person. (4) le fait pour l’accusé de croire que la personne vi- sée aux alinéas (1)a), b) ou c) était âgée d’au moins dix- huit, seize ou quatorze ans, selon le cas, ne constitue un moyen de défense contre une accusation fondée sur le paragraphe (1) que s’il a pris des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de la personne. iii facts iii les faits [17] in early 2013, mr. morrison placed the fol- lowing ad on the “casual encounters” section of craigslist: [17] au début 2013, m. morrison a publié l’an- nonce suivante sur craigslist, dans la section [tra- duction] « brèves rencontres » : [traduction] daddy looking for his little girl – m4w – 45 (brampton) papa recherche sa petite fille – h ch f – 45 (brampton) daddy looking for his little girl to meet and have some fun with him during the day next week on tue. and wed of this week have the place all to ourselfs too, in the brampton and knightsbridge area. papa recherche sa petite fille pour une rencontre et pour avoir du plaisir avec lui durant le jour, mardi de la se- maine prochaine et mercredi de cette semaine. on aurait la place à nous tout seuls, dans la région de brampton et knightsbridge. (2015 oncj 599, at para. 21 (canlii)) (2015 oncj 599, par. 21 (canlii)) [18] police constable hilary hutchinson responded to the ad, posing as a 14- year-old girl named “mia”. from february 5, 2013 until may 21, 2013, mr. mor- rison and “mia” exchanged messages, as summarized below. [18] l’agente de police hilary hutchinson a ré- pondu à l’annonce, se faisant passer pour une fille de 14 ans dénommée « mia ». entre le 5 février 2013 et le 21 mai 2013, m. morrison et « mia » ont échangé des messages, qui sont résumés ci- dessous. [19] in her initial e-mail response to mr.  mor- rison’s ad, “mia” said she was 14 years old. the conversation soon became sexual in nature, with mr. morrison asking “mia” what sexual acts she had performed and inviting her to touch herself sexu- ally. the sexualized conversation continued over the following months. at various points, mr. morrison suggested to “mia” that she watch pornography and continued to invite her to touch herself sexually. mr. morrison also suggested that “mia” should skip school and meet him in brampton, where he would [19] dans son courriel initial en réponse à l’an- nonce de m. morrison, « mia » a dit qu’elle avait 14 ans. la conversation a rapidement pris une tour- nure sexuelle, m. morrison demandant à « mia » de lui dire quels actes sexuels elle avait déjà accom- plis et l’invitant à se toucher de manière sexuelle. la conversation à caractère sexuel a continué au cours des mois suivants. à différentes occasions, m. morrison a suggéré à « mia » de regarder de la pornographie et a continué de l’inviter à se toucher de manière sexuelle. monsieur morrison a également 22 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. pick her up so they could engage in sexual activity. this meeting did not occur. [20] during these conversations, “mia” repeatedly mentioned that she was 14 years old. she used lan- guage consistent with her represented age, including common abbreviations and certain misspellings. she also referred to her classes at school, her mom and grandma, and her recreational activities — playing sports, hanging out with her friends, and listening to music. her messages were sent before and after school hours on weekdays. [21] on more than one occasion, mr. morrison asked “mia” to send him a photo, but she never did. he also asked for her phone number, which she provided. after a missed call on april 26, 2013, mr. morrison ceased contact with “mia”. on may 10, 2013, “mia” texted mr. morrison, “r u mad at me?”: 2015 oncj 599, at para 21. almost two weeks later, he replied, “who are you?”: para 21. [22] mr. morrison was arrested on may 23, 2013 and charged with child luring under s 1721(1)(b) of the code — the relevant secondary offence being invitation to sexual touching directed at a person under the age of 16 contrary to s. 152 of the code. suggéré à « mia » de faire l’école buissonnière et de le rencontrer à brampton, où il viendrait la chercher afin qu’ils puissent se livrer à des activités sexuelles. cette rencontre n’a jamais eu lieu. [20] durant ces conversations, « mia » a mentionné à plusieurs reprises qu’elle avait 14 ans. elle utilisait un langage qui correspondait à celui des jeunes de cet âge, notamment en utilisant des abréviations commu- nes et en faisant certaines fautes d’orthographe. elle faisait également référence à ses cours à l’école, à sa mère et à sa grand- mère, ainsi qu’à ses loisirs — faire du sport, fréquenter ses amis et écouter de la musique. ses messages étaient envoyés les jours de semaine, avant et après les heures de classe. [21] monsieur morrison a plus d’une fois demandé à « mia » de lui envoyer une photo, mais elle ne l’a jamais fait. il lui a également demandé son numéro de téléphone, qu’elle lui a donné. après un appel manqué le 26 avril 2013, m. morrison a cessé tout contact avec « mia ». le 10 mai 2013, « mia » a envoyé à m. morrison le message texte suivant : [traduction] « tes fâché contre moi? » : 2015 oncj 599, par 21. près de deux semaines plus tard, il a répondu : « qui es-tu? » : par 21. [22] monsieur morrison a été arrêté le 23 mai 2013 et accusé de leurre au titre de l’al 1721(1)b) du code — l’infraction sous- jacente en l’espèce étant l’incitation à des contacts sexuels visant une per- sonne âgée de moins de 16 ans en contravention de l’art. 152 du code. [23] at the time of arrest, constable hutchinson informed mr. morrison that a complaint had been received from the guardian of a 14- year-old child. in response, mr. morrison stated: “i was only talking to one girl” (2015 oncj 599, at para. 17 (emphasis de- leted)). when he was later interviewed by constable hutchinson and told that the police had received a complaint that he was speaking to a 14- year-old girl for a sexual purpose on the internet, he responded: “so that means you can’t talk to anybody then? ok” (para 21). when constable hutchinson told him that talking to people under a certain age about sexual acts is prohibited, mr. morrison replied: “i don’t know whether she was or not so” (para 21). [23] au moment de l’arrestation, l’agente hutchin- son a informé m. morrison qu’une plainte avait été reçue de la part du tuteur d’une enfant de 14 ans. en réponse, m. morrison a affirmé ce qui suit : [tra- duction] « je parlais juste à une fille » (2015 oncj 599, par. 17 (italique omis)). plus tard, lorsqu’il a été interrogé par l’agente hutchinson et informé que quelqu’un s’était plaint à la police du fait qu’il discutait en ligne avec une fille de 14  ans à des fins sexuelles, il a répondu ce qui suit : « alors, ça veut dire qu’on ne peut plus parler à personne? d’accord » (par 21). lorsque l’agente hutchinson lui a dit qu’il est interdit de parler à des personnes âgées de moins d’un certain âge à propos d’actes [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 23 mr.  morrison also stated that he was unsure of “mia’s” age and that, on the internet, “you don’t really know” whether you are speaking to a child or an adult: 2017 onca 582, 350 ccc (3d) 161, at para 20. [24] at his trial, mr. morrison testified that he be- lieved he was communicating with an adult female engaged in role- play who was determined to stay in character. he also emphasized that the section of craigslist in which he posted his ad requires users to confirm they are at least 18 years of age. on cross- examination, however, he admitted that this require- ment is effectively useless because persons under 18 can get around it simply by clicking a button. he also admitted that he asked “mia” for a photo to assess her level of attractiveness, not to determine her age. sexuels, m. morrison a répondu : « je ne sais pas si elle avait l’âge ou pas » (par 21). monsieur morrison a également déclaré qu’il n’était pas certain de l’âge de « mia » et que, sur internet, [traduction] « on ne sait pas vraiment » si la personne à qui on parle est un enfant ou un adulte : 2017 onca 582, 350 ccc (3d) 161, par 20. [24] à son procès, m. morrison a déclaré qu’il croyait communiquer avec une femme adulte qui s’adonnait à un jeu de rôle et qui était déterminée à rester dans son personnage. il a également sou- ligné que la section de craigslist dans laquelle il avait publié son annonce exige que les utilisateurs confirment qu’ils sont âgés d’au moins 18 ans. en contre- interrogatoire, toutefois, il a avoué que cette exigence était inutile, parce que les personnes ayant moins de 18 ans pouvaient la contourner simplement en cliquant sur un bouton. il a également reconnu qu’il avait demandé à « mia » de lui donner une photo pour apprécier sa beauté et non pour déter- miner son âge. iv decisions below iv les décisions des juridictions inférieures a ontario court of justice (gage j.) a la cour de justice de l’ontario (le juge gage) (1) reasons for charter ruling (2014 oncj (1) les motifs du jugement sur la charte (2014 673) oncj 673) [25] mr. morrison brought an application chal- lenging the constitutional validity of the combined operation of s 1721(3) and (4) of the code under ss. 11(d) and 7 of the charter. [25] monsieur morrison a déposé une demande dans laquelle il contestait la constitutionnalité de l’effet combiné des par 1721(3) et (4) du code, sur le fondement de l’al. 11d) et de l’art. 7 de la charte. [26] the trial judge, gage j., accepted mr. mor- rison’s submission that the presumption under s 1721(3) violated the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the charter. in his view, a statu- tory presumption establishing an essential element of the offence will be unconstitutional “unless there exists an inexorable connection between the fact that engages the presumption (here, a representation as to age) and the existence of the essential ele- ment (the accused’s belief as to the [other person]’s age)”: para. 25 (canlii). applying this principle, he found no such inexorable connection between the [26] le juge du procès, le juge gage, a convenu avec m.  morrison que la présomption établie au par.  172.1(3) violait la présomption d’innocence garantie par l’al. 11d) de la charte. à son avis, une présomption législative établissant un élément essen- tiel de l’infraction sera inconstitutionnelle [traduc- tion] « à moins qu’il existe un lien inexorable entre le fait qui entraîne l’application de la présomption (en l’espèce, la présentation d’une personne comme ayant un certain âge) et l’existence de l’élément essentiel (la croyance de l’accusé quant à l’âge de [l’autre personne]) » : par. 25 (canlii). appliquant 24 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. representation and the accused’s belief: para 26. the crown made no attempt to justify the s. 11(d) infringement. accordingly, the trial judge held s 1721(3) to be of no force and effect in the case before him. [27] on the other hand, the trial judge held that the reasonable steps requirement under s 1721(4) complied with the charter. he concluded that the effect of subs. (4) was merely to impose a tactical burden on the accused; it did not reverse the burden of proof or criminalize innocent behaviour. he there- fore found s 1721(4) to be constitutionally valid. ce principe, il a conclu qu’il n’existait aucun lien inexorable de la sorte entre le fait que la personne ait été présentée comme ayant un certain âge et la croyance de l’accusé  : par.  26. la couronne n’a pas tenté de justifier la contravention à l’al 11d). par conséquent, le juge du procès a conclu que le par 1721(3) était inopérant dans l’affaire dont il était saisi. [27] en revanche, le juge du procès a conclu que l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) était conforme à la charte. il a conclu que le par. (4) visait simplement à imposer un fardeau tactique à l’accusé; il n’avait pas pour effet de renverser le fardeau de la preuve ni de criminaliser un comportement innocent. il a donc conclu que le par 1721(4) était constitutionnel. (2) reasons for conviction (2015 oncj 599) (2) les motifs de la déclaration de culpabilité [28] the trial judge then turned to whether mr. morrison could be convicted under s 1721(1)(b) in the absence of the presumption under s 1721(3). he took the view that s 1721(1)(b) contemplated two independent pathways to conviction: the crown had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused either (1) believed the other person was under the age of 16 or (2) failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age. (2015 oncj 599) [28] le juge du procès s’est ensuite penché sur la question de savoir si m. morrison pouvait être déclaré coupable de l’infraction visée à l’al 1721(1)b) en l’absence de la présomption établie au par 1721(3). il était d’avis que, suivant l’al 1721(1)b), deux voies distinctes pouvaient conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité : la couronne devait établir hors de tout doute raisonnable (1) que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne était âgée de moins de 16 ans ou (2) qu’il n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne. [29] beginning with the first potential pathway to conviction, the trial judge stated that he was “satis- fied beyond a reasonable doubt that [mr. morrison] was at least indifferent to the age of the person he was communicating with”: para 26. he clarified that by “indifferent” he meant “simply not turning his mind to the question in any meaningful way”: para 27. he added, however, that indifference is “not the equivalent of belief”, and he clarified that he did not find mr. morrison to have been wilfully blind: paras 26-27. rather, he considered mr. morrison’s state of mind to be “closer to negligence rather than the sort of advertence necessary to sustain a find- ing of an actual belief [o]n his part that mia was underage”: para 27. in his view, mr. morrison’s [29] examinant d’abord la première voie pou- vant conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité, le juge du procès a affirmé qu’il était [traduction] « convaincu hors de tout doute raisonnable que, à tout le moins, [m. morrison] avait fait preuve d’in- différence à l’égard de l’âge de la personne avec qui il communiquait » : par 26. il a précisé que, par « indifférent », il voulait dire que m. morrison « ne s’était tout simplement jamais penché sur la question avec sérieux » : par 27. il a toutefois ajouté que l’in- différence n’était « pas l’équivalent d’une croyance » et a précisé que, selon lui, m. morrison n’avait pas fait preuve d’aveuglement volontaire : par 26-27. il était plutôt d’avis que l’état d’esprit de m. morrison s’apparentait « davantage à de la négligence qu’au [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 25 evidence that he believed he was communicating with an adult woman was “sufficient, if barely so, to inspire a reasonable doubt concerning his sub- jective belief regarding the age of the person with whom he was communicating”: para 28. he reached this conclusion despite his earlier observation that “[mr.] morrison’s stated assumption that he was dealing with an adult determined to remain in char- acter is an assumption without any supporting foun- dation”: para 23. [30] turning to the second potential pathway to conviction, the trial judge concluded that mr. mor- rison had failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain “mia’s” age, which in his view was sufficient to enter a conviction. he found that none of the steps mr. morrison pointed to as constituting reasonable steps — including posting the ad in an adult- only section of craigslist, using a specific term of art al- legedly relating to a known and popular form of adult role- play (daddy/little girl), asking “mia” for her age and photos, and the nature of the initial exchange of e-mails being such that only adult persons interested in role- play would continue the dialogue — quali- fied as reasonable steps. on that basis, he entered a guilty verdict. genre de connaissance nécessaire pour conclure qu’il croyait réellement que mia n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé » : par 27. de l’avis du juge du procès, le témoi- gnage de m. morrison selon lequel il croyait qu’il communiquait avec une femme adulte « suffisait, quoiqu’à peine, pour susciter un doute raisonnable concernant sa croyance subjective quant à l’âge de la personne avec qui il communiquait » : par 28. le juge du procès est parvenu à cette conclusion, bien qu’il ait précédemment fait remarquer que « l’hy- pothèse formulée par [m.] morrison selon laquelle il avait affaire à une adulte déterminée à demeurer dans son personnage n’[était] aucunement fondée » : par 23. [30] se penchant ensuite sur la deuxième voie pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité, le juge du procès a conclu que m. morrison n’avait pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de « mia », ce qui était suffisant, à son avis, pour conclure à sa culpabilité. il a conclu qu’au- cune des mesures que m. morrison avait invoquées comme mesures raisonnables — notamment publier l’annonce dans une section de craigslist réservée aux adultes, utiliser une terminologie consacrée préten- dument liée à une forme connue et populaire de jeu de rôle entre adultes (papa/petite fille), demander à « mia » de lui dire son âge et de lui montrer des pho- tos, et le fait que la nature des courriels initiaux était telle que seuls des adultes intéressés dans les jeux de rôle continueraient la conversation — ne constituait une mesure raisonnable. pour cette raison, il a inscrit un verdict de culpabilité. (3) reasons for charter ruling and sentence (2015 oncj 598, 341 crr (2d) 25) (3) les motifs de la décision fondée sur la charte et peine (2015 oncj 598, 341 crr (2d) 25) [31] following his conviction, mr. morrison re- newed his attack on the constitutionality of the rea- sonable steps requirement under s 1721(4) and, in addition, challenged the mandatory minimum of one year’s imprisonment under s 1721(2)(a) as infring- ing s. 12 of the charter. [31] après avoir été déclaré coupable, m. morrison a une fois de plus contesté la constitutionnalité de l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4). de plus, il a remis en cause la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire d’un an prévue à l’al 1721(2)a), au motif qu’elle contrevenait à l’art. 12 de la charte. [32] the trial judge again dismissed the charter challenge to the reasonable steps requirement. how- ever, he concluded that the mandatory minimum [32] là encore, le juge du procès a rejeté la con- testation, fondée sur la charte, de l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables. toutefois, il a 26 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. under s 1721(2)(a) violated s. 12 of the charter. in his view, a four- month sentence followed by a year of probation was a fit sentence in mr. morri- son’s case, having regard to the circumstances of the offence, including the fact that mr. morrison was merely indifferent or negligent as to “mia’s” age, and mr. morrison’s personal situation. in light of this determination, he held that a sentence of one year would be grossly disproportionate and that the mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) was of no force or effect in the case before him. conclu que la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) violait l’art. 12 de la charte. selon lui, une peine de quatre mois suivie d’une probation d’un an était adaptée au cas de m. morrison, compte tenu des circonstances de l’infraction, notamment du fait que m. morrison avait simplement fait preuve d’indifférence ou de négligence à l’égard de l’âge de « mia », ainsi que de sa propre situation. à la lumière de cette conclusion, il a statué qu’une peine d’emprisonnement d’un an serait exagérément dis- proportionnée et que la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) était inopérante dans l’af- faire dont il était saisi. b court of appeal for ontario (watt, van rensburg and pardu jja) (2017 onca 582, 350 ccc. (3d) 161) b la cour d’appel de l’ontario (les juges watt, van rensburg et pardu) (2017 onca 582, 350 ccc (3d) 161) [33] justice pardu, writing for a unanimous panel of the ontario court of appeal, upheld the trial judge’s conclusions on all three constitutional issues. [34] first, the court of appeal agreed with the trial judge that s 1721(3) infringed s. 11(d) of the charter. it reasoned that, even absent evidence to the contrary, it “does not follow inexorably from proof that the [other person] represented that he or she is underage that the accused believed the rep- resentation”, emphasizing that representations on the internet are “notoriously unreliable” and deception is “rampant”: paras 59-60. further, the court of appeal concluded that this infringement could not be justified under s. 1 because it was neither min- imally impairing nor proportionate. thus, relying on s. 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982, it declared s 1721(3) to be of no force and effect. [33] la juge pardu, s’exprimant au nom d’une formation unanime de la cour d’appel de l’ontario, a confirmé les conclusions du juge du procès sur les trois questions constitutionnelles. [34] premièrement, la cour d’appel a convenu avec le juge du procès que le par 1721(3) contrevenait à l’al. 11d) de la charte. elle a expliqué que, même en l’absence d’une preuve contraire, [traduction] « la preuve que [l’autre personne] s’est présentée comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé ne veut pas inexorable- ment dire que l’accusé l’a crue telle », soulignant que les représentations projetées sur internet ne sont « manifestement pas fiables » et que la tromperie est « endémique » : par 59-60. en outre, la cour d’ap- pel a conclu que cette contravention ne saurait être justifiée au regard de l’article premier, parce qu’elle ne constituait pas une atteinte minimale et n’était pas proportionnée. par conséquent, se fondant sur le par. 52(1) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982, elle a déclaré le par 1721(3) inopérant. [35] second, the court of appeal agreed with the trial judge that s 1721(4) did not infringe s. 7 of the charter. in its view, “if the crown fails to prove that the accused believed that the other person was underage, the crown will still obtain a conviction if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age”: para 79. the court acknowledged that [35] deuxièmement, la cour d’appel a convenu avec le juge du procès que le par 1721(4) ne contre- venait pas à l’art. 7 de la charte. à son avis, [tra- duction] « si la couronne ne réussit pas à prouver que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé, elle obtiendra tout de même une déclaration de culpabilité si elle prouve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé n’a pas pris [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 27 the reasonable steps requirement added an “objective dimension” to the fault requirement for child luring: para 95. it reasoned, however, that although child luring was an offence that carried a high degree of stigma and a severe punishment, it was not one of those exceptional offences that requires a purely subjective standard of fault. for that reason, it found s 1721(4) to be constitutionally sound. [36] third, the court of appeal agreed with the trial judge that the mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) was grossly disproportionate when ap- plied to mr morrison. accordingly, relying on s. 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982, the court of appeal de- clared the mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) to be of no force and effect. [37] before this court, the crown appeals from the decision of the court of appeal, submitting that the court erred in holding that the presump- tion under s 1721(3) and the mandatory minimum under s.  172.1(2)(a) are constitutionally invalid. mr. morrison cross- appeals, challenging the court of appeal’s conclusion that the reasonable steps re- quirement under s 1721(4) is constitutionally valid. de mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne » : par 79. la cour d’appel a reconnu que l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables ajoutait une « dimension objective » à l’exigence en matière de faute applicable au leurre : par 95. toutefois, selon ses explications, même si le leurre était une infraction qui présentait un risque élevé de stigmatisation et qui emportait une peine sévère, il ne s’agissait pas d’une infraction excep- tionnelle exigeant une norme de faute purement sub- jective. pour ce motif, la cour d’appel a conclu que le par 1721(4) était constitutionnel. [36] troisièmement, la cour d’appel a convenu avec le juge du procès que la peine minimale obli- gatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) était exagérément disproportionnée dans le cas de m morrison. par conséquent, se fondant sur le par. 52(1) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982, la cour d’appel a déclaré inopérante la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a). [37] la couronne se pourvoit devant la cour contre l’arrêt de la cour d’appel, affirmant que celle-ci a commis une erreur en concluant que la présomption établie au par 1721(3) et la peine minimale obli- gatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) étaient inconstitu- tionnelles. monsieur morrison interjette un pourvoi incident, dans lequel il conteste la conclusion de la cour d’appel selon laquelle l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) est constitutionnelle. v issues v les questions en litige [38] the parties raise three main issues: [38] les parties soulèvent trois questions princi- pales : (1) does the presumption under s 1721(3) of the (1) la présomption établie au par 1721(3) du code code violate s. 11(d) of the charter? viole-t-elle l’al. 11d) de la charte? (2) does the reasonable steps requirement under s 1721(4) of the code violate s. 7 of the char- ter? (2) l’obligation de prendre des mesures raison- nables visée au par 1721(4) du code viole-t-elle l’art. 7 de la charte? (3) does the mandatory minimum sentence of one year’s imprisonment under s 1721(2)(a) of the code violate s. 12 of the charter? (3) la peine minimale obligatoire d’un an d’em- prisonnement prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) du code viole-t-elle l’art. 12 de la charte? 28 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. vi analysis vi analyse a the offence of child luring a l’infraction de leurre [39] before turning to the three issues raised on appeal, i find it useful to first describe the nature and purpose of the child luring offence. parliament created this offence to combat the very real threat posed by adult predators who attempt to groom or lure children by electronic means. as this court ex- plained in levigne, the offence seeks to protect chil- dren by “identify[ing] and apprehend[ing] predatory adults who, generally for illicit sexual purposes, troll the internet to attract and entice vulnerable children and adolescents”: para 24. [40] to achieve this purpose, s 1721 criminal- izes conduct that precedes the commission, or even the attempted commission, of certain designated offences, most of which involve sexual exploitation of children. it thereby creates an essentially inchoate offence — that is, a preparatory crime that captures conduct intended to culminate in the commission of a completed offence: see legare, at para. 25; r v. alicandro, 2009 onca 133, 95 or (3d) 173, at para. 20, citing a. ashworth, principles of criminal law (5th ed. 2006), at pp 468-70. there is no re- quirement that the accused meet or even intend to meet with the other person with a view to commit- ting any of the designated offences: see legare, at para 25. the offence reflects parliament’s desire to “close the cyberspace door before the predator gets in to prey”: para 25. [39] avant de me pencher sur les trois questions soulevées dans le présent pourvoi, j’estime utile de décrire en premier lieu la nature et l’objectif de l’infraction de leurre le législateur a créé cette infraction pour lutter contre la menace bien réelle que présentent les prédateurs adultes qui tentent de manipuler ou de leurrer des enfants par des moyens électroniques. comme la cour l’a expliqué dans l’arrêt levigne, l’infraction vise à protéger les enfants en «  démasqu[ant] et [en] arrêt[ant] les prédateurs adultes qui rôdent dans l’internet pour appâter des enfants et des adolescents vul- nérables, généralement à des fins sexuelles illi- cites » : par 24. [40] pour atteindre cet objectif, l’art 1721 cri- minalise les actes qui précèdent la perpétration, et même la tentative de perpétration, de certaines infractions énumérées, dont la plupart impliquent l’exploitation sexuelle d’enfants. cet article crée donc une infraction essentiellement inchoative — c’est-à-dire un crime préparatoire constitué d’actes visant à mener à la perpétration d’un crime complet : voir legare, par. 25; r c. alicandro, 2009 onca 133, 95 or (3d) 173, par. 20, citant a. ashworth, principles of criminal law (5e éd. 2006), p. 468- 470. il n’est pas nécessaire que l’accusé rencontre ou ait même l’intention de rencontrer l’autre personne en vue de perpétrer l’une des infractions énumérées : voir legare, par 25. l’infraction reflète l’objectif du législateur de « fermer la porte du cyberespace avant que le prédateur ne la franchisse pour traquer sa proie » : par 25. [41] this court considered the child luring of- fence most recently in levigne. there, the accused communicated by computer for a sexual purpose with an undercover officer posing as a 13- year-old boy and was subsequently charged with child luring under s 1721 of the code. at trial, he admitted that he had taken no steps to ascertain the other person’s age, despite repeated representations by the person that he was underage. the trial judge nevertheless entered an acquittal on the basis that he was left [41] la cour s’est penchée sur l’infraction de leurre plus récemment dans l’arrêt levigne. dans cette affaire, l’accusé a communiqué au moyen d’un ordinateur, dans un but sexuel, avec un agent d’infil- tration qui se faisait passer pour un garçon de 13 ans et a été subséquemment accusé de leurre au titre de l’art 1721 du code. au procès, il a reconnu n’avoir pris aucune mesure pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne, malgré le fait que celle-ci s’était présentée à maintes reprises comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 29 with a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused believed the other person was underage. [42] the question on appeal was whether the trial judge was bound by the combined effect of s 1721(3) and (4) to convict the accused notwithstanding his state of reasonable doubt as to whether the accused believed the other person was underage. the alberta court of appeal held that he was. this court did the same. fixé. le juge du procès a néanmoins acquitté l’ac- cusé, au motif que la question de savoir s’il croyait réellement que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé avait soulevé un doute raisonnable dans son esprit. [42] en appel, il fallait trancher la question de savoir si le juge du procès était tenu, en raison de l’effet combiné des par 1721(3) et (4), de déclarer l’accusé coupable, même s’il avait un doute raison- nable quant à savoir si l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. la cour d’ap- pel de l’alberta a conclu par l’affirmative, de même que la présente cour. [43] fish j., for a unanimous court, explained that the offence of child luring has three essential ele- ments: (1) an intentional communication by means of telecommunication;1 (2) with a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the requisite age; (3) for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a designated offence with respect to that person: para 23. [43] rédigeant l’arrêt unanime de la cour, le juge fish a expliqué que l’infraction de leurre comportait trois éléments essentiels : (1) une communication intentionnelle par un moyen de télécommunication1; (2) avec une personne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé ou que l’accusé croit telle; (3) dans le dessein de faciliter la perpétration à son égard d’une infraction énumérée : par 23. [44] he then turned to s 1721(3) and (4), which he characterized as “close companion[s]”: para 3. he noted that under subs. (3), where the person is represented to the accused as being underage, the accused is presumed to have believed that representa- tion, absent evidence to the contrary. the purpose of this provision, he stated, was to “facilitat[e] the prosecution of child luring offences while leaving intact the burden on the crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”: para 30. [44] le juge fish a ensuite examiné les par 1721(3) et (4), qu’il a qualifiés d’« accolé[s] » : par 3. il a fait remarquer que, aux termes du par. (3), lorsqu’une personne est présentée à l’accusé comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé, l’accusé est présumé l’avoir crue telle, sauf preuve contraire. il a déclaré que cette disposition avait pour but de « facilite[r] les pour- suites pour leurre, mais ne dispens[ait] aucunement le ministère public de prouver la culpabilité hors de tout doute raisonnable » : par 30. [45] under subs. (4), he observed, accused per- sons could not raise the defence that they believed the other person was of legal age unless they “took reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person”. he characterized the purpose of this provision as being “to foreclose exculpatory claims of ignorance or mistake that are entirely devoid of an objective evidentiary basis”: para 31. [45] le juge fish a fait observer que, aux termes du par. (4), l’accusé ne pouvait faire valoir pour sa défense qu’il croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal « que s’il a[vait] pris des mesures raison- nables pour s’assurer de l’âge de la personne ». selon lui, cette disposition vise à « faire obstacle aux alléga- tions disculpatoires d’ignorance ou d’erreur dénuées de tout fondement probatoire objectif » : par 31. 1 at the time levigne was decided, the provision referred to com- munications “by means of a computer system”. however, as noted above, the provision now refers to communications “by a means of telecommunication”. 1 au moment où l’arrêt levigne a été rendu, la disposition faisait référence à des communications « au moyen d’un ordinateur ». toutefois, comme nous l’avons indiqué précédemment, la dis- position fait désormais référence à des communications « par un moyen de télécommunication ». 30 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. [46] fish j. held, at para. 32, that the combined ef- fect of these two subsections “should be understood and applied” in the following manner: [46] le juge fish a décrit comme suit, au par. 32, le « résultat » que devrait avoir l’effet combiné de ces deux paragraphes : 1 where it has been represented to the accused that the person with whom he or she is communicating by com- puter (the “interlocutor”) is underage, the accused is pre- sumed to have believed that the interlocutor was in fact underage. 1 lorsque la personne avec laquelle l’accusé commu- nique au moyen d’un ordinateur (l’« interlocuteur ») lui a été présentée comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé, l’ac- cusé est présumé l’avoir cru telle. 2 this presumption is rebuttable: it will be displaced by evidence to the contrary, which must include evidence that the accused took steps to ascertain the real age of the interlocutor. objectively considered, the steps taken must be reasonable in the circumstances. 2 cette présomption est réfutable : elle sera écartée par une preuve contraire établissant notamment que l’accusé a pris des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge réel de l’interlocuteur. les mesures prises, considérées objec- tivement, doivent être raisonnables dans les circonstances. 3 the prosecution will fail where the accused took rea- sonable steps to ascertain the age of his or her interlocutor and believed that the interlocutor was not underage. in this regard, the evidential burden is on the accused but the persuasive burden is on the crown. 4 such evidence will at once constitute “evidence to the contrary” under s 1721(3) and satisfy the “reasonable steps” requirement of s 1721(4). 3 la poursuite échouera si l’accusé a pris des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de son interlocuteur et croyait que celui-ci avait atteint l’âge fixé. à cet égard, le fardeau de présentation de la preuve incombe à l’accusé, mais le fardeau de persuasion repose sur le ministère public. 4 ces éléments de preuve vont à la fois constituer une « preuve contraire » au sens du par 1721(3) et établir que les « mesures raisonnables » exigées au par 1721(4) ont été prises. 5 where the evidential burden of the accused has been discharged, he or she must be acquitted if the trier of fact is left with a reasonable doubt whether the accused in fact believed that his or her interlocutor was not underage. 5 lorsque l’accusé s’est déchargé de son fardeau, il doit être acquitté s’il subsiste un doute raisonnable dans l’esprit du juge des faits quant à savoir si l’accusé croyait en réalité que son interlocuteur avait atteint l’âge fixé. [47] in this passage, fish j. reads subss. (3) and (4) together. he interprets the former to prohibit an accused from rebutting the presumption of belief if the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascer- tain the other person’s age. in other words, fish j. reads the reasonable steps requirement in subs. (4) into subs. (3) so as to cohere with the intention of parliament as he understood it. [47] dans ce passage, le juge fish rapproche les par. (3) et (4). il interprète le premier comme interdi- sant à l’accusé de réfuter la présomption de croyance s’il n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour s’assu- rer de l’âge de l’autre personne. en d’autres termes, le juge fish interprète l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par. (4) dans le cadre du par. (3), de façon à ce qu’elle corresponde à l’in- tention du législateur telle qu’il l’a comprise. [48] from the foregoing — constitutional consid- erations aside — i understand the presumption under subs. (3) and the defence under subs. (4) to operate together as follows. where the other person is rep- resented to the accused as being underage, the pre- sumption that the accused believed the other person was underage applies. however, this presumption is [48] d’après ce qui précède — et abstraction faite des considérations constitutionnelles —, je com- prends que la présomption établie au par. (3) et le moyen de défense prévu au par. (4) s’appliquent conjointement de la manière suivante : lorsque l’autre personne est présentée à l’accusé comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé, la présomption que l’accusé croyait [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 31 rebuttable — it will be displaced by evidence to the contrary: para 32(2). evidence to the contrary must include evidence that the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age: para 32(2). by virtue of subs. (4), to raise this defence, the ac- cused bears an initial evidentiary burden of pointing to some evidence capable of showing that he or she took reasonable steps: para 32(3). the crown then bears the persuasive burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take such steps: para 32(3). if the accused fails to discharge his or her evidentiary burden under subs. (4) or if the crown proves that the accused failed to take reason- able steps, then the presumption under subs. (3) is not rebutted and the accused is conclusively deemed to have believed that the other person was underage: para. 32(2) and (3). in that scenario, the crown will have met its burden of proving the second element of the offence: that the accused believed the other person was underage. [49] therefore, under levigne, the combined effect of subss. (3) and (4) is to create two pathways to conviction where the other person is represented as being underage to the accused: the crown must prove that the accused either (1) believed the other person was underage or (2) failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age. in the context of child luring cases involving police sting opera- tions, such as in levigne, where it can be assumed that the undercover police officer posing as a child will represent that he or she is underage, these two pathways to conviction would have been available to the trier of fact. l’autre personne telle s’applique. toutefois, cette présomption est réfutable; elle sera écartée par une preuve contraire : par 32(2). la preuve contraire doit notamment établir que l’accusé a pris des me- sures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne : par 32(2). suivant le par. (4), pour in- voquer ce moyen de défense, l’accusé a d’abord le fardeau de présenter des éléments de preuve pouvant démontrer qu’il a pris des mesures raisonnables : par 32(3). la couronne doit ensuite s’acquitter du fardeau de persuasion consistant à prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé n’a pas pris de telles mesures : par 32(3). si l’accusé ne réussit pas à s’acquitter de son fardeau de présentation pour l’application du par. (4) ou si la couronne prouve que l’accusé n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables, la présomption établie au par. (3) n’est donc pas ré- futée et l’accusé est définitivement réputé avoir cru que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé : par. 32(2) et (3). dans ce cas, la couronne se sera acquittée de son fardeau consistant à prouver le deu- xième élément de l’infraction : que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. [49] par conséquent, suivant l’arrêt levigne, l’ap- plication combinée des par. (3) et (4) a pour effet de créer deux voies pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité lorsque l’autre personne est présentée à l’accusé comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé : la couronne doit prouver (1) que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé ou (2) qu’il n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne. dans les cas de leurre comportant des opérations d’infiltration, comme dans l’affaire levigne, lorsque l’on peut pré- sumer que l’agent d’infiltration se faisant passer pour un enfant se présentera comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé, le juge des faits pourrait emprunter ces deux voies pour conclure à la culpabilité de l’accusé. [50] importantly, however, the constitutionality of s 1721(3) and (4) was not in issue in levigne: see para 3. in the present appeal, the circumstances are different. this court is now asked to rule upon the constitutionality of s 1721(3) and (4), as well as the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a), for the first time. i will now consider those issues in turn, beginning with s 1721(3) and [50] toutefois, il est important de souligner que la constitutionnalité des par 1721(3) et (4) n’était pas contestée dans l’arrêt levigne : voir par 3. dans le présent pourvoi, les circonstances sont différentes. pour la première fois, la cour est aujourd’hui appelée à statuer sur la constitutionnalité des par 1721(3) et (4), de même que sur la constitutionnalité de la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a). 32 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. (4) and assessing how a finding of unconstitutionality in respect of either or both impacts on the analysis in levigne. je me pencherai sur ces questions à tour de rôle, en commençant par les par 1721(3) et (4) ainsi qu’en déterminant quelles répercussions une conclusion d’inconstitutionnalité à l’égard de l’un ou l’autre, ou des deux, peut avoir sur l’analyse effectuée dans l’arrêt levigne. b the presumption under section 172.1(3) b la présomption établie au par 1721(3) (1) does the presumption under section 172.1(3) violate section 11(d) of the charter? (1) la présomption établie au par.  172.1(3) viole-t-elle l’al. 11d) de la charte? [51] section 11(d) of the charter protects the ac- cused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. before an accused can be convicted of an offence, the trier of fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the essential elements of the offence have been proved: see r v. vaillancourt, [1987] 2 scr 636, at p 654. this is one of the principal safeguards for ensuring, so far as possible, that innocent persons are not convicted: see r v. lifchus, [1997] 3 scr 320, at para 13. the right to be presumed innocent is violated by any provision whose effect is to allow for a conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt: see vaillancourt, at pp. 654-56; r v. st- onge lamoureux, 2012 scc 57, [2012] 3 scr 187, at para 24. [52] various provisions of the code establish pre- sumptions whereby proof of one fact is presumed to be proof of one of the essential elements of an offence. any such presumption will comply with s. 11(d) solely if proof of the substituted fact leads “inexorably” to the existence of the essential element that it replaces: see r v. whyte, [1988] 2 scr. 3, at pp. 18-19; r v. downey, [1992] 2 scr 10, at pp. 29-30; r v. audet, [1996] 2 scr 171, at para 44. only then will there be no possibility that the substitution might result in the accused being convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt: see audet, at para 44. [51] l’alinéa 11d) de la charte protège le droit de l’accusé d’être présumé innocent jusqu’à ce que sa culpabilité soit établie. pour qu’un accusé soit dé- claré coupable d’une infraction, le juge des faits doit être convaincu hors de tout doute raisonnable que preuve a été faite de l’existence de tous les éléments essentiels de l’infraction : voir r c. vaillancourt, [1987] 2 rcs 636, p 654. il s’agit de l’une des principales mesures de protection visant à éviter, dans la mesure du possible, qu’un innocent soit dé- claré coupable : voir r c. lifchus, [1997] 3 rcs. 320, par 13. la disposition dont l’effet est de per- mettre qu’un accusé soit déclaré coupable malgré l’existence d’un doute raisonnable viole le droit à la présomption d’innocence : voir vaillancourt, p. 654- 656; r c. st- onge lamoureux, 2012 csc 57, [2012] 3 rcs 187, par 24. [52] diverses dispositions du code établissent des présomptions par lesquelles la preuve d’un fait est présumée être la preuve de l’un des éléments essentiels d’une infraction. une telle présomption ne sera conforme à l’al. 11d) que si la preuve du fait substitué mène «  inexorablement  » à l’existence de l’élément essentiel qu’il remplace : voir r c. whyte, [1988] 2 rcs 3, p. 18-19; r c. downey, [1992] 2 rcs 10, p. 29-30; r c. audet, [1996] 2 rcs 171, par.  44 ce n’est que dans ce cas qu’il n’y aura aucune possibilité que l’accusé soit déclaré coupable du fait de la substitution, malgré l’existence d’un doute raisonnable  : voir audet, par 44. [53] to be clear, the nexus requirement for demon- strating that a statutory presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence is strict. it is not one [53] en termes clairs, l’exigence d’établir un lien pour démontrer qu’une présomption législative ne contrevient pas à la présomption d’innocence est [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 33 of mere “likelihood” or “probability”, nor is it one satisfied by a “common sense” or “rational” infer- ence. rather, this court’s jurisprudence demonstrates that the connection between proof of the substituted fact and the existence of the essential element it replaces must be nothing less than “inexorable”. an “inexorable” link is one that necessarily holds true in all cases. [54] given the stringency of this test, for reasons that follow, i am satisfied that the presumption under s 1721(3) offends s. 11(d) of the charter. [55] in the context of a sting operation where there is no underage person — which, to be clear, is the specific context to which these reasons are restricted — s 1721(1)(b) stipulates that in order to secure a conviction, the crown must prove beyond a rea- sonable doubt that, among other things, the accused believed the other person was under the age of 16. subsection 172.1(3), however, creates a presumption that proof that the other person was represented to the accused as being under 16 will, absent evidence to the contrary, stand in for proof of the essential element that the accused believed the other person was under 16. stricte. il ne s’agit pas d’une exigence où il faut éta- blir une simple « vraisemblance » ou « probabilité », ni d’une exigence à laquelle on peut satisfaire par une inférence « conforme au bon sens » ou « ra- tionnelle ». la jurisprudence de la cour démontre plutôt que le lien entre la preuve du fait substitué et l’existence de l’élément essentiel qu’il remplace ne doit être rien de moins qu’« inexorable ». un lien « inexorable » est un lien qui demeure nécessaire- ment valable dans tous les cas. [54] compte tenu de la rigueur de ce critère, pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis convaincu que la présomption établie au par 1721(3) contrevient à l’al. 11d) de la charte. [55] dans le contexte d’une opération d’infil- tration où il n’y a pas réellement une personne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé — contexte qui, préci- sons-le, est expressément celui auquel les présents motifs sont restreints —, l’al 1721(1)b) dispose que, pour obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité, la couronne doit prouver hors de tout doute rai- sonnable, entre autres, que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne était âgée de moins de 16  ans. toutefois, le par 1721(3) établit une présomption selon laquelle la preuve que l’autre personne a été présentée à l’accusé comme ayant moins de 16 ans remplacera, sauf preuve contraire, la preuve de l’élément essentiel que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas encore 16 ans. [56] the crown maintains that the presumption under s 1721(3) does not infringe s. 11(d) because the presumption is rebuttable where there is evi- dence to the contrary. with respect, i cannot agree. a basic fact presumption will infringe s. 11(d) if proof of the basic fact is not capable, in itself, of satisfying the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the presumed fact. (this is another way of articulating the “inexorable connection” test). the accused’s opportunity to raise or identify evi- dence to the contrary does not resolve or attenuate the s. 11(d) problem created when proof of a basic fact does not lead inexorably to acceptance of the presumed fact. this is because the presumption of innocence requires that the crown “establi[sh] the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable [56] selon la couronne, la présomption établie au par.  172.1(3) ne contrevient pas à l’al.  11d), puisqu’elle peut être réfutée lorsqu’il existe une preuve contraire. en toute déférence, je ne puis sous- crire à cette proposition. une présomption fondée sur un fait établi contreviendra à l’al. 11d) si la preuve du fait établi n’est pas, en soi, capable de convaincre le juge des faits hors de tout doute raisonnable du fait présumé. (il s’agit d’une autre façon de formuler le critère du « lien inexorable ».) la possibilité qu’a l’accusé de présenter ou de relever des éléments de preuve contraire ne résout pas ou n’atténue pas le problème lié à l’al. 11d) lorsque la preuve d’un fait établi ne mène pas inexorablement à l’acceptation du fait présumé. il en est ainsi parce que la présomption d’innocence exige que la couronne « [établisse] hors 34 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. doubt before the accused must respond”: st- onge lamoureux, at para. 24 (emphasis added); see also downey, at p 23. de tout doute raisonnable la culpabilité de la per- sonne accusée avant que celle-ci n’ait à répondre » : st- onge lamoureux, par. 24 (je souligne); voir aussi downey, p 23. [57] the mere fact that a representation of age was made to the accused does not lead “inexorably” to the conclusion that the accused believed that representa- tion, even absent evidence to the contrary. to be sure, a trier of fact may well infer, on the evidence, that the accused believed the representation. but that is not the test. the test is whether the connection between the proven fact and the existence of the essential element it replaces is “inexorable”. that test is not met here. [57] le simple fait qu’une personne ait été présen- tée à l’accusé comme ayant un certain âge ne conduit pas « inexorablement » à la conclusion que ce dernier l’a crue, même en l’absence d’une preuve contraire. certes, le juge des faits pourrait bien inférer, au vu de la preuve, que l’accusé l’avait crue. mais il ne s’agit pas là du critère applicable. le critère consiste plutôt à savoir si le lien entre le fait prouvé et l’existence de l’élément essentiel qu’il remplace est « inexorable ». ce critère n’est pas rempli en l’espèce. [58] deception and deliberate misrepresentations are commonplace on the internet: see r v. pengelley, 2010 onsc 5488, 261 ccc (3d) 93, at para 17. as the court of appeal in this case aptly put it: there is simply no expectation that representations made during internet conversations about sexual matters will be accurate or that a participant will be honest about his or her personal attributes, including age. indeed, the expectation is quite the opposite, as true personal identities are often concealed in the course of online communication about sexual matters. [para. 60] [59] here, for example, there is evidence that mr. morrison himself made a misrepresentation about his age on the ad he posted: he claimed to be 45 when he was really in his sixties. on the internet, it may simply be expected that true personal identities are concealed, even when there is no evidence suggesting a misrepresentation in the particular case. [58] la tromperie et les fausses déclarations dé- libérées sont monnaie courante sur internet : voir r c. pengelley, 2010 onsc 5488, 261 ccc (3d) 93, par 17. comme la cour d’appel l’a si bien dit en l’espèce : [traduction] on ne peut tout simplement pas s’attendre à ce que des déclarations faites au cours d’une conversation en ligne à caractère sexuel soient exactes ou à ce qu’un participant soit honnête au sujet de ses attributs personnels, y compris son âge. en fait, il faut plutôt s’attendre tout à fait à l’inverse, puisque la véritable identité personnelle des participants est souvent cachée lors de communica- tions en ligne de nature sexuelle. [par. 60] [59] en l’espèce, par exemple, la preuve démontre que m. morrison lui- même a fait une fausse décla- ration au sujet de son âge dans l’annonce qu’il a publiée : il prétendait avoir 45 ans alors qu’il était dans la soixantaine. sur internet, nous pouvons sim- plement nous attendre à ce que la véritable identité personnelle soit cachée, même lorsque rien ne donne à penser qu’il y a eu une fausse déclaration dans le cas particulier. [60] it follows that where a representation of age is made online, the trier of fact could still be left with a reasonable doubt at the close of the crown’s case as to whether the accused believed the other person was underage. yet, despite the trier of fact’s own reason- able doubt, the accused’s belief that the other person was underage would be deemed to be established [60] il s’ensuit que, lorsqu’une personne se présente en ligne comme ayant un certain âge, la question de savoir si l’accusé croyait que l’autre per- sonne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé pourrait toujours soulever un doute raisonnable dans l’esprit du juge des faits à la clôture de la preuve de la couronne. pour tant, malgré le doute raisonnable du juge des [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 35 beyond a reasonable doubt by virtue of s 1721(3) unless the accused did something to rebut the pre- sumption. the presumption in s 1721(3) therefore contravenes s. 11(d); it will only be acceptable for an accused to bear a tactical burden to rebut a basic fact presumption where proof of the basic fact leads inexorably to acceptance of the presumed fact. [61] i pause to note that “evidence to the contrary” under subs. (3) would not include the inherent unre- liability of representations made over the internet; it refers instead to evidence which is specific to the particular circumstances of the accused and indicates that he or she did not believe the other person was un- derage. as fish j. noted in levigne, “evidence to the contrary” must include steps to ascertain the other person’s age: para 32(2). further, if “evidence to the contrary” were to be read so broadly as to include the dubious nature of internet communications or other forms of telecommunication, then the presumption would be rendered meaningless. since an offence under s 1721 necessarily includes some form of telecommunication, the crown would never be able to rely on the presumption because there would al- ways be some evidence to the contrary. in my view, this was plainly not parliament’s intent. in sum, because proof of a representation as [62] to age does not lead inexorably to the existence of the essential element that the accused believed the other person was underage — even absent evidence to the contrary — the presumption under s 1721(3) violates the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the charter. faits, la croyance de l’accusé que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé serait réputée établie hors de tout doute raisonnable par application du par 1721(3), à moins que l’accusé n’ait fait quelque chose pour réfuter la présomption. la présomption établie au par 1721(3) contrevient donc à l’al. 11d); nous ne pourrions accepter qu’un accusé supporte le fardeau tactique de réfuter une présomption fon- dée sur un fait établi que lorsque la preuve du fait établi mènera inexorablement à l’acceptation du fait présumé. [61] je souligne au passage que le caractère in- trinsèquement peu fiable des déclarations faites sur internet ne constitue pas une « preuve contraire » pour l’application du par. (3); cela renvoie plutôt à une preuve qui est propre à la situation parti- culière de l’accusé et qui indique qu’il ne croyait pas que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. comme le juge fish l’a indiqué dans l’arrêt levigne, la « preuve contraire » doit notamment éta- blir que l’accusé a pris des mesures pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne : par 32(2). en outre, si la « preuve contraire » était interprétée largement au point d’englober les communications en ligne ou autres formes de télécommunication douteuses, la présomption perdrait tout son sens. comme l’infrac- tion visée à l’art 1721 comprend nécessairement une forme de télécommunication, la couronne ne pourrait jamais invoquer la présomption, parce qu’il y aurait toujours des éléments de preuve contraire. à mon sens, ce n’était clairement pas l’intention du législateur. [62] en résumé, puisque la preuve que l’autre per- sonne a été présentée comme ayant un certain âge ne mène pas inexorablement à l’existence de l’élément essentiel que l’accusé croyait qu’elle n’avait pas at- teint l’âge fixé — même en l’absence d’une preuve contraire —, la présomption établie au par 1721(3) viole la présomption d’innocence garantie par l’al. 11d) de la charte. (2) can the infringement be saved under section 1 of the charter? (2) la contravention peut- elle être justifiée au regard de l’article premier de la charte? [63] under the oakes test (r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103), a charter infringement can be justified [63] selon le test établi dans l’arrêt r c. oakes, [1986] 1 rcs 103, une contravention à la charte 36 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. under s. 1 where the party seeking to justify that in- fringement can demonstrate that: peut se justifier au regard de l’article premier lorsque la partie qui cherche à la justifier peut démontrer les éléments suivants : (1) the law creating the infringement has a pressing (1) la règle de droit qui porte atteinte sert un objectif and substantial objective; and urgent et réel; (2) the means chosen are proportionate in that: (2) les moyens choisis sont proportionnés, c’est- à-dire : (a) they are rationally connected to the law’s a) qu’ils ont un lien rationnel avec l’objectif objective; de la règle de droit; (b) they limit the charter right in question as little as reasonably possible in order to achieve the law’s objective; and b) qu’ils restreignent le droit en question ga- ranti par la charte aussi peu que cela est raisonnablement possible pour atteindre son objectif; (c) the law’s salutary effects are proportion- ate to its deleterious effects on the affected charter right. c) que les effets bénéfiques de la règle de droit sont proportionnels à ses effets préjudi- ciables sur le droit garanti par la charte. [64] the crown did not attempt to justify the s. 11(d) infringement under s. 1 at trial. nonetheless, i will consider the crown’s submissions and explain why, in my view, the charter violation here cannot be justified. [64] au procès, la couronne n’a pas tenté de justi- fier la contravention à l’al. 11d) au regard de l’article premier. j’examinerai néanmoins ses observations et expliquerai pourquoi, à mon sens, la violation de la charte en l’espèce ne peut être justifiée. (a) pressing and substantial objective and ra- a) l’objectif urgent et réel, et le lien rationnel tional connection [65] the purpose of the child luring prohibition as a whole is, as identified above, to protect children by “identify[ing] and apprehend[ing] predatory adults who, generally for illicit sexual purposes, troll the internet to attract and entice vulnerable children and adolescents”: levigne, at para.  24; see also alicandro, at para. 36 (stating that s 1721 “was enacted to protect children against the very specific danger posed by certain kinds of communications via computer systems”). it seeks to “close the cyberspace door before the predator gets in to prey”: legare, at para 25. this overarching purpose is undoubtedly pressing and substantial: see r v. krj, 2016 scc 31, [2016] 1 scr 906, at para 66. [65] comme il a déjà été mentionné, le but d’in- terdire le leurre dans son ensemble est de protéger les enfants en « démasqu[ant] et [en] arrêt[ant] les prédateurs adultes qui rôdent dans l’internet pour appâter des enfants et des adolescents vulnérables, généralement à des fins sexuelles illicites » : levigne, par. 24; voir également alicandro, par. 36 (où le juge a affirmé que l’art 1721 avait été [traduc- tion] « édicté afin de protéger les enfants contre le danger bien précis que présentent certains types de communications électroniques »). il vise à « fermer la porte du cyberespace avant que le prédateur ne la franchisse pour traquer sa proie » : legare, par 25. il ne fait aucun doute que cet objectif primordial est urgent et réel : voir r c. krj, 2016 csc 31, [2016] 1 rcs 906, par 66. [66] the main purpose of s 1721(3) in particu- lar — which is the focus of the inquiry at this stage [66] l’objectif principal du par 1721(3) en parti- culier — l’aspect central de l’examen à cette étape-ci [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 37 (see rjr- macdonald inc v canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at para. 144 (“rjr- macdonald”)) — is to facilitate prosecution of the child luring offence: see levigne, at para 30. the prosecution of child luring offences is connected to the broader objective of protecting children from on- line sexual predators: see alicandro, at para 36. the parties agree that s 1721(3) has a pressing and sub- stantial objective and that the charter limit it creates is rationally connected to that objective. for present purposes, without finally deciding the issue, i am prepared to accept their concessions in this regard. (voir rjr- macdonald inc. c. canada (procureur général), [1995] 3  rcs  199, par.  144 («  rjr- macdonald  »)) — est de faciliter les poursuites pour leurre : voir levigne, par 30. les poursuites pour leurre ont un lien avec l’objectif plus vaste de protéger les enfants des prédateurs sexuels en ligne : voir alicandro, par 36. les parties conviennent que le par 1721(3) sert un objectif urgent et réel et que la restriction au droit garanti par la charte qu’il crée a un lien rationnel avec cet objectif. pour les fins qui nous occupent, sans trancher définitivement la question, je suis disposé à accepter leurs concessions à cet égard. (b) minimal impairment b) l’atteinte minimale in my view, however, the presumption under [67] s 1721(3) fails the minimal impairment test. [67] à mon sens, toutefois, la présomption établie au par 1721(3) ne satisfait pas au critère de l’atteinte minimale. [68] to show minimal impairment, the party seek- ing to justify the infringement must demonstrate that the impugned measure impairs the right in question “as little as reasonably possible in order to achieve the legislative objective”: rjr- macdonald, at para 160. the impairment must be “minimal” in the sense that it impairs the right in question “no more than necessary”: para 160. [68] pour démontrer que l’atteinte est minimale, la partie qui cherche à justifier la contravention doit établir que la mesure contestée restreint le droit en question « aussi peu que cela est raisonnablement possible aux fins de la réalisation de l’objectif légis- latif » : rjr- macdonald, par 160. l’atteinte au droit en question doit être « minimale », en ce qu’elle « ne dépasse pas ce qui est nécessaire » : par 160. [69] here, the presumption under s 1721(3) is designed to facilitate prosecution of the child luring offence, which is connected to the broader objective of protecting children from online sexual predators. but the crown has failed to establish that, absent the presumption, the child luring provision cannot oper- ate effectively. where the other person is represented to the accused as being underage, the trier of fact can, on the basis of evidence (including the record generated by police), draw a logical, common sense inference that the accused believed that representa- tion. the court of appeal captured this point well: [69] en l’espèce, la présomption établie au par. 172.1(3) vise à faciliter les poursuites pour leurre, un objectif qui a un lien avec l’objectif plus vaste de protéger les enfants des prédateurs sexuels en ligne. toutefois, la couronne n’a pas démontré que, en l’absence de la présomption, la disposition en ma- tière de leurre ne peut être efficace. lorsque l’autre personne est présentée à l’accusé comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé, le juge des faits peut, en se fondant sur la preuve (notamment le dossier de la police), tirer une inférence logique et conforme au bon sens que l’accusé la croyait telle. la cour d’appel l’a bien expliqué : at trial, the crown can ask the trier of fact to infer that the accused believed the [other person] was underage based on all the facts in the record, including: the content of the communication; whether representations as to age were made; the tone of the communications; the nature of the [traduction] au procès, la couronne peut demander au juge des faits d’inférer que l’accusé croyait que [l’autre personne] n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé au vu de l’en- semble des faits au dossier, y compris : le contenu de la communication, la question de savoir si la personne a été 38 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. forum used; the frequency of communications; whether photographs were exchanged; and all of the other infinitely variable circumstances surrounding the exchange. this approach is routinely part of the work of trial courts. it need not involve limiting the accused’s right to be pre- sumed innocent by means of the presumption of belief in s 1721(3) of the code. the absence of the presumption would not undermine the prosecution of the child luring offence. [para. 72] [70] put simply, a less intrusive means of achieving the state’s overarching objective would be to do away with the presumption under s 1721(3) and instead rely on the prosecution’s ability to secure convictions by inviting the trier of fact to find, based on a logical, common sense inference drawn from the evidence, that the accused believed the other person was un- derage. indeed, this process of inferential reasoning is not unfamiliar to judges and juries, who engage in this type of reasoning day in and day out. [71] because the crown has not shown that the pre- sumption under s 1721(3) infringes the right to be presumed innocent “as little as reasonably possible in order to achieve the legislative objective” of pros- ecuting child luring offences and thereby protecting children from online sexual predators, it cannot be saved under s. 1: rjr- macdonald, at para 160. présentée comme ayant un certain âge, le ton des commu- nications, la nature de la tribune utilisée, la fréquence des communications, la question de savoir si des photos ont été échangées, ainsi que toutes les autres circonstances in- finiment variables entourant la conversation. les cours de première instance sont habituellement appelées à le faire. il n’est pas nécessaire de limiter le droit à la présomption d’innocence de l’accusé en ayant recours à la présomption de croyance établie au par 1721(3) du code. l’absence de la présomption n’aurait pas pour effet de nuire aux poursuites pour leurre. [par. 72] [70] en termes simples, un moyen moins envahis- sant d’atteindre l’objectif primordial de l’état serait d’écarter la présomption établie au par 1721(3) et de se fonder plutôt sur la capacité du poursuivant à obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité en invitant le juge des faits à conclure, en fonction d’une infé- rence logique et conforme au bon sens tirée de la preuve, que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. en effet, ce processus de raisonnement par déduction n’est pas étranger aux juges et jurés, qui appliquent ce type de raisonnement quotidiennement. [71] puisque la couronne n’a pas démontré que la présomption établie au par 1721(3) porte atteinte au droit à la présomption d’innocence « aussi peu que cela est raisonnablement possible aux fins de la réalisation de l’objectif législatif » consistant à faciliter les poursuites pour leurre et ainsi protéger les enfants des prédateurs sexuels en ligne, l’atteinte ne peut être justifiée au regard de l’article premier : rjr- macdonald, par 160. (c) balancing c) la mise en balance [72] in addition, i am of the view that the delete- rious effects of the presumption under s 1721(3) outweigh its salutary effects. as alluded to above, the crown has not shown that the salutary effects of the presumption are significant, even in the context of an offence as serious as child luring. and to the extent, if any, that the presumption actually results in additional convictions, it does so only by sweeping in accused persons whose belief as to the other person’s age may be the subject of a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact. although the presumption may ease the crown’s burden of proving its case, [72] de plus, je suis d’avis que les effets préjudi- ciables de la présomption établie au par 1721(3) l’emportent sur ses effets bénéfiques. comme je l’ai déjà dit, la couronne n’a pas démontré que les effets bénéfiques de la présomption étaient importants, même dans le contexte d’une infraction aussi grave que le leurre. et dans la mesure, le cas échéant, où la présomption permet d’inscrire davantage de ver- dicts de culpabilité, elle le fait uniquement en visant également des accusés dont la croyance quant à l’âge de l’autre personne peut soulever un doute raison- nable dans l’esprit du juge des faits. bien que la [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 39 prosecutorial convenience and expediency cannot justify the risk of convicting the innocent created by subs (3). présomption puisse alléger le fardeau de la couronne quant à sa preuve, la commodité de cette présomp- tion pour le poursuivant et l’efficacité ne peuvent justifier le risque que crée le par. (3) de déclarer un innocent coupable. (3) conclusion (3) conclusion [73] in sum, the presumption under s 1721(3) infringes s. 11(d) of the charter, and that infringe- ment cannot be justified under s 1. i therefore agree with the court of appeal that s 1721(3) should be declared to be without force or effect pursuant to s. 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982. [73] en somme, la présomption établie au par. 172.1(3) contrevient à l’al. 11d) de la charte, et cette contravention ne peut être justifiée au regard de l’article premier. par conséquent, je conviens avec la cour d’appel que le par 1721(3) devrait être déclaré inopérant, conformément au par. 52(1) de la  loi constitutionnelle de 1982. c the reasonable steps requirement under sec- c l’obligation de prendre des mesures raison- tion 172.1(4) nables visée au par 1721(4) (1) does the reasonable steps requirement un- der section 172.1(4) violate section 7 of the charter? (1) l’obligation de prendre des mesures rai- sonnables visée au par 1721(4) viole-t-elle l’art. 7 de la charte? [74] section  7 of the charter establishes that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and secu- rity of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. mr. morrison submits that the reasonable steps requirement of s 1721(4) violates s. 7 of the charter by allowing for a conviction, and resulting imprisonment, where the accused has simply been negligent in failing to take reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age. this, in his view, would deprive him of his liberty in violation of the principles of fundamental justice. [74] l’article 7 de la charte énonce que « [c]ha- cun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu’en conformité avec les principes de justice fon- damentale ». monsieur morrison soutient que l’obli- gation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) viole l’art. 7 de la charte, car elle ouvre la porte au prononcé d’une déclaration de culpa- bilité, et à l’emprisonnement qui en résulte, dans une situation où l’accusé a simplement fait preuve de négligence en omettant de prendre des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre per- sonne. selon lui, cela porterait atteinte à son droit à la liberté d’une manière qui contrevient aux principes de justice fondamentale. [75] to accord with the principles of fundamen- tal justice, the mental element of an offence must “maintain a proportionality between the stigma and punishment attached to a [conviction for the offence] and the moral blameworthiness of the offender”: r. v. martineau, [1990] 2 scr 633, at p. 646; see also r v. logan, [1990] 2 scr 731, at p. 743; h c stewart,. sexual offences in canadian law (loose- leaf), at p 4-27. this court has recognized [75] l’élément moral d’une infraction doit, pour être conforme aux principes de justice fondamentale, « maintenir une proportionnalité entre les stigmates et la peine rattachés à une déclaration de culpabilité [relativement à l’infraction] et la culpabilité mo- rale du délinquant  »  : r c martineau, [1990] 2 rcs 633, p. 646; voir aussi r c. logan, [1990] 2 rcs 731, p. 743; h c stewart,. sexual offences in canadian law (feuilles mobiles), p.  4-27 la 40 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. that a small group of offences, including murder and attempted murder, carry such stigma and punishment that they require a purely subjective standard of fault: see vaillancourt, at pp. 653-54; martineau, at p. 646; r v creighton, [1993] 3 scr 3, at p 18. however, “an objective fault requirement is constitutionally sufficient for a broad range of offences” beyond this limited class: creighton, at p 18. [76] as discussed above, in levigne, this court implicitly held that the combined effect of subss. (3) and (4) was to create two pathways to conviction where the other person is represented to the accused as being underage. in such circumstances, the ac- cused is presumed under subs. (3) to have believed that the other person was underage unless there is evidence that the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age. in effect, therefore, the required mens rea is established where the crown proves that the accused either (1) believed the other person was underage or (2) failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age. [77] the trial judge proceeded on the basis that although s 1721(3) infringed s. 11(d) of the charter and as such was of no force or effect in the case before him, these two pathways to conviction nonetheless remained available. having been left with a reasona- ble doubt as to whether mr. morrison believed “mia” was underage, he pursued the second pathway to conviction, finding mr. morrison guilty on the basis that he had failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain “mia’s” age as required under s 1721(4). the court of appeal endorsed this approach. cour a reconnu qu’un petit groupe d’infractions, dont le meurtre et la tentative de meurtre, donnent lieu à de tels stigmates et à une telle peine qu’il est nécessaire d’adopter à leur égard une norme de faute purement subjective : voir vaillancourt, p. 653-654; martineau, p. 646; r c creighton, [1993] 3 rcs. 3, p 18. cependant, « du point de vue constitution- nel, une exigence objective en matière de faute suffit pour une large gamme d’infractions » au- delà de ce groupe restreint : creighton, p 18. [76] comme il a été mentionné précédemment, la cour a implicitement conclu dans l’arrêt levigne que l’effet combiné des par. (3) et (4) était de créer deux voies distinctes pouvant conduire à une décla- ration de culpabilité dans les situations où l’autre personne est présentée à l’accusé comme n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé. dans de telles circonstances, par application du par.  (3), l’accusé est présumé avoir cru que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé, à moins que la preuve ne démontre que l’accusé a pris des mesures raisonnables pour s’as- surer de l’âge de l’autre personne. en fait, la mens rea requise est donc établie lorsque la couronne prouve (1) que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé ou (2) qu’il n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne. [77] le juge du procès s’est prononcé en se fon- dant sur le fait que, même si le par 1721(3) contre- venait à l’al. 11d) de la charte et, de ce fait, qu’il était inopérant dans l’affaire dont il était saisi, ces deux voies pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité étaient néanmoins ouvertes. comme un doute raisonnable subsistait dans son esprit quant à savoir si m. morrison croyait que « mia » n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé, il a choisi la deuxième voie pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpabi- lité, en déclarant m. morrison coupable au motif qu’il n’avait pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de « mia », comme l’exigeait le par 1721(4). la cour d’appel a souscrit à cette façon de procéder. [78] mr. morrison submits that the courts below erred in failing to find that s 1721(4) infringes s. 7 of the charter. he maintains that in allowing for a [78] monsieur morrison soutient que les tribunaux de juridictions inférieures ont commis une erreur en ne concluant pas que le par 1721(4) contrevient [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 41 conviction based on a failure to take reasonable steps, subs. (4) makes the child luring offence an objective mens rea offence, allowing for convictions based on mere negligence. this, he says, violates the princi- ples of fundamental justice because the stigma and punishment associated with the child luring offence are so serious that subjective mens rea alone will suffice to sustain a conviction. i agree with mr. morrison that a conviction [79] for child luring carries a high degree of stigma and a potentially severe punishment. the offence of child luring is punishable by up to 14 years’ imprisonment, and the offender is also subject to a lengthy registra- tion as a sex offender. child luring is a serious crime that undermines the safety of our children and preys on their vulnerability. the stigma and punishment that attach to a conviction are thus rightfully high and severe. that said, i am very doubtful that this stigma and punishment rise to the level of requiring purely subjective mens rea. in any event, for reasons that will become apparent, i find it unnecessary to decide that issue here. à l’art. 7 de la charte. il prétend qu’en laissant la porte ouverte à une déclaration de culpabilité fondée sur le défaut de prendre des mesures raisonnables, le par. (4) confère à l’infraction de leurre la qualité d’infraction à mens rea objective, ouvrant ainsi la porte à des déclarations de culpabilité fondées sur la simple négligence. il affirme que cela contrevient aux principes de justice fondamentale, parce que les stigmates et la peine rattachés à l’infraction de leurre sont si graves que seule une mens rea subjec- tive sera suffisante pour justifier une déclaration de culpabilité. [79] je conviens avec m. morrison qu’un haut ni- veau de stigmatisation et une peine potentiellement sévère sont rattachés à une déclaration de culpabilité pour leurre. l’infraction de leurre est passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de 14 ans, et le délinquant est aussi assujetti à une longue période d’inscription au registre des délinquants sexuels. le leurre est un crime grave qui sape la sécurité des enfants et qui s’attaque à leur vulnérabilité. les stigmates et la peine rattachés à une déclaration de culpabilité sont donc, à juste titre, élevés et sévères. cela dit, je doute fortement que cette stigmatisation et que cette peine soient importantes au point d’exiger une mens rea purement subjective. quoi qu’il en soit, pour des motifs qui ressortiront de l’analyse qui suit, je conclus qu’il est inutile de trancher cette question en l’espèce. [80] in short, i reject mr.  morrison’s submis- sion that s 1721(4) breaches s. 7 of the charter.2 in reaching this conclusion, i part ways with the courts below in the following key respect: in my view, the reasonable steps requirement under s 1721(4) does not, in the absence of the presump- tion under s 1721(3), provide a second pathway [80] en somme, je rejette l’argument de m. mor- rison selon lequel le par 1721(4) viole l’art. 7 de la charte2. en parvenant à cette conclusion, je diverge d’opinion avec les tribunaux de juridictions infé- rieures au sujet de l’aspect fondamental suivant : à mon avis, l’obligation de prendre des mesures rai- sonnables visée au par 1721(4) ne fournit pas, en 2 no argument was made before this court on whether the limit on the accused’s ability to raise the defence that he believed the other person was of legal age violates the presumption of innocence under s 11(d) of the charter. importantly, we do not have the benefit of the crown’s arguments on this point, making it inap- propriate for this court to pronounce on the matter: see british columbia (attorney general) v. christie, 2007 scc 21, [2007] 1 scr 873, at para. 28. mr. morrison argued that s 172.1(4) is unconstitutional on the basis that it allows for conviction on the basis of mere negligence. 2 aucun argument n’a été soumis à la cour quant à savoir si la res- triction imposée relativement à la capacité de l’accusé de soulever le moyen de défense selon lequel il croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal viole la présomption d’innocence garantie par l’al. 11d) de la charte. fait important, nous ne bénéficions pas des arguments de la couronne à cet égard, ce qui fait en sorte qu’il n’est pas approprié que la cour se prononce sur cette ques- tion : voir colombie- britannique (procureur général) c. christie, 2007 csc 21, [2007] 1 rcs 873, par 28. monsieur morrison a fait valoir que le par 1721(4) était inconstitutionnel parce qu’il ouvrait la porte aux déclarations de culpabilité fondées sur la simple négligence. 42 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. to conviction. instead, as i will explain, it simply limits a defence. [81] as noted above, in the context of a police sting operation where there is no underage person, s 1721(1) makes it an offence for a person to com- municate, by means of telecommunication, with a person who the accused believes is underage for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a des- ignated offence against that person. by expressly including a presumption under s 1721(3) as to the accused’s belief in this regard — albeit a presump- tion which i have found to be unconstitutional — parliament signalled that the requirement of proving belief is essential in this context. [82] subsection 172.1(4) does not make this re- quirement any less essential. rather, in the absence of the presumption under s 1721(3), what it does is bar accused persons from raising, as a defence, that they believed the other person was of legal age where they failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age. put differently, it does not provide an independent pathway to conviction; it merely lim- its a defence. this proposition is made clear by the opening words of subs. (4): “it is not a defence   ”. to be clear, while the word “defence” can be under- stood more broadly or more narrowly depending on the context, i am of the view that “defence” here is referring to an affirmative defence advanced by the accused as to the accused’s belief that would entitle him or her to an acquittal if believed or if it were to leave the trier of fact in a state of reasonable doubt. l’absence de la présomption établie au par 1721(3), une deuxième voie pouvant conduire à une décla- ration de culpabilité. comme je l’expliquerai plus loin, elle ne fait plutôt que restreindre un moyen de défense. [81] comme il a été mentionné plus tôt, dans le contexte d’une opération d’infiltration policière à la- quelle aucune personne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé ne participe, le par 1721(1) constitue en infraction pour une personne le fait de communiquer, par un moyen de télécommunication, avec quelqu’un que l’accusé croit ne pas avoir atteint l’âge fixé en vue de faciliter la perpétration à son égard d’une infraction énumérée. en incluant expressément une présomp- tion au par 1721(3) en ce qui a trait à la croyance de l’accusé à cet égard — encore qu’il s’agisse d’une présomption que j’ai déclarée inconstitutionnelle —, le législateur a signalé que l’exigence de prouver la croyance était essentielle dans ce contexte. [82] le paragraphe 172.1(4) ne rend pas cette exi- gence moins essentielle. en réalité, en l’absence de la présomption établie au par 1721(3), cette disposi- tion a pour effet d’empêcher les accusés de soulever, comme moyen de défense, le fait qu’ils croyaient que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal dans les cas où ils ont omis de prendre des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de son âge. autrement dit, cette dis- position n’offre pas une voie indépendante pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité; elle ne fait que restreindre un moyen de défense. cela ressort clairement du par. (4), avec le passage ainsi libellé : «    ne constitue un moyen de défense    ». pour être clair, bien que le mot « défense » puisse être interprété de façon plus générale ou plus précise selon le contexte, je suis d’avis que ce mot renvoie ici à une défense affirmative avancée par l’accusé, quant à la croyance de ce dernier, qui lui donnerait droit à un acquittement si le juge des faits y ajoutait foi ou si elle devait laisser ce dernier dans un état de doute raisonnable. [83] consequently, if the crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not take rea- sonable steps, then the trier of fact is precluded from considering the defence that the accused believed the other person to be of legal age. but that does not [83] par conséquent, si la couronne prouve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables, le juge des faits ne peut alors pas examiner le moyen de défense selon lequel l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 43 relieve the crown of its ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage. thus, to illustrate, if the trier of fact can only conclude from the evidence that the accused was negligent or reckless with re- gard to the other person’s age, the crown would not have met its burden, and the accused would be enti- tled to an acquittal. this is because negligence and recklessness are states of mind that do not entail any concrete belief about the other person’s age. in short, there is but one pathway to conviction: proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage. nothing less will suffice. [84] to the extent my colleague justice abella con- cludes otherwise, i respectfully disagree. in the sting context where there is no actual underage person, the notion that “s 1721(4) allows for a conviction if the crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the ac- cused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain age (the objective path to liability)” simply does not hold up: abella j.’s reasons, at para 214. if proving the absence of reasonable steps were sufficient to ground a conviction in this context, there would have been no need for the presumption under subs. (3) in the first place. as explained above, absent that presumption, subs. (4) does nothing more than limit a defence. the main effect of subs. (4), discussed in further detail below, is to impose an evidentiary burden on the accused regarding reasonable steps where the accused asserts he or she believed the other person was of legal age: see levigne, at para 32(3). it is the crown, however, that bears the persuasive burden: see para 32(3). in my respectful view, nothing in this arrangement prevents an accused from making full answer and defence. l’âge légal. mais cela ne dispense pas la couronne de son fardeau ultime consistant à prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. ainsi, à titre d’illustration, si le juge des faits peut uniquement conclure, en fonction de la preuve, que l’accusé a fait preuve de négligence ou d’insouciance relativement à l’âge de l’autre personne, la couronne ne se sera pas acquittée de son fardeau et l’accusé aura droit à un acquittement. il en est ainsi parce que la négligence et l’insouciance constituent des états d’esprit qui n’entraînent pas une réelle croyance au sujet de l’âge de l’autre personne. en somme, il n’existe qu’une seule voie pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité : la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. rien de moins ne saurait suffire. [84] en toute déférence, dans la mesure où ma collègue la juge abella arrive à une conclusion dif- férente, je ne saurais y souscrire. dans le contexte d’une opération d’infiltration à laquelle aucune per- sonne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé ne participe réel- lement, la notion selon laquelle « le par 1721(4) permet le prononcé d’une déclaration de culpabilité si la couronne prouve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a omis de prendre des mesures raison- nables pour s’assurer de l’âge (la voie objective vers la responsabilité) » ne tient tout simplement pas : mo- tifs de la juge abella, par 214. s’il suffisait de prou- ver l’absence de mesures raisonnables pour étayer une déclaration de culpabilité dans ce contexte, la présomption établie au par. (3) n’aurait, au départ, aucune raison d’être. comme il a été expliqué pré- cédemment, en l’absence de cette présomption, le par. (4) ne fait rien de plus que restreindre un moyen de défense. le principal effet du par. (4), qui sera analysé en détail plus loin, est d’imposer à l’accusé un fardeau de présentation relativement aux mesures raisonnables prises lorsqu’il affirme qu’il croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal : voir levigne, par 32(3). toutefois, le fardeau de persua- sion repose sur la couronne : voir par 32(3). à mon humble avis, rien dans ces dispositions n’empêche l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière. it is trite that an accused’s failure to discharge [85] an evidentiary burden vis-à-vis a defence does not, in il est bien établi que le défaut de l’accusé de [85] s’acquitter du fardeau de présentation qui lui incombe 44 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. and of itself, provide a freestanding basis for convic- tion, irrespective of whether the crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. if it were other- wise, a bedrock principle of criminal law — namely, that in order to secure a conviction, the crown must prove all of the essential elements of the offence be- yond a reasonable doubt — would be stripped of any meaning: see r v. s (wd), [1994] 3 scr 521, at p 532. in the sting context where there is no actual underage person, which is the context with which we are concerned, that principle requires that the crown prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage. in so concluding, i am not unmindful of the [86] comments in r v. george, 2017 scc 38, [2017] 1 scr 1021, at para. 8, upon which justice abella relies by way of analogy to hold that in the pres- ent context the crown can obtain a “conviction if [it] proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the ac- cused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain age (the objective path to liability)”: paras 213-14. paragraph 8 of george reads as follows: at common law, “true crimes” — like those at issue here — would have a purely subjective fault element. however, through statutory intervention, parliament has imported an objective element into the fault analysis to enhance protec- tions for youth (stewart, at pp. 4-23 and 4-24). as a result, to convict an accused person who demonstrates an “air of reality” to the mistake of age defence, the crown must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either that the accused person (1) did not honestly believe the complainant was at least 16 (the subjective element); or (2) did not take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the complainant’s age (the objective element) (stewart, at p. 4-24; m. manning, qc, and p. sankoff, manning, mewett & sankoff: criminal law (5th ed. 2015), at p. 1113 (“manning, mewett & sankoff”)). relativement à un moyen de défense ne peut, à lui seul, servir de fondement à une déclaration de culpabilité, dans les cas où la couronne n’a pas fait la preuve de l’infraction hors de tout doute raisonnable. s’il en était autrement, l’un des principes fondamentaux du droit criminel — à savoir que, pour obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité, la couronne doit prouver tous les éléments essentiels de l’infraction hors de tout doute raisonnable — serait dénué de tout sens : voir r c. s (wd), [1994] 3 rcs 521, p 532. dans le contexte d’une opération d’infiltration à laquelle aucune personne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé ne par- ticipe réellement, soit le contexte qui nous intéresse en l’espèce, ce principe exige que la couronne prouve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. [86] en concluant ainsi, je ne fais pas abstrac- tion des commentaires formulés dans l’arrêt r c. george, 2017 csc 38, [2017] 1 rcs 1021, par. 8, sur lesquels s’appuie par analogie la juge abella pour conclure que dans la cadre de l’affaire qui nous intéresse, la couronne peut obtenir une « déclaration de culpabilité si [elle] prouve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a omis de prendre des me- sures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge (la voie objective vers la responsabilité) » : par 213-214. le paragraphe 8 de l’arrêt george est ainsi rédigé : en common law, les [traduction] « crimes véritables » — du genre de ceux en cause dans la présente affaire — com- portent un élément de faute purement subjectif. toutefois, par voie de dispositions législatives, le parlement a importé dans l’analyse de la faute un élément objectif afin d’accor- der une protection accrue aux jeunes personnes (stewart, p. 4-23 et 4-24). par conséquent, pour que soit déclaré coupable un accusé qui démontre que sa défense d’erreur sur l’âge possède une « apparence de vraisemblance », le ministère public doit alors prouver hors de tout doute rai- sonnable soit que l’accusé (1) ne croyait pas sincèrement que le plaignant était âgé d’au moins 16 ans (l’élément subjectif), soit que l’accusé (2) n’a pas pris « toutes les mesures raisonnables » pour s’assurer de l’âge du plaignant (l’élément objectif) (stewart, p. 4-24; m. manning, cr, et p. sankoff, manning, mewett & sankoff : criminal law (5e éd. 2015), p. 1113 (« manning, mewett & sankoff »)). [87] with respect, i am unable to adopt my col- league’s analysis in george, ms.  george was [87] en toute déférence, je ne puis souscrire à l’analyse de ma collègue. dans l’arrêt george, [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 45 charged with sexual interference and sexual as- sault of a person under the age of 16. given that the complainant was legally incapable of consenting, ms. george’s sole defence was that she believed, albeit mistakenly, that the 14- year-old complainant was at least 16 years old. in those circumstances, if the trier of fact were to find or have a reasonable doubt that ms. george honestly believed the com- plainant was at least 16, she would be entitled to an acquittal. put differently, if the crown hoped to obtain a conviction, it had to overcome her defence of mistaken belief. [88] against this backdrop, the passage in question at para. 8 of george explains that there were two alternate ways by which the crown could negate the defence of mistaken belief in age once the air of reality test had been met. first, the crown could prove that the accused did not honestly believe the complainant was at least 16; or, second, the crown could prove that the accused did not take “all rea- sonable steps” to ascertain the complainant’s age. while the crown had to prove at least one of these propositions to negate the defence of mistaken belief, doing so would not, from a legal perspective, inevita- bly lead to a conviction. as a legal matter, to obtain a conviction for sexual interference or sexual assault of a person under the age of 16, the crown had to go further and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the complainant was under 16. as a practical matter, once ms. george’s sole defence was negated, her conviction was a virtual certainty. mme  george était accusée de contacts sexuels et d’agression sexuelle à l’égard d’une personne âgée de moins de 16 ans. puisque le plaignant ne pou- vait pas légalement consentir, la seule défense que pouvait faire valoir mme george était qu’elle croyait — bien qu’erronément — que le plaignant âgé de 14 ans avait au moins 16 ans. ainsi, si le juge avait conclu que mme george croyait honnêtement que le plaignant était âgé d’au moins 16 ans, ou s’il avait un doute raisonnable en ce sens, mme george aurait eu droit à un acquittement. autrement dit, pour que la couronne obtienne une déclaration de culpabilité, il lui fallait réfuter la défense de croyance erronée. [88] c’est dans ce contexte que le passage précité du par. 8 de l’arrêt george explique que la couronne disposait de deux façons différentes de renverser la défense de croyance erronée quant à l’âge, une fois qu’il avait été satisfait au test de la vraisemblance. ou bien la couronne pouvait prouver que l’accusée ne croyait pas honnêtement que le plaignant avait au moins 16 ans; ou bien elle pouvait prouver que l’accusée n’avait pas pris « toutes les mesures rai- sonnables » pour s’assurer de l’âge du plaignant. même si la couronne devait prouver au moins l’un de ces deux éléments afin de renverser la défense de croyance erronée, le simple fait d’y parvenir n’aurait pas, en droit, mené inévitablement à une déclaration de culpabilité. sur le plan juridique, pour que l’ac- cusée soit déclarée coupable de contacts sexuels ou d’agression sexuelle à l’égard d’une personne âgée de moins de 16  ans, la couronne devait en faire davantage et prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusée croyait le plaignant âgé de moins de 16 ans. sur le plan pratique, une fois sa seule défense renversée, il était presque certain que mme george allait être déclarée coupable. [89] these same legal principles apply in respect of the offence of child luring. the best evidence of this is found in the s 1721(3) presumption, which parliament built into the child luring provision. as i have pointed out above at para. 84, if proving the absence of reasonable steps and thereby disproving the defence of honest belief in age were sufficient to ground a conviction in this context, there would have been no need for parliament to include the pre- sumption under s 1721(3) in the first place. this [89] les mêmes principes juridiques s’appliquent à l’infraction de leurre. la présomption établie au par 1721(3), que le législateur a intégré à la déposi- tion en matière de leurre, en est la plus belle preuve. comme je l’ai indiqué au par. 84, si, pour obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité dans un tel contexte, il suf- fisait de prouver l’absence de mesures raisonnables et d’ainsi réfuter la défense de la croyance honnête à l’âge légal, le législateur n’aurait pas eu à ajou- ter, au départ, la présomption du par 1721(3). une 46 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. goes against the presumption that parliament does not speak in vain: see attorney general of quebec v. carrières ste- thérèse ltée, [1985] 1 scr 831, at p. 838; canada (attorney general) v. jti- macdonald corp., 2007 scc 30, [2007] 2 scr 610, at para 87. [90] put simply, as a matter of law, an accused cannot be convicted merely for failing to establish a defence; rather, a conviction will be sustained only where the crown is able to negate a properly raised defence and show, on the evidence as a whole, that all of the essential elements of the offence in question have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [91] i offer this clarification, bearing in mind that the comments enunciated in para. 8 of george were clearly not central to the resolution of that case. the issue of whether an accused could be convicted for failing to show that he or she took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age was in fact neither raised nor argued by the parties. in the ab- sence of full argument and a considered analysis, the passage in question ought not to be interpreted in a way that would sweep aside a bedrock principle of our criminal law. telle situation contreviendrait à la présomption selon laquelle le législateur ne parle pas pour rien dire : voir procureur général du québec c. carrières ste- thérèse ltée, [1985] 1 rcs 831, p. 838; canada (procureur général) c. jti- macdonald corp., 2007 csc 30, [2007] 2 rcs 610, par 87. [90] dit simplement, en droit, un accusé ne peut pas être déclaré coupable du simple fait qu’il n’a pas su établir de défense; il ne pourra être déclaré coupable que si la couronne parvient à renverser une défense dûment invoquée et à établir, au vu de l’en- semble de la preuve, que tous les éléments essentiels de l’infraction en cause ont été prouvés hors de tout doute raisonnable. [91] j’apporte cette précision tout en notant que les commentaires formulés au par. 8 de l’arrêt george n’étaient clairement pas déterminants pour régler cette affaire. en réalité, la question de savoir si un accusé pouvait être déclaré coupable parce qu’il n’a pas été en mesure de prouver qu’il a pris toutes les mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge du plai- gnant n’a pas été soulevée ni débattue par les parties. en l’absence d’un débat exhaustif et d’une analyse réfléchie, le passage en question ne devrait pas être interprété de façon à écarter un principe fondamental du droit criminel. (2) conclusion (2) conclusion [92] it follows from the foregoing analysis that s 1721(4) does not infringe s. 7 of the charter. this is because even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that child luring forms part of the very narrow class of offences requiring purely sub- jective mens rea, s 1721(4) does not depart from this standard: it does not create a situation in which an accused may be convicted on the basis of simple negligence — namely, in this context, a failure to take reasonable steps. rather, only subjective mens rea — in this case, belief — will suffice. [92] il s’ensuit, d’après l’analyse qui précède, que le par 1721(4) ne contrevient pas à l’art. 7 de la charte. il en est ainsi parce que, même en tenant pour acquis, pour les besoins de la discussion, que le leurre fait partie du groupe d’infractions très restreint exigeant une mens rea purement subjective, le par 1721(4) ne s’éloigne pas de cette norme : il ne crée pas une situa- tion dans laquelle un accusé peut être déclaré coupable en raison de la simple négligence — en l’espèce, le défaut de prendre des mesures raisonnables. il n’y a plutôt que la mens rea subjective — en l’espèce, la croyance — qui sera suffisante. [93] it also follows that the trial judge entered a guilty verdict on a basis that was legally unsound. for the trial judge to have properly convicted mr. morri- son, he would have to have been satisfied beyond a [93] il s’ensuit aussi que le juge du procès a ins- crit un verdict de culpabilité à partir d’un fonde- ment non valide en droit. pour que la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée par le juge du procès à [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 47 reasonable doubt that mr. morrison believed “mia” was under the age of 16. he was not. this demands a remedy. [94] but before turning to the question of remedy, it is first necessary to describe how s 1721 is to be applied in future cases in the absence of the presump- tion under s 1721(3), which i have found to be of no force and effect. l’égard de m. morrison ait été valide, il aurait dû avoir été convaincu hors de tout doute raisonnable que m. morrison croyait que « mia » était âgée de moins de 16 ans. il n’était pas convaincu d’une telle chose. cela commande une réparation. [94] mais avant d’analyser la question de la répa- ration, il est nécessaire de décrire tout d’abord com- ment l’art 1721 doit être appliqué dans les dossiers ultérieurs en l’absence de la présomption établie au par 1721(3), présomption que j’ai déclarée inopé- rante. d the operation of section 172.1 without sec- d l’application de l’art 1721 sans le par 1721(3) tion 172.1(3) (1) belief regarding age (1) la croyance quant à l’âge [95] in the context of a police sting where there is no underage person, the offence of child luring has three essential elements: (1) an intentional commu- nication by means of telecommunication; (2) with a person who the accused believes is under the requi- site age; (3) for the purpose of facilitating the com- mission of a designated offence with respect to that person (see levigne, at para. 23; legare, at para 36). the crown must prove each of these elements be- yond a reasonable doubt: see legare, at para 37. the discussion below will focus on the second element. [96] because the presumption under s 1721(3) is no longer of any force or effect, the crown cannot secure a conviction by proving that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the other per- son’s age once a representation as to age was made. instead, the crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage. [97] to meet this burden, the crown must show that the accused either (1) believed the other person was underage or (2) was wilfully blind as to whether the other person was underage. the second alterna- tive is legally equivalent to the first. [95] dans le contexte d’une infiltration policière à laquelle aucune personne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé ne participe, l’infraction de leurre comporte trois éléments essentiels : (1) une communication intentionnelle par un moyen de télécommunications; (2) avec une personne dont l’accusé croit qu’elle n’a pas atteint l’âge exigé par la loi; (3) dans le des- sein de faciliter la perpétration à son égard d’une infraction énumérée (voir levigne, par. 23; legare, par 36). la couronne doit établir chacun de ces élé- ments hors de tout doute raisonnable : voir legare, par 37. l’analyse ci- dessous sera axée sur le deu- xième élément. [96] la présomption établie au par 1721(3) étant désormais inopérante, la couronne ne peut pas obte- nir une déclaration de culpabilité en démontrant que l’accusé a omis de prendre des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne dès que cette dernière a été présentée comme ayant un certain âge. la couronne doit plutôt prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. [97] pour s’acquitter de ce fardeau, la couronne doit démontrer (1) que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé ou (2) qu’il a fait preuve d’aveuglement volontaire quant à savoir si l’autre personne avait ou non atteint l’âge fixé. les deux possibilités s’équivalent en droit. 48 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. [98] wilful blindness exists where an accused’s “suspicion is aroused to the point where he or she sees the need for further inquiries, but deliberately chooses not to make those inquiries”: r v. briscoe, 2010 scc 13, [2010] 1 scr 411, at para. 21 (emphasis in original). wilful blindness has been characterized as “deliberate ignorance” because it connotes “an actual process of suppressing a suspicion”: d. stuart, canadian criminal law: a treatise (7th ed. 2014), at p 261 “a court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant ac- tually knew”: briscoe, at para. 23, citing g. williams, criminal law: the general part (2nd ed. 1961), at p 159. this court has repeatedly held that if an ac- cused is found to be wilfully blind, that state of mind may substitute for actual knowledge: sansregret v. the queen, [1985] 1 scr 570, at pp. 584-85; bri- scoe, at para 21. indeed, it is “equivalent to knowl- edge”: briscoe, at para. 23, citing williams, at p 159. [99] further, where a person knows something, then for legal purposes they necessarily believe it: united states of america v. dynar, [1997] 2 scr 462, at para 69. if wilful blindness is sufficient to establish knowledge, then it follows logically that wilful blind- ness can stand in for belief as well. therefore, if the trier of fact is satisfied that the accused was wilfully blind as to whether the other person was underage, then the trier of fact will necessarily be satisfied that the accused believed the other person was underage. il y a aveuglement volontaire lorsqu’un ac- [98] cusé « a des doutes au point de vouloir se renseigner davantage, mais [  ] choisit délibérément de ne pas le faire » : r c. briscoe, 2010 csc 13, [2010] 1 rcs 411, par. 21 (en italique dans l’original). l’aveuglement volontaire a été décrit comme une forme d’« ignorance délibérée », étant donné qu’elle évoque l’idée [traduction] « d’un processus réel de suppression des soupçons » : d. stuart, canadian criminal law  : a treatise (7e éd.  2014), p.  261. « une cour peut valablement conclure à l’ignorance volontaire seulement lorsqu’on peut presque dire que le défendeur connaissait réellement le fait » : briscoe, par. 23, citant g. williams, criminal law : the general part (2e éd. 1961), p 159. la cour a statué à maintes reprises que, s’il est conclu que l’accusé a fait preuve d’aveuglement volontaire, cet état d’esprit peut se substituer à la connaissance réelle : sansregret c. la reine, [1985] 1 rcs 570, p. 584-585; briscoe, par 21. en fait, l’aveuglement volontaire « équivaut à la connaissance » : briscoe, par. 23, citant williams, p 159. [99] en outre, pour les besoins de l’application du droit, lorsqu’une personne sait quelque chose, elle y croit nécessairement  : états- unis d’amé- rique c dynar, [1997] 2  rcs  462, par.  69 si l’aveuglement volontaire est suffisant pour établir la connaissance, il s’ensuit alors logiquement qu’il peut aussi se substituer à la croyance. par consé- quent, si le juge des faits est convaincu que l’accusé avait fait preuve d’aveuglement volontaire quant à savoir si l’autre personne avait ou non atteint l’âge fixé, il sera alors nécessairement convaincu que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint cet âge. [100] for greater clarity, i pause here to note that although the two concepts are often conflated, reck- lessness is distinct from wilful blindness: sansregret, at pp. 584-85; briscoe, at para 23. recklessness refers to the state of mind of a person who, “aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk”: sansregret, at p 582. by contrast, wilful blindness “arises where a person who has become aware of the need for some inquiry declines to make the inquiry because he does not [100] pour une meilleure compréhension, je m’ar- rête ici pour faire remarquer que, bien que les deux concepts soient souvent confondus, l’insouciance est distincte de l’aveuglement volontaire : sansregret, p.  584-585; briscoe, par.  23 l’insouciance ren- voie à l’état d’esprit de celui qui, « conscient que sa conduite risque d’engendrer le résultat prohibé par le droit criminel, persiste néanmoins malgré ce risque » : sansregret, p 582. par contraste, l’aveu- glement volontaire « se produit lorsqu’une personne qui a ressenti le besoin de se renseigner refuse de le [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 49 wish to know the truth. he would prefer to remain ignorant”: p 584. faire, parce qu’elle ne veut pas connaître la vérité. elle préfère rester dans l’ignorance » : p 584. [101] in the context of a police sting where there is no underage person, a showing that the accused was merely reckless, rather than wilfully blind, as to whether the other person was underage will not ground a conviction. in a sense, this distinguishes the child luring offence from the offence of sex- ual assault. the required mens rea for sexual as- sault is established where the accused is reckless with regard to a lack of consent on the part of the person sexually touched: r v. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 scr 330, at para. 42; r v. ja, 2011 scc 28, [2011] 2 scr 440, at para 24. an accused’s aware- ness that there is a risk that the complainant has not consented to the sexual touching, and the accused’s persistence despite this risk, is sufficient to make out the requisite mental element. in the child luring context, however, proving that the accused had a mere awareness of a risk that the other person was underage does not establish that the accused believed the person was underage, which is what s 1721(1) requires in the context of a police sting where there is no underage person. [102] in sum, in order to establish the second ele- ment outlined above in the context of a police sting where there is no underage person, the crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused (1) believed the other person was underage or (2) was wilfully blind as to whether the other person was underage. (2) the defence of belief that the other person was of legal age [101] dans le contexte d’une infiltration policière à laquelle aucune personne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé ne participe, le fait de démontrer que l’accusé a fait preuve de simple insouciance, plutôt que d’aveu- glement volontaire, quant à savoir si l’autre personne avait atteint ou non l’âge fixé, ne pourra servir de fon- dement à une déclaration de culpabilité. dans un sens, cela distingue l’infraction de leurre de celle d’agres- sion sexuelle. la mens rea nécessaire pour l’agression sexuelle est établie lorsque l’accusé a fait preuve d’insouciance relativement à l’absence de consente- ment de la part de la personne qui subit les attouche- ments sexuels : r c. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 rcs 330, par. 42; r c. ja, 2011 csc 28, [2011] 2 rcs 440, par 24. le fait qu’un accusé soit au courant de l’exis- tence d’un risque que la personne ayant porté plainte n’a pas consenti aux attouchements sexuels, ainsi que la persistance de l’accusé malgré ce risque, suffisent pour établir l’élément moral requis. cependant, dans le contexte du leurre, le fait de prouver que l’accusé avait une simple connaissance du risque que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé n’établit pas que l’accusé croyait que la personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé, ce que nécessite le par 1721(1) dans le contexte d’une infiltration policière à laquelle aucune personne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé ne participe. [102] en résumé, pour établir le deuxième élément énoncé ci- dessus dans le contexte d’une infiltration policière à laquelle aucune personne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé ne participe, la couronne doit prou- ver hors de tout doute raisonnable (1) que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé ou (2) qu’il a fait preuve d’aveuglement volon- taire quant à cette question. (2) le moyen de défense fondé sur la croyance selon laquelle l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal in levigne, this court affirmed that if the [103] trier of fact is left in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether the accused believed the other person was of legal age, then the accused is entitled to an acquit- tal: see para 32(5). subsection 172.1(4), however, [103] dans l’arrêt levigne, la cour a affirmé que, s’il subsiste un doute raisonnable dans l’esprit du juge des faits quant à savoir si l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal, l’accusé a alors droit à un acquittement  : voir par.  32(5). 50 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. stipulates that the defence that the accused believed the other person was of legal age can be raised only if the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age. to be clear, this provision does not require that the accused’s belief be both honest and reasonable; rather, it simply requires that there be some objective evidence capable of supporting an honest belief. [104] with this in mind, the novel issue before us is how this defence operates in the absence of the presumption under s 1721(3), which, again, is no longer of any force or effect. cependant, le par 1721(4) prévoit que le moyen de défense selon lequel l’accusé croyait que l’autre per- sonne avait atteint l’âge légal peut uniquement être soulevé si l’accusé a pris des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de la personne. en clair, cette disposition n’exige pas que la croyance de l’accusé soit à la fois honnête et raisonnable; en fait, il suffit que l’accusé présente des éléments de preuve objec- tifs pouvant démontrer que sa croyance était honnête. [104] dans cette perspective, la question nouvelle que la cour est appelée à trancher est la manière dont ce moyen de défense fonctionne en l’absence de la présomption établie au par 1721(3), laquelle, faut-il le répéter, est désormais inopérante. (a) what are reasonable steps under sec- a) quelles sont les mesures raisonnables visées tion 172.1(4)? au par 1721(4)? [105] in my view, the “reasonable steps” that the accused is required to take under subs. (4) are steps that a reasonable person, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, would take to ascertain the other person’s age: see r v. dragos, 2012 onca 538, 111 or (3d) 481, at paras 31-32. the reason- able steps requirement therefore has both objective and subjective dimensions: the steps must be objec- tively reasonable, and the reasonableness of those steps must be assessed in light of the circumstances known to the accused at the time. although the words “in the circumstances known to the accused at the time” do not appear in s 1721(4), courts have drawn an analogy between s 1721(4) and the requirement under s 2732(b) that the accused take “reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time” in order to make out the defence of mis- taken belief in consent against a charge of sexual assault: see dragos, at paras 39-41. in my view, it is appropriate to incorporate this qualifier because the reasonable steps requirement is highly contextual, and what may qualify as reasonable steps in one case may not in another: see r v. thain, 2009 onca 223, 243 ccc (3d) 230, at para. 37; dragos, at paras. 32 and 41; pengelley, at para 9. [105] je suis d’avis que les «  mesures raison- nables » que l’accusé doit prendre pour l’application du par. (4) sont les mesures qu’une personne raison- nable prendrait, dans les circonstances dont l’accusé avait alors connaissance, pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne : voir r c. dragos, 2012 onca 538, 111 or (3d) 481, par 31-32. l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables comporte donc à la fois une dimension objective et une dimension subjective : les mesures doivent être objectivement raisonnables, et le caractère raisonnable de ces mesures doit être ap- précié au regard des circonstances dont l’accusé avait alors connaissance. bien que l’expression « dans les circonstances dont il avait alors connaissance » ne soit pas employée au par 1721(4), les tribunaux ont dressé une analogie entre cette disposition et l’exi- gence prévue à l’al 2732b) selon laquelle l’accusé doit prendre les « mesures raisonnables, dans les cir- constances dont il avait alors connaissance » pour pouvoir établir le moyen de défense de croyance er- ronée au consentement relativement à une accusation d’agression sexuelle : voir dragos, par 39-41. selon moi, il est approprié d’intégrer ce critère, parce que l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables est fortement liée au contexte et que ce qui peut constituer une mesure raisonnable dans un cas peut ne pas l’être dans un autre : voir r c. thain, 2009 onca 223, 243 ccc (3d) 230, par. 37; dragos, par. 32 et 41; pengelley, par 9. [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 51 in levigne, this court stated that the purpose [106] of the reasonable steps requirement in s 1721(4) is to bar the accused from claiming a defence based on an asserted belief that is “entirely devoid of an objective evidentiary basis”: para 31. taking into ac- count this purpose, in my view, reasonable steps are steps that provide information reasonably capable of supporting the accused’s belief that the other person was of legal age. put simply, reasonable steps must be meaningful. for example, relying on the fact that a public chat room is monitored by moderators who may remove children cannot constitute a reasonable step when the accused was using a private chat room to make the relevant communications: see levigne, at para 42. such a step is entirely meaningless. [107] in the same vein, a step that solicits informa- tion that does not in fact reasonably support a belief that the other party is of legal age cannot constitute a reasonable step. if the accused asked for the other person’s age — which might, depending on the re- sponse, form evidence of reasonable steps — but was told she was 13, that inquiry cannot constitute a reasonable step: see levigne, at para 43. again, such a step is not meaningful. it cannot support a belief that the other person is of legal age. the same applies where the accused receives an ambiguous response or no response at all. thus, one must consider not only the nature of the steps taken, but also the infor- mation — or lack thereof — that they solicit: see r. v. ghotra, 2016 onsc 1324, 334 ccc (3d) 222, at paras. 106 and 108. [106] dans l’arrêt levigne, la cour a statué que l’objectif de l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) est d’empêcher l’accusé de soulever un moyen de défense fondé sur l’allégation de croyances « dénuées de tout fon- dement probatoire objectif » : par 31. si l’on tient compte de cet objectif, les mesures raisonnables sont, selon moi, celles qui permettent l’obtention de renseignements pouvant raisonnablement appuyer la croyance de l’accusé selon laquelle l’autre per- sonne avait atteint l’âge légal. en termes simples, les mesures raisonnables doivent être valables. par exemple, se fonder sur le fait qu’un clavardoir pu- blic est surveillé par des modérateurs qui peuvent en expulser les enfants ne peut pas constituer une mesure raisonnable lorsque l’accusé utilisait un cla- vardoir privé pour procéder aux communications en cause : voir levigne, par 42. une telle mesure n’est nullement valable. [107] dans la même veine, une mesure se soldant par l’obtention de renseignements n’appuyant pas de façon raisonnable la croyance selon laquelle l’autre personne a atteint l’âge légal ne peut consti- tuer une mesure raisonnable. si l’accusé a demandé à l’autre personne de lui donner son âge — ce qui, selon la réponse, pourrait constituer une preuve de la prise de mesures raisonnables —, mais que l’autre personne lui a mentionné qu’elle était âgée de 13 ans, cette demande de renseignements ne peut constituer une mesure raisonnable : voir levigne, par 43. là aussi, une telle mesure n’est pas valable. elle ne peut appuyer une croyance selon laquelle l’autre personne a atteint l’âge légal la même chose s’applique lorsque l’accusé reçoit une ré- ponse ambiguë ou qu’il ne reçoit aucune réponse. par conséquent, on ne doit pas uniquement tenir compte de la nature des mesures prises, mais aussi des renseignements qu’elles permettent d’obte- nir, ou de l’absence de renseignements : voir r c. ghotra, 2016 onsc 1324, 334 ccc (3d) 222, par. 106 et 108. [108] relatedly, if the accused takes some initial steps that could reasonably support a belief that the other person is of legal age, but “red flags” are sub- sequently raised suggesting he or she may not be, then the accused may be required to take additional [108] dans le même ordre d’idées, si l’accusé prend quelques mesures initiales qui pourraient rai- sonnablement appuyer une croyance selon laquelle l’autre personne a atteint l’âge légal, mais que des [traduction] « signaux d’alarme » donnant à penser 52 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. steps to ascertain the other person’s age: see dragos, at paras. 62-64 and 66. if the accused takes no such additional steps, then he or she may be found not to have satisfied the reasonable steps requirement. the requirement is thus an ongoing one. [109] reasonable steps need not be “active”: see dragos, at para. 62; ghotra, at paras. 105, 139 and 153. the line between active and passive steps is not always easily drawn and may amount to little more than semantics. whether we characterize certain steps as “passive” or “active” is of no moment. in my view, there is no compelling reason, whether in a sting context or otherwise, for foreclosing the no- tion that arguably “passive” conduct — such as the receipt and consideration of unsolicited information — could provide information reasonably capable of supporting the accused’s belief that the other person was of legal age. [110] further, parliament has not required the ac- cused to take “all” reasonable steps: see pengelley, at para. 11; ghotra, at para 139. accordingly, the accused is not required to exhaust all potential rea- sonable steps in order to invoke the defence. there is no magic number of steps that the accused must take. in some cases, a single, decisive step may suffice; in others, multiple steps may be required. as with all legal tests that apply across a broad range of factual circumstances, context is crucial. que ce n’est pas le cas apparaissent subséquemment, l’accusé pourrait alors devoir prendre des mesures additionnelles pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre per- sonne : voir dragos, par. 62-64 et 66. si l’accusé ne prend pas de telles mesures additionnelles, nous pourrions alors conclure qu’il ne s’est pas acquitté de son obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables. l’obligation est donc continue. [109] les mesures raisonnables ne sont pas néces- sairement des mesures [traduction] « actives » : voir dragos, par. 62; ghotra, par. 105, 139 et 153. il n’est pas toujours facile d’établir la distinction entre une mesure active et une mesure passive, et cette distinction peut ne constituer guère plus qu’une ques- tion de sémantique. que nous disions de certaines mesures qu’elles sont « passives » ou « actives » importe peu. à mon avis, aucune raison impérieuse ne commande de limiter, dans un contexte d’infiltra- tion policière ou autre, la notion suivant laquelle les mesures que l’on pourrait qualifier de « passives » — comme la réception et l’examen de renseignements non sollicités — peuvent se solder par l’obtention de renseignements pouvant raisonnablement appuyer la croyance de l’accusé que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal. [110] en outre, le législateur n’a pas enjoint à l’ac- cusé de prendre « toutes » les mesures raisonnables : voir pengelley, par. 11; ghotra, par 139. par consé- quent, l’accusé n’a pas l’obligation de prendre toutes les mesures raisonnables possibles pour invoquer le moyen de défense. il n’existe pas de nombre ma- gique de mesures que l’accusé doit prendre. dans certains cas, une seule mesure décisive pourra suf- fire; dans d’autres, de multiples mesures peuvent être nécessaires. comme c’est le cas pour tous les critères juridiques qui s’appliquent à l’échelle d’un vaste ensemble de circonstances factuelles, le contexte est d’une importance capitale. [111] it is also worth emphasizing that the rea- sonable steps requirement should be applied with a healthy dose of common sense. trial judges and juries should adopt a practical, common sense ap- proach to the reasonable steps requirement, bearing in mind its overarching purpose: to bar an accused from raising a defence based on an asserted belief [111] il convient aussi de mettre l’accent sur le fait que l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables doit être appliquée avec une généreuse dose de bon sens. les juges de première instance et les jurys doivent se pencher sur l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables dans une démarche pratique et empreinte de bon sens, en gardant à l’esprit son [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 53 that is “entirely devoid of an objective evidentiary basis” (levigne, at para 31). [112] without purporting to offer an exhaustive list, reasonable steps may, depending on the circum- stances, include: asking for the other person’s age and receiving a response that supports that accused’s asserted belief; noting the other person’s representa- tion, whether solicited or unsolicited, that he or she is of legal age; asking for and receiving proof of identification indicating that the other person is of legal age; asking for and receiving a photograph or reviewing profile pictures suggesting the other per- son is of legal age; observing conduct or behaviour suggesting the other person is of legal age; choosing to communicate through a website that enforces age restrictions; and, in the case of a personal ad, includ- ing language indicating that the accused is looking to speak only with adults. the ultimate question is whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the ac- cused’s steps to ascertain the other person’s age were sufficient to constitute “reasonable steps” — namely, those that provide information that is reasonably capable of supporting the accused’s belief that the other person was of legal age. objectif premier : empêcher un accusé de soulever un moyen de défense fondé sur une allégation de croyances « dénuées de tout fondement probatoire objectif » (levigne, par 31). [112] sans prétendre que la liste ci- après est ex- haustive, voici, selon les circonstances, des mesures raisonnables qui peuvent être prises : demander à l’autre personne son âge et recevoir une réponse qui appuie sa croyance alléguée; prendre note du fait que l’autre personne a été présentée comme ayant atteint l’âge légal ou non, que ce renseignement ait été sollicité ou non; demander et recevoir une preuve d’identité selon laquelle l’autre personne a atteint l’âge légal; demander et recevoir une photo donnant à penser que l’autre personne a atteint l’âge légal, ou examiner des photos de profil indiquant une telle chose; observer une conduite ou un comportement donnant à penser que l’autre personne a atteint l’âge légal; choisir de communiquer au moyen d’un site web qui fait respecter les restrictions quant à l’âge; dans le cas d’une annonce personnelle, inclure des informations selon lesquelles on cherche unique- ment à parler à des adultes. l’ultime question est de savoir si, selon toutes les circonstances, les me- sures prises par l’accusé pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne étaient suffisantes pour constituer des « mesures raisonnables », à savoir des mesures appelant à l’obtention de renseignements pouvant raisonnablement appuyer la croyance de l’accusé que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal. [113] in sum, the approach to assessing reasonable steps is a highly contextual one that accounts for the setting in which the communications take place: the internet. [113] en somme, la méthode pour apprécier les mesures raisonnables dépend largement du contexte et tient compte du cadre dans lequel les communica- tions ont lieu : internet. [114] to the extent that my colleague justice abella maintains that the reasonable steps require- ment “may prove impossible to meet” (abella j. reasons, at para.  196), i cannot agree. as i have explained, the words “reasonable steps” are to be given broad scope. as such, they come nowhere close to creating a “nearly insurmountable barrier to the accused’s ability to raise and defend his or her innocent belief”: abella j.’s reasons, at para 217. my colleague poses the question, “what steps can an accused possibly take on the internet to reasonably [114] dans la mesure où ma collègue la juge abella maintient qu’il « peut se révéler impossible » de satisfaire à l’obligation de prendre des mesures rai- sonnables (motifs de la juge abella, par. 196), je ne puis être d’accord avec elle. comme je l’ai expliqué, l’expression « mesures raisonnables » doit être inter- prétée dans son sens large. ainsi, elle est bien loin de créer un « un obstacle quasiment infranchissable à la capacité de l’accusé d’invoquer en défense sa croyance de bonne foi » (motifs de la juge abella, par 217). ma collègue pose la question suivante : 54 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. verify the communicant was not under the relevant age    ?”: para 217. with respect, the answer is found above at paras. 105-12 of my reasons. [115] furthermore, i respectfully do not share my colleague’s concern that good faith communications aimed at ascertaining whether the other person is of legal age might themselves be found to constitute child luring: see paras 222-23. to be captured under s 1721(1), the communication at issue must have been made for the purpose of facilitating the commis- sion of a designated secondary offence. good faith communications aimed at ascertaining whether the other person is of legal age fall outside the scope of this prohibition. to illustrate, a simple request for a photo, when taken as a precautionary measure for ensuring the other person is of legal age, would not be caught by s 1721(1) and may qualify as evidence of reasonable steps. by contrast, the same request, when made for the purpose of facilitating the com- mission of a designated secondary offence, would fall within the ambit of s 1721(1). while these two scenarios involve the same act, the different purposes for which the act is performed are worlds apart, and the evidence necessary to support an inference that the request was made to facilitate the commission of a designated secondary offence would be absent where the request was made in good faith. [116] with all this in mind, the defence that the accused believed the other person was of legal age would operate in practice as follows: (1) first, in order to raise the defence, the accused bears the evidentiary burden of pointing to some evidence from which it may be found that he or she took reasonable steps and honestly believed the other person was of legal age: see levigne, at para 32(3). in other words, the accused must show that the defence has an “air of reality”. « quelles mesures un accusé peut-il possiblement prendre sur internet pour s’assurer raisonnable- ment que l’interlocuteur avait atteint l’âge appli- cable [  ]? » (motifs de la juge abella, par 217). en toute déférence, je suis d’avis que la réponse se trouve aux par. 105 à 112 de mes motifs. [115] en outre, en toute déférence, je ne partage pas l’inquiétude de ma collègue pour qui les communica- tions de bonne foi visant à vérifier si l’autre personne a atteint l’âge légal pourraient elles- mêmes être consi- dérées comme constituant un leurre : voir les motifs de la juge abella, par 222-223. pour être visée par le par 1721(1), la communication en cause doit avoir été établie en vue de faciliter la perpétration d’une infraction secondaire énumérée. les communications de bonne foi visant à vérifier si l’autre personne a atteint l’âge légal ne sont pas visées par cette inter- diction. par exemple, si on demande simplement une photo par mesure de précaution pour s’assurer que l’autre personne a atteint l’âge légal, cette demande ne serait pas visée par le par 1721(1) et pourrait être considérée comme une preuve que l’accusé a pris des mesures raisonnables. en revanche, cette même demande, si elle est faite en vue de faciliter la perpétration d’une infraction secondaire énumérée, tomberait sous le coup du par 1721(1). bien que ces deux scénarios illustrent la même action, les fins pour lesquelles cette action est menée sont complè- tement opposées, et la preuve nécessaire pour étayer une inférence que la demande a été faite en vue de faciliter la perpétration d’une infraction secondaire énumérée serait absente dans le cas où la demande serait faite de bonne foi. [116] en gardant tous ces éléments à l’esprit, j’es- time que le moyen de défense selon lequel l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal fonctionnerait, en pratique, de la manière suivante : (1) premièrement, pour que l’accusé puisse soulever le moyen de défense, il lui incombe de faire ressor- tir en preuve certains éléments qui permettraient de conclure qu’il a pris des mesures raisonnables et qu’il croyait honnêtement que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal : voir levigne, par 32(3). en d’autres termes, l’accusé doit démontrer que le moyen de défense est « vraisemblable ». [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 55 (2) second, if the accused discharges his or her evidentiary burden, the defence is left with the trier of fact, and the crown then bears the per- suasive burden of disproving the defence beyond a reasonable doubt: see levigne, at para 32(3). however, this does not mean that in order to ob- tain a conviction, the crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take reasonable steps. (3) third, regardless of whether the defence can be considered, the trier of fact must ultimately de- termine whether the crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage. thus, at the end of the day, whether the accused is convicted or acquitted does not hinge on whether the accused took reasonable steps; it hinges on whether the crown can prove culpable belief beyond a rea- sonable doubt. (2) deuxièmement, si l’accusé s’acquitte de son fardeau de présentation, le moyen de défense est soumis au juge des faits, et la couronne a alors le fardeau de persuasion de réfuter hors de tout doute raisonnable le moyen de défense : voir levigne, par 32(3). toutefois, cela ne signifie pas que, pour obtenir une déclaration de culpabi- lité, la couronne doit prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a omis de prendre des mesures raisonnables. (3) troisièmement, sans égard à la question de sa- voir si le moyen de défense peut être examiné, le juge des faits doit ultimement juger si la cou- ronne a prouvé hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. ainsi, au bout du compte, le fait que l’accusé soit déclaré coupable ou ac- quitté ne dépend pas de la question de savoir s’il a pris des mesures raisonnables; cela repose sur celle de savoir si la couronne peut prouver la croyance coupable hors de tout doute raison- nable. [117] i will address each of these stages in turn. [117] je traiterai de ces étapes à tour de rôle. (b) step 1: does the defence have an air of b) la première étape : le moyen de défense est-il reality? vraisemblable? [118] the first step is for the trial judge to de- termine whether there is an “air of reality” to the defence. a defence has an air of reality if a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could acquit the accused on the basis of the defence: see r v. cinous, 2002 scc 29, [2002] 2 scr 3, at para 2. if the defence has no air of reality — that is, there is no evidentiary basis on which the defence can rest — then it must not be left with the jury: see pappajohn v. the queen, [1980] 2 scr 120, at pp. 126-27; r v. osolin, [1993] 4 scr 595, at p. 648, per mclachlin j. (dissenting, but not on this point); r. v. park, [1995] 2 scr 836, at paras 11-13. [118] à la première étape, le juge du procès doit décider si le moyen de défense est « vraisemblable ». un moyen de défense est vraisemblable s’il peut permettre à un jury ayant reçu des directives ap- propriées et agissant raisonnablement d’acquitter l’accusé : voir r c. cinous, 2002 csc 29, [2002] 2 rcs 3, par 2. si le moyen de défense n’est pas vraisemblable, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’il n’existe aucun fondement probatoire sur lequel le moyen de défense peut s’appuyer, il ne doit donc pas être soumis au jury : voir pappajohn c. la reine, [1980] 2 rcs. 120, p. 126-127; r c. osolin, [1993] 4 rcs 595, p. 648, la juge mclachlin (dissidente, mais non sur ce point); r c. park, [1995] 2 rcs 836, par 11-13. [119] in my view, the defence that the accused believed the other person was of legal age has an air of reality only if the trier of fact could find, on the evidence, that the accused took steps capable [119] selon moi, le moyen de défense selon le- quel l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne avait at- teint l’âge légal est vraisemblable uniquement si le juge des faits pouvait conclure, selon la preuve, que 56 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. of amounting to “reasonable steps” in the circum- stances to ascertain the other person’s age and that the accused honestly believed the other person was of legal age. in other words, the accused will only meet the air of reality threshold if he or she can point to evidence capable of supporting findings that: l’accusé a pris des mesures pouvant constituer des « mesures raisonnables » dans les circonstances pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne et qu’il croyait honnêtement que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal. en d’autres termes, l’accusé ne satisfera au critère de la vraisemblance que s’il peut produire des éléments de preuve pouvant appuyer des conclusions conformes à tous les points qui suivent : (1) the accused took steps to ascertain the other (1) l’accusé a pris des mesures pour s’assurer de person’s age; l’âge de l’autre personne; (2) those steps were reasonable; and (2) ces mesures étaient raisonnables; (3) the accused honestly believed the other person (3) l’accusé croyait honnêtement que l’autre per- was of legal age. sonne avait atteint l’âge légal. [120] in particular, this means that the defence of honest belief in legal age will not be in play if there is no evidence capable of satisfying the “rea- sonableness” requirement (2). if the accused cannot discharge this evidentiary burden, then the defence will not be left with the trier of fact. in those circum- stances, in the context of a jury trial, the trial judge should provide a limiting instruction that because the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the other person’s age, the jury is precluded, as a matter of law, from considering the defence of honest belief in legal age. in that event, as described more fully under “step 3” below, the sole question the jury must consider is whether — on the whole of the evidence, including the evidence relating to the ac- cused’s failure to take reasonable steps — the crown has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused believed the other person was underage. [120] en particulier, cela signifie que le moyen de défense de croyance honnête à l’âge légal n’entrera pas en jeu s’il n’existe pas de preuve susceptible de satisfaire à l’exigence du « caractère raisonnable » (2). si l’accusé ne peut s’acquitter de ce fardeau de présentation, le moyen de défense ne sera pas soumis au juge des faits. dans ces circonstances, dans le contexte d’un procès devant jury, le juge du procès devrait donner une directive restrictive selon laquelle, parce que l’accusé n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre per- sonne, le jury ne peut, en droit, tenir compte du moyen de défense de croyance honnête à l’âge lé- gal. dans ce cas, comme il est décrit plus en détail à la « troisième étape » ci- dessous, la seule question que le jury doit examiner est de savoir si — selon l’ensemble de la preuve, y compris les éléments de preuve relatifs au défaut de l’accusé de prendre des mesures raisonnables — la couronne a établi, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. [121] where the accused has failed to point to any steps capable of amounting to reasonable steps in the circumstances, this may be a good indication that the accused believed the other person was underage or was wilfully blind as to whether the other person was underage. however, even if the defence lacks an air of reality, this is not necessarily determinative of the accused’s belief. the crown continues to bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage. [121] lorsque l’accusé n’a pas su présenter quel- que mesure que ce soit pouvant constituer une me- sure raisonnable dans les circonstances, cela pourrait être un bon indice que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé ou qu’il avait fait preuve d’aveuglement volontaire quant à ce fait. cependant, même si le moyen de défense n’est pas vraisemblable, cela n’est pas nécessairement dé- terminant de la croyance de l’accusé. il incombe toujours à la couronne de prouver hors de tout doute [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 57 where the defence is unavailable, even though the trier of fact will be precluded from considering the defence, the evidence as a whole may leave gaps or weaknesses in the crown’s case that could give rise to a reasonable doubt as to whether the crown has met its burden of showing that the accused believed the other person was underage. [122] conversely, if the trial judge determines that the defence has an air of reality, then it will be left with the trier of fact. meeting this evidentiary burden does not require the accused to take the stand; the accused could instead point to evidence adduced by the crown, such as the content of the relevant tele- communications or police interviews, demonstrating that there is an air of reality to the defence. raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. lorsque ce moyen de défense ne peut pas être invoqué, même si le juge des faits n’aura pas la possibilité d’en tenir compte, l’ensemble de la preuve peut entraîner des lacunes ou des faiblesses dans le dossier de la couronne qui pourraient soulever un doute raisonnable quant à sa- voir si la couronne s’est acquittée de son fardeau de démontrer que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. [122] en revanche, si le juge du procès conclut que le moyen de défense est vraisemblable, celui-ci sera alors soumis au juge des faits. l’accusé n’aura pas nécessairement à témoigner pour s’acquitter de ce fardeau de présentation; il peut évoquer les élé- ments de preuve produits par la couronne, comme le contenu des télécommunications pertinentes ou les interrogatoires de la police, qui démontrent que le moyen de défense est vraisemblable. (c) step 2: has the crown disproved the de- c) la deuxième étape : la couronne a-t-elle fence? réfuté le moyen de défense? [123] if the accused discharges his or her eviden- tiary burden and the defence that the accused be- lieved the other person was of legal age is left with the trier of fact, then the crown bears the persuasive burden of disproving the defence: see levigne, at para. 32(3); see also m. manning and p. sank off, manning, mewett & sankoff: criminal law (5th ed. 2015), at p 397. this means that in order to rebut the defence, which is one of honest belief in legal age, the crown must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. however, it is important to understand the role played, and not played, by reasonable steps in this analysis. [123] si l’accusé s’acquitte de son fardeau de pré- sentation et que le moyen de défense selon lequel il croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal est soumis au juge des faits, la couronne a alors le far- deau de persuasion de réfuter le moyen de défense : voir levigne, par. 32(3); voir aussi m. manning et p. sankoff, manning, mewett & sankoff : crimi nal law (5e éd. 2015), p 397. suivant cette exigence, pour renverser le moyen de défense — celui de la croyance honnête à l’âge légal —, la couronne doit le réfuter hors de tout doute raisonnable. toutefois, il est important de comprendre l’incidence qu’ont les mesures raisonnables sur cette analyse ainsi que celle qu’elles n’ont pas. [124] if the crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take reasonable steps, then the accused will be barred from relying on the defence of honest belief in legal age. this is consist- ent with the wording of subs. (4), which uses the lan- guage “[i]t is not a defence”. therefore, it is only the accused’s ability to raise the defence that is affected where the crown disproves reasonable steps. this does not relieve the crown of its burden of proving [124] si la couronne prouve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a omis de prendre des me- sures raisonnables, ce dernier ne pourra pas invo- quer le moyen de défense de la croyance honnête à l’âge légal. ceci est conforme au libellé du par. (4), qui utilise l’expression «  ne constitue un moyen de défense ». par conséquent, seule la capacité de l’accusé de soulever le moyen de défense est tou- chée lorsque la couronne réfute la prise de mesures 58 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage. [125] conversely, if the crown cannot disprove reasonable steps beyond a reasonable doubt, then the accused can raise the defence of honest belief in legal age. however, even where the defence is in play, the crown will still obtain a conviction if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage. in other words, the crown is not required to disprove reasonable steps beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction. [126] thus, put simply, whether the accused is convicted or acquitted does not hinge on whether the accused took reasonable steps; it hinges on whether the crown can prove the accused’s belief beyond a reasonable doubt. the presence or absence of rea- sonable steps is not essential for either conviction or acquittal — in short, it is not the “be- all and end- all”. instead, the reasonable steps requirement is simply a threshold requirement for raising the defence of honest belief in legal age. that is, it limits a defence that, if believed or found to raise a reasonable doubt, would entitle the accused to an acquittal. without s 1721(4), the defence of honest belief in legal age could be relied upon regardless of whether the accused took reasonable steps. raisonnables, ce qui n’allège pas le fardeau lui in- combant de prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. [125] en revanche, si la couronne ne peut pas réfuter la prise de mesures raisonnables hors de tout doute raisonnable, l’accusé peut invoquer le moyen de défense de croyance honnête à l’âge lé- gal. cependant, même lorsque le moyen de défense est en jeu, la couronne obtiendra quand même une déclaration de culpabilité si elle prouve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. en d’autres termes, la couronne n’est pas tenue de réfuter la prise de mesures raisonnables hors de tout doute rai- sonnable pour obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité. [126] ainsi, en termes simples, le fait que l’accusé soit déclaré coupable ou soit acquitté ne dépend pas de la question de savoir s’il a pris des mesures rai- sonnables, mais bien de savoir si la couronne peut prouver la croyance de l’accusé hors de tout doute raisonnable. que des mesures raisonnables soient prises ou non n’est pas essentiel pour que l’accusé soit déclaré coupable ou acquitté; bref, ce n’est pas la panacée. plutôt, l’exigence des mesures raison- nables n’est que la condition préalable pour que soit soulevé le moyen de défense de la croyance honnête à l’âge légal. pour ainsi dire, elle limite un moyen de défense qui, si on y ajoutait foi ou s’il soulevait un doute raisonnable, justifierait l’acquittement de l’accusé. sans le par 1721(4), il serait possible d’in- voquer le moyen de défense de croyance honnête à l’âge légal, que l’accusé ait pris ou non des mesures raisonnables. [127] to illustrate how these principles would ap- ply in practice, if the crown fails to disprove rea- sonable steps, then the defence is available to the accused and the trier of fact may — or may not — infer from the evidence, including the evidence of reasonable steps, that the accused believed the other person was of legal age. the mere failure to disprove reasonable steps does not, however, guarantee that the defence of honest belief in legal age will succeed. this is because the trier of fact may disbelieve the accused based on credibility findings or based on [127] pour illustrer la façon dont ces principes s’appliqueraient dans la pratique, si la couronne ne parvient pas à réfuter la prise de mesures raison- nables, ce moyen de défense est alors à la disposi- tion de l’accusé, et le juge des faits peut — ou non — inférer de la preuve, y compris des éléments de preuve relatifs aux mesures raisonnables, que l’ac- cusé croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal. le simple fait de ne pas réfuter la prise de mesures raisonnables ne garantit pas, cependant, que le moyen de défense de la croyance honnête à l’âge [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 59 a consideration of the totality of the evidence. for example, where the accused has taken reasonable steps, but the evidence shows that the accused made statements to a third party that he or she was in a relationship with a 14- year-old, the crown may well succeed in establishing that the accused had the req- uisite belief to sustain a conviction. [128] by contrast, if the crown does succeed in disproving reasonable steps, then the defence of honest belief in legal age will fail. in that event, in the context of a jury trial, the trial judge should provide the limiting instruction set out at para. 120 above. légal sera retenu. en effet, le juge des faits peut ne pas croire l’accusé en se fondant sur des conclusions quant à la crédibilité ou sur l’examen de l’ensemble de la preuve. par exemple, lorsque l’accusé a pris des mesures raisonnables, mais que la preuve démontre qu’il a déclaré à un tiers être en relation avec une personne de 14 ans, la couronne pourrait bien réussir à établir que l’accusé avait la croyance nécessaire pour justifier une déclaration de culpabilité. [128] en revanche, si la couronne réussit à réfuter la prise de mesures raisonnables, le moyen de dé- fense de la croyance honnête à l’âge légal échouera. dans ce cas, dans le contexte d’un procès devant jury, le juge du procès devrait donner la directive restrictive énoncée au par. 120, ci- dessus. (d) step 3: has the crown proven that the ac- cused believed the other person was under- age? d) la troisième étape  : la couronne a-t-elle prouvé que l’accusé croyait que l’autre per- sonne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé? [129] as explained above, where the crown estab- lishes that the accused failed to take reasonable steps, s 1721(4) bars accused persons from raising, as a defence, that they believed the other person was of legal age. but a conviction cannot rest solely on this basis; without the presumption under subs. (3), the reasonable steps requirement under subs. (4) does not provide an independent pathway to conviction. therefore, the inquiry does not end if and when the crown establishes that the accused did not take reasonable steps. instead, the trier of fact would then be required to consider the whole of the evidence, including the evidence relating to the accused’s fail- ure to take reasonable steps, not to reintroduce the defence of honest belief in legal age, but in deter- mining whether the crown has discharged its legal burden of establishing that the accused believed the other person was underage. only if that element is proven can a conviction be entered. [129] comme il a été expliqué précédemment, lorsque la couronne établit que l’accusé a omis de prendre des mesures raisonnables, le par 1721(4) empêche les personnes accusées de soulever, à titre de moyen de défense, le fait qu’elles croyaient que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal. toutefois, une déclaration de culpabilité ne peut pas reposer uniquement sur ce fondement; en l’absence de la pré- somption établie au par. (3), l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables prévue au par. (4) n’ouvre pas à elle seule la voie à une déclaration de culpabi- lité. par conséquent, l’analyse ne prend pas fin dès lors que la couronne établit que l’accusé n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables. le juge des faits devra plutôt examiner l’ensemble de la preuve, y compris les éléments de preuve relatifs au défaut de l’accusé de prendre des mesures raisonnables, non pas en vue de soulever de nouveau le moyen de défense de la croyance honnête à l’âge légal, mais bien pour juger si la couronne s’est acquittée de son fardeau consistant à établir que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. ce n’est que si cet élément est établi qu’une déclaration de culpa- bilité peut être inscrite. [130] with this in mind, where an accused has failed to take reasonable steps, the trial judge must [130] cela étant posé, lorsque l’accusé n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables, le juge de première 60 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. instruct the jury that the accused’s evidence that he or she believed the other person was of legal age cannot be considered in determining whether the crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. this instruction is essential — it guards against the risk that an acquittal may result based on an assertion that is devoid of any objective basis in the evidence. thus, put simply, where reasonable steps have not been taken, an accused’s evidence that he or she believed the other person was of legal age is without any value, and the jury cannot rely on that evidence when assessing the strength of the crown’s case. [131] there are circumstances in which, despite the absence of reasonable steps, the crown may nonetheless fail to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was un- derage. for example, the trier of fact may determine that the accused was merely aware of a risk that the other person was underage (ie, was reckless), or was merely negligent. neither of these findings could ground a conviction. [132] equally, there are circumstances in which, despite the reasonable steps requirement having been satisfied, the crown may still succeed in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage. for example, as illus- trated above, there may be evidence that the accused made statements to a third party that indicate he or she had the belief necessary to sustain a conviction. instance doit donner comme directive au jury de ne pas prendre en compte la preuve de l’accusé ten- dant à montrer qu’il croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal pour décider si la couronne a établi la culpabilité hors de tout doute raisonnable. cette directive est essentielle : elle permet d’éviter le risque qu’un acquittement soit prononcé sur la foi d’une affirmation dénuée de tout fondement proba- toire objectif. par conséquent, en clair, dans les cas où l’accusé n’a pas pris de mesures raisonnables, la preuve selon laquelle ce dernier croyait que l’autre personne avait atteint l’âge légal n’a aucune valeur, et le jury ne peut s’en servir pour évaluer la solidité de la preuve de la couronne. [131] il existe des circonstances dans lesquelles, malgré l’absence de mesures raisonnables, la cou- ronne peut néanmoins échouer à établir hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. par exemple, le juge des faits peut conclure que l’accusé avait sim- plement connaissance du risque que l’autre personne n’ait pas atteint l’âge fixé (c’est-à-dire, que l’accusé a fait preuve d’insouciance), ou qu’il était simplement négligent. une déclaration de culpabilité ne peut s’appuyer sur ni l’une ni l’autre de ces conclusions. [132] de même, il y a des circonstances dans les- quelles, même s’il est satisfait à l’exigence relative aux mesures raisonnables, la couronne peut toujours réussir à prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. par exemple, comme il a été pré- cédemment illustré, il peut y avoir des éléments de preuve selon lesquels l’accusé a fait des déclarations à un tiers qui indiquent qu’il avait la croyance né- cessaire pour justifier une déclaration de culpabilité. in sum, it is the third step in the analysis — [133] whether the crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the other person was underage — that is the question of ultimate consequence. [133] bref, c’est la troisième étape de l’analyse — la question de savoir si la couronne a prouvé hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait que l’autre personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé — qui entraîne la conséquence ultime. e application and remedy e application et réparation [134] having outlined the proper approach to in- terpreting and applying s 1721 in the absence of the [134] après cette description de l’approche qu’il convient d’adopter en ce qui a trait à l’interprétation [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 61 presumption under s 1721(3),. i return to mr. mor- rison’s case. [135] as indicated, although the trial judge was left with a reasonable doubt as to whether mr. morrison believed “mia” was under the age of 16, he none- theless convicted mr. morrison on the basis that he failed to take reasonable steps. however, as i have pointed out, this conclusion was legally unsound. a failure to take reasonable steps does not constitute an independent pathway to conviction in the absence of the presumption under subs (3). to support a con- viction, the crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that mr. morrison believed “mia” was under 16. the trial judge found that it did not. accordingly, mr. morrison’s conviction cannot stand. [136] this leaves the question of remedy — namely, whether mr. morrison is entitled to an acquittal or in- stead must face a new trial, should the crown choose to retry him.3 for reasons that follow, i would order a new trial, despite the trial judge’s finding that the evidence was “sufficient, if barely so, to inspire a rea- sonable doubt concerning [mr. morrison’s] subjective belief regarding the age of the person with whom he was communicating”: 2015 oncj 599, at para 28. et à l’application de l’art 1721 en l’absence de la présomption établie au par 1721(3), je reviens au dossier de m morrison. [135] comme il a été mentionné, malgré le doute raisonnable qui subsistait dans son esprit quant à savoir si m. morrison croyait que « mia » était âgée de moins de 16 ans, le juge du procès a néanmoins déclaré m. morrison coupable au motif que ce der- nier avait omis de prendre des mesures raisonnables. cependant, comme je l’ai signalé, cette conclusion n’était pas valide en droit. le défaut de prendre des mesures raisonnables ne constitue pas une voie in- dépendante pouvant conduire à la déclaration de culpabilité en l’absence de la présomption établie au par (3). pour appuyer une déclaration de culpa- bilité, la couronne devait prouver, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que m. morrison croyait que « mia » était âgée de moins de 16 ans, ce qu’elle n’a pas fait, selon le juge du procès. la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée à l’encontre de m. morrison ne peut donc pas être maintenue. [136] il reste donc à trancher la question de la ré- paration, c’est-à-dire celle de savoir si m. morrison a droit à un acquittement ou s’il doit subir un nou- veau procès, dans l’éventualité où la couronne opte pour une telle solution3. pour les motifs qui suivent, j’ordonnerais la tenue d’un nouveau procès, et ce, même si le juge du procès a conclu que la preuve était [traduction] « suffisante, quoiqu’à peine, pour susciter un doute raisonnable concernant la croyance subjective [de m. morrison] concernant l’âge de la personne avec qui il communiquait » : 2015 oncj 599, par 28. [137] as i have explained, the trial judge proceeded on the erroneous understanding that mr. morrison could be convicted on the basis that he failed to take reasonable steps. the legal framework the trial judge applied was therefore incorrect. it follows, in my [137] comme je l’ai expliqué, le juge du procès est allé de l’avant en se fondant sur l’interpréta- tion erronée qu’il avait selon laquelle m. morrison pouvait être déclaré coupable au motif qu’il avait omis de prendre des mesures raisonnables. le cadre 3 technically, there is a third option: mr. morrison’s conviction could be upheld on the basis of s 686(1)(b)(iii) of the code. however, i am of the view that it would be inappropriate to do so here, as the crown has not requested that this court apply the curative proviso and mr. morrison has not had the opportunity to make submissions based on how the correct legal framework should be applied to his case. 3 il existe, en fait, une troisième solution  : la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée à l’encontre de m. morrison pourrait être maintenue au titre du sous-al. 686(1)b)(iii) du code. cependant, je suis d’avis que cette solution serait inappropriée en l’espèce, étant donné que la couronne n’a pas demandé à la cour d’ap- pliquer la disposition réparatrice et que m. morrison n’a pas eu la possibilité de présenter des observations fondées sur la façon dont le bon cadre juridique devrait être appliqué à sa cause. 62 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. view, that his conclusion that he was left with a rea- sonable doubt as to whether mr. morrison believed “mia” was under 16 — a conclusion that would ordinarily result in an acquittal — must be treated with considerable caution, as it may well have been tainted by his erroneous understanding that a con- viction could still be entered on another basis. this concern is a very real one here because, as i will explain, the trial judge’s finding that mr. morrison was “indifferent” as to “mia’s” age was not only unsupported by any objective evidence; it also ran contrary to mr. morrison’s sworn testimony, the sole basis for the trial judge’s conclusion. [138] in his reasons, the trial judge observed that mr. morrison’s “stated assumption that he was deal- ing with an adult determined to remain in charac- ter” was “an assumption without any supporting foundation”: para. 23 (emphasis added). he further acknowledged that mr. morrison’s testimony in this regard was the “only thing standing in the way” of finding that he believed “mia” was underage: para. 24 (emphasis added). the remainder of the evidence “suggest[ed] that morrison believed he was in fact communicating with a fourteen- year-old female”: para 23. [139] despite having made these observations, the trial judge nevertheless went on to conclude, based solely on mr. morrison’s unsupported testimony, that mr. morrison was “indifferent” to “mia’s” age, in the sense of “simply not turning his mind to the question in any meaningful way”: paras 26-27. as such, he was left in a state of reasonable doubt as to mr. morrison’s belief: paras 27-28. juridique appliqué par le juge du procès était donc incorrect. selon moi, il s’ensuit que sa conclusion se- lon laquelle il subsistait chez lui un doute raisonnable quant à savoir si m. morrison croyait que « mia » était âgée de moins de 16 ans — une conclusion qui se solderait en temps normal par un acquittement — doit être traitée avec une prudence considérable, puisqu’elle pourrait bien avoir été viciée par son interprétation erronée du droit quant à la possibilité qu’une déclaration de culpabilité puisse néanmoins être inscrite pour un autre motif. cette préoccupation est bien réelle en l’espèce, car, comme je l’explique- rai plus loin, non seulement la conclusion du juge du procès selon laquelle m. morrison avait fait preuve [traduction] « d’indifférence » à l’égard de l’âge de « mia » reposait- elle sur aucun élément de preuve objectif, mais elle allait aussi à l’encontre du témoi- gnage sous serment de m. morrison, qui constituait la seule assise à la conclusion du juge du procès. [138] dans ses motifs, le juge du procès a fait remarquer que [traduction] « la supposition for- mulée par [m. morrison] selon laquelle il avait af- faire à une adulte déterminée à demeurer dans son personnage » n’était « aucunement fondée : par. 23 (je souligne). il a aussi reconnu que le témoignage de m. morrison à cet égard était la « seule chose faisant obstacle » à la conclusion portant que ce dernier croyait que « mia » n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé : par. 24 (je souligne). le reste de la preuve « donn[ait] à penser que [m.] morrison croyait qu’il communiquait effectivement avec une personne de sexe féminin âgée de quatorze ans » : par 23. [139] bien qu’il ait formulé ces observations, le juge du procès a néanmoins conclu, en se fon- dant uniquement sur le témoignage non étayé de m. morrison, que ce dernier avait fait preuve [tra- duction] « d’indifférence » à l’égard de l’âge de « mia », en ce sens qu’il « ne s’était tout simplement jamais penché sur la question avec sérieux » : par. 26- 27. par conséquent, il subsistait chez lui un doute raisonnable quant à la croyance de m. morrison : par 27-28. [140] the trial judge’s crucial finding that mr. mor rison was indifferent to “mia’s” age had no basis in mr. morrison’s testimony, the sole evidence [140] la conclusion fondamentale du juge du procès portant que m. morrison avait fait preuve d’indifférence à l’égard de l’âge de «  mia  » ne [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 63 upon which he purported to rely. at no point did mr. morrison testify that he did not turn his mind to “mia’s” age. nor did he make any concession to that effect in cross- examination. mr. morrison consist- ently affirmed that he believed “mia” was an adult woman — a belief that the trial judge found to be without any supporting foundation. thus, in conclud- ing that mr. morrison was indifferent to “mia’s” age, the trial judge not only relied exclusively on evidence he found to be unsupported; he used that evidence to ground a conclusion it could not logically sustain and, in fact, directly contradicted. in determining the appropriate remedy, this gap in logic cannot be overlooked. if this were a situation in which the crown’s [141] case was weak, an order for a new trial would ar- guably be unwarranted. but here, the crown’s case was anything but weak. without commenting further on the matter, i note that the record discloses evi- dence strongly indicating that a trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that mr. morrison believed “mia” was underage or was wilfully blind as to whether she was underage. for example, as detailed in paras. 19-24 above: trouvait aucun fondement dans le témoignage de m. morrison, soit le seul élément de preuve sur le- quel il a dit s’être fondé. monsieur morrison n’a en aucun temps, lors de son témoignage, affirmé ne pas s’être attardé à l’âge de « mia ». il n’a pas non plus fait de concessions en ce sens en contre- interrogatoire. monsieur morrison a constamment affirmé qu’il croyait que « mia » était une adulte, et le juge du procès a conclu que cette croyance était dépourvue de fondement. donc, en concluant que m. morrison avait fait preuve d’indifférence à l’égard de l’âge de « mia », non seulement le juge du procès s’est fondé exclusivement sur une preuve qui, d’après lui, n’était pas étayée, mais il s’est servi de cette preuve comme fondement d’une conclusion qu’elle ne pouvait pas, en toute logique, soutenir et que, dans les faits, elle contredisait directement. il est impossible de faire fi de cette lacune en matière de logique lorsque vient le temps d’établir la réparation appropriée. [141] s’il s’agissait d’une situation dans laquelle le dossier de la couronne était faible, on pourrait prétendre qu’il ne serait pas justifié d’ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès. toutefois, le dossier de la couronne en l’espèce était tout sauf faible. je re- marque, sans en dire davantage, que le dossier révèle une preuve indiquant fortement qu’un juge des faits pourrait conclure, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que m. morrison croyait que « mia » n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé ou qu’il avait fait preuve d’aveuglement volontaire quant à cette question. à titre d’exemple, comme il est mentionné aux par. 19-24 ci- dessus : • • “mia” indicated on numerous occasions that she was 14 years old. • « mia » a mentionné à de nombreuses reprises qu’elle était âgée de 14 ans. she used language and discussed topics consist- ent with her represented age. • elle utilisait un langage et discutait de sujets qui correspondaient à celui des jeunes de cet âge. • mr. morrison offered to pick “mia” up near her school to engage in sexual activity. • monsieur  morrison a offert d’aller chercher « mia » près de son école pour qu’ils se livrent à des actes sexuels. • upon arrest, mr. morrison made several state- ments that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that he believed “mia” was un- derage. • une fois arrêté, m. morrison a formulé plusieurs déclarations qui pourraient raisonnablement être interprétées comme démontrant qu’il croyait que « mia » n’avait pas atteint l’âge fixé. 64 • r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. in cross- examination, mr. morrison admitted that the requirement that users must indicate that they are over 18 years old in order to access the relevant section of craigslist is effectively useless. • en contre- interrogatoire, m. morrison a admis que l’obligation pour les usagers de la partie du site de craigslist qui est en cause d’indiquer qu’ils sont âgés de plus de 18 ans afin d’y avoir accès est en réalité inutile. • mr.  morrison further admitted that he asked “mia” for a photo to assess her level of attrac- tiveness, not to determine her age. [142] for these reasons, considerations of fairness — including fairness to the public and the integ- rity of the justice system — favour a new trial, one that is conducted using a correct legal framework. accordingly, i would order a new trial. • monsieur morrison a aussi reconnu qu’il avait demandé à « mia » de lui donner une photo pour apprécier sa beauté, et non pour déterminer son âge. [142] pour ces motifs, les considérations relatives à l’équité — dont l’équité envers le public et l’intégrité du système de justice — favorisent la tenue d’un nouveau procès, lequel devra se dérouler confor- mément au bon cadre juridique par conséquent, j’ordonnerais la tenue d’un nouveau procès. f the one- year mandatory minimum sentence f la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obliga- under section 172.1(2)(a) toire d’un an prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) [143] finally, mr. morrison challenges the manda- tory minimum sentence of one year’s imprisonment under s 1721(2)(a) as infringing the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the charter. there is a high bar to establish- ing cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12: r v. nur, 2015 scc 15, [2015] 1 scr 773, at para. 39; r v. lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr 130, at para 24. a mandatory minimum sentence infringes s. 12 if it imposes a grossly disproportionate sen- tence — that is, a sentence that is “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency” and “abhorrent or intolerable” to society, but not one that is merely ex- cessive: r v. smith, [1987] 1 scr 1045, at p. 1072, citing miller v. the queen, [1977] 2 scr 680, at p. 688; lloyd, at para. 24, citing r v. morrisey, 2000 scc 39, [2000] 2 scr 90, at para 26. [143] enfin, m. morrison conteste la peine d’em- prisonnement minimale obligatoire d’un an prévue à l’al 1721(2)a), au motif qu’elle porte atteinte au droit à la protection contre les peines cruelles et inu- sitées que lui garantit l’art. 12 de la charte. la barre est haute lorsqu’il s’agit d’établir qu’une peine est cruelle et inusitée pour l’application de l’art. 12 : r. c. nur, 2015 csc 15, [2015] 1 rcs 773, par. 39; r c. lloyd, 2016 csc 13, [2016] 1  rcs  130, par 24. une peine minimale obligatoire contrevient à l’art.  12 si elle inflige une peine exagérément disproportionnée — c’est-à-dire une peine qui est « excessive au point de ne pas être compatible avec la dignité humaine », de même qu’« odieuse ou in- tolérable » socialement. il ne s’agit pas d’une peine qui est simplement excessive : r c. smith, [1987] 1 rcs 1045, p. 1072, citant miller c. la reine, [1977] 2 rcs 680, p. 688; lloyd, par. 24, citant r c. morrisey, 2000 csc 39, [2000] 2 rcs 90, par 26. [144] as this court articulated in nur, two ques- tions arise when a mandatory minimum is challenged under s 12. first, the court must assess whether the provision results in a grossly disproportionate sen- tence when applied to the offender before the court. if it does not, the second question is whether the [144] comme l’a expliqué la cour dans l’arrêt nur, deux questions se posent lorsqu’une peine mi- nimale obligatoire est contestée sur le fondement de l’art 12. premièrement, le tribunal doit se demander si la disposition a pour effet d’infliger une peine exa- gérément disproportionnée dans le cas du délinquant [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 65 provision’s reasonably foreseeable applications will impose grossly disproportionate sentences on other offenders: see para 77. [145] in my view, it would be unwise to rule on the constitutional validity of the mandatory mini- mum under s 1721(2)(a) in this appeal. the courts below proceeded on the mistaken understanding that mr. morrison could be convicted on the basis of mere negligence — that is, his failure to take reasonable steps — and their conclusions on the s. 12 issue rested, at least in part, on this mistaken understanding: see 2015 oncj 598, at paras. 70, 72, 91 and 93-94; ca reasons, at paras. 121 and 131-34. similarly, the four- month sentence imposed by the trial judge was influenced by his mistaken understanding that s 1721(4) can be read so as to allow for a conviction absent proof of subjective mens rea. i would also note that the parties did not have the opportunity to make submissions on the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum with the benefit of a clear statement from this court as to the mens rea required for a conviction. in these circumstances, any final determination of the s. 12 issue is best left to the trial judge at the new trial, should mr. morrison be convicted again. qui se trouve devant lui. dans la négative, le tribunal doit ensuite se demander si les applications raison- nablement prévisibles de la disposition infligeront à d’autres délinquants des peines exagérément dispro- portionnées : voir par 77. [145] à mon sens, il serait peu judicieux de sta- tuer sur la constitutionnalité de la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) dans le cadre du présent pourvoi. les cours de juridictions inférieures sont parties du principe erroné que m. morrison pouvait être déclaré coupable sur le fondement d’une simple négligence, c’est-à-dire son défaut de prendre des mesures raisonnables, et leurs conclusions sur la question de l’art. 12 reposaient, du moins en partie, sur ce raisonnement erroné : voir 2015 oncj 598, par. 70, 72, 91 et 93-94, motifs de la ca, par. 121 et 131-134. de même, la décision du juge du procès d’infliger une peine de quatre mois a été influen- cée par le fait que ce dernier croyait à tort que le par 1721(4) pouvait être interprété de façon à per- mettre une déclaration de culpabilité en l’absence de la preuve de la mens rea subjective. je souligne également que les parties n’ont pas eu l’occasion de présenter des observations sur la constitutionnalité de la peine minimale obligatoire en disposant d’un énoncé clair de la cour quant à la mens rea requise pour une déclaration de culpabilité. dans ces cir- constances, il vaut mieux laisser au juge présidant le nouveau procès le soin de trancher définitivement la question de l’art. 12, dans le cas où m. morrison serait à nouveau déclaré coupable. [146] i would, however, offer the following comments on the one hand, several features of s 1721 suggest that the mandatory minimum under subs. (2)(a) is, at the very least, constitutionally sus- pect. subsection 172.1(2) “casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct”, making it potentially vulnerable to constitutional challenge given the range of reasonably foreseeable applications of the manda- tory minimum: nur, at para. 82; lloyd, at para 35. the mandatory minimum attaches to any offence committed under s.  172.1(1), and these offences vary in a number of respects. they include child lur- ing in the context of communications with a person who is, or who the accused believes is, of various ages — less than 18 years old under s 1721(1)(a), [146] toutefois, j’aimerais formuler les commen- taires suivants d’une part, plusieurs aspects de l’art 1721 semblent, à tout le moins, jeter un doute sur la constitutionnalité de la peine minimale obli- gatoire prévue à l’al (2)a). le paragraphe 172.1(2) « s’applique à une vaste gamme de comportements potentiels », ce qui le rend potentiellement vulné- rable sur le plan constitutionnel, compte tenu de l’éventail d’applications raisonnablement prévisibles de la peine minimale obligatoire : nur, par. 82; lloyd, par 35. la peine minimale obligatoire se rattache à toutes les infractions prévues au par 1721(1), et celles-ci varient à un certain nombre d’égards. elles comprennent le leurre dans le contexte de commu- nications avec des personnes d’âges variés ou que 66 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. less than 16 under s 1721(1)(b), and less than 14 under s.  172.1(1)(c) moreover, s.  172.1’s scope encompasses situations potentially ranging from a single text message sent by a 21- year-old young adult to a 15- year-old adolescent, to those involving numerous conversations taking place over weeks or months between a middle- aged mature adult and a 13- year-old child. [147] subsection 172.1(1) also criminalizes com- munications sent for the purpose of facilitating a wide array of designated secondary offences. these include, among others, sexual interference with a per- son under 16 (s. 151), sexual exploitation (s. 153(1)), incest (s. 155), bestiality in the presence of a person under 16 (s. 160(3)), exposure of genitals to a per- son under 16 (s. 173(2)), aggravated sexual assault (s. 273), and abduction (ss. 280 and 281). the sec- ondary offences vary in terms of their gravity, as evidenced by the fact that parliament has assigned markedly different sentencing ranges to different of- fences within this list. for example, a conviction for aggravated sexual assault against a person under 16 carries with it a mandatory minimum of five years’ imprisonment and a maximum penalty of lifetime imprisonment (s 273(2)(a2)). by contrast, a con- viction for exposure of genitals to a person under 16 carries with it a mandatory minimum of 90 days’ imprisonment and a maximum of two years’ im- prisonment where the crown proceeds by way of indictment (s. 173(2)(a)) and a mandatory minimum of 30 days’ imprisonment and a maximum of six months’ imprisonment where the crown proceeds summarily (s. 173(2)(b)) — these two mandatory minimums are in fact less strict than those established under s 1721(2). and certain designated secondary offences carry no mandatory minimum at all. l’accusé croit telles — moins de 18 ans dans le cas de l’al 1721(1)a), moins de 16 ans dans le cas de l’al. b), et moins de 14 ans dans le cas de l’al c). en outre, la portée de l’art 1721 englobe différentes situations, lesquelles peuvent aller d’un seul mes- sage texte envoyé par un jeune adulte de 21 ans à un adolescent de 15 ans aux nombreuses conversations qui durent des semaines ou des mois entre un adulte d’âge mûr et un enfant de 13 ans. [147] le paragraphe 172.1(1) criminalise égale- ment les communications envoyées en vue de faciliter la perpétration d’un large éventail d’infractions secon- daires énumérées. il s’agit notamment des contacts sexuels avec une personne âgée de moins de 16 ans (art. 151), de l’exploitation sexuelle (par. 153(1)), de l’inceste (art. 155), de la bestialité en présence d’une personne âgée de moins de 16 ans (par. 160(3)), de l’exhibitionnisme devant une personne âgée de moins de 16 ans (par. 173(2)), de l’agression sexuelle grave (art. 273) et de l’enlèvement (art. 280 et 281). la gravité des infractions secondaires diffère, comme le démontre la grande variété de peines que le lé- gislateur a prévu pour les diverses infractions figu- rant sur cette liste. par exemple, une déclaration de culpabilité pour agression sexuelle grave sur une per- sonne âgée de moins de 16 ans emporte une peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire de cinq ans et une peine maximale d’emprisonnement à perpé- tuité (al 273(2)a2)). en revanche, une déclaration de culpabilité pour exhibitionnisme devant une per- sonne âgée de moins de 16 ans emporte une peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire de 90 jours et une peine d’emprisonnement maximale de deux ans lorsque la couronne procède par mise en accusation (al. 173(2)a)), ainsi qu’une peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire de 30 jours et une peine d’empri- sonnement maximale de six mois lorsque la couronne opte pour la procédure sommaire (al. 173(2)b)) — ces deux peines minimales obligatoires étant moins strictes que celles prévues au par 1721(2). de plus, certaines infractions secondaires énumérées ne sont assorties d’aucune peine minimale obligatoire. [148] as this brief overview demonstrates, there is considerable variation in terms of the conduct and circumstances that may be caught by s 1721(1). yet, despite this variation, parliament has not included [148] comme le démontre cet aperçu, le compor- tement et les circonstances que vise le par 1721(1) varient considérablement. pourtant, malgré cette va- riation, le législateur n’a pas prévu de « mécanisme » [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 67 a “safety valve” in the provision that would allow judges to exempt outlier cases where a significantly lower sentence might be appropriate, making the mandatory minimum provision vulnerable to consti- tutional challenge: see lloyd, at para 36. dans la disposition qui permettrait aux juges d’écar- ter la peine minimale obligatoire dans certains cas précis où une peine nettement moindre conviendrait mieux, rendant ainsi la disposition sur la peine mini- male obligatoire vulnérable sur le plan constitution- nel : voir lloyd, par 36. [149] moreover, the fact that child luring is a hy- brid offence may present additional concerns from a s. 12 perspective. if the crown proceeds by way of indictment, then the mandatory minimum is one year’s imprisonment (s 1721(2)(a)). if, however, the crown proceeds summarily, then the mandatory min- imum is six months’ imprisonment (s 1721(2)(b)). by creating a hybrid offence, parliament has ac- knowledged that the offence can occur in circum- stances where considerably lower sentences are appropriate.4 [149] de plus, le fait que le leurre soit une infrac- tion mixte peut susciter d’autres préoccupations au regard de l’art 12. si la couronne procède par mise en accusation, la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire est d’un an (al 1721(2)a)). toutefois, si elle opte pour la procédure sommaire, la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire est de six mois (al 1721(2)b)). en créant une infraction mixte, le législateur a reconnu que les circonstances de l’infraction peuvent commander une peine nettement moindre4. importantly, in nur, a majority of this court [150] rejected the argument that in determining whether a mandatory minimum is grossly disproportionate, a court should take into account the prosecutor’s discretion to proceed summarily rather than by way of indictment, thereby avoiding the mandatory min- imum attaching to the latter form of proceeding: see paras. 85-86 and 92. accordingly, based on this court’s jurisprudence, it is not open to a court to assume that the crown will seek the higher manda- tory minimum only where proceeding summarily would be inappropriate in light of the gravity of the conduct alleged. [150] il est important de souligner que, dans l’arrêt nur, les juges majoritaires de la cour ont rejeté l’ar- gument selon lequel, lorsqu’il examine la question de savoir si une peine minimale obligatoire est exa- gérément disproportionnée, le tribunal devrait tenir compte du pouvoir discrétionnaire du poursuivant de procéder par voie sommaire plutôt que par mise en accusation, pour ainsi éviter la peine minimale obligatoire associée à ce dernier mode de poursuite : voir par. 85-86 et 92. par conséquent, au vu de la ju- risprudence de la cour, le tribunal ne peut présumer que la couronne cherchera à obtenir la peine mini- male obligatoire la plus sévère uniquement lorsqu’il serait inadéquat d’opter pour la procédure sommaire, compte tenu de la gravité du comportement reproché. [151] from a s. 12 perspective, then, hybrid of- fences raise the following key concern: if we assume — as parliament evidently did — that the sentencing floor embodied by the summary conviction manda- tory minimum represents a fit sentence in at least some reasonably foreseeable cases, and this court [151] ainsi, au regard de l’art. 12, les infractions mixtes soulèvent la préoccupation principale sui- vante : si nous présumons — comme l’a manifes- tement fait le législateur — que la peine plancher formant la peine minimale obligatoire sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire est une peine 4 before it was amended in july 2015, and at the time mr. morrison was charged, s 1721(2)(b) prescribed a mandatory minimum of 90 days’ imprisonment and a maximum of 18 months’ impris- onment where the crown proceeded summarily. at that time, s. 172.1(2)(a) provided for a minimum of one year’s imprisonment and a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment if the crown pro- ceeded by way of indictment. 4 avant d’être modifié en juillet 2015, et au moment où m. morrison a été accusé, l’al 1721(2)b) prévoyait une peine d’emprisonne- ment minimale obligatoire de 90 jours et une peine d’emprisonne- ment maximale de 18 mois lorsque la couronne optait pour la procédure sommaire. à cette époque, l’al 1721(2)a) prévoyait une peine d’emprisonnement minimale d’un an et une peine d’emprisonnement maximale de 10 ans si la couronne procédait par mise en accusation. 68 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. cannot rely on prosecutorial discretion to ensure that the higher mandatory minimum is invoked only where proceeding summarily would be inappropri- ate, then it would seem that there will necessarily be some reasonably foreseeable cases in which the application of the higher mandatory minimum will be disproportionate (ie, too severe). put differently, by identifying a sentencing floor embodied by the summary conviction minimum sentence, parliament has openly acknowledged that there will be circum- stances in which the application of the higher man- datory minimum will be harsher than necessary. yet, following nur, the court is precluded from relying on prosecutorial discretion to eliminate the risk that the higher mandatory minimum will be applied where the lower mandatory minimum ought to be applied. [152] in the context of a hybrid offence, then, where a two- tier mandatory minimum is challenged on the basis that the higher tier is grossly dispro- portionate, an important question to be answered is whether the difference between the summary convic- tion sentencing floor (ie, the lower mandatory min- imum) and the mandatory minimum for a conviction on indictment (ie, the higher mandatory minimum) is so great as to render the higher mandatory mini- mum “grossly” disproportionate in cases where the summary conviction sentencing floor would be fit. appropriée dans au moins certains cas raisonnable- ment prévisibles, et que la cour ne peut se fonder sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire du poursuivant pour s’assurer que la peine minimale obligatoire la plus lourde n’est invoquée que lorsqu’il ne conviendrait pas d’opter pour la procédure sommaire, il semble- rait donc que, dans certains cas raisonnablement prévisibles, l’application de la peine minimale obli- gatoire la plus lourde sera forcément disproportion- née (c-à-d trop sévère). autrement dit, en prévoyant une peine plancher consacrée par une peine minimale sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure som- maire, le législateur a ouvertement reconnu que, dans certaines circonstances, l’application de la peine mi- nimale obligatoire la plus lourde sera plus sévère que nécessaire. pourtant, suivant l’arrêt nur, le tribunal ne peut se fonder sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire du poursuivant pour écarter le risque que la peine mini- male obligatoire la plus lourde soit appliquée dans un cas où la peine minimale obligatoire la moins sévère aurait dû être appliquée. [152] dans le contexte d’une infraction mixte, lors- qu’une peine minimale obligatoire à deux niveaux est contestée au motif que le niveau le plus sévère est exagérément disproportionné, il est important de juger si la différence entre la peine plancher sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire (c-à-d la peine minimale obligatoire la moins sé- vère) et la peine minimale obligatoire sur déclaration de culpabilité par mise en accusation (c-à-d la peine minimale obligatoire la plus sévère) est importante au point de rendre la peine minimale obligatoire la plus sévère « exagérément » disproportionnée dans les cas où la peine plancher sur déclaration de culpa- bilité par procédure sommaire serait appropriée. [153] with that in mind, certain considerations may militate in favour of a finding that the one- year mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) does not infringe s 12. applying this court’s guidance in lloyd, the ultimate question is whether a sentence of one year’s imprisonment would be grossly dispro- portionate, having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender and, if need be, other persons in reasonably foreseeable situations: para 22. it may well be that a one- year sentence for offenders in reasonably foreseeable scenarios [153] cela étant posé, certains facteurs peuvent inciter à conclure que la peine minimale obligatoire d’un an prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) ne contrevient pas à l’art 12. suivant les directives énoncées par la cour dans l’arrêt lloyd, il faut se demander en défi- nitive si une peine d’un an d’emprisonnement serait exagérément disproportionnée, eu égard à la nature de l’infraction et à la situation du délinquant et, au besoin, à celle d’autres personnes dans des situa- tions raisonnablement prévisibles : par 22. dans certaines situations hypothétiques raisonnables, il se [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison le juge moldaver 69 would not be “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency” or “abhorrent or intolerable” to society and that the crown’s decision to seek a lesser punish- ment by proceeding summarily — which, in a sense, might be viewed as granting the accused a form of leniency — has no impact on that conclusion: see lloyd, at para 24. child luring is a serious offence that targets one of the most vulnerable groups within canadian society — our children. it requires a high level of mens rea and involves a high degree of moral blameworthiness. and while the offence may be committed in various ways and in a broad array of circumstances — which is generally the case with most criminal offences — the simple fact remains that in order to secure a conviction, the crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally communicated with a person who is, or who the accused believed to be, underage, with specific intent to facilitate the commission of a sex- ual offence or the offence of abduction against that person. thus, it is at least arguable that a mandatory minimum sentence of one year’s imprisonment is not grossly disproportionate in its reasonably foreseeable applications. [154] returning to the potential significance of the fact that s 1721 is a hybrid offence, i would add that this court in nur did not go so far as to state that in the context of a hybrid offence where a summary conviction carries a lesser mandatory minimum or no minimum at all, every mandatory minimum attaching to a conviction on indictment is necessarily grossly disproportionate and therefore contrary to s 12. in this regard, without commenting on the merits of the decision, i note that the alberta court of appeal recently upheld the constitutionality of a one- year mandatory minimum that is triggered following a conviction on indictment for sexual exploitation un- der s. 153(1) of the code, which, like child luring, is a hybrid offence: see r v. ejb, 2018 abca 239, 72 alta. lr (6th) 29. on the other hand, and again without commenting on the merits, there is recent ap- pellate authority going the other way: see, eg,. r v. peut bien qu’une peine d’un an d’emprisonnement pour un délinquant ne soit pas « excessive au point de ne pas être compatible avec la dignité humaine » ni « odieuse ou intolérable » socialement, et que la décision de la couronne de demander une peine moindre en procédant par voie sommaire — ce qui, dans un sens, pourrait être perçu comme une forme de clémence envers l’accusé — n’ait aucune inci- dence sur cette conclusion : voir lloyd, par 24. le leurre est une infraction grave qui cible l’un des groupes les plus vulnérables au sein de la société ca- nadienne : nos enfants. elle requiert un niveau élevé de mens rea et suppose un degré élevé de culpabilité morale. et bien que l’infraction puisse être commise de différentes façons et dans un large éventail de circonstances — ce qui est généralement le cas pour la plupart des infractions criminelles — il n’en de- meure pas moins que, pour obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité, la couronne doit prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a communiqué inten- tionnellement avec une personne qui n’avait pas at- teint l’âge fixé, ou qu’il croyait telle, avec l’intention précise de faciliter la perpétration à l’égard de l’autre personne d’une infraction à caractère sexuel ou de l’infraction d’enlèvement. ainsi, il est à tout le moins possible de soutenir que la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire d’un an n’est pas exagérément disproportionnée en ce qui concerne ses applications raisonnablement prévisibles. [154] retournant à l’importance que peut revêtir le fait pour l’art 1721 d’être une infraction mixte, j’ajouterais que, dans l’arrêt nur, la cour n’est pas allée jusqu’à déclarer que, dans le contexte d’une infraction mixte où une déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire emporte une peine mini- male obligatoire moindre ou aucune peine minimale, toutes les peines minimales obligatoires rattachées à une déclaration de culpabilité par mise en accusation sont forcément exagérément disproportionnées et, donc, contraires à l’art 12. à cet égard, sans me pro- noncer sur le bien- fondé de l’arrêt, je remarque que la cour d’appel de l’alberta a récemment confirmé la constitutionnalité d’une peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire d’un an sur déclaration de culpabilité par mise en accusation pour exploitation sexuelle, une infraction visée au par. 153(1) du code qui, comme le leurre, est une infraction mixte : voir 70 r v morrison moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. hood, 2018 nsca 18, 45 cr (7th) 269, where the nova scotia court of appeal struck down the one- year mandatory minimums for sexual exploitation, sexual interference, and child luring, all of which are hybrid offences. [155] a proper consideration of the constitutional- ity of the mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) should take into account the various factors i have identified. few, if any, were considered in the courts below or fully argued before this court. as such, on the record before us and the arguments presented, in my respectful view, it would be unwise, if not inappropriate, for the court to finally determine the s. 12 issue on this appeal. r c. ejb, 2018 abca 239, 72 alta. lr (6th) 29. d’un autre côté, et encore une fois sans faire de commentaires sur le fond, il y a des arrêts récents de cours d’appel qui vont dans l’autre sens : voir, p ex, r c. hood, 2018 nsca 18, 45 cr (7th) 269, où la cour d’appel de la nouvelle- écosse a déclaré inconstitutionnelles les peines d’emprisonnement minimales obligatoires d’un an pour l’exploitation sexuelle, les contacts sexuels et le leurre, qui sont tous des infractions mixtes. [155] pour bien apprécier la constitutionnalité de la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a), il faut tenir compte des divers facteurs que j’ai énu- mérés. peu de ces facteurs, s’il en est, ont été exa- minés par les cours de juridictions inférieures ou débattus à fond devant la cour. ainsi, au vu du dos- sier dont nous disposons et des arguments qui ont été présentés, je suis d’avis qu’il serait peu judicieux, voire inapproprié, pour la cour de trancher défi- nitivement la question de l’art. 12 dans le présent pourvoi. vii disposition vii dispositif [156] for the above reasons, i reach the following conclusions. [156] pour les motifs qui précèdent, j’arrive aux conclusions qui suivent. [157] the crown’s appeal concerning the consti- tutionality of s 1721(3) of the code is dismissed. subsection  (3) infringes s.  11(d) of the charter, and that infringement cannot be saved under s 1. it is therefore without force or effect pursuant to s. 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982. [158] mr. morrison’s cross- appeal is allowed in part. his submissions regarding the constitutional- ity of s 1721(4) of the code are dismissed. sub- section (4) does not infringe s. 7 of the charter. [159] however, in light of the trial judge’s errors, i would set aside mr. morrison’s conviction and order a new trial. [157] le pourvoi de la couronne concernant la constitutionnalité du par 1721(3) du code est re- jeté. le paragraphe (3) contrevient à l’al. 11d) de la charte, et cette contravention ne peut être justifiée au regard de l’article premier. il est donc inopérant par application du par. 52(1) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982. [158] le pourvoi incident de m. morrison est ac- cueilli en partie. les arguments de ce dernier concer- nant la constitutionnalité du par 1721(4) du code sont rejetés. le paragraphe (4) ne contrevient pas à l’art. 7 de la charte. [159] toutefois, à la lumière des erreurs commises par le juge du procès, j’annule la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée contre m. morrison et j’or- donne la tenue d’un nouveau procès. [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge karakatsanis 71 [160] finally, i would decline to rule on whether the mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) in- fringes s. 12 of the charter. to that extent, i would allow the crown’s appeal and set aside the court of appeal’s conclusion to the contrary. [160] enfin, je refuse de statuer sur la question de savoir si la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) contrevient à l’art. 12 de la charte. dans cette mesure, j’accueille le pourvoi de la couronne et j’annule la conclusion contraire de la cour d’appel. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [161] karakatsanis j. — i have read the reasons of my colleague moldaver j. and concur with his analysis and conclusions regarding the proper inter- pretation and constitutionality of s 1721(3) and (4) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. i also agree with moldaver j. that the conviction should be set aside and a new trial ordered. [162] i write only with respect to the constitution- ality of the mandatory minimum punishment set out in s 1721(2)(a). this provision requires courts to impose a minimum prison sentence of one year on every person who commits an indictable offence under s 1721(1). douglas morrison has challenged the constitutionality of this provision throughout the proceedings and, in my view, it is incumbent on this court to address this issue. both courts below deter- mined that this provision is unconstitutional. if this court declines to decide this issue and morrison is retried and found guilty, he may be put in the unfor- tunate position of having to re- argue a constitutional challenge that was decided in his favour throughout these proceedings but not addressed on final appeal. morrison — as well as other individuals convicted of a child luring offence by way of indictment — may find themselves subject to a mandatory minimum sentence that is constitutionally unsound. [163] for the reasons that follow, i would find that the mandatory minimum sentence in s 1721(2)(a) violates s. 12 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms and is not saved by s 1. [161] la juge karakatsanis — j’ai lu les motifs de mon collègue le juge moldaver et je souscris à son analyse et à ses conclusions sur l’interprétation à donner aux par 1721(3) et (4) du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, et la constitutionnalité de ces dispositions. je suis aussi d’accord avec lui pour dire que la déclaration de culpabilité devrait être annulée et la tenue d’un nouveau procès ordonnée. [162] mes motifs portent uniquement sur la consti- tutionnalité de la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a), qui exige que les tribunaux in- fligent une peine d’emprisonnement minimale d’un an à quiconque commet un acte criminel visé au par 1721(1). douglas morrison a contesté la consti- tutionnalité de cette disposition au fil des instances et, à mon avis, il incombe à la cour d’examiner cette question. les deux cours de juridictions infé- rieures ont déclaré la disposition inconstitutionnelle. si la cour refuse de trancher cette question et que m. morrison est déclaré coupable à l’issue d’un nou- veau procès, il pourrait se trouver dans la fâcheuse situation de devoir plaider à nouveau une question constitutionnelle qui a déjà été tranchée en sa faveur devant les cours de juridictions inférieures, mais qui n’a pas été examinée dans le cadre du pourvoi final. monsieur morrison, comme d’autres individus reconnus coupables de l’infraction de leurre punis- sable par voie de mise en accusation, pourrait se voir condamné à une peine minimale obligatoire invalide sur le plan constitutionnel. [163] pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclurais que la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) viole l’art. 12 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés et ne peut être justifiée au regard de l’article premier. 72 r v morrison karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. a determining whether a provision violates sec- a juger si une disposition viole l’art. 12 de la tion 12 of the charter charte [164] section 12 of the charter states that “[e]very- one has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” in order to qualify as “cruel and unusual” punishment, a mandatory minimum sentence must be grossly disproportionate (r v. lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr 130, at paras. 22-23; r v smith (edward dewey), [1987] 1 scr 1045, at pp 1072-73). [164] aux termes de l’art. 12 de la charte, « [c]ha- cun a droit à la protection contre tous traitements ou peines cruels et inusités. » pour être qualifiée de « cruelle et inusitée », la peine minimale obligatoire doit être exagérément disproportionnée (r c. lloyd, 2016 csc 13, [2016] 1 rcs 130, par. 22-23; r. c. smith (edward dewey), [1987] 1 rcs 1045, p 1072-1073). [165] the standard of gross disproportionality is a high bar. a grossly disproportionate sentence must be more than merely excessive. it must be so excessive as to outrage our society’s standards of decency and must be disproportionate to the extent that canadians would find it abhorrent or intolerable (smith, at p. 1072; r v morrisey, 2000 scc 39, [2000] 2 scr 90, at para. 26; r v. ferguson, 2008 scc 6, [2008] 1 scr 96, at para 14). [165] la norme de la disproportion exagérée est exigeante. une peine exagérément disproportionnée doit être plus que simplement excessive. elle doit être excessive au point de ne pas être compatible avec la dignité humaine et tellement disproportionnée que les canadiens la considéreraient comme odieuse ou intolérable (smith, p. 1072; r c morrisey, 2000 csc 39, [2000] 2 rcs 90, par. 26; r c. ferguson, 2008 csc 6, [2008] 1 rcs 96, par 14). [166] to determine whether a mandatory minimum sentence imposes a grossly disproportionate punish- ment, the court engages in a comparative exercise. this involves comparing the mandatory minimum sentence for the relevant offence to the fit and propor- tionate sentence that would otherwise be mandated by the sentencing principles found in the criminal code. ultimately, if the mandatory minimum forces courts to impose a sentence that is grossly dispro- portionate to the otherwise fit and proportionate sen- tence, then the mandatory minimum is inconsistent with s. 12 (lloyd, at para 23). [166] pour juger si une peine minimale obligatoire est exagérément disproportionnée, les tribunaux se livrent à un exercice comparatif qui consiste à com- parer la peine minimale obligatoire relative à l’in- fraction en cause à la peine juste et proportionnée que commanderait l’application des principes de détermination de la peine établis par le code crimi- nel. au bout du compte, si elle contraint le tribunal à infliger une peine qui est exagérément disproportion- née au regard de ce que constituerait une peine juste et proportionnée, la peine minimale obligatoire est incompatible avec l’art. 12 (lloyd, par 23). [167] this inquiry often occurs in two stages. first, the judge determines whether the mandatory mini- mum represents a grossly disproportionate sentence when applied to the circumstances of the specific offender before the court. if so, then the mandatory minimum sentence violates s. 12 (smith, at p. 1073; ferguson, at paras. 13-14; morrisey, at paras. 27-29 and 41; r v. nur, 2015 scc 15, [2015] 1 scr 773, at para 39). [167] cette analyse comporte souvent deux étapes. premièrement, le juge établit si la peine minimale obligatoire est exagérément disproportionnée en te- nant compte de la situation particulière du délinquant concerné. dans l’affirmative, la peine minimale obli- gatoire viole l’art. 12 (smith, p. 1073; ferguson, par. 13-14; morrisey, par. 27-29 et 41; r c. nur, 2015 csc 15, [2015] 1 rcs 773, par 39). [168] second, even if the mandatory minimum does not violate s. 12 on the facts of the case be- fore the court, the judge must consider whether the [168] deuxièmement, même si la peine minimale obligatoire ne viole pas l’art. 12 au regard des faits propres à l’affaire qui lui a été présentée, le juge doit [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge karakatsanis 73 mandatory minimum sentence would be grossly dis- proportionate in other reasonably foreseeable cases. the rule of law requires certainty; no one should serve time in custody because of an unconstitutional provision (see nur, at paras. 51, 63-64). the court must therefore consider whether it is reasonably fore- seeable that the mandatory minimum sentence will violate s. 12 when applied to others. this involves evaluating the scope of the offence, the nature of the offenders and circumstances that it may capture, and the resulting range of fit and proportionate sentences. based on this analysis, if, in a reasonably foreseeable case, imposing the mandatory minimum would result in a grossly disproportionate sentence, then the man- datory minimum violates s 12 (r v. goltz, [1991] 3 scr 485, at pp. 505-6; ferguson, at para. 30; nur, at para. 51; lloyd, at paras 25-37). [169] when assessing a mandatory minimum in the context of reasonably foreseeable cases, it will often be helpful to begin by considering previously reported cases. past cases provide examples of the range of real- life conduct captured by the offence, as well as the characteristics of those who have been convicted (see nur, at paras 72-76). in turn, these factual scenarios help demonstrate the range of fit and proportionate sentences for the offence. as al- ways, judges should be guided by their common sense and judicial experience when examining the scope of an offence provision and the resulting range of proportionate sentences that it would give rise to (para 75). moreover, judges need not limit their inquiry to only the facts of reported cases (morrisey, at para 33). chercher à savoir si elle serait exagérément dispro- portionnée dans d’autres cas raisonnablement prévi- sibles. la primauté du droit commande la certitude; personne ne devrait purger une peine d’emprisonne- ment en raison d’une disposition inconstitutionnelle (voir nur, par. 51 et 63-64). le tribunal doit par conséquent se demander s’il est raisonnablement pré- visible que l’application de la peine minimale obliga- toire à d’autres personnes violera l’art 12. pour ce faire, il faut évaluer la portée de l’infraction, le genre de délinquants et de situations qu’elle peut viser, ainsi que la gamme de peines justes et proportion- nées qui pourraient donc être infligées. il découle de cette analyse que si l’infliction de la peine minimale obligatoire donnait lieu à une peine exagérément disproportionnée dans un cas raisonnablement prévi- sible, la peine minimale obligatoire viole l’art 12 (r. c. goltz, [1991] 3 rcs 485, p. 505-506; ferguson, par. 30; nur, par. 51; lloyd, par 25-37). [169] lorsqu’on évalue une peine minimale obliga- toire au regard des cas raisonnablement prévisibles, il est souvent utile de commencer par examiner les décisions publiées. ces décisions nous donnent des exemples de l’étendue des actes susceptibles de tomber concrètement sous le coup de l’infraction, ainsi que des caractéristiques des personnes qui ont été reconnues coupables de cette infraction (voir nur, par 72-76). les scénarios factuels servent à leur tour à démontrer la gamme de peines justes et proportionnées pour l’infraction. comme toujours, les juges devraient suivre leur bon sens et leur ex- périence judiciaire lorsqu’ils examinent la portée d’une disposition créatrice d’infraction et la gamme de peines proportionnées qui peuvent y être associées (par 75). par ailleurs, les juges ne sont pas tenus de restreindre leur analyse aux faits des décisions publiées (morrisey, par 33). [170] in the past, this court has referred to “reason- able hypothetical” circumstances in which a given provision would apply in determining whether a corresponding mandatory minimum sentence would be grossly disproportionate (see morrisey, at paras. 2 and 30-33; goltz, at p 515). however, as the court recently noted, the word “hypothetical” has created confusion and often overwhelmed the analysis, lead- ing to unhelpful debates over how general or realistic [170] dans le passé, la cour a renvoyé aux circons- tances « hypothétiques raisonnables » dans lesquelles une disposition donnée s’appliquerait pour juger si la peine minimale obligatoire qui y est associée serait exagérément disproportionnée (voir morrisey, par. 2 et 30-33; goltz, p 515). or, comme la cour l’a récem- ment fait observer, le mot « hypothétique » créait de la confusion et a souvent dominé l’analyse, ce qui a mené à des débats inutiles quant à savoir à quel point 74 r v morrison karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. the hypothetical must be (see nur, at paras. 57 and 61). therefore, in lloyd, the majority emphasized “reasonably foreseeable applications” of the law (see paras. 22 and 25). [171] i find this shift in terminology helpful. in my view, discussing “reasonable hypotheticals” does not accurately capture the thrust of the s. 12 inquiry. evaluating the conduct that an offence captures and the range of appropriate sentences that may arise does not involve a novel application of judicial im- agination. rather, s. 12 requires courts to consider the scope of the offence, the types of activities it pe- nalizes and the reasonably foreseeable circumstances in which it may arise. as chief justice mclachlin outlined in nur: “what is the reach of the law? what kind of conduct may the law reasonably be expected to catch? what is the law’s reasonably foreseeable impact? courts have always asked these questions in construing the scope of offences and in determining their constitutionality” (para 61). la situation hypothétique devrait être générale ou réa- liste (voir nur, par. 57 et 61). par conséquent, dans l’arrêt lloyd, les juges majoritaires ont mis l’accent sur les « applications raisonnablement prévisibles » de la disposition législative (voir par. 22 et 25). [171] je trouve ce changement terminologique utile. à mon avis, discuter des « hypothèses raison- nables » ne reflète pas l’idée maîtresse de l’examen fondé sur l’art 12. évaluer la conduite visée par une infraction et la gamme des peines appropriées qui peuvent en découler ne requiert pas que les juges se livrent à un nouvel exercice imaginatif. l’article 12 exige plutôt des tribunaux qu’ils examinent la portée de l’infraction, les types d’activités qu’elle sanc- tionne et les circonstances raisonnablement prévi- sibles dans lesquelles elle peut survenir. comme la juge en chef mclachlin l’a souligné dans l’arrêt nur : « quelle est la portée de la loi? quels actes pourraient raisonnablement tomber sous le coup de la loi? quelle est l’incidence raisonnablement pré- visible de la loi? telles sont les questions que les tribunaux se posent toujours pour délimiter la portée d’une disposition créant une infraction et se pronon- cer sur sa constitutionnalité » (par 61). b does the one year mandatory minimum sen- tence in section 172.1(2)(a) violate section 12 of the charter? b la peine d’emprisonnent minimale obligatoire d’un an prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) viole-t-elle l’art. 12 de la charte? [172] morrison argues that the mandatory min- imum sentence in s 1721(2)(a) is grossly dispro- portionate, both in his case and in other reasonably foreseeable applications. the courts below found that morrison should be sentenced to four months imprisonment. therefore, they both concluded that sentencing him to the mandatory minimum prison term of one year would be grossly disproportionate (2015 oncj 598, 341 crr (2d) 25, at paras. 89 and 98; 2017 onca 582, at paras 129-30). [172] monsieur morrison soutient que la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) est exagérément disproportionnée, tant dans son cas qu’au regard d’autres applications raisonnablement prévisibles de cette disposition. les cours de juridic- tions inférieures ont conclu que m. morrison devrait être condamné à un emprisonnement de quatre mois. par conséquent, elles ont toutes deux conclu qu’il se- rait exagérément disproportionné de le condamner à une peine d’emprisonnent minimale obligatoire d’un an (2015 oncj 598, 341 crr (2d) 25, par. 89 et 98; 2017 onca 582, par 129-130). [173] given the unique circumstances of this case, it is no longer appropriate to determine whether im- posing the mandatory minimum sentence on him would represent a grossly disproportionate punish- ment. as my colleague moldaver j. notes, morrison [173] vu les circonstances particulières de la pré- sente affaire, il ne convient plus de juger si l’inflic- tion de la peine minimale obligatoire à l’égard de m. morrison constituerait une peine exagérément disproportionnée. comme le souligne mon collègue [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge karakatsanis 75 was convicted based on the trial judge’s misappre- hension of how the offence in s 1721 operates and its requisite mens rea (see para 135). [174] because morrison may face a retrial, it is not prudent to determine whether those errors affected either his conviction or the fit sentence in this case. in these circumstances — given my conclusion that the mandatory minimum sentence in s 1721(2)(a) represents a grossly disproportionate punishment in other reasonably foreseeable applications — it is not necessary to assess the proportionality of the man- datory minimum against the fit and proportionate sentence that would be imposed on morrison. [175] the constitutional law principles mandating an inquiry into the nature and scope of the law be- yond one particular accused are especially relevant in this case. as the court noted in nur, “[l]ooking at whether the mandatory minimum has an uncon- stitutional impact on others avoids the chilling effect of unconstitutional laws remaining on the statute books” (para 64). in this case, morrison himself could face these chilling effects. as i have stated, he could be subjected to the mandatory minimum sen- tence if retried and convicted despite twice succeed- ing in his s. 12 challenge in the courts below. more broadly, the decisions below raise a spectre of un- constitutionality over s 1721(2)(a). no one should be subject to an unconstitutional law and “[t]esting the law against reasonably foreseeable applications will prevent people from suffering cruel and unu- sual punishment in the interim until the mandatory minimum is found to be unconstitutional” (para 63). these concerns militate in favour of considering the reasonably foreseeable applications of the law even absent a convicted offender before the court in this particular case. i now turn to the issue of reasonably foreseeable applications of s 1721(2)(a). le juge moldaver, la déclaration de culpabilité de m. morrison repose sur la mauvaise compréhen- sion par le juge du procès de l’infraction décrite à l’art 1721 et de la mens rea requise (voir par 135). [174] comme m. morrison pourrait avoir à subir un nouveau procès, il n’est pas prudent de juger si ces erreurs ont eu une incidence sur sa déclaration de culpabilité ou la peine juste qui peut être infligée en l’espèce. dans ces circonstances, et comme je conclus que la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) serait exagérément disproportionnée dans d’autres cas raisonnablement prévisibles, il n’est pas nécessaire d’évaluer la proportionnalité de la peine minimale obligatoire au regard de la peine juste et proportionnée qui serait infligée à m morrison. [175] les principes de droit constitutionnel exigeant un examen de la nature et de la portée d’une disposi- tion allant au- delà de la situation d’un simple accusé sont particulièrement pertinents en l’espèce. comme l’a souligné la cour dans l’arrêt nur, « [s]e demander si une peine minimale obligatoire se révèle inconsti- tutionnelle pour d’autres personnes permet d’éviter que des dispositions inconstitutionnelles ne demeurent malencontreusement en vigueur » (par 64). dans l’af- faire qui nous occupe, m. morrison pourrait lui- même vivre ces conséquences malencontreuses. comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, s’il est déclaré coupable au terme d’un éventuel nouveau procès, m. morrison pourrait se voir infliger cette peine minimale obligatoire même s’il a réussi par deux fois à la contester sur le fonde- ment de l’art. 12 devant les juridictions inférieures. d’une manière plus générale, les décisions des juridic- tions inférieures mettent en doute la constitutionnalité de l’al 1721(2)a). personne ne devrait être assujetti à une disposition inconstitutionnelle et « [c]ontrôler la loi au regard d’applications raisonnablement pré- visibles permet d’éviter que des justiciables ne soient condamnés à des peines cruelles et inusitées avant que la peine minimale obligatoire ne soit déclarée in- constitutionnelle » (par 63). ces préoccupations nous invitent fortement à examiner les applications raison- nablement prévisibles de la disposition législative même si, dans l’affaire qui nous intéresse, la cour n’a pas affaire à un délinquant ayant été déclaré coupable. j’examinerai maintenant la question des applications raisonnablement prévisibles de l’al 1721(2)a). 76 r v morrison karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. [176] child luring is a very serious offence. it re- quires the accused to subjectively believe that he or she is communicating with an underage individual for the purpose of facilitating one of the offences enumerated in s 1721(1)(a), (b) or (c). this section was adopted by parliament “to identify and appre- hend predatory adults who, generally for illicit sex- ual purposes, troll the internet to attract and entice vulnerable children and adolescents” (r v. levigne, 2010 scc 25, [2010] 2 scr 3, at para 24). it pro- tects potential child victims by allowing the criminal law to intervene before the harm caused by the com- mission of the secondary offences actually occurs (r. v. alicandro, 2009 onca 133, 95 or (3d) 173, at para 20). [177] given the gravity of this offence, there is no doubt that, in many cases, the appropriate sentence will be a term of imprisonment that falls within the range contemplated by s 1721(2)(a). for exam- ple, the ontario court of appeal has determined that in most child luring cases, the sentencing goals of denunciation and deterrence require a sentence of institutional incarceration (r v. jarvis (2006), 211 ccc (3d) 20 (ont. ca), at paras. 27 and 31; r v folino, 2005 onca 258, 77  or  (3d) 641, at para. 25; alicandro, at para. 49; but see r v. woodward, 2011 onca 610, 107 or (3d) 81, at para 58). in most cases proceeding by indictment, the appropriate range will be from 12 to 24 months (jarvis, at para 31). [176] le leurre est une infraction très grave qui requiert que l’accusé croie subjectivement qu’il communique avec une personne n’ayant pas atteint l’âge fixé par la loi afin de faciliter la perpétration à son égard de l’une des infractions énumérées aux al 1721(1)a), b) ou c). l’article 172.1 a été adopté par le législateur « en vue de démasquer et d’arrêter les prédateurs adultes qui rôdent dans l’internet pour appâter des enfants et des adolescents vulnérables, généralement à des fins sexuelles illicites » (r c. levigne, 2010 csc 25, [2010] 2 rcs 3, par 24). il protège les enfants susceptibles de devenir victimes en permettant l’application de dispositions pénales avant qu’un préjudice ne soit réellement causé par la perpétration des infractions sous- jacentes (r c. ali- candro, 2009 onca 133, 95 or (3d) 173, par 20). [177] étant donné la gravité de l’infraction en cause, il ne fait aucun doute que, dans bien des cas, la peine appropriée sera une peine d’emprisonne- ment dont la durée s’inscrira dans le cadre prévu à l’al 1721(2)a). par exemple, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a jugé que, pour la plupart des infractions de leurre, les objectifs de dénonciation et de dis- suasion qui sous- tendent la peine commandent une incarcération en établissement (r c. jarvis (2006), 211 ccc (3d) 20 (ca ont), par. 27 et 31; r c. folino, 2005 onca 258, 77 or (3d) 641, par. 25; alicandro, par. 49; mais voir r c. woodward, 2011 onca 610, 107  or  (3d) 81, par.  58) dans la plupart des poursuites intentées par voie de mise en accusation, la durée de peine appropriée variera entre 12 et 24 mois (jarvis, par 31). [178] however, this does not mean that such a sen- tence will be appropriate in other reasonably foresee- able cases (see r v. lacasse, 2015 scc 64, [2015] 3 scr 1089, at paras 57-61). nor does it mean that this mandatory minimum provision is consistent with s. 12 of the charter. for the following reasons, i would find that it is not. [178] cela ne veut toutefois pas dire qu’une telle peine sera appropriée dans d’autres cas raisonnable- ment prévisibles (voir r c. lacasse, 2015 csc 64, [2015] 3 rcs 1089, par. 57-61), ni que cette dis- position établissant une peine minimale obligatoire est compatible avec l’art. 12 de la charte. pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclurais qu’elle ne l’est pas. [179] the offence of child luring can be committed in various ways, under a broad array of circumstances and by individuals with a wide range of moral cul- pability. this alone makes the provision vulnerable to constitutional challenge because such laws al- most inevitably capture cases where the mandatory [179] l’infraction de leurre peut être commise de plusieurs façons, dans des circonstances très variées et par des personnes qui peuvent avoir divers degrés de culpabilité morale. ces caractéristiques suffisent à rendre la disposition en cause vulnérable sur le plan constitutionnel parce qu’il est presque inévitable [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge karakatsanis 77 minimum sentence will be grossly disproportionate (see, eg,. lloyd, at para. 35; nur, at para. 82; smith, at p 1078). simply put, if the offence casts a wide net, this increases the likelihood of it catching indi- viduals whose conduct will not warrant punishment remotely close to that required by the mandatory minimum sentence. [180] the three essential elements of child luring under s 1721(1) are: (a) intentional communication by means of telecommunication; (b) with an indi- vidual who is — or the accused believes is — under 18, 16, or 14 years of age (depending on the sub- section at issue); (c) for the purpose of facilitating one of the enumerated secondary offences (here, invitation to sexual touching contrary to s. 152 of the criminal code) (see r v. legare, 2009 scc 56, [2009] 3 scr 551, at para 3). [181] the range of conduct that constitutes an offence under this section is extremely broad. as this court stated in legare, to be convicted of child luring, the accused need not commit the secondary offence on which the child luring charge is based or even intend to meet the victim. rather, the accused need only communicate for the purpose of facili- tating the secondary offence — helping to bring it about or making it easier or more likely to occur (paras. 25 and 28). the impugned communications need not be sexually explicit or objectively capable of facilitating the secondary offence (paras. 29 and 42). furthermore, there is significant variation in the nature and gravity of the designated secondary offences (see moldaver j.’s reasons, at para 147). qu’il existera des situations tombant sous le coup de telles dispositions législatives où la peine minimale obligatoire sera exagérément disproportionnée (voir, p ex, lloyd, par. 35; nur, par. 82; smith, p 1078). en termes simples, une infraction qui ratisse large augmente la probabilité que tombent dans ses mailles des individus dont la conduite ne justifie aucunement l’infliction de la peine minimale obligatoire. [180] les trois éléments essentiels du leurre pour l’application du par 1721(1) sont : a) une commu- nication intentionnelle par un moyen de télécommu- nication; b) avec une personne qui est âgée — ou dont l’accusé croit qu’elle est âgée — de moins de 18, 16 ou 14 ans (selon l’alinéa en cause); c) en vue de faciliter la perpétration de l’une des infractions sous- jacentes énumérées (en l’espèce, l’incitation à des contacts sexuels en contravention de l’art. 152 du code criminel) (voir r c. legare, 2009 csc 56, [2009] 3 rcs 551, par 3). [181] l’éventail des comportements qui consti- tuent une infraction pour l’application de cet article est extrêmement vaste. comme l’a déclaré la cour dans legare, pour être reconnu coupable de leurre, le prévenu n’a pas besoin d’avoir commis l’infrac- tion sous- jacente sur laquelle repose l’accusation de leurre ni même avoir eu l’intention de rencontrer la victime. en effet, il n’a qu’à communiquer avec la victime en vue de faciliter la perpétration de l’infrac- tion sous- jacente, en aidant à provoquer la perpétra- tion de l’infraction ou en la rendant plus facile ou plus probable (par. 25 et 28). il n’est pas nécessaire que les communications en question soient sexuel- lement explicites ni objectivement susceptibles de faciliter la perpétration de l’infraction sous- jacente (par. 29 et 42). de plus, la nature et la gravité des infractions secondaires énumérées varient énormé- ment (voir les motifs du juge moldaver, par 147). [182] as outlined above, s 1721(1) captures a wide variety of communications. the offence can be committed by individuals who use the internet to tar- get children for the purpose of physically exploiting them or, conversely, by individuals who have no in- tention of meeting their victims in person. similarly, the duration of the communication may vary signif- icantly. while, in some cases, the offender will have [182] comme nous l’avons vu, le par 1721(1) vise une grande variété de communications. l’infraction peut être commise par des personnes qui utilisent internet pour cibler des enfants en vue de les exploiter physiquement ou, à l’inverse, par des personnes qui n’ont aucune intention de rencontrer leurs victimes en personne. de même, la durée de la communica- tion peut considérablement varier. alors que, dans 78 r v morrison karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. engaged in an extended dialogue with the victim in order to “groom” him or her, the offence can equally be made out through a short series of messages last- ing only a few minutes. as my colleague points out, it can capture a single text sent by a 21- year-old adult to a 15- year-old adolescent or multiple conservations taking place over a long period between a mature adult and a 13- year-old child (moldaver j.’s rea- sons, at para 146). finally, the communication can actually be with an underage child or, as in this case, with a police officer posing as one (see r v. rafiq, 2015 onca 768, 342 oac 193, at paras 47-49). these factors may impact the level of harm caused by the offence, thereby informing what constitutes a fit and proportionate sentence (see s. 718 of the criminal code). certaines affaires, le délinquant peut avoir engagé un long dialogue avec la victime pour la manipuler, dans d’autres affaires, l’infraction peut être commise en quelques minutes à peine lors d’un échange d’une série de courts messages. comme le souligne mon collègue, il peut s’agir d’un unique message texte envoyé par un adulte de 21 ans à un adolescent de 15 ans, comme de multiples conversations qui se déroulent sur une longue période entre un adulte mûr et un enfant de 13 ans (motifs du juge moldaver, par 146). enfin, la communication peut aussi avoir lieu avec un enfant qui n’a pas atteint l’âge fixé par la disposition ou, comme en l’espèce, avec un policier qui se fait passer pour un mineur de cet âge (voir r. c. rafiq, 2015 onca 768, 342 oac 193, par. 47- 49). ces facteurs peuvent avoir une incidence sur le niveau de préjudice causé par la perpétration de l’infraction et nous éclairent donc sur ce qui consti- tue une peine juste et proportionnée (voir l’art. 718 du code criminel). [183] the personal circumstances of the offender and the relationship between the offender and the victim may also vary significantly. past cases demon- strate that child luring offences are sometimes com- mitted by individuals who are close in age to their victims, by those who suffer from cognitive difficul- ties or mental illness, and by individuals who were themselves abused in the past (see, eg,. r v. hood, 2018 nsca 18, 409 crr (2d) 70; r v. s (s), 2014 oncj 184, 307 crr (2d) 147; r v. crant, 2017 oncj 192). these factors may diminish the moral blameworthiness associated with the offence (see s 7181 of the criminal code). [183] la situation personnelle du délinquant et sa relation avec la victime peuvent aussi grande- ment varier. il ressort de la jurisprudence que les infractions de leurre sont parfois commises par des personnes qui n’ont pas une grande différence d’âge avec leurs victimes, qui ont des troubles cognitifs ou des maladies mentales ou encore qui ont elles- mêmes déjà été agressées (voir, p ex, r c. hood, 2018 nsca 18, 409 crr (2d) 70; r c. s (s), 2014 oncj 184, 307 crr (2d) 147; r c. crant, 2017 oncj 192). ces facteurs peuvent atténuer la culpa- bilité morale associée à l’infraction (voir art 7181 du code criminel). [184] given the variety of circumstances cap- tured by the offence, it is not surprising that the s 1721(1) jurisprudence demonstrates that the fit and proportionate sentence can be significantly less than the one- year mandatory minimum term of im- prisonment required by the criminal code. courts applying the criminal code’s sentencing principles have determined that, in certain child luring cases, a fit and proportionate sanction included lesser pen- alties: a short period of institutional incarceration of 90 days or less (alicandro, at paras. 2 and 49; r v. read, 2008 oncj 732 at para.  29 (canlii); see also r v. dehesh, [2010] oj. no. 2817 (scj), at [184] vu la diversité des situations tombant sous le coup de l’infraction, il n’est pas surprenant que la jurisprudence relative au par 1721(1) démontre qu’une peine juste et proportionnée puisse être beau- coup moins lourde que la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire d’un an requise par le code criminel. les tribunaux qui appliquent les principes de détermination de la peine du code criminel ont jugé que la peine juste et proportionnée dans certains cas de leurre devait être moins lourde; elle pour- rait consister en une brève incarcération de 90 jours ou moins en établissement (alicandro, par. 2 et 49; r c. read, 2008 oncj 732, par. 29 (canlii); voir [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge karakatsanis 79 para. 9; s (s), at para. 91); a conditional sentence (r v. el- jamel, 2010 onca 575, 261 ccc (3d) 293, at paras. 2 and 20; folino, at para. 33; r v. b. and s., 2014 bcpc 94, at para. 42 (canlii); r v. danielson, 2013 abpc 26, at para. 89 (canlii)); or even a conditional discharge (r v. pelletier, 2013 qccq 10486 at para. 73 (canlii)). although some of these cases (dehesh; s (s);. danielson) proceeded by way of summary conviction, they demonstrate that the offence can warrant such sentences. and, as the nova scotia court of appeal recently noted, in certain reasonably foreseeable cases, a suspended sentence would be appropriate (hood, at para 154). [185] the fact that s 1721(1) is a hybrid offence is also an important consideration. during the period at issue, the mandatory minimum sentence for an individual guilty of child luring on summary con- viction was 90 days imprisonment, while the manda- tory minimum for an individual guilty on indictment was one year (s 1721(2))5. the 90- day mandatory minimum for summary conviction offences clearly demonstrates that parliament understood that, in certain circumstances, a sentence far below that re- quired by the one- year mandatory minimum would be appropriate. aussi r c. dehesh, [2010] oj. no 2817 (csj), par. 9; s (s), par. 91), en une peine d’emprisonne- ment avec sursis (r c. el- jamel, 2010 onca 575, 261 ccc (3d) 293, par. 2 et 20; folino, par. 33; r. c. b and s., 2014 bcpc 94, par. 42 (canlii); r c. danielson, 2013 abpc 26, par. 89 (canlii)), voire en une absolution sous condition (r c. pelletier, 2013 qccq 10486, par. 73 (canlii)). bien que la couronne ait procédé par voie sommaire dans cer- taines de ces affaires (dehesh; s (s);. danielson), ces décisions démontrent que l’infraction peut com- mander de telles peines. comme la cour d’appel de la nouvelle- écosse l’a récemment indiqué, dans certains cas raisonnablement prévisibles, il pourrait même être indiqué de surseoir au prononcé de la peine (hood, par 154). [185] le fait que le par 1721(1) prévoit une in- fraction mixte est aussi une considération impor- tante. lors de la période visée par le présent pourvoi, la peine minimale obligatoire pour une personne reconnue coupable de leurre sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire consistait en un emprisonnement de 90 jours, alors que la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire pour la per- sonne reconnue coupable d’un acte criminel était d’un an (par 1721(2))5. l’existence de la peine mini- male obligatoire de 90 jours pour les infractions pu- nissables par procédure sommaire montre clairement que le législateur comprenait que, dans certaines situations, des peines beaucoup moins lourdes que la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire d’un an seraient appropriées. [186] here, the disparity between these two man- datory minimum sentences strongly suggests that s 1721(2)(a) violates s. 12 of the charter. the fact that the provision itself indicated that a 90- day sen- tence — that is, a jail sentence one quarter the length of the mandatory minimum under s 1721(2)(a) — would sometimes be appropriate strongly supports the assertion that the one- year mandatory minimum is grossly disproportionate. and, as this court has made clear, an unconstitutional mandatory minimum [186] en l’espèce, la disparité entre les deux peines minimales obligatoires tend fortement à indiquer que l’al 1721(2)a) viole l’art. 12 de la charte. le fait que la disposition elle- même prévoyait qu’une peine d’emprisonnement de 90 jours, soit une peine d’em- prisonnement équivalant au quart de la durée de la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a), puisse parfois être appropriée étaye solidement l’affirmation selon laquelle la peine d’emprisonne- ment minimale obligatoire d’un an est exagérément 5 the provision was subsequently amended to change the man- datory minimum sentence on summary conviction to a term of imprisonment of six months (s 1721(2)). 5 la disposition a ensuite été modifiée pour que la peine d’em- prisonnement minimale obligatoire sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité soit une peine d’emprisonnement de six mois (par 1721(2)). 80 r v morrison karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. cannot be saved by the fact that prosecutors can elect to proceed summarily, thereby preventing the grossly disproportionate effects of the provision (nur, at paras 85-98). [187] for these reasons, i would conclude that s 1721(2)(a) violates s. 12 of the charter. given the broad scope and hybrid nature of the child luring provision, it encompasses situations that can vary dramatically in the moral blameworthiness of the of- fender and the potential harm inflicted on the victim. an examination of the scope and potential applica- tions of the offence, as informed by lower court ju- risprudence, clearly demonstrates that short periods of imprisonment — or even conditional sentences, conditional discharges or suspended sentences — are sometimes fit and proportionate in the circumstances. further, during the period at issue, parliament itself contemplated that a 90- day period of incarceration would sometimes be appropriate for this offence. sentencing someone to one year in jail when the fit and proportionate sentence would be 90 days or less is intolerable and would be shocking to canadians. it is a cruel and unusual punishment and violates s. 12 of the charter. disproportionnée. par ailleurs, comme la cour l’a clairement dit, une peine minimale obligatoire in- constitutionnelle ne peut être sauvegardée par le fait que les poursuivants peuvent opter pour la procédure sommaire et ainsi écarter les effets exagérément disproportionnés de la disposition (nur, par 85-98). [187] pour ces motifs, je conclurais que l’al. 172.1(2)a) viole l’art. 12 de la charte. étant donné sa grande portée et sa nature mixte, la disposition relative au leurre englobe des situations qui peuvent être radicalement différentes en ce qui concerne la culpabilité morale du délinquant et le préjudice sus- ceptible d’être causé à la victime. il ressort claire- ment de l’examen de la portée de l’infraction et de ses possibles applications, effectué à la lumière de la jurisprudence élaborée par les tribunaux de juri- dictions inférieures, que des courtes périodes d’em- prisonnement — voire des peines d’emprisonnement avec sursis, des absolutions sous condition ou des sursis au prononcé de la peine — peuvent consti- tuer, dans certaines situations, des peines justes et proportionnées. à l’époque, le législateur a par ail- leurs lui- même considéré qu’une incarcération de 90 jours serait parfois appropriée pour l’infraction. condamner une personne à un an de prison, lorsque la peine juste et proportionnée serait un emprisonne- ment de 90 jours — ou une peine moins lourde en- core —, est intolérable et serait choquant pour les canadiens. une telle peine est cruelle et inusitée et viole l’art. 12 de la charte. c is this infringement justified under section 1 c la violation est- elle justifiée au regard de l’ar- of the charter? ticle premier de la charte? [188] the crown has not argued that the manda- tory minimum sentence required by s 1721(2)(a) is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic soci- ety. indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a mandatory minimum sentence which is found to be grossly disproportionate because it outrages our society’s standards of decency could represent a justifiable infringement under s. 1 of the charter (see nur, at para 111). i would therefore conclude that the mandatory minimum sentence in s 1721(2)(a) is unconstitutional. [188] la couronne n’a pas soutenu que la justi- fication de la peine minimale obligatoire requise par l’al 1721(2)a) peut se démontrer dans le cadre d’une société libre et démocratique. il est effecti- vement difficile de concevoir comment une peine minimale obligatoire qui a été jugée exagérément disproportionnée parce qu’elle est incompatible avec le principe de la dignité humaine cher à la société canadienne pourrait constituer une atteinte justifiable au regard de l’article premier de la charte (voir nur, par 111). je conclurais par conséquent que la peine minimale obligatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) est inconstitutionnelle. [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge karakatsanis 81 d remedy d réparation [189] the crown argues that instead of declaring s 1721(2)(a) to be of no force and effect, the court should read into the indictable offence the manda- tory minimum sentence associated with summary conviction. this, it is argued, would represent a less intrusive remedy and more closely accord with the will of parliament. i disagree. in ferguson, this court re- iterated [190] that the normal remedy for a mandatory sentencing provision that imposes cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the charter is a declaration that the law is of no force and effect (para 36). [191] here, there is no indication that parliament would have passed a provision with an identical mandatory minimum sentence for both summary conviction and indictable offences had it known that the one- year mandatory minimum associated with the indictable offence under s 1721(2)(a) was un- constitutional. indeed, parliament has other options to address this type of constitutional infirmity. for example, parliament could build judicial discretion into the provision to account for those cases where the mandatory minimum would not be constitutional. it is not the role of this court to rewrite the provision to make it charter-compliant. as in ferguson, i would find that applying such a remedy in these cir- cumstances would represent an inappropriate judicial incursion into the legislative role. [189] la couronne fait valoir qu’au lieu de décla- rer inopérant l’al 1721(2)a), la cour devrait inté- grer dans l’acte criminel la peine d’emprisonnement minimale associée à une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire. elle ajoute qu’une telle interprétation serait une répa- ration moins intrusive qui se rapprocherait davantage de la volonté du législateur. [190] je ne suis pas d’accord. dans l’arrêt fer- guson, la cour a réitéré que, lorsqu’une disposition prévoit une peine obligatoire cruelle et inusitée en contravention de l’art. 12 de la charte, la réparation consiste habituellement en un jugement déclaratoire portant que cette disposition est inopérante (par 36). [191] dans le cas qui nous occupe, rien ne donne à penser que le législateur aurait adopté une disposition prévoyant la même peine d’emprisonnement mini- male obligatoire pour les infractions punissables sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire et pour les actes criminels, s’il avait su que la peine d’emprisonnement minimale obligatoire d’un an as- sociée aux actes criminels, prévue à l’al 1721(2)a), était inconstitutionnelle. le législateur a en effet à sa disposition d’autres façons de remédier à ce type de vice constitutionnel. il pourrait, par exemple, accorder un pouvoir discrétionnaire aux tribunaux pour qu’ils puissent prévoir des peines adaptées dans les cas où la peine minimale obligatoire ne serait pas constitutionnelle. il n’appartient pas à la cour de réécrire la disposition pour qu’elle soit conforme à la charte. conformément à l’arrêt ferguson, je suis d’avis de conclure que, si la cour accordait une telle réparation, elle empiéterait de façon injustifiée sur le rôle du législateur. e conclusion e conclusion [192] for the reasons outlined above, i would not disturb the court of appeal’s conclusion that s 1721(2)(a) is of no force and effect under s. 52 of the constitution act, 1982. [192] pour les motifs qui précèdent, je ne modi- fierais pas la conclusion de la cour d’appel selon laquelle l’al 1721(2)a) est inopérant par application de l’art. 52 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982. [193] as this court has previously recognized, and as evidenced by this case, the wider the range [193] comme la cour l’a reconnu précédem- ment et comme le démontre la présente affaire, plus 82 r v morrison abella j. [2019] 2 scr. of conduct to which a mandatory minimum sentence applies, the more likely that it will be found to be grossly disproportionate in certain circumstances and therefore inconsistent with s. 12 of the charter (lloyd, at para. 35; nur, at paras 82-83). [194] such constitutional defects, however, are avoidable. the harms associated with unconstitu- tional mandatory minimum sentences stem from their rigidity. they rob judges of the flexibility nec- essary to avoid imposing grossly disproportionate sentences. building a safety valve — residual discre- tion — into mandatory minimum provisions would remedy this by allowing judges to make an exception in cases where the mandatory minimum would prove unconstitutional. this approach would allow legis- lators to send a clear and unequivocal signal that minimum sentences are presumptively appropriate, while permitting judges to depart from those guide- lines in cases where the mandatory minimum would constitute excessive and unacceptable punishment. l’éventail de comportements auxquels s’applique une peine minimale obligatoire est grand, plus cette peine risque d’être jugée exagérément disproportion- née dans certaines situations, et, partant, contraire à l’art. 12 de la charte (lloyd, par. 35; nur, par. 82- 83). [194] il est cependant possible d’éviter de tels vices constitutionnels le préjudice associé aux peines minimales obligatoires inconstitutionnelles découle de la rigidité des dispositions, qui enlèvent aux juges la flexibilité nécessaire qui leur permettrait d’éviter d’infliger des peines exagérément dispropor- tionnées. la construction d’une soupape — l’octroi d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire résiduel — pour les dis- positions prévoyant une peine minimale obligatoire remédierait au problème en permettant aux juges de faire une exception dans les cas où la peine mini- male obligatoire s’avérerait inconstitutionnelle. une telle approche permettrait au législateur d’envoyer le message clair et sans équivoque suivant : les peines minimales sont présumées être appropriées, mais les juges peuvent néanmoins s’écarter des balises qu’elles donnent dans les cas où la peine minimale obligatoire serait excessive et inacceptable. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [195] abella j. (dissenting in part) — this appeal concerns what the crown must show to prove the offence of luring a child through telecommunication under s 1721 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, and, more importantly, how an accused may defend against such a charge. i agree that the pre- sumption of belief regarding age under s 1721(3) of the criminal code is a violation of s. 11(d) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. in my respectful view, however, the reasonable steps requirement in s 1721(4) provides a second path to conviction by importing an objective element into the mens rea of the offence when mistake of age is in issue. as a result, it too is unconstitutional. [195] la juge abella (dissidente en partie) — le présent pourvoi porte sur la preuve que doit faire la couronne pour établir l’infraction de leurre par un moyen de télécommunication, prévue à l’art 1721 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, et, surtout, com- ment un accusé peut se défendre contre une telle accu- sation. je suis d’accord pour dire que la présomption de croyance à l’âge établie au par 1721(3) du code criminel est une violation de l’al. 11d) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. toutefois, soit dit en tout respect, j’estime que l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) offre une deuxième voie pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité en introduisant un élément objectif dans la mens rea de l’infraction lorsque l’erreur sur l’âge est en cause. en conséquence, cette disposition est inconstitutionnelle elle aussi. [196] although the offence is premised on the ac- cused’s belief that he or she was communicating [196] bien que l’infraction repose sur la croyance de l’accusé qu’il communiquait avec un enfant, [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge abella 83 with a child, the accused is barred from relying on his or her innocent belief where no reasonable steps were taken to ascertain the communicant’s age. in the context of the internet, this obligation to take reasonable steps may prove impossible to meet, and evidence going to “reasonable steps” may in fact ensnare the accused in the web of liability created by the offence. the result is an infringement of the right to make full answer and defence and the presumption of innocence under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. internet child luring refers to the deliberate [197] and methodical process in which a predator “as- pire[s] to gain the trust of [the] targeted victims” online before attempting to “entice them into sex- ual activity, over the internet or, still worse, in per- son” (r v. legare, [2009] 3 scr 551, at para 2). predators use the anonymity of the internet to contact and interact with children in ways that would not be possible in the real world. typically, the pred- atory adult will use private messaging to establish a degree of familiarity with the child before grad- ually sexualizing the relationship through the use of pornography, sexual conversation online, phone conversations, and, in some cases, the arrangement of a physical encounter. [198] the goal of criminalizing child luring is to prevent predators from using these methods to lure children into situations where they can be exploited sexually. under s 1721, it is an offence to commu- nicate by means of telecommunication with someone the accused knows or believes to be under an age specified by s 1721 for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a listed secondary offence with respect to that person, namely, abduction or a speci- fied sexual offence. the three essential elements are first, an online communication; second, the accused’s knowledge or belief that the communicant was under the relevant age; and third, the accused’s intention to facilitate a secondary offence (legare, at para. 3; r. v. levigne, [2010] 2 scr 3, at para 23). l’accusé est empêché de s’appuyer sur sa croyance de bonne foi lorsqu’aucune mesure raisonnable n’a été prise pour déterminer l’âge de l’interlocuteur. dans le contexte d’internet, cette obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables peut se révéler impossible à satisfaire et la preuve concernant ces « mesures raisonnables » peut même avoir pour effet de prendre l’accusé au piège dans la toile de responsabilité créée par l’infraction. il en résulte une atteinte au droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière et au droit à la présomption d’innocence garantis par l’art. 7 et l’al. 11d) de la charte. [197] le leurre par internet désigne le processus dé- libéré et méthodique par lequel un prédateur « espèr[e] gagner la confiance de [ses] proies » en ligne avant de tenter « de les amener, par [  ] la ruse, à se livrer à des activités sexuelles sur internet ou, pire encore, en personne » (r c. legare, [2009] 3 rcs 551, par 2). les prédateurs ont recours à l’anonymat dans l’internet pour entrer en rapport et interagir avec des enfants par des façons qui ne seraient pas possibles dans le monde réel. généra lement, l’adulte prédateur emploie une messagerie privée pour établir un degré de familiarité avec l’enfant avant de graduellement sexualiser la relation par l’utilisation de pornographie, de conversations sexuelles en ligne, de conversations téléphoniques et, dans certains cas, par l’organisation d’un rendez- vous en personne. [198] la criminalisation du leurre a pour but d’empêcher les prédateurs d’employer ces méthodes pour attirer les enfants dans des situations où ces derniers sont susceptibles d’être exploités sexuel- lement. suivant l’art 1721, commet une infraction quiconque communique par un moyen de télécom- munication avec une personne dont l’accusé sait ou croit qu’elle n’a pas atteint l’un des âges précisés à l’art 1721 en vue de faciliter la perpétration à son égard d’une infraction sous- jacente énumérée, à sa- voir l’enlèvement ou l’une des infractions sexuelles mentionnées. les trois éléments essentiels sont, pre- mièrement, une communication en ligne, deuxième- ment, le fait pour l’accusé de savoir ou de croire que l’interlocuteur n’avait pas atteint l’âge applicable et, troisièmement, l’intention de l’accusé de faciliter la perpétration d’une infraction sous- jacente (legare, par. 3; r c. levigne, [2010] 2 rcs 3, par 23). 84 r v morrison abella j. [2019] 2 scr. in legare, fish j. noted that attempting to [199] classify these elements into actus reus and mens rea may prove unhelpful in reaching an appropriate ver- dict (para 39). for the purpose of assessing guilt, it is enough that the three elements set out above accu- rately convey the prohibited conduct that constitutes the child luring offence (paras 40-41). but in this appeal, to fully understand whether the contours of the offence are consistent with the rights guaranteed in the charter, it is necessary to go further. [200] beginning with the conduct element, the actus reus of child luring will be established where the accused communicates with another person us- ing a method of telecommunication. this clearly implicates a wide range of legal conduct, since the vast majority of people use various means of tele- communication on a daily basis for a multitude of legitimate purposes. but the broadly defined conduct element is essential because a fundamental aspect of child luring is the predator’s ability to form a relationship with the victim through ostensibly in- nocuous conversation about the child’s home life and personal interests (legare, at para 29). child luring is an “inchoate” or “incipient” offence which criminalizes conduct preceding the commission or attempted commission of a substantive sexual of- fence. allowing law enforcement to intervene early and “close the cyberspace door before the predator gets in to prey” (para. 25) protects children by pre- venting the harms of sexual exploitation that man- ifest themselves when the accused has completed the substantive offence or taken actions sufficient to establish the inchoate offences of attempt or coun- selling (h c stewart, “legare: mens rea matters” (2010), 70 cr (6th) 12, at p 13). [199] dans l’arrêt legare, le juge fish a souligné que tenter de classer ces éléments comme s’ins- crivant soit dans l’actus reus soit dans la mens rea pouvait se révéler peu utile pour rendre le verdict qui convient (par 39). pour apprécier la culpabilité, il suffit que les trois éléments énoncés ci- dessus expri- ment fidèlement l’acte interdit qui constitue l’infrac- tion de leurre (par 40-41). toutefois, dans le présent pourvoi, pour bien comprendre si les paramètres de l’infraction sont conformes aux droits garantis par la charte, il faut pousser l’analyse plus loin. [200] en ce qui concerne d’abord l’élément du comportement, l’actus reus du leurre sera établi si l’accusé communique avec une autre personne par un moyen de télécommunication. ceci inclut manifestement un vaste ensemble d’actes légaux, puisque la grande majorité des gens ont recours à des moyens de télécommunication tous les jours pour une multitude de fins légitimes. toutefois, la définition large de l’élément du comportement est essentielle, parce qu’un aspect fondamental du leurre est la capacité du prédateur d’établir une relation avec la victime par des conversations apparemment anodines sur la vie familiale et les intérêts person- nels de l’enfant (legare, par 29). le leurre est une infraction « inchoative » ou « préliminaire » qui cri- minalise un comportement qui précède la perpétra- tion ou la tentative de perpétration d’une infraction substantielle d’ordre sexuel. permettre aux autorités policières d’intervenir en amont et de « fermer la porte du cyberespace avant que le prédateur ne la franchisse pour traquer sa proie » (par. 25) protège les enfants en empêchant les préjudices de l’exploi- tation sexuelle qui se manifestent lorsque l’accusé a commis l’infraction substantielle ou a commis des actes qui suffisent à établir les infractions inchoatives de tentative ou de conseil (h c stewart, « legare : mens rea matters » (2010), 70 cr (6th) 12, p 13). [201] online communications become criminal child luring when coupled with the requisite men- tal elements: the accused’s belief that he or she is communicating with a child, and the accused’s in- tention to facilitate a specified offence against that child. the further an offence is removed from the actual harms sought to be avoided, the more im- portant the subjective component becomes in order [201] les communications en ligne deviennent un leurre criminel lorsqu’elles s’accompagnent des éléments moraux exigés : la croyance de l’accusé qu’il communique avec un enfant et l’intention de l’accusé de faciliter la perpétration d’une infraction mentionnée contre cet enfant. plus une infraction est éloignée de l’infliction des préjudices réels que l’on veut prévenir, plus l’élément subjectif devient [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge abella 85 to justify criminalization (legare, at paras. 32-33, quoting a. ashworth, principles of criminal law (6th ed. 2009), at p. 456; stewart (2010), at p 15). as a result, to constitute child luring, it is essential that the communications online be done for the purpose of facilitating a subsequent offence and that the ac- cused believe the communicant to be a child. these elements form the mens rea of the offence (stewart (2010), at pp 16-17). as a preparatory crime, child luring captures otherwise legal conduct — commu- nications online — where it is subjectively intended to culminate in the commission of a completed crime (legare, at paras. 25 and 32). [202] a key part of this subjective intention is the accused’s belief, which is expressly identified as the sufficient fault element. this means that the crown can prove its case based on the accused’s subjective understanding that the victim was under the relevant age, regardless of whether that belief is true (stewart (2010), at p. 16; united states of america v. dynar, [1997] 2 scr 462, at paras 68-71). specifying the fault element to be “belief” allows for sting op- erations, in which law enforcement officers pose as children to “identify and apprehend predatory adults” who “troll the internet to attract and entice vulnerable children and adolescents” (levigne, at paras.  24-25). these sting operations are crucial in the enforcement of child luring laws since, as doherty ja cogently put it, “children cannot be ex- pected to police the internet” (r v. alicandro (2009), 95 or (3d) 173 (ca), at para 38). important pour que la criminalisation soit justifiée (legare, par. 32-33, citant a. ashworth, principles of criminal law (6e éd. 2009), p. 456; stewart (2010), p 15). en conséquence, pour constituer un leurre, il est essentiel que les communications en ligne soient faites en vue de faciliter la perpétration d’une in- fraction subséquente et que l’accusé croie que l’in- terlocuteur est un enfant. ces éléments constituent la mens rea de l’infraction (stewart (2010), p 16-17). en tant que crime préparatoire, le leurre est constitué d’actes par ailleurs légaux — les communications en ligne — qui sont subjectivement censés mener à la perpétration d’un crime complet (legare, par. 25 et 32). [202] un élément clé de cette intention subjective est la croyance de l’accusé, qui est expressément identifiée comme l’élément de faute suffisant. de ce fait, la couronne peut établir sa preuve en fonction de la compréhension subjective de l’accusé que la victime n’avait pas atteint l’âge applicable, que la croyance soit conforme à la réalité ou non (stew- art (2010), p. 16; états- unis d’amérique c. dynar, [1997] 2 rcs 462, par 68-71). en précisant que l’élément de faute est la « croyance », on permet les opérations d’infiltration, dans lesquelles les po- liciers se font passer pour des enfants « en vue de démasquer et d’arrêter les prédateurs adultes » qui « rôdent dans l’internet pour appâter des enfants et des adolescents vulnérables » (levigne, par 24-25). ces opérations d’infiltration jouent un rôle essentiel dans l’application des lois relatives au leurre, car, comme l’a exprimé de façon convaincante le juge doherty, [traduction] « [o]n ne peut s’attendre à ce que les enfants assurent le maintien de l’ordre dans internet » (r c. alicandro (2009), 95 or (3d) 173 (ca), par 38). it is clear then that the offence of child luring [203] is almost entirely grounded in the accused’s intention and belief. and although both must be established to make out the offence, belief will often be central to proving intention. this is because the exercise of inferring intention from the record of communica- tions conducted online depends almost entirely on the context. conversations between adults take on a different colour when one adult believes that he or she is communicating with a child. as a result, where il est donc clair que l’infraction de leurre [203] est presque entièrement fondée sur l’intention et la croyance de l’accusé. et, bien que les deux éléments doivent être prouvés pour établir l’infraction, il arri- vera souvent que la croyance joue un rôle essentiel dans la preuve de l’intention. il en est ainsi parce que l’exercice qui consiste à inférer l’intention à partir du dossier des communications faites en ligne dépend presque entièrement du contexte. les conversations entre adultes prennent un ton différent lorsqu’un 86 r v morrison abella j. [2019] 2 scr. it is shown that the accused believed the communi- cant was under the specified age, communications that can be read as cultivating a relationship of trust or that are sexual in nature will almost inevitably support an intention to facilitate a secondary offence. the accused’s belief that the communicant is a child often constitutes the sole difference between inno- cent online discourse and criminal child luring. it is for that reason that belief is the only issue in dispute for the vast majority of child luring cases. [204] although belief is at the centre of the child luring offence, how this element can be proven by the crown (and defended by the accused) is affected by two additional provisions, both of which are at issue in this appeal. the first is the presumption of age under s 1721(3), which states: des adultes croit communiquer avec un enfant. en conséquence, lorsqu’il est établi que l’accusé croyait que l’interlocuteur n’avait pas atteint l’âge précisé, les communications qui peuvent être interprétées comme cultivant une relation de confiance ou qui revêtent un caractère sexuel témoigneront presque inévitablement d’une intention de faciliter la perpé- tration d’une infraction sous- jacente. la croyance de l’accusé selon laquelle l’interlocuteur est un enfant constitue souvent la seule différence entre une dis- cussion anodine en ligne et le leurre criminel. c’est pour cette raison que la croyance est la seule question en litige dans la vaste majorité d’affaires de leurre. [204] bien que la croyance soit au cœur de l’infrac- tion de leurre, deux autres dispositions, toutes deux en cause dans le présent pourvoi, ont une incidence sur la manière dont cet élément peut être prouvé par la couronne (et faire l’objet d’une défense par l’accusé). la première est la présomption relative à l’âge, établie au par 1721(3), qui édicte ce qui suit : presumption re age présomption (3) evidence that the person referred to in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) was represented to the accused as being under the age of eighteen years, sixteen years or fourteen years, as the case may be, is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that the accused believed that the person was under that age. (3) la preuve que la personne visée aux alinéas (1)a), b) ou c) a été présentée à l’accusé comme ayant moins de dix- huit, seize ou quatorze ans, selon le cas, constitue, sauf preuve contraire, la preuve que l’accusé la croyait telle. [205] section 172.1(3) creates a basic fact pre- sumption which allows the crown to discharge its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed that he or she was communicating with a child by simply proving that the commu- nicant was represented as being under one of the specified ages in s 1721. in this case, for exam- ple, “mia andrews”, in her initial email response to mr. morrison, asserted that she was fourteen years old. by operation of s 1721(3), this assertion would constitute proof that mr. morrison believed he was communicating with a person who was only fourteen years of age. [205] le paragraphe 172.1(3) crée une présomption fondée sur des faits établis qui permet à la couronne de s’acquitter de son fardeau consistant à prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé croyait communiquer avec un enfant en prouvant simple- ment que l’interlocuteur avait été présenté comme n’ayant pas atteint l’un des âges précisés à l’art 1721. en l’espèce, par exemple, « mia an drews », dans sa première réponse par courriel à m. morrison, a affirmé être âgée de quatorze ans. par application du par 1721(3), cette affirmation constituerait une preuve que m. morrison croyait communiquer avec une personne qui n’était âgée que de quatorze ans. [206] the presumption is rebuttable by “evidence to the contrary”. generally, this requires “evidence that is capable of raising a reasonable doubt as to the [206] la présomption est réfutable par une « preuve contraire ». généralement, il faut une « preuve ca- pable de susciter un doute raisonnable quant au [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge abella 87 presumed fact” (r v. gibson, [2008] 1 scr 397, at para. 53; r v. boucher, [2005] 3 scr 499, at para 15). however, this is further modified by the second provision at issue, s 1721(4), which states: fait présumé » (r c. gibson, [2008] 1 rcs 397, par. 53; r c. boucher, [2005] 3 rcs 499, par 15). toutefois, cette réalité est modifiée par la deuxième disposition en cause, le par 1721(4), qui est ainsi libellé : no defence moyen de défense (4) it is not a defence to a charge under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) that the accused believed that the person referred to in that paragraph was at least eighteen years of age, sixteen years or fourteen years of age, as the case may be, unless the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person. (4) le fait pour l’accusé de croire que la personne vi- sée aux alinéas (1)a), b) ou c) était âgée d’au moins dix- huit, seize ou quatorze ans, selon le cas, ne constitue un moyen de défense contre une accusation fondée sur le paragraphe (1) que s’il a pris des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de la personne. in levigne, fish j. interpreted the combined [207] effect of ss 1721(3) and (4). where the accused communicates with someone who represents himself or herself as being under one of the specified ages, the accused is presumed under s 1721(3) to have believed that he or she was communicating with a person under that age. this presumption is rebuttable by evidence to the contrary, which, by the terms of s 1721(4), must include evidence that the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the person’s age (levigne, at para 32). where the presumption of belief is rebutted by evidence to the contrary, and the accused has taken reasonable steps, the trier of fact must consider whether, based on all the evidence, the accused believed the person to be under the stated age, and acquit if left with a reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilty belief (para 32). if no reason- able steps were taken then, all other elements being proven, the accused will be convicted. [207] dans l’arrêt levigne, le juge fish a interprété l’effet combiné des par 1721(3) et (4). lorsque l’ac- cusé communique avec une personne qui se présente comme n’ayant pas atteint l’un des âges précisés, l’accusé est présumé, en application du par 1721(3), avoir cru communiquer avec une personne n’ayant pas atteint cet âge. cette présomption est réfutable par une preuve contraire qui, suivant le libellé du par 1721(4), doit notamment établir que l’accusé a pris des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne (levigne, par 32). lorsque la présomption de croyance est réfutée par une preuve contraire et que l’accusé a pris des mesures raison- nables, le juge des faits doit se demander si, sur le fondement de l’ensemble de la preuve, l’accusé croyait que la personne n’avait pas atteint l’âge men- tionné et prononcer l’acquittement s’il subsiste dans son esprit un doute raisonnable quant à la croyance coupable de l’accusé (par 32). si aucune mesure rai- sonnable n’a été prise et que tous les autres éléments ont été prouvés, l’accusé sera déclaré coupable. [208] i agree, for the reasons of the majority, that the presumption of age violates s. 11(d) of the charter and cannot be saved under s 1. with respect, i do not share the view that striking down the pre- sumption under s 1721(3) eliminates a second path to conviction under s 1721(4), whereby a conviction is available if the crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the communicant’s age. what makes such a conviction possible is the interplay between the wording of the provision and the way this court [208] je conviens, pour les motifs exposés par les juges majoritaires, que la présomption relative à l’âge viole l’al. 11d) de la charte et qu’elle ne peut être sauvegardée en application de l’article premier. en toute déférence, je ne partage pas l’avis selon lequel l’invalidation de la présomption établie au par 1721(3) a pour effet d’éliminer une deuxième voie pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpa- bilité par application du par 1721(4), voie suivant laquelle un accusé peut être déclaré coupable si la couronne prouve hors de tout doute raisonnable 88 r v morrison abella j. [2019] 2 scr. has interpreted mistake of fact. i would, as a result, find that s 1721(4) is also unconstitutional. [209] the requirement to take reasonable steps un- der s 1721(4), on its face, limits the accused’s ability to rely on the defence of mistake of fact. as the court recognized in the pre-charter case of pappajohn v. the queen, [1980] 2 scr 120, however, mistake of fact is not a true “defence” but rather the absence of (or, more accurately, a reasonable doubt as to) mens rea. in order to raise a reasonable doubt as to mens rea, the contours of the mistake must parallel the fault element of the offence. this means that subjec- tive mens rea may be negated by an honest mistake, while objective mens rea may only be negated by an honest and reasonable mistake (d. stuart, canadian criminal law: a treatise (7th ed. 2014), at pp. 311 and 317; k. roach, criminal law (7th ed. 2018), at pp. 18-19 and 202-4; pappajohn, at p 152). given the symbiotic relationship between mens rea and mistake of fact, the mens rea is necessarily affected where the availability of a mistake of fact “defence” is legislatively constrained by an objective aspect which, in this case, is the requirement to take rea- sonable steps to ascertain age. que l’accusé a omis de prendre des mesures raison- nables pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’interlocuteur. un tel verdict de culpabilité est possible en raison de l’interaction entre le libellé de la disposition et la manière dont la cour a interprété l’erreur de fait. je serais donc d’avis de conclure que le par 1721(4) est lui aussi inconstitutionnel. [209] à première vue, l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) limite la capacité de l’accusé d’invoquer le moyen de dé- fense d’erreur de fait. toutefois, comme la cour l’a reconnu dans l’arrêt pappajohn c. la reine, [1980] 2 rcs 120, rendu avant l’entrée en vigueur de la charte, l’erreur de fait n’est pas une « défense » à proprement parler, mais plutôt l’absence de mens rea (ou, plus exactement, un doute raisonnable quant à la mens rea). pour soulever un doute raisonnable quant à la mens rea, les paramètres de l’erreur doivent correspondre à l’élément de faute de l’infraction. ceci signifie que la mens rea subjective peut être renversée par une erreur honnête, alors que la mens rea objective ne peut être renversée que par une erreur honnête et raisonnable (d. stuart, canadian criminal law : a treatise (7e éd. 2014), p. 311 et 317; k. roach, criminal law (7e éd. 2018), p. 18-19 et 202-204, pappajohn, p 152). en raison de la rela- tion symbiotique entre la mens rea et l’erreur de fait, la mens rea est nécessairement influencée lorsque la loi limite la possibilité d’invoquer la « défense » d’erreur de fait par un aspect objectif, à savoir, en l’espèce, l’obligation de prendre des mesures raison- nables pour s’assurer de l’âge. [210] criminal law jurisprudence has recognized the effect of reasonable steps provisions on the fault element of an offence. offences which include such limits have been described as “subjective- objective”, since the determination of whether an accused took “reasonable steps” to ascertain age is based on what steps a reasonable person would take in light of the circumstances known to the accused at the time (r. v. george, [2017] 1 scr 1021, at para. 9; r v. saliba (2013), 304 ccc (3d) 133 (ont. ca), at paras.  27-28; r v duran (2013), 306 oac. 301 (ca), at paras. 53-54; r v. p (lt) (1997), 113 ccc (3d) 42 (bcca), at para. 20; hc stewart,. sexual offences in canadian law (loose- leaf), at [210] la jurisprudence en droit criminel a re- connu l’effet des dispositions exigeant la prise de mesures raisonnables sur l’élément de faute d’une infraction. les infractions qui présentent de telles limites ont été décrites comme étant « subjectives et objectives  », puisque la réponse à la question de savoir si un accusé a pris des « mesures raison- nables » pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’autre personne repose sur les mesures que prendrait une personne raisonnable dans les circonstances dont avait alors connaissance l’accusé (r c. george, [2017] 1 rcs. 1021, par. 9; r c. saliba (2013), 304 ccc (3d) 133 (ca ont), par. 27-28; r c. duran (2013), 306 oac 301 (ca), par. 53-54; r c. p (lt) [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge abella 89 p 4-262). although the analysis depends on the information subjectively known to the accused, it remains an objective inquiry because it is assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person: the accused is “held up to a standard of reasonable con- duct” (r v. sinclair, 92 alta. lr (5th) 64 (qb), at para. 40; r v. malcolm (2000), 148 man. r. (2d) 143 (ca), at para. 13; r v. darrach (1998), 38 or. (3d) 1 (ca), at pp. 24-25, aff’d on other grounds, [2000] 2 scr 443; r v. cornejo (2003), 68 or. (3d) 117 (ca), at paras. 19 and 30-34; duran, at pa- ras. 51-55; r. cairns way, “bill c-49 and the politics of constitutionalized fault” (1993), 42 unblj. 325, at pp 329-30). [211] we can see how the reasonable steps require- ment adds objectivity to the mens rea by looking at how this “defence” works in practice. to raise an air of reality for the mistake defence when there is a reasonable steps requirement, whether the mistake is one of age or consent, there must be evidence which supports both the accused’s honest belief that the complainant was over the relevant age/consent- ing, and that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain age, or reasonable steps to ascertain consent. as a result, once mistake of fact is put in issue, the crown can succeed by proving either that the accused believed the complainant to be under the relevant age/not consenting, or that the accused failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain age, or reasonable steps to ascertain consent (george, at para. 8; stewart (loose- leaf), at pp 4-262 to 4-26.3; m. manning and p. sankoff, manning, mewett & sankoff: criminal law (5th ed. 2015), at p 1113). the result is that the mens rea of the offence can be established solely on the accused’s failure to take reasonable steps. (1997), 113 ccc (3d) 42 (ca c-b), par. 20; hc . stewart, sexual offences in canadian law (feuilles mobiles), p 4-262). bien que l’analyse dé- pende de l’information dont disposait subjectivement l’accusé, l’analyse demeure objective puisqu’elle est réalisée du point de vue d’une personne raison- nable : l’accusé est [traduction] « tenu à la norme du comportement raisonnable » (r c. sinclair, 92 alta lr (5th) 64 (br), par. 40; r c. malcolm (2000), 148 man. r. (2d) 143 (ca), par. 13; r c. darrach (1998), 38 or (3d) 1 (ca), p. 24-25, confirmé pour d’autres motifs par [2000] 2 rcs. 443; r c. cornejo (2003), 68 or (3d) 117 (ca), par. 19 et 30-34; duran, par. 51-55; r. cairns way, « bill c-49 and the politics of constitutionalized fault » (1993), 42 unblj 325, p 329-330). [211] nous pouvons voir comment l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables ajoute une cer- taine objectivité à la mens rea en examinant com- ment cette « défense » s’applique en pratique. pour établir la vraisemblance de la défense d’erreur de fait lorsqu’il y a une obligation de prendre des me- sures raisonnables, que l’erreur porte sur l’âge ou le consentement, il doit exister une preuve qui ap- puie la croyance sincère de l’accusé que le plaignant avait atteint l’âge applicable/était consentant et que l’accusé a pris toutes les mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge ou des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer du consentement. en conséquence, dès que l’erreur de fait est invoquée, la couronne peut avoir gain de cause en prouvant soit que l’accusé croyait que le plaignant n’avait pas atteint l’âge ap- plicable/n’était pas consentant, soit que l’accusé a omis de prendre toutes les mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge ou des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer du consentement (george, par. 8; stewart (feuilles mobiles), p 4-262 à 4-26.3; m. manning et p. sankoff, manning, mewett & sankoff : criminal law (5e éd. 2015), p 1113). il s’ensuit que la mens rea de l’infraction peut être établie sur le seul fonde- ment du défaut pour l’accusé de prendre des mesures raisonnables. [212] acknowledging that s 1721(4) affects the mens rea of the offence aligns with the interpretation of analogous limits elsewhere in the criminal code, which also inject objectivity into the fault element [212] reconnaître que le par 1721(4) a une in- cidence sur la mens rea de l’infraction s’accorde avec l’interprétation des limites analogues prévues ailleurs dans le code criminel, qui incorporent elles 90 r v morrison abella j. [2019] 2 scr. of the offence (with respect to mistake of age, see s 1501(4) and (5) of the criminal code; george, at para. 8; roach, at pp. 233-34; stewart (loose- leaf), at pp 4-262 to 4-26.3; with respect to mistaken belief in consent, see s 2732(b) of the criminal code; malcolm, at para. 13; darrach, at pp. 24-25; cornejo, at paras. 19 and 30-34). [213] this court recently recognized that a reason- able steps requirement adds objectivity to the fault element of the offence in its unanimous decision in george, which discussed how limits on mistake of age under s 1501(4) of the criminal code affect the available pathways to conviction in the context of general sexual offences. gascon j., writing for the court, said:    [the accused’s] only available defence — or, more ac- curately, her only available means of negating her criminal intent (mens rea) to have sex with a minor — was “mistake of age”, ie [the accused] believing that cd was at least 16. however, the criminal code limits the availability of the mistake of age defence by requiring that “all reason- able steps” be taken to ascertain the complainant’s age: aussi une certaine objectivité dans l’élément de faute de l’infraction (pour ce qui est de l’erreur sur l’âge, voir les par 1501(4) et (5) du code criminel; george, par. 8; roach, p. 233-234; stewart (feuilles mobiles), p 4-262 à 4-26.3; pour ce qui est de la croyance erronée au consentement, voir l’al 2732b) du code criminel; malcolm, par. 13; darrach, p. 24- 25; cornejo, par. 19 et 30-34). [213] la cour a récemment reconnu qu’une obli- gation en matière de prise de mesures raisonnables ajoute une certaine objectivité à l’élément de faute de l’infraction, dans la décision qu’elle a rendue à l’unanimité dans l’affaire george, qui portait sur la manière dont les limites apportées à l’erreur sur l’âge par le par 1501(4) du code criminel ont une incidence sur les voies disponibles pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité dans le contexte des infractions sexuelles générales. s’exprimant au nom de la cour, le juge gascon a affirmé ce qui suit :    le seul moyen de défense [que l’accusée] pouvait invoquer — ou, pour être plus précis, le seul moyen dont elle disposait pour réfuter qu’elle avait eu l’intention cri- minelle (mens rea) d’avoir des rapports sexuels avec un mineur — était de faire valoir qu’elle avait commis une « erreur sur l’âge », c’est-à-dire qu’elle croyait que cd. avait au moins 16 ans. cependant, le code criminel limite l’ouverture de la défense d’erreur sur l’âge en exigeant d’un accusé qu’il ait pris « toutes les mesures raison- nables » pour s’assurer de l’âge du plaignant : 150.1   . mistake of age 150.1   . inadmissibilité de l’erreur (4) it is not a defence to a charge under section 151 or 152, subsection 160(3) or 173(2), or section 271, 272 or 273 that the accused believed that the complainant was 16 years of age or more at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed unless the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant. (4) le fait que l’accusé croyait que le plaignant était âgé de seize ans au moins au moment de la perpétration de l’infraction reprochée ne constitue un moyen de défense contre une accusation portée en vertu des ar- ticles 151 ou 152, des paragraphes 160(3) ou 173(2) ou des articles 271, 272 ou 273 que si l’accusé a pris toutes les mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge du plaignant. at common law, “true crimes” — like those at issue here — would have a purely subjective fault element. however, through statutory intervention, parliament has imported an objective element into the fault analysis to enhance protections for youth. as a result, to convict an en common law, les [traduction] «  crimes véri- tables » — du genre de ceux en cause dans la présente affaire — comportent un élément de faute purement sub- jectif. toutefois, par voie de dispositions législatives, le parlement a importé dans l’analyse de la faute un élément [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge abella 91 accused person who demonstrates an “air of reality” to the mistake of age defence, the crown must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either that the accused person (1) did not honestly believe the complainant was at least 16 (the subjective element); or (2) did not take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the complainant’s age (the objective element). [emphasis added; citations omitted; paras 7-8] [214] these words are clear and unambiguous, confirming that reasonable steps requirements import objectivity into the mens rea of criminal offences. george’s discussion of reasonable steps require- ments applies with equal force to s 1721(4). when mistake of age is in issue, s 1721(4) allows for a conviction if the crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain age (the objective path to liability), or if it proves that the accused subjectively believed that the communicant was under the relevant age (the subjective path to liability). because statutorily defining the parameters of a permissible mistake of fact also necessarily transforms the fault element of the offence, the crown, by proving either the subjective or objective path to conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, will also have established the mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. objectif afin d’accorder une protection accrue aux jeunes personnes. par conséquent, pour que soit déclaré cou- pable un accusé qui démontre que sa défense d’erreur sur l’âge possède une « apparence de vraisemblance », le ministère public doit alors prouver hors de tout doute rai- sonnable soit que l’accusé (1) ne croyait pas sincèrement que le plaignant était âgé d’au moins 16 ans (l’élément subjectif), soit que l’accusé (2) n’a pas pris « toutes les mesures raisonnables » pour s’assurer de l’âge du plai- gnant (l’élément objectif). [italiques ajoutés; références omises; par 7-8] [214] ces mots sont clairs et sans équivoque, et ils confirment que les obligations en matière de prise de mesures raisonnables introduisent une cer- taine objectivité dans la mens rea des infractions criminelles. l’analyse dans l’arrêt george au su- jet des obligations en matière de prise de mesures raisonnables s’applique avec autant de vigueur au par 1721(4). lorsque l’erreur sur l’âge est en cause, le par 1721(4) permet le prononcé d’une décla- ration de culpabilité si la couronne prouve hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a omis de prendre des mesures raisonnables pour s’assurer de l’âge (la voie objective vers la responsabilité) ou si elle prouve que l’accusé croyait subjectivement que l’interlocuteur n’avait pas atteint l’âge appli- cable (la voie subjective vers la responsabilité). parce que la définition par voie législative des pa- ramètres de l’erreur de fait acceptable a nécessaire- ment pour effet, en outre, de transformer l’élément de faute de l’infraction, la couronne, en prouvant hors de tout doute raisonnable l’une ou l’autre de ces voies pouvant conduire à une déclaration de culpabilité — objective ou subjective —, se trouvera également à avoir établi la mens rea hors de tout doute raisonnable. [215] i see nothing constitutionally suspect about reasonable steps requirements generally. these re- quirements are intended to “enhance protections for youth” in the mistake of age context (george, at para. 8) and preclude reliance on stereotypes and assumptions in the consent context (see, eg,. r v. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 scr 330, at para. 95, per l’heureux- dubé j., concurring). in the unique con- text of internet child luring, however, the limitations on the accused’s ability to allege mistaken belief in age in s 1721(4) are, in my view, inconsistent with [215] les obligations en matière de prise de me- sures raisonnables ne me paraissent pas suspectes sur le plan constitutionnel d’une manière générale. ces obligations ont pour objectif « d’accorder une protection accrue aux jeunes personnes » dans le contexte de l’erreur sur l’âge (george, par. 8) et d’in- terdire le recours aux stéréotypes et aux suppositions dans le contexte du consentement (voir, p ex, r. c. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 rcs 330, par. 95, la juge l’heureux- dubé, dans des motifs concordants). cependant, dans le contexte particulier du leurre par 92 r v morrison abella j. [2019] 2 scr. the guarantees under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter, which provide: internet, les restrictions sur la capacité de l’accusé d’alléguer la croyance erronée à l’âge qui est visée au par 1721(4) sont, à mon avis, incompatibles avec les garanties prévues à l’art. 7 et à l’al. 11d) de la charte, dont le texte suit : life, liberty and security of person vie, liberté et sécurité 7 everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 7 chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu’en conformité avec les principes de justice fondamentale. proceedings in criminal and penal matters affaires criminelles et pénales 11 any person charged with an offence has the right 11 tout inculpé a le droit : . (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty ac- cording to law in a fair and public hearing by an independ- ent and impartial tribunal. d) d’être présumé innocent tant qu’il n’est pas déclaré coupable, conformément à la loi, par un tribunal indépen- dant et impartial à l’issue d’un procès public et équitable. it is a principle of fundamental justice un- [216] der s. 7 that the accused has the right to present full answer and defence to a criminal charge (r v. lyttle, [2004] 1 scr 193, at paras. 41 and 43). this depends on the accused’s ability to establish a defence and challenge the case presented by the prosecution. the right to full answer and defence in turn upholds the right of the innocent not to be con- victed, itself enshrined under s. 11(d) of the charter. where a provision has the effect of obstructing an accused’s ability to present full answer and defence to the charge leveled against him or her, it will con- stitute a violation of both ss. 7 and 11(d). il est un principe de justice fondamentale [216] visé à l’art. 7 selon lequel l’accusé a le droit de pré- senter une défense pleine et entière contre une accu- sation criminelle (r c. lyttle, [2004] 1 rcs 193, par. 41 et 43). pour être en mesure de le faire, l’ac- cusé doit pouvoir établir sa défense et contester la preuve présentée par la poursuite. à son tour, le droit à une défense pleine et entière maintient le droit de la personne innocente de ne pas être déclarée coupable, un droit qui est lui- même consacré à l’al. 11d) de la charte. lorsqu’une disposition a pour effet de nuire à la capacité d’un accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière contre l’accusation portée contre lui, elle constituera une violation à la fois de l’art. 7 et de l’al 11d). [217] under s.  172.1(4), the accused is barred from arguing that he or she did not believe that the online communicant was a child unless he or she took steps to ascertain the communicant’s age that were objectively reasonable in the circumstances. in my view, any defence will be largely illusory for an accused who believed that he or she was communicating with an adult. what steps can an accused possibly take on the internet to reason- ably verify the communicant was not under the relevant age in order to escape objective liability? [217] le paragraphe 172.1(4) empêche l’accusé de plaider qu’il ne croyait pas que l’interlocuteur en ligne était un enfant, à moins qu’il ait pris des mesures pour s’assurer de l’âge de l’interlocuteur qui étaient objectivement raisonnables dans les circons- tances. à mon avis, toute défense sera largement il- lusoire dans le cas où l’accusé croyait communiquer avec un adulte. quelles mesures un accusé peut-il possiblement prendre sur internet pour s’assurer raisonnablement que l’interlocuteur avait atteint l’âge applicable afin d’échapper à la responsabilité [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge abella 93 the effect is a nearly insurmountable barrier to the accused’s ability to raise and defend his or her innocent belief. objective? il en résulte un obstacle quasiment in- franchissable à la capacité de l’accusé d’invoquer en défense sa croyance de bonne foi. [218] the requirement to take “reasonable steps” to ascertain age under s 1721(4) has been interpreted, in my view appropriately, in a way that parallels the substantially similar requirement to take “all reason- able steps” to ascertain the complainant’s age under s 1501(4) and (5) of the criminal code in order to rely on a mistaken belief in age defence in relation to a general sexual offence (r v. thain (2009), 243 ccc (3d) 230 (ont. ca), at paras. 36-37; r v. dragos (2012), 111 or (3d) 481 (ca), at pa- ras. 61-62; r v. pengelley (2010), 261 ccc (3d) 93 (ont. scj), at paras 10-11). that analysis is based on what steps a reasonable person would take in the circumstances subjectively known to the accused at the time (george, at para. 9; saliba, at paras. 27-28; duran, at paras. 53-54; p (lt), at para 20). the inquiry has been described as a “highly contextual, fact- specific exercise” (george, at para. 9; stewart (loose- leaf), at p 4-263). [219] under ss 1501(4) and (5), the trier of fact must consider whether, based on the available indicia of age known to the accused, a reasonable person would accept the complainant’s age without further inquiry (p (lt), at paras. 20 and 27; duran, at para 52). the indicia of age include information which the accused may passively observe, such as the complainant’s physical appearance, behaviour and conduct, and other outward representations (r v osborne (1992), 102 nfld & peir 194 (nfld ca), at para 22). where some compelling factor exists that obviates the need for further inquiry by the accused, the reasonable steps requirement will be met. but where these factors instead call out for further inquiry, the trier of fact must go on to consider whether the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain age, or whether more was required (r v. mastel (2011), 268 ccc (3d) 224 (sask. ca), at para 22). as this court held in george, “the more reasonable an accused’s perception of the complainant’s age, the fewer steps reasonably required of them” (para 9). a similar analysis ap- plies in the context of mistaken belief in consent [218] l’obligation de prendre des « mesures raison- nables » pour s’assurer de l’âge, visée au par 1721(4), a été interprétée, à bon droit à mon avis, d’une ma- nière qui rappelle l’obligation à peu près semblable de prendre « toutes les mesures raisonnables » pour s’assurer de l’âge du plaignant en application des par 1501(4) et (5) du code criminel afin de pouvoir invoquer la défense de la croyance erronée à l’âge en lien avec une infraction sexuelle générale (r c. thain (2009), 243 ccc (3d) 230 (ca ont), par. 36- 37; r c. dragos (2012), 111 or (3d) 481 (ca), par. 61-62; r c. pengelley (2010), 261 ccc (3d) 93 (csj ont), par 10-11). cette analyse s’appuie sur les mesures qu’une personne raisonnable prendrait dans les circonstances dont l’accusé avait subjective- ment connaissance à l’époque (george, par. 9; saliba, par. 27-28; duran, par. 53-54; p (lt), par 20). cette analyse a été qualifiée d’« éminemment contextuelle et tributaire des faits » (george, par. 9; stewart (feuilles mobiles), p 4-263). [219] sous le régime des par 1501(4) et (5), le juge des faits doit se demander si, eu égard aux in- dices disponibles concernant l’âge et dont l’accusé avait connaissance, une personne raisonnable accep- terait l’âge du plaignant sans s’informer davantage (p (lt), par. 20 et 27; duran, par 52). les indices concernant l’âge comprennent les renseignements que l’accusé est susceptible d’avoir observés passi- vement, notamment l’apparence physique, le com- portement et la conduite du plaignant et d’autres représentations externes (r c. osborne (1992), 102 nfld. & peir 194 (cat-n), par 22). s’il existe un facteur concluant qui rend inutile une enquête plus poussée par l’accusé, l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables aura été remplie. toutefois, lorsque ces facteurs appellent une enquête plus pous- sée, le juge des faits doit ensuite se demander si l’accusé a pris des mesures raisonnables pour s’as- surer de l’âge, ou s’il devait faire davantage (r c. mastel (2011), 268 ccc (3d) 224 (ca sask), par.  22) comme a conclu la cour dans l’arrêt george, « plus la perception qu’a l’accusé de l’âge du plaignant est raisonnable, moins le nombre de 94 r v morrison abella j. [2019] 2 scr. under s 2732(b) (see malcolm, at paras. 21 and 24; darrach, at pp. 24-25; cornejo, at paras. 19 and 30-34). [220] but it is difficult, if not impossible, to apply such an inquiry in the context of internet child luring. unlike the objective indicia of age that are available in an in- person encounter, such as the complainant’s appearance or behaviour, the accused is required to rely exclusively on information presented over the internet, where deception is often undetectable. online profiles, mannerisms, and appearances are frequently artificially constructed or exaggerated. how can a reasonable person be expected to ascer- tain a communicant’s age when he or she cannot even confirm the communicant’s identity? [221] and even if it would be reasonable for an accused to accept that the information presented online belongs to the communicant, what steps can reasonably be taken to ascertain age? identification documents or credit card information may be sent electronically, but an individual has no means by which to verify that information. this problem is compounded when dealing with youth who lack access to such reliable documents in the first place. how does one reasonably differentiate online be- tween a 14- year-old and a 45- year-old, let alone between a 15, 16, or 17- year-old? the anonymous and unverifiable nature of online identities is, as the crown acknowledges, the very reason that the offence is based on what the accused believed at the time of the communication, and not on whether that belief was correct. mesures raisonnablement requises de la part du pre- mier sera élevé  » (par.  9). une analyse similaire s’applique dans le contexte de la croyance erronée au consentement pour l’application de l’al 2732b) (voir malcolm, par. 21 et 24; darrach, p. 24-25; cornejo, par. 19 et 30-34). [220] toutefois, il est difficile, voire impossible, de faire une telle enquête dans le contexte du leurre par internet. contrairement aux indices objectifs concer- nant l’âge qui sont disponibles dans une rencontre en personne, par exemple, l’apparence ou le comporte- ment du plaignant, l’accusé doit s’appuyer exclusive- ment sur les renseignements présentés dans internet, où la tromperie est souvent impossible à détecter. il arrive fréquemment que, en ligne, les profils, les maniérismes et les apparences soient artificiellement construits ou exagérés. comment peut-on s’attendre à ce qu’une personne raisonnable s’assure de l’âge de son interlocuteur lorsqu’elle ne peut même pas confirmer l’identité de ce dernier? [221] et même s’il était raisonnable qu’un accusé accepte que les renseignements présentés en ligne sont ceux de l’interlocuteur, quelles mesures peuvent être raisonnablement prises pour s’assurer de l’âge? des documents d’identification ou des données de carte de crédit peuvent être envoyés par voie électro- nique, mais un individu ne dispose d’aucun moyen de vérifier ces renseignements ce problème est amplifié lorsque les interlocuteurs sont de jeunes personnes qui, au départ, n’ont pas accès à des do- cuments aussi fiables. comment fait-on la différence, en ligne, entre une personne âgée de 14 ans et une personne qui en a 45, et a fortiori entre des personnes âgées de 15, 16 ou 17 ans? le caractère anonyme et invérifiable des identités en ligne est, comme le re- connaît la couronne, la raison précise pour laquelle l’infraction est fondée sur ce que l’accusé croyait au moment de la communication, et non sur la question de savoir si cette croyance était bien fondée. [222] moreover, additional communications made in an effort to ascertain age will necessarily put the accused at a heightened risk of being inculpated in the very offence intended to be avoided. conversa- tions about family, school, and activities designed to assess whether the communicant is of sufficient age [222] qui plus est, les communications supplé- mentaires faites dans le but de s’assurer de l’âge feront nécessairement courir à l’accusé un risque accru d’être inculpé de l’infraction même qu’il tentait d’éviter. des conversations sur la famille, l’école et les activités, ayant pour but de vérifier si [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison la juge abella 95 are among the same techniques used by predators to identify and groom young people online (see legare, at para. 29; r v. adams (2016), 45 alta. lr (6th) 171 (qb), at para 90). similarly, the accused’s request for a photo or video is often associated with child luring (legare, at paras. 10-11; trial decision, at para. 35; pengelley, at para. 54; r v. bayat (2011), 108 or (3d) 420 (ca), at para. 20; r v. froese, 2015 onsc 1075, at para. 74 (canlii)). [223] the inherent similarity between evidence going to “reasonable steps” and evidence of child luring in the internet context may make it impossible for an accused to escape objective liability, despite holding an honest belief that the communicant was over the specified age. this is so because attempts to ascertain age may be seen by the trier of fact as evidence that the accused believed that the commu- nicant was a child. the result of the reasonable steps requirement in s 1721(4), therefore, is to render illusory the accused’s ability to allege an honest but mistaken belief in age. this, in my view, constitutes an interference with the accused’s fundamental right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 and the presumption of innocence under s 11(d). [224] as fish j. made clear in legare, what mat- ters is “whether the evidence as a whole establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused com- municated by computer with an underage victim for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a spec- ified secondary offence with respect to that victim” (para. 42 (emphasis in original)). the crown must prove each element of the offence beyond a reason- able doubt, including belief, and the accused must have a full and fair opportunity to defend against the charge, whether by arguing that the crown has failed to meet its burden, or by adducing positive evidence supporting his or her innocence. any other state of affairs will violate the charter. l’interlocuteur est suffisamment âgé, figurent parmi les techniques qu’emploient les prédateurs pour iden- tifier de jeunes personnes et exercer sur elles une manipulation psychologique en ligne (voir legare, par. 29; r c. adams (2016), 45 alta. lr (6th) 171 (br), par 90). de même, le fait pour l’accusé de demander une photo ou une vidéo, dans bien des cas, est associé au leurre (legare, par. 10-11; jugement de première instance, par. 35; pengelley, par. 54; r. c. bayat (2011), 108 or (3d) 420 (ca), par. 20; r c. froese, 2015 onsc 1075, par. 74 (canlii)). [223] la similitude inhérente de la preuve relative à la prise de « mesures raisonnables » et de celle du leurre par internet pourrait faire en sorte qu’il est impossible pour un accusé d’échapper à la res- ponsabilité objective, même s’il croit honnêtement que son interlocuteur a atteint l’âge précisé. il en est ainsi parce que les tentatives visant à s’assurer de l’âge d’une personne peuvent être perçues par le juge des faits comme une preuve selon laquelle l’accusé croyait que son interlocuteur était un enfant. l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) a donc pour conséquence de rendre illusoire la possibilité pour un accusé de faire valoir une croyance honnête, quoiqu’erronée, à l’âge. à mon avis, il s’agit là d’une atteinte au droit fon- damental de présenter une défense pleine et entière que l’art. 7 garantit à l’accusé et à la présomption d’innocence que lui garantit l’al 11d). [224] comme l’a expliqué clairement le juge fish dans l’arrêt legare, ce qui importe, « c’est de déter- miner si la preuve dans son ensemble établit hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a communiqué au moyen d’un ordinateur avec une victime qui n’a pas atteint l’âge fixé en vue de faciliter la perpé- tration à son égard d’une infraction d’ordre sexuel énumérée » (par. 42 (en italique dans l’original)). la couronne doit prouver chaque élément de l’in- fraction hors de tout doute raisonnable, y compris la croyance, et l’accusé doit avoir la possibilité pleine et entière de se défendre contre l’accusation, que ce soit en plaidant que la couronne ne s’est pas acquittée de son fardeau ou en présentant une preuve positive appuyant son innocence. toute autre situation violera la charte. 96 r v morrison abella j. [2019] 2 scr. [225] nor do i think that s 1721(4) can be saved under s. 1 of the charter, largely for the reasons provided by the majority in relation to s 1721(3). i agree that preventing the accused from advancing mistake of age arguments in the absence of an objec- tive basis is rationally connected to the pressing and substantial objective as defined in levigne, namely “to foreclose exculpatory claims of ignorance or mis- take that are entirely devoid of an objective eviden- tiary basis” (para 31). but in my view the harmful effects of the provision outweigh its salutary effects. the reasonable steps requirement under s 1721(4) significantly harms the right to make full answer and defence and the presumption of innocence, rights fundamental to our criminal justice system, and erodes these rights in a manner that risks convicting the innocent. the seriousness of this harm outweighs any salutary impact. section 172.1(4) is, as a result, unconstitutional. i would therefore set aside mr. morrison’s [226] conviction and order an acquittal. [227] finally, i agree with justice karakatsanis that the mandatory minimum sentence in s 1721(2)(a) violates s. 12 of the charter. [225] je ne crois pas non plus que le par 1721(4) puisse être sauvegardé en application de l’article premier de la charte, essentiellement pour les mo- tifs exposés par les juges majoritaires en lien avec le par 1721(3). je reconnais que le fait d’empêcher l’accusé de présenter des arguments relatifs à l’erreur sur l’âge en l’absence de fondement objectif a un lien rationnel avec l’objectif urgent et réel, comme le définit l’arrêt levigne, « de faire obstacle aux alléga- tions disculpatoires d’ignorance ou d’erreur dénuées de tout fondement probatoire objectif » (par 31). cependant, à mon avis, les effets préjudiciables de la disposition l’emportent sur ses effets bénéfiques. l’obligation de prendre des mesures raisonnables visée au par 1721(4) porte sérieusement atteinte au droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière et à la présomption d’innocence, des droits fondamentaux dans notre système de justice criminelle, et elle érode ces droits d’une manière qui risque de faire déclarer coupables des personnes innocentes. la gravité des préjudices l’emporte sur tout effet bénéfique. en conséquence, le par 1721(4) est inconstitutionnel. [226] je suis donc d’avis d’annuler la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée contre m. morrison et d’or- donner l’acquittement. [227] enfin, je suis d’accord avec la juge karakatsanis pour dire que la peine minimale obli- gatoire prévue à l’al 1721(2)a) viole l’art. 12 de la charte. appeal and cross- appeal allowed in part, pourvoi principal et pourvoi incident accueillis abella j. dissenting in part. en partie, la juge abella est dissidente en partie. appeal: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’appelante/intimée au pourvoi in- cident : procureure générale de l’ontario, toronto. appeal: rusonik, o’connor, robbins, ross, gorham & angelini, toronto; caramanna, friedberg, toronto. procureurs de l’intimé/appelant au pourvoi inci- dent : rusonik, o’connor, robbins, ross, gorham & angelini, toronto; caramanna, friedburg, toronto. of canada: attorney general of canada, ottawa. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général du canada : procureur général du canada, ottawa. of quebec: attorney general of quebec, québec. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné- rale du québec : procureure générale du québec, québec. [2019] 2 rcs. r c morrison 97 of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de la colombie- britannique : procureur général de la colombie- britannique, victoria. of saskatchewan: attorney general of saskatche- wan, regina. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de la saskatchewan : procureur général de la saskatchewan, regina. of alberta: attorney general of alberta, edmonton. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’alberta : procureur général de l’alberta, edmonton. yers’ association (ontario): berkes newton- smith, toronto; daniel brown law, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association (ontario) : berkes newton- smith, to- ronto; daniel brown law, toronto.
i. introduction 79 91 92 96 103 114 [1] this appeal concerns the legal framework that applies to a discrimination claim involving a public figure’s right to the safeguard of his dignity, on the one hand, and a professional comedian’s freedom of expression, on the other it invites us, incidentally, to clarify the scope of the jurisdiction of the commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (“commission”) and the human rights tribunal (“tribunal”) with respect to discrimination claims based on the charter of human rights and freedoms, cqlr, c. c-12 (“charter” or “quebec charter”). [2] very often, discrimination complaints are made in the context of employment, housing, or goods and services available to the public. in this case, the complaint that gave rise to the appeal is quite different, as it concerns a professional comedian, the appellant, mike ward, who mocked a public figure with a disability, jérémy gabriel. [3] however, the complaint underlying this appeal led not to an action in defamation based on the comments made by mr. ward, but rather to a discrimination claim based on those comments. could the tribunal conclude that the discrimination complaint was well-founded? in our view, the answer must be no, because the elements of a discrimination claim under the quebec charter were not established. [4] it is important to begin by noting that this question draws attention to a trend by the commission and the tribunal, in their decisions, to interpret their home statute, the quebec charter, as giving them jurisdiction over cases involving allegedly “discriminatory” comments made by individuals, either in private or in public. with respect, we are of the view that this trend deviates from this court’s jurisprudence and reflects a misinterpretation of the provisions at issue in this case, particularly ss. 4 and 10 of the quebec charter, which guarantee, respectively, the right to the safeguard of dignity and the equal recognition and exercise of human rights and freedoms, including in a context where expression is allegedly “discriminatory”. it leads to the suppression of expression whose content is perceived to be discriminatory and to significant monetary awards against the speakers. [5] it must be recognized at the outset that the quebec charter, which elevates freedom of expression to a fundamental freedom, was not enacted to encourage censorship. it follows that expression in the nature of rude remarks made by individuals does not in itself constitute discrimination under that statute. but this does not mean that the quebec charter can never apply to expression of this kind in very specific circumstances in this appeal, we therefore wish to clarify the legal framework that applies to a discrimination claim in a context involving freedom of expression. [6] briefly stated, a complainant must, in order to succeed, establish all the elements of discrimination, as required by s 10 of the quebec charter the complainant must show (1) a distinction, exclusion or preference; (2) based on one of the grounds listed in the first paragraph of s 10; (3) that has the effect of impairing the right to full and equal recognition and exercise of a human right or freedom (quebec (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. bombardier inc. (bombardier aerospace training center), 2015 scc 39, [2015] 2 scr 789, at para. 35) at this last step, the scope of the fundamental right on which the alleged infringement is based must be determined in light of s 9.1 where the right to the safeguard of dignity is in conflict with freedom of expression, the complainant must first show that the expression incites others to vilify them or to detest their humanity on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination the complainant must then establish that the expression, considered in its context, is likely to result in discriminatory treatment of them. [7] in this case, we are of the opinion that the elements of a discrimination claim under the quebec charter have not been established. we would therefore allow the appeal. ii background [8] the appeal is between mr. ward and the commission, which is acting here for the benefit of mr. gabriel. in the proceedings below, the commission also acted on behalf of mr. gabriel’s parents, sylvie gabriel and steeve lavoie we note that mr. gabriel and ms. gabriel are interveners in this appeal. [9] at the time of the events alleged against mr. ward, mr. gabriel was a minor and a student in secondary school, and he had an artistic career as a singer. the circumstances in which mr. gabriel began that career, at the age of 8 and with his parents’ support, are commendable he was born with treacher collins syndrome, which caused certain malformations of the head as well as profound deafness. when he was 6 years old, he received a bone-anchored hearing aid that made it possible for him to hear 80 to 90 percent of sounds. thanks to that hearing aid, he learned to speak and to sing. [10] the first two years of his career, 2005 and 2006, were highlighted by several events that received media coverage (eg, performance of the national anthem at a sporting event, an invitation to sing for céline dion, and a musical performance in rome in the presence of pope benedict xvi). he carried on with his career by taking part in a number of television shows, the production of a documentary about treacher collins syndrome that was broadcast in france, the release of an album and then his autobiography, and concerts as a result of his fame, mr. gabriel became a patient ambassador for shriners hospitals in 2012 he travelled in canada and the united states and volunteered to participate in shows and fundraisers. [11] mr. ward, for his part, is a professional comedian and a graduate of the école nationale de l’humour whose career began in 1993. his performances, for which he has won many awards, are, he says, in the style of dark comedy, a comedy genre in which shocking subjects or social taboos are [translation] “tackled”. [12] from september 2010 to march 2013, mr. ward gave a show called mike ward s’expose, the main theme of which was tolerance and the fact that [translation] “we are all the same”. around 135,000 tickets were sold. this litigation centres on one of the routines in that show, called [translation] the untouchables. in that routine, mr. ward mocked certain figures in quebec’s artistic community whom he described as “sacred cows” that could not be made fun of for various reasons, whether because of their wealth or their influence, or because “they are seen as weak” (examination-in-chief of mr. ward, ar, vol. iii, at p 146, excerpts quoted in ca. reasons, at paras. 75, 14 and 168). mr. gabriel was one of the public figures referred to in the routine. [13] in addition to that show, mr. ward made several videos on topical subjects that were posted on his website. the videos were about a number of public figures. one of them was posted in connection with the release of mr. gabriel’s autobiography. in that video, mr. ward made disparaging comments about mr. gabriel’s physical appearance. [14] the evidence shows that students attending the same secondary school as mr. gabriel drew inspiration from some of the comments in that video to make fun of him. the evidence also shows that, at the time, mr. gabriel was already the subject of tasteless jokes by people who drew a connection between his performance for pope benedict xvi or his meeting with cardinal ouellet and pedophilia, well before mr. ward made his comments about him. [15] in 2012, mr. gabriel’s parents filed a complaint with the commission, on their own behalf and on behalf of mr. gabriel, sometime after the broadcast of a television interview with mr. ward that included an excerpt from the routine called the untouchables concerning their son. the commission concluded that there was a basis for discrimination and referred the complaint to the tribunal. iii procedural history a human rights tribunal, 2016 qctdp 18, 35 cclt (4th) 258 (judge hughes presiding) [16] the tribunal considered the three elements of discrimination within the meaning of the charter, namely: (1) a distinction (2) based on a prohibited ground (3) that has the effect of nullifying or impairing the equal recognition or exercise of a human right or freedom first, mr. ward had subjected mr. gabriel to differential treatment by making comments about him in order to make his audience laugh. second, mr. ward had made comments concerning mr. gabriel’s disability, although he had not chosen mr. gabriel because of his disability third, mr. ward’s derogatory comments attained the degree of seriousness required by calego international inc. v. commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, 2013 qcca 924, [2013] rjdt 517. the tribunal therefore concluded that by exposing mr. gabriel to mockery because of his disability, mr. ward had infringed mr. gabriel’s right to the safeguard of his dignity in a discriminatory manner. [17] having found that all the elements of discrimination had been established, the tribunal considered mr. ward’s “defence” based on freedom of expression. in its view, mr. ward’s comments exceeded the limits of what a reasonable person can tolerate in the name of freedom of expression the tribunal therefore held that the discrimination suffered by mr. gabriel was not justified. mr. ward was ordered to pay $25,000 in moral damages and $10,000 in punitive damages he then appealed that judgment. b quebec court of appeal, 2019 qcca 2042, 62 cclt (4th) 230 (1) majority reasons (roy and cotnam jja) [18] the appeal was dismissed by the majority, justices claudine roy and geneviève cotnam, who noted that the standard of review applicable in an appeal from a decision rendered by the tribunal is reasonableness.1 first, they pointed out that mr. ward had chosen mr. gabriel both because of his fame and because of his disability and that the impugned comments had been directed specifically at the physical characteristics associated with that disability. in their view, the tribunal could reasonably find that there was a distinction based on a prohibited ground the 1 this standard of review was modified by canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, which was released a few weeks after the court of appeal’s decision. we will refer to that case in part vi of these reasons. tribunal’s finding on the third element of discrimination was also upheld on the basis that, even in a pluralistic society, a reasonable person targeted by mr. ward’s comments would have had their dignity impaired in a discriminatory manner. [19] the majority then analyzed the “defence” raised by mr. ward in their opinion, the tribunal had accurately applied the approach outlined by this court in bombardier by treating freedom of expression as a means of justifying expression that is prima facie discriminatory they also adopted the test set out in calego, which involves determining whether a reasonable person accustomed to a pluralistic society in which freedom of expression is valued and some immoderate language is accepted would regard the affront suffered as particularly contemptuous and fraught with consequences for them. in the majority’s view, the tribunal could reasonably conclude that mr. ward’s comments were not justified by freedom of expression. the majority declined, in obiter, to recognize that comedy performances have a special status when it comes to freedom of expression. (2) dissenting reasons (savard ja) [20] in dissent, justice manon savard (as she then was) began by pointing out the only legal issue raised in the case: [translation] the issue raised by the appeal is of an entirely different nature. it concerns the analytical framework to be adopted by the human rights tribunal (“tribunal”) when it has to decide a complaint of discrimination resulting from expression, and nothing else, based on a ground prohibited under section 10 of the charter of human rights and freedoms. the issue also requires a review, within that framework, of the appropriate balance between the right to dignity and freedom of expression. beyond the impugned expression, which was in the style — by definition shocking and trenchant — of the type of humour used by the appellant, did he discriminate against the impleaded parties? and i stress that i am saying discriminate and not defame, because the tribunal has no jurisdiction in the latter case [emphasis in original; footnote omitted; para. 7.] [21] in the view of savard ja, who would have allowed mr. ward’s appeal, the tribunal had erred by excluding any comparative and contextual analysis in finding differential treatment. the fact that a person is targeted by name in a comedy show is not enough to establish a distinction within the meaning of s 10 of the quebec charter. savard ja also found that references to a prohibited ground that characterizes a person cannot on their own satisfy the first two elements of discrimination. in her opinion, the tribunal had also erred by considering interference with the right to the safeguard of dignity in isolation; it should have considered freedom of expression not as a defence that could justify discriminatory conduct, but as a limit to the scope of that right pursuant to s 9.1 of the quebec charter that provision, she found, requires a balancing of freedom of expression and the right to the safeguard of dignity. relying on the principles set out in saskatchewan (human rights commission) v whatcott, 2013 scc 11, [2013] 1 scr 467, savard ja concluded that mr. ward’s comments did not constitute discriminatory speech and that the tribunal had therefore erred in finding otherwise. iv. issue [22] the only issue is that of the legal framework that applies to a discrimination claim under the quebec charter, in a context involving freedom of expression, in order to determine whether, in this case, mr. ward interfered with mr. gabriel’s right to the safeguard of his dignity and thereby in fact discriminated against him. before dealing with that issue, we think it will be helpful to say a few words about the applicable standard of review and to note the distinction that must be drawn with respect to jurisdiction over, on the one hand, an action in defamation and, on the other, a discrimination claim in the context of the quebec charter. v relevant provisions of the quebec charter [23] the provisions of the quebec charter at issue in this appeal, as they read at the relevant time, are as follows: chapter i fundamental freedoms and rights . 3. every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association. 4. every person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, honour and reputation. 91. in exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of québec. in this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by law. chapter i.1 right to equal recognition and exercise of rights and freedoms 10. every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap. discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such right. vi applicable standard of review [24] as stated above, the court of appeal found that reasonableness was the standard of review that applied in this case. however, the applicable standard of review was modified by canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, which was released a few weeks after the court of appeal’s judgment. according to vavilov, the presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review for an administrative decision will be rebutted where the legislature has provided for “a statutory appeal mechanism from an administrative decision maker to a court, thereby signalling the application of appellate standards” (para. 33). [25] here, ss. 132 and 133 of the quebec charter state that the tribunal’s decisions may be appealed to the quebec court of appeal. because there is a statutory appeal mechanism, appellate standards apply rather than the reasonableness standard (vavilov, at para. 37; see housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235). the applicable standard is correctness for questions of law and palpable and overriding error for questions of mixed fact and law. vii jurisdiction over defamation and discrimination [26] any action for compensation for the moral or material prejudice resulting from an infringement of a right guaranteed by the quebec charter is subject to the ordinary rules of civil liability (aubry v. éditions vice-versa inc., [1998] 1 scr 591, at para. 49; béliveau st-jacques v. fédération des employées et employés de services publics inc., [1996] 2 scr 345, at para. 122) an action in defamation, whose purpose is to remedy the consequences of wrongful interference with reputation, is no exception to this principle. although it encompasses the right of every person to the safeguard of their reputation set out in s 4 of the charter, it still requires proof of the coexistence of fault, injury and a causal connection between the two (prud’homme v. prud’homme, 2002 scc 85, [2002] 4 scr 663, at para. 32). [27] in this regard, it is important to be clear that the comments made by mr. ward about mr. gabriel did not lead to an action in defamation, but rather to a discrimination claim. this distinction is important because the tribunal has no power to decide actions in defamation or other civil liability actions, since its jurisdiction is limited to complaints of discrimination or exploitation based on ss. 10 to 19 and 48 of the quebec charter (ss. 111, 80 and 71(1) of the quebec charter; mouvement laïque québécois v saguenay (city), 2015 scc 16, [2015] 2 scr 3, at para. 40) the tribunal can hear disputes involving expression like the comments made in this case only if the expression may constitute discrimination within the meaning of s 10 of the charter. [28] the quebec charter gives the tribunal direct, albeit limited, jurisdiction over certain types of expression, insofar as it prohibits discriminatory harassment and advertising (ss. 10.1 and 11) however, this limited direct jurisdiction has been extended indirectly in recent decades as a result of a line of decisions generously interpreting both of the two main provisions at issue, that is, the provision setting out the right to equal recognition and exercise of rights and freedoms (s 10 of the quebec charter) and that setting out the right of every person to the safeguard of their dignity, honour and reputation (s 4) according to that line of decisions, hurtful expression relating to a ground listed in s 10 of the quebec charter constitutes discrimination and may be within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, even if the harm suffered is relative and the social effects of discrimination, such as the perpetuation of prejudice or disadvantage, are absent (see, eg,. commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v filion, 2004 canlii 468 (que hrt);. tchanderli-braham v bériault, 2018 qctdp 4; jied v. éthier, 2019 qctdp 26; mirouh v. gaudreault, 2021 qctdp 10; ayotte v. tremblay, 2021 qctdp 13). [29] in addition to being based solely on the content of expression and not on its discriminatory effects, that line of decisions, which includes the tribunal’s judgment, dispenses with any fair balancing of freedom of expression and protection of the right to the safeguard of dignity. it therefore creates a second avenue of recourse for discrimination, parallel to an action in defamation, to compel a person to answer for the harm caused by their words, with a much less onerous burden of proof on the complainant, who is in fact not required to bring their own proceedings if the commission agrees to act on their behalf. [30] in our view, that line of decisions raises serious concerns in light of our precedents on freedom of expression a discrimination claim is not, and must not become, an action in defamation. the two are governed by different considerations and have different purposes. a discrimination claim must be limited to expression whose effects are truly discriminatory our analysis below reflects this perspective in clarifying the legal framework that applies to a discrimination claim based on ss. 4 and 10 of the quebec charter in a context where forms of verbal expression are in issue, drawing from the principles established in whatcott, with the necessary modifications. viii analysis a preliminary remarks [31] mr. ward essentially argues that the tribunal and the majority of the court of appeal erred in identifying and applying the legal framework for s 10 of the quebec charter he submits that the elements of discrimination cannot be examined in isolation without considering freedom of expression, which limits the right to the safeguard of dignity. he argues that mr. gabriel’s right to equality was not infringed. the commission, for its part, submits that mr. ward’s “humorous” comments interfered with mr. gabriel’s right to equal recognition of the right to the safeguard of his dignity and that the interference is not justified by freedom of expression. the court of appeal and the tribunal dealt with the rights to the safeguard of dignity, honour and reputation more or less interchangeably. in this court, the commission relies mainly on the concept of dignity. we will do the same. [32] we will begin by discussing the elements of discrimination and the limit imposed by s 9.1 of the quebec charter on the right being asserted we will then consider the conflict between the right to the safeguard of dignity and freedom of expression, and we will indicate how such a conflict is to be resolved in analyzing the third element of a discrimination claim based on expression. finally, we will apply the s 10 legal framework to the facts of this case. b elements of discrimination under the quebec charter [33] the objectives of the quebec charter are set out in its preamble as it read at the time: whereas every human being possesses intrinsic rights and freedoms designed to ensure his protection and development; whereas all human beings are equal in worth and dignity, and are entitled to equal protection of the law; whereas respect for the dignity of human beings, equality of women and men, and recognition of their rights and freedoms constitute the foundation of justice, liberty and peace; whereas the rights and freedoms of the human person are inseparable from the rights and freedoms of others and from the common well-being; whereas it is expedient to solemnly declare the fundamental human rights and freedoms in a charter, so that they may be guaranteed by the collective will and better protected against any violation . [34] recognizing that all human beings are equal in worth and dignity, the quebec charter seeks to eliminate discrimination by ensuring equal protection of everyone’s fundamental freedoms and rights (quebec (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. montréal (city), 2000 scc 27, [2000] 1 scr. 665 (“cdpdj v montréal”), at para. 34; quebec (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. maksteel québec inc., 2003 scc 68, [2003] 3 scr 228, at para. 35). [35] unlike the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (“canadian charter”), the quebec charter does not protect equality per se. the right to equality set out in s 10 is protected only in the recognition and exercise of the other rights and freedoms guaranteed by the quebec charter (bombardier, at para. 53). in this sense, s 10 does not establish an independent right to equality but rather strengthens the protection of those other rights and freedoms (p. carignan, “l’égalité dans le droit: une méthode d’approche appliquée à l’article 10 de la charte des droits et libertés de la personne” (1987), 21 rjt 491, at pp. 526-27). on the other hand, the quebec charter has a much broader scope than the canadian charter, because it binds not only the state but also all natural and legal persons situated in quebec (ss. 54 and 55 of the quebec charter; d. proulx, “droit à l’égalité”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit public — droit constitutionnel (loose-leaf), vol. 2, by s. beaulac and j-f. gaudreault-desbiens, eds., fasc. 9, at nos. 85-86). [36] a plaintiff claiming the protection of s 10 must satisfy a burden of proof that has three elements first, the plaintiff must prove a “distinction, exclusion or preference” (quebec charter, s 10), that is, “a decision, a measure or conduct [that] ‘affects [him or her] differently from others to whom it may apply’” (bombardier, at para. 42, quoting ontario human rights commission v. simpsons-sears ltd., [1985] 2 scr 536, at p 551). second, the plaintiff must establish that one of the characteristics expressly protected in s 10 was a factor in the differential treatment complained of (bombardier, at paras. 52 and 56). third, the plaintiff must show that the differential treatment impairs the full and equal exercise or recognition of a freedom or right guaranteed by the quebec charter (bombardier, at para. 53) where these three elements are established, the burden of justifying the discrimination falls on the defendant. [37] no right is absolute, however. section 9.1 of the charter determines the scope of the fundamental right on which the alleged infringement of s 10 is based (devine v. quebec (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 790, at p 818). section 9.1 read as follows at the relevant time: 91. in exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of québec. in this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by law. [38] the first paragraph of this section “suggest[s] the manner in which the scope of the fundamental freedoms and rights [guaranteed by the quebec charter] is to be interpreted” (ford v. quebec (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 712, at p 770). the purpose of this provision is [translation] “to temper the absoluteness of the freedoms and rights set out in ss. 1 through 9 . . . by imposing limits . . . on the holders of those rights and freedoms in relation to other citizens” (bruker v. marcovitz, 2007 scc 54, [2007] 3 scr 607, at para. 77, quoting journal des débats: commissions parlementaires, 3rd sess., 32nd leg., december 16, 1982, at p. b-11609). it echoes the preamble to the charter, which states that “the rights and freedoms of the human person are inseparable from the rights and freedoms of others and from the common well-being”. any assertion of a right must therefore be “reconciled with countervailing rights, values, and harm” (bruker, at para. 77). [39] however, s 10, which is in a different chapter than ss. 1 to 9.1 of the charter, remains outside the scope of s 9.1 (ford, at p 781; devine, at p 818). [40] in a context where a discrimination claim is based on a right guaranteed by any of ss. 1 to 9 and where the defendant also asserts a right set out in those provisions, the respective scope of the rights being asserted must be determined in light of s 91. this balancing exercise must be undertaken as part of the analysis of the elements of discrimination in this regard, we agree with savard ja: the right relied on by the defendant is not a defence, but a limit to the scope of the right invoked by the plaintiff. before it can be found that there has been discrimination in the recognition or exercise of a right provided for in any of ss. 1 to 9, the protection of that right must be called for in light of the “democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of québec” referred to in s 9.1, as it read at the relevant time there is no discrimination if, in a particular context, s 9.1 gives the right exercised by the defendant precedence over the right invoked by the plaintiff in combination with s 10. this is why the elements of discrimination cannot be analyzed in isolation. to do so would make it possible to circumvent the reasonable limits on the right invoked in support of s 10 by giving that right an unlimited scope. such an approach was rejected in devine (p 818). [41] in that case, the court had to determine, among other things, whether certain provisions of the charter of the french language, rsq, c. c-11, infringed freedom of expression (s 3) in a manner that was discriminatory within the meaning of s 10 of the quebec charter. after establishing that there was a distinction based on a prohibited ground (at p 817), the court considered the interaction between ss. 10 and 9.1 of the quebec charter: does this distinction have the effect of nullifying or impairing the right to full and equal recognition and exercise of a human right or freedom recognized by the quebec charter? as in ford, the human right or freedom in issue in this case is freedom of expression guaranteed by s 3 of the quebec charter. in ford it was found that the right guaranteed by s 3 extended to protect the freedom to express oneself in the language of one’s choice; in this case, however, we have found that s 3 does not extend to guarantee a right to express oneself exclusively in one’s own language. this result was reached by operation of s 9.1, which does not limit the application of s 10 but does limit the application of s 3. dean françois chevrette, in his article discussing the operation of s 9.1, “la disposition limitative de la charte des droits et libertés de la personne: le dit et le non‑dit” (1987), 21 rjt 461, at p 470, has clarified the relationship among ss. 1 through 9, 9.1 and 10 to the same effect: [translation] one final, delicate question remains by guaranteeing the equal recognition and exercise of rights and freedoms — in particular the rights and freedoms enshrined in ss. 1 to 9 — is s 10 of the charter itself subject to s 9.1, especially given that the latter section is arguably incorporated by reference into ss. 1 to 9? in my view, the answer to this question should be no. doubtless the rights and freedoms protected under ss. 1 to 9 can ultimately be limited by virtue of s 9.1 — this despite the guarantee of their full and equal exercise provided by s 10. but the limiting clause does not apply to the principle of equality itself to conclude otherwise would be to broaden the well-defined scope of s 91. while it is true that s 9.1 does not apply to the principle of equality enshrined in s 10, it does apply to the guarantee of free expression enshrined in s 3 whenever it is alleged that a distinction on a ground prohibited by s 10 has the effect of impairing or nullifying a right under s 3, the scope of s 3 must still be determined in light of s 91. where, as here, s 9.1 operates to limit the scope of freedom of expression guaranteed under s 3, s 10 cannot be invoked to circumvent those reasonable limits and to substitute an absolute guarantee of free expression on the other hand, having specified the scope of free expression, s 9.1 cannot be invoked to justify a limit upon equal recognition and exercise of the right guaranteed by s 3. here, sections 52 and 57 do create a distinction based on language of use but do not have the effect of impairing or nullifying rights guaranteed under s 3. they thus conform to the quebec charter. [emphasis added; pp. 817-19.] [42] although devine did not involve a conflict between two fundamental rights, we are of the view that the principles it establishes regarding the interaction between ss. 9.1 and 10 can be transposed to this case. because s 9.1 does not apply to s 10, the scope of the right being asserted, in light of s 9.1, must be determined in analyzing the third element of discrimination. therefore, at this third step, the plaintiff must show that the distinction based on a prohibited ground has the effect of impairing the recognition or exercise of the fundamental right being asserted to do so, the plaintiff will have to show that the protection of that right is called for in light of s 91. [43] in the present case, as savard j.a correctly noted, the conflict is not between the right to equality and freedom of expression, but rather between the complainant’s right to the safeguard of his dignity and the defendant’s right to freedom of expression. an approach of this kind is consistent with the structure of the quebec charter and the principles laid down by this court in devine. [44] where a discrimination claim is based on a freedom or right guaranteed by any of ss. 1 to 9, the plaintiff must therefore prove on a balance of probabilities: 1 a “distinction, exclusion or preference”; 2 based on one of the grounds listed in s 10; 3 that has the effect of nullifying or impairing the equal recognition or exercise of a right whose protection is called for in light of s 9.1 in the context in which it is invoked. proof of these elements establishes, on the face of it, that there is discrimination. in some situations, such as in matters of employment, the quebec charter creates specific defences for the defendant. in such a case, it will fall to the defendant to justify their decision, action or conduct that is prima facie discriminatory (bombardier, at para. 37). [45] the applicable legal framework having been outlined, nothing further needs to be said about the first two elements of the plaintiff’s burden, as their application remains consistent with the approach proposed in bombardier. however, it is necessary to clarify the analysis of the third element of discrimination where the claim brought requires, as it does here, a determination of the respective scope of the right to the safeguard of dignity and freedom of expression in light of s 91. c. third element of discrimination in the context of a conflict between the right to the safeguard of dignity and freedom of expression [46] the quebec charter does not establish any hierarchy between the right to the safeguard of dignity, guaranteed by s 4, and the freedom of expression protected by s 3. when these rights are in conflict, the proper approach is to interpret them so that both are exercised with “a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of quebec” (ford, at p 770). [47] we will start by looking at these rights separately. we will then consider whatcott, in which the court found that limits on freedom of expression may be justified in a free and democratic society in order to prevent the discriminatory effects of hate speech. lastly, we will emphasize the relevance of that case in describing the test that must be applied in analyzing the third element of discrimination in order to resolve a conflict between ss. 3 and 4 of the quebec charter. this test is meant to be applied in a context where the plaintiff argues that the defendant’s expression had the effect of impairing the recognition of the plaintiff’s right to the safeguard of their dignity. it does not apply in any other context. (1) right to the safeguard of dignity [48] this court has recognized that “[h]uman dignity . . . [is] among the values that underlie the [canadian] charter” (health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn. v. british columbia, 2007 scc 27, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para. 81). however, the quebec charter goes further, because human dignity is not only a fundamental value in that statute, but also a right the safeguard of which is specifically protected (quebec (public curator) v. syndicat national des employés de l’hôpital st-ferdinand, [1996] 3 scr 211, at para. 100) section 4 of the quebec charter sets out the right of every person “to the safeguard of his dignity” but as several authors agree, behind this eloquent turn of phrase is a right whose scope is particularly difficult to identify (see, eg,. d. goubau, with the collaboration of a-m. savard, le droit des personnes physiques (6th ed 2019), at no. 180; j. torres-ceyte and m. lacroix, “impression(s), la dignité”, in b. lefebvre and b. moore, eds., les grandes valeurs (2019), 19, at pp. 27-28; c. brunelle, “la dignité dans la charte des droits et libertés de la personne: de l’ubiquité à l’ambiguïté d’une notion fondamentale”, in la charte québécoise: origines, enjeux et perspectives, [2006] r du b (numéro thématique) 143, at pp. 172-74). once the concept of dignity leaves the realm of values and moves into the realm of legal norms, many difficulties arise in its application (a. gajda, “the trouble with dignity”, in a. t. kenyon, ed., comparative defamation and privacy law (2016), 246, at pp. 258-61; see also r v. kapp, 2008 scc 41, [2008] 2 scr 483, at paras. 21-22). for the purposes of this appeal, these difficulties can be overcome without adopting a fixed definition of this concept. it will suffice to clarify the scope of this “right to the safeguard of . . . dignity”. [49] courts have found interference with the right to the safeguard of dignity in a wide variety of contexts. for example, they have found an infringement of s 4 of the quebec charter in the following cases: patients with an intellectual disability were deprived of hygiene care by hospital centre staff taking part in an illegal strike (st-ferdinand, at paras. 108-9); an illustrator’s copyright was seriously infringed (cinar corporation v robinson, 2013 scc 73, [2013] 3 scr 1168, at paras. 116-17); an individual suspected of theft was beaten, tortured and threatened with death by police officers (gauthier v. beaumont, [1998] 2 scr 3, at para. 90); a senior civil servant was denied access to an official residence following his publicized firing based on sexual harassment allegations before a real investigation had been completed (fortier v. québec (procureure générale), 2015 qcca 1426, at para. 120 (canlii)); a visually impaired man was denied access to a discotheque dance floor with his guide dog (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. 9185-2152 québec inc (radio lounge brossard), 2015 qcca 577, at para. 86 (canlii)); workers of chinese origin were forced to listen to their employer’s racist admonishments (calego, at paras. 55-56 and 105); a senior executive was the target of sexist and offensive remarks by the host of a shock jock radio show (genex communications inc. v. association québécoise de l’industrie du disque, du spectacle et de la vidéo, 2009 qcca 2201, [2009] rjq 2743, at para. 92); a couple was arrested and charged with criminal offences on the basis of falsified police reports (solomon v. québec (procureur général), 2008 qcca 1832, [2008] rjq 2127, at paras. 167, 179 and 191; see also, along the same lines, procureur général du canada v manoukian, 2020 qcca 1486, 70 cclt (4th) 182, at paras. 139 and 144); intimate photographs were sent to third parties without authorization (j.l v sb, [2000] rra 665 (que. sup. ct.), at para. 21). [50] in addition to these very diverse cases, there is a long line of decisions in which disrespect is readily regarded as an infringement of s 4 as long as it is of some seriousness (see, eg,. cinar, at para. 116; bourdeau v hamel, 2013 qccs 752, at para. 197 (canlii); hébert v. giguère, [2003] rjq 89 (sup. ct.), at paras. 155 and 159; commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v 9113-0831 québec inc. (bronzage évasion au soleil du monde), 2007 qctdp 18, [2007] rjdt. 1289, at para. 42) after completing their own analysis of the cases on s 4, professors goubau and savard make the following observation: [translation] in reality, interference with dignity is raised on its own only very exceptionally claims for compensation for interference with dignity are almost always made as part of an action based on interference with another fundamental right, whether it be the right to reputation, the right to respect for one’s private life, the right to equality, the right to physical inviolability, etc. courts will find interference with dignity where the interference with another fundamental right is particularly serious. in this sense, interference with dignity appears to be a threshold of seriousness for the infringement of another right defamatory statements must therefore reach a certain level of seriousness in order to constitute interference with personal dignity in addition to interference with reputation as a result, the concept of dignity is generally invoked as a modality of the other fundamental rights rather than as an independent right. this may seem surprising, but in reality it is simply a reflection of the fact that the legal concept of dignity is difficult to define with precision. [no. 180] [51] this commentary clearly illustrates the confusion surrounding the right to the safeguard of dignity. in our view, treating this right as a mere modality of the other fundamental rights trivializes the very terms of s 4. the scope of one fundamental right cannot be determined on the basis of the degree to which some other fundamental right is infringed. the right to the safeguard of dignity should not be invoked to protect an interest that is already fully secured by another fundamental right, because that other fundamental right is itself grounded in dignity (m. fabre-magnan, “la dignité en droit: un axiome” (2007), 58 riej 1, at pp. 18-19) this lack of coherence in the application of s 4 causes at least two significant problems in relation to the issue before us here. [52] first, the uncertain scope of this provision makes any balancing of rights under s 9.1 difficult. second, the combination of ss. 4 and 10 tends to change the nature of the norm of equality provided for in the quebec charter — and to extend the jurisdiction of the commission and the tribunal well beyond what the legislature intended. indeed, some authors have noted that the juxtaposition of the two provisions greatly broadens the scope of the norm of equality (proulx, at no. 121; a. morin, le droit à l’égalité au canada (2nd ed. 2012), at p 186). [53] in our view, this results not from the structure of the quebec charter, but from a misinterpretation of the right to the safeguard of dignity, the imprecise nature of which is regarded as having the effect of lessening the plaintiff’s burden of proof in a discrimination action (see morin, at p 185). that reasoning makes an infringement of the right to equal recognition of the right to the safeguard of dignity easier to establish given the fact that dignity is always more or less affected when equality is denied, as the norm of equality flows from dignity (law v canada (minister of employment and immigration), [1999] 1 scr 497, at paras. 51-54). [54] in our opinion, such an approach amounts to circumventing the legislature’s intention and making s 10 of the quebec charter a vehicle for the protection of equality per se comparable to that of the canadian charter the difference, however, is that the quebec charter is much broader in scope than the canadian charter and other human rights statutes: it does not apply only to dealings with the state or to certain areas of activity, but extends to all relationships between individuals. as we wrote in bombardier, “[t]he [quebec] charter, unlike the canadian charter, does not protect the right to equality per se; this right is protected only in the exercise of the other rights and freedoms guaranteed by the [quebec] charter” (para. 53). an interpretation of s 4 that overlooks this significant limitation must be rejected the right to the safeguard of dignity is not — and must not become — incantatory [translation] “boilerplate” (torres-ceyte and lacroix, at p 28, quoting a. popovici, “la renonciation à un droit de la personnalité”, in thirtieth anniversary conference, 1975-2005: cross-examining private law (2008), 99, at p 107). [55] in our view, the interpretation of this provision must be refocused on its purpose by considering its wording and context. [56] in st-ferdinand, this court found that the right to the safeguard of dignity relates specifically to human dignity and protects against “interferences with the fundamental attributes of a human being which violate the respect to which every person is entitled simply because he or she is a human being and the respect that a person owes to himself or herself” (para. 105) in other words, s 4 does not protect every person as such, but protects the humanity of every person in its most fundamental attributes. it is therefore the concept of humanity that is at the centre of the right to the safeguard of dignity indeed, this is demonstrated by the preamble to the quebec charter, on which the court relied in st-ferdinand inspired by the universal declaration of human rights, ga. res. 217 a (iii), un. doc. a/810, at 71 (1948), the preamble provides that “all human beings are equal in worth and dignity” and that “respect for the dignity of human beings” is one of the “foundation[s] of justice, liberty and peace” in this context, dignity is the quality inherent in every human being [translation] “the recognition of which in a sense defines civilization, and the disregard of which, barbarism” (t. de koninck, de la dignité humaine (2002), at p 16; see also r. dworkin, justice for hedgehogs (2011), at p 112). [57] in fact, the emergence in law of the concept of dignity, and the meaning of this concept, were shaped by the very specific historical context of the atrocities committed in the 20th century, particularly during the second world war (c. mccrudden, “human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights” (2008), 19 ejil 655, at pp. 664-71; brunelle, at pp. 145-46). to be contrary to s 4 of the quebec charter, conduct must reach a high level of gravity that does not trivialize this very meaningful concept such conduct cannot be assessed in a purely subjective manner. an objective analysis is required, because dignity [translation] “is aimed at protecting not a particular person or even a class of persons, but humanity in general” (fabre-magnan, at p 21). [58] what s 4 confers is not a right to dignity but, more precisely, a right to the safeguard of dignity the connotation and meaning of the words chosen by the legislature in this section are much stronger than those of “respect for the dignity” in the preamble to the quebec charter. the term “safeguard” refers to a form of defence or protection against a peril, whereas the term “respect” reflects the concept of regard or deference (see “sauvegarde” and “respect” in dictionnaire de l’académie française (9th ed (online)); é. littré, dictionnaire de la langue française (1958), vol. 6, at pp. 1432-35 and 1940; le grand robert de la langue française (electronic version)). unlike, for example, s 5, which confers a right to respect for one’s private life, s 4 does not permit a person to claim respect for their dignity, but only the safeguarding of their dignity, that is, protection from the denial of their worth as a human being. where a person is stripped of their humanity by being subjected to treatment that debases, subjugates, objectifies, humiliates or degrades them, there is no question that their dignity is violated. in this sense, the right to the safeguard of dignity is a shield against this type of interference that does no less than outrage the conscience of society. (2) freedom of expression [59] like the right to the safeguard of dignity, freedom of expression flows from the concept of human dignity (d. grimm, “freedom of speech and human dignity”, in a. stone and f. schauer, eds., the oxford handbook of freedom of speech (2021), 106, at p 111; j. waldron, the harm in hate speech (2012), at p 139; r. dworkin, “foreword”, in i. hare and j. weinstein, eds., extreme speech and democracy (2009), v, at pp. vii-viii). the quebec charter recognizes that all human beings are equal in worth and dignity; this equality would be hollow if some people were silenced because of their opinions the purpose of protecting freedom of expression is therefore to “ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream” (irwin toy ltd v. quebec (attorney general), [1989] 1 scr 927, at p 968). [60] as mclachlin j (as she then was) wrote in r v. zundel, [1992] 2 scr. 731, “[t]he view of the majority has no need of constitutional protection” (p 753). in fact, the exercise of freedom of expression presupposes, at the same time that it fosters, society’s tolerance of expression that is unpopular, offensive or repugnant (irwin toy, at pp. 969-71; montréal (ville de) v cabaret sex appeal inc., [1994] rjq 2133 (ca)). freedom to express harmless opinions that reflect a consensus is not freedom (r. moon, “what happens when the assumptions underlying our commitment to free speech no longer hold?” (2019), 28:1 const. forum 1, at p 4). this is why freedom of expression does not truly begin until it gives rise to a duty to tolerate what other people say (l. c. bollinger, the tolerant society (1986); dworkin (2009), at p vii). it thus ensures the development of a democratic, open and pluralistic society. understood in this sense, “a person’s right to free expression is protected not in order to protect him, but in order to protect a public good, a benefit which respect for the right of free expression brings to all those who live in the society in which it is respected, even those who have no personal interest in their own freedom” (j. raz, “free expression and personal identification” (1991), 11 oxford j. leg. stud. 303, at p 305). [61] limits on freedom of expression are justified where, in a given context, there are serious reasons to fear harm that is sufficiently specific and cannot be prevented by the discernment and critical judgment of the audience (whatcott, at paras. 129-35; moon, at pp. 1-2 and 4). [62] for example, the law of defamation rests on the idea that “[f]alse allegations can so very quickly and completely destroy a good reputation. a reputation tarnished by libel can seldom regain its former lustre” (hill v. church of scientology of toronto, [1995] 2 scr 1130, at para. 108; see also bou malhab v diffusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 scc 9, [2011] 1 scr 214, at para. 18). similarly, the prohibition against hate speech is justified not only because it causes emotional distress to the members of a vulnerable group, but also because it propagates, within social discourse, premises of inferiority that may gradually desensitize the majority and lay the groundwork for later, broad attacks (r v keegstra, [1990] 3 scr 697, at pp. 746-48; canada (human rights commission) v. taylor, [1990] 3 scr 892, at pp. 918-19; whatcott, at para. 74). similar social harm justifies the prohibition against exposing to public view certain types of obscene material that portrays degrading and dehumanizing depictions of sex as being normal, acceptable and even desirable, insofar as such material predisposes those exposed to it to sexually violent behaviour incompatible with the proper functioning of society (r v. butler, [1992] 1 scr 452, at pp. 493-97 and 501-2; little sisters book and art emporium v. canada (minister of justice), 2000 scc 69, [2000] 2 scr 1120, at paras. 59-60; see, to the same effect, r v. sharpe, 2001 scc 2, [2001] 1 scr 45, at paras. 34 and 88-92). in contrast, the prohibition against publishing false news was held to be unconstitutional because it was based on a very vague definition of the social harm to be addressed, a definition that made it far too broad (zundel, at pp. 769-75). [63] in our view, limits on freedom of expression are also justified where it is used to disseminate expression that, even if it does not fully meet the definition of hatred set out in whatcott, nonetheless forces certain persons “to argue for their basic humanity or social standing, as a precondition to participating in the deliberative aspects of our democracy” (whatcott, at para. 75; see also keegstra, at p 765) as professor waldron writes: [a] person [must be able] to walk down the street without fear of insult or humiliation, to find the shops and exchanges open to him, and to proceed with an implicit assurance of being able to interact with others without being treated as a pariah. [p 220] freedom of expression would not benefit society as a whole if it prevented a person or class of persons from truly participating in the political process and the ordinary activities of society just like everyone else. [64] it is understood that these limits also apply in an artistic context. this court has already recognized, in butler, that artistic expression rests at the heart of the values underlying freedom of expression (p 486). however, the court has declined to make artistic expression a category in its own right with a status superior to that of general freedom of expression (aubry, at para. 55). there is no reason to reverse that position. the artistic context of an expressive activity is and will always be relevant, as this court’s decisions clearly demonstrate ever since brodie, dansky and rubin v the queen, [1962] scr 681, which concerned the censorship of lady chatterley’s lover, a novel by d. h. lawrence, this court has been very reluctant to hinder the development of arts and literature (see, eg,. butler, at p 486; little sisters, at paras. 195-96, per iacobucci j., dissenting on another point) in our view, however, freedom of expression cannot give an artist — to the extent that a person can be described as such — a level of protection higher than that of other persons. (3) approach adopted in whatcott [65] in whatcott, this court considered whether the prohibition against hate speech in s 14(1)(b) of the saskatchewan human rights code, ss 1979, c. s-24.1, was constitutional under s 2(b) of the canadian charter. as part of that exercise, the court had to “balance the fundamental values underlying freedom of expression . with . . a commitment to equality and respect for group identity and the inherent dignity owed to all human beings” (whatcott, at para. 66). [66] in our view, the differences between the saskatchewan human rights code and the quebec charter in no way diminish the importance of the principles enunciated in whatcott in deciding the issue raised in this case. for the sake of clarity, we reproduce the relevant provisions of the saskatchewan human rights code here: 3 the objects of this act are: (a) to promote recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family; and (b) to further public policy in saskatchewan that every person is free and equal in dignity and rights and to discourage and eliminate discrimination. 5 every person . . shall, under the law, enjoy the right to freedom of expression through all means of communication, including . . any . broadcasting device. 14 (1) no person shall publish or display . . . any representation . . . : . (b) that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground. (2) nothing in subsection (1) restricts the right to freedom of expression under the law upon any subject. [67] unlike the quebec charter, the saskatchewan human rights code did not confer a positive right to the “safeguard of . . dignity, honour and reputation”. section 14(1)(b) of the saskatchewan human rights code nonetheless protected rights and interests similar to those guaranteed by ss. 4 and 10 of the quebec charter (whatcott, at paras. 66 and 70). indeed, the verbs “ridicule”, “belittle” and “affront the dignity” refer to actions that negate a person’s reputation, honour and dignity. [68] this court’s jurisprudence also establishes “that mere differences in terminology do not support a conclusion that there are fundamental differences in the objectives of human rights statutes” and that the quebec charter should therefore be interpreted “in light of the canadian charter and other human rights legislation” (cdpdj v. montréal, at paras. 46-47 (emphasis added)). it follows that, as long as this is not contrary to the usual rules of interpretation, symmetry in the interpretation of the various instruments that protect human rights and freedoms is desirable. [69] the fact that the saskatchewan human rights code ensures respect for human dignity by limiting freedom of expression rather than by guaranteeing two concurrent positive rights, as the quebec charter does, is a difference in means rather than in purpose. [70] moreover, while it is true that whatcott concerned the constitutionality of a provision under s 1 of the canadian charter rather than a conflict between two rights under s 9.1 of the quebec charter, the fact remains that these two provisions are not unrelated to each other (ford, at pp. 769-70). both are intended to circumscribe the scope of rights and freedoms based on the requirements of a free and democratic society. finally, given that the quebec charter must conform to constitutional norms, it should not, as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the canadian charter, which, it should be noted, guarantees freedom of expression but not a positive right to the safeguard of dignity (cdpdj v. montréal, at para. 42). [71] with respect, we are of the view that the tribunal and the majority of the court of appeal erred in excluding whatcott from their reasoning (tribunal reasons, at paras. 127 and 129; ca reasons, at paras. 210-11). in our opinion, whatcott merits special attention because the principles arising from it are indispensable to the analysis required in this case. [72] mr. whatcott had distributed flyers vilifying homosexuals to members of the public. the complainants, who had received the flyers at their homes, argued that the material promoted hatred against individuals because of their sexual orientation — a prohibited ground recognized by the saskatchewan statute. when proceedings were brought against mr. whatcott before the province’s human rights tribunal under s 14(1)(b) of the saskatchewan human rights code, he challenged the constitutionality of that provision on the basis that it infringed s 2(b) of the canadian charter and was not justified under s 1. [73] writing for the court in that case, rothstein j began by determining the scope of s 14(1)(b) by defining the concept of “hatred” in his view, minimizing subjectivity and overbreadth required prohibiting only expression that was likely to cause the harm the legislature was seeking to address, that is, “the most extreme type of expression that has the potential to incite or inspire discriminatory treatment against protected groups on the basis of a prohibited ground” (para. 48). this category did not include “hurt feelings, humiliation or offensiveness” (para. 47) the objective of s 14(1)(b) was to prevent discriminatory effects (at para. 54), not to “discourag[e] repugnant or offensive ideas” or to “censor ideas or to compel anyone to think ‘correctly’” (paras. 51 and 58). the intent of the author of the expression was therefore irrelevant, as was the content or nature of the ideas expressed (paras. 49 and 58). the analysis had to be focused on the “mode of expression [of those ideas] in public and the effect that this mode of expression may have” (para. 51). even if repugnant and offensive, expression that did not incite abhorrence, delegitimization or rejection did not risk causing socially harmful effects such as discrimination; it was therefore not likely to expose anyone to “hatred” within the meaning of s 14(1)(b) of the saskatchewan human rights code (para. 57) determining whether expression met that definition required an objective assessment based on the reasonable person standard (paras. 52, 56 and 59). [74] having established the scope of s 14(1)(b), rothstein j then turned to the constitutional aspect. given that hate speech may lay the groundwork for later attacks on the members of a vulnerable group, attacks that may involve discrimination and violence, he had no difficulty in determining that its suppression is a pressing and substantial objective (para. 77) he noted that, to satisfy the rational connection requirement, the hate speech to be suppressed must “rise to a level beyond merely impugning individuals: it must seek to marginalize the group by affecting its social status and acceptance in the eyes of the majority” (para. 80 (emphasis added)). however, “protecting the emotions of an individual group member is not rationally connected to the overall purpose of reducing discrimination” (para. 82). this was why, in his view, the prohibition against any representation that “ridicules”, “belittles” or “affronts . . dignity” was not justified under s 1 of the canadian charter these words refer to “expression which is derogatory and insensitive, such as representations criticizing or making fun of protected groups on the basis of their commonly shared characteristics and practices, or on stereotypes” (para. 89) a democratic society concerned about preserving freedom of expression must make space for that kind of discourse given that it typically does not lead to the systemic discrimination against vulnerable groups that the legislature was seeking to eradicate (paras. 89-92 and 109). finding that the words “ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of” could be severed from s 14(1)(b) without contravening the legislative intent, rothstein j. determined that that part of s 14(1)(b) was unconstitutional (paras. 93-95 and 99). however, he was of the view that the remainder of s 14(1)(b) was justified under s 1 of the canadian charter. [75] he found that the prohibition in s 14(1)(b) applied if, first, the expression met the definition of hatred under that provision. this would be the case if “a reasonable person, aware of the relevant context and circumstances, would view the representations as exposing or likely to expose a person or class of persons to detestation or vilification on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination” (para. 178) but this could not be sufficient, as the assessment also had to take the legislature’s objectives into account (ibid.) it was therefore necessary to consider, second, whether the expression, “when viewed objectively and in its context, has the potential to lead to discriminatory treatment of the targeted group” to which the person or class of persons belonged (para. 191). [76] having set out the applicable test, rothstein j stated that it was reasonable to conclude that two of the four flyers at issue in the case were contrary to s 14(1)(b).2 he found that, first, those flyers met the definition of hatred because they relied on a respected source — the bible — to lend credibility to pejorative generalizations and to depict homosexuals as subhuman and as carriers of disease, sex addicts, pedophiles and predators who would proselytize vulnerable children and cause their premature death (paras. 187-90). second, the flyers expressly called for the rejection of homosexuality and the discriminatory treatment of homosexuals (paras. 191-92) however, rothstein j found that it was not reasonable to draw the same conclusion about the other two flyers. as offensive as they were, those flyers, viewed objectively, did not meet the definition of hatred (paras. 194-201) it was therefore unnecessary to determine whether they were likely to lead to discriminatory treatment of homosexuals. [77] in short, the court limited the prohibition created by s 14(1)(b) to expression that could inspire extreme feelings of detestation likely to affect the 2 vavilov, decided a few years after whatcott, modified the standards of review that apply in a context in which there is a statutory right of appeal from an administrative tribunal’s decision. vulnerable group’s acceptance within society and that also had enough motivating force to lead to the type of discriminatory treatment the legislature was seeking to address. the court declined to limit freedom of expression in order to confer protection from emotional harm professor rainville aptly summarizes the nature of the social harm that justified limiting freedom of expression in whatcott: [translation] canadian law protects the victim’s social standing while forgoing protection of the victim’s emotional serenity offensive words are tolerated, whereas expression that is likely to lead to discrimination, ostracism or violence against [individuals] is prohibited. the harm that may, in this context, justify departing from freedom of expression therefore has two characteristics: the apprehended harm is meant to be collective and social in nature. . the prohibited harm is therefore social and not mental, collective and not individual. [emphasis in original.] (la répression de l’art et l’art de la répression: la profanation de la religion à l’épreuve des mutations du droit pénal au sujet du blasphème et de la protection des identités religieuses (2019), at p 61) [78] with these principles established, we must now determine how they apply in the context of the quebec charter. (4) test that applies where there is a conflict between the right to the safeguard of dignity and the right to freedom of expression [79] after establishing a distinction based on a prohibited ground, the plaintiff must show as well that the distinction has the effect of impairing the full and equal recognition of the right to the safeguard of their dignity. the protection of that right must also be called for in light of s 9.1 otherwise, the application will fail as savard ja properly pointed out, it is at this stage that a conflict between the plaintiff’s right to the safeguard of their dignity and the defendant’s freedom of expression should be resolved (ca reasons, at paras. 94-99). [80] in this process, it is important to avoid giving s 4 a scope so broad that it would neutralize freedom of expression, or so vague that it would be inconsistent with the principles laid down by this court in taylor and whatcott. finally, although this is not determinative in our analysis, we note that an infringement of s 10 may lead not only to a civil action, but also to penal proceedings under s 134(1) of the quebec charter. if it were necessary to find one, this would be an additional reason to clarify the applicable test. [81] in calego, to which both the majority and the dissenting judge referred in their reasons, morissette ja proposed that a conflict between dignity and freedom of expression be resolved as follows: [translation] . . we must be guided first and foremost by an objective test in interpreting section 4. the touchstone for the concepts of dignity and honour is an abstract standard it is the perception of a reasonable person who, when a discriminatory remark is made about them, as here, tempers their reaction because they are familiar with the customs of a pluralistic society in which freedom of expression is valued and some immoderate language in the exercise of that other fundamental right is accepted. in other words, here we tolerate a frankness that is not the norm everywhere else. this consideration must be reflected in the analysis of the concepts of dignity and honour. therefore, a reasonable person will not regard their “right to the safeguard of his dignity [or] honour” as having been infringed in a manner contrary to s 10 of the chrf unless there has been a particularly contemptuous affront to their racial, ethnic or other identity and one that has grave consequences for them finally, in such matters, the maxim de minimis non curat lex should always be borne in mind. [emphasis in original; text in brackets in original; para. 99.] [82] in our view, the perception of a reasonable person targeted by the same words must be excluded. that approach results in a shift toward protecting a right not to be offended, which has no place in a democratic society (dworkin (2009), at p viii; see also whatcott, at paras. 50 and 90). the applicable test must not be focused either on the repugnant or offensive nature of the expression or on the emotional harm caused to the person otherwise, it would amount to censoring expression because of its content or its impact on a person, regardless of its discriminatory effects. an approach of this kind has been rejected by this court (whatcott, at paras. 50-51, 58 and 82). [83] the test for resolving a conflict between the right to freedom of expression and the right to the safeguard of dignity requires rather that it be determined, first, whether a reasonable person, aware of the relevant context and circumstances, would view the expression targeting an individual or group as inciting others to vilify them or to detest their humanity on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. this first criterion is more in keeping with the requirements of the canadian charter as formulated in whatcott hate speech within the meaning of whatcott is therefore prohibited, as is expression that has the same effects on personal dignity without meeting the definition of hatred given in that case. [84] second, it must be shown that a reasonable person would view the expression, considered in its context, as likely to lead to discriminatory treatment of the person targeted. this second criterion takes the objectives of the quebec charter into account (whatcott, at paras. 178 and 191) the purpose of s 10 is to eliminate discrimination in the recognition and exercise of human rights and freedoms the recognition of a right implies “the social acceptance of a general duty to respect . . . it” (ontario human rights commission, at p 554). discrimination within the meaning of the quebec charter therefore involves differential treatment that affects an individual’s social acceptance. as a result, only expression that, considered in its context, is likely to jeopardize the social acceptance of the individual or group is discriminatory (whatcott, at paras. 178 and 191). the analysis is focused not on the content of the expression as such, but on its likely effects on third parties, that is, the discriminatory treatment likely to result from it (whatcott, at paras. 54, 58 and 82). [85] in this regard, the mode of expression and the effect of the mode of expression are determinative expression that stirs up extreme and intrinsically dangerous emotions like hatred in an audience clearly does not have the same impact as expression that is calm and rational. this does not mean, of course, that speech that purports to be scientific or rational is incapable of arousing the contempt of the majority for the humanity of vulnerable groups. but in general, expression that appeals to an audience’s reason or to emotions free of any real motivating force will be unlikely to lead to discriminatory treatment of the targeted individual or group. [86] before we proceed with our analysis, a few observations must be made about expression that occurs in private. the application of the quebec charter, unlike the legislation at issue in whatcott, is not limited to expression that is broadcast or published it is not impossible that expression that occurs in private will be discriminatory under the quebec charter, in exceptional cases. first, the expression must, in the eyes of the reasonable person, be likely to incite vilification or detestation of the humanity of the person targeted. second, a reasonable person must conclude that the expression, considered in its context, would likely have led third parties, if they had been present, to discriminate against the individual targeted. at the risk of repeating ourselves, the analysis must be focused on the likely discriminatory effects of the expression, not on the emotional harm suffered by the person alleging discrimination. [87] these principles having been outlined, their application to expression that is humorous in nature calls for two remarks. [88] first, expression that attacks or ridicules people may inspire feelings of disdain or superiority in relation to them, but it generally does not encourage the denial of their humanity or their marginalization in the eyes of the majority (whatcott, at paras. 89-91). it is true that ridicule, if pushed to the limit, could cross this line, but it will do so only in extreme and unusual circumstances. [89] second, humour, whether in good or in bad taste, rarely has [translation] “the spillover effect needed to give rise to an attitude of hatred and discrimination among third parties” (rainville, at p 68) it involves well-known methods such as [translation] “exaggeration, over-generalization, provocation and distortion of reality” (ca reasons, at para. 129, per savard ja). the audience is able to identify these methods, when they are clear, and must be acknowledged to be discerning enough not to take everything said at face value (see, by analogy, bou malhab, at para. 74; s. martin, “rira bien qui rira le dernier: la caricature confrontée au droit à l’image” (2004), 16 cpi 611, at pp. 621-22). this is all the more true where the expression comes from a person publicly known for their particular type of humour (see, by analogy, bou malhab, at para. 89) or where it targets a public figure whose fame exposes them to such commentary (see, by analogy, wic radio ltd. v. simpson, 2008 scc 40, [2008] 2 scr 420, at para. 48; trudeau v. ad4 distribution canada inc., 2014 qcca 1740, at paras. 21-22 (canlii)). other than in exceptional cases, it would be surprising if expression in such circumstances had enough motivating force to lead to discriminatory treatment. [90] these clarifications must not be interpreted as resulting in a form of impunity for comedians or as diminishing the protection given by the law to public figures there is less of a risk that expression will lead to discrimination where it involves supposedly humorous comments that are made by a well-known comedian or that concern a person known to the public. and in the absence of a sufficiently serious risk, the claim must fail. d application to this case [91] in summary, we are of the view that mr. gabriel was made subject to a distinction by being targeted by mr. ward’s comments however, in light of the tribunal’s finding that mr. ward [translation] “did not choose jérémy because of his handicap” but rather “because he was a public personality” (tribunal reasons, at para. 86), it must be concluded that the distinction was not based on a prohibited ground. this conclusion on its own is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. nonetheless, we believe that it will be helpful to analyze discrimination in its entirety in light of the particular context of this case. (1) a distinction, exclusion or preference [92] as the court stated in bombardier, “[t]he first element of discrimination is not problematic” (para. 42). the plaintiff must prove “differential treatment, that is, that a decision, a measure or conduct ‘affects [him or her] differently from others to whom it may apply’” (ibid., quoting ontario human rights commission, at p 551). [93] mr. ward is a professional comedian who says that he uses dark humour. in the routine in his show called the untouchables and in his comedy videos, he held several public figures up to ridicule. mr. gabriel was one of them. [94] the tribunal found that mr. gabriel had been subjected to differential treatment by being exposed to mockery in mr. ward’s comedy show and videos (tribunal reasons, at para. 81). in our view, no intervention is warranted with respect to this finding of fact in the absence of a palpable and overriding error (vavilov, at para. 37; hydro-québec v. matta, 2020 scc 37, at para. 33). [95] that being said, a distinction alone cannot suffice the distinction in question must have been based on a prohibited ground, which is the second element of discrimination. (2) based on a prohibited ground [96] the tribunal, referring to bombardier, correctly identified the applicable test for the second element of discrimination under that test, “the plaintiff has the burden of showing that there is a connection between a prohibited ground of discrimination and the distinction, exclusion or preference of which he or she complains or, in other words, that the ground in question was a factor in the distinction, exclusion or preference” (bombardier, at para. 52 (emphasis in original)) in other words, “for a particular decision or action to be considered discriminatory, the prohibited ground need only have contributed to it” (bombardier, at para. 48). [97] the tribunal’s conclusion on this point is contradictory first, it found, [translation] “[i]n light of the evidence as a whole”, that mr. ward “did not choose [mr. gabriel as a target] because of his handicap”, but rather “because he was a public personality who attracted public sympathy and seemed to be ‘untouchable’” (para. 86). the distinction identified at first by the tribunal was therefore not based on a prohibited ground. its analysis should have ended there. [98] in our view, the tribunal erred when it continued its analysis by focusing on mr. ward’s actual comments to determine whether they were related to mr. gabriel’s disability, despite its finding that [translation] “[mr.] ward’s decision to make jokes about [mr. gabriel] was not in itself discriminatory” (para. 87 (emphasis added)). [99] the tribunal’s reasoning essentially involved finding that there was a distinction based on a prohibited ground because the comments referred to such a ground. but the mere mention of a prohibited ground cannot in itself establish that that ground was a factor in the differential treatment. it may of course be an indication that this was the case, but it is certainly not sufficient evidence. if it were otherwise, there would no longer be any need to prove that the ground contributed to the differential treatment. as this court stated in bombardier, “although the nature of the evidence that is presented may vary from case to case, the ‘legal test’ does not change. what can vary are the circumstances that might make it possible to meet the requirements of the various elements of the analysis, and the courts must adopt an approach that takes the context into account” (para. 69). [100] in light of its finding that mr. gabriel had been targeted by mr. ward’s comments because of his fame and not because of his disability, the tribunal had no choice but to conclude that the second element of discrimination had not been established. in disregarding its own finding of fact, the tribunal overlooked the specific nature of the claim before it it confined itself to the message and the harm, and it conducted its analysis as it would in an action for defamation, where the plaintiff is not required to prove either differential treatment or a connection to a prohibited ground of discrimination. [101] moreover, and with respect, the majority of the court of appeal ignored the tribunal’s first finding of fact and erroneously substituted their own analysis by concluding that [translation] “mr. ward chose mr. gabriel both because of his fame and because of his disability” (ca reasons, at para. 168). [102] that being said, even if we were to adopt the tribunal’s position or that of the majority of the court of appeal, the outcome of this appeal would not be affected in view of the conclusion we reach on the third element of discrimination. (3) impairing the recognition of the right to the safeguard of dignity [103] the last element of discrimination requires establishing whether the differential treatment based on a prohibited ground impairs mr. gabriel’s right to full and equal recognition of his right to the safeguard of his dignity. this step must begin with a determination of whether the protection of mr. gabriel’s right to the safeguard of his dignity is called for in light of s 9.1 of the charter. for this purpose, this right must be balanced against mr. ward’s right to freedom of expression. [104] the conflict between the fundamental rights invoked by the parties can be resolved by applying the test out above. it must first be asked whether a reasonable person, aware of the relevant context and circumstances, would view the expression targeting mr. gabriel as inciting others to vilify him or to detest his humanity on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination it must then be asked whether this reasonable person would view the expression, considered in its context, as likely to lead to discriminatory treatment of mr. gabriel. in our opinion, the comments made by mr. ward meet neither of these two requirements. [105] in her dissent, savard j.a properly emphasized the importance of considering expression in its context (ca reasons, at paras. 128-29). the context here is that of a dark comedy show meant for an audience that had paid to hear this kind of talk in his show, mr. ward said that it had become impossible in quebec to mock people without risking legal proceedings. he said that he wanted to take risks and poke fun at the “untouchables”, that is, people whom quebecers like and who are successful and powerful after mocking the physical appearance of many public figures, mr. ward came to mr. gabriel, whom he described to his audience as a young person with a loudspeaker on his head. alluding to the complaints of those who did not really appreciate mr. gabriel’s artistic talent, he said that he had defended mr. gabriel’s right to live out his dream, believing that he was about to die. mr. ward added that, because mr. gabriel had not died, he had tried to drown him but had not succeeded. in ending the routine, he said that he had discovered from searches that mr. gabriel’s illness was being ugly. [106] as for the video, it was made in connection with the release of mr. gabriel’s autobiography in 2008, two years after the launch of the show in issue. the comedian made the video available on his professional website for about a year. it consisted of a photograph of the young mr. gabriel in which only the eyes and mouth moved. using a disguised voice, mr. ward made his target speak in the first person. in the video, mr. gabriel was presented as a young person with a loudspeaker on his head and a mouth that did not close all the way. [107] mr. gabriel’s testimony spoke volumes about the pain caused to him by those hurtful words, which date back to a time when he was still a young teenager. there is certainly nothing uplifting in the fact that a popular, well-known comedian used his platform to make fun of a young man with a disability. be that as it may, the question here is not whether mr. ward’s comments were in good or in bad taste; rather, a legal framework must be applied to comments that were made in a specific context. that legal framework is focused on the likely discriminatory effects of the comments, not on the emotional harm suffered by the person targeted. [108] in our view, a reasonable person aware of the relevant circumstances would not view mr. ward’s comments about mr. gabriel as inciting others to vilify him or to detest his humanity on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination his comments, considered in their context, cannot be taken at face value although mr. ward said some nasty and disgraceful things about mr. gabriel’s disability, his comments did not incite the audience to treat mr. gabriel as subhuman. [109] in both his video and his show, mr. ward mocked some of mr. gabriel’s physical characteristics making fun of a person’s physical characteristics may be repugnant; it most certainly is when the person in question is a young person with a disability who contributes with determination to society. but expression of this kind does not, simply by being repugnant, incite others to detest or vilify the humanity of the person targeted (whatcott, at paras. 90-91) the first requirement of the test is therefore not met, and the analysis could end here. [110] that being said, even if we had found that the comments incited others to vilify mr. gabriel or to detest his humanity on the basis of a prohibited ground, the analysis of the second requirement of the test set out in this decision would also have led to the denial of his claim. a reasonable person could not view the comments made by mr. ward, considered in their context, as likely to lead to discriminatory treatment of mr. gabriel. [111] at first instance, the tribunal found that mr. gabriel’s classmates [translation] “were inspired by [mr.] ward’s comments” to make fun of him (para. 114 (emphasis added)) that evidence is relevant only insofar as it tells us something about the likely effect of the comments. it must be remembered that the test is objective. it should therefore be kept in mind that something that occurs following a person’s conduct is not necessarily a result of that conduct. thus, the fact that people are inspired by certain comments does not mean that this is a likely effect of those comments. of course, it is foreseeable that comments made by a well-known comedian will have repercussions outside their initial context, but this does not mean that those repercussions can necessarily be attributed to the comedian. it must still be determined whether, viewed objectively, the comments encouraged such repercussions in our view, this is not the case here. [112] the impugned comments involved open provocation and systematic exaggeration — methods that increased their derisory effect they were made by a career comedian known for this type of humour. they exploited, rightly or wrongly, a feeling of discomfort in order to entertain, but they did little more than that. as a result, the comments made in the video and the show, considered in their context, were not likely to have a spillover effect that could lead to discriminatory treatment of mr. gabriel. [113] accordingly, the commission did not meet the requirements for succeeding under ss. 4 and 10 of the quebec charter but this conclusion does not mean that mr. gabriel was without recourse following these events. other recourses were available. for example, though we express no opinion on the chances of success of these alternative recourses, mr. gabriel could have invoked the protection against harassment provided for in s 10.1 of the charter because of the fact that he had been bullied he could also have brought an action in defamation however, neither the commission nor the tribunal has jurisdiction over defamation. the combination of the norm of equality in the quebec charter and the right to the safeguard of dignity cannot confer such jurisdiction on them indirectly. ix disposition [114] the appeal is allowed without costs. the judgments of the tribunal and the court of appeal are set aside as they relate to mr. gabriel. the reasons of abella, karakatsanis, martin and kasirer jj. were delivered by abella and kasirer jj. — [115] this is an appeal about discriminatory speech that targets a disabled child. it involves a comedian relying on his artistic licence to skewer public figures, and a child with a physical disability who became known as a singer. the issue is whether the child with disabilities lost protection from discrimination and the right to be free from public humiliation and bullying just because he is well known. [116] this country has spent generations working towards creating a society that values human rights and protects individuals from harm caused by their differences of race, religion, disability, colour, or sexual orientation, among other grounds. we would never tolerate humiliating or dehumanizing conduct towards children with disabilities; there is no principled basis for tolerating words that have the same abusive effect. wrapping such discriminatory conduct in the protective cloak of speech does not make it any less intolerable when that speech amounts to wilful emotional abuse of a disabled child. [117] legislatures and the courts have consistently taken action to prevent and compensate for the serious harm that can be caused by speech. this is not, therefore, primarily a case about artistic freedom. it is a case about the rights of vulnerable and marginalized individuals, particularly children with disabilities, to be free from public humiliation, cruelty, vilification and bullying that singles them out on the basis of their disability and the devastating harm to their dignity that results. unsurprisingly, given the tenor of the jokes and his young age, the impact on the child here was severe. he was ostracized from his peer group and experienced suicidal thoughts. [118] at issue in this case is s 10 of the charter of human rights and freedoms, cqlr, c. c-12 (“quebec charter”), which protects the equal exercise of other individual rights and freedoms, including the right to the safeguard of one’s dignity. in our view, this provision serves to protect individuals from discriminatory speech so harmful that a reasonable person in their circumstances would refuse to tolerate it. section 10 should continue to be interpreted in a way that allows for this individual harm to be addressed, in keeping with the standard set out by the court of appeal in calego international inc. v. commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, 2013 qcca 924, [2013] rjdt 517. [119] for the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeal the central question is whether the impairment of the equal exercise of the right to dignity is sufficiently serious, or whether it is justified by the comedian’s freedom of expression. in the circumstances of this case, the widely disseminated taunting of a 10 to 13 year-old disabled child that plays on dehumanizing notions associated with his disability clearly meets this threshold. background [120] the complainant jérémy gabriel was born in 1996 with treacher collins syndrome the syndrome causes deformities to the ears, head and palate and, in mr. gabriel’s case, deafness when he turned 6, jérémy gabriel was fitted with an osteo-integrated hearing aid which allowed him, for the first time, to hear between 80 and 90 percent of sounds. the hearing aid enabled him to learn how to speak. he also developed a passion for singing in 2005, at the age of 8, he had his first public appearance as a singer on a television show called donnez au suivant. he subsequently became well known between 2005 and 2008, when he was 8 to 11 years old, jérémy gabriel performed widely, including with céline dion and for the pope. he also appeared on a number of television programs broadcast both provincially and nationally and sang the national anthem at a montreal canadiens game. [121] mike ward is a comedian who has been performing stand-up comedy since the 1990s. by his own account, he has performed in thousands of shows and some of this material is accessible to a wider audience on the internet from 2010 to 2013, mr. ward performed in a show called mike ward s’expose. in it, he targeted celebrities whom he brands as “sacred cows”. [122] in 2007, when he was 10 years old, jérémy gabriel released an autobiography detailing his career and his experience living with treacher collins syndrome. shortly afterwards, mr. ward posted a number of video clips on his website mocking jérémy gabriel. in these clips, mr. ward mocked jérémy gabriel’s disability, including through imitation, and made the following comments: [translation] so now i’m takin’ the opportunity, y’know, to put out the goods while i’m still young, y’know, because i mean later, y’know, when i’m 40, i won’t be able to make records any more, y’know. i mean ugly guy who sings, y’know, there’s already gregory charles, so he’s got like a monopoly on the market. and well, y’know, i didn’t want to say that, but it’s because i can’t control what comes out because my mouth doesn’t close all the way, look . but that’s an operation i would have liked to get, but apparently i’d rather sink all my money in the sports car my mother bought, so now i’m stuck with this little speaker on my head, a mouth that won’t shut and a pretty average book, thank you very much. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. iii, at p 194 (transcribed from attached cd)) [123] in his mike ward s’expose show, mr. ward made the following remarks about jérémy gabriel, who was between 13 and 16 years old at the time: [translation] she impresses me, céline, because she sang for the pope. the only other quebec kid to sing for the pope? little jérémy? you remember little jérémy, y’know, the kid with the subwoofer on his head? when little jérémy came, everyone complained except me, i was the only one who defended him. y’know when he came, he sang for the pope, people said, “he’s really bad, he’s off-key, he sings badly” i defended him, i said, “he’s dying, let him live out his dream, he’s living out a dream. his dream was to sing off-key in front of the pope”. then after he sang for the canadiens, people complained again, “he sings badly. he’s off-key, he’s no good”. christ, he’s living out a dream, let him live out his dream. [he] sang for céline, again with the “he really sucks, he’s off-key, he sings badly” christ, he’s dying, let him live out his dream i defended him . . except now . . . five years later . . . he’s still not dead! idiot that i am, i defended him like an idiot, and he doesn’t die. i saw him with his mother at a club piscine. i tried to drown him . couldn’t do it, couldn’t do it, he’s unkillable. i went online to see what his illness was. you know what’s wrong with him? he’s ugly! (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 260-61 (reproduced as transcribed)) [124] approximately 135,000 tickets were sold to these performances and 7,500 dvd copies of the performances were also sold. a recorded version of the show was also available on mr. ward’s website to which the wider public had access. [125] jérémy gabriel learned of mr. ward’s videos in 2010 when he was 13 years old and had just begun high school at school, students tormented him, repeating the jokes that mr. ward had made during his routine and circulated online. the impact on mr. gabriel during this formative stage of his life was substantial. he questioned whether his life had any value, felt lost, isolated and experienced repeated suicidal thoughts. [126] in 2012, mr. ward was interviewed on a tv show called les francs-tireurs. he discussed the jokes he made about jérémy gabriel, explaining that pushing boundaries and going too far lay at the heart of his comedy. in response to the interviewer’s questions, mr. ward acknowledged the view that his jokes were not just in poor taste but amounted to bullying a child with a disability: [translation] interviewer: ok. and in your show, you say he’s ugly. mr. ward: yes. interviewer: is it his fault if he’s ugly? mr. ward: no. interviewer: how is that funny? mr. ward: i don’t know, but it’s . . . it’s . . . i don’t know. it’s . . . but the way my joke is put together, i find it funny. and people laugh and then i judge people for laughing over it, laughing at it . interviewer: if you make fun of jérémy, who won’t you make fun of? . interviewer: because i come back to that, mike, he’s ill, not his fault. can you give him a break? mr. ward: but you see, that’s one of the jokes that when i said i have a line, that i’m always on the line, there i’m on the wrong side of the line, but i don’t know, fuck, it’s a problem i have. i . . . it makes me laugh. interviewer: you took part in a video against bullying where you said how bad bullying is. listen, what you’re doing with jérémy, i think it’s a form of bullying to bash him all over the province in front of hundreds, in front of thousands of people. how is it not bullying? mr. ward: i don’t know. i don’t know. it’s a good point. i hear you and, y’know, let’s say, if you were talking, let’s say i’m in my living room, you’re talking to someone and you say that, i’m gonna be like christ he’s totally right. y’know, the other guy’s a fucking jackass to talk about a child with a disability that way . . . [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. iii, at p 196 (transcribed from attached cd)) [127] this interview prompted jérémy gabriel and his parents to file a complaint with the commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (“commission”) they alleged that mr. ward’s comments were a discriminatory interference with their right to dignity, honour and reputation under ss. 4 and 10 of the quebec charter. [128] the commission concluded that mr. ward’s comments and videos were discrimination under the quebec charter and brought the claim before the human rights tribunal (“tribunal”) on behalf of jérémy gabriel and his parents. [129] the tribunal (hughes jcq presiding with the assistance of assessors me claudine ouellet and me mélanie samson) held that prima facie discrimination was made out based on the test from the quebec jurisprudence (2016 qctdp 18, 35 cclt (4th) 258) it found that mr. gabriel had been singled out based on his disability in a way that violated his right to equality. the tribunal cited the devastating effects mr. ward’s comments had on his sense of self-worth, the fact that he was bullied in school, felt distant from his friends and family and that he had suicidal thoughts. [130] at the justification stage of the analysis, the tribunal concluded that freedom of expression could not serve as a defence in this case because mr. ward’s jokes did not raise an issue of public importance and strayed from the core values of protected speech. as such, the impairment of the equal exercise of mr. gabriel’s right to dignity, honour and reputation was unjustified. [131] mr. ward was ordered to pay mr. gabriel $35,000 in moral and punitive damages as well as $7,000 to his mother. [132] at the court of appeal, the majority, applying the same test from the quebec jurisprudence as the tribunal, agreed that mr. gabriel’s right to the equal exercise of his right to dignity, honour and reputation was violated and that freedom of expression could not justify mr. ward’s conduct (2019 qcca 2042, 62 cclt (4th) 230). it therefore upheld the damages award in favour of mr. gabriel, but overturned the award in favour of his mother because it concluded that none of her rights were violated. [133] the dissenting judge found that it was unreasonable for the tribunal to hold that mr. gabriel suffered a distinction based on his disability, concluding instead that he was targeted not because he has a disability, but because he was a public personality. she added that caricaturing someone based on their disability cannot give rise to a claim under ss. 4 and 10 because it is a question of defamation, not of discrimination. since the tribunal does not have jurisdiction over defamation, it had no jurisdiction over the claim moreover, she concluded that the tribunal erred in seeing freedom of expression as part of the justificatory analysis, rather than as an internal limit on the right to dignity. she would have allowed the appeal by dismissing the claims brought in the name of both mr. gabriel and his mother. analysis [134] we see no reason to depart from this court’s jurisprudence confirming that it is the impact of the conduct that matters, not the intention, rejecting the proposition that it is acceptable to discriminate if it results from treating likes alike, and that freedom of expression includes the right to discriminate. mr. ward’s justifications that he did not intend to discriminate, that he was treating jérémy gabriel like any other celebrity, and that his artistic licence as a comedian gave him a right to mock a disabled child have, as a result, no basis in law. [135] the claim is that the language used by mr. ward about mr. gabriel’s disability, both in live performances and on the internet, constituted a discriminatory interference with his right to dignity, honour and reputation. the claim is based on a combination of ss. 4 and 10 of the quebec charter. section 4 protects the right to the safeguard of one’s dignity, along with honour and reputation, as a fundamental right. section 10 is the quebec charter’s equality provision it protects against discriminatory interferences with any of the rights or freedoms set out in the quebec charter.3 together, ss. 4 and 10 protect the right to the full and equal safeguard of dignity, honour and reputation. these sections provide: every person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, honour and 4. reputation. 10 every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, gender identity or expression, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap. discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such right. [136] under the quebec charter, fundamental freedoms and rights, including s 4, are circumscribed and balanced through an application of s 9.1 which provided at the relevant time: 9.1 in exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of québec. in this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by law. [137] to determine whether speech constitutes discrimination, the same framework as the one used for other claims of discrimination under s 10 applies. it was most recently confirmed by this court in quebec (commission des droits de la 3 this includes not only the “fundamental freedoms and rights” set out in ss. 1 to 9, but also the “political rights” set out in ss. 21 and 22, the “judicial rights” set out in ss. 23 to 38 and the “economic and social rights” set out in ss. 39 to 48. personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v bombardier inc (bombardier aerospace training center), [2015] 2 scr 789. a unanimous court held that the approach to discrimination under the quebec charter was to consider first whether a case of prima facie discrimination was made out, and then to determine if the conduct was justified (paras. 36-37). [138] the test set out in bombardier for whether there is prima facie discrimination requires claimants to show, on a balance of probabilities, that they have been subject to a “distinction, exclusion or preference” based on one of the grounds enumerated in s 10 (para. 35). they must show that this distinction “affects the full and equal exercise of a right or freedom guaranteed to him or her by the [quebec] charter” (para. 53). as the court explained, at para. 54: this means that the right to non-discrimination cannot serve as a basis for an application on its own and that it must necessarily be attached to another human right or freedom recognized by law however, this requirement should not be confused with the independent scope of the right to equality; the [quebec] charter does not require a “double violation” (right to equality and, for example, freedom of religion), which would make s 10 redundant. [citations omitted.] [139] that means that for a claim to succeed under s 10, the equality provision, the complainant must show that the exercise of one of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the quebec charter other than equality was affected in a discriminatory way but without having to show that that right or freedom was independently violated (velk v mcgill university, 2011 qcca 578, 89 ccpb 175, at para. 42; quebec (commission des droits de la personne) v. st-jean-sur-richelieu, commission scolaire (1994), 117 dlr (4th) 67 (que. ca), at pp. 90-91; see also david robitaille, “non- indépendance et autonomie de la norme d’égalité québécoise: des concepts ‘fondateurs’ qui méritent d’être mieux connus” (2004), 35 rdus 103, at pp. 111-13; christian brunelle, “pour une restructuration de la charte québécoise?”, in mélanges en l’honneur de jacques-yvan morin, [2015] rqdi (hors-série) 199, at p 213). [140] if the complainant can show prima facie discrimination on a balance of probabilities, the defendant is entitled to “present a defence of justification, which he or she must then establish” (bombardier, at para. 58). at this stage, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to “justify his or her decision or conduct on the basis of the exemptions provided for in the applicable human rights legislation or those developed by the courts” (para. 37). [141] as bombardier itself states, this approach is in keeping with this court’s application of the test for discrimination across the country and in line with the court “favour[ing] a consistent interpretation of the various provincial human rights statutes unless a legislature intends otherwise” (para. 31; see, eg,. british columbia (public service employee relations commission) v. bcgseu, [1999] 3 scr 3, at para. 2; mcgill university health centre (montreal general hospital) v syndicat des employés de l’hôpital général de montréal, [2007] 1 scr 161, at para. 44, per abella j., concurring; moore v. british columbia (education), [2012] 3 scr 360; british columbia (superintendent of motor vehicles) v. british columbia (council of human rights), [1999] 3 scr 868, at para. 20). [142] we note the disagreement below about where the balancing mandated by s 9.1 of the quebec charter should take place in the structure of the bombardier test. the dissenting judge at the court of appeal insisted that the tribunal was wrong not to undertake this balancing in determining whether there had been prima facie discrimination (para. 99), while the majority concluded that the balance was best conducted at the justification step (para. 194). where, as here, the considerations on both sides of the balance have been fully canvassed by the parties, the extent to which the balancing is undertaken at the first step where the commission has the persuasive burden of proof or at the second step where that burden is on a defendant will generally be immaterial to the outcome. that is precisely the case here with mr. ward. [143] to determine whether there has been prima facie discrimination in the case before us, the first step is to determine whether mr. ward subjected mr. gabriel to a distinction based on his disability. if so, the question becomes whether the distinction had the effect of impairing the right to full recognition or exercise of a right under the quebec charter. [144] whether there is a distinction on a ground listed in s 10 in a particular case is a question of mixed fact and law that is owed deference on appeal. there is no reason to interfere with the tribunal’s conclusion that this first element of prima facie discrimination was made out on the record. [145] the commission’s burden “is limited to showing prejudice and its connection to a prohibited ground of discrimination” (quebec (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. montréal (city), [2000] 1 scr 665 (“boisbriand”), at para. 65). this means that the commission does not have to show that mr. ward intended to single out mr. gabriel based on his disability, or that the distinction was based exclusively, or even primarily, on his disability. there must only be a connection between the distinction and the ground (bombardier, at paras. 41 and 45-47) as this court said in janzen v platy enterprises ltd., [1989] 1 scr. 1252, for a distinction to be based on an enumerated ground, “[i]t is sufficient that ascribing to an individual a group characteristic is one factor in the treatment of that individual” (p 1288 (emphasis added); see also desroches v. commission des droits de la personne, [1997] rjq 1540 (ca)). [146] the tribunal has repeatedly held that the use of an overtly discriminatory slur constitutes a “distinction, exclusion or preference” based on an enumerated ground (see, eg,. commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. remorquage sud-ouest (9148-7314 québec inc.), 2010 qctdp 12; st-éloi v. rivard, 2018 qctdp 2). but it has also held that comments which are not overt slurs may constitute discrimination depending on how a person in the marginalized group at issue would understand them (see generally commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. camirand, 2008 qctdp 11, at para. 39 (canlii); commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. paradis, 2016 qctdp 17, at para. 149 (canlii); commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. quenneville, 2019 qctdp 18; de gaston v. wojcik, 2012 qctdp 20; commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. brisson, 2009 qctdp 3, at para. 42 (canlii)). [147] mr. ward’s jokes about mr. gabriel were self-evidently pejorative slurs based on his disability mr. ward referred to jérémy gabriel as the [translation] “ugly singing kid” and he mocked him as unable to close his mouth (tribunal reasons, at para. 21) and as having a “sub-woofer” on his head in describing a hearing aid device (para. 18). his jokes about drowning mr. gabriel drew on pernicious stereotypes about persons with disabilities as objects of pity and as burdens on society who are disposable (eldridge v. british columbia (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr 624, at para. 56). scholars have observed this, in particular in respect of mistreatment of children with disabilities (see, eg,. susanne commend, “au secours des petits infirmes”: les enfants handicapés physiques au québec entre charité et exclusion, 1920-1990, doctoral thesis (2018), at p 87). [148] mr. ward argued that mr. gabriel was not singled out because he was a child with a disability but because he was a celebrity. this ignores the fundamental truth in this case: mr. ward targeted aspects of mr. gabriel’s public personality which were inextricable from his disability as such, he stood apart from the other public figures that mr. ward mocked as “sacred cows”. these realities cannot be artificially severed to immunize mr. ward’s comments from human rights scrutiny. this is why the tribunal concluded, rightly, that both mr. ward’s widely disseminated video clips, available day or night to anyone with an internet connection, and his stand-up special subjected mr. gabriel to a distinction based on his disability they either explicitly mocked his physical characteristics which stem from his disability, or related to aspects of his public personality which are inextricably linked to his disability (tribunal reasons, at para. 82). [149] with respect, the notion that mr. ward’s comments cannot constitute a distinction based on his disability because mr. gabriel was treated like any other celebrity reflects a discredited conception of discrimination. in commission scolaire régionale de chambly v. bergevin, [1994] 2 scr 525, at p 540, this court confirmed that under s 10 of the quebec charter, as in discrimination law across canada, uniform treatment which fails to accommodate differences may constitute a prohibited distinction. as mcintyre j explained in andrews v. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143, “there is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals” (p 164, quoting dennis v. united states, 339 us 162 (1950), at p 184) and so, to avoid such inequity, “the main consideration” for courts hearing discrimination claims should be “the impact . . . on the individual . . . concerned” (p 165). as such, there will be a distinction based on a prohibited ground whenever a claimant “carries a burden that others do not, by reason of [an enumerated] personal characteristic” (withler v canada (attorney general), [2011] 1 scr 396, at para. 62; see also boisbriand, at para. 65; mouvement laïque québécois v saguenay (city), [2015] 2 scr 3, at para. 120). [150] at this stage of the analysis, it is immaterial whether mr. ward intended to mock mr. gabriel because he has a disability, whether mr. ward was joking or being serious, or whether mr. gabriel was skewered in the same way as other celebrities. the issue is not mr. ward’s stated intention not to discriminate against mr. gabriel (ontario human rights commission v. simpsons-sears ltd., [1985] 2 scr 536). the issue is the impact of mr. ward’s comments on this child with a disability in the circumstances we disagree, with respect, that the tribunal was wrong to find a distinction on an enumerated ground, much less that it committed a palpable and overriding error. [151] the existence of prima facie discrimination therefore depends on whether this distinction had the effect of impairing mr. gabriel’s right to free and equal recognition of the s 4 right under s 10 of the quebec charter the parties and the judges below disagree on the applicable standard that mr. ward’s speech had to meet to constitute an actionable violation of this prohibition on discrimination. [152] mr. ward relies on this court’s decision in saskatchewan (human rights commission) v. whatcott, [2013] 1 scr 467, for the proposition that the guarantee of freedom of expression in the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (“canadian charter”) means that speech that impairs the right to equality can only be actionable if it amounts to something akin to hate speech. this approach, adopted by the dissenting judge in the court of appeal in this case, was explicitly rejected by the court of appeal in calego. [153] in whatcott, this court considered the constitutionality of a statutory prohibition against publishing or displaying any representation “that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground”, conceded to be a prima facie breach of s 2(b) of the canadian charter (paras. 12 and 62) the objective of the provision was defined as “reducing the harmful effects and social costs of discrimination by tackling certain causes of discriminatory activity” (para. 71) the court held that while prohibiting representations that are objectively seen to expose protected groups to hatred was rationally connected to this objective, prohibiting expression which “ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of” those protected groups was not, and those words were severed from the provision (para. 99). [154] whatcott concerns a brand of harmful speech — hate speech — that is prohibited because it gives rise to social harm to a marginalized group as opposed to individual harm this court in whatcott, referring to its earlier decision in canada (human rights commission) v. taylor, [1990] 3 scr 892, defined “hatred” in this context in reference to whether an informed reasonable person would “view the expression as likely to expose a person or persons to detestation and vilification on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination” (para. 59). [155] this is not a case of hate speech as that term is used in whatcott and taylor. neither the tribunal nor the majority of the court of appeal considered whether mr. ward’s expression amounted to hate speech. [156] like the provision in whatcott, s 10 places a prima facie limit on s 2(b) of the canadian charter by prohibiting speech that prevents the equal exercise of the right to the safeguard of dignity, honour and reputation (see generally canadian broadcasting corp. v. canada (attorney general), [2011] 1 scr 19, at para. 38). but the legislative purpose underlying s 10 is broader than the whatcott provision and, accordingly, the prohibition on speech can be broader than hate speech while remaining rationally connected to that purpose. because s 10 guarantees the equal exercise of all “human rights and freedoms”, including the right to the safeguard of dignity, honour and reputation, the purpose of the provision goes beyond preventing harm on a group scale and the perpetuation of discriminatory attitudes in the public at large. section 10 is inherently tied to the other individual human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the quebec charter (robitaille, at p 108). the provision considered in whatcott was, by contrast, uniquely aimed at preventing societal, as opposed to individual, harm by addressing “certain causes of discriminatory activity” (paras. 71 and 79-84). by its very terms, it targeted only expression that was published or displayed “such as through newspapers or other printed matter, or through television or radio broadcasting” (whatcott, at para. 83), whereas s 10 evidences no similarly restricted scope the proper interpretation of s 10 cannot be understood in reference to principles governing the constitutionality of a different provision with a different objective. [157] it is well recognized that speech can cause individual harm without being hateful, and there is no constitutional bar to legal recourse in such circumstances where the limit on freedom of expression is aimed at different objectives (jean-louis baudouin, patrice deslauriers and benoît moore, la responsabilité civile (9th ed 2020), vol. 1, at nos. 1-291, 1-296, 1-600 and 1-603) this is the case, for example, with harassment (quebec charter, s 10.1; see, eg,. commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v sfiridis, 2002 qctdp 42 (canlii); janzen; mccoy v mccoy, 2014 qccs 286), defamation (art. 1457 civil code of québec (“ccq”) and quebec charter, s 4; see also bou malhab v diffusion métromédia cmr inc., [2011] 1 scr 214, at paras. 48-49), and circumstances like those in british columbia human rights tribunal v schrenk, [2017] 2 scr 795, where employees were subjected to various discriminatory slurs. nor does freedom of expression limit the ability of administrative decision-makers to address harmful speech that is not hate speech (see, eg,. canadian centre for bio-ethical reform v. grande prairie (city), 2018 abca 154, 67 alta. lr (6th) 230, at paras. 70 and 114). [158] neither the canadian charter nor the quebec charter, therefore, make hate speech the threshold at which discriminatory comments can be actionable. in this sense, whatcott is not the proper standard to decide the present appeal. [159] instead, the appropriate threshold for discriminatory speech under the quebec charter was set out in the court of appeal’s decision in calego, where an employer called all of his asian employees into a meeting and berated them for being dirty because they were chinese (para. 11) the court unanimously upheld the tribunal’s ruling that the employer’s comments were a discriminatory interference with each of the individual employees’ right to dignity, making them actionable under ss. 4 and 10 of the quebec charter (paras. 55-56, 104-5 and 118). [160] two judges wrote concurring reasons in calego, and the third judge on the panel subscribed to both in his reasons, morissette j.a explained that the determination of whether speech undermines the equal exercise of the right to dignity is an objective one, not subjectively determined, but it is one that takes into account the circumstances of the complainant (paras. 99-102) only comments which are [translation] “a particularly contemptuous affront to their racial, ethnic or other identity and one that has grave consequences” will constitute discrimination (para. 99). this is a fact-specific and highly contextual inquiry. because the complainants in that case were vulnerable and on the job site, forced to listen and suffer silently as they were targeted because of their membership in an ethnic group, it was clear that they suffered discrimination (paras. 104-5). [161] vézina ja agreed that insulting comments based on a prohibited ground can constitute s 10 discrimination this will be the case where the comments are [translation] “interference that is truly serious”, and he noted that the “threshold is high” (para. 50) referring to the tribunal judge’s finding that the employees were shaken and suffered psychological damage because of the employer’s comments, he was of the view that the speech in question violated their right to the equal exercise of the right to dignity (paras. 54-56). [162] calego was based on a significant body of jurisprudence from the tribunal holding that comments based on a ground enumerated in s 10 of the quebec charter which impair the equal exercise of someone’s right to the safeguard of their dignity are actionable discrimination (see, eg,. commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. chamberland, 2013 qctdp 37; de gaston). [163] following calego, speech based on an enumerated ground will violate the s 10 guarantee of equality in the exercise of the s 4 right to the safeguard of one’s dignity when it constitutes such a contemptuous affront to the individual’s identity that it would have serious consequences for the reasonable person in that individual’s circumstances. the reasonable person would be aware of the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society, and would therefore be expected to tolerate hurtful speech, even related to protected grounds, that does not rise to a high level of gravity (calego, at para. 99; see also yapi v. moustafa, 2021 qctdp 9, at para. 37 (canlii); ferdia v 9142-7963 québec inc., 2021 qctdp 2, at para. 28 (canlii)). [164] as morissette ja explained in calego, at para. 102, while the assessment of whether speech impairs dignity is objective, it must account for the particular characteristics of the plaintiff and it must consider all of the context in which the remarks are made: [translation] the applicable test is therefore first and foremost an objective one. that being said, the impact must be assessed in the specific context in which someone claims to be a victim of discrimination. to this extent, the abstractness of the test (reflected in the concept of the objectively reasonable person) is attenuated and the test moves closer to the particular situation of the individual claiming to be a victim of discrimination. [165] calego also makes the manner in which the impugned comments were delivered relevant to the assessment of whether speech impairs the equal exercise of the right to the safeguard of one’s dignity. in that case, the fact that the employees were a [translation] “‘captive’ audience” who had no choice but to listen to the speaker made it more likely that the comments would cause them harm to dignity (para. 103). [166] in this case, the tribunal found that mr. ward’s speech constituted discrimination because it impaired mr. gabriel’s equal exercise of his rights to the safeguard of his dignity and honour (at para. 102) as well as his reputation (para. 116). in calego, morissette ja noted explicitly that these concepts are distinct and sought to distinguish, in particular, the notion of dignity from honour and reputation he emphasized, at para. 101, that dignity in this context was squarely focused on the respect owed to individuals by virtue of their status as human beings and was not necessarily tied to the perspective of others in society: [translation] moreover, the concepts of dignity, honour and reputation cannot be reduced to one and the same thing. i am inclined to think that the last two connote, though perhaps to different degrees, the idea of a third party’s view of the alleged victim of the interference. this is not the case, it seems to me, of the first concept, because dignity is the respect to which a person is entitled as a human being and subject of law. in our view, it is not necessary to consider honour and reputation in this case. even when dignity alone is considered, it remains clear that s 10 has been breached and the tribunal’s award of damages should stand. [167] dignity is [translation] “the pre-eminent value of every human being recognized as a person in their own right, regardless of their individual characteristics and their social affiliations” (dominique goubau, with the collaboration of anne-marie savard, le droit des personnes physiques (6th ed. 2019), at no. 177, quoting jean-guy belley, “la protection de la dignité humaine dans le pluralisme juridique contemporain” (2010), 8 crdf 117, at p 119). [168] the right to the safeguard of one’s dignity is a stand-alone right under the quebec charter the court explored s 4 dignity in quebec (public curator) v. syndicat national des employés de l’hôpital st-ferdinand, [1996] 3 scr 211, where the issue was whether employees of an elder care hospital who walked out on their patients violated the patients’ rights l’heureux-dubé j defined the right to the safeguard of dignity as a prohibition on “interferences with the fundamental attributes of a human being which violate the respect to which every person is entitled simply because he or she is a human being” (para. 105; see also marie annik grégoire, “le parcours tumultueux des propos injurieux en droit québécois depuis 2009: l’arrêt génex communications inc. c. association québécoise de l’industrie du disque, du spectacle et de la vidéo (adisq) est-il toujours pertinent?” (2016), 57 c de d 3). [169] in the broader canadian context, this court has recognized dignity as the lodestar of the canadian charter and all of the rights it enshrines (r v. kapp, [2008] 2 scr 483, at para. 21). in law v. canada (minister of employment and immigration), [1999] 1 scr 497, it defined dignity as being concerned with the integrity and empowerment of individuals and groups: “human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits” (para. 53). enhancing dignity means, according to the court in law, making place for all individuals and groups in society. [170] more specifically, the right to the safeguard of one’s dignity under s 4 of the quebec charter aims to ensure that every person is treated with the basic level of respect to which everyone is entitled by virtue of their humanity (hôpital st-ferdinand, at para. 105; see also gauthier v beaumont, [1998] 2 scr 3, at para. 90; cinar corporation v. robinson, [2013] 3 scr 1168, at para. 116; procureur général du canada v. manoukian, 2020 qcca 1486, 70 cclt (4th) 182, at para. 136). this right, like the rest of the quebec charter, must be given “a liberal, contextual and purposive interpretation” (bombardier, at para. 31; see also béliveau st‑jacques v. fédération des employées et employés de services publics inc., [1996] 2 scr 345, at para. 116; hôpital st-ferdinand, at para. 105) dignity was included in the quebec charter alongside the right to safeguard one’s honour and reputation, reflecting jurisprudence that did not fall strictly under either of the two more specific concepts (christian brunelle, “la dignité dans la charte des droits et libertés de la personne: de l’ubiquité à l’ambiguïté d’une notion fondamentale”, in la charte québécoise: origines, enjeux et perspectives, [2006] r du b (numéro thématique) 143, at pp. 162-65) its inclusion ensures that broader notions of dignity can be protected without the need for an exhaustive list of each of its manifestations (brunelle (2006), at pp. 171-72). [171] turning to the case before us, the question is whether mr. ward impaired the equal exercise of mr. gabriel’s right to the safeguard of his dignity while the tribunal correctly identified calego as the controlling authority, in our respectful view it fell into error by focusing on the purely subjective effects on mr. gabriel, rather than a reasonable person in his circumstances (tribunal reasons, at paras. 99 and 102). this is an extricable legal error that justifies intervention on appeal. nevertheless, even on the modified objective standard that should have been applied, there are unique aspects of this case that militate towards a finding of impairment. [172] the manner in which the comments were delivered, and in particular their broad dissemination, is clearly relevant to the analysis mr. ward performed his stand-up routine 230 times to a combined audience of over 100,000 people, and sold over 7,500 dvd copies of it. his video clips remained accessible to all on his website for a year, and were made available on other platforms without mr. ward’s authorization. each time the jokes were repeated, so too was the harm to mr. gabriel. mr. ward’s comments were so widespread that jérémy gabriel could not ignore them. neither could his classmates. mr. ward’s jokes followed him to school where other children repeated the insults and magnified the mockery. this was a direct consequence of mr. ward, a well-known figure in quebec, distributing his routines about jérémy gabriel widely this must be considered as a factor in the determination of whether mr. ward’s comments were likely to cause serious harm to a reasonable person in his circumstances. the fact that there was no escape for mr. gabriel in this case from the impugned speech is similar to calego where it was significant for the court of appeal that the complainants had no choice but to listen to the discriminatory speech that targeted them individually (para. 103). [173] mr. ward’s comments must also be understood in conjunction with the fact that when they were made, jérémy gabriel was at times a child and at other times a teenager. he was 10 years old when he released his autobiography in 2007; according to a finding of the tribunal (at para. 21) shortly afterwards mr. ward released the video clips mocking jérémy gabriel’s appearance and his disability on his website. when mr. ward began performing his show mike ward s’expose in which he joked about drowning him, jérémy gabriel was 13 (tribunal reasons, paras. 18-19). [174] this court explained in canadian foundation for children, youth and the law v. canada (attorney general), [2004] 1 scr 76, that any workable approach to discrimination claims brought by children must incorporate the “viewpoint of the child, which will often include a sense of relative disempowerment and vulnerability” (para. 53). and, in r v. sharpe, [2001] 1 scr 45, at para. 169, l’heureux-dubé, gonthier and bastarache jj noted that children’s “physical, mental, and emotional immaturity” make them “one of the most vulnerable groups in society” (see also r v. db, [2008] 2 scr 3, at para. 43; a.b v bragg communications inc., [2012] 2 scr 567, at para. 17). childhood and early adolescence is a formative stage of life during which time an individual’s desire to belong can of course be deeply felt a reasonable young person in jérémy gabriel’s shoes would be particularly susceptible to the harms associated with dehumanizing comments. [175] in his stand-up routine, mr. ward remarked that he defended mr. gabriel from criticism only until he found out that he was not dying, at which point he took it upon himself to drown him. this implies that it would be too burdensome for society to accept jérémy gabriel in the mainstream permanently and that ultimately society would be better off if he were dead mr. ward’s joke invokes archaic attitudes advocating for the exclusion and segregation of children with disabilities (commend, at p 87; daniel ducharme and karina montminy, l’accommodement des étudiants et étudiantes en situation de handicap dans les établissements d’enseignement collégial (2012), at p 10). [176] mr. ward preyed on jérémy gabriel’s disability and the way it manifests itself in order to make his audience laugh, portraying the child as a subject of ridicule rather than as an individual deserving of respect (see brunelle (2006), at p 152). these are clearly the types of comments which could lead a disabled child to question his “self-respect and self-worth” (law, at para. 53), violating s 10 of the quebec charter and causing severe dignitary harm. [177] although the assessment of whether speech impairs the equal exercise of the s 4 right is an objective one, it is important to note that the tribunal found that mr. ward’s comments caused mr. gabriel anguish and prompted him to isolate himself from his peer group and even to contemplate suicide (para. 155). the tribunal noted that mr. gabriel often wondered whether his disability made him less valuable than others. [178] given the particular vulnerability of a child in jérémy gabriel’s circumstances, the broad dissemination of mr. ward’s comments and the cruelty of the implication that he was a disposable or burdensome human being, this case presents unique circumstances that suggest the right to equal exercise of dignity was impaired. in our view, these facts are sufficient to conclude that the commission has met its burden and that prima facie discrimination was made out. [179] it is true that, if mr. gabriel’s right to reputation has been violated, he could have brought a civil suit for defamation. but the commission brought a claim in discrimination on his behalf instead, as it was entitled to do. a claim for defamation under quebec law is one which seeks recourse for a breach of the right to the safeguard of reputation based on the general rules of civil liability (art. 1457 ccq) and s 4 of the quebec charter (bou malhab, at paras. 22-23 and 27) such a claim does not necessarily engage the distinct right to dignity and it is not based on the plaintiff’s membership in a particular group (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no. 1-297; see also bou malhab, at para. 27). as morissette ja was careful to point out in calego, dignity relates to an individual’s sense of self and whether they feel that their intrinsic value has been respected, but reputation relates to how others perceive the complainant (para. 101). saying that mr. gabriel’s only recourse was a civil remedy to repair harm to his reputation would be to ignore that the claim we are asked to consider here is focused on the right to equal exercise of the s 4 right to safeguard, among other things, his dignity, which is plainly a claim of a different nature. [180] while the civil code of québec must be read in harmony with the quebec charter (preliminary provision of the ccq), this is not to say that human rights protections are to be somehow systematically read down in the name of conformity with civil liability (see mélanie samson and louise langevin, “revisiting québec’s jus commune in the era of the human rights charters” (2015), 63 am. j. comp. l. 719, at p 742). the jurisprudence of this court calls for “flexibility and imagination” in remedying the infringement of human rights, and warns against losing sight of the fact that the quebec charter may require “intervention that is in no way related to the law of civil liability” (quebec (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. communauté urbaine de montréal, [2004] 1 scr 789, at para. 26; bombardier, at para. 104; see also de montigny v brossard (succession), [2010] 3 scr 64, at para. 44). an approach that wholly equates compensation for unlawful interference with rights and freedoms under s 49 of the quebec charter with civil liability would unduly limit the remedial power of the scheme (samson and langevin, at pp. 727-28). [181] when the claim involves, as it does here, a discriminatory interference with exercise of the rights or freedoms outlined in the quebec charter, s 10 is engaged and the human rights tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim. section 71 of the quebec charter provides that the commission may make an investigation into any situation “which appears to the commission to be . . . a case of discrimination within the meaning of sections 10 to 19”. and, s 80 of the quebec charter provides that “the commission may apply to a tribunal to obtain, where consistent with the public interest, any appropriate measure against the person at fault or to demand, in favour of the victim, any measure of redress it considers appropriate at that time” finally, s 111 of the quebec charter grants the tribunal jurisdiction over “any application submitted under section 80”. the tribunal is therefore competent to hear a claim arising from s 10 of the quebec charter and it correctly identified this as the basis of its jurisdiction over this claim (see also mouvement laïque, at paras. 40, 58 and 63). [182] there is undoubtedly resemblance between a s 10 claim based on equal exercise of dignity and a claim in defamation, because s 4 of the quebec charter is implicated in both (see, eg,. calego, at para. 40). a defamation claim will succeed if the interference with reputation violates “the objective standard of conduct of a reasonable person” (bou malhab, at para. 24), whereas a s 10 equality claim based on the right to dignity will succeed if the interference with the equal exercise of that right meets a certain threshold appreciated from the perspective of a reasonable person in the complainant’s circumstances (calego, at para. 102; see also derbal v. tchassao, 2021 qctdp 11, at para. 38 (canlii); st-jean-sur-richelieu, commission scolaire, at pp. 90-91; commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. ville de longueuil, 2020 qctdp 21, at paras. 127-29 (canlii)). it goes without saying that the very nature of s 10 focuses the analysis on discrimination on the basis of a protected ground. accordingly, language could be defamatory but not discriminatory because it is not based on a ground enumerated in s 10. similarly, if the equal exercise of the right to dignity alone is impaired and there is no impact on reputation, speech could be discriminatory without being defamatory. each ground addresses related but distinct violations. [183] this conclusion shifts the onus to mr. ward to justify his prima facie discriminatory speech he attempts to do so by invoking his right to freedom of expression under s 3 of the quebec charter and s 2(b) of the canadian charter as a defence to the commission’s claim. section 3 provides: 3 every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association. section 2(b) provides: 2 everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: . freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including (b) freedom of the press and other media of communication; [184] professor daniel proulx explains why the rights set out in ss. 1 to 9 may themselves be recognized as justifications to prima facie discrimination, citing the quebec charter’s preamble which explains that “the rights and freedoms of the human person are inseparable from the rights and freedoms of others and from the common well-being”: [translation] however crucial it may be to respect for human dignity, the right to equality is not superior in principle to the other rights or freedoms in canada. . . . it follows that an alleged discriminator can always argue as a defence, on condition of proving this, that their prima facie discriminatory decision or policy is justified by their duty to respect the other rights or freedoms guaranteed in the charter. this is why the right to respect for one’s private life (s 5), the right to security (s 1) and the right to property (s 6) may, in appropriate circumstances, all constitute valid reasons for establishing rules that are a priori discriminatory. (“droit à l’égalité”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit public — droit constitutionnel (loose-leaf), vol 2, by stéphane beaulac and jean-françois gaudreault-desbiens, eds., fasc 9, at no. 151; see also laroche v. lamothe, 2018 qcca 1726.) [185] generally, conflicts between individual quebec charter rights are resolved under s 9.1, which is reproduced here for convenience as it stated: 91. in exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of québec. in this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by law. [186] in ford v. quebec (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 712, and devine v. quebec (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 790, this court explained that s 9.1 of the quebec charter does not apply to s 10’s guarantee of equality both of these cases concerned claims brought under the quebec charter alleging that different provisions of a statute limiting the use of english in commercial activity violated the right to freedom of expression under s 3 and constituted discrimination under s 10 of the quebec charter. [187] the court held in devine that any claim based solely on s 3 could not succeed because the infringement of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was justified under s 91. the fact that s 9.1 did not apply to s 10, however, did not allow the complainants to circumvent the state’s justification, making equality rights absolute. the court explained that s 9.1 applied indirectly to s 10 by limiting the scope of the underlying right to freedom of expression: while it is true that s 9.1 does not apply to the principle of equality enshrined in s 10, it does apply to the guarantee of free expression enshrined in s 3 whenever it is alleged that a distinction on a ground prohibited by s 10 has the effect of impairing or nullifying a right under s 3, the scope of s 3 must still be determined in light of s 91. where, as here, s 9.1 operates to limit the scope of freedom of expression guaranteed under s 3, s 10 cannot be invoked to circumvent those reasonable limits and to substitute an absolute guarantee of free expression on the other hand, having specified the scope of free expression, s 9.1 cannot be invoked to justify a limit upon equal recognition and exercise of the right guaranteed by s 3. [p 818] as professor david robitaille explained in interpreting these cases: [translation] “because in fact equal treatment can be claimed only in relation to the recognition or exercise of freedom of expression, the result is that a limit justified under section 9.1 on the very recognition or exercise of that freedom will logically prevent the right to non-discrimination from being asserted” (p 117). [188] as the language of s 9.1 itself mandates, this court must consider “democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of québec” in balancing these rights. here, that requires a consideration of mr. gabriel’s right to the safeguard of his dignity and mr. ward’s freedom of expression. only by properly balancing these rights can we appreciate the scope of the s 10 right to the equal exercise of the former right. in this way, the s 9.1 balancing ties back to the standard expressed in calego and the manner in which the balance was struck in that case. the standard is informed by the perspective of the reasonable subject of the speech in the circumstances of the victim, a standard that is attuned to the value of free expression in society (para. 99). the arguments mr. ward raises as justification on the basis of his freedom of speech can be understood as arguments about whether the calego standard has been met in this case. [189] before engaging in any proportionality analysis under s 9.1, however, we must establish to what extent mr. ward’s right to freedom of expression has been engaged this court has consistently given a broad interpretation to freedom of expression, explaining that “content neutrality is the governing principle” (peter w. hogg and wade k. wright, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at s 43:11). in irwin toy ltd. v. quebec (attorney general), [1989] 1 scr 927, the court explained the breadth of the constitutional protection for freedom of expression as follows: freedom of expression was entrenched in our constitution and is guaranteed in the quebec charter so as to ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream such protection is, in the words of both the canadian and quebec charters, “fundamental” because in a free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the community and to the individual. [p 968] given this breadth, it is clear that mr. ward’s expressive freedoms would be curtailed by the remedy sought by the commission. [190] but the analysis does not end here. freedom of expression is not absolute. because of s 9.1 of the quebec charter, this right, like the s 4 right underlying mr. gabriel’s s 10 claim, may not be exercised in a way that is disproportionately harmful or abusive (jean-françois gaudreault-desbiens and charles-maxime panaccio, “the asymmetrical distinctness of the charter of human rights and freedoms in the post-chaoulli era”, in la charte québécoise: origines, enjeux et perspectives, [2006] r du b (numéro thématique) 217, at p 244; see also calego). ensuring a proportionate balance between the rights of individuals under the quebec charter involves a consideration of the specific rights at issue, the values that underpin them and the circumstances of the particular case (bruker v. marcovitz, [2007] 3 scr. 607, at paras. 76-78, referring to syndicat northcrest v. amselem, [2004] 2 scr 551, at para. 154, per bastarache j., dissenting; aubry v. éditions vice-versa inc., [1998] 1 scr 591, at paras. 56-65; see also jena mcgill, “‘now it’s my rights versus yours’: equality in tension with religious freedoms” (2016), 53 alta l rev 583, at pp. 588-90; errol p. mendes, “reaching equilibrium between conflicting rights”, in shaheen azmi, lorne foster and lesley jacobs, eds., balancing competing human rights claims in a diverse society: institutions, policy, principles (2012), 241, at pp. 242-43). [191] on mr. gabriel’s side of the balance is the severity of the personal consequences a reasonable person in his position would have suffered because of mr. ward’s speech as well as this court’s consistent recognition that certain forms of discriminatory speech may cause serious individual and societal harms which justify limits on expressive freedom in r v keegstra, [1990] 3 scr 697, this court recognized that “the emotional damage caused by words may be of grave psychological and social consequence” (p 746) relatedly, this court concluded in r v lucas, [1998] 1 scr 439, that the criminal prohibition on defamatory libel recognized “the innate dignity of the individual and the integral link between reputation and the fruitful participation of an individual in canadian society” (para. 48) the provisions were upheld despite the limit on freedom of expression, with cory j explaining that “[i]t would trivialize and demean the magnificent panoply of rights guaranteed by the charter if a significant value was attached to the deliberate recounting of defamatory lies that are likely to expose a person to hatred, ridicule or contempt” (para. 93). [192] freedom of expression has also been restricted in order to safeguard one’s reputation, a right which, alongside dignity and honour, is enshrined in s 4 of the quebec charter (gilles e. néron communication marketing inc v chambre des notaires du québec, [2004] 3 scr 95, at para. 52; prud’homme v prud’homme, [2002] 4 scr 663, at para. 43; bou malhab, at para. 17). [193] a child in jérémy gabriel’s circumstances would have suffered significant harm as a result of mr. ward’s speech because of mr. ward’s jokes and the dissemination of his material over the internet, mr. gabriel felt [translation] “lost, fragile and isolated” (tribunal reasons, at para. 27), developed suicidal ideation and sought the help of a psychologist. for two years he lost his passion for singing and even his desire to “exist” (ibid., at para. 25). mr. gabriel testified that he was “humiliated” and felt “belittled” (ibid., at para. 102). in particular, he testified that mr. ward’s jokes about drowning him made him believe that his “life was worth less . . . because [he is] disabled” (ibid., at para. 25). significantly, mr. gabriel’s classmates repeated many of the jokes from mr. ward’s stand-up special and video clips reproduced on the internet. mr. gabriel explained that the jokes followed him for at least two years, causing catastrophic harm to his self-esteem. [194] these types of harm to a person’s right to dignity mirror those caused by bullying, an issue which disproportionately affects young, vulnerable people and which has been addressed by legislation in various provinces and in this court’s jurisprudence (jane bailey, “‘sexualized online bullying’ through an equality lens: missed opportunity in ab v. bragg?” (2014), 59 mcgill lj 709, at pp. 725-26; donn short, “don’t be so gay!”: queers, bullying, and making schools safe (2013); an act to prevent and stop bullying and violence in schools, sq 2012, c 19 (“bill 56”); the public schools amendment act (reporting bullying and other harm), sm 2011, c 18; accepting schools act, 2012, so 2012, c 5; an act to amend the alberta bill of rights to protect our children, sa 2015, c 1; an act to amend the education act, snb 2012, c 21; see also intimate images and cyber-protection act, sns 2017, c 7). bullying and exclusion has been identified as having a pervasive negative impact on children with disabilities in particular (canadian human rights commission, left out: challenges faced by persons with disabilities in canada’s schools (2017), at p 6). [195] in bragg, this court considered the validity of a publication ban in a case involving a young person who sought to uncover the identity of someone who posted photos and “unflattering” sexually explicit comments about her online (para. 1). the court developed a definition of bullying and held that because of the risk it poses to the psychological well-being of young people, its prevention could justify limits on the press’ freedom of expression. the definition of bullying was taken from the report of the nova scotia task force on bullying and cyberbullying, chaired by professor a. wayne mackay: . . . behaviour that is intended to cause, or should be known to cause, fear, intimidation, humiliation, distress or other forms of harm to another person’s body, feelings, self-esteem, reputation or property. bullying can be direct or indirect, and can take place by written, verbal, physical or electronic means, or any other form of expression. (respectful and responsible relationships: there’s no app for that: the the nova scotia task force on bullying and report of cyberbullying (2012), at pp. 42-43) we note that a similar definition was incorporated into quebec law by bill 56, which amended the education act, rsq, c. i-13.3, s 13, to define bullying as “any repeated direct or indirect behaviour, comment, act or gesture, whether deliberate or not, including in cyberspace, which occurs in a context where there is a power imbalance between the persons concerned and which causes distress and injures, hurts, oppresses, intimidates or ostracizes” (bill 56, s 2) the court in bragg then referred to the harmful consequences of bullying as “‘extensive’, including loss of self-esteem, anxiety, fear and school drop-outs” (para. 21, quoting task force on bullying and cyberbullying, at p 4) and explained that these harms may be magnified by the internet which allows the content to “spread widely, quickly — and anonymously” (para. 22). other harms identified by the court include increased rates of attempted suicide amongst young people who have been bullied (para. 21). the court concluded that the dangers of bullying were so well documented and serious that it could infer that bullying caused “objective harm” (para. 16). [196] in a 2012 interview, mr. ward himself acknowledged the view that his comments constituted bullying as we have explained, because of the content of mr. ward’s material, its broad dissemination and jérémy gabriel’s vulnerability as a disabled child, mr. ward’s comments were very likely to cause “fear, intimidation, humiliation [or] distress”. mr. ward’s “comedy” did in fact cause those very harms. because of their broad dissemination, these harms were magnified when jérémy gabriel’s classmates repeated mr. ward’s jokes, teasing him and mocking him repeatedly at school. not only did mr. ward himself directly bully jérémy gabriel, he also inspired others to repeat his mockery and further bully him. given that our society takes active steps to challenge bullying between children, it seems consistent that the bullying of a child by an adult, including through the broad dissemination of harmful material on the internet, can in some circumstances be actionable. [197] the significance of the damage bullying can cause to a young person and the importance of minimizing it cannot be understated. it is the precise kind of harmful conduct canada has a legal obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent under art. 19 of the united nations convention on the rights of the child, can. ts 1992 no. 3 (“crc”),4 including those which protect children from emotional violence such as “[p]sychological bullying and hazing by adults or other children” (united nations, committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 13 (2011): the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence, u.n doc crc/c/gc/13, april 18, 2011, at para. 21; see also carmen lavallée, “la convention internationale relative aux droits de l’enfant et son application au canada” (1996), 48 ridc 605, at p 612). moreover, art. 2 of the crc imposes an obligation on states to ensure that crc rights will be exercised free from discrimination the need for child-specific non-discrimination clauses stems from the “special status and needs” of children and their “vulnerability vis-à-vis . . other individuals” (samantha besson and eleonor 4 quebec has also declared itself to be bound by the crc (décret 1676-91, (1992) 124 go. ii, 51). kleber, “article 2 the right to non-discrimination”, in john tobin, ed., the un convention on the rights of the child: a commentary (2019), 41, at pp. 48-49 (emphasis in original)). [198] the importance of this obligation to root out discriminatory bullying is amplified by art. 23 of the crc which states that a child with a disability “should enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and facilitate the child’s active participation in the community” and obliges canada to pursue the “maximum inclusion in society” of disabled children (wouter vandenhole, gamze erdem türkelli and sara lembrechts, children’s rights: a commentary on the convention on the rights of the child and its protocols (2019), at p 249). canada has also ratified the united nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, can t.s 2010 no. 8.5 this convention requires that states guarantee persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds, to ensure full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by children with disabilities and to take appropriate measures to protect persons with disabilities from exploitation, violence and abuse (arts. 5, 7 and 16). [199] in sum, for the purposes of proportionality under s 9.1, the commission advances considerable emotional harms caused to mr. gabriel, as well as a number of 5 quebec has also declared itself to be bound by the convention (décret 179-2010, (2010) 142 go. ii, 1196). domestic and international authorities recognizing the importance of addressing such harms. [200] mr. ward invokes the importance of stand-up comedy and satire as an “acclaimed art form” that is “often mordant, crude and even cruel” and argues that there is some heightened public interest in mocking mr. gabriel because he is famous. [201] it is of course true that art, and in particular satire, plays an important social role binnie j explained in wic radio ltd v simpson, [2008] 2 scr 420, at para. 48: “. . the law must accommodate commentators such as the satirist or the cartoonist . . . their function is not so much to advance public debate as it is to exercise a democratic right to poke fun at those who huff and puff in the public arena”. in r v. butler, [1992] 1 scr 452, sopinka j affirmed that “[a]rtistic expression rests at the heart of freedom of expression values and any doubt in this regard must be resolved in favour of freedom of expression” (p 486; see also sharpe, at paras. 60-61). the court has also repeatedly noted that “artistic self-fulfillment” is a fundamental element of freedom of expression on par with “spiritual . . self-fulfilment” and “participat[ion] in the political process” (rocket v. royal college of dental surgeons of ontario, [1990] 2 scr 232, at p 247, citing irwin toy, at p 976; see also rjr- macdonald inc. v. canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at para. 107). [202] nonetheless, while the importance of artistic expression may weigh in the balance of a particular case, this court has refused to recognize it as a distinct class of expression deserving of privileged protection in aubry, l’heureux-dubé and bastarache jj., for the majority, reasoned that because “[a]n artist can assert his or her right to freedom of expression under the same conditions as any other person”, it is “unnecessary to create a special category to take freedom of artistic expression into account. . . nor is there any justification for giving [artistic expression] a status superior to that of general freedom of expression” (para. 55). they added that “[t]he argument that the public has an interest in seeing any work of art cannot be accepted, especially because an artist’s right to publish his or her work, no more than other forms of freedom of expression, is not absolute” (para. 62). [203] as the court explained in aubry, in determining whether there is a proportionate public interest justifying an exercise of freedom of expression which violates another person’s quebec charter rights, courts must consider all of the “values concerned” (para. 62) the values underlying freedom of expression are linked to “seeking the truth in diverse fields of inquiry, and to our capacity for self-expression and individual realization” (grant v. torstar corp., [2009] 3 scr 640, at para. 1; see also thomson newspapers co. v. canada (attorney general), [1998] 1 scr 877, at paras. 91-94; groia v. law society of upper canada, [2018] 1 scr 772, at para. 117; rjr-macdonald inc., at paras. 72-73). [204] following aubry, it is clear that an artist cannot simply invoke the artistic nature of their work to avoid scrutiny and justify the violation of the rights of others. artistic expression, like any other expression, may cross a boundary when its effect is to disproportionately harm others. [205] similar reasoning was applied in pardy v earle, 2013 bcsc 1079, 52 bclr (5th) 295. in that case, a master of ceremonies at a comedy show directed homophobic and sexist slurs toward the claimant. the claimant filed a complaint of discrimination on the grounds of her sexual orientation and gender. the human rights tribunal allowed her claim because she had been humiliated on the basis of a prohibited ground in a way that caused injury to her dignity and self-respect. the supreme court of british columbia upheld the tribunal’s judgment explaining that “[w]hile comments made by comedians, artists and emcees are entitled to protection under s 2(b) of the [canadian] charter, there is no absolute protection for comments that might otherwise amount to discrimination under human rights legislation” and that although “comedy clubs are places where performers push boundaries and sometimes try to generate outrage[, i]t does not follow that comedy clubs are zones of absolute immunity from human rights legislation” (paras. 327 and 337). [206] mr. ward, therefore, cannot rely on the simple assertion that his comedy is art, he must point to why the harm to his expressive rights is such that the speech in this case should not be considered to be discrimination. [207] mr. ward justifies his speech as being a useful contribution on a matter of public interest because in satirizing mr. gabriel, he is calling attention to the public’s “uncritical reverence” for certain “sacred cows” in quebec society he adds that mr. gabriel’s place “in the public domain” inevitably opens him up to criticism. [208] a similar argument was advanced in hill v church of scientology of toronto, [1995] 2 scr 1130, where this court was asked to modify the test for defamation of public officials to provide greater scope for freedom of expression. cory j acknowledged that the freedom “to criticize the operation of institutions and the conduct of [public officials]” (para. 101) is of central importance in a democratic society. he noted, however, that defamatory comments threaten reputation, which is “closely related to the innate worthiness and dignity of the individual” (para. 107; see also para. 120), and concluded that importing a heightened standard in cases involving public figures would unjustly leave them without a remedy (paras. 120 and 137-40). [209] and in grant, mclachlin c.j recognized “the innate dignity of the individual” (para. 58, quoting lucas, at para. 48), and explained that public figures did not, by virtue of their renown, lose the ability to vindicate their interest in protecting their reputation. of particular relevance for our case, she held that “[p]eople who enter public life cannot reasonably expect to be immune from criticism, some of it harsh and undeserved but nor does participation in public life amount to open season on reputation” (para. 58 (emphasis added)). she went on to say, at para. 105: public interest may be a function of the prominence of the person referred to in the communication, but mere curiosity or prurient interest is not enough. some segment of the public must have a genuine stake in knowing about the matter published. [210] these principles are reflected in jurisprudence from jurisdictions outside canada. courts in the united kingdom, for example, have also rejected the notion that the rights of public figures must systematically yield to freedom of expression. the house of lords held that the press could not publish details relating to a famous model’s drug rehabilitation, violating her right to privacy, simply because her status as a public personality made her life a matter of public interest (campbell v. mgn ltd., [2004] ukhl 22, [2004] 2 ac 457, at para. 120). in hrh the duchess of sussex v. associated newspapers ltd., [2021] ewhc 273 (ch.), [2021] 4 wlr 35, a case concerning the media’s decision to publish private correspondence of a member of the royal family, the high court of justice (chancery division) rejected the “crude common law principle . . . that those who seek favourable publicity somehow waive their rights” (para. 101). [211] similarly, in the landmark case of von hannover v germany, no. 59320/00, echr 2004-vi, the european court of human rights rejected the notion that monaco’s princess caroline von hannover had lost the ability to protect her right to privacy and prevent the republication of photos taken of her by paparazzi. her status as a “figure of contemporary society” did not subjugate her right to privacy to the press’ freedom of expression (para. 75). to diminish the protections available to princess caroline on the basis that she was a public figure would undermine the goal of the convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 213 unts 221, to guarantee rights for all. [212] this jurisprudence confirms, then, the principle reflected in domestic sources that the dignity of public figures is not necessarily subservient to the right to express harmful remarks. [213] in addition, the notion that people somehow waive their right to be free from discrimination because they have entered the public square risks undermining the very purpose of the quebec charter, which protects everyone from discrimination, regardless of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or any other designated ground marginalized groups are already underrepresented in the public sphere. permitting discriminatory attacks on them simply because they have become famous imposes further barriers to their meaningful participation in public life and implies that they must choose between fame and human rights protections. [214] with well-known personalities, as with anyone else, courts must consider all the competing interests at stake, the harm caused and whether there is an actual identifiable public interest permitting the impugned expression. [215] this takes us back to mr. ward and his submission that his criticism of mr. gabriel must be equated with the public interest. we accept, of course, that there is value in the performance of comedy and in criticizing those in power in society. but in the circumstances of this case, condoning the humiliation and dehumanization of a child, let alone one with a disability, would fly in the face of the very idea of the public interest. [216] in this case, mr. ward’s message about mr. gabriel, albeit one said in jest, was that he was disposable and that society would be better off without him. unlike other “sacred cows” targeted by mr. ward, jérémy gabriel fell victim to a stark power imbalance here. the focus of the jokes was not only on mr. gabriel’s disability but was connected to harmful, dehumanizing notions associated with the worth of children with disabilities. in this way, the speech strayed far from “the quest for truth, the promotion of individual self-development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy” said to underlie s 2(b) (taylor, at p 922, quoting keegstra, at p 766), and which will justify insulting humour in other contexts. the mere fact that it provoked laughter, or that the speech was delivered in performance, does not change mr. ward’s message. [217] in our view, therefore, mr. ward’s remarks cannot be justified in the circumstances and they result in a violation of the equal exercise of the right to the safeguard of dignity enshrined in the quebec charter it is certainly true that the reasonable person in mr. gabriel’s circumstances, as morissette ja observes, must temper their reaction in that they are understood to be familiar with the customs and practices in a pluralistic society in which freedom of expression is a plain value and where some excesses of language, even hurtful language, are tolerated as a necessary inconvenience associated with ordinary social interaction (calego, at paras. 99-102). but this is not an instance of what morissette ja describes as falling under the rubric of de minimis non curat lex. mr. ward’s speech was only peripherally connected to the core values underlying freedom of expression and he has not identified any other substantial public interest that would justify them mr. ward’s exercise of his expressive rights under s 3 of the quebec charter are therefore completely disproportionate when compared to the s 4 harm suffered by mr. gabriel. [218] a reasonable person in mr. gabriel’s circumstances, even one attuned to the importance placed on freedom of expression, including artistic expression and satire, would not be expected to bear the speech at issue in this case (calego, at para. 99) this is especially so given the circumstances considered above: jérémy gabriel was a child at the relevant time, the jokes were disseminated broadly to a wide swath of the public over the internet and they played on harmful dehumanizing attitudes towards children with disabilities. were the facts different, for example, if mr. gabriel had not been a child, if the jokes had not been as broadly disseminated such that mr. gabriel could have found refuge from their harmful impact, or if the jokes themselves had not tied directly into the most repugnant attitudes concerning the place of children with disabilities in our society, the high threshold set out in calego may not have been breached. but on these facts, mr. ward has failed to justify his prima facie discriminatory conduct and the tribunal was right to find that a s 10 violation was made out here. [219] the final issue on appeal is whether the punitive damages award made by the tribunal and upheld by the court of appeal was appropriate. under s 49 of the quebec charter: 49. any unlawful interference with any right or freedom recognized by this charter entitles the victim to obtain the cessation of such interference and compensation for the moral or material prejudice resulting therefrom. in case of unlawful and intentional interference, the tribunal may, in addition, condemn the person guilty of it to punitive damages. [220] the question is whether the tribunal erred in finding that mr. ward’s comments about mr. gabriel constituted such an unlawful and intentional interference with the equal exercise of his right to dignity. [221] the generally applicable standards of review identified in housen v. nikolaisen, [2002] 2 scr 235, apply to compensation awards (see southwind v. canada, 2021 scc 28, at para. 85). an appellate court should not interfere with the award unless it amounts to a palpable and overriding error or it is tainted by an extricable legal error (housen, at para. 36; richard v. time inc., [2012] 1 scr 265, at paras. 189-90). [222] the tribunal in this case found that mr. ward could not have been unaware of the consequences of his jokes about mr. gabriel (para. 163) the tribunal was entitled to infer from this that mr. ward knew his discriminatory comments were hurtful. it was a logical, direct and unavoidable consequence of mr. ward’s comments that mr. gabriel would suffer devastating impacts as a well-known and influential stand-up comic, mr. ward could not ignore that denigrating a child on the basis of his disability would impair the equal exercise of his right to the safeguard of his dignity. [223] that harm materialized the tribunal was therefore entitled to grant punitive damages and there is no reason to overturn or modify them. punitive damages here serve not only a denunciatory purpose, but serve to deter people like mr. ward from profiting from the intentional interference with the quebec charter rights of others and treating compensation for this harm as merely the cost of doing business (sébastien grammond, “un nouveau départ pour les dommages-intérêts punitifs” (2012), 42 rgd 105, at p 120) the preventive impact of such denunciation and deterrence “benefits society as a whole” (de montigny, at para. 52; see also mélanie samson, “les dommages punitifs en droit québécois: tradition, évolution et . . . révolution?” (2012), 42 rdus 159, at pp. 186-87). [224] we would dismiss the appeal with costs. appeal allowed without costs, abella, karakatsanis, martin and kasirer jj. dissenting. solicitor for the respondent: bitzakidis, clément-major, fournier (cdpdj), montréal. harvey avocat inc., québec. l’humour: walid hijazi, montréal. solicitors for the intervener the international commission of jurists (canada): gowling wlg (canada), ottawa. solicitors for the intervener the canadian civil liberties association: borden ladner gervais, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the canadian constitutional foundation: ruby shiller enenajor digiuseppe, toronto. canada: david matas, winnipeg.
[1] a person who is convicted of a criminal of- fence and sentenced to imprisonment for two years or longer becomes an inmate of canada’s federal correctional system. parliament has directed in s. 3 of the corrections and conditional release act, sc 1992, c. 20 (“ccra”), that the purpose of the correctional system is to contribute to the main- tenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. this purpose is to be achieved by two means: fi rst, by carrying out sentences through the safe and humane custody of offenders and, second, by assisting in their rehabilitation and their reintegration into the com- munity as law- abiding citizens through the provision of programs in penitentiaries and the community. the correctional service of canada (“csc”) is the entity charged with ensuring that the purpose of the correctional system is achieved. [2] in order to fulfi ll its mandate, the csc must make numerous decisions about each inmate in its custody. for example, it is required to assign a secu- rity classifi cation of maximum, medium or minimum to each inmate, taking into account the risk to public safety posed by the inmate, the inmate’s likelihood of escape, and the inmate’s institutional supervision needs: see ccra, s. 30; corrections and conditional release regulations, sor/92-620, s 18. the csc must decide in which penitentiary to house each in- mate, taking into account factors such as the safety of the inmate, other inmates and the public, and the availability of rehabilitative programs and services: see ccra, s 28. it develops a correctional plan for each inmate in order to ensure that inmates receive the most effective programs to rehabilitate them and prepare them for reintegration into the community on their release: see ccra, s 151. the csc also [1] quiconque est reconnu coupable d’une infrac- tion criminelle et condamné à une peine d’empri- sonnement de deux ans ou plus devient un détenu du système correctionnel fédéral. à l’article 3 de la loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, lc 1992, c. 20 (« lscmlc »), le législateur précise que le système correctionnel vise à contribuer au maintien d’une société juste, vivant en paix et en sécurité. le système correctionnel doit le faire, d’une part, en assurant l’exécution des peines par des mesures de garde sécuritaires et humaines, et d’autre part, en aidant au moyen de programmes appropriés dans les pénitenciers ou dans la collec- tivité, à la réadaptation des délinquants et à leur réinsertion sociale à titre de citoyens respectueux des lois. le service correctionnel du canada (« scc ») est l’organisme chargé de veiller à ce que l’objet du système correctionnel soit atteint. [2] pour s’acquitter de son mandat, le scc doit prendre de nombreuses décisions concernant les dé- tenus dont il a la garde. à titre d’exemple, il doit assigner à chacun d’eux une cote de sécurité selon les catégories dites maximale, moyenne et minimale, en tenant compte de la menace pour la sécurité du public que pose le détenu, du risque d’évasion qu’il présente et du degré de surveillance qu’il requiert (voir lscmlc, art. 30; règlement sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, dors/92-620, art 18). le scc doit décider dans quel pénitencier le détenu purgera sa peine, en te- nant compte de facteurs tels que sa sécurité, la sé- curité des autres détenus et celle du public, ainsi que l’accessibilité à des programmes et services de réadaptation (voir lscmlc, art 28). il élabore un plan correctionnel pour chaque détenu afi n d’assurer aux détenus les meilleurs programmes dans le but de [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 175 decides whether to recommend to the parole board of canada that an inmate be released on parole. [3] if the csc is to effectively assist in the rehabil- itation of inmates while ensuring the safety of other inmates and staff members and the protection of society as a whole, it must base its decisions about inmates in its custody on sound information. this is explicitly recognized in s. 24(1) of the ccra, which requires the csc to “take all reasonable steps to ensure that any information about an offender that it uses is as accurate, up to date and complete as possible”. favoriser leur réadaptation et de les préparer à leur réinsertion sociale (voir lscmlc, art 151). c’est aussi le scc qui décide s’il convient de recomman- der à la commission des libérations conditionnelles du canada la mise en liberté conditionnelle d’un détenu. [3] pour que le scc puisse réellement aider à la réadaptation des détenus tout en veillant à la sécurité des autres détenus et des agents, ainsi qu’à la protec- tion de la société dans son ensemble, il doit fonder les décisions qu’il prend au sujet des détenus dont il a la garde sur des renseignements valables. c’est ce que reconnaît explicitement le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc, qui commande au scc « de veiller, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseignements qu’il utilise concernant les délinquants soient à jour, exacts et complets ». [4] this appeal concerns a challenge by the ap- pellant, jeffrey g. ewert, to the csc’s use of one particular type of information. mr. ewert, who is métis, challenges the csc’s reliance on certain psy- chological and actuarial risk assessment tools on the ground that the validity of the tools when applied to indigenous offenders has not been established through empirical research. [4] dans ce pourvoi, l’appelant, jeffrey g. ewert, conteste l’utilisation par le scc d’un type particulier de renseignement. m. ewert, qui est métis, s’oppose au recours par le scc à certains outils d’évaluation psychologique et actuarielle du risque, soutenant que la validité de ces outils, lorsqu’ils sont utilisés à l’endroit de délinquants autochtones, n’a pas été établie par des recherches empiriques. [5] a judge of the federal court concluded that, by relying on these tools despite long- standing concerns about their application to indigenous offenders, the csc had breached its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra and had unjustifi ably infringed mr. ewert’s rights under s. 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. the federal court of appeal over- turned both of these fi ndings. [5] un juge de la cour fédérale a conclu qu’en s’appuyant sur ces outils malgré les préoccupa- tions soulevées depuis longtemps au sujet de leur utilisation à l’égard de délinquants autochtones, le scc avait manqué à l’obligation que lui impose le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc et avait, sans justifi cation, porté atteinte aux droits que garantit à m. ewert l’art. 7 de la charte canadienne des droits et liber- tés. la cour d’appel fédérale a infi rmé ces deux conclusions. [6] i agree with the federal court of appeal that mr.  ewert has not established a violation of his charter rights. however, i conclude that the trial judge was correct to fi nd that the csc had, in con- tinuing to rely on the impugned tools without ensur- ing that they are valid when applied to indigenous offenders, breached its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra. as i will explain, my conclusion in this respect is informed in part by the guiding principle [6] je conviens avec la cour d’appel fédérale que m. ewert n’a pas établi la violation de ses droits ga- rantis par la charte. toutefois, j’estime que le juge du procès a eu raison de conclure qu’en continuant de se fi er aux outils contestés sans s’assurer de leur vali- dité à l’endroit des délinquants autochtones, le scc avait manqué à l’obligation qui lui incombait suivant le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. comme je l’expliquerai, ma conclusion à cet égard s’appuie en partie sur un 176 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. in s. 4(g) of the ccra, which provides that correc- tional policies, programs and practices must respect cultural differences and be responsive to the special needs of indigenous peoples. [7] for the reasons that follow, i would allow mr. ewert’s appeal in part, and declare that the csc did in fact breach the obligation in s. 24(1) of the ccra. although a declaration is an exceptional rem- edy, it is one that is available in the circumstances of this case and one that this court should exercise its discretion to grant. examen du principe de fonctionnement énoncé à l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc, qui prévoit que les directives d’orientation générale, programmes et pratiques du scc doivent respecter les différences culturelles et tenir compte des besoins propres aux autochtones. [7] pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis d’ac- cueillir en partie le pourvoi de m. ewert et de décla- rer que le scc a effectivement manqué à l’obligation énoncée au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. bien que le jugement déclaratoire soit une réparation exception- nelle, celui-ci est possible en l’espèce, et la cour devrait accorder une telle réparation dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire. ii background ii contexte [8] mr.  ewert is 56 years old he identifies as métis. [8] m.  ewert est âgé de 56  ans il affi rme être métis. [9] mr. ewert was convicted of murder and at- tempted murder for strangling and sexually assault- ing two women in two separate incidents in 1984. mr. ewert is currently serving two concurrent life sentences for these offences. he has spent over 30 years in federal custody and has been held in medium and maximum security settings during that time. [10] mr. ewert has been eligible to apply for day parole since 1996 and for full parole since 1999. he has waived his right to each parole hearing for which he has been eligible. [9] m. ewert a été reconnu coupable de meurtre et de tentative de meurtre pour avoir étranglé et agressé sexuellement deux femmes lors de deux incidents distincts survenus en 1984. il purge actuellement deux peines concurrentes d’emprisonnement à per- pétuité pour ces crimes. il a passé plus de 30 ans dans des établissements correctionnels fédéraux à sécurité maximale et à sécurité moyenne. [10] m. ewert est admissible à demander la li- bération conditionnelle de jour depuis 1996 et à la libération conditionnelle totale depuis 1999 il a renoncé à son droit à une audience pour la libération conditionnelle à laquelle il était admissible. [11] at trial, mr. ewert challenged the csc’s use of fi ve psychological and actuarial risk assessment tools. one of these is the hare psychopathy checklist- revised (“pcl-r”), a tool that was designed to as- sess the presence of psychopathy but is also used to assess the risk of recidivism. mr. ewert also chal- lenged the use of the violence risk appraisal guide (“vrag”) and the sex offender risk appraisal guide (“sorag”), two actuarial tools designed to assess the risk of violent recidivism; the static-99, an actuarial tool designed to estimate the probability of sexual and violent recidivism; and the violence risk scale – sex offender (“vrs-so”), a rating [11] au procès, m. ewert a contesté le recours par le scc à cinq outils d’évaluation psychologique et actuarielle du risque. l’un de ces outils est l’échelle de psychopathie de hare — révisée (« pcl-r »), un outil qui a été conçu pour évaluer la présence de psychopathie, mais qui est aussi utilisé pour me- surer le risque de récidive. m. ewert a également contesté le recours au guide d’évaluation du risque de violence (« gerv ») et au guide d’évaluation du risque chez les délinquants sexuels (« gerds »), deux outils actuariels conçus pour évaluer le risque de récidive violente; la statique-99, un outil actuariel conçu pour estimer la probabilité de récidive sexuelle [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 177 scale designed to assess the risk of sexual recidivism that is used in connection with the delivery of sex offender treatment. [12] mr. ewert claimed that while he has been incarcerated, the csc has relied on these tools in conducting needs and risk assessments on him. he further claimed that these tools had been developed and tested on predominantly non- indigenous pop- ulations and that there was no research confi rming that they were valid when applied to indigenous persons. mr. ewert submitted that, therefore, the csc’s reliance on the impugned tools in respect of indigenous offenders represented a failure by the csc to take all reasonable steps to ensure the accu- racy of information about offenders that it uses, as required by s. 24(1) of the ccra. he also argued that the csc’s reliance on the tools was contrary to the guiding principle now set out in s. 4(g) of the ccra that correctional policies and practices must respect ethnic and cultural differences and be responsive to the special needs of indigenous persons. further, mr. ewert argued that the csc’s reliance on tools that had not been shown to be valid when applied to indigenous offenders infringed his rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the charter. he sought declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the csc from using the impugned tools in respect of him or disseminating any results generated by the tools in his case. ou violente; l’échelle des risques de violence  : délinquants sexuels (« ervds »), une échelle vi- sant à évaluer le risque de récidive sexuelle qui est employée relativement à la prestation des traitements destinés aux délinquants sexuels. [12] m. ewert a prétendu que durant son incar- cération, le scc a utilisé ces outils pour procéder à des évaluations du risque et des besoins à son su- jet. il a ajouté que ces outils avaient été élaborés et mis à l’épreuve à l’endroit d’une population princi- palement non autochtone, et qu’aucune recherche ne confi rmait qu’ils étaient valides dans le cas des autochtones. m. ewert a donc fait valoir qu’en se fi ant aux outils contestés à l’égard de délinquants au- tochtones, le scc n’avait pas veillé, dans la mesure du possible, à l’exactitude des renseignements qu’il utilise concernant les délinquants, comme l’exige le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. il a également soutenu que l’utilisation de ces outils par le scc était contraire au principe de fonctionnement énoncé à l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc, selon lequel les directives d’orientation générale et les pratiques du scc doivent respecter les différences ethniques et culturelles et tenir compte des besoins propres aux autochtones. toujours se- lon m. ewert, l’utilisation par le scc d’outils dont la validité n’a pas été démontrée dans le cas des délinquants autochtones a porté atteinte aux droits que lui garantissent les art. 7 et 15 de la charte. il a sollicité un jugement déclaratoire et une injonction empêchant le scc d’utiliser les outils contestés à son égard ou de diffuser les résultats générés par ces outils à son sujet. iii judgments below iii décisions des juridictions inférieures a federal court (phelan j.), 2015 fc 1093, 343 a cour fédérale (le juge phelan), 2015 cf 1093 crr (2d) 15 [13] at trial, mr. ewert relied in support of his claims on the expert evidence of dr. stephen hart, a professor of psychology at simon fraser university. dr. hart was qualifi ed to give opinion evidence in the area of the development, application and validity of actuarial and psychological instruments used by the csc. the trial judge generally accepted dr. hart’s evidence. in particular, he accepted and relied on dr. hart’s evidence that tests like the impugned tools [13] au procès, m. ewert a fondé ses prétentions sur le témoignage d’expert de m. stephen hart, pro- fesseur de psychologie à l’université simon fraser. m. hart a été reconnu comme expert pour livrer un témoignage d’opinion dans les domaines de l’éla- boration, de l’application et de la validité des ins- truments actuariels et psychologiques utilisés par le scc. le juge du procès a de façon générale retenu le témoignage de m. hart, plus particulièrement que 178 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. are susceptible to “cross- cultural bias” or “variance”. dr. hart testifi ed that cross- cultural variance occurs when the reliability or validity of an assessment tool varies depending on the cultural background of the individual to whom the tool is applied. he further testifi ed that membership in a cultural group is assessed through self- identifi cation and that accul- turation is a matter of degree. generally speaking, however, because of the significant cultural dif- ferences between indigenous and non- indigenous canadians, the impugned tools — which were devel- oped for and validated by studies on predominantly non- indigenous populations — are more likely than not to be cross- culturally variant to some degree when applied to indigenous individuals. dr. hart testifi ed that notwithstanding his opinion that the tools were likely to be affected by cultural bias, he could not express an opinion on the impact of that bias: it could be subtle and tolerable or it could be profound and intolerable. [14] the trial judge also accepted dr. hart’s evi- dence that although there are a number of types of analyses that can be employed to establish that an actuarial test is free of cross- cultural variance, none of them have been completed for the impugned tools. one academic study published in 2013 suggests that the pcl-r does validly predict the recidivism risk posed by indigenous offenders, but dr. hart dis- counted it because, for one thing, it is based on a small sample size. dr. hart’s evidence led the trial judge to fi nd that the scores generated by the im- pugned tools when applied to indigenous individuals ought not to be relied upon “in and of themselves”: para 56. les tests, comme ceux contestés, sont susceptibles d’être biaisés par des « préjugés interculturels » ou de la « variance ». m. hart a déclaré que de la va- riance interculturelle se produit lorsque la fi abilité ou la validité des outils d’évaluation varie en fonction de l’héritage culturel de l’individu à l’égard de qui ils sont utilisés. il a ajouté que l’appartenance à un groupe culturel est évaluée en fonction de l’auto- identifi cation, et que l’acculturation est une question de degré. de façon générale, toutefois, en raison des différences culturelles importantes qui séparent les canadiens autochtones des non- autochtones, il est plus probable que les outils contestés — qui ont été élaborés à l’endroit d’une population principalement non autochtone et validés par des études réalisées sur une telle population — comportent vraisemblable- ment une certaine variance interculturelle dans le cas des autochtones. m. hart a déclaré que, bien qu’il estime que les outils étaient probablement empreints d’un préjugé culturel, il ne pouvait se prononcer sur l’effet de ce préjugé : il pouvait tout aussi bien être subtil et tolérable que profond et intolérable. [14] le juge du procès a également retenu le té- moignage de m. hart, selon qui il existe plusieurs types d’analyse qui permettent de démontrer qu’un test actuariel ne donne lieu à aucune variance in- terculturelle, mais aucune de ces analyses n’a été menée à l’égard des outils contestés. selon une étude scientifi que publiée en 2013, la pcl-r permet de prédire valablement le risque de récidive posé par les délinquants autochtones, mais m. hart a écarté cette étude notamment à cause de la petite taille de l’échantillon sur lequel elle portait. le témoignage de m. hart a amené le juge du procès à conclure que les résultats produits par les outils contestés lorsque ceux-ci étaient utilisés à l’égard d’autochtones ne devraient pas « à eux seuls » être considérés comme des données fi ables (par. 56 (canlii)). [15] the respondent, to whom i will refer as the “crown” in these reasons, presented the confl icting expert evidence of dr. marnie rice, a clinical psy- chologist, researcher and professor of psychology and psychiatry. dr. rice testifi ed that the impugned tools are valid and are not affected by cultural bias with respect to indigenous offenders. the trial judge found dr. rice’s evidence to be of little assistance [15] l’intimée, que j’appellerai « la couronne » dans les présents motifs, a présenté le témoignage d’expert contradictoire de mme marnie rice, psy- chologue clinicienne, chercheuse et professeure de psychologie et de psychiatrie. selon mme rice, les outils contestés sont valides et ne sont pas empreints d’un préjugé culturel dans le cas des délinquants autochtones. le juge du procès a jugé peu utile le [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 179 and concluded that it could not be relied upon, except where it was consistent with that of dr hart. [16] the trial judge accepted that the csc had re- lied on results generated by certain of the impugned tools in making decisions that affected key aspects of mr. ewert’s incarceration. specifi cally, he found that results generated by these tools were one factor csc decision- makers had considered in deciding whether to recommend that mr. ewert be granted parole, in determining his security classifi cation, and in deny- ing requests for escorted temporary absences. the trial judge also found that it was common practice in the csc to use the impugned tools to assess an inmate’s psychopathy or risk of violence, and that the scores derived from these assessments were required to be taken into account in determining an inmate’s overall security rating. [17] citing the evidence of the crown’s fact wit- ness, a former head of research at the csc, the trial judge found that the csc had been aware of concerns about the validity of the application of the impugned tools to indigenous offenders since 2000, but that it had conducted no research to verify the validity of their application in that context. témoignage de mme rice et a conclu qu’on ne pouvait s’y fi er, sauf dans la mesure où il était compatible avec celui de m hart. [16] le juge du procès a reconnu que le scc s’était fondé sur les résultats obtenus au moyen de certains des outils contestés pour prendre des décisions qui ont infl ué, à des égards importants, sur l’incarcération de m ewert. plus particulièrement, il a conclu que les résultats générés par ces outils faisaient partie des fac- teurs dont les décideurs du scc avaient tenu compte pour décider de recommander ou non que m. ewert soit libéré sous condition, pour déterminer sa cote de sécurité et pour refuser ses demandes de permission de sortir avec escorte. le juge du procès a également conclu que le scc se servait couramment des outils contestés pour évaluer la psychopathie d’un détenu ou son risque de violence, et que les résultats obtenus au moyen de ces tests devaient être pris en compte pour déterminer la cote de sécurité globale d’un détenu. [17] citant la déposition présentée par le témoin des faits de la couronne, l’ancien directeur général de la recherche au scc, le juge du procès a conclu que le scc savait depuis l’an 2000 que la validité du recours aux outils contestés dans le cas des dé- linquants autochtones suscitait des inquiétudes, mais qu’il n’avait mené aucune recherche pour vérifi er la validité de leur utilisation dans ce contexte. [18] these fi ndings led the trial judge to conclude that, by continuing to rely on the impugned tools without confi rming — even though it had long had concerns in this respect — that they are valid when applied to indigenous persons, the csc had failed to “take all reasonable steps to ensure that any informa- tion about an offender that it uses is as accurate   . as possible” as is required by s. 24(1) of the ccra. [18] en raison de ces constats, le juge du procès a conclu qu’en continuant de se fi er aux outils contes- tés sans s’assurer de la validité de leur utilisation à l’égard des autochtones — malgré les préoccupations soulevées depuis longtemps à ce sujet — le scc n’avait pas « veill[é], dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseignements qu’il utilise [  ] soient [  ] exacts », comme l’exige le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. [19] the trial judge also concluded that the csc had, by relying on the impugned tools, infringed mr. ewert’s rights under s. 7 of the charter. the trial judge was satisfi ed that mr. ewert’s s. 7 liberty interest had been adversely affected by decisions related to his security classifi cation, his suitability for parole and his requests for temporary absences, and that his security of the person interest under that section was engaged by the impact on him of being [19] le juge du procès a également conclu qu’en se fi ant aux outils contestés, le scc avait porté at- teinte aux droits garantis à m. ewert par l’art. 7 de la charte. selon lui, les décisions du scc concernant la cote de sécurité, le bien- fondé de la libération condi- tionnelle et les demandes de permission de sortir de m. ewert ont lésé le droit à la liberté dont ce dernier bénéfi cie en vertu de l’art. 7; le droit à la sécurité de la personne que lui garantit cette disposition était 180 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. labelled a psychopath. the trial judge concluded that these deprivations of liberty and security of the per- son were contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. the csc’s application of the impugned tools to indigenous inmates was arbitrary and overbroad given the purpose and objective being pursued by the csc in making decisions, which the trial judge characterized as being to predict an offender’s risk of reoffending as accurately as possible in the interests of public safety. these infringements could not be justifi ed under s. 1 of the charter. en jeu en raison des répercussions que l’étiquette de psychopathe a eues sur lui. le juge du procès a conclu que ces privations de liberté et de sécurité de la personne contrevenaient aux principes de justice fondamentale. l’utilisation faite par le scc des ou- tils contestés à l’égard de détenus autochtones était arbitraire et sa portée était excessive vu l’objet de ses décisions qui, selon le juge, est de prédire le risque de récidive d’un délinquant de façon aussi précise que possible afi n d’assurer la sécurité du public. ces atteintes ne pouvaient être justifi ées au regard de l’article premier de la charte. [20] mr. ewert argued, in the alternative, that the csc’s use of the impugned tools was contrary to a proposed new principle of fundamental justice, namely that the state must obey the law. the trial judge concluded that it was unnecessary to address this argument. the trial judge also held that the fac- tual record was not suffi ciently developed to support mr. ewert’s argument that his rights under s. 15 of the charter had been infringed. [20] m. ewert a soutenu, subsidiairement, que l’uti- lisation par le scc des outils contestés était contraire à un nouveau principe proposé de justice fondamentale, à savoir que l’état doit respecter la loi. le juge du procès a conclu qu’il n’était pas nécessaire d’exami- ner cet argument. toujours selon lui, les faits mis en preuve n’étaient pas suffi samment étoffés pour étayer la prétention de m. ewert que l’on avait porté atteinte aux droits que lui reconnaît l’art. 15 de la charte. [21] having concluded that the csc had breached a statutory duty owed to mr. ewert and had violated his rights under s. 7 of the charter, the trial judge ordered an interim injunction that prohibited the csc from using results generated by the impugned tools with respect to mr ewert. the trial judge also indicated his intention to issue a fi nal order enjoining the use of these tools in respect of mr. ewert and other indigenous inmates until, at a minimum, the csc had conducted a study that confi rmed the reli- ability of the tools for use in respect of indigenous offenders. the details of the fi nal order were to be addressed at a remedies hearing. [21] après avoir conclu que le scc avait manqué à une obligation légale qu’il avait envers m. ewert et avait violé les droits que l’art. 7 de la charte garantit à ce dernier, le juge du procès a prononcé une injonc- tion interlocutoire interdisant au scc d’utiliser les résultats générés par les outils contestés à l’égard de m ewert. il a également exprimé l’intention de rendre une ordonnance défi nitive interdisant l’utilisation de ces outils à l’endroit de m. ewert et des autres détenus autochtones jusqu’à ce que, à tout le moins, le scc ait mené une étude qui confi rme la fi abilité de ces ins- truments dans le cas des délinquants autochtones. la cour fédérale devait régler les détails de l’ordonnance défi nitive lors de l’audience relative aux réparations. b federal court of appeal (dawson ja,. nadon and webb jja. concurring), 2016 fca 203, 487 nr 107. b cour d’appel fédérale (la juge dawson, avec l’accord des juges nadon et webb), 2016 caf 203 [22] the federal court of appeal allowed the crown’s appeal from the trial judge’s interim order. [22] la cour d’appel fédérale a accueilli l’appel interjeté par la couronne contre l’ordonnance pro- visoire du juge du procès. [23] the federal court of appeal concluded that the trial judge had applied an incorrect legal test in [23] la cour d’appel fédérale a conclu que le juge du procès avait appliqué le mauvais critère juridique [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 181 deciding whether mr. ewert had established a breach of s. 24(1) of the ccra. the court of appeal stated that, to fi nd that s. 24(1) had been breached, the trial judge had to be satisfi ed on a balance of probabilities that the assessment tools produce or are likely to pro- duce false results and conclusions when applied to indigenous persons. because there was no evidence showing that to be the case, mr. ewert had not estab- lished that the csc had failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the information it used about indigenous inmates was as accurate as possible. [24] the court of appeal also held that to estab- lish a violation of s. 7 of the charter, mr. ewert had to establish on a balance of probabilities that the impugned tools produce inaccurate results when ap- plied to indigenous inmates. the trial judge had erred in failing to require mr. ewert to meet this standard, as he had instead relied on the absence of evidence proving the accuracy and reliability of the assess- ment tools when applied to indigenous offenders to fi nd that mr. ewert had established a s. 7 violation. [25] finally, the court of appeal rejected mr. ewert’s argument that it should fi nd that his rights under s. 15 of the charter had been infringed. pour décider si m. ewert avait établi une contra- vention au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. elle a précisé que, pour conclure à pareille contravention, le juge du procès devait être convaincu, selon la prépondé- rance des probabilités, que les outils d’évaluation produisent ou sont susceptibles de produire des ré- sultats et des conclusions erronés dans le cas des autochtones. en l’absence de toute preuve en ce sens, m. ewert n’a pas établi que le scc n’avait pas veillé, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseignements qu’il utilisait concernant les détenus autochtones soient les plus exacts possible. [24] la cour d’appel a aussi conclu que, pour éta- blir une violation de l’art. 7 de la charte, m. ewert devait prouver, selon la prépondérance des probabi- lités, que les outils contestés produisent des résultats inexacts à l’égard des détenus autochtones. le juge du procès a commis une erreur en omettant d’exiger de m. ewert qu’il satisfasse à cette norme, et en se fondant plutôt sur l’absence de preuve démontrant l’exactitude et la fi abilité des outils d’évaluation dans le cas des délinquants autochtones pour conclure que m. ewert avait établi une violation de l’art 7. [25] enfi n, la cour d’appel a rejeté l’argument de m. ewert selon lequel elle devrait conclure qu’il avait été porté atteinte aux droits que lui garantit l’art. 15 de la charte. iv issues iv questions en litige [26] mr. ewert’s appeal to this court raises the following issues: [26] l’appel formé par m. ewert devant notre cour soulève les questions suivantes : a did the csc breach its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra by failing to take all reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of the results generated by the impugned tools when applied to indigenous of- fenders? a le scc a-t-il manqué à l’obligation que lui im- pose le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc en ne veillant pas, dans la mesure du possible, à l’exactitude des résul- tats produits par les outils contestés dans le cas des délinquants autochtones? b did the csc’s reliance on results generated by the impugned tools constitute an unjustifi ed infringe- ment of mr. ewert’s rights under s. 7 of the charter? b l’utilisation par le scc des résultats produits par les outils contestés constitue-t-elle une atteinte injustifi ée aux droits garantis à m. ewert par l’art. 7 de la charte? c did the csc’s reliance on results generated by the impugned tools constitute an unjustifi ed infringement of mr. ewert’s rights under s. 15 of the charter? c l’utilisation par le scc des résultats produits par les outils contestés constitue-t-elle une atteinte injustifi ée aux droits garantis à m. ewert par l’art. 15 de la charte? 182 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. v analysis v analyse [27] in this court, mr. ewert’s argument that the csc breached its obligation under the ccra has been made primarily in support of the further ar- gument that this constituted an infringement of his rights under the charter. mr. ewert argues that this court should recognize a new principle of fundamen- tal justice, namely that the state must obey the law, and he further argues that he was deprived of liberty and security of the person contrary to that principle, because the csc was in breach of its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra. mr. ewert has failed to establish his charter claims. i nonetheless agree with the trial judge that mr. ewert has established that the csc breached its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra. in the exceptional circumstances of this case, it is appropriate for this court to exercise its discretion to grant a declaration to this effect. i will set out my reasons for reaching this conclusion after explaining the basis for my fi nding that the csc was in breach of the obligation in s. 24(1) of the ccra and for my conclusion that mr. ewert’s charter claims should be dismissed. [27] devant notre cour, m. ewert a fait valoir que le scc avait manqué à l’obligation qui lui incombe suivant la lscmlc essentiellement pour étayer son autre argument selon lequel ce manquement consti- tuait une atteinte à ses droits reconnus par la charte. m. ewert plaide l’opportunité pour la cour de recon- naître un nouveau principe de justice fondamentale, à savoir que l’état doit respecter la loi, soutenant par ailleurs qu’il a été privé de sa liberté et de la sécurité de sa personne en contravention de ce principe, parce que le scc a manqué à son obligation prévue au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. m. ewert n’a pas réussi à établir le bien- fondé de ses prétentions soumises en vertu de la charte. je partage néanmoins l’avis du juge du procès selon lequel m. ewert a démontré que le scc avait manqué à l’obligation que lui impose le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. dans les circonstances exceptionnelles de la présente affaire, il convient que la cour accorde, en vertu de son pouvoir discré- tionnaire, un jugement déclaratoire en ce sens. j’ex- poserai les motifs pour lesquels j’arrive à ce constat après avoir expliqué le fondement de ma conclusion selon laquelle le scc avait manqué à l’obligation que lui impose le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc et de ma conclusion selon laquelle les demandes de m. ewert fondées sur la charte devraient être rejetées. a did the csc breach its obligation under sec- a le scc a-t-il manqué à l’obligation que lui tion 24(1) of the ccra? impose le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc? [28] in order to determine whether the csc breached its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra, the scope of that obligation must fi rst be defi ned. then, the csc’s conduct must be examined in order to determine whether the csc met the legislated standard. [28] pour savoir si le scc a manqué à l’obliga- tion que lui impose le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc, il convient dans un premier temps de cerner l’étendue de cette obligation. il faudra ensuite examiner la conduite du scc afi n de décider si ce dernier a res- pecté la norme légale. [29] to interpret the scope of the obligation provided for in s. 24(1), i will apply the modern approach to stat- utory interpretation: “the words of an act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and or- dinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, quoting e. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87). because the ccra is federal [29] pour interpréter l’étendue de l’obligation pré- vue au par. 24(1), j’utiliserai la méthode moderne d’interprétation des lois : « il faut lire les termes d’une loi dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’[économie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’inten- tion du législateur » (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1  rcs  27, par.  21, citant e driedger, construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p 87). la [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 183 legislation, the interpretation exercise must also be guided by s. 12 of the interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21, which reads as follows: lscmlc étant une loi fédérale, son interprétation doit aussi s’appuyer sur l’art. 12 de la loi d’interpré- tation, lrc 1985, c. i-21, lequel prévoit : 12 every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpre- tation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. 12 tout texte est censé apporter une solution de droit et s’interprète de la manière la plus équitable et la plus large qui soit compatible avec la réalisation de son objet. [30] in the instant case, the inquiry into whether the csc has met the obligation set out in s. 24(1) gives rise to two main questions. the fi rst is whether results generated by the impugned tools are a type of information to which s. 24(1) applies. if the answer is yes, the second question is whether the csc took suffi cient steps to ensure the accuracy of that infor- mation. i will discuss each of these questions in turn. [30] dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, l’analyse vi- sant à déterminer si le scc a respecté l’obligation énoncée au par. 24(1) soulève deux questions prin- cipales. d’abord, les résultats produits par les outils contestés sont- ils des renseignements du type de ceux auxquels s’applique le par. 24(1)? dans l’affi rmative, le scc a-t-il pris des mesures suffi santes pour veiller à l’exactitude de ces renseignements? j’examinerai successivement chacune de ces questions. (1) does the obligation provided for in sec- tion  24(1) of the ccra apply to results generated by the impugned tools? (1) l’obligation prévue au par.  24(1) de la lscmlc s’applique-t-elle aux résultats pro- duits par les outils contestés? [31] the fi rst issue to address is whether the obliga- tion provided for in s. 24(1) of the ccra applies to results generated by the impugned tools. mr. ewert argues that it does, while the crown argues that it does not. the crown submits that s. 24(1) requires only that information be properly gathered and re- corded, and that the obligation imposed by that pro- vision is inapplicable to the results generated by the impugned tools. for the reasons set out below, i would reject the crown’s argument. reading the words of s. 24(1) in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme and objects of the ccra, i conclude that the obligation provided for in s. 24(1) applies to results generated by the impugned tools. [32] section 24(1) of the ccra reads as follows: [31] la première question à laquelle il nous faut répondre est celle de savoir si l’obligation prévue au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc s’applique aux résultats générés par les outils contestés. m. ewert soutient que oui, alors que la couronne prétend le contraire. d’après la couronne, le par. 24(1) exige uniquement que les renseignements soient recueillis et consignés correctement, et l’obligation qu’impose cette dispo- sition ne s’applique pas aux résultats produits par les outils contestés. pour les motifs exposés ci- après, je rejette l’argument de la couronne. si je lis les termes du par. 24(1) dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’économie et les objets de la lscmlc, je conclus que l’obligation prévue au par. 24(1) s’applique aux résultats générés par les outils contestés. [32] le paragraphe 24(1) de la lscmlc est ainsi libellé : accuracy, etc., of information exactitude des renseignements 24 (1) the service shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that any information about an offender that it uses is as accurate, up to date and complete as possible. 24 (1) le service est tenu de veiller, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseignements qu’il utilise concer- nant les délinquants soient à jour, exacts et complets. 184 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. [33] on its face, the obligation imposed by s. 24(1) of the ccra appears to apply to information derived from the impugned tools. section 24(1) provides that the obligation applies to “any information about an offender that [the csc] uses”. in the ordinary sense of these words, the knowledge the csc might derive from the impugned tools — for example, that an offender has a personality disorder or that there is a high risk that an offender will violently reoffend — is “information” about that offender. the trial judge found that the csc uses results generated by the impugned tools in making various decisions about offenders. thus, those results are “information about an offender that [the csc] uses” in the ordinary meaning of those words. the fact that s. 24(1) applies to “any” such information confi rms that, if its words are read in their grammatical and ordinary sense, it applies to the information at issue in this case. [34] this interpretation of s. 24(1) is supported by the relevant statutory context. sections 23 through 27 of the ccra all fall under the heading “information” and must be read together. however, although these sections all relate generally to information, they deal with different aspects of the csc’s collection, use and dissemination of information and apply to dif- ferent types of information. for example, s. 23(1) enumerates specifi c types of information the csc must obtain when a person is sentenced, committed or transferred to penitentiary. section 25(1) requires the csc to disclose to bodies authorized to super- vise offenders “all information under its control that is relevant to release decision- making”. section 26 governs the disclosure of information about an of- fender to a victim of an offence, enumerating, for example, specifi c information that must be disclosed to the victim (s. 26(1)(a)) and other information that may be disclosed to the victim in specifi c circum- stances (s 26(1)(b)). section 27 governs the dis- closure to an offender of information considered in taking a decision about him or her, requiring that in certain circumstances the offender be given “all the information” to be considered or that was considered [33] à première vue, l’obligation imposée par le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc semble s’appliquer aux renseignements tirés des outils contestés. le para- graphe 24(1) dispose que l’obligation s’applique aux « renseignements [que le scc] utilise concer- nant les délinquants ». selon le sens ordinaire de ces mots, les connaissances que le scc peut tirer des outils contestés — par exemple, qu’un délin- quant souffre d’un trouble de la personnalité ou qu’il présente un risque élevé de récidive violente — sont des « renseignements » concernant ce dé- linquant. le juge du procès a conclu que le scc utilise les résultats générés par les outils contestés pour prendre différentes décisions à l’égard des délinquants. ces résultats sont donc des « rensei- gnements [que le scc] utilise concernant les dé- linquants », selon le sens ordinaire de ces mots. le fait que le par. 24(1) s’applique aux renseignements ainsi utilisés (« “any” such information ») confi rme que, si on lit ses termes en suivant leur sens ordinaire et grammatical, il s’applique aux renseignements en cause dans la présente affaire. [34] cette interprétation du par. 24(1) est étayée par le contexte législatif pertinent. les articles 23 à 27 de la lscmlc sont tous regroupés sous la ru- brique « renseignements » et doivent être lus en corrélation. or, bien qu’ils aient de façon générale tous trait aux renseignements, ils portent sur dif- férents aspects de la collecte, de l’utilisation et de la diffusion de renseignements par le scc, et ils s’appliquent à différents types de renseignements. à titre d’exemple, le par. 23(1) énumère certains types de renseignements que le scc doit obtenir après la condamnation ou le transfèrement d’une personne au pénitencier. le paragraphe 25(1) oblige le scc à communiquer aux organismes agréés en matière de surveillance de délinquants « les renseignements per- tinents dont il dispose [  ] pour prendre la décision de les mettre en liberté ». l’article 26 régit la com- munication à la victime de renseignements au sujet d’un délinquant. on y énumère, par exemple, les renseignements précis qui doivent être communiqués à la victime (al. 26(1)a)) et les autres renseignements qui peuvent lui être communiqués dans certaines circonstances (al 26(1)b)). l’article 27 régit la com- munication au délinquant des renseignements entrant [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 185 in the taking of the decision, or a summary of that information. [35] when ss. 23 through 27 are read together, it is clear that where parliament intended a particular pro- vision to apply to only certain types of information, it enumerated them or otherwise qualifi ed the scope of the information to which a particular provision was to apply. this further reinforces the conclusion that the obligation in s. 24(1) — which applies to “any information about an offender that [the csc] uses” — was intended to have broad application. [36] furthermore, reading s. 24(1) in the context of the other provisions in ss. 23 through 27 confi rms that the broad scope of the obligation in s. 24(1) should not be limited by the evidently narrower scope of s 24(2). section 24(2) provides that it ap- plies to information the csc has obtained pursuant to s. 23(1) and then disclosed to an offender pursuant to s 23(2). however, the fact that subs. 24(2) is in the same section as subs. 24(1) does not mean that these two provisions were intended to have identical scopes. as i mentioned above, certain provisions in s. 26 expressly apply to different types of informa- tion, but s. 26 as a whole deals generally with the disclosure of information to victims. and whereas the subsections of s. 27 all deal generally with giving information to offenders, ss. 27(1) and 27(2) address the giving of information in different circumstances. likewise, ss. 24(1) and 24(2) both deal generally with the accuracy of information. it does not follow that they apply to identical types of information. had parliament intended s. 24(1) to apply only to infor- mation the csc has collected pursuant to s. 23(1), it could have said so explicitly. moreover, it could have placed the two subsections of s. 24 in s. 23 instead of placing them together in a separate section. in any case, the fact that subss. 24(1) and 24(2) are in the same section is not suffi cient to overcome the clear language of the words “any information”, which en ligne de compte dans une décision à son sujet, et exige que, dans certaines circonstances, on lui communique « tous les renseignements » entrant en ligne de compte ou pris en compte dans la décision, ou un sommaire de ceux-ci. [35] lorsqu’on lit ensemble les art. 23 à 27, on voit clairement que, lorsque le législateur a voulu qu’une disposition s’applique seulement à certains renseignements, il les a énumérés ou a autrement restreint la portée des renseignements auxquels la disposition est censée s’appliquer cela renforce davantage la conclusion selon laquelle il entendait que l’obligation prévue au par. 24(1) — qui s’ap- plique aux « renseignements [que le scc] utilise concernant les délinquants  » («  any information about an offender that [the csc] uses ») — soit d’application large. [36] qui plus est, la lecture du par. 24(1) à la lu- mière des autres dispositions contenues aux art. 23 à 27 confi rme que la portée générale de l’obligation prévue à ce paragraphe ne saurait être restreinte par la portée manifestement plus restrictive du par 24(2). le paragraphe 24(2) précise qu’il s’applique aux ren- seignements que le scc a obtenus conformément au par. 23(1), puis communiqués au délinquant en application du par 23(2). toutefois, ce n’est pas parce que les par. 24(2) et 24(1) se trouvent dans le même article qu’ils sont censés avoir la même portée. comme je l’ai mentionné précédemment, certaines dispositions de l’art. 26 s’appliquent ex- pressément à différents types de renseignements, mais l’ensemble de l’art. 26 vise de façon générale la communication de renseignements aux victimes. et si les paragraphes de l’art. 27 traitent tous géné- ralement de la communication de renseignements au délinquant, les par. 27(1) et (2) concernent les différentes circonstances dans lesquelles ceux-ci sont communiqués. de même, les par. 24(1) et (2) traitent tous deux de façon générale de l’exactitude des renseignements, ce qui ne veut pas dire qu’ils s’appliquent aux mêmes types de renseignements. si le législateur avait voulu que le par. 24(1) s’ap- plique seulement aux renseignements recueillis par le scc en conformité avec le par. 23(1), il aurait pu le dire explicitement. il aurait aussi pu incorporer les 186 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. indicate that the obligation provided for in s. 24(1) has a broad scope. [37] the legislative scheme within which the csc operates also favours a reading of the words “any information about an offender that [the csc] uses” in s. 24(1) that includes results generated by the impugned tools. both that legislative scheme and the csc’s practice based on the scheme con- template csc decision- makers using information such as results generated by the impugned tools in making important decisions about offenders. for example, s. 17 of the corrections and conditional release regulations requires the csc to consider “any physical or mental illness or disorder suffered by the inmate” and “the inmate’s potential for violent behaviour” in determining the security classifi cation to be assigned to an inmate. moreover, according to evidence presented at trial, it is csc policy to require that psychological risk assessments be conducted with respect to offenders in some circumstances, including where an inmate serving a life sentence is being considered for conditional release. the fact that the legislative scheme contemplates that the csc will use information such as results generated by the impugned tools indicates that the scheme also contemplates that the information will be subject to the obligation provided for in s 24(1). and the fact that csc policy requires the use of this information in certain circumstances favours applying the obli- gation to it. deux paragraphes de l’art. 24 à l’art. 23 plutôt que de les regrouper dans un article distinct. quoi qu’il en soit, le fait que les par. 24(1) et (2) se trouvent dans le même article ne saurait écarter le sens clair des mots « les renseignements » (en anglais « any information »), qui indiquent que l’obligation prévue au par. 24(1) a une vaste portée. [37] le régime législatif dans le cadre duquel œuvre le scc favorise également une interprétation des mots « les renseignements [que le scc] utilise concernant les délinquants » au par. 24(1) qui en- globe les résultats produits par les outils contestés. autant ce régime législatif que la pratique appliquée par le scc sur son fondement prévoient que les dé- cisions importantes concernant les délinquants sont prises par le scc en fonction de ces résultats. à titre d’exemple, l’art. 17 du règlement sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition exige du scc qu’il tienne compte de « toute maladie physique ou mentale ou tout trouble mental dont il souffre » et de « sa propension à la violence » pour déterminer la cote de sécurité à assigner à chaque détenu. par ailleurs, selon la preuve présentée au procès, le scc a pour politique d’exiger une éva- luation psychologique du risque dans certains cas, notamment lorsqu’un détenu purgeant une peine d’emprisonnement à perpétuité est évalué en vue d’une libération conditionnelle. le fait que le régime législatif envisage que le scc utilisera des rensei- gnements comme les résultats produits par les outils contestés indique qu’il envisage également que ces renseignements seront assujettis à l’obligation pré- vue au par 24(1). et le fait que la politique du scc exige le recours à ces renseignements dans certaines circonstances joue en faveur de leur assujettissement à l’obligation. in addition, the statutory purpose of the cor- [38] rectional system supports an interpretation according to which the csc’s obligation under s. 24(1) extends to the accuracy of psychological or actuarial test results that it uses. as i mentioned above, the sys- tem’s purpose is to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by carrying out sentences through the safe and humane custody of inmates and by assisting in their rehabilitation and their reintegration into the community as law- abiding [38] en outre, l’objectif de la loi relatif au système correctionnel appuie l’interprétation selon laquelle l’obligation qu’impose au scc le par. 24(1) s’étend à l’exactitude des résultats des tests psychologiques ou actuariels qu’il utilise. comme je l’ai mentionné précédemment, l’objet du système est de contribuer au maintien d’une société juste, vivant en paix et en sécurité, d’une part, en assurant l’exécution des peines par des mesures de garde sécuritaires et hu- maines, et d’autre part, en aidant à la réadaptation [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 187 citizens: ccra, s 3. having accurate information about an offender’s psychological needs and the risk the offender poses is doubtless crucial for the csc to effectively achieve this purpose. thus, the system’s purpose is best furthered by interpreting s. 24(1) of the ccra broadly. [39] accurate information about an offender’s psy- chological needs is also necessary for the csc to comply with the guiding principle set out in s. 4(c) of the ccra, namely that the csc is to use necessary and proportionate measures to attain the purpose referred to in s 3. and interpreting s. 24(1) such that the obligation to ensure the accuracy of information applies to the results of psychological tests is con- sistent with the guiding principle in s. 4(g) that the csc’s practices must be responsive to the needs of equity- seeking groups, including persons requiring mental health care. this is because psychological tests, including some of the tests at issue in this case, are used to assess the psychological and treatment needs of such persons. interpreting s. 24(1) as applying to a broad [40] range of information, including psychological test results and recidivism risk assessments, is also con- sistent with the paramount consideration for the csc set out in s 31 of the ccra: the protection of so- ciety. mr. ewert’s concern in this case is that, as a result of cultural bias, the impugned psychological tests and risk assessments incorrectly identify him as having psychopathic personality disorder or overes- timate the risk that he will reoffend. but when the csc uses tests whose accuracy is in question, there is also a risk of the converse: that psychological or actuarial tests that are inaccurate when applied to a particular cultural group may underestimate risk, thereby undermining the protection of society. des détenus et à leur réinsertion sociale à titre de citoyens respectueux des lois (lscmlc, art.  3). disposer de renseignements exacts sur les besoins psychologiques d’un délinquant et le risque qu’il présente est indubitablement crucial pour permettre effectivement au scc d’atteindre cet objectif. ainsi, une interprétation large du par. 24(1) de la lscmlc favorise l’atteinte de l’objet du système. [39] le scc doit également pouvoir compter sur des renseignements exacts concernant les besoins psychologiques d’un délinquant afi n de pouvoir se conformer au principe de fonctionnement énoncé à l’al. 4c) de la lscmlc, à savoir que le scc doit prendre les mesures nécessaires et proportionnelles pour atteindre l’objectif mentionné à l’art 3. et in- terpréter le par. 24(1) de manière à ce que l’obli- gation de veiller à l’exactitude des renseignements s’applique aux résultats des tests psychologiques s’accorde avec le principe de fonctionnement de l’al. 4g), selon lequel les pratiques du scc doivent tenir compte des besoins propres aux groupes en quête d’équité, notamment les personnes ayant be- soin de soins de santé mentale. en effet, les tests psychologiques, y compris certains des tests en litige dans la présente affaire, sont utilisés en vue de l’éva- luation des besoins psychologiques et en matière de traitement de ces personnes. interpréter le par. 24(1) comme s’appliquant [40] à un vaste éventail de renseignements, y compris aux résultats de tests psychologiques et aux éva- luations du risque de récidive, s’accorde également avec le critère prépondérant appliqué par le scc aux termes de l’art 31 de la lscmlc : la protection de la société. en l’espèce, ce qui inquiète m. ewert, c’est qu’en raison de préjugés culturels, les tests psychologiques et les évaluations du risque contestés lui attribuent à tort un trouble de personnalité psy- chopathique ou exagèrent le risque de récidive qu’il présente. or, lorsque le scc utilise les tests dont la fi abilité est mise en question, le risque contraire ap- paraît lui aussi, à savoir que les tests psychologiques ou actuariels dont les résultats sont inexacts dans le cas d’un certain groupe culturel sous- estiment les risques et compromettent par le fait même la pro- tection de la société. 188 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. [41] finally, the nature of the information derived from the impugned tools provides further support for its inclusion in the scope of the words “any in- formation” in s 24(1). in oral argument, the crown took the position that actuarial tests are an important tool because the information derived from them is objective and thus mitigates against bias in subjective clinical assessments. in other words, the impugned tools are considered useful because the information derived from them can be scientifi cally validated. in my view, this is all the more reason to conclude that s. 24(1) imposes an obligation on the csc to take reasonable steps to ensure that the information is accurate. [42] i accordingly reject the crown’s argument that the obligation in s. 24(1) relates only to information- gathering and record- keeping — that is, that the csc’s obligation extends only to ensuring that infor- mation about an offender is accurately recorded. had parliament so intended, it would have been simple enough to provide that the obligation was “to take all reasonable steps to ensure that any information the csc uses is accurately recorded”. moreover, an obligation to ensure accurate record- keeping would be relatively easy for the csc to meet. the obliga- tion s. 24(1) actually creates with respect to ensuring accuracy is qualifi ed: what is required is that “all reasonable steps” be taken to ensure that informa- tion is “as accurate    as possible”. the fact that parliament considered these qualifi cations necessary suggests that s. 24(1) requires more than simply good record- keeping. [41] enfi n, la nature des renseignements tirés des outils contestés renforce encore plus l’idée qu’ils sont visés par les mots « les renseignements » au par 24(1). lors de sa plaidoirie, la couronne a fait valoir que les tests actuariels sont un outil impor- tant parce que les renseignements qui en découlent sont objectifs et qu’ils viennent donc atténuer les distorsions propres aux évaluations cliniques subjec- tives. autrement dit, les outils contestés sont jugés utiles parce que les renseignements qu’ils produisent peuvent être scientifi quement validés. à mon avis, il faut en conclure à plus forte raison que le par. 24(1) impose au scc l’obligation de veiller, dans la me- sure du possible, à ce que les renseignements soient exacts. [42] je rejette en conséquence l’argument de la couronne selon lequel l’obligation du par. 24(1) ne se rapporte qu’à la collecte de renseignements et à la tenue de dossiers — c’est-à-dire que le scc doit seulement veiller à ce que les renseignements qu’il utilise concernant les délinquants soient consignés correctement. si c’est ce que le législateur voulait, il aurait pu simplement préciser que l’obligation consistait à « veiller, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseignements que le scc utilise soient consignés correctement ». de plus, il serait relative- ment facile pour le scc de s’acquitter de l’obligation de veiller à consigner avec exactitude les renseigne- ments utilisés. l’obligation d’exactitude créée dans les faits par le par. 24(1) est limitée : ce qui est exigé, c’est que « dans la mesure du possible », le scc veille à ce que les renseignements soient « exacts ». le fait que le législateur ait jugé cette limite néces- saire tend à indiquer que le par. 24(1) exige davan- tage qu’une simple bonne tenue de dossiers. [43] the crown also argues that the obligation to ensure accuracy provided for in s. 24(1) should not apply to results generated by the impugned tools, be- cause it is inappropriate to speak of “accuracy” in the context of actuarial science. the crown submits that actuarial scores cannot be described as being “accu- rate” or “inaccurate”; rather, they may have “differ- ent levels of predictive validity, in the sense that they predict poorly, moderately well or strongly”: rf, at para 106. however, the obligation provided for in s. 24(1) is a general one that is necessarily described [43] la couronne soutient également que l’obli- gation d’exactitude prévue au par. 24(1) ne devrait pas s’appliquer aux résultats générés par les ou- tils contestés, parce qu’il ne convient pas de parler d’« exactitude » dans le domaine de la science ac- tuarielle. la couronne souligne que les estimations actuarielles ne peuvent être qualifi ées d’« exactes » ou d’« inexactes »; en fait, on peut dire de leur ca- pacité prédictive qu’elle est [traduction] « faible, assez bonne ou forte » (mi, par 106). toutefois, l’obligation prévue au par. 24(1) en est une de nature [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 189 using general rather than technical language. even if we accept that actuarial science draws a distinction between the concepts of “accuracy” and “predictive validity”, it is not inappropriate to apply the obliga- tion provided for in s. 24(1) to actuarial test scores: in this context, the obligation to take all reasonable steps to ensure that information is “as accurate    as possible” may be understood to mean that the csc must take steps to ensure that it relies on test scores that predict risks strongly rather than those that do so poorly. in any case, at trial, both parties’ experts [44] proceeded from the premise that the accuracy of a psychological or actuarial assessment tool can be evaluated and that such an evaluation is relevant to a decision whether to use that tool. for example, dr. hart testifi ed that “validity” is a term of art in psychology that refers to “the accuracy or mean- ingfulness of test scores” and that “with respect to a violence risk assessment tool, the accuracy would be the ability of the test scores to forecast future violence”: ar, vol. xx, at pp 6635-36. similarly, dr. rice testifi ed that, in the context of risk assess- ment instruments, “validity” refers to “the accuracy of measurement” or “[t]he degree to which an as- sessment measures what it’s supposed to measure”: “accurate predictions are said to be valid”: ar, vol. xxi, at pp 6770-71. that the experts understood that accuracy is a concept relevant to the impugned tools makes sense. the pcl-r produces a numerical score that is meant to indicate whether the subject has a psychopathic personality disorder; if pcl-r scores actually refl ect the subject’s state in this regard, they can, in ordinary language, be said to be accurate. similarly, if the results generated by assessment tools meant to assess the risk of recidivism actually correspond to the risk that the subject will reoffend, they can be said to be accurate. générale qui appelle nécessairement une description en termes généraux plutôt que techniques. même si nous acceptons que la science actuarielle établit une distinction entre les notions d’« exactitude » et de « validité prédictive », il n’est pas inopportun d’as- sujettir les résultats de tests actuariels à l’obligation prévue au par. 24(1) : dans ce contexte, l’obligation de veiller, « dans la mesure du possible », à ce que les renseignements soient « exacts » signifi erait que le scc doit veiller à ce que les résultats de tests sur lesquels il s’appuie aient une capacité forte plutôt que faible à prédire les risques. [44] quoi qu’il en soit, au procès, les experts des deux parties sont partis du principe que l’exactitude d’un outil d’évaluation psychologique ou actuarielle peut être évaluée et que cette évaluation est impor- tante pour décider s’il convient d’utiliser cet outil. par exemple, m. hart a affi rmé que la [traduc- tion] « validité » est un terme technique en psy- chologie qui désigne « l’exactitude ou l’utilité des résultats des tests » et que « pour ce qui est de l’ou- til d’évaluation du risque de violence, l’exactitude s’entendrait de la capacité des résultats du test de prévoir la perpétration de futurs actes de violence » (da, vol. xx, p 6635-6636). de même, mme rice a mentionné que, dans le contexte des instruments d’évaluation du risque, la [traduction] « validité » s’entend de « l’exactitude de la mesure » ou « de jusqu’à quel point une évaluation mesure ce qu’elle est censée mesurer » : « les prédictions exactes sont jugées valables » (da, vol. xxi, p 6770-6771). que les experts aient compris l’importance que revêt le concept d’exactitude des outils contestés va de soi. la pcl-r produit des résultats numériques censés indiquer si le sujet souffre d’un trouble de person- nalité psychopathique; si les résultats de la pcl-r refl ètent véritablement l’état du sujet à cet égard, on peut dire, en termes simples, qu’ils sont exacts. de même, si les résultats générés par les outils destinés à évaluer le risque de récidive correspondent bel et bien au risque de récidive du sujet, on peut dire d’eux qu’ils sont exacts. [45] in light of the words, the context and the pur- pose of s. 24(1) of the ccra, i conclude that results generated by the impugned tools are “information” within the meaning of that provision. as a result, the [45] compte tenu des mots, du contexte et de l’ob- jet du par. 24(1) de la lscmlc, je conclus que les résultats générés par les outils contestés sont des « renseignements » au sens de cette disposition. en 190 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. csc’s statutory obligation to take “all reasonable steps” to ensure that information is accurate applies to them. conséquence, l’obligation légale qui incombe au scc de veiller, « dans la mesure du possible », à ce que les renseignements soient exacts s’applique à eux. (2) did the csc take “all reasonable steps” to ensure that the information it used was accurate? (2) le scc a-t-il veillé, « dans la mesure du possible », à ce que les renseignements qu’il a utilisés soient exacts? [46] having determined that the obligation pro- vided for in s. 24(1) applies to information derived from the impugned tools, the next question is whether the csc breached that obligation. more specifi cally, it must be asked whether the csc took all reasona- ble steps to ensure that the impugned tools produce accurate information when applied to indigenous persons such as mr ewert. [46] puisqu’il est décidé que l’obligation prévue au par. 24(1) s’applique aux renseignements tirés des outils contestés, il faut se demander si le scc a manqué à cette obligation et, plus précisément, si le scc a veillé, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les outils contestés produisent des renseignements exacts lorsqu’ils sont utilisés à l’égard d’autoch- tones comme m ewert. [47] mr. ewert bore the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the csc had breached its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra. as the trial judge correctly found, this did not require mr. ewert to prove that the impugned tools produce inaccurate results. the question is not whether the csc relied on inaccurate information, but whether it took all reasonable steps to ensure that it did not. showing that the csc failed to take all reasonable steps in this respect may, as a practical matter, require showing that there was some reason for the csc to doubt the accuracy of information in its possession about an offender. if the trial judge’s reasons for judgment are read as a whole, it is clear that this is what he meant when he wrote that it was suffi cient for mr. ewert to raise a “reasonable challenge” to the “reliability” of the assessment tools: para 82. the trial judge stated clearly that the question to be addressed was whether the csc’s actions were suffi cient to fulfi ll the legislated standard of all reasonable steps to en- sure accuracy, currency and completeness. he made no error in setting out the applicable legal test, and there is no indication that he applied an incorrect standard of proof: see fh v. mcdougall, 2008 scc 53, [2008] 3 scr 41, at para 54. [47] m. ewert avait le fardeau de démontrer, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, que le scc a manqué à l’obligation que lui impose le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. comme le juge du procès l’a conclu à bon droit, cela n’obligeait pas m. ewert à prou- ver que les outils contestés produisent des résultats inexacts. il ne s’agit pas de savoir si le scc s’est fondé sur des résultats inexacts, mais s’il a veillé, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que cela ne soit pas le cas. pour démontrer que le scc ne s’est pas acquitté de cette obligation, il faut peut- être, en pra- tique, prouver que le scc avait une raison de douter de l’exactitude des renseignements en sa possession au sujet d’un délinquant. si les motifs du jugement de première instance sont lus comme un tout, il est manifeste que c’est ce que le juge du procès voulait dire lorsqu’il a écrit que m. ewert n’avait qu’à sou- lever un « doute raisonnable » quant à la « fi abilité » des outils d’évaluation (par 82). le juge du procès a clairement dit que la question à trancher était de savoir si, par ses agissements, le scc avait satisfait à l’obligation légale qu’il avait de veiller, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseignements soient exacts, à jour et complets. sa formulation du critère juridique applicable ne comportait aucune erreur et rien n’indique qu’il a appliqué une norme de preuve erronée : voir fh c. mcdougall, 2008 csc 53, [2008] 3 rcs 41, par 54. [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 191 [48] section 24(1) requires that the csc take all reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of informa- tion about an offender that it uses, not all possible steps. what constitutes “all reasonable steps” for the purposes of s. 24(1) of the ccra will vary with the context. the trial judge’s conclusion that the csc failed to take the reasonable steps required in the particular circumstances of this case is amply supported by the record. [49] the trial judge noted that the csc had long been aware of concerns regarding the possibility of psychological and actuarial tools exhibiting cultural bias. such concerns had in fact led the csc to con- duct research into the validity of certain actuarial tools other than the impugned tools when applied to indigenous offenders and to cease using those other tools in respect of indigenous inmates. similar confi rmatory research had also been contemplated by the federal court of appeal in ewert v. canada (attorney general), 2008 fca 285, 382 nr 370. as well, research into the validity of at least some of the impugned tools when applied to members of cultural minority groups had been conducted in other jurisdictions. [50] by contrast, the trial judge found that the csc had not taken any action to confi rm the validity of the impugned tools and that it had continued to use them in respect of indigenous offenders without qualifi cation. this was true despite the fact that re- search by the csc into the impugned tools, though challenging, would have been feasible. in these cir- cumstances, the trial judge concluded that the csc’s failure to take any steps to ensure the validity of the impugned tools when applied to indigenous offend- ers did not meet the legislated standard set out in s. 24(1) of the ccra. [48] le paragraphe 24(1) exige que le scc veille, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseigne- ments qu’il utilise concernant les délinquants soient exacts, et non qu’il prenne toutes les mesures pos- sibles à cette fi n. ce en quoi consiste « la mesure du possible » pour l’application du par. 24(1) de la lscmlc varie selon le contexte. le dossier étaye amplement la conclusion du juge du procès selon laquelle le scc n’a pas pris les mesures raisonnables qui s’imposaient eu égard aux circonstances particu- lières de l’espèce. [49] le juge du procès a fait observer que le scc savait depuis longtemps qu’on se préoccupait de la possibilité que les outils d’évaluation psychologique et les tests actuariels soient empreints d’un préjugé culturel. d’ailleurs, ce sont ces préoccupations qui ont effectivement poussé le scc à mener des re- cherches sur la validité de l’utilisation de certains ou- tils actuariels (mais pas des outils contestés) à l’égard de délinquants autochtones et à ne plus utiliser ces autres outils à l’endroit des détenus autochtones. dans ewert c. canada (procureur général), 2008 caf 285, la cour d’appel fédérale a également envi- sagé la conduite de telles recherches. des recherches sur la validité d’au moins certains des outils contestés utilisés à l’égard de membres de minorités culturelles ont aussi été menées dans d’autres ressorts. [50] le juge du procès a toutefois conclu que le scc n’avait rien fait pour confi rmer la validité des outils contestés et qu’il avait continué à les utiliser sans réserve à l’égard des délinquants autochtones, et ce, même s’il aurait pu, malgré les diffi cultés de l’exercice, mener de telles recherches. le juge du procès a ainsi conclu que l’omission du scc de faire quoi ce que soit pour s’assurer de la validité des outils contestés à l’égard des délinquants autoch- tones ne respectait pas l’obligation légale énoncée au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. [51] further support for the conclusion that the csc’s inaction in this respect constituted a failure to take the requisite reasonable steps can be found in the guiding principle set out in s.  4(g) of the ccra, which the trial judge highlighted as being [51] le principe de fonctionnement énoncé à l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc, que le juge du procès a estimé particulièrement pertinent pour son exa- men, étaye aussi la conclusion selon laquelle, par son inaction à cet égard, le scc n’a pas pris les 192 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. of particular relevance to his inquiry. that provision reads as follows: mesures raisonnables requises l’alinéa  4g) est ainsi libellé : principles that guide service principes de fonctionnement 4 the principles that guide the service in achieving the purpose referred to in section 3 are as follows: 4 le service est guidé, dans l’exécution du mandat visé à l’article 3, par les principes suivants : .   . (g) correctional policies, programs and practices respect gender, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences and are responsive to the special needs of women, aboriginal peoples, persons requiring mental health care and other groups; [52] this is the fi rst opportunity this court has had to consider the interpretation and application of s. 4(g) of the ccra. the inquiry into its meaning must be guided by the modern approach to statutory interpretation i discussed above in relation to s. 24(1) of the ccra. [53] in my view, the application of that approach leads to the conclusion that the principle set out in s. 4(g) of the ccra can only be understood as a direction from parliament to the csc to advance sub- stantive equality in correctional outcomes for, among others, indigenous offenders. section 4(g) represents an acknowledgement of the systemic discrimination faced by indigenous persons in the canadian correc- tional system. this is a long- standing concern, and one that has become more, not less, pressing since s. 4(g) was enacted. in these circumstances, it is critical that the csc give meaningful effect to s. 4(g) in performing all of its functions. in the context of the present case, giving meaningful effect to s. 4(g) means, at a minimum, addressing the long- standing, and credible, concern that continuing to use the im- pugned risk assessments in evaluating indigenous inmates perpetuates discrimination and contributes to the disparity in correctional outcomes between indigenous and non- indigenous offenders. g) ses directives d’orientation générale, programmes et pratiques respectent les différences ethniques, culturelles et linguistiques, ainsi qu’entre les sexes, et tiennent compte des besoins propres aux femmes, aux autochtones, aux personnes nécessitant des soins de santé mentale et à d’autres groupes; [52] c’est la première fois que notre cour a la possibilité d’examiner l’interprétation et l’appli- cation de l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc. pour cerner le sens de cette disposition, il convient de recourir à la méthode moderne d’interprétation des lois dont j’ai parlé précédemment au sujet du par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. [53] à mon avis, le recours à cette méthode nous amène à conclure que l’unique interprétation pos- sible du principe énoncé à l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc est la suivante : le législateur enjoint au scc de progresser vers l’égalité réelle des résultats cor- rectionnels en ce qui concerne notamment les dé- linquants autochtones le législateur reconnaît à l’al. 4g) la discrimination systémique vécue par les autochtones au sein du système correctionnel cana- dien. cette préoccupation de longue date est devenue plus urgente depuis l’adoption de l’al 4g). dans ces circonstances, il est essentiel que le scc donne vé- ritablement effet à l’al. 4g) dans l’exercice de toutes ses fonctions. dans le contexte de la présente affaire, cela veut dire que le scc doit au moins essayer de répondre aux inquiétudes valables et de longue date selon lesquelles la poursuite de l’utilisation des évaluations du risque contestées à l’égard des détenus autochtones perpétue la discrimination et contribue à la disparité des résultats correctionnels entre les délinquants autochtones et les délinquants non autochtones. [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 193 it is evident from the grammatical and ordi- [54] nary sense of the words of s. 4(g) that this provision requires the csc to ensure that its practices, however neutral they may appear to be, do not discriminate against indigenous persons. the requirement that the csc respect differences and be responsive to the special needs of various groups refl ects the long- standing principle of canadian law that substantive equality requires more than simply equal treatment and that, indeed, “identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality”: andrews v. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143, at pp. 164- 65. although s. 4(g) is not limited to indigenous persons, the fact that the provision specifi cally ad- verts to the needs of indigenous persons, as well as of women and persons requiring mental health care, indicates that, in parliament’s view, those groups are among the most vulnerable to discrimination in the correctional system. [55] the legislative history of the ccra supports the view that s. 4(g) mandates the csc to pursue substantive equality in correctional outcomes by re- specting the unique needs of equity- seeking groups, and in particular those of indigenous persons. a guiding principle similar to the one now found in s. 4(g) was among the proposals originally set out in a federal government green paper entitled directions for reform: a framework for sentencing corrections and conditional release (1990): see canada, solicitor general, towards a just, peaceful and safe society: the corrections and conditional release act five years later — consolidated report (1998), at pp. ii and 7; house of commons debates, vol. iv, 3rd sess., 34th parl., november 4, 1991, at pp. 4430-31 (hon. doug lewis). one of the con- cerns identifi ed in directions for reform was that although the correctional system had shortcomings even in “managing a homogenous population of of- fenders” (p. 10), the function to which it was geared, its shortcomings were even more acute for women, indigenous persons, racialized persons, persons with mental health issues and other distinct groups. the authors acknowledged that the profound effects of this disparity called into question the very effective- ness, fairness and even- handedness of the corrections system, and they called for reforms to promote equity and predictability in the system and in decisions il ressort du sens grammatical et ordinaire des [54] mots de l’al. 4g) que le scc doit s’assurer que ses pratiques — aussi neutres semblent- elles — ne sont pas discriminatoires à l’endroit des autochtones. l’exigence que le scc respecte les différences et ré- ponde aux besoins propres à divers groupes témoigne du principe bien établi en droit canadien selon lequel l’égalité réelle requiert plus qu’une simple égalité de traitement et qu’en fait, « un traitement identique peut fréquemment engendrer de graves inégalités » : andrews c. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 rcs 143, p 164-165. l’alinéa 4g) ne vise pas uniquement les autochtones, mais le fait que la dis- position renvoie expressément à leurs besoins ainsi qu’à ceux des femmes et des personnes nécessitant des soins de santé mentale indique que le législateur perçoit ces groupes comme parmi les plus suscep- tibles de faire l’objet de discrimination dans le sys- tème correctionnel. [55] l’historique législatif de la lscmlc appuie le point de vue selon lequel l’al. 4g) prescrit au scc de viser l’égalité réelle des résultats correctionnels en respectant les besoins propres aux groupes en quête d’équité, et en particulier ceux des autochtones. un principe de fonctionnement semblable à celui qui fi gure maintenant à l’al. 4g) se trouvait parmi les propositions initialement formulées par le gou- vernement fédéral dans le livre vert intitulé vers une réforme : un cadre pour la détermination de la peine, les affaires correctionnelles et la mise en li- berté sous condition (1990) (voir canada, solliciteur général, pour une société juste, paisible et sûre : la loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition cinq ans plus tard — rapport global (1998), p. ii et 7; débats de la chambre des com- munes, vol. iv, 3e sess., 34e lég., 4 novembre 1991, p. 4430-4431 (l’hon. doug lewis)). une des sources de préoccupation relevées dans le document intitulé vers une réforme était que si le système correction- nel accusait des lacunes même dans la « gestion d’une population homogène de délinquants » (p. 13), en fonction de laquelle il était conçu, ces lacunes étaient encore plus graves dans le cas des femmes, des autochtones, des membres de groupes ethniques, des personnes atteintes de troubles mentaux et d’autres groupes distincts. les auteurs du document ont reconnu que les profondes répercussions de cette 194 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. made about individual offenders: pp. 10 and 15, see also pp 6-7. [56] in directions for reform, the over- representation of indigenous persons in the criminal justice system was emphasized as a priority for the federal govern- ment. the paper expressed a commitment to ensuring the equitable treatment of indigenous offenders by all components of that system, including the correc- tional system. signifi cantly, the authors explicitly recognized that equitable treatment of indigenous offenders involves “more than the replication of programs designed for non- aboriginal offenders”: p 25. inequitable treatment of indigenous offend- ers in the correctional system and the conditional release process was specifi cally linked to the issue of indigenous over- representation in prison popula- tions: p 11. [57] the mischief s. 4(g) was intended to remedy informs its interpretation. this mischief is, at least in part, the troubled relationship between canada’s criminal justice system and its indigenous peoples. the alienation of indigenous persons from the ca- nadian criminal justice system has been well doc- umented. although this court has in the past had occasion to discuss this issue most extensively in the context of sentencing and of the interpretation and application of s 7182(e) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, it is clear that the problems that contribute to this reality are not limited to the sentencing process. numerous government commis- sions and reports, as well as decisions of this court, have recognized that discrimination experienced by indigenous persons, whether as a result of overtly racist attitudes or culturally inappropriate practices, extends to all parts of the criminal justice system, including the prison system: see r v. gladue, [1999] 1 scr 688, at paras. 61-65 and 68; r v. ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1 scr 433;. manitoba, pub- lic inquiry into the administration of justice and aboriginal people, report of the aboriginal jus- tice inquiry of manitoba, vol. 1, the justice system disparité remettaient en cause l’effi cacité du système correctionnel, son équité et son uniformité, et ont réclamé des réformes pour favoriser une plus grande équité et prévisibilité du système et des décisions prises à l’endroit des délinquants : p. 12-13 et 17, voir aussi p 8-9. [56] le document vers une réforme qualifi ait la surreprésentation des autochtones dans le système de justice pénale de priorité pour le gouvernement fédéral et exprimait un engagement de la part de toutes les composantes de ce système, y compris du système correctionnel, à garantir un traitement équitable aux détenus autochtones. fait important, les auteurs ont explicitement reconnu qu’un traite- ment équitable des délinquants autochtones nécessite «  plus que la simple application de programmes conçus pour des non- autochtones » : p 28. ils ont expressément lié le traitement inéquitable des délin- quants autochtones dans le système correctionnel et dans le processus de mise en liberté sous condition à la surreprésentation des autochtones au sein de la population carcérale : p 14. [57] la situation problématique à laquelle l’al. 4g) visait à remédier nous éclaire sur l’interprétation de cette disposition. ce problème consiste, du moins en partie, en la relation trouble entre le système de justice pénale et les peuples autochtones du canada. le sentiment d’aliénation des autochtones à l’en- droit du système canadien de justice pénale est bien documenté. notre cour a déjà eu l’occasion d’ana- lyser cette question de manière fort approfondie sous l’angle de la détermination de la peine et de l’interpré- tation et l’application de l’al 7182e) du code crimi- nel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, mais il est manifeste que les problèmes à l’origine de cet état de fait ne se limitent pas au processus de détermination de la peine. il a été reconnu dans un grand nombre de commissions gouvernementales et de rapports, ainsi que dans des décisions de notre cour que la discrimination subie par les autochtones, qu’elle soit le résultat d’attitudes ouvertement racistes ou de pratiques inappropriées sur le plan culturel, s’étend à l’ensemble du système de justice pénale, y compris au système carcéral : voir r c. gladue, [1999] 1 rcs 688, par. 61-65 et 68; r. c. ipeelee, 2012 csc 13, [2012] 1 rcs 433;. mani- toba, public inquiry into the administration of justice [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 195 and aboriginal people (1991), pp. 431-73; canada, royal commission on aboriginal peoples, bridging the cultural divide: a report on aboriginal people and criminal justice in canada (1996); canada, commission of inquiry into certain events at the prison for women in kingston (1996), at pp 219-23. [58] parliament has recognized an evolving so- cietal consensus that these problems must be rem- edied by accounting for the unique systemic and background factors affecting indigenous peoples, as well as their fundamentally different cultural values and world views. in the sentencing context, this rec- ognition is embodied in s 7182(e) of the criminal code, which directs sentencing judges “to under- take the process of sentencing aboriginal offenders differently, in order to endeavour to achieve a truly fi t and proper sentence”: gladue, at para 33. given this social context, the clear direction in s. 4(g) of the ccra to respect cultural and linguistic differences, together with the provisions dealing specifi cally with indigenous inmates in ss. 80 through 84, should be understood to be the means by which parliament chose to address this broader problem in the correc- tional context. [59] indeed, the purpose of the correctional system set out in the ccra cannot be fully achieved with- out giving effect to the guiding principle set out in s 4(g). the csc must provide for the humane cus- tody of offenders, using measures that are limited to what is necessary and proportionate: ccra, ss. 3(a) and 4(c). it must also assist in their rehabilitation and their reintegration into the community in order to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society: ccra, ss. 3 and 31. to achieve these objectives relative to indigenous offenders, the csc must ensure that its policies and programs are appropriate for indigenous offenders and re- sponsive to their needs and circumstances, including needs and circumstances that differ from those of non- indigenous offender populations. for the cor- rectional system, like the criminal justice system and aboriginal people, report of the aboriginal jus- tice inquiry of manitoba, vol. 1, the justice system and aboriginal people (1991), p. 431-473; canada, commission royale sur les peuples autochtones, par- delà les divisions culturelles : un rapport sur les autochtones et la justice pénale au canada (1996); canada, commission d’enquête sur certains événe- ments survenus à la prison des femmes de kingston (1996), p 238-243. [58] le législateur a reconnu l’existence d’un con- sensus en évolution dans la société sur le besoin de résoudre ces problèmes en tenant compte des facteurs systémiques et contextuels particuliers qui touchent les peuples autochtones, ainsi que de leurs valeurs culturelles et de leur vision du monde fondamentale- ment différentes. dans le contexte de la détermina- tion de la peine, cette reconnaissance est exprimée à l’al 7182e) du code criminel, qui enjoint aux juges de la peine « d’aborder différemment le processus de détermination de la peine à l’égard des délinquants autochtones, pour en arriver à une peine véritable- ment adaptée et appropriée » : gladue, par 33. vu ce contexte social, la directive claire donnée à l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc de respecter les différences culturelles et linguistiques, à laquelle s’ajoutent les dispositions traitant expressément des détenus autochtones (art. 80 à 84), devraient être considérées comme le moyen choisi par le législateur pour s’attaquer à ce problème plus vaste dans le domaine correctionnel. [59] en fait, l’objet du système correctionnel énoncé dans la lscmlc ne peut être pleinement atteint si on ne donne pas effet au principe de fonc- tionnement formulé à l’al 4g). le scc doit assurer la détention humaine de délinquants par des mesures de garde qui ne vont pas au- delà de ce qui est néces- saire et proportionnel (lscmlc, al. 3a) et 4c)). il doit aussi aider à la réadaptation des délinquants et à leur réinsertion sociale pour contribuer au main- tien d’une société juste, vivant en paix et en sécurité (lscmlc, art. 3 et 31). pour réaliser ces objectifs à l’égard des délinquants autochtones, le scc doit veiller à ce que ses directives d’orientation générale et programmes soient appropriés pour eux et adaptés à leurs besoins et à leur situation, y compris aux be- soins et situations différents de ceux des délinquants non autochtones. pour que le système correctionnel, 196 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. as a whole, to operate fairly and effectively, those administering it must abandon the assumption that all offenders can be treated fairly by being treated the same way. [60] two and a half decades have passed since this principle in s. 4(g) was incorporated into the ccra. nonetheless, there is nothing to suggest that the situation has improved in the realm of corrections. recent reports indicate that the gap between indige- nous and non- indigenous offenders has continued to widen on nearly every indicator of correctional per- formance. for example, relative to non- indigenous offenders, indigenous offenders are more likely to receive higher security classifi cations, to spend more time in segregation, to serve more of their sentence behind bars before fi rst release, to be under- represented in community supervision populations, and to return to prison on revocation of parole: can- ada, offi ce of the correctional investigator, spirit matters: aboriginal people and the corrections and conditional release act: final report (2012); can- ada, offi ce of the correctional investigator, annual report 2015-2016 (2016), at pp. 43-44; canada, of- fi ce of the auditor general, 2016 fall reports of the auditor general of canada: report 3 — preparing indigenous offenders for release — correctional service canada (2016). comme l’ensemble du système pénal, fonctionne de manière équitable et effi cace, ses administrateurs doivent cesser de présumer que tous les délinquants peuvent être traités équitablement en étant traités de la même façon. [60] cela fait maintenant deux décennies et demie que ce principe fi gurant à l’al. 4g) a été inséré dans la lscmlc. or, rien ne porte à croire que la situation s’est améliorée au sein du système correctionnel. des rapports récents indiquent que l’écart n’a cessé de se creuser entre les délinquants autochtones et les délin- quants non autochtones pour presque chaque indica- teur de rendement correctionnel. à titre d’exemple, les délinquants autochtones sont plus susceptibles que les autres délinquants de se voir attribuer une cote de sécurité de niveau supérieur, de passer plus de temps en isolement, de passer une plus grande partie de leur peine derrière les barreaux avant leur pre- mière mise en liberté, d’être sous- représentés parmi les délinquants sous surveillance dans la collectivité et d’être incarcérés de nouveau si leur libération conditionnelle est révoquée : canada, bureau de l’enquêteur correctionnel, une question de spiri- tualité : les autochtones et la loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition : rapport fi nal (2012); canada, bureau de l’enquêteur correctionnel, rapport annuel 2015-2016 (2016), p. 48-49; canada, bureau du vérifi cateur général, automne 2016 — rapports du vérifi cateur général du canada : rapport 3 — la préparation des dé- tenus autochtones à la mise en liberté — service correctionnel canada (2016). it is thus clear that the concerns that moti- [61] vated the incorporation of the principle set out in s. 4(g) into the ccra are no less relevant today than they were when the ccra was enacted. in the face of ongoing disparities in correctional outcomes for indigenous offenders, it is crucial, to ensure that the correctional system functions fairly and effectively, that the direction set out in s. 4(g) be given mean- ingful effect. although many factors contributing to the broader issue of indigenous over- incarceration and alienation from the criminal justice system are beyond the csc’s control, there are many matters within its control that could mitigate these pressing societal problems: see spirit matters, at pp. 6 and il est donc évident que les préoccupations [61] ayant motivé l’incorporation du principe énoncé à l’al. 4g) dans la lscmlc sont toujours aussi per- tinentes aujourd’hui que lors de l’adoption de cette loi. vu les écarts persistants dans les résultats cor- rectionnels des délinquants autochtones, il est crucial qu’on donne utilement effet à la directive formulée à l’al. 4g) pour assurer le fonctionnement équitable et effi cace du système correctionnel. bien que de nombreux facteurs contribuant au problème plus vaste de la surincarcération des autochtones et à leur aliénation par rapport au système de justice pénale échappent à la volonté du scc, nombreux sont les leviers dont il a le contrôle qui pourraient atténuer [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 197 13. taking reasonable steps to ensure that the csc uses assessment tools that are free of cultural bias would be one. [62] against this backdrop of the purposes of s. 4(g) of the ccra, i will now turn to how this provision can inform the inquiry into what was re- quired of the csc in the context of this case. in my view, both the clear direction expressed in s. 4(g) and the underlying rationale for that direction strongly support the conclusion that the csc’s inaction with respect to the concerns raised about the risk assess- ment instruments at issue in this appeal fell short of what s. 24(1) of the ccra required it to do. [63] the trial judge found that the impugned tools were susceptible to cultural bias. he also found that, although the csc was aware of this concern, it had not conducted any research to confi rm the validity of the tools when used in respect of indigenous inmates. the csc failed to address a concern that the psycho- logical and risk information generated by these tools — information that infl uences the csc’s decisions — may be less accurate in the case of indigenous inmates. this failure is contrary to the direction set out in s. 4(g) that correctional practices must respect cultural and linguistic differences. [64] the failure to inquire into the validity of the impugned tools also risked undermining the pur- poses of s. 4(g) and of the ccra as a whole. the trial judge found that scores derived from the im- pugned tools were considered in csc decisions on key aspects of mr. ewert’s incarceration, including those related to his security classifi cation, to es- corted temporary absences and to parole. the trial judge’s fi ndings therefore show that these tools are used for a variety of purposes, including in areas in which indigenous inmates reportedly lag behind non- indigenous inmates. ces problèmes sociétaux pressants (voir une question de spiritualité, p. 6 et 14). par exemple, le scc pour- rait s’assurer, dans la mesure du possible, d’utiliser des outils d’évaluation exempts de préjugé culturel. [62] c’est sur cette toile de fond des objectifs fi xés à l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc que j’examinerai main- tenant la façon dont cette disposition peut éclairer l’analyse de l’obligation dont devait s’acquitter le scc en l’espèce. à mon avis, tant la directive claire donnée à l’al. 4g) que les raisons qui ont motivé son adoption étayent fortement la conclusion que le scc a manqué à son obligation aux termes du par. 24(1) de la lscmlc, vu son inaction quant aux préoccu- pations soulevées à propos des outils d’évaluation du risque en litige dans le présent pourvoi. [63] le juge du procès a conclu que les outils contestés étaient susceptibles d’être empreints d’un préjugé culturel. il a aussi conclu que le scc, bien qu’étant conscient de cette source de préoccupation, n’avait mené aucune recherche pour confi rmer la va- lidité des outils à l’égard des détenus autochtones. le scc n’a pas cherché à apaiser la crainte que les ren- seignements générés par ces outils d’évaluation psy- chologique et du risque — renseignements qui ont une incidence sur les décisions du scc — puissent être moins exacts dans le cas des délinquants au- tochtones. son inaction à cet égard est contraire à la directive donnée à l’al. 4g) voulant que les pratiques correctionnelles doivent respecter les différences culturelles et linguistiques. [64] l’omission de vérifi er la validité des outils contestés risquait aussi de compromettre la réalisa- tion des objectifs de l’al. 4g) et de la lscmlc dans son ensemble. le juge du procès a conclu que les résultats obtenus à partir des outils contestés ont été examinés par le scc pour prendre des décisions au sujet de plusieurs aspects clés de l’incarcération de m. ewert, dont ceux relatifs à sa cote de sécurité, à la possibilité qu’on lui accorde la permission de sortir avec escorte et à son admissibilité à une libé- ration conditionnelle. les conclusions du juge du procès démontrent donc que ces outils sont utilisés à diverses fi ns, y compris pour des matières à l’égard desquelles les détenus autochtones accuseraient un retard par rapport aux détenus non autochtones. 198 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. [65] thus, the clear danger posed by the csc’s continued use of assessment tools that may over- estimate the risk posed by indigenous inmates is that it could unjustifi ably contribute to disparities in correctional outcomes in areas in which indigenous offenders are already disadvantaged. for example, if the impugned tools overestimate the risk posed by indigenous inmates, such inmates may experience unnecessarily harsh conditions while serving their sentences, including custody in higher security set- tings and unnecessary denial of parole. overestima- tion of the risk may also contribute to reduced access to rehabilitative opportunities, such as a loss of the opportunity to benefi t from a gradual and structured release into the community on parole before the expiry of a fi xed- term sentence. another effect of an overestimation of the risk is that it could bar an inmate from participation in indigenous- specifi c pro- gramming that is contingent on an offender having a low security classifi cation or being eligible for an escorted temporary absence: see generally spirit matters, at pp. 3-4 and 29; annual report 2015- 2016, at p 44. thus, any overestimation of the risk posed by indigenous offenders would undermine the purpose of s. 4(g) of the ccra of promoting substantive equality in correctional outcomes for indigenous inmates and would also frustrate the cor- rectional system’s legislated purpose of providing humane custody and assisting in the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community. [65] en conséquence, il semble évident qu’en con- tinuant d’utiliser des outils d’évaluation qui peuvent surestimer le risque posé par les détenus autochtones, le scc pourrait contribuer de façon injustifi able aux disparités dans les résultats correctionnels sur des matières à l’égard desquelles les détenus autoch- tones sont déjà désavantagés. à titre d’exemple, si les outils contestés exagèrent le risque posé par les détenus autochtones, ces derniers peuvent se faire imposer des conditions inutilement diffi ciles ils pourraient ainsi être détenus dans des établissements à sécurité plus élevée que nécessaire et se voir refuser inutilement une libération conditionnelle. la suresti- mation du risque peut aussi avoir pour conséquence de diminuer l’accès aux possibilités de réadaptation, comme la perte de l’occasion de bénéfi cier d’une mise en liberté sous condition graduelle et structurée dans la communauté avant l’expiration d’une peine à durée déterminée. une surévaluation du risque pourrait également empêcher un détenu de parti- ciper à des programmes réservés aux délinquants autochtones ayant une cote de sécurité faible ou qui sont admissibles à des sorties avec escorte (voir, de façon générale, une question de spiritualité, p. 3-4 et 33; rapport annuel 2015-2016, p 49). ainsi, toute surestimation du risque posé par des détenus autoch- tones compromettrait, d’une part, la réalisation de l’objectif fi xé à l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc de favoriser l’égalité réelle dans les résultats correctionnels des détenus autochtones et contrecarrerait, d’autre part, l’objectif confi é par la loi au système correctionnel de prendre des mesures de garde humaines et d’aider à la réadaptation des délinquants et à leur réinsertion sociale. [66] given this context, it is crucial that the csc heed the directive set out in s. 4(g) of the ccra, the effect of which is that the csc’s practices must not perpetuate systemic discrimination against indige- nous persons. in the context of the case at bar, this required, at the very least, that the csc take seri- ously the credible concerns that have been repeatedly raised according to which information derived from the impugned tools is of questionable validity with respect to indigenous inmates because the tools fail to account for cultural differences. by disregarding the possibility that these tools are systematically dis- advantaging indigenous offenders and by failing to [66] dans ce contexte, il est crucial que le scc prenne note de la directive énoncée à l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc et donc que les pratiques du scc ne perpétuent pas la discrimination systémique à l’en- droit des autochtones. en l’espèce, le scc devait à tout le moins prendre au sérieux les préoccu- pations crédibles, maintes fois soulevées, sur la validité douteuse des renseignements obtenus à partir des outils contestés concernant les détenus autochtones parce que ces outils ne tiennent pas compte des différences culturelles en faisant fi de la possibilité que ces outils désavantagent sys- tématiquement les délinquants autochtones et en [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 199 take any action to ensure that they generate accurate information, the csc fell short of what it is required to do under s. 24(1) of the ccra. [67] although this court is not now in a position to defi ne with precision what the csc must do to meet the standard set out in s. 24(1) in these circum- stances, what is required, at a minimum, is that if the csc wishes to continue to use the impugned tools, it must conduct research into whether and to what ex- tent they are subject to cross- cultural variance when applied to indigenous offenders. any further action the standard requires will depend on the outcome of that research. depending on the extent of any cross- cultural variance that is discovered, the csc may have to cease using the impugned tools in respect of indigenous inmates, as it has in fact done with other actuarial tools in the past. alternatively, the csc may need to qualify or modify the use of the tools in some way to ensure that indigenous inmates are not prejudiced by their use. omettant de prendre des mesures pour s’assurer qu’ils génèrent des renseignements exacts, le scc a manqué à l’obligation qui lui incombe suivant le par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. [67] notre cour n’est pas aujourd’hui en mesure de défi nir avec précision ce que le scc doit faire en l’occurrence pour respecter la norme énoncée au par. 24(1), mais s’il veut continuer à se servir des outils contestés, il doit à tout le moins mener des re- cherches pour savoir si, et le cas échéant dans quelle mesure, ces outils sont susceptibles de donner lieu à de la variance interculturelle lorsqu’on les utilise à l’égard de délinquants autochtones. toute autre mesure nécessaire au regard de la norme dépendra du résultat de ces recherches. selon l’étendue de la variance interculturelle constatée, le scc pourrait devoir cesser d’utiliser les outils contestés à l’égard des détenus autochtones, comme il l’a d’ailleurs déjà fait pour d’autres outils actuariels. subsidiairement, le scc pourrait devoir modifi er la façon dont il se sert des outils pour s’assurer que leur utilisation ne porte pas préjudice aux détenus autochtones. b did the csc’s reliance on results generated by the impugned tools constitute an unjusti- fi ed infringement of mr. ewert’s rights under section 7 of the charter? b l’utilisation par le scc des résultats produits par les outils contestés constitue-t-elle une at- teinte injustifi ée aux droits garantis à m. ewert par l’art. 7 de la charte? [68] to establish that a law or a government action violates s. 7 of the charter, a claimant must show that the law or action interferes with, or deprives him or her of, life, liberty or security of the per- son and that the deprivation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice: carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para 55. [68] pour établir qu’une loi ou mesure gouverne- mentale viole l’art. 7 de la charte, le demandeur doit démontrer qu’elle porte atteinte à sa vie, à sa liberté ou à la sécurité de sa personne, ou l’en prive et que la privation n’est pas conforme aux principes de justice fondamentale (carter c. canada (procureur général), 2015 csc 5, [2015] 1 rcs 331, par 55). in this court, mr. ewert argues that the trial [69] judge was correct to fi nd that the csc’s use of the impugned tools deprived him of liberty and security of the person in a way that was contrary to the principles of fundamental justice prohibit- ing arbitrariness and overbreadth. in the alterna- tive, he submits that this court should recognize a new principle of fundamental justice — that the state must obey the law — and should fi nd that the csc’s use of the impugned tools was contrary to [69] m. ewert soutient devant notre cour que le juge du procès a eu raison de conclure que l’utilisa- tion par le scc des outils contestés l’a privé de sa liberté et de la sécurité de sa personne contrairement aux principes de justice fondamentale qui interdisent l’arbitraire et la portée excessive. subsidiairement, il ajoute que notre cour devrait reconnaître un nouveau principe de justice fondamentale — l’obligation de l’état de respecter la loi — et devrait conclure que l’utilisation des outils contestés par le scc était 200 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. that principle because it constituted a breach of s. 24(1) of the ccra. contraire à ce principe parce qu’elle constituait une violation du par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. [70] assuming, although i will not so decide, that the csc’s reliance on the impugned tools in making decisions about mr. ewert engaged a liberty interest or security of the person interest protected by s. 7 of the charter, i conclude that mr. ewert has not estab- lished that the csc’s reliance on the tools violated the principle of fundamental justice against arbitrari- ness or that against overbreadth. i also conclude that mr. ewert has not established that this court should recognize a new principle of fundamental justice in this case. therefore, mr. ewert has not established an infringement of his rights under s. 7 of the charter. [70] bien que ce ne soit pas la conclusion à laquelle je parviendrai, en supposant que le scc a fait inter- venir un droit de m. ewert à la liberté ou à la sécurité de sa personne protégé par l’art. 7 de la charte en se fondant sur les outils contestés pour prendre des décisions à son sujet, je conclus que m. ewert n’a pas établi que le recours aux outils par le scc vio- lait le principe de justice fondamentale interdisant l’arbitraire ou celui interdisant la portée excessive. je conclus aussi que m. ewert n’a pas démontré que notre cour devrait reconnaître un nouveau principe de justice fondamentale dans la présente affaire. en conséquence, m. ewert n’a pas établi une atteinte aux droits que lui garantit l’art. 7 de la charte. (1) mr.  ewert has not established that the csc’s reliance on the impugned tools vi- olated the prohibition against arbitrariness or that against overbreadth (1) m. ewert n’a pas établi que l’utilisation par le scc des outils contestés contrevenait à l’interdiction de l’arbitraire ou à celle de la portée excessive [71] this court discussed the prohibitions against arbitrariness and overbreadth as principles of fun- damental justice in canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at paras. 107 and 111-13 (citations omitted): [71] notre cour a décrit les interdictions de l’arbi- traire et de la portée excessive comme des principes de justice fondamentale dans canada (procureur géné- ral) c. bedford, 2013 csc 72, [2013] 3 rcs 1101, par. 107 et 111-113 (renvois omis) : although there is signifi cant overlap between these three principles, and one law may properly be character- ized by more than one of them, arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality remain three distinct princi- ples that stem from what hamish stewart calls “failures of instrumental rationality” — the situation where the law is “inadequately connected to its objective or in some sense goes too far in seeking to attain it”    . as peter hogg has explained: bien qu’il y ait un chevauchement important entre le caractère arbitraire, la portée excessive et la disproportion totale, et que plus d’une de ces trois notions puissent bel et bien s’appliquer à une disposition, il demeure que les trois correspondent à des principes distincts qui découlent de ce que hamish stewart appelle un [traduction] « manque de logique fonctionnelle », à savoir que la disposition « n’est pas suffi samment liée à son objectif ou, dans un certain sens, qu’elle va trop loin pour l’atteindre » [  ]. peter hogg explique : the doctrines of overbreadth, disproportionality and ar- bitrariness are all at bottom intended to address what hamish stewart calls “failures of instrumental ration- ality”, by which he means that the court accepts the legislative objective, but scrutinizes the policy instrument enacted as the means to achieve the objective. if the policy instrument is not a rational means to achieve the objective, then the law is dysfunctional in terms of its own objective. [traduction] les principes liés à la portée excessive, à la disproportion et au caractère arbitraire visent tous au fond à pallier ce que hamish stewart appelle un « manque de logique fonctionnelle », en ce sens que le tribunal reconnaît l’objectif législatif, mais examine le moyen choisi pour l’atteindre. si ce moyen ne permet pas logiquement d’atteindre l’objectif, la disposition est dysfonctionnelle eu égard à son propre objectif.   . [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 201 arbitrariness asks whether there is a direct connection between the purpose of the law and the impugned effect on the individual, in the sense that the effect on the individual bears some relation to the law’s purpose. there must be a rational connection between the object of the measure that causes the s. 7 deprivation, and the limits it imposes on life, liberty, or security of the person    . a law that imposes limits on these interests in a way that bears no connection to its objective arbitrarily impinges on those interests   . déterminer qu’une disposition est arbitraire ou non exige qu’on se demande s’il existe un lien direct entre son objet et l’effet allégué sur l’intéressé, s’il y a un certain rapport entre les deux. il doit exister un lien rationnel entre l’objet de la mesure qui cause l’atteinte au droit garanti à l’art. 7 et la limite apportée au droit à la vie, à la liberté ou à la sécurité de la personne [  ]. la disposition qui limite ce droit selon des modalités qui n’ont aucun lien avec son objet empiète arbitrairement sur ce droit  . overbreadth deals with a law that is so broad in scope that it includes some conduct that bears no relation to its purpose. in this sense, the law is arbitrary in part. at its core, overbreadth addresses the situation where there is no rational connection between the purposes of the law and some, but not all, of its impacts   . il y a portée excessive lorsqu’une disposition s’ap- plique si largement qu’elle vise certains actes qui n’ont aucun lien avec son objet. la disposition est alors en partie arbitraire. essentiellement, la situation en cause est celle où il n’existe aucun lien rationnel entre les objets de la disposition et certains de ses effets, mais pas tous  . overbreadth allows courts to recognize that the law is rational in some cases, but that it overreaches in its effect in others. despite this recognition of the scope of the law as a whole, the focus remains on the individual and whether the effect on the individual is rationally connected to the law’s purpose. for example, where a law is drawn broadly and targets some conduct that bears no relation to its purpose in order to make enforcement more practical, there is still no connection between the purpose of the law and its effect on the specifi c individual. enforcement prac- ticality may be a justifi cation for an overbroad law, to be analyzed under s. 1 of the charter. [emphasis in original.] in the instant case, the trial judge concluded [72] that the csc had infringed mr. ewert’s rights under s. 7 of the charter, because its reliance on the im- pugned tools in making decisions about indigenous persons was contrary to the principles against arbi- trariness and overbreadth. his conclusions on arbi- trariness and overbreadth can be considered together, because they were based on the same underlying fi ndings. the trial judge found that the objective of the csc’s decision- making was to “reliably predict an offender’s risk of reoffending as accurately as possible in the interests of public safety”: para 96. in this court, mr. ewert does not take issue with this characterization of the relevant objective. the trial judge accepted dr. hart’s evidence that the impugned tools were susceptible to cultural bias and that there was no evidence that scores generated by those tools predict the risk of recidivism as accurately for l’application de la notion de portée excessive permet au tribunal de reconnaître qu’une disposition est ration- nelle sous certains rapports, mais que sa portée est trop grande sous d’autres. malgré la prise en compte de la portée globale de la disposition, l’examen demeure axé sur l’intéressé et sur la question de savoir si l’effet sur ce dernier a un lien rationnel avec l’objet. par exemple, lors- qu’une disposition est rédigée de manière générale et vise des comportements qui n’ont aucun lien avec son objet afi n de faciliter son application, il n’y a pas non plus de lien entre l’objet de la disposition et son effet sur l’intéressé. faciliter l’application pourrait justifi er la portée excessive d’une disposition suivant l’article premier de la charte. [en italique dans l’original.] [72] dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, le juge du pro- cès a conclu que le scc avait porté atteinte aux droits de m. ewert au titre de l’art. 7 de la charte parce que son utilisation des outils contestés pour prendre des décisions à l’endroit d’autochtones était contraire aux principes interdisant l’arbitraire et la portée excessive. ses conclusions sur l’arbitraire et la portée excessive peuvent être examinées conjointement puisqu’elles reposaient sur les mêmes constats sous- jacents. le juge du procès a estimé que l’objectif des décisions du scc était de [traduction] « prédire le risque de récidive d’un délinquant de façon aussi précise que possible afi n d’assurer la sécurité du public » (par 96). m. ewert ne conteste pas devant la cour cette des- cription de l’objectif en cause. le juge du procès a accepté le témoignage de m. hart selon lequel les outils contestés étaient susceptibles d’être empreints d’un préjugé culturel et que rien ne prouvait que les 202 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. indigenous inmates as for non- indigenous inmates. in the trial judge’s view, two conclusions fl owed from these fi ndings. first, given the absence of ev- idence of accuracy, the csc’s continued use of the impugned tools in respect of indigenous offenders was inconsistent with the objective of predicting the risk posed by offenders and was therefore ar- bitrary. second, because the csc’s reliance on the impugned tools with respect to indigenous offenders was arbitrary but its reliance on them with respect to non- indigenous offenders was unobjectionable, its practice of using those tools for the entire in- mate population without distinguishing between indigenous and non- indigenous inmates was over- broad. [73] the trial judge reasonably concluded that, given the concerns relating to cultural bias, it was problematic for the csc to continue to use the im- pugned tools without qualifi cation or caution. be that as it may, to establish arbitrariness or overbreadth, mr. ewert had to show on a balance of probabilities that the csc’s practice of using the impugned tools with respect to indigenous offenders had no rational connection to the relevant government objective. the fact that a government practice is in some way unsound or that it fails to further the government objective as effectively as a different course of action would is not suffi cient to establish that the govern- ment practice is arbitrary. the fi nding that there is uncertainty about the extent to which the tests are accurate when applied to indigenous offenders is not suffi cient to establish that there is no rational connection between reliance on the tests and the relevant government objective. indeed, taken at its highest, dr. hart’s expert evidence does not support a fi nding that there is no such rational connection. dr. hart testifi ed that the tools were susceptible to cultural bias but when asked directly about the likely magnitude of any cultural bias, he was unable to say: he suggested the bias might be relatively limited and tolerable, but could also be profound and intolerable. in other words, there was no evidence before the trial judge that how the impugned tools operate in the case of indigenous offenders is likely résultats générés par ces outils prédisaient le risque de récidive aussi exactement à l’égard des détenus autochtones qu’à l’égard des détenus non autochtones. selon le juge du procès, deux conclusions pouvaient être tirées de ces constatations. premièrement, vu l’ab- sence de preuve quant à l’exactitude des renseigne- ments obtenus, l’utilisation continue par le scc des outils contestés à l’égard des délinquants autochtones était incompatible avec l’objectif de prédiction du risque posé par les délinquants et était donc arbitraire. deuxièmement, comme l’utilisation des outils contes- tés par le scc à l’endroit des délinquants autochtones était arbitraire mais qu’on ne pouvait s’opposer à leur utilisation à l’endroit des autres délinquants, la pratique du scc consistant à recourir à ces outils à l’égard de la totalité de la population carcérale sans faire de distinction entre les autochtones et les non- autochtones avait une portée excessive. [73] le juge du procès a raisonnablement conclu qu’il était problématique de la part du scc de conti- nuer à utiliser les outils contestés sans réserve ou circonspection, compte tenu des préoccupations sur l’existence d’un préjugé culturel. quoi qu’il en soit, pour établir l’arbitraire ou la portée excessive, m. ewert devait démontrer, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, que la pratique du scc consistant à utiliser les outils contestés à l’égard des délinquants autochtones n’avait aucun lien rationnel avec l’ob- jectif pertinent du gouvernement. pour établir que la pratique du gouvernement est arbitraire, il ne suffi t pas de démontrer qu’elle était d’une quelconque façon inadéquate ou qu’elle ne favorisait pas au- tant l’atteinte de l’objectif du gouvernement qu’une autre façon de faire. la conclusion qu’il subsiste de l’incertitude sur la mesure dans laquelle les résultats des tests sont exacts à l’égard des délinquants autoch- tones n’est pas suffi sante pour établir qu’il n’existe pas de lien rationnel entre le recours aux tests et l’objectif pertinent du gouvernement. en fait, vu sous son jour le plus favorable, le témoignage d’expert de m. hart n’appuie pas la conclusion selon laquelle il n’y a pas de lien rationnel de ce genre. m. hart a déclaré que les outils pourraient être empreints d’un préjugé culturel. toutefois, lorsqu’on l’a interrogé directement sur l’ampleur probable du possible pré- jugé culturel, il a été incapable de la décrire. il a ré- pondu que le préjugé pourrait être relativement faible [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 203 to be so different from how they operate in the case of non- indigenous offenders that their use in respect of indigenous offenders is completely unrelated to the government objective. [74] this is not to say that the trial judge’s fi ndings with respect to the csc’s unqualifi ed reliance on the impugned tests are not troubling. nevertheless, the onus was on mr. ewert to prove that the csc’s impugned practice was arbitrary or overbroad; he has not done so in this case. et tolérable, tout autant que profond et intolérable. autrement dit, le juge du procès ne disposait d’au- cune preuve démontrant en quoi le fonctionnement des outils contestés à l’égard des délinquants autoch- tones peut être si différent de leur fonctionnement à l’égard de délinquants non autochtones que leur utilisation dans le cas des délinquants autochtones n’a rien à voir avec l’objectif du gouvernement. [74] cela ne veut pas dire que les conclusions du juge du procès au sujet de l’utilisation sans réserve des outils contestés par le scc ne sont pas trou- blantes. néanmoins, c’est à m. ewert qu’il incombait de prouver que la pratique contestée du scc était arbitraire ou avait une portée excessive, ce qu’il n’a pas fait en l’espèce. (2) mr. ewert has not established that this court should recognize a new principle of fundamental justice (2) m. ewert n’a pas établi que notre cour de- vrait reconnaître un nouveau principe de jus- tice fondamentale [75] mr. ewert’s primary argument with respect to the breach of his s. 7 rights is based on the alleged arbitrariness and overbreadth of the csc’s practice of relying on the impugned tools, as discussed above. however, he also argues, in the alternative, that the alleged deprivation of his liberty and security of the person interests was contrary to a proposed new principle of fundamental justice: that the state must obey the law. the trial judge found it unnecessary to address the issue of this proposed new principle of fundamental justice. [76] mr. ewert bears the onus of establishing that this principle should be found to exist as a principle of fundamental justice. but he presented no detailed argument on this point and did not directly address how the proposed new principle would meet the test developed by this court for determining that a princi- ple is one of fundamental justice within the meaning of s. 7 of the charter: see r v. db, 2008 scc 25, [2008] 2 scr 3, at para. 46; r v. malmo- levine, 2003 scc 74, [2003] 3 scr 571, at para 112. he has not established that this court should recognize this proposed new principle of fundamental justice in the case at bar. [75] comme nous l’avons vu, l’argument principal de m. ewert quant à la violation de ses droits garantis à l’art. 7 repose sur son allégation selon laquelle la pratique du scc d’utiliser les outils contestés serait arbitraire et aurait une portée excessive. m. ewert soutient toutefois aussi de façon subsidiaire que la privation alléguée de ses droits à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne était contraire à un nouveau principe proposé de justice fondamentale : l’état doit respecter la loi. le juge du procès a estimé qu’il n’était pas nécessaire de traiter de ce nouveau prin- cipe proposé de justice fondamentale. [76] m. ewert a le fardeau d’établir que l’on de- vrait conclure à l’existence de ce principe en tant que principe de justice fondamentale. or, il n’a pré- senté aucune argumentation détaillée à ce sujet et n’a pas directement démontré en quoi le nouveau principe proposé satisferait au critère élaboré par notre cour pour déterminer qu’un principe en est un de justice fondamentale au sens de l’art. 7 de la charte (voir r c. db, 2008 csc 25, [2008] 2 rcs 3, par. 46; r c. malmo- levine, 2003 csc 74, [2003] 3 rcs 571, par 112). il n’a pas établi que notre cour devrait reconnaître en l’espèce que le nouveau principe qu’il propose est un principe de justice fondamentale. 204 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. c did the csc’s reliance on results generated by the impugned tools constitute an unjusti- fi ed infringement of mr. ewert’s rights under section 15 of the charter? c l’utilisation par le scc des résultats produits par les outils contestés constitue-t-elle une at- teinte injustifi ée aux droits garantis à m. ewert par l’art. 15 de la charte? [77] at trial, mr. ewert argued that the csc’s reli- ance on the impugned tools infringed his rights under s. 15 of the charter. he submitted in his statement of claim that by using the impugned tools, the csc was using “reliable or true information” to make decisions about non- indigenous inmates and “unre- liable or false information” to make decisions about indigenous inmates. this practice, he claimed, led the csc to mete out harsher treatment and prolonged incarceration to indigenous inmates. [78] the trial judge rejected mr.  ewert’s s.  15 claim on the basis that the evidentiary record was not suffi ciently developed. the federal court of appeal upheld that conclusion in this court, mr.  ewert argues that the factual fi ndings set out in the trial judge’s reasons are suffi cient to support this claim. [79] in my view, mr. ewert has not established the infringement of his s. 15 rights that he alleged. as i explained above, the evidence before the trial judge established a risk that the impugned tools are less accurate when applied to indigenous inmates than when they are applied to non- indigenous inmates. however, the trial judge did not fi nd, and indeed could not have done so on the evidence before him, that the impugned tools do in fact overestimate the risk posed by indigenous inmates or lead to harsher conditions of incarceration or to the denial of reha- bilitative opportunities because of such an overesti- mation. i would therefore not disturb the trial judge’s conclusion on this issue. [77] au procès, m. ewert a fait valoir que l’utili- sation des outils contestés par le scc portait atteinte aux droits que lui garantit l’art. 15 de la charte. dans sa déclaration, il a soutenu qu’en se servant de ces outils, le scc utilisait des [traduction] « renseignements fi ables ou exacts » pour prendre des décisions au sujet des détenus non autochtones et des « renseignements non fi ables ou inexacts » pour prendre des décisions au sujet des détenus autoch- tones. il soutient que cette pratique a amené le scc à infl iger aux détenus autochtones un traitement plus dur et à leur imposer une incarcération prolongée. [78] le juge du procès a rejeté la prétention de m. ewert fondée sur l’art. 15 parce que les faits mis en preuve n’étaient pas suffi samment étoffés. la cour d’appel fédérale a confi rmé cette conclusion. devant notre cour, m. ewert affi rme que les conclu- sions factuelles énoncées dans les motifs du juge du procès sont suffi santes pour étayer sa prétention. [79] à mon avis, m. ewert n’a pas démontré une atteinte aux droits que lui garantit l’art 15. comme je l’ai expliqué précédemment, la preuve dont disposait le juge du procès établissait que l’utilisation des ou- tils contestés risquait de donner des résultats moins exacts à l’égard des détenus autochtones qu’à l’égard des autres détenus. le juge du procès n’a cependant pas conclu, et en fait il n’aurait pas pu le faire au vu de la preuve dont il disposait, que les outils contestés surestiment effectivement le risque posé par les déte- nus autochtones ou mènent à des conditions d’incar- cération plus sévères ou à la privation de possibilités de réadaptation en raison d’une telle surévaluation. je suis donc d’avis de ne pas modifi er la conclusion du juge du procès sur ce point. vi conclusion and disposition vi conclusion et dispositif [80] the csc was aware of long- standing con- cerns as to whether the impugned tools were valid when applied to indigenous offenders. yet it contin- ued to rely on the results they produced in making [80] le scc était au courant des préoccupations de longue date sur la validité des résultats produits par les outils contestés à l’égard des délinquants autoch- tones. or, il a continué de se fi er à ces résultats pour [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 205 decisions about offenders without inquiring into their validity with respect to indigenous offenders. this was a breach of the csc’s obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra to take all reasonable steps to ensure that any information about an offender that it uses is as accurate as possible. in these circumstances, it is appropriate for this court to exercise its discretion to issue a declaration that the csc has failed to meet its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra. [81] a declaration is a narrow remedy but one that is available without a cause of action and whether or not any consequential relief is available: manitoba metis federation inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2013 scc 14, [2013] 1 scr 623, at para. 143; p. w. hogg, p. j. monahan and w. k. wright, liability of the crown (4th ed. 2011), at p. 37; l. sarna, the law of declaratory judgments (4th ed. 2016), at p. 88; see also federal courts rules, sor/98-106, r 64. a court may, in its discretion, grant a declara- tion where it has jurisdiction to hear the issue, where the dispute before the court is real and not theoreti- cal, where the party raising the issue has a genuine interest in its resolution, and where the respondent has an interest in opposing the declaration sought: see daniels v. canada (indian affairs and northern development), 2016 scc 12, [2016] 1 scr 99, at para. 11; canada (prime minister) v. khadr, 2010 scc 3, [2010] 1 scr 44, at para. 46; solosky v. the queen, [1980] 1 scr 821, at pp 830-33. prendre des décisions au sujet des délinquants sans examiner leur validité à l’égard des autochtones. cette pratique constituait un manquement du scc à l’obligation que lui impose le par.  24(1) de la lscmlc de veiller, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseignements qu’il utilise concernant les délinquants soient exacts. dans ces circonstances, il est opportun que la cour exerce son pouvoir discré- tionnaire pour prononcer un jugement déclaratoire selon lequel le scc a failli à son obligation aux termes du par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. [81] un jugement déclaratoire est une répara- tion d’une portée restreinte, mais il peut être ob- tenu sans cause d’action et prononcé, peu importe si une mesure de redressement consécutive peut être accordée (manitoba metis federation inc. c. canada (procureur général), 2013 csc 14, [2013] 1 rcs 623, par. 143; p w. hogg, p j. monahan et w. k. wright, liability of the crown (4e éd. 2011), p. 37; l. sarna, the law of declaratory judgments (4e éd. 2016), p. 88; voir aussi les règles des cours fédérales, dors/98-106, règle 64). le tribunal peut, à son gré, prononcer un jugement déclaratoire lors- qu’il a compétence pour entendre le litige, lorsque la question en cause est réelle et non pas simplement théorique, lorsque la partie qui soulève la question a véritablement intérêt à ce qu’elle soit résolue et lorsque l’intimé a intérêt à s’opposer au juge- ment déclaratoire sollicité (voir daniels c. canada (affaires indiennes et du nord canadien), 2016 csc 12, [2016] 1 rcs 99, par. 11; canada (premier ministre) c. khadr, 2010 csc 3, [2010] 1 rcs 44, par. 46; solosky c. la reine, [1980] 1 rcs 821, p 830-833). [82] these criteria are met here. the federal court had jurisdiction over the substance of mr. ewert’s claim: federal courts act, rsc 1985, c. f-7, s 17. the question whether the csc is required to val- idate the impugned assessment tools for use with indigenous inmates is a real, not a theoretical, one that has been the subject of proceedings spanning almost two decades. mr. ewert, as an indigenous in- dividual and an inmate subject to the csc’s decision- making — including decision- making that affects critical aspects of his incarceration such as his secu- rity classifi cation and the granting of parole — has [82] ces conditions sont réunies en l’espèce. la cour fédérale a compétence sur le contenu de l’action intentée par m. ewert (loi sur les cours fédérales, lrc 1985, c. f-7, art 17). la question de savoir si le scc est tenu de valider les outils d’évaluation contestés utilisés auprès des détenus autochtones est réelle et non pas simplement théorique, et a fait l’ob- jet de procédures pendant près de deux décennies. m. ewert, en tant qu’autochtone et détenu assujetti au processus décisionnel du scc (qui comprend le processus décisionnel ayant une incidence sur les aspects clés de son incarcération, comme sa cote de 206 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. a genuine interest in the resolution of this question. finally, the federal crown, and its representative, the commissioner of the csc, are proper parties to oppose the declaration. [83] a declaration is a discretionary remedy. like other discretionary remedies, declaratory relief should normally be declined where there exists an adequate alternative statutory mechanism to resolve the dispute or to protect the rights in question: see d. j. m. brown and j. m. evans, with the assistance of d. fairlie, judicial review of administrative action in canada (loose- leaf), at topic 1:7330. here, the grievance procedure created by s. 90 of the ccra arguably provides an alternative means by which mr. ewert could challenge the csc’s compliance with the obligation in s. 24(1) of the ccra. it may be that in most cases, the existence of this statutory grievance mechanism would be a reason to decline to grant a declaration. however, in the exceptional cir- cumstances of this case, a declaration is warranted. [84] these exceptional circumstances include the fact that mr. ewert has already used the stat- utory grievance mechanism to raise his concerns about the csc’s use of actuarial assessment tools on indigenous inmates. it cannot be said, based on the events that followed, that the grievance mecha- nism was effective in resolving the issues raised by mr ewert. sécurité et la décision de lui accorder une libération conditionnelle) a véritablement intérêt à ce que cette question soit résolue. finalement, la couronne fé- dérale et son représentant, le commissaire du scc, sont des parties habiles à s’opposer au jugement déclaratoire. [83] un jugement déclaratoire constitue une répa- ration discrétionnaire. comme c’est le cas pour les autres réparations discrétionnaires, le tribunal devrait habituellement refuser de rendre un jugement décla- ratoire lorsque la loi prévoit un autre moyen approprié de régler le litige ou de protéger les droits en question (voir d j m brown et j m evans, avec l’aide de d. fairlie, judicial review of administrative action in canada (feuilles mobiles), rubrique 1:7330). en l’es- pèce, on peut soutenir que la procédure de règlement de griefs créée par l’art. 90 de la lscmlc prévoit un autre moyen par lequel m. ewert pourrait contes- ter la façon dont le scc s’acquitte de l’obligation énoncée au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. il se peut que dans la plupart des cas, l’existence de ce mécanisme de règlement de griefs prévu par la loi constitue un motif de refuser d’accorder un jugement déclaratoire. cependant, dans les circonstances exceptionnelles de l’espèce, un jugement déclaratoire est justifi é. [84] ces circonstances exceptionnelles com- prennent le fait que m. ewert s’est déjà prévalu du mécanisme de règlement de griefs prévu par la loi afi n d’exprimer ses préoccupations relatives à l’uti- lisation par le scc d’outils d’évaluation actuarielle à l’égard de détenus autochtones. on ne saurait affi r- mer, en raison de l’historique du dossier, que le mé- canisme de règlement de griefs a permis de résoudre les questions soulevées par m ewert. [85] beginning in april 2000, mr. ewert fi led a series of grievances complaining about the use of the pcl-r, the vrag and other assessment tools in respect of indigenous inmates: ewert v. canada (attorney general), 2007 fc 13, 306 ftr 234, at paras 7-14. in the course of responding to these grievances, the csc acknowledged that there re- mained questions about the validity of these tools when applied to indigenous offenders and stated that it was not aware of any research validating the tools for use with such offenders. however, despite [85] à partir d’avril 2000, m. ewert a déposé une série de griefs dans lesquels il se plaignait de l’uti- lisation d’outils d’évaluation comme la pcl-r et le gerv à l’égard de détenus autochtones (ewert c. canada (procureur général), 2007 cf 13, par. 7-14 (canlii)). en répondant à ces griefs, le scc a re- connu qu’il restait à trancher des questions concer- nant la validité de ces outils à l’égard des détenus autochtones et a indiqué qu’il n’avait été informé d’aucune recherche qui validerait l’utilisation de ces outils à l’endroit de ces délinquants. cependant, [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge wagner 207 indicating that it would obtain an opinion on the issue from an independent outside body, the csc failed to do so. it also failed to otherwise confi rm the validity of the tests. in closing mr. ewert’s grievance in june 2005 — more than fi ve years after he fi led his fi rst complaint — the csc informed him that it was reviewing its intake assessment tools used for indigenous offenders and that it would take no fur- ther action in connection with his grievance until its review was complete. [86] the fact that a review of the csc’s assess- ment tools was under way in 2005 was an important factor in the federal court’s decision to dismiss mr. ewert’s application for judicial review with re- spect to the resolution of his grievance: ewert (2007), at paras 66-67. it was also an important consider- ation in the federal court of appeal’s decision to uphold the dismissal of that application, including on the basis that it was premature: ewert (2008), at paras. 7-8 and 10. in its 2007 decision, the federal court urged the csc to explain to mr. ewert the results, if any, of its review. such an explanation had not yet been provided when mr. ewert appealed to the federal court of appeal in 2008 — eight years after he commenced the grievance procedure. indeed, the trial judge in the present proceeding observed that there was no evidence that the csc had ever completed the research referred to by the federal court in 2007 and anticipated by the federal court of appeal in 2008: para 72. [87] almost two decades have now passed since mr. ewert fi rst complained about the use of certain of the impugned assessment tools with respect to indigenous inmates. in these exceptional circum- stances, mr. ewert should not be required to begin the grievance process anew in order to determine whether the csc’s continued failure to address the validity of the impugned assessment tools is a breach of its duty under s. 24(1) of the ccra. that it may technically have been open to him to do so should not preclude this court from exercising its discretion to grant a declaration to this effect. même s’il a indiqué qu’il obtiendrait un avis sur la question auprès d’un organisme indépendant, le scc ne l’a pas fait. il a aussi omis de confi rmer d’une autre façon la validité de ces tests. lorsqu’il a fermé le dossier de grief de m. ewert en juin 2005, soit plus de cinq ans après le dépôt de sa première plainte, le scc a informé m. ewert qu’il était en train d’examiner ses outils d’évaluation destinés aux délinquants autochtones et qu’il ne prendrait aucune autre mesure relativement à sa plainte avant que cet examen ne soit terminé. [86] le fait qu’un examen des outils d’évaluation du scc était en cours en 2005 constituait un facteur im- portant dans la décision de la cour fédérale de rejeter la demande de contrôle judiciaire de m. ewert visant le règlement de son grief (ewert (2007), par 66-67). ce facteur a aussi été important dans la décision de la cour d’appel fédérale de confi rmer le rejet du grief, notamment pour le motif que la demande de contrôle judiciaire était prématurée (ewert (2008), par. 7-8 et 10 (canlii)). dans sa décision de 2007, la cour fédérale a exhorté le scc à expliquer à m. ewert les résultats de son examen, le cas échéant. pareille expli- cation n’avait toujours pas été donnée à m. ewert au moment où celui-ci a interjeté appel à la cour d’appel fédérale en 2008, soit huit ans après avoir intenté la procédure de règlement de griefs. en effet, le juge du procès dans la présente instance a souligné que rien ne prouvait que la recherche dont faisait mention la cour fédérale en 2007 et qu’anticipait la cour d’appel fédérale en 2008 avait été achevée à quelque moment que ce soit (par 72). [87] près de deux décennies se sont maintenant écoulées depuis que m. ewert s’est plaint pour la pre- mière fois de l’utilisation de certains des outils d’éva- luation contestés à l’égard des détenus autochtones. dans ces circonstances exceptionnelles, m. ewert ne devrait pas être tenu de recommencer le processus de règlement de griefs pour que soit tranchée la question de savoir si l’omission continue du scc de vérifi er la validité des outils d’évaluation contestés constitue un manquement à son obligation prévue au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. le fait qu’il aurait pu avoir recours à un tel processus ne devrait pas empêcher la cour d’exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour prononcer un jugement déclaratoire en ce sens. 208 ewert v canada wagner j. [2018] 2 scr. [88] to be clear, a declaration that the csc breached its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra does not invalidate any particular decision made by the csc, including any decision made in reliance on the impugned assessment tools. should mr. ewert wish to challenge the validity of any such decision, he must do so through an application for judicial review of the relevant decision. [89] i would also emphasize that in allowing mr. ewert’s appeal in part and issuing a declaration that the csc breached its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra, this court is not restoring the federal court’s order. the trial judge was of the view that the interim order he issued, as well as the fi nal order he indicated would follow, could be based either on his fi nding that the csc violated mr. ewert’s rights under s. 7 of the charter or on his fi nding that the csc breached its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra. i have concluded that the trial judge erred in accepting mr.  ewert’s argument under s.  7 of the charter. this court did not hear argument on the availability of consequential relief based on the csc’s breach of its obligation under s. 24(1) of the ccra and i make no comment on the availability of such relief in new proceedings. however, i would not remit this matter for a remedies hearing. if mr. ewert is of the view that any further remedy is available or appropriate in the circumstances, he may apply, in new proceedings, for a determination of that issue. [90] accordingly, i would allow mr. ewert’s ap- peal in part. mr. ewert is entitled to the following declaration: that the correctional service of canada breached its obligation set out in s.  24(1) of the corrections and conditional release act. [88] précisons que le jugement déclaratoire selon lequel le scc a manqué à son obligation prévue au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc n’invalide pas des dé- cisions particulières prises par le scc, y compris toute décision fondée sur les outils d’évaluation contestés. si m. ewert veut contester la validité de l’une ou de l’autre de ces décisions, il doit présenter une demande de contrôle judiciaire de la décision en cause. [89] je tiens également à souligner qu’en accueil- lant l’appel de m. ewert en partie et en pronon- çant un jugement déclaratoire selon lequel le scc a manqué à son obligation prévue au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc, la cour ne rétablit pas l’ordonnance de la cour fédérale. le juge de première instance était d’avis que l’ordonnance provisoire qu’il a pro- noncée, ainsi que l’ordonnance défi nitive qui serait rendue plus tard, pouvaient s’appuyer sur sa conclu- sion selon laquelle le scc avait violé les droits que l’art. 7 de la charte garantit à m. ewert ou sur sa conclusion suivant laquelle le scc avait manqué à son obligation prévue au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. j’ai conclu que le juge du procès avait commis une erreur en retenant l’argument de m. ewert fondé sur l’art. 7 de la charte. la cour n’a pas entendu d’argument sur la possibilité d’obtenir une mesure de redressement consécutive en raison du manque- ment du scc à son obligation au titre du par. 24(1) de la lscmlc, et je ne fais aucun commentaire sur la possibilité d’obtenir une telle mesure de redresse- ment lors d’une nouvelle procédure. je ne suis tou- tefois pas d’avis de renvoyer la présente affaire pour audience sur les réparations. si m. ewert estime qu’une autre réparation peut être accordée ou est indiquée dans les circonstances, il peut demander, dans le cadre d’une nouvelle procédure, que l’on statue sur ce point. [90] en conséquence, je suis d’avis d’accueillir en partie le pourvoi de m ewert. ce dernier a droit à un jugement déclarant : que le service correctionnel du canada a manqué à son obligation prévue au par. 24(1) de la loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition. [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge rowe 209 the reasons of côté and rowe jj. were delivered version française des motifs des juges côté et by rowe rendus par rowe j. (dissenting in part) — le juge rowe (dissident en partie) — i overview i aperçu [91] i have read justice wagner’s reasons. i agree with justice wagner’s analysis with respect to mr. jeffrey g. ewert’s claims under ss. 7 and 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. how- ever, i would dismiss the appeal. i respectfully part ways with the majority on several issues. first, i do not interpret s. 24(1) of the corrections and condi- tional release act, sc 1992, c. 20 (“ccra”), as re- quiring the correctional service of canada (“csc”) to conduct studies on the tests that psychologists use to assess offenders. second, i would decline to grant declaratory relief; the appropriate course of action for mr. ewert would be to seek judicial review. [91] j’ai pris connaissance des motifs du juge wagner. je souscris à son analyse des demandes de m. jeffrey g. ewert fondées sur les art. 7 et 15 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. cependant, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. en tout respect, je me dissocie des juges majoritaires sur plusieurs points. premièrement, je ne considère pas que le par. 24(1) de la loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en li- berté sous condition, lc 1992, c. 20 (« lscmlc »), oblige le service correctionnel du canada (« scc ») à mener des études sur les tests qu’utilisent les psycho- logues pour évaluer les délinquants. deuxièmement, je m’abstiendrais de rendre un jugement déclaratoire; la meilleure chose à faire pour m. ewert serait de se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire. [92] i share with the majority a view that it is im- portant to address indigenous overrepresentation in prisons. this court has emphasized that decision makers in the penal system, such as judges, should take into account the specifi c needs and circum- stances of indigenous peoples: r v. gladue, [1999] 1 scr 688;. r v. ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1  scr  433. thus, i am in accord with justice wagner in his expressions of concern as to the csc’s inaction with respect to the issue that mr. ewert has raised. notwithstanding the foregoing, i am not persuaded that it was parliament’s intent to hold the csc to account on this issue pursuant to s. 24(1) of the ccra. [92] je partage l’avis des juges majoritaires qu’il importe de remédier à la surreprésentation des autochtones dans les prisons. notre cour a sou- ligné que les décideurs du système pénal, comme les juges, devraient prendre en compte la situation et les besoins particuliers des peuples autochtones (r c. gladue, [1999] 1 rcs 688;. r c. ipeelee, 2012 csc 13, [2012] 1 rcs 433). je me rallie donc au juge wagner lorsqu’il se dit préoccupé par le défaut du scc de résoudre la question soulevée par m ewert. malgré ce qui précède, je ne suis pas convaincu que le législateur souhaitait obliger le scc à rendre des comptes sur ce point conformé- ment au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc. ii background ii contexte [93] my colleague has described accurately the nature of mr. ewert’s claim and the decisions of the courts below. i would, however, emphasize certain key facts. the procedural history is signifi cant; it is important to understand the csc’s response — including its failings — to mr. ewert’s concerns about these psychological tools. as well, it helps frame mr. ewert’s claim with respect to the remedy [93] mon collègue a décrit avec exactitude la nature du recours intenté par m. ewert et les décisions des juridictions inférieures. je tiens cependant à mettre en relief certains faits déterminants. l’historique des procédures est signifi catif; il est important pour saisir la réponse du scc — notamment ses carences — aux inquiétudes de m. ewert relatives à ces ou- tils d’évaluation psychologique. il aide également à 210 ewert v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. sought. that is critical to the proper disposition of this appeal. situer le recours de m. ewert par rapport à la répa- ration qu’il sollicite, une tâche essentielle pour bien trancher le présent pourvoi. [94] mr. ewert fi rst complained about the use of the impugned tools a very long time ago, in april 2000. in the years after, he fi led inmate complaints about the use of these tools. all these grievances were dis- missed. in june 2005, the csc dismissed a third- level grievance, but sent mr. ewert a letter indicating that it was in the process of having the tools reviewed. [94] m. ewert s’est plaint la première fois de l’uti- lisation des outils contestés il y a fort longtemps, en avril 2000. les années suivantes, il a déposé des plaintes à ce sujet en tant que détenu. tous ces griefs ont été rejetés. en juin 2005, le scc a rejeté un grief de troisième niveau, mais il a envoyé à m. ewert une lettre précisant qu’il était en train d’analyser les outils. [95] about this time, mr. ewert commenced an action in federal court on these matters. the action was severed. part of it proceeded as a judicial review; the rest of the action was stayed pending the outcome of the judicial review. the federal court and federal court of appeal dismissed the judicial review on the basis that the application was premature, as the csc’s review of the impugned tools was ongoing: ewert v. canada (attorney general), 2007 fc 13, 306 ftr 234, aff’d 2008 fca 285, 382 nr 370. [96] the part of the action that had been stayed eventually continued; it is the basis for the present appeal. throughout, mr. ewert claimed damages based on breaches of his charter rights. however, the other civil claims that formed the basis of this action evolved considerably between 2005 and 2015 when, fi nally, the trial occurred. mr. ewert’s fi rst amended statement of claim, fi led after the judicial review, claimed that the csc acted negligently in its treatment of him. that claim was later replaced with claims of misfeasance of public offi ce and breach of fi duciary duties. the third (and fi nal) amended state- ment of claim removed the claim for misfeasance and substituted a claim that the csc acted contrary to its statutory obligations. the remedies sought in- cluded damages, a declaration that the csc breached mr.  ewert’s charter rights, and an injunction to prevent the csc from using the impugned tools. [95] vers la même époque, m. ewert a intenté une action en cour fédérale sur ces questions. l’action a été scindée en deux. une partie a suivi son cours sous forme de contrôle judiciaire; le reste de l’action a été suspendu en attendant l’issue du contrôle judi- ciaire. la cour fédérale et la cour d’appel fédérale ont rejeté la demande de contrôle judiciaire, estimant qu’elle était prématurée vu que le scc n’avait pas encore terminé son examen des outils contestés : ewert c. canada (procureur général), 2007 cf 13, conf. par 2008 caf 285. [96] la partie de l’action qui avait été suspendue a fi ni par reprendre son cours; c’est sur elle que re- pose le présent pourvoi. tout au long de l’instance, m. ewert a réclamé des dommages- intérêts pour atteinte à ses droits garantis par la charte. cependant, les autres recours civils qui constituent le fondement de cette action ont considérablement évolué entre 2005 et 2015, l’année où le procès a fi nalement eu lieu. dans la première déclaration modifi ée qu’il a déposée après s’être pourvu en contrôle judiciaire, m. ewert alléguait que le scc avait agi avec né- gligence dans le traitement qu’il lui avait réservé. m. ewert a plus tard prétendu, en remplacement de cette allégation, que le scc avait commis une faute dans l’exercice d’une charge publique et manqué à ses obligations fi duciaires. dans sa troisième (et dernière) déclaration modifi ée, il a supprimé l’allégation de faute dans l’exercice d’une charge publique et plutôt allégué que le scc avait contrevenu aux obligations que lui impose la lscmlc. il a notamment demandé des dommages- intérêts, un jugement déclaratoire por- tant que le scc avait porté atteinte aux droits que lui garantit la charte ainsi qu’une injonction interdisant à celui-ci d’utiliser les outils contestés. [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge rowe 211 [97] the action in this third permutation proceeded through the federal court to the present appeal. the judge saw the case “fi rstly as a breach of [the] statutory duty” contained in s. 24(1) of the ccra (2015 fc 1093, 343 crr (2d) 15, at para. 77); he also found that mr. ewert’s s. 7 charter rights had been infringed. the judge held that mr. ewert was not required to “establish defi nitively that the tests are biased”: para 82. with respect to remedy, the judge issued an interim order prohibiting the csc from using the tools’ results in respect of mr. ewert; the order went on to direct the parties to fi le written submissions about the parameters of a study of the impugned tools. the trial judge indicated that he intended to issue a fi nal order enjoining the use of the impugned tools in respect of mr. ewert and other inmates until the csc’s study of the tools’ reliability was completed. in effect, the federal court would approve the study to be undertaken by the csc. while the judge did not address this, his approach would seem to lead to a continuing order, pursuant to which the federal court would evaluate the outcome of the csc study. [98] the federal court of appeal allowed the ap- peal on both the statutory breach and the charter breach, fi nding that the trial judge erred fi rst, in ap- plying the burden of proof, and second, that none of mr. ewert’s claims were established on a balance of probabilities: 2016 fca 203, 487 nr 107. in light of the foregoing, the court of appeal did not see it as necessary to deal with either the statutory interpretation of s. 24(1) or the remedy. [97] l’action ainsi modifi ée pour une troisième fois a été instruite par la cour fédérale, et notre cour en est maintenant saisie. le juge de première instance a considéré que l’affaire concernait « d’abord et avant tout un manquement à [l’]obligation d’origine légis- lative » prévue au par. 24(1) de la lscmlc (2015 cf 1093, par. 77 (canlii)); il a également conclu qu’il avait été porté atteinte aux droits garantis à m. ew- ert par l’art. 7 de la charte. le juge a conclu qu’il n’était pas nécessaire que m. ewert « établisse de façon défi nitive que les tests sont empreints d’un pré- jugé » (par 82). comme mesure de réparation, le juge a rendu une ordonnance interlocutoire interdisant au scc d’utiliser les résultats produits par les outils à l’égard de m. ewert; il a également enjoint aux parties de déposer des observations écrites sur les paramètres à établir en vue de l’étude des outils contestés. il a dit avoir l’intention de rendre une ordonnance défi nitive interdisant l’utilisation des outils contestés à l’endroit de m. ewert et des autres détenus jusqu’à ce que le scc ait terminé son étude de la fi abilité de ces outils. en fait, la cour fédérale approuverait l’étude que devait effectuer le scc. bien que le juge ne l’ait pas précisé, son approche semble aboutir à une ordonnance de du- rée indéterminée en vertu de laquelle la cour fédérale évaluerait les résultats de l’étude menée par le scc. [98] la cour d’appel fédérale a fait droit à l’appel autant en ce qui concerne la violation de la lscmlc que celle de la charte, estimant que le juge de pre- mière instance s’était trompé, d’une part, dans son application du fardeau de la preuve, et d’autre part, parce qu’aucune des allégations formulées par m. ewert n’avait été établie selon la prépondérance des probabilités : 2016 caf 203. étant donné ces conclusions, la cour d’appel n’a pas jugé néces- saire d’examiner la question de l’interprétation du par. 24(1) ni celle de la réparation à accorder. iii issues iii questions en litige [99] the issues in this appeal are the following: [99] voici les questions soulevées par le présent pourvoi : (a) does s. 24(1) of the ccra impose an obli- gation on the csc to test the tools used by psychologists to assess offenders? a) le paragraphe  24(1) de la lscmlc im- pose-t-il au scc l’obligation de mettre à l’essai les outils utilisés par des psychologues pour évaluer les délinquants? 212 ewert v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. (b) what is the appropriate remedy? b) quelle réparation convient-il d’accorder? [100] i would answer these questions as follows. section 24(1) does not impose an obligation on the csc to conduct research as to the validity of the impugned tools. as well, i would not grant declar- atory relief. [100] je répondrais comme suit à ces questions. le paragraphe 24(1) n’impose pas au scc l’obli- gation de mener une étude sur la validité des outils contestés. en outre, je ne rendrais pas de jugement déclaratoire. iv analysis iv analyse [101] as i would decide this case on a different basis, i begin with a brief note of clarifi cation with respect to my position on the reasons offered by the federal court of appeal. mr. ewert in his claim set out two factual propositions about the use of the impugned tests with respect to indigenous inmates: fi rst, the results generated by the impugned tools are of unknown reliability; and, second, the impugned tools generate false results. the federal court found that on the balance of probabilities mr. ewert had demonstrated the fi rst proposition. the federal court of appeal held that the trial judge misapplied the balance of probabilities test. as i will not dispose of this case on the standard of proof, i do not need to decide the issue. i would say only that the trial judge’s analysis was far from clear and that i agree with the federal court of appeal that mr. ewert failed to prove the second proposition on the balance of probabilities. a whether section 24(1) of the ccra imposes an obligation on the csc to test the tools used by psychologists to assess offenders? [101] comme je suis d’avis de trancher autrement la présente affaire, je commence par donner de brefs éclaircissements sur ma position relative aux motifs fournis par la cour d’appel fédérale. m. ewert for- mule dans sa demande deux énoncés de fait concer- nant l’utilisation des outils contestés à l’égard des détenus autochtones : premièrement, les résultats générés par ces outils sont d’une fi abilité inconnue; et deuxièmement, les outils contestés produisent de faux résultats. la cour fédérale a conclu que m. ewert avait démontré, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, le bien- fondé du premier énoncé. la cour d’appel fédérale a conclu que le juge de pre- mière instance avait mal appliqué la norme de la pré- pondérance des probabilités. puisque je ne disposerai pas du pourvoi en fonction de la norme de preuve, il ne m’est pas nécessaire de trancher la question. je dirai simplement que l’analyse du juge de première instance est loin d’être claire et que je partage l’avis de la cour d’appel fédérale selon lequel m. ewert n’a pas prouvé le bien- fondé du second énoncé selon la prépondérance des probabilités. a le paragraphe 24(1) de la lscmlc impose-t-il au scc l’obligation de mettre à l’essai les outils employés par les psychologues pour évaluer les délinquants? [102] the opening sections of the ccra outline the purposes and principles of the statutory regime. sections 3, 3.1 and 4 state: [102] les dispositions introductives de la lscmlc exposent les objets et les principes du régime établi par cette loi. les articles 3, 3.1 et 4 prévoient : 3 the purpose of the federal correctional system is to contrib- ute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by (a) carrying out sentences imposed by courts through the safe and humane custody and supervision of of- fenders; and 3 le système correctionnel vise à contribuer au maintien d’une société juste, vivant en paix et en sécurité, d’une part, en assurant l’exécution des peines par des mesures de garde et de surveillance sécuritaires et humaines, et d’autre part, en aidant au moyen de programmes appropriés dans les pénitenciers ou dans la collectivité, à la réadaptation [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge rowe 213 (b) assisting the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community as law- abiding citi- zens through the provision of programs in penitentia- ries and in the community. des délinquants et à leur réinsertion sociale à titre de ci- toyens respectueux des lois. 3.1 the protection of society is the paramount considera- tion for the service in the corrections process. 3.1 la protection de la société est le critère prépondé- rant appliqué par le service dans le cadre du processus correctionnel. 4 the principles that guide the service in achieving the purpose referred to in section 3 are as follows: 4 le service est guidé, dans l’exécution du mandat visé à l’article 3, par les principes suivants :   .   . (g) correctional policies, programs and practices re- spect gender, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences and are responsive to the special needs of women, aboriginal peoples, persons requiring mental health care and other groups; g) ses directives d’orientation générale, programmes et pratiques respectent les différences ethniques, culturelles et linguistiques, ainsi qu’entre les sexes, et tiennent compte des besoins propres aux femmes, aux autochtones, aux personnes nécessitant des soins de santé mentale et à d’autres groupes;   .   . [103] sections  23 and 24 of the ccra are the opening sections under the heading “information”. they read as follows: [103] les articles 23 et 24 de la lscmlc sont les dispositions introductives de la rubrique « rensei- gnements ». ils sont rédigés comme suit : 23 (1) when a person is sentenced, committed or trans- ferred to penitentiary, the service shall take all reasonable steps to obtain, as soon as is practicable, 23 (1) le service doit, dans les meilleurs délais après la condamnation ou le transfèrement d’une personne au pé- nitencier, prendre toutes mesures possibles pour obtenir : (a) relevant information about the offence; a) les renseignements pertinents concernant l’infrac- tion en cause; (b) relevant information about the person’s personal history, including the person’s social, economic, crim- inal and young- offender history; b) les renseignements personnels pertinents, notam- ment les antécédents sociaux, économiques et crimi- nels, y compris comme jeune contrevenant; (c) any reasons and recommendations relating to the sentencing or committal that are given or made by (i) the court that convicts, sentences or commits the person, and (ii) any court that hears an appeal from the convic- tion, sentence or committal; c) les motifs donnés par le tribunal ayant prononcé la condamnation, infl igé la peine ou ordonné la détention — ou par le tribunal d’appel — en ce qui touche la peine ou la détention, ainsi que les recommandations afférentes en l’espèce (d) any reports relevant to the conviction, sentence or committal that are submitted to a court mentioned in subparagraph (c)(i) or (ii); and d) les rapports remis au tribunal concernant la condam- nation, la peine ou l’incarcération; 214 ewert v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. (e) any other information relevant to administering the sentence or committal, including existing information from the victim, the victim impact statement and the transcript of any comments made by the sentencing judge regarding parole eligibility. e) tous autres renseignements concernant l’exécution de la peine ou de la détention, notamment les rensei- gnements obtenus de la victime, la déclaration de la victime quant aux conséquences de l’infraction et la transcription des observations du juge qui a prononcé la peine relativement à l’admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle. (2) where access to the information obtained by the ser- vice pursuant to subsection (1) is requested by the offender in writing, the offender shall be provided with access in the prescribed manner to such information as would be disclosed under the privacy act and the access to infor- mation act. (2) le délinquant qui demande par écrit que les rensei- gnements visés au paragraphe (1) lui soient communiqués a accès, conformément au règlement, aux renseignements qui, en vertu de la loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et de la loi sur l’accès à l’information, lui seraient communiqués. (3) no provision in the privacy act or the access to in- formation act shall operate so as to limit or prevent the service from obtaining any information referred to in paragraphs (1)(a) to (e). (3) aucune disposition de la loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels ou de la loi sur l’accès à l’information n’a pour effet d’empêcher ou de limiter l’obtention par le service des renseignements visés aux alinéas (1)a) à e). 24 (1) the service shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that any information about an offender that it uses is as accurate, up to date and complete as possible. 24 (1) le service est tenu de veiller, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseignements qu’il utilise concer- nant les délinquants soient à jour, exacts et complets. (2) where an offender who has been given access to in- formation by the service pursuant to subsection 23(2) believes that there is an error or omission therein, (a) the offender may request the service to correct that information; and (b) where the request is refused, the service shall attach to the information a notation indicating that the offender has requested a correction and setting out the correction requested. (2) le délinquant qui croit que les renseignements aux- quels il a eu accès en vertu du paragraphe  23(2) sont erronés ou incomplets peut demander que le service en effectue la correction; lorsque la demande est refusée, le service doit faire mention des corrections qui ont été demandées mais non effectuées. [104] in interpreting s. 24(1) i will look to the “words of [the] act    in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament”: rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, citing e. a. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87. [104] afi n d’interpréter le par. 24(1), je lirai les [traduction] « termes [de la] loi dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’[économie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur » : rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27, par. 21, citant e a driedger,. construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p 87. [105] there are two possible interpretations of s 24(1). one interpretation is that insight or under- standing derived from the assessment tools — for example, that an offender has a personality disorder [105] le paragraphe 24(1) se prête à deux interpré- tations. l’une d’elles est que les indications ou les connaissances que l’on peut tirer des outils d’évalua- tion — par exemple, que le délinquant souffre d’un [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge rowe 215 or is at a high risk to reoffend — is “information” that the csc uses in its decision- making. thus, the requirement to take “reasonable steps” to ensure the information is “accurate” imposes an obligation on the csc to verify that the tests are valid, ie that they meaningfully assess that which they are intended to assess. an alternative interpretation is that s. 24(1) refers to biographical or factual information about an offender. thus, things like age, criminal record, behaviour in prison, courses taken with a view to rehabilitation, and the like are “information” that should be “accurate, up to date and complete”. [106] mr. ewert urges on us the fi rst interpretation. he argues that s. 24(1) imposes a duty on the csc to test the impugned tools, as the test results are “information” that the csc “uses”, inter alia, to assess the risk to public safety: ccra, ss. 28 to 31; corrections and conditional release regulations, sor/92-620, ss. 13, 17 and 18. as well, s. 4(g) of the ccra requires the csc to respect the different needs of indigenous inmates. thus, the csc’s statutory duty to take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of “information” includes an obligation to ensure the validity of assessments whose results are recorded in an inmate’s records. trouble de la personnalité ou qu’il présente un risque élevé de récidive — sont des « renseignements » que le scc utilise dans son processus décisionnel. ainsi, l’obligation qu’il a de veiller, « dans la mesure du possible », à ce que les renseignements soient « exacts » l’oblige à s’assurer que les outils sont valides, c-à-d qu’ils évaluent vraiment ce qu’ils sont censés évaluer. l’autre interprétation est que le par. 24(1) renvoie aux renseignements d’ordre bio- graphique ou factuel qui concernent le délinquant. ainsi, des choses telles que son âge, ses antécédents criminels, la façon dont il se comporte en prison, les cours qu’il a suivis en vue de sa réadaptation, notamment, sont des « renseignements » qui doivent être « à jour, exacts et complets ». [106] m. ewert nous prie d’adopter la première interprétation. il soutient que le par. 24(1) impose au scc l’obligation de mettre à l’essai les outils contestés, étant donné que les résultats produits par ces outils sont des « renseignements » que le scc « utilise », entre autres, pour mesurer le risque que le délinquant présente pour la sécurité du public : lscmlc, art. 28 à 31; règlement sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, dors/92-620, art. 13, 17 et 18. en outre, l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc exige du scc qu’il respecte les besoins propres aux détenus autochtones. partant, l’obliga- tion que la lscmlc lui impose de veiller, dans la mesure du possible, à l’exactitude des « renseigne- ments » comporte l’obligation de s’assurer de la vali- dité des évaluations dont les résultats sont consignés aux dossiers du détenu. [107] the csc argues for a more limited view of s. 24(1), taking the position that the provision is limited to “primary facts” and not “inferences or assessments drawn by the service”. parliament has created a scheme governing the csc’s use of information that allows offenders to challenge in- accuracies in that information pursuant to s 24(2). sections 24(1) and 24(2) should be read together and interpreted in this context. thus, the requirement under s. 24(1) to take reasonable steps with respect to the accuracy of “information” does not include an obligation to conduct studies as to the validity of as- sessment tools. section 4(g) of the ccra expresses guiding principles to inform the csc’s actions, but [107] le scc plaide en faveur d’une interpréta- tion plus restreinte du par. 24(1), faisant valoir que la disposition ne s’applique qu’aux [traduction] « faits primaires » et non aux « inférences ou aux évaluations tirées par le service ». le législateur a créé un régime qui régit l’utilisation de renseigne- ments par le scc et qui permet aux délinquants de contester l’exactitude de ces renseignements en vertu du par 24(2). les paragraphes 24(1) et (2) doivent être lus conjointement et interprétés dans ce contexte. ainsi, l’obligation au par. 24(1) de veiller, dans la mesure du possible, à l’exactitude des « ren- seignements » ne comporte pas l’obligation de mener des études sur la validité des outils d’évaluation. 216 ewert v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. does not prescribe a particular outcome for any csc decision, nor does it infuse s. 24(1) with the meaning that mr. ewert suggests. [108] i fi nd the second interpretation to be per- suasive. sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the ccra are about accurate record- keeping. section 24 is not about challenging the means that the csc uses to make its decisions. when an offender’s complaint is about the way that a particular decision is made, the ccra provides a means for offenders to fi le a grievance and, if necessary, pursue judicial review: ccra, s. 90; corrections and conditional release regulations, ss. 74 to 82. that is of fundamental im- portance. but, it is not what is dealt with in ss. 24(1) and 24(2). [109] the ccra is concerned with managing the custody of offenders, assisting in their rehabilitation and reintegration, and protecting society: ccra, ss. 3 and 31. these goals require good decision- making based, inter alia, on accurate information. section 24 relates to the accuracy of information. for instance, the csc should correct a report that says that an offender was involved in a fi ght when the offender was not involved. making decisions on the basis of inaccurate information will not assist the csc in furthering its objectives to rehabilitate offenders and protect society. thus, s. 24 serves an important function. that function does not include verifying the validity of assessment tools. such mat- ters are open to challenge. but, the proper avenue for such challenges is the grievance procedure and, where necessary, judicial review. these challenges must be brought in a way that respects parliamentary intent, rather than forcing an unwarranted interpre- tation of s 24. l’alinéa 4g) de la lscmlc énonce les principes de fonctionnement du scc, mais il n’impose à ce dernier aucun résultat précis pas plus qu’il ne donne au par. 24(1) le sens suggéré par m ewert. [108] j’estime que la deuxième interprétation est convaincante. les paragraphes 24(1) et (2) de la lscmlc visent la tenue exacte des dossiers. l’ar- ticle 24 ne vise pas la contestation des moyens pris par le scc pour prendre ses décisions. lorsqu’un délinquant se plaint de la façon dont une décision donnée est prise, la lscmlc lui fournit un moyen de déposer un grief et, si nécessaire, de se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire : lscmlc, art. 90; règlement sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, art. 74 à 82. ce processus est d’une importance fondamentale. mais ce n’est pas de cela dont il est question aux par. 24(1) et (2). [109] la lscmlc a pour objectifs de gérer la garde des délinquants, d’aider à leur réadaptation et à leur réinsertion, et de protéger la société : lscmlc, art. 3 et 31. l’atteinte de ces objectifs passe par un pro- cessus décisionnel adéquat qui repose, entre autres, sur des renseignements exacts. l’article 24 s’attache à l’exactitude des renseignements. par exemple, si un rapport indique qu’un délinquant a participé à une bagarre alors que ce n’est pas le cas, le scc doit corriger cette erreur. un processus décisionnel fondé sur des renseignements inexacts n’aidera pas le scc à atteindre ses objectifs de réadaptation des délinquants et de protection de la société. l’article 24 remplit donc une fonction importante. s’assurer de la validité des outils d’évaluation n’en fait pas partie. les questions de cette nature peuvent être contestées. elles doivent cependant l’être par voie de grief et, s’il y a lieu, par voie de contrôle judiciaire. ces re- cours doivent être intentés d’une façon qui respecte l’intention du législateur, plutôt que de forcer une interprétation injustifi ée de l’art 24. [110] parliament imposed a duty on the csc in s. 24(1) to record information accurately. sec- tion 24(2) provides a means for inmates to correct er- rors in the information that is recorded. the scheme is simple. it refl ects parliament’s intent to provide offenders with a specifi c remedy they could use to [110] au paragraphe 24(1), le législateur impose au scc l’obligation de consigner avec exactitude les renseignements qu’il obtient. le paragraphe 24(2) permet au délinquant de demander la correction des renseignements erronés qui sont consignés. le ré- gime est simple. il traduit l’intention du législateur [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge rowe 217 make sure that the csc’s duty to maintain accurate records is met. [111] this interpretation is reinforced by the refer- ence to s. 23 in s 24(2). section 23 sets out the types of information the csc will obtain about an offender when they arrive at a penitentiary. all this informa- tion is factual or biographical. this is the type of information referred to in s 24(1). an offender may be provided with this information upon request and, if there is an error, it can be corrected pursuant to the procedure set out in s 24(2). [112] mr.  ewert argues that parliament would have referred to the types of information subject to s. 24(1) if it wanted to do so, just as it did in s 23. this is not persuasive. the scheme that is set out in ss. 23 and 24 is straightforward. section 23 lists the information that is to be recorded. section 24(1) re- quires the csc to record this information accurately and to keep it up to date. section 24(2) provides a means for an inmate to correct errors or defi ciencies in the information. [113] mr. ewert argues that the word “informa- tion” in ss. 24(1) and 24(2) should be given different meanings. indeed, the logic of his position, and that adopted by the majority, requires that “information” be given different meanings in s. 24(1) and s 24(2). this is so because “information”, in s. 24(2) is ex- pressly linked to what is described in s. 23, while mr. ewert and the majority say that “information” in s. 24(1) has a far wider meaning. but why would parliament have chosen such an oblique structure as to give two different meanings to the same word (“information”) in consecutive subsections of the same provision? it is not plausible. moreover, when the same words are used throughout a statute, they are presumed to have the same meaning: r v. zeol- kowski, [1989] 1 scr 1378, at p 1387. d’offrir aux délinquants un moyen particulier de s’assurer que le scc respecte son obligation de tenue exacte des dossiers. [111] cette interprétation est renforcée par le fait que le par. 24(2) renvoie à l’art 23. cet article précise les types de renseignements que le scc obtiendra au sujet d’un délinquant qui arrive au pénitencier. tous ces renseignements sont d’ordre factuel ou biographique. c’est à ce type de renseignements que renvoie le par 24(1). le délinquant peut accéder, sur demande, à ces renseignements, et s’ils sont erronés, il peut en demander la correction suivant la procé- dure établie au par 24(2). [112] m. ewert soutient que, s’il l’avait voulu, le législateur aurait mentionné les types de rensei- gnements assujettis au par. 24(1), tout comme il l’a fait à l’art 23. cet argument n’est pas convaincant. le régime établi par les art. 23 et 24 est simple. l’article  23 dresse la liste des renseignements à consigner. le paragraphe 24(1) exige du scc qu’il consigne ces renseignements avec exactitude et qu’il les tienne à jour. quant au par. 24(2), il offre au dé- tenu un moyen de faire corriger les renseignements erronés ou incomplets. [113] m. ewert ajoute qu’il convient de donner un sens différent au mot « renseignements » aux par. 24(1) et (2). en fait, la logique de la thèse qu’il avance, et qui a été adoptée par la majorité, exige que l’on interprète différemment le mot « renseigne- ments » aux par. 24(1) et 24(2). il en est ainsi parce que les « renseignements » dont il est question au par. 24(2) sont expressément liés à ceux décrits à l’art. 23, même si m. ewert et les juges majoritaires disent que le mot « renseignements » au par. 24(1) a un sens beaucoup plus large. or, pourquoi le lé- gislateur aurait-il choisi de donner indirectement deux sens différents au même mot («  renseigne- ments ») dans deux paragraphes consécutifs d’un même article? cette hypothèse n’est pas plausible. qui plus est, lorsque les mêmes mots sont employés dans l’ensemble d’une loi, ils sont présumés avoir le même sens : r c. zeolkowski, [1989] 1 rcs 1378, p 1387. 218 ewert v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. [114] we should also consider the other words in s. 24, including the requirement that the information be “as accurate, up to date and complete as possi- ble”. my colleague rejects the crown’s argument that it is inappropriate to speak of “accuracy” when dealing with actuarial science because “the obliga- tion provided for in s. 24(1) is a general one that is necessarily described using general rather than technical language”: para 43. in support of this, he writes that “both parties’ experts proceeded from the premise that the accuracy of a psychological or actuarial assessment tool can be evaluated and that such an evaluation is relevant to a decision whether to use the tool”: para 44. [114] nous devrions également tenir compte des autres termes de l’art.  24, y compris l’exigence que les renseignements soient, «  dans la mesure du possible, [  ] à jour, exacts et complets ». mon collègue rejette l’argument de la couronne selon lequel il ne convient pas de parler d’« exactitude » dans le domaine de la science actuarielle parce que « l’obligation prévue au par. 24(1) en est une de nature générale qui appelle nécessairement une des- cription en termes généraux plutôt que techniques » (par 43). pour appuyer cette proposition, il écrit que « les experts des deux parties sont partis du principe que l’exactitude d’un outil d’évaluation psycholo- gique ou actuarielle peut être évaluée et que cette évaluation est importante pour décider s’il convient d’utiliser cet outil » (par 44). [115] with respect, the expert evidence in this case points to a different understanding of “accuracy”. dr. hart, the expert whom the trial judge found to be most credible, described the predictive capacity of the impugned tools in terms of validity and reli- ability, rather than accuracy. it is not appropriate to speak of a psychological test as being accurate or in- accurate, in the same way that an instrument such as a thermometer is or is not accurate. rather, validity (the meaningfulness of the inferences drawn from as- sessment measurements) and reliability (the stability of measurements across evaluators or across time) exist on a spectrum: ar, vol. xviii, at pp 5703-5. thus, a psychological test can be more or less valid or reliable, but it cannot properly be described as being “accurate” or “inaccurate”. [115] avec égards, le témoignage des experts en l’espèce nous amène à saisir différemment l’« exac- titude ». m. hart, l’expert que le juge du procès a trouvé le plus crédible, a utilisé les mots [traduc- tion] « validité » et « fi abilité » au lieu d’« exacti- tude » pour décrire la capacité prédictive des outils contestés. il ne convient pas de dire qu’un test psy- chologique est exact ou non, de la même façon qu’un instrument tel un thermomètre n’est pas exact. la validité (l’utilité des inférences tirées des mesures d’évaluation) et la fi abilité (la stabilité des mesures d’un évaluateur à l’autre ou dans le temps) se si- tuent sur une échelle (da, vol. xviii, p 5703-5705). ainsi, un test psychologique peut être plus ou moins valide ou fi able, mais on ne peut le qualifi er à juste titre d’« exact » ou d’« inexact ». [116] further, one needs to consider how the csc would be required to act under my colleague’s in- terpretation. if further research provides insight into the degree of validity and reliability of the impugned tools as applied to aboriginal offenders, how valid or reliable must the tools be in order to be deemed “accurate” (as opposed to “inaccurate”)? this is quite different from verifying factual information such as those items listed in s. 23(1) — date of birth, criminal history, or other primary information that will necessarily be accurate or inaccurate. as well, what does it mean to require the impugned tools to be “as accurate as possible”? the assessment of human personality, by whatever means, remains imprecise. [116] de plus, il faut se demander comment le scc serait tenu d’agir selon l’interprétation de mon collègue. si d’autres recherches nous éclairent sur le degré de validité et de fi abilité des outils contes- tés à l’endroit des délinquants autochtones, à quel point les outils doivent- ils être valides ou fi ables pour être réputés « exacts » (au lieu d’« inexacts »)? nous sommes bien loin de la vérifi cation de ren- seignements factuels comme ceux énumérés au par. 23(1) : la date de naissance, les antécédents criminels ou d’autres renseignements de base qui seront nécessairement exacts ou inexacts. en outre, qu’entendons- nous par exiger que les outils contestés soient « exacts dans la mesure du possible »? quel [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge rowe 219 it is not clear how the csc and the courts are to ac- count for this, if they are required to ensure that such assessments are “as accurate as possible”. [117] the scope of the obligation in s. 24(1), as applied to the impugned tools, simply requires that the csc maintain accurate records of the inmates’ test scores. if mr. ewert scored in the 98th percen- tile on factor 1 of the hare psychopathy checklist revised, but the csc documents that fi gure as being in the 89th percentile and uses that incorrect score in the course of its decision- making, then the csc would have breached its obligations under s. 24(1) (assuming that the csc failed to take “reasonable steps” to ensure the score was recorded correctly). the remedy for mr. ewert in such a case would be to bring an application under s 24(2). [118] where the offender brings a challenge under s. 24(2) to have errors corrected, this is not the same as bringing a challenge to a decision made on the basis of incorrect information: kim v. canada, 2017 fc 848, at para. 43 (canlii). a proceeding to en- force s. 24(2) only considers whether there has been an error in the information recorded in the offender’s fi le. if so, it will be corrected or a notation will be added. by contrast, in a judicial review of a grievance proceeding, the usual question is whether the csc’s decision based, inter alia, on information in the in- mate’s fi le (including test results) was reasonable. judicial review allows the court to consider how the csc makes its decisions, including the validity of the impugned tools. que soit le moyen employé, l’évaluation de la per- sonnalité humaine demeure imprécise. on ne sait pas de quelle manière le scc et les tribunaux doivent en tenir compte, s’ils doivent veiller à que ces évalua- tions soient « exactes dans la mesure du possible ». [117] la portée de l’obligation prévue au par. 24(1) en ce qui a trait aux outils contestés exige simple- ment que le scc consigne avec exactitude les notes obtenues par les détenus au test. si m. ewert se classe dans le 98e percentile pour le facteur 1 de l’échelle de psychopatie révisée de hare, mais les documents du scc indiquent qu’il se classe dans le 89e percentile et le scc utilise cette note erronée dans sa prise de décision, le scc manque à ses obli- gations aux termes du par. 24(1) (à supposer qu’il n’ait pas veillé, « dans la mesure du possible », à ce que la note soit consignée correctement). la solution pour m. ewert en pareil cas serait de présenter une demande en vertu du par 24(2). [118] le délinquant qui se prévaut du moyen de contestation prévu au par. 24(2) pour obtenir la cor- rection d’erreurs ne saurait être assimilé à celui qui conteste une décision fondée sur des renseignements incorrects : kim c. canada, 2017 cf 848, par. 43 (canlii). pour l’application du par. 24(2), il suffi t de déterminer si le renseignement consigné au dossier du délinquant est erroné. s’il l’est, il sera corrigé ou une note sera ajoutée au dossier. à l’inverse, lors du contrôle judiciaire d’une décision relative à un grief, il faut généralement se demander si la décision prise par le scc sur le fondement, entre autres, des ren- seignements versés au dossier du détenu (y compris des résultats de test) était raisonnable. le contrôle judiciaire permet à la cour d’examiner le processus décisionnel du scc, notamment la validité des outils contestés. [119] the federal court regularly conducts judicial reviews of the csc’s decision- making, including ap- plications to correct information under s 24(2). this jurisprudence supports a reading of s. 24(1) that is con- sistent with the analysis that i have set out above. the federal court has limited the csc’s obligation under s. 24(1) to ensure that factual information is accu- rate, up to date and complete. section 24(1) was held not to apply to “the inferences or assessments drawn [119] la cour fédérale est régulièrement saisie de demandes de contrôle judiciaire visant le proces- sus décisionnel du scc, y compris de demandes de correction de renseignements au titre du par 24(2). les décisions qu’elle rend en la matière appuient une interprétation du par. 24(1) qui s’accorde avec l’analyse que j’ai exposée ci- dessus. la cour fédé- rale a limité l’obligation que le par. 24(1) impose au scc de veiller à ce que les renseignements factuels 220 ewert v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. by the service from fi le information”: tehrankari v. canada (correctional service) (2000), 38 cr (5th) 43 (fctd), at para. 41; see also charalambous v. canada (attorney general), 2015 fc 1045, at para. 15 (canlii), aff’d 2016 fca 177, 483 nr 398. [120] the federal court has also interpreted the phrase “reasonable steps” in a way that is consist- ent with the idea that the csc’s obligations extend only to factual information. the word “reasonable” is a limit on the csc’s obligations that is meant to ensure that the csc can rely on information it ob- tains from offi cial records. the csc is not required — as a reasonable step — to re- investigate all the factual information it obtains from such records: tehrankari v. canada (attorney general), 2012 fc 332, at paras. 35-36 (canlii); charalambous (fc), at para 16. for instance, when an offender is trans- ferred, offi cials at the new institution must make decisions about the offender based on records created at another institution, by the police or by the courts. it would go beyond “reasonable steps” to require the csc to fact- check everything in the offi cial records. qu’il utilise soient à jour, exacts et complets. la cour a jugé que le par. 24(1) ne s’appliquait pas aux « inférences ou [aux] évaluations que le service tire des renseignements contenus dans les dossiers » : tehrankari c. canada (service correctionnel), 2000 canlii 15218 (cf 1re inst), par. 41; voir également charalambous c. canada (procureur général), 2015 cf 1045, par. 15 (canlii), conf. par 2016 caf 177. [120] la cour fédérale a également donné à l’expres- sion « dans la mesure du possible » une interprétation qui s’accorde avec l’idée que l’obligation du scc ne s’étend qu’aux renseignements factuels. le mot « pos- sible » est une limite imposée à l’obligation du scc afi n que celui-ci puisse se fi er aux renseignements qu’il tire des dossiers offi ciels. le scc n’est pas, « dans la mesure du possible », tenu de faire à nouveau enquête sur l’ensemble des renseignements factuels qu’il tire de ces dossiers : tehrankari c. canada (procureur général), 2012 cf 332, par. 35-36 (canlii); chara- lambous (cf), par 16. par exemple, lors d’un trans- fèrement, les autorités du nouvel établissement doivent prendre des décisions concernant le délinquant à par- tir des dossiers constitués par l’autre établissement, la police ou les tribunaux. ce serait excéder « la mesure du possible » que d’exiger du scc qu’il vérifi e tous les faits consignés aux dossiers offi ciels. [121] i would adopt the reasoning of the federal court in the foregoing decisions. the federal court and the federal court of appeal in its jurisprudence has set out a clear and coherent interpretation of s. 24(1) and (2). i see no reason to depart from that jurisprudence. [121] je ferais mien le raisonnement adopté par la cour fédérale dans les décisions susmentionnées. la jurisprudence de la cour fédérale et de la cour d’appel fédérale donne une interprétation claire et cohérente des par. 24(1) et (2). je ne vois aucune raison de m’en écarter. [122] justice wagner relies in part on s. 4(g) of the ccra to determine the csc’s obligations. this provision helps to interpret the ccra, but it does not transform the nature and purpose of s 24(1). indeed, while s. 4(g) is part of the ccra’s statement of prin- ciples, such provisions do not “create legally binding rights or obligations, nor do they purport to do so”: r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at pp. 454-455, citing greater van- couver (regional district) v. british columbia, 2011 bcca 345, 339 dlr (4th) 251. [122] le juge wagner s’appuie en partie sur l’al. 4g) de la lscmlc pour déterminer les obligations du scc. cette disposition facilite l’interprétation de la lscmlc, mais elle ne change en rien la nature et l’objet du par 24(1). en effet, l’al. 4g) fait partie de l’énoncé de principes de la lscmlc, mais les dis- positions de cette nature ne [traduction] « créent pas de droits ou d’obligations juridiquement contrai- gnants, pas plus qu’elles ne sont censées en créer » : r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6e éd. 2014), p. 454-455, citant greater vancouver (regional district) c. british columbia, 2011 bcca 345, 339 dlr (4th) 251. [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge rowe 221 [123] as stated above, i am in full accord with the majority that the csc needs to take into account the special circumstances of indigenous offenders in its decision- making. failing to do so may render a decision (eg, denial of a transfer from a medium security facility to a minimum security facility) un- reasonable however, s.  4(g) does not assist this court in choosing between the competing interpre- tations of the type of information that is within the scope of s 24(1). indeed, my colleague does not rely on s. 4(g) to do so, but rather relies on it to interpret the “reasonable steps” requirement after he has de- termined that the results of the impugned tools is information that has to be accurate under s. 24(1), ie, that the tests must be valid. [124] in addition, my colleague’s interpretation of the “reasonable steps” requirement in s. 24(1) leaves open some important questions about the scope of the csc’s obligations. if the csc must study the impugned tools to ensure their validity and reliabil- ity with respect to indigenous offenders, what level of specifi city is required? must it distinguish be- tween métis and other indigenous offenders? must it distinguish between indigenous persons who live on reserve and those who live off reserve? must it distinguish between male and female aboriginal of- fenders? or with respect to other groups with unique “gender, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences”? the majority reasons will invite further challenges on this issue. the courts will then be faced with diffi - cult line- drawing exercises about the degree to which these tools must be validated with respect to specifi c communities. while it is desirable for the csc to search for better decision- making methodologies, it is not the courts who are best equipped to engage in this exercise, as compared to the csc itself or actu- arial experts. section 24 was not intended to require the courts to look behind these decisions. [123] comme je l’ai mentionné, je suis entièrement d’accord avec les juges majoritaires lorsqu’ils affi r- ment que le scc doit tenir compte de la situation particulière des délinquants autochtones dans son processus décisionnel. s’il ne le fait pas, sa décision (p ex refuser qu’un détenu soit transféré d’un éta- blissement à sécurité moyenne à un établissement à sécurité minimale) pourrait bien devenir déraison- nable. toutefois, l’al. 4g) n’aide pas la cour à choisir entre les différentes interprétations possibles du type de renseignements qui sont visés par le par 24(1). d’ailleurs, pour ce faire, mon collègue ne s’appuie pas sur l’al 4g). il s’y appuie plutôt pour interpréter l’obligation d’agir « dans la mesure du possible » après avoir décidé que les résultats produits par les outils contestés sont des renseignements qui doivent être exacts selon le par. 24(1), c-à-d que les tests doivent être valides. [124] qui plus est, l’interprétation donnée par mon collègue à l’obligation d’agir « dans la mesure du possible » énoncée au par. 24(1) laisse en suspens certaines questions importantes au sujet de la portée des obligations du scc. si le scc doit étudier les outils contestés pour assurer leur validité et leur fi a- bilité à l’égard des délinquants autochtones, à quel degré de spécifi cité est-il tenu? doit-il distinguer les délinquants métis des autres délinquants autoch- tones? doit-il faire une distinction entre les autoch- tones qui vivent dans les réserves de ceux qui vivent en dehors de celles-ci? doit-il distinguer les délin- quants autochtones des délinquantes autochtones? ou à l’endroit des autres groupes ayant des « diffé- rences ethniques, culturelles et linguistiques, ainsi qu’entre les sexes » qui leur sont propres? les motifs de la majorité donneront lieu à d’autres contestations sur ce point. les tribunaux devront alors s’atteler à la tâche diffi cile d’établir à quel point ces outils doivent être validés à l’égard de certains groupes. bien qu’il soit souhaitable pour le scc de chercher de meilleurs mécanismes de prise de décision, ce ne sont pas les tribunaux qui sont les mieux outillés pour se prêter à cet exercice, comparativement au scc lui- même ou aux experts actuariels. l’article 24 n’était pas censé obliger les tribunaux à se pencher sur ce qui a mené à ces décisions. 222 ewert v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. [125] one can readily understand mr.  ewert’s frustration with the csc’s failure, after his repeated requests, to study the validity of the assessment tools when used with indigenous offenders. the csc re- sponded to mr. ewert’s 2005 grievance by telling him that they were studying the tools. the reviewing judges of the federal courts took note of the csc’s delayed response and declined to order costs to the csc: ewert (2007), at para. 71, ewert (2008), at para 11. a further decade has passed. this further delay, without any valid explanation, might make the csc’s actions unreasonable. but, that is not the issue that is now before us. [125] on peut facilement comprendre la frustration de m. ewert alors que, malgré ses demandes répé- tées, le scc n’a pas mené d’étude sur la validité des outils d’évaluation à l’égard de délinquants autoch- tones. le scc a répondu au grief déposé en 2005 par m. ewert en lui disant qu’il menait une étude sur ces outils. les juges des cours fédérales siégeant en contrôle ont pris acte de la réaction tardive du scc et ont refusé de lui accorder ses dépens : ewert (2007), par. 71, ewert (2008), par 11. il s’est depuis écoulé une autre décennie. ce nouveau délai, pour lequel aucune explication valable n’a été fournie, pourrait rendre déraisonnables les mesures prises par le scc. mais là n’est pas la question dont nous sommes actuellement saisis. b what is the appropriate remedy in this case? b quelle réparation convient-il d’accorder en l’es- [126] i would dismiss the appeal on the basis that s. 24(1) does not impose an obligation on the csc to study the impugned tools, but in addition i differ from the majority as to the remedy. my colleague grants a declaration, relying on the exceptional cir- cumstances of this case. notwithstanding these cir- cumstances, i would decline to do so. [127] this court has stated that “[t]he proper rem- edy for breach of statutory duty by a public authority, traditionally viewed, is judicial review for invalid- ity”: holland v. saskatchewan, 2008 scc 42, [2008] 2 scr 551, at para 9. allowing inmates to apply to the federal court for a declaration that the csc has violated s. 24 or some other provision would effectively bypass the ordinary process of judicial re- view. the consequences of a declaratory “bypass” of judicial review are signifi cant. such a remedy would fail to accord the deference that is typically shown to administrative decision makers. this could open the door to “undue interference with the discharge of administrative functions in respect of the matters delegated to administrative bodies by parliament and legislatures”: dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, at para 27. pèce? [126] je rejetterais le pourvoi au motif que le par. 24(1) n’impose pas au scc l’obligation d’étu- dier les outils contestés, mais je ne suis en outre pas d’accord avec la majorité quant à la réparation à ac- corder. mon collègue rend un jugement déclaratoire en s’appuyant sur les circonstances exceptionnelles de l’espèce. malgré ces circonstances, je m’abstien- drais de le faire. [127] notre cour a déclaré que « [l]e recours tradi- tionnellement reconnu lorsqu’une autorité publique manque à son obligation légale est la demande de contrôle judiciaire pour invalidité  »  : holland c. saskatchewan, 2008 csc 42, [2008] 2 rcs 551, par 9. permettre aux détenus de s’adresser à la cour fédérale afi n d’obtenir un jugement déclarant que le scc a violé l’art. 24 ou une autre disposition reviendrait dans les faits à contourner le processus ordinaire de contrôle judiciaire. les conséquences d’un tel contournement sous forme de jugement dé- claratoire sont importantes. les décideurs adminis- tratifs n’auraient pas droit à la déférence qui leur est normalement accordée. il pourrait s’ensuivre une « immixtion injustifi ée dans l’exercice de fonctions administratives en certaines matières déterminées par le législateur » : dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, par 27. [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada le juge rowe 223 [128] while i am sympathetic to mr. ewert’s situ- ation, it is unwise to depart from settled legal prin- ciples, even on the hard facts of this case. [128] bien que je sois sensible à la situation de m. ewert, il est imprudent de s’écarter des principes juridiques établis, même au vu de la dure réalité en l’espèce. v disposition v dispositif [129] i would dismiss the appeal. [129] je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. appendix annexe relevant statutory provisions dispositions légales pertinentes canadian charter of rights and freedoms charte canadienne des droits et libertés 7 everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 7 chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu’en conformité avec les principes de justice fondamentale. 15. (1) every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefi t of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 15. (1) la loi ne fait acception de personne et s’ap- plique également à tous, et tous ont droit à la même pro- tection et au même bénéfi ce de la loi, indépendamment de toute discrimination, notamment des discriminations fondées sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l’âge ou les défi ciences men- tales ou physiques. (2) subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of con- ditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. (2) le paragraphe (1) n’a pas pour effet d’interdire les lois, programmes ou activités destinés à améliorer la situa- tion d’individus ou de groupes défavorisés, notamment du fait de leur race, de leur origine nationale ou ethnique, de leur couleur, de leur religion, de leur sexe, de leur âge ou de leurs défi ciences mentales ou physiques. corrections and conditional release act, sc 1992, c. 20 loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, lc 1992, c. 20 part i partie i institutional and community corrections système correctionnel . purpose and principles objet et principes purpose of correctional system but du système correctionnel 3 the purpose of the federal correctional system is to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by 3 le système correctionnel vise à contribuer au maintien d’une société juste, vivant en paix et en sécurité, d’une part, en assurant l’exécution des peines par des mesures de 224 ewert v canada [2018] 2 scr. (a) carrying out sentences imposed by courts through the safe and humane custody and supervision of of- fenders; and (b) assisting the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community as law- abiding citi- zens through the provision of programs in penitentia- ries and in the community. garde et de surveillance sécuritaires et humaines, et d’autre part, en aidant au moyen de programmes appropriés dans les pénitenciers ou dans la collectivité, à la réadaptation des délinquants et à leur réinsertion sociale à titre de ci- toyens respectueux des lois. paramount consideration critère prépondérant 3.1 the protection of society is the paramount considera- tion for the service in the corrections process. 3.1 la protection de la société est le critère prépondé- rant appliqué par le service dans le cadre du processus correctionnel. principles that guide service principes de fonctionnement 4 the principles that guide the service in achieving the purpose referred to in section 3 are as follows: 4 le service est guidé, dans l’exécution du mandat visé à l’article 3, par les principes suivants : .   . (c) the service uses measures that are consistent with the protection of society, staff members and offenders and that are limited to only what is necessary and pro- portionate to attain the purposes of this act; c) il prend les mesures qui, compte tenu de la protec- tion de la société, des agents et des délinquants, ne vont pas au- delà de ce qui est nécessaire et proportionnel aux objectifs de la présente loi; .   . (g) correctional policies, programs and practices re- spect gender, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences and are responsive to the special needs of women, aboriginal peoples, persons requiring mental health care and other groups; g) ses directives d’orientation générale, programmes et pratiques respectent les différences ethniques, cul- turelles et linguistiques, ainsi qu’entre les sexes, et tiennent compte des besoins propres aux femmes, aux autochtones, aux personnes nécessitant des soins de santé mentale et à d’autres groupes; .   . information renseignements service to obtain certain information about offender obtention de renseignements 23 (1) when a person is sentenced, committed or trans- ferred to penitentiary, the service shall take all reasonable steps to obtain, as soon as is practicable, 23 (1) le service doit, dans les meilleurs délais après la condamnation ou le transfèrement d’une personne au pé- nitencier, prendre toutes mesures possibles pour obtenir : (a) relevant information about the offence; a) les renseignements pertinents concernant l’infrac- tion en cause; [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada 225 (b) relevant information about the person’s personal history, including the person’s social, economic, crim- inal and young- offender history; b) les renseignements personnels pertinents, notam- ment les antécédents sociaux, économiques et crimi- nels, y compris comme jeune contrevenant; (c) any reasons and recommendations relating to the sentencing or committal that are given or made by (i) the court that convicts, sentences or commits the person, and (ii) any court that hears an appeal from the convic- tion, sentence or committal; (d) any reports relevant to the conviction, sentence or committal that are submitted to a court mentioned in sub- paragraph (c)(i) or (ii); and (e) any other information relevant to administering the sentence or committal, including existing information from the victim, the victim impact statement and the tran- script of any comments made by the sentencing judge regarding parole eligibility. c) les motifs donnés par le tribunal ayant prononcé la condamnation, infl igé la peine ou ordonné la détention — ou par le tribunal d’appel — en ce qui touche la peine ou la détention, ainsi que les recommandations afférentes en l’espèce; d) les rapports remis au tribunal concernant la condam- nation, la peine ou l’incarcération; e) tous autres renseignements concernant l’exécution de la peine ou de la détention, notamment les rensei- gnements obtenus de la victime, la déclaration de la victime quant aux conséquences de l’infraction et la transcription des observations du juge qui a prononcé la peine relativement à l’admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle. access by offender accès du délinquant aux renseignements (2) where access to the information obtained by the service pursuant to subsection (1) is requested by the offender in writing, the offender shall be provided with access in the prescribed manner to such information as would be disclosed under the privacy act and the access to information act. (2) le délinquant qui demande par écrit que les rensei- gnements visés au paragraphe (1) lui soient communiqués a accès, conformément au règlement, aux renseignements qui, en vertu de la loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et de la loi sur l’accès à l’information, lui seraient communiqués. disclosure to service communication de renseignements au service (3) no provision in the privacy act or the access to in- formation act shall operate so as to limit or prevent the service from obtaining any information referred to in paragraphs (1)(a) to (e). (3) aucune disposition de la loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels ou de la loi sur l’accès à l’information n’a pour effet d’empêcher ou de limiter l’obtention par le service des renseignements visés aux alinéas (1)a) à e). accuracy, etc., of information exactitude des renseignements 24 (1) the service shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that any information about an offender that it uses is as accurate, up to date and complete as possible. 24 (1) le service est tenu de veiller, dans la mesure du possible, à ce que les renseignements qu’il utilise concer- nant les délinquants soient à jour, exacts et complets. 226 ewert v canada [2018] 2 scr. correction of information correction des renseignements (2) where an offender who has been given access to in- formation by the service pursuant to subsection 23(2) believes that there is an error or omission therein, (a) the offender may request the service to correct that information; and (b) where the request is refused, the service shall attach to the information a notation indicating that the offender has requested a correction and setting out the correction requested. (2) le délinquant qui croit que les renseignements aux- quels il a eu accès en vertu du paragraphe  23(2) sont erronés ou incomplets peut demander que le service en effectue la correction; lorsque la demande est refusée, le service doit faire mention des corrections qui ont été demandées mais non effectuées. service to give information to parole boards, etc. communication de renseignements 25 (1) the service shall give, at the appropriate times, to the parole board of canada, provincial governments, pro- vincial parole boards, police, and any body authorized by the service to supervise offenders, all information under its control that is relevant to release decision- making or to the supervision or surveillance of offenders. 25 (1) aux moments opportuns, le service est tenu de communiquer à la commission des libérations condition- nelles du canada, aux gouvernements provinciaux, aux commissions provinciales de libération conditionnelle, à la police et à tout organisme agréé par le service en matière de surveillance de délinquants les renseignements pertinents dont il dispose soit pour prendre la décision de les mettre en liberté soit pour leur surveillance.   .   . disclosure of information to victims communication de renseignements à la victime 26 (1) at the request of a victim of an offence committed by an offender, the commissioner 26 (1) sur demande de la victime, le commissaire : (a) shall disclose to the victim the following informa- tion about the offender: a) communique à celle-ci les renseignements suivants : (i) the offender’s name, (i) le nom du délinquant, (ii) the offence of which the offender was convicted and the court that convicted the offender, (ii) l’infraction dont il a été trouvé coupable et le tribunal qui l’a condamné, (iii) the date of commencement and length of the sentence that the offender is serving, and (iii) la date de début et la durée de la peine qu’il purge, (iv) eligibility dates and review dates applicable to the offender under this act in respect of temporary absences or parole; (iv) les dates d’admissibilité et d’examen appli- cables aux permissions de sortir ou à la libération conditionnelle; (b) may disclose to the victim any of the follow- ing information about the offender, where in the b) peut lui communiquer tout ou partie des rensei- gnements suivants si, à son avis, l’intérêt de la victime [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada 227 commissioner’s opinion the interest of the victim in such disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of the offender’s privacy that could result from the dis- closure: justifi erait nettement une éventuelle violation de la vie privée du délinquant : (i) the offender’s age, (i) l’âge du délinquant, (ii) the name and location of the penitentiary in which the sentence is being served, (ii) le nom et l’emplacement du pénitencier où il est détenu, (ii.1) if the offender is transferred, a summary of the reasons for the transfer and the name and lo- cation of the penitentiary in which the sentence is being served, (ii.2) if the offender is to be transferred to a min- imum security institution as designated by com- missioner’s directive and it is possible to notify the victim before the transfer, a summary of the reasons for the transfer and the name and location of the institution in which the sentence is to be served, (ii.3) the programs that were designed to address the needs of the offender and contribute to their successful reintegration into the community in which the offender is participating or has partic- ipated, (ii.1) en cas de transfèrement dans un autre péni- tencier, le nom et l’emplacement de celui-ci et un résumé des motifs du transfèrement, (ii.2) dans la mesure du possible, un préavis du transfèrement dans un établissement à sécurité mini- male au sens des directives du commissaire, le nom et l’emplacement de l’établissement et un résumé des motifs du transfèrement, (ii.3) les programmes visant à répondre aux be- soins et à contribuer à la réinsertion sociale des délinquants auxquels le délinquant participe ou a participé, (ii.4) the serious disciplinary offences that the of- fender has committed, (ii.4) les infractions disciplinaires graves qu’il a commises, (iii) information pertaining to the offender’s cor- rectional plan, including information regarding the offender’s progress towards meeting the objectives of the plan, (iii) des renseignements concernant son plan cor- rectionnel, notamment les progrès qu’il a accomplis en vue d’en atteindre les objectifs, (iv) the date of any hearing for the purposes of a review under section 130, (iv) la date de toute audience prévue à l’égard de l’examen visé à l’article 130, (v) that the offender has been removed from canada under the immigration and refugee protection act before the expiration of the sentence, and (v) son renvoi du canada dans le cadre de la loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés avant l’expiration de sa peine, (vi) [repealed, 2015, c. 13, s. 46] (vi) [abrogé, 2015, ch. 13, art. 46] (vii) whether the offender is in custody and, if not, the reason why the offender is not in custody; (vii) s’il est sous garde et, le cas échéant, les raisons pour lesquelles il ne l’est pas; 228 ewert v canada [2018] 2 scr. (c) shall disclose to the victim any of the following in- formation about the offender, if, in the commissioner’s opinion, the disclosure would not have a negative im- pact on the safety of the public: c) lui communique tout ou partie des renseignements ci- après si, à son avis, cette communication n’aurait pas d’incidence négative sur la sécurité du public : (i) the date, if any, on which the offender is to be released on temporary absence, work release, parole or statutory release, (i) la date de la mise en liberté du délinquant au titre d’une permission de sortir, d’un placement à l’exté- rieur ou de la libération conditionnelle ou d’offi ce, (ii) the conditions attached to the offender’s tem- porary absence, work release, parole or statutory release, (ii) les conditions dont est assorti la permission de sortir, le placement à l’extérieur ou la libération conditionnelle ou d’offi ce, (iii) the destination of the offender on any tem- porary absence, work release, parole or statutory release, whether the offender will be in the vicinity of the victim while travelling to that destination and the reasons for any temporary absence; and (iii) la destination du délinquant lors de sa permis- sion de sortir et les raisons de celle-ci, sa destination lors de son placement à l’extérieur, sa libération conditionnelle ou d’offi ce et son éventuel rappro- chement de la victime, selon son itinéraire; (d) shall provide the victim with access to a photo- graph of the offender taken on the occurrence of the earliest of any of the following — and any subsequent photograph of the offender taken by the service — if, in the commissioner’s opinion, to do so would not have a negative impact on the safety of the public: d) lui donne accès à une photographie du délinquant au premier des événements ci- après, ou à toute nouvelle photographie du délinquant prise par le service par la suite, si, à son avis, cet accès n’aurait pas d’incidence négative sur la sécurité du public : (i) the release of the offender on unescorted tem- porary absence, (i) la mise en liberté du délinquant lors d’une per- mission de sortir sans escorte, (ii) the offender’s work release, (ii) son placement à l’extérieur, (iii) the offender’s release on parole, and (iii) sa libération conditionnelle, (iv) the offender’s release by virtue of statutory release or the expiration of the sentence. (iv) sa libération d’office ou l’expiration de sa peine.   .   . information to be given to offenders communication de renseignements au délinquant 27 (1) where an offender is entitled by this part or the regulations to make representations in relation to a de- cision to be taken by the service about the offender, the person or body that is to take the decision shall, subject to subsection (3), give the offender, a reasonable period before the decision is to be taken, all the information to be considered in the taking of the decision or a summary of that information. 27 (1) sous réserve du paragraphe (3), la personne ou l’organisme chargé de rendre, au nom du service, une décision au sujet d’un délinquant doit, lorsque celui-ci a le droit en vertu de la présente partie ou des règlements de présenter des observations, lui communiquer, dans un délai raisonnable avant la prise de décision, tous les ren- seignements entrant en ligne de compte dans celle-ci, ou un sommaire de ceux-ci. [2018] 2 rcs. ewert c canada 229 idem idem (2) where an offender is entitled by this part or the reg- ulations to be given reasons for a decision taken by the service about the offender, the person or body that takes the decision shall, subject to subsection (3), give the of- fender, forthwith after the decision is taken, all the infor- mation that was considered in the taking of the decision or a summary of that information. (2) sous réserve du paragraphe (3), cette personne ou cet organisme doit, dès que sa décision est rendue, faire connaître au délinquant qui y a droit au titre de la pré- sente partie ou des règlements les renseignements pris en compte dans la décision, ou un sommaire de ceux-ci. appeal allowed in part, côté and rowe jj. dis- pourvoi accueilli en partie, les juges côté et senting in part. rowe sont dissidents en partie. procureurs de l’appelant : gratl & company, vancouver; eric purtzki, vancouver. vancouver; eric purtzki, vancouver. procureur de l’intimée : procureur général du canada, ottawa. canada, ottawa. association of canada and the canadian associa- tion of elizabeth fry societies: nelligan o’brien payne, ottawa; native women’s association of can- ada, ottawa. procureurs des intervenantes l’association des femmes autochtones du canada et l’association canadienne des sociétés elizabeth fry : nelligan o’brien payne, ottawa; association des femmes autochtones du canada, ottawa. legal committee: perez bryan procope, toronto; advocacy centre for the elderly, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant mental health legal committee : perez bryan procope, toronto; advo- cacy centre for the elderly, toronto. solicitors for the interveners the west coast prison justice society and the prisoners’ legal ser- vices: nanda & company, edmonton. procureurs des intervenants west coast prison justice society et prisoners’ legal services : nanda & company, edmonton. rights commission: canadian human rights com- mission, ottawa. procureur de l’intervenante la commission ca- nadienne des droits de la personne : commission canadienne des droits de la personne, ottawa. procureur de l’intervenant aboriginal legal ser- services: aboriginal legal services, toronto. vices : aboriginal legal services, toronto. association (ontario): presser barristers, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association (ontario) : presser barristers, toronto. civil liberties association and the union of british columbia indian chiefs: champ & associates, ot- tawa. procureurs des intervenantes british columbia civil liberties association et l’union des chefs in- diens de la colombie- britannique : champ & asso- ciates, ottawa.
[1] over 25 years ago, in canadian broadcasting corp. v. lessard, [1991] 3 scr 421, and its com- panion case canadian broadcasting corp. v. new brunswick (attorney general), [1991] 3 scr 459, this court established a general framework govern- ing applications by the police for search warrants — and, as recognized in subsequent cases, production orders — relating to the media. this framework, reaffirmed just eight years ago in r v. national post, 2010 scc 16, [2010] 1 scr 477, seeks to balance two competing concepts: the state’s interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime, and the me- dia’s right to privacy in gathering and disseminating the news. il y a plus de 25 ans, dans l’arrêt société radio‑ [1] canada c. lessard, [1991] 3 rcs 421, et dans la cause connexe société radio‑ canada c. nouveau‑ brunswick (procureur général), [1991] 3  rcs. 459, la cour a énoncé un cadre d’analyse général pour régir les demandes présentées par la police en vue d’obtenir des mandats de perquisition  — et, comme il a été reconnu dans des causes subsé- quentes, des ordonnances de communication — en lien avec les médias. ce cadre d’analyse, réaffirmé il y a seulement huit ans dans r c. national post, 2010 csc 16, [2010] 1 rcs 477, vise à mettre en balance deux concepts contradictoires : l’intérêt de l’état à enquêter sur les crimes et à poursuivre leurs auteurs, d’une part, et le droit des médias à la confidentialité des renseignements dans le processus de collecte et de diffusion des informations, d’autre part. [2] the appellants, a media organization and one of its journalists, say that this framework is not work- ing. they claim that, in practice, it serves as nothing more than a “rubber stamp” permitting the police to access materials in the hands of the media. they submit that it must therefore be reformed — perhaps even abandoned entirely — to provide stronger pro- tection for the media and the special role it plays in a free and democratic society. applying this stronger protection, they maintain that the production order challenged in this case (“production order”), which requires them to produce records of communications [2] les appelants, un organe de presse et un de ses journalistes, affirment que ce cadre d’analyse ne fonctionne pas. ils soutiennent que, en pratique, il ne sert qu’à « entériner d’office » les demandes de la police pour lui donner accès à des documents dont les médias ont possession. selon eux, il est donc nécessaire de modifier ce cadre — voire de carrément l’abandonner  — pour mieux protéger les médias ainsi que le rôle particulier qu’ils jouent dans une société libre et démocratique. à leur avis, si une telle protection accrue était appliquée, l’or- donnance de communication contestée en l’espèce 388 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. they had with a suspected terrorist, should be set aside. [3] the respondent, the crown, sees things dif- ferently. it submits that the existing framework ad- equately protects the media and the special role it plays. further, it maintains that the production order was properly issued in accordance with that frame- work and should not be set aside. [4] for reasons that follow, i am of the view that the lessard framework continues to provide a suit- able model for considering applications for search warrants and production orders relating to the me- dia. i would, however, refine certain aspects of that framework: (« ordonnance de communication »), qui leur intime de produire des relevés de conversations qu’ils ont eues avec un individu soupçonné de terrorisme, devrait être annulée. [3] l’intimée, la couronne, voit les choses autre- ment. elle soutient que le cadre d’analyse actuel protège adéquatement les médias et le rôle parti- culier qu’ils jouent. en outre, elle fait valoir que l’ordonnance de communication a été rendue comme il se doit, en conformité avec ce cadre d’analyse, et qu’elle ne devrait pas être annulée. [4] pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis que le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans lessard constitue encore un modèle convenable pour juger du bien- fondé des demandes visant l’obtention de mandats de perquisition et d’ordonnances de communication en lien avec les médias. je préciserais toutefois certains aspects de ce cadre : • • first, rather than treating prior partial publica- tion as a factor that always militates in favour of granting an order, i would assess the effect of prior partial publication on a case-by- case basis. • premièrement, plutôt que de considérer la pu- blication partielle antérieure comme un facteur qui milite toujours pour le prononcé de l’ordon- nance, j’évaluerais l’effet d’une telle publication au cas par cas. second, with respect to the standard of review to be applied when reviewing an order relating to the media that was made ex parte, i would adopt a modified garofoli standard (see r v. garofoli, [1990] 2 scr 1421): if the media points to information not before the authorizing judge that, in the reviewing judge’s opinion, could reasonably have affected the authorizing judge’s decision to issue the order, then the media will be entitled to a de novo review. otherwise, the traditional garofoli standard will apply, meaning that the order may be set aside only if the media can establish that — in light of the record before the authorizing judge, as amplified on review — there was no reasonable basis on which the au- thorizing judge could have granted the order. • deuxièmement, en ce qui a trait à la norme de contrôle qu’il convient d’adopter lors de l’exa- men d’une ordonnance rendue ex parte en lien avec un média, j’adopterais une version modifiée de la norme établie dans r c. garofoli, [1990] 2 rcs 1421 : si le média fait état de rensei- gnements qui n’ont pas été portés à l’attention du juge qui a autorisé la communication, et qui, selon le juge siégeant en révision, auraient rai- sonnablement pu avoir une incidence sur la dé- cision du premier juge de rendre l’ordonnance, le média a droit à un examen de novo. sinon, la norme traditionnelle établie dans garofoli s’ap- plique, c’est-à-dire que l’ordonnance ne peut être annulée que si le média est en mesure de démontrer — à la lumière du dossier porté à l’attention du premier juge, étoffé de nouveaux éléments durant le contrôle — que le juge qui a autorisé le mandat et la communication ne disposait d’aucun fondement raisonnable pour avoir rendu l’ordonnance. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 389 • third, i would reorganize the lessard factors to make them easier to apply in practice. [5] turning to the case at hand, and applying the refined lessard framework, i would not set aside the production order. here, the state’s interest in investigating and prosecuting the alleged crimes out- weighs the appellants’ right to privacy in gathering and disseminating the news. importantly, disclosure of the materials sought would not reveal a confiden- tial source; no “off the record” or “not for attribu- tion” communications would be disclosed; there is no alternative source through which the materials sought may be obtained; the source used the media to publicize his activities with a terrorist organiza- tion and broadcast its extremist views as a sort of spokesperson on its behalf; and the state’s interest in investigating and prosecuting the alleged crimes — which include serious terrorism offences — weighs heavily in the balance. accordingly, i would dismiss the appeal. • troisièmement, je réorganiserais les facteurs éta- blis dans lessard pour qu’ils soient plus faciles à appliquer en pratique. [5] dans la présente affaire, après avoir appliqué le cadre d’analyse établi dans lessard et désormais peau- finé, je serais d’avis de ne pas annuler l’ordonnance de communication. en l’espèce, l’intérêt de l’état à enquêter sur les crimes présumés et à poursuivre leurs auteurs l’emporte sur le droit des appelants à la confidentialité des renseignements dans la collecte et la diffusion des informations. fait important, la communication des renseignements recherchés ne révélerait pas l’identité d’une source confidentielle; aucune communication faite « à titre confidentiel » ou « sous le couvert de l’anonymat » ne serait divulguée; il n’existe aucune autre source par qui il serait possible d’obtenir les renseignements demandés; la source s’est servi du média, en quelque sorte comme porte- parole pour elle, afin de rendre publiques ses activités auprès d’un groupe terroriste et de diffuser ses idées extrémistes; et l’intérêt de l’état à enquêter sur les crimes présumés — qui comprennent des infractions graves de terrorisme — et à poursuivre leurs auteurs pèsent lourd dans la balance. en conséquence, je suis d’avis de rejeter l’appel. [6] before setting out my reasons, i wish to clarify at the outset that this case does not engage the new journalistic sources protection act, sc 2017, c. 22 (“jspa”), brought into force in october 2017. among other things, the jspa provides enhanced protections for maintaining the confidentiality of a “journalistic source”1 and sets out a new framework governing applications for search warrants, production orders, and other orders relating to a “journalist”.2 although, going forward, this new regime will govern pro- duction orders relating to “journalists”, even where [6] avant d’exposer mes motifs, je souhaite pré- ciser d’emblée que la présente affaire ne met pas en cause la nouvelle loi sur la protection des sources journalistiques, lc 2017, c. 22 («  lpsj »), en- trée en vigueur en octobre 2017. cette loi confère notamment des protections accrues pour le main- tien de la confidentialité d’une « source journalis- tique »1 et énonce un nouveau cadre d’analyse pour régir les demandes de mandats de perquisition, les ordonnances de communication ainsi que les autres ordonnances relatives à un « journaliste »2. même 1 2 “journalistic source” is defined in s 391(1) of the canada ev‑ idence act, rsc 1985, c. c-5, as “a source that confidentially transmits information to a journalist on the journalist’s undertak- ing not to divulge the identity of the source, whose anonymity is essential to the relationship between the journalist and the source”. “journalist” is defined in s 391(1) of the canada evidence act as “a person whose main occupation is to contribute directly, either regularly or occasionally, for consideration, to the collection, writing or production of information for dissemination by the media, or anyone who assists such a person”. 1 le terme « source journalistique » est défini au par 391(1) de la loi sur la preuve au canada, lrc 1985, c. c-5, comme une « source qui transmet confidentiellement de l’information à un journaliste avec son engagement, en contrepartie, de ne pas divulguer l’identité de la source, dont l’anonymat est essentiel aux rapports entre le journaliste et la source ». 2 le terme « journaliste » est défini au par 391(1) de la loi sur la preuve au canada comme une « personne dont l’occupation principale consiste à contribuer directement et moyennant rétri- bution, soit régulièrement ou occasionnellement, à la collecte, la rédaction ou la production d’informations en vue de leur diffusion par les médias, ou tout collaborateur de cette personne ». 390 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. no confidential source is involved, the facts in this case arose before the jspa was brought into force, and therefore it does not apply. accordingly, these reasons deal with the statutory and common law framework standing separate and apart from the jspa. given that the legal landscape in this area has changed and now has a new and untested statutory component, and bearing in mind the lack of any real merit to the argument that, on the facts of this case, the production order should be set aside, i am of the view that we should adopt a narrow approach that is restricted to the issues raised by the parties both here and in the courts below. si, à l’avenir, ce nouveau régime dictera comment traiter des ordonnances de communication relatives à des « journalistes », et ce, même lorsqu’il ne sera pas question de sources confidentielles, les faits de la présente cause se sont produits avant l’entrée en vigueur de la lpsj, qui ne s’applique donc pas. en conséquence, les présents motifs traitent du cadre juridique légal et de common law distinct de celui établi par la lpsj comme le paysage juridique dans ce domaine a changé et qu’il existe mainte- nant un nouvel élément législatif qui n’a pas fait l’objet d’un examen judiciaire, et compte tenu de l’absence de fondement à l’argument selon lequel, suivant les faits de la présente affaire, l’ordon- nance de communication devrait être annulée, je suis d’avis que nous devons adopter une approche étroite qui se limite aux questions soulevées par les parties ici et devant les tribunaux d’instances inférieures. ii facts ii faits [7] my colleague has summarized the relevant facts and judicial history in her reasons, and i see no need to duplicate her efforts. i will refer to the facts only as necessary to develop a particular issue. however, to briefly summarize, vice media canada inc (“vice media”) is a company that produces stories and content on a number of multimedia plat- forms. in 2014, one of its reporters, ben makuch (together with vice media, the “appellants”), be- gan exchanging with a canadian man suspected of having joined the islamic state of iraq and syria (“isis”), farah mohamed shirdon, through an in- stant text messaging application, kik messenger. based on these exchanges, mr. makuch wrote three news stories and vice media published the articles. the rcmp sought and obtained the production order, which directed the appellants to hand over screen captures of mr. makuch’s exchanges with mr shirdon. the appellants unsuccessfully chal- lenged the production order in the courts below and now appeal to this court. [7] ma collègue a résumé les faits pertinents ainsi que l’historique judiciaire de la cause dans ses mo- tifs; je ne vois pas l’utilité de dupliquer ses efforts. je ne ferai donc référence aux faits que lorsque cela sera nécessaire pour traiter d’une question en parti- culier. cela dit, pour résumer, média vice canada inc. (« média vice ») est une compagnie qui produit des histoires et du contenu sur un grand nombre de plateformes multimédias. en 2014, un de ses jour- nalistes, ben makuch (conjointement avec média vice, les « appelants »), a commencé à communiquer avec un canadien soupçonné d’avoir rallié l’état is- lamique de l’irak et de la syrie (« daech »), farah mohamed shirdon, au moyen d’une application de messagerie texte instantanée, kik messenger. en se fondant sur ces échanges, m. makuch a écrit trois articles qu’a publiés média vice. la grc a sollicité et obtenu une ordonnance de communication qui intimait aux appelants de lui remettre les captures d’écran des échanges qu’avait eus m. makuch avec m shirdon. la tentative des appelants de contester l’ordonnance de communication a échoué devant les cours d’instances inférieures. ils interjettent mainte- nant appel devant la cour. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 391 iii issues iii questions en litige [8] this appeal raises four main issues: [8] le présent appel soulève principalement quatre questions : (1) should the lessard framework be reformed? (1) le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans lessard de- (2) where the police are seeking a production order relating to the media, should a presumptive no- tice requirement be imposed? vrait-il être modifié? (2) lorsque la police sollicite une ordonnance de communication en lien avec un média, faudrait-il imposer une exigence présumée de signifier un avis? (3) what is the standard of review to be applied on review of a production order relating to the media? (3) quelle est la norme de contrôle applicable à l’examen d’une ordonnance de communication en lien avec un média? (4) should the production order be set aside? (4) l’ordonnance de communication devrait- elle iv analysis être annulée? iv analyse a should the lessard framework be reformed? a le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans lessard de‑ [9] the main jurisprudential question on appeal can be stated simply: does the lessard framework provide adequate protection to the media and the special role it plays in canadian society, or does it need to be reformed or perhaps even abandoned? to answer this question, i consider it necessary to first review the three key precedents that have shaped this area of the law: lessard, new brunswick and national post. vrait‑il être modifié? [9] la principale question jurisprudentielle en appel peut être formulée simplement  : le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans lessard offre-t-il une pro- tection suffisante aux médias ainsi qu’au rôle par- ticulier qu’ils jouent dans la société canadienne, ou a-t-il besoin d’être modifié, voire abandonné? pour répondre à cette question, j’estime qu’il est nécessaire de commencer par examiner les trois précédents clés qui ont façonné ce domaine du droit  : lessard, nouveau‑ brunswick et national post. (1) lessard, new brunswick and national post (1) lessard, nouveau‑brunswick et national post in both lessard and new brunswick, canadian [10] broadcasting corporation (“cbc”) reporters cap- tured video footage of individuals engaging in what appeared to be criminal activity: in lessard, occupying and damaging a post office building in pointe- claire, quebec; in new brunswick, throwing molotov cocktails at a guardhouse in st- quentin, new brunswick, setting it aflame. parts of the foot- age were broadcast on television. the police subse- quently applied for search warrants permitting them [10] tant dans l’arrêt lessard que dans l’arrêt nouveau‑ brunswick, des journalistes de la société radio- canada (« src ») avaient filmé sur bande vi- déo des individus impliqués dans ce qui semblait être une activité criminelle : dans lessard, ces individus avaient occupé et causé des dommages à un bureau de poste à pointe- claire, au québec; dans nouveau‑ brunswick, ils avaient lancé des cocktails molotov sur un poste de garde à st- quentin, au nouveau- brunswick, y mettant ainsi le feu. une partie des 392 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. to search cbc’s premises and seize the tapes in their entirety — both aired and unaired footage. in lessard, the information to obtain submit- [11] ted in support of the application contained nothing from which the authorizing justice of the peace could determine whether there was an alternative source of information, and if so, whether the police had taken reasonable steps to obtain the information from that source. in the information in new brunswick, the po- lice explained that while alternative sources existed, they either provided insufficient evidence or were unavailable or unwilling to testify. [12] in both cases, the search warrants were granted and the tapes seized. cbc then applied to have the warrants set aside. in lessard, cbc failed initially but succeeded on appeal. in new brunswick, it was the opposite. the parties then appealed to this court. [13] this court undertook the delicate task of fash- ioning a framework for determining whether an ap- plication for a search warrant relating to the media should be granted, having regard to both the right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure under s. 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms and the guarantee of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) — that is, a framework for “assess[ing] s. 8 reasonable- ness in a s. 2(b) context” (national post, at para 79). underlying this framework is the recognition that the media plays a special role in a free and democratic society and as such, investigative orders relating to the media raise unique concerns. bandes vidéo avaient été diffusées à la télévision. la police avait subséquemment sollicité des mandats de perquisition qui les autoriseraient à fouiller les locaux de la src et à saisir la totalité des bandes vidéo — soit à la fois les passages qui avaient été diffusés et ceux qui ne l’avaient pas été. [11] dans lessard, la dénonciation soumise au soutien de la demande ne contenait aucune indication qui aurait permis au juge de paix d’établir s’il existait une autre source d’information et, le cas échéant, si la police avait pris des mesures raisonnables pour obtenir l’information de cette source. en revanche, dans nouveau‑ brunswick, la police avait expliqué dans la dénonciation qu’il existait d’autres sources de renseignements, mais qu’elles fournissaient des élé- ments de preuve insuffisants, qu’elles n’étaient pas disponibles ou qu’elles ne voulaient pas témoigner. [12] dans les deux causes, les mandats de perqui- sition ont été délivrés et les bandes vidéo saisies. la src a ensuite demandé l’annulation des mandats. dans lessard, les démarches de la src ont échoué avant d’être couronnées de succès en appel. dans nouveau‑ brunswick, c’est l’inverse qui s’est produit. les parties ont ensuite interjeté appel devant la cour. [13] la cour s’est attelée à la tâche délicate de concevoir un cadre d’analyse pour décider si une demande de mandat de perquisition en lien avec un média devrait être accueillie, compte tenu à la fois du droit à la protection contre les fouilles, les per- quisitions ou les saisies abusives protégé par l’art. 8 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés et du droit à la liberté d’expression protégé par l’al. 2b) — c’est-à-dire, pour « encadrer [  ] l’analyse du ca- ractère abusif au sens de l’art. 8 dans le contexte de l’application de l’al. 2b) » : national post, par 79. ce cadre tient compte implicitement du rôle particulier que jouent les médias dans une société libre et démo- cratique et, de ce fait, il prévoit que les ordonnances en lien avec les médias et relatives à des enquêtes soulèvent des préoccupations particulières. in both lessard and new brunswick, the spe- [14] cial status accorded to the media was front and centre in cory j.’s majority reasons. in lessard, he stated that “the media are entitled to particularly careful [14] tant dans lessard que dans nouveau‑ brunswick, le statut particulier accordé aux médias était à l’avant- plan des motifs majoritaires du juge cory. dans lessard, il a affirmé que les « médias [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 393 consideration, both as to the issuance of a search warrant and as to the conditions that may be attached to a warrant to ensure that any disruption of the gath- ering and dissemination of news is limited as much as possible” and that “[t]he media are entitled to this special consideration because of the importance of their role in a democratic society” (p 444). similarly, in new brunswick, he wrote: the media have a vitally important role to play in a democratic society. it is the media that, by gathering and disseminating news, enable members of our society to make an informed assessment of the issues which may significantly affect their lives and well- being   . the importance of that role and the manner in which it must be fulfilled give rise to special concerns when a warrant is sought to search media premises. [p. 475] [15] but while he stressed the vital importance of the media and acknowledged the special concerns that arise when a warrant to search media premises is sought, cory j. clarified that rather than “import[ing] any new or additional requirements for the issuance of search warrants”, the constitutional protection of freedom of expression afforded by s. 2(b) serves as “a backdrop against which the reasonableness of the search may be evaluated” (new brunswick, at pp 475-76). he nonetheless emphasized that the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of ex- pression “requires that careful consideration be given not only to whether a warrant should issue but also to the conditions which might properly be imposed upon any search of media premises” (ibid., at p 476). ont droit à une attention toute particulière en ce qui concerne tant l’attribution d’un mandat de perqui- sition que les conditions dont peut être assorti un mandat afin que toute perturbation de la collecte et de la diffusion des informations soit le plus possible limitée » et que « [l]es médias ont droit à cette at- tention particulière en raison de l’importance de leur rôle dans une société démocratique » : p 444. de même, dans nouveau‑ brunswick, il a écrit : les médias ont un rôle primordial à jouer dans une so- ciété démocratique. ce sont les médias qui, en réunissant et en diffusant les informations, permettent aux membres de notre société de se former une opinion éclairée sur les questions susceptibles d’avoir un effet important sur leur vie et leur bien- être. [  ]. l’importance de ce rôle et la ma- nière dont il doit être rempli suscitent des préoccupations spéciales lorsqu’un mandat est demandé pour effectuer une perquisition dans les locaux d’un média. [p. 475] [15] tout en insistant sur l’importance vitale des médias et en reconnaissant l’existence de préoccupa- tions spéciales qui découlent d’une demande de man- dat en vue de la fouille de locaux d’organes de presse, le juge cory a précisé que plutôt que d’« ajoute[r des] exigences supplémentaires pour l’attribution des mandats de perquisition », la protection constitu- tionnelle que confère l’al. 2b) à la liberté d’expres- sion sert de « toile de fond qui permet d’évaluer si la perquisition est abusive » : nouveau‑ brunswick, p. 475- 476. il a néanmoins insisté pour dire que cette protection constitutionnelle « exige qu’on examine attentivement non seulement si un mandat devrait être décerné mais également les conditions dont peut à bon droit être assortie une perquisition dans les locaux d’un média » : ibid., p 476. [16] justice cory went on to articulate a list of nine factors for judges to consider when determin- ing whether to issue a search warrant relating to the media: [16] le juge cory a ensuite dressé une liste de neuf facteurs dont les juges doivent tenir compte lorsqu’ils décident s’ils doivent délivrer un mandat de perquisition en lien avec les médias : (1) all statutory requirements for the issuance of the search warrant must be met. (1) toutes les exigences prévues par la loi rela- tives à la délivrance d’un mandat de perquisition doivent être respectées. (2) if all statutory requirements have been met, then the authorizing judge “should consider all of the circumstances in determining whether to (2) s’il est satisfait à toutes les exigences prévues par la loi, le juge saisi de la demande « doit exa- miner toutes les circonstances pour déterminer 394 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. exercise his or her discretion to issue [the] war- rant”. s’il doit exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire de décerner [le] mandat ». (3) the authorizing judge “should ensure that a bal- ance is struck between the competing interests of the state in the investigation and prosecution of crimes and the right to privacy of the media in the course of their news gathering and news dissemination”, bearing in mind that “the media play a vital role in the functioning of a demo- cratic society” and that the media will generally be an innocent third party. (4) the affidavit supporting the application must contain “sufficient detail” to enable the author- izing judge to properly exercise his or her dis- cretion as to whether to issue the warrant. (5) although it is not a constitutional require- ment, the affidavit should “ordinarily” disclose whether there are alternative sources from which the information may reasonably be obtained and, if so, that those sources have been investigated and all reasonable efforts to obtain the informa- tion from those sources have been exhausted. (3) le juge saisi de la demande « doit s’assurer qu’on a bien pondéré l’intérêt de l’état à découvrir et à poursuivre les criminels et le droit des médias à la confidentialité des renseignements dans le processus de collecte et de diffusion des infor- mations », en gardant à l’esprit que « les médias jouent un rôle primordial dans le fonctionnement d’une société démocratique » et qu’ils sont géné- ralement des tiers innocents. (4) l’affidavit présenté à l’appui de la demande doit contenir « suffisamment de détails » pour permettre au juge saisi de la demande d’exercer correctement son pouvoir discrétionnaire en ce qui concerne la délivrance d’un mandat de per- quisition. (5) bien qu’il ne s’agisse pas d’une exigence consti- tutionnelle, l’affidavit devrait « ordinairement » indiquer s’il y a d’autres sources qui permet- traient d’obtenir raisonnablement les rensei- gnements et, le cas échéant, qu’elles ont été consultées et que tous les efforts raisonnables pour obtenir les renseignements auprès de ces sources ont été épuisés. (6) if the information sought has been disseminated by the media in whole or in part, then this “will be” a factor favouring the issuance of the warrant. (6) si le média a rendu publics, en tout ou en partie, les renseignements recherchés, ce facteur « favo- risera » la délivrance du mandat de perquisition. (7) if the authorizing judge determines that a war- rant should be issued, then he or she should con- sider imposing conditions on its implementation so that the media “will not be unduly impeded in the publishing or dissemination of the news”. (8) if it comes to light after the warrant is issued that the police “failed to disclose pertinent informa- tion that could well have affected the decision to issue the warrant”, then this may result in a finding that the warrant was invalid. (7) si le juge saisi de la demande décide qu’il est justifié de délivrer un mandat de perquisition, il y a alors lieu d’examiner l’imposition de cer- taines conditions à sa mise en œuvre, de manière à ce que le média « ne soit pas indûment empê- ché de publier ou de diffuser les informations ». (8) si, après l’attribution d’un mandat de perquisi- tion, il ressort que la police a « omis de commu- niquer des renseignements pertinents qui auraient bien pu influer sur la décision de décerner le mandat », il peut en résulter une conclusion que le mandat n’était pas valide. (9) if the search was unreasonably conducted, then (9) une perquisition effectuée de manière abusive this may render the search invalid. peut être invalide. (lessard, at p. 445; new brunswick, at pp. 481-82) (lessard, p. 445; nouveau‑ brunswick, p. 481- 482) [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 395 [17] justice cory added that “all factors should be evaluated in light of the particular factual situation presented” and “[t]he factors which may be vital in assessing the reasonableness of one search may be irrelevant in another” (new brunswick, at p 478) he framed the “essential question” as follows: “taking into account all the circumstances and viewing them fairly and objectively can it be said that the search was a reasonable one?” (ibid). [18] applying this framework, the majority upheld the validity of the search warrants in both cases. [19] nearly two decades later, in national post, this court had further occasion to consider the prin- ciples to be applied when the state’s interest in in- vestigating and prosecuting crime collides with the media’s s. 8 rights in a s. 2(b) context. there, in exchange for a blanket, unconditional promise of confidentiality, a secret source supplied a journalist at the national post with a plain brown envelope containing a document said to implicate a former canadian prime minister in a financial conflict of interest. having received a complaint that the doc- ument was forged, the rcmp applied for a search warrant and an assistance order permitting them to search the premises of the national post and seize the document and the envelope in which it was con- tained. although the search warrant and assistance order were initially granted, they were later quashed by the reviewing judge, only to be reinstated by the ontario court of appeal. [17] le juge cory a ajouté qu’« [o]n doit [  ] éva- luer tous les facteurs en tenant compte de la situation de fait particulière qui est présentée » et que « [l]es facteurs qui peuvent être importants pour évaluer si une perquisition est abusive peuvent ne pas être per- tinents à l’égard d’une autre » : nouveau‑ brunswick, p 478. il a circonscrit la « question essentielle » de la façon suivante : « si on a tenu compte de toutes les circonstances et si on les a examinées avec justesse et objectivité, peut-on dire que la perquisition n’était pas abusive? » : ibid. [18] en appliquant ce cadre d’analyse, les juges majoritaires ont confirmé la validité du mandat de perquisition dans les deux causes. [19] près de deux décennies plus tard, dans na‑ tional post, la cour a eu de nouveau l’occasion de se pencher sur les principes applicables lorsque l’intérêt de l’état dans les enquêtes et les pour- suites criminelles entre en conflit avec les droits des médias protégés par l’art. 8 dans le contexte de l’al 2b). dans cette affaire, en échange d’une promesse générale et inconditionnelle de confiden- tialité, une source anonyme a remis à un journaliste du quotidien national post une enveloppe brune ordinaire dans laquelle se trouvait un document qui impliquait prétendument un ancien premier ministre du canada dans un conflit d’intérêts de nature fi- nancière. puisqu’elle avait reçu une plainte selon laquelle le document était contrefait, la grc a de- mandé un mandat de perquisition et une ordonnance d’assistance qui permettraient à ses membres de fouiller les locaux du quotidien et de saisir le do- cument ainsi que l’enveloppe dans laquelle il se trouvait. initialement, tant le mandat de perquisition que l’ordonnance d’assistance ont été accordés; ils ont toutefois été annulés ultérieurement par le juge chargé de la révision, pour finalement être rétablis par la cour d’appel de l’ontario. [20] on further appeal to this court, binnie j., writ- ing for a seven- justice majority, set out the “general rule” when it comes to search and seizure: “[t]he public has the right to every person’s evidence” (national post, para 1). that rule, of course, has its exceptions. in particular, the issue before the court was to determine the circumstances in which the [20] par suite d’un appel subséquent devant la cour, le juge binnie a rédigé les motifs des sept juges majoritaires et énoncé la « règle générale » en matière de fouilles, perquisitions et saisies : « [l]e public a droit à la preuve émanant de toutes les sources  »  : national post, par.  1 bien sûr, cette règle fait l’objet d’exceptions en particulier, la 396 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. courts will respect a promise of confidentiality given by a journalist to a source. [21] in approaching this issue, binnie j. reaffirmed and applied the principles set out in lessard and new brunswick (see paras. 31-33, 79, 82 and 87). in doing so, he repeatedly emphasized the vital importance of the media and its special role in society. he de- scribed the public interest in freedom of expression as being “of immense importance” (para. 5); stated that “freedom of the press and other media of com- munication” is “vital in a society based on the rule of law” (para. 26); and recognized the “special position of the media” (para 64). he also confirmed that “freedom to publish the news necessarily involves a freedom to gather the news” (para 33). in making these observations, he confirmed and underscored s. 2(b)’s role in safeguarding the media’s freedom to gather and publish the news. [22] justice binnie acknowledged that “the law should and does accept that in some situations the public interest in protecting [a] secret source from disclosure outweighs other competing public inter- ests — including criminal investigations” (para 34). however, he rejected the argument that a judicial order compelling disclosure of a confidential source would generally violate s. 2(b) (para 41). he also declined to recognize a class privilege protecting the journalist- confidential source relationship. instead, he held that journalist- confidential source privilege should be assessed on a case-by- case basis, applying the wigmore criteria (see paras 53-64). [23] considering these criteria, he concluded that no such privilege could be established on the facts. in the result, the majority upheld the validity of the search warrant and assistance order. cour devait déterminer les circonstances dans les- quelles les tribunaux respecteraient une promesse de confidentialité faite par un journaliste à une source. [21] pour répondre à cette question, le juge binnie a confirmé les principes énoncés dans lessard et nouveau‑ brunswick et il les a appliqués  : voir par. 31-33, 79, 82 et 87. ce faisant, il a insisté à répé- tition sur l’importance vitale des médias et sur leur rôle très particulier dans la société. il a décrit l’inté- rêt du public envers la liberté d’expression comme étant d’une « importance considérable » (par. 5); il a affirmé que « la liberté de la presse et des autres moyens de communication » est « essentielle [  ] dans une société fondée sur la primauté du droit » (par. 26); et il a reconnu la « situation très particu- lière des médias » (par 64). en outre, il a confirmé que « la liberté de diffuser les informations emporte nécessairement la liberté de recueillir les informa- tions » : par 33. en formulant ces observations, le juge binnie a confirmé et souligné le rôle de l’al. 2b) pour protéger la liberté des médias de recueillir et de diffuser les informations. [22] le juge binnie a convenu que « le droit de- vrait accepter — et accepte effectivement — que, dans certaines situations, l’intérêt public à protéger [une] source secrète contre toute divulgation l’em- porte sur les autres intérêts publics — y compris la conduite d’enquêtes criminelles » : par 34. en revanche, il a rejeté l’argument selon lequel une ordonnance judiciaire de divulguer l’identité d’une source confidentielle porterait généralement atteinte au droit protégé par l’al. 2b) : par 41. il a aussi refusé de reconnaître l’existence d’un privilège générique qui aurait protégé la relation entre un journaliste et une source confidentielle. il a plutôt conclu que le privilège applicable à cette relation doit être évalué au cas par cas, en appliquant le test de wigmore : voir par 53-64. [23] après avoir appliqué ces critères, le juge binnie a conclu que les faits n’appuyaient pas l’exis- tence d’un tel privilège. ainsi, les juges majoritaires ont confirmé la validité du mandat de perquisition et de l’ordonnance d’assistance. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 397 [24] having reviewed the key precedents, i will now turn to the appellants’ proposed reforms to the lessard framework. [24] maintenant que j’ai passé en revue les précé- dents clés, je vais me pencher sur les modifications au cadre d’analyse établi dans lessard que proposent les appelants. (2) appellants’ proposed reforms to lessard (2) modifications au cadre d’analyse établi dans framework lessard que proposent les appelants (a) presumed chilling effect a) effet dissuasif présumé [25] the appellants submit that whenever the state seeks a production order relating to the media, a “chilling effect” should be presumed. they argue that the media should not be put to the task of prov- ing, in each individual case, that the order would have a chilling effect, for such an effect is, they say, inevitable. [25] selon les appelants, lorsque l’état sollicite une ordonnance de communication en lien avec un média, il faut présumer qu’il en découlera un « effet dissuasif ». ils plaident que les médias ne devraient pas avoir à prouver, dans chaque cas, que l’ordon- nance aurait un tel effet, puisqu’ils estiment que celui-ci est inévitable. [26] in this context, i would define the term “chill- ing effect” fairly broadly: it refers to the stifling or discouragement of the media’s legitimate activities in gathering and disseminating the news for fear of legal repercussions such as compelled disclosure. these effects may manifest themselves in a number of ways — for example: • confidential sources may “dry up”. as lord denning wrote in british steel corp. v. gra nada television ltd., [1981] ac 1096, “if [newspa- pers] were compelled to disclose their sources, they would soon be bereft of information which they ought to have. their sources would dry up. wrongdoing would not be disclosed” (p 1129). if sources who are willing to speak out only on a confidential basis come to fear that their identity may be disclosed at the whim of the state, then they will remain in the shadows. consequently, the media will lose opportunities to receive and disseminate important information to the public. [26] dans ce contexte, je définirais le terme « effet dissuasif » relativement largement : il fait référence à l’étouffement ou au découragement des activités légitimes des médias dans la collecte et la diffusion des informations par crainte de répercussions juri- diques telles que la communication obligatoire. ces effets peuvent se manifester de plusieurs façons — par exemple : • les sources confidentielles d’information pour- raient se « tarir ». comme lord denning l’a écrit dans british steel corp. c. granada television ltd., [1981] ac 1096, [traduction] « si [les journaux] étaient tenus de révéler l’identité de leurs sources, ils se retrouveraient rapidement dépourvus de l’information qu’ils devraient dé- tenir. leurs sources se tariraient. les actes ré- préhensibles ne seraient pas mis en lumière » : p 1129. si des sources qui sont disposées à se confier uniquement sous le couvert de l’anony- mat se mettent à craindre que leur identité soit divulguée au gré du bon vouloir de l’état, elles resteront dans l’ombre. en conséquence, les mé- dias perdront des occasions de recueillir et de diffuser des informations importantes pour le public. • journalists may consciously avoid recording and preserving their notes, contact lists, internal deliberations, and other work product out of a concern that any such recordings may find their • les journalistes pourraient consciemment évi- ter de sauvegarder ou de conserver leurs notes, leurs listes de contacts, les comptes rendus de délibérations internes ou d’autres produits de 398 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. way into the hands of the police (see national post, at para. 78, adopting the dissenting reasons of mclachlin j. (as she then was) on this point in lessard, at p 452). • the media may self- censor in order to conceal the fact that it possesses information of inter- est to the police, with a view to protecting its sources and preserving its ability to gather in- formation in the future (ibid). • the public may come to view the media as an arm of the state such that the public loses faith in the media’s ability to execute its functions independently and impartially (see canadian broadcasting corp. v. manitoba (attorney gen‑ eral), 2009 mbca 122, 250 ccc (3d) 61, at para. 74, citing new brunswick, p. 474; lessard, at p. 432, per la forest j., concurring). this lack of faith in the media may in turn undermine its ability to gather and disseminate the news. [27] proving the existence and extent of such ef- fects is, of course, no easy feat. chilling effects do not lend themselves to scientific or empirical proof. rather, they are intangible in nature and difficult — if not impossible — to measure with exactitude. but that does not mean they are insignificant or unimpor- tant. to the contrary, to the extent that chilling effects do arise, their consequences can be considerable: a weak and fearful press, alongside a diminishing pool of sources, translates into a less informed, less open, and less vibrant society in which discussion, debate, and the flow of information are stymied. thus, concerns over potential chilling effects cannot be overlooked. leur travail par crainte que ces renseignements puissent se retrouver entre les mains de la po- lice : voir national post, par. 78, qui a adopté les motifs dissidents de la juge mclachlin (plus tard juge en chef) sur ce point dans lessard, p 452. • les médias pourraient s’autocensurer de ma- nière à dissimuler le fait qu’ils possèdent de l’information d’intérêt pour la police, dans le but de protéger leurs sources et de préserver leur capacité de recueillir de l’information dans le futur : ibid. • le public pourrait en venir à percevoir les médias comme un bras de l’état de sorte qu’il perdrait confiance en la capacité de ces derniers de s’ac- quitter de leurs fonctions de manière indépen- dante et impartiale : voir canadian broadcasting corporation c manitoba (attorney general), 2009 mbca 122, 250 ccc (3d) 61, par. 74, ci- tant nouveau‑ brunswick, p. 474; lessard, p. 432, le juge la forest (motifs concordants). ce manque de confiance dans les médias pourrait à son tour miner leur capacité de recueillir et de diffuser les nouvelles. [27] prouver l’existence de tels effets et leur éten- due n’est bien sûr pas facile. les effets dissuasifs ne se prêtent pas à une preuve scientifique ou empirique. ils sont plutôt de nature intangible et difficiles — voire impossibles — à mesurer avec exactitude. cela ne signifie pas qu’ils sont insignifiants et sans impor- tance. au contraire, dans la mesure où des effets dis- suasifs se produisaient bel et bien, leurs conséquences pourraient être considérables : une presse faible et craintive, épaulée par un bassin de sources de moins en moins important, se traduit par une société moins informée, moins ouverte et moins dynamique dans laquelle la discussion, le débat et le flux de l’infor- mation sont entravés. il ne faut donc pas négliger les craintes concernant les effets de dissuasion potentiels. [28] however, with respect, i struggle to see why a chilling effect should be presumed in all cases, re- gardless of the circumstances. the law is not quick to make assumptions without a basis in the evidence in the particular case. and while the evidence may often support a concern over potential chilling effects, in my view, the existence and extent of any potential [28] cependant, soit dit en tout respect, j’ai du mal à voir pourquoi il faudrait présumer qu’il se produi- rait un effet dissuasif dans tous les cas, quelles que soient les circonstances. le droit n’est pas disposé à faire des suppositions sans qu’elles soient fon- dées sur des éléments de preuve dans un cas parti- culier. en outre, même si la preuve appuie souvent [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 399 chilling effects should be assessed on a case-by- case basis, not simply presumed in the abstract. [29] the conclusion that chilling effects should not be simply presumed without regard to the particular circumstances finds ample support in this court’s jurisprudence. in none of lessard, new brunswick or national post did this court see reason to recognize a presumed chilling effect. moreover, even before those cases were decided, this court declined to assume, in the absence of evidence, that compelling journalists to testify before tribunals will necessarily cause sources to “dry up” (see british steel corp.) or otherwise “detrimentally affect journalists’ ability to gather information” (moysa v. alberta (labour relations board), [1989] 1 scr 1572, at p 1581). further, while this court has held that “[i]n some sit- uations, a chilling effect can be inferred from known facts and experience” (r v. khawaja, 2012 scc 69, [2012] 3 scr 555, at para. 79), this statement does not support the imposition of a presumed chilling effect. rather, it merely confirms the more modest proposition that, in some situations, a chilling effect can — not must — be inferred. in sum, i see no rea- son why this court should depart from its established jurisprudence and recognize a presumed chilling effect in all cases. les préoccupations concernant les effets dissuasifs potentiels, à mon avis, l’existence et l’étendue de tout effet éventuel de cette nature devraient être évaluées au cas par cas, et non simplement présumées dans l’abstrait. [29] la conclusion portant qu’il ne faudrait pas simplement présumer qu’il se produirait des effets dissuasifs sans tenir compte des circonstances par- ticulières est amplement étayée par la jurisprudence de la cour. dans aucun des arrêts lessard, nouveau‑ brunswick ou national post la cour n’a jugé bon de reconnaître un effet dissuasif présumé. de plus, même avant que ces décisions soient rendues, la cour avait refusé de tenir pour acquis, en l’absence de preuve, que le fait de contraindre des journalistes à témoigner devant les tribunaux aurait nécessai- rement pour effet que les sources [traduction] « se tarirait » (voir british steel corp.) ou autre- ment « nuirait à leur capacité de recueillir de l’in- formation » : moysa c. alberta (labour relations board), [1989] 1 rcs 1572, p 1581. de plus, bien que la cour ait conclu que, « [d]ans certains cas, l’existence de l’effet paralysant peut être inférée de faits connus et d’observations antérieures » (r. c. khawaja, 2012 csc 69, [2012] 3 rcs 555, par. 79), cet énoncé n’étaye pas l’imposition d’une présomption d’effet dissuasif. il ne fait que confir- mer la proposition plus modeste selon laquelle, dans certaines situations, un effet dissuasif peut — et non doit — être inféré. bref, je ne vois pas pourquoi la cour devrait s’écarter de sa jurisprudence établie et reconnaître une présomption d’effet dissuasif dans tous les cas. [30] i would add that in cases where the police are seeking information that the media did not pro- cure through a promise of confidentiality and has already published in large measure, as was the case in lessard and new brunswick, the order may cause little to no chilling effect. and to the extent there is a risk that some potential chilling effects may arise, those potential effects may be neutralized through the imposition of conditions on the order. in her dissent in lessard, mclachlin j. described chilling effects as being the result of “the prospect of seizure of press material in future cases without the imposi- tion of conditions to protect press freedom and the [30] j’ajouterais que dans les cas où la police cherche à obtenir des renseignements que les médias ne se sont pas procurés au moyen d’une promesse de confidentialité et qu’ils ont déjà publiés en grande partie, comme c’était le cas dans lessard et dans nouveau‑ brunswick, l’ordonnance ne causerait que peu ou pas du tout d’effet dissuasif. en outre, dans la mesure où il existe un risque que des effets dissua- sifs surviennent, ceux-ci pourraient être neutralisés grâce à l’imposition de conditions dans l’ordon- nance. dans lessard, la juge mclachlin, dissidente, a décrit les effets dissuasifs comme étant le résul- tat de « l’éventualité d’une saisie de documents de 400 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. identity of informants” (p. 453 (emphasis added)). thus, where appropriate conditions are imposed, the concern over potential chilling effects may be sufficiently mitigated. [31] for these reasons, in my view, there is no basis for recognizing a presumed chilling effect whenever the state seeks a production order relating to the me- dia. instead, the existence and extent of any potential chilling effect should be assessed on a case-by- case basis. as is often said, context is crucial. [32] with this in mind, if the authorizing judge concludes, based on the record, that the order sought would likely have a chilling effect, then that finding should be considered in determining whether, in light of all the circumstances, the order should be refused, or if granted, what conditions should be included. in some cases, the existence and extent of potential chilling effects may be a significant factor in the analysis. in other cases, it may not. again, each case turns on its own unique facts. (b) removal of distinction between confidential and non‑ confidential sources [33] the appellants argue that confidential sources and non- confidential sources should be treated the same under the lessard framework. they maintain that if sources must insist on confidentiality to have their communications shielded from access at will by the state, then the ability of the media to carry out its function will be seriously undermined. [34] the simple answer to the appellants’ argument is that there are good reasons to draw a distinction between confidential and non- confidential sources, as the privacy and other concerns they raise may differ substantially. presse à l’avenir sans l’imposition de conditions qui protègent la liberté de la presse et l’identité des infor- mateurs » : p. 453 (je souligne). en conséquence, la préoccupation relative aux effets dissuasifs peut être suffisamment atténuée si des conditions appropriées sont imposées. [31] à mon avis, pour les motifs qui précèdent, rien ne justifie de reconnaître une présomption d’effet dissuasif chaque fois que l’état demande une or- donnance de communication en lien avec un média. l’existence et l’étendue de tout effet dissuasif éven- tuel devraient plutôt être évaluées au cas par cas. comme on le dit souvent, le contexte est fondamental. [32] dans cette optique, si le juge saisi de la de- mande conclut, au vu du dossier, que l’ordonnance sollicitée est susceptible d’avoir un effet dissuasif, cette conclusion devrait être prise en compte pour décider si, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, la demande en vue de l’obtention d’une ordonnance devrait être rejetée ou, si elle est accueillie, de quelles conditions elle devrait être assortie. dans certains cas, l’existence et l’étendue des effets dissuasifs éventuels peuvent constituer un facteur important dans l’analyse, et dans d’autres, non. encore une fois, chaque cas demeure un cas d’espèce. b) suppression de la distinction entre les sources confidentielles et les sources non confiden‑ tielles [33] les appelants soutiennent que les sources confidentielles et les sources non confidentielles de- vraient être traitées de la même façon lorsqu’est appliqué le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans lessard. selon eux, si les sources doivent insister pour conser- ver leur anonymat afin que leurs communications soient protégées contre l’accès à volonté de l’état, la capacité des médias de s’acquitter de leurs fonctions sera gravement compromise. [34] la réponse simple à l’argument des appelants est qu’il existe de bonnes raisons d’établir une dis- tinction entre les sources confidentielles et celles qui ne le sont pas, puisque les préoccupations concernant la vie privée et les autres préoccupations qu’elles soulèvent peuvent différer substantiellement. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 401 [35] this court’s jurisprudence demonstrates that confidential sources raise unique considerations. most notably, in national post, the potential nega- tive effects of permitting state- compelled disclosure of confidential sources were found to be so com- pelling as to justify opening the door to journalist- confidential source privilege on a case-by- case basis. no such privilege exists between journalists and non- confidential sources (see national post, at para 56). moreover, as noted above, the potential chilling ef- fects that may result from permitting state- compelled disclosure of information may differ considerably depending on whether the source of the information is confidential or non- confidential. [36] the enactment of the jspa, to which i have previously referred, serves as a further illustration of the important distinction between confidential and non- confidential sources. through that legislation, among other things, parliament amended the crimi‑ nal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, and the canada evidence act, rsc 1985, c. c-5, to provide en- hanced protections for maintaining the confidenti- ality of a “journalistic source”, a term restrictively defined as a source who transmits information in confidence and whose anonymity is essential to the relationship with the journalist. for example, under s 48802(3) of the criminal code, a “journalist” may bring an application objecting to the disclosure of documents seized under a search warrant or produc- tion order on the basis that they identify or are likely to identify a “journalistic source”. hence, parliament too has acknowledged that there is a meaningful difference between confidential and non- confidential sources. [37] accordingly, i would not erase the distinction between confidential and non- confidential sources. [35] la jurisprudence de la cour démontre que les sources confidentielles soulèvent des considérations particulières. plus particulièrement, dans national post, il a été conclu que les effets négatifs poten- tiels du fait de permettre la divulgation imposée par l’état de sources confidentielles étaient si prédomi- nants qu’ils justifiaient de permettre l’application du privilège du secret des sources confidentielles des journalistes au cas par cas. il n’existe pas de tel privilège entre les journalistes et les sources non confidentielles : voir national post, par 56. de plus, comme je l’ai indiqué précédemment, les effets dis- suasifs éventuels pouvant découler de l’autorisa- tion de divulguer des renseignements imposée par l’état peuvent différer considérablement selon que la source des renseignements est confidentielle ou non. [36] l’adoption de la lpsj, à laquelle j’ai déjà fait référence, illustre aussi l’importante distinction entre les sources confidentielles et celles qui ne le sont pas. en adoptant cette loi, le parlement a notamment modifié le code criminel, lrc  1985, c.  c-46, et la loi sur la preuve au canada, lrc 1985, c. c-5, afin que ces textes législatifs prévoient des protections accrues en vue du maintien de la confi- dentialité d’une « source journalistique », un terme défini étroitement comme une source qui transmet confidentiellement de l’information et dont l’ano- nymat est essentiel aux rapports entre le journaliste et la source. par exemple, suivant le par 48802(3) du code criminel, un « journaliste » peut présenter une demande pour s’opposer à la divulgation de documents saisis en exécution d’un mandat de per- quisition ou d’une ordonnance de communication pour le motif qu’ils identifient ou sont susceptibles d’identifier une « source journalistique ». ainsi, le législateur a lui aussi reconnu qu’il existe une diffé- rence significative entre les sources confidentielles et les sources non confidentielles. [37] en conséquence, je n’écarterais pas la distinc- tion entre les sources confidentielles et celles qui ne le sont pas. [38] to be clear, however, the absence of a confi- dentiality agreement does not give the state free rein to compel production of materials in the hands of the media. even where the source of the information [38] je précise toutefois que l’absence d’entente relative à la confidentialité ne donne pas à l’état la liberté totale d’imposer la communication de docu- ments qui se trouvent en la possession des médias. 402 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. sought is non- confidential, compelled production may cause chilling effects, and the impact on the media and the privacy interests at stake may nonethe- less be significant. but once again, context is crucial, and it should not be assumed that the existence or absence of a confidentiality agreement makes no difference in the analysis. même lorsque la source des renseignements deman- dés n’est pas confidentielle, la communication forcée peut causer des effets dissuasifs, et l’incidence sur les médias et sur les droits à la vie privée en jeu peut être importante. cela dit, encore une fois, le contexte est d’une importance capitale, et on ne peut pas présumer que l’existence ou l’absence d’une entente de confidentialité ne fait aucune différence dans l’analyse. (c) recharacterization of effect of prior partial c) requalification de l’effet de la publication publication partielle antérieure [39] as indicated, the sixth lessard factor provides that if the information sought has been disseminated by the media in whole or in part, then “this will be a factor which will favour the issuing of the search warrant” (lessard, at p.  445; new brunswick, at p. 481 (emphasis added)). indeed, in lessard, cory j. treated prior partial publication as a decisive factor:    once the news media have published the gathered information, that information then passes into the public domain. the publication of that information is a very im- portant factor for the justice of the peace to consider. this is something that favours the issuing of a search warrant. when a crime has been committed and evidence of that crime has been published, society has every right to expect that it will be investigated and, if appropriate, prosecuted. here, the publication or broadcasting of the information was a factor of sufficient importance to enable the justice of the peace to exercise his discretion and issue the search warrant notwithstanding the failure of the police to explain that there was no alternative source available that would give them the information contained in the videotape. [pp. 446-47] [39] comme nous l’avons vu, le sixième facteur établi dans lessard prévoit que si les renseigne- ments demandés ont été rendus publics par les mé- dias en totalité ou en partie, « ce facteur favorisera l’attribution du mandat de perquisition » : lessard, p. 445; nouveau‑ brunswick, p. 481 (je souligne). en effet, dans lessard, le juge cory a conclu que la publication partielle antérieure constituait un facteur décisif :    une fois que les médias ont publié les renseigne- ments recueillis, ceux-ci sont alors dans le domaine pu- blic. la publication de ces renseignements est un facteur très important que le juge de paix doit prendre en consi- dération c’est quelque chose qui milite en faveur de l’attribution d’un mandat de perquisition. lorsqu’un acte criminel a été commis et que des éléments de preuve de cet acte criminel ont été publiés, la société est tout à fait en droit de s’attendre à ce qu’il fasse l’objet d’une enquête et, s’il y a lieu, d’une poursuite. en l’espèce, la publication ou la diffusion des renseignements était un facteur suffi- samment important pour que le juge de paix soit fondé à exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire et à décerner le mandat de perquisition même si la police n’a pas expliqué qu’il n’existait pas d’autre source pouvant lui donner les renseignements contenus sur la bande vidéo. [p. 446- 447] [40] the appellants take issue with the state of the law on prior partial publication. they maintain that prior partial publication does nothing to reduce the chilling effects caused by compelling disclosure of the unpublished materials, nor does it attenuate the media’s interests in the unpublished materials, par- ticularly when those materials are journalist- source communications. [40] les appelants contestent l’état du droit sur la publication partielle antérieure. ils soutiennent qu’une telle publication ne réduit aucunement les effets dissuasifs causés par la divulgation forcée des renseignements non publiés, et n’atténue pas non plus l’intérêt des médias à l’égard de ces renseigne- ments, particulièrement lorsqu’il s’agit de commu- nications entre un journaliste et sa source. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 403 i accept that “[w]hen a crime has been com- [41] mitted and evidence of that crime has been published, society has every right to expect that it will be inves- tigated and, if appropriate, prosecuted” (lessard, at p 447). in my view, the publication of materials that raise serious and credible concerns over potential criminality, particularly where there is an ongoing or imminent threat to safety and security, cannot be ignored in weighing the state and the media’s respective interests. neither the police nor canadian society should turn a blind eye to such materials. nor should the courts. [42] moreover, not only may prior partial publica- tion heighten the state’s interests in the unpublished materials, but in some circumstances it may also attenuate the media’s interests in those materials. for example, where “[t]he media ha[s] already com- pleted their basic function of news gathering and news dissemination” (lessard, at p. 447) — ie, the news cycle is over — this may be a factor suggesting that the media’s interests in the unpublished materi- als have been diminished. [43] however, i cannot accept that prior partial publication will always militate in favour of grant- ing the order. prior partial publication should not necessarily lessen the degree of protection afforded to the unpublished materials, since permitting state access to the unpublished materials still interferes with the media’s right to privacy in gathering and disseminating the news (see lessard, at p. 453, per mclachlin j., dissenting), and compelled production of the unpublished materials may still cause chilling effects. in fact, in some cases, the media may well have decided not to disseminate the unpublished materials precisely because they are particularly sensitive. relatedly, the unpublished materials will sometimes be of a different nature as compared to the published materials, thereby raising different privacy concerns. for example, the state may seek disclosure of the raw communications between journalist and source (potentially including related metadata) or a journalist’s personal notes or contact lists. the important privacy interests attaching to those types [41] je reconnais que « [l]orsqu’un acte criminel a été commis et que des éléments de preuve de cet acte criminel ont été publiés, la société est tout à fait en droit de s’attendre à ce qu’il fasse l’objet d’une enquête et, s’il y a lieu, d’une poursuite » : lessard, p 447. à mon avis, lorsqu’on soupèse les intérêts respectifs de l’état et des médias, on ne peut ignorer la publication de renseignements qui soulèvent des préoccupations graves et crédibles quant à de possibles crimes, particulièrement s’il y a un risque continu ou imminent pour la sécurité. ni la police ni la société canadienne ne devraient fermer les yeux sur ces renseignements — les tri- bunaux non plus. [42] en outre, non seulement la publication par- tielle antérieure peut renforcer l’intérêt de l’état à l’égard des renseignements non publiés, mais dans certaines situations, elle peut aussi atténuer l’intérêt des médias à leur égard. par exemple, lorsque « [l]e média [a] déjà exercé sa fonction de base qui consiste à recueillir et à diffuser des informations » (lessard, p. 447) — c-à-d que le cycle des informations est terminé —, cela peut être un facteur indiquant que l’intérêt du média à l’égard des renseignements non publiés a été réduit. [43] cependant, je ne peux accepter que la publi- cation partielle antérieure favorise toujours l’octroi de l’ordonnance. en effet, une telle publication ne devrait pas nécessairement réduire la protection ac- cordée aux renseignements non publiés, puisque le fait de permettre à l’état d’avoir accès à ce type de renseignements entrave toujours le droit des médias à la confidentialité des renseignements dans la col- lecte et la diffusion des informations (voir lessard, p.  453, la juge mclachlin, dissidente), et que la communication forcée des renseignements non pu- bliés peut toujours causer un effet dissuasif. en fait, dans certains cas, les médias auraient bien pu avoir décidé de ne pas rendre publics les renseignements non publiés précisément parce qu’ils sont particu- lièrement sensibles. dans le même ordre d’idées, les renseignements non publiés sont parfois d’une nature différente de celle des renseignements pu- bliés, et soulèveraient donc des préoccupations dif- férentes en matière de respect de la vie privée. par exemple, l’état peut demander la divulgation des 404 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. of materials are not necessarily diminished through publication of a news article based on or otherwise related to those materials. [44] accordingly, i am of the view that the effect of prior partial publication should be assessed on a case-by- case basis. in determining the effect of prior partial publication in any particular case, the author- izing judge should consider all the circumstances, including the nature of the materials (both published and unpublished) and how much of the full body of materials has already been published. where, for example, the published materials raise serious and credible concerns over potential criminality, the dis- closure of the unpublished materials would not reveal a confidential source or disclose “off the record” or “not for attribution” communications, and much of the materials have already been published, prior par- tial publication may militate in favour of granting the order. all of these conditions were present in lessard and new brunswick. by contrast, where only some or none of these conditions are present, the effect of prior partial publication may be more neutral. in my view, this more nuanced approach to prior partial publication adds greater flexibility to the lessard framework and permits a more contextual inquiry. communications telles quelles entre un journaliste et sa source (qui pourraient même comprendre les métadonnées connexes), ou les notes personnelles ou les listes de contacts d’un journaliste. or, les intérêts importants en matière de respect de la vie privée qui se rattachent à ces types de renseignements ne sont pas nécessairement amoindris par la publication d’un article fondé sur ces documents ou qui leur est autrement lié. [44] en conséquence, j’estime qu’il faut évaluer l’effet de la publication partielle antérieure au cas par cas. lorsqu’il évalue l’effet d’une telle publi- cation dans un dossier donné, le juge saisi de la demande doit tenir compte de toutes les circons- tances, y compris de la nature des renseignements (tant de ceux qui ont été publiés que de ceux qui ne l’ont pas été) et de la portion de l’ensemble complet de renseignements qui a déjà été publiée. lorsque, par exemple, les renseignements publiés soulèvent des préoccupations graves et crédibles quant à de possibles crimes, que la communication des ren- seignements non publiés ne révélerait pas l’identité d’une source confidentielle ou des communications faites « à titre confidentiel » ou « sous le couvert de l’anonymat » et que la plupart des renseignements ont déjà été rendus publics, la publication partielle antérieure peut favoriser l’octroi de l’ordonnance. toutes ces conditions étaient réunies dans lessard et dans nouveau‑ brunswick. en revanche, lorsque seulement certaines de ces conditions sont réunies, ou lorsqu’aucune de ces conditions n’existe, l’effet de la publication partielle antérieure pourrait être plus neutre. à mon avis, cette façon plus nuancée d’aborder la publication partielle antérieure assouplit le cadre d’analyse établi dans lessard, et permet de procéder à une analyse plus contextuelle. [45] finally, i am of the view that although it is listed as an independent factor under the lessard framework, prior partial publication is best viewed as an aspect of the lessard balancing test, at least in the sense that prior partial publication may enhance the state’s interest in investigating and prosecuting alleged crime and may diminish the media’s inter- ests in the unpublished materials. for the sake of clarity, therefore, i would simply treat prior partial publication as part of the overall balancing exercise, [45] finalement, je suis d’avis que, même si, selon le cadre d’analyse établi dans lessard, la publica- tion partielle antérieure est un facteur indépendant, il est préférable de la considérer comme un aspect du critère de mise en balance établi dans lessard, au moins en ce sens que la publication partielle an- térieure pourrait accroître l’intérêt de l’état à en- quêter sur les crimes et à poursuivre leurs auteurs et pourrait diminuer l’intérêt des médias à l’égard des renseignements non publiés. en conséquence, [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 405 rather than an independent factor to be considered on its own. par souci de clarté, je considérerais la publication partielle antérieure comme faisant simplement partie de l’exercice de mise en balance générale, plutôt que comme un facteur indépendant devant être examiné de manière isolée. (d) state’s interests — prospect of trial and pro‑ d) bative value of evidence intérêts de l’état — perspective d’un procès et valeur probante des éléments de preuve [46] the appellants argue that in assessing the state’s interests under the third factor of the lessard framework, the authorizing judge should consider (1) the prospect of a trial actually taking place; and (2) the probative value of the evidence sought. [46] les appelants font valoir que lorsque le juge saisi de la demande évalue les intérêts de l’état selon le troisième facteur du cadre d’analyse énoncé dans lessard, il devrait tenir compte (1) de la perspective qu’un procès ait réellement lieu; et (2) de la valeur probante des éléments de preuve demandés. (i) prospect of trial (i) perspective d’un procès [47] first, with respect to the prospect of a trial ac- tually taking place, it is important to understand that what we are concerned with here is the investigation and evidence‑ gathering stage. searches performed at this stage are aimed at investigating and gather- ing evidence of potential criminality, not at proving allegations and securing a conviction in court. at this early stage, “the public interest requires prompt and thorough investigation of potential offences”, and as such “all relevant information and evidence should be located and preserved as soon as possible” (canadianoxy chemicals ltd. v. canada (attorney general), [1999] 1 scr 743, at para. 19 (empha- sis in original)). the function of the police at this juncture is “to investigate incidents which might be criminal, make a conscientious and informed deci- sion as to whether charges should be laid, and then present the full and unadulterated facts to the pros- ecutorial authorities” (para 22). this function does not include “investigat[ing] and decid[ing] whether the essential elements of an offence are made out”; that role belongs to the courts (ibid). [47] premièrement, pour ce qui est de la perspec- tive qu’un procès ait réellement lieu, il est important de comprendre que ce qui nous préoccupe ici, c’est l’étape de l’enquête et de l’obtention d’éléments de preuve. les fouilles et perquisitions effectuées à cette étape visent à enquêter et à obtenir des éléments de preuve relativement à de possibles crimes, et non à prouver des allégations et à obtenir une condamna- tion en cour. à cette étape préliminaire, « l’intérêt public commande qu’une enquête prompte et appro- fondie soit menée s’il y a possibilité d’infraction », de sorte que « tous les renseignements et éléments de preuve pertinents [soient] trouvés et conservés le plus rapidement possible » : canadianoxy chemicals ltd. c. canada (procureur général), [1999] 1 rcs 743, par. 19 (souligné dans l’original). à ce stade, le rôle des policiers consiste à « enquêter sur des incidents qui pourraient être criminels, à prendre une décision consciencieuse et éclairée sur l’opportunité de porter des accusations, puis à soumettre l’ensemble des faits sans les dénaturer aux autorités chargées des poursuites » : par 22. ce rôle ne comprend pas le fait de « mener une enquête pour décider si les élé- ments essentiels d’une infraction sont établis »; une décision qui appartient aux tribunaux : ibid. [48] once the nature and purpose of the inves- tigation and evidence- gathering stage is properly understood, it becomes clear that the prospect of a trial actually taking place is not relevant at this stage [48] une fois qu’on comprend correctement la na- ture et l’objet de l’étape de l’enquête et de l’obtention d’éléments de preuve, il est clair que la perspective qu’un procès ait réellement lieu n’est pas pertinente 406 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. of the inquiry. put simply, the prospect of a trial is a concern left for another day and for a different set of actors. à cette étape de l’analyse. en termes simples, le fac- teur de la perspective d’un procès devra être examiné ultérieurement et par d’autres acteurs. [49] further, and more practically, it may be dif- ficult — if not impossible — to gauge at this early stage the prospect of a trial actually taking place. much can change in the course of investigating and prosecuting alleged crime. to ask judges at such an early stage to attempt to assess the prospect of a trial actually taking place down the road would be im- practicable and would require authorizing judges to engage in speculation. and in any event, even where it appears uncertain — or even unlikely — that a trial will actually take place, society still has an interest in seeing crime investigated, particularly where it is ongoing or poses a future threat. [49] de plus, d’un point de vue plus pratique, il peut être difficile — voire impossible — d’évaluer à cette étape préliminaire la perspective qu’un procès ait réellement lieu. beaucoup de choses peuvent changer au cours de l’enquête et de la poursuite à l’égard du crime qui aurait été commis. demander aux juges à un tel stade préliminaire de tenter d’évaluer la pers- pective qu’un procès ait réellement lieu ultérieure- ment serait impraticable et obligerait les juges saisis de la demande à se livrer à des conjectures. quoi qu’il en soit, même s’il semblait incertain — ou même improbable — qu’un procès ait réellement lieu, la société a tout de même un intérêt à ce que le crime fasse l’objet d’une enquête, particulièrement lorsqu’il est continu ou qu’il représente un danger futur. [50] finally, from a policy perspective, the conse- quences of accepting the appellants’ proposal would be perverse. it would enable a suspected criminal to delay or even prevent the police from securing cru- cial authorizations permitting them to carry out their investigation by, for example, fleeing the country and thereby decreasing the likelihood of a trial ever taking place. it goes without saying that this type of conduct must not be encouraged. [50] finalement, sur le plan des principes, accepter la proposition des appelants aurait des conséquences malencontreuses, notamment celle de permettre à une personne soupçonnée d’un crime de retarder ou même d’empêcher l’obtention par les policiers des autorisations essentielles pour mener leur enquête, par exemple en s’enfuyant du pays, ce qui réduirait les chances qu’un procès ait lieu. il va sans dire que ce type de conduite ne doit pas être encouragé. [51] therefore, i am of the view that the prospect of a trial actually taking place is not a relevant factor in determining whether to grant a production order in relation to the media. [51] en conséquence, j’estime que la perspective qu’un procès ait réellement lieu n’est pas un facteur pertinent pour établir si l’ordonnance de commu- nication en lien avec les médias doit être accordée. (ii) probative value of materials sought (ii) valeur probante des documents demandés [52] second, the appellants maintain that in deter- mining whether to grant a production order relating to the media, authorizing judges should consider the probative value of the materials sought. they then go further and suggest that this probative value should be considered incrementally against the ma- terials that are, or could reasonably be expected to be, available and admissible at trial. they submit that a court should grant a production order relating to the media only where the materials sought are “necessary    in the sense of making the difference [52] deuxièmement, les appelants soutiennent que lorsqu’il se penche sur l’opportunité de rendre une ordonnance de communication en lien avec les mé- dias, le juge saisi de la demande devrait tenir compte de la valeur probante des renseignements demandés. ils vont ensuite plus loin et suggèrent que cette valeur probante devrait être examinée progressivement en fonction des renseignements qui sont disponibles et admissibles au procès, ou dont on pourrait rai- sonnablement s’attendre à ce qu’ils le soient. selon eux, le tribunal devrait accorder une ordonnance [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 407 between acquittal and conviction” (af, at para. 117 (emphasis deleted)). [53] for the sake of clarity, i note that s 487014 (formerly s 487012) of the criminal code, the pro- vision permitting peace officers and public officers to apply for an order requiring a person who is not under investigation to produce a document, requires that the court be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, among other things, the doc- ument or data sought “will afford evidence respect- ing the commission of the offence” (s 487014(2)). it says nothing of probative value. therefore, the question is whether, in addition to this statutory re- quirement, there is — or should be — a common law rule requiring authorizing judges to consider the probative value of the materials sought in deciding whether to exercise their discretion to grant the order requested. in national post, this court stated that in weigh- [54] ing the public interest in protecting the journalist- confidential source relationship in question against countervailing public interests such as the investi- gation of a particular crime, courts should consider, among other things, “the probative value of the evi- dence sought to be obtained” (para 61). in light of this clear recognition, i see no reason why the probative value of the materials sought would not similarly be considered by authorizing judges in determining whether to exercise their discretion to make a produc- tion order in relation to the media. de communication en lien avec les médias seule- ment lorsque les renseignements demandés sont [traduction] « nécessaires [  ] en ce sens qu’ils peuvent faire une différence entre l’acquittement et la condamnation » : ma, par. 117 (soulignement omis). [53] par souci de clarté, je souligne que l’art. 487.014 (l’ancien art 487012) du code criminel — soit la disposition qui permet aux juges de paix et aux fonctionnaires publics de demander une or- donnance exigeant qu’une personne qui ne fait pas l’objet d’une enquête communique un document — requiert que la cour soit convaincue qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire, notamment, que le document ou les données demandés « fourniront une preuve concernant la perpétration de l’infraction » : par 487014(2). il n’aborde aucunement la valeur probante. en conséquence, il s’agit d’établir si, en plus de cette exigence législative, il existe — ou de- vrait exister — une règle de common law exigeant qu’un juge saisi de la demande tienne compte de la valeur probante des documents demandés lorsqu’il décide s’il devrait accorder l’ordonnance sollicitée en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire. [54] dans national post, la cour a affirmé que lorsqu’ils mettent en balance l’intérêt public à pro- téger la relation entre un journaliste et sa source confidentielle en cause et les intérêts publics opposés comme la tenue d’une enquête sur un crime précis, les tribunaux doivent tenir compte, notamment, de « la valeur probante des éléments que l’on cherche à obtenir » : par 61. à la lumière de cette recon- naissance sans équivoque, je ne vois pas pourquoi la valeur probante des renseignements demandés ne serait pas prise en considération de la même façon par un juge saisi de la demande lorsqu’il décide s’il accorde l’ordonnance de communication en lien avec les médias en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire. [55] accordingly, where the materials sought can reasonably be expected to have a higher degree of probative value, the case in favour of granting the order is strengthened. our jurisprudence supports this proposition. for example, in lessard and new brunswick, the footage was believed to show the actual commission of criminal offences, thereby having obvious probative value. in national post, [55] par conséquent, lorsqu’on peut raisonnable- ment s’attendre à ce que les renseignements deman- dés aient une valeur probante plus élevée, l’argument en faveur de l’octroi de l’ordonnance est renforcé. notre jurisprudence étaye cette proposition par exemple, dans lessard et dans nouveau‑ brunswick, la cour a jugé que les séquences vidéo montraient la perpétration d’actes criminels, ce qui leur conférait 408 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. the materials sought had even higher potential pro- bative value: they were alleged to form the very actus reus of a criminal offence (para 77). in these circumstances, the state’s interests in the materi- als are heightened, and the probity of the materials sought weighs more heavily in the balance. by con- trast, where the materials sought can reasonably be expected to be of lesser probative value, the state’s interests in the materials may be attenuated. une valeur probante évidente. dans national post, les documents demandés avaient une valeur probante encore plus grande; en effet, on a fait valoir qu’ils constituaient l’actus reus même du crime reproché : par 77. dans de telles circonstances, l’intérêt de l’état à l’égard des renseignements est accru, et la valeur probante des renseignements demandés pèse plus lourd dans la balance. en revanche, lorsqu’on peut raisonnablement s’attendre à ce que les ren- seignements demandés aient une valeur probante moindre, l’intérêt de l’état à l’égard de ces rensei- gnements peut être atténué. [56] that said, the assessment of probative value has its limits. this court has cautioned that “[i]t will often be difficult to determine definitively the probative value of a particular thing before the police investigation has been completed” (descôteaux v. mierzwinski, [1982] 1 scr 860, at p 889). it is therefore important not to place undue weight on the assessment of likely probative value, as it may be an imprecise and uncertain exercise. [56] cela dit, l’évaluation de la valeur probante a ses limites. la cour a signalé qu’il « sera souvent difficile de déterminer péremptoirement la valeur probante d’une chose avant la fin de l’enquête poli- cière » : descôteaux c. mierzwinski, [1982] 1 rcs. 860, p 889. ainsi, comme une telle démarche peut être imprécise et incertaine, il est important de ne pas accorder trop d’importance à l’évaluation de la valeur probante probable. [57] in the end, while probative value may be a relevant consideration in applying the lessard frame- work, i would not go so far as to impose the appel- lants’ proposed “necessity” test. the notion that the police should be denied a production order unless they can demonstrate that the order is necessary to secure a conviction cannot be sustained for several reasons, including the following: • first, it misapprehends the role of author- izing judges. on this point, i would endorse doherty ja’s observation in the court below that the appellants’ submission “improperly blurs the line between judge and prosecutor by assigning judges the job of deciding whether the prosecution has sufficient evidence to prove its case without access to the information in the hands of the media” (2017 onca 231, 137 or (3d) 263, at para 41). [57] en fin de compte, même si la valeur probante peut être un facteur pertinent lors de l’application du cadre d’analyse énoncé dans lessard, je n’irais pas jusqu’à imposer aux appelants le critère proposé de la « nécessité ». l’idée selon laquelle les policiers devraient se voir accorder une ordonnance de com- munication seulement s’ils démontrent que l’ordon- nance est nécessaire pour obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité ne peut être retenue pour plusieurs raisons, y compris les suivantes : • premièrement, elle est fondée sur une idée fausse du rôle du juge saisi de la demande. à ce sujet, je souscris à l’observation du juge doherty de la cour d’appel, selon laquelle l’argument des appelants [traduction] « brouille à tort la ligne de démarcation entre un juge et un procureur en attribuant au juge la tâche de décider si la preuve de la poursuite est suffisante sans qu’il ait accès aux informations que les médias ont en leur possession » : 2017 onca 231, 137 or (3d) 263, par 41. • second, in a different sense, it would effectively transform the production order application into a trial of the alleged offence on the merits. in • deuxièmement, dans un sens différent, elle transformerait en fait la demande de communi- cation en un procès sur le fond de l’infraction [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 409 my view, it would be both inappropriate and impracticable to require the authorizing judge to speculate about whether the police have amassed sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an offence has been committed. • third, the mere fact that other evidence  — even similar evidence  — is available should not preclude the police from gathering further evidence. again, the objective at the investiga- tion and evidence- gathering stage is to conduct a “prompt and thorough investigation of potential offences” and to locate and preserve “all relevant information and evidence    as soon as possi- ble” (canadianoxy, at para. 19 (emphasis in original)). indeed, at this stage, “[i]t is important that an investigation unearth as much evidence as possible” (para. 24 (emphasis added)). reprochée. à mon avis, il serait à la fois inap- proprié et impossible d’exiger que le juge saisi de la demande cherche à savoir si la police a re- cueilli suffisamment d’éléments de preuve pour prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable qu’une infraction a été commise. • troisièmement, le simple fait que d’autres éléments de preuve — même des éléments de preuve semblables — soient disponibles ne de- vrait pas empêcher la police de recueillir des éléments de preuve supplémentaires. encore une fois, l’objectif à l’étape de l’enquête et de l’obtention d’éléments de preuve est de mener une « enquête prompte et approfondie [  ] s’il y a possibilité d’infraction » ainsi que de trou- ver et de conserver « tous les renseignements et éléments de preuve [  ] le plus rapidement possible » : canadianoxy, par. 19 (soulignement dans l’original). de fait, à cette étape, « [i]l est important que les enquêteurs découvrent le plus d’éléments de preuve possible » : par. 24 (je souligne). • fourth, imposing a test of strict necessity would seriously undermine the ability of the police to investigate and gather evidence of potential criminality. • quatrièmement, l’imposition d’un critère de stricte nécessité entraverait grandement la capacité de la police à mener une enquête et à obtenir des éléments de preuve à l’égard de possibles crimes. [58] thus, while the probative value of the materi- als sought may be considered in weighing the state’s interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime against the media’s right to privacy in gathering and disseminating the news, i would not accede to the appellants’ submission that a strict necessity test should be imposed. b where the police are seeking a production order relating to the media, should a presumptive notice requirement be imposed? [59] the appellants ask that this court impose a rule to the effect that, absent exigent circumstances, the media must be given notice of an application for a production order relating to it. [58] ainsi, bien que la valeur probante des docu- ments demandés puisse être prise en considération lors de la mise en balance de l’intérêt de l’état à enquêter sur les crimes et à poursuivre leurs auteurs, d’une part, et du droit des médias à la confidentialité des renseignements dans la collecte et la diffusion des informations, d’autre part, je ne peux souscrire à l’argument des appelants voulant que le critère de stricte nécessité doive être imposé. b lorsque la police sollicite une ordonnance de communication en lien avec un média, fau‑ drait‑il imposer une exigence présumée de si‑ gnifier un avis? [59] les appelants demandent à la cour d’impo- ser une règle selon laquelle, sauf dans les situations d’urgence, les médias devraient être avisés de toute demande sollicitant une ordonnance de communica- tion qui les concerne. 410 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. i respectfully disagree that we should impose [60] such a requirement. as i will explain, the proposed requirement cannot be sustained in light of (1) the clear language of the criminal code; and (2) this court’s decision in national post. [60] soit dit en tout respect, je ne crois pas que nous devrions imposer une telle exigence. comme je l’expliquerai, l’exigence proposée ne peut être rete- nue à la lumière (1) du texte clair du code criminel; et (2) de la décision de la cour dans national post. (1) criminal code (1) code criminel [61] first, the criminal code provision authoriz- ing the type of production order issued in this case, s 487014(1), grants peace officers and public of- ficers the ability to bring an “ex parte application” for a production order. parliament presumably used these words for a reason, and they ought to be given effect. with respect, imposing a presumptive notice requirement absent exigent circumstances would effectively rewrite the legislation. one of the con- sequences of this rewriting would be to transform production order applications relating to the media into full- blown adversarial hearings. whatever the merits of that approach, it is not the one envisioned by parliament. [61] premièrement, la disposition du code crimi‑ nel qui autorise le type d’ordonnance de communi- cation délivrée en l’espèce, le par 487014(1), donne aux agents de la paix et aux fonctionnaires publics la capacité de présenter une « demande ex parte » en vue d’obtenir une ordonnance de communication. le parlement a vraisemblablement utilisé ces mots à dessein, et il faut leur donner effet. n’en déplaise aux tenants de l’opinion contraire, présumer qu’il faut envoyer un avis en l’absence d’une situation d’urgence reviendrait dans les faits à réécrire la loi. cela aurait notamment pour conséquence de trans- former les demandes sollicitant une ordonnance de communication en lien avec un média en audiences contradictoires à part entière. peu importe le bien- fondé de cette démarche, ce n’est pas celle qu’a envisagée le législateur. [62] i would add, as doherty ja did in the court below (para. 23), that the negative impact on the media resulting from the ex parte proceeding model is countered, at least to some degree, by the media’s right under s 4870193(1) of the criminal code to apply to court to have the production order varied or revoked before the materials are turned over to the police. [62] j’ajouterais, comme l’a fait le juge doherty en cour d’appel (par. 23), que les répercussions néga- tives sur les médias du modèle de l’instance ex parte sont contrées, au moins dans une certaine mesure, par le droit que leur confère le par 4870193(1) du code criminel de demander au tribunal la modifica- tion ou la révocation de l’ordonnance de communica- tion avant que les documents soient remis à la police. (2) national post (2) national post [63] second, in national post, a majority of this court rejected the argument that where the police are seeking a search warrant relating to the media, the media must be given notice. justice binnie observed that a majority of the court in new brunswick held that the special position of the media did not “import any new or additional [procedural] requirements” (para. 82, citing new brunswick, at p. 475 (text in brackets added by binnie j)). he stated that although the media should be given the opportunity to present its case against the warrant at the earliest opportunity, [63] deuxièmement, dans national post, les juges majoritaires de la cour ont rejeté l’argument selon lequel un média devrait être avisé lorsque la police sollicite un mandat de perquisition en lien avec lui. le juge binnie a noté que les juges majoritaires de la cour dans nouveau‑ brunswick avaient conclu que la situation très particulière des médias « n’ajoute pas d’exigences [procédurales] supplémentaires » : par. 82, citant nouveau‑ brunswick, p. 475 (texte entre crochets ajouté par le juge binnie). il a ajouté que même si les médias devraient pouvoir présenter [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 411 it enjoys no entitlement to notice. rather, the author- izing judge retains discretion as to the timing of when the media will be permitted to present its case, and it may be appropriate to proceed ex parte in “cases of urgency or other circumstances” (para. 83 (emphasis added)). these “other circumstances” may include instances where, for example, proceeding ex parte would help ensure the evidence does not disappear while the merits of the warrant are debated (ibid). justice binnie cautioned, however, that where the authorizing judge does proceed ex parte, “adequate terms must be inserted in any warrant to protect the special position of the media, and to permit the media ample time and opportunity to point out why, on the facts, the warrant should be set aside” (para 84). [64] i am of the view that we should adhere to our previous decision in national post. it is consistent with the ex parte model provided for in the criminal code, and i see no compelling reason to depart from a decision of the court issued only eight years ago. des arguments contre le mandat à la première oc- casion, ils ne jouissaient pas du droit de recevoir un avis. c’est plutôt le juge saisi de la demande qui détient le pouvoir discrétionnaire de décider du moment où le média aura le droit de présenter son point de vue, et il peut être approprié d’entendre la demande ex parte dans les « situations d’urgence ou d’autres circonstances » : par. 83 (je souligne). ces « autres circonstances » peuvent comprendre les cas où, par exemple, l’instruction de la demande ex parte contribuerait à empêcher la disparition de la preuve pendant le débat sur le bien- fondé de la délivrance du mandat : ibid. cependant, le juge binnie a pré- cisé que lorsque le juge saisi de la demande instruit la demande ex parte, « il doit assortir [le mandat] de conditions adéquates pour protéger la situation très particulière du média et lui donner amplement le temps et la possibilité de justifier l’annulation du mandat, au vu des faits » : par 84. [64] je suis d’avis que nous devrions souscrire à notre décision antérieure dans national post. elle est conforme au modèle de demande ex parte prévue dans le code criminel, et je ne vois aucune raison im- périeuse d’écarter une décision que la cour a rendue il y a seulement huit ans. (3) conclusion (3) conclusion i would not impose a presumptive notice re- [65] quirement in situations where the police are seeking a production order in relation to the media. in my view, the traditional model of ex parte applications for production orders “provides adequate protection to ensure a strong, vibrant and independent media, free to carry out its important role in our society without unwarranted state intrusion” (r v. canadian broadcasting corp. (2001), 52 or (3d) 757 (ca), at para. 6) (“cbc (onca)”). i would therefore give effect to the language of the criminal code and to this court’s decision in national post: as a starting proposition, there is no notice requirement where the police are seeking a production order relating to the media. instead, the criminal code permits peace officers and public officers to bring an ex parte appli- cation for a production order (s 487014(1)), subject to the authorizing judge’s overriding discretion to require notice where he or she deems appropriate [65] je n’imposerais pas d’obligation présumée de signifier un avis dans les situations où les services de police sollicitent une ordonnance de communi- cation en lien avec un média. à mon avis, le modèle traditionnel de demande ex parte en vue d’obtenir une ordonnance de communication [traduction] « assure une protection adéquate afin que les mé- dias soient forts, vibrants et indépendants, libres de s’acquitter de leur important rôle au sein de la société sans intrusions injustifiées de l’état » : r c. canadian broadcasting corp. (2001), 52 or (3d) 757 (ca), par. 6 (« cbc (ca. ont) »). je don- nerais donc effet au texte du code criminel et à la décision de la cour dans national post : comme prémisse de départ, il n’y a pas d’obligation de si- gnification d’un avis lorsque la police sollicite une ordonnance de communication en lien avec un mé- dia. le code criminel permet plutôt aux agents de la paix et aux fonctionnaires publics de présenter une 412 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. (see national post, at para. 83; cbc (onca), at para 50). [66] absent urgency or other circumstances justi- fying an ex parte proceeding, the authorizing judge may well find it desirable to require that notice be given to the media (see national post, at para. 83), especially if he or she considers that more informa- tion is necessary to properly balance the rights and interests at stake. that conclusion, however, is not mandatory. it is worth emphasizing that bare assertions in [67] the affidavit submitted in support of the application for a production order will not provide a basis for proceeding ex parte. instead, the police should show some evidentiary basis for why there is “urgency or other circumstances”. in my view, this is essential to ensure the media is not denied the opportunity to make its case before the authorizing judge without good reason. to illustrate, a broad and unsupported claim that the media is unlikely to cooperate with police or that the media could theoretically put the materials beyond the reach of authorities if notice were to be given — which is always a risk to at least some degree — should not suffice. demande ex parte afin d’obtenir une ordonnance de communication (par 487014(1)), sous réserve du pouvoir discrétionnaire prépondérant du juge saisi de la demande, qui peut exiger qu’un avis soit donné lorsqu’il le juge approprié : voir national post, par. 83; cbc (ca. ont.), par 50. [66] en l’absence de situations d’urgence ou d’autres circonstances qui peuvent justifier la pro- cédure ex parte, le juge saisi de la demande peut fort bien conclure qu’il est préférable d’aviser le média (voir national post, par. 83), surtout s’il ou elle considère qu’il serait nécessaire de disposer de plus de renseignements pour mettre correctement en balance les droits et intérêts en jeu. le juge n’est toutefois pas tenu de tirer une telle conclusion. il convient de souligner que les simples af- [67] firmations dans l’affidavit soumis à l’appui de la demande relative à l’ordonnance de communication ne sauraient justifier une audience ex parte. les po- liciers doivent plutôt faire état de certains éléments de preuve qui expliquent pourquoi il y a « situation d’urgence ou autres circonstances ». à mon avis, cela est essentiel pour faire en sorte que les médias ne se voient pas refuser sans raison valable l’occasion de présenter leur preuve devant le juge saisi de la demande. à titre d’exemple, une allégation générale et non étayée selon laquelle il est improbable que le média coopère avec les services de police ou qu’il puisse théoriquement mettre les renseignements hors de portée des autorités si un avis est donné — ce qui est toujours un risque, jusqu’à un certain point — ne devrait pas être suffisante. c what is the standard of review to be applied on review of a production order relating to the media? c quelle est la norme de contrôle applicable à l’examen d’une ordonnance de communication en lien avec un média? [68] setting aside the jspa for the moment, there are two main avenues through which a person subject to a production order may challenge the order: [68] en faisant fi, pour le moment, de la lpsj, il existe deux moyens principaux par lesquels une per- sonne visée par une ordonnance de communication peut la contester : • first, the person may pursue a statutory right of review. a person required to produce a doc- ument under s 487014 of the criminal code may bring an application under s 4870193(1) to • d’abord, elle peut exercer son droit à un examen prévu par la loi. en effet, la personne qui est tenue de communiquer un document en application de l’art 487014 du code criminel peut présenter [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 413 the justice or judge who made the order, or to a judge in the judicial district where the order was made, to revoke or vary the order. such an appli- cation may succeed only if the reviewing judge is satisfied that (a) it would be unreasonable in the circumstances to require the applicant to pre- pare or produce the document or (b) production of the document would disclose information that is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure by law (s 4870193(4)). • second, provided the order was not made by a justice of a superior court (see d j m. brown and j m. evans, with the assistance of d. fairlie, ju dicial review of administrative action in can‑ ada (loose- leaf), vol. 1, at §1:2210), the person may file an application for certiorari in a superior court. [69] with respect to this second avenue, garofoli is the leading authority on the standard of review. put succinctly, the standard to be applied is whether — in light of the record before the authorizing judge, as amplified on review  — the authorizing judge “could have” granted the authorization (p 1452). the reviewing judge is not entitled to substitute his or her view for that of the authorizing judge (ibid). instead, the reviewing judge is restricted to deter- mining whether “there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued” (r v. araujo, 2000 scc 65, [2000] 2 scr 992, at para. 54 (em- phasis deleted); see also r v. morelli, 2010 scc 8, [2010] 1 scr 253, at paras. 40-43; r v. nero, 2016 onca 160, 334 ccc (3d) 148, at paras 68-72). une demande en vertu du par 4870193(1) au juge de paix ou au juge qui a rendu l’ordon- nance ou à tout autre juge du district judiciaire où elle a été rendue afin de la faire modifier ou révoquer. le juge saisi de la demande n’y ac- cédera que s’il est convaincu a) qu’il est dé- raisonnable, dans les circonstances, d’obliger l’intéressé à préparer ou à communiquer le do- cument, ou b) que la communication révélerait des renseignements protégés par le droit appli- cable en matière de divulgation ou de privilèges (par 4870193(4)). • ensuite, à condition que l’ordonnance n’ait pas été rendue par un juge d’une cour supé- rieure (voir d j m brown et j m evans, avec le concours de d. fairlie, judicial review of administrative action in canada (feuilles mo- biles), vol. 1, §1:2210), la personne peut présen- ter une demande de certiorari devant une cour supérieure. [69] en ce qui a trait à cette deuxième possibilité, l’arrêt garofoli est l’arrêt de principe concernant la norme de contrôle. en bref, la norme applicable est celle de savoir — au vu du dossier qui a été sou- mis au juge saisi de la demande, étoffé lors de la révision — si le juge qui a accordé l’autorisation « pouvait le faire » : p 1452. le juge chargé de la révision n’est pas autorisé à substituer son opinion à celle du juge qui a accordé l’autorisation : ibid. la fonction du juge siégeant en révision se limite plutôt à établir « s’il existait quelque élément de preuve fiable auquel le juge [a] pu raisonnablement ajouter foi pour accorder l’autorisation » : r c. araujo, 2000 csc 65, [2000] 2 rcs 992, par. 54 (soulignement omis); voir aussi r c. morelli, 2010 csc 8, [2010] 1 rcs 253, par. 40-43; r c. nero, 2016 onca 160, 334 ccc (3d) 148, par 68-72. [70] although this court has never explicitly indi- cated that the garofoli standard applies on an appli- cation to set aside a production or other investigative order relating to the media, binnie j. in national post stated that the standard is whether “there was no reasonable basis” for the order, and the reviewing judge “is generally bound    to afford a measure of deference to the determination of the issuing justice” [70] bien que la cour n’ait jamais explicitement indiqué que la norme établie dans garofoli s’ap- plique à une demande visant l’annulation d’une ordonnance de communication ou d’une autre or- donnance d’investigation en lien avec un média, dans national post, le juge binnie a affirmé que la norme est celle qui consiste à établir s’il y avait « absence de motifs raisonnables » pour justifier la délivrance de 414 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. (para 80). in my view, the “no reasonable basis” standard is functionally equivalent to the garofoli standard described above. [71] the appellants submit that although the garofoli standard may be an appropriate one to apply when reviewing production orders generally, it is far too deferential when applied to production orders relat- ing to the media. this is the case, they say, because the production order will generally have been made ex parte, and therefore the authorizing judge would not have had the benefit of hearing the media’s case when balancing the rights and interests at stake as required by lessard. consequently, unless the me- dia is entitled to a de novo review, it will have been denied the opportunity to have its interests pitted against those of the state in determining whether the order should be made, not merely whether it could have been made. i agree that where the production order was [72] made against the media ex parte, the highly defer- ential garofoli standard may, in some cases, work unfairness. in fact, though i need not rely on this concession, the crown accepted that in the context of production orders made against the media ex parte, “you cannot just take the garofoli framework as it was laid down in garofoli and apply it” (transcript, at p 105). l’ordonnance. en outre, le juge chargé de la révision « est habituellement tenu [  ] de faire preuve d’une certaine retenue à l’égard de la décision du juge qui a entendu la demande de mandat » : par 80. à mon avis, la norme d’« absence de motifs raisonnables » est l’équivalent fonctionnel de la norme établie dans garofoli, décrite précédemment. [71] les appelants soutiennent que, même si l’ap- plication de la norme établie dans garofoli peut être appropriée lors de l’examen des ordonnances de communication en général, elle exige beaucoup trop de déférence lorsqu’elle s’applique à une ordonnance de communication en lien avec un média. selon eux, il en est ainsi parce que l’ordonnance de communi- cation est généralement rendue ex parte et que, en conséquence, le juge saisi de la demande ne peut pas entendre la position du média avant de mettre en balance les droits et les intérêts en jeu comme l’exige l’arrêt lessard. sauf si le média a droit à un examen de novo, ses intérêts n’auront donc pas pu être comparés à ceux de l’état lorsque le juge a décidé si l’ordonnance devait être accordée, et non seulement si elle avait pu être accordée. [72] certes, lorsque l’ordonnance de communica- tion a été rendue ex parte contre un média, la norme énoncée dans garofoli, qui commande une grande déférence, peut, dans certains cas, créer des injus- tices. en fait, même si je n’ai pas besoin de me fonder sur cette concession, la couronne a admis que, dans le contexte d’une ordonnance de communication pro- noncée ex parte contre un média, [traduction] « on ne peut pas simplement prendre le cadre d’analyse tel qu’il a été énoncé dans garofoli et l’appliquer » : transcription, p 105. [73] however, it may be going too far to create a general rule entitling the media to a de novo review of any production order that was made ex parte. in my view, where the production order was made ex parte, the following test should be applied: if the me- dia points to information not before the authorizing judge that, in the reviewing judge’s opinion, could reasonably have affected the authorizing judge’s decision to issue the order, then the media will be entitled to a de novo review. if, on the other hand, the media fails to meet this threshold requirement, [73] il pourrait toutefois être exagéré de créer une règle générale autorisant les médias à obtenir une révision de novo de toute ordonnance de communi- cation qui été rendue ex parte. à mon avis, lorsque l’ordonnance a été ainsi rendue, il faut appliquer le test suivant : si le média expose des renseigne- ments qui n’ont pas été portés à la connaissance du juge saisi de la demande et qui, selon le juge chargé de la révision, auraient pu raisonnablement avoir une incidence sur la décision du premier juge de délivrer l’ordonnance, le média aura droit [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 415 then the traditional garofoli standard will apply, meaning that the production order may be set aside only if the media can establish that — in light of the record before the authorizing judge, as amplified on review — there was no reasonable basis on which the authorizing judge could have granted the order. in applying the garofoli standard in this context, re- viewing judges should bear in mind that authorizing judges are required to give special consideration to the vital role of the media in a free and democratic society and to balance the state’s interest in investi- gating and prosecuting crimes and the media’s right to privacy in gathering and disseminating the news. [74] the threshold requirement of pointing to in- formation not before the authorizing judge that could reasonably have affected the decision, which should be assessed on a case-by- case basis, is not unduly burdensome. for example, without purporting to supply an exhaustive list, the requisite threshold may be satisfied by pointing to: • • • a confidentiality agreement protecting the source’s identity, or an agreement to keep cer- tain communications “off the record” or to treat them as “not for attribution”, that the authorizing judge was not aware of; unique features in the nature of the journalist- source relationship that the authorizing judge was not aware of; evidence that the production order affected, af- fects, or will affect the media — such as by preventing or delaying publication or compro- mising a journalistic investigation — in a way that could not have been foreseen by the author- izing judge; à une révision de novo. si, par contre, le média ne respecte pas cette exigence minimale, la norme traditionnelle établie dans garofoli s’appliquera, ce qui signifie que l’ordonnance de communication sera annulée seulement si le média peut établir que — au vu du dossier soumis au juge saisi de la demande, étoffé lors de la révision — il n’y avait aucun fondement raisonnable sur lequel le juge saisi de la demande a pu accorder l’ordonnance. lorsqu’il applique la norme établie dans garofoli dans ce contexte, le juge siégeant en révision doit garder à l’esprit que le juge saisi de la demande est tenu d’accorder une attention particulière au rôle essentiel des médias dans une société libre et démocratique, et de mettre en balance l’intérêt de l’état à enquêter sur les crimes et à poursuivre leurs auteurs et l’intérêt des médias à la confidentialité des renseignements dans la collecte et la diffusion des informations. [74] le critère minimal, qui consiste à exposer des renseignements qui n’ont pas été soumis au juge saisi de la demande et qui auraient raisonnablement pu avoir une incidence sur la décision — ce qui doit être évalué au cas par cas — n’est pas un fardeau excessif. par exemple, sans prétendre dresser ici une liste exhaustive, les médias pourraient s’en acquitter en signalant les éléments suivants : • • • une entente de confidentialité qui protège l’iden- tité de la source, ou une entente selon laquelle certaines communications ont été faites «  à titre confidentiel » ou doivent être considérées comme ayant été faites «  sous le couvert de l’anonymat », dont le juge saisi de la demande n’avait pas connaissance; des caractéristiques uniques de la nature de la relation entre le journaliste et sa source, dont le juge saisi de la demande n’avait pas connais- sance; la preuve que l’ordonnance de communication a eu, a ou aura une incidence sur le média — par exemple en empêchant ou en retardant une publication ou en compromettant une enquête journalistique — d’une manière telle que n’au- rait pas pu prévoir le juge saisi de la demande; 416 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. • • specific evidence — rather than general con- cerns — concerning chilling effects that the au- thorizing judge was not aware of; or alternative sources of the information that the authorizing judge was not aware of. [75] the requisite threshold would not, however, be satisfied by relying on the fact that the materials sought were provided on a confidential basis if that fact was known to the authorizing judge, as was the case in national post. nor would it be satisfied by a general assertion that the authorizing judge did not give sufficient weight to concerns over chilling effects or simply did not strike the right balance. [76] this modified garofoli standard recognizes that a strict application of the garofoli standard may work significant unfairness where, due to absence of the media at the authorization stage, information that could reasonably have affected the decision was not before the authorizing judge. in such circum- stances, the authorizing judge would have performed the lessard analysis — which requires a “careful weighing” of the rights and interests at stake and that the media be given “particularly careful consid- eration” (lessard, at p. 444) — without having fully weighed both sides of the scale. a decision that was made without having considered all of the relevant information that could reasonably have affected the outcome cannot rightly be shown deference, and therefore a fresh weighing is justified. • • des éléments de preuve précis — plutôt que des préoccupations d’ordre général — quant aux effets dissuasifs dont le juge saisi de la demande n’avait pas connaissance; ou d’autres sources de renseignements dont le juge saisi de la demande n’avait pas connaissance. [75] cependant, un média ne peut satisfaire au critère minimal requis en se fondant sur le fait que les renseignements demandés ont été fournis à titre confidentiel si le juge saisi de la demande était au courant de ce fait, comme c’était le cas dans national post. ils ne peuvent pas non plus y satisfaire en af- firmant de façon générale que le juge saisi de la demande n’a pas donné suffisamment d’importance aux effets dissuasifs ou qu’il n’a tout simplement pas établi le juste équilibre. [76] cette norme garofoli modifiée reconnaît que l’application stricte de la norme établie dans cet arrêt peut créer d’importantes injustices lorsque, en raison de l’absence des médias au stade de l’auto- risation, des renseignements qui auraient pu raison- nablement avoir une incidence sur la décision n’ont pas été soumis au juge saisi de la demande. dans ces circonstances, ce juge saisi de la demande aurait effectué l’analyse énoncée dans lessard — qui exige de « comparer soigneusement » les droits et intérêts en jeu et qui prévoit que les médias ont droit à une « attention toute particulière » (lessard, p. 444) — sans avoir pleinement mis en balance les différents intérêts en jeu. une décision qui a été prise sans que tous les renseignements pertinents raisonnablement susceptibles d’avoir une incidence sur le résultat n’aient été examinés ne peut à bon droit être traitée avec déférence; il est donc justifié dans ces circons- tances de procéder à une nouvelle mise en balance. [77] however, this modified garofoli standard also recognizes that there is no principled reason to un- dertake a de novo review where the media cannot point to information not before the authorizing judge that could reasonably have affected the authorizing judge’s decision to issue the order. in some circum- stances, even where the media was absent at the au- thorization hearing, the authorizing judge may have had all the information that could reasonably have [77] cela dit, cette norme garofoli modifiée re- connaît aussi qu’aucune raison logique ne justifie qu’une révision de novo soit entreprise lorsque le média ne peut pas présenter des renseignements qui n’ont pas été soumis au juge saisi de la demande et qui auraient raisonnablement pu avoir une inci- dence sur sa décision de rendre l’ordonnance. dans certaines circonstances, même lorsque le média n’a pas été présent lors de l’audition de la demande [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 417 affected the decision before him or her. if there is no information offered on review that could reasonably have affected the authorization decision but was not before the authorizing judge, then the justification for permitting a de novo review — namely, that relevant considerations were not taken into account — falls away. [78] there are, of course, good reasons for showing deference to the authorizing judge’s decision where he or she had all of the relevant information bearing on the decision before him or her. for example, a production order is presumptively a valid court order and de novo review would be inconsistent with the existence of a valid court order. additionally, the discretionary nature of a decision to issue a produc- tion order invites a deferential standard of review. more broadly, while the media carries with it unique considerations given its special role in society, that does not necessarily make the garofoli standard any less appropriate. [79] this modified garofoli standard is not incon- sistent with national post. as indicated, binnie j. stated in that case that the reviewing judge “is gen- erally bound    to afford a measure of deference to the determination of the issuing justice” (para. 80 (emphasis added)). his use of the word “generally” clearly contemplated that deference would not be an absolute rule. for the reasons i have identified, i consider it appropriate to recognize an exception where the production order relating to the media was made ex parte in circumstances where the author- izing judge did not have before him or her all the information that could reasonably have affected the decision. while the garofoli standard applies as a general rule, “[t]he media are entitled to this special consideration because of the importance of their role in a democratic society” (lessard, at p 444). d’autorisation, il est possible que le juge saisi de la demande ait disposé de tous les renseignements qui pouvaient raisonnablement avoir une incidence sur sa décision. si, lors de la révision, le média ne met de l’avant aucun renseignement qui aurait raisonnable- ment pu avoir une incidence sur la décision relative à l’autorisation, mais qui n’a pas été soumis au juge saisi de la demande, la raison qui justifie la révision de novo — soit que les facteurs pertinents n’ont pas été considérés — ne tient plus. [78] évidemment, il existe de bonnes raisons de faire preuve de déférence à l’égard de la décision du juge saisi de la demande lorsque celui-ci disposait de tous les renseignements pertinents qui avaient une incidence sur la décision qu’il devait prendre. par exemple, une ordonnance de communication est présumée être une ordonnance judiciaire valide, et une révision de novo ne serait pas compatible avec l’existence d’une telle ordonnance. de plus, la nature discrétionnaire de la décision de rendre une ordon- nance de communication commande une norme de contrôle empreinte de déférence. de façon plus géné- rale, bien qu’un média soit porteur de considérations uniques compte tenu de son rôle particulier au sein de la société, la norme garofoli n’est pas pour autant moins appropriée. [79] cette norme garofoli modifiée est compatible avec l’arrêt national post. comme je l’ai déjà indi- qué, le juge binnie a affirmé dans cette décision que le juge chargé de la révision « est habituellement tenu [  ] de faire preuve d’une certaine retenue à l’égard de la décision du juge qui a entendu la demande de mandat » : par. 80 (je souligne). il ressort clairement de son emploi du mot « habituellement » que la dé- férence n’est pas une règle absolue. pour les raisons que j’ai cernées, j’estime approprié de reconnaître une exception lorsque l’ordonnance de communi- cation en lien avec un média a été rendue ex parte dans une situation où le juge saisi de la demande ne disposait pas de tous les renseignements raisonnable- ment susceptibles d’avoir une incidence sur sa déci- sion. même si la norme garofoli s’applique de façon générale, « [l]es médias ont droit à cette attention particulière en raison de l’importance de leur rôle dans une société démocratique » : lessard, p 444. 418 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. i wish to re- emphasize that it remains open to [80] the authorizing judge to exercise his or her discre- tion to require that the media be given notice, and judges should not hesitate to exercise this discretion where the police have failed to provide some ev- identiary basis for why there is “urgency or other circumstances”. in addition, where the affidavit in support of the application appears to leave important gaps in information (eg, regarding the nature of the journalist- source relationship), or where the author- izing judge is uncertain as to the effect the order may have on the specific media outlet or the media more broadly, the authorizing judge may well decide that it would be unwise to proceed ex parte. while ex parte proceedings remain the statutory status quo, author- izing judges are not bound to proceed in this manner. requiring notice will generally obviate the need for a de novo review, with consequential savings to the administration of justice. [80] je tiens à souligner une fois de plus que le juge saisi de la demande a la possibilité d’exiger, en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, que le mé- dia soit avisé, et il ne devrait pas hésiter à exercer ce pouvoir lorsque les services de police n’ont pas fourni la preuve établissant des « situations d’ur- gence ou d’autres circonstances ». de plus, lorsque l’affidavit à l’appui de la demande semble comporter d’importantes lacunes quant aux renseignements (p ex, concernant la nature de la relation entre le journaliste et sa source), ou lorsque le juge saisi de la demande ne sait pas avec certitude quels effets pour- rait avoir l’ordonnance sur un organe de presse en particulier ou sur les médias de façon plus générale, il peut décider qu’il ne serait pas avisé de procéder ex parte. bien que l’audience ex parte soit le statu quo prévu par la loi, le juge saisi de la demande n’est pas tenu de procéder de cette façon. règle générale, l’obligation de donner un avis élimine la nécessité de procéder à un examen de novo, ce qui entraîne des économies pour l’administration de la justice. [81] finally, for the sake of clarity, i wish to add that where the media was given notice and appeared before the authorizing judge, there is generally good reason to apply the traditional garofoli standard on review. in that context, permitting a de novo review may do little more than add unnecessary time and expense. [81] finalement, pour plus de précision, je vou- drais ajouter que lorsque le média a reçu un avis et comparu devant le juge saisi de la demande, il existe généralement de bonnes raisons d’appliquer la norme de contrôle garofoli traditionnelle. dans ce contexte, permettre une révision de novo ne ferait guère plus qu’ajouter des délais et des dépenses indus. d reorganization of lessard factors d réorganisation des facteurs établis dans lessard [82] having settled the main jurisprudential issues on appeal, i wish to take this opportunity to reorgan- ize the lessard factors to make them easier to apply in practice. on an application for a production order against the media, the authorizing judge should apply a four- part analysis: [82] puisque j’ai réglé les principales questions ju- risprudentielles qui se posent dans le présent pourvoi, je veux profiter de cette occasion pour restructurer les facteurs établis dans lessard afin de les rendre plus faciles à appliquer en pratique. lorsque lui est soumise une demande relative à une ordonnance de communication en lien avec un média, le juge saisi de la demande doit appliquer une analyse en quatre étapes : (1) notice. first, the authorizing judge must con- sider whether to exercise his or her discretion to require notice to the media. while the stat- utory status quo is an ex parte proceeding (see criminal code, s 487014(1)), the authorizing judge has discretion to require notice where he (1) avis. premièrement, le juge saisi de la demande doit établir s’il y a lieu qu’il exige, en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, que le média soit avisé. bien que le statu quo prévu par la loi soit l’audience ex parte (voir par 487014(1) du code criminel), le juge saisi de la demande peut [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 419 or she deems appropriate (see national post, at para. 83; cbc (onca), at para 50). proceeding ex parte may be appropriate in “cases of ur- gency or other circumstances” (national post, at para 83). however, where, for example, the authorizing judge considers that he or she may not have all the information necessary to prop- erly engage in the analysis described below, this may be an appropriate circumstance in which to require notice. (2) statutory preconditions. second, all statutory preconditions must be met (lessard, factor 1). (3) balancing. third, the authorizing judge must balance the state’s interest in the investigation and prosecution of crimes and the media’s right to privacy in gathering and disseminating the news (lessard, factor 3). in performing this bal- ancing exercise, which can be accomplished only if the affidavit supporting the application contains sufficient detail (lessard, factor 4), the authorizing judge should consider all of the circumstances (lessard, factor 2). these circum- stances may include (but are not limited to): (a) the likelihood and extent of any potential chilling effects; (b) the scope of the materials sought and whether the order sought is narrowly tai- lored; (c) the likely probative value of the materials; (d) whether there are alternative sources from which the information may reasonably be obtained and, if so, whether the police have made all reasonable efforts to obtain the information from those sources (lessard, factor 5); décider, en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, d’exiger l’envoi d’un avis lorsqu’il le juge ap- proprié : voir national post, par. 83; cbc (ca. ont.), par 50. il peut être approprié de procé- der ex parte dans « des situations d’urgence ou d’autres circonstances » : national post, par 83. cependant, par exemple, il peut être approprié d’exiger que le média soit avisé dans la situation où le juge saisi de la demande estime qu’il ne dispose pas de tous les renseignements néces- saires pour effectuer comme il se doit l’analyse décrite ci- dessous. (2) conditions légales préalables. deuxièmement, toutes les conditions légales préalables doivent être réunies (lessard, facteur 1). (3) mise en balance. troisièmement, le juge saisi de la demande doit procéder à la mise en balance de l’intérêt de l’état à enquêter sur les crimes et à poursuivre leurs auteurs, d’une part, et du droit des médias à la confidentialité des rensei- gnements dans la collecte et la diffusion des informations, d’autre part (lessard, facteur 3). lorsqu’il effectue cette mise en balance, qui ne peut avoir lieu que si l’affidavit à l’appui de la demande contient suffisamment de détails (lessard, facteur 4), le juge saisi de la demande doit tenir compte de l’ensemble des circons- tances (lessard, facteur 2). ces circonstances comprennent (notamment) : a) b) c) d) la probabilité qu’il y ait des effets dissuasifs, et l’étendue de ceux-ci, le cas échéant; la portée des renseignements demandés et la question de savoir si l’ordonnance deman- dée est formulée de façon restrictive; la valeur probante éventuelle des renseigne- ments; la question de savoir s’il existe d’autres sources desquelles les renseignements peuvent raisonnablement être obtenus et, dans l’affirmative, si les services de police ont déployé tous les efforts raisonnables pour obtenir les renseignements auprès de ces sources (lessard, facteur 5); 420 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. (e) the effect of prior partial publication, now assessed on a case-by- case basis (lessard, factor 6); and e) l’effet de la publication partielle antérieure, désormais examiné au cas par cas (lessard, facteur 6); (f) more broadly, the vital role that the media plays in the functioning of a democratic society and the fact that the media will gen- erally be an innocent third party (lessard, factor 3). at the end of the day, the decision as to whether to grant the order sought is discretionary (lessard, factor 2), and the relative importance of the vari- ous factors guiding that discretion will vary from case to case (see new brunswick, at p 478). (4) conditions. fourth, if the authorizing judge decides to exercise his or her discretion to issue the order, he or she should consider imposing conditions on the order to ensure that the media will not be unduly impeded in the publishing and dissemination of the news (lessard, factor 7). the authorizing judge may also see fit to order that the materials be sealed for a period pending review. [83] as explained above at para. 73, if the order is granted ex parte and is later challenged by the media, the standard of review is determined by applying the following test: if the media points to information not before the authorizing judge that, in the reviewing judge’s opinion, could reasonably have affected the authorizing judge’s decision to issue the order, then the media will be entitled to a de novo review. if, on the other hand, the media fails to meet this threshold requirement, then the traditional garofoli standard will apply, meaning that the production order may be set aside only if the media can establish that — in light of the record before the authorizing judge, as amplified on review — there was no reasonable basis on which the authorizing judge could have granted the order. [84] with this analytical framework in mind, i will now apply the law to the facts of this case. f) de façon plus générale, le rôle vital que jouent les médias dans le fonctionnement d’une société démocratique et le fait qu’ils sont généralement des tiers innocents (lessard, facteur 3). en définitive, la décision de décerner ou non l’ordonnance relève d’un pouvoir discrétion- naire (lessard, facteur 2), et l’importance rel- ative des divers facteurs guidant l’exercice de ce pouvoir variera d’une affaire à l’autre : voir nouveau‑ brunswick, p 478. (4) conditions. quatrièmement, si le juge saisi de la demande décide de décerner l’ordonnance en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, il doit envisager d’assortir celle-ci de conditions pour que le média ne soit pas indûment empêché de publier et de diffuser les informations (lessard, facteur  7) le juge saisi de la demande peut également juger qu’il est approprié que les ren- seignements soient scellés pendant un certain temps en attendant la décision en révision. [83] comme je l’ai déjà expliqué au par. 73, si l’or- donnance est décernée lors d’une audience ex parte et qu’elle est ultérieurement contestée par le média, la norme de contrôle sera établie en appliquant le test suivant : si le média expose des renseignements dont ne disposait pas le juge saisi de la demande et qui, de l’avis du juge chargé de la révision, auraient raison- nablement pu avoir une incidence sur la décision du juge saisi de la demande de décerner l’ordonnance, le média aura droit à un examen de novo. si, par contre, le média ne satisfait pas à ce critère minimal, la norme garofoli traditionnelle s’appliquera, ce qui signifie que l’ordonnance de communication pourra être annulée seulement si le média peut établir que — compte tenu du dossier soumis au juge saisi de la demande, étoffé lors de la révision — il n’y avait aucun fondement raisonnable sur lequel le juge saisi de la demande a pu accorder l’ordonnance. [84] c’est en tenant compte de ce cadre d’analyse que je vais maintenant appliquer le droit aux faits de la présente affaire. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 421 e should the production order be set aside? e l’ordonnance de communication devrait‑ elle être annulée? (1) notice and standard of review (1) avis et norme de contrôle [85] as a procedural matter, the production order cannot be successfully challenged on the basis that it should not have been made ex parte. the information to obtain (“ito”) sworn by constable grewal ex- plains the police’s rationale for seeking the order ex parte. it describes vice media and its operations and sets out key information regarding mr. makuch, his interactions with mr. shirdon, and the articles he wrote based on those interactions in light of this discussion, it identifies a risk that once alerted to the police’s interest in the material, the appel- lants could move the materials beyond the reach of canadian courts. it explains that before bringing the application, investigators weighed the potential risks associated with alerting the appellants of the inves- tigative importance of the information against the benefits of obtaining the information more swiftly. it also states that there was no basis on which to be assured that the appellants would cooperate with the police, adding that the police drew “a reasonable inference that this news organization would not be able to stage this kind of interview with a purported member of a terrorist group if they had a reputation for immediately handing original evidence to the police” (ar, at pp 242-43). although the police’s explanation for seeking the production order ex parte could have been stronger and better supported, i am of the view that when that explanation is read in the context of the ito as a whole, it was open to the authorizing judge to rely on this explanation and to proceed ex parte, declining to exercise his discretion to require notice. [85] sur le plan de la procédure, l’ordonnance de communication ne peut être contestée avec succès au motif qu’elle n’aurait pas dû être le fruit d’une audience ex parte. dans sa dénonciation faite sous serment, l’agent grewal a expliqué les raisons pour lesquelles les policiers ont demandé une audience ex parte. la dénonciation comporte une description de média vice et de ses activités et énonce les prin- cipaux renseignements relatifs à m. makuch, à ses interactions avec m. shirdon et aux articles qu’il a écrits fondés sur ces interactions. à la lumière de ces discussions, elle fait état d’un risque que les ap- pelants mettent les renseignements hors de la portée des tribunaux canadiens lorsqu’ils seront informés de l’intérêt qu’ils suscitent pour les services de police. la dénonciation explique en outre que, avant de présenter la demande, les enquêteurs ont soupesé les risques potentiels associés au fait d’alerter les appelants de l’importance des renseignements pour l’enquête et les avantages d’obtenir plus rapidement ces renseignements. elle précise aussi que rien ne prouvait que les appelants collaboreraient avec les services de police, et que ceux-ci ont [traduction] « raisonnablement inféré que cet organe de presse ne serait pas en mesure d’organiser ce type d’entre- vue avec une personne prétendument membre d’un groupe terroriste s’il avait la réputation de remettre immédiatement la preuve originale à la police » : da, p. 242- 243. même si l’explication qu’ont don- née les services de police pour présenter ex parte leur demande d’ordonnance de communication aurait pu être plus solide et plus étayée, je suis d’avis qu’en la lisant dans le contexte de la dénonciation dans son ensemble, le juge saisi de la demande pouvait, en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, se fonder sur elle pour entendre la demande ex parte, et refuser d’exiger l’envoi d’un avis. [86] on the issue of standard of review, the appel- lants have not pointed to any information not before the authorizing judge that could reasonably have affected the decision to issue the production order. i note, for instance, that mr.  makuch’s evidence [86] quant à la question de la norme de contrôle, les appelants n’ont relevé aucun renseignement qui n’a pas été soumis au juge saisi de la demande et qui aurait raisonnablement pu avoir une incidence sur la décision de délivrer l’ordonnance de communication. 422 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. regarding chilling effects on his ability to cultivate journalist- source relationships consisted primarily of a mere assertion that “it is critical for [his] work that individuals do not view [him] as an agent of the police or that the information they provide [him] will be used for purposes of a police investigation”, as well as his stated belief that if individuals that he interviews “are aware that everything they tell [him] could be provided to police”, then “they will be much less inclined to answer [his] questions and provide [him] with information” (ar, at p 87). in my view, such assertions are too general to qual- ify as information not before the authorizing judge that could reasonably have affected the authorizing judge’s decision, especially given that the ito does indicate that vice media would have difficulty stag- ing interviews of this nature if it had a reputation for immediately handing original evidence to the police. accordingly, the traditional garofoli standard applies, and the authorizing judge’s decision may be overturned only if the appellants can establish that — in light of the record before the authorizing judge, as amplified on review — there was no reasonable basis on which the authorizing judge could have granted the production order. [87] the remaining question, then, is whether the production order can withstand scrutiny under the lessard framework, as restated above. in my view, applying that framework, there was a reasonable ba- sis on which to grant the production order. the statu- tory preconditions were met, and based on the record it was open to the authorizing judge to conclude that the compelling state interest in the investigation and prosecution of the alleged terrorism offences at issue outweighed the media’s right to privacy in the circumstances of this case. indeed, as i will discuss, even on a de novo review, the production order was properly granted. je note, par exemple, que la preuve présentée par m. makuch quant aux effets dissuasifs sur sa ca- pacité d’entretenir des relations journaliste- source consistait principalement en une simple affirmation selon laquelle [traduction] « il est essentiel pour [son] travail que des individus ne [le] perçoivent pas comme un représentant de la police ou que les rensei- gnements qu’ils [lui] fournissent seront utilisés à des fins d’enquêtes policières », et en sa croyance voulant que si des individus qu’il questionne « savent que tout ce qu’ils [lui] disent pourrait être remis à la po- lice », « ils seront beaucoup moins enclins à répondre à [ses] questions et à [lui] fournir des renseigne- ments » : da, p 87 à mon avis, ces affirmations sont trop générales pour constituer des renseignements dont ne disposait pas le juge saisi de la demande qui auraient raisonnablement pu avoir une incidence sur sa décision s’il en avait eu connaissance, surtout compte tenu du fait que la dénonciation précise que média vice aurait de la difficulté à organiser des entrevues de la nature de celle en cause en l’espèce si elle avait la réputation de remettre immédiatement à la police les éléments de preuve originaux dont elle prend connaissance. en conséquence, la norme traditionnelle établie dans garofoli s’applique, et la décision du juge saisi de la demande peut être annulée seulement si les appelants démontrent que — compte tenu du dossier dont dispose le juge, étoffé lors de la révision — il n’y avait aucun fondement raisonnable sur lequel le juge a pu s’appuyer pour accorder l’ordonnance de communication. [87] il reste donc à décider si l’ordonnance de communication peut résister à une analyse selon le cadre établi dans lessard, comme il a été reformulé précédemment. à mon avis, si on applique ce cadre d’analyse, il existait un fondement raisonnable jus- tifiant l’octroi de l’ordonnance de communication. il était satisfait aux conditions préalables prévues par la loi et, selon le dossier, le juge saisi de la demande pouvait conclure que l’intérêt impérieux de l’état à enquêter sur des infractions de terrorisme présumées en l’espèce et à poursuivre leurs auteurs prévalait sur le droit du média à la confidentialité dans les circonstances de la présente affaire. en fait, comme je l’expliquerai, même si on procédait à un examen de novo, il faudrait conclure que l’ordonnance de communication a été décernée à bon droit. • • [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 423 (2) statutory preconditions (2) conditions légales préalables [88] subsection 487.014(2) of the criminal code permits a judge or justice to issue a production or- der where he or she is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that (1) “an offence has been or will be committed”; (2) “the document or data is in the person’s posses- sion or control”; and (3) the document or data “will afford evidence respecting the commission of the offence”. [88] le paragraphe 487.014(2) du code criminel permet au juge ou au juge de paix de délivrer une or- donnance de communication lorsqu’il est convaincu, par une dénonciation faite sous serment, qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire que (1) « une in- fraction [  ] a été ou sera commise »; (2) « le do- cument ou les données sont en la possession de la personne ou à sa disposition »; et (3) le document ou les données « fourniront une preuve concernant la perpétration de l’infraction ». [89] here, these baseline statutory requirements were met: [89] dans le cas qui nous occupe, ces exigences législatives initiales étaient respectées : • first, the ito provided reasonable grounds to believe that mr. shirdon had committed certain offences — including participating in the activ- ities of a terrorist group contrary to s 8318 of the criminal code and committing indictable offences (namely, uttering threats of death) for a terrorist group contrary to s 832 — in relation to his alleged participation in, and facilitation of, the activities of isis. premièrement, la dénonciation fournissait des motifs raisonnables de croire que m. shirdon avait commis certaines infractions — il aurait no- tamment participé aux activités d’un groupe ter- roriste (infraction prévue à l’art 8318 du code criminel) et commis des actes criminels (no- tamment proféré des menaces de mort) pour un groupe terroriste (infraction prévue à l’art 832 du code criminel) — en lien avec sa prétendue participation aux activités de daech et sa faci- litation de celles-ci. second, the ito provided reasonable grounds for believing that the appellants had in their pos- session the materials sought — including re- cords of communications between mr. shirdon and mr. makuch over kik messenger — based on the police’s belief that mr. makuch, as a jour- nalist, would have saved the communications. • third, the ito provided reasonable grounds for believing that those materials would afford evidence respecting the commission of the al- leged offences. as macdonnell j. observed, the ito provided an overview of the results of the investigation, set out the basis for the police’s belief that mr. shirdon had made statements to mr. makuch with respect to his involvement in isis (statements which, on their face, were ev- idence of the offences under investigation), and affirmed that the affiant believed that the doc- uments sought “will afford evidence of the   . • deuxièmement, la dénonciation fournissait des motifs raisonnables de croire que les appelants avaient en leur possession les renseignements sollicités — y compris les communications entre m. shirdon et m. makuch sur l’application kik messenger — fondés sur la croyance des poli- ciers que m. makuch, puisqu’il est journaliste, aurait sauvegardé les communications. • troisièmement, la dénonciation fournissait des motifs raisonnables de croire que ces documents pouvaient offrir des éléments de preuve concer- nant la perpétration des infractions présumées. comme l’a noté le juge macdonnell, la dénon- ciation fournissait un aperçu des résultats de l’enquête, énonçait le fondement de la croyance des policiers selon laquelle m. shirdon avait fait des déclarations à m. makuch en ce qui a trait à sa participation à daech (déclarations qui, à première vue, étaient des éléments de preuve des infractions faisant l’objet de l’enquête), et 424 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. offences” (2016 onsc 1961, 352 crr (2d) 60, at para. 21, citing ito, at para. 17, as repro- duced in ar, at p 148). indiquait que le déposant croyait que les docu- ments demandés [traduction] « fourniront une preuve des    infractions » : 2016 onsc 1961, 352 crr (2d) 60, par. 21, citant la dénoncia- tion, par. 17, telle qu’elle est reproduite dans le da, p 148. thus, the statutory preconditions for the issuance of a production order were satisfied in the circumstances. dans les circonstances, il avait donc été satisfait aux conditions légales préalables pour la délivrance d’une ordonnance de communication. (3) balancing (3) mise en balance [90] this case turns on the lessard balancing exer- cise — an exercise which this court has recognized can be a “difficult and complex process” (p 444). (a) media’s right to privacy in gathering and disseminating news [91] beginning with the media’s right to privacy in gathering and disseminating the news, there are two main factors that, in my view, demonstrate that the impact of the production order on this right is attenuated: (1) the nature of the materials sought; and (2) the narrow scope of the order and the fact that it is minimally disruptive of the appellants’ legitimate activities. [90] la présente affaire repose sur la mise en ba- lance établie dans lessard : une mise en balance qui peut s’avérer « difficile et compliqué » selon la cour : p 444. a) droit des médias à la confidentialité des ren‑ seignements dans la collecte et la diffusion des informations [91] tout d’abord, selon moi, deux principaux fac- teurs démontrent que l’incidence de l’ordonnance de communication sur le droit des médias à la confiden- tialité des renseignements dans la collecte et la dif- fusion des informations est réduite : (1) la nature des renseignements demandés; et (2) la portée étroite de l’ordonnance et le fait qu’elle ne représente qu’une perturbation minimale des activités légitimes des appelants. [92] first, unlike in national post, this is not a case in which compliance with the order would result in a confidential source’s identity being re- vealed. mr. shirdon never insisted on confidentiality. although he used a pseudonym when he first con- nected with mr. makuch, he openly identified himself as the canadian who had burned his passport in the online propaganda video, and his name was used re- peatedly throughout the articles in question. clearly, he did not regard himself as a confidential source, nor did mr makuch. nor is there any indication in the record that any of the information mr. shirdon provided to mr. makuch was “off the record” or “not for attribution”. moreover, without insisting on confidentiality, mr. shirdon used the appellants as a means through which to publicize his activities [92] d’abord, contrairement à la situation qui pré- valait dans national post, il ne s’agit pas d’une affaire où le respect de l’ordonnance aurait pour effet de révéler l’identité d’une source anonyme. m. shirdon n’a jamais mis l’accent sur la confidentialité. bien qu’il ait utilisé un pseudonyme lorsqu’il a initiale- ment pris contact avec m. makuch, il s’est ouver- tement présenté comme étant le canadien qui avait brûlé son passeport dans la vidéo de propagande diffusée en ligne et son nom a été utilisé à plusieurs reprises dans les articles en cause il est évident qu’il ne se considérait pas comme une source ano- nyme, et que m. makuch ne le percevait pas comme tel non plus. rien n’indique non plus dans le dos- sier que m. shirdon a fourni des renseignements à m. makuch « à titre confidentiel » ou « sous le [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 425 with isis and broadcast its extremist views as a sort of spokesperson on behalf of the organization. as macdonnell j. put it, mr. shirdon regarded the appellants as “the channels through which he would speak to the whole world” (para 43). clearly, there- fore, this is no ordinary case. while the production order could arguably raise some concerns over po- tential chilling effects — for example, it may convey a sense that the media is being conscripted as an arm of the state, discourage journalists from keeping notes and records regarding their communications with suspected criminals, or lead those involved in criminal activities to have second thoughts about speaking to the media — the factors described above largely mitigate any potential chilling effect that might otherwise be associated with the production order. [93] second, in my view, a carefully tailored order, targeting only a limited scope of materials that are closely related to the offence(s) under investigation, has a lesser impact on the media’s right to privacy in gathering and disseminating the news, as compared to a more sweeping order. here, the production order is carefully tailored, targeting a relatively discrete set of records and communications. the scope of ma- terials sought does not overreach or result in undue interference. relatedly, the order is only minimally disruptive of the appellants’ legitimate activities. no search is involved, and compliance would not be un- duly burdensome. accordingly, this factor militates in favour of the production order. couvert de l’anonymat ». de plus, sans insister sur la confidentialité, m. shirdon a utilisé les appelants pour publiciser ses activités auprès de daech et propager ses idées extrémistes, en tant en quelque sorte, que porte- parole de l’organisation. comme l’a affirmé le juge macdonnell, m. shirdon voyait les appelants comme étant [traduction] « la voie par laquelle il pourrait s’adresser au monde entier » : par 43. il est donc évident qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une affaire ordinaire. même si l’ordonnance de communication peut raisonnablement soulever certaines préoccupa- tions concernant des effets dissuasifs éventuels — par exemple, elle pourrait donner l’impression que le média est utilisé en tant que prolongement de l’état, décourager les journalistes de conserver des notes et des relevés concernant leurs communications avec les personnes soupçonnées de crimes, ou amener les personnes ayant participé à des activités criminelles à revenir sur leur décision de parler aux médias —, les facteurs décrits précédemment atténuent largement tout effet dissuasif qui pourrait autrement être associé à l’ordonnance de communication. [93] ensuite, à mon avis, une ordonnance soi- gneusement rédigée, qui vise seulement un nombre limité de renseignements étroitement liés aux in- fractions qui font l’objet d’une enquête, aurait une moins grande incidence sur le droit des médias à la confidentialité des renseignements dans la collecte et la diffusion des informations, en comparaison à une ordonnance plus générale. en l’espèce, l’ordon- nance de communication est soigneusement rédigée et ne vise qu’un nombre relativement restreint de renseignements et de communications. la portée des renseignements demandés n’est pas excessive et ne donne pas lieu à une immixtion injustifiée. dans le même ordre d’idées, l’ordonnance ne constitue qu’une perturbation minimale des activités légitimes des appelants; elle ne comporte aucune recherche, et s’y conformer ne constitue pas un fardeau excessif. en conséquence, ce facteur milite pour la délivrance de l’ordonnance de communication. (b) state’s interest in investigating and prose‑ b) cuting crime intérêt de l’état à enquêter sur les crimes et à poursuivre leurs auteurs [94] turning to the other side of the scale, there are four main factors that, in my view, demonstrate that [94] par ailleurs, quatre principaux facteurs il- lustrent, à mon avis, que l’intérêt de l’état à enquêter 426 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. the state’s interest in investigating and prosecuting crime is high in this case: (1)  the seriousness of the crimes alleged and the need to respond swiftly; (2) the importance of the materials sought to the in- vestigation and prosecution of the alleged offences; (3) the absence of alternative sources from which the information may be reasonably obtained; and (4) the fact of prior partial publication. [95] first, as cory j. stated in new brunswick, “investigation of a serious and violent crime [is] of importance to the state”, and this importance will be further enhanced where there is some urgency to the investigation (p 476). the offences with which mr. shirdon has been charged include participating in the activities of a terrorist group and commit- ting indictable offences (namely, uttering threats of death) for a terrorist group. such conduct is in- compatible with a safe, peaceful, and democratic society. and according to one of mr. makuch’s ar- ticles, mr. shirdon communicated to mr. makuch a specific threat that if canada joins the crusade against muslims, then blood will flow in the streets of canada and canadians will be attacked in their homes. suffice it to say that a threat of this nature cannot be taken lightly, nor can a response be put off until later. to the contrary, the offences alleged demand a swift and committed response. [96] second, the records sought  — including screenshots of the unedited communications be- tween mr. makuch and mr. shirdon (rather than simply mr. makuch’s interpretation and relaying of those communications) — would provide reliable, direct, and probative evidence that would not require second- hand interpretation. such evidence would significantly advance the investigation and prose- cution of the offences alleged. therefore, the state’s interest in the materials is heightened. sur les crimes et à poursuivre leurs auteurs est im- portant dans la présente affaire : (1) la gravité des crimes présumés et la nécessité que des mesures soient prises rapidement; (2) l’importance des ren- seignements demandés pour l’enquête et la poursuite des infractions présumées; (3) l’absence d’autres sources desquelles les renseignements pouvaient raisonnablement être obtenus; et (4) le fait que les renseignements ont déjà été partiellement publiés. [95] premièrement, comme l’a affirmé le juge cory dans nouveau‑ brunswick, « [l’]enquête relative à un crime grave et violent [est] importante pour l’état », et cette importance est accrue lorsqu’il y a une cer- taine urgence à effectuer l’enquête : p 476. les in- fractions dont a été accusé m. shirdon comprennent la participation à des activités d’un groupe terroriste et la commission d’actes criminels (notamment pro- férer des menaces de mort) pour un groupe terroriste. un tel comportement est incompatible avec une so- ciété sécuritaire, pacifique et démocratique. de plus, selon un des articles de m. makuch, m. shirdon lui aurait communiqué une menace précise, selon laquelle le sang coulerait dans les rues du canada et les canadiens seraient attaqués dans leur mai- son si le canada participait à la croisade contre les musulmans. il va sans dire qu’une menace de cette nature ne peut être prise à la légère, et qu’on ne peut remettre à plus tard la prise de mesures. au contraire, les infractions présumées exigent une réponse rapide et engagée. [96] deuxièmement, les renseignements deman- dés  — y compris les captures d’écran des com- munications non caviardées entre mm. makuch et shirdon (plutôt que simplement l’interprétation et la transmission par m. makuch de ces communica- tions) — fournissent des éléments de preuve fiables, directs et probants qui ne nécessitent pas d’interpré- tation de seconde main. ces éléments de preuve fe- raient nettement progresser l’enquête et la poursuite relative aux infractions présumées. en conséquence, l’intérêt de l’état à l’égard des renseignements est renforcé. [97] third, the materials sought are not available from any other source. the ito stated that the ef- forts of the police to obtain the materials from the [97] troisièmement, les renseignements demandés ne peuvent être obtenus d’une autre source. la dé- nonciation précisait que les efforts des policiers pour [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc le juge moldaver 427 text- messaging service provider, kik interactive, or from any other individual or company, were unsuc- cessful. there is nothing suggesting the materials sought may be available through some other alter- native source. obtenir les renseignements auprès du fournisseur de service de messagerie texte, kik interactive, ou de toute autre personne ou entreprise, ont échoué. rien ne laisse croire que les renseignements demandés auraient pu être obtenus auprès d’une autre source. [98] fourth, in this case, prior partial publication also militates in favour of granting the production order. justice macdonnell stated that “[t]he author- izing justice was also entitled to consider that the bulk of the information that shirdon communicated to mr. makuch had been published by mr. makuch” (para 44). mr. makuch went even further, stating in his affidavit that “[a]ll relevant information and com- ments that shirdon made during our k[ik] messenger exchanges were included in my articles” (ar, at p. 86), though of course those articles did not include the full record of the original communications them- selves. further, the publication of the articles put into the public sphere information relating to the commis- sion of serious terrorism offences. as cory j. stated in lessard, “[w]hen a crime has been committed and evidence of that crime has been published, society has every right to expect that it will be investigated and, if appropriate, prosecuted” (p 447). [99] in light of the considerations outlined above, the state’s interest in the materials is high in this case. this militates in favour of the production order. [98] quatrièmement, en l’espèce, la publication partielle antérieure milite aussi en faveur de l’octroi de l’ordonnance de communication. le juge macdonnell a affirmé que [traduction] « [l]e juge saisi de la de- mande est aussi habilité à tenir compte du fait qu’une grande partie des renseignements que m. shirdon a communiqués à m. makuch avaient été publiés par ce dernier » : par 44. m. makuch est même allé plus loin en affirmant dans son affidavit que [traduction] « [t]ous les renseignements pertinents et les commen- taires que m. shirdon a faits pendant nos échanges sur k[ik] messenger se trouvent dans mes articles » (da, p. 86), même si évidemment ces articles ne com- prennent pas un relevé complet des communications originales elles- mêmes. de plus, la publication des articles a versé dans le domaine public des renseigne- ments relatifs à la perpétration d’infractions graves de terrorisme. comme l’a affirmé le juge cory dans lessard, « [l]orsqu’un acte criminel a été commis et que des éléments de preuve de cet acte criminel ont été publiés, la société est tout à fait en droit de s’attendre à ce qu’il fasse l’objet d’une enquête et, s’il y a lieu, d’une poursuite » : p 447. [99] compte tenu des considérations énoncées précédemment, l’intérêt de l’état à l’égard des do- cuments est élevé en l’espèce, ce qui milite pour l’octroi de l’ordonnance de communication. (c) conclusion c) conclusion [100] i therefore conclude that the balancing ex- ercise favours the issuance of the production order. [100] je conclus donc que l’exercice de mise en balance favorise la délivrance de l’ordonnance de communication. (4) conditions (4) conditions [101] finally, following this court’s guidance in national post (see para. 84), the authorizing judge imposed adequate terms in the production order providing ample time — a full 60 days — to com- ply with the order, thereby giving the appellants [101] enfin, conformément aux directives que la cour a données dans national post (voir par. 84), le juge saisi de la demande a assorti l’ordonnance de communication de conditions adéquates, qui don- naient aux appelants amplement de temps — soit 428 r v vice media canada inc moldaver j. [2018] 3 scr. sufficient opportunity to move to have the production order set aside, as they did. this factor further sup- ports the conclusion that the authorizing judge was justified in proceeding ex parte and in issuing the order. 60 jours complets — pour se conformer à l’ordon- nance, ce qui leur laissait suffisamment l’occasion de chercher à faire annuler l’ordonnance de commu- nication, comme ils l’ont d’ailleurs fait. ce facteur étaye la conclusion voulant que le juge saisi de la demande a eu raison de tenir une audience ex parte et de délivrer l’ordonnance. v my colleague’s proposed approach v la démarche proposée par ma collègue [102] finally, i briefly comment on my colleague’s approach, which treats this case as an opportunity to formally recognize that freedom of the press enjoys “distinct and independent constitutional protection under s. 2(b) of the charter” (abella j.’s reasons, at para 123). [103] in my respectful view, it is neither necessary nor appropriate in this case to do so. neither the proper contours of this proposed understanding of s. 2(b) nor its implications — whether in this case or beyond the scope of the appeal — was fully argued by the parties or considered by the courts below. this proposed recognition may have unforeseen consequences, for example, on the law relating to freedom of information requests, publication bans, and other areas implicating freedom of the press. in these circumstances, i consider it prudent to rely on the precedents established by this court in lessard, new brunswick and national post. [104] here, i consider that the lessard framework has not been shown to be unworkable, its validity has not been undermined by subsequent jurisprudence, and none of the considerations on which it is based can be said to be no longer relevant (sriskandarajah v. united states of america, 2012 scc 70, [2012] 3 scr 609, at para 19). accordingly, i am not convinced that it is necessary to open up s. 2(b) on this appeal and abandon the lessard framework in favour of another test. in my view, it is preferable to retain the essential framework from lessard and refine that framework in the ways i have outlined above. [102] enfin, je vais brièvement formuler quelques observations sur la démarche proposée par ma col- lègue, selon laquelle l’affaire qui nous occupe constitue l’occasion de reconnaître officiellement que la liberté de la presse jouit « d’une protection constitutionnelle distincte et indépendante aux termes de l’al. 2b) de la charte » : motifs de la juge abella, par 123. [103] à mon avis, il n’est ni nécessaire ni appro- prié en l’espèce d’agir ainsi. ni les limites qu’il convient d’imposer à cette interprétation proposée de l’al. 2b) ni ses répercussions — que ce soit dans la présente affaire ou au- delà de celle-ci — n’ont été pleinement débattues par les parties ou examinées par les instances inférieures. cette reconnaissance proposée pourrait avoir des conséquences impré- vues, par exemple, sur le droit en matière de de- mandes d’accès à l’information, sur les ordonnances de non- publication et sur d’autres domaines mettant en jeu la liberté de la presse. dans les circonstances, il m’apparaît prudent que nous nous fondions sur les précédents établis par la cour dans lessard, nouveau‑ brunswick et national post. [104] en l’espèce, selon moi, il n’a pas été dé- montré que le cadre d’analyse établi dans lessard était impraticable, sa validité n’a pas été minée par la jurisprudence subséquente, et aucune des consi- dérations sur lesquelles cet arrêt était fondé ne peut être jugée dépassée : sriskandarajah c. états‑ unis d’amérique, 2012 csc 70, [2012] 3 rcs 609, par 19. je ne suis donc pas convaincu qu’il soit né- cessaire d’élargir la portée de l’al. 2b) dans le présent appel et d’abandonner le cadre d’analyse établi dans lessard au profit d’un autre test. selon moi, il est préférable de conserver l’essence du cadre d’analyse établi dans cet arrêt et de le peaufiner comme je l’ai indiqué précédemment. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 429 in declining to recognize freedom of the [105] press as enjoying distinct and independent constitu- tional protection under s. 2(b), i do not suggest that freedom of the press is anything less than essential in a free and democratic society. nor do i deny that freedom of the press is entitled to constitutional pro- tection — the text of s. 2(b) confirms that it clearly is. rather, i simply take the view that because this appeal can readily be disposed of without going so far as to rethink s. 2(b), and because the matter was not fully argued by the parties or considered by the courts below, i do not view this appeal as an appropriate venue in which to formally recognize a distinct and independent constitutional protection for freedom of the press under s 2(b). i would leave that question for another day. [105] en refusant de reconnaître que la liberté de la presse jouit d’une protection constitutionnelle distincte et indépendante en application de l’al. 2b), je ne prétends pas que la liberté de la presse n’est pas essentielle dans le cadre d’une société libre et démo- cratique. je ne nie pas non plus que la liberté de la presse jouit d’une protection constitutionnelle — le texte de l’al. 2b) confirme clairement que tel est le cas. je suis plutôt simplement d’avis que le présent pourvoi peut être facilement tranché sans que nous allions jusqu’à repenser l’al. 2b), que la question n’a pas été pleinement débattue par les parties ou examinée par les tribunaux d’instances inférieures, et que le présent pourvoi n’est pas l’occasion appro- priée pour reconnaître officiellement une protection constitutionnelle distincte et indépendante relati- vement à la liberté de la presse en application de l’al 2b). je reporterais à une autre occasion l’examen de cette question. vi conclusion vi conclusion [106] in sum, considering all of the circumstances, not only was there a reasonable basis on which the authorizing judge could have issued the production order, but a de novo consideration of the lessard framework favours the issuance of the production order. accordingly, i would uphold its validity. [106] en somme, compte tenu de toutes les cir- constances, non seulement y avait-il un fondement raisonnable sur lequel le juge saisi de la demande pouvait délivrer l’ordonnance de communication, mais un examen de novo du cadre d’analyse établi dans lessard favorise la délivrance de cette ordon- nance. j’en confirmerais donc la validité. [107] as for the sealing order and the publication ban, the appellants have failed to demonstrate why this court should depart from doherty ja’s con- clusion on these matters. as such, i would decline to set them aside. [107] pour ce qui est de l’ordonnance de mise sous scellés et l’ordonnance de non- publication, les appe- lants n’ont pas réussi à démontrer pourquoi la cour devrait s’écarter de la conclusion du juge doherty sur ces questions. je refuse donc de les annuler. [108] accordingly, i would dismiss the appeal. the reasons of wagner cj,. abella, karakatsanis and martin jj. were delivered by [108] en conséquence, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. version française des motifs du juge en chef wagner et des juges abella, karakatsanis et martin rendus par [109] abella j. — for 25 years, this court has flirted with acknowledging that s. 2(b) of the charter protects independent rights for the media. unlike the majority, i see no reason to continue to avoid giving distinct constitutional content to the words “freedom [109] la juge abella — depuis 25 ans, la cour a flirté avec l’idée de reconnaître que l’al. 2b) de la charte protège des droits indépendants pour les médias. contrairement aux juges majoritaires, je ne vois aucune raison pour continuer de nous abstenir 430 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. of the press” in s 2(b). the words are clear, the con- cerns are real, and the issue is ripe. [110] a strong, independent and responsible press ensures that the public’s opinions about its dem- ocratic choices are based on accurate and reliable information. this is not a democratic luxury — there can be no democracy without it. [111] this case explores the border between vig- orous protection for the press and the state’s ability to investigate crime by seeking information from the press. there are, as a result, two provisions of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms at issue in this appeal. one is s. 8, which protects a reasonable expectation of privacy. the other is s. 2(b), which protects “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication”. [112] strong constitutional safeguards against state intrusion are a necessary precondition for the press to perform its essential democratic role effectively. as these reasons seek to demonstrate, s. 2(b) contains a distinct constitutional press right which protects the press’ core expressive functions — its right to gather and disseminate information for the public benefit without undue interference. when the state seeks ac- cess to information in the hands of the media through a production order, both the media’s s. 2(b) rights and s. 8 privacy rights are engaged. a rigorously protective harmonized analysis is therefore required. de donner un contenu constitutionnel distinct aux mots « liberté de la presse » qui figurent à l’al 2b). les mots sont clairs, les préoccupations sont réelles et l’enjeu est mûr. [110] une presse forte, indépendante et respon- sable garantit que les opinions du public quant à ses choix démocratiques soient fondées sur des rensei- gnements exacts et fiables. cela n’est pas un luxe démocratique — il ne peut y avoir de démocratie sans elle. [111] la présente cause explore la frontière entre la protection vigoureuse de la presse et la capacité de l’état d’enquêter sur des crimes en demandant des renseignements à la presse. deux dispositions de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés sont donc en jeu dans le présent pourvoi : l’art. 8, qui protège l’attente raisonnable en matière de respect de la vie privée, et l’al. 2b), qui protège la « liberté de pensée, de croyance, d’opinion et d’expression, y compris la liberté de la presse et des autres moyens de communication ». [112] des garanties constitutionnelles fortes contre les intrusions de l’état sont des conditions préalables nécessaires pour que la presse puisse exercer effica- cement son rôle démocratique essentiel. comme les présents motifs visent à le démontrer, l’al. 2b) traite d’un droit constitutionnel distinct pour la presse, un droit qui protège ses fonctions essentielles d’expres- sion — sa capacité de recueillir et de diffuser des renseignements pour le bien public, sans ingérence indue. lorsque l’état sollicite, au moyen d’une or- donnance de communication, l’accès à des rensei- gnements qui sont entre les mains des médias, les droits garantis à la presse par l’al. 2b) ainsi que ses droits au respect de la vie privée, protégés par l’art. 8, entrent en jeu. il faut donc procéder à une analyse harmonisée rigoureusement protectrice. background les faits [113] in 2014, vice media canada inc. published three stories about farah mohamed shirdon, a canadian man believed to have left canada to join isis in syria. those stories were based on mes- sages between mr. shirdon and ben makuch, a vice [113] en 2014, média vice canada inc. a publié trois articles sur farah mohamed shirdon, un cana- dien qu’on soupçonne d’avoir quitté le canada pour rallier le groupe état islamique en syrie (daech). ces articles étaient fondés sur des messages en [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 431 media journalist, in which mr. shirdon talked openly about his involvement with isis, using mr. makuch to make his message public. seeking evidence of mr. shirdon’s alleged terrorist activities, police ob- tained an ex parte production order directing vice media and mr. makuch to hand over screenshots of the messages. vice media unsuccessfully challenged the order in the ontario courts and now appeals to this court. [114] mr. makuch was a full- time reporter, editor and video producer in canada for vice media, an organization that publishes in both traditional media and multimedia platforms. his specialty was report- ing on cyber security, terrorism, intelligence and isis. to that end, he began following social media accounts of isis jihadists and other militants. in april 2014, a video was posted on youtube show- ing jihadists ripping up their passports, pledging allegiance to isis, and making specific threats of violence and destruction against canada. soon after, a journalist colleague gave mr. makuch the twitter contact information of a person who claimed to be one of the people in that video, and who was willing to speak with someone from vice media. [115] in may 2014, mr. makuch initiated contact with this individual, who at first identified himself as “abu usamah”. they communicated through kik messenger, an instant messaging platform. kik does not store the content of messages, so the only records of the communications are those on the devices of the parties to the conversation. “abu usamah” responded freely to questions mr. makuch posed to him about his activities and his involvement in isis. he con- firmed that he was a canadian, had left canada, and was in the youtube video. ligne échangés entre m. shirdon et ben makuch, un journaliste de média vice. m. shirdon y traitait ouvertement de son implication dans daech, et il utilisait m. makuch pour publiciser son message. à la recherche de la preuve des activités terroristes alléguées de m. shirdon, la police a obtenu une or- donnance de communication ex parte qui intimait à média vice et à m. makuch de lui remettre des cap- tures d’écran des messages. média vice a contesté l’ordonnance sans succès devant les cours onta- riennes et interjette maintenant appel devant la cour. [114] m.  makuch travaillait à temps plein au canada à titre de journaliste, de rédacteur et de pro- ducteur vidéo pour média vice, une organisation qui publie à la fois dans les médias traditionnels et sur des plateformes multimédias. il se spécialisait dans les reportages relatifs à la cybersécurité, au terrorisme, au renseignement et à daech. à cette fin, il a commencé à suivre les comptes de médias so- ciaux de djihadistes membres de daech et d’autres militants. en avril 2014, une vidéo a été publiée sur youtube; on y voyait des djihadistes déchirer leur passeport, prêter allégeance à daech, et proférer des menaces précises de violence et de destruction contre le canada. peu après, un collègue journaliste a donné à m. makuch des renseignements sur le compte twitter d’une personne qui prétendait être une de celles apparaissant sur la vidéo, et qui était disposée à parler à quelqu’un de média vice. [115] en mai 2014, m. makuch a pris contact avec cet individu qui, au départ, disait s’appeler « abu usamah ». ils ont communiqué en utilisant « kik messenger  », une plateforme de messagerie ins- tantanée. comme kik ne conserve pas le contenu des messages, les seules traces des échanges sont celles qui figurent sur les appareils des parties aux conversations. « abu usamah » répondait librement aux questions que lui posait m. makuch à propos de ses activités et de son rôle au sein de daech. il a confirmé être canadien, avoir quitté le canada, et être apparu dans la vidéo diffusée sur youtube. [116] a cbc news story on june 18, 2014 iden- tified farah shirdon, originally from calgary, as one of the men in the youtube video. subsequently, mr. makuch published articles in june and august [116] le 18 juin 2014, un reportage de la src a désigné farah shirdon, originaire de calgary, comme l’un des hommes présents dans la vidéo dif- fusée sur youtube. subséquemment, soit en juin et 432 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. of 2014 based on his initial exchanges with “abu usamah”, now revealed to be mr shirdon. inde- pendently, someone from vice media in new york contacted mr. shirdon to arrange a skype video in- terview with him that was published online in sep- tember 2014. the kik message exchanges between mr. shirdon and mr. makuch continued, resulting in a third article in october 2014. mr. makuch’s articles contain statements by mr. shirdon that, if true, could provide strong evidence implicating mr. shirdon in multiple terrorism offences. in february  2015, the rcmp applied ex [117] parte for a production order from the ontario court of justice under s 487014 of the criminal code, rsc  1985, c.  c-46, directing vice media and mr. makuch to produce documents relating to their communications with mr shirdon. the order was granted but was sealed, along with the information to obtain (ito) sworn by an rcmp officer. [118] when it received the order, vice media deter- mined that the only documents in its possession that responded to the order were screen captures of the kik messages. rather than producing that material, vice media brought an application in the superior court to quash the order and unseal the records the rcmp relied on to obtain it. it argued that the order was an overbroad “fishing expedition” and that the ito did not assert sufficient grounds to justify it under the existing legal framework. it also contended that the sealing order was an unjustified interference with open access to court documents. en août 2014, m. makuch a publié des articles fondés sur ses premiers échanges avec « abu usamah », qu’on savait désormais être m shirdon. parallèlement, un employé de média vice à new york a commu- niqué avec m. shirdon pour organiser, au moyen de skype, une entrevue qui a été diffusée en ligne en septembre 2014. les échanges entre mm. shirdon et makuch sur la plateforme de messagerie kik ont continué et ont donné lieu à un troisième article publié en octobre 2014. les articles de m. makuch ont relaté des déclarations de m. shirdon qui, si elles s’avèrent exactes, pourraient fournir des éléments de preuve solides de la participation de m. shirdon à de multiples infractions terroristes. [117] en février 2015, au moyen d’une demande ex parte, la grc a sollicité une ordonnance de commu- nication de la cour de justice de l’ontario en applica- tion de l’art 487014 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, pour qu’il soit intimé à média vice et à m. makuch de produire les documents relatifs à leurs communications avec m shirdon. la demande a été accueillie, mais l’ordonnance a été scellée, de même que la dénonciation faite par un agent de la grc. [118] lorsqu’elle a reçu l’ordonnance, média vice a estimé que les seuls documents en sa possession qu’elle visait étaient les captures d’écran des mes- sages échangés sur la plateforme kik messenger. plutôt que de produire ces documents, média vice a présenté une demande à la cour supérieure pour que l’ordonnance soit annulée et que l’ordonnance de mise sous scellés des dossiers de la grc sur lesquels elle était fondée soit levée. média vice a fait valoir que l’ordonnance constituait une « re- cherche à l’aveuglette » trop vaste et que la dénon- ciation ne fournissait pas un fondement suffisant pour la justifier dans le cadre juridique existant. elle a aussi soutenu que l’ordonnance de mise sous scel- lés constituait une ingérence injustifiée dans le libre accès aux documents judiciaires. [119] the reviewing judge dismissed vice media’s challenge to the production order but allowed, in part, its application in respect of the sealing order.3 he rejected its argument that the information sought [119] le juge chargé de la révision a rejeté la con- testation de l’ordonnance de communication par média vice, mais il a accueilli, en partie, sa demande relative à l’ordonnance de mise sous scellés3. il a 3 (2016), 352 crr (2d) 60 (ont. scj). 3 (2016), 352 crr (2d) 60 (csj. ont). [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 433 was available from other sources, including sim- ilar information from media reports, which were not substitutes for the messages themselves. fur- ther, no promise of confidentiality was sought by or given to mr. shirdon since mr. shirdon had come to mr. makuch as a “channe[l] through which he would speak to the whole world”, and vice media had already published much of this information. accordingly, the reviewing judge held that it was open to the authorizing judge to conclude that the media’s interest was outweighed by the public in- terest in obtaining reliable evidence of very serious terrorism offences. he concluded, however, that most of the material in the ito should be unsealed. [120] the court of appeal dismissed vice media’s appeal of the production order.4 it rejected vice me- dia’s argument that the context of media searches required a more robust form of review, concluding instead that the ordinary standard for warrant review set out in r v. garofoli, [1990] 2 scr 1421, should apply. it also lifted part of the sealing order that the reviewing judge had left in place over the ito, re- leasing more of the material relied on by the police to obtain the production order. rejeté l’argument selon lequel les renseignements demandés pouvaient être obtenus d’autres sources, y compris des renseignements similaires au moyen de reportages, qui ne pouvaient remplacer les messages eux- mêmes. en outre, le juge a affirmé qu’aucune promesse de confidentialité n’avait été sollicitée par m. shirdon ou ne lui avait été faite, puisque c’est lui qui avait approché m. makuch afin qu’il lui serve de [traduction] « la voie par laquelle il pourrait s’adresser au monde entier », et puisque média vice avait déjà publié une part importante des renseigne- ments recherchés. selon le juge chargé de la révision, son collègue qui avait prononcé l’ordonnance de communication pouvait conclure que l’intérêt du pu- blic dans l’obtention d’éléments de preuve fiables at- testant de la perpétration d’infractions très sérieuses de terrorisme l’emportait sur l’intérêt du média. il a par ailleurs conclu que les scellés devraient être levés sur presque toute l’information contenue dans la dénonciation. [120] la cour d’appel a rejeté l’appel interjeté par média vice quant à l’ordonnance de commu- nication4. elle n’a pas retenu son argument selon lequel le contexte de recherche de renseignements auprès de médias exige une forme d’examen plus robuste, concluant plutôt que la norme habituelle applicable à l’examen d’un mandat de perquisition énoncée dans r c. garofoli, [1990] 2 rcs 1421 devrait s’appliquer. la cour d’appel a également levé une partie de l’ordonnance de mise sous scel- lés relative à la dénonciation que le juge chargé de la révision avait laissée intacte; elle a ainsi rendu publics encore plus d’éléments sur lesquels s’était fondée la police pour obtenir l’ordonnance de com- munication. analysis analyse [121] at the centre of the analysis in this appeal is s. 2(b) of the charter, which states: [121] dans le présent appel, l’analyse repose sur l’al. 2b) de la charte, dont le texte est le suivant : 2 everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 2 chacun a les libertés fondamentales suivantes :   .   . 4 (2017), 137 or (3d) 263 (ca). 4 (2017), 137 or (3d) 263 (ca). 434 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; b) liberté de pensée, de croyance, d’opinion et d’ex- pression, y compris la liberté de la presse et des autres moyens de communication;   .   . specifically, the focus is on “freedom of the press and other media”. plus précisément, l’accent est mis sur la « liberté de la presse et des autres moyens de communication ». [122] this court has decided many cases involving the rights of the press. time and again it has empha- sized the media’s importance. but it has, to date, stopped short of openly and unambiguously giving distinct and independent meaning to the guarantee of “freedom of the press and other media” in s 2(b). it is difficult to justify, in my respectful view, why the express inclusion of “freedom of the press” in the text of s. 2(b) should be denied distinct constitutional meaning. recognizing charter protection for the press under s. 2(b) is merely recognizing explicitly something this court has repeatedly gestured to- wards (see, for example, r v. national post, [2010] 1 scr 477, at para. 78; canadian broadcasting corp. v. new brunswick (attorney general), [1991] 3 scr 459,5 at pp. 464 and 475). [122] la cour a rendu de nombreuses décisions relativement aux droits de la presse. elle a souligné à maintes reprises l’importance de cette dernière. jusqu’à présent, elle n’est toutefois pas allée aussi loin que de donner ouvertement et sans ambiguïté un sens distinct et indépendant à la protection de la « li- berté de la presse et des autres moyens de communi- cation » prévue à l’al 2b). selon moi, il est difficile de justifier pourquoi l’inclusion expresse de la « liberté de la presse » dans le texte de l’al. 2b) ne devrait pas avoir un sens constitutionnel distinct. reconnaître la protection que la charte assure à la presse aux termes de l’al. 2b) ne constitue qu’une reconnaissance expli- cite de quelque chose dont la cour s’est rapprochée à maintes reprises : voir, par exemple, r c. national post, [2010] 1 rcs 477, par. 78; société radio‑ canada c. nouveau‑ brunswick (procureur général), [1991] 3 rcs 4595, p. 464 et 475. [123] why not openly acknowledge that freedom of the press is not a derivative right? it enjoys dis- tinct and independent constitutional protection under s. 2(b) of the charter, not only because it is specifi- cally mentioned in the text of s. 2(b), but also because of its distinct and independent role. prior judicial hesitancy to recognize such a right has attracted considerable academic criticism (see, for example, jamie cameron, section 2(b)’s other fundamental freedom: the press guarantee, 1982‑ 2012 (2013) (online); benjamin oliphant, “freedom of the press as a discrete constitutional guarantee” (2013), 59 mcgill lj 283;. gerald chan, “transparency confined to the courthouse: a critical analysis of criminal lawyers’ assn., cbc and national post” [123] pourquoi ne pas reconnaître ouvertement que la liberté de la presse n’est pas un droit dérivé? elle jouit d’une protection constitutionnelle distincte et indépendante aux termes de l’al. 2b) de la charte, non seulement parce qu’elle est spécifiquement nommée dans cette disposition, mais également en raison de son rôle distinct et indépendant. dans le passé, les hésitations des tribunaux à reconnaître un tel droit ont suscité de nombreuses critiques de la part des universitaires : voir, par exemple, jamie cameron, section 2(b)’s other fundamental free‑ dom : the press guarantee, 1982‑ 2012 (2013) (en ligne); benjamin oliphant, « freedom of the press as a discrete constitutional guarantee » (2013), 59 rd. mcgill 283; gerald chan, « transparency confined 5 any references in these reasons to new brunswick refer to the 1991 decision unless specific reference is made to this court’s 1996 decision in canadian broadcasting corp. v. new brunswick (attorney general), [1996] 3 scr 480. 5 toutes les références dans les présents motifs à l’arrêt nouveau‑ brunswick renvoient à la décision de 1991 à moins qu’il ne soit spécifiquement fait référence à la décision de la cour rendue en 1996 dans société radio‑ canada c nouveau‑ brunswick (procureur général), [1996] 3 rcs 480. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 435 (2011), 54 sclr (2d) 169). based on the clear text and purpose of s.  2(b), even crown counsel graciously conceded in oral argument before this court that “freedom of the press” is a distinct con- stitutionally protected right. [124] this court has long recognized that among the core purposes animating s. 2(b) are the pursuit of truth and the ability to participate in democratic decision making (irwin toy ltd. v. quebec (attorney general), [1989] 1 scr 927, at p 976). in uphold- ing these objectives, s. 2(b) protects “listeners as well as speakers” (ford v. quebec (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 712, at p 767). it has already also observed that “[t]he full and fair discussion of pub- lic institutions, which is vital to any democracy, is the raison d’être of the s. 2(b) guarantees” and that democratic debate is “predicated on an informed public, which is in turn reliant upon a free and vig- orous press” (canadian broadcasting corp. v. new brunswick (attorney general), [1996] 3 scr 480, at para. 23, per la forest j). and it has noted that the role of the media in providing a vehicle for the free flow of information and debate is “explicitly recognized in the text of s. 2(b) itself” (grant v. torstar corp., [2009] 3 scr 640, at para. 52, per mclachlin cj). to the courthouse : a critical analysis of criminal lawyers’ assn., cbc and national post » (2011), 54 sclr (2d) 169. en se fondant sur le texte clair de l’al. 2b) et sur son objet, même l’avocat de la cou- ronne a gracieusement concédé durant sa plaidoirie orale devant la cour que la « liberté de la presse » est un droit distinct protégé par la constitution. [124] la cour a reconnu depuis longtemps que deux des objets principaux sous- jacents de l’al. 2b) étaient la recherche de la vérité et la capacité de participer à la prise de décisions démocratiques : irwin toy ltd. c. québec (procureur général), [1989] 1 rcs 927, p 976. en soutenant ces objectifs, l’ali- néa 2b) protège « autant celui qui s’exprime que celui qui l’écoute » : ford c. québec (procureur général), [1988] 2 rcs 712, p 767. la cour a également déjà fait remarquer que « [l]a raison d’être des garan- ties de l’al. 2b) est de permettre des discussions com- plètes et impartiales sur les institutions publiques, condition vitale à toute démocratie », et que le débat au sein du public « suppose que ce dernier est in- formé, situation qui à son tour dépend de l’existence d’une presse libre et vigoureuse » : société radio‑ canada c. nouveau‑ brunswick (procureur général), [1996] 3 rcs 480, par. 23, le juge la forest. la cour a en outre souligné que « le libellé de l’al. 2b) lui- même reconnaît » le rôle des médias à titre de véhicule pour la libre circulation de l’information et la tenue de débats : grant c. torstar corp., [2009] 3 rcs 640, par. 52, la juge en chef mclachlin. [125] the purpose underlying protection for the press is related to, but distinct from, the broader guar- antee of freedom of expression. the dichotomy in s. 2(b) between freedom of expression generally and freedom of the press specifically is a logical one, since the press plays a distinct expressive role, with both institutional and historic differences from how and why others are entitled to “freedom of expression”. section 2(b) sets out generous protections designed to facilitate the healthy functioning of our democracy. but they are incomplete if s. 2(b) is viewed only as an individual right to freedom of expression, reading out protection of “freedom of the press”. a vigor- ous, rigorous, and independent press holds people and institutions to account, uncovers the truth, and informs the public. it provides the public with the [125] l’objet sous- jacent de la protection de la presse a un lien avec la protection plus large de la liberté d’expression, tout en étant distinct d’elle. la dichotomie présente à l’al. 2b) entre la liberté d’ex- pression en général et la liberté de la presse spécifi- quement est logique, puisque la presse joue un rôle distinct sur le plan de l’expression, compte tenu des différences tant institutionnelles qu’historiques qui justifient comment et pourquoi les autres jouissent du droit à la « liberté d’expression ». l’alinéa 2b) prévoit des garanties généreuses conçues pour faciliter le bon fonctionnement de notre démocratie. ces garan- ties seraient toutefois incomplètes si la liberté d’ex- pression visée à cette disposition était perçue comme un droit individuel à la liberté d’expression, de sorte qu’il serait fait abstraction de la protection conférée 436 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. information it needs to engage in informed debate. in other words, it is the public’s “right to know” that explains and animates the distinct constitutional pro- tection for freedom of the press (branzburg v. hayes, 408 us 665 (1972), at p. 721, per douglas j. (dis- senting); see also houchins v. kqed, inc., 438 us. 1 (1978), at p. 17, per stewart j. (concurring)). [126] the singular purpose of press protection has, in fact, resulted in the european court of human rights concluding that the freedom of expression guarantee in article 10 of the european convention on human rights, 213 unts 221,6 which does not expressly mention any right for the press, none- theless includes a distinct press right. a separate right was held to be necessary to protect the “vi- tal public watchdog role of the press    and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information” (goodwin v. united kingdom (1996), 22 ehrr 123, at para 39). à la « liberté de la presse ». une presse vigoureuse, rigoureuse et indépendante tient les individus et les institutions responsables, découvre la vérité et in- forme le public. elle fournit au public l’information dont il a besoin pour participer à un débat éclairé. autrement dit, c’est le « droit [du public] d’être renseigné », qui explique et donne vie à la protection constitutionnelle distincte de la liberté de la presse : branzburg c. hayes, 408 us 665 (1972), p. 721, le juge douglas (dissident); voir aussi houchins c. kqed, inc., 438 us 1 (1978), p. 17, le juge stewart (dans des motifs concordants). [126] l’objectif singulier de la protection de la presse a, en fait, conduit la cour européenne des droits de l’homme à conclure que la garantie de la li- berté d’expression prévue à l’art. 10 de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 213 rtnu. 2216, qui ne mentionne expressément aucun droit pour la presse, inclut néanmoins un droit distinct pour elle. il a été jugé que l’existence d’un droit dissocié était nécessaire pour protéger le « rôle in- dispensable de “chien de garde” [de la presse] et son aptitude à fournir des informations précises et fiables » : goodwin c. royaume‑uni, no 17488/90, 27 mars 1996 (hudoc), par 39. [127] the question, then, is what does this s. 2(b) right include? as crown counsel also conceded in oral argument, for a start it includes not only the right to transmit news and other information, but also the right to gather this information without “undue governmental interference” (new brunswick (1996), [127] il reste donc à savoir ce que renferme ce droit garanti à l’al 2b). comme l’avocat de la couronne l’a concédé durant sa plaidoirie orale, il comprend tout d’abord non seulement le droit de transmettre des nouvelles et d’autres informations, mais éga- lement le droit de collecter cette information sans 6 article 10 6 article 10 : (1) everyone has the right to freedom of expression. this right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public au- thority and regardless of frontiers. this article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. (2) the exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintain- ing the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 1. toute personne a droit à la liberté d’expression. ce droit comprend la liberté d’opinion et la liberté de recevoir ou de communiquer des informations ou des idées sans qu’il puisse y avoir ingérence d’autorités publiques et sans considération de frontière. le présent article n’empêche pas les états de soumettre les entreprises de radiodiffusion, de cinéma ou de télévision à un régime d’autorisations. 2. l’exercice de ces libertés comportant des devoirs et des responsabilités peut être soumis à certaines formalités, conditions, restrictions ou sanctions, prévues par la loi, qui constituent des mesures nécessaires, dans une société démocratique, à la sécurité nationale, à l’intégrité territoriale ou à la sûreté publique, à la défense de l’ordre et à la prévention du crime, à la protection de la santé ou de la morale, à la protection de la réputation ou des droits d’autrui, pour empêcher la divulgation d’informations confidentielles ou pour garantir l’autorité et l’impartialité du pouvoir judiciaire. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 437 at para.  24  (emphasis deleted), citing canadian broadcasting corp. v. lessard, [1991] 3 scr 421, pp. 429-30, per la forest j). the right to convey information to the public is fragile unless the press is free to pursue leads, communicate with sources, and assess the information acquired. newsgathering activities form an “integral part of freedom of the press” because they are an indispensable part of the right and the ability to tell the public the facts and ideas that make up the story (canadian broadcast‑ ing corp. v. canada (at torney general), [2011] 1 scr 19, at para. 46; see also edmonton journal v. alberta (attorney general), [1989] 2 scr 1326, at pp. 1339-40; dagenais v. canadian broadcasting corp., [1994] 3 scr 835; r v. mentuck, [2001] 3 scr 442). without protection from undue inter- ference in newsgathering, public access to the fruits of the media’s work is diminished, as is the public’s ability to understand, debate and form opinions on the issues of the day, thereby impairing its ability to participate meaningfully in the democratic process. « l’intervention indue du gouvernement » : nouveau‑ brunswick (1996), par. 24 (soulignement omis), citant société radio‑ canada c. lessard, [1991] 3 rcs. 421, p. 429- 430, le juge la forest. le droit de trans- mettre l’information au public est fragile à moins que la presse soit libre de suivre des pistes, de commu- niquer avec des sources et d’évaluer l’information acquise. les activités de collecte d’informations font « partie intégrante de la liberté de la presse », car elles sont essentielles au droit et à la capacité d’exposer au public les faits et les idées qui composent l’his- toire : société radio‑ canada c. canada (procureur général), [2011] 1 rcs 19, par. 46; voir également edmonton journal c. alberta (procureur général), [1989] 2 rcs 1326, p. 1339- 1340; dagenais c. société radio‑ canada, [1994] 3 rcs 835; r c. mentuck, [2001] 3 rcs 442. sans protection contre toute ingérence indue dans la collecte d’informations, l’accès du public aux fruits du travail de la presse est diminué, tout comme sa capacité à comprendre les questions d’actualité, à en débattre et à se forger des opinions sur elles, ce qui nuit à sa capacité de participer de manière significative au processus dé- mocratique. [128] explicit constitutional protection for news- gathering underlies the protections for the press which we have already recognized. the court held that open access to court proceedings by the press is protected under s. 2(b) (attorney general of nova scotia v. macintyre, [1982] 1 scr 175;. edmon‑ ton journal; dagenais; mentuck; vancouver sun (re), [2004] 2 scr 332). similarly, constitutional protection was extended to “filming, taking photo- graphs and conducting interviews” outside court- rooms (canadian broadcasting corp. v. canada (attorney general), at para 46). in this way, broader protection of the press’ newsgathering activities rep- resents a logical and incremental development of the jurisprudence. [128] la protection constitutionnelle explicite de la collecte d’informations est à l’origine des protections de la presse que nous avons déjà reconnues. la cour a conclu que le libre accès aux procédures judiciaires par la presse est protégé par l’al. 2b) : procureur gé‑ néral de la nouvelle‑ écosse c. macintyre, [1982] 1 rcs 175; edmonton journal; dagenais; mentuck; vancouver sun (re), [2004] 2 rcs 332. en outre, la protection a été élargie à « la prise d’images et [à] la tenue d’entrevues » à l’extérieur des salles d’au- dience : société radio‑ canada c. canada (procureur général), par 46. une protection plus large des activi- tés de collecte d’informations de la presse représente donc un développement logique et progressif de la jurisprudence. [129] there is no doubt that defining precisely who is the “press” or “media” and what activities are entitled to protection is, in light of the prolifera- tion of new forms and sources of media, sometimes challenging. it has obvious implications for the ques- tions of who has standing to assert a s. 2(b) viola- tion and what is sufficient to establish a violation. [129] il ne fait aucun doute que définir précisément qui est la « presse » ou qui sont les « médias » et quelles activités ont droit à la protection est parfois difficile à la lumière de la prolifération de nouvelles formes et sources de médias. cela a des répercus- sions évidentes sur la question de savoir qui a qualité pour plaider une violation de l’al. 2b) et ce qui est 438 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. but although the definitions of “media” and “press” have gone from linear to kaleidoscopic, there is no reason to avoid protecting what is at the core of the right. and what is at the core is the right to gather and disseminate information for the public’s benefit without undue interference from government. as binnie j. observed in his dissent in r v. sinclair, [2010] 2 scr 310, at para. 107, a charter right “should be given a broad interpretation consistent with its purpose. if it takes time to work out its proper amplitude, so be it.” in any event, at this stage, there is no need to be preoccupied over who is covered by the s. 2(b) press protection (see oliphant, at p 299). [130] not every activity should or will be protected under s. 2(b), but the more the activity accords with standards of professional journalistic ethics, such as those referred to in the chamberland commission report, the more likely it will be found to attract con- stitutional protection (quebec, commission d’enquête sur la protection de la confidentialité des sources jour‑ nalistiques — rapport (2017), at p 38). that is why this court has recognized the need to protect confiden- tial journalistic source relationships to ensure the free flow of information necessary to the media’s news- gathering function (national post; globe and mail v. canada (attorney general), [2010] 2 scr 592). on the other hand, as binnie j. cautioned in national post, vigorous protection for freedom of the press does not require unwavering support for tabloid espionage or “[c]hequebook journalism” (para 38). suffisant pour établir une violation. toutefois, même si les définitions des « médias » et de la « presse » sont passées de linéaires à kaléidoscopiques, il n’y a aucune raison d’éviter de protéger ce qui est au cœur de ce droit, soit, le droit de recueillir et de diffuser l’information dans l’intérêt du public, sans l’intervention indue du gouvernement. comme le juge binnie, dissident, l’a fait remarquer dans r c. sinclair, [2010] 2 rcs 310, par. 107, un droit pro- tégé par la charte doit recevoir « une interprétation large qui soit compatible avec son objet. s’il faut du temps pour en déterminer la portée exacte, qu’il en soit ainsi. » je précise toutefois que, à cette étape, il n’y a pas lieu de se préoccuper de savoir qui est visé par la protection de la presse prévue à l’al. 2b) : voir oliphant, p 299. [130] toutes les activités ne devraient pas être pro- tégées par l’al. 2b) ou ne le seront pas, mais plus une activité est conforme aux normes d’éthique journalis- tique professionnelle — comme celles mentionnées dans le rapport de la commission chamberland —, plus il est probable qu’elle bénéficiera d’une protection constitutionnelle : québec, commission d’enquête sur la protection de la confidentialité des sources journa‑ listiques — rapport (2017), p 38. c’est pourquoi la cour a reconnu la nécessité de protéger les relations des sources journalistiques confidentielles avec les mé- dias, ce qui assure la libre circulation de l’information nécessaire à la fonction de collecte d’informations de la presse : national post; globe and mail c. canada (procureur général), [2010] 2 rcs 592. par ailleurs, comme l’exprime la mise en garde du juge binnie dans national post, une protection vigoureuse de la liberté de la presse n’exige pas un appui indéfectible à l’espionnage tabloïde ou à la « [p]ratique qui consiste à rémunérer les sources » : par 38. [131] does s. 2(b)’s press and media guarantee include protection for journalistic “work product”, such as a reporter’s personal notes, recordings of in- terviews, or source contact lists? it seems inescapable that it usually does. the european court of human rights has held that protecting the press includes protection for material in the journalist’s possession that might identify a confidential source (goodwin, at para. 39; see also nagla v. latvia, no. 73469/10, july 16, 2013 (hudoc)). and in r. (miranda) v. [131] la protection de la liberté de la presse et des médias prévue à l’al. 2b) comprend- elle la protection du « produit du travail » journalistique, comme les notes personnelles d’un journaliste, les enregistre- ments d’entrevues ou les listes de ses sources ainsi que leurs coordonnées? il semble inéluctable que c’est habituellement le cas la cour européenne des droits de l’homme a jugé que la protection de la presse inclut la protection du matériel en posses- sion du journaliste qui pourrait identifier une source [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 439 secretary of state for the home department, [2016] 1 wlr 1505, lord dyson held that the protec- tion of sources is “no more than one aspect” of the article 10 press protection, which protects “jour- nalistic material” even where “the source is known” (paras. 102 and 107). similarly, in his concurring opinion in lessard, la forest j. stated that “work product” must be protected because “[t]he fear that the police can easily gain access” to this material “could well hamper the ability of the press to gather information” (pp 431-32). [132] it also necessarily includes, in my respect- ful view, protecting communications not only with sources that are truly confidential, as in national post, but also those whose comments are “off the record” or “not for attribution”. and it includes pro- tecting the journalist’s documentation of his or her investigative work (chamberland commission re- port, at pp 175-80). these are the indispensable tools which help the press gather, assess and disseminate information. [133] the question then is under what circum- stances should the state be able to get access to the background relied on by the press in preparing the in- formation the public will see. in the context of search warrants and production orders, what are the impli- cations of letting s. 2(b) come out of the shadows and explicitly acknowledging the media’s entitlement to constitutional protection? is the current legal frame- work, developed before a distinct charter right for the press was recognized, sufficiently respectful of the media’s enhanced status? that brings us to the issue in this case. confidentielle : goodwin, par. 39; voir aussi nagla c. latvia, n° 73469/10, 16 juillet 2013 (hudoc). en outre, dans r. (miranda) c. secretary of state for the home department, [2016] 1 wlr 1505, lord dyson a jugé que la protection des sources confiden- tielles n’est [traduction] « qu’un seul aspect » de la protection conférée par l’art. 10, qui protège égale- ment le « matériel journalistique » même lorsque « la source est connue » : par. 102 et 107. de même, en rédigeant son opinion concordante dans lessard, le juge la forest a déclaré que le « produit du travail » d’un journaliste doit être protégé parce que « [l]a crainte que la police puisse avoir facilement accès » à ce matériel « pourrait bien gêner la presse dans la collecte de l’information » : p. 431- 432. [132] à mon avis, la protection de la liberté de la presse comprend aussi nécessairement celle des communications non seulement avec les sources qui sont véritablement confidentielles, comme dans national post, mais aussi avec ceux dont les com- mentaires ont été faits « à titre confidentiel » ou « sous réserve d’anonymat ». elle inclut en outre la protection de la documentation du journaliste relative à son travail d’enquête : rapport de la commission chamberland, p. 175- 180. il s’agit d’outils indispen- sables pour aider la presse à recueillir, à évaluer et à diffuser l’information. [133] la question est alors celle de savoir dans quelles circonstances l’état devrait avoir accès au contexte sur lequel s’appuie la presse pour préparer l’information qui sera rendue publique. lorsqu’il s’agit de mandats de perquisition et d’ordonnances de communication, quelles sont les conséquences de laisser l’al. 2b) sortir de l’ombre et de reconnaître explicitement le droit de la presse à la protection constitutionnelle? le cadre juridique actuel, élaboré avant la reconnaissance par la charte d’un droit distinct pour la presse, respecte-t-il suffisamment le statut rehaussé de la presse? voilà qui nous amène à la question à trancher en l’espèce. [134] binnie j.’s phrase in national post that the public has the “right to every person’s evidence” (para. 1) was used in the context of a case exploring the relationship between the law of privilege and disclosure. what is at issue here, however, is not the [134] la phrase du juge binnie dans national post selon laquelle le public a « droit à la preuve émanant de toutes les sources » (par. 1) a été utilisée dans le contexte d’une cause où il était question de la relation entre le droit relatif au privilège et la communication 440 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. state’s “right” to everyone’s evidence, it is every- one’s right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure and the media’s right to freedom of the press. the state has an interest in investigating and prosecuting crime, but it does not have a right to do so in violation of the charter. [135] judicial involvement with search warrants and production orders occurs at two stages: at the authorization stage, when police seek an order from a judicial officer permitting a search or directing production of information, usually without notice to the person or organization targeted; and at judicial review, when the targeted party can challenge the initial authorization. the relevant charter provision is s. 8, which states: d’éléments de preuve. or, en l’espèce, la question en litige ne porte pas sur le « droit » de l’état à la preuve émanant de tous, mais sur le droit de tous d’être protégés contre les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les saisies abusives et sur le droit des médias à la liberté de la presse. l’état a un intérêt à enquêter sur les crimes et à poursuivre leurs auteurs; il n’a toutefois pas un droit de le faire en violation de la charte. [135] les juges interviennent à deux étapes dans le cadre de la délivrance des mandats de perquisition et des ordonnances de communication : à l’étape de l’autorisation, lorsque la police demande le prononcé par un officier de justice d’une ordonnance autorisant une perquisition ou intimant la production de ren- seignements, habituellement sans avis à la personne ou à l’organisation visée; et à l’étape de la révision judiciaire, lorsque la partie visée peut contester l’au- torisation initiale. la disposition pertinente de la charte est l’art. 8, qui prévoit ce qui suit : 8 everyone has the right to be secure against unrea- 8 chacun a droit à la protection contre les fouilles, les sonable search or seizure. perquisitions ou les saisies abusives. [136] the provision setting out the conditions for authorizing a production order in this case was s 487014 of the criminal code, which states, in part: [136] les conditions auxquels les demandeurs de- vaient satisfaire pour qu’une ordonnance de commu- nication soit prononcée en l’espèce sont énoncées à l’art 487014 du code criminel, qui prévoit notam- ment ce qui suit : general production order ordonnance générale de communication 487.014 (1) subject to sections 487.015 to 487.018, on ex parte application made by a peace officer or public officer, a justice or judge may order a person to produce a document that is a copy of a document that is in their possession or control when they receive the order, or to prepare and produce a document containing data that is in their possession or control at that time. 487.014 (1) sous réserve des articles 487.015 à 487.018, le juge de paix ou le juge peut, sur demande ex parte présentée par un agent de la paix ou un fonctionnaire public, ordonner à toute personne de communiquer un document qui est la copie d’un document qui est en sa possession ou à sa dis- position au moment où elle reçoit l’ordonnance ou d’établir et de communiquer un document comportant des données qui sont en sa possession ou à sa disposition à ce moment. conditions for making order conditions préalables à l’ordonnance (2) before making the order, the justice or judge must be satisfied by information on oath in form 5.004 that there are reasonable grounds to believe that (2) il ne rend l’ordonnance que s’il est convaincu, par une dénonciation sous serment faite selon la formule 5.004, qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire, à la fois : (a) an offence has been or will be committed under this or any other act of parliament; and a) qu’une infraction à la présente loi ou à toute autre loi fédérale a été ou sera commise; [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 441 (b) the document or data is in the person’s possession or control and will afford evidence respecting the com- mission of the offence. b) que le document ou les données sont en la posses- sion de la personne ou à sa disposition et fourniront une preuve concernant la perpétration de l’infraction.   .   . in hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr. [137] 145, this court held that if the state seeks to intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy, the consti- tutional baseline to ensure compliance with s. 8 of the charter is prior judicial authorization based on “reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the search” (p 168). the hunter standard has been incorporated into many of the statutory provisions — including s 487014 — under which police seek authorizations for searches and seizures. these are referred to as the “statutory preconditions for issu- ance”. but even where those preconditions are met, the judicial officer from whom the authorization is sought retains discretion not to issue the order. [138] this court set out the approach for how s. 8 applies to production orders when the target is the press in lessard and its companion case, new brunswick, where the crown sought video footage the cbc had shot and then aired of demonstrations said to show criminal activity. [137] dans hunter c. southam inc., [1984] 2 rcs. 145, la cour a statué que si l’état cherche à s’ingérer là où il existe une attente raisonnable en matière de vie privée, le critère constitutionnel minimal pour assurer le respect de l’art. 8 de la charte est l’auto- risation judiciaire préalable fondée sur « l’existence de motifs raisonnables et probables, établie sous ser- ment, de croire qu’une infraction a été commise et que des éléments de preuve se trouvent à l’endroit de la perquisition » : p 168. la norme hunter a été intégrée à bon nombre des dispositions législatives — y compris l’art 487014 — en vertu desquelles la police demande l’autorisation de procéder à des per- quisitions et à des saisies. c’est ce que l’on appelle les « conditions légales préalables à la délivrance de l’ordonnance ». cela dit, même lorsqu’il est satisfait à ces conditions préalables, l’officier de justice à qui l’autorisation est demandée conserve le pouvoir dis- crétionnaire de ne pas rendre l’ordonnance. [138] c’est dans lessard et dans l’affaire connexe, nouveau‑ brunswick — où la couronne a cherché à obtenir des séquences vidéo de démonstrations que la src avait tournées, puis diffusées, dont on alléguait qu’elles montraient l’activité criminelle — que la cour a établi la façon dont l’art. 8 s’applique aux ordonnances de communication lorsque la cible est la presse. [139] the court held that there must be a balancing of the constitutional s. 8 privacy rights of the press against whom an order is sought with the interests of the state in investigating crime. of particular rele- vance to this case, it also held that s. 2(b)’s guarantee of freedom of expression “does not    import any new or additional requirements for the issuance of search warrants” when the press is involved (new brunswick, at p. 475 (emphasis added)). while not- ing that “the media play a vital role in the functioning of a democratic society” and “will not be implicated in the crime under investigation” since it is “truly an innocent third party” (p. 481), the court observed [139] la cour a statué qu’il faut établir un équi- libre entre le droit à la vie privée du média — pro- tégé par l’art. 8 de la charte — contre lequel une ordonnance est demandée, d’une part, et l’intérêt de l’état à enquêter sur les crimes, d’autre part. fait particulièrement pertinent en l’espèce, la cour a également jugé que le droit à la liberté d’expres- sion protégé par l’al. 2b) « n’ajoute pas d’exigences supplémentaires pour l’attribution des mandats de perquisition  » lorsque la presse est concernée  : nouveau‑ brunswick, p. 475 (italiques ajoutés). tout en notant que « les médias jouent un rôle primordial dans le fonctionnement d’une société démocratique » 442 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. that s. 2(b) merely provides the “backdrop” for eval- uating whether it is reasonable to issue the order (p 475). twenty years later, in national post, this court expanded on the lessard framework in the context of confidential journalistic sources. [140] while both lessard and national post were decided on the assumption that although the press had enhanced privacy interests under s. 8, there was no distinct role for the constitutionally protected right under s 2(b). rather, the framework acknowledged that s. 2(b) was an important aspect of the analysis for judicial authorizations that target the media. as noted in national post, such orders “constitute a head-to- head clash between the government and the media, and the media’s ss. 2(b) and 8 interests are clearly implicated” (para 78). that is why new brunswick and lessard added a number of considera- tions to the s. 8 analysis over and above the statutory requirements for warrants so that “any disruption of the gathering and dissemination of news is limited as much as possible” (lessard, at p 444). chief among these were: (a) recognition that the press’ interests should be interfered with no more than is reasonably necessary (factors 5 and 7); and (b) a balancing test that weighed the state’s interest against “the right to privacy of the media in the course of their news gathering and news dissemination” (factor 3) (new brunswick, at p. 481; lessard, at p 445). et « ne sont pas impliqués dans l’acte criminel faisant l’objet de l’enquête » puisqu’il s’agit « vraiment d[e] tiers innocents » (p. 481), la cour a observé que l’al. 2b) se limite à fournir la « toile de fond » pour évaluer s’il est raisonnable de rendre l’ordonnance (p 475). vingt ans plus tard, dans national post, la cour a élargi le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans lessard où il était question de sources journalistiques confi- dentielles. [140] les arrêts tant lessard que national post ont été décidés en partant de l’hypothèse que même si la presse avait des intérêts accrus en matière de protection de la vie privée suivant l’art. 8, il n’y avait pas de rôle distinct pour le droit constitutionnel pro- tégé par l’al 2b). le cadre d’analyse reconnaissait plutôt que l’al. 2b) constituait un aspect important de l’analyse d’une autorisation judiciaire qui vise un média. comme il a été noté dans national post, de telles ordonnances « opposent ouvertement le gou- vernement et les médias, et mettent manifestement en jeu les droits que l’al. 2b) et l’art. 8 garantissent aux médias » : par 78. c’est pourquoi les arrêts nouveau‑ brunswick et lessard ont ajouté un certain nombre de facteurs à l’analyse fondée sur l’art. 8 en plus des exigences prévues par la loi pour les man- dats de sorte que « toute perturbation de la collecte et de la diffusion des informations soit le plus possible limitée » : lessard, p 444. les principaux nouveaux facteurs étaient les suivants : a) la reconnaissance qu’on ne devrait porter atteinte aux intérêts de la presse que dans la mesure raisonnablement néces- saire (facteurs 5 et 7); et b) un test de mise en balance de l’intérêt de l’état et du « droit des médias à la confidentialité des renseignements dans le processus de collecte et de diffusion des informations » : fac- teur 3; nouveau‑ brunswick, p. 481; lessard, p 445. in my view, an independent, distinct protec- [141] tion in s. 2(b) requires an approach that explicitly addresses those rights, as well as the s. 8 privacy rights. an approach based solely on s. 8 privacy rights is, in my respectful view, no longer sustaina- ble. recognizing a distinct press guarantee in s. 2(b) of the charter means that the press is no longer just the “backdrop” referred to in new brunswick. rather than being simply a balance between the consti- tutional privacy rights of the press and the state’s [141] à mon avis, une protection indépendante et distincte découlant de l’al. 2b) exige une approche qui viserait explicitement ces droits, ainsi que les droits à la vie privée que garantit l’art 8. selon moi, une approche fondée uniquement sur le droit à la vie privée prévu à l’art. 8 n’est plus viable. la recon- naissance d’une protection distincte pour la presse à l’al. 2b) de la charte signifie qu’elle ne serait plus seulement la « toile de fond » dont il était question dans nouveau‑ brunswick. plutôt que de simplement [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 443 interest in investigating crime, it is now a balance between the state’s investigatory interest and both the media’s s. 8 privacy rights and its s. 2(b) media rights. [142] the fact that both constitutional rights for the press are engaged suggests a new harmonized anal- ysis, in which the media’s right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure as well as its right to be protected from undue interference with legit- imate newsgathering activities, are explicitly taken into account. i agree with counsel for the intervener, the international coalition, that what this requires, in addition to the important baseline standards estab- lished under s. 8, is a proportionality inquiry showing essentially that the salutary effects of the production order outweigh the deleterious effects. [143] once the statutory preconditions for au- thorizing the order are met, in other words, the au- thorizing judge should be satisfied that the benefit of the state’s interests in obtaining the information outweighs the harmful impact on the media’s consti- tutionally protected s. 8 and s. 2(b) rights, including being satisfied that the production order interferes with the media’s rights no more than is necessary. rechercher un équilibre entre le droit constitutionnel à la vie privée de la presse et l’intérêt de l’état à enquêter sur les crimes, il s’agit maintenant d’éta- blir un équilibre entre l’intérêt de l’état en matière d’enquête, d’une part, et le droit à la vie privée de la presse protégé par l’art. 8 et ses droits protégés par l’al. 2b), d’autre part. [142] le fait que les deux droits constitutionnels de la presse soient engagés suggère qu’il faille adopter une nouvelle analyse harmonisée, dans laquelle on tiendrait compte explicitement du droit de la presse d’être à l’abri des fouilles, des perquisitions et des saisies abusives ainsi que de son droit d’être pro- tégé contre toute ingérence indue dans ses activités légitimes de collecte d’informations. je suis d’ac- cord avec l’avocat de l’intervenante, l’international coalition, pour dire que ce qu’il faut, en plus de satisfaire aux critères de base importants établis en application de l’art. 8, c’est une analyse de la pro- portionnalité démontrant essentiellement que les effets bénéfiques de l’ordonnance de communication l’emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables. [143] autrement dit, une fois qu’il est satisfait aux conditions préalables au prononcé de l’ordonnance, le juge saisi de la demande devrait être convaincu que le bénéfice que retirerait l’état de l’obtention de l’information l’emporte sur l’atteinte aux droits de la presse protégés constitutionnellement par l’art. 8 et l’al. 2b), et notamment que l’ordonnance de com- munication ne porterait pas plus atteinte aux droits de la presse que nécessaire. [144] balancing the benefit against the harm, au- thorizing judges would consider what the impact of the production order is on the media’s s. 8 and s. 2(b) rights. a harmonized approach means that among the considerations authorizing judges would weigh are: the media’s reasonable expectation of privacy; whether there is a need to target the press at all, since “[t]he media should be the last rather than the first place that authorities look for evidence” (canadian broadcasting corp. v. manitoba (attorney general) (2009), 250 ccc (3d) 61 (man. ca), at para. 74); whether the evidence is available from any other source, and if so, whether reasonable steps were taken to obtain it (lessard, at p. 445, factor 5); and [144] en mettant en balance l’avantage et le préju- dice, les juges saisis de telles demandes tiendraient compte de l’incidence de l’ordonnance de commu- nication sur les droits des médias garantis par l’art. 8 et l’al 2b). l’adoption d’une approche harmoni- sée signifie que les juges prendraient en considé- ration notamment les facteurs suivants : l’attente raisonnable des médias en matière de respect de la vie privée; s’il est nécessaire de cibler la presse, puisque [traduction] « [l]es médias devraient être le dernier endroit et non le premier où les autori- tés cherchent des éléments de preuve » (canadian broadcasting corp c. manitoba (attorney general) (2009), 250 ccc (3d) 61 (ca. man.), par. 74); si 444 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. whether the proposed order is narrowly tailored to interfere with the media’s rights no more than nec- essary (lessard, at p. 445, factor 7). [145] the authorizing judge must balance the state’s investigatory interest with the press’ s. 8 and s. 2(b) rights. the authorizing judge should be sat- isfied that the interests of the state in investigating and prosecuting crimes outweigh the press’ s. 8 pri- vacy rights. those rights, in turn, cannot be assessed without also considering the distinct constitutional protection for the press under s 2(b). only where the authorizing judge is satisfied that the state’s ben- eficial interest outweighs the harmful impact on the press should a production order be made. [146] generally, the more intrusive the proposed order is on the s. 8 privacy and s. 2(b) rights of the media, that is, the more it seeks to get access to con- fidential or “off the record” communications with sources, or to journalistic work products like private notes and contact lists, the greater the impact on the media’s ability to gather and publish the news. and, in turn, the greater the harmful impact on the pub- lic’s right to know the fruits of the press’ activities. in national post, binnie j. expanded on this impact, citing with approval the dissent of mclachlin j. in lessard: la preuve est disponible d’une autre source et, dans l’affirmative, si des mesures raisonnables ont été prises pour l’obtenir (lessard, p. 445, facteur 5); et si l’ordonnance proposée est étroitement adaptée pour ne porter atteinte aux droits de la presse que dans la mesure nécessaire (lessard, p. 445, facteur 7). [145] le juge appelé à autoriser la perquisition doit mettre en balance l’intérêt de l’état à mener une enquête, d’une part, et les droits de la presse protégés par l’art. 8 et l’al. 2b), d’autre part. il doit être convaincu que les intérêts de l’état à découvrir et à poursuivre les criminels l’emportent sur le droit au respect de la vie privée de la presse garanti par l’art 8. ce droit, à son tour, ne peut être apprécié par le juge sans qu’il tienne compte de la protec- tion constitutionnelle distincte dont jouit la presse aux termes de l’al 2b). ce n’est que lorsqu’il est convaincu que l’intérêt dont bénéficie l’état l’em- porte sur l’atteinte aux droits de la presse qu’il de- vrait rendre une ordonnance de communication. [146] généralement, plus l’ordonnance proposée est intrusive à l’égard des droits des médias garantis par l’art. 8 et par l’al. 2b) — c’est-à-dire que plus elle cherche à avoir accès à des communications confidentielles ou « faites à titre confidentiel » par des sources, ou à des produits journalistiques comme des notes privées et des listes de contacts —, plus l’impact sur la capacité de la presse de recueillir et de publier les nouvelles et, par conséquent, plus l’atteinte au droit du public de connaître les fruits des activités de la presse est grand. dans national post, le juge binnie a traité de cet impact, citant avec approbation la dissidence de la juge mclachlin dans lessard : the ways in which police search and seizure may im- pinge on the values underlying freedom of the press are manifest. first, searches may be physically disruptive and impede efficient and timely publication. second, retention of seized material by the police may delay or forestall completing the dissemination of the news. third, confi- dential sources of information may be fearful of speaking to the press, and the press may lose opportunities to cover various events because of fears on the part of participants that press files will be readily available to the authorities. fourth, reporters may be deterred from recording and preserving their recollections for future use. fifth, the les façons dont les perquisitions et les saisies ef- fectuées par la police peuvent empiéter sur les valeurs qui sous- tendent la liberté de la presse sont manifestes. premièrement, les perquisitions peuvent entraîner des perturbations sur le plan matériel et empêcher la publi- cation efficace et opportune du journal. deuxièmement, la retenue par les policiers d’objets saisis peut retarder ou empêcher la diffusion complète des informations. troisièmement, les sources confidentielles de renseigne- ments peuvent craindre de parler aux journalistes, et la presse peut ainsi perdre des chances d’assurer la couver- ture de différents événements en raison des craintes des [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 445 processing of news and its dissemination may be chilled by the prospect that searches will disclose internal edi- torial deliberations. finally, the press may resort to self- censorship to conceal the fact that it possesses information that may be of interest to the police in an effort to protect its sources and its ability to gather news in the future. all this may adversely impact on the role of the media in furthering the search for truth, community participation and self- fulfillment. participants que les autorités puissent facilement prendre connaissance des dossiers de la presse. quatrièmement, cela peut dissuader les journalistes d’enregistrer et de conserver les renseignements recueillis pour s’en servir ul- térieurement. cinquièmement, le traitement et la diffusion des informations peuvent être gênés par l’éventualité que les délibérations internes de la rédaction soient rendues publiques à la suite de perquisitions. en dernier lieu, la presse peut recourir à l’autocensure pour cacher le fait qu’elle est en possession de renseignements qui peuvent intéresser les policiers, dans le but de protéger ses sources et sa capacité de recueillir des informations à l’avenir. tout cela peut avoir des répercussions néfastes sur le rôle joué par les médias pour favoriser la recherche de la vérité, la participation au sein de la collectivité et l’accomplisse- ment personnel. (national post, at para. 78, citing lessard, at p. 452) (national post, par. 78, citant lessard, p. 452) [147] as this quote demonstrates, an obvious collateral impact on the press of being required to comply with a production order is a chilling effect not only on the particular press being targeted, but on the press generally. the extent of the chill may vary from case to case, but its existence can hardly be questioned. [148] on the other side of the balance is the strength of the state’s interest in obtaining the order. as cory j. held in lessard, “all members of the community have an interest in seeing that crimes are investigated and prosecuted” (p 446) in particular, the “investigation of a serious and violent crime [is] of importance to the state”, and in circumstances where a crime is ongoing or where there is a risk that further crimes will be committed, “some urgency in conducting the search must be recognized” (new brunswick, at p 476). in other words, the more serious the crime under investigation, the more cogent the evidence sought and the more urgent the investigative need, the stronger the state’s interest will be. [147] comme l’illustre cette citation, une inci- dence collatérale évidente du fait que la presse puisse être contrainte de se conformer à une ordonnance de communication est un effet dissuasif non seulement sur l’organe de presse ciblé, mais aussi sur la presse en général. l’ampleur de l’effet dissuasif peut varier d’un cas à l’autre, mais on ne peut guère remettre son existence en cause. [148] le pendant de cet effet dissuasif est l’impor- tance de l’intérêt de l’état à ce que l’ordonnance soit rendue. comme le juge cory l’a affirmé dans lessard, « tous les citoyens ont un intérêt à ce que les actes cri- minels fassent l’objet d’enquêtes et de poursuites » : p 446. plus particulièrement, « [l]’enquête relative à un crime grave et violent [est] importante pour l’état », et lorsqu’un crime est en cours ou lorsqu’il existe un risque que d’autres crimes soient commis, « il faut reconnaître qu’il y [a] une certaine urgence à effectuer la perquisition » : nouveau‑ brunswick, p 476. autrement dit, plus le crime faisant l’objet de l’enquête est grave, plus la preuve recherchée est convaincante et plus le besoin d’enquête est urgent, plus l’intérêt de l’état est élevé. [149] while the cogency of the evidence is a rel- evant consideration, i agree with the crown that in assessing the strength of the state’s interest it would not be appropriate to require an assessment of whether the evidence is necessary for the crown [149] bien que la force probante de la preuve soit une considération pertinente, j’estime, comme la couronne, que pour évaluer le degré d’intérêt de l’état, il ne serait pas approprié d’exiger une éva- luation de la nécessité qu’il présente les éléments 446 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. to obtain a conviction. production orders are often a preliminary part of the crown’s efforts to marshal a case. what will ultimately be necessary to prove the crown’s case at trial is unknowable at the early stages of an investigation, where the police’s role is “to locate, examine and preserve all the evidence relevant to events which may have given rise to crim- inal liability”, not to “decide whether the essential elements of an offence are made out” (canadianoxy chemicals ltd. v. canada (attorney general), [1999] 1 scr 743, at para 22). [150] recognizing that s.  2(b) requires a more rigorous approach to authorizations against the press, also compels clarification of some aspects of the impact on the media’s rights that have emerged in the jurisprudence. one is the relevance of “prior publication”. in lessard and new brunswick, the material sought was video footage of events said to constitute criminal activity, which had already been broadcast by the press. the court held that the fact that the information sought had been published in whole or in part attenuated the media’s claim to s. 8 privacy protection in the footage (lessard, at pp. 446-47; new brunswick, at p 477). [151] but one of the media’s core functions is the exercise of discretion over what is and is not pub- lished, and there is often an expanse of unpublished material behind each published story. it seems to me that prior publication is a factor to be addressed on a case-by- case basis. if a journalist obtains a number of documents and decides to publish only some or part of them, the publication in “part” should not undermine protection for the unpublished portion, since state access to it clearly interferes with both privacy and newsgathering. de preuve en cause pour obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité les ordonnances de communication ne constituent souvent qu’une étape préliminaire des efforts de la couronne pour mener à bien une affaire. tôt durant l’enquête, il est impossible de sa- voir ce qui sera ultimement nécessaire pour prouver la cause de la couronne au procès, dans la mesure où le rôle de la police consiste à « découvrir, [à] exa- miner et [à] conserver tous les éléments de preuve se rapportant à des événements susceptibles de donner lieu à une responsabilité criminelle » et non pas à « décider si les éléments essentiels d’une infraction sont établis  »  : canadianoxy chemicals ltd c. canada (procureur général), [1999] 1 rcs 743, par 22. [150] si l’on reconnaît que l’al. 2b) exige d’adopter une approche plus rigoureuse pour autoriser des per- quisitions contre la presse, il faut également clarifier certains éléments qui ressortent de la jurisprudence et qui ont une incidence sur la décision relative aux droits de la presse. une de ces incidences est la perti- nence de la « publication antérieure ». dans lessard et nouveau‑ brunswick, l’information que la police cherchait à obtenir était une bande vidéo déjà diffu- sée par la presse d’événements qui auraient constitué une activité criminelle. la cour a conclu que le fait que l’information recherchée avait été publiée en tout ou en partie atténuait la prétention des médias à la protection de la vie privée protégée par l’art. 8 relativement aux séquences : lessard, p. 446- 447; nouveau‑ brunswick, p 477. [151] cela dit, les médias ont notamment pour fonction principale d’exercer un pouvoir discrétion- naire pour décider ce qui est publié et ce qui ne l’est pas, et derrière chaque article publié ou reportage dif- fusé, il y a souvent une quantité importante d’infor- mations qui n’est pas rendue publique. il me semble que la publication antérieure est un facteur qui doit être étudié au cas par cas. si un journaliste obtient un grand nombre de documents et qu’il décide de n’en publier que certains ou qu’une partie, la publication « partielle » ne devrait pas miner la protection pour l’information qui n’a pas été publiée, puisque, autre- ment, l’accès qu’aurait l’état serait clairement une ingérence tant dans la vie privée du média que dans ses activités de collecte d’informations. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 447 [152] there is also the issue of how to deal with sources, some of whom ask for full confidential- ity, while others say certain things “off the record” despite being otherwise unconcerned about being identified as a source. for this latter group, the desire to remain anonymous with respect to those particular communications may be no less significant to their willingness to communicate with the journalist than a desire for blanket confidentiality such as was at issue in national post. where part or all of a communi- cation with a journalist was intended or understood to be “off the record”, it too is entitled to protection from disclosure requirements. this aligns with the approach taken by the chamberland commission, which noted the need to protect journalists’ source materials even where the identification of a confiden- tial source is not at issue (chamberland commission report, at pp 175-80). [153] and the final aspect warranting discussion is whether a production order should be made against the press without the press at the hearing. this court, in applying criminal code provisions similar to s 487014(1), has interpreted them to permit, but not require, ex parte proceedings in order to ensure that a judge is not deprived of the option of having a hear- ing on notice “to ensure reasonableness and fairness in the circumstances” (r v. sab, [2003] 2 scr. 678, at para. 56; r v. rodgers, [2006] 1 scr 554, at para 16). there are strong rationales for providing notice to the press in cases like this. if the authoriz- ing judge lacks evidence and submissions from the party exclusively in possession of the information needed for the balancing — the innocent media third party whose s. 2(b) rights are engaged — then there is nothing to balance. and the authorizing judge would have no way of knowing some highly relevant facts, such as the nature of the relationship between a source and a journalist. for this reason, the court in national post held that “the media should have the opportunity to put their case against the warrant at the earliest reasonable opportunity”, and that absent urgent circumstances, the issuing judge “may well [152] la question du traitement des sources doit aussi être résolue, dans la mesure où certaines d’entre elles requièrent une totale confidentialité, tandis que d’autres révèlent certains éléments « à titre confidentiel » sans par ailleurs se soucier d’être nommées comme source. pour ce dernier groupe, le souhait de rester anonymes quant à ces com‑ munications en particulier peut ne pas être moins important eu égard à leur volonté de communiquer avec le journaliste que le désir d’une confidentialité absolue comme celle dont il était question dans national post. lorsqu’une partie ou la totalité d’une communication avec un journaliste était destinée à être faite « à titre confidentiel » ou comprise comme devant être telle, elle aussi a droit à une protection contre les exigences en matière de communication. cette vision est conforme à l’approche adoptée par la commission chamberland, qui a souligné la nécessité de protéger l’information fournie par les sources des journalistes même lorsque l’iden- tification d’une source confidentielle n’est pas en litige : rapport de la commission chamberland, p. 175- 180. [153] le dernier aspect qui mérite d’être discuté est celui de savoir s’il est opportun qu’une ordonnance de communication soit prononcée contre un média qui n’est pas présent à l’audience. lorsqu’elle a ap- pliqué des dispositions du code criminel similaires au par 487014(1), la cour les a interprétées pour qu’elles permettent, mais pas pour qu’elles exigent, la tenue de procédures ex parte, de manière à ga- rantir que le juge ne soit pas privé de la possibilité de tenir une audience après signification d’un avis « afin de garantir le caractère juste et raisonnable des procédures dans les circonstances » : r c. sab, [2003] 2 rcs 678, par. 56; r c. rodgers, [2006] 1 rcs 554, par 16. dans de tels cas, il existe de bonnes raisons pour que la presse soit avisée. si le juge saisi de la demande n’a pas été informé par la partie qui est la seule à disposer — le média tiers innocent dont les droits protégés par l’al. 2b) sont en cause  — de certains éléments de preuve ou de certaines allégations dont il a besoin pour mettre en balance les différents intérêts en cause, il n’aura alors rien à mettre en balance. en outre, ce juge n’aura aucun moyen de connaître certains faits hautement pertinents, comme la nature de la 448 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. conclude that it is desirable to proceed on notice” (para 83). while the issue of notice is ultimately a matter within the discretion of the authorizing judge, it is, obviously, highly preferable in most cases to proceed on notice to the media rather than ex parte. [154] in rare cases where the crown can show that there are exigent circumstances or that there is a real risk of the destruction of evidence, notice may not be feasible. a real risk, for example, that the press would act to move evidence “beyond the reach of [the] canadian court process”, as the ito in this case asserted, might also militate against giving notice. in those circumstances, an order should be made for sealing and preserving the evidence that is ob- tained pending notice to the press and an opportunity to contest the order before a reviewing judge. the possibility that the press may not “cooperate with police”, which was also suggested in the ito, does not raise the same concerns. in those cases, it remains preferable to proceed on notice so that the media can oppose the order at the earliest possible opportunity. relation qui unit une source et un journaliste. pour cette raison, dans national post, la cour a conclu que « les médias devraient avoir la possibilité de faire valoir leurs arguments contre la délivrance du mandat à la première occasion raisonnable », et que, à défaut d’une situation d’urgence, le juge saisi de la demande « pourrait conclure à bon droit qu’il est préférable d’aviser le média » : par 83. bien que la question de l’avis soit ultimement une question qui relève du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge saisi de la demande, il est évidemment nettement préférable dans la plupart des cas d’aviser le média plutôt que d’entendre la demande ex parte. [154] par ailleurs, dans les rares cas où la cou- ronne peut démontrer qu’il existe des circonstances qui l’exigent ou un risque réel de destruction d’élé- ments de preuve, l’envoi d’un avis pourrait ne pas être possible. un risque réel, par exemple, que la presse prenne des mesures pour mettre la preuve [traduction] « hors de la portée [du] système ju- diciaire canadien », comme l’indique la dénoncia- tion en l’espèce, pourrait également militer contre l’envoi d’un avis dans ces circonstances, il y a lieu de rendre une ordonnance de mise sous scellés et de conservation des éléments de preuve obtenus jusqu’à ce que le média soit avisé et qu’il ait l’oc- casion de contester l’ordonnance devant un juge siégeant en révision. la possibilité que la presse ne « collabore pas avec les services de police », ce qui a également été suggéré dans la dénonciation en l’espèce, ne soulève pas les mêmes préoccupations. dans de tels cas, il demeure préférable d’aviser le média de sorte qu’il puisse s’opposer à l’ordonnance dès qu’il en a l’occasion. [155] that brings us to the approach for reviewing production orders. once an authorization has been granted, the person targeted by the order can chal- lenge it. a challenge to an ordinary search warrant or production order by a third party typically occurs by way of certiorari in the superior court (scott c. hutchison et al., search and seizure law in canada (loose- leaf), at pp. 16-53 to 16-55). the target can argue that the record before the authorizing judge was insufficient to establish the requisite statutory grounds for issuance. alternatively, he or she can argue that the record did not accurately reflect what [155] voilà qui nous amène à l’approche qu’il convient d’adopter pour examiner les ordonnances de communication. une fois qu’une autorisation a été accordée, la personne visée par l’ordonnance peut la contester. habituellement, un mandat de perquisition ou une ordonnance de communication par un tiers est contesté au moyen d’un bref de certiorari en cour supérieure : scott c. hutchison et autres, search and seizure law in canada (feuilles mobiles), p. 16-53 à 16-55. la personne visée peut plaider que le juge saisi de la demande ne disposait pas d’un dossier suf- fisant pour établir les motifs de délivrance prescrits [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 449 the affiant knew or ought to have known and that, if it had, the authorization would not have been granted (robert w. hubbard, peter m. brauti and scott k. fenton, wiretapping and other electronic surveillance: law and procedure (loose- leaf), at section 852). [156] this court set out the orthodox approach for reviewing authorizations in garofoli. under that approach, the reviewing judge “does not substitute his or her view for that of the authorizing judge” (p 1452). instead, he or she is confined to deter- mining whether, in light of the record as amplified on review, “there continues to be any basis for the decision of the authorizing judge” (ibid.) even where the record reveals “the existence of fraud, non- disclosure, misleading evidence and new evidence”, if the authorizing judge “could have granted the au- thorization”, the reviewing judge should not interfere (ibid. (emphasis added); see also r v. nero (2016), 334 ccc (3d) 148 (ont. ca);. r v. araujo, [2000] 2 scr 992). [157] the combination of the garofoli approach with ex parte authorization proceedings may make sense in the ordinary search warrant context, where the amplification of the record on review does not generally change the interests at stake. any new evidence on review still typically relates to whether the statutory preconditions for issuance have been satisfied, namely, whether there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and evidence of it would be obtained. as this court has said, “[w]hat matters is what the affi- ant knew or ought to have known at the time the affi- davit in support of the    authorization was sworn” (world bank group v. wallace, [2016] 1 scr 207, at para 119). as a result, this court has held that the scope for cross- examination of an affiant is usually narrow, and “[e]ven if it is established that informa- tion contained within the affidavit is inaccurate, or that a material fact was not disclosed, this will not necessarily detract from the existence of the statutory pre- conditions” (r v. pires, [2005] 3 scr 343, at para 30). new facts are not relevant if the affiant par la loi. il peut aussi faire valoir que le dossier ne reflétait pas correctement ce que savait ou aurait dû savoir l’affiant et que, s’il l’avait reflété, l’autorisa- tion n’aurait pas été accordée : robert w. hubbard, peter m. brauti et scott k. fenton, wiretapping and other electronic surveillance : law and procedure (feuilles mobiles), par 852. [156] la cour a énoncé l’approche traditionnelle pour réviser les autorisations dans garofoli. suivant cette approche, le juge chargé de la révision « ne substitue pas son opinion à celle du juge qui a ac- cordé l’autorisation » : p 1452. il doit plutôt se limi- ter à déterminer si, à la lumière du dossier étoffé dans le cadre de la demande de révision, « il existe en- core un fondement quelconque à la décision du juge qui a accordé l’autorisation » : ibid. même lorsque le dossier révèle l’existence « [de] fraude, [d’une] non- divulgation, [d’une] déclaration trompeuse et [de] nouveaux éléments de preuve », si le juge qui a accordé l’autorisation « pouvait le faire », le juge qui siège en révision ne devrait pas intervenir : ibid. (italiques ajoutés); voir également r c. nero (2016), 334 ccc (3d) 148 (ca ont);. r c. araujo, [2000] 2 rcs 992. [157] la combinaison de l’approche garofoli et de la procédure d’autorisation ex parte peut avoir un sens dans le contexte d’un mandat de perquisition or- dinaire, où l’étoffement du dossier lors de l’examen ne change généralement pas les intérêts en jeu. tout nouvel élément de preuve présenté à l’étape de la révision porte généralement sur la question de savoir s’il a été satisfait aux conditions légales préalables, c’est-à-dire s’il y avait des motifs raisonnables et probables de croire qu’une infraction a été commise et si des preuves de cette infraction seraient obte- nues. comme la cour l’a affirmé, « [c]e qui importe, c’est ce que le déposant savait ou aurait dû savoir au moment où il a souscrit l’affidavit accompagnant la dénonciation » : groupe de la banque mondiale c. wallace, [2016] 1 rcs 207, par 119. ainsi, la cour a conclu que la portée du contre- interrogatoire d’un affiant est généralement limitée, et que « [m]ême s’il est établi que les renseignements contenus dans l’af- fidavit sont inexacts, ou qu’un fait substantiel n’a pas été communiqué, cela ne réfutera pas nécessairement la présence des conditions légales préalables » : r c. 450 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. could not reasonably have known of them (world bank group, at para 122). [158] but this highly deferential approach was not designed to scrutinize whether s. 2(b) charter rights were sufficiently protected. in fact, this court has never directly analysed what approach should be applied for reviewing a production order against the press. in proceedings where the press is involved, and there has been no notice before the authorizing judge, the press will not have had the opportunity to explain how the order would interfere with its work until after the authorization is made. at that stage, irrespective of the new evidence, under the garofoli approach the court would not be entitled to conduct a fresh balancing. instead, it could only set aside the order if it felt the authorizing judge could not have come to any other conclusion than to deny the order. [159] although all production orders involve in- fringements of constitutional privacy rights, those infringements are usually knowable in advance and require little additional elaboration. the nature and extent of the impacts on the press are, by contrast, fact- dependent and contextual. a challenge to an ex parte authorization against a journalist may, and necessarily does, involve the introduction of facts on review that the police affiant had little to no way of knowing. and, unlike in an ordinary garofoli review, those facts are highly relevant, because the inquiry is not about the sincerity or reasonableness of the affiant’s beliefs, it is about whether the order reflects a proportionate balancing. pires, [2005] 3 rcs 343, par 30. les nouveaux éléments de preuve ne sont pas pertinents si l’affiant ne pouvait pas raisonnablement en avoir eu connais- sance : groupe de la banque mondiale, par 122. [158] cette approche hautement empreinte de dé- férence n’a toutefois pas été conçue pour examiner si les droits visés à l’al. 2b) de la charte avaient été suffisamment protégés. en fait, la cour n’a jamais analysé directement quelle approche conviendrait pour réviser une ordonnance de communication ren- due contre la presse. dans les procédures auxquelles elle prend part sans avoir été avisée de la demande dont le juge est saisi, la presse n’aura pas eu l’occa- sion avant que l’autorisation soit accordée d’expli- quer comment l’ordonnance interférerait avec son travail. à cette étape, indépendamment de l’existence ou non de nouveaux éléments de preuve, suivant l’approche garofoli, la cour ne serait pas autorisée à mettre les intérêts en jeu de nouveau en balance. elle ne pourrait plutôt qu’annuler l’ordonnance si elle estimait que le juge qui a accordé l’autorisation n’aurait pas pu conclure autrement que par un refus de prononcer l’ordonnance. [159] s’il est vrai que toutes les ordonnances de communication entraînent des atteintes aux droits à la vie privée protégés par la constitution, ces atteintes sont généralement connues à l’avance et requièrent bien peu qu’on élabore à leur sujet. en revanche, la nature et l’étendue de l’incidence de ces ordon- nances sur la presse sont tributaires des faits et du contexte. la contestation d’une autorisation ex parte prononcée contre un journaliste peut mener, et mène nécessairement, lors de la révision, à la présenta- tion de faits que le policier signataire de l’affidavit n’avait bien peu sinon aucun moyen de connaître. en outre, contrairement à la situation qui prévaut dans le contexte d’une révision de type garofoli ordinaire, ces faits sont hautement pertinents, parce que l’exa- men ne porte pas sur la sincérité ou sur le caractère raisonnable des croyances de l’affiant, mais sur la question de savoir si l’ordonnance est le fruit d’une mise en balance proportionnée. [160] most significantly, if the authorizing judge’s decision has been made without the benefit of any submissions or evidence from the press, it is hard [160] fait le plus important, si la décision du juge qui a accordé l’autorisation a été prise sans qu’il ait pu prendre connaissance des observations ou [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 451 to see why it would be entitled to deference. in my view, where the press has not had a chance to ap- pear before the authorizing judge, it is entitled to a de novo balancing on the review. it would be an artificial exercise to defer to the conclusions of a de- cision maker who does not possess some or all of the most relevant facts in order to balance the interests at play. as well, a de novo hearing provides a more straightforward process for all parties, minimizing the number of steps and interim decisions, and ena- bling the judge to zero in on the substantive issues. if, on the other hand, the press was present and able to make its case before the authorizing judge, the more deferential garofoli approach would be justified. [161] a final note about the analysis. some of the parties referred to the new journalistic sources pro‑ tection act, sc 2017, c. 22, for the general purpose of showing that parliament intended to strengthen press protection. none of its provisions, however, was at issue before us. as a result, these reasons have intentionally avoided addressing or applying any of them. des éléments de preuve de la presse, il est difficile de concevoir pourquoi elle mériterait d’être traitée avec déférence. à mon avis, lorsque la presse n’a pas eu l’occasion de comparaître devant le juge qui a accordé l’autorisation, elle a droit à ce qu’une nouvelle mise en balance soit faite dans le contexte de la révision. il serait artificiel de s’en remettre aux conclusions d’un décideur qui ne disposait pas de certains des éléments de preuve les plus pertinents, ou d’aucun d’entre eux, pour mettre en balance les intérêts en jeu. en outre, une nouvelle audience offre un processus plus direct à toutes les parties, et mini- mise le nombre d’étapes ainsi que de décisions inté- rimaires, tout en permettant au juge de se concentrer sur les questions de fond. si, par contre, la presse était présente et a eu l’occasion de présenter sa thèse au juge saisi de la demande, il serait justifié d’adopter l’approche plus déférente adoptée dans garofoli. [161] j’ajouterais un dernier élément concernant l’analyse. certaines parties ont renvoyé à la nouvelle loi sur la protection des sources journalistiques, lc 2017, c. 22, dans le but général de démontrer que le parlement voulait renforcer la protection de la presse. or, aucune disposition de cette loi n’était en cause devant nous. en conséquence, j’évite inten- tionnellement d’aborder ou d’appliquer cette loi dans les présents motifs. application application [162] in this case, vice media has put forward all of the evidence and argument that would have been weighed in the balance. based on that record, in my view, the production order strikes a proportionate balance between the rights and interests at stake. [162] en l’espèce, média vice a présenté tous les éléments de preuve et plaidé tous les arguments qui auraient pesé dans la balance. en conséquence, à mon avis, l’ordonnance de communication repré- sente une mise en balance proportionnée des droits et intérêts en jeu. [163] the order is narrowly tailored and targets only mr. makuch’s communications with mr. shirdon, and, apart from vice media’s claim that the crown could somehow use published media accounts as a substitute for the evidence it seeks, there is no sug- gestion that those communications are available from any other source. balancing the harms and benefits of the order, although any production order against a journalist is serious, the harmful impact of this order is, in my view, minimal. in saying so i do not rely on [163] l’ordonnance a une portée limitée et vise uniquement les communications entre m. makuch et m shirdon. en outre, mis à part la prétention de média vice selon laquelle la couronne pourrait d’une quelconque façon utiliser les comptes ren- dus médiatiques publiés plutôt que les éléments de preuve qu’il cherche à obtenir, rien ne laisse à penser que ces communications pourraient être obtenues d’une autre source. en dépit du sérieux de toutes les ordonnances de communication prononcées contre 452 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. the crown’s submission that vice media’s privacy in- terest in these documents was undermined by “prior publication”. rather, it is because the specific facts of this case undermine the strength of vice media’s suggestion that the production order would interfere with its newsgathering and publication functions. [164] the unusual lens through which this ap- peal must be viewed is that we are dealing with information from a source in circumstances where the source wanted everything he said to be made public. i do not deny the seriousness of journalists being seen to be participating in or conscripted into the investigation of crime. that perception could most decidedly undermine the media’s perceived independence, resulting in a “loss of credibility and appearance of impartiality” (manitoba, at para 74). but the concern shrivels in the context of this case. [165] it bears repeating that mr. shirdon was not a confidential source, or even one who so much as intimated that he wished mr. makuch to conceal his identity. on the contrary, he went to mr. makuch with the express purpose of broadcasting his ex- tremist views to the public. crucially, mr. makuch’s lengthy, detailed affidavit contains no suggestion whatsoever that anything mr. shirdon said was in- tended or understood to be “off the record”, and vice media has never argued otherwise. un journaliste, j’estime que la mise en balance des avantages et des inconvénients de l’ordonnance en l’espèce mène à la conclusion que ces derniers sont minimes. pour énoncer cette affirmation, je ne me fonde pas sur l’argument de la couronne selon lequel il a déjà été porté atteinte aux intérêts à la vie privée de média vice en ce qui a trait à ces documents par une « publication antérieure ». je me prononce ainsi plutôt parce que les faits précis de la présente cause affaiblissent la force de la suggestion de média vice selon laquelle l’ordonnance de communication constituerait une ingérence dans ses fonctions de collecte d’informations et de publication. [164] la lentille inhabituelle à travers laquelle il faut voir le présent appel découle de ce que nous traitons de renseignements provenant d’une source dans des circonstances où cette dernière souhaitait que tous ses propos soient rendus publics. je ne nie pas la gravité de la perception de la participation ou de la conscription des journalistes à l’enquête sur les crimes. cette perception pourrait assurément miner la perception d’indépendance des médias, ce qui entraî- nerait [traduction] « une perte de leur crédibilité et de l’apparence de leur impartialité » : manitoba, par 74. cette préoccupation perd toutefois de son importance dans le contexte de la présente affaire. [165] il vaut la peine de répéter que m. shirdon n’était pas une source confidentielle, ni même une source qui aurait même laissé entendre qu’il sou- haitait que m. makuch dissimule son identité. au contraire, il a approché ce dernier précisément pour que ses opinions extrémistes soient diffusées publi- quement. fait crucial, l’affidavit long et détaillé de m. makuch ne contient aucune suggestion que tout ce que m. shirdon a dit était destiné à être révélé « à titre confidentiel » ou compris comme tel, et média vice n’a jamais plaidé le contraire. [166] vice media points out that mr. shirdon did not initially identify himself to mr. makuch and used a pseudonym. but this does not amount to a confiden- tiality agreement. more pertinently, mr. makuch’s own conduct shows that the relationship was not confidential in any way. it was mr. makuch, not the police, who identified mr. shirdon to the public, by publishing the articles that linked abu usamah to [166] média vice souligne que, initialement, m. shirdon n’a pas révélé son identité à m. makuch et a utilisé un pseudonyme. cela n’équivaut toutefois pas à un accord de confidentialité. fait plus perti- nent, la conduite de m. makuch lui- même illustre que la relation n’était aucunement confidentielle. c’est lui, et non pas la police, qui a révélé l’identité de m. shirdon au public, en publiant les articles [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc la juge abella 453 farah shirdon and the youtube video. it cannot be said, therefore, that this case involved state interfer- ence with a journalist- source relationship. no one, in fact, interfered with mr. shirdon’s anonymity or pri- vacy since he himself was the person who willingly gave up both in order to have a public platform for his views — a fact confirmed by mr. makuch’s ap- parent lack of concern about identifying mr. shirdon in his articles. [167] vice media argues that being required to comply with any production order, regardless of whether it covers confidential or quasi- confidential communications, and regardless of whether there is any appearance of connection between the journalist and the police, will chill sources. with respect, ac- cepting that submission would amount to a univer- sal, automatic immunity from production orders for the press. while the risk of a chilling effect can be presumed in such cases, the particular factual con- text of each case may amplify, diminish, or displace that presumption. in this case, the deliberately non- confidential nature of the source and the communi- cations at issue diminish the risk of a chill. [168] as for the strength of the state’s interest, vice media does not dispute that mr. shirdon’s al- leged offences are extremely serious. nor does vice media dispute that the communications between mr. makuch and mr. shirdon are likely to reveal strong evidence of mr. shirdon’s alleged terrorist conduct. what it says instead is that the crown does not really need these communications to succeed in its prosecution of mr. shirdon — a prosecution, moreover, that vice media says is unlikely to occur soon, if ever. but, as previously noted, whether the evidence sought is necessary for the crown to obtain a conviction is not part of assessing the strength of the state’s interests. qui établissaient un lien entre abu usamah et farah shirdon et qui faisaient état de la vidéo présente sur youtube. il n’est donc pas possible de prétendre qu’il est question, en l’espèce, d’une ingérence de l’état dans la relation entre un journaliste et une source. en fait, personne ne s’est ingéré dans l’ano- nymat ou dans la vie privée de m. shirdon, puisque c’est lui- même qui a renoncé à l’un comme à l’autre de manière à obtenir un forum pour faire connaître ses opinions — un fait confirmé par l’absence ap- parente de préoccupation de m. makuch au sujet de l’identification de m. shirdon dans ses articles. [167] média vice plaide que le fait d’être tenu de se conformer à quelque ordonnance de communication que ce soit, qu’elle concerne ou non des communica- tions confidentielles ou quasi confidentielles, et qu’il y ait ou non une quelconque apparence de lien entre le journaliste et la police, aura pour effet de dissuader les sources de parler aux journalistes. soit dit en tout respect, si nous devions accepter une telle prétention, cela reviendrait à reconnaître une immunité univer- selle et automatique contre toutes les ordonnances de communication visant la presse. bien qu’on puisse présumer qu’il y aurait un risque de dissuasion dans de tels cas, le contexte factuel particulier de chaque cas peut amplifier, diminuer ou repousser cette pré- somption. en l’espèce, la nature délibérément non confidentielle de la source et les communications en cause diminuent le risque d’effet dissuasif. [168] quant au degré d’intérêt de l’état, média vice ne conteste pas que les infractions reprochées à m. shirdon soient très graves. elle ne conteste pas non plus que les communications entre m. makuch et m.  shirdon révéleront vraisemblablement une preuve solide de la conduite terroriste alléguée de ce dernier. ce que média vice affirme plutôt, c’est que la couronne n’a pas réellement besoin de ces com- munications pour avoir gain de cause dans sa pour- suite contre m. shirdon — une poursuite, en outre, dont média vice soutient qu’elle n’aura vraisembla- blement pas lieu prochainement, le cas échéant. or, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, la question de savoir si les éléments de preuve recherchés sont nécessaires pour que la couronne obtienne une déclaration de culpabilité ne relève pas de l’évaluation du degré d’intérêt de l’état. 454 r v vice media canada inc abella j. [2018] 3 scr. [169] nor can i accept vice media’s argument that the production order should not be issued unless and until mr. shirdon returns to canada and a prosecu- tion here becomes imminent. fleeing from canada to join isis is part of the very conduct for which mr. shirdon is charged. it would be incongruous to use his flight from canada as a basis for delaying an investigation of his conduct. [169] je ne peux pas accepter non plus l’argument de média vice selon lequel l’ordonnance de com- munication ne devrait pas être rendue à moins que m. shirdon ne revienne au canada et tant et aussi longtemps qu’il ne l’aura pas fait et qu’une poursuite ici ne sera pas imminente. sa fuite du canada pour rejoindre daech fait partie intégrante du compor- tement précis pour lequel m. shirdon est accusé. il serait incongru d’utiliser sa fuite du canada comme fondement pour reporter une enquête sur sa conduite. [170] this leads to the conclusion that the benefit of the state’s interest in obtaining the messages out- weighs any harm to vice media’s rights. [170] ainsi, il faut conclure que les avantages pour l’intérêt de l’état à obtenir les messages l’emportent sur le préjudice causé aux droits de média vice. [171] i would therefore dismiss the appeal. [171] je suis donc d’avis de rejeter l’appel. appeal dismissed. pourvoi rejeté. procureurs des appelants : st. lawrence barristers, ters, toronto; linden & associates, toronto. toronto; linden & associates, toronto. procureur de l’intimée : service des poursuites service of canada, toronto. pénales du canada, toronto. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné‑ rale de l’ontario : procureure générale de l’ontario, toronto. ples television network, the advocates in defence of expression in media, the canadian association of journalists, the canadian journalists for free expression, the canadian media guild/communi‑ cations workers of america canada, the centre for free expression, global news, a division of corus television limited partnership and postmedia net‑ work inc.: stockwoods, toronto. procureurs des intervenants le réseau de télévi‑ sion des peuples autochtones, les avocats pour la dé‑ fense de l’expression dans les médias, l’association canadienne des journalistes, canadian journalists for free expression, la guilde canadienne des mé‑ dias/syndicat des communications d’amérique canada, centre for free expression, global news, a division of corus television limited partnership et postmedia network inc. : stockwoods, toronto. casting corporation: canadian broadcasting cor‑ poration, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la société radio‑ canada : société radio‑ canada, toronto. lawyers association: mirza kwok defence lawyers, mississauga; hameed law, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana‑ dienne des avocats musulmans : mirza kwok defence lawyers, mississauga; hameed law, ottawa. [2018] 3 rcs. r c média vice canada inc. 455 defence initiative, reporters without borders, the reporters committee for freedom of the press, the media law resource centre, the international press institute, article 19, pen international, pen canada the canadian centre of pen international, the index on censorship, the committee to protect journal‑ ists, the world association of newspapers and news publishers and the international human rights pro‑ gram: blake, cassels & graydon, toronto. procureurs des intervenants media legal de‑ fence initiative, reporters sans frontières, reporters committee for freedom of the press, media law resource centre, international press institute, ar‑ ticle 19, pen international, pen le centre canadien de pen international, index on censorship, com‑ mittee to protect journalists, world association of newspapers and news publishers et international human rights program : blake, cassels & graydon, toronto. civil liberties association:  bersenas jacobsen chouest thomson blackburn, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante british columbia civil liberties association  :  bersenas jacobsen chouest thomson blackburn, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana‑ liberties association: lerners, toronto. dienne des libertés civiles : lerners, toronto.
i. overview [1] this appeal centres on the appropriate framework for determining applications to retroactively decrease the amount of child support owing or forgive child support arrears under s 17 of the divorce act, rsc 1985, c 3 (2nd supp). the amount of child support payable varies based on the payor parent’s income, and income often fluctuates. as a result, applications to retroactively vary support are a common occurrence in courtrooms across the country in an ideal world, when parents work together in the best interests of their children, they will provide full and accurate income information every year and recalculate the proper amount of support owing. when that does not occur, s 17 of the divorce act allows a parent to ask the court to vary an existing order retroactively to align with the payor’s actual income for the relevant period. [2] in the present case, mr. colucci did not make any voluntary payments toward his child support obligations for over 16 years and now owes approximately $170,000 in arrears on application by mr. colucci, the motion judge retroactively decreased support, effectively reducing the arrears owing to $41,642 the court of appeal for ontario overturned that decision and ordered him to pay the full amount of the arrears. [3] the divergent results in the lower courts highlight the confusion surrounding the applicable framework with respect to applications under s 17 to retroactively reduce or rescind arrears, a confusion that has persisted since this court’s landmark decision in dbs v. srg, 2006 scc 37, [2006] 2 scr 231. in that case, the court considered the principles and competing interests underlying recipients’ applications for retroactive child support the court is now asked to clarify the principles which guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a payor seeks to retroactively decrease support to reflect a past reduction in income. the courts have and need wide discretion to vary child support orders to ensure the correct amount of child support is being paid and to adapt to the enormous diversity of individual circumstances that families face. there is, however, a pressing need for clear statements about what must be established before a court will retroactively decrease the amount owing under an existing child support order. [4] the applicable framework must give effect to the objectives and provisions of the federal child support guidelines, sor/97-175 (“guidelines”), particularly the core objective of safeguarding the child’s right to a “fair standard of support” (s 1). retroactive variation applications also require courts to weigh the certainty and predictability provided by an existing court order against the need for flexibility in a system that ties support to fluctuating payor income the framework set out below balances these interests in a way that incentivizes payment of the right amount of child support when it is due and the timely disclosure of financial information — the linchpin of a just and effective family law system. rules which create perverse incentives to ignore or postpone parental support obligations are to be firmly rejected in favour of legal standards designed with the fundamental purposes of child support in mind. [5] the controversy between the parties centres on whether the framework for retroactive decreases under s 17 should reflect the flexible and discretionary approach applied to retroactive increases in dbs. with certain modifications, i conclude that it should. a payor who has established a past decrease in income is not automatically entitled to a retroactive decrease of support back to the date of the decrease, as suggested by the motion judge in this case. the overall decision is a discretionary one. [6] as i will explain further, the court’s discretion is structured by a presumption in favour of retroactively decreasing support to the date the payor gave the recipient effective notice of an intention to seek a downward adjustment of the child support obligation, up to three years before formal notice is given of an application to vary under s 17. this presumption is triggered as soon as a past material change in circumstances is established — it is no longer necessary to first ask whether retroactive relief is generally appropriate before moving to the question of how far back retroactive relief should extend. discretionary factors parallel to those considered in dbs may justify departing from the presumptive date in favour of a longer or shorter period of retroactivity for consistency, this presumption-based approach should be mirrored where the recipient seeks a retroactive increase. once a past material change in income is established, a presumption is triggered in favour of retroactively increasing support to a certain date, with the dbs factors guiding the court’s exercise of discretion in deciding whether to depart from that date. [7] given the informational asymmetry between the parties, a payor’s success in obtaining a retroactive decrease will depend largely on the payor’s financial disclosure and communication indeed, effective notice in this context is only “effective” when there has been disclosure of the changed financial circumstances. at the stage of considering the dbs factors, disclosure will once again be a key consideration in assessing whether the payor’s conduct operates to shorten or lengthen the presumptive period of retroactivity. [8] in the courts below, it appears mr. colucci also sought rescission of all or part of his arrears on the basis of a current and ongoing inability to pay. applications of this kind require a different analysis. in these cases, the court order or agreement reflects the correct amount of child support owing, but the payor has failed to keep up with payments as they fell due. the payor subsequently asks the court to forgive all or part of the accrued debt because of present financial hardship. when the arrears reflect the amount that ought to have been paid, the payor cannot rely on a past decrease in income to explain why there are arrears. in these cases, there is a presumption against rescinding any part of the arrears, as courts have a range of other remedial options. rescission sits at the far end of the range because it wipes out a legally recognized debt. as such, rescission is only appropriate in exceptional circumstances such circumstances may arise where full disclosure of the payor’s financial circumstances shows that the payor is unable to pay the arrears and will be unable to pay in the future, even with a flexible payment plan. [9] in these reasons, i will set out the foundational principles established by the guidelines and dbs, followed by a discussion of the centrality of financial disclosure to the child support regime against this backdrop, i will explain the framework courts ought to apply to determine when to retroactively reduce child support under s 17 of the divorce act. in doing so, i will reconcile the divergent lines of authority on the applicability of the contextual dbs factors. finally, i will set out the analysis that applies where the payor seeks rescission of arrears based on current inability to pay rather than a past change in circumstances. applying the framework to the facts of this case, there is no reason for this court to intervene to reduce or forgive the debt accrued under the existing child support order. i would dismiss mr. colucci’s appeal. ii background [10] in 2016, mr. colucci applied to retroactively reduce child support and rescind arrears totalling approximately $170,000 at the time of the application. [11] the parties were married in 1983 and divorced in 1996 the order of mcmahon j., dated may 13, 1996 (“divorce order”), made on consent, provided that ms. colucci would have sole custody of the parties’ two daughters, aged 8 and 6 at the time, and required mr. colucci to pay child support of $115 per week per child (indexed) until they were no longer “child[ren] of the marriage”. the record does not show what mr. colucci’s income was at the time of the order, but the amount of child support was negotiated taking into account that ms. colucci forewent any claim to spousal support. one year after the order was made, the guidelines came into force. [12] in april 1998, mr. colucci contacted ms. colucci through counsel to request a reduction in his child support obligations on the basis of a decrease in his income he provided no financial disclosure to support his request and the parties reached no agreement at that time. mr. colucci’s child support obligations ended in 2012, when the daughters were no longer children of the marriage. after that time, no further support payments accrued until he brought this application in 2016, mr. colucci took no further steps to vary the divorce order. [13] from 1998 to 2012, the period during which arrears accrued, mr. colucci was absent from the children’s lives and his whereabouts were unknown to ms. colucci and the children he made no voluntary child support payments and the family responsibility office (“fro”) was only able to collect limited sums through enforcement mechanisms from 1998 to 2016. enforcement action taken by the fro includes garnishment of mr. colucci’s workplace safety and insurance board payments and federal income tax refunds, the suspension of his driver’s license and canadian passport, the issuance of a writ of seizure and sale, and reporting to the credit bureau. [14] mr. colucci commenced a motion to change in november 2016. he sought orders retroactively varying child support to the date the guidelines came into force (may 1, 1997) and “[f]ixing the arrears of child support if any and determining the payments on those arrears in accordance with [his] income” (ar, vol. ii, at p 4). he also asked that “any arrears of support . . . not only be fixed but that the payments on those arrears be fixed in accordance with [his] ability to pay” (p 10). [15] in the course of these proceedings, mr. colucci eventually disclosed where he had been all these years. he said he moved to the united states in 2000 and worked there until 2005. he claims he earned approximately usd 25,000 annually during those years. in 2005, he returned to italy to care for his mother until her death in 2008. from 2005 to 2008, he states that he made between €3,000 and €4,000 per year, with the exception of 2007, when he made €19,000. soon after his mother’s death, he received an inheritance of €15,000. he said he lived on these funds until 2016, when he returned to canada. in 2016, mr. colucci received an additional €15,000 from the sale of his mother’s property he is entitled to a further €15,000 from the sale, which he was scheduled to receive on august 31, 2019. [16] mr. colucci provided little documentation or financial disclosure to support these claims. he relied largely on unsubstantiated assertions in his affidavit about where he worked and how much he was paid, making it extremely difficult to accurately determine his income for the relevant years. mr. colucci claims he is unable to provide tax returns for the years 2000 to 2015. he says he cannot obtain tax returns from the internal revenue service for the years he worked in the united states, in part because “[h]e does not have a canadian passport . . . and may be denied re-entry” if he attends in person to obtain the returns (ar, vol. ii, at p 59). he claims he worked for cash only between 2007 and 2015 and “did not file any income tax returns” (ibid). mr. colucci offers no other explanation for the absence of tax returns for these years. he explained that he did not file a tax return in 2017 because he did not want the authorities to garnish his tax refund. iii. judicial history a ontario superior court of justice, 2018 onsc 6627 (hockin j.) [17] in brief reasons, the motion judge held that a material change in circumstances occurred when the guidelines were adopted in may 1997, entitling mr. colucci to a retroactive adjustment of his child support obligation from that date forward. the motion judge relied on principles from corcios v. burgos, 2011 onsc 3326, at para. 40 (canlii), to impute income to mr. colucci based on ontario’s minimum wage for the two years before he went to the us and six of the years he spent in italy. however, the motion judge did not apply the factors set out in corcios for assessing whether a reduction of arrears is warranted. [18] after finding a material change in circumstances, the motion judge simply completed a mathematical calculation. based on the income attributed to mr. colucci for the years 1997 to 2012, the motion judge retroactively reduced mr. colucci’s child support obligations, effectively reducing the arrears owing from approximately $170,000 to $41,642. the motion judge found that this variation was warranted in order to bring the child support arrears in line with the principles stemming from the guidelines, in particular the table amounts (which were implemented one year after the divorce order), and to reflect changes in mr. colucci’s drop in income over the period when the arrears were accruing (paras. 14-15). [19] prospective payments against the arrears were fixed at $425 per month based on mr. colucci’s asserted current income. mr. colucci was also ordered to pay ms. colucci €15,000 upon receiving the funds from the sale of his mother’s house. he was scheduled to receive the funds on august 31, 2019. as of the date of the hearing before this court, this amount had yet to be paid to ms. colucci. [20] the motion judge made no reference to the dbs factors, referring to dbs only to note that “the so-called [three-year] rule does not apply” (para. 20). the “three-year rule” is a presumption established in dbs that a retroactive increase in support should extend no more than three years before the recipient gave formal notice of the application to vary under s 17 of the divorce act. the motion judge added that [t]his is not a retroactive support order but a case where arrears have accumulated and require adjustment. in any event, it would be wrong to limit the calculation in view of [mr. colucci’s] delinquency. [para. 20] b court of appeal, 2019 onca 561, 26 rfl (8th) 259 (brown, roberts and zarnett jja) [21] ms. colucci appealed the motion judge’s order on three grounds: (1) the motion judge failed to apply the principles on retroactive variation from dbs and gray v. rizzi, 2016 onca 152, 129 or (3d) 201, in order to evaluate whether it was appropriate to reduce the arrears in this case; (2) the motion judge failed to apply the three-year rule; and (3) the motion judge incorrectly imputed income to mr. colucci (para. 13). [22] speaking for the court, roberts ja found that, while the enactment of the guidelines constituted a change in circumstances, the motion judge erred in concluding that mr. colucci was entitled to a retroactive variation extending back to 1997 “as of right” (para. 14). the motion judge also erred in distinguishing dbs and failing to follow gray. roberts ja stated: while [dbs] involved an application for a retroactive increase in support, the factors articulated by the supreme court were intended to serve as general principles applicable, with appropriate adaptation, to retroactive support variations that would decrease the quantum of child support. [para. 15] [23] in line with these remarks, the ontario court of appeal in gray adapted the four dbs factors to applications to reduce or rescind child support arrears, along with the rule that variation should extend to the date of effective notice unless that date is more than three years before formal notice (ca reasons, at paras. 15-18). [24] roberts j.a noted that, given mr. colucci’s failure to make full and accurate financial disclosure, the court was unable to determine whether he sought relief based on a current inability to pay the arrears or a change in financial circumstances that affected his ability to meet his obligations as they came due. however, the outcome is the same in either scenario (para. 28). [25] with respect to the second scenario of changed circumstances based on decreased income, the motion judge ought to have applied the corcios/gray factors (ca reasons, at paras. 22-23). applying those factors, the court of appeal found that mr. colucci failed to “discharg[e] his onus to explain his significant failure to make support payments and his extraordinary delay in proceeding with his application to vary” (para. 31). his blameworthy conduct as a “recalcitrant payor” (para. 30) and in failing to produce documents and misrepresenting his mother’s estate, along with hardship experienced by his daughters (including considerable student debt), militated against varying the child support order more than three years from the date of effective notice, that is november 17, 2016, the commencement of the motion to change (paras. 27-32). as this date does not affect the amount of the accumulated arrears to 2012, no reduction in arrears was allowed (paras. 34-36). [26] further, the court of appeal noted that mr. colucci was in breach of his ongoing requirement to make full documentary and financial disclosure (at para. 32) and had failed to produce any reliable evidence of his inability to pay while arrears were accumulating (para. 31). iv. issues [27] this appeal raises two questions: first, what is the appropriate framework for deciding applications to retroactively reduce child support under s 17 of the divorce act, and second, what is the appropriate framework where the payor parent seeks to rescind child support arrears under s 17 based on current and ongoing inability to pay? v analysis [28] while children should be shielded from the economic consequences of divorce to the fullest extent possible, the federal child support regime contemplates that the family as a whole — including the child — will share the rising and falling fortunes of the payor parent, just as they would have before the separation because child support under the divorce act is tied to payor income and income tends to fluctuate, a child support order or agreement reflects a snapshot in time and is never final (dbs, at para. 64; dbs v srg, 2005 abca 2, 361 a.r 60 (“dbs (ca)”), at para. 100; brear v brear, 2019 abca 419, 97 alta l.r (6th) 1, at para. 20, per pentelechuk ja). various legal, administrative and consent-based mechanisms exist to periodically change child support orders to bring them in line with financial realities. [29] section 17 of the divorce act is one such mechanism. it provides that, on application, a court “may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, retroactively or prospectively, a support order or any provision of one” (s 17(1)(a)). as the wording indicates, s 17 confers wide discretion on the judge, who “may” — but is not required to — vary, rescind, or suspend an order into the future, the past, or both. the divorce act expressly confers such broad powers because wide judicial discretion is necessary to respond to the multiplicity of factual situations produced by human behaviour. [30] experience teaches that there are three main categories of claims for retroactive relief under s 17, each with its own particular set of considerations: 1 the recipient seeks to retroactively increase support because of a past change in circumstances, with the change usually being an increase in the payor’s income in such circumstances, the existing order or agreement underestimates the payor’s income. 2 the payor seeks a retroactive decrease in support because of a past change in circumstances. the paradigmatic change is a drop in income that impacts the payor’s ability to make payments as they come due in such circumstances, the existing order or agreement overestimates the payor’s income. 3 the payor seeks to rescind or suspend arrears because of current and future inability to pay rather than a past change in circumstances. [31] mr. colucci seeks two forms of relief under s 17. he invokes the second category when he asks this court to go back to the date the guidelines came into force in 1997 and reduce his support obligation to correspond to what he says his income was for each of the years during which child support was payable, up until 2012. in his motion to change and before the court of appeal, it appears that he also sought to rescind all or some of what he ought to have paid because he says he is unable to pay even a reduced amount. this falls within the third category of cases. [32] in this section, i start by setting out the basic principles of child support law established in the guidelines and dbs, which must underpin and inform the courts’ approach to variation of child support and rescission of arrears. it will become clear from this discussion that the linchpin holding the child support regime together is financial disclosure. as such, before turning to the applicable framework under s 17, i will elaborate on the importance of disclosure, a theme that will run throughout the analysis that follows. a foundational principles in the guidelines and dbs. [33] child support under the divorce act is determined in accordance with the guidelines, which are legally binding as subordinate legislation enacted pursuant to s 26.1 of the divorce act. the guidelines establish the goals, principles and provisions which govern all child support applications and determinations under the divorce act. section 1 of the guidelines sets out four overarching objectives that must be borne in mind in any child support proceeding in which the guidelines apply: (a) to establish a fair standard of support for children that ensures that they continue to benefit from the financial means of both spouses after separation; (b) to reduce conflict and tension between spouses by making the calculation of child support orders more objective; (c) to improve the efficiency of the legal process by giving courts and spouses guidance in setting the levels of child support orders and encouraging settlement; and (d) to ensure consistent treatment of spouses and children who are in similar circumstances. [34] the enactment of the guidelines in 1997 marked a paradigm shift in canadian child support law away from a need-based approach to one which clearly established the child’s entitlement to support commensurate with the payor’s income (dbs, at paras. 42-45). the guidelines rest on the principle that “spouses have a joint financial obligation to maintain the children of the marriage in accordance with their relative abilities to contribute to the performance of that obligation” (divorce act, s 261(2)). section 3 of the guidelines provides that the amount of child support is presumptively determined in accordance with the applicable table in schedule i. putting aside shared custody arrangements, the tables generally allow parents and courts to calculate the amount of child support owing based on just two numbers: the payor’s income, and the number of children to be supported. (for s 7 expenses under the guidelines, the income of the recipient is also relevant.) the amount of child support is determined based solely on parental income and not the child’s needs (unless the payor’s income is over $150,000) (s 4). [35] all provinces and territories have an equivalent to the guidelines or have adopted the federal guidelines for the purpose of determining child support under provincial family law legislation. of course, the provinces are free to depart from the approach in the federal guidelines, as child support that is not incidental to divorce falls within provincial competence (dbs, at paras. 49 and 53). [36] building on the sea change initiated by the guidelines, dbs was a landmark decision in which the court considered four cases involving applications by recipient parents for retroactive child support the court confirmed the long- established principles that support is the right of the child and that parents have a financial obligation to their children arising at birth and continuing after separation (dbs, at paras. 37-38; see also macminn v. macminn (1995), 174 ar 261 (ca), at para. 15; hunt v. smolis-hunt, 2001 abca 229, 97 alta. lr (3d) 238, at para. 17; paras v. paras, [1971] 1 or 130 (ca), at p 134). the court also explained that, in the guidelines era, the payor parent is always under a free-standing legal obligation — independent of any court order — to pay child support commensurate with income (dbs, at para. 68). [37] prior to dbs, some courts had yet to move away from the judicial reluctance to award retroactive support that characterized the pre-guidelines era in order to obtain retroactive support capturing the period before formal proceedings were commenced, the recipient parent generally had to show exceptional circumstances or, at the very least, “appropriate circumstances” (c. davies, “retroactive child support: the alberta trilogy” (2005), 24 cflq 1, at p 8; whitton v. shippelt, 2001 abca 307, 23 rfl (5th) 437, at para. 19). in dbs, the court took a decisive step into the guidelines era by emphasizing that retroactive child support awards “cannot simply be regarded as exceptional orders to be made in exceptional circumstances” (para. 5). when the payor’s income rises but they continue to pay in accordance with an existing court order, they fall short of meeting the free-standing legal obligation to pay support commensurate with income. dbs confirmed that a retroactive increase of support in such circumstances is therefore “not truly retroactive”; rather, it “enforce[s] an obligation that should have been fulfilled already” (paras. 67-68; see also para. 69). [38] the majority in dbs found that a retroactive increase in support will not always be appropriate (para. 95). the court must exercise its discretion to determine whether a retroactive award should be given at all, and how far back it should extend. justice bastarache set out four factors to guide the courts’ discretion: (a) the recipient’s delay in seeking retroactive support; (b) the payor’s conduct; (c) the child’s circumstances; and (d) hardship entailed by a retroactive award. these factors were recently considered by this court in michel v. graydon, 2020 scc 24 (para. 29, per brown j.; paras. 111-26, per martin j). [39] where a retroactive increase in child support is appropriate, the majority in dbs suggested that the date of retroactivity should generally be the date of “effective notice” (para 118) “effective notice” in this context was said to simply require the recipient to “broac[h]” the subject of an increase in child support (para. 121) the majority of the court noted, however, that recipients should be encouraged to move discussions forward after giving effective notice. to that end, the majority concluded that retroactive awards should generally extend no further than three years before the date of formal notice. this is known as the “three-year rule”, although it is a presumption only. [40] in a significant caveat to these general rules, justice bastarache added that the date of the payor’s increase in income may sometimes be a more appropriate date of retroactivity, particularly where the payor engages in “blameworthy conduct” (para. 124). such conduct includes the payor’s failure to disclose material increases in income. at para. 124, bastarache j said: not disclosing a material change in circumstances — including an increase in income that one would expect to alter the amount of child support payable — is itself blameworthy conduct the presence of such blameworthy conduct will move the presumptive date of retroactivity back to the time when circumstances changed materially. a payor parent cannot use his/her informational advantage to justify his/her deficient child support payments. [41] since dbs, various courts have accepted and acted upon the principle that failing to disclose an increase in income is blameworthy conduct justifying variation to the date of the change (c (m.) v. o (j.), 2017 nbca 15, 93 rfl (7th) 59, at para. 37; goulding v. keck, 2014 abca 138, 42 rfl (7th) 259, at para. 44; brear, at para. 74, per pentelechuk ja;. burchill v roberts, 2013 bcca 39, 41 bclr (5th) 217, at paras. 29-30; greene v. greene, 2010 bcca 595, 12 bclr. (5th) 330, at para. 73; carlaw v carlaw, 2009 nssc 428, 299 nsr (2d) 1, at paras. 23-25; damphouse v damphouse, 2020 abqb 101, at para. 72 (canlii)). “blameworthy conduct”, as that concept has developed in the cases, does not simply extend to the most egregious cases of deception or intentional evasion, like this case. it may also extend to cases of mere passivity and “taking the path of least resistance” (burchill, at para. 30). [42] most recently, in michel, my colleague brown j (speaking for the court on this point) confirmed that “the date of effective notice is not relevant when a payor parent has engaged in blameworthy conduct (irrespective of the degree of blameworthiness)”, including failure to disclose material information (para. 36; see also para. 33) payor parents are “subject to a duty of full and honest disclosure” (para. 33) where the payor fails to comply with this duty and leaves the recipient unaware of increases in income, a retroactive award “will commonly be appropriate” because non-disclosure “eliminates any need to protect [the payor’s] interest in the certainty of his [or her] child support obligations” (paras. 32 and 34). [43] in practice, then, the date of retroactivity is frequently adjusted to align with the date of the material increase in income, despite the “general rule” of varying to the date of effective notice in dbs (para. 118). it would be “untenable to suggest that a parent who fails to provide financial disclosure can assume that the amount being provided is adequate because the recipient parent has not brought a court application” (brear, at para. 74, per pentelechuk ja). further, even where the payor has disclosed increases in income, the dbs factors may support extending a retroactive increase of support back to the time of the change in income. [44] in settling on the date of effective notice as the “general rule”, dbs. represented a kind of compromise between the pre-guidelines world — with its payor- focused concepts of laches and hoarding — and the child-centered era of the guidelines. in the pre-guidelines era, notice was considered important because it was viewed as unfair to surprise payors with a retroactive award when they could not know the extent of their child support obligation until it was determined by the court (dbs. (ca), at para. 79). after the guidelines became law, parents knew about the existence and extent of their obligations, but courts continued to show reluctance to grant retroactive awards and pre-guidelines concepts like notice and laches retained some influence this background helps explain the majority’s wariness in dbs about changing the rules for payors mid-stream. since dbs, however, expectations of and for payors have evolved. the guidelines and s 17 of the divorce act are clear and dbs itself gave notice to payor parents that they must pay more support as income rises and that this obligation may be enforced after the fact. [45] in light of the existing approach to blameworthy conduct and the pervasiveness of non-disclosure, it may be necessary in a future case to revisit the presumptive date of retroactivity in cases where the recipient seeks a retroactive variation to reflect increases in the payor’s income. a presumption in favour of varying support to the date of the increase would better reflect the recipient’s informational disadvantage and remove any incentive for payors to withhold disclosure or underpay support in the hopes that the status quo will be maintained. such a presumption would accord with other core principles of child support and reinforce that payors share the burden of ensuring the child receives the appropriate amount of support. [46] in dbs, the court also drew attention to three interests which must be balanced to achieve a fair result in retroactive variation cases: first and foremost, the child’s interest in receiving the appropriate amount of support to which they are entitled; second, the interest of the parties and the child in certainty and predictability; and third, the need for flexibility to ensure a just result in light of fluctuations in payor income (dbs, at paras. 2, 74 and 96; see also templeton v. nuttall, 2018 onsc 815, at para. 43 (canlii); contino v. leonelli-contino, 2005 scc 63, [2005] 3 scr 217, at para. 33) the child’s interest in a fair standard of support commensurate with income is the core interest to which all rules and principles must yield. a fair result that adequately protects this interest will sometimes lean toward preserving certainty, and sometimes toward flexibility. [47] in addition to the fundamental principles established in the guidelines and dbs, any framework for decreased child support must account for the informational asymmetry between the parties and the resulting need for full and frank disclosure of the payor’s income. it is to this point which i now turn. b encouraging timely and full disclosure [48] after applying the guidelines and dbs for many years, it has become clear just how much the child support system, including s 17 variations, depends upon adequate, accurate and timely financial disclosure. the centrality of disclosure in child support matters has been recognized in a rich body of jurisprudence both before and after dbs (see, eg,. shamli v. shamli, 2004 canlii 45956 (ont. scj), at para. 8; hietanen v. hietanen, 2004 bcsc 306, 7 rfl (6th) 67, at para. 11; gray, at para. 63; mkr v. jar, 2015 nbca 73, 443 nbr (2d) 313, at paras. 14 and 20; francis v. terry, 2004 nsca 118, 227 nsr (2d) 99, at para. 9; goulding, at para. 44). simply stated, disclosure is the linchpin on which fair child support depends and the relevant legal tests must encourage the timely provision of necessary information. [49] the pivotal role of disclosure comes as no surprise since the premise underlying the guidelines “is that the support obligation itself should fluctuate with the payor parent’s income” (dbs, at para. 45) the structure of the guidelines thus creates an informational asymmetry between the parties. in a system that ties support to payor income, it is the payor who knows and controls the information needed to calculate the appropriate amount of support. the recipient does not have access to this information, except to the extent that the payor chooses or is made to share it. it would thus be illogical, unfair and contrary to the child’s best interests to make the recipient solely responsible for policing the payor’s ongoing compliance with their support obligation. [50] this is why frank disclosure of income information by the payor lies at the foundation of the child support regime in roberts v. roberts, 2015 onca 450, 65 rfl (7th) 6, the court of appeal described the duty to disclose financial information as “[t]he most basic obligation in family law” (para. 11). a payor’s failure to make timely, proactive and full disclosure undermines the policies underlying the family law regime and “the processes that have been carefully designed to achieve those policy goals” (leitch v. novac, 2020 onca 257, 150 or (3d) 587, at para. 44). without proper disclosure, the system simply cannot function and the objective of establishing a fair standard of support for children that ensures they benefit from the means of both parents will be out of reach (michel, at para. 32, per brown j.; brear, at para. 19, per pentelechuk ja). [51] full and frank disclosure is also a precondition to good faith negotiation. without it, the parties cannot stand on the equal footing required to make informed decisions and resolve child support disputes outside of court promoting proactive payor disclosure thus advances the objectives — found in s 1 of the guidelines — of reducing conflict between the parties and encouraging settlement. [52] in line with these realities, courts have increasingly recognized that the payor’s duty to disclose income information is a corollary of the legal obligation to pay support commensurate with income (brear, at paras. 19 and 69, per pentelechuk ja;. roseberry v roseberry, 2015 abqb 75, 13 alta l.r (6th) 215, at para. 63; cunningham v seveny, 2017 abca 4, 88 rfl (7th) 1, at paras. 21 and 26) as explained by brown j., speaking for the full court in michel, payor parents “are subject to a duty of full and honest disclosure — a duty comparable to that arising in matrimonial negotiations” (para. 33, referencing rick v brandsema, 2009 scc 10, [2009] 1 scr 295, at paras. 47-49). courts and legislatures have also implemented various mechanisms to incentivize and even require regular ongoing disclosure of updated income information by the payor, along with tools to move proceedings forward in the face of non-disclosure. those mechanisms include imputing income to payors who have failed to make adequate disclosure, striking pleadings, drawing adverse inferences, and awarding costs. by encouraging timely disclosure, these tools reduce the likelihood that the recipient will be forced to apply to court multiple times to secure disclosure. [53] following dbs, lawyers and courts also began implementing “proactive strategies to avoid tedious and conflicting arguments related to ‘asking versus telling’ about income increases”, such as the use of mandatory annual disclosure obligations in child support orders in alberta and ontario (m. l. gordon, “an update on retroactive child and spousal support: five years after s (db) v. g (sr)” (2012), 31 cflq. 71, at p 72; see also sawatzky v. sawatzky, 2018 mbca 102, 428 dlr (4th) 247, at para. 58; roseberry, at para. 64). in ontario, the legislature has echoed this trend by amending the guidelines to include a requirement that payors disclose income information annually without the requirement of a request from the recipient (child support guidelines, o. reg. 391/97, s 241(1)). similarly, in british columbia, s 5(1) of the family law act, sbc 2011, c 25, imposes a general duty to disclose “full and true information” for the purpose of resolving family law disputes. [54] in keeping with these developments, the exercise of judicial discretion and the setting of legal standards under s 17 of the divorce act must encourage financial disclosure and in no way reward those who improperly withhold, hide or misrepresent information they ought to have shared. proactive disclosure of changes in income is the first step to ensuring that child support obligations are tied to payor income as it fluctuates inadequate disclosure breeds “a backlog of [retroactive] support applications” (roseberry, at para. 61). indeed, with full, frank and regular disclosure, long-term arrears — such as mr. colucci’s — should be rare. c. the applicable framework [55] in building a framework for the variation of child support and the rescission of arrears, judicial discretion must be structured to safeguard the child’s interest in receiving the appropriate amount of support to which they are entitled. alongside this paramount interest, there must be a fair balancing of certainty and flexibility to reach a just result in light of fluctuations in payor income and the particular circumstances of each case. in addition, the framework under s 17 must promote the timely disclosure of accurate information, which in turn encourages equal bargaining and fair settlements, as the payor parent “holds the cards” when it comes to child support (michel, at para. 32, per brown j). above all, “the ultimate goal must be to ensure that children benefit from the support they are owed at the time when they are owed it. any incentives for payor parents to be deficient in meeting their obligations should be eliminated” (dbs, at para. 4). payors should not be better off from a legal standpoint if they do not pay the child support the law says they owe. nor should payors receive any sort of benefit or advantage from failing to disclose their real financial situation or providing disclosure on the eve of the hearing. [56] based on these guiding principles, i will first set out the framework applicable to a payor’s application for a retroactive decrease in support based on a material change in circumstances. i will then explain the applicable framework where the payor seeks to rescind arrears based on present inability to pay rather than a past change in circumstances. (1) retroactive decreases where the prior order overestimates payor income [57] this category of cases covers situations in which the payor has experienced a material drop in income that affected their ability to make payments as they came due. the payor will argue that the recipient was in fact owed a lower amount under the guidelines than the amount payable under a pre-existing order or agreement, thus necessitating a recalculation of the amount owing for past years based on the payor’s actual income, the number of children to be supported in those years, and the table amounts decreased income is an all too common and unfortunate reality for many families any framework developed to accommodate retroactive variations of child support in response to decreased payor income must deal fairly with a wide range of factual situations, from payors who diligently paid the proper amount until they lost their employment or otherwise fell on hard times, to those who have made little effort to meet their responsibilities and are absent, intentionally underemployed or persistently delinquent. [58] in this section, i first discuss the threshold the payor must meet to access a retroactive decrease under s 17, namely the requirement of showing a change in circumstances that would justify varying the amount of child support. i then reconcile the divergent lines of authority about what happens when this threshold is met, settling on a presumption-based approach that leaves space for judicial discretion structured by the dbs factors under this approach, once the payor has met the threshold of showing a change in circumstances, a presumption is triggered in favour of varying support back to the date of effective notice, up to three years before formal notice. i explain what effective notice means and why it is an appropriate presumptive date in this category of case. i then discuss how the dbs factors can be adapted to retroactive decreases in deciding whether to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity. finally, i address quantum, the final stage of the analysis, which requires the court to calculate the proper amount of support in accordance with the guidelines. (a) the threshold requirement of a change in circumstances [59] like any applicant seeking a retroactive variation under s 17 of the divorce act, a payor seeking a downward retroactive change must first show a past change in circumstances, as required under s 17(4). section 14 of the guidelines lists situations constituting a change in circumstances for the purpose of s 17(4) of the divorce act, including the coming into force of the guidelines (s 14(c)). a change in circumstances could also include a change that, if known at the time, would probably have resulted in different terms, such as a drop in income (guidelines, s 14(a); willick v. willick, [1994] 3 scr 670, at p 688; gray, at para. 39). [60] the onus is on the party seeking a retroactive decrease to show a change in circumstances (punzo v. punzo, 2016 onca 957, 90 rfl (7th) 304, at para. 26; templeton, at para. 33) in some cases that may be relatively straightforward: for example, establishing that the children are no longer legally entitled to support because they are no longer children of the marriage. [61] most commonly, the retroactive variation claim will be based on a material change in income to meet the threshold, a decrease in income must be significant and have some degree of continuity, and it must be real and not one of choice (willick, at pp. 687-88; earle v earle, 1999 canlii 6914 (bcsc), at para. 27; maccarthy v. maccarthy, 2015 bcca 496, 380 bcac 102, at para. 58, citing earle; lmp v. ls, 2011 scc 64, [2011] 3 scr 775, at para. 33; gray, at para. 39; brown v. brown, 2010 nbca 5, 353 nbr (2d) 323 (“brown”), at para. 2; templeton, at para. 35) trivial or short-lived changes are insufficient to justify a variation (templeton, at para. 35). in this way, the threshold inquiry preserves some sense of certainty and predictability for the parties and the child, while allowing some flexibility in response to changes in the payor’s income. [62] the payor must have disclosed sufficient reliable evidence for the court to determine when and how far their income fell, and to ascertain whether the change was significant, long lasting, and not one of choice a decision to retroactively decrease support can only be made based on “reliable, accurate and complete information” (earle, at para. 28). the payor cannot ask the court to make findings on income that are contrary to the recipient’s interests “while at the same time shielding information that is relevant to the determination of their income behind a protective wall” (templeton, at para. 67; see also tougher v tougher, 1999 abqb 552, at paras. 14-15 (canlii); terry, at para. 9). [63] of course, a payor whose income was originally imputed because of an initial lack of disclosure cannot later claim that a change in circumstances occurs when he or she subsequently produces proper documentation showing the imputation was higher than the table amount for their actual income. the payor cannot rely on their own late disclosure as a change in circumstances to ground a variation order (gray, at paras. 33-34). this would “defeat the purpose of imputing income in the first place” and act as “a disincentive for payors to participate in the initial court process” (trang v. trang, 2013 onsc 1980, 29 rfl (7th) 364, at para. 53). (b) reconciling divergent authorities on the application of dbs. [64] assuming the threshold of a change in circumstances is met, the parties disagree on two crucial questions: how to decide whether retroactive relief should be granted in the first place, and how far back a court should go when varying a previously ordered amount. [65] to answer these questions, each party relies on one of two divergent lines of authority in the post-dbs jurisprudence concerning retroactive decreases in child support mr. colucci says the payor who satisfies the threshold is entitled to a retroactive decrease without any consideration of contextual factors. this reflects the approach taken in brown. in brown, the new brunswick court of appeal concluded that dbs does not apply to arrears at all, given bastarache j.’s comments at paras. 1 and 98 of dbs (discussed below). under the brown test, the court considers only whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the original order was made and, if so, what the proper amount of child support should have been under the guidelines. as such, the brown test is a “no-fault” test (mw v. kt, 2019 nlsc 14, 19 rfl (8th) 51, at para. 43). [66] ms. colucci relies on the corcios/gray line of authority, in which the contextual dbs factors have been adapted to suit applications to retroactively decrease support. under the corcios/gray framework, the court may consider these factors in deciding whether a retroactive decrease is appropriate, in setting the date of retroactivity, and sometimes in setting the amount to be paid (gray, at para. 60; templeton, at paras. 49-50). mirroring dbs, the corcios/gray approach establishes a general rule in favour of varying back to the date that the payor gave the recipient effective notice of their intention to seek a decrease based on changed circumstances, up to a presumptive maximum of three years before the date of formal notice (gray, at para. 61). the court of appeal followed the corcios/gray approach in the case at bar. [67] in my view, both lines of authority have something to offer. brown offers simplicity and predictability. however, it ignores the interest of the recipient and child in certainty and does nothing to encourage the payor to disclose changes in income to the recipient further, the brown framework is inconsistent with the discretionary language of s 17 of the divorce act, which provides that the court “may” retroactively vary a support order. on the brown approach, the court must vary the order once the payor has established a change in circumstances, and must vary back to the date of the change. the brown framework also makes it much easier for a payor parent to obtain a retroactive decrease than it is for a recipient to obtain a retroactive increase, a shortcoming that is even more unfair when considered in light of the recipient’s informational disadvantage. this undermines the objective in s 1 of the guidelines of ensuring consistent treatment of spouses in similar circumstances. these are serious limitations which stand in the way of a fair resolution on the facts of each case. [68] the corcios/gray framework mitigates these limitations by adapting dbs to the decrease context, in terms of both focusing on the date of effective notice as the default date of retroactivity and leaving room to shift the date of retroactivity based on contextual factors. the problem, however, is that gray directs the court to consider multiple factors over three different questions (whether a retroactive order is appropriate, how far back it should extend, and what the quantum should be) (gray, at para. 60) the result is often confusion and undue complexity: the questions are mingled, the factors become muddled and the layering of discretion over multiple steps of the analysis means that predictability and transparency are sacrificed this complexity makes the framework less useful for family law litigants who are increasingly self-represented (morwald-benevides v. benevides, 2019 onca 1023, 148 or (3d) 305, at para. 19). [69] a framework that involves the application of multi-factoral discretion at multiple steps of the analysis is also less useful as an anchor for negotiations and settlement of child support matters there is a trend in family law away from an adversarial culture of litigation to a culture of negotiation (see, eg,. d. martinson and m jackson, “family violence and evolving judicial roles: judges as equality guardians in family law cases” (2017), 30 can j fam l 11, at p 22; d. m. sowter, “advocacy in non-adversarial family law: a recommendation for revision to the model code” (2018), 35 windsor yb. access just. 401, at p 402; p. j. dalphond and a. nag, “enfin une réforme de la loi sur le divorce” (2019), 78 r. du b 255, at pp. 312 et seq). not only is encouraging settlement one of the objectives of the guidelines, but recent amendments to the divorce act reflect this shift by requiring parties, where appropriate, to try to resolve family law disputes through family dispute resolution processes (s 73). parents should be encouraged — absent family violence or significant power imbalances — to resolve their disputes themselves outside the court structure and legal rules should be clear and accessible so they may reach fair agreements. reaching a negotiated settlement not only saves resources but also reduces the need for future court applications by setting up a less acrimonious relationship between the parties (n. bala, “reforming family dispute resolution in ontario: systemic changes and cultural shifts”, in m. trebilcock, a. duggan and l. sossin, eds., middle income access to justice (2012), 271, at pp. 286- 87). [70] to support a culture of negotiation, the framework under s 17 of the divorce act must provide parties with a foundation for their efforts to resolve the matter themselves a framework that promotes timely disclosure and structures judicial discretion through clear and simple presumptions will provide a solid starting point for negotiation between the parties. [71] there is thus merit in a simplified framework which takes the benefits of brown and corcios/gray but removes their drawbacks. to advance clarity, simplicity and predictability, the analysis should be focused on a single presumption regarding the date of retroactivity. once the applicant establishes a change in circumstances, a presumption is triggered that support will be varied back to a certain date (ie, effective notice, up to three years before formal notice). the dbs factors are then concentrated on one question: should the court depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity to achieve a fair result? it is on this question only that the factors of delay, payor conduct, the child’s circumstances and potential hardship are brought to bear. [72] it is therefore no longer necessary to first ask whether retroactive relief is warranted as a general proposition, with contextual factors guiding both this preliminary inquiry and the question of how far back retroactive relief should go. already in the jurisprudence, this preliminary question has often been blurred with the question of the timing of any retroactive order, casting doubt on the utility of inquiring first into the general appropriateness of retroactive relief. for example, even though the analytical framework in corcios called for a separate step of asking whether retroactive relief is appropriate in the first place, the court did not separate out this preliminary question from the inquiry into how far back retroactive relief should extend. moving directly to a presumptive date simplifies the analysis and enhances fairness and predictability for the parties. [73] to ensure consistency and even-handedness, this same presumption-based approach should be applied in all retroactive variation contexts, including where the recipient applies under s 17 for a retroactive increase. it would not be fair if payors claiming a decrease benefit from a presumption that is unavailable to recipients claiming an increase, especially when applications to retroactively reduce support will often be countered by an application for a retroactive increase in the same proceeding, or vice versa. a recipient is thus no longer required to demonstrate as a preliminary matter that a retroactive award is appropriate based on the dbs factors once an increase in the payor’s income has been shown, the only question is how far back retroactive support should extend no injustice arises if the inquiry into the general appropriateness of retroactive child support is omitted, as any fears that payors will be taken by surprise by ex post changes are fully answered by the express reference to retroactive variations in the wording of s 17, the way the guidelines work, and the fact that the court’s reasons in dbs were given over fifteen years ago. [74] thus, where a past material change in the payor’s income is established, the amount set out in the child support order no longer reflects the content of the payor’s legal obligation to pay support in line with the table amounts. the only question is what remedy flows from this legal fact. in the decrease context, the presumption of varying back to the date of effective notice, up to three years before formal notice, assists the court in answering this question it will still be true under this approach that not all applications will lead to retroactive variation, but the focus will be on whether a material change in circumstances has been proven and the date to which a retroactive variation should extend. [75] this means i reject mr. colucci’s argument, based on brown, that the dbs factors have no role in retroactive decrease applications he submits that para. 98 of dbs is binding authority establishing that the dbs factors do not apply to arrears. at para. 98, bastarache j wrote: . . these factors are not meant to apply to circumstances where arrears have accumulated. in such situations, the payor parent cannot argue that the amounts claimed disrupt his/her interest in certainty and predictability; to the contrary, in the case of arrears, certainty and predictability militate in the opposite direction there is no analogy that can be made to the present cases. [76] in my view, this passage does not support the proposition that the dbs. factors are wholly irrelevant where the payor seeks a retroactive decrease based on a change in circumstances rather, bastarache j was pointing out that the balance between certainty and flexibility is very different as between the increase and decrease categories of cases those interests will pull in different directions depending on whether the recipient or the payor seeks to retroactively vary support. this is a point that bears further elucidation, as it will be relevant to the way effective notice is defined in the increase and decrease contexts. [77] on an application for a retroactive increase, the recipient seeks the flexibility of a retroactive award to capture the payor’s increased income and secure payment of child support in the correct amount. it is the payor who has some interest in the certainty and predictability supplied by an existing court order or agreement (dbs, at para. 63) however, this certainty interest is heavily qualified by the guidelines-era principle that more income means more support the payor cannot reasonably expect their child support obligations to remain static in the face of material increases in income. given the structure of the guidelines, the only real “certainty” in the face of fluctuating income is that the payor is responsible for paying the table amount based on actual income. further, a payor who has fallen into arrears cannot resist a retroactive increase based on their interest in certainty, as the payor cannot claim they relied on the order in arranging their affairs (gray, at para. 51; maceachern v. bell, 2019 onsc 4720, 33 rfl (8th) 68, at para. 89). [78] conversely, in a claim for a retroactive decrease, as indicated in dbs, at para. 98, the interest in certainty lies with the recipient parent and child, while the interest in flexibility lies with the payor parent. under the guidelines, the payor is only responsible for child support commensurate with income, but a retroactive reduction in support means a disruption to the certainty enjoyed by the child and the recipient. the recipient is entitled to expect that the existing order will be complied with unless they are in receipt of reasonable proof that a relevant change in the payor’s circumstances has occurred. again, the payor holds the relevant information and knows when there has been a decrease in income it is in the payor’s own best interest to use this knowledge to notify the recipient of the change in circumstances and take steps to formally vary a child support order. [79] in my view, the role of para. 98 of dbs is to capture these salient differences which demand a distinct balancing of interests in retroactive decrease and increase cases paragraph 98 does not preclude this court from employing the four dbs factors, with necessary modification, as part of a unified framework to govern increase and decrease variation applications under s 17. indeed, there is good reason to do so, as the dbs factors will assist the court in weighing the equities and reaching a fair balancing of certainty, flexibility and the child’s right to support based on income. (c) the presumptive date of retroactivity [80] even before the dbs factors come into play, the choice of the presumptive date of retroactivity itself aims to reach a preliminary balancing of these competing interests although the general preference for effective notice as the presumptive date in increase cases may need to be revisited for the reasons previously stated, for retroactive decreases, this presumptive date properly reflects the recipient’s informational disadvantage and represents a fair balancing of certainty and flexibility. as such, once the payor establishes a change in circumstances, a presumption arises in favour of varying support to the date of effective notice, up to three years before formal notice. [81] in this section, i outline why this presumption strikes the right balance between relevant interests; what is meant by “effective notice” in decrease cases; the role of the three-year rule; and the appropriate date of retroactivity where the payor has not given effective notice. (i) the rationale for effective notice as the presumptive date of retroactivity in decrease cases [82] the presumption in decrease cases that support will be reduced back to the date of effective notice strikes a fair balance between the certainty interest of the child and recipient and the payor’s interest in flexibility. while recipients should be aware that support in the guidelines era varies with payor income, they are at an informational disadvantage the recipient is entitled to rely on the court order or agreement in the absence of proper communication and disclosure by the payor showing a decrease in income that is lasting and genuine (hgs v jrm, 2018 abqb 892, 16 rfl (8th) 404, at para. 87). as the court of appeal stated in this case, “the support amount provided for in the prior order or agreement will have formed a part of the recipient parent’s budget and the support recipient often will have undertaken financial obligations premised on the continuation of the support set out in the order” (para. 26). [83] a retroactive decrease will mean less funds, a possible set-off and even a repayment from the recipient to the payor. this in turn implicates and intensifies the certainty interest of the child and the recipient who have relied on the prior court order. it will generally be more difficult to adjust to the receipt of lesser, rather than greater amounts of support, increasing the likelihood and severity of hardship those with lower incomes will have less ability to absorb negative financial events. [84] the best interests of the child lie in predictability and stability of household finances. the guidelines contemplate that a drop in payor income may lead to a drop in the child’s standard of living, just as it would if the parents were still together. however, payors must promptly communicate such changes to the recipient, just as they would if the parents had not separated, and move to have the terms of the order or agreement changed to restore certainty to child support arrangements between the parties this ensures that the child is impacted as little as possible by the parents’ separation and continues to benefit from predictable and regular support from the payor parent. a drop in support can be presumed to have detrimental impacts on the child, but ongoing communication and disclosure cushions those impacts and preserves the child’s best interests to the fullest extent possible. for these reasons, in the absence of effective notice of a drop in payor income, certainty and predictability for the child are to be prioritized over the payor’s interest in flexibility. [85] the payor’s interest in flexibility comes to the forefront once effective notice is given (hgs, at para. 82). as such, by making the date of effective notice the presumptive date of retroactivity, the framework preserves ample flexibility for the payor. the presumption also provides payors with the certainty of knowing that any material change in income should be disclosed. not only is the payor the one who is aware of their financial situation, but they also control the date on which they disclose that information. the payor therefore has control over the date of notice and the date of retroactivity. (ii) effective notice [86] what qualifies as “effective notice” must be viewed in light of the information asymmetry between the parties and the way that certainty, flexibility and the child’s best interests play out in retroactive decrease cases. when a recipient seeks a retroactive increase, the court held in dbs that the recipient will have provided effective notice simply by broaching the topic of a potential increase (para. 121). this low bar was justified by the recipient’s informational disadvantage regardless of whether the recipient had given notice, the payor knew when their own income had increased and must be taken to know that more income means more support. [87] in the decrease context, by contrast, experience has shown that it is not enough for the payor to merely broach the subject of a reduction of support with the recipient. a payor seeking a retroactive decrease has the informational advantage. the presumptive date of retroactivity must encourage payors to communicate with recipients on an ongoing basis and move with reasonable dispatch to formalize a decrease through a court order or change to a pre-existing agreement. the timing and extent of disclosure will be a critical consideration in ascertaining whether and when effective notice has been given and determining whether to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity. [88] in decrease cases, therefore, courts have recognized that effective notice must be accompanied by “reasonable proof” that is sufficient to allow the recipient to “independently assess the situation in a meaningful way and respond appropriately” (gray, at para. 62, citing corcios, at para. 55; templeton, at para. 51). this ensures that effective notice provides a realistic starting point for negotiations and allows the recipient to adjust expectations, make necessary changes to lifestyle and expenditures, and make informed decisions (hrynkow v gosse, 2017 abqb 675, at para 13 (canlii); hodges v. hodges, 2018 abca 197, at para. 10 (canlii)). [89] in some cases, such as where the payor is incarcerated or suffers a serious health setback, clear communication may be sufficient to meet the requirements of effective notice in other cases, the payor may not have access to full income information at the time notice is given, but should provide proof of the change in circumstances by promptly obtaining and disclosing available documents, such as those demonstrating new employment, reduction of salary or termination of employment. even where a diligent payor believes in good faith that a decrease in income will be temporary, the most prudent course of action is nevertheless to communicate the change to the recipient and provide information which substantiates the claimed change in circumstance. [90] after communicating a change and providing available documents, a payor maintains “an ongoing obligation to engage in meaningful dialogue with the recipient, advise the recipient of changes in their circumstances that may impact their ability to pay support and voluntarily disclose pertinent information so that the recipient can continue to independently assess the situation and react appropriately” (templeton, at para. 52). failure to do so may impact the period of retroactivity when the court applies the discretionary dbs factors. further, effective notice of an initial change in income will not amount to effective notice of subsequent changes (corcios, at para. 55). (iii) the three-year rule [91] even where the payor has given proper effective notice, the period of retroactivity is presumed to extend no further than three years before the date of formal notice. this three-year presumptive rule was established by the majority in dbs to incentivize recipients seeking a retroactive variation to move discussions forward and to protect the payor’s certainty interests (para. 123). [92] this three-year rule has been applied for parallel reasons in the retroactive decrease context, as it was by the court of appeal in this case (para. 27; see also corcios, at para. 55; gray, at para. 61; hgs, at paras. 94-95 and 105-8) the informational asymmetry between the parties means the recipient will often lack the requisite information to know whether the change in circumstances communicated by the payor at the time of effective notice continues to reflect the payor’s situation. thus, a lengthy “period of inactivity after effective notice may indicate that the [recipient] parent’s reasonable interest in certainty has returned” (dbs, at para. 123). the longer the delay, the greater the recipient’s reliance on and certainty interest in the unchallenged order (brown v barber, 2016 abqb 687, 85 rfl (7th) 401 (“barber”), at para. 35). [93] the presumptive three-year limit allows the parties time to negotiate but recognizes that the payor must commence proceedings in a timely manner if negotiations fail in order to protect the certainty interests of the child and recipient (corcios, at para. 55). payors should not be encouraged to wait until an enforcement agency takes steps to enforce an order to bring an application to vary. further, as the interveners west coast legal education and action fund association and the women’s legal education and action fund inc. point out, given the pervasiveness of deficient disclosure in family law, recipients may often have good reason to doubt the adequacy of disclosure provided with effective notice resulting disputes about disclosure and payor income can only be resolved through formal proceedings, and those proceedings must be commenced in a timely manner to restore certainty to child support arrangements between the parties. [94] the presumptive three-year limit is also justified by evidentiary concerns. reliable evidence is required to determine the payor’s income. the best evidence of income or ability to earn income is generally more readily available closer to the time that the income is earned (janik v. drotlef, 2018 oncj 287, at para. 230 (canlii)). if the payor delays in bringing an application, it may be more difficult to produce reliable and full documentation on income. this leaves recipients and courts to bridge the gaps through guesswork, adverse inferences and the imputation of income timely disclosure and applications to vary must be incentivized to preserve procedural fairness to the recipient and ensure the court has access to the information necessary to determine whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and to quantify support. three years provide ample time. the legislature could step in to address these concerns by imposing a presumptive limitation period of a longer or shorter duration. for example, in quebec, “in no case where the arrears claimed have been due for over six months may the debtor be released from payment of them unless he shows that it was impossible for him to exercise his right to obtain a review of the judgment fixing the support” (civil code of québec, art. 596 para. 2). (iv) where no effective notice given [95] where no effective notice was given before proceedings were commenced, the start date of the variation will generally be the date of formal notice. however, this result is not automatic. disclosure remains a relevant factor. for instance, if three years have elapsed since a motion to change was served on the recipient, but full and frank disclosure is only provided on the eve of the hearing, the payor parent generally should not benefit from a decrease for the period between the date of formal notice and the time of disclosure. payors should not be rewarded for breaching disclosure obligations in the guidelines, the rules of court, and other legislation slipshod or misleading disclosure deprives the parties of an opportunity to negotiate between the date of formal notice and the hearing however, if the payor can show a good reason for delayed disclosure, the court may vary back to the date of formal notice despite the delay. payors facing such difficulties must be prepared to adduce evidence of their efforts to obtain the relevant documents in a timely fashion. (d) discretion to depart from the presumption: the four dbs. factors [96] the court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair in the circumstances of a particular case. in this section, i explore how the dbs factors — adapted to suit the retroactive decrease context — help the court reach a fair balancing of the three interests at play, namely the child’s interest in a fair standard of support, the payor’s interest in flexibility, and the interest of the child and recipient in certainty. there is no fixed formula; none of the factors is determinative and they must be viewed holistically (dbs, at para. 99). (i) understandable reason for the delay [97] the first factor is whether the payor has an understandable reason for the delay in giving effective notice or seeking relief in the courts. judges are well placed to assess whether the reasons proffered for the delay explain the extent of the payor’s inactivity where the payor has such a reason, fairness may militate in favour of extending the date of retroactivity to a time before the date of effective notice or not applying the three-year limit. [98] understandable reasons for delay may include health problems or other difficulties that prevent the payor from confronting the situation, or an unwillingness to disrupt a fragile parent-child relationship (d. smith, “retroactive child support — an update” (2007), 26 cflq 209, at p 239). the payor may also lack the financial or emotional wherewithal to proceed with the matter (brown, at para. 34). [99] in some cases, the recipient’s conduct may be at play, such as where the recipient threatens to withhold access or uses other tactics to discourage the payor from applying to reduce support. to ensure the child’s best interests are protected, recipient conduct is only a significant factor where the recipient is aware of the change in the payor’s circumstances and has therefore been able to plan for a possible reduction in support. courts must also be cautious to distinguish bad faith on the part of the recipient from situations where recipient conduct results from safety concerns arising from a history of family violence. [100] the recipient’s delay in enforcing arrears is irrelevant to the analysis (haisman v. haisman (1994), 157 ar 47 (ca), at para. 46; templeton, at para. 48). courts must bear in mind that child support arrears are a debt. under general principles of debtor-creditor law, the debtor is required to seek out and pay the creditor, and debts are not forgiven by the mere passage of time in the absence of a statutory limitation period (brown, at para. 33). (ii) the payor’s conduct [101] the second factor is the payor’s conduct. blameworthy conduct is conduct that has “the effect of privileging [the payor’s] interests over the child’s right to support” (goulding, at para. 44 (emphasis in original); see also dbs, at para. 106). the payor’s subjective intentions are rarely relevant (goulding, at para. 44). [102] the payor’s efforts to disclose and communicate will often be prominent considerations in assessing the payor’s conduct in the context of an application for a retroactive decrease of support. for example, if the payor provides effective notice but fails to communicate and disclose information on an ongoing basis after the date of effective notice, the payor’s silence may militate in favour of abbreviating the period of retroactivity. conversely, if more than three years have passed between the date of effective notice and the date of formal notice, the court might consider declining to apply the three-year rule if the payor has made ongoing efforts to disclose, communicate and engage in dialogue with the recipient. [103] the court may also consider whether the payor made voluntary payments against the arrears, continued to pay in accordance with their ability to pay, cooperated with enforcement agencies, and showed a willingness to support the child rather than evading child support obligations (see difrancesco v. couto (2001), 56 or (3d) 363 (ca), at para. 25). it should go without saying that a person who is subject to a child support order must “comply with the order until it is no longer in effect”, and this principle is now expressly enshrined in the divorce act “[f]or greater certainty” (s 75). genuine efforts to continue paying as much as the payor can will show good faith and a willingness to support the child. (iii) circumstances of the child [104] the circumstances of the child are the third factor if the child has experienced hardship or is currently in need, this factor militates in favour of a shorter period of retroactivity. [105] another relevant consideration is whether the retroactive decrease would result in an order requiring the recipient to repay support to remedy an overpayment. the framework under s 17 of the divorce act should not penalize payors for having continued to pay the full amount of support under an order or agreement after they experience a drop in income. however, reimbursement or set-off may cause hardship for the child and recipient. as such, where repayment is a possibility, it is even more important for the payor to give the recipient prompt notice of the decrease in their income — complete with disclosure enabling the recipient to meaningfully assess the extent of any potential future repayment — and move with reasonable diligence to seek a formal variation (corcios, at para. 55; gray, at para. 60; see also fleury v. fleury, 2009 abca 43, 448 ar 92, at para. 32). [106] in cases involving claims of overpayment, it will rarely be appropriate, given the recipient’s absence of knowledge, to retroactively decrease support to a date before the recipient could have expected that child support payments received from the payor might need to be repaid at some future date. this approach protects the child’s best interests and the recipient’s certainty interest, while allowing payors who have overpaid to seek a retroactive decrease as long as the recipient has been given proper notice and disclosure. (iv) hardship [107] the final factor is hardship to the payor if the period of retroactivity is not lengthened beyond the presumptive date. the payor must adduce evidence to “establish real facts” supporting a finding of hardship (goulding, at para. 57). bald assertions are not enough (ibid). the payor must also provide a complete picture of their financial situation, including income, assets and debts. for example, in this case, an assessment of hardship requires consideration of not only mr. colucci’s present income and future earning capacity, but also the funds he received from his mother’s estate and any other assets. [108] a showing of hardship will not automatically justify a departure from the presumed date of retroactivity. hardship carries much less weight where brought on by the payor’s own unreasonable failure to make proper disclosure and give notice to the recipient (dbs, at para. 116). hardship to the payor must also be viewed in the context of hardship to the recipient and child if the court were to extend the period of the retroactive decrease (goulding, at para. 56). it is a holistic and relative assessment (michel, at para. 100, per martin j). (e) quantum and terms of variation order [109] if retroactive variation is appropriate, quantum is governed by the statutory scheme that applies to the award (dbs, at para. 126) in this case, the guidelines apply in determining the quantum of support the guidelines leave some space for discretion, such as when there is undue hardship within the meaning of s 10. as in the prospective context, the court may also impute income under s 19 of the guidelines, such as where the payor has been intentionally under-employed or has unreasonably deducted expenses from income blameworthy conduct by the payor may be considered in setting interest or costs (michel, at para. 119, per martin j). [110] full and complete disclosure is required to quantify the appropriate amount of support for the period of retroactivity, just as it would be when quantifying prospective support (brown, at para. 20). the onus is on the payor to show the extent to which their income decreased during the period of retroactivity (templeton, at para. 65). if the payor fails to provide all relevant evidence required for the court to fully appreciate their true income during any part of the period of retroactivity, the court may draw an adverse inference against the payor (templeton, at para. 67). the payor must also make complete disclosure of their current financial circumstances if seeking a periodic payment plan or temporary suspension on hardship grounds. [111] finally, while the above framework facilitates fair resolution of disputes after the fact, parties, counsel and the courts should be mindful of best practices designed to obviate the need to resort to the courts. given the prevalence of fluctuating income, the preferred solution — absent family violence — is a yearly recalculation of child support based on disclosure of updated income some provinces offer an administrative recalculation service (see, eg,. family law act, rso 1990, c. f.3, s 39.1(2)) and/or free family mediation services if the parties cannot agree on a change in support following a change in the payor’s income (see, eg, family justice counsellors in british columbia: family law act, s 10). [112] where an application under s 17 of the divorce act has become necessary because the parties have not recalculated support regularly, courts should consider including a term in the order to obviate the need for future retroactive applications. the court might include an order requiring parties whose income is necessary to determine the amount of support to advise each other promptly of changes in income and to exchange the information listed in s 21(1) of the guidelines on an annual basis (see, eg,. corcios, at para. 76; burchill, at para. 64). the court might also consider a term providing that parties are to recalculate support on an annual basis and, if unable to agree, may apply to the court for a determination of the amount payable (dbs (ca), at para. 94; n. bakht et al., “dbs v. sgr:. promoting women’s equality through the automatic recalculation of child support” (2006), 18 cjwl 535, at p 556). (f) summary [113] to summarize, where the payor applies under s 17 of the divorce act to retroactively decrease child support, the following analysis applies: (1) the payor must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. the onus is on the payor to show a material decrease in income that has some degree of continuity, and that is real and not one of choice. (2) once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively decreasing child support to the date the payor gave the recipient effective notice, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. in the decrease context, effective notice requires clear communication of the change in circumstances accompanied by the disclosure of any available documentation necessary to substantiate the change and allow the recipient parent to meaningfully assess the situation. (3) where no effective notice is given by the payor parent, child support should generally be varied back to the date of formal notice, or a later date where the payor has delayed making complete disclosure in the course of the proceedings. (4) the court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. the dbs factors (adapted to the decrease context) guide this exercise of discretion. those factors are: (i) whether the payor had an understandable reason for the delay in seeking a decrease; (ii) the payor’s conduct; (iii) the child’s circumstances; and (iv) hardship to the payor if support is not decreased (viewed in context of hardship to the child and recipient if support is decreased). the payor’s efforts to pay what they can and to communicate and disclose income information on an ongoing basis will often be a key consideration under the factor of payor conduct. (5) finally, once the court has determined that support should be retroactively decreased to a particular date, the decrease must be quantified. the proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the guidelines. [114] it is also helpful to summarize the principles which now apply to cases in which the recipient applies under s 17 to retroactively increase child support: a) the recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances while the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. there is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers. b) once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. in the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor. c) where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice. d) the court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. the dbs factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in michel. if the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income. e) once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. the proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the guidelines. (g) application to the present case [115] support orders attract deference on appeal. absent an error or an extricable question of law, a palpable and overriding error, or a fundamental mischaracterization or misapprehension of the evidence, an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge’s exercise of discretion (brandsema, at para. 30). [116] in this case, i agree with the court of appeal that the motion judge erred in principle. instead of balancing the payor’s interest in flexibility against the interests of the child and recipient, the motion judge concluded that the coming into force of the guidelines was a change in circumstances that “entitled [mr. colucci] as of right to a variation and a calculation based on table amounts and his drop in income” (reasons of motion judge, at para. 15 (emphasis added)). while the motion judge did not have the benefit of these reasons, that conclusion was inconsistent with the principles underlying the guidelines and the framework set out above. [117] the motion judge was correct in concluding that the coming into force of the guidelines constituted a change in circumstances under s 14(c). while this legal change opens the door at the threshold step, it does not obviate the need for evidence of mr. colucci’s earnings in the years since the guidelines came into force. without reliable and complete income information, the court cannot recalculate support for the intervening years in accordance with the guidelines thus, mr. colucci’s failure to adduce adequate evidence of his income since 2000 is fatal to his application. even if he adduced sufficient evidence of his income from 1997 to 2000, the three-year rule applies, as discussed below. [118] aside from the coming into force of the guidelines, mr. colucci also relied on material decreases in his income after the guidelines came into force as a justification for retroactively decreasing the amount of support. to the extent he relies on drops in income, however, his deficient communication, inadequate evidence and insufficient disclosure are fatal to his application: not only has he not proven a decrease in income, he can point to no actions which qualify as effective notice. the court of appeal properly rejected the submission that his child support obligations should be retroactively varied to april 1998, when he asked ms. colucci through counsel for a reduction in the amount of child support payable because of an alleged decrease in his income. [119] it is not enough for a payor in mr. colucci’s shoes to advise the recipient that their income has fallen without taking any further steps. following ms. colucci’s refusal to vary support in 1998, mr. colucci “produced no proof of his changed financial circumstances, nor, after his initial request for a reduction in 1998, did he instigate any further negotiations, mediation or court proceedings” (c.a reasons, at para. 34) rather, he cut off communication and did nothing until commencing this proceeding in 2016. since mr. colucci did not provide reasonable proof to allow the recipient to meaningfully assess the situation, his request fell short of effective notice. further, the request in 1998 could not constitute notice of the more dramatic drops in his income after the initial request was made. a payor who experiences this kind of fluctuation in income must continue to communicate subsequent changes with proper disclosure to allow the recipient to plan accordingly. [120] as mr. colucci gave no effective notice before arrears stopped accumulating in 2012, the presumption set out above leads to the conclusion that he is not entitled to any retroactive decrease in his child support obligations even if mr. colucci had given effective notice in 1998, the presumptive three-year limit would apply. the application of the three-year rule would preclude any retroactive decrease, given that his children were no longer eligible for child support beginning in 2012 and he gave formal notice in 2016. nor would the application of the dbs factors support a longer period of retroactivity. indeed, had it been necessary to decide this point, all factors, particularly that of payor conduct, would support a shorter period of retroactivity. it is not enough for the payor to give notice and then disappear. the court of appeal correctly noted that, when the parties were unable to reach an agreement on a reduced amount of support, “it was incumbent on [mr. colucci] to initiate proceedings in a timely manner” (para. 34) instead, he “unreasonably failed to do anything for 18 years” (ibid). [121] mr. colucci claimed that he did not commence a motion in 1998 because he lacked the financial resources to do so. however, lack of funds cannot justify his failure to produce reasonable proof of the change in income he claimed at the time of his request, or his subsequent failure to communicate, negotiate or seek a change for 18 years. [122] mr. colucci also made few, if any, voluntary payments during that time and showed no willingness to support the children, who suffered hardship as a result of his failure to fulfill his obligations. his conduct shows bad faith efforts to evade the enforcement of a court order. he did not notify the recipient or the fro when he left canada or advise them of his whereabouts or income for the duration of his absence (c.a reasons, at para. 8) the fro took a number of steps that failed to spur mr. colucci to comply with his obligations voluntarily, including garnishing benefits and suspending his passport and driver’s license. the fro was only able to collect limited sums through these enforcement mechanisms ms. colucci was thus left to shoulder the financial burden of raising and supporting the children on her own (para. 30). the daughters also incurred considerable debt in pursuing post-secondary education (ibid). [123] mr. colucci turned his back on his support obligations and a court order when he cut off communication and “absconded without a trace to the united states and italy” (ca reasons, at para. 31). he only came out of hiding when he had returned to canada and was facing enforcement action by the fro, including potential garnishment of his wages. mr. colucci cannot now seek to avoid the consequences of his actions. to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity and grant a retroactive decrease in these circumstances would give tacit approval to this kind of conduct, contrary to the best interests of children. as carey j stated, mr. colucci’s “success at getting to the age of 62 without paying a dollar voluntarily . . . should not be rewarded” (colucci v. colucci, 2018 onsc 4868, at para. 4; see also paras. 2-3). [124] moreover, mr. colucci has continued to evade his child support obligations by misrepresenting his financial circumstances and breaching his ongoing obligation to make full documentary and financial disclosure, even in the course of these proceedings (ca reasons, at para. 32). as such, this case provides an example of the kind of inadequate disclosure that would justify a refusal to vary back to the date of formal notice. mr. colucci did not provide his tax returns or any other documentary evidence of income for the years 2000 to 2015, and most of the little disclosure he made was provided well after he commenced the motion to change. documentation regarding his mother’s estate was not produced until over a year later, and even then, the document was in italian only his income information for 2016 and 2017 was not provided until july 2018. in addition, mr. colucci redacted his employer’s name from his t4 and filed no tax return in 2017 to avoid garnishment of his wages and tax refund, preferring to forfeit the refund altogether than have it go toward his child support obligations. he also failed to pay ms. colucci the €15,000 that he was ordered to pay by the motion judge despite being in receipt of the earmarked funds from his mother’s estate. [125] a few words on the recalculation of support and imputation of income. mr. colucci argued that the motion judge must have been satisfied with the financial information before him, as he relied on this information in recalculating mr. colucci’s support obligation and in concluding that minimum wage should be imputed to mr. colucci in certain years due to under-employment. [126] i agree with ms. colucci that it was problematic for the motion judge to rely on mr. colucci’s limited financial disclosure to recalculate support and exercise his discretion to impute income. apart from mr. colucci’s own assertions about when he worked and how much he was paid, there was no objective or cogent evidence supporting his alleged income from 2000 to 2015. the motion judge essentially took mr. colucci’s word for it, imputing income based on mr. colucci’s assertion that he made substantially less than minimum wage in certain years and recalculating support based on the income he claimed to have made in other years. [127] this case highlights one of the mischiefs of delayed applications to retroactively decrease support: as the years go by, it becomes more difficult to produce reliable income information, such as tax returns. for example, mr. colucci claims he was unable to obtain tax returns from the internal revenue service for the years he worked in the united states. the payor cannot rely on the passage of time as an excuse for incomplete disclosure upon finally seeking retroactive variation. it would be unfair to the recipient and children to bridge gaps in the payor’s disclosure with guesswork that works to their disadvantage. such an approach would also incentivize payors to provide inadequate disclosure in the hopes that the court will either accept their assertions or impute income that is lower than the income actually earned. [128] vague or incomplete information is also difficult to challenge on cross- examination. as mr. colucci had not produced documentation supporting his asserted income from 2000 to 2015, there would have been no documents to cross-examine him on with respect to those years, rendering the exercise futile. recipients should not be expected to hire forensic accountants or investigators to uncover the financial information needed to effectively cross-examine the payor or challenge the payor’s submission that only minimum wage should be imputed where a finding of under- employment is made. such an expectation is particularly unrealistic where, as here, the payor has left the country and stopped making payments, leaving the recipient to struggle to care and provide for the children on her own. [129] payors are reminded that the onus is on them to establish that a retroactive decrease is warranted based on reliable evidence, and that parties to litigation are subject to a general obligation to disclose all information that is relevant and material to the case (kinsella v. mills, 2020 onsc 4785, 44 rfl (8th) 1, at para. 166). in this case, the obligation to disclose material information was breached and the payor fell short of his burden of proof mr. colucci cannot expect a court to award relief that prejudices the recipient and his children while shielding material information and documentation from the view of the court and recipient. [130] finally, although he did not pursue a claim for reimbursement before the motion judge, mr. colucci claimed he overpaid $2,310.90 in child support based on his asserted income and the table amounts. even if he had supported this calculation with proper disclosure of financial information, the absence of any communication of his alleged changes in circumstances would be a strong factor militating against any claim for reimbursement from ms. colucci. [131] in conclusion, mr. colucci is not entitled to relief on the basis of a decrease in income. he gave no effective notice of his intention to seek a reduction in support, either in 1998 or at any point before his daughters had ceased to be children of the marriage in 2012. even if he had given effective notice in 1998, the presumptive three- year limit applies. the dbs factors do not support a longer period of retroactivity. since mr. colucci commenced his motion to change in 2016, four years after his support obligation had terminated and arrears stopped accumulating, the application of the three-year limit precludes retroactive variation of the amount of support owing under the prior order. [132] i will now consider the scenario in which a payor who has fallen behind on payments seeks full or partial rescission of arrears under s 17 on the basis of a current and ongoing inability to pay. mr. colucci relied on inability to pay as an alternative ground of relief in his motion to change, this ground was briefly addressed at the court of appeal (at paras. 9, 28 and 31) and it was discussed in ms. colucci’s written submissions before this court. the question of whether the courts have authority under s 17 to order the rescission of arrears based on present inability to pay, as discussed in brown, was not raised before us and we will not address it. (2) rescission of arrears where the prior order corresponds with payor’s income (a) the presumption: no rescission unless payor shows current and future inability to pay [133] although applications for rescission raise different considerations than those for a retroactive decrease of support based on a change in circumstances, in practice, both will frequently arise together while a payor may simply ask for accumulated arrears to be forgiven on the basis of a current and ongoing inability to pay without challenging the accuracy of the underlying order, rescission applications will normally arise when the request to retroactively decrease arrears is unsuccessful or results in only a partial reduction of the arrears (see, eg,. templeton, at para. 39; hgs, at para. 113). [134] in this category of cases, the prior child support order or agreement corresponds with the payor’s income the arrears accurately reflect the amount of support that the payor should have paid under the guidelines, after all considerations, including any claim of hardship under s 10, have been determined. in other words, the arrears represent sums that could have been paid at the time payments came due, but were not the payor parent’s claim for rescission is thus a form of “hardship” application, in which there has been no past change in circumstances justifying a retroactive decrease in the support obligation (barber, at paras. 15-16; brown, at para. 43). [135] it follows that, under this third category of cases, the payor’s ongoing financial capacity is the only relevant factor the payor must therefore provide sufficient reliable evidence to enable the court to assess their current and prospective financial circumstances, including their employment prospects and any assets, pensions, inheritances or other potential sources of future capacity to pay. [136] courts have taken a highly restrictive approach to the availability of rescission or suspension of child support based solely on current and ongoing inability to pay (see, eg,. haisman, at paras. 26-27; gray, at para. 58; clw v. svw, 2017 abca 121, at para. 30 (canlii); punzo, at para. 46; blanchard v. blanchard, 2019 abca 53, at para. 32 (canlii); sal v. bjl, 2019 abca 350, 31 rfl (8th) 299, at para. 12; semancik v. saunders, 2011 bcca 264, 19 bclr (5th) 219, at para. 25; mayotte v salthouse (1997), 29 rfl (4th) 38 (alta ca), at para. 2; heiden v. british columbia (director of maintenance enforcement) (1995), 16 bclr (3d) 48 (ca), at paras. 10 and 13). these cases demonstrate that any discretion to grant relief in this context is narrow. [137] this strict approach to rescission and suspension of arrears based on current inability to pay is justified. the interests of the recipient and child in certainty and predictability are paramount, as the payor has failed to comply with a court order or agreement without any “excuse for non-payment of support when it came due” (templeton, at para. 47). the child’s interest in a fair standard of support is subverted when the payor directs support elsewhere; in such circumstances, “the child effectively subsidizes the payor’s improved standard of living” (walsh v. walsh (2004), 69 or. (3d) 577 (ca), at para. 25, with additional reasons (2004), 6 rfl (6th) 432). the payor parent, on the other hand, “cannot argue that the amounts claimed disrupt his/her interest in certainty and predictability” (dbs, at para. 98). [138] accordingly, in this third category of cases, the payor must overcome a presumption against rescinding any part of the arrears. the presumption will only be rebutted where the payor parent establishes on a balance of probabilities that — even with a flexible payment plan — they cannot and will not ever be able to pay the arrears (earle, at para. 26; corcios, at para. 55; gray, at para. 58). present inability to pay does not, in itself, foreclose the prospect of future ability to pay, although it may justify a temporary suspension of arrears (haisman, at para. 26) this presumption ensures rescission is a last resort available only where suspension or other creative payment options are inadequate to address the prejudice to the payor. it also encourages payors to keep up with their support obligations rather than allowing arrears to accumulate in the hopes that the courts will grant relief if the amount becomes sufficiently large. arrears are a “valid debt that must be paid, similar to any other financial obligation”, regardless of whether the quantum is significant (bakht et al., at p 550). [139] while we speak of rescinding arrears, the wording of s 17 of the divorce act makes clear that what it authorizes is rescission of the underlying court order or a term of the order which gave rise to the unmet obligations thus a claim to cancel arrears asks the court to set aside an existing and accurate court order, replace it with another, and forgive what is otherwise a legally enforceable debt. that child support should not attract more leniency than other debts is reinforced by the range of maintenance enforcement regimes which exist across the country to enforce compliance with child support obligations. governments in each province and territory have established administrative maintenance enforcement programs (“meps”) (such as ontario’s fro) to administer child support orders and help ensure children receive the support owed to them under court orders, including by taking enforcement action such as garnishing wages and suspending drivers’ licenses (see, eg,. family responsibility and support arrears enforcement act, 1996, so 1996, c 31). further, child support arrears are not released by an order of discharge under the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3, s 178(1)(c); these debts are prioritized even where providing a clean slate is a competing policy consideration (see brown, at para. 42; st-jules v. st-jules, 2012 nsca 97, 321 nsr (2d) 133, at para. 50). thus, s 17 of the divorce act is not to be used to reduce or vacate arrears too readily, as this would undermine the recognition and enforcement of serious legal obligations. [140] the court has a range of available options when faced with proven payor hardship. a court’s refusal to rescind arrears does not mean the payor must pay the entire amount immediately (earle, at para. 24). if the court concludes that the payor’s financial circumstances will give rise to difficulties paying down arrears, the court ought to first consider whether hardship can be mitigated by ordering a temporary suspension, periodic payments, or other creative payment options (haisman v. haisman (1993), 7 alta l.r (3d) 157 (qb) (“haisman (qb)”), at paras. 32-33, rev’d on other grounds (1994), 157 ar 47 (ca);. templeton, at para. 47; brown, at para. 44) meps may also allow the debtor to enter into a reasonable payment plan where the debtor has fallen into arrears and is struggling to keep up with payments (see, eg,. the family maintenance act, ccsm, c. f20, s 56.2(2) and (3); j. d. payne and m. a. payne, child support guidelines in canada, 2020 (2020), at p 476). after all, blood cannot be drawn from a stone — where the payor is truly unable to make payments toward the arrears, “any enforcement options available to the support recipient and the court are of no practical benefit” (brown, at para. 44). [141] while the presumption in favour of enforcing arrears may be rebutted in “unusual circumstances” (gray, at para. 53), the standard should remain a stringent one. rescission of arrears based solely on current financial incapacity should not be ordered lightly. it is a last resort in exceptional cases, such as where the payor suffers a “catastrophic injury” (gray, at para. 53, citing tremblay v. daley, 2012 onca 780, 23 rfl (7th) 91). i agree with ms. colucci that the availability of rescission would otherwise become an “open invitation to intentionally avoid one’s legal obligations” (haisman (qb), at para. 18, citing schmidt v. schmidt (1985), 46 rfl (2d) 71 (man. qb), at p 73; rf, at para. 57). simply stated, how many payors would pay in full when the amounts come due if they can expect to pay less later? the rule should not allow or encourage debtors to wait out their obligations or subvert statutory enforcement regimes that recognize child support arrears as debts to be taken seriously. (b) application to the present case [142] to the extent that mr. colucci relies on current inability to pay in this case, his failure to adduce adequate evidence of his financial circumstances would be fatal to any application to rescind arrears. as stated by the court of appeal, mr. colucci has not provided complete and accurate disclosure of his income and assets and continued to misrepresent his financial circumstances in the course of the proceedings, including with respect to his inheritance from his mother’s estate (paras. 28 and 31-32). as such, he has not discharged his onus of showing that he will be unable to pay now or in the future even with a flexible payment plan. vi disposition [143] for the foregoing reasons, i would dismiss the appeal with costs.
[1] abella j. — this appeal involves the applica- tion of modern international human rights law, the phoenix that rose from the ashes of world war ii and declared global war on human rights abuses. its mandate was to prevent breaches of internation- ally accepted norms. those norms were not meant to be theoretical aspirations or legal luxuries, but moral imperatives and legal necessities. conduct that undermined the norms was to be identifi ed and addressed. [2] the process of identifying and responsively addressing breaches of international human rights law involves a variety of actors. among them are courts, which can be asked to determine and develop the law’s scope in a particular case. this is one of those cases. [1] la juge abella — le présent pourvoi porte sur l’application du droit international moderne des droits de la personne, le phénix qui est né des cendres de la deuxième guerre mondiale et qui a lancé la lutte mondiale contre les violations des droits de la personne. ce droit visait à empêcher les violations des normes acceptées à l’échelle internationale. ces normes ne se voulaient pas des aspirations théo- riques ni des extravagances juridiques, mais bien des impératifs moraux et des nécessités juridiques. la conduite portant atteinte aux normes devait être cernée et traitée. [2] le processus qui consiste à cerner les viola- tions du droit international des droits de la personne et à prendre des mesures adéquates à cet égard fait intervenir divers acteurs. les tribunaux se retrouvent parmi ceux-ci, pouvant être appelés à établir et à faire évoluer la portée du droit dans un cas donné. nous sommes en présence d’un tel cas. [3] gize yebeyo araya, kesete tekle fshazion and mihretab yemane tekle are refugees and former eritrean nationals. they claim that they were indefi - nitely conscripted through their military service into a forced labour regime where they were required to work at the bisha mine in eritrea and subjected to violent, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. the mine is owned by a canadian company, nevsun resources ltd. [3] gize yebeyo araya, kesete tekle fshazion et mihretab yemane tekle sont des réfugiés et d’an- ciens ressortissants érythréens. ils affi rment avoir été conscrits indéfi niment, par l’entremise de leur service militaire, dans un régime de travail forcé dans le cadre duquel ils ont dû travailler à la mine bisha en érythrée et ont subi un traitement violent, cruel, inhumain et dégradant. la mine appartient à une société canadienne, nevsun resources ltd. [4] the eritrean workers started these proceedings in british columbia as a class action against nevsun on behalf of more than 1,000 individuals who claim to have been compelled to work at the bisha mine be- tween 2008 and 2012. in their pleadings, the eritrean workers sought damages for breaches of domestic [4] les travailleurs érythréens ont introduit la pré- sente instance en colombie- britannique au moyen d’un recours collectif contre nevsun au nom de plus de 1 000 personnes qui affi rment avoir été contraintes de travailler à la mine bisha entre 2008 et 2012. dans leurs actes de procédure, les travailleurs érythréens [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 191 torts including conversion, battery, “unlawful con- fi nement” (false imprisonment), conspiracy and negligence. they also sought damages for breaches of customary international law prohibitions against forced labour; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and crimes against humanity.1 [5] nevsun brought a motion to strike the pleadings on the basis of the “act of state doctrine”, which pre- cludes domestic courts from assessing the sovereign acts of a foreign government. this, nevsun submits, includes eritrea’s national service program. its po- sition was also that the claims based on customary international law should be struck because they have no reasonable prospect of success.2 ont réclamé des dommages- intérêts pour des délits de droit interne, notamment pour détournement, voies de fait, « séquestration » (détention injustifi ée), complot et négligence. ils ont également réclamé des dommages- intérêts pour la violation des interdictions de droit international coutumier relatives au travail forcé; à l’esclavage; aux traitements cruels, inhu- mains ou dégradants; et aux crimes contre l’huma- nité1. [5] nevsun a présenté une requête en radiation des actes de procédure sur le fondement de la [tra- duction] « doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement », qui empêche les tribunaux nationaux de porter un jugement sur les actes souverains d’un gouverne- ment étranger. selon nevsun, cela comprend le pro- gramme de service national de l’érythrée. elle a également fait valoir que les demandes fondées sur le droit international coutumier devaient être radiées parce qu’elles ne présentent aucune perspective rai- sonnable de succès2. [6] both the chambers judge and the court of appeal dismissed nevsun’s motions to strike on these bases. for the reasons that follow, i see no reason to disturb those conclusions. [6] le juge en cabinet et la cour d’appel ont tous les deux rejeté les requêtes en radiation de nevsun fondées sur ces bases. pour les motifs qui suivent, je ne vois aucune raison de modifi er ces conclusions. background contexte [7] the bisha mine in eritrea produces gold, cop- per and zinc. it is one of the largest sources of rev- enue for the eritrean economy. the construction of the mine began in 2008. it was owned and operated by an eritrean corporation, the bisha mining share company, which is 40 percent owned by the eritrean national mining corporation and, through subsidi- aries, 60 percent owned by nevsun, a publicly- held corporation incorporated under british columbia’s business corporations act, sbc 2002, c 57. [7] la mine bisha en érythrée produit de l’or, du cuivre et du zinc il s’agit de l’une des plus impor tantes sources de revenu pour l’économie érythréenne la construction de la mine a com- mencé en 2008 celle-ci était exploitée par une société érythréenne qui en était aussi propriétaire, la bisha mining share company, détenue à 40 pour 100 par la eritrean national mining corporation et, par l’intermédiaire de fi liales, à 60 pour 100 par nevsun, une société ouverte constituée sous le régime de la business corporations act, sbc 2002, c. 57 de la colombie- britannique. 1 eritrean workers’ amended notice of civil claim, at paras. 7, 53, 56(a), 60, 63, 66, 70 and 71 (ar, vol. iii, at p 159). 2 nevsun’s notice of application: application to strike workers’ customary international law claims as disclosing no reasonable claim (ar, vol. iii, at p 58). 1 avis de poursuite civile modifi ée présenté par les travailleurs érythréens, par. 7, 53, 56a), 60, 63, 66, 70 et 71 (da, vol. iii, p 159). 2 avis de demande de nevsun : demande de radiation des réclama- tions de droit international coutumier des travailleurs en raison de l’absence de demande raisonnable (da, vol. iii, p 58). 192 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. [8] the bisha company hired a south african com- pany called senet as the engineering, procurement and construction manager for the construction of the mine. senet entered into subcontracts on behalf of the bisha company with mereb construction company, which was controlled by the eritrean mili- tary, and segen construction company which was owned by eritrea’s only political party, the people’s front for democracy and justice. mereb and segen were among the construction companies that re- ceived conscripts from eritrea’s national service program. [9] the national service program was established by a 1995 decree requiring all eritreans, when they reached the age of 18, to complete 6 months of mili- tary training followed by 12 months of “military de- velopment service” (2016 bcsc 1856, at para 26). conscripts were assigned to direct military service and/or “to assist in the construction of public projects that are in the national interest”. in 2002, the period of military conscription in [10] eritrea was extended indefi nitely and conscripts were forced to provide labour at subsistence wages for various companies owned by senior eritrean military or party offi cials, such as mereb and segen. [11] for those conscripted to the bisha mine, the tenure was indefi nite. the workers say they were forced to provide labour in harsh and dangerous conditions for years and that, as a means of ensuring the obedience of conscripts at the mine, a variety of punishments were used. they say these punishments included “being ordered to roll in the hot sand while being beaten with sticks until losing consciousness” and the ‘“helicopter’ which consisted of tying the workers’ arms together at the elbows behind the back, and the feet together at the ankles, and being left in the hot sun for an hour”. [8] la bisha company a embauché une entre- prise sud- africaine appelée senet à titre de ges- tionnaire de l’ingénierie, de l’approvisionnement et de la construction pour la construction de la mine. senet a conclu des contrats de sous- traitance pour le compte de la bisha company avec mereb construction company, qui était contrôlée par l’armée érythréenne, et avec segen construction company, qui appartenait au seul parti politique de l’érythrée, le front populaire pour la démocratie et la justice. mereb et segen fi guraient parmi les entre- prises de construction qui recevaient des conscrits dans le cadre du programme de service national de l’érythrée. [9] le programme de service national a été éta- bli par un décret, pris en 1995, obligeant tous les érythréens, lorsqu’ils atteignent l’âge de 18 ans, à suivre un entraînement militaire d’une durée de six mois suivi d’un [traduction] « service de perfec- tionnement militaire » d’une durée de 12 mois (2016 bcsc 1856, par 26). les conscrits étaient affectés au service militaire direct ou à « la construction de projets publics d’intérêt national ». [10] en 2002, la période de conscription mili- taire en érythrée a été prolongée indéfi niment et les conscrits ont été contraints de travailler à des salaires de subsistance pour diverses entreprises appartenant à des offi ciers supérieurs de l’armée érythréenne ou à des représentants du parti, comme mereb et segen. [11] pour les conscrits affectés à la mine bisha, la durée des fonctions était indéfi nie. les travailleurs affi rment qu’ils ont été contraints de travailler dans des conditions dures et dangereuses pendant des années et que, pour que les conscrits à la mine obéissent, divers châtiments leur étaient infl igés. par exemple, ils soutiennent qu’ils pouvaient [tra- duction] « se voir ordonner de se rouler dans le sable brûlant, tout en étant battus à coups de bâtons jusqu’à en perdre conscience » et subir le châtiment de « l’“hélicoptère”, qui consistait à ce que les bras du travailleur soient attachés derrière son dos au niveau des coudes, à ce que ses pieds soient attachés au niveau des chevilles, et à ce qu’il soit laissé en plein soleil pendant une heure ». [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 193 [12] the workers claim that those who became ill — a common occurrence at the mine — had their pay docked if they failed to return to work after fi ve days. when not working, the eritrean workers say they were confi ned to camps and not allowed to leave unless authorized to do so. conscripts who left without permission or who failed to return from authorized leave faced severe punishment and the threat of retribution against their families. they say their wages were as low as us$30 per month. [12] les travailleurs soutiennent que ceux qui tom- baient malades — ce qui était fréquent à la mine — voyaient leur paye réduite s’ils ne retournaient pas au travail après cinq jours. les travailleurs érythréens affi rment que lorsqu’ils ne travaillaient pas, ils étaient confi nés dans des camps et ne pouvaient pas partir sans y être autorisés. les conscrits qui partaient sans permission ou qui ne revenaient pas après un congé autorisé s’exposaient à un châtiment sévère et à la menace de représailles contre leur famille. ils affi rment que leur salaire était d’aussi peu que de 30 $us par mois. [13] gize yebeyo araya says he voluntarily en- listed in the national service program in 1997 but instead of being released after completing his 18 months of service, was forced to continue his military service and was deployed as a labourer to various sites, including the bisha mine in february 2010. at the mine, he says he was required to work six days a week from 5:00 am to 6:00 pm, of- ten outside in temperatures approaching 50 degrees celsius. he escaped from eritrea in 2011. [13] gize yebeyo araya dit s’être engagé volon- tairement dans le programme de service national en 1997, mais au lieu d’être libéré après avoir terminé ses 18 mois de service, il a été contraint de continuer son service militaire et a été affecté comme ouvrier dans divers sites, dont la mine bisha en février 2010. il soutient qu’à la mine, il devait travailler six jours par semaine de 5 h à 18 h, souvent à l’extérieur à des températures avoisinant les 50 degrés celsius. il a fui l’érythrée en 2011. [14] kesete tekle fshazion says he was con- scripted in 2002 and remained under the control of the eritrean military until he escaped from eritrea in 2013. he says he was sent to the bisha mine in 2008 where he worked from 6:00 am to 6:00 pm. six days a week and 6:00 am to 2:00 pm on the seventh day. [15] mihretab yemane tekle says he was con- scripted in 1994 and, after completing his 18 months of service, was deployed to several positions, mainly within the eritrean military. he says he was trans- ported to the bisha mine in february 2010 where he worked six days a week from 6:00 am to 6:00 pm, often outside, uncovered, in temperatures approach- ing 50 degrees celsius. he escaped eritrea in 2011. [14] kesete tekle fshazion affi rme avoir été conscrit en 2002 et être resté sous l’autorité de l’armée érythréenne jusqu’au moment où il a fui l’érythrée en 2013. il dit qu’il a été envoyé à la mine bisha en 2008, où il travaillait de 6 h à 18 h six jours par semaine et de 6 h à 14 h le septième jour. [15] mihretab yemane tekle affi rme qu’il a été conscrit en 1994 et qu’après avoir terminé ses 18  mois de service, il a été affecté à plusieurs postes, principalement au sein des forces militaires érythréennes. il dit qu’il a été transporté à la mine bisha en février 2010, où il travaillait six jours par semaine de 6 h à 18 h, souvent à l’extérieur, à décou- vert, à des températures avoisinant les 50 degrés celsius. il a fui l’érythrée en 2011. prior proceedings historique judiciaire [16] nevsun brought a series of applications seek- ing: an order denying the proceeding the status of a representative action; a stay of the proceedings on the basis that eritrea was a more appropriate forum [16] nevsun a présenté une série de demandes visant à obtenir : une ordonnance rejetant le statut de recours collectif de l’instance; un sursis de l’instance au motif que l’érythrée constituait un ressort plus 194 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. (forum non conveniens); an order striking portions of the evidence — fi rst- hand affi davit material and secondary reports — fi led by the eritrean workers; an order dismissing or striking the pleadings pur- suant to rule 21-8 or, alternatively, rule 9-5 of the supreme court civil rules, bc. reg. 168/2009, on the grounds that british columbia courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a result of the operation of the act of state doctrine; and an order striking that part of the pleadings based on customary interna- tional law as being unnecessary and disclosing no reasonable cause of action, pursuant to rule 9-5 of the supreme court civil rules. [17] the chambers judge, abrioux j., observed that since it controlled a majority of the board of the bisha company and nevsun’s ceo was its chair, nevsun exercised effective control over the bisha company. he also observed that there was opera- tional control: “through its majority representation on the board of [the bisha company, nevsun] is involved in all aspects of bisha operations, including exploration, development, extraction, processing and reclamation”. [18] he denied nevsun’s forum non conveniens application, concluding that nevsun had not estab- lished that convenience favours eritrea as the appro- priate forum. there was also a real risk of an unfair trial occurring in eritrea. abrioux j admitted some of the fi rst- hand affi davit material and the second- ary reports for the limited purpose of providing the required social, historical and contextual framework, but he denied the proceeding the status of a repre- sentative action, meaning the eritrean workers were not permitted to bring claims on behalf of the other individuals, many of whom are still in eritrea. approprié (forum non conveniens); une ordonnance radiant certaines parties de la preuve — des affi da- vits et des rapports secondaires — présentée par les travailleurs érythréens; une ordonnance rejetant ou radiant les actes de procédure en vertu de l’art. 21-8 ou, subsidiairement, de l’art. 9-5 des supreme court civil rules, bc. reg. 168/2009, au motif que les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique n’avaient pas compétence ratione materiae en raison de l’applica- tion de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement; et une ordonnance radiant la partie des actes de procédure fondée sur le droit international coutumier au motif qu’elle est inutile et ne révèle aucune cause d’action raisonnable, conformément à l’art. 9-5 des supreme court civil rules. [17] le juge abrioux, siégeant en cabinet, a fait observer qu’étant donné qu’elle exerçait un contrôle sur la majorité des membres du conseil d’administra- tion de la bisha company et que le directeur général de nevsun était son président, nevsun exerçait un contrôle effectif sur la bisha company. il a éga- lement fait observer qu’un contrôle opérationnel était exercé : [traduction] « par sa représentation majoritaire au conseil d’administration de la [bisha company, nevsun] participe à tous les aspects des activités de bisha, y compris l’exploration, la mise en valeur, l’extraction, le traitement et la restauration ». [18] le juge a rejeté la demande de nevsun fondée sur le forum non conveniens, concluant que nevsun n’avait pas établi que le critère de la commodité favorisait l’érythrée en tant que ressort approprié. il y avait également un risque réel que le procès soit inéquitable en érythrée. le juge abrioux a admis certains des affi davits et des rapports secondaires à seule fi n d’établir le cadre social, historique et contextuel requis, mais a refusé d’accorder à l’ins- tance le statut de recours collectif, ce qui veut dire que les travailleurs érythréens n’ont pas été autorisés à présenter des réclamations au nom des autres per- sonnes, dont un grand nombre se trouvent toujours en érythrée. [19] as to the act of state doctrine, abrioux j. noted that it has never been applied in canada, but was nonetheless of the view that it formed part of [19] quant à la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement, le juge abrioux a fait remarquer qu’elle n’a jamais été appliquée au canada, mais il était néanmoins [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 195 canadian common law. ultimately, however, he con- cluded that it did not apply in this case. in dealing with nevsun’s request to strike [20] the claims based on customary international law, abrioux j characterized the issue as “whether claims for damages arising out of the alleged breach of jus cogens or peremptory norms of customary interna- tional law    may form the basis of a civil proceed- ing in british columbia”. he said that claims should only be struck if, assuming the pleaded facts to be true, it is “plain and obvious” that the pleadings disclose no reasonable likelihood of success and are bound to fail. he rejected nevsun’s argument that there is no reasonable prospect at trial that the court would recognize either “claims based on breaches of [customary international law]” or claims for “new torts based on the adoption of the customary norms advanced by the [workers]”. he held that customary international law is incorporated into and forms part of canadian common law unless there is domestic legislation to the contrary. neither the state immunity act, rsc 1985, c. s-18, nor any other legislation bars the eritrean workers’ claims. in his view, while novel, the claims stemming from nevsun’s breaches of customary international law should proceed to trial where they can be evaluated in their factual and legal context, particularly since the prohibitions on slavery, forced labour and crimes against humanity are jus cogens, or peremptory norms of custom- ary international law, from which no derogation is permitted. d’avis qu’elle faisait partie de la common law cana- dienne. il a fi nalement conclu, cependant, qu’elle ne s’appliquait pas en l’espèce. [20] lors de son examen de la demande de nevsun visant la radiation des réclamations fondées sur le droit international coutumier, le juge abrioux a décrit la question comme étant celle de savoir [traduc- tion] « si les réclamations de dommages- intérêts découlant de la violation alléguée du jus cogens ou des normes impératives de droit international cou- tumier [  ] peuvent constituer le fondement d’un recours civil en colombie- britannique ». il a affi rmé que ces réclamations ne devraient être radiées que s’il est « évident et manifeste », les faits allégués étant avérés, que les actes de procédure ne pré- sentent aucune possibilité raisonnable de succès et sont voués à l’échec. il a rejeté l’argument de nevsun selon lequel il n’y a aucune possibilité raisonnable au procès que le tribunal reconnaisse des « réclama- tions fondées sur des violations du [droit internatio- nal coutumier] » ou des réclamations relatives à de « nouveaux délits fondés sur l’adoption de normes de droit coutumier présentés par les [travailleurs] ». il a conclu que le droit international coutumier est intégré dans la common law canadienne et en fait partie, sauf s’il existe une disposition législative contraire dans le droit interne. ni la loi sur l’immu- nité des états, lrc 1985, c. s-18, ni aucune autre loi ne fait obstacle aux réclamations des travailleurs érythréens. à son avis, même si elles sont inédites, les réclamations découlant des violations par nevsun du droit international coutumier devraient faire l’ob- jet d’une instruction lors de laquelle elles pourront être examinées en fonction de leur contexte factuel et juridique, d’autant plus que les interdictions relatives à l’esclavage, au travail forcé et aux crimes contre l’humanité sont de jus cogens, c’est-à-dire qu’elles constituent des normes impératives du droit inter- national coutumier, auxquelles aucune dérogation n’est permise. [21] on appeal, nevsun argued that abrioux j. erred in refusing to decline jurisdiction on the fo- rum non conveniens application; in admitting the eritrean workers’ reports, even for a limited purpose; in holding that the eritrean workers’ claims were not barred by the act of state doctrine; and in declining [21] en appel, nevsun a soutenu que le juge abrioux avait commis une erreur en refusant de décliner compétence relativement à la demande fondée sur le forum non conveniens; en admettant les rapports des travailleurs érythréens, même à une fi n précise; en concluant que la doctrine de l’acte de 196 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. to strike the eritrean workers’ claims that were based on customary international law. the eritrean work- ers did not appeal from abrioux j.’s ruling denying the proceeding the status of a representative action. [22] writing for a unanimous court, newbury ja. upheld abrioux j.’s rulings on the forum non conven- iens and evidence applications (2017 bcca 401). as for the act of state doctrine, newbury ja noted that no canadian court has ever directly applied the doctrine, but that it was adopted in british columbia by virtue of what is now s. 2 of the law and equity act, rsbc 1996, c. 253, which recognizes that the common law of england as it was in 1858 is part of the law of british columbia. she concluded, how- ever, that the act of state doctrine did not apply in this case because the eritrean workers’ claims were not a challenge to the legal validity of a foreign state’s laws or executive acts. even if the act of state doctrine did apply, it would not bar the eritrean workers’ claims since one or more of the doctrine’s acknowledged exceptions would apply. [23] turning to the international law issues, newbury ja noted that in actions brought against foreign states, courts in both england and canada have not recognized a private law cause of action since they involved the principle of state immunity, codifi ed in canada by the state immunity act. but because the eritrean workers’ customary interna- tional law claims were not brought against a foreign state, they were not barred by the state immunity act. gouvernement ne faisait pas obstacle aux réclama- tions des travailleurs érythréens; et en refusant de radier les réclamations des travailleurs érythréens qui étaient fondées sur le droit international coutumier. les travailleurs érythréens n’ont pas interjeté appel de la décision du juge abrioux de refuser d’accorder à l’instance le statut de recours collectif. [22] s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel à l’unanimité, la juge newbury a confi rmé les décisions du juge abrioux concernant les demandes ayant trait au forum non conveniens et à la preuve (2017 bcca 401). quant à la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement, la juge newbury a souligné qu’aucun tribunal cana- dien ne l’avait directement appliquée, mais qu’elle avait été adoptée en colombie- britannique en vertu de ce qui constitue maintenant l’art. 2 de la law and equity act, rsbc 1996, c. 253, qui reconnaît que la common law d’angleterre telle qu’elle existait en 1858 fait partie du droit de la colombie- britannique. elle a toutefois conclu que la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement ne s’appliquait pas en l’espèce parce que les réclamations des travailleurs érythréens ne constituaient pas une contestation de la validité juri- dique des actes législatifs ou exécutifs d’un état étranger. même si la doctrine de l’acte de gouver- nement s’appliquait, elle ne ferait pas obstacle aux réclamations des travailleurs érythréens puisqu’au moins une des exceptions reconnues dans la doctrine s’appliquerait. [23] pour ce qui est des questions de droit inter- national, la juge newbury a souligné que, dans des actions intentées contre des états étrangers, les tribu- naux autant en angleterre qu’au canada n’ont pas re- connu l’existence d’une cause d’action de droit privé parce que ces actions faisaient intervenir le principe de l’immunité des états, que codifi e au canada la loi sur l’immunité des états. cependant, étant donné que les réclamations de droit international coutumier des travailleurs érythréens n’étaient pas intentées contre un état étranger, elles n’étaient pas irrecevables au titre de la loi sur l’immunité des états. [24] finally, newbury ja was alert to what she referred to as a fundamental change that has occurred in public international law, whereby domestic courts have become increasingly willing to address issues [24] enfi n, la juge newbury était consciente qu’il s’était produit ce qu’elle a appelé un changement fondamental dans le droit international public, par lequel les tribunaux nationaux acceptent de plus en [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 197 of public international law when appropriate. with this in mind, she characterized the central issue on appeal as being “whether canadian courts, which have thus far not grappled with the development of what is now called ‘transnational law’, might also begin to participate in the change described”. she concluded that the fact that aspects of the eritrean workers’ claims were actionable as private law torts, did not mean that they had no reasonable chance of success on the basis of customary international law. [25] ultimately, newbury ja held that since the law in this area is developing, it cannot be said that the eritrean workers’ claims based on breaches of customary international law were bound to fail. plus de se pencher sur des questions de droit inter- national public lorsque cela est indiqué. dans cette optique, elle a estimé que la principale question en litige dans l’appel était de savoir [traduction] « si les tribunaux canadiens, qui n’ont pas encore été aux prises avec le développement de ce qui est mainte- nant appelé le “droit transnational”, devraient aussi commencer à participer au changement décrit ». elle a conclu que le fait que certains aspects des récla- mations des travailleurs érythréens ouvraient droit à une action en responsabilité civile délictuelle n’avait pas pour conséquence qu’ils n’avaient aucune chance raisonnable de succès sur le fondement du droit inter- national coutumier. [25] la juge newbury a fi nalement conclu qu’étant donné que le droit dans ce domaine est en pleine évo- lution, on ne saurait affi rmer que les réclamations des travailleurs érythréens fondées sur des violations du droit international coutumier étaient vouées à l’échec. analysis analyse [26] nevsun’s appeal focussed on two issues: [26] le pourvoi interjeté par nevsun est axé sur deux questions : (1) does the act of state doctrine form part of (1) la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement fait- elle canadian common law? partie de la common law canadienne? (2) can the customary international law prohibitions against forced labour; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and crimes against human- ity ground a claim for damages under canadian law? nevsun did not challenge the court of appeal’s deci- sion on the admissibility of the reports or on forum non conveniens. as a result, there is no dispute that if the act of state doctrine does not bar the matter from proceeding, british columbia courts are the appropriate forum for resolving the claims. (2) les interdictions de droit international coutu- mier relatives au travail forcé; à l’esclavage; aux traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants; et aux crimes contre l’humanité peuvent- elles servir de fondement à une action en dommages- intérêts en droit canadien? nevsun n’a pas contesté la décision de la cour d’appel concernant l’admissibilité des rapports et le forum non conveniens. en conséquence, il ne fait aucun doute que si la doctrine de l’acte de gouver- nement n’empêche pas l’instruction de l’affaire, les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique constituent le ressort approprié pour régler les réclamations. the act of state doctrine la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement [27] nevsun’s fi rst argument is that the entire claim should be struck because the act of state doctrine makes it non- justiciable. [27] selon le premier argument de nevsun, l’action au complet devrait être radiée parce que la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement la rend non justiciable. 198 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. [28] the act of state doctrine is a known (and heav- ily criticized) doctrine in england and australia. it has, by contrast, played no role in canadian law. nonetheless, nevsun asserts that these proceedings are barred by its operation. it is helpful, then, to start by examining what the doctrine is. [29] there is no single defi nition that captures the unwieldly collection of principles, limitations and exceptions that have been given the name “act of state” in english law. a useful starting point, how- ever, is lord millett’s description: “the act of state doctrine is a rule of domestic law which holds the na- tional court incompetent to adjudicate upon the law- fulness of the sovereign acts of a foreign state” (r. v. bow street metropolitan stipendiary magistrate, ex parte pinochet ugarte (no. 3), [2000] 1 ac 147 (hl), at p 269). [30] the act of state doctrine shares some features with state immunity, which extends personal immu- nity to state offi cials for acts done in their offi cial capacity. but the two are distinct, as lord sumption explained in belhaj v. straw, [2017] uksc 3: unlike state immunity, act of state is not a personal but a subject matter immunity. it proceeds from the same premise as state immunity, namely mutual respect for the equality of sovereign states. but it is wholly the creation of the common law. although international law requires states to respect the immunity of other states from their domestic jurisdiction, it does not require them to apply any particular limitation on their subject matter jurisdiction in litigation to which foreign states are not parties and in which they are not indirectly impleaded. the foreign act of state doctrine is at best permitted by international law. [emphasis added; para 200] [28] la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement est une doctrine connue (et vivement critiquée) en angleterre et en australie. en revanche, elle n’a joué aucun rôle en droit canadien. nevsun affi rme néanmoins que son application fait obstacle à la présente instance. il est donc utile de commencer par examiner en quoi consiste la doctrine. [29] il n’existe pas de défi nition unique qui décrit l’ensemble indomptable de principes, de restric- tions et d’exceptions ayant reçu le nom d’« act of state » (« acte de gouvernement ») en droit anglais. la description que donne lord millett constitue toute- fois un bon point de départ : [traduction] « la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement est une règle de droit interne selon laquelle le tribunal national n’est pas compétent pour se prononcer sur la légalité des actes souverains d’un état étranger » (r c. bow street metropolitan stipendiary magistrate, ex parte pinochet ugarte (no. 3), [2000] 1 ac 147 (hl), p 269). [30] la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement pré- sente des caractéristiques communes avec le principe de l’immunité des états, qui confère l’immunité personnelle aux représentants de l’état pour les actes commis dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions offi cielles. cependant, comme l’a expliqué lord sumption dans belhaj c. straw, [2017] uksc 3, il s’agit de notions distinctes : [traduction] contrairement à l’immunité des états, l’acte de gouvernement constitue non pas une immu- nité personnelle, mais une immunité liée à la compétence ratione materiae. il repose sur la même prémisse que l’immunité des états, c’est-à-dire un respect mutuel pour l’égalité des états souverains, mais il est une pure création de la common law. bien que le droit international oblige les états à respecter l’immunité des autres états à l’égard de leur compétence interne, il ne les oblige pas à appli- quer une restriction particulière à leur compétence ratione materiae dans un litige auquel les états étrangers ne sont pas parties et dans lequel ils ne sont pas indirectement mis en cause. la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement étranger est tout au plus permise en droit international. [italique ajouté; par 200] [31] the outlines of the act of state doctrine can be traced to the early english authorities of blad [31] les grandes lignes de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement remontent à l’ancienne jurisprudence [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 199 v bamfi eld (1674), 3 swans 604, and duke of brunswick v. king of hanover (1848), 2 hlc 1 (see also yukos capital sarl v. ojsc rosneft oil co. (no. 2), [2012] ewca civ 855, at para 40). in blad, bamfi eld and other english trad- [32] ers brought a claim in the english courts against a danish trader who had been granted letters patent by the king of denmark as ruler of iceland “for the sole trade of iceland” (p 993). the trader seized bamfi eld’s goods in iceland for allegedly fi shing contrary to his letters patent. bamfi eld challenged the validity of the letters patent. lord nottingham ruled that bamfi eld’s action was barred on the grounds that “to send it to a trial at law, where either the court must pretend to judge of the validity of the king’s letters patent in denmark, or of the exposition and meaning of the articles of peace; or that a common jury should try whether the english have a right to trade in iceland, is monstrous and absurd” (p 993). in the subsequent case of duke of brunswick, [33] the deposed duke sued the king of hanover in england, alleging that, through acts done in hanover and elsewhere abroad, he had aided in depriving the duke of his land and title. the house of lords refused to judge the acts of a sovereign in his own country. in the words of the lord chancellor:    a foreign sovereign, coming into this country, cannot be made responsible here for an act done in his sovereign character in his own country; whether it be an act right or wrong, whether according to the constitution of that country or not, the courts of this country cannot sit in judgment upon an act of a sovereign, effected by virtue of his sovereign authority abroad, an act not done as a british subject, but supposed to be done in the exercise of his authority vested in him as sovereign. [pp. 998-99] anglaise qui se dégage des arrêts blad c. bamfi eld (1674), 3 swans. 604, et duke of brunswick c. king of hanover (1848), 2 hlc 1 (voir aussi yukos capital sarl c. ojsc rosneft oil co. (no. 2), [2012] ewca civ 855, par 40). [32] dans l’arrêt blad, bamfi eld et d’autres com- merçants anglais avaient intenté une action devant les tribunaux anglais contre un commerçant danois qui s’était vu délivrer des lettres patentes par le roi du danemark, en tant que souverain de l’islande, [tra- duction] « pour le commerce exclusif en islande » (p 993). le commerçant avait saisi les marchan- dises de bamfi eld en islande parce que celui-ci avait prétendument pêché en contravention de ses lettres patentes. bamfi eld contestait la validité des lettres patentes. lord nottingham a décidé que l’action de bamfi eld était irrecevable parce que [traduc- tion] « l’idée d’un procès en droit, où la cour doit faire mine de se prononcer sur la validité des lettres patentes du roi au danemark, ou sur la formulation et le sens des ar ticles de la paix, et où un jury de droit commun devrait décider si les anglais ont le droit de faire du commerce en islande, est monstrueuse et absurde » (p 993). [33] dans l’arrêt subséquent duke of brunswick, le duc destitué poursuivait le roi d’hanovre en angleterre, alléguant que, par des actes posés à hanovre et ailleurs à l’étranger, celui-ci avait contri- bué à le dépouiller de sa terre et de son titre. la chambre des lords a refusé de juger les actes posés par un souverain dans son propre pays. pour repren- dre les termes employés par le lord chancelier : [traduction]    le souverain étranger qui vient dans notre pays ne saurait être tenu responsable ici d’un acte posé en sa qualité de souverain dans son propre pays; qu’il s’agisse d’un acte bon ou mauvais, ou que cet acte soit ou non conforme à la constitution de ce pays, les tribunaux de notre pays ne peuvent porter un jugement sur l’acte d’un souverain, accompli en vertu de son autorité souveraine à l’étranger, et non en tant que sujet britannique, mais censé avoir été posé dans l’exercice du pouvoir qui lui est conféré en sa qualité de souverain. [p. 998-999] [34] since then, the english act of state doctrine has developed a number of qualifi cations and limitations, [34] depuis ce temps, la doctrine anglaise de l’acte de gouvernement a engendré un certain nombre de 200 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. and it no longer includes the sweeping proposition that domestic courts cannot adjudicate the lawfulness of foreign state acts. this became clear in the case of oppenheimer v. cattermole, [1976] ac 249, where the house of lords refused to recognize and apply a nazi decree depriving jews of their german citizenship and leading to the confi scation of all their property on which the state could “lay its hands” (p 278). lord cross held that such a discriminatory law “constitutes so grave an infringement of human rights that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all”, noting that it is “part of the public policy of this country that our courts should give effect to clearly established rules of in- ternational law” (p 278). the house of lords elabo- rated on this principle in kuwait airways corpn. v. iraqi airways co. (nos. 4 and 5), [2002] ukhl 19, where lord nicholls held that foreign laws “may be fundamentally unacceptable for reasons other than human rights violations” (para 18). [35] there has also been a proliferation of limita- tions on, and exceptions to, the act of state doctrine in england, refl ecting an attempt to respond to the diffi culties of applying a single doctrine to a het- erogeneous collection of issues. this challenge was identifi ed by lord wilberforce in his infl uential ac- count of the english act of state doctrine in buttes gas and oil co. v. hammer (no. 3), [1982] ac. 888 (hl), a defamation action that arose in the context of two confl icting oil concessions granted by neighbouring states in the arabian gulf. he referred to the act of state doctrine as “a generally confused topic”, adding that “[n]ot the least of its diffi culty has lain in the indiscriminating use of ‘act of state’ to cover situations which are quite distinct, and dif- ferent in law” (p 930). he explained that, though often referred to using the general terminology of “act of state”, english law differentiates between crown acts of state (concerning the acts of offi cers of the crown committed abroad) and foreign acts of state (concerning the justiciability in domestic courts of actions of foreign states). he went on to observe that within the foreign act of state doctrine, the cases réserves et de restrictions, et elle ne comprend plus le large principe selon lequel les tribunaux internes ne peuvent se prononcer sur la légalité des actes d’un état étranger. ce fait ressort clairement de la décision oppenheimer c. cattermole, [1976] ac. 249, où la chambre des lords a refusé de reconnaître et d’appliquer un décret nazi dépouillant les juifs de leur citoyenneté allemande et entraînant la confi sca- tion de tous les biens de ceux-ci sur lesquels l’état pouvait [traduction] « mettre la main » (p 278). lord cross a déclaré qu’une telle loi discriminatoire « constitue une violation si grave des droits de la personne que les tribunaux de notre pays doivent tout simplement refuser de la reconnaître en tant que loi », soulignant que « l’ordre public de notre pays prévoit que nos tribunaux donnent effet aux règles de droit international clairement établies » (p 278). la chambre des lords a précisé ce principe dans kuwait airways corpn. c. iraqi airways co. (nos. 4 and 5), [2002] ukhl 19, où lord nicholls a affi rmé que les lois étrangères [traduction] «  peuvent être fondamentalement inacceptables pour des motifs autres que les violations des droits de la personne » (par 18). il y a également eu prolifération en angleterre [35] de restrictions à la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement et d’exceptions relatives à celle-ci, ce qui traduit une tentative de résolution des diffi cultés liées à l’appli- cation d’une seule doctrine à un ensemble hétéro- gène de questions. lord wilberforce a décrit ce défi dans l’important exposé sur la doctrine anglaise de l’acte de gouvernement qu’il a fait dans la décision buttes gas and oil co. c. hammer (no. 3), [1982] ac 888 (hl), où il était question d’une action en diffamation ayant pris naissance dans le contexte de deux concessions pétrolifères confl ictuelles accor- dées par des états voisins dans le golfe persique. il a qualifi é la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement de [traduction] « notion généralement confuse », ajoutant que « [l’]une des diffi cultés qu’elle soulève, et non la moindre, réside dans l’emploi systéma- tique de l’“acte de gouvernement” pour viser des situations qui sont fort distinctes, et différentes en droit » (p 930). il a expliqué que le droit anglais fait une distinction entre les actes de gouvernement de la couronne (concernant les actes des représentants de la couronne commis à l’étranger) et les actes de [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 201 support the existence of two separate principles: a more specifi c principle guiding courts to consider the choice of law in cases involving whether and when a domestic court will give effect in its law to a rule of foreign law; and the more general principle that courts refrain from adjudicating the transactions of foreign states. [36] and in the 2012 yukos case, rix lj, writ- ing for the court of appeal of england and wales, modernized the description of the doctrine: it would seem that, generally speaking, the doctrine is con- fi ned to acts of state within the territory of the sovereign, but in special and perhaps exceptional circumstances   . may even go beyond territorial boundaries and for that very reason give rise to issues which have to be recognised as non- justiciable. the various formulations of the para- digm principle are apparently wide, and prevent adjudica- tion on the validity, legality, lawfulness, acceptability or motives of state actors. it is a form of immunity ratione materiae, closely connected with analogous doctrines of sovereign immunity and, although a domestic doctrine of english (and american) law, is founded on analogous concepts of international law, both public and private, and of the comity of nations. it has been applied in a wide variety of situations, but often arises by way of defence or riposte: as where a dispossessed owner sues in respect of his property, the defendant relies on a foreign act of state as altering title to that property, and the claimant is prevented from calling into question the effectiveness of that act of state. [para. 66] gouvernement étrangers (concernant la justiciabilité devant les tribunaux nationaux des actes des états étrangers), bien qu’ils soient souvent désignés par le terme général « acte de gouvernement ». il a ensuite fait observer que la jurisprudence appuie l’existence de deux principes distincts au sein de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement étranger : un principe précis orientant le choix des tribunaux quant à la loi applicable dans les affaires portant sur la question de savoir si et quand un tribunal national donnera effet dans son droit à une règle de droit étranger; et le principe plus général voulant que les tribunaux s’abs- tiennent de juger les opérations des états étrangers. [36] et dans l’arrêt yukos rendu en 2012, le lord juge rix, s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel de l’angleterre et du pays de galles, a modernisé la description de la doctrine : [traduction] il semble que, en règle générale, la doctrine ne s’applique qu’aux actes de gouvernement commis sur le territoire du souverain, mais que, dans des circons- tances spéciales et peut- être exceptionnelles [  ] elle puisse même franchir les limites territoriales et soulever, précisément pour cette raison, des questions devant être considérées comme non justiciables. les diverses for- mulations de ce paradigme sont manifestement larges et empêchent tout jugement portant sur la validité, la légalité, l’acceptabilité ou les intentions des représentants de l’état. c’est une forme d’immunité ratione materiae présentant des liens étroits avec des doctrines analogues d’immunité du souverain et, bien qu’il s’agisse d’une doctrine interne de droit anglais (et américain), elle repose sur des notions analogues de droit international, tant public que privé, et de courtoisie entre les nations. elle a été appliquée dans des situations très diverses, mais est souvent soulevée dans le cadre d’une défense ou d’une riposte : comme lorsqu’un propriétaire dépossédé intente une poursuite concernant ses biens, que le défendeur soutient qu’un acte de gouver- nement étranger a altéré le titre de propriété sur ces biens, et que le demandeur ne peut mettre en doute l’effi cacité de cet acte de gouvernement. [par. 66] [37] rix lj noted the numerous limitations or exceptions to the doctrine which he grouped into fi ve categories. first, the impugned act must occur within the territory of the foreign state for the doc- trine to apply. second, “the doctrine will not apply to foreign acts of state which are in breach of clearly [37] le lord juge rix a fait état des nombreuses restrictions ou exceptions à la doctrine, qu’il a regroupées en cinq catégories premièrement, l’acte contesté doit se produire sur le territoire de l’état étranger pour que la doctrine s’applique. deuxièmement, [traduction] «  la doctrine ne 202 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. established rules of international law, or are contrary to english principles of public policy, as well as where there is a grave infringement of human rights” (para 69). third, judicial acts are not “acts of state” for the purposes of the doctrine. fourth, the doctrine will not apply to the conduct of a state that is of a commercial (rather than sovereign) character. fifth, the doctrine does not apply where the only issue is whether certain acts have occurred, not the legal ef- fectiveness of those acts. [38] the effect of all these limitations, as he noted, was to dilute the doctrine substantially: the important thing is to recognise that increasingly in the modern world the doctrine is being defi ned, like a silhouette, by its limitations, rather than to regard it as occupying the whole ground save to the extent that an ex- ception can be imposed. that after all would explain why it has become wholly commonplace to adjudicate upon or call into question the acts of a foreign state in relation to matters of international convention, whether it is the per- secution of applicant asylum refugees, or the application of the rome statute with regard to international criminal responsibility or other matters    . that is also perhaps an element in the naturalness with which our courts have been prepared, in the face of cogent evidence, to adjudicate upon allegations relating to the availability of substantive justice in foreign courts. it also has to be remembered that the doctrine was fi rst developed in an era which predated the existence of modern international human rights law. the idea that the rights of a state might be curtailed by its obligations in the fi eld of human rights would have seemed somewhat strange in that era. that is perhaps why our courts have sometimes struggled, albeit ultimately successfully, to give effective support to their abhorrence of the persecutions of the nazi era [as in oppenheimer]. [emphasis added; para 115] s’applique pas aux actes de gouvernement étran- gers qui constituent un manquement aux règles de droit international clairement établies, ou qui sont contraires aux principes anglais d’ordre public, ainsi qu’en cas de violation grave des droits de la personne » (par 69). troisièmement, les actes judi- ciaires ne sont pas des « actes de gouvernement » aux fi ns d’application de la doctrine. quatrièmement, la doctrine ne s’applique pas à la conduite d’un état qui revêt un caractère commercial (plutôt que sou- verain). cinquièmement, la doctrine ne s’applique pas lorsque la seule question est de savoir si certains actes se sont produits, et ne concerne pas l’effi cacité de ces actes. [38] comme l’a souligné le lord juge rix, toutes ces restrictions ont eu pour effet de diluer considé- rablement la doctrine : [traduction] il importe de reconnaître que de nos jours, la doctrine est de plus en plus souvent défi nie, comme une silhouette, par ses restrictions plutôt que d’être considérée comme occupant tout l’espace, sauf dans la mesure où une exception peut être imposée. cela, après tout, pourrait ex- pliquer pourquoi il est devenu monnaie courante de juger ou de remettre en question les actes d’un état étranger rela- tivement aux affaires liées aux conventions internationales, qu’il s’agisse de la persécution de demandeurs d’asile, ou de l’application du statut de rome en ce qui concerne la responsabilité pénale internationale ou d’autres affaires [  ]. cela constitue peut- être aussi un élément de l’aisance avec laquelle nos tribunaux se sont montrés disposés, en présence d’une preuve convaincante, à se prononcer sur les allégations relatives à l’accès à la justice quant au fond devant les tribunaux étrangers. il faut également se souvenir que la doctrine tire son origine d’une époque antérieure à l’existence du droit international moderne des droits de la personne. l’idée que les droits d’un état puissent être restreints par ses obligations en matière de droits de la personne aurait semblé quelque peu étrange à l’époque. c’est sans doute pourquoi nos tribunaux ont parfois eu du mal, bien qu’ils aient fi ni par le faire, à donner libre cours à leur aversion pour les persécutions de l’époque nazie [comme dans oppenheimer]. [italique ajouté; par 115] [39] the doctrine was again recently assessed by the english courts in belhaj, where mr. belhaj and his wife alleged that english offi cials were complicit [39] la doctrine a encore récemment été analysée par les tribunaux anglais dans la décision belhaj, où m.  belhaj et son épouse alléguaient que des [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 203 with the libyan state in their illegal detention, ab- duction and removal to libya in 2004. the court of fi rst instance concluded that most of the claims were barred by the foreign act of state doctrine. on appeal, lloyd jones lj for the court cited with ap- proval the modern description of the doctrine and its limitations set out in yukos and held that the action could proceed in light of compelling public policy reasons ([2014] ewca civ 1394). fonctionnaires anglais avaient été complices de l’état libyen dans leur détention illégale, enlèvement et renvoi en libye en 2004. la cour de première ins- tance a conclu que la plupart des demandes étaient irrecevables par application de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement. en appel, le lord juge lloyd jones, au nom de la cour, a évoqué en l’approuvant la des- cription moderne de la doctrine et ses restrictions énoncées dans l’arrêt yukos, et a conclu que l’action pouvait être instruite en raison de motifs impérieux d’ordre public ([2014] ewca civ 1394). [40] upholding the court of appeal, a divided supreme court provided four separate sets of rea- sons, each seeking to clarify the doctrine but disa- greeing on how to do so. [40] confi rmant la décision de la cour d’appel, une cour suprême divisée a exposé quatre opinions distinctes, les juges cherchant tous à préciser la doc- trine mais ne s’entendant pas sur la façon de le faire. [41] lord mance held that the doctrine should be disaggregated into three separate rules, subject to limitations. he concluded that the doctrine did not apply to the circumstances of the case and, if it did, a public policy exception like the one articulated in yukos would apply. lord neuberger separated the doctrine into different rules from those of lord mance. like lord mance, he concluded that the doctrine did not apply in this case and, even if it did, a public policy exception would preclude its application. lady hale and lord clarke agreed with lord neuberger and lord mance that the foreign act of state doctrine did not apply to the case and, notwithstanding the differing list of rules provided by lords mance and neuberger, considered their reasons on the matter to be substantially the same. lord sumption maintained a more unifi ed version of the doctrine, holding that it would have applied but for a public policy exception. [41] lord mance a estimé que la doctrine devait être décomposée en trois règles distinctes, sous réserve de restrictions. il a conclu que la doctrine ne s’appliquait pas aux circonstances de l’affaire et que, si elle devait s’appliquer, une exception d’ordre public comme celle énoncée dans l’arrêt yukos s’ap- pliquerait. lord neuberger a divisé la doctrine en règles différentes de celles de lord mance. à l’instar de ce dernier, lord neuberger a conclu que la doctrine ne s’appliquait pas dans cette affaire et que, même si elle devait s’appliquer, une exception d’ordre public empêcherait son application. lady hale et lord clarke ont convenu avec lord neuberger et lord mance que la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement étranger ne s’appliquait pas à l’affaire et, malgré la liste de règles différente présentée par les lords mance et neuberger, ils étaient d’avis que leur opi- nion sur la question était essentiellement la même. lord sumption a soutenu une version plus unifi ée de la doctrine, estimant qu’elle se serait appliquée n’eût été une exception d’ordre public. [42] as the confl icting judgments in belhaj high- light, the attempt to house several unique concepts under the roof of the act of state doctrine in english jurisprudence has led to considerable confusion. attempting to apply a doctrine which is largely de- fi ned by its limitations has also caused some con- fusion in australia. in habib v. commonwealth of australia, [2010] fcafc 12, jagot j observed that [42] comme le montrent les jugements contradic- toires énoncés dans la décision belhaj, la tentative de faire cohabiter plusieurs concepts uniques au sein de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement dans la jurisprudence anglaise a donné lieu à beaucoup de confusion. le fait d’avoir tenté d’appliquer une doc- trine en grande partie défi nie par ses restrictions a également causé de la confusion en australie. dans 204 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. the act of state doctrine has been described as “a common law principle of uncertain application” (para. 51 (austlii)). [43] similarly, in moti v. the queen, [2011] hca 50, the court rejected the contention that the act of state doctrine jurisprudence established “a general and universally applicable rule that australian courts may not be required (or do not have or may not ex- ercise jurisdiction) to form a view about the lawful- ness of conduct that occurred outside australia by reference to foreign law” (para. 50 (austlii)). the court noted that “the phrase ‘act of state’, must not be permitted to distract attention from the need to identify the issues that arise in each case at a more particular level than is achieved by applying a single, all- embracing formula” (para 52). [44] the canadian common law has grown from the same roots. as in england, the foundational cases concerning foreign act of state are blad and duke of brunswick. but since then, whereas english jurisprudence continually reaffi rmed and recon- structed the foreign act of state doctrine, canadian law has developed its own approach to addressing the twin principles underlying the doctrine articu- lated in buttes gas: confl ict of laws and judicial restraint. both principles have developed separately in canadian jurisprudence rather than as elements of an all- encompassing “act of state doctrine”. as such, in canada, the principles underlying the act of state doctrine have been completely subsumed within this jurisprudence. la décision habib c. commonwealth of australia, [2010] fcafc 12, le juge jagot a fait remarquer que la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement a été qualifi ée de [traduction] « principe de common law d’appli- cation incertaine » (par. 51 (austlii)). [43] de la même façon, dans l’arrêt moti c. the queen, [2011] hca 50, la cour a rejeté la thèse voulant que la jurisprudence relative à la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement établissait [traduction] «  une règle générale et d’application universelle selon laquelle les tribunaux australiens ne peuvent être tenus de se former une opinion sur la légalité d’une conduite survenue à l’extérieur de l’australie en se référant au droit étranger (ou n’ont pas com- pétence ou ne peuvent exercer leur compétence pour ce faire) » (par. 50 (austlii)). la cour a souligné que « l’expression “acte de gouvernement” ne saurait faire oublier la nécessité que les questions soulevées dans chaque affaire soient défi nies à un niveau plus particulier que celui qui est atteint lorsqu’on applique une formule unique de portée générale » (par 52). [44] la common law canadienne s’est développée à partir des mêmes racines. comme en angleterre, les arrêts fondamentaux en ce qui concerne l’acte de gouvernement étranger sont les arrêts blad et duke of brunswick mais depuis ce temps, alors que la jurisprudence anglaise n’a eu de cesse de réaffi rmer et de reconstituer la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement étranger, le droit canadien a éla- boré sa propre méthode pour traiter les principes jumeaux qui sous- tendent la doctrine exposée dans l’arrêt buttes gas : le confl it de lois et la retenue judiciaire. ces deux principes ont évolué séparément dans la jurisprudence canadienne plutôt qu’en tant qu’éléments de la doctrine englobante de l’« acte de gouvernement ». en conséquence, au canada, les principes sous- jacents à la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement ont été complètement subsumés dans notre jurisprudence. [45] our courts determine questions dealing with the enforcement of foreign laws according to or- dinary private international law principles which generally call for deference, but allow for judicial discretion to decline to enforce foreign laws where [45] nos tribunaux tranchent les questions por- tant sur l’application des lois étrangères selon les principes ordinaires de droit international privé qui commandent généralement la déférence, mais qui permettent l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 205 such laws are contrary to public policy, including respect for public international law. [46] laane and baltser v. estonian state cargo & passenger ss. line, [1949] scr 530, is an early example of how the law has developed in canada (see martin bühler, “the emperor’s new clothes: defabricating the myth of ‘act of state’ in anglo- canadian law”, in craig scott, ed., torture as tort: comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 343, at pp. 346-48 and 351). in laane, this court consid- ered whether canada would give effect to a 1940 decree of the estonian soviet socialist republic pur- porting to nationalize all estonian merchant ships, including those in foreign ports, with compensa- tion to the owners at a rate of 25 percent of each ship’s value. one of the ships was in the port of saint john, new brunswick, when it was sold by court order at the insistence of crew members who were owed wages. the balance of the sale proceeds was claimed by the estonian state cargo and passenger steamship line. this court refused to enforce the 1940 decree because it was confi scatory and contrary to canadian public policy. none of the four judges who gave reasons had any hesitation in expressing views about the lawfulness of estonia’s conduct, whether as a matter of international law or canadian public policy. as rand j noted: “   there is the gen- eral principle that no state will apply a law of another which offends against some fundamental morality or public policy” (p 545). no act of state concerns about estonia’s sovereignty or non- interference in its affairs were even raised by the court. instead, the case was dealt with as a straightforward private international law matter about whether to enforce the foreign law despite its penal and confi scatory nature. judiciaire de refuser d’appliquer des lois étrangères lorsque celles-ci sont contraires à l’ordre public, ce qui comprend le respect du droit international public. [46] l’arrêt laane and baltser c. estonian state cargo & passenger ss. line, [1949] rcs 530, constitue l’un des premiers exemples de la façon dont le droit a évolué au canada (voir martin bühler, « the emperor’s new clothes : defabricating the myth of “act of state” in anglo- canadian law », dans craig scott, dir., torture as tort : comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 343, p. 346-348 et 351). dans cet arrêt, notre cour s’est demandé si le canada devait appliquer un décret de 1940 de la république socia- liste soviétique d’estonie visant la nationalisation de tous les navires marchands estoniens, y compris ceux se trouvant dans des ports étrangers, accompagnée du versement à leurs propriétaires d’une indemnité au taux de 25 pour 100 de la valeur de chaque navire. l’un de ces navires se trouvait dans le port de saint john (nouveau- brunswick) lorsqu’il a été vendu en justice sur les instances de membres de l’équipage à qui un salaire était dû. la estonian state cargo and passenger steamship line a réclamé le produit de la vente. la cour a refusé d’appliquer le décret de 1940 parce qu’il était confi scatoire et contraire à l’ordre public canadien. aucun des quatre juges ayant rédigé des motifs n’a hésité à exprimer son opinion sur la légalité de la conduite de l’estonie, que ce soit du point de vue du droit international ou de l’ordre public canadien. comme l’a souligné le juge rand : [traduction] «    il est un principe général qu’aucun état ne peut appliquer une loi d’un autre état qui va à l’encontre de la morale fondamentale ou de l’ordre public » (p 545). la cour n’a soulevé aucune préoccupation relative à l’acte de gouverne- ment concernant la souveraineté de l’estonie ou la non- ingérence dans les affaires de celle-ci. l’affaire a plutôt été traitée comme une simple affaire de droit international privé portant sur la question de savoir s’il y avait lieu d’appliquer la loi étrangère en dépit de sa nature pénale et confi scatoire. [47] our courts also exercise judicial restraint when considering foreign law questions. this re- straint means that courts will refrain from making fi ndings which purport to be legally binding on [47] nos tribunaux exercent aussi une retenue judiciaire lorsqu’ils se penchent sur des questions de droit étranger. cette retenue signifi e que les tri- bunaux s’abstiendront de tirer des conclusions qui 206 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. foreign states. but our courts are free to inquire into foreign law questions when doing so is necessary or incidental to the resolution of domestic legal contro- versies properly before the court. in hunt v. t&n plc, [1993] 4 scr 289, this [48] court confi rmed that canadian courts should not hesitate to make determinations about the validity of “foreign” laws where such determinations are incidental to the resolution of legal controversies properly before the courts. the issue in hunt was whether the courts in british columbia had the au- thority to determine the constitutionality of a quebec statute. in concluding that british columbia courts did have such authority and, ultimately, that the stat- ute in question was constitutionally inapplicable to other provinces, la forest j made no reference to act of state: in determining what constitutes foreign law, there seems little reason why a court cannot hear submissions and receive evidence as to the constitutional status of for- eign legislation. there is nothing in the authorities cited by the respondents that goes against this proposition. quite the contrary, buck v. attorney- general, [1965] 1 all er. 882 (ca), holds only that a court has no jurisdiction to make a declaration as to the validity of the constitution of a foreign state. that would violate the principles of public international law. but here nobody is trying to challenge the constitution itself. the issue of constitutionality arises incidentally in the course of litigation.   . se veulent juridiquement contraignantes pour les états étrangers. cependant, nos tribunaux sont libres d’examiner des questions de droit étranger lorsque cela est nécessaire ou accessoire au règlement de différends juridiques internes dont la cour est dûment saisie. [48] dans l’arrêt hunt c. t&n plc, [1993] 4 rcs. 289, notre cour a confi rmé que les tribunaux cana- diens ne devraient pas hésiter à rendre des décisions sur la validité de lois « étrangères » lorsque de telles décisions sont accessoires au règlement de différends juridiques dont ils sont dûment saisis. dans cet arrêt, il s’agissait de savoir si les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique avaient compétence pour se pronon- cer sur la constitutionnalité d’une loi québécoise. en concluant que les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique étaient compétents et, fi nalement, que la loi en question était constitutionnellement inap- pli cable aux autres provinces, le juge la forest n’a fait aucune mention d’un acte de gouvernement : il semble qu’il y ait peu de raisons pour que le tribunal qui cherche à déterminer ce qui constitue une loi étran- gère ne puisse pas entendre des arguments et recevoir des éléments de preuve concernant la constitutionnalité d’une telle loi. la jurisprudence citée par les intimées ne va nullement à l’encontre de cette proposition. au contraire, tout ce que la cour a décidé dans l’arrêt buck c. attorney- general, [1965] 1 all er 882 (ca), c’est qu’un tribunal n’est pas compétent pour rendre un jugement déclaratoire sur la validité de la constitution d’un état étranger. cela violerait les principes du droit international public. mais, en l’espèce, personne n’essaie d’attaquer la constitution elle- même. la question de la constitutionnalité est acces- soire au litige  .   .   . the policy reasons for allowing consideration of con- stitutional arguments in determining foreign law that inci- dentally arises in the course of litigation are well founded. the constitution of another jurisdiction is clearly part of its law, presumably the most fundamental part. a foreign court in making a fi nding of fact should not be bound to assume that the mere enactment of a statute necessarily means that it is constitutional. [pp. 308-9] il existe de bonnes raisons de principe de permettre l’examen d’arguments d’ordre constitutionnel pour statuer sur une loi étrangère qui est soulevée accessoirement dans un litige. la constitution d’un autre ressort fait clairement partie de son droit et en constitue vraisemblablement la partie la plus fondamentale. le tribunal étranger qui tire une conclusion de fait ne devrait pas être tenu de présu- mer qu’une loi est constitutionnelle du simple fait de son adoption. [p. 308-309] [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 207 [49] the decision in hunt confi rms that there is no jurisdictional bar to a canadian court dealing with the laws or acts of a foreign state where “the question arises merely incidentally” (p 309). and in reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr. 217, this court noted that, in certain circumstances, the adjudication of questions of international law by canadian courts will be necessary to determine rights or obligations within our legal system, and in these cases, adjudicating these questions is “not only per- missible but unavoidable” (para. 23; see also gib van ert, “the domestic application of international law in canada”, in curtis a. bradley, ed., the oxford handbook of comparative foreign relations law (2019), 501). [50] our courts are also frequently asked to evalu- ate foreign laws in extradition and deportation cases. in these instances, our courts consider comity but, as in other contexts, the deference accorded by comity to foreign legal systems “ends where clear violations of international law and fundamental human rights begin” (r v. hape, [2007] 2 scr 292, at para. 52; see also tolofson v. jensen, [1994] 3 scr 1022, at p. 1047; canada (justice) v. khadr, [2008] 2 scr. 125, at paras. 18 and 26; canada (prime minister) v. khadr, [2010] 1 scr 44, at para 16). in canada v. schmidt, [1987] 1 scr 500, an extradition case, la forest j recognized that [49] l’arrêt hunt confi rme qu’aucun obstacle lié à la compétence n’empêche un tribunal canadien de statuer sur les lois ou les actes d’un état étranger lors- que « la question n’est soulevée qu’accessoirement » (p 309). et dans le renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, [1998] 2 rcs 217, notre cour a souligné que, dans certaines circonstances, une décision d’un tribunal canadien sur des questions de droit interna- tional sera nécessaire pour déterminer les droits ou les obligations au sein de notre système juridique, et qu’en pareil cas, une décision sur ces questions est « non seulement permise mais inévitable » (par. 23; voir aussi gib van ert, « the domestic application of international law in canada », dans curtis a. bradley, dir., the oxford handbook of comparative foreign relations law (2019), 501). [50] nos tribunaux sont aussi souvent appelés à évaluer des lois étrangères dans des affaires d’extra- dition et d’expulsion. dans de tels cas, nos tribu- naux prennent en considération la courtoisie, mais comme dans d’autres contextes, le respect découlant de la courtoisie à l’égard des systèmes juridiques étrangers « cesse dès la violation manifeste du droit international et des droits fondamentaux de la per- sonne » (r c. hape, [2007] 2 rcs 292, par. 52; voir aussi tolofson c. jensen, [1994] 3 rcs 1022, p. 1047; canada (justice) c. khadr, [2008] 2 rcs. 125, par. 18 et 26; canada (premier ministre) c. khadr, [2010] 1 rcs 44, par 16). dans canada c. schmidt, [1987] 1 rcs 500, une affaire d’extra- dition, le juge la forest a reconnu que in some circumstances the manner in which the foreign state will deal with the fugitive on surrender, whether that course of conduct is justifi able or not under the law of that country, may be such that it would violate the principles of fundamental justice to surrender an accused under those circumstances. [p. 522] dans certaines situations le traitement que l’état étranger réservera au fugitif extradé, que ce traitement soit ou non justifi able en vertu des lois de ce pays-là, peut être de telle nature que ce serait une violation des principes de justice fondamentale que de livrer un accusé dans ces circonstances. [p. 522] [51] mclachlin j endorsed this principle in kindler v. canada (minister of justice), [1991] 2 scr 779, where she explained that “[t]he test for whether an extradition law or action offends s. 7 of the charter on account of the penalty which may be imposed in the requesting state, is whether the impo- sition of the penalty by the foreign state ‘suffi ciently [51] la juge mclachlin a souscrit à ce principe dans l’arrêt kindler c canada (ministre de la justice), [1991] 2 rcs 779, où elle a expliqué que « [l]e critère servant à déterminer si une loi ou une action en matière d’extradition porte atteinte à l’art. 7 de la charte relativement à la peine qui peut être infl igée dans l’état requérant, est de savoir si 208 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. shocks’ the canadian conscience” (p. 849, citing schmidt, at p 522). as part of the inquiry, the review- ing court must consider “the nature of the justice system in the requesting jurisdiction” in light of “the canadian sense of what is fair, right and just” (kindler, at pp 849-50). l’application de la peine par l’état étranger “choque suffi samment” la conscience canadienne » (p. 849, citant schmidt, p 522). dans le cadre de l’examen, la cour de révision doit examiner « la nature du sys- tème judiciaire de l’état requérant » à la lumière du « sens de ce qui est juste et équitable au canada » (kindler, p 849-850). [52] and in united states v. burns, [2001] 1 scr. 283, this court unanimously held that “[a]n extra- dition that violates the principles of fundamental justice will always shock the conscience” (para. 68 (emphasis in original)). the court concluded that it was a violation of s. 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms for the minister to extradite canadian citizens to the united states without, as a condition of extradition, assurances that the death penalty would not be sought. [52] et dans l’arrêt états- unis c. burns, [2001] 1 rcs 283, notre cour a statué à l’unanimité qu’« [u]ne extradition qui viole les principes de jus- tice fondamentale choquera toujours la conscience » (par. 68 (souligné dans l’original)). la cour a conclu que la décision du ministre d’extrader des citoyens canadiens aux états- unis sans obtenir, comme condi- tion de l’extradition, des assurances que la peine de mort ne serait pas infl igée contrevenait à l’art. 7 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. [53] in the deportation context, the court’s unani- mous decision in suresh v canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), [2002] 1 scr 3, concluded that the minister, and by extension the reviewing court, should consider the human rights record of the foreign state when assessing whether the potential deportee will be subject to torture there. [54] the question of whether and when it is appro- priate for a canadian court to scrutinize the human rights practices of a foreign state in the context of de- portation hearings was also squarely before the court in india v. badesha, [2017] 2 scr 127. moldaver j., writing for the court, said: “i am unable to accept    that evidence of systemic human rights abuses in a receiving state amounts to a general indictment of that state’s justice system   ”, concluding that the minister and the reviewing court are entitled to “consider evidence of the general human rights situ- ation” in a foreign state (para 44). [53] dans le contexte de l’expulsion, la cour a conclu, dans l’arrêt unanime suresh c. canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immigration), [2002] 1 rcs 3, que le ministre et, par extension, le tribunal de révision, doivent prendre en considé- ration les antécédents de l’état étranger en matière de respect des droits de la personne lorsqu’ils éta- blissent si la personne susceptible d’être expulsée y sera assujettie à la torture. [54] dans l’affaire inde c badesha, [2017] 2 rcs 127, la cour a aussi été directement saisie de la question de savoir si et quand il convient qu’un tri- bunal canadien examine attentivement les pratiques d’un état étranger en matière de droits de la personne dans le cadre d’audiences relatives à l’expulsion. le juge moldaver, s’exprimant au nom de la cour, a affi rmé ce qui suit : «    je ne puis accepter l’affi r- mation [  ] selon laquelle la preuve de violations systématiques des droits de la personne dans un état d’accueil revient à critiquer généralement le système de justice de cet état    », concluant que le ministre et la cour de révision peuvent « tenir compte d’élé- ments de preuve portant sur la situation générale [d’un état étranger] en matière de respect des droits de la personne » (par 44). [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 209 [55] even though all of these cases dealt to some extent with questions about the lawfulness of foreign state acts, none referred to the “act of state doctrine”. [56] despite the absence of any cases applying the act of state doctrine in canada, nevsun argues that the doctrine was part of the english common law received into the law of british columbia in 1858. [57] while the english common law, including some of the cases which are now recognized as form- ing the basis of the act of state doctrine, was gener- ally received into canadian law at various times in our legal history, as the preceding analysis shows, canadian jurisprudence has addressed the principles underlying the doctrine within our confl ict of laws and judicial restraint jurisprudence, with no attempt to have them united as a single doctrine. the act of state doctrine in canada has been completely ab- sorbed by this jurisprudence. [58] to now import the english act of state doc- trine and jurisprudence into canadian law would be to overlook the development that its underlying principles have received through considered analysis by canadian courts. [59] the doctrine is not part of canadian common law, and neither it nor its underlying principles as developed in canadian jurisprudence are a bar to the eritrean workers’ claims. [55] même si ces arrêts portaient tous dans une cer- taine mesure sur des questions concernant la légalité d’actes d’un état étranger, aucun ne faisait allusion à la doctrine de l’« acte de gouvernement ». [56] malgré l’absence de décisions appliquant la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement au canada, nevsun soutient que la doctrine faisait partie de la common law anglaise reçue dans le droit de la colombie- britannique en 1858. [57] bien que la common law anglaise, y com- pris certaines des décisions maintenant considérées comme constituant le fondement de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement, ait généralement été reçue dans le droit canadien à divers moments de l’histoire de notre droit, comme le démontre l’analyse qui précède, la jurisprudence canadienne a traité des principes qui sous- tendent la doctrine dans notre jurisprudence portant sur le confl it de lois et la rete- nue judiciaire, sans tenter de les joindre en une seule doctrine. au canada, la doctrine de l’acte de gou- vernement a été complètement absorbée par cette jurisprudence. introduire maintenant la doctrine anglaise [58] de l’« acte de gouvernement » et la jurisprudence à ce sujet dans le droit canadien reviendrait à faire abstraction de l’évolution que les principes sous- jacents de cette doctrine ont subie dans le cadre de l’analyse réfl échie à laquelle se sont livrés les tribu- naux canadiens. [59] la doctrine ne fait pas partie de la common law canadienne, et ni elle ni ses principes sous- jacents élaborés dans la jurisprudence canadienne ne font obstacle aux réclamations des travailleurs érythréens. customary international law droit international coutumier [60] the eritrean workers claim in their pleadings that customary international law is part of the law of canada and, as a result, a “breach of customary [60] les travailleurs érythréens soutiennent dans leurs actes de procédure que le droit international coutumier fait partie du droit du canada, et que, 210 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. international law    is actionable at common law”. specifi cally, the workers’ pleadings claim: par conséquent, [traduction] « une violation du droit international coutumier [  ] donne ouverture à une action en common law ». plus particulièrement, dans leurs actes de procédure, les travailleurs reven- diquent ce qui suit : 7 the plaintiffs bring this action for damages against nevsun under customary international law as incor- porated into the law of canada and domestic british columbia law. 7 les demandeurs intentent la présente action en dommages- intérêts contre nevsun en droit internatio- nal coutumier, incorporé au droit canadien et au droit interne de la colombie- britannique.   .   . 53 the plaintiffs seek damages under customary interna- tional law, as incorporated into the law [of] canada, from nevsun for the use of forced labour, slavery, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and crimes against humanity. 53 les demandeurs réclament à nevsun en droit inter- national coutumier, incorporé au droit canadien, des dommages- intérêts pour recours au travail forcé, es- clavage, traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, et crimes contre l’humanité.   .   . 56 the plaintiffs claim: 56 les demandeurs réclament : (a) damages at customary international law as incor- a) des dommages- intérêts en droit international cou- porated into the law of canada; tumier, incorporé au droit canadien;   .   . 60 the use of forced labour is a breach of customary international law and jus cogens and is actionable at common law. 60 le recours au travail forcé constitue une violation du droit international coutumier et du jus cogens donnant ouverture à une action en common law.   .   . 63 slavery is a breach of customary international law and jus cogens and is actionable at common law. 63 l’esclavage constitue une violation du droit interna- tional coutumier et du jus cogens donnant ouverture à une action en common law.   .   . 66 cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is a breach of customary international law and is actionable at common law. 66 les traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants constituent une violation du droit international cou- tumier donnant ouverture à une action en common law.   .   . 70 crimes against humanity are a breach of customary international law and jus cogens and are actionable at common law. 70 les crimes contre l’humanité constituent une viola- tion du droit international coutumier et du jus cogens donnant ouverture à une action en common law. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 211 [61] as these excerpts from the pleadings dem- onstrate, the workers broadly seek damages from nevsun for breaches of customary international law as incorporated into the law of canada. [62] as the chambers judge and the court of appeal noted, this court is not required to determine defi nitively whether the eritrean workers should be awarded damages for the alleged breaches of cus- tomary international law. the question before us is whether nevsun has demonstrated that the eritrean workers’ claims based on breaches of customary international law should be struck at this preliminary stage. [63] nevsun’s motion to strike these custom- ary international law claims was based on british columbia’s supreme court civil rules permitting pleadings to be struck if they disclose no reason- able claim (rule  9-5(1)(a)), or are unnecessary (rule 9-5(1)(b)). [64] a pleading will only be struck for disclos- ing no reasonable claim under rule 9-5(1)(a) if it is “plain and obvious” that the claim has no reasonable prospect of success (r v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., [2011] 3 scr 45, at para. 17; odhavji estate v. woodhouse, [2003] 3 scr 263, at paras 14-15). when considering an application to strike under this provision, the facts as pleaded are assumed to be true “unless they are manifestly incapable of be- ing proven” (imperial tobacco, at para. 22, citing operation dismantle v. the queen, [1985] 1 scr. 441, at p 455). [65] under rule 9-5(1)(b), a pleading may be struck if “it is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexa- tious”. fisher j articulated the relevant considera- tions in willow v. chong, 2013 bcsc 1083, stating: [61] comme le démontrent ces extraits des actes de procédure, les travailleurs réclament essentiellement à nevsun des dommages- intérêts pour des violations du droit international coutumier, incorporé au droit du canada. [62] comme l’ont souligné le juge en cabinet et la cour d’appel, notre cour n’a pas à décider de façon défi nitive s’il y a lieu d’accorder des dommages- intérêts aux travailleurs érythréens pour les viola- tions alléguées du droit international coutumier. la question dont nous sommes saisis est celle de savoir si nevsun a établi que les réclamations des travailleurs érythréens fondées sur des violations du droit international coutumier doivent être radiées à ce stade préliminaire. [63] la requête de nevsun visant à faire radier les réclamations de droit international coutumier reposait sur les supreme court civil rules de la colombie- britannique, qui permettent la radiation d’actes de procédure s’ils ne révèlent aucune cause d’action raisonnable (al. 9-5(1)(a) des règles), ou s’ils sont inutiles (al. 9-5(1)(b) des règles). [64] un acte de procédure sera radié au motif qu’il ne révèle aucune cause d’action raisonnable comme le prévoit l’al. 9-5(1)(a) des règles seulement s’il est « évident et manifeste » que la demande ne pré- sente aucune possibilité raisonnable de succès (r c. imperial tobacco canada ltée, [2011] 3 rcs 45, par. 17; succession odhavji c. woodhouse, [2003] 3 rcs 263, par 14-15). lors de l’examen d’une demande de radiation fondée sur cette disposition, les faits allégués sont tenus pour avérés « sauf s’ils ne peuvent manifestement pas être prouvés » (imperial tobacco, par. 22, citant operation dismantle c. la reine, [1985] 1 rcs 441, p 455). [65] selon l’alinéa 9-5(1)(b) des règles, un acte de procédure peut être radié s’il est [traduction] « inutile, scandaleux, frivole ou vexatoire ». dans la décision willow c. chong, 2013 bcsc 1083, la juge fisher a énoncé les considérations pertinentes de la façon suivante : under rule 9-5(1)(b), a pleading is unnecessary or vexatious if it does not go to establishing the plaintiff’s [traduction] aux termes de l’al. 9-5(1)(b) des règles, l’acte de procédure est inutile ou vexatoire s’il ne permet 212 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. cause of action, if it does not advance any claim known in law, where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or where it would serve no useful purpose and would be a waste of the court’s time and public resources: citizens for foreign aid reform inc. v. canadian jewish congress, [1999] bcj no. 2160 (sc); skender v. farley, 2007 bcca 629. [para. 20 (canlii)] [66] this court admonished in imperial tobacco that the motion to strike is a tool that must be used with care. the law is not static and unchanging. actions that yesterday were deemed hope- less may tomorrow succeed.   . therefore, on a motion to strike, it is not determinative that the law has not yet recognized the particular claim. the court must rather ask whether, assuming the facts pleaded are true, there is a reasonable prospect that the claim will succeed. the ap- proach must be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to proceed to trial. [para. 21] pas d’établir la cause d’action du demandeur, s’il ne pré- sente aucune action connue en droit, s’il est évident que l’action ne saurait être accueillie ou si l’acte de procédure ne servirait à aucune fi n utile et constituerait un gaspillage du temps de la cour et de ressources publiques : citizens for foreign aid reform inc. c. canadian jewish congress, [1999] bcj no. 2160 (cs);. skender c. farley, 2007 bcca 629. [par. 20 (canlii)] [66] notre cour a fait une mise en garde dans l’arrêt imperial tobacco, selon laquelle la requête en radiation ne saurait être accueillie à la légère. le droit n’est pas immuable. des actions qui semblaient hier encore vouées à l’échec pourraient être accueillies demain. [  ]. par conséquent, le fait qu’une action en particulier n’a pas encore été reconnue en droit n’est pas déterminant pour la requête en radiation. le tribunal doit plutôt se demander si, dans l’hypothèse où les faits allégués seraient avérés, il est raisonnablement possible que l’action soit accueillie. l’approche doit être généreuse et permettre, dans la me- sure du possible, l’instruction de toute demande inédite, mais soutenable. [par. 21] [67] the chambers judge in this case summarized the issues as follows: [67] le juge en cabinet en l’espèce a résumé les questions de la façon suivante : the proceeding raises issues of transnational law being the term used for the convergence of customary interna- tional law and private claims for human rights redresses and which include: (a) whether claims for damages arising out of the al- leged breach of jus cogens or peremptory norms of customary international law such as forced labour and torture may form the basis of a civil proceeding in british columbia; (b) the potential corporate liability for alleged breaches of both private and customary interna- tional law. this in turn raises issues of corporate immunity and whether the act of state doctrine raises a complete defence to the plaintiffs’ claims. [traduction] l’instance soulève des questions con- cer nant l’utilisation du terme droit transnational pour la convergence du droit international coutumier et des recours privés en vue de l’obtention de réparations en matière de droits de la personne, et comprend les questions suivantes : a) les demandes de dommages- intérêts décou- lant d’une présumée violation de jus cogens ou des normes impératives de droit international coutu- mier, comme celles interdisant le travail forcé et la torture, peuvent- elles constituer le fondement d’une instance civile en colombie- britannique; b) la responsabilité potentielle des sociétés pour les présumées violations du droit privé et du droit in- ternational coutumier, qui appelle la question de l’immunité des sociétés et celle de savoir si la doc- trine de l’acte de gouvernement soulève une défense complète aux actions des demandeurs. he concluded that though the workers’ claims raised novel and diffi cult issues, the claims were not bound il a conclu que même si les réclamations des tra- vailleurs soulèvent des questions inédites et diffi ciles, [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 213 to fail and should be allowed to proceed for a full contextual analysis at trial. in the british columbia court of appeal, [68] newbury ja also believed that a private law remedy for breaches of the international law norms alleged by the workers may be possible. in her view, recog- nizing such a remedy may be an incremental fi rst step in the development of this area of the law and, as a result, held that the claims based on breaches of customary international law should not be struck at this preliminary stage. celles-ci n’étaient pas vouées à l’échec et devraient être autorisées à faire l’objet d’une analyse contex- tuelle complète lors d’un procès. [68] la juge newbury de la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a également estimé qu’un recours de droit privé était possible à l’égard des violations des normes de droit international alléguées par les travailleurs. à son avis, la reconnaissance d’un tel recours peut constituer la première étape de l’évolution de ce domaine du droit et, par consé- quent, elle a conclu qu’il n’y avait pas lieu de radier les réclamations fondées sur des violations du droit international coutumier à ce stade préliminaire. [69] for the reasons that follow, i agree with the chambers judge and the court of appeal that the claims should be allowed to proceed. as the chambers judge put it: “the current state of the law in this area remains unsettled and, assuming that the facts set out in the [notice of civil claim] are true, nevsun has not established that the [customary international law] claims have no reasonable likeli- hood of success”. [69] pour les motifs qui suivent, je conviens avec le juge en cabinet et la cour d’appel qu’il faut permettre que les demandes soient instruites. comme l’a dit le juge en cabinet : [traduction] « l’état actuel du droit dans ce domaine demeure incertain, et à sup- poser que les faits énoncés dans [l’avis de poursuite civile] soient véridiques, nevsun n’a pas établi que les demandes [de droit international coutumier] n’ont aucune possibilité raisonnable de succès ». [70] canadian courts, like all courts, play an im- portant role in the ongoing development of interna- tional law. as la forest j wrote in a 1996 article in the canadian yearbook of international law:    in the fi eld of human rights, and of other laws imping- ing on the individual, our courts are assisting in developing general and coherent principles that apply in very signifi - cant portions of the globe. these principles are applied consistently, with an international vision and on the basis of international experience. thus our courts — and many other national courts — are truly becoming international courts in many areas involving the rule of law. they will become all the more so as they continue to rely on and benefi t from one another’s experience. consequently, it is important that, in dealing with interstate issues, national courts fully perceive their role in the international order and national judges adopt an international perspective. [70] les tribunaux canadiens, comme tous les tri- bunaux, jouent un rôle important dans l’évolution continue du droit international. comme l’a écrit le juge la forest dans un ar ticle publié en 1996 dans l’annuaire canadien de droit international : [traduction]    dans le domaine des droits de la per- sonne, et des autres lois ayant des effets sur l’individu, nos tribunaux participent à l’élaboration de principes généraux et cohérents qui s’appliquent dans de très grandes parties du globe. ces principes sont appliqués d’une manière uni- forme, dans une perspective internationale et à la lumière de l’expérience internationale. ainsi, nos tribunaux — et bien d’autres tribunaux nationaux — deviennent de véri- tables tribunaux internationaux dans plusieurs domaines faisant intervenir la primauté du droit. ils le deviendront encore davantage à mesure qu’ils continueront à s’appuyer sur l’expérience des autres et à en tirer profi t. il est donc important, lors de l’examen des questions interétatiques, que les tribunaux nationaux comprennent bien le rôle qu’ils jouent dans l’ordre international et que les juges nationaux adoptent un point de vue international. 214 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. (hon. gérard v. la forest, “the expanding role of the supreme court of canada in international law issues” (1996), 34 can. yb. intl law 89, at pp. 100-1) [71] since “[i]nternational law not only perco- lates down from the international to the domestic sphere, but    also bubbles up”, there is no rea- son for canadian courts to be shy about imple- menting and advancing international law (anthea roberts, “comparative international law? the role of national courts in creating and enforcing international law” (2011), 60 iclq 57, at p. 69; jutta brunnée and stephen j. toope, “a hesitant embrace: the application of international law by canadian courts” (2002), 40 can. yb. intl law 3, at pp. 4-6, 8 and 56; see also hugh m. kindred, “the use and abuse of international legal sources by canadian courts: searching for a principled approach”, in oonagh e fitzgerald, ed., the globalized rule of law: relationships between international and domestic law (2006), 5, at p 7). [72] understanding and embracing our role in im- plementing and advancing customary international law allows canadian courts to meaningfully contrib- ute, as we already assertively have, to the “choir” of domestic court judgments around the world shap- ing the “substance of international law” (osnat grady schwartz, “international law and national courts: between mutual empowerment and mutual weakening” (2015), 23 cardozo j. intl & comp. l. 587, at p. 616; see also rené provost, “judging in splendid isolation” (2008), 56 am. j. comp. l 125, at p 171). (hon. gérard v. la forest, « the expanding role of the supreme court of canada in international law issues » (1996), 34 acdi 89, p. 100-101) [71] étant donné que le [traduction] « [d]roit in- ternational ne fait pas que descendre de la sphère in- ternationale à la sphère nationale, mais [  ] remonte aussi », les tribunaux canadiens n’ont aucune raison d’hésiter à mettre en œuvre et à faire avancer le droit international (anthea roberts, « comparative international law? the role of national courts in creating and enforcing international law » (2011), 60 iclq 57, p. 69; jutta brunnée et stephen j. toope, « a hesitant embrace : the application of international law by canadian courts  » (2002), 40 acdi 3, p. 4-6, 8 et 56; voir aussi hugh m. kindred, « l’usage et le mésusage des sources juri- diques internationales par les tribunaux canadiens : à la recherche d’une perspective raisonnée », dans oonagh e. fitzgerald, dir., règle de droit et mondia- lisation : rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne (2006), 11, p 13). [72] en comprenant et en accueillant notre rôle dans la mise en œuvre et la progression du droit inter- national coutumier, les tribunaux canadiens peuvent contribuer utilement, comme nous l’avons déjà fait avec assurance, au [traduction] « concert » de jugements rendus par des tribunaux nationaux aux quatre coins du monde, qui forme la « substance du droit international  » (osnat grady schwartz, « international law and national courts : between mutual empowerment and mutual weakening  » (2015), 23 cardozo j. intl & comp. l 587, p. 616; voir également rené provost, « judging in splendid isolation » (2008), 56 am. j. comp. l 125, p 171). [73] given this role, we must start by determining whether the prohibitions on forced labour; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and crimes against humanity, the violations of which form the foundation of the workers’ customary international law claims, are part of canadian law, and, if so, whether their breaches may be remedied. to deter- mine whether these prohibitions are part of canadian [73] compte tenu de ce rôle, nous devons com- mencer par établir si les règles interdisant le travail forcé; l’esclavage; les traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants; et les crimes contre l’humanité, dont les violations constituent le fondement des récla- mations relatives au droit international coutumier présentées par les travailleurs, font partie du droit canadien et, dans l’affi rmative, s’il peut être remédié [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 215 law, we must fi rst determine whether they are part of customary international law. [74] customary international law has been de- scribed as “the oldest and original source of inter- national law” (philip alston and ryan goodman, international human rights (2013), at p.  72) it is the common law of the international legal sys- tem — constantly and incrementally evolving based on changing practice and acceptance. as a result, it sometimes presents a challenge for defi nitional precision. [75] but in the case of the norms the eritrean work- ers claim nevsun breached, the task is less oner- ous, since these norms emerged seamlessly from the origins of modern international law, which in turn emerged responsively and assertively after the brutality of world war ii. it brought with it accept- ance of new laws like prohibitions against genocide and crimes against humanity, new institutions like the united nations, and new adjudicative bodies like the international court of justice and eventually the international criminal court, all designed to promote a just rule of law and all furthering liberal democratic principles (philippe sands, east west street: on the origins of “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” (2016), at pp. 361-64; lloyd axworthy, navigating a new world: canada’s global future (2003), at pp 200-1). à ces violations. pour déterminer si ces interdictions font partie du droit canadien, nous devons d’abord décider si elles font partie du droit international cou- tumier. [74] le droit international coutumier est considéré comme [traduction] « la source d’origine la plus ancienne du droit international » (philip alston et ryan goodman, international human rights (2013), p 72). c’est la common law du système juridique international — évoluant constamment et progressi- vement au rythme des changements qui surviennent dans la pratique et l’acceptation. il peut donc parfois poser un défi sur le plan de l’élaboration d’une défi - nition précise. [75] cependant, dans le cas des normes qui, selon les travailleurs érythréens, auraient été violées par nevsun, la tâche est moins lourde, car ces normes ont émergé naturellement des origines du droit in- ternational moderne qui, à son tour, est apparu de manière réactive et ferme à la suite de la brutalité de la deuxième guerre mondiale. le droit international moderne a entraîné l’acceptation de nouvelles lois comme celles interdisant le génocide et les crimes contre l’humanité, de nouvelles institutions comme les nations unies et de nouveaux organismes déci- sionnels comme la cour internationale de justice et, par la suite, la cour pénale internationale, qui visent tous à promouvoir la primauté du droit et à faire avancer des principes démocratiques libéraux (philippe sands, east west street : on the origins of « genocide » and « crimes against humanity » (2016), p. 361-364; lloyd axworthy, navigating a new world : canada’s global future (2003), p. 200- 201). [76] the four authoritative sources of modern in- ternational law, including customary international law, are found in art.  38(1) of the statute of the international court of justice, can. ts 1945 no. 7, which came into force october 24, 1945: [76] les quatre sources offi cielles du droit inter- national moderne, y compris le droit international coutumier, sont énoncées au par. 38(1) du statut de la cour internationale de justice, rt. can. 1945 no 7, entré en vigueur le 24 octobre 1945 :   .   . a international conventions, whether general or particu- lar, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contest- ing states; a les conventions internationales, soit générales, soit spéciales, établissant des règles expressément reconnues par les états en litige; 216 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. b international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; b la coutume internationale comme preuve d’une pratique générale acceptée comme étant le droit; c the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; c les principes généraux de droit reconnus par les nations civilisées; d    judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualifi ed publicists of the various nations, as sub- sidiary means for the determination of rules of law. d    les décisions judiciaires et la doctrine des publicis- tes les plus qualifi és des différentes nations, comme moyen auxiliaire de détermination des règles de droit. professors brunnée and toope have described art. 38 as the “litmus test for the sources of international law” (brunnée and toope (2002), “a hesitant embrace”, at p 11). les professeurs brunnée et toope ont qualifié l’art. 38 de [traduction] « critère décisif quant aux sources du droit international » (brunnée et toope (2002), « a hesitant embrace », p 11). [77] there are two requirements for a norm of customary international law to be recognized as such: general but not necessarily universal practice, and opinio juris, namely the belief that such prac- tice amounts to a legal obligation (united nations, international law commission, report of the international law commission, 73rd sess., supp. no. 10, un. doc. a/73/10, 2018, at p. 124; north sea continental shelf, judgment, icj. report 1969, p. 3, at para. 71; kazemi estate v. islamic republic of iran, [2014] 3 scr 176, at para. 38; harold hongju koh, “twenty- first- century international lawmaking” (2013), 101 geo. lj 725, at p. 738; jean- marie henckaerts, “study on customary inter- national humanitarian law: a contribution to the un- derstanding and respect for the rule of law in armed confl ict” (2005), 87 int’l rev red cross 175, at p. 178; antonio cassese, international law (2nd ed. 2005), at p 157). [78] to meet the fi rst requirement, the practice must be suffi ciently general, widespread, representa- tive and consistent (international law commission, at p 135). to meet the second requirement, opinio juris, the practice “must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation”, as “distinguished from mere usage or habit” (international law commission, at p. 138; north sea continental shelf, at para 77). [77] pour être reconnue comme telle, une norme de droit international coutumier doit satisfaire à deux exigences : il doit s’agir d’une pratique générale, mais pas nécessairement universelle, et cette pratique doit équivaloir à une obligation juridique (opinio juris) (nations unies, commission du droit inter- national, rapport de la commission du droit inter- national, 73e sess., suppl. no 10, doc. nu. a/73/10, 2018, p. 125; plateau continental de la mer du nord, arrêt, cij. recueil 1969, p.  3, par.  71; kazemi (succession) c. république islamique d’iran, [2014] 3 rcs 176, par. 38; harold hongju koh, « twenty- first- century international lawmaking » (2013), 101 geo. lj 725, p. 738; jean- marie henckaerts, « étude sur le droit international humanitaire coutu- mier : une contribution à la compréhension et au res- pect du droit des confl its armés » (2005), 87 ricr. 289, p. 178; antonio cassese, international law (2e éd. 2005), p 157). [78] pour satisfaire à la première exigence, la pratique doit être suffi samment générale, répandue, représentative et constante (commission du droit international, p 143). pour satisfaire à la deuxième exigence, l’opinio juris, la pratique « doit être menée avec le sentiment de l’existence d’une obligation juridique ou d’un droit », et « distinguée du simple usage ou de la simple habitude » (commission du droit international, p. 146; plateau continental de la mer du nord, par 77). [79] the judicial decisions of national courts are also evidence of general practice or opinio juris and [79] les décisions judiciaires des tribunaux na- tionaux sont également une preuve de la pratique [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 217 thus play a crucial role in shaping norms of cus- tomary international law. as the permanent court of international justice noted in case concerning certain german interests in polish upper silesia (germany v. poland) (1926), pcij. ser. a, no. 7, legal decisions are “facts which express the will and constitute the activities of states” (p. 19; see also prosecutor v. jelisic, it-95-10-t, 14 december 1999 (icty, trial chamber), at para. 61; prosecutor v. krstic, it-98-33-t, 2 august 2001 (icty, trial chamber), at paras. 541, 575 and 579-89; prosecutor v. erdemovic, it-96-22-a, joint separate opinion of judge mcdonald and judge vohrah, 7 october 1997 (icty, appeals chamber), at paras 47-55). [80] when an international practice develops from being intermittent and voluntary into being widely accepted and believed to be obligatory, it becomes a norm of customary international law. as professor james l. brierly wrote: générale ou de l’opinio juris et jouent donc un rôle essentiel dans la détermination des normes de droit international coutumier. comme l’a souligné la cour permanente de justice internationale dans affaire relative à certains intérêts allemands en haute- silésie polonaise (allemagne c. pologne) (1926), cpji. sér. a, no 7, les décisions judiciaires sont des « faits, manifestations de la volonté et de l’acti- vité des états » (p. 19; voir également procureur c jelisic, it-95-10-t, 14  décembre 1999 (tpiy, chambre de première instance), par. 61; procureur c. krstic, it-98-33-t, 2 août 2001 (tpiy, chambre de première instance), par.  541, 575 et 579-589; procureur c. erdemovic, it-96-22-a, opinion indi- viduelle conjointe de la juge mcdonald et du juge vohrah, 7 octobre 1997 (tpiy, chambre d’appel), par 47-55). [80] lorsqu’une pratique internationale cesse d’être intermittente et volontaire pour devenir une pratique largement acceptée et considérée comme obligatoire, elle devient une norme de droit inter- national coutumier. comme l’a écrit le professeur james l. brierly : custom in its legal sense means something more than mere habit or usage; it is a usage felt by those who fol- low it to be an obligatory one. there must be present a feeling that, if the usage is departed from, some form of sanction will probably, or at any rate ought to, fall on the transgressor. [traduction] la coutume dans son sens juridique ne se résume pas à la simple habitude ou au simple usage; il s’agit d’un usage considéré comme obligatoire par ceux qui le suivent. il doit y avoir un sentiment que la déroga- tion à l’usage expose probablement, ou devrait en tout cas exposer, le transgresseur à une certaine forme de sanction. (james l. brierly, the law of nations: an introduc- tion to the international law of peace (6th ed. 1963), at p. 59, cited in john h. currie, et al., international law: doctrine, practice, and theory (2nd ed. 2014), at p. 116) (james l. brierly, the law of nations : an introduc- tion to the international law of peace (6e éd. 1963), p. 59, cité dans john h. currie, et autres, interna- tional law : doctrine, practice, and theory (2e éd. 2014), p. 116) [81] this process, whereby international practices become norms of customary international law, has been variously described as “accretion”, “crystalli- zation”, “ripening” and “gel[ling]” (see, eg,. bruno simma and philip alston, “the sources of human rights law: custom, jus cogens, and general principles” (1988), 12 aust. ybil 82, at p. 104; the paquete habana, 175 us 677 (1900), at p. 686; jutta brunnée and stephen j. toope, “international [81] ce processus, par lequel les pratiques interna- tionales deviennent des normes de droit international coutumier, a été qualifi é d’[traduction] « accrois- sement », de « cristallisation », de « maturation » et de « gélifi cation » (voir, p ex,. bruno simma et philip alston, « the sources of human rights law : custom, jus cogens, and general principles » (1988), 12 aust. ybil 82, p. 104; the paquete habana, 175 us 677 (1900), p. 686; jutta brunnée 218 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. law and the practice of legality: stability and change” (2018), 49 vuwlr 429, at p 443). [82] once a practice becomes a norm of custom- ary international law, by its very nature it “must have equal force for all members of the international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favour” (north sea continental shelf, at para 63). [83] within customary international law, there is a subset of norms known as jus cogens, or peremptory norms, which have been “accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole    from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modifi ed only by a subsequent norm of gen- eral international law having the same character” (vienna convention on the law of treaties, can. ts. 1980 no. 37 (entered into force 27 january 1980), art 53). this court acknowledged that “a peremptory norm, or jus cogens norm is a fundamental tenet of international law that is non- derogable” (kazemi, at para. 47, citing john h. currie, public international law (2nd ed. 2008), at p. 583; claude emanuelli, droit international public: contribution à l’étude du droit international selon une perspective canadienne (3rd ed. 2010), at pp. 168-69; vienna convention on the law of treaties, art 53). et stephen j. toope, « international law and the practice of legality : stability and change » (2018), 49 vuwlr 429, p 443). [82] une fois que la pratique devient une norme de droit international coutumier, elle doit, de par sa nature, « s’appliquer dans des conditions égales à tous les membres de la communauté internatio- nale et ne peu[t] donc être subordonné[e] à un droit d’exclusion exercé unilatéralement et à volonté par l’un quelconque des membres de la communauté à son propre avantage » (plateau continental de la mer du nord, par 63). [83] le droit international coutumier comprend un sous- ensemble de normes dites de jus cogens, ou normes impératives, qui ont été « acceptée[s] et reconnue[s] par la communauté internationale des [é]tats dans [leur] ensemble [auxquelles] aucune dérogation n’est permise et qui ne peu[vent] être modifi ée[s] que par une nouvelle norme du droit international général ayant le même caractère  » (convention de vienne sur le droit des traités, rt. can. 1980 no 37 (entrée en vigueur le 27 janvier 1980), art.  53) notre cour a reconnu qu’«  une norme impérative ou norme de jus cogens est un précepte fondamental du droit international auquel on ne peut déroger » (kazemi, par. 47, citant john h. currie, public international law (2e éd. 2008), p. 583; claude emanuelli, droit international pu- blic : contribution à l’étude du droit internatio- nal selon une perspective canadienne (3e éd. 2010), p. 168-169; convention de vienne sur le droit des traités, art 53). [84] peremptory norms have been accepted as fundamental to the international legal order (ian brownlie, principles of public international law (7th  ed 2008), at pp.  510-12; see also andrea bianchi, “human rights and the magic of jus cogens” (2008), 19 ejil 491; evan j. criddle and evan fox- decent, “a fiduciary theory of jus cogens” (2009), 34 yale j. intl l 331). [84] les normes impératives ont été acceptées à titre d’élément fondamental de l’ordre juridique international (ian brownlie, principles of public international law (7e éd. 2008), p. 510-512; voir également andrea bianchi, « human rights and the magic of jus cogens » (2008), 19 ejil 491; evan j. criddle et evan fox- decent, « a fiduciary theory of jus cogens » (2009), 34 yale j. intl l 331). [85] how then does customary international law apply in canada? as professor koh explains, “[l]aw- abiding states internalize international law by in- corporating it into their domestic legal and political [85] de quelle façon, alors, le droit internatio- nal coutumier s’applique-t-il au canada? comme l’ex plique le professeur koh, [traduction] « [l]es états respectueux des lois internalisent le [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 219 structures, through executive action, legislation, and judicial decisions which take account of and incor- porate international norms” (harold hongju koh, “transnational legal process” (1996), 75 neb. l. rev. 181, at p. 204 (emphasis in original)). some areas of international law, like treaties, require legis- lative action to become part of domestic law (currie, et al., international law: doctrine, practice, and theory, at pp. 160-61 and 173-74; currie, public international law, at pp 225-26). [86] on the other hand, customary international law is automatically adopted into domestic law with- out any need for legislative action (currie, public international law, at pp. 225-26; hape, at paras. 36 and 39, citing trendtex trading corp. v. central bank of nigeria, [1977] 1 qb 529 (eng. ca), per lord denning; hersch lauterpacht, “is international law a part of the law of england?”, in transactions of the grotius society, vol. 25, problems of peace and war: papers read before the society in the year 1939 (1940), 51). in england this is known as the doctrine of incorporation and in canada as the doc- trine of adoption. as professor brownlie explains: the dominant principle    is that customary rules are to be considered part of the law of the land and enforced as such, with the qualifi cation that they are incorporated only so far as is not inconsistent with acts of parliament or prior judicial decisions of fi nal authority. [p. 42] droit international en l’incorporant à leurs structures politiques et juridiques internes au moyen de mesures exécutives et législatives et de décisions judiciaires prenant en compte et incorporant les normes inter- nationales » (harold hongju koh, « transnational legal process » (1996), 75 neb. l. rev. 181, p. 204 (en italique dans l’original)). certains domaines du droit international, comme les traités, nécessitent une intervention législative pour faire partie intégrante du droit interne (currie, et autres, international law : doctrine, practice, and theory, p. 160-161 et 173- 174; currie, public international law, p 225-226). [86] par contre, le droit international coutumier est automatiquement intégré dans le droit interne sans que le législateur n’ait à intervenir (currie, public international law, p.  225-226; hape, par.  36 et 39, citant trendtex trading corp. c. central bank of nigeria, [1977] 1 q.b 529 (ca. ang.), lord denning; hersch lauterpacht, « is international law a part of the law of england? », dans transactions of the grotius society, vol. 25, problems of peace and war : papers read before the society in the year 1939 (1940), 51). en angleterre, ce principe est appelé doctrine de l’incorporation et au canada, doctrine de l’adoption. comme l’explique le profes- seur brownlie : [traduction] ce principe dominant [  ] veut que les règles de droit coutumier soient considérées comme faisant partie du droit du pays et appliquées en consé- quence, tout en étant assorties de la réserve selon laquelle elles doivent être intégrées seulement dans la mesure où cela n’est pas incompatible avec les lois du parlement ou les décisions judiciaires antérieures rendues par une juridiction de dernier ressort. [p. 42] [87] the adoption of customary international law as part of domestic law by way of automatic judicial incorporation can be traced back to the 18th century (gib van ert, using international law in canadian courts (2nd ed. 2008), at pp 184-208). blackstone’s 1769 commentaries on the laws of england: book the fourth, for example, noted that “the law of na- tions    is here adopted in it[s] full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land”, at p. 67; see also triquet v. bath (1764), 3 burr. 1478 (kb). similarly, in the frequently cited [87] l’adoption du droit international coutumier dans le droit interne par incorporation judiciaire automatique remonte au 18e  siècle (gib van ert, using international law in canadian courts (2e éd. 2008), p 184-208). par exemple, selon l’ouvrage commentaries on the laws of england : book the fourth, 1769, de blackstone, [traduction] « le droit des nations [  ] est adopté ici dans [sa] pleine mesure par la common law, et est considéré comme faisant partie du droit du pays », p. 67; voir aussi triquet c. bath (1764), 3 burr. 1478 (br). de la 220 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. case of chung chi cheung v. the king, [1939] ac. 160 (pc),. lord atkin wrote: the courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which nations accept amongst themselves. on any judicial issue they seek to ascertain what the relevant rule is, and, having found it, they will treat it as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes or fi nally declared by their tribunals. [p. 168] [88] direct incorporation is also far from a niche preserve among nations in a study covering 101 countries over a period between 1815 and 2013, professors pierre- hugues verdier and mila versteeg found widespread acceptance of the direct applica- tion of customary international law:    perhaps the most striking pattern that emerges from our data is that in virtually all states, [customary international law] rules are in principle directly applicable without legislative implementation.    [m]ost countries that re- quire treaty implementation do not apply the same rule to international custom, but rather apply it directly. (pierre- hugues verdier and mila versteeg, “interna- tional law in national legal systems: an empiri- cal investigation” (2015), 109 am. j. intl l 514, at p. 528) in canada, in the ship “north” v. the king [89] (1906), 37 scr 385, davies j., in concurring rea- sons, expressed the view that the admiralty court was “bound to take notice of the law of nations” (p.  394) similarly, in reference as to whether members of the military or naval forces of the united states of america are exempt from criminal proceedings in canadian criminal courts, [1943] scr 483, taschereau j., drawing on chung chi cheung, held that the body of rules accepted by nations are incorporated into domestic law absent statutes to the contrary (pp 516-17). même façon, dans la décision souvent citée chung chi cheung c. the king, [1939] ac 160 (cp), lord atkin a écrit ceci : [traduction] les cours reconnaissent l’existence d’un ensemble de règles que les nations acceptent entre elles. pour chaque question juridique soulevée, elles cherchent à déterminer la règle pertinente et, une fois qu’elles l’ont établie, elles considèrent cette règle comme étant incor- porée au droit interne, dans la mesure où elle n’est pas incompatible avec des règles édictées par statuts ou décla- rées défi nitives par leurs tribunaux. [p. 168] [88] l’incorporation directe est aussi loin d’être une chasse gardée entre les nations. dans le cadre d’une étude visant 101 pays pour la période allant de 1815 à 2013, les professeurs pierre- hugues verdier et mila versteeg ont pu constater une acceptation générale de l’application directe du droit internatio- nal coutumier : [traduction]    la tendance sans doute la plus frappante qui se dégage de nos données est que dans presque tous les états, les règles de [droit international coutumier] sont en principe directement applicables sans mise en œuvre législative. [  ] [l]a plupart des pays qui exigent une mise en œuvre des traités n’appliquent pas la même règle à la coutume internationale, mais l’appliquent plutôt directement. (pierre- hugues verdier et mila versteeg, « interna- tional law in national legal systems : an empirical investigation » (2015), 109 am. j. intl l 514, p. 528) [89] au canada, dans l’arrêt the ship “north” c. the king (1906), 37 rcs 385, le juge davies, dans des motifs concordants, s’est dit d’avis que la cour de l’amirauté est [traduction] « tenue de prendre connaissance d’offi ce du droit des nations » (p 394). de la même façon, dans reference as to whether members of the military or naval forces of the united states of america are exempt from criminal proceedings in canadian criminal courts, [1943] rcs 483, le juge taschereau, s’inspirant de la décision chung chi cheung, a conclu que l’ensemble des règles acceptées par les nations sont incorporées au droit interne s’il n’y a pas de lois à l’effet contraire (p 516-517). [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 221 [90] as these cases show, canada has long fol- lowed the conventional path of automatically incor- porating customary international law into domestic law via the doctrine of adoption, making it part of the common law of canada in the absence of con- fl icting legislation. this approach was more recently confi rmed by this court in hape, where lebel j for the majority held: despite the court’s silence in some recent cases, the doctrine of adoption has never been rejected in canada. indeed, there is a long line of cases in which the court has either formally accepted it or at least applied it. in my view, following the common law tradition, it appears that the doctrine of adoption operates in canada such that prohibitive rules of customary international law should be incorporated into domestic law in the absence of con- fl icting legislation. the automatic incorporation of such rules is justifi ed on the basis that international custom, as the law of nations, is also the law of canada unless, in a valid exercise of its sovereignty, canada declares that its law is to the contrary. parliamentary sovereignty dictates that a legislature may violate international law, but that it must do so expressly. absent an express derogation, the courts may look to prohibitive rules of customary international law to aid in the interpretation of canadian law and the development of the common law. [emphasis added; para 39]. it is important to note that he concluded that rules of customary international law should be automatically incorporated into domestic law in the absence of con- fl icting legislation. his use of the word “may” later in the paragraph cannot be taken as overtaking his clear direction that, based on “a long line of cases”, customary international law is automatically incor- porated into canadian law. judicial decisions are not talmudic texts whereby each word attracts its own exegetical interpretation. they must be read in a way that respects the author’s overall intention, without permitting a stray word or phrase to undermine the overarching theory being advanced. [90] comme le montrent ces arrêts, le canada a suivi pendant longtemps la voie conventionnelle de l’incorporation automatique du droit international coutumier au droit interne par application de la doc- trine de l’adoption, faisant de celui-ci une partie de la common law canadienne, sauf disposition légis- lative contraire. cette approche a été confi rmée plus récemment par notre cour dans l’arrêt hape, où le juge lebel a conclu au nom des juges majoritaires : malgré ce silence de notre cour dans certaines affaires récentes, la doctrine de l’adoption n’a jamais été rejetée au canada. en fait, un fort courant jurisprudentiel la recon- naît formellement ou, du moins, l’applique. à mon avis, conformément à la tradition de la common law, il appert que la doctrine de l’adoption s’applique au canada et que les règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier devraient être incorporées au droit interne sauf disposition législative contraire l’incorporation automatique des règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier se justifi e par le fait que la coutume internationale, en tant que droit des nations, constitue également le droit du canada à moins que, dans l’exercice légitime de sa souveraineté, celui-ci ne déclare son droit interne incompatible. la sou- veraineté du parlement permet au législateur de contre- venir au droit international, mais seulement expressément. si la dérogation n’est pas expresse, le tribunal peut alors tenir compte des règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier pour interpréter le droit canadien et élaborer la common law. [italique ajouté; par 39]. il est important de noter qu’il a conclu que les règles de droit international coutumier devraient être automatiquement incorporées au droit interne sauf disposition législative contraire. son utilisation du mot « peut » plus loin dans le para graphe ne peut être interprétée comme occultant sa directive claire selon laquelle, en fonction d’un « fort courant jurisprudentiel », le droit international coutumier est automatiquement incorporé au droit canadien. les décisions judiciaires ne sont pas des textes talmu- diques où chaque mot commande sa propre inter- prétation exégétique. elles doivent être lues d’une façon qui respecte l’intention générale de l’auteur, sans permettre qu’un mot ou une phrase isolés mine la thèse globale avancée. [91] justice lebel himself, in an article he wrote several years after hape, explained that the court’s [91] le juge lebel lui- même, dans un ar ticle qu’il a rédigé plusieurs années après l’arrêt hape, a 222 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. use of the word “may” in hape was in no way meant to diverge from the traditional approach of directly incorporating customary norms into canadian com- mon law: following [hape], there was some comment and con- cern to the effect that the [statement that “courts may look to prohibitive rules of customary international law to aid in the interpretation of canadian law and the development of the common law” (para. 39)] left the law in a state of some doubt. these comments pointed out that this sentence could be read as holding that prohibitive norms are not actually part of the domestic common law, but may only serve to aid in its development. in my view, this was not the sense of this passage, for at least three reasons. first, the sentences immediately preceding this last sentence stated, without reservation, that prohibitive rules of cus- tomary international law are incorporated into domestic law in the absence of confl icting legislation. second, the entire discussion of incorporation was for the purpose of showing how the norm of respect for the sovereignty of foreign states, forming, as it does, part of our common law, could shed light on the interpretation of s. 32(1) of the charter. third, the majority reasons also explicitly held that the customary principles of non- intervention and territorial sovereignty “may be adopted into the common law of canada in the absence of confl icting legislation”. the gist of the majority opinion in hape was that accept- ing incorporation of customary international [law] was the right approach. in conclusion, the law in canada today appears to be settled on this point: prohibitive customary norms are directly incorporated into our common law and must be followed by courts absent legislation which clearly overrules them. [emphasis added.] expliqué que l’utilisation par la cour du mot « peut » dans cet arrêt ne visait d’aucune façon à diverger de l’approche traditionnelle, qui consiste à incorporer directement les normes de droit coutumier à la com- mon law canadienne : [traduction] à la suite de [l’arrêt hape], certains ont formulé des commentaires ou étaient préoccupés concernant le fait que [l’énoncé selon lequel « le tribunal peut [  ] tenir compte des règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier pour interpréter le droit canadien et élaborer la common law » (par. 39)] ait laissé le droit dans un certain état de doute. ces commentaires indiquent que cette phrase peut être interprétée comme prescrivant que les normes impératives ne font pas déjà partie de la common law interne, mais ne servent qu’à contribuer à son évolution. à mon avis, tel n’était pas le sens de cet énoncé, et ce, pour au moins trois raisons. premièrement, les phrases qui précèdent immédiatement cette dernière phrase énonçaient, sans réserve, que les règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier sont intégrées au droit interne s’il n’y a pas de confl it de lois. deuxièmement, l’ensemble des observations sur l’intégration visait à mon- trer de quelle façon la norme de respect de la souveraineté des états étrangers, qui fait partie de notre common law, pouvait éclairer l’interprétation du par. 32(1) de la charte. troisièmement, les juges majoritaires dans leurs motifs ont aussi expressément statué que les principes de droit international coutumier de la non- intervention et de la sou- veraineté territoriale «  peuvent être incorporés à la com- mon law du canada », « sauf disposition incompatible ». l’essentiel de l’opinion majoritaire dans l’arrêt hape était que l’incorporation du droit international coutumier était la bonne approche à adopter. en conclusion, le droit au canada aujourd’hui semble être établi sur ce point : les normes prohibitives de droit international coutumier sont directement incorporées à notre common law et les tribu- naux doivent les respecter si aucune disposition législative ne les écarte de façon évidente. [italique ajouté.] (louis lebel, “a common law of the world? the reception of customary international law in the canadian common law” (2014), 65 unblj 3, at p. 15) (louis lebel, « a common law of the world? the reception of customary international law in the canadian common law » (2014), 65 rd. un-b. 3, p. 15) [92] as for lebel j.’s novel use of the word “pro- hibitive”, we should be wary of concluding that he intended to create a new category of customary in- ternational law unique to canada. in the same article, lebel j clarifi ed that “prohibitive” norms simply [92] pour ce qui est de l’utilisation novatrice par le juge lebel du mot « prohibitives », nous devons nous garder de conclure qu’il avait l’intention de créer une nouvelle catégorie de règles de droit international coutumier unique au canada. dans le même ar ticle, [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 223 mean norms that are “mandatory”, in the sense that they are obligatory or binding (lebel, at p 17). as professor currie observes, the word “prohibitive” is a “puzzling qualifi cation [that] does not fi gure in any of the authorities cited by lebel j for the doctrine, nor is it a feature of the doctrine of adoption that operates in the united kingdom” (john h. currie, “weaving a tangled web: hape and the obfuscation of canadian reception law” (2007), 45 can. yb. intl law 55, at p. 70; see also armand de mestral and evan fox- decent, “rethinking the relationship between international and domestic law” (2008), 53 mcgill lj 573, at p 587). [93] the use of the word “prohibitive”, therefore, does not add a separate analytic factor, it merely emphasizes the mandatory nature of customary in- ternational law (see van ert, using international law in canadian courts, at pp 216-18). this aligns with lebel j.’s statement in hape that the “automatic in- corporation” of norms of customary international law “is justifi ed on the basis that international custom, as the law of nations, is also the law of canada” (para. 39 (emphasis added)). [94] therefore, as a result of the doctrine of adop- tion, norms of customary international law — those that satisfy the twin requirements of general prac- tice and opinio juris — are fully integrated into, and form part of, canadian domestic common law, absent confl icting law (oonagh e. fitzgerald, “implementation of international humanitarian and related international law in canada”, in oonagh e fitzgerald, ed., the globalized rule of law: relationships between international and domestic law (2006), 625, at p 630). legislatures are of course free to change or override them, but like all common law, no legislative action is required to give them effect (kindred, at p 8). to suggest otherwise by requiring legislative endorsement, upends a 250 year old legal truism and would put canada out of step with most countries (verdier and versteeg, at p 528). as professor toope noted, “[t]he canadian story of international law is not merely a story of ‘persuasive’ foreign law. international law also speaks directly to le juge lebel a précisé que les normes « pro hi bi- tives » signifi ent simplement qu’elles sont « impéra- tives », dans le sens qu’elles sont obligatoires (lebel, p 17). comme l’a observé le professeur currie, le mot « prohibitives » est une [traduction] « cu- rieuse qualifi cation [qui] n’apparaît dans aucune des sources de doctrine citées par le juge lebel, et n’est pas non plus une caractéristique de la doctrine de l’adoption qui s’applique au royaume- uni » (john h. currie, « weaving a tangled web : hape and the obfuscation of canadian reception law » (2007), 45 acdi 55, p. 70; voir aussi armand de mestral et evan fox- decent, « rethinking the relationship between international and domestic law » (2008), 53 rd. mcgill. 573, p 587). [93] en conséquence, l’emploi du mot « pro hi bi- tives » n’ajoute pas de facteur analytique distinct; il ne fait que souligner le caractère impératif du droit international coutumier (voir van ert, using international law in canadian courts, p 216-218). cette idée est conforme avec l’énoncé du juge lebel dans l’arrêt hape selon lequel l’« incorporation auto- matique » des normes de droit international coutumier « se justifi e par le fait que la coutume internationale, en tant que droit des nations, constitue également le droit du canada » (par. 39 (italique ajouté)). [94] en conséquence, par application de la doctrine de l’adoption, les normes de droit international cou- tumier — celles qui satisfont aux deux exigences, soit la pratique générale et l’opinio juris — sont entièrement intégrées dans la common law interne canadienne, et font partie de celle-ci, sauf disposition législative contraire (oonagh e. fitzgerald, « la mise en œuvre au canada du droit humanitaire inter- national et connexe », dans oonagh e. fitzgerald, dir., règle de droit et mondialisation  : rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne (2006), 779, p 785). évidemment, les législatures sont libres de les changer ou d’y passer outre, mais comme pour toute règle de common law, aucune mesure législative n’est nécessaire pour leur donner effet (kindred, p 15). soutenir le contraire en exigeant l’adoption par le législateur renverse un truisme juri- dique reconnu depuis plus de 250 ans et causerait un décalage entre le canada et la plupart des pays (verdier et versteeg, p 528). comme l’a souligné 224 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. canadian law and requires it to be shaped in certain directions. international law is more than ‘compara- tive law’, because international law is partly our law” (stephen j. toope, “inside and out: the stories of international law and domestic law” (2001), 50 unblj 11, at p. 23 (emphasis in original)). [95] there is no doubt then, that customary inter- national law is also the law of canada. in the words of professor rosalyn higgins, former president of the international court of justice: “in short, there is not ‘international law’ and the common law. international law is part of that which comprises the common law on any given subject” (rosalyn higgins, “the relationship between international and regional human rights norms and domestic law” (1992), 18 commonwealth l. bull. 1268, at p 1273). the fact that customary international law is part of our common law means that it must be treated with the same respect as any other law. [96] in other words, “canadian courts, like courts all over the world, are supposed to treat public international law as law, not fact” (gib van ert, “the reception of international law in canada: three ways we might go wrong”, in centre for international governance innovation, canada in international law at 150 and beyond, paper no. 2 (2018), at p. 6; see also van ert, using international law in canadian courts, at pp 62-69). le professeur toope, [traduction] « [l]’histoire du droit international canadien n’est pas seulement une histoire de droit étranger “convaincant”. le droit international concerne aussi directement le droit canadien et exige que celui-ci aille dans certaines directions. le droit international représente plus que le “droit comparatif”, car le droit international est en partie notre droit » (stephen j. toope, « inside and out : the stories of international law and domestic law » (2001), 50 rd. un-b 11, p. 23 (en italique dans l’original)). [95] il ne fait donc aucun doute que le droit inter- national coutumier constitue également le droit du canada. pour reprendre les mots employés par la professeure rosalyn higgins, ancienne présidente de la cour internationale de justice : [traduction] «  bref, il n’y a pas le “droit international” d’un côté et la common law de l’autre. le droit inter- national fait partie de ce qui constitue la common law sur tout sujet donné » (rosalyn higgins, « the relationship between international and regional human rights norms and domestic law » (1992), 18 commonwealth l. bull. 1268, p 1273). le fait que le droit international coutumier fasse partie de notre common law signifi e qu’il doit faire l’objet du même respect que tout autre droit. [96] autrement dit, [traduction] « les tribunaux canadiens, comme tous les tribunaux dans le monde, sont censés traiter le droit international public comme du droit, et non comme un fait » (gib van ert, « the reception of international law in canada : three ways we might go wrong  », dans centre pour l’innovation dans la gouvernance internationale, canada et droit international : 150 ans d’histoire et perspectives d’avenir, document no 2 (2018), p. 6; voir également van ert, using international law in canadian courts, p 62-69). [97] unlike foreign law in confl ict of laws ju- risprudence, therefore, which is a question of fact requiring proof, established norms of customary international law are law, to be judicially noticed (van ert, “the reception of international law”, at p. 6; van ert, using international law in canadian courts, at pp 62-69). professor higgins explains this as follows: “there is not a legal system in the world [97] contrairement au droit étranger dans la juris- prudence portant sur le confl it de lois, par conséquent, qui est une question de fait exigeant une preuve, les normes établies en droit international coutumier sont du droit, et doivent faire l’objet d’une connaissance d’offi ce (van ert, « the reception of international law », p. 6; van ert, using international law in canadian courts, p 62-69). la professeure higgins [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 225 where international law is treated as ‘foreign law’. it is everywhere part of the law of the land; as much as contracts, labour law or administrative law” (p. 1268; see also james crawford, brownlie’s principles of public international law (9th ed. 2019), at p. 52; robert jennings and arthur watts, oppenheim’s international law (9th ed. 2008), vol. 1, at p. 57; van ert, using international law in canadian courts, at p 64). [98] and just as the law of contracts, labour law and administrative law are accepted without the need of proof, so too is customary international law. taking judicial notice — in the sense of not requiring formal proof by evidence — is appropriate and an inevitable implication both of the doctrine of adop- tion3 and legal orthodoxy (anne warner la forest, “evidence and international and comparative law”, in oonagh e. fitzgerald, ed., the globalized rule of law: relationships between international and domestic law (2006), 367, at pp. 381-82; van ert, using international law in canadian courts, at pp. 42-56 and 62-66). [99] some academics suggest that when recognis- ing new norms of customary international law, allow- ing evidence of state practice may be appropriate. while these scholars acknowledge that permitting such proof departs from the conventional approach of judicially noticing customary international law, they maintain that this in no way derogates from the nature of international law as law (anne warner la forest, at pp. 384 and 388; van ert, using international law in canadian courts, at pp 67-69). the questions of whether and what evidence may be used to demon- strate the existence of a new norm are not, however, live issues in this appeal. here the inquiry is less complicated and taking judicial notice is appropriate 3 as anne warner la forest writes: “[i]f custom is indeed the law of the land, then the argument in favour of judicial notice, as traditionally understood, is a strong one. it is a near perfect syllogism. if custom is the law of the land, and the law of the land is to be judicially noticed, then custom should be judicially noticed” (p 381). explique cet énoncé de la façon suivante : [traduc- tion] « il n’y a aucun système juridique dans le monde où le droit international est considéré comme du “droit étranger”. partout, il fait partie du droit du pays; tout autant que le droit des contrats, le droit du travail ou le droit administratif » (p. 1268; voir aussi james crawford, brownlie’s principles of public international law (9e éd. 2019), p. 52; robert jennings et arthur watts, oppenheim’s international law (9e  éd 2008), vol.  1, p.  57; van ert, using international law in canadian courts, p 64). [98] et tout comme le droit des contrats, le droit du travail et le droit administratif sont acceptés sans qu’aucune preuve ne soit nécessaire, il s’agit de la même chose pour le droit international coutumier. la connaissance d’offi ce — dans le sens où une preuve offi cielle n’est pas requise — est appropriée et est une conséquence inévitable tant de la doc- trine de l’adoption3 que de l’orthodoxie juridique (anne warner la forest, « le principe de la preuve, le droit international et le droit comparé  », dans oonagh e. fitzgerald, dir., règle de droit et mon- dialisation : rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne (2006), 455, p. 471-473; van ert, using international law in canadian courts, p. 42- 56 et 62-66). [99] certains auteurs suggèrent que lors de la reconnaissance de nouvelles normes de droit inter- national coutumier, il peut être approprié d’ admettre la preuve de la pratique de l’état. bien que ces uni- versitaires reconnaissent que le fait de permettre une telle preuve s’écarte de l’approche convention- nelle qui consiste à prendre connaissance d’offi ce du droit international coutumier, ils soutiennent que cela ne déroge aucunement à la nature du droit inter- national en tant que droit (anne warner la forest, p. 475-476 et 480-481; van ert, using international law in canadian courts, p 67-69). toutefois, les questions de savoir si des éléments de preuve, et le cas échéant, lesquels, peuvent être utilisés pour 3 comme l’a écrit anne warner la forest, « [si le droit interna- tional coutumier] est effectivement le droit du pays, l’argument favorable à la doctrine de la connaissance d’offi ce, telle qu’elle est traditionnellement entendue, a du poids. c’est même presque un parfait syllogisme. si le droit international coutumier est le droit du pays et que le droit du pays est admis sans preuve, le droit international coutumier doit être admis sans preuve » (p 472). 226 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. since the workers claim breaches not simply of es- tablished norms of customary international law, but of norms accepted to be of such fundamental im- portance as to be characterized as jus cogens, or peremptory norms. démontrer l’existence d’une nouvelle norme ne sont pas des questions en litige dans le présent pourvoi. en l’espèce, l’examen est moins compliqué et la prise de connaissance d’offi ce est appropriée car les travailleurs allèguent des violations non seulement de normes établies du droit international coutumier, mais aussi de normes reconnues comme étant d’une importance si fondamentale qu’elles sont qualifi ées de normes de jus cogens, ou de normes impératives. [100] crimes against humanity have been de- scribed as among the “least controversial examples” of violations of jus cogens (louis lebel and gloria chao, “the rise of international law in canadian constitutional litigation: fugue or fusion? recent developments and challenges in internalizing international law” (2002), 16 sclr (2d) 23, at p 33). [100] les crimes contre l’humanité ont été décrits comme étant parmi les [traduction] «  exemples les moins controversés » de violations du jus cogens (louis lebel et gloria chao, « the rise of interna- tional law in canadian constitutional litigation : fugue or fusion? recent developments and chal- lenges in internalizing international law » (2002), 16 sclr (2d) 23, p 33). [101] the prohibition against slavery too is seen as a peremptory norm. in 2002, the offi ce of the united nations high commissioner for human rights con- fi rmed that “it is now a well- established principle of international law that the ‘prohibition against slav- ery and slavery- related practices have achieved the level of customary international law and have at- tained “jus cogens” status’” (david weissbrodt and anti- slavery international, abolishing slavery and its contemporary forms, un. doc. hr/ pub/ 02/4 (2002), at p 3). [101] l’interdiction de l’esclavage aussi est consi- dérée comme une norme impérative. en 2002, le haut- commissariat des nations unies aux droits de l’homme a confi rmé que « l’interdiction de l’es- clavage et des pratiques analogues est désormais un principe bien établi de droit international qui a rang de règle de droit international coutumier et de “jus cogens” » (david weissbrodt et la société anti- esclavagiste internationale, abolir l’esclavage et ses formes contemporaines, doc. nu. hr/pub/02/4 (2002) p 3). [102] compelling authority also confi rms that the prohibition against forced labour has attained the status of jus cogens. the international labour organization, in a report entitled “forced labour in myanmar (burma)”, ilo. offi cial bulletin: special supplement, vol. lxxxi, 1998, series b, recognized that, “there exists now in international law a peremp- tory norm prohibiting any recourse to forced labour and that the right not to be compelled to perform forced or compulsory labour is one of the basic hu- man rights” (para 203). to the extent that debate may exist about whether forced labour is a peremp- tory norm, there can be no doubt that it is at least a norm of customary international law. [102] il existe aussi de l’autorité convaincante qui confi rme que l’interdiction du travail forcé a mainte- nant valeur de jus cogens. dans un rapport intitulé « travail forcé au myanmar (birmanie) », bulletin offi ciel du bit : supplément spécial, vol. lxxxi, 1998, série b, l’organisation internationale du travail a reconnu « qu’il existe aujourd’hui en droit interna- tional une norme qui interdit de manière impérative tout recours au travail forcé, le droit de ne pas être as- treint à accomplir un travail ou service comptant parmi les droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine » (par 203). dans la mesure où il pourrait y avoir débat quant à la question de savoir si l’interdiction du travail forcé constitue une norme impérative, il ne fait aucun doute qu’elle constitue à tout le moins une norme de droit international coutumier. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 227 [103] and the prohibition against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment has been described as an “absolute right, where no social goal or emergency can limit [it]” (currie, et al., international law: doctrine, practice, and theory, at p 627). this is refl ected in the ratifi cation of several international covenants and treaties such as the international cov- enant on civil and political rights, can. ts 1976 no. 47 (entered into force march 23, 1976), art. 7; the convention against torture and other cruel, in- human or degrading treatment or punishment, can ts 1987 no. 36 (entered into force june 26, 1987), art. 16; the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 213 unts 221, art. 3; the american declaration of the rights and duties of man, april 30, 1948, art. 26; the american convention on human rights, 1144 unts 123, art. 5; the african charter on human and peoples’ rights, 1520 unts 217, art. 5; the convention on the rights of the child, can. ts. 1992 no. 3, art. 37; the european convention for the prevention of torture and inhuman or degrad- ing treatment or punishment, 1561 unts 363; and the inter- american convention to prevent and punish torture, oasts. no. 67 (currie, et al., international law: doctrine, practice, and theory, at p 627). [104] nevsun argues, however, that even if custom- ary international law norms such as those relied on by the eritrean workers form part of the common law through the doctrine of adoption, it is immune from their application because it is a corporation. [103] en outre, l’interdiction relative aux traite- ments cruels, inhumains ou dégradants a été qualifi ée de [traduction] « droit absolu qu’aucun objectif social ni aucune urgence ne saurait restreindre » (currie, et al., international law : doctrine, practice, and theory, p 627). c’est ce qui ressort de la rati- fi cation de plusieurs conventions et traités interna- tionaux comme le pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, rt. can. 1976 no 47 (entré en vigueur le 23 mars 1976), art. 7; la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, rt. can. 1987 no 36 (entrée en vigueur le 26 juin 1987), art. 16; la convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, 213 rtnu 221, art. 3; la déclaration américaine des droits et devoirs de l’homme, 30 avril 1948, art. 26; la convention américaine relative aux droits de l’homme, 1144 rtnu 123, art. 5; la charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, 1520 rtnu 217, art. 5; la convention relative aux droits de l’enfant, rt. can. 1992 no 3, art. 37; la convention européenne pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants, 1561 rtnu 363; et la convention interaméricaine pour la prévention et la répression de la torture, stoea no 67 (currie, et autres, international law : doctrine, practice, and theory, p 627). [104] nevsun soutient toutefois que, même si des normes de droit international coutumier comme celles invoquées par les travailleurs érythréens font partie de la common law par application de la doc- trine de l’adoption, elle est à l’abri de leur application parce qu’elle est une société. [105] nevsun’s position, with respect, miscon- ceives modern international law. as professor william s. dodge has observed, “[i]nternational law    does not contain general norms of liability or non- liability applicable to categories of actors” (william s. dodge, “corporate liability under customary international law” (2012), 43 geo. j. int’l l 1045, at p 1046). though certain norms of customary in- ternational law, such as norms governing treaty mak- ing, are of a strictly interstate character and will have no application to corporations, others prohibit con- duct regardless of whether the perpetrator is a state [105] soit dit en tout respect, nevsun se méprend sur le droit international moderne. comme l’a fait observer le professeur william s. dodge, [traduc- tion] « [l]e droit international [  ] ne comporte pas de normes générales de responsabilité ou de non- responsabilité applicables à des catégories d’ac- teurs » (william s. dodge, « corporate liability under customary international law » (2012), 43 geo. j. int’l l 1045, p 1046). bien que certaines normes de droit international coutumier, comme les normes régissant la conclusion de traités, soient de nature strictement interétatique et ne s’appliquent 228 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. (see, eg,. dodge; harold hongju koh, “separating myth from reality about corporate responsibility litigation” (2004), 7 jiel 263, at pp. 265-67; andrew clapham, human rights obligations of non- state actors (2006), at p 58). [106] while states were classically the main sub- jects of international law since the peace of west- phalia in 1648 (cassese, at pp.  22-25; oona a. hathaway and scott j. shapiro, the international- ists: how a radical plan to outlaw war remade the world (2017), at p xix), international law has long- since evolved from this state- centric tem- plate. as lord denning wrote in trendtex trading corp., “i would use of international law the words which galileo used of the earth: ‘but it does move’” (p 554). in fact, international law has so fully ex- [107] panded beyond its grotian origins that there is no longer any tenable basis for restricting the appli- cation of customary international law to relations between states. the past 70 years have seen a pro- liferation of human rights law that transformed in- ternational law and made the individual an integral part of this legal domain, refl ected in the creation of a complex network of conventions and normative instruments intended to protect human rights and ensure compliance with those rights. pas aux sociétés, d’autres interdisent un certain comportement, que l’auteur de la faute soit un état ou non (voir, p ex,. dodge; harold hongju koh, « separating myth from reality about corporate responsibility litigation » (2004), 7 jiel 263, p. 265-267; andrew clapham, human rights ob- ligations of non- state actors (2006), p 58). [106] bien que les états aient historiquement été les principaux sujets du droit international depuis la paix de westphalie en 1648 (cassese, p. 22-25; oona a. hathaway et scott j. shapiro, the internationalists : how a radical plan to outlaw war remade the world (2017), p xix), le droit international a depuis longtemps évolué par rapport à ce modèle axé sur l’état. comme l’a écrit lord denning dans trendtex trading corp., [traduction] «  [j]’emploierai à l’égard du droit international les mots qu’a em- ployés galilée à l’égard de la terre : “et pourtant elle bouge” » (p 554). [107] en fait, le droit international a tellement pris de l’ampleur par rapport à son origine grotienne qu’il n’existe plus aucune raison valable de restreindre l’application du droit international coutumier aux rapports entre les états. au cours des 70 dernières années, nous avons assisté à une prolifération de lois relatives aux droits de la personne qui ont transformé le droit international et fait de l’individu une partie intégrante de ce domaine juridique, comme en fait foi la création d’un réseau complexe de conventions et d’instruments normatifs visant à protéger les droits de la personne et à en assurer le respect. [108] professor payam akhavan notes that “[t]he rapid emergence of human rights signifi ed a revo- lutionary shift in international law, from a state- centric to a human- centric conception of global order” (payam akhavan, “canada and interna- tional human rights law: is the romance over?” (2016), 22 canadian foreign policy journal 331, at p 332). the result of these developments is that international law now works “not only to maintain peace between states, but to protect the lives of individuals, their liberty, their health, [and] their education” (emmanuelle jouannet, “what is the use of international law? international law as a 21st century guardian of welfare” (2007), 28 mich. [108] le professeur payam akhavan a souligné que [traduction] «  [l]’émergence rapide des droits de la personne a entraîné un changement révolutionnaire en droit international, soit le pas- sage d’une conception de l’ordre mondial axée sur l’état à une axée sur la personne » (payam akhavan, « canada and international human rights law : is the romance over? » (2016), 22 canadian foreign policy journal 331, p 332). cette évolution a fait en sorte que le droit international vise maintenant [traduction] « non seulement à maintenir la paix entre les états, mais aussi à protéger la vie des per- sonnes ainsi que leur liberté, leur santé [et] leur ins- truction  » (emmanuelle jouannet, «  what is the [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 229 j. int’l l 815, at p 821). as professor christopher c. joyner adds: “the rights of peoples within a state now transcend national boundaries and have become essentially a common concern under international law” (christopher c. joyner, “‘the responsibility to protect’: humanitarian concern and the lawfulness of armed intervention” (2007), 47 va j. int’l l 693, at p 717). [109] this represents the international law actual- ization of professor hersch lauterpacht’s statement in 1943 that “[t]he individual human being    is the ultimate unit of all law” (sands, at p 63). use of international law? international law as a 21st century guardian of welfare » (2007), 28 mich. j. int’l l 815, p 821). le professeur christopher c. joyner a ajouté : [traduction] « les droits des per- sonnes se trouvant dans un état transcendent mainte- nant les frontières nationales et sont essentiellement devenus une source de préoccupation commune en droit international » (christopher c. joyner, «“the responsibility to protect” : humanitarian concern and the lawfulness of armed intervention » (2007), 47 va j. int’l l 693, p 717). [109] cela représente l’actualisation en droit in- ternational de la déclaration du professeur hersch lauterpacht, faite en 1943, selon laquelle [traduc- tion] « [l]’être humain [  ] constitue l’ultime unité de tout droit » (sands, p 63). [110] a central feature of the individual’s position in modern international human rights law is that the rights do not exist simply as a contract with the state. while the rights are certainly enforceable against the state, they are not defi ned by that relationship (patrick macklem, the sovereignty of human rights (2015), at p 22). they are discrete legal entitle- ments, held by individuals, and are “to be respected by everyone” (clapham, human rights obligations, at p 58). [110] la principale caractéristique de la position de l’individu en droit international moderne des droits de la personne est que les droits ne résultent pas sim- plement d’un contrat avec l’état. bien que les droits soient assurément exécutoires contre l’état, ils ne sont pas défi nis par cette relation (patrick macklem, the sovereignty of human rights (2015), p 22). il s’agit de droits distincts, dont jouissent les individus, et que [traduction] « tout le monde doit respecter » (clapham, human rights obligations, p 58). [111] moreover, as professor beth stephens has observed, these rights may be violated by private actors: [111] de plus, comme l’a fait observer la profes- seure beth stephens, ces droits peuvent être violés par des acteurs privés : the context in which international human rights norms must be interpreted and applied today is one in which such norms are routinely applied to private actors. human rights law in the past several decades has moved decisively to prohibit violations by private actors in fi elds as diverse as discrimination, children’s rights, crimes against peace and security, and privacy.   . it is clear that individuals today have both rights and responsibilities under international law. although expressed in neutral language, many human rights provisions must be understood today as applying to individuals as well as to states. [traduction] le contexte dans lequel les normes internationales en matière de droits de la personne doivent être interprétées et appliquées de nos jours en est un dans lequel de telles normes sont régulièrement appliquées à des acteurs privés. au cours des dernières décennies, le droit en matière de droits de la personne a résolument évolué dans le sens de l’interdiction des violations par des acteurs privés dans des domaines aussi divers que la discrimination, les droits de l’enfant, les crimes contre la paix et la sécurité, et la vie privée. [  ]. il est clair que, de nos jours, les particuliers ont à la fois des droits et des responsabilités en droit international. bien qu’elles soient formulées en termes neutres, plusieurs dispositions en matière de droits de la personne doivent être interprétées aujourd’hui comme s’appliquant aussi bien aux particu- liers qu’aux états. 230 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. (beth stephens, “the amorality of profi t: transna- tional corporations and human rights” (2002), 20 bjil 45, at p. 73) (beth stephens, « the amorality of profi t : trans- national corporations and human rights » (2002), 20 bjil 45, p. 73) there is no reason, in principle, why “private actors” excludes corporations. il n’y a aucune raison, en principe, pour laquelle les « acteurs privés » excluraient les sociétés. [112] canvassing the jurisprudence and academic commentaries, professor koh observes that non- state actors like corporations can be held responsi- ble for violations of international criminal law and concludes that it would not “make sense to argue that international law may impose criminal liabil- ity on corporations, but not civil liability” (koh, “separating myth from reality”, at p 266). he de- scribes the idea that domestic courts cannot hold corporations civilly liable for violations of interna- tional law as a “myth” (koh, “separating myth from reality”, at pp. 264-68; see also simon baughen, human rights and corporate wrongs: closing the governance gap (2015), at pp 130-32). professor koh also notes that [t]he commonsense fact remains that if states and in- dividuals can be held liable under international law, then so too should corporations, for the simple reason that both states and individuals act through corporations. given that reality, what legal sense would it make to let states and individuals immunize themselves from liability for gross violations through the mere artifi ce of corporate forma- tion? [emphasis in original.] [112] examinant soigneusement la jurisprudence et la doctrine, le professeur koh remarque que les acteurs non étatiques comme les sociétés peuvent être tenues responsables de violations du droit pénal international et conclut qu’il [traduction] « serait illogique de soutenir que le droit internatio- nal peut imputer une responsabilité criminelle aux sociétés, mais pas une responsabilité civile » (koh, « separating myth from reality », p 266). il qualifi e de « mythe » l’idée que les tribunaux nationaux ne peuvent tenir les sociétés civilement responsables de violations du droit international (koh, « separating myth from reality », p. 264-268; voir aussi simon baughen, human rights and corporate wrongs : closing the governance gap (2015), p 130-132). le professeur koh souligne ce qui suit : [traduction]    il n’en demeure pas moins que si les états et les particuliers peuvent être tenus responsables en droit international, les sociétés devraient pouvoir l’être aussi, pour la simple raison que les états et les particuliers agissent par l’intermédiaire de sociétés. compte tenu de cette réalité, serait-il sensé sur le plan juridique de laisser les états et les particuliers se soustraire à la responsabi- lité pour violations fl agrantes par le simple artifi ce de la constitution en société? [en italique dans l’original.] (koh, “separating myth from reality”, at p. 265) (koh, « separating myth from reality », p. 265) [113] as a result, in my respectful view, it is not “plain and obvious” that corporations today enjoy a blanket exclusion under customary international law from direct liability for violations of “obliga- tory, defi nable, and universal norms of international law”, or indirect liability for their involvement in what professor clapham calls “complicity offenses” (koh, “separating myth from reality”, at pp. 265 and 267; andrew clapham, “on complicity”, in marc henzelin and robert roth, eds., le droit pénal à l’épreuve de l’internationalisation (2002), 241, at pp 241-75). however, because some norms of [113] par conséquent, à mon humble avis, il n’est pas « évident et manifeste » que les sociétés jouissent aujourd’hui d’une exclusion générale en droit international coutumier à l’égard de la respon- sabilité directe pour violations des [traduction] «  normes obligatoires, défi nissables et universelles de droit international », ou de la responsabilité indi- recte pour leur participation à ce que le professeur clapham appelle les « infractions de complicité » (koh, « separating myth from reality », p. 265 et 267; andrew clapham, « on complicity », dans marc henzelin et robert roth, dir., le droit pénal [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 231 customary international law are of a strictly interstate character, the trial judge will have to determine whether the specifi c norms relied on in this case are of such a character. if they are, the question for the court will be whether the common law should evolve so as to extend the scope of those norms to bind corporations. [114] ultimately, for the purposes of this appeal, it is enough to conclude that the breaches of custom- ary international law, or jus cogens, relied on by the eritrean workers may well apply to nevsun. the only remaining question is whether there are any canadian laws which confl ict with their adoption as part of our common law. i could not, with respect, fi nd any. [115] on the contrary, the canadian government has adopted policies to ensure that canadian compa- nies operating abroad respect these norms (see, eg,. global affairs canada, doing business the canadian way: a strategy to advance corporate social re- sponsibility in canada’s extractive sector abroad, last updated july 31, 2019 (online); global affairs canada, minister carr announces appointment of fi rst canadian ombudsperson for responsible enter- prise, april 8, 2019 (online) (announcing the creation of an ombudsperson for responsible enterprise, and a multi- stakeholder advisory body on responsible business conduct)). with respect to the canadian ombudsperson for responsible enterprise, man- dated to review allegations of human rights abuses of canadian corporations operating abroad, the ca- nadian government has explicitly noted that “[t]he creation of the ombudsperson’s offi ce does not af- fect the right of any party to bring a legal action in a court in any jurisdiction in canada regarding allega- tions of harms committed by a canadian company abroad” (global affairs canada, responsible busi- ness conduct abroad — questions and answers, last updated september 16, 2019 (online); yousuf aftab and audrey mocle, business and human rights as à l’épreuve de l’internationalisation (2002), 241, p 241-275). cependant, parce que certaines normes de droit international coutumier ont un caractère strictement interétatique, le juge de première ins- tance devra établir si les normes précises invoquées dans le cas qui nous occupe ont un tel caractère. dans l’affi rmative, le tribunal devra alors trancher la question de savoir si la common law devrait évoluer de manière à élargir la portée de ces normes pour que les sociétés y soient assujetties. [114] en dernière analyse, pour les besoins du pré- sent pourvoi, il suffi t de conclure que les violations des normes de droit international coutumier, ou de jus cogens, invoquées par les travailleurs érythréens pourraient fort bien s’appliquer à nevsun. il ne reste plus qu’à établir s’il existe des lois canadiennes en- trant en confl it avec leur adoption dans notre com- mon law. soit dit en tout respect, je n’en ai trouvé aucune. [115] au contraire, le gouvernement canadien a adopté des politiques visant à faire en sorte que les sociétés canadiennes exerçant des activités à l’étran- ger respectent ces normes (voir, p.  ex., affaires mondiales canada, le modèle d’affaires canadien : stratégie de promotion de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises pour les sociétés extractives cana- diennes présentes à l’étranger, mise à jour 31 juillet 2019 (en ligne); affaires mondiales canada, le mi- nistre carr annonce la nomination de la première ombudsman canadienne pour la responsabilité des entreprises, 8 avril 2019 (en ligne) (annonçant la création d’un poste d’ombudsman pour la responsa- bilité des entreprises, et la mise sur pied d’un groupe consultatif multipartite sur la conduite responsable des entreprises)). en ce qui concerne l’ombudsman canadien pour la responsabilité des entreprises, qui a pour mandat d’examiner les allégations de violations des droits de la personne par des sociétés cana diennes exerçant des activités à l’étranger, le gouvernement canadien a expressément souligné que « [l]a création du bureau de l’ombudsman ne porte pas atteinte au droit de toute partie d’intenter une action en justice devant un tribunal dans une juridiction quelconque au canada concernant des allégations de méfaits 232 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. law: towards justiciability of rights, involvement, and remedy (2019), at pp 47-48). [116] in the absence of any contrary law, the cus- tomary international law norms raised by the eritrean workers form part of the canadian common law and potentially apply to nevsun. commis par une société canadienne à l’étranger » (affaires mondiales canada, conduite responsable des entreprises à l’étranger — foire aux questions, dernière mise à jour le 16 septembre 2019 (en ligne); yousuf aftab et audrey mocle, business and human rights as law : towards justiciability of rights, involvement, and remedy (2019), p 47-48). [116] sauf disposition législative contraire, les normes de droit international coutumier invoquées par les travailleurs érythréens font partie de la com- mon law canadienne et sont susceptibles de s’appli- quer à nevsun. [117] is a civil remedy for a breach of this part of our common law available? put another way, can our domestic common law develop appropriate remedies for breaches of adopted customary international law norms? [117] un recours civil peut-il être exercé pour une violation de cette partie de notre common law? autrement dit, notre common law interne peut- elle élaborer des recours appropriés pour la violation des normes de droit international coutumier adoptées? [118] development of the common law occurs where such developments are necessary to clarify a legal principle, to resolve an inconsistency, or to keep the law aligned with the evolution of soci- ety (friedmann equity developments inc. v. final note ltd., [2000] 1 scr 842, at para. 42; see also bow valley husky (bermuda) ltd v saint john shipbuilding ltd., [1997] 3 scr 1210, at para. 93; watkins v. olafson, [1989] 2 scr 750). in my re- spectful view, recognizing the possibility of a remedy for the breach of norms already forming part of the common law is such a necessary development. as lord scarman noted: [118] une évolution de la common law s’effectue lorsque des changements sont nécessaires pour pré- ciser un principe de droit, pour éliminer une incohé- rence ou pour permettre au droit de suivre l’évolution de la société (friedmann equity developments inc. c. final note ltd., [2000] 1 rcs 842, par. 42; voir également bow valley husky (bermuda) ltd. c. saint john shipbuilding ltd., [1997] 3 rcs 1210, par. 93; watkins c. olafson, [1989] 2 rcs 750). à mon humble avis, la reconnaissance de la possibilité d’un recours pour la violation de normes faisant déjà partie de la common law est l’une de ces évolutions nécessaires. comme l’a souligné lord scarman : unless statute has intervened to restrict the range of judge- made law, the common law enables the judges, when faced with a situation where a right recognised by law is not adequately protected, either to extend existing principles to cover the situation or to apply an existing remedy to redress the injustice. there is here no novelty: but merely the application of the principle ubi jus ibi remedium [for every wrong, the law provides a remedy]. [traduction] à moins qu’une loi soit venue restreindre la portée du droit jurisprudentiel, la common law permet au juge qui est confronté à une situation où un droit reconnu par la loi n’est pas adéquatement protégé, soit d’élargir la portée des principes existants afi n qu’ils s’appliquent à la situation, soit d’appliquer un recours existant afi n de remédier à l’injustice. cela n’a rien de nouveau : il s’agit simplement de l’application du principe ubi jus ibi reme- dium [pour chaque tort causé, le droit prévoit un recours]. (sidaway v. board of governors of the bethlem royal hospital, [1985] 1 ac 871, at p. 884 (hl)) (sidaway c board of governors of the bethlem royal hospital, [1985] 1 ac 871, p. 884 (hl)) [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 233 [119] with respect specifi cally to the allegations raised by the workers, like all state parties to the international covenant on civil and political rights, canada has international obligations to ensure an ef- fective remedy to victims of violations of those rights (art 2). expounding on the nature of this obligation, the united nations human rights committee — which was established by states as a treaty monitor- ing body to ensure compliance with the international covenant on civil and political rights — provides additional guidance in its general comment no. 31: the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on states parties to the covenant, un. doc. ccpr/ c/ 21/ rev.1/ add.13, may 26, 2004. in this document, the human rights committee specifi es that state par- ties must protect against the violation of rights not just by states, but also by private persons and entities. the committee further specifi es that state parties must ensure the enjoyment of covenant rights to all individuals, including “asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may fi nd themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdic- tion of the state party” (para 10). as to remedies, the committee notes: .  .  the enjoyment of the rights recognized under the covenant can be effectively assured by the judiciary in many different ways, including direct applicability of the covenant, application of comparable constitutional or other provisions of law, or the interpretive effect of the covenant in the application of national law. [para. 15] [119] en ce qui concerne plus particulièrement les allégations soulevées par les travailleurs, le canada, comme tous les états parties au pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, a des obliga- tions internationales visant à garantir un recours utile aux victimes de violations de ces droits (art 2). expliquant la nature de cette obligation, le comité des droits de l’homme des nations unies — qui a été créé par les états à titre d’organe de surveillance de l’application des traités pour veiller au respect du pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques — donne des indications supplémentaires dans son observation générale no 31 : la nature de l’obligation juridique générale imposée aux états parties au pacte, doc n.u ccpr/c/21/rev.1/ add.13, 26 mai 2004. dans ce document, le comité des droits de l’homme précise que les états par- ties doivent assurer une protection non seulement contre les violations de droits commises par les états, mais aussi contre celles commises par des personnes privées, physiques ou morales. le comité précise également que les états parties doivent accorder la jouissance des droits reconnus dans le pacte à tous les individus, notamment les « demandeurs d’asile, réfugiés, travailleurs migrants et autres personnes qui se trouveraient sur le territoire de l’état partie ou relèveraient de sa compétence » (par 10). quant aux recours, le comité souligne ce qui suit :    les tribunaux peuvent de diverses manières garantir effectivement l’exercice des droits reconnus par le pacte, soit en statuant sur son applicabilité directe, soit en appli- quant les règles constitutionnelles ou autres dispositions législatives comparables, soit en interprétant les impli- cations qu’ont pour l’application du droit national les dispositions du pacte. [par. 15] [120] in the domestic context, the general prin- ciple that “where there is a right, there must be a remedy for its violation” has been recognized in numerous decisions of this court (see, eg,. kazemi, at para. 159; henry v. british columbia (attorney general), [2015] 2 scr 214, at para. 65; doucet- boudreau v. nova scotia (minister of education), [2003] 3 scr 3, at para. 25; r v 974649 ontario inc., [2001] 3 scr 575, at para. 20; great western railway v. brown (1879), 3 scr 159, at p 179). [120] dans le contexte interne, le principe général selon lequel « là où il y a un droit, il y a un recours » a été reconnu dans plusieurs arrêts de notre cour (voir, p ex,. kazemi, par. 159; henry c. colombie- britannique (procureur général), [2015] 2 rcs. 214, par. 65; doucet- boudreau c. nouvelle- écosse (ministre de l’éducation), [2003] 3 rcs 3, par. 25; r c 974649 ontario inc., [2001] 3 rcs 575, par. 20; great western railway c. brown (1879), 3 rcs 159, p 179). 234 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. [121] the right to a remedy in the context of alle- gations of human rights violations was discussed by this court in kazemi, where a canadian woman’s es- tate sought damages against the islamic republic of iran for torture. the majority did not depart from the position in hape that customary international law, including peremptory norms, are part of canadian common law, absent express legislation to the con- trary. however, it concluded that the state immunity act was the kind of express legislation that prevented a remedy against the state of iran for the breach of the jus cogens prohibition against torture, which it agreed was part of domestic canadian law. lebel j for the majority noted that “[w]hile rights would be illusory if there was never a way to remedy their violation, the reality is that certain rights do exist even though remedies for their violation may be limited by procedural bars” (para 159). in effect, the majority in kazemi held that the general right to a remedy was overridden by parliament’s enact- ment of the state immunity act. however, the state immunity act protects “foreign states” from claims, not individuals or corporations. [122] unlike kazemi, there is no law or other pro- cedural bar precluding the eritrean workers’ claims. nor is there anything in kazemi that precludes the possibility of a claim against a canadian corporation for breaches in a foreign jurisdiction of customary international law, let alone jus cogens. as a result, it is not “plain and obvious” that canadian courts cannot develop a civil remedy in domestic law for corporate violations of the customary international law norms adopted in canadian law. [121] la cour a examiné le droit à un recours dans le contexte d’allégations de violations des droits de la personne dans l’arrêt kazemi, où la succession d’une canadienne réclamait à la république isla- mique d’iran des dommages- intérêts pour torture. les juges majoritaires ne se sont pas écartés de la position adoptée dans l’arrêt hape, selon laquelle le droit international coutumier, notamment les normes impératives, font partie de la common law canadienne, sauf disposition législative expresse contraire. cependant, ils ont conclu que la loi sur l’immunité des états constituait un type de loi ex- presse qui empêchait l’exercice d’un recours contre l’état de l’iran pour violation de la prohibition de la torture fondée sur le jus cogens, qui, ils en ont convenu, faisait partie du droit interne canadien. le juge lebel, au nom des juges majoritaires, a souligné que « [c]ertes, les droits seraient dénués de tout contenu s’il n’existait jamais un moyen de remédier à leur violation. toutefois, en réalité, cer- tains droits peuvent exister même si des obstacles de nature procédurale sont susceptibles de restreindre les réparations pour leur violation » (par 159). en effet, les juges majoritaires dans l’arrêt kazemi ont conclu que la loi sur l’immunité des états adoptée par le parlement l’emportait sur le droit général à un recours. or, la loi sur l’immunité des états protège les « états étrangers » contre les poursuites — et non les particuliers ou les sociétés. [122] contrairement à la situation dans l’affaire kazemi, aucune loi ni aucun autre obstacle de nature procédurale n’empêche les réclamations des tra- vailleurs érythréens. il n’y a rien non plus dans l’arrêt kazemi qui écarte la possibilité qu’une réclamation soit présentée contre une société canadienne pour des violations dans un ressort étranger du droit inter- national coutumier, et encore moins du jus cogens. par conséquent, il n’est pas « évident et manifeste » que les tribunaux canadiens ne peuvent élaborer un recours civil en droit interne pour les violations par une société des normes de droit international coutu- mier adoptées en droit canadien. [123] nevsun additionally argues that the harms caused by the alleged breaches of customary in- ternational law can be adequately addressed by the recognized torts of conversion, battery, “unlawful [123] nevsun soutient en outre qu’il est possible de remédier adéquatement aux préjudices causés par les violations alléguées du droit international coutumier au moyen des délits reconnus de détournement, voies [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 235 confi nement”, conspiracy and negligence, all of which the eritrean workers have also pleaded. in my view, it is at least arguable that the eritrean workers’ allegations encompass conduct not captured by these existing domestic torts. [124] customary international law norms, like those the eritrean workers allege were violated, are inherently different from existing domestic torts. their character is of a more public nature than ex- isting domestic private torts since the violation of these norms “shock[s] the conscience of humanity” (m. cherif bassiouni, “international crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes” (1996), 59 law & contemp. probs. 63, at p 69). [125] refusing to acknowledge the differences between existing domestic torts and forced labour; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and crimes against humanity, may undermine the court’s ability to adequately address the heinous nature of the harm caused by this conduct. as professor virgo notes, in the context of allegations of human rights violations, the symbolism refl ected by the charac- terization or labelling of the allegations is crucial: from the perspective of the victim    the fact that torture is characterised as a tort, such as battery, will mat- ter — simply because characterising torture in this way does not necessarily refl ect the seriousness of the conduct involved. in the context of violations of human rights   . symbolism is crucial. de fait, « séquestration », complot et négligence, qui ont également tous été invoqués par les travailleurs érythréens. à mon avis, on peut à tout le moins sou- tenir que les allégations des travailleurs érythréens englobent une conduite qui n’est pas visée par ces délits internes existants. [124] les normes de droit international coutu- mier, comme celles dont les travailleurs érythréens allèguent la violation, sont fondamentalement dif- férentes des délits de droit interne existants. elles ont un caractère plus public que les délits de droit privé interne puisque leur violation [traduction] « heurte la conscience de l’humanité » (m. cherif bassiouni, « international crimes : jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes » (1996), 59 law & contemp. probs. 63, p 69). [125] le refus de reconnaître les différences entre les délits internes existants et le travail forcé; l’escla- vage; les traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégra- dants; et les crimes contre l’humanité pourrait miner la capacité de la cour à répondre adéquatement au caractère odieux des dommages causés par de tels actes. comme le souligne le professeur virgo, dans le contexte de violations alléguées des droits de la personne, le symbolisme de la qualifi cation ou de la désignation des allégations est crucial : [traduction] du point de vue de la victime [  ] le fait que la torture soit qualifi ée de délit, comme le délit de voies de fait, a de l’importance — simplement parce qu’une telle qualifi cation de la torture ne refl ète pas néces- sairement la gravité de la conduite reprochée. dans le contexte des violations des droits de la personne [  ] le symbolisme est crucial.   .   . [in this context, accurately labelling the wrong is impor- tant] because the main reason why the victim wishes to commence civil proceedings will presumably be to ensure public awareness of the violation of fundamental human rights. the remedial consequence of successfully bringing a case is often, or even usually, only a secondary concern. [dans ce contexte, il est important de bien qualifi er le tort causé] parce que la principale raison pour laquelle la victime souhaite introduire une instance civile est sans doute de sensibiliser l’opinion publique à la violation des droits fondamentaux de la personne. la conséquence réparatrice liée au fait d’avoir gain de cause ne constitue souvent, voire même généralement, qu’une préoccupation secondaire. 236 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. (graham virgo, “characterisation, choice of law and human rights”, in craig scott, ed., torture as tort: comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 325, at p. 335) (graham virgo, « characterisation, choice of law and human rights », dans craig scott, dir., torture as tort : comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 325, p. 335) [126] while courts can, of course, address the extent and seriousness of harm arising from civil wrongs with tools like an award of punitive damages, these responses may be inadequate when it comes to the violation of the norms prohibiting forced la- bour; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treat- ment; or crimes against humanity. the profound harm resulting from their violation is suffi ciently distinct in nature from those of existing torts that, as the workers say, “[i]n the same way that torture is something more than battery, slavery is more than an amalgam of unlawful confi nement, assault and unjust enrichment”. accepting this premise, which seems to be diffi cult to refute conceptually, reliance on existing domestic torts may not “do justice to the specifi c principles that already are, or should be, in place with respect to the human rights norm” (craig scott, “translating torture into transnational tort: conceptual divides in the debate on corporate accountability for human rights harms”, in craig scott, ed., torture as tort: comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 45, at p. 62, fn. 4; see also sandra raponi, “grounding a cause of action for torture in transnational law”, in craig scott, ed., torture as tort: comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 373; virgo). [126] bien que les tribunaux puissent, évidemment, répondre à la portée et à la gravité du préjudice dé- coulant des fautes civiles au moyen d’outils comme les dommages- intérêts punitifs, ces réponses peuvent être inadéquates lorsqu’il s’agit de la violation de normes interdisant le travail forcé; l’esclavage; les traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants; ou les crimes contre l’humanité. le préjudice profond dé- coulant de la violation de ces normes est de nature suffi samment distincte de celle des délits existants; comme le disent les travailleurs, [traduction] « [d]e la même façon que la torture est plus que des voies de fait, l’esclavage est plus qu’un amalgame d’une séquestration, de voies de fait et d’un enrichis- sement injustifi é ». si on accepte cette prémisse, qui semble diffi cile à réfuter sur le plan conceptuel, il est possible que le fait de se fonder sur les délits de droit interne existants ne puisse pas [traduction] « rendre justice aux principes particuliers qui sont déjà en place, ou qui devraient l’être, en ce qui a trait à la norme en matière de droits de la personne (craig scott, « translating torture into transnational tort : conceptual divides in the debate on corporate accountability for human rights harms », dans craig scott, dir., torture as tort  : comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 45, p. 62, note 4; voir également sandra raponi, « grounding a cause of action for torture in transnational law », dans craig scott, dir., torture as tort  : comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 373; virgo). [127] the workers’ customary international law pleadings are broadly worded and offer several ways in which the violation of adopted norms of customary international law may potentially be compensable in domestic law. the mechanism for how these claims should proceed is a novel question that must be left to the trial judge. the claims may well be allowed to proceed based on the recognition of new nominate torts, but this is not necessarily the only possible [127] les actes de procédure fondés sur le droit international coutumier des travailleurs sont formu- lés en termes généraux, et présentent de nombreuses façons dont la violation des normes de droit inter- national coutumier adoptées pourrait donner lieu à une compensation en droit interne. le mécanisme relatif à la façon dont ces demandes devraient être instruites est une question inédite qui doit être lais- sée au juge de première instance. il pourrait y avoir [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge abella 237 route to resolving the eritrean workers’ claims. a compelling argument can also be made, based on their pleadings, for a direct approach recognizing that since customary international law is part of canadian common law, a breach by a canadian company can theoretically be directly remedied based on a breach of customary international law. [128] the doctrine of adoption in canada entails that norms of customary international law are di- rectly and automatically incorporated into canadian law absent legislation to the contrary (gib van ert, “what is reception law?”, in oonagh e. fitzgerald, ed., the globalized rule of law: relationships be- tween international and domestic law (2006), 85, at p 89). that may mean that the eritrean workers’ customary international law claims need not be con- verted into newly recognized categories of torts to succeed. since these claims are based on norms that already form part of our common law, it is not “plain and obvious” to me that our domestic common law cannot recognize a direct remedy for their breach. requiring the development of new torts to found a remedy for breaches of customary international law norms automatically incorporated into the common law may not only dilute the doctrine of adoption, it could negate its application. lieu de laisser les demandes suivre leur cours sur le fondement de la reconnaissance de nouveaux délits nommés, mais il ne s’agit pas nécessairement de l’unique façon de régler les réclamations des tra- vailleurs érythréens. une thèse convaincante peut être aussi avancée, fondée sur les actes de procédure des travailleurs, en faveur d’une approche directe reconnaissant le fait que, vu que le droit international coutumier fait partie de la common law canadienne, il peut théoriquement être remédié directement à une violation commise par une société canadienne sur la base d’une violation du droit international coutumier. [128] au canada, la doctrine de l’adoption im- plique que les normes de droit international cou- tumier soient directement et automatiquement in cor porées au droit canadien sauf disposition lé- gislative contraire (gib van ert, « qu’est-ce que le droit de la réception? », dans oonagh e. fitzgerald, dir., règle de droit et mondialisation  : rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne (2006), 107, p 113). cela peut vouloir dire que les récla- mations des travailleurs érythréens en droit inter- national coutumier n’ont pas à être converties en nou velles catégories de délits pour être accueillies. étant donné que ces réclamations reposent sur des normes qui font déjà partie de notre common law, il ne me semble pas « évident et manifeste » que notre common law interne ne reconnaît pas un recours direct pour leur violation. exiger la création de nou- veaux délits pour établir le fondement d’un recours à l’égard de violations des normes de droit interna- tional coutumier automatiquement incorporées à la common law pourrait non seulement avoir pour effet de diluer la doctrine de l’adoption, mais pourrait aussi en nier l’application. [129] effectively and justly remedying breaches of customary international law may demand an ap- proach of a different character than a typical “private law action in the nature of a tort claim” (vancouver (city) v. ward, [2010] 2 scr 28, at para. 22, citing dunlea v. attorney- general, [2000] nzca 84, at para 81). the objectives associated with preventing violations of jus cogens and norms of customary international law are unique. a good argument can be made that appropriately remedying these viola- tions requires different and stronger responses than [129] remédier de façon juste et effi cace aux vio- lations du droit international coutumier peut com- mander une approche différente de « [l’]action de droit privé de la nature d’un recours délictuel » ty- pique (vancouver (ville) c. ward, [2010] 2 rcs 28, par. 22, citant dunlea c. attorney- general, [2000] nzca 84, par 81). les objectifs associés à la pré- vention des violations de jus cogens et des normes de droit international coutumier sont uniques. on peut soutenir que le fait de remédier comme il se doit à ces violations exige des réponses différentes et plus 238 nevsun resources ltd v araya abella j. [2020] 1 scr. typical tort claims, given the public nature and im- portance of the violated rights involved, the grav- ity of their breach, the impact on the domestic and global rights objectives, and the need to deter sub- sequent breaches. rigoureuses que les actions habituelles en matière de responsabilité délictuelle, compte tenu du caractère public et de l’importance des droits violés en jeu, de la gravité du manquement à ceux-ci, de l’incidence sur les objectifs internes et mondiaux en matière de droits et de la nécessité de créer un effet dissuasif à l’égard de toute violation ultérieure. [130] as professor koh wrote about civil remedies for terrorism: [130] comme l’a écrit le professeur koh au sujet des recours civils pour terrorisme : whenever a victim of a terrorist attack obtains a civil judgment in a united states court, that judgment promotes two distinct sets of objectives: the objectives of traditional tort law and the objectives of public international law. a judgment awarding compensatory and punitive dam- ages to a victim of terrorism serves the twin objectives of traditional tort law, compensation and deterrence. at the same time, the judgment promotes the objectives of public international law by furthering the development of an international rule of law condemning terrorism. by issuing an opinion and judgment fi nding liability, the united states federal court adds its voice to others in the international community collectively condemning terror- ism as an illegitimate means of promoting individual and sovereign ends. [traduction] chaque fois qu’une victime d’un atten- tat terroriste obtient un jugement civil devant un tribu- nal américain, ce jugement favorise l’atteinte de deux types d’objectifs distincts : les objectifs du droit de la responsabilité civile délictuelle traditionnel et les objec- tifs du droit international public. le jugement accordant des dommages- intérêts compensatoires et punitifs à une victime de terrorisme remplit le double objectif du droit de la responsabilité civile délictuelle traditionnel, soit l’indemnisation et la dissuasion. parallèlement, le juge- ment contribue à l’atteinte des objectifs du droit interna- tional public en favorisant l’élaboration d’une règle de droit international condamnant le terrorisme. en rendant une opinion et un jugement concluant à l’existence d’une responsabilité, la cour fédérale des états- unis ajoute sa voix à celle des autres membres de la communauté inter- nationale condamnant collectivement le terrorisme comme un moyen illégitime de parvenir à des fi ns individuelles et souveraines. (harold hongju koh, “civil remedies for uncivil wrongs: combatting terrorism through transna- tional public law litigation” (2016), 50 tex. int’l lj 661, at p. 675) (harold hongju koh, « civil remedies for uncivil wrongs  : combatting terrorism through trans- national public law litigation » (2016), 50 tex. int’l lj 661, p. 675) [131] this proceeding is still at a preliminary stage and it will ultimately be for the trial judge to con- sider whether the facts of this case justify fi ndings of breaches of customary international law and, if so, what remedies are appropriate. these are complex questions but, as wilson j noted in hunt v. carey canada inc., [1990] 2 scr 959: [131] la présente instance est encore à un stade préliminaire, et il appartiendra en défi nitive au juge de première instance de se demander si les faits de la présente affaire justifi ent de conclure à des violations du droit international coutumier et, dans l’affi rma- tive, quels sont les recours appropriés. il s’agit de questions complexes, mais comme l’a souligné la juge wilson dans hunt c. carey canada inc., [1990] 2 rcs 959 : the fact that a pleading reveals “an arguable, diffi cult or important point of law” cannot justify striking out part of the statement of claim. indeed, i would go so far as to suggest that where a statement of claim reveals a diffi cult ce n’est pas parce qu’un acte de procédure révèle [tra- duction] « une question de droit contestable, diffi cile ou importante » que l’on peut radier certaines parties de la déclaration. certes, j’irais jusqu’à dire que, lorsqu’une [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 239 and important point of law, it may well be critical that the action be allowed to proceed. only in this way can we be sure that the common law    will continue to evolve to meet the legal challenges that arise in our modern indus- trial society. [pp. 990-91] [132] customary international law is part of ca- nadian law. nevsun is a company bound by cana- dian law. it is not “plain and obvious” to me that the eritrean workers’ claims against nevsun based on breaches of customary international law cannot succeed. those claims should therefore be allowed to proceed. [133] i would dismiss the appeal with costs. déclaration révèle une question de droit diffi cile et impor- tante, il peut fort bien être capital que l’action puisse suivre son cours. ce n’est que de cette façon que nous pouvons nous assurer que la common law [  ] v[a] continuer à évoluer pour répondre aux contestations judiciaires qui se présentent dans notre société industrielle moderne. [p. 990-991] [132] le droit international coutumier fait partie du droit canadien. nevsun est une société assujettie au droit canadien. il ne me semble pas « évident et manifeste » que les réclamations des travailleurs érythréens contre nevsun fondées sur des viola- tions du droit international coutumier sont vouées à l’échec. en conséquence, ces réclamations devraient suivre leur cours. [133] je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi avec dépens. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par brown and rowe jj. (dissenting in part) — les juges brown et rowe (dissidents en par- i. introduction [134] at the british columbia supreme court, nevsun resources ltd. applied to strike 67 para- graphs of the eritrean workers’ notice of civil claim (“nocc”). the chambers judge dismissed nevsun’s application, holding that the claim was not bound to fail (2016 bcsc 1856, 408 dlr (4th) 383). his decision was upheld on appeal (2017 bcca 401, 4 bclr (6th) 91). the majority would also uphold the dismissal of nevsun’s application to strike the pleadings of the workers. tie) — i. introduction [134] devant la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique, nevsun resources ltd. a sollicité la radiation de 67 para graphes de l’avis de poursuite civile des travailleurs érythréens. le juge en cabinet a rejeté la requête de nevsun, estimant que la demande des travailleurs n’était pas vouée à l’échec (2016 bcsc 1856, 408 dlr (4th) 383). sa décision a été confi rmée en appel (2017 bcca 401, 4 bclr. (6th) 91). les juges majoritaires confi rmeraient eux aussi le rejet de la requête présentée par nevsun pour faire radier les actes de procédure des travailleurs. [135] we would allow nevsun’s appeal in part. we agree with the majority that the dismissal of nevsun’s application should be upheld as it regards the foreign act of state doctrine, and we concur in the majority reasons from paras. 27 to 59. we would, however, allow nevsun’s appeal on the matter of the use of customary international law in creating tort liability. as we will explain, we part ways from the majority on this issue in several respects: the characterization [135] nous accueillerions le pourvoi de nevsun en partie nous sommes d’accord avec les juges majoritaires pour dire qu’il y a lieu de confi rmer le rejet de la requête de nevsun en ce qui concerne la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement étranger, et nous souscrivons aux motifs exposés par les juges majo- ritaires du par. 27 au par 59. nous ferions toutefois droit au pourvoi de nevsun sur la question du recours au droit international coutumier dans la création 240 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. of the content of international law; the procedure for identifying international law; the meaning of “adop- tion” of international law in canadian law; and the availability of a tort remedy. [136] our reasons are structured as follows. we begin by explaining the theories of the case which are advanced to defend the pleadings from the mo- tion to strike. we then set out our view of the proper approach to customary international law: it is to determine what practices states in fact engage in out of the belief that these practices are mandated by customary international law. we then explain how the rules of customary international law (frequently termed “norms”) are given effect in canada. when the norms are prohibitive, this question is simple; when the norms are mandatory, the matter is more complicated. we then do our best to explain why, on its theory of the case, the majority fi nds it not plain and obvious the claim is doomed to fail. we identify three domains of disagreement: the content of international law in fact; how the doctrine of adop- tion operates; and the differences between the effect of international law on domestic criminal law and tort law. in the fi nal section, we turn to the theory of the case upon which the chambers judge relied in dismissing the motion to strike: the workers seek recognition of new common law torts. after stating the test for determining whether a new tort should be recognized, we explain why the causes of action advanced in the pleadings do not meet it. d’une responsabilité délictuelle. comme nous l’ex- pliquerons plus loin, nous divergeons d’opinion avec les juges majoritaires sur cette question à plusieurs égards, à savoir : la qualifi cation du contenu du droit international, le processus de détermination du droit international, ce qu’il faut entendre par « adoption » du droit international en droit canadien et la possibi- lité d’exercer un recours délictuel. [136] nos motifs sont structurés comme suit. nous commençons par expliquer les thèses qui sont avancées pour défendre les actes de procédure de la requête en radiation. nous exposons ensuite notre point de vue sur la démarche à adopter en matière de droit international coutumier : il s’agit de déterminer quelles sont les pratiques auxquelles se livrent de fait les états parce qu’ils ont le sentiment qu’ils y sont tenus par le droit international coutumier. nous ex- pliquons par la suite comment il est donné effet aux règles de droit international coutumier (souvent qua- lifi ées de « normes ») au canada. lorsque les normes sont prohibitives, la question est simple; lorsqu’elles sont obligatoires, la question est plus compliquée. nous nous efforçons ensuite d’expliquer pourquoi, suivant leur thèse, les juges majo ri taires concluent qu’il n’est pas évident et manifeste que la récla- mation est vouée à l’échec. nous dégageons trois sujets de discorde : le contenu du droit international dans les faits, le fonctionnement de la doctrine de l’adoption, et les différences entre l’incidence du droit international sur le droit pénal national et son incidence sur le droit de la responsabilité délictuelle. dans la dernière section de notre analyse, nous nous penchons sur la thèse sur laquelle s’est fondé le juge en cabinet pour rejeter la requête en radiation : les travailleurs cherchent à faire reconnaître de nou- veaux délits de common law. après avoir exposé le critère à appliquer pour déterminer s’il convient de reconnaître un nouveau délit, nous expliquons en quoi les causes d’action invoquées dans les actes de procédure ne satisfont pas à ce critère. ii two theories of the case ii deux thèses [137] the majority explains that the pleadings are broadly worded and identifi es two separate theo- ries upon which they could be upheld (majority rea- sons, at para 127). one of these is the focus of the [137] les juges majoritaires expliquent que les actes de procédure sont formulés en termes généraux et ils exposent deux thèses distinctes sur la base desquelles ceux-ci pourraient être maintenus (motifs [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 241 majority’s reasons with regard to customary inter- national law; the other is the focus of the chambers judge’s reasons. we would summarize these two theories as follows: (a) the majority’s theory: the workers seek to have canadian courts recognize a cause of action for “breach of customary international law” and to prosecute a claim thereunder (para 127) (while the majority never describes the workers’ plead- ings as raising a “tort” claim, we observe that its theory of the case describes a cause of action that can only be understood in canadian com- mon law as a “tort”. a tort is simply a wrong against a third party, actionable in law, typically for money damages (moran v. pyle national (canada) ltd., [1975] 1 scr 393, at pp. 404- 5). that is the very substance of the allegation here, and we will treat it as such. if the cause of action the majority is proposing is not a “tort”, then it must be a species of action not known to canadian common law, and so should fail simply on that basis). (b) the chambers judge’s theory: the workers seek to have canadian courts recognize four new nominate torts inspired by customary interna- tional law: use of forced labour; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and crimes against humanity.4 the workers then seek to prosecute claims under those torts. in our respectful view, the latter theory is more con- sistent with the pleadings before us, but both must be defeated in order for nevsun to succeed on its motion to strike. des juges majoritaires, par 127). une de ces thèses est l’accent que mettent les juges majoritaires sur le droit international coutumier; l’autre est l’accent mis sur les motifs du juge en cabinet. nous résumerions ainsi ces deux thèses : a) thèse des juges majoritaires : les travailleurs cherchent à faire reconnaître par les tribunaux canadiens une cause d’action pour « violation du droit international coutumier », et à présenter une réclamation fondée sur celle-ci (par 127). (bien que les juges majoritaires n’affi rment ja- mais que les travailleurs, dans leurs actes de pro- cédure, font valoir une réclamation fondée sur la « responsabilité délictuelle », nous constatons que leur thèse décrit une cause d’action ne pou- vant être considérée en common law canadienne que comme un « délit ». un délit est tout simple- ment une transgression contre un tiers donnant ouverture à une action en justice, généralement en vue d’obtenir des dommages- intérêts (moran c. pyle national (canada) ltd., [1975] 1 rcs. 393, p 404-405). c’est l’essence même de la prétention formulée en l’espèce, et nous la consi- dérons comme telle. si la cause d’action que proposent les juges majoritaires ne constitue pas un « délit », il doit alors s’agir d’un type d’action inconnu en common law canadienne et elle devrait donc être rejetée sur ce simple fondement). b) thèse du juge en cabinet  : les travailleurs cherchent à faire reconnaître par les tribunaux canadiens quatre nouveaux délits nommés ins- pirés du droit international coutumier, à savoir le recours au travail forcé, l’esclavage, les trai- tements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, et les crimes contre l’humanité4. ils cherchent ensuite à présenter des réclamations fondées sur ces délits. à notre humble avis, la seconde thèse s’accorde davantage avec les actes de procédure devant nous, mais les deux thèses doivent être rejetées pour que nevsun puisse avoir gain de cause dans sa requête en radiation. 4 see chambers judgment, at paras. 427, 444, 455 and 465-66. 4 voir le jugement du juge en cabinet, par. 427, 444, 455 et 465-466. 242 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. [138] the following paragraphs of the workers’ amended nocc describe the proposed cause of ac- tion: [138] la cause d’action proposée est décrite dans les para graphes suivants de l’avis de poursuite civile modifi é des travailleurs : [traduction] 53 the plaintiffs seek damages under customary interna- tional law, as incorporated into the law [of] canada, from nevsun for the use of forced labour, slavery, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and crimes against humanity. 53 les demandeurs réclament à nevsun, en vertu des règles de droit international coutumier incorporées au droit canadien, des dommages- intérêts pour recours au travail forcé, esclavage, traitements cruels, inhu- mains ou dégradants, et crimes contre l’humanité.   .   . 57 forced labour, slavery, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and crimes against humanity are prohibited under international law. this prohibition is incorpo- rated into and forms a part of the law of canada. 57 le travail forcé, l’esclavage, les traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants et les crimes contre l’huma- nité sont interdits en droit international. cette inter- diction a été intégrée au droit canadien et en fait partie.   .   . 60 the use of forced labour is a breach of customary international law and jus cogens and is actionable at common law. 60 le recours au travail forcé constitue une violation du droit international coutumier et du jus cogens donnant ouverture à une action en common law. (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 170 and 172-73) (da, vol. iii, p. 170 et 172-173) [139] paragraphs 63, 66, and 70 are to the same effect as para. 60, except “use of forced labour” is replaced by “slavery”, “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” and “crimes against humanity”, respec- tively (ar, vol. iii, at pp 173-75). [139] les para graphes 63, 66 et 70 vont dans le même sens que le par. 60, sauf que les mots [tra- duction] « recours au travail forcé » y sont rem- placés respectivement par les mots « esclavage », « traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants » et « crimes contre l’humanité » (da, vol. iii, p. 173- 175). [140] in our view, paras. 60, 63, 66 and 70 suggest that the workers sought to have four nominate torts recognized. [140] à notre avis, il ressort des par. 60, 63, 66 et 70 que les travailleurs ont tenté de faire reconnaître quatre délits nommés. [141] the chambers judge’s theory accords with how the workers framed their claims before this court, as the following excerpts from their factum demonstrate: [141] la thèse du juge en cabinet s’accorde avec la façon dont les travailleurs ont formulé les réclama- tions qu’ils ont présentées devant notre cour, comme en témoignent les extraits suivants de leur mémoire : [traduction] 98 the development of the common law will be aided by the recognition of torts which fully capture the 98 la reconnaissance de délits qui englobent toutes les conduites préjudiciables interdites, plutôt que traiter [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 243 prohibited injurious conduct, rather than treating these kinds of claims as a variant or hybrid of tradi- tional torts.   . les réclamations de cette nature comme portant sur une variante ou un hybride des délits traditionnels, contribuera à l’évolution de la common law  .   .   . 102   . in assessing whether to recognize new nominate torts, charter values inform the assessment of the societal importance of the rights at issue.   . 102   . s’agissant de déterminer s’il faut reconnaître de nouveaux délits nommés, les valeurs consacrées par la charte guident l’appréciation de l’importance que revêtent les droits en cause dans notre société  .   .   . 117 to be clear, the [workers] do not contend that the adoption of jus cogens norms into canadian law leads automatically to a civil remedy for the violation of those norms. rather, the jus cogens norms serve as a source for development of the common law, and the test for recognition of new common law torts must still be satisfi ed. 117 en clair, les [travailleurs] ne prétendent pas que l’adoption de normes de jus cogens en droit cana- dien ouvre automatiquement droit à un recours civil pour la violation de ces normes. les normes de jus cogens servent plutôt de source à l’évolution de la common law et le critère permettant de reconnaître de nouveaux délits de common law doit quand même être respecté. 118    the recognition of these new torts is desirable given the factors outlined at paragraphs 97 to 110 above. 118    la reconnaissance de ces nouveaux délits est souhaitable compte tenu des facteurs exposés aux para graphes 97 à 110 ci- dessus.   .   . 149 here, recognizing new nominate torts for slavery or crimes against humanity under the common law complements and advances parliament’s broader intent in enacting legislation such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes act that there be accountability for serious human rights abuses. [emphasis added.] 149 en l’espèce, la reconnaissance des nouveaux délits nommés d’esclavage ou de crimes contre l’huma- nité en common law complète et favorise l’intention générale qu’avait le parlement en adoptant une loi comme la loi sur les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre, à savoir qu’il y ait une obligation de rendre des comptes pour les violations graves des droits de la personne. [nous soulignons.] [142] we also observe that, at para. 117 of their factum, the workers specifi cally disavow the major- ity’s theory of the case. [142] ajoutons qu’au par. 117 de leur mémoire, les travailleurs désavouent expressément la thèse des juges majoritaires. [143] the second theory should be preferred also because, in deciding whether a pleading is bound to fail, it ought to be read generously. for example, the pleading ought to be considered as it might reason- ably be amended (british columbia/ yukon assn. of drug war survivors v. abbotsford (city), 2015 bcca 142, 75 bclr (5th) 69, at para. 15; kripps v. touche ross & co. (1992), 69 bclr (2d) 62 (ca)). in our view, the second theory is the more [143] la seconde thèse devrait également être pri- vilégiée parce que, pour décider si un acte de procé- dure est voué à l’échec, il convient de l’interpréter de façon généreuse. par exemple, l’acte de procédure devrait être considéré tel qu’il pourrait être raison- nablement modifi é (british columbia/yukon assn. of drug war survivors c. abbotsford (city), 2015 bcca 142, 75 bclr (5th) 69, par. 15; kripps c. touche ross & co. (1992), 69 bclr (2d) 62 244 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. plausible claim. that said, the workers could reason- ably amend their pleadings to clearly engage the fi rst theory, so both must be considered. [144] as the majority has explained, we ask whether it is plain and obvious a pleading is “cer- tain to fail” or “bound to fail” because this is the test that courts apply on a motion to strike (hunt v. carey canada inc., [1990] 2 scr 959, at p 980). this question is to be determined “in the context of the law and the litigation process”, assuming the facts pleaded by the non- moving party are true (r v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2011 scc 42, [2011] 3 scr 45, at paras. 23 and 25 (emphasis omitted)). [145] any confusion over whether a novel question of law can be answered on a motion to strike should be put to bed: it can. if a court would not recognize a novel claim when the facts as pleaded are taken to be true — that is, in the most favourable factual context possible in the litigation process — the claim is plainly doomed to fail (s. g. a. pitel and m. b. lerner, “resolving questions of law: a modern approach to rule 21” (2014), 43 adv. q 344, at p 351). as justice karakatsanis explained for this court in hryniak v. mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 scr 87, judges can and should resolve legal disputes promptly to facilitate rather than frustrate access to justice (paras. 24-25 and 32). answering novel questions of law on a motion to strike is one way they can do so (pitel and lerner, at p 358). but there also are some questions that the court could answer on a motion to strike, but ought not to. they include, for example, questions related to the inter- pretation of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, or questions where the facts are unlikely, if not implausible. deciding a question of law with- out proof of the facts in such circumstances risks distorting the law for an ultimately fruitless purpose. (ca)). à notre avis, la seconde thèse est la plus plausible. cela dit, les travailleurs pourraient raison- nablement modifi er leurs actes de procédure pour qu’entre clairement en jeu la première thèse, de sorte que les deux thèses doivent être examinées. [144] comme les juges majoritaires l’expliquent, nous devons nous demander s’il est évident et mani- feste qu’un acte de procédure « est voué à l’échec », puisqu’il s’agit du critère que les tribunaux appliquent lorsqu’ils sont saisis d’une requête en radiation (hunt c. carey canada inc., [1990] 2 rcs 959, p 980). la question doit être tranchée « dans le contexte du droit et du processus judiciaire », dans l’hypothèse où les faits allégués par la partie qui ne demande pas la radiation seraient avérés (r c. imperial tobacco canada ltée, 2011 csc 42, [2011] 3 rcs 45, par. 23 et 25 (italique omis)). [145] il convient de mettre fi n à toute confusion entourant la question de savoir s’il est possible de répondre à une question de droit inédite dans le cadre d’une requête en radiation : c’est possible. si un tribunal ne reconnaît pas une réclamation inédite lorsque les faits allégués sont tenus pour avérés — c’est-à-dire dans le contexte factuel le plus favorable possible du processus judiciaire —, la réclamation est manifestement vouée à l’échec (s g a. pitel et m b. lerner, « resolving questions of law : a modern approach to rule 21 » (2014), 43 adv. q 344, p 351). comme la juge karakatsanis l’a expliqué, au nom de la cour, dans l’arrêt hryniak c. mauldin, 2014 csc 7, [2014] 1 rcs 87, les juges peuvent et devraient régler de façon expéditive les litiges d’ordre juridique de manière à faciliter plutôt qu’à empêcher l’accès à la justice (par. 24-25 et 32). répondre à des questions de droit inédites alors qu’ils sont saisis d’une requête en radiation est une façon de le faire (pitel et lerner, p 358). il existe cependant des questions auxquelles le tribunal pour- rait, mais ne devrait pas, répondre lors d’une requête en radiation. celles-ci comprennent, par exemple, les questions relatives à l’interprétation de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés ou encore celles touchant à des faits peu probables, voire peu plau- sibles. décider d’une question de droit sans disposer d’une preuve factuelle en pareilles circonstances risque de dénaturer en vain le droit. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 245 [146] the majority would fi nd that it is not plain and obvious that the workers’ cause of action is doomed to fail. so far as we can discern, the major- ity’s reasons concern entirely extricated questions of law. in refraining to decide a question of law, there appears to be no pressing concern for judicial economy or for the integrity of the common law. the uncertainty in the majority’s reasons relates to which theory the workers should rely on, not whether the workers’ claim can succeed on either theory. we can only understand the inevitable effect of its reasons to be that, if the facts pleaded by the workers are proven, the workers’ claim should succeed. in other words, in its view, the phoenix will fl y. and concomi- tantly, it means that if the workers continue these proceedings relying on the majority’s theory of the case, a court should recognize a new cause of action for tortious breach of customary international law. [147] that observation aside, however, our disa- greement with the majority in this matter about the better theory of the case does not affect either our, or its, proposed disposition of the appeal. as previously mentioned, the question to be decided on a motion to strike is whether the pleadings are bound to fail on all reasonable theories of the case. in its view, the workers’ claims are not bound to fail on either theory. in our view, they are, for four reasons. [146] les juges majoritaires seraient d’avis de conclure qu’il n’est pas évident et manifeste que la cause d’action des travailleurs est vouée à l’échec. pour autant que nous puissions en juger, les motifs des juges majoritaires portent entièrement sur des questions de droit qui se dégagent. ne pas trancher une question de droit semble indiquer qu’il n’y a pas de préoccupation urgente en ce qui a trait à l’éco- nomie des ressources judiciaires ou à l’intégrité de la common law. l’incertitude dans les motifs des juges majoritaires concerne la question de savoir sur quelle thèse les travailleurs devraient se fonder, et non celle de savoir si la demande des travailleurs peut être accueillie sur le fondement de l’une ou l’autre des thèses. il nous faut donc comprendre que l’effet inévitable qui découle de leurs motifs est que, si les faits allégués par les travailleurs sont établis, leur demande devrait être accueillie. autrement dit, selon les juges majoritaires, le phénix volera. et, de façon concomitante, cela signifi e que, si les travailleurs poursuivent la présente instance en se fondant sur la thèse retenue par les juges majoritaires, un tribunal devrait reconnaître une nouvelle cause d’action pour violation délictueuse du droit international coutu- mier. [147] toutefois, hormis cette observation, notre désaccord avec les juges majoritaires en l’espèce quant à la meilleure thèse ne change rien à la façon dont il convient à notre avis, ou au leur, de trancher le pourvoi. comme nous l’avons vu précédemment, la question à trancher dans le cadre d’une requête en radiation est celle de savoir si les actes de pro- cédure sont voués à l’échec selon toutes les thèses raisonnables. les juges majoritaires estiment que, suivant l’une ou l’autre thèse, les réclamations des travailleurs ne sont pas vouées à l’échec. à notre avis, elles le sont, et ce, pour quatre raisons. [148] first, the claims run contrary to how norms of international law become binding in canada. according to the doctrine of adoption, the courts of this country recognize legal prohibitions that mirror the prohibitive rules of customary international law. courts do not convert prohibitive rules into liability rules. changing the doctrine of adoption to do so runs into the second problem, which is that doing so [148] tout d’abord, elles vont à l’encontre de la façon dont les normes de droit international de- viennent contraignantes au canada. selon la doctrine de l’adoption, les tribunaux canadiens reconnaissent les interdictions juridiques qui correspondent aux règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier. les tribunaux ne convertissent pas les règles prohibi- tives en règles de responsabilité. changer la doctrine 246 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. would be inconsistent with the doctrine of incremen- talism and the principle of legislative supremacy. nor does developing a theory of the case that does not rely on the doctrine of adoption rescue the pleadings: the third problem is that some of the claims are ad- dressed by extant torts. and, fi nally, the viability of other claims requires changing the common law in a manner that would infringe the separation of powers and place courts in the unconstitutional position of conducting foreign relations, which is the executive’s domain. we therefore fi nd the workers’ claims for damages based on breach of customary international law disclose no reasonable cause of action and are bound to fail. de l’adoption à cette fi n se heurte au deuxième pro- blème, à savoir l’incompatibilité d’un tel changement avec la théorie du gradualisme et le principe de la suprématie législative. l’élaboration d’une thèse qui ne repose pas sur la doctrine de l’adoption ne permet pas non plus de sauver les actes de procédure : le troi- sième problème est que certaines des réclamations relèvent de délits existants. et, enfi n, les chances de succès d’autres réclamations exigeraient de modifi er la common law d’une manière qui porterait atteinte à la séparation des pouvoirs et qui placerait les tri- bunaux dans la situation inconstitutionnelle où ils auraient à assurer la conduite des relations inter- nationales, ce qui est du ressort de l’exécutif. nous estimons par conséquent que les réclamations en dommages- intérêts des travailleurs fondées sur la violation du droit international coutumier ne révèlent aucune cause d’action raisonnable et sont vouées à l’échec. iii on the first theory, the claim is bound to fail iii selon la première thèse, la réclamation est vouée [149] the majority maintains that, because inter- national law is incorporated into canadian law, it is not plain and obvious that a claim to remedy such a breach brought in a canadian court is doomed to fail. but to give effect to this claim would dis- place international law from its proper role within the canadian legal system. in the following section, we will explain why this is so. we will also explain why changing the role of international law within canadian law exceeds the limits of the judicial role. à l’échec [149] les juges majoritaires affi rment que, comme le droit international est incorporé au droit canadien, il n’est pas évident et manifeste qu’une réclamation présentée devant un tribunal canadien pour qu’il soit remédié à une violation du droit international est vouée à l’échec. cependant, donner suite à cette réclamation reviendrait à faire jouer au droit inter- national un rôle différent de celui qui lui incombe au sein du système juridique canadien. dans la section suivante, nous expliquerons pourquoi il en est ainsi. nous expliquerons aussi pourquoi le fait de chan- ger le rôle du droit international en droit canadien outrepasse les limites du rôle dévolu aux tribunaux. a the operation of international law in canada a l’application du droit international au canada [150] one essential point of disagreement we have with the majority concerns which law is supreme in canadian courts: canadian law, or international law. the majority (at para. 94) adopts the opinion of professor stephen j. toope, who has opined that “[i]nternational law    speaks directly to canadian law and requires it to be shaped in certain directions” [150] un des points essentiels sur lequel nous divergeons d’opinion avec les juges majoritaires concerne la question de savoir lequel du droit cana- dien ou du droit international est le droit suprême de- vant les tribunaux canadiens. les juges majoritaires (au par. 94) adoptent l’opinion exprimée par le pro- fesseur stephen j. toope, selon qui [traduction] [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 247 (“inside and out: the stories of international law and domestic law” (2001), 50 unblj 11, at p 23). we disagree. [151] the conventional — and, in our view, cor- rect — approach to the supremacy of legal systems is that each court treats its own constituting document as supreme (j. crawford, brownlie’s principles of public international law (9th ed. 2019), at p 101). an international tribunal or international court will apply the law of its constituting treaty. canadian law cannot require international law to be shaped in certain directions, except insofar as international law grants that power to canadian law. [152] it follows that canadian courts will apply the law of canada, including the supreme law of our constitution. and it is that law — canadian law — which defi nes the limits of the role interna- tional law plays within the canadian legal system. to hold otherwise would be to ignore s. 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982, and s. 96 of the constitution act, 1867. to be clear, then: international law can- not require canadian law to take a certain direction, except inasmuch as canadian law allows it. « [l]e droit international concerne [  ] directement le droit canadien et exige que celui-ci aille dans cer- taines directions » (« inside and out : the stories of international law and domestic law » (2001), 50 rd. un-b 11, p 23). nous ne partageons pas cet avis. [151] selon la conception traditionnelle — qui est, à notre avis, la bonne — de la suprématie des systèmes juridiques, chaque tribunal considère son propre document constitutif comme le document su- prême (j. crawford, brownlie’s principles of public international law (9e éd. 2019), p 101). un tribunal international applique les règles de droit prévues dans son traité constitutif. le droit canadien ne peut exiger que le droit international aille dans certaines directions, sauf dans la mesure où le droit internatio- nal confère ce pouvoir au droit canadien. [152] il s’ensuit que les tribunaux canadiens ap- pliquent le droit canadien, y compris la loi suprême qu’est notre constitution. et c’est ce droit — le droit canadien — qui défi nit les limites du rôle joué par le droit international dans le système juridique cana- dien. conclure autrement reviendrait à ne pas tenir compte du par. 52(1) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 et de l’art. 96 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. pour que tout soit bien clair, le droit interna- tional ne peut exiger que le droit canadien prenne une certaine direction, sauf dans la mesure où le droit canadien le lui permet. [153] on the majority’s theory, the workers’ plead- ings — which seek the remedy of money damages — are viable only if international law is given a role that exceeds the limits placed upon it by canadian law. these limits are set out in r v. hape, 2007 scc 26, [2007] 2 scr 292, at para. 39, where this court stated that “prohibitive rules of customary inter- national law should be incorporated into domestic law in the absence of confl icting legislation”. these prohibitive rules of customary international law, by their nature, could not give rise to a remedy. on its terms then, for these pleadings to succeed, canadian law must change. and, in our view, such a change would require an act of a competent legislature. it does not fall within the competence of this court, or [153] selon la thèse des juges majoritaires, les actes de procédure des travailleurs  — qui visent à obtenir des dommages- intérêts à titre de répara- tion — ne sont valables que si le droit international se voit attribuer un rôle qui outrepasse les limites que lui impose le droit canadien. ces limites sont énoncées dans l’arrêt r c hape, 2007 csc 26, [2007] 2 rcs 292, par. 39, dans lequel notre cour a déclaré que « les règles prohibitives du droit interna- tional coutumier devraient être incorporées au droit interne sauf disposition législative contraire ». ces règles prohibitives de droit international coutumier ne pourraient, de par leur nature, donner ouverture à un recours. par conséquent, selon son libellé, pour que ces actes de procédure puissent tenir la route, le 248 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. any other. and yet, without that change, the plead- ings are doomed to fail. [154] below, we set out the existing limits of the role that public international law can play according to canadian law. public international law has two main sources: custom and convention, which have different effects on and in canadian law. while the focus of this appeal is customary international law, its role and function can best be understood in rela- tion to its counterpart, conventional international law. below, we describe these two main sources of international law in more detail. droit canadien doit changer. et, à notre avis, un tel changement exigerait l’intervention du législateur compétent. il n’est pas du ressort de notre cour ou de tout autre tribunal d’effectuer celui-ci. et pour- tant, sans ce changement, les actes de procédure sont voués à l’échec. [154] nous exposons ci- après les limites actuelles du rôle que le droit canadien permet au droit inter- national public de jouer. le droit international public a deux sources principales, la coutume et la conven- tion, qui ont des effets différents sur le droit canadien et en droit canadien. bien que le présent pourvoi porte principalement sur le droit international cou- tumier, la meilleure façon de comprendre le rôle et la fonction du droit international coutumier est de le faire eu égard à son pendant, le droit international conventionnel. nous décrivons ci- après plus en détail ces deux sources principales du droit international. (1) conventional international law: the role of (1) le droit international conventionnel : le rôle treaties des traités [155] although customary international law was historically the primary source of international law (j h currie, public international law (2nd  ed. 2008), at p. 124), convention, most often in the form of treaties, has become the source of much substan- tive international law today (j. brunnée and s. j. toope, “a hesitant embrace: the application of international law by canadian courts” (2002), 40 can. yb. intl law 3, at p 13). this trend originated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the growth of international bodies and the elaboration of broader- based treaty regimes, mostly concerned with the conduct of war and humanitarian law (currie, at p 124). [155] bien que le droit international coutumier ait été historiquement la source première du droit international (j h. currie, public international law (2e éd. 2008), p. 124), la convention — le plus sou- vent sous forme de traités — est devenue de nos jours la source d’une grande partie des règles de fond du droit international (j. brunnée et s j. toope, « a hesitant embrace : the application of international law by canadian courts » (2002), 40 acdi 3, p 13). cette tendance est née à la fi n du 19e et au début du 20e siècle avec la croissance des organismes internationaux et l’élaboration de régimes de traités ayant une plus vaste portée et portant principale- ment sur la conduite de guerre et le droit humanitaire (currie, p 124). [156] a treaty is much like a contract, in the sense that it records the terms to which its signatories consent to be bound (j. harrington, “redressing the democratic defi cit in treaty law making: (re-)establishing a role for parliament” (2005), 50 mcgill lj 465, at p. 470): “the essential idea [of treaties] is that states are bound by what they expressly consent to” (brunnée and toope, at p 14). it sets out the parties’ mutual legal rights and [156] un traité ressemble beaucoup à un contrat, en ce sens qu’il consigne les modalités par lesquelles ses signataires acceptent d’être liés (j. harrington, « redressing the democratic defi cit in treaty law making : (re-)establishing a role for parliament » (2005), 50 rd. mcgill 465, p. 470) : [traduction] « l’idée essentielle [des traités] est que les états sont liés par ce à quoi ils consentent expressément » (brunnée et toope, p 14). un traité énonce les droits [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 249 obligations, and are governed by international law (currie, at p 123). article 38(1)(a) of the statute of the international court of justice, can. ts 1945 no. 7, contains an implicit defi nition of treaty when it specifi es that the international court of justice shall apply “international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states” (see also brunnée and toope, at p 14). a treaty may be bilateral (recording re- ciprocal undertakings among two or more states) or multilateral (recording a generalized agreement between several states) (currie, at p 123). in either form, it permits states to enter into agreements with other states on specifi c issues or projects, or to estab- lish widely applicable norms intended to govern legal relationships with as many states as will expressly agree to their terms (p 123). [157] because a treaty is concerned with express agreement between states, certain formalities govern the process of entering a binding treaty (brunnée and toope, at p. 14), which we discuss below. [158] in canada, each order of government plays a different role in the process of entering a treaty. signifi cantly, it is the executive which controls the negotiation, signature and ratifi cation of treaties, in exercise of the royal prerogative power to conduct foreign relations. its signature manifests initial con- sent to the treaty framework, but does not indicate consent to be bound by specifi c treaty obligations; that latter consent is given by ratifi cation. it is only when a treaty enters into force that the specifi c treaty obligations become binding. for multilateral treaties, entry into force usually depends on the deposit of a specifi c number of state ratifi cations. if a treaty is in force and ratifi ed by canada, the treaty binds canada as a matter of international law (brunnée and toope, at pp 14-15). et les obligations juridiques mutuels des parties, et il est régi par le droit international (currie, p 123). l’ar ticle 38(1)a) du statut de la cour internatio- nale de justice, rt. can. 1945 no 7, contient une défi nition implicite du traité lorsqu’il précise que la cour internationale de justice applique « les conven- tions internationales, soit générales, soit spéciales, établissant des règles expressément reconnues par les états en litige » (voir aussi brunnée et toope, p 14). le traité peut être bilatéral (traité faisant état d’engagements réciproques entre deux ou plusieurs états) ou multilatéral (traité faisant état d’un accord général conclu entre plusieurs états) (currie, p 123). sous une forme ou sous l’autre, il permet aux états de conclure des accords avec d’autres états sur des questions ou des projets précis, ou d’établir des normes d’application générale destinées à régir les rapports juridiques avec tous les états qui accepte- ront expressément ses modalités (p 123). [157] comme un traité concerne l’accord intervenu expressément entre des états, certaines formalités régissent la conclusion d’un traité ayant un carac- tère contraignant (brunnée et toope, p 14). nous y reviendrons plus loin. [158] au canada, chaque ordre de gouvernement joue un rôle différent dans le processus de conclusion d’un traité. fait important à signaler, c’est l’exécutif qui a en charge la négociation, la signature et la ratifi cation des traités dans l’exercice de la préro- gative royale en matière de relations étrangères. la signature de l’exécutif exprime un consentement initial aux grands axes du traité, mais n’indique pas un consentement à être lié par les obligations parti- culières qu’il renferme; ce consentement est donné par ratifi cation. ce n’est qu’au moment de l’entrée en vigueur du traité que ces obligations particulières deviennent contraignantes. dans le cas des traités multilatéraux, l’entrée en vigueur est habituellement subordonnée au dépôt d’un nombre précis de ratifi - cations par les états. un traité en vigueur qui a été ratifi é par le canada lie le canada en droit interna- tional (brunnée et toope, p 14-15). 250 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. [159] many treaties do not require a change in domestic law to bind the state to a course of action. where it does, however, and even when interna- tionally binding, a treaty has no formal legal effect domestically until it is transformed or implemented through a domestic law- making process, usually by legislation (harrington, at pp. 482-85; currie, at p 235). giving an unimplemented treaty bind- ing effect in canada would result in the executive creating domestic law — which, absent legislative delegation, it cannot do without infringing on legisla- tive supremacy and thereby undermining the separa- tion of powers. any domestic legal effect therefore depends on parliament or a provincial legislature adopting the treaty rule into a domestic law that can be invoked before canadian courts (currie, at p 237). for example, the environmental commit- ments in the north american free trade agreement, can. ts 1994 no. 2 (entered into force january 1, 1994) (“nafta”) were implemented by provincial governments through a canadian interprovincial agreement (harrington, at pp 483-84). the formali- ties associated with treaties respect the role that each order of the state is competent to play, in accordance with the separation of powers and the principle of legislative supremacy. [159] bon nombre de traités ne requièrent pas que le droit interne soit modifi é de manière à contraindre l’état à suivre une ligne de conduite donnée. toute- fois, lorsqu’il le fait, le traité n’a aucun effet juri- dique formel en droit interne  — même s’il est contraignant sur le plan international — tant qu’il n’a pas été transformé ou mis en œuvre dans le cadre d’un processus législatif interne, habituellement par l’édiction d’une loi (harrington, p. 482-485; currie, p 235). donner à un traité n’ayant pas été mis en œuvre un effet contraignant au canada entraînerait la création de règles de droit interne par l’exécutif, ce que ce dernier ne peut faire, en l’absence de délé- gation législative, sans porter atteinte à la suprématie législative et sans compromettre par le fait même la séparation des pouvoirs. pour qu’une règle issue d’un traité puisse produire des effets en droit interne, il est donc nécessaire que le parlement ou une légis- lature provinciale intègre cette règle dans une loi interne pouvant être invoquée devant les tribunaux canadiens (currie, p 237). par exemple, les engage- ments environnementaux contenus dans l’accord de libre- échange nord- américain, rt. can. 1994 no 2 (entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 1994) (« aléna ») ont été mis en œuvre par les gouvernements provin- ciaux au moyen d’un accord interprovincial canadien (harrington, p 483-484). les formalités afférentes aux traités respectent le rôle que chaque ordre de l’état peut jouer, conformément à la séparation des pouvoirs et au principe de la suprématie législative. (2) customary international law (2) le droit international coutumier [160] as with conventional international law, the content of customary international law is established by the actions of states on the international plane. the relevance of customary international law to do- mestic law has both a substantive and a procedural aspect. substantively, customary international law norms can have a direct effect on public common law, without legislative enactment. but for that sub- stantive effect to be afforded a customary interna- tional law norm, the existence of the norm must be proven as a matter of fact according to the normal court process. [160] comme pour le droit international conven- tionnel, le contenu du droit international coutumier est établi par les actes accomplis par les états sur le plan international. la pertinence du droit internatio- nal coutumier à l’égard du droit interne comporte à la fois un aspect substantiel et un aspect procédural. sur le plan substantiel, les normes de droit international coutumier peuvent avoir une incidence directe sur la common law publique, sans qu’il soit nécessaire d’adopter une mesure législative. cependant, pour qu’un effet substantiel soit accordé à une norme de droit international coutumier, l’existence de cette norme doit être établie sur le plan factuel conformé- ment au processus judiciaire normal. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 251 (a) sources of customary international law a) sources du droit international coutumier [161] as the majority describes (at para. 77), cus- tomary international law is a general practice ac- cepted as law that is concerned with the principles of custom at the international level. a rule of customary international law exists when state practice evidences a “custom” and the practicing states accept that cus- tom as law (currie, at p 188). [162] a custom exists where a state practice is ap- plied both generally and uniformly. to be general, it must be a suffi ciently widespread practice. to be uniform, the states that apply that practice must have done so consistently. a state practice need not, however, be perfectly widespread or consistent at all times. and for good reason: if that were true, the mo- ment one state departs from either requirement, the custom would cease to exist (currie, at pp 188-93). [163] the requirement that states, which follow the practice, do so on the basis that they subjectively be- lieve the practice to be legally mandated is known as opinio juris (currie, at p. 188; j. l. slama, “opinio juris in customary international law” (1990), 15 okla. city u. l. rev. 603, at p 656). the practicing state must perform the practice out of the belief that this practice is necessary in order to fulfi l its obliga- tions under customary international law, rather than simply due to political, security or other concerns.5 [161] comme l’expliquent les juges majoritaires (par. 77), le droit international coutumier constitue une pratique générale qui est acceptée comme étant le droit et qui concerne les principes coutumiers à l’échelle internationale. une règle de droit interna- tional coutumier existe lorsqu’une pratique étatique atteste l’existence d’une « coutume » et que les états qui se livrent à sa pratique acceptent cette coutume comme étant le droit (currie, p 188). [162] il existe une coutume lorsque la pratique étatique est appliquée à la fois de manière générale et uniforme. pour être générale, la pratique doit être suffi samment répandue pour être uniforme, elle doit avoir été appliquée de manière constante par les états qui l’appliquent. il n’est pas nécessaire cependant que la pratique étatique soit universelle- ment répandue ou qu’elle soit toujours constante, et ce, pour une bonne raison : si c’était le cas, dès lors qu’un état dérogerait à l’une ou l’autre des exigences applicables, la coutume cesserait d’exister (currie, p 188-193). [163] l’exigence que les états qui appliquent la pratique croient subjectivement y être légalement tenus est ce qu’on appelle l’opinio juris (currie, p. 188; j l. slama, « opinio juris in customary international law » (1990), 15 okla. city u l. rev. 603, p 656). l’état qui se livre à la pratique doit le faire parce qu’il croit que cela est nécessaire pour s’acquitter des obligations qui lui incombent en vertu du droit international coutumier, plutôt que simple- ment pour des raisons de politique, de sécurité ou autres5. [164] the high bar established by the twin require- ments of state practice and opinio juris refl ects the extraordinary nature of customary international law: it leads courts to adopt a role otherwise left to leg- islatures; and, unless a state persistently objects, its [164] le critère exigeant que représente l’obli- gation de démontrer tant la pratique étatique que l’opinio juris témoigne du caractère exceptionnel du droit international coutumier; il amène les tribunaux à adopter un rôle qui serait autrement dévolu aux 5 that this creates a paradox of sorts is a well- known problem in the theory of customary international law (see, for exam- ple, j. kammerhofer, “uncertainty in the formal sources of international law: customary international law and some of its problems” (2004), 15 eur. j. int’l l 523). it is not a paradox we have cause to address in this case. 5 le fait qu’il en résulte en quelque sorte un paradoxe est un problème bien connu en théorie du droit international coutumier (voir, par exemple, j. kammerhofer, « uncertainty in the formal sources of international law : customary international law and some of its problems » (2004), 15 eur. j. int’l l 523). nous n’avons pas de raisons d’examiner ce paradoxe en l’espèce. 252 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. recognition binds states to rules to which they have not affi rmatively consented (currie, at p 187). and, if a rule becomes recognized as peremptory (ie, as jus cogens) then even persistent objection will not relieve a state of the rule’s constraints (j. a. green, the persistent objector rule in international law (2016), at pp 194-95). législateurs et, à moins qu’un état ne s’y oppose systématiquement, sa reconnaissance a pour effet de contraindre des états à appliquer des règles aux- quelles ils n’ont pas expressément consenti (currie, p 187). de plus, si une règle est reconnue comme une norme impérative (c-à-d comme une norme de jus cogens), même l’objection systématique de l’état ne permettra pas à ce dernier de se soustraire aux contraintes de cette règle (j a. green, the persistent objector rule in international law (2016), p. 194- 195). (b) the adoption of customary international b) l’adoption du droit international coutumier law in canada au canada [165] once a norm of customary international law has been established, it can become a source of canadian domestic law unless it is inconsistent with extant statutory law. this doctrine is called “adop- tion” in canada and “incorporation” in its english antecedents. hape explains the doctrine as follows: the english tradition follows an adoptionist approach to the reception of customary international law. prohibitive rules of international custom may be incorporated directly into domestic law through the common law, without the need for legislative action. according to the doctrine of adoption, the courts may adopt rules of customary inter- national law as common law rules in order to base their decisions upon them, provided there is no valid legislation that clearly confl icts with the customary rule: i. brownlie, principles of public international law (6th ed. 2003), at p 41. although it has long been recognized in english common law, the doctrine received its strongest endorse- ment in the landmark case of trendtex trading corp. v. central bank of nigeria, [1977] 1 qb 529 (ca). lord denning considered both the doctrine of adoption and the doctrine of transformation, according to which interna- tional law rules must be implemented by parliament before they can be applied by domestic courts. in his opinion, the doctrine of adoption represents the correct approach in english law. rules of international law are incorporated automatically, as they evolve, unless they confl ict with legislation.   . [165] dès lors qu’une norme de droit international coutumier a été établie, elle peut devenir une source du droit interne canadien, à moins d’être incompa- tible avec le droit législatif existant. c’est ce qu’on appelle la doctrine de « l’adoption » en droit cana- dien et de « l’incorporation » dans son précurseur anglais. voici comment cette doctrine est expliquée dans l’arrêt hape : la tradition juridique britannique recourt à la méthode de l’adoption pour la réception du droit international coutumier. les règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier peuvent être incorporées directement au droit interne en application de la common law, sans que le légis- lateur n’ait à intervenir. ce principe veut que les tribunaux puissent adopter les règles du droit international coutumier et les intégrer aux règles de common law sur lesquelles ils fondent leurs décisions, à condition qu’aucune dispo- sition législative valide n’entre clairement en confl it avec elles : i. brownlie, principles of public international law (6e éd. 2003), p 41. reconnu depuis longtemps en com- mon law anglaise, c’est dans l’arrêt de principe trendtex trading corp. c. central bank of nigeria, [1977] 1 qb. 529 (ca), que le principe a été confi rmé le plus ferme- ment. lord denning y a examiné la doctrine de l’adoption et celle de la transformation, suivant laquelle le parlement doit mettre en œuvre une règle de droit international pour qu’un tribunal interne puisse l’appliquer. à son avis, la doctrine de l’adoption est celle qu’il convient d’appliquer en droit anglais. les règles du droit international et leurs modifi cations sont automatiquement incorporées, à moins qu’elles n’entrent en confl it avec une loi  .   .   . [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 253 despite the court’s silence in some recent cases, the doctrine of adoption has never been rejected in canada. indeed, there is a long line of cases in which the court has either formally accepted it or at least applied it. in my view, following the common law tradition, it appears that the doctrine of adoption operates in canada such that prohibitive rules of customary international law should be incorporated into domestic law in the absence of confl ict- ing legislation. the automatic incorporation of such rules is justifi ed on the basis that international custom, as the law of nations, is also the law of canada unless, in a valid exercise of its sovereignty, canada declares that its law is to the contrary. parliamentary sovereignty dictates that a legislature may violate international law, but that it must do so expressly. absent an express derogation, the courts may look to prohibitive rules of customary international law to aid in the interpretation of canadian law and the development of the common law. [emphasis added; pa- ras. 36 and 39.] [166] in our view, two features of this passage are noteworthy: (1) that prohibitive rules of customary international law can be incorporated into domes- tic law “in the absence of confl icting legislation”; and (2) that adoption only operates with respect to “prohibitive rules of international custom”. taken to- gether, these elements respect legislative supremacy in the incorporation of customary international law into domestic law. [167] the primacy given to contrary legislation preserves the legislature’s ability to control the effect of international laws in the domestic legal system. as currie writes, the adoption of customary international law preserves “the domestic legal system’s ultimate ability, primarily through its legislative branch, to control the content of domestic law through express override of a customary rule” (p 234). malgré ce silence de notre cour dans certaines affaires récentes, la doctrine de l’adoption n’a jamais été rejetée au canada. en fait, un fort courant jurisprudentiel la recon- naît formellement ou, du moins, l’applique. à mon avis, conformément à la tradition de la common law, il appert que la doctrine de l’adoption s’applique au canada et que les règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier devraient être incorporées au droit interne sauf disposi- tion législative contraire. l’incorporation automatique des règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier se justifi e par le fait que la coutume internationale, en tant que droit des nations, constitue également le droit du canada à moins que, dans l’exercice légitime de sa souveraineté, celui-ci ne déclare son droit interne incompatible. la sou- veraineté du parlement permet au législateur de contreve- nir au droit international, mais seulement expressément. si la dérogation n’est pas expresse, le tribunal peut alors tenir compte des règles prohibitives du droit international coutumier pour interpréter le droit canadien et élaborer la common law. [nous soulignons; par. 36 et 39.] [166] à notre avis, deux éléments de ce passage méritent d’être mentionnés : (1) les règles prohibi- tives de droit international coutumier peuvent être incorporées au droit interne « sauf disposition légis- lative contraire », et (2) l’adoption ne s’applique qu’à l’égard des « règles prohibitives du droit internatio- nal coutumier ». considérés ensemble, ces éléments respectent la suprématie législative en ce qui a trait à l’incorporation du droit international coutumier au droit interne. [167] la primauté qui est accordée aux dispo- sitions législatives contraires préserve la capacité du législateur à contrôler l’incidence des règles de droit international dans le système juridique interne. comme l’écrit currie, l’adoption du droit internatio- nal coutumier préserve [traduction] « la capacité ultime du système juridique interne, principalement par l’intermédiaire de son organe législatif, à contrô- ler le contenu du droit interne en dérogeant expres- sément à une règle de droit coutumier » (p 234). [168] the majority (at paras. 91-93) suggests that there is no difference between “mandatory” norms of international law and “prohibitive” norms, citing the extrajudicial writing of justice lebel (l. lebel, “a common law of the world? the reception of customary international law in the canadian [168] les juges majoritaires (aux par. 91-93) sug- gèrent qu’il n’existe aucune différence entre les normes « impératives » de droit international et les normes « prohibitives », citant à cet égard un ar- ticle de doctrine rédigé par le juge lebel (l. lebel, « a common law of the world? the reception 254 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. common law” (2014), 65 unblj 3). we agree that this is not a distinction that is generally drawn in international law jurisprudence. it is, however, a helpful distinction for explaining the capacity of a common law court to remedy a breach of an inter- national law norm. as james crawford (a judge of the international court of justice) has explained, the fi rst question when considering a rule of customary international law is to ask whether it is susceptible to domestic application (p 65). although a common law court adopts both prohibitive and mandatory norms, the domestic legal effect of the adoption of a prohibitive norm is different from the domestic legal effect of the adoption of a mandatory norm. this distinction becomes clear when comparing the roles of the various branches of the state. [169] to illustrate the difference between pro- hibitive and mandatory norms, it may be helpful to analogize to certiorari and mandamus or to acts and omissions. when a norm is prohibitive, in the sense that it prohibits a state from acting in a certain way, the doctrine of adoption means that actions by the executive branch contravening the norm can be set aside through judicial review, as is the case with cer- tiorari. when a norm is mandatory, in the sense that it mandates a state to act in a certain way, the doctrine of adoption means that omissions in contravention of the norm can be remedied through judicial review, as is the case with mandamus.6 mandamus is a limited remedy — it allows courts to enforce a clear public duty, but not to devise a regulatory scheme out of whole cloth. of customary international law in the canadian common law » (2014), 65 rd. un-b 3). nous sommes d’accord pour dire que ce n’est pas une distinction que fait généralement la jurisprudence de droit international. c’est toutefois une distinction utile lorsqu’il s’agit d’expliquer la capacité d’un tribunal de common law de remédier à une violation d’une norme de droit international. comme james crawford (juge à la cour internationale de justice) l’a expliqué, la première question à se poser dans l’examen d’une règle de droit international coutu- mier est celle de savoir si cette règle est susceptible d’application nationale (p 65). bien qu’un tribunal de common law adopte à la fois des normes prohibi- tives et des normes impératives, l’incidence juridique nationale de l’adoption d’une norme prohibitive dif- fère de l’incidence juridique nationale de l’adoption d’une norme impérative. cette distinction devient évidente lorsqu’on compare les rôles des différents organes de l’état. [169] pour illustrer la différence qui existe entre les normes prohibitives et les normes impératives, il peut être utile d’établir une analogie avec le certio- rari et le mandamus, ou encore avec les actes et les omissions. lorsqu’une norme est prohibitive, en ce sens qu’elle interdit à un état d’agir d’une certaine façon, la doctrine de l’adoption fait en sorte que les actes de l’organe exécutif qui contreviennent à cette norme peuvent être annulés au moyen d’un contrôle judiciaire, comme le fait le certiorari. lorsqu’une norme est impérative, en ce sens qu’elle impose à un état l’obligation d’agir d’une certaine façon, la doctrine de l’adoption permet de remédier aux omissions d’agir qui contreviennent à la norme au moyen d’un contrôle judiciaire, comme le fait le mandamus6. le mandamus constitue une réparation limitée — il permet aux tribunaux de faire observer un devoir public clair, mais non d’élaborer un régime réglementaire de toutes pièces. [170] when the legislative branch contravenes an adopted norm, there is no difference between [170] lorsque le pouvoir législatif contrevient à une norme adoptée, il n’y a aucune différence entre 6 to be clear, we do not mean to suggest that relief in the nature of certiorari and mandamus are the only remedies available in such a situation: for example, equitable remedies such as injunctive or declaratory relief may also be available. 6 par souci de clarté, nous ne voulons pas dire que les réparations de la nature du certiorari et du mandamus sont les seules réparations disponibles dans un tel cas : à titre d’exemple, des réparations en equity comme l’injonction ou le jugement déclaratoire sont également possibles. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 255 prohibitive norms and mandatory norms if the legislature passes a law contravening a prohibitive norm of international law, that law is not subject to review by the courts. similarly, if the legislature does not pass a law in contravention of a manda- tory norm of international law, the courts cannot construct that law for them, unless doing so is other- wise within the courts’ power. courts may presume the intent of the legislature is to comply with cus- tomary international law norms (see, for example, canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, [2019] 4 scr 465, at para. 182), but that presumption is rebuttable: cus- tomary international law has interpretive force, but it does not formally constrain the legislature. the interpretive force comes from the presumption that the legislature would not mean to inadvertently violate customary international law (j. m. keyes and r. sullivan, “a legislative perspective on the interaction of international and domestic law”, in o. e. fitzgerald, ed., the globalized rule of law: relationships between international and domestic law (2006), 277, at p 297). [171] the fi nal question is what happens when pri- vate common law contravenes a norm.7 we are aware of no case where private common law has violated a prohibitive norm. nor are we aware of any case where private common law has violated a manda- tory norm. in the case that has come closest, kazemi estate v. islamic republic of iran, 2014 scc 62, [2014] 3 scr 176, this court found that canada was not under an obligation to provide a private law civil remedy for violations of a norm: les normes prohibitives et les normes impératives. si le législateur adopte une loi qui contrevient à une norme prohibitive du droit international, cette loi n’est pas susceptible d’examen judiciaire. de même, si le législateur, en violation d’une norme impérative du droit international, n’adopte pas une loi, les tribunaux ne peuvent établir cette loi pour lui, à moins qu’ils ne soient par ailleurs investis du pouvoir de le faire. les tribunaux peuvent présumer qu’il est de l’intention du législateur de respecter les normes de droit international coutumier (voir, par exemple, canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immigration) c. vavilov, 2019 csc 65, [2019] 4 rcs 465, par. 182), mais cette présomption est ré- futable : le droit international coutumier a une force d’interprétation, mais n’impose pas formellement de contraintes au législateur. la force d’interprétation découle de la présomption selon laquelle le légis- lateur ne voudrait pas contrevenir par inadvertance au droit international coutumier (j m. keyes et r. sullivan, « l’interaction du droit international et du droit national dans une perspective législative », dans o e. fitzgerald, dir., règle de droit et mondialisa- tion : rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne (2006), 351, p 374-375). [171] la dernière question est de savoir ce qui ar- rive lorsqu’une règle de common law privée contre- vient à une norme7. nous ne connaissons aucune décision portant sur une règle de common law pri- vée ayant enfreint une norme prohibitive. nous ne connaissons non plus aucune décision portant sur une règle de common law privée ayant enfreint une norme impérative. dans l’affaire kazemi (succession) c. république islamique d’iran, 2014 csc 62, [2014] 3 rcs 176, qui se rapproche le plus d’un tel cas, notre cour a conclu que le canada n’est aucunement tenu de prévoir une réparation civile de droit privé en cas de violations d’une norme : while the prohibition of torture is certainly a jus cogens norm from which canada cannot derogate (and is also very likely a principle of fundamental justice), the question in si l’interdiction de la torture est assurément une norme du jus cogens à laquelle le canada ne peut déroger (et aussi, fort probablement, un principe de justice fondamentale), 7 we say “private” common law in contradistinction to “public” common law. public common law is the law that governs the activities of the crown, and is of course the law related to the executive branch, discussed previously. “private” common law is law that governs relations between non- state entities. 7 nous disons common law « privée » par opposition à common law « publique ». la common law publique est le droit qui régit les activités de la couronne et qui se rapporte bien sûr à l’organe exécutif, examiné précédemment. la common law privée est le droit qui régit les relations entre des entités non étatiques. 256 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. this case is whether this norm extends in such a way as to require each state to provide a civil remedy for torture committed abroad by a foreign state. il s’agit en l’espèce de savoir si cette norme va jusqu’à obliger chaque état à prévoir une réparation civile pour des actes de torture commis à l’étranger par un autre état. several national courts and international tribunals have considered this question, and they have consistently con- fi rmed that the answer is no: customary international law does not extend the prohibition of torture so far as to require a civil remedy for torture committed in a foreign state. [paras. 152-53] plusieurs cours de justice nationales et tribunaux inter- nationaux se sont penchés sur cette question et ils ont sys- tématiquement confi rmé que la réponse est non : le droit international coutumier n’étend pas l’interdiction de la tor- ture au point d’exiger une réparation civile pour des actes de torture commis dans un état étranger. [par. 152-153] [172] in short, even if a plaintiff can prove that, (1) a prohibition lies on nation states at international law; and (2) that prohibition is jus cogens, these two considerations are nonetheless insuffi cient to support the proposition that international law requires every state to provide a civil remedy for conduct in breach of the prohibition. [172] en résumé, même si le demandeur est en mesure de prouver que, (1) en droit international, une interdiction frappe les états- nations, et que (2) cette interdiction fait partie du jus cogens, ces deux consi- dérations sont néanmoins insuffi santes pour étayer l’idée selon laquelle le droit international oblige chaque état à prévoir une réparation civile pour une conduite allant à l’encontre de cette interdiction. [173] there are good reasons for distinguishing between executive action and legislative action. canada — and the provinces — have the ability, should they choose to exercise it, to violate norms of customary international law. but that is a choice that only parliament or the provincial legislatures can make; the federal and provincial governments cannot do so without the authorization of those leg- islative bodies. [173] il existe de bonnes raisons d’établir une dis- tinction entre l’action exécutive et l’action législa- tive. le canada — et les provinces — ont le pouvoir, s’ils décident de l’exercer, de violer les normes de droit international coutumier. cependant, c’est une décision que seuls le parlement ou les législatures provinciales peuvent prendre; les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux ne peuvent le faire sans l’auto- risation de ces organes législatifs. [174] but how does this inform the development of private common law? if there were a private common law rule that contravened a prohibitive norm — we confess that such a combination of norm and private law rule is beyond our imagination, but perhaps it could exist — we would agree that judges must alter that law. when the private common law contravenes a mandatory norm, the court is faced with determin- ing whether any existing statutes prevent the court from amending the common law as necessary for it to comply with that norm. [174] mais comment cela contribue-t-il à l’évo- lution de la common law privée? si une règle de la common law privée contrevenait à une norme prohibitive — nous devons reconnaître qu’une telle combinaison de norme et de règle de droit privé dépasse notre imagination, mais qu’elle pourrait quand même exister —, nous serions d’accord pour dire que les juges devraient la modifi er. lorsque la common law privée contrevient à une norme impé- rative, le tribunal doit déterminer si une loi existante l’empêche d’apporter à la common law les modifi - cations nécessaires de façon à ce qu’elle respecte cette norme. [175] how, then, to determine whether a statute pre- vents so amending the common law? we would sug- gest that courts should follow a three- step process. first, precisely identify the norm. second, determine [175] comment alors le tribunal détermine-t-il si une loi a pour effet de l’empêcher de modifi er ainsi la common law? nous proposons qu’il suive le processus en trois étapes suivant. premièrement, [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 257 how the norm would best be given effect. third, determine whether any legislation prevents the court from changing the common law to create that effect. if no legislation does so, courts should implement that change to the common law. if any legislation does so, the courts should respect that legislative choice, and refrain from changing the common law. in such circumstances, judicial restraint respects both legislative supremacy and the superior institutional capacity of the legislatures to design regulatory schemes to comply with canada’s international ob- ligations. these are foundational considerations, go- ing to the proper roles of courts, legislatures and the executive. the incorporation of a rule of customary international law must yield to such constitutional principles (r v. jones (margaret), [2006] ukhl 16, [2007] 1 ac 136, at para. 23, per lord bingham; crawford, at pp 65-66). [176] one fi nal point on the doctrine of adop- tion. hape is ambivalent as to whether incorpora- tion means that rules of customary international law are incorporated (para. 36), should be incorporated (para. 39) or simply may aid in the interpretation of the common law (para 39). the traditional english view is the fi rst. but the modern english jurispru- dence puts that view in doubt, and rightly so (see jones, at para. 11, per lord bingham). as we dis- cussed above, a rule of customary international law may need to be adapted to fi t the differing circum- stances of common law instead of public interna- tional law. le tribunal devrait cerner avec précision la norme en cause. deuxièmement, il devrait décider de la meilleure façon d’y donner effet. troisièmement, il devrait vérifi er si une loi l’empêche de modifi er la common law de façon à créer cet effet. si aucune loi ne l’en empêche, il devrait mettre en œuvre le changement dans la common law. si une loi l’en empêche, il devrait respecter ce choix législatif et s’abstenir de modifi er la common law. en pareilles circonstances, la retenue judiciaire respecte à la fois la suprématie législative et la capacité institution- nelle supérieure des législateurs de concevoir des régimes réglementaires qui permettent au canada de remplir ses obligations internationales. ce sont là des considérations fondamentales qui touchent aux rôles dévolus aux tribunaux, aux législateurs et à l’exécutif. l’incorporation d’une règle de droit international coutumier doit céder le pas à de tels principes constitutionnels (r c. jones (margaret), [2006] ukhl 16, [2007] 1 ac 136, par. 23, lord bingham; crawford, p 65-66). [176] une dernière observation sur la doctrine de l’adoption s’impose. l’arrêt hape est ambivalent quant à savoir si l’incorporation signifie que les règles de droit international coutumier sont incor- porées (par. 36), devraient être incorporées (par. 39) ou aident tout simplement à interpréter la common law (par 39). la première signifi cation constitue le point de vue traditionnel anglais. cependant, la jurisprudence anglaise moderne met en doute ce point de vue, et avec raison (voir jones, par. 11, lord bingham). comme nous l’avons vu, une règle de droit international coutumier peut devoir être adaptée afi n de correspondre aux circonstances différentes de la common law plutôt qu’au droit international public. (c) the procedure for recognizing customary c) la procédure de reconnaissance du droit international law international coutumier [177] much of canadian civil procedure depends on the distinction between law and facts. facts are pled, but law is not; facts are determined through evidence, but law is not; facts cannot be settled on a motion to strike or summary judgment, but law can; factual fi ndings by a trier of fact are deferred to by appellate courts; legal conclusions are not. perhaps [177] au canada, la procédure civile dépend en grande partie de la distinction entre le droit et les faits. les faits sont allégués, mais le droit ne l’est pas; les faits sont établis à la lumière de la preuve, mais pas le droit; il ne peut être statué sur les faits dans le cadre d’une requête en radiation ou en juge- ment sommaire, mais il peut l’être sur le droit; les 258 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. most importantly, judges cannot determine matters of fact without evidence led by the parties (except where judicial notice applies), but can decide ques- tions of law. judges doing their own research on law is not only accepted, but expected. judges doing their own research on facts is impermissible. [178] the majority suggests that the content of customary international law should be treated as law by canadian courts, not fact, but, incongruously, also recognizes that the authorities on which it relies for this proposition nonetheless maintain that evidence of state practice is necessary to prove a new norm of customary international law (para. 96, citing g van ert, “the reception of international law in canada: three ways we might go wrong”, in centre for international governance innovation, canada in international law at 150 and beyond, paper no. 2 (2018), at p. 6; g van ert, using international law in canadian courts (2nd ed. 2008), at pp 62-69). with respect, we see the approach of treating norms of international law as law and new norms of inter- national law as fact as creating an unwieldy hybridi- zation of law and fact. as we have discussed above, procedure in canadian law is largely built upon the distinction between law and fact, and such a hybrid therefore promises to cause confusion. the absence of clear methodology will foster conclusionary rea- soning, in other words decision making by intuition. and, what standard of review would be applied to such decisions? confusion in means gives rise to uncertainty in ends. juridictions d’appel font preuve de déférence envers les conclusions de fait tirées par le juge des faits, mais non envers les conclusions de droit. fait peut- être le plus important, les juges ne peuvent trancher des questions de fait si les parties ne leur ont pas soumis d’éléments de preuve (sauf si la connais- sance d’offi ce s’applique), mais ils peuvent se pro- noncer sur des questions de droit. non seulement il est accepté que les juges effectuent leurs propres recherches juridiques, mais c’est ce qu’on attend d’eux. par contre, les juges ne sont pas autorisés à effectuer leurs propres recherches au sujet des faits. [178] les juges majoritaires laissent entendre que les tribunaux canadiens devraient assimiler le contenu du droit international coutumier à du droit, et non à des faits, mais ils reconnaissent aussi de façon incongrue que les sources qu’ils citent à l’appui de cette proposition maintiennent néanmoins que la preuve de la pratique de l’état est nécessaire pour établir l’existence d’une nouvelle norme de droit international coutumier (par. 96, citant g van ert, « the reception of international law in canada : three ways we might go wrong » (2018), p. 6; g van ert, using international law in canadian courts (2e éd. 2008), p 62-69). en toute déférence, nous estimons que de traiter les normes de droit international comme du droit et les nouvelles normes de droit international comme des faits revient à créer une hybridation peu maniable de droit et de faits. comme nous l’avons vu précédemment, la procé- dure en droit canadien repose en grande partie sur la distinction entre le droit et les faits, et un tel hybride promet donc de créer de la confusion. l’absence d’une méthodologie claire favorisera le raisonne- ment non étayé, autrement dit la prise des décisions par intuition. et quelle serait la norme de contrôle applicable à de telles décisions? quand les moyens prêtent à confusion, la fi n est incertaine. [179] the process is perhaps most conveniently un- derstood as comprising three steps. the fi rst requires the court to fi nd the facts of state practice and opinio juris. in easy cases, the fi rst step can be dispensed with without a trial due to the power of judicial no- tice. when there is or can be no dispute about the existence of a norm of customary international law it is appropriate for the courts to take judicial notice [179] il est peut- être plus commode de considé- rer que le processus comporte trois étapes. la pre- mière exige du tribunal qu’il établisse les faits de la pra tique étatique et de l’opinio juris. dans les cas simples, la première étape peut être écartée sans tenue d’un procès, en raison du pouvoir de prendre connaissance d’offi ce lorsque nul ne conteste ou ne peut contester l’existence d’une norme de [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 259 (r v. find, 2001 scc 32, [2001] 1 scr 863, at para. 48; r v. spence, 2005 scc 71, [2005] 3 scr. 458, at para 61). in this case, we agree with the majority that the existence of some of the norms of international law that have been pled — for example, that crimes against humanity are prohibited — meets the threshold for taking judicial notice (majority rea- sons, at para 99). where, however, the existence of a norm of customary international law is contested — as it is on the question of whether corporations can be held liable at international law — judges should rely on the pleadings (on an application to strike or for summary judgment) or the evidence that is ad- duced before them. [180] it is in these contested, hard cases where this step is particularly important. courts will be called on to evaluate both whether there exists a custom generally among states that is applied uniformly, and whether the practicing states respect the custom out of the belief that doing so is necessary in order to fulfi l their obligations under customary international law. these are, fundamentally, empirical exercises: they do not ask what state practice should be or whether states should comply with the norm out of a sense of customary international legal obligation, but whether states in fact do so. as van ert has ac- knowledged, “[s]tate practice    is a matter of fact” (using international law in canadian courts, at p. 67) and that when a claimant asserts “a new rule of customary international law”, proof in evidence may be required (“the reception of international law in canada”, at p. 6, fn. 60). droit international coutumier, il convient que les tribunaux en prennent connaissance d’offi ce (r c. find, 2001 csc 32, [2001] 1 rcs 863, par. 48; r c. spence, 2005 csc 71, [2005] 3 rcs 458, par 61). en l’espèce, nous sommes d’accord avec les juges majoritaires pour dire que l’existence de certaines des normes de droit international qui ont été alléguées — par exemple l’interdiction des crimes contre l’humanité — satisfait au seuil permettant d’en prendre connaissance d’offi ce (motifs des juges majoritaires, par 99). cependant, lorsque l’existence d’une norme de droit international coutumier est contestée — comme elle l’est en ce qui a trait à la question de savoir si les sociétés peuvent être tenues responsables en droit international —, le juge devrait se fonder sur les actes de procédure (lorsqu’il est saisi d’une requête en radiation ou d’une requête en jugement sommaire) ou sur les éléments de preuve qui lui sont présentés. [180] c’est dans ces cas contestés et épineux que cette étape est particulièrement importante. les tri- bunaux seront appelés à déterminer à la fois s’il existe de façon générale une coutume au sein des états qui est appliquée de manière uniforme, et si les états qui se livrent à sa pratique respectent celle-ci parce qu’ils croient qu’il est nécessaire de le faire pour s’acquitter de leurs obligations en droit inter- national coutumier. il s’agit fondamentalement de démarches empiriques : elles ne consistent pas à se demander ce que devrait être la pratique étatique ou si les états devraient se conformer à la norme parce qu’ils s’y sentent tenus par le droit interna- tional coutumier, mais à vérifi er si les états s’y conforment effectivement. comme l’a reconnu van ert, [traduction] « [l]a pratique étatique [  ] est une question de fait » (using international law in canadian courts, p. 67) et, lorsqu’un demandeur invoque [traduction] « une nouvelle règle de droit international coutumier », il se peut qu’il doive en faire la preuve (« the reception of international law in canada », p. 6, note 60). [181] as the majority has correctly described (at para. 79), the judicial decisions of national courts can be “evidence” of general practice or opinio juris. these national courts include canadian courts, the courts of other common law systems, and the courts [181] comme les juges majoritaires le précisent à juste titre (au par. 79), les décisions judiciaires des tri- bunaux nationaux peuvent constituer « une preuve » de la pratique générale ou de l’opinio juris. ces tri- bunaux nationaux incluent les tribunaux canadiens, 260 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. of every other national legal system. to determine whether a rule of customary international law exists, canadian courts must be prepared to understand and evaluate judicial decisions from the world over. as this court explained, “[t]o establish custom, an ex- tensive survey of the practices of nations is required” (r v. finta, [1994] 1 scr 701, at p 773). canadian judges need to be able to understand decisions ren- dered in a foreign legal system, in which they are not trained, and in languages which they do not know. making expert evidence available for judges to understand foreign language texts is simply sen- sible (van ert, using international law in canadian courts, at p 57). put another way, the foundations of customary international law rest, in part, on foreign law. in canada, foreign law is treated as fact, not law (j. walker, castel & walker: canadian confl ict of laws (6th ed. (loose- leaf)), vol. 1, at p 7-1). when a canadian court applies canadian confl ict of laws rules and determines that the law of a foreign state is to be applied in a canadian court proceeding, the canadian judge does not then embark on their own analysis of the foreign law. rather, the canadian judge relies on the parties to adduce evidence of the content of the foreign law. [182] it is only once the facts of state practice and opinio juris are found that the court can proceed to a second step, which is to identify which, if any, norms of customary international law must be rec- ognized to best explain these facts. this question arises since state practice and opinio juris may be consistent with more than one possible norm. this is a question of law. les tribunaux d’autres régimes de common law et les tribunaux de tout autre système juridique national. pour déterminer s’il existe une règle de droit inter- national coutumier, les tribunaux canadiens doivent être prêts à comprendre et à évaluer des décisions judiciaires du monde entier. comme notre cour l’a expliqué, « [p]our déterminer la coutume, il faut étu- dier de façon approfondie les pratiques des nations » (r c. finta, [1994] 1 rcs 701, p 773). les juges canadiens doivent être en mesure de comprendre les décisions rendues dans un système juridique étran- ger — sur lequel ils n’ont pas de formation — et dans des langues qu’ils ne connaissent pas. il semble tout simplement logique de mettre à la disposition des juges une preuve d’expert pour qu’ils puissent comprendre des textes rédigés dans une langue étran- gère (van ert, using international law in canadian courts, p 57). en d’autres termes, les fondements du droit international coutumier reposent en partie sur le droit étranger. au canada, le droit étranger est traité comme un fait, et non comme du droit (j. walker, castel & walker : canadian confl ict of laws (6e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), vol. 1, p 7-1). lorsqu’un tribunal canadien applique les règles canadiennes de droit international privé et décide qu’il faut appliquer le droit d’un état étranger dans une instance judiciaire canadienne, il n’entreprend pas sa propre analyse du droit étranger. le juge canadien compte plutôt sur les parties pour qu’elles lui soumettent des éléments de preuve sur le contenu du droit étranger. [182] c’est seulement une fois que les faits de la pratique étatique et de l’opinio juris sont établis que le tribunal peut passer à la deuxième étape, laquelle consiste à déterminer quelles normes de droit inter- national coutumier, s’il en est, doivent être reconnues afi n de mieux expliquer ces faits. cette question se pose, car la pratique étatique et l’opinio juris peuvent être compatibles avec plus d’une norme. il s’agit d’une question de droit. [183] the fi nal step is to apply the norms, as recog- nized, to the facts of the case at bar. this is a question of mixed fact and law. [183] la dernière étape consiste à appliquer les normes qui sont ainsi reconnues aux faits de l’espèce. il s’agit d’une question mixte de faits et de droit. [184] we should note that, although we disagree with the majority on this procedural point, and al- though this point is important, it is ultimately not [184] il convient de souligner que, bien que nous ne partagions pas l’avis des juges majoritaires sur ce point procédural, et bien que ce point soit important, [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 261 the nub of our disagreement. the more the questions in dispute are questions of fact, the more diffi cult it is for a court to properly strike the pleadings. it is therefore more diffi cult for us to strike these claims on our understanding of the jurisprudential charac- ter of international law, than it is on the majority’s understanding. nonetheless, as we will explain, we would do just that. ce n’est pas là que se situe en défi nitive le nœud de notre désaccord. plus les questions en litige sont d’ordre factuel, plus il est diffi cile pour le tribunal de radier à juste titre les actes de procédure. il est donc plus diffi cile pour nous de radier les réclamations en cause en l’espèce selon notre conception du caractère jurisprudentiel du droit international, que ce ne l’est selon la conception des juges majoritaires. c’est néanmoins, comme nous l’expliquerons, exactement ce que nous ferions. b the claim, on the majority’s theory, contra- venes these limits placed upon international law within canadian law b selon la thèse des juges majoritaires, la récla- mation ne respecte pas les limites imposées au droit international en droit canadien [185] in the following section, we explain why the majority’s theory of the case cannot succeed. we begin here by summarizing its approach, as we understand it: [185] dans la section qui suit, nous expliquons les raisons pour lesquelles la thèse des juges majoritaires ne peut être retenue. nous commençons par résumer leur démarche telle que nous la comprenons : (a) there are prohibitions at international law against crimes against humanity, slavery, the use of forced labour, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (paras 100-103). a) il existe en droit international des règles interdi- sant les crimes contre l’humanité, l’esclavage, le recours au travail forcé et les traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants (par 100-103). (b) these prohibitions have the status of jus cogens, except possibly for that against the use of forced labour (paras 100-103). b) ces interdictions ont valeur de jus cogens, sauf peut- être celle visant le recours au travail forcé (par 100-103). (c) individuals and states both must obey some cus- tomary international law prohibitions, and it is a question for the trial judge whether they must obey these specific prohibitions (paras.  105, 110-11 and 113). c) les individus et les états doivent se conformer à certaines interdictions de droit international coutumier et il appartient au juge de première instance de décider s’ils doivent respecter ces interdictions particulières (par. 105, 110-111 et 113). (d) corporations must also obey certain such prohi- bitions (paras 112-13). d) les sociétés doivent également se conformer à certaines de ces interdictions (par 112-113). (e) individuals are benefi ciaries of these prohibi- e) ces interdictions profi tent aux individus (par. 106- tions (paras 106-11). 111). (f) it would not “make sense to argue that inter- national law may impose criminal liability on corporations, but not civil liability” (para. 112, citing h. h. koh, “separating myth from reality about corporate responsibility litigation” (2004), 7 jiel 263, at p 266). f) il [traduction] « serait illogique de soutenir que le droit international peut imputer une res- ponsabilité criminelle aux sociétés, mais pas une responsabilité civile » (par. 112, citant h h. koh, «  separating myth from reality about corporate responsibility litigation » (2004), 7 jiel 263, p 266). 262 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. (g) the doctrine of adoption makes any action pro- hibited at international law also prohibited at domestic law, unless there is legislative action to the contrary (paras. 94, 114 and 116). g) par application de la doctrine de l’adoption, tout acte interdit en droit international est également interdit en droit interne, sauf disposition législa- tive contraire (par. 94, 114 et 116). (h) in domestic law, where there is a right there must h) en droit interne, là où il y a un droit, il y a un be a remedy (paras 120-21). recours (par 120-121). (i) there is no adequate remedy in domestic law, including in existing tort (paras 122-26). i) il n’y a pas de recours adéquat en droit interne, y compris en vertu des délits existants (par. 122- 126). [186] we have no quarrel with steps (a), (b), (c), (e), and (h) of the majority’s analysis. [187] in our respectful view, however, the major- ity’s analysis goes astray at steps (d), (f), (g), and (i). the conclusion it draws at step (d) relies upon it being possible for a norm of customary international law to exist when state practice is not general and not uniform. the conclusions it draws at steps (f) and (g) are not supported by the premises on which it relies. and the conclusions the majority draws at step (i) are possible only if one ignores the express criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, prohibition against courts creating common law offences. we will address these in turn. (1) as a matter of law, corporations cannot be liable at customary international law [186] nous n’avons rien à redire en ce qui concerne les étapes a), b), c), e) et h) de l’analyse des juges majoritaires. [187] cependant, à notre humble avis, les juges majoritaires font fausse route aux étapes d), f), g) et i) de leur analyse. la conclusion qu’ils tirent à l’étape d) repose sur le fait qu’il est possible qu’une norme de droit international coutumier existe lorsqu’une pratique étatique n’est pas générale et n’est pas uni- forme. les conclusions auxquelles ils arrivent aux étapes f) et g) ne sont pas étayées par les prémisses sur lesquelles ils se fondent. de plus, les conclu- sions qu’ils tirent à l’étape i) ne sont possibles que si l’on ne tient pas compte de l’interdiction expresse édictée par le code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, selon laquelle les tribunaux ne peuvent créer des infractions de common law. nous examinerons ces conclusions à tour de rôle. (1) sur le plan juridique, les sociétés ne peuvent pas être tenues responsables en droit interna- tional coutumier [188] the majority states that “it is not ‘plain and obvious’ that corporations today enjoy a blanket exclusion under customary international law from direct liability for violations of ‘obligatory, defi n- able, and universal norms of international law’” (para. 113, citing koh, at p 267). the authority the majority cites in support of this proposition is a sin- gle law review essay by professor harold koh. it cites no cases where a corporation has been held civilly liable for breaches of customary international law anywhere in the world, and we do not know of [188] les juges majoritaires affi rment qu’il « n’est pas “évident et manifeste” que les sociétés jouissent aujourd’hui d’une exclusion générale en droit inter- national coutumier à l’égard de la responsabilité directe pour violations des [traduction] “normes obligatoires, défi nissables et universelles de droit international” » (par. 113, citant koh, p 267). la seule source que les juges majoritaires invoquent à l’appui de cette proposition est un essai du professeur harold koh, publié dans une revue juridique. ils ne citent aucune décision dans laquelle une société a été [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 263 any. while it does cite a book by simon baughen and an article by andrew clapham, those authorities do not support its view of the matter (s. baughen, human rights and corporate wrongs: closing the governance gap (2015), at pp. 130-32; a. clapham, “on complicity”, in m. henzelin and r. roth, eds., le droit pénal à l’épreuve de l’internationalisation (2002), 241, at pp 241-75). baughen’s discussion of norms of international criminal law imposing civil liability on aiders and abetters is specifi c to the provision in the united states code now commonly known as the alien tort statute, 28 usc § 1350 (2018), and clapham’s article concerns the recogni- tion of the complicity of corporations in international criminal law and human rights violations, not the recognition of civil liability rules. in our view, that corporations are excluded [189] from direct liability is plain and obvious. although normally such a contested issue would be left to trial, in the context of a disputed norm of customary inter- national law the existence of an opposing view can itself be dispositive. as this court said in kazemi, “customary international law is, by its very nature, unequivocal. it is not binding law if it is equivocal” (para 102). tenue civilement responsable de violations au droit international coutumier quelque part dans le monde, et nous n’en connaissons aucune. bien qu’ils citent un livre de simon baughen et un ar ticle de andrew clapham, ces écrits n’étayent pas leur point de vue (s. baughen, human rights and corporate wrongs : closing the governance gap (2015), p. 130-132; a. clapham, « on complicity », dans m. henzelin et r. roth, dir., le droit pénal à l’épreuve de l’internatio- nalisation (2002), 241, p 241-275). l’analyse que fait baughen des normes de droit pénal international qui imposent une responsabilité civile aux personnes qui aident et encouragent est propre à la disposition du united states code qui est maintenant commu- nément appelée la alien tort statute, 28 usc § 1350 (2018), et l’ar ticle de clapham porte sur la reconnaissance de la complicité des sociétés en droit pénal international et sur les violations des droits de la personne, et non sur la reconnaissance de règles de responsabilité civile. [189] à notre avis, il est évident et manifeste que les sociétés sont exclues de la responsabilité directe. bien que normalement, il incomberait au tribunal de première instance de se prononcer sur une telle question litigieuse, dans le contexte d’une norme contestée de droit international coutumier, l’existence d’une opinion contraire peut en soi être déterminante. comme notre cour l’a affi rmé dans l’arrêt kazemi, « le droit international coutumier, de par sa nature même, ne saurait être équivoque. en effet, s’il est équivoque, il n’a pas force obligatoire » (par 102). in this regard, and against professor koh’s [190] lone essay, we would pit the united nations general assembly’s report of the special representative of the secretary- general (srsg) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, un. doc. a/hrc/ 4/ 035, february 19, 2007, which states that “preliminary research has not identifi ed the emergence of uniform and consistent state practice establishing corporate responsibilities under customary international law” (para 34). this is confi rmed by the evaluation of judge crawford, in the book that the majority cites [190] nous aimerions opposer à cet égard ainsi qu’à cet unique essai du professeur koh le rapport de l’assemblée générale des nations unies intitulé rapport du représentant spécial du secrétaire géné- ral chargé de la question des droits de l’homme et des sociétés transnationales et autres entreprises, doc. nu. a/hrc/4/35, 19 février 2007, selon lequel « les premiers éléments de recherche n’ont pas permis de faire apparaître une pratique uniforme et cohérente des états établissant les responsabilités des entre- prises en droit international coutumier » (par 34). cela est confi rmé par l’évaluation suivante faite par 264 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. at para. 97 of its reasons (brownlie’s principles of public international law): at present, no international processes exist that require private persons or businesses to protect human rights. decisions of international tribunals focus on states’ re- sponsibility for preventing human rights abuses by those within their jurisdiction. nor is corporate liability for human rights violations yet recognized under customary international law. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] le juge crawford dans l’ouvrage cité par les juges majoritaires au par. 97 de leurs motifs (brownlie’s principles of public international law) : [traduction] à l’heure actuelle, aucun processus international n’exige des particuliers ou des entreprises qu’ils protègent les droits de la personne. les décisions des tribunaux internationaux portent principalement sur la responsabilité qui incombe aux états de prévenir les viola- tions des droits de la personne par quiconque se trouve sur leur territoire. de plus, le droit international coutumier ne reconnaît pas encore la responsabilité des sociétés en cas de violations des droits de la personne. [nous soulignons; notes en bas de page omises.] (crawford, at p. 630) (crawford, p. 630) [191] the authorities thus favour the proposition that corporate liability for human rights violations has not been recognized under customary interna- tional law; the most that one could credibly say is that the proposition that such liability has been rec- ognized is equivocal. to repeat kazemi, “customary international law is, by its very nature, unequivocal. it is not binding law if it is equivocal” (para 102). absent such a binding norm, the workers’ cause of action is clearly doomed to fail. (2) the doctrine of adoption does not trans- form a prohibitive rule into a liability rule [191] les sources appuient donc la proposition selon laquelle la responsabilité des sociétés en cas de violations des droits de la personne n’a pas été reconnue en droit international coutumier; le plus que l’on puisse affi rmer de façon crédible, c’est que la proposition selon laquelle une telle responsabilité a été reconnue est équivoque. pour reprendre ce qui a été dit dans kazemi, « le droit international cou- tumier, de par sa nature même, ne saurait être équi- voque. en effet, s’il est équivoque, il n’a pas force obligatoire » (par 102). en l’absence d’une telle norme obligatoire, la cause d’action des travailleurs est clairement vouée à l’échec. (2) la doctrine de l’adoption ne transforme pas une règle prohibitive en règle de responsabi- lité [192] with respect, we fi nd the majority’s analysis in respect of steps (f) and (g) diffi cult to follow. [192] soit dit en tout respect, nous estimons que l’analyse des juges majoritaires à l’égard des étapes f) et g) est diffi cile à suivre. [193] at paragraph 101, the majority writes that “[t]he prohibition against slavery too is seen as a peremptory norm”. we are uncertain how it deduces the potential existence of a liability rule from this uncontroversial statement of a prohibition. perhaps it sees a liability rule as inherent in a “prohibition”, or perhaps it sees the doctrine of adoption as producing [193] au para graphe 101, les juges majoritaires écrivent que « [l]’interdiction de l’esclavage aussi est considérée comme une norme impérative ». nous ne savons pas trop comment ils déduisent l’existence possible d’une règle de responsabilité de cette décla- ration incontestée d’interdiction. peut- être qu’ils considèrent qu’une règle de responsabilité découle [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 265 a liability rule in response to a prohibition, or perhaps both.8 we do not know. [194] faced with such uncertainty, we will con- sider all the plausible reasoning paths that could take the majority from the existence of a prohibition to the existence of a liability rule. we see three such paths that correspond to distinct interpretations of its reasons: (1) prohibitions of customary international law re- quire the canadian state to provide domestic liability rules between individuals and corpora- tions. with regard to slavery, the prohibition would require canada to provide a legal rule pursuant to which enslaved persons could hold a corporation responsible for their enslavement liable. the doctrine of adoption requires our courts to create such rules if they do not already exist. paragraph 119 of the majority’s reasons supports this interpretation. (2) a prohibition in customary international law it- self contains a liability rule between individuals and corporations. with regard to slavery, the pro- hibition upon slavery would include a subordi- nate rule that a “corporation who is responsible for enslavement is liable to enslaved persons”. the doctrine of adoption requires domestic courts to enforce these rules. paragraphs 127 and 128 of the majority reasons support this interpretation. nécessairement d’une « interdiction » ou que la doc- trine de l’adoption crée une règle de responsabilité en réponse à une interdiction, ou peut- être encore ces deux choses8. nous l’ignorons. [194] en présence d’une telle incertitude, nous examinerons tous les raisonnements possibles qui ont pu amener les juges majoritaires à passer de l’existence d’une interdiction à l’existence d’une règle de responsabilité. nous en voyons trois, les- quels correspondent à des interprétations distinctes de leurs motifs : (1) les interdictions de droit international coutu- mier obligent l’état canadien à prévoir des règles de responsabilité interne entre les individus et les sociétés. en ce qui concerne l’esclavage, l’inter- diction obligerait le canada à prévoir une règle de droit selon laquelle les personnes réduites à l’esclavage peuvent tenir une société responsa- ble de cette situation. la doctrine de l’adoption exige que nos tribunaux créent de telles règles si elles n’existent pas déjà. le para graphe 119 des motifs des juges majoritaires appuie cette interprétation. (2) une interdiction en droit international coutu- mier renferme elle- même une règle de respon- sabilité entre les individus et les sociétés. en ce qui concerne l’esclavage, l’interdiction de cette pratique inclurait une règle accessoire selon laquelle « une société responsable de réduction en esclavage est responsable envers les per- sonnes tenues dans cette situation ». la doctrine de l’adoption exige que les tribunaux nationaux fassent respecter ces règles. les para graphes 127 et 128 des motifs des juges majoritaires appuient cette interprétation. (3) general (that is, non- criminal) customary inter- national law requires states to enact laws prohib- iting certain actions. international criminal law (3) le droit international coutumier général (c’est- à-dire de nature non pénale) oblige les états à adopter des lois interdisant certains actes. 8 there is, of course, a further possibility, but it is not one that the majority advances. it may be neither the prohibition at customary international law nor the doctrine of adoption that creates the li- ability rule. rather, it would be a prosaic change to the common law that creates the liability rule, inspired by the recognition that an action prohibited at customary international law is wrongful. this was the theory of the case by which the chambers judge upheld the pleadings. we consider and reject this theory in part iv of our reasons. 8 il existe, bien sûr, une autre possibilité, mais ce n’en est pas une que les juges majoritaires avancent. il se peut que ni l’interdiction en droit international coutumier ni la doctrine de l’adoption ne créent la règle de responsabilité. ce serait plutôt un changement prosaïque à la common law qui crée cette règle, inspirée de la reconnaissance qu’un acte interdit en droit international coutumier constitue une transgression. il s’agit de la thèse qui a permis au juge en cabinet de confi rmer les actes de procédure. nous exa- minons et rejetons cette thèse dans la partie iv de nos motifs. 266 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. also prohibits corporations from taking these actions. with regard to slavery, the prohibition upon slavery would mean that, respectively, “canada must prohibit and prevent slavery by third parties” and “it is an international crime for a corporation to enslave someone”. the doctrine of adoption transforms these require- ments and prohibitions into tort liability rules. paragraphs 117 and 122 of the majority reasons support this interpretation. le droit pénal international interdit également aux sociétés d’accomplir ces actes. en ce qui concerne l’esclavage, l’interdiction de cette pra- tique signifi erait, d’une part, que « le canada doit interdire et prévenir l’esclavage par des tiers » et, d’autre part, que « commet un crime international toute société qui réduit une per- sonne à l’esclavage ». la doctrine de l’adoption transforme ces exigences et ces interdictions en règles de responsabilité délictuelle. les para- graphes 117 et 122 des motifs des juges majori- taires appuient cette interprétation. if either of the fi rst two interpretations cor- [195] rectly represents the majority’s reasons, then we would respectfully suggest that its reasons depend on customary international law norms that do not exist. if the third interpretation correctly represents the majority’s reasons, we would respectfully suggest that its reasons depend on affording to the doctrine of adoption a role it cannot have. [195] si l’une ou l’autre des deux premières inter- prétations refl ète bien les motifs exposés par les juges majoritaires, ceux-ci reposent, à notre humble avis, sur des normes de droit international coutumier qui n’existent pas. si la troisième interprétation refl ète bien ces motifs, ceux-ci reposent, à notre humble avis, sur l’attribution à la doctrine de l’adoption d’un rôle qu’elle ne peut avoir. [196] if, as in the fi rst interpretation above, the ma- jority’s reasons depend on customary international law requiring states to provide a civil remedy for breaches of prohibitions, then we say — fi rst of all — that this theory is not what the workers have pleaded. the workers did not plead the necessary facts of state practice and opinio juris: they did not plead that there exists a general practice among states of providing a civil remedy for breaches of prohibitions, and that states perform that practice out of compliance with customary international law. nor can the court take judicial notice of such practices, because they are not suffi ciently well- established. [196] si, comme l’indique la première interpréta- tion énoncée ci- dessus, les motifs des juges majori- taires reposent sur l’idée que le droit international coutumier oblige les états à prévoir un recours civil pour les violations d’interdictions, permettez- nous alors d’affi rmer, dans un premier temps, que cette théorie n’est pas celle que les travailleurs ont invo- quée. ces derniers n’ont pas allégué les faits né- cessaires relatifs à la pratique étatique et à l’opinio juris : ils n’ont pas fait valoir qu’il existe une pratique générale au sein des états qui consiste à prévoir un recours civil pour les violations d’interdictions, et que les états se livrent à cette pratique pour se conformer au droit international coutumier. le tri- bunal ne peut pas non plus prendre connaissance d’offi ce de telles pratiques, parce qu’elles ne sont pas suffi samment bien établies. [197] further, and more fundamentally, states are typically free to meet their international obligations according to their own domestic institutional ar- rangements and preferences customary interna- tional law may well require all states to prohibit slavery, but it does not typically govern the form of that prohibition. a civil liability rule is but one pos- sibility. a prohibition could also be effected through, [197] de plus — et de manière plus fondamen- tale —, les états sont en règle générale libres de s’acquitter de leurs obligations internationales conformément à leurs propres arrangements et pré- férences internes en matière institutionnelle. le droit international coutumier peut fort bien obliger tous les états à interdire l’esclavage, mais il ne régit habituel- lement pas la forme que prendra cette interdiction. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 267 for example, the criminal law or through administra- tive penalties. how legislatures accomplish such a goal is typically a matter for them to consider and decide. as the second circuit court of appeals ob- served in khulumani v. barclay national bank ltd., 504 f.3d 254 (2nd cir. 2007), the “law of nations generally does not create private causes of action to remedy its violations, but leaves to each nation the task of defi ning the remedies that are available for international law violations” (p. 269, citing kadic v. karadžic, 70 f.3d 232 (2nd cir. 1995), at p 246). while it is conceivable that international law could develop to give such a result, it has not done so (kazemi, at para 153). asserting that it has done so or that it should do so does not make it so. if, as in the second interpretation above, the [198] majority’s reasons depend on an existing a rule of customary international law that renders a corpora- tion directly civilly liable to an individual, then we observe, once again, that this theory is not pleaded. [199] the support for this conclusion in the major- ity’s reasons (at para. 112) consists of the aforemen- tioned academic essay by professor koh. professor koh’s essay states it would not “make sense to argue that international law may impose criminal liabil- ity on corporations, but not civil liability”. if the majority is relying on this essay as evidence of the existence of such a rule, then we would say simply that a single essay does not constitute state practice or opinio juris. une règle de responsabilité civile n’est qu’une possi- bilité parmi d’autres. une interdiction pourrait égale- ment être mise en œuvre au moyen, par exemple, du droit pénal ou de sanctions administratives. c’est aux législateurs qu’il appartient normalement d’examiner et de décider comment ils atteindront cet objectif. comme la second circuit court of appeals l’a fait remarquer dans khulumani c. barclay national bank ltd., 504 f.3d 254 (2nd cir. 2007), [traduction] « le droit des nations ne crée généralement pas de causes d’action privées pour remédier à ses vio- lations, mais il confi e à chaque nation la tâche de défi nir les recours qui peuvent être exercés en cas de violations du droit international » (p. 269, citant kadic c karadžic, 70 f.3d 232 (2nd  cir 1995), p 246). bien qu’il soit concevable que le droit inter- national puisse évoluer de manière à donner lieu à un tel résultat, il n’a pas évolué ainsi (kazemi, par 153). affi rmer que le droit international a ainsi évolué ou qu’il devrait évoluer ainsi n’en fait pas une réalité. [198] si, comme en témoigne la deuxième inter- prétation susmentionnée, les motifs exposés par les juges majoritaires reposent sur l’existence d’une règle de droit international coutumier qui rend une société directement civilement responsable envers un individu, permettez- nous alors de constater, encore une fois, que cette théorie n’a pas été invoquée. [199] pour étayer cette conclusion, les juges majo- ritaires se fondent dans leurs motifs (par. 112) sur l’essai doctrinal susmentionné du professeur koh. dans cet essai, le professeur koh affi rme qu’il [tra- duction] « serait illogique de soutenir que le droit international peut imputer une responsabilité cri- minelle aux sociétés, mais pas une responsabilité civile ». si les juges majoritaires se fondent sur cet essai pour démontrer l’existence d’une telle règle, nous dirions simplement qu’un seul essai ne consti- tue pas une pratique étatique ou une opinio juris. [200] even taken on its own terms as authority for any proposition, the koh essay does not indicate that customary international law has so evolved; rather, it simply speculates that it could so evolve. the mere possibility that customary international law could change is not suffi cient, on a motion to strike, to save a claim from being doomed to fail. otherwise, [200] même en considérant que, selon ce qui y est affi rmé, il étaye une proposition quelconque, l’essai du professeur koh n’indique pas que le droit inter- national coutumier a ainsi évolué; il avance plutôt tout simplement l’hypothèse qu’il pourrait connaître cette évolution. la simple possibilité que le droit international coutumier puisse changer ne suffi t pas, 268 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. all kinds of suppositious claims would succeed on the basis that the legislature could create a new statu- tory cause of action to support them. of course, on a motion to strike, it is impossible to strike a novel common law claim for novelty alone. the relevant distinction here is that courts have some discretion to change the common law. courts do not have that discretion in respect of statutory law or customary international law. courts can recognize a change to customary international law, but they cannot change it directly themselves. [201] we observe also that professor koh, in his other work, is clear that his academic project is nor- mative in nature: he does not seek merely to describe the existing state of international law, but to change international law through his scholarship (see h. h. koh, international law vs. donald trump: a reply, march 5, 2018 (online)). state practice is not a nor- mative concept, but a descriptive one. it therefore cannot be established based on how a single us. academic thinks international law should work, but rather must be based on how states in fact behave. state practice is the difference between civil liabil- ity and criminal liability at customary international law. that criminal liability arises from customary international law has been accepted by the states of the international community since nuremberg. it is precisely this acceptance that creates customary international law. dans le cadre d’une requête en radiation, à empê- cher qu’une réclamation ne soit vouée à l’échec. autrement, toutes sortes de réclamations hypo thé- tiques seraient accueillies au motif que le législateur pourrait créer une nouvelle cause d’action légale à l’appui de celles-ci. bien entendu, lors d’une requête en radiation, il est impossible de radier une nouvelle réclamation de common law du simple fait de sa nouveauté. la distinction pertinente ici est que les tribunaux jouissent d’un certain pouvoir discrétion- naire leur permettant de modifi er la common law. les tribunaux n’ont pas ce pouvoir discrétionnaire en ce qui a trait au droit législatif ou au droit international coutumier. ils peuvent reconnaître un changement au droit international coutumier, mais ils ne peuvent eux- mêmes modifi er ce droit directement. [201] nous constatons également que, dans son autre publication, le professeur koh dit clairement que son projet académique est de nature norma- tive : il ne cherche pas tout simplement à décrire l’état actuel du droit international, mais à changer ce droit grâce à ses travaux de recherche (voir h h. koh, international law vs. donald trump : a reply, 5 mars 2018 (en ligne)). la pratique étatique n’est pas un concept normatif, mais un concept descriptif. elle ne peut donc être établie en fonction de la façon dont un seul universitaire américain pense que le droit international devrait fonctionner, mais elle doit plutôt reposer sur la manière dont les états se sont comportés dans les faits. la pratique étatique est ce qui différencie la responsabilité civile de la responsa- bilité pénale en droit international coutumier. depuis le procès de nuremberg, les états de la communauté internationale acceptent que la responsabilité pénale découle du droit international coutumier. c’est pré- cisément cette acceptation qui crée le droit interna- tional coutumier. [202] outside the sphere of criminal law, there is no corresponding acceptance-of- liability rule regard- ing individuals. this widely accepted view is neatly summarized by professor roger o’keefe, who writes, “[t]he phenomenon of individual criminal responsibility under international law sets this subset of international crimes apart from the general body of public international law, the breach of whose rules gives rise only to the delictual responsibility of any [202] en dehors du domaine du droit pénal, il n’existe pas, dans le cas des individus, de règles cor- respondantes d’acceptation de la responsabilité. ce point de vue largement partagé est bien résumé par le professeur roger o’keefe, qui écrit que [traduc- tion] « [l]e phénomène de la responsabilité pénale individuelle en droit international distingue ce sous- ensemble de crimes internationaux de l’ensemble du droit international public, dont la violation des [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 269 state in breach” (international criminal law (2015), at pp. 47-48 (footnote omitted)). indeed, as the ma- jority of this court observed in kazemi (at para. 104), criminal proceedings and civil proceedings are “seen as fundamentally different by a majority of actors in the international community”. [203] authority from this country also supports the view that customary international law prohibi- tions do not create civil liability rules. in bouzari v. islamic republic of iran (2004), 71 or (3d) 675, the court of appeal for ontario considered and re- jected the argument that the customary international law prohibition against torture “constitutes a right to be free from torture and where there is a right there must be a remedy”, and therefore a civil remedy must exist (para 92). as bouzari correctly held, “[a]s a matter of principle, providing a civil remedy for breach of the prohibition of torture is not the only way to give effect to that prohibition” (para. 93) and “as a matter of practice, states do not accord a civil remedy for torture committed abroad by foreign states” (para 94). the issue may be simply stated: a domestic court cannot effect a change to the law by “seeing a widespread state practice that does not exist today” (para 95). [204] it may be that neither of our fi rst two in- terpretations of its reasons is correct, and that the majority shares our view that there is no rule of customary international law that requires states to create civil liability rules or that purports to impose civil liability directly. if that is so, then, as in the third interpretation above, the doctrine of adoption must play in the majority’s reasons the role of converting a general prohibition upon states and criminal prohi- bitions upon individuals into a civil liability rule. in our view, this would afford the doctrine of adoption a role it cannot play. règles n’entraîne que la responsabilité délictuelle de l’état fautif » (international criminal law (2015), p. 47-48 (note en bas de page omise)). d’ailleurs, comme les juges majoritaires de notre cour l’ont fait observer dans l’arrêt kazemi (au par. 104), « [l]a majorité des acteurs de la communauté internationale considère toujours que [les procédures pénales et les procédures civiles] demeurent fondamentalement différent[e]s ». [203] un arrêt canadien appuie également le point de vue selon lequel les interdictions de droit interna- tional coutumier ne créent pas de règles de responsa- bilité civile. dans l’arrêt bouzari c. islamic republic of iran (2004), 71 or (3d) 675, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a examiné et rejeté l’argument selon lequel l’interdiction de la torture prévue en droit internatio- nal coutumier [traduction] « constitue un droit à la protection contre la torture, et là où il y a un droit, il y a un recours », de sorte qu’il doit exister un recours civil (par 92). comme il a été conclu à bon droit dans bouzari, « [e]n principe, le fait de prévoir un recours civil pour une violation de l’interdiction de la torture ne constitue pas la seule façon de donner effet à cette interdiction » (par. 93) et, « en pratique, les états n’accordent pas une réparation civile pour des actes de torture commis à l’étranger par des états étrangers » (par 94). la question peut être énoncée en termes simples : un tribunal interne ne peut apporter un changement au droit en « se fondant sur une pratique étatique répandue qui n’existe pas actuellement » (par 95). [204] il se peut que ni l’une ni l’autre de nos deux premières interprétations des motifs des juges majo- ritaires ne soit correcte et que ceux-ci partagent notre point de vue selon lequel il n’existe aucune règle de droit international coutumier qui oblige les états à créer des règles de responsabilité civile ou qui vise à imposer directement une responsabilité civile. si tel est le cas, il ressort alors de la troisième interpré- tation susmentionnée que la doctrine de l’adoption doit, selon les motifs des juges majoritaires, trans- former en règle de responsabilité civile une interdic- tion générale frappant les états et des interdictions pénales touchant des individus. à notre avis, cela aurait pour effet de conférer à la doctrine de l’adop- tion un rôle qu’elle ne peut jouer. 270 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. it is not enough to simply say that the doc- [205] trine of adoption incorporates prohibitive and man- datory rules into the common law. outside the realm of criminal law, customary international law imposes prohibitions and mandates on states, not private ac- tors. as judge crawford puts it, “human rights   . arise against the state, which so far has a virtual monopoly of responsibility” (p 111). states are the only duty- holders under general customary interna- tional law. [206] nor is it enough to say that the doctrine of adoption must respond to a state’s duties under cus- tomary international law. we do not dispute that a state’s duties may include one to prohibit and an- other to prevent violations of those aforementioned rights. nor do we dispute that such a mandatory norm can trigger the doctrine of adoption. our dis- pute is limited to how the doctrine of adoption leads canadian law to change in response to recognition of a norm of customary international law. in our view, the three- step process we defi ned above for determining whether to amend private common law rules in response to the recognition of a mandatory norm of customary international law ought to govern. [207] at the fi rst step, we would identify the man- datory norm at issue here as “canada must prohibit and prevent slavery by third parties”, mutatis mutan- dis for each of the activities alleged to be in violation of international law. we agree that the pleadings may allege that this norm may exist, and further, it is not plain and obvious to us that it does not. we would not therefore strike out the claim on that basis. this brings us to considering the second and third steps of the process for adopting a mandatory norm: de- termining how the norm would be best given effect, and determining whether any legislation prevents the court from changing the common law to give the norm that effect. il ne suffi t pas d’affi rmer simplement que la [205] doctrine de l’adoption a pour effet d’incorporer des règles prohibitives et impératives à la common law. en dehors du domaine du droit pénal, le droit inter- national coutumier impose certaines interdictions et obligations aux états, et non aux acteurs privés. comme l’explique le juge crawford, [traduction] « les droits de la personne [  ] se forment contre l’état, qui, pour l’heure, assume pratiquement seul la responsabilité en la matière » (p 111). seuls les états sont assujettis à des devoirs en droit international coutumier général. il ne suffi t pas non plus d’affi rmer que la [206] doctrine de l’adoption doit tenir compte des devoirs auxquels l’état est tenu en droit international coutu- mier. nous ne contestons pas que l’état peut avoir notamment le devoir d’interdire les violations des droits susmentionnés et celui consistant à les pré- venir. nous ne contestons pas non plus qu’une telle norme impérative puisse déclencher l’application de la doctrine de l’adoption notre contestation porte uniquement sur la manière dont la doctrine de l’adoption amène le droit canadien à changer en réponse à la reconnaissance d’une norme de droit international coutumier. à notre avis, le processus en trois étapes que nous avons décrit précédemment permettant de déterminer s’il convient de modifi er les règles de la common law privée en réponse à la reconnaissance d’une norme impérative de droit international coutumier devrait s’appliquer. [207] à la première étape, nous estimons que la norme impérative en cause en l’espèce est que « le canada doit interdire et prévenir l’esclavage par des tiers », avec les adaptations nécessaires pour chacune des activités qui contreviendraient au droit international. nous convenons qu’il est possible que, dans les actes de procédure, il soit allégué que cette norme peut exister, et qui plus est, il ne nous semble pas évident et manifeste qu’elle n’existe pas. nous sommes donc d’avis de ne pas radier la réclamation pour cette raison. cela nous amène à l’examen des deuxième et troisième étapes du processus d’adop- tion d’une norme impérative : décider de la meilleure façon de donner effet à la norme et vérifi er si une loi empêche le tribunal de modifi er la common law de façon à donner cet effet à la norme. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 271 [208] at the second step, we say that such a manda- tory rule is appropriately given effect through, and only through, the criminal law. indeed, the major- ity’s reasons appear animated by concerns that are the subject of the criminal law. we will discuss this aspect of its reasons in greater detail in the next sec- tion and will not repeat the point here. [209] at the third step, we note that parliament has, in s. 9 of the criminal code, clearly prohibited courts from creating criminal laws via the common law. in r v. dlw, 2016 scc 22, [2016] 1 scr 402, at para. 3, this court explicitly rejected the idea that it could “turn back the clock and re- enter   a period when the courts rather than parliament could change the elements of criminal offences”. at this step, we conclude that, on this interpretation of the majority’s theory of the case, the pleadings are doomed to fail on two bases: fi rst, that violations of the mandatory norms at issue here are properly remedied through the criminal law, for which there is not a private law cause of action; and secondly, that parliament has prohibited the courts from creating new crimes. [210] the majority’s approach is no more tenable if we take a step back and consider it more conceptu- ally. essentially, on this interpretation, the majority’s approach amounts to saying that the doctrine of adop- tion has what jurists in europe would call “horizontal effect”. articles of the treaties that constitute the european union give individuals rights both against the state (“vertical effect”) and against other private parties (“horizontal effect”) (p. craig, “britain in the european union”, in j. jowell, d. oliver and c o’cinneide, eds., the changing constitution (8th ed. 2015), 104, at p 127). in canada, this court rejected the idea that the charter has horizontal ef- fect (see rwdsu v. dolphin delivery ltd., [1986] 2 scr 573, at p. 597; see also g. phillipson, “the human rights act, ‘horizontal effect’ and the common law: a bang or a whimper?” (1999), 62 mod. l. rev. 824, at p 824). it would be astonishing [208] à la deuxième étape, nous sommes d’avis que c’est au moyen du droit pénal, et seulement au moyen du droit pénal, qu’il peut valablement être donné effet à une telle règle impérative. d’ailleurs, les motifs des juges majoritaires semblent reposer sur des craintes relevant du droit pénal. nous analy- serons cet aspect de leurs motifs plus en détail dans la prochaine section et nous ne répéterons pas les mêmes choses ici. [209] à la troisième étape, nous constatons qu’à l’art. 9 du code criminel, le parlement a clairement interdit aux tribunaux de créer des règles de droit pénal au moyen de la common law dans l’arrêt r c. dlw, 2016 csc 22, [2016] 1 rcs 402, par. 3, notre cour a explicitement écarté l’idée qu’on pouvait « faire reculer l’horloge du temps et [  ] revenir à [  ] une période au cours de laquelle les tribunaux et non le législateur pouvaient modifi er les éléments constitutifs des infractions cri mi nelles ». à cette étape, nous concluons que, suivant cette interprétation de la thèse des juges majoritaires, les actes de procédure sont voués à l’échec pour deux raisons : premièrement, le droit pénal, pour lequel il n’existe aucune cause d’action de droit privé, permet de remédier de façon appropriée aux violations des normes impératives en cause en l’espèce, et, deuxiè- mement, le parlement a interdit aux tribunaux de créer de nouveaux crimes. [210] l’approche des juges majoritaires n’est pas plus défendable si nous prenons un certain recul et considérons celle-ci sous un angle plus conceptuel. essentiellement, selon cette interprétation, cette approche équivaut à dire que la doctrine de l’adop- tion a ce que les juristes européens appelleraient un « effet horizontal ». les ar ticles des traités qui consti- tuent l’union européenne confèrent aux individus des droits à la fois contre l’état (« effet vertical ») et contre d’autres parties privées (« effet horizon- tal ») (p. craig, « britain in the european union », dans j. jowell, d. oliver et c. o’cinneide, dir., the changing constitution (8e éd. 2015), 104, p 127). au canada, notre cour a rejeté l’idée selon laquelle la charte a un effet horizontal (voir sdgmr c. dolphin delivery ltd., [1986] 2 rcs 573, p. 597; voir également g. phillipson, « the human rights act, “horizontal effect” and the common law : a 272 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. were customary international law to have horizontal effect where the charter does not. one wonders if the majority’s view of the adoption of customary international law would amount to a new bill of horizontal rights; conceptually, these are very deep waters. [211] the majority’s approach also amounts to recognizing a private law cause of action for simple breach of customary international public law. this would be similarly astonishing, since there is no private law cause of action for simple breach of statu- tory canadian public law (see r in right of canada v. saskatchewan wheat pool, [1983] 1 scr 205; holland v. saskatchewan, 2008 scc 42, [2008] 2 scr 551, at para 9). as judge crawford has ex- plained, a rule of customary international law will not be adopted if it is itself “contradicted by some antecedent principle of the common law” (p. 66, cit- ing west rand central gold mining company v. rex, [1905] 2 kb 391, at p. 408, per lord alverstone cj;. chung chi cheung v. the king, [1939] ac. 160 (pc), at p. 168, per lord atkin). [212] further yet, the mere existence of interna- tional criminal liability rules does not make necessary the creation of domestic torts. as we have already noted, in support of its view that domestic courts can hold corporations civilly liable for breaches of international law, the majority (para. 112) relies upon an essay by professor koh. but this essay concerns the domestic courts of the united states, not canada. and the law being applied by us courts differs in a highly signifi cant respect. as professor koh writes, “congress passed two statutes — the alien tort statute and the torture victim protection act (tvpa) — precisely to provide civil remedies for international law violations” (“separating myth from reality about corporate responsibility litigation”, at pp. 266-67 (emphasis added)). the former, the hoary and historically unique alien tort statute, requires american courts to treat international law as creating civil liabilities (khulumani, at p. 270, fn. 5). the alien tort statute has no analogue outside the united states (a. ramasastry and r. c. thompson, bang or a whimper? » (1999), 62 mod. l. rev. 824, p 824). il serait étonnant que le droit international coutumier ait un effet horizontal alors que la charte n’en a pas. on peut se demander si l’opinion des juges majoritaires au sujet de l’adoption du droit international coutumier n’équivaudrait pas à un nou- veau projet de loi sur les droits horizontaux; sur le plan conceptuel, il s’agit d’un terrain dangereux. [211] l’approche des juges majoritaires revient aussi à reconnaître une cause d’action de droit privé pour une simple violation du droit international pu- blic coutumier. cela serait également étonnant, car il n’existe aucune cause d’action de droit privé pour une simple violation du droit législatif public canadien (voir r du chef du canada c. saskatchewan wheat pool, [1983] 1 rcs 205; holland c. saskatchewan, 2008 csc 42, [2008] 2 rcs 551, par 9). comme l’a expliqué le juge crawford, une règle de droit international coutumier ne sera pas adoptée si elle est elle- même [traduction] « contredite par un prin- cipe antérieur de common law » (p. 66, citant west rand central gold mining company c. rex, [1905] 2 kb 391, p. 408, lord juge en chef alverstone; chung chi cheung c. the king, [1939] ac 160 (cp), p. 168, lord atkin). [212] de surcroît, la simple existence de règles internationales en matière de responsabilité pénale ne rend pas nécessaire la création de délits nationaux. comme nous l’avons déjà souligné, à l’appui de leur thèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux peuvent tenir des sociétés civilement responsables de viola- tions du droit international, les juges majoritaires (au par. 112) s’appuient sur un essai du professeur koh. cependant, cet essai concerne les tribunaux internes des états- unis et non du canada. de plus, les règles de droit appliquées par les tribunaux américains dif- fèrent de manière signifi cative de celles appliquées par les tribunaux canadiens. comme l’écrit le pro- fesseur koh, [traduction] « [l]e congrès a adopté deux lois — l’alien tort statute et la torture victim protection act (tvpa) — précisément pour prévoir des recours civils pour les violations du droit inter- national » (« separating myth from reality about corporate responsibility litigation », p. 266-267 (nous soulignons)). la première, l’ancienne et uni- que dans l’histoire alien tort statute, exige que les [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 273 commerce, crime and confl ict: legal remedies for private sector liability for grave breaches of international law — a survey of sixteen countries (2006), at p. 24; j. zerk, corporate liability for gross human rights abuses: towards a fairer and more ef- fective system of domestic law remedies — a report prepared for the offi ce of the un high commissioner for human rights, february 2014 (online), at p 45). the existence of these statutes has infl uenced the peculiar american equivalent to the doctrine of adoption. essentially, the majority’s approach would amount to americanizing the canadian doctrine of adoption without accounting for the unique statutory context from which the american doctrine arose. it goes without saying that canadian courts cannot adopt a us statute when parliament and the legis- latures have not. [213] in short, in order to reach the conclusion it does about the necessity of a tort liability rule, the majority must signifi cantly change the doctrine of adoption. as we will explain below (see section iii, subheading c), this is not a change that this court is empowered to make. tribunaux américains considèrent que le droit inter- national crée une responsabilité civile (khulumani, p.  270, note  5) l’alien tort statute ne possède pas d’équivalent à l’extérieur des états- unis (a. ramasastry et r c. thompson, commerce, crime and confl ict : legal remedies for private sector liability for grave breaches of international law — a survey of sixteen countries (2006), p. 24; j. zerk, corporate liability for gross human rights abuses : towards a fairer and more effective system of domes- tic law remedies — a report prepared for the offi ce of the un high commissioner for human rights, février 2014 (en ligne), p 45). l’existence de ces lois a infl uencé l’équivalent américain particulier de la doctrine de l’adoption. essentiellement, l’approche des juges majoritaires reviendrait à américaniser la doctrine canadienne de l’adoption sans tenir compte du contexte législatif unique dont est issue la doctrine américaine. il va sans dire que les tribunaux cana- diens ne peuvent adopter une loi américaine alors que le parlement et les législatures provinciales ne l’ont pas fait. [213] en somme, pour parvenir à leur conclusion sur la nécessité d’une règle de responsabilité délic- tuelle, les juges majoritaires doivent modifi er consi- dérablement la doctrine de l’adoption. comme nous l’expliquerons plus loin (voir section iii, rubrique c), ce n’est pas une modifi cation que notre cour est habilitée à faire. (3) a tort remedy is not necessary (3) un recours délictuel n’est pas nécessaire [214] at what we identifi ed as step (h) of its rea- sons, the majority suggests that where there is a right, there must be a remedy. we agree. it adds, in what we termed step (i) of its reasons, that this truism signifi es there is no bar to canadian courts granting a civil remedy for violations of customary international law norms. here is another point of disagreement. in our view, it is possible, even at this early stage of proceedings, to exclude a remedy for money dam- ages for violations of customary international law norms. the right to a remedy does not necessarily mean a right to a particular form, or kind of remedy. parliament could prefer another remedy, such as judi- cial review, or a criminal sanction. as this court said in kazemi, “[r]emedies are by no means automatic [214] à ce qui correspond selon nous à l’étape h) de leurs motifs, les juges majoritaires suggèrent que là où il y a un droit, il y a un recours. nous sommes du même avis. ils ajoutent, à ce que nous avons appelé l’étape i) de leurs motifs, que ce truisme signifi e que rien n’empêche les tribunaux canadiens d’accorder une réparation civile pour les violations de normes de droit international coutumier. il s’agit là d’un autre point de désaccord avec eux. à notre avis, il est possible, même à ce stade peu avancé de la procédure, d’exclure la possibilité d’accorder des dommages- intérêts à titre de réparation pour les vio- lations de normes de droit international coutumier. le droit d’obtenir réparation ne fait pas nécessaire- ment référence au droit à une forme ou à une sorte 274 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. or unlimited; there is no societal consensus that an effective remedy is always guaranteed to compensate for every rights violation” (para 159). [215] the majority rejects the possibility that exist- ing domestic torts could suffi ce. in its view, “it is at least arguable that the eritrean workers’ allegations encompass conduct not captured by these existing domestic torts” (para 123). it tells us it is diffi cult to refute the concept that “torture is something more than battery” and that “slavery is more than an amal- gam of unlawful confi nement, assault and unjust enrichment” (para. 126, citing rf, at para 4). there is, it says (at para. 125), important “symbolism”, in the labelling of an action as “torture” or “battery”. it adopts the view that the “remedial consequence of successfully bringing a case is often, or even usu- ally, only a secondary concern” (para. 125, citing g. virgo, “characterisation, choice of law and human rights”, in c. scott, ed., torture as tort: comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 325, at p 335). the majority also explains that these proposed causes of action are “inherently different from” and have “a more public nature than” tradi- tional torts, since these tortious actions “shoc[k] the conscience” (para. 124, citing m. c. bassiouni, “international crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes” (1996), 59 law & contemp. probs. 63, at p 69). it concludes by explaining that an ap- propriate remedy must emphasize “the public nature and importance of the violated rights involved, the gravity of their breach, the impact on the domestic and global rights objectives, and the need to deter subsequent breaches” (para 129). particulière de réparation. le parlement pourrait préférer une autre réparation, comme le contrôle judiciaire, ou une sanction pénale. comme notre cour l’a déclaré dans l’arrêt kazemi, « [l]es répara- tions ne sont nullement automatiques ou illimitées; il n’existe aucun consensus au sein de la société pour admettre qu’une réparation effi cace est toujours dis- ponible pour indemniser toute violation d’un droit » (par 159). [215] les juges majoritaires écartent la possibi- lité que les délits de droit interne existants puissent suffi re. selon eux, « on peut à tout le moins soute- nir que les allégations des travailleurs érythréens englobent une conduite qui n’est pas visée par ces délits internes existants » (par 123). ils nous disent qu’il est diffi cile de réfuter l’idée que « la torture est plus [qu’une batterie] »9 et que « l’esclavage est plus qu’un amalgame d’une séquestration, de voies de fait et d’un enrichissement injustifi é » (par. 126, citant mi, par 4). il y a, affi rment- ils (au par. 125), un « symbolisme » important dans le fait de qualifi er une poursuite d’action pour « torture » ou pour batte- rie. ils souscrivent à l’idée que [traduction] « [l]a conséquence réparatrice liée au fait d’avoir gain de cause ne constitue souvent, voire même générale- ment, qu’une préoccupation secondaire » (par. 125, citant g. virgo, « characterisation, choice of law and human rights », dans c. scott, dir., torture as tort : comparative perspectives on the development of transnational human rights litigation (2001), 325, p 335). les juges majoritaires expliquent éga- lement que les causes d’action proposées sont « fon- damentalement différentes » des délits traditionnels et « ont un caractère plus public » que ceux-ci, puis- que ces actes délictueux [traduction] « heurte[nt] la conscience » (par. 124, citant m c. bassiouni, « international crimes : jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes » (1996), 59 law & contemp. probs. 63, p 69). ils concluent en expliquant que le recours approprié doit souligner « [le] caractère public et [  ] l’importance des droits violés en jeu, [  ] la gravité du manquement à ceux-ci, [  ] l’incidence sur les objectifs internes et mondiaux en matière de droits et [  ] la nécessité de créer un effet dissuasif à l’égard de toute violation ultérieure » (par 129). 9 le terme « batterie » réfère à la « battery ». [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 275 [216] with respect, these considerations are not relevant to deciding the scope of tort law. a dif- ference merely of damages or the extent of harm will not suffi ce to ground a new tort. for example, in non- marine underwriters, lloyd’s of london v. scalera, 2000 scc 24, [2000] 1 scr 551, this court explained that a separate tort of sexual battery was unnecessary because the harms addressed by sexual battery were fully encompassed by battery. the sexual aspect of the claim went to the amount of damages, which did not require the recognition of a separate tort (para 27). similarly, the court of appeal for ontario recently held that “an increased societal recognition” of the wrongfulness of con- duct did not necessitate the creation of a new tort (merrifi eld v canada (attorney general), 2019 onca 205, 145 or (3d) 494, at paras. 50-53, leave to appeal refused, scc. bull., september 20, 2019, at p 7). the point is this: since all torture is battery (or intentional infl iction of emotional distress), albeit a particularly severe form thereof, it does not need to be recognized as a new tort. our law, as is, furnishes an appropriate cause of action. [217] the majority provides plausible reasons for recognizing four new common law crimes, were that something courts could do. however, in our respect- ful view, they are inapposite for determining whether a new common law tort should be recognized. [216] en toute déférence, ces considérations ne sont pas pertinentes lorsqu’il s’agit de décider de la portée du droit de la responsabilité délictuelle. une différence ayant trait simplement aux dommages- intérêts ou à l’importance du préjudice ne suffi ra pas à justifier la reconnaissance d’un nouveau délit. à titre d’exemple, dans l’arrêt non- marine underwriters, lloyd’s of london c. scalera, 2000 csc 24, [2000] 1 rcs 551, notre cour a expliqué qu’il n’était pas nécessaire de reconnaître un délit distinct de batterie de nature sexuelle parce que le délit de batterie englobait déjà tous les préjudices visés par la batterie de nature sexuelle. les aspects sexuels de la réclamation avaient trait au montant des dommages- intérêts, ce qui ne justifi ait pas la recon- naissance d’un délit distinct (par 27). de même, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a récemment jugé qu’une [traduction] « reconnaissance accrue au sein de la société » du caractère transgressif d’une conduite ne rendait pas nécessaire la création d’un nouveau délit (merrifi eld c. canada (attorney general), 2019 onca 205, 145 or (3d) 494, par. 50-53, autorisa- tion de pourvoi refusée, csc bull., 20 septembre 2019, p 8). le fait est le suivant : puisque toute torture constitue une batterie (ou une infl iction inten- tionnelle d’un trouble émotif), encore qu’il s’agisse d’une forme particulièrement grave de batterie, elle n’a pas à être reconnue comme un nouveau délit. notre droit, dans l’état actuel, prévoit une cause d’action appropriée. [217] les juges majoritaires avancent des raisons plausibles en faveur de la reconnaissance de quatre nouveaux crimes de common law, si les tribunaux étaient habilités à ce faire. toutefois, à notre humble avis, celles-ci ne sont pas pertinentes lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer si un nouveau délit de common law devrait être reconnu. [218] the suitability of criminal law, relative to tort law, in addressing this conduct, is readily apparent. parliament reached precisely this conclusion when it chose to criminalize crimes against humanity (see crimes against humanity and war crimes act, sc. 2000, c 24). parliament chose not to provide for a li- ability rule in tort. as we have already mentioned, to fi nd a new tort based on mere degree of harm would contradict scalera. a more profound degree of harm, [218] le fait que le droit pénal, par comparaison au droit de la responsabilité délictuelle, convienne pour traiter de la conduite en cause en l’espèce res- sort à l’évidence. c’est précisément la conclusion à laquelle le parlement est venu lorsqu’il a décidé de criminaliser les crimes contre l’humanité (voir la loi sur les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre, lc 2000, c 24). le parlement a décidé de ne pas prévoir de règle de responsabilité délictuelle. 276 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. may, however, be an appropriate reason for crafting a different criminal remedy. “[s]ymbolism”, too, is an issue well- addressed by criminal remedies and poorly addressed by tort. the labelling of a crime matters (r v. vaillancourt, [1987] 2 scr 636); the labelling of a tort, not so much. tort is not an area of law in which the primary value of bringing a case is often, or even usually, symbolic. finally, the tort system has its own, built-in way to adapt to breaches of rights that are more grave or that need to be deterred: by awarding increased damages. [219] the majority also suggests recognizing new nominate torts so that this court can “ad[d] its voice to others in the international community collec- tively condemning [these crimes]” and so “furthe[r] the development of an international rule of law” (para. 130, citing h. h. koh, “civil remedies for uncivil wrongs: combatting terrorism through transnational public law litigation” (2016), 50 tex. int’l lj 661, at p 675). comme nous l’avons déjà dit, conclure à l’existence d’un nouveau délit fondé simplement sur l’impor- tance du préjudice contredirait l’arrêt scalera. un préjudice plus important pourrait toutefois consti- tuer une raison appropriée pour élaborer un recours pénal différent le «  symbolisme  » constitue lui aussi un aspect qui est bien pris en compte par les recours pénaux et qui l’est mal par le régime de la responsabilité délictuelle. la qualifi cation d’un crime est importante (r c. vaillancourt, [1987] 2 rcs 636), alors que la qualifi cation d’un délit l’est moins. la responsabilité délictuelle n’est pas un domaine du droit où la principale valeur d’une poursuite est souvent, ou même habituellement, de nature symbolique. enfi n, le régime de la respon- sabilité délictuelle a sa propre façon de s’adapter aux violations de droits qui sont plus graves ou qui doivent faire l’objet d’une dissuasion : par l’octroi de dommages- intérêts majorés. [219] les juges majoritaires suggèrent égale- ment que l’on reconnaisse de nouveaux délits nom- més afi n de permettre à notre cour [traduction] d’« ajoute[r] sa voix à celle des autres membres de la communauté internationale condamnant collec- tivement [ces crimes] » et de « favoris[er] [ainsi] l’élaboration d’une règle de droit international » (par. 130, citant h h. koh, « civil remedies for uncivil wrongs  : combatting terrorism through transnational public law litigation » (2016), 50 tex. int’l lj 661, p 675). [220] in making this suggestion, the majority un- dervalues the tools canadian courts already have that can be used to condemn crimes against humanity and degrading treatment. first, even were this action formally for the tort of battery, a court can express its condemnation of the conduct through its reasons. nothing would prevent the trial judge in this case from writing in his or her reasons that nevsun com- mitted, or was complicit in, forced labour, slavery and other human rights abuses, even if his or her ultimate legal conclusion is that nevsun committed assault, battery, or other wrongs. causes of action sometimes go by different names. for example, what this court referred to as the “unlawful means” tort in ai. enterprises ltd. v. bram enterprises ltd., 2014 scc 12, [2014] 1 scr 177, is commonly [220] en formulant cette suggestion, les juges majoritaires sous- estiment les outils dont disposent déjà les tribunaux canadiens pour condamner les crimes contre l’humanité et les traitements dégra- dants. premièrement, même si la présente action concernait offi ciellement le délit de batterie, un tribu- nal pourrait, dans ses motifs, exprimer sa réprobation à l’égard de la conduite en cause. rien en l’espèce n’empêcherait le juge de première instance d’écrire dans ses motifs que nevsun a eu recours au travail forcé et à l’esclavage et qu’elle a commis d’autres violations des droits de la personne, ou a été com- plice de tels actes, même si, ultimement, il conclut en droit qu’elle s’est livrée à des voies de fait, à des batteries ou à d’autres transgressions. les causes d’action peuvent parfois porter différents noms. par [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 277 referred to as ‘“unlawful interference with economic relations’, ‘interference with a trade or business by unlawful means’, ‘intentional interference with eco- nomic relations’, or simply ‘causing loss by unlawful means’” (para 2). similarly, what this court referred to as the “tort of civil fraud” in bruno appliance and furniture, inc. v. hryniak, 2014 scc 8, [2014] 1 scr 126, at para. 21, and mauldin, at para. 87, is also commonly referred to as the “tort of deceit” (see dhillon v. dhillon, 2006 bcca 524, 232 bcac. 249, at para 77). [221] a trial court could also express its condemna- tion through its damage award. punitive damages, for example, which have been recognized by this court as “straddl[ing] the frontier between civil law (com- pensation) and criminal law (punishment)”, have as a goal the denunciation of misconduct (whiten v. pilot insurance co., 2002 scc 18, [2002] 1 scr. 595, at paras. 36 and 44). the majority tells us that an award of punitive damages “may be inadequate” to remedy the violation of these international norms (para 126). it says that a “different and stronger” response may be required (para 129). but the “dif- ferent and stronger” response that the majority con- cludes must be given appears to be a tort with a new name but the same remedy. again, the better conclu- sion is that a remedy in criminal law is appropriate, while a remedy in tort law (established by the courts, rather than the legislature) is not. exemple, ce que notre cour a appelé délit d’« atteinte par un moyen illégal » dans l’arrêt ai. enterprises ltd. c. bram enterprises ltd., 2014 csc 12, [2014] 1 rcs 177, est communément appelé « “atteinte ou entrave illicite aux rapports économiques”, “atteinte aux rapports commerciaux par un moyen illicite”, “atteinte aux intérêts économiques par un geste illé- gal”, “ingérence par recours à un moyen illicite” ou simplement délit consistant à “causer une perte par un moyen illicite” » (par 2). de même, ce que notre cour a qualifi é de « délit de fraude civile » dans l’arrêt bruno appliance and furniture, inc. c. hryniak, 2014 csc 8, [2014] 1 rcs 126, par. 21, et dans mauldin, par. 87, est aussi communément appelé [traduction] « délit de tromperie » (voir dhillon c. dhillon, 2006 bcca 524, 232 bcac. 249, par 77). [221] le tribunal de première instance pour- rait également exprimer sa réprobation par les dommages- intérêts qu’il impose. à titre d’exemple, les dommages- intérêts punitifs, qui, comme l’a re- connu notre cour, « chevauchent la frontière entre le droit civil (indemnisation) et le droit criminel (puni- tion) », visent à dénoncer une conduite répréhensible (whiten c. pilot insurance co., 2002 csc 18, [2002] 1 rcs 595, par. 36 et 44). les juges majoritaires nous disent que l’octroi de dommages- intérêts puni- tifs « peu[t] être inadéqua[t] » lorsqu’il s’agit de remédier à la violation de ces normes internationales (par 126). ils affi rment qu’une réponse « différent[e] et plus rigoureus[e] » peut être requise (par 129). or la réponse « différent[e] et plus rigoureus[e] » qui, selon les juges majoritaires, doit être donnée semble être un délit portant un nouveau nom, mais ouvrant droit à la même réparation. encore là, mieux vaut conclure qu’un recours en droit pénal est appro- prié, alors qu’un recours en droit de la responsabilité délictuelle (établi par les tribunaux plutôt que par le législateur) ne l’est pas. [222] we note also that the majority’s approach in this regard would put canada out of step with other states. as dr. zerk explains, although “most jurisdic- tions provide for the possibility of private claims for compensation for wrongful behaviour”, “these kinds of claims are not in most cases aimed at gross human rights abuses specifi cally” (p 43). instead, torts such [222] nous soulignons aussi que l’approche préco- nisée par les juges majoritaires à cet égard ferait en sorte que le canada serait déphasé par rapport aux autres états. comme l’explique mme zerk, bien que [traduction] « la plupart des états prévoient la pos- sibilité de présenter des demandes d’indemnisation de droit privé en cas de comportement transgressif », 278 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. as “assault”, “battery”, “false imprisonment”, and “negligence” are used (pp 43-44). indeed, corporate liability for violations of customary international law generally depends on “ordinary common law torts or civil law delicts” (ramasastry and thompson, at p 22). such ordinary private law actions provide mechanisms to address the “harm arising out of a grave breach” of international criminal law (p 24). this is a critical point here, where the workers ad- vance such ordinary private law claims in addition to their claim founded on customary international law. even were this part of nevsun’s motion to strike to be granted, the workers could pursue in canada the same relief they could obtain in most other states. « ces types de réclamations ne visent pas dans la plu- part des cas des violations fl agrantes des droits de la personne en particulier » (p 43). des délits comme ceux de « voies de fait », de « batterie », de « séques- tration » et de « négligence » sont plutôt utilisés (p 43-44). d’ailleurs, la responsabilité des sociétés pour les violations du droit international coutumier en général repose sur des [traduction] « délits ordinaires de common law ou des délits ordinaires de droit civil » (ramasastry et thompson, p 22). de telles actions ordinaires de droit privé prévoient des mécanismes pour remédier au « préjudice découlant d’une violation grave » du droit pénal international (p 24). il s’agit d’un point essentiel en l’espèce, où les travailleurs font valoir de telles réclamations ordinaires de droit privé en plus de leur réclamation fondée sur le droit international coutumier. même si cette partie de la requête en radiation de nevsun de- vait être accueillie, les travailleurs pourraient deman- der au canada la même réparation que celle qu’ils pourraient obtenir dans la plupart des autres états. [223] and, as we will discuss below in section iv, subheading d, our existing private international law jurisprudence also provides a vehicle by which courts can declare that the law of another state is so morally repugnant that the courts of this country will decline to apply it. [223] de plus, comme nous le verrons plus loin dans la section iv, rubrique d, notre jurisprudence actuelle en droit international privé permet égale- ment aux tribunaux de déclarer que le droit d’un autre état est si moralement répugnant que les tribu- naux canadiens refusent de l’appliquer. c changing the limits of international law is not c ce n’est pas aux tribunaux de changer les the job of courts limites du droit international [224] above, we have described how the majority’s reasons either depend on customary international law norms that do not exist or depend on affording to the doctrine of adoption a role it does not have. this requires us to consider whether this court can change the doctrine of adoption so that it provides a civil liability rule for breaches of prohibitions at customary international law. in our view, it cannot, regardless of whether it is framed as recognizing a cause of action for breach of customary international law or as giving horizontal effect to that law. [224] nous avons déjà expliqué en quoi les motifs des juges majoritaires reposent soit sur des normes de droit international coutumier qui n’existent pas, soit sur l’attribution à la doctrine de l’adoption d’un rôle qu’elle n’a pas. il nous faut donc nous demander si notre cour peut modifi er la doctrine de l’adoption de manière à ce qu’elle prévoit une règle de respon- sabilité civile pour les violations d’interdictions en droit international coutumier. à notre avis, notre cour ne peut pas procéder à ce changement, peu importe qu’il soit formulé de manière à reconnaître l’existence d’une cause d’action pour violation du droit international coutumier ou à attribuer un effet horizontal au droit international coutumier. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 279 it is of course open to parliament and the [225] legislatures to make such a change. absent statutory intervention, however, the ability of courts to shape the law is, as a matter of common- law methodology, constrained. courts develop the law incrementally. this is a manifestation of the unwritten constitutional principle of legislative supremacy, which goes to the core of just governance and to the respective roles of the legislature, the executive and the judi- ciary (watkins v. olafson, [1989] 2 scr 750, at pp. 760-61; london drugs ltd. v. kuehne & nagel international ltd., [1992] 3 scr 299, at pp. 436- 38; r v. salituro, [1991] 3 scr 654, at pp. 666- 67; fraser river pile & dredge ltd. v. can- dive services ltd., [1999] 3 scr 108, at para. 43; b. mclachlin, “unwritten constitutional principles: what is going on?” (2006), 4 nzjpil 147). it also refl ects the comparative want of expertise of the courts, relative to the legislature. the legislature has the institutional competence and the democratic legitimacy to enact major legal reform. by contrast, the courts are confi ned by the record to considering the circumstances of the particular parties before them, and so cannot anticipate all the consequences of a change. il est évidemment loisible au parlement [225] et aux législatures provinciales d’effectuer un tel changement. toutefois, en l’absence d’interven- tion législative, la capacité des tribunaux de façon- ner le droit est limitée de par la méthodologie de la common law les tribunaux élaborent le droit graduellement. il s’agit là d’une manifestation du principe constitutionnel non écrit de la suprématie législative, qui touche au cœur même de la juste gouvernance et du rôle respectif du législatif, de l’exécutif et du judiciaire (watkins c. olafson, [1989] 2 rcs 750, p.  760-761; london drugs ltd c. kuehne & nagel international ltd., [1992] 3 rcs. 299, p. 436-438; r c. salituro, [1991] 3 rcs 654, p. 666-667; fraser river pile & dredge ltd. c. can- dive services ltd., [1999] 3 rcs 108, par. 43; b. mclachlin, les principes constitutionnels non écrits : qu’est-ce qui se passe dans ce domaine?, 1er décembre 2005 (en ligne)). ce principe refl ète aussi le manque relatif de connaissances spécialisées des tribunaux par rapport au législateur. celui-ci dispose de la compétence institutionnelle et de la légitimité démocratique nécessaires pour adopter une réforme juridique majeure. en revanche, le dossier restreint l’examen des tribunaux à la situation des parties en cause, de sorte qu’ils ne peuvent prévoir toutes les conséquences d’un changement. [226] the importance, both practical and norma- tive, of confi ning courts to making only incremental changes to the common law was stated by this court in watkins, at pp. 760-61: [226] dans l’arrêt watkins, aux p. 760-761, notre cour a affi rmé l’importance, tant pratique que nor- mative, du fait que les tribunaux ne puissent apporter que des changements graduels à la common law : this branch of the case, viewed thus, raises starkly the question of the limits on the power of the judiciary to change the law. generally speaking, the judiciary is bound to apply the rules of law found in the legislation and in the precedents. over time, the law in any given area may change; but the process of change is a slow and incremental one, based largely on the mechanism of ex- tending an existing principle to new circumstances. while it may be that some judges are more activist than others, the courts have generally declined to introduce major and far- reaching changes in the rules hitherto accepted as governing the situation before them. cette partie du pourvoi, vue dans cette perspective, pose carrément la question des limites du pouvoir des tribunaux de modifi er le droit en général, le pouvoir judiciaire est tenu d’appliquer les règles de droit formu- lées dans les textes législatifs et la jurisprudence. avec le temps, le droit relatif à un domaine donné peut changer, mais cela ne se fait que lentement et progressivement, et dépend largement du mécanisme d’application d’un principe existant à des circonstances nouvelles. bien que certains juges puissent être plus innovateurs que d’autres, les tribunaux judiciaires ont généralement refusé de modi- fi er sensiblement et profondément des règles reconnues jusque-là pour les appliquer au cas qui leur était soumis. there are sound reasons supporting this judicial reluc- tance to dramatically recast established rules of law. the il y a de solides raisons qui justifi ent ces réticences du pouvoir judiciaire à modifi er radicalement des règles 280 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. court may not be in the best position to assess the defi cien- cies of the existing law, much less problems which may be associated with the changes it might make. the court has before it a single case; major changes in the law should be predicated on a wider view of how the rule will operate in the broad generality of cases. moreover, the court may not be in a position to appreciate fully the economic and policy issues underlying the choice it is asked to make. major changes to the law often involve devising subsidi- ary rules and procedures relevant to their implementation, a task which is better accomplished through consultation between courts and practitioners than by judicial decree. finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the long- established principle that in a constitutional democracy it is the legislature, as the elected branch of government, which should assume the major responsibility for law reform. considerations such as these suggest that major revi- sions of the law are best left to the legislature. where the matter is one of a small extension of existing rules to meet the exigencies of a new case and the consequences of the change are readily assessable, judges can and should vary existing principles. but where the revision is major and its ramifi cations complex, the courts must proceed with great caution. [emphasis added.] [227] in the same vein, justice robert j. sharpe, writing extra- judicially, has refl ected on the limits of the judicial role when faced with polycentric issues: de droit établies. une cour de justice n’est peut- être pas l’organisme le mieux placé pour déterminer les lacunes du droit actuel et encore moins les problèmes que pourraient susciter les modifi cations qu’elle pourrait apporter. la cour de justice est saisie d’un cas particulier; les chan- gements importants du droit doivent se fonder sur une perception plus générale de la façon dont la règle s’appli- quera à la grande majorité des cas. de plus, une cour de justice peut ne pas être en mesure d’évaluer pleinement les questions économiques et de principe qui sous- tendent le choix qu’on lui demande de faire. les modifi cations substantielles du droit comportent souvent la formulation de règles et de procédures subsidiaires nécessaires à leur mise en œuvre, ce qui devrait plutôt se faire par voie de consultation entre les tribunaux et les praticiens que par décision judiciaire. enfi n, et c’est peut- être là le plus important, il existe un principe établi depuis longtemps selon lequel, dans une démocratie constitutionnelle, il appartient à l’assemblée législative, qui est le corps élu du gouvernement, d’assumer la responsabilité principale pour la réforme du droit. ce sont des considérations comme celles-là qui per- mettent de soutenir que les réformes majeures du droit doivent plutôt relever de l’assemblée législative. lorsqu’il s’agit de procéder à une extension mineure de l’application de règles existantes de manière à répondre aux exigences d’une situation nouvelle et lorsque les conséquences de la modifi cation sont faciles à évaluer, les juges peuvent et doivent modifi er les règles existantes. mais quand il s’agit d’une réforme majeure ayant des ramifi cations complexes, les tribunaux doivent faire preuve de beaucoup de pru- dence. [nous soulignons.] [227] dans le même ordre d’idées, le juge robert j. sharpe s’est, dans un ar ticle de doctrine, penché sur les limites du rôle des tribunaux lorsqu’ils sont saisis de questions polycentriques : the fi rst question is whether the proposed change is of a nature that falls within the capacity of the courts to decide. judges, as i have argued, should be conscious of the inherent limits of adjudication and the fact that their view of a legal issue will necessarily be limited by the dynamics of the adversarial litigation process. that process is well- suited to deal with the issues posed by bipolar disputes and considerably less capable of deal- ing with polycentric issues that raise questions and pose problems that transcend the interests of the parties. judges should hesitate to move the law in new directions when the implications of doing so are not readily captured or [traduction] la première question à se poser est celle de savoir si, de par sa nature, le changement proposé est du ressort des tribunaux. comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, les juges devraient être conscients des limites inhérentes à la fonction juridictionnelle et du fait que leur conception d’une question de droit sera nécessairement limitée par la dynamique propre au processus de débat contradictoire. ce processus se prête bien à l’examen des questions que posent des litiges bipolaires, mais il est considérablement moins apte à permettre l’analyse de questions polycen- triques qui soulèvent des enjeux et des problèmes qui transcendent les intérêts des parties. les juges devraient [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 281 understood by looking at the issue through the lens of the facts of the case they are deciding. the legislative process is better suited to consider and weigh competing policy choices that are external to legal rights and duties. elected representatives have the capacity to refl ect the views of the population at large. government departments have the resources to study and evaluate policy options. the legislative process allows all interested parties to make their views known and encourages consideration and ac- commodation of competing viewpoints. the second question relates to the magnitude of the change. common law judges constantly refer to incremen- tal or interstitial change and characterize the development of the common law as a gradual process of evolution. former senior law lord tom bingham put it this way: it is very much in the common law tradition “to move the law a little further along a line on which it is already moving, or to adapt it to accord with modern views and practices.” if the proposed change fi ts that description, there is a strong tradition to support judicial law- making. it is quite another thing, however, “to seek to recast the law in a radically innovative or adventurous way,” as that makes the law “uncertain and unpredictable” and is unfair to the losing party who relied on the law as it existed before the change. developments of the latter magnitude may best be left to the legislature. [footnote omitted.] hésiter à lancer le droit dans de nouvelles directions lors- que les conséquences de telles mesures ne sont pas faciles à appréhender ou à comprendre lors de l’examen de la question en litige eu égard aux faits de l’affaire qu’ils sont appelés à trancher. le processus législatif se prête mieux à l’examen et à l’évaluation de choix de politique générale divergents qui n’ont rien à voir avec les droits et les devoirs juridiques. les représentants élus sont en mesure de refl éter l’opinion de l’ensemble de la popula- tion. les ministères disposent des ressources nécessaires pour étudier et évaluer les options de politique générale. le processus législatif permet à tous les intéressés de faire connaître leur point de vue et il encourage l’examen et la prise en compte de points de vue divergents. la deuxième question à se poser concerne l’ampleur du changement les juges de common law parlent constamment d’un changement graduel ou interstitiel et ils qualifi ent l’évolution de la common law de processus d’évolution graduel. l’ancien lord juge principal tom bingham l’explique en ces termes : il est tout à fait dans la tradition de la common law « de poursuivre la tendance déjà entamée par le droit ou encore d’adapter celui-ci aux perspectives et aux réalités actuelles ». si le changement proposé correspond à cette description, il existe une solide tradition qui permet l’établissement de règles de droit par les tribunaux. c’est toutefois une tout autre chose que « de chercher à reformuler le droit d’une manière radicalement novatrice ou hasardeuse », car le droit devient alors « in- certain et imprévisible », ce qui est injuste pour la partie déboutée, qui s’est fi ée aux règles de droit existant avant le changement. il est préférable de laisser au législateur le soin d’apporter au droit des changements de cette ampleur. [note en bas de page omise.] (good judgment: making judicial decisions (2018), at p. 93) (good judgment : making judicial decisions (2018), p. 93) accordingly, for a change to be incremental, it can- not have complex and uncertain ramifi cations. this court has repeatedly declined to change the com- mon law in those very circumstances (watkins, at p. 761; london drugs ltd., at pp. 436-38; salituro, at pp. 677-78; fraser river pile & dredge ltd., at para 44). en conséquence, pour qu’un changement soit gra- duel, il ne peut avoir des conséquences complexes et incertaines. notre cour a à maintes reprises refusé de modifi er la common law dans ces circonstances bien précises (watkins, p. 761; london drugs ltd., p. 436-438; salituro, p. 677-678; fraser river pile & dredge ltd., par 44). [228] there is much accumulated wisdom in this jurisprudence. to alter the courts’ treatment of cus- tomary international law would “se[t] the law on [228] cette jurisprudence témoigne de la sagesse acquise par les tribunaux au fi l du temps. modifi er la façon dont les tribunaux traitent le droit international 282 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. an unknown course whose ramifi cations cannot be accurately gauged” (bow valley husky (bermuda) ltd. v. saint john shipbuilding ltd., [1997] 3 scr. 1210, at para 93). as this court explained in kazemi, at para. 108: the common law should not be used by the courts to de- termine complex policy issues in the absence of a strong legal foundation or obvious and applicable precedents that demonstrate that a new consensus is emerging. to do otherwise would be to abandon all certainty that the com- mon law might hold. particularly in cases of international law, it is appropriate for canadian courts only to follow the “bulk of the authority” and not change the law drastically based on an emerging idea that is in its conceptual infancy. the majority views such a change as “necessary” (at para. 118), but provides no reason to believe the change will have anything other than complex and uncertain ramifi cations. such a fundamental reform to the common law must be left to the legislature, even though doing so by judge- made law might seem intuitively desirable (salituro, at p 670). coutumier « pla[cerait] le droit sur une trajectoire inconnue et dont les conséquences ne peuvent pas être mesurées avec précision » (bow valley husky (bermuda) ltd c saint john shipbuilding ltd., [1997] 3 rcs 1210, par 93). comme notre cour l’a expliqué dans l’arrêt kazemi, au par. 108 : les tribunaux ne devraient pas se servir de la common law pour trancher des questions complexes de politique en l’absence d’un fondement juridique solide ou d’un en- semble de précédents applicables et clairs qui dé montrent l’émergence d’un nouveau consensus. une approche dif- férente reviendrait à détruire toute la certitude que peut assurer la common law. dans les causes de droit interna- tional plus particulièrement, il convient que les tribunaux canadiens suivent uniquement la [traduction] « jurispru- dence dominante », et ne modifi ent pas le droit de façon radicale sur la base d’une idée émergente qui se trouverait encore à ses balbutiements sur le plan conceptuel. les juges majoritaires jugent un tel changement «  nécessair[e]  » (par.  118), mais ils n’avancent aucune raison qui permette de croire que celui-ci entraînera autre chose que des conséquences com- plexes et incertaines. il faut laisser au législateur le soin de procéder à une réforme aussi fondamentale de la common law, même s’il pourrait sembler intui- tivement souhaitable de le faire au moyen du droit jurisprudentiel (salituro, p 670). if parliament wishes to create an action for [229] a breach of customary international law, that is a decision for parliament itself to take. it is not one for this court to take on parliament’s behalf. as stated by professor o’keefe: [229] si le parlement souhaite créer une action pour violation du droit international coutumier, c’est à lui de prendre cette décision. notre cour ne peut le faire pour lui. comme l’explique le professeur o’keefe :    the recognition by the courts of a cause of action in tort for the violation of a rule of customary international law would be no less than the judicial creation of a new tort, something which has not truly happened since the coining of the unifi ed tort of negligence in donoghue v. stephenson in 1932.9 the reason for this is essentially con- stitutional: given its wide- reaching implications, economic and sometimes political, the creation of a novel head of tort is now generally recognized as better left to parliament, on account of the latter’s democratic legitimacy and superior [traduction]    la reconnaissance par les tribunaux d’une cause d’action délictuelle pour violation d’une règle de droit international coutumier ne constituerait pas moins que la création judiciaire d’un nouveau délit, ce qui n’est pas vraiment arrivé depuis l’institution du délit unifi é de négligence en 1932 dans l’arrêt donoghue c. stephenson10. la raison en est essentiellement constitutionnelle : compte tenu de ses vastes répercussions — économiques et parfois politiques —, il est aujourd’hui généralement reconnu qu’il est préférable de laisser au parlement le soin de créer 9 this statement was written prior to jones v. tsige, 2012 onca 10 cette affi rmation est antérieure à l’arrêt jones c. tsige, 2012 32, 108 or (3d) 241. onca 32, 108 or (3d) 241. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 283 capacity to engage beforehand in the necessary research and consultation. [footnote omitted.] un nouveau type de délit, en raison de la légitimité démo- cratique de ce dernier et du fait qu’il est plus en mesure d’effectuer à l’avance les recherches et les consultations nécessaires. [note en bas de page omise.] (r. o’keefe, “the doctrine of incorporation revis- ited”, in j. crawford and v. lowe, eds., the british year book of international law 2008 (2009), 7, at p. 76) (r. o’keefe, « the doctrine of incorporation re- visited », dans j. crawford et v. lowe, dir., the british year book of international law 2008 (2009), 7, p. 76) [230] when the english courts determined to give horizontal effect to an international instrument (the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 213 unts. 221), they did so pursuant to the direction of a statute that made it unlawful for a public author- ity — which by the terms of the statute included the courts — to act “in a way which is incompatible with a convention right” (human rights act 1998 (uk), 1998, c. 42, s. 6(1) and (3)). similarly, the horizontal effect of the treaties of the european union in the united kingdom depends on a statutory instruction in the european communities act 1972 (uk), 1972, c. 68 (r (miller) v. secretary of state, [2017] uksc 5, [2018] ac 61, at paras 62-68). while we agree with the majority’s reasoning (at para. 94) that leg- islative endorsement is not required for there to be vertical effect in the common law (that is, an effect against the executive) of a mandatory or prohibitive norm of customary international law, there is no such tradition of horizontal effect in the common law (that is, an effect on the relations between private parties) without legislative action. further, and to the extent such an effect is even possible, it should be governed by the considerations we set out at paras. 174-75 concerning the effect of mandatory and prohibitive norms in private common law. [230] lorsque les tribunaux anglais ont décidé de donner un effet horizontal à un instrument internatio- nal (la convention européenne intitulée convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fon- damentales, 213 rtnu 221), ils l’ont fait confor- mément à la prescription d’une loi qui rendait illégal le fait pour une autorité publique — expression qui, aux termes de cette loi, englobait les tribunaux — d’agir [traduction] « d’une manière incompatible avec un droit garanti par la convention » (human rights act 1998 (r-u), 1998, c. 42, par. 6(1) et 6(3)). de même, l’effet horizontal que les traités de l’union européenne ont au royaume- uni tient à une directive législative fi gurant dans la european communities act 1972 (r-u), 1972, c.  68 (r. (miller) c. secretary of state, [2017] uksc 5, [2018] ac 61, par 62-68). bien que nous soyons d’accord avec le raisonnement des juges majoritaires (par. 94) lorsqu’ils affi rment que l’adoption par le législateur n’est pas nécessaire pour qu’une norme impérative ou prohibitive de droit international coutumier ait un effet vertical en common law ( c’est-à-dire un effet à l’égard de l’exécutif), il n’existe aucune tra- dition d’effet horizontal de la sorte en common law ( c’est-à-dire un effet sur les relations entre parties privées) sans intervention législative. de plus, et dans la mesure où un tel effet est même possible, il devrait être régi par les considérations que nous avons énoncées aux par. 174-175 concernant l’effet des normes impératives et prohibitives en common law privée. it is thus for parliament to decide whether [231] to change the doctrine of adoption to provide courts the power to convert prohibitive rules of international law into free- standing torts. parliament has not done so. while it has created a statutory cause of action il appartient donc au parlement de décider [231] s’il convient de modifi er la doctrine de l’adoption pour conférer aux tribunaux le pouvoir de convertir des règles prohibitives du droit international en délits autonomes. or, il ne l’a pas fait. bien qu’il ait créé 284 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. for victims of terrorism, it has not chosen to do so for every violation of customary international law (see s. 4 of the justice for victims of terrorism act, sc 2012, c. 1, s 2). une cause d’action légale pour les victimes d’actes terroristes, il ne l’a pas fait pour chaque violation de droit international coutumier (voir l’art. 4 de la loi sur la justice pour les victimes d’actes de terrorisme, lc 2012, c. 1, art 2). iv on the second theory, the claims are also iv selon la deuxième thèse, les réclamations sont bound to fail également vouées à l’échec [232] we have thus far confi ned our comments to the theory of the case given by the majority. as part of reading the pleadings generously, however, we must also consider the theory given by the chambers judge and the court of appeal. under this theory, the amended pleadings sought to have the court rec- ognize four new nominate torts inspired by inter- national law: use of forced labour; slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and crimes against humanity. [233] on this theory of the case, international law plays a limited role. it will be of merely persuasive authority in recognizing the tort to begin with. it will also play less ongoing signifi cance. although prov- ing the content of customary international law may be valuable for showing the urgency of recognizing a new tort, once a new tort is recognized, the new tort will have a comfortable home within the common law. if slavery is recognized as a tort, a future litigant will have no need to prove that an edge- case of slav- ery is a violation of customary international law; they can instead simply invoke the domestic tort. it is far easier for canadian judges to know the contours of a domestic tort than it is for them to know the contours of customary international law. the transmutation of customary international law into individual domestic torts has another advantage, too. on an edge- case, where it is unclear whether states are obliged to prohibit the conduct under customary international law, canadian judges will not be faced with a partly empirical question (as they would on the majority’s theory of the case), but a normative question. [232] nous avons jusqu’ici limité nos observa- tions à la thèse exposée par les juges majoritaires. toutefois, suivant une interprétation généreuse des actes de procédure en cause, nous devons aussi tenir compte de la thèse avancée par le juge en cabinet et la cour d’appel. suivant celle-ci, les actes de pro- cédure modifi és visaient à obtenir du tribunal qu’il reconnaisse quatre nouveaux délits nommés inspirés du droit international : le recours au travail forcé, l’esclavage, les traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, et les crimes contre l’humanité. [233] selon cette thèse, le droit international joue un rôle limité. il n’aura qu’une valeur de persua- sion dans la reconnaissance d’un délit. il revêtira aussi une importance continue qui est moindre. bien qu’il puisse s’avérer fort utile de prouver le contenu du droit international coutumier pour démontrer l’urgence de reconnaître un nouveau délit, une fois qu’il sera reconnu, le nouveau délit disposera d’une demeure confortable au sein de la common law. si l’esclavage est reconnu comme un délit, un futur plaideur n’aura pas besoin de démontrer qu’un cas limite d’esclavage constitue une violation du droit international coutumier; il lui suffi ra d’invoquer le délit interne. il est beaucoup plus facile pour les juges canadiens de connaître les contours d’un délit interne que de connaître ceux du droit internatio- nal coutumier. la transmutation de règles de droit international coutumier en délits individuels en droit interne comporte aussi un autre avantage. dans un cas limite, où l’on ne sait pas avec certitude si les états sont tenus d’interdire une conduite en droit international coutumier, les juges canadiens seront appelés à trancher non pas une question partiellement empirique (comme ils le seraient suivant la thèse des juges majoritaires), mais une question normative. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 285 [234] the question that remains is: when should canadian common law courts recognize these new nominate torts? [235] we explain below, fi rst, the test that canadian courts have developed for recognizing — or more precisely, for refusing to recognize — a new nomi- nate tort. we then apply that test to the four torts the workers allege. [234] une question demeure : dans quelles cir- constances les tribunaux canadiens de common law devraient- ils reconnaître ces nouveaux délits nom- més? [235] nous expliquons plus loin tout d’abord le critère que les tribunaux canadiens ont élaboré pour reconnaître — ou plus précisément pour refuser de reconnaître — un nouveau délit nommé. nous appli- quons ensuite ce critère aux quatre délits allégués par les travailleurs. a the test for recognizing a new nominate tort a critère à respecter pour reconnaître un nouveau délit nommé in frame v. smith, [1987] 2 scr 99, at [236] p. 120, wilson j (dissenting, but not on this point) described the history of disputed theories for recog- nizing new torts: [236] dans l’arrêt frame c. smith, [1987] 2 rcs. 99, à la p. 120, la juge wilson (dissidente, mais pas sur ce point) a décrit l’historique des thèses contes- tées appliquées pour reconnaître de nouveaux délits : it has been described in solomon, feldthusen and mills, cases and materials on the law of torts (2nd ed. 1986), as follows (at p. 6): il a été décrit dans solomon, feldthusen and mills, cases and materials on the law of torts (2nd ed. 1986) de la manière suivante (à la p. 6) : initially, the search for a theoretical basis for tort law centred on the issue of whether there was a general principle of tortious liability. sir john salmond ar- gued that tort law was merely a patchwork of distinct causes of action, each protecting different interests and each based on separate principles of liability [see salmond, the law of torts (6th ed., 1924) at pp 9-10]. essentially the law of torts was a fi nite set of independ- ent rules, and the courts were not free to recognize new heads of liability. in contrast, writers such as pollock contended that the law of torts was based upon the single unifying principle that all harms were tortious unless they could be justifi ed [see pollock, the law of torts (13th ed., 1929) at p 21]. the courts were thus free to recognize new torts. glanville williams suggested a compromise between the two viewpoints. he argued that tort law historically exhibited no com- prehensive theory, but that the existing categories of liability were suffi ciently fl exible to enable tort law to grow and adapt. [emphasis added.] [traduction] au départ, la recherche d’un fondement théorique pour le droit des délits se concentrait sur la question de savoir s’il y avait un principe général en matière de responsabilité délictuelle. sir john salmond a soutenu que le droit des délits était simplement un ensemble disparate de cause[s] d’actions distinctes, chacune protégeant différents intérêts et chacune étant fondée sur des principes distincts de responsabilité [voir salmond, the law of torts (6th ed., 1924) aux pp. 9 et 10]. essentiellement, le droit des délits était un ensemble limité de règles indépendantes et les tribu- naux n’étaient pas libres de reconnaître de nouveaux chefs de responsabilité. par ailleurs, des auteurs tel pollock ont soutenu que le droit des délits était fondé sur le seul principe unifi cateur selon lequel tous les préjudices étaient délictuels à moins qu’ils ne puissent être justifi és [voir pollock, the law of torts (13th ed., 1929) à la p 21]. les tribunaux étaient ainsi libres de reconnaître de nouveaux délits. glanville williams a proposé un compromis entre ces deux opinions. il a soutenu que le droit des délits n’est historiquement pas fondé sur une théorie générale, mais que les catégories existantes de responsabilité sont néanmoins suffi sam- ment souples pour permettre au droit des délits de croître et de s’adapter. [nous soulignons.] 286 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. justice wilson agreed with, and adopted, glanville williams’s pragmatic approach (p. 120, citing g. l. williams, “the foundation of tortious liability” (1939), 7 cambridge lj 111). la juge wilson a souscrit à l’approche pragmatique de glanville williams (p. 120, citant g l. williams, « the foundation of tortious liability » (1939), 7 cambridge lj 111), et l’a adoptée. [237] three clear rules for when the courts will not recognize a new nominate tort have emerged: (1) the courts will not recognize a new tort where there are adequate alternative remedies (see, for ex- ample, scalera); (2) the courts will not recognize a new tort that does not refl ect and address a wrong visited by one person upon another (saskatchewan wheat pool, at pp. 224-25); and (3) the courts will not recognize a new tort where the change wrought upon the legal system would be indeterminate or substantial (wallace v. united grain growers ltd., [1997] 3 scr 701, at paras 76-77). put another way, for a proposed nominate tort to be recognized by the courts, at a minimum it must refl ect a wrong, be necessary to address that wrong, and be an ap- propriate subject of judicial consideration. [238] the fi rst rule, that of necessity, acknowl- edges at least three alternative remedies: another tort, an independent statutory scheme, and judicial review. if any of these alternatives address the wrong targeted by the proposed nominate tort, then the court will decline to recognize it. [237] trois règles claires ont été dégagées pour déterminer dans quelles circonstances les tribunaux ne reconnaîtront pas l’existence d’un nouveau délit nommé : (1) les tribunaux ne reconnaîtront pas un nouveau délit lorsqu’il existe d’autres voies de re- cours appropriées (voir, par exemple, scalera); (2) les tribunaux ne reconnaîtront pas un nouveau délit qui ne refl ète pas et ne permet pas de redresser le tort infl igé par une personne à une autre (saskatchewan wheat pool, p. 224-225); (3) les tribunaux ne recon- naîtront pas un nouveau délit lorsque le changement qui en résulterait pour le système juridique serait indéterminé ou substantiel (wallace c. united grain growers ltd., [1997] 3 rcs 701, par 76-77). en d’autres termes, pour pouvoir être reconnu par les tribunaux, le délit nommé proposé doit au moins refl éter un tort qui a été causé, être nécessaire pour redresser ce tort et pouvoir faire l’objet d’un examen judiciaire approprié. [238] la première règle, celle de la nécessité, reconnaît au moins trois autres voies de recours : un autre délit, un régime législatif indépendant et le contrôle judiciaire. si l’une de ces voies de recours permet de redresser le tort visé par le délit nommé proposé, le tribunal refusera alors de reconnaître ce délit. [239] as we described above, a difference merely of damages or the extent of harm will not suffi ce to ground a new tort (scalera). the proposed torts of “harassment” and “obstruction” also failed at the necessity stage. as the saskatchewan court of appeal recently observed in mclean v. mclean, 2019 skca 15, at paras. 103-5 (canlii), the pro- posed tort of harassment was entirely encompassed by the tort of intentional infl iction of mental suf- fering and so need not be recognized as a distinct tort (see also merrifi eld, at para 42). similarly, the proposed tort of obstruction — the plaintiffs had alleged the defendants had obstructed them from clearing trees — was encompassed by the existing torts of nuisance and trespass (6165347 manitoba [239] comme nous l’avons expliqué plus haut, une différence ayant trait simplement aux dommages- intérêts ou à l’importance du préjudice ne suffi ra pas à justifier la reconnaissance d’un nouveau délit (scalera). les délits proposés de « harcèle- ment » et d’« entrave » n’ont pas non plus franchi l’étape de la nécessité. comme la cour d’appel de la saskatchewan l’a récemment fait observer dans l’arrêt mclean c. mclean, 2019 skca 15, par. 103- 105 (canlii), le délit proposé de harcèlement est déjà entièrement visé par le délit d’infl iction inten- tionnelle d’une souffrance morale et n’a donc pas besoin d’être reconnu comme un délit distinct (voir également merrifi eld, par 42). de même, le délit pro- posé d’entrave — les demanderesses avaient allégué [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 287 inc. v. jenna vandal, 2019 mbqb 69, at paras. 91 and 100 (canlii)). [240] a statutory remedy can also suffi ce to show that a new nominate tort is unnecessary. for example, in seneca college of applied arts and technology v. bhadauria, [1981] 2 scr 181, at p. 195, this court held that the ontario human rights code, rso 1970, c. 318 (“code”) foreclosed the devel- opment of a common law tort based on the same policies embodied in the code. similarly, in frame, at p. 111, the court declined to create a common law tort concerning alienation of affection in the family context because the legislature had occupied the fi eld through the children’s law reform act, rso 1980, c 68. [241] the second rule, that the tort must refl ect a wrong visited by one person upon another, is also well- established and is refl ected in the courts’ resist- ance to creating strict or absolute liability regimes (see, for example, saskatchewan wheat pool, at p 224). it is also the converse of the idea so memo- rably expressed by sharpe ja in jones v. tsige, 2012 onca 32, 108 or (3d) 241, at para. 69: there, the “facts    cr[ied] out for a remedy”. when the facts do not make such a cry, the courts will not recognize a tort. que les défendeurs les avaient empêchées de déboi- ser — est visé par les délits existants de nuisance et d’intrusion (6165347 manitoba inc. c. jenna vandal, 2019 mbqb 69, par. 91 et 100 (canlii)). [240] l’existence d’un recours prévu par la loi peut également suffi re à démontrer qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de créer un nouveau délit nommé. par exemple, dans l’arrêt seneca college of applied arts and technology c. bhadauria, [1981] 2 rcs. 181, p. 195, notre cour a jugé que l’ontario human rights code, rso 1970, c. 318 (« code »), excluait la possibilité d’élaborer un délit de common law fondé sur les mêmes politiques que celles consa- crées par le code. de même, dans l’arrêt frame, à la p. 111, la cour a refusé de créer un délit de common law pour détournement d’affection dans un contexte familial parce que le législateur provincial avait déjà occupé ce champ en édictant la loi portant réforme du droit de l’enfance, lro 1980, c 68. [241] la deuxième règle, selon laquelle le délit doit refl éter un tort infl igé par une personne à une autre, est également bien établie et trouve son expres- sion dans le fait que les tribunaux résistent à créer des régimes de responsabilité stricte ou absolue (voir, par exemple, saskatchewan wheat pool, p 224). c’est également l’inverse de l’idée que le juge sharpe a exprimée de façon si mémorable dans l’arrêt jones c. tsige, 2012 onca 32, 108 or (3d) 241, au par. 69 (canlii), en déclarant que, dans cette affaire, [tra- duction] « les faits [  ] réclam[aient] un recours ». lorsque les faits ne sont pas tels, les tribunaux ne reconnaîtront pas un délit. [242] finally, the change wrought to the legal sys- tem must not be indeterminate or substantial. this rule refl ects the courts’ respect for legislative su- premacy and the courts’ mandate to ensure that the law remains stable, predictable and accessible (t. bingham, the rule of law (2010), at p 37). hence, the ontario superior court’s rejection of a proposed tort of “derivative abuse of process” that would pro- vide compensation for someone allegedly injured by another person’s litigation. such a tort, the court noted, would create indeterminate liability (harris v. glaxosmithkline inc., 2010 onsc 2326, 101 or. [242] enfi n, le changement apporté au système juridique ne doit pas être indéterminé ou substantiel. cette règle témoigne du respect des tribunaux pour la suprématie législative et de la mission des tribunaux de veiller à ce que le droit demeure stable, prévisible et accessible (t. bingham, the rule of law (2010), p 37). d’où le refus, par la cour supérieure de l’on- tario, de reconnaître le délit proposé [traduction] d’« abus de procédure dérivé » qui permettrait d’in- demniser une personne qui s’estime lésée par l’action en justice intentée par une autre. le tribunal a fait observer qu’un tel délit créerait une responsabilité 288 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. (3d) 665, aff’d on other grounds, 2010 onca 872, 106 or (3d) 661, leave to appeal refused, [2011] 2 scr vii). similarly, in wallace, this court rejected the proposed tort of “bad faith discharge” (para. 78) because it would create a “radical shift in the law” (para. 77) and contradict “established principles of employment law” (para 76). a shift will be less radical when it is presaged by some combination of obiter, academic commentary, and persuasive for- eign judicial activity, none of which are present here. [243] jones v. tsige provides a rare and instructive example of where a proposed new nominate tort was found by a court to have passed this test. the breach of privacy was indeed seen by the court as a wrong caused by one person to another, and as a wrong for which there existed no other remedy in tort law or in statute. the court of appeal for ontario found support to recognize a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion in the common law and charter ju- risprudence (para. 66), and looked to other jurisdic- tions which had recognized a similar cause of action arising from a right to privacy, either by statute or by the common law (paras 55-64). the court defi ned the elements of the cause of action (paras. 70-72) and identifi ed factors to guide an assessment of damages (paras 87-90). having undertaken this careful analy- sis, the court concluded that it had the competence as an institution to make this incremental change to the common law — it being “within the capacity of the common law to evolve to respond to the problem” (para 68). indéterminée (harris c. glaxosmithkline inc., 2010 onsc 2326, 101 or (3d) 665, conf. pour d’autres motifs par 2010 onca 872, 106 or (3d) 661, autorisation de pourvoi refusée, [2011] 2 rcs vii). de même, dans l’arrêt wallace, notre cour a refusé de reconnaître le délit proposé de « renvoi de mau- vaise foi » (par. 78), estimant que cela constituerait « une modifi cation radicale du droit » (par. 77) et serait incompatible avec « les principes reconnus du droit régissant la relation employeur- employé » (par 76). une modifi cation sera moins radicale si elle est présagée par une combinaison de remarques incidentes, de doctrine et d’appréciations judiciaires étrangères convaincantes. or, on ne trouve aucun de ces éléments en l’espèce. [243] l’affaire jones c. tsige offre un exemple à la fois rare et instructif d’un cas où un tribunal a jugé qu’un nouveau délit nommé proposé satisfaisait à ce critère. le tribunal a en effet estimé que l’atteinte à la vie privée constituait un tort causé par une personne à une autre et pour lequel il n’existait aucun autre recours en droit de la responsabilité délictuelle ou dans la loi. la cour d’appel de l’ontario a reconnu une cause d’action pour intrusion dans l’intimité en se fondant sur la common law et la jurisprudence relative à la charte (par. 66), et elle a examiné ce qui se faisait dans d’autres états qui avaient reconnu une cause d’action semblable découlant d’un droit à la vie privée en vertu d’une loi ou de la common law (par 55-64). la cour a défi ni les éléments de la cause d’action (par. 70-72) et a dégagé certains facteurs devant guider l’évaluation des dommages- intérêts (par 87-90). après avoir procédé à cette analyse minutieuse, elle a conclu qu’elle avait compétence, en tant qu’institution, pour apporter ce changement graduel à la common law, puisque, selon elle, [tra- duction] « [l]a common law a la capacité d’évoluer pour faire face au problème » (par 68). b two of the proposed nominate torts fail this b deux des délits nommés proposés ne satisfont pas test à ce critère [244] in our view, the proposed torts of cruel, in- human or degrading treatment, and “crimes against humanity” both fail this test. [244] à notre avis, les délits proposés de traite- ments cruels, inhumains ou dégradants et de « crimes contre l’humanité » ne satisfont pas à ce critère. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 289 [245] the proposed tort of cruel, inhuman or de- grading treatment fails the necessity test, since any conduct captured by this tort would also be captured by the extant torts of battery or intentional infl iction of emotional distress. to the extent that this tort de- scribes a greater degree of harm than that typically litigated in the conventional torts, this goes only to damages. as this court found in scalera, no distinct tort is necessary. [246] the proposed tort of “crimes against human- ity” also fails, but for a different reason: it is too multifarious a category to be the proper subject of a nominate tort. many crimes against humanity would be already addressed under extant torts. if there are individual crimes against humanity that would not already be recognized as tortious conduct in canada, the workers should specify them, rather than rely on a catch- all phrase that includes wrongs already covered. adopting such a tort wholesale would not be the kind of incremental change to the common law that a canadian court ought to make. [245] le délit proposé de traitements cruels, inhu- mains ou dégradants ne satisfait pas au critère de la nécessité, car toute conduite visée par ce délit serait également visée par les délits existants de batterie ou d’infl iction intentionnelle d’un trouble émotif. dans la mesure où ce délit décrit un plus grand pré- judice que celui qui est habituellement plaidé dans le cas des délits traditionnels, cette différence n’a trait qu’aux dommages- intérêts. comme notre cour l’a conclu dans l’arrêt scalera, aucun délit distinct n’est nécessaire. [246] le délit proposé de « crimes contre l’hu- manité » ne peut non plus être retenu, mais pour une raison différente : il s’agit d’une catégorie trop hétérogène pour faire l’objet d’un délit nommé. de nombreux crimes contre l’humanité sont déjà visés par des délits existants. s’il existe des crimes particu- liers contre l’humanité qui ne sont pas déjà reconnus comme des conduites délictueuses au canada, les travailleurs devraient les préciser au lieu de s’en remettre à une expression fourre- tout qui englobe des transgressions déjà visées. l’adoption globale d’un tel délit ne saurait correspondre au genre de changement graduel qu’un tribunal canadien devrait apporter à la common law. c two of the proposed nominate torts may pass c deux des délits nommés proposés satisfont peut- this test être à ce critère [247] in our view, it is possible the proposed torts of slavery and use of forced labour would pass the test for recognizing a new nominate tort. recognizing each of these torts — subject to further develop- ment throughout the proceedings — may prove to be necessary, in that each may capture conduct not independently captured in torts such as battery, in- tentional infl iction of emotional distress, negligence, or forcible confi nement. for example, it is possible that the facts, if fully developed in the course of trial, might show that one person kept another person enslaved without need for any force or violence, simply by convincing that other person that they are rightfully property. use of forced labour also, by its terms, may include liability that pierces the corporate veil or extends through agency relationships. and, to the extent there are non- tort alternative remedies [247] à notre avis, il est possible que les délits proposés d’esclavage et de recours au travail forcé satisfassent au critère à respecter pour reconnaître un nouveau délit nommé. la reconnaissance de chacun de ces délits — sous réserve d’autres développe- ments dans l’instance — peut s’avérer nécessaire, en ce que chacun d’eux peut viser une conduite qui n’est pas visée de façon indépendante par un délit comme celui de batterie, d’infliction intentionnelle d’un trouble émotif, de négligence ou de séquestration. à titre d’exemple, il est possible que l’exposition de tous les faits au procès révèle qu’une personne a réduit une autre personne à l’esclavage sans avoir eu à recourir à la force ou à la violence, simplement en la convainquant qu’elle était sa propriété légi- time. de par ses conditions, le recours au travail forcé peut également englober une responsabilité qui 290 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. under the criminal law, they would not restore the victim as tort law would. it is also uncontroversial that each of these [248] torts — again, subject to further development — re- fl ects wrongs being done by one person to another. [249] finally, the admission of these torts would not cause unforeseeable or unknowable harm to canadian law. both slavery and use of forced labour are widely understood in this country to be illegal and, indeed, morally reprehensible, and liability for such conduct would herald no great shift in expecta- tions. perce le voile de la personnalité morale ou qui passe à travers la relation entre mandant et mandataire. de plus, dans la mesure où le droit pénal prévoit d’autres voies de recours non délictuelles, celles-ci ne permettraient pas de remettre la victime dans la situation où elle se trouvait antérieurement comme le droit de la responsabilité civile délictuelle permettrait de le faire. [248] de plus, nul ne conteste que chacun des délits en question — encore une fois, sous réserve de développements ultérieurs — vise des torts causés par une personne à une autre. [249] enfi n, le fait d’admettre ces délits ne cause- rait pas de préjudice imprévisible ou inconnaissable en droit canadien. l’esclavage et le recours au travail forcé sont généralement considérés dans notre pays comme des conduites illégales et, en fait, morale- ment répréhensibles, et la responsabilité à l’égard de telles conduites n’annoncerait aucun changement majeur dans les attentes. [250] nonetheless, for the reasons that follow, we would hold that the attempt to create such nominate torts is doomed to fail. [250] néanmoins, pour les motifs qui suivent, nous sommes d’avis que la tentative de créer de tels délits nommés est vouée à l’échec. d slavery and use of forced labour should not be recognized for the first time in the circum- stances of this case d l’esclavage et le recours au travail forcé ne devraient pas être reconnus pour la première fois dans les circonstances de l’espèce [251] in our view, proposed torts should not be recognized for the fi rst time in a proceeding based on conduct that occurred in a foreign territory, where the workers in this case had no connection to british columbia at the time of the alleged torts, and where the british columbian defendant has only an attenu- ated connection to the tort. [251] à notre avis, les délits proposés ne devraient pas être reconnus pour la première fois dans une instance fondée sur une conduite ayant eu lieu en ter- ritoire étranger, alors que les travailleurs en l’espèce n’avaient aucun lien avec la colombie- britannique au moment des délits reprochés et où la défenderesse britanno- colombienne n’a qu’un lien ténu avec le délit. [252] in general, tortious conduct abroad will not be governed by canadian law, even where the wrong is litigated before canadian courts. it is the law of the place of the tort that will, normally, govern (tolofson v. jensen, [1994] 3 scr 1022, at p 1050). the only exception is when such law is so repugnant to the [252] en règle générale, une conduite délictueuse qui a eu lieu à l’étranger ne sera pas régie par le droit canadien, même lorsque la transgression est jugée devant les tribunaux canadiens. c’est le droit du lieu où le délit a été commis qui s’appliquera habituel- lement (tolofson c. jensen, [1994] 3 rcs 1022, [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 291 fundamental morality of the canadian legal system as to lead the court not to apply it (p 1054). [253] one of two possibilities may arise when the proceedings in this case continue. it may be that the court fi nds eritrean law not so offensive, and proceeds to apply it. in that case, judicial restraint would prevent the courts from recognizing a novel tort in canadian law, because its application would be moot. alternatively, if eritrean law is found to be repugnant, the british columbia courts would be in the unfortunate position of setting out a position for the fi rst time on these proposed new torts based on conduct that occurred in a foreign state. [254] there are problems, both practical and in- stitutional, with developing canadian law based on conduct that occurred in a foreign state. [255] the practical problem is that the law that is appropriate for regulating a foreign state may not also be law that is appropriate for regulating canada. it is trite to say that hard cases make bad law. when a case comes through the public policy exception to confl icts of law, it will, almost by defi nition, be a hard case. [256] the institutional problem is well expressed by la forest j in tolofson, at p. 1052: it seems to me self evident, for example, that state a has no business in defi ning the legal rights and liabilities of citizens of state b in respect of acts in their own country, or for that matter the actions in state b of citizens of state c, and it would lead to unfair and unjust results if it did. p 1050). la seule exception à cette règle est le cas où le droit en question est contraire aux valeurs morales fondamentales du régime juridique canadien au point d’amener le tribunal à ne pas l’appliquer (p 1054). [253] deux scénarios sont possibles lors de la poursuite de la procédure en l’espèce. il se peut que le tribunal estime que le droit érythréen n’est pas si choquant et entreprenne de l’appliquer. en pareil cas, la retenue judiciaire empêcherait les tribunaux de reconnaître un nouveau délit en droit canadien, parce que son application serait théorique. en revanche, si le droit érythréen est jugé répugnant, les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique se trouveraient dans la situation malheureuse d’énoncer pour la première fois une position sur ces nouveaux délits proposés en fonction d’une conduite ayant eu lieu à l’étranger. [254] l’élaboration de règles de droit cana diennes fondées sur une conduite qui a eu lieu dans un état étranger soulève des problèmes tant pratiques qu’ins- titutionnels. [255] le problème pratique réside dans le fait que les règles de droit qui conviennent pour un état étranger ne sont peut- être pas également celles qui conviennent pour le canada il va sans dire que les cas épineux créent de mauvais précédents. lorsqu’une affaire tombe sous le coup de l’exception d’ordre public au droit international privé, il s’agira presque par défi nition d’un cas épineux. [256] quant au problème institutionnel, le juge la forest l’explique bien dans l’arrêt tolofson, à la p. 1052 : il me semble aller de soi, par exemple, qu’il n’appar- tient pas à l’état a de défi nir les droits et obligations des citoyens de l’état b à l’égard d’actes accomplis dans leur propre pays, ni, quant à cela, les actions accomplies dans l’état b par des citoyens de l’état c, car il s’ensuivrait des résultats inéquitables et injustes si c’était le cas. if that is true of legislatures, it is ever the more true for courts. courts simply must recognize the limits of their institutional competence and the distinct roles of the judiciary vis-à-vis parliament and the ce qui est vrai dans le cas des législateurs l’est encore plus pour les tribunaux. les tribunaux doivent sim- plement reconnaître les limites de leur compétence institutionnelle et le rôle distinct que joue le pouvoir 292 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. executive (canada (prime minister) v. khadr, 2010 scc 3, [2010] 1 scr 44, at paras 46-47). the judiciary is confi ned to making incremental changes to the common law, and can only respond to the evidence and argument before it. in contrast, the executive has the resources to study complex matters of state, conduct research, and consult with affected groups and the public. parliament can do so, too, as well as hearing expert testimony through its com- mittees. while the remedy that a court may order is limited to the question before the court, the execu- tive can craft broad legal and institutional responses to these issues. the executive can create delegated regulatory authority, and implement policy and pro- cedures. further, whereas courts do not have the jurisdiction or resources to monitor the impact of its decisions, the executive can develop specialized units with a mandate to monitor, make recommendations, implement and, where necessary, adjust a course of action. the domain of foreign relations is, in our view, perhaps the most obvious example of where the executive is competent to act, but where courts lack the institutional competence to do so. [257] lester b. pearson, in a speech before the empire club of canada and the canadian club of toronto in 1951, spoke about developing foreign policy in canada (“canadian foreign policy in a two power world”, the empire club of canada: addresses 1950-1951 (1951), 346) mr.  pearson emphasized the delicacy of foreign relations, which calls for balancing political, economic and geo- graphical considerations and consultation with other nations — a role that courts are not institutionally suited to undertake: judiciaire par rapport au parlement et à l’exécutif (canada (premier ministre) c. khadr, 2010 csc 3, [2010] 1 rcs 44, par 46-47). les tribunaux ne peuvent apporter que des changements graduels à la common law, et ils doivent s’en tenir à la preuve et aux arguments qui leur sont présentés. en re vanche, l’exécutif dispose des ressources voulues pour étu- dier des affaires d’état complexes, pour effectuer des recherches et pour consulter les groupes touchés et le public. le parlement peut en faire autant, et il peut aussi entendre des témoignages d’experts au moyen de ses comités. bien que la réparation qu’un tribunal peut ordonner ne puisse porter que sur la question qui lui a été soumise, l’exécutif peut élaborer des réponses juridiques et institutionnelles générales à apporter aux questions en jeu. l’exécutif peut créer des pouvoirs de réglementation délégués et mettre en œuvre des politiques et des procédures. de plus, alors que les tribunaux n’ont ni la compétence ni les ressources pour surveiller les incidences de leurs décisions, l’exécutif peut mettre sur pied des unités spécialisées chargées de surveiller, de faire des recommandations, de mettre en œuvre une ligne de conduite et, au besoin, de modifi er celle-ci. le domaine des relations étrangères est, à notre avis, peut- être l’exemple le plus fl agrant d’une situation où l’exécutif est compétent pour agir, mais où les tribunaux n’ont pas la compétence institutionnelle pour le faire. [257] lester b. pearson, dans une allocution pro- noncée en 1951 devant l’empire club of canada et le canadian club of toronto, a traité de l’élaboration de la politique étrangère canadienne (« canadian foreign policy in a two power world », the empire club of canada : addresses 1950-1951 (1951), 346). m. pearson a insisté sur le fait que les relations étran- gères étaient une question délicate qui commandait la mise en balance des considérations politiques, éco- nomiques et géographiques, d’une part, et la consul- tation d’autres nations, d’autre part — un rôle que les tribunaux ne sont pas institutionnellement faits pour assumer : the formulation of foreign policy has special diffi cul- ties for a country like canada, which has enough respon- sibility and power in the world to prevent its isolation [traduction] la formulation de la politique étrangère présente des diffi cultés particulières pour un pays comme le canada, qui a suffi samment de responsabilités et de [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 293 from the consequences of international decisions, but not enough to ensure that its voice will be effective in making those decisions. pouvoirs dans le monde pour prévenir son isolement par rapport aux conséquences des décisions internationales, mais qui n’en a pas assez pour s’assurer qu’il pourra vrai- ment se faire entendre lorsqu’il s’agira de prendre ces décisions. today, furthermore, foreign policy must be made in a world in arms, and in confl ict.   . en outre, de nos jours, la politique étrangère doit se faire dans un monde où règnent les hostilités armées et les confl its  .   .   . we all agree, however, that we must play our proper part, no less and no more, in the collective security action of the free world, without which we cannot hope to get through the dangerous days ahead. but how do we decide what that proper part is, having regard to our own political, economic and geographical situation? it is certainly not one which can be determined by fi xing a mathematical proportion of what some other country is doing. as long as we live in a world of sovereign states, canada’s part has to be determined by ourselves, but this should be done only after consultation with and, if possible, in agreement with our friends and allies. we must be the judge of our international obligations and we must decide how they can best be carried out for canada     [pp. 349 and 352] [258] mr. pearson’s speech was given in the cold war context, and considered canada’s foreign re- lations policy vis-à-vis two major world powers. clearly, the landscape of international relations and canada’s role on the world stage have changed dra- matically since 1951. today, as the political and economic relationships between nations become in- creasingly complex, mr. pearson’s message is even more compelling: foreign relations is a delicate mat- ter, which the executive — and not the courts — is equipped to undertake. nous sommes cependant tous d’accord pour dire que nous devons jouer notre juste rôle, ni plus ni moins, dans l’intervention collective de sécurité du monde libre, sans quoi nous n’avons aucun espoir de survivre aux temps dangereux qui nous attendent. mais comment décider en quoi consiste ce rôle, compte tenu de notre propre situa- tion politique, économique et géographique? ce n’est certainement pas un rôle qu’il est possible de déterminer en fi xant une proportion mathématique de ce que fait un autre pays. tant que nous vivrons dans un monde com- posé d’états souverains, c’est à nous qu’il appartient de décider du rôle que joue le canada, mais cela ne devrait se faire qu’après avoir consulté nos amis et nos alliés et, si possible, avec leur accord. c’est à nous qu’il incombe de juger de nos obligations internationales et de décider de la meilleure façon de les mettre en œuvre pour le canada  . [p. 349 et 352] [258] le discours de m. pearson a été prononcé dans le contexte de la guerre froide et il portait sur la politique en matière de relations extérieures du canada à l’égard de deux grandes puissances mon- diales. de toute évidence, la situation des relations internationales et le rôle du canada sur la scène internationale ont changé radicalement depuis 1951. de nos jours, alors que les relations politiques et économiques entre les nations deviennent de plus en plus complexes, le message de m. pearson est encore plus percutant : la question des relations extérieures est un sujet délicat dont l’exécutif — et non les tri- bunaux — est en mesure de se charger. [259] setting out a novel tort in the exceptional circumstance of a foreign state’s law being held by the court to be so repugnant to canadian morality would be an intrusion into the executive’s dominion over foreign relations. the courts’ role within this [259] établir un nouveau délit dans la situation exceptionnelle où le tribunal estime que le droit d’un état étranger est aussi contraire aux valeurs mo rales canadiennes constituerait un empiètement sur la compétence de l’exécutif en matière de relations 294 nevsun resources ltd v araya brown and rowe jj. [2020] 1 scr. country is, primarily, to adjudicate on disputes within canada, and between canadian residents. this is the purpose for which the courts have been vested their powers by s. 96 of the constitution act, 1867. our courts’ legitimacy depends on our place within the constitutional architecture of this country; canadian courts have no legitimacy to write laws to govern matters in eritrea, or to govern people in eritrea. developing canadian law in order to respond to events in eritrea is not the proper role of the court: that is a task that ought to be left to the executive, through the conduct of foreign relations, and to the legislatures and parliament. in making these observations, we do not [260] question the public policy exception to applying the law indicated by a choice of law exercise. the proper use of that exception, however, is to apply existing canadian law, which is either the product of legis- lative enactment or the common law, to situations where applying the foreign law would be repugnant to the consciences of canadians. that exception should not be used as a back door for the courts to create new law governing the behaviour of the citi- zens of other states in their home state. extérieures. le rôle des tribunaux canadiens consiste principalement à trancher les différends à l’intérieur du canada et qui opposent des résidents canadiens. c’est à cette fi n que les tribunaux se sont vu conférer leurs pouvoirs par l’art. 96 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. la légitimité de nos tribunaux dépend de la place qu’ils occupent dans l’architecture constitu- tionnelle du canada; les tribunaux canadiens n’ont aucune légitimité pour établir des règles de droit ré- gissant des affaires qui se produisent en érythrée, ou régissant le peuple érythréen. il n’appartient pas aux tribunaux de faire évoluer le droit canadien pour réa- gir à des événements qui se produisent en érythrée; il convient de laisser cette tâche à l’exécutif, dans la conduite des relations extérieures, ainsi qu’aux législatures provinciales et au parlement. [260] en formulant ces observations, nous ne re- mettons pas en question l’exception d’ordre public à l’application du droit désigné par l’opération relative au choix du droit applicable. la bonne façon d’utili- ser cette exception consiste toutefois à appliquer le droit canadien existant, qu’il découle d’une loi ou de la common law, à des situations dans lesquelles l’application du droit étranger serait incompatible avec la conscience des canadiens. cette exception ne devrait pas être utilisée comme un moyen détourné dont disposeraient les tribunaux pour créer du droit nouveau régissant, dans leur état d’origine, le com- portement des citoyens d’autres états. v conclusion v conclusion [261] this appeal engages fundamental questions of procedure and substance. the majority’s approach to the procedural question at the heart of a motion to strike will encourage parties to draft pleadings in a vague and underspecifi ed manner. it offers this lesson: the more nebulous the pleadings and legal theory used to protect them, the more likely they are to survive a motion to strike. this approach will suck much of the utility from the motion to strike. doomed actions will occupy the superior courtrooms of this country, persisting until the argument col- lapses at summary judgment or trial. in a moment where courts are struggling to handle the existing [261] le présent pourvoi soulève des questions fondamentales de procédure et de fond. l’approche préconisée par les juges majoritaires en ce qui a trait à la question de procédure au cœur d’une requête en radiation aura pour effet d’encourager les parties à rédiger les actes de procédure de manière vague et insuffi samment précise. la leçon à en tirer est la suivante : plus les actes de procédure et la thèse juridique utilisée pour les protéger sont nébuleux, plus les actes de procédure sont susceptibles de résis- ter à une requête en radiation. cette approche aura pour effet de priver les requêtes en radiation d’une bonne partie de leur utilité. les actions vouées à [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya les juges brown et rowe 295 caseload, increasing the load is likely not to facilitate access to justice, but to frustrate it. in substance, this appeal is about, as much as [262] anything else, maintaining respect for the appropriate role of each order of the canadian state. the creation of a cause of action for breach of customary inter- national law would require the courts to encroach on the roles of both the legislature (by creating a drastic change in the law and ignoring the doctrine of incrementalism), and the executive (by wading into the realm of foreign affairs). [263] it is not up to the court to ignore the founda- tions of customary international law, which prohib- its certain state conduct, in order to create a cause of action against private parties. rather, it would be up to parliament to create a statutory cause of action. and, where an issue has consequences for foreign relations, the executive, not courts, is insti- tutionally competent to decide questions of policy. fundamentally, it is this understanding and respect for the institutional competence of each order of the state that underlies the proper functioning of the domestic and international order. [264] a fi nal word. the implications of the ma- jority’s reasons should be comprehended. on the majority’s approach to determining what norms of customary international law may exist, generalist judges will be called upon to determine the practices of foreign states and the bases for those practices without hearing evidence from either party. they are to make these determinations aided only by lawyers, who themselves will rarely be experts in this fi eld. the judiciary is institutionally ill- suited to make such determinations. l’échec occuperont les salles d’audience des cours supérieures de notre pays, et subsisteront jusqu’à ce que l’argument s’effondre à l’étape du jugement sommaire ou au procès. à une époque où les tribu- naux déploient des efforts considérables pour venir à bout du volume de dossiers en cours, augmenter ce volume est susceptible non pas de faciliter l’accès à la justice, mais bien d’empêcher cet accès. [262] en substance, le présent pourvoi vise, entre autres choses, à assurer le respect du rôle dévolu à chaque ordre de l’état canadien. la création d’une cause d’action pour violation du droit international coutumier obligerait les tribunaux à empiéter à la fois sur le rôle réservé au législateur (en modifi ant radicalement le droit et en faisant fi de la théorie du gradualisme) et sur celui réservé à l’exécutif (en s’immisçant dans le domaine des affaires exté- rieures). [263] il n’appartient pas à la cour de faire abstrac- tion des fondements du droit international coutumier, qui interdit certaines conduites de l’état, dans le but de créer une cause d’action contre des parties privées. il reviendrait plutôt au parlement de créer une cause d’action légale. de plus, lorsqu’une ques- tion a des répercussions sur les relations extérieures, c’est l’exécutif, et non les tribunaux, qui a la com- pétence institutionnelle pour décider des questions de politique générale. fondamentalement, c’est cette compréhension et ce respect de la compétence ins- titutionnelle de chaque ordre de l’état qui sont à la base du bon fonctionnement tant de l’ordre national que de l’ordre international. [264] un dernier mot. les motifs des juges majo- ritaires ont des implications qu’il convient de com- prendre. eu égard à l’approche que préconisent les juges majoritaires pour déterminer quelles normes de droit international coutumier peuvent exister, les juges généralistes seront appelés à déterminer les pratiques des états étrangers et les fondements de ces pratiques sans entendre les témoignages des parties. ils devront prendre ces décisions en recou- rant seulement à l’aide des avocats qui, eux- mêmes, sont rarement des spécialistes dans ce domaine. les tribunaux ne sont pas institutionnellement faits pour prendre de telles décisions. 296 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. [265] the result, we fear, will be instability. in in- ternational law, on the majority’s approach, canadian courts will, perhaps on the word of a single law professor, be empowered to declare what the states of the world have through their practices agreed upon. and this uncertainty will redound upon the law of this country. the line of reasoning set out in this judgment departs from foundational principles of judicial law- making in tort law, and there is no reason to believe that canadian courts will in the future be any more restrained with their use of inter- national law. so fundamental a remaking of the laws of this country is not for the courts. this, ultimately, is where we part ways with the majority. [266] for these reasons, we would allow the ap- peal in part and strike the paragraphs of the workers’ claim related to causes of action arising from cus- tomary international law norms, with costs to nevsun in this court and in the courts below. [265] nous craignons qu’il en résulte de l’instabi- lité. en droit international, selon l’approche préconi- sée par les juges majoritaires, les tribunaux canadiens pourront, peut- être sur la foi d’un seul professeur de droit, déclarer ce dont, par leurs pratiques, les états du monde ont convenu. et cette incertitude rejaillira sur le droit de notre pays. le raisonnement exposé dans le présent jugement s’écarte des principes fon- damentaux de la fonction judiciaire d’élaboration du droit en matière de responsabilité délictuelle, et rien ne permet de croire que les tribunaux canadiens dis- poseront à l’avenir d’une marge de manœuvre plus restreinte dans leur utilisation du droit international. il n’appartient pas aux tribunaux de refaire de façon aussi fondamentale les règles de droit de notre pays. c’est, en défi nitive, sur ce point que nous divergeons d’opinion avec les juges majoritaires. [266] pour ces motifs, nous accueillerions le pour- voi en partie et nous radierions les para graphes de la demande des travailleurs qui se rapportent à des causes d’action découlant du droit international cou- tumier, le tout avec dépens en faveur de nevsun de- vant notre cour et devant les juridictions inférieures. the reasons of moldaver and côté jj. were de- version française des motifs des juges moldaver livered by et côté rendus par côté j (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i. introduction i. introduction [267] my main point of departure from the analysis of my colleague, abella j., concerns the existence and applicability of the act of state doctrine, or some other rule of non- justiciability barring the respond- ents’ claims. as for the reasons of brown and rowe jj. concerning the respondents’ claims inspired by customary international law, while i agree with their analysis and conclusion, i wish to briefl y stress a few points on that issue before addressing the act of state doctrine. [267] le point principal sur lequel je me dissocie de l’analyse de ma collègue, la juge abella, concerne l’existence et l’applicabilité de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement, ou d’une quelconque autre règle de non- justiciabilité faisant obstacle aux réclamations des intimés. en ce qui a trait aux motifs des juges brown et rowe concernant les réclamations des inti- més inspirées du droit international coutumier, bien que je souscrive à leur analyse et à leur conclusion, je souhaite faire quelques brèves re marques sur cette question avant de traiter de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 297 ii claims inspired by customary international ii réclamations inspirées du droit international law coutumier [268] on this fi rst issue, i must emphasize that the extension of customary international law to corpora- tions represents a signifi cant departure in this area of the law. [268] sur cette première question, je dois souligner que l’élargissement du droit international coutumier de manière à ce qu’il s’applique aux corporations constitue un écart majeur dans ce domaine du droit. [269] the question posed to this court is not whether corporations are “immune” from liabil- ity under customary international law (abella j.’s reasons, at para. 104), but whether customary inter- national law extends the scope of liability for viola- tion of the norms at issue to corporations: kiobel v. royal dutch petroleum co., 621 f.3d 111 (2nd cir. 2010), at p. 120, aff’d on other grounds, 569 us. 108 (2013). while my colleague recites the rigorous requirements for establishing a norm of customary international law (paras. 77-78), when it comes to ac- tually analyzing whether international human rights law applies to corporations, she does not engage in the descriptive inquiry into whether there is a suf- fi ciently widespread, representative and consistent state practice. instead, she relies on normative argu- ments about why customary international law ought to apply to corporations: see paras 104-13. a court cannot abandon the test for international custom in order to recast international law into a form more compatible with its own preferences: as professor dworkin demonstrated in law’s empire (1986), the ordering of competing principles according to the importance of the values which they embody is a basic technique of adjudication. but the same approach cannot be adopted in international law, which is based upon the common consent of nations. it is not for a national court to “develop” international law by unilaterally adopting a version of that law which, however desirable, forward- looking and refl ective of values it may be, is simply not accepted by other states. (jones v. ministry of interior of saudi arabia, [2006] ukhl 26, [2007] 1 ac 270, at p. 298, per lord hoffmann) [269] la question soumise à la cour n’est pas de savoir si les corporations sont « à l’abri » de toute responsabilité au regard du droit international cou- tumier (motifs de la juge abella, par. 104), mais plutôt de savoir si le droit international coutumier élargit la portée de la responsabilité pour violation des normes dont il est question aux corporations : kiobel c. royal dutch petroleum co., 621 f.3d 111 (2nd cir. 2010), p. 120, conf. pour d’autres motifs, 569 us 108 (2013). bien que ma collègue fasse état des exigences rigoureuses pour qu’une norme de droit international coutumier soit établie (par. 77- 78), lorsque vient le temps d’analyser la question de l’application du droit international des droits de la personne aux corporations, elle ne procède pas à l’examen descriptif quant à savoir si la pratique de l’état est suffi samment répandue, représentative et uniforme. elle se fonde plutôt sur des arguments normatifs concernant les raisons pour lesquelles le droit international coutumier devrait s’appliquer aux corporations : voir par 104-113. un tribunal ne peut abandonner le test relatif aux coutumes inter na tio- nales afi n de reformuler le droit international pour le rendre plus compatible avec ses propres préférences : [traduction] comme l’a démontré le professeur dworkin dans law’s empire (1986), l’organisation de principes concurrents en fonction de l’importance des valeurs qu’ils incarnent est une technique de base du processus décisionnel. cependant, on ne peut adopter la même approche en droit international, lequel repose sur le consentement universel des nations. il n’appartient pas à un tribunal national de « faire évoluer » le droit inter- national en adoptant de façon unilatérale une version de ces règles qui, aussi souhaitable, avant- gardiste et fi dèle aux valeurs qu’elle puisse être, n’est tout simplement pas acceptée par les autres états. (jones c. ministry of interior of saudi arabia, [2006] ukhl 26, [2007] 1 ac 270, p. 298, lord hoffmann) 298 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. my colleague is indeed correct that international law “does move” (para. 106), but it moves only so far as state practice will allow. the widespread, representa- tive and consistent state practice and opinio juris re- quired to establish a customary rule do not presently exist to support the proposition that international human rights norms have horizontal application be- tween individuals and corporations: j. crawford, brownlie’s principles of public international law (9th ed. 2019), at pp. 102 and 607. ma collègue a effectivement raison de dire que le droit international évolue (par. 106), mais il n’évo- lue que dans la mesure où le permet la pratique des états. la pratique étatique répandue, représenta- tive et uniforme et l’opinio juris, qui sont les condi- tions à respecter pour établir une règle coutumière, n’existent pas en l’espèce pour étayer la proposition voulant que les normes internationales relatives aux droits de la personne s’appliquent horizontalement entre les individus et les corporations : j. crawford, brownlie’s principles of public international law (9e éd. 2019), p. 102 et 607. iii act of state doctrine iii doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement [270] turning to the issue of the act of state doc- trine, this is not a confl ict of laws case. this court is not being asked to determine whether the courts of british columbia have jurisdiction over the parties, whether a court of another jurisdiction is a more ap- propriate forum to hear the dispute, whether the law of another jurisdiction should be applied or what the content of that foreign law happens to be. [271] rather, we must decide whether the respond- ents’ claims are amenable to adjudication by courts within canada’s domestic legal order or whether they are allocated to the plane of international affairs for resolution in accordance with the principles of public international law and diplomacy. in my view, the respondents’ claims, as pleaded, fall within this latter category. accordingly, i would allow the appeal and dismiss the respondents’ claims in their entirety, as they are not justiciable. [270] pour ce qui est de la question de la doc- trine de l’acte de gouvernement, il ne s’agit pas en l’espèce d’une affaire de confl it de lois. la cour n’est pas appelée à déterminer si les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique ont compétence sur les parties, si le tribunal d’une autre juridiction constitue un ressort plus approprié pour instruire le litige, si le droit d’une autre juridiction doit s’appliquer ou encore le contenu du droit étranger qui se trouverait ainsi à s’appliquer. [271] nous devons plutôt décider si les réclama- tions des intimés peuvent être tranchées par les tri- bunaux faisant partie de l’ordre juridique interne du canada, ou si elles entrent dans la catégorie des affaires internationales devant être tranchées selon les principes du droit international public et de la diplomatie. j’estime que les réclamations des in- timés, telles qu’elles ont été présentées, relèvent de cette dernière catégorie. je serais donc d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et de rejeter les réclamations des intimés dans leur intégralité puisqu’elles ne sont pas justiciables. [272] in the reasons that follow, i begin by out- lining two distinct branches within the act of state doctrine. i conclude that our choice of law juris- prudence does indeed play a similar role to that of certain aspects of the act of state doctrine. however, i also conclude that the act of state doctrine includes a second branch distinct from choice of law which renders some claims non- justiciable. this branch of the doctrine bars the adjudication of civil actions [272] dans les motifs qui suivent, je commence par énoncer les deux volets distincts de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement. je conclus que la juris- prudence relative au choix de la loi applicable joue effectivement un rôle semblable, à certains égards, à celui de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement. toutefois, je conclus aussi que la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement comprend un deuxième volet dis- tinct du choix de la loi applicable qui rend certaines [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 299 which have their foundation in allegations that a foreign state has violated public international law. [273] next, i discuss how the doctrine of justicia- bility and the constitutional separation of powers ex- plain why a canadian court may not entertain a civil claim between private parties where the outcome depends on a fi nding that a foreign state violated international law. finally, i apply the doctrine of justiciability to the respondents’ claims, ultimately fi nding that they are not justiciable, because they require a determination that eritrea has committed an internationally wrongful act. réclamations non justiciables. ce volet de la doctrine empêche que soient jugées des actions civiles repo- sant sur des allégations voulant qu’un état étranger ait violé le droit international public. [273] j’explique ensuite pourquoi la doctrine de la justiciabilité et la séparation constitutionnelle des pouvoirs font en sorte qu’un tribunal canadien ne puisse instruire une action civile entre des parties privées lorsque l’issue dépend d’une conclusion à l’effet qu’un état étranger a violé le droit internatio- nal. enfi n, j’applique la doctrine de la justiciabilité aux réclamations des intimés, et je conclus ultime- ment qu’elles ne sont pas justiciables, parce qu’elles requièrent qu’il soit conclu que l’érythrée a commis un acte illicite à l’échelle internationale. a substantive foundations of the act of state a fondements de la doctrine de l’acte de gouver- doctrine nement [274] whether a national court is competent to adjudicate upon the lawfulness of sovereign acts of a foreign state is a question that has many dimensions. as the united kingdom supreme court explained in belhaj v. straw, [2017] uksc 3, [2017] ac 964, the act of state doctrine can be disaggregated into an array of categories: para. 35, per lord mance; paras. 121-22, per lord neuberger; paras. 225-38, per lord sumption. [274] la question de savoir si un tribunal national est compétent pour juger de la légalité des actes souverains d’un état étranger comporte plusieurs aspects. comme l’a expliqué la cour suprême du royaume- uni dans l’arrêt belhaj c. straw, [2017] uksc 3, [2017] ac 964, la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement peut être disséquée en un éventail de catégories : par. 35, lord mance; par. 121-122, lord neuberger; par. 225-238, lord sumption. [275] my colleague holds that the act of state doc- trine, and all of its animating principles, have been completely subsumed by the canadian choice of law and judicial restraint jurisprudence. with respect, i am unable to agree with her approach. there is another distinct, though complementary, dimension of the act of state doctrine in addition to the choice of law dimension. claims founded upon a foreign state’s alleged breach of international law raise a unique issue of justiciability which is not addressed in my colleague’s reasons. [275] selon ma collègue, la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement, et tous les principes qui la sous- tendent, ont été complètement subsumés dans la jurisprudence canadienne relative au choix de la loi applicable et à la retenue judiciaire. avec égards, je ne puis souscrire à son approche. il existe un autre aspect distinct, bien que complémentaire, de la doc- trine de l’acte de gouvernement en plus de l’aspect relatif au choix de la loi applicable. les réclama- tions fondées sur une violation du droit international qu’aurait commise un état étranger soulèvent une question unique de justiciabilité qui n’est pas abor- dée dans les motifs de ma collègue. [276] whether this dimension is referred to as a branch of the act of state doctrine or as a specifi c application of the more general doctrine of justi- ciability, the canadian jurisprudence leads to the [276] que cet aspect soit qualifi é de volet de la doc- trine de l’acte de gouvernement ou considéré comme une application précise de la doctrine plus générale de la justiciabilité, la jurisprudence canadienne mène 300 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. conclusion that some claims are not justiciable, be- cause adjudicating them would impermissibly inter- fere with the conduct by the executive of canada’s international relations. [277] i pause to note that the distinction between the non- justiciability and choice of law branches does not exhaust the “array of categories” within the act of state doctrine. rather, i prefer to consider the doctrine along two axes: (1) unlawfulness under the foreign state’s domestic law, as opposed to unlaw- fulness under international law; and (2) the choice of law branch, as opposed to the non- justiciability branch, of the doctrine. these two axes are inter- related. as i explain below, there are choice of law rules that apply to a court’s review of alleged un- lawfulness under the foreign state’s domestic law and under international law. there are also rules of non- justiciability which address unlawfulness under the foreign state’s domestic law and unlawfulness under international law. the discussion that follows is not intended to be comprehensive, as my aim is simply to demonstrate that the issue before this court is whether a domestic court is competent to adjudi- cate claims based on a foreign state’s violations of international law under the non- justiciability branch of the doctrine. à conclure que certaines réclamations ne sont pas justiciables, parce que le fait de se prononcer sur celles-ci constituerait une ingérence inadmissible dans la conduite par l’exécutif des relations interna- tionales du canada. [277] j’ouvre ici une parenthèse pour souligner que la distinction entre les volets relatifs à la non- justiciabilité et au choix de la loi applicable n’épuise pas l’« éventail de catégories » au sein de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement. je préfère plutôt consi- dérer la doctrine selon deux axes : (1) le caractère illégal au regard du droit interne de l’état étranger, par opposition au caractère illégal au regard du droit international; et (2) le volet relatif au choix de la loi applicable, par opposition au volet relatif à la non- justiciabilité de la doctrine. ces deux axes sont étroitement liés. comme je l’explique plus loin, il existe des règles relatives au choix de la loi appli- cable qui s’appliquent à l’examen par un tribunal d’une allégation d’illégalité en vertu du droit interne d’un état étranger et en vertu du droit internatio- nal. il existe aussi des règles de non- justiciabilité qui portent sur l’illégalité au regard du droit interne d’un état étranger et au regard du droit international. l’analyse qui suit ne se veut pas exhaustive, mon objectif étant simplement de démontrer que la cour est appelée à décider si, au regard du volet relatif à la non- justiciabilité de la doctrine, un tribunal national est compétent pour statuer sur des actions fondées sur des violations du droit international commises par un état étranger. [278] i turn now to the underlying rationale for drawing a distinction between the respective branches of the act of state doctrine. [278] j’aborde maintenant la raison d’être de la distinction entre les différents volets de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement. (1) choice of law branch of the act of state doctrine (1) volet relatif au choix de la loi applicable de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement [279] the choice of law branch of the act of state doctrine establishes a general rule that a foreign state’s domestic law — or “municipal law” — will be recognized and normally accepted as valid and ef- fective: belhaj, at paras. 35 and 121-22. in england, the effect of this principle is that english courts will not adjudicate on the lawfulness or validity of sov- ereign acts performed by a state under its own laws: [279] le volet de la doctrine de l’acte de gouver- nement relatif au choix de la loi applicable établit la règle générale voulant que le droit interne d’un état étranger — ou « droit municipal » — sera reconnu et habituellement accepté comme valide et exécu- toire : belhaj, par. 35 et 121-122. en angleterre, ce principe fait en sorte que les tribunaux anglais ne se prononceront pas sur la légalité ou la validité [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 301 johnstone v. pedlar, [1921] 2 ac 262, at p. 290 (hl). this branch is focused on whether an english court should give effect to a foreign state’s municipal law. [280] there are exceptions to this general rule. the act of state doctrine gives way to the “well- established exception in private international law of public pol- icy”: c. mclachlan, foreign relations law (2014), at para 12157. for example, in oppenheimer v. cattermole, [1976] ac 249, the house of lords refused to apply a nazi- era law depriving jews of their citizenship and property: pp.  277-78 lord cross reasoned that “it is part of the public policy of this country that our courts should give effect to clearly established rules of international law”, and that the nazi decree was “so grave an infringement of human rights that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all”: p 278. the house of lords reiterated this principle in kuwait airways corpn. v. iraqi airways co. (nos. 4 and 5), [2002] ukhl 19, [2002] 2 ac 883, holding that the domestic law of a foreign state could be disregarded if it constitutes a serious violation of international law. iraq had issued a decree expropriating aircrafts of the kuwait airways corporation which were then in iraq. the house of lords held that the iraqi decree was a clear violation of international law and that the english courts were therefore at liberty to refuse to recognize it on grounds of public policy. this shows how international law informs the public policy ex- ception of the choice of law branch. des actes souverains d’un état qui a agi en vertu de ses propres lois : johnstone c. pedlar, [1921] 2 ac. 262, p. 290 (hl). ce volet est axé sur la question de savoir si un tribunal anglais devrait donner effet au droit municipal d’un état étranger. [280] il existe des exceptions à cette règle générale. la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement cède le pas devant [traduction] l’« exception relative à l’ordre public, bien établie en droit international privé » : c mclachlan, foreign relations law (2014), par 12157. par exemple, dans l’arrêt oppenheimer c. cattermole, [1976] ac 249, la chambre des lords a refusé d’appliquer une loi datant de l’époque nazie qui privait les juifs de leur citoyenneté et les dépossé- dait de leurs biens : p 277-278. lord cross fut d’avis que [traduction] « cela fait partie de l’ordre public de ce pays que nos tribunaux donnent effet aux règles de droit international clairement établies » et que le décret nazi constituait « une violation si grave des droits de la personne que les tribunaux de notre pays devaient tout simplement refuser de le reconnaître en tant que loi » : p 278. la chambre des lords a réitéré ce principe dans l’arrêt kuwait airways corpn. c. iraqi airways co. (nos. 4 and 5), [2002] ukhl 19, [2002] 2 ac 883, concluant que le droit national d’un état étranger peut être ignoré s’il constitue une violation grave du droit international. l’iraq avait prononcé un décret d’expropriation des avions de la kuwait airways corporation qui se trouvaient alors sur son territoire. la chambre des lords a conclu que le décret iraquien constituait de toute évidence une violation du droit international et que les tribunaux anglais pouvaient donc refuser de le reconnaître pour des raisons d’ordre public. cela démontre comment le droit international vient préciser l’exception rela- tive à l’ordre public du volet relatif au choix de la loi applicable. [281] in canada, similar principles are refl ected in this court’s choice of law jurisprudence. in laane and baltser v. estonian state cargo & passenger ss. line, [1949] scr 530, this court declined to give effect to a 1940 decree of the estonian soviet socialist republic that purported to nationalize all estonian merchant vessels and also purported to have extraterritorial effect. the appeal was decided on the principle that a domestic court will not give [281] au canada, des principes semblables ressor- tent de la jurisprudence de notre cour sur le choix de la loi applicable. dans l’arrêt laane and baltser c. estonian state cargo & passenger ss. line, [1949] rcs 530, la cour a refusé de donner effet à un décret adopté en 1940 par la république socialiste soviétique d’estonie visant la nationalisation de tous les navires marchands estoniens, et devant avoir une portée extraterritoriale. l’appel fut décidé sur 302 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. effect to foreign public laws that purport to have extraterritorial effect: see p. 538, per rinfret cj; p. 542, per kerwin j.; p. 547, per rand j.; pp. 547- 51, per kellock j. however, rand j would also have held that, irrespective of the decree’s extraterritorial scope, there is a “general principle that no state will apply a law of another which offends against some fundamental morality or public policy”: p 545. i note that no act of state issue actually arose on the facts of that case, as the domestic law branch of the act of state doctrine applies only to acts carried out in the foreign state’s territory: see, eg,. belhaj, at paras. 229 and 234, per lord sumption. therefore, it is unsurprising that “[n]o act of state concerns about estonia’s sovereignty or non- interference in its affairs were even raised by the court”: abella j.’s reasons, at para 46. in another english case, buck v. attorney [282] general, [1965] 1 all er 882 (ca), the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the constitution of sierra leone was invalid. lord harman held that an english court could not make a declaration that impugned the validity of the constitution of a foreign state: p 885. lord diplock reasoned that the claim had to be dismissed because the issue of the validity of the foreign law did not arise incidentally: the only subject- matter of this appeal is an issue as to the validity of a law of a foreign independent sovereign state, in fact, the basic law prescribing its constitution. the validity of this law does not come in question incidentally in proceedings in which the high court has undoubted jurisdiction as, for instance, the validity of a foreign law might come in question incidentally in an action on a con- tract to be performed abroad. the validity of the foreign law is what this appeal is about; it is nothing else. that is a subject- matter over which the english courts, in my view, have no jurisdiction. [pp. 886-87] le principe qu’un tribunal national ne peut donner effet à des lois publiques étrangères visant à avoir un effet extraterritorial : voir p. 538, le juge en chef rinfret; p. 542, le juge kerwin; p. 547, le juge rand; et p. 547-551, le juge kellock. toutefois, indépen- damment de la portée extraterritoriale du décret, le juge rand aurait également conclu qu’il est un [tra- duction] « principe général qu’aucun état ne peut appliquer une loi d’un autre état qui va à l’encontre de certaines valeurs morales fondamentales ou de l’ordre public » : p 545. je remarque que la ques- tion de l’acte de gouvernement ne s’est pas posée au regard des faits dans cette affaire, car le volet de droit interne de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement ne s’applique qu’aux actes accomplis sur le territoire de l’état étranger : voir, p ex,. belhaj, par. 229 et 234, lord sumption. il n’est donc pas surprenant que la cour n’ait soulevé « aucune préoccupation relative à l’acte de gouvernement concernant la souveraineté de l’estonie ou la non- ingérence dans les affaires de celle-ci » : motifs de la juge abella, par 46. [282] dans une autre décision anglaise, buck c. attorney general, [1965] 1 all er 882 (ca), les demandeurs sollicitaient un jugement déclarant que la constitution de la sierra leone était invalide. lord harman a conclu qu’un tribunal anglais ne pouvait rendre un jugement déclaratoire attaquant la validité de la constitution d’un état étranger : p 885. quant à lord diplock, il a conclu que l’action devait être rejetée parce que la question de la validité de la loi étrangère ne se posait pas seulement de façon accessoire : [traduction] le seul objet du présent pourvoi est une question relative à la validité d’une loi d’un état étranger souverain et indépendant, en fait, de la loi fondamentale qui en prescrit la constitution. la validité de cette loi n’est pas mise en doute accessoirement dans des procédures à l’égard desquelles la haute cour est indubitablement compétente étant donné, par exemple, que la validité d’une loi étrangère pourrait être mise en doute accessoirement dans une action relative à un contrat devant être exécuté à l’étranger. la validité de la loi étrangère est ce dont il est exclusivement question dans le présent pourvoi. à mon avis, il s’agit là d’un sujet sur lequel les tribunaux anglais n’ont pas compétence. [p. 886-887] [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 303 [283] while the facts of buck fall within the non- justiciability branch, the effect of lord diplock’s reasoning is that the act of state doctrine does not prevent a court from examining the validity of a foreign law if the court is obliged to determine the content of the foreign law as a choice of law issue. as professor mclachlan points out, any other approach could lead to perverse results, because a court apply- ing foreign law must apply the law as it would have been applied in the foreign jurisdiction: mclachlan, at para 12139. in this regard, too, this court reached a simi- [284] lar result in hunt v. t&n plc, [1993] 4 scr 289. the issue in it was whether british columbia’s su- perior court could rule on the constitutionality of a quebec statute which prohibited the removal from quebec of business documents required for judicial processes outside quebec. this court approached the question as one of confl ict of laws, observing that there was no reason why a court should never be able to rule on the constitutionality of another province’s legislation. ultimately, this court held that a provincial superior court has jurisdiction to make fi ndings respecting the constitutionality of a statute enacted by the legislature of another province if this issue arises incidentally in litigation before it. the constitutionality of the quebec statute was not foundational to the claim advanced in the british columbia courts. rather, it arose in the discovery process in the context of the parties’ obligation to disclose relevant documents, some of which were in quebec. therefore, the constitutionality of the statute could properly be considered in the choice of law analysis. of course, because the facts of that case gave rise to an issue involving the british columbia courts and quebec legislation, it is, again, unsur- prising that this court “made no reference to act of state”: abella j.’s reasons, at para 48. [283] bien que les faits de l’affaire buck relèvent du volet relatif à la non- justiciabilité, le raisonnement de lord diplock a pour effet que la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement n’empêche pas les tribunaux d’exa- miner la validité d’une loi étrangère s’ils doivent déterminer le contenu de celle-ci dans le contexte du choix de la loi applicable. comme le souligne le professeur mclachlan, toute autre approche pourrait donner lieu à des résultats pervers, parce que le tribu- nal qui applique les lois étrangères doit les appliquer de la même façon qu’elles l’auraient été dans l’état étranger : mclachlan, par 12139. [284] à cet égard, la cour est encore une fois arri- vée à une conclusion semblable dans l’arrêt hunt c. t&n plc, [1993] 4 rcs 289. la question était celle de savoir si la cour supérieure de la colombie- britannique pouvait statuer sur la constitutionnalité d’une loi québécoise, qui interdisait de sortir du québec des documents d’entreprise exigés dans le cadre d’une instance se déroulant à l’extérieur de la province. la cour a traité la question comme une question de confl it de lois, faisant remarquer qu’il n’existait aucune raison justifi ant qu’un tribunal ne puisse jamais statuer sur la constitutionnalité d’une loi d’une autre province. la cour a fi nalement conclu que les cours supérieures provinciales sont compé- tentes pour statuer sur la constitutionnalité d’une loi adoptée par la législature d’une autre province si la question est accessoire au litige dont elles sont saisies. la constitutionnalité de la loi québécoise ne constituait pas le fondement de l’action introduite devant les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique. la question s’est plutôt posée à l’occasion du processus de communication préalable de la preuve dans le cadre de l’obligation des parties de communiquer les documents pertinents, dont certains se trouvaient au québec. par conséquent, la constitutionnalité de la loi pouvait être considérée à juste titre dans le cadre de l’analyse du choix de la loi applicable. évidemment, comme les faits de cette affaire soule- vaient une question mettant en cause les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique et une loi du québec, il n’est pas surprenant que la cour n’ait « fait aucune mention d’un acte de gouvernement » : motifs de la juge abella, par 48. 304 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. [285] nonetheless, based on this comparative re- view of the case law, it appears that this court’s choice of law jurisprudence leads to the same result as the choice of law branch of the english act of state doctrine: see mclachlan, at paras 1224 and 12.126- 12167. to this extent, i agree with abella j that that jurisprudence plays a similar role to that of the choice of law branch of the act of state doctrine in the con- text of alleged unlawfulness under foreign domestic and international law: paras 44-57. however, this is not true as regards the non- justiciability branch as applied to alleged violations of international law. [285] cela étant dit, il ressort de cet examen com- paratif de la jurisprudence que les décisions en ma- tière de choix de la loi applicable rendues par notre cour mènent au même résultat que le volet relatif au choix de la loi applicable de la doctrine anglaise de l’acte de gouvernement : voir mclachlan, par 1224 et 12126-12167. dans cette mesure, je suis d’accord avec la juge abella pour dire que cette jurisprudence joue un rôle semblable à celui du volet relatif au choix de la loi applicable de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement dans le contexte des allégations d’actes illégaux au regard du droit national étranger et du droit international : par 44-57. or, on ne peut dire la même chose concernant le volet relatif à la non- justiciabilité, lorsqu’on l’applique à des viola- tions alléguées du droit international. (2) non- justiciability branch of the act of state (2) volet relatif à la non- justiciabilité de la doc- doctrine trine de l’acte de gouvernement [286] the non- justiciability branch of the doctrine is concerned with judicial abstention from adjudicat- ing upon the lawfulness of actions of foreign states: see buttes gas and oil co v hammer (no.  3), [1982] ac 888 (hl), at p. 931; mclachlan, at paras 12168 and 12177-12178. as i explain be- low, a court should not entertain a claim, even one between private parties, if a central issue is whether a foreign state has violated its obligations under international law. [286] le volet relatif à la non- justiciabilité de la doctrine a trait à l’abstention des tribunaux de se prononcer sur la légalité des actions d’un état étranger : voir buttes gas and oil co. c. hammer (no. 3), [1982] ac 888 (hl), p. 931; mclachlan, par 12168 et 12177-12178. comme je l’explique plus loin, un tribunal ne devrait pas instruire une demande, même si elle oppose des parties privées, si la question centrale est de déterminer si l’état étranger a violé ses obligations en vertu du droit international. [287] blad v. bamfi eld (1674), 3 swans. 604, 36 er 992, may be the earliest case regarding this branch of the act of state doctrine. a danish man, blad, had seized property of english subjects (in- cluding bamfi eld) in iceland on the authority of letters patent granted by the king of denmark. blad was sued in england for this allegedly unlawful act. he sought an injunction to restrain the proceeding. in the high court of chancery, lord nottingham entered a stay of the proceeding against blad because the english subjects’ defence against the injunction was premised on a fi nding that the danish letters pat- ent were inconsistent with articles of peace between england and denmark. lord nottingham reasoned that a misinterpretation of the articles of peace “may be the unhappy occasion of a war” (p. 606), and that [287] l’arrêt blad c. bamfi eld (1674), 3 swans. 604, 36 er 992, est peut- être la première déci- sion qui aborde ce volet de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement. m. blad, un danois, avait saisi les biens que des sujets anglais (dont m. bamfi eld) pos- sédaient en islande, invoquant des lettres patentes accordées par le roi du danemark. m. blad a été poursuivi en angleterre pour cet acte prétendument illégal. il a sollicité une injonction afi n d’empêcher la poursuite. en haute cour de chancellerie, lord nottingham a ordonné l’arrêt de la poursuite intentée contre m. blad au motif que la défense opposée par les sujets anglais à la demande d’injonction reposait sur la conclusion que les lettres patentes danoises allaient à l’encontre du traité de paix intervenu entre l’angleterre et le danemark. lord nottingham a [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 305 it would be “monstrous and absurd” (p. 607) to have a domestic court decide the question of the legality of the danish letters patent, the meaning of the articles of peace or the question of whether the english had a right to trade in iceland. [288] another early case on the act of state doctrine is duke of brunswick v. king of hanover (1848), 2 hlc 1, 9 er 993. revolutionaries in the german duchy of brunswick overthrew the reigning duke, charles, in 1830. the king of hanover deposed charles in favour of charles’ brother, william, and placed charles’ assets under the guardianship of the duke of cambridge. charles brought an action in which he sought an accounting for the property of which he had been deprived. in the house of lords, lord chancellor cottenham reasoned that the action was not concerned with determining private rights as between individuals but, rather, concerned an al- legation that the king of hanover had acted contrary to the “laws and duties and rights and powers of a sovereign exercising sovereign authority”: p 1000. this led the lord chancellor to conclude that the english courts cannot “entertain questions to bring sovereigns to account for their acts done in their sovereign capacities abroad”: p 1000. jugé qu’une mauvaise interprétation du traité [tra- duction] « pouvait devenir un motif malheureux de guerre » (p. 606), et qu’il serait « odieux et absurde » (p. 607) qu’un tribunal national décide de la légalité des lettres patentes danoises, du sens du traité de paix ou encore de la question de savoir si les anglais avaient le droit de faire du commerce en islande. [288] une autre décision ancienne sur la doc- trine de l’acte de gouvernement est l’arrêt duke of brunswick c. king of hanover (1848), 2 hlc 1, 9 er 993. l’affaire concerne des révolutionnaires du duché allemand de brunswick qui, en 1830, ont renversé le duc régnant, charles. le roi de hanovre a destitué charles de son trône, l’a remplacé par le frère de charles, william, et a confi é la gestion des biens de charles au duc de cambridge. charles a demandé une reddition de comptes relativement aux biens dont il avait été dépossédé. à la chambre des lords, le lord chancelier cottenham a conclu que l’action ne visait pas à statuer sur les droits privés des parties, mais portait plutôt sur une allégation selon laquelle le roi de hanovre aurait agi en contraven- tion des [traduction] « lois, obligations, droits et pouvoirs d’un souverain exerçant son autorité sou- veraine » : p 1000. cela a mené le lord chancelier à conclure que les tribunaux anglais ne peuvent « ins- truire une affaire dans laquelle un souverain devrait répondre des actes qu’il a commis à l’étranger dans l’exercice de ses pouvoirs souverains » : p 1000. [289] the leading case on the non- justiciability branch is buttes gas. the occidental petroleum corporation and buttes gas and oil co. held com- peting concessions to exploit disputed oil reserves near an island in the arabian gulf occidental claimed its right to exploit the reserves under a con- cession granted by the emirate of umm al qaiwain. buttes gas claimed its right pursuant to one granted by the emirate of sharjah. both emirates, as well as iran, claimed to be entitled to the island and to its oil reserves. after the united kingdom intervened, the dispute was settled by agreement. occidental’s concession was subsequently terminated. occidental alleged that buttes gas and sharjah had fraudulently conspired to cheat and defraud occidental, or to cause the united kingdom and iran to act unlawfully [289] l’arrêt de principe sur le volet relatif à la non- justiciabilité est l’arrêt buttes gas. la occidental petroleum corporation et buttes gas and oil co. possédaient des concessions concurrentes qui leur permettaient d’exploiter les réserves de pétrole en litige, lesquelles étaient situées près d’une île du golfe persique. occidental prétendait avoir le droit d’exploiter les réserves en vertu d’une concession accordée par l’émirat d’umm al qaiwain, alors que buttes gas affi rmait tenir son droit d’exploitation d’une concession accordée par l’émirat de sharjah. les deux émirats de même que l’iran disaient avoir la propriété de l’île et de ses réserves de pétrole. à la suite de l’intervention du royaume- uni, le confl it fut réglé au moyen d’un accord. la concession d’occi- dental a par la suite été résiliée. occidental a allégué 306 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. to the injury of occidental: p 920. buttes gas ar- gued that an english court should not entertain such claims, as they concerned acts of foreign states. que buttes gas et l’émirat sharjah avaient comploté frauduleusement en vue de la tromper et de la frau- der, ou en vue d’inciter le royaume- uni et l’iran à agir illégalement au détriment d’occidental : p 920. buttes gas soutenait que les tribunaux anglais ne de- vraient pas instruire de telles demandes, puisqu’elles concernaient les actes d’états étrangers. [290] in the house of lords, lord wilberforce held that occidental’s claim was not justiciable. he identifi ed a branch of the act of state doctrine which he said was concerned with the applicability of for- eign domestic legislation: p 931. he suggested that this branch was essentially a choice of law rule con- cerned with the choice of the proper law to apply to a dispute: p 931. however, he drew one important distinction: [290] à la chambre des lords, lord wilberforce a conclu que la demande d’occidental n’était pas justiciable. il a reconnu un volet de la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement, qui selon lui portait sur l’applicabilité des lois nationales étrangères : p 931. il a affi rmé que ce volet constituait pour l’essentiel une règle de choix de la loi applicable, à propos de la loi qu’il convient d’appliquer à un litige : p 931. il a toutefois établi une importante distinction : it is one thing to assert that effect will not be given to a foreign municipal law or executive act if it is contrary to public policy, or to international law (cf. in re helbert wagg & co. ltd’s claim [1956] ch. 323) and quite another to claim that the courts may examine the validity, under international law, or some doctrine of public policy, of an act or acts operating in the area of transactions between states. [p. 931] [traduction] c’est une chose d’affi rmer qu’il ne sera pas donné effet à une loi municipale étrangère ou à un acte de l’exécutif si cela est contraire à l’ordre public ou au droit international (voir in re helbert wagg & co. ltd’s claim [1956] ch. 323), mais c’est une tout autre chose de prétendre que les tribunaux peuvent examiner, en vertu du droit international ou d’une quelconque doctrine d’ordre public, la validité d’un acte ou d’actes relevant du domaine des transactions entre états. [p. 931] [291] lord wilberforce went on to hold, follow- ing blad, duke of brunswick and other authorities, that private law claims which turn on a fi nding that a foreign state has acted in a manner contrary to public international law are not justiciable by an english court: [291] lord wilberforce a ensuite conclu, suivant les arrêts blad, duke of brunswick ainsi que d’autres décisions, que les recours de droit privé qui reposent sur la conclusion qu’un état étranger a agi de façon contraire au droit international public ne sont pas justiciables par les tribunaux anglais : it would not be diffi cult to elaborate on these consid- erations, or to perceive other important inter- state issues and/or or issues of international law which would face the court. they have only to be stated to compel the conclusion that these are not issues upon which a municipal court can pass. leaving aside all possibility of embarrassment in our foreign relations (which it can be said not to have been drawn to the attention of the court by the executive) there are    no judicial or manageable standards by which to judge these issues, or to adopt another phrase (from a pas- sage not quoted), the court would be in a judicial no- man’s land: the court would be asked to review transactions in which four sovereign states were involved, which they had brought to a precarious settlement, after diplomacy and [traduction] il ne serait pas diffi cile d’élaborer sur ces considérations, ou d’imaginer d’autres questions inter- éta tiques importantes, et/ou d’autres questions de droit international dont la cour serait saisie. il suffi t de les énon- cer pour arriver impérativement à la conclusion que ce ne sont pas des questions sur lesquelles un tribunal municipal peut se prononcer. outre qu’elles peuvent nous plonger dans l’embarras sur le plan des relations étrangères (ce qui, pourrait-on dire, n’a pas été porté à l’attention de la cour par l’exécutif), il n’existe [  ] aucune norme judiciaire ou fonctionnelle permettant de statuer sur ces questions ou, pour reprendre une autre expression (tirée d’un passage non cité), la cour se retrouverait dans un « no man’s land » judiciaire : elle serait appelée à examiner des transactions [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 307 the use of force, and to say that at least part of these were “unlawful” under international law. [p. 938] [292] in the two passages reproduced above, lord wilberforce touched on an important point: a distinc- tion must be drawn between the types of problems addressed in justiciability cases and the types of problems addressed in choice of law cases. private international law is a response to the problem of how to distribute legal authority among compet- ing municipal jurisdictions: r. banu, “assuming regulatory authority for transnational torts: an interstate affair? a historical perspective on the canadian private international law tort rules” (2013), 31 windsor yb. access just. 197, at p 199. however, the problem posed by claims based on violations of public international law is that the inter- national plane constitutes an additional legal system with its own claim to jurisdiction over certain legal questions: mclachlan, at para 1222. thus, confl ict of laws rules alone are not capable of addressing the concerns raised by lord wilberforce in buttes gas, because they do not mediate between domestic legal systems and the international legal system. in order to address the problems raised by lord wilberforce regarding the legitimacy of a domestic court’s con- sideration of questions of international law, this court must inquire into whether such questions are justiciable under canada’s domestic constitutional arrangements. concernant quatre états souverains — à l’égard desquelles un règlement précaire est intervenu, après avoir usé de diplomatie et de force — et à dire qu’au moins une partie de ces transactions étaient « illégales » au regard du droit international. [p. 938] [292] dans les deux extraits reproduits plus tôt, lord wilberforce aborde un point important : une distinction doit être établie entre les types de pro- blèmes examinés dans des affaires de justiciabilité et ceux examinés dans des affaires de choix de la loi applicable. le droit international privé offre une réponse au problème que pose la répartition de la juridiction ou compétence entre des ressorts munici- paux concurrents : r. banu, « assuming regulatory authority for transnational torts  : an interstate affair? a historical perspective on the canadian private international law tort rules » (2013), 31 windsor yb. access just. 197, p 199. or, le pro- blème que soulèvent les réclamations fondées sur des violations du droit international public est que leur dimension internationale fait qu’elles participent d’un système juridique additionnel qui se réclame de la juridiction à l’égard de certaines questions de droit : mclachlan, par 1222. par conséquent, les règles de confl it de lois ne peuvent à elles seules répondre aux préoccupations soulevées par lord wilberforce dans l’arrêt buttes gas, car elles ne concilient pas les systèmes juridiques nationaux et le système juridique international. pour répondre aux problèmes soulevés par lord wilberforce quant à la légitimité de l’examen par un tribunal national de questions de droit international, notre cour doit se demander si ces questions sont justiciables au regard de l’ordre constitutionnel interne du canada. [293] before doing so, i want to express my agree- ment with newbury ja that the early english cases which underpin the act of state doctrine were re- ceived into the law of british columbia in 1858 by what is now s. 2 of the law and equity act, rsbc. 1996, c. 253: 2017 bcca 401, 4 bclr (6th) 91, at para 123. however, for conceptual clarity, the principles animating early cases such as blad and duke of brunswick should be refl ected through the lens of the modern doctrine of justiciability recog- nized by this court in highwood congregation of jehovah’s witnesses (judicial committee) v. wall, [293] avant de le faire, je tiens à mentionner que je suis d’accord avec les propos de la juge newbury pour dire que les premières décisions anglaises qui sous- tendent la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement ont été reçues dans le droit de la colombie- britannique en 1858 en vertu de ce qui est maintenant l’art. 2 de la law and equity act, rsbc 1996, c. 253 : 2017 bcca 401, 4 bclr (6th) 91, par 123. toutefois, par souci de clarté conceptuelle, les principes qui sous- tendent ces premières décisions, comme blad et duke of brunswick, doivent être refl étés à travers le prisme de la doctrine moderne de la justiciabilité 308 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. 2018 scc 26, [2018] 1 scr 750. it is to that doc- trine which i now turn. reconnue par notre cour dans l’arrêt highwood congregation of jehovah’s witnesses (judicial committee) c. wall, 2018 csc 26, [2018] 1 rcs. 750. c’est cette doctrine que j’examine maintenant. b justiciability of international law questions in b justiciabilité des questions de droit international canada au canada [294] justiciability is rooted in a commitment to the constitutional separation of powers: l. m. sossin, boundaries of judicial review: the law of justiciability in canada (2nd ed. 2012), at p 289. the separation of powers under the constitution prescribes different roles for the executive, legisla- tive and judicial orders: fraser v. public service staff relations board, [1985] 2 scr 455, at pp 469-70. in exercising its jurisdiction, a court must conform to the separation of powers by showing deference for the roles of the executive and the legislature in their respective spheres so as to refrain from unduly inter- fering with the legitimate institutional roles of those orders: ontario v. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr 3, at pa- ras 29-30. it is “fundamental” that each order not “overstep its bounds, that each show proper def- erence for the legitimate sphere of activity of the other”: new brunswick broadcasting co. v. nova scotia (speaker of the house of assembly), [1993] 1 scr 319, at p. 389, per mclachlin j. the doctrine of justiciability refl ects these institutional limita- tions. [295] this court recognized the existence of a general doctrine of non- justiciability in highwood congregation, stating that the main question to be asked in applying the doctrine of justiciability is whether the issue is one that is appropriate for a court to decide: para 32. the answer to that question depends on whether the court asking the question has the institutional capacity to adjudicate the matter and whether its doing so is legitimate: para 34. [294] la justiciabilité s’inscrit dans une volonté de respecter la séparation constitutionnelle des pou- voirs : l m. sossin, boundaries of judicial review : the law of justiciability in canada (2e éd. 2012), p 289. la séparation des pouvoirs prévue dans la constitution impose différents rôles aux ordres exé- cutif, législatif et judiciaire : fraser c. commission des relations de travail dans la fonction publique, [1985] 2 rcs 455, p 469-470. en exerçant sa juridiction, le tribunal doit se conformer à la sé- paration des pouvoirs en faisant preuve de défé- rence envers les rôles de l’exécutif et du législatif dans leurs domaines respectifs, de manière à évi- ter tout empiétement indu sur le rôle institutionnel légitime de chaque organe : ontario c. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 csc 43, [2013] 3 rcs 3, par 29-30. il est « essentiel » qu’aucun des ordres « n’outrepasse ses limites et que chacu[n] respecte de façon appropriée le domaine légitime de compétence de l’autre » : new brunswick broadcasting co. c. nouvelle- écosse (président de l’assemblée législative), [1993] 1 rcs 319, p. 389, la juge mclachlin. la doctrine de la justiciabilité tient compte de ces limites institutionnelles. [295] dans l’arrêt highwood congregation, notre cour a reconnu l’existence d’une doctrine générale de non- justiciabilité, et a déclaré que la question principale devant être posée lors de l’application de cette doctrine est de savoir si la question en litige en est une qu’il convient de faire trancher par un tribu- nal : par 32. pour répondre à cette question, il faut se demander si le tribunal qui pose la question dispose de la capacité institutionnelle requise pour trancher l’affaire et s’il est légitime qu’il le fasse : par 34. [296] a court has the institutional capacity to con- sider international law questions, and its doing so is legitimate, if they also implicate questions with respect to constitutional rights (canada (justice) [296] un tribunal possède la capacité institution- nelle requise pour instruire des questions de droit in- ternational, et il est légitime qu’il le fasse, si celles-ci impliquent aussi des questions relatives aux droits [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 309 v. khadr, 2008 scc 28, [2008] 2 scr 125), the legality of an administrative decision (suresh v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), 2002 scc 1, [2002] 1 scr 3) or the interface between international law and canadian public insti- tutions (reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at para 23). if, however, a court allows a private claim which impugns the lawfulness of a foreign state’s conduct under international law, it will be overstepping the limits of its proper institutional role. in my view, although the court has the institu- tional capacity to consider such a claim, its doing so would not be legitimate. [297] the executive is responsible for conducting international relations: canada (prime minister) v. khadr, 2010 scc 3, [2010] 1 scr 44, at para 39. in kazemi estate v. islamic republic of iran, 2014 scc 62, [2014] 3 scr 176, this court observed that creating a universal civil jurisdiction allowing torture claims against foreign offi cials to be pursued in canada “would have a potentially considerable impact on canada’s international relations”, and that such decisions are not to be made by the courts: para 107. similar concerns arise in the case of litiga- tion between private parties founded upon allegations that a foreign state has violated public international law. such disputes “are not the proper subject matter of judicial resolution” (sossin, at p. 251), because questions of international law relating to internation- ally wrongful acts of foreign states are not juridi- cal claims amenable to adjudication on “judicial or manageable standards” (buttes gas, at p. 938, per lord wilberforce). such questions are allocated to the plane of international affairs for resolution in ac- cordance with the principles of public international law and diplomacy. constitutionnels (canada (justice) c. khadr, 2008 csc 28, [2008] 2 rcs 125), à la légalité d’une décision administrative (suresh c. canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immigration), 2002 csc 1, [2002] 1 rcs 3) ou au rapport entre le droit inter- national et les institutions publiques canadiennes (renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, [1998] 2 rcs 217, par 23). si, toutefois, un tribunal permet un recours de droit privé qui attaque la légalité de la conduite d’un état étranger au regard du droit inter- national, il se trouverait à outrepasser les limites de son propre rôle institutionnel. à mon avis, bien que le tribunal ait la capacité institutionnelle pour instruire un tel recours, il ne serait pas légitime qu’il le fasse. [297] l’exécutif est chargé de la conduite des rela- tions internationales : canada (premier ministre) c. khadr, 2010 csc 3, [2010] 1 rcs 44, par 39. dans l’arrêt kazemi (succession) c république islamique d’iran, 2014 csc 62, [2014] 3 rcs. 176, la cour a fait observer que la création d’une compétence universelle en matière civile qui permet- trait que des poursuites soient intentées au canada contre des agents d’un état étranger pour des actes de torture « aurait des conséquences potentiellement graves sur les relations internationales du canada » et que de telles décisions n’incombaient pas aux tri- bunaux : par 107. des préoccupations semblables se posent dans le cas des litiges entre des parties privées fondés sur des allégations qu’un état étranger a violé le droit international public. de telles disputes [tra- duction] « ne se prêtent pas à une intervention judi- ciaire » (sossin, p. 251), parce que les questions de droit international liées aux actes illicites à l’échelle internationale commis par des états étrangers ne sont pas des demandes juridiques susceptibles d’être tranchées selon des [traduction] « normes judi- ciaires ou fonctionnelles » (buttes gas, p. 938, lord wilberforce). de telles questions entrent dans la catégorie des affaires internationales devant être tran- chées selon les principes du droit international public et de la diplomatie. in khadr (2010), this court justifi ed its in- [298] terference with the exercise by the executive of an aspect of its power over international relations on the basis that the judiciary possesses “a narrow power to review and intervene on matters of foreign affairs [298] dans l’arrêt khadr (2010), notre cour a jus- tifi é son intervention quant à l’exercice par l’exé- cutif d’un aspect de son pouvoir sur les relations internationales sur le fondement que les tribunaux jouissent d’un « pouvoir circonscrit pour examiner 310 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. to ensure the constitutionality of executive action”: para 38. however, the same cannot be said of a private claim for compensation which is depend- ent upon a determination that a foreign state has breached its international obligations. this is not a case in which a court would be abdicating its consti- tutional judicial review function if it were to decline to adjudicate the claim. les questions relatives aux affaires étrangères et inter- venir à leur égard » : par 38. on ne saurait toutefois en dire autant d’un recours privé en compensation qui est tributaire de la conclusion qu’un état étran- ger ait manqué à ses obligations internationales. il ne s’agit pas d’un cas où le tribunal renoncerait à l’exercice de son pouvoir constitutionnel de contrôle s’il refusait de statuer sur la demande. [299] presbyterian church of sudan v. talisman energy, inc., 2005 wl 2082846 (sd. new york), is an example of how private litigation can interfere with the responsibility of the executive for the con- duct of international relations. in presbyterian, a foreign state had sent a diplomatic note to the united states department of state in response to litigation initiated in the us by sudanese residents against a company incorporated and domiciled in the foreign state that had operations in sudan. the allegations were based on violations of international law by sudan. although the company’s motion to dismiss the claim was not successful, the incident was sig- nifi cant enough to spur the foreign state to send the diplomatic note in which it insisted that its foreign policy was being undermined by the litigation. i would point out in particular that the motion failed because the action as pleaded did “not require a judgment that [the foreign state’s foreign policy] was or caused a violation of the law of nations”, which suggests that if the reverse were true, the claim would have been barred: para 5. thus, even in the case of disputes between private parties, when courts “en- gage in piecemeal adjudication of the legality of the sovereign acts of states, they risk disruption of our country’s international diplomacy”: international association of machinists and aerospace workers v. organization of petroleum exporting countries, 649 f.2d 1354 (9th cir. 1981), at pp 1358-60. [299] l’arrêt presbyterian church of sudan c. talisman energy, inc., 2005 wl 2082846 (sd. new york), illustre comment un litige privé peut empié- ter sur la responsabilité de l’exécutif en matière de conduite des relations internationales. dans cette affaire, un état étranger avait transmis une note di- plomatique au département d’état des états- unis, réagissant ainsi à une action intentée aux états- unis par des résidents soudanais à l’encontre d’une cor- poration constituée et domiciliée dans l’état étranger qui exerçait des activités au soudan. l’action repo- sait sur des allégations de violations du droit interna- tional commises par le soudan. bien que la requête en rejet de l’action présentée par la corporation ait été rejetée, l’incident fut assez important pour inciter l’état étranger à envoyer la note diplomatique dans laquelle il affi rmait que le litige compromettait sa politique étrangère. je signale en particulier que la requête a été rejetée parce que l’action, telle qu’elle a été intentée, ne [traduction] « visait pas à obtenir un jugement portant que la [politique étrangère de l’état étranger] contrevenait au droit des nations ou qu’elle était à l’origine d’une violation de ce droit », ce qui tend à indiquer que, dans le cas contraire, elle aurait été irrecevable : par 5. par conséquent, même dans le cas de litiges entre parties privées, lorsque les tribunaux [traduction] « se pro noncent de façon fragmentée sur la légalité des actes sou- verains d’états, ils risquent de perturber la diplo- matie internationale de notre pays » : international association of machinists and aerospace workers c. organization of petroleum exporting countries, 649 f.2d 1354 (9th cir. 1981), p 1358-1360. [300] as a practical matter, canadian courts have good reason to refrain from passing judgment on al- leged internationally wrongful acts of foreign states. if canadian courts claimed the power to pass judg- ment on violations of public international law by [300] d’un point de vue pratique, les tribunaux canadiens ont de bonnes raisons de s’abstenir de se prononcer sur des allégations d’actes illicites à l’échelle internationale qu’auraient commis des états étrangers. si les tribunaux canadiens s’arrogeaient le [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 311 states, that could well have unforeseeable and grave impacts on the conduct of canada’s international relations, expose canadian companies to litigation abroad, endanger canadian nationals abroad and undermine canada’s reputation as an attractive place for international trade and investment. sensitive dip- lomatic matters which do not raise domestic public law questions should be kept out of the hands of the courts. [301] further, as this doctrine consists in a rule of non- justiciability, it is not amenable to the applica- tion of a public policy exception. it arises from the constitutional separation of powers and the limits of the legitimacy of acts of the judiciary. the public importance and fundamental nature of the values at stake cannot render justiciable that which is other- wise not within the judiciary’s bailiwick. [302] abella j relies on the secession reference as authority for the proposition that the adjudication of questions of international law is permitted for the purpose of determining the private law rights or obligations of individuals within our legal system: para 49. with respect, this is an overstatement of the scope of the reasoning in the secession reference, in which this court held that it could consider the question whether international law gives the national assembly, the legislature or the government of quebec the right to effect the secession of quebec from canada unilaterally: paras.  21-23 in the court’s view, the question was not a “pure” ques- tion of international law, because its purpose was to determine the legal rights of a public institution which exists as part of the domestic canadian legal order: para 23. this court’s holding was confi ned to delineating the scope of canada’s obligation to respect the right to self- determination of the people of quebec. no issue regarding private law claims or internationally wrongful acts of a foreign state arose in the secession reference. pouvoir de juger des violations du droit international public commises par des états, cela pourrait fort bien entraîner des conséquences imprévisibles et graves sur la conduite des relations internationales du canada, exposer les corporations canadiennes à des poursuites à l’étranger, compromettre la sécurité des ressortissants canadiens à l’étranger et nuire à la réputation du canada en tant que pays prisé pour le commerce et les investissements internationaux. les affaires diplomatiques de nature délicate qui ne soulèvent aucune question de droit public interne devraient être gardées hors des mains des tribunaux. [301] par ailleurs, étant donné que cette doctrine constitue une règle de non- justiciabilité, elle ne se prête pas à l’application d’une exception d’ordre public. elle découle de la séparation constitution- nelle des pouvoirs et des limites de la légitimité des actes des tribunaux. l’importance pour le public des valeurs en jeu et leur nature fondamentale ne sau- raient rendre justiciable ce qui autrement ne relève pas du domaine de l’ordre judiciaire. [302] la juge abella se fonde sur le renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec à l’appui de la proposition voulant qu’il soit permis de statuer sur des questions de droit international pour déterminer les droits ou obligations de droit privé de toute personne au sein de notre système juridique : par 49. en toute déférence, c’est donner une portée excessive au raisonnement de la cour dans cette affaire, où celle-ci a conclu qu’elle pouvait examiner la question de savoir si l’assem- blée nationale, la législature ou le gouvernement du québec possédait, en vertu du droit international, le droit de procéder unilatéralement à la sécession du québec du canada : par 21-23. de l’avis de la cour, la question n’en était pas une de droit international « pur », parce qu’elle visait à déterminer les droits juridiques d’une institution publique qui fait partie de l’ordre juridique interne canadien : par 23. cette conclusion de la cour se limitait à la défi nition de la portée de l’obligation qu’avait le canada de respecter le droit à l’autodétermination du peuple québécois. aucune question touchant à des recours de droit privé ou à des actes illicites à l’échelle internationale commis par des états étrangers n’a été soulevée dans le renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec. 312 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. in its public law decisions, this court has [303] had recourse to international law to determine is- sues relating to other public authorities, such as whether municipalities can levy rates on foreign legations (reference as to powers to levy rates on foreign legations and high commissioners’ residences, [1943] scr 208) and whether the federal or provincial governments possess propri- etary rights in canada’s territorial sea and continen- tal shelf (reference re offshore mineral rights of british columbia, [1967] scr 792; reference re newfoundland continental shelf, [1984] 1 scr. 86). it has never held that a canadian court is free, in adjudicating a private law claim, to decide whether a foreign state — which does not exist as a part of the domestic canadian legal order — has violated public international law. [304] abella j also relies on decisions in the ex- tradition and deportation contexts, in which courts consider the human rights records of foreign states as part of their decision- making process: paras. 50- 55. however, when canadian courts examine the human rights records of foreign states in extradi- tion and deportation cases, they do so to ensure that canada complies with its own international, statutory and constitutional obligations: see suresh. the same cannot be said of a civil claim for compensation. to equate the respondents’ civil claim for a private law remedy to claims in the public law extradition and deportation contexts is to disregard the judiciary’s statutory and constitutional mandates to consider human rights issues in foreign states in extradition and deportation cases. no such mandate exists in the context of private law claims. [303] dans ses décisions en matière de droit public, notre cour a fait appel au droit international pour trancher les questions liées à d’autres autorités pu- bliques, par exemple la question de savoir si les gou- vernements municipaux peuvent taxer les légations étrangères (reference as to powers to levy rates on foreign legations and high commissioners’ residences, [1943] rcs 208) et pour établir si le gouvernement fédéral ou les gouvernements provin- ciaux possèdent des droits de propriété à l’égard de la mer territoriale et du plateau continental du canada (reference re offshore mineral rights of british columbia, [1967] rcs 792; renvoi relatif au pla- teau continental de terre- neuve, [1984] 1 rcs. 86). elle n’a jamais conclu qu’un tribunal canadien est libre, lorsqu’il se prononce sur un recours de droit privé, de décider si un état étranger — qui ne relève pas de l’ordre juridique interne canadien — a violé le droit international public. [304] la juge abella s’appuie aussi sur des déci- sions rendues dans des contextes d’extradition et d’expulsion, où les tribunaux tiennent compte des antécédents de l’état étranger en matière de respect des droits de la personne dans le cadre de leur pro- cessus décisionnel : par 50-55. toutefois, lorsqu’un tribunal canadien s’intéresse aux antécédents d’un état étranger en matière de droits de la personne dans une affaire d’extradition et d’expulsion, il le fait pour s’assurer que le canada respecte ses propres obli- gations internationales, statutaires et constitution- nelles : voir suresh. on ne peut en dire autant d’un recours civil en compensation. assimiler le recours civil des intimés visant une réparation de droit privé à des réclamations dans des contextes de droit public dans lesquels s’inscrivent l’extradition et l’expulsion revient à faire abstraction du mandat statutaire et constitutionnel des tribunaux, qui consiste à tenir compte des questions liées aux droits de la personne dans les états étrangers dans les affaires d’extradition et d’expulsion. un tel mandat n’existe pas dans le contexte des recours de droit privé. [305] in conclusion, although a court has the insti- tutional capacity to consider international law ques- tions, it is not legitimate for it to adjudicate claims between private parties which are founded upon an allegation that a foreign state violated international [305] en conclusion, bien qu’une cour dispose de la capacité institutionnelle nécessaire pour instruire des questions de droit international, il n’est pas légi- time qu’elle statue sur les demandes entre parties privées reposant sur une allégation voulant qu’un [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 313 law. the adjudication of such claims impermissi- bly interferes with the conduct by the executive of canada’s international relations. that interference is not justifi ed without a mandate from the legislature or a constitutional imperative to review the legality of executive or legislative action in canada. in the absence of such a mandate or imperative, claims based on a foreign state’s internationally wrongful acts are allocated to the plane of international affairs for resolution in accordance with the principles of public international law and diplomacy. état étranger ait violé le droit international. juger de telles demandes constitue une ingérence non permise à l’égard de la conduite par l’exécutif des relations internationales du canada. une telle ingérence ne peut se justifi er sans un mandat de la législature ou un impératif constitutionnel forçant l’examen de la légalité d’une action exécutive ou législative au canada. en l’absence d’un tel mandat ou impé- ratif, les demandes fondées sur des actes illicites à l’échelle internationale commis par un état étranger relèvent de la catégorie des affaires internationales devant être tranchées selon les principes du droit international public et de la diplomatie. iv the respondents’ claims require a determina- tion that eritrea violated public international law iv les réclamations des intimés exigent qu’il soit conclu que l’érythrée a violé le droit internatio- nal public [306] in this context, justiciability turns on whether the outcome of the claims is dependent upon the allegation that the foreign state acted unlawfully. if this issue is central to the litigation, the claims are not justiciable: eg,. buck, at pp. 886-87; buttes gas, at pp 935-38. by contrast, a court may consider the legality of acts of a foreign state under municipal or international law if the issue arises incidentally: eg,. hunt; w. s. kirkpatrick & co., inc. v. environmental tectonics corp., international, 493 us 400 (1990), at p 406. in buck, the issue of the validity of the for- [307] eign state’s constitution was central to the plaintiffs’ claim, because the plaintiffs were seeking a declara- tion that the constitution of sierra leone was invalid: p 886. lord diplock stated: [306] dans ce contexte, la justiciabilité est axée sur la question de savoir si l’issue des demandes est tributaire de l’allégation que l’état étranger a agi illégalement. si cette question est au cœur du litige, les demandes ne sont pas justiciables : voir, p ex,. buck, p. 886-887; buttes gas, p 935-938. en revanche, le tribunal peut statuer sur la légalité des actes d’un état étranger au regard du droit municipal ou du droit international si la question n’est sou- levée qu’accessoirement : voir, p ex,. hunt; w s. kirkpatrick & co., inc. c. environmental tectonics corp., international, 493 us 400 (1990), p 406. [307] dans l’arrêt buck, la question de la validité de la constitution de l’état étranger était au cœur de la réclamation des demandeurs, parce que ceux-ci sollicitaient un jugement déclarant que la constitu- tion de la sierra leone était invalide : p 886. lord diplock a énoncé ce qui suit : i do not think that this rule [that a state does not purport to exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of another state], which deprives the court of jurisdiction over the subject- matter of this appeal because it involves asser- tion of jurisdiction over the internal affairs of a foreign sovereign state, can be eluded by the device of making the attorney- general for england a party instead of the government of sierra leone. [p. 887] [traduction] je ne crois pas que cette règle [celle selon laquelle un état ne peut exercer sa juridiction sur les affaires internes d’un autre état], qui prive le tribunal de sa juridiction sur l’objet du présent pourvoi parce qu’il lui faudrait se déclarer compétent sur les affaires internes d’un état souverain étranger, puisse être écartée en constituant comme partie le procureur général de l’angleterre plutôt que le gouvernement de la sierra leone. [p. 887] 314 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. [308] a case to the opposite effect is kirkpatrick, in which the respondent alleged that the petitioner had obtained a construction contract from the nigerian government by bribing nigerian offi cials, which was prohibited under nigerian law. scalia j found that the factual predicate for application of the act of state doctrine did not exist in that case, as nothing in the claim required the court to declare an offi cial act of a foreign state to be invalid: p 405. scalia j. reasoned that [a]ct of state issues only arise when a court must decide — that is, when the outcome of the case turns upon — the effect of offi cial action by a foreign sovereign. when that question is not in the case, neither is the act of state doctrine. that is the situation here. regardless of what the court’s factual fi ndings may suggest as to the legality of the nigerian contract, its legality is simply not a question to be decided in the present suit, and there is thus no occasion to apply the rule of decision that the act of state doctrine requires. [emphasis in original; p 406] [309] similarly, in hunt, la forest j concluded that the issue of the constitutionality of the “for- eign” statute arose incidentally, because it arose in a proceeding in which the plaintiff sought the dis- closure of relevant documents, which was barred by the impugned quebec statute in buttes gas, on the other hand, occidental pleaded the tort of conspiracy against buttes gas, but to succeed, the claim required a determination that sharjah, umm al qaiwain, iran and the united kingdom had vio- lated international law. this was not incidental to the claim, and the house of lords held that it was not justiciable: p 938. [308] à l’opposé, dans l’arrêt kirkpatrick, la dé- fenderesse alléguait que le demandeur avait obtenu un contrat de construction du gouvernement nigérien après avoir versé des pots-de- vin à des fonc tion naires nigériens, ce qui était interdit en droit nigérien. le juge scalia a conclu que l’assise factuelle justifi ant l’application de la doctrine de l’acte de gouverne- ment n’existait pas dans ce cas, car rien dans la de- mande n’exigeait que la cour déclare invalide un acte offi ciel d’un état étranger : p 405. le juge scalia s’est exprimé comme suit : [traduction] les questions relatives à l’acte de gouver- nement ne se posent que lorsque le tribunal doit statuer — c’est-à-dire, lorsque l’issue de l’affaire dépend de — l’effet d’un acte offi ciel posé par un souverain étranger. lorsque l’affaire ne porte pas sur cette question, elle ne porte pas non plus sur la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement. c’est le cas en l’espèce. peu importe ce que les conclusions de fait de la cour peuvent suggérer quant à la légalité du contrat nigérien, la question de sa légalité ne peut tout simplement pas être tranchée dans le cadre de la présente instance, et il n’y a donc pas lieu de recourir à la règle de décision qu’exige la doctrine de l’acte de gouvernement. [en italique dans l’original; p 406] [309] de même, dans l’arrêt hunt, le juge la forest a conclu que la question de la constitution- nalité d’une loi «  étrangère  » avait été soulevée accessoirement, parce qu’elle s’était posée dans le cadre d’une instance où le demandeur avait cherché à obtenir la communication de documents pertinents, ce qui était interdit par la loi québécoise contestée. en revanche, dans l’affaire buttes gas, occidental poursuivait buttes gas pour délit civil de complot, mais pour lui donner gain de cause, la cour devait conclure que l’émirat de sharjah, l’émirat d’umm al qaiwain, l’iran et le royaume- uni avaient violé le droit international. la question n’était pas accessoire au litige, et la chambre des lords a conclu qu’elle ne relevait pas de sa compétence : p 938. [310] in the case at bar, the issue of the legality of eritrea’s acts under international law is central to the respondents’ claims. to paraphrase lord diplock in buck, at p. 887, the respondents are simply using the appellant, nevsun resources ltd., as a device to avoid the application of eritrea’s sovereign immunity from civil proceedings in canada. the respondents’ [310] dans le cas qui nous occupe, la question de la légalité des actes posés par l’érythrée au re- gard du droit international est au cœur même des réclamations des intimés pour paraphraser les propos de lord diplock dans l’arrêt buck (p. 887), les intimés se servent tout simplement de l’appe- lante, nevsun resources ltd., comme un outil pour [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya la juge côté 315 central allegation is that eritrea’s national service program is an illegal system of forced labour (ar, vol iii, at pp.  162-64) that constitutes a crime against humanity (p 175). the respondents allege that “nevsun expressly or implicitly condoned the use of forced labour and the system of enforcement through threats and abuse, by the eritrean military”, and that it is directly liable for injuries suffered by the respondents as a result of its “failure to stop the use of forced labour and the enforcement practices at its mine site when it was obvious    that the plain- tiffs were forced to work there against their will”: ar, vol. iii, at p 178. [311] in other words, the respondents allege that nevsun is liable because it was complicit in the eritrean authorities’ alleged internationally wrongful acts. as was the case in buttes gas, nevsun can be liable only if the acts of the actual alleged perpe- trators — eritrea and its agents — were unlawful as a matter of public international law. the case at bar is therefore materially different from hunt and kirkpatrick, in which the legality of the acts of a foreign sovereign state, or of an authority in another jurisdiction, had arisen incidentally to the claim. empêcher l’application de l’immunité de juridic- tion de l’érythrée à l’égard d’une instance civile au canada. l’allégation centrale mise de l’avant par les intimés est que le programme de service national de l’érythrée est un régime illégal de travail forcé (da, vol. iii, p. 162-164) constituant un crime contre l’humanité (p 175). ils allèguent que [traduction] « nevsun tolère expressément ou implicitement le recours au travail forcé et le régime de coercition par l’entremise de menaces et d’abus par l’armée érythréenne » et que nevsun est directement res- ponsable des préjudices subis par les intimés parce qu’elle « a été incapable de mettre fi n au recours au travail forcé et aux mesures coercitives dans sa mine alors qu’il était évident [  ] que les demandeurs étaient forcés de travailler contre leur gré » : da, vol. iii, p 178. [311] en d’autres mots, les intimés allèguent que nevsun est responsable parce qu’elle se serait rendue complice d’actes illicites à l’échelle internationale qu’auraient commis les autorités érythréennes. tout comme dans l’affaire buttes gas, nevsun ne peut être tenue responsable que si les actes commis par ceux qui en sont réellement les auteurs — l’érythrée et ses mandataires — étaient illégaux au regard du droit international public. l’affaire qui nous occupe est donc sensiblement différente des affaires hunt et kirkpatrick, dans lesquelles la question de la légalité des actes d’un état étranger souverain, ou d’une autorité dans un autre ressort, s’était posée de façon accessoire à la demande. [312] to obtain relief, the respondents would have to establish that the national service program is a system of forced labour that constitutes a crime against humanity. this means that determinations that the eritrean state acted unlawfully would not be incidental to the allegations of liability on nevsun’s part. in my view and with respect, newbury ja. erred in fi nding that the respondents were not ask- ing the court to “inquire into the legality, validity or ‘effectiveness’ of the acts of laws or conduct of a foreign state”: ca reasons, at para 172. as she had noted earlier in her reasons — and i agree with her on this point — given how the complaint was being pleaded, nevsun could only be found liable if “eritrea, its offi cials or agents were found [312] pour obtenir réparation, les intimés devront démontrer que le programme de service national est un système de travail forcé qui constitue un crime contre l’humanité. cela signifi e que les conclusions voulant que l’état érythréen a agi illégalement ne seraient pas accessoires aux allégations relatives à la responsabilité de nevsun. à mon avis, et avec res- pect, la juge newbury a conclu à tort que les intimés n’invitaient pas la cour à [traduction] « examiner la légalité, la validité ou l’“effi cacité” des actes, des lois ou de la conduite d’un état étranger » : motifs de la ca, par 172. comme elle l’a mentionné plus tôt dans ses motifs — et je suis d’accord avec elle sur ce point — compte tenu de la façon dont l’action a été intentée, nevsun ne pouvait être tenue responsable 316 nevsun resources ltd v araya côté j. [2020] 1 scr. to have violated fundamental international norms and nevsun were shown to have been complicit in such conduct”: para 92. the respondents’ claims, as pleaded, require a determination that eritrea has violated international law and must therefore fail. que si «  l’érythrée, ses représentants ou manda- taires étaient reconnus coupables de violations de normes internationales fondamentales et que s’il était démontré que nevsun s’était rendue complice de cette conduite » : par 92. les réclamations des intimés, telles qu’intentées, exigent qu’il soit conclu que l’érythrée a violé le droit international et doivent donc être rejetées. v conclusion v conclusion [313] it is plain and obvious that the respondents’ claims are bound to fail, because private law claims which are founded upon a foreign state’s interna- tionally wrongful acts are not justiciable, and the respondents’ claims are dependent upon a determina- tion that eritrea has violated its international obliga- tions. additionally, for the reasons given by brown and rowe jj., i fi nd that it is plain and obvious that the respondents’ causes of action which are inspired by customary international law are bound to fail. accordingly, i would allow the appeal and dismiss the respondents’ claims. [313] il est évident et manifeste que les réclama- tions des intimés sont vouées à l’échec, parce que les recours de droit privé qui reposent sur les actes illicites à l’échelle internationale d’un état étran- ger ne sont pas justiciables, et que les réclamations des intimés sont tributaires de la conclusion que l’érythrée a violé ses obligations internationales. j’estime en outre, pour les motifs exposés par les juges brown et rowe, qu’il est évident et manifeste que les causes d’action des intimés, qui s’inspirent du droit international coutumier, sont vouées à l’échec. je suis donc d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et de reje- ter les demandes des intimés. appeal dismissed with costs, brown and rowe jj. dissenting in part and moldaver and côté jj. dissenting. pourvoi rejeté avec dépens, les juges brown et rowe sont dissidents en partie et les juges moldaver et côté sont dissidents. procureurs de l’appelante : fasken martineau dumoulin, vancouver. dumoulin, vancouver. procureurs des intimés : camp fiorante matthews matthews mogerman, vancouver. mogerman, vancouver. man rights program, university of toronto faculty of law: waddell phillips, toronto; university of toronto, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant international human rights program, university of toronto faculty of law  : waddell phillips, toronto; university of toronto, toronto. national and the global justice clinic at new york university school of law: arvay finlay, vancouver. procureurs des intervenants earthrights interna- tional et global justice clinic at new york university school of law : arvay finlay, vancouver. tional canada and the international commission of jurists: champ & associates, ottawa; power law, vancouver; university of ottawa, ottawa. procureurs des intervenants amnesty interna- tional canada et la commission internationale de juristes : champ & associates, ottawa; power law, vancouver; université d’ottawa, ottawa. [2020] 1 rcs. nevsun resources ltd c araya 317 tion of canada: davies ward phillips & vineberg, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association mi- nière du canada : davies ward phillips & vineberg, toronto. ada: trudel johnston & lespérance, mont réal; an- drew e. cleland, mont réal. procureurs de l’intervenante mines alerte ca- nada : trudel johnston & lespérance, mont réal; andrew e. cleland, mont réal. issn 0045-4230 if undelivered, return to: library supreme court of canada ottawa, ontario canada k1a 0j1 en cas de non-livraison, retourner à : bibliothèque cour suprême du canada ottawa (ontario) canada k1a 0j1 available from: library supreme court of canada ottawa, ontario – canada k1a 0j1 scr-rcs@scc-csc.ca en vente auprès de : bibliothèque cour suprême du canada ottawa (ontario) – canada k1a 0j1 scr-rcs@scc-csc.ca
[1] the court — the bulk of this case occurred before the release of this court’s decision in r v. jordan, 2016 scc 27, [2016] 1 scr 631. the facts leading to the respondent’s s. 11(b) challenge are in- dicative of the culture of rampant and long- standing systemic delay — and complacency towards that delay — that had grown up in our criminal justice system. the manner in which these proceedings were conducted epitomizes this culture. such facts are [1] la cour — la présente affaire s’est en grande partie déroulée avant que notre cour ne rende son ar- rêt r c. jordan, 2016 csc 27, [2016] 1 rcs 631. les faits à l’origine de la contestation de l’intimé fondée sur l’al. 11b) sont révélateurs de la culture de délais systémiques et endémiques — ainsi que de complaisance à l’égard de ces délais — qui s’était instaurée dans notre système de justice criminelle. la façon dont la présente instance s’est déroulée illustre [2020] 2 rcs. r c thanabalasingham la cour 415 unlikely to be replicated in cases where the s. 11(b) framework set out in jordan and applied in r v. cody, 2017 scc 31, [2017] 1 scr 659, is adhered to from the outset. [2] the respondent, mr.  thanabalasingham, was charged with the second degree murder of his spouse in august 2012. at the preliminary hearing, the crown chose to pursue a charge of fi rst degree murder. the preliminary hearing lasted more than a year, due in no small measure to systemic delay. in june 2015, mr. thanabalasingham’s trial was sched- uled for february 2018. it was later rescheduled to proceed in april 2017. by then, jordan had been re- leased and it was the governing authority on s. 11(b) of the ca na dian charter of rights and freedoms. [3] shortly before he was scheduled to stand trial, mr. thanabalasingham brought a motion pursuant to s. 11(b) of the charter, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated. the trial judge agreed and ordered a stay of proceedings (2017 qccs 1271). by a majority of 3-2, the quebec court of appeal upheld the trial judge’s order (2019 qcca 1765). the matter now comes to this court as of right. [4] in our view, the appeal must be dismissed. the delay in this case gave rise to a breach of mr. thanabalasingham’s s. 11(b) right and we would uphold the trial judge’s order. parfaitement cette culture. il est peu probable que de tels faits se reproduisent si le cadre qui a été établi dans l’arrêt jordan relativement à l’al. 11b) et appli- qué dans l’arrêt r c. cody, 2017 csc 31, [2017] 1 rcs 659, est respecté dès le départ. [2] l’intimé, m. thanabalasingham, a été inculpé en août 2012 du meurtre au deuxième degré de son épouse. lors de l’enquête préliminaire, le ministère public a décidé de porter des accusations de meurtre au premier degré. l’enquête préliminaire a duré plus d’un an, et ce, dans une large me sure en raison de délais systémiques. en juin 2015, la date du procès de m. thanabalasingham a été fi xée à février 2018. elle a par la suite été modifi ée et fi xée à avril 2017. à ce moment-là, l’arrêt jordan avait été rendu et constituait l’arrêt faisant autorité sur l’al. 11b) de la charte ca na dienne des droits et libertés. [3] peu de temps avant la date de son procès, m.  thanabalasingham a présenté, en vertu de l’al. 11b) de la charte, une requête dans laquelle il alléguait que son droit d’être jugé dans un délai raisonnable avait été violé. le juge du procès lui a donné raison et a ordonné l’arrêt des procédures (2017 qccs 1271). par une majorité de trois contre deux, la cour d’appel du québec a confi rmé l’ordon- nance du juge du procès (2019 qcca 1765). notre cour a été saisie de plein droit du présent pourvoi. [4] à notre avis, le pourvoi doit être rejeté. le délai qui s’est écoulé en l’espèce a entraîné la violation du droit garanti à m. thanabalasingham par l’al. 11b), et nous sommes d’avis de confi rmer l’ordonnance rendue par le juge du procès. [5] there is no doubt that the delay in this case far exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling es- tablished in jordan. with respect to this calculation, the crown urges us to adopt the dissenting reasons of gagnon ja in the court of appeal. applying the principles in jordan, he found that the net delay was under 35 months. in so concluding, he treated the delay arising from the preliminary hearing as a discrete exceptional event. with respect, we are of the view that he erred in law in coming to this con- clusion. the preliminary hearing was not a discrete event, and its length was not outside the crown’s [5] il ne fait aucun doute que le délai qui s’est écoulé en l’espèce excède de beaucoup le plafond présumé de 30 mois établi dans l’arrêt jordan. pour ce qui est de ce calcul, le ministère public nous ex- horte à nous rallier aux motifs dissidents du juge gagnon de la cour d’appel. appliquant les prin- cipes énoncés dans l’arrêt jordan, le juge gagnon a conclu que le délai net était inférieur à 35 mois. pour arriver à cette conclusion, il a considéré que le délai découlant de l’enquête préliminaire constituait un événement distinct et exceptionnel. avec égards, nous sommes d’avis que le juge gagnon a commis 416 r v thanabalasingham the court [2020] 2 scr. control in the sense contemplated by jordan (see jordan, at paras 69-70). we say this without endors- ing the trial judge’s critical comments regarding the crown’s exercise of its prosecutorial discretion (see trial reasons, at para. 39 (canlii)); it was open to the crown to pursue a charge of fi rst degree murder. that said, as this court noted in jordan, “[w]hile the court plays no supervisory role for such decisions, crown counsel must be alive to the fact that any de- lay resulting from their prosecutorial discretion must conform to the accused’s s. 11(b) right” (para 79). had gagnon ja properly accounted for the delay arising from the preliminary hearing, he would have arrived at a net delay of 45 months — well beyond the 30-month presumptive ceiling. [6] in view of this conclusion, we need not address the issue of defence delay. in particular, it is unneces- sary to consider how the calculation of defence delay may have been impacted by efforts made by the court and the crown to move the original trial date forward from february 12, 2018. even if gagnon ja was correct in attributing a year of delay to the defence for its inability to take up an earlier trial date, the resulting delay would still have been 45 months, as indicated. une erreur en tirant cette conclusion l’enquête préliminaire n’était pas un événement distinct et sa durée n’était pas une circonstance indépendante de la volonté du ministère public au sens de l’arrêt jordan (voir jordan, par 69-70). cela ne signifi e pas que nous souscrivons aux critiques formulées par le juge du procès sur la façon dont le ministère public a exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire en matière de poursuites (voir les motifs du jugement de première instance, par. 39 (canlii)); il était loisible au minis- tère public de porter des accusations de meurtre au premier degré. cela dit, comme l’a fait observer notre cour dans l’arrêt jordan, « [m]ême si le tri- bunal ne joue aucun rôle de surveillance à l’égard de telles décisions, l’avocat du ministère public doit être conscient du fait que tout délai qui découle de l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire du poursui- vant doit respecter les droits de l’accusé protégés par l’al. 11b) » (par 79). si le juge gagnon avait tenu compte comme il se doit du délai attribuable à l’enquête préliminaire, il serait arrivé à un délai net de 45 mois — délai dépassant de beaucoup le plafond présumé de 30 mois. [6] vu cette conclusion, nous n’avons pas besoin d’examiner la question du délai imputable à la dé- fense. en particulier, il n’est pas nécessaire de se demander comment le calcul de ce délai a pu être infl uencé par les efforts déployés par le tribunal et par le ministère public pour avancer la date du pro- cès, qui avait été fi xée initialement au 12 février 2018. même si le juge gagnon de la cour d’appel a eu raison d’imputer à la défense la responsabilité d’une période d’un an dans le délai total, en raison de l’incapacité de celle-ci à obtenir une date de procès plus rapprochée, le délai fi nal aurait quand même été de 45 mois, comme il a été indiqué plus tôt. [7] since most of the delay in this case accrued before jordan was released, we must consider, as the courts below did, whether the transitional excep- tional circumstance justifi es the delay (see jordan, at para 96). here, it bears repeating that the vast majority of the lengthy delay in this case stemmed from systemic delay that had reached epidemic pro- portions across many parts of this country — a key factor that motivated this court’s decision in jordan. indeed, as the trial judge noted, this problem had [7] étant donné que dans la présente affaire, la plus grande partie du délai s’est écoulée avant le prononcé de l’arrêt jordan, nous devons, comme l’on fait les juridictions inférieures, nous deman- der si la me sure transitoire exceptionnelle permet de justifi er ce délai (voir jordan, par.  96). à ce stade-ci, il convient de répéter que la majeure partie du long délai qui s’est écoulé dans la présente affaire découlait de délais systémiques qui avaient atteint des proportions épidémiques dans de nombreuses [2020] 2 rcs. r c thanabalasingham la cour 417 “plagued the criminal justice system in the district of montreal” specifi cally (para 40). [8] with respect to the transitional exceptional circumstance, we cannot say that the trial judge erred in concluding that the crown failed to establish that the exception applied. as this court said in cody, the crown will “rarely, if ever, be successful in justifying the delay as a transitional exceptional circumstance under the jordan framework” if the case would have warranted a stay under r v. morin, [1992] 1 scr. 771 (para 74). in our view, this case would certainly have qualifi ed for a stay under the previous frame- work. the trial judge calculated the institutional de- lay in this case at roughly 43 months, which greatly surpasses the morin guidelines (14 to 18 months). mr. thanabalasingham spent nearly fi ve years in custody awaiting trial, and he accordingly suffered actual prejudice as well as inferred prejudice (trial reasons, at para 33). with respect to the nature of the charge, the trial judge recognized that the offence charged was “very serious” and that “a woman lost her life in tragic circumstances” (para 36). that said, we agree with crown counsel and the amicus curiae that the trial judge erred by stating that the “seriousness of the offence charged is a factor of very limited relevance in the analysis” (para 37). in fairness to the trial judge, he did not have the benefi t of this court’s reasons in cody. there, the court clarifi ed that r v. williamson, 2016 scc 28, [2016] 1 scr 741, “should not be read as discounting the important role that the seriousness of the offence and prejudice play under the transitional exceptional cir- cumstance” (para. 70) and recognized that “[u]nder the morin framework, prejudice and seriousness of the offence ‘often played a decisive role in whether delay was unreasonable’” (para. 69, quoting jordan, at para 96). it would appear that the trial judge read williamson in the manner cautioned against in cody. however, we are of the view that, given the circum- stances of this case, this error was inconsequential. even if the trial judge had not made this error, he would have arrived at the same result. we would régions du ca nada — un facteur clé qui a motivé la décision rendue par notre cour dans l’affaire jordan. d’ailleurs, comme l’a fait observer le juge du procès, ce problème [traduction] « affl ige[ait] le système de justice criminelle dans le district de montréal » en particulier (par 40). [8] pour ce qui est de la me sure transitoire excep- tionnelle, nous ne pouvons affi rmer que le juge du procès a commis une erreur en concluant que le ministère public n’a pas été en me sure d’établir que cette exception s’appliquait en l’espèce. comme l’a dit notre cour dans l’arrêt cody, le ministère public « ne réussira que rarement, voire jamais, à justifi er le délai en invoquant la me sure transitoire excep- tionnelle prévue par le cadre énoncé dans jordan » si l’affaire justifi ait le prononcé d’un arrêt des procé- dures selon l’arrêt r c. morin, [1992] 1 rcs 771 (par 74). à notre avis, la présente espèce aurait cer- tainement donné ouverture à un arrêt des procédures suivant le cadre d’analyse qui s’appliquait antérieu- rement. le juge du procès a établi à environ 43 mois le délai institutionnel dans la présente affaire, période qui dépasse largement les balises fi xées dans l’arrêt morin (14 à 18 mois). monsieur thanabalasingham a passé près de cinq ans en détention en attente de son procès et il a par conséquent subi un préjudice réel, de même qu’un préjudice présumé (motifs du jugement de première instance, par 33). en ce qui concerne la nature des accusations, le juge du procès a reconnu que l’infraction reprochée était [traduc- tion] « très grave » et qu’« une femme a[vait] perdu la vie dans des circonstances tragiques » (par 36). cela dit, à l’instar du procureur du ministère public et de l’amicus curiae, nous sommes d’avis que le juge du procès a fait erreur en affi rmant que « la gravité de l’infraction reprochée est un facteur dont la pertinence est très limitée dans le cadre de cette analyse » (par 37). à la décharge du juge du procès, signalons toute fois que ce dernier ne disposait pas des motifs exposés par notre cour dans l’affaire cody. dans cet arrêt, la cour a précisé que la déci- sion r c. williamson, 2016 csc 28, [2016] 1 rcs. 741, « ne doit pas être considérée comme ayant pour effet d’écarter le rôle important que jouent la gravité de l’infraction et le préjudice subi dans l’application de la me sure transitoire exceptionnelle » (par. 70), et 418 r v thanabalasingham the court [2020] 2 scr. therefore not interfere with his determination that a stay of proceedings was warranted. [9] nothing in the foregoing should be taken as a retreat from the message that jordan sought to con- vey, or from the principles and policy considerations underlying it. jordan sought to put an end to an era where interminable delays were tolerated, and to the complacent, “anything goes” culture that had grown up in the criminal justice system. the clear and dis- tinct message in jordan was that all participants in the system are to take proactive measures at all stages of the trial process to move cases forward and bring accused persons to trial in a timely fashion. crown counsel is tasked with “making reasonable and re- sponsible decisions regarding who to prosecute and for what, delivering on their disclosure obligations promptly with the cooperation of police, creating plans for complex prosecutions, and using court time effi ciently” (jordan, at para 138). defence counsel must be aware that, aside from time legitimately taken to respond to the charges, they “will have di- rectly caused the delay if the court and the crown are ready to proceed, but [they are] not” (jordan, at para. 64; see also para 65). as we did in both jordan and cody, we again emphasize the special role that trial judges — who are charged with cur- tailing unnecessary delay and changing courtroom culture — must play in this shift (cody, at para. 37, citing jordan, at para 114). for example, where the defence seeks an adjournment, a court may deny it “on the basis that it would result in unacceptably long delay, even where it would be deductible as defence delay” (cody, at para 37). in sum, practices that were formerly commonplace or merely tolerated are no longer compatible with the right guaranteed by elle a reconnu que « [s]uivant le cadre qui avait été établi dans l’arrêt morin, le préjudice subi et la gra- vité de l’infraction “ont souvent joué un rôle décisif dans la décision quant au caractère raisonnable du délai” » (par. 69, citant jordan, par 96). il semble que le juge du procès ait donné à l’arrêt williamson l’interprétation contre laquelle notre cour avait mis en garde dans l’arrêt cody. nous estimons toute fois que, compte tenu des circonstances de la présente affaire, cette erreur est sans conséquence. même s’il n’avait pas commis cette erreur, le juge du pro- cès serait parvenu au même résultat. nous refusons donc d’intervenir pour modifi er sa conclusion selon laquelle l’arrêt des procédures était justifi é. [9] rien de ce qui précède ne devrait toute fois être considéré comme un recul par rapport au message que l’arrêt jordan cherche à transmettre ou aux prin- cipes et considérations d’intérêt général qui sous- tendent cet arrêt. l’arrêt jordan visait à mettre fi n à une époque où des délais interminables étaient tolé- rés, ainsi qu’à la culture complaisante du « tout est permis » qui s’était instaurée au sein du système de justice criminelle. le message clair, net et précis de l’arrêt jordan est que toutes les per sonnes associées au système de justice doivent prendre des me sures proactives à toutes les étapes du procès pour faire progresser l’instance et pour que les per sonnes accu- sées soient jugées en temps utile. le ministère public a pour tâches de «  prendre des décisions rai son nables et responsables lorsqu’il s’agira de déterminer qui — et pour quelle infraction — poursuivre, de s’acquitter de ses obligations de communication de la preuve rapidement en collaboration avec la police, d’établir des plans pour les poursuites complexes et d’utiliser de façon effi cace le temps du tribunal » (jordan, par 138). la défense doit être consciente du fait que, mis à part le temps qui est légitimement consacré à répondre aux accusations, elle «  cause directement le délai si le tribunal et le ministère public sont prêts à procéder, mais pas elle » (jordan, par. 64; voir éga- lement par 65). comme nous l’avons fait tant dans l’arrêt jordan que dans l’arrêt cody, nous tenons une fois de plus à souligner le rôle important que les juges de première instance — qui sont chargés de réduire les délais inutiles et de changer la culture en salle d’audience — sont appelés à jouer pour opérer ce changement (cody, par. 37, citant jordan, par 114). [2020] 2 rcs. r c thanabalasingham la cour 419 s. 11(b) of the charter — a right that inures not just to the benefi t of accused persons, but to the benefi t of victims and society as a whole as well. par exemple, lorsque la défense sollicite un ajour- nement, le tribunal peut refuser de l’accorder « pour le motif qu’il en résulterait un délai intolérablement long, et ce, même si cette période pourrait par ailleurs être déduite en tant que délai imputable à la défense » (cody, par 37). en résumé, des pratiques qui étaient autrefois monnaie courante ou encore simplement tolérées ne sont désormais plus compatibles avec le droit garanti par l’al. 11b) de la charte — droit qui profi te non seulement aux accusés, mais également aux victimes et à l’en semble de la société. [10] for these reasons, we would dismiss the ap- peal. [10] pour ces motifs, nous sommes d’avis de reje- ter le pourvoi. appeal dismissed. pourvoi rejeté. procureur de l’appelante : directeur des poursui- and penal prosecutions, montréal. tes criminelles et pénales, montréal.
[1] mr. bessette was charged with a provincial driving offence in british columbia. before the start of his trial in provincial court, he asked to be tried in french. were he being prosecuted for a crimi- nal offence in the very same court, the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, would unquestionably have given him the option of being tried in english or french. this appeal asks whether the criminal code provision for trials in either official language of canada extends to persons accused of certain provincial offences in british columbia. [1] monsieur bessette a été accusé d’une infrac- tion provinciale liée à la conduite automobile en colombie- britannique. avant le début de son pro- cès devant la cour provinciale, il a demandé d’être jugé en français. s’il avait été poursuivi pour une infraction criminelle devant la même cour, le code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, lui aurait incontesta- blement donné la possibilité d’être jugé en anglais ou en français. le présent pourvoi porte sur la question de savoir si la disposition du code criminel qui pré- voit que les procès peuvent avoir lieu dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles du canada s’applique aux personnes accusées de certaines infractions pro- vinciales en colombie- britannique. 542 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. [2] based on a principled interpretation of the rel- evant statutory provisions, we conclude that accused persons in mr. bessette’s position are entitled to be tried in either official language. we are also of the view that this important question merited proper consideration at the outset of the trial. as such, the provincial court judge’s decision not to hon- our mr. bessette’s request for a trial in french was immediately reviewable by the superior court on a petition for certiorari. [3] we would therefore allow the appeal, quash the order of the provincial court, and order that mr. bessette is entitled to be tried in french. [2] nous concluons, en nous appuyant sur une interprétation de principe des dispositions législa- tives pertinentes, que les accusés dans la situation de m. bessette ont le droit d’être jugés dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles. nous estimons égale- ment que cette importante question méritait un exa- men adéquat dès le début du procès. par conséquent, la décision du juge de la cour provinciale de ne pas faire droit à la demande de m. bessette d’être jugé en français était immédiatement susceptible de contrôle par la cour supérieure sur requête en certiorari. [3] nous sommes donc d’avis d’accueillir le pour- voi, d’annuler l’ordonnance de la cour provinciale et d’ordonner que m. bessette a le droit d’être jugé en français. ii context a facts ii contexte a faits [4] the appellant, mr.  bessette, was charged with “driving while prohibited”, an offence under s. 95(1) of british columbia’s motor vehicle act, rsbc 1996, c 318. [5] prior to the anticipated start of his trial in pro- vincial court, mr. bessette made an application to be tried in french, relying on s. 530 of the criminal code. that provision grants an accused the right to be tried by a provincial court judge who speaks the accused’s official language. mr. bessette argued that s. 530 applies to his prosecution because the motor vehicle act and british columbia’s offence act, rsbc 1996, c. 338, are silent as to the lan- guage of trials. meanwhile, s. 133 of the offence act dictates that gaps in that act are to be filled with the provisions of the criminal code relating to offences punishable on summary conviction. section 530 is one such provision of the criminal code. [4] l’appelant, m. bessette, a été accusé de [tra- duction] « conduite sous le coup d’une interdic- tion », infraction prévue au par. 95(1) de la loi de la colombie- britannique intitulée motor vehicle act, rsbc 1996, c 318. [5] avant que commence son procès devant la cour provinciale, m. bessette a demandé d’être jugé en français, en se fondant sur l’art. 530 du code crimi- nel. cette disposition confère à l’accusé le droit de subir son procès devant un juge de la cour provin- ciale qui parle la langue officielle qui est la sienne. m. bessette a fait valoir que l’art. 530 s’applique à la poursuite intentée contre lui vu que la motor vehicle act et la offence act, rsbc 1996, c. 338 de la colombie- britannique sont muettes quant à la langue dans laquelle doivent se dérouler les procès. parallèlement, l’art. 133 de la offence act prescrit que les dispositions du code criminel relatives aux infractions punissables sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire, comme l’art. 530, sup- pléent à ses lacunes. [6] the crown contested mr. bessette’s applica- tion, arguing that english is the language of provin- cial offence prosecutions according to an act that all proceedings in courts of justice within that part [6] la couronne a contesté la demande de m.  bes sette, plaidant que l’anglais est la langue utilisée lors des poursuites relatives aux infractions provinciales en vertu de la loi intitulée an act that [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 543 of great britain called england, and in the court of exchequer in scotland, shall be in the english language (gb), 1731, 4 geo. ii, c. 26 (“1731 act”). this english statute forms part of british columbia law by virtue of s. 2 of the law and equity act, rsbc 1996, c. 253 (conseil scolaire francophone de la colombie- britannique v. british columbia, 2013 scc 42, [2013] 2 scr 774, at para. 41; see also paras 14-17). as its full title says, the 1731 act directs that proceedings in british columbia courts be conducted in english. [7] the provincial court judge accepted the crown’s argument and dismissed mr. bessette’s application, holding that british columbia law does not provide for french- language trials of provincial offences. [8] instead of proceeding to trial in english, mr. bes- sette brought a petition in the supreme court of british columbia (ie,. british columbia’s superior court) for judicial review of the provincial court judge’s decision. (in british columbia, an application for judicial review takes the form of a petition: judicial review procedure act, rsbc 1996, c. 241, s 2(1)). he asked the superior court judge to quash the pro- vincial court judge’s ruling and order that his trial be conducted in french. [9] a judge of the supreme court of british co lum- bia dismissed mr. bessette’s petition on the grounds that there were no exceptional circumstances war- ranting departure from the general rule against pre- or mid- trial intervention by superior courts in criminal or quasi- criminal matters. in essence, the court held that his petition was premature and that he should instead wait to challenge the language of his trial through an appeal of the trial decision if he was ulti- mately convicted. all proceedings in courts of justice within that part of great britain called england, and in the court of exchequer in scotland, shall be in the english language (g-b), 1731, 4 geo. ii, c. 26 (« loi de 1731 »). cette loi anglaise fait partie de la loi de la colombie- britannique par l’effet de l’art. 2 de la law and equity act, rsbc 1996, c. 253 (conseil scolaire francophone de la colombie- britannique c colombie- britannique, 2013 csc 42, [2013] 2 rcs 774, par. 41; voir aussi les par 14-17). comme son titre complet l’indique, la loi de 1731 dispose que les instances devant les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique se déroulent en anglais. [7] le juge de la cour provinciale a fait droit à l’ar- gument de la couronne et a rejeté la demande de m. bessette, concluant que la loi de la colombie- britannique ne prévoit pas que les procès relatifs aux infractions provinciales peuvent se dérouler en français. [8] m. bessette, plutôt que de subir son procès en anglais, a présenté à la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique (c-à-d la cour supérieure de la colombie- britannique) une requête en contrôle judiciaire de la décision du juge de la cour provinciale. (en colombie- britannique, une demande de contrôle judiciaire prend la forme d’une requête : judicial review procedure act, rsbc 1996, c. 241, par 2(1)). il a demandé au juge de la cour supérieure d’annuler la décision du juge de la cour provinciale et d’ordonner que son procès se déroule en français. [9] un juge de la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique a rejeté la requête de m. bessette au motif qu’aucune circonstance exceptionnelle ne jus- tifiait de déroger à la règle générale selon laquelle, dans les affaires criminelles ou quasi criminelles, les cours supérieures ne peuvent intervenir avant ou pen- dant le procès. essentiellement, le tribunal a conclu que sa requête était prématurée et qu’il aurait plutôt dû attendre de contester la langue de son procès lors d’un appel de la décision de première instance s’il était ultimement déclaré coupable. [10] mr. bessette appealed. the court of appeal for british columbia held that the superior court judge’s decision was entitled to deference and dis- missed mr. bessette’s appeal. [10] m. bessette a porté cette décision en appel. la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a conclu que la décision du juge de la cour supérieure com- mandait la déférence et a rejeté l’appel de m bessette. 544 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. [11] the supreme court of british columbia and the court of appeal for british columbia therefore did not consider it necessary or appropriate to decide the substantive question of whether a person accused of a provincial offence in british columbia has the right to be tried in french. they disposed of the case on the basis that the provincial court judge’s deci- sion (that british columbia law does not provide for french- language trials of provincial offences) was not the type of decision which should be reviewed by a superior court on an interlocutory basis. [12] mr.  bessette now appeals to this court. among other relief, he asks for an order that his trial, which has yet to take place, be conducted in french. [11] la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique et la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique n’ont donc pas jugé nécessaire ou approprié de trancher la question de fond de savoir si une personne ac- cusée d’une infraction provinciale en colombie- britannique a le droit d’être jugée en français. elles ont statué sur l’affaire en partant du principe que la décision du juge de la cour provinciale (selon la- quelle la loi de la colombie- britannique ne prévoit pas que les procès relatifs aux infractions provin- ciales peuvent se dérouler en français) n’était pas le type de décision pouvant faire d’objet d’un contrôle par une cour supérieure sur une base interlocutoire. [12] m. bessette interjette maintenant appel devant notre cour. il demande notamment à la cour d’or- donner que son procès, qui n’a toujours pas eu lieu, se déroule en français. b relevant statutory provisions b dispositions législatives pertinentes [13] at the centre of this dispute is the british columbia offence act, as it governs prosecutions of offences under provincial statutes such as the motor vehicle act (offence act, ss. 1 (definition of “proceedings”), 2, 3(1) and 5; see also r v. corbett, 2005 bcsc 1437, 24 mvr (5th) 310, at paras. 3-4; interpretation act, rsbc 1996, c. 238, s. 1 (defi- nition of “enactment”)). both the motor vehicle act and the offence act are silent on the language of trials. because of this silence, s. 133 of the offence act becomes the focal point of this dispute. that pro- vision incorporates certain criminal code provisions where a matter is not provided for in the offence act. section 133 and other relevant provisions of the offence act state as follows: definitions 1 in this act: [13] au cœur du présent litige se trouve la offence act de la colombie- britannique, étant donné qu’elle régit les poursuites à l’égard d’infractions prévues dans des lois provinciales comme la motor vehicle act (offence act, art. 1 — définition de [traduc- tion] «  instance  » («  proceedings  »)  — 2, 3(1) et 5; voir aussi r c. corbett, 2005 bcsc 1437, 24 mvr (5th) 310, par. 3-4; interpretation act, rsbc 1996, c. 238, art. 1 — définition de [tra- duction] « texte de loi » (« enactment »)). la motor vehicle act ainsi que la offence act sont muettes quant à la langue dans laquelle se déroulent les pro- cès. en raison de ce silence, l’art. 133 de la offence act devient le point central du présent litige. cette disposition incorpore certaines dispositions du code criminel lorsque la offence act est muette sur une question. l’article 133 et les autres dispositions per- tinentes de la offence act énoncent ce qui suit : [traduction] définitions 1 les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la pré- sente loi.   .   . [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 545 “proceedings” means « instance » s’entend à la fois de ce qui suit : (a) proceedings in respect of offences, and (a) une instance à l’égard d’infractions; (b) proceedings in which a justice is authorized by an enactment to make an order; (b) une instance durant laquelle un juge est au- torisé par un texte de loi à rendre une ordon- nance;   .   . offence punishable on summary conviction infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire 2 an offence created under an enactment is punish- able on summary conviction. 2 l’infraction créée par un texte de loi est punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure som- maire. application to proceedings application à l’instance 3 (1) except where otherwise provided by law, this act 3 (1) sauf disposition contraire de la loi, la présente loi applies to proceedings as defined in section 1. s’applique aux instances au sens de l’article 1.   .   . general offence infraction générale 5 a person who contravenes an enactment by doing an act that it forbids, or omitting to do an act that it requires to be done, commits an offence against the enactment. 5 commet une infraction quiconque contrevient au texte de loi en accomplissant un acte qu’il interdit ou en omettant d’accomplir un acte qu’il prescrit.   .   . application of criminal code application du code criminel 133 if, in any proceeding, matter or thing to which this act applies, express provision has not been made in this act or only partial provision has been made, the provisions of the criminal code relating to offences punishable on summary conviction apply, with the necessary changes and so far as applicable, as if its provisions were enacted in and formed part of this act. 133 si, dans toute instance, affaire ou chose à laquelle s’applique la présente loi, aucune disposition ex- presse n’a été adoptée dans la présente loi ou seule une disposition partielle a été adoptée, les dispo- sitions du code criminel relatives aux infractions punissables sur déclaration sommaire de culpabi- lité s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires et dans la mesure où elles sont applicables, comme si ces dispositions faisaient partie de la présente loi. [14] the two statutes competing to govern the language of offence act trials are the criminal code, which provides for trials in the accused’s official language of choice, and the 1731 act, which [14] les deux lois qui pourraient régir la ques- tion de la langue des procès intentés en vertu de la offence act sont le code criminel, qui prévoit que les procès peuvent se dérouler dans la langue officielle 546 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. provides only for english trials. their relevant pro- visions are: du choix de l’accusé, et la loi de 1731, qui prévoit que les procès se déroulent en anglais seulement. voici les dispositions pertinentes : language of accused langue de l’accusé 530 (1) on application by an accused whose language is one of the official languages of canada, made not later than 530 (1) sur demande d’un accusé dont la langue est l’une des langues officielles du canada, faite au plus tard : (a) the time of the appearance of the accused at which his trial date is set, if a) au moment où la date du procès est fixée : (i) he is accused of an offence mentioned in sec- tion 553 or punishable on summary conviction, (i) s’il est accusé d’une infraction mentionnée à l’article 553 ou punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire,   .   . a justice of the peace, provincial court judge or judge of the nunavut court of justice shall grant an order di- recting that the accused be tried before a justice of the peace, provincial court judge, judge or judge and jury, as the case may be, who speak the official language of canada that is the language of the accused or, if the cir- cumstances warrant, who speak both official languages of canada. un juge de paix, un juge de la cour provinciale ou un juge de la cour de justice du nunavut ordonne que l’accusé subisse son procès devant un juge de paix, un juge de la cour provinciale, un juge seul ou un juge et un jury, selon le cas, qui parlent la langue officielle du canada qui est celle de l’accusé ou, si les circonstances le justifient, qui parlent les deux langues officielles du canada. (criminal code, s. 530) (code criminel, art. 530)    [t]o protect the lives and fortunes of the subjects of that part of great britain called england, more effectually than heretofore from the peril of being ensnared or brought in danger by forms and proceedings in courts of justice, in an unknown language, be it enacted    that    all writs, process, and returns thereof and proceedings thereon, and all pleadings, rules, orders, indictments, informations, inquisitions, presentments, verdicts, prohibitions, certif- icates, and all patents, charters, pardons, commissions, records, judgments, statutes, recognizances, bonds, rolls, entries, fines and recoveries, and all proceedings relating thereunto, and all proceedings of courts leet, courts baron, and customary courts, and all copies thereof, and all pro- ceedings whatsoever in any courts of justice   , and which concern the law and administration of justice, shall be in the english tongue and language only, and not in latin or french, or any other tongue or language whatsoever   . [traduction]    [p]our mieux protéger qu’auparavant la vie et la fortune des sujets de cette partie de la grande- bretagne que l’on appelle l’angleterre contre le péril ou le danger que présentent les formules et instances en cour de justice dans une langue inconnue, qu’il soit statué … que … tous les brefs, les sommations et la preuve de leur signification, et les instances en découlant, et les actes de procédure, règles, ordonnances, actes d’accusation, dénon- ciations, enquêtes, dépôts, verdicts, interdictions et certi- ficats, les lettres patentes, chartes, grâces, commissions, archives, jugements, lois, engagements, cautionnements, rôles, inscriptions, amendes et indemnités, et les instances s’y rapportant et les instances de la cour foncière, de la cour de baronnie et des tribunaux coutumiers, et les copies des documents y afférents, et toute instance, quelle qu’elle soit dans toute cour de justice    et qui portent sur la loi et l’administration de la justice, seront établis en anglais seulement, et non en latin ou en français, ou en toute autre langue, quelle qu’elle soit   . (1731 act, preamble) (loi de 1731, préambule) [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 547 as set out above, there is no dispute that the 1731 act remains in force in british columbia. it applies because of s. 2 of british columbia’s law and equity act, which states as follows: comme nous l’avons mentionné précédemment, il n’est pas contesté que la loi de 1731 est encore en vigueur en colombie- britannique. elle s’applique en raison de l’art. 2 de la law and equity act de la colombie- britannique, qui énonce ce qui suit : [traduction] application of english law in british columbia application du droit anglais en colombie- britannique 2 2 subject to section 3, the civil and criminal laws of england, as they existed on november 19, 1858, so far as they are not from local circumstances in- applicable, are in force in british columbia, but those laws must be held to be modified and altered by all legislation that has the force of law in british columbia or in any former colony comprised within its geographical limits. sous réserve de l’article 3, les lois civiles et cri- minelles d’angleterre en vigueur le 19 novembre 1858 s’appliquent en colombie- britannique, à condition de ne pas être rendues inapplicables par les circonstances dans cette province et elles doivent être tenues pour modifiées par toute me- sure législative adoptée en colombie- britannique ou dans toute ancienne colonie située à l’intérieur de ses limites géographiques. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire a provincial court of british columbia (gul- bransen prov. ct. j.) — 2015 bcpc 230 a cour provinciale de la colombie- britannique (le juge gulbransen) — 2015 bcpc 230 [15] the provincial court judge dismissed mr. bes- sette’s application for a trial in french. he held that s. 530 of the criminal code could not be incorpo- rated into the offence act to displace the 1731 act because this latter act already forms part of british columbia law. the judge adopted the reasoning of an earlier decision of the provincial court of british columbia, r v. laflamme, bc prov. ct., no. 19739, february 17, 1997, which held that it is settled law that english is the language of the courts in british columbia; s. 133 of the offence act is intended to incorporate procedural provisions of the criminal code, not substantive ones; and to read s. 133 as al- lowing for trials in french would be a “political” de- cision. the judge hearing mr. bessette’s application also expressed some discomfort with the idea that a federal statute like the criminal code could impose language obligations on a purely provincial matter (namely, the prosecution of provincial offences). [15] le juge de la cour provinciale a rejeté la de- mande de m. bessette pour un procès en français. il a conclu que l’art. 530 du code criminel ne pouvait pas être incorporé à la offence act pour remplacer la loi de 1731 parce que cette dernière fait déjà partie de la loi de la colombie- britannique. le juge a suivi le raisonnement adopté dans une décision antérieure de la cour provinciale de la colombie- britannique, r c. laflamme, bc prov. ct., no. 19739, 17 fé- vrier 1997, où celle-ci a conclu qu’il est établi en droit que l’anglais est la langue des tribunaux en colombie- britannique; que l’art. 133 de la offence act vise à incorporer les dispositions procédurales du code criminel et non les dispositions substantielles; et que donner à l’art. 133 une interprétation selon la- quelle les procès peuvent avoir lieu en français serait une décision « politique ». le juge chargé d’entendre la demande de m. bessette a aussi exprimé un certain inconfort quant à l’idée voulant qu’une loi fédérale comme le code criminel puisse imposer des obli- gations linguistiques dans une affaire de juridiction purement provinciale (soit les poursuites visant les infractions provinciales). 548 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. b supreme court of british columbia (blok j.) — 2016 bcsc 2416, 372 crr (2d) 54 b cour suprême de la colombie- britannique (le juge blok) — 2016 bcsc 2416, 372 crr (2d) 54 [16] the supreme court of british columbia dis- missed mr. bessette’s petition for prerogative relief on the basis that it was premature. in its view, the provincial court judge’s decision would, if neces- sary, be reviewable by way of appeal after trial. put differently, an appeal represented an adequate al- ternative remedy to certiorari — the prerogative writ which permits the superior court granting it to review the decision of the judge below. as explained in skogman v. the queen, [1984] 2 scr 93, at pp. 98- 100, to grant certiorari is to undertake judicial review (or “certiorari review”). in coming to this conclusion, the superior [17] court judge made the following assessments (based on the factors set out in r v. johnson (1991), 3 or. (3d) 49 (ca)): (a) the provincial court had the competence to make the ruling it did; (b)  it was not apparent that the ruling resulted in an “ongoing significant” infringement of mr. bessette’s rights; (c) judicial economy, and the principles against delay and fragmentation of proceedings, strongly militated against considering the merits of mr. bessette’s pe- tition; (d) the provincial court was not implicated in the alleged rights violation, but had simply made a ruling on a disputed question of law; and (e) the decision was not so “obviously wrong” (if indeed wrong at all) to merit immediate intervention. [16] la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique a rejeté la requête de bref de prérogative de m. bes- sette au motif qu’elle était prématurée. selon elle, la décision du juge de la cour provinciale serait, au besoin, susceptible de contrôle par voie d’appel après le procès. autrement dit, l’appel représentait un recours adéquat au lieu d’un certiorari (le bref de prérogative qui permet à la cour supérieure qui l’accueille de réviser la décision du juge de l’instance inférieure). comme il est expliqué dans skogman c. la reine, [1984] 2 rcs 93, p. 98- 100, accorder un certiorari consiste à entreprendre un contrôle judiciaire (ou un « contrôle par voie de certiorari »). [17] en arrivant à cette décision, le juge de la cour supérieure a tiré les conclusions suivantes (en fonc- tion des facteurs énoncés dans r c. johnson (1991), 3 or (3d) 49 (ca)) : a) la cour provinciale avait juridiction pour statuer comme elle l’a fait; b) il n’était pas évident que la décision ait donné lieu à une atteinte « grave continue » aux droits de m. bes- sette; c) l’économie des ressources judiciaires, et les principes à l’encontre des délais et de la frag- mentation des instances, militaient fortement contre l’examen au fond de la requête de m. bessette; d) la cour provinciale n’a eu aucun rôle à jouer dans la violation des droits invoquée, mais a simplement statué sur une question de droit en litige; et e) la décision n’était pas « manifestement erronée » (si elle était effectivement erronée) au point de justifier une intervention immédiate. c court of appeal for british columbia (saunders, goepel and fenlon jja) — 2017 bcca 264, 361 ccc (3d) 448 c cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique (les juges saunders, goepel et fenlon) — 2017 bcca 264, 351 ccc (3d) 448 [18] a unanimous panel of the court of appeal held that the supreme court of british columbia’s decision attracted deference as it was a discretion- ary decision about whether the interests of justice favoured granting certiorari. the court held that it was open to the superior court judge to conclude that an appeal from conviction represented an ad- equate alternative remedy and that there were no circumstances warranting departure from the general [18] une formation unanime de la cour d’appel a conclu que la décision de la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique commandait la déférence étant donné qu’il s’agissait d’une décision discré- tionnaire quant à savoir s’il était dans l’intérêt de la justice que le certiorari soit accordé la cour a statué que le juge de la cour supérieure pouvait conclure que l’appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité représentait un autre recours adéquat et qu’aucune [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 549 rule against interlocutory appeals in criminal and quasi- criminal matters. circonstance ne justifiait de déroger à la règle géné- rale interdisant les appels interlocutoires dans les affaires criminelles et quasi criminelles. iv issues iv questions [19] there are two questions before this court: [19] la cour est saisie de deux questions : 1 the threshold question: was the provincial court’s decision not to grant mr. bessette his trial in french immediately reviewable by the supreme court of british columbia on a petition for certiorari, and, if so, did the supreme court err in declining to consider the merits of mr. bessette’s petition? 1 question préliminaire : la décision de la cour provinciale de ne pas accorder un procès en français à m. bessette était- elle immédiatement susceptible de contrôle par la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique sur requête en certiorari et, dans l’affir- mative, la cour suprême a-t-elle commis une erreur en refusant de procéder à un examen au fond de la requête de m. bessette? 2 the substantive question: does s. 133 of the of- fence act incorporate s. 530 of the criminal code and thereby grant persons accused of certain provin- cial offences the right to be tried in french? 2 question de fond : l’article 133 de la offence act incorpore-t-il l’art. 530 du code criminel, conférant ainsi aux personnes accusées de certaines infractions provinciales le droit d’être jugées en français? [20] it is not contested that mr.  bessette made his application before the provincial court at the appropriate time under s. 530(1)(a) of the criminal code, and therefore meets the procedural require- ments for obtaining a french- language trial. there is also no dispute that the provincial court must have the capacity to provide trials in french; indeed, because it hears criminal code matters, it is required to be institutionally bilingual (r v. beaulac, [1999] 1 scr 768, at para 28). [20] il n’est pas contesté que m. bessette a présenté sa demande à la cour provinciale au bon moment conformément à l’al. 530(1)a) du code criminel, et qu’il respecte donc les conditions sur le plan procé- dural pour être jugé en français. il n’est pas non plus contesté que la cour provinciale doit être en mesure de tenir des procès en français; de fait, parce qu’elle est saisie d’affaires portant sur des infractions au code criminel, elle est tenue d’être institutionnelle- ment bilingue (r c. beaulac, [1999] 1 rcs 768, par 28). v analysis v analyse a the threshold question: availability of certio- a la question préliminaire : la possibilité de re- rari courir à un certiorari [21] in our view, whether mr. bessette is entitled to be tried in french raises a jurisdictional question, and certiorari review is therefore available before the trial is heard. although superior courts retain a residual discretion to refuse certiorari review, even in the face of alleged jurisdictional errors, no such refusal is warranted in the circumstances. [21] à notre avis, la question de savoir si m. bes- sette a le droit d’être jugé en français soulève une question juridictionnelle, et le contrôle par voie de certiorari est donc disponible avant l’instruction du procès. bien que les cours supérieures demeurent investies du pouvoir discrétionnaire résiduel de re- fuser d’accorder le contrôle par voie de certiorari, même en dépit d’erreurs juridictionnelles invoquées, un tel refus n’est pas justifié dans les circonstances. 550 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. (1) jurisdictional error: failure to comply with (1) erreur juridictionnelle : non- respect d’une a mandatory statutory provision disposition législative impérative [22] superior courts generally do not intervene in ongoing criminal proceedings in the provincial courts. as was recently explained by this court in r. v. awashish, 2018 scc 45, [2018] 3 scr 87, crim- inal appeals are statutory and, with limited excep- tions, there are no interlocutory appeals. indeed, the offence act provisions governing appeals from “or- der[s]” (ss. 102 and 109) have been interpreted by the british columbia courts as authorizing only appeals from final orders (see r v. plummer, 2018 bcsc 513, 25 mvr (7th) 117, at para 16). criminal trials should not routinely be fragmented by interlocutory proceedings as these may be based on an incom- plete record, take on a life of their own, or result in significant delay and the inefficient use of judicial resources (awashish, at para. 10; johnson, at p 54). [23] for parties to criminal proceedings, pre- or mid- trial certiorari is available “for a jurisdictional error by a provincial court judge” (awashish, at para 20). in the criminal context, a jurisdictional error occurs “where the court fails to observe a mandatory provision of a statute or where a court acts in breach of the principles of natural justice” (awashish, at para 23). the court that makes such an error loses jurisdiction over the accused (doyle v. the queen, [1977] 1 scr 597, at pp. 603 and 607; see also r v. deschamplain, 2004 scc 76, [2004] 3 scr 601, at paras. 12, 18-19, 33 and 37-38). whether the alleged error by the trial judge constitutes a jurisdictional error, making certiorari review available, is a question of law reviewable for correctness. [22] généralement, les cours supérieures n’inter- viennent pas dans les instances criminelles en cours devant les cours provinciales. comme l’a récem- ment expliqué la cour dans r c. awashish, 2018 csc 45, [2018] 3 rcs 87, les appels permis en matière criminelle sont prévus par la loi et, sauf exceptions limitées, il n’y a pas d’appels interlocu- toires. par ailleurs, selon l’interprétation des tribu- naux de la colombie- britannique, les dispositions de la offence act qui régissent les appels d’« ordon- nances » (art. 102 et 109) autorisent seulement les appels à l’égard d’ordonnances définitives (voir r. c. plummer, 2018 bcsc 513, 25 mvr (7th) 117, par 16). les instances criminelles ne doivent pas être couramment fragmentées par des procédures interlocutoires car celles-ci pourraient être fondées sur un dossier incomplet, devenir des instances dis- tinctes ou donner lieu à des retards importants et à une utilisation inefficace des ressources judiciaires (awashish, par. 10; johnson, p 54). [23] pour ce qui est des parties à une instance cri- minelle, elles peuvent recourir au certiorari avant ou pendant le procès « s’il y a erreur de compé- tence d’un juge de la cour provinciale » (awashish, par 20). en matière criminelle, il y a erreur juri- dictionnelle « lorsque le tribunal ne se conforme pas à une disposition impérative d’une loi ou trans- gresse les principes de justice naturelle » (awashish, par 23). le tribunal qui commet une telle erreur perd sa juridiction à l’égard de l’accusé (doyle c. the queen, [1977] 1 rcs 597, p. 603 et 607; voir aussi r c deschamplain, 2004 csc 76, [2004] 3 rcs 601, par. 12, 18-19, 33 et 37-38). la ques- tion de savoir si l’erreur qu’aurait commise le juge de première instance est une erreur juridictionnelle, ce qui rendrait possible le contrôle par voie de certio- rari, est une question de droit susceptible de contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. [24] the parties agree that the law governing the availability of certiorari review in the criminal con- text applies in this quasi- criminal context. both par- ties argued their case on this basis. however, they dispute whether the provincial court’s decision not [24] les parties reconnaissent que la loi régis- sant le recours à un contrôle par voie de certiorari dans le contexte criminel s’applique dans le présent contexte, qui est quasi criminel. elles ont toutes deux plaidé leur cause sur ce fondement. cependant, elles [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 551 to grant mr. bessette a trial in french was imme- diately reviewable by the superior court for con- stituting a failure to observe a mandatory statutory provision. [25] on its face, s. 530 of the criminal code is clearly a mandatory statutory provision. it dictates, in no uncertain terms, that the judge “shall grant” a french trial on application of the accused (provided the application is brought within the requisite time). “shall” is mandatory language (interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21, s. 11; beaulac, at para 31). ne s’entendent pas sur la question de savoir si la dé- cision de la cour provinciale de ne pas accorder un procès en français à m. bessette était immédiatement susceptible de contrôle par une cour supérieure parce que cette décision constituait un non- respect d’une disposition législative impérative. [25] à première vue, l’art. 530 du code criminel est clairement une disposition législative impérative. elle commande, en des termes non équivoques, que le juge « ordonne » que l’accusé subisse son procès en français sur demande de ce dernier (à condition que la demande soit présentée dans le délai pres- crit). le présent de l’indicatif indique l’obligation (loi d’interprétation, lrc 1985, c. i-21, art. 11; beaulac, par 31). in r v. munkonda, 2015 onca 309, 126 [26] or (3d) 646, the court of appeal for ontario ex- pressly decided that not complying with s. 530 of the criminal code constitutes a jurisdictional error that is susceptible to review on certiorari (at pa- ras. 131-33): [26] dans r c. munkonda, 2015 onca 309, 126 or (3d) 691, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a expres- sément décidé que le non- respect de l’art. 530 du code criminel constitue une erreur juridictionnelle qui est susceptible de contrôle par voie de certiorari (par. 131- 133) : it is settled law that an accused can bring certiorari to quash a committal for trial where there is a lack or loss of jurisdiction (r v. forsythe, [1980] 2 scr 268, [1980] scj. no. 66, at p 271). a magistrate will lose jurisdiction if he or she “fails to observe a mandatory provision of the criminal code” (forsythe, at pp 271-72 scr). il est de jurisprudence constante qu’un accusé puisse avoir recours au certiorari pour casser un renvoi à procès après enquête préliminaire s’il y a absence ou perte de compétence (r c. forsythe, [1980] 2 rcs 268, [1980] scj no 66, p 271). un magistrat perdra compétence « s’il omet de se conformer à une disposition impérative du code criminel » (forsythe, à la p 271). the quebec courts have held that ss. 530 and 530.1 of the criminal code are mandatory provisions. for example, the superior court of quebec concluded that [transla- tion] “the interpretation of sections 530 and 530.1 raises a jurisdictional issue, and so any error by the justice of the peace on that point will affect his or her jurisdiction” (r c. edwards, [1998] jq no 1420, [1998] rjq 1471 (sc), at para 60). or la jurisprudence québécoise a déjà établi que les articles 530 et 530.1 du code criminel sont des dispo- sitions impératives. ainsi la cour supérieure du québec a conclu que « l’interprétation des articles 530 et 530.1 soulève une question de nature juridictionnelle, de sorte que toute erreur du juge de paix sur ce point affecte sa compétence » (r c. edwards, [1998] jq 1420, [1998] rjq 1471 (cs), au par 60). in my opinion, the failure of the judge in this case to ensure that the requirements of ss. 530 and 530.1 were met resulted in a loss of jurisdiction, and we have the authority to quash the committal for trial. [emphasis added.] à mon avis, l’omission du juge, en l’espèce, de s’as- surer que les exigences des articles 530 et 530.1 sont res- pectées entraîne une perte de compétence, et nous avons la compétence pour casser le renvoi à procès. [nous sou- lignons.] [27] we agree that failing to ensure that the re- quirements of s. 530 of the criminal code are met [27] nous convenons que l’omission de s’assu- rer du respect des exigences de l’art. 530 du code 552 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. constitutes a jurisdictional error. as such, the court that fails to comply with s. 530, where it applies, loses jurisdiction over the proceedings. this is con- sistent with this court’s decision in beaulac, in which bastarache j. said the following (at para. 11):    the order under s. 530(4) governs the judicial process itself, rather than the conduct of the parties, such that traditional concerns as to certainty and the need for the orderly administration of justice are not brought into play. the order would have been subject to review if it had been made by the trial judge, and the appellant should not be penalized for having brought the application in a timely manner prior to the trial rather than at the trial proper. [emphasis added.] [28] the attorney general of british columbia rightly concedes the mandatory nature of s 530. however, he maintains that, because the applicability of s. 530 to offence act trials is the very question in dispute, the provincial court judge’s determina- tion that s. 530 does not apply cannot constitute the failure to follow a mandatory statutory provision. put differently, the attorney general submits that the provincial court judge was not deciding whether to follow a mandatory statutory provision; he was deciding whether a mandatory statutory provision indeed applied to him — a matter of statutory in- terpretation and a question of law. in the attorney general’s view, the provincial court judge would only have committed a jurisdictional error if he had concluded that s. 530 applied to mr. bessette’s trial but nonetheless failed to follow it. criminel constitue une erreur juridictionnelle. par conséquent, le tribunal qui omet de se conformer à l’art. 530, lorsque celui-ci s’applique, perd sa ju- ridiction sur l’instance. ce principe est conforme à la décision de notre cour dans beaulac, où le juge bastarache a affirmé ce qui suit (au par. 11) :    l’ordonnance prévue au par. 530(4) régit le processus judiciaire lui- même, plutôt que la conduite des parties, de sorte que les préoccupations traditionnelles en ce qui concerne la certitude et le besoin d’une administration ordonnée de la justice n’entrent pas en jeu. l’ordonnance aurait été susceptible de contrôle judiciaire si elle avait été rendue par le juge du procès et l’appelant ne devrait pas être pénalisé pour avoir présenté sa demande en temps opportun avant le procès plutôt qu’au procès lui- même. [nous soulignons.] [28] le procureur général de la colombie- britannique reconnaît à juste titre la nature impéra- tive de l’art 530. cependant, il soutient que, parce que l’applicabilité de l’art. 530 aux procès intentés en vertu de la offence act est la question même qui est en litige, la décision du juge de la cour pro- vinciale selon laquelle l’art. 530 ne s’applique pas ne peut constituer un non- respect d’une disposition législative impérative. autrement dit, le procureur général fait valoir que le juge de la cour provinciale ne décidait pas s’il devait ou non se conformer à une disposition législative impérative; il décidait si une disposition législative impérative s’appliquait à lui — ce qui est une question d’interprétation légis- lative et une question de droit. de l’avis du procureur général, le juge de la cour provinciale aurait commis une erreur juridictionnelle seulement s’il avait conclu que l’art. 530 s’appliquait au procès de m. bessette mais qu’il avait tout de même omis de s’y conformer. [29] with respect, we disagree. whether the pro vin- cial court is bound to comply with a mandatory stat- utory provision does not become a non- jurisdictional question simply because the court decides that it is not bound by the provision. in this regard, the attorney general’s position contradicts this court’s approach to identifying jurisdictional issues amenable to certiorari review in the course of criminal proceed- ings set out in r v. russell, 2001 scc 53, [2001] 2 scr 804. in russell, the court (per mclachlin [29] avec égards, nous ne sommes pas de cet avis. la question de savoir si la cour provinciale est tenue de se conformer à une disposition législative impéra- tive ne devient pas une question qui ne touche pas la juridiction simplement parce que le tribunal décide qu’il n’est pas lié par la disposition. à cet égard, la position du procureur général est contraire à la dé- marche, énoncée dans r c. russell, 2001 csc 53, [2001] 2 rcs 804, que la cour a adoptée pour cer- ner les questions juridictionnelles qui peuvent faire [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 553 cj) concluded that the preliminary inquiry judge’s committal of mr. russell for trial was reviewable on certiorari because the kind of error alleged by mr.  russell went to jurisdiction (russell, at pa- ras. 21-22 and 30). in russell, the evidence at the preliminary [30] inquiry suggested that mr. russell had forcibly con- fined one person and then killed another. the prelim- inary inquiry judge held that mr. russell should be tried on the charge of first degree murder, as murder is first degree when done “while committing” certain enumerated offences, including forcible confinement (criminal code, s 231(5)). in making mr. russell stand trial for first degree murder, the preliminary inquiry judge held that the victim of the predicate offence (forcible confinement) did not need to be the same as the victim of the murder for the latter offence to be done “while committing” the former. mr. russell sought certiorari to quash the committal. [31] when the matter reached this court, it held that the preliminary inquiry judge had properly in- terpreted “while committing” and had therefore not exceeded jurisdiction in deciding that mr. russell should stand trial for first degree murder none- theless, the judge’s decision had been amenable to certiorari review since, had the judge erred in his interpretation, he would have exceeded his jurisdic- tion in committing mr. russell to stand trial. l’objet d’un contrôle par voie de certiorari dans le cadre d’une instance criminelle. dans cette affaire, la juge en chef mclachlin, au nom de la cour, a conclu que la décision du juge de l’enquête préliminaire de renvoyer m. russell à procès était susceptible de révision par voie de certiorari parce que le genre d’erreur alléguée par m. russell touchait la juridic- tion (russell, par. 21-22 et 30). [30] dans russell, la preuve au stade de l’enquête préliminaire indiquait que m. russell avait séques- tré une personne et en avait tué une autre. le juge de l’enquête préliminaire a conclu que m. russell devrait être jugé pour meurtre au premier degré, car le meurtre est au premier degré si l’accusé a causé la mort d’une autre personne « en commettant » certaines infractions énumérées, notamment la sé- questration (par. 231(5) du code criminel). en ren- voyant m. russell à procès pour meurtre au premier degré, le juge de l’enquête préliminaire a conclu qu’il n’était pas nécessaire que la victime de l’infraction sous- jacente (la séquestration) soit la même que la victime de meurtre pour que l’accusé ait commis cette dernière infraction « en commettant » la pre- mière. m. russell a cherché à obtenir un certiorari pour annuler son renvoi à procès. [31] lorsque notre cour a été saisie de l’affaire, elle a conclu que le juge de l’enquête préliminaire avait dûment interprété l’expression « en commet- tant », et qu’il n’avait donc pas outrepassé sa juri- diction en décidant que m. russell devrait subir un procès pour meurtre au premier degré. néanmoins, la décision du juge aurait pu faire l’objet d’un contrôle par voie de certiorari, car si le juge avait commis une erreur dans son interprétation, il aurait outrepassé sa juridiction en renvoyant m. russell à procès. [32] applying russell, if the provincial court judge erred in his interpretation of s. 133 of the offence act (as mr. bessette asserts and as we find below), the effect was that he failed to observe a mandatory statutory provision (namely s. 530 of the criminal code) and thereby exceeded (or lost) his jurisdiction. because mr. bessette complied with the statutory re- quirements of s. 530 for requesting a trial in french, if s. 530 applies, a provincial court judge does not have the jurisdiction to conduct mr. bessette’s trial in [32] suivant l’arrêt russell, si le juge de la cour provinciale a commis une erreur dans son interpréta- tion de l’art. 133 de la offence act (comme m. bes- sette le fait valoir et comme nous le concluons plus loin), cette erreur a eu pour effet qu’il a omis de se conformer à une disposition législative impérative (soit l’art. 530 du code criminel) et ainsi outrepassé (ou perdu) sa juridiction. étant donné que m. bes- sette s’est conformé aux exigences statutaires de l’art. 530 pour demander la tenue d’un procès en 554 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. english. indeed, if a trial in english was erroneously ordered, the proceeding would be a nullity from the outset. as such, the error mr. bessette alleged before the superior court was amenable to certiorari review. [33] to be clear, our conclusion that certiorari review was available in this case is not predicated on our conclusion that s. 133 of the offence act incorpo- rates s. 530 of the criminal code. certiorari review would have been available even if s. 133 did not incorporate s 530. the determinative question is not whether the error alleged on a petition for certiorari is in fact established. rather, it is whether the error alleged would result in a loss of jurisdiction over the proceedings. this, in turn, depends upon the nature, effects and consequences of the decision. such an approach is logical; it permits the reviewing court to determine whether the petition can be adjudicated before deciding the merits of that petition. [34] on an application by a party for certiorari in the course of a criminal (or, as is the case here, quasi- criminal) trial, the alleged error will be jurisdictional in nature if making it results in a failure to comply with a mandatory statutory provision or a breach of natural justice. here, the interpretation of s. 133 of the offence act related to a mandatory statutory provision, such that a misinterpretation of s. 133 would have resulted in a loss of jurisdiction over the proceedings. as such, the proper interpretation of s. 133 is itself jurisdictional for the purposes of certiorari review. français, dans le cas où cet article s’applique, un juge de la cour provinciale n’a pas juridiction pour instruire le procès de m. bessette en anglais. en ef- fet, si l’on ordonnait à tort la tenue d’un procès dans cette langue, l’instance serait nulle dès le début. par conséquent, l’erreur que m. bessette a fait valoir devant la cour supérieure pouvait faire l’objet d’un contrôle par voie de certiorari. [33] nous tenons à préciser que notre conclusion selon laquelle le contrôle par voie de certiorari était possible en l’espèce ne repose pas sur notre conclusion que l’art. 133 de la offence act incorpore l’art. 530 du code criminel. le contrôle par voie de certiorari aurait été possible même si l’art. 133 n’incorporait pas l’art 530. la question déterminante n’est pas celle de savoir si l’erreur visée dans le bref de certiorari est établie dans les faits. la question est plutôt celle de savoir si l’erreur invoquée entraînerait une perte de juridiction sur l’instance. la réponse dépend quant à elle de la nature, des effets et des conséquences de la décision. une telle approche est logique; elle permet à la cour de révision d’établir si la requête peut être tranchée avant qu’elle se prononce sur son fond. [34] dans le cadre d’une requête en certiorari pré- sentée par une partie lors d’un procès criminel (ou, comme en l’espèce, un procès quasi criminel), l’erreur invoquée sera de nature juridictionnelle si elle donne lieu au non- respect d’une disposition législative im- pérative ou à un manquement aux règles de justice naturelle. en l’espèce, l’interprétation de l’art. 133 de la offence act avait trait à une disposition législative impérative, si bien qu’une mauvaise interprétation de cet article aurait donné lieu à une perte de juridiction sur l’instance. par conséquent, l’interprétation qu’il convient de donner à l’art. 133 est elle- même de na- ture juridictionnelle aux fins du contrôle par voie de certiorari. (2) discretion to undertake certiorari review (2) pouvoir discrétionnaire de procéder à un con- trôle par voie de certiorari [35] even where certiorari review is available, superior courts retain the discretion to refuse to conduct that review (strickland v. canada (attor- ney general), 2015 scc 37, [2015] 2 scr 713, at para 37). one of the discretionary grounds for [35] même lorsqu’un contrôle par voie de cer- tiorari est possible, la cour supérieure conserve le pouvoir discrétionnaire de refuser de procéder à un tel contrôle (strickland c. canada (procureur géné- ral), 2015 csc 37, [2015] 2 rcs 713, par 37). [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 555 refusing to engage in certiorari review — the ground invoked by the superior court in this case — is the existence of an adequate alternative remedy (strick- land, at para. 40; r v. arcand (2004), 73 or (3d) 758 (ca), at para 13). because certiorari review is a discretionary remedy, the court’s decision not to undertake it is entitled to deference on appeal (strickland, at para 39). to interfere with the judge’s decision, the appellate court must be satisfied that the decision fails to give weight to all relevant consider- ations (miningwatch canada v. canada (fisheries and oceans), 2010 scc 2, [2010] 1 scr 6, at para. 43), rests on an error in principle, or is plainly wrong (cowper- smith v. morgan, 2017 scc 61, [2017] 2 scr 754, at para. 46; see also cana- dian pacific ltd. v. matsqui indian band, [1995] 1 scr 3, at p. 64 (per sopinka j., dissenting, but not on this point of law)). [36] in our view, the superior court judge erred in exercising his discretion not to engage in cer- tiorari review and consider the substantive issues raised in mr. bessette’s petition. specifically, the superior court erred in concluding that (a) whether s. 133 of the offence act incorporates s. 530 of the criminal code is a ruling which does not engage the provincial court’s “competence” or jurisdiction; (b) there was no “ongoing significant” infringement of mr. bes sette’s rights at stake; and (c) mr. bes- sette’s right to a trial in french was a question best left on appeal following his trial. had the superior court judge recognized the jurisdictional nature of the dispute, the impact of his decision on mr. bes- sette’s claimed language rights, and the desirability of deciding the language of trial question before the start of the trial, he should have concluded that an appeal from conviction would not represent an ade- quate alternative remedy to certiorari review. l’un des motifs discrétionnaires pouvant fonder le refus de procéder à un contrôle par voie de certio- rari — soit le motif invoqué par la cour supérieure en l’espèce — est l’existence d’un autre recours adéquat (strickland, par. 40; r c. arcand (2004), 73 or (3d) 758 (ca), par 13). étant donné que le contrôle par voie de certiorari est un recours discré- tionnaire, la décision de la cour de ne pas procéder à un tel contrôle commande la déférence en appel (strickland, par 39). pour que la cour d’appel puisse intervenir à l’égard de la décision du juge, elle doit être convaincue que la décision n’accorde pas suffi- samment d’importance à tous les éléments pertinents (mines alerte canada c. canada (pêches et océans), 2010 csc 2, [2010] 1 rcs 6, par. 43), qu’elle est fondée sur une erreur de principe ou qu’elle est net- tement erronée (cowper- smith c. morgan, 2017 csc 61, [2017] 2 rcs 754, par. 46; voir aussi canadien pacifique ltée c. bande indienne de matsqui, [1995] 1 rcs 3, p. 64 (le juge sopinka, dissident, mais pas sur ce point de droit)). [36] à notre avis, le juge de la cour supérieure a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a décidé d’exercer sa discrétion de ne pas procéder au contrôle par voie de certiorari et de ne pas examiner les questions de fond soulevées dans la requête de m bessette. plus précisément, la cour supérieure a commis une erreur en concluant que a) la question de savoir si l’art. 133 de la offence act incorpore l’art. 530 du code crimi- nel est une décision qui ne relève pas de la « compé- tence » ou juridiction de la cour provinciale; b) il n’y a eu aucune atteinte « grave continue » aux droits en cause de m. bessette; et c) le droit de m. bessette à un procès en français était une question qui devrait être débattue en appel après son procès. si le juge de la cour supérieure avait reconnu que le litige portait sur une question juridictionnelle, que sa décision avait une incidence sur les droits linguistiques reven- diqués par m. bessette et qu’il était souhaitable de trancher la question de la langue du procès avant le début de celui-ci, il aurait dû conclure qu’un appel de la déclaration de culpabilité ne représentait pas un recours adéquat au lieu du contrôle par voie de certiorari. [37] as explained above, whether mr. bessette had a right to a french- language trial for the provincial [37] comme nous l’avons expliqué, la question de savoir si m. bessette avait droit à un procès en 556 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. offence for which he was charged was a jurisdic- tional question. this factor ought to have weighed heavily against deferring the question until the end of the trial; the prospect of conducting a trial with- out jurisdiction is a serious matter with important consequences. français pour l’infraction provinciale dont il était accusé était une question juridictionnelle. ce facteur aurait dû militer fortement contre le report de la ques- tion à la fin du procès; le fait de tenir un procès sans avoir juridiction pour le faire constitue une grave erreur qui a des conséquences importantes. [38] second, this court has recognized that the right to a trial in the official language of one’s choice, where it applies, is “fundamental”. the right is sub- stantive, not merely procedural. it is not concerned with trial fairness, but with affirming the accused’s linguistic and cultural identity, which is inherently “personal”. the violation of the right is a “substantial wrong” (beaulac, at paras. 23, 25, 28, 34, 45, 47 and 53-54). [38] ensuite, notre cour a reconnu que le droit d’une personne à un procès dans la langue officielle de son choix, lorsqu’il s’applique, est « fondamen- tal ». il s’agit d’un droit substantiel, et non sim- plement procédural. il n’a pas trait à l’équité du procès : il vise plutôt à affirmer l’identité linguistique et culturelle de l’accusé, qui est éminemment « per- sonnelle ». la violation du droit est un « tort impor- tant » (beaulac, par. 23, 25, 28, 34, 45, 47 et 53-54). [39] the attorney general builds on the reason- ing of the court of appeal (at para. 30), and cites beaulac (at para. 57), to argue that a new trial can represent a suitable remedy for a language rights violation. the fact that “a new hearing will generally be an appropriate [after- the-fact] remedy for most language rights violations” (mazraani v. industrial alliance insurance and financial services inc., 2018 scc 50, [2018] 3 scr 261, at para. 48) does not mean that a new hearing represents an adequate al- ternative remedy from the outset. what a court may order in response to damage done does not speak to what a court should order when given the opportunity to identify and prevent similar damage. in this re- gard, we note that the relatively short time estimated for mr. bessette’s trial (an hour) has no import on the analysis; a violation cannot reasonably be quantified by its duration (see mazraani, at para 51). [39] le procureur général s’inspire du raisonne- ment de la cour d’appel (par.  30), et cite l’arrêt beaulac (par. 57) pour faire valoir qu’un nouveau procès peut représenter un recours convenable en cas de violation des droits linguistiques. le fait qu’une « nouvelle audience constituera généralement une ré- paration [après le fait] convenable dans la plupart des cas de violation de droits linguistiques » (mazraani c. industrielle alliance, assurance et services fi- nanciers inc., 2018 csc 50, [2018] 3 rcs 261, par. 48) ne signifie pas qu’une nouvelle audience représente toujours un autre recours adéquat. ce qu’un tribunal peut ordonner en réponse aux dom- mages causés n’est pas indicateur de ce qu’un tribu- nal devrait ordonner lorsqu’il a l’occasion de cerner et de prévenir un dommage similaire. à cet égard, nous soulignons que la période relativement courte estimée pour le procès de m. bessette (une heure) n’a aucune importance dans le cadre de l’analyse; une violation ne peut raisonnablement être quantifiée selon sa durée (voir mazraani, par 51). [40] as the violation of the accused’s trial lan- guage right is a harm in itself, an appeal following a conviction by an english- speaking court cannot represent an adequate alternative remedy to deciding, before the trial has taken place, whether the accused is indeed entitled to this fundamental right. further, mr. bessette rightly points out that, had he been ac- quitted after an english trial, he would have had no opportunity to have his language rights vindicated. [40] étant donné que la violation du droit linguis- tique de l’accusé relativement à son procès constitue elle- même un préjudice, un appel de la déclaration de culpabilité inscrite par un tribunal d’expression anglaise ne peut représenter une réponse adéquate à la question de savoir, avant que le procès ait lieu, si l’accusé jouissait effectivement de ce droit fonda- mental. de plus, m. bessette souligne à juste titre que s’il avait été acquitté à la suite d’un procès en [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 557 this is because an accused does not have the right to appeal an acquittal under the offence act (s 102). [41] the superior court judge declined to consider the substantive aspects of mr. bessette’s petition in part because mr. bessette indicated that he might raise another distinct language issue as a defence at his trial (namely, whether he was entitled to re- ceive notice of his driving prohibition in french). the superior court judge considered it “undesirable” to deal with mr. bessette’s petition on the merits as doing so “could result in two language- rights appeals, one via the current judicial review route (to deal with the language at trial) and the other by way of an ordinary appeal following the trial (to deal with the language issue concerning the notice of prohibition)” (para 29). while the judge’s view may have some practical merit, it ultimately fails to recognize the distinct nature of the trial language claim. an application for a trial in french asks the court to conduct future proceedings in a manner which respects the accused’s language rights. the possibility that the accused’s rights were violated in the past (by a prohibition notice infringing the accused’s language rights) cannot be used to justify additional, preventable infringements. [42] finally, we are not persuaded by the attorney general’s argument that the case of r v. prince, [1986] 2 scr 480, supports declining certiorari review in mr. bessette’s case. the rationale for de- clining certiorari review in prince is simply not germane to the issues raised in mr. bessette’s case. in prince, dickson cj stated: anglais, il n’aurait eu aucune occasion de faire valoir ses droits linguistiques, parce qu’un accusé n’a pas de droit d’appel à l’égard d’un acquittement sous le régime de la offence act (art 102). [41] le juge de la cour supérieure a refusé d’exami- ner les aspects de fond de la requête de m. bessette en partie parce que ce dernier a affirmé qu’il pour- rait soulever une question linguistique distincte en défense lors de son procès (à savoir s’il avait le droit de recevoir un avis de son interdiction de conduire en français). le juge de la cour supérieure a estimé [traduction] « non souhaitable » d’instruire sa re- quête au fond car cela « pourrait déboucher sur deux appels en matière de droits linguistiques, l’un par la voie du contrôle judiciaire (portant sur la langue du procès) utilisée en l’espèce et l’autre constituant un appel ordinaire suivant le procès (portant sur la ques- tion de la langue de l’avis d’interdiction) » (par 29). bien que le point de vue du juge présente un certain intérêt sur le plan pratique, il ne reconnaît pas, en définitive, le caractère distinct de la demande fondée sur la langue du procès. une demande visant la te- nue d’un procès en français requiert que le tribunal tienne une instance future d’une façon qui respecte les droits linguistiques de l’accusé. la possibilité que les droits de l’accusé aient été violés dans le passé (par un avis d’interdiction portant atteinte à ses droits linguistiques) ne peut servir à justifier des atteintes supplémentaires et évitables. [42] enfin, l’argument du procureur général, se- lon lequel l’arrêt r c. prince, [1986] 2 rcs 480, étaye la décision de refuser d’accorder un contrôle par voie de certiorari dans le cas de m. bessette, ne nous convainc pas. la raison pour laquelle le juge a refusé d’accorder un contrôle par voie de certiorari dans prince n’est simplement pas pertinente en ce qui a trait aux questions soulevées dans le cas de m bessette. dans prince, le juge en chef dickson a affirmé ce qui suit : although it was not argued in this court, i wish to add that in my view it is normally appropriate for a su- perior court to decline to grant a prerogative remedy on an interlocutory application in respect of the rule against multiple convictions. that rule has proved to be a fertile source of appeals. the delay engendered by an erroneous quoique ce point n’ait pas été soulevé en cette cour, je tiens à souligner que, selon moi, il convient normalement qu’une cour supérieure refuse de faire droit à une demande interlocutoire de bref de prérogative lorsque c’est la règle interdisant les déclarations de culpabilité multiples qui est en cause. cette règle est à l’origine de nombreux appels. 558 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. application of the kienapple principle prior to the con- clusion of the trial is regrettably illustrated by the present case. prerogative remedies are discretionary, and notwith- standing the possibility of jurisdictional error in some cases, it would generally be preferable for superior courts to decline to consider the merits of a  kienapple argu- ment on an interlocutory application. [emphasis added; pp 507-8] [43] in our view, dickson cj was not stating that certiorari review should be declined when juris- dictional errors are alleged. to the contrary, he was opining that, in light of the particular challenges they pose, and despite their jurisdictional nature, alleged kienapple errors should, exceptionally, await adju- dication at the end of trial. [44] in any event, deciding whether a person is en- titled to a trial in his or her official language of choice cannot be analogized to applying the kienapple prin- ciple against multiple convictions. the latter is inher- ently fact- specific, record- dependant, and poses the risk (in dickson cj’s view) of becoming a frequent and fertile source of appeals. the same cannot be said of deciding whether the offence act offers trials in either official language, which is a question of law that does not depend on any evidentiary record. in addition, and as set out above, where the law does in- deed provide the accused with a choice to proceed to trial in either official language, that choice is the ac- cused’s to make for his or her own reasons. provided the accused is able to instruct counsel and follow the proceedings in the language selected, no evidentiary record is necessary to justify the accused’s stated choice (beaulac, at paras. 34 and 56). la présente affaire offre malheureusement un exemple des retards qui peuvent résulter d’une application erronée du principe de l’arrêt kienapple avant la fin du procès. les brefs de prérogative relèvent de l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétion- naire et, nonobstant la possibilité d’une erreur de compétence dans certains cas, il serait généralement préférable que les cours supérieures refusent d’examiner le bien- fondé de l’ar- gument de l’arrêt kienapple invoqué dans le cadre d’une demande interlocutoire. [nous soulignons; p. 507- 508.] [43] à notre avis, le juge en chef dickson n’affir- mait pas que le contrôle par voie de certiorari devrait être rejeté lorsque des erreurs juridictionnelles sont invoquées. au contraire, il était d’avis que compte tenu des défis particuliers qu’elles posent, et malgré le fait qu’elles étaient de nature juridictionnelle, les erreurs de type kienapple invoquées devraient, ex- ceptionnellement, être tranchées à la fin du procès. [44] quoi qu’il en soit, décider si une personne a le droit de subir son procès dans la langue officielle de son choix ne peut être comparé à l’application du principe de l’arrêt kienapple interdisant les décla- rations de culpabilité multiples. celui-ci, de par sa nature même, est axé sur les faits, dépend du dossier et pose le risque (de l’avis du juge en chef dickson) d’être à l’origine d’appels nombreux et fréquents. il en va autrement de la décision de savoir si la offence act permet que les procès se déroulent dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles, laquelle est une question de droit qui ne dépend pas de la preuve au dossier. de plus, comme nous l’avons indiqué pré- cédemment, lorsque la loi prévoit effectivement que l’accusé peut choisir de subir son procès dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles, il fera ce choix pour des raisons qui lui appartiennent. si l’accusé est capable de donner des directives à son avocat et de suivre le déroulement des procédures dans la langue choisie, aucune preuve ne sera nécessaire pour jus- tifier le choix de l’accusé (beaulac, par. 34 et 56). [45] further, and crucially, the attorney general acknowledged in oral submissions that a supreme court of british columbia decision on the language of offence act trials would serve as binding prece- dent for the statutory courts hearing such trials in the province (transcript, at p 59). thus, had the supreme court judge decided the merits of mr. bessette’s [45] en outre, et plus fondamentalement, le procu- reur général a reconnu lors de sa plaidoirie qu’une dé- cision de la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique concernant la langue dans laquelle doivent se dérouler les procès intentés en vertu de la offence act ser- virait de précédent contraignant pour les tribunaux statutaires instruisant de tels procès dans la province [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 559 petition, his decision would have discouraged further interlocutory appeals on the same ground, rather than encouraging them. [46] as set out above, interlocutory appeals are circumscribed in part because of concerns about judicial economy, delay, and the fragmentation of proceedings. however, in this case, these consider- ations militate in favour of adjudicating the merits of mr. bessette’s petition before the start of his trial. modern courts are busy and work to avoid delay. when a pre- trial petition alleges a jurisdictional error by the trial court that would render the proceedings a nullity, it is difficult to imagine how it could be preferable for the superior court to refuse to rule on that alleged error and compel a full trial on the mer- its. to do so would give rise to a potential ground of appeal which might result in the appeal court having to order a new trial. this second trial, which would inevitably take place at some later time further down the road, might have been avoided entirely had the petition been dealt with on the merits when it was first brought. such successive proceedings cost not only the justice system — crucially, they also cost the accused. putting the accused through a trial which may well be a nullity risks putting the accused to undue legal expense. this risk should not be taken lightly. [47] had mr. bessette not appealed the superior court’s decision, it would have resulted in a trial in english being conducted without jurisdiction, and a significant infringement of mr. bessette’s language rights. by failing to recognize this prospect, the su- perior court made a decision which failed to give weight to all relevant considerations, erred in prin- ciple and was, respectfully, “plainly wrong” in the result. in our view, there was no basis for the superior court to exercise its discretion to decline certiorari review. the court ought to have decided the merits of mr. bessette’s petition. (transcription, p 59). par conséquent, si le juge de la cour suprême s’était prononcé sur le fond de la requête de m. bessette, sa décision aurait découragé les appels interlocutoires au même motif, plutôt que d’avoir l’effet de les encourager. [46] comme nous l’avons indiqué précédemment, les appels interlocutoires sont limités en partie en raison de considérations relatives à l’économie des ressources judiciaires, aux retards et à la fragmen- tation des procédures. cependant, dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, ces considérations militent pour que la requête de m. bessette soit tranchée sur le fond avant le début de son procès. les tribunaux modernes sont occupés et s’efforcent d’éviter de retarder les ins- tances. lorsqu’une partie allègue dans une requête préliminaire que le tribunal de première instance a commis une erreur juridictionnelle qui rendrait nulle l’instance, on peut difficilement imaginer en quoi il serait préférable que la cour supérieure refuse de statuer sur l’erreur reprochée et ordonne un procès complet sur le fond. agir ainsi ferait naître un pos- sible moyen d’appel susceptible d’avoir pour effet que la cour d’appel doive ordonner un nouveau pro- cès. ce deuxième procès, qui aurait inévitablement lieu plus tard, pourrait être évité entièrement si la requête était tranchée sur le fond au moment où elle a été présentée pour la première fois. de telles ins- tances successives coûtent non seulement au système de justice — elles coûtent aussi surtout à l’accusé. faire subir à l’accusé un procès qui pourrait bien être nul risque d’assujettir celui-ci à des frais juridiques indus. ce risque ne devrait pas être pris à la légère. [47] si m. bessette n’avait pas interjeté appel de la décision de la cour supérieure, la cour provinciale aurait tenu un procès en anglais sans que le juge ait juridiction pour le faire, et il en aurait résulté une atteinte grave aux droits linguistiques de m. bes- sette. en omettant de reconnaître cette possibilité, la cour supérieure a pris une décision qui ne tenait pas compte de toutes les considérations pertinentes, qui contenait une erreur de principe et, avec égards, qui était « clairement erronée » quant au résultat. à notre avis, rien ne justifiait que la cour supérieure refuse, en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, d’accorder le contrôle par voie de certiorari. la cour aurait dû trancher la requête de m. bessette sur le fond. 560 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. [48] it is to those merits that we now turn. [48] c’est de ce fond que nous allons maintenant traiter. b the substantive question: language of offence b la question de fond : la langue des procès in- act trials tentés en vertu de la offence act [49] as a preliminary point, we would note that while some language rights receive constitutional protection, the language of trials held pursuant to the offence act is, in this case, simply a question of stat- utory interpretation. mr. bessette has not alleged any infringement of his rights arising under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms or challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme in question. [49] tout d’abord, nous voulons souligner que bien que certains droits linguistiques soient protégés par la constitution, la question de la langue des procès intentés en vertu de la offence act en est simplement une d’inter- prétation statutaire en l’espèce. m. bes sette n’a invoqué aucune atteinte aux droits que lui garantit la charte canadienne des droits et libertés, ni contesté la consti- tutionnalité du régime statutaire dont il est question. [50] rather, he and the attorney general divide over which statute the offence act designates as determining the language of trials. mr. bessette says that the criminal code governs on this point and provides for trials in either official language. the attorney general says that the question is answered in the 1731 act, which mandates english- only trials. the task of this court is therefore to interpret the relevant provisions of the offence act and determine the proper interrelationship between that act, the criminal code, and the 1731 act in respect of the language of offence act trials. as set out above, of the courts below, only the provincial court of british columbia addressed this substantive issue. having the benefit of the parties’ developed submissions on interpreting the offence act, we focus on those sub- missions instead of the provincial court’s reasons. [50] plutôt, m. bessette et le procureur général ne s’entendent pas sur la loi que la offence act désigne comme étant celle qui détermine la langue dans la- quelle les procès doivent se dérouler. m. bessette soutient que le code criminel régit cette question et prévoit que les procès peuvent se dérouler dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles. le procureur général affirme plutôt que la réponse à la question se trouve dans la loi de 1731, qui prévoit que les procès ont lieu en anglais seulement le rôle de notre cour consiste donc à interpréter les disposi- tions pertinentes de la offence act et à établir quelle est la corrélation adéquate entre cette loi, le code criminel et la loi de 1731 en ce qui concerne la langue des procès intentés en vertu de la offence act. comme nous l’avons vu, parmi les juridictions in- férieures, seule la cour provinciale de la colombie- britannique s’est penchée sur cette question de fond. ayant eu le bénéfice des argumentations détaillées des parties quant à l’interprétation de la offence act, nous portons notre attention sur celles-ci plutôt que sur les motifs de la cour provinciale. [51] to reiterate, the offence act provisions at issue state the following: [51] rappelons que les dispositions en question de la offence act sont libellées comme suit : [traduction] application to proceedings application à l’instance 3 (1) except where otherwise provided by law, this act 3 (1) sauf disposition contraire de la loi, la présente loi applies to proceedings as defined in section 1. s’applique aux instances au sens de l’article 1.   .   . [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 561 application of criminal code application du code criminel 133 if, in any proceeding, matter or thing to which this act applies, express provision has not been made in this act or only partial provision has been made, the provisions of the criminal code relating to offences punishable on summary conviction apply, with the necessary changes and so far as applica- ble, as if its provisions were enacted in and formed part of this act. 133 si, dans toute instance, affaire ou chose à laquelle s’applique la présente loi, aucune disposition ex- presse n’a été adoptée dans la présente loi ou seule une disposition partielle a été adoptée, les dispo- sitions du code criminel relatives aux infractions punissables sur déclaration sommaire de culpabi- lité s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires et dans la mesure où elles sont applicables, comme si ces dispositions faisaient partie de la présente loi. [52] the parties have provided two very different readings of these provisions and, as a result, dispute the “hierarchy of laws” or “order of operations” created by the offence act. [52] les parties ont soumis deux lectures très dif- férentes de ces dispositions et, par conséquent, elles contestent la « hiérarchie des lois » ou l’« ordre des opérations » que crée la offence act. [53] the attorney general says that the wording of ss. 3(1) and 133 conveys that other british columbia law (such as the 1731 act) takes precedence over the provisions of both the offence act and the criminal code. in his view, the words “[e]xcept where oth- erwise provided by law” in s. 3(1) indicate that the offence act applies to proceedings only insofar as other british columbia law does not already apply. similarly, the words “and so far as applicable” in s. 133 indicate that criminal code provisions must be incorporated in a manner that is consistent with existing british columbia law. since the 1731 act already states the law on the language of proceed- ings in british columbia, the offence act — and, by extension, the criminal code — cannot govern on this point. [53] le procureur général affirme que la formula- tion du par. 3(1) et de l’art. 133 indique que d’autres lois de la colombie- britannique (comme la loi de 1731) ont préséance sur les dispositions de la offence act et du code criminel. à son avis, les mots [tra- duction] « [s]auf disposition contraire de la loi » au par. 3(1) indiquent que la offence act s’applique aux instances seulement dans la mesure où la loi de la colombie- britannique ne s’applique pas déjà. de la même façon, les mots « et dans la mesure où elles sont applicables » à l’art. 133 indiquent que les dispositions du code criminel doivent être incorporées d’une façon qui est conforme aux lois existantes de la colombie- britannique. étant donné que la loi de 1731 prévoit déjà la langue des instances en colombie- britannique, la offence act — et, par extension, le code criminel — ne peuvent régir cette question. [54] we disagree with this reading. in our view, it is not supported by the guiding rule of statutory interpretation, which has been reiterated many times by this court: [54] nous sommes en désaccord avec cette posi- tion. à notre avis, elle ne trouve pas appui dans le principe directeur de l’interprétation statutaire, qui a souvent été repris par notre cour : today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament. [traduction] aujourd’hui, il n’y a qu’un seul prin- cipe ou solution : il faut lire les termes d’une loi dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’[économie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur. (bell expressvu limited partnership v. rex, 2002 scc 42, [2002] 2 scr 559, at para. 26, citing (bell expressvu limited partnership c. rex, 2002 csc 42, [2002] 2 rcs 559, par. 26, citant elmer 562 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. elmer a. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87; see also canada (attorney gen- eral) v. thouin, 2017 scc 46, [2017] 2 scr 184, at para. 26; canadian broadcasting corp. v. sodrac 2003 inc., 2015 scc 57, [2015] 3 scr 615, at para. 48; and r v. steele, 2014 scc 61, [2014] 3 scr 138, at para 23) [55] on their face and read in context, ss. 3(1) and 133 have clear functions; the former sets the scope of the offence act — as applying to “proceedings” — and the latter clearly dictates that any gaps in the offence act are to be filled with the provisions of the criminal code, adapted to fit the offence act context. these provisions cannot reasonably be read as prioritizing other, more removed legislation over both the provisions of the offence act itself and other legislation to which the offence act specifi- cally refers. put in terms of “hierarchy” or “order of operations”, as mr. bessette says, ss. 3(1) and 133 of the offence act direct the following: a. driedger, construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p.  87; voir aussi canada (procureur général) c. thouin, 2017 csc 46, [2017] 2 rcs 184, par. 26; société radio- canada c. sodrac 2003 inc., 2015 csc 57, [2015] 3 rcs 615, par. 48; et r c. steele, 2014 csc 61, [2014] 3 rcs 138, par 23) [55] à première vue et placés dans leur contexte, le par.  3(1) et l’art.  133 ont des fonctions pré- cises; le premier énonce la portée de la offence act  — elle s’applique aux «  instances  »  — et le dernier indique clairement que les dispositions du code criminel, adaptées au contexte de la offence act, suppléent à toute lacune dans celle-ci. on ne peut raisonnablement interpréter ces dispositions comme priorisant d’autres lois, plus éloignées, plutôt que les dispositions de la offence act elle- même et d’autres lois auxquelles la offence act renvoie expressément. les dispositions du par. 3(1) et de l’art. 133 de la offence act, placées en ordre de «  hiérarchie  » ou en «  ordre d’opérations  », comme l’affirme m. bessette, prescrivent de faire ce qui suit : (1) look to the particularized legislation creating the offence in question (in this case, the motor vehicle act) (s. 3(1)); (1) consulter la loi précise qui crée l’infraction dont il est question (en l’espèce, la motor vehicle act) (par. 3(1)); (2) provided the particularized legislation does not direct otherwise, apply the offence act (s. 3(1)); (3) where the offence act is silent on the matter in question (or makes only partial provision for the matter), look to the criminal code (s. 133); and (4) if the matter is not addressed in any of the preceding legislation, turn to other sources of law, including other british columbia legisla- tion. [56] mr. bessette argues that this roadmap leads directly to the incorporation of s. 530 of the criminal code into the offence act via s. 133 of the latter act. we agree. in what follows, we explain why the act’s language and purpose support mr. bessette’s interpretation of the offence act. (2) à moins que la loi précise n’en dispose autre- ment, appliquer la offence act (par. 3(1)); (3) lorsque la offence act est muette quant à la question en jeu (ou qu’elle ne prévoit qu’une dis- position partielle à ce sujet), consulter le code criminel (art. 133); et (4) si les lois qui précèdent ne traitent pas de la ques- tion, consulter d’autres sources de droit, y com- pris les autres lois de la colombie- britannique. [56] m. bessette fait valoir que ce cadre aboutit directement à l’incorporation de l’art. 530 du code criminel à la offence act par l’art. 133 de celle-ci. nous sommes d’accord avec lui dans les para- graphes qui suivent, nous expliquons pourquoi le texte et l’objet de la loi étayent l’interprétation que donne m. bessette à la offence act. [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 563 (1) section 3(1) of the offence act — the scope (1) paragraphe 3(1) de la offence act — la dis- provision position relative à la portée [57] located in the opening provisions of the of- fence act, s. 3(1) plays a straightforward role familiar to legislation: it sets out the act’s scope. it instructs that, unless another enactment directs otherwise (“[e]xcept where otherwise provided by law”), “this act applies to proceedings as defined in section 1” (see, for example, anderson v. victoria (city), 2002 bcsc 1466, 9 bclr (4th) 75, at paras 14-15). put differently, all provincial offence “proceedings” are governed by the offence act unless they (or aspects of them) are expressly removed from the ambit of the act by another provincial enactment — typically the particularized legislation creating the offence. [58] on this plain and logical interpretation of s. 3(1), the phrase “[e]xcept where otherwise provided by law” does not mean that a particular provision of the offence act will not apply to “proceedings” if that particular provision contradicts another law in effect in british columbia (such as the 1731 act). rather, the offence act “applies to proceedings as defined in section 1”, “[e]xcept” if it is expressly “provided by [another] law” that the offence act, in whole or in part, does not apply to proceedings to which it would normally apply. [57] faisant partie des dispositions initiales de la offence act, le par. 3(1) joue un rôle simple et familier à la législation : il définit la portée de la loi. il prévoit que, à moins qu’un autre texte de loi n’en dispose autrement ([traduction] « [s]auf disposi- tion contraire de la loi »), « la présente loi s’applique aux instances au sens de l’article 1 » (voir, p ex,. anderson c. victoria (city), 2002 bcsc 1466, 9 bclr (4th) 75, par 14-15). autrement dit, toutes les « instances » visant une infraction provinciale sont régies par la offence act sauf si un autre texte de loi provincial — habituellement la loi précise créant l’infraction — écarte expressément celles-ci (ou des aspects de celles-ci) du champ d’application de la offence act. [58] suivant l’interprétation claire et logique du par. 3(1) qui précède, l’expression « [s]auf dispo- sition contraire de la loi » ne veut pas dire qu’une disposition précise de la offence act ne s’appliquera pas aux « instances » si elle contredit une autre loi en vigueur en colombie- britannique (comme la loi de 1731). en effet, la offence act « s’applique aux instances au sens de l’article 1 », « [s]auf » si une « disposition contraire [d’une autre] loi » prévoit expressément que la offence act ne s’applique pas, en totalité ou en partie, aux instances auxquelles elle s’appliquerait normalement. [59] both the history and application of s. 3(1) support this interpretation. the legislative prede- cessor to s. 3(1) of the offence act, s. 4(1) of an act respecting summary proceedings before justices of peace (summary convictions act), rsbc 1948, c. 317, read as follows: [59] l’historique et l’application du par. 3(1) ap- puient tous deux cette interprétation. voici le texte du par. 4(1) de an act respecting summary proceedings before justices of peace (summary convictions act), rsbc 1948, c. 317, la disposition qui a précédé le par. 3(1) de la offence act : [traduction] 4. (1) subject to any special provision otherwise enacted with respect to such offense, act or matter, this act shall apply to: 4. (1) subordonnément à toute disposition spéciale dé- crétée d’ailleurs au sujet de cette infraction, ac- tion, matière ou chose, la présente loi s’applique (a) every case in which any person commits, or is suspected of having committed, any offence or act over which the legislature (a) à tous les cas où un individu a commis ou est soupçonné d’avoir commis quelque infrac- tion ou fait quelque chose qui tombe sous le 564 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. has legislative authority, and for which such person is liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment, fine, penalty, or other punish- ment: contrôle législatif du législateur provincial et qui rend l’inculpé passible, après décla- ration sommaire de culpabilité, de l’empri- sonnement, de l’amende ou de quelque autre peine; (b) every case in which a complaint is made to any justice in relation to any matter over which the legislature has legislative authority, and with respect to which such justice has author- ity by law to make any order for the payment of money or otherwise. [code, s 706] (b) à tous les cas où une plainte est portée devant un juge de paix au sujet d’une affaire qui tombe sous le contrôle législatif du législateur provin- cial, et à l’égard de laquelle ce juge de paix est autorisé par la loi à ordonner le paiement de deniers ou autrement. [code, art 706]. the language of “special provision” bolsters our conclusion that “[e]xcept where otherwise provided by law” in s. 3(1) means “except where other par- ticularized legislation displaces the application of the offence act”. l’utilisation de l’expression « disposition spéciale » appuie notre conclusion selon laquelle l’expression « [s]auf disposition contraire de la loi » qui figure au par. 3(1) signifie « sauf si une autre loi précise écarte l’application de la offence act ». [60] examples of provincial enactments which displace the offence act in the manner contemplated by s. 3(1) include the freedom of information and protection of privacy act, rsbc 1996, c. 165, s. 74(3); the voluntary blood donations act, sbc. 2018, c. 30, s. 21(1); the armoured vehicle and after- market compartment control act, sbc 2010, c. 8, s. 12(9); and the legal profession act, sbc 1998, c. 9, s 85(4). these statutes provide expressly that s. 5 of the offence act — which makes it an “offence” under the offence act to do an act that the statute for- bids, or to omit to do an act that the statute requires to be done — does not apply to the statute in question. [60] parmi les textes de loi provinciaux qui écartent la offence act de la façon prévue au par. 3(1), men- tionnons la freedom of information and protection of privacy act, rsbc 1996, c. 165, par. 74(3); la voluntary blood donations act, sbc 2018, c. 30, par. 21(1); la armoured vehicle and after- market compartment control act, sbc 2010, c. 8, par. 12(9); et la legal profession act, sbc 1998, c. 9, par 85(4). ces lois prévoient expressément que l’art. 5 de la offence act — lequel érige en « infrac- tion » l’acte interdit par la loi ou l’omission d’ac- complir un acte exigé par la loi — ne s’applique pas à la loi en question. [61] finally, as mr. bessette notes, the attorney general’s proposed interpretation of “[e]xcept where otherwise provided by law” in s. 3(1) would give rise to an absurd consequence: it would render the offence act provisions subordinate to all other laws which might touch on offence act “proceedings”. in other words, the offence act would make itself residual. this interpretation is contrary to both the purpose of the act and the remaining text of s. 3(1), which states that “this act applies to proceedings”. [61] enfin, comme le signale m. bessette, l’inter- prétation que le procureur général propose de donner à l’expression [traduction] « [s]auf disposition contraire de la loi » figurant au par. 3(1) entraîne- rait une conséquence absurde : elle subordonnerait les dispositions de la offence act à toute autre loi susceptible de toucher aux « instances » intentées en vertu de cette loi. autrement dit, la offence act deviendrait une loi supplétive. cette interprétation est contraire tant à l’objet de la offence act qu’au reste du texte du par. 3(1), selon lequel « la présente loi s’applique aux instances ». [62] section 3(1) therefore gives us the first two steps in our legislative hierarchy or interpretive roadmap. first, it directs us to look to particularized [62] le paragraphe  3(1) nous indique donc les deux premières étapes de la hiérarchie entre les lois ou marche à suivre relative à l’interprétation. tout [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 565 legislation (here, the motor vehicle act) to determine whether that legislation ousts or alters the application of the offence act. second, if that legislation does not affect the offence act, s. 3(1) tells us that the pro- visions of the offence act apply. the motor vehicle act contains a number of references to the offence act, none of which purport to displace that act either as a whole or with respect to the language of trials. as such, the provisions of the offence act apply. d’abord, il nous enjoint de nous pencher sur une loi précise (en l’occurrence la motor vehicle act) pour décider si cette loi écarte l’application de la offence act ou la modifie. ensuite, si cette loi n’a pas d’incidence sur la offence act, le par. 3(1) nous indique que les dispositions de celle-ci s’appliquent. la motor vehicle act contient plusieurs renvois à la offence act, mais aucun d’entre eux ne vise à l’écarter en totalité ou en partie pour ce qui est de la langue des procès. par conséquent, les dispositions de la offence act s’appliquent. (2) section 133 of the offence act — the incor- (2) article 133 de la offence act — la disposition poration provision d’incorporation [63] one such offence act provision is s.  133, which directly contradicts the attorney general’s contention that the 1731 act dictates the language of offence act trials. section 133 clearly states that the provisions of the offence act and, residually, the criminal code, govern “proceedings” in priority to other legislation. if there were any doubt about the meaning of [64] s. 3(1), s. 133 reaffirms that the place to look for the law governing proceedings is “in this act”, not in any and all other british columbia law. had the legisla- ture instead chosen more general wording such as “in an enactment”, the attorney general’s proposed approach of giving precedence to the 1731 act on the matter of trial language might have had merit. however, the wording of s. 133 is very specific, and reflects a clear intention that the law be ascertained by looking within the four corners of the offence act. [63] l’article 133 de la offence act constitue une telle disposition, laquelle contredit directement la prétention du procureur général selon laquelle la loi de 1731 prescrit la langue des procès intentés en vertu de la offence act. l’article 133 indique clai- rement que les dispositions de la offence act et, de façon résiduelle, celles du code criminel, régissent les [traduction] « instances » et qu’elles ont pré- séance sur toute autre loi. [64] s’il y avait quelque doute au sujet du sens du par. 3(1), l’art. 133 confirme que c’est [traduction] « dans la présente loi » qu’il faut chercher les dispo- sitions régissant les instances, et non dans une autre loi de la colombie- britannique si le législateur avait plutôt employé une formulation plus générale comme « dans un texte de loi », l’approche que pré- conise le procureur général qui consiste à donner préséance à la loi de 1731 en ce qui concerne la langue du procès aurait peut- être été fondée. cepen- dant, le libellé de l’art. 133 est très précis et exprime l’intention claire que le droit soit établi en fonction de ce qui se trouve à l’intérieur de la offence act. [65] then, if no provision for a matter has been made in the offence act, s. 133 states that “the provi- sions of the criminal code relating to offences pun- ishable on summary conviction apply”, thus placing the criminal code next in the order of operations. section 133 provides for the incorporation of the criminal code in broad terms, as its provisions re- lating to summary conviction offences apply both in instances where “express provision has not been [65] alors, si la offence act ne contient aucune disposition sur une question donnée, l’art. 133 dis- pose que [traduction] « les dispositions du code criminel relatives aux infractions punissables sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire s’appliquent », ce qui fait du code criminel la deu- xième loi en ordre d’application. l’article 133 prévoit l’incorporation du code criminel en termes généraux, car ses dispositions liées aux infractions punissables 566 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. made” in the offence act and where “only partial provision has been made”. [66] this court has recognized that the incorpora- tion of criminal code provisions is not restricted to situations where the offence act and the provincial enactment creating the offence are silent on a matter. in moore v. the queen, [1979] 1 scr 195, the accused was charged with obstructing a peace officer by refusing to identify himself after violating the motor vehicle act by proceeding against a red light on his bicycle. the motor vehicle act made partial provision for the circumstances, as it included pro- visions requiring motor vehicle drivers (but not cy- clists) to identify themselves upon request by a peace officer, and provisions authorizing a peace officer to make an arrest without a warrant. this court incor- porated into the summary convictions act, 1960, via its s. 101 (now s. 133 of the offence act) an arrest power contained in s. 450(2) of the criminal code, and concluded that, since a constable had the power to arrest mr. moore to establish his identity pursuant to s. 450(2), mr. moore had committed the offence of obstructing that constable in the performance of his duties when he refused to accede to the constable’s identification request. sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité s’appliquent à la fois dans les cas où « aucune disposition expresse n’a été adoptée » dans la offence act et dans ceux où « seule une disposition partielle a été adoptée ». [66] notre cour a reconnu que l’incorporation de dispositions du code criminel ne se fait pas uni- quement dans les situations où la offence act et le texte de loi provincial créant l’infraction sont muets sur une question. dans moore c. la reine, [1979] 1 rcs 195, l’inculpé a été accusé d’avoir entravé un agent de la paix en refusant de s’identifier après avoir violé la motor vehicle act en brûlant un feu rouge alors qu’il roulait à bicyclette. la motor vehicle act prévoyait en partie la situation, car elle renfermait des dispositions obligeant les conducteurs de véhi- cule à moteur (mais non les cyclistes) à donner leur identité sur demande d’un agent de la paix, ainsi que des dispositions autorisant l’agent de la paix à arrêter quelqu’un sans mandat. notre cour a incorporé dans la summary convictions act, 1960, par son art. 101 (aujourd’hui l’art. 133 de la offence act) le pouvoir d’arrestation qui figure au par. 450(2) du code crimi- nel, et a conclu que, comme un agent avait le pouvoir d’arrêter m. moore pour établir son identité en vertu du par. 450(2), m. moore avait commis l’infraction d’en- trave à cet agent dans l’exercice de ses fonctions quand il a refusé d’accéder à sa demande d’identification. in moore, the fact that the motor vehicle act [67] clearly made partial provision for the matter did not preclude the incorporation of the relevant criminal code provisions (see also central okanagan (re- gional district) v. ushko, [1998] bcj. no. 2123 (ql) (sc);. vancouver (city) v. wiseberg, 2005 bcsc 1377, at paras. 28-36 (canlii); r v. ambrosi, 2012 bcsc 409, at paras.  31-32 (canlii); r v. 0721464 bc ltd, 2011 bcpc 90, at paras. 20-27 (canlii)). therefore, it is only where the offence act or the particularized legislation creating the of- fence fully provides for a matter that incorporation of criminal code provisions is precluded. [67] dans moore, le fait que la motor vehicle act prévoyait clairement la situation en partie n’écar- tait pas l’incorporation des dispositions applicables du code  criminel (voir aussi central okanagan (regio nal district) c. ushko, [1998] bcj. no. 2123 (ql) (cs);. vancouver (city) c. wiseberg, 2005 bcsc 1377, par. 28-36 (canlii); r c. ambrosi, 2012 bcsc 409, par. 31-32 (canlii); r c 0721464 bc. ltd., 2011 bcpc 90, par. 20-27 (canlii)). par conséquent, ce n’est que lorsque la offence act ou la loi précise créant l’infraction prévoit entièrement une situation que l’incorporation de dispositions du code criminel est exclue. [68] contrary to the attorney general’s suggestion that the words “and so far as applicable” indicate that criminal code provisions must be incorporated around other valid law (such as the 1731 act), the ordinary meaning of the phrase “with the necessary [68] contrairement à la suggestion du procureur général suivant laquelle les mots [traduction] « et dans la mesure où elles sont applicables » indiquent que les dispositions du code criminel doivent être incorporées d’une façon qui est conforme aux autres [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 567 changes and so far as applicable” is that the incor- porated provisions will be adapted to fit the offence act context. as above, the comparison between the previous and current versions of this provision sup- ports this interpretation: where, in any proceeding, matter, or thing to which this act applies, express provision has not been made in this act or only partial provision has been made, the provisions of the criminal code relating to offences punishable upon summary conviction apply, mutatis mutandis, as if the pro- visions thereof were enacted in and formed part of this act. lois valides (comme la loi de 1731), le sens ordinaire de l’expression « avec les adaptations nécessaires et dans la mesure où elles sont applicables » veut que les dispositions incorporées puissent être adaptées au contexte de la offence act. tel que nous l’avons mentionné précédemment, la comparaison entre les versions antérieure et actuelle de cette disposition étaye cette interprétation : [traduction] lorsque, dans toute instance, affaire ou chose à laquelle s’applique la présente loi, aucune disposition expresse n’a été adoptée dans celle-ci ou seule une disposition partielle y a été adoptée, les dispositions du code criminel relatives aux infractions punissables sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité s’appliquent, mutatis mutandis, comme si ces dispositions faisaient partie de la présente loi. (summary convictions act, 1960, s. 101) (summary convictions act, 1960, art. 101) if, in any proceeding, matter or thing to which this act applies, express provision has not been made in this act or only partial provision has been made, the provisions of the criminal code relating to offences punishable on summary conviction apply, with the necessary changes and so far as applicable, as if its provisions were enacted in and formed part of this act. [traduction] si, dans toute instance, affaire ou chose à laquelle s’applique la présente loi, aucune disposition ex- presse n’a été adoptée dans celle-ci ou seule une disposition partielle y a été adoptée, les dispositions du code criminel relatives aux infractions punissables sur déclaration som- maire de culpabilité s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires et dans la mesure où elles sont applicables, comme si ces dispositions faisaient partie de la présente loi. (offence act, s. 133) (offence act, art. 133) [69] this comparison demonstrates that “with the necessary changes and so far as applicable” is merely a re- wording of “mutatis mutandis”. this latin ex- pression means “[w]ith the necessary changes in points of detail, meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be altered when neces- sary, as to names, offices, and the like” (black’s law dictionary (6th ed. 1990), at p. 1019; see also the british columbia interpretation act, s. 44 (“mu- tatis mutandis”) and samograd v. collison (1995), 17 bclr (3d) 51 (ca)) “[w]ith the necessary changes and so far as applicable” therefore cannot be stretched to mean “to the extent that another source of law does not contradict the criminal code”. [69] cette comparaison démontre que l’expres- sion « avec les adaptations nécessaires et dans la mesure où elles sont applicables » est tout simple- ment une autre façon de dire « mutatis mutandis ». cette locution latine signifie « en changeant ce qui doit être changé, [et est] utilisée lorsqu’on veut ap- pliquer une règle à un cas analogue, à la condition toutefois d’effectuer les adaptations qui s’imposent » (dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien avec table des abréviations et lexique anglais- français (3e éd. 2004), p. 387; voir aussi la interpretation act de la colombie- britannique, art. 44 (« mutatis mutandis ») et l’arrêt samograd c. collison (1995), 17 bclr (3d) 51 (ca)). on ne saurait donc élar- gir le sens de l’expression « avec les adaptations né- cessaires et dans la mesure où elles sont applicables » pour qu’elle signifie « dans la mesure où une autre source de droit ne contredit pas le code criminel ». 568 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. [70] further, as with s. 3(1), the attorney general’s proposed interpretation of s. 133 creates illogical consequences. the attorney general’s approach in- vites the court applying s. 133 to search for other applicable legislation, including imperial legislation received into british columbia law, before looking to the criminal code. respectfully, this flies in the face of the plain wording and purpose of s. 133, as well as the overall scheme of the act. [71] following the attorney general’s logic, this court would have erred in moore by considering for incorporation through s. 101 of the summary con- victions act, 1960 (now s. 133 of the offence act) an arrest power contained in s. 450(2) of the criminal code, before and instead of looking for english laws on constabulary powers in place in 1858 which might have been applicable. to illustrate the implications of the attorney general’s position, it is worth not- ing that the parties and the court would have had to study, in priority to the criminal code, english laws such as: an act to provide for the regulation of municipal corporations in england and wales (uk), 1835, 5 & 6 will iv, c. 76; an act for further improving the police in and near the metropolis (uk), 1839, 2 & 3 vict., c. 47; an act for the es- tablishment of county and district constables by the authority of justices of the peace (uk), 1839, 2 & 3 vict., c. 93; an act to amend the act for the establishment of county and district constables (uk), 1840, 3 & 4 vict., c. 88; an act for con- solidating in one act certain provisions usually contained in acts for regulating the police of towns (uk), 1847, 10 & 11 vict., c. 89; an act to amend the acts relating to the metropolitan police (uk), 1856, 19 vict., c. 2; and an act to render more effec- tual the police in counties and boroughs in england and wales (uk), 1856, 19 & 20 vict., c 69. [72] similarly, the attorney general’s position im- plies that in application to destroy the dog “tup- pence”, 2004 bcpc 27, at paras. 46-47 (canlii), the court should have looked to the english justices of the peace act 1361 (eng.), 1361, 34 edw. 3, c. 1, instead of s. 810 of the criminal code, contrary to the express instruction set out in s 133. [70] de plus, comme dans le cas du par. 3(1), l’inter- prétation de l’art. 133 que propose le procureur géné- ral entraîne des conséquences illogiques. l’ap proche de celui-ci invite le tribunal qui applique l’art. 133 à chercher d’autres dispositions législatives applicables, ce qui comprend la législation impériale reçue dans le droit de la colombie- britannique, avant d’examiner le code criminel. avec égards, cette interprétation va à l’encontre du libellé clair et de l’objet de l’art. 133, ainsi que de l’économie générale de la loi. [71] selon la logique du procureur général, notre cour aurait fait erreur dans moore en envisageant d’incorporer par l’art. 101 de la summary convic- tions act, 1960 (aujourd’hui l’art. 133 de la offence act) un pouvoir d’arrestation prévu au par. 450(2) du code criminel, avant et au lieu de chercher des lois anglaises sur les pouvoirs policiers en vigueur en 1858 qui auraient pu être applicables. pour illustrer les conséquences de la position du procureur général, il convient de signaler que les parties et la cour au- raient dû examiner, avant le code criminel, des lois anglaises comme : an act to provide for the regu- lation of municipal corporations in england and wales (r-u), 1835, 5 & 6 will iv, c. 76; an act for further improving the police in and near the metropo- lis (r-u), 1839, 2 & 3 vict., c. 47; an act for the establishment of county and district constables by the authority of justices of the peace (r-u), 1839, 2 & 3 vict., c. 93; an act to amend the act for the estab- lishment of county and district constables (r-u), 1840, 3 & 4 vict., c. 88; an act for consolidating in one act certain provisions usually contained in acts for regulating the police of towns (r-u), 1847, 10 & 11 vict., c. 89; an act to amend the acts relating to the metropolitan police (r-u), 1856, 19 vict., c. 2; et an act to render more effectual the police in counties and boroughs in england and wales (r-u), 1856, 19 & 20 vict., c 69. [72] de même, la position du procureur général semble indiquer que dans la décision application to destroy the dog « tuppence », 2004 bcpc 27, par. 46-47 (canlii), le tribunal aurait dû se pencher sur la loi anglaise intitulée justices of the peace act 1361 (angl.), 1361, 34 edw. 3, c. 1, au lieu d’exa- miner l’art. 810 du code criminel, contrairement à la directive expresse qui figure à l’art 133. [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 569 [73] finally, we would reject the attorney general’s submission that s. 133 cannot incorporate s. 530 of the criminal code because language rights are substantive in nature and the focus of s. 133 is the incorporation of missing procedural sections. as set out above, the language of s. 133 provides for a generous incorporation of certain provisions of the criminal code. that language does not sup- port creating a distinction between substantive and procedural sections of the criminal code. more- over, s. 133 has previously been held to incorporate substantive provisions (see moore; little v. peers (1988), 22 bclr (2d) 224 (ca);. r v. singh, 2001 bcca 79, 149 bcac 215). [73] enfin, nous sommes d’avis de rejeter l’argu- ment du procureur général suivant lequel l’art. 133 ne peut incorporer l’art. 530 du code criminel parce que les droits linguistiques sont des droits de nature substantielle et que l’objet de l’art. 133 est l’incorpo- ration des articles manquants de nature procédurale. comme nous l’avons expliqué précédemment, le texte de l’art. 133 prévoit une incorporation étendue de cer- taines dispositions du code criminel. cette disposition ne permet pas de créer une distinction entre les dispo- sitions de fond et les dispositions d’ordre procédural du code criminel. en outre, l’art. 133 a déjà été inter- prété comme incorporant des dispositions de fond (voir moore; little c. peers (1988), 22 bclr (2d) 224 (ca);. r c. singh, 2001 bcca 79, 149 bcac 215). [74] in light of the foregoing, there can be no doubt that s. 133 of the offence act incorporates s. 530 of the criminal code without heed to the 1731 act. because the offence act applies to motor vehicle act proceedings, and neither the motor vehicle act nor the offence act makes provision for the language of trials, s. 530 of the criminal code applies “as if [it] were enacted in and formed part of [the offence act]”. [74] étant donné ce qui précède, il ne fait aucun doute que l’art.  133 de la offence act incorpore l’art. 530 du code criminel sans égard à la loi de 1731. puisque la offence act s’applique aux ins- tances intentées en vertu de la motor vehicle act et qu’aucune de ces deux lois ne traite de la langue dans laquelle doivent se dérouler les procès, l’art. 530 du code criminel s’applique [traduction] « comme [s’il] faisai[t] partie de la [offence act] ». (3) partial provision for french: sec tion (3) disposition partielle sur l’usage du français : 132(2)(a.4) of the offence act alinéa 132(2)(a.4) de la offence act [75] the attorney general argues that the offence act is not in fact silent as to the language of pro- ceedings, as it does provide for the use of french in a limited fashion at s 132(2)(a4) and provides forms in english only (in a schedule to the act). this, in the attorney general’s submission, demonstrates the limited role that the legislature intended the french language to play in offence act proceedings, and establishes that the broader provisions of s. 530 do not apply. [75] selon le procureur général, la offence act n’est pas, en fait, muette quant à la langue des ins- tances, car elle autorise un usage limité du français à l’al 132(2)(a4) et établit des formulaires en an- glais uniquement (en annexe de la loi). de l’avis du procureur général, cela démontre le rôle limité que le législateur voulait attribuer au français dans les instances tenues sous le régime de cette loi, et établit que les dispositions plus générales de l’art. 530 ne s’appliquent pas. [76] section 132(2)(a.4) of the offence act states: [76] l’alinéa 132(2)(a.4) de la offence act dis- pose : without limiting subsection (1), the lieutenant governor in council may, on the recommendation of the attorney general, make regulations as follows: [traduction] sans limiter la portée du paragraphe (1), le lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil peut, sur recommanda- tion du procureur général, prendre des règlements :   .   . 570 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. only for the purposes of an agreement between the province and canada under the contraventions act (canada), exercising the authority under paragraphs (a.1), (a.2), (a.3) and (g) in both the english and french languages; uniquement pour les besoins d’un accord entre la pro- vince et le canada visé par la loi sur les contraventions (canada), dans l’exercice des pouvoirs conférés aux alinéas (a.1), (a.2), (a.3) et (g) en français et en anglais; [77] essentially, the attorney general argues that if s. 133 incorporates the language provisions of the criminal code, then s 132(2)(a4) and the associ- ated federal regulation (discussed below) would be redundant. [77] le procureur général soutient essentiellement que l’al 132(2)(a4) et le règlement fédéral connexe (dont il est question plus loin) seraient redondants si l’art. 133 incorporait les dispositions du code criminel relatives à la langue. [78] we reject the significance the attorney gen- eral places on s 132(2)(a4). at most, this provision and the english forms scheduled to the offence act prevent the incorporation of s. 849(3) of the criminal code, which states: [78] nous rejetons l’importance que le procureur général attache à l’al 132(2)(a4). cette disposition et les formulaires en anglais en annexe à la offence act empêchent tout au plus l’incorporation du par. 849(3) du code criminel, qui prévoit ce qui suit : any pre- printed portions of a form set out in this part, varied to suit the case, or of a form to the like effect shall be printed in both official languages. [79] further, and more crucially, s 132(2)(a4) and the scheduled forms deal only with the language of forms. accordingly, they cannot preclude the incor- poration of s. 530 of the criminal code — which deals with the language of trials. to the extent that the forms speak to the role of the french language under the offence act generally, they make “partial provision” for french, permitting the incorporation of s 530. [80] relatedly, the attorney general submits that s. 3 of the federal application of provincial laws regulations, sor/96- 312, part viii (province of british columbia (“federal regulation”)) demon- strates that s. 133 of the offence act is understood not to already incorporate s. 530 of the criminal code. section 3 of the federal regulation makes s. 530 ap- plicable in respect of prosecutions under the offence act of contraventions under the federal contraven- tions act, sc 1992, c 47. sont imprimés dans les deux langues officielles les textes des formules prévues à la présente partie. [79] en outre, et plus fondamental encore, l’al. 132(2)(a.4) et les formulaires en annexe ne traitent que de la langue de ceux-ci. ils ne peuvent donc pas empêcher l’incorporation de l’art. 530 du code criminel, qui porte sur la langue des procès. dans la mesure où les formulaires témoignent du rôle que joue la langue française sous le régime de la offence act en général, il y a dans cette loi une « disposition partielle » sur l’usage du français, donnant ainsi ouverture à l’incorporation de l’art 530. [80] sur une note connexe, le procureur général plaide que l’art. 3 du règlement sur l’application de certaines lois provinciales, dors/96- 312, par- tie viii (province de la colombie- britannique (« rè- glement fédéral »)) démontre que l’art. 133 de la offence act est perçu comme n’incorporant pas déjà l’art. 530 du code criminel. l’article 3 du règlement fédéral prévoit l’applicabilité de l’art. 530 aux pour- suites intentées sous le régime de la offence act à l’égard de contraventions visées par la loi sur les contraventions, lc 1992, c 47. [81] this argument must similarly be rejected. the apparent rationale for the federal regulation is the federal government’s responsibility to ensure that prosecutions under the contraventions act provide [81] cet argument doit lui aussi être rejeté. la raison d’être apparente du règlement fédéral est la responsabilité du gouvernement canadien de faire en sorte que les poursuites visées par la loi sur les [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 571 for the use of both official languages (see commis- sioner of official languages (can.) v. canada (min- ister of justice), 2001 fct 239, 194 ftr 181). moreover, the federal regulation cannot and should not be treated as an interpretive aid for the british columbia offence act. we therefore fail to see how the incorporation by a federal regulation of s. 530 of the criminal code into the offence act for the specific purpose of the prosecution of contraventions under a federal enactment can preclude the incorpo- ration of s. 530 of the criminal code into the offence act via s 133. [82] in short, the provisions accounting for the prosecution of contraventions act offences under the offence act (s 132(2)(a4) and part viii of the fed- eral regulation), and the offence act forms, neither inform nor prevent the incorporation of s. 530 of the criminal code by way of s. 133 of the offence act. contraventions puissent se faire dans les deux langues officielles (voir canada (commissaire aux langues officielles) c. canada (ministre de la justice), 2001 cfpi 239. de plus, le règlement fédéral ne peut et ne doit pas être considéré comme un outil d’interpréta- tion de la offence act de la colombie- britannique. nous ne voyons donc pas de quelle façon l’incorpo- ration, par règlement fédéral, de l’art. 530 du code criminel dans la offence act dans le but précis de poursuivre les auteurs de contraventions prévues dans un texte de loi fédéral peut empêcher l’incor- poration de l’art. 530 du code criminel à la offence act au moyen de l’art 133. [82] bref, les dispositions portant sur les pour- suites à l’égard des infractions visées par la loi sur les contraventions en vertu de la offence act (al 132(2)(a4) et partie viii du règlement fédéral), ainsi que les formulaires de la offence act, n’influent pas sur l’incorporation de l’art. 530 du code criminel par l’art. 133 de la offence act ni ne l’empêchent. (4) the chronological interpretation (4) l’interprétation chronologique [83] the attorney general also relies on the timing of the enactments of s. 133 of the offence act and s. 530 of the criminal code to support his position that the former cannot incorporate the latter. the predecessor to s. 133 of the offence act was first passed in 1955 as part of an act respecting sum- mary proceedings (sum mary convictions act, 1955), sbc 1955, c. 71, s 102. this provision was sub- stantially similar to the current s 133. section 530 of the criminal code (then s 4621) became law on june 30, 1978, and was declared in force in british columbia on january 1, 1990. given that s. 530 came into force 35 years after the predecessor to s. 133 was enacted, the attorney general argues that it cannot be incorporated. [84] this position quite simply ignores s. 32 of british columbia’s interpretation act, as it was worded prior to january 1, 2019, which states: [83] le procureur général invoque aussi les mo- ments où ont été adoptés l’art. 133 de la offence act et l’art. 530 du code criminel à l’appui de sa position voulant que l’art. 133 ne puisse incorporer l’art 530. la disposition qui a précédé l’art. 133 de la offence act a vu le jour en 1955 en tant que partie de la loi intitulée an act respecting summary proceedings (summary convictions act, 1955), sbc 1955, c. 71, art 102. cette disposition res- semblait beaucoup à l’art. 133 actuel. l’article 530 du code criminel (l’art.  462.1 à l’époque) a été adopté le 30 juin 1978 et est entré en vigueur en colombie- britannique le 1er janvier 1990. comme l’art. 530 est entré en vigueur 35 ans après l’adoption de la disposition précédant l’art. 133, le procureur général plaide qu’il ne peut être incorporé. [84] cette position fait tout simplement abstraction de l’art. 32 de la interpretation act de la colombie- britannique, dans sa version antérieure au 1er jan- vier 2019, dont voici le texte : in an enactment a reference to another enactment of the province or of canada is a reference to the other [traduction] dans un texte de loi, la mention d’un autre texte de loi de la province ou du canada renvoie à 572 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. enactment as amended, whether amended before or after the commencement of the enactment in which the refer- ence occurs. l’autre texte modifié avant ou après l’adoption du texte où figure cette mention. [85] indeed, the courts in british columbia have held that s. 133 of the offence act “refer[s] to the criminal code as amended from time to time” and that “section 133 of the offence act should not be given a static interpretation but should incorporate contemporary sections of the criminal code as re- quired” (wiseberg, at paras. 32-35; r v. trow (1977), 5 bclr 133 (sc), at p 136). [85] en effet, les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique ont jugé que l’art. 133 de la offence act [traduction] « renvoie au code criminel et à ses modifications » et qu’« il faut non pas donner à l’article 133 de la offence act une interprétation statique, mais plutôt incorporer les articles actuels du code criminel au besoin » (wiseberg, par. 32-35; r c. trow (1977), 5 bclr 133 (cs), par 136). [86] relatedly, the attorney general emphasizes the fact that, in 1971, the british columbia legisla- ture abandoned legislation which would have granted british columbia courts the discretion to conduct proceedings in french. the attorney general argues that this abandonment illustrates that, absent fur- ther legislative action, there is no ability for british columbia courts to conduct trials in french (official report of debates of the legislative assembly, 2nd sess., 29th parl., march 10, 1971, at p 646). [87] even if the legislature’s reasoning for aban- doning this legislation could be ascertained, this decision was made nearly 50 years ago. as such, it cannot reasonably have any bearing on this court’s interpretation of the offence act as that statute reads today. it goes without saying that an enactment tells us a great deal more about a legislature’s intent than that legislature’s failure to enact something. any meaning that could be ascribed to the legislature’s in- action in 1971 cannot compete with the plain mean- ing of s 133. section 133 sets out the applicable law; silence or inaction does not. [86] dans le même ordre d’idées, le procureur général insiste sur le fait qu’en 1971, le parlement de la colombie- britannique a abandonné une loi qui aurait accordé aux tribunaux de cette province le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’instruire des instances en français. selon le procureur général, cet abandon montre que, sans aucune autre mesure législative, les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique ne peuvent pas tenir des procès en français (official report of debates of the legislative assembly, 2e sess., 29e lég., 10 mars 1971, p 646). [87] même s’il était possible d’établir les raisons pour lesquelles le parlement a abandonné ce projet de loi, la décision a été prise il y a près de 50 ans. elle ne peut donc raisonnablement influer sur l’interpréta- tion que la cour donne aujourd’hui à la offence act dans sa version actuelle. il va sans dire qu’un texte de loi en révèle beaucoup plus sur l’intention du législa- teur que le fait qu’il n’ait pas adopté une disposition précise. tout sens pouvant être donné à l’inaction du législateur en 1971 ne peut faire concurrence au sens ordinaire de l’art 133. cette disposition énonce le droit applicable; on ne peut dire la même chose du silence ou de l’inaction. [88] the plain intent of s. 133 of the offence act is to allow for incorporation of certain criminal code provisions in broad and general terms. we cannot glean from the words of s. 133 a specific intent to exclude s. 530 of the criminal code. to insist on such an exclusion of s. 530 is to demote the importance of language rights, or to assume that the province does not intend to make provision for the french language in its courts. this intention [88] l’article 133 de la offence act vise clairement à permettre l’incorporation de certaines dispositions du code criminel en termes larges et généraux. nous ne pouvons déduire du libellé de l’art. 133 que le législateur avait l’intention précise que l’art. 530 du code criminel soit exclu. insister pour exclure ainsi l’art.  530, c’est diminuer l’importance des droits linguistiques ou présumer que la province n’a pas l’intention d’adopter une disposition prévoyant [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 573 is clearly not present in s. 133 or elsewhere in the offence act. [89] as a final point, we note that both the attorney general and the provincial court judge rely on the division of powers between the provinces and the federal government to suggest that the language of provincial offence trials in british columbia should not readily be determined by the criminal code, a federal statute. while it is true that the language used in courts is a matter falling under provincial powers, british columbia has exercised that power in favour of granting french trials for provincial offences, by legislating to incorporate s. 530 of the criminal code into the offence act. interpreting s. 133 of the offence act as incorporating s. 530 of the criminal code does not equate to imposing or inserting a fed- eral provision into a british columbia act. rather, by virtue of their incorporation, the language provisions found under s. 530 form part of the offence act itself. l’usage du français devant ses tribunaux. cette inten- tion n’est manifestement pas présente à l’art. 133 ni ailleurs dans la offence act. [89] en dernier lieu, soulignons que le procureur général et le juge de la cour provinciale se fondent sur le partage des compétences entre les provinces et le gouvernement fédéral pour affirmer que la langue utilisée lors des procès relatifs aux infractions pro- vinciales en colombie- britannique ne devrait pas d’emblée être établie par le code criminel, une loi fédérale. s’il est vrai que la langue utilisée devant les tribunaux est une question relevant de la juridiction provinciale, la colombie- britannique a exercé cette compétence de manière à autoriser la tenue de procès en français relativement aux infractions provinciales en légiférant pour incorporer l’art. 530 du code cri- minel à la offence act. interpréter l’art. 133 de la offence act comme incorporant l’art. 530 du code criminel n’équivaut pas à imposer ou à insérer une disposition fédérale dans une loi de la colombie- britannique. de par leur incorporation, les disposi- tions de l’art. 530 en matière linguistique font plutôt partie de la offence act. (5) implied repeal (5) abrogation implicite [90] in their submissions before this court, the parties agreed that if s. 133 of the offence act were found to incorporate s. 530 of the criminal code, the 1731 act would be implicitly repealed in respect of offence act prosecutions. the attorney general conceded this point in oral submissions (transcript, at pp 75-76) [90] devant la cour, les parties s’entendent pour dire que s’il est conclu que l’art. 133 de la offence act incorpore l’art. 530 du code criminel, la loi de 1731 serait implicitement abrogée en ce qui concerne les poursuites intentées en vertu de la offence act. le procureur général a concédé ce point lors de sa plaidoirie (transcription, p 75-76) [91] we agree. by virtue of its incorporation into the offence act, s. 530 enjoys the same status in that act as it does in the criminal code. therefore, just as s. 530 of the criminal code implicitly repealed the 1731 act in respect of criminal trials (conseil sco- laire francophone, at para. 48), it implicitly repeals the 1731 act in respect of offence act trials. [91] nous sommes du même avis. de par son incor- poration dans la offence act, l’art. 530 jouit du même statut dans cette loi que dans le code criminel. par conséquent, l’art. 530 du code criminel abroge impli- citement la loi de 1731 à l’égard des procès intentés en vertu de la offence act, tout comme il abrogeait implicitement cette loi en ce qui concerne les procès criminels (conseil scolaire francophone, par 48). [92] section 2 of the law and equity act lends further support to this conclusion. it states that “the civil and criminal laws of england    must be held to be modified and altered by all legislation that has [92] l’article 2 de la law and equity act vient étayer davantage cette conclusion. il dispose que [traduction] « les lois civiles et criminelles d’an- gleterre [  ] doivent être tenues pour modifiées 574 bessette v british columbia (ag). côté and martin jj. [2019] 2 scr. the force of law in british columbia”. as s. 133 of the offence act incorporates s. 530 of the criminal code, s. 530 is, in effect, a provision of the offence act itself and therefore constitutes “legislation that has the force of law in british columbia”. as such, the imperial 1731 act must give way to the offence act’s provision for trials in either official language. par toute mesure législative adoptée en colombie- britannique ». puisque l’art. 133 de la offence act in- corpore l’art. 530 du code criminel, celui-ci devient lui- même, en fait, une disposition de la offence act et constitue donc une « mesure législative adoptée en colombie- britannique ». en conséquence, la loi de 1731 impériale doit céder le pas à la disposition de la offence act qui autorise la tenue de procès dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles. vi conclusion vi conclusion [93] for the above reasons, we conclude that s. 133 of the offence act incorporates s. 530 of the criminal code and that this incorporation implicitly repeals the 1731 act in respect of offence act proceedings. the provincial court judge erred in holding otherwise and in denying mr. bessette his right to a trial in french. this failure to comply with s. 530 consti- tuted a jurisdictional error, resulting in the provincial court’s loss of jurisdiction over mr. bessette’s trial. the supreme court of british columbia failed to recognize the jurisdictional nature of the provincial court judge’s ruling, its serious effects on mr. bes- sette’s language rights, and the clear benefits of ad- judicating the matter pre- trial. this failure caused it to err in declining to entertain mr. bessette’s petition for prerogative relief. the court of appeal for british columbia similarly erred in upholding the supreme court’s decision. [94] we would therefore allow the appeal, quash the order of the provincial court, and order that mr. bessette be allowed to stand trial in french. [93] pour les motifs qui précèdent, nous concluons que l’art. 133 de la offence act incorpore l’art. 530 du code criminel et que cette incorporation abroge implicitement la loi de 1731 à l’égard des instances engagées sous le régime de la offence act. le juge de la cour provinciale a commis une erreur en concluant autrement et en refusant à m. bessette le droit à un procès en français. ce non- respect de l’art. 530 constituait une erreur juridictionnelle, et a entraîné la perte de juridiction de la cour provinciale sur le procès de m bessette. la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique a omis de reconnaître que la décision du juge de la cour provinciale touchait à la juridiction, que celle-ci a eu des conséquences graves sur les droits linguistiques de m. bessette et qu’il y a des avantages évidents à trancher la ques- tion avant le procès. cette omission a amené la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique à commettre une erreur en refusant d’instruire la requête en bref de prérogative de m bessette. la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a elle aussi fait erreur en confirmant la décision de la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique. [94] nous sommes donc d’avis d’accueillir le pour- voi, d’annuler l’ordonnance de la cour provinciale et d’ordonner qu’il soit permis à m. bessette de subir son procès en français. vii. costs vii. dépens [95] mr.  bessette has requested that costs be awarded to him, both in this court and the courts below. cost awards in criminal cases are very rare, particularly in the absence of any charter violation (r v. m (ca), [1996] 1 scr 500;. r v. 974649 [95] m. bessette a demandé que les dépens lui soient adjugés devant la cour et les juridictions in- férieures. les dépens sont rarement octroyés en ma- tière criminelle, surtout s’il n’y a pas eu violation de la charte (r c. m (ca), [1996] 1 rcs 500; [2019] 2 rcs. bessette c colombie- britannique (pg). les juges côté et martin 575 ontario inc., 2001 scc 81, [2001] 3 scr 575). costs are typically awarded as a consequence of acts of bad faith or intentional misconduct on the part of the crown (munkonda, at para. 142; m (ca), at para 97). this was the case in munkonda, where the prosecution failed in several ways to respect the appellant’s language rights, and afforded superior treatment to the accused who had chosen to have their preliminary inquiry held in english than to the accused who had chosen to proceed in french (para 146). r c. 974649 ontario inc., 2001 csc 81, [2001] 3 rcs 575). ils sont habituellement adjugés en raison d’actes de mauvaise foi ou de conduite répré- hensible intentionnelle de la couronne (munkonda, par. 142; m (ca), par 97). c’est ce qui s’est pro- duit dans munkonda, où la poursuite n’a pas respecté à plusieurs égards les droits linguistiques de l’appe- lant, et a réservé un meilleur traitement aux accusés qui avaient choisi de subir leur enquête préliminaire en anglais qu’aux accusés qui avaient choisi de pro- céder en français (par 146). [96] there may be unique circumstances in which an accused should recover his or her legal costs even where there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the crown. in r v. curragh inc., [1997] 1 scr. 537, costs were awarded to the accused as a result of delays occasioned by the words and actions of the trial judge which gave rise to an apprehension of bias (para 13). [96] il peut exister des circonstances uniques dans lesquelles l’accusé devrait recouvrer ses dépens même lorsqu’il n’y a aucune preuve de mauvaise foi de la part de la couronne. dans r c. curragh inc., [1997] 1 rcs 537, les dépens ont été adjugés à l’accusé en raison des délais occasionnés par les propos et les actes du juge du procès qui ont suscité une crainte de partialité (par 13). in our view, the circumstances which might [97] justify awarding costs against the crown are not present in mr. bessette’s case. consequently, we would allow the appeal without costs. [97] à notre avis, les circonstances susceptibles de justifier la condamnation de la couronne aux dépens ne sont pas présentes dans le cas de m bessette. par conséquent, nous sommes d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi sans dépens. appeal allowed. pourvoi accueilli. procureurs de l’appelant : juristes power, van- ver; martin + associates, vancouver. cou ver; martin + associates, vancouver. procureur de l’intimé : procureur général de la british columbia, victoria. colombie- britannique, victoria. official languages of canada: office of the com- missioner of official languages, gatineau. procureur de l’intervenant le commissaire aux langues officielles du canada : commissariat aux langues officielles du canada, gatineau. ciations de juristes d’expression française de com- mon law inc.: shapray cramer fitterman lamer, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante la fédération des as- sociations de juristes d’expression française de com- mon law inc. : shapray cramer fitterman lamer, vancouver.
i. overview [1] steven devecseri died in a motorcycle accident. his insurer, royal & sun alliance insurance company of canada (“rsa”), proceeded to defend his estate in two lawsuits started by others injured in the accident, including jeffrey bradfield. three years after the accident, and over a year into litigation, rsa learned mr. devecseri had consumed alcohol immediately prior to the accident, putting him in breach of his insurance policy. rsa promptly ceased defending mr. devecseri’s estate and denied coverage. this reduced the value to mr. bradfield (and another third-party claimant) of mr. devecseri’s policy from the policy limits of $1,000,000 to the statutory minimum coverage of $200,000. nearly three years later, one of the actions proceeded to trial, resulting in a judgment against mr. devecseri’s estate and mr. bradfield, and a judgment for mr. bradfield on a cross-claim against the estate. [2] in enforcing his judgment against mr. devecseri’s estate, mr. bradfield rejected rsa’s position that its exposure on behalf of the estate was confined to the statutory minimum of $200,000. he advanced two grounds: first, waiver by conduct, and secondly, promissory estoppel. the trial judge agreed that rsa had waived its right to deny full coverage the court of appeal rejected both grounds of particular significance, it found that rsa’s conduct could not amount to a “promise or assurance which was intended to affect [the parties’] legal relationship and to be acted on” because rsa lacked knowledge of mr. devecseri’s policy breach when it provided him with a defence (see maracle v. travellers indemnity co. of canada, [1991] 2 scr. 50, at p 57). in so concluding, it saw no basis to fix rsa with imputed knowledge of the policy breach, even though the parties agreed that a coroner’s report, available shortly after the accident — and approximately three years before rsa took an off-coverage position — would have provided rsa with evidence of the breach. mr. bradfield appealed to this court, advancing both waiver by conduct and promissory estoppel arguments. [3] we would dismiss the appeal. the appellant now concedes, correctly in our view, that waiver by conduct was precluded by statute at the relevant time. with respect to promissory estoppel, we agree with the court of appeal that rsa could not have intended to alter its legal relationship with mr. bradfield because it lacked knowledge of the facts which demonstrated (or otherwise put rsa on notice) of mr. devecseri’s policy breach. nonetheless, even if this obstacle could be overcome, we would still harbour serious reservations about the availability of any estoppel argument on the facts of this case a third-party claimant like mr. bradfield faces additional hurdles in establishing a successful estoppel argument against an insurer, given the nature of their statutory relationship whether and to what extent ontario’s insurance act, rso. 1990, c. i.8, permits third parties like mr. bradfield to assert estoppel arguments, including on behalf of a first-party insured, raises a number of issues that were not fully or satisfactorily argued but which warrant comment. [4] a preliminary issue also arises. mr. bradfield discontinued his appeal after this court granted leave to appeal because he and rsa reached a settlement agreement. this court then granted the request of the trial lawyers association of british columbia to be substituted as the appellant. although the appeal is moot, trial lawyers argues that we ought to exercise our discretion to hear it on the merits in accordance with borowski v. canada (attorney general), [1989] 1 scr 342. we agree. ii background [5] on may 29, 2006, mr. bradfield, mr. devecseri and several others were riding motorcycles when mr. devecseri rode into oncoming traffic, colliding with a car being driven by jeremy caton the collision killed mr. devecseri and injured both mr. caton and mr. bradfield. at the time, mr. devecseri had alcohol in his system, in contravention of his motorcycle license and thereby in breach of his standard motor vehicle insurance policy. [6] rsa appointed an adjuster to investigate the accident he interviewed mr. bradfield, who — despite having accompanied mr. devecseri prior to the accident — did not mention that mr. devecseri had been drinking alcohol. nor was this fact revealed by the police report which had been provided in a redacted form to the adjuster. the adjuster’s report to rsa concluded that, while speed was a factor in the collision, further investigation would be required to know whether drugs or alcohol played any role. the adjuster also expressed confusion about who would normally be responsible for obtaining a coroner’s report, although rsa’s initial instructions to the adjuster listed a coroner’s report as a potential avenue of investigation. neither he nor anyone else at rsa took steps to obtain a coroner’s report. [7] on october 7, 2007, mr. bradfield sued mr. devecseri’s estate. on may 27, 2008, mr. caton sued the estate, as well as mr. bradfield and another motorcyclist in the group. pursuant to its insurance policy with mr. devecseri, rsa responded to these claims on behalf of the estate rsa retained counsel and filed a statement of defence in each action on march 5, 2009. [8] on june 25, 2009, examinations for discovery of mr. bradfield and the other motorcyclist occurred the other motorcyclist testified that he had seen mr. devecseri and mr. bradfield consuming alcohol at a restaurant shortly before the accident. mr. bradfield testified that he was at a restaurant with mr. devecseri, but said he could not recall if mr. devecseri was drinking alcohol. a coroner’s report, dated august 29, 2006, was then obtained, confirming that mr. devecseri had a modest quantity of alcohol in his system when he died. [9] on july 8, 2009, rsa advised all parties that it was taking an off-coverage position this change in position meant that if their claims were to succeed, mr. bradfield and mr. caton would be collectively entitled to no more than the statutory minimum coverage of $200,000 (insurance act, s 251(1)), rather than the $1 million that would have been available under mr. devecseri’s full policy. [10] almost three years later, in may 2012, mr. bradfield settled his action against mr. devecseri’s estate. as part of the settlement, rsa paid him $100,000 plus costs, representing half its statutory minimum coverage, while paying the other half to mr. caton. the settlement also included a payment to mr. bradfield by his own insurer of $750,000 in underinsured coverage. [11] in june 2012, mr. caton obtained a judgment for $1.8 million against mr. devecseri’s estate and mr. bradfield. while each was jointly liable to mr. caton, several liability was apportioned 90 percent against mr. devecseri and 10 percent against mr. bradfield. in the same proceeding, mr. bradfield also obtained judgment on a cross-claim for contribution and indemnity against mr. devecseri’s estate. [12] following the trial, mr. bradfield sought a declaration of entitlement to recover judgment against rsa on the basis that rsa waived mr. devecseri’s breach or was estopped from denying coverage to mr. devecseri’s estate the trial judge granted the declaration, finding that rsa waived its right to deny coverage by failing to take an off-coverage position and by providing a defence to mr. devecseri’s estate as the litigation progressed (2018 onsc 4477). having found waiver by conduct, the trial judge did not consider the estoppel argument. [13] the court of appeal allowed rsa’s appeal (2019 onca 800, 148 or. (3d) 161). it rejected mr. bradfield’s waiver argument, in part because, at that time, s 131(1) of the insurance act precluded recognition of waiver by conduct. likewise, mr. bradfield’s promissory estoppel argument failed because rsa lacked knowledge of the policy breach, such knowledge could not be imputed to rsa, and mr. bradfield was unable to establish detrimental reliance. iii. issues [14] commencing with waiver, the parties before this court agree that s 131(1) of the insurance act, as it read at the relevant time, required that waiver be given in writing and that rsa did not waive any rights in writing.1 accordingly, promissory estoppel is the sole issue before us: was rsa estopped from denying coverage because it responded to the claims against mr. devecseri’s estate long after it could have discovered evidence of mr. devecseri’s policy breach? iv analysis [15] promissory estoppel is an equitable defence whose elements were stated by sopinka j for this court in maracle, at p 57: the principles of promissory estoppel are well settled. the party relying on the doctrine must establish that the other party has, by words or conduct, made a promise or assurance which was intended to affect their legal relationship and to be acted on. furthermore, the [promisee] must establish that, in reliance on the [promise], he acted on it or in some way changed his position. [emphasis added.] the equitable defence therefore requires that (1) the parties be in a legal relationship at the time of the promise or assurance; (2) the promise or assurance be intended to affect that relationship and to be acted on; and (3) the other party in fact relied on the 1 although s 131(1) has since been amended to allow for recognition of waiver by conduct, the parties agree that the prior legislation applies to deciding this appeal. promise or assurance it is, as we will explain, implicit that such reliance be to the promisee’s detriment. [16] promissory estoppel seeks to protect against the “inequity of allowing the other party to resile from his statement where it has been relied upon to the detriment of the person to whom it was directed” (fort frances v. boise cascade canada ltd., [1983] 1 scr 171, at p 202) in the insurance context, estoppel arises most commonly where an insurer, having initially taken steps consistent with coverage, then denies coverage because of the insured’s breach of a policy term or its ineligibility for insurance in the first place. to prevent the insurer from denying coverage, the insured will attempt to show that the insurer is estopped from changing its coverage position based on its prior words or conduct. [17] although the nuances of the relationship between promissory estoppel and other forms of estoppel were not argued before us in this appeal, we observe that trial lawyers’ arguments may be better framed as supporting estoppel by representation rather than promissory estoppel (see ryan v. moore, 2005 scc 38, [2005] 2 scr 53, at para. 5; page v. austin (1884), 10 scr 132, at p 164). while the latter doctrine prevents the promisor from reneging on an assurance to alter the parties’ legal relationship, the former doctrine prevents a promisor from denying the truth of a prior representation (see, generally, b. macdougall, estoppel (2nd ed. 2019), at §§ 5.33 to 545). given the similarities between the doctrines, however, we resolve this appeal applying only the principles of promissory estoppel upon which trial lawyers relies, while noting that similar reasoning would apply if the claim were grounded in estoppel by representation. [18] as we will explain, trial lawyers’ estoppel argument must fail, primarily because rsa gave no promise or assurance intended to affect its legal relationship with mr. bradfield rsa lacked knowledge, at the time it provided a defence to mr. devecseri’s estate, of mr. devecseri having breached the policy by consuming alcohol this is fatal to trial lawyers’ position further, and even if constructive knowledge of the facts demonstrating a breach were sufficient for purposes of estoppel (which, as we will explain, it is not), rsa cannot be fixed with constructive knowledge of such facts in the circumstances of this case. rsa was under a duty to mr. devecseri to investigate the claim against him “fairly”, in a “balanced and reasonable manner” (fidler v sun life assurance co of canada, 2006 scc 30, [2006] 2 scr 3, at para. 63, citing with approval 702535 ontario inc v lloyd’s london, non-marine underwriters (2000), 184 dlr (4th) 687 (ont. ca), at para. 29). it did so. rsa was under no additional duty to mr. bradfield or other third-party claimants to investigate policy breaches at all, much less on a different and more rigorous standard than that which it owed to its insured. [19] these points are sufficient to dispose of this appeal. as indicated, however, we propose to canvass some additional difficulties that a third-party claimant like mr. bradfield must contend with in raising a successful estoppel argument against an insurer. a. intention [20] the parties agree that, for three years — from the date of the accident in may 2006 to discoveries in june 2009 — rsa was ignorant of mr. devecseri’s alcohol consumption. the issue is whether, that ignorance notwithstanding, rsa can be held to an assurance, by words or conduct, that it would not deny coverage on the basis of this policy breach. in our view, rsa’s lack of knowledge is fatal to trial lawyers’ estoppel argument. [21] to ground promissory estoppel, the requirement stated in maracle that a promise or assurance must be intended to affect the parties’ legal relationship signifies that the promisor must know of the facts that are said to give rise to that legal relationship, and of the alteration thereto — in this case, that mr. devecseri would be covered to the full policy limits despite his having breached the policy we acknowledge that the jurisprudence from this court speaks of intention, not knowledge (maracle, at pp. 57-59; john burrows ltd. v. subsurface surveys ltd., [1968] scr. 607, at p 615). but the significance of intention depends entirely on what the promisor knows. a promisor, such as rsa, cannot intend to alter a relationship by promising to refrain from acting on information that it does not have. if rsa is to be taken, by having furnished a defence, as having intended to affect a relationship with mr. bradfield by extending coverage notwithstanding mr. devecseri’s breach, it must be shown to have known of the facts which demonstrate that breach. [22] as we explain below, the requirement that rsa be shown to have known of the facts demonstrating a breach leaves a narrow role for imputed knowledge in this context. trial lawyers seeks to broaden this role, arguing that constructive knowledge arising from a breach of a duty to investigate is enough. we disagree. as we explain below, to hold otherwise would be to unwisely and unnecessarily undermine the existing duty on insurers owed to insureds — and not to third-party claimants like mr. bradfield — to investigate liability claims fairly, in a balanced and reasonable manner. [23] it is this simple: rsa lacked knowledge of the facts demonstrating mr. devecseri’s breach. this alone is dispositive of trial lawyers’ appeal. (1) imputed knowledge [24] as we have explained, promissory estoppel requires that an insurer know the facts demonstrating a breach in order to be bound to any promise to cover, notwithstanding that breach. to be clear, that is all that is required: knowledge of the facts. had, therefore, rsa known of the fact that demonstrated mr. devecseri’s breach (specifically, that he had consumed alcohol prior to the accident) but had failed to appreciate its legal significance (specifically, that this was a breach), knowledge of that legal significance could have been imputed to rsa. the leading authority from this court and the jurisprudence developed in lower courts support this view. but, as will be seen, this jurisprudence does not assist trial lawyers here. [25] in western canada accident and guarantee insurance co v parrott (1921), 61 scr 595, an employee was injured while working at her employer’s unguarded laundry machine. the employer, whose insurance policy required that all the machines be equipped with a safety guard, sent the insurer a report of the accident that implied that the machine in question was not guarded. further, two of the insurer’s agents either saw or were told that the machine was unguarded. justice idington held that, upon reading the employer’s report alone, it would be “inconceivable” that the insurer did not turn its mind to the breach (p 598). it followed that the insurer was in possession of the relevant fact that demonstrated the breach. while the contention that the insurer did not understand the legal significance of this fact was rejected by idington j as unbelievable (at p 600), it was also irrelevant: because the insurer knew of the relevant fact, the knowledge of its legal significance could be imputed to the insurer. in separate reasons, other members of this court agreed that the insurer was taken, by its knowledge of the fact of the unguarded machine, to have full knowledge of its rights to deny coverage (at p 601, per duff j.; at pp. 602-3, per anglin j.; at pp. 606-7, per mignault j.), and the insurer was therefore estopped from denying coverage after having defended the action. [26] parrott demonstrates the narrow operation of imputed knowledge in this context. where the insurer is shown to have known of the fact demonstrating a breach but has failed to appreciate its legal significance (that is, failed to discern that it indeed demonstrated a breach), a trier of fact may infer the insurer knew of its right to withhold coverage while intending to assure the insured that it would not act thereon (see maracle, at p 59; john burrows, at p 616). the employer’s reliance on the insurer’s conduct — in providing a defence and taking the matter to trial — as an assurance of coverage was reasonable in view of the insurer having actual knowledge of the fact of the unguarded machine. [27] this view finds support in the lower courts. in rosenblood estate v. law society of upper canada (1989), 37 ccli 142 (ont. hc), aff’d 16 ccli (2d) 226 (ont ca), the very nature of the claim — that a solicitor was aware that a property he was dealing with was over-mortgaged — fell outside the scope of the insurance policy. again, however, while the insurer knew of the solicitor’s awareness, it failed to appreciate its significance as demonstrative of a policy breach. and as in parrott, that did not matter: it was taken, by virtue of its knowledge of the fact, as appreciating its significance (p 156). whether the insurer actually did appreciate the significance of the fact was irrelevant. in this sense, estoppel differs from waiver, which requires knowledge of the legal significance of the facts (saskatchewan river bungalows ltd. v. maritime life assurance co., [1994] 2 scr 490, at p 500). in rosenblood estate, the reliance of the solicitor’s estate on the insurer providing a defence as an assurance of coverage was reasonable in light of the insurer having actual knowledge of the mere fact that brought the claim outside the scope of the policy. [28] this was echoed recently at the court of appeal for ontario in the commonwell mutual assurance group v campbell, 2019 onca 668, 95 ccli. (5th) 344, aff’g 2018 onsc 5899, 95 ccli (5th) 328, at paras. 38 and 40, where, again, the nature of the claim itself fell outside the scope of coverage. the insurer thus had knowledge of facts supporting a denial of coverage from the moment it received a statement of claim it was irrelevant that the insurer did not turn its mind to the applicable exclusion, and it was estopped from relying on that exclusion later to deny coverage. [29] this point — that the provision of a defence by an insurer, despite its knowledge of a fact demonstrating a breach, supports an inference that the insurer intended to alter its legal relationship with the insured — is widely accepted in our law (see, eg,. parlee v. pembridge insurance co., 2005 nbca 49, 283 nbr (2d) 75, at para. 12; fellowes, mcneil v. kansa general international insurance co. (2000), 22 ccli (3d) 1 (ont ca), at para. 69; gilewich v 3812511 manitoba ltd., 2011 mbqb 169, 267 man. r (2d) 40, at para. 42; gillies v. couty (1994), 100 bclr. (2d) 115 (sc), at paras. 5 and 8; federal insurance co. v. matthews (1956), 3 dlr. (2d) 322 (bcsc), at p 345; see also owen sound public library board v mial developments ltd (1979), 26 o.r (2d) 459 (ont ca), at p 467) also widely accepted is the proposition that, where an insurer knows of the facts demonstrating a breach, a failure to appreciate their legal significance as such — that is, as demonstrative of a breach — is irrelevant, so that such an appreciation may be imputed to the insurer, and the insurer estopped from denying coverage (see, for instance, personal insurance co. v. alexander estate, 2012 nwtsc 19, 30 mvr (6th) 282, at paras. 33-35 and 41-42; snair v. halifax insurance nationale-nederlanden north america corp. (1995), 145 nsr (2d) 132 (sc), at para. 62; rowe v. mills (1986), 72 nbr (2d) 344 (qb), at para. 12; hassan v toronto general insurance co. (1960), 22 dlr (2d) 360 (ont. hcj), at pp. 368-69). [30] in sum, where an insurer is shown to be in possession of the facts demonstrating a breach, an inference may be drawn that the insurer, by its conduct, intended to alter its legal relationship with the insured ⸺ notwithstanding the fact that the insurer did not realize the legal significance of the facts or otherwise failed to appreciate the terms of its policy with the insured. [31] here, it is undisputed that, when rsa defended mr. devecseri’s estate, it did not know of the fact of his consumption of alcohol prior to the accident, which fact, if known, would have demonstrated his policy breach. this is not a case where rsa knew of mr. devecseri’s consumption of alcohol but failed to appreciate it as putting him in breach on that basis, parrott, rosenblood estate and campbell are readily distinguishable. knowledge of the facts demonstrating mr. devecseri’s breach cannot be imputed to rsa, and rsa therefore cannot be taken to have intended to assure his estate, or mr. bradfield, or anyone else, that it would not be relying upon that breach to deny coverage. (2) constructive knowledge [32] trial lawyers urges us to find that rsa constructively knew of mr. devecseri’s breach, and is thus taken to know what it ought to or should have known. this submission is premised on what trial lawyers says is rsa’s breach of a duty to diligently investigate the claim against its insured we would reject trial lawyers’ argument, and with it the possibility of recognizing constructive knowledge arising from a breach of a duty to investigate as grounding promissory estoppel, for two reasons. [33] first, this argument entails a significant — and, in our view, unwise and unnecessary — modification of the obligation an insurer owes to the insured in the context of a liability claim this duty exists because insurers have strong economic incentives to deny coverage, which this court has sought to moderate in the public interest. as claims arise under a policy of liability insurance, insurers are bound by a duty to the insured to investigate each claim “fairly”, in a “balanced and reasonable manner”, and not engage in a relentless search for a policy breach (fidler, at para. 63, citing 702535 ontario inc., at para. 29) the point bears reiteration: this court has sought to temper the incentives of insurers in order to protect the interests of insureds, who are vulnerable when insurers act with “wilful tunnel vision” to look for policy breaches where there is “nothing to go on” (whiten v. pilot insurance co., 2002 scc 18, [2002] 1 scr 595, at paras. 102-3). [34] the duty owed to the insured to investigate fairly, in a balanced and reasonable manner, as recognized by this court is at odds with the duty to investigate “thoroughly” and “diligently” urged upon us by trial lawyers (af, at paras. 121 and 123) apparently relying on coronation insurance co v taku air transport ltd., [1991] 3 scr 622, trial lawyers submits that the insurer is bound by a duty to “know the things that were within [its] grasp” (transcript, p 24; see also af, at para. 124; coronation insurance, at p 640). but coronation insurance is of minimal assistance here. first, the standard set in that case and in canadian indemnity co. v. canadian johns-manville co., [1990] 2 scr 549, related to insurers’ presumed knowledge of their own files and of issues of public notoriety. the coroner’s report at issue in this case was neither in the possession of the insurer nor notorious. more fundamentally, those cases concerned an insurer’s assessment of the risks associated with a prospective insured before even entering into an insurance contract. at that pre-contract stage, this court’s concern was to temper the insurer’s incentives to enter into a contract while turning a blind eye to the risks posed by the insured, only to then use the non-disclosure of those risks as a basis for denying coverage as claims arose. the incentives operate differently where, as here, we are concerned with claims under an existing contract. at that stage, the insurer has every incentive to search for breaches in relation to a given claim. we fear that, far from tempering these incentives, trial lawyers’ submission would augment them, pushing insurers to go the extra mile to find policy breaches. for this reason, the submission must be rejected. [35] secondly, there is no basis in law for a third-party claimant such as mr. bradfield to be able to ground an estoppel argument in any alleged breaches of an insurer’s duty to its insured. in other words, the duty to investigate fairly, in a balanced and reasonable manner, is owed only to the insured, not third parties. were such a duty owed to third parties, it would sit uneasily, and indeed would undermine, the duties of utmost good faith and fair dealing that govern the relationship between the parties to an insurance contract — in this case, between rsa and mr. devecseri. this is because the obligations between the insurer and the insured are reciprocal; while the insurer has the aforementioned duty to investigate fairly, in a balanced and reasonable manner, the insured is also under a reciprocal duty to disclose facts material to the claim (whiten, at para. 83, citing andrusiw v. aetna life insurance co. of canada (2001), 289 ar 1 (qb), at paras. 84-85; bhasin v hrynew, 2014 scc 71, [2014] 3 scr 494, at para. 55). [36] this reciprocity of obligation is worth stressing. this court has taken care to strike a careful balance in stating and developing the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing between insurer and insured with a view to facilitating the honest, fair, and expeditious resolution of insurance claims. here, rsa owed mr. devecseri a duty to investigate the claims against his estate fairly, in a balanced and reasonable manner, and without being zealous or relentless in its search for policy breaches had he survived, mr. devecseri would have owed a reciprocal duty to disclose any information in his possession which might have voided his coverage — in particular, that he had consumed alcohol if, after having received this disclosure, rsa had continued to provide a defence, mr. devecseri could have relied on that continued defence as an assurance of coverage that could prevent rsa from later changing positions had, however, mr. devecseri failed to disclose to rsa the fact of his having consumed alcohol, the breach of his duty to disclose would foreclose any later assertion by him and against rsa of estoppel. [37] trial lawyers asks that we allow third-party claimants to piggy-back onto the relationship between insurer and insured, characterized as it is by mutual duties of utmost good faith and fair dealing, but in a way that strips the new relationship between an insurer and third-party claimants of all such mutuality so, while mr. bradfield claims he does not recall whether mr. devecseri consumed alcohol, it is worth bearing in mind that, had he known, he would be under no obligation to rsa to disclose that fact and yet, trial lawyers would have this court burden rsa with a duty to mr. bradfield to discover that selfsame fact. we see no justice in impressing rsa with such a duty while mr. bradfield owes no corresponding obligation. further, and in any event, we note that promissory estoppel requires that the party seeking the aid of equity come with clean hands, which may also entail an obligation to disclose material facts, particularly in contexts such as insurance where parties are bound by reciprocal duties of utmost good faith (see, eg,. macdougall, at §§ 5.289 to 5292). [38] viewed in light of the reciprocity of obligations between the actual contracting parties — the insurer and the insured — there is a certain absurdity to trial lawyers’ position it would effectively mean that a contract of liability insurance provides greater protection to, and imposes fewer (indeed, no) obligations upon, third parties like mr. bradfield than it provides to and imposes upon the first-party insured. this result effectively runs contrary to the clear expression of legislative intent in s 258(11) of the insurance act, which provides that an insurer is entitled to assert any defences against the claimant as it could raise against the insured. [39] for these reasons, we must reject trial lawyers’ argument that rsa can be fixed with constructive knowledge of mr. devecseri’s policy breach. b further issues [40] trial lawyers says it can assert estoppel on behalf of both mr. devecseri’s estate and mr. bradfield, based on assurances to each, and based on detriment suffered by each. this submission is extraordinary. while these issues were not satisfactorily argued by the parties and we therefore leave their resolution to another day, we highlight below some of the difficulties that trial lawyers would face in asserting estoppel in the manner it proposes, given the third-party nature of its claim and the relevant statutory context. (1) limits of the statutory relationship [41] promissory estoppel generally requires that the promisor and promisee already have a legal relationship (maracle, at p 57; canadian superior oil ltd v. paddon-hughes development co., [1970] scr 932, at p 938; atlantic steel buildings ltd. v. cayman group ltd. (1982), 50 nsr (2d) 609 (sc (app. div.)); see also macdougall, at § 592). trial lawyers says that mr. bradfield, as a third-party claimant relative to mr. devecseri’s insurance policy, was in a legal relationship with rsa by virtue of s 258 of the insurance act. the relevant provisions of s 258 of the insurance act read as follows: application of insurance money, 3rd party claims, etc. 258 (1) any person who has a claim against an insured for which indemnity is provided by a contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability policy, even if such person is not a party to the contract, may, upon recovering a judgment therefor in any province or territory of canada against the insured, have the insurance money payable under the contract applied in or towards satisfaction of the person’s judgment and of any other judgments or claims against the insured covered by the contract and may, on the person’s own behalf and on behalf of all persons having such judgments or claims, maintain an action against the insurer to have the insurance money so applied. defence where excess limits (11) where one or more contracts provide for coverage in excess of the limits mentioned in section 251 [i.e the $200,000 mandatory insurance minimum], . . . the insurer may, (a) with respect to the coverage in excess of those limits; and (b) as against a claimant, avail itself of any defence that it is entitled to set up against the insured . [42] trial lawyers submits that this statutory language creates the requisite legal relationship allowing mr. bradfield to assert a right of coverage as against rsa, both on his own behalf and by “stand[ing] in the shoes” of mr. devecseri’s estate (af, at para. 102). we agree that s 258 creates a legal relationship between mr. bradfield and rsa. it grants third-party claimants under an insurance policy a cause of action directly against an insurer, thereby bypassing the insured in this way, and to that extent, it ousts the common law rule of contractual privity which would otherwise bar a third-party claimant from suing an insurer on an insurance contract to which the claimant is not a party. absent s 258, the third-party claimant’s ability to recover funds from an insurer would be “entirely dependent upon the extent to which the insured [here, mr. devecseri’s estate] chooses to or is able to enforce its contractual rights against the insurer [here, rsa]” (b billingsley, general principles of canadian insurance law (3rd ed 2020), at p 295) all other provinces and territories have enacted provisions similar in effect to s 258. [43] we are, however, far from persuaded that trial lawyers accounts correctly for the nature of this relationship or of the rights and responsibilities flowing therefrom, and their implications for the estoppel analysis. this is because the precise nature of this legal relationship, as determined by the statutory text, permits a claimant to sue the insurer only “upon recovering a judgment” against the insured. on the facts of this case, this restriction is significant because rsa abandoned its defence of mr. devecseri in 2009, three years before mr. bradfield obtained his cross-claim judgment against rsa. this is the first obvious difficulty with trial lawyers’ position: it relies on conduct by rsa that predates the existence of the relevant legal relationship. [44] the difficulties do not end there. it is unclear to us, based on the text of the statute, whether mr. bradfield can assert an estoppel argument on behalf of mr. devecseri’s estate, as trial lawyers proposes section 258(1) permits mr. bradfield to bring his claim only on his “own behalf and on behalf of all persons having such judgments or claims . . . against the insured”, which would appear to foreclose claims in which mr. bradfield “steps into the shoes” of mr. devecseri’s estate and asserts an estoppel on that basis. we note, on the other hand, that s 258(1) states that it applies to judgments against the insured that are “covered by the contract”, which language contemplates a judicial determination of whether the first-party insured is, indeed, “covered”, in the sense that the insured could estop the insurer from denying coverage. [45] accordingly, without fuller submissions than we received, we would refrain from definitively concluding whether s 258(1) allows the type of claim that mr. bradfield advanced. but we nevertheless emphasize that these questions require clear answers before a claim like mr. bradfield’s could succeed. (2) assurance regarding coverage [46] even accepting for the purposes of argument that s 258 operates as trial lawyers suggests — by permitting mr. bradfield to assert estoppel based on rsa’s conduct predating the cross-claim judgment, whether on his own behalf or on behalf of mr. devecseri — there are further difficulties to resolve. we are of the view that trial lawyers has not identified any conduct by rsa that could amount to a “clear and unequivocal” or “unambiguous” assurance that it would refrain from denying coverage based on a later-revealed policy breach (engineered homes ltd. v. mason, [1983] 1 scr 641, at pp. 646-47, citing halsbury’s laws of england (4th ed.), vol. 16, at para. 1514). [47] trial lawyers relies exclusively on rsa’s fulfilment of its various statutory obligations and its duty to defend as such an assurance. at the initial stages of the litigation, ontario’s insurance legislation required rsa to advise plaintiffs of the existence of a policy covering mr. devecseri, the liability limits under that policy, and “whether the insurer will respond under the policy to the claim” (insurance act, s 2584). in answering the latter question, rsa had to determine whether its duty to defend mr. devecseri required it to respond under the policy. importantly, rsa’s duty to defend mr. devecseri was triggered not by rsa being satisfied that mr. devecseri was not in breach, but simply by the receipt of a claim against the insured alleging facts which, “if proven to be true, would require the insurer to indemnify the insured for the claim” (progressive homes ltd. v. lombard general insurance co. of canada, 2010 scc 33, [2010] 2 scr 245, at para. 19; see also monenco ltd. v. commonwealth insurance co., 2001 scc 49, [2001] 2 scr 699, at para. 29; non-marine underwriters, lloyd’s of london v. scalera, 2000 scc 24, [2000] 1 scr 551, at paras. 74-78; nichols v american home assurance co., [1990] 1 scr 801, at pp. 810-11). put simply, and absent a known policy breach, at the initial stages of a liability dispute the insurer may decline to defend the insured only where it is clear that the true nature of the facts as pleaded fall outside the scope of the policy (scalera, at paras. 50-55), or the claim is expressly excluded. [48] where, therefore, an insurer responds to a claim against its insured by defending, it is communicating — to the insured and to the third-party claimant — only that the claims against its insured are of a type that fall within the terms of coverage. in no sense can such a limited communication, without more, be taken as a promise to indemnify the claimant if the insured is found at fault, irrespective of any later-revealed or later-occurring policy breaches trial lawyers, in short, seeks to imbue rsa’s provision of a defence to mr. devecseri’s estate with greater significance than rsa’s conduct in fact signified. [49] lastly, even were it possible to construe the insurer’s assumption of a defence on behalf of its insured as a promise not to deny coverage, the third-party context of this case raises yet more problems for trial lawyers. in cases of questionable coverage, insurers often rely on reservation-of-rights letters or non-waiver agreements to preserve their right to deny coverage upon investigating the claim (see, generally, n. p. kent, “preventive paperwork: non-waiver agreements, reservation-of-rights letters and the defence of claims in questionable coverage situations” (1995), 17 advocates’ q 399). it is unclear to us how and whether a third party would ever obtain knowledge of a rights-reserving instrument of this kind, and in the absence of such knowledge, the third party could conceivably argue an estoppel unavailable to the insured. in this way, trial lawyers’ submission once more appears to give more to the third party than to the first-party insured. (3) detrimental reliance [50] the final hurdle for trial lawyers would lie in establishing detrimental reliance. while we need not decide whether detrimental reliance is made out on the facts of this case, we note that the parties advanced arguments on the extent to which detrimental reliance can be presumed in cases where litigation has progressed to an advanced stage (see rosenblood estate, at pp. 156-57). this court has never opined on such a presumption of prejudice and we decline to do so here, but we nevertheless highlight that the cases upon which trial lawyers relies involved claims by the first-party insured, not third-party claimants this distinction requires careful consideration in a future case. [51] we also affirm that detrimental reliance by the promisee must be shown to assert promissory estoppel. the court in maracle did not refer to the requirement of detrimental reliance because the detriment in that case was self-evident: the promisor allegedly stated it would not act on an expired limitation period and the promisee then allowed the limitation period to expire before bringing an action. detrimental reliance has, however, always been a requirement for asserting promissory estoppel, or for that matter any form of estoppel. this is because, being an equitable doctrine, its goal is to address unconscionable, unjust, or unfair conduct (ryan, at paras. 68 and 74; cowper‑smith v. morgan, 2017 scc 61, [2017] 2 scr 754, at paras. 20 and 28). and what makes it unconscionable, unjust, or unfair to resile from a promise or assurance is that the promisor has, by intention and effect, induced the promisee to change its position in reliance thereon, to its detriment for that reason, asserting promissory estoppel requires evidence of prejudice, inequity, unfairness or injustice before courts will give hold a promisor to its promise or assurance (see hughes v. metropolitan railway co. (1877), 2 app. cas. 439 (hl), at p 448, aff’d in conwest exploration co. v. letain, [1964] scr 20, at pp. 27-28, per judson j.; fort frances, at p 202, and ryan, at para. 51, citing amalgamated investment & property co. (in liquidation) v. texas commerce international bank ltd., [1982] 1 qb 84 (ca), at p 122). v disposition and costs [52] we would dismiss the appeal. [53] trial lawyers says costs should not be awarded against it because it is a public interest litigant and because rsa was not obliged to participate in this appeal. the latter suggestion we find highly unrealistic, given the obligation trial lawyers sought to have imposed on insurers in this case. nevertheless, and while this is a close call, we are of the view that the parties should bear their own costs on the appeal and the motion to substitute trial lawyers as a party. our order in this regard should not be taken as a suggestion to other similarly situated groups that they may in future take up and prosecute appeals arising out of settled litigation without the risk of exposure to a costs order. the following are the reasons delivered by karakatsanis j — [54] i have read the reasons of moldaver and brown jj and i agree that the appeal must be dismissed. i also agree with much of their legal analysis. however, in my view, they have added an unnecessary gloss to an element of promissory estoppel, inconsistent with the jurisprudence and inconsistent with the underlying principles of equity. by doing so, they have undermined the protection that this equitable doctrine provides. [55] as my colleagues note, the elements of promissory estoppel were stated by this court in maracle v. travellers indemnity co. of canada, [1991] 2 scr 50, and are well established in the jurisprudence. a basic requirement is that the promisor “has, by words or conduct, made a promise or assurance which was intended to affect their legal relationship and to be acted on” (maracle, at para. 57). justices moldaver and brown interpret this requirement — an intention to vary legal rights — as requiring the promisor’s actual knowledge of the facts underlying the legal right. they reason that the promisor cannot intend to affect the legal relationship unless they have actual knowledge of the facts underlying that relationship (para. 21). nevertheless, because they accept that the jurisprudence does not require actual knowledge of the legal significance of the facts, they conclude that knowledge of the legal significance may be imputed. [56] i cannot agree that actual knowledge is required precisely because the promisor’s intent must be analyzed objectively subjective intent is unknowable to anyone other than the promisor and is not the appropriate lens for this equitable doctrine. the jurisprudence has long established that the intent of the promisor must be interpreted objectively. a promise is intended to vary legal relations when it would be reasonable for the promisee to interpret it as such. the objective approach is grounded in our jurisprudence — going back to the origins of the doctrine — and aligns with the fundamental purpose of promissory estoppel: preventing inequity. [57] as i shall explain, under an objective approach, knowledge is relevant because it informs the interpretation of the promisor’s conduct in the full factual context. the objective approach considers whether, viewed objectively in light of the full context and including all the facts that the promisor knew or reasonably can be taken to have known, the promisor intended to alter legal rights. [58] because knowledge of the underlying facts is an important part of the context in which an objective assessment is made, my colleagues’ additional requirement of actual knowledge may have little practical effect on the result in many cases. as my colleagues observe, even if constructive knowledge were sufficient for the purposes of promissory estoppel, it would not be available on the facts of this case and the appeal could be dismissed on that basis. however, my colleagues’ addition of an absolute requirement of actual knowledge of the facts distracts from the true inquiry and unduly constrains the flexibility inherent in equity. i. analysis [59] confusion over the role of the promisor’s knowledge in this appeal stems from a failure to properly apply an objective analysis of the promisor’s intent. there is no dispute in our jurisprudence that promissory estoppel requires a promise or assurance that was intended by the promisor to alter legal relations and that the promise or assurance must be clear and unequivocal. importantly, the jurisprudence indicates that the promisor’s conduct is analyzed objectively. the promisor’s intent is discerned from their words or conduct and their knowledge is relevant to the extent that it illuminates how the words or conduct can be reasonably interpreted. [60] whether the promisor intended the promise to be binding is often the contentious question in promissory estoppel cases (a robertson, “knowledge and unconscionability in a unified estoppel” (1998), 24 monash u.l rev 115, at pp. 127-28). this requirement of intention did not appear in hughes v. metropolitan railway co. (1877), 2 app. cas. 439 (hl), the case often credited as the source of the modern doctrine it was lord denning’s summary of the principle in central london property trust ltd. v. high trees house ltd., [1947] kb 130, that added the requirement that the promise be “intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon and in fact acted upon” (p 134). [61] the interpretive issue is how this intent should be judged: objectively or subjectively (ie according to the subjective perspective of the promisor). [62] this issue was addressed by the court of appeal for ontario in owen sound public library board v. mial developments ltd. (1979), 26 or (2d) 459. the court of appeal concluded that “a promise, whether express or inferred from a course of conduct, is intended to be legally binding if it reasonably leads the promisee to believe that a legal stipulation, such as strict time of performance, will not be insisted upon” (p 465). the court of appeal held that intent does not require a direct statement to that effect and determined that “[k]nowledge by the promisor that the promisee is likely to regard the promise as affecting their legal relations constitutes an appropriate basis from which the inference of the existence of a sufficient intent can be drawn” (p 467 (emphasis added)) as professor mccamus explains, “the court [in owen sound] clearly indicated that the fact the contractor may not have intended to signal a willingness to ignore the time limit was irrelevant” (the law of contracts (3rd ed. 2020), at p 313). [63] one of the earliest endorsements of this objective analysis was that of parke b in freeman v. cooke (1848), 2 ex. 654, 154 er 652, who wrote: [i]f whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take the representation to be true, and believe that it was meant that he should act upon it, and did act upon it as true, the party making the representation would be equally precluded from contesting its truth . . . . [p 656] (see also birmingham and district land co. v. london and north western railway co (1888), 40 ch d 268 (ca), at p 287, per bowen lj;. charles rickards ld. v. oppenheim, [1950] 1 kb 616 (ca), at p 623, per denning lj) [64] in addition to the jurisprudence, an objective interpretation of the promisor’s words or conduct is strongly supported by commentators. in his treatise, professor mccamus writes: “the test for whether the undertaking was given is . objective” (p 313) professor macdougall similarly concludes, “a promise or assurance, whether express or inferred from a course of conduct, is intended to be legally binding if it reasonably leads the promisee to believe that a right or other legal stipulation . . will not be insisted upon” (estoppel (2nd ed 2019), at § 5195). professor manwaring has observed that, “[s]ubjective intention is unknowable and intention can only be inferred from words and actions or, in other words, the objective manifestations of intent” and that the “case law clearly supports the view that the intentions of the promisor are to be discovered through an objective analysis” (“promissory estoppel in the supreme court of canada” (1987), 10 dal. lj 43, at p 64). [65] there are important doctrinal reasons to focus on the reasonable interpretation of the promisor’s conduct, and not on their subjective intent or actual knowledge promissory estoppel responds to unconscionability (or inequity or unfairness) and reliance, which are closely linked concepts (see cowper-smith v. morgan, 2017 scc 61, [2017] 2 scr 754, at paras. 15-16) as moldaver and brown jj. acknowledge in this appeal, “[p]romissory estoppel seeks to protect against the ‘inequity of allowing the other party to resile from his statement where it has been relied upon to the detriment of the person to whom it was directed’” (para. 16, quoting fort frances v. boise cascade canada ltd., [1983] 1 scr 171, at p 202). however, inequity is found where the promisor acted in a manner that the promisee reasonably interpreted as a promise and the promisee changed their position as a result as expressed by mason cj and wilson j in waltons stores (interstate) ltd. v. maher (1988), 164 clr 387, “equity will come to the relief of a plaintiff who has acted to his detriment on the basis of a basic assumption in relation to which the other party to the transaction has ‘played such a part in the adoption of the assumption that it would be unfair or unjust if he were left free to ignore it’” (p 404, quoting grundt v. great boulder pty gold mines ltd. (1937), 59 clr 641, at p 675, per dixon j). [66] in my view, the role of knowledge in promissory estoppel flows from the nature of this objective analysis, which focuses on whether it was reasonable in the circumstances to interpret the promisor’s words or conduct as an intent to change legal relations subjective intent — which is unknowable to the promisee — is not the appropriate focus for promissory estoppel. for the same reason, promissory estoppel does not require actual knowledge in every case. [67] proprietary estoppel — unlike promissory estoppel — initially did require the defendant’s actual knowledge (of both the existence of the right and the claimant’s mistaken belief as to their legal right). the house of lords in thorner v. major, [2009] ukhl 18, [2009] 1 wlr 776, followed by this court in cowper-smith, removed the explicit knowledge requirement and endorsed an objective interpretation. lord scott of foscote described the objective analysis as follows: if it is reasonable for a representee to whom representations have been made to take the representations at their face value and rely on them, it would not in general be open to the representor to say that he or she had not intended the representee to rely on them . . . . it could not be thought reasonable for a representee to rely on a representation that, objectively viewed, was not intended by the representor to be relied on. [para. 17] [68] because equity is concerned with addressing unfairness, the application of the doctrine must be fair to both parties and must consider the context from both perspectives. equity is not just concerned with the subjective intention or the actual knowledge of the promisor. the person who relies on the promisor’s words or conduct should be able to rely on the entire context, including what the promisor could reasonably be assumed to know. and the impact of any words or conduct must also be assessed from the perspective of what the promisor could reasonably assume the promisee knew therefore, in order to determine whether, viewed objectively, the words or conduct convey an intention to vary legal rights, the fact-finder must look at the entire context, including what the promisor knew or can be taken to have known. [69] as an illustrative example, if it were industry practice to immediately obtain a police report after a motor vehicle accident, and this practice was generally known or the insurer knew that the person relying on the promise had knowledge of this practice, then it would be reasonable to interpret the insured’s conduct in light of an assumption that they were aware of the contents of the police report. the fact that an insurer, through mistake or negligence, actually failed to obtain the report would not be decisive to an objective interpretation of their conduct unless the insured knew that the insurer had not obtained the report. [70] for this reason, the objective lens does not mean that there is no role for the knowledge of the promisor (and promisee) western canada accident and guarantee insurance co v parrott (1921), 61 scr 595, illustrates the role that knowledge plays in the promissory estoppel analysis the insurance company’s conduct could be reasonably interpreted as a promise intended to alter legal relations precisely because it was clear in the context that they knew they had the option to void the policy but chose not to. as duff j wrote, the insurance company’s conduct in the circumstances provided “ample evidence to support the inference, and that i think is the right inference, that the company agreed to assume responsibility under the policy” (p 601) actual knowledge of the facts supported the inference that the promisor intended to change legal relations; but it does not follow that actual knowledge is therefore a requirement of promissory estoppel parrott did not, therefore, create a unique promissory estoppel test for the insurance context that requires knowledge. [71] importantly, knowledge plays this role not because there is a bright-line rule that the promisor must have knowledge of the underlying facts in every case. knowledge is simply part of the context that informs the reasonable interpretation of the promisor’s conduct. there is only one test for promissory estoppel in canadian law, and the jurisprudence confirms that it is based on an objective interpretation of the promisor’s conduct. [72] my colleagues accept that imputed knowledge can be sufficient for promissory estoppel so long as the promisor is aware of the underlying facts; it does not matter if the promisor lacks knowledge about the legal significance of those facts. in other words, a court can “impute” knowledge of legal significance of the facts to the promisor however, my colleagues reject the idea that “constructive knowledge” arising from a breach of a duty to investigate is sufficient i find this distinction unhelpful again, promissory estoppel does not depend on a rigid categorization of different types of knowledge, but on the objective assessment of how the promisor’s conduct can be interpreted. [73] it is well established that a promisor cannot resist promissory estoppel by claiming that they only had knowledge of the facts but not their legal rights (see peyman v lanjani, [1985] 1 ch 457 (ca), at p 495, per may lj;. parlee v. pembridge insurance co., 2005 nbca 49, 283 nbr (2d) 75, at para. 12; the commonwell mutual assurance group v. campbell, 2018 onsc 5899, 95 ccli. (5th) 328, at paras. 38 and 40, aff’d 2019 onca 668, 95 ccli (5th) 344). this is significant because the knowledge that is relevant to an intention to change legal relations is knowledge of legal rights. in other words, if the promisor does not realize the legal significance of the underlying facts, they cannot intend to change legal relations at all. as professor manwaring writes: “if the promisor can easily discover what her legal rights are, it would be inequitable to allow her to act without making a reasonable effort to do so” (p 63). equity’s goal of preventing inequitable conduct is engaged where the promisor could easily have discovered their legal rights, chose not to, and then, through words or conduct, reasonably led the promisee to believe that the promisor would not enforce the legal rights. [74] the jurisprudence “imputes” knowledge of legal rights precisely because it would be inequitable for the promisor to resile where their conduct can reasonably be interpreted as an intention to change legal relations. the same objective analysis applies where the promisor can be taken to have knowledge of the facts. what matters is whether the context supports the inference of intent. [75] the objective approach also maintains the proper distinction between waiver — a common law doctrine — and promissory estoppel. waiver, which requires “full knowledge of rights” and “an unequivocal and conscious intention to abandon them”, imposes this strict test because there is no consideration for the promise (saskatchewan river bungalows ltd v maritime life assurance co., [1994] 2 scr 490, at p 500) further, unlike promissory estoppel, waiver does not require detrimental reliance waiver requires a conscious intention; full knowledge is necessary. by contrast, promissory estoppel — which is rooted in equity — does not impose a strict knowledge requirement, but requires detrimental reliance equity relieves against the harsh consequences of the application of common law rules. [76] therefore, whether the promisor has made a promise or assurance with the intent to change legal relations is a factual determination that must be made in light of the full context. a promise or assurance is intended to be legally binding where it would be reasonable for the promisee to rely on it. [77] i agree with my colleagues that in this case, royal & sun alliance insurance company of canada’s (rsa) conduct cannot be interpreted as an unequivocal assurance that rsa would continue to provide coverage even if the policy was void. a coroner’s report that none of the parties had accessed is not relevant to the objective interpretation of rsa’s conduct. rsa’s continued coverage did not signify any intent to change legal relations: the motor vehicle accident report included no reference to alcohol; none of the motorcyclists told the police about alcohol consumption; mr. bradfield never told rsa’s investigators or his own insurer about alcohol consumption; and the durham regional police collision investigation unit report did not mention alcohol. [78] i would also reject the idea that rsa is estopped simply because three years passed before it took an off-coverage position. the length of time is not determinative here ultimately, there is nothing unique in rsa’s conduct to suggest that rsa promised that it would not void coverage if it failed to discover breaches after a specific period of time. [79] therefore, mr. bradfield cannot succeed in establishing promissory estoppel because rsa did not make a promise or assurance that can be reasonably interpreted as intending to alter legal relations this is sufficient to dispose of this appeal. ii conclusion [80] in my view, the promisor’s intent in promissory estoppel must be interpreted objectively based upon their words or conduct: a promise is intended to be binding when it would be reasonable for the promisee to interpret it as such. given that the analysis does not focus on the subjective intent of the promisor, there is no absolute requirement that the promisor have knowledge of their legal rights or the underlying facts giving rise to those rights in every case. instead, knowledge is relevant because it is part of the context informing the objective interpretation of the promisor’s words or conduct. because the intention of the words or conduct must be assessed objectively, both what the promisor knew and what they reasonably ought to have known are relevant. [81] i would dismiss the appeal.
i. overview [1] this appeal raises the issue of whether a common law duty of good faith performance applies in a long-term contract for waste removal in the greater vancouver region. more specifically, it bears on how principles of good faith might preclude what one scholar has called the “abuse of contractual discretionary powers” (j. d. mccamus, the law of contracts (3rd ed. 2020), at p 938). in bhasin v. hrynew, 2014 scc 71, [2014] 3 scr 494, at paras. 47 and 50, cromwell j observed that the exercise of contractual discretion is one circumstance in which courts have found a duty of good faith performance exists in a manner consonant with the “organizing principle” from which this and other good faith duties derive: “parties generally must perform their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily” (para. 63, see also mccamus, pp. 931-943) however, bhasin does not explore the source or content of the specific duty to exercise discretion in good faith, which matters were not at issue in that appeal. [2] the appellant here, a waste removal contractor, says the respondent exercised its contractual power to decide where the waste would be allocated in the region contrary to the requirements of good faith. the appellant argues that the courts below failed to understand the notion at the core of bhasin, according to which a contracting party should have “appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of [their] contracting partner” (bhasin, at para. 65) it says that the respondent’s exercise of discretion made it impossible to earn the level of profit it had bargained for under what it depicts as a long-term relational contract, predicated on trust between the parties in the result, the respondent exercised its discretionary power in a way the appellant has described as failing to meet the standard of honesty and reasonableness required by bhasin in this context. [3] the problem in this case is not so much whether the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith exists, but on what basis it exists and according to what standard its breach can be made out. to be sure, the appellant is right to say that the organizing principle of good faith recognized in bhasin exemplifies the idea that a contracting party should have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of their contracting partners but in claiming compensation for its lost opportunity based on a supposedly dishonest or unreasonable exercise of the discretion to reallocate waste under the contract, the appellant misrepresents the organizing principle and overstates one of the specific duties of good faith derived therefrom. [4] the duty to exercise contractual discretion is breached only where the discretion is exercised unreasonably, which here means in a manner unconnected to the purposes underlying the discretion this will be made out, for example, where the exercise of discretion is arbitrary or capricious, as cromwell j suggested in bhasin in his formulation of the organizing principle of good faith performance. according to bhasin, this duty is derived from the same requirement of corrective justice as the duty of honest performance, which requirement demands that parties exercise or perform their rights and obligations under the contract having appropriate regard for the legitimate contractual interests of the contracting partner like the duty of honest performance observed in c.m callow inc v zollinger, 2020 scc 45, the duty recognized here is one that applies in a manner cromwell j referred to as doctrine in bhasin, ie, the duty applies regardless of the intentions of the parties (bhasin, at para. 74). [5] carefully considered, the appellant’s case does not rest on allegations that it fell prey to lies or deception there is no claim that the respondent exercised its discretion capriciously or arbitrarily. the appellant does not point to, under the guise of allegedly unreasonable conduct, any identifiable wrong committed by the respondent beyond seeking its own best interest within the bounds set for the exercise of discretion by the agreement the duty of good faith at issue here constrains the permissible exercise of discretionary powers in contract but, in so doing, it does not displace the detailed, negotiated bargain as the primary source of justice between the parties. [6] importantly, the good faith duty at issue does not require the respondent to subordinate its interests to those of the appellant, nor does it require that a benefit be conferred on the appellant that was not contemplated under the contract or one which stands beyond the purposes for which the discretion was agreed. here, the appellant decries conduct that is self-interested, to be sure, and that, it says, made it impossible to achieve the fundamental benefit for which it had bargained. but in seeking damages for this loss, the appellant does not allege that the respondent committed any actionable wrong in exercising the discretion provided for under the contract. while it is true the arbitrator characterized the long-term contract here as a relational one, he found that the situation giving rise to this dispute, however unlikely it may have appeared to the parties, was a risk that the parties had specifically considered in drafting their detailed agreement. in that context, whatever trust and cooperation that the parties might owe one another arising out of the long-term relational character of the contract cannot resolve this case in favour of the appellant by requiring the respondent to act as a fiduciary. [7] when the contours of good faith performance in this context are properly identified, it is plain that the respondent did not exercise its power to reallocate waste in breach of a good faith duty. in point of fact, in its call to be paid damages on the basis of the contractual duty of good faith owed to it by the respondent, the appellant is asking the court to award it an advantage not provided for in the agreement between the parties in the absence of any appreciable breach of contract or identifiable wrong. this seems to me to confuse the requirements of good faith performance with an injunction to act selflessly in a way that stands outside the ordinary compass of social ordering by contract, in service of a notional solidarity between the parties based on a different theory of justice. accordingly, i would dismiss this appeal. ii background a. the contract [8] the appellant, wastech services ltd. (“wastech”), is a british columbia company engaged in waste transportation and disposal the respondent, the greater vancouver sewerage and drainage district (“metro”), is a statutory corporation constituted under the greater vancouver sewerage and drainage district act, sbc. 1956, c 59. one of its primary mandates is the administration of waste disposal from the metro vancouver regional district. [9] wastech and metro had a long-standing commercial relationship they entered into contracts for the disposal of waste from the greater vancouver regional district twice in 1986, once in 1988 and again in 1992. in 1996, after approximately 18 months of negotiations, wastech and metro entered into a new waste disposal agreement (“contract”), setting out what the parties described as “an integrated, comprehensive municipal solid waste transfer system and sanitary landfill in a reliable, cost-effective and environmentally-sound manner” (ar, vol. ii, at p 9, recital b). the contract was complex, and included several recitals, numerous defined terms and schedules it replaced the four existing agreements between wastech and metro and had a term of 20 years. [10] the contract contemplated the removal and transportation of waste by wastech on behalf of the district represented by metro to three disposal facilities: the vancouver landfill; the burnaby waste to energy facility; and the cache creek landfill. wastech was to be paid at a reduced rate, subject to a number of variables, for the short-haul transportation of waste to the vancouver landfill and the burnaby waste to energy facility as compared to the rate paid to transport to the cache creek landfill, which is farther away. [11] wastech’s compensation was structured around a “target operating ratio” (“target or”). defined in s 14.1(ag) of the contract as a ratio of 0.890, the target or reflected a scenario where wastech’s operating costs were 89 percent of its total revenues, resulting in an operating profit of 11 percent. it bears noting that the contract did not guarantee that wastech would achieve the target or in any given year. [12] the contract provided for various adjustments to allow for fluctuations in the actual operating ratio (“actual or”) achieved by wastech section 14.19 of the contract provided that if the actual or deviated from the target or, the parties would share equally the financial consequences of the deviation if the actual or were to exceed the target or, metro would pay wastech an additional sum equal to 50 percent of the difference between the target or and the actual or. wastech would similarly compensate metro if the actual or was less than the target or. section 14.11 of the contract also provided that the rates to be paid to wastech and metro’s contribution to fix operating expenses would each be adjusted annually if the actual or achieved in the immediately preceding operating year was less than 0.860 or greater than 0920. [13] section 12.7 of the contract required metro to provide wastech, annually, with a detailed forecast of the allocation of all of the waste expected to be handled under the contract for the following operating year. the arbitrator found that, “[o]ne purpose of this requirement [was] to give wastech an opportunity to plan its future operations and manage its costs” (ar, vol. i, p 1 (“award”), at para. 44). however, ss. 30.1, 30.2 and 30.4 gave metro “absolute discretion” to determine and amend the minimum amount of waste to be transported to the cache creek landfill for any given year. [14] during negotiations, wastech and metro realized that waste transported to the long-haul cache creek landfill might decrease and that one possible reason for such a decrease could be metro’s decision to reduce the waste transported to that site by redirecting it to the short-haul vancouver landfill moreover, both parties were aware that this could preclude wastech from achieving the target or both parties believed that such a scenario was highly unlikely. given their mutual desire to simplify the contract, wastech and metro agreed not to include an adjustment provision dealing with that scenario in the contract. b circumstances of the alleged breach [15] in september 2010, metro provided wastech its annual waste allocation plan for 2011, according to which about 600,000 to 700,000 tonnes of waste would have to be disposed of in the operating year. metro directed wastech to reallocate waste transportation for 2011: the vancouver landfill was to receive 200,000 tonnes, up from the 138,380 it received in 2010; the burnaby waste to energy facility was to receive enough waste to operate at maximum capacity; and the cache creek landfill was to receive the remaining waste. [16] ultimately, the total waste transported by wastech during the 2011 operating year was 609,340 tonnes; approximately 8 percent less than in 2010 the cache creek landfill received 273,018 tonnes; approximately 31 percent less than in 2010 the vancouver landfill received 187,428 tonnes; approximately 36 percent more than it received in 2010. these totals reflected a conscious decision by metro to reallocate waste from the cache creek landfill to the vancouver landfill. [17] as a result of the waste reallocation, and before adjustment payments, wastech operated at a loss, achieving an operating ratio of 1045. however, after taking into account the adjustment payments under s 14.19, wastech operated at a profit, achieving an operating ratio of 0960. as i noted above, this adjustment payment was intended to ensure that the parties would share the financial consequences of a deviation from the target or equally. after taking into account this payment, wastech therefore recorded an operating profit of 4 percent for the year, well shy of its target of 11 percent. [18] pursuant to s 18.3 of the contract, wastech referred the dispute to arbitration, alleging that metro breached the contract by allocating waste among the facilities for 2011 in a manner that deprived wastech of the possibility of achieving the target or that year wastech sought compensatory damages in the amount of $2,888,162, which, it said, represented the additional amount the company would have earned in 2011 if metro’s allocation of waste had not deprived it of the opportunity to achieve the target or. iii decisions below a. the arbitral award — bcicac case no dca-1560, february 13, 2015 (gerald w. ghikas, qc) [19] the arbitrator ruled in favour of wastech. [20] wastech advanced two submissions first, it argued that metro’s reallocation of waste from the cache creek landfill to the vancouver landfill in the 2011 operating year violated an implied term of the contract based on the presumed intentions of the parties. the alleged implied term as formulated by wastech before the arbitrator was complex. in substance, it would oblige the parties to reset retroactively various rates and payments in the event that metro reallocated waste in a manner that made it impossible for wastech to achieve the target or in the immediately preceding operating year. [21] in the alternative, wastech submitted that metro’s discretionary power to allocate waste between the facilities was subject to a duty of good faith such that it could not be exercised in a way that would deprive wastech of the opportunity to achieve the target or. [22] the arbitrator declined to find that the term proposed by wastech was implied because it was not obvious that the parties would have agreed to it. on the contrary, the arbitrator found that the parties made a decision not to include a term in the contract “dealing with the subject-matter of the term” that wastech submitted was implied (award, at para. 74). [23] nevertheless, the arbitrator felt that this did not preclude him from considering whether metro’s discretionary power under the contract was constrained by a duty of good faith. on this point, he agreed with wastech that a duty of good faith applied, that metro had breached that duty, and that wastech was therefore entitled to compensation. [24] the arbitrator began by reviewing this court’s judgment in bhasin he observed that where a contract expressly confers a discretionary power on a party, courts have held that the power must be exercised in good faith. since the contract was a long-term, relational agreement dependent upon an element of trust and confidence between wastech and metro, the arbitrator held that the “existing doctrines” of good faith required metro to have “‘appropriate regard’ for the legitimate contractual interests of wastech when exercising its discretionary contractual power” to allocate waste (para. 85). [25] turning to the evidence before him, the arbitrator accepted that metro’s reallocation of waste away from the cache creek landfill for 2011 was “guided by the objectives of maximizing the [burnaby facility’s] efficiency, preserving remaining site capacity at the [cache creek landfill], and operating the system in the most cost- effective manner” (para. 87) in addition, prior to the reallocation of waste, metro’s financial position had suffered as a result of declining volumes of waste. based on this evidence, the arbitrator found that metro’s reallocation decision “was made in furtherance of its own business objectives” and that, “[i]f viewed only from metro’s perspective and without regard to the interests of wastech, metro’s conduct was both honest and reasonable” (para. 88). [26] in the arbitrator’s view, it still remained to be determined whether metro had “appropriate regard” to wastech’s interests under the contract. this was the key question because “[t]he focus of the organizing principle stated in bhasin is on conduct that does not show ‘appropriate regard’ for the ‘legitimate expectations’ of the other party as to how the contract will be performed” (para. 90). he wrote that, according to bhasin, the exercise of a “bargained-for contractual right [is] ‘dishonest’ where it is wholly at odds with the legitimate contractual expectations of the other party”, and that no additional form of dishonesty, such as “half-truths, lies or deceit”, need be shown (para. 90). [27] the arbitrator found that metro’s exercise of its discretionary power made it “not possible” for wastech to achieve the target or (para. 89). he also found that wastech had a legitimate contractual expectation that metro would not exercise its power in a way that would deprive wastech of the opportunity to achieve the target or (para. 92). furthermore, the arbitrator wrote that having the opportunity to achieve the target or in every year of the contract was “the fundamental benefit for which wastech bargained” (para. 94). noting that courts have often required evidence that a party’s conduct “gutted” or eviscerated the contract, or deprived the other contracting party of all or substantially all of the benefit for which it bargained, the arbitrator said it was not necessary for wastech to provide such evidence because “the over-arching principle stated in bhasin does not include such a requirement” (para. 93). [28] based on this reasoning, the arbitrator held that “metro’s conduct show[ed] a lack of appropriate regard for wastech’s legitimate expectations” that was sufficient to justify finding a breach of a duty of good faith (para. 94). however, the arbitrator clarified that the breach occurred not in the reallocation decision itself, but rather in metro’s failure to compensate wastech for its lost opportunity to achieve the target or (para. 95). b. supreme court of british columbia — leave decision, 2016 bcsc 68, 409 dlr (4th) 9 (fitzpatrick j.) [29] metro petitioned for leave to appeal the arbitrator’s award under s 31 of the arbitration act, rsbc 1996, c 55 [rep. & sub. 2020, c 2, s 72], and was granted leave to appeal upon the following questions of law: 1 did the arbitrator err in law in failing to apply proper principles in holding that the exercise of a bargained-for right could be “dishonest” and an act undertaken in bad faith simply because it was wholly at odds with the expectations of the counter-party, which expectations were not embodied in the contract? 2 did the arbitrator err in law by confusing the “organizing principle” stated in bhasin with a free-standing obligation of contractual good faith, disregarding the applicable principles of good faith as found in the authorities? [para. 40] c court of appeal for british columbia — leave decision, 2016 bcca 393, 409 dlr (4th) 4 (frankel, mackenzie and fenlon jja) [30] wastech appealed the order granting metro leave to appeal. in brief oral reasons, the court of appeal unanimously dismissed wastech’s appeal. d. supreme court of british columbia — appeal decision, 2018 bcsc 605 (mcewan j.) [31] the chambers judge hearing the merits of metro’s appeal set aside the arbitrator’s award, awarded costs of the appeal to metro, and remitted the issue of costs of the arbitration to the arbitrator. [32] the chambers judge rejected wastech’s argument that “objectively reasonable constraints on the exercise of metro’s discretion must be imposed” based on the requirement that metro had to show “appropriate regard” for wastech’s interests (paras. 23 and 41 (canlii)). [33] in the chambers judge’s view, the imposition of a duty to have appropriate regard for the interests of another contracting party must be based on the terms of the contract itself in this case, the parties considered and deliberately rejected a term constraining the exercise of metro’s discretionary power to allocate waste. he wrote: “this was a case of sophisticated parties leaving aside a term that might have addressed the problem”, rather than an instance of overlooking or failing to consider a provision. for the chambers judge, this alone “negate[d] the approach taken by the arbitrator” (para. 57). [34] recalling that bhasin explicitly recognized that a party may sometimes cause loss to another in the legitimate pursuit of economic self-interest, the chambers judge also held that the arbitrator had effectively ignored the terms of the contract in finding that metro’s conduct was “dishonest” only because it was “at odds” with wastech’s legitimate contractual expectations (paras. 60-62). at the end of the day, he found it difficult to “see how the principle of good faith [could] be applied to [the contract] in light of the actual circumstances in which the [contract] was developed” (para. 61). he therefore allowed metro’s appeal. e court of appeal for british columbia — appeal decision, 2019 bcca 66, 19 bclr (6th) 217 (newbury, stromberg-stein and fisher jja) [35] wastech appealed the chambers judge’s order in reasons written by newbury ja, the court of appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal, with costs of the appeal awarded to metro. [36] newbury ja began her analysis by noting that the chambers judge did not clearly answer the two questions of law before him. accordingly, she considered the two questions afresh (paras. 63-65). in answering each of them affirmatively, the court of appeal identified four errors of law committed by the arbitrator. [37] first, the court of appeal held that the arbitrator applied the wrong legal test for determining whether metro’s conduct nullified the benefits that wastech reasonably expected to obtain from the contract specifically, he failed to ascertain wastech’s legitimate contractual interests or expectations by reference to the terms of the contract itself (para. 68). [38] second, the arbitrator erred in concluding that his rejection of wastech’s proposed implied term did not “add anything” to his good faith analysis when, as a matter of law, it “substantially took away from” wastech’s arguments in support of a breach of a duty of good faith (para. 69 (emphasis deleted); award, at para. 91). [39] third, the court of appeal held that the arbitrator erred in deciding that it was unnecessary to determine whether metro’s conduct had nullified or eviscerated the contract in order to conclude that metro had breached a duty of good faith (para. 70). that conclusion effectively created, contrary to what this court wrote in bhasin, a stand-alone duty not to show “disregard of [the other party’s] contractual interests” (para. 70). relying on styles v. alberta investment management corp., 2017 abca 1, 44 alta l.r (6th) 214, the court of appeal held that such a conclusion would constitute a “radical extension of the law” (para. 70). [40] finally, newbury j.a wrote that the arbitrator was wrong to hold that “dishonesty” included the exercise of contractual rights in a manner that is wholly at odds with the legitimate contractual expectations of the other party in bhasin, cromwell j was “concerned substantially with conduct that has at least a subjective element of improper motive or dishonesty” (ca reasons, at para. 71). some subjective element of dishonesty, untruthfulness, improper motive, or “bad faith” is therefore necessary to attribute dishonesty to a party and find a breach of a duty of good faith. this could include conduct so reckless that contractual performance is inexplicable and incomprehensible to the point that it can be regarded as an “abuse of power, having regard to the purposes for which it [was] meant to be exercised” (para. 71, quoting finney v. barreau du québec, 2004 scc 36, [2004] 2 scr 17, at para. 39). [41] in light of the arbitrator’s errors, the court of appeal dismissed wastech’s appeal, concluding that the chambers judge was correct to allow metro’s appeal. however, it also noted that its conclusions would have been the same had it applied a standard of reasonableness, rather than correctness, in reviewing the arbitrator’s award (para. 74). iv analysis a. standard of review [42] the parties raise preliminary issues relating to the standard of review applicable on appeal from a commercial arbitration award and the proper character of the questions of law on appeal in this particular case. [43] wastech submits, first, that the court of appeal erred in reviewing the arbitrator’s finding of a breach of the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith. relying on s 31 of the arbitration act and the judgments of this court in sattva capital corp. v. creston moly corp., 2014 scc 53, [2014] 2 scr 633, and teal cedar products ltd v british columbia, 2017 scc 32, [2017] 1 scr 688, wastech says that appeals from commercial arbitration awards are confined to extricable questions of law and that, here, metro has failed to demonstrate a proper legal basis to set aside the award matters of contractual interpretation raise, both generally and in this case, questions of mixed fact and law, says wastech and, as such, they are not reviewable on appeal. second, wastech submits that the questions of law relevant in this case, as decided by the arbitrator, are subject to review on the reasonableness standard. nevertheless, wastech also says the arbitrator committed no reviewable errors even on a correctness standard. [44] metro answers by noting that the court of appeal considered sattva and teal cedar fully and was aware of the limited scope of appeals in commercial arbitration. the court rightly confirmed that the questions raised here are questions of law reviewable on the correctness standard. here, says metro, the questions upon which leave was granted relate to the content of the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith and the arbitrator’s error in stating the legal test, which are plainly questions of law metro further submits that even if the applicable standard is reasonableness, the arbitrator’s award was unreasonable and cannot stand. [45] this court has indeed held that the standard of review applicable in appeals under s 31 of the arbitration act is reasonableness, unless the question is one that would attract the correctness standard, such as constitutional questions or those questions of law that are of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator’s expertise (sattva, at paras. 102-6; teal cedar, at paras. 74-76). i am mindful, however, that this court’s judgment in canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, which was released shortly after this appeal was heard, set out a revised framework for determining the standard of review a court should apply when reviewing the merits of an administrative decision. i note that vavilov does not advert either to teal cedar or sattva, decisions which emphasize that deference serves the particular objectives of commercial arbitration (see sattva, at para. 104; teal cedar, at paras. 81-83). [46] in these circumstances, i would leave for another day consideration of the effect, if any, of vavilov on the standard of review principles articulated in sattva and teal cedar. we have not had the benefit of submissions on that question, nor do we have the assistance of reasons on point from the courts below. moreover, the parties here agree, rightly in my view, that the outcome of this appeal does not depend on the identification of the proper standard of review thus, although this court would ordinarily be called upon to determine whether the court of appeal identified the correct standard of review and applied it properly, in this case it is unnecessary to decide whether the standard is correctness or reasonableness (see agraira v. canada (public safety and emergency preparedness), 2013 scc 36, [2013] 2 scr 559, at paras. 45-47) on either standard, the arbitrator’s award cannot stand respectfully stated, the fact that i do not pursue discussion of this particular point raised in the opinion of my colleagues should not be understood as my agreeing with their view (see, similarly, newfoundland and labrador (attorney general) v. uashaunnuat (innu of uashat and of mani-utenam), 2020 scc 4, at para. 15). [47] i also agree with metro that wastech cannot, at this stage, challenge the questions on which the award was granted after all, it did not appeal the court of appeal’s leave to appeal decision, where it had unsuccessfully argued that the order granting metro leave to appeal should be overturned on the principal ground that the issues raised were questions of mixed fact and law. nevertheless, i respectfully agree with the attorney general of british columbia’s submission that, in granting leave to appeal, leave courts should ensure that the questions of law upon which leave is granted are simply and precisely stated to prosecute the appeal efficiently in this case, the complicated formulation of the first question of law, in particular, made it difficult for the courts below to provide a direct and effective answer. b good faith [48] wastech submits that the courts below erred in overturning the arbitrator’s determination that metro breached a duty of good faith, specifically one that constrained the manner in which metro could exercise its discretionary power to allocate waste amongst the various disposal facilities. the arbitrator was right, says wastech, that metro failed to show appropriate regard to wastech’s “legitimate contractual expectations”, as understood in bhasin, and therefore breached the contract. [49] to this end, wastech invokes the organizing principle of good faith recognized by this court in bhasin — that “parties generally must perform their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily” (para. 63). this exemplifies, says wastech, the notion that, “in carrying out his or her own performance of the contract, a contracting party should have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of the contracting partner” (bhasin, at para. 65). [50] wastech disagrees with the court of appeal’s conclusion that the arbitrator erred by effectively creating a free-standing obligation not to show “disregard of [the other party’s] contractual interests”, which the court of appeal considered to be a “radical extension of the law” (para. 70). wastech acknowledges that the organizing principle is not a “stand alone” or “free-standing” obligation to have appropriate regard to the contracting party’s interests when performing a contract wastech submits, however, that the arbitrator correctly held that a specific manifestation of the organizing principle of good faith applies in this case, and that metro failed to abide by the constraints imposed on its exercise of discretion by that existing doctrine. [51] wastech is certainly not mistaken in saying that the organizing principle of good faith performance provides a standard from which more specific legal doctrines may be derived (bhasin, at para. 64). generally, claims of breach of good faith will not succeed if they do not fall within an “existing doctrin[e]” of good faith, although the existing doctrines “overlap to some extent” and all derive from the same organizing principle (bhasin, at paras. 48 and 66). furthermore, the list of existing doctrines is not closed and may be developed incrementally where the existing law is found wanting. but such developments should be consistent with the structure of the common law of contracts and give due weight to the importance of private ordering through agreements as well as certainty in commercial affairs (bhasin, at para. 66). [52] while wastech is correct to observe that the organizing principle of good faith rests, in part, on the notion that contracting parties should have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of their contracting partner, the governing principles of the existing doctrines define the “highly context-specific” meaning of “appropriate consideration” and “legitimate interests” in the particular situations and relationships in which good faith obligations have heretofore been recognized (bhasin, at para. 69). careful reference to the specific doctrine at issue in each case is critical because, as metro rightly notes, “it is no test for the content of the duty of good faith to say that one has to have appropriate regard for the legitimate contractual interests of the counterparty — because appropriate regard is a broad phrase that covers a variety of different levels of conduct depending on the circumstances” (rf, at para. 47). importantly, whatever variation may come with context, a contracting party — unlike a fiduciary — typically is not required to serve the contractual interests of the other party by duties of good faith performance. [53] in my view, it has not been shown that metro performed its obligations or executed its rights under the contract in a manner contrary to the applicable requirements of good faith. it breached neither the duty of honest performance nor the duty to exercise discretion in good faith. respectfully stated, the arbitrator’s conclusion that wastech had made out a contractual breach of a duty of good faith performance must be set aside. (1) the duty of honest performance [54] wastech and metro agree that for a contractual discretionary power to be exercised in good faith, it cannot, at a minimum, be exercised dishonestly these submissions are consistent with the jurisprudence of this court. as explained in bhasin, at paras. 73-75, and reaffirmed in callow, at para. 53, the duty of honest performance, a distinct manifestation of the organizing principle of good faith, constrains the manner in which all contractual rights and obligations are exercised or performed, as a matter of contractual doctrine this necessarily includes the exercise of contractual discretionary powers. to exercise a contractual discretionary power dishonestly within the meaning of bhasin is a breach of contract. [55] i hasten to say that the duty of honest performance, as contemplated in bhasin, is not at issue here wastech does not allege that metro lied or otherwise knowingly misled wastech in respect of a matter directly linked to the performance of the contract, including in the exercise of its discretionary power to allocate waste between the various disposal facilities this brand of dishonesty is necessary to establish a breach of the duty of honest performance recognized in bhasin and applied in callow. wastech expressly conceded before the arbitrator that the duty of honest performance in this precise sense is not at issue in this case (award, at para. 82). despite this concession, and despite his conclusion that, from its perspective, metro’s exercise of discretion was “honest”, the arbitrator nevertheless held that evidence of “half-truths, lies or deceit” is not required to prove that a discretionary power has been exercised dishonestly (paras. 88 and 90). the exercise of a discretionary power can be “dishonest”, he said, where it is “wholly at odds with the legitimate contractual expectations of the other party” (para. 90). the court of appeal held that the arbitrator erred on this point in its view, some subjective element is required to establish dishonesty in the relevant sense (paras. 71-73). [56] i agree generally with the court of appeal on this point here there is certainly no lie. there is not even an allegation of misrepresentation of the truth of any character. given its concession that there is no issue of dishonesty on the facts of this case, wastech does not contest the court of appeal’s conclusion that dishonesty cannot be proven without some subjective element. the duty of honest performance set forth in bhasin was not breached here. but that is not the end of wastech’s argument. instead, wastech submits that the arbitrator was correct in holding that a breach of good faith can still be proven even in the absence of a finding of dishonesty in other words, wastech submits that honesty is not the only constraint that good faith imposed on metro’s exercise of discretion. i turn next to a consideration of this point. (2) the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith [57] pursuant to the framework set out in bhasin, the arbitrator concluded that an existing doctrine obliged metro to exercise its discretion in good faith. while not dispositive, wastech and metro agree with the arbitrator that an existing doctrine of good faith applies in this case which constrained the manner in which metro could exercise its discretionary power under the contract. [58] i agree with the parties that the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith is well-established in the common law and note it was expressly recognized by cromwell j in his account of the organizing principle of good faith in bhasin (paras. 47-48, 50 and 89, citing a number of authors including j. d. mccamus, the law of contracts (2nd 2012), at pp. 835-68; s. m. waddams, the law of contracts (6th ed. 2010), at paras. 494-508). as cromwell j observed, the duty was applied by this court in mitsui & co. (canada) ltd. v. royal bank of canada, [1995] 2 scr 187 (bhasin, at para. 50). it is not, therefore, a recent creation cut from whole cloth. [59] it was not necessary in bhasin to spell out the contours of this aspect of good faith performance of contracts. in this appeal, in order to answer wastech’s claim that the power to reallocate waste was used in a manner that failed to show appropriate regard for its interests, one must determine what constraints the duty to exercise discretion in good faith imposes on the holder of that discretion. this court must then ask whether metro failed to abide by those constraints, thereby breaching the contract. [60] in their submissions before this court, the parties have marshalled an array of arguments in their efforts to identify the proper limits imposed by the duty to exercise discretion in good faith wastech’s primary submission is that, under pre-bhasin jurisprudence, the “governing” and “proper” standard for assessing whether metro exercised its discretionary power to allocate waste in good faith is “reasonableness”. wastech submits that it would be unreasonable for a party to exercise its discretion “in such a way as to deny the other contractual party substantial benefits flowing to it which represent fundamental aspects of the parties’ legitimate contractual expectations” (appellant’s condensed book, at p 1) by depriving wastech of the “fundamental benefit for which [it] bargained” — the opportunity to achieve the target or in every year of the contract — wastech says metro exercised its discretion unreasonably and therefore contrary to the requirements of the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith (af, at para. 23). [61] in my respectful view, wastech’s position contains two closely related flaws. first, it overstates the meaning of “reasonableness” in this context. second, its submission rests on the further erroneous proposition that determining whether a party’s exercise of discretion resulted in the “substantial nullification” or “evisceration” of the benefit or objective of the contract is a correct method of assessing whether that party exercised its discretion in accordance with the requirements of the good faith duty at issue. i begin, however, with an explanation of that duty. [62] one may well ask — as courts and scholars have on occasion — how the exercise of an apparently unfettered contractual discretion could ever constitute a breach of contract since one could argue that a party, in exercising such a discretionary power, even opportunistically, is merely doing what the other party agreed it could do in the contract (d. stack, “the two standards of good faith in canadian contract law” (1999), 62 sask. l. rev. 201, at p 208). the answer can best be traced to the “standard” that underpins and is manifested in the specific legal doctrine requiring that where one party exercises a discretionary power, it must be done in good faith. expressed as an organizing principle, this standard is that parties must perform their contractual duties, and exercise their contractual rights, honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily (bhasin, at paras. 63-64). accordingly, a discretionary power, even if unfettered, is constrained by good faith. to exercise it, for example, capriciously or arbitrarily, is wrongful and constitutes a breach of contract even unfettered, the discretionary power will have purposes that reflects the parties’ shared interests and expectations, which purposes help identify when an exercise is capricious or arbitrary, to stay with this same example like the duty of honest performance considered in bhasin and callow, the duty to exercise discretionary power in good faith places limits on how one can exercise facially unfettered contractual rights. when the good faith duty is violated, the contract has been breached the question is what constraints this particular duty puts on the exercise of contractual discretion. [63] stated simply, the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith requires the parties to exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with the purposes for which it was granted in the contract, or, in the terminology of the organizing principle in bhasin, to exercise their discretion reasonably. (a) content of the duty [64] i begin with an observation that, in bhasin, this court unanimously agreed that, in some circumstances, good faith may require “reasonable” contractual performance for example, at para. 66, cromwell j wrote that the “organizing principle of good faith manifests itself through the existing doctrines about the types of situations and relationships in which the law requires, in certain respects, honest, candid, forthright or reasonable contractual performance” (emphasis added). indeed, this is consistent with the organizing principle itself, which expressly refers to reasonable contractual performance, and with professor mccamus’ description of the cases applying the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith: “a number of canadian authorities applying this proposition have linked it to the concept of good faith in each of them, the defendant was required to exercise the power in question in a reasonable fashion” ((2020), at p 932; see also bhasin, at para. 63). [65] i also observe that many canadian courts have held that reasonableness is required in the specific context of exercises of contractual discretionary powers. for example, in greenberg v. meffert (1985), 50 or (2d) 755, a decision relied upon by both wastech and metro, the court of appeal for ontario concluded: “the discretion must be exercised in a reasonable way” (p 763). more recently, in 2123201 ontario inc. v. israel estate, 2016 onca 409, 130 or (3d) 641, the same court wrote: “that a discretion given to a contracting party must be exercised reasonably is clear from the authorities” (para. 28). additional canadian examples abound (see, eg,. lemesurier v. andrus (1986), 54 or (2d) 1 (ca), at p 7; jack wookey hldg. ltd. v. tanizul timber ltd. (1988), 27 bclr (2d) 221 (ca), at p 225; canadian national railway co. v. inglis ltd. (1997), 36 or (3d) 410 (ca), at pp. 415-6; marshall v. bernard place corp (2002), 58 o.r (3d) 97 (ca), at para. 26; shelanu inc v print three franchising corp (2003), 64 o.r (3d) 533 (ca), at para. 96; filice v complex services inc., 2018 onca 625, 428 dlr (4th) 548, at para. 38). [66] courts in the united kingdom and australia have ruled similarly (see, eg,. abu dhabi national tanker co. v. product star shipping ltd. (the “product star”) (no. 2), [1993] 1 lloyd’s rep. 397 (eng. ca), at p 404, per leggatt lj;. renard constructions (me) pty ltd. v. minister for public works (1992), 26 nswlr 234 (ca), at p 258, per priestley ja). [67] finally, many jurists have expressed support for the proposition that contractual discretionary powers must be exercised reasonably in order to abide by the requirements of the good faith duty at issue, or have at least acknowledged that courts often apply such a constraint (see, eg,. a. mason, “contract, good faith and equitable standards in fair dealing” (2000), 116 lqr 66, at p 76; j. d. mccamus, “abuse of discretion, failure to cooperate and evasion of duty: unpacking the common law duty of good faith contractual performance” (2005), 29 adv q 72, at p 80; mccamus (2020), at p 937; j. m. paterson, “good faith duties in contract performance” (2014), 14 ouclj 283, at pp. 284, 299 and 302; a. gray, “development of good faith in canada, australia and great britain” (2015), 57 can. bus l.j 84, at p 113; s. m. waddams, the law of contracts (7th ed 2017), at para. 503). [68] i think it best to note at the outset that i do not refer to reasonableness in an administrative law sense rather, i agree with professor mccamus’ view that reasonableness for this good faith duty is understood by reference to purpose: “. . . where discretionary powers are conferred by agreement, it is implicitly understood that the powers are to be exercised reasonably. the concept of reasonableness in this context implies a duty to exercise the discretion honestly and in light of the purposes for which it was conferred” ((2020), at p 937). [69] thus, beyond the requirement of honest performance, to determine whether a party failed in its duty to exercise discretionary power in good faith, one must ask the following question: was the exercise of contractual discretion unconnected to the purpose for which the contract granted discretion? if so, the party has not exercised the contractual power in good faith. [70] the touchstone for measuring whether a party has exercised a discretionary power in good faith is the purpose for which the discretion was created where discretion is exercised in a manner consonant with the purpose, that exercise may be characterized as reasonable according to the bargain the parties had chosen to put in place. perforce, the exercise of power consonant with purpose may be thought of as undertaken fairly and in good faith on the parties’ own terms. as such, barring issues such as unconscionability not raised in this appeal, that exercise is best understood, as a general matter, to be insulated from judicial review as a matter of fairness. [71] but where the exercise stands outside of the compass set by contractual purpose, the exercise is unreasonable in light of the agreement for which the parties bargained and, as such, it may be thought of as unfair and contrary to the requirements of good faith scholars commenting on trends in common law jurisdictions have observed that “courts have repeatedly held that discretionary contractual powers should not be exercised for an ‘improper’ or ‘extraneous’ purpose” (j. m. paterson, “implied fetters on the exercise of discretionary contractual powers” (2009), 35 mon. l. r 45, at p 54). as professor collins has written, “[t]he good faith standard . . . enables a court to control discretionary decisions that are perceived to be based on improper purposes, that is where the power is used for a purpose not originally expected by the subject of the power” (h. collins, “discretionary powers in contracts”, in d. campbell, h. collins and j. wightman, eds., implicit dimensions of contract: discrete, relational and network contracts (2003), 219, at p 223) it is this principle that constrains contractual discretion and, accordingly, fixes the proper limits for judicial review of the exercise of the power importantly, it is not what a court sees as fair according to its view of what is the proper exercise of the discretion. instead, drawing on the purpose set by the parties, the measure of fairness is what is reasonable according to the parties’ own bargain. where the exercise of the discretionary power falls outside of the range of choices connected to its underlying purpose — outside the purpose for which the agreement the parties themselves crafted provides discretion — it is thus contrary to the requirements of good faith courts can then intervene, for example, where the exercise of the power is arbitrary or capricious in light of its purpose as set by the parties. [72] sometimes, the text of the discretionary clause itself will make the parties’ contractual purpose clear. in other circumstances, purpose can only be understood by reading the clause in the context of the contract as a whole. writing extra-judicially, lord sales has recently explained that where the clause that confers a discretionary power is “entirely general”, a court will have to construe the ambit of the power itself (p. sales, “use of powers for proper purposes in private law” (2020), 136 lqr 384, at p 393). in those cases, he notes at p 393: “it is necessary instead to form a broad view of the purposes of the venture to which the contract gives effect, and of what loyalty to that venture might involve for a party to it, and to take those broad purposes as providing the inherent limits for the exercise of the power.” [73] i hasten to say that the role of the courts is not to ask whether the discretion was exercised in a morally opportune or wise fashion from a business perspective. the common law recognizes that “[c]ompetition between businesses regularly involves each business taking steps to promote itself at the expense of the other. . . . far from prohibiting such conduct, the common law seeks to encourage and protect it” (ai. enterprises ltd v bram enterprises ltd., 2014 scc 12, [2014] 1 scr 177, at para. 31, citing obg ltd. v. allan, [2007] ukhl 21, [2008] 1 ac 1, at para. 142). as a general matter, good faith should not be used as a pretext for scrutinizing motive (bhasin, at para. 70). [74] not only does this deferential approach ensure “some elbow-room” for the “aggressive pursuit of self-interest” (c. sappideen and p. vines, eds., fleming’s the law of torts (10th ed. 2011), at para. 30.120; see also ai. enterprises, at para. 31), but it also prevents good faith from veering into “a form of ad hoc judicial moralism or ‘palm tree’ justice” (bhasin, at para. 70). in this context, then, courts must only ensure parties have not exercised their discretion in ways unconnected to the purposes for which the contract grants that power. [75] to this end, it is helpful to keep in mind that, generally speaking, a range of outcomes flows from the choices that may be considered a reasonable exercise of discretion when considered in light of the purposes identified by the contract. some of these choices may properly be thought of as connected to the purposes of the discretion. others will be demonstrably unconnected to the contemplated purposes. wherever a party is granted discretion, there may be differing yet legitimate ways in which that party can exercise its power that is itself part of the bargain. in a contractual context, these choices are ascertained principally by reference to the contract, interpreted as a whole — the first source of justice between the parties. good faith does not eliminate the discretion-exercising party’s power of choice. rather, it simply limits the range of legitimate ways in which a discretionary power may be exercised in light of the relevant purposes (s. j. burton, “breach of contract and the common law duty to perform in good faith” (1980), 94 harv. l. rev. 369, at pp. 385-86). where discretion is exercised for an improper purpose, as against that which was intended by the parties, one that is “ulterior or extraneous” to their intentions, it is exercised in bad faith (j. d. mccamus, “the new general ‘principle’ of good faith performance and the new ‘rule’ of honesty in performance in canadian contract law” (2015), 32 jcl 103, at p 115). [76] with this approach in mind, i stress that what a court considers unreasonable is highly context-specific, and ultimately “depend[s] upon the intention of the parties as disclosed by their contract” (greenberg, at p 762; see also sherry v. cibc mortgages inc., 2016 bcca 240, 88 bclr (5th) 105, at paras. 63-65; g. r. hall, canadian contractual interpretation law (3rd ed. 2016), at pp. 312-13). demonstrating a breach will necessarily centre on an exercise of contractual interpretation it is in properly interpreting the contract and the purposes for which discretion was granted that the range of good faith behaviour comes into focus and breaches can be identified. [77] i add, however, the following comment as a general guide. for contracts that grant discretionary power in which the matter to be decided is readily susceptible of objective measurement — eg, matters relating to “operative fitness, structural completion, mechanical utility or marketability” — the range of reasonable outcomes will be relatively smaller (greenberg, at p 762). for contracts that grant discretionary power “in which the matter to be decided or approved is not readily susceptible [to] objective measurement — [including] matters involving taste, sensibility, personal compatibility or judgment of the party” exercising the discretionary power — the range of reasonable outcomes will be relatively larger (greenberg, at p 761). i emphasize, however, that this comment should operate as a general guide, not a means to categorize unreasonableness. [78] to understand the requirements of this duty it is helpful to consider the standards advanced by the parties, and the extent to which these concepts assist in determining whether the exercise of discretion is unreasonable, that is, not connected to the relevant purposes. [79] i recall that wastech argues that the good faith duty at issue prohibited metro from exercising its discretion in a way that denied it benefits fundamental to its legitimate contractual expectations for its part, metro concedes that contractual discretionary powers “may not be exercised to nullify or eviscerate the fundamental benefit of the contract” (rf, at para. 54). [80] in support of its position, wastech relies principally upon gateway realty ltd. v. arton holdings ltd. (1991), 106 nsr (2d) 180 (sc (td)), aff’d (1992), 112 nsr (2d) 180 (s.c (app div.)), an influential decision regarding good faith in contract law, where kelly j wrote that “bad faith” includes conduct that is “contrary to community standards of honesty, reasonableness or fairness”, and can generally be said to occur where an exercise of discretion “substantially nullif[ies] the bargained objective or benefit contracted for by the other” (paras. 38, 58 and 60). this standard has subsequently been adopted and applied by a number of canadian appellate courts, and endorsed by some scholars (see, eg,. mesa operating limited partnership v. amoco canada resources ltd. (1994), 149 ar 187 (ca), at para. 22; klewchuk v. switzer, 2003 abca 187, 330 a.r 40, at para. 33; g. h. l. fridman, the law of contract in canada (6th ed. 2011), at p 530). [81] wastech submits that the arbitrator’s conclusions as to the nature of the impact on wastech of metro’s exercise of discretion amount to a finding of “nullification” or “evisceration” in particular, wastech points to the arbitrator’s findings that metro’s exercise of discretion made it “impossible” for wastech to achieve the target or, and that having the opportunity to achieve the target or in every year of the contract was “the fundamental benefit for which wastech bargained” (award, at para. 94). metro answers that the arbitrator made no finding of “substantial nullification” or “evisceration”, nor was such a finding open to him on the facts (rf, at paras. 73 and 75; transcript, at p 93). [82] respectfully stated, i am of the view that requiring “substantial nullification” — that is to say, the evisceration by one party of the better part of the benefit of the contract of the other — is not the appropriate standard for concluding a breach of the duty to exercise discretionary power in good faith. [83] the fact that a party’s exercise of discretion causes its contracting partner to lose some or even all of its anticipated benefit under the contract should not be regarded as dispositive, in itself, as to whether the discretion was exercised in good faith (burton, at pp. 384-85). as authors a. swan, j. adamski, and a. y. na explain, the mere fact that a party is deprived of substantially the whole benefit of a contract is not sufficient, absent proof of the discretion-exercising party’s fault or default, to make out a claim for breach of the contract (see canadian contract law (4th ed 2018), at §7.73) in other words, absent some infringement of the non-exercising party’s rights, there is no actionable wrong for the law to correct. [84] for these reasons, i conclude that the “substantial nullification” or “evisceration” of the benefit of a contract is not a necessary prerequisite to finding that a party breached the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith. however, the fact that an exercise of discretion substantially nullifies or eviscerates the benefit of the contract could well be relevant to show that discretion had been exercised in a manner unconnected to the relevant contractual purposes. [85] the parties also submit that the good faith duty at issue does not permit a party to exercise its discretion capriciously or arbitrarily in support, wastech and metro both point to the organizing principle recognized in bhasin — which states that parties generally must perform their contractual duties “honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily” (bhasin, at para. 63) — and to a line of decided cases, which they say confirm the existence of such constraints on the exercise of contractual discretionary powers. [86] i agree with the parties that the jurisprudence supports a conclusion that the good faith duty at issue does not permit a party to exercise its discretion capriciously or arbitrarily. in greenberg, at p 763, the court of appeal for ontario noted that the discretionary provision in question had to be “exercised in a reasonable way, not arbitrarily or capriciously” similarly, the supreme court of the united kingdom affirmed the existence of these constraints in english law in british telecommunications plc v. telefónica o2 uk ltd., [2014] uksc 42, [2014] 4 all er. 907, at para. 37: “. . . it is well established that in the absence of very clear language to the contrary, a contractual discretion must be exercised in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously . . . . this will normally mean that it must be exercised consistently with its contractual purpose”. [87] although capriciousness and arbitrariness have sometimes been referred to independently of improper purpose, i agree with the supreme court in telefónica that a capricious or arbitrary exercise of a discretionary power is an example of such a power being exercised contrary to that standard when seeking to demonstrate that discretion was exercised capriciously or arbitrarily, one necessarily considers contractual purposes by showing that discretion was exercised in a manner unconnected to the underlying contractual purposes for which the power was conferred. [88] in sum, then, the duty to exercise discretion in good faith will be breached where the exercise of discretion is unreasonable, in the sense that it is unconnected to the purposes for which the discretion was granted. this will notably be the case where the exercise of discretion is capricious or arbitrary in light of those purposes because that exercise has fallen outside the range of behaviour contemplated by the parties. the fact that the exercise substantially nullifies or eviscerates the fundamental contractual benefit may be relevant but is not a necessary pre-requisite to establishing a breach. (b) source of the duty [89] having determined the content of the duty, i turn now to consider its source so as to ascertain whether it arises on the facts of this case. [90] i acknowledge that there is some debate as to the source of this duty. the arbitrator held that the requirements of the officious bystander test for implying a term in fact did not need to be met in order for the good faith duty at issue to apply. similarly, wastech submits that the good faith duty at issue “operates as a matter of law” and is not limited to circumstances where a term can be implied as a matter of fact (af, at para. 74) for its part, metro concedes that the failure to imply a term does not necessarily preclude, as a matter of law, the imposition of a good faith duty. cromwell j observed in bhasin that there is “a shadow of uncertainty over a good deal of the jurisprudence” regarding the source of many good faith obligations (para. 74; see also paras. 48 and 52). while cromwell j expressly addressed this uncertainty for the duty of honest performance, clarifying that it operates as a general doctrine of contract law, he did not resolve this uncertainty for all existing manifestations of the organizing principle (para. 74). it therefore falls to this court to do so in respect of the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith and in light of wastech’s argument that good faith constrains the exercise of metro’s power here. [91] in my view, it is appropriate to recognize the duty to exercise discretion in good faith as a general doctrine of contract law. like the duty of honest performance, it need not find its source in an implied term in the contract, but rather it operates in every contract irrespective of the intentions of the parties (see bhasin, at para. 74). this brings conceptual clarity to the law of good faith by analyzing the duty to exercise discretion in good faith in line with the bhasin duty. [92] further, recognizing this general duty interferes very little with freedom of contract for two reasons first, just as parties will rarely expect that their contract permits dishonest performance (bhasin, at para. 76), contracting parties rarely if ever expect discretion granted by the contract to be exercised in a manner unconnected to the purposes for which it was conferred. for example, on the facts of this case, a duty on metro to exercise its discretion in good faith was necessary to give business efficacy to the contract as the arbitrator rightly observed, absent a duty of good faith constraining the exercise of metro’s discretion, “metro theoretically ha[d] the discretion to reduce the volume of waste directed to the [cache creek landfill] to zero” (para. 94) it is absurd to think the parties intended for metro to have such untrammelled power given that it would have left wastech subject to metro’s “uninhibited whim” (the “product star”, at p 404, per leggatt lj). indeed, it is difficult to imagine any party wishing to confer such untrammelled power on its contracting partner for this reason, when contracting parties confer a discretionary power, even without any apparent constraining criteria or conditions, courts have long recognized that the “natural inference” is that they intend some minimum constraints on the exercise of the discretion (sales, at p 387; see also swan, adamski and na, at § 8.304; bhasin, at para. 45) in my view, those minimum constraints include the expectation that the parties will not exercise their discretion in a manner unconnected to the purposes for which it was granted, for example in a capricious or arbitrary manner. given that parties will very often expect minimum constraints of this nature, recognizing that these constraints apply to all contracts by virtue of the duty to exercise discretionary power in good faith interferes little with their freedom of contract. [93] second, as discussed above, the content of the duty is guided by the will of the parties as expressed in their contract. rather than interfering with the objectives of the contracting parties or imposing duties on them beyond their reasonable contemplation, this duty merely requires that parties operate within the scope of discretion defined by their own purposes for which they freely negotiated its grant. holding the parties to this standard will generally be consistent with, not an unanticipated departure from, their freely negotiated bargain recognizing a general duty of contract law here will therefore interfere very little with that freedom. [94] overall, then, like the duty of honest performance, the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith is not an implied term, but a general doctrine of contract law that operates irrespective of the intentions of the parties (bhasin, at para. 74). this places the two duties on the same footing, and conforms to the general assumption that parties do not intend discretion to be completely unconstrained (see bhasin, at para. 45) just like the duty of honest performance, the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith, as described herein, should be understood to be obligatory in all contracts parties who provide for discretionary power cannot contract out of the implied undertaking that the power will be exercised in good faith, ie, in light of the purposes for which it was conferred this holding will impinge on freedom of contract but only in those rare cases in which parties seek to authorize the exercise of contractual discretion in a manner unconnected with its underlying purposes or otherwise immunize such conduct from judicial review. [95] accordingly, there is no question that the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith applies in this case. the entire agreement clause in this contract (s 32.17) does not exclude the duty, although, in any particular case, the contract as a whole will guide the analysis of what the duty requires. this also means the fact that the arbitrator rejected the existence of an implied term did not preclude recognizing and applying the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith. (c) application to metro’s exercise of discretion [96] was metro’s exercise of discretion unreasonable with regard to the purposes for which the discretion was granted and thereby a breach of the duty? in my view, it was not. [97] i recall that the contract gives metro the “absolute discretion” to determine the minimum amount of waste that will be transported to the cache creek landfill as opposed to the other waste disposal sites in a given period unlike some previous agreements between the parties, there is no guaranteed minimum volume of waste allocated to this site in a given year (award, at para. 84) this minimum amount (“trailer capacity guarantee”) is to be determined in reference to the seasonal variation of waste flows and “other factors which influence the volume of [w]aste being delivered to the cache creek landfill during a calendar year” (ar, vol. ii, at p 68, s 30.5) beyond this general statement, there is no guidance as to the purposes underlying the grant of discretion to metro to determine this amount. [98] however, reading the clauses in the context of the contract as a whole, the purposes become clearer the recitals at the beginning of the contract describe the parties’ intention to, among other things, incentivize each other to “maximize efficiency and minimize costs”, to provide for the “maximization of the municipal solid waste disposal capacity of the cache creek landfill”, and to be “sensitive to significant changes in operating standards, services or system configuration” (ar, vol. ii, at p 9, recitals c(2) and (6) to (7)). this is consistent with the text of the overall contract, which provides flexibility to account for variable factors foreseen by the parties such as waste volumes, operating costs and the capacity of the waste disposal sites (award, at para. 43). as discussed above, the contract adjusts for the impacts these factors will have on wastech’s profitability, not only by adjusting the rates payable by metro, but also by requiring it to share in the consequences of failing to meet the target level of profitability (ss. 14.11 and 1419). it was through this structure that the parties decided to manage the risk and rewards of the operation. [99] in this context, the purposes of giving metro discretion to determine waste allocation in its “absolute discretion” were clearly to allow it the flexibility necessary to maximize efficiency and minimize costs of the operation. granting such discretion, as opposed to fixing certain waste volumes, serves the overall objective of allowing the parties to adapt to changing circumstances over the life of the contract so as to ensure this operational efficiency further, the fact that this discretion exists alongside a detailed framework to adjust payments towards the goal of a negotiated level of profitability, contradicts the idea that the parties intended this discretion be exercised so as to provide wastech with a certain level of profit. those incentives are already carefully created elsewhere in the contract. reading these clauses in context, then, the purposes for granting metro “absolute discretion” was to allow it to structure the disposal of waste for which it had contracted wastech in an efficient and cost-effective manner given the operational variability the parties foresaw. [100] based on these purposes, metro did not act unreasonably. metro’s exercise of discretion was “guided by the objectives of maximizing the [burnaby waste to energy facility’s] efficiency, preserving remaining site capacity at the [cache creek landfill], and operating the system in the most cost-effective manner” and “was made in furtherance of its own business objectives” (award, at paras. 87-88). all this points to an exercise of discretion that cannot be said to be unconnected to the contractual purposes for which it was granted. [101] importantly, the duty did not require metro to subordinate its interests to those of wastech in exercising its discretionary power in the manner that wastech claims the contract purposely included no guarantee that the target or would be achieved. the parties were aware of the risk that the exercise of discretion represented and chose, notwithstanding long negotiations and a detailed agreement, not to constrain the discretion in the way wastech now requests. in point of fact, wastech is asking for an advantage for which it did not bargain. it asks, in effect, that metro confer a benefit upon it that was not contemplated, expressly or impliedly, under the contract. on my understanding, this stands outside of the “requirement of justice” identified by cromwell j in bhasin (para. 64). [102] although, during the hearing of this appeal, wastech repeatedly emphasized the arbitrator’s conclusion that the contract was a long-term, relational agreement dependent upon an element of trust and cooperation between wastech and metro, this is not dispositive of the case in favour of wastech. despite the arbitrator’s conclusion, which i do not purport to disturb, the detailed nature of the contract plainly demonstrates that the parties carefully structured their relationship, and precisely allocated the risks of their bargain between them by means of, among other things, the various adjustment mechanisms set out in the contract assessing whether metro exercised its discretion in good faith cannot ignore this context. this is not an example of an unforeseen or unregulated matter that, by reason of the relational character of the contract, was left to the trust and cooperation said to be inherent in the long-term arrangement. the parties foresaw this risk — and chose to leave the discretion in place. [103] it seems to me that the only questionable conduct raised here is that metro’s exercise of discretion made it “impossible” for wastech to achieve the target or in 2011. to be sure, given the spirit of trust and cooperation underlying the contract — which, again, the arbitrator, in his review of the facts, described as being long-term and relational — the legitimate contractual interests of these parties were different than parties to, say, a more transactional agreement (see bhasin, at para. 69). the fact remains that the contract did not guarantee that wastech would achieve the target or in any given year indeed, the various, complex adjustment mechanisms provided in the contract itself, which only apply where the actual or for a given year deviates from the target or, plainly demonstrate that the parties anticipated that the target or would not be achieved in some years (award, at para. 84). accordingly, the mere fact that wastech did not have the opportunity to achieve the target or in one year of the 20-year contract is not altogether surprising, notwithstanding the arbitrator’s conclusion that the contract was a long-term, relational agreement. rather, it seems to me that the impact of metro’s exercise of discretion on wastech simply reflects the allocation of risk set out in the contract, for which wastech negotiated and to which it agreed. indeed, recital c(3) specifically notes that the contract provided for the sharing of “risks and benefits”. it is true that the eventuality at the origin of this dispute was thought by both parties to be unlikely. but together they saw the risk and, together, they turned away from it, leaving the discretion in place. in this sense, metro cannot be said to have exercised its discretion in a manner demonstrably unconnected with the relevant purposes. wastech itself may have expected that opportunity every year, but given the terms of the bargain to which it agreed, that expectation was not shared. [104] the text of the discretionary clause in the case at bar did not spell out, in explicit terms, why the contract provides metro with “absolute discretion” to allocate waste from one year to the next but when read in the context of the contract as a whole, with an eye to what lord sales calls the parties’ “loyalty to th[e] venture”, the purpose that constrained metro’s exercise of discretion becomes plain. [105] reading the contract as a whole, one understands that there was no guarantee that wastech would achieve the target or in any given year. the risk that revenues could vary from one year to the next was in the contemplation of the parties, and this variance could well be based on factors such as the exercise of metro’s discretion to reallocate waste. this risk was addressed in the contract, notably through the adjustment clauses. the risk that the exercise of discretion would affect profitability of either party in a given year was thus a considered one and, that risk notwithstanding, the discretionary power was left in place. in these circumstances, the purpose of the clause was plainly to give metro the leeway, based on its judgment as to what was best for itself, to adjust the proportions of the allocations of waste amongst the three sites as it required to ensure the efficiency of the operation the ability to make that allocation was not only permitted, but it could be said to reflect the purpose of the clause. [106] while metro’s choice, from the point of view of its contracting partner, wastech, was disadvantageous, that choice was within the range permitted by the purpose of the clause. in that sense it was in good faith even if the exercise meant that wastech’s own interest suffered as a consequence. because the exercise of discretion was within the range of conduct contemplated by the purpose of the clause, it cannot be said, according to the standards of contractual justice, to be in bad faith or unfair. [107] by asking for what amounts to a guarantee of the target or in every year of the contract, wastech is asking for an outcome that stands outside of the contract. it complains that the outcome is unfair because, in the result, it would not be in a position to earn the revenue to which it felt entitled. in point of fact, wastech is asking for metro’s discretion to be constrained so that it can achieve a result — an advantage — for which it did not bargain and, in fact, that it might have been said to have bargained away. it asks the court to have metro subvert its own interest in name of accommodating wastech’s interest. but metro is wastech’s contracting partner, not its fiduciary. the loyalty required of it in the exercise of this discretion was loyalty to the bargain, not loyalty to wastech. wastech cannot rely on an understanding of good faith that sits uncomfortably with the foundation of contractual justice. (d) quebec civil law would not assist wastech [108] lastly, i allow myself to observe that metro argues, after noting cromwell j.’s allusions to the abuse of rights in civil law in bhasin, that wastech’s position would not be treated more favourably under quebec law it is true, as is acknowledged in bhasin, at para. 83, that art. 7 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”) provides in part that good faith requires parties to refrain from exercising their rights, including contractual rights, in an unreasonable manner.1 indeed, even prior to the enactment of this rule, this court held in houle v. canadian national bank, [1990] 3 scr 122, that the doctrine of abuse of rights requires that contractual rights be exercised reasonably in the quebec law of obligations (pp. 154-55) in houle, this court characterized the defendant bank’s conduct as “sudden, impulsive, and harmful”, and that it constituted, for the court, “a flagrant abuse of the bank’s contractual right” 1 article 7 ccq: “no right may be exercised with the intent of injuring another or in an excessive and unreasonable manner, and therefore contrary to the requirements of good faith” cromwell j also referred expressly to art. 6 and 1375 ccq (bhasin, at para. 83). (p 176) i recall that in callow this court drew on the quebec abuse of rights framework to clarify that the direct link to contractual performance required to make out a breach of the duty of honest performance was met where an obligation was performed, or a right exercised, dishonestly and therefore in bad faith. in this case, there is no reason to draw on this framework, as the bad faith exercise of the contractual discretion is an uncontroversial definitional feature of this duty. instead it is the content of the duty that is at issue here. there is, of course, no question of applying quebec law to this dispute but, says metro, even by analogy or comparison, the standard of reasonable conduct in the law of abuse of contractual rights in quebec would not provide wastech with the redress it seeks here. [109] i agree with metro that invoking the substantive content of what constitutes an abuse in the exercise of a discretionary contractual clause in quebec law is of no help to wastech in this case. in arguing that the denial of the opportunity to earn its target revenue reflects an unreasonable exercise of metro’s discretion to reallocate waste, wastech does not allege that metro acted imprudently or negligently, in an intemperate manner or with an intention to harm, factors often considered to be relevant to the measure of abuse of right in houle and in the cases decided under art. 6, 7 and 1375 ccq (j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obligations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, nos. 156 and 157). moreover, quebec scholars and courts have pointed out that the standard as to what constitutes an abusive exercise of a discretionary right is an especially exacting one: typically it is said to repose on [translation] “bad faith or a blatant fault causing abnormal injury” (j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers and b. moore, la responsabilité civile, vol. 1, principes généraux (8th ed. 2014), at para. 1-232, citing ponce v. montrusco & associés inc., 2008 qcca 329, [2008] rjdt 65). none of this kind of conduct is alleged by wastech in support of its claim based on the supposedly unreasonable exercise of the power in the contract in this case. it is true that some authorities in quebec support the view that a contractual right should not be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily (d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (3rd ed. 2018), no. 1987). but, as we have seen, even allowing for these measures as relevant to what is the reasonable exercise of a discretionary power in the common law, wastech has not staked its claim against metro on this basis. [110] more importantly still, wastech’s argument that metro’s discretionary power should have been exercised in the spirit of cooperation — a principle that has been recognized on occasion in quebec — would be of no assistance to wastech here. ultimately, wastech asks, under the guise of good faith performance of metro’s discretionary power, that it be provided with a benefit not contemplated by the parties in the contract whatever the extent to which a duty of cooperation with one’s contracting party is required by the law of good faith in quebec, it would stop short of requiring metro, in the absence of any wrongful conduct, to confer a guarantee of profit that is not provided for in the contract. in this sense, this court has compared quebec law to a similar notion sketched for the common law in bhasin in the case of churchill falls (labrador) corp v hydro-québec, 2018 scc 46, [2018] 3 scr 101, at para. 128: “the duty to cooperate with the other contracting party does not mean that one’s own interests must be sacrificed” whatever cooperation is required of contracting parties by good faith, in ordinary commercial contracts or even in long- term relational agreements, the law does not require, as a general rule, the parties to act as the law would require of a fiduciary, or to redistribute advantages under the agreement in a manner that stands outside the ordinary purview of contractual justice (see, eg,. dunkin’ brands canada ltd. v. bertico inc., 2015 qcca 624, 41 blr. (5th) 1, at para. 74, and gestion immobilière bégin inc. v 9156-6901 québec inc., 2018 qcca 1935, at para. 28 (canlii)) decidedly, an analogy to quebec law does not assist wastech in this case. (3) conclusion on good faith [111] where a party to a contract exercises its discretion unreasonably, which in this context means in a manner not connected to the underlying purposes of the discretion granted by the contract, its conduct amounts to a breach of the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith — a wrongful exercise of the discretionary power — and thus a contractual breach that must be corrected. requiring a party to pay damages to repair such a wrong accords with the theory of corrective justice and does not amount to a reallocation of the benefits under the contract as determined by the parties or a gift from one party to another. [112] this same theory of corrective justice anchors the organizing principle of good faith and the specific duties derived therefrom as reflected in cromwell j.’s statements in bhasin that the organizing principle is a “requirement of justice”. that does not require a party to subordinate its interests to those of the other party (para. 86). like the distinct duty of honest performance, the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith is not a fiduciary duty. in exercising a contractual discretionary power, “a party may sometimes cause loss to another — even intentionally — in the legitimate pursuit of economic self-interest” (para. 70). doing so is not necessarily exercising discretion wrongfully or in “bad faith”. [113] i note once again that the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith does not require a party to confer a benefit on the other party that was not a part of their original agreement, nor does it require a party to subordinate its interests to those of the other party. respectfully stated, the arbitrator failed to abide by these tenets and the arbitral award extends the good faith duty at issue beyond its proper bounds. in these circumstances, wastech’s argument that metro could not deprive it of the fundamental benefit for which it bargained fails to take into account the terms of the agreement itself and the purpose for which metro was extended the discretionary power in question. the parties saw the risk that wastech could fail to meet the target or in a given year they chose to leave that risk in the bargain and refrained from guaranteeing wastech’s profit margin. in light of this, wastech cannot say the exercise of the discretion was unreasonable. in essence, it argues that good faith required metro to subordinate its interests to wastech, and to guarantee to wastech something which the contract they painstakingly negotiated over approximately 18 months did not. generally speaking, this is not the role of good faith in the common law of contract in light of the requirement of justice spoken to in bhasin and the arbitrator erred in law by giving effect to these arguments. for these reasons, i agree with the courts below that wastech’s claim must fail: the arbitrator’s award cannot stand whether the standard of review is correctness or reasonableness. v disposition [114] i would dismiss the appeal with costs. the reasons of côté, brown and rowe jj. were delivered by brown and rowe jj. — i. introduction [115] we are in accord with our colleague kasirer j to dismiss the appeal. notwithstanding our agreement in the result, we write separately for four reasons. first, this court should clarify the applicable standard of review. secondly, while we agree that the purpose of a discretion is the proper focus of the good faith analysis, in assessing that purpose, courts must give effect to the parties’ bargain. thirdly, we do not agree with our colleague’s treatment of the duty of honest performance insofar as he suggests that it is a preliminary step in addressing the duty to exercise discretion in good faith. finally, our colleague’s reliance on the civil law of quebec is unnecessary, ill-advised and wholly misplaced. rather than assisting in the development of the common law of good faith in contractual performance, as stated by this court in bhasin v. hrynew, 2014 scc 71, [2014] 3 scr 494, the digression into the civil law gives rise to complication, uncertainty and confusion. [116] at root, answering the question posed by this appeal is a matter of straightforwardly applying bhasin and confirming that, while bhasin organized several established common law doctrines under the rubric of “good faith”, it did not represent an abandonment of commercial certainty by requiring contracting parties to place their counterparty’s interests ahead of their own. inasmuch as the effect of the arbitrator’s decision in this case was to require that the respondent protect the appellant’s interests at the expense of its own, it is not consistent with bhasin or the jurisprudence that preceded it. we would therefore dismiss the appeal. ii. standard of review [117] our colleague refrains from identifying the standard of review, since on either standard he would overturn the arbitrator’s conclusions. in our view, however, this court ought to provide clear guidance on this point. conflicting lines of authority have arisen concerning the application of canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v vavilov, 2019 scc 65, to arbitration appeals (northland utilities (nwt) limited v hay river (town of), 2021 nwtca 1, at paras 21-44 (canlii); ontario first nations (2008) limited partnership v ontario lottery and gaming corporation, 2020 onsc 1516, at paras. 62-75 (canlii); cove contracting ltd v. condominium corporation no 012 5598 (ravine park), 2020 abqb 106, 10 alta. lr (7th) 178, at paras. 3-12; allstate insurance co. v. ontario (minister of finance), 2020 onsc 830, 149 o.r (3d) 761, at paras. 12-19; buffalo point first nation v. cottage owners association, 2020 mbqb 20, at paras. 46-48 (canlii); clark v. unterschultz, 2020 abqb 338, 41 rfl (8th) 28, at paras. 55-56) this question ought to be resolved. [118] in vavilov, this court concluded that the appellate standards of review identified in housen v nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, apply to statutory rights of appeal from administrative decisions (para. 37). certain trial courts have, however, resisted applying this principle to appeals from arbitral awards. two reasons are offered for this. first, sattva capital corp. v. creston moly corp., 2014 scc 53, [2014] 2 scr 633, and teal cedar products ltd. v. british columbia, 2017 scc 32, [2017] 1 scr 688, do not support the application of appellate standards of review to arbitration appeals, and vavilov did not expressly overrule those decisions (ontario first nations, at para. 71; cove contracting ltd., at paras. 10-12). secondly, vavilov was driven by “constitutional considerations that justify deference by the judiciary to the legislature” (ontario first nations, at para. 72) in contrast, the standard of review that applies to appeals from private arbitration awards is “guided by commercial considerations about respect for the decision-makers chosen by the parties. as a result, deference is justified by the parties’ contractual intent” (ontario first nations, at para. 72). [119] there are important differences between commercial arbitration and administrative decision-making (sattva, at para. 104) those differences do not, however, affect the standard of review where the legislature has provided for a statutory right of appeal. appellate standards of review apply as a matter of statutory interpretation as this court explained in vavilov, “a legislative choice to enact a statutory right of appeal signals an intention to ascribe an appellate role to reviewing courts” (para. 39) this interpretive principle applies in similar manner to statutory rights of appeal from arbitral awards: more generally, there is no convincing reason to presume that legislatures mean something entirely different when they use the word “appeal” in an administrative law statute than they do in, for example, a criminal or commercial law context accepting that the word “appeal” refers to the same type of procedure in all these contexts also accords with the presumption of consistent expression, according to which the legislature is presumed to use language such that the same words have the same meaning both within statutes: a r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed 2014), at p 217. statute across and (vavilov, at para. 44) [120] factors that justify deference to the arbitrator, notably respect for the parties’ decision in favour of alternative dispute resolution and selection of an appropriate decision-maker, are not relevant to this interpretive exercise. what matters are the words chosen by the legislature, and giving effect to the intention incorporated within those words. thus, where a statute provides for an “appeal” from an arbitration award, the standards in housen apply to this extent, vavilov has displaced the reasoning in sattva and teal cedar concluding otherwise would undermine the coherence of vavilov and the principles expressed therein. [121] the appeal in this case was brought pursuant to s 31 of the arbitration act, rsbc 1996, c 55,2 which provides that, either by consent of the parties or with leave 2 since repealed, and replaced by the appeal clause in the arbitration act, sbc 2020, c 2, s 59. of the supreme court of british columbia, a party to an arbitration “may appeal to the court on any question of law arising out of the award”. in light of vavilov, it follows that the standard of review to be applied by this court in this case is correctness (housen, at para. 8). our conclusion on this point is limited to the specific statutory provision at issue. in every case, the question is one of legislative intention, as reflected in the language of the statute. [122] instead of responding substantively, our colleague invokes an unfortunate passage from the majority judgment in newfoundland and labrador (attorney general) v uashaunnuat (innu of uashat and of mani-utenam), 2020 scc 4, at para. 15, explicitly dismissing opposing views of colleagues as unworthy of answer. of no less concern are the implications of his refusal to decide the appropriate standard of review, which risks undermining this court’s decision in vavilov as it relates to statutory appeals. to leave this undecided is to invite conflict and confusion. iii background [123] this appeal arises from a 20-year comprehensive agreement (“agreement”) between the greater vancouver sewerage and drainage district (“metro”) and wastech services inc (“wastech”) to deal with the management of municipal solid waste. specifically, the agreement contemplated that wastech or its subcontractors would deliver solid waste to transfer stations in cache creek, vancouver and burnaby wastech operated the cache creek transfer station metro had discretion under the agreement to determine the allocation of waste each year among these stations. the volume of waste distributed to each facility would impact the costs, revenues, and, accordingly, wastech’s ability to earn a profit. in particular, wastech received a higher rate of pay for disposals at cache creek. wastech’s total compensation under the agreement was structured around a target operating ratio of 0.890 (“target or”), meaning that, in any given year, operating costs should comprise 89 percent of revenue so that wastech would receive the remaining 11 percent of revenue as profit. [124] significantly, the agreement did not guarantee that wastech would achieve its target or; rather, it addressed what would happen if the target or was not achieved. if the actual operating ratio (“actual or”) fell between 0.860 and 0.920 at year end, the agreement provided for a retroactive payment by or to wastech of 50 percent of the difference between the target or and the actual or. effectively, the parties would share the financial consequences of any deviation of 0.300 or less from the target or. in addition, the agreement contained a prospective adjustment, which was applied if the actual or fell outside of the “target band” between 0.860 and 0.920 (“outside band adjustment”) the outside band adjustment was intended to be sufficient to return the operating ratio to just outside the target band further, if wastech’s actual or fell outside of the target band for three consecutive years, the rates were subject to re-calculation. [125] the total waste hauled by wastech under the agreement had declined steadily since 2007 metro therefore decided to redirect flows of waste from cache creek to vancouver for the 2011 year to “maximize the remaining life of the cache creek landfill” (arbitrator’s decision, ar, vol. i, p 1 (“award”), at para. 52) and because of metro’s own budget concerns. metro was aware that wastech might not be able to reduce its costs to account for the change in allocation, which ultimately caused delivery volumes at cache creek to drop by 31 percent in 2011, relative to 2010. because of metro’s decision, wastech had no possibility of achieving the target or in 2011. [126] the arbitrator expressly declined to imply a term in the agreement guaranteeing the target or, finding that the parties had considered such a term and rejected it. he also concluded, however, that metro was bound by its duty of good faith to have appropriate regard for wastech’s legitimate interests. while the 2011 allocation decision was honest and reasonable when considered from metro’s perspective, it also “had significant financial implications [for wastech] beyond those addressed by the [agreement’s] adjustment mechanisms” (para. 86) the arbitrator concluded that metro’s decision was “dishonest” because it inappropriately negated wastech’s legitimate expectation of at least having the opportunity to earn the target or in each year of the agreement. iv. issues [127] metro was granted leave to appeal the arbitrator’s decision on two questions of law: 1. did the arbitrator err in law in failing to apply proper principles in holding that the exercise of a bargained-for right could be “dishonest” and an act undertaken in bad faith simply because it was wholly at odds with the expectations of the counter-party, which expectations were not embodied in the contract? 2. did the arbitrator err in law by confusing the “organizing principle” stated in bhasin with a free-standing obligation of contractual good faith, disregarding the applicable principles of good faith as found in the authorities? (2016 bcsc 68, 409 dlr (4th) 9, at para. 40) ultimately, these questions both raise one straightforward issue: what is the standard applicable when determining whether a contractual discretion has been exercised in good faith? v analysis a. the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith [128] the first step in deciding a common law good faith claim is to consider whether any established good faith doctrines apply (cm. callow inc. v. zollinger, 2020 scc 45, at para. 129). in bhasin, this court recognized in the common law four distinct doctrines, each with corresponding duties, that manifest a “general organizing principle” of good faith: (1) a duty of cooperation between the parties to achieve the objects of the contract (para. 49); (2) a duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith (para. 50); (3) a duty not to evade contractual obligations in bad faith (para. 51); and (4) a duty of honest performance (para. 73). this appeal draws from one of them ⸺ the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith. [129] while this court has recognized the existence of this good faith doctrine, it has never opined on the applicable standard (see mitsui & co. (canada) ltd. v. royal bank of canada, [1995] 2 scr 187; bhasin, at paras. 47 and 50). we agree with our colleague that the appellate jurisprudence supports the notion that discretion must be exercised reasonably, and that this standard simply requires that a party exercise discretion in accordance with the purpose for which it was granted we would, however, emphasize two points to bear in mind in applying it. [130] first, the purpose of good faith is to “secur[e] the performance and enforcement of the contract made by the parties” (transamerica life canada inc. v. ing canada inc. (2003), 68 or (3d) 457 (ca), at para. 53). it cannot be used as a device to “create new, unbargained-for rights and obligations”, or “to alter the express terms of the contract reached by the parties” (transamerica, at para. 53). contracting parties cannot be held to a standard that is “contrary to the plain wording of the contract, or that involve[s] the imposition of subjective expectations” (styles v alberta investment management corp., 2017 abca 1, 44 alta. lr (6th) 214, at para. 45). [131] where an agreement reflects a shared, reasonable expectation as to the manner in which a discretion may be exercised, that expectation will be enforced (mesa operating limited partnership v. amoco canada resources ltd. (1994), 149 ar 187 (ca), at para. 19; j. t. robertson, “good faith as an organizing principle in contract law: bhasin v. hrynew ⸺ two steps forward and one look back” (2015), 93 can. bar rev 809, at p 839; j steyn, “contract law: fulfilling the reasonable expectations of honest men” (1997), 113 lqr 433, at p 434). this, in our view, is what it means to exercise discretion reasonably. as our colleague states, parties will usually expect that a discretion will be exercised in accordance with the purposes for which it was conferred. however, this is so only where the purpose of a discretionary power arises from the terms of the contract, construed objectively, and having regard to the factual matrix. in this way, the obligation to exercise discretion reasonably does not reflect the imposition of external standards on the exercise of discretion, but rather giving effect to the standards inherent in the parties’ own bargain. [132] accordingly, we do not share our colleague’s view that, where a discretion is unfettered on its face, a court must “form a broad view of the purposes of the venture to which the contract gives effect, and of what loyalty to that venture might involve for a party to it, and to take those broad purposes as providing the inherent limits for the exercise of the power” (kasirer j.’s reasons, at para. 72, quoting p sales, “use of powers for proper purposes in private law” (2020), 136 lqr 384, at p 393). our colleague’s invocation of “loyalty to th[e] venture” suggests that parties must use their discretion, even where it is chosen by the parties to be unfettered, in a way that (from the view of the judge) advances the objectives of the contract. this is not an exercise in interpretation. rather, it is the imposition, post facto, of a judicial view. approaching the interpretive task from such a starting point risks, even invites, undermining freedom of contract and distorting the parties’ bargain by imposing constraints to which they did not agree. [133] secondly, our colleague says that the duty to exercise discretion in good faith is a general doctrine of contract law. consequently, “it need not find its source in an implied term in the contract, but rather it operates in every contract irrespective of the intentions of the parties” (kasirer j.’s reasons, at para. 91). whether or not such judge-made rules operate irrespective of the intentions of the parties, we are steadfast in our view that the purpose of a discretion is always defined by the parties’ intentions, as revealed by the contract. it follows that, where a contract discloses a clear intention to grant a discretion that can be exercised for any purpose, courts, operating within their proper role, must give effect to that intention. with careful drafting, parties can largely immunize the exercise of discretion from review on this basis. conversely, they may choose to specify the purpose for which a discretion has been granted in order to provide a clear standard against which the exercise of discretion is to be assessed. in either instance, their intention should be given effect and not subverted. [134] in this case, the award was predicated on the view that metro was to have “appropriate regard” for wastech’s interest in achieving the target or every year. but the structure of the agreement makes it clear that metro’s discretion was subject to no such constraint. indeed, through the outside band adjustment and the adjustment that applies if wastech’s compensation falls outside of the target or for three consecutive years, the agreement expressly contemplated that there might well be years in which wastech would be unable to achieve the target or. the parties managed this risk by agreeing to formulae that adjusted the total compensation towards the target or. finding that the discretion was constrained in the manner wastech suggests would ignore these features of the agreement. [135] it is for this reason that we say this matter really is quite straightforward. in the bargain struck by the parties, metro was given wide discretion, and wastech’s interests in the exercise of metro’s discretion were protected by the formulae that adjusted the total compensation towards the target or in effect, the parties contemplated that metro could exercise the discretion so as to advance its own interests, just as they contemplated protecting wastech’s interests by the adjustment formulae. while good faith requires a party to exercise its contractual discretion for the purpose for which it was given, the arbitrator erred by concluding that metro was obligated to exercise its discretion in a way that protected wastech’s subjective expectations. to the contrary, wastech had bargained for the inclusion of the adjustment formulae to protect its interests, while accepting that metro could exercise its discretion solely in its interests. b other issues [136] two other matters arising from our colleague’s reasons require comment. [137] first, our colleague addresses the duty of honest performance in his reasons the issue of honesty arose here because the arbitrator described metro’s conduct as “dishonest”, by which he meant that it was “wholly at odds” with wastech’s “legitimate contractual expectations” (award, at para. 90) we agree with our colleague that the arbitrator erred. the difficulty, however, is that our colleague goes further in his elaborations regarding honest performance, and risks blurring the boundaries between that duty, and the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith. this is a particular concern in his suggestion that the duty of honest performance is a preliminary step in assessing whether there is a breach of the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith (at para. 69: “. . . beyond the requirement of honest performance . . . ”). this misreads and distorts settled law. the two doctrines are, and should remain, distinct; connecting them in this way fails to comprehend or have regard for how the common law, as set out in bhasin, has distinguished between them. indeed, the arbitrator’s description of metro’s conduct as “dishonest” was a product of the same error as that of our colleague, since it flowed from the arbitrator’s failure to appreciate that dishonesty is distinct from good faith, and that the organizing principle is distinct from both of these doctrines our colleague’s response to this should have been to achieve greater clarity with respect to each duty; instead, he has engendered confusion in this aspect of the common law. [138] secondly, our colleague takes up the unfortunate invitation presented by the parties in their submissions to discuss the result that would follow by applying the civil code of québec but this case is from british columbia the civil code of québec has no relevance here, and our colleague (yet further) confuses matters for no useful purpose by incorporating an analysis thereunder. this is particularly undesirable where the common law of british columbia, which is the law that applies to the agreement, readily answers the questions of law posed by this appeal. [139] furthermore, even if the civil law of quebec were remotely relevant (which it is not), wastech did not rely on civilian concepts to expand the common law. rather, it observed in passing that the approach to good faith which it espoused would be consistent with the civilian approach. having concluded that wastech’s understanding of the common law of good faith was flawed, there is no reason to address the way its claim would be handled under the civil law. and in any event, as our colleague stresses, wastech’s claim would not be treated more favourably under the civil law (para. 108). this leaves us asking why he finds it appropriate to address the requirement of good faith and the doctrine of abuse of right under the civil law of quebec at great length, or at all. as one of us stated in callow, at para. 170, “unnecessary digression into external legal concepts [creates] practical difficulties on the ground by making the common law governing contractual relationships less comprehensible and therefore less accessible to those who need to know it, thereby increasing costs for all concerned”. respectfully, our colleague’s extensive obiter dicta here, as in callow, will surely achieve just that. [140] our colleague’s digressions concerning honest performance and quebec civil law do not reflect, to our mind, appropriate common law methodology the common law develops best by increments, one brick at a time ⸺ as it did in bhasin ⸺ carefully, and in response to the matters presented, and not by expositions on matters that are not. instead, we say, again respectfully, that our colleague builds an edifice of unknown and untested stability. this is unwise. vi conclusion [141] we would dismiss the appeal, with costs. appeal dismissed with costs. solicitors for the respondent: nathanson, schachter & thompson, vancouver. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. toronto.
i. overview 55 63 70 71 72 72 75 80 82 87 96 101 105 119 124 126 131 146 151 160 [1] the unified national judicial system is a defining feature of canada’s judiciary. this system ensures the joint participation of the federal government and the provinces.1 on the one hand, the constitution grants exclusive jurisdiction over the administration of justice to the provinces, thereby empowering them to create courts and organize them on the other hand, it places a specific category of courts, the superior courts, at the centre of the canadian judiciary and vests the federal government with the power to appoint their judges. [2] over the years, the courts have endeavoured to give meaning to this characteristic of canada’s judicial system, which stems from ss. 92(14) and 96 to 100 of the constitution act, 1867. the case law sought to strike a proper balance between provincial initiatives on the administration of justice and respect for one of the important compromises of the fathers of confederation, on which the special and inalienable status conferred on the s 96 courts is grounded. [3] the first question raised in these appeals is whether art. 35 para. 1 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“ccp”), is consistent with s 96 of the constitution act, 1867. put differently, does granting exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims for less than $85,000 to the court of québec create a parallel or shadow court that usurps the role reserved by the constitution to the superior courts? in this case, the legislature has not transferred a specific jurisdiction to the provincial court, but rather an extensive and exclusive jurisdiction over a vast area at the heart of private law. this case presents an opportunity for this court to clarify the line that the provinces must not cross in exercising their jurisdiction over the administration of justice. this question 1 for the sake of readability of these reasons, references only to the provinces will be understood to include canada’s territories. represents a new milestone in the evolution of the case law on s 96, as it concerns a wholesale court-to-court transfer of jurisdiction over contractual and extracontractual obligations below a specific monetary limit, which has the effect of removing these matters from the jurisdiction of the superior courts. [4] the purpose of s 96 is to give effect to the compromise reached at confederation by protecting the special status of the superior courts of general jurisdiction as the cornerstone of our unitary justice system. the principles of national unity and the rule of law are central to this organization of the judiciary. to ensure that s 96 fulfills its function, this court has developed various tests over time, the most recent being the three-step test from re residential tenancies act, 1979, [1981] 1 scr 714 (“residential tenancies”), and the core jurisdiction test adopted in macmillan bloedel ltd. v. simpson, [1995] 4 scr 725. these two tests are based on a shared concern reflected in earlier jurisprudence: the nature and role of superior courts are to be protected, and the creation of courts with provincially appointed judges that mirror or usurp the functions of superior courts is not permitted. [5] the three-step residential tenancies test limits the granting of power or jurisdiction over a type of dispute where, at the time of confederation, the power or jurisdiction came exclusively or primarily within the remit of the superior courts. in our view, the application of this test does not on its own render art. 35 para. 1 ccp unconstitutional indeed, there was sufficient general involvement by the inferior courts in civil disputes pertaining to the law of contractual and extracontractual obligations in three of the four founding provinces. [6] the second test aims to determine whether a grant of jurisdiction infringes on the superior courts’ core jurisdiction either through an alteration of their essential nature or because they are prevented from playing their central role conferred by s 96. article 35 para. 1 ccp infringes on the superior courts’ general private law jurisdiction — an essential feature that forms part of their core jurisdiction — in a way that is inconsistent with the constitution both the superior court and the court of québec play an important part in maintaining the rule of law, enjoy the guarantees of judicial independence, are composed of professional, qualified judges, and promote access to justice. these shared characteristics are essential to the proper functioning of both courts and to the protection of the public. while we acknowledge these realities, the question is nevertheless whether the province’s wholesale transfer of an exclusive jurisdiction to a court with provincially appointed judges complies with s 96. [7] in this distinct context, we have looked to a wide range of factors to answer that question: the scope of the jurisdiction granted by art. 35 para. 1 ccp, the exclusivity of the grant, the high monetary limit, the available appeal mechanisms, and the absence of a societal objective capable of justifying the legislation. the weighing of the relevant factors leads us to conclude that the grant to the court of québec of exclusive jurisdiction over civil disputes concerning contractual and extracontractual obligations up to a value of less than $85,000 unduly compromises the position of s 96 courts and is unconstitutional. the scope of the jurisdiction granted by art. 35 para. 1 ccp, combined with the various features of the institutional context in which that jurisdiction is exercised, transforms the court of québec into a prohibited parallel court and impermissibly infringes on the core jurisdiction of the superior court this necessarily undermines the crucial role the quebec superior court plays in the canadian judicial system. [8] we agree with the court of appeal that the monetary limit is too high when considered in its historical and institutional contexts. it is noteworthy that the transfer of jurisdiction to the court of québec not only grants a broad civil jurisdiction in the area of obligations that is circumscribed by a monetary limit, but also removes that jurisdiction from the quebec superior court. this improperly impinges on the superior court’s ability to hear and rule on disputes in a field at the heart of quebec private law. no other court with provincially appointed judges in canada has a comparable exclusive jurisdiction in civil matters: the other provinces retain a form of concurrent jurisdiction between courts with provincially appointed judges and s 96 courts. [9] other characteristics of the court of québec likewise support the conclusion that the impugned article oversteps the bounds of constitutionality both courts hear civil cases involving contractual and extracontractual matters and apply the same laws and procedural rules in adjudicating them. further, the court of québec’s decisions can be appealed directly to the quebec court of appeal. as a result, the jurisdiction provided for in art. 35 para. 1 ccp gives the court of québec every appearance of being a parallel court and undermines the central role reserved to the superior courts in the canadian judicial system by ss. 96 to 100 of the constitution act, 1867 it is difficult to see what remains to distinguish the court of québec from a constitutionally protected superior court. [10] in our view, the second reference question, which relates to the court of québec’s application of the obligation of judicial deference when it hears an appeal from an administrative decision under certain provincial statutes, is now moot as a result of this court’s decision in canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, and the coming into force of s 83.1 of the courts of justice act, cqlr, c. t-16. we therefore decide not to address it. [11] for the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeals on the basis that art. 35 para. 1 ccp is unconstitutional and the second question is moot. ii background to the reference to the quebec court of appeal [12] on january 1, 2016, the new code of civil procedure, including art. 35, came into force. article 35 grants the court of québec exclusive jurisdiction over all civil disputes in which the value of the subject matter or the amount being claimed is less than $85,000 however, this jurisdiction excludes family matters other than adoption, and any other jurisdiction that is exclusively assigned by law to another court or adjudicative body. article 35 para. 1 ccp reads as follows: the court of québec has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine applications in which the value of the subject matter of the dispute or the amount claimed, including in lease resiliation matters, is less than $85,000, exclusive of interest; it also hears and determines applications ancillary to such an application, including those for the specific performance of a contractual obligation. however, it does not have such jurisdiction in cases where jurisdiction is formally and exclusively assigned to another court or adjudicative body, or in family matters other than adoption. [13] the structure of quebec’s judicial organization, of which art. 35 forms part, can be understood by briefly reviewing the scope of the superior court’s and the court of québec’s current jurisdictions in order to get a full picture of the issues raised by these appeals. [14] the court of québec, as a statutory court, may exercise only the jurisdiction conferred on it by the legislature. under quebec legislation, the court of québec has jurisdiction throughout quebec over civil, criminal and penal matters, as well as over youth matters this three-pronged jurisdiction is reflected in the three divisions of the court (ss. 2, 79 and 106 of the courts of justice act). the court also sits on administrative matters and on appeals in cases provided for by law (s 79). pursuant to art. 35 ccp, the court of québec’s civil division has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine applications where the value of the subject matter is less than $85,000. applications not exceeding $15,000 are heard by the civil division’s small claims division (art. 536 ccp). [15] by contrast, the quebec superior court, as the court of original general jurisdiction, has province-wide jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter that is not formally and exclusively assigned to another court (art. 33 para. 1 ccp). as a result, it hears, inter alia, civil suits in which the amount at issue is at least $85,000, cases relating to immovable property or its dismemberments, successions and wills, and most family law cases, including divorce applications. the superior court also has exclusive jurisdiction over class actions and injunctions (art. 33 para. 2 ccp), a general power of judicial review (art. 34 para. 1 ccp) and jurisdiction to hear and determine a number of civil proceedings provided for in federal legislation, such as applications relating to bankruptcy and insolvency. [16] the chief justice, senior associate chief justice and associate chief justice of the superior court of quebec (“chief justice of the superior court et al.”) argue that the effect of art. 35 ccp is to deny quebec litigants the right to file any civil claim in the superior court in which the value of the subject matter of the dispute is less than $85,000. they argue this provision prevents the superior court from stating and advancing the law with respect to such claims. the chief justice of the superior court et al. challenge the constitutionality of art. 35 ccp on this basis. [17] for this very reason, at the time of the code of civil procedure reform, the chief justice of the superior court et al. urged the quebec legislature not to raise the ceiling of the court of québec’s civil jurisdiction from $70,000 to $85,000. moreover, they asked the quebec government to submit a reference to the quebec court of appeal to ask that court to rule on the constitutionality of the court of québec’s civil jurisdiction. after these requests were denied, the chief justice of the superior court et al. filed an originating application on july 19, 2017, seeking a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality in the superior court. in their application, they also contested the appellate jurisdiction granted to the court of québec with respect to certain administrative decisions on the basis that the requirement of deference recognized in the case law is incompatible with the superior courts’ power of judicial review. [18] in august 2017, in response to those legal proceedings, the quebec government issued order in council 880-2017, concernant un renvoi à la cour d’appel portant sur la validité constitutionnelle des dispositions de l’article 35 du code de procédure civile qui fixent à moins de 85 000 $ la compétence pécuniaire exclusive de la cour du québec et sur la compétence d’appel attribuée à la cour du québec, (2017) 149 go. ii, 4495. in october 2017, the attorney general of quebec (“agq”) filed with the court of appeal a notice of reference submitting the following questions: [translation] 1 are the provisions of the first paragraph of article 35 of the code of civil procedure (chapter c-25.01), setting at less than $85,000 the limit to the exclusive monetary jurisdiction of the court of québec, valid with regard to section 96 of the constitution act, 1867, given the jurisdiction of quebec over the administration of justice under paragraph 14 of section 92 of the constitution act, 1867? 2 is it compatible with section 96 of the constitution act, 1867 to apply the obligation of judicial deference, which characterizes the application for judicial review, to the appeals to the court of québec provided for in sections 147 of the act respecting access to documents held by public bodies and the protection of personal information (chapter a-2.1), 115.16 of the act respecting the autorité des marchés financiers (chapter a-33.2), 100 of the real estate brokerage act (chapter c-73.2), 379 of the act respecting the distribution of financial products and services (chapter d-9.2), 159 of the act respecting administrative justice (chapter j-3), 240 and 241 of the police act (chapter p-13.1), 91 of the act respecting the régie du logement (chapter r-8.1) and 61 of the act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector (chapter p-39.1)? (order in council, at p 4496) iii quebec court of appeal, 2019 qcca 1492 [19] the court of appeal first outlined the origin and purpose of the provisions of the constitution act, 1867 relating to the courts and the organization of justice, namely ss. 96 to 100, 129 and 133. noting that these provisions are intended to reflect the united kingdom’s judicial system, the court concluded that the constitution does not allow superior courts to be abolished or deprived of their core powers. similarly, the court held that there is “a prohibition against creating courts with provincially appointed judges that exercise, in whole or in part, the jurisdiction of the superior courts as ‘shadows’ or ‘mirrors’ thereof” (paras. 35 and 46-47 (canlii)). the court of appeal noted that the test developed in residential tenancies is generally used for this purpose. [20] the court of appeal considered whether art. 35 ccp infringes on the core jurisdiction of the quebec superior court (para. 102). relying on trial lawyers association of british columbia v. british columbia (attorney general), 2014 scc 59, [2014] 3 scr 31, the court held that the quebec legislature may increase the amount of the court of québec’s monetary jurisdiction only if it can do so without altering the core jurisdiction of the superior courts to “resolve disputes between individuals and decide questions of private . . . law” (para. 141, quoting trial lawyers, at para. 32). [21] to identify the monetary limit beyond which an infringement on the core jurisdiction could not be justified, the court of appeal reviewed the structure of the courts in the other provinces. it then concluded that, “[i]n light of the historical context as well as the objectives tied to the rule of law and national unity arising from section 96 of the constitution act, 1867 . . . the superior court can retain its core jurisdiction to adjudicate civil disputes only if that jurisdiction applies to ‘substantial’ claims of litigants” (para. 148 (emphasis added)). [22] the court of appeal took the amount of $100 as the starting point for its analysis, because that was the amount of “the maximum monetary jurisdiction exercised in 1867 by some of the inferior courts charged with hearing certain civil matters” (para. 144). however, it stressed that updating the amount “is only one of the elements for determining whether a claim is substantial for a present-day litigant” (para. 153) an increase over and above the actual updated amount would not automatically infringe on the core jurisdiction of the superior courts (para. 154). other factors must be considered, such as “(1) the monetary threshold for appeals as of right to the court of appeal; (2) the legislative objectives of the limits set on the jurisdiction of the court of québec and, consequently, of the superior court; and (3) empirical and statistical data” (para. 155). [23] the court of appeal concluded that art. 35 ccp is unconstitutional because it infringes on the core jurisdiction of the superior court to adjudicate certain substantial civil disputes by granting the court of québec jurisdiction over civil claims for less than $85,000, with the exception of certain excluded civil matters. in reaching this conclusion, the court considered, among other things, (i) the updated value of an amount of $100, which was a “substantial” amount in 1867, (ii) the threshold of $60,000 established by the quebec legislature for an appeal as of right, and (iii) the legislative background regarding the determination of the ceiling in light of the evidence and the applicable principles, the maximum limit for the jurisdiction of the court of québec must, to be consistent with s 96, fall between $55,000 and $70,000, subject to future updates (para. 188). [24] after reviewing increases in the threshold for appeals as of right and in the monetary ceiling of the civil jurisdiction of the court of québec, the court of appeal observed “that there has long been parity between the threshold for appeals as of right to the court of appeal and the ceiling for the court of québec’s exclusive jurisdiction” (para. 174). it emphasized that when these amounts were increased in 1995, the purpose was “to foster greater efficiency within the judicial system, by [among other things] adjusting the jurisdiction of the court of québec and reducing waiting times for hearings in the superior court” (para. 178) in the court of appeal’s opinion, the situation became problematic when legislative amendments in 2002 raised the jurisdictional ceiling from $30,000 to $70,000 with a view to reducing costs and delays, as that increase was greater than the one that would result from converting the 1867 amount of $100 to 2002 dollars ($37,175.75) (para. 181). the court of appeal noted that the legislative debates revealed that the idea “that inflation had eroded the court of québec’s jurisdiction” seemed to have been the primary motivation behind these increases (para. 182) for the most recent increase brought about as part of the ccp reform in 2014, the legislature merely considered the previous ceiling of $70,000 and updated it to $85,000 the court of appeal concluded that this last increase was “the extension of an ever-growing erosion of the constitutional jurisdiction of the quebec superior court over civil matters” (para. 187). [25] on the second reference question, the court of appeal held that applying the obligation of judicial deference to administrative appeals to the court of québec is compatible with s 96 this is because the superior court retains “its full superintending and reforming power over administrative decisions and decisions of inferior tribunals as well as its fundamental role as the guardian of an independent and unified system of justice in canada” (paras. 365 and 367). we note, however, that the court of appeal issued its opinion before our decision in vavilov. iv analysis on the first question a. scope of the first reference question [26] the first question before this court differs from the one it considered in renvoi touchant la constitutionnalité de la loi concernant la juridiction de la cour de magistrat, [1965] scr 772 that decision dealt with the constitutionality of amending legislation that had raised the monetary jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court from $200 to $500 in that case, this court reversed the quebec court of appeal’s opinion on the basis that it had ruled on the whole of the magistrate court’s jurisdiction rather than specifically addressing the particular concern underlying the reference question and the recitals contained in the order in council giving rise to the reference. [27] the reference question in this case has been stated in much broader terms, and we are not limited to looking only at the legislation that increased the amount of the court of québec’s monetary jurisdiction from $70,000 to $85,000. with respect for the court of appeal, we do not agree that the question confines our analysis to “the monetary ceiling imposed by article 35 ccp” (ca reasons, at para. 102; see also paras. 137-38). as worded, the question expressly mentions the monetary limit and the exclusivity of the court of québec’s jurisdiction. these are distinctive characteristics of quebec’s court structure unlike in other provinces, the principal distinction in quebec between the court with provincially appointed judges and the superior court, aside from certain remedies, is the monetary limit for the disputes each court may hear. apart from this distinction, the two courts hear and determine identical applications, apply the same code of civil procedure, and the decisions of both can be appealed to the quebec court of appeal. quebec’s judicial system is also unique in that all civil disputes falling within the scope of art. 35 ccp are removed from the superior court’s jurisdiction and assigned exclusively to the court of québec. [28] although the monetary limit and the exclusivity of the grant of jurisdiction are both important to the analysis, the language of the reference question requires a more wide-ranging analysis that takes into account how courts with provincially appointed judges and superior courts operate the question requires a more comprehensive answer on the constitutionality of art. 35 para. 1 ccp in light of ss. 92(14) and 96 of the constitution act, 1867. whether the grant is constitutional must therefore be examined having regard not only to the distinctive characteristics underlined above, but also to other characteristics relating to the broader context of the grant. such an approach is necessary to determine the impact the grant might have on the jurisdiction of the province’s superior court. in cases where this court has examined s 96, it has always been careful to consider the provisions at issue in their context rather than in the abstract (tomko v. labour relations board (ns), [1977] 1 scr 112, at p 120; residential tenancies, at p 735; crevier v. attorney general of quebec, [1981] 2 scr 220, at p 234; macmillan bloedel, at paras. 12 and 59). that is the approach that must be taken here. b constitutional framework [29] superior courts are the centrepiece of the unitary judicial system created by ss. 92(14), 96 to 100 and 129 of the constitution act, 1867. these provisions lay one of the key foundations of canada’s constitution, as they represent the balance struck between our federation’s national and provincial aspirations (reference re senate reform, 2014 scc 32, [2014] 1 scr 704, at para. 23; reference re supreme court act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 scc 21, [2014] 1 scr 433, at para. 87). [30] constitutional provisions must be “placed in [their] proper linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts” and interpreted in a broad and purposive manner (r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at p 344; see also hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at pp. 155-56; r v. comeau, 2018 scc 15, [2018] 1 scr. 342, at para. 52; reference re supreme court act, at para. 19). to properly understand the scope of the protection of the superior courts under s 96, we must therefore consider the historical context, that is, the compromise reached at confederation that is central to canada’s judicial system, as well as the role and purpose of s 96. [31] this court’s juriprudence on s 96 of the constitution act, 1867 upholds the two fundamental principles underlying this provision, namely national unity and the rule of law the case law has sought to safeguard the compromise reached at confederation by preserving the unitary nature of our judicial system. to achieve this objective, the court has, over the years, developed various tests designed to protect the status of the superior courts. the creation of courts that mirror the superior courts has always been considered an important limit that cannot be overstepped all the tests have had the purpose, among others, of precluding such an outcome. if the role of the superior courts were undermined by the creation of parallel courts, canada’s judicial system would be stripped of its unitary nature and could be transformed into a dualistic system like that of the united states. (1) compromise reached at confederation [32] historically, the english judicial system was based on a dichotomy between so-called inferior courts and the superior courts whose judges were appointed by the monarch (w. blackstone, commentaries on the laws of england (1765), book i, at pp. 258 and 327). the term “inferior court” was based on the fact that the powers and jurisdiction of such courts were strictly limited by their constitutions. the superior courts, on the other hand, had an inherent general jurisdiction. the advantage of the inferior courts was their accessibility; their decentralization allowed for justice to be delivered to the door of everyone in the country, whereas the royal courts were less accessible to the ordinary citizen however, royal courts historically had more extensive legal expertise than inferior courts. for this reason, royal courts exercised a power of control and supervision over decisions of inferior courts (g. pépin, les tribunaux administratifs et la constitution — étude des articles 96 à 101 de l’aanb. (1969), at pp. 134-35, quoting halsbury, the laws of england (3rd ed. 1954), vol. 9, at pp. 348-50). [33] this fundamental dichotomy was imported into the colonies of british north america. although the colonies established a three-tiered system consisting of a superior court, intermediate courts and inferior courts, the classification of the courts of the canadian provinces reflected the dichotomy of the english system. there were superior courts on the one hand, and the non-superior courts on the other hand (pépin, at pp. 134-35). this judicial system was maintained until the constitution act, 1867 was enacted (j. baker, an introduction to english legal history (5th ed 2019), at pp. 57-59). [34] at the time of confederation, the founding fathers chose to establish a constitution similar in principle to that of the united kingdom, as recognized in the preamble to the constitution act, 1867 the judicial system and the constitutional arrangements passed on to us by the united kingdom therefore constitute the historical foundation of our judicial system. [35] however, because the founding provinces opted for a federal union rather than a unitary system like the one that existed in the united kingdom, the british judicial system required adaptation. it was modified to take into account the fact that powers in canada are shared by two levels of government — the provinces and the federal government. [36] to guarantee both national unity and provincial autonomy, the fathers of confederation reached a compromise, creating a unitary justice system characterized by federal-provincial cooperation.2 to begin, all courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction of the founding provinces would continue to exist (s 129 of the constitution act, 1867). thus, the distinction between superior and non-superior courts that characterized the british system was expressly maintained. 2 the constitutional provisions reflecting this compromise reached at confederation are reproduced in the appendix. [37] in addition, s 92(14) of the constitution act, 1867 ensured that the provinces’ exclusive power over the administration of justice would remain intact, thereby preserving their autonomy in that regard. a province could therefore reorganize its courts to reflect its own reality and needs however, ss. 96 to 100 created an exception to the provinces’ power by conferring on the federal government the power to appoint judges to the superior courts, fix their remuneration and remove them (residential tenancies, at p 728). another exception, s 101 of the constitution act, 1867, gave the federal government the power to create federal statutory courts. this power was limited, however, as such courts would be confined by their constitutional boundaries to the administration of federal laws (windsor (city) v. canadian transit co., 2016 scc 54, [2016] 2 scr 617, at para. 33). [38] the fathers of confederation thus rejected the creation of a dualistic system like the ones established in other federations, including the united states. they preferred instead to establish a unitary system whose objective was national unity (residential tenancies, at p 728). [39] the superior courts of the various provinces were called upon to form the cornerstone of this system and to act as a “unifying force”, thereby enabling the development of the law nationwide (macmillan bloedel, at paras. 11, 29 and 37; see also attorney general of canada v. law society of british columbia, [1982] 2 scr. 307, at p 327; reference re young offenders act (pei), [1991] 1 scr 252, at p 264; reference re amendments to the residential tenancies act (ns), [1996] 1 scr 186, at para. 72; windsor, at para. 32). because the superior courts were given an inherent general jurisdiction like that of their british predecessors, they were empowered to interpret and apply both provincial and federal law (scowby v. glendinning, [1986] 2 scr 226, at pp. 249-50, per la forest j., dissenting on another point). [40] in short, the aim of the compromise reached at confederation was not simply to maintain the pre-existing justice system it created a system in which responsibilities were shared between the provinces and the federal government, enabling each province to shape the judicial landscape in its own territory in accordance with local realities thus, there is no requirement that the judiciary be structured uniformly from one province to the next; for a province to have established its own standards or made unique choices does not in itself amount to a constitutional defect. on the contrary, ss. 92(14) and 96 work together to advance access to justice by allowing the superior courts to coexist with tribunals and courts with provincially appointed members, as long as the unitary system, of which the superior courts are the cornerstone, is preserved. (2) role and purpose of section 96 [41] the superior courts recognized by s 96 “have always occupied a position of prime importance in the constitutional pattern of this country” (law society of british columbia, at p 327; see also windsor, at para. 32). although s 96 may on its face appear to relate solely to the federal government’s power to appoint judges, it has been interpreted by this court as guaranteeing a nucleus to the superior courts (sobeys stores ltd. v. yeomans and labour standards tribunal (ns), [1989] 1 scr 238, at p 264; canada (human rights commission) v. canadian liberty net, [1998] 1 scr. 626, at para. 27; see also tomko, at p 120). in this way, s 96 forms a safeguard against erosion of the historic compromise this means that neither the provinces nor the federal government may confer functions reserved to the superior courts on other courts to which s 96 does not apply (residential tenancies, at p 728; scowby, at para. 34; mcevoy v. attorney general for new brunswick, [1983] 1 scr 704, at pp. 720-21; windsor, at para. 32). if a province or the federal government could, by statute, confer the essential functions of the superior courts on another court, the role of the superior courts as the cornerstone of the judicial system would evidently be eroded and the system’s unitary nature would, in turn, be undermined. a transfer of jurisdiction from the superior courts to the provincial courts could ultimately transform the canadian system into a dualistic system. if that were to happen, it would be impossible to achieve the purpose of the compromise reached at confederation (residential tenancies, at p 728). [42] the superior courts’ role as the cornerstone of canada’s judicial system is based on two key principles: national unity and the rule of law. (a) national unity [43] one of the main objectives of the historic compromise reflected in s 96 is to reinforce the national character of the canadian judicial system (p. w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed supp. (loose-leaf)), vol. 1, at p 7-3) the superior courts form a network of related courts whose role is to unify and ensure the uniformity of justice in canada (ibid.; see also residential tenancies, at p 728). protecting the essence of the superior courts thus preserves “uniformity throughout the country in the judicial system” (reference re young offenders act (pei), at p 264). [44] moreover, s 96 has the effect of counterbalancing the provinces’ exclusive power over the administration of justice by entrusting to the federal government the task of appointing the judges who will sit on the superior courts. in accordance with the intentions of the fathers of confederation, the administration of justice thus depends on the cooperation of governments at both levels. [45] in light of the objective of national unity, the limits imposed by s 96 must be consistent across the country (sobeys, at pp. 265-66). to make “[a] rule which would permit a transfer of power in one province and deny it in another would undercut the unifying force of the s 96 courts” (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 78). ultimately, the constitutionally guaranteed existence of a federally appointed bench across the country has served as a unifying force and a vital safeguard of the rule of law in canada (ibid., at para. 72). (b) rule of law [46] the rule of law is maintained through the separation of judicial, legislative and executive functions ((a.) j. johnson, “the judges reference and the secession reference at twenty: reassessing the supreme court of canada’s unfinished unwritten constitutional principles project” (2019), 56 alta l. rev 1077, at pp. 1100-1101). in keeping with the principle of the separation of powers, the task of interpreting, applying and stating the law falls primarily to the judiciary (reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721, at p 744; british columbia v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2005 scc 49, [2005] 2 scr 473, at para. 50). [47] this separation allows the courts to implement the three fundamental facets of the rule of law: equality of all before the law, the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws, and oversight of the exercise of public powers (reference re manitoba language rights, at pp. 748-51; imperial tobacco, at para. 58; cooper v. canada (human rights commission), [1996] 3 scr 854, at para. 16). historically, the superior courts had primary responsibility for this task. [48] thus, in order to preserve the superior courts’ role as the cornerstone of the judicial system, they must be able to continue acting as primary guardians of the rule of law as they always have (macmillan bloedel, at para. 29; reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 26, per lamer cj, concurring; w. r. lederman, “the independence of the judiciary” (1956), 34 can bar rev 769, 1139, at p 1178; a. lamer, “the rule of law and judicial independence: protecting core values in times of change” (1996), 45 unblj 3, at p 11; l. huppé, le régime juridique du pouvoir judiciaire (2000), at pp. 10-11). this role falls to the superior courts because they are ideally placed to ensure the maintenance of the rule of law (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at paras. 26, per lamer cj, concurring, and 72, per mclachlin j for the majority). [49] in light of canada’s constitutional architecture, the superior courts are in the best position to preserve the various facets of the rule of law because of their independence and national character, they are best suited to resolving disputes over the division of powers between the provinces and the federal government and ensuring that government actions do not conflict with the fundamental rights of citizens (see amax potash ltd v government of saskatchewan, [1977] 2 scr 576, at p 590; d. p. jones, “a constitutionally guaranteed role for the courts” (1979), 57 can. bar rev 669, at p 675) moreover, the superior courts’ existence and status enjoy constitutional protection against legislative interference (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at paras. 72-73; trial lawyers, at para. 30) as a result, the superior courts need not rely on statutorily conferred powers to fully exercise their judicial functions. [50] while it is true that this court, in reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3 (“reference re remuneration of judges (1997)”), recognized the independence of provincial court judges and reaffirmed the important role played by provincial courts in maintaining the rule of law, the fact remains that the superior courts are the primary guardians of the rule of law. subject to constitutional guarantees of judicial independence, legislatures may abolish courts with provincially appointed judges or seriously fetter their powers without falling afoul of the constitution, whereas superior courts are constitutionally protected from such legislative interference. [51] only the superior courts have inherent powers that flow from their very nature, and the particular purpose of those powers is to enable the superior courts to ensure the maintenance of the rule of law in our legal system (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 56, per lamer cj, concurring; r v. ahmad, 2011 scc 6, [2011] 1 scr 110, at para. 61; ontario v criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr 3, at paras. 19 and 26). as will be seen below, these fundamental powers are constitutionally protected and therefore cannot be removed from them or unduly fettered. for example, the superior courts have the power to control their own process and enforce their orders they also have the power to review exercises of public power for legality and to ensure that citizens are protected from arbitrary government action (crevier; ues, local 298 v bibeault, [1988] 2 scr 1048, at p 1090; dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr. 190, at para. 31; vavilov, at para. 24) finally, the superior courts have residual jurisdiction as courts of original general jurisdiction, meaning they may — without statutory authorization — hear any matter that has not been assigned to a statutory court. as we will explain, this provides superior courts with a comprehensive view of the law, allowing them to preserve the coherence of the judicial system and set its overall directions (r. pepin, “les parlements peuvent-ils vider les cours supérieures de leur juridiction? ont-elles des pouvoirs ‘inhérents’, ‘inaliénables’? réflexions sur la décision macmillan bloedel ltd c simpson” (1997), 22 queen’s l.j 487, at pp. 512-13; huppé, at pp. 12-14). [52] although the provincial courts also play an important part in safeguarding the rule of law, none of their powers receive the same protection their role as guardians of the rule of law therefore rests on a less stable foundation this led lamer cj to remark that no statutory court can be “as crucial to the rule of law” as the superior courts (macmillan bloedel, at para. 37; see also reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 72; trial lawyers, at para. 39). (3) concept common to the section 96 tests: prohibition against creating parallel courts that undermine the role of the superior courts [53] to ensure s 96 can play its role to the fullest extent and achieve its purpose, this court has developed various tests over the years. the most recent are the three-step residential tenancies test and the core jurisdiction test. the court has often reiterated that s 96 must be able to evolve in accordance with the living tree doctrine (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 27, per lamer cj, concurring; see hogg, at pp. 15-51 to 15-57) the jurisprudence on s 96 must thus not cause “judicial functions [to] be frozen in an 1867 mold”, and “[a]daptations must be permitted to allow the legislatures scope to deal effectively with emerging social problems and concerns” (scowby, at pp. 250-51, per la forest j., dissenting; see also p 253; residential tenancies, at pp. 749-50). [54] in accordance with this evolutive approach, s 96 has gone through a “process of liberalization” to adapt to modern realities (residential tenancies, at p 730). despite this liberalization, this court has consistently reiterated the prohibition against establishing parallel courts that usurp the functions reserved to superior courts, as such parallel courts would eviscerate the protection afforded by s 96. (a) historical jurisdiction [55] first, the decisions on s 96 gave effect to the prohibition against creating parallel courts by protecting the historical jurisdiction of superior courts. section 96 was originally given a “sweeping” interpretation (residential tenancies, at p 729). in 1938, the privy council held that the functions conferred on the superior courts in 1867 could under no circumstances be granted to a court with provincially appointed judges, as such a grant would be invalid (toronto corporation v. york corporation, [1938] ac 415 (pc)). for the first time, lord atkin expressed concern about the creation of a parallel court by framing the issue as whether the administrative body in question was “in pith and substance . . . a superior court, or a tribunal analogous thereto” (p 426 (emphasis added)). [56] this court rejected the privy council’s “sweeping” approach that same year in reference re adoption act, [1938] scr 398, on the basis that it was too rigid and fixed the jurisdiction of the courts as it stood in 1867 (p 418). nevertheless, this court agreed with lord atkin’s statement that provinces could not, directly or indirectly, create courts analogous to superior courts (p 414). [57] the privy council then relaxed the applicable test in labour relations board of saskatchewan v. john east iron works, ltd., [1949] ac 134 (pc), to better account for the emergence of administrative tribunals. lord simonds reiterated that the ultimate objective of the analysis was to determine whether “the jurisdiction exercisable by the board is not such as to constitute it a court within s 96 of the british north america act” (p 152 (emphasis added); see also cour de magistrat, at p 781). [58] in tomko, the court developed the principle that the validity of a grant of jurisdiction must be considered having regard to the “institutional framework” (p 131) in which the jurisdiction is exercised, a principle that was subsequently incorporated into the residential tenancies test. here again, the prohibition against creating parallel courts played an important role. laskin cj stated that the creation of agencies whose members are appointed by a province and invested with jurisdiction or powers “conformable or analogous to [those] exercised . . . by courts which are within s 96” represents the line that may not be crossed (p 120 (emphasis added)). [59] finally, in residential tenancies, our court articulated the three-step test that remains in use today, subject to a few modifications introduced in subsequent cases:  characterization of the grant of jurisdiction: to determine whether a grant of jurisdiction is constitutionally infirm, a court must first properly characterize the jurisdiction being transferred.  three steps: (1) does the transferred jurisdiction conform to a jurisdiction that was dominated by superior, district or county courts at the time of confederation? (2) if so, was the jurisdiction in question exercised in the context of a judicial function? (3) if the first two questions are answered in the affirmative, is the jurisdiction either subsidiary or ancillary to an administrative function or necessarily incidental to the achievement of a broader policy goal of the legislature? (residential tenancies, at pp. 734-36; attorney general of quebec v. grondin, [1983] 2 scr 364; sobeys, at p 266; reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at paras. 32, per lamer cj, concurring, and 74, per mclachlin j for the majority) [60] in residential tenancies, dickson j (as he then was) firmly reiterated the relationship between the prohibition against creating parallel courts and the role and purpose of s 96: section 92(14) and ss. 96 to 100 represent one of the important compromises of the fathers of confederation it is plain that what was sought to be achieved through this compromise, and the intended effect of s 96, would be destroyed if a province could pass legislation creating a tribunal, appoint members thereto, and then confer on the tribunal the jurisdiction of the superior courts what was conceived as a strong constitutional base for national unity, through a unitary judicial system, would be gravely undermined. [p 728] [61] in its jurisprudence subsequent to residential tenancies, this court has consistently refused to allow the creation of parallel courts. in mcevoy, the court held that the contemplated court could not be established, because it would “effectively be a s 96 court” (pp. 718-19). the same fundamental concept was applied in sobeys, in which wilson j., writing for the majority, stated that “s 96 operates . . . to prevent the creation of provincial tribunals charged with exercising the jurisdiction of superior courts” (p 245). similarly, in reference re young offenders act (pei),. lamer cj. observed that s 96 would be rendered meaningless if it were permissible to “constitute, maintain and organize provincial courts staffed with provincially appointed judges having the same jurisdiction and powers as superior courts” (p 264). [62] more recently, in macmillan bloedel, mclachlin j (as she then was), dissenting, but not on this point, noted that, “[c]learly, parliament and the legislatures cannot be allowed to set up shadow courts exercising all or some of the powers of s 96 courts” (para. 54) the following year, in reference re residential tenancies act (ns),. mclachlin j reiterated, this time for the majority, that “[s]hadow courts and tribunals usurping the functions of the superior courts guaranteed by s 96 are prohibited” (para. 73). she explained that “[i]t follows from the constitutional status of the s 96 courts that neither parliament nor the legislatures may impair their status” (ibid.) their status would be impaired if it were possible to transfer their work to tribunals with provincially appointed members, “[s]o the wholesale transfer of superior court powers cannot be allowed” (ibid). (b) core jurisdiction [63] the core jurisdiction test aims to do more than simply protect historical jurisdiction. it also ensures that superior courts are not impaired in such a way that they are unable to play their role under s 96. the superior courts’ core jurisdiction includes the powers and jurisdiction essential to their role as the cornerstone of the unitary justice system and the primary guardians of the rule of law. these essential functions are not limited to inherent jurisdiction and powers in the traditional sense, but include any subject-matter jurisdiction that meets this criterion. if these essential powers and areas of jurisdiction were transferred exclusively to another court, that court would become a parallel court — an outcome prohibited by the constitution. it follows that the creation of a parallel court would prevent the superior courts from playing their constitutional role. that being said, even if no parallel court is created, the superior courts could be impaired to such an extent that they can no longer play their constitutional role this would be the case if the legislature were to interfere impermissibly with the exercise of core jurisdiction by, for example, circumscribing it to the point of “maim[ing]” the superior courts in their very essence (macmillan bloedel, at para. 37). [64] until macmillan bloedel, this court’s decisions protected the superior courts’ role by limiting grants of their historical jurisdiction. in macmillan bloedel, the court applied the three-step residential tenancies test to an exclusive grant to youth courts of the power to punish young persons for ex facie contempt of court — a power that was traditionally exercised by superior courts. the application of that test was seen as deficient because it did not prevent the removal of this significant power from the superior courts this court thought it was necessary to interpret the nucleus of the superior courts as also protecting their core jurisdiction (sobeys, at p 264). otherwise, there was a risk that gaps in the residential tenancies test would undermine the role of superior courts either by allowing the creation of parallel courts with certain powers essential to the superior courts’ role or by allowing the defining features of superior courts to be removed. [65] to preserve the essence of the superior courts, this court therefore added a second test to the analysis of constitutionality under s 96. it held that when the core jurisdiction of superior courts is affected, courts must ask whether the legislation has the effect of removing any of the attributes of the superior courts’ core jurisdiction (macmillan bloedel, at paras. 18 and 27) core jurisdiction includes “critically important jurisdictions which are essential to the existence of a superior court of inherent jurisdiction and to the preservation of its foundational role within our legal system” (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 56, per lamer cj, concurring). these defining features enable a superior court “to fulfil itself as a court of law” (macmillan bloedel, at paras. 30, 35 and 38 (emphasis deleted), quoting i. h. jacob, “the inherent jurisdiction of the court” (1970), 23 current legal problems 23, at p 27). their “inherent” nature is attributable to the fact that they are derived not from legislation, but “from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law” (para. 30, quoting jacob, at p 27). if such an attribute is removed, the measure is unconstitutional. [66] in addition to calling a removal of jurisdiction into question, this new doctrine operates to prevent the creation of parallel courts, like the residential tenancies test also does the core jurisdiction test prevents the legislature from transferring to other courts the features that are essential to the role of the superior courts as the centrepiece of the unitary justice system and the primary guardians of the rule of law, for such transfers could transform those other courts into mirrors of the superior courts the prohibition against parallel courts and the protection of the superior courts’ core jurisdiction are thus closely related; the creation of parallel courts affects the superior courts’ essential functions and place in the judicial system, thereby undermining or usurping their role and exceeding the limits imposed by s 96. however, the core jurisdiction test does not merely place limits on what can be transferred to other courts. it also curbs impermissible interference by the legislature with the exercise of the jurisdiction and powers that constitute the very essence of the superior courts in order to prevent these courts from being “maim[ed]” (macmillan bloedel, at para. 37). [67] the emergence of a test protecting core jurisdiction thus marks a change in direction. unlike the residential tenancies test, the core jurisdiction analysis is not primarily historical in nature it is the very essence of the superior courts that is protected the content of the core jurisdiction is therefore not limited to what the superior courts exercised exclusively at the time of confederation it extends to whatever is needed in order to preserve the vigour and strength of those courts. the protected powers and jurisdiction are solidly anchored in the role the superior courts are called upon to play in the maintenance of the rule of law in our unitary justice system (macmillan bloedel, at paras. 37-38 and 41). [68] the content of the core jurisdiction includes the inherent jurisdiction and inherent powers of a superior court recognized in macmillan bloedel: namely, review of the legality and constitutional validity of laws, enforcement of its orders, control over its own process, and its residual jurisdiction as a court of original general jurisdiction. [69] the constitutional protection of the residual jurisdiction of the superior courts as courts of original general jurisdiction was reiterated in trial lawyers, in which the court held that the imposition of hearing fees that had the effect of denying some individuals access to a court of original general jurisdiction impermissibly infringed on the core jurisdiction of the superior courts (para. 32). the hearing fees at issue caused undue hardship to litigants of modest means and therefore deprived them of access to the superior court for the adjudication of disputes over which no other court had jurisdiction. because such litigants were not indigent, they did not qualify for any exemption from paying the hearing fees. consequently, the superior court was deprived of its ability to hear, as the court of original general jurisdiction, disputes that involved individuals who were neither poor nor rich and over which no other court had jurisdiction such individuals fell through the cracks in the judicial system; their disputes could no longer be resolved by the law, which jeopardized the maintenance of an actual order of positive laws and thus the rule of law. it is impossible to conceive of a superior court being stripped of a feature so essential as its status as a court of original general jurisdiction. (c) conclusion [70] in short, a review of this court’s jurisprudence highlights the prohibition against creating parallel courts or striking at the very essence of superior courts, which gives full effect to the compromise reached at confederation. although the applicable tests may have changed over the years, they are not ends in and of themselves; they are simply expressions of the principles that underlie s 96. accordingly, it is important not to apply these tests in a purely mechanical fashion; on the contrary, they must be approached with those principles in mind. c application [71] we will begin by applying the residential tenancies test to determine whether art. 35 para. 1 ccp affects a jurisdiction that has historically been exercised by the superior courts and cannot be granted to a court with provincially appointed judges because we conclude that the application of that test does not enable us to answer the question before the court, we will then turn to the core jurisdiction test. as we will explain, that test must be adapted to better reflect the underlying purposes of the two tests, including that of prohibiting the creation of parallel courts. in this case, we find that the impugned provision is unconstitutional, because it impermissibly infringes on the superior courts’ general private law jurisdiction, which forms part of their core jurisdiction in its current form, art. 35 para. 1 ccp has the effect of transforming the court of québec into a parallel court that undermines the constitutional role of the superior court of general jurisdiction in other words, the court of québec’s exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims for less than $85,000 is unconstitutional. (1) three-step residential tenancies test (a) characterizing the jurisdiction [72] before proceeding with the first step of the test, we must characterize the jurisdiction at issue (sobeys, at pp. 252-55; reference re young offenders act (pei), at p 265; reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 76). the parties and interveners proposed a variety of characterizations for the jurisdiction granted to the court of québec by art. 35 para. 1 ccp. [73] we agree with those who argued that this provision grants jurisdiction over civil disputes concerning contractual and extracontractual obligations (af,. agq, at para. 56; af,. conférence des juges de la cour du québec (“cjcq”), at para. 93; if,. attorney general of canada, at paras. 39 and 45; af,. conseil de la magistrature, at paras. 29 and 93; af,. canadian association of provincial court judges, at paras. 62 and 68). while this characterization is not “narrow” as required by sobeys (p 254; see also macmillan bloedel, at para. 25; reference re young offenders act (pei), at p 266), its generality is a product of the expansive language of art. 35 para. 1 ccp. [74] we reject the respondents’ claim that this provision refers to a [translation] “general civil jurisdiction, exclusive throughout the territory of quebec, up to $85,000 in 2016 dollars” (rf,. chief justice of the superior court et al., at para. 78; see also if,. trial lawyers association, at para. 24). that is the kind of characterization this court has warned against. it focuses on the type of remedy sought — monetary relief in a quantifiable amount — rather than on “the type of dispute involved” (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 76) a monetary ceiling or geographical limitations should not be introduced into the very definition of the jurisdiction, as they provide no information about the type of dispute in question; they are merely factors that help determine whether lower courts were sufficiently involved in an area of jurisdiction at the time of confederation (sobeys, at p 261; reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 77). (b) historical analysis [75] guidance on the methodology to be used in addressing this issue can be found in sobeys and in reference re residential tenancies act (ns). at this first step, the court must ask whether inferior courts of the four founding provinces had a “general shared involvement” or a “meaningful concurrency of power” in the area of jurisdiction in question at the time of confederation (sobeys, at pp. 260-61 (emphasis deleted); reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 77). if they did, the grant of jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of the residential tenancies test. otherwise, the second step of the test must be undertaken. [76] in our view, there was a general shared involvement in the area of jurisdiction at issue: three of the four founding provinces’ inferior courts had, at the time of confederation, sufficient practical involvement in matters relating to contractual and extracontractual obligations in lower canada, 60 percent of civil litigation took place in two s 96 courts, the superior court or the circuit court (ar,. agq, vol. iii, at p 170) the scope and monetary ceiling of the inferior courts’ jurisdiction were far too limited to establish significant involvement in such a vast area of jurisdiction. in all the other provinces, however, inferior courts played a predominant role in the administration of civil justice they had broad jurisdiction and heard between 80 percent (in upper canada and nova scotia) and 90 percent (in new brunswick) of all civil cases (pp. 183, 192 and 198). in most of the provinces, therefore, there was sufficient practical involvement of the inferior courts in matters relating to contractual and extracontractual obligations. accordingly, the residential tenancies test does not lead to the conclusion that art. 35 para. 1 ccp is unconstitutional with respect to the types of disputes in question. it is therefore unnecessary to proceed to the second and third steps, which are of questionable relevance to the transfer before us in any event. [77] indeed, the residential tenancies test was established at a time when administrative bodies were growing in number and a modern administrative state was emerging in canada. the court was sensitive to this new reality, which had not existed at confederation. the purpose of the test was to avoid stifling institutional innovations designed to provide administrative rather than judicial solutions for social or political problems (see sobeys, at pp. 253-54) subsequent decisions did not point to any functional gap in the test, given that a large proportion of those cases involved administrative tribunals (see, eg,. massey-ferguson industries ltd. v. government of saskatchewan, [1981] 2 scr 413; crevier; grondin; sobeys; chrysler canada ltd. v canada (competition tribunal), [1992] 2 scr 394; reference re residential tenancies act (ns)). while the first step of the test — the only one that applies in the instant case — was drawn from cases involving transfers to courts (sobeys, at p 254), it cannot readily be applied to a court-to-court transfer of a vast area of jurisdiction. such broad transfers have rarely been at issue in cases where the residential tenancies test was applied this strand of jurisprudence has generally been concerned with provisions granting limited and specific powers. [78] the case at bar instead concerns the implementation of a comprehensive scheme that divides civil disputes involving contractual and extracontractual obligations in quebec between two courts. given that art. 35 para. 1 ccp grants a broad jurisdiction over civil matters, the jurisdiction cannot be characterized more narrowly. therefore, as this court noted about the characterization stage that precedes the first step of the analysis, the broader the granted jurisdiction is, “the more likely it will be that at least some aspects of the jurisdiction will have been within the purview of inferior courts at confederation” (sobeys, at p 253) as a consequence, the expansive characterization required by the provision at issue inappropriately favours a finding of general shared involvement. this leads to a rather strange result: the broader a grant of jurisdiction, the greater the chance that it will escape the restrictions of the residential tenancies test. thus, even though it was developed to prohibit the creation of parallel courts, that test does not deal effectively with the very jurisdiction-granting provisions that are the most likely to establish such courts because of their generality. this is why such a grant requires a tailored analytical framework for the purpose of determining whether a parallel court that undermines the role of the superior courts has been created. [79] as is clear from its application, the residential tenancies test does not provide a satisfactory framework where, as here, a broad jurisdiction at the heart of private law has been transferred to a court. thus, this question must be considered from the standpoint of the modified core jurisdiction test so as to better protect the constitutional status of s 96 courts. (2) core jurisdiction test [80] as we explained above, even if a grant of jurisdiction passes the residential tenancies test, it does not necessarily follow that the grant is constitutional. its impact on the core jurisdiction of superior courts still has to be assessed, even if the grant is not exclusive. it must first be determined whether one of the attributes of the superior courts’ core jurisdiction is affected. if so, it must then be determined whether the legislation has the effect of depriving the superior courts of an aspect of their core jurisdiction or whether it otherwise impermissibly invades that core jurisdiction. [81] in this case, art. 35 para. 1 ccp involves the superior courts’ general private law jurisdiction to decide whether the transfer of jurisdiction effected by art. 35 impermissibly infringes on this aspect of the superior courts’ core jurisdiction, we must weigh certain factors. we conclude that the grant to the court of québec of exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims for less than $85,000 prevents the quebec superior court from playing its role under s 96 in cases concerning private law matters. in short, this grant has the effect of transforming the court of québec into a prohibited parallel court accordingly, the transfer of jurisdiction contemplated by art. 35 para. 1 ccp exceeds the limits established by s 96 of the constitution act, 1867 and is thus unconstitutional. (a) general private law jurisdiction [82] the core jurisdiction of the superior courts includes their ability to act as courts of general jurisdiction, that is, to hear and determine matters not exclusively assigned by law to other courts (macmillan bloedel, at paras. 29, 32 and 37; canadian liberty net, at para. 35; noël v société d’énergie de la baie james, 2001 scc 39, [2001] 2 scr 207, at para. 27). it therefore encompasses, by necessary implication, general jurisdiction over private law matters (canadian liberty net, at para. 26; huppé, at p 12) however, the existence of this general jurisdiction requires a broad subject-matter jurisdiction, as it is inconceivable for the superior courts to have general jurisdiction over private law matters in a context in which every branch of private law has been exclusively assigned to other courts. this would alter the nature of superior courts by stripping them of one of their essential features, that of exercising judicial functions and stating the law in private disputes. as this court noted in trial lawyers, “[t]he resolution of these disputes and resulting determination of issues . . . are central to what the superior courts do. . . . to prevent this business being done strikes at the core of the jurisdiction of the superior courts protected by s 96 of the constitution act, 1867” (para. 32). [83] in our view, the superior courts’ core jurisdiction presupposes a broad subject-matter jurisdiction whose scope corresponds, at the very least, to the central divisions of private law to which more specific fields of law are often attached. this can be explained by the superior courts’ historical origins and their nature as courts of original general jurisdiction, as well as by the principles of national unity and of the rule of law that underpin s 96. [84] historically, the english royal courts had general civil jurisdiction and were responsible for the major developments in private law (lederman, at p 773). the canadian superior courts, which are descended from those courts, inherited their role of prime importance in the judicial system (law society of british columbia, at pp. 326-27; macmillan bloedel, at paras. 29, 32 and 36). at the time of confederation, they had jurisdiction over all important civil cases (g. t. g. seniuk and n. lyon, “the supreme court of canada and the provincial court in canada” (2000), 79 can. bar rev. 77, at pp. 95-96). [85] the paramount role given to the superior courts derives in part from the fact that they are courts of original general jurisdiction a court of original general jurisdiction is the antithesis of a specialized tribunal. a specialized tribunal draws legal conclusions based on a limited number of principles and rules falling within its area of expertise, whereas a court of original general jurisdiction considers and interprets many principles and general rules that may apply in a number of fields of law. in giving the superior courts this breadth of perspective, the framers of the constitution intended them to ensure the maintenance and coherent development of an actual order of positive laws, as well as to ensure stability and predictability in private law relationships (reference re manitoba language rights, at pp. 747-52; reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at para. 70; t bingham, the rule of law (2010), at pp. 38-39; huppé, at p 13) if the legislatures were free to diminish, by means of unlimited transfers of jurisdiction, the superior courts’ ability to lay down the broad lines of the case law, it would no longer be possible for these courts to perform their constitutional role as the primary guardians of the rule of law. [86] this is why a general jurisdiction over private law matters must be accompanied by a subject-matter jurisdiction that is broad enough to preserve the superior courts’ role in providing jurisprudential guidance on private law (n. lyon, “is amendment of section 96 really necessary?” (1987), 36 unblj 79, at pp. 83-84). in our view, this requires significant — though not necessarily predominant — involvement in the resolution of disputes falling under the most fundamental branches of private law, such as property law, the law of succession and the law of obligations. a province may assign portions or offshoots of these fields to courts whose judges it appoints, within the restrictions of residential tenancies. but if, in so doing, it limits the superior court’s involvement significantly, then it “alters [that court’s] essence, making it something less than a superior court” (macmillan bloedel, at para. 1) in short, a province which takes away an aspect of the court’s core jurisdiction contravenes s 96 — a provision whose purpose lies in the “maintenance of the rule of law through the protection of the judicial role” (reference re remuneration of judges (1997), at para. 88 (emphasis added); trial lawyers, at para. 39). in every case, the line that must not be crossed will be dependent upon a contextual and multi-factored analysis. (b) purpose of the analysis and factors to consider [87] article 35 para. 1 ccp assigns one of the fundamental branches of quebec civil law to the court of québec where the value of the subject matter of a dispute is less than $85,000. it unavoidably affects an aspect of the superior courts’ core jurisdiction: their general jurisdiction over private law matters. what remains to be determined, therefore, is whether it impermissibly invades that jurisdiction. in our view, the following question must be asked: does the grant of jurisdiction impair the superior court of general jurisdiction in such a way as to alter its essential nature or prevent it from playing its role under s 96? if the jurisdiction-granting provision transforms the provincial court into a parallel court prohibited by the constitution, the answer to this question must be yes. [88] there are various factors that can be helpful when it comes to determining whether, by granting a court with provincially appointed judges a jurisdiction as broad as the one at issue in this case, a legislature has created a prohibited parallel court that impairs the superior court by preventing it from playing its constitutional role. in this case, six factors are of particular relevance: the scope of the jurisdiction being granted, whether the grant is exclusive or concurrent, the monetary limits to which it is subject, whether there are mechanisms for appealing decisions rendered in the exercise of the jurisdiction, the impact on the caseload of the superior court of general jurisdiction, and whether there is an important societal objective this list is not exhaustive other factors may be relevant in different contexts: one need only think, for example, of geographical limitations. however, in the circumstances of this case and in light of the evidence before us, we are of the view that the question can be decided on the basis of these six factors. [89] in our opinion, these factors give effect to the compromise reached at confederation concerning the special status of the superior courts of general jurisdiction in a unitary justice system. they make it possible to draw a sufficiently clear line between, on the one hand, legitimate exercises of the provinces’ power in relation to the administration of justice and, on the other hand, grants of jurisdiction to parallel courts that usurp the superior courts’ general private law jurisdiction and prevent them from playing their constitutional role the superior courts of general jurisdiction are and must remain central to the canadian justice system (macmillan bloedel, at paras. 22 and 51-52) however, this court has repeatedly noted that canada’s constitution is a living tree and that a court’s jurisdiction must not be frozen at what it was in 1867 (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at paras. 32, per lamer cj, concurring, and 69, per mclachlin j for the majority; reference re young offenders act (pei), at p 266; sobeys, at p 255). but the living tree must “gro[w] and expan[d] within its natural limits” (reference re securities act, 2011 scc 66, [2011] 3 scr 837, at para. 56, quoting edwards v attorney-general for canada, [1930] ac 124 (pc), at p 136). section 96 is one of these limits. [90] before we turn to the heart of the analysis, two preliminary remarks are in order. [91] first, these appeals do not concern the small claims division of the court of québec’s civil division. even though the small claims division’s jurisdiction is covered by art. 35 ccp, the parties’ submissions did not relate to that division. there is therefore no need to apply our multi-factored analysis to the small claims division in the case before us. [92] second, the institutional characteristics of courts with provincially appointed judges have changed considerably since 1867. today, although the existence of courts with provincially appointed judges is not itself protected by the constitution, those courts offer the same guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality as the superior courts. [93] even though ss. 96 to 100 do not apply to the judges of those courts, their independence is protected as a result of the preamble to the constitution of canada. in reference re remuneration of judges (1997), this court held that the constitutional principle of judicial independence extends to courts with provincially appointed judges, including in civil matters lamer cj, writing for the majority, noted that “judicial independence [has] grown into a principle that now extends to all courts, not just the superior courts of this country” (para. 106). [94] in addition, whereas at the time of confederation, provincial court judges generally had no legal training (j. deslauriers, “la cour provinciale et l’art. 96 de l’aanb” (1977), 18 c de d 881, at p 910; lyon, at p 82), the present situation is quite different as the agq rightly notes, their training now meets the highest standards required of the judiciary (af, at para. 152). there is therefore no doubt that courts with provincially appointed judges offer the same constitutional guarantees as the superior courts and provide justice of the same quality. the provincial legislatures have considerable latitude to establish courts whose judges are appointed by the provinces and which play a part in maintaining the rule of law. however, they cannot in so doing deprive the superior courts of general jurisdiction of their essential features, nor can they create parallel courts that prevent the latter from playing the role assigned to them by s 96. [95] with this in mind, let us now consider the relevant factors. (i) scope of the jurisdiction being granted [96] the first factor is the scope of the jurisdiction that is granted to the court with provincially appointed judges is it a vast or limited area of jurisdiction? as mclachlin j (as she then was) wrote in macmillan bloedel, the concern is that “vast areas of contract, tort and criminal jurisdiction [not] be transferred to shadow courts with impunity, thus destroying the compromise of the fathers of confederation and the intended effect of s 96” (para. 67, dissenting, but not on this point). [97] the scope of the jurisdiction being granted is not a strictly quantitative factor linked to the number of disputes concerned. on the contrary, this factor requires that the jurisdiction in question be situated in relation to the main branches of private law. in determining whether the transfer is “vast” or “limited”, we must bear in mind the role of the superior courts of general jurisdiction, which, more than any other court, are responsible for ensuring the coherence of private law. if a provincial court is granted a large block of jurisdiction at the heart of private law — such as contract law or property law — that would suggest that that court is, in exercising the jurisdiction in question, acting as a prohibited parallel court and that the superior courts are impaired as a result. whether such a grant is constitutional will then depend on the scope of the limits placed on it. in contrast, a grant of a limited jurisdiction — over matters with respect to lease, for example — will not weigh as heavily in favour of such a conclusion, since it is only a very specific branch and not the very centre of contract law. [98] whether a grant of jurisdiction is vast or limited is a question of degree. for example, jurisdiction over civil disputes is more vast than jurisdiction over contract law, which is in turn more vast than jurisdiction over employment contracts, which is more vast than jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment, which, finally, is more vast than jurisdiction over unjust dismissals the more vast the granted jurisdiction is, the more likely it is that the provincial court will resemble a superior court of general jurisdiction. in contrast, a limited or specific grant will be less likely to make the provincial court resemble a superior court of general jurisdiction. [99] in the case at bar, art. 35 para. 1 ccp grants to the court of québec almost the entirety of the law of obligations for claims of less than $85,000. this is not just any area of jurisdiction. the law of obligations, the real heart of private law, is the foundation of a multitude of specialized subfields. in fact, it is difficult to imagine a more central field: [translation] at the very heart of [the] social order, the law of obligations is the legal foundation of the daily lives of the members of a civil society. indeed, the law of obligations is everyday life put in a legal equation. the essential function of this branch of private law is in fact to supply the rules required to meet the needs of human beings in their everyday relationships with one another. (p-a. crépeau, “la fonction du droit des obligations” (1998), 43 mcgill lj 729, at p 732.) [100] based on its scope and because of the fundamental nature of the field of law in question, the block of jurisdiction granted to the court of québec in art. 35 para. 1 ccp is unquestionably similar to the general private law jurisdiction exercised by the superior courts of general jurisdiction. whether such a broad grant is valid will depend on what limits are imposed on it. (ii) whether the grant is exclusive or concurrent [101] as courts of original general jurisdiction, the superior courts have “inherent jurisdiction over all matters, both federal and provincial, unless a different forum is specified” (hunt v t&n plc, [1993] 4 scr 289, at p 311) jurisdiction granted exclusively to a court with provincially appointed judges is removed from the superior court in the process (macmillan bloedel, at para. 27). by depriving the superior courts of their capacity to resolve a particular class of disputes, exclusivity threatens their status as the cornerstone of a unitary system of justice. in contrast, a concurrent grant preserves that capacity the superior courts’ role is therefore not undermined to the same extent. [102] in the instant case, civil suits concerning contractual and extracontractual matters for less than $85,000 have been removed from the superior court’s jurisdiction. according to the statistics that were adduced in evidence, this accounts for more than 20,000 cases a year, not including those opened in the small claims division (rr,. chief justice of the superior court et al., at pp. 3-4). this removal of jurisdiction undermines the superior court’s role as the cornerstone of a unitary system of justice. it means that in quebec, a large volume of cases under one of the most fundamental branches of private law cannot be brought before a superior court of general jurisdiction given that the superior courts are at the heart of a nationwide unitary justice system, the scope of their jurisdiction should not vary disproportionately from one province to another. [103] it may therefore be helpful in this analysis to consider the situation elsewhere in canada. even though s 92(14) allows for and encourages flexibility in how the justice system is organized in each province, the superior courts of general jurisdiction must retain a certain uniformity in the sense that they must be able to play their essential role in a similar manner. across the country, a vast majority of provinces have established courts with provincially appointed judges that have jurisdiction over civil matters almost all are identified as small claims courts, are governed by a simplified procedure, and their decisions can be appealed to the superior courts. the highest monetary jurisdiction is $50,000, in alberta. while these courts retain some form of concurrent jurisdiction with the superior courts, quebec has conferred exclusive jurisdiction over civil disputes concerning contractual and extracontractual obligations on a court with provincially appointed judges. it must be borne in mind in the analysis that the terms of this grant would also be permissible in the other provinces. [104] the role left to the quebec superior court in this field is minimal in comparison with the role of superior courts elsewhere in canada. although the quebec superior court has retained its jurisdiction over major disputes relating to obligations, such as class actions or disputes in which the value of the subject matter is $85,000 or more, it is in the process of becoming inaccessible to ordinary quebecers. section 92(14) gives the provinces the authority to create courts in the context of their power over the administration of justice (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 72), but that power, while broad, is limited by the scope of ss. 96 to 100, which operate in favour of the superior courts. in accordance with this court’s case law, a grant of exclusive jurisdiction whose effect would be to completely remove one of the attributes of the core jurisdiction “would maim” the superior courts (macmillan bloedel, at para. 37) and could never be acceptable regardless of the result of applying the other factors. (iii) monetary limit [105] monetary limits reflect a certain division of labour between the courts pursuant to which the superior courts play the central role. as this court held in sobeys, “the nature of the inferior-superior court distinction will invariably mean that the former’s jurisdiction was limited in some way”, including monetarily (p 260). the lack of a monetary ceiling or the existence of a very high monetary ceiling can blur the distinction between a superior court of general jurisdiction and a court with provincially appointed judges, thereby showing that the latter is, in reality, operating as a prohibited parallel court that prevents the former from playing its constitutional role. [106] that being said, a monetary limit is merely one of several factors to weigh; it cannot be determinative in itself. if considered in isolation, a decision to impose a particular monetary limit will always appear to be discretionary. this is why such a limit must be analyzed in its context and in light of the other factors. the approach to be taken in this regard is one that gives the provinces flexibility without making the constitutional limit imposed by s 96 illusory. [107] the court of appeal properly took the $100 monetary limit that had, in 1867, circumscribed the involvement of the inferior courts of the four founding provinces in the area of jurisdiction at issue as the starting point for its analysis. comparing the current monetary ceiling to the monetary ceiling of the inferior courts at confederation produces a quantitative benchmark that can be used to contrast the historical role of inferior courts with the role played by a court with provincially appointed judges today the historical monetary ceiling needs to be expressed in present-day dollars and calculated using a reliable conversion method that allows for a useful comparison. [108] if the current and historical monetary limits are close, it might be thought that the impact on the superior courts’ role in exercising the jurisdiction in question will be lower the fact that the two amounts are equivalent would suggest that the involvement of the court with provincially appointed judges corresponds to the inferior courts’ historical involvement. [109] however, the monetary factor must not transform the analysis into a mathematical operation; it is but one factor among several, and it is useful because it allows the analysis to be anchored in a quantitative range. the current monetary ceiling can exceed the historical ceiling without necessarily making the grant unconstitutional, just as the fact that a ceiling is under the historical ceiling could be insufficient to ensure that the grant is constitutional in every case, the difference between the historical ceiling and the current ceiling must be analyzed having regard to the other factors in order to determine whether and, where appropriate, to what extent the superior courts’ role is undermined. [110] there should nevertheless be a reasonable connection between the current monetary ceiling and the historical one that reflects the general division of labour at the time of confederation between the inferior courts and what are now the s 96 courts. if the current ceiling is significantly higher than the historical ceiling of the inferior courts, that would suggest that the superior courts of general jurisdiction have been deprived of part of the role they have always played and that that part has been conferred on a court with provincially appointed judges. the constitutional basis for such a ceiling will be much more fragile if the ceiling applies to a vast area of jurisdiction at the heart of any of the fundamental branches of private law. [111] it is to be expected that the monetary limit will increase over time because of inflation. the provinces should not have to frequently take action to adjust the limit. the courts should therefore be flexible when considering an amount that retains a reasonable connection to the historical monetary ceiling. such an approach gives the provinces the latitude they need to ensure that legislation evolves in line with the rate of inflation (national assembly, standing committee on institutions, “étude détaillée du projet de loi no 54 — loi portant sur la réforme du code de procédure civile”, journal des débats, vol. 37, no. 71, 2nd sess., 36th leg., may 2, 2002, at pp. 6-7 and 9). [112] this flexibility also facilitates access to justice (blackstone, commentaries on the laws of england (1768), book iii, at p 30, “[t]he policy of our ancient constitution . . . was to bring justice home to every man’s door”). although the current monetary limit should generally reflect the balance between the s 96 courts and the inferior courts at the time of confederation, there is room in the analysis for an expansion of provincial jurisdiction in response to changes in society and to pressing needs with regard to access to justice. this goal of facilitating access to justice should therefore always give a province a certain flexibility when it sets a monetary ceiling it considers appropriate in light of its own circumstances and specific provincial reality. quebec is free to establish a court with provincially appointed judges that is unique to it, but that court’s monetary jurisdiction must have a sufficient connection to the monetary limit that existed in 1867 in order to give effect to the compromise reached at confederation. [113] it is true that in this approach, significant weight is given to the monetary limit as a benchmark, whereas this court has stated in discussing the residential tenancies test that geographical limitations must carry more weight than monetary limits (sobeys, at p 260). but that statement must be read in context. the court was considering the practical involvement of the inferior courts in a specific area of jurisdiction at the time of confederation significant geographical limitations could have had a considerable impact on the percentage of the population who had recourse to those courts. the relationship between the monetary ceilings and the role the inferior courts had actually played in that area of jurisdiction was less clear in addition, attaching less importance to the monetary factor reflected considerations linked to inflation (sobeys, at p 260). [114] the monetary factor we are proposing for this multi-factored analysis should not be subject to the same reservations as arose from sobeys first, it already takes inflation into account. second, the factors of this analysis relate to the impact of legislation on the role the superior courts of general jurisdiction play in canada’s constitutional architecture; they do not relate to the question whether there was a practical involvement of the inferior courts in a specific area of jurisdiction. third, the purpose of this analysis is to remedy the problem of a wholesale grant of a vast area of jurisdiction. the monetary limits will clearly not have the same effect on the superior courts’ role if the grant involves a specific, well-defined area of jurisdiction as they will if it involves a vast area of jurisdiction at the heart of private law. in the latter case, it will be much harder to limit the importance to be attached to them. [115] in the case at bar, the court of appeal took $100 as the starting point. this amount, which served as a basis for the expert reports filed by various parties, “is the amount of the maximum monetary jurisdiction exercised in 1867 by some of the inferior courts charged with hearing certain civil matters” (para. 144). four conversion methods were proposed, based on the consumer price index, interest rates, nominal wages and gdp per capita. [116] we agree with the court of appeal’s analysis as regards the consumer price index, interest rates and nominal wages (paras. 167-71). the best approach is to select the least imperfect method — the nominal gdp method in this case — and to remain mindful of its imperfections. in any event, the monetary limits are not a straitjacket, but a quantitative benchmark that is useful for anchoring the analysis in a monetary range. as we mentioned above, there must, in order to reflect the general division of labour that has always existed between the s 96 courts and the other courts, be a certain proportionality between the current ceiling and the historical one. [117] although we concede that the nominal gdp per capita method has its weaknesses, it is nonetheless the one that should be used this method has the advantage of incorporating [translation] “all changes having occurred over time that have made it possible to enhance the well-being of individual members of a society”, and of being based on fairly reliable historical statistics (ar,. agq, vol. iii, at pp. 68-70). it is not perfect, as it does not account for a number of factors that are not included in calculating gdp, such as domestic activities, second-hand transactions and environmental costs (ibid). using this method, the agq’s expert before the court of appeal arrived at an updated amount of $66,008 for canada and $60,790 for quebec (pp. 71-72). the respondent’s expert, using statistics he considered to be more reliable, arrived at updated amounts of $63,698 for canada and $55,354 for quebec (rr,. chief justice of the superior court et al., at pp. 39 and 42; see ca reasons, at para. 171 and fn. 281). [118] thus, a ceiling of $100 in 1867 is equivalent today, canada-wide, to an amount somewhere between $63,698 and $66,008. the current ceiling of $85,000 is 29 percent more than the higher of these two amounts this certainly suggests that the court of québec’s role is greater than the historical role of the inferior courts, but this expanded role is not in itself entirely disproportionate given the gap between the current and historical ceilings and the methodological challenge of accurately converting historical monetary data the monetary ceiling must be considered in its context in order to determine whether it undermines the role of the quebec superior court by impermissibly infringing on its general private law jurisdiction. the figures must not obscure what is at issue here: the limits on the exclusive grant of a large block of jurisdiction that has an impact on the whole of quebec civil law. when the transfer of a large block of jurisdiction affects one of the most fundamental branches of private law, the scope of the limits to which it is subject must be considerable. (iv) appeal mechanisms [119] appeal mechanisms can shed helpful light on the question whether a grant of jurisdiction establishes a prohibited parallel court that undermines the role of the superior courts of general jurisdiction. [120] from a constitutional point of view, a superior court of general jurisdiction and a provincial court of appeal are both “superior court[s]” within the meaning of s 96 (attorney general of quebec v. farrah, [1978] 2 scr 638, at p 656, per pigeon j., concurring; pépin, at p 136; h. brun, g. tremblay and e. brouillet, droit constitutionnel (6th ed. 2014), at p 834). however, the fact that a provincial court of appeal has oversight of decisions of the court with provincially appointed judges does not on its own justify a conclusion that the transfer of jurisdiction at issue satisfies constitutional requirements. first, it is above all the role of the superior court of general jurisdiction that is protected by s 96 (macmillan bloedel, at paras. 22, 29 and 37; canadian liberty net, at paras. 26-27). second, the fact that a court with provincially appointed judges is subject to review or appeal does not authorize that court to absorb s 96 court functions (re: bc. family relations act, [1982] 1 scr 62, at p 71, per laskin cj, dissenting, but not on this point). [121] nevertheless, how decisions rendered by the provincial court in exercising the jurisdiction at issue are to be appealed may help us answer the question whether the grant of that jurisdiction prevents the superior court of general jurisdiction from playing its role. if decisions of the court with provincially appointed judges can be appealed to a superior court of general jurisdiction at little cost, without leave and with no requirement of deference on questions of law, then there is a very clear hierarchical distinction between the two courts, and the superior court of general jurisdiction retains its ability to state the law. it will then be more difficult to conclude that the grant of jurisdiction undermines the superior court’s role and impermissibly invades its general private law jurisdiction. if, on the other hand, there is a right to appeal directly to the provincial court of appeal, then there is no hierarchical distinction between the two courts and the superior court of general jurisdiction has no sway over decisions of the court with provincially appointed judges in short, that would suggest that the court with provincially appointed judges functions as a parallel court. [122] in the instant case, decisions rendered in exercising the jurisdiction provided for in art. 35 para. 1 ccp may be appealed to the quebec court of appeal under art. 30 or 31 ccp. in most of the other provinces, decisions of a court with provincially appointed judges must be appealed to the superior court of general jurisdiction before they can be appealed to the provincial court of appeal in such circumstances, a hierarchical distinction can be drawn between the court with provincially appointed judges and a prohibited parallel court it can therefore be concluded that the superior court retains its role within the provincial judicial structure. [123] articles 30 and 31 ccp confirm that the court of québec’s decisions cannot be appealed to the superior court to some extent, the court of québec’s decisions are more shielded from appellate review than those of the superior court. given that the threshold for an appeal as of right is fixed at $60,000 (leave is required for an appeal in any other case), appeals as of right against decisions of the court of québec will be much less common than those requiring leave. in most cases, litigants who wish to have decisions of the court of québec reviewed must go through a screening process in order to obtain leave to appeal. this factor therefore suggests that art. 35 para. 1 ccp transforms the court of québec into a prohibited parallel court that undermines the role of the superior court of general jurisdiction. (v) impact on the caseload of the superior court of general jurisdiction [124] a grant of jurisdiction to a court with provincially appointed judges does not necessarily deprive the superior court of all forms of involvement in that area of jurisdiction. if, for example, the grant in question is subject to a monetary ceiling, the superior court of general jurisdiction continues to have jurisdiction over claims that exceed the amount of that ceiling. but there may be circumstances in which the impact of the grant on the caseload retained by the superior court of general jurisdiction in the specific area of jurisdiction makes it possible to draw conclusions as to whether that court’s role has been undermined and whether a parallel court has been created. [125] in this case, the evidence in the record supports no conclusion as to the impact of art. 35 ccp on the superior court’s role. the parties submitted statistics that compared the caseload falling under art. 35 ccp with the quebec superior court’s general civil law caseload, including in family matters and bankruptcy and insolvency cases. this means that it is impossible to determine, even approximately, what impact art. 35 ccp has on the superior court’s caseload in matters falling specifically under the law of obligations. (vi) pursuit of an important societal objective [126] granting jurisdiction to a court with provincially appointed judges may be the means a legislature adopts to try to address a societal concern. the pursuit of an important societal objective may lend credence to the idea of a legitimate exercise of the provincial power in relation to the administration of justice, that is, of an exercise of that power for a purpose other than the creation of a prohibited parallel court. access to justice, for example, is an important societal objective that could justify granting certain areas of jurisdiction to courts with provincially appointed judges (re: bc. family relations act, at p 107). the provinces must have considerable flexibility in what they do to address the needs of a changing society the only limit on their initiative is that they may not create parallel courts that undermine the role of the superior courts of general jurisdiction. that being said, it is not enough to allege that there is an important societal objective; it is also necessary to show that the objective is real and that there is a connection between the grant of jurisdiction to a court with provincially appointed judges and the achievement of the objective given that the provinces are responsible for the administration of justice, for the adoption of rules of practice and for the financing of court operations, they cannot avail themselves of an access to justice argument on the basis of their own failure to give the superior courts sufficient resources. [127] access to justice can also be promoted through features like a simplified procedure and simplified rules on the production of evidence. a summary procedure, for example, or rules of evidence that are relaxed in comparison with those that apply in the superior courts, will make the court with provincially appointed judges distinctive it will then be more difficult to conclude that the grant of jurisdiction establishes a prohibited parallel court that prevents the superior court of general jurisdiction from playing its role. other features such as the types of remedies that may be ordered (tomko, at pp. 123-25) or the absence of representation by lawyers can also be taken into consideration. [128] the agq submitted that the increase in the monetary ceiling for the court of québec’s civil jurisdiction was a response to a concern for access to justice in areas far from urban centres. however, we agree with the court of appeal that the agq has not established that this increase facilitates access to justice (c.a reasons, at para. 185). in fact, the court of québec and the superior court both follow the same procedure and grant the same remedies, with a few exceptions, which means that it cannot readily be concluded, without further evidence, that the increase in the court of québec’s monetary ceiling facilitates access to justice. [129] the procedural framework in which the jurisdiction set out in art. 35 para. 1 ccp is exercised is the same as in the superior court. except in relation to questions of jurisdiction and the rules of practice, the code of civil procedure makes no significant distinction between the two courts in this regard. the same is true of the rules of evidence provided for in the civil code of québec. the court of québec’s small claims division has a simplified procedure in which parties are not represented by lawyers (arts. 536 to 570 ccp); however, its monetary jurisdiction is quite limited compared to the one conferred on the court of québec by art. 35 para. 1 ccp. that limited jurisdiction cannot negate the quite obvious similarity between the procedural schemes that apply to the court of québec and the superior court. [130] moreover, access to justice is an argument that cuts both ways in this case. quebec is the only province that has conferred so broad a jurisdiction on its court with provincially appointed judges: elsewhere in canada, the superior courts play the central role in civil matters. yet it is not clear that this alone places the other provinces at a disadvantage compared with quebec when it comes to resolving access to justice issues. given their power in relation to the administration of justice, the provinces are free to reorganize their superior courts in order to deal with such challenges. if, for any reason, the situation is different in quebec, no evidence on this subject was tendered. to the extent that a higher number of judges or courts is necessary, access to justice is perhaps better served by incorporating an additional court than by establishing an alternative court, that is, by adding a complementary court that is more accessible and has a simplified procedure rather than by establishing a parallel court which absorbs the superior court’s functions. (c) weighing the factors [131] although the multi-factored analysis is not a mathematical operation, it must nonetheless be capable of being transposed to a monetary scale. in our view, the historical monetary ceilings serve as a good starting point for the analysis and a useful anchor for a quantitative range up to the amounts of those historical ceilings, the jurisdiction-granting provision can generally be considered to be consistent with the constitution. but as we will explain, a legislature cannot be found to be in compliance with its obligations under s 96 solely because it complies with the historical monetary ceilings. [132] to determine how much latitude a legislature has should it wish to exceed these historical ceilings, we must consider the various factors of the multi-factored analysis: the scope of the jurisdiction being granted, whether the grant is exclusive or concurrent, the relationship between the proposed monetary limit and the historical monetary ceilings, appeal mechanisms, the impact of the jurisdiction-granting provision on the superior court’s caseload, and whether there is an important societal objective all these factors are weighed in order to strike an appropriate balance between recognition of the provinces’ jurisdiction over the administration of justice and preservation of the nature, the constitutional role and the core jurisdiction of the superior courts of general jurisdiction. [133] the more the analysis of the above factors suggests that the core jurisdiction of those courts has been infringed on, the less the province will be allowed to depart from the updated historical monetary ceilings conversely, the less the analysis of the factors in question suggests that the core jurisdiction of the superior courts has been infringed on, the more the province will be free to depart from those ceilings. this is essentially a continuum. at one end of the spectrum, the grant of a vast jurisdiction that is exclusive, is not accompanied by a mechanism for appealing a decision to a superior court of general jurisdiction, has a significant impact on that court’s caseload and is not justified having regard to an important societal objective will limit the legislature’s freedom and is not constitutional. the impact of such a grant on the superior court of general jurisdiction could be so great that merely complying with the historical monetary ceilings would not suffice under s 96. at the other end of the spectrum, the concurrent grant of a more limited jurisdiction — one that is accompanied by a mechanism for appealing a decision to a superior court of general jurisdiction, has little impact on that court’s workload and is justified having regard to an important societal objective — will give the legislature considerable flexibility. in every case, however, there must be a reasonable connection between the monetary ceiling contemplated by the legislature and the updated historical ceilings the two ceilings must be in a similar range so as to be consistent with the general division of labour at the time of confederation. in the same way, an exclusive grant cannot “maim” the superior courts by impermissibly infringing on their core jurisdiction. [134] in this case, the historical monetary ceiling of $100 is not in dispute. in today’s dollars, this represents an amount of between $63,698 and $66,008 the amount need not be within a dollar of that range. the imperfection of the conversion methods and the flexibility that must be accorded to the provinces can justify slight differences. nor is a province required to amend its legislation every year in order to index the monetary jurisdiction of its courts to the rate of inflation. thus, an amount close to these ones can serve as a starting point for the analysis. [135] the monetary ceiling of less than $85,000 fixed by art. 35 para. 1 ccp. represents an increase of approximately 29 percent over the historical ceiling this increase is not clearly disproportionate; the adopted amount can reasonably be connected to the historical ceiling insofar as it falls into a similar range. what must now be done is to weigh the various qualitative factors in order to determine whether this grant of jurisdiction is consistent with the flexibility the quebec legislature has. in our view, the answer must be no. the quebec legislature has only minimal flexibility, because the result of the multi-factored analysis clearly indicates that there is an impermissible infringement on the core jurisdiction of the superior courts of general jurisdiction. [136] first, the scope of the jurisdiction granted to the court of québec is indicative of a significant encroachment on the general private law jurisdiction of the superior courts of general jurisdiction this limits the quebec legislature’s latitude. aside from exceptional situations such as the one considered in mcevoy, in which a transfer of the entirety of the jurisdiction over criminal matters to a court with provincially appointed judges was proposed, it is hard to imagine a broader transfer of jurisdiction than the one effected in art. 35 para. 1 ccp, which grants a substantial block of jurisdiction over private law matters. the law of obligations is nothing less than [translation] “the general code for the relations man [sic] has with his peers” (g. trudel, traité de droit civil du québec (1946), vol. 7, at p 15). [137] second, the exclusivity of the transfer accentuates the encroachment on the core jurisdiction of the superior courts and reduces the flexibility the quebec legislature has accordingly. the impact of the exclusivity of the grant is considerable: it means that the law of obligations will evolve in large part under the authority of a court with provincially appointed judges. the superior court’s authority over obligations will be diminished accordingly. in light of s 96, a grant of jurisdiction as broad as this over so fundamental a field of law must be subject to very significant limits, especially if it is exclusive an exclusive grant of jurisdiction, even one that falls within acceptable historical limits, can have a significant impact on the core jurisdiction of the superior courts. [138] third, the fact that there is no accessible appeal mechanism that would enable the superior court of general jurisdiction to review decisions of the court of québec reinforces our conclusion that the two courts are parallel and that the interference is impermissible the absence of such a mechanism contributes, once again, to reducing the province’s flexibility in relation to the updated historical ceiling. [139] fourth, as we explained above, the statistical evidence produced in this case does not permit us to determine with certainty that art. 35 para. 1 ccp has only a minimal impact on the superior court’s caseload in the area of obligations. [140] fifth, the agq has not shown that a concrete public policy justified greater flexibility in relation to the historical limit. it follows that the quebec legislature could not depart from the updated historical ceilings other than minimally. [141] in our opinion, art. 35 para. 1 ccp in its current form infringes s 96. its constitutional infirmity does not arise from the high monetary limit alone, but from the combination with all the other factors it would be possible to imagine a grant of jurisdiction that does not exclude the superior court from a field of law that is so vast and so fundamental. that is not, however, this legislation. here, there is an exclusive grant of a vast area of jurisdiction at the core of quebec’s private law to a court with provincially appointed judges that operates like a superior court in every respect. the grant, if it is subject to no limits other than a monetary one, transforms the court of québec into a s 96 court in other words, art. 35 para. 1 ccp encroaches impermissibly on the role the constitution reserves to the superior court of general jurisdiction. [142] if the quebec legislature were to decide merely to lower the monetary ceiling for the court of québec’s jurisdiction without altering its institutional context or the nature of the grant of jurisdiction provided for in art. 35 para. 1 ccp, it would, to comply with its constitutional obligations, have to establish a monetary ceiling below the updated historical ceiling so as to leave the superior court with a caseload that is sufficient for it to continue to play a meaningful role in the development of the law of obligations. if, on the other hand, the legislature were to decide to revise the wording of art. 35 para. 1 ccp and the institutional context in which that jurisdiction is exercised while minimizing the impact on the superior court’s core jurisdiction, it would have some latitude to raise the monetary ceiling above the updated historical ceiling the legislature should however ensure that a reasonable connection was maintained with the latter ceiling and the superior court was not deprived of too much of the caseload concerning the law of obligations. whatever the legislature’s choice may be, any change, including simplified procedures, that truly enhances access to justice will be an important factor in determining whether a grant of jurisdiction that affects the general private law jurisdiction of the superior courts is consistent with s 96. [143] this multi-factored approach gives full effect to the compromise reached at confederation, reflected in the constitutional framework consisting of ss. 96 to 100. it is necessary in order to safeguard the unity and uniformity of the canadian judicial system, which is the concern that motivated the framers of the constitution even though the superior courts, with their guarantee of judicial independence, are no longer the sole guardians of the rule of law, the fact remains that their constitutional status must be protected. the transfer brought about by art. 35 para. 1 ccp deprives the quebec superior court of any capacity to resolve a broad range of disputes at the heart of private law, thereby creating a parallel court that infringes on the core jurisdiction of the superior courts. [144] in closing, it would seem appropriate to clarify the scope of these reasons and their impact on the other tests developed with respect to s 96. the multi-factored analysis we are adopting here is not intended to replace the current law. the analysis under s 96 continues to involve two tests. the first — the residential tenancies test — continues to apply to any transfer of historical jurisdiction of the superior courts to an administrative tribunal or to another statutory court the second — the core jurisdiction test — continues to apply in order to determine whether a statutory provision has the effect of removing or impermissibly infringing on any of the attributes that form part of the core jurisdiction of the superior courts. where a transfer to a court with provincially appointed judges has an impact on the general private law jurisdiction of the superior courts, the question whether the infringement on the core jurisdiction is permissible or impermissible should be answered having regard to the factors discussed above those factors give the provincial legislature sufficiently clear guidance to determine what latitude it has under s 96 when it wishes to grant a court whose judges are appointed by the province jurisdiction over a significant portion of the common law without creating a parallel court. [145] in residential tenancies, a rampart against the creation of prohibited parallel courts was erected on the basis of s 96. that rampart has already proven its worth, as is attested by several decades of case law. as a general rule, that test will be sufficient for purposes of the analysis. but there may be cases in which it will prove to be inadequate for the role it must play where an attempt is made to assign a vast field of the general law to a court with provincially appointed judges. such a transfer would tend to distort the historical analysis and to inappropriately favour a finding that there was a general shared involvement. here, the grant under art. 35 para. 1 ccp is one of those cases in which the gaps in the residential tenancies test are apparent. the core jurisdiction test, which we have adapted to better reflect the principles underlying s 96, compensates for those gaps by providing an analytical framework on the basis of which it is possible to give an adequate response to problems of this nature for which no satisfactory solution can be found in the existing case law. v analysis on the second question [146] the second question concerns the application by the court of québec of the “obligation of judicial deference, which characterizes the application for judicial review,” when hearing appeals of administrative decisions under one of the eight specified acts. this question, understood correctly, is not about the constitutionality of the court of québec’s appellate jurisdiction, but rather about the application by the court of québec of the standards of judicial review, that is, the standards of reasonableness and correctness that were established in dunsmuir and reiterated in vavilov. we are of the view, however, that the question has become moot because the court of québec is no longer required to apply these standards of review when hearing an administrative appeal. moreover, there are no exceptional circumstances that would justify answering the question despite its mootness. [147] in vavilov, this court reformed the analysis for determining the standard of review that applies to the judicial review of administrative actions. in essence, where a legislature has provided for a right of appeal to a court, the appellate standards of review developed in housen v nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235 — correctness for questions of law and palpable and overriding error for questions of fact and of mixed fact and law — will apply. where the legislature has not provided for a right of appeal and has left the availability of judicial review intact, the administrative law standards of review will apply instead. [148] furthermore, the new s 83.1 of the courts of justice act, which came into force on june 5, 2020, provides that the court of québec must now apply the housen standards in exercising its jurisdiction over appeals of administrative decisions. [149] thus, the combined effect of vavilov and s 83.1 is that the court of québec is no longer bound by the obligation of judicial deference and must now apply the appellate standards from housen in any appeal it hears from an administrative decision. this is true of all the rights of appeal in question in this case. [150] it is not unreasonable to argue that the intermediate step of appealing to a court with provincially appointed judges before applying for judicial review to the superior court might be unconstitutional because it is likely to deprive the superior courts of a considerable number of such applications. however, we wish to be clear that we are not ruling on whether the court of québec’s appellate jurisdiction is constitutional, as that is not the question before us that matter is therefore left for another day. vi effect of the decision [151] in principle, a reference is merely an advisory procedure. the answer to a reference question may be viewed as a legal opinion for the executive that is analogous to an opinion provided by law officers of the crown (reference re secession of quebec, at para. 15) in a reference, the court therefore does not have the power to formally declare a law to be unconstitutional. the only power it has is to answer the question before it (attorney-general for ontario v. attorney-general for canada, [1912] ac. 571 (pc), at pp. 588-89; reference re public schools act (man.), s 79(3), (4) and (7), [1993] 1 scr 839, at p 863; reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1998] 1 scr 3 (“reference re remuneration of judges (1998)”), at para. 9). [152] notwithstanding their advisory — and therefore, in principle, non-binding — nature, opinions given in references are in practice treated as judicial decisions and are followed by other courts (canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at para. 40; see also reference re certification in the manitoba health sector, 2019 mbca 18, [2019] 5 wwr 614, at para. 23; g. rubin, “the nature, use and effect of reference cases in canadian constitutional law” (1960), 6 mcgill lj 168, at pp. 175-80). the day after this court gives an opinion, any trial court considering the same question would in all likelihood apply that opinion because of its persuasive weight (reference re remuneration of judges (1998), at para. 10). it may therefore be appropriate, where the circumstances so require, for this court to exercise its remedial discretion to suspend the effects of its decision in the context of a reference, as it may do on an appeal. [153] this court recently stated in ontario (attorney general) v. g, 2020 scc 38, at para. 83, that a declaration of invalidity can be suspended “when an identifiable public interest, grounded in the constitution, is endangered by an immediate declaration to such an extent that it outweighs the harmful impacts of delaying the declaration’s effect” the analysis in this regard is guided by certain principles (para. 94). in the instant case, since suspending the declaration of invalidity would not perpetuate interference with any right guaranteed by the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, the most determinative principle is that of respect for the distinct institutional roles of the courts and the legislatures (paras. 97 and 126-31). [154] the weighing of the various factors we have identified shows that the quebec legislature has available to it a range of possible legislative measures that would be constitutional should it wish to depart from the updated historical monetary ceiling it is not for this court to choose which of those measures should be implemented to replace the current art. 35 para. 1 ccp. in accordance with the constitutional principles of parliamentary sovereignty and democracy, it would be preferable to leave it to the democratically elected quebec legislature to choose which of those possibilities best reflects the interests and priorities of the people of quebec (see g, at para. 97). this is all the more true where the harmful effects of a suspension would be minimal, as affected litigants would in the meantime continue to have access to the court of québec, an impartial and independent court that plays a part in maintaining the rule of law. [155] an immediately effective declaration would significantly impair the quebec legislature’s ability to legislate in order to address the constitutional invalidity (g, at paras. 129-30) the day after the publication of this opinion, litigants with lawsuits for identical amounts could be subject to the jurisdiction of different courts (the court of québec or the superior court) depending on whether they decide to raise a preliminary exception concerning the jurisdiction of the court of québec such a situation would generate intolerable uncertainty in the administration of civil justice in quebec. and it would then be difficult for the quebec legislature, in enacting a new, constitutionally compliant art. 35 ccp, to apply transitional measures that would restore the harmony of the system. [156] for these reasons, like the court of appeal, we agree that our opinion that art. 35 para. 1 ccp is unconstitutional should not be implemented for a period of 12 months from the date of its release. it is normally up to the government to demonstrate how long the suspension should be. despite the absence of submissions on this point in this court, we find the length of time determined by the court of appeal to be adequate (g, at para. 135) article 35 para. 1 ccp should therefore be considered valid in the interim the quebec legislature will also turn its mind to transitional provisions once it has selected between the available constitutionally compliant options. three comments must be made regarding the effects of this opinion, however. [157] first, any originating proceedings filed in the court of québec before or during the suspension period can be pursued to the conclusion of the proceedings even if the proceedings conclude after the 12-month period has expired. any judgment that terminates a proceeding at that time will be final and will not be affected by this court’s opinion the absence of such a transitional measure would deprive quebec of a harmonious judicial system, result in great disorder and affect the implementation and enforcement of litigants’ rights. if this court did not address this situation, the rule of law would suffer (reference re manitoba language rights, at pp. 750-51). [158] second, res judicata precludes the reopening of cases that were within the jurisdiction of the court of québec pursuant to art. 35 para. 1 cpc and that have already been decided by that court (see reference re manitoba language rights, at p 756) any decisions rendered by the court of québec in such cases before this decision will thus continue to be fully effective. [159] third, the de facto doctrine, which recognizes and gives effect “to the justified expectations of those who have relied upon the acts of those administering the invalid laws and to the existence and efficacy of public and private bodies corporate, though irregularly or illegally organized” (ibid., at p 757), will also save rights, obligations and other effects which have arisen out of actions performed pursuant to art. 35 ccp by courts, judges, persons exercising statutory powers and public officials. “such rights, obligations and other effects are, and will always be, enforceable and unassailable” (ibid). vii disposition [160] our answers to the stated questions are as follows: [translation] 1 are the provisions of the first paragraph of article 35 of the code of civil procedure (chapter c-25.01), setting at less than $85,000 the limit to the exclusive monetary jurisdiction of the court of québec, valid with regard to section 96 of the constitution act, 1867, given the jurisdiction of quebec over the administration of justice under paragraph 14 of section 92 of the constitution act, 1867? no, the provisions of the first paragraph of art. 35 of the code of civil procedure (chapter c-25.01) setting at less than $85,000 the limit to the exclusive monetary jurisdiction of the court of québec are not valid with regard to s 96 of the constitution act, 1867. [translation] 2 is it compatible with section 96 of the constitution act, 1867 to apply the obligation of judicial deference, which characterizes the application for judicial review, to the appeals to the court of québec provided for in sections 147 of the act respecting access to documents held by public bodies and the protection of personal information (chapter a-2.1), 115.16 of the act respecting the autorité des marchés financiers (chapter a-33.2), 100 of the real estate brokerage act (chapter c-73.2), 379 of the act respecting the distribution of financial products and services (chapter d-9.2), 159 of the act respecting administrative justice (chapter j-3), 240 and 241 of the police act (chapter p-13.1), 91 of the act respecting the régie du logement (chapter r-8.1) and 61 of the act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector (chapter p-39.1)? we do not answer this question, because it is now moot. [161] for the foregoing reasons, we would dismiss the appeals without costs. introduction [162] i have read the reasons of my colleagues côté and martin jj., but with respect, i cannot agree with their conclusion like abella j., although for different reasons, i am of the view that art. 35 para. 1 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“ccp”), does not remove from the quebec superior court part of its core jurisdiction. i explain this below. [163] the first question raised in the reference to the quebec court of appeal requires an answer that strikes a balance between, on the one hand, the ability of the provinces and territories to experiment with new forms of access to civil justice through provincially or territorially constituted courts and, on the other, the need to preserve the core jurisdiction of the superior courts that allows them to state and develop the civil law or the common law. [164] specifically, what must be determined in this case is whether art. 35 para. 1 ccp, which raises the monetary ceiling of the court of québec’s civil jurisdiction from less than $70,000 to less than $85,000, is contrary to s 96 of the constitution act, 1867. the enactment of this provision of the ccp was part of a series of increases in the ceiling that were all related to the genesis and history of the court of québec, a provincially constituted court that, over the course of the reforms made to it from the time of confederation until today, has played a key beneficial role in quebec’s justice system by facilitating the judicial resolution of conflicts in all districts in the province. [165] although the quebec legislature has always regarded such increases as a way of promoting access to justice, the respondents the chief justice, senior associate chief justice and associate chief justice of the superior court of quebec see in them instead a gradual erosion of the superior courts’ core jurisdiction in civil matters that cannot be authorized by s 96. [166] the court of appeal held that, in order to be consistent with s 96, the monetary ceiling of the court of québec’s civil jurisdiction must fall between $55,000 and $70,000, subject to future updates, and that setting the ceiling for claims at less than $85,000 is therefore unconstitutional (2019 qcca 1492, at para. 188 (canlii)). the court of appeal stated that s 96 gives the quebec superior court core jurisdiction over “substantial” civil law disputes, which it defined as those involving an amount of $70,000 or more, an amount corresponding to the updated maximum value of the monetary ceiling of the inferior courts’ jurisdiction at the time of confederation. the court of appeal shared the concerns raised by the respondents about the gradual erosion of the quebec superior court’s civil jurisdiction and noted that the quebec legislature has given the court of québec a more significant role in civil matters than any other canadian province (paras. 147, 150 and 187). [167] the appellants the conférence des juges de la cour du québec, the attorney general of quebec, the conseil de la magistrature du québec and the canadian association of provincial court judges are appealing the answer given by the quebec court of appeal to the first reference question. [168] it should be noted that both the attorney general of quebec and the attorney general of canada, who is intervening for the federal government, fully support the position that art. 35 para. 1 ccp is constitutional. in particular, the attorney general of canada takes the view that the court of appeal’s analytical approach overlooks the actual impact of this article [translation] “on the superior court’s ability to hear civil disputes” (if (agc), at para. 5). he adds that, in the final analysis, given “its insignificant effect” on the core jurisdiction exercised by the superior court in this regard, art. 35 para. 1 ccp in no way infringes s 96 of the constitution act, 1867 (para. 8). [169] in my view, the appeals relating to the first question should be allowed. in the opinion it provided on the questions referred to it (“opinion”), the court of appeal interpreted the limits of the superior court’s core jurisdiction too broadly and froze in time the civil jurisdiction of the court of québec, as a provincially constituted court, rather than adopting an analytical framework attuned to the actual constitutional objectives of s 96 these objectives include fostering a unified judicial system throughout canada. in my opinion, the preservation of the superior courts’ ability to state and develop private law allows this objective to be achieved in accordance with s 96. [170] for this purpose, it is not necessary to maintain the monetary ceiling of the inferior courts’ civil jurisdiction in effect at the time of confederation. there is another approach — not only desirable but also truer to the spirit of s 96 — that gives the provinces and territories real autonomy in the administration of civil justice and permits them to make the choices best suited to their own emerging and complex challenges. as i will explain, such an analytical framework makes it possible both to protect the essential space the provinces and territories have for experimentation in matters of access to justice, which may include expanding their courts’ civil jurisdiction, and to ensure in the process that the superior courts can continue to state and develop the civil law and the common law. [171] the analysis that follows is based on the two stages of the s 96 analytical framework, which are concerned with the historical jurisdiction and the core jurisdiction of the superior courts. [172] with regard to the first stage of the analytical framework, i am of the view that art. 35 ccp satisfies the three tests developed in re residential tenancies act, 1979, [1981] 1 scr 714. when properly characterized in terms of its subject matter, the jurisdiction conferred by this article on the court of québec is civil jurisdiction over contractual and extracontractual obligations at the time of confederation, the inferior courts of three of the four founding provinces, with the exception of lower canada (the province of quebec), exercised a general shared jurisdiction in this regard. [173] as for the second stage of the analysis, i am of the view that art. 35 ccp. does not remove from the quebec superior court any power that is within its core jurisdiction. this jurisdiction must be defined narrowly and, with due respect for those who disagree, i see no need to confer on the superior courts any more power over private law disputes than is necessary. [174] of all the possible interpretations of the confederation compromise embodied in s 96, the only one that seems reasonable to me is the one that ultimately allows the superior courts to state and develop private law. as long as this ability is not jeopardized, the superior courts’ core jurisdiction in this area will remain intact and the unified nature of canada’s judicial system will be protected. [175] the provinces and territories are therefore free to increase the civil jurisdiction of their respective courts insofar as they comply with this important restriction. the following factors, which are both quantitative and qualitative, provide some helpful guidance: (a) the impact on the number of cases that the superior court continues to deal with; (b) the impact on the proportion of cases within the superior court’s jurisdiction compared with those within the jurisdiction of a provincially or territorially constituted court; (c) the impact on the nature and importance of the cases within the superior court’s jurisdiction. [176] once these factors are applied in this case, as i will do below, the necessary conclusion is that art. 35 ccp does not have the effect of removing the power to state and develop private law from the quebec superior court. the evidence shows that the superior court continues to hear a sufficient number and substantial proportion of civil cases, in which it is called upon to adjudicate significant disputes that are highly varied in nature. [177] like quebec, other provinces are continuing, by means of innovative initiatives, to promote access to justice everywhere within their boundaries the interpretation i adopt of s 96, informed by the compromise of the founders of confederation, has the advantage of giving the provinces the degree of autonomy they need in the years ahead to address the complex challenge of access to justice, an undertaking whose success does not depend on a single solution. [178] before i embark on the analysis mentioned above, it is important to begin by providing a broad outline of the court of québec’s genesis and history, viewed from the standpoint of the exercise by that court of its civil jurisdiction. ii background [179] the history of the court of québec and its predecessors before and since confederation can be divided into four phases, which go back to the pre-confederation period and the commissioners’ court, until the time the commissioners’ court was replaced following confederation by the magistrate’s court, which was later renamed provincial court and, finally, court of québec: (1) replacement of the commissioners’ court by the magistrate’s court (1869 to 1953); (2) abolition of the circuit court and increase in the magistrate court’s civil jurisdiction (1953 to 1965); (3) replacement of the magistrate’s court by the provincial court and increase in its civil jurisdiction (1965 to 1988); (4) replacement of the provincial court by the court of québec and increase in its civil jurisdiction (1988 to today). [180] the first phase began with the creation of the magistrate’s court, which was established by the quebec legislature in 1869 and given the civil jurisdiction formerly exercised by the commissioners’ court, also a provincially constituted court (an act respecting district magistrates in this province, sq 1869, c 23, ss. 13, 16 and 17) like the commissioners’ court, the magistrate’s court exercised that jurisdiction concurrently with the circuit court, a s 96 court (see renvoi concernant la constitutionnalité de la loi concernant la juridiction de la cour de magistrat, 11-12 elizabeth ii, chapitre 62, [1965] b.r 1, at pp. 7-8, 11-12 and 18-19; séminaire de chicoutimi v la cité de chicoutimi, [1973] scr 681, at pp. 689-90) the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court increased from $25 to $50 in 1871, to $99.99 in 1921 and then to less than $200 in 1946 (an act further to amend the law respecting district magistrates in this province, sq 1871, c 9, s 1; an act to amend the code of civil procedure respecting the district magistrate’s court, sq 1921, c 100, s 1; an act respecting the jurisdiction of the district magistrate’s court, sq 1946, c 53, s 1). in 1922, the circuit court’s civil jurisdiction was transferred to the magistrate’s court in districts where the latter was present (an act to amend the code of civil procedure respecting the jurisdiction of the circuit and magistrates’ courts, sq. 1922, c 94). [181] the circuit court was abolished by the quebec legislature in 1953, during the second phase. the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court over civil suits for less than $200 then became exclusive rather than concurrent (an act to amend the courts of justice act, sq 1952-53, c 29, s 17; an act to amend the code of civil procedure, sq 1952-53, c 18, s 12). in 1963, that jurisdiction was increased to less than $500 (an act respecting the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court, sq 1963, c 62, s 1). [182] in 1964, the quebec government referred the question of whether that increase was constitutionally valid to the court of appeal, clearly seeking to put an end to the uncertainty surrounding its constitutionality. the court of appeal unanimously held that the increase was invalid on the ground that, taken together, the successive increases in the civil jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court had the effect of usurping the superior court’s role (renvoi concernant la constitutionnalité de la loi concernant la juridiction de la cour de magistrat). [183] that decision was appealed to this court fauteux j., writing for his colleagues, found that the court of appeal had gone beyond the question referred to it by ruling on the constitutionality of the series of increases since 1869, when it should instead have confined itself to the specific question of the increase in the monetary ceiling that was the subject of the reference (re cour de magistrat de québec, [1965] scr 772, at p 780). on that point, fauteux j held for a unanimous court that the increase in question, which had raised the ceiling from less than $200 to less than $500, was not contrary to s 96 (p 783). [184] in 1965, at the start of the third phase of its history, the magistrate’s court was renamed provincial court (an act to amend the courts of justice act, sq 1965, c 17, s 1) over the years, the monetary ceiling of the provincial court’s civil jurisdiction was raised several times, to less than $1,000 in 1966, less than $3,000 in 1969, less than $6,000 in 1979, less than $10,000 in 1982 and less than $15,000 in 1984 (code of civil procedure, sq 1965, c 80, art. 34; an act to again amend the code of civil procedure, sq 1969, c 81, s 2; an act to amend the code of civil procedure and other legislation, sq 1979, c 37, s 8; an act to amend various legislation, sq. 1982, c 58, s 19; an act to amend the code of civil procedure and other legislation, sq 1984, c 26, s 3). [185] finally, in the fourth phase, which began in 1988, the national assembly of quebec created the court of québec by merging the provincial court, the court of sessions of the peace and the youth court (an act to amend the courts of justice act and other legislation to establish the court of québec, sq 1988, c 21, ss. 1 to 5). because the court of québec inherited the provincial court’s civil jurisdiction, its civil jurisdiction at that time was less than $15,000; that jurisdiction increased to less than $30,000 a few years later, in 1995, then to less than $70,000 in 2002 and, finally, to less than $85,000 in 2016 (an act to amend the code of civil procedure and the act respecting municipal courts, sq 1995, c 2, s 2; an act to reform the code of civil procedure, sq 2002, c 7, s 5; an act to establish the new code of civil procedure, sq 2014, c 1, s 35). [186] the following table, which is based largely on the one set out in the opinion (see para. 173), shows how the monetary ceiling of the civil jurisdiction of provincially constituted courts in quebec has increased since 1965 and also indicates, for each increase, the corresponding value determined by updating the $100 ceiling in effect in 1867: year of legislative amendment (date of assent) ceiling of the jurisdiction of the court of québec (formerly the magistrate’s court and the provincial court) 1965 1969 1979 1982 1984 1995 2002 2014 $1,000 $3,000 $6,000 $10,000 $15,000 $30,000 $70,000 $85,000 updated value of the 1867 ceiling of $100 (where available) $2,884.41 $3,904.83 $11,130.55 $14,732.18 $17,222.62 $27,901.34 $37,175.75 $52,843.97 (2016) $55,354.47 (2017) as can be seen, before 2002, almost all of the increases were below the updated value of the $100 ceiling that existed in 1867; the situation then changed, as the ceiling of the court of québec’s jurisdiction greatly exceeded that value. a objectives pursued by the quebec legislature [187] in making reforms to the quebec justice system, the province has been guided by two inseparable objectives: (1) promoting access to justice; (2) strengthening the position of the court known today as the court of québec as a distinct provincial judicial institution in fact, enhancing access to justice has been a central concern underlying each increase in the monetary ceiling of the court of québec’s civil jurisdiction (legislative assembly, “projet de loi: code de procédure civile”, débats de l’assemblée législative, vol. 1, 1st sess., 24th leg., december 12 and 16, 1952, at pp. 273 and 284 (hon m. duplessis); legislative assembly, “bill 20 — code de procédure civile”, débats de l’assemblée législative, vol. 2, no. 85, 4th sess., 27th leg., july 14, 1965, at p 4294 (hon. c. wagner); national assembly, “bill 74 — loi modifiant de nouveau le code de procédure civile”, débats de l’assemblée nationale, vol. 8, no. 100, 4th sess., 28th leg., december 9, 1969, at p 4748 (r. paul); national assembly, “projet de loi no 40 — loi modifiant le code de procédure civile et d’autres dispositions législatives”, journal des débats, vol. 21, no. 36, 4th sess., 31st leg., june 5, 1979, at p 1686 (m.-a bédard); national assembly, “projet de loi no 101 — loi modifiant diverses dispositions législatives”, journal des débats, vol. 26, no. 100, 3rd sess., 32nd leg., december 13, 1982, at p 7105 (m-a. bédard); national assembly, “projet de loi 83 — loi modifiant le code de procédure civile et d’autres dispositions législatives”, journal des débats, vol. 27, no. 91, 4th sess., 32nd leg., may 15, 1984, at p 6033 (p.-m johnson); national assembly, “projet de loi 41 — loi modifiant le code de procédure civile et la loi sur les cours municipales”, journal des débats, vol. 34, no. 8, 1st sess., 35th leg., december 8, 1994, at pp. 359-60 (p. bégin); national assembly, “projet de loi no 54 — loi portant réforme du code de procédure civile”, journal des débats, vol. 37, no. 58, 2nd sess., 36th leg., november 20, 2001, at pp. 3769-71 (p. bégin); national assembly, “projet de loi nº 28 — loi instituant le nouveau code de procédure civile”, journal des débats, vol. 43, no. 72, 1st sess., 40th leg., september 24, 2013, at pp. 4502-9 (b. st-arnaud)) the proposal to streamline quebec’s judicial system in order to make it more accessible and more capable of delivering justice effectively gained significant momentum during the quiet revolution and truly became the driving force behind the reform of the quebec courts (see h. st-louis, “reform of the trial courts in quebec”, in p. h. russell, ed., canada’s trial courts: two tiers or one? (2007), 123, at pp. 124-25). this explains why the court of québec [translation] “became the court with the widest presence throughout the territory [of quebec]” (s. normand, la cour du québec: genèse et développement (2013), at p 90). [188] the commitment to making thorough reforms to quebec’s justice system also required modernizing and improving the structural organization of the court of québec as a provincial judicial institution (see p. h. russell, the judiciary in canada: the third branch of government (1987), at p 126). as patrice garant observes, those judicial reforms reflect the fact that, during and after the quiet revolution, [translation] “the government and legislature of quebec became aware of the significance of the . . court [of québec] as an institution that was important to quebec’s identity” (“la cour du québec et la justice administrative” (2012), 53 c de d 229, at p 242). [189] when the replacement of the magistrate’s court by the provincial court was proposed in the legislative assembly of quebec in 1965, that sweeping reform proposal was driven by three main ideas: increasing the civil jurisdiction of the court in question, making it more accessible to litigants, and making it more professional; all of these objectives thus contributed jointly to the renewal of quebec’s justice system (legislative assembly, “bill no 75 — loi modifiant la loi des tribunaux judiciaires”, débats de l’assemblée legislative, vol. 2, no. 84, 4th sess., 27th leg., july 13, 1965, at pp. 4232-35 (hon. c. wagner)). [190] however, the spirit of reform in the quebec legislature came up against a few obstacles, all related to s 96, which served as a constitutional limit and check. initial attempts to abolish the circuit court in the district of montréal and to replace it with a magistrate’s court were rejected by the federal government (an act to amend the law respecting district magistrates, sq 1888, c 20, s 1; an act to amend the law respecting district magistrates, s.q 1889, c 30, s 1; department of justice, correspondence, reports of the ministers of justice and orders in council upon the subject of dominion and provincial legislation 1867-1895 (1896), at pp. 345 and 431-32). [191] in addition, despite this court’s favourable decision in re cour de magistrat de québec, doubts remained about the constitutionality of the increase in the monetary jurisdiction of the court we now know as the court of québec in civil matters (see, eg,. débats de l’assemblée nationale, december 9, 1969, at pp. 4746-48 and 4750 (r. paul and a. maltais); national assembly, commission permanente de la justice, “projet de loi no 101 — loi modifiant diverses dispositions législatives”, journal des débats, no. 226, 3rd sess., 32nd leg., december 16, 1982, at pp. b-11320 and b-11321 (m-a. bédard); national assembly, “projet de loi 83 — loi modifiant le code de procédure civile et d’autres dispositions législatives”, journal des débats, vol. 27, no. 103, 4th sess., 32nd leg., june 7, 1984, at pp. 6826-31 (p-m. johnson)). the court of appeal’s decision in that case nonetheless continued to have some persuasive force based on the perception that this court had allowed the appeal for [translation] “technical” reasons (see j. deslauriers, “la cour provinciale et l’art. 96 de l’aanb” (1977), 18 c de d 881, at p 914). that situation led the chief judge of the court of québec to state in 2007 that it was only a matter of time before there was a constitutional challenge to that court’s civil jurisdiction (see st-louis, at p 132). clearly, history has proved her right. b emergence of the role of provincially constituted courts in canada [192] a connection can be made between, on the one hand, the almost complete absence of decisions on the interpretation and application of s 96 involving an exclusive transfer of jurisdiction to a provincially constituted court (and not an administrative tribunal) and, on the other, the establishment and strong expansion of this type of court in canada. [193] in 1867, magistrate’s courts exercised quite limited jurisdiction in criminal matters and were composed largely of magistrates who were not legal professionals (g. t. g seniuk and n. lyon, “the supreme court of canada and the provincial court in canada” (2000), 79 can. bar rev. 77, at pp. 91-93). starting in the 1960s, the provincial and territorial governments replaced magistrate’s courts with new “provincial” courts presided over by qualified judges who had previously practised as lawyers, which had the effect of making these courts more professional (russell, at pp. 126-27). [194] in parallel with the establishment of modern provincially constituted courts, the parliament of canada passed legislation to confer much more extensive criminal jurisdiction on them. this played a part in making these courts the backbone of the criminal justice system, even though at another time, as we know, inferior courts generally had jurisdiction only over minor criminal cases. the practical result of that significant change was to give provincial courts concurrent jurisdiction with superior courts over all offences under the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, with a few exceptions (seniuk and lyon, at pp. 95-96). in 2014-15, for example, over 99 percent of the 328,028 criminal cases dealt with by the courts involving offences committed by adults were tried by provincially constituted courts (k. roach, criminal law (7th ed. 2018), at pp. 2-3). [195] it should also be noted that, in recent years, a number of provinces have increased their courts’ monetary jurisdiction in civil matters. in 2014, alberta raised its provincial court’s monetary ceiling from $25,000 to $50,000 (provincial court civil division amendment regulation, alta. reg. 139/2014), and since 2015, the lieutenant governor in council has had the power to increase that ceiling to $100,000 (see statutes amendment act, 2015, sa 2015, c 12, s 6(4)(a)(v)). in 2017, british columbia raised its provincial court’s monetary ceiling from $25,000 to $35,000 as well (small claims act, rsbc 1996, c 430, s 3; small claims court monetary limit regulation, bc. reg. 179/2005, s 1, as amended by bc. reg. 120/2017, sch. 1). a few years earlier, in 2012, british columbia also created a new civil resolution tribunal to deal with most claims in which the amount sought does not exceed $5,000 (civil resolution tribunal act, sbc 2012, c 25, ss. 2, 118 and 133; tribunal small claims regulation, bc. reg. 232/2018, s 3). finally, saskatchewan did the same in 2016 by increasing the claims ceiling from $20,000 to $30,000 (the small claims amendment regulations, 2016, sask reg. 4/2016, s 3; the small claims act, 2016, ss 2016, c. s-50.12, s 4; the small claims regulations, 2017, rrs, c. s-50.12, reg. 1, s 3). [196] given the fact that provincially constituted courts typically sit in more locations than superior courts, it must be recognized that the initiatives taken by the provincial legislatures have promoted access to justice in civil matters in the provinces in question (if (canadian council of chief judges), at para. 11). [197] in reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3, this court was asked to consider the impact of the expansion in the provincial courts’ civil jurisdiction, a measure that, according to lamer cj, required a “constitutional response” (para. 129). in light of the legislative policy of granting greater jurisdiction to provincially constituted courts, this court held that those courts therefore needed the same guarantees of judicial independence as the superior courts (para. 129). [198] these appeals represent an opportunity for this court to provide a constitutional response that recognizes the efforts made by the provinces and territories to ensure modern, accessible justice that is attuned to 21st century issues, without draining all substance from the central unifying role played by the superior courts in canada’s justice system. iii role of sections 92(14) and 96 in canada’s constitutional order [199] constitutional provisions must be “placed in [their] proper linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts” (r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at p 344) and interpreted in a manner that is sensitive to evolving circumstances, as they “must continually adapt to cover new realities” (reference re same-sex marriage, 2004 scc 79, [2004] 3 scr 698, at para. 30). in addition, the underlying principles of constitutional provisions, such as federalism, may be relevant to their interpretation (reference re senate reform, 2014 scc 32, [2014] 1 scr 704, at para. 25). [200] here, ss. 96 and 92(14) of the constitution act, 1867, taken together, reflect one of the important compromises reached by the fathers of confederation with respect to the administration of justice in canada. [201] on the one hand, s 92(14) gives each province the power and responsibility to legislate in relation to the administration of justice, including for the purpose of creating, transforming or abolishing judicial offices section 129 of the constitution act, 1867 in fact expressly provides for the continuance of the inferior courts that had civil jurisdiction at the time of confederation, whose powers are within the exclusive authority of the provinces under s 92(14). the provinces’ power is a wide one that gives them a great deal of flexibility, allowing them, among other things, to organize their courts in a manner that favours access to justice and strengthens public confidence in the judiciary while at the same time taking their specific needs and challenges into account (conférence des juges de paix magistrats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2016 scc 39, [2016] 2 scr 116, at para. 39; see also reference re adoption act, [1938] scr 398, at pp. 413-14). [202] on the other hand, this provincial power is subject to what s 96 subtracts in favour of parliament, including the power to appoint the judges of the superior courts in each province as well as the requirements that “flow by necessary implication from [the] terms [of that provision]” (british columbia v imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2005 scc 49, [2005] 2 scr 473, at para. 66, per major j). parliament’s power of appointment therefore “implicitly limit[s] provincial competence to endow a provincial tribunal with [the] powers [of s 96 courts]” (re residential tenancies act, 1979, at p 728) by giving such protection to the superior courts’ core inherent jurisdiction, which is integral to their operations, s 96 helps to establish a strong constitutional base for national unity through a network of related canadian courts that ensures the rule of law, interprovincial uniformity and minimum standards of decision making throughout the country (trial lawyers association of british columbia v. british columbia (attorney general), 2014 scc 59, [2014] 3 scr 31, at para. 29). in this sense, s 96 confers “a special and inalienable status” on the superior courts (macmillan bloedel ltd. v. simpson, [1995] 4 scr 725, at para. 52). [203] it does not follow, in my view, that s 96 freezes the civil jurisdiction of the inferior courts at what it was at the time of confederation. the section does, of course, constitute an important constitutional protection, but its scope remains limited to what is necessary to ensure that the underlying objectives of the confederation compromise are achieved, and primarily the objective of ensuring a unified judicial presence throughout canada. under the doctrine of mutual modification, the scope of s 96 must be understood together with the scope of s 92(14) so that “the constitution operates as an internally consistent harmonious whole” (trial lawyers, at para. 25; see reference re adoption act, at p 415; citizens insurance co of canada v parsons (1881), 7 app. cas. 96 (pc), at p 109). in other words, the interpretation of s 96 must take into account “the structure of government that [the constitution] seeks to implement” and “the manner in which the constitutional provisions are intended to interact with one another” (reference re senate reform, at para. 26). [204] in light of the foregoing, s 96 cannot have the effect of depriving the provinces of the autonomy and flexibility they need to administer civil justice in a manner that responds to evolving social realities and the changing needs of litigants, nor can it stand “in the way of new institutional approaches to social or political problems” (sobeys stores ltd v yeomans and labour standards tribunal (ns), [1989] 1 scr 238, at p 253; see p. j. monahan, b. shaw and p. ryan, constitutional law (5th ed 2017), at pp. 155-56; h. brun, g. tremblay and e. brouillet, droit constitutionnel (6th ed. 2014), at p 775). this means that s 96 should not be given an overly broad scope that would unduly limit the provinces’ ability to address complex and emerging legislative challenges related to the administration of justice. moreover, the case law on s 96 has long recognized the central role that the inferior courts play in ensuring access to justice because, as duff cj put it, their decisions touch “the great mass of the people more intimately and more extensively than do the judgments of the superior courts” (reference re adoption act, at p 415; see also re: bc. family relations act, [1982] 1 scr 62, at pp. 106-7 and 112-13; p. girard, j. phillips and r. b. brown, a history of law in canada (2018), vol. 1, beginnings to 1866, at pp. 390-92 and 397-404). [205] in my view, to prevent s 92(14) from being drained of all substance, the provinces must have real freedom to make the choices best suited to their own needs and to balance a number of important values by experimenting with new forms of access to civil justice through their courts as beetz j wrote in opseu v ontario (attorney general), [1987] 2 scr 2, unlike in a case involving the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, in a distribution of powers case, once it is demonstrated that the enacting legislature is competent, the balancing of conflicting values depends on the political judgment of such legislature and cannot be reviewed by the courts without their passing upon the wisdom of the legislation. [p 56] [206] therefore, subject to the limits imposed by the historical and core jurisdiction of the s 96 superior courts, the provincial legislatures have full power to expand their courts’ civil jurisdiction in order to facilitate access to justice in accordance with re residential tenancies act, 1979 and sobeys stores, the first stage of the analysis is to determine whether the grant of jurisdiction in question is permissible. the second stage is to decide whether the superior court’s jurisdiction can be ousted, that is, whether an exclusive grant of jurisdiction is permissible. iv analytical framework for the historical jurisdiction of the superior courts [207] the three-step analysis for determining the constitutionality of a provincial grant of jurisdiction was established by dickson j (as he then was) in re residential tenancies act, 1979 and was later refined by the court in sobeys stores, reference re young offenders act (pei), [1991] 1 scr 252 (“reference re young offenders”), and reference re amendments to the residential tenancies act (ns), [1996] 1 scr. 186 (“reference re residential tenancies act (ns)”). the first step, the historical test, involves answering the following question: does the impugned power or jurisdiction broadly conform to an exclusive power or jurisdiction exercised by the superior, district or county courts at the time of confederation? [208] if the impugned jurisdiction was exercised concurrently by the superior and inferior courts at the time of confederation, it must be determined whether the inferior courts had a “general shared involvement” (sobeys stores, at p 260 (emphasis deleted)) or a “meaningful concurrency of power” (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 77) in this regard. if so, the grant will be considered valid under the historical test the historical analysis therefore strikes a balance between the preservation of the superior courts’ historical role and the need to adapt to the realities of modern society, while giving the provinces flexibility to experiment with measures to facilitate access to justice (sobeys stores, at pp. 263 and 278-82). [209] on the other hand, if the jurisdiction was exclusive to the superior courts, then it is necessary to proceed to the second and third steps of the analytical framework. a characterization of the jurisdiction conferred by article 35 ccp. [210] the application of the historical test must begin with a proper characterization of the jurisdiction in issue the characterization of the impugned jurisdiction must go beyond “a technical analysis of remedies” (sobeys stores, at p 255) it is not focused on the “particular remedy sought” (reference re young offenders, at p 266), but is concerned rather with the “type of dispute” (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 76; macmillan bloedel, at para. 14), the “jurisdiction” (sobeys stores, at p 260) or the “subject-matter” of the decision (dupont v. inglis, [1958] scr 535, at p 543) — in short, with the matter in issue. moreover, the effect of the characterization must not be to “freeze the jurisdiction of inferior courts at what it was in 1867” (reference re young offenders, at p 266) for example, in sobeys stores, the court characterized the power in issue as jurisdiction over unjust dismissal, not over the remedy of reinstatement similarly, in attorney general of quebec v grondin, [1983] 2 scr 364, the court characterized the exclusive jurisdiction given to the régie du logement as jurisdiction over disputes between landlords and tenants, without considering the $10,000 monetary ceiling at the characterization stage. [211] this is a crucial question, as the manner in which the jurisdiction in issue is characterized can be determinative in the application of the historical test as wilson j recognized in sobeys stores, “those challenging legislation will probably favour the narrower view as more likely to bring success through the historical test”, whereas “[t]hose supporting the legislation will no doubt advocate a more expansive view on the assumption that the broader the characterization the more likely it will be that at least some aspects of the jurisdiction will have been within the purview of inferior courts at confederation” (p 253). [212] two characterizations have been proposed in this case. the respondents and the intervener the trial lawyers association of british columbia characterize the jurisdiction in issue as general civil jurisdiction that is exclusive throughout quebec over claims for less than $85,000 (in 2016 dollars). the appellants and the intervener the attorney general of canada characterize it as jurisdiction over civil disputes based on contractual and extracontractual obligations. [213] in my view, the characterization proposed by the respondents — and implicitly adopted by the court of appeal in its analysis of core jurisdiction — presents four problems. first, it gives too much weight to the monetary ceiling established by art. 35 ccp and therefore departs from this court’s consistent line of cases establishing that the characterization should not be focused on the remedy sought. the value of a claim is not in itself a “type of dispute”, as the same questions of fact and law may arise regardless of the amount in issue. [214] second, the characterization proposed by the respondents has the effect of bypassing the application of the historical test, under which, as i explain below, monetary limits are only one factor in the overall assessment among several others, including the geographic reach of the jurisdiction and the range of disputes the court could decide (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 77) at the preliminary stage of characterization, no one factor, be it monetary or geographic, can be made so decisive. [215] in the same vein, the allegedly exclusive nature of the jurisdiction cannot be included in its characterization. if a grant of jurisdiction satisfies both stages of the s 96 analytical framework, then it can be exclusive (macmillan bloedel, at para. 18). the exclusivity of the grant therefore results from the fact that both stages are met. it cannot be allowed to influence the analysis by being included in the characterization prematurely. [216] finally, a monetary characterization could freeze the jurisdiction of the provincial courts at what it was at the time of confederation as a result of a technical analysis of remedies, contrary to this court’s consistent case law on this point. that approach is therefore liable to deprive the provinces of the flexibility they require to structure their courts’ jurisdiction in a manner that takes account of evolving social realities and the changing needs of litigants. b application of the historical test [217] the historical analysis is concerned with the jurisdiction vested exclusively in the superior courts at the time of confederation. if the inferior courts had either a meaningful concurrency of power or a “shared involvement” in the field in question, then s 96 does not come into play. an “overly technical” analysis must be avoided (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 77), because what is required is analogous jurisdiction and it is not necessary “that jurisdiction . . . have been entirely or even generally concurrent, for the nature of the inferior-superior court distinction will invariably mean that the former’s jurisdiction was limited in some way” (sobeys stores, at p 260). [218] in sobeys stores, the court set out three questions for assessing the extent of the courts’ shared involvement in exercising the jurisdiction in question: (a) was the inferior court jurisdiction geographically restricted? was it confined to certain municipal or district courts or was it being exercised province-wide? (b) was the inferior court jurisdiction limited to a few specific situations? . (c) was the inferior court jurisdiction restricted by pecuniary limits so as to reduce its scope even after allowing for inflation? [p 261] in addition to these questions, two other factors were recognized by the court in reference re residential tenancies act (ns): the percentage of the population that would have used the inferior courts, and the frequency with which disputes amenable to their process arose (para. 77). [219] it is clear that, depending on the context, certain factors will have more weight than others for example, “[a] significant geographical limitation would tell against the legislative scheme much more than a purely pecuniary limit” (sobeys stores, at p 260) it is also clear that the purpose of these factors is essentially to ascertain whether a substantial percentage of the population had access to an inferior court in the field in question. this was the question that wilson j was considering in sobeys stores when she explained the relevance of the monetary and geographical factors in terms of “recourse to the inferior courts for the majority of colonial residents” (p 260). as i mentioned above, the court in reference re residential tenancies act (ns) also recognized two new analytical factors to provide a clearer picture of public access to the inferior courts, noting that the “practical involvement” of those courts in exercising the jurisdiction at issue is what matters (para. 77 (emphasis in original)). [220] in the application of the historical test, all courts that existed in pre-confederation canada must be considered, and not only those of the province (then a colony) in question. as wilson j also recognized in sobeys stores, “consistency at the level of the historical analysis would seem to be desirable and . . . it is best achieved by measuring each s 96 challenge against the same historical yardstick. the test at this stage should be national, not provincial” (p 266). in other words, if the objective is to ensure the integrity of a unified judicial system, the analysis of court involvement must not be confined “within artificially circumscribed boundaries” (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 78). because they give priority to and focus exclusively on the historical situation in quebec, the respondents’ arguments and the court of appeal’s analysis depart from this court’s case law on this point that methodology is contrary both to the federalism principle (r v. comeau, 2018 scc 15, [2018] 1 scr 342, at para. 78) and to the objective underlying s 96 of ensuring a unified judicial system. [221] when the jurisdiction in issue is properly characterized, the analysis of the historical test leads to the conclusion that the jurisdiction was not vested exclusively in the s 96 courts. i agree with my colleagues that, on the whole, the inferior courts at the time of confederation had a general shared involvement or a meaningful concurrency of power in contractual and extracontractual matters. this is confirmed by a historical overview. [222] in upper canada (the province of ontario), division courts had jurisdiction over any personal action up to $40 and any contractual claim up to $100 (d. fyson, civil justice in mid-nineteenth-century british north america: court structure, judges and recourse to the courts in lower canada, upper canada, new brunswick and nova scotia, april 10, 2018, reproduced in ar (agq), vol. iii, at p 126 (“fyson report”)). this represented about 83 percent of civil cases (p 183). [223] in new brunswick, the city court of saint john could hear civil disputes up to $80 (p 137) and, until 1867, the court of common pleas exercised jurisdiction concurrently with the new brunswick supreme court in civil matters, without any monetary limits except in cases involving title to land (pp. 131-33). [224] in nova scotia, justices of the peace, who were spread throughout the province, had jurisdiction over small claims up to $20 (or $80 when two justices sat) (p 141), while the halifax city court had jurisdiction over actions in contract not exceeding $80 and other civil actions up to $40 (p 144). those actions represented the majority of civil cases in that province (p 198). [225] in lower canada, commissioners’ courts had jurisdiction in contractual matters up to $25 in 228 localities (pp. 110-13), or most of the territory, and heard approximately 26 percent of cases in 1866 (p 170). the montréal recorder’s court had jurisdiction over disputes between landlords and tenants up to $100 (p 118), which, as this court has stated, would correspond to “quite a substantial” monetary jurisdiction today (sobeys stores, at p 270) the québec recorder’s court heard disputes between masters and servants without any monetary limit (fyson report, at p 118). the so-called “inferior” courts therefore heard about 40 percent of civil actions in 1866 (p 170). [226] all told, the vast majority — at least 80 percent — of civil disputes in pre-confederation canada, with the exception of lower canada, came before the inferior courts although that jurisdiction was subject to monetary limits in several matters, it nevertheless indicates that there was significant coextensive involvement by the inferior courts in contractual and extracontractual matters. those courts were truly a powerful force in the civil justice system, they had significant private law jurisdiction at the time within their respective territory, and they heard the great majority of cases. if the court of appeal had properly characterized the jurisdiction in question as being over “civil disputes based on contractual and extracontractual obligations”, it could not have reached any other conclusion. [227] it clearly follows that s 96 cannot have the effect of freezing quebec’s civil justice system at a time prior to confederation. section 96 unquestionably allows increases in the court of québec’s civil jurisdiction in light of the general historical conditions in most of the founding provinces before 1867. quebec could therefore take this path despite the fact that the other provinces made different choices after confederation. [228] accordingly, it must be concluded that art. 35 ccp satisfies the historical step of the analysis set out in re residential tenancies act, 1979 what remains to be determined is whether this article has the effect of removing from the superior court part of its core jurisdiction. v analytical framework for the core jurisdiction of the superior courts [229] i agree with the court of appeal’s view that, in light of trial lawyers, s 96 of the constitution act, 1867 gives the superior courts a core jurisdiction that allows them “to resolve disputes between individuals and decide questions of private and public law” (para. 48 (emphasis deleted), citing trial lawyers, at para. 32). [230] that being said, i nonetheless find that the monetary ceiling provided for in art. 35 ccp does not have the effect of removing the power to resolve disputes between individuals and decide questions of private and public law from the quebec superior court. a description of the analytical framework [231] the framework that has been established to protect the superior courts’ core jurisdiction does not allow this jurisdiction to be removed from them (macmillan bloedel, at para. 30) the framework involves two questions: (1) is the power in question within the core jurisdiction of the superior courts? (2) does the law have the effect of removing the power from their core jurisdiction? [232] the analysis required to answer the first question referred to the court of appeal entails identifying a power that is within the core jurisdiction of the superior courts. in macmillan bloedel, lamer cj described this jurisdiction in the following manner: “the core jurisdiction . . . comprises those powers which are essential to the administration of justice and the maintenance of the rule of law” (para. 38). removing such powers from a superior court would make it “something other than a superior court” and deprive it of its “essential character” (para. 30). [233] this court has repeatedly emphasized that the superior courts’ core jurisdiction is “a very narrow one which includes only critically important jurisdictions” (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 56; see also babcock v. canada (attorney general), 2002 scc 57, [2002] 3 scr 3, at para. 59; r v ahmad, 2011 scc 6, [2011] 1 scr 110, at paras. 59 and 61) if they were deprived of these critically important powers, the superior courts could not continue to play their central and unifying role in our constitutional and judicial system and to uphold the rule of law (re residential tenancies act, 1979, at p 728; macmillan bloedel, at paras. 15 and 35-37; trial lawyers, at para. 32; see also reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 72; reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, at para. 88; ontario v criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr 3, at para. 17; windsor (city) v. canadian transit co., 2016 scc 54, [2016] 2 scr 617, at para. 32). as noted by professor daly, identifying the powers that are within the superior courts’ core jurisdiction is always a very delicate exercise, as it must not lead to the jurisdiction being expanded so far as to imperil canadian courts’ well-established respect for institutional pluralism (p. daly, “section 96: striking a balance between legal centralism and legal pluralism”, in r. albert, p. daly and v. macdonnell, eds., the canadian constitution in transition (2019), 84, at p 101). [234] some of these powers are procedural and arise from the exercise by the superior courts of their inherent jurisdiction the power to punish for all forms of contempt is one example (macmillan bloedel, at paras. 38-41); the power to remedy abuses of process is another (babcock, at para. 60; ahmad, at para. 61). [235] other powers are part of the superior courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. they include the power to judicially review the decisions of administrative tribunals that was recognized in crevier v. attorney general of quebec, [1981] 2 scr 220, and the power to pronounce upon the validity of federal laws that was affirmed in attorney general of canada v. law society of british columbia, [1982] 2 scr 307. [236] this court has struck down various laws whose effect was to remove from the superior courts a power arising from their core jurisdiction. i am referring here to the removal of the power to review the decisions of administrative tribunals (attorney general of quebec v farrah, [1978] 2 scr 638; crevier) or the removal of the power to try young persons for contempt of court ex facie (macmillan bloedel). [237] in trial lawyers, the court used the expressions “infringe” and “impinge” to describe the pernicious effect of a law on the superior courts’ core jurisdiction (paras. 31-32, 36 and 45). the use of these expressions does not change the nature of the test formulated in macmillan bloedel: the question remains whether the law in question has the effect of removing a power that is within the core jurisdiction. b power to resolve private law disputes [238] in trial lawyers, mclachlin c.j defined the superior courts’ core jurisdiction in civil matters as follows: the historic task of the superior courts is to resolve disputes between individuals and decide questions of private and public law . . . the resolution of these disputes and resulting determination of issues of private and public law, viewed in the institutional context of the canadian justice system, are central to what the superior courts do . . . to prevent this business being done strikes at the core of the jurisdiction of the superior courts protected by s 96 of the constitution act, 1867. [para. 32] in its analysis, the court of appeal relied on this passage to identify the superior courts’ core jurisdiction (paras. 115 and 140) based on the definition quoted above, the superior courts may, at first glance, seem to have a very broad jurisdiction. i reiterate, however, that this core jurisdiction “is a very narrow one which includes only critically important jurisdictions” (reference re residential tenancies act (ns), at para. 56). [239] the superior courts’ jurisdiction in matters of private law is limited to what is necessary for them to play their central role in maintaining the rule of law and the unity of our constitutional and judicial system. insofar as this jurisdiction stays within these limits and contributes to protecting this crucial role played by the superior courts, it should be concluded that the definition and above all the scope given to the jurisdiction are in keeping with the principles established by the court in this regard. [240] in order for this role to be preserved, the superior courts must, of course, have substantial jurisdiction in matters of private law, but their jurisdiction need not be exclusive. certain powers in this area can therefore be removed from them (labour relations board of saskatchewan v john east iron works, ltd., [1949] a.c 134 (pc);. reference re residential tenancies act (ns)). [241] in my view, the power to resolve disputes between individuals and decide questions of private law is meaningful only if the superior courts, as courts of original general jurisdiction, have substantial jurisdiction that allows them to state and develop the civil law in quebec and the common law in the other provinces. otherwise, the role they have played in unifying canada’s judicial system and maintaining the rule of law from confederation until today would be jeopardized. c factors to be considered [242] to decide whether art. 35 ccp removes from the quebec superior court its substantial jurisdiction in civil matters, the court of appeal focused its analysis on two monetary factors: the updated value of the $100 ceiling that applied in 1867, and the monetary threshold for appeals as of right. [243] with regard to the first factor, the court of appeal updated the 1867 ceiling of $100 on the inferior courts’ monetary jurisdiction over certain civil matters in order to determine the maximum limit of the court of québec’s monetary jurisdiction in civil matters primarily on the basis of this factor, the court of appeal found that art. 35 ccp has the effect of infringing on “the core jurisdiction of the quebec superior court to adjudicate certain substantial civil disputes” (para. 188). [244] with respect, i do not think that an amount like this can be of such decisive importance in assessing the impact of this article on the exercise of the quebec superior court’s core jurisdiction in the civil law. in my opinion, the court of appeal’s approach was not sufficiently holistic given that, as indicated above, the superior court’s power to resolve disputes between individuals and decide questions of private law must be significant enough to enable it to state and develop the law in this area. the question is therefore not whether the superior court can still adjudicate substantial civil disputes, but rather whether its jurisdiction in this regard is substantial enough that it is capable of ensuring this development. [245] i believe that three quantitative and qualitative factors are relevant in determining whether art. 35 ccp (or any other statutory provision) removes from the superior court part of its core jurisdiction in matters of private law: (a) the impact on the number of cases that the superior court continues to deal with; (b) the impact on the proportion of cases within the superior court’s jurisdiction compared with those within the jurisdiction of a provincially constituted court; (c) the impact on the nature and importance of the cases within the superior court’s jurisdiction. [246] as long as the superior courts continue to hear a volume of cases that is sufficient in number and proportion and varied enough in nature and importance that they are able to state and develop the civil law in quebec and the common law in the other provinces, they will, as a result, continue to play their unifying role in canada’s constitutional and judicial system. under such conditions, the legislatures can, without infringing on the superior courts’ core jurisdiction in matters of private law, confer subject-matter jurisdiction on provincially constituted courts to empower them to hear a certain number of civil claims. [247] in this regard, professor daly writes that “[t]he question . . is how to preserve the s 96 courts as central pillars of the canadian legal order, their ‘prime importance in the constitutional pattern,’ while also preserving space for institutional and interpretive pluralism by maintaining a favourable constitutional climate for legislative experimentation” (p 98, citing law society of british columbia, at p 327). in my view, the three factors set out above ensure an appropriate balance in seeking, on the one hand, to have a plurality of provincial or territorial justice system models that can increase access to justice by means of various initiatives and, on the other, to have the superior courts play their unifying role in the canadian legal order. [248] a number of appellants and interveners pointed out the various initiatives introduced by provincial legislatures that have recognized the need to reform some aspects of the operations of their private law courts in order to enhance access to justice in their province. protection of the superior courts’ core jurisdiction in this field should certainly not have the effect of deterring the provinces and territories from making essential efforts to this end. as brandeis j stated in new state ice co. v. liebmann, 285 us 262 (1932), at p 311, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” in this sense, for the reasons set out above, the approach i am suggesting here does not interfere with the ability of the provinces and territories to experiment with new forms of access to civil justice. [249] moreover, it goes without saying that the application of the three factors is highly factual in nature, which does not mean that it calls for a cyclical re-examination of the impact of a statutory provision on the specific exercise of this jurisdiction. in the words of laskin cj in r v. zelensky, [1978] 2 scr 940, at p 951, it is true that “[n]ew appreciations thrown up by new social conditions . . . make it appropriate for this court to re-examine courses of decision on the scope of legislative power . always remembering, of course, that it is entrusted with a very delicate role in maintaining the integrity of the constitutional limits imposed by the british north america act” (see also clark v. canadian national railway co., [1988] 2 scr 680, at p 703; big m drug mart, at p 335). [250] the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that a statutory provision impairs a superior court’s ability to state and develop private law strikes me as a particularly onerous one. this is the case, it seems to me, because of the extensive evidence required for this purpose, which must be quantitative, qualitative and comprehensive. d article 35 ccp. does not infringe on the superior court’s core jurisdiction in civil matters [251] in this case, i conclude from the application of the three factors set out above that art. 35 ccp does not have the effect of removing from the superior court part of its core jurisdiction. [252] first, with regard to the impact of the grant of jurisdiction on the number of cases heard by the superior court, that court continues to deal with a large number of civil cases. specifically, the data for 2017-18, after art. 35 ccp came into force, show that about 45 percent of civil cases were opened at the superior court (63,807 cases in the civil, commercial and family chambers, compared with 77,021 cases in the court of québec’s civil division, including the small claims division, except appeals in administrative matters) (ministère de la justice, nombre de dossiers ouverts à la cour supérieure et à la cour du québec (2012-13 à 2017-18), january 28, 2019, reproduced in ar (agq), vol. vii, at pp. 179-80). after the maximum limit of the court of québec’s civil jurisdiction was increased in 2016, the number of cases heard by the superior court fell slightly (ar (agq), vol. iv, at p 131). the fact remains that a large number of civil cases come before the superior court, which suggests that its power to state and develop private law has been preserved. [253] second, the impact of art. 35 ccp on the proportion of civil cases heard in the superior court must be considered. the number of cases opened at the superior court in comparison with those opened at the court of québec remains relatively stable more specifically, this has been so since 2005-6 (a.r (agq), vol. iv, at p 223) in fact, the proportion of civil cases opened at the court of québec has decreased since the 1980s — approximately 68 percent in 1980-81 and 1985-86, and 60 percent in 2005-6, 2010-11 and 2016-17 — despite the fact that the monetary ceiling of the court of québec’s jurisdiction was less than $10,000 in the early 1980s (p 223). moreover, the proportion of cases heard by the quebec superior court today is much higher than the proportion of cases heard by the superior courts of upper canada, new brunswick and nova scotia at the time of confederation, which was less than 20 percent (fyson report, at pp. 183, 192 and 198). this evidence shows that neither art. 35 ccp nor the other statutory provisions that increased the monetary ceiling of the jurisdiction of the court of québec (or its predecessors) removed the power to state and develop private law from the superior court. [254] finally, with regard to the impact of art. 35 ccp on the nature of the cases heard by the superior court, it can be said without a doubt that that court continues to hear claims on a variety of subjects as well as the judicial applications that are the most substantial in monetary terms. first of all, the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction to state and develop the law with respect to class actions, injunctions, and wills and successions, as well as family law and insolvency law. in addition, where there is shared jurisdiction in a field of law, the superior court continues to have jurisdiction over civil claims in which the amount in issue is substantial. although art. 35 ccp sets the court of québec’s monetary ceiling at less than $85,000, the vast majority of the cases opened at that court involve claims not exceeding $40,000 (ar. (agq), vol. v, at p 40) moreover, in 2016-17, only 3.3 percent of the civil cases opened at the court of québec (other than in the small claims division) involved an amount between $70,001 and $85,000 (p 40). on the other hand, in all civil claims before the superior court relating to areas of shared jurisdiction where an amount is in issue, that amount is $85,000 or more. despite art. 35, the superior court retains its power to decide civil cases on a wide range of subjects, includes cases in which the monetary claims are substantial. [255] in short, art. 35 ccp does not have the effect of removing from the quebec superior court its jurisdiction over substantial civil claims. its core jurisdiction in this regard remains intact it should be noted that both the attorney general of quebec and the attorney general of canada, relying on the above factual evidence, also come to the same conclusion. [256] this conclusion, and the holistic three-factor approach on which it is based, aligns readily with that of my colleagues as regards the application of the analytical framework from re residential tenancies act, 1979 at the time of confederation, upper canada, new brunswick and nova scotia gave the “inferior” courts a leading role in implementing various civil matters, whereas in lower canada, the superior courts played that role instead the fact remains that in the first three provinces mentioned, the superior courts — as courts of original general jurisdiction — were able to state and develop the common law even though the inferior courts heard at least 80 percent of civil cases (fyson report, at pp. 183, 192 and 198). the same conclusion applies equally today with respect to the superior court’s role in quebec civil law, despite the fact that the court of québec now plays a major role in this area. this is one of the things that the application of the analytical framework established in re residential tenancies act, 1979 demonstrates retrospectively since confederation, ontario, nova scotia, new brunswick and quebec have made different choices in the administration of justice in their province with regard to the role of “provincial” courts. history thus shows that the role of these courts cannot be considered immutable and that, in accordance with the constitutional limits established by s 96, the provinces could in the past — just as they still can today — make different choices in this regard without any detrimental effect on the central and unifying role played by the superior courts in our judicial system. vi conclusion [257] for the reasons given above, i would answer the first question referred to the court of appeal in the affirmative and i would allow the appeals of the conférence des juges de la cour du québec, the attorney general of quebec, the conseil de la magistrature du québec and the canadian association of provincial court judges. [258] as for the second question referred to the court of appeal, i defer to the majority’s analysis and i would dismiss the appeal of the chief justice, senior associate chief justice and associate chief justice of the superior court of quebec. the following are the reasons delivered by abella j — [259] this is a dispute brought by the chief justice, senior associate chief justice and associate chief justice of the superior court of quebec over the constitutional impact of a $15,000 increase in the jurisdiction of provincial court judges. it is before this court in the third decade of the 21st century and over 150 years since confederation, yet some of the old hierarchal attitudes towards “inferior” courts linger despite progressive copernican revolutions in almost every aspect of canada’s approach to law since our country was founded. [260] the atavistic suggestion that this $15,000 increase adversely affects the very constitutional foundation of superior courts in quebec, let alone the rule of law and national unity, is neither constitutionally mandated, historically accurate, nor desirable, and ignores what this court has said about the importance, independence and impartiality of provincial court judges. it would also come as a surprise to the millions of people who have appeared before provincial court judges over the years in criminal, family and civil cases whose outcomes, to those people, have no less serious consequences than what occurs in superior courts. background [261] in 2016, the legislature of quebec increased the exclusive civil jurisdiction of the provincially appointed court of québec from $70,000 to $85,000 this jurisdiction has been subject to a number of increases since the mid-1960s, set out in the following table: year 1965 1969 monetary jurisdiction $1,000 $3,000 1979 1982 1984 1995 2002 2014 $6,000 $10,000 $15,000 $30,000 $70,000 $85,000 [262] the most recent increase, however, was seen by the superior court of quebec as a trespass on its jurisdiction, thereby violating s 96 of the constitution act, 1867. as a result, the chief justice, senior associate chief justice and associate chief justice of the superior court of quebec instituted proceedings seeking a declaration that the increase was unconstitutional. [263] the increase is set out in art. 35 para. 1 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“ccp”): 35. the court of québec has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine applications in which the value of the subject matter of the dispute or the amount claimed, including in lease resiliation matters, is less than $85,000, exclusive of interest; it also hears and determines applications ancillary to such an application, including those for the specific performance of a contractual obligation. however, it does not have such jurisdiction in cases where jurisdiction is formally and exclusively assigned to another court or adjudicative body, or in family matters other than adoption. [264] the government of quebec referred the question to the court of appeal of quebec. there were two reference questions. the first is the only one at issue before us, namely: [translation] are the provisions of the first paragraph of article 35 of the code of civil procedure (chapter c-25.01), setting at less than $85,000 the limit to the exclusive monetary jurisdiction of the court of québec, valid with regard to section 96 of the constitution act, 1867, given the jurisdiction of quebec over the administration of justice under paragraph 14 of section 92 of the constitution act, 1867? (décret 880-2017, (2017) 149 go. ii, 4495) [265] the court of appeal held that the constitutionally guaranteed role of superior courts would be undermined by the $15,000 increase since it encroached on and eroded the traditional jurisdiction of superior courts over “substantial civil disputes” (2019 qcca 1492). in its view, the previous exclusive monetary jurisdiction of $70,000 was constitutional, but raising it from $70,000 to $85,000 impermissibly altered the jurisdiction of the superior court. analysis [266] the relevant constitutional provisions are ss. 92(14), which sets out the provincial government’s authority to create courts, and 96 of the constitution act, 1867 which constrains it: 92 in each province the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to matters coming within the classes of subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, . 14. the administration of justice in the province, including the constitution, maintenance, and organization of provincial courts, both of civil and of criminal jurisdiction, and including procedure in civil matters in those courts. 96 the governor general shall appoint the judges of the superior, district, and county courts in each province, except those of the courts of probate in nova scotia and new brunswick. [267] although the text of s 96 suggests the existence of only a simple appointment power, this court has recognized that implicit in this provision are protections for the historical jurisdiction of the superior court, the role of its judges and the protection of the superior courts’ independence this has led this court in its jurisprudence to attempt to balance the provinces’ authority under s 92(14) to create provincial courts and to appoint their judges, with s 96’s guarantee that some jurisdiction must remain in the hands of federally appointed superior courts. [268] in the reference re adoption act, [1938] scr 398 (“adoption reference”), this court was asked to determine the validity of provincial laws empowering provincial courts to rule on a number of family law issues. chief justice duff, for a unanimous court, upheld the grant of jurisdiction. he noted that s 92(14) provides for the existence of provincial courts as well as for the provinces’ control over their administration for him, the constitution had to be understood in a way that provides leeway for provincial governments to expand the jurisdiction of their provincial courts. [269] this expansive provincial power was to be limited only by the principle that the jurisdiction granted must “broadly conform to a type of jurisdiction generally exercisable by courts of summary jurisdiction rather than the jurisdiction exercised by courts within the purview of s 96” (p 421) notably, chief justice duff could not “accept the view that the jurisdiction of inferior [sic] courts” was “fixed forever as it stood at the date of confederation” (p 418). [270] and in re cour de magistrat de québec, [1965] scr 772, the court decided that an increase from $200 to $500 in the provincial court’s monetary jurisdiction did not impermissibly turn it into a s 96 court. any tension between the powers set out in ss. 92(14) and 96 was to be resolved not by enshrining provincial court jurisdiction at pre-confederation levels, but by ensuring that s 92(14) does not undermine s 96. [271] in later years, the court was asked to determine the constitutional parameters of provincial administrative tribunals and assess whether their jurisdiction trespassed on that of s 96 courts. in tomko v. labour relations board (ns), [1977] 1 scr 112, and mississauga (city) v. peel (municipality), [1979] 2 scr 244, this court held that neither a provincial labour board’s power to make cease and desist orders, nor a provincial administrative board’s power to adjudicate certain disputes between municipalities, trespassed on the jurisdiction of superior courts. on the other hand, a transport tribunal’s power to hear appeals from the transport commission was found to be unconstitutional (attorney general of quebec v. farrah, [1978] 2 scr. 638). [272] in an attempt to operationalize the jurisprudence’s approach to resolving the tension between ss. 92(14) and 96, this court developed a three-stage test in re residential tenancies act, 1979, [1981] 1 scr 714 (“residential tenancies”), for analyzing the validity of a provincial grant of jurisdiction. the purpose of the test is to balance the provinces’ authority to develop courts, with the recognition that some areas of jurisdiction, by virtue of s 96, must remain in the jurisdiction of superior courts. it aims to prevent legislatures from creating “shadow courts” which could usurp the jurisdiction of superior courts, undermining s 96 courts’ ability to serve their function within the canadian judicial system. it is essentially an historical inquiry. [273] the first stage of the test asks whether superior, district or county courts at the time of confederation had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter now being given to the provincial “court”. if provincial courts in a majority of the four original provinces had a “practical involvement” in adjudicating cases related to the particular subject matter at confederation, there could be no finding of exclusive jurisdiction for s 96 courts, since the jurisdiction was shared at the time. there was therefore no basis for preventing the province from giving the jurisdiction, even exclusively, to its own courts or tribunals. [274] in sobeys stores ltd. v. yeomans and labour standards tribunal (ns), [1989] 1 scr 238, justice wilson clarified that at the first stage, the “purposes of s 96 require a strict, that is to say a narrow, approach to characterization” (p 254). in her view, because the purpose of the analysis is to find “broad conformity” with a jurisdiction exercised at confederation, the focus should be on the type of case at issue, not on an analysis that would “freeze” the ability of both provincial and superior courts to operate within genuinely appropriate, as opposed to technically mandated, constitutional spheres (p 255). [275] if the jurisdiction at issue was exclusively held by a s 96 court at confederation, the second stage of the analysis asks whether the provincial body is acting in a judicial capacity. if not, the inquiry does not proceed further since it is not within the jurisdiction exercisable by a s 96 court. if it is, the third stage of the analysis is triggered. [276] the assessment at the third stage is of the provincial court or tribunal in its institutional context in order to determine whether it is exercising a judicial power that is merely subsidiary or ancillary to general administrative functions, or one that is necessary to achieve a broad policy goal. in either of these circumstances, the grant is constitutionally permissible. as chief justice laskin wrote for the majority in tomko, in upholding a labour board’s authority, “it is not the detached jurisdiction or power alone that is to be considered but rather its setting in the institutional arrangements in which it appears and is exercisable under the provincial legislation” (p 120). [277] almost 15 years later, a layer was added to the test in macmillan bloedel ltd. v. simpson, [1995] 4 scr 725, when the court concluded that the legislature may not, even if its grant of jurisdiction passed the residential tenancies test, reduce or impair “the core” of superior court jurisdiction. the focus of this new requirement was determining whether a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to a provincial body frustrated the ability of superior courts to execute their functions. [278] the case involved a young person who was charged with contempt of court after violating a superior court’s order the legislative scheme in effect at the time stipulated that a youth court had exclusive jurisdiction to try criminal offences committed by young offenders. the court held that although the jurisdiction granted to the provincial court had been exclusively held by s 96 courts at confederation and was clearly judicial in nature, the third stage of the residential tenancies test was nonetheless met because the youth court served a “clear and laudable” policy goal as mandated by tomko. [279] even though it passed the residential tenancies test, the court held that giving exclusive jurisdiction to the youth court to try a contempt charge based on a breach of a superior court order was a violation of that court’s core jurisdiction because it removed from the core power of s 96 courts the jurisdiction to prosecute contempt. [280] chief justice lamer conceded that core jurisdiction is “difficult to define” (paras. 30 and 33) but it was unnecessary in his view to offer a comprehensive definition because “the power to punish for contempt ex facie is obviously within that jurisdiction” (para. 38). he did, however, offer some guidance by stating that the core powers guaranteed by s 96 were those that formed the “essential character” of superior courts, the removal of which would “emasculat[e] the court, making it something other than a superior court” (para. 30). he added that the core is comprised of “powers which are essential to the administration of justice and the maintenance of the rule of law” (para. 38) the power to prosecute contempt was a core power because in order to function properly, a s 96 court must be able to “ensure its orders are enforced and its process respected” (para. 37). [281] in the 1996 reference re amendments to the residential tenancies act (ns), [1996] 1 scr 186 (“residential tenancies (1996)”), the court upheld a grant of jurisdiction over residential leases to a provincial administrative tribunal, confirming that s 96 is primarily concerned with entrenching the powers that were essential to preserving the judicial role of s 96 judges. while the case was not decided on the basis of core jurisdiction, chief justice lamer in concurring reasons, further explained the concept of the “core”, characterizing it as “very narrow” so that “only critically important jurisdictions which are essential to the existence of a superior court of inherent jurisdiction and to the preservation of its foundational role within our legal system” fall within the constitutionally protected core of s 96 courts (para. 56 (emphasis added)). [282] the purpose of this new core doctrine was to identify which powers could not be removed from superior courts, supplementing the residential tenancies test which delineates the jurisdictions which may be given to provincial courts or tribunals. a grant of jurisdiction to a provincial court or tribunal which respects the residential tenancies test may be exclusive, as long as the exclusivity does not engender a correlative loss of jurisdiction to the superior court’s narrowly defined core jurisdiction (residential tenancies (1996), at paras. 71 and 75) as prof hogg noted, the only “constitutional restrictions on the jurisdiction that can be withdrawn from a superior court” are those which fall within the narrow category of “core” jurisdiction, apart from which “the nature and scope of superior-court jurisdiction are simply issues of policy to be resolved and enacted by . . competent legislative bod[ies]” (peter w hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp. (loose-leaf)), vol. 1, at p 7-43 (emphasis in original)). [283] identifying the core of a s 96 court’s jurisdiction is therefore an exercise in identifying those aspects of the superior court’s power that are essential to its character and to its ability to deal effectively with the cases properly before it. that is why this court said in babcock v. canada (attorney general), [2002] 3 scr 3, at para. 60, that a rule prohibiting courts from compelling documents covered by cabinet confidences did not violate s 96 because the rule “ha[d] not substantially altered the role of the judiciary from their function under the common law regime” (see also ontario v. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, [2013] 3 scr 3, at para. 22; crevier v. attorney general of quebec, [1981] 2 scr 220; noël v. société d’énergie de la baie james, [2001] 2 scr 207, at para. 27). [284] the latest case that addressed the core of s 96 jurisdiction was trial lawyers association of british columbia v british columbia (attorney general), [2014] 3 scr 31, where the court found that constraints on the superior court’s ability to waive hearing fees which were too burdensome for litigants violated s 96 because they left some individuals without any access to a court or tribunal chief justice mclachlin explained the rationale as follows: the historic task of the superior courts is to resolve disputes between individuals and decide questions of private and public law. measures that prevent people from coming to the courts to have those issues resolved are at odds with this basic judicial function. the resolution of these disputes and resulting determination of issues of private and public law, viewed in the institutional context of the canadian justice system, are central to what the superior courts do. indeed, it is their very book of business. to prevent this business being done strikes at the core of the jurisdiction of the superior courts protected by s 96 of the constitution act, 1867. as a result, hearing fees that deny people access to the courts infringe the core jurisdiction of the superior courts. [para. 32] the applicants who could not access the superior court had no alternative, competent public forum in which to resolve their disputes, leading chief justice mclachlin to conclude that the superior court must preserve its inherent jurisdiction to hear claims that would otherwise go unresolved. [285] as all of this jurisprudence shows, the first step of the analysis is to characterize the grant of jurisdiction to the provincial court. [286] this court’s jurisprudence confirms that the boundaries of provincial court jurisdiction need not be drawn along the precise borders that existed at confederation; rather, the inquiry centers on the type of case being heard. it is a functional approach which examines the purpose of the grant of jurisdiction. [287] the operative question in the appeal before us is whether, at confederation, superior courts in the four original provinces had exclusive jurisdiction over the type of monetary claims which were granted to the court of québec in art. 35. if they did not, the first stage of the residential tenancies test is met, which essentially means that it passes the residential tenancies test, period. in my view, the evidence is clear that the superior courts did not have exclusive jurisdiction at confederation over what the court of appeal identified as “substantial claims”. it is true that they had jurisdiction beyond a certain monetary threshold, but that does not mean that theirs was a more substantial jurisdiction. [288] currently, the jurisdiction granted to the provincial court by art. 35 is the power to adjudicate civil claims worth up to $85,000. the monetary cap is indicative of an inflection point, chosen by the legislature, to balance the jurisdiction of the provincial and the superior court. for the purpose of the residential tenancies test, the question is whether this point reflects the historical balance between provincial and superior courts as justice mclachlin wrote in residential tenancies (1996), at para. 75, “if the inferior [sic] courts before confederation alone exercised the power, or shared it in a practical way with the future superior courts, s 96 is not engaged and no further enquiry is required” (emphasis added). [289] in determining the historical involvement of provincial courts in deciding civil claims, it is instructive to look at the proportion of cases that were heard by different courts at confederation (residential tenancies (1996), at para. 77; sobeys stores, at p 260). at the time, in most provinces, a majority of civil claims were heard by provincial courts. each of the original provinces had slightly different systems of civil justice. [290] the provincial courts with the most civil jurisdiction at confederation were the division courts, which had broad civil jurisdiction subject to a monetary limit. the division courts in upper canada had a $40 limit on their jurisdiction in tort and a $100 limit on their jurisdiction for debt, or breach of contract (donald fyson, civil justice in mid-nineteenth-century british north america: court structure, judges and recourse to the courts in lower canada, upper canada, new brunswick and nova scotia, april 10, 2018, at p 28) in new brunswick, the justices of the peace had jurisdiction over tort claims worth $8 and debt claims worth $20 but the city court of saint john could hear cases from within the city which were worth up to $80 (pp. 36 and 39). in nova scotia, justices of the peace could hear cases of debt worth up to $80 and the city court of halifax could hear cases worth up to $80 (pp. 43 and 46). [291] in upper canada the division courts heard 83 percent of cases, in new brunswick the justices of the peace and city court together heard 81 percent of cases, and in nova scotia the justices of the peace and city court also heard 81 percent of cases (pp. 85, 94 and 100). in lower canada, in 1866, the more local rural circuit courts themselves s 96 courts, heard approximately 55 percent of cases, whereas the superior court heard approximately 5 percent of cases and the remaining 40 percent of cases were heard by various provincial courts (p 72). [292] comparing the proportion of cases heard then with today’s distribution shows that a grant of $85,000 of civil jurisdiction, like the grant of $70,000 in 2002, not only continues to respect the balance struck at the time of confederation, but leaves superior courts with more civil jurisdiction than they had at that time. in three of the four original provinces, superior courts heard less than 20 percent of civil claims. today, the superior court of quebec hears about 28 percent of civil claims (ministère de la justice, nombre de dossiers ouverts à la cour supérieure et à la cour du québec (2012-13 à 2017-18)) this represents a proportionally greater involvement for the superior court today than that of s 96 courts across the colonies in the 1860s. [293] clearly, the superior courts at confederation did not have exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims in general any exclusive jurisdiction was limited to a small proportion of civil claims above a certain monetary threshold. this threshold was not, however, a marker which indicated when claims became substantial, it simply aimed to maintain a balance between the different types of courts in operation at the time. while the superior courts had jurisdiction over amounts above $100, as justice wilson noted in sobeys stores this did not mean that the provincial courts did not also have jurisdiction over “substantial” claims: an examination of the court system in pre-confederation upper canada reveals . . . that inferior courts had sufficient shared involvement in the area of unjust dismissal. the division courts, of which there could be as many as twelve per district, were the forerunners of today’s small claims courts, and their civil jurisdiction was defined in an act respecting the division courts, csuc 1859, c 19, s 55: 55. the judge of every division court may hold plea of, and may hear and determine in a summary way, for or against persons, bodies corporate or otherwise: . 2. all claims and demands of debt, account or breach of contract, or covenant, or money demand, whether payable in money or otherwise, where the amount or balance claimed does not exceed one hundred dollars, and except in cases in which a jury is legally demanded by a party as hereinafter provided, he shall be sole judge in all actions brought in such division courts, and shall determine all questions of law and fact in relation thereto, and he may make such orders, judgments or decrees thereupon as appear to him just and agreeable to equity and good conscience, and every such order, judgment and decree, shall be final and conclusive between the parties. given inflation, a contract jurisdiction of up to $100 in 1867 must be considered the equivalent of quite a substantial monetary jurisdiction today. since the division court system also covered the entire colony, i would conclude that at confederation jurisdiction in the area of unjust dismissal was shared by superior and inferior courts to an extent sufficient to pass the historical test. [emphasis added; pp. 269-70.] [294] since, as this passage from sobeys stores confirms, both courts shared jurisdiction over “substantial” monetary claims, the superior courts did not have exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims at confederation, nor were they ever the only court entrusted with deciding substantial cases this means that art. 35 ccp is a prima facie valid grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the provincial court under the residential tenancies test. [295] the court of appeal, however, reframed the reference question as follows: “by limiting the jurisdiction of the superior court of quebec to adjudicate disputes in civil matters to cases in which the value in dispute is $85,000 and more, is the legislature infringing on the core jurisdiction of the superior court of quebec to adjudicate private law disputes?” as a result, it did not apply the residential tenancies test at all, relying exclusively on finding a violation of the superior court’s core jurisdiction. it acknowledged justice wilson’s quote in sobeys stores that provincial courts enjoyed “quite a substantial monetary jurisdiction” at confederation but nonetheless drew the inference that since superior courts had exclusive jurisdiction over claims worth more than $100, they had jurisdiction over “substantial civil disputes”. [296] its argument for creating a new core of “substantial civil disputes” amounts to this: since the provincial court had jurisdiction over what were deemed to be “quite substantial” claims of $100, and since the superior courts had jurisdiction over claims of more than $100, the superior court’s jurisdiction was over “more substantial” claims and therefore the superior courts had jurisdiction over all substantial claims. [297] how do we calculate the difference between what justice wilson called “quite substantial” civil claims heard by the provincial court, and the “substantial” civil claims arrogated to the superior courts by the court of appeal, let alone for the purpose of constitutional analysis? the artificiality of the exercise is reinforced by the court of appeal’s conclusion that claims worth up to $70,000 were not substantial but that anything more is. how much money does it take to qualify for “substantial” status? after all, one litigant’s substantial amount may be another litigant’s spare change, as george bernard shaw wryly demonstrated through the following exchange in pygmalion between professor henry higgins and his friend colonel pickering, where higgins explains to pickering why he is prepared to accept liza doolittle’s few coins instead of his normal rates for language instruction: higgins . . . you know, pickering, if you consider a shilling, not as a simple shilling, but as a percentage of this girl’s income, it works out as fully equivalent to sixty or seventy guineas from a millionaire. pickering how so? higgins figure it out. a millionaire has about 150 pounds a day. she earns about half-a-crown. she offers me two-fifths of her day’s income for a lesson two-fifths of a millionaire’s income for a day would be somewhere about 60 pounds it’s handsome. by george, it’s enormous! [i]t’s the biggest offer i ever had. liza [rising, terrified] sixty pounds! what are you talking about? i never offered you sixty pounds. where would i get — (1913 (reprinted 2008), at pp. 43-44) [298] the court of appeal asserted that superior courts have an untouchable core over civil matters and that this core guarantees litigants the right to have their matters adjudicated by a s 96 court. it concluded that the power of superior courts to hear civil cases was part of the integral functions of superior courts and that to remove this power would emasculate the courts or fundamentally alter their nature in support of this proposition, it relies on a single statement from b.c trial lawyers, at para. 32, indicating that the core jurisdiction of superior courts involves the power to “resolve disputes between individuals and decide questions of private . . . law”. [299] in my respectful view, b.c trial lawyers did not broaden the core monetary jurisdiction of superior courts. the case stands for the proposition that when hearing fees leave litigants without the opportunity to access a public, independent and impartial tribunal, superior court judges must have discretion to waive those fees. it does not stand for the principle that litigants have an unfettered constitutional right to bring all civil disputes to a superior court. [300] my colleagues justices côté and martin conclude that absent protections for a core jurisdiction over civil claims, the superior courts will no longer be able to provide “jurisprudential guidance on private law” (at para. 86), jeopardizing the “rule of law” in this country. while it is clear that this court has recognized a link between core jurisdiction and the rule of law, my colleagues have, with respect, vastly overstated the reach of that concept. in the s 96 context, “the rule of law” means that superior courts must have the autonomy to enforce their own judgments, that courts must be impartial and independent and that superior courts must maintain residual jurisdiction over cases which otherwise have not been assigned to a competent forum (macmillan bloedel; reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3 (“pei. reference”); bc. trial lawyers). the rule of law does not mean that if some questions of private law are determined in one independent and impartial forum rather than another, canada’s “actual order of positive laws” will be impermissibly altered (côté and martin jj.’s reasons, at para. 85). [301] there is no doubt that legislation cannot have the effect of taking away the authority superior courts need in order to make sure that they can effectively adjudicate the claims which are properly before them and to enforce their orders in those cases, but “core” jurisdiction has been held to be a narrow concept, not a malleable one. it is intended to protect only the essential role and function of superior courts. as long as the “essential character” of superior courts is neither undermined nor impaired, provincial legislatures are constitutionally entitled to exercise their jurisdiction under s 92(14) by creating and authorizing provincial courts, even exclusively, to respond to local justice needs, not as those needs existed at confederation, but as they exist now. [302] there is no evidence that reducing the civil jurisdiction of the superior court of quebec by $15,000 has impaired the ability of the superior court to perform any of its recognized core functions. in fact, art. 35 ccp does not alter any of the characteristics or attributes of the superior court of quebec, let alone materially. the notion that our superior courts have inherited some core power over the development of private law from the pre-confederation english courts of inherent jurisdiction is irreconcilable with the fact that superior courts, since confederation, have shared that role with a number of provincial courts. in other words, superior courts have never had the exclusive responsibility of guiding the development of private law this role, therefore, cannot be part of superior courts’ core jurisdiction the “core” test from macmillan bloedel, no matter how it is applied, results in the conclusion that reducing the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior court by $15,000 does not impair the core of that court in any way. [303] although the classic application of the residential tenancies/macmillan bloedel test is dispositive of the appeal, this case reveals some of the fault lines of that approach. it may be time to consider replacing the test in a way that updates the law on the relationship between ss. 92(14) and 96 and synchronizes it with this court’s approach to constitutional interpretation generally and, in particular, with chief justice lamer’s observations in residential tenancies (1996) where he invoked lord sankey’s famous admonition in the 1929 “persons” case (edwards v attorney-general for canada, [1930] ac 124 (pc)) that the constitution is a “living tree” to be interpreted flexibly: notwithstanding the importance of s 96 in its institutional context (ie. the protection of the independence and the “core” jurisdiction of superior courts), we have recognized that a constitution is a “living tree” which must be capable of accommodating new areas and new interests. consequently, a flexible approach has been adopted in determining when judicial power may be transferred to inferior courts and tribunals. consistent with this flexible approach, this court, on occasion, has expressed sympathy for the proposition that s 96 should not be interpreted so as to thwart or unduly restrict the future growth of provincial administrative tribunals. we have acknowledged that “[a]daptations must be permitted to allow the legislatures scope to deal effectively with emerging social problems and concerns, and to develop new techniques of dispute resolution and the expeditious disposition of relatively minor disputes” for the benefit of its citizenry after all, the constitution is a document for the people and one of the most important goals of any system of dispute resolution is to serve well those who make use of it. for most civil matters, individual litigants are largely concerned with obtaining access to inexpensive and expedient adjudication. the challenge for this court is to balance these institutional and individual concerns while ensuring that s 96 continues to play an important and meaningful role in canadian society [emphasis added; citations omitted; text in brackets in original; paras. 27-29.] [304] that living tree has been well watered by this court, not only to protect both provincial and federal spheres of jurisdiction, but also to give them flexibility when doing so does not materially impair the other’s ability to exercise its constitutional mandate this has come to be known as flexible or cooperative federalism and has been used by this court as an aid in interpreting the constitution and resolving tensions between federal and provincial heads of power (reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at para. 32; r v. comeau, [2018] 1 scr. 342, at para. 77). [305] in kitkatla band v. british columbia (minister of small business, tourism and culture), [2002] 2 scr 146, for example, this court held that a provincial act aimed at protecting heritage objects could apply to the artifacts of indigenous people, even though the act had a disproportionate effect on the people regulated by federal jurisdiction over aboriginal affairs under s 91(24). cooperative federalism is also why this court’s jurisprudence on the division of powers recognizes that the provincial and federal powers are not watertight compartments, and that both levels of government can legislate over the same subject matter so long as there is no operational conflict (multiple access ltd. v. mccutcheon, [1982] 2 scr 161). provincial laws will not be invalid simply because they affect an area that could have been federally regulated, there must be some form of impairment or frustration of purpose (hogg, at pp. 15-28 to 15-29 and 16-4 to 16-10.6) it is an approach that recognizes that “[i]t is . fundamental . . . that both federal and provincial powers must be respected, and one power may not be used in a manner that effectively eviscerates another” (reference re securities act, [2011] 3 scr 837, at para. 7) and in canadian western bank v. alberta, [2007] 2 scr 3, this court stated that a “legitimate interplay between federal and provincial powers” should be favoured to doctrines which strictly limit provincial authority (paras. 36-37). [306] this approach to federalism not only accepts that overlap between federal and provincial powers is “inevita[ble]”, but that it is useful because it allows governments to respond to a complex interplay of issues (nil/tu,o child and family services society v. bc. government and service employees’ union, [2010] 2 scr. 696, at paras. 42-43). it also explains this court’s permissive approach to paramountcy, a doctrine which invalidates provincial laws which interfere with federal laws (chatterjee v. ontario (attorney general), [2009] 1 scr 624, at para. 53). in orphan well association v. grant thornton ltd., [2019] 1 scr 150, this court said: “conflict must be defined narrowly so that each level of government may act as freely as possible within its respective sphere of constitutional authority” (para. 66) similarly, in saskatchewan (attorney general) v. lemare lake logging ltd., [2015] 3 scr 419, the court explained that a “restrained approach” to paramountcy was in order and that a harmonious approach favouring compatibility should be taken (para. 21). [307] most recently, in comeau, the court decided that provincially enacted prohibitions on owning liquor purchased from an entity other than the provincial commission did not violate s 121 of the constitution which protects the free transfer of goods throughout the country. the court explained that s 121 prohibits the imposition of charges on goods crossing provincial boundaries — tariffs and tariff-like measures at the same time, the historical evidence nowhere suggests that provinces, for example, would lose their power to legislate under s 92 of the constitution act, 1867 for the benefit of their constituents even if that might have impacts on interprovincial trade. [emphasis added; para. 67.] it called for “provisions like s 121” being “interpreted in a way that does not deprive parliament and provincial legislatures of the powers granted to them to deal effectively with problems that arise” (para. 72) moreover, it explained: “an expansive interpretation of federal powers is typically met with calls for recognition of broader provincial powers, and vice versa; the two are in a symbiotic relationship” (para. 79). [308] there is no reason why such an approach should not be extended to our understanding of the relationship between s 92(14), which allows provinces to create courts of civil or criminal jurisdiction, and s 96. [309] as prof. hogg noted, this court’s approach to s 96 has been “regrettable” and an “impediment to much new regulatory or social policy” (p 7-38.1) he also criticized the parochialism of the residential tenancies test: test] is not satisfactory . . . [the residential tenancies as constitutional-law doctrine. each of the three steps is vague and disputable in many situations, and small differences between the provinces in their history or institutional arrangements can spell the difference between the validity administrative tribunals . . . . the courts are unlikely to abandon doctrine which has been built up over a long time; nor are they likely to abandon their concern (which i regard as extravagant) to prevent the erosion of superior-court jurisdiction. [pp. 7-49 to 7-50] apparently invalidity similar and of [310] other scholars have argued that the test itself is unduly technical and history-based, making it antithetical to this court’s practice of applying purposive constitutional interpretation. in their view, too rigorous an application of the test may lead to institutions being frozen in time in a way that makes them [translation] “outdated and inefficient” (gaétan migneault, “l’administration de la justice et la structure judiciaire canadienne” (2006), 37 rdus 41, at p 43; see also j. gareth morley, “dead hands, living trees, historic compromises: the senate reform and supreme court act references bring the originalism debate to canada” (2016), 53 osgoode hall lj 745). [311] the principles of regional diversity and subsidiarity add philosophical oxygen to the need for the generous approach to the authority of provincial governments to make jurisdictional grants to provincial adjudicative bodies called for by chief justice duff in the adoption reference, justice wilson in sobeys stores and chief justice lamer in residential tenancies (1996) in 114957 canada ltée (spraytech, société d’arrosage) v hudson (town), [2001] 2 scr 241, at para. 3, justice l’heureux-dubé explained that subsidiarity is based on the principle that decisions “are often best [made] at a level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected” (see also canadian western bank, at para. 45). justices lebel and deschamps in reference re assisted human reproduction act, [2010] 3 scr 457, at para. 183, confirmed the significance of the approach when they said that the notion of subsidiarity recognizes that the level of government “closest to the citizen” is in “the best position to respond to the citizen’s concerns”. ensuring the ability of local governments to more freely address local concerns in turn “facilitates democratic participation by distributing power to the government thought to be most suited to achieving the particular societal objective” (para. 183, quoting reference re secession of quebec, at para. 58). [312] provincial governments are closer to the issues affecting most people who use the courts and to the realities of local issues. they are therefore better placed to recognize and address local concerns with the justice system. provincial legislatures must be able to facilitate access to justice by empowering courts and tribunals which are responsive to those needs of the justice system. [313] this court’s judgment in the first residential tenancies reference was not particularly concerned with the benefits of flexible federalism. rather, it was animated by a number of protective aspirations for s 96 courts the first was the desire to promote national unity through the preservation of a unitary court system. as this court explained in residential tenancies: . . . the intended effect of s 96, would be destroyed if a province could pass legislation creating a tribunal, appoint members thereto, and then confer on the tribunal the jurisdiction of the superior courts. what was conceived as a strong constitutional base for national unity, through a unitary judicial system, would be gravely undermined. [emphasis added; p 728.] [314] the second was ensuring that disputes are adjudicated by impartial and independent courts. the close relationship between the preservation of s 96 jurisdiction and the need for an independent judiciary was explained in mcevoy v. attorney general for new brunswick, [1983] 1 scr 704, at p 720, where the court said: the traditional independence of english superior court judges has been raised to the level of a fundamental principle of our federal system by the constitution act, 1867 and cannot have less importance and force in the administration of criminal law than in the case of civil matters. under the canadian constitution the superior courts are independent of both levels of government the provinces constitute, maintain and organize the superior courts; the federal authority appoints the judges. the judicature sections of the constitution act, 1867 guarantee the independence of the superior courts; they apply to parliament as well as to the provincial legislatures. [emphasis added.] [315] the link between judicial independence and the imposition of constraints on provincial court jurisdiction was explained by justice wilson in sobeys stores when she observed that much of the s 96 jurisprudence “establishes the proposition that, while the jurisdiction of the inferior [sic] courts will not be frozen as of the date of confederation, neither will it be substantially expanded so as to undermine the independence of the judiciary which s 96 protects” (p 253 (emphasis added)). [316] in this way, the court’s approach to s 96 was said to reinforce prof. w. r. lederman’s theory that certain cases must be heard by superior courts because they must be decided by independent courts (“the independence of the judiciary” (1956), 34 can. bar rev. 769 and 1139). the rationale for narrowly circumscribing the provincial power over courts and tribunals was not that there is some inherent value in the judiciary being appointed by the federal government, it was in ensuring that the independence of the country’s judiciary was not eroded through the creation of “shadow courts”. chief justice lamer reiterated this point in residential tenancies (1996) when he explained that the s 96 jurisprudence is concerned with protecting the “independence and the ‘core’ jurisdiction of superior courts” (para. 27). [317] but the assumption that the constitution protected the independence only of superior courts disintegrated in the 1997 pei. reference dealing with the constitutionality of different provincial schemes for remunerating provincial court judges. the specific issue was determining whether the constitution ensured the independence and impartiality of provincially appointed judges and whether legislative modifications to those judges’ pay structure undermined that independence. [318] chief justice lamer concluded that the time had come to recognize that the constitution’s preamble recognized that all courts, including provincial courts, enjoyed constitutionally protected independence. in his view, the maintenance of strong judicial institutions was so fundamental to the maintenance of our constitutional order that the provincial power to create courts under s 92(14) “implie[s]” those protections (para. 108). in turn, the constitutionalization of the independence of provincial courts helps maintain “the rule of law”. of particular significance in the appeal before us, chief justice lamer concluded that the purpose of s 96 could now shift away from the protection of national unity and toward “the maintenance of the rule of law through the protection of the judicial role” (para. 88) but the rule of law that requires that competent and independent adjudicators decide questions of law “should be indifferent as to which independent court or tribunal is entitled to ensure that enforcement” (peter w. hogg and cara f zwibel, “the rule of law in the supreme court of canada” (2005), 55 utlj 715, at p 731). [319] by guaranteeing the same constitutional protection for judicial independence to both superior and provincial courts, and their joint designation as defenders of the rule of law, the pei. reference represented a fundamental change in the constitutional attributes of the canadian judiciary, a change which, in my respectful view, made the utility and legitimacy of a strict approach to s 96, especially through the residential tenancies test, wobblier. [320] since the original purpose of the residential tenancies test was ensuring that provinces did not establish courts or administrative tribunals with adjudicative jurisdiction over matters which would remove the jurisdiction of an independent court to adjudicate justiciable disputes, the concern was no longer relevant after the pei. reference (see patrick healy, “constitutional limitations upon the allocation of trial jurisdiction to the superior or provincial court in criminal matters” (2003), 48 crim. l.q 31, at p 35) as prof healy observed, this court’s approach to the legislative allocation of jurisdiction “over-states the significance of the superior court and understates the significance of the provincial court” (p 67). [321] given the constitutionally enshrined independence of the provincial courts, they are as well placed to uphold the rule of law independently as the superior courts. appeals to the rule of law and independence, therefore, can no longer serve to narrow the jurisdiction of provincial courts. [322] as the pei. reference suggests, this newly articulated acknowledgment of the independence of provincial courts makes them a partner in protecting national unity. the principle of national unity was detailed by justice mclachlin in her dissent in macmillan bloedel: the result is a network of related canadian courts ensuring judicial independence, interprovincial uniformity, and minimum standards of decision making throughout the country. this in turn provides “a strong constitutional base for national unity”. [citation omitted; para. 51.] [323] this confirms that there is not some inherent quality in superior court judges which makes them uniquely capable of ensuring minimum standards of justice. the constitutionalization of the independence and impartiality of provincial courts dispels this notion increased constitutional recognition of the important role of provincially appointed judges within the canadian judiciary does nothing to diminish the independence and impartiality of our courts on the contrary, it enhances the judiciary as a whole and the public’s perception that the provincial court judges they appear before to have their liberty or livelihood or support and custody rights determined are no less judicial because they are appointed by a different level of government. to paraphrase gertrude stein, to them a judge is a judge is a judge. [324] as prof. hogg explained, the unitary nature of our court system stems from the fact that provincially and federally administered courts apply both federal and provincial law and are slotted into a judicial hierarchy which ultimately culminates at the supreme court of canada: the administration of justice in canada has important unitary as well as federal characteristics. of course, as one would expect in a federal country, there is a separate hierarchy of provincial courts in each province. but these courts, whether they were in existence at the time of confederation or were established later under s 92(14), are not confined to deciding cases arising under provincial laws the provincial power over the administration of justice in the province enables a province to invest its courts with jurisdiction over the full range of cases, whether the applicable law is federal or provincial or constitutional. then, there is an appeal from the provincial court of appeal, which stands at the top of each provincial hierarchy, to the supreme court of canada. although the supreme court of canada is established by federal legislation, it is more of a national than a federal court, because it is a “general court of appeal for canada”, with power to hear appeals from the provincial courts (as well as from the federal courts, which are described later) in all kinds of cases, whether the applicable law is federal or provincial or constitutional. the position of the supreme court of canada, with its plenary jurisdiction, at the top of each provincial hierarchy, has the effect of melding the ten provincial hierarchies into a single national system. [emphasis added; p 7-3.] [325] relatedly, justice la forest offered the following comments on our unitary court system in ontario (attorney general) v pembina exploration canada ltd., [1989] 1 scr 206, a case about whether a provincial small claims court had jurisdiction over claims arising from federal matters: in assessing the constitutional issues, it is well to remember that the court system in canada is, in general, a unitary one under which provincially constituted inferior and superior courts of original and appellate jurisdiction apply federal as well as provincial laws under a hierarchical arrangement culminating in the supreme court of canada established by parliament under s 101 of the constitution act, 1867. i have already referred to my view that a province may, in the exercise of its powers under s 92(14), confer general jurisdiction on its courts, and that i saw no reason why this power did not extend to courts of inferior jurisdiction. indeed, it seems to me that the essentially unitary structure of the canadian judicial system invites this conclusion. from confederation to this day, the courts in the provinces, barring inconsistent federal laws, have decided every type of dispute imaginable. as hogg, has put it: “it did not matter whether a dispute raised a question of constitutional law, federal law, provincial law, or a mixture of the three, the provincial courts still had jurisdiction.” they may not, in strictness, be national courts, but they are the ordinary courts of the land to which the citizen customarily turns when he has need to resort to the administration of justice [citation omitted; pp. 215 and 225.] [326] moreover, in paul v british columbia (forest appeals commission), [2003] 2 scr 585, justice bastarache held that a provincial administrative tribunal could hear cases dealing with aboriginal law in carrying out its otherwise valid provincial mandate. he offered a few comments on the notion of a unitary court system, explaining that our unitary system of justice “encompasses the ordinary courts, federal courts, statutory provincial courts and administrative tribunals” (para. 22). [327] article 35 ccp does not create a dualist justice system, nor does it threaten to do so. decisions of the court of québec are subject to appeals before the court of appeal and the supreme court of canada. just as judicial review “integrates provincial tribunals into the unitary system of justice”, the possibility of appeals culminating before this court draws the court of québec into our unitary system (paul, at para. 22). in addition, the court of québec regularly deals with matters of federal law through its expansive criminal jurisdiction this adjudication of federal and provincial claims, which exists and has long existed throughout canada, does nothing to fragment our court system and in fact reinforces its integrated character. [328] i accept that the notion of core jurisdiction protects “critically important jurisdictions which are essential to the existence of a superior court of inherent jurisdiction and to the preservation of its foundational role within our legal system”. these are the jurisdictions which are essential to the maintenance of our constitution and which ensure that superior courts are not rendered ineffective. more generally, it must also be recognized that wholesale transfers of jurisdiction which deprive superior courts of a meaningful involvement in the types of cases over which they have traditionally held exclusive jurisdiction will violate s 96. [329] but the fact that an exercise of provincial authority under s 92(14) has an impact on the jurisdiction of superior courts should not, on its own, mean that the grant is unconstitutional as justice mclachlin explained in her dissent in macmillan bloedel, “short of impairing s 96 courts, nothing in the constitution suggests that parliament should not be able to clothe inferior [sic] tribunals with s 96 powers” (para. 54 (emphasis added)) this impairment will occur when provincial courts “usur[p] the functions of superior courts” (residential tenancies (1996), at para. 73). this leads, it seems to me, to an approach not unlike the one this court applies in any case of apparent tension between ss. 91 and 92, namely a focus on whether the impugned legislative action has materially impaired or frustrated another head of power, not on whether it has simply had an incidental effect on it. [330] unlike the multi-factored test proposed by my colleagues, this more flexible approach is in line with chief justice duff’s proscription in the adoption reference against “fixing” provincial court jurisdiction in time as well as chief justice lamer’s recognition in residential tenancies (1996) that s 96 must be interpreted in accordance with the notion that our constitution is a living tree. it also accounts for prof hogg’s argument that it is “unwise” to introduce stringent restrictions on the legislatures’ ability to create provincial courts to address a vague, often “extravagant” concern that provinces will erode the jurisdiction of superior courts (pp. 7-50 and 7-51). [331] the focus should be on ensuring that s 96 is not rendered “meaningless through . . . the provincial competence to constitute, maintain and organize provincial courts” (reference re young offenders act (pei), [1991] 1 scr 252, at p 264 (emphasis added)). as chief justice lamer stated in residential tenancies (1996), the provinces’ power under s 92(14) may be freely exercised so long as “s 96 continues to play an important and meaningful role in canadian society” (para. 29). [332] as such, it seems to me that in essence, the only relevant question in determining whether a grant of jurisdiction to a provincial court violates s 96 is whether the grant materially impairs the “essential character” and functions of superior courts. in other words, what can the superior court no longer do because of the grant of jurisdiction to the provincial court or tribunal, and how does this loss represent a “critically important jurisdiction” that is essential to its existence as a superior court of inherent jurisdiction? [333] in this appeal, despite the $15,000 increase in exclusive provincial court jurisdiction under art. 35 ccp, the jurisdictional loss of this amount by the superior court of quebec has not prevented it in any material way from playing its usual role in deciding the kind of civil cases it has always heard in fact, it now hears a higher proportion of civil cases than superior courts did in three of the four provinces at the time of confederation. on that finding alone, the proposition that the essential character of s 96 courts in quebec has been impaired is untenable. even if, as justice wilson suggests in sobeys stores, the balancing act between ss. 92(14) and 96 aims to preserve “the original bargain [of confederation]”, it cannot be that the “bargain” is breached by an exercise of provincial power which leaves provincial courts with proportionally less civil jurisdiction than they had in 1867 (p 263). [334] no matter the approach taken in analyzing art. 35 ccp, it is a valid exercise of the province’s right under s 92(14) to administer justice and to constitute courts of civil jurisdiction in quebec. i see nothing in the grant of jurisdiction at issue here that trespasses on or materially impairs the jurisdiction of quebec’s superior court judges. there is no evidence that the exercise of this power has materially impaired the ability of superior courts to exercise their constitutional functions or that it has had any meaningful adverse impact on the jurisdiction protected by s 96 consequently, the answer to the reference question is that art. 35 is “valid with regard to section 96 of the constitution act, 1867”. [335] the system of civil justice enacted by the provincial legislature respects the balance between ss. 92(14) and 96 by ensuring that both provincially and federally appointed courts have a meaningful role in providing access to justice. the court of québec today is, as provincial courts have always been, an important court which combines with the superior court to form a strong network of courts for litigants across the province. as chief justice lamer remarked in residential tenancies (1996), it is important to recall that “the constitution is a document for the people and one of the most important goals of any system of dispute resolution is to serve well those who make use of it” (para. 28) a mature constitutional relationship between these two important judicial partners in delivering access to justice goes a long way towards serving well “those who make use of it”, namely, the public. [336] i would allow the appeal. raising the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of québec by $15,000, to an $85,000 limit, is constitutional. appendix constitution act, 1867 exclusive powers of provincial legislatures 92 in each province the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to matters coming within the classes of subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, . 14. the administration of justice in the province, including the constitution, maintenance, and organization of provincial courts, both of civil and of criminal jurisdiction, and including procedure in civil matters in those courts. vii. judicature . 96 the governor general shall appoint the judges of the superior, district, and county courts in each province, except those of the courts of probate in nova scotia and new brunswick. 98 the judges of the courts of quebec shall be selected from the bar of that province. 99 (1) subject to subsection (2) of this section, the judges of the superior courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the governor general on address of the senate and house of commons. 100 the salaries, allowances, and pensions of the judges of the superior, district, and county courts (except the courts of probate in nova scotia and new brunswick), and of the admiralty courts in cases where the judges thereof are for the time being paid by salary, shall be fixed and provided by the parliament of canada. 101 the parliament of canada may, notwithstanding anything in this act, from time to time provide for the constitution, maintenance, and organization of a general court of appeal for canada, and for the establishment of any additional courts for the better administration of the laws of canada. ix. miscellaneous provisions . 129 except as otherwise provided by this act, all laws in force in canada, nova scotia, or new brunswick at the union, and all courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and all legal commissions, powers, and authorities, and all officers, judicial, administrative, and ministerial, existing therein at the union, shall continue in ontario, quebec, nova scotia, and new brunswick respectively, as if the union had not been made; subject nevertheless (except with respect to such as are enacted by or exist under acts of the parliament of great britain or of the parliament of the united kingdom of great britain and ireland,) to be repealed, abolished, or altered by the parliament of canada, or by the legislature of the respective province, according to the authority of the parliament or of that legislature under this act.
i. overview this appeal concerns the scope of the voyeurism offence in s 162(1)(a) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c c-46 section 162(1)(a) provides that it is an offence to surreptitiously observe or make a visual recording of a person who is in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, if the person is in “a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude, to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or to be engaged in explicit sexual activity”. the question in this appeal is whether the “place” referred to in s 162(1)(a) is qualified by an implicit temporal component; specifically, must the person be in a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude at the specific time when the person is surreptitiously observed or recorded? on the facts of this case, the issue is whether a hockey coach, the respondent, randy william downes, committed the offence of voyeurism under s 162(1)(a) by surreptitiously photographing 2 boys aged between 12 and 14 years old in their underwear in hockey arena dressing rooms, even if a person could not reasonably be expected to be nude at the specific time when the photos were taken. there was conflicting evidence at trial on whether boys at this age shower or are nude in dressing rooms. the trial judge relied on this court’s decision in r v. jarvis, 2019 scc 10, [2019] 1 scr 488, on the scope of the voyeurism offence. she effectively interpreted s 162(1)(a) as having no implicit temporal component, and convicted mr. downes of two counts of voyeurism. a majority of the court of appeal for british columbia (per willcock ja,. grauer ja concurring) disagreed with the trial judge’s interpretation, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge had failed to address conflicts in the evidence about whether nudity could reasonably be expected when the photos were taken. in dissent, dickson ja agreed with the trial judge and would have dismissed the appeal. the crown now appeals to this court as of right on the question of law as to whether s 162(1)(a) has an implicit temporal component. in addition, mr. downes submits that if s 162(1)(a) is interpreted as lacking a temporal component, then the provision is unconstitutionally overbroad contrary to s 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. mr. downes did not raise this constitutional issue at trial. he raised it for the first time before the court of appeal, but the court did not address it. in my view, properly interpreted based on its text, context, and purpose, s 162(1)(a) has no implicit temporal component the text of s 162(1)(a) lacks language suggesting that parliament intended the “place” to be evaluated at the specific time when the observation or recording was made. further, as this court observed in jarvis, parliament’s purposes in enacting the voyeurism offence were to protect individuals’ privacy and sexual integrity. those purposes are promoted by interpreting s 162(1)(a) without an implicit temporal component, and would be detracted from by reading in such a component. in effect, s 162(1)(a) designates places such as bedrooms, bathrooms, and dressing rooms as “safe places” where people should be free from intrusions onto their privacy and sexual integrity, whether or not a person in the place could reasonably be expected to be nude or engaged in sexual activity at the specific time the person is surreptitiously observed or recorded finally, i would decline to address the constitutional issue because this is not an appropriate case for this court to exceptionally exercise its discretion to decide such an issue for the first time on appeal. i would therefore allow the appeal and restore the convictions. ii background mr. downes was convicted of 2 counts of voyeurism under s 162(1)(a) of the criminal code for surreptitiously taking 38 photos of 2 adolescent male hockey players, tr and gc, in hockey dressing rooms. mr. downes was the boys’ hockey coach. he also ran a sports photography business from his home. in march 2016, canada border services agency (“cbsa”) officers searched mr. downes’ electronic devices at the border when he returned to canada from the united states after a brief shopping trip and found thousands of photos of children engaged in sporting activities some of the children were in locker rooms. mr. downes explained to the cbsa that the photos were from his sports photography business. although none of the photos involved nudity or child pornography, the cbsa alerted the rcmp because of a concern that mr. downes might have child pornography on his home computer. in april 2016, the rcmp obtained and executed a warrant to search mr. downes’ home and electronic devices. they found the photos of tr and gc. that led to the voyeurism charges. the photos of tr were taken when he was 13 or 14 years old and show him sitting on a bench wearing only his underwear, revealing his crotch area and bare torso, or putting on street clothes after a hockey practice. the photos of gc were taken when he was about 12 years old and show him wearing only his underwear, wearing a shirt and underwear, or fully clothed; in some photos, gc is standing clothed at a sink in the washroom area of a dressing room. mr. downes told the rcmp that he liked young boys but that it was “not a sexual thing” (ar, vol. iii, at p 207). mr. downes took the photos of tr and gc using his iphone. he deleted some photos but emailed others to himself, downloaded them onto a computer, and copied them onto a usb stick. he also cropped some photos to focus on gc. none of tr,. gc, or gc’s mother knew that mr. downes had taken the photos. the trial judge found that mr. downes likely knew that a hockey league rule prohibited the use of cell phones in dressing rooms to prevent photos being taken of children. at trial, both parties led evidence about whether a person could reasonably be expected to be nude in a hockey dressing room. the evidence centred on whether boys would remove their underwear or shower in dressing rooms t.r and gc. testified that they did not shower in dressing rooms, but that some of their teammates did one of mr downes’ former hockey players testified that he would change his underwear in dressing rooms, and although he did not shower, other players occasionally did. another of mr. downes’ former hockey players testified that from ages 11 to 14 or 15 he never got completely naked or showered in dressing rooms and never saw others do so three hockey coaches (two of whom had coached with mr. downes) testified that boys of tr and gc’s ages rarely are naked or shower in dressing rooms; a former manager of one of mr. downes’ hockey teams testified to the same effect. one hockey coach explained that this was because boys of tr and gc’s ages are too self-conscious about their bodies. but it was common ground that children a little older than tr and gc and adults often are naked or shower in dressing rooms. iii decisions below a. supreme court of british columbia, 2019 bcsc 992 (macnaughton j.) the trial judge convicted mr. downes on both voyeurism charges. she held that the crown had proved the four elements of voyeurism under s 162(1)(a) beyond a reasonable doubt: mr. downes took the photos of tr and gc (1) intentionally, (2) surreptitiously, (3) in circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (4) in a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude. the trial judge applied the contextual factors identified by this court in jarvis and found that tr and gc were in circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. she noted that tr and gc were in a private or semi-private place set aside for dressing and undressing; their parents entrusted them to mr. downes, an experienced coach; and they did not expect to be photographed by their coach through the surreptitious use of a cell phone for non-instructional purposes. the trial judge ruled that although tr and gc would expect to be observed by others in the dressing room, they would not expect to be photographed, nor would they expect mr. downes to email photos of them to himself and to keep them long after he stopped having contact with them. at trial, mr. downes did not expressly argue that s 162(1)(a) contains an implicit temporal component. instead, he argued that the crown had to prove that tr. and gc were in a place in which they could reasonably be expected to be nude. he argued that the evidence showed that neither t.r nor g.c had any expectation of being nude in the dressing rooms in which they were photographed. the trial judge rejected that argument. she stated that s 162(1)(a) focuses on the nature of the place in which an observation or recording is made, but does not require that the person who is the subject of the observation or recording was, or ever had been, nude, or that the person could reasonably be expected to be nude. it is sufficient under s 162(1)(a) that a person (not “the person”) could reasonably be expected to be nude, to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or to be engaged in explicit sexual activity in the trial judge’s view, homes, bathrooms, and changing rooms are traditionally private or quasi-private places in which a person can reasonably expect privacy, and in which they can reasonably be expected to be nude or partially nude. the focus in s 162(1)(a) on the place in which an observation or recording is made recognizes that there are private or semi-private spaces in which a person should be protected from being observed or recorded. the trial judge found that individuals of various ages change their underwear or shower in dressing rooms, and thus can reasonably be expected to be nude in them she concluded that this finding was sufficient for the purposes of s 162(1)(a). as a result, the dressing rooms where mr. downes photographed tr and gc were places in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude. b court of appeal for british columbia, 2022 bcca 8, 409 ccc (3d) 464 (willcock and grauer jja,. dickson ja. dissenting) a majority of the court of appeal for british columbia allowed mr. downes’ appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial. the majority concluded that the trial judge had failed to consider whether nudity was reasonably expected “at the time” when the offences allegedly occurred (paras. 40 and 55). the majority stated that s 162(1)(a) was intended to apply to persons who expect to observe or record nudity or sexual activity in its view, s 162(1)(a) does not criminalize an invasion of privacy alone the majority noted that although mr downes’ conduct involved a breach of trust and an invasion of privacy, that did not necessarily make it conduct that s 162(1)(a) criminalized as a sexual offence. the majority ruled that although it was open to the trial judge to find that nudity was reasonably expected in the dressing rooms in which tr and gc were photographed, she had failed to address conflicts in the evidence on whether nudity was expected at the time the photos were taken. the majority therefore ordered a new trial. dickson j.a dissented in her view, s 162(1)(a) contains no implicit temporal component; the provision instead focuses on the “place”. the relevant place under s 162(1)(a) is “a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude, exposing intimate body parts or engaging in sexual activity, regardless of the expected use of that place specifically when the conduct occurred” (para 56 (emphasis in original)). she stated that when a person is in “a manifestly private place such as a bathroom or dressing room they are generally entitled to expect that they will not be surreptitiously observed or recorded there” (para. 92). in her view, parliament intended to criminalize surreptitious observation or recording of persons in such places. dickson ja concluded that mr. downes criminally invaded the personal privacy and sexual integrity of tr and gc by surreptitiously photographing them in their underwear in the dressing rooms, irrespective of whether nudity could be expected at that specific time. his conduct was “seriously exploitative and personally invasive”, and was “appropriately criminalized as a form of sexual offence” (para. 97). iv. issues this appeal raises two issues: (1) does s 162(1)(a) of the criminal code have an implicit temporal component? (2) if s 162(1)(a) does not have an implicit temporal component, is the provision unconstitutionally overbroad contrary to s 7 of the charter? v analysis a does section 162(1)(a) of the criminal code have an implicit temporal component? (1) the voyeurism offence parliament enacted the voyeurism offence, s 162(1) of the criminal code, in 2005. section 162(1) provides: voyeurism 162 (1) every one commits an offence who, surreptitiously, observes — including by mechanical or electronic means — or makes a visual recording of a person who is in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, if (a) the person is in a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude, to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or to be engaged in explicit sexual activity; (b) the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or is engaged in explicit sexual activity, and the observation or recording is done for the purpose of observing or recording a person in such a state or engaged in such an activity; or (c) the observation or recording is done for a sexual purpose. mr. downes was charged with voyeurism under s 162(1)(a). the offence is committed when a person surreptitiously observes or makes a visual recording of another person who is in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, if the observation or recording is done in “a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude, to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or to be engaged in explicit sexual activity”. a “visual recording” under s 162 is defined under subs. (2) as including “a photographic, film or video recording made by any means”. it is not disputed that the photos taken by mr downes are “visual recordings” it is also no longer disputed that mr downes took the photos surreptitiously and in circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. the issue before this court is whether the photos were taken in “a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude” does this element of the offence have a temporal component? must the crown establish that a person could reasonably be expected to be nude in the place at the specific time when the photos were taken? this question of statutory interpretation requires this court to consider the words in s 162(1)(a) “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, quoting e. a. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87; jarvis, at para. 24). section 162(1)(a) must be interpreted “according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the act as a whole” (canada trustco mortgage co. v. canada, 2005 scc 54, [2005] 2 scr 601, at para. 10). in what follows, i will first review this court’s decision in jarvis and the purposes of the voyeurism offence. i will then interpret s 162(1)(a) based on its text, context, and purpose. (2) this court’s decision in jarvis and the purposes of section 162(1) this court considered s 162(1) for the first time in jarvis. in that case, this court ruled that a high school teacher who used a camera concealed inside a pen to surreptitiously record female students at the school by focussing on their faces, upper bodies, and breasts, committed the offence of voyeurism under s 162(1)(c) (“the observation or recording is done for a sexual purpose”). the elements of the offence were established because the students were surreptitiously recorded in circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy and the recordings were made for a sexual purpose. in jarvis, wagner cj for the majority noted that the voyeurism offence was enacted as part of bill c-2, an act to amend the criminal code (protection of children and other vulnerable persons) and the canada evidence act, 1st sess., 38th parl., 2004-2005 (assented to july 20, 2005), the overarching purpose of which was to “protect children and other vulnerable persons from sexual exploitation, violence, abuse and neglect” (para. 51). most sex crimes, including voyeurism, are committed by men, while the victims are usually women and children (see department of justice, voyeurism as a criminal offence: a consultation paper (2002), at p 4; r v. friesen, 2020 scc 9, [2020] 1 scr 424, at para. 65, citing r v. george, 2017 scc 38, [2017] 1 scr 1021, at para 2; j bailey, “implicitly feminist?: the supreme court of canada’s decision in r v jarvis” (2020), 32 cjwl 196, at pp. 200-201). parliament’s object in enacting s 162(1), wagner cj found in jarvis, was “to protect individuals’ privacy and sexual integrity, particularly from new threats posed by the abuse of evolving technologies” (para. 48). the new voyeurism offence “was motivated by concerns about the potential for rapidly evolving technology to be abused for the secret viewing or recording of individuals for sexual purposes and in ways that involve a serious breach of privacy” (para. 49, citing department of justice, at p 1). voyeurism is thus both a sexual and a privacy-based offence. section 162(1) is intended to deal with both these related harms: behaviour that violates sexual integrity, and behaviour that breaches privacy (paras. 51-52). rowe j., concurring in the result in jarvis, agreed with wagner cj that the purpose and object of s 162(1) is “to protect well-established interests of privacy, autonomy and sexual integrity of all individuals, in light of threats posed by new technologies to encroach upon them” (para. 113). parliament’s objectives of protecting against the related harms of violations of privacy and sexual integrity are apparent in the wording and structure of s 162(1). i will consider each objective in turn. parliament’s objective of protecting privacy appears in the opening words of s 162(1), which state that it is an offence for someone to surreptitiously observe or record a person “in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy” if any of paras (a), (b), or (c) applies in jarvis, wagner c.j explained that the circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy under s 162(1) are “circumstances in which a person would reasonably expect not to be the subject of the type of observation or recording that in fact occurred” (para 28) a court should consider the entire context in which the observation or recording occurred, including the following non-exhaustive factors: (1) the location of the person when they were observed or recorded; (2) the nature of the impugned conduct (ie, whether it consisted of observation or recording); (3) the awareness or consent of the person who was observed or recorded; (4) the manner in which the observation or recording was made; (5) the subject matter or content of the observation or recording; (6) any rules, regulations, or policies that governed the observation or recording; (7) the relationship between the parties; (8) the purpose for which the observation or recording was made; and (9) the personal attributes of the person who was observed or recorded (paras. 5 and 28-29). parliament’s objective of protecting sexual integrity is also apparent in each of paras. (a), (b), and (c) of s 162(1). section 162(1)(a) protects the sexual integrity of persons in specific places: when “the person is in a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude, to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or to be engaged in explicit sexual activity”. i agree with the observations of juriansz ja in r v. trinchi, 2019 onca 356, 145 or (3d) 721, at para. 8, that para. (a) “does not require the person to be actually nude, exposing intimate parts of his or her body, or engaged in sexual activity”; it suffices if they are in a place where a person may “reasonably be expected to be in such a state, such as a changing room, toilet, shower stall, or bedroom” (see also jarvis, at para. 46, per wagner cj;. m. manning and p. sankoff, manning, mewett & sankoff: criminal law (5th ed. 2015), at ¶21245). i also agree that, unlike para. (c), para. (a) “does not require the accused to act for a sexual purpose. it would apply to an accused who hoped to profit by posting recordings on the internet” (trinchi, at para 8; see also jarvis, at para 32, per wagner cj, and at paras 143-44, per rowe j). section 162(1)(b) protects the sexual integrity of persons engaged in specific activities: when “the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or is engaged in explicit sexual activity, and the observation or recording is done for the purpose of observing or recording a person in such a state or engaged in such an activity”. i again agree with juriansz ja that, under para. (b), the “nature of the location does not matter, but the accused must have the purpose of observing or recording the subject in such a state or engaged in such an activity” (trinchi, at para 9; see also jarvis, at paras 46-47 and 52, per wagner cj). in addition, the crown need not prove that the accused acted for a sexual purpose: “[p]aragraph (b), like para (a), would apply to an accused whose purpose was commercial” (trinchi, at para. 9; see also jarvis, at para. 32, per wagner cj, and at para. 143, per rowe j). section 162(1)(c) protects the sexual integrity of persons when the observation or recording is done for a sexual purpose. this provision applies “whether the subject is clothed or unclothed — no matter what she or he is doing” (trinchi, at para. 10). in jarvis, for example, the accused teacher was convicted under s 162(1)(c), even though the students surreptitiously video recorded were fully clothed and going about common school activities. paragraph (c) applies regardless of the location of the targeted subject (jarvis, at paras. 46-47 and 52, per wagner cj, and at para. 129, per rowe j). i hasten to add that the opening words of s 162(1) also protect sexual integrity, and each of paras (a), (b), and (c) of s 162(1) also protect privacy. parliament’s two objectives of protecting against the related harms of violations of sexual integrity and privacy appear throughout s 162(1). for example, in considering whether a person “is in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy” in the opening words of s 162(1), a court must consider whether a person “would reasonably expect not to be the subject of the type of observation or recording that in fact occurred”, based on the non-exhaustive list of considerations identified in jarvis (paras 5 and 28-29) these considerations include factors relating to sexual integrity, such as whether the subject matter of the observation or recording includes intimate parts of a person’s body (para. 29(5)), and whether the recording is for a sexual purpose (paras. 29(8) and 31-32). similarly, paras. (a), (b), and (c) of s 162(1) protect privacy from surreptitious observations or recordings in circumstances where sexual integrity is engaged. i now turn to consider whether s 162(1)(a) has an implicit temporal component; in other words, whether the crown must prove that nudity was reasonably expected at the specific time when the surreptitious recording was made. (3) the interpretation of section 162(1)(a) (a) positions of the parties the crown submits that the majority of the court of appeal erred by interpreting s 162(1)(a) as requiring proof that nudity is reasonably expected in the place at the specific time when a surreptitious recording is made. the crown says that it is sufficient for it to prove that the “place” where a surreptitious recording was made is one in which nudity could reasonably be expected to occur at any time section 162(1)(a) thus protects the privacy of persons in certain “places”, whether or not nudity is expected at the time of the alleged offence. the crown claims that there is ample evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusion that “the hockey dressing rooms, in which mr. downes took the photographs of tr and gc, are places in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude” (af, at para. 95, quoting trial reasons, at para. 228 (canlii)). mr downes argues that s 162(1)(a) requires the crown to prove that nudity is reasonably expected at the specific time and place at which a surreptitious recording is made. he claims that a temporal component ensures that the voyeurism offence maintains its purpose of prohibiting breaches of sexual privacy. in his view, s 162(1)(a) should be interpreted in light of the harms contemplated in the scheme for sexual offences in part v of the criminal code, and is breached only when the person is recorded in a way that infringes their sexual integrity he claims that an actual infringement of sexual integrity is needed; a risk of infringement is insufficient. mr. downes notes that none of the photos at issue depicted nudity or was pornographic. he claims that since none of the boys in his photos was nude and there was no reasonable expectation at the time the photos were taken that anybody would be nude, it cannot be inferred that he intended to take a nude or otherwise prohibited voyeuristic photo. in my view, when s 162(1)(a) is properly interpreted based on its text, context, and purpose, the provision does not have an implicit temporal component. (b) text the text of s 162(1)(a) refers to an objective test for the “place” without regard to time. although not determinative, the text of s 162(1)(a) thus suggests that the provision lacks a temporal component. the test in s 162(1)(a) for the “place” is objective in two respects. first, s 162(1)(a) uses the definite article “the person” (“la personne”) when referring to the subject of the observation or recording, but uses the indefinite article “a person” (“une personne”) when referring to the reasonably expected uses of the place. this means that the person being surreptitiously observed or recorded must be in a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude. second, s 162(1)(a) asks whether a person can “reasonably” be expected to be nude in the place, and not whether the accused subjectively expected them to be nude the use of an objective test in s 162(1)(a) is not determinative of whether the provision contains a temporal component, however, because parliament still might have intended that the objective evaluation be made at a specific time. the key textual point is the lack of express language in s 162(1)(a) suggesting that parliament intended the “place” to be evaluated at the specific time when the observation or recording was made. had parliament intended to insist on such a temporal component, it could have done so expressly for example, an adjacent provision, s 162.1(1) — the offence of publishing an intimate image without consent — contains two express temporal components. an “intimate image” is defined under s 162.1(2) as a visual recording of a person made by any means, “(a) in which the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts or is engaged in explicit sexual activity; (b) in respect of which, at the time of the recording, there were circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (c) in respect of which the person depicted retains a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time the offence is committed” section 162(1)(a) contains no such temporal language. had parliament intended s 162(1)(a) to contain a temporal component, it could easily have referred to the observation or recording being made in “a place in which a person can then reasonably be expected to be” nude, or being made in a place in which a person would reasonably be expected to be nude “at the time of the observation or recording” (see ca reasons, at para. 77, per dickson ja (emphasis in original)). but parliament chose not to do so. thus, while not determinative, the lack of express temporal language in s 162(1)(a)’s objective test for the “place” suggests that parliament did not intend the provision to contain a temporal component. (c) statutory context and purpose the statutory context and purpose of s 162(1)(a) also suggest that parliament did not intend the provision to contain a temporal component. interpreting s 162(1)(a) as prohibiting surreptitious observation or recording of persons in specific places without a temporal component promotes parliament’s purposes of protecting privacy and sexual integrity, especially for children and other vulnerable persons. interpreting s 162(1)(a) with a temporal component detracts from these purposes and leads to arbitrary and absurd results. parliament’s purposes of protecting privacy and sexual integrity are promoted by interpreting s 162(1)(a) as a location-based offence without a temporal component. as noted by the intervener, the attorney general of ontario, rather than providing a specific list of places protected under s 162(1)(a), parliament chose to define the protected places in a principled and normative way: “if it is reasonable to expect that people in a certain place will be naked, or expose their genitals or anal region or breasts, or be engaged in explicit sexual activity, then that is a place where everyone is entitled to be free from surreptitious observation and visual recording — whether naked or not, exposed or not, explicit sexual activity or not” (if, at para. 18). thus, when a person is in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, s 162(1)(a) stipulates a rule that normatively identifies a class of quintessentially “safe places”, such as bedrooms, bathrooms, and dressing rooms, in which people should be entitled to not be non-consensually observed or visually recorded, whether or not they or another person in the place are reasonably expected to be nude at the time of the observation or recording. in this way, s 162(1)(a) protects both privacy and sexual integrity. it is worth elaborating on how prohibiting voyeurism in such “safe places” under s 162(1)(a), whether or not nudity is reasonably expected at the time of the surreptitious observation or recording, protects sexual integrity as it is understood today. as noted in this court’s decisions in friesen and jarvis, society’s conception of sexual offences has evolved from a focus on the wrongful interference with sexual propriety to a concern with protecting sexual integrity (friesen, at para. 55, and jarvis, at para. 127, per rowe j., both citing e. craig, troubling sex: towards a legal theory of sexual integrity (2012), at p 68). in the passage cited approvingly in friesen and the concurring reasons in jarvis, professor elaine craig explained that “[t]his shift from focusing on sexual propriety to sexual integrity enables greater emphasis on violations of trust, humiliation, objectification, exploitation, shame, and loss of self-esteem rather than simply, or only, on deprivations of honour, chastity, or bodily integrity (as was more the case when the law’s concern had a greater focus on sexual propriety)” (p 68). under a sexual integrity analysis, the focus is “not simply [on] the sexual motives, arousal, or body parts of the accused, or the community’s standard of sexual propriety, but also [on] the perception, experience, and impact on the complainant” (p 75). in addition, a sexual integrity analysis focuses not just on physical harm to the complainant, but also on emotional and psychological harm, which is often more lasting than physical harm, especially for children (friesen, at paras. 56-59). surreptitious observation or recording of a person where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and which occurs in a “safe place” under s 162(1)(a), violates or poses a risk of violating sexual integrity, even if nudity is not reasonably expected at the specific time of the observation or recording. an observation or recording in such a quintessentially private and “safe place” violates trust and can result in the person’s humiliation, objectification, exploitation, shame, or loss of self-esteem (craig, at p 68). it can also cause emotional and psychological harm, even if the person is not observed or recorded when nude as the intervener, the samuelson-glushko canadian internet policy and public interest clinic, observes: “such violations of trust objectify those targeted by reducing them to body parts, creating images that in a digital environment can be easily replicated, cropped and manipulated in ways and for uses that disregard their right to control their own bodies. these violating images hinder subjects from developing their sexuality as they see fit, while also potentially exposing them to the shame and humiliation that often results from instantaneous and widespread dissemination” (if, at para. 24). the emotional and psychological harms caused by violations of sexual integrity, even from non-nude photographs, are illustrated in this case. the sentencing judge noted the statement of tr’s mother that “when she told t.r about the photographs, he was disappointed as he had considered mr. downes one of his more positive coaches. she said tr’s trust was broken and, as a result, tr is more cautious and less trusting of coaches and people in general” (2020 bcsc 177, at para. 18 (canlii)) as dickson j.a noted aptly, “[t]he potentially traumatic impact for adolescent boys of being photographed surreptitiously in such a manifestly private place is obvious” (para. 97). to sum up, reading s 162(1)(a) as prohibiting surreptitious observation or recording of persons in specific places and without a temporal component promotes parliament’s purposes of protecting privacy and sexual integrity. by contrast, interpreting s 162(1)(a) with a temporal component detracts from parliament’s purposes of protecting privacy and sexual integrity on such an interpretation, surreptitious photos of children in their underwear in inherently private places would be permitted without criminal sanction simply because the children in those places were too self-conscious to undress (such as boys around the age of puberty) (see trial reasons, at para. 220). such an interpretation would fail to protect the privacy and sexual integrity of some of the most vulnerable persons in our society — persons whom parliament sought to protect through the voyeurism offence. relatedly, the crown argues that such an interpretation of s 162(1)(a) would result in arbitrary and absurd results: groups of children who are too self-conscious about their bodies to shower or be nude in dressing rooms could be photographed surreptitiously, but children who are just a few years older and less self-conscious — and who thus might shower or be nude — could not be photographed. i agree with the crown that parliament could not have intended such arbitrary and absurd results (see rizzo, at para. 27). parliament could not have intended that persons who ordinarily choose to disrobe in a place where nudity can reasonably be expected are protected from voyeurism, while persons who ordinarily choose to keep their clothes on are not. the majority of the court of appeal concluded otherwise by taking a narrow perspective that views sexual offences as concerned with sexual propriety alone rather than also with sexual integrity the majority ruled that an implicit temporal component is essential for s 162(1)(a) to fulfill its purpose as a sexual offence, rather than as an offence protecting privacy alone in its view, reading s 162(1)(a) as criminalizing surreptitious observation or recording when nudity is not reasonably expected at the time of the observation or recording would “capture conduct that does not bear any of the hallmarks of voyeurism as a breach of sexual privacy” (para. 41 (emphasis in original)). the majority declared that the voyeurism offence in s 162(1) “[is] fundamentally concerned with bodily and sexual privacy” and “[is] not intended to establish [an] offenc[e] founded upon an invasion of privacy alone” (para. 54). it stated that while mr. downes’ conduct was “undoubtedly a breach of trust and invasive of privacy, that does not necessarily make it conduct that this section criminalizes as a sexual offence” (para. 54). i disagree the majority’s reasoning assumes that in order to stigmatize conduct as a violation of sexual integrity, and thus as a sexual offence, there must be a risk of capturing nude images at the relevant time but, as i have explained above, taking surreptitious photographs of children in their underwear in an inherently “safe place” like a hockey dressing room violates not only the children’s privacy but also their sexual integrity, even if nudity was not reasonably expected when the photos were taken. taking surreptitious photos in such an inherently “safe place” may injure many interests associated with sexual integrity: such conduct violates trust and can result in the humiliation, objectification, exploitation, shame, and loss of self-esteem of the targeted individuals such photos can injure a person’s sexual integrity by reducing them to body parts, by hindering them from developing their sexuality as they see fit, and by creating a risk of widespread dissemination of the photos to strangers. when viewed through the lens of parliament’s purpose of protecting sexual integrity rather than simply sexual propriety, mr. downes’ conduct violated both the children’s privacy and their sexual integrity. he thus engaged in conduct that parliament has criminalized as a sexual offence. (d) conclusion section 162(1)(a) does not have an implicit temporal component requiring the crown to prove that nudity was reasonably expected at the specific time when the photos were taken. as a result, the trial judge appropriately convicted mr. downes of two counts of voyeurism under s 162(1)(a). b. if section 162(1)(a) does not have an implicit temporal component, is the provision unconstitutionally overbroad contrary to section 7 of the charter? mr. downes submits that if this court accepts that s 162(1)(a) does not have an implicit temporal component, then the provision is unconstitutionally overbroad contrary to s 7 of the charter. he states that the objective of s 162(1) is to target exploitative sexual conduct and says that the lack of a temporal component “extends the offence to cover conduct bearing no connection to its underlying purpose of preventing sexual exploitation” (rf, at para. 68). mr. downes did not raise this constitutional issue at trial, and although he raised it at the court of appeal, the court did not address it. there is a serious question as to whether mr. downes can challenge the constitutionality of s 162(1)(a) in this crown appeal as of right under s 693(1)(a) of the criminal code. such an appeal is limited to the question of law on which a judge of the court of appeal dissents, which in this case was whether s 162(1)(a) has an implicit temporal component. although in a crown appeal as of right the respondent can raise “any argument which supports the order of the court below” (r v. keegstra, [1995] 2 scr 381, at para. 23), mr. downes’ overbreadth argument does not support the court of appeal’s order: if accepted, it would likely result not in a new trial but in no trial, since s 162(1)(a) would be unconstitutional (para 36) thus, ordinarily mr. downes could not challenge the constitutionality of s 162(1)(a) without first obtaining leave to cross-appeal on this issue under s 40 of the supreme court act, rsc 1985, c. s-26. i have concluded, however, that it is unnecessary to decide whether the constitutional issue raised by mr. downes is properly before this court because, in any event, this is not a case in which this court should exceptionally exercise its discretion to decide such a constitutional question for the first time on appeal as noted in guindon v. canada, 2015 scc 41, [2015] 3 scr 3, at para. 20, “[w]hether to hear and decide a constitutional issue when it has not been properly raised in the courts below is a matter for the court’s discretion, taking into account all of the circumstances, including the state of the record, fairness to all parties, the importance of having the issue resolved by this court, its suitability for decision and the broader interests of the administration of justice.” the test is a stringent one: this court must be satisfied that hearing and deciding the new constitutional issue causes no prejudice to the parties (paras. 22-23). in this case, deciding whether s 162(1)(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad would prejudice the crown and would require the court to address an important charter issue in a factual vacuum. because the charter issue was not raised at trial, the crown has filed no evidence on whether any infringement of s 7 of the charter could be justified under s 1. as noted in guindon, “[a] respondent, like any other party, cannot rely upon an entirely new argument that would have required additional evidence to be adduced at trial” (para. 32 (citations omitted in original), quoting bell expressvu limited partnership v. rex, 2002 scc 42, [2002] 2 scr 559, at para. 58). this is especially so in constitutional cases this court has often stressed the importance of a full evidentiary record when deciding constitutional questions and has cautioned that “charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum” (mackay v. manitoba, [1989] 2 scr 357, at p 361; guindon, at para. 116, per abella and wagner jj). as the court of appeal for ontario has stated, “[a]rguing the interpretation of a statute is much different than arguing its constitutional validity” (r v. wookey, 2016 onca 611, 363 crr (2d) 177, at para. 61, per tulloch ja. (now cjo)). as a result, in all the circumstances, i would decline to decide the constitutional issue. vi disposition i would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the court of appeal for british columbia, and restore the convictions. appeal allowed. solicitor for the appellant: ministry of attorney general — bc. prosecution service, victoria. solicitors for the respondent: sorochan law corporation, vancouver; orris law corporation, vancouver. the attorney general — crown law office — criminal, toronto. prosecution service — appeals and specialized prosecutions office, edmonton.
i. overview [1] the circumstances giving rise to this appeal are tragic and abhorrent. the respondent, kevin eric goforth, was convicted by a jury of unlawful act manslaughter and unlawfully causing bodily harm. the convictions were in relation to mr. goforth’s two young foster children the older child died as a result of a brain injury that developed following a cardiac arrest caused by malnutrition and dehydration the younger child was severely ill due to malnutrition and dehydration, but she survived. both children had bruises, abrasions, and lesions on their bodies. the main issue in this appeal is whether the jury was properly instructed such that it was able to find that mr. goforth had the requisite mens rea. [2] a majority of the court of appeal for saskatchewan allowed mr. goforth’s appeal, set aside his convictions, and ordered a new trial. the majority found that the trial judge had erred in two principal ways. first, the trial judge erred in describing the mens rea requirement for failing to provide necessaries of life, which was the predicate offence for both manslaughter and unlawfully causing bodily harm. second, she erred in failing to review and to instruct the jury on the evidence of mr. goforth’s parenting circumstances as a secondary caregiver. [3] in my view, the majority of the court of appeal erred by failing to take a functional approach in its assessment of the jury charge. this court has long held that an accused is entitled to a jury that is properly — and not necessarily perfectly — instructed the ultimate question in this appeal is whether the jury was properly instructed such that appellate intervention was unwarranted. in my view, while the charge was not perfect, the jury was nonetheless properly instructed. none of the issues raised in connection with the jury charge warranted appellate intervention. [4] at the conclusion of the hearing, the court allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, with reasons to follow. these are the reasons. ii. facts [5] on november 8, 2011, two young girls were placed in foster care with mr. goforth and his wife, tammy goforth, after having previously spent over a year and a half in temporary care with other foster parents. the goforths had been identified as a possible permanent placement for the children. at the time they were placed in the care of the goforths, the children were three and two years old. neither child had any major health concerns prior to the placement. a child protection worker had described the girls as being “fairly pudgy”, “very full-faced”, and “full-cheeked” in appearance (ar, vol. iii, at p 141) she had also described the older child’s disposition as “warm”, “affectionate”, and “very happy” (p 154) a previous foster parent had described the younger child’s disposition as “bubbly” and “happy” (ar, vol. iv, at p 232). [6] on the night of july 31, 2012, approximately nine months after the girls entered their care, the goforths took the older child to the hospital the attending pediatrician in the intensive care unit testified at trial that the older child was very sick. she was in cardiac arrest and was not breathing it took hospital staff 15 minutes to resuscitate her heart she was severely emaciated and dehydrated her weight was significantly below the third percentile for children of her age and gender she had multiple bruises and abrasions on her body. she was placed on a life support machine as she was not capable of breathing on her own. she was also in renal failure, likely due to severe dehydration. [7] despite continued treatment over the next day and a half, the older child’s condition showed no signs of improvement and she was declared brain dead. she was taken off life support and died on august 2, 2012. the cause of her death, as set out in the agreed statement of facts, was “diffuse hypoxic/ischemic brain injury that developed following a cardiac arrest on july 31, 2012, secondary to malnutrition and dehydration” (ar, vol. ii, at p 171). [8] given the horrific state of the older child, the police were called shortly after her admission to the hospital. the police subsequently found the younger child and she was admitted to hospital early in the morning on august 1, 2012 she was similarly emaciated, malnourished, and dehydrated her weight was also under the third percentile for children of her age and gender. she had increased body hair, which was a condition the attending pediatrician had previously seen in patients with anorexia nervosa and which, she explained in her testimony at trial, was a way the body could insulate itself after fat stores had been lost in addition, the younger child had pneumonia, a urinary tract infection, and a large ulcer on her lower left leg with signs of infection. she also had bruises on her face, open sores and abrasions on the lower spine, and wrap-around lesions on her wrists and ankles. [9] mr. and ms. goforth were both ultimately charged with, and were jointly tried for, second degree murder (criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, s 235) in relation to the death of the older child and unlawfully causing bodily harm (s 269(a)) in relation to the younger child. unlawful act manslaughter (s 222(5)(a)) was a lesser and included offence in the second degree murder charges. all of the offences required the crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the two accused had committed an unlawful act. the unlawful act alleged by the crown was failure to provide necessaries of life as set out in s 215(2) of the criminal code. [10] section 215 imposes a legal duty on certain persons to provide necessaries of life to another person and sets out the corresponding offence for failure without lawful excuse to perform that duty. it states: 215 (1) every one is under a legal duty (a) as a parent, foster parent, guardian or head of a family, to provide necessaries of life for a child under the age of sixteen years; (b) to provide necessaries of life to their spouse or common-law partner; and (c) to provide necessaries of life to a person under his charge if that person (i) is unable, by reason of detention, age, illness, mental disorder or other cause, to withdraw himself from that charge, and (ii) is unable to provide himself with necessaries of life. (2) every person commits an offence who, being under a legal duty within the meaning of subsection (1), fails without lawful excuse to perform that duty, if (a) with respect to a duty imposed by paragraph (1)(a) or (b), (i) the person to whom the duty is owed is in destitute or necessitous circumstances, or (ii) the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person to whom the duty is owed, or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person to be endangered permanently; or (b) with respect to a duty imposed by paragraph (1)(c), the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person to whom the duty is owed or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person to be injured permanently. [11] the jury convicted ms. goforth of second degree murder and unlawfully causing bodily harm. because her subsequent appeal was unanimously dismissed by the court of appeal, there is no appeal in relation to ms. goforth before this court. [12] the jury acquitted mr. goforth of second degree murder but convicted him of the lesser and included offence of unlawful act manslaughter. he was also convicted of unlawfully causing bodily harm. mr. goforth appealed his convictions. iii decision below [13] the majority of the court of appeal for saskatchewan allowed mr. goforth’s appeal, set aside his convictions, and ordered a new trial (2021 skca 20, 400 ccc (3d) 1) the majority held that the trial judge had erred in her explanation to the jury of the legal elements of s 215 and in how she related the evidence to those elements. [14] in the majority’s view, the trial judge did not properly convey the mens rea requirement for the predicate offence under s 215 — failing to provide necessaries of life when explaining the essential elements of s 215, the trial judge confusingly introduced two different standards relating to the required foreseeability of harm. as a result, the jury may have concluded that, in order to find that mr. goforth committed the predicate offence under s 215, the crown only had to prove that a reasonable person in the circumstances would have foreseen the risk of bodily harm beyond the trivial or transitory. this is less stringent than the standard required for s 215, which is that a reasonable person in the circumstances must have foreseen the risk of death or permanent health impairment. the error was compounded by the trial judge’s failure to explain what is meant by a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances. [15] the majority also found that the trial judge had erred in relating the evidence to the mens rea requirement. although personal characteristics of an accused short of incapacity are irrelevant in assessing the objective mens rea requirement for s 215, the actual circumstances of an accused bear on whether their conduct is a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent person. when reviewing the evidence relevant to mens rea for the jury, the trial judge referred only to a very limited subset of the evidence. although a more complete summary of the evidence was provided at other times in the charge, the failure to refer to the evidence of mr. goforth’s parenting and work circumstances when discussing mens rea created the real possibility that the jury would have been led to believe that evidence of mr. goforth’s circumstances was irrelevant to assessing mens rea. [16] in dissent, caldwell ja would have dismissed the appeal. with respect to the trial judge’s instruction on the mens rea requirement for s 215, caldwell ja. acknowledged that the foresight requirement for manslaughter was intermingled in the trial judge’s discussion of the foresight requirement for the predicate offence under s 215 however, he found that the trial judge had stated the law correctly — albeit somewhat confusingly the lower foresight standard was routinely introduced as a “further” requirement that the crown had to prove. when the trial judge’s instructions were read as a whole, there was no reasonable possibility that they misled the jury or caused it to misunderstand what the crown had to prove. further, caldwell ja found that “no reasonable juror could have concluded both that (a) mr. [goforth] ought to have foreseen the risk of bodily harm beyond the trivial or transitory, and yet (b) there was no objectively foreseeable risk of death or permanent endangerment of health in the circumstances” (para. 102). [17] caldwell ja rejected the argument that the trial judge had failed to recount the evidence of mr. goforth’s circumstances to the jury. at trial, mr. goforth’s position was that neither he nor his wife had deprived the children of food or fluids this position was inconsistent with mr. goforth’s position on appeal. on appeal, he argued that his wife’s primary role in the household constituted a circumstance that had rendered him unable to foresee the risks posed by his own failure to provide necessaries of life to the children. in the view of caldwell ja,. mr. goforth’s position on appeal “was patently precluded from being put to the jury by the position he took at trial and, regardless, would have been overwhelmed by the uncontroverted evidence of the children’s deplorable physical condition” (para. 75). the argument, in effect, was that a reasonable parent in the circumstances of his spousal relationship would not have been aware that the children had been neglected, were starving, and required medical attention. caldwell ja found that mr. goforth’s spousal relationship was personal to him and was irrelevant to the objective mens rea requirement in s 215. [18] with regard to ms. goforth, the court of appeal was unanimous in dismissing her appeal ms. goforth appealed only her conviction for second degree murder, arguing that there was an inconsistency between her conviction on that charge and mr. goforth’s acquittal. although the impugned mens rea instruction was repeated in relation to the charges against ms. goforth, there were no concerns about whether the jury was potentially confused about the required foreseeability standard in the context of ms. goforth’s conviction for second degree murder, the jury must have been satisfied either that ms. goforth meant to cause the older child’s death or that she meant to cause the older child bodily harm that she knew was likely to cause death and she was reckless as to whether death ensued or not (criminal code, s 229(a)) by necessary implication, the jury’s conclusion amounted to a finding that ms. goforth met the requisite foresight standard for s 215. iv. issues on appeal [19] the following issues must be considered in this appeal: (1) did the trial judge err by improperly instructing the jury on the mens rea requirement for s 215 (failure to provide necessaries of life)? specifically, did the trial judge err by intermingling the required foreseeability standard for s 215 with the required foreseeability standard for manslaughter or unlawfully causing bodily harm? (2) did the trial judge err by failing to instruct the jury on mr. goforth’s circumstances as a secondary caregiver during the mens rea instruction for s 215? (3) did the trial judge err by failing to explain what is meant by a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances? (4) if the trial judge erred, can the curative proviso be applied? v analysis a. standard of review [20] the alleged errors in this case pertain to the trial judge’s charge to the jury. as i stated above, this court has long held that an accused is entitled to a jury that is properly — and not necessarily perfectly — instructed (r v daley, 2007 scc 53, [2007] 3 scr 523, at para. 31; r v. jacquard, [1997] 1 scr 314, at paras. 2 and 32). [21] trial judges are not held to a standard of perfection in crafting jury instructions (daley, at para. 31) rather, an appellate court must take a functional approach when reviewing a jury charge by examining the alleged errors in the context of the evidence, the entire charge, and the trial as a whole (r v. calnen, 2019 scc 6, [2019] 1 scr 301, at para. 8; r v. pickton, 2010 scc 32, [2010] 2 scr 198, at para. 10; r v. jaw, 2009 scc 42, [2009] 3 scr 26, at para. 32). it is the substance of the charge — and not adherence to or departure from a prescriptive formula — that is determinative (r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr 579, at para. 54; r v. luciano, 2011 onca 89, 273 oac 273, at para. 69). as bastarache j instructed in daley, at para. 30: . . . it is important for appellate courts to keep in mind the following. the cardinal rule is that it is the general sense which the words used must have conveyed, in all probability, to the mind of the jury that matters, and not whether a particular formula was recited by the judge. the particular words used, or the sequence followed, is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge and will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. [emphasis added.] [22] indeed, trial judges must be afforded some flexibility in crafting the language of jury instructions, as their role requires them to “decant and simplify” the law and evidence for the jury (jacquard, at para. 13; r v. rodgerson, 2015 scc 38, [2015] 2 scr 760, at para. 50; see also r v. araya, 2015 scc 11, [2015] 1 scr. 581, at para. 39). b did the trial judge err by improperly instructing the jury on the mens rea requirement for section 215 (failure to provide necessaries of life)? specifically, did the required foreseeability standard for section 215 with the required foreseeability standard for manslaughter or unlawfully causing bodily harm? the trial judge err by intermingling [23] the crown argues that the trial judge did not err in her charge regarding the mens rea requirement for s 215 the jury charge addressed the objective foreseeability requirements for both manslaughter and the predicate offence. although the charge juxtaposed these two foreseeability standards, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have thought the crown only had to satisfy the lower foreseeability standard relating to manslaughter. [24] mr. goforth, on the other hand, submits that the majority of the court of appeal was correct to find that the trial judge’s instruction on the mens rea required for s 215 was deficient. according to him, the majority functionally reviewed the jury charge and correctly concluded that the charge was inadequate because it confused the two foreseeability standards. [25] for the reasons that follow, i would reject mr. goforth’s submission. although the jury charge was not perfect, a functional reading of it shows that the jury was properly instructed. (1) the mens rea requirements [26] mr. goforth was charged with second degree murder and unlawfully causing bodily harm. unlawful act manslaughter was a lesser and included offence in the second degree murder charge. all of these charges were predicated on the alleged failure to provide the children concerned with necessaries of life contrary to s 215. the mens rea requirement for both manslaughter and unlawfully causing bodily harm is the same. both offences require the mens rea of the predicate offence, which in this case is the mens rea for s 215, as well as objective foresight that the unlawful act could cause bodily harm beyond the trivial or transitory (r v. creighton, [1993] 3 scr 3, at p 44; r v. desousa, [1992] 2 scr 944, at p 961). [27] section 215 creates a penal negligence offence. it is “aimed at establishing a uniform minimum level of care to be provided for those to whom it applies, and this can only be achieved if those under the duty are held to a societal, rather than a personal, standard of conduct” (r v. naglik, [1993] 3 scr 122, at p 141 (emphasis deleted)). liability is premised on what a reasonable person in the accused’s position would have known or foreseen, so “fault lies in the absence of the requisite mental state of care” (r v beatty, 2008 scc 5, [2008] 1 scr 49, at para. 8) the provision punishes conduct that is a marked departure from an objectively reasonable standard of care. more specifically, the mens rea requirement for s 215 is established when the crown proves that the accused’s conduct constitutes “a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent parent in circumstances where it was objectively foreseeable that the failure to provide the necessaries of life would lead to a risk of danger to the life, or a risk of permanent endangerment to the health, of the child” (naglik, at p 143; see also r v. jf, 2008 scc 60, [2008] 3 scr 215, at para. 8). [28] in r v. roy, 2012 scc 26, [2012] 2 scr 60, at para. 36, cromwell j. provided a useful analytical framework for assessing whether objective mens rea has been made out: it is helpful to approach the issue by asking two questions the first is whether, in light of all the relevant evidence, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible if so, the second question is whether the accused’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it, if possible, was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances. [emphasis in original.] [29] in this case, the crown needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that mr. goforth had the requisite mens rea for the predicate offence under s 215 as well as the requisite mens rea for the offences of manslaughter and unlawfully causing bodily harm. [30] in order to satisfy the mens rea requirement for s 215, the crown needed to prove that (a) it was objectively foreseeable, to a reasonable person in the circumstances of the accused, that the failure to provide food, fluids, or medical care would lead to a risk of danger to the life, or a risk of permanent endangerment to the health, of the children; and that (b) the accused’s conduct represented a marked departure from the conduct expected of a reasonably prudent parent, foster parent, guardian, or head of a family in the circumstances. [31] in order to satisfy the mens rea requirement for either manslaughter or unlawfully causing bodily harm, the crown needed to prove — in addition to establishing the mens rea for s 215 — that it was objectively foreseeable, to a reasonable person in the circumstances of the accused, that the failure to provide necessaries of life to the children would lead to a risk of bodily harm which was neither trivial nor transitory (creighton, at pp. 44-45). this is a lower foreseeability standard than what is required for s 215, as the foreseeability of death or of permanent endangerment to health is not required. therefore, when the offence under s 215 is the predicate offence for either manslaughter or unlawfully causing bodily harm, if the crown proves the requisite mens rea requirement for s 215, then, by necessary implication, the additional mens rea requirement for manslaughter or unlawfully causing bodily harm will be satisfied. (2) the charge functionally conveyed the mens rea requirements [32] the majority of the court of appeal concluded that the following instruction could have confused the jury about the appropriate standard for mens rea: the crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of an offence under section 215(2), its external circumstances and the mental or fault element. the accused’s conduct must also constitute a marked departure from that of a reasonable person in the same circumstances further, the crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person would foresee the risk of bodily harm, beyond the trivial or transitory, in the context of dangerous conduct. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. i, at p 154) this instruction was repeated numerous times in the jury charge, in relation to both counts of the indictment, with slight variations (see, eg,. ar, vol. i, at pp. 173-74, 175, 252 and 254-55). [33] in the assessment of whether the jury would have been confused about the appropriate foreseeability standard, it is important to note that the trial judge also clearly and correctly summarized the required mens rea for s 215 in a different portion of the charge. when specifically discussing whether mr. goforth had the requisite mens rea for s 215 in relation to the older child, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: did kevin goforth’s failure to provide the necessaries of life to [the older child] represent a marked departure from the standard of conduct of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances where it is objectively foreseeable that the failure to provide food or fluids or the failure to seek medical attention would lead to a risk of danger to life or a risk of permanent endangerment to the child’s health? these further considerations can be transformed into questions for you to consider. a) was it objectively foreseeable that the failure to provide [the older child] with food or fluids or the failure to seek medical attention for [the older child] would lead to a risk of danger to life or a risk of permanent endangerment to [the older child’s] health? b) if so, did kevin’s failure to provide [the older child] with food or fluids or to seek medical attention represent a marked departure from the standard of conduct of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances? (ar, vol. i, at p 172) a similar instruction — albeit more abridged — was provided about whether mr. goforth had the requisite mens rea for s 215 in relation to the younger child. [34] the questions posed by the trial judge in the above passage adhere to the two-step inquiry discussed by cromwell j in roy, at para. 36 (see also naglik, at pp. 143-44). [35] ultimately, when read as a whole, the trial judge’s instructions functionally conveyed the necessary legal principles the jury charge was not perfect the trial judge did not make a clear distinction between the required foreseeability standard for s 215 and the required foreseeability standard for manslaughter or unlawfully causing bodily harm she routinely juxtaposed the two different foreseeability requirements without clearly alerting the jury to how the respective foresight standards corresponded to the respective offences. [36] the imprecise juxtaposition of different mens rea requirements should be avoided. it could potentially confuse the jury and could potentially necessitate a new trial in a different set of circumstances however, in the circumstances of this case, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury was confused about the required mens rea for s 215 or misled about what the crown had to prove in order for the jury to find mr. goforth guilty of either manslaughter or unlawfully causing bodily harm with respect, the court of appeal erred in holding otherwise, for three reasons. [37] first, despite the frequency with which the more confusing instruction was repeated, the clearest explanation of the mens rea requirement was provided when the trial judge invited the jury to consider two straightforward questions to assess whether that requirement had been met these questions told the jurors exactly what to ask themselves in the circumstances of this case. there is simply no reasonable possibility that any juror would have disregarded these straightforward questions and would have instead chosen to apply the lower foresight standard. [38] second, the fact that the impugned instruction was routinely introduced with the word “further” also supports the argument that the jury would have simply concluded that both foresight standards had to be satisfied. [39] finally, i note that defence counsel did not object to the charge at trial and that appellate counsel before the court of appeal did not initially identify the juxtaposition of the two foreseeability standards as an issue of concern (ca reasons, at paras. 93-94). although not determinative, defence counsel’s failure to object at trial and appellate counsel’s failure to identify the issue initially on appeal undermine the argument that the jury may have been misled or confused about the appropriate standard. indeed, contrary to the opinion of my colleague (at para. 65), this provides a strong reason to conclude that the jury would not have been misled or confused as bastarache j explained in daley, at para. 58: . . . it is expected of counsel that they will assist the trial judge and identify what in their opinion is problematic with the judge’s instructions to the jury. while not decisive, failure of counsel to object is a factor in appellate review. the failure to register a complaint about the aspect of the charge that later becomes the ground for the appeal may be indicative of the seriousness of the alleged violation see jacquard, at para. 38: “in my opinion, defence counsel’s failure to object to the charge says something about both the overall accuracy of the jury instructions and the seriousness of the alleged misdirection.” (see also calnen, at paras. 38-39; thériault v. the queen, [1981] 1 scr. 336, at pp. 343-44.) [40] in sum, when the jury charge is read functionally and as a whole, i have no trouble concluding that the jury was properly instructed on the law and able to draw the necessary legal conclusions. c did the trial judge err by failing to instruct the jury on mr. goforth’s circumstances as a secondary caregiver during the mens rea instruction for section 215? [41] the law is clear that personal characteristics of an accused, short of incapacity, are irrelevant in assessing objective mens rea (creighton, at p 61) in creighton, the majority of this court rejected the view that “individual excusing conditions” (p 63) such as educational, experiential, and “habitual” characteristics of an accused may be taken into account (p 61). consideration of personal characteristics, short of incapacity, injects subjectivity into the objective test, which undermines the purpose of having a single and uniform minimum legal standard of care (pp. 61 and 70). this is not to say that the reasonable person is placed in a factual vacuum. “while the legal duty of the accused is not particularized by his or her personal characteristics short of incapacity, it is particularized in application by the nature of the activity and the circumstances surrounding the accused’s failure to take the requisite care” (p 71; see also r v javanmardi, 2019 scc 54, [2019] 4 scr 3, at paras. 36-38) the reasonable person is therefore placed in the relevant circumstances of the accused. these circumstances “do not personalize the objective standard; they contextualize it” (d. m. paciocco, “subjective and objective standards of fault for offences and defences” (1995), 59 sask. l. rev. 271, at p 285). [42] the issue that arises in this appeal is whether mr. goforth’s alleged status as a secondary caregiver is a relevant circumstance or an irrelevant personal characteristic. the crown argues that mr. goforth’s role in the household, his belief that his wife had everything well in hand, and his work schedule were irrelevant to the assessment of the objective mens rea for s 215. mr. goforth argues that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on his circumstances as the less involved parent, which deprived the jury of critical information about whether he had the capacity to foresee the risk of harm to the girls. [43] the majority of the court of appeal highlighted evidence relating to five circumstances that it believed were “critical to the question as to whether mr. [goforth] had the necessary moral culpability”: (a) his alleged lack of involvement in providing necessaries for the girls; (b) his alleged reliance on ms. goforth as the person who would feed and clothe the girls and see to their needs; (c) the girls’ history of recurring illness and recovery under the care of ms. goforth; (d) his alleged limited interactions with the girls, including that he never saw them unclothed; and (e) his evidence that the girls were picky eaters but that he observed them eating and drinking and they were never refused either food or drink (para. 199). [44] in contrast to the majority, caldwell ja, in dissent, held that “the nature or characteristics of mr. [goforth]’s relationship with his spouse are ‘individualized excusing conditions’” and that, as a result, “mr. [goforth]’s spousal relationship is personal to him and . . . is not relevant in an objective mens rea inquiry” (paras. 108-9). [45] with respect, neither the majority nor the dissent in the court of appeal accurately characterized the relevant circumstances in this case. the dissent, on the one hand, described the relevant circumstances too narrowly. the existence or nature of a spousal relationship can be considered a relevant circumstance — the circumstances of a single parent may be significantly different than the circumstances of a parent in a two-parent home. similarly, the work schedule and physical absence of one parent may be a relevant circumstance, depending on the particular factual matrix. [46] the majority, on the other hand, adopted an overly broad conceptualization of circumstances. contrary to the majority’s conclusion, mr. goforth’s “alleged lack of involvement in providing necessaries for the girls” is not a circumstance in which the reasonable person needed to be placed (ca reasons, at para. 199). indeed, given that mr. goforth was physically in the children’s presence on a daily basis, his alleged lack of involvement in providing necessaries for them cannot be characterized as a circumstance. rather, it constitutes an essential element of the actus reus. mr. goforth had a duty to provide necessaries of life to the children. his utter neglect of them is not a circumstance that can ground his failure to foresee the risk of harm. [47] i acknowledge that the other four purported circumstances (listed in (b) to (e) at para. 43, above) could be legally relevant. however, contrary to the conclusion of the majority of the court of appeal, none of these circumstances were “critical” to the jury’s assessment of mr. goforth’s “moral culpability” indeed, none of these circumstances were material to the jury’s consideration of whether mr. goforth had the requisite foresight to be criminally liable under s 215. in light of the evidence relating to the children’s deplorable and heart-wrenching condition, none of these alleged circumstances could have possibly prevented mr. goforth from foreseeing the risk of harm to them. according to his own evidence, mr. goforth ate dinner with all of the children — the goforths’ own children and their foster children — almost every evening. he testified that the girls got sick about twice a month but that at no point did he think he or ms. goforth should call the doctor or the free health line. he was well positioned to observe their condition, yet he did nothing. the uncontroverted medical evidence presented at trial indicated that both girls suffered from malnutrition over a prolonged period. [48] accordingly, much of the evidence relating to mr. goforth’s circumstances — including his alleged reliance on his wife, his alleged limited interaction with the girls, and the girls’ alleged history of being picky eaters and suffering from illness regularly — was immaterial given the evidence of emaciation and neglect any reasonable parent in mr. goforth’s circumstances would have foreseen the danger and would have taken action. [49] in any event, the trial judge’s charge sufficiently recited the evidence about mr. goforth’s alleged circumstances. as mentioned above, trial judges have a duty to “decant and simplify”, and “there is no need to state evidence twice where once will do” (jacquard, at paras. 13-14). [50] the trial judge instructed the jury multiple times on mr. goforth’s evidence relating to his busy schedule and his purported status as a secondary caregiver. although the more detailed description of the evidence was given in portions of the charge that discussed the actus reus, there is no basis to conclude that the trial judge’s comparably brief recitation of the evidence when discussing mens rea would have caused the jury any confusion when discussing the relevant mens rea evidence in relation to the older child, the trial judge still instructed the jury to “consider the evidence of tammy and kevin goforth” (ar, vol. i, at p 173), and then briefly mentioned some of the testimonial evidence. when discussing the relevant mens rea evidence in relation to the younger child, the trial judge instructed the jury that “the evidence you have already considered on this issue is relevant here” (p 255). the trial judge’s brevity would not have caused the jury to conclude that only the limited subset of evidence specifically mentioned was relevant. [51] the trial judge also instructed the jury on mr. goforth’s alleged circumstances a final time when outlining the defence theory of the case at the end of her charge. she summarized mr. goforth’s position as follows: throughout the time in which the children resided with kevin and tammy, kevin was continuously employed as a carpenter in regina that required him to work six days per week at approximately 10-12 hours per day. kevin was not the primary caregiver for the children. while he focussed on providing monetary support for the family, meals, bathing and clothing of the children was a responsibility of tammy’s. (ar, vol. i, at p 263) [52] again, defence counsel’s failure to object to the jury charge is significant. it belies the argument that the trial judge’s decision not to repeat evidence in an already lengthy jury charge constituted an error. as binnie j stated in r v. royz, 2009 scc 13, [2009] 1 scr 423, at para. 3: “lack of objection is not fatal, but it may be informative, because defence counsel would have understood that additional evidentiary matters reviewed at his request might result in the judge repeating additional portions of the evidence requested by the prosecution on the same point, which might in the end have been expected to be more prejudicial than helpful to the defence.” [53] overall, the jury was well aware of all the circumstances that mr. goforth argued prevented him from foreseeing the risk of harm to the children. indeed, on any reasonable view of the case, this, more than anything else, would appear to explain why ms. goforth was convicted of second degree murder whereas mr. goforth was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. i have no hesitation in concluding that the jury was properly instructed and that it rightly rejected mr. goforth’s defence that his circumstances prevented him from foreseeing the risk of harm to the children. d did the trial judge err by failing to explain what is meant by a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances? [54] on appeal to this court, mr. goforth reiterates that the trial judge’s failure to explain the meaning of the term “marked departure” also left the jury ill-equipped to apply the mens rea standard. mr. goforth argues that this case is analogous to r v. stephan, 2017 abca 380, 423 dlr (4th) 56, rev’d 2018 scc 21, [2018] 1 scr. 633. in stephan, this court ordered a new trial because the trial judge, among other things, “did not sufficiently explain the concept of marked departure in a way that the jury could understand and apply it” (para. 2). [55] i do not agree with this submission. in the circumstances of this case, a new trial is not warranted simply because the trial judge did not explain the meaning of the term “marked departure”. this case is easily distinguishable from stephan, in which this court agreed with o’ferrall ja that the trial judge had erred by failing to describe what is meant by this term. in stephan, the alleged marked departure pertained to the conduct of parents who relied on naturopathic and home remedies to treat their child’s suspected meningitis in that case, the trial judge was required to explain more thoroughly what a marked departure was due to the difficulty of assessing whether the parents’ conduct in the circumstances constituted a marked departure — hindsight is not the same as foresight. moreover, there was an additional concern in stephan that the jury may have thought that a reasonable parent should react more like a medical professional since there was a large body of expert medical evidence. [56] there are no such concerns with respect to mr. goforth the alleged marked departure in this case relates to whether a reasonable person would have foreseen that failing to provide food or fluids to young children — one of whom ultimately died as a result of brain injury that developed following a cardiac arrest caused by malnutrition and dehydration — would result in a risk of danger to life or of permanent endangerment to health. given this context, the jury was easily able to assess whether the failure to provide food or fluids to young children constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances. [57] again, the fact that mr. goforth failed to object to the jury charge and request an instruction on the meaning of “marked departure” speaks volumes. it was simply not in his interest to do so and it was inconsistent with his defence at trial — namely, that neither he nor his wife ever denied food or fluids to the children and that medical attention was not required up until the time they took the older child to the hospital. [58] my colleague is incorrect to assert that i am, in substance, applying the curative proviso it must be remembered that the “adequacy of the jury instructions must be assessed in the context of the evidence and the trial as a whole” (pickton, at para. 10) jury charges may therefore focus on what is “actually and realistically at issue in the case” (para. 10). the charge in this case was adequate because, based on the evidence and the trial as a whole, there was no issue as to whether the failure to provide food or fluids to young children constituted a marked departure — it was not a “difficult concept” to understand or apply in the circumstances. furthermore, i would reiterate what dickson cj stated in r v. corbett, [1988] 1 scr 670, at pp. 693-94: we should maintain our strong faith in juries which have, in the words of sir william holdsworth, “for some hundreds of years been constantly bringing the rules of law to the touchstone of contemporary common sense” (holdsworth, a history of english law (7th ed 1956), vol. i, at p 349). jurors do not check their common sense at the door of the deliberation room. given the evidence and the circumstances of the trial as a whole, i am confident that the jury in this case was well-equipped to make a common sense assessment of whether failing to provide food or fluids to young children constituted a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person. e. if the trial judge erred, can the curative proviso be applied? [59] in light of my conclusion that the jury charge functionally conveyed the necessary law and evidence to the jury, it is not necessary to resort to the application of the curative proviso. vi disposition [60] the appeal is allowed, the convictions are restored, and the sentence appeal is remitted to the court of appeal. the reasons of brown, martin and jamal jj. were delivered by brown j — [61] i agree with my colleagues that the appeal should be allowed. but i do not accept that the jury charge, when viewed from the “functional perspective” required by the jurisprudence, “properly . . . equipped [the jury] to decide the case” according to law (r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr 579, at para. 54). [62] at many points ⸺ five, by my colleagues’ count, which i accept ⸺ this jury charge misstated an essential element of the offence that comprised the central issue, being whether the crown had established the mens rea for the offence of failing to provide the necessaries of life. yet, in concluding that the charge was “functionally” adequate, my colleagues point to a single instance, in “a different portion of the charge”, in which “the trial judge . . . clearly and correctly summarized the required mens rea” (para. 33) this, they say, was “the clearest explanation of the mens rea requirement” (para. 37). [63] what my colleagues do not account for, however, is that, merely because they have the insight to distinguish the single correct instruction from the repeated incorrect instructions, it does not follow that the jury had that insight. this charge may have been “functionally” adequate from the standpoint of a reviewing court searching for a correct instruction. but that is not the same thing as a charge that is “functionally” adequate for the purposes of a jury knowing the law that it must apply to the evidence. there is no reason to suppose that this jury could possibly have known to single out that single correct instruction as the one to follow, and to ignore the five incorrect instructions as mere distractions. that my colleagues observe that the single correct instruction was “the clearest explanation” is of no significance, either, since that observation is informed by their proper understanding of the law ⸺ an understanding which this jury did not have, which is precisely the problem. [64] in any event, focusing on one correct instruction interspersed with five incorrect instructions fails to take a functional approach to the charge. the functional approach requires the charge to be read as a whole and asks whether an appellate court can be satisfied that the jury would have adequately understood the issues involved, the law relating to the charge the accused was facing, and the evidence to be considered in resolving the issues (r v. jacquard, [1997] 1 scr 314, at para. 54; r v. daley, 2007 scc 53, [2007] 3 scr 523, at para. 31; r v. cooper, [1993] 1 scr 146, at p 163; r v. calnen, 2019 scc 6, [2019] 1 scr 301, at para. 8). my colleagues claim to be applying daley’s “cardinal rule” that “it is the general sense which the words used must have conveyed, in all probability, to the mind of the jury that matters, and not whether a particular formula was recited by the judge” (daley, at para. 30 (emphasis added)). of course, the words used in the charge need not represent some formulaic statement of the applicable law. but they must be an accurate statement of the law, and the jury must not be left to, in effect, cobble together its own charge by guessing correctly about which part of the charge to follow and which part to disregard. applying that standard, it is simply not possible to say that this charge passes muster. [65] my colleagues also place great weight on the single use of the word “further”, in a lengthy, convoluted charge (para. 38). the significance they ascribe to it is, with respect, hardly obvious. as for their stress upon counsel not having objected to the charge, and again with respect, this court has repeatedly observed that trial counsel’s failure to object, while a consideration, is not determinative (barton, at para. 48; daley, at para. 58; jacquard, at para. 37; r v. arcangioli, [1994] 1 scr. 129, at pp. 142-43; thériault v. the queen, [1981] 1 scr 336, at pp. 343-44; cullen v. the king, [1949] scr 658, at p 664). my colleagues concede this (at para. 39), but do not acknowledge the point that underlies why counsel’s failure to object is not determinative: ultimately, it is the trial judge who is responsible for the charge. [66] remarkably, my colleagues maintain (at paras. 55-56) that this charge was adequate despite the trial judge not sufficiently explaining the concept of a marked departure for the mens rea of failing to provide the necessaries of life, and despite this court in r v. stephan, 2018 scc 21, [2018] 1 scr 633, rev’g 2017 abca 380, 423 dlr (4th) 56, having ordered a new trial on precisely the basis that the “difficult concept” of a marked departure had not been properly explained to the jury (stephan (ca), at para. 247). they say, however, that there is no concern here because the jury, “[g]iven the evidence and the circumstances of the trial as a whole” (para. 58), was “easily able to assess whether the failure to provide food or fluids to young children constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances” (para. 56). but this is not the same thing as saying that the charge was adequate. in substance, and their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, my colleagues are applying the curative proviso. [67] the matter comes down to this by commingling, confusing and “routinely” and with “frequency” (to use my colleagues’ terms at paras. 35 and 37) substituting the differing standards of foreseeability of harm (as between manslaughter and failing to provide the necessaries of life), the trial judge left the jury equipped with a charge that, in critical sections, is not comprehensible to a legally trained reader, let alone to a layperson juror. compounding the confusion, the jury charge addressed the mens rea under a heading relating to the actus reus. it cannot plausibly be maintained that this charge left the jury equipped to do its job. [68] on this record, however, i am persuaded of the crown’s submission that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice flowed from the deficient instructions. it is inconceivable, given the extreme form which the failure to provide the necessaries of life took in this case, that the jury would not have found that the crown had established the more stringent foreseeability requirement applicable to failing to provide the necessaries of life. i would apply the curative proviso, allow the appeal and restore goforth’s convictions of manslaughter and unlawfully causing bodily harm. appeal allowed.
[1] the chief justice, moldaver, gascon, côté, brown, rowe and martin jj. — for more than 40 years, the super bowl game, which is played in the united states, had been broadcast in canada in ac- cordance with the “simultaneous substitution” regime, which was set out in various regulations made under the broadcasting act, sc 1991, c 11. as a result, canadians were prevented from viewing high- profile commercials that were aired in the us broadcast of the super bowl. [2] after a lengthy consultation process, the ca- nadian radio- television and telecommunications commission (“crtc”) decided that the broadcast of the super bowl should be exempt from the simulta- neous substitution regime as of january 1, 2017 (“fi- nal decision”), which meant that canadians would be free to view the us broadcast that features amer- ican commercials — which the crtc described as being “an integral element of the event”. the crtc implemented that decision by way of an order (“final order”) issued under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act, which provides that the crtc can require that television service providers “carry, on such terms and conditions as the [crtc] deems appropriate, programming services specified by the [crtc]”. [1] le juge en chef et les juges moldaver, gascon, côté, brown, rowe et martin  — pendant plus de 40 ans, le super bowl, qui se joue aux états- unis, a été diffusé au canada conformé- ment au régime de la « substitution simultanée » établi dans divers règlements pris en vertu de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, lc 1991, c 11. en raison de ce régime, la population canadienne n’était pas en mesure de voir les messages publicitaires hautement médiatisés qui sont présentés lors de la télédiffusion du super bowl par des stations américaines. [2] au terme d’un long processus de consultations, le conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunica- tions canadiennes (« crtc ») a décidé que la diffu- sion du super bowl devait être exemptée du régime de substitution simultanée à compter du 1er janvier 2017 (« décision définitive ») afin que la population canadienne puisse regarder la télédiffusion améri- caine de cet événement et ainsi voir les messages publicitaires américains — messages publicitaires que le crtc décrit comme constituant « un élément intégral de l’événement ». il a mis en œuvre cette décision au moyen d’une ordonnance (« ordonnance définitive ») rendue en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, disposition qui prévoit que le crtc peut obliger les fournisseurs de services de télévision à « offrir certains services de programma- tion selon les modalités qu’il précise ». [3] the main question in these statutory appeals is whether the crtc had the authority under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act to issue the final order. the federal court of appeal answered this question in the affirmative. applying the standard of reasonable- ness, it held — on the basis of “the deference owed to the crtc in its interpretation of its home statutes and the broad discretion conferred on the crtc by paragraph 9(1)(h)” — that “the crtc’s explanation [3] la principale question en litige dans les présents appels prévus par la loi consiste à décider si l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion confère au crtc le pouvoir de rendre l’ordonnance définitive. la cour d’appel fédérale a répondu par l’affirmative à cette question. appliquant la norme de la décision raison- nable, la cour a conclu que — compte tenu de « la défé- rence qui est due au crtc lorsqu’il interprète ses lois habilitantes ainsi que le pouvoir discrétionnaire élargi [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 859 of its jurisdiction to make the final order is justifia- ble, transparent, and intelligible and falls within the range of reasonable outcomes defensible in respect of the facts and the law” (2017 fca 249, [2018] 4 fcr 300, at para 28). [4] we arrive at a different conclusion. the appli- cable standard must be determined in accordance with the framework set out in canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, [2019] 4 scr 653, a case this court heard to- gether with these statutory appeals in order to “con- sider the law applicable to the judicial review of administrative decisions as addressed in dunsmuir and subsequent cases” (vavilov, at para 6). given that the appellants have challenged the crtc’s final decision and final order by way of the statutory appeal mechanism provided for in s. 31(2) of the broadcasting act, the appellate standards of review apply here (vavilov, at paras 36-52). and because the issues in these appeals raise legal questions that go directly to the limits of the crtc’s statutory grant of power, and therefore plainly fall within the scope of the statutory appeal mechanism referred to above, the applicable standard is correctness. [5] applying this standard, we are of the view that the final order was issued on the basis of an in- correct interpretation of the scope of the authority conferred on the crtc under s 9(1)(h). properly interpreted, s. 9(1)(h) only authorizes the issuance of mandatory carriage orders — orders that require television service providers to carry specific channels as part of their cable or satellite offerings — that include specified terms and conditions. it does not empower the crtc to impose terms and conditions on the distribution of programming services gener- ally. accordingly, because the final order does not actually mandate that television service providers distribute a channel that broadcasts the super bowl, but instead simply imposes a condition on those that already do, its issuance was not authorized by s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act. conféré au crtc par l’alinéa 9(1)h) » — « [l’]expli- cation [du crtc] quant à sa compétence pour rendre son ordonnance définitive est justifiée, transparente et intelligible, et elle appartient aux issues raisonnables pouvant se justifier en regard des faits et du droit » (2017 caf 249, [2018] 4 rcf 300, par 28). [4] nous en arrivons à une conclusion différente. la norme de contrôle applicable doit être déterminée conformément au cadre d’analyse établi dans l’arrêt canada (citoyenneté et immigration) c. vavilov, 2019 csc 65, [2019] 4 rcs 653, que la cour a entendu en même temps que les présents pourvois prévus par la loi afin de « se pencher sur le droit applicable au contrôle judiciaire des décisions ad- ministratives tel que traité dans l’arrêt dunsmuir et les arrêts subséquents » (vavilov, par 6). comme les appelantes ont contesté la décision définitive et l’ordonnance définitive du crtc par le mécanisme d’appel prévu au par. 31(2) de la loi sur la radiodif- fusion, les normes de contrôle applicables en appel s’appliquent en l’espèce (vavilov, par 36-52). et parce que les points en litige dans les présents pour- vois soulèvent des questions de droit qui concernent directement les limites du pouvoir conféré par la loi au crtc et qui, de ce fait, relèvent clairement du mécanisme d’appel susmentionné, la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la décision correcte. [5] suivant cette norme, nous estimons que l’or- donnance définitive a été rendue sur la base d’une in- terprétation erronée de l’étendue du pouvoir conféré au crtc par l’al 9(1)h). interprétée correctement, cette disposition autorise seulement la délivrance d’ordonnances de distribution obligatoire — c-à-d. des ordonnances obligeant les fournisseurs de ser- vices de télévision à distribuer certaines chaînes dans le cadre des services par câble ou par satellite qu’ils offrent — selon des modalités précisées. elle n’ha- bilite toutefois pas le crtc à imposer des modalités régissant la distribution de services de program- mation d’une manière générale par conséquent, comme l’ordonnance définitive n’impose pas aux fournisseurs de services de télévision l’obligation de distribuer une chaîne qui diffuse le super bowl, mais impose plutôt une condition à ceux qui le font déjà, la délivrance de cette ordonnance n’était pas autorisée en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion. 860 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. [6] we would allow the appeals and quash the final order and the final decision accordingly. [6] nous sommes d’avis d’accueillir les pourvois et en conséquence de casser l’ordonnance définitive et la décision définitive. i background i le contexte a overview of simultaneous substitution in can- a survol de la substitution simultanée au canada ada [7] the crtc is an independent public authority that oversees broadcasting and telecommunications in canada section  5(1) of the broadcasting act requires that the crtc “regulate and supervise all aspects of the canadian broadcasting system with a view to implementing the broadcasting policy set out in subsection 3(1)” of that act. [7] le crtc est un organisme public indépendant qui surveille la radiodiffusion et les télécommunica- tions au canada. selon le par. 5(1) de la loi sur la ra- diodiffusion, le crtc « réglemente et surveille tous les aspects du système canadien de radiodiffusion en vue de mettre en œuvre la politique canadienne de radiodiffusion ». in regulating the canadian broadcasting in- [8] dustry, the crtc is required, for the most part, to ensure that all “programming undertakings” and “distribution undertakings” are licensed and that they comply with all conditions applicable to such licences (broadcasting act, ss. 32 and 33). [9] programming undertakings are broadcasters, or television stations, that “acquire, create and pro- duce television programming, and are licensed by the crtc to serve a certain geographic area within the reach of their signal transmitters” (reference re broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2010- 167 and broadcasting order crtc 2010- 168, 2012 scc 68, [2012] 3 scr 489 (“cogeco”), at para 4). although the signals of local television stations can be received for free by anyone with the proper equipment, most canadians receive them from “distribution under- takings” — which are essentially television service providers like bell — as part of their cable, satellite or internet tv subscriptions (broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2015-24, january 29, 2015 (online), at para 3). these distribution undertakings receive signals from television stations, and retransmit them to their subscribers for a fee (cogeco, at para 4). [8] dans le cadre de la réglementation de l’indus- trie canadienne de la radiodiffusion, le crtc veille principalement à ce que toutes les « entreprises de programmation » et toutes les « entreprises de dis- tribution » détiennent une licence et se conforment aux modalités applicables à ces licences (loi sur la radiodiffusion, art. 32 et 33). [9] les entreprises de programmation sont des radiodiffuseurs ou des stations de télévision qui « ac- quièrent, créent et produisent des émissions de télévi- sion. le crtc leur délivre des licences les autorisant à desservir une région donnée à l’intérieur de la por- tée de leur émetteur » (renvoi relatif à la politique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2010- 167 et l’ordonnance de radiodiffusion crtc 2010- 168, 2012 csc 68, [2012] 3 rcs 489 (« cogeco »), par 4). bien que les signaux des stations de télévision locales puissent être captés gratuitement par toute personne disposant de l’équipement approprié, la plupart des canadiennes et des canadiens reçoivent ces signaux d’« entreprises de distribution » — qui sont essentiellement des fournisseurs de services de télévision comme bell — dans le cadre de leur abonnement à un service de télévision par câble, par satellite ou sur internet (politique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2015-24, 29 janvier 2015 (en ligne), par 3). ces entreprises de distribution reçoivent les signaux de stations de télévision, et les retransmettent à leurs abonnés moyennant certains frais (cogeco, par 4). [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 861 [10] given the technical nature of these terms, we will refer in these reasons to distribution un- dertakings as “television service providers”, and programming undertakings as “television stations”. some of the authorities also refer to programming undertakings as “broadcasters”. [11] section 7 of the broadcasting distribution reg- ulations, sor/97- 555 (“distribution regulations”), provides that, as a general rule, television service pro- viders cannot alter or delete the signals of television stations while retransmitting them. section 7(a) of the distribution regulations provides for an exception to this rule that applies where simultaneous substitution of the signal is either required or authorized under the simultaneous programming service deletion and substitution regulations, sor/2015- 240 (“simulta- neous substitution regulations”). the simultaneous substitution regulations were made by the crtc in november 2015 pursuant to its powers under s. 10(1) of the broadcasting act. [12] simultaneous substitution is a process by which a television service provider temporarily deletes and replaces the entire signal of a distant (usually national or international) television station with the signal of another (usually local) television station that is airing the same program at the same time requests for simultaneous substitution are most often made by canadian television stations that hold exclusive broadcasting rights to a par- ticular american program so as to require that television service providers in canada replace the signal of an american station airing the same pro- gram with the canadian station’s signal. for ex- ample, if the canadian broadcasting corporation (“cbc”) owns the exclusive broadcasting rights for a specific event (eg the academy awards), it can request that the signal of an american station airing that event (e.g a station of the american broadcasting company) be replaced with a cbc station’s signal. the result is that local viewers will see the cbc’s broadcast of that event — with the same content as the u.s broadcast but with [10] vu la nature technique de ces termes, dans les présents motifs, nous appellerons «  fournis- seurs de services de télévision » les entreprises de distribution, et « stations de télévision » les entre- prises de programmation. dans certaines sources, jurisprudentielles et autres, les entreprises de pro- grammation sont également appelées «  radiodif- fuseurs ». [11] l’article 7 du règlement sur la distribution de radiodiffusion, dors/97- 555 (« règlement sur la distribution »), précise que, en règle générale, les fournisseurs de services de télévision ne peuvent modifier ou retirer les signaux des stations de télé- vision au cours de leur retransmission. l’alinéa 7a) du règlement sur la distribution prévoit une ex- ception à cette règle dans le cas où la substitution simultanée du signal est faite en conformité avec le règlement sur le retrait et la substitution simultanés de services de programmation, dors/2015- 240 (« règlement sur la substitution simultanée »). le crtc a pris le règlement sur la substitution si- multanée en novembre 2015, en vertu des pouvoirs que lui confère le par. 10(1) de la loi sur la radio- diffusion. [12] la substitution simultanée est le processus par lequel un fournisseur de services de télévision retire temporairement le signal entier d’une station de télévision éloignée (généralement nationale ou internationale) pour le remplacer par le signal d’une autre station de télévision (généralement locale) qui diffuse la même émission en même temps. les demandes de substitution simultanée sont le plus souvent présentées par des stations de télévision canadiennes jouissant de droits exclusifs de télédif- fusion d’une émission américaine donnée afin que des fournisseurs de services de télévision canadiens remplacent le signal d’une station américaine qui diffuse cette émission par celui de la station cana- dienne. par exemple, si la canadian broadcasting corporation (« cbc ») jouit du droit exclusif de diffusion d’un événement donné (p ex la cérémonie de remise des oscars), elle peut demander que le signal d’une station américaine qui diffuse cet événe- ment (p ex une station de l’american broadcasting company) soit remplacé par celui de la cbc. ainsi, le téléspectateur local verra la télédiffusion par la 862 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. different commercials — when tuning in to either station. [13] an important reason why simultaneous sub- stitution is permitted by the crtc as an exception to the general rule in s. 7 of the distribution regulations is to allow canadian broadcasters to realize greater advertising revenues: the record of this proceeding indicates that simultane- ous substitution is still of significant benefit to canadian broadcasters since it allows them to fully exploit and mon- etize the programming rights they have acquired, to the benefit of their overall investment in the production of canadian programming. while the commission recog- nizes the challenges of quantifying the actual financial benefits of simultaneous substitution for broadcasters, it generally agrees that the estimated value of advertis- ing revenue attributable to substitution in the 2012- 2013 broadcast year was approximately $250 million. cbc de cet événement — avec le même contenu que la télédiffusion américaine, mais avec des publicités différentes — lorsqu’il syntonisera l’une ou l’autre de ces stations. [13] une raison importante pour laquelle le crtc autorise la substitution simultanée, à titre d’exception à la règle générale énoncée à l’art. 7 du règlement sur la distribution, est qu’une telle mesure permet aux radiodiffuseurs canadiens de générer des revenus publicitaires plus élevés : le dossier de la présente instance indique que la substitu- tion simultanée demeure très avantageuse pour les radio- diffuseurs canadiens puisqu’elle leur permet d’exploiter et de rentabiliser au maximum les droits d’émissions qu’ils achètent, au profit de leur investissement dans la produc- tion d’émissions canadiennes. bien que le conseil recon- naisse les défis en matière de quantification des avantages financiers réels de la substitution simultanée pour les ra- diodiffuseurs, il est en général d’avis que la valeur estimée des revenus de publicité attribuables à la substitution, pour l’année de radiodiffusion 2012- 2013, est d’environ 250 millions de dollars. (broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2015-25, january 29, 2015 (online), at para. 14) (politique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2015-25, 29 janvier 2015 (en ligne), par. 14) put simply, because simultaneous substitution allows local television stations to maximize their audiences for specific programs, those stations will be able to charge advertisers more for in- program commercials. en termes simples, parce que la substitution simul- tanée permet aux stations de télévision locales de maximiser leurs auditoires à l’égard de certaines émissions, ces stations peuvent demander aux an- nonceurs des tarifs plus élevés pour les messages publicitaires diffusés durant ces émissions. [14] section 3 of the simultaneous substitution regulations authorizes an operator of a canadian tel- evision station to ask a television service provider “to delete the programming service of another canadian television station or a non- canadian television sta- tion and substitute for it the programming service of a local television station or regional television sta- tion”. section 4(1)(b) requires that the television ser- vice provider carry out the requested action if, among other things, “the programming service to be deleted and the programming service to be substituted are comparable and are to be broadcast simultaneously”. pursuant to s. 4(3), however, a television service provider “must not delete a programming service [14] l’article 3 du règlement sur la substitution simultanée autorise l’exploitant d’une station de té- lévision canadienne à demander à un fournisseur de services de télévision « de retirer le service de pro- grammation d’une station de télévision canadienne ou d’une station de télévision non canadienne et d’y substituer le service de programmation d’une station de télévision locale ou d’une station de télévision régionale ». aux termes de l’al. 4(1)b), le fournisseur de services de télévision doit donner suite à la de- mande si, notamment, « le service de programmation à retirer et le service de programmation à substituer sont comparables et doivent être diffusés simultané- ment ». suivant le par. 4(3), toutefois, le fournisseur [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 863 and substitute another programming service for it if the [crtc] decides under subsection 18(3) of the broadcasting act that the deletion and substitution are not in the public interest”. section 18(3) of the broadcasting act reads as follows: the [crtc] may hold a public hearing, make a report, issue any decision and give any approval in connection with any complaint or representation made to the [crtc] or in connection with any other matter within its jurisdic- tion under this act if it is satisfied that it would be in the public interest to do so. de services de télévision « ne peut retirer un service de programmation et y substituer un autre service de programmation si le [crtc] rend une décision, en vertu du paragraphe 18(3) de la loi sur la radiodif- fusion, portant que le retrait et la substitution ne sont pas dans l’intérêt public ». le paragraphe 18(3) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion est rédigé ainsi : les plaintes et les observations présentées au [crtc], de même que toute autre question relevant de sa compé- tence au titre de la présente loi, font l’objet de telles au- diences, d’un rapport et d’une décision — notamment une approbation — si le [crtc] l’estime dans l’intérêt public. [15] the relevant provisions of the broadcasting act, the distribution regulations, and the simulta- neous substitution regulations are reproduced in full in appendix a to these reasons. [15] les dispositions pertinentes de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, du règlement sur la distribution et du règlement sur la substitution simultanée sont re- produites en entier à l’annexe a des présents motifs. b simultaneous substitution and the super bowl b la substitution simultanée et le super bowl [16] bell media inc. (“bell”) is a canadian broad- caster that owns and operates a number of television stations of the ctv network in large and small mar- kets across the country. [16] bell média inc. (« bell ») est un radiodiffuseur canadien qui possède et exploite un certain nombre de stations de télévision de ctv dans de petits et grands marchés partout au pays. [17] the national football league (“nfl”) is an unincorporated association of 32 separately owned member clubs, each of which operates a professional football team. the nfl’s super bowl championship game is among the most widely viewed single tele- vision events in canada each year. [18] the nfl owns the copyright for the television production of the super bowl. in 2013, it granted bell the exclusive right to broadcast that event in canada on ctv until the 2018- 2019 season. [17] la national football league (« nfl ») est une association non constituée en personne morale qui regroupe 32 équipes appartenant à des proprié- taires différents, qui exploitent chacun une équipe de football professionnel. le match de championnat de la nfl, le super bowl, figure chaque année parmi les événements télévisuels individuels les plus regardés au canada. [18] la nfl est titulaire des droits d’auteur sur la production télévisuelle du super bowl. en 2013, elle accorde à bell le droit exclusif de diffuser cet événement au canada sur ctv jusqu’à la saison 2018- 2019. [19] for over 40 years, the canadian broadcast of the super bowl had been subject to the applicable simultaneous substitution regime, which meant that the us broadcast of the event — featuring amer- ican commercials — was unavailable to canadian viewers. [19] depuis plus de 40 ans, la diffusion au canada du super bowl est assujettie au régime de substitu- tion simultanée, ce qui veut dire que les téléspec- tateurs canadiens n’ont pas accès à la télédiffusion américaine de cet événement, au cours de laquelle sont présentés les messages publicitaires américains. 864 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. in 2013, the crtc initiated a broad public [20] consultation, called “let’s talk tv: a conversation with canadians about the future of television”, for the purpose of reviewing the entire framework for the regulation of television in canada. as part of this consultation, it held a public hearing seeking com- ments on simultaneous substitution, through which canadians expressed frustration over their inability to see the high- profile commercials that are aired on the us broadcast of the super bowl. [20] en 2013, le crtc lance une vaste consulta- tion publique, appelée « parlons télé : une conversa- tion avec les canadiens sur l’avenir de la télévision », afin d’examiner l’ensemble du cadre réglementaire applicable à la télévision au canada. dans le cadre de cette consultation, il tient une audience publique visant à recueillir des commentaires sur la substitu- tion simultanée, audience au cours de laquelle des canadiennes et des canadiens ont exprimé leur frus- tration devant l’impossibilité de voir les messages publicitaires hautement médiatisés présentés lors de la télédiffusion américaine du super bowl. [21] on  january  29,  2015, the crtc released broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2015-25, in which it announced its intention to continue to allow the practice of simultaneous substitution gen- erally, but to disallow it for (among other things) broadcasts of the super bowl beginning in 2017. the crtc based this decision on “the comments received from canadians and the fact that the non- canadian advertising produced for the super bowl is an integral part of this special event program- ming” (para 22). [21] le 29 janvier 2015, le crtc publie la poli- tique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2015-25, annonçant son intention de continuer à permettre le recours à la substitution simultanée de façon géné- rale, mais de ne pas permettre cette mesure, entre autres, pour la radiodiffusion du super bowl, et ce, à compter de 2017. le crtc fonde sa décision sur « [l]es commentaires des canadiens et [le] fait que la publicité non canadienne produite à l’occasion du super bowl fait partie intégrante de la diffusion de cet événement spécial » (par 22). [22] on november 19, 2015, the crtc announced the enactment of the simultaneous substitution reg- ulations, which would replace the previous regime set out in the distribution regulations. in the ac- companying broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2015- 513, november 19, 2015 (online), the crtc indicated that it intended to prohibit simultaneous substitution for the super bowl by way of an order issued under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act. [22] le19 novembre 2015, le crtc annonce l’édic- tion du règlement sur la substitution simultanée, afin de remplacer le régime précédent établi dans le règlement sur la distribution. dans la politique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2015- 513, 19 novembre 2015 (en ligne) qui l’accompagne, le crtc indique qu’il entend interdire la substitution simultanée lors du super bowl en rendant une or- donnance en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion. [23] the federal court of appeal unanimously dis- missed statutory appeals brought by bell and the nfl against the crtc’s broadcasting regulatory policies of january and november 2015 and the promulgation of the simultaneous substitution regulations (bell canada v. canada (attorney general), 2016 fca 217, 402 dlr (4th) 551). writing for the court, de montigny ja held that it was premature to assess the validity of a proposed distribution order or regulation prohibiting simultaneous substitution for the super bowl, as no such order or regulation had actually been made as of the time of the hearing (para 34). [23] la cour d’appel fédérale rejette à l’unanimité les appels prévus par la loi interjetés par bell et la nfl à l’encontre des énoncés de politique de jan- vier et de novembre 2015 du crtc et de la prise du règlement sur la substitution simultanée (bell canada c. canada (procureur général), 2016 caf 217). rédigeant les motifs de la cour, le juge de montigny conclut qu’il est prématuré d’évaluer la validité d’un projet d’ordonnance de distribution ou de règlement interdisant la substitution simultanée à l’occasion du super bowl, étant donné qu’aucune ordonnance n’a encore été rendue ni aucun règlement [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 865 he also held that “the remedial regime set out in the [simultaneous substitution regulations] ha[d] been validly adopted” (para 54). [24] on february 3, 2016, the crtc invited com- ments on its proposed order under s. 9(1)(h) to pro- hibit simultaneous substitution for the super bowl (broadcasting notice of consultation crtc 2016-37, february 3, 2016 (online)). it received submissions from a number of interested parties, including bell and the nfl. pris au moment de l’audience (par 34). il juge égale- ment que « le régime de réparation énoncé dans [le règlement sur la substitution simultanée] a été pris à bon droit » (par 54). [24] le 3 février 2016, le crtc sollicite des com- mentaires au sujet de l’ordonnance qu’il se propose de rendre en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) afin d’interdire la substitution simultanée lors du super bowl (avis de consultation de radiodiffusion crtc 2016-37, 3 février 2016, (en ligne)). il reçoit les observations d’un certain nombre de parties intéressées, dont bell et la nfl. ii procedural history ii les décisions des juridictions inférieures a decisions of the crtc: broadcasting regula- tory policy crtc 2016- 334 and broadcasting order crtc 2016- 335, august 19, 2016 (on- line) a les décisions du crtc : politique réglemen- taire de radiodiffusion crtc 2016- 334 et or- donnance de radiodiffusion crtc 2016- 335, 19 août 2016 (en ligne) [25] on august 19, 2016, pursuant to s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act, the crtc issued broadcasting order 2016- 335 (“final order”), which prohibited simultaneous substitution for the super bowl as of january 1, 2017. the salient portion of the final order reads as follows: [25] le 19 août 2016, le crtc rend, en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, l’ordon- nance de radiodiffusion 2016- 335 (« ordonnance dé- finitive »), laquelle interdit la substitution simultanée du super bowl à compter du 1er janvier 2017. voici le passage pertinent de l’ordonnance définitive : a distribution undertaking subject to this order may only distribute the programming service of a canadian televi- sion station that broadcasts the super bowl if that distri- bution undertaking does not carry out a request made by that canadian television station pursuant to section 3 of the simultaneous programming service deletion and substi- tution regulations to delete the programming service of another canadian television station or a non- canadian television station and substitute for it the programming service of a local television station or regional television station during any period in which the super bowl is being broadcast on the requesting canadian television station. [para. 3] une entreprise de distribution visée par la présente ordon- nance peut distribuer le service de programmation d’une station de télévision canadienne qui diffuse le super bowl seulement si l’entreprise de distribution ne donne pas suite à une demande déposée par cette station de télévision ca- nadienne, en vertu de l’article 3 du règlement sur le retrait et la substitution simultanée de services de programma- tion, qui exigerait de retirer le service de programmation d’une autre station de télévision canadienne ou non ca- nadienne pour y substituer le service de programmation d’une station de télévision locale ou régionale pendant toute période où le super bowl est diffusé par la station de télévision canadienne ayant déposé la demande. [par. 3] [26] the crtc’s reasons for issuing the final order are set out in broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2016- 334 (“final decision”). in those rea- sons, the crtc expressed the view that the decision to no longer authorize simultaneous substitution for the super bowl reflected a reasonable balance of the many policy objectives of the broadcasting act. [26] les motifs exposés par le crtc pour justifier la délivrance de l’ordonnance définitive sont énon- cés dans la politique réglementaire de radiodiffu- sion crtc 2016- 334 (« décision définitive »). dans ces motifs, le crtc exprime l’avis que la décision de ne plus autoriser la substitution simultanée du super bowl établit un équilibre raisonnable entre les 866 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. the crtc also held that its authority to implement that policy decision was rooted in s. 9(1)(h) of that act, and that the final order issued pursuant to that authority satisfied the requirement of s. 4(3) of the simultaneous substitution regulations. as we noted above, s. 4(3) prohibits television service providers from carrying out simultaneous substitution where the crtc has decided, under s. 18(3) of the broad- casting act, that doing so is not in the public interest. [27] among the legal submissions advanced during the consultation process, bell and the nfl argued that the crtc lacked jurisdiction to issue the final order under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act. they took the position that orders issued under s. 9(1)(h) “can only affect a programming service (that is, the entire output of a service), and not an individual program such as the super bowl” (final decision, at para 52). the crtc rejected this argument, finding that the provision in question confers on it the “broad power to regulate the cable industry and impose any conditions necessary to do so” (para 21). it ex- plained the relationship between s. 9(1)(h) and the final order specifically as follows: nombreux objectifs de politique générale de la loi sur la radiodiffusion. le crtc conclut également que son pouvoir de mettre en œuvre cette décision de politique générale tire son origine de l’al. 9(1)h) de cette loi, et que l’ordonnance définitive rendue en vertu de ce pouvoir satisfait au par. 4(3) du rè- glement sur la substitution simultanée. comme nous l’avons vu, cette disposition interdit aux fournisseurs de services de télévision de procéder à la substitution simultanée si le crtc décide, en vertu du par. 18(3) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, qu’il n’est pas dans l’intérêt public de le faire. [27] parmi les arguments juridiques invoqués dans le cadre du processus de consultation, bell et la nfl soutiennent que le crtc n’a pas compétence en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion pour rendre l’ordonnance définitive. elles font plutôt valoir qu’une ordonnance rendue suivant cette disposition « ne peut porter que sur un service de programma- tion (l’entièreté du signal d’un service) et non cibler une émission particulière comme le su per bowl » (décision définitive, par 52). le crtc ne retient pas ces arguments, concluant que la disposition contestée lui confère le « pouvoir étendu [  ] de réglementer l’industrie du câble et d’imposer toute condition pour ce faire » (par 21). sur le rapport entre l’al. 9(1)h) et l’ordonnance définitive de façon plus particulière, le crtc formule les explications suivantes : the proposed distribution order relates to the distribution of a “canadian television station that broadcasts the super bowl”,    and then imposes a condition on that distribu- tion, specifically, that the simultaneous substitution shall not be performed during the super bowl. further, the wording of the proposed order adequately responds to the contention that s. 9(1)(h) can only operate with respect to a programming service, as opposed to a particular program (such as the super bowl). l’ordonnance de distribution proposée porte sur la distri- bution « d’une station de télévision canadienne qui diffuse le super bowl », [  ] puis impose une condition à cette distribution en précisant que la substitution simultanée ne doit pas être effectuée lors du super bowl. de plus, la formulation de l’ordonnance proposée répond adéquate- ment à l’allégation selon laquelle l’article 9(1)h) ne peut s’appliquer qu’à un service de programmation et non à une émission en particulier (comme le super bowl). moreover, the distribution order reflects the way simulta- neous substitution is actually performed. the entire output of a programming service is, for a particular program, deleted and the entire output of another programming service is substituted, until that program ends. the dis- tribution order reflects the notion that the entire output of the programming service of a television station will not be deleted and substituted for the super bowl, a particular program. [paras. 54-55] en outre, l’ordonnance de distribution reflète la façon dont la substitution simultanée est effectuée. pour une émission précise, le signal intégral d’un service de programmation est supprimé et le signal intégral d’un autre service de pro- grammation lui est substitué jusqu’à la fin de l’émission. l’ordonnance de distribution reflète le fait que le signal intégral du service de programmation d’une station de télévision ne sera ni supprimé ni substitué au cours d’une émission particulière, le super bowl. [par. 54-55] [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 867 [28] the final decision also addressed a sub- mission from sasktel that the wording of the final order could be interpreted as requiring a television service provider to distribute a canadian television station that broadcasts the super bowl, even if it does not otherwise distribute that station (para 62). the crtc clarified its position: the final order was not intended to mandate the distribution of a station that broadcasts the super bowl, “but simply to add a condition that must be fulfilled should a [television service provider] carry the station (whether it is be- ing carried because it is mandated to be carried by regulation as a local television station, or whether it is simply authorized to be carried as a distant signal)” (para. 63 (emphasis added)). [28] la décision définitive répond également à l’observation de sasktel selon laquelle la formula- tion de l’ordonnance définitive pourrait être interpré- tée comme ayant pour effet d’imposer au fournisseur de services de télévision de distribuer la station de télévision canadienne qui diffuse le super bowl, même s’il ne la distribue pas déjà (par 62). le crtc précise sa position  : l’ordonnance définitive n’a jamais eu pour objet d’imposer la distribution d’une station qui diffuse le super bowl, « mais simplement d’ajouter une condition aux [fournisseurs de services de télévision] qui distribuent une telle station (que cette distribution soit obligatoire en vertu de la ré- glementation à titre de station de télévision locale ou qu’elle soit simplement autorisée à titre de signal éloigné) » (par. 63 (nous soulignons)). b decision of the federal court of appeal: 2017 b l’arrêt de la cour d’appel fédérale : 2017 caf fca 249, [2018] 4 fcr 300 249, [2018] 4 rcf 300 [29] bell and the nfl were granted leave to ap- peal the final decision and the final order to the federal court of appeal pursuant to s. 31(2) of the broadcasting act. their appeals were unanimously dismissed. [29] bell et la nfl obtiennent, en vertu du par. 31(2) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, l’autorisation de faire appel devant la cour d’appel fédérale de la décision définitive et de l’ordonnance définitive. leurs appels sont rejetés à l’unanimité. [30] near ja, writing for the court, began his anal- ysis by considering the issue of whether the crtc had jurisdiction to issue the final order pursuant to s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act. after identifying reasonableness as the applicable standard of review, he found that it was reasonable for the crtc to have interpreted that the term “programming services”, as it is used in s. 9(1)(h), includes an individual program like the super bowl. he also found that the crtc’s policy determination that simultaneous substitution for the super bowl was not in the public interest was entitled to deference on appeal (para. 24), and that once it had made this determination under s. 18(3) of the broadcasting act, “it was entitled to exempt the super bowl from the simultaneous substitution re- gime under [s.] 4(3) of the [simultaneous substitution regulations]” (para 25). [30] rédigeant les motifs de la cour d’appel fédé- rale, le juge near commence son analyse en exami- nant la question de savoir si le crtc a compétence en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion pour rendre l’ordonnance définitive. après avoir déterminé que la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la décision raisonnable, il statue qu’il était raisonnable de la part du crtc d’avoir considéré que l’expression « services de programmation », telle qu’elle est employée à l’al. 9(1)h), peut s’en- tendre d’une seule et unique émission comme le super bowl. il conclut également que la décision de politique générale du crtc selon laquelle la substitution simultanée du super  bowl n’est pas dans l’intérêt public commande la déférence en appel (par. 24), et qu’après avoir rendu cette décision en vertu du par. 18(3) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, « le crtc pouvait alors exempter le super bowl du régime de substitution simultanée au titre du para- graphe 4(3) du [règlement sur la substitution simul- tanée] » (par 25). 868 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. in addition to challenging the reasonableness [31] of the crtc’s final decision and final order, the nfl argued that the final order should be set aside on the basis that it conflicted with the copyright act, rsc 1985, c. c-42, and with international trade law. near ja agreed with the nfl that the standard of review for this issue was correctness, both because the copyright act is not the crtc’s “home statute” and because the crtc shares concurrent jurisdiction over the application of that act with the copyright board and courts at first instance (para 38). on the merits, however, he found no conflict of purpose or operational conflict between the final order and the copyright act, and rejected the nfl’s submission on this issue accordingly. [31] en plus de contester le caractère raisonnable de la décision définitive et de l’ordonnance défini- tive du crtc, la nfl fait valoir que l’ordonnance définitive doit être annulée parce qu’elle entre en conflit avec la loi sur le droit d’auteur, lrc 1985, c. c-42, et le droit commercial international. le juge near retient l’argument de la nfl suivant lequel la norme de contrôle applicable à cette question est celle de la décision correcte, à la fois parce que la loi sur le droit d’auteur n’est pas la « loi habilitante » du crtc et parce que le crtc partage sa compé- tence à l’égard de l’application de celle-ci avec la commission du droit d’auteur et les tribunaux de première instance (par 38). sur le fond, toutefois, il conclut à l’absence de conflit — sur le plan de l’objet et de l’application — entre l’ordonnance définitive et la loi sur le droit d’auteur, et il rejette en consé- quence l’argument de la nfl à cet égard. iii analysis iii analyse [32] before this court, the appellants, bell and the nfl, submit that the final order and the final decision should be set aside on the basis that the crtc lacked the statutory authority, pursuant to s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act, to prohibit simul- taneous substitution for the super bowl. they also submit that the final decision and the final order are invalid because they conflict with the operation and the purpose of s. 31(2) of the copyright act. [33] because we accept the appellants’ primary jurisdictional argument and would allow the appeals on that basis alone, we find it unnecessary to address the purported conflict between the final decision and order and the copyright act. the two issues that we will address in these reasons are therefore the following: [32] devant notre cour, les appelantes bell et la nfl soutiennent que l’ordonnance définitive et la décision définitive devraient être annulées au motif que le crtc n’a pas le pouvoir, en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, d’interdire la substitu- tion simultanée du super bowl. elles plaident en outre que la décision définitive et l’ordonnance définitive sont également invalides parce qu’elles entrent en conflit avec l’application et l’objet du par. 31(2) de la loi sur le droit d’auteur. [33] étant donné que nous souscrivons au principal argument des appelantes relativement à la question de la compétence, et que nous sommes d’avis d’accueillir les pourvois sur cette seule base, nous estimons qu’il n’est pas nécessaire d’examiner le conflit entre la décision définitive et l’ordonnance définitive d’une part, et la loi sur le droit d’auteur d’autre part. les deux questions sur lesquelles nous nous penchons dans les présents motifs sont donc les suivantes : 1 what standard should this court apply in review- ing the crtc’s decision regarding the scope of its authority under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act? 1 selon quelle norme la cour doit- elle contrôler la décision du crtc concernant l’étendue du pouvoir que lui confère l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion? 2 was the crtc correct in deciding that it had the power under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act to 2 le crtc a-t-il eu raison de décider qu’il avait, en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 869 implement its final decision to issue the final order prohibiting simultaneous substitution for the super bowl? le pouvoir de mettre en œuvre sa décision défini- tive de rendre l’ordonnance définitive interdisant la substitution simultanée du super bowl? a correctness as the applicable standard of re- a la norme de contrôle applicable : la norme de view la décision correcte [34] bell and the nfl challenge the final deci- sion and the final order by means of the statutory appeal mechanism provided for in s. 31(2) of the broadcasting act, which allows for an appeal to be brought to the federal court of appeal, with leave, “on a question of law or a question of jurisdiction”. the appellate standards of review therefore apply (see vavilov, at paras 36-52). [35] bell and the nfl do not dispute that the crtc is the administrative body that is statutorily man- dated with overseeing broadcasting and telecommu- nications in canada in accordance with the policy objectives set out in the broadcasting act and the telecommunications act, sc 1993, c 38. instead, the primary ground of appeal they advance in this case is that the crtc lacked the authority to issue a spe- cific order prohibiting simultaneous substitution for the super bowl under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act. this raises a question that goes directly to the limits of the crtc’s statutory grant of power, and therefore plainly falls within the scope of the statutory appeal mechanism of s. 31(2); the attorney general of canada conceded as much in oral argument (tran- script, day 1, at p 80)1. the applicable standard is therefore correctness (housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at para 8). [34] bell et la nfl contestent la décision défini- tive et l’ordonnance définitive au moyen du méca- nisme d’appel prévu au par. 31(2) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, lequel prévoit la possibilité d’interje- ter appel devant la cour d’appel fédérale, avec l’au- torisation de celle-ci, « sur une question de droit ou de compétence ». les normes de contrôle applicables en appel s’appliquent donc en l’espèce (voir vavilov, par 36-52). [35] bell et la nfl ne contestent pas que le crtc est l’organisme administratif chargé par la loi de sur- veiller la radiodiffusion et les télécommunications au canada, conformément aux objectifs de politique générale énoncés dans la loi sur la radiodiffusion et la loi sur les télécommunications, lc 1993, c 38. le principal moyen d’appel qu’elles invoquent en l’espèce est plutôt que le crtc n’a pas, en vertu de l’al.  9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, le pouvoir de rendre une ordonnance particulière in- terdisant la substitution simultanée du super bowl. cet argument soulève une question qui touche direc- tement aux limites du pouvoir conféré par la loi au crtc et qui, de ce fait, relève clairement du méca- nisme d’appel prévu au par. 31(2); ce que concède d’ailleurs le procureur général du canada au cours des plaidoiries (transcription de l’audience, jour 1, p 80)1. la norme applicable est par conséquent celle de la décision correcte (housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, par 8). b crtc’s authority under section 9(1)(h) of the b le pouvoir conféré au crtc par l’alinéa 9(1)h) broadcasting act de la loi sur la radiodiffusion [36] the main issue on the merits of the appeals is therefore whether the crtc was correct in [36] la principale question de fond à trancher dans les présents pourvois consiste donc à décider si le 1 “mr. morris: i wouldn’t dispute that in this case you are dealing with a question of jurisdiction within the sense of [s. 31(2) of the broadcasting act], there is no doubt about that, but it is absolutely is [sic] not a true question of jurisdiction.” 1 [traduction] « m. morris : je ne conteste pas qu’en l’espèce vous êtes en présence d’une question de compétence au sens de cette disposition [c à d le par. 31(2) de la loi sur la radiodiffu- sion], cela ne fait aucun doute, mais il ne s’agit absolument pas d’une véritable question de compétence. » 870 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. determining that it had the authority, pursuant to s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act, to implement its final decision to issue the final order prohibiting simultaneous substitution for the super bowl. before determining the scope of the crtc’s power under that provision, we will begin with an analysis of the nature and effect of the final order. crtc a eu raison de statuer qu’il a le pouvoir, en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, de mettre en œuvre sa décision définitive de rendre l’ordonnance définitive interdisant la substitution simultanée du super  bowl. avant de déterminer l’étendue du pouvoir que confère cette disposition législative au crtc, nous analysons d’abord la na- ture et l’effet de l’ordonnance définitive. (1) nature and effect of the final order (1) la nature et l’effet de l’ordonnance définitive [37] the final order permits television service providers to distribute “the programming service of a canadian television station that broadcasts the super bowl” (final decision, at para. 53), on the condition that they refrain from carrying out a re- quest for simultaneous substitution from that station for the duration of the event. its effect is therefore that a television service provider that distributes both american and canadian television stations airing the super bowl must do so without altering their respective signals. [38] it is important to recognize, however, that the final order does not require that television service providers distribute any programming services to their customers; this was made clear in the crtc’s final decision. responding to sasktel’s concern that the wording of the final order “could be inter- preted as requiring a [television service provider] to distribute a    station that broadcasts the super bowl, even if it does not already distribute that sta- tion” (para. 62), the crtc gave the following ex- planation: [37] l’ordonnance définitive permet aux fournis- seurs de services de télévision de distribuer « le ser- vice de programmation d’une station de télévision canadienne qui diffuse le super bowl » (décision définitive, par. 53), à la condition que ces fournis- seurs s’abstiennent de donner suite à une demande qui serait déposée par la station en question en vue d’obtenir la substitution simultanée pendant toute la durée de l’événement. en conséquence, l’ordon- nance a pour effet qu’un fournisseur de services de télévision qui distribue à la fois une station de télévision canadienne et une station de télévision américaine diffusant toutes deux le super bowl doit le faire sans modifier leur signal respectif. [38] il importe toutefois de reconnaître que l’or- donnance définitive n’oblige pas les fournisseurs de services de télévision à distribuer des services de programmation donnés à leurs clients; cela est clai- rement indiqué dans la décision définitive du crtc. en effet, répondant à la préoccupation de sasktel selon laquelle la formulation de l’ordonnance défi- nitive « pourrait être interprétée comme l’imposition à [tout fournisseur de services de télévision] de dis- tribuer une station qui diffuse le super bowl, même si [le fournisseur de services de télévision] ne la distribue pas déjà », la crtc fournit les explications suivantes : it was not the [crtc’s] intent to mandate [television service providers] to distribute a station that broadcasts the super bowl, but simply to add a condition that must be fulfilled should a [television service provider] carry the station (whether it is being carried because it is mandated to be carried by regulation as a local television station, or whether it is simply authorized to be carried as a distant signal). accordingly, sasktel is correct as to the intent of le [crtc] n’avait pas l’intention d’obliger [les fournis- seurs de services de télévision] à distribuer une station qui diffuse le super bowl, mais simplement d’ajouter une condition aux [fournisseurs de services de télévision] qui distribuent une telle station (que cette distribution soit obligatoire en vertu de la réglementation à titre de station de télévision locale ou qu’elle soit simplement autorisée à titre de signal éloigné). par conséquent, la proposition [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 871 the distribution order and how the [crtc] will interpret it in the future. [para. 63] de sasktel correspond à l’intention de l’ordonnance de distribution et à son interprétation future par le [crtc]. [par. 63] [39] the result is therefore that the condition of carriage set out in the final order — prohibiting simultaneous substitution for the super bowl — ap- plies only to those service providers that already distribute the programming services of a canadian television station airing the super bowl, either be- cause they are required to do so in accordance with some other order or have chosen to do so on a dis- cretionary basis. the final order does not mandate the distribution of any such station. [39] il s’ensuit donc que la condition de distribu- tion énoncée dans l’ordonnance définitive — qui interdit la substitution simultanée du super bowl — s’applique seulement aux fournisseurs de services qui distribuent déjà les services de programmation d’une station de télévision canadienne qui présente le super bowl, que ce soit parce qu’ils sont tenus de le faire en vertu d’une autre ordonnance ou parce qu’ils ont choisi de le faire de leur plein gré. l’ordonnance définitive n’impose pas la distribution d’une telle station. (2) scope of the crtc’s power under sec- tion 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act (2) l’étendue du pouvoir conféré au crtc par l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion [40] the main thrust of the position advanced by bell and the nfl is that the final order exceeds the authority delegated to the crtc under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act. that provision reads as follows: [40] l’idée maîtresse de la position avancée par bell et la nfl est que l’ordonnance définitive dé- borde le cadre du pouvoir qui est délégué au crtc par l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, dis- position qui est rédigée ainsi : 9 (1) subject to this part, the [crtc] may, in furtherance of its objects, 9 (1) sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente partie, le [crtc] peut, dans l’exécution de sa mission :   .   . (h) require any licensee who is authorized to carry on a distribution undertaking to carry, on such terms and conditions as the [crtc] deems appropriate, program- ming services specified by the [crtc]. h) obliger [les] titulaires [de licences d’exploitation d’entreprises de distribution] à offrir certains services de programmation selon les modalités qu’il précise. [41] the scope of the crtc’s authority under s. 9(1)(h) is to be determined by interpreting that pro- vision in accordance with the modern approach to statutory interpretation. as this court has reiterated on numerous occasions, this approach requires that the words of the statute be read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmo- nious with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (e a driedger,. construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87, as quoted in rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, and most recently in r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr 579, at para 71). [41] l’étendue du pouvoir conféré au crtc doit être déterminée en interprétant cette disposition con- formément à la démarche moderne d’interprétation des lois. comme l’a maintes fois répété notre cour, conformément à cette démarche, les termes d’une loi doivent être lus [traduction] « dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’esprit de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur » (e a driedger,. construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p. 87, cité dans rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27, par. 21, et plus récemment dans r c. barton, 2019 csc 33, [2019] 2 rcs 579, par 71). 872 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. [42] bell and the nfl submit that s. 9(1)(h) “does not allow the crtc to require that [television service providers] carry a specific program, or set terms and conditions for the carriage of a single program like the super bowl” (af (nfl), at para 35). rather, they say, the term “programming services” as used in that provision refers to the entire aggregation of programs broadcast by a television station. on this basis, they submit that the crtc cannot issue a s. 9(1)(h) order that targets individual programs, like the super bowl. [43] to begin, we observe that the final order appears to impose a condition on the distribution of a canadian television station’s signal; the order effectively says that a service provider can distribute such a signal during its broadcast of the super bowl as long as it does not carry out a request for simulta- neous substitution for an american television station that also broadcasts the super bowl for the duration of the event (final decision, at para 54). this, ac- cording to the crtc, “reflects the way [in which] simultaneous substitution is actually performed”: the television service provider deletes and replaces the signal of the television station, and not of a specific television program (ibid., at para 55). put simply, the final order imposes a requirement upon the carriage of a given “programming service” — in the sense of the affected television stations’ broadcast to the public — albeit only for the duration of a specific program. [42] bell et la nfl soutiennent que l’al. 9(1)h) [traduction] « ne permet pas au crtc d’exiger que les [fournisseurs de services de télévision] distribuent une émission particulière, ou de fixer les modalités applicables à la distribution d’une seule émission comme le super bowl » (ma (nfl), par 35). elles affirment que l’expression « services de programma- tion », telle qu’elle est employée dans cette disposi- tion, vise plutôt l’ensemble des émissions diffusées par une station de télévision. pour ce motif, elles prétendent que le crtc ne peut pas rendre en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) une ordonnance visant des émissions individuelles, tel le super bowl. [43] nous tenons d’abord à souligner que l’or- donnance définitive semble imposer une condition à la distribution du signal d’une station de télévision canadienne; elle énonce effectivement qu’un four- nisseur de services peut distribuer un tel signal pen- dant la diffusion du super bowl dans la mesure où il ne donne pas suite à une demande de substitution simultanée, pendant toute la durée de l’événement, du signal d’une station de télévision américaine qui diffuse elle aussi le super bowl (décision défi- nitive, par 54). cette condition, affirme le crtc, « reflète la façon dont la substitution simultanée est effectuée » : le fournisseur de services de télévision supprime et remplace le signal d’une station de télévision, et non celui d’une émission de télévi- sion particulière (ibid., par 55). en termes simples, l’ordonnance définitive impose une condition à la distribution d’un « service de programmation » donné — c’est-à-dire la programmation des stations de télévision visées — quoique seulement pour la durée d’une émission particulière. [44] we need not decide, for the purpose of these appeals, whether the “terms and conditions” that can be imposed under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act can relate directly to a specific program or must instead relate to a television station’s slate of pro- gramming in its entirety. this is because we are of the view that the crtc did not have the stat- utory authority to issue the final order pursuant to that provision in the first place. specifically, the crtc’s authority under s. 9(1)(h) — interpreted in accordance with the provision’s text, context and purpose — is limited to issuing orders that require [44] pour trancher les présents pourvois, nous n’avons pas à décider si les « modalités » pouvant être imposées en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion peuvent porter directement sur une émission particulière, ou si elles doivent plutôt porter sur la totalité de la programmation d’une station de télévision. il en est ainsi parce que nous sommes d’avis que le crtc n’est de toute façon pas autorisé par la loi à rendre l’ordonnance définitive en vertu de cette disposition. pour être plus précis, le pouvoir dont dispose le crtc en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) — in- terprété en conformité avec son libellé, son contexte [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 873 television service providers to carry specific channels as part of their service offerings, and attaching terms and conditions to such mandatory carriage orders (af (nfl), at paras. 3, 8, 12, 29, 35, 61-62 and 77-79; transcript, day 1, at pp. 5 and 17-21; tran- script, day 3, at pp 180-83). section 9(1)(h) does not, as the attorney general of canada suggests (rf, at paras. 65, 66, 71 and 76-78; transcript, day 1, at pp. 80 and 90-92), give the crtc a broad power to impose conditions outside the context of a mandatory carriage order. [45] we will begin this interpretive exercise with the statutory text of s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act, the bilingual version of which we reproduce below for ease of reference: et son objet — se limite à la délivrance d’ordon- nances obligeant les fournisseurs de services de té- lévision à distribuer certaines chaînes dans le cadre des services qu’ils offrent, et à assortir de certaines modalités ces ordonnances de distribution obliga- toire (ma (nfl), par. 3, 8, 12, 29, 35, 61-62 et 77-79; transcription de l’audience, jour 1, p. 5 et 17-21; jour 3, p. 180- 183). contrairement à ce que prétend le procureur général du canada (mi, par. 65, 66, 71 et 76-78; transcription de l’audience, jour 1, p. 80 et 90-92), cette disposition ne confère pas au crtc le pouvoir général d’imposer des conditions en dehors du contexte d’une ordonnance de distri- bution obligatoire. [45] nous amorçons notre interprétation par l’exa- men du libellé de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la ra- diodiffusion, dont nous reproduisons ci- dessous les versions anglaise et française par souci de commo- dité : 9 (1) subject to this part, the commission may, in fur- therance of its objects, 9 (1) sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente partie, le [crtc] peut, dans l’exécution de sa mission :   .   . (h) require any licensee who is authorized to carry on a distribution undertaking to carry, on such terms and conditions as the commission deems appropriate, programming services specified by the commission. h) obliger [les] titulaires [de licences d’exploitation d’entreprises de distribution] à offrir certains services de programmation selon les modalités qu’il précise. it is highly relevant that, in the english version of the act, the phrase “on such terms and conditions as the [crtc] deems appropriate” is couched in between commas, next to the words “carry” and “programming services”. this, in our view, indicates that the primary power delegated to the crtc is to mandate that television service providers carry specific programming services as part of their cable or satellite offerings, and that the secondary power relates to the imposition of terms and conditions on such mandatory carriage orders. une considération extrêmement pertinente est le fait que, dans la version anglaise de la disposition, les mots « on such terms and conditions as the [crtc] deems appropriate » sont intercalés, au moyen de virgules, entre les mots « carry » et « programming services ». à notre avis, cela indique que le pouvoir principal délégué au crtc est le pouvoir d’obliger les fournisseurs de services de télévision à distribuer certains services de programmation dans le cadre des services par câble ou par satellite qu’ils offrent, et que le pouvoir secondaire est celui d’imposer certaines modalités à l’égard de telles ordonnances de distribution obligatoire. [46] support for this interpretation can also be found in the text of the french version. the lan- guage used there contemplates a direct link between [46] cette interprétation trouve également appui dans le libellé de la version française. les termes qui y sont employés envisagent un lien direct entre « les 874 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. “les modalités” (the terms and conditions) and the “oblig[ation]    à offrir [les] services de programma- tion” (obligation to carry programming services) — and therefore further weighs against interpreting this provision as conferring on the crtc a general power to impose conditions on carriage. indeed, there is no discordance between the english and french versions of s. 9(1)(h); both indicate that it is limited to author- izing the issuance of mandatory carriage orders on specified terms and conditions. modalités » (the terms and conditions) et l’« oblig[a- tion] [  ] [d’]offrir [des] services de programmation » (obligation to carry programming and services) — et, de ce fait, militent encore davantage contre une inter- prétation de cette disposition qui conférerait au crtc un pouvoir général d’imposer des conditions de distri- bution. il n’existe d’ailleurs aucune contradiction entre les versions anglaise et française de cette disposition; elles indiquent toutes deux que celle-ci se limite à autoriser le crtc à rendre des ordonnances de dis- tribution obligatoire selon les modalités qu’il précise. [47] the federal court of appeal reached the same conclusion as to the plain meaning of this statutory text in bell canada v. 7262591 canada ltd., 2018 fca 174, 428 dlr (4th) 311. at issue in that case was whether the crtc had jurisdiction under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act to order that tel- evision service providers adhere to the “wholesale code”, a broadcasting regulatory policy that gov- erned “affiliation agreements” between television stations and service providers. answering this ques- tion in the negative, woods ja explained her con- clusion as follows: [47] la cour d’appel fédérale est arrivée à la même conclusion en ce qui concerne le sens ordinaire de cette disposition législative dans l’arrêt bell canada c. 7262591 canada ltd., 2018 caf 174. dans cette affaire, il s’agissait de décider si le crtc avait com- pétence, en vertu de l’al.  9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, pour ordonner aux fournisseurs de services de télévision d’adhérer au « code sur la vente en gros », une politique qui régit les « accords d’affiliation » entre les stations de télévision et les fournisseurs de services. répondant à cette question par la négative, la juge woods a expliqué ce qui suit : by its terms, paragraph 9(1)(h) provides the crtc with the power to require a licensee to carry specified program- ming services, and if so required, it provides an additional power to mandate such terms and conditions of carriage of those services as the commission deems appropriate   . selon ce texte, l’alinéa 9(1)h) confère au crtc le pou- voir d’obliger le titulaire de licence à offrir certains ser- vices de programmation et, si c’est nécessaire, lui confère un pouvoir additionnel de rendre obligatoires les modalités et conditions relatives à la prestation de ces services qu’il estime appropriées  . the ordinary meaning of this provision does not en- compass a general power to regulate the terms and con- ditions of carriage. such regulation must relate to terms and conditions of programming services that the crtc specifies and requires to be provided by a licensee. [pa- ras. 168- 69] vu son sens ordinaire, cette disposition n’inclut pas le pouvoir général de régir les modalités et conditions rela- tives à la prestation des services. le crtc ne peut que régir les modalités et conditions des services de program- mation qu’il précise et que doivent assurer les titulaires. [par. 168- 169] [48] the context surrounding s. 9(1)(h) also sup- ports our view as to its scope. it is important to recog- nize that this provision sets out but one power among many that the crtc has in relation to the issuance of licenses to broadcasting undertakings pursuant to s. 9 of the broadcasting act. of particular note are the powers under s. 9(1)(b), which allows the crtc to subject such licenses to conditions it deems appropri- ate for the implementation of canadian broadcasting policy, and under s. 9(1)(g), which allows the crtc [48] le contexte entourant l’al. 9(1)h) appuie égale- ment notre point de vue sur la portée de celui-ci. il im- porte de reconnaître que cette disposition particulière n’énonce que l’un des nombreux pouvoirs dont dis- pose le crtc relativement à l’attribution de licences aux entreprises de radiodiffusion, en vertu de l’art. 9 de la loi sur la radiodiffusion. soulignons notamment le pouvoir énoncé à l’al. 9(1)b), qui permet au crtc d’assortir ces licences des conditions qu’il estime indi- quées pour la mise en œuvre de la politique canadienne [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 875 to “require any licensee who is authorized to carry on a distribution undertaking to give priority to the carriage of broadcasting”. the existence of these specific powers weighs against reading s. 9(1)(h) as conferring a general power to impose terms and conditions on any carriage of programming services. [49] moreover, s. 10 of the broadcasting act con- fers on the crtc the power to make regulations in respect of various aspects of the broadcasting system, including “standards of programs and the allocation of broadcasting time for the purpose of giving effect to the broadcasting policy set out in subsection 3(1)” (s. 10(1)(c)); “the carriage of any foreign or other programming services by distribution undertakings” (s. 10(1)(g)); and “such other matters as it deems nec- essary for the furtherance of its objects” (s 10(1)(k)). again, the extent of the crtc’s powers under this section of the broadcasting act means that a narrow reading of s. 9(1)(h) will not hamper its efforts to regulate the broadcasting industry in accordance with the statutory objectives listed in s 3(1). [50] further, the distribution regulations refer in various provisions to “the programming services of a programming undertaking that the [crtc] has required, under paragraph  9(1)(h) of the act, to be distributed as part of [a television service pro- vider’s] basic service” (ss. 17(1)(g), 41(1)(b), and 46(3)(b); see also ss. 18(3)(a), 19(2)(d), 47(2)(a.1) and 49(2)(a)(i)). these regulatory provisions offer yet another contextual indication that the power under s.  9(1)(h) extends only to the issuance of mandatory carriage orders on specified terms and conditions. de radiodiffusion, et celui prévu à l’al. 9(1)g), qui permet au crtc d’« obliger les titulaires de licences d’exploitation d’entreprises de distribution à privilé- gier la fourniture de radiodiffusion ». l’existence de ces pouvoirs particuliers milite contre une interpréta- tion de l’al. 9(1)h) qui conférerait au crtc un pouvoir général d’imposer des conditions à l’égard de toute distribution de services de programmation. [49] de plus, l’art. 10 de la loi sur la radiodiffu- sion confère au crtc le pouvoir de prendre des rè- glements portant sur divers aspects du système de radiodiffusion, notamment : « les normes des émis- sions et l’attribution du temps d’antenne pour mettre en œuvre la politique canadienne de radiodiffusion » (al. 10(1)c)); « la fourniture de services de program- mation — même étrangers — par les entreprises de distribution » (al. 10(1)g)); et « toute autre mesure qu’il estime nécessaire à l’exécution de sa mission » (al 10(1)k)). là encore, l’étendue des pouvoirs que confère au crtc cette disposition de la loi sur la ra- diodiffusion indique qu’une interprétation restrictive de l’al. 9(1)h) n’entravera pas les efforts déployés par cet organisme pour réglementer l’industrie de la radiodiffu- sion conformément aux objectifs énumérés au par 3(1). [50] le règlement sur la distribution mentionne également, à plusieurs endroits, les « services de pro- grammation d’une entreprise de programmation dont la distribution dans le cadre du service de base [d’un fournisseur de services de télévision] est rendue obli- gatoire par le [crtc] en application de l’alinéa 9(1)h) de la loi » (al. 17(1)g), 41(1)b) et 46(3)b)); voir éga- lement les al. 18(3)a), 19(2)d) et 47(2)a.1), ainsi que le sous-al 49(2)a)(i)). ces dispositions réglementaires fournissent- elles aussi un autre élément contextuel indiquant que le pouvoir prévu à l’al. 9(1)h) vise uni- quement les ordonnances de distribution obligatoire rendues selon des modalités précisées. [51] finally, this interpretation is confirmed by the purpose for which s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act was enacted. as was explained in a report entitled review of the regulatory framework for broadcasting services in canada: [51] enfin, l’objet pour lequel l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion a été édicté confirme cette interprétation. comme l’expliquent les auteurs du document révision du cadre réglementaire des ser- vices de radiodiffusion au canada : section 9(1)(h) provides an important means for the com- mission to ensure carriage of important canadian services l’alinéa  9(1)h) est un outil important qui permet au con seil de garantir la distribution de services canadiens 876 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. which market forces might not otherwise dictate be car- ried in different regions of canada. this power is also an important one in ensuring that the canadian broadcasting system strengthens and enriches the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of canada. importants que les forces du marché ne suffiraient pas à assurer dans certaines régions du canada. grâce à cette importante prérogative, le système canadien de radiodif- fusion contribue à renforcer et enrichir le tissu culturel, politique, social et économique du canada. (l j e. dunbar and c. leblanc, review of the reg- ulatory framework for broadcasting in canada — final report (2007), at p. 195) (l j e. dunbar et c. leblanc, révision du cadre réglementaire des services de radiodiffusion au ca- nada — rapport final (2007), p. 154) [52] the power to mandate the carriage of specific programming services is thus a useful tool — al- beit one among many — that the crtc can use to achieve the various policy objectives listed in s. 3 of the broadcasting act (ibid., at p 75). the crtc has in fact exercised this power on several occasions to mandate the distribution of an existing or proposed service that • makes an exceptional contribution to canadian expres- sion and reflects canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity; • contributes in an exceptional manner to achieving the overall objectives for the digital basic service and one or more objectives of the act, such as: [52] le pouvoir de rendre obligatoire la distribu- tion de certains services de programmation constitue donc un outil utile — parmi bien d’autres — que peut utiliser le crtc pour réaliser les divers objectifs de politique générale énumérés à l’art. 3 de la loi sur la radiodiffusion (ibid., p 75). d’ailleurs, le crtc a exercé ce pouvoir à plusieurs reprises afin de rendre obligatoire la distribution d’un service, existant ou proposé, atteignant les objectifs suivants : • • il contribue de façon exceptionnelle à l’expression ca- nadienne et reflète les attitudes, les opinions, les idées, les valeurs et la créativité artistique canadiennes; il contribue de façon exceptionnelle à l’atteinte de l’ensemble des objectifs du service numérique de base et favorise l’atteinte d’un ou de plusieurs objectifs de la loi, tels que : canadian identity and cultural sovereignty; l’identité du canada et sa souveraineté culturelle; ethno- cultural diversity, including the special place of aboriginal peoples in canadian society; la diversité ethnoculturelle, y compris la place par- ticulière des peuples autochtones dans la société canadienne; service to and reflection and portrayal of persons with disabilities; or le reflet, la représentation et le soutien des personnes handicapées; linguistic duality, including improved service to official language minority communities (olmcs); and la dualité linguistique, y compris l’amélioration du service offert aux communautés de langue officielle en situation minoritaire (closm); • makes exceptional commitments to original, first- run canadian programming in terms of exhibition and ex- penditures. • il prend des engagements exceptionnels à l’égard de la présentation des émissions et des dépenses de la programmation canadienne originale de première dif- fusion. (broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2013- 372, august 8, 2013 (online), at para. 7) (politique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2013- 372, 8 août 2013 (en ligne), par. 7) [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada le juge en chef et autres 877 for example, the crtc recently granted a mandatory carriage order to the aboriginal peoples television network, requiring that that network be distributed as part of the basic service of canadian cable and satellite providers at a specified monthly rate of $0.35 per subscriber (broadcasting order crtc 2018- 341, august 31, 2018 (online)). other programming ser- vices that enjoy s. 9(1)(h) status include the cable public affairs channel (cpac), nouveau tv-5, and the weather network. [53] more significantly, it appears that the crtc has only ever validly exercised its power under s. 9(1)(h) for the issuance of mandatory carriage orders. as we noted above, its attempt to use that power to make the wholesale code binding upon television service providers (broadcasting order crtc 2015- 439, september 24, 2015 (online)) was rejected by the federal court of appeal. likewise, this court held in cogeco, in the context of a ref- erence question, that the crtc lacked jurisdiction under s. 9(1)(h) to implement a proposed “value for signal regime”. apart from those cases, we have not been directed to, nor have we found, any orders under s. 9(1)(h) other than ones that mandate the distribution of particular programming services on specified terms and conditions. par exemple, le crtc a récemment rendu une ordonnance de distribution obligatoire du service de programmation du réseau aboriginal peoples television network, exigeant que celui-ci soit dis- tribué dans le cadre du service de base des four- nisseurs canadiens de services par câble et par satellite au tarif de gros mensuel par abonné de 0,35 $ (ordonnance de radiodiffusion crtc 2018- 341, 31 août 2018 (en ligne)). parmi les autres ser- vices de programmation jouissant du statut prévu à l’al.  9(1)h), mentionnons la chaîne d’affaires publiques par câble (cpac), nouveau tv-5 et météo média. [53] fait plus important encore, il semble que le crtc n’ait jamais validement exercé le pouvoir qui lui est conféré par l’al. 9(1)h) sauf lorsqu’il a rendu des ordonnances de distribution obligatoire. en ef- fet, comme nous l’avons souligné, lorsqu’il a tenté d’utiliser ce pouvoir pour imposer l’application du code sur la vente en gros aux fournisseurs de ser- vices de télévision (ordonnance de radiodiffusion crtc 2015- 439, 24 septembre 2015 (en ligne)), cette mesure a été écartée par la cour d’appel fé- dérale. de même, dans l’arrêt cogeco, répondant alors à la question qui lui était soumise dans le contexte d’un renvoi, notre cour a conclu que le crtc n’avait pas compétence pour mettre en œuvre le «  régime de compensation pour la valeur des signaux » qui était proposé. mises à part les ordon- nances en cause dans ces décisions, on ne nous a fait état d’aucune autre sorte d’ordonnances fondées sur l’al. 9(1)h) que les ordonnances rendant obligatoire la distribution de certains services de programma- tion selon des modalités précises, et nous n’en avons trouvé aucune. [54] furthermore, this use of s. 9(1)(h) is con- sistent with the way in which this provision was understood in various reports and publications that were prepared in advance of the enactment of the broadcasting act in 1991 in a clause-by- clause analysis of the bill that became the broadcasting act, the department of communications explained that s. 9(1)(h) addressed what was described as the “cable-as- gatekeeper” problem in that it would “en- sur[e] that the cable industry cannot frustrate the licensing of new satellite to cable services simply by [54] cette utilisation de l’al. 9(1)h) correspond à la façon dont cette disposition est interprétée dans un certain nombre de publications et rapports ré- digés avant l’édiction de la loi sur la radiodiffu- sion en 1991. dans une analyse article par article du projet de loi devenu la loi sur la radiodiffusion, le ministère des communications explique que cette disposition apporte une solution au problème des [traduction] « entreprises de câblodistribution en tant que gardes- barrières », car elle « fait en sorte que l’industrie du câble ne puisse contrecarrer l’octroi de 878 bell canada v canada the chief justice et al. [2019] 4 scr. refusing to carry them”. the analysis also included the following comments: this clause provides a clear statutory basis for the [crtc]’s priority carriage regulations (already enacted in the cable regulations). the 1968 act was silent on such a power. it would also allow the crtc to require carriage of a par- ticular service such as, for example, tv-5, a second cbc service, or the alternative programmer. [emphasis added.] licences à de nouveaux services par satellite et par câble tout simplement en refusant de les distribuer ». il ajoute ceci : [traduction] cette disposition établit une assise législa- tive claire à l’égard des règles sur la distribution prioritaire [du crtc] (déjà édictées dans la réglementation sur la télévision par câble). la loi de 1968 était muette au sujet d’un tel pouvoir. cette disposition permettrait également au crtc d’exiger la distribution d’un service donné, par exemple tv-5, une seconde chaîne cbc ou la program- mation complémentaire. [nous soulignons.] (canada, department of communications, the broad- casting act 1988: a clause-by- clause analysis of bill c-136 (1988), at s. 9(1)(h)) (canada, ministère des communications, the broad- casting act 1988 : a clause-by- clause analysis of bill c-136 (1988), al. 9(1)h)) [55] the government response to the fifteenth re- port of the standing committee on communications and culture: a broadcasting policy for canada (1988) also refers, at various places, to the fact that, “[u]nder clause 9.(1)(h), the crtc can require carriage of specified services” (see pp. 27, 56 and 90)  — it appeared in particular in a response to a recommendation that the broadcasting act “be drafted so as to define the essential role of distribu- tion undertakings as that of distributing canadian radio and television services in french and english, both public and private, with first priority given to public- sector canadian services” (p 90). and after the standing committee on communications and culture expressed the view that the statute “should be drafted so as to provide authorization for the [crtc] to establish any conditions respecting the carriage of programming services that are neces- sary to further the objectives of the act” (house of commons, minutes of proceedings and evidence of the standing committee on communications and culture, no. 36, 2nd sess., 33th parl., may 4, 1987, at p. 78), the government showed it was satisfied that this concern was adequately addressed by the narrowly drafted s. 9(1)(h) (government response, at p 89). [55] à différents endroits dans la réponse du gou- vernement au quinzième rapport du comité perma- nent des communications et de la culture : pour une politique canadienne de la radiodiffusion (1988), il est également fait état du fait qu’« [e]n vertu de l’ali- néa 9(1)h), le crtc peut exiger la distribution d’un service en particulier » (voir p. 29, 61 et 97) — par- ticulièrement en réponse à la recommandation selon laquelle « [i]l faudrait rédiger la [loi sur la radiodif- fusion] de façon à ce qu’elle définisse le rôle essentiel des entreprises de distribution, tout comme celui des services de distribution de radio et de télévision ca- nadiennes en français et en anglais, tant publics que privés, en accordant la priorité aux services canadiens du secteur public » (p 97). et par suite de l’avis for- mulé par le comité permanent des communications et de la culture suivant lequel « il faudrait rédiger [la loi] de façon à ce que le [crtc] soit autorisé à établir toutes les conditions de transmission de services de programmation qui sont nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs de la loi » (chambre des communes, procès- verbaux et témoignages du comité permanent des communications et de la culture, no 36, 2e sess., 33e lég., 4 mai 1987, p. 78), le gouvernement se dit convaincu que le libellé étroit de l’al. 9(1)h) constitue une réponse adéquate à cette préoccupation (réponse du gouvernement, p 97). [56] while certainly not determinative, this legisla- tive history nevertheless provides a further indication as to the interpretation of s. 9(1)(h) that is borne [56] bien que cet historique législatif ne soit certes pas déterminant, il fournit néanmoins des indications additionnelles sur l’interprétation de l’al. 9(1)h), [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada les juges abella et karakatsanis 879 out by its text and its context: that this provision only confers on the crtc the authority to issue mandatory carriage orders on specified terms and conditions, and does not establish a “broad power to regulate the cable industry and impose any condi- tions necessary to do so” (final decision, at para. 21 (emphasis added)). [57] because the crtc did not, in the final order, purport to mandate the carriage of any particular programming services, but instead sought to “add a condition that must be fulfilled should a [televi- sion service provider] carry [a canadian] station” that broadcasts the super bowl (final decision, at para. 63 (emphasis added)), the issuance of that or- der was not within the scope of its delegated power under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act. we would therefore quash the final order, as well as the final decision. interprétation qui est étayée par le texte et le contexte de cette disposition : à savoir qu’elle confère au crtc uniquement le pouvoir de rendre des ordon- nances de distribution obligatoire selon des modali- tés qu’il précise — et ne lui confère pas le « pouvoir étendu [  ] de réglementer l’industrie du câble et d’imposer toute condition pour ce faire » (décision définitive, par. 21 (nous soulignons)). [57] étant donné que le crtc ne vise pas, dans l’ordonnance définitive, à rendre obligatoire la dis- tribution de certains services de programmation, mais plutôt à « ajouter une condition aux [fournis- seurs de services de télévision] qui distribuent une [  ] station [canadienne] » qui diffuse le super bowl (décision définitive, par. 63 (nous soulignons)), cette ordonnance ne pouvait être rendue en vertu du pou- voir délégué au crtc par l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion. en conséquence, nous sommes d’avis de casser l’ordonnance définitive, ainsi que la décision définitive. [58] we would note that these appeals turn strictly on the scope of the crtc’s authority under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act, and that neither bell nor the nfl disputes the federal court of appeal’s holding that it was reasonable for the crtc to have deter- mined that the public interest would be served by exempting the super bowl from the simultaneous substitution regime (paras 23-24). therefore, and although we maintain that s. 9(1)(h) did not give the crtc the authority to implement that policy determination, we express no view as to whether the crtc could do so pursuant to some other statutory power. [58] nous tenons à souligner que les présents pour- vois concernent strictement l’étendue du pouvoir conféré au crtc par l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la ra- diodiffusion, et que ni bell ni la nfl ne contestent la décision de la cour d’appel fédérale selon laquelle il était raisonnable de la part du crtc de conclure qu’il était dans l’intérêt du public d’exempter le super bowl du régime de substitution simultanée (par 23-24). par conséquent, et bien que nous maintenions que l’al. 9(1)h) n’habilite pas le crtc à mettre en œuvre cette décision de politique générale, nous ne nous pro- nonçons pas sur la question de savoir si le crtc peut le faire en vertu d’un autre pouvoir prévu par la loi. iv conclusion iv conclusion [59] for the foregoing reasons, we would allow these appeals with costs throughout, set aside the decision of the federal court of appeal, and quash the decisions of the crtc (crtc 2016- 334 and crtc 2016- 335). [59] pour les motifs qui précèdent, nous sommes d’avis d’accueillir les pourvois avec dépens dans toutes les cours, d’infirmer l’arrêt de la cour d’appel fédérale et de casser les décisions du crtc (crtc 2016- 334 et crtc 2016- 335). the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [60] abella and karakatsanis jj. (dissenting) — these cases concern the canadian radio- television [60] les juges abella et karakatsanis (dis- sidentes) — ces différentes affaires portent sur la 880 bell canada v canada abella and karakatsanis jj. [2019] 4 scr. and telecommunications commission’s 2016 decision to prohibit broadcasters from substituting canadian advertisements for us advertisements during the super bowl broadcast. the outcome of the appeals turns on whether the crtc’s interpretation of “pro- gramming services” in its home statute is reasonable. in our view, that interpretation was reasonable and the decision should be upheld. [61] as set out in our concurring reasons in canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, [2019] 4 scr 653, as a general rule, administrative decisions are to be reviewed for rea- sonableness. none of the correctness exceptions ap- ply to the crtc’s decision and reasonableness review is consistent with the highly specialized expertise of the crtc. when conducting reasonableness review, a court assesses whether the decision as a whole is rea- sonable, viewed in light of the reasons given and the decision- making context. reviewing courts should pay particular attention to the administrative context and the consequences, operational implications and challenges identified by the decision- maker. to suc- ceed, the party challenging the decision must satisfy the reviewing court that the decision is unreasonable. [62] the super bowl is the championship match that closes each season of football games played by the 32 teams of the national football league (nfl). the super bowl broadcast is among the most widely- viewed events on canadian television. [63] bell canada is the parent company of bell media inc. (collectively, bell). in addition to provid- ing cable television services to canadians, bell owns and operates 30 local ctv television stations across the country. in 2013, bell purchased an exclusive license to broadcast the super bowl on ctv until the 2018-19 season. décision qu’a rendue le conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes en 2016 et qui interdit aux diffuseurs de substituer des messages publicitaires canadiens à des messages publicitaires américains pendant la télédiffusion du super bowl. l’issue des pourvois dépend de la question de savoir si l’interprétation donnée par le crtc à l’expression « services de programmation » qui figure dans sa loi habilitante est raisonnable. à notre avis, cette interprétation était raisonnable et la décision devrait être confirmée. [61] comme nous l’indiquons dans nos motifs con- cordants dans l’arrêt canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immi gration) c. vavilov, 2019 csc 65, [2019] 4 rcs 653, le contrôle des décisions administratives doit en règle générale se faire selon la norme de la dé- cision raisonnable. aucune des exceptions justifiant le recours à la norme de la décision correcte ne s’applique à la décision du crtc, et l’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable est conforme à la très grande expertise que possède le crtc en la matière. lors d’un examen fondé sur la norme de la décision raisonnable, la cour de révision se demande si, dans son ensemble, la décision est raisonnable eu égard aux motifs expo- sés et au contexte décisionnel. les cours de révision doivent porter une attention particulière au contexte administratif de la décision, à ses conséquences et aux implications et défis sur le plan de la mise en œuvre dont a fait état le décideur. pour avoir gain de cause, la partie qui conteste la décision doit convaincre la cour de révision que la décision est déraisonnable. [62] le super bowl est le match de championnat qui marque la fin de chaque saison de football que jouent les 32 équipes de la national football league (nfl). la télédiffusion du super bowl compte parmi les événements présentés par la télévision canadienne qui attirent le plus de téléspectateurs. [63] bell canada est la société mère de bell média inc. (appelées collectivement bell). en plus de four- nir des services de télévision par câble à la popula- tion canadienne, bell est propriétaire- exploitante de 30 stations de télévision locales de la chaîne ctv à l’échelle du pays. en 2013, bell a acheté une licence exclusive l’autorisant à télédiffuser le super bowl sur la chaîne ctv jusqu’à la saison 2018- 2019. [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada les juges abella et karakatsanis 881 [64] the canadian radio- television and tele- communications commission is a regulatory body established in 1976. it has been called the “arche- type” of an expert administrative tribunal: b. kain, “developments in communications law: the 2012- 2013 term — the broadcasting reference, the su- preme court and the limits of the crtc” (2014), 64 sclr (2d) 63, at p 63. parliament gave the crtc an extensive mandate to implement measures that further canadian broadcasting policy: reference re broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2010- 167 and broadcasting order crtc 2010- 168, [2012] 3 scr 489, at para. 2, per rothstein j. broadcast- ing policy in canada seeks to maintain a distinctive canadian culture while fostering a competitive en- vironment for the development of a strong domes- tic telecommunications industry: broadcasting act, sc 1991, c. 11, s 3. [65] the powers and purposes of the crtc in rela- tion to broadcasting are set out in part ii of the broad- casting act (see also canadian radio- television and telecommunications commission act, rsc 1985, c. c-22, s 12(1)). the crtc licenses television stations and cable providers and can subject those licenses to terms and conditions that it deems appro- priate. it can also make regulations about program standards, the character of advertising, and the pro- portion of time that may be allotted to canadian and foreign content. [64] le conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télé- communications canadiennes est un organisme de réglementation qui a été établi en 1976. il a été qua- lifié d’« archétype » du tribunal administratif spécia- lisé (b. kain, « developments in communications law : the 2012- 2013 term — the broadcasting reference, the supreme court and the limits of the crtc » (2014), 64 sclr (2d) 63, p 63). le parlement a conféré au crtc un vaste mandat l’habilitant à prendre des mesures en vue de favori- ser la mise en œuvre de la politique canadienne de radiodiffusion (renvoi relatif à la politique régle- mentaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2010- 167 et l’or- donnance de radiodiffusion crtc 2010- 168, [2012] 3 rcs 489, par. 2, le juge rothstein). au canada, la politique de radiodiffusion vise à maintenir une culture canadienne distinctive tout en favorisant un environnement concurrentiel pour le développe- ment d’une industrie nationale forte dans le secteur des télécommunications (loi sur la radiodiffusion, lc 1991, c. 11, art 3). [65] la mission et les pouvoirs du crtc en ma- tière de radiodiffusion sont énoncés dans la partie ii de la loi sur la radiodiffusion (voir également la loi sur le conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télé- communications canadiennes, lrc 1985, c. c-22, par 12(1)). le crtc octroie des licences à l’égard des stations de télévision et des fournisseurs de ser- vices de câblodistribution, et il peut assujettir ces licences aux modalités qu’il précise. il peut en outre prendre des règlements portant sur les normes rela- tives aux émissions, à la nature de la publicité et à la proportion du temps d’antenne qui peut être attribué au contenu canadien ou étranger. [66] among the regulatory tools available to the crtc is a technique called simultaneous substi- tution. first proposed by the crtc’s institutional predecessor in 1971, simultaneous substitution is a process by which the signal of a “distant” sta- tion (usually in the united states) is replaced by the signal of a “local” station: r. armstrong, broad- casting policy in canada (2nd ed. 2016), at p 45. when a canadian station, or broadcaster, broad- casts a u.s program at the same time as a us. station, the canadian station can request a canadian distribution undertaking — the cable or television [66] parmi les outils de réglementation dont dis- pose le crtc, il existe une technique nommée substitution simultanée. cette technique, qui a été proposée en 1971 par l’organisme qui a précédé le crtc, est un processus par lequel le signal d’une station « éloignée » (habituellement aux états- unis) est remplacé par le signal d’une station « locale » (r arm strong, broadcasting policy in canada (2e éd. 2016), p 45). lorsqu’une station canadienne, ou un radiodiffuseur, diffuse une émission améri- caine en même temps qu’une station américaine, la station canadienne peut demander à une entreprise de 882 bell canada v canada abella and karakatsanis jj. [2019] 4 scr. service provider — to replace the us signal with its signal, which usually includes canadian adver- tising: simultaneous programming service deletion and substitution regulations, sor/2015- 240, s. 3 (simultaneous substitution regulations). as long as a request respects certain guidelines, the distribution undertaking receiving the request must comply: s 4. [67] canadian broadcasters frequently make simul- taneous substitution requests as a means of protecting their distribution rights in canada: armstrong, at p 116. simultaneous substitution also allows cana- dian companies to consolidate audiences for a given program and, as a result, permits broadcasters to charge higher rates for advertising during that time slot: armstrong, at pp 54-55. the crtc reported that in 2012-13, simultaneous substitution created revenue of approximately $250 million: broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2015-25, january 29, 2015 (online). [68] in october 2013, the crtc launched “let’s talk tv”, a three- stage public consultation seek- ing input from canadians on the future of cana- dian television. the crtc reported that it had received numerous complaints regarding simul- taneous substitution, 20 percent of which were related to super bowl commercials: broadcasting notice of consultation crtc 2014- 190, april 24, 2014 (online). the crtc later issued a working document to provide models for reform concern- ing a number of issues and to stimulate discussion and debate among stakeholders, in which it pro- posed two options to address simultaneous sub- stitution complaints — eliminating simultaneous substitution entirely or, alternatively, only during live event programming, including sporting events such as the super bowl: broadcasting notice of consultation crtc 2014- 190-3, august 21, 2014 (online) bell subsequently submitted evidence to the crtc to establish the significance of live event simultaneous substitution, which accounted for as much as 33 percent of the total simultaneous distribution canadienne — le fournisseur de services de télévision ou de câblodistribution — de remplacer le signal américain par son signal, lequel comprend généralement des messages publicitaires canadiens (règlement sur le retrait et la substitution simultanée de services de programmation, dors/2015- 240, art. 3 (règlement sur la substitution simultanée)). tant qu’une demande respecte certaines lignes direc- trices, l’entreprise de distribution qui la reçoit doit s’y conformer (art 4). [67] les radiodiffuseurs canadiens présentent fréquemment des demandes de substitution simul- tanée afin de protéger leurs droits de distribution au canada (armstrong, p 116). la substitution simul- tanée permet en outre aux sociétés canadiennes de consolider des auditoires pour une émission don- née, ce qui permet aux radiodiffuseurs de demander des tarifs plus élevés pour la publicité pendant cette plage horaire (armstrong, p 54-55). selon les don- nées publiées par le crtc, la substitution simulta- née a généré en 2012- 2013 des revenus d’environ 250  millions de dollars (politique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2015-25, 29 janvier 2015 (en ligne)). [68] en octobre 2013, le crtc a lancé une consul- tation publique en trois étapes intitulée « parlons télé », dans le cadre de laquelle les canadiens étaient invités à donner leur avis sur l’avenir de la télévi- sion canadienne. le crtc a signalé qu’il avait reçu de nombreuses plaintes à l’égard de la substitution simultanée, dont 20 pour cent portaient sur les mes- sages publicitaires présentés durant le super bowl (avis de consultation de radiodiffusion crtc 2014- 190, 24 avril 2014 (en ligne)). par la suite, afin de fournir des modèles de réforme portant sur un certain nombre de questions et de stimuler les discussions et les débats entre les parties prenantes, le crtc a publié un document de travail dans lequel il proposait deux solutions pour traiter les plaintes relatives à la substitution simultanée : éliminer complètement la substitution simultanée ou l’éliminer seulement pendant les événements en direct, y compris les évé- nements sportifs comme le super bowl (avis de consultation de radiodiffusion crtc 2014- 190-3, 21 août 2014 (en ligne)). bell a subséquemment présenté au crtc des éléments de preuve en vue [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada les juges abella et karakatsanis 883 substitution revenues of one of its television net- works: crtc 2015-25. [69] in january 2015, the crtc announced its intention to proceed with the second option, disal- lowing simultaneous substitution for specialty ser- vices in general and for the super bowl in particular, beginning with the 2017 broadcast. it found this partial disallowance would be less harmful to the broadcasting industry than a complete elimination of simultaneous substitution: crtc 2015-25. at the same time, the crtc announced its intention to address “recurring, substantial simultaneous substi- tution errors” by imposing various sanctions for such errors: crtc 2015-25, at para 20. d’établir l’importance de la substitution simulta- née portant sur des événements diffusés en direct, substitutions qui totalisaient jusqu’à 33 pour cent de l’ensemble des revenus de substitution simultanée de l’un de ses réseaux de télévision (crtc 2015-25). [69] en janvier 2015, le crtc a annoncé son in- tention d’aller de l’avant avec la deuxième solution, c’est-à-dire l’interdiction de la substitution simulta- née dans le cas des services spécialisés en général et du super bowl en particulier, à compter de la radiodiffusion de cet événement en 2017. il a conclu que cette interdiction partielle serait moins préju- diciable pour l’industrie de la radiodiffusion que l’élimination complète de la substitution simultanée (crtc 2015-25). à la même occasion, le crtc a annoncé son intention de traiter l’enjeu « des erreurs importantes récurrentes de substitution simultanée » en imposant diverses sanctions pour de telles erreurs (crtc 2015-25, par 20). in july 2015, the crtc issued a notice indi- [70] cating that it would implement its decision to pro- hibit simultaneous substitution for the 2017 super bowl by issuing an order pursuant to s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act: broadcasting notice of con- sultation crtc 2015- 330, july 23, 2015 (online). that provision authorizes the crtc to require any licensee to carry specific programming services on such terms and conditions as the commission deems appropriate. [70] en juillet 2015, le crtc a publié un avis indi- quant qu’il mettrait en œuvre sa décision d’interdire la substitution simultanée pour le super bowl de 2017 en rendant une ordonnance en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion (avis de consultation de radiodiffusion crtc 2015- 330, 23 juillet 2015 (en ligne)). cette disposition autorise le crtc à obliger un titulaire de licence à offrir des services de pro- grammation en particulier selon les modalités que le conseil précise. [71] in the notice, the crtc also announced its intention to create the simultaneous substitution reg- ulations, which would update and amend the broad- casting distribution regulations, sor/97- 555, that governed the regime. interested parties were given two months to comment on the proposed regulations: crtc 2015- 330. the same day, the crtc issued an information bulletin explaining its rationale for the changes and indicating how viewers could sub- mit simultaneous substitution- related complaints: broadcasting information bulletin crtc 2015- 329, july 23, 2015 (online). [71] dans l’avis, le crtc a également annoncé son intention d’établir le règlement sur la substi- tution simultanée, lequel actualiserait et modifierait le règlement sur la distribution de radiodiffusion, dors/97- 555, qui gouvernait alors le régime. les parties intéressées se sont vu accorder un délai de deux mois pour présenter leurs observations sur le projet de règlement (crtc 2015- 330). le même jour, le crtc a publié un bulletin d’infor- mation dans lequel il expliquait la raison d’être des changements et indiquait comment les téléspecta- teurs pouvaient déposer des plaintes relatives à la substitution simultanée (bulletin d’information de radiodiffusion crtc 2015- 329, 23 juillet 2015 (en ligne)). 884 bell canada v canada abella and karakatsanis jj. [2019] 4 scr. [72] bell and the nfl filed submissions to the crtc in response to the call for comments. they argued that the crtc was engaging in impermissible “administrative law discrimination” by targeting a single show and lacked jurisdiction to make an or- der they saw as conflicting with the copyright act, rsc 1985, c. c-42, and canada’s treaty obliga- tions. after receiving these and other submissions, the crtc announced the promulgation of the si- multaneous substitution regulations, whereby it had the authority to prohibit simultaneous substitution in the public interest: s 4(3). the new public interest provisions were broader than those repealed in the broadcasting distribution regulations: ss. 38(4) and 51(3). in the crtc’s view, s. 9(1)(h) of the broad- casting act — which authorizes it to impose terms and conditions on the distribution of programming services — permitted it to make targeted simulta- neous substitution orders: broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2015- 513, november 19, 2015 (on- line). in february 2016, the crtc again called for [73] comments about its proposed order to prohibit simul- taneous substitution during the super bowl. the nfl reiterated its opposition and bell made new submis- sions regarding the potential impact of the order on canadian production and entertainment industries. [74] on august 19, 2016, the crtc issued broad- casting regulatory policy crtc 2016- 334, and broadcasting order crtc 2016- 335, august 19, 2016 (online), its final order prohibiting simulta- neous substitution during the super bowl, effective january 2017 (super bowl order). [75] bell and the nfl appealed the order pursu- ant to s. 31(2) of the broadcasting act, challeng- ing the commission’s reliance on s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act as being outside of its jurisdiction. [72] bell et la nfl ont déposé des observations auprès du crtc, en réponse à l’appel lancé par celui-ci en ce sens. elles ont fait valoir que le crtc se livrait à de la [traduction] « discrimination ad- ministrative » inadmissible en ciblant une émission en particulier, et qu’il n’avait pas compétence pour rendre une ordonnance qui, selon elles, entrait en conflit avec la loi sur le droit d’auteur, lrc 1985, c. c-42, et avec les obligations issues de traités du canada. après avoir reçu ces observations, ainsi que d’autres, le crtc a annoncé l’édiction du règlement sur la substitution simultanée, en vertu duquel il avait le pouvoir d’interdire la substitution simultanée dans l’intérêt public (par 4(3)). les nouvelles dispositions relatives à l’intérêt public avaient une portée plus large que celles du règlement sur la distribution de radiodiffusion qui étaient abrogées (par. 38(4) et 51(3)). de l’avis du crtc, l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion  — qui l’autorise à imposer des modalités à l’égard de la distribution de ser- vices de programmation — lui permettait de rendre des ordonnances de substitution simultanée ciblées (politique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2015- 513, 19 novembre 2015 (en ligne)). [73] en février 2016, le crtc a de nouveau lancé un appel sollicitant des observations sur son pro- jet d’ordonnance visant à interdire la substitution simultanée pendant le super bowl. la nfl a réi- téré son opposition et bell a présenté de nouvelles observations relatives à l’incidence potentielle de cette ordonnance sur les industries canadiennes de la production et du divertissement. [74] le 19 août 2016, le crtc a publié la poli- tique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2016- 334, ainsi que l’ordonnance de radiodiffusion crtc 2016- 335, 19 août 2016 (en ligne), son ordonnance définitive interdisant la substitution simultanée pen- dant le super bowl à compter de janvier 2017 (or- donnance relative au super bowl). [75] bell et la nfl ont interjeté appel de l’ordon- nance en application du par. 31(2) de la loi sur la ra- diodiffusion, plaidant que le conseil avait outrepassé ses pouvoirs en rendant cette ordonnance sur le fon- dement de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion. [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada les juges abella et karakatsanis 885 [76] near ja, writing for the federal court of appeal, dismissed the appeals ([2018] 4 fcr 300). he concluded that the standard of review for the jurisdictional question was reasonableness. in his view, the crtc’s previous interpretations of the term “programming services” left ample room for the interpretation applied here. he also concluded that it was not open to a reviewing court to step into the place of the crtc to reweigh the competing objectives set out in the broadcasting act. near ja. dismissed the nfl’s arguments that the decision con- flicted with the copyright act and canada’s treaty obligations. [77] before this court, bell focuses its submissions on the standard of review, arguing that the applicable standard of review is correctness. bell argues first that s. 9(1)(h) is a jurisdiction- conferring provision, framing the issue as a true question of jurisdiction in “the narrow sense of [the crtc’s] authority to enter upon an inquiry”: af (bell), at para 52. it also ar- gues that concerns regarding freedom of expression, the presence of a statutory appeal and the absence of policy considerations also militate in favour of correctness. finally, bell asserts that the question of whether the super bowl order conflicts with the copyright act must be reviewed for correctness, because these questions extend beyond the crtc’s home statute. in the alternative, bell argues that the crtc’s interpretation of s. 9(1)(h) is unreasonable because the statute permits only one reasonable in- terpretation. [76] s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel fédé- rale, le juge near a rejeté les appels ([2018] 4 rcf. 300). il a conclu que la norme de la décision raison- nable était la norme de contrôle applicable à la ques- tion de la compétence. à son avis, les interprétations données antérieurement par le crtc à l’égard de l’expression « services de programmation » lais- saient largement place à l’interprétation appliquée en l’espèce. il a en outre jugé qu’il n’était pas loisible à une cour de révision de se substituer au crtc pour soupeser les objectifs concurrents énoncés dans la loi sur la radiodiffusion. le juge near a rejeté les ar- guments de la nfl selon lesquels la décision entrait en conflit avec la loi sur le droit d’auteur et avec les obligations issues de traités du canada. [77] devant notre cour, bell s’attache principale- ment dans ses observations à la question de la norme de contrôle, plaidant que la norme applicable est celle de la décision correcte. bell prétend d’abord que l’al. 9(1)h) est une disposition attributive de compétence, puis décrit la question en litige comme étant une véritable question de compétence en ce qu’elle porte sur la compétence du tribunal adminis- tratif, c’est-à-dire la compétence [traduction] « au sens strict de la faculté [du crtc] de connaître de la question » (ma,. bell, par 52). bell soutient ensuite que des préoccupations liées à la liberté d’expres- sion, ainsi que la présence d’un droit d’appel prévu par la loi et l’absence de considérations de politique générale, militent également en faveur de l’applica- tion de la norme de la décision correcte. enfin, bell affirme que la question de savoir si l’ordonnance relative au super bowl entre en conflit avec la loi sur le droit d’auteur doit être examinée au regard de la norme de la décision correcte, parce que de telles questions débordent le cadre de la loi habilitante du crtc. subsidiairement, bell plaide que l’in- terprétation que donne le crtc de l’al. 9(1)h) est déraisonnable, en ce que la loi n’admet qu’une seule interprétation raisonnable. [78] the nfl adopts bell’s arguments regarding the standard of review and makes additional argu- ments regarding the merits of the crtc’s decision. the nfl characterizes the crtc’s interpretation of s. 9(1)(h) as the arrogation of an “orwellian power to reach down into the specific shows that broadcasters [78] la nfl fait siens les arguments de bell re- lativement à la norme de contrôle et présente des arguments supplémentaires concernant le bien- fondé de la décision du crtc. la nfl considère qu’en interprétant l’al. 9(1)h) comme il le fait, le crtc s’arroge un [traduction] « pouvoir orwellien lui 886 bell canada v canada abella and karakatsanis jj. [2019] 4 scr. create and decide which ones are worthy of distribu- tion to the public”: af (nfl), at para 4. drawing on dictionaries, previous crtc decisions and other provisions of the broadcasting act, the nfl asserts that “programming services” can only mean an entire channel. it relies heavily on the legislative history of the provision to argue that s. 9(1)(h) was not intended to permit orders regarding individual programs. the nfl further asserts that the “contrived interpretation of the crt[c]    was clearly designed to justify its end goal of banning sim sub for only a single program”: para 96. finally, the nfl argues that the crtc’s interpretation creates an operational conflict with and frustrates the purposes of the copyright act. [79] the attorney general of canada submits that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness and that a deferential analysis should begin with respectful attention to the crtc’s reasons. in its view, an administrative body may choose any reason- able interpretation of a statute — not only the most reasonable interpretation. moreover, the attorney general of canada submits that bell and the nfl have failed to demonstrate how the crtc’s inter- pretation was unreasonable, particularly in light of the crtc’s specialized, technical knowledge of its operational context and duty to balance the 40- odd objectives of the broadcasting act. the crtc, it says, reasonably rejected the appellants’ arguments regarding the copyright act and international trea- ties. permettant de se pencher sur les émissions particu- lières que créent les radiodiffuseurs et de décider lesquelles sont dignes d’être distribuées au public » (ma,. nfl, par.  4) s’appuyant sur des diction- naires, sur des décisions antérieures du crtc et sur d’autres dispositions de la loi sur la radiodiffu- sion, la nfl soutient que l’expression « services de programmation » peut uniquement s’entendre d’une chaîne en entier. la nfl s’appuie considérablement sur l’historique législatif de la disposition pour plai- der que l’al. 9(1)h) n’est pas censé autoriser des ordonnances visant des émissions particulières. la nfl prétend en outre que [traduction] « l’inter- prétation artificielle donnée par le crtc [  ] visait clairement à justifier la fin ultime qu’il recherchait, c’est-à-dire bannir la substitution simultanée pour une seule émission » (par 96). enfin, la nfl affirme que l’interprétation que fait le crtc crée un conflit d’application avec la loi sur le droit d’auteur et entrave la réalisation des objectifs de cette loi. [79] le procureur général du canada fait valoir que la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la décision raisonnable, et que le tribunal de révision doit procéder à une analyse empreinte de déférence et accorder, au départ, une attention respectueuse aux motifs exposés par le crtc. à son avis, un organisme administratif peut choisir toute interpré- tation raisonnable d’une loi — et non seulement l’interprétation la plus raisonnable. en outre, le pro- cureur général du canada avance que bell et la nfl n’ont pas démontré en quoi l’interprétation du crtc était déraisonnable, particulièrement à la lumière des connaissances techniques spécialisées que possède le crtc, du contexte dans lequel celui-ci exerce ses fonctions et de l’obligation qui lui incombe de mettre en équilibre la quarantaine d’objectifs de la loi sur la radiodiffusion. le crtc, dit-il, a raisonnablement rejeté les arguments des appelantes concernant la loi sur le droit d’auteur et les traités internationaux. i analysis i analyse [80] we are of the view that the applicable stand- ard of review is reasonableness and that the crtc’s decision was reasonable. as we point out in our con- curring reasons in vavilov, the majority’s framework disregards the significance of specialized expertise [80] nous sommes d’avis que la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la décision raisonnable, et que la décision du crtc était raisonnable. comme nous le soulignons dans nos motifs concordants dans l’ar- rêt vavilov, le cadre d’analyse appliqué par les juges [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada les juges abella et karakatsanis 887 and results in broad application of the standard of correctness. it does so based solely on the premise that appeal clauses reflect the legislature’s intention that all questions of law be reviewed by a court on the basis of correctness. since there is an appeal clause in the broadcasting act, the majority says the court is entitled to substitute its opinion for that of the crtc. this case demonstrates the fundamental flaws of such an approach. [81] under reasonableness review, bell and the nfl bear the onus of demonstrating that the crtc’s decision, as a whole, is unreasonable. in our view, the federal court of appeal approached the decision with appropriate deference, providing an effective foil to the appellants’ correctness- based arguments. we agree that the appellants have not met their bur- den. [82] reasonableness review begins with seeking to understand the decision and the reasons for that decision in light of the administrative context and the grounds on which it is challenged. here, bell and the nfl argue that the crtc’s interpretation of “programming services” was not available because, in their view, the term refers to an entire channel, whereas they characterize the super bowl order as targeting a specific program. as a result, they argue, there was no legal basis for the super bowl order. majoritaires ne tient pas compte de l’importance de l’expertise du décideur et se traduit par une large ap- plication de la norme de la décision correcte. il en est ainsi uniquement sur la base de la prémisse voulant que la présence de dispositions créant un droit d’ap- pel reflète l’intention du législateur que toutes les questions de droit soient contrôlées judiciairement suivant le critère de la décision correcte. vu l’exis- tence d’une disposition créant un droit d’appel dans la loi sur la radiodiffusion, les juges majoritaires affirment que la cour a le droit de substituer son opinion à celle du crtc. la présente affaire illustre bien les lacunes fondamentales d’une telle approche. [81] selon la norme de la décision raisonnable, bell et la nfl ont le fardeau de démontrer que, glo- balement, la décision du crtc est déraisonnable. à notre avis, la cour d’appel fédérale a examiné la décision du crtc en faisant montre de la déférence qui convenait, réfutant concrètement les arguments des appelantes fondés sur la norme de la décision correcte. à l’instar de la cour d’appel fédérale, nous estimons que les appelantes ne se sont pas acquittées du fardeau qui leur incombait. [82] en cas de contrôle judiciaire basé sur la norme de la décision raisonnable, le tribunal de révision s’efforce d’abord de bien comprendre la décision ainsi que les motifs l’appuyant, et ce, à la lumière du contexte administratif dans lequel elle a été rendue et des moyens qui sont invoqués pour la contester. en l’espèce, bell et la nfl plaident qu’il n’était pas loisible au crtc d’interpréter comme il l’a fait l’ex- pression « services de programmation », car à leur avis cette expression s’entend de l’entière program- mation d’une chaîne, alors que l’ordonnance relative au super bowl cible une émission en particulier. en conséquence, plaident ces sociétés, l’ordonnance relative au super bowl était dénuée de fondement juridique. [83] as an archetype of an expert administrative body, the crtc’s specialized expertise is well- settled. extensive statutory powers have been granted to this regulatory body, and an exceptionally spe- cialized mandate requires the crtc to consider and balance complex public interest considerations in regulating an entire industry. the need for an expert [83] le crtc est l’archétype de l’organisme administratif spécialisé, et son expertise est bien établie. des pouvoirs étendus ont été conférés par la loi à cet organisme de réglementation, et un mandat exceptionnellement spécialisé l’oblige à prendre en compte et à mettre en équilibre des considérations d’intérêt public complexes dans 888 bell canada v canada abella and karakatsanis jj. [2019] 4 scr. body to balance sensitive public interest issues in a highly technical context is particularly evident in this case, with the record containing a series of public notices, consultations and policies spanning almost three years and leading to the decision at issue. [84] in our view, the reasons provided by the crtc in the order and accompanying regulatory policy set out a rational and persuasive line of reasoning which clearly outlines the consequences, operational implications and challenges that motivated its de- cision. the challenges raised by bell and the nfl fail to satisfy us that the crtc was unreasonable in concluding that s. 9(1)(h) provided a legal basis to prohibit simultaneous substitution during the super bowl. [85] in its decision, the crtc highlighted that simultaneous substitution is not a right, but an excep- tion to the general requirement that distribution un- dertakings may not alter the programs they transmit. the crtc emphasized that the decision was part of “much broader policy determinations” in light of its duty to regulate and supervise the broadcasting sys- tem as a whole. given the cultural significance of the super bowl, the decision was an attempt to balance support for canadian programming with a response to the frustrations of viewers and other objectives of the broadcasting act, such as allowing subscribers to view complete programming. the crtc noted that s. 4(3) of the simultaneous substitution regulations prohibits simultaneous substitution where the crtc has decided that the practice is not in the public interest. le cadre de la réglementation d’une industrie tout entière. le besoin de faire appel à un organisme ex- pert pour mettre en équilibre de délicates questions d’intérêt public, et ce, dans un contexte hautement technique, est particulièrement évident dans la pré- sente affaire, où le dossier d’instance renferme une série de mesures — avis publics, consultations et politiques — qui se sont étalées sur une période de presque trois ans et qui ont abouti à la décision en litige. [84] à notre avis, les motifs fournis par le crtc dans l’ordonnance et dans la politique réglementaire qui l’accompagne exposent un raisonnement logique et convaincant, qui explique clairement les consé- quences, ainsi que les implications et les défis sur le plan de la mise en œuvre qui ont motivé sa décision. les arguments soulevés par bell et la nfl pour contester cette décision ne nous convainquent pas que le crtc a conclu de manière déraisonnable que l’al. 9(1)h) constituait une assise juridique permet- tant d’interdire la substitution simultanée pendant le super bowl. [85] dans sa décision, le crtc a souligné que la substitution simultanée n’était pas un droit, mais plutôt une exception à l’obligation générale qu’ont les entreprises de distribution de ne pas modifier les émissions qu’elles transmettent. le crtc a précisé que la décision faisait partie « de décisions de poli- tique ayant une portée beaucoup plus large » compte tenu du devoir qui lui incombe de réglementer et de surveiller l’ensemble du système de radiodif- fusion. vu la dimension culturelle du super bowl, la décision se veut une tentative en vue d’assurer l’équilibre entre, d’une part, le soutien à la program- mation canadienne et, d’autre part, la prise en compte des frustrations exprimées par les téléspectateurs et la réalisation d’autres objectifs de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, par exemple le fait de permettre aux abonnés de voir l’émission complète. le crtc a fait observer que le par. 4(3) du règlement sur la substi- tution simultanée interdit la substitution simultanée lorsque le crtc décide que la pratique n’est pas dans l’intérêt public. [86] given its decision that authorizing simultane- ous substitution during the super bowl was not in [86] à la lumière de sa décision portant qu’il n’était pas dans l’intérêt public d’autoriser la substitution [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada les juges abella et karakatsanis 889 the public interest, the crtc determined it could use its power under s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act to implement that decision. simultanée pendant le super bowl, le crtc a conclu qu’il pouvait exercer le pouvoir que lui confère l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion pour mettre en œuvre cette décision. [87] section 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act pro- vides: [87] voici le texte de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion : licences, etc. catégories de licences 9 (1) subject to this part, the commission may, in fur- therance of its objects, 9 (1) sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente partie, le conseil peut, dans l’exécution de sa mission :   .   . (h) require any licensee who is authorized to carry on a distribution undertaking to carry, on such terms and conditions as the commission deems appropri- ate, programming services specified by the commis - sion. in the crtc’s view, s. 9(1)(h) of the broad- [88] casting act was enacted “to clarify the commission’s broad power to regulate the cable industry and im- pose any conditions necessary to do so.” the open- ing clause of s. 9(1) couches the crtc’s authority to make orders “in furtherance of its objects”, and thus, in the purposes of the act. in support of this, the crtc cited a previous notice in which it had concluded that the broad wording of s. 9(1)(h) was part and parcel of the flexible mandate that allows it to use a combination of regulations, conditions and orders to achieve the objects of the broadcasting act. the order was therefore found by the crtc to be within its jurisdiction. h) obliger ces titulaires à offrir certains services de programmation selon les modalités qu’il précise. [88] de l’avis du crtc, l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion a été édicté « afin de clarifier le pouvoir étendu du conseil de réglementer l’indus- trie du câble et d’imposer toute condition pour ce faire ». la phrase liminaire du par. 9(1) énonce que le crtc dispose du pouvoir de rendre des ordon- nances « dans l’exécution de sa mission », et donc en vue de la réalisation des objectifs de la loi. au soutien de cette interprétation, le crtc a cité un avis antérieur dans lequel il a conclu que le libellé général de l’al.  9(1)h) est une caractéristique du mandat souple qui lui a été confié et qui lui permet de recourir à une combinaison de règlements, de conditions et d’ordonnances pour réaliser les objec- tifs de la loi sur la radiodiffusion. le crtc a par conséquent conclu que l’ordonnance relevait de sa compétence. [89] the crtc also responded to the nfl’s ar- gument that s. 9(1)(h) could only be used to make orders concerning the entire output of a program- ming service rather than an individual program. in the crtc’s view, the wording of the order — di- rected at a programming service — was sufficient to indicate that this was in fact what was being done. the crtc explained that, on a technical level, any simultaneous substitution order involves replacing [89] le crtc a en outre répondu à l’argument de la nfl selon lequel l’al. 9(1)h) ne pouvait être utilisé que pour rendre des ordonnances visant l’in- tégralité d’un service de programmation, et non une émission en particulier. suivant le crtc, le libellé de l’ordonnance — laquelle visait un service de pro- grammation — suffisait à indiquer que c’est effec- tivement ce que faisait son ordonnance. le crtc a expliqué que, sur le plan technique, toute ordonnance 890 bell canada v canada abella and karakatsanis jj. [2019] 4 scr. the entire output of a programming service. as the crtc wrote in its decision: moreover, the distribution order reflects the way simulta- neous substitution is actually performed. the entire output of a programming service is, for a particular program, de- leted and the entire output of another programming service is substituted, until that program ends. the distribution order reflects the notion that the entire output of the pro- gramming service of a television station will not be deleted and substituted for the super bowl, a particular program. de substitution simultanée implique le remplacement du signal intégral d’un service de programmation. comme l’a écrit le crtc dans sa décision : en outre, l’ordonnance de distribution reflète la façon dont la substitution simultanée est effectuée. pour une émission précise, le signal intégral d’un service de programmation est supprimé et le signal intégral d’un autre service de pro- grammation lui est substitué jusqu’à la fin de l’émission. l’ordonnance de distribution reflète le fait que le signal intégral du service de programmation d’une station de télévision ne sera ni supprimé ni substitué au cours d’une émission particulière, le super bowl. (super bowl order, at para. 55) (ordonnance relative au super bowl, par. 55) [90] finally, the crtc wrote that policy deter- minations regarding simultaneous substitution do not affect the nfl’s copyright and would, at most, have only a secondary impact on the revenues that could be generated from broadcasting the program. furthermore, not only did the international trade agreements raised by the nfl not apply directly to the crtc, they simply provided canada with the ability to create simultaneous substitution and did not limit the commission’s ability to modify or remove the regime. [91] because judicial substitution is incompatible with reasonableness review, we do not begin our analysis by asking how we would have decided the issue before us. rather, it is in light of the above reasons, as well as the broader administrative context and record, that we must consider whether bell and the nfl have raised any arguments that, if accepted, would render the crtc’s decision unreasonable. the crtc here holds the “interpretative upper hand: under reasonableness review, we defer to any reason- able interpretation adopted by an administrative de- cision maker, even if other reasonable interpretations may exist”: mclean v. british columbia (securities commission), [2013] 3 scr 895, at para. 40 (em- phasis in original). [90] enfin, le crtc a écrit que les décisions de politique générale en matière de substitution simulta- née n’avaient pas d’incidence sur les droits d’auteur de la nfl, et qu’elles n’auraient tout au plus qu’une incidence secondaire sur les revenus que pourrait générer la radiodiffusion de l’émission. en outre, non seulement les accords commerciaux internationaux invoqués par la nfl ne s’appliquaient pas directe- ment au crtc, mais ils donnaient simplement au canada la capacité de créer un mécanisme de substi- tution simultanée, sans limiter la capacité du conseil de modifier ce mécanisme, voire de l’éliminer. [91] parce que le fait pour la cour de révision de substituer son interprétation à celle du décideur ad- ministratif serait incompatible avec la réalisation d’un contrôle judiciaire selon la norme de la décision raison- nable, nous n’allons pas amorcer notre analyse en nous demandant comment nous aurions tranché la question dont nous sommes saisis. c’est donc plutôt à la lumière des raisons susmentionnées, ainsi que du contexte ad- ministratif plus large et du dossier, que nous devons nous demander si bell et la nfl ont soulevé des argu- ments qui, s’ils étaient retenus, rendraient la décision du crtc déraisonnable. en l’espèce, le crtc jouit « [d’un] privilège [  ] en matière d’interprétation : suivant la norme de la raisonnabilité, nous devons déférer à toute interprétation raisonnable du décideur administratif, même lorsque d’autres interprétations raisonnables sont possibles » (mclean c. colombie- britannique (securities commission), [2013] 3 rcs. 895, par. 40 (en italique dans l’original)). [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada les juges abella et karakatsanis 891 [92] bell and the nfl concentrated their textual analysis of s. 9(1)(h) on the term “programming ser- vices”. they submit that this term cannot support the issuance of an order with terms and conditions that relate to a single program. the nfl further argued that the use of the terms “programming services” and “programs” elsewhere in the broadcasting act indicates that the two terms serve different purposes in the act. [93] we agree with near ja that neither bell and the nfl’s submissions, nor the legislative history of s. 9(1)(h), exclude the possibility that “programming services” could relate to a single program in this con- text. showing appropriate deference and attention to the administrative context, near ja looked to a pre- vious decision of the crtc for guidance with respect to the interpretation of this term, which confirmed that the crtc had previously relied on s. 33(2) of the interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21, to support its conclusion that the term “programming services” may be singular or plural depending on the context in which it is used: broadcasting decision crtc 2005- 195, may 12, 2005 (online), at paras 27-28. as the intervener the “wholesale code applicants” pointed out, bell itself has advanced contradictory interpretations of s. 9(1)(h) in different proceedings: if (wholesale. code applicants), at paras 11-13. in addition, the fact that parliament granted to the governor in council the right to make an order for the urgent broadcast of a specific “program” under s. 26(2) of the broadcasting act sheds little light on the interpretation of “programming services” in s. 9(1)(h), which operates in a completely different context and allows the crtc to impose terms and conditions on the distribution of programming ser- vices. [92] bell et la nfl ont principalement axé leur analyse textuelle de l’al. 9(1)h) sur l’expression « ser- vices de programmation ». elles soutiennent que cette expression ne saurait appuyer la délivrance d’une ordonnance comportant des modalités qui ne visent qu’une seule émission. la nfl a en outre plaidé qu’il ressortait de l’utilisation des termes « services de programmation » et « émissions » ailleurs dans la loi sur la radiodiffusion que ces deux termes servent des objectifs différents dans la loi. [93] à l’instar du juge near de la cour d’appel fé- dérale, nous estimons que ni les observations de bell et de la nfl ni l’historique législatif de l’al. 9(1)h) n’excluent la possibilité que l’expression « services de programmation » puisse s’entendre d’une seule émission dans le présent contexte. manifestant la déférence et l’attention au contexte administratif qui s’imposent, le juge near a examiné une décision antérieure du crtc pour guider son interprétation de cette expression, examen qui a confirmé que le crtc s’était auparavant appuyé sur le par. 33(2) de la loi d’interprétation, lrc 1985, c. i-21, pour justifier sa conclusion que l’expression « services de pro- grammation » peut désigner l’unité ou la pluralité, se- lon le contexte dans lequel elle est utilisée (décision de radiodiffusion crtc 2005- 195, 12 mai 2005 (en ligne) par 27-28). comme l’a souligné la partie inter- venante « wholesale code applicants », bell a elle- même fait valoir des interprétations contradictoires de l’al. 9(1)h) dans des instances différentes (mi,. wholesale code applicants, par 11-13). en outre, le fait que le législateur a accordé au gouverneur en conseil le droit d’ordonner, par décret, la radiodiffu- sion urgente d’une « émission » en particulier en ap- plication du par. 26(2) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion éclaire peu l’interprétation de l’expression « services de programmation » à l’al. 9(1)h), qui s’applique dans un contexte complètement différent et permet au crtc d’imposer des modalités à l’égard de la distribution de services de programmation. in any event, the super bowl order attached [94] a condition to the carriage of canadian television stations and was, by its own terms, structured to ap- ply to programming services — a reflection of how simultaneous substitution is actually performed. as the crtc observed, when simultaneous substitution [94] quoi qu’il en soit, l’ordonnance relative au super bowl imposait aux stations de télévision cana- diennes une condition de distribution et, suivant les termes mêmes dans lesquels elle était formulée, cette ordonnance était structurée de façon à s’appliquer aux services de programmation — reflétant ainsi 892 bell canada v canada abella and karakatsanis jj. [2019] 4 scr. is performed, it is not simply the advertisements that are replaced, but the entire feed of the program. if a station were to make a simultaneous substi- tution request for the super bowl, for example, both the game and the advertisements would be re- broadcasted by distribution undertakings complying with the request. in other words, the resulting broad- cast would not be an american signal of the super bowl game intermittently interrupted by a signal carrying canadian commercials. it would be a con- tinuous canadian re- transmission of the entire super bowl broadcast, including canadian commercials. we agree with the attorney general of canada’s submission that the crtc’s reasoning here engaged its specialized and technical knowledge, leading to an interpretation that was reasonable in this opera- tional context. [95] in addition, the crtc evidently considered s. 9(1)(h) in its context, including not only the ob- jectives of the broadcasting act but also its broader statutory framework. in response to the jurisdic- tional arguments brought by bell and the nfl, the crtc relied on s. 4(1) and (3) of the simultaneous substitution regulations which prohibit licensees from engaging in simultaneous substitution where the crtc has determined that the practice is “not in the public interest”. we agree with the federal court of appeal’s assessment that “[i]t is not for the court to engage in weighing these competing policy objectives and substituting its own view in decid- ing which policy objectives should be pursued” in the public interest: para 24. the super bowl order was one piece in a mosaic of decisions arising from nearly three years of consultation and was reason- ably determined to further the policy objectives of the broadcasting act. section 9(1)(h) contains no statutory limits on the types of terms or conditions that the crtc may deem appropriate towards pro- gramming services, and the provision must be read in light of parliament’s broad grant of discretion to the crtc. throughout the process, the crtc made clear that its decision was weighed — and ultimately la manière dont la substitution simultanée est réali- sée en pratique. comme l’a fait observer le crtc, lorsque la substitution simultanée est effectuée, ce ne sont pas simplement les messages publicitaires qui sont remplacés, mais le signal intégral de l’émission. si une station faisait une demande de substitution simultanée pour le super bowl, par exemple, ce sont à la fois le match et les messages publicitaires qui seraient rediffusés par les entreprises de distri- bution donnant suite à la demande. autrement dit, la radiodiffusion en résultant ne serait pas un signal américain diffusant le match du super bowl, un signal qui serait interrompu de façon intermittente par un signal diffusant des messages publicitaires canadiens. ce serait une retransmission canadienne continue de tout le super bowl, incluant des mes- sages publicitaires canadiens. nous faisons nôtre l’observation du procureur général du canada selon laquelle le raisonnement du crtc en l’espèce repo- sait sur ses connaissances spécialisées et techniques, et il a abouti à une interprétation qui était raisonnable eu égard au contexte d’application particulier. [95] de plus, le crtc a de toute évidence exa- miné l’al. 9(1)h) en tenant compte du contexte dans lequel il s’appliquait, y compris non seulement des objectifs de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, mais éga- lement du cadre législatif plus large. en réponse aux arguments avancés par bell et la nfl sur la question de la compétence, le crtc s’est appuyé sur les par. 4(1) et (3) du règlement sur la substi- tution simultanée, qui ont pour effet d’interdire aux titulaires de licence de procéder à la substitution simultanée lorsque le crtc conclut que la pratique « n’est pas dans l’intérêt public ». nous souscrivons à l’observation de la cour d’appel fédérale selon laquelle « [l]a cour [d’appel fédérale] n’a pas pour rôle d’entreprendre une pondération de ces objectifs stratégiques concurrents et de substituer ses propres conclusions quant aux objectifs à atteindre » dans l’intérêt public (par 24). l’ordonnance relative au super bowl était une pièce parmi d’autres dans une mosaïque de décisions découlant de tout près de trois années de consultations, et elle a été raisonnablement jugée comme ayant pour effet de favoriser la réalisa- tion des objectifs de politique générale de la loi sur la radiodiffusion. l’alinéa 9(1)h) n’impose aucune restriction quant aux types de modalités que le crtc [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada les juges abella et karakatsanis 893 justified — in light of “much broader policy determi- nations” and the crtc’s duty to regulate the “system as a whole”. [96] finally, bell and the nfl argue that the crtc’s interpretation of s. 9(1)(h) conflicts with the operation and purpose of the copyright act. it is well established that the purpose of the cop- yright act is to balance authors’ and users’ rights and that the crtc may not choose to pursue its objectives in ways that are incompatible with the purposes of the copyright act or which operation- ally conflict with its specific provisions: reference re broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2010- 167 and broadcasting order crtc 2010- 168, at para 45. but given the nfl’s repeated submission that “[us] advertising is not even part of the su- per bowl game or covered by the nfl’s copyright, much less integral to the super bowl”, it can hardly come as a surprise that the crtc adopted the same position: ar, vol. ii, at p. 115 (emphasis added). we agree with near ja that there is no operational conflict with the copyright act. the nfl submits that the super bowl order conflicts with s. 31(2)(c) of the copyright act because it is not “required or permitted by or under the laws of canada”. as the court of appeal pointed out, however, this sub- mission ignores that the order was validly made pursuant to s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act and by way of s. 4(3) of the simultaneous substitution regulations. finally, we see nothing wrong with the crtc’s conclusion that the international treaties raised by the parties are permissive and do not re- quire simultaneous substitution. there is therefore no conflict of purpose. peut fixer à l’égard des services de programmation, et cette disposition doit être considérée à la lumière du large pouvoir discrétionnaire que le parlement a conféré au crtc. tout au long du processus, le crtc a clairement indiqué qu’il prenait sa décision à la lumière de « décisions de politique ayant une portée beaucoup plus large » et de l’obligation qui lui incombe de réglementer l’« ensemble du sys- tème » — et c’est ainsi qu’il l’a justifiée en définitive. [96] enfin, bell et la nfl plaident que l’interpré- tation que donne le crtc de l’al. 9)(1)h) entre en conflit avec l’objet de la loi sur le droit d’auteur et l’application de celle-ci. il est bien établi que la loi sur le droit d’auteur a pour objet de mettre en équilibre les droits des créateurs et ceux des utilisa- teurs, et que le crtc ne peut choisir de poursuivre ses objectifs par des moyens qui sont incompatibles avec l’objet de la loi sur le droit d’auteur ou qui en- traînent un conflit d’application avec des dispositions précises de cette loi (renvoi relatif à la politique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2010- 167 et l’ordonnance de radiodiffusion crtc 2010- 168, par 45). cependant, compte tenu de l’argument qu’a répété la nfl et selon lequel [traduction] « les messages publicitaires [américains] ne sont même pas un aspect du match du super bowl ou même visés par les droits d’auteur de la nfl, et consti- tuent encore moins une partie intégrante du super bowl », il n’est guère surprenant que le crtc ait adopté la même position (da, vol ii, p. 115 (nous soulignons)). nous souscrivons à la conclusion du juge d’appel near portant qu’il n’existe pas de conflit d’application avec la loi sur le droit d’auteur. la nfl prétend que l’ordonnance relative au super bowl entre en conflit avec l’al. 31(2)c) de la loi sur le droit d’auteur, car elle ne découle d’aucune « obliga- tion ou permission légale ou réglementaire ». comme l’a toutefois souligné la cour d’appel, cette préten- tion fait abstraction du fait que l’ordonnance a été validement rendue en vertu de l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion et par application du par. 4(3) du règlement sur la substitution simultanée. enfin, nous ne relevons aucune erreur dans la conclusion du crtc selon laquelle les traités internationaux invoqués par les parties ont un caractère permissif et n’ont pas pour effet d’exiger la substitution simulta- née. il n’y a par conséquent pas de conflit d’objets. 894 bell canada v canada abella and karakatsanis jj. [2019] 4 scr. [97] bell and the nfl’s burden was not only to show that their competing interpretation of s. 9(1)(h) was reasonable, but also that the crtc’s interpreta- tion was unreasonable (mclean, at para 41). that they have not done. deferential review of the decision and administrative context satisfy us that the crtc reasonably interpreted s. 9(1)(h) of the broadcasting act and that its super bowl order was reasonable and defensible in light of the facts and law. we would dismiss the appeals. il incombait à bell et à la nfl de prouver non [97] seulement que l’interprétation opposée de l’al. 9(1)h) qu’elles préconisent était raisonnable, mais égale- ment que celle proposée par le crtc était dérai- sonnable (mclean, par 41). elles ne se sont pas acquittées de ce fardeau. un examen empreint de déférence de la décision et du contexte administratif dans lequel elle a été prise nous convainquent que le crtc a raisonnablement interprété l’al. 9(1)h) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, et que son ordonnance re- lative au super bowl était raisonnable et défendable au regard des faits et du droit. nous rejetterions les pourvois. appendix a annexe a broadcasting act, sc 1991, c. 11 loi sur la radiodiffusion, lc 1991, c. 11 2 (1) in this act, 2 (1) les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.   .   . program means sounds or visual images, or a combination of sounds and visual images, that are intended to inform, enlighten or entertain, but does not include visual images, whether or not combined with sounds, that consist pre- dominantly of alphanumeric text; (émission) émission les sons ou les images — ou leur combinai- son — destinés à informer ou divertir, à l’exception des images, muettes ou non, consistant essentiellement en des lettres ou des chiffres. (program)   .   . 9 (1) subject to this part, the commission may, in fur- therance of its objects, 9 (1) sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente partie, le conseil peut, dans l’exécution de sa mission :   .   . (h) require any licensee who is authorized to carry on a distribution undertaking to carry, on such terms and conditions as the commission deems appropriate, programming services specified by the commission. h) obliger ces titulaires à offrir certains services de programmation selon les modalités qu’il précise.   .   . 18   . 18   . (3) the commission may hold a public hearing, make a report, issue any decision and give any approval in con- nection with any complaint or representation made to the commission or in connection with any other matter within (3) les plaintes et les observations présentées au con- seil, de même que toute autre question relevant de sa com- pétence au titre de la présente loi, font l’objet de telles audiences, d’un rapport et d’une décision — notamment [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada 895 its jurisdiction under this act if it is satisfied that it would be in the public interest to do so. une approbation — si le conseil l’estime dans l’intérêt public.   .   . 31 (1) except as provided in this part, every decision and order of the commission is final and conclusive. 31 (1) sauf exceptions prévues par la présente partie, les décisions et ordonnances du conseil sont définitives et sans appel. (2) an appeal lies from a decision or order of the commis sion to the federal court of appeal on a ques- tion of law or a question of jurisdiction if leave therefor is obtained from that court on application made within one month after the making of the decision or order sought to be appealed from or within such further time as that court under special circumstances allows. (2) les décisions et ordonnances du conseil sont sus- ceptibles d’appel, sur une question de droit ou de com- pétence, devant la cour d’appel fédérale. l’exercice de cet appel est toutefois subordonné à l’autorisation de la cour, la demande en ce sens devant être présentée dans le mois qui suit la prise de la décision ou ordonnance attaquée ou dans le délai supplémentaire accordé par la cour dans des circonstances particulières. simultaneous programming service deletion and substitution regulations, sor/2015- 240 règlement sur le retrait et la substitution simultanée de services de programmation, dors/2015- 240 1   . 1   . (2) in these regulations, the expressions canadian pro- gramming service, comparable, customer, dth distri- bution undertaking, educational authority, educational television programming service, format, licence, licensed, licensed area, licensee, non- canadian television station, official contour, operator, programming service, regional television station, relay distribution undertaking, sub- scriber, subscription television system and terrestrial distribution undertaking have the same meanings as in section 1 of the broadcasting distribution regulations. (2) dans le présent règlement, abonné, autorisé, autorité éducative, client, comparable, entreprise de distribution par relais, entreprise de distribution par srd, entreprise de distribution terrestre, exploitant, format, licence, péri- mètre de rayonnement officiel, service de programmation, service de programmation canadien, service de program- mation de télévision éducative, station de télévision non canadienne, station de télévision régionale, système de télévision par abonnement, titulaire et zone de desserte autorisée s’entendent au sens de l’article 1 du règlement sur la distribution de radiodiffusion.   .   . 3 (1) the operator of a canadian television station may ask a licensee that carries on a terrestrial distribution un- dertaking to delete the programming service of another canadian television station or a non- canadian television station and substitute for it the programming service of a local television station or regional television station. 3 (1) l’exploitant d’une station de télévision canadienne peut demander au titulaire qui exploite une entreprise de distribution terrestre de retirer le service de program- mation d’une station de télévision canadienne ou d’une station de télévision non canadienne et d’y substituer le service de programmation d’une station de télévision locale ou d’une station de télévision régionale.   .   . 4  (1) except as otherwise provided under these reg- ulations or in a condition of its licence, a licensee that receives a request referred to in section 3 must carry out 4 (1) sous réserve du présent règlement ou des conditions de sa licence, le titulaire qui reçoit la demande visée à l’article 3 doit retirer le service de programmation en cause 896 bell canada v canada [2019] 4 scr. the requested deletion and substitution if the following conditions are met: et effectuer la substitution demandée si les conditions suivantes sont réunies : (a) the request is in writing and is received by the licensee at least four days before the day on which the programming service to be substituted is to be broadcast; a) la demande est présentée par écrit et doit être re- çue par le titulaire au moins quatre jours avant la date prévue pour la diffusion du service de programmation à substituer; (b) the programming service to be deleted and the programming service to be substituted are comparable and are to be broadcast simultaneously; b) le service de programmation à retirer et le service de programmation à substituer sont comparables et doivent être diffusés simultanément; (c) the programming service to be substituted has the same format as, or a higher format than, the program- ming service to be deleted; and c) le service de programmation à substituer est d’un format égal ou supérieur au service de programmation à retirer; (d) if the licensee carries on a terrestrial distribution undertaking, the programming service to be substi- tuted has a higher priority under section  17 of the broadcasting distribution regulations than the pro- gramming service to be deleted. d) dans le cas où le titulaire exploite une entreprise de distribution terrestre, le service de programma- tion à substituer a priorité, en vertu de l’article 17 du règlement sur la distribution de radiodiffusion, sur le service de programmation à retirer.   .   . (3) a licensee must not delete a programming service and substitute another programming service for it if the commission decides under subsection 18(3) of the broad- casting act that the deletion and substitution are not in the public interest. (3) le titulaire ne peut retirer un service de programma- tion et y substituer un autre service de programmation si le conseil rend une décision, en vertu du paragraphe 18(3) de la loi sur la radiodiffusion, portant que le retrait et la substitution ne sont pas dans l’intérêt public. broadcasting distribution regulations, sor/ 97- 555 règlement sur la distribution de radiodiffusion, dors/97- 555 1 the definitions in this section apply in these regula- tions. 1 les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent au présent rè- glement.   .   . programming service means a program that is provided by a programming undertaking. (service de programmation) service de programmation émission fournie par une en- treprise de programmation. (programming service)   .   . 7 subject to section 7.2, a licensee shall not alter the content or format of a programming service or delete a programming service in a licensed area in the course of its distribution except 7 sous réserve de l’article 7.2, le titulaire ne peut modifier le contenu ou le format d’un service de programmation ou retirer un tel service au cours de sa distribution dans une zone de desserte autorisée, sauf si, selon le cas : (a) as required or authorized by a condition of its li- cence or under the simultaneous programming service deletion and substitution regulations. a) la modification ou le retrait est fait en conformité avec les conditions de sa licence ou le règlement sur le retrait et la substitution simultanés de services de programmation; [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada 897 appeals allowed with costs throughout, abella and karakatsanis jj. dissenting. les pourvois sont accueillis avec dépens dans toutes les cours, les juges abella et karakatsanis sont dissidentes. procureurs des appelantes : mccarthy tétrault, toronto. toronto. procureur de l’intimé  :  procureur général du canada, toronto. canada, toronto. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. of quebec: attorney general of quebec, québec. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’ontario : procureur général de l’ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné- rale du québec : procureure générale du québec, québec. of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de la colombie- britannique : procureur général de la colombie- britannique, victoria. of saskatchewan: attorney general of saskatche- wan, regina. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de la saskatchewan : procureur général de la saskatchewan, regina. procureurs de l’intervenante telus communica- tions inc.: nelligan o’brien payne, ottawa. tions inc. : nelligan o’brien payne, ottawa. for tenants ontario - tenant duty counsel program: advocacy centre for tenants ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le centre ontarien de défense des droits des locataires - programme d’avo- cats de service en droit du logement : centre onta- rien de défense des droits des locataires, toronto. ties commission, the british columbia securities commission and the alberta securities commission: ontario securities commission, toronto. procureur des intervenantes la commission des valeurs mobilières de l’ontario, british columbia securities commission et alberta securities com- mission : ontario securities commission, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante ecojustice canada society: ecojustice canada society, toronto. society : ecojustice canada society, toronto. and insurance appeals tribunal (ontario), the work- ers’ compensation appeals tribunal (northwest territories and nunavut), the workers’ compensa- tion appeals tribunal (nova scotia), the appeals commission for alberta workers’ compensation procureur des intervenants le tribunal d’appel de la sécurité professionnelle et de l’assurance con tre les accidents du travail (ontario), workers’ compensation appeals tribunal (territoires du nord- ouest et nuna- vut), le tribunal d’appel des décisions de la commis- sion des accidents du travail de la nouvelle- écosse, 898 bell canada v canada [2019] 4 scr. and the workers’ compensation appeals tribunal (new brunswick): workplace safety and insurance appeals tribunal, toronto. appeals commission for alberta workers’ compen- sation et le tribunal d’appel des accidents au tra- vail (nouveau- brunswick) : workplace safety and insurance appeals tribunal, toronto. international commercial arbitration centre foun- dation: fasken martineau dumoulin, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante british columbia international commercial arbitration centre foun- dation : fasken martineau dumoulin, vancouver. dian administrative tribunals: lax o’sullivan lisus gottlieb, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant le conseil des tribu- naux administratifs canadiens : lax o’sullivan lisus gottlieb, toronto. emy of arbitrators, the ontario labour- management arbitrators’ association and conférence des arbitres du québec: susan l. stewart, toronto; paliare ro- land rosenberg rothstein, toronto; rae christen jeffries, toronto. procureurs des intervenantes national academy of arbitrators, ontario labour- management arbi- trators’ association et la conférence des arbitres du québec : susan l. stewart, toronto; paliare roland rosenberg rothstein, toronto; rae christen jeffries, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant le congrès du travail congress: goldblatt partners, toronto. du canada : goldblatt partners, toronto. tion of pharmacy regulatory authorities: shores jardine, edmonton. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association natio- nale des organismes de réglementation de la phar- macie : shores jardine, edmonton. procureurs de l’intervenante queen’s prison law clinic: stockwoods, toronto. clinic : stockwoods, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant advocates for the rule of law: mccarthy tétrault, vancouver. rule of law : mccarthy tétrault, vancouver. parative administrative law forum: cambridge university — the faculty of law, cambridge, uk;. white & case, washington, dc. procureurs de l’intervenant cambridge compar- ative administrative law forum : cambridge uni- versity — the faculty of law, cambridge (r-u);. white & case, washington, dc. canadian advertisers and the alliance of cana- dian cinema, television and radio artists: lenczner slaght royce smith griffin, toronto. procureurs des intervenantes l’association ca- nadienne des annonceurs et alliance of canadian cinema, television and radio artists : lenczner slaght royce smith griffin, toronto. canadian internet policy and public interest clinic: caza saikaley, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenante la clinique d’in- térêt public et de politique d’internet du canada samuelson- glushko : caza saikaley, ottawa. [2019] 4 rcs. bell canada c canada 899 association: gowling wlg (canada), ottawa. solicitors for the interveners blue ant media inc., the canadian broadcasting corporation, dhx media ltd., groupe v média inc., the independent broadcast group, the aboriginal peoples television network, allarco entertainment inc., bbc kids, channel zero, ethnic channels group ltd., holly- wood suite, outtv network inc., stingray digital group inc., tv5 québec canada, zoomermedia ltd. and pelmorex weather networks (television) inc. (37896): fasken martineau dumoulin, mont- réal. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association du barreau canadien : gowling wlg (canada), ot- tawa. procureurs des intervenants blue ant media inc., la société radio- canada, dhx media ltd., le groupe v média inc., le groupe de diffuseurs indé- pendants, aboriginal peoples television network, allarco entertainment inc., bbc kids, channel zero, ethnic channels group ltd., hollywood suite, outtv network inc., le groupe stingray digital inc., tv5 québec canada, zoomermedia ltd. et le réseau de stations météorologiques pelmorex (télévision) inc. (37896) : fasken martineau dumoulin, montréal. solicitors for the intervener the first nations child & family caring society of canada: stikeman elliott, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenante la société de soutien à l’enfance et à la famille des premières nations du canada : stikeman elliott, ottawa.
i. introduction [1] this appeal raises an issue relating to compensation, or set-off in a common law setting, between two debts in the context of proceedings under the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36 (“ccaa”). the question is whether compensation is permitted for debts between the same parties: on the one hand, a debt resulting from the act to ensure mainly the recovery of amounts improperly paid as a result of fraud or fraudulent tactics in connection with public contracts, cqlr, c. r-22003 (“bill 26”), that predates an initial order made under the ccaa and, on the other hand, a debt between the same parties that postdates that order. in these reasons, we will use the expression “pre-post compensation” to refer generally to compensation between debts arising before and after an initial order. [2] this question thus affords the court an occasion to interpret, for the first time, certain provisions of bill 26 as well as the regulation made under it, the voluntary reimbursement program, cqlr, c. r-22003, r 1 (“vrp regulation”). in doing so, we will clarify for public bodies the burden of proof that rests on them in seeking to establish that a claim arising from an agreement entered into under the voluntary reimbursement program (“vrp”) is fraudulent. [3] bill 26 was passed by the quebec national assembly in march 2015 in response to a commission of inquiry that had brought to light the existence of schemes involving collusion and corruption in the awarding and management of public contracts in the construction industry (“charbonneau commission”), and the vrp regulation was made a few months later. the program resulting from this legislation, which was in effect for two years, allowed enterprises to “reimburse certain amounts improperly paid in the course of the tendering, awarding or management of a public contract in relation to which there may have been fraud or fraudulent tactics” (s 3 of bill 26). [4] to answer the question with respect to compensation in the context of this appeal, the court must first determine whether a claim arising from an agreement entered into under the vrp is necessarily a “claim that relates to” a “debt or liability resulting from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation” pursuant to s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa. we would answer this question in the negative. it cannot be presumed that a claim arising from the vrp falls within that provision where no evidence to this effect has been tendered. we also conclude that a court should generally exercise its discretion to stay pre-post compensation, although it may, in rare cases, refuse such a stay. as well, the court may later lift the stay of the right to pre-post compensation in appropriate cases in the case at bar, however, we conclude that the initial order stayed the right of the appellant, ville de montréal (“city”), to pre-post compensation and that it would not be appropriate to lift the stay in relation to the claims in issue. [5] the appeal should therefore be dismissed. ii. facts [6] sm group, which at the relevant time was a consulting engineering firm, performed a variety of contracts for the city over a period of several years the charbonneau commission’s work uncovered a link between sm group and certain central players in the collusion schemes. two of its former officers were in fact charged with criminal offences. sm group subsequently became insolvent. [7] on august 24, 2018, the quebec superior court made an initial order by which sm group became subject to proceedings under the ccaa and the rights and remedies of creditors were stayed the respondent, deloitte restructuring inc. (“deloitte”), was appointed as monitor. following that order, sm group continued to perform work for the city, including the construction of the samuel de champlain bridge and the rebuilding of the turcot interchange. [8] the city refused to pay for that work. on november 7, 2018, it invoked its right to effect compensation between its debt to sm group for the work done after the initial order and two claims against sm group that, according to the city, arose before the order and resulted from fraud on sm group’s part. [9] on november 12, 2018, the superior court approved the sale of some of sm group’s assets to thornhill investments inc (“thornhill”) one week later, sm group’s contracts were assigned to thornhill. [10] the two claims raised by the city are related to the application of bill 26. the purpose of that statute, read in conjunction with the integrity in public contracts act, sq 2012, c 25, enacted in 2012, and the act to give effect to the charbonneau commission recommendations on political financing, s.q 2016, c 18, enacted in 2016, is to strengthen public confidence in government institutions by addressing the revelations made by the charbonneau commission bill 26 has been described as [translation] “a statutory benchmark for establishing a lack of ethics and lax (if not criminal) morals in a number of enterprises in relation to the awarding of public contracts in quebec” (r v. fedele, 2018 qcca 1901, at para. 44 (canlii)). [11] the first claim the city alleges it has against sm group arises from a settlement agreement entered into in november 2017 by sm group and the minister of justice, acting on the city’s behalf, under the vrp (“vrp claim”). the second is based on a proceeding brought by the city against sm group in september 2018, in which it claimed more than $14 million from sm group for allegedly having participated in collusion in relation to a call for tenders for a water meter contract (“water meter contract claim”). [12] because sm group had failed to repay the vrp claim and because the sale of certain assets to thornhill was imminent, the city advised sm group that it intended to effect compensation between what it owed sm group and the above-mentioned claims, noting that those claims could not be discharged or dealt with by a compromise or arrangement in the planned restructuring process given that they resulted from fraud and from a misappropriation of public funds. [13] in response, deloitte applied for a declaratory judgment stating that compensation could not be effected with respect to the amounts owed by the city to sm group for work performed for the city. iii. judicial history a quebec superior court, 2019 qccs 2316 (corriveau j.) [14] the supervising judge granted deloitte’s application for a declaratory judgment and held that pre-post compensation could not be effected in favour of the city. even though, in her view, the vrp claim was linked to an allegation of fraud that had not been refuted by sm group, she concluded that, according to the principles laid down in quebec (agence du revenu) v. kitco metals inc., 2017 qcca 268, pre-post compensation was not possible. she also concluded that the water meter contract claim was neither liquid nor exigible, which precluded compensation. b quebec court of appeal, 2020 qcca 438 (rochette and healy jja,. ruel ja. dissenting in part) [15] rochette ja, writing for the majority, rejected the city’s argument regarding the vrp claim relying on kitco, he reached the same conclusion as the supervising judge: that pre-post compensation could not be effected in this case. he also rejected the city’s argument that a claim relating to fraud falling within s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa is an exception to the rule stated in that case. in any event, he expressed the view that the city had not proved that s 19(2)(d) applied to its claims. finally, with regard to the water meter contract claim, rochette ja added that the conditions for judicial compensation were not met, since the certainty, liquidity and exigibility of that claim had to be determined later in a proceeding other than that of the restructuring case. [16] ruel ja, dissenting in part, agreed with his colleagues on the nature of the water meter contract claim. however, he was of the view that the vrp claim had to be presumed to fall within s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa and that kitco had to be distinguished on the basis that it had been rendered in a different context. in the final analysis, ruel ja found that s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa represents an exception to the principle established in that case and that it therefore allowed pre-post compensation between the two parties’ respective debts. iv. issues [17] this appeal raises the following three questions: 1 is the vrp claim a claim that relates to a debt resulting from fraud pursuant to s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa? 2 does the ccaa permit compensation between a debt that arises before an initial order and one that arises after that order? 3 if compensation is permitted, should the city be authorized to withhold the payments owed to sm group until judgment is rendered in the case relating to the water meter contract? [18] we will deal with these questions by considering each of the city’s claims separately. v analysis [19] in essence, the city argues that the vrp claim cannot be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement because it relates to a debt resulting from fraud pursuant to s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa according to the city, such a claim falls outside the absolute prohibition against pre-post compensation imposed by kitco. the city also argues that the absolute nature of the kitco rule is inconsistent with the broad discretion conferred on supervising judges by the ccaa. it submits that supervising judges can, in exercising their discretion, authorize pre-post compensation in appropriate circumstances. the exercise of this discretion is particularly appropriate where fraud is involved. [20] for the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the vrp claim in this case is not a claim that relates to a debt resulting from fraud pursuant to s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa. we also conclude that a right to pre-post compensation, or set-off, invoked under the civil law or the common law can be stayed under ss. 11 and 11.02 of the ccaa in our opinion, however, a supervising judge has the discretion to authorize pre-post compensation only in exceptional circumstances, given the high disruptive potential of this form of compensation. in this regard, the fact that the debt underlying a vrp claim is fraudulent, where this is shown, is a relevant factor in the exercise of the supervising judge’s discretion. in this case, we find that it would not be appropriate to allow the city to effect compensation with respect to the vrp claim. nor would it be appropriate to authorize the city to withhold the payments owed to sm group pending the outcome of the case relating to the water meter contract. a voluntary reimbursement program claim (1) characterization of the voluntary reimbursement program claim [21] we must begin by determining whether the vrp claim is a claim that relates to a fraudulent debt, because this is the premise behind the city’s reasoning. for the reasons that follow, we conclude that this basic premise is not correct: the vrp claim is not a claim that relates to a debt resulting from fraud pursuant to s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa. the mere fact that a debtor company participated in the vrp is not sufficient to infer that the company defrauded a public body. in light of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to deal with deloitte’s alternative argument that s 19 of the ccaa is inapplicable in this case because there is no plan providing for a compromise or arrangement. [22] the first step in characterizing the vrp claim is to distinguish, for the purposes of the ccaa, claims that are subject to a compromise or arrangement from those that are not. section 19(1) of the ccaa sets out the general scheme governing claims that may be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement: 19 (1) subject to subsection (2), the only claims that may be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement in respect of a debtor company are (a) claims that relate to debts or liabilities, present or future, to which the company is subject on the earlier of (i) the day on which proceedings commenced under this act, and (ii) if the company filed a notice of intention under section 50.4 of the bankruptcy and insolvency act or commenced proceedings under this act with the consent of inspectors referred to in section 116 of the bankruptcy and insolvency act, the date of the initial bankruptcy event within the meaning of section 2 of that act; and (b) claims that relate to debts or liabilities, present or future, to which the company may become subject before the compromise or arrangement is sanctioned by reason of any obligation incurred by the company before the earlier of the days referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) and (ii). [23] as an exception to this scheme, s 19(2) of the ccaa provides that certain claims may not be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement, including those that result from fraud: (2) a compromise or arrangement in respect of a debtor company may not deal with any claim that relates to any of the following debts or liabilities unless the compromise or arrangement explicitly provides for the claim’s compromise and the creditor in relation to that debt has voted for the acceptance of the compromise or arrangement: . (d) any debt or liability resulting from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation, other than a debt or liability of the company that arises from an equity claim; . [24] the burden of proof applicable to this scheme can be determined by referring to the case law and academic commentary on s 178(1)(e) of the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3 (“bia”), which is analogous in every respect to s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa. as this court noted in century services inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2010 scc 60, [2010] 3 scr 379, these two statutes “for[m] part of an integrated body of insolvency law” (para. 78; see also 9354-9186 québec inc. v. callidus capital corp., 2020 scc 10, at para. 74). [25] to discharge its burden of proving that its claim relates to a debt “resulting from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation”, a creditor must establish, on a balance of probabilities, the following four elements: (i) the debtor made a representation to the creditor; (ii) the representation was false; (iii) the debtor knew that the representation was false; (iv) the false representation was made to obtain property or a service (léger v ouellet, 2011 qcca 1858, at para. 30 (canlii); dupuis v. cernato holdings inc., 2019 qcca 376, at para. 37 (canlii); see also l. w. houlden, g. b. morawetz and j. sarra, bankruptcy and insolvency law of canada (4th ed. rev. (loose-leaf)), vol. 3, at h§63; berger, re, 2010 onsc 4376, 70 cbr (5th) 225, at para. 28; j. p. sarra, g. b. morawetz and l. w. houlden, the 2020-2021 annotated bankruptcy and insolvency act (2020), at pp. 1001 and 1006; d. brochu, précis de la faillite et de l’insolvabilité (5th ed. 2016), at pp. 502-3). once these elements have been proved, the creditor of a claim to which s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa applies is in a better position than other ordinary creditors, insofar as such a claim, while not conferring secured creditor status, cannot be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement (see houlden, morawetz and sarra, at h§63) this exception to the general scheme established by s 19(1) of the ccaa must be interpreted narrowly (see, eg, by analogy, lambert v macara, [2004] rjq 2637 (ca), at para. 96; canada mortgage and housing corp. v. gray, 2014 onca 236, 119 or (3d) 710, at para. 24). [26] the city’s burden was certainly not negligible: it had to prove that sm group had knowingly made a false representation that led to the vrp claim. however, the city considered it sufficient for that purpose to mention that the claim existed, and did not try to prove or even allege any of these elements, presuming or assuming that the vrp claim resulted from fraudulent representations. [27] as a result, the content of the vrp agreement, bill 26 and the vrp regulation must be interpreted to determine whether the vrp claim may be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement. in this regard, and for the reasons that follow, we agree with the majority of the court of appeal that s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa does not apply to the vrp claim. [28] first, the content of the vrp agreement itself is a complete bar to the city’s argument that participation in the program in itself justifies a finding that the city’s claim results from sm group’s fraudulent activities because this confidential agreement entered into by the parties clearly stipulates that the amount fixed in the agreement can in no way be considered to constitute an admission of liability, it cannot be presumed that the vrp claim is a claim that falls within s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa. the onus was therefore on the city to prove, in accordance with the provisions of that statute, that sm group had knowingly made a false representation to it in order to obtain property or a service. [29] in this regard, there is, moreover, a well-established principle in the case law that a court must generally make its own findings of fact in applying s 19(2)(d) (see houlden, morawetz and sarra, at h§63). this is true, for example, even where findings possibly linked to fraud have been made in a previous trial or where a default judgment or a consent to judgment might have contained such findings it can be inferred by analogy from the case law on s 178(1)(e) of the bia that the courts have been particularly consistent and rigorous in assessing the evidence presented to them in this regard (see, eg,. terrain dev immobilier inc. v. charron, 2021 qcca 417, at para. 2 (canlii); dupuis, at paras. 36-40; pelletier v cae rive-nord, 2019 qcca 2164, at paras. 13-19 (canlii); tavan v rostami, 2014 qcca 304, at paras. 3-6 (canlii); léger, at paras. 30-40; guilbert v. economical mutual insurance co., 2020 mbqb 179, [2021] ilr ¶i-6280, at paras. 20-25; sharma v. sandhu, 2019 mbqb 160, at paras. 38-45 (canlii); royal bank of canada v. hejna, 2013 onsc 1719, at paras. 90-92 (canlii); berger, at paras. 28-35; re horwitz (1984), 52 cbr (ns) 102 (ont. hcj), at pp. 106-7, aff’d (1985), 53 cbr (ns) 275 (ca);. agriculture financial services corp v zaborski, 2009 abqb 183, 58 cbr (5th) 301, at paras. 12-18; szeto, re, 2014 bcsc 1563, 15 cbr (6th) 255, at paras. 37-63; the toronto-dominion bank v merenick, 2007 bcsc 1261, at paras. 30-48 (canlii); johnson v erdman, 2007 skqb 223, 34 cbr (5th) 108, at paras. 10-12; coyle (bankrupt), re, 2011 nssc 238, 304 nsr (2d) 369, at paras. 53-58). [30] second, bill 26 and the vrp regulation published in the gazette officielle du québec pursuant to ss. 3 and 4 of that statute do not provide any greater support for the city’s position. we agree with the majority of the court of appeal, who rejected the idea of a statutory presumption or a presumption of fact that a debtor made fraudulent representations based solely on the fact that it participated in the vrp. that scheme, which was in effect from november 2015 to december 2017, created no such presumption. [31] the purpose of the vrp as defined in s 3 of bill 26 — in chapter ii, entitled “reimbursement program” — supports this conclusion: 3. the minister publishes in the gazette officielle du québec a voluntary, fixed-term reimbursement program to make it possible for an enterprise or a natural person mentioned in section 10 to reimburse certain amounts improperly paid in the course of the tendering, awarding or management of a public contract in relation to which there may have been fraud or fraudulent tactics. [32] the use of the words “may have been” in the phrase “there may have been fraud or fraudulent tactics” clearly contradicts the city’s argument. moreover, the same words are also used in s 1 of the vrp regulation in describing the purpose of that program: 1 the voluntary reimbursement program makes it possible for every natural person and every enterprise to reimburse certain amounts improperly paid by a public body in the course of the tendering, awarding or management of a public contract entered into after 1 october 1996 in relation to which there may have been fraud or fraudulent tactics. [33] the fact that fraud is characterized as a possibility rather than a certainty is by no means surprising given the vrp’s purpose of recovering amounts paid improperly by public bodies, it stands to reason that bill 26 does not provide for any mechanism to determine whether amounts agreed to under the vrp are in fact related, in whole or in part, to fraud. section 7 of the vrp regulation supports this point, since it states the following: 7. the fact that a natural person or an enterprise participates in the program does not constitute an admission of liability or of a fault committed by the natural person or enterprise. [34] the fault in question in s 7 is a matter of civil liability and is limited to the public contract to which a vrp agreement pertains. where the legislature intends to refer to penal or criminal proceedings, or to civil proceedings outside the scope of a vrp agreement, it does so expressly. this interpretation is confirmed when s 7 of the vrp regulation is read in conjunction with s 8: 8 every natural person or enterprise participating in the program acknowledges that revealing information or sending documents within the program framework does not restrict in any manner whatever a public body’s capacity to bring civil proceedings against the natural person or enterprise in relation to public contracts for which a settlement has not been reached under the program or to which the act does not apply. every natural person or enterprise acknowledges that participation in the program and the conclusion of an agreement under it in no manner protects the natural person or enterprise, or its officers, against any penal or criminal proceedings that have been or may be brought in connection with public contracts entered into by the natural person or enterprise. [35] evidence that a natural person or enterprise participated in the vrp therefore cannot on its own justify characterizing a claim as being related to a debt resulting from fraud pursuant to s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa. [36] however, the city submits that reading ss. 1, 3 and 10 of bill 26 together leads to an entirely different conclusion, namely that a natural person or enterprise that participated in the vrp necessarily defrauded a public body. in our view, the city is wrong. [37] it is true that s 1 of bill 26 does not refer to fraud as being hypothetical: 1. this act provides for exceptional measures for the reimbursement and recovery of amounts improperly paid as a result of fraud or fraudulent tactics in the course of the tendering, awarding or management of public contracts. as we saw above, however, s 3 of bill 26 and s 1 of the vrp regulation are clear: there is no question that, unlike s 1 of bill 26, which sets out the purpose of that statute generally, the substantive provisions of bill 26 and the vrp regulation contemplate fraud only hypothetically in addition, the city’s interpretation cannot be reconciled with ss. 7 and 8 of the vrp regulation, which are reproduced above. [38] that being said, the city points out that s 3 of bill 26 refers to s 10, which specifically states that fraud was committed: 10. any enterprise or natural person who has, in any capacity, participated in fraud or fraudulent tactics in the course of the tendering, awarding or management of a public contract is presumed to have caused injury to the public body concerned. in such a case, the officers of the enterprise in office at the time the fraud or fraudulent tactics occurred are held liable unless they prove that they acted with the care, diligence and skill that a prudent person would have exercised in similar circumstances. the directors of the enterprise in office at the time the fraud or fraudulent tactics occurred are also held liable if it is established that they knew or ought to have known that fraud or fraudulent tactics were committed in relation to the contract concerned, unless they prove that they acted with the care, diligence and skill that a prudent person would have exercised in similar circumstances. the enterprises and natural persons referred to in this section are solidarily liable for the injury caused, unless such liability is waived by the public body. [39] we do not agree with the city’s interpretation on this point. it is up to the courts to conclude that fraud of this kind has been committed. more precisely, we are of the view that the city is confusing two schemes created by bill 26: one — the vrp (ss. 3 to 9) — introduced by chapter ii and the other by chapter iii, which is entitled “special rules applicable to judicial proceedings” (ss. 10 to 17). the first scheme was designed to encourage — for a two-year period — natural persons or enterprises fearing that a public body would bring civil proceedings against them to participate in the vrp with a view to entering into an agreement through a completely confidential process (s 7 of bill 26; s 4 of the vrp regulation). it was only once the first scheme ended that the second, one of an entirely different nature, took effect. [40] the scheme provided for in ss. 10 to 17 of bill 26 is one that deviates from the general law. it applies to judicial proceedings brought by a public body, or by the minister of justice on behalf of a public body, against a natural person or enterprise that allegedly participated in fraud in relation to a public contract. when a court allows such an action, not only can it assume that the defendant caused injury to the public body through its fraudulent act (s 10 para. 1), but in addition, “[t]he injury is presumed to correspond to the amount claimed by the public body concerned for the contract concerned if the amount does not exceed 20% of the total amount paid for that contract” (s 11 para. 1) the enterprises and natural persons contemplated by the statute are solidarily liable for such injury (s 10 para. 4). an amount granted “bears interest from the date the work is accepted by the public body concerned for the contract concerned” (s 11 para. 3). as well, the court “must add a lump sum equal to 20% of any amount granted for injury, to cover expenses incurred for the purposes of th[e] act” (s 14). [41] in other words, these provisions are designed to make it easier to prove causation and injury when such a proceeding is brought, but it should be noted that they are of no effect if a court finds that the evidence of fraud is insufficient; as well, and most importantly, they in no way make it easier to prove such a fault. section 10 of bill 26 is therefore of no assistance to the city, which in any event has not sought to show, on any basis other than the mere existence of the vrp agreement, that sm group took part in fraud in connection with a contract the city awarded to it. the schemes created by bill 26 suggest that a court will recognize the existence of fraud only under the chapter iii scheme. moreover, it appears that the reference to s 10 in s 3 merely serves to specify the natural persons to whom the vrp applies, namely directors and officers of enterprises. [42] lastly, it should be mentioned that it can easily be imagined that an enterprise that entered into a potentially contentious public contract with a public body would make the strategic choice to participate in the vrp out of fear of bad publicity or to avoid exposing itself to the exceptional scheme of chapter iii of bill 26, the result of which, if the proceeding were decided in the public body’s favour, would likely be significant additional financial liability for the enterprise on top of the legal fees it would have to pay. [43] in sum, neither the content of the vrp agreement nor its legal framework supports a presumption that sm group admitted to having committed a fraudulent act; nor does the vrp agreement constitute a serious, precise and concordant presumption of fact (art. 2849 of the civil code of québec). it follows that the city has not shown that the vrp claim falls within s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa. (2) compensation between debts arising before and after an initial order (pre-post compensation) [44] the bankruptcy of large companies often resulted in “the entire disruption of the corporation, loss of goodwill, and sale of assets on a discounted basis” (j. p. sarra, rescue! the companies’ creditors arrangement act (2nd ed 2013), at pp. 22-23; see also century services, at para. 16). parliament, wishing to protect the survivability of such companies, which are essential to economic prosperity and to a high rate of employment, therefore set up a restructuring process in the ccaa that was designed to prevent them from being dismantled and having their assets liquidated at a discount (century services, at paras. 17-18 and 70; callidus, at paras. 41-42). [45] initially, restructuring under the ccaa was done through a plan of arrangement or compromise negotiated between the debtor company and its creditors that averted the company’s bankruptcy by allowing it to adjust its debts and reorganize its business (s. e. edwards, “reorganizations under the companies’ creditors arrangement act” (1947), 25 can bar rev. 587, at pp. 588-90 and 592) later, liquidation under the ccaa emerged as a practice. liquidation can also serve as a tool for restructuring a struggling business “by allowing the business to survive, albeit under a different corporate form or ownership” (callidus, at para. 45; see also sarra, at p 169; k. p. mcelcheran, commercial insolvency in canada (4th ed. 2019), at p 311). [46] the primary tool that allows the ccaa to achieve its restructuring objective is a stay of proceedings and of creditors’ rights (sarra, at pp. 17 and 52; mcelcheran, at p 5). the direct effect of a stay is that it creates a status quo period that stabilizes the debtor company’s situation by shielding it from its creditors while the restructuring process is under way (century services, at para. 60; see also kitco, at para. 43 (canlii)) without such a period, there would be a free-for-all in which individual creditors would fight it out to enforce their rights without regard for the company’s survival or the maximization of its liquidation value (century services, at para. 22). [47] during the status quo period, the debtor company can therefore continue operating without fear of being driven into bankruptcy by its creditors. this temporary respite creates an environment conducive to fair negotiations between the various stakeholders and gives the debtor the necessary time to prepare a plan of compromise or arrangement ensuring its survival, or to take steps to maximize the value of the business it operates with a view to its liquidation under the ccaa (meridian developments inc. v. toronto dominion bank (1984), 32 alta. lr (2d) 150 (qb), at para. 15; kitco, at para. 43; callidus, at paras. 40 and 46). [48] the fundamental feature of the ccaa is a grant to the courts that apply it of a broad discretion to make any orders needed to ensure that restructuring is successful and that the ccaa’s objectives are achieved (century services, at para. 19). the true “engine” driving the statutory scheme (callidus, at para. 48, citing stelco inc. (re) (2005), 253 dlr (4th) 109 (ont. ca), at para. 36), this judicial discretion also plays a prominent part in stays of proceedings. [49] in principle, a court may deny a stay application such applications are rarely denied, however, to the point where the terms “initial order” and “stay order” have, in practice, become interchangeable (sarra, at p 51). stays are in fact requested and granted systematically, other than in certain exceptional cases (p 51). [50] a stay is a temporary measure, however; once it has been lifted, creditors regain their ability to fully exercise their rights and remedies (quinsam coal corp., re, 2000 bcca 386, 20 cbr (4th) 145, at paras. 9 and 14). on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, a court may include in its initial order a first stay period of no more than 10 days (s 11.02(1) of the ccaa). after that, the court may renew the stay for any period it considers necessary (s 11.02(2) of the ccaa). when a stay is renewed, or at any other time in the course of the proceedings, an interested creditor may, in accordance with the procedure set out in the initial order, apply to the court to lift a stay affecting any of its rights or remedies (sarra, at pp. 58-60 and 88; see also muscletech research & development inc., re (2006), 19 cbr (5th) 54 (ont. scj), at para. 5; parc industriel laprade inc. v. conporec inc., 2008 qcca 2222, [2008] rjq 2590, at paras. 7-8 and 14-15). [51] while it is true that the bia and the ccaa form part of an integrated body of insolvency law, there are nonetheless some fundamental differences between the two schemes (century services, at para. 78). unlike the bia, the ccaa gives courts a broad discretion to decide whether a stay is appropriate, to determine how long it should last and to adjust its scope depending on what is needed to restructure the debtor company and to achieve the objectives of the ccaa. in this regard, the ccaa has been described as a “skeletal” statute that does not contain “a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred” (century services, at para. 57, quoting metcalfe & mansfield alternative investments ii corp. (re), 2008 onca 587, 92 or (3d) 513, at para. 44). [52] to fully understand the rights and restrictions applicable in a given case, it is therefore not enough to read the legislation; it is also important to consider the court’s exercise of its discretion, which is reflected in all of the many orders made throughout the proceedings. [53] the question raised by this appeal is therefore whether a court’s discretion allows it to stay a right to pre-post compensation, or set-off, invoked by a creditor under the civil law or the common law and, by extension, to authorize pre-post compensation in appropriate cases. (a) power to grant and lift a stay of the right to pre-post compensation [54] in our view, the broad discretion conferred on a court by ss. 11 and 11.02 of the ccaa allows it to stay rights held by creditors if the exercise of those rights could jeopardize the restructuring process this includes a creditor’s right to effect pre-post compensation. [55] under s 11.02 of the ccaa, a court may stay any action, suit or other proceeding that might be brought against the debtor company. despite the language of s 11.02, which at first glance limits the power to order a stay to judicial proceedings, the courts have taken a large and liberal approach in interpreting the scope of the rights and remedies that can be included in a stay order (see meridian, at para. 26; quintette coal ltd. v. nippon steel corp. (1990), 51 bclr (2d) 105 (ca), at pp. 113-14; smoky river coal ltd., re, 1999 abca 179, 71 alta l.r (3d) 1, at paras. 31-33; mcelcheran, at pp. 135 and 245-46; r. j. wood, bankruptcy and insolvency law (2nd ed. 2015), at p 363). for example, in quintette coal, the british columbia court of appeal concluded that a creditor’s right to pre-post set-off can be stayed just like any other enforcement measure with a high disruptive potential (see also associated investors of canada ltd. (manager of) v. principal savings & trust co. (liquidator of) (1993), 13 alta. lr (3d) 115 (ca), at paras. 23-24; north american tungsten corp., re, 2015 bcca 390, 377 bcac 6, at paras. 13-16, aff’d 2015 bcca 426, 378 bcac 116, at paras. 28-30). in our view, this interpretation is the correct one, as it advances the ccaa’s remedial objectives and is consistent with its scheme. [56] it can also be seen from the various model initial orders adopted by the country’s superior courts that prohibitions against setting off debts are standard practice, and in the vast majority of cases take effect as soon as an initial order is made (see court of queen’s bench of alberta, alberta template ccaa initial order, january 2019 (online), at paras. 14 and 16; supreme court of british columbia, model ccaa initial order, august 1, 2015 (online), at paras. 16 and 18; ontario superior court of justice, commercial list, initial order, january 21, 2014 (online), at paras. 15-16; superior court of quebec, commercial division, initial order, may 2014 (online), at paras. 10 and 12; court of queen’s bench for saskatchewan, saskatchewan template ccaa initial order, december 6, 2017 (online), at paras. 15-16). [57] a court’s discretion is therefore broad enough to allow it to stay the right of creditors to effect pre-post compensation in such a case, the prohibition against pre-post compensation flows directly from the stay order. conversely, a court may in its discretion refuse to impose such a prohibition or, if pre-post compensation was stayed by the order, lift the stay at a later date to allow an interested creditor to assert its rights on this point, we reject the absolute prohibition proposed by the quebec court of appeal in kitco, because we conclude that a court has the discretion to allow pre-post compensation in appropriate cases. [58] the instances in which a court should not stay the right to effect pre-post compensation in an initial order will be rare, however. it must be borne in mind that a supervising judge’s discretion, although broad, is not boundless. it must be exercised in furtherance of the ccaa’s remedial objectives (callidus, at para. 49). [59] the status quo period could be rendered pointless if creditors were allowed to effect pre-post compensation without restraint (see kitco, at paras. 20 and 43). tungsten, in which the court stayed pre-post set-off, provides a good example of the disruptive potential of this form of set-off (north american tungsten corp., re, 2015 bcsc 1382, 28 cbr (6th) 147 (“tungsten (sc)”), at para. 32, aff’d 2015 bcca 390, 377 bcac 6, at paras. 16, 20 and 25, and 2015 bcca 426, 378 bcac 116, at para. 29) if a creditor could rely on compensation to refuse to pay for goods or services supplied by the debtor during the status quo period, the restructuring could be torpedoed. the debtor would have a disincentive to provide its creditors with goods and services because it would fear not being paid for them; it would then be deprived of the funds needed to continue operating (see kitco, at paras. 46-48). section 32 of the ccaa in fact gives the debtor a right — subject to the limits and formal requirements provided for in that provision — to disclaim or resiliate any agreement to which it is a party on the day on which the restructuring proceedings commence in addition, an interim lender would most likely refuse to continue to finance the debtor’s operations during this period if the loaned funds were destined to enrich another creditor at its expense. lastly, the rampart set up by a stay to protect against attacks from all sides by creditors would also crumble, thereby increasing the risk of the debtor’s collapse and bankruptcy (see also a. r. anderson, t. gelbman and b. pullen, “recent developments in the law of set-off”, in j. p. sarra, ed., annual review of insolvency law 2009 (2010), 1, at pp. 22 and 29). [60] the inevitable interruption of the business relationship between the debtor and those who are at once creditors and customers could not come at a worse time. without these contracts and without the payment of accounts receivable and interim financing to replenish the debtor’s working capital, the resale value of its business would melt away, thus setting up roadblocks for restructuring it by way of liquidation. and such a situation could also be unfavourable to creditors that wish to effect compensation. if the debtor terminates a contract and refuses to perform it, the creditor concerned will be deprived of the benefit of the contract and will have to find a new contracting party in place of the debtor, with no guarantee that the price will remain the same. [61] furthermore, where pre-post compensation has been stayed, the court retains the discretion to lift the stay based on the specific facts of each case. however, it must be cautious in doing so, given the high disruptive potential of such compensation. [62] in conclusion, we are of the view that ss. 11 and 11.02 of the ccaa authorize a court to stay pre-post compensation. although we would temper the rule from kitco, which involves an absolute prohibition against pre-post compensation, it is our view that in the vast majority of cases an initial order will, and should, stay a creditor’s right to set up pre-post compensation against the debtor. finally, where an initial order has stayed the right of creditors to pre-post compensation, the court retains the discretion to lift the stay having regard to the circumstances. (b) scope of section 21 of the ccaa [63] in addition, we note that s 21 of the ccaa does not grant creditors a right to pre-post compensation that would be shielded from a supervising judge’s power to order a stay under ss. 11 and 11.02 of the ccaa. although s 21 of the ccaa indicates that there is a right to effect compensation in proceedings under that statute, we are of the opinion that it applies only to compensation between debts that arise before an initial order is made (in other words, “pre-pre compensation”). the modern approach to statutory interpretation dictates this conclusion (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, citing e. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87) our interpretation of s 21 of the ccaa is not based on an inappropriate analogy with the provisions of the bia. [64] section 21 does state that it is possible to effect compensation in insolvency proceedings under the ccaa, but it does not specifically deal with pre-post compensation. it reads as follows: law of set-off or compensation to apply 21 the law of set-off or compensation applies to all claims made against a debtor company and to all actions instituted by it for the recovery of debts due to the company in the same manner and to the same extent as if the company were plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be. read in light of its context, its purpose and the scheme of the ccaa, s 21 is, in our view, limited to authorizing pre-pre compensation for the purpose of quantifying creditors’ claims on the date of commencement of proceedings. [65] with regard to the context, s 21 is in a different part of the statute than the one that provides for a court’s discretion to order a stay. the power to order a stay (ss. 11 and 11.02) and most of the exceptions to it (see, eg, ss. 11.01, 11.08 and 11.1) appear in part ii, which is entitled “jurisdiction of courts”. section 21, meanwhile, is in the division of part iii entitled “claims”, which also includes ss. 19 and 20. this indicates that parliament probably did not consider s 21 to be an exception to the stay period if parliament had in fact intended s 21 to be an exception, it would have included it in part ii or expressly stated that it was an exception. [66] what is more, when s 21 is considered in the broader context of the “claims” division, it becomes clear that this provision is part of a set of rules governing the claims that may be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement and the quantification of the resulting amounts. [67] section 19 specifies which claims may be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement (s 19(1)) and those which will remain intact despite the creditors’ agreement to a compromise or arrangement and its sanction by a court (s 19(2)). only claims arising before the date of commencement of bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings are “claims” that fall under s 19 and therefore give creditors a right to vote on a compromise or arrangement as for s 20, it contains rules for determining the amount of claims. once that amount has been determined, it can then be used to define the relative weight of the voting rights of each creditor with a claim.1 [68] section 21 complements ss. 19 and 20; the compensation authorized by s 21 is intended, among other things, to determine the value of the claim that a creditor may have against the debtor on the date of commencement of proceedings in other words, the purpose of s 21 is to provide an accurate picture of the pecuniary interest each creditor has in the restructuring on the date of commencement of proceedings, and of the number of votes each creditor should have (see kitco, at para. 83). this provision is not concerned with what might happen to the debtor’s business after that date, because the date of commencement of proceedings is when [translation] “the claims 1 a plan of compromise or arrangement must be approved by a special majority representing two thirds in value of the creditors or a class of creditors (s 6(1) of the ccaa). must be established” and therefore when the mutuality of debts must be assessed (b. boucher, “procédures en vertu de la loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit des affaires — faillite, insolvabilité et restructuration (loose-leaf), by s. rousseau, ed., fasc. 14, at no. 70; see also kitco, at para. 34). [69] with all due respect for our colleague, in light of the context of s 21, it is evident that this provision is not meant to legitimize pre-post compensation. [70] this contextual interpretation of s 21, which limits its scope to pre-pre compensation, is also confirmed by the section’s purpose. it was added to the ccaa to prevent the unfair situation that would result from a creditor being required to pay its debt to the debtor company in full but receiving almost nothing from the debtor in payment of its claim under an arrangement or compromise. the effect of s 21 is that the creditor receives payment of its claim up to the value of the debt it owes to the debtor (anderson, gelbman and pullen, at p 27; boucher, at no. 70; mcelcheran, at p 116). [71] it is true that compensation “creat[es] a type of security interest in the [insolvent company’s] estate” because it “[authorizes] the party claiming set-off [to] ‘reorde[r]’ . . his priority” by reducing the value of that party’s claim (husky oil operations ltd. v. minister of national revenue, [1995] 3 scr 453, at paras. 59-60; see kitco, at paras. 63-68). the creditor uses its indebtedness to the debtor as a form of security for its claim, security that is equal in value to its debt to the insolvent company (stein v blake, [1996] 1 a.c 243 (hl), at p 251) this portion of its claim is therefore sure to be paid in full (husky oil, at para. 58). the effect of compensation is thus to deviate from the principle of equality among ordinary creditors, a fundamental principle of insolvency law that applies with equal force in proceedings under the ccaa, one of the remedial objectives of which is to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of the claims made against a debtor (callidus, at para. 40). the exception created by compensation must therefore be interpreted narrowly as a general rule, “[o]nce a formal insolvency process commences, all unsecured creditor remedies are stayed and the creditor must stand in line behind secured and preferred creditors and share any remaining recoveries in the estate pro rata with all other unsecured creditors” (mcelcheran, at p 78). [72] the prejudice suffered by a creditor wishing to effect pre-post compensation does not justify expanding the scope of s 21. when the debt owed by the creditor arises after a stay order has been made, prejudice is merely illusory. the fact that the creditor contracted obligations toward the debtor company during the stay period does not place it in a worse situation than it would have been in had it contracted with a third party instead. if it had contracted with a third party, it would likewise have had to pay the full price of the goods or services it obtained (tungsten (sc), at para. 27) a creditor that contracts with the debtor company during the status quo period knows or ought to know that it will probably receive only pennies on the dollar in payment of its pre-order claim and that payment of its post-order debt will benefit it and the other creditors. [73] because there is really prejudice only in the case of pre-pre compensation, this exception to the principle of equality should apply to only one of the debtor’s assets on the date of commencement of insolvency proceedings, that is, the debt owed to it by the creditor (kitco, at para. 68; husky oil, at para. 59) otherwise, giving the green light to pre-post compensation would amount to granting certain creditors an additional “type of security interest” in respect of new assets acquired by the debtor after the commencement of proceedings (for example, amounts received as interim financing). professor wood aptly describes the injustice that would thus befall the other ordinary creditors whose rights and remedies have been stayed: the ability to exercise a right of set-off in restructuring proceedings can operate to improve greatly the position of one creditor at the expense of the other creditors. this is illustrated in the following example. suppose that the debtor company owes $1,000 to a creditor. the debtor company then initiates restructuring proceedings. while the proceedings are under way, the debtor company sells and delivers goods to the creditor for $1,000. by exercising its right of set-off, the creditor obtains full recovery of its claim at the expense of the other unsecured creditors whose claims will be compromised or otherwise affected by the plan. [p 400] [74] yet the very purpose of the stay period is to ensure that no creditor gains an advantage over the others while the restructuring of the debtor company is under way (woodward’s ltd., re (1993), 79 bclr (2d) 257 (sc), at para. 12; lehndorff general partner ltd., re (1993), 17 cbr (3d) 24 (ont. cj (gen. div.)), at para. 6); hawkair aviation services ltd., re, 2006 bcsc 669, 22 cbr (5th) 11, at para. 17). pre-post compensation should not allow a creditor to do indirectly what it cannot do directly parliament could not have intended to create such an additional security interest that can be realized during the stay period simply because the creditor and the debtor company have a continuing business relationship. [75] to repeat, viewing s 21 as allowing pre-post compensation would undermine the effectiveness of the status quo period, would jeopardize the survival of the debtor company or the business it operates and could derail the restructuring process. it is clear that parliament could not have intended that a struggling company, deprived of its only lifeline, be condemned to drown in its debts solely because a single creditor wanted to gain an advantage over the others. such an outcome is contrary to the fundamental objectives of the ccaa. [76] before concluding, we will pause to briefly discuss kitco. in that case, the court of appeal rejected a literal interpretation of s 21 as allowing all forms of compensation, including pre-post compensation, without any restrictions our colleague is of the view that kitco, which was applied by the majority of the court of appeal and by the supervising judge in the instant case, has created an asymmetry between the interpretation given to s 21 of the ccaa by the quebec courts and the interpretation given to it by the courts of other canadian provinces he cites air canada, re (2003), 45 cbr (4th) 13 (ont. scj), and tungsten in this regard. [77] in our view, kitco is not at odds with the jurisprudence of the rest of the country on the interpretation of s 21 air canada and tungsten did not determine whether pre-post compensation is consistent with the interpretation and objectives of the ccaa, let alone establish a framework for the exercise of this right by creditors. [78] first of all, in air canada, the issues did not relate to the impact of pre-post compensation on the achievement of the ccaa’s objectives. rather, the case concerned the requirements for legal set-off at common law and the interpretation of a provision of the winding-up and restructuring act, rsc 1985, c. w-11, that was worded differently from s 18.1 (now s 21) of the ccaa on the subject of legal set-off, air canada argued that the making of an initial order under the ccaa results in a loss of mutuality between debts, by analogy with the vesting of a bankrupt’s property in a trustee under the bia. this was the context in which the court found that an initial order under the ccaa does not alter the status of creditor and debtor of the insolvent company, unlike what happens in a bankruptcy proceeding. [79] moreover, in tungsten, the dispute related primarily to the possibility of staying the right to pre-post set-off. the judge who ruled on the applications did not analyze the arguments concerning the effects of pre-post set-off on the status quo period and on the underlying objectives of this period, finding that it was not necessary to do so in the circumstances. our colleague maintains that the question of whether pre-post set-off could be effected was never raised by the parties, which by implication showed that it was permitted by s 21 of the ccaa. in our view, the fact that the possibility of effecting pre-post set-off was not argued tends more to weaken the authority of that decision than to strengthen it. [80] therefore, and with due respect for the contrary view, the state of the law on the interpretation of s 21 had not been settled elsewhere in canada. when ruling in kitco, the court of appeal was not bound by air canada and tungsten. [81] in summary, we conclude, as the court of appeal did in kitco, that s 21 of the ccaa allows pre-pre compensation for the purpose of quantifying creditors’ claims on the date of commencement of proceedings (kitco, at para. 82). this provision does not have the effect of authorizing pre-post compensation. that being said, s 21 of the ccaa does not prohibit this form of compensation either a supervising judge therefore retains the discretion to stay or to authorize the exercise of a right to pre-post compensation, or set-off, invoked by a creditor under the civil law or the common law. [82] we turn now to the situation in this case. (c) application [83] in the case at bar, the words of the stay order made by the superior court are broad enough to prohibit pre-post compensation: no exercise of rights or remedies orders that during the stay period, and subject to, inter alia, subsection 11.1 ccaa, all rights and remedies, including, but not limited to modifications of existing rights and events deemed to occur pursuant to any agreement to which any of the debtors is a party as a result of the insolvency of the foreign debtors and/or these ccaa proceedings, any events of default or non-performance by the debtors or any admissions or evidence in these ccaa proceedings, of any individual, natural person, firm, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, trust, joint venture, association, organization, governmental body or agency, or any other entity (all of the foregoing, collectively being “persons” and each being a “person”) against or in respect of the debtors, or affecting the business, the property or any part thereof, are hereby stayed and suspended except with leave of this court. no interference with rights . orders that during the stay period, no person shall discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, resiliate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, licence or permit in favour of or held by the debtors, except with the written consent of the debtors, as applicable, and the monitor, or with leave of this court. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. i, at p 75) [84] given that the order stayed compensation in respect of pre-post claims, what remains to be determined is whether the superior court should have exercised its discretion under s 11 of the ccaa and allowed such compensation in respect of the vrp claim. although we are of the view that the supervising judge erred in finding, in reliance on kitco, that she had no discretion to authorize pre-post compensation, we feel that remanding the case to the court of original jurisdiction would be unhelpful and would not be in the interests of justice. what is more, the delays resulting from this case have prejudiced the rights of third persons in good faith involved in the restructuring of sm group in this regard, thornhill was unable to reimburse, as stipulated, the transition financing granted by the interveners alaris royalty corp. and integrated private debt fund v lp, which are also creditors of sm group, largely because of the city’s refusal to pay the cost of the work done by sm group. [85] in exercising its discretion under the ccaa, a court must keep three baseline considerations in mind: (1) the appropriateness of the order being sought, (2) due diligence and (3) good faith on the applicant’s part (callidus, at para. 49; century services, at para. 70). [86] the first consideration, the appropriateness of the order being sought, relates both to the order itself and to the means that are employed (century services, at para. 70). it is assessed in light of the remedial objectives of the ccaa (callidus, at para. 49; century services, at para. 70) these remedial objectives include the following: avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from the liquidation of an insolvent company; maximizing creditor recovery; ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the claims against the debtor company; preserving going-concern value where possible; protecting jobs and communities affected by the company’s financial distress; and enhancing the credit system generally (callidus, at paras. 40-42). in this regard, the context of restructuring by way of liquidation, and the impact of pre-post compensation on its progress, can be weighed by a court in exercising its discretion. in addition, protecting the public interest, although it overlaps a number of the remedial objectives to be considered by the courts, must also be included in this list (callidus, at para. 40; century services, at para. 60). [87] here, the city argues that protecting the public interest is a consideration that favours pre-post compensation. it submits that the majority of the court of appeal erred in not considering [translation] “the public interest in ensuring the recovery of fraudulently misappropriated public funds” (af, at para. 2; see also para. 80) we cannot accept this argument, for the following reasons. [88] in our view, the city is wrongly conflating the public interest with its own interest as a public body with a claim. the objective of protecting the public interest does not mean that public bodies should be placed in a better position than other creditors because their claims relate to public funds that would be contrary to the principle of equality among creditors. in the context of the ccaa, protecting the public interest therefore cannot be reduced to protecting the interests of a particular creditor. it involves taking account of interests beyond those of the debtor company and its creditors, such as the interests of employees whose jobs are threatened or of the community in which the debtor company operates (ernst & young inc. v. essar global fund ltd., 2017 onca 1014, 139 or (3d) 1, at para. 102; metcalfe, at paras. 50-52; sarra, at pp. 162 and 501; wood, at p 341; see also, for a clear illustration, canadian red cross society/société canadienne de la croix-rouge, re (1998), 5 cbr (4th) 299 (ont. cj (gen. div.)), at para. 50). [89] protecting the public interest can also encompass considerations of commercial morality that reflect societal norms, such as considerations related to the fact that no one should profit from fraudulent activities in which they have taken part (a. keay, “insolvency law: a matter of public interest?” (2000), 51 n. ir. legal q. 509, at pp. 513 and 525) in very specific circumstances, a court could therefore conclude that protection of the public interest and the ccaa’s other remedial objectives justify authorizing pre-post compensation in favour of a creditor that has proved that it was a victim of fraud within the meaning of s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa, which explains the relevance of determining whether the vrp claim is a claim resulting from fraud in this case but while such a conclusion is possible in law, it should not be drawn automatically in every case, a court should exercise its discretion as indicated in callidus and century services, and if it so happens that predominant weight must be given to the objective of protecting the public interest, the court should take care not to reduce the public interest to the interests of a particular creditor or group of creditors. [90] in the instant case, the city’s vrp claim is an ordinary claim because, as we have indicated, the city has not proved the alleged fraud and such proof cannot be inferred solely from the fact that its claim is related to an agreement entered into under the vrp its argument that the objective of protecting the public interest favours pre-post compensation must therefore be rejected. the city has not relied on any of the ccaa’s other remedial objectives in support of its position. it follows that it has not discharged its burden of proving that the order being sought is appropriate. moreover, the work performed for the city by sm group was in the public interest, as it involved continuing to carry out major projects, such as the construction of the samuel de champlain bridge and the rebuilding of the turcot interchange. [91] the second consideration, due diligence, clearly weighs against pre-post compensation by the city. under the ccaa, this consideration is important because it “discourages parties from sitting on their rights and ensures that creditors do not strategically manoeuver or position themselves to gain an advantage” (callidus, at para. 51) the procedure set out in the ccaa involves negotiations as well as compromises between the debtor and stakeholders and is overseen by a court and a monitor; it follows that all those who participate must be on an equal footing and must have a clear understanding of their respective obligations and rights (para. 51). this court accordingly reached the following conclusion in callidus: a party’s failure to participate in ccaa proceedings in a diligent and timely fashion can undermine these procedures and, more generally, the effective functioning of the ccaa regime (see, eg,. north american tungsten corp. v. global tungsten and powders corp., 2015 bcca 390, 377 bcac 6, at paras. 21-23; re ba energy inc., 2010 abqb 507, 70 cbr (5th) 24; hsbc bank canada v bear mountain master partnership, 2010 bcsc 1563, 72 cbr (5th) 276, at para. 11; caterpillar financial services ltd. v 360networks corp., 2007 bcca 14, 279 dlr (4th) 701, at paras. 51-52, in which the courts seized on a party’s failure to act diligently). [para. 51] [92] in this case, it is clear that the city did not act in accordance with the standard of diligence expected in ccaa proceedings. on this point, deloitte submits that the city should have given notice of its intention to effect compensation in the days after the initial order was made on august 24, 2018. the record does not show that the city learned of the initial order on august 24, 2018, but, as indicated in an email to counsel for deloitte, the city was aware of the existence of that order by at least september 10, 2018 whatever the case may be, we are of the view that a diligent creditor, after learning of the debtor’s insolvency when it is subject to proceedings under the ccaa, cannot wait 47 to 58 days to notify the debtor of its intention to effect compensation. [93] the city justifies the lateness of its application by stating that it was waiting for one of the payments on the vrp claim, which was due on october 31, 2018, before taking any action. yet the vrp agreement indicates that the payment in question was actually due on october 1, 2018 furthermore, the city knew or ought to have known that the term had already expired several weeks earlier, as sm group’s insolvency had resulted in the loss of the benefit of the term of the vrp claim. [94] whether intentional or not, this inaction on the city’s part tended to place it in a better position than other ordinary creditors at what, we should point out, was a critical time in the restructuring process by invoking compensation, the city could obtain services without paying for them. the city had to suspect that if it had indicated its intention to proceed in this manner right from the start, as due diligence requires, sm group would likely have refused to undertake the work provided for in the contract, knowing that it would not be paid and that this would be a major stumbling block in the interim financing process. what is more, under s 32 of the ccaa, sm group could even have asked that the contract be resiliated. [95] in summary, the considerations that guide the exercise of a court’s discretion do not justify lifting the stay of the city’s right to pre-post compensation. given our conclusions on the first two considerations, it is not necessary for us to discuss the city’s good faith. in our view, remanding the case to the court of original jurisdiction would lead inevitably to the same outcome. b water meter contract claim [96] here again, the words of the stay order made by the superior court are broad enough to prohibit pre-post compensation. however, the superior court agreed to lift the stay of proceedings to allow the city to establish the existence and amount of its claim in the case relating to the water meter contract. the relevant excerpts from its judgment are as follows: [translation] the court, seized of the application of ville de montréal dated september 27, 2018 for authorization to lift the stay of proceedings in order to deal with and liquidate a claim in the civil division (“application”); . lifts, in favour of the applicant, ville de montréal, the stay of proceedings ordered in this case with regard to sm. consultants inc., the sm. group inc., the smi group inc. and the sm. group international l.p (“debtors concerned”) . . for the sole purpose of allowing the applicant, ville de montréal, to establish its claim against the debtors concerned . . in the proceedings instituted in the superior court of quebec bearing number 500-17-104932-184; [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. iv, at p 129) [97] this order did not authorize the city to withhold the amounts owed to sm group for the work subsequent to the initial order with a view to effecting compensation if the city was successful in the case relating to the water meter contract. the city submits that it is entitled to withhold the payments owed to sm group until judgment is rendered in that case. [98] in the circumstances, an order allowing the city to withhold the amounts owed to sm group pending the outcome of the case relating to the water meter contract would not be appropriate. remanding the case to the court of original jurisdiction for a decision on this question would, once again, be unhelpful and contrary to the interests of justice. [99] not only would the order being sought by the city place thornhill at the mercy of the outcome of lengthy and complex judicial proceedings — which, it must not be forgotten, concern a claim for several million dollars — but it would not be appropriate for the same reasons as those relating to the vrp claim the city is conflating the public interest with its own interest as a public body with a claim that was never established in addition, the city did not act diligently although its originating application in the case relating to the water meter contract was filed on september 26, 2018, it breached its obligation of diligence by waiting until november 7, 2018 before indicating its intention to effect compensation, even though it had been aware of the initial order since at least september 10, 2018. vi conclusion [100] for these reasons, we would dismiss this appeal with costs. english version of the reasons delivered by brown j — [101] i agree with the majority that a supervising judge has a discretion under s 11 of the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36 (“ccaa”), as to whether to allow a creditor to effect compensation, or set-off, between pre-initial order and post-initial order debts (“pre-post compensation”). i find, however, that this discretion is not limited solely to the exceptional circumstances the majority describes. while my colleagues in the majority recognize the broad discretion conferred on a supervising judge by the ccaa, in my view they fail to give full effect to it by concluding that pre-post compensation will never be authorized unless there are exceptional circumstances. [102] moreover, unlike my colleagues who limit the scope of s 21 of the ccaa to compensation between debts arising before an initial order is made, i conclude that pre-post compensation is permitted under s 21 of the ccaa but that it must be subject to the exercise of a supervising judge’s discretion. the majority at the quebec court of appeal (2020 qcca 438), like the supervising judge (2019 qccs 2316), erred in relying on the quebec court of appeal’s decision in quebec (agence du revenu) v. kitco metals inc., 2017 qcca 268, to conclude that pre-post compensation will never be authorized. but, for the reasons set out below, this court must in my view reject the approach taken in kitco. [103] given that the supervising judge in this case did not exercise her discretion, believing herself to be bound by kitco, it would be unwise for this court to exercise that discretion for the first time in order to determine whether ville de montréal (the “city”) may effect compensation here. i would therefore allow the appeal solely for the purpose of remanding the case to the superior court so it can decide whether the city may effect compensation between the debts incurred by sm group before the initial order and the amounts owed by the city to sm group for work performed by the latter after the initial order. i would also allow the appeal so that it can be determined whether compensation is available in respect of the city’s water meter claim against sm group, as nothing in s 21 of the ccaa prohibits judicial compensation. [104] furthermore, and again unlike my colleagues, i find that there is no need in this appeal to decide whether the city’s claim against sm group, which derives from the act to ensure mainly the recovery of amounts improperly paid as a result of fraud or fraudulent tactics in connection with public contracts, cqlr, c. r-22003, must be characterized as a claim based on “false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation” within the meaning of s 19(2)(d) of the ccaa. in my view, s 21 of the ccaa must be interpreted as allowing pre-post compensation regardless of whether a claim results from fraud for the purposes of s 19(2)(d). i nonetheless agree with my colleagues that proof by a creditor that it was a victim of fraud within the meaning of s 19(2)(d) is a factor favouring pre-post compensation that must be weighed by a supervising judge along with the other relevant considerations. [105] my colleagues consider it necessary to characterize the city’s claim arising from the voluntary reimbursement program (“vrp”) because proof that the debt underlying a claim is fraudulent is a relevant factor in the exercise of a supervising judge’s discretion to permit or to deny pre-post compensation (para. 20) as they acknowledge, this is a relevant factor in the exercise of a supervising judge’s discretion. as i will explain in greater detail below, whether the city’s vrp claim results from fraud is a question to be decided by the supervising judge in the exercise of her discretion, not by my colleagues or this court. i. decision of the quebec court of appeal in kitco [106] kitco metals inc. specialized in buying scrap gold and extracting fine gold from it for resale. it was subject to special tax rules: it paid the goods and services tax (“gst”) and the quebec sales tax (“qst”) on the purchase of scrap gold (“inputs”), but the sale of fine gold was not subject to these taxes. under these special rules, kitco paid the taxes to its gold suppliers, which were required to remit them to the agence du revenu du québec (“agency”). when the fine gold was sold, kitco was then entitled to a refund of the taxes paid the agency, however, became aware of a fraudulent scheme by which the gold suppliers were not remitting to it the taxes they collected, even though it was refunding kitco for them. [107] the agency, suspecting that kitco was involved in this fraudulent scheme, sent it a notice of assessment for more than $300 million (the pre-order debt). on june 7, 2011, the agency proceeded with compulsory execution on that notice to recover the amounts it considered it was owed. the next day, kitco filed a notice of intention to make a proposal under the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3 (“bia”), thereby staying its creditors’ remedies (s 69). one month later, it instead obtained an initial order under the ccaa that continued the stay of remedies (stay still in effect at the time of judgment). meanwhile, kitco had been continuing its business activities since june 8, 2011: it was paying taxes on inputs and claiming tax refunds from the agency in accordance with the applicable tax rules. the agency owed it more than $1.7 million in refunds (the post-order debt) but applied this amount as compensation against the tax assessments it was claiming from kitco. kitco successfully brought a motion in the superior court to force the agency to refund it $1.7 million on the basis that this compensation was unlawful. [108] vézina ja, writing for the court of appeal in kitco, began by explaining that june 8, 2011 was the date of commencement of insolvency proceedings and therefore the date on which the creditors’ remedies were stayed and their claims had to be established (para. 34 (canlii)) he also took the view that the compensation effected by the agency was unlawful. in his opinion, although s 21 of the ccaa does not expressly state that compensation can be effected only in respect of debts that arose prior to insolvency proceedings, a literal interpretation of the section must be rejected because it would be incompatible with, among other things, the principle that ordinary creditors must be treated equally (para. 20) such an interpretation would also undermine the status quo period that companies in financial difficulty need in order to develop a plan of arrangement (para. 43). vézina ja therefore concluded that a literal interpretation would ultimately be contrary to the ccaa’s restructuring objective (para. 45). [109] this conclusion was based in large part on vézina ja’s observation that the schemes of the bia and the ccaa have [translation] “close links” and are two “integrated” schemes, which means that “case law and scholarly opinion can be applied to both equally” (paras. 51-52) relying on para. 56 of dims. construction inc. (trustee of) v quebec (attorney general), 2005 scc 52, [2005] 2 scr 564, he considered that “[t]he general principles of the bia preclude any transaction that would have the effect of granting a security that did not exist before the bankruptcy” (kitco, at para. 61) on this point, he found that the principles laid down in husky oil operations ltd. v. minister of national revenue, [1995] 3 scr 453, in which the court stated that set-off is like a form of security, cannot readily be transposed into the civil law, in which compensation is automatic and is effected by operation of law once two debts coexist and are certain, liquid and exigible (para. 65). lastly, he was of the view that s 21 of the ccaa and s 97(3) of the bia identify the point in time when compensation may be effected, that is, on the date on which the creditors’ “provable claims” must be established, which is the date of commencement of insolvency proceedings: [translation] in my opinion, sections 21 ccaa and 97(3) bia, which provide that the “law of set-off or compensation applies to all claims. . .”, thereby identify the point in time when compensation is effected, or in other words, the moment at which the claims must be established: it is on the date of [commencement of proceedings] that temporal reciprocity is established. [para. 82] [110] vézina j.a found, at para. 78, that the question of what constitutes a “provable claim” is answered by s 121(1) of the bia, which refers to “[a]ll debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt’s discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt”. [111] with respect, i am of the view that several errors were made in kitco. first, vézina ja erred in relying on this court’s judgment in dims. construction to reach the conclusion that pre-post compensation can never be allowed under the ccaa, even though that judgment was rendered in the context of a bankruptcy under the bia. despite the similarities between the insolvency schemes established by the ccaa and the bia, these are two different statutes, and their differences are significant in the case at bar. secondly, kitco was based on an inappropriate narrow interpretation of s 21 of the ccaa that disregarded the “flexible” nature the ccaa is recognized as having (century services inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2010 scc 60, [2010] 3 scr. 379, at para. 14; r. j. wood, bankruptcy and insolvency law (2nd ed. 2015), at p 337) as well as the broad discretion conferred on supervising judges, whereas courts of other canadian provinces have held that pre-post set-off can be permitted. thirdly, kitco was decided in a context where a company in financial difficulty was actually restructured, and it cannot readily be transposed into a context such as the one in the instant case, which instead involves the liquidation of a company’s assets and contracts. a fundamental differences between the two insolvency schemes [112] it is important to underscore the fundamental differences between the scheme established by the ccaa and the one established by the bia, differences that highlight that, under the ccaa scheme, the mutuality of debts is maintained and supervising judges have a broad discretion that allows them to authorize pre-post compensation. i do not question the notion that these two schemes must be viewed as “an integrated body of insolvency law” and that legislative efforts to harmonize them have been going on for several decades (century services, at paras. 19-24 and 78). as i recount below, however, there remain many differences between the two schemes (wood, at p 337). [113] the three principal canadian statutes dealing with insolvency, the ccaa, the bia and the winding-up and restructuring act, rsc 1985, c. w-11 (“wura”), have the following main objectives: “. . to treat the claims of creditors fairly and equitably, to protect the public interest, to create a fair, timely and cost-effective process, and to achieve a balance of benefit and cost in deciding whether to restructure or liquidate a business, maximizing enterprise value” (j. p. sarra, “the oscillating pendulum: canada’s sesquicentennial and finding the equilibrium for insolvency law”, in j. p. sarra and b. romaine, eds., annual review of insolvency law 2016 (2017), 9, at pp. 9-10, objectives referred to with approval by the court in 9354-9186 québec inc. v. callidus capital corp., 2020 scc 10, at para. 40). more specifically, the ccaa’s main objective is the financial and commercial rehabilitation of an insolvent company through the filing of a plan of arrangement with its creditors (wood, at p 338; b. boucher, “procédures en vertu de la loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit des affaires — faillite, insolvabilité et restructuration (loose-leaf), by s. rousseau, ed., fasc. 14, at nos. 2 and 8). in seeking an initial order, an insolvent company shields itself from its creditors, staying their remedies for a certain period so that all its energy can be channeled into preparing a plan of arrangement for a viable recovery (boucher, at no. 2). [114] for these reasons, the scheme established by the ccaa is flexible and allows creative solutions to be put forward to achieve the objective mentioned above, the restructuring of a financially distressed company, in contrast to the bia, which provides a set of pre-established rules (boucher, at no. 8; wood, at p 337). the ccaa is therefore characterized as “remedial” legislation (j. p. sarra, rescue! the companies’ creditors arrangement act (2nd ed. 2013), at p 500; boucher, at no. 3). [115] the court has found that the ccaa’s provisions must be interpreted expansively to enable its remedial objectives to be achieved, and in particular to allow a company to continue its activities and to avoid the social and economic losses that can result from its liquidation (century services, at para. 70). because of the remedial scope of the ccaa, a “broad” discretion is also conferred on supervising judges by s 11 of the ccaa (callidus, at para. 48; century services, at para. 14). this section provides that a supervising judge may make “any order that [the judge] considers appropriate”, although it specifies that such an order must be consistent with the restrictions set out in the ccaa and must be “appropriate” in light of the circumstances of each case. as this court noted in callidus, s 11 is in a sense the “engine” of the ccaa (para. 48, quoting stelco inc. (re) (2005), 253 dlr (4th) 109 (ont. ca), at para. 36). this discretion granted to supervising judges under the ccaa allows for the implementation of “creative and effective” solutions (century services, at para. 21, quoting industry canada, marketplace framework policy branch, report on the operation and administration of the bankruptcy and insolvency act and the companies’ creditors arrangement act (2002), at p 41), in recognition of the “positional advantage” gained by supervising judges, who “acquir[e] extensive knowledge and insight into the stakeholder dynamics and the business realities of [ccaa] proceedings” (callidus, at paras. 47-48) examples of “creative” solutions adopted by courts under the ccaa include “security for debtor in possession financing or super-priority charges on the debtor’s assets” and the release of “claims against third parties as part of approving a comprehensive plan of arrangement and compromise, even over the objections of some dissenting creditors” (century services, at para. 62). [116] as the court again recently recognized, the broad discretion conferred on supervising judges by s 11 of the ccaa enables them to propose solutions “that respond to the circumstances of each case and ‘meet contemporary business and social needs’” (callidus, at para. 48, quoting century services, at para. 58) this broad discretion is unique to the ccaa and has no equivalent in the bia, which is based instead on pre-established rules designed to apply to a range of situations this is, therefore, one major difference between the two insolvency schemes. [117] another major difference between these two schemes is that the ccaa allows a company that has obtained an initial order to continue its business activities during the restructuring or reorganization period (callidus, at para. 41) the continuation of a struggling company’s business activities averts “the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company” (century services, at para. 70) and “preserves going-concern value” (callidus, at para. 46). accordingly, when an insolvent company has recourse to the ccaa, it is not divested of its property in favour of a third party, unlike with the measures put in place under the bia that vest the bankrupt’s property in a trustee (s 71 of the bia). there is thus no loss of mutuality under the ccaa. the status of debtor or creditor of the insolvent company remains unchanged and is not bestowed on a third party. [118] this mutuality, which survives the initial order, is what makes compensation possible under the ccaa, unlike under the bia. this same fundamental difference between the ccaa scheme and the bia scheme also played a crucial role in dims. construction, on which vézina j.a largely relied in kitco in dims. construction, this court had to determine whether the schemes established in two quebec labour law statutes subverted the scheme of distribution provided for by the bia. those two statutes created a similar mechanism that required an employer subject to one of them to pay an assessment due from a contractor whose services it had retained once the employer had paid the assessment, it was entitled to retain the amount it had paid out of any sums it owed to the contractor, thereby effecting compensation (para. 2) in that case, three employers had been directed to pay the assessments of a contractor, dims. construction inc., before it went bankrupt on april 1, 1999, but only one of them had done so before that date (paras. 3-4). dims. construction’s trustee in bankruptcy, relying on the court’s judgment in husky oil, asked the court to declare that two sections of the statutes in question were inoperable in the context of a bankruptcy under the bia (para. 5). [119] in her analysis, deschamps j began by discussing s 97(3) of the bia, which concerns compensation, and made two relevant observations first, because s 97(3) applies to claims against a bankrupt’s estate, a creditor must meet the conditions set out in s 121(1) of the bia, which means that, in order to effect compensation, the creditor must “prove the bankrupt was subject to a debt by reason of an obligation incurred before the bankruptcy” (para. 40 (emphasis added)) second, s 97(3) states that compensation is effected in the same manner as if the bankrupt were a plaintiff or a defendant in a lawsuit and, exceptionally, makes it possible to proceed “as if the bankrupt’s patrimony had not vested in the trustee as a result of the bankruptcy” (para. 41). [120] deschamps j concluded that there are three possible scenarios in quebec civil law, depending on when an employer pays an assessment due from a contractor: (1) the payment is made by the employer before the bankruptcy, and the debts become certain, liquid and exigible before the bankruptcy; (2) the payment is made before the bankruptcy and the employer is in debt to the bankrupt contractor, but one of the conditions for legal compensation is not met; and (3) the payment is made after the bankruptcy (para. 42). regarding the third scenario — one that also brings into play art. 1651 of the civil code of québec, which provides that a person subrogated to the rights of another (the employer in that case) does not have more rights than the subrogating creditor — deschamps j concluded that when the employer pays after the contractor’s bankruptcy, “[t]he dual status of creditor and debtor”, and therefore the mutuality of the debts, does not arise until after the bankruptcy (para. 51) it must therefore be inferred that s 97(3) of the bia, read in conjunction with ss. 121, 136(3) and 141 of the bia, requires that “the mutual debts come into existence before the bankruptcy” in order for compensation to be effected (para. 55 (emphasis added)). deschamps j added at para. 56 that, according to the rules specific to the bankruptcy scheme under the bia, the trustee may object to the substitution of a creditor (the employer in that case) if this has the effect of giving the creditor a security that did not exist at the time of the bankruptcy: what distinguishes a pre-bankruptcy payment from a post-bankruptcy payment is that, in the former case, the substitution of creditors takes place before the moment when the trustee acquires the bankrupt’s property. in the case of a post-bankruptcy payment, the substitution occurs after the bankruptcy, and the trustee can object to it. the general principles of the bia preclude any transaction that would have the effect of granting a security that did not exist before the bankruptcy. [emphasis added.] [121] the argument is a simple one. for legal compensation to be effected, in addition to the fact that a claim must be shown to be certain, liquid and exigible, [translation] “two persons must be reciprocally debtor and creditor of each other” (code civil du québec: annotations — commentaires 2020-2021 (5th ed. 2020), by b. moore, ed., et al., at p 1558) this is one of the four essential conditions for compensation to be possible. this mutuality of claims is severed when an insolvent company becomes bankrupt, because a trustee in bankruptcy is appointed and the company’s property is vested in the trustee (s 71 of the bia). on the date of the initial bankruptcy event, the bankrupt company loses its status as creditor or debtor in favour of the trustee. as well, the bankrupt company ceases its business activities and normally does not incur any obligations after the bankruptcy. this is why claims provable under the bia must be established on the date of the initial bankruptcy event and why, logically, compensation cannot be effected between pre- and post-bankruptcy debts (ss. 97(3) and 121(1)). however, as the intervener union des municipalités du québec rightly noted at the hearing, the situation is very different when an insolvent company applies for an initial order under the ccaa, since the company continues its business activities while at the same time seeking a stay of its creditors’ remedies (transcript, at pp. 48-49). under the ccaa, the property of the company applying for an initial order is not vested in a monitor the mutuality of debts remains intact, as the company continues to be the debtor or creditor of a claim (see, on this point, l. morin and g-p. michaud, “set-off and compensation in insolvency restructuring under the bia/ccaa: after the kitco and beyond the rack decisions”, in sarra and romaine, annual review of insolvency law 2016, 311, at pp. 343-44; see also a. r. anderson, t. gelbman and b. pullen, “recent developments in the law of set-off”, in j. p. sarra, ed., annual review of insolvency law 2009 (2010), 1, at pp. 23-25 (these authors acknowledge that an insolvent company’s property is not vested in a monitor under the ccaa and that the mutuality of debts is not severed, but they advocate having the courts interpret the ccaa in such a way as to put an end to this mutuality)). [122] these two fundamental differences between the ccaa scheme and the bia scheme suffice to explain why this court should reject the approach proposed in kitco. as we will see below, courts of other canadian provinces have relied in part on these differences between the two schemes to find that s 21 of the ccaa, unlike the equivalent provisions in the bia (s 97(3)) and the wura (s 73(1)), does not prohibit pre-post set-off. b courts of other canadian provinces have recognized the possibility of effecting pre-post set-off [123] for two reasons, the right to effect set-off under the ccaa has been a subject of debate among canadian courts. first, before the legislative reform of 1997 (an act to amend the bankruptcy and insolvency act, the companies’ creditors arrangement act and the income tax act, sc 1997, c 12) and the addition of s 21 (formerly s 18.1), this right was not formally recognized in the ccaa secondly, questions relating to the framework for the right to effect set-off have arisen in recent decades, particularly with regard to the possibility of staying this right temporarily after an initial order has been made (ccaa, s 11.02(1); see quintette coal ltd. v. nippon steel corp (1990), 51 bclr (2d) 105 (ca);. cam-net communications v. vancouver telephone co., 1999 bcca 751, 71 bclr (3d) 226; north american tungsten corp., re, 2015 bcca 390, 377 bcac 6 (“tungsten no. 1”) (decision on application for leave to appeal), aff’d 2015 bcca 426, 378 bcac 116 (“tungsten no. 2”); re just energy corp., 2021 onsc 1793); or of directly restricting the right in the language of an initial order under the ccaa (crystallex international corp., re, 2012 onsc 6812, 100 cbr (5th) 132). [124] more specifically, the question now before this court is whether s 21 of the ccaa allows pre-post compensation. this question is all the more relevant in the context of a restructuring process under the ccaa because the insolvent company continues its business activities. [125] one of the first cases in which this question was considered after the 1997 legislative reform was air canada, re (2003), 45 cbr (4th) 13, a judgment of farley j of the ontario superior court of justice there, farley j had to decide whether a paragraph included in an initial order whose purpose was to limit the right of air canada’s creditors to effect set-off should be varied.2 air canada essentially argued that under the ccaa, as under the bia, legal set-off cannot be permitted between pre- and post-order debts (paras. 10-11). because the bia provides, in s 71 (formerly s 71(2)), that the bankrupt’s property vests in the trustee on the date of the initial bankruptcy event, farley j concluded that there is no longer any mutuality 2 the paragraph in question read as follows: “this court orders that persons may exercise only such rights of set off as are permitted under section 18.1 of the ccaa as of the date of this order. for greater certainty, no person may set off any obligations of an applicant to such person which arose prior to such date” (para. 2). the last sentence was particularly problematic. between a creditor and a bankrupt debtor following a bankruptcy, despite such mutuality being a necessary condition for set-off: in a bankruptcy, the trustee is inserted into the proceedings. post-bankruptcy dealings of a creditor with the trustee in bankruptcy do not involve the same party, namely the debtor before the condition of bankruptcy. . . . thus, creditors who incur post-bankruptcy obligations to trustees in bankruptcy cannot claim legal set-off to avoid paying such obligations by setting-off such obligations against their proven (pre-bankruptcy) claims against the bankrupt the same parties are not involved so there cannot be mutual cross-obligations [emphasis in original; para. 14.] [126] farley j next considered air canada’s second argument, that s 21 (then s 18.1) of the ccaa must be interpreted similarly to s 73(1) of the wura (at paras. 16-17), which provides that the law of set-off applies to “all claims on the estate of a company, and to all proceedings for the recovery of debts due or accruing due to a company at the commencement of the winding-up of the company”. he rejected this argument for several reasons, emphasizing in particular the differences between the words of s 73(1) of the wura and those of s 21 of the ccaa. for example, s 21 does not provide that set-off must be between claims accruing due as of the date an initial order is made. farley j noted that these differences in wording reflect a choice made by parliament, which did not intend to enact identical set-off provisions in canada’s three insolvency statutes (para. 23). for these reasons, he ordered that the paragraph of the order restricting the right to effect set-off be varied (para. 24). [127] although he struck out the part of the initial order that precluded pre-post set-off, farley j nonetheless stayed set-off until air canada’s situation was more stable in order to avoid the disruptive consequences that would result from allowing set-off during the status quo period. he suggested that the best time to effect set-off would be in conjunction with the formation of a plan of arrangement (para. 25). [128] my colleagues argue (at para. 77) that “air canada and tungsten [which i will discuss below] did not determine whether pre-post compensation is consistent with the interpretation and objectives of the ccaa, let alone establish a framework for the exercise of this right by creditors.” this, however, ignores that air canada is widely recognized as being authoritative and as standing for the proposition that mutuality is not severed by an initial order made under the ccaa, which means that pre-post set-off or compensation is possible but is subject to a supervising judge’s power to stay it (see r. thornton, “air canada and stelco: legal developments and practical lessons”, in j. p. sarra, ed., annual review of insolvency law 2006 (2007), 73; north american tungsten corp., re, 2015 bcsc 1382, 28 cbr (6th) 147 (“tungsten no. 3”), at para. 15). for example, robert thornton writes: air canada was indebted to certain parties as at the date of the initial order subsequent to the date of the initial order, those parties became indebted to air canada they wished to set-off their post-ccaa debts against air canada’s pre-ccaa debts owing to them. . . . farley j held that there was no loss of mutuality upon the commencement of a ccaa proceeding accordingly, legal set-off is available both in respect of debts existing as at the date of an initial order and in respect of debts that arose after the date of an initial order. farley j. was correct in so doing. it now appears to be clear in canada that legal and equitable set-off are unaffected by proceedings commenced under the ccaa other than (i) the right to exercise them may be “temporally” stayed and (ii) if the ccaa applicant refuses to acknowledge the set-off, it would be necessary for the creditor to seek judicial intervention. it is the authors’ view that it is appropriate for set-off rights to continue after the commencement of a ccaa proceeding the ccaa applicant continues to carry on business in the ordinary course. [emphasis added; pp. 94-96.] [129] in tungsten, the british columbia court of appeal also considered set-off under s 21 of the ccaa — first in an application for leave to appeal two orders of the british columbia supreme court (tungsten no. 1, per savage ja) and then in an appeal from that decision denying leave to appeal (tungsten no. 2) the insolvent company had obtained an initial order under the ccaa effective june 9, 2015, at which time it owed approximately $4.4 million to global tungsten and powders corp. (“gtp”) under a loan agreement. it subsequently continued selling tungsten to gtp, which gave notice that it wished to set off its claim (the pre-order debt) against the amounts due or accruing due for the tungsten sold to it (the post-order debt) (tungsten no. 1, at paras. 2 and 6). the chambers judge had held that gtp had a valid right of set-off (tungsten no. 2, at para. 7). [130] in these two decisions, the main question before the court of appeal was whether the chambers judge had erred in concluding that the right to effect set-off could be stayed, like the other creditors’ remedies, once the initial order had been made. the question of whether pre-post set-off could be effected was never raised by the parties, which by implication showed that it was permitted under the ccaa. relying on s 21 of the ccaa as well as on s 11 of that statute, which confers a broad discretion on a supervising judge, the court of appeal explained that nothing in the words of s 21 prohibits a supervising judge from making the right of set-off subject to a stay of remedies (tungsten no. 1, at paras. 12-13 and 16; tungsten no. 2, at paras. 31 and 34-35). [131] contrary to what my colleagues say at para. 79, in that case both the chambers judge and the court of appeal considered the arguments relating to the effects of pre-post set-off on the status quo period and on the underlying objectives of this period, but they did so from the perspective of a stay of the right to effect set-off rather than by questioning the very possibility of pre-post set-off. this shows that my colleagues’ concerns about the disruptive potential of pre-post set-off were given adequate consideration by the supervising judge in exercising his discretion to permit or to stay set-off. [132] in particular, the chambers judge wrote the following: “. . . a temporal stay of rights can be granted to further the purpose of the initial order and the purposes of the act” (tungsten no. 3, at para. 25). while conceding that there was some merit to the arguments on the effects of pre-post set-off, he was not prepared to reverse the decision in air canada (paras. 17-18). moreover, he stayed the right to effect set-off on the basis that, “[i]n order to preserve the status quo to effect a restructuring, a stay of the set-off is, and was, absolutely essential”, and he added, among other things, that if the stay of set-off were not continued, the restructuring efforts “would be thrown into disarray” and “[t]he status quo would be significantly altered and the restructuring would effectively be at an end” (para. 32). the judge who considered the application for leave to appeal noted in turn that, “[c]learly, if an attempt at compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success there must be a means of holding creditors at bay” (tungsten no. 1, at para. 16). he added that not staying the right to effect set-off would favour gtp to the detriment of the other creditors (paras. 18 and 25) groberman ja, who wrote the judgment of the court of appeal, stressed the principle that a creditor should not be able to exercise a right of set-off to circumvent a compromise or arrangement under the ccaa (tungsten no. 2, at paras. 37-39). [133] despite my colleagues’ protestations to the contrary, the state of the law elsewhere in canada is clear: pre-post set-off is possible under the ccaa, subject to a supervising judge’s discretion to stay such set-off having regard to its effects on the status quo period, the underlying objectives of this period, the advancement of efforts to reach an arrangement, and the remedial objectives of the ccaa. [134] it must be concluded that the approach proposed by the quebec court of appeal in kitco has created an asymmetry between the interpretation given to s 21 of the ccaa by the quebec courts and the interpretation given to it by the courts of other canadian provinces this asymmetry is contrary to the principle of homogenous interpretation of federal statutes (morin and michaud, at p 344). c restructuring an insolvent company versus liquidating its assets [135] finally, in kitco, vézina ja noted that his conclusions were based on the fact that the insolvent company was engaged in a genuine restructuring process and that staying its creditors’ remedies was crucial to bringing this process to a successful conclusion he stressed that kitco’s restructuring plan was in jeopardy because the agency was effecting compensation with the amounts it was supposed to pay kitco. kitco was required to carry on its activities while paying 15 percent in taxes on its gold inputs without receiving the refund to which it was entitled in this regard. it was thus in an [translation] “untenable” position relative to competitors in its field (paras. 47-48). [136] staying the remedies of an insolvent company’s creditors under the ccaa to allow the company to develop a plan of arrangement is of critical importance, particularly where the exercise of a creditor’s right to effect pre-post compensation might sabotage the company’s efforts to regain financial health. [137] in this case, however, and in the opinion of the monitor and the interveners themselves, there has never been any question of sm group proposing a plan of arrangement. once sm group’s principal creditors filed an application for an initial order under the ccaa, it was clear that they wished to opt for a liquidation process — that is, the sale of the insolvent company to a new buyer. in this particular situation, where a plan of arrangement cannot be contemplated and the insolvent company will be liquidated or sold in any event, to conclude that pre-post compensation is never allowed could be unfair to the company’s creditors with claims that are certain, liquid and exigible. in such cases, the creditors’ remedies will be stayed indefinitely and they will never be able to effect pre-post compensation, since the insolvent company will become an “empty shell” after the sale moreover, because a plan of arrangement cannot be contemplated, allowing pre-post compensation will not have the effect of derailing the company’s restructuring process, as there is no such process. ii discretion not exercised by the supervising judge in this case [138] in my view, pre-post compensation is permitted under s 21 of the ccaa, but it must be subject to the exercise of a supervising judge’s discretion. in callidus, this court clarified the framework for the exercise of this discretion under s 11 of the ccaa. the first two criteria are found in s 11, which provides that a supervising judge may make any order that is “appropriate” in the circumstances of the case and consistent with the restrictions set out in the ccaa. the court added that the exercise of the discretion must also further the remedial objectives of the ccaa and be focused in particular on the criteria of appropriateness, good faith and due diligence (para. 70). [139] my colleagues make a series of arguments against compensation in general and pre-post compensation in particular: the high disruptive potential of compensation; respect for the status quo period; the loss of incentive for the debtor to provide goods and services during the stay period because it would fear not being paid for them, which would deprive it of the funds needed to continue operating; the fact that an interim lender would most likely refuse to continue to finance the debtor’s operations if the loaned funds were destined to enrich another creditor; the fact that the rampart set up by a stay to protect against attacks by creditors would crumble; the fact that compensation deviates from the principle of equality among ordinary creditors and that pre-post compensation amounts to giving certain creditors an additional “type of security interest” in respect of new assets acquired by the debtor after the commencement of proceedings; etc. (paras. 59, 61 and 73). [140] most of these arguments presuppose that pre-post compensation will be systematically allowed without regard for the circumstances of each case and without considering whether it is “appropriate” — hence my colleagues’ position that pre-post compensation should never be authorized unless there are exceptional circumstances. although these arguments are legitimate, they must be left to the supervising judge, who will weigh them — along with the other relevant considerations and circumstances — in exercising the discretion to permit or to deny pre-post compensation in a particular case, having regard to the remedial objectives of the ccaa. [141] believing herself to be bound by the conclusions of the quebec court of appeal in kitco, the supervising judge in this case did not exercise her discretion under s 11 of the ccaa given that this discretion was not exercised by the supervising judge, it is not for this court to exercise it to determine whether to permit compensation between the amounts owed by the city to sm group and the claim held by the city against sm group. the court has made it clear that supervising judges are in the best position to decide whether to exercise their discretion in a particular case based on “a circumstance-specific inquiry that must balance the various objectives of the ccaa” (callidus, at para. 76). [142] my colleagues are of the view that remanding the case to the court of original jurisdiction would be unhelpful and not in the interests of justice (paras. 84 and 98). i respectfully disagree. in fact, this court recently noted in canadian broadcasting corp. v. manitoba, 2021 scc 33, that in cases involving an exercise of discretion by a court of first instance, “it is not in the interests of justice for this court to step into [that court’s] shoes and decide these matters at first instance”, and that this court’s role is limited to reviewing the exercise of the discretion “through [a] deferential lens” (para. 88). iii conclusion [143] for these reasons, i would allow the appeal solely for the purpose of remanding the case to the superior court to have it determine whether the city may effect compensation between sm group’s pre-initial order debts and the post-initial order amounts owed by the city to sm group. i would also allow the appeal so that it can be determined whether the city may effect compensation in respect of its water meter claim. appeal dismissed with costs, brown j dissenting. private debt fund v lp: mccarthy tétrault, montréal. dumoulin, montréal. de la ville de laval, laval. ladner gervais, montréal.
i. overview [1] the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36 (“ccaa”), has a long and storied history. from its origins in the great depression to its revival and reinvention during the 1970s and 1980s, the ccaa has played an important role in canada’s economy. today, the ccaa provides an opportunity for insolvent companies with more than $5,000,000 in liabilities to restructure their affairs through a plan of arrangement. the goal of the ccaa process is to avoid bankruptcy and maximize value for all stakeholders. [2] in order to facilitate the restructuring process, courts supervising ccaa restructurings may authorize an insolvent company to incur certain critical costs associated with this process. supervising courts may also secure payment of these costs by ordering a super-priority charge against the insolvent company’s assets. today, our court is called upon to determine whether a supervising court may order super-priority charges over assets that are subject to a claim of her majesty protected by a deemed trust created by s 227(4.1) of the income tax act, rsc 1985, c 1 (5th supp.) (“ita”). [3] the crown raises two arguments as to why a supervising court should be unable to subordinate her majesty’s interest to super-priority charges. first, the crown says that s 227(4.1) creates a proprietary interest in a debtor’s assets and a court cannot attach a super-priority charge to assets subject to her majesty’s interest. second, the crown says that even if s 227(4.1) does not create a proprietary interest, it creates a security interest that has statutory priority over all other security interests, including super-priority charges. [4] both of these arguments must fail. as this court has previously held, the ccaa generally empowers supervising judges to order super-priority charges that have priority over all other claims, including claims protected by deemed trusts. in all cases where a supervising court is faced with a deemed trust, the court must assess the nature of the interest established by the empowering enactment, and not simply rely on the title of deemed trust. in this case, when the relevant provisions of the ita are examined in their entirety, it is clear that the ita does not establish a proprietary interest because her majesty’s claim does not attach to any specific asset. further, there is no conflict between the ccaa order and the ita, as the deemed trust created by the ita has priority only over a defined set of security interests. a super-priority charge ordered under s 11 of the ccaa does not fall within that definition. for the reasons that follow, i would therefore dismiss the appeal. ii background [5] canada north group and six related corporations (“debtors”) initiated restructuring proceedings under s 50.4(1) of the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3 (“bia”), but soon changed course and sought to restructure under the ccaa. in their initial ccaa application, they requested a package of relief standard to ccaa proceedings, including a thirty-day stay on all proceedings against them, the appointment of a monitor and the creation of three super-priority charges the first charge they requested was an administration charge of up to $1,000,000 in favour of counsel, a monitor and a chief restructuring officer for the fees they incurred the second was a $1,000,000 financing charge in favour of an interim lender. the third was a $150,000 directors’ charge protecting their directors and officers against liabilities incurred after the commencement of the proceedings. the debtors included in their initial motion an affidavit from one of their directors attesting to a $1,140,000 debt to her majesty the queen for source deductions and goods and services tax (“gst”). [6] justice nielsen of the court of queen’s bench heard the motion together with a cross-motion by the debtors’ primary lender, canadian western bank, seeking the appointment of a receiver. justice nielsen granted an initial order in favour of the debtors on the terms requested in the initial application, aside from a $500,000 reduction in the administration charge (alta qb,. no. 1703-12327, july 5, 2017 (“initial order”)). the terms of that order included the following with regard to priority: each of the directors’ charge, administration charge and the interim lender’s charge (all as constituted and defined herein) shall constitute a charge on the property and subject always to section 34(11) of the ccaa such charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (collectively, “encumbrances”) in favour of any person. [emphasis deleted; para. 44.] justice nielsen further ordered that these charges “shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by . . . (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes” (para. 46). [7] three weeks after the initial order was granted, the debtors sought supplementary orders extending the stay of proceedings and increasing the interim financing to $2,500,000 canadian western bank again filed a motion to appoint a receiver. at the hearing of the three motions, counsel for her majesty appeared in order to advise that her majesty would be filing a motion to vary the initial order on the ground that the order failed to recognize her priority interest in unremitted source deductions (the portion of remuneration that employers are required to withhold from employees and remit directly to the canada revenue agency (“cra”)). [8] the crown filed the motion soon after its argument for variance was grounded in the nature of her majesty’s interest in the debtors’ property. it argued that the nature of her majesty’s interest is determined by s 227(4.1) of the ita and that that provision creates a proprietary interest: security (4) every person who deducts or withholds an amount under this act is deemed, notwithstanding any in subsection 224(1.3)) in the amount so deducted or withheld, to hold the amount separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for the security interest would be property of the person, in trust for her majesty and for payment to her majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this act. (as defined interest (4.1) notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the bankruptcy and insolvency act (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that act), any other enactment of canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for her majesty is not paid to her majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this act, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for a security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed (a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for her majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, and (b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was so deducted or withheld, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest and is property beneficially owned by her majesty notwithstanding any security interest in such property and in the proceeds thereof, and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the receiver general in priority to all such security interests. iii. judgments below a court of queen’s bench, 2017 abqb 550, 60 alta. lr (6th) 103 [9] justice topolniski heard her majesty’s motion to vary the initial order. despite the delay between the initial order and the motion to vary, topolniski j found that she had jurisdiction to hear the motion based on the discretion and flexibility conferred by the ccaa however, she dismissed the motion on the ground that s 227(4.1) of the ita creates a security interest that can be subordinated to court-ordered super-priority charges. [10] justice topolniski relied upon temple city housing inc., re, 2007 abqb 786, 42 cbr (5th) 274, and first vancouver finance v. mnr, 2002 scc 49, [2002] 2 scr 720, to conclude that the deemed trust created by s 227(4.1) of the ita is not a proprietary interest. rather, the ita creates something similar to a floating charge over all the debtor’s assets, which permits the debtor to alienate property subject to the deemed trust. these characteristics are inconsistent with a proprietary interest, and thus s 227(4.1) does not create such an interest. [11] justice topolniski also considered whether s 227(4.1) creates a security interest that requires her majesty’s interest to take priority over court-ordered charges. she acknowledged that the ccaa preserves the operation of the deemed trust, but she found that it also authorizes the reorganization of priorities by court order. because each of the charges included in the initial order was critical to the restructuring process, they were necessarily required by the ccaa regime. b. leave to appeal, 2017 abca 363, 54 cbr (6th) 5 [12] following the dismissal of the crown’s motion, the debtors determined that there were sufficient assets in the estate to satisfy both her majesty and the beneficiaries of the three court-ordered super-priority charges in full however, the crown sought and obtained leave to appeal in order to seek appellate guidance on the nature of her majesty’s priority. c court of appeal of alberta, 2019 abca 314, 93 alta. lr (6th) 29 [13] the court of appeal dismissed the appeal. it was divided as to whether the super-priority charges had priority over her majesty’s claim. justice rowbotham wrote for the majority and agreed with the motion judge that s 227(4.1) of the ita creates a security interest, in accordance with this court’s earlier finding in first vancouver that the deemed trust is like a “floating charge over all of the assets of the tax debtor in the amount of the default” (first vancouver, at para. 40). she found further support for this in the fact that the deemed trust also falls squarely within the ita’s definition of “security interest” in s 224(13). [14] after determining that her majesty’s interest in the debtors’ property was a security interest, rowbotham ja turned to the question of whether the deemed trust could be subordinated to the court-ordered super-priority charges she found that “while a conflict may appear to exist at the level of the ‘black letter’ wording” of the ita and the ccaa, “the presumption of statutory coherence require[d] that the provisions be read to work together” (para. 45) a deemed trust that could not be subordinated to super-priority charges would undermine both acts’ objectives because fewer restructurings could succeed and thus less tax revenue could be collected. if the crown’s position prevailed, then absurd consequences could follow approximately 75 percent of restructurings require interim lenders. without the assurance that they would be repaid in priority, these lenders would not come forward, nor would monitors or directors. the reality is that all of these services are provided in reliance on super priorities. without these priorities, ccaa restructurings may be severely curtailed or at least delayed until her majesty’s exact claim could be ascertained, by which point the company might have totally collapsed. [15] justice wakeling dissented. in his view, none of the arguments raised by the majority could overcome the text of the ita. on his reading, the text of s 227(4.1) is clear: her majesty is the beneficial owner of the amounts deemed to be held separate and apart from the debtor’s property, and these amounts must be paid to her majesty notwithstanding any type of security interest, including super-priority charges. in his view, nothing in the ccaa overrides this proprietary interest. section 11 of the ccaa cannot permit discretion to be exercised without regard for s 227(4.1) of the ita, nor can ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa be used, as they only allow a court to make orders regarding “all or part of the company’s property” (s 11.2(1)) in conclusion, since no part of the ccaa authorizes a court to override s 227(4.1), a court must give effect to the clear text of s 227(4.1) and cannot subordinate her majesty’s claims to super-priority charges. iv. issue [16] the central issue in this appeal is whether the ccaa authorizes courts to grant super-priority charges with priority over a deemed trust created by s 227(4.1) of the ita. in order to answer this question, i proceed in three stages. first, i assess the nature of the ccaa regime and the power of supervising courts to order such charges. given that supervising courts generally have the authority to order super-priority charges with priority over all other claims, i then turn to s 227(4.1) of the ita to determine whether it gives her majesty an interest that cannot be subordinated to super- priority charges here i assess the crown’s two arguments as to why s 227(4.1) provides for an exception to the general rule, namely that her majesty has a proprietary or ownership interest in the insolvent company’s assets and that, even if her majesty does not have such an interest, s 227(4.1) provides her with a security interest that has absolute priority over all claims. i conclude by assessing how courts should exercise their authority to order super-priority charges where her majesty has a claim against an insolvent company protected by a s 227(4.1) deemed trust. v analysis [17] in order to determine whether the ccaa empowers a court to order super- priority charges over assets subject to a deemed trust created by s 227(4.1) of the ita, we must understand both the ccaa regime and the nature of the interest created by s 227(41). a ccaa regime [18] the ccaa is part of canada’s system of insolvency law, which also includes the bia and the winding-up and restructuring act, rsc 1985, c. w-11, s 6(1), for banks and other specified institutions. although both the ccaa and the bia create reorganization regimes, what distinguishes the ccaa regime is that it is restricted to companies with liabilities of more than $5,000,000 and “offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations” (century services inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2010 scc 60, [2010] 3 scr 379, at para. 14). [19] the ccaa works by creating breathing room for an insolvent debtor to negotiate a way out of insolvency. upon an initial application, the supervising judge makes an order that ordinarily preserves the status quo by freezing claims against the debtor while allowing it to remain in possession of its assets in order to continue carrying on business. during this time, it is hoped that the debtor will negotiate a plan of arrangement with creditors and other stakeholders. the goal is to enable the parties to reach a compromise that allows the debtor to reorganize and emerge from the ccaa process as a going concern (century services, at para. 18). [20] the view underlying the entire ccaa regime is thus that debtor companies retain more value as going concerns than in liquidation scenarios (century services, at para. 18) the survival of a going-concern business is ordinarily the result with the greatest net benefit. it often enables creditors to maximize returns while simultaneously benefiting shareholders, employees, and other firms that do business with the debtor company (para. 60) thus, this court recently held that the ccaa embraces “the simultaneous objectives of maximizing creditor recovery, preservation of going- concern value where possible, preservation of jobs and communities affected by the firm’s financial distress . . . and enhancement of the credit system generally” (9354- 9186 québec inc v callidus capital corp., 2020 scc 10, at para. 42, quoting j. p. sarra, rescue! the companies’ creditors arrangement act (2nd ed 2013), at p 14). [21] the most important feature of the ccaa — and the feature that enables it to be adapted so readily to each reorganization — is the broad discretionary power it vests in the supervising court (callidus capital, at paras. 47-48) section 11 of the ccaa confers jurisdiction on the supervising court to “make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances” this power is vast as the chief justice and moldaver j recently observed in their joint reasons, “on the plain wording of the provision, the jurisdiction granted by s 11 is constrained only by restrictions set out in the ccaa itself, and the requirement that the order made be ‘appropriate in the circumstances’” (callidus capital, at para. 67) keeping in mind the centrality of judicial discretion in the ccaa regime, our jurisprudence has developed baseline requirements of appropriateness, good faith and due diligence in order to exercise this power. the supervising judge must be satisfied that the order is appropriate and that the applicant has acted in good faith and with due diligence (century services, at para. 69). the judge must also be satisfied as to appropriateness, which is assessed by considering whether the order would advance the policy and remedial objectives of the ccaa (para. 70). for instance, given that the purpose of the ccaa is to facilitate the survival of going concerns, when crafting an initial order, “[a] court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize” (para. 60). [22] on review of a supervising judge’s order, an appellate court should be cognizant that supervising judges have been given this broad discretion in order to fulfill their difficult role of continuously balancing conflicting and changing interests. appellate courts should also recognize that orders are generally temporary or interim in nature and that the restructuring process is constantly evolving. these considerations require not only that supervising judges be endowed with a broad discretion, but that appellate courts exercise particular caution before interfering with orders made in accordance with that discretion (pacific national lease holding corp., re (1992), 72 bclr (2d) 368 (ca), at paras. 30-31). [23] in addition to s 11, there are more specific powers in some of the provisions following that section they include the power to order a super-priority security or charge on all or part of a company’s assets in favour of interim financiers (s 11.2), critical suppliers (s 11.4), the monitor and financial, legal or other experts (s 11.52), or indemnification of directors or officers (s 11.51) each of these provisions empowers the court to “order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company” (ss. 11.2(2), 11.4(4), 11.51(2) and 1152(2)). [24] as this court held in century services, at para. 70, the general language of s 11 is not restricted by the availability of these more specific orders. in fact, courts regularly grant super-priority charges in favour of persons not specifically referred to in the aforementioned provisions, including through orders that have priority over orders made under the specific provisions. these include, for example, key employee retention plan charges (grant forest products inc., re (2009), 57 cbr (5th) 128 (ont scj);. timminco ltd., re, 2012 onsc 506, 85 cbr (5th) 169), and bid protection charges (in the matter of a plan of compromise or arrangement of green growth brands inc., 2020 onsc 3565, 84 cbr (6th) 146). [25] in sun indalex finance, llc v. united steelworkers, 2013 scc 6, [2013] 1 scr 271, at para. 60, quoting the amended initial order in that case, this court confirmed that a court-ordered financing charge with priority over “all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise”, had priority over a deemed trust established by the personal property security act, rso 1990, c. p.10 (“ppsa”), to protect employee pensions justice deschamps wrote for a unanimous court on this point. she found that the existence of a deemed trust did not preclude orders granting first priority to financiers: “this will be the case only if the provincial priorities provided for in s 30(7) of the ppsa ensure that the claim of the salaried plan’s members has priority over the [debtor-in-possession (“dip”)] charge” (para. 48). [26] justice deschamps first assessed the supervising judge’s order to determine whether it had truly been necessary to give the financing charge priority over the deemed trust. even though the supervising judge had not specifically considered the deemed trust in the order authorizing a super-priority charge, he had found that there was no alternative but to make the order. financing secured by a super priority was necessary if the company was to remain a going concern (para. 59). justice deschamps rejected the suggestion “that the dip lenders would have accepted that their claim ranked below claims resulting from the deemed trust”, because “[t]he harsh reality is that lending is governed by the commercial imperatives of the lenders, not by the interests of the plan members or the policy considerations that lead provincial governments to legislate in favour of pension fund beneficiaries” (para. 59). [27] after determining that the order was necessary, she turned to the statute creating the deemed trust’s priority section 30(7) of the ppsa provided that the deemed trust would have priority over all security interests. in her view, this created a conflict between the court-ordered super priority and the statutory priority of the claim protected by the deemed trust the super priority therefore prevailed by virtue of federal paramountcy (para. 60). [28] there are also practical considerations that explain why supervising judges must have the discretion to order other charges with priority over deemed trusts. restructuring under the ccaa often requires the assistance of many professionals. as wagner cj and moldaver j recently recognized for a unanimous court, the role the monitor plays in a ccaa proceeding is critical: “the monitor is an independent and impartial expert, acting as ‘the eyes and the ears of the court’ throughout the proceedings . . . . the core of the monitor’s role includes providing an advisory opinion to the court as to the fairness of any proposed plan of arrangement and on orders sought by parties, including the sale of assets and requests for interim financing” (callidus capital, at para. 52, quoting ernst & young inc v essar global fund ltd., 2017 onca 1014, 139 or (3d) 1, at para. 109). in the words of morawetz j (as he then was), “[i]t is not reasonable to expect that professionals will take the risk of not being paid for their services, and that directors and officers will remain if placed in a compromised position” (timminco, at para. 66). [29] this court has similarly found that financing is critical as “case after case has shown that ‘the priming of the dip facility is a key aspect of the debtor’s ability to attempt a workout’” (indalex, at para. 59, quoting j. p. sarra, rescue! the companies’ creditors arrangement act (2007), at p 97) as lower courts have affirmed, “professional services are provided, and dip funding is advanced, in reliance on super- priorities contained in initial orders. to ensure the integrity, predictability and fairness of the ccaa process, certainty must accompany the granting of such super-priority charges” (first leaside wealth management inc. (re), 2012 onsc 1299, at para. 51 (canlii)). [30] super-priority charges in favour of the monitor, financiers and other professionals are required to derive the most value for the stakeholders they are beneficial to all creditors, including those whose claims are protected by a deemed trust. the fact that they require super priority is just a part of “[t]he harsh reality . . . that lending is governed by the commercial imperatives of the lenders” (indalex, at para. 59). it does not make commercial sense to act when there is a high level of risk involved for a monitor and financiers to put themselves at risk to restructure and develop assets, only to later discover that a deemed trust supersedes all claims, smacks of unfairness. as mclachlin j (as she then was) said, granting a deemed trust absolute priority where it does not amount to a trust under general principles of law would “defy fairness and common sense” (british columbia v. henfrey samson belair ltd., [1989] 2 scr 24, at p 33). [31] it is therefore clear that, in general, courts supervising a ccaa reorganization have the authority to order super-priority charges to facilitate the restructuring process. similarly, courts have ensured that the ccaa is given a liberal construction to fulfill its broad purpose and to prevent this purpose from being neutralized by other statutes: [translation] “as the courts have ruled time and again, the purpose of the ccaa and orders made under it cannot be affected or neutralized by another [act], whether of public order or not” (triton électronique inc. (arrangement relatif à), 2009 qccs 1202, at para. 35 (canlii)). “this case is not so much about the rights of employees as creditors, but the right of the court under the [ccaa] to serve not the special interests of the directors and officers of the company but the broader constituency referred to in chef ready foods ltd. [v. hongkong bank of can. (1990), 51 bclr (2d) 84 (ca)] . . . such a decision may inevitably conflict with provincial legislation, but the broad purposes of the [ccaa] must be served” (pacific national lease holding, at para. 28). courts have been particularly cautious when interpreting security interests so as to ensure that the ccaa’s important purpose can be fulfilled. for instance, in chef ready foods, gibbs ja observed that if a bank’s rights under the bank act, s.c 1991, c 46, were to be interpreted as being immune from the provisions of the ccaa, then the benefits of ccaa proceedings would be “largely illusory” (p 92). “there will be two classes of debtor companies: those for whom there are prospects for recovery under the [ccaa]; and those for whom the [ccaa] may be irrelevant dependent upon the whim of the [creditor]” (p 92). it is important to keep in mind that ccaa proceedings operate for the benefit of the creditors as a group and not for the benefit of a single creditor. without clear and direct instruction from parliament, we cannot countenance the possibility that it intended to create a security interest that would limit or eliminate the prospect of reorganization and recovery under the ccaa for some companies. to do so would turn the ccaa into a dead letter. with this in mind, i turn to the specific provision at issue in this appeal. b nature of the interest created by section 227(4.1) of the ita [32] the crown argues that, despite the authority a supervising court may have to order super-priority charges, her majesty’s claim to unremitted source deductions is protected by a deemed trust, and that ordering charges with priority over the deemed trust is contrary to s 227(4.1) of the ita. to determine whether this is true, we must begin by understanding how the deemed trust comes about. [33] section 153(1) of the ita requires employers to withhold income tax from employees’ gross pay and forward the amounts withheld to the cra when an employer withholds income tax from its employees in accordance with the ita, it assumes its employees’ liability for those amounts (s 227(9.4)) as a result, her majesty cannot have recourse to the employees if the employer fails to remit the withheld amounts instead, her majesty’s interest is protected by a deemed trust. section 227(4) of the ita provides that amounts withheld are deemed to be held separate and apart from the employer’s assets and in trust for her majesty if an employer fails to remit the amounts withheld in the manner provided by the ita, s 227(4.1) extends the trust to all of the employer’s assets. in this case, the debtors failed to remit the amounts withheld to the cra, bringing s 227(4.1) into operation. [34] when a company seeks protection under the ccaa, s 37(1) of the ccaa provides that most of her majesty’s deemed trusts are nullified (unless the property in question would be regarded as held in trust in the absence of the statutory provision creating the deemed trust). however, s 37(2) of the ccaa exempts the deemed trusts created by s 227(4) and (4.1) of the ita from the nullification provided for in s 37(1). these deemed trusts continue to operate throughout the ccaa process (century services, at para. 45). in my view, this preservation by the ccaa of the deemed trusts created by the ita does not modify the characteristics of these trusts. they continue to operate as they would have if the insolvent company had not sought ccaa protection. therefore, the crown’s arguments must be assessed by reviewing the nature of the interest created by s 227(4.1) of the ita. [35] before doing so, and while it is not strictly speaking required of me given the reasons i set out below, i pause here to clarify the role of s 6(3) of the ccaa, which provides as follows: (3) unless her majesty agrees otherwise, the court may sanction a compromise or arrangement only if the compromise or arrangement provides for the payment in full to her majesty in right of canada or a province, within six months after court sanction of the compromise or arrangement, of all amounts that were outstanding at the time of the application for an order under section 11 or 11.02 and that are of a kind that could be subject to a demand under (a) subsection 224(1.2) of the income tax act . [36] section 6(3) merely grants her majesty the right to insist that a compromise or arrangement not be sanctioned by a court unless it provides for payment in full to her majesty of certain claims within six months after court sanction. section 6(3) does not say that it modifies the deemed trust created by s 227(4.1) of the ita in any way, and it comes into operation only at the end of the ccaa process when parties seek court approval of their arrangement or compromise section 6(3) also applies to numerous claims that are not protected by the deemed trust, including penalties, interest, withholdings on non-resident dispositions and certain retirement contributions (see ss. 224(1.2) and 227(10.1) of the ita, the latter of which refers to amounts payable under ss. 116, 227(9), (9.2), (9.3), (9.4) and (10.2), part xii.5 and part xiii). equating the deemed trust with the right under s 6(3) renders s 37(2) of the ccaa and the deemed trust meaningless i therefore proceed, as this court did in indalex, by assessing the interest created by s 227(4.1) of the ita without regard to the ccaa (indalex, at para. 48). [37] section 227(4.1) provides: (4.1) notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the bankruptcy and insolvency act (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that act), any other enactment of canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for her majesty is not paid to her majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this act, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for a security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed (a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for her majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, and (b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was so deducted or withheld, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest and is property beneficially owned by her majesty notwithstanding any security interest in such property and in the proceeds thereof, and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the receiver general in priority to all such security interests. (1) does section 227(4.1) of the ita create a proprietary or ownership interest in the debtor’s assets? [38] this appeal — like previous appeals to this court — does not require the court to exhaustively define the nature and content of the interest created by s 227(4.1) of the ita (royal bank of canada v. sparrow electric corp., [1997] 1 scr 411, and first vancouver). all that is necessary is to determine whether s 227(4.1) confers upon her majesty an interest in the debtor’s property that precludes a court from ordering charges with priority over her majesty’s claim. the crown argues that s 227(4.1) does so by giving her majesty a proprietary interest in the debtor’s assets, which “causes those assets to become the property of the crown” (af, at para. 46). the crown rests this argument on the wording of the section. first, it says that property equal in value to the amount deemed to be held in trust by a person is deemed to be held “separate and apart from the property of the person”. second, it says that the property deemed to be held in trust is deemed “to form no part of the estate or property of the person”. third, it says that the property deemed to be held in trust “is property beneficially owned by her majesty notwithstanding any security interest in such property”. the crown submits that, as a result of her majesty’s proprietary interest, amounts subject to the deemed trust cannot be considered assets of the debtor in ccaa proceedings. [39] in order to determine whether s 227(4.1) confers a proprietary or ownership interest upon her majesty, we must look at the nature of the rights afforded to her majesty by the deemed trust and compare them to the rights ordinarily afforded to an owner. to begin with, it is clear that the statute does not purport to transfer legal title to any property to her majesty. instead, the crown’s argument places considerable weight on the common law meaning of the words “beneficially owned by her majesty” and “in trust”. trusts and beneficial ownership are equitable concepts that are part of the common law. as in all cases of statutory interpretation, the meaning of these words is a question of parliamentary intent. in the interpretation of a federal statute that uses concepts of property and civil rights, reference must be had to ss. 8.1 and 8.2 of the interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21. these sections provide: 8.1 both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and recognized sources of the law of property and civil rights in canada and, unless otherwise provided by law, if in interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the rules, principles and concepts in force in the province at the time the enactment is being applied. 8.2 unless otherwise provided by law, when an enactment contains both civil law and common law terminology, or terminology that has a different meaning in the civil law and the common law, the civil law terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the province of quebec and the common law terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the other provinces. [40] in other words, where parliament uses a private law expression and is silent as to its meaning, courts must refer to the applicable provincial private law. this is known as the principle of complementarity. however, as both these sections also make clear, parliament is free to derogate from provincial private law and create a uniform rule across all provinces (see r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at pp. 158-59). [41] in this case, parliament has expressly chosen to dissociate itself from provincial private law section 227(4.1) says that it operates “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this act, the bankruptcy and insolvency act (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that act), any other enactment of canada, any enactment of a province or any other law”. in caisse populaire desjardins de l’est de drummond v. canada, 2009 scc 29, [2009] 2 scr 94, the majority found that, through these words, parliament has created a standalone scheme of uniform application across all provinces (paras. 11-13) the nature of the deemed trust created by s 227(4.1) must thus be understood on its own terms. [42] with that said, it is also clear that parliament has chosen to use terms with established legal meanings in constructing the deemed trust while the meaning of these terms is not to be based on their precise meaning under alberta common law, it is difficult to attempt to understand s 227(4.1) without any reference to how these concepts generally operate. despite the protestations of my colleagues justices brown and rowe, i do not see how we could begin to understand the meaning of the words “deemed trust”, “held in trust” or “beneficially owned” without reference to the civil law or common law. the law of trusts in both civil law and common law thus provides critical context for understanding parliament’s intent from a civil law perspective, some courts have found it awkward to apply the idea of beneficial ownership under s 227(4.1) in quebec “on the ground that it is a concept that is obviously derived from the common law” (canada (attorney general) v. caisse populaire d’amos, 2004 fca 92, 324 nr 31, at para. 48). i agree with the following observation by noël ja (as he then was): it is not the task of the judiciary to determine whether it is appropriate for parliament to use common law concepts in quebec (or to use civil law concepts elsewhere in canada) for the purpose of giving effect to federal legislation the task of the courts is limited to discovering parliament’s intention and giving effect to it. [para. 49] [43] under quebec civil law, it is clear that s 227(4.1) does not establish a trust within the meaning of the civil code of québec (“ccq”). articles 1260 and 1261 ccq provide the following: 1260. a trust results from an act whereby a person, the settlor, transfers property from his patrimony to another patrimony constituted by him which he appropriates to a particular purpose and which a trustee undertakes, by his acceptance, to hold and administer. 1261. the trust patrimony, consisting of the property transferred in trust, constitutes a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of them has any real right. as this court held in bank of nova scotia v. thibault, 2004 scc 29, [2004] 1 scr. 758, at para. 31, “three requirements must therefore be met in order for a trust to be constituted [under quebec civil law]: property must be transferred from an individual’s patrimony to another patrimony by appropriation; the property must be appropriated to a particular purpose; and the trustee must accept the property.” [44] under s 227(4.1) of the ita, however, no specific property is transferred to a trust patrimony. indeterminacy remains as to which assets are subject to the deemed trust, ergo, as to which assets left the settlor’s patrimony and entered the trust’s patrimony although s 227(4.1) provides that the assets are deemed to be held “separate and apart from the property of the person” and “to form no part of the estate or property of the person”, this is not sufficient to constitute an autonomous patrimony such as the one contemplated by the civilian trust regime. it flows from the autonomous nature of the trust patrimony that assets held in trust must be property in which none of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary has any property right but this runs afoul of the interest created by s 227(4.1), because nothing in that provision deprives the person whose assets are subject to a deemed trust of property rights in these assets. therefore, the main element of a civilian trust is absent in the deemed trust established by s 227(4.1): there is no autonomous patrimony to which specific property is transferred. [45] furthermore, under s 227(4.1), the person whose assets are subject to the deemed trust would act as trustee. again, this is inconsistent with the definition of a trustee in civil law. the person whose assets are subject to a deemed trust pursuant to s 227(4.1) does not “undertak[e], by his acceptance, to hold and administer” a trust patrimony (art. 1260 ccq). but most importantly, the fact that assets subject to the deemed trust are indeterminate makes the trustee’s role effectively impossible to play. the ccq provides that the trustee “has the control and the exclusive administration of the trust patrimony” and “acts as the administrator of the property of others charged with full administration” (art. 1278) thus, the trustee under s 227(4.1) would be required to administer its own property — or at least an indefinite part of it — in the interest of her majesty (art. 1306 ccq). the trustee would be subject to obligations impossible to fulfill, such as the obligation not to mingle the administered property with its own (art. 1313 ccq). obviously, one cannot act as an administrator of the property of others with respect to one’s own property it is therefore clear that the interest created by s 227(4.1) has little, if anything, in common with the trust in civil law. [46] in the common law, a trust arises when legal ownership and beneficial ownership of a particular property are separated (see valard construction ltd. v. bird construction co., 2018 scc 8, [2018] 1 scr 224, at para. 18) “because a trust divides legal and beneficial title to property between a trustee and a beneficiary, respectively, the ‘hallmark’ characteristic of a trust is the fiduciary relationship existing between the trustee and the beneficiary, by which the trustee is to hold the trust property solely for the beneficiary’s enjoyment” (para. 17 (footnote omitted)). as rothstein j. wrote, because of this fiduciary relationship, “[t]he beneficial owner of property has been described as ‘the real owner of property even though it is in someone else’s name’” (pecore v. pecore, 2007 scc 17, [2007] 1 scr 795, at para. 4, quoting csak v. aumon (1990), 69 dlr (4th) 567 (ont. hcj), at p 570). [47] while the precise rights given to a beneficial owner may vary according to the terms of the trust and the principles of equity, i agree with the crown that, where this type of interest exists, it will generally be inappropriate for the supervising judge to order a super-priority charge over the property subject to the interest, although the broad power conferred on the court by s 11 of the ccaa would enable it to do so. property held in trust cannot be said to belong to the trustee because “in equity, it belongs to another person” (henfrey, at p 31). however, a close examination of the nature of the interest created by s 227(4.1) of the ita reveals that it does not create this type of interest because “[t]he employer is not actually required to hold the money separate and apart, the usual fiduciary obligations of a trustee are absent, and the trust exists without a res the law of tracing is similarly corrupted” (r. j. wood and r. t. g. reeson, “the continuing saga of the statutory deemed trust: royal bank v. tuxedo transportation ltd.” (2000), 15 bflr 515, at p 532). in other words, the key attributes that allow the common law to refer to beneficial ownership as being a proprietary interest are missing. [48] according to the common law understanding of a trust, the legal owner or trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the equitable owner or beneficiary the fiduciary relationship impresses the office of trustee with three fundamental duties: the trustee must act honestly and with reasonable skill and prudence, the trustee cannot delegate the office, and the trustee cannot personally profit from its dealings with the trust property or its beneficiaries (see valard, at para. 17). this severely restricts what the trustee may do with trust property and creates a relationship significantly different from the one between a debtor and a creditor. for instance, while a debtor may attempt to reduce its debt or reach a compromise, a trustee cannot, since it must always act in the best interest of the beneficiary and cannot consider its own interests. similarly, while a debtor is liable to a creditor until the debt is repaid, a trustee is not liable to a beneficial owner where property is lost, unless it was lost through a breach of the standard of care owed (see e. e. gillese, the law of trusts (3rd ed. 2014), at p 14). in the case of the deemed trust, however, parliament did not create such a fiduciary relationship. parliament expressly contemplated a potential compromise between her majesty and the debtor in s 6(3) of the ccaa. in addition, the terms of the ita do not require that the debtor actually keep the property subject to the deemed trust separate and use it solely for the benefit of her majesty. in fact, her majesty does not enjoy the benefit of her interest in the property while the property is held by the debtor. instead, parliament contemplated that the debtor would continue to use and dispose of the property subject to the trust for its own business purposes (see first vancouver, at paras. 42-46). [49] another core attribute of beneficial ownership is certainty as to the property that is subject to the trust (see gillese, at p 39). many deemed trusts fail to provide for certainty of subject matter. for instance, in henfrey, the court considered the deemed trust created by the british columbia social service tax act, rsbc. 1979, c 388. like s 227(4.1) of the ita, the social service tax act provided that tax collected but not remitted was deemed to be held in trust for her majesty. it further provided that unremitted amounts were deemed to be held separate and apart from and form no part of the assets or estate of the tax collector. while mclachlin j found that the property was identifiable at the time the tax was collected, she noted that “[t]he difficulty in this, as in most cases, is that trust property soon ceases to be identifiable. the tax money is mingled” (p 34). therefore, she concluded that there was no trust under general principles of equity. the legislature’s attempt to resolve this problem by deeming the amounts to be separate from and form no part of the tax debtor’s property was merely a tacit acknowledgment that “the reality is that after conversion the statutory trust bears little resemblance to a true trust. there is no property which can be regarded as being impressed with a trust” (p 34). [50] in first vancouver, this court examined the nature of the interest created by s 227(4.1) of the ita. writing for the court, iacobucci j held that this provision creates a charge which “is in principle similar to a floating charge over all the assets of the tax debtor in the amount of the default” (para. 40). he concluded that parliament specifically intended to create a charge with fluidity, a charge that could readily float over all of the debtor’s assets rather than attach to a particular one (para. 33). parliament’s intention was to capture any property that comes into the possession of the tax debtor whilst simultaneously allowing any asset to be alienated and the proceeds of disposition to be captured (para. 5). [51] this lack of certainty as to the subject matter of the trust is even starker in the present case than in henfrey or in sparrow electric, where there was certainty as to the assets until they were mingled section 227(4.1) purports to bring all assets owned by the debtor within its reach despite the wording of the section, this interest — one of the same nature as a “floating charge” — has no particular property to which it attaches. without certainty of subject matter, equity cannot know which property the debtor has a fiduciary obligation to maintain in the beneficiary’s interest and thus “[t]he notion of a trust without a res simply cannot be made sensible or coherent” (wood and reeson, at pp. 532-33 (footnote omitted); see also sparrow electric, at para. 31). [52] parliament’s decision to avoid certainty of subject matter was an intentional modification to the deemed trust following this court’s decision in dauphin plains credit union ltd. v. xyloid industries ltd., [1980] 1 scr 1182. in dauphin plains, the court refused to enforce her majesty’s claim because the crown had failed to establish that the moneys purported to be deducted actually existed or were kept in such a way as to be traceable (p 1197). traceability is another key aspect of a beneficial interest, since it allows the beneficial owner to enjoy the benefits of ownership, such as income from the property. it also ensures that the beneficial owner is responsible for the costs of ownership. by choosing not to attach her majesty’s claim to any particular asset, parliament has protected her majesty from the risks associated with asset ownership, including damage, depreciation and loss i agree with gonthier j., who, speaking of the predecessor to s 227(4.1) (albeit in dissent), said that “this subsection is antithetical to tracing in the traditional sense, to the extent that it requires no link at all between the subject matter of the trust and the fund or asset which the subject matter is being traced into” (sparrow electric, at para. 37). had parliament wanted to confer a beneficial ownership interest upon her majesty, it would have had to impose these associated risks as well. [53] for the same reason as in henfrey, the statement that property is deemed to be removed from the debtor’s estate is equally ineffective at preventing a judge from ordering super priorities over the debtor’s property. because the deemed trust does not attach to specific property and the debtor remains free to alienate any of its assets, no property is actually removed from the debtor’s estate. [54] this interpretation is supported by the existence of s 227(4.2) of the ita, which specifically anticipates other interests taking priority over the deemed trust (something that would be impossible if there were an ownership interest). it states that “[f]or the purposes of subsections 227(4) and 227(4.1), a security interest does not include a prescribed security interest”. in the income tax regulations, crc, c 945, s 2201(1), the governor in council has defined “prescribed security interest” as a registered mortgage “that encumbers land or a building, where the mortgage is registered . . . before the time the amount is deemed to be held in trust by the person”. therefore, in certain situations, mortgage holders take priority over her majesty. [55] i reiterate that, without specific property to attach to, there can be no trust. the fact that s 227(4.1) specifically anticipates that the character of assets will change over time and automatically releases any assets that the debtor chooses to alienate from the deemed trust means that parliament had in mind something different from beneficial ownership in the common law sense of the word i tend to agree with noël ja’s assessment of s 227(4.1): “the deemed trust mechanism, whether applied in quebec or elsewhere, effectively creates in favour of the crown a security interest . . .” (caisse populaire d’amos, at para. 46). [56] other scholars agree that s 227(4.1) “merely secures payment or performance of an obligation” (r. j. wood, “irresistible force meets immovable object: canada v. canada north group inc.” (2020), 63 can. bus. lj 85, at p 95; see also a. duggan and j. ziegel, “justice iacobucci and the canadian law of deemed trusts and chattel security” (2007), 57 utlj 227, at pp. 245-46). wood and reeson reach the particularly damning conclusion that “[t]he concept of a trust is used in the legislation, but in virtually every respect the characteristics of a trust are lacking” and thus “the use of inappropriate legal concepts” has led to the creation of a “statutory provision [that] is deeply flawed” (pp. 531-32). they “suspec[t] that the intention of the drafters was that revenue canada should obtain a charge on all the assets of the debtor”, and they state that “the statutory deemed trust is nothing more than a legislative mechanism that is intended to create a non-consensual security interest in the assets of the employer” (p 533). [57] nonetheless, for our purposes it is not necessary to conclusively determine whether the interest created by s 227(4.1) should be characterized as a security interest. what is clear is that s 227(4.1) does not create a beneficial interest that can be considered a proprietary interest. like the deemed trust at issue in henfrey, it “does not give [the crown] the same property interest a common law trust would” (p 35). without attaching to specific property, creating the usual right to the enjoyment of property or the fiduciary obligations of a trustee, the interest created by s 227(4.1) lacks the qualities that allow a court to refer to a beneficiary as a beneficial owner. therefore, i do not accept the crown’s argument that her majesty has a proprietary interest in a debtor’s property that is adequate to prevent the exercise of a supervising judge’s discretion to order super-priority charges under s 11 of the ccaa or any of the sections that follow it. (2) does section 227(4.1) of the ita create a super priority that conflicts with a court-ordered super-priority charge? [58] the crown also refers to the part of s 227(4.1) which states that the receiver general shall be paid the proceeds of a debtor’s property “in priority to all such security interests”, as defined in s 224(13). in the crown’s view, court-ordered super-priority charges under s 11 of the ccaa or any of the sections that follow it are security interests within the meaning of s 224(1.3) and therefore her majesty’s interest has priority over them. [59] my colleagues justices brown and rowe point to the legislative history of s 227(4.1) as evidence that parliament intended her majesty’s deemed trust to have “absolute priority” over all other security interests (para. 201). in particular, they rely upon justice iacobucci’s comment in sparrow electric that “it is open to parliament to step in and assign absolute priority to the deemed trust” by using the words “shall be paid to the receiver general in priority to any such security interest” (reasons of brown and rowe jj., at para. 202, citing sparrow electric, at para. 112) they further rely upon the press release accompanying the amendments, which stated that the deemed trust was to have absolute priority. [60] with respect, i disagree with this reasoning. sparrow electric dealt with a type of interest very different from the one before us now. in sparrow electric, this court held that a fixed and specific charge over the tax debtor’s inventory had priority over her majesty’s deemed trust created by the ita thus the purpose of the amendments was to “clarify that the deemed trusts for unremitted source deductions and gst apply whether or not other security interests have been granted in respect of the inventory or trade receivables of a business” (department of finance canada, unremitted source deductions and unpaid gst (april 7, 1997), at p 2). if parliament had intended that the deemed trust have absolute priority, it would not have enacted s 227(4.2) at the same time as noted above, s 227(4.2) provides that “a security interest does not include a prescribed security interest”, and thus specifically envisions that the deemed trust will not have absolute priority. in my view, by using the words “in priority to all such security interests” in s 227(4.1), parliament intended that the priority be absolute not over all possible interests, but only over security interests as defined in s 224(13). what must therefore be determined is whether a court-ordered super-priority charge under the ccaa falls within that definition. [61] section 224(1.3) reads as follows: security interest means any interest in, or for civil law any right in, property that secures payment or performance of an obligation and includes an interest, or for civil law a right, created by or arising out of a debenture, mortgage, hypothec, lien, pledge, charge, deemed or actual trust, assignment or encumbrance of any kind whatever, however or whenever arising, created, deemed to arise or otherwise provided for . [62] this definition is expansive however, the list of illustrative security interests makes it clear that a super-priority charge created under the ccaa cannot fall within its meaning. court-ordered super-priority charges are utterly different from any of the interests listed. these super-priority charges are granted, not for the sole benefit of the holder of the charge, but to facilitate restructuring in furtherance of the interests of all stakeholders in this way, they benefit the creditors as a group the fact that parliament chose to provide a list of examples whose nature is so unlike that of a court- ordered super-priority charge demonstrates that it must have had a very different type of interest in mind when drafting s 224(1.3) i could not agree more with professor wood about the limited class of interests that parliament had in mind: [court-ordered super-priority charges] are fundamentally different in nature from security interests that arise by way of agreement between the parties and from non-consensual security interests that arise by operation of law. court-ordered charges are unlike conventional consensual and non- consensual security interests in that they are integrally connected to insolvency proceedings that operate for the benefit of the creditors as a group given the fundamentally different character of court-ordered charges, it would be reasonable to expect that they would be specifically mentioned in the ita definition of a security interest if they were to be included. [emphasis added; p 98.] [63] my colleagues brown and rowe jj allege that this interpretation of s 224(1.3) is contrary to our court’s decision in caisse populaire desjardins de l’est de drummond, where rothstein j wrote that the provided examples “do not diminish the broad scope of the words ‘any interest in property’ (para. 15; see also para. 14). with respect, i disagree with my colleagues. as justice rothstein explained at para. 40, his comments were made in response to the argument that the list of examples of security interests was exhaustive. i agree with him that the list of examples provided is not exhaustive. however, the examples remain illustrative of the types of interests that parliament had in mind and are clearly united by a common theme or class because parliament employed a compound “means . . . and includes” structure to establish its definition: “security interest means any interest in, or for civil law any right in, property that secures payment or performance of an obligation and includes . . . ”. in my view, this structure evidences parliament’s intent that the list have limiting effect, such that only the instruments enumerated and instruments that are similar in nature fall within the definition. the critical difference between the listed security interests and super- priority charges ordered under s 11 of the ccaa or any of the sections that follow it explains both why the latter are excluded from the list of specific instruments and why there can be no suggestion that they may be included in the broader term “encumbrance” at the end of that list the ejusdem generis principle supports this position by limiting the generality of the final words on the basis of the narrow enumeration that precedes them (national bank of greece (canada) v. katsikonouris, [1990] 2 scr 1029, at p 1040). all of the other instruments arise by agreement or by operation of law. therefore, court-ordered super-priority charges under s 11 or any of the sections that follow it are different in kind from anything on the list. [64] using the list of specific examples to ascertain parliament’s intent in this case is also consistent with the presumption against tautology. in mcdiarmid lumber ltd. v. god’s lake first nation, 2006 scc 58, [2006] 2 scr 846, mclachlin cj. defined this presumption in the following way: it is presumed that the legislature avoids superfluous or meaningless words, that it does not pointlessly repeat itself or speak in vain: sullivan, at p 158. thus, “[e]very word in a statute is presumed to make sense and to have a specific role to play in advancing the legislative purpose” (p 158). this principle is often invoked by courts to resolve ambiguity or to determine the scope of general words. (para. 36, quoting r. sullivan, sullivan and driedger on the construction of statutes (4th ed. 2002), at p 158; see also placer dome canada ltd. v. ontario (minister of finance), 2006 scc 20, [2006] 1 scr 715, at para. 45.) [65] the ita contains two definitions of “security interest”, in s 224(1.3) and s 18(5). for the purposes of computing taxpayer income, parliament chose to define “security interest” in s 18(5) in nearly the same manner as in s 224(1.3), but without listing the ten specific security instruments: “security interest, in respect of a property, means an interest in, or for civil law a right in, the property that secures payment of an obligation” the presumption against tautology means that we must presume that parliament included the specific additional words in s 224(1.3) because they “have a specific role to play in advancing the legislative purpose” (placer dome, at para. 45, quoting r. sullivan, driedger on the construction of statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at p 159). applying the presumption against tautology demonstrates that parliament intended interpretive weight to be placed on the examples. [66] to come back to caisse populaire desjardins de l’est de drummond, i agree with rothstein j that the definition of “security interest” in s 224(1.3) of the ita is expansive such that it “does not require that the agreement between the creditor and debtor take any particular form” (para. 15). however, i am of the view that there is a key restriction in this expansive definition. the definition focuses on interests created either by consensual agreement or by operation of law, and these types of interests are usually designed to protect the rights of a single creditor, usually to the detriment of other creditors. in that case, the court was considering whether a right to compensation conferred on a single creditor by a contract entered into between that creditor and the debtor was a security interest within the meaning of s 224(13). the situation at issue in that case was completely different than the one at issue in the present case. indeed, in the present case, the interest of the participants in the restructuring is created by a court order, not by an agreement or by operation of law. as i have said above, when a judge orders a super-priority charge in ccaa proceedings, it is quite a different type of interest as the ccaa restructuring process benefits all creditors and not one in particular. [67] finally, if parliament had wanted to include court-ordered super-priority charges in the definition of “security interest”, it would have said so specifically. parliament must be taken to have legislated with the operation of the ccaa in mind. in the words of professor sullivan, “the legislature is presumed to know its own statute book and to draft each new provision with regard to the structures, conventions, and habits of expression as well as the substantive law embodied in existing legislation” (sullivan (2014), at p 422 (footnote omitted)). given that, in indalex, this court has already found that granting super-priority charges is critical as “a key aspect of the debtor’s ability to attempt a workout”, one would expect parliament to use clearer language where such a definition could jeopardize the operation of another one of its acts. i am therefore in total disagreement with my colleagues justices brown and rowe that “nothing in the definition of security interest in the ita precludes the inclusion of an interest that is designed to operate to the benefit of all creditors” (para. 210). to the contrary, everything hints at priming charges being excluded from the definition of security interest. [68] in conclusion, a court-ordered super-priority charge under the ccaa is not a security interest within the meaning of s 224(1.3) of the ita. as a result, there is no conflict between s 227(4.1) of the ita and the initial order made in this case i therefore respectfully disagree with my colleague justice moldaver’s suggestion that there may be a conflict between s 11 of the ccaa and the ita (para. 258). the initial order’s super-priority charges prevail over the deemed trust. c was it necessary for the initial order to subordinate her majesty’s claim protected by a deemed trust in this case? [69] finally, i must now identify the provision in which the initial order here should be grounded. while the initial order under consideration in indalex was based on the court’s equitable jurisdiction, in most instances, orders in ccaa proceedings should be considered an exercise of statutory power (century services, at paras. 65-66). [70] as discussed above, a supervising court’s authority to order super-priority charges is grounded in its broad discretionary power under s 11 of the ccaa and also in the more specific grants of authority under ss. 11.2, 11.4, 11.51 and 1152. those provisions authorize the court to grant certain priming charges that rank ahead of the claims of “any secured creditor”. while i have already concluded that her majesty does not have a proprietary interest as a result of her deemed trust, it is less certain whether her majesty is a “secured creditor” under the ccaa. professor wood is of the view that her majesty is not a “secured creditor” under the ccaa by virtue of her deemed trust interest; rather, ss. 37 to 39 of the ccaa create “two distinct approaches — one that applies to a deemed trust, the other that applies when a statute gives the crown the status of a secured creditor” (p 96). therefore, the ranking of a priming charge ahead of the deemed trust would fall outside the scope of the express priming charge provisions i do not need to definitively determine if her majesty falls within the definition of “secured creditor” under the ccaa by virtue of her trust. instead, i would ground the supervising court’s power in s 11, which “permits courts to create priming charges that are not specifically provided for in the ccaa” (p 98) i respectfully disagree with the suggestion of my colleagues brown and rowe jj. that professor wood or any other author has suggested that s 11 is limited by the specific provisions that follow it (para. 228) to the contrary, this court said in century services, at paras. 68-70, that s 11 provides a very broad jurisdiction that is not restricted by the availability of more specific orders. [71] my colleagues brown and rowe jj also argue that “priming charges cannot supersede the crown’s deemed trust claim because they may attach only to the property of the debtor’s company” (para. 223 (emphasis in original)). with respect, this argument cannot stand because, although ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa contain this restriction, there is no such restriction in s 11 as lalonde j recognized, [translation] “in exercising the authority conferred by the ccaa, including inherent powers, the courts have not hesitated to use this jurisdiction to intervene in contractual relationships between a debtor and its creditors, even to make orders affecting the rights of third parties” (triton électronique, at para. 31). there may be circumstances where it is appropriate for a court to attach charges to property that does not belong to the debtor — if, for instance, this deemed trust were to be equivalent to a proprietary interest. however, that circumstance does not arise in this case because the property subject to her majesty’s deemed trust remains the property of the debtor, as the deemed trust does not create a proprietary interest. my colleagues’ reliance on s 37(2) of the ccaa is similarly ill-founded. as i said earlier, s 37(2) simply preserves the status quo it does not alter her majesty’s interest it merely continues that interest and excludes it from the operation of s 37(1), which would otherwise downgrade it to the interest of an ordinary creditor. [72] that said, courts should still recognize the distinct nature of her majesty’s interest and ensure that they grant a charge with priority over the deemed trust only when necessary. in creating a super-priority charge, a supervising judge must always consider whether the order will achieve the objectives of the ccaa. when there is the spectre of a claim by her majesty protected by a deemed trust, the judge must also consider whether a super priority is necessary. the record before us contains no reasons for the initial order, so this is difficult to determine in this case. given that her majesty has been paid and that the case is in fact moot, it is not critical for us to determine whether the supervising judge believed it was necessary to subordinate her majesty’s claim to the super-priority charges. based on justice topolniski’s reasons for denying the crown’s motion to vary the initial order, it is clear that she would have found that the super-priority charges deserved priority over her majesty’s interest (paras. 100-104). however, i wish to say a few words on when it may be necessary for a supervising judge to subordinate her majesty’s interest to super-priority charges. [73] it may be necessary to subordinate her majesty’s deemed trust where the supervising judge believes that, without a super-priority charge, a particular professional or lender would not act. this may often be the case. on the other hand, i agree with professor wood that, although subordinating super-priority charges to her majesty’s claim will often increase the costs and complexity of restructuring, there will be times when it will not. for instance, when her majesty’s claim is small or known with a high degree of certainty, commercial parties will be able to manage their risks and will not need a super priority. after all, there is an order of priority even amongst super-priority charges, and therefore it is clear that these parties are willing to have their claims subordinated to some fixed claims. a further example of where different considerations may be in play is in so-called liquidating ccaa proceedings. as this court recently recognized, ccaa proceedings whose fundamental objective is to liquidate — rather than to rescue a going concern — have a legitimate place in the ccaa regime and have been accepted by parliament through the enactment of s 36 (callidus capital, at paras. 42-45) liquidating ccaa proceedings often aim to maximize returns for creditors, and thus the subordination of her majesty’s interest has less justification beyond potential unjust enrichment arguments. vi disposition [74] i would dismiss the appeal with costs in this court in accordance with the tariff of fees and disbursements set out in schedule b of the rules of the supreme court of canada, sor/2002-156. the reasons of karakatsanis and martin jj. were delivered by karakatsanis j — i. overview [75] when a company seeks to restructure its affairs in order to avoid bankruptcy, the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36 (ccaa), allows the court to order charges in favour of parties that are necessary to the restructuring process: lenders who provide interim financing, the monitor who administers the company’s restructuring, and directors and officers who captain the sinking ship (among others). these charges, often referred to as “priming charges”, are meant to encourage investment in the company as it undergoes reorganization a company’s reorganization, as an alternative to the devastating effects of bankruptcy, serves the public interest by benefitting creditors, employees, and the health of the economy more generally. [76] in this case, the ccaa judge ordered priming charges over the estates of canada north group and six related companies (debtor companies) in favour of an interim lender, the monitor, and directors. property of two of the debtor companies, however, was also subject to a deemed trust in favour of the crown, under the income tax act, rsc 1985, c 1 (5th supp.) (ita), for unremitted source deductions consisting of employees’ income tax, canada pension plan contributions, and employment insurance premiums while this appeal is moot because there are sufficient assets to satisfy both the crown’s deemed trust claim and the priming charges, this court is asked to determine which has priority in the restructuring: the priming charges under the ccaa or the deemed trust under the ita. [77] section 227(4.1) of the ita provides that, when an employer fails to remit source deductions to the crown, a deemed trust attaches to the property of the employer to the extent of the unremitted source deductions the deemed trust operates “notwithstanding any security interest in such property” and “[n]otwithstanding . . . any other enactment of canada”. sections 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa give the court authority to order priming charges over a company’s property in favour of interim lenders, directors and officers, and estate administrators priming charges can rank ahead of any other secured claim. read on their own, these provisions appear to give different parties super-priority in an insolvency. this issue of statutory interpretation has been described as the collision of an unstoppable force with an immoveable object (r. j. wood, “irresistible force meets immovable object: canada v. canada north group inc.” (2020), 63 can. bus. lj 85). [78] the appellant, the crown, argues that s 227(4.1) of the ita creates a proprietary right in the crown because, through the mechanism of a deemed trust, it gives the crown beneficial ownership of the amount of the unremitted source deductions. in other words, that amount is the crown’s property and a ccaa judge cannot, therefore, order a charge over it; it should be taken out of the estate and can play no role in the restructuring process. [79] in contrast, the respondents argue that s 227(4.1) creates a security interest in the crown squarely contemplated by ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa. they further submit that there is no conflict between the relevant provisions because the policies underlying both acts can be harmonized in favour of giving effect to the ccaa provisions. [80] for the reasons below, i conclude that there is no conflict between the ita and ccaa provisions the right that attaches to “beneficial ownership” under s 227(4.1) of the ita must be interpreted in the specific statutory context in which it arises. here, the crown’s right to unremitted source deductions in a ccaa restructuring is protected by the requirement that the plan of compromise pay the crown in full. because i do not conclude that the crown’s interest fits within the relevant statutory definition of “secured creditor” under the ccaa, it is not captured by the court’s authority to order priming charges under ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa. however, in my view, the broad discretionary power under s 11 of the ccaa permits a court to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions. this conclusion harmonizes the purposes of both federal statutes. i would dismiss the appeal. ii. facts [81] in july 2017, the court of queen’s bench of alberta issued an order granting the debtor companies protection under the ccaa (alta qb,. no. 1703- 12327, july 5, 2017 (initial order)). the initial order provided for priming charges in the following order of priority: (1) an administration charge of $500,000 in favour of the court-appointed monitor, ernst & young inc.; (2) an interim lender’s charge of $1,000,000 in favour of the interim lender, business development bank of canada (bdbc); and (3) a directors’ charge of $150,000 (together, priming charges). the interim lender’s charge was later increased to $3,500,000 and the administration charge to $950,000. [82] paragraph 44 of the initial order provided that the priming charges have priority over the claims of secured creditors: each of the directors’ charge, administration charge and the interim lender’s charge . . . shall constitute a charge on the property and subject always to section 34(11) of the ccaa such charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise . . in favour of any person. [83] paragraph 46 of the initial order provided that the priming charges “shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by . . . (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes”. [84] at the time of the initial order, two of the debtor companies had failed to remit source deductions and owed the crown $685,54293. the crown applied to vary the priming charges in the initial order on the basis that paras. 44 and 46(d) failed to recognize the crown’s legislated interest in unremitted source deductions. the crown argued that s 227(4.1) of the ita, s 23(4) of the canada pension plan, rsc 1985, c. c-8 (cpp), and s 86(2.1) of the employment insurance act, sc 1996, c 23 (eia), require the crown’s claims for unremitted source deductions to have priority over the claims of all other creditors of a debtor, notwithstanding any other federal statute, including the ccaa. in these reasons, i will only refer to s 227(4.1) of the ita as the relevant ita, cpp and eia provisions are identical and the latter two statutes cross- reference the ita. iii decisions below a court of queen’s bench of alberta, 2017 abqb 550, 60 alta l.r (6th) 103 (topolniski j.) [85] the application judge held that court-ordered priming charges under ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa have priority over the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions. first, she concluded that the crown’s deemed trust under s 227(4.1) of the ita creates a security interest rather than a proprietary interest because the definition of “security interest” in the ita includes an interest created by a deemed or actual trust, and it would be inconsistent to interpret the crown’s interest under s 227(4.1) contrary to its enabling statute. she also reasoned that the deemed trust is a security interest because it lacks certainty of subject matter and is therefore not a true trust. [86] second, the application judge concluded that s 227(4.1) of the ita and ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa are not inconsistent because any conflict can be avoided by interpretation. she reasoned that the policy objectives of both acts have to be respected because they were enacted by the same government. on the one hand, the collection of source deductions is at the heart of the ita. on the other, the ccaa aims to facilitate business survival. the application judge concluded that, without the court’s ability to order priming charges, interim lending “would simply end”, along with “the hope of positive ccaa outcomes” (para. 102). the goals of both acts can therefore only be achieved if priority is given “to those charges necessary for restructuring”, while the deemed trust ranks in priority to all other secured creditors (para. 112). b court of appeal of alberta, 2019 abca 314, 93 alta. lr (6th) 29 (rowbotham and schutz jja,. wakeling ja. dissenting) [87] a majority of the court of appeal dismissed the crown’s appeal. it agreed with the application judge that the crown’s deemed trust under s 227(4.1) of the ita creates a security interest rather than a proprietary interest it also agreed that the crown’s position failed to reconcile the objectives of the ita and ccaa, and given the importance of interim lending, concluded that absurd consequences could follow if the crown’s position prevailed. [88] wakeling ja disagreed. he concluded that s 227(4.1) of the ita makes two unequivocal statements: first, that the crown is the beneficial owner of the debtor’s property to the extent of the unremitted source deductions; and second, that this amount must be paid to the crown notwithstanding the security interests of any other secured creditors, including, in his opinion, the holders of a priming charge. as a result, it was unnecessary to reconcile policy objectives. in his view, the notwithstanding clause in s 227(4.1) was conclusive because the relevant ccaa provisions lacked the same language. as a result, there was “no need to look beyond the four corners of s 227(4.1) to determine the scope of the unassailable priority it creates” (para. 135) finally, wakeling ja noted that there is perfect correlation between the purpose of the ita and the plain meaning of s 227(41). iv parties’ submissions a. the appellant the crown [89] the crown’s submissions before this court echo the dissent at the court of appeal: the text of s 227(4.1) unequivocally states that unremitted source deductions become the property of the crown the crown argues that the plain meaning of s 227(4.1) aligns with its purpose, which is to protect the largest source of government revenue. [90] the crown makes two principal submissions first, it submits that the crown’s interest under s 227(4.1) of the ita is a proprietary interest rather than a security interest because the text of s 227(4.1) causes the unremitted source deductions to become the property of the crown. there is no need to rely on the “notwithstanding clause” in s 227(4.1) because the ita and ccaa provisions work harmoniously; the priming charges can only attach to a company’s property and s 227(4.1) provides that the unremitted source deductions are beneficially owned by the crown. [91] second, the crown submits in the alternative that, even if its interest is a security interest, it ranks ahead of the priming charges. this is because a priming charge under the ccaa is a security interest within the meaning of the ita, and s 227(4.1) specifically states that the deemed trust ranks ahead of all other security interests. b. the respondent business development bank of canada [92] the respondent bdbc, urges this court to follow the approach taken by the courts below it submits that the crown’s interest under the deemed trust is a security interest because (1) the enabling statute, the ita, defines a deemed trust as a security interest; (2) this court, in first vancouver finance v. mnr, 2002 scc 49, [2002] 2 scr 720, characterized the deemed trust as a “floating charge”, which is a security interest; and (3) the opposite conclusion, that it is a proprietary interest, would be at odds with commercial reality. as the definition of “secured creditor” in the ccaa includes the holder of a deemed trust, that act contemplates that a priming charge can rank ahead of the crown’s deemed trust. thus, ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa contemplate that a priming charge can rank ahead of the crown’s deemed trust. c. the respondent ernst & young, in its capacity as monitor [93] both bdbc and ernst & young (together, respondents) submit that the crown’s deemed trust is a security interest and that the statutes can be interpreted harmoniously to avoid a conflict. the monitor submits that a court-ordered priming charge is not a security interest within the meaning of s 227(4.1) of the ita because it is not specifically listed in the definition of security interest under the ita, and as a taxing statute, the ita requires a strict, textual approach to interpretation. [94] the monitor also highlights that the crown is a unique creditor because it has immediate information available to it respecting remittance and can certify and pursue amounts owing immediately. v. issue [95] the issue on appeal is whether court-ordered priming charges under the ccaa can rank ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions, as created by s 227(4.1) of the ita and related provisions of the cpp and eia. it is clear from the wording of s 227(4.1) of the ita that, if there is any conflict with a provision from another act, s 227(4.1) is to prevail. accordingly, this appeal turns on whether, and to what extent, the ccaa regime conflicts with s 227(4.1) of the ita. in answering that question, i proceed in four steps: 1 what rights does s 227(4.1) of the ita confer on the crown in respect of unremitted source deductions? 2 how is the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions treated in parliament’s insolvency regime? 3 do ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa permit the court to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions? 4 if not, does s 11 of the ccaa allow the court to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions? vi analysis a what rights does section 227(4.1) of the ita confer on the crown in respect of unremitted source deductions? (1) general scheme and background of sections 227(4) and 227(4.1) of the ita [96] section 153(1) of the ita requires employers to deduct and withhold amounts from their employees’ wages (source deductions) and remit those amounts to the receiver general by a specified due date when source deductions are made, s 227(4) deems that they are held separate and apart from the property of the employer and from property held by any secured creditor of the employer, notwithstanding any security interest in that property. source deductions are deemed to be held in trust for her majesty for payment by the specified due date. [97] if source deductions are not paid by the specified due date, s 227(4.1) extends the trust in s 227(4). it deems that a trust attaches to the employer’s property to the extent of any unremitted source deductions; that the trust existed from the moment the source deductions were made; and that the trust did not form part of the estate or property of the employer from the moment the source deductions were made (all regardless of whether the employer’s property is subject to a security interest). it also deems that, to the extent of any unremitted source deductions, the employer’s property is property “beneficially owned” by the crown, notwithstanding any security interest in the employer’s property: (4.1) notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the bankruptcy and insolvency act (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that act), any other enactment of canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for her majesty is not paid to her majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this act, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for a security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed (a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for her majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, and (b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was so deducted or withheld, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest and is property beneficially owned by her majesty notwithstanding any security interest in such property and in the proceeds thereof, and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the receiver general in priority to all such security interests. [98] the ita defines “security interest” in s 224(1.3): security interest means any interest in, or for civil law any right in, property that secures payment or performance of an obligation and includes an interest, or for civil law a right, created by or arising out of a debenture, mortgage, hypothec, lien, pledge, charge, deemed or actual trust, assignment or encumbrance of any kind whatever, however or whenever arising, created, deemed to arise or otherwise provided for . [99] as emphasized by the crown, ss. 227(4) and 227(4.1) were amended to their current form — excerpted above — to reverse the effect of this court’s decision in royal bank of canada v. sparrow electric corp., [1997] 1 scr 411. the crown submits that, in explicitly reversing sparrow electric’s result, parliament meant to always give the crown super-priority in an insolvency. i do not agree that such a broad conclusion can be drawn from this legislative history. in sparrow electric, the issue was who, between a lending bank and the crown, had priority in the debtor’s bankruptcy the bank had a general security agreement over all of the debtor’s property, which it entered into several months before successfully petitioning the debtor into bankruptcy while the debtor also owed the crown $625,990.86 in unremitted source deductions at the time of the bankruptcy, the first instance of non- remittance to the crown was after the bank entered its general security agreement. [100] iacobucci j., writing for a majority of the court, held in favour of the bank. at that time, the deemed trust was worded differently, triggering only upon an event of “liquidation, assignment, receivership or bankruptcy”, and the amount of the unremitted source deductions was only deemed to be held “separate from and form no part of the estate in liquidation, assignment, receivership or bankruptcy” (para. 13 (emphasis added)) the majority therefore concluded that the deemed trust did not attach to the debtor’s property because, at the relevant time, that property was already “legally the [bank’s]” (para. 98). because the bank had a fixed and specific charge over all of the debtor’s property, there was nothing left for the trust to attach to. the trust could not be effective unless there was some unencumbered asset in the bankruptcy out of which the trust could be deemed (para. 99). [101] after sparrow electric, parliament amended the deemed trust to ensure that, in a case like sparrow electric, the deemed trust attached notwithstanding any security interest held in the debtor’s property (first vancouver, at para. 27) as iacobucci j explained in first vancouver, parliament intended “to grant priority to the deemed trust in respect of property that is also subject to a security interest regardless of when the security interest arose in relation to the time the source deductions were made or when the deemed trust takes effect” (para. 28).1 [102] in this appeal, the crown argues that a court-ordered priming charge under the ccaa is a security interest for the purposes of the crown’s deemed trust. i agree that the definition of “security interest” in s 224(1.3) of the ita is broad, capturing 1 it bears noting, however, that ss. 227(4) and 227(4.1) of the ita do not give the crown priority over all creditors. they explicitly carve out an exception for the rights of unpaid suppliers (bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3, s 81.1) and the rights of farmers, fisherman, and aquaculturists (s 812). in addition, s 227(4.2) of the ita carves out an exception for a prescribed security interest, defined in the income tax regulations, crc, c 945, s 2201. broadly, a prescribed security interest is a mortgage in land or a building which is registered before the failure to remit the source deductions at issue (regulatory impact analysis statement, sor/99-322, canada gazette, part ii, vol. 133, no. 17, august 18, 1999, at pp. 2041-42). “any interest in . . . property that secures payment or performance of an obligation and includes an interest . . created by or arising out of a . . charge . . ., however or whenever arising, created, deemed to arise or otherwise provided for”. however, wood makes the observation that court-ordered charges are fundamentally different in nature from the security interests that arise by consensual agreement or by operation of law enumerated in s 224(1.3) because “they are integrally connected to insolvency proceedings that operate for the benefit of the creditors as a group” (wood (2020), at p 98). as a result, he reasons that “it would be reasonable to expect that they would be specifically mentioned in the ita definition of security interest if they were to be included” (p 98). [103] while s 227(4.1) undeniably operates notwithstanding any security interest — and priming charge — over the debtor’s property, the legislative history post-sparrow electric says nothing about the crown’s specific right to unremitted source deductions, pursuant to the deemed trust, when a company undergoes restructuring under the ccaa. even if, as the crown insists, a priming charge under the ccaa is a security interest for the purposes of the crown’s deemed trust (and i do not settle that debate in these reasons), that does not define what rights the crown has, in a ccaa restructuring, pursuant to its deemed trust. this court has never considered how s 227(4.1) of the ita interacts with the ccaa regime in light of the seminal insolvency decisions in century services inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2010 scc 60, [2010] 3 scr 379, and sun indalex finance, llc v. united steelworkers, 2013 scc 6, [2013] 1 scr 271. this appeal calls on this court to do so. (2) the right of beneficial ownership in section 227(4.1) of the ita [104] the crown argues that s 227(4.1) creates a proprietary right in the crown because it gives the crown beneficial ownership of the amount of the unremitted source deductions. because this is an ownership right, the amount of the unremitted source deductions is taken out of the debtor’s estate, effectively giving the crown super- priority. in other words, the crown agrees with the dissent in the court of appeal: that property is the crown’s property and a ccaa judge cannot order a charge over it. the respondents, in line with the court of appeal majority, submit that s 227(4.1) creates a security interest and can therefore be subordinated to a priming charge under the ccaa. [105] these submissions rely heavily on characterizing the crown’s interest as either a “security interest” or as “proprietary” in nature. however, in my view, defining an entitlement as one or the other does not resolve the issues on appeal because neither characterization has essential features in the abstract rather, a statutory entitlement takes its character from the statutory provision. general concepts of “proprietary right” and “security interest” — or of “property,” “trust” and “beneficial ownership” — are of limited assistance in this analysis. [106] this court has noted that property is often understood as a “bundle of rights” and obligations (saulnier v. royal bank of canada, 2008 scc 58, [2008] 3 scr 166, at para. 43). depending on which rights someone holds, their “bundle of rights” can be viewed as a weak or robust proprietary interest for this reason, the holder of a security interest has been described as having a proprietary right in its security. in sparrow electric, for example, both iacobucci j., writing for the majority, and gonthier j., writing for the dissent, explained the secured creditor in that case as having a proprietary right in, and effectively owning, the debtor’s property that secured its debt (paras. 42 and 98). [107] similarly, ronald c. c. cuming, catherine walsh and roderick j. wood state that, in the context of personal property security legislation, a secured creditor holds a proprietary right in collateral. this is because, for these authors, “[t]he defining characteristic of a proprietary right . . . is that it is . . . enforceable against the world”, and the right of a secured creditor with a perfected security interest is enforceable against the world (personal property security law (2nd ed. 2012), at p 613). without an explanation for what the terms mean in a particular context, it is difficult to draw any conclusion from characterizing something as one or the other. (while there is a clear difference between a right in rem (available against the world at large) and a right in personam (available against a determinate set of individuals), whether the term “proprietary right” means a “right in rem” or the term “security interest” means a “right in personam” depends upon the statutory context. in any event, the submissions before this court were not framed in these terms). [108] this court explained in saulnier that, when analyzing the definition of property under a statute, there is little use in considering property in the abstract or even under the common law because “parliament can and does create its own lexicon” for particular purposes (para. 16; see also quebec (revenue) v caisse populaire desjardins de montmagny, 2009 scc 49, [2009] 3 scr 286, at paras. 11-12). indeed, “interests unknown to the common law may be created by statute” (wotherspoon v. canadian pacific ltd., [1987] 1 scr 952, at p 999, citing ross j. in town of lunenburg v. municipality of lunenburg, [1932] 1 dlr 386 (nssc), at p 390) as a result, caution is required before importing definitions from other contexts, relying on statements or description from cases out of context, and employing general concepts like “proprietary right” and “security interest” it is crucial in this appeal to stay within the bounds of the statutory provisions being interpreted. [109] section 227(4.1) states that the amount of the unremitted source deductions is “beneficially owned” by the crown. however, it does not follow that this right of beneficial ownership is absolute or that the term imports specific rights that flow from it. this is not a case where parliament has used a term with an established legal meaning — leading to an inference that parliament has given the term that meaning in the statute in question (r v. dlw, 2016 scc 22, [2016] 1 scr 402, at para. 20). the concept of beneficial ownership does not have a precise doctrinal meaning in the common law of canada, and it does not exist in the civil law of quebec it is also not used consistently in the ita. the meaning of “beneficially owned” in s 227(4.1) can only be understood in the specific, relevant statutory context in which it arises. to that end, while s 227(4.1) uses the mechanism of a trust and confers some type of beneficial ownership on the crown, it modifies even those features of beneficial ownership that are widely associated with it under the common law. [110] as a federal statute with national application, the ita rests on the private law of the provinces. this relationship of complementarity is codified in s 8.1 of the interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21 however, the federal statute can derogate and dissociate itself from the private law when it legislates on a matter that falls within its jurisdiction: see m. lamoureux, “the harmonization of tax legislation dissociation: a mechanism of exception part iii” (online). as i shall explain, the trust created by s 227(4.1) disassociates itself from the requirements of a trust in both the provincial common law and civil law. [111] i proceed as follows: (1) there is no settled doctrinal meaning of the term beneficial ownership; and (2) s 227(4.1) does not create a true trust because there is no certainty of subject matter. a lack of certainty of subject matters means that the crown cannot, through tracing, claim appreciation of trust value and the trustee (tax debtor) is free to dispose of trust property these features render the crown’s beneficial ownership weaker than generally understood at common law. the result is an interest “unknown to the common [or civil] law”. we cannot, therefore, look at s 227(4.1) in isolation to define the way in which the crown’s “beneficially owned” property under s 227(4.1) should be treated in an insolvency — that clarification must come from, and indeed does come from, parliament’s insolvency legislation. (i) no settled doctrinal meaning [112] beneficial ownership is most commonly used in the law of trusts to broadly distinguish between who has legal title to property (the trustee) and who has beneficial enjoyment of that property (the beneficiary). black’s law dictionary (11th ed. 2019), for example, defines a “beneficial owner” as “[o]ne recognized in equity as the owner of something because use and title belong to that person, even though legal title may belong to someone else, esp. one for whom property is held in trust” (p 1331). [113] despite this common usage, there is no clear definition of the rights flowing from the term “beneficial ownership” under the common law (see, eg,. c. brown, “beneficial ownership and the income tax act” (2003), 51 can tax j. 401; m. d. brender, “beneficial ownership in canadian income tax law: required reform and impact on harmonization of quebec civil law and federal legislation” (2003), 51 can. tax j 311, at p 316). as well, the civil code of québec does not have a concept of beneficial ownership (see canada (attorney general) v. caisse populaire d’amos, 2004 fca 92, 324 nr 31, at paras. 48-49). [114] the term itself is also contentious within the academy, giving rise to a heated debate about whether a trust beneficiary should be thought of as an owner at all (see, eg,. d. w. m. waters, “the nature of the trust beneficiary’s interest” (1967), 45 can bar rev 219; l. d smith, “trust and patrimony” (2008), 38 rgd 379; b. mcfarlane and r. stevens, “the nature of equitable property” (2010), 4 j. eq. 1; j. e. penner, “the (true) nature of a beneficiary’s equitable proprietary interest under a trust” (2014), 27 can. jl & jur. 473; brender, at p 316). the conventional view is that a trust beneficiary only has a right in personam against the trustee to enforce the terms of the trust, which is not a proprietary right in the trust property. a different view is that a trust beneficiary has equitable ownership of trust property, despite the existence of an intermediary with legal title (brown, at pp. 413-14). some suggest that there is a midway approach in canada: depending on the context, a beneficiary’s right is either a personal right against the trustee or a proprietary right in trust property (brender, at p 316). [115] in “beneficial ownership and the income tax act”, brown notes the debate in the academy and analyzes how the terms “beneficial ownership”, “beneficial owner”, and “beneficially owned” are used in the ita. after examining 26 provisions invoking beneficial ownership in the ita, she concludes that its meaning is “no longer obvious” (p 452). [116] this court need not resolve the ongoing debate however, it serves to highlight that “the real question is what is the nature of a beneficiary’s interest in a trust when considered in the context of the legislation that is sought to be applied” (brown, at p 419). in the ita context, brown concludes that “the matter of what ‘beneficial ownership’ means for tax purposes must be settled within the structure of the ita” (p 435) further, whether the beneficiary’s rights within the ita are in rem or in personam will often depend on a combination of factors, like the wording of the deeming provision, private law concepts, case law, and tax policy (see pp. 435-36). [117] in my view, the works cited above belie the notion that s 227(4.1) of the ita, and its use of the concept of beneficial ownership, is unequivocal in meaning. not only is there no settled definition of beneficial ownership under the common law, there also appears to be no consistent meaning of the term in the ita. and the concept does not exist in quebec civil law. the meaning of beneficial ownership when used in a statute must always be construed within the context of the particular provision in which it occurs. what is necessary is careful scrutiny of s 227(4.1), and specifically, the right of beneficial ownership it gives the crown, particularly in the context of a statutory deemed trust with no specific subject matter. (ii) section 227(4.1) does not create a “true” trust [118] a statutory deemed trust is a unique legal vehicle. unlike an express trust, which can be created by contract, will, or oral and written declarations, and unlike a trust that arises by operation of law, a statutory deemed trust “is a trust that legislation brings into existence by constituting certain property as trust property and a certain person as the trustee of that property” (guarantee company of north america v. royal bank of canada, 2019 onca 9, 144 or (3d) 225, at para. 18; see also a. grenon, “common law and statutory trusts: in search of missing links” (1995), 15 est. & tr. j 109, at p 110). [119] being a creature of statute, a statutory deemed trust does not have to fulfill the ordinary requirements of trust law, namely, certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter, and certainty of object (british columbia v. henfrey samson belair ltd., [1989] 2 scr 24; see also friends of toronto public cemeteries inc v public guardian and trustee, 2020 onca 282, 59 etr (4th) 174, at para. 163). [120] section 227(4.1), for example, does not fulfill the ordinary requirements of the common law of trusts (see r. j. wood and r. t. g. reeson, “the continuing saga of the statutory deemed trust: royal bank v. tuxedo transportation ltd.” (2000), 15 bflr 515, at pp. 522-24). there is no identifiable trust property and therefore no certainty of subject matter (henfrey, at p 35) to use the terminology in henfrey, s 227(4.1) is not a “true” trust (p 34) moreover, without specific property being transferred to the trust patrimony, s 227(4.1) does not satisfy the requirements of an autonomous patrimony contemplated by the civil code of québec in arts. 1260, 1261 and 1278: see bank of nova scotia v. thibault, 2004 scc 29, [2004] 1 scr 758, at para. 31. [121] this departure from a standard requirement of trust formation — certainty of subject matter — results in at least two features of s 227(4.1) that are at odds with the operation of ordinary trusts. first, through equitable tracing, the beneficiary of a trust can claim appreciation in trust value, but this advantage is impossible without identifiable trust property (rawluk v. rawluk, [1990] 1 scr 70, at pp. 79 and 92-93; foskett v. mckeown, [2001] 1 ac 102 (hl), at pp. 129-31; l. d. smith, the law of tracing (1997), at pp. 347-48). the tracing mechanism in s 227(4.1) provides that the value of any unremitted source deductions continues to survive in the assets remaining in the tax debtor’s hands. section 227(4.1) traces the value of the unremitted source deductions, necessarily capping the crown’s right at that value. in sparrow electric, gonthier j explained that such a tracing mechanism is “antithetical to tracing in the traditional sense, to the extent that it requires no link at all between the subject matter of the trust and the fund or asset which the subject matter is being traced into” (para. 37; see also wood and reeson, at p 518; smith (1997), at pp. 310-20 and 347-48; r. j. wood, “the floating charge in canada” (1989), 27 alta. l. rev. 191, at p 221). [122] while s 227(4.1) gives the crown beneficial ownership in the value of unremitted source deductions, it does not allow the crown to claim more than the value of the source deductions in other words, it gives the crown the right of beneficial ownership without at least some of the advantages that beneficial ownership often entails. [123] second, a trustee cannot normally dispose of trust property in the ordinary course of the trustee’s business section 227(4.1), however, allows the tax debtor to dispose of its property, conveying clear title to property subject to the trust. [124] this was the point made by iacobucci j in first vancouver when he likened the deemed trust in s 227(4.1) to a floating charge. because a floating charge is a security interest, the respondents rely on iacobucci j.’s analogy to argue that s 227(4.1) only creates a security interest as opposed to a proprietary right. i disagree with the respondents’ submission — the limited analogy to a floating charge in that context cannot be relied on in this case to liken the crown’s interest to a security interest for the purposes of the ccaa. [125] one of the issues in first vancouver was whether the deemed trust in s 227(4.1) continued to attach to property that had been sold by the tax debtor to a third-party purchaser for value. the court concluded that, in the event of a sale to a third party, “the trust property is replaced by the proceeds of sale of such property” (para. 40) this is because the deemed trust “does not attach specifically to any particular assets of the tax debtor so as to prevent their sale” and the tax debtor is thereby “free to alienate its property in the ordinary course” (para. 40). in this way, “the deemed trust is in principle similar to a floating charge over all the assets of the tax debtor” (para. 40). as a result, the deemed trust in s 227(4.1) would not override the rights of third-party purchasers for value (para. 44). [126] in short, the deemed trust in s 227(4.1) clearly “anticipate[s] that the character of the tax debtor’s property will change over time” (first vancouver, at para. 41). in making these statements, iacobucci j did not, however, equate the deemed trust in s 227(4.1) to a floating charge for all purposes. otherwise, the trust would not attach until an event of crystallization, and s 227(4.1) clearly contemplates that the trust attaches from the moment source deductions are made or withheld (see s 227(4.1)(a) and (b); see also a. duggan and j. ziegel, “justice iacobucci and the canadian law of deemed trusts and chattel security” (2007), 57 utlj 227, at p 246; wood (1989), at p 195). [127] the court’s limited analogy to a floating charge in first vancouver helps explain why “beneficial ownership” in s 227(4.1) again means something narrower than it does outside of that statutory context. the crown’s right of beneficial ownership does not prevent the trustee from disposing of trust property until the canada revenue agency (cra) enforces the deemed trust (canada revenue agency, tax collections policies (online); see also ita, ss. 222, 223(1) to (3), (5) and (6) and 224(1)). freely disposing of trust property, including for one’s own business purposes, is obviously not something a trustee can do under the common law. [128] the crown’s reliance on s 227(4.1)(b) of the ita is misplaced for similar reasons. that clause specifies that the amount of the unremitted source deductions is deemed to “form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was so deducted or withheld”. the crown argues that this is further clarification that a ccaa judge cannot order a charge over that amount again, the deeming words of s 227(4.1)(b) must be interpreted in the context of a trust without certainty of subject matter. to say that a certain amount does not form part of the debtor’s estate or property reiterates that the crown has an interest in that amount; it also clarifies that the debtor’s interest in its estate is reduced by that amount. however, it does not change the makeup of the estate itself — it does not change the specific property that constitutes the debtor’s estate. so long as the thing that is deemed not to form part of the debtor’s estate or property is an amount or value of money rather than property with a specific subject matter, the debtor’s estate remains unchanged and the debtor continues to have control over it. [129] to conclude, beneficial ownership under s 227(4.1) is a manipulation of the concept of beneficial ownership under ordinary principles of trust law. the logical incoherence of s 227(4.1) has prompted some scholars to criticize the provision as using inappropriate legal concepts. for example, wood and reeson state: . . . we believe that the design of [s 227(4.1) of the ita] is deeply flawed. . . . in large measure, the difficulties have as their source the use of inappropriate legal concepts the concept of a trust is used in the legislation, but in virtually every respect the characteristics of a trust are lacking. the employer is not actually required to hold the money separate and apart, the usual fiduciary obligations of a trustee are absent, and the trust exists without a res. the law of tracing is similarly corrupted. the tracing exercise does not seek to identify a chain of substitutions, and a proprietary claim is available without the need for a proprietary base. the misuse of the trust concept and the perversion of conventional tracing principles empty these concepts of meaning and will pose a threat to the rationality of the law. [footnote omitted; pp. 531-33.] [130] others have similarly commented that, in substance, s 227(4.1) only creates a security interest (j. s. ziegel, “crown priorities, deemed trusts and floating charges: first vancouver finance v. minister of national revenue” (2004), 45 cbr. (4th) 244, at p 248; duggan and ziegel, at pp. 239 and 245-46; m. j. hanlon, v. tickle and e. csiszar, “conflicting case law, competing statutes, and the confounding priority battle of the interim financing charge and the crown’s deemed trust for source deductions”, in j. p. sarra et al., eds., annual review of insolvency law 2018 (2019), 897). [131] similarly, in caisse populaire desjardins de montmagny, this court rejected the crown’s argument that s 222(3) of the excise tax act, rsc 1985, c. e-15 (eta), which is nearly identical to s 227(4.1) of the ita, created a proprietary right in the crown (paras. 20-27). in that case, the debtor companies owed goods and services tax (gst) at the time of their respective bankruptcies. as the crown’s gst claims are unsecured in bankruptcy, the tax authorities took the position that amounts owing up to the date of the bankruptcy were the crown’s property this court unanimously disagreed with that position, concluding that the manner and mechanism of collecting gst was not consistent with a proprietary right (paras. 21-23). [132] in any event, treating s 227(4.1) as only effectively creating a security interest would not resolve the issues in this appeal without reference to how the crown’s interest arises under the ccaa as noted above, broad general characterizations do not help in defining the specific attributes of this deemed trust. this court must grapple with the fact that s 227(4.1) is both structured as a security interest, like a charge, but also uses the mechanism of a deemed trust. [133] the takeaway for this appeal is that the structure of s 227(4.1), on its own, does not shed light on what to do with the crown’s beneficial ownership of unremitted source deductions in the insolvency regimes. although the provision is clear that the crown’s right operates notwithstanding other security interests, the content of that right for the purposes of insolvency cannot be inferred solely from the text of the ita. the unique statutory device manipulates private law concepts and cannot be carried through to a logical conclusion for the purposes of insolvency for this reason, it is not surprising that the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3 (bia) and the ccaa specifically articulate how the deemed trust for unremitted source deductions should be treated. [134] i now turn to that half of the equation: parliament’s insolvency regime. b how is the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions treated in parliament’s insolvency regime? (1) parliament’s insolvency regime [135] there are three main statutes in parliament’s insolvency regime: the ccaa, which is at issue in this appeal, the bia and the winding-up and restructuring act, rsc 1985, c. w-11 (wura) (the wura covers insolvencies of financial institutions and certain other corporations, like insurance companies, and is not relevant to this appeal (s 6(1); 9354-9186 québec inc. v. callidus capital corp., 2020 scc 10, at para. 39)) in century services, deschamps j., writing for the majority, described insolvency as the factual situation that arises when a debtor is unable to pay creditors . certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a debtor to obtain a court order staying its creditors’ enforcement actions and attempt to obtain a binding compromise with creditors to adjust the payment conditions to something more realistic. alternatively, the debtor’s assets may be liquidated and debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules the former is usually referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation. [para. 12] [136] the bia contains both a liquidation regime and a restructuring regime (century services, at paras. 13 and 78) the liquidation regime provides a detailed statutory scheme of distribution whereby the debtor’s assets are liquidated and distributed to creditors in contrast, the restructuring regime allows debtors to make proposals to their creditors for the adjustment and reorganization of debt. the bia is available to debtors, either natural or legal persons, owing $1000 or more (s 43(1)). [137] the ccaa is predominantly a restructuring statute and access is restricted to companies with liabilities in excess of $5 million (s 3(1)) as deschamps j. explained in century services, the purpose of the ccaa is remedial; it provides a means for companies to avoid the devastating social and economic consequences of commercial bankruptcies (paras. 15 and 59, quoting elan corp. v. comiskey (1990), 1 or (3d) 289 (ca), at p 306, per doherty ja, dissenting). liquidations do not only harm creditors, but employees and other stakeholders as well the ccaa permits companies to continue to operate, “preserving the status quo while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all” (century services, at para. 77) in enacting a restructuring statute, parliament recognized that companies have more value as going concerns, especially since they are “key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships” (para. 18). [138] due to its remedial nature, the ccaa is famously skeletal in nature (century services, at paras. 57-62). it does not “contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred” (para. 57, quoting metcalfe & mansfield alternative investments ii corp (re), 2008 onca 587, 92 o.r (3d) 513, at para. 44, per blair ja). under s 11, for example, the court may make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances, subject to the restrictions set out in the act. section 11 has been described as “the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme” (stelco inc. (re) (2005), 75 or (3d) 5 (ca), at para. 36; see also 9354-9186 québec inc., at para. 48). deschamps j observed in century services that these discretionary grants of jurisdiction to the courts have been key in allowing the ccaa to adapt and evolve to meet contemporary business and social needs. although judicial discretion must always be exercised in furtherance of the ccaa’s remedial purpose, it takes many forms and has proven to be flexible, innovative, and necessary (paras. 58-61; us. steel canada inc., re, 2016 onca 662, 402 dlr (4th) 450, at para. 102). [139] this is in contrast to the liquidation regime in the bia, which has slightly different purposes in husky oil operations ltd v minister of national revenue, [1995] 3 scr 453, gonthier j explained that bankruptcy serves two goals: it “ensure[s] the equitable distribution of a bankrupt debtor’s assets among the estate’s creditors inter se [and it ensures] the financial rehabilitation of insolvent individuals” (para. 7; see also 9354-9186 québec inc., at para. 46). similarly, sarra and houlden and morawetz jj describe the purposes of the bia as permitting both “an honest debtor, who has been unfortunate, to secure a discharge so that he or she can make a fresh start and resume his or her place in the business community” and “the orderly and fair distribution of the property of a bankrupt among his or her creditors on a pari passu basis” (the 2020-2021 annotated bankruptcy and insolvency act (2020), at p 2). [140] to realize its goals, the bia is strictly rules-based and has a comprehensive scheme for the liquidation process (century services, at para. 13; husky oil, at para. 85). it “provide[s] an orderly mechanism for the distribution of a debtor’s assets to satisfy creditor claims according to predetermined priority rules” (century services, at para. 15). the bia’s comprehensive nature ensures, among other things, that there is a single proceeding in which creditors are placed on an equal footing and know their rights. it also ensures that, post-discharge, the bankrupt will have enough to live on and can have a fresh start (canada (superintendent of bankruptcy) v 407 etr concession company ltd., 2013 onca 769, 118 o.r (3d) 161, at para. 41) while proposals under the bia’s restructuring regime similarly serve a remedial purpose, “this is achieved through a rules-based mechanism that offers less flexibility” (century services, at para. 15). [141] importantly, the specific goals of restructuring in the ccaa, in contrast to liquidation, result in the introduction of a key player: the interim lender interim financing, previously referred to as debtor-in-possession financing, is a judicially- supervised mechanism whereby an insolvent company is loaned funds for use during and for the purposes of the restructuring process. before the 2009 amendments, there were no statutory provisions on interim financing in the ccaa, but the institution was well-established in the jurisprudence (l. w houlden, g. b morawetz and j. sarra, bankruptcy and insolvency law of canada (4th ed. rev. (loose-leaf)), vol. 4, at n§93; see also century services, at para. 62). the 2009 amendments codified much of the existing jurisprudence, and i discuss the statutory provisions in detail below. [142] interim financing is crucial to the restructuring process. it allows the debtor to continue to operate on a day-to-day basis while a workout solution is being arranged. a plan of compromise would be futile if, in the interim six months, the debtor was forced to close its doors. for this reason, farley j., in royal oak mines inc., re (1999), 7 cbr (4th) 293 (ont. cj (gen. div.)), at para. 1, quoting royal oak mines inc., re (1999), 6 cbr (4th) 314 (ont. cj (gen. div.)), at para. 24, observed that interim financing helps “keep the lights . . . on”. similarly, in indalex, deschamps j explained that giving interim lenders super-priority “is a key aspect of the debtor’s ability to attempt a workout” (para. 59, quoting j. p. sarra, rescue! the companies’ creditors arrangement act (2007), at p 97). without interim financing and the ability to prime (ie, to give it priority) the interim lender’s loan, the remedial purposes of the ccaa can be frustrated (para. 58). [143] with this background in mind, i turn now to consider the treatment of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions in parliament’s insolvency regime. (2) the deemed trust for unremitted source deductions in the bia and ccaa [144] the statutes in this case are all federal statutes. the ita, bia, and ccaa make up a co-existing and harmonious statutory scheme, enacted by one level of government (see, eg,. r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at p 337, on the presumption of coherence). an example of this co-existence is when, in the insolvency regime, parliament modifies entitlements that it otherwise grants the crown outside of insolvency. for example, through s 222(3) of the eta, parliament provides for a statutory deemed trust in favour of the crown for unremitted gst. parliament also renders that deemed trust, which is nearly identical in language to s 227(4.1) of the ita, ineffective in the bia and ccaa (bia, ss. 67(2) and 86(3); ccaa, s 37(1); century services, at paras. 51-56). as i shall explain, parliament also deals specifically with the deemed trust in s 227(4.1) of the ita in the bia and ccaa, albeit in different ways. [145] in the bia, the deemed trust for unremitted source deductions appears in s 67(3). section 67 is under the heading “property of the bankrupt”. section 67(1)(a) excludes property held in trust by the bankrupt from property of the bankrupt that is divisible among creditors. section 67(2) provides that any provincial or federal deemed trust in favour of the crown does not qualify as a trust under s 67(1)(a) unless it would qualify as a trust absent the deeming provision (in other words, unless it would qualify as a common law or true trust) (see caisse populaire desjardins de montmagny, at para. 15; urbancorp cumberland 2 gp inc. (re), 2020 onca 197, 444 dlr (4th) 273, at paras. 32-33). section 67(3) states that s 67(2) does not apply in respect of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions under the ita, cpp or eia. thus, while s 67(2) provides in general terms an exception to s 67(1)(a), that exception does not apply to the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions by virtue of s 67(3). [146] the result of this scheme is that the debtor’s estate — to the extent of the unremitted source deductions — is not “property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors” (bia, s 67(1)) for the purposes of the bia’s liquidation regime, it is effectively the crown’s property. together, ss. 67(1)(a) and 67(3) give content to the crown’s right of beneficial ownership under s 227(4.1) of the ita: the amount of the unremitted source deductions is taken out of the pool of money that is distributed to creditors in a bia liquidation. [147] in the ccaa, the crown’s deemed trust appears in ss. 37(2) and 6(3), alongside other deemed trusts and devices section 37(2) explicitly preserves the operation of s 227(4.1) in ccaa proceedings: 37 (1) subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for her majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for her majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision. (2) subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the income tax act, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the canada pension plan or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the employment insurance act (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a “federal provision”), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to her majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if (a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the income tax act and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the income tax act, or (b) the province is a province providing a comprehensive pension plan as defined in subsection 3(1) of the canada pension plan, that law of the province establishes a provincial pension plan as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the canada pension plan, and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, despite any act of canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision. [148] due to this language, the court in century services variously described the s 227(4.1) trust as “surviv[ing]”, “continu[ing]”, and “remain[ing] effective” in the ccca (see paras. 38, 45, 49, 53 and 79). the crown relies on these observations to argue that the deemed trust remains fully intact in the ccaa, conferring a proprietary right on the crown that cannot be subordinated to any other party. [149] in my view, the crown’s submission overextends the analysis in century services. the issue in that case was whether the deemed trust under s 222(3) of the eta for unremitted gst was effective in the ccaa. as mentioned, s 222(3) is almost identical in wording to s 227(4.1) of the ita, providing that the deemed trust extends to property of the tax debtor equal in value to the amount of the unremitted gst and extends to property otherwise held by a secured creditor pursuant to a security interest. section 222(3) of the eta also provides that the deemed trust operates despite any other enactment of canada, except the bia. thus, under the bia, the crown priority for unremitted gst is lost. however, under the ccaa, s 37(1) provides that statutory deemed trusts in favour of the crown should not be regarded as trusts unless they would qualify as trusts absent the deeming language. the court in century services grappled with the apparent conflict between s 222(3) of the eta and s 37(1) (then s 18.3(1)) of the ccaa. [150] a majority of the court reasoned that, through statutory interpretation, the apparent conflict could be resolved in favour of the ccaa (century services, at para. 44) parliament had shown a tendency to move away from asserting crown priority in insolvency. under both the bia and ccaa, it had enacted a general rule that deemed trusts in favour of the crown are ineffective in insolvency. it had also explicitly carved out an exception to that general rule for unremitted source deductions. the logic of the ccaa suggested that only the deemed trust for unremitted source deductions survived (paras. 45-46). [151] thus, while the court emphasized that the deemed trust in s 227(4.1) “survives” in the ccaa, it did not comment on how it survives. this court has never considered the scope of the deemed trust under the ccaa, especially in light of the purposes of the ccaa and the equivocal nature of the beneficial ownership conferred through the deeming provision. for this appeal, it is necessary to probe into ss. 37(2) and 6(3) to determine how the ccaa construes the crown’s right to unremitted source deductions. [152] to that end, although s 37(2) of the ccaa is almost identical to s 67(3) of the bia, it does not have the same effect because it is not nested under a provision like s 67(1)(a). section 37(2) of the ccaa carves out an exception to s 37(1), which is different from s 67(1)(a). while s 67(1)(a) excludes trust property from property of the bankrupt divisible among creditors, s 37(1) only provides that “property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for her majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision”. unlike the bia, the ccaa is silent on how trust property should be treated and silent on what constitutes property of the debtor in a restructuring context — indeed, there is no definition of property in the ccaa at all. this is in keeping with the ccaa’s comparatively skeletal nature. [153] the result is that s 37(2) provides that the crown continues to beneficially own the debtor’s property equal in value to the unremitted source deductions; the unremitted source deductions “shall . . be regarded as being held in trust for her majesty” however, although this signals that, unlike deemed trusts captured by s 37(1), the crown’s deemed trust continues and confers a stronger right, s 37(2) does not explain what to do with that right for the purposes of a ccaa proceeding. it does not, for example, provide that trust property should be put aside, as it would be in the bia context. in keeping with the ccaa’s flexibility, s 37(2) says little about what the crown’s unique right of beneficial ownership under s 227(4.1) of the ita requires. but as i shall explain, s 11 gives the court broad discretion to consider and give effect to the crown’s interest recognized in s 37(2). [154] in addition, s 6(3) of the ccaa gives specific effect to the crown’s right under the deemed trust under that provision, the court cannot sanction a plan of compromise unless it pays the crown in full for unremitted source deductions within six months of the plan’s sanction (assuming the crown does not agree otherwise): (3) unless her majesty agrees otherwise, the court may sanction a compromise or arrangement only if the compromise or arrangement provides for the payment in full to her majesty in right of canada or a province, within six months after court sanction of the compromise or arrangement, of all amounts that were outstanding at the time of the application for an order under section 11 or 11.02 and that are of a kind that could be subject to a demand under (a) subsection 224(1.2) of the income tax act . [155] pursuant to s 6(3), then, the crown’s right under s 227(4.1) includes a right not to have to compromise. the crown can demand to be paid in full under the plan “in priority to all . . . security interests”. the right is therefore different in kind than a security interest. while there may be some risk to the crown that the plan may fail, and the crown may not be paid in full if the restructuring dissolves into liquidation and the estate is depleted in the interim, the ccaa recognizes that there is societal value in helping a company remain a going concern. this remedial goal is at the forefront of providing flexibility in preserving the crown’s right to unremitted source deductions in s 37(2), and in giving a concrete effect to that right in s 6(3) of the ccaa. [156] in my view, the reason for this difference between the bia and ccaa is straightforward. the purpose of a bia liquidation is to give the debtor a fresh start and pay out creditors to the extent possible the debtor’s property has to be divided according to the statute’s rigid priority scheme. to begin the process of distribution, it is necessary to pool together the debtor’s funds and determine what is, and is not, available for creditors a comprehensive definition of property of the debtor is necessary, and no flexibility is needed in the regime to facilitate the liquidation process. there is also no other overarching goal, like facilitating the debtor’s restructuring, that requires an institution like interim financing or requires modifying entitlements. [157] in a restructuring proceeding under the ccaa, however, there is no rigid formula for the division of assets. certain debt might be restructured; other debt might be paid out. when a debtor’s restructuring is on the table, the goal pivots, and interim financing is introduced to facilitate the restructuring. entitlements and priorities shift to accommodate the presence of the interim lender — a new and necessary player who is absent from the liquidation scene. [158] the fact that the crown’s right under s 227(4.1) of the ita is treated differently between the two statutes is therefore consistent with the different schemes and purposes of the acts. this is not a circumstance where parliament attempted to harmonize entitlements across the regimes (see, eg,. indalex, at para. 51, per deschamps j.) the ccaa gives the deemed trust meaning for its purposes the concrete meaning given is that a plan of compromise must pay the crown in full within six months of approval. c. do sections 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa permit the court to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions? [159] in this case, the initial order subordinated the crown’s deemed trust to the priming charges. the courts below found that this authority is derived from ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa, which allow the court to order priming charges over a company’s property in favour of interim lenders, directors and officers, and estate administrators priming charges can rank ahead of any other secured claim for example, the relevant portions of s 11.2, which are substantially similar to the relevant portions of ss. 11.51 and 11.52, read as follows: 11.2 (1) on application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company’s property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement the security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made. (2) the court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company. [160] as priming charges can “rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor”, the definition of “secured creditor” in s 2(1) is key: secured creditor means a holder of a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, all or any property of a debtor company as security for indebtedness of the debtor company, or a holder of any bond of a debtor company secured by a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, or a trust in respect of, all or any property of the debtor company, whether the holder or beneficiary is resident or domiciled within or outside canada, and a trustee under any trust deed or other instrument securing any of those bonds shall be deemed to be a secured creditor for all purposes of this act except for the purpose of voting at a creditors’ meeting in respect of any of those bonds . [161] the respondents submit, in line with the courts below, that the crown is a “secured creditor” under the ccaa in respect of its interest in unremitted source deductions because the enabling statute, the ita, itself defines the holder of a deemed trust as holding a “security interest” (see temple city housing inc., re, 2007 abqb 786, 42 cbr (5th) 274). the respondents also rely on the analogy in first vancouver likening the crown’s deemed trust to a floating charge (which is a security interest). accordingly, the respondents argue that ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 give the court authority to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust. [162] the crown, like the dissent at the court of appeal, argues that the crown is not a “secured creditor” because the definition of “secured creditor” in the ccaa does not list the holder of a deemed trust and because ss. 37 to 39 of the ccaa clearly draw a distinction between the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions, on the one hand, and the crown’s secured and unsecured claims on the other. accordingly, the crown argues that ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 do not give the court authority to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust. [163] as i shall detail, i conclude that ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 do not give the court the authority to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions. [164] first, i agree with the respondents that the general definition of security interest under the ita includes the holder of a deemed or actual trust (s 224(13)). however the reference to security interest in s 227(4.1) is not to the crown’s interest but to others’ interest in the debtor’s property. in my view, any definition of security interest in the ita is not relevant to defining the crown’s interest since it serves an entirely different purpose. what matters is whether the ccaa provisions give the court authority to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions. this is determined by interpreting the words of the ccaa and how the ccaa defines secured creditor. [165] i also agree with the crown that the definition of “secured creditor” in the ccaa does not specifically list the holder of a deemed or actual trust. in addition, the crown’s interest cannot simply be called a “charge”. as explained above, although the crown’s deemed trust has some parallels with a floating charge, the provision also employs some aspects of beneficial ownership. i would also hesitate to draw analogies with any of the other terms listed in the ccaa definition. the holders of several of these instruments are often described as having proprietary rights in their security. it was a legislative choice to define them as secured creditors for the purposes of the ccaa it is difficult to shoehorn the crown’s deemed trust into the definition of “secured creditor” in the ccaa, particularly as the ccaa specifically refers to the deemed trust in s 37(2). [166] moreover, i agree with the crown that ss. 37 to 39 of the ccaa treat the crown’s deemed trust and the crown’s secured claims as distinct interests. after s 37 of the ccaa, dealing with deemed trusts, s 38(1) provides a general rule that secured claims of the crown rank as unsecured claims. section 38(2) contains an exemption from s 38(1) for consensual security interests that are granted to the crown. section 38(3) contains an exemption for the cra’s enhanced requirement to pay. finally, s 39(1) preserves the crown’s secured creditor status if it registers before the commencement of a ccaa proceeding, and s 39(2) subordinates a crown security or charge to prior perfected security interests. [167] as wood notes, “these provisions adopt two distinct approaches — one that applies to a deemed trust, the other that applies when a statute gives the crown the status of a secured creditor” (wood (2020), at p 96). if s 227(4.1) of the ita gave the crown the status of a secured creditor, then the cra would presumably need to comply with ss. 38 and 39 by registering its security interest. no one suggests that the crown has to register its claim for unremitted source deductions. in my view, ss. 37 to 39 draw a distinction between deemed trusts on the one hand and secured and unsecured claims on the other, and the crown is not, therefore, a “secured creditor” under the ccaa for its right to unremitted source deductions. [168] this is dispositive for the purposes of ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the ccaa. these sections do not give the court the authority to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions. d does section 11 of the ccaa allow the court to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions? [169] the remaining issue is whether another provision in the ccaa, namely s 11, confers that jurisdiction. as noted above, s 11 allows the court to make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances, subject to the restrictions set out in the act: 11 despite anything in the bankruptcy and insolvency act or the winding- up and restructuring act, if an application is made under this act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances. [170] in 9354-9186 québec inc., this court explained that the discretionary authority in s 11 is broad, but not boundless (para. 49) there are three “baseline considerations”: (1) the order sought must be appropriate; (2) the applicant must be acting in good faith; and (3) the applicant must demonstrate due diligence (century services, at para. 70; 9354-9186 québec inc., at para. 49). appropriateness is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the remedial objectives of the ccaa. the general language of s 11 should not, however, be “restricted by the availability of more specific orders” (century services, at para. 70). [171] in keeping with its broad language, s 11 of the ccaa has been used to make a wide array of orders. most recently, for example, this court clarified that it can be used to bar a creditor from voting on a plan where the creditor has acted for an improper purpose (9354-9186 québec inc., at paras. 56 and 66). [172] the issue in this case is whether s 11 can be used to rank an interim lender’s loan, or other priming charge, ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions. in my view, it can, for two reasons. [173] first, given my conclusion about the content of the crown’s right under s 227(4.1) of the ita for the purposes of the ccaa (requiring that it at least be paid in full under a plan of compromise), ranking a priming charge ahead of the crown’s deemed trust does not conflict with the ita provision. so long as the crown is paid in full under a plan of compromise, the crown’s right under s 227(4.1) remains intact “notwithstanding any security interest” in the amount of the unremitted source deductions. for this reason, it is irrelevant whether a priming charge under ss. 11, 11.2, 11.51 or 11.52 of the ccaa is a “security interest” within the meaning of s 227(4) and (4.1) of the ita. the analysis above does not depend on finding that a priming charge is not captured within the ita definition. [174] in addition, depending on the circumstances, such an order may further the remedial objectives of the ccaa. for example, interim financing is often crucial to the restructuring process if there is evidence that interim lending cannot be obtained without ranking the interim loan ahead of the crown’s deemed trust, such an order could, again depending on the circumstances, further the remedial objectives of the ccaa. in general, the court should have flexibility to order super-priority charges in favour of parties whose function is to facilitate the proposal of a plan of compromise that, in any event, will be required to pay the crown in full. [175] second, i do not accept the crown’s argument that s 11 is unavailable because other ccaa provisions, namely ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52, confer more specific jurisdiction (see 9354-9186 québec inc., at paras. 67-68). [176] while i agree that s 11 is restricted by the provisions set out in the ccaa and cannot be used to violate specific provisions in the act, s 11 is not “restricted by the availability of more specific orders”. the fact that specific provisions of the ccaa allow the court to rank priming charges ahead of a secured creditor does not mean that the court can only rank priming charges ahead of a secured creditor such an interpretation would amount to reading words into ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52 that do not exist. an order that ranks a priming charge ahead of the beneficiary of the deemed trust is different in kind than the orders contemplated by ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52, which contemplate the subordination of secured creditors. there is no provision in the ccaa stipulating what the court can do with trust property and no provision in the ccaa conferring more specific jurisdiction on whether a priming charge can rank ahead of the beneficiary of a deemed trust so long as the order does not conflict with other provisions in the act, namely ss. 37(2) and 6(3), and so long as it fulfills the “baseline considerations” of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence, an order ranking a priming charge ahead of the crown’s deemed trust would fall under the jurisdiction conferred by s 11 (century services, at para. 70; 9354-9186 québec inc., at para. 49). as explained above, there would be no conflict with ss. 37(2) and 6(3) of the ccaa. [177] both parties invoked policy concerns to assist in the interpretative exercise. i do not find it necessary to resort to such arguments. however, it is far from evident that interim lending would simply end if the crown’s deemed trust had super-priority in an appropriate case it is also far from evident that the crown would suffer significantly if the priming charges had super-priority in an appropriate case, given the existence of s 6(3) of the ccaa requiring full payment, and the crown’s favourable treatment in the bia liquidation regime in the event the restructuring failed. what is clear is that interim lending is crucial to the restructuring process, and the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions is crucial to tax collection. it will be up to the ccaa judge to weigh and balance the moving pieces. [178] to that end, s 11 of the ccaa gives the court discretion and flexibility to weigh several considerations in ranking a priming charge ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions. it requires the court to take a focused look at the specific facts of a case to determine whether such an order is necessary and appropriate. where relevant, the court will consider the crown’s interest in the deemed trust as a result of s 37(2). courts may no doubt look to the factors already listed in s 11.2(4) — the likely duration of ccaa proceedings, plans for managing the company during those proceedings, views of the company’s major creditors and the monitor, and the company’s ability to benefit from interim financing, among others — for guidance. section 11.2(4) of the ccaa states: (4) in deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things, (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this act; (b) how the company’s business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings; (c) whether the company’s management has the confidence of its major creditors; (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company; (e) the nature and value of the company’s property; (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and (g) the monitor’s report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any. [179] in addition, it seems to me that courts may consider:  whether the interim lender has indicated, in good faith, that it will not lend to the debtor without ranking ahead of the crown’s deemed trust;  the relative amounts of the interim loan and the unremitted source deductions (if the amount of the unremitted source deductions is a small fraction of the amount of the interim loan, the interim lender may not be significantly prejudiced without super-priority);  whether, and for how long, the crown allowed source deductions to go unremitted without taking action (see, eg,. hanlon, tickle and csiszar); and  finally, the prospects of success of a restructuring; and whether the ccaa is likely to be used to sell the debtor’s assets. [180] finally, different considerations will apply if a court is considering ranking a different party’s charge, like the monitor’s or directors’ charge, ahead of the crown’s deemed trust. vii conclusion [181] i would dismiss the appeal and clarify that the authority to rank priming charges ahead of the crown’s deemed trust for unremitted source deductions is derived from s 11 of the ccaa rather than ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 1152. the crown’s interest under s 227(4.1) of the ita is a deemed trust interest, but beneficial ownership of deemed trust property is a manipulation of private law concepts, without settled meaning accordingly, the specific nature of beneficial ownership of deemed trust property must be determined in the relevant context in which it is asserted. here, the crown’s right to unremitted source deductions in a ccaa restructuring is protected by both ss. 37(2) and 6(3) the former is flexible, requiring the crown’s deemed trust property to be considered when appropriate under the act; the latter specifically requires that a plan of compromise provide for payment in full of the crown’s deemed trust claims within six months of the plan’s approval. the crown’s right differs under the bia, in keeping with the different goals and schemes of liquidation and restructuring. given the content of the crown’s right to unremitted source deductions in a ccaa restructuring, there is no conflict between s 227(4.1) of the ita and s 11 of the ccaa. the schemes of both federal acts can be harmonized and the objectives of both statutes furthered. [182] the respondents will have their costs in accordance with the tariff of fees and disbursements set out in schedule b of the rules of the supreme court of canada, sor/2002-156. the reasons of abella, brown and rowe jj. were delivered by brown and rowe jj. — i. overview [183] at issue in this appeal is whether the crown’s deemed trust claim for unremitted source deductions under s 227(4) and (4.1) of the income tax act, rsc. 1985, c 1 (5th supp.) (“ita”), s 23(3) and (4) of the canada pension plan, rsc. 1985, c. c-8 (“cpp”), and ss. 23(4) and 86(2) and (2.1) of the employment insurance act, sc 1996, c 23 (“eia”) (collectively, the “fiscal statutes”), have priority over court-ordered priming charges under the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36 (“ccaa”). [184] the present iteration of the deemed trust provision, s 227(4.1) of the ita, was the result of a 1997 amendment enacted by parliament directly in response to this court’s interpretation of the provision’s predecessor in royal bank of canada v. sparrow electric corp., [1997] 1 scr 411 (department of finance canada, unremitted source deductions and unpaid gst (april 7, 1997)). that provision was itself the result of several amendments, beginning in 1942, with the amendment introducing the deemed trust in s 92(6) and (7) of the income war tax act, rsc. 1927, c 97 (previously sc 1917, c 28) (an act to amend the income war tax act, sc 1942-43, c 28, s 31). the provision and the historical amendments demonstrate parliament’s intention to safeguard its ability to collect employee source deductions under the relevant statutes, in priority to all other claims against a debtor’s property. [185] the crown appeals from the decision of the court of appeal of alberta which, like the chambers judge, held that the ccaa court could subordinate the deemed trust claims under the fiscal statutes to the priming charges (2019 abca 314, 93 alta. l.r 29, aff’g 2017 abqb 550, 60 alta l.r (6th) 103) having examined the pertinent provisions of the fiscal statutes, and for the reasons that follow, we find ourselves in respectful disagreement with that conclusion, and prefer the view of the dissenting judge, wakeling j.a the crown’s deemed trust claims under the fiscal statutes have ultimate priority and cannot be subordinated by priming charges. [186] in our view, the text of the impugned provisions in the fiscal statutes is clear: the crown’s deemed trust operates “[n]otwithstanding . . . any other enactment of canada” (ita, s 227(41))2. parliament used unequivocal language ⸺ indeed, the very language suggested by this court in sparrow electric ⸺ to give ultimate priority to the crown’s claim further, and again in clear and unequivocal text, parliament imposed limits on the broad grant of authority by which a court can prioritize priming charges, thereby making plain the superiority of deemed trust claims finally, no provision of the ccaa is rendered meaningless by this interpretation. unlike in other contexts such as the legislative scheme governing the gst/hst, parliament has left no room for subordinating the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes in pursuit of other legislative objectives. we would, therefore, allow the appeal. ii analysis a general comments on the nature of the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes [187] the deemed trust created by the ita is an essential instrument to collect source deductions (first vancouver finance v. mnr, 2002 scc 49, [2002] 2 scr. 720, at para. 22). the ita grants special priority to the crown to collect unremitted source deductions, reflecting its status as an “involuntary creditor” (first vancouver, at para. 23). [188] section 227(4) and (4.1) of the ita reads: 2 the wording of the deemed trust provisions in the relevant provisions of the fiscal statutes is materially identical. this decision focuses on the deemed trusts in s 227(4) and (4.1) of the ita. the reasoning herein, however, applies with equal force to each of the other statutes. (4) every person who deducts or withholds an amount under this act is deemed, notwithstanding any security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) in the amount so deducted or withheld, to hold the amount separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for the security interest would be property of the person, in trust for her majesty and for payment to her majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this act. (4.1) notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the bankruptcy and insolvency act (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that act), any other enactment of canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for her majesty is not paid to her majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this act, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for a security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed (a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for her majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, and (b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was so deducted or withheld, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest and is property beneficially owned by her majesty notwithstanding any security interest in such property and in the proceeds thereof, and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the receiver general in priority to all such security interests. [189] these sections describe two relevant events first, at the time of the deduction, a trust is deemed in favour of the crown, binding every person (the “tax debtor”) who collects source deductions in the amount withheld until the person remits the source deductions (ita, s 227(4)). section 227(4) deems the tax debtor to hold the source deductions “separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person”. [190] the second event occurs where the tax debtor has failed to remit the source deductions in accordance with the manner and time provided by the ita section 227(4.1) extends the deemed trust to all “property of the person and property held by any secured creditor . . . equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust”. this is achieved by deeming the source deductions to be held “in trust for her majesty” from the moment the amount was “deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person”. parliament further provided that the unremitted source deductions under the fiscal statutes “form no part of the estate or property of the person” from the time of deduction or withholding, and is “property beneficially owned by her majesty notwithstanding any security interest in such property and in the proceeds thereof, and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the receiver general in priority to all such security interests”. [191] this court has held that the deemed trust is a “creatur[e] of statute” and “is not in truth a real [trust], as the subject matter of the trust cannot be identified from the date of creation of the trust” (sparrow electric, at para. 31, per gonthier j., citing d. w. m. waters, law of trusts in canada (2nd ed. 1984), at p 117, and adopted in first vancouver, at para. 37) this statement fuelled a debate in this appeal about whether the deemed trust is a security interest or a proprietary interest, with the respondents arguing that the crown cannot hold a proprietary interest in the debtor’s property because there is a lack of certainty in the subject matter. [192] we agree with each of our colleagues justices karakatsanis and côté that the deemed trust is not a “true” trust and that it does not confer an ownership interest or the rights of a beneficiary on the crown as they are understood at common law or within the meaning of the civil code of québec (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at paras. 119-20; côté j.’s reasons, at paras. 43 and 49) respectfully, however, our colleagues miss the point of the deemed quality of the trust. the matters of a property interest, certainty of subject matter and autonomous patrimony that arise from attempts to describe the operation of the deemed trust are entirely irrelevant and do not assist in deciding this appeal, nor in understanding parliament’s intent. the deemed trust is a legal fiction, with sui generis characteristics that are described in s 227(4) and (4.1) of the ita as noted in first vancouver, at para. 34, “it is open to parliament to characterize the trust in whatever way it chooses; it is not bound by restraints imposed by ordinary principles of trust law” while first vancouver considered the contrast between a statutory trust and a common law trust, the same applies to our colleague côté j.’s reference to the civil code (canada (attorney general) v. caisse populaire d’amos, 2004 fca 92, 324 n.r 31, at para. 49) what matters here is not the characterization of the deemed trust that is at issue, but its operation and as we explain, it operates to give the crown a statutory right of access to the debtor’s property to the extent of its corpus and a right to be paid in priority to all security interests. [193] further, no concerns regarding certainty of subject matter or autonomous patrimony arise here. it is of course true that, in common law canada, for a trust to come into existence there must be certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter, and certainty of object (d. w. m. waters, m. r. gillen and l. d. smith, eds., waters’ law of trusts in canada (4th ed. 2012), at p 140; e. e. gillese, the law of trusts (3rd ed 2014), at p 41) similarly, under the quebec civil law, “[t]hree requirements must . . . be met in order for a trust to be constituted: property must be transferred from an individual’s patrimony to another patrimony by appropriation; the property must be appropriated to a particular purpose; and the trustee must accept the property” (bank of nova scotia v. thibault, 2004 scc 29, [2004] 1 scr 758, at para. 31). and, again, it is also true that the subject matter of the deemed trust under s 227(4.1) cannot be identified from the date of creation of the trust and does not constitute an autonomous patrimony to which specific property is transferred. [194] but again, none of this remotely matters here. statutory text, not ordinary principles of trust law, determines the nature of, and rights conferred by, deemed trusts (first vancouver, at para. 34). and this court has recognized that parliament, through the trust deemed by s 227(4.1) of the ita, has “revitaliz[ed] the trust whose subject matter has lost all identity” (sparrow electric, at para. 31, per gonthier j., adopted in first vancouver, at para. 37). this is because the subject matter of the deemed trust is ascertained ex post facto, corresponding to the property of the tax debtor and property held by any secured creditor equal in value to the amount deemed to be held in trust by s 227(4) that, but for the security interest, would be property of the tax debtor. in short, the subject matter is whatever assets the employer then has from which to realize the original trust debt. hence iacobucci j.’s description in first vancouver of the operation of s 227(4.1) as “similar in principle to a floating charge” (para. 4). parliament also circumvented the traditional requirements of the civil code for constituting a trust by requiring the amount of the unremitted source deductions to be held “separate and apart from the property of the [debtor]” and to “form no part of the estate [patrimoine, in the french version] or property of the [debtor]” (s 227(41)). [195] in short, the requirements of “true” trusts of civil and common law are irrelevant to ascertaining the operation of a statutorily deemed trust. parliament did not legislate a “true” trust instead, it legislated a deeming provision which “artificially imports into a word or an expression an additional meaning which they would not otherwise convey beside the normal meaning which they retain where they are used” (r v. verrette, [1978] 2 scr 838, at p 845). [196] on this point, and contrary to the view of the majority at the court of appeal, iacobucci j did not hold that the deemed trust is a floating charge ⸺ nor that it was “of the same nature” (côté j.’s reasons, at para. 51) ⸺ but rather that it operated similarly, by permitting a debtor in the interim to alienate property in the normal course of business. they are distinct legal concepts; whereas the deemed trust takes “priority over existing and future security interests”, a floating charge would be overridden by a subsequent fixed charge (toronto-dominion bank v. canada, 2020 fca 80, [2020] 3 fcr 201, at para. 62; see also first vancouver, at para. 28). [197] significantly, the s 227(4.1) deemed trust does not encompass the whole of the tax debtor’s interest in property, but only the amount deemed to be held in trust by s 227(4). but this does not mean the crown cannot have a property interest in the debtor’s property. it merely limits that interest to the extent of the unremitted source deductions. this makes sense. the crown may collect only what it is owed. b. the deemed trust under the fiscal statutes have absolute priority over all other claims in ccaa proceedings [198] the text, context, and purpose of s 227(4.1) of the ita support the conclusion that s 227(4.1) of the ita and the related deemed trust provisions under the fiscal statutes bear only one plausible interpretation: the crown’s deemed trust enjoys priority over all other claims, including priming charges granted under the ccaa. parliament’s intention when it amended and expanded s 227(4) and (4.1) of the ita was clear and unmistakable. (1) the deemed trusts apply notwithstanding the provisions of the ccaa (a) text of the fiscal statutes [199] the text of s 227(4.1) of the ita is determinative: the crown’s deemed trust claim enjoys superior priority over all “security interests”, including priming charges under the ccaa. the amount subject to the deemed trusts is deemed “to be held . . . separate and apart from the property of the person” and “to form no part of the estate or property of the person”. it is “beneficially owned by her majesty”, and the “proceeds of such property shall be paid . . . in priority to all such security interests”. the crown’s right pursuant to its deemed trust is clear: it is a right to be paid in priority to all security interests. [200] parliament granted this unassailable priority by employing the unequivocal language of “[n]otwithstanding any . . enactment of canada” this is a “blanket paramountcy clause”; it prevails over all other statutes (p. salembier, legal and legislative drafting (2nd ed. 2018), at p 385). no similar “notwithstanding” provision appears in the ccaa, subordinating the claims under the deemed trusts of the fiscal statues to priming charges. indeed, it is quite the opposite: unlike most deemed trusts which are nullified in ccaa proceedings by the operation of s 37(1) of the ccaa, s 37(2) preserves the deemed trusts of the fiscal statutes this distinguishes the deemed trust at issue here from those discussed in century services inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2010 scc 60, [2010] 3 scr 379, which were nullified by the operation of what is now s 37(1) deschamps j repeatedly contrasted the different deemed trusts and specified that “the crown’s deemed trust and corresponding priority in source deductions remain effective both in reorganization and in bankruptcy” (para. 38). the ita and ccaa thus operate without conflict. (b) legislative predecessor provisions [201] the predecessor provisions of a statutory provision form part of the “entire context” in which it must be interpreted (merk v. international association of bridge, structural, ornamental and reinforcing iron workers, local 771, 2005 scc 70, [2005] 3 scr 425, at para. 28). and here, it confirms that, by enacting s 227(4.1) of the ita, parliament intended for the deemed trusts arising from the fiscal statutes to have absolute priority over all secured creditors, as defined in s 224(1.3) of the ita. [202] as already noted, parliament amended s 227(4.1) of the ita to its current form in response to this court’s decision in sparrow electric. in sparrow electric, both royal bank and the minister claimed priority to the proceeds from the tax debtor’s property. this court held that the bank had priority since the inventory was subject to the bank’s security before the deemed trust arose in reaching this conclusion, iacobucci j invited parliament to grant absolute priority to the crown, and showed how this could be achieved: i wish to emphasize that it is open to parliament to step in and assign absolute priority to the deemed trust. a clear illustration of how this might be done is afforded by s 224(1.2) ita, which vests certain moneys in the crown “notwithstanding any security interest in those moneys” and provides that they “shall be paid to the receiver general in priority to any such security interest”. all that is needed to effect the desired result is clear language of that kind in the absence of such clear language, judicial innovation is undesirable, both because the issue is policy charged and because a legislative mandate is apt to be clearer than a rule whose precise bounds will become fixed only as a result of expensive and lengthy litigation. [emphasis added; para. 112.] [203] parliament proceeded to do just that it amended the fiscal statutes to reinforce its priority. the press release accompanying the amendments stated that the objective of the amendments was to “assert the absolute priority of the crown’s claim [for] unremitted source deductions [and to] ensure that tax revenue losses are minimised and that delinquent taxpayers and their secured creditors do not benefit from failures to remit source deductions and gst at the expense of the crown” (department of finance canada, at p 1 (emphasis added)). [204] the purpose of these amendments was described by iacobucci j for this court in first vancouver. it was, he recognized, to grant priority to the deemed trusts and ensure the crown’s claim prevails over secured creditors, irrespective of when the security interest arose (paras. 28-29). “it is evident from these changes” he added, “that parliament has made a concerted effort to broaden and strengthen the deemed trust in order to facilitate the collection efforts of the minister” (para. 29) parliament’s intention could not have been clearer. [205] indeed, our colleagues’ view to the contrary leaves us wondering: if the all-encompassing scope of the notwithstanding clause of s 227(4.1) of the ita is insufficient to prevail over the priming charges, what language would possibly be sufficient? courts must give proper effect to parliament’s plain statutory direction, and not strain to subvert it on the basis that parliament’s categorical language or “basket clause” did not itemize a particular security interest. (2) the priming charges are “security interests” within the meaning of the fiscal statutes [206] the priming charge provisions in ss. 11.2(1), 11.51(1) and 11.52(1) of the ccaa allow the supervising court to “make an order declaring that all or part of the company’s property is subject to a security or charge” (“charge ou sûreté” in the french version). this does not, however, prevail over the deemed trust created by s 227(4.1) of the ita, which provides that the unpaid amounts of the deemed trust for source deductions have priority over all “security interests” that term is defined by s 224(1.3) of the ita as follows: security interest means any interest in, or for civil law any right in, property that secures payment or performance of an obligation and includes an interest, or for civil law a right, created by or arising out of a debenture, mortgage, hypothec, lien, pledge, charge, deemed or actual trust, assignment or encumbrance of any kind whatever, however or whenever arising, created, deemed to arise or otherwise provided for . (garantie) this makes clear that a “security interest” includes a “charge” (a “sûreté” in the french version). further, ss. 11.2(1), 11.51(1) and 11.52(1) of the ccaa describe the priming charges as a “security or charge” there can be no doubt, therefore, that priming charges under the ccaa are security interests under the ita. [207] even were this insufficient, the definition of “security interest” in s 224(1.3) of the ita is sufficiently expansive to capture ccaa priming charges. the word “includes”, and the categorical language of “encumbrance of any kind whatever, however or whenever arising, created, deemed to arise or otherwise provided for” could not be any more expansive. as professor sullivan explains, “the purpose of a list of examples following the word ‘including’ is normally to emphasize the broad range of general language and to ensure that it is not inappropriately read down so as to exclude something that is meant to be included” (sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at para. 439). [208] this court has already recognized, in caisse populaire desjardins de l’est de drummond v. canada, 2009 scc 29, [2009] 2 scr 94, that parliament chose “an expansive definition of ‘security interest’ . . . in order to enable maximum recovery by the crown” (para. 14), such that it captures any interest in the property of the debtor that secures payment or performance of an obligation: in order to constitute a security interest for the purposes of s 227(4.1) ita and s 86(2.1) eia, the creditor must hold “any interest in property that secures payment or performance of an obligation” the definition of “security interest” in s 224(1.3) ita does not require that the agreement between the creditor and debtor take any particular form, nor is any particular form expressly excluded. so long as the creditor’s interest in the debtor’s property secures payment or performance of an obligation, there is a “security interest” within the meaning of this section. while parliament has provided a list of “included” examples, these examples do not diminish the broad scope of the words “any interest in property” . . . [emphasis added; para. 15.] in that case, rothstein j held for the court that a contract providing a right to compensation (or set-off at common law) could constitute a “security interest” under s 224(1.3) of the ita, despite that it was not enumerated in the definition and that it is not traditionally understood as such (paras. 37-40). [209] for all these reasons, the priming charges fall under the definition of “security interest”, because they are “interest[s] in the debtor’s property [that] secur[e] payment or performance of an obligation”, ie the payment of the monitor, the interim lender, and directors consequently, the crown’s interest under the trust deemed created by s 227(4.1) of the ita enjoys priority over the priming charges. [210] our colleague côté j., however, sees the matter differently in our respectful view, she disregards this court’s authoritative statement of the law in caisse populaire desjardins de l’est de drummond. specifically, she concludes that priming charges are not “security interests” under the ita because “[c]ourt-ordered charges are unlike conventional consensual and non-consensual security interests in that they are integrally connected to insolvency proceedings that operate for the benefit of the creditors as a group” (côté j.’s reasons, at para. 62 (emphasis deleted), quoting r. j. wood, “irresistible force meets immovable object: canada v canada north group inc.” (2020), 63 can bus l.j 85, at p 98) with respect, nothing in the definition of security interest in the ita precludes the inclusion of an interest that is designed to operate to the benefit of all creditors. [211] further, and irrespective of the nature of ccaa proceedings, our colleague’s conclusion is irreconcilable with this court’s holding in caisse populaire desjardins de l’est de drummond and with the “expansive definition” parliament adopted to maximize recovery (caisse populaire desjardins de l’est de drummond, at para. 14). the fact that the instrument is court-ordered and is for the presumed benefit of all creditors is irrelevant. it does not affect the nature of the priming charges — to secure the payment of an obligation — which is the only relevant criterion (para. 15). as for the express inclusion of “priming charges” in the definition and their creation by court order, we reiterate that “sûreté” and “charge” are explicitly included “however or whenever arising, created, deemed to arise or provided for” (ita, s 224(13)). [212] nor is professor wood’s commentary, and by extension, the reasoning in daimlerchrysler financial services (debis) canada inc v mega pets ltd., 2002 bcca 242, 1 bclr (4th) 237, and minister of national revenue v schwab construction ltd., 2002 skca 6, 213 sask r 278, of any avail to our colleague karakatsanis j (para. 102; see also wood, at p 98, fns. 51-52). while those judgments held that finance leases and conditional sales agreements did not fall under the definition of s 224(1.3) of the ita because they were not specifically listed, that reasoning was later squarely rejected in caisse populaire de l’est de drummond. and, were that not enough, mega pets and schwab, unlike the instant case, dealt with situations where property was not transferred to the debtor, which facts were treated as determinatively supporting the conclusion that the instruments in those cases were not “security interests”. for example, under a conditional sales agreement, the seller does not have an interest in the debtor’s property because ownership rests with the seller until performance of the obligation (mega pets, at para. 32). by contrast, the priming charges secure payment out of property that remains the debtor’s. [213] finally, this court’s interpretation of “security interest” in caisse populaire de l’est de drummond is confirmed by the french version of the text. “sont en particulier des garanties” is illustrative, not limitative. le robert (online) defines “en particulier” (in particular) as [translation] “particularly, among others, especially, above all” (emphasis added) unsurprisingly, the french version of s 224(1.3) has been described as being [translation] “as broadly worded as possible” (r. p. simard, “priorités et droits spéciaux de la couronne”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — sûretés (loose-leaf), vol. 1, by p-c. lafond, ed., fasc. 4, at para. 20). there is no discordance between both versions of the text the french version conforms perfectly to the english text’s use of the verb “includes”, and confirms the plain reading of the english version. [214] respectfully, our colleagues côté and karakatsanis jj. frustrate the clear will of parliament clear, all-inclusive language should be treated as such, and not circumvented by straining to draw distinctions of no legal significance whatsoever or by searching for what is not specifically mentioned in order to avoid the otherwise inescapable conclusion that parliament granted absolute priority to the deemed trusts. (3) conclusion [215] it is this simple: 1 the fiscal statutes give absolute priority to the deemed trusts for source deductions over all security interests notwithstanding the ccaa; 2 the priming charges are “security interests” within the meaning of the fiscal statutes; and 3 the ccaa does not subordinate the claims under the deemed trusts of the fiscal statutes to the priming charges. [216] this is sufficient to decide the appeal: the deemed trusts of the fiscal statutes have priority over the priming charges. however, in view of the respondents’ submissions that such a finding leaves the deemed trust provisions in the fiscal statutes in conflict with the ccaa, and that recognizing the ultimate priority of the crown’s deemed trust renders certain provisions of the ccaa meaningless, we are compelled to explain why this is not so. c. the ccaa and the fiscal statutes operate harmoniously (1) the broad grant of authority under section 11 of the ccaa is not unlimited [217] it is not disputed that s 11 of the ccaa contains a grant of broad supervisory discretion and the power to “make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances” to give effect to that supervisory role (see j. p. sarra, rescue! the companies’ creditors arrangement act (2nd ed. 2013), at pp. 18-19). what is in dispute, however, are the limits to this broad power. [218] a supervising judge’s authority to grant priming charges was not always contained in the ccaa. prior to the 2009 amendments, it was derived from the courts’ inherent jurisdiction (temple city housing inc., re, 2007 abqb 786, 42 cbr (5th) 274, at para. 14; qb reasons, at para. 105). while the amendments in some respects represented a codification of the past practice, they clarified how priming charges operated (ccaa, ss. 11.2, 11.51 and 11.52) despite being “the engine driving the statutory scheme”, s 11’s exercise was expressly stated by parliament to be “subject to the restrictions set out in this act” (see 9354-9186 québec inc v callidus capital corp., 2020 scc 10, at paras. 48-49, citing stelco inc (re) (2005), 75 o.r (3d) 5 (ca), at para. 36). three such restrictions are significant here. (a) the continued operation of the deemed trusts for unremitted source deductions (section 37(2)) [219] the first restriction on the authority to grant priming charges is found in s 37(2) of the ccaa. this provides for the continued operation of the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes in a ccaa proceeding ⸺ a point this court repeatedly highlighted in century services, at paras. 78-81 at the hearing of this appeal, the respondents argued that s 37(1) nullifies the crown’s priority in respect of all deemed trusts under the ccaa, and that s 37(2) acts merely to reincorporate the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes into ccaa proceedings without their absolute priority. this tortured interpretation misconceives the effect of s 37(1). [220] section 37(1) provides that, despite any deemed trust provision in federal or provincial legislation, “property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for her majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision”, but it is expressly made “[s]ubject to subsection (2)” through s 37(2), parliament also preserved the operation of the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes within ccaa proceedings by providing that “[s]ubsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under [the fiscal statutes]”. in the face of parliament’s clear direction that the deemed trusts operate “notwithstanding” any other enactment, and the express preservation of the deemed trusts in the ccaa, there is simply no basis whatsoever for reading s 37 as invalidating the deemed trust provisions under the fiscal statutes only to revive them with a conveniently lesser priority. such an interpretation finds no support in the text, context, or purpose of the statutory schemes. rather, all those considerations support the view that the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes are preserved in ccaa proceedings in both form and substance, along with their absolute priority. [221] before turning to the second restriction, we note each of our colleagues karakatsanis j and côté j fail to give effect to parliament’s decision, expressed in clear statutory text, to “preser[ve] deemed trusts and asser[t] crown priority only in respect of source deductions” under the ccaa (century services, at para. 45). for the same reason, the reliance they place on british columbia v. henfrey samson belair ltd., [1989] 2 scr 24, is misconceived. there, the court held that the deemed trust created by provincial legislation was not a “true trust” so as to fall outside the debtor’s property under what is now s 67(1)(a) of the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc. 1985, c. b-3 (“bia”) that is not this case. unlike the deemed trust in henfrey, the deemed trusts of the fiscal statutes receive a particular treatment in bankruptcy and insolvency proceeding because they are preserved by s 37(2) of the ccaa and s 67(3) of the bia. further, while the court in henfrey concluded that the deemed trust was ineffective in bankruptcy because the commingling of assets rendered the money subject to the deemed trusts untraceable, this rationale has no application to s 227(41). in first vancouver, this court noted that “by deeming the trust to be effective ‘at any time’ the debtor is in default, the amendments serve to strengthen the conclusion that the minister is not required to trace its interest to assets which belonged to the tax debtor at the time the source deductions were made” (para. 37). again, no conclusions regarding the nature of the deemed trusts flow from the fact that tracing is irrelevant under s 227(4.1): the deemed trusts are statutory instruments and the question is one of operation, not characterization. (b) priming charges attach only to the property of the debtor company [222] the second restriction on the ccaa’s broad authority to grant priming charges is that the ccaa requires priming charges to attach only to “all or part” of the property of the debtor’s company (s 11.2(1); see also ss. 11.51(1) and 1152(1)). here, parliament evinces a clear intent to preserve the ultimate priority it afforded the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes. this is because, by operation of s 227(4.1) of the ita and s 37(2) of the ccaa, the unremitted source deductions are deemed not to form part of the property of the debtor’s company. [223] parliament could not have been more explicit: the source deductions are deemed never to form part of the company’s property and, if there is a default in remittances, the crown is deemed to obtain beneficial ownership in the tax debtor’s property in the amount of the unremitted source deductions that it can collect “notwithstanding” any other enactment or security interest whether this is a true ownership interest is irrelevant to this appeal as the legislation deems the crown to obtain beneficial ownership for these purposes it follows that the priming charges cannot supersede the crown’s deemed trust claim because they may attach only to the property of the debtor’s company, of which parliament took great care to ensure the source deductions were deemed to form no part. as michael j. hanlon explains: while it has been held that an interim financing charge may rank ahead of the deemed trusts existing in favour of the canada revenue agency with respect to amounts owing on account of unremitted source deductions, this appears to be incorrect. property deemed to be held in trust pursuant to the provisions creating the deemed trust are deemed not to form part of the debtor’s estate, and given that those deemed trusts with respect to source deductions, are preserved in a ccaa context, the interim financing charge would not attach to those assets. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] (halsbury’s laws of canada ⸺ bankruptcy and insolvency (2017 reissue), at hbi-376) (c) the definition of “secured creditor” (section 2) [224] the third restriction on the ccaa’s broad authority to grant priming charges is that the court “may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company” (ss. 11.2(2), 11.51(2) and 1152(2)). also, the definition of “secured creditor” in s 2(1) of the ccaa makes it manifestly clear that the crown is not a “secured creditor” in respect of its deemed trust claims under the fiscal statutes: secured creditor means a holder of a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, all or any property of a debtor company as security for indebtedness of the debtor company, or a holder of any bond of a debtor company secured by a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, or a trust in respect of, all or any property of the debtor company, whether the holder or beneficiary is resident or domiciled within or outside canada, and a trustee under any trust deed or other instrument securing any of those bonds shall be deemed to be a secured creditor for all purposes of this act except for the purpose of voting at a creditors’ meeting in respect of any of those bonds . this definition highlights two relevant considerations. first, the definition should be read as encompassing two classes of creditors. and second, the use of the word “trust” must be given legal significance. [225] as to the first consideration, we accept the crown’s submission that the proper reading of the definition of secured creditor references only two classes of secured creditors: (i) holders of direct security, and (ii) holders of secured bonds. so understood, a secured creditor means either a holder of a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, all or any property of a debtor company as security for indebtedness of the debtor company, or a holder of any bond of a debtor company secured by a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, or a trust in respect of, all or any property of the debtor company . the reference to “trust” appears only in relation to an instrument securing a bond of the debtor company the definition must be read as “secured creditor means . . a holder of any bond of a debtor company secured by . . . a trust in respect of, all or any property of the debtor company”. accordingly, holders of an interest under a deemed trust are not a third class of creditors (a. prévost, “que reste-t-il de la fiducie réputée en matière de régimes de retraite?” (2016), 75 r du b 23, at p 58). [226] while finding this interpretation “initially attractive”, the majority of the court of appeal ultimately rejected this reading it did so because, irrespective of whether the definition needs a third reference to a “holder of a trust” drafted in parallel to the first two classes of creditors, the crown’s interest could be classified as a “charge” and is therefore captured by the first class of secured creditors (ca reasons, at paras. 42-43). respectfully, this is incorrect. deemed trusts are not covered by the word “charge” to conclude that the word “charge” encompasses “deemed trusts” under the first class of secured creditors when “charge” and “trust” are listed distinctly under the second class of secured creditors (holders of secured bonds) would be incoherent and run contrary to legislative presumptions in statutory interpretation. why would parliament include a specific reference to trusts if they are already covered by charge? parliament is presumed to avoid “superfluous or meaningless words, [and] phrases” (bristol-myers squibb co v canada (attorney general), 2005 scc 26, [2005] 1 scr 533, at para. 178) the deliberate and distinct text of “trust” and “charge” shows that it was not parliament’s intention to have holders of deemed trusts subsumed under “charge” such that the crown in this circumstance would become a secured creditor. [227] in any case, if there were only one class of creditor, the crown would not be a secured creditor with respect to the deemed trust claim under the fiscal statutes. while parliament distinguished between “deemed or actual trust[s]” in s 224(1.3) of the ita, it made no such distinction in the definition of secured creditor. parliament is presumed to legislate with intent and chose its words carefully. our role as a court with respect to legislation is interpretation, not drafting. we must ascribe legal significance to parliament’s choice of text ⸺ that is, to the words parliament chose and did not choose. (d) “restrictions” under section 11 of the ccaa [228] our colleague karakatsanis j agrees with our analysis of the priming charge provisions, but she does not seem to view them as “restrictions” within the meaning of s 11 because “[t]he general language of s 11 should not . . . be ‘restricted by the availability of more specific orders’” (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 170, citing century services, at para. 70) with respect, as a matter of law and statutory interpretation this view is simply unavailable to our colleague. neither s 11 nor the court’s inherent jurisdiction can “empower a judge . . . to make an order negating the unambiguous expression of the legislative will” (baxter student housing ltd v. college housing co-operative ltd., [1976] 2 scr 475, at p 480; see also r v. caron, 2011 scc 5, [2011] 1 scr 78, at para. 32). parliament has imposed clear restrictions on the courts’ power to give priority to priming charges. it is one thing to rely on s 11 as a source of general authority even when other specific orders are available; it is another to misconstrue s 11 as a source of unfettered authority to circumvent such unambiguous restrictions. while courts may use their general s 11 power to create priming charges for purposes other than those that are specifically enumerated (see wood, at pp. 90-91), parliament has clearly expressed its intention to restrict any such charge in a critical way ⸺ it cannot take priority over the crown’s deemed trust. [229] for the same reason, we respectfully find untenable our colleague justice moldaver’s suggestion that it is unclear whether there are restrictions internal to the ccaa itself that would prevent a court from using its power under s 11 to order a priming charge in priority to the crown’s deemed trust claim. this statement does not account for parliament’s clear intention, recorded in s 37(2), to preserve the crown’s right to be paid in absolute priority over all secured creditors in ccaa proceedings. it also renders superfluous the restrictions on the court’s authority to prioritize priming charges under ss. 11.2(2), 11.51(2) and 11.52(2) of the ccaa. [230] further, our colleague moldaver j says it is unnecessary to “define the particular nature or operation of the” deemed trust under the ita (para. 255), and relies on the “notwithstanding” language of s 227(4.1) of the ita to determine whether the crown’s claim can have priority over priming charges. this interpretation effectively reads in a conflict in the statutory schemes, despite this court’s clear direction that “an interpretation which results in conflict should be eschewed unless it is unavoidable” (lévis (city) v. fraternité des policiers de lévis inc., 2007 scc 14, [2007] 1 scr. 591, at para. 47). in any event, this is not an unavoidable conflict: there is simply no conflict. parliament avoided any conflict between the ccaa and the ita by imposing restrictions upon the court’s authority under s 11 of the ccaa. (e) structure of crown claims under the ccaa [231] finally, while not a “restrictio[n] set out in [the ccaa]”, as specified in s 11, the cogency of the statutory scheme as a whole depends on an interpretation where the crown cannot be a secured creditor. this is so because classifying the crown as “secured creditor” would disrupt the structure of crown claims that the ccaa clearly defines at ss. 37 to 39 (wood, at p 98). section 37 applies to deemed trust claims, with s 37(1) providing that deemed trusts in favour of the crown are ineffective under the ccaa, as a general rule, and s 37(2) providing an exemption for the deemed trust for source deductions section 38(1) sets out the general rule that the crown’s secured claims rank as unsecured claims, with specific exemptions at s 38(2) and (3). finally, s 39(1) preserves the crown’s secured creditor status if it registers before the commencement of the ccaa proceedings but, under s 39(2), that security is subordinate to prior perfected security interests. [232] this leads us to question why parliament would expressly “preserve” the deemed trusts of the fiscal statutes by operation of s 37(2), only then to rank the crown as an unsecured creditor by the operation of s 38(1). unlike the interpretation that affords the deemed trusts ultimate priority, allowing the crown to be reduced to an unsecured creditor in respect of its deemed trust claims would render s 37(2) almost meaningless. further, this interpretation would require the crown to register its claim under s 39(1) to preserve its status because the deemed trust is not afforded the exemption under s 38. it would be illogical for parliament to confer greater protection on secured claims afforded an exemption under s 38(2) or (3) than it conferred on deemed trusts for source deductions, when the clear objective was to confer “absolute priority” on the latter (first vancouver, at paras. 26-28). [233] we note that professor wood is not alone in recognizing that “sections 38 and 39 of the ccaa govern the conditions upon which a crown claim can be viewed as ‘secured’ for the purposes of the ccaa” (f. l. lamer, priority of crown claims in insolvency (loose-leaf), at §79.2) since the deemed trusts for unremitted source deductions under the fiscal statutes do not meet the conditions of these sections, it follows that the crown’s claim is not “secured”. [234] in our view, a plain reading of the definition of secured creditor within the context of the broader statutory scheme results in a single inescapable conclusion. that is, there are three classes of crown claims under the ccaa: (1) claims pursuant to deemed trusts continued under the ccaa; (2) secured claims; and (3) unsecured claims. the claims for unremitted source deductions fall under the first type: claims pursuant to deemed trusts continued under the ccaa. (2) recognizing the ultimate priority of the crown’s deemed trust does not defeat the purpose of any provision of the ccaa [235] for two further and related reasons, the majority at the court of appeal and the respondents resist the conclusion that the crown’s deemed trust enjoys absolute priority. (a) protection of crown claims under section 6(3) [236] first, the majority held that granting ultimate priority to the deemed trusts would render s 6(3) of the ccaa meaningless. this provision prohibits the court from sanctioning a compromise or arrangement unless it provides for payment in full to the crown, within six months of the sanction of the plan, of all amounts due to the crown. the majority reasoned that if the crown is always paid first for its deemed trust claims under the fiscal statutes, there would be no need to protect the crown claims under s 6(3). [237] respectfully, this conclusion is erroneous a review of the purpose and scope of s 6(3) of the ccaa is clear: it operates only where there is an arrangement or compromise put to the court, and it protects the entirety of the crown claim pursuant to s 224(1.2) of the ita and similar provisions of the fiscal statutes. this includes claims not subject to the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes, such as income tax withholdings, employer contributions to employment insurance and cpp, interest and penalties in contrast, the deemed trusts arise immediately and operate continuously “from the time the amount was deducted or withheld” from the employee’s remuneration, and apply to only those deductions. it follows, then, that, without s 6(3), the crown would be guaranteed entitlement only to unremitted source deductions when the court sanctions a compromise or arrangement, and not to its other claims under s 224(1.2) of the ita. this is because most of the crown’s claims rank as unsecured under s 38 of the ccaa. [238] it bears emphasizing that s 6(3) does not apply where no arrangement is proposed or to ccaa proceedings which involve the liquidation of the debtor’s assets. such “liquidating ccaas” are “now commonplace in the ccaa landscape” (callidus capital corp., at para. 42). the absolute priority of the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes, continued by s 37(2) of the ccaa, provides protection to the crown’s claim for unremitted source deductions in liquidating ccaas. each of our colleagues côté and karakatsanis jj. deprive the crown of its guaranteed entitlements in such cases, despite parliament having unambiguously granted “absolute priority” to claims for unremitted source deductions (department of finance canada). [239] we note that our colleague karakatsanis j does not conclude that s 6(3) is rendered nugatory by our interpretation; rather, she says that, since the term “beneficial ownership” as it is used in the deemed trusts does not have the same meaning at common law, we must look to the ccaa to ascertain the crown’s rights this “manipulation of private law concepts, without settled meaning”, she further says, raises the question of how the deemed trust survives under the ccaa (para. 181). and the answer, she finds, is furnished by s 6(3). [240] this is wrong for three reasons. first, there is no question as to how the deemed trust survives. section 37(2) operates to exempt the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes from any change in form or substance under the ccaa; this continues the operation of s 227(4.1), which confers absolute priority on the crown’s claim to the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes. in other words, the deemed trust survives as it was under the fiscal statutes. it is unsurprising, therefore, that this court did not opine on how the trust “survives” in ccaa proceedings in century services: it is, with respect, plain and obvious. [241] secondly, our colleague karakatsanis j.’s suggestion that the understanding of the rights conferred on the crown under the deemed trust must arise from reading s 6(3) of the ccaa entirely bypasses the text of the ita which specifically sets out those rights after providing that the crown has “beneficial ownership” of the value of the unremitted source deduction, the ita continues: “the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the receiver general in priority to all such security interests” (s 227(41)). this is the right of the crown under the deemed trust, and our colleague fails to give effect to this right. [242] finally, as we have discussed, s 6(3) protects different interests than those captured by the deemed trusts. if s 6(3) were to exhaust the crown’s rights under the ccaa, our colleague karakatsanis j correctly observes that “there may be some risk to the crown that the plan [under s 6(3)] may fail, and the crown may not be paid in full if the restructuring dissolves into liquidation and the estate is depleted in the interim” (para. 155 (emphasis added)). this, however, only supports our interpretation. the right “not to have to compromise” under s 6(3) is a right independent of the crown’s right under deemed trusts (para. 155 (emphasis deleted)). (b) power to stay the crown’s garnishment right (section 11.09) [243] secondly, the majority at the court of appeal and the respondents say that giving effect to the clear statutory wording would be contrary to the purpose of s 11.09 of the ccaa, which grants courts the power to stay the crown’s garnishment right under the ita (c.a reasons, at para. 54) this demonstrates, the argument goes, parliament’s intent to have the court exercise control over the crown’s interests while monitoring the restructuring proceedings. on this view, granting absolute priority to the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes necessarily implies that s 11.09 of the ccaa does not apply to the deemed trust claim. [244] again respectfully, this is not so a court-ordered stay of garnishments under s 11.09 of the ccaa can apply to the crown’s deemed trust claims under the fiscal statutes because the deemed trust provisions and s 11.09 each serve different purposes: the deemed trusts grant a priority to the crown, while s 11.09 imposes conditions on when and how the crown can enforce its garnishment rights under s 224(1.2) of the ita. in other words, s 11.09 permits the court to stay the crown’s ability to enforce its claims under the deemed trusts, but it does not remove its priority. [245] the critical point is this: giving effect to parliament’s clear intent to grant absolute priority to the deemed trust does not render s 6(3) or s 11.09 meaningless. to the contrary, s 6(3) and s 11.09 respect the ultimate priority of the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes by allowing for the ultimate priority of the crown claim to persist, while not frustrating the remedial purpose of the ccaa. (3) conclusion [246] as with our discussion of the deemed trust’s absolute priority, the harmonious operation of the ccaa and the fiscal statutes can be summarized as follows: 1 the ccaa preserves the crown’s right to be paid in priority to all security interests for its claims for source deductions under the fiscal statutes; 2 under the ccaa, the crown is not a “secured creditor” in respect of its deemed trust claims under the fiscal statutes; 3 as priming charges can attach only to the debtor’s property, and as parliament has made it clear that unremitted source deductions form no part of the debtor’s property, the crown’s interest under the deemed trust is not subject to the priming charges; 4 section 6(3) of the ccaa, which operates only where there is an arrangement or compromise put to the court, protects the entirety of the crown claim under s 224(1.2) of the ita and similar provisions of the fiscal statutes; and 5 the deemed trust’s grant of priority to the crown is unaffected by s 11.09, which instead imposes conditions on when and how the crown can enforce its garnishment rights under s 224(1.2) of the ita. d policy reasons do not support a different interpretation [247] the majority of the court of appeal and the respondents place significant weight on what they view as the potentially “absurd consequences” that would result from concluding that the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes have priority over the priming charges. the same point implicitly underlies our colleague côté j.’s reasons. indeed, the majority at the court of appeal went as far as to warn that, under this interpretation, interim financing would “simply end”, an assertion that “almost certainly goes too far” (ca reasons, at para. 50; wood, at p 99). it added that it would lead to more business failures and, in turn, undermine tax collection (paras. 48 and 50). we disagree. [248] the “absurd consequences” identified by the majority at the court of appeal rest on faulty premises. the conclusion that interim financing would “simply end” was not supported by the record the majority extrapolated from admittedly incomplete and dated data about interim financing drawn from a textbook which does not indicate the presence of a deemed trust claim. this sweeping statement elides cases where there is no interim lending and cases, such as this one, where the debtor’s assets are sufficient to satisfy both the interim lending and the crown’s deemed trust claim. this is an omission that cannot be readily ignored as there are usually enough funds available to satisfy both the crown claim and the court-ordered priming charges (wood, at p 100) equally unfounded is the majority’s claim that confirming the priority of the deemed trusts of the fiscal statutes would “inject an unacceptable level of uncertainty into the insolvency process” (c.a reasons, at para. 51) a company applying under the ccaa is required to provide its financial statements (s 10(2)(c)), which include the source deductions owed to the crown. interim lenders can rely on this information to evaluate the risk of providing financing. [249] moreover, the majority at the court of appeal did not consider that parliament can, and did, choose to prioritize the integrity of the tax system over the interests of secured creditors indeed, and with respect, the majority’s own interpretation arguably itself produces absurd results, whereby employees’ gross remuneration are conscripted as a subsidy to secure interim financing and the services of insolvency professionals. [250] we therefore do not remotely see the consequences of our interpretation as rising to the level of absurdity. and parliament has unambiguously struck the balance it considered appropriate in pursuit of the dual objectives of collecting unremitted source deductions, which are not the property of the debtor, and avoiding the “devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy” (century services, at para. 59, quoting elan corp. v. comiskey (1990), 1 or (3d) 289 (ca), at p 306, per doherty ja, dissenting). whether s 227(4.1) of the ita is an effective means to protect the fiscal base or whether “the crown is biting off the hand that feeds it” are not questions that this court has the competence or legitimacy to answer (ca reasons, at para. 48). [251] in any event, even were there evidence that giving priority to the deemed trusts under the fiscal statutes over the priming charges produced absurd results, our conclusion would be no different. the presumption against absurdity is exactly that: a presumption. nothing more. illogical consequences flowing from the application of a statute do not give rein to courts to disregard clear legislative intent as lamer cj. noted in r v. mcintosh, [1995] 1 scr 686, at para. 41, “parliament . . . has the right to legislate illogically (assuming that this does not raise constitutional concerns). and if parliament is not satisfied with the judicial application of its illogical enactments, then parliament may amend them accordingly.” [252] here, parliament’s intention to give absolute priority to the deemed trust of the fiscal statutes is unequivocal. our role is to give effect to this intention. iii disposition [253] we would allow the appeal. the respondents should be entitled to costs in accordance with “schedule b” to the regulations (rules of the supreme court of canada, sor/2002-156). there are no exceptional circumstances that would justify enhanced costs. despite the appeal being moot, it was not improper for the crown to seek the correct interpretation of the fiscal statutes. the following are the reasons delivered by moldaver j — [254] i have had the benefit of reading the reasons of my colleagues, justice côté, justice karakatsanis, and justices brown and rowe. while i substantially agree with the analysis and conclusions of brown and rowe jj., there are two points that i wish to address. [255] first, unlike brown and rowe jj., i see no reason to define the particular nature or operation of the crown’s interest under s 227(4.1) of the income tax act, rsc 1985, c 1 (5th supp.) (“ita”), in the context of proceedings under the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36 (“ccaa”) while a future appeal may require this court to determine exactly how the crown’s interest under s 227(4.1) “survives”, and whether it amounts to some form of ownership interest in the debtor’s property, as brown and rowe jj maintain, some form of security interest in that property, or something else entirely (eg, a right not to have to compromise, as karakatsanis j maintains), such an inquiry is not necessary in this case. properly interpreted, the relevant provisions of the ccaa and ita work in harmony to direct that the crown’s interest — in whatever form it takes — must be given priority over court-ordered priming charges this conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. [256] in my view, to the extent that brown and rowe jj conclude that the crown’s interest under s 227(4.1) affords the crown beneficial ownership over the source deductions such that “the source deductions are deemed never to form part of the company’s property”, they have effectively decided the appeal by two paths — first, by way of the crown’s absolute priority under s 227(4.1), and second, by way of the crown’s beneficial ownership over any unremitted source deductions (para. 223). as they note, if the crown’s interest amounts to an ownership interest and unremitted source deductions do not form part of the debtor company’s property, priming charges could never attach to those source deductions, whether ordered under the specific priming charge provisions or the court’s broad power under s 11 of the ccaa (paras. 222-23) if this is indeed the case, it is not clear that the issue of competing priority between the crown’s interest and court-ordered priming charges ever arises, as the source deductions would be simply inaccessible to anyone other than the crown. as i am not necessarily convinced that the crown’s interest under s 227(4.1) amounts to an ownership interest, and as the crown’s absolute priority does not depend on this conclusion, i would leave the question of the nature of the crown’s interest to another day. [257] second, while i agree with brown and rowe jj. that s 37(2) of the ccaa can be interpreted as an internal restriction on s 11, i hesitate to accept this conclusion, as it strikes me that in order to give proper effect to parliament’s intention for s 11 to serve as “the engine” that drives the ccaa and empowers supervising judges to further its remedial objectives, any restrictions on that discretionary power should be explicit and unambiguous (9354-9186 québec inc. v. callidus capital corp., 2020 scc 10, at para. 48, citing stelco inc. (re) (2005), 75 or (3d) 5 (ca), at para. 36). with respect, s 37(2) does not amount to such an explicit and unambiguous restriction rather, s 37(2) is a simple exception to s 37(1), which serves to nullify the effect of any statutory provision that deems property to be held in favour of the crown: 37(1) subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for her majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for her majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision. (2) subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the income tax act . [258] in effect, then, the function of s 37(2) is merely to preserve the crown’s deemed trust under s 227(4.1) from extinguishment under s 37(1). in preserving the crown’s interest, however, “s 37(2) does not explain what to do with that right for the purposes of a ccaa proceeding”, nor does it say anything that would limit the court’s power under s 11 to order priming charges in priority to the crown’s deemed trust claim (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 153). indeed, as karakatsanis j notes, “there is no provision in the ccaa stipulating what the court can do with trust property and no provision in the ccaa conferring more specific jurisdiction on whether a priming charge can rank ahead of the beneficiary of a deemed trust” (para. 176). rather, it is only when one looks to s 227(4.1) that the absolute priority of the crown’s interest — and the resulting limitations on s 11 — become apparent. it is thus not entirely clear that interpreting s 37(2) as an internal restriction accords with the function of s 37(2) or the leeway that parliament intended for the scope of powers under s 11. in other words, the relationship between ss. 11 and 37(2) may not be as clear-cut as my colleagues seem to suggest accordingly, while i ultimately agree with brown and rowe jj that s 37(2) can be interpreted as an internal restriction so as to avoid a conflict between the ccaa and ita, i feel it important to explain that, if this interpretation is mistaken, s 11 is nonetheless restricted by the external text of s 227(41). [259] if s 37(2) does not amount to an internal restriction on s 11, using s 11 to prioritize priming charges over the crown’s deemed trust claim would put the provision in direct conflict with s 227(4.1) which, as my colleagues brown and rowe jj. have explained, requires that the crown’s claim be ranked in priority to all security interests, including priming charges. the direct conflict would trigger the “[n]otwithstanding” language in s 227(4.1), which states that “[n]otwithstanding . . . any other enactment of canada”, the crown’s claim is to have priority this language thus imposes an external restriction on the court’s power under s 11 indeed, the supremacy of s 227(4.1) is implicitly acknowledged by the text of s 11 as, unlike s 227(4.1), which operates despite “any other enactment of canada”, s 11 only operates “[d]espite anything in the bankruptcy and insolvency act or the winding-up and restructuring act”, but not despite anything in the ita. accordingly, while the court’s discretionary authority under s 11 could, in theory, empower a court to subordinate the crown’s interest in unremitted source deductions, that power is ultimately stopped short by the express language of s 227(41). [260] in outlining this position, i consider it important to contextualize this court’s statement in callidus that “the jurisdiction granted by s 11 is constrained only by restrictions set out in the ccaa itself, and the requirement that the order made be ‘appropriate in the circumstances’” (para. 67) the focus in callidus was on the discretionary authority of supervising ccaa judges within the confines of the ccaa itself; it was not on addressing the question of the authority of ccaa judges to apply s 11 in the face of overriding federal legislation respectfully, where, as here, parliament has expressly indicated the supremacy of a statute over the provisions of the ccaa, the court’s power under s 11 is correspondingly restricted. [261] the crown’s deemed trust claim must thus take priority over all court-ordered priming charges, whether they arise under the specific priming charge provisions, or under the court’s discretionary authority. [262] a necessary consequence of the absolute supremacy of the crown’s deemed trust claim over court-ordered priming charges is that the crown’s interest under s 227(4.1) cannot be given effect by s 6(3) of the ccaa. section 6(3) of the ccaa provides that [u]nless her majesty agrees otherwise, the court may sanction a compromise or arrangement only if the compromise or arrangement provides for the payment in full to her majesty in right of canada or a province, within six months after court sanction of the compromise or arrangement, of all amounts that were outstanding at the time of the application for an order under section 11 or 11.02 and that are of a kind that could be subject to a demand under (a) subsection 224(1.2) of the income tax act . [263] in my view, there are two reasons why s 6(3) cannot represent the crown’s interest under s 227(4.1) first, the focus of s 6(3) is to establish a timeframe for payment to the crown of certain outstanding debts in the event that the debtor company succeeds in staying viable as a going concern. by contrast, s 227(4.1) is focused on ensuring the priority of the crown’s claim. the key point of distinction here is that, under s 6(3), the crown could be ranked last, so long as it is paid within six months of any arrangement such an outcome would be plainly inconsistent with the absolute priority of the crown’s claim, as established by the ccaa and ita. second, as s 6(3) applies only where a compromise or plan of arrangement is reached, the crown’s deemed trust claim would not operate in the event that a liquidation occurred under the ccaa, thereby depriving the crown of its priority over security interests in such circumstances again, this potential consequence would be at odds with the clear intention of the ccaa and ita. [264] before concluding, i would note that it cannot be doubted that parliament considered the potential consequences of its legislative actions, including any consequences for ccaa proceedings. if circumstances do arise in which the priority of the crown’s claim threatens the viability of a particular restructuring, it clearly lies with the crown to be flexible so as to avoid any consequences that would undermine the remedial purposes of the ccaa. [265] i would, therefore, allow the appeal. the respondents are entitled to costs in this court in accordance with schedule b of the rules of the supreme court of canada, sor/2002-156. appeal dismissed with costs, abella, moldaver, brown and rowe jj. dissenting. solicitors for the respondents canada north group inc., canada north camps inc., campcorp structures ltd., dj catering ltd., 816956 alberta ltd., 1371047 alberta ltd., 1919209 alberta ltd. and ernst & young inc. in its capacity as monitor: duncan craig, edmonton. cassels brock & blackwell, calgary. solicitors for the intervener the insolvency institute of canada: blake, cassels & graydon, calgary. restructuring professionals: osler, hoskin & harcourt, calgary.
i. introduction [1] this appeal raises the question whether a non-liability clause in a contract is valid in respect of a breach of a fundamental obligation in quebec civil law. the superior court declared (2016 qccs 4086), on the basis that an exoneration clause or limitation of liability clause is without effect if it relates to the very essence of an obligation — the [translation] “doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation” — that a limitation of liability clause in a freely negotiated contract for services between the appellant, 6362222 canada inc. (“createch”), and the respondent, prelco inc., was inoperative. [2] in this case, createch breached its fundamental obligation under the contract, namely to inquire into prelco’s specific operating needs and requirements and to propose an approach to implementing an integrated management system that would be capable of satisfying them. the trial judge concluded that createch could not rely on the clause in question in order to limit its liability for material injury it had caused to prelco. the court of appeal confirmed that conclusion, explaining that the doctrine accepted by the trial judge exists in quebec law and that it applied in this case (2019 qcca 1457). [3] there are two possible legal bases for the existence of the doctrine and for applying it to this case, and they do not have the same justification. the first is that a non-liability clause relating to a fundamental obligation is inoperative if it is contrary to a rule of public order that limits freedom of contract the second is that a non-liability clause is inoperative if it releases the debtor from all obligations to the creditor, because the clause thereby deprives the creditor’s correlative obligation of its cause and is therefore incompatible with the very existence of the fundamental obligation flowing from the contract as a synallagmatic act. these two bases — public order and absence of an objective cause of the obligation — are central to the dispute between the parties. [4] although the court of appeal was right to refer to public order and absence of a cause in support of its analysis of the validity of the clause at issue, we nonetheless conclude that the appeal should be allowed. respectfully stated, neither of the legal bases for the doctrine suffices to negate the non-liability clause to which the parties freely consented in the case at bar, as neither public order nor the non-existence of the obligation can be successfully argued in this appeal. [5] while it is true that the first basis for the doctrine does apply in certain specific situations provided for in the civil code of québec (“ccq” or “code”), public order does not have the effect, generally, of rendering a non-liability clause relating to a fundamental obligation in a contract by mutual agreement inoperative. the opposite conclusion would be contrary to the scheme of the code. the legislature, by addressing clauses that are inconsistent with higher values it intentionally associated with public order, has allowed sophisticated parties to agree to the allocation of risk in contexts to which the code does not explicitly refer. as to the second basis, the clause at issue does not deprive the obligation of its objective cause. it is common ground that the prestation agreed to is due from the debtor, createch, even if the sanctions for nonperformance of the agreement are undermined by the effect of the non-liability clause. the creditor, prelco, in fact concedes that it gave createch a [translation] “chance to correct its errors and make specific performance” (rf, at para. 121). an effective sanction, namely specific performance and agreed damages for unsatisfactory services, is still possible this sanction reflects an obligation that has a cause — createch’s contractual counterprestation — an obligation whose existence is not open to question. ii background [6] the business relationship between createch and prelco began in 2007. createch is a consulting firm specialized in performance improvement and in the implementation of integrated management systems prelco is a large manufacturing company that makes and transforms flat glass for various architectural and industrial uses its production operations are conducted in several plants  all of them interconnected  that are located in rivière-du-loup, in montréal and in edmundston, new brunswick. [7] prelco engaged createch to improve the company’s business processes relating to customer service. a number of projects for that purpose were carried out in 2007 and 2008, and all of them met prelco’s expectations while doing this work, createch informed prelco that its computer systems were not particularly efficient, as they were composed of a large number of programs whose databases functioned autonomously. prelco asked createch’s advice on this. [8] createch agreed to conduct a summary analysis of the systems in question. upon the completion of that analysis, prelco invited createch, in late february or early march 2008, to present a proposal for the supply of software and professional services in order to implement an integrated management system in its business. [9] a draft contract prepared by createch in 2008 was thus submitted to prelco. negotiations then took place. prelco did not ask for any changes to the proposed general conditions (sup. ct reasons, at paras. 20-22 (canlii)), which included provisions concerning the parties’ general responsibilities. [10] according to the provisions in question, responsibility for [translation] “implementation and deliverables” was in some instances said to be “shared” by the parties, whereas in others it amounted, for createch only, to a “limited” responsibility that consisted in providing “ad hoc support as well as advice” (joint sch., vol. i, at p 244). finally there were some tasks for which prelco was to be fully responsible. the draft contract also included an estimate of the time each of the parties was to spend on the project. [11] the other clauses of the proposed general conditions included cl. 7 entitled [translation] “limited liability”, which is central to this case: [translation] createch’s liability to the client for damages that can be attributed to any cause whatsoever, regardless of the nature of the action, whether provided for in the agreement or delictual, shall be limited to amounts paid to createch under the agreement unless such damages result from gross negligence or wilful misconduct on createch’s part. if such damages result from the delivery of unsatisfactory services, createch’s liability shall be limited to the amount of any fees paid in relation to the said unsatisfactory services. createch may not be held liable for any damages resulting from the loss of data, profits or revenue or from the use of products or for any other special, consequential or indirect damages relating to services and/or material provided pursuant to the agreement unless such damages result from gross negligence or wilful misconduct on createch’s part. (joint sch., vol. i, at p 227) [12] there were nonetheless discussions about the sharing of risks relating to cost overruns for services, and these resulted in createch accepting a reduced hourly rate of 50 percent for the “contingency of the project” portion. [13] in april 2008, the parties signed an agreement (“contract”) for the implementation at prelco of a microsoft dynamics nav integrated management solution, a prestation whose estimated value was $650,574 the amount payable to createch was approximate, because a monthly billing method [translation] “on a time and materials basis in accordance with hours used and payable upon receipt of the invoice” was provided for (joint sch., vol. i, at p 246) clause 7 quoted above ultimately appeared verbatim in the contract. [14] when the system was implemented, numerous problems arose: inconsistent invoices sent to customers, errors in putting orders into production, shipping delays, and inefficiency of the planning and production system, which was slow faced with these recurring problems, prelco terminated its contractual relationship with createch in the spring of 2010 and then engaged another firm, irisco, to make the integrated management system functional. after irisco had resolved the problems, the integrated management system functioned properly. prelco was able to use the system and to manage its production, although it did not benefit from all the expected advantages. [15] prelco brought an action against createch for $6,246,648.94 in damages. this amount related to the reimbursement of an overpayment, costs for restoring the system, the reimbursement of claims from customers, and loss of profits. createch in turn filed a cross-application for $331,134.42, the unpaid balance for the project. iii. judicial history a quebec superior court, 2016 qccs 4086 (ouellet j.) [16] the trial judge found that the integrated management system’s performance problems could be attributed to an erroneous approach adopted by createch on beginning the project rather than personalizing the nav software, createch should have integrated into it [translation] “proven programs that were available on the market” (para. 169). [17] in the trial judge’s view, because createch’s conduct [translation] “did not show gross recklessness, gross carelessness or gross negligence”, this mistake could not be characterized as an intentional fault (para. 207). he added that the “particular structure of the [c]ontract, [which required] extensive involvement of both the service provider and the client in implementing the . . . system”, meant that a gross fault could not be attributed to createch (para. 208). [18] he also found that the contract, having resulted from discussions between the parties, could not be characterized as a contract of adhesion. it was a synallagmatic contract  more precisely a time and materials contract for services  under which createch had an obligation of means having been negotiated by mutual agreement between sophisticated legal persons, the contract was not subject to consumer protection legislation. [19] the limitation of liability clause in the contract was nevertheless inoperative, because createch had breached its fundamental obligation, that is, [translation] “to properly identify and propose management software and a development approach suited to prelco’s situation such that the integrated management system would be fully operational” (paras. 213 and 220-25) having misunderstood “the scale and complexity of prelco’s operations”, createch had committed a fault in its initial choice as to the approach to take in implementing the management system and had as a result breached its fundamental obligation (para. 215) because of this erroneous initial choice, createch had not understood that the system required indexes, which was a “fundamental error” whose effect had been to cause the system to freeze for several minutes when tables were being consulted (para. 225). [20] citing certain academic commentary and judicial decisions in this regard, the trial judge explained that [translation] “there is now a view in our civil law that a non-liability clause becomes inoperative in the event of a breach of a fundamental obligation by the party who benefits from that clause” (para. 210) he added, in a comment he himself described as being in obiter, that the obligation of good faith flowing from arts. 6, 7 and 1375 ccq could also serve as a basis for his conclusion that the doctrine applies to the facts of this case (para. 226). [21] the trial judge nevertheless found that liability for the damages claimed by prelco could not lie completely with createch, although the latter did bear the greatest share of that liability. prelco had had human resource problems and, like createch, had minimized the risk related to its employees’ lack of training and preparation when they had jointly decided to launch the system. the trial judge therefore apportioned liability between them, ascribing 60 percent to createch and 40 percent to prelco. [22] regarding prelco’s claims, the trial judge began by rejecting the one for an overpayment of $1,567,325, finding that prelco had not paid unnecessarily for the software and services provided by createch. after the work done by irisco, he observed, [translation] “the nav system functioned and was used by prelco” (para. 233). if the items “software” and “maintenance” were excluded, he stated, prelco had not shown “what portion of the $1,520,000 represented unnecessary work from which prelco does not now benefit” (ibid). however, the trial judge accepted prelco’s claim for $79,200 for fees paid to irisco. because those fees resulted from createch’s error in its choice for the approach to implementation, he did not apportion liability. [23] as to the claims from customers and loss of profits on sales made and lost by prelco, the trial judge apportioned liability and fixed the amounts payable to that company at $189,200 and $1,935,000 respectively because he had found that the integrated management system functioned and was being used by prelco, he rejected prelco’s principal argument and granted createch’s cross-application. [24] the trial judge ultimately ordered createch to pay prelco $2,203,400 in damages however, because he was granting createch’s cross-application in the amount of $331,134, he effected compensation between the two claims. the result of compensation was that the amount createch owed prelco was $1,872,266. b quebec court of appeal, 2019 qcca 1457 (chamberland, bélanger and rancourt jja) [25] createch appealed the superior court’s judgment. in createch’s view, the trial judge had erred in finding that the limitation of liability clause in the contract was inoperative because it had breached a fundamental obligation prelco initiated an incidental appeal, submitting that the trial judge had made several errors in calculating the damages related to its share of liability, the value of the services delivered by createch and the amount representing lost sales. [26] the court of appeal dismissed createch’s appeal, holding unanimously that the mere fact that a breach relates to a fundamental obligation can suffice for the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation to neutralize an exoneration clause or limitation of liability clause. it concluded that the doctrine applies in a case such as the one before it the court began by noting that exoneration clauses and limitation of liability clauses relating to material injury caused to another are valid in quebec civil law, but that, in the words of the first paragraph of art. 1474 ccq, no one may rely on such a clause to exclude or limit his or her liability “for material injury caused to another through an intentional or gross fault”. [27] furthermore, the court of appeal did not accept createch’s argument that the rejection of the common law doctrine of “fundamental breach” in tercon contractors ltd v british columbia (transportation and highways), 2010 scc 4, [2010] 1 scr 69, barred prelco’s claim. in the court of appeal’s view, the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation is not solely a common law rule, but is also a creation of the quebec courts drawn from civil law commentary and jurisprudence. tercon is therefore of no consequence in the case at bar, because this means of neutralizing non-liability clauses has an independent legal basis that is proper to the civil law nor does this development represent [translation] “an isolated case of judicial creation” (ca reasons, at para. 25 (canlii)), as it brings to mind principles developed by this court in other contexts, such as in national bank of canada (canadian national bank) v soucisse, [1981] 2 scr 339, at pp. 359-63, and montréal (ville) v. lonardi, 2018 scc 29, [2018] 2 scr 103, at para. 85. [28] the court of appeal noted that the quebec courts and several authors have recognized that the doctrine applies in a commercial context such as this. it referred to a number of principles to justify the existence of what it described as the [translation] “rule of . . fundamental obligation” for finding that the clause is invalid, including “commutative justice”, flexible application of gross fault, “reciprocity of obligations” and “total absence of cause of the obligation” (para. 39, citing d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (3rd ed. 2018), at no. 2980). [29] the court of appeal therefore concluded that the trial judge had not erred in finding that the non-liability clause was inoperative for the purposes of art. 1438 ccq, as the clause affected a fundamental obligation of the contract (para. 41). the court explained that the question was whether the clause [translation] “drains the contract of its essential effect or paralyzes the fundamental obligation” (para. 45). to apply the clause in the instant case would, when all is said and done, amount to allowing createch “to free itself from its fundamental obligation and would strip the [c]ontract of its essential effect” (para. 49). the court of appeal dismissed the incidental appeal on the basis that the trial judge had made no palpable and overriding error with respect to the three grounds that were raised. iv. issue [30] the issue in this case is a question of law: can createch’s failure to perform a fundamental obligation of the contract render cl. 7 of this contract inoperative? this question cannot be dissociated from the legal context of the case: createch’s breach of an obligation of means was a simple fault and not a gross or intentional fault this contractual fault caused material injury and not bodily or moral injury. the clause on which createch relies is in a contract by mutual agreement that was negotiated by two sophisticated legal persons and not in a contract of adhesion or a consumer contract. does the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation — which unquestionably forms part of quebec law in certain legal contexts — apply to the fault committed by createch so as to negate cl. 7 of the contract? [31] it bears noting that we will be using the generic term “non-liability clause” to refer to a clause “by which the parties agree in advance to exclude or limit the debtor’s liability resulting from the non-performance of an obligation” (private law dictionary and bilingual lexicons (2nd ed. 1991), by p-a. crépeau, ed., at p 288). to distinguish a clause that excludes liability from one that limits it, we will use, for the former, “exoneration clause” and, for the latter, “limitation of liability clause”; where the distinction between the two is of no consequence for our purposes, we will use the term “non-liability clause”. although theoretically distinct, these clauses are often dealt with together both in legislation and by judges and academic commentators (see, eg, art. 1474 ccq, and the explanations in j. e. c. brierley and r. a. macdonald, eds., quebec civil law: an introduction to quebec private law (1993), at no. 523). v arguments of the parties [32] createch argues that the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation cannot apply in the context of a contract by mutual agreement, submitting that [translation] “it would be inconsistent to disallow an exoneration clause merely because it affects the ‘essence of the contract’” (af, at para. 38 (emphasis in original)) although the doctrine is relevant in certain cases of abuse of bargaining power or imbalance between contracting parties that have been identified by the legislature, createch asserts that it cannot apply in this case and that the opposite conclusion would be contrary to the scheme of the code. even though its fault in this case relates to a fundamental obligation, createch points out that the contract contains a limitation of liability clause and that such clauses have been considered valid in quebec law since the end of the 19th century. the legislature has thus left the parties free to limit, or even to completely exclude, contractual liability in the name of autonomy of the will, a principle that was retained in the civil code of québec, provided that such limitation or exclusion is not otherwise prohibited by law to exclude one’s liability for a simple fault by contract “is not contrary to public order” (af, at para. 37, fn. 52) where what is at issue is the apportionment of risk in a complex commercial contract that has been negotiated freely, because there is no inequality or unfairness to correct. [33] createch adds that the clause in question does not deprive the obligation of its cause. quoting various academic commentators, createch submits that the concept of cause of the obligation [translation] “would be relevant only if the clause denied the creditor any remedy in the event of nonperformance” (af, at para. 64 (emphasis deleted), quoting lluelles and moore, at no. 2980). what is more, to relax the concept of gross fault would be contrary to the definition set out in art. 1474 ccq, and such a conclusion would at any rate be inconsistent with the trial judge’s findings of fact. [34] prelco counters that the doctrine justifies the trial judge’s conclusion that a non-liability clause that applies to a fundamental obligation is inoperative for that reason alone prelco proposes, citing, among others, cie immobilière viger ltée v. giguère inc., [1977] 2 scr 67, that despite the code’s apparent silence, this rule drawn from the decided cases and the academic literature applies to contracts by mutual agreement as much as to contracts of adhesion or consumer contracts there was nothing wrong with the conclusion of the courts below, as a contract clause cannot be used to [translation] “change the nature of the contract” by removing “its entire substance” (transcript, at p 69). not only is there nothing in the code to bar this rule developed by the courts and authors, but a number of its provisions in fact represent a basis for the doctrine on which the trial judge and the court of appeal relied in the instant case. [35] first, prelco argues that the justification for the doctrine according to which a non-liability clause is invalid in the event of a breach of a fundamental obligation can be found in the foundations of the quebec law of obligations, including the duty to honour one’s contractual undertakings (art. 1458 ccq). second, it submits that various concepts of our civil law confirm that the doctrine exists and is legitimate, including the principle of reciprocity of obligations (arts. 1378, 1380 and 1381 ccq), those of good faith and equity in contractual relations (arts. 6, 7, 1375 and 1434 ccq), and the concept of cause of the obligation (art. 1371 ccq). third, it argues that coherence in contracting, one of the principles on which the doctrine is based, requires that any non-liability clause whose effect would be to strip the contract of its purpose be annulled (art. 1427 ccq). vi applicable legal framework [36] for the reasons that follow, and with respect, we are of the view that the clause should be found to be valid despite the breach of a fundamental obligation alleged against createch first, clauses like this one are permitted by the code, and none of the circumstances in which the legislature has provided that such a clause would be invalid on the basis of public order — what is known as “legislative” or “formal” public order — apply in this case. although the general law does allow for the evolution of the concept of public order through judicial action — what is known as “judicial” or “virtual” public order — there is every reason to believe that the scheme of the code excludes such an innovation for the clause at issue here (on the distinction between legislative public order and judicial public order, see lluelles and moore, at no. 1905). second, it is true that certain clauses, such as a no obligation clause (clause de non-obligation) that negates or excludes all of the debtor’s obligations, can have the effect of depriving an obligation of its cause and impairing its validity however, a non-liability clause does not by its nature have the effect of negating obligations. it is noteworthy that there are authors who argue that an exoneration clause can in some cases be likened to a no obligation clause that deprives the obligation of its cause if the effect of the clause is not only to exclude damages claims, but also to release the debtor from any obligation to the creditor. this position certainly does not lack a theoretical basis, but it is not exempt from criticism either. in any event, as we will see, it does not apply in this case, because that is not the effect of the non-liability clause at issue here. [37] we propose to consider the various arguments raised by the parties with respect to the two possible legal bases for the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation in two steps: (a) validity of the clause having regard to public order; and (b) validity of the clause having regard to the requirement relating to the cause of the obligation. a. the non-liability clause is inoperative because it violates a rule of public order [38] it is not disputed that the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation applies in quebec positive law, in relation to consumer contracts and contracts of adhesion in particular as is expressly provided for in art. 1437 ccq. in specific contexts in which one or the other of these types of contracts is involved, the legislature has departed from the principle of autonomy of the will in order to neutralize “abusive” clauses that are excessively and unreasonably detrimental to the other party, a consumer or adhering party. article 1437 para. 2 ccq characterizes as abusive a clause which so departs from the fundamental obligations that it changes the nature of the contract. however, this appeal is instead concerned with determining the scope of the doctrine in a context other than that of consumer contracts, in relation to a contract whose clauses were negotiated freely and could accordingly be the subject of mutual concessions by the parties. [39] it is common ground that non-liability clauses are valid in principle. this rule, originally stated by this court in obiter in the glengoil steamship co v. pilkington (1897), 28 scr 146, was subsequently, despite some hesitation, accepted in positive law, with the effect that its place is now certain (lluelles and moore, at no. 2969). the validity in principle of non-liability clauses is based on autonomy of the will and its corollary, freedom of contract, both of which are general principles of the general law of obligations. it is clear that the principle of freedom of contract itself [translation] “is not expressed as such in the civil code”, but that it has, as a basis and also as its principal limit, the free exercise of civil rights circumscribed by public order (j. pineau, d. burman and s. gaudet, théorie des obligations (4th ed. 2001), by j. pineau and s. gaudet, at no. 156, inferring the principle from art. 9 ccq). in our view, the modern principle that freedom of contract is subject to public order informs the general law of obligations as a general principle of law within the meaning of the preliminary provision of the code (see j. pineau, “la philosophie générale du code civil”, in le nouveau code civil: interprétation et application — les journées maximilien-caron 1992 (1993), 269, at p 285). [40] the validity in principle of non-liability clauses is subject to the same limits established in the civil code of québec with respect to public order although the principles from glengoil are not explicitly stated in the code either, they might be thought to have been reaffirmed in it through the modern principle of freedom of contract even though their scope has been limited further by the broader role conferred on mandatory rules in contract matters (lluelles and moore, at nos. 1809 and 2969). it might also be said that the validity in principle of such clauses is implicitly recognized by the effect of arts. 1474 and 1475 ccq (see j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obligations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at no. 868; p-a. crépeau, “la fonction du droit des obligations” (1998), 43 mcgill lj 729, at pp. 759-62). [41] in glengoil, taschereau j., while noting that such clauses are not, in principle, contrary to public order, held that they must be construed strictly (pp. 158-59). any ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the exercise of the right to exact performance by equivalence as reparation for an injury (see lluelles and moore, at nos. 2969 and 2986; c. masse, “civil liability (law of obligations iii)”, in reform of the civil code, vol. 2-b, obligations iii, v, vi (1993), at no. 94; jobin and vézina, at no. 875; f. levesque, précis de droit québécois des obligations: contrat, responsabilité, exécution et extinction (2014), at no. 493) parties are thus free to stipulate non-liability clauses, provided of course that the other conditions relating to the validity of the contractual obligation are satisfied. [42] the validity in principle of non-liability clauses is, however, limited by legislative and judicial public order (aside from glengoil, at p 158, see, eg,. bruker v. marcovitz, 2007 scc 54, [2007] 3 scr 607, at paras. 61-62; goulet v. transamerica life insurance co of canada, 2002 scc 21, [2002] 1 scr 719, at paras. 43-46; garcia transport ltée v. royal trust co., [1992] 2 scr 499; lluelles and moore, at nos. 1907-8 and 1914). in private law, respect for public order is set up as a mandatory rule of general application (see arts. 8 and 9 ccq). [43] in the context in question here, the principle of freedom of contract as a basis for the validity in principle of non-liability clauses is confirmed implicitly in art. 1474 ccq: 1474. a person may not exclude or limit his liability for material injury caused to another through an intentional or gross fault; a gross fault is a fault which shows gross recklessness, gross carelessness or gross negligence. he may not in any way exclude or limit his liability for bodily or moral injury caused to another. [44] the legislature has set out exceptions to the modern conception of this principle. taking a cautious attitude, it provided that a notice stipulating exclusion from or limitation of contractual liability has effect with respect to the creditor only if the party who invokes the notice proves that the other party was aware of its existence at the time the contract was formed (art. 1475 ccq). article 1474 ccq, a provision for which there was no equivalent in the civil code of lower canada (j. pineau, “theory of obligations”, in reform of the civil code, vol. 2-a, obligations i, ii, at no. 176), also sets limits in the name of public order, but it does not refer to the fundamental obligation concept. [45] first of all, the first paragraph of art. 1474 ccq, by prohibiting non-liability clauses where there is gross or intentional fault, discourages recklessness, fraud, negligence and deliberate faults (see lluelles and moore, at no. 2975; jobin and vézina, at no. 870; djamad v banque royale du canada, 2021 qcca 371, at paras. 46-49 (canlii); audet v. transamerica life canada, 2012 qcca 1746, [2012] rjq 1844, at paras. 90-91) this paragraph codifies a well-established moralizing trend in the jurisprudence that relates to the nature of the debtor’s conduct rather than directly to the creditor’s vulnerability (lluelles and moore, at nos. 2975 and 2976; jobin and vézina, at no. 870). we would add that the paragraph’s wording suggests that this limit on freedom of contract applies even in contracts by mutual agreement such as the one at issue in the case at bar. even in a freely negotiated agreement, the parties cannot circumvent it. this means that the debtor cannot rely on a non-liability clause after deliberately refusing to perform his or her obligation (lluelles and moore, at no. 2975). [46] next, the second paragraph of art. 1474 ccq relates to the nature of the injury, reflecting a legislative policy of public order that is distinct from the one being applied in the first paragraph and is focused on protecting the human person (lluelles and moore, at no. 2971; é. cossette-lefebvre, “chronique — plaidoyer en faveur du rejet de la ‘théorie de l’obligation essentielle’ en droit civil québécois: critique de l’arrêt 6362222 canada inc. c. prelco inc., 2019 qcca 1457, à la lueur du droit comparé”, repères, november 2020 (available on la référence), at no. 14; n. vézina, “préjudice matériel, corporel et moral: variations sur la classification tripartite du préjudice dans le nouveau droit de la responsabilité” (1993), 24 rdus 161, at p 171; pineau, “la philosophie générale du code civil”, at p 284). the legislature thus made it clear that, regardless of the seriousness of the fault and despite the principle of freedom of contract, no one may exclude or limit his or her liability for bodily or moral injury. these are examples that come within public order of direction — a principle “the purpose of which is to regulate the economy in the general interest of society either by restricting contractual freedom or, less frequently, by reinstating it” — and necessitate the absolute nullity of incompatible clauses (private law dictionary and bilingual lexicons — obligations (2003), by p-a. crépeau, ed., at p 246, “public order of direction”). [47] as for art. 1437 ccq, it sets a limit that is of public order of protection, that is, one the purpose of which is to protect a contracting party who is presumed to be economically weaker: 1437. an abusive clause in a consumer contract or contract of adhesion is null, or the obligation arising from it may be reduced. an abusive clause is a clause which is excessively and unreasonably detrimental to the consumer or the adhering party and is therefore contrary to the requirements of good faith; in particular, a clause which so departs from the fundamental obligations arising from the rules normally governing the contract that it changes the nature of the contract is an abusive clause. [48] this article expressly recognizes the application of the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation in quebec civil law where there is an abusive contract clause, but limits it to consumer contracts (defined in art. 1384 ccq) and contracts of adhesion (art. 1379 ccq), which are characterized by an imbalance between the parties in accordance with this legislative basis for the doctrine, which falls under public order of protection, an exoneration clause or limitation of liability clause that would otherwise be permitted will be invalid if it relates to a fundamental obligation (see, eg,. v. karim, les obligations (5th ed 2020), vol. 1, at nos. 2315-19, 2288 and 3909; masse, at no. 96; s. ghozlan, “la notion d’obligation essentielle dans le cadre du contrôle des clauses abusives: étude des systèmes juridiques français et québécois” (2015), 49 rjtum 399, at pp. 413-16 and 434-40; cossette-lefebvre, at no. 39; ferme franky 2004 inc v gestions pierre saint-cyr inc (centrale de contrôle d’alarmes du québec), 2014 qcca 848, at para. 3 (canlii)). [49] the existence of the rule of nullity of abusive clauses in consumer contracts and contracts of adhesion indicates — out of a concern for protecting contracting parties who are considered to be at a disadvantage — that these two types of contractual relationships do not fully favour the realization of the ideal of contractual fairness based on absolute autonomy of the will in accordance with this exceptional treatment of consumer contracts and contracts of adhesion, a clause that departs from the fundamental obligations of a contract to such an extent that it changes the nature of the contract is considered to be abusive, and therefore null. this limit on the validity of non-liability clauses is in addition to art. 1474 ccq, the effects of which are not confined to the specific context of consumer contracts or contracts of adhesion (s. grammond, a-f. debruche and y. campagnolo, quebec contract law (3rd ed. 2020), at no. 361). [50] the validity or effectiveness of a non-liability clause is also open to challenge in other cases specified by the legislature in relation to nominate contracts (jobin and vézina, at no. 868; lluelles and moore, at no. 2970; levesque, at no. 488; p-g. jobin and m. cumyn, la vente (4th ed. 2017), at no. 201). this is true of, among others, a contract of lease in the residential context (arts. 1863, 1893 and 1900 para. 1 ccq;. karrum realties inc. v. ama investments inc., 2007 qcca 880, at para. 35 (canlii); 9092-3335 québec inc v 4364856 canada inc., 2019 qccs 3666, at para. 35 (canlii)), a contract of sale (arts. 1732 and 1733 ccq;. association pour la protection des automobilistes inc v toyota canada inc., 2008 qcca 761, [2008] rjq 918, at para. 34), carriage (art. 2070 ccq) or employment (art. 2092 ccq;. quebec (commission des normes du travail) v. asphalte desjardins inc., 2014 scc 51, [2014] 2 scr 514, at para. 53), or a deposit with an innkeeper (art. 2298 ccq). it is also true of a consumer contract as a result of s 10 of the consumer protection act, cqlr, c. p-40.1 (n. l’heureux and m. lacoursière, droit de la consommation (6th ed. 2011), at nos. 60 and 71). but these provisions constitute specific rules adopted by the legislature to govern certain nominate contracts, and not the implementation of a rule of general application. [51] because these various legislative provisions are each tailor-made to apply to the needs of a specific nominate contract, their effect is often to render all non-liability clauses inoperative, but some of them instead regulate the extent to which one may resort to such clauses. in all these cases, however, the purpose of the limit placed on freedom of contract is to protect parties who are weak or at a disadvantage economically. we would reiterate that the code provides for no like rule of general application that falls under public order of protection, including one relating to a breach of a fundamental obligation in other words, if an impugned clause has been freely negotiated, is compatible with the constraints provided for in arts. 1474 and 1475 ccq and is not specifically regulated, it cannot be excluded on the basis of legislative public order. the legislature also set out mandatory rules of liability that parties cannot avoid by contract (see, eg, art. 2118 ccq;. j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers and b. moore, la responsabilité civile, vol. 2, responsabilité professionnelle (9th ed. 2020), at no. 2-257; j. deslauriers, vente, louage, contrat d’entreprise ou de services (2nd ed. 2013), at nos. 2475-77; v. karim, contrats d’entreprise (ouvrages mobiliers et immobiliers: construction et rénovation), contrat de prestation de services (obligations et responsabilité des professionnels) et l’hypothèque légale (4th ed. 2020), at no. 1639). [52] furthermore, the policy adopted in quebec civil law with respect to lesion, as codified in the reform of the civil code of québec, which came into force in 1994, confirms the importance attached to autonomy of the will in this context the restrictions imposed on freedom of contract in the case of lesion, like those set out in art. 1437 ccq, have only a targeted purpose article 1405 ccq provides that lesion vitiates consent only with respect to minors and protected persons of full age (see p-g. jobin, “l’étonnante destinée de la lésion et de l’imprévision dans la réforme du code civil au québec”, [2004] rtd civ. 693). although the civil code revision office proposed the enactment of a provision of general application with respect to lesion, the code’s provisions instead give preference to the principle of autonomy of the will and to the [translation] “stability of business relations” when it comes to contractual relationships between unprotected persons of full age (j. pineau, “la philosophie générale du nouveau code civil du québec” (1992), 71 can. bar rev. 423, at pp. 438-39; lluelles and moore, at no. 880; m. lemieux, “les clauses abusives dans les contrats d’adhésion” (2000), 41 c de d 61, at pp. 64 and 76-82). [53] in other words, the principle of freedom of contract ensures, for the general law of contracts, contractual fairness absent express exceptions. in rare circumstances, an unprotected person of full age may invoke lesion where that is permitted by law (eg, with respect to partition of the family patrimony (art. 424 ccq) or to a loan of money (art. 2332 ccq)). at first blush, therefore, we remain in the [translation] “free zone” in which freedom of contract is not limited by public order (pineau, “la philosophie générale du nouveau code civil du québec”, at p 439) as the court explained in churchill falls (labrador) corp. v. hydro-québec, 2018 scc 46, [2018] 3 scr 101, “restrictions on consensualism generally take the form of exceptions and specific rules” (para. 102). [54] we accept createch’s view that this permissive approach in quebec law to the validity of a non-liability clause where there is a breach of a fundamental obligation is to some extent echoed in this court’s decisions in cases originating in the common law provinces createch points in particular to how the courts have treated the analogous concept, the doctrine of “fundamental breach”, a judge-made criterion that was formerly used as a substantive rule to be applied in order to declare that a non-liability clause was inoperative (tercon, at para. 106, citing karsales (harrow) ltd. v. wallis, [1956] 1 wlr 936 (ca)). developments in the common law are of course not determinative of our analysis, given that any answer to the question raised in this appeal must be based on the principles of quebec civil law (see, eg,. abb inc. v. domtar inc., 2007 scc 50, [2007] 3 scr 461, at para. 85). we would add that the court of appeal was right to suggest that, where the sources of the law are concerned, the civil law doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation has a history of its own that is shaped by quebec’s legislation, jurisprudence and academic commentary and is not dictated by sources from other jurisdictions (paras. 24-25) nevertheless, this consideration of the common law remains relevant to quebec law for the purpose of determining how the civil law doctrine gives way to freedom of contract, while at the same time abiding by principles whose purpose is to protect vulnerable parties. [55] as long ago as 1989, in hunter engineering co. v. syncrude canada ltd., [1989] 1 scr 426, dickson c.j had referred to the principle drawn from the academic commentary that not all exclusion clauses are unreasonable, and stressed that the common law doctrine of fundamental breach must take this reality into account. dickson cj noted that in the commercial context, such clauses “are negotiated as part of the general contract” (p 461) and that they can therefore reflect gains or concessions that sophisticated parties considered fair in the circumstances rather than systematically attacking such clauses, he wrote, “there is much to be gained by addressing directly the protection of the weak from over-reaching by the strong” (p 462). in tercon, the court laid “to rest” the generalized application of this common law doctrine of fundamental breach (paras. 62 and 81). binnie j., writing for the court on this point, broke the new analytical approach for non-liability clauses down into three distinct stages: (1) the clause must be interpreted in order to determine whether it applies to the circumstances established in evidence; (2) it must be asked whether “the . . . clause was unconscionable at the time the contract was made, ‘as might arise from situations of unequal bargaining power between the parties’”; and (3) if the clause is held to be applicable and valid, it must be asked whether it is nonetheless inoperative “because of the existence of an overriding public policy” (paras. 122-23, quoting hunter, at p 462; see also j. d. mccamus, the law of contracts (3rd ed. 2020), at pp. 893-94) thus, to repeat the principle stated in hunter, “[e]xplicitly addressing concerns of unconscionability and inequality of bargaining power allows the courts to focus expressly on the real grounds for refusing to give force to a contractual term said to have been agreed to by the parties” (p 462). [56] while we will go no further in attempting to reconcile the different approaches of the two traditions, it thus follows that at common law, as in civil law, there is a concern with specific situations of abuse and contractual imbalance as well as with other cases that are contrary to public order, or are matters of “public policy”, but at the same time an acceptance that a non-liability clause in a freely negotiated contract can be a fair solution having regard to the context of the negotiations. it can therefore be said that neither of the two legal traditions has a rule of general application that totally prohibits non-liability clauses relating to fundamental obligations in contracts between sophisticated parties (see s. grammond, “la règle sur les clauses abusives sous l’éclairage du droit comparé” (2010), 51 c de d 83, at p 109). [57] is it nonetheless possible that the general law of obligations includes limits based on public order that are not set out in the civil code of québec? in other words, is there a [translation] “new restriction” (lluelles and moore, at no. 2978) on the principle of autonomy of the will — one that is imperative — that concerns breaches of fundamental obligations and whose purpose is to protect the general interest of society or economically weaker contracting parties? as we explained above, it is not for the legislature alone to articulate rules of public order that limit freedom of contract. the development of judicial public order is of course a matter for the courts: in some circumstances a court might hold that a provision enacted by the legislature is mandatory, while in others it might articulate a new legal principle as a rule of public order (godbout v longueuil (ville de), [1995] rjq 2561 (ca), at p 2570 (per baudouin ja), aff’d [1997] 3 scr 844; jobin and vézina, at no. 100; lluelles and moore, at no. 1922). given that the rule that non-liability clauses are valid in principle is itself not explicitly stated in the code, the question whether or not a rule regarding breaches of fundamental obligations exists is equally relevant. [58] as the parties agree, it is a well-known fact that innovations by judges and authors are not unknown in the civil law, and as beetz j put it in a comment that has been repeated many times, “[t]he civil code does not contain the whole of civil law” (viger, at p 76; see, eg,. bank of montreal v. kuet leong ng, [1989] 2 scr 429, at p 442; ostiguy v. allie, 2017 scc 22, [2017] 1 scr 402, at para. 73; p-g. jobin, “la cour suprême et la réforme du code civil” (2000), 79 can. bar rev. 27, at p 36). under the former code, the bulk of the general law with respect to non-liability clauses consisted of principles created by the courts and by authors (j-l. baudouin and p. deslauriers, la responsabilité civile, vol. 1, principes généraux (7th ed. 2007), at no. 1-1375). at that time, the enactment of provisions relating to such clauses in certain specific contexts did not deprive the courts of their power to intervene in this regard (b. moore, “les clauses abusives: dix ans après” (2003), 63 r du b 59, at pp. 63-64). [59] but does the principle stated in viger authorize the judiciary to extend the application of the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation to freely negotiated contracts by mutual agreement between sophisticated legal persons on the basis of public order in the case at bar? in our view, the answer to this question must be no. [60] it should be mentioned that certain authors cited by the court of appeal in its reasons in this case have expressed reservations regarding such an extension of the doctrine through judicial public order. lluelles and moore are of the opinion that the provisions of legislative public order are sufficient in this regard (nos. 2978-79). they note that art. 1437 ccq and art. 1474 ccq can be used to remedy abuse (ibid). in the latter case, although the characterization of gross fault must be focused on the debtor’s conduct (lluelles and moore, at no. 2976; jobin and vézina, at no. 870), nonperformance of a fundamental obligation could be relevant to the analysis on characterization of the debtor’s fault (see, eg,. poissonnerie bari v. gestion inter-parc inc (national tilden), 2002 canlii 111 (que sup. ct.), at paras. 20-23; c. deslauriers-goulet, “l’obligation essentielle dans le contrat” (2014), 55 c de d. 923, at p 947). [61] furthermore, lluelles and moore stress that extending the doctrine would — on the basis of the concept of cause of the obligation, to which we will return below, and not, strictly speaking, on the basis of public order — be relevant [translation] “if the clause denied . . any remedy” (no. 2980; see also no. 1831) moreover, a number of authors note that the legislature’s rejection of rules with respect to lesion between unprotected persons of full age and unforeseeability show that its intention was to bar the courts from intervening on the basis of [translation] “substantive unfairness” (grammond, at p 98; see also lluelles and moore, at no. 1064.5; cossette-lefebvre, at no. 41). they conclude that freedom of contract should continue to apply, absent a gross or intentional fault, to any contract that is neither a contract of adhesion nor a consumer contract (lluelles and moore, at no. 2981). [62] it might be thought that the legislature spoke directly to the purpose of the concept of public order — both of direction and of protection — and intervened to validate the use of non-liability clauses in cases to which art. 1437 ccq does not apply. indeed, at the time of the reform of the civil code, the legislature chose to target contracts of adhesion and consumer contracts and to disregard contracts by mutual agreement, an approach that has led to some criticism; for example, professor jobin and professor vézina write that [translation] “consumer contracts and contracts of adhesion are not alone in having abusive clauses, and contractual fairness should in our opinion be universal” (no. 140). [63] the civil code revision office put forward an argument resembling the one advanced by these authors (report on the québec civil code, vol. i, draft civil code (1978), at p 343, and vol. ii, t 2, commentaries, at p 614). however, not only was this conception of contractual fairness not codified in relation to freely negotiated contracts (cossette-lefebvre, at no. 41; é. charpentier, “pour une interprétation (très) large de l’article 1437 du code civil du québec”, in b. moore, ed., mélanges jean-louis baudouin (2012), 255, at p 267), but the legislature deliberately indicated its preference for freedom of contract in this context throughout the code (see p-g. jobin, “la révision du contrat par le juge dans le code civil”, in e. caparros, ed., mélanges germain brière (1993), 400, at pp. 410-11). [64] the scheme of the code thus reveals a conscious decision by the legislature to strike a balance between the concept of public order and the principle of freedom of contract subject to the constraints provided for in art. 1474 ccq, a person may exclude or limit his or her liability for material injury caused to another through a fault that is neither intentional nor gross. in addition, art. 1475 ccq shows that the legislature, far from being silent on the subject, has permitted the use of such clauses in the name of freedom of contract in the event of material injury, although it has imposed certain limits we would reiterate that these articles draw no distinction between exoneration clauses and limitation of liability clauses the breach of a fundamental obligation is seen as a form of abuse only in the context of consumer contracts and contracts of adhesion under art. 1437 ccq. another basis for this freedom to agree on risk sharing in contracts by mutual agreement can be found in arts. 1613 and 1622 ccq, which confirm that the parties may foresee and stipulate the damages for which they will be liable in the event of nonperformance. regardless of whether an obligation is fundamental or accessory, the parties can agree on damages at the time of formation of the contract, and a court can give effect to such an agreement even if the debtor has committed a simple fault. [65] it would therefore be difficult to say that a party is acting in bad faith merely because he or she is seeking to apply a non-liability clause in a contract that was freely negotiated on equal terms moreover, the presumption of good faith (art. 2805 ccq) is one more basis for asserting that a contracting party may take advantage of such a clause if he or she has not committed an intentional or gross fault. the fact that the person who takes advantage of a non-liability clause has committed a fault does not in itself justify a finding of bad faith on that person’s part. it is true that art. 1437 para. 2 ccq establishes a connection between non-liability clauses and good faith in the context in which that paragraph applies, it can be said that the creditor’s good faith is open to question because of the contractual imbalance, as it is assumed in that exceptional situation that the clause is “excessively and unreasonably” detrimental to the creditor (art. 1437 ccq; compare art. 7 ccq). [66] it should also be mentioned that in a different situation, one in which the non-liability clause affected only an accessory obligation, the commercial and social utility of excluding or limiting one’s liability in a freely negotiated contract would be compromised. from a risk management perspective, non-liability clauses take on their full significance in relation to the principal obligation to be performed as carole aubert de vincelles points out, [translation] “[r]isk management, which is necessary to every contracting strategy, and correlatively to every commercial management strategy, cannot be conducted without limitation of damages clauses (clauses limitatives de réparation)” (“plaidoyer pour un affinement réaliste du contrôle des clauses limitatives de réparation portant sur les obligations essentielles”, [2008] rdc 1034, at no. 9). [67] thus, the code provides for a set of limits and prohibitions that are applicable to non-liability clauses in the context of nominate contracts, but includes no analogous express restriction of general application. the limits and prohibitions that are expressly provided for in the code apply to situations of inequality between contracting parties or are based on other rules of public order deemed to be pertinent by the legislature. aside from these situations, and of course subject to other mandatory rules that are of no consequence here, the general law of obligations leaves the contracting parties free to apportion the risk of nonperformance between them. [68] although our analysis of the scheme of the civil code of québec is determinative of this first ground of appeal, we nevertheless feel that it would be helpful to say a few words about the quebec cases concerning the questions raised by this ground aside from the fact that the legislative context of the civil code of lower canada was very different, it should be noted that in the cases mentioned by authors and cited by the court of appeal in this case to justify a generalized application of the doctrine, this was discussed only in obiter. in most of the cases in which the doctrine has been raised, the courts reached their decisions on the basis either of the requirement of proving knowledge of the non-liability clause or of the concept of gross fault, that is, of concrete cases raising concerns of public order (see conseil des ports nationaux v swift canadian co ltd., [1953] b.r 730; southern canada power co ltd v. conserverie de napierville ltée, [1967] b.r 907; western assurance co v. desgagnés, [1976] 1 scr 286, at p 289; fenêtres st-jean inc. v. banque nationale du canada (1990), 69 dlr (4th) 384 (que. ca);. impact graphics ltd. v. bpg. central security corp., [1995] az-95021939 (que. sup. ct.); empire cold storage co. ltd. v. la cie de volailles maxi ltée, 1995 canlii 4828 (que. ca);. bnp paribas (canada) v. ikea property ltd., 2005 qcca 297, [2005] rra 319, at paras. 121-22). it is therefore understandable that professor claude masse, who favoured the generalized application of the doctrine, recognized in a paper published some time before the civil code of québec came into force that the doctrine was “still not well established in our law” (no. 96; see also lluelles and moore, at no. 2978). [69] furthermore, in samen investments inc. v. monit management ltd., 2014 qcca 826, a case decided under the new code that concerned a contract of mandate and that was mentioned by the court of appeal in the case at bar, it does not seem to have been necessary to refer to the doctrine in order to neutralize the exoneration clause (para. 119 (canlii); in the instant case, the court of appeal in fact stated that the confirmation that the doctrine applied had been an obiter dictum), as the case could have been decided on the basis of the concept of gross or intentional fault (see lluelles and moore, at no. 2981, fn. 130). as for the other cases quoted by the court of appeal, some of them concerned, among other things, a non-liability clause in a contract of adhesion (société de gestion complan (1980) inc. v. bell distribution inc., 2009 qccs 2881, [2009] rdi 569, at para. 53, aff’d 2011 qcca 320, at para. 28 (canlii); thériault v dumas, 2000 canlii 5214 (cq), at pp. 5 and 9-10) or a consumer contract (pruneau v. société d’agriculture du comté de richmond, 2006 qccq 12523, at paras. 70-79 (canlii)), or could be resolved without discussing the doctrine (axa assurances inc v assurances générales des caisses desjardins inc., [2009] rjq. 1104, at para. 267). [70] in conclusion on this point, given the code’s silence in this regard, the basis drawn from the cases and academic commentary that prelco proposes in support of the existence of a rule of public order of general application that would neutralize a non-liability clause affecting a fundamental obligation is too unsettled to be accepted. everything suggests that the legislature deliberately chose not to include such a mandatory rule to regulate such clauses in the civil code of québec, preferring to leave it to sophisticated parties to themselves manage the risks of nonperformance, and that it would be inappropriate in the circumstances to do so in their place. as we explained above, it can be concluded that the civil law does not lack other resources for dealing with situations that are truly contrary to public order (lluelles and moore, at nos. 2969-77; see also cossette-lefebvre, at no. 41). b. the non-liability clause is inoperative because it deprives the obligation of its cause [71] in coming to its conclusion, the court of appeal relied on a second basis: reciprocity of obligations and total absence of cause. this basis is distinct from public order. in the court of appeal’s view, allowing a debtor to rely on a non-liability clause in order to avoid responsibility for his or her breach of a fundamental obligation is contrary to the idea that the debtor’s reciprocal prestation is owed to the creditor, without which the contractual obligation is deprived of its cause. [72] it is clear here that the court of appeal was referring to the requirement, spoken to in art. 1371 ccq, to the effect that it is of the essence of an obligation arising out of a juridical act that there be a cause which justifies its existence. the cause of an obligation, referred to as the “objective” cause, must be distinguished from the cause of a contract, or the “subjective” cause (art. 1410 para. 1 ccq). the “subjective” cause concept concerns each party’s reason for entering into the contract, which must be consistent with the law or with public order, or else the contract will be null (art. 1411 ccq;. lluelles and moore, at nos. 1066-72). [73] the “objective” cause, on the other hand, is related to the classical doctrine of cause in the civil law, that is, the [translation] “logical, impersonal and abstract reason . . that justifies a party’s acceptance of his or her obligations” (jobin and vézina, at nos. 358 and 363) citing henri capitant, professors jobin and vézina explain that the cause of an obligation “is the purpose the parties had in mind at the time of formation of the contract, but in a synallagmatic contract this purpose is the performance of the correlative obligation” (no. 361, citing de la cause des obligations (contrats, engagements unilatéraux, legs) (3rd ed 1927); lluelles and moore, at no. 1063; pineau, burman and gaudet, at nos. 144, 147 and 171). this implies that a court must [translation] “determine that [this interdependence of obligations] exist[ed]” at the time the contract was formed (lluelles and moore, at no. 10643). [74] in quebec law, this objective cause concept is codified in art. 1371 ccq, unlike in france, where it is interspersed throughout the civil code (o. deshayes, t. genicon and y-m. laithier, “la cause a-t-elle réellement disparu du droit français des contrats?” (2017), 13 ercl 418, at pp. 419-21). as justice lebel and professor berthold explain in an academic paper, the civil code revision office had proposed abandoning the concept of cause in quebec law, but the legislature rejected that proposal in 1994 (“la cause”, in v. caron et al., eds., les oubliés du code civil du québec (2014), 193, at pp. 204 and 206). in their opinion, the connection between the concept of cause of the obligation and that of an abusive clause is clear, as the office had proposed abandoning the former, in part because the application of the latter was to be extended to all contracts (civil code revision office, vol. ii, t 2, at p 554; see also pineau, “théorie des obligations”, at no. 8). ultimately, the legislature decided to retain the concept of cause of an obligation and not to adopt a general rule on lesion between persons of full age, but instead adopted a rule of limited scope with respect to the abusive clause concept in art. 1437 ccq. [75] the parties do not dispute that some contract clauses that deprive an obligation of its cause within the meaning of art. 1371 ccq may affect the validity of the obligation. [76] this is true, for example, of certain no obligation clauses that exclude all prestations that would normally be owed by the debtor, with the result that the creditor’s obligations lack reciprocal prestations berthold also speaks of [translation] “no undertaking stipulations” (stipulations de non-engagement), those that exclude “everything one of the parties is normally required to do to ensure that the contractual transaction is carried out” (peut-on donner d’une clause et reprendre de l’autre? essai sur la cause comme instrument de contrôle de la cohérence matérielle du contrat (2016), at no. 99 (emphasis deleted)). in his opinion, it would also be true of no claims clauses (clauses de non-recours), those that deprive the creditor of the obligation of any remedy to sanction nonperformance (nos. 94, 99 and 110; see also lluelles and moore, at nos. 1064.6, 2968 and 2980). such clauses, by negating all of the debtor’s obligations, deprive the correlative obligation of its cause and impair the reciprocal nature of the contractual relationship. [77] the crux of the issue in this appeal is therefore as follows: does a non-liability clause relating to the fundamental obligation of a contract have the effect of depriving the obligation of its cause? are there circumstances in which a non-liability clause is akin to a no obligation clause that does not meet the requirement of art. 1371 ccq? [78] it should be noted that there is a conceptual difference between the no obligation clause and the non-liability clause: the former negates the obligations that would normally be included in the contract, while the latter excludes the liability that would normally flow from nonperformance of the obligations provided for in the contract (see cossette-lefebvre, at no. 28). leveneur-azémar explains that, unlike the no obligation clause, which concerns the prestations a debtor undertakes to perform, [translation] “a non-liability clause applies only at the performance stage, at which it prevents the liability of a debtor who was bound by an obligation but is in default from being triggered” (étude sur les clauses limitatives ou exonératoires de responsabilité (2017), at no. 14). in principle, an exoneration clause or limitation of liability clause affects only the sanction of the payment of damages. it is not, at least by nature, a clause that excludes every obligation or sanction (nos. 17-18). [79] regarding the validity of a non-liability clause where there is a breach of a fundamental obligation, two competing views are advanced by authors. [80] there are some who disagree with the theory that an exoneration clause or limitation of liability clause can deprive the correlative obligation of its cause, as certain no obligation clauses are said to do. in their view, a debtor’s obligation does not cease to exist simply because a clause limits or excludes his or her liability in the event of nonperformance. not only does the non-liability clause leave the obligation intact, it also leaves intact the other sanctions that would normally be available upon nonperformance, such as the exception for nonperformance, specific performance, resolution or resiliation of the contract, or reduction of the correlative obligation (cossette-lefebvre, at no. 29) moreover, because art. 1474 para. 1 ccq bars a debtor from relying on a non-liability clause in a case of gross or intentional fault, and because an arbitrary refusal to perform an obligation would constitute such a fault, the debtor remains bound to perform it: the exoneration clause does not negate the obligation. finally, the authors who support this view are concerned with the possibility of the cause being relied on to produce effects similar to those of lesion in circumstances in which the legislature does not allow for that (see, generally, cossette-lefebvre, at nos. 26-28). [81] there are others who maintain that a non-liability clause that is akin to a no claims clause can in fact deprive an obligation of its cause: [translation] “[w]here payment by equivalence is the only remaining way for the debtor’s obligations to be performed, a stipulation that excludes it altogether has the effect in practice of draining the debtor’s undertaking of all substance and, through a mirror effect, of depriving the creditor’s undertaking of its cause” (berthold, at nos. 124 and 143 (emphasis deleted), and, in the french context, j. rochfeld, cause et type de contrat (1999), at nos. 485-86; aubert de vincelles, at no. 8; p. jestaz, “l’obligation et la sanction: à la recherche de l’obligation fondamentale”, in p. jestaz, ed., autour du droit civil — écrits dispersés, idées convergentes (2005), 325, at p 326). lluelles and moore, although critical of the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation, concede that it could be supported by the concept of total absence of cause, explaining that [translation] “this idea would be relevant only if the clause denied the creditor any remedy in the event of nonperformance” (no. 2980). [82] also according to this view, a simple limitation of liability clause cannot on its own deprive an obligation of its cause. for some authors, however, the objective cause concept should permit a clause to be neutralized not only if the clause negates the cause, but also in cases in which the counterprestation is so trivial or [translation] “insignificant” that it can be considered to be non-existent (see the explanations given by lluelles and moore, at no. 1064.4, and, in a different context, canadian national railway company v ace european group ltd., 2019 qcca 1374, at paras. 41-42 and 45-46 (canlii)) this has allowed some french academic commentators and judges to ensure [translation] “a minimum level of fairness in the contrat” (ibid.; see, eg,. f. terré et al., droit civil: les obligations (12th ed 2019), at nos. 876-78 and 884). [83] thus, there are authors who suggest that the courts must verify [translation] “the reality of the consideration and not simply its materiality” (lluelles and moore, at no. 1064.5), subject, of course, to the fact that “the cause must not be used as a pretext to negate the legislative policy with respect to lesion” (no. 1064.5 (emphasis deleted); see also g. goldstein and n. mestiri, “la liberté contractuelle et ses limites — étude à la lueur du droit civil québécois”, in b. moore, ed., mélanges jean pineau (2003), 299, at pp. 336-37). the authors conclude that this principle could in theory apply to a case in which a non-liability clause relates to a fundamental obligation (lluelles and moore, at nos. 10645-10646). however they assert that, if there is a sanction, the solution advanced by those espousing this view does not apply (no. 1064.5; see also jobin and vézina, at no. 361) it should be mentioned that even authors who are doubtful about this approach recognize that the distinction between a non-liability clause and a no obligation clause is sometimes not watertight (leveneur-azémar, at no. 17). what is certain is that if this theory were to apply, lluelles and moore point out that it should only be possible for the cause of the obligation to determine whether the consideration is insignificant in “extreme cases” (no. 10645). [84] as we will see, this question does not arise with respect to cl. 7 of the contract, because of the sanction provided for in the event of nonperformance. this is not a situation in which the counterprestation is insignificant, and even less one in which it is non-existent the sanction for nonperformance of the fundamental obligation remains, and it cannot be said that the obligation is deprived of its objective cause. this means that the disagreement among the authors is not in issue. [85] in light of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to address the question in the context of this appeal. neither of these positions is without merit. it would therefore be more prudent in the circumstances of this case to refrain from resolving the disagreement in the abstract without taking account of practical difficulties that could arise in the future. [86] thus, art. 1371 ccq applies to contract clauses that negate or exclude all of the debtor’s obligations and, in so doing, deprive the correlative obligation of its cause. where a contract includes such clauses, it can be said that the reciprocal nature of the contractual relationship is called into question (arts. 1371, 1378 para. 1, 1380 para. 1, 1381 para. 1 and 1458 ccq). to apply a more exacting criterion would amount to annulling or revising a contract on assessing the equivalence rather than the existence of the debtor’s prestation and, as a result, to indirectly introducing the concept of lesion, which is narrowly delimited in the code. vii application of the law to the facts of this case [87] in this case, createch committed a fault in performance after having undertaken to deliver and implement, jointly with prelco, a microsoft dynamics nav integrated management solution at the latter company for an estimated $650,574 in consideration. [88] the trial judge concluded his analysis by finding that createch had not committed a gross or intentional fault (paras. 206-8), that its obligation was one of means (para. 205) and that its simple fault related to a fundamental obligation under the contract (para. 220) he also found that the contract, including cl. 7, was a synallagmatic contract for services that had been freely negotiated and was therefore not a contract of adhesion (para. 187), and that the creditor, prelco, was a sophisticated legal person and not a consumer (paras. 210-11) in other words, neither art. 1437 ccq nor the consumer protection act applied to the contract. finally, the injury for which prelco was seeking reparation was a material injury and not a bodily or moral injury within the meaning of art. 1474 ccq. these findings have not been contested. [89] the trial judge found that the clause was a limitation of liability clause (paras. 190-91 and 225), a finding that was endorsed by the court of appeal (para. 49). the limit is described as follows in the first paragraph of the clause: “if such damages result from the delivery of unsatisfactory services, createch’s liability shall be limited to the amount of any fees paid in relation to the said unsatisfactory services.” [90] prelco correctly notes that it is necessary, in interpreting a contract, to take account of the rules of interpretation set out in the code, including art. 1427, which requires that each clause be given “the meaning derived from the contract as a whole”. but it is not the interpretation of the clause that is in issue here. rather, the trial judge found that createch’s breach rendered cl. 7 of the contract inoperative. with respect, that finding resulted from an error of law. we are also of the view that the court of appeal erred in law in its justification for upholding the trial judge’s decision to declare cl. 7 inoperative because of createch’s contractual fault. [91] on the basis of the rule stated by this court in glengoil and reaffirmed under the auspices of the civil code of québec, cl. 7 is valid and the parties were free to include it in the contract. it should be understood that prelco’s argument is based on a perception of unfairness that being said, there is nothing in this case that would require the courts to intervene to protect a party who is weak or at a disadvantage economically moreover, prelco is advancing no coherent argument based on a justification related to the general interest of society, such as protection of the human person, that would allow for judicial intervention this suggests to us that a judge cannot, in the name of judicial public order, propose a principle that is inconsistent with the scheme of the code where there is no legislative basis for doing so. clause 7 thus does not violate any rule of legislative or judicial public order, nor is there any specific rule relating to nominate contracts that applies to the facts of this case. [92] prelco erroneously sought to present breach of a fundamental obligation as a separate category of fault, one that is more serious than or qualitatively different from a simple fault, while at the same time accepting the trial judge’s finding of fact that createch had not committed a gross or intentional fault. prelco offers no authority for this recharacterization of an act or omission giving rise to liability, which is at odds with the general theory of contractual liability we note as well that where the legislature imposes liability on the debtor for breach of a fundamental obligation, as it has done in art. 1437 ccq for the benefit of a consumer or an adhering party, a simple fault suffices to trigger the debtor’s liability as long as the conditions for contractual liability are met. [93] what can be said about the argument, taken up in part by the court of appeal, that cl. 7 is inoperative because of the [translation] “reciprocity of obligations” or the “concept of total absence of cause of the obligation” (ca reasons, at para. 39)? [94] in this case, cl. 7 is not a no obligation clause that would exclude the reciprocity of obligations despite the wording of cl. 7, createch owed substantial obligations to prelco, which prelco does not deny. [95] even if it were necessary to accept the position of the authors in whose opinion a no claims clause can deprive an obligation of its cause — which we are not doing here — the non-liability clause at issue in this case could not be so characterized. it is true that the clause is strict and that it significantly limits the sanctions that can be imposed on createch. prelco correctly asserts that, as far as damages are concerned, the clause in question resembles an exoneration clause. although the first paragraph of cl. 7 permits an action in damages that is limited to amounts paid, the second paragraph has the effect of excluding any entitlement to damages for injuries from a non-exhaustive list that are a consequence of the debtor’s default a limitation of liability clause would allow reparation to be obtained for those injuries but would limit the amount of the reparation however, the first paragraph can be equated to an authorization of specific performance by replacement in light of art. 1602 para. 1 ccq, which provides that, “[w]here the debtor is in default, the creditor may perform the obligation or cause it to be performed at the expense of the debtor”, the meaning of the clause limiting createch’s liability to the “amount of any fees paid in relation to the said unsatisfactory services” is easy to understand. this clause permits prelco both to keep the integrated management system and to obtain damages for unsatisfactory services, as well as to be compensated for necessary costs for specific performance by replacement finally, we would add that according to the words chosen by the contracting parties themselves, these limits on liability apply “unless such damages result from gross negligence or wilful misconduct on createch’s part”, which words are consistent with the constraints of public order provided for in art. 1474 para. 1 ccq. [96] in short, the stipulation in cl. 7 of the contract excludes any reparation for loss of profits arising from a simple fault the amount prelco can claim under that clause is therefore limited to what results “from the delivery of unsatisfactory services” by createch, and in such circumstances “createch’s liability shall be limited to the amount of any fees paid in relation to the said unsatisfactory services”. the damages in question here total $79,200, that is, the amount of prelco’s claim for fees paid to irisco. [97] the trial judge’s finding was unequivocal: if the items “software” and “maintenance” were excluded from the claim for an overpayment for the services provided by createch, prelco had not discharged its burden of showing “what portion of the $1,520,000 represented unnecessary work from which [it] does not now benefit” (para. 233). because createch’s work was found to be useful, the clause barred that claim. however, that would not have been the case had the system been found to be unnecessary for prelco’s purposes. [98] there is therefore a cause we also understand that prelco’s objections relate not to the existence of that counterprestation, but to its significance. in principle, however, the requirement provided for in art. 1371 ccq that there be a cause is met if the cause exists, because its existence is what justifies the other party’s obligation. in light of createch’s alleged breach in relation to its fundamental obligation, cl. 7 does not deprive the contractual obligation of its cause, but determines the extent of the debtor’s liability for the simple fault identified by the trial judge. [99] even if we were to concede for the sake of argument that the fact that a sanction is insignificant would justify a conclusion that there is no cause, it could not be argued that such is the case in this appeal. the clause does not exclude all sanctions. in this case, it must instead be concluded that, from the moment the contract was formed, specific performance was possible, and indeed contemplated, in the event of nonperformance. in fact, prelco has conceded this point in this court, as it explains in its factum that it gave createch a “chance to correct its errors and make specific performance”. as createch states, in the circumstances of this case, the non-liability clause in the contract could be characterized as being equivalent to a clause providing for specific performance by replacement (art. 1602 ccq). the effect of the clause thus relates to liability and not to the very existence of the obligation. [100] it is clear that prelco is using the concept of objective cause to ground its argument that cl. 7 should be declared to be inoperative because it creates an imbalance in prestations and not, strictly speaking, a situation in which this synallagmatic contract has no counterprestation whatsoever. but that is not the purpose of art. 1371 ccq. the cause of the obligation does not permit a court to create a scheme for lesion between unprotected persons of full age; such a scheme has in fact been rejected by the legislature. [101] one last point needs to be considered. in principle, where a clause negates a correlative obligation, [translation] “it is the contract itself that will succumb to the annulment of the correlative obligation” (lluelles and moore, at no. 2980, fn. 127; see also art. 1416 ccq). pursuant to art. 1438 ccq, however, the nullity of the contract may be partial in appropriate circumstances, that is, [translation] “unless it is apparent that the contract may be considered only as an indivisible whole” (jobin and vézina, at no. 398; see also levesque, at no. 202; pineau, burman and gaudet, at nos. 203 and 205; karim, les obligations, at nos. 2353-54 and 2357; berthold, at no. 165; lluelles and moore, at no. 1876). this court accepted this position in fortin v. chrétien, 2001 scc 45, [2001] 2 scr 500, at paras. 34-37. as professor berthold explains, [translation] “by removing the conflicting stipulation from the contract”, a court is merely re-establishing the exchange agreed on by the parties (no. 150). what it does is neutralize the legally problematic clause rather than categorically concluding that “the parties to a synallagmatic contract did not intend to make an exchange” (no. 151 (emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted)). [102] although the trial judge did not directly address the application of art. 1438 ccq, he noted that the parties had agreed on [translation] “risk sharing” and that createch had therefore given a discount on its regular rates (paras. 20-22). moreover, createch is correct to argue that a party can often obtain a [translation] “favourable price” in exchange for a limitation of liability clause. it might therefore be thought that this means the contract is an indivisible whole as for prelco, it instead argues that there was no connection between the clause at issue in this appeal and the “risk sharing” negotiated for a [translation] “cost overrun” (transcript, at p 61) because the contract, including cl. 7, is valid, the issue of nullity — total or partial — does not arise in this appeal, and it is unnecessary to discuss it further. viii conclusion [103] in summary, given that neither of the bases for the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation applies and that none of the respondent’s arguments are accepted, it is our view that the trial judge and the court of appeal erred in law in finding that the limitation of liability clause in the contract was inoperative. that clause is not ambiguous, and the trial judge could not annul it. the will of the parties had to be respected. nor could the concept of cause of an obligation justify the decision of the courts below in this case. [104] for these reasons, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the quebec court of appeal is set aside in part, as is the trial judge’s decision regarding the award against createch on prelco’s heads of claim for claims from customers, loss of profits on sales made and loss of profits on sales lost createch is entitled to its costs throughout. appeal allowed with costs throughout.
[1] the concept of expropriation concerns the power of a public authority to deprive a property [1] la notion d’expropriation réfère au pouvoir, pour une autorité publique, de priver un propriétaire [2018] 2 rcs. lorraine (ville) c 2646-8926 québec inc le juge en chef 581 owner of the enjoyment of the attributes of his or her right of ownership. because of the importance attached to private property in liberal democracies, the exercise of the power to expropriate is strictly regulated to ensure that property is expropriated for a legitimate public purpose and in return for a just indemnity. in quebec, the expropriation act, cqlr, c. e-24, limits the exercise of this power and lays down the procedure to be followed in this regard. [2] when property is expropriated outside this leg- islative framework for an ulterior motive, such as to avoid paying an indemnity, the expropriation is said to be disguised. where a municipal government improperly exercises its power to regulate the uses permitted within its territory in order to expropriate property without paying an indemnity, two remedies are therefore available to aggrieved owners. they can seek to have the by- law that resulted in the expropri- ation declared either to be null or to be inoperable in respect of them. if this option is no longer open to them, they can claim an indemnity based on the value of the property that has been wrongly taken from them. [3] this appeal concerns an action to annul zoning by- laws that had the effect, according to the owner of one lot, of unlawfully expropriating it. de la jouissance des attributs de son droit de propriété sur un bien. compte tenu de l’importance accordée à la propriété privée dans les démocraties libérales, l’exercice du pouvoir d’exproprier est strictement encadré afin de veiller à ce que les expropriations soient accomplies pour des fins publiques légitimes et moyennant une juste indemnité. au québec, la loi sur l’expropriation, rlrq, c. e-24, limite l’exercice de ce pouvoir et édicte la procédure à suivre à cet égard. [2] dans les cas où une expropriation est effec- tuée en dehors de ce cadre législatif, pour des mo- tifs obliques, notamment afin d’éviter le paiement d’une indemnité, on dit alors qu’il s’agit d’une ex- propriation déguisée. ainsi, lorsqu’une administra- tion municipale exerce abusivement son pouvoir de réglementer les usages permis sur son territoire dans le but de procéder à une expropriation sans verser d’indemnité, deux modes de réparation s’offrent alors au propriétaire lésé. il peut demander que la réglementation qui a entraîné l’expropriation soit dé- clarée nulle ou inopposable à son égard. dans l’éven- tualité où cette avenue ne lui était plus ouverte, il lui est loisible de réclamer le paiement d’une indemnité correspondant à la valeur du bien dont il est spolié. [3] le présent pourvoi porte sur une demande d’annulation de règlements de zonage qui, selon le propriétaire du lot visé, ont eu pour conséquence de l’exproprier illégalement. [4] the owner’s action in nullity was initially dis- missed by emery j. of the quebec superior court on the ground that it had not been instituted within a reasonable time. the owner appealed that decision to the quebec court of appeal, which concluded that emery j. had failed to consider that the appellants’ adoption of the contested by- laws represented an abuse of power. the court of appeal set aside the decision and declared that the by- laws were inoper- able in respect of the owner. [4] le propriétaire concerné est d’abord débouté devant la cour supérieure du québec, où sa demande en nullité est rejetée par le juge emery au motif qu’elle n’a pas été intentée dans un délai raisonnable. il s’adresse ensuite à la cour d’appel du québec qui exprime l’avis que le juge emery a omis de considé- rer que l’adoption par les appelantes des règlements contestés constitue un abus de pouvoir la cour d’appel infirme la décision et déclare les règlements inopposables au propriétaire. [5] for the reasons that follow, i am of the opin- ion that the only issue before the court of appeal was whether emery j. had exercised his discretion judicially in dismissing the owner’s action in nullity for being out of time. in view of the time that had [5] pour les motifs qui suivent, j’estime que la seule question dont était saisie la cour d’appel con- sistait à déterminer si le juge emery avait exercé judiciairement son pouvoir discrétionnaire en reje- tant, pour cause de tardiveté, la demande en nullité 582 lorraine (ville) v 2646-8926 québec inc the chief justice [2018] 2 scr. elapsed between the adoption of the initial by- law and the contestation, that discretion was indeed exer- cised judicially. a finding that a by- law is inoperable cannot remedy the fact that an action in nullity was brought out of time; both of these grounds — nullity and inoperability — fall within the superior court’s discretion in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to review government actions. moreover, the action, as a procedural conduit, was prescribed under the substantive law applicable to such matters. présentée par le propriétaire. vu le délai écoulé entre l’adoption du règlement initial et la contestation, ce pouvoir a été exercé judiciairement. une conclusion d’inopposabilité d’un règlement ne peut remédier à la tardiveté d’une demande en nullité; ces moyens — nullité et inopposabilité — relèvent tous deux du même pouvoir discrétionnaire dont dispose la cour supérieure dans l’exercice de sa compétence inhé- rente en matière de contrôle des actes de l’adminis- tration. au surplus, en tant que conduit procédural, la demande en justice était prescrite selon le droit substantiel applicable en semblable matière. i would therefore allow the appeal and set aside [6] the court of appeal’s orders declaring the contested by- laws to be inoperable. [6] partant, j’accueillerais le pourvoi et j’annule- rais les ordonnances d’inopposabilité rendues par la cour d’appel à l’égard des règlements contestés. ii background ii contexte [7] on july 7, 1989, 2646-8926 québec inc. (“com- pany”) purchased lot 2 322 934 in the official cadastre of quebec, registration division of terre bonne, in ville de lorraine (“town”). this wooded lot was located in the grand coteau forest. the municipal zoning by- law in force at the time authorized the construction of residential developments. françois pichette, the company’s majority shareholder, was in fact planning to subdivide the lot for residential construction some 15 years in the future. [7] le 7 juillet 1989, la société 2646-8926 qué- bec inc. (« société ») se porte acquéreuse du lot 2 322 934 du cadastre officiel du québec, circonscrip- tion foncière de terre bonne, dans la ville de lorraine (« ville »). ce terrain boisé est situé dans la forêt du grand coteau. la réglementation municipale en ma- tière de zonage alors en vigueur autorise la construc- tion d’ensembles résidentiels. monsieur françois pichette, actionnaire majoritaire de la so ciété, en- visage d’ailleurs d’y réaliser un lotissement domi- ciliaire dans un horizon d’une quinzaine d’années. [8] on june 23, 1991, the town adopted by- law u-91, the effect of which was that approximately 60 percent of the area of the company’s lot became part of a conservation zone. the uses authorized in the zone were limited to recreational and leisure activities, such as hiking and cross- country skiing. as a result, the residential subdivision planned by mr. pichette was no longer possible on the section of the lot affected by the by- law. [8] le 23 juin 1991, la ville adopte le règlement u-91, suivant lequel environ 60 p. 100 de la super- ficie du lot de la société fait désormais partie d’une zone de conservation. les usages qui y sont autori- sés se limitent aux activités récréatives et de loisirs, telles que la randonnée pédestre ou le ski de fond. en conséquence, le lotissement domiciliaire projeté par m. pichette n’est plus possible dans la section du lot touchée par le règlement u-91. [9] mr. pichette did not learn of by- law u-91 until late 2001 or early 2002, when he visited the lot for the first time and saw that some infrastructures for hiking and cross- country skiing, including culverts, stairs, fences and public benches, had been installed on it. [9] monsieur pichette n’apprend l’existence du règlement u-91 que vers la fin de l’année 2001 ou au début de l’année suivante. il se rend alors pour la première fois sur le terrain et constate qu’on y a amé- nagé quelques infrastructures servant à la randonnée pédestre et au ski de fond, notamment des ponceaux, escaliers, clôtures et bancs publics. [2018] 2 rcs. lorraine (ville) c 2646-8926 québec inc le juge en chef 583 in 2003, mr. pichette hired a town planning [10] firm to contact the town and persuade it to amend its by- law. in early 2004, the town informed the company that it did not intend to change the zoning restrictions applicable to the lot. however, it agreed to meet with the company’s representatives. [10] en 2003, m. pichette confie à une firme d’ur- banisme le mandat d’effectuer des démarches au- près de la ville pour la convaincre de modifier sa réglementation. au début de 2004, la ville informe la société qu’elle n’envisage pas de modifier les res- trictions de zonage touchant le lot. elle accepte néan- moins de rencontrer les représentants de la société. [11] in march 2005, the municipalité régionale de comté de thérèse-de blainville (“mrc”) adopted by- law 01-03.3, which set out its land use and de- velopment plan. the map accompanying the plan showed that the company’s lot was in a [trans- lation] “[r]esidential with green spaces” zone in which residential subdivisions were authorized. un- der s. 5 para. 2 of the act respecting land use plan- ning and development, cqlr, c a-191, the town was required to amend its own by- laws to reflect the zoning designation set out in the mrc’s plan. [11] en mars 2005, la municipalité régionale de comté de thérèse-de blainville (« mrc ») adopte le règlement 01-03.3 édictant son schéma d’aménage- ment et de développement. selon la carte accompa- gnant le schéma, le lot de la société fait partie d’une zone « [r]ésidentiel[le] en milieu paysager » où était autorisé le lotissement domiciliaire. suivant l’art. 5 al. 2 de la loi sur l’aménagement et l’urbanisme, rlrq, c a-191, la ville est tenue de modifier sa propre réglementation afin de refléter la désignation de zonage prévue dans le schéma de la mrc. [12] on february 27, 2007, after retaining a law- yer, the company sent the town a letter in which it stated that it considered itself to be a victim of disguised expropriation. on november 2, 2007, the company brought an action against the town in which it sought to have by- law u-91 declared to be null and also asked that the hiking and cross- country skiing infrastructures be removed. those infrastruc- tures were in fact removed before the hearing. [12] le 27  février  2007, après avoir retenu les services d’un avocat, la société fait parvenir à la ville une lettre l’informant qu’elle considère avoir été victime d’une expropriation déguisée. le 2 no- vembre 2007, la société intente contre la ville une action en nullité du règlement u-91, en plus d’exiger le retrait des infrastructures servant à la randonnée pédestre et au ski de fond. ces infrastructures seront retirées avant l’audition. [13] on april  28, 2010, the mrc adopted by- law 10-02, which amended the 2005 land use and development plan by extending an area restricted to [translation] “green space”’ use to the woods of the grand coteau forest. that amendment brought the land use and development plan into line with the restrictive zoning designation for the portion of the company’s lot that was affected by by- law u-91. the company then amended its motion to request that by- law 10-02 also be declared to be null. [13] le 28 avril 2010, la mrc adopte le règle- ment 10-02, qui modifie le schéma d’aménagement et de développement de 2005 en élargissant l’aire d’affectation « espace vert » au boisé de la forêt du grand coteau. cette modification harmonise le schéma avec la désignation de zonage restrictive de la partie du lot de la société qui est touchée par le règlement u-91. la société amende alors sa re- quête pour y ajouter une demande en nullité du rè- glement 10-02. [14] on july 13, 2010, the town adopted by- law urb-03 to replace by- law u-91. the new by- law did not change the uses permitted on the company’s lot. the company once again amended its motion to institute proceedings to ask that this by- law be declared null as well. [14] le 13 juillet 2010, la ville adopte le règlement urb-03, lequel remplace le règlement u-91. ce nouveau règlement n’apporte aucune modification aux usages permis sur le lot de la société. cette der- nière amende une fois de plus sa requête introductive d’instance afin d’exiger que ce règlement soit lui aussi déclaré nul. 584 lorraine (ville) v 2646-8926 québec inc the chief justice [2018] 2 scr. [15] finally, on october 3, 2012, the company added a conclusion to its motion by which it sought an indemnity for disguised expropriation. [15] le 3 octobre 2012, la société ajoute enfin à sa requête une conclusion réclamant une indemnité pour cause d’expropriation déguisée. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire a quebec superior court, 2015 qccs 3135 a cour supérieure du québec, 2015 qccs 3135 [16] at the parties’ request, emery j. of the supe- rior court split the proceeding in order to consider the action in nullity on its own first. the claims for an indemnity for disguised expropriation and for reimbursement of the taxes paid by the company were therefore not resolved. [17] emery j. dismissed the action to annul the three contested by- laws, finding that it was [trans- lation] “prescribed” because it had not been insti- tuted “within a reasonable time during the 10- year prescriptive period” (para. 52 (canlii)). he con- cluded that the company was presumed to have had knowledge of the content of by- law u-91 from the moment it was adopted in 1991 and that 16 years had elapsed between that moment and the filing of the action in nullity in 2007. in emery j.’s opinion, even if it was assumed that the company had not had fac- tual knowledge of the by- law until 2002, that 5-year period would also be unreasonable. he found that the evidence showed that between 2003 and 2007, the town had never expressed any intention of amending its zoning by- law in the company’s favour. [16] à la demande des parties, le juge emery de la cour supérieure scinde l’instance afin d’examiner, dans un premier temps, uniquement la demande en nullité. les demandes sollicitant le paiement d’une indemnité pour cause d’expropriation déguisée, ainsi que le remboursement des taxes payées par la so- ciété, demeurent donc en suspens. [17] le juge emery rejette la demande en nullité visant les trois règlements contestés, estimant qu’elle est « prescrite » parce qu’elle n’a pas été intentée « dans un délai raisonnable au cours de la période de prescription décennale » (par. 52 (canlii)). il conclut que, comme la société est présumée avoir eu connaissance du contenu du règlement u-91 dès l’adoption de celui-ci en 1991, il s’est donc écoulé 16 ans entre le moment de son adoption et le dépôt de la demande en nullité en 2007. de l’avis du juge emery, même en tenant pour acquis que la société n’a factuellement pris connaissance du règlement qu’en 2002, cette période de 5 ans aurait elle aussi constitué un délai déraisonnable. en effet, il conclut que la preuve révèle qu’entre 2003 et 2007 la ville n’a jamais manifesté une quelconque intention de modifier sa réglementation de zonage en faveur de la société. [18] finally, emery j. stated that he would not address the issue of the costs that might be awarded if the claims for a compensatory indemnity and for reimbursement of the taxes that had been paid were ultimately rejected. [18] enfin, le juge emery précise qu’il ne se pro- nonce pas sur la question des dépens susceptibles de découler d’un éventuel rejet des demandes réclamant le paiement d’une indemnité compensatoire et le remboursement des taxes payées. b quebec court of appeal, 2016 qcca 1803, b cour d’appel du québec, 2016 qcca 1803, 2 lcr (2d) 299 59 mplr (5th) 192 [19] the court of appeal allowed the appeal, declared by- laws u-91, urb-03 and 10-02 to be inoperable in respect of the company and referred [19] la cour d’appel accueille le pourvoi, déclare les règlements u-91, urb-03 et 10-02 inopposables à la société et renvoie l’affaire à la cour supérieure [2018] 2 rcs. lorraine (ville) c 2646-8926 québec inc le juge en chef 585 the matter back to the superior court to consider and rule on the claims that had been split from the original proceeding. [20] the court of appeal began by expressing the view that emery j. had properly applied the relevant legal principles in concluding that the action in nul- lity should be dismissed for being out of time. but in its opinion, emery j. had erred in law in failing to consider the fact that the company was the victim of an abuse of power in the form of a disguised expro- priation. the court of appeal found that the town had carried out a disguised expropriation in that it had limited how the lot could be used by amending the zoning by- law and installing infrastructures of public utility on the lot. in doing so, the town had abused its power of regulation. citing the princi- ples set out in benjamin v. montreal (ville) (2004), 86  lcr  161 (que ca), the court of appeal concluded that it could order a remedy with respect to that abuse despite the late filing of the action in nullity. pour enquête, audition et décision sur les demandes scindées de l’instance originale. [20] d’entrée de jeu, la cour d’appel se dit d’avis que le juge emery a bien appliqué les principes de droit pertinents en concluant au rejet de la demande en nullité pour cause de tardiveté. toutefois, il aurait selon elle commis une erreur de droit en omettant de considérer que la société a été victime d’un abus de pouvoir qui a pris la forme d’une expropriation déguisée. la cour estime que la ville a procédé à une expropriation déguisée du fait qu’elle a restreint l’usage qui pouvait être fait du lot en modifiant la réglementation de zonage et en installant sur celui-ci des infrastructures d’utilité publique. ce faisant, elle aurait exercé abusivement son pouvoir de régle- mentation. se référant aux principes énoncés dans l’arrêt mont réal (ville) c. benjamin, 2004 canlii 44591 (ca. qc), la cour d’appel conclut qu’il lui est loisible de remédier à cet abus malgré la tardiveté du recours en nullité. [21] the court of appeal accordingly declared that the impugned by- laws were inoperable in respect of the company. given the significant amount of time that had passed between the adoption of the by- laws and the contestation thereof, the interest in preserving legal certainty precluded a declaration of nullity. the case was returned to the superior court to resume the hearing and reach a decision on the damages being claimed, which had been split from the original proceeding. [21] en conséquence, la cour d’appel déclare que les règlements contestés sont inopposables à la so- ciété. en effet, vu l’écart temporel important entre l’adoption de ces règlements et leur contestation, l’intérêt de préserver la stabilité des lois fait échec à une déclaration de nullité. le dossier est retourné à la cour supérieure afin que se poursuivent l’enquête, l’audition et l’adjudication quant aux dommages- intérêts réclamés, questions qui avaient été scindées de l’instance originale. iv analysis iv analyse [22] this appeal essentially raises the following question: can a by- law that is contested for being abusive be declared to be inoperable in respect of the party contesting it if that party did not institute its action within a reasonable time? [22] le présent pourvoi soulève essentiellement la question suivante : est-ce qu’un règlement qu’une partie conteste en raison de son caractère abusif peut lui être déclaré inopposable si cette dernière n’a pas présenté sa demande dans un délai raison- nable? [23] this issue must first be placed in its proce- dural context in order to clarify the consequences of the splitting of the proceeding in the superior court. in its action, the company was seeking a series of [23] d’entrée de jeu, il convient de situer la ques- tion en litige dans son contexte procédural afin de bien saisir les conséquences de la scission d’instance intervenue en cour supérieure dans le cadre de 586 lorraine (ville) v 2646-8926 québec inc the chief justice [2018] 2 scr. remedies for the town’s abusive conduct: the nullity or inoperability of the contested by- laws, payment of an indemnity and reimbursement of the taxes it had paid. as requested by the parties at the start of the hearing, emery j. agreed to split the proceeding and to limit the judgment now at issue in this appeal to a determination of the validity of the municipal by- laws. the issue whether, as a result of the town’s actions, an indemnity is payable under art. 952 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”) therefore remains unresolved. [24] moreover, the splitting of the proceeding by emery j. attests to the fact that the company’s re- quest for a declaration of nullity was made in the alternative to the other main remedy it was seeking. if the action in nullity had been allowed and the zoning by- laws had been declared to be invalid or inoperable, there would no longer have been any factual basis for the indemnity being sought for dis- guised expropriation. son action, la société sollicitait une série de répa- rations afin de remédier à la conduite abusive de la ville : la nullité ou l’inopposabilité de la régle- mentation contestée, le paiement d’une indemnité et le remboursement des taxes payées. sur demande formulée au début de l’instruction par les parties, le juge emery a accepté de scinder l’instance et de se prononcer, dans le jugement examiné dans le présent pourvoi, uniquement sur la validité de la réglemen- tation municipale. pour cette raison, la question de savoir si les agissements de la ville donnaient ouver- ture au paiement d’une indemnité en application de l’art. 952 du code civil du québec (« ccq ») est demeurée en suspens. [24] d’ailleurs, la scission d’instance accordée par le juge emery témoigne du caractère alternatif de la demande en nullité au regard de l’autre réparation principale recherchée. si la demande en nullité avait été accueillie et la réglementation de zonage déclarée invalide ou inopposable, l’indemnité sollicitée pour cause d’expropriation déguisée aurait perdu son as- sise factuelle. a an action to annul a by- law considered to be abusive must be instituted within a reasonable time a une demande en nullité visant un règlement jugé abusif doit être présentée dans un délai raisonnable [25] an action to annul a municipal by- law for abuse of power must be instituted within a reason- able time. the superior court hears an action in nullity pursuant to its general superintending and reforming power with respect to government ac- tions, including the acts of municipal councils (code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25, art. 33 (now code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501, art. 34 (“ccp”))). because the exercise of this inherent power is discretionary, the superior court may dis- miss an action that has not been brought within a reasonable time. however, the discretion to do so may be exercised only where the plaintiff seeks to have a by- law declared to be null for being abu- sive, not where nullity is being sought on the ba- sis of lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. gonthier j. summarized the effects of this distinction in immeubles port louis ltée v. lafontaine (village), [25] une demande en nullité présentée à l’encontre d’un règlement municipal pour cause d’abus de pou- voir doit être formée dans un délai raisonnable. en effet, la saisine de la cour supérieure au moyen d’une demande en nullité repose sur son pouvoir général de contrôle ou de surveillance à l’égard des actes de l’administration, dont ceux des conseils muni- cipaux (code de procédure civile, rlrq, c. c-25, art. 33 (maintenant code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501, art. 34 (« cpc »))). l’exercice de ce pouvoir inhérent étant discrétionnaire, la cour su- périeure peut rejeter le recours entrepris par un justiciable qui a omis de se pourvoir dans un délai raisonnable. toutefois, cette discrétion ne peut être exercée que dans les cas où le demandeur cherche à faire déclarer la nullité d’un règlement qu’il estime abusif, et non dans ceux où la nullité est demandée pour cause d’absence de compétence ou d’excès de [2018] 2 rcs. lorraine (ville) c 2646-8926 québec inc le juge en chef 587 [1991] 1 scr 326, at p. 342, endorsing the follow- ing comment of professor rousseau: compétence. le juge gonthier a résumé les effets de cette distinction dans immeubles port louis ltée c. lafontaine (village), [1991] 1 rcs 326, p. 342, où il retient les propos du professeur rousseau : [translation]    the presence of excess of jurisdiction or ultra vires still allows the action in nullity to be brought any time during the thirty- year period provided for by general civil law (art. 2242 [of the civil code of lower canada]), while if the disputed decision is instead affected by abuse of power, the court may exercise its discretion and dismiss the action even if it is within this time limit.    la présence de l’excès de juridiction ou de l’ultra vires permettrait encore d’exercer l’action en nullité dans toute l’étendue du délai de trente ans prévu par le droit commun (art. 2242 [du code civil du bas- canada]), alors que si la décision contestée est plutôt affectée d’abus de pouvoir, le tribunal peut exercer une discrétion et rejeter le recours même s’il respecte ce délai. (quoting g. rousseau, “aspects contentieux de la ré- solution et du règlement en droit municipal” (1986), 46 r du b. 627, at pp 652-53) (citant g. rousseau, « aspects contentieux de la ré- solution et du règlement en droit municipal » (1986), 46 r du b. 627, p 652-653) [26] an abuse of power occurs where a public body exercises its power of regulation unlawfully, that is, in a manner inconsistent with the purposes the legislature was pursuing in delegating the power: [26] constitue un abus de pouvoir le fait pour un or- ganisme public d’exercer illégalement son pouvoir de réglementation, c’est-à-dire en dérogation des fins vou- lues par le législateur dans la délégation de ce pouvoir : a municipality must exercise its powers in accordance with the purposes sought by the legislature. it vitiates its acts and decisions if it abuses its discretionary power. a municipal act committed for unreasonable or reprehen- sible purposes, or purposes not covered by legislation, is void. this illegality results not from the breach of specific provisions but from limitations imposed by the courts on the discretionary power of government and affects the substance of the disputed decision, since it is the reasons for the act which must be assessed. the courts will accord- ingly determine whether the act is fraudulent, discrimina- tory, unjust or affected by bad faith, in which case it will be treated as an abuse of power    . une municipalité doit exercer ses pouvoirs en pour- suivant les fins voulues par le législateur. elle entache ses actes et décisions si elle abuse de son pouvoir discrétion- naire. un acte municipal posé à des fins déraisonnables ou condamnables ou à des fins non prévues par la loi est nul. cette illégalité ne résulte pas de la violation de textes précis mais dérive de limites imposées par les tribunaux au pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’administration et touche le fond de la décision contestée puisque ce sont les motifs de l’acte qu’il faut évaluer. c’est ainsi que les tribunaux vérifieront si l’acte est frauduleux, discriminatoire, injuste ou empreint de mauvaise foi. auquel cas il sera qualifié d’abus de pouvoir   . (immeubles port louis, at p. 349) (immeubles port louis, p. 349) [27] it is settled law that a “disguised” expropri- ation, insofar as it occurs in the guise of a zoning by- law, constitutes an abuse of the power of regula- tion conferred on the body in respect of such mat- ters (développements vaillancourt inc. v. rimouski (city), 2009 qcca 1475, 98 lcr 1, at para 22). where a municipal government limits the enjoyment of the attributes of the right of ownership of property to such a degree that the person entitled to enjoy those attributes is de facto expropriated from them, it therefore acts in a manner inconsistent with the pur- poses being pursued by the legislature in delegating [27] il est acquis qu’une expropriation dite dégui- sée, dans la mesure où elle s’effectue sous le couvert d’un règlement de zonage, constitue un abus com- mis dans l’exercice du pouvoir de réglementation confié à l’organisme en la matière (rimouski (ville) c. développements vaillancourt inc., 2009 qcca 1475, [2009] rdi 457, par 22). en restreignant la jouissance des attributs du droit de propriété sur un bien à un point tel que leur titulaire s’en trouve ex- proprié de facto, une administration municipale dé- roge alors aux fins voulues par le législateur lorsqu’il a délégué à cette dernière le pouvoir de « spécifier, 588 lorraine (ville) v 2646-8926 québec inc the chief justice [2018] 2 scr. to it the power “to specify, for each zone, the struc- tures and uses that are authorized and those that are prohibited” (act respecting land use planning and development, s. 113 para 2(3)). pour chaque zone, les constructions ou les usages qui sont autorisés et ceux qui sont prohibés » (loi sur l’aménagement et l’urbanisme, art. 113 al 2(3)). [28] this means that a plaintiff who intends to con- test a zoning by- law he or she considers abusive must bring an action within a reasonable time. it is impor- tant to note that the recent codification of the duty to act within a reasonable time in art. 529 para. 3 of the ccp has not changed the common law principles on which this concept is based (morrissette v. st- hyacinthe (ville), 2016 qcca 1216, at para. 37 (canlii); l. chamberland, ed., le grand collectif: code de procédure civile — commentaires et anno- tations (2nd ed. 2017), at p 2304). [28] partant, le demandeur qui entend contester un règlement de zonage qu’il estime abusif doit intenter son recours dans un délai raisonnable. il importe d’ail- leurs de préciser que la récente codification de l’obli- gation d’agir dans un délai raisonnable mentionnée à l’art. 529 al. 3 du cpc n’est pas de nature à altérer ou modifier les principes de common law qui régissent cette notion (morrissette c. st- hyacinthe (ville), 2016 qcca 1216, par. 37 (canlii); l. chamberland, dir., le grand collectif : code de procédure civile — com- mentaires et annotations (2e éd. 2017), p 2304). in the instant case, emery j. exercised his dis- [29] cretion judicially in dismissing the action in nullity for being out of time. and as the court of appeal rec- ognized (at para. 8), he was justified in applying the presumption of legal knowledge to determine that the starting point for reasonable time was june 23, 1991. [30] despite the applicability of the presump- tion of legal knowledge, emery j. also found that mr. pichette had become aware of by- law u-91 no later than in early 2002. that finding of fact is not in dispute, and neither is the finding that the town at no time indicated to the company’s representatives that it had any intention of amending the by- law. [31] the replacement of by- law u-91, adopted in 1991, with the 2010 by- law urb-03 — which in no way changed the restrictions applicable to the use of the company’s lot — did not have the effect of restarting the computation of reasonable time in relation to legal knowledge of the content of that by- law (wendover-et- simpson (corp. municipale) v. filion, [1992] rdi 263 (que. ca), at p 267). [29] en l’espèce, le juge emery a exercé judiciai- rement son pouvoir discrétionnaire en rejetant la demande en nullité pour cause de tardiveté. il était justifié d’appliquer, comme le reconnaît d’ailleurs la cour d’appel (par. 8), la présomption de connais- sance légale pour fixer au 23 juin 1991 le point de départ du délai raisonnable. [30] malgré l’applicabilité de la présomption de connaissance légale, le juge emery a également conclu que m. pichette avait pris connaissance du règlement u-91 au plus tard au début de l’année 2002. cette conclusion de fait n’est pas contestée, non plus que celle selon laquelle la ville n’a jamais fait état aux représentants de la société d’une quel- conque intention de modifier sa réglementation. [31] le remplacement du règlement u-91 adopté en 1991 par le règlement urb-03 de 2010 — lequel n’a d’aucune façon modifié les restrictions appli- cables à l’égard de l’usage du lot de la société — n’a pas eu pour effet de redémarrer la computation du délai raisonnable en ce qui concerne la connaissance légale du contenu de ce règlement (wendover-et- simpson (corp. municipale) c. filion, [1992] rdi. 263 (ca. qc), p 267). [32] in the end, 16 years elapsed between the adop- tion of by- law u-91 and its being contested in court. in addition, the time that elapsed after the company’s majority shareholder had acquired factual knowledge [32] tout compte fait, il s’est écoulé une période de 16 ans entre l’adoption du règlement u-91 et sa contestation devant les tribunaux. au surplus, le délai qui s’est écoulé à partir de la prise de connaissance [2018] 2 rcs. lorraine (ville) c 2646-8926 québec inc le juge en chef 589 of the by- law was at least 5 years. given the dis- cretionary nature of the superior court’s power of judicial review, that 5-year period was in itself suf- ficient for that court to dismiss the action in nullity for being out of time (rimouski, at para. 32; bérubé v. municipalité de saint- raphaël, 2017 qccs 5015; produits forestiers pms inc. v. terrebonne (ville), 2014 qccs 4878). the company was unable to show that the power to penalize its lack of diligence had not been exercised judicially. factuelle par l’actionnaire majoritaire de la société a été d’au moins 5 ans. même en ne retenant que ce dernier délai, il était loisible pour la cour supérieure, en raison de la nature discrétionnaire du pouvoir de contrôle judiciaire dont elle dispose, de rejeter pour cause de tardiveté la demande en nullité (rimouski, par. 32; bérubé c. municipalité de saint- raphaël, 2017 qccs 5015; produits forestiers pms inc. c. terrebonne (ville), 2014 qccs 4878). la société n’a pas su démontrer que le pouvoir de sanctionner son défaut de faire montre de diligence n’avait pas été exercé judiciairement. [33] that conclusion sufficed to justify dismissing the action in nullity and referring the matter back to the superior court to consider the claims that remained unresolved. with respect, however, i am of the view that the court of appeal made two errors in its subsequent analysis. [33] cette conclusion était suffisante pour justifier le rejet de la demande en nullité et le renvoi de l’af- faire devant la cour supérieure pour examen des ré- clamations encore pendantes. avec égards, toutefois, je suis d’avis que la cour d’appel a commis deux erreurs lorsqu’elle a poursuivi son analyse. [34] first, the court of appeal could not conclude that the abuse of power it had found to exist had the effect of relieving the plaintiff of its duty of diligence, that is, the requirement that the plaintiff institute its action within a reasonable time. on the contrary, remedying an abuse of power is a function that goes to the very heart of the superior court’s inherent jurisdiction, which entails the exercise of its discretion to penalize lack of diligence. as this court noted in immeubles port louis, a plaintiff who brings an action seeking a remedy for a municipality’s abuse of its power of regulation has a duty to act within a reasonable time: in municipal law and with respect to the direct action in nullity, reliance has been placed primarily on the plain- tiff’s duty of diligence in proceedings involving abuse of power. [p. 369] [34] d’une part, elle ne pouvait considérer que l’abus de pouvoir auquel elle avait conclu avait pour effet de dispenser le demandeur de l’obligation de diligence qui lui imposait de présenter sa demande dans un délai raisonnable. au contraire, remédier à l’abus de pouvoir est une fonction qui touche au cœur même de la compétence inhérente de la cour supérieure, qui implique l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire de sanctionner un défaut de diligence. comme le rappelait notre cour dans immeubles port louis, la présentation d’une demande visant à ob- tenir réparation à l’encontre d’un abus commis par une municipalité dans l’exercice de son pouvoir de réglementation est assujettie à l’obligation pour le demandeur d’agir dans un délai raisonnable : en droit municipal et en regard de l’action directe en nullité, on a surtout fait valoir l’obligation de diligence du demandeur en matière d’abus de pouvoir. [p. 369] [35] second, the court of appeal erred in distin- guishing between invalidity of a by- law, as declared by the superior court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, and inoperability of a by- law, as ordered to remedy an abuse of power. inoperability and inva- lidity are both remedies that fall within the superior court’s discretionary exercise of its inherent power to order a remedy where a by- law is abusive. the [35] d’autre part, la cour d’appel fait fausse route lorsqu’elle distingue l’invalidité d’un règlement pro- noncée par la cour supérieure dans l’exercice de sa compétence inhérente et l’inopposabilité d’un règlement prononcée comme moyen de remédier à un abus de pouvoir. l’inopposabilité et l’invalidité d’un règlement sont des formes de réparation qui relèvent toutes deux de l’exercice discrétionnaire par 590 lorraine (ville) v 2646-8926 québec inc the chief justice [2018] 2 scr. duty to act within a reasonable time that applies in exercising the discretion to dismiss or not to dis- miss an action to annul a by- law is therefore equally applicable to a finding that a by- law is inoperable (thériault v. gatineau (ville), 2005 qcca 1245, at paras. 12-14 (canlii)). this is why the presumption of legal knowledge that determines the starting point for reasonable time also applies to an action to have a by- law declared to be inoperable (rimouski, at para 27). la cour supérieure de son pouvoir inhérent de remé- dier au caractère abusif du règlement en question. l’obligation d’agir dans un délai raisonnable appli- cable dans l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de rejeter ou non une demande en nullité visant un acte réglementaire est donc tout aussi applicable à une conclusion d’inopposabilité (thériault c. gatineau (ville), 2005 qcca 1245, par.  12-14 (canlii)). c’est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle la présomp- tion de connaissance légale qui détermine le point de départ du délai raisonnable est également applicable à une demande en inopposabilité (rimouski, par 27). [36] although a certain flexibility may be desirable in determining whether the time taken was reasona- ble in cases in which a declaration of inoperability is sought (m-a lechasseur,. zonage et urbanisme en droit canadien (3rd ed. 2016), at p. 439), that flexi- bility cannot be interpreted such that it overrides the duty to act within a reasonable time. in other words, contrary to what the company argues, a person in- stituting an action for a declaration of inoperability is not relieved of the duty to be diligent in bringing the matter before the superior court in order to have that court exercise its inherent jurisdiction to review government actions. [36] bien qu’un certain assouplissement puisse être souhaitable dans l’évaluation du caractère rai- sonnable du délai dans les affaires d’inopposabi- lité (m-a. lechasseur, zonage et urbanisme en droit canadien (3e éd. 2016), p. 439), cette souplesse ne saurait être interprétée comme ayant pour effet d’écarter l’obligation d’agir dans un délai raison- nable. autrement dit, l’auteur d’une demande en ino- pposabilité n’est pas, contrairement à ce qu’avance la société, soustrait à l’obligation de faire montre de diligence dans la saisine de la cour supérieure afin qu’elle exerce sa compétence inhérente en matière de contrôle des actes de l’administration. [37] in my opinion, these errors likely resulted from a misreading of benjamin, a case in which the quebec court of appeal had held that, even though the plaintiff had not brought a direct action in nullity to remedy the alleged disguised expropriation of his property, it was open to him to bring an action to claim an indemnity (paras 47-62). an action to annul the zoning by- law, the usual remedy in such circum- stances, would probably have been dismissed for being out of time. unlike the instant case, therefore, benjamin did not involve an action to have a by- law declared null or inoperable, nor did it involve the exercise of the superior court’s power of review as a court of original general jurisdiction. the duty to act within a reasonable time in filing an action to claim an indemnity was thus unrelated to the availability of the action, as the trial judge had in fact properly noted (benjamin v. mont réal (ville), 2003 canlii 33374 (que. sup. ct.), at para 40). [37] je suis d’avis que ces erreurs découlent pro- bablement d’une lecture erronée de l’arrêt benjamin. dans cette affaire, la cour d’appel du québec avait décidé que, en dépit du fait que le demandeur n’avait pas intenté d’action directe en nullité afin de remédier à l’expropriation déguisée dont il s’estimait victime, il lui était loisible d’engager une action pour réclamer une indemnité (par 47-62). en effet, une action en nul- lité visant le règlement de zonage, recours habituel en pareilles circonstances, aurait vraisemblablement été rejetée pour cause de tardiveté. contrairement à l’ins- tance qui nous occupe, l’affaire benjamin ne portait donc pas sur une demande en nullité ou en inoppo- sabilité, et n’impliquait d’aucune façon l’exercice du pouvoir de contrôle de la cour supérieure en tant que tribunal de droit commun. l’obligation d’agir dans un délai raisonnable dans le dépôt de l’action en récla- mation d’une indemnité était donc étrangère à la re- cevabilité de celle-ci, comme le notait d’ailleurs à bon droit le juge de première instance (benjamin c. mont- réal (ville), 2003 canlii 33374 (cs. qc), par 40). [2018] 2 rcs. lorraine (ville) c 2646-8926 québec inc le juge en chef 591 in the case at bar, it was the issue of the indem- [38] nity that was not before the quebec court of appeal; the claim for an indemnity had been suspended when the proceeding was split. the only question before the court of appeal was therefore whether emery j. had exercised his discretion judicially in dismissing the action in nullity for being out of time. [39] the court of appeal correctly decided that question by answering the question in the affirmative at paras. 7 and 8 of its reasons. however, it erred when it then went on to decide an issue that was not before it, namely whether, the lateness of the action in nullity notwithstanding, the by- law represented a disguised expropriation that justified an order for payment of an indemnity where one was sought. [38] en l’espèce, c’est la question de l’indem- nité qui ne se posait pas devant la cour d’appel du québec; la demande s’y rapportant a été suspendue lors de la scission d’instance. ainsi, la seule question que devait trancher la cour d’appel était celle de savoir si le juge emery avait exercé judiciairement son pouvoir discrétionnaire en rejetant la demande en nullité pour cause de tardiveté. [39] la cour d’appel a correctement résolu cette question en y répondant par l’affirmative aux par. 7 et 8 de son jugement. cependant, elle a fait erreur en se prononçant ensuite sur une question qui ne lui était pas soumise, c’est-à-dire la question de savoir si, malgré la tardiveté de la demande en nullité, le règlement constituait une expropriation déguisée justifiant d’ordonner le paiement d’une indemnité sur demande à cet effet. b the action in nullity was prescribed b la demande en nullité était prescrite [40] furthermore, the action in nullity was pre- scribed in accordance with the general law rules of prescription. [41] the courts have consistently held that the government can rely on civil law prescription in defending against an action in which the nullity of a by- law is sought. it is in the context of an action be- fore it that the superior court exercises its power of judicial review. the civil law prescriptive period ap- plies to the action in nullity, which is the procedural conduit for the application for judicial review, while compliance with the duty to act within a reasonable time is assessed within that window: [40] de surcroît, la demande en nullité était pres- crite en vertu de la prescription de droit commun. il est de jurisprudence constante que l’ad- [41] ministration peut plaider la prescription de droit ci- vil à l’encontre d’une demande sollicitant la nullité d’un acte réglementaire. en effet, c’est dans le cadre d’une action en justice dont elle est saisie que la cour supérieure est amenée à exercer son pouvoir de contrôle judiciaire. la prescription civile s’applique à la demande en nullité, qui représente le conduit procédural du pourvoi en contrôle judiciaire, alors que le respect de l’obligation d’avoir agi dans un délai raisonnable s’évalue à l’intérieur de cette fe- nêtre temporelle : saying that the direct action in nullity is available does not in every case mean that the plaintiff has thirty years to object. the thirty- year prescription of the direct action in nullity applies to the action at law, to the procedural conduit, while the discretionary power is inherent in the reforming jurisdiction of the superior court pursuant to art. 33 of the code of civil procedure [art. 34 of the current ccp]. dire que l’action directe en nullité est recevable n’im- plique pas dans tous les cas que le demandeur a trente ans pour se plaindre. la prescription trentenaire de l’action directe en nullité s’applique à la demande en justice, au conduit procédural alors que le pouvoir discrétionnaire est inhérent à la juridiction de contrôle que possède la cour supérieure par le biais de l’art. 33 du code de procédure civile [l’art. 34 de l’actuel cpc]. (immeubles port louis, at p. 357) (immeubles port louis, p. 357) 592 lorraine (ville) v 2646-8926 québec inc the chief justice [2018] 2 scr. in short, in cases of abuse of power, including [42] those in which disguised expropriation is in issue, the superior court must consider the reasonableness of the time within which the action in nullity was brought, but must also consider the applicable pre- scriptive period under the ccq (j. mccann, pres- criptions extinctives et fins de non- recevoir (2011), at pp 124-25). [43] under art. 2242 of the civil code of lower canada, a public law direct action in nullity was pre- scribed by 30 years (immeubles port louis, at p. 362; air canada v. city of dorval, [1985] 1 scr 861, at p. 873; côté v. corporation of the county of drum- mond, [1924] scr 186). since the coming into force of the ccq, such actions have been subject to the 10- year general law prescriptive period provided for in art. 2922 (marcotte v. longueuil (city), 2009 scc 43, [2009] 3 scr 65, at para. 38; c. gervais, la prescription (2009), at p. 20; p. garant, droit administratif (5th ed. 2004), at p. 528 (referred to in the 7th ed. at p 518)). [44] in the instant case, the trial judge determined that the starting point for the presumption of legal knowledge was june 23, 1991, the date on which by- law u-91 was adopted. the company had 30 years from that moment to bring its action in nullity before its right of action would be extinguished. however, that period was reduced to 10 years when the ccq, including art. 2922, came into force. section 6 para. 2 of the act respecting the implementation of the re- form of the civil code provides that the 10- year pre- scriptive period began to run on january 1, 1994. this means that it ended on january 1, 2004, well be- fore the action in nullity was filed in november 2007. it must be concluded not only that the su- [45] perior court exercised its discretion judicially in penalizing the company for not bringing its action in nullity within a reasonable time, but also that the action was already prescribed, as the town argued at trial (paras 33-34). [42] en somme, dans les cas d’abus de pouvoir, notamment en matière d’expropriation déguisée, la cour supérieure doit considérer le caractère raison- nable du délai dans lequel la demande en nullité a été intentée, en plus de la période de prescription prévue par le ccq (j. mccann, prescriptions extinctives et fins de non- recevoir (2011), p 124-125). [43] en vertu de l’art. 2242 du code civil du bas- canada, l’action directe en nullité de droit public se prescrivait par 30 ans (immeubles port louis, p. 362; air canada c. cité de dorval, [1985] 1 rcs 861, p. 873; côté c. corporation of the county of drum- mond, [1924] rcs 186). depuis l’entrée en vi- gueur du ccq, une telle demande est soumise à la prescription décennale de droit commun prévue à l’art. 2922 (marcotte c. longueuil (ville), 2009 csc 43, [2009] 3 rcs 65, par. 38; c. gervais, la pres- cription (2009), p. 20; p. garant, droit administratif (5e éd. 2004), p. 528 (la 7e éd. y référant à la p 518)). [44] en l’espèce, le juge de première instance a fixé le point de départ de la présomption de connais- sance légale au 23 juin 1991, date à laquelle le rè- glement u-91 fut adopté. à partir de ce moment, la société jouissait d’une période de 30 ans pour inten- ter son action en nullité avant que son droit d’action ne s’éteigne. à l’entrée en vigueur du ccq et de son art. 2922, cette période a toutefois été réduite à 10 ans. l’article 6 al. 2 de la loi sur l’application de la réforme du code civil est venu préciser que cette période de prescription décennale courait à partir du 1er janvier 1994. elle fut donc réalisée en date du 1er janvier 2004, soit bien avant le dépôt de la demande en nullité en novembre 2007. [45] non seulement convient-il de conclure que la cour supérieure a exercé judiciairement son pouvoir discrétionnaire en sanctionnant le caractère dérai- sonnable du délai qui s’est écoulé avant que soit intentée la demande en nullité, mais il faut égale- ment conclure que cette demande était d’ores et déjà prescrite, comme l’avait soulevé la ville en première instance (par 33-34). [2018] 2 rcs. lorraine (ville) c 2646-8926 québec inc le juge en chef 593 [46] that being said, the outcome of this appeal has no bearing on the conclusions being sought by the company that were not dealt with by emery j., including the one relating to the claim for an in- demnity for disguised expropriation. even where a plaintiff no longer meets the conditions for applying for judicial review, he or she still has the right, in appropriate cases and if the claim is supported by the evidence, to seek payment of an indemnity for disguised expropriation (benjamin (ca), at pa- ras. 47-62; j. hétu and y. duplessis, with l. vézina, droit municipal: principes généraux et contentieux (2nd ed. (loose- leaf)), vol. 1, at p 8577). [47] the case can continue in the superior court on the claims that remain unresolved because of the splitting of the proceeding, including the claim for an indemnity for disguised expropriation. [46] cela dit, l’issue du présent pourvoi ne porte pas à conséquence sur les conclusions recherchées par la société sur lesquelles le juge emery n’a pas statué, y compris celle qui a trait à la réclamation d’une indemnité pour cause d’expropriation dégui- sée. même si un demandeur ne satisfait plus aux conditions d’ouverture d’un pourvoi en contrôle ju- diciaire, il n’est pas pour autant privé du droit de solliciter, dans les cas qui le permettent et si la preuve étaye sa demande, le paiement d’une indemnité pour cause d’expropriation déguisée (benjamin (ca), par. 47-62; j. hétu et y. duplessis, avec la colla- boration de l. vézina, droit municipal : principes généraux et contentieux (2e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), vol. 1, p 8577). [47] le dossier pourra suivre son cours devant la cour supérieure sur les demandes demeurées en suspens en raison de la scission d’instance, et no- tamment celle qui porte sur l’indemnité pour cause d’expropriation déguisée. v conclusion v conclusion [48] i would allow the appeal, set aside the court of appeal’s orders declaring that the contested by- laws are inoperable and restore the order of emery j. of the superior court dismissing the action in nullity, with costs throughout. [48] je propose d’accueillir le pourvoi, d’annu- ler les ordonnances de la cour d’appel déclarant inopposables les règlements contestés et de rétablir l’ordonnance du juge emery de la cour supérieure ayant rejeté la demande en nullité, le tout avec dé- pens devant toutes les cours. appeal allowed with costs throughout. pourvoi accueilli avec dépens dans toutes les cours. procureurs des appelantes  :  tandem avocats- conseils inc., rosemère. conseils inc., rosemère. procureurs de l’intimée : doyon izzi nivoix, mont- mont réal. réal. politaine de mont réal: bélanger sauvé, mont réal. procureurs de l’intervenante la communauté mé- tropolitaine de mont réal : bélanger sauvé, mont réal. ation of construction and housing professionals inc.: fasken martineau dumoulin, mont réal. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association des professionnels de la construction et de l’habita- tion du québec inc. : fasken martineau dumoulin, mont réal.
[1] the trial process in canada is one of the corner- stones of our constitutional democracy. it is essential to the maintenance of a civilized society. trials are the primary mechanism whereby disputes are re- solved in a just, peaceful, and orderly way. [1] les procès constituent l’une des pierres angu- laires de la démocratie constitutionnelle canadienne. ils sont essentiels à la préservation d’une société civilisée. ils constituent le mécanisme principal pour régler les litiges d’une façon juste, pacifi que et or- donnée. [2] to achieve their purpose, it is essential that tri- als be conducted in a civilized manner. trials marked [2] pour remplir leur fonction, les procès doivent absolument être menés d’une manière civilisée. 786 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. by strife, belligerent behaviour, unwarranted per- sonal attacks, and other forms of disruptive and dis- courteous conduct are antithetical to the peaceful and orderly resolution of disputes we strive to achieve. [3] by the same token, trials are not — nor are they meant to be — tea parties. a lawyer’s duty to act with civility does not exist in a vacuum. rather, it exists in concert with a series of professional obligations that both constrain and compel a lawyer’s behaviour. care must be taken to ensure that free expression, resolute advocacy and the right of an accused to make full answer and defence are not sacrifi ced at the altar of civility. [4] the proceedings against the appellant, joseph groia, highlight the delicate interplay that these con- siderations give rise to. at issue is whether mr. groia’s courtroom conduct in the case of r v. felderhof, 2007 oncj 345, 224 ccc (3d) 97, warranted a fi nding of professional misconduct by the law society of upper canada. to be precise, was the law society appeal panel’s fi nding of professional misconduct against mr. groia reasonable in the circumstances? for the reasons that follow, i am respectfully of the view that it was not. [5] the appeal panel developed an approach for assessing whether a lawyer’s uncivil behaviour crosses the line into professional misconduct. the approach, with which i take no issue, targets the type of conduct that can compromise trial fairness and diminish public confi dence in the administration of justice. it allows for a proportionate balancing of the law society’s mandate to set and enforce standards of civility in the legal profession with a lawyer’s right to free speech. it is also sensitive to the lawyer’s duty of resolute advocacy and the client’s constitutional right to make full answer and defence. lorsqu’ils sont empreints de querelles, de compor- tements belliqueux, d’attaques personnelles injusti- fi ées et de toute autre forme de conduite perturbatrice et disgracieuse, ils sont à l’antithèse du règlement pacifi que et ordonné des différends que nous nous efforçons d’atteindre. [3] du même coup, les procès ne sont pas une partie de plaisir, et là n’est pas non plus leur objectif. le devoir de l’avocat d’agir avec civilité ne s’inscrit pas dans l’abstrait. il existe plutôt de concert avec une série d’obligations professionnelles qui à la fois restreignent et dictent le comportement de l’avocat. il faut faire attention de ne pas sacrifi er, au nom de la civilité, la liberté d’expression, l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur et le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière. [4] les procédures engagées contre l’appelant, joseph groia, mettent en évidence l’interaction dé- licate que soulèvent ces principes. la question en litige est celle de savoir si la conduite de m. groia à l’audience dans l’affaire r c. felderhof, 2007 oncj 345, 224 ccc (3d) 97, justifi ait que le barreau du haut- canada le déclare coupable de manquement professionnel. plus précisément, la conclusion de manquement professionnel tirée par le comité d’ap- pel du barreau contre m. groia était- elle raisonnable dans les circonstances? pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis, en toute déférence, qu’elle ne l’était pas. [5] le comité d’appel a élaboré une méthode pour évaluer si le comportement irrespectueux de l’avocat franchit la ligne du manquement professionnel. sa méthode, à laquelle je n’ai rien à reprocher, cible le type de conduite qui peut compromettre l’équité du procès et miner la confi ance du public dans l’ad- ministration de la justice. elle permet une mise en balance proportionnée du mandat du barreau de fi xer et de faire respecter des normes de civilité dans la profession juridique, d’une part, et du droit à la liberté d’expression de l’avocat, d’autre part. elle tient également compte de l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur et du droit constitutionnel de l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 787 [6] moreover, the appeal panel’s approach is fl ex- ible enough to capture the broad array of situations in which lawyers may slip into uncivil behaviour, yet precise enough to guide lawyers and law societies on the scope of permissible conduct. [7] that said, the appeal panel’s fi nding of pro- fessional misconduct against mr. groia on the basis of incivility was, in my respectful view, unreason- able. even though the appeal panel accepted that mr. groia’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were made in good faith, it used his honest but er- roneous views as to the disclosure and admissibil- ity of documents to conclude that his allegations lacked a reasonable basis. however, as i will explain, mr. groia’s allegations were made in good faith and they were reasonably based. as such, the allegations themselves could not reasonably support a fi nding of professional misconduct. [8] nor could the other contextual factors in this case reasonably support a fi nding of professional misconduct against mr. groia on the basis of in- civility. the evolving abuse of process law at the time accounts, at least in part, for the frequency of mr. groia’s allegations; the presiding judge took a passive approach in the face of mr. groia’s allega- tions; and when the presiding judge and reviewing courts did direct mr. groia, apart from a few slips, he listened. the appeal panel failed to account for these contextual factors in its analysis. in my view, the only conclusion that was reasonably open to the appeal panel on the record before it was a fi nding that mr. groia was not guilty of professional mis- conduct. [9] accordingly, i would allow mr. groia’s appeal. [6] de plus, la méthode appliquée par le comité d’appel est suffi samment souple pour englober les nombreuses situations qui peuvent induire un com- portement irrespectueux chez les avocats, mais suf- fi samment précise pour orienter les avocats et les ordres professionnels sur l’étendue des conduites admissibles. [7] cela dit, j’estime que la conclusion de manque- ment professionnel pour incivilité du comité d’appel contre m. groia était déraisonnable. même s’il a accepté que les allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite formulées par m. groia avaient été faites en toute bonne foi, le co- mité d’appel s’est fondé sur le point de vue sincère, mais erroné, de celui-ci quant à la communication de la preuve et à l’admissibilité des documents pour conclure que ses allégations n’avaient aucun fon- dement raisonnable or, comme je l’expliquerai, les allégations de m. groia non seulement ont été formulées de bonne foi, mais étaient raisonnable- ment fondées. ainsi, les allégations elles- mêmes ne pouvaient raisonnablement étayer une conclusion de manquement professionnel. [8] les autres facteurs contextuels en l’espèce ne pouvaient pas non plus raisonnablement étayer la conclusion de manquement professionnel pour in- civilité contre m groia. le droit en matière d’abus de procédure, en constante évolution au moment des faits en cause, explique, du moins en partie, la fréquence des allégations de m. groia; le juge qui présidait le procès a adopté une approche pas- sive vis-à-vis de ces allégations; et m. groia, sauf à quelques occasions, a obéi aux directives du juge qui présidait le procès et des cours de révision lorsque ceux-ci le ramenaient à l’ordre. le comité d’appel n’a pas tenu compte de ces facteurs contextuels dans son analyse. à mon avis, compte tenu de la teneur du dossier dont il était saisi, le comité d’appel ne pouvait raisonnablement que conclure à l’absence de culpabilité de m. groia pour manquement pro- fessionnel. [9] par conséquent, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi de m groia. 788 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. ii factual background ii contexte factuel [10] mr. groia’s alleged misconduct stems from his in- court behaviour while representing john felderhof. mr. felderhof was an offi cer and director of bre-x minerals ltd., a canadian mining company. bre-x collapsed when claims that it had discovered a gold mine proved false. the fraud — one of the largest in canadian capital markets — cost investors over $6 billion. the ontario securities commission (“osc”) charged mr. felderhof with insider trading and author- izing misleading news releases under the securities act, rso 1990, c. s5. [11] mr. felderhof hired mr. groia, a former osc prosecutor, to defend him. the trial proceeded in the ontario court of justice before justice peter hryn. it took place in two phases. phase one began on october 16, 2000 and lasted 70 days. phase two did not begin until march 2004. on july 31, 2007, mr. felderhof was acquitted of all charges. [12] phase one of the felderhof trial was charac- terized by a pattern of escalating acrimony between mr. groia and the osc prosecutors. a series of dis- putes plagued the proceedings with a toxicity that manifested itself in the form of personal attacks, sarcastic outbursts and allegations of professional impropriety, grinding the trial to a near standstill. [10] l’allégation d’inconduite reprochée à m. groia découle de son comportement en cour alors qu’il re- présentait john felderhof. ce dernier était dirigeant et administrateur de bre-x minerals ltd., une société minière canadienne, qui s’est effondrée lorsqu’il s’est révélé que la mine d’or qu’elle avait prétendument découverte n’avait jamais existée. la fraude — l’une des plus grosses sur les marchés fi nanciers cana- diens — a coûté aux investisseurs plus de six milliards de dollars. la commission des valeurs mobilières de l’ontario (« cvmo ») a accusé m. felderhof sur le fondement de la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, lro 1990, c s5, d’avoir procédé à des opérations d’initié et d’avoir autorisé la publication de commu- niqués trompeurs. [11] m. felderhof a retenu les services de m. groia, un ancien avocat de la cvmo, pour le défendre. le procès, qui s’est déroulé en deux phases, a eu lieu devant le juge peter hryn de la cour de jus- tice de l’ontario. la première phase a commencé le 16 octobre 2000 et a duré 70 jours. la deuxième n’a commencé qu’en mars 2004. le 31 juillet 2007, m. felderhof a été acquitté de toutes les accusations. [12] la première phase du procès de m. felderhof a été marquée par une animosité croissante entre m. groia et les avocats de la cvmo. une série de confl its a teinté les procédures d’une toxicité qui s’est manifestée sous forme d’attaques personnelles, d’emportements sarcastiques et d’allégations d’in- conduite professionnelle, qui ont pratiquement pa- ralysé le procès. a disclosure disputes a confl its relativement à la communication [13] disputes between mr.  groia and the osc prosecutors arose during the disclosure process. the bre-x investigation yielded an extensive documen- tary record. the osc initially disclosed interview transcripts and so- called “c-binders” — binders of documents the osc intended to use as part of its case against mr felderhof. it did not, however, disclose a substantial body of additional documents it had in its possession. the osc prosecutors and mr. groia disagreed over the scope and format of [13] les confl its entre m. groia et les avocats de la cvmo ont éclaté durant le processus de communi- cation de la preuve. l’enquête sur bre-x a donné lieu à une preuve documentaire volumineuse. la cvmo a initialement communiqué des transcriptions d’en- trevues et des cartables de documents, appelés [tra- duction] « cartables de la commission », qu’elle comptait utiliser dans le cadre de sa preuve contre m felderhof. elle a toutefois omis de communiquer une quantité importante d’autres documents qu’elle [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 789 further disclosure sought by the defence. according to mr. groia, it was the osc’s responsibility to sort through all of the documents it had in its possession and to disclose hard copies of any relevant document to the defence. when the osc prosecutors refused to do so, mr. groia wrote a letter to the osc alleging that the prosecution was “operating under a serious misapprehension of its disclosure obligation[s]”, an error that mr. groia described as “an abuse of pro- cess”: law society appeal panel, 2013 onlsap 41, at para. 33 (canlii) (“ap reasons”). he would build on these themes as the trial progressed. in response, the osc offered to disclose electronic copies of the documents in its possession and provide mr. groia “with a reasonable supply of blank paper”: ap rea- sons, at paras 35-37. [14] dissatisfi ed with the osc’s response, mr. groia moved for additional disclosure. mr. naster, the lead osc prosecutor, argued that the osc was not aware of any relevant document that had not been disclosed to mr felderhof. the trial judge, however, agreed with mr. groia and ordered the osc to disclose a further 235 boxes of documents and hard copies of documents stored on 15 discs in its possession. avait en sa possession. les avocats de la cvmo et m. groia ne s’entendaient pas sur l’étendue et le format des documents dont la communication était demandée par la défense. selon m. groia, il revenait à la cvmo de faire le tri des documents qu’elle avait en sa possession et de communiquer à la défense les copies papier des documents pertinents. lorsque les avocats de la cvmo ont refusé de le faire, m. groia a écrit une lettre à cette dernière dans laquelle il allé- guait que la poursuite [traduction] « agissait selon une interprétation gravement erronée de s[es] obli- gation[s] en matière de communication », une erreur qu’il a qualifi ée d’« abus de procédure » : motifs du comité d’appel, 2013 onlsap 41, par. 33 (canlii) (« motifs du comité d’appel »). il a pris appui sur ce thème au fur et à mesure que le procès progressait. en réponse, la cvmo a offert de communiquer des copies électroniques des documents en sa possession et de fournir à m. groia « une quantité raisonnable de feuilles blanches » : motifs du comité d’appel, par 35-37. [14] insatisfait de cette réponse, m. groia a de- mandé la communication de documents additionnels. m. naster, l’avocat principal de la cvmo, a fait valoir que cette dernière n’était pas au courant de l’existence de documents pertinents qui n’avaient pas été communiqués à m felderhof. le juge du procès s’est néanmoins dit d’accord avec m. groia et a ordonné à la cvmo de communiquer 235 autres boîtes de documents ainsi que des copies papier de documents stockés sur 15 disques en sa possession. b the second disclosure motion b la deuxième requête en communication [15] as the trial neared, the parties were still at odds over disclosure. adamant that the osc had not fulfi lled its disclosure obligations, mr. groia sent mr. naster a letter accusing the osc of adopting “a ‘win at any costs’ mentality” which demonstrated “a shocking disregard for [mr. felderhof’s] rights”. [15] bien que la tenue du procès approchait, les parties ne s’entendaient toujours pas sur la commu- nication. convaincu que la cvmo ne s’était pas ac- quittée de ses obligations en cette matière, m. groia a envoyé une lettre à m. naster dans laquelle il accusait la cvmo d’adopter une [traduction] « mentalité axée sur le “gain à tout prix” » qui démontrait « un profond mépris pour [les] droits [de m felderhof] ». [16] mr.  groia then brought a motion arguing that the osc’s disclosure was so defi cient that it amounted to an abuse of process warranting a stay of proceedings. in the alternative, mr. groia sought [16] m. groia a ensuite présenté une requête dans laquelle il a allégué que la communication de la cvmo était défi ciente à un point tel qu’elle équi- valait à un abus de procédure justifi ant l’arrêt des 790 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. full disclosure, and in the further alternative, an or- der prohibiting the osc from calling witnesses un- til it made full disclosure. interspersed throughout mr. groia’s submissions on the motion were alle- gations that the prosecutors were “unable or unwill- ing    to recognize their responsibilities”, motivated by an “animus towards the defence”, and determined to make mr. felderhof’s ability to defend himself “as diffi cult as possible”. [17] by the end of the motion, mr. groia conceded that the stringent test for a stay of proceedings had not been met. accordingly, the trial judge declined to stay the prosecution. once again, however, he was satisfi ed that the osc had not fulfi lled its disclosure obligations and he ordered additional disclosure. the trial judge also admonished the osc for a com- ment made by one of its media personnel that the osc’s goal “was simply to seek a conviction on the charges” it had laid: ap reasons, at para 55. procédures. à titre subsidiaire, m. groia a sollicité la communication complète des documents et, sub- sidiairement encore, une ordonnance interdisant à la cvmo d’assigner des témoins jusqu’à ce qu’elle communique la totalité des documents. les observa- tions de m. groia dans le cadre de la requête étaient entrecoupées d’allégations selon lesquelles les avo- cats de la poursuite n’étaient [traduction] « pas en mesure ni disposés [  ] à reconnaître leurs respon- sabilités », étaient motivés par une « animosité en- vers la défense » et étaient déterminés à compliquer « autant que possible » la tâche de m. felderhof de se défendre. [17] à la fi n de l’audition de la requête, m. groia a reconnu qu’il n’avait pas été satisfait au test strict permettant de prononcer l’arrêt des procédures. par conséquent, le juge du procès a refusé de mettre fi n à la poursuite. il était toutefois convaincu que la cvmo ne s’était pas acquittée de ses obligations en matière de communication et a ordonné celle de documents additionnels. le juge du procès a égale- ment réprimandé la cvmo parce que l’un de ses responsables des communications avec les médias avait indiqué que l’objectif de la cvmo [traduc- tion] « était simplement d’obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité relativement aux accusations » qu’elle avait portées : motifs du comité d’appel, par 55. c the admissibility of documents c l’admissibilité des documents [18] characteristic of most securities act prosecu- tions, the case against mr. felderhof relied heavily on documentary evidence. between them, the prosecu- tion and defence had nearly 100 binders containing thousands of documents. disputes over the admis- sibility of those documents was a major source of friction throughout the trial. [18] comme dans la plupart des poursuites fondées sur la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, les accusations portées contre m. felderhof reposaient fortement sur une preuve documentaire. à elles deux, la pour- suite et la défense détenaient près de 100 cartables contenant des milliers de documents. les différends concernant l’admissibilité de ces documents ont été une source de friction majeure tout au long du pro- cès. [19] mr. naster initially suggested that either party could provisionally tender documents, subject to arguments as to their admissibility at the end of the trial. mr. groia rejected this approach. he was con- cerned that given the staggering size of the fraud, a number of bre-x documents were falsifi ed. as such, he insisted that the admissibility of each document [19] m. naster a initialement suggéré que chaque partie dépose provisoirement ses documents, réser- vant la question de leur admissibilité pour la fi n du procès. m. groia a rejeté cette suggestion. il était préoccupé par le fait que, en raison de l’ampleur considérable de la fraude, un grand nombre de docu- ments de bre-x étaient falsifi és. par conséquent, il a [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 791 should be ruled on as the document was tendered. mr. naster then changed his position, seeking an omnibus ruling on the admissibility of all of the doc- uments. the trial judge declined to hear mr. naster’s motion, and the parties were put to the strict proof of each document they proposed to tender. [20] the disputes resulted in frequent objections and lengthy arguments on the admissibility and use of individual documents. the fi rst osc witness had to be excused for large periods of time as the parties argued. the disputes became increasingly hostile and ground the trial to a near standstill. after 42 days of evidence, the fi rst osc witness’s testimony had yet to be completed. insisté pour que l’admissibilité de chaque document soit décidée au moment de son dépôt. m. naster a en- suite changé d’avis, sollicitant une décision sur l’ad- missibilité de l’ensemble des documents. le juge du procès a refusé d’instruire la requête de m. naster, et les parties ont dû faire la preuve de chaque document qu’elles entendaient déposer. [20] les confl its ont suscité de fréquentes objec- tions et de longs débats sur l’admissibilité et l’uti- lisation de chaque document. le premier témoin de la cvmo a dû être excusé durant de longues périodes pendant que les parties présentaient leurs observations. les confl its sont devenus de plus en plus hostiles et ont pratiquement paralysé le procès. après 42 jours d’audience consacrés à entendre de la preuve, le premier témoin de la cvmo n’avait toujours pas fi ni de témoigner. [21] much of the disagreement stemmed from mr. groia’s honest but mistaken understanding of the law of evidence and the role of the prosecu- tor. his position on the admissibility of documents was founded on two legal errors. first, mr. groia maintained that the prosecution was duty- bound to introduce all authentic, relevant documents and that its failure to introduce relevant exculpatory docu- ments through its own witnesses was a deliberate tactic designed to ensure that mr. felderhof did not receive a fair trial. [21] la mésentente découlait surtout du fait que m. groia, bien qu’en toute honnêteté, avait mal in- terprété le droit de la preuve et le rôle du poursuivant. son opinion quant à l’admissibilité des documents reposait sur deux erreurs de droit. premièrement, il faisait valoir que le poursuivant avait le devoir de pré- senter tous les documents authentiques et pertinents et que son défaut de présenter des documents dis- culpatoires pertinents avec le concours de ses propres témoins était une tactique délibérée pour garantir que m. felderhof ne bénéfi cie pas d’un procès équitable. [22] second, mr. groia believed that he could put documents, acknowledged by the osc as being au- thentic, to the fi rst osc witness even though that witness had not authored them and could not iden- tify them. mr. naster’s objections to this approach spawned further allegations of prosecutorial impro- priety. mr. groia argued that the osc was using “a conviction fi lter” and thwarting mr. groia’s attempts to secure a fair trial for his client. [22] deuxièmement, m. groia croyait qu’il pouvait soumettre des documents dont l’authenticité avait été reconnue par la cvmo à l’intention du premier témoin de cette dernière même si celui-ci n’en était pas l’auteur et ne pouvait pas les reconnaître. les objections de m. naster à cette façon de procéder ont entraîné d’autres allégations de conduite répréhen- sible. m. groia a fait valoir que la cvmo utilisait [traduction] « un fi ltre axé sur une condamna- tion » et contrecarrait ses tentatives d’assurer que son client bénéfi cie d’un procès équitable. [23] mr. groia’s mistaken position on the admissi- bility of documents was reinforced by mr. naster’s comment in the fi rst disclosure motion that he had “an obligation as a prosecutor to ensure that all rel- evant materials are placed before [the trial judge]”: [23] l’opinion erronée de m. groia sur l’admis- sibilité des documents a été renforcée par le com- mentaire de m. naster dans la première requête en communication. en effet, il y affi rmait qu’il avait [traduction] « l’obligation, en tant que poursuivant, 792 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. ap reasons, at para 38. in addition, mr. groia mis- took mr. naster’s concession that he was duty- bound to disclose all relevant documents as a promise that he would consent to the admissibility of those doc- uments at trial. in mr. groia’s view, mr. naster un- fairly reneged on this promise. [24] the osc was not entirely blameless for these skirmishes. mr. naster continued to challenge the trial judge’s ruling declining to hear an omnibus document motion, lamenting that he was getting “shafted big time”. both sides stubbornly dug their heels in, refusing to budge and taking every oppor- tunity to quarrel. [25] despite the frequency and fervor of the dis- putes, the trial judge initially adopted a hands- off approach, opting to stay above the fray. mr. naster re- peatedly invited the trial judge to rule on mr. groia’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process if he found the allegations to be substantiated for his part, mr. groia made it clear that while he did not intend to bring an abuse of process motion at the time, he was putting the prosecutors on notice that their con- duct was unacceptable and laying the groundwork for an abuse of process motion later in the proceedings. accordingly, the trial judge postponed any ruling on the propriety of the prosecution’s conduct. [26] it was not until the 57th day of trial that the judge directed mr. groia to stop repeating his mis- conduct allegations. instead, whenever mr. groia felt the prosecution was acting inappropriately, he was to simply state that he was making “the same objection”. the trial judge reiterated his instruction a few days later. mr. groia largely followed the trial judge’s directions for the remainder of phase one. de s’assurer que tous les documents pertinents soient soumis à l’attention [du juge du procès] » : motifs du comité d’appel, par 38. de plus, m. groia a inter- prété à tort l’admission de m. naster selon laquelle il avait le devoir de communiquer tous les documents pertinents comme une promesse qu’il consentirait à l’admissibilité de ces documents au procès. de l’avis de m. groia, m. naster n’a pas honoré sa promesse et a ainsi agi de manière inéquitable. [24] la cvmo a également eu sa part de respon- sabilité dans ces altercations. m. naster a continué de contester la décision du juge du procès de refu- ser d’instruire sa requête relative à l’ensemble des documents, se plaignant de se faire [traduction] « carrément rouler ». les deux parties campaient obstinément sur leur position, refusant de céder et saisissant toutes les occasions pour se quereller. [25] malgré la fréquence et l’intensité des confl its, le juge du procès a initialement décidé de ne pas intervenir, choisissant de rester au- dessus de la mêlée. m. naster l’a invité à maintes reprises à se prononcer sur les allégations de conduite répréhen- sible de la part des avocats de la poursuite formulées par m. groia et à arrêter les procédures pour cause d’abus de procédure s’il estimait que ces allégations étaient fondées. pour sa part, m. groia a indiqué clairement que, bien qu’il n’eut pas l’intention de présenter une requête pour abus de procédure à ce moment-là, il prévenait les avocats de la poursuite que leur conduite était inacceptable et préparait le terrain en prévision du dépôt d’une éventuelle re- quête de ce type. dans les circonstances, le juge du procès a remis à plus tard sa décision sur la légitimité de la conduite des avocats de la poursuite. [26] ce n’est qu’au 57e jour de procès que le juge a ordonné à m. groia de cesser de répéter ses allé- gations d’inconduite. chaque fois que ce dernier estimait que la poursuite agissait de façon inappro- priée, il devait plutôt simplement dire qu’il formulait [traduction] « la même objection ». le juge du procès a réitéré ses directives quelques jours plus tard. m. groia a essentiellement obtempéré durant le reste de la première phase. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 793 d the judicial review application d la demande de contrôle judiciaire [27] during a scheduled three- week hiatus in the felderhof trial, the osc brought a judicial review ap- plication in the superior court before a campbell j, seeking the removal of the trial judge. the osc ar- gued that the trial judge had committed a number of errors which caused him to lose jurisdiction and undermined the osc’s right to a fair trial. one of the osc’s grounds for its application was the trial judge’s failure to rein in mr. groia’s uncivil behav- iour, thereby creating a reasonable apprehension of bias. [28] justice campbell dismissed the application. he found no jurisdictional error necessitating the trial judge’s removal. he concluded that the trial judge had acted in an even- handed manner through- out phase one: r v. felderhof, 2002 canlii 41888, at paras. 281-85 (“felderhof onsc”). campbell j. also noted that mr. groia’s stance on the role of the prosecutor was mistaken, explaining, at para. 33, that the prosecution was entitled to seek a conviction “within the appropriate limits of fairness”. despite mr. felderhof’s success on the judicial review appli- cation, campbell j. declined to order costs against the osc, in part because of mr. groia’s “appallingly unrestrained” conduct. [29] the court of appeal for ontario dismissed the osc’s appeal from campbell j.’s order: r v felderhof (2003), 68 or (3d) 481 (“felderhof onca”). writ- ing for a unanimous panel, rosenberg ja clarifi ed that although the defence has the right to allege abuse of process, that allegation should only be made at the appropriate juncture and with a suffi cient factual foundation. and even then, “defence counsel [was] obliged to make submissions without the rhetorical excess and invective that mr. groia sometimes em- ployed”: para 93. [27] au cours d’une pause prévue de trois semaines durant le procès de m. felderhof, la cvmo a pré- senté une demande de contrôle judiciaire devant le juge a. campbell de la cour supérieure pour sol- liciter la révocation du juge du procès. la cvmo a fait valoir que ce dernier avait commis plusieurs erreurs à l’origine de sa perte de compétence et de la compromission du droit de la cvmo à un procès équitable. la cvmo a notamment invoqué que le juge du procès était incapable de sévir contre le com- portement irrespectueux de m. groia, créant ainsi une crainte raisonnable de partialité. [28] le juge campbell a rejeté la demande. il n’a trouvé aucune erreur de compétence nécessitant la révocation du juge du procès. il a conclu que ce- lui-ci avait agi de façon impartiale tout au long de la première phase : r c. felderhof, 2002 canlii 41888, par. 281-285 (« felderhof (csj ont) »). le juge campbell a également indiqué que le point de vue de m. groia sur le rôle du poursuivant était erroné, expliquant, au par. 33, que la poursuite était habilitée à tenter d’obtenir une déclaration de culpa- bilité [traduction] « dans les limites appropriées de l’équité ». même si m. felderhof a eu gain de cause relativement à la demande de contrôle judiciaire, le juge campbell a refusé de condamner la cvmo aux dépens, en partie en raison de la conduite « horrible- ment incontrôlée » de m groia. [29] la cour d’appel de l’ontario a rejeté l’appel formé par la cvmo contre l’ordonnance du juge campbell : r c. felderhof (2003), 68 or (3d) 481 (« felderhof (ca ont) »). s’exprimant au nom de la cour unanime, le juge rosenberg a précisé que bien que la défense ait le droit d’alléguer l’abus de procédure, cette allégation ne devrait être avancée qu’au moment opportun et que si elle est suffi sam- ment fondée. qui plus est, [traduction] « l’avocat de la défense [était] tenu de présenter des observa- tions sans utiliser des excès de rhétorique et lancer des invectives comme le faisait parfois m. groia » : par 93. [30] campbell j. and rosenberg ja were each critical of mr. groia’s behaviour throughout the trial. [30] les juges campbell et rosenberg ont tous les deux critiqué le comportement de m. groia tout au 794 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. campbell j. observed that “mr. groia took every opportunity to needle mr. naster with sarcastic alle- gations of professional misconduct” (para. 284) and described mr. groia’s submissions as “descend[ing] from legal argument to irony to sarcasm to petu- lant invective” (para 64). rosenberg ja similarly noted that “mr. groia was prone to rhetorical ex- cess and sarcasm” and described his submissions as “unseemly”, “unhelpful” and “improper”: paras. 13 and 80. [31] both judges also voiced displeasure with how the prosecution had behaved, noting that there had been “tactical manoeuvring on both sides” ( felderhof onca, at para. 68), and that “[n]either side    ha[d] any monopoly over incivility or rhetorical excess” (felderhof onsc, at para 264). [32] the felderhof trial resumed in march 2004, with new counsel appearing for the osc. in line with the guidance provided by campbell  j and rosenberg ja, the evidentiary disputes were re- solved and the second phase of the trial proceeded without further incident, completing on july 31, 2007, with mr. felderhof being acquitted on all charges. long du procès. le premier a souligné que [traduc- tion] « m. groia a saisi toutes les occasions pour accuser avec sarcasme m. naster de manquement professionnel » (par. 284) et a ajouté que les obser- vations de m. groia sont « passées de l’argument ju- ridique à l’ironie, puis au sarcasme, et enfi n à l’injure pétulante » : par 64. le juge rosenberg a lui aussi indiqué que [traduction] « m. groia était porté sur les excès de rhétorique et le sarcasme » et qualifi é ses observations de « déplacées », d’« inutiles » et d’« inconvenantes » : par. 13 et 80. [31] les juges ont tous deux manifesté leur insa- tisfaction quant à la façon dont la poursuite s’était comportée, soulignant que [traduction] « les deux côtés avaient employé des tactiques malveillantes » (felderhof (ca. ont.), par. 68), et qu’« aucun des deux côtés [  ] n’avait le monopole de l’incivilité et de l’excès de rhétorique » (felderhof (csj ont), par 264). [32] le procès de m. felderhof a repris en mars 2004 et la cvmo était représentée par un nouvel avo- cat. conformément aux directives des juges campbell et rosenberg, les confl its en matière de preuve ont été réglés et la deuxième phase du procès s’est dérou- lée sans incident, se terminant le 31 juillet 2007 par l’acquittement de m. felderhof relativement à toutes les accusations. iii procedural history iii historique des procédures a the law society disciplinary proceedings a les procédures disciplinaires du barreau in 2004, the law society launched an in- [33] vestigation into mr.  groia’s conduct during the felderhof trial. the law society initiated the in- vestigation on its own motion; no independent com- plaint was fi led against mr groia. at mr. groia’s request, the law society postponed its investigation until the felderhof trial ended. on november 18, 2009 — more than nine years after the felderhof trial began — the law society brought disciplinary proceedings against mr. groia, alleging professional misconduct based on his uncivil behaviour during phase one of the trial. [33] en 2004, le barreau a déclenché une enquête sur la conduite de m.  groia durant le procès de m felderhof. il a ouvert l’enquête de son propre chef; aucune plainte indépendante n’ayant été dé- posée contre m groia. à la demande de ce dernier, le barreau a reporté son enquête à l’issue du procès de m felderhof. le 18 novembre 2009, soit plus de neuf ans après le début de ce procès, le barreau a in- tenté des procédures disciplinaires contre m. groia, alléguant un manquement professionnel sur le fon- dement de son comportement irrespectueux durant la première phase du procès. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 795 [34] the professional misconduct allegations were fi rst litigated before a three- member panel of the law society (the hearing panel). mr. groia testifi ed in his own defence. the hearing panel concluded that allowing mr. groia to re- litigate the propriety of his conduct was an abuse of process given campbell j.’s and rosenberg ja’s fi ndings on the issue — this despite the fact that mr. groia was not a party to the judicial review proceedings and made no submis- sions on his own behalf in defence of his behaviour. relying heavily on those fi ndings, the hearing panel found mr. groia guilty of professional misconduct: law society hearing panel, 2012 onlshp 94 (“hp reasons”). it suspended mr. groia’s licence to practice law for two months and ordered him to pay nearly $247,000 in costs: hearing panel decision on penalty, 2013 onlshp 59. [35] mr. groia appealed the hearing panel’s deci- sion to the law society appeal panel. the appeal panel found that the hearing panel had erred in treat- ing the felderhof judicial review fi ndings as conclu- sive and precluding mr. groia from defending his behaviour. at the request of both parties, the appeal panel considered the professional misconduct allega- tions against mr. groia de novo based on the record of proceedings before the hearing panel, including mr. groia’s testimony before that body. [34] les allégations de manquement profession- nel ont d’abord été entendues par un comité formé de trois membres du barreau (le comité d’audi- tion). m. groia a témoigné pour sa propre défense. le comité d’audition a conclu que permettre à m. groia de débattre de nouveau de la légitimité de sa conduite constituait un abus de procédure compte tenu des conclusions des juges campbell et rosenberg sur la question, et ce, malgré le fait que m. groia n’était pas partie au contrôle judiciaire et n’a présenté aucune observation en défense pour justifi er son comportement. s’appuyant fortement sur ces conclusions, le comité d’audition a trouvé m. groia coupable de manquement professionnel : décision du comité d’audition, 2012 onlshp 94 (« motifs du comité d’audition »). il a suspendu le permis de pratique de l’avocat pendant deux mois et lui a enjoint de payer près de 247 000 $ en dépens : décision du comité d’audition sur la peine : 2013 onlshp 59. [35] m. groia a interjeté appel de la décision du comité d’audition devant le comité d’appel du bar- reau. ce dernier a conclu que le comité d’audition avait commis une erreur en considérant comme con- cluantes les conclusions du juge saisi du contrôle judiciaire et en empêchant m. groia de défendre son comportement. à la demande des deux parties, le comité d’appel a examiné de novo les allégations de manquement professionnel visant m. groia en se fondant sur le dossier du comité d’audition, y com- pris le témoignage que m. groia avait rendu devant cette juridiction. [36] the appeal panel grappled with the issue of when in- court incivility amounts to professional mis- conduct under the law society’s codes of conduct in force at the relevant time.1 it reasoned that incivility “capture[s] a range of unprofessional communica- tions” (para. 6) and ultimately settled on a multi- factorial, context- specifi c approach for assessing a lawyer’s behaviour. in particular, the appeal panel articulated a series of contextual factors — what the [36] le comité d’appel a débattu de la question de savoir à quel moment une incivilité en cour équivaut à un manquement professionnel au sens du code de déontologie du barreau en vigueur au moment pertinent1. il a conclu que l’incivilité [traduction] « englobe un éventail de communications manquant de professionnalisme » (par. 6) et a fi nalement adopté une méthode multifactorielle et axée sur le contexte pour évaluer le comportement d’un avocat plus 1 two sets of law society conduct rules were in force during the felderhof proceedings: the professional conduct handbook, ef- fective january 30, 1987 to october 31, 2000, and the rules of professional conduct, effective november 1, 2000 to septem- ber 30, 2014. 1 deux codes de déontologie ont été successivement en vigueur durant l’instance felderhof : le code de déontologie, en vigueur du 30 janvier 1987 au 31 octobre 2000, et le code de déontolo- gie, en vigueur du 1er novembre 2000 au 30 septembre 2014. 796 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. lawyer said, the manner and frequency in which it was said, and the presiding judge’s reaction to the lawyer’s behaviour — that should generally be taken into account. in the fi nal analysis, the appeal panel con- [37] cluded that mr. groia was guilty of professional misconduct. as indicated, it based its fi nding entirely on the record before the hearing panel. because the appeal panel did not hear mr. groia testify, it was not in a position to assess his credibility. it therefore assumed that mr. groia had made his allegations of professional impropriety against the osc prose- cutors in good faith, based on his testimony before the hearing panel. nevertheless, it concluded that mr. groia’s repeated personal attacks lacked a rea- sonable basis. while the appeal panel acknowledged that the prosecutors “were not entirely blameless”, it could fi nd nothing in the way the osc conducted the trial that suggested it adopted a win-at- all-costs approach or intentionally sabotaged mr. groia’s at- tempt to secure a fair trial for his client. the ap- peal panel reduced mr. groia’s suspension to one month and decreased the costs award against him to $200,000. particulièrement, le comité d’appel a énuméré une série de facteurs contextuels — les remarques que l’avocat a formulées, la manière dont elles ont été formulées et la fréquence à laquelle elles l’ont été, ainsi que la réaction du juge présidant l’audience face au comportement de l’avocat — qui devraient généralement être pris en considération. [37] dans son analyse fi nale, le comité d’appel a déclaré m. groia coupable de manquement profes- sionnel. comme nous l’avons indiqué, cette conclu- sion reposait entièrement sur le dossier dont disposait le comité d’audition. comme le comité d’appel n’a pas entendu le témoignage de m. groia, il n’était pas en mesure d’évaluer sa crédibilité. ses membres ont donc présumé que m. groia avait formulé ses allégations de conduite répréhensible contre les avo- cats de la cvmo de bonne foi, sur le fondement de son témoignage devant le comité d’audition. malgré cela, il a conclu que les attaques personnelles répé- tées de m. groia n’étaient pas raisonnablement fon- dées. bien que le comité d’appel ait reconnu que la conduite des avocats de la poursuite [traduction] « n’était pas entièrement irréprochable », rien dans la façon dont la cvmo a mené le procès ne donnait à penser qu’elle voulait gagner à tout prix ou qu’elle voulait sciemment saboter la tentative de m. groia d’assurer que son client bénéfi cie d’un procès équi- table. le comité d’appel a réduit la suspension de m. groia à un mois et le montant des dépens aux- quels il a été condamné à 200 000 $. b the ontario superior court of justice — divi- sional court, 2015 onsc 686, 124 or (3d) 1 b cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario — cour divisionnaire, 2015 onsc 686, 124 or (3d) 1 [38] mr. groia appealed to the divisional court from the appeal panel’s decision. the divisional court reasoned that the appeal panel’s approach did not suffi ciently protect resolute advocacy. in its view, for a lawyer to be found guilty of professional mis- conduct, it was necessary that the lawyer’s behaviour bring, or have a tendency to bring, the administration of justice into disrepute. nevertheless, the divisional court upheld the appeal panel’s decision as rea- sonable. it found that the appeal panel considered all of the relevant factors and “expressed, in a fair, rational and understandable way, why [it] ultimately [38] m. groia a interjeté appel de la décision du co- mité d’appel devant la cour divisionnaire. celle-ci a conclu que l’approche adoptée par le comité d’appel ne protégeait pas suffi samment le droit de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur. à son avis, pour qu’un avocat soit déclaré coupable de man- quement professionnel, il est nécessaire que son comportement ait déconsidéré, ou été susceptible de déconsidérer, l’administration de la justice. la cour divisionnaire a malgré tout confi rmé la décision du comité d’appel au motif qu’elle était raisonnable. elle a conclu que le comité d’appel avait tenu compte [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 797 concluded that the appellant’s conduct amounted to professional misconduct”: para 97. de tous les facteurs pertinents et [traduction] « avait exprimé, d’une manière juste, rationnelle et compréhensible, pourquoi il avait conclu en défi - nitive que la conduite de l’appelant équivalait à un manquement professionnel » : par 97. c the court of appeal for ontario, 2016 onca c la cour d’appel de l’ontario, 2016 onca 471, 471, 131 or (3d) 1 131 or (3d) 1 [39] a majority of the court of appeal dismissed mr. groia’s further appeal. cronk ja, writing for the majority, identifi ed reasonableness as the ap- propriate standard of review. in her view, nothing displaced the presumption of reasonableness that applied to the appeal panel’s interpretation of its enabling legislation. [39] les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont rejeté l’appel subséquent de m groia. la juge cronk, s’exprimant au nom de la majorité, a indiqué que la norme qu’il convenait d’appliquer était celle de la décision raisonnable. à son avis, rien ne réfutait la présomption selon laquelle l’interprétation par le comité d’appel de sa loi habilitante était raisonnable. [40] justice cronk found the appeal panel’s de- cision reasonable. it did not unduly impinge on a lawyer’s duty to resolutely advocate on his or her client’s behalf; it proportionately balanced the law- yer’s and client’s expressive freedoms; and it was not vague or ill- defi ned. according to cronk ja, the appeal panel’s fi nding of professional misconduct was amply justifi ed. in her view, mr. groia’s conduct “exceeded even the most broadly defi ned reasona- ble boundaries of zealous advocacy”, “affected the orderly progression of the trial” and “contributed to the delay in the completion of the testimony of the fi rst witness”: para 211. [41] justice brown, dissenting, disagreed with the majority’s position on both the standard of review and the application of that standard to the appeal panel’s decision. in his view, the fact that mr. groia’s conduct took place in court fundamentally altered the analysis. the primacy of the judiciary as arbiters of in- court conduct mandated correctness review to ensure that “courts remain the fi nal umpires of the propriety of what barristers do in courtrooms”: para 313. [40] la juge cronk a estimé que la décision du comité d’appel était raisonnable. elle n’avait pas indûment porté atteinte au droit de l’avocat de repré- senter son client avec vigueur; elle avait fait une mise en balance proportionnée des droits à la liberté d’ex- pression de l’avocat et de son client; et elle n’était pas vague ni mal défi nie. selon la juge cronk, la conclu- sion de manquement professionnel du comité d’appel était amplement justifi ée. selon elle, la conduite de m. groia [traduction] « a dépassé les limites rai- sonnables même les plus largement défi nies d’une défense passionnée », « a miné la progression or- donnée du procès » et « a retardé le déroulement du témoignage du premier témoin » : par 211. [41] le juge brown, dissident, n’a pas souscrit à la position des juges majoritaires tant sur la norme de contrôle que sur l’application de celle-ci à la décision du comité d’appel. à son avis, le fait que m. groia ait adopté la conduite en cause en cour a fondamen- talement altéré l’analyse. la primauté des juges à titre d’arbitres de la conduite des personnes présentes en cour commandait l’utilisation de la norme de la décision correcte pour veiller à ce que [traduction] « les tribunaux demeurent les derniers arbitres de la bienséance dont font preuve les avocats dans la salle d’audience » : par 313. [42] in brown ja’s view, the appeal panel’s ap- proach to determining whether a lawyer’s behaviour warrants professional sanction underemphasized the [42] selon le juge brown, la façon dont le comité d’appel s’y est pris pour déterminer si le comporte- ment de l’avocat méritait une sanction professionnelle 798 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. effect of the lawyer’s conduct on the fairness of the proceeding. furthermore, it failed to give “meaningful consideration to the rulings made by the trial judge” and the “response of the barrister to those rulings”: para 360. brown ja proposed a test that assessed the lawyer’s conduct, its effect on the proceeding, and the presiding judge’s response: para 319. applying that test, he would not have found mr. groia guilty of pro- fessional misconduct. although mr. groia’s personal attacks on the osc prosecutors were improper, they did not undermine trial fairness. mr. groia largely complied with the trial judge’s instructions to refrain from making invective- laced allegations. and after the court of appeal for ontario administered a “pub- lic shaming”, phase two of the trial proceeded with- out incident. ne donnait pas assez d’importance à l’incidence de la conduite de celui-ci sur l’équité des procédures. de plus, cette approche n’a pas permis de [traduction] « véritablement tenir compte des conclusions tirées par le juge du procès » et de « la réaction de l’avocat face à ces conclusions » : par 360. le juge brown a proposé l’application d’un test qui permet d’évaluer la conduite de l’avocat, ses effets sur l’équité des procédures et la réaction du juge présidant le procès face à la conduite : par 319. en appliquant ce test, il n’aurait pas déclaré m. groia coupable de manque- ment professionnel. les attaques personnelles de ce dernier à l’endroit des avocats de la cvmo étaient effectivement inappropriées, mais elles n’ont pas miné l’équité du procès. m. groia a essentiellement obtempéré aux directives du juge du procès de s’abs- tenir de formuler des allégations abusives. d’ailleurs, après que la cour d’appel de l’ontario l’a « vilipendé sur la place publique », la deuxième phase du procès s’est déroulée sans incidents. iv analysis iv analyse a the standard of review a la norme de contrôle [43] this court’s decisions in law society of new brunswick v. ryan, 2003 scc 20, [2003] 1 scr. 247, at para. 42, and doré v. barreau du québec, 2012 scc 12, [2012] 1 scr 395, at para. 45, es- tablish that law society misconduct fi ndings and sanctions are reviewed for reasonableness. that is the standard against which the appeal panel’s deci- sion is to be assessed. [44] in the ordinary course, an established standard of review obviates the need for a full standard of re- view analysis: see dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, at para 62. however, given the lower courts’ conspicuous disagreement on the standard of review, in my view it is helpful to explain why a reasonableness standard applies. [43] dans les arrêts barreau du nouveau- brunswick c. ryan, 2003 csc 20, [2003] 1 rcs 247, par. 42, et doré c. barreau du québec, 2012 csc 12, [2012] 1 rcs 395, par. 45, la cour a établi que la norme applicable aux conclusions de manquement profes- sionnel tirées par un barreau ainsi qu’aux sanctions imposées à cet égard est celle de la décision raison- nable. c’est à la lumière de cette norme que doit être examinée la décision du comité d’appel. [44] habituellement, lorsqu’il est bien établi qu’une norme de contrôle est celle qui doit s’appliquer, il de- vient inutile de se lancer dans une analyse complète de la norme de contrôle : voir dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, par 62. toutefois, compte tenu du désaccord manifeste entre les cours d’instances inférieures quant à la norme ap- plicable, j’estime qu’il est utile d’expliquer pourquoi c’est celle de la décision raisonnable qui s’applique. [45] setting threshold criteria for a fi nding of pro- fessional misconduct and assessing whether a law- yer’s behaviour satisfi es those criteria involve the [45] lorsqu’il fi xe les conditions qui permettront de conclure à un manquement professionnel et qu’il évalue si le comportement de l’avocat respecte ces [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 799 interpretation of the law society’s home statute and the exercise of discretion under it and are thus pre- sumptively entitled to deference. as i will explain, that presumption is not rebutted. [46] this court’s post-dunsmuir jurisprudence has fi rmly entrenched the notion that decisions of spe- cialized administrative bodies “interpreting [their] own statute or statutes closely connected to [their] function” are entitled to deference from courts, and are thus presumptively reviewed for reasonableness: canadian national railway co. v. canada (attor- ney general), 2014 scc 40, [2014] 2 scr 135, at para. 55; see also edmonton (city) v. edmonton east (capilano) shopping centres ltd., 2016 scc 47, [2016] 2 scr 293, at para. 22; mouvement laïque québécois v. saguenay (city), 2015 scc 16, [2015] 2 scr 3, at para. 46; and mclean v. british columbia (securities commission), 2013 scc 67, [2013] 3 scr 895, at para 21. [47] that presumption applies here. the appeal panel’s approach to determining when incivility amounts to professional misconduct and its appli- cation of that approach in assessing mr.  groia’s conduct involve an interpretation of the rules of pro- fessional conduct enacted under its home statute and the discretionary application of general principles to the facts before it. the appeal panel’s decision is thus presumptively reviewed for reasonableness. conditions, le barreau doit interpréter sa propre loi constitutive et exercer le pouvoir discrétionnaire qu’elle lui confère. par conséquent, les conclusions qu’il tire à cet égard sont présumées commander la déférence. comme je l’expliquerai, cette présomp- tion n’a pas été réfutée en l’espèce. [46] dans la jurisprudence de la cour qui a suivi l’arrêt dunsmuir, il a été fermement établi que la dé- cision d’un organisme administratif spécialisé qui « interprète sa propre loi constitutive ou une loi étroi- tement liée à son mandat » commande la déférence des cours de justice et que la norme de contrôle applicable à ces décisions est présumée être celle de la décision raisonnable : compagnie des che- mins de fer nationaux du canada c. canada (pro- cureur général), 2014 csc 40, [2014] 2 rcs 135, par. 55; voir également edmonton (ville) c. edmon- ton east (capilano) shopping centres ltd., 2016 csc 47, [2016] 2 rcs 293, par. 22; mouvement laïque québécois c. saguenay (ville), 2015 csc 16, [2015] 2 rcs 3, par. 46; et mclean c. colombie- britannique (securities commission), 2013 csc 67, [2013] 3 rcs 895, par 21. [47] cette présomption s’applique en l’espèce. la méthode adoptée par le comité d’appel pour déter- miner à quel moment une incivilité équivaut à un manquement professionnel et son application de cette méthode pour évaluer la conduite de m. groia requiert l’interprétation du code de déontologie édicté sous le régime de sa loi constitutive ainsi que l’application, à la discrétion du comité, de principes généraux aux faits qui lui ont été soumis. il y a donc lieu de présumer que la norme de contrôle applicable à la décision du comité d’appel est celle de la déci- sion raisonnable. [48] mr.  groia, along with brown  j.a in dis- sent, share the view that the presumption of reason- ableness is rebutted in this case, albeit for different reasons. mr. groia argues that determining when incivility amounts to professional misconduct is a question of central importance outside the law so- ciety’s expertise. he also adopts brown ja’s posi- tion that a crucial distinction exists between in- court and out-of- court conduct, necessitating correctness [48] m. groia, tout comme le juge brown dans ses motifs dissidents, est d’avis que la présomption de la norme de la décision raisonnable a été réfutée en l’espèce, mais pour différentes raisons. m. groia fait valoir que la question de déterminer à quel moment une incivilité équivaut à un manquement profession- nel est une question d’importance capitale étrangère au domaine d’expertise du barreau. il est également d’accord avec le juge brown pour dire qu’il existe 800 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. review. with respect, i cannot accept these argu- ments. une distinction essentielle entre la conduite en cour et la conduite hors cour, la première nécessitant un contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. soit dit en tout respect, je ne puis accepter ces arguments. (1) question of central importance outside of (1) question d’importance capitale et étrangère the law society’s expertise au domaine d’expertise du barreau [49] dunsmuir identifi es four narrow categories for which correctness review is appropriate. only one is at issue here: questions of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the decision maker’s expertise: dunsmuir, at para 60. mr. groia argues that determining when in- court behaviour amounts to professional misconduct falls under this category. [49] l’arrêt dunsmuir relève quatre catégories de situations restreintes dans lesquelles il convient d’appliquer la norme de la décision correcte. seule une catégorie est en cause en l’espèce : les questions d’une importance capitale pour le système juridique dans son ensemble et étrangères au domaine d’ex- pertise du décideur : dunsmuir, par 60. m. groia fait valoir que la question de déterminer à quel moment un comportement en cour équivaut à un manquement professionnel relève de cette catégorie. [50] unquestionably, lawyers are vital to the proper functioning of the administration of justice in our free and democratic society. as major j. observed in r v. mcclure, 2001 scc 14 [2001] 1 scr 445, at para. 2: [50] il va sans dire que les avocats sont indispen- sables à une saine administration de la justice dans notre société libre et démocratique. comme l’a fait observer le juge major dans l’arrêt r c. mcclure, 2001 csc 14, [2001] 1 rcs 445, par. 2 : the law is a complex web of interests, relationships and rules. the integrity of the administration of justice depends upon the unique role of the solicitor who provides legal advice to clients within this complex system. by guiding clients through this “complex web of interests”, lawyers uphold the rule of law. they pro- vide those subject to our legal system a means to self- determination under and through the law and guard against arbitrary or unjustifi ed state action: see a. woolley, understanding lawyers’ ethics in canada (2nd ed. 2016), at pp 33-35. le droit est un écheveau complexe d’intérêts, de rap- ports et de règles. l’intégrité de l’administration de la justice repose sur le rôle unique de l’avocat qui donne des conseils juridiques à des clients au sein de ce système complexe. en guidant leurs clients dans cet « écheveau com- plexe d’intérêts », les avocats maintiennent la pri- mauté du droit. ils assurent aux personnes assujetties à notre système juridique le droit à l’autodétermi- nation en vertu des lois et les protègent contre les agissements arbitraires ou injustifiés de l’état  : voir a. woolley, understanding lawyers’ ethics in canada (2e éd. 2016), p 33-35. [51] as such, the permissible scope of their in- court behaviour is arguably of central importance to the legal system as a whole. but even assuming that this raises a question of central importance, it cannot be said that assessing whether incivility amounts to professional misconduct is outside the law society’s expertise. to the contrary, law society disciplinary tribunals have signifi cant expertise regulating the [51] ainsi, on pourrait soutenir que les compor- tements admissibles des avocats en cour revêtent une importance capitale pour le système juridique dans son ensemble. cela dit, même si l’on présume que leurs comportements soulèvent une question d’importance capitale, on ne saurait affi rmer qu’éva- luer si une incivilité équivaut à un manquement pro- fessionnel est une question étrangère au domaine [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 801 legal profession: green v. law society of manitoba, 2017 scc 20, [2017] 1 scr 360, at para. 25; ryan, at para 42. one of the law society’s core functions “is to establish general rules applicable to all mem- bers to ensure ethical conduct, protect the public and discipline lawyers who breach the rules”: canadian national railway co. v. mckercher llp, 2013 scc 39, [2013] 2 scr 649, at para. 15; see also law society act, rso  1990, c l.8, s.  41. and the law society has over two centuries of institutional expertise fulfi lling this mandate. [52] moreover, law society disciplinary panels are composed, in part, of other lawyers. as cory j. remarked in re stevens and law society of upper canada (1979), 55 or (2d) 405 (hcj), at p. 410: “probably no one could approach a complaint against a lawyer with more understanding than a group com- posed primarily of members of his profession.” this understanding comes from experience. lawyers are “keenly aware of the problems and frustrations that confront a practitioner”: stevens, at p 410. d’expertise du barreau. au contraire, les tribunaux disciplinaires des barreaux ont l’expertise voulue pour réglementer la profession juridique : green c. société du barreau du manitoba, 2017 csc 20, [2017] 1 rcs 360, par. 25; ryan, par 42. l’une des fonctions principales du barreau est d’établir « des règles générales applicables à tous les membres pour assurer l’éthique professionnelle, protéger le public et imposer des sanctions disciplinaires aux avocats qui enfreignent les règles » : compagnie des chemins de fer nationaux du canada c. mckercher llp, 2013 csc 39, [2013] 2 rcs 649, par. 15; voir également l’art 41 de la loi sur le barreau, lro 1990, c l8. qui plus est, le barreau remplit ce mandat depuis plus de deux siècles, possédant ainsi une expertise institutionnelle approfondie. [52] en outre, les comités de discipline du barreau sont formés, en partie, d’autres avocats. comme le juge cory l’a fait remarquer dans la décision re stevens and law society of upper canada (1979), 55 or (2d) 405 (hcj), p. 410 : [traduction] « il n’y a sans doute personne qui puisse aborder une plainte contre un avocat avec plus de compréhension qu’un groupe formé principalement de membres de sa profession. » cette compréhension découle de leur expérience. les avocats sont « bien conscients des problèmes et des frustrations auxquels les juristes sont confrontés » : stevens, p 410. (2) in- court versus out-of- court conduct (2) la conduite en cour par opposition à la con- duite hors cour [53] even where the question under review does not fi t neatly into one of the four dunsmuir cor- rectness categories, “a contextual analysis” that re- veals a legislative intent not to defer to a tribunal’s decision may nonetheless rebut the presumption of reasonableness: mclean, at para.  22; edmonton east, at para. 32; saguenay, at para 46. brown ja. and mr. groia refer to one particular contextual fac- tor: mr. groia’s uncivil behaviour took place in a courtroom in their view, reviewing professional misconduct fi ndings based on in- court behaviour for reasonableness impermissibly infringes on judi- cial independence. they maintain that in assessing whether courtroom conduct crosses the line, correct- ness review is required to ensure “the court has the [53] même lorsque la question faisant l’objet du contrôle ne s’inscrit pas parfaitement dans l’une des catégories qui commandent le recours à la norme de la décision correcte établie dans l’arrêt dunsmuir, « une analyse contextuelle » qui révèle l’intention du législateur de ne pas faire montre de retenue en- vers la décision d’un tribunal peut néanmoins écar- ter la présomption d’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable : mclean, par. 22; edmonton east, par. 32; et saguenay, par 46. le juge brown et m. groia font référence à un facteur contextuel en particulier : soit que ce dernier a adopté le comporte- ment irrespectueux dans une salle d’audience. à leur avis, appliquer la norme de la décision raisonnable à une conclusion de manquement professionnel sur le 802 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. last word in answering the question”: groia onca, at para. 280, per brown ja. [54] with respect, the fact that mr. groia’s uncivil behaviour took place in a courtroom is, in my view, irrelevant to determining the standard of review. to be sure, the independence of the judiciary is a consti- tutional cornerstone: beauregard v. canada, [1986] 2 scr 56, at pp 69-73. crucial to the principle of judicial independence is the presiding judge’s power to control his or her courtroom. however, i do not see a deferential standard of review as threatening that power. [55] in this regard, i agree with cronk ja that “the application of the reasonableness standard of review in cases like this one in no way intrudes on a presiding judge’s authority to control the process in his or her courtroom”: para 67. courts and law societies enjoy concurrent jurisdiction to regulate and enforce standards of courtroom behaviour. a trial judge is free to control the conduct in his or her courtroom irrespective of the degree of deference accorded to a law society’s disciplinary decision by a different court. [56] to be clear, the location of the impugned be- haviour is unquestionably relevant to the misconduct analysis itself. as i will explain, the fact that the behaviour occurs in a courtroom is an important contextual factor that must be taken into account when evaluating whether that behaviour amounted to professional misconduct; but it does not impact on the standard of review. fondement d’un comportement en cour constitue un empiétement inadmissible sur l’indépendance judi- ciaire. ils affi rment que pour évaluer si une conduite en salle d’audience dépasse les bornes, la norme de la décision correcte doit être appliquée pour veiller à ce que [traduction] « la cour ait le dernier mot lors- qu’elle répond à la question » : groia (ca. ont.), par. 280, le juge brown. [54] à mon humble avis, le fait que m. groia a adopté le comportement irrespectueux dans une salle d’audience n’est pas pertinent pour décider quelle est la norme de contrôle applicable. certes, l’indé- pendance judiciaire est l’une des pierres angulaires du droit constitutionnel : beauregard c. canada, [1986] 2 rcs 56, p. 69-73; et le pouvoir du juge de contrôler le déroulement de l’instance dans sa salle d’audience est essentiel au principe de l’indé- pendance judiciaire. je ne crois pas pour autant que le recours à la norme de contrôle qui commande la déférence menace ce pouvoir. [55] à cet égard, je conviens avec la juge cronk que [traduction] « l’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable dans des cas comme celui qui nous occupe n’empiète d’aucune manière sur le pou- voir du juge de contrôler le déroulement de l’instance dans sa salle d’audience » : par 67. les tribunaux et les barreaux ont compétence concurrente pour ré- glementer le comportement dans la salle d’audience et pour appliquer des normes à cet égard. le juge du procès est libre de contrôler le déroulement de l’instance dans sa salle d’audience sans égard au degré de déférence qu’une autre cour accordera à la décision disciplinaire d’un barreau. [56] en clair, il ne fait aucun doute que l’endroit où le comportement reproché a été adopté doit être examiné dans l’analyse de l’inconduite elle- même. comme je l’expliquerai, le fait que cela se soit dé- roulé dans la salle d’audience est un facteur contex- tuel important qui doit être pris en considération lorsqu’on évalue si ce comportement équivaut à un manquement professionnel; il n’a toutefois aucune incidence sur la norme de contrôle applicable. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 803 in sum, the appeal panel’s decision is re- [57] viewed for reasonableness. [57] en somme, la norme de contrôle applicable à la décision du comité d’appel est celle de la décision raisonnable. b was the appeal panel’s decision reasonable? b la décision du comité d’appel était- elle raison- nable? (1) the appeal panel’s approach (1) la méthode utilisée par le comité d’appel [58] to determine whether the appeal panel’s de- cision was reasonable, i.e whether it fell within a range of reasonable outcomes, it is necessary to explore how the appeal panel reached its result. in this case, as is apparent from its reasons, the appeal panel first developed an approach for assessing whether a lawyer’s behaviour crosses the line into professional misconduct on the basis of incivility. having done so, it then evaluated whether mr. groia was guilty of professional misconduct. [59] the appeal panel took a context- specifi c ap- proach to evaluating a lawyer’s in- court behaviour. in particular, it considered whether mr. groia’s allega- tions were made in good faith and had a reasonable basis. it also identifi ed the frequency and manner in which mr. groia made his submissions and the trial judge’s reaction to mr. groia’s behaviour as relevant considerations. [60] mr. groia maintains that the appeal panel’s approach led to an unreasonable result. several inter- veners join him, pointing to perceived weaknesses in different aspects of the appeal panel’s approach and urging this court to adopt their preferred approaches for evaluating a lawyer’s conduct. [58] pour décider si la décision du comité d’ap- pel était raisonnable, c-à-d si elle se situe dans l’éventail des solutions raisonnables possibles, il est nécessaire d’examiner comment il en est arrivé au résultat qu’il a formulé. en l’espèce, comme il appert de ses motifs, le comité d’appel a d’abord élaboré une méthode pour analyser si le comporte- ment d’un avocat franchit la ligne du manquement professionnel pour incivilité. ensuite, il a évalué si m. groia s’est rendu coupable d’un tel manque- ment. [59] le comité d’appel a adopté une méthode axée sur le contexte pour évaluer le comportement adopté par un avocat en salle d’audience. plus particulière- ment, il s’est demandé si les allégations de m. groia avaient été faites de bonne foi et étaient raisonna- blement fondées. le comité d’appel a aussi estimé que la fréquence à laquelle m. groia a formulé ses observations, la façon dont il l’a fait et la réaction du juge du procès quant au comportement en cause était des considérations pertinentes. [60] m. groia soutient que la méthode utilisée par le comité d’appel a mené à un résultat déraisonnable. plusieurs intervenants se joignent à lui, soulignant ce qu’ils perçoivent comme des faiblesses dans divers aspects de cette méthode et invitant la cour à adop- ter les méthodes qu’ils préconisent pour évaluer la conduite d’un avocat. [61] these arguments can be broadly grouped into four categories. first, the appeal panel’s approach does not appropriately balance civility and resolute advocacy. second, it does not provide enough guid- ance to lawyers. third, it does not properly account for the presiding judge’s reaction to the lawyer’s [61] ces arguments peuvent, dans les grandes lignes, être regroupés en quatre catégories. premiè- rement, la méthode du comité d’appel ne mettrait pas en balance comme il se doit la civilité et le droit de défendre un client avec vigueur. deuxièmement, elle ne guiderait pas suffisamment les avocats. 804 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. behaviour and judicial independence. fourth, it dis- proportionately balances the law society’s statutory mandate with the lawyer’s right to free expression. [62] for the reasons that follow, i would reject these submissions. when developing an approach for assessing whether incivility amounts to profes- sional misconduct, the appeal panel recognized the importance of civility while remaining sensitive to the lawyer’s duty of resolute advocacy — a duty of particular importance in the criminal context because of the client’s constitutional right to make full answer and defence. its context- specifi c approach is fl exible enough to assess allegedly uncivil behaviour arising out of the diverse array of situations in which court- room lawyers fi nd themselves. at the same time, the appeal panel set a reasonably precise benchmark that instructs lawyers as to the permissible bounds of ethical courtroom behaviour, articulating a series of factors that ought generally to be considered when evaluating a lawyer’s conduct and describing how those factors operate when assessing a lawyer’s be- haviour. finally, the appeal panel’s approach allows law society disciplinary tribunals to proportionately balance the lawyer’s expressive freedom with its statutory mandate in any given case. troisièmement, elle ne tiendrait pas correctement compte de la réaction du juge qui a présidé l’au- dience face au comportement de l’avocat et de l’in- dépendance judiciaire. quatrièmement, elle ferait pencher la balance de manière disproportionnée pour le mandat que confère la loi au barreau au détriment du droit de l’avocat à la liberté d’expression. [62] pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de rejeter ces arguments. lorsqu’il a élaboré une méthode pour évaluer si une incivilité équivaut à un manquement professionnel, le comité d’appel a re- connu l’importance de la civilité tout en demeurant attentif à l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur — une obligation particu- lièrement importante en contexte criminel en rai- son du droit constitutionnel du client de présenter une défense pleine et entière sa méthode axée sur le contexte est suffi samment souple pour éva- luer le comportement dit irrespectueux découlant des diverses situations dans lesquelles les avocats peuvent se trouver en salle d’audience. du même coup, le comité d’appel a fi xé un point de repère raisonnablement précis qui indique aux avocats les limites permises du comportement éthique en salle d’audience, en énonçant une série de facteurs qui doivent généralement être examinés pour évaluer la conduite de l’avocat et en décrivant comment ces facteurs s’appliquent lorsqu’il s’agit de procéder à cette évaluation. enfi n, la méthode appliquée par le comité d’appel permet aux tribunaux discipli- naires des barreaux de faire une mise en balance proportionnée de la liberté d’expression de l’avo- cat, d’une part, et du mandat que lui confi e la loi, d’autre part. (a) the appeal panel recognized the importance a) le comité d’appel a reconnu l’importance de of civility la civilité [63] to begin, when developing its approach, the appeal panel recognized the importance of civility to the legal profession and the corresponding need to target behaviour that detrimentally affects the admin- istration of justice and the fairness of a particular pro- ceeding. the duty to practice with civility has long been embodied in the legal profession’s collective [63] tout d’abord, lorsqu’il a élaboré sa méthode, le comité d’appel a reconnu l’importance de la civilité dans l’exercice de la profession juridique et le besoin correspondant de cibler les comportements qui nuisent à l’administration de la justice et à l’équité des pro- cès. l’obligation de pratiquer avec civilité est ancrée depuis longtemps dans la conscience collective de la [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 805 conscience2 — and for good reason. civility has been described as “the glue that holds the adversary sys- tem together, that keeps it from imploding”: morden acjo, “notes for convocation address — law society of upper canada, february 22, 2001”, in law society of upper canada, ed., plea negotiations: achieving a “win- win” result (2003), at pp. 1-10 to 1-11. practicing law with civility brings with it a host of benefi ts, both personal and to the profession as a whole. conversely, incivility is damaging to trial fairness and the administration of justice in a number of ways. profession juridique2 — et pour cause. c’est elle qui [traduction] « assure la cohésion du système contra- dictoire et l’empêche d’imploser » : le juge en chef adjoint morden, « allocution à l’occasion d’une re- mise de diplômes — barreau du haut- canada, 22 fé- vrier 2001 », dans barreau du haut- canada, dir., plea negotiations : achieving a « win- win » result (2003), p. 1-10 à 1-11. pratiquer le droit avec civilité com- porte de nombreux avantages, tant pour les individus en cause que pour la profession dans son ensemble. à l’inverse, l’incivilité nuit à l’équité du procès et à l’administration de la justice de plusieurs façons. [64] first, incivility can prejudice a client’s cause. overly aggressive, sarcastic, or demeaning court- room language may lead triers of fact, be they judge or jury, to view the lawyer — and therefore the cli- ent’s case — unfavourably. uncivil communications with opposing counsel can cause a breakdown in the relationship, eliminating any prospect of settlement and increasing the client’s legal costs by forcing un- necessary court proceedings to adjudicate disputes that could have been resolved with a simple phone call. as one american commentator aptly wrote: conduct that may be characterized as uncivil, abrasive, hostile, or obstructive necessarily impedes the goal of resolving confl icts rationally, peacefully, and effi ciently, in turn delaying or even denying justice    . this mindset eliminates peaceable dealings and often forces dilatory, inconsiderate tactics that detract from just resolution. [64] premièrement, l’incivilité peut porter pré- judice à la cause du client. l’avocat qui tient des propos trop agressifs, sarcastiques ou humiliants dans une salle d’audience peut donner un éclairage défavorable de sa personne — et donc de la cause du client — aux yeux du juge des faits, qu’il s’agisse d’un juge ou d’un jury. les communications dénuées de civilité avec l’avocat de la partie adverse peuvent entraîner une rupture dans la relation, ce qui élimine tout espoir de règlement et augmente les frais juri- diques du client en forçant inutilement les tribunaux à régler des confl its qui auraient pu se régler par un simple appel téléphonique. comme l’a judicieuse- ment écrit une auteure américaine : [traduction] une conduite incivile, abrasive, hostile ou récalcitrante nuit forcément à la réalisation de l’objectif de régler les confl its de façon rationnelle, pacifi que et effi cace et cause plutôt des retards, voire des dénis de justice [  ]. cet état d’esprit empêche les rapports pacifi ques et em- porte souvent des tactiques dilatoires et désobligeantes qui réduisent les chances de règlement équitable des litiges. (k. a. nagorney, “a noble profession? a discussion of civility among lawyers” (1999), 12 geo. j. legal ethics 815, at p. 817) (k. a. nagorney, « a noble profession? a discus- sion of civility among lawyers » (1999), 12 geo. j. legal ethics 815, p. 817) 2 the fi rst codifi ed set of canadian legal ethics implored law- yers that their behaviour “should be characterized by courtesy and good faith”: w.w pue, “becoming ‘ethical’: lawyers’ professional ethics in early twentieth century canada”, in d. gibson and ww. pue, eds., glimpses of canadian legal history (1991), 237, at p 276. today, every provincial and territorial law society imposes a duty of civility in its code of professional con- duct. the law society’s rules of professional conduct in force at the time of the felderhof trial stated that “[a] lawyer shall be cour- teous, civil, and act in good faith    with all persons with whom the lawyer has dealings in the course of litigation”: r 401(6). 2 le premier ensemble de règles de déontologie destiné aux juristes au canada enjoignait aux avocats d’adopter un comportement qui [traduction] « [devait] se caractériser par la courtoisie et la bonne foi » : w w pue, « becoming “ethical” : lawyers’ professional ethics in early twentieth century canada », dans d. gibson et w w. pue, dir., glimpses of canadian legal history (1991), 237, p 276. aujourd’hui, tous les barreaux provinciaux et territoriaux imposent un devoir de civilité dans leur code de déontologie. le code de déontologie du barreau en vigueur au moment du procès de m. felderhof prévoyait ce qui suit : « l’avocat fait preuve de cour- toisie, de civilité et de bonne foi envers [  ] toutes les personnes avec qui il entre en contact en cours d’instance » : par 401(6). 806 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. [65] second, incivility is distracting. a lawyer forced to defend against constant allegations of im- propriety will naturally be less focused on arguing the case. uncivil behaviour also distracts the triers of fact by diverting their attention away from the substantive merits of the case. the trial judge risks becoming preoccupied with policing counsel’s con- duct instead of focusing on the evidence and legal issues: justice michael code, “counsel’s duty of civility: an essential component of fair trials and an effective justice system” (2007), 11 can. crim. lr 97, at p 105. [65] deuxièmement, l’incivilité dérange. l’avocat qui est forcé de se défendre contre des allégations incessantes d’inconduite sera naturellement moins concentré pour plaider. un comportement irrespec- tueux dérange également les juges des faits en dé- tournant leur attention du bien- fondé de l’affaire. qui plus est, le juge du procès risque d’être davantage préoccupé par la conduite de l’avocat que par la preuve et les questions juridiques : le juge michael code, « counsel’s duty of civility : an essential component of fair trials and an effective justice system » (2007), 11 rev. can. dp 97, p 105. [66] third, incivility adversely impacts other justice system participants. disparaging personal attacks from lawyers  — whether or not they are directed at a witness — can exacerbate the already stressful task of testifying at trial. [67] finally, incivility can erode public confi dence in the administration of justice — a vital component of an effective justice system: valente v. the queen, [1985] 2 scr 673, at p 689. inappropriate vitriol, sarcasm and baseless allegations of impropriety in a courtroom can cause the parties, and the public at large, to question the reliability of the result: see felderhof onca, at para. 83; marchand (litigation guardian of) v. public general hospital society of chatham (2000), 51 or (3d) 97, at para 148. incivility thus diminishes the public’s perception of the justice system as a fair dispute- resolution and truth- seeking mechanism. [68] the appeal panel was alive to the profound importance of civility in the legal profession when developing its approach. it recognized that “‘civility’ protects and enhances the administration of justice” (para. 211), targeting behaviour that could call into question trial fairness and the public’s perception of the administration of justice (paras. 228 and 230-31). [66] troisièmement, l’incivilité nuit aux autres intervenants du système judiciaire. les attaques per- sonnelles désobligeantes des avocats  — qu’elles soient adressées ou non à un témoin  — peuvent exacerber la tâche déjà stressante de témoigner lors d’un procès. [67] enfi n, l’incivilité peut miner la confi ance du public dans l’administration de la justice — une composante essentielle d’un système judiciaire ef- fi cace : valente c. la reine, [1985] 2 rcs 673, p 689. les propos virulents, le sarcasme et les al- légations non fondées d’inconduite dans une salle d’audience peuvent mener les parties, et le public en général, à remettre en cause la fi abilité du résul- tat : voir felderhof (ca. ont.), par. 83; marchand (litigation guardian of) c. public general hospital society of chatham (2000), 51 or (3d) 97, par 148. ainsi, l’incivilité ternit la façon dont le public devrait percevoir le système judiciaire, soit comme un sys- tème qui assure le règlement équitable des litiges et qui constitue un mécanisme de recherche de la vérité. [68] le comité d’appel a tenu compte de la grande importance de la civilité dans l’exercice de la pro- fession juridique lorsqu’il a élaboré sa méthode. il a reconnu qu’elle [traduction] « protège et rehausse l’administration de la justice » (par. 211), ciblant le comportement qui pourrait remettre en doute l’équité du procès et la perception qu’a le public de l’admi- nistration de la justice : par. 228 et 230-231. [69] mr. groia and various interveners argue that the appeal panel should have gone further. like the divisional court, they would require that before [69] m. groia et divers intervenants font valoir que le comité d’appel aurait dû aller plus loin. à l’instar de la cour divisionnaire, ils auraient exigé [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 807 a lawyer can be found guilty of professional mis- conduct, the lawyer’s behaviour must bring the ad- ministration of justice into disrepute or impact trial fairness. with respect, i would not give effect to their arguments. i echo the comments of cronk ja. that such a requirement is “unnecessary and unduly restrictive”: groia onca, para 169. the appeal panel’s approach targets conduct that tends to com- promise trial fairness and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, making an explicit requirement unnecessary. moreover, uncivil behaviour worthy of sanction may not have a perceptible impact on the fairness of the particular proceeding. finally, in my view, requiring the law society to evaluate the fair- ness of a proceeding would shift the focus away from the lawyer’s behaviour and inappropriately imbue the law society with a judicial function. (b) the appeal panel accounted for the relation- ship between civility and resolute advocacy [70] second, in developing its approach, the ap- peal panel was sensitive to the lawyer’s duty of res- olute advocacy and the client’s constitutional right to make full answer and defence. it held that “the word ‘civility’ should not be used to discourage fearless advocacy” (par. 211) and was careful to create an approach which ensured “that the vicissitudes that confront courtroom advocates are fairly accounted for so as not to create a chilling effect on zealous advocacy” (para 232). [71] although of doubtless importance, the duty to practice with civility is not a lawyer’s sole ethical mandate. rather, it exists in concert with a series of professional obligations that both constrain and com- pel a lawyer’s behaviour. the duty of civility must be understood in light of these other obligations. in particular, standards of civility cannot compromise the lawyer’s duty of resolute advocacy. que pour qu’un avocat puisse être déclaré coupable de manquement professionnel, son comportement doive déconsidérer l’administration de la justice ou avoir une incidence sur l’équité du procès. soit dit avec respect, je ne retiens pas leurs arguments. je répète les commentaires de la juge cronk selon les- quels pareille exigence est [traduction] « inutile et indûment contraignante » : groia (ca. ont.), par 169. la méthode adoptée par le comité d’appel cible la conduite qui tend à compromettre l’équité du procès et à déconsidérer l’administration de la jus- tice, rendant l’exigence explicite inutile. de plus, le comportement irrespectueux qui mérite une sanction pourrait avoir une incidence qui n’est pas perceptible sur l’équité du procès. enfi n, à mon sens, exiger que le barreau évalue l’équité du procès ferait passer en second plan le comportement de l’avocat et confé- rerait indûment au barreau une fonction judiciaire. b) le comité d’appel a tenu compte de la rela- tion entre la civilité et l’obligation de repré- senter son client avec vigueur [70] ensuite, en élaborant sa méthode, le comité d’appel a tenu compte de l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur et du droit constitutionnel de ce dernier de présenter une dé- fense pleine et entière. il a conclu que [traduction] « le mot “civilité” ne devrait pas être utilisé pour décourager les avocats de représenter résolument leur client » (par. 211) et s’est assuré de créer une méthode qui veillait à ce que « les tribulations aux- quelles sont confrontés les avocats en salle d’au- dience soient équitablement prises en compte d’une manière qui ne freine pas la passion avec laquelle ils défendent leurs clients » : par 232. [71] bien que son importance soit certaine, le de- voir de pratiquer avec civilité n’est pas le seul man- dat déontologique de l’avocat. en fait, il existe de concert avec une série d’obligations professionnelles qui à la fois restreignent et dictent le comportement de l’avocat. le devoir d’agir avec civilité doit être interprété à la lumière de ces autres obligations. plus particulièrement, les normes de civilité ne peuvent compromettre l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur. 808 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. [72] the importance of resolute advocacy cannot be overstated. it is a vital ingredient in our adver- sarial justice system — a system premised on the idea that forceful partisan advocacy facilitates truth- seeking: see eg. phillips v. ford motor co. (1971), 18 dlr (3d) 641, at p 661. moreover, resolute advocacy is a key component of the lawyer’s com- mitment to the client’s cause, a principle of funda- mental justice under s. 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms: canada (attorney general) v. federation of law societies of canada, 2015 scc 7, [2015] 1 scr 401, at paras 83-84. [73] resolute advocacy requires lawyers to “raise fearlessly every issue, advance every argument and ask every question, however distasteful, that the law- yer thinks will help the client’s case”: federation of law societies of canada, model code of pro- fessional conduct (online), r 51-1 commentary 1. this is no small order. lawyers are regularly called on to make submissions on behalf of their clients that are unpopular and at times uncomfortable. these submissions can be met with harsh criticism — from the public, the bar, and even the court. lawyers must stand resolute in the face of this adversity by con- tinuing to advocate on their clients’ behalf, despite popular opinion to the contrary. [74] the duty of resolute advocacy takes on par- ticular salience in the criminal law context. criminal defence lawyers are the fi nal frontier between the accused and the power of the state. as cory j. noted in the inquiry regarding thomas sophonow: the investigation, prosecution and consideration of entitlement to compensation (2001), at p. 53: it cannot be forgotten that it is often only the defence counsel who stands between the lynch mob and the ac- cused. defence counsel must be courageous, not only in the face of an outraged and infl amed community, but also, on occasion, the apparent disapproval of the court. [72] l’importance de l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur ne peut être sur- estimée. il s’agit d’un élément fondamental de notre système de justice contradictoire — un système qui repose sur le principe qu’une défense vigoureuse des intérêts du client facilite la recherche de la vé- rité : voir, p ex, phillips c. ford motor co. (1971), 18 dlr (3d) 641, p 661. de plus, cette obliga- tion de l’avocat est une composante essentielle du devoir de ce dernier de se dévouer à la cause de son client, un principe de justice fondamentale garanti par l’art. 7 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés : canada (procureur général) c. fédération des ordres professionnels de juristes du canada, 2015 csc 7, [2015] 1 rcs 401, par 83-84. [73] l’obligation de représenter le client avec vi- gueur impose à l’avocat « de soulever résolument tous les points, de faire valoir tous les arguments et de po- ser toutes les questions, si déplaisantes soient- elles, qui, selon [lui], aideront la cause de son client » : code type de déontologie professionnelle de la fé- dération des ordres professionnels de juristes du ca- nada (en ligne), art 51-1, commentaire 1. il s’agit d’un mandat de taille. les avocats sont régulière- ment appelés à présenter au nom de leurs clients des observations qui sont impopulaires et parfois incon- fortables. ces observations peuvent être sévèrement critiquées — par le public, par le barreau, et même par le tribunal. les avocats doivent demeurer fermes face à cette adversité en continuant de défendre les inté- rêts de leurs clients, malgré la forte opinion contraire. [74] l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur revêt une importance particulière dans le contexte criminel. en effet, les avocats de la défense sont l’ultime frontière entre l’accusé et le pouvoir de l’état. comme le juge cory l’a fait remar- quer dans the inquiry regarding thomas sophonow : the investigation, prosecution and consideration of entitlement to compensation (2001), p. 53 : [traduction] n’oublions pas que l’avocat de la dé- fense se retrouve souvent seul entre les lyncheurs et l’ac- cusé l’avocat de la défense doit être courageux, non seulement devant une communauté indignée et enfl ammée, mais également, à l’occasion, face à la désapprobation apparente de la cour. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 809 [75] for criminal defence lawyers, fearless ad- vocacy extends beyond ethical obligations into the realm of constitutional imperatives. as the inter- vener the criminal lawyers’ association of ontario (“clao”) notes, defence lawyers advancing the accused’s right to make full answer and defence “are frequently required to criticize the way state actors do their jobs”: quebec (director of criminal and penal prosecutions) v. jodoin, 2017 scc 26, [2017] 1 scr 478, at para. 32; doré, at paras 64-66. these criticisms range from routine charter appli- cations — alleging, for example, an unconstitutional search, detention, or arrest — to serious allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. defence lawyers must have suffi cient latitude to advance their clients’ right to make full answer and defence by raising argu- ments about the propriety of state actors’ conduct without fear of reprisal. [76] in saying this, i should not be taken as en- dorsing incivility in the name of resolute advocacy. in this regard, i  agree with both cronk  j.a and rosenberg ja that civility and resolute advocacy are not incompatible: see groia onca, at paras. 131-39; felderhof onca, at paras. 83 and 94. to the contrary, civility is often the most effective form of advocacy. nevertheless, when defi ning incivility and assessing whether a lawyer’s behaviour crosses the line, care must be taken to set a suffi ciently high threshold that will not chill the kind of fearless advocacy that is at times necessary to advance a client’s cause. the appeal panel recognized the need to develop an ap- proach that would avoid such a chilling effect. [75] pour les avocats criminalistes, l’obligation de représenter résolument le client dépasse les obli- gations déontologiques et repose sur des impéra- tifs constitutionnels. comme la criminal lawyers’ association of ontario (« clao »), intervenante, le fait remarquer, les avocats de la défense qui in- voquent le droit de l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière [traduction] « sont fréquemment tenus de critiquer la façon dont les acteurs de l’état font leur travail » : québec (directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales) c jodoin, 2017 csc 26, [2017] 1 rcs 478, par. 32; doré, par 64-66. ces critiques varient de simples demandes fondées sur la charte — dans lesquelles on allègue, par exemple, une fouille, une détention ou une arrestation incons- titutionnelle — aux graves allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite. les avocats de la défense doivent avoir suffi samment de latitude pour invoquer le droit de leurs clients de présenter une défense pleine et entière en soulevant, sans craindre des représailles, des arguments sur la légitimité de la conduite des acteurs de l’état. [76] cela dit, il ne faut pas croire que j’approuve l’incivilité au nom de l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur. à cet égard, je conviens avec les juges cronk et rosenberg que la civilité et l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur ne sont pas incompatibles : voir groia (ca. ont.), par. 131-139; felderhof (ca. ont.), par. 83 et 94. au contraire, la civilité est sou- vent le moyen le plus effi cace pour représenter un client. quoi qu’il en soit, lorsqu’il convient de défi nir l’incivilité et d’évaluer si le comportement de l’avo- cat dépasse les bornes, il faut s’assurer d’établir un seuil suffi samment élevé pour éviter de décourager l’avocat de défendre son client avec la fermeté qui est parfois nécessaire pour faire progresser sa cause. le comité d’appel a reconnu la nécessité d’élaborer une méthode qui éviterait un tel effet décourageant. (c) the appeal panel’s approach is both flexible c) la méthode adoptée par le comité d’appel and precise est souple et précise [77] the appeal panel developed an approach that is both fl exible and precise. a rigid defi nition of when incivility amounts to professional misconduct in the courtroom is neither attainable nor desirable. [77] le comité d’appel a élaboré une méthode qui est à la fois souple et précise. il n’est pratiquement pas possible ni même souhaitable de défi nir stric- tement à quel moment une incivilité dans la salle 810 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. rather, determining whether a lawyer’s behaviour warrants a fi nding of professional misconduct must remain a context- specific inquiry that is flexible enough to assess behaviour arising from the diverse array of situations in which lawyers fi nd themselves. [78] and yet standards of civility must be artic- ulated with a reasonable degree of precision. an overly vague or open- ended test for incivility risks eroding resolute advocacy. prudent lawyers will steer clear of a blurry boundary to avoid a potential mis- conduct fi nding for advancing arguments that may rightly be critical of other justice system participants. in contrast, a standard that is reasonably ascertaina- ble gives lawyers a workable defi nition which they can use to guide their behaviour. it also guides law society disciplinary tribunals in their task of deter- mining whether a lawyer’s behaviour amounts to professional misconduct. [79] the appeal panel’s approach strikes a rea- sonable balance between fl exibility and precision. the appeal panel described its approach to assess- ing whether a lawyer’s uncivil behaviour warrants professional sanction as “fundamentally contextual and fact specifi c”, noting the importance of “con- sider[ing] the dynamics, complexity and particular burdens and stakes of the trial or other proceeding”: paras. 7 and 232. by focussing on the particular factual matrix before it, the appeal panel’s approach is fl exible enough to accommodate the diverse ar- ray of situations in which courtroom lawyers fi nd themselves. d’audience équivaut à un manquement professionnel. la méthode pour déterminer si le comportement de l’avocat justifi e une conclusion de manquement pro- fessionnel doit plutôt demeurer axée sur le contexte et être suffi samment souple pour évaluer le compor- tement qui découle de l’éventail de situations dans lesquelles les avocats peuvent se trouver. [78] les normes de civilité doivent néanmoins être formulées avec suffi samment de précision. un cri- tère trop vague ou pas assez limité pour déterminer s’il y a incivilité risquerait de compromettre l’obliga- tion de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur. les avocats prudents se tiendraient loin des frontières fl oues afi n d’éviter une éventuelle conclusion de man- quement pour avoir invoqué des arguments visant à dénoncer à bon droit d’autres intervenants du système de justice. en revanche, un critère qu’on peut raison- nablement cerner donne aux avocats une défi nition pratique dont ils peuvent se servir pour guider leur comportement. ce critère peut également servir de guide pour les tribunaux disciplinaires des ordres pro- fessionnels qui doivent déterminer si le comportement d’un avocat équivaut à un manquement professionnel. [79] la méthode élaborée par le comité d’appel établit un équilibre raisonnable entre la souplesse et la précision. selon le comité d’appel, cette mé- thode pour évaluer si le comportement irrespectueux de l’avocat justifi e une sanction professionnelle est [traduction] « fondamentalement contextuelle et tributaire des faits en cause », et elle prend en consi- dération l’importance de « tenir compte de la dyna- mique, de la complexité, des fardeaux et des enjeux particuliers du procès ou de toute autre procédure » : par. 7 et 232. en concentrant son analyse sur le cadre factuel dont il disposait, le comité d’appel a établi une méthode suffi samment souple pour s’adapter aux diverses situations dans lesquelles les avocats peuvent se trouver en salle d’audience. [80] at the same time, the appeal panel’s approach is suffi ciently precise to delineate an appropriate boundary past which behaviour warrants a profes- sional misconduct fi nding. the appeal panel iden- tifi ed a set of factors that a disciplinary panel ought generally to consider when evaluating a lawyer’s conduct. it then provided guidance on how those [80] en même temps, la méthode du comité d’ap- pel est suffi samment précise pour défi nir les limites adéquates au- delà desquelles le comportement jus- tifi e une conclusion de manquement professionnel. le comité d’appel a relevé un ensemble de facteurs qu’un comité disciplinaire doit généralement exa- miner lorsqu’il évalue la conduite d’un avocat. il a [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 811 factors operate when assessing a lawyer’s behaviour. importantly, as the appeal panel recognized, this list is not closed and the weight assigned to each factor will vary case-by- case. i turn to those factors now. ensuite donné des directives sur la façon dont ces facteurs s’appliquent lorsqu’il s’agit d’évaluer le comportement d’un avocat. plus important encore, comme l’a reconnu le comité d’appel, cette liste n’est pas défi nitive et le poids à accorder à chaque fac- teur variera en fonction de chaque cas. je me penche maintenant sur ces facteurs. (i) factors to consider when assessing a law- (i) facteurs à examiner dans l’évaluation du yer’s behaviour comportement d’un avocat 1 what the lawyer said 1 les remarques formulées par l’avocat [81] first, the appeal panel looked to what the law- yer said. mr. groia alleged prosecutorial misconduct throughout phase one of the felderhof trial. as such, the appeal panel had to determine when these kinds of allegations amount to professional misconduct. it concluded that prosecutorial misconduct allegations, or other challenges to opposing counsel’s integrity, cross the line into professional misconduct unless they are made in good faith and have a reasonable basis: ap reasons, at paras. 9 and 235. in other words, allegations that are either made in bad faith or without a reasonable basis amount to professional misconduct. [82] two points about evaluating what the law- yer said warrant comment. first, i do not read the appeal panel’s reasons as characterizing allegations made in bad faith or without a reasonable basis as a stand- alone “test” for professional misconduct. when the reasons are read as a whole, it is apparent that whether or not allegations of prosecutorial mis- conduct are made in bad faith or without a reasona- ble basis is simply one piece of the “fundamentally contextual and fact specifi c” analysis for determining whether a lawyer’s behaviour amounts to profes- sional misconduct: ap reasons, at paras. 7 and 232. [81] premièrement, le comité d’appel s’est penché sur les remarques énoncées par l’avocat. m. groia a formulé des allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite tout au long de la première phase du procès de m felderhof. par conséquent, le comité d’appel devait déterminer à quel moment ce genre d’allégations équivaut à un manquement professionnel. il a conclu que les alléga- tions de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite, ou toute autre contestation de l’inté- grité de l’avocat de la partie adverse, franchissent la ligne du manquement professionnel sauf si elles sont formulées de bonne foi et raisonnablement fondées : motifs du comité d’appel, par. 9 et 235. autrement dit, les allégations équivalent à un manquement profes- sionnel dès lors qu’elles sont formulées de mauvaise foi ou sans un fondement raisonnable. [82] deux éléments concernant l’évaluation des remarques de l’avocat méritent mon attention. premièrement, d’après ma lecture des motifs du co- mité d’appel, ces derniers n’établissent pas que la formulation d’allégations faites de mauvaise foi ou sans fondement raisonnable suffi t à elle seule pour juger de l’existence ou non d’un manquement profes- sionnel. lorsqu’on lit les motifs dans leur ensemble, clairement, le fait que les allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite sont faites de mauvaise foi ou sans fondement rai- sonnable ne constitue qu’un élément de l’analyse [traduction] « fondamentalement contextuelle et tributaire des faits en cause » qui permet de déter- miner si le comportement d’un avocat équivaut à un manquement professionnel : motifs du comité d’appel, par. 7 et 232. 812 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. [83] to be clear, in some circumstances, bad faith allegations or allegations that lack a reasonable basis may, on their own, warrant a fi nding of professional misconduct. however, a law society disciplinary tri- bunal must always take into account the full panoply of contextual factors particular to an individual case before making that determination. a contrary inter- pretation would render redundant any assessment of the frequency or manner in which the allegations were made and the presiding judge’s reaction — factors which the appeal panel considered relevant to the overall inquiry. [84] second, it was open to the appeal panel to conclude that allegations of prosecutorial miscon- duct or other challenges to opposing counsel’s in- tegrity must both be made in good faith and have a reasonable basis. various interveners take issue with this standard. the british columbia civil liberties association argues that sanctioning a lawyer for making good faith allegations without a reasona- ble basis punishes the lawyer for simply being mis- taken. the clao agrees, submitting that the appeal panel’s standard does not give defence counsel the necessary latitude to fearlessly advance arguments that turn out to be incorrect. accordingly, only alle- gations made in bad faith should warrant a fi nding of professional misconduct. [85] i share the interveners’ concerns that law so- cieties should not sanction lawyers for sincerely held but mistaken legal positions or questionable litiga- tion strategies. nonetheless, in my view, the appeal panel’s standard withstands scrutiny. allegations that impugn opposing counsel’s integrity must not be made lightly. a reputation for integrity is a lawyer’s most important professional asset. it generally takes a long time to build up and it can be lost overnight. courts and legal commentators have emphasized the importance of a lawyer’s reputation. in hill v. church of scientology of toronto, [1995] 2 scr 1130, at para. 118, cory j. put it this way: [83] bref, pour que ce soit bien clair, dans certaines circonstances, les allégations faites de mauvaise foi ou sans fondement raisonnable peuvent, à elles seules, justifi er une conclusion de manquement professionnel. cependant, l’instance disciplinaire d’un barreau doit toujours tenir compte de tout l’éventail des facteurs contextuels propres à un cas en particulier avant de se prononcer. toute évaluation de la fréquence à laquelle les allégations ont été formulées ou de la manière dont elles l’ont été, ainsi que de la réaction du juge — des facteurs qui, selon le comité d’appel, présentent un in- térêt pour l’examen dans son ensemble — deviendrait superfl ue si on adoptait une interprétation contraire. [84] deuxièmement, le comité d’appel pouvait conclure que les allégations de conduite répréhen- sible de la part des avocats de la poursuite ou toute autre contestation de l’intégrité de l’avocat de la partie adverse doivent être formulées de bonne foi et être raisonnablement fondées. divers inter- venants contestent ce critère. la british columbia civil liberties association soutient que sanction- ner l’avocat pour avoir formulé des allégations de bonne foi sans fondement raisonnable le pénalise pour une simple erreur. la clao est d’accord et soutient que le critère appliqué par le comité d’appel n’accorde pas à l’avocat de la défense la latitude nécessaire pour invoquer résolument des arguments qui se révèlent incorrects. par conséquent, seules les allégations formulées de mauvaise foi justifi ent une conclusion de manquement professionnel. [85] je partage les préoccupations des intervenants pour qui les ordres professionnels ne devraient pas punir les avocats pour des opinions juridiques sin- cères bien qu’erronées ou des stratégies d’instance douteuses. il n’en demeure pas moins, à mon sens, que le critère appliqué par le comité d’appel résiste à l’exa- men. les allégations qui remettent en question l’in- tégrité de l’avocat de la partie adverse ne doivent pas être formulées à la légère. la réputation d’intégrité de l’avocat est son atout professionnel le plus important. cette réputation prend généralement beaucoup de temps à bâtir et elle peut se perdre en un claquement de doigts. les tribunaux et les auteurs en ont d’ail- leurs souligné l’importance. dans l’arrêt hill c. église de scientologie de toronto, [1995] 2 rcs 1130, par. 118, le juge cory l’a formulé ainsi : [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 813 the reputation of a lawyer is of paramount importance to clients, to other members of the profession, and to the judiciary. a lawyer’s practice is founded and maintained upon the basis of a good reputation for professional integ- rity and trustworthiness. it is the cornerstone of a lawyer’s professional life. even if endowed with outstanding talent and indefatigable diligence, a lawyer cannot survive with- out a good reputation. la réputation d’un avocat est d’une importance primor- diale vis-à-vis des clients, des membres de la profession et de la magistrature. l’avocat monte sa pratique et la maintient grâce à sa réputation d’intégrité et de conscience professionnelles. elle est la pierre angulaire de sa vie professionnelle. même doué d’un talent exceptionnel et faisant preuve d’une diligence de tout instant, l’avocat ne peut survivre sans une réputation irréprochable. [86] maintaining a reputation for practicing with integrity is a lifelong challenge. once sullied, a law- yer’s reputation may never be fully restored. as such, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct must have a reasonable foundation. i agree with the appeal panel that anything less “gives too much licence to irresponsible counsel with sincere but nevertheless unsupportable suspicions”: para 235. the conse- quences for the opposing lawyer’s reputation are simply too severe to require anything less than a reasonable basis for allegations impugning his or her integrity. [87] finally, the appeal panel’s reasonable basis requirement will not chill resolute advocacy. a law- yer must establish a “proper evidentiary foundation” before alleging abuse of process arising from prose- cutorial misconduct: r v. anderson, 2014 scc 41, [2014] 2 scr 167, at paras 52-55. absent a proper foundation, an abuse of process motion will be sum- marily dismissed: r v. cody, 2017 scc 31, [2017] 1 scr 659, at para 38. unreasonable allegations, therefore, do nothing to advance the client’s case. an ethical standard prohibiting such allegations does not impair resolute advocacy. to be clear, not all defence action summarily dismissed under cody will warrant professional sanction. on the contrary, defence ac- tion a court deems illegitimate may well fall short of professional misconduct: cody, at paras 32-35. [86] maintenir une réputation d’intégrité est le défi d’une vie. une fois entachée, celle de l’avocat pourrait ne jamais être totalement rétablie. ainsi, les allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite doivent être raisonnablement fondées je conviens avec le comité d’appel que tout critère inférieur [traduction] « donne trop de latitude à l’avocat irresponsable qui a des soupçons sincères, mais néanmoins insoutenables » : par 235. les conséquences pour la réputation de l’avocat de la partie adverse sont tout simplement trop graves pour exiger moins qu’un fondement raisonnable re- lativement à des allégations qui portent atteinte à son intégrité. [87] enfi n, la norme relative au fondement rai- sonnable appliquée par le comité d’appel n’aura pas pour effet de décourager l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur. de fait, l’avocat doit établir « l’existence d’une preuve suffi sante » avant d’allé- guer un abus de procédure découlant d’une conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite (r c. anderson, 2014 csc 41, [2014] 2 rcs 167, par. 52-55) puisque, en l’absence d’une preuve suffi - sante, une requête pour abus de procédure est rejetée sommairement : r c. cody, 2017 csc 31, [2017] 1 rcs 659, par 38. les allégations déraisonnables n’aident donc pas la cause du client. la norme déon- tologique interdisant ce genre d’allégations ne com- promet pas l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur. je précise toutefois que ce ne sont pas toutes les mesures de défense rejetées sommairement dans cody qui justifi ent une sanction professionnelle. au contraire, les mesures de défense qu’un tribunal juge illégitimes peuvent fort bien ne pas équivaloir à un manquement professionnel  : cody, par 32-35. [88] that said, the reasonable basis requirement is not an exacting standard. i understand the appeal [88] cela dit, la norme relative au fondement rai- sonnable appliquée par le comité d’appel n’est pas 814 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. panel to have meant that allegations made without a reasonable basis are those that are speculative or entirely lacking a factual foundation. crucially, as the appeal panel noted, allegations do not lack a rea- sonable basis simply because they are based on legal error: at para 280. in other words, it is not profes- sional misconduct to challenge opposing counsel’s integrity based on a sincerely held but incorrect legal position so long as the challenge has a suffi cient fac- tual foundation, such that if the legal position were correct, the challenge would be warranted. [89] nor is it professional misconduct to advance a novel legal argument that is ultimately rejected by the court. many legal principles we now consider foundational were once controversial ideas that were fearlessly raised by lawyers. such innovative advo- cacy ought to be encouraged — not stymied by the threat of being labelled, after the fact, as “unreason- able”. [90] in my view, there are two reasons why law so- cieties cannot use a lawyer’s legal errors to conclude that his or her allegations lack a reasonable basis. first, a fi nding of professional misconduct against a lawyer can itself be damaging to that lawyer’s repu- tation. branding a lawyer as uncivil for nothing more than advancing good faith allegations of impropriety that stem from a sincerely held legal mistake is a highly excessive and unwarranted response. un critère exigeant. je comprends que, pour le comité d’appel, les allégations formulées sans fondement raisonnable sont des allégations fondées sur des sup- positions ou qui ne reposent sur aucun fondement factuel. fait important, comme l’a indiqué le comité d’appel, les allégations ne sont pas sans fondement raisonnable simplement parce qu’elles reposent sur une erreur de droit : par 280. autrement dit, contes- ter l’intégrité de l’avocat de la partie adverse sur le fondement d’une opinion juridique sincère, bien qu’erronée, ne constitue pas un manquement profes- sionnel, pour autant que cette contestation repose sur un fondement factuel suffi sant, de telle sorte que si l’opinion juridique avait été correcte, la contestation aurait été justifi ée. [89] il ne s’agit pas non plus d’un manquement professionnel que d’invoquer un argument juri- dique novateur qui est ultimement rejeté par le tri- bunal. bon nombre de principes juridiques que nous considérons désormais comme fondamentaux ont au- trefois été des idées controversées soulevées résolu- ment par des avocats. il faut encourager ce type de défense novatrice — qui ne doit pas être contrecar- rée par la menace d’être étiquetée, après le fait, de « déraisonnable ». [90] à mon sens, les barreaux ne peuvent pas uti- liser les erreurs de droit commises par un avocat pour conclure que ses allégations ne sont pas rai- sonnablement fondées, et ce, pour deux raisons. premièrement, la conclusion de manquement pro- fessionnel contre un avocat peut elle- même ternir la réputation de cet avocat. taxer un avocat d’incivilité parce qu’il a formulé de bonne foi des allégations de manquement issues d’une opinion juridique sincère, bien qu’erronée, sans plus, est une réponse nettement excessive et injustifi ée. [91] second, inquiring into the legal merit of a law- yer’s position to conclude that his or her allegations lack a reasonable basis would discourage lawyers from raising well- founded allegations, impairing the lawyer’s duty of resolute advocacy. prosecutorial abuse of process is extraordinarily serious. it im- pairs trial fairness and compromises the integrity of the justice system: anderson, at paras. 49-50; r. v. o’connor, [1995] 4 scr 411, at paras 62-63. [91] deuxièmement, l’examen du bien- fondé de la position de l’avocat pour conclure que ses allé- gations ne sont pas raisonnablement fondées aurait pour effet de décourager ses pairs de soulever des allégations bien fondées, ce qui porterait atteinte à l’obligation de l’avocat de représenter son client avec vigueur. l’abus de procédure de la part de la poursuite est extrêmement grave. il porte atteinte à l’équité du procès et compromet l’intégrité du [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 815 defence lawyers play an integral role in preventing these dire consequences and holding other justice system participants accountable by raising reason- able allegations finding a lawyer guilty of pro- fessional misconduct on the basis of incivility for making an abuse of process argument that is based on a sincerely held but mistaken legal position dis- courages lawyers from raising these allegations, frus- trating the duty of resolute advocacy and the client’s right to make full answer and defence. [92] my colleagues in dissent interpret the “rea- sonable basis” requirement differently. in their view, the appeal panel concluded that where allegations of impropriety made against opposing counsel stem from a mistake of law, the mistake must be both honest and reasonable. and if the appeal panel de- termines that the mistake of law is unreasonable, even though it is honestly held, then the allegations of impropriety will not be reasonably based and can therefore lead to a fi nding of professional misconduct on account of incivility: reasons of karakatsanis j. et al., at paras 193-96. in so concluding, they con- tend that my interpretation of the “reasonable basis” requirement — that allegations of impropriety must have a factual foundation, and not be based on innu- endo or speculation — immunizes egregious legal errors from review, “effectively dispossess[ing] the law societies of their regulatory authority anytime a lawyer can cloak his accusations in a subjective legal belief”: reasons of karakatsanis j. et al., at para 221. système de justice  : anderson, par.  49-50; r c. o’connor, [1995] 4  rcs  411, par.  62-63 les avocats de la défense ont un rôle important à jouer pour empêcher ces conséquences désastreuses et pour engager la responsabilité des autres intervenants du système de justice en formulant des allégations raisonnables. déclarer un avocat coupable de man- quement professionnel pour incivilité parce qu’il a invoqué l’abus de procédure, sur la foi d’une opinion juridique sincère, bien qu’erronée, découragerait les avocats de soulever ce type d’allégations et contre- viendrait à leur obligation de représenter leur client avec vigueur ainsi qu’au droit du client de présenter une défense pleine et entière. [92] mes collègues dissidents interprètent l’exi- gence d’un « fondement raisonnable » différemment. à leur avis, le comité d’appel a conclu que si les allégations d’inconduite formulées contre l’avocat de la partie adverse sont fondées sur une mauvaise interprétation du droit, l’erreur devrait être à la fois sincère et raisonnable. si le comité d’appel jugeait que l’erreur de droit est déraisonnable, même si elle est commise sincèrement, les allégations d’incon- duite ne seraient pas raisonnablement fondées et pourraient donc entraîner une conclusion de manque- ment professionnel pour incivilité : motifs de la juge karakatsanis et autres, par 193-196. en concluant de la sorte, ils prétendent que mon interprétation de l’exigence d’un « fondement raisonnable » — soit que les allégations d’inconduite doivent reposer sur un fondement factuel, et non pas être fondées sur des insinuations ou des conjectures — soustrait les er- reurs juridiques grossières à tout contrôle, « pourrait, dans les faits, priver les barreaux de leur pouvoir de réglementation en matière d’incivilité dès lors qu’un avocat est en mesure de défendre ses accusations au moyen d’une croyance juridique subjective » : motifs de la juge karakatsanis et autres, par 221. [93] respectfully, my colleagues’ concerns are misplaced. when a lawyer alleges prosecutorial mis- conduct based on a legal mistake, law societies are perfectly entitled to look to the reasonableness of the mistake when assessing whether it is sincerely held, and hence, whether the allegations were made in good faith. looking to the reasonableness of a mistake is a well- established tool to help assess its [93] soit dit en tout respect, les préoccupations de mes collègues sont mal fondées pour deux raisons. lorsqu’un avocat allègue une conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite en se fondant sur une erreur de droit, les barreaux ont parfaitement le droit de se pencher sur le caractère raisonnable de cette erreur lorsqu’ils évaluent si elle était sin- cère, et donc, de se demander si les allégations ont 816 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. sincerity: see eg,. pappajohn v. the queen, [1980] 2 scr 120, at p. 156, per dickson j., dissenting, but not on this point; r v. bulmer, [1987] 1 scr 782, at p. 792; r v. moreau (1986), 26 ccc (3d) 359 (ont. ca), at pp 374-75. the more egregious the legal mistake, the less likely it will have been sin- cerely held, making it less likely the allegation will have been made in good faith. and if the law society concludes that the allegation was not made in good faith, the second question — whether there was a reasonable basis for the allegation — falls away. [94] i pause here to note that there is good reason why a law society can look to the reasonableness of a legal mistake when assessing whether allegations of impropriety are made in good faith, but not when assessing whether they are reasonably based. the “good faith” inquiry asks what the lawyer actually believed when making the allegations. the reasona- bleness of the lawyer’s legal mistake is one piece of circumstantial evidence that may help a law society in this exercise. however, it is not determinative. even the most unreasonable mistakes can be sin- cerely held. [95] in contrast, the “reasonable basis” inquiry re- quires a law society to look beyond what the lawyer believed, and examine the foundation underpinning the allegations. looking at the reasonableness of a lawyer’s legal position at this stage would, in ef- fect, impose a mandatory minimum standard of legal competence in the incivility context. in other words, it would allow a law society to fi nd a lawyer guilty of professional misconduct on the basis of incivility for something the lawyer, in the law society’s opinion, ought to have known or ought to have done. and, as i have already explained, this would risk unjustifi ably tarnishing a lawyer’s reputation and chilling resolute advocacy. été faites de bonne foi. l’examen du caractère rai- sonnable d’une erreur est un outil bien établi pour aider à évaluer si elle a été faite sincèrement : voir, p ex, pappajohn c. la reine, [1980] 2 rcs 120, p. 156, le juge dickson, dissident, mais pas sur ce point; r c. bulmer, [1987] 1 rcs 782, p. 792; r. c. moreau (1986), 26 ccc (3d) 359 (ca. ont.), p 374-375. plus l’erreur de droit a été grossière, moins il est probable qu’elle ait été sincère, de sorte qu’il est moins probable que l’allégation ait été faite de bonne foi. si le barreau conclut que l’allégation n’a pas été faite de bonne foi, la seconde question — soit celle de savoir si l’allégation était raisonnable- ment fondée — devient superfl ue. [94] je fais une parenthèse ici pour souligner qu’il est parfaitement justifi é qu’un barreau puisse se pen- cher sur le caractère raisonnable d’une erreur de droit lorsqu’il examine si les allégations d’inconduite sont formulées de bonne foi, mais pas quand il détermine si elles sont raisonnablement fondées l’examen de la « bonne foi » suppose de se demander ce que l’avocat croyait réellement lorsqu’il a énoncé les allégations. le caractère raisonnable de l’erreur de droit commise par un avocat est un des éléments de la preuve circonstancielle qui peut aider un barreau dans cet exercice. cet élément n’est toutefois pas dé- terminant. même les erreurs les plus déraisonnables peuvent être faites sincèrement. [95] en revanche, l’examen du « fondement raison- nable » exige que le barreau regarde au- delà du point de vue de l’avocat et qu’il examine le fondement des allégations. se pencher sur le caractère raisonnable de la position juridique d’un avocat à cette étape-ci imposerait, dans les faits, une norme obligatoire mi- nimale de compétence juridique dans le contexte de l’incivilité. autrement dit, cela permettrait à un bar- reau de déclarer un avocat coupable de manquement professionnel pour incivilité pour quelque chose que cet avocat, selon le barreau, aurait dû savoir ou aurait dû faire. qui plus est, comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, cela risquerait de ternir indûment la répu- tation de l’avocat et de freiner la détermination des membres de la profession de représenter leurs clients avec vigueur. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 817 [96] that, however, does not end the matter. as my colleagues correctly observe, “the law society rules govern civility and competence”: reasons of karakatsanis j. et al., at para. 193 (emphasis in origi- nal). a lawyer who bases allegations on “outrageous” or “egregious” legal errors may be incompetent. my point is simply that he or she should not be punished for incivility on that basis alone. as such, any concern that law societies are “effectively dispossess[ed]” of their regulatory authority misstates my position. [97] to conclude, i  would not give effect to mr. groia’s and the interveners’ submissions crit- icizing how the appeal panel evaluated what the lawyer said. the appeal panel considered what the lawyer said to be an important contextual factor. allegations of professional misconduct or other chal- lenges to opposing counsel’s integrity must be made in good faith and have a reasonable basis. although a reasonable basis is not a high bar, i see no basis for interfering with the appeal panel’s conclusion that it is necessary to protect against speculative or baseless allegations. 2 the manner and frequency of the lawyer’s behaviour [98] the appeal panel also considered the fre- quency of what was said and the manner in which it was said to be relevant factors. a single outburst would not usually attract sanction. in contrast, re- petitive attacks on opposing counsel would be more likely to cross the line into professional miscon- duct. the appeal panel also found that challenges to opposing counsel’s integrity made in a “repetitive stream of invective”, or with a “sarcastic and biting” tone were inappropriate. finally, the appeal panel held that whether the lawyer was provoked was a relevant factor: paras. 233 and 236. [96] cela ne clôt toutefois pas le débat. comme mes collègues le remarquent à juste titre, « les règles du barreau régissent à la fois les questions de ci- vilité et celles de compétence » : motifs de la juge karakatsanis et autres, par. 193 (en italique dans l’ori- ginal). l’avocat qui fonde des allégations sur des er- reurs juridiques « scandaleuses » ou « grossières » est possiblement incompétent. je dis simplement qu’il ne devrait toutefois pas être puni pour incivilité sur ce seul fondement. ainsi, toute préoccupation selon la- quelle les barreaux sont, « dans les faits, priv[és] » du pouvoir que leur confère la règlementation n’est pas fondée sur une lecture exacte de mon point de vue. [97] pour terminer, je suis d’avis de ne pas retenir les critiques de m. groia et des intervenants quant à la façon dont le comité d’appel a évalué les propos de l’avocat. en effet, le comité d’appel a considéré les remarques de l’avocat comme un facteur contextuel important. des allégations de manquement profes- sionnel ou d’autres remises en question de l’intégrité de l’avocat de la partie adverse doivent être énoncées de bonne foi et raisonnablement fondées. bien que l’existence d’un fondement raisonnable ne soit pas un critère élevé, je ne vois aucune raison d’intervenir pour modifi er la conclusion du comité d’appel selon laquelle il est nécessaire pour se prémunir contre les allégations fondées sur des suppositions et sans fondement. 2 la manière dont les remarques ont été formu- lées par l’avocat et la fréquence à laquelle elles l’ont été [98] le comité d’appel a également jugé que la fréquence à laquelle les propos ont été formulés et la manière dont ils l’ont été sont des facteurs perti- nents. un seul emportement n’est généralement pas sanctionné. en revanche, les attaques répétées contre l’avocat de la partie adverse risquent davantage de franchir la ligne du manquement professionnel. le comité d’appel a également conclu que les contes- tations de l’intégrité de l’avocat de la partie adverse formulées en une [traduction] « suite ininterrom- pue d’invectives » ou avec un ton « sarcastique et cinglant » sont inappropriées. enfi n, le comité d’ap- pel a conclu qu’il est pertinent de savoir si l’avocat a été provoqué : par. 233 et 236. 818 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. [99] considering the manner and frequency of the lawyer’s behaviour was reasonable. trials are often hard fought. the stakes are high — especially so in a criminal trial where the accused faces a loss of lib- erty. emotions can sometimes get the better of even the most stoic litigators. punishing a lawyer for “a few ill- chosen, sarcastic, or even nasty comments” (ap reasons, at para. 7) ignores these realities. [100] this does not mean that a solitary bout of incivility is beyond reproach. a single, scathing at- tack on the integrity of another justice system par- ticipant can and has warranted disciplinary action: see eg,. doré; histed v. law society of manitoba, 2007 mbca 150, 225 man. r. (2d) 74; law society of upper canada v. wagman, 2008 onlsap 14. be that as it may, it was well within the appeal panel’s purview to conclude that, as a general rule, repetitive personal attacks and those made using demeaning, sarcastic, or otherwise inappropriate language are more likely to warrant disciplinary action. [101] one fi nal point. when considering the man- ner and frequency of the lawyer’s behaviour, it must be remembered that challenges to another lawyer’s integrity are, by their very nature, personal attacks. they often involve allegations that the lawyer has deliberately fl outed his or her ethical or professional duties. strong language that, in other contexts, might well be viewed as rude and insulting will regularly be necessary to bring forward allegations of pros- ecutorial misconduct or other challenges to a law- yer’s integrity. care must be taken not to confl ate the strong language necessary to challenge another lawyer’s integrity with the type of communications that warrant a professional misconduct fi nding. il est raisonnable de tenir compte de la ma- [99] nière dont les remarques ont été formulées par l’avo- cat et de la fréquence à laquelle elles l’ont été. les procès sont souvent le théâtre d’âpres luttes. les enjeux sont élevés — surtout dans un procès cri- minel où l’accusé risque de perdre sa liberté. les émotions peuvent parfois dominer le plaideur même le plus stoïque. punir un avocat pour avoir formulé [traduction] « quelques commentaires mal choisis, sarcastiques ou même vicieux » (motifs du comité d’appel, par. 7) ignore ces réalités. [100] cela ne signifi e pas pour autant que l’in- civilité commise une seule fois est sans reproche. une seule attaque cinglante envers l’intégrité d’un autre intervenant du système de justice peut justifi er une mesure disciplinaire, ce qui s’est d’ailleurs déjà produit : voir, p ex, doré;. histed c. law society of manitoba, 2007 mbca 150, 225 man. r. (2d) 74; law society of upper canada c. wagman, 2008 onlsap 14. cela dit, le comité d’appel a clairement agi dans les limites de sa compétence lorsqu’il a conclu que, en règle générale, l’avocat qui multiplie les attaques personnelles et qui tient des propos dé- gradants, sarcastiques ou autrement déplacés risque davantage de faire l’objet de mesures disciplinaires. [101] en dernier lieu, lorsqu’on examine la ma- nière dont les remarques ont été formulées par l’avo- cat et la fréquence à laquelle elles l’ont été, il faut se rappeler que les contestations de l’intégrité d’un autre avocat sont, de par leur nature même, des at- taques personnelles. elles comprennent souvent des allégations selon lesquelles l’avocat aurait délibéré- ment bafoué ses obligations éthiques ou profession- nelles. des propos forts qui, dans d’autres contextes, pourraient bien être considérés comme grossiers et insultants seront régulièrement nécessaires pour pré- senter des allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite ou d’autres contesta- tions de l’intégrité d’un avocat. il faut donc s’assurer de ne pas confondre les propos forts nécessaires pour contester l’intégrité d’un autre avocat et le genre de communications qui justifi e une conclusion de manquement professionnel. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 819 3 the trial judge’s reaction 3 la réaction du juge du procès [102] the third factor the appeal panel identifi ed is the presiding judge’s reaction to the lawyer’s be- haviour: para 225. i agree that when the impugned behaviour occurs in a courtroom, what, if anything, the judge does about it becomes relevant. unlike the law society, the presiding judge observes the lawyer’s behaviour fi rsthand. this offers the judge a comparatively advantageous position to evaluate the lawyer’s conduct relative to the law society, who only enters the equation once all is said and done. as brown ja insightfully explained: by its nature, a professional discipline proceeding is an exercise in the retrospective examination of counsel’s conduct by those who were not present when the conduct occurred and who lack the ability to recreate, with preci- sion and certainty, exactly what took place. a discipline re- view is largely transcript- based, restricting the reviewer’s ability to understand the sense and nuance of the moment. retrospective transcript- based reviews contain inherent limitations which can produce an artifi cial understand- ing of what took place in the courtroom, and which risk turning the review into an exercise in monday- morning quarterbacking. [102] le troisième facteur relevé par le comité d’appel est la réaction du juge présidant le procès face au comportement de l’avocat : par 225. certes, lorsque le comportement reproché est adopté dans une salle d’audience, les interventions du juge à cet égard, le cas échéant, deviennent pertinentes. contrairement au barreau, le juge du procès observe le comportement de l’avocat directement. il est donc en meilleure position pour évaluer la conduite de l’avocat que l’ordre professionnel, qui intervient seu- lement une fois que tout a été dit et que tout a été fait. comme le juge brown l’a judicieusement expliqué : [traduction] de par sa nature, la procédure en matière de discipline professionnelle consiste en un examen ré- trospectif de la conduite de l’avocat par des personnes qui n’étaient pas présentes au moment où se sont déroulés les faits et qui n’ont pas la capacité de recréer, avec pré- cision et certitude, ce qui s’est passé exactement. comme l’examen disciplinaire est fondé en grande partie sur la transcription du procès, l’examinateur ne peut saisir com- plètement le sens et les nuances qui se dégageaient des échanges au moment des faits. les examens rétrospectifs fondés sur une transcription comportent des limites in- hérentes qui peuvent donner lieu à une compréhension artifi cielle de ce qui s’est passé dans la salle d’audience et qui risquent de transformer l’examen en un exercice de raisonnement a posteriori. (groia onca, at par. 318) (groia (ca. ont.), par. 318) [103] these observations underscore the impor- tance of considering the presiding judge’s response to the lawyer’s conduct. the question then becomes: how important is that response? mr. groia would treat the presiding judge’s reaction as near- conclusive. he argues that law societies should rarely, if ever, initiate disciplinary proceedings if the presiding judge took no issue with the lawyer’s behaviour. this is because allowing law societies to second- guess the presiding judge on the scope of acceptable courtroom conduct erodes judicial independence. [103] ces observations soulignent l’importance d’examiner la réaction du juge présidant le procès face à la conduite de l’avocat. il faut toutefois se demander à quel point cette réaction est importante. selon m.  groia, la réaction du juge serait quasi déterminante. en effet, il soutient que les ordres professionnels de juristes devraient rarement, voire jamais, intenter des procédures disciplinaires si le juge du procès ne s’est pas opposé au comportement de l’avocat. il devrait en être ainsi puisque permettre aux ordres professionnels de substituer leur opinion à celle du juge sur l’étendue des conduites accep- tables en salle d’audience minerait l’indépendance judiciaire. 820 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. in my view, mr. groia’s restrictive approach [104] is inappropriate for a number of reasons. first, un- like the presiding judge, law societies are not tasked with maintaining the fairness of any particular pro- ceeding. the presiding judge has a responsibility to intervene when the fairness of the trial is at stake: brouillard v. the queen, [1985] 1 scr 39, at p. 44; r v. henderson (1999), 44 or (3d) 628 (ca), at p 641. this duty includes controlling uncivil be- haviour that risks undermining the fairness — and the appearance of fairness  — of the proceeding: marchand, at para 148. in contrast, by setting and enforcing standards of civility, law societies foster fairness and cultivate public confi dence in the ad- ministration of justice on a profession- wide level. preventing law societies from supervising courtroom behaviour absent a trial judge’s intervention frus- trates these functions. [105] second, as the appeal panel recognized, “there may be many reasons why a trial judge may choose to remain relatively passive in the face of one or both counsels’ courtroom incivility”: para 225. for instance, as campbell j. pointed out, judicial in- tervention “might simply excite further provocation” on the lawyer’s part, thereby frustrating the goal of maintaining an orderly, fair proceeding: felderhof onsc, at para 284. judges may also be reasonably concerned about the appearance of impartiality — especially in a jury trial, where reprimanding counsel in the jury’s presence could conceivably prejudice that lawyer in the jury’s eyes. in these situations, the trial judge’s silence is not a tacit approval of the lawyer’s behaviour, but rather a conscious decision taken to protect trial fairness. [106] furthermore, in some cases the trial judge’s decision to remain passive may prove wrong and give rise to an unfair trial. it would be illogical to bar the law society from reviewing a lawyer’s behaviour based on a trial judge’s error. [104] à mon sens, l’approche restrictive proposée par m. groia ne convient pas, et ce, pour plusieurs rai- sons. premièrement, les ordres professionnels n’ont pas pour mandat de préserver l’équité d’une instance en particulier comme il incombe au juge présidant le procès de le faire. en effet, ce dernier a la responsabi- lité d’intervenir lorsque l’équité du procès est en jeu : brouillard c. la reine, [1985] 1 rcs 39, p. 44; r c. henderson (1999), 44 or (3d) 646 (ca), p 661. ainsi, il doit notamment contrôler le compor- tement irrespectueux qui risque de miner l’équité — et l’apparence d’équité — du procès : marchand, par 148. en revanche, en fi xant et en faisant respec- ter certaines normes de civilité, les ordres profession- nels encouragent l’équité et cultivent la confi ance du public envers l’administration de la justice à l’échelle de la profession. empêcher les ordres professionnels de superviser le comportement des avocats en salle d’audience en l’absence d’intervention du juge du procès nuirait à ces fonctions. [105] deuxièmement, comme l’a reconnu le co- mité d’appel, [traduction] « le juge du procès peut avoir de nombreuses raisons de demeurer relative- ment passif au vu de l’incivilité de l’un ou l’autre des avocats dans la salle d’audience » : par 225. par exemple, comme l’a fait remarquer le juge campbell, l’intervention du juge [traduction] « pourrait sim- plement multiplier les provocations » de la part de l’avocat, contrecarrant ainsi l’objectif de tenir un procès ordonné et équitable : felderhof (csj. ont.), par 284. de plus, l’apparence d’impartialité pourrait être une source de préoccupations pour les juges — surtout dans un procès avec jury, où réprimander l’avocat en présence des jurés pourrait vraisembla- blement nuire à cet avocat aux yeux des jurés. dans ces situations, le silence du juge du procès n’équivaut pas à une approbation tacite du comportement de l’avocat, mais plutôt à une décision délibérée visant à protéger l’équité du procès. [106] qui plus est, dans certains cas, le juge du pro- cès peut avoir tort de demeurer passif et sa décision peut entraîner l’iniquité du procès. il serait illogique d’empêcher le barreau d’examiner le comportement de l’avocat sur la foi d’une erreur commise par le juge du procès. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 821 [107] third, behaviour that the presiding judge deems inappropriate may not rise to the level of professional misconduct. this court stressed in cody that courts will no longer tolerate “illegitimate” de- fence action — including baseless arguments and the way in which they are presented. however, as indicated, improper defence behaviour is not nec- essarily professional misconduct, be it a function of incivility or incompetence: cody, at paras. 32- 35. the law society must therefore be careful not to place too much weight on a judge’s criticism of defence behaviour. [108] fourth, as i explain above at paras. 54-55, the law society’s decision to discipline a lawyer in no way impairs the presiding judge’s ability to control his or her courtroom. just as the law society’s dis- ciplinary decision is not conditional on the judge’s response, the judge remains free to set boundaries of appropriate courtroom behaviour irrespective of any law society standards of civility: see jodoin, at para 23. [109] it follows that the judge’s reaction is not conclusive of the propriety of the lawyer’s conduct. rather, as the appeal panel concluded, it is simply one piece of the contextual analysis. its weight will vary depending on the circumstances of the case. [110] part and parcel of the presiding judge’s re- sponse is how the lawyer modifi ed his or her behav- iour thereafter. the lawyer who crosses the line, but pays heed to the judge’s direction and behaves appro- priately from then on is less likely to have engaged in professional misconduct than the same lawyer who continues to behave inappropriately despite the judge’s instructions. [107] troisièmement, le comportement que le juge du procès estime inapproprié n’entraîne pas nécessai- rement un manquement professionnel. dans l’arrêt cody, la cour a souligné que les tribunaux ne tolére- ront plus les mesures prises « illégitimement » par la défense — y compris les arguments sans fondement et la façon inacceptable, le cas échéant, dont ils sont présentés. toutefois, comme le précise cet arrêt, le comportement inapproprié de la défense n’équivaut pas forcément à un manquement professionnel, fut-il incivil ou incompétent : cody, par 32-35. le barreau doit donc s’assurer de ne pas accorder trop de poids aux critiques du juge à l’égard du comportement de la défense. [108] quatrièmement, comme je l’ai déjà expliqué aux paragraphes 54 et 55, la décision du barreau de prendre des mesures disciplinaires contre un avocat n’entrave d’aucune manière la capacité du juge de contrôler le déroulement de l’instance dans sa salle d’audience. tout comme la décision disciplinaire du barreau n’est pas conditionnelle à la réaction du juge, la décision de ce dernier de fi xer les limites du comportement acceptable dans la salle d’audience indépendamment des normes de civilité établies par les ordres professionnels demeure de son ressors exclusif : voir jodoin, par 23. [109] la réaction du juge ne permet donc pas né- cessairement de déterminer la légitimité de la con- duite de l’avocat. en fait, comme le comité d’appel l’a conclu, il s’agit simplement d’un élément de l’analyse contextuelle. le poids qu’il convient de lui accorder dépend des circonstances de l’affaire. [110] l’examen de la façon dont l’avocat a mo- difi é son comportement après avoir essuyé des re- proches fait partie intégrante de celui de la réaction du juge présidant le procès. l’avocat qui dépasse les bornes, mais qui obéit aux directives du juge et se comporte bien à partir du moment où celles-ci lui sont communiquées, risque moins de commettre un manquement professionnel que le même avocat qui continue de mal se comporter en dépit des directives du juge. 822 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. (d) the appeal panel’s approach allows for a proportionate balancing of lawyers’ expres- sive rights and the law society’s statutory mandate d) la méthode du comité d’appel permet une mise en balance proportionnée du droit à la liberté d’expression de l’avocat et du mandat législatif du barreau [111] an administrative decision that engages the charter by limiting its protections will only be rea- sonable if it refl ects a proportionate balancing of the charter protections at play with the decision maker’s statutory mandate: doré, at para. 57; loyola high school v. quebec (attorney general), 2015 scc 12, [2015] 1 scr 613, at para 39. this court explained in loyola that a “proportionate balanc- ing is one that gives effect, as fully as possible to the charter protections at stake given the particular statutory mandate”: para 39. [112] law society decisions that discipline law- yers for what they say may engage lawyers’ expres- sive freedom under s. 2(b) of the charter: doré, at paras. 59, 63 and 65-68. this is true regardless of whether the impugned speech occurs inside or out- side a courtroom. courtroom lawyers are engaged in expressive activity, the method and location of the speech do not remove the expressive activity from the scope of protected expression, and law society decisions sanctioning lawyers for what they say in the courtroom have the effect of restricting their expression: see irwin toy ltd. v. quebec (attorney general), [1989] 1  scr  927, at p.  978; mont- réal (city) v. 2952-1366 québec inc., 2005 scc 62, [2005] 3 scr 141, at paras. 56 and 82. [113] as such, a particular professional misconduct fi nding that engages a lawyer’s expressive freedom will only be reasonable if it refl ects a proportionate balancing of the law society’s statutory objective with the lawyer’s expressive freedom. similarly, an approach to assessing whether a lawyer’s uncivil communications warrant law society discipline must allow for such a proportionate balancing to occur. [111] une décision administrative qui fait interve- nir la charte en limitant les protections qu’elle offre n’est raisonnable que si elle résulte d’une mise en balance proportionnée des droits en cause protégés par la charte et du mandat légal du décideur : doré, par. 57; école secondaire loyola c. québec (procu- reur général), 2015 csc 12, [2015] 1 rcs 613, par 39. la cour a d’ailleurs expliqué, dans l’arrêt loyola, qu’« [u]ne mise en balance proportionnée en est une qui donne effet autant que possible aux pro- tections en cause conférées par la charte compte tenu du mandat législatif particulier en cause » : par 39. [112] les décisions des barreaux d’imposer des mesures disciplinaires à l’encontre d’avocats en rai- son de déclarations qu’ils ont faites sont susceptibles de faire entrer en jeu le droit à la liberté d’expression garanti à ces derniers par l’al. 2b) de la charte : doré, par. 59, 63 et 65-68. il en est ainsi, peu importe que les propos attaqués aient été proférés à l’intérieur ou à l’extérieur d’une salle d’audience. les avocats plaideurs se livrent à des activités expressives. or, ni le lieu ni le mode de telles activités n’ont pour effet de les exclure du champ d’application de l’expres- sion protégée. les décisions des barreaux d’imposer des sanctions aux avocats pour les propos qu’ils tiennent en salle d’audience ont pour effet de limi- ter leur liberté d’expression : voir irwin toy ltd. c. québec (procureur général), [1989] 1 rcs 927, p. 978; mont réal (ville) c. 2952-1366 québec inc., 2005 csc 62, [2005] 3 rcs 141, par. 56 et 82. [113] en conséquence, une conclusion de manque- ment professionnel qui fait intervenir le droit à la li- berté d’expression d’un avocat n’est raisonnable que si elle est le fruit d’une mise en balance proportionnée des objectifs législatifs poursuivis par le barreau, d’une part, et de la liberté d’expression dont jouit l’avocat, d’autre part. de même, l’approche retenue pour déter- miner si les communications dénuées de civilité d’un avocat justifi ent la prise de mesures disciplinaires de la part d’un barreau doit, elle aussi, permettre la ré- alisation d’une telle mise en balance proportionnée. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 823 [114] under its statutory mandate, the law society has a duty to advance the public interest, the cause of justice and the rule of law by regulating the legal profession: law society act, s.  4.2 disciplinary tribunals fulfi ll an integral subset of this function by setting and enforcing standards of professional conduct — in this case civility. performing this man- date can engage lawyers’ expressive rights under the charter: doré, at para 63. [115] allowing lawyers to freely express them- selves serves an important function in our legal sys- tem. as steel ja noted in histed, at para. 71: the lawyer, as an intimate part of the legal system, plays a pivotal role in ensuring the accountability and transpar- ency of the judiciary. to play that role effectively, he/she must feel free to act and speak without inhibition and with courage when the circumstances demand it. at issue in histed was a disciplinary decision result- ing from a lawyer’s criticism of a judge. steel ja’s comments were thus restricted to critical remarks directed at the judiciary. i would go further and add that lawyers play an integral role in holding all jus- tice system participants accountable. reasonable criticism enhances the transparency and fairness of the system as a whole, thereby serving the interests of justice. overemphasizing civility has the potential to thwart this good by chilling well- founded criti- cism: a. woolley, “does civility matter?” (2008), 46 osgoode hall lj, 175, at p 180. proportionately balancing lawyers’ expressive rights, therefore, “may involve disciplinary bodies tolerating a degree of discordant criticism”: doré, at para 65. [114] conformément à son mandat législatif, le barreau a l’obligation de défendre l’intérêt public et de faire avancer la cause de la justice et la primauté du droit en réglementant la profession juridique : loi sur le barreau, art 42. ainsi, les tribunaux discipli- naires s’acquittent d’un volet essentiel de cette fonc- tion par l’établissement et l’application de normes de déontologie, y compris — comme c’est le cas en l’espèce — d’une conduite empreinte de civilité. l’accomplissement de ce mandat est susceptible de faire jouer le droit des avocats à la liberté d’expres- sion que leur garantit la charte : doré, par 63. [115] le fait de permettre aux avocats de s’ex- primer librement sert une importante fonction dans notre système judiciaire. ainsi que la juge steel l’a souligné dans l’arrêt histed, par. 71 : [traduction] faisant partie intégrante du système de jus- tice, les avocats jouent un rôle crucial dans l’actualisation de la responsabilité et de la transparence judiciaires. pour s’acquitter effi cacement de ce rôle, ils doivent se sentir libres d’agir et de parler sans contrainte et avec courage lorsque les circonstances l’exigent. dans cette affaire, la question en litige portait sur une décision disciplinaire rendue à la suite de cri- tiques formulées par un avocat contre un juge. les observations de la juge steel se limitaient donc aux critiques dirigées contre la magistrature. pour ma part, j’irai plus loin en affi rmant que les avocats jouent un rôle primordial quant à la responsabi- lisation de tous les intervenants du système judi- ciaire. des critiques raisonnables permettent en effet d’augmenter la transparence et l’équité du système dans son ensemble, ce qui sert les intérêts de la jus- tice. insister de façon démesurée sur la civilité risque de contrecarrer ces effets bénéfi ques en découra- geant l’expression de critiques fondées : a. woolley, « does civility matter? » (2008), 46 osgoode hall lj, 175, p 180. il peut par conséquent découler de la mise en balance proportionnée du droit des avo- cats à la liberté d’expression « que des organismes disciplinaires tolèrent certaines critiques acérées » : doré, par 65. [116] when the impugned behaviour occurs in a courtroom, lawyers’ expressive freedom takes on [116] lorsque le comportement en cause survient dans une salle d’audience, la liberté d’expression 824 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. additional signifi cance. in that arena, the lawyer’s primary function is to resolutely advocate on his or her client’s behalf. as i discuss above at paras. 74- 75, resolute advocacy in the criminal context allows the client to meaningfully exercise his or her consti- tutional right to make full answer and defence. law society tribunals must account for this unique aspect of lawyers’ expressive rights when arriving at a dis- ciplinary decision arising out of in- court behaviour. [117] that said, speech is not sacrosanct simply because it is uttered by a lawyer. certain communica- tions will be far removed from the core values s. 2(b) seeks to protect: the search for truth and the common good: r v. keegstra, [1990] 3 scr 697, at pp. 762 and 765. the protection afforded to expressive free- dom diminishes the further the speech lies from the core values of s. 2(b): keegstra, at pp. 760-62; rjr- macdonald inc. v. canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at paras 72-73. as such, a fi nding of professional misconduct is more likely to represent a proportionate balance of the law society’s statutory objective with the lawyer’s ex- pressive rights where the impugned speech lies far from the core values of lawyers’ expressive freedom. [118] the fl exibility built into the appeal panel’s context- specifi c approach to assessing a lawyer’s behaviour allows for a proportionate balancing in any given case. considering the unique circumstances in each case — such as what the lawyer said, the context in which he or she said it and the reason it was said — enables law society disciplinary tribu- nals to accurately gauge the value of the impugned speech. this, in turn, allows for a decision, both with respect to a fi nding of professional misconduct and any penalty imposed, that refl ects a proportionate balancing of the lawyer’s expressive rights and the law society’s statutory mandate. des avocats revêt un degré d’importance encore plus élevé. en effet, dans ce forum, leur principale fonc- tion consiste à se porter avec vigueur à la défense de leurs clients. comme je l’ai déjà mentionné aux par. 74 et 75, en matière pénale, une défense menée avec vigueur permet au client d’exercer véritable- ment son droit constitutionnel de présenter une dé- fense pleine et entière. les tribunaux disciplinaires des barreaux doivent donc tenir compte de cet as- pect particulier du droit à la liberté d’expression des avocats lorsqu’ils rendent une décision disciplinaire concernant un comportement adopté en cour. [117] cela dit, toute parole n’est pas sacro- sainte dès lors qu’elle sort de la bouche d’un avocat. en effet, certaines communications auront très peu à voir avec les valeurs fondamentales que l’al. 2b) cherche à protéger, c’est-à-dire la recherche de la vérité et le bien commun : r c. keegstra, [1990] 3 rcs 697, p. 762 et 765. plus des propos s’éloignent des valeurs qui se trouvent au cœur de l’al. 2b), moins grande est la protection offerte à la liberté d’expression : keegstra, p. 760-762; rjr- macdonald inc. c. canada (procureur général), [1995] 3 rcs 199, par 72-73. dans ce contexte, une conclusion de manquement pro- fessionnel est plus susceptible de refl éter une mise en balance proportionnée de l’objectif poursuivi par la loi régissant le barreau et des droits de l’avocat en matière de liberté d’expression si les propos attaqués s’écartent fortement des valeurs fondamentales inhérentes à cette liberté d’expression dont bénéfi cient les avocats. [118] la souplesse de la méthode axée sur le con- texte retenue par le comité d’appel pour évaluer le comportement d’un avocat ouvre la voie dans tous les cas à une mise en balance proportionnée le fait de tenir compte des circonstances particulières propres à chaque cas — par exemple, les propos de l’avocat, le contexte dans lequel il les a tenus et les raisons pour lesquelles il l’a fait — permet aux tri- bunaux disciplinaires des barreaux de soupeser avec justesse la valeur des propos attaqués. ils peuvent en conséquence rendre une décision — en ce qui concerne une conclusion de manquement profes- sionnel, mais aussi toute pénalité susceptible d’être infl igée — qui résulte d’une mise en balance propor- tionnée du droit à la liberté d’expression de l’avocat et du mandat législatif du barreau. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 825 in addition, the appeal panel’s reasonable [119] basis standard allows for a proportionate balancing between expressive freedom and the law society’s statutory mandate. allegations impugning opposing counsel’s integrity that lack a reasonable basis lie far from the core values underpinning lawyers’ expres- sive rights. reasonable criticism advances the inter- ests of justice by holding other players accountable. unreasonable attacks do quite the opposite. as i have explained at paras. 63-67, such attacks frustrate the interests of justice by undermining trial fairness and public confi dence in the justice system. a decision fi nding a lawyer guilty of professional misconduct for launching unreasonable allegations would there- fore be likely to represent a proportionate balancing of the law society’s mandate and the lawyer’s ex- pressive rights. [120] in contrast, sanctioning a lawyer for good faith, reasonably based allegations that are grounded in legal error does not refl ect a proportionate balanc- ing. advancing good faith, reasonable allegations — even those based on legal error — helps maintain the integrity of the justice system by holding other participants accountable. well- founded arguments exposing misconduct on the part of opposing counsel thus lie close to the core of the s. 2(b) values under- pinning a lawyer’s expressive freedom. discouraging lawyers from bringing forward such allegations does nothing to further the law society’s statutory man- date of advancing the cause of justice and the rule of law. if anything, silencing lawyers in this manner undercuts the rule of law and the cause of justice by making it more likely that misconduct will go unchecked. [119] en outre, la norme relative au fondement raisonnable énoncée par le comité d’appel laisse place à une mise en balance proportionnée de la liberté d’expression et du mandat législatif du barreau. des allégations qui mettent en doute l’in- tégrité de l’avocat de la partie adverse et qui ne sont pas raisonnablement fondées se situent loin des valeurs fondamentales qui sous- tendent la liberté d’expression des avocats. si des critiques raison- nables servent les intérêts de la justice en assurant la responsabilisation des autres intervenants du sys- tème, des attaques injustifi ées, elles, ont exactement l’effet contraire. comme je l’ai expliqué plus tôt, aux par. 63-67, pareilles attaques nuisent aux in- térêts de la justice en compromettant l’équité du procès et en sapant la confi ance du public dans le système de justice. une décision déclarant un avocat coupable de manquement professionnel pour avoir formulé des allégations déraisonnables est donc, selon toute vraisemblance, le fruit d’une mise en balance proportionnée du mandat du barreau et du droit à la liberté d’expression de l’avocat. [120] à l’inverse, le fait de sanctionner un avo- cat pour des allégations raisonnablement fondées et formulées en toute bonne foi, mais qui reposent sur des erreurs de droit, ne témoignerait pas d’une mise en balance proportionnée. avancer des alléga- tions raisonnables et de bonne foi — même celles qui se fondent sur une erreur de droit — contribue à maintenir l’intégrité du système de justice en te- nant responsables les autres intervenants qui y parti- cipent. ainsi, des arguments bien fondés dénonçant des manquements de la part des avocats de la partie adverse se rapprochent des valeurs protégées par l’al. 2b) qui sous- tendent la liberté d’expression des avocats. décourager les avocats de soulever de telles allégations ne contribuerait en rien à l’accomplisse- ment du mandat que confère la loi au barreau, soit de promouvoir la justice et la primauté du droit. à vrai dire, museler de la sorte des avocats mettrait à mal le principe de la primauté du droit et desservirait la cause de la justice en augmentant la probabilité que de tels manquements ne rencontrent aucune op- position. 826 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. (e) conclusion e) conclusion [121] in sum, i would not give effect to mr. groia’s and the interveners’ challenges to the appeal panel’s approach to incivility, and in particular, when a law- yer’s courtroom conduct warrants a fi nding of pro- fessional misconduct. the appeal panel appreciated the need to guard against the consequences of inci- vility, and remained sensitive to the lawyer’s duty of resolute advocacy. its contextual analysis accom- modates the diversity of modern legal practice. at the same time, the appeal panel articulated a series of factors — what the lawyer said, the manner and frequency in which it was said, and the presiding judge’s reaction to the lawyer’s behaviour — and explained how those factors operate in a way that is suffi ciently precise to guide lawyers’ conduct and instruct disciplinary tribunals in future cases. finally, the appeal panel’s approach allows for a proportion- ate balancing of lawyers’ expressive rights and the law society’s statutory mandate. [121] en somme, je suis d’avis de rejeter les con- testations de m. groia et des intervenants quant à la méthode adoptée par le comité d’appel pour se pro- noncer sur l’incivilité, et plus particulièrement, pour décider si la conduite d’un avocat en cours est sus- ceptible de justifi er une conclusion de manquement professionnel. le comité d’appel a reconnu la né- cessité d’une protection contre les conséquences de l’incivilité, tout en demeurant conscient du devoir de l’avocat d’assurer une défense vigoureuse pour son client. l’analyse contextuelle sur laquelle s’ap- puie cette méthode prend en considération le carac- tère diversifi é de la pratique moderne du droit. dans la même foulée, le comité d’appel a énoncé une sé- rie de facteurs  — soit le contenu des remarques formulées par l’avocat; la manière dont elles ont été formulées; la fréquence à laquelle elles l’ont été et la réaction du juge présidant l’audience face au comportement de l’avocat  — et il a expliqué comment fonctionnent ces facteurs de façon suffi - samment précise pour guider le comportement des avocats et fournir des instructions aux tribunaux disciplinaires dans l’avenir. enfi n, la méthode défi - nie par le comité d’appel permet de procéder à une mise en balance proportionnée du droit à la liberté d’expression des avocats et du mandat que confère la loi au barreau. (2) application to mr. groia’s case (2) application au cas de m. groia [122] while i take no issue with the appeal panel’s approach, i  am respectfully of the view that the appeal panel unreasonably found mr. groia guilty of professional misconduct in assessing “what” mr. groia said, the appeal panel reiterated that mis- conduct allegations or other challenges to opposing counsel’s integrity cross the line into professional misconduct unless they are made in good faith and have a reasonable basis. the appeal panel accepted that mr. groia’s allegations of misconduct were made in good faith. it based its fi nding of professional misconduct primarily on the fact that his allegations lacked a reasonable basis. however, contrary to its own approach, the appeal panel used mr. groia’s sincerely held but erroneous legal beliefs to reach [122] bien que je n’aie rien à redire quant à la méthode appliquée par le comité d’appel, j’estime, avec égards, que ce dernier a déraisonnablement reconnu m. groia coupable de manquement profes- sionnel. lorsqu’il a évalué « en quoi » consistaient les « remarques » de m. groia, le comité d’appel a réitéré que les allégations relatives à une conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la partie ad- verse, parmi d’autres formes de remise en ques- tion de leur intégrité, franchissent le seuil de ce qui constitue un manquement professionnel, à moins que ces allégations soient raisonnablement fondées et soulevées de bonne foi. le comité d’appel a ad- mis que m. groia avait formulé en toute bonne foi les allégations d’inconduite. sa conclusion selon [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 827 this conclusion — one which, as i have explained above at paras. 88-91, cannot be reasonable. [123] once the allegations of impropriety — what mr. groia said — are no longer in the mix, it be- comes apparent that the other factors in this case cannot reasonably support a fi nding of professional misconduct against him. as i will explain, the fre- quency of mr. groia’s allegations was, to some ex- tent, a product of the uncertainty surrounding the manner in which abuse of process allegations should be raised — a factor the appeal panel did not con- sider. [124] moreover, the trial judge took a largely hands off approach and did not direct mr. groia as to how he should be bringing his allegations. eventually, the trial judge did intervene, albeit quite late in the day, and he instructed mr. groia not to keep repeat- ing the same allegations over and over again, but to simply register his objection. in response, mr. groia complied, albeit with the odd slip. and when the re- viewing courts admonished mr. groia for his behav- iour during phase one of the felderhof trial, phase two proceeded entirely without incident. again, the appeal panel did not factor the trial judge and reviewing courts’ response to mr. groia’s behaviour and how mr. groia modifi ed his conduct thereafter into its analysis. laquelle il avait commis un manquement profession- nel reposait principalement sur l’absence de fonde- ment raisonnable pour justifi er les allégations qu’il avait avancées. toutefois, en contradiction avec la méthode qu’il préconise, le comité d’appel s’est ap- puyé sur les croyances sincères, quoiqu’erronées, de m. groia pour parvenir à sa conclusion, qui, comme je l’ai déjà précisé aux par. 88 à 91, ne saurait être jugée raisonnable. [123] dès lors que les allégations d’inconduite — qui faisaient l’objet des remarques formulées par m. groia — sont exclues de l’équation, il devient manifeste que les autres facteurs entrant en jeu en l’espèce ne peuvent raisonnablement suffi re à fonder contre lui une conclusion de manquement profes- sionnel. comme je l’expliquerai plus loin, la fré- quence des allégations formulées par m. groia tenait, jusqu’à un certain degré, à une certaine incertitude quant à la manière appropriée de porter des alléga- tions d’abus de procédure, un facteur que le comité d’appel n’a pas examiné. [124] qui plus est, le juge du procès a adopté, dans une large mesure, une attitude non interven- tionniste, en s’abstenant d’indiquer à m. groia de quelle manière il devait soumettre ses allégations. par la suite, il est intervenu, bien qu’assez tardivement, et a donné comme directive à m. groia de cesser de répéter continuellement les mêmes allégations, et de se borner à faire noter son opposition. sauf lors de rares incartades, m. groia s’est conformé à ces directives. du reste, après que les cours de ré- vision aient réprimandé m. groia pour sa conduite au cours de la première phase du procès felderhof, la deuxième phase s’est déroulée sans le moindre incident. encore une fois, le comité d’appel n’a pas tenu compte dans son analyse des réactions du juge du procès et des cours de révision devant le com- portement de m. groia, ni de la façon dont celui-ci a modifi é son attitude par la suite. [125] taking these factors into account, i am re- spectfully of the view that there is only one reason- able outcome in this matter: a fi nding that mr. groia did not engage in professional misconduct on ac- count of incivility. [125] en tenant compte de tous ces facteurs, je suis d’avis qu’il n’existait qu’une solution raisonnable en l’espèce, soit, conclure que m. groia n’avait pas commis de manquement professionnel pour incivi- lité. 828 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. (a) the appeal panel used mr. groia’s mistaken legal beliefs to conclude that his allega- tions lacked a reasonable basis [126] the appeal panel acknowledged that sub- missions made on the basis of a sincerely held but erroneous legal belief, cannot ground a fi nding of professional misconduct. it accepted that in making his allegations of impropriety against the osc pros- ecutors, “mr. groia was not deliberately misrepre- senting the law and was not ill- motivated”: para 332. that said, the appeal panel used mr. groia’s legal errors to conclude that he had no reasonable basis for his repeated allegations of prosecutorial impropriety. [127] with respect, such a fi nding was not rea- sonably open to the appeal panel. mr. groia’s legal errors, coupled with the osc prosecutors’ conduct, provided a reasonable basis for his allegations. had mr. groia been right in law, his abuse allegations against the osc prosecutors would almost certainly have been substantiated. a) le comité d’appel s’est servi des croyances juridiques erronées de m. groia pour con- clure à l’absence de fondement raisonnable de ses allégations [126] le comité d’appel a reconnu que des as- sertions faites sur la base de croyances juridiques sincères, mais erronées, ne sauraient justifi er une conclusion de manquement professionnel. il a en outre admis que, en portant ses allégations de con- duite répréhensible à l’encontre des procureurs de la cvmo, [traduction] « m. groia ne cher- chait pas délibérément à présenter le droit sous un faux jour, et n’était pas animé de mauvaises in- tentions » : par 332. pour autant, le comité d’ap- pel s’est servi des erreurs de droit commises par m. groia pour conclure que ses allégations répé- tées quant à la con duite répréhensible des avocats de la poursuite ne reposaient sur aucun fondement raisonnable. [127] soit dit en tout respect, le comité d’appel ne pouvait raisonnablement tirer une telle conclusion. les erreurs de droit commises par m. groia, jointes à la conduite adoptée par les procureurs de la cvmo, fondaient raisonnablement ses allégations. le droit eut-il donné raison à m. groia, les allégations d’abus de procédure qu’il a formulées à l’encontre des pro- cureurs de la cvmo auraient presque à coup sûr été fondées. [128] recall that the allegations arose during disputes about disclosure and the admissibility of documentary evidence. mr. groia argued that the prosecutors were using a “conviction fi lter” to de- liberately undermine the fairness of mr. felderhof’s trial by failing to tender, as part of the osc’s case, any relevant, authentic document of mr.  groia’s choosing. he launched further allegations of impro- priety when the prosecutors objected to his attempts to introduce documents through a witness that had neither seen nor authored them. his beliefs in this regard were fuelled, in part, by comments made by mr. naster during the fi rst disclosure motion brought by mr. groia, early on in the felderhof proceedings. they were also supported, in part, by the trial judge’s rulings against the osc on disclosure issues and his [128] souvenons- nous que ces allégations ont été soulevées à l’occasion de différends survenus entre les parties au sujet de la communication de la preuve et de l’admissibilité de la preuve docu- mentaire. m. groia a soutenu que les procureurs re- couraient à un « fi ltre axé sur une condamnation » afi n de délibérément miner l’équité du procès de m. felderhof parce qu’ils omettaient de déposer, dans le cadre de la preuve présentée par la cvmo, tous les documents authentiques et pertinents de son choix. par la suite, m. groia a formulé de nouvelles allégations d’inconduite lorsque les procureurs se sont opposés à ses tentatives de présenter des docu- ments par l’entremise d’un témoin, même si ce der- nier n’en était pas l’auteur et ne les avait jamais vus. ses croyances à cet égard étaient en partie alimentées [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 829 rejection of the osc’s request for an omnibus ruling on the admissibility of all documents. [129] during the fi rst disclosure motion brought by mr. groia, mr. naster submitted to the court that he had “an obligation as a prosecutor to ensure that all relevant materials are placed before [the trial judge]” and that he was “duty- bound” to place rele- vant materials before the court. while mr. naster was referring to his disclosure obligations, his statements lent credence to mr. groia’s sincerely held but mis- taken belief that the prosecution was legally required to introduce all relevant documents through its own witnesses, and that the osc was acting improperly in refusing to do so. [130] in its reasons, the appeal panel was careful to point out that it was not concluding that mr. groia’s allegations lacked a reasonable basis because of his sincerely held but mistaken legal beliefs. it stated, at para. 280: our concern about the submissions quoted above is not merely that mr. groia was making incorrect legal submissions; that, of course, is not a basis for a fi nding of professional misconduct. [emphasis added.] the law society confi rmed its position in the oral hearing before this court, acknowledging that “it is not professional misconduct to make an erroneous submission as to the law”. par les remarques de m. naster relativement à la première requête en communication présentée par m. groia, au début du procès dans l’affaire felderhof. elles prenaient aussi appui, en partie, sur les déci- sions défavorables à la cvmo rendues par le juge du procès en ce qui concerne la communication de la preuve, de même que sur son rejet de la demande du cvmo pour qu’une décision concernant l’ad- missibilité de l’ensemble des documents soit rendue. [129] dans le cadre de la première requête en com- munication présentée par m.  groia, m.  naster a fait valoir qu’il avait [traduction] « l’obligation, en tant que poursuivant, de s’assurer que tous les documents pertinents soient soumis à l’attention [du juge du procès] », et qu’il était de son « devoir » de déposer ces documents devant le tribunal. s’il est vrai qu’elles faisaient référence à ses obligations en matière de communication de la preuve, ces dé- clarations de m. naster sont venues conforter les croyances sincères, mais erronées, de m. groia vou- lant que la poursuite soit légalement tenue de sou- mettre l’ensemble des documents pertinents à l’aide de ses propres témoins, et que la cvmo agissait de manière répréhensible en refusant de s’exécuter. [130] dans ses motifs, le comité d’appel a pris soin de souligner qu’il ne concluait pas à l’absence de fondement des allégations de m. groia en raison de ses croyances juridiques sincères, mais erronées. au paragraphe 280, il a d’ailleurs fait la déclaration suivante : [traduction] notre préoccupation au sujet des argu- ments précités ne tient pas seulement au fait que m. groia présentait des arguments juridiques erronés; cela, bien entendu, ne peut servir de fondement à une conclusion de manquement professionnel. [je souligne.] le barreau a confi rmé sa position à cet égard à l’au- dience tenue devant la cour, où il a reconnu que [traduction] « la formulation d’observations in- correctes au sujet du droit ne saurait être assimilée à un manquement professionnel ». [131] however, as the following extracts from the appeal panel’s reasons show, it did precisely what it professed it should not do. specifi cally, it repeatedly [131] toutefois, comme l’indiquent les passages de ses motifs repris ci- après, le comité d’appel a agi précisément comme il proscrivait de le faire. plus 830 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. used mr. groia’s sincerely held but mistaken legal beliefs to ground its conclusion that mr. groia’s alle- gations lacked a reasonable foundation. for example, it reasoned: [mr. groia’s] submissions, in our view, directly attack the integrity of the prosecutors, by alleging that they can- not be relied upon to keep their ‘word’ and are lazy and incompetent    . further, they have no factual foundation. as a matter of the law of evidence that mr. groia ought to have known, mr. naster was perfectly entitled to object to mr. groia putting documents to a witness notwithstanding that the witness could not identify them and suggesting that they be marked as exhibits. particulièrement, il s’est servi à maintes reprises des croyances juridiques sincères, mais erronées, de m. groia pour justifi er sa conclusion selon laquelle les allégations de ce dernier étaient dénuées de fon- dement raisonnable. à titre d’exemple, il a énoncé le raisonnement suivant : [traduction] à notre avis, les observations [de m. groia] s’en prennent directement à l’intégrité des avo- cats de la poursuite, car elles avancent que ceux-ci, en plus de ne pas être fi ables pour ce qui est de tenir « pa- role », sont paresseux et incompétents. [  ]. qui plus est, elles ne reposent sur aucun fondement factuel. en vertu du droit de la preuve — que m. groia aurait dû connaître —, m.  naster avait parfaitement le droit tant de s’opposer à ce que m. groia porte des documents à l’attention d’un témoin même si celui-ci n’était en mesure de les identi- fi er que de proposer que ces documents soient inscrits en preuve.   .   .   . the osc was taking strict but nevertheless princi- pled positions on admissibility which were consistent with the law of evidence. mr. naster was acting in a responsible fashion. in short, there was nothing to justify mr. groia’s aggressive personal attack on the prosecutors’ good faith and integrity. his submissions regarding the ‘conviction fi lter’ not only were wrong in law but did not have a rea- sonable basis.   . la cvmo avait adopté des positions strictes, mais néanmoins fondées sur des principes, à l’égard de l’ad- missibilité des documents, positions qui s’accordaient avec le droit de la preuve applicable. m. naster agissait de façon responsable. bref, rien ne justifi ait les attaques personnelles agressives portées par m. groia contre la bonne foi et l’intégrité des procureurs. non seulement ses observations au sujet d’un « fi ltre axé sur une condamna- tion » étaient- elles erronées en droit, mais elles étaient dépourvues de tout fondement raisonnable.   .   . in our view, there was no basis for such a suggestion. in fact, mr. naster’s submissions were correct in law and it was mr. groia who made erroneous and unreasonable submissions on the law of evidence mr groia’s comments about the prosecutor on this occasion were insulting and directly impugned his integrity. à notre avis, rien ne justifi ait une telle prétention. de fait, les arguments de m. naster étaient corrects au regard du droit; c’est plutôt m. groia qui a formulé des obser- vations erronées et déraisonnables en ce qui concerne le droit de la preuve. les remarques faites à cette occasion par m. groia au sujet du procureur étaient insultantes, et portaient directement atteinte à son intégrité.   .   .    we conclude that mr. groia had no reasonable basis on which to attack either the integrity of the prosecutors or their motives. the prosecutors had not promised that they would introduce all relevant documents, regardless of the rules of evidence. they were under no obligation to call evidence favourable to the defence. they had not resiled    nous arrivons donc à la conclusion que m. groia n’avait aucun motif raisonnable d’attaquer l’intégrité ou les motivations des procureurs ceux-ci n’avaient pas promis de présenter l’ensemble des documents pertinents, peu importe les règles de preuve. les procureurs n’avaient aucune obligation de produire des éléments de preuve [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 831 from their promises. their positions on evidentiary issues were not improper and were often correct. [emphasis added; paras. 285, 295, 312 and 324.] [132] in each of these passages, the appeal panel concluded that mr. groia’s allegations lacked a rea- sonable basis because the osc prosecutors were right in law. put another way, the appeal panel con- cluded that mr. groia’s allegations lacked a reason- able basis because he was wrong in law. this was unreasonable. as i have explained, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct based on a sincerely held but mistaken legal belief will be reasonably based as long as they have a suffi cient factual foundation. the question for incivility purposes is not whether mr. groia was right or wrong on the law. rather, the question is whether, based on his understanding of the law, his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, which the appeal panel found were made in good faith, had a factual foundation. in this case, they did. [133] as indicated, had mr. groia’s views on the role of the prosecutor and the law of evidence been correct, he would have been justifi ed in alleging abuse of process. his submissions regarding pro- fessional misconduct would not only have had a reasonable basis; they may well have been accepted. the prosecution repeatedly and intentionally failed to tender all relevant documents, despite mr. groia’s repeated requests. it also objected to mr. groia pre- senting any relevant document of his choosing to a crown witness. viewed this way, it is apparent that mr. groia’s allegations, based as they were on his sincerely held but mistaken legal beliefs, had ample factual foundation. favorables à la défense. ils ne sont donc pas revenus sur leur promesse, et leurs positions quant aux questions rela- tives à la preuve n’étaient pas inappropriées; elles étaient même souvent justes. [je souligne; par. 285, 295, 312 et 324.] [132] dans chacun des passages qui précèdent, le comité d’appel en est venu à la conclusion que les allégations de m. groia ne reposaient sur au- cun fondement raisonnable, puisque le droit donnait raison aux procureurs de la cvmo. autrement dit, selon la conclusion du comité d’appel, les alléga- tions de m. groia étaient dénuées de tout fondement raisonnable, car ce dernier avait tort du point de vue du droit. cette conclusion était déraisonnable. je le répète, des allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite faites sur la base d’une erreur juridique sincère, bien qu’erronée, sont raisonnablement fondées, pour autant qu’elles re- posent sur un fondement factuel suffi sant. dès lors, la question de l’incivilité n’est pas celle de savoir si m. groia a eu raison ou tort en droit; elle consiste plu- tôt à se demander si, en fonction de sa compréhension du droit, ses allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite — qui selon le co- mité d’appel ont été faites de bonne foi — reposaient sur un fondement factuel. en l’espèce, tel était le cas. [133] comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, à supposer que les points de vue de m. groia au sujet du rôle de la poursuite et du droit de la preuve aient été justes, il aurait été fondé à alléguer l’abus de procédure. ses observations relatives au manquement professionnel n’auraient pas seulement été raisonnablement jus- tifi ées; elles auraient fort bien pu être retenues. la poursuite a, intentionnellement et à maintes reprises, omis de présenter tous les documents pertinents mal- gré les demandes répétées de m. groia en ce sens. elle s’est également opposée à ce que m. groia sou- mette quelque document pertinent que ce soit de son choix à un témoin à charge. sous cet angle, il est manifeste que les allégations de m. groia, fondées comme elles l’étaient sur ses croyances juridiques sincères, mais erronées, avaient une assise factuelle amplement suffi sante. i appreciate that the appeal panel also found [134] that mr. groia’s allegations had no factual foundation [134] je suis conscient que le comité d’appel a aussi conclu que les allégations de m. groia n’avaient 832 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. because, contrary to mr. groia’s understanding, “the prosecutors had not promised that they would in- troduce all relevant documents, regardless of the rules of evidence”: para 324. this contributed to the appeal panel’s fi nding that mr. groia’s allega- tions lacked a reasonable basis. respectfully, how- ever, that conclusion was not reasonably open to the appeal panel. [135] mr. groia’s understanding of what the osc prosecutors said must be assessed in light of his sin- cerely held but mistaken legal beliefs. this is because failing to appreciate how mr. groia’s legal mistakes coloured his understanding of the facts effectively allowed the appeal panel to use those legal mistakes to fi nd that his allegations lacked a reasonable basis, contrary to its own approach. [136] as discussed, mr. groia mistakenly believed that the prosecution was legally required to introduce all relevant documents through its own witnesses. it is therefore understandable that he would interpret mr. naster’s submission that he was “duty- bound” to place all relevant documents before the court as a promise to tender those documents. this is espe- cially so given the trial judge’s failure to correct mr. groia’s mistaken legal positions, a point i dis- cuss in greater detail below. it was unreasonable to conclude that mr. groia’s assertions that the osc was reneging on its promises lacked factual founda- tion. they were based on an ambiguous statement that mr. groia reasonably interpreted as a promise because of his erroneous understanding of the law of evidence. pas de fondement factuel parce que, contrairement à ce que comprenait ce dernier, [traduction] « les avocats de la poursuite ne s’étaient pas engagés à déposer en preuve tous les documents pertinents, indépendamment des règles de preuve applicables » : par 324. cela a contribué à la conclusion du comité d’appel selon laquelle les allégations de m. groia n’étaient pas raisonnablement fondées. soit dit en tout respect, j’estime toutefois que le comité d’appel ne pouvait pas raisonnablement tirer cette conclu- sion. [135] la compréhension qu’avait m. groia des propos des avocats de la cvmo doit être évaluée à la lumière de sa compréhension sincère, bien qu’erro- née, de la réalité juridique. il en est ainsi parce que le défaut de tenir compte de la façon dont les erreurs ju- ridiques de m. groia ont teinté sa compréhension de la situation a, dans les faits, permis au comité d’appel d’utiliser ces erreurs de droit pour conclure que ses allégations n’étaient pas raisonnablement fondées, contrairement à ce que préconise sa méthode. [136] comme nous l’avons vu, m. groia croyait à tort que la poursuite était légalement tenue de dépo- ser tous les documents pertinents en les présentant à ses propres témoins. il est donc compréhensible qu’il interprète la thèse de m. naster selon laquelle il était de son « devoir » de soumettre tous les do- cuments pertinents à la cour comme une promesse qu’il agirait de la sorte. cela est particulièrement vrai puisque le juge du procès a omis de corriger les erreurs de droit de m. groia, un élément dont je vais traiter plus en détail ultérieurement. il était déraison- nable de conclure que les affi rmations de m. groia selon lesquelles la cvmo revenait sur la promesse n’avaient pas de fondements factuels. elles étaient fondées sur une affi rmation ambiguë que m. groia a raisonnablement interprétée comme une promesse en raison de sa compréhension erronée du droit de la preuve. in this regard, it is important to note that [137] the appeal panel would normally be in a position to consider the reasonableness of the lawyer’s le- gal beliefs — in this case, mr. groia’s erroneous understanding of the role of the prosecutor and the law of evidence — and conclude that they were not [137] à cet égard, il est important de noter que le comité d’appel pourrait normalement examiner le caractère raisonnable des croyances de l’avocat quant au droit — en l’occurrence, la compréhension erronée de m. groia du rôle de l’avocat de la pour- suite et du droit de la preuve — et conclure qu’elles [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 833 sincerely held. however, that fi nding was not open to the appeal panel here. in view of the fact that it did not hear mr. groia testify, the appeal panel assumed that his legal mistakes were sincerely held, and there- fore that his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were made in good faith: para 238. in short, mr. groia’s legal errors, coupled [138] with how the osc prosecutors conducted them- selves, provided the reasonable basis for his alle- gations. based on its own fi ndings, including that mr. groia’s allegations were made in good faith, it was not reasonably open to the appeal panel to conclude that mr. groia was guilty of professional misconduct on account of incivility. on its own ap- proach, his allegations were made in good faith and reasonably based. [139] my colleagues in dissent accept that the ap- peal panel “considered    the    legal underpinnings of mr. groia’s claims to determine whether they had a reasonable basis”: reasons of karakatsanis j. et al., at para 191. in their view, it was open to the appeal panel to do so. [140] respectfully, i cannot agree. allowing the appeal panel to consider the legal underpinnings of a lawyer’s allegations would allow it to fi nd a lawyer guilty of professional misconduct for nothing more than making good faith allegations of impropriety that stem from a sincerely held legal mistake. as i have explained at paras. 88-91, such a fi nding is un- reasonable. it does not account for mr. groia’s duty of resolute advocacy — a duty of particular impor- tance in this case given its impact on his client’s right to make full answer and defence. mr. groia was both entitled and bound to protect his client’s rights by raising reasonably based, good faith arguments about the propriety of the osc’s conduct — even though those arguments turned out to be legally incorrect. nor does such a fi nding refl ect a proportionate bal- ancing of the lawyer’s expressive rights and the law society’s statutory objective of advancing the cause n’étaient pas sincères. en l’espèce, le comité d’appel ne pouvait toutefois pas tirer une telle conclusion. en effet, comme il n’a pas entendu le témoignage de m. groia, il a tenu pour acquis que la mauvaise compréhension du droit par ce dernier était sincère et donc que ses allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite étaient formulées de bonne foi : par 238. [138] en somme, les erreurs de droit de m. groia, associées à la façon dont les procureurs de la cvmo se sont comportés, ont constitué le fondement raison- nable de ses allégations. sur la base de ses propres conclusions — y compris celle voulant que les allé- gations de m. groia aient été faites en toute bonne foi —, le comité d’appel ne pouvait pas raisonna- blement trouver m. groia coupable de manquement professionnel pour incivilité. de l’avis même du comité d’appel, les allégations de m. groia ont été soulevées de bonne foi, en plus d’être raisonnable- ment fondées. [139] mes collègues dissidents acceptent que le co- mité d’appel « a pris en considération les fondements [  ] juridiques [  ] des prétentions de m. groia pour évaluer si elles étaient raisonnablement fon- dées » : motifs de la juge karakatsanis et autres, par 191. à leur avis, le comité d’appel pouvait le faire. [140] soit dit en tout respect, je ne peux me ran- ger à cet avis. si on autorisait le comité d’appel à examiner les fondements juridiques des allégations formulées par un avocat, cela reviendrait à l’autoriser à reconnaître un avocat coupable de manquement professionnel uniquement parce qu’il aurait fait de bonne foi des allégations d’inconduite, allégations découlant d’une erreur de droit sincère. j’ai expliqué aux par. 88-91 qu’une telle conclusion serait dérai- sonnable. elle ne tiendrait pas compte de l’obligation de m. groia de représenter son client avec vigueur — une obligation qui revêtait une importance particu- lière en l’espèce, compte tenu de son incidence sur le droit de son client de présenter une défense pleine et entière. m. groia avait le droit et le devoir de proté- ger les droits de son client en avançant des arguments de bonne foi et raisonnablement fondés au sujet du caractère convenable du comportement de la cvmo, 834 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. of justice and rule of law by setting and enforcing standards of civility (see para 121). in the end, what mr. groia said — his alle- [141] gations impugning the osc prosecutors’ integrity — should not have been used to ground a fi nding of professional misconduct against him. the appeal panel unreasonably concluded otherwise. et ce, même si ces arguments se sont avérés mal fon- dés en droit. une telle conclusion ne refl ète pas non plus une mise en balance proportionnée des droits de l’avocat en matière de liberté d’expression et de l’objectif poursuivi par la loi régissant le barreau, c’est-à-dire faire promouvoir la justice et la primauté du droit en établissant des normes de civilité et en assurant leur respect : voir par 121. [141] en dernière analyse, les propos tenus par m. groia — soit ses allégations portant atteinte à l’intégrité des procureurs de la cvmo — n’auraient pas dû servir à fonder une conclusion de manque- ment professionnel à son encontre. or, le comité d’appel, de façon déraisonnable, est parvenu à une conclusion autre. (b) the other contextual factors cannot rea- sonably support a finding of professional misconduct b) les autres facteurs contextuels ne peuvent raisonnablement servir de fondement à une conclusion de manquement professionnel [142] the other contextual factors in this case cannot reasonably ground a fi nding of professional misconduct against mr.  groia. the frequency of mr. groia’s allegations, the presiding judge’s re- sponse, and how mr. groia modifi ed his behaviour in response to the directions of the presiding judge and the reviewing courts all suggest that mr. groia’s behaviour during phase one of the felderhof trial was not worthy of professional sanction. the man- ner in which mr. groia raised his allegations was inappropriate. but that cannot, in the circumstances of this case, reasonably support a fi nding of profes- sional misconduct. [142] les autres facteurs contextuels de l’espèce ne sauraient servir de fondement à une conclusion de manquement professionnel de la part de m groia. la fréquence des allégations de celui-ci, la réaction du juge du procès et la manière dont m. groia a modifi é sa conduite après que ce juge et les cours de révision ont émis des directives sont autant d’éléments qui laissent croire que le comportement de m. groia au cours de la première phase du procès felderhof ne justifi ait pas une sanction professionnelle. la ma- nière dont m. groia a soulevé ses allégations était certes inappropriée, mais, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, elle ne saurait justifi er raisonnablement une conclusion de manquement professionnel. (i) the evolving law of abuse of process af- fected the frequency of mr. groia’s behav- iour (i) l’évolution du droit en matière d’abus de procédure a infl ué sur la fréquence des agis- sements de m. groia [143] when phase one of the felderhof trial took place, uncertainty surrounded how allegations of abuse of process should be brought forward. specif- ically, prior to rosenberg ja’s decision dismissing the osc’s appeal of its judicial review application, it was not at all clear that defence counsel who wished to raise abuse of process should refrain from repeat- ing their allegations throughout the trial but wait [143] pendant que se déroulait la première phase du procès felderhof, une certaine incertitude en- tourait la façon dont il convenait de présenter des allégations d’abus de procédure. plus précisément, avant la décision du juge rosenberg rejetant l’appel formé par la cvmo à l’encontre de la décision rela- tive à sa demande de contrôle judiciaire, il était loin d’être clair que l’avocat de la défense qui souhaitait [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 835 instead until the end of trial to bring a motion. given this procedural uncertainty — uncertainty that the appeal panel did not account for — the frequency of mr. groia’s allegations was understandable. [144] this court instructed that an abuse of pro- cess motion should typically be brought at the end of trial: r v. la, [1997] 2 scr 680, at para. 27; see also r v. clement (2002), 166 ccc (3d) 219 (ont. ca), at para 14. the court reasoned that deciding the abuse motion at the end of the proceeding gives the trial judge a full evidentiary record to assess the prejudice caused by the abusive conduct and tailor an appropriate remedy. what remained unclear was the manner in which counsel was entitled to raise abuse of process arguments. could these allegations be made repeatedly throughout the trial? or must a lawyer hold off in raising them until the end of the trial during an abuse of process motion? [145] mr. groia opted for the former. by repeat- edly accusing the prosecutors of the same deliberate wrongdoing, mr. groia was laying the evidentiary groundwork for an abuse of process motion he in- tended to bring at the end of trial. he was also putting the osc “on notice” of his intention to bring the motion. this approach was improper. to be sure, prosecutors are entitled to notice that the defence be- lieves their conduct is improper and will be bringing an abuse of process motion at the end of the proceed- ing. but defence counsel is not entitled to repeatedly make the same allegations of deliberate wrongdoing outside of that motion. accordingly, the trial judge did not have to listen to the same allegations, made over and over again by mr groia. indeed, he should have acted sooner to curb them: see felderhof onsc, at para 93. soulever la question de l’abus de procédure devait éviter de répéter ses allégations pendant toute la du- rée du procès, et plutôt attendre à la fi n de l’instance pour déposer une requête. vu cette incertitude sur le plan de la procédure — incertitude dont le comité d’appel n’a pas tenu compte —, la fréquence des allégations de m. groia était compréhensible. [144] la cour a formulé des directives voulant qu’une requête en arrêt des procédures doive norma- lement être présentée à la fi n de l’instruction : r c. la, [1997] 2 rcs 680, par. 27; voir également l’ar- rêt r c. clement (2002), 166 ccc (3d) 219 (ca. ont.), par 14. selon le raisonnement de la cour, le juge du procès qui se prononce sur une requête pour abus de procédure à la fi n de l’instance seulement dispose alors d’un dossier de preuve complet, en fonction duquel il peut évaluer le préjudice causé par la conduite abusive et déterminer la réparation qu’il convient d’accorder dans les circonstances. ce qui demeurait nébuleux, toutefois, c’est la manière dont l’avocat était autorisé à soulever ses arguments fondés sur l’abus de procédure. les allégations en question pouvaient- elles être formulées à répétition tout au long du procès? ou l’avocat devait-il plutôt attendre à la fi n de l’instance, au moment de l’ins- truction de la requête pour abus de procédure, pour avancer ses allégations? [145] monsieur  groia a choisi la première op- tion. en accusant de façon répétée les procureurs des mêmes actes fautifs délibérés, m. groia jetait les bases de sa preuve à l’appui de la requête en arrêt des procédures qu’il comptait déposer à la fi n de l’instance. il « prévenait » également de cette façon les représentants de la cvmo de son intention de déposer la requête. cette approche était inadéquate. bien entendu, les procureurs ont le droit de recevoir avis du fait que la défense juge leur conduite incon- venante et qu’elle déposera une requête pour abus de procédure à la fi n de l’instance. en dehors de cette requête, l’avocat de la défense ne peut cependant pas exprimer à répétition les mêmes accusations d’inconduite délibérée. le juge du procès n’avait donc pas à écouter ces allégations répétées sans cesse par m groia. de fait, il aurait dû intervenir plus tôt pour y mettre un frein : voir felderhof (csj ont), par 93. 836 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. [146] but hindsight is 20/20. the frequency of mr.  groia’s abuse allegations must be evaluated based on the state of the law when he made them. the appeal panel failed to account for the uncer- tainty surrounding the proper approach to raising abuse of process arguments — uncertainty that was only clarifi ed by rosenberg ja in his reasons dis- missing the osc’s appeal of its judicial review ap- plication. [147] i appreciate that the way in which the evolv- ing law of abuse of process infl uenced mr. groia’s allegations was not argued before the appeal panel. nevertheless, in my respectful view, it was unrea- sonable for the appeal panel to evaluate mr. groia’s behaviour based on the law of abuse of process rosenberg ja articulated in felderhof three years after the conduct at issue took place. (ii) the judges’ reactions to mr. groia’s behav- iour and mr. groia’s response [148] the appeal panel also failed to factor into its analysis how the trial judge reacted to mr. groia’s behaviour and how mr.  groia modified his con- duct in response to the trial judge and reviewing courts’ directions. both of these factors suggest that mr. groia’s behaviour was not worthy of a fi nding of professional misconduct. [149] mr. groia began accusing the osc prosecu- tors of impropriety early on in the proceedings. yet for the vast majority of phase one, the trial judge adopted a passive stance, choosing not to comment on the substance of mr. groia’s allegations or the manner in which he was making them. the trial judge remained largely silent even as the osc pros- ecutors repeatedly complained about mr. groia’s behaviour and insisted that the trial judge rule on whether their conduct was improper. [146] avec le recul, tout devient cependant net. il faut évaluer la fréquence à laquelle m. groia a ré- pété ses allégations d’abus de procédure en fonction de l’état du droit au moment où il les a faites. le comité d’appel n’a pas tenu compte de l’incertitude entourant la façon de s’y prendre pour soulever des arguments fondés sur l’abus de procédure — une incertitude dissipée seulement par le juge rosenberg dans ses motifs rejetant l’appel formé par la cvmo contre la décision portant rejet de sa demande de contrôle judiciaire. [147] je suis conscient du fait que l’incidence qu’a eue la façon dont évoluait le droit relatif à l’abus de procédure sur les allégations de m. groia n’a pas été plaidée devant le comité d’appel. il n’en demeure pas moins que, selon moi, il était déraisonnable que le comité d’appel évalue le comportement de m. groia sur le fondement des règles de droit relatives à l’abus de procédure formulées par le juge rosenberg de la cour d’appel dans felderhof trois ans après que la conduite en cause a été adoptée. (ii) la réaction des différents juges face au com- portement de m. groia et la façon dont ce dernier a agi par la suite [148] le comité d’appel a également omis de prendre en considération dans son analyse la fa- çon dont le juge du procès a réagi à la conduite de m. groia, ainsi que la manière dont celui-ci a changé de comportement après que le juge du procès et les cours de révision ont émis des directives. ces deux facteurs tendent à démontrer que le comportement de m. groia ne justifi ait pas une conclusion de man- quement professionnel. [149] m. groia s’est mis à accuser les procureurs de la cvmo d’inconduite dès le début de l’instance. malgré cela, pendant la plus grande partie de la pre- mière phase du procès, le juge a adopté une attitude passive, choisissant de ne pas se prononcer sur la teneur des allégations de m. groia ou sur la manière dont il les soulevait. il est resté largement muet, même si les procureurs de la cvmo se sont plaints à maintes reprises du comportement de m. groia tout en insistant pour que le juge décide si leur conduite était blâmable ou non. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 837 [150] for example, after one hotly contested ex- change between the parties, the trial judge accepted that mr. groia’s allegations were “notice that [an abuse of process] application may come at the end of the day” and stated that “there is no ruling to be made with respect to that matter”. the trial judge responded to another of the osc’s requests to rule on mr. groia’s allegations by stating that he expected both counsel “to conduct themselves professionally”. [151] it was not until the 57th day of trial that the judge fi rst instructed mr. groia to simply make “the same objection” when he believed the prosecutors were acting inappropriately. on the record before this court, the trial judge reminded mr. groia to refrain from repeating his misconduct allegations on two more occasions in the remaining weeks of phase one. in response, mr. groia largely complied with the trial judge’s admonition. [152] the appeal panel noted the relevance of the presiding judge’s reaction to the professional mis- conduct inquiry. however, it did not once mention how the trial judge reacted to mr. groia’s allegations when assessing his behaviour. this was a signifi cant omission. while i accept that the trial judge’s passive approach throughout the bulk of mr. groia’s prose- cutorial misconduct allegations does not, on its own, absolve mr. groia of any wrongdoing, it nevertheless shaped both the substance and manner of mr. groia’s allegations. [150] par exemple, après un échange musclé entre les parties, le juge du procès a admis que les alléga- tions de m. groia constituaient un [traduction] « avis selon lequel une requête [pour abus de procé- dure] était susceptible d’être présentée à la fi n », en ajoutant qu’« aucune décision n’avait à être rendue sur la question ». à la suite d’une autre demande de la cvmo le pressant de statuer sur les allégations de m. groia, le juge du procès a répondu en déclarant qu’il attendait des avocats de part et d’autre qu’ils « se conduisent de façon professionnelle ». [151] ce n’est qu’au 57e jour du procès que, pour la première fois, le juge a ordonné à m. groia de simplement préciser qu’il formulait [traduction] « la même objection » chaque fois qu’il considérait la conduite des procureurs inappropriée. suivant le dos- sier dont nous sommes saisis, au cours des semaines restantes de la première phase du procès, le juge a également rappelé à deux autres reprises à m. groia d’éviter de répéter ses allégations d’inconduite. par la suite, m. groia s’est essentiellement conformé à ces directives. [152] le comité d’appel a noté la pertinence de la réaction du juge présidant le procès pour l’enquête relative au manquement professionnel. cela dit, au moment d’évaluer le comportement de m. groia, pas une seule fois n’a-t-il mentionné la manière dont le juge du procès a réagi aux allégations faites par ce dernier. il s’agissait là d’une omission importante. j’accepte que l’approche passive du juge du procès essentiellement chaque fois que des allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite ont été formulées par m. groia ne suffi se pas, isolément, à absoudre m. groia de toute incon- duite. cela a toutefois infl uencé à la fois le contenu des allégations de m. groia et la façon dont il les a formulées. [153] first, by failing to correct mr. groia’s le- gal mistakes, the trial judge buttressed the reasona- bleness of mr. groia’s sincerely held but mistaken belief that the osc prosecutors were in fact acting abusively. second, the trial judge’s failure to ad- monish mr. groia for the manner in which he raised his allegations signaled to mr. groia that there was nothing wrong with the way he was impugning the [153] premièrement, en ne corrigeant pas les er- reurs de droit de m. groia, le juge du procès a étayé ses croyances sincères, bien qu’erronées, selon les- quelles les avocats de la cvmo agissaient de fait de manière répréhensible. deuxièmement, le silence du juge du procès quant à la façon dont m. groia a soulevé ses allégations lui a signalé que sa façon de remettre en question l’intégrité des avocats de la 838 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. prosecutors’ integrity. it was therefore imperative for the appeal panel to consider the trial judge’s reaction when evaluating mr. groia’s conduct. in this regard, i note that this was a judge- alone trial, and admonishing mr. groia for the manner in which he was impugning the prosecutors’ integrity could not possibly have prejudiced him the way it might have had this been a jury trial. equally, there was nothing preventing the trial judge from admonishing mr. groia for his mistaken legal beliefs and letting him know that they did not form a proper basis for allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. [154] nor did the appeal panel incorporate mr. groia’s marked change in behaviour in response to the directions of the trial judge and the review- ing courts into its analysis. when the trial judge instructed mr. groia how to object when he thought the prosecution was offside, mr. groia, for the most part, listened. and after receiving a “public sham- ing” from campbell j. and rosenberg ja,. phase two of the felderhof trial unfolded without incident. it was incumbent on the appeal panel to factor in mr. groia’s compliance with the judges’ directions when assessing his behaviour. both the trial judge’s passivity and mr. groia’s compliance with the di- rections given by every judge involved in this case militate against a fi nding of professional misconduct. poursuite n’avait rien de répréhensible. il fallait donc absolument que le comité d’appel examine la réac- tion du juge du procès pour statuer sur la conduite de m groia. à cet égard, je souligne que le procès s’est déroulé devant un juge seul et que réprimander m. groia pour la manière dont il attaquait l’intégrité des avocats de la poursuite n’aurait pas pu lui nuire comme si le procès s’était déroulé devant un jury. de même, rien n’empêchait le juge du procès de mettre m. groia en garde quant à ses croyances juridiques erronées et de lui dire qu’elles ne constituaient pas un fondement valide pour les allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite. [154] le comité d’appel n’a pas non plus tenu compte dans son analyse du changement de com- portement marqué de m. groia après que le juge du procès et les cours de révision ont émis des di- rectives. lorsque le juge du procès a dit à m. groia comment présenter ses objections dans les cas où il considérait les agissements de la poursuite fautifs, m. groia, dans l’ensemble, a obtempéré. qui plus est, après que celui-ci a été « vilipendé sur la place publique » par les juges campbell et rosenberg, la deuxième phase du procès felderhof s’est déroulée sans incidents. il incombait au comité d’appel de prendre en compte le respect, par m.  groia, des directives émises par les juges au moment d’évaluer son comportement. la passivité du juge du procès, tout autant que l’observation par m. groia des direc- tives de chacun des juges en cause, milite contre une conclusion de manquement professionnel. (iii) the manner in which mr. groia brought his (iii) la manière dont m. groia a formulé ses al- allegations légations [155] the fi nal contextual factor is the manner in which mr. groia brought his allegations. my col- leagues assert that i “discount the manner in which mr. groia made his allegations”, thereby “setting a benchmark for professional misconduct that permits sustained and sarcastic personal attacks”: reasons of karakatsanis j. et al., at paras. 211 and 227. [155] en l’espèce, la manière dont m. groia a porté ses allégations constitue le dernier facteur con textuel. selon mes collègues, je « ne tiendrai[s] pas compte de la manière dont m. groia a formulé ses alléga- tions » « établi[ssant] [ainsi] une nouvelle norme en matière de manquement professionnel qui per- mettrait à un avocat de porter des attaques [person- nelles] soutenues et sarcastiques » : motifs de la juge karakatsanis et autres, par. 211 et 227. [156] respectfully, i take issue with that charac- terization of my reasons. i appreciate that a lawyer [156] soit dit en tout respect, je m’inscris en faux contre cette caractérisation de mes motifs. j’admets [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada le juge moldaver 839 can be found guilty of professional misconduct for challenging opposing counsel’s integrity in an inap- propriate manner. however, in this case, the manner in which mr. groia made his allegations could not, on its own, reasonably ground a fi nding of profes- sional misconduct. [157] to be sure, mr. groia should not have made his allegations in the sarcastic tone that he sometimes employed. the tenor of his allegations at times de- scended into what can fairly be described as “petulant invective”: felderhof onsc, at para 64. however, as indicated, throughout the majority of phase one, the trial judge did not criticize mr. groia for the manner in which he was making his allegations. although the trial judge’s passivity cannot be taken as acqui- escence, it is nonetheless a relevant contextual factor to consider when evaluating the language and tone mr. groia chose to employ. when the trial judge did intervene, mr. groia appropriately modifi ed the way in which he pursued his abuse of process arguments. the sarcastic manner in which mr. groia challenged the prosecutors’ integrity simply cannot, in light of the other contextual factors in this case, justify the appeal panel’s fi nding of professional misconduct. qu’un avocat peut être trouvé coupable de manque- ment professionnel pour avoir mis en question de manière inappropriée l’intégrité de l’avocat de la par- tie adverse. cependant, dans le cas qui nous occupe, la manière dont m. groia a formulé ses allégations ne saurait, à elle seule, raisonnablement servir de fondement à une conclusion de manquement pro- fessionnel. il est certain que m. groia n’aurait pas dû [157] faire ses allégations avec le ton sarcastique qu’il a parfois employé. le contenu de ses propos tenait par moments de ce que l’on pourrait qualifi er d’« in- jures pétulantes » : felderhof (csj. ont.), par 64. néanmoins, je le répète, pendant la plus grande partie de la première phase du procès, le juge s’est abstenu d’adresser toute critique à m. groia quant à la manière dont il avançait ses allégations. bien que l’attitude passive du juge du procès ne puisse être interprétée comme un consentement à cet égard, il s’agit néanmoins d’un facteur contextuel à prendre en considération au moment d’évaluer les termes et le ton choisis par m groia. par ailleurs, lorsque le juge du procès est fi nalement intervenu, m. groia a modifi é de façon appropriée sa façon de faire valoir ses arguments fondés sur l’abus de procédure. la manière sarcastique avec laquelle m. groia a mis en cause l’intégrité des procureurs ne peut tout simple- ment pas, à la lumière des autres facteurs contextuels de l’espèce, justifi er la conclusion de manquement professionnel tirée par le comité d’appel. [158] my colleagues in dissent rely heavily on campbell  j and rosenberg  ja’s critical com- ments of mr. groia’s behaviour throughout phase one to reach a contrary conclusion: reasons of kar- akatsanis j. et al., at para 225. those comments, how- ever, were made in a proceeding to which mr. groia was not a party, without giving mr. groia an oppor- tunity to defend himself. while undoubtedly helpful in guiding mr. groia on the scope of appropriate be- haviour going forward, it is unfair to take those com- ments as conclusive proof of professional misconduct on account of incivility. further, as indicated, despite the criticisms levelled at mr. groia by campbell j. and rosenberg ja for the uncivil way in which he had made his allegations against mr. naster, the trial judge never once castigated mr. groia for the tone [158] mes collègues dissidents s’appuient for- tement sur les commentaires critiques des juges campbell et rosenberg quant au comportement de m. groia tout au long de la première phase du procès pour tirer une conclusion contraire : motifs de la juge karakatsanis et autres, par 225. or, ces commen- taires ont été faits dans le contexte d’une procédure à laquelle m. groia n’était pas partie, sans qu’il ait eu la possibilité de se défendre. cela dit, s’ils ont sans aucun doute guidé m. groia sur le type de comporte- ment qu’il serait approprié qu’il adopte pour la suite des choses, il est injuste de considérer que ces com- mentaires constituent une preuve concluante d’un manquement professionnel pour incivilité. qui plus est, comme je l’ai déjà précisé, en dépit des critiques formulées par les juges campbell et rosenberg pour 840 groia v law society of upper canada moldaver j. [2018] 1 scr. or manner of his submissions or the language used by him. l’incivilité de la façon dont m. groia a énoncé ses allégations contre m. naster, le juge du procès n’a pas une seule fois reproché à m. groia le ton ou le langage qu’il a utilisés pour présenter ses observa- tions ni sa manière de le faire. v conclusion and disposition v conclusion et dispositif [159] the appeal panel’s fi nding of professional misconduct against mr. groia was unreasonable. the appeal panel used mr. groia’s sincerely held but mistaken legal beliefs to conclude that his al- legations of prosecutorial misconduct lacked a rea- sonable basis. but, as i have explained, mr. groia’s legal errors — in conjunction with the osc prose- cutor’s conduct — formed the reasonable basis upon which his allegations rested. in these circumstances, it was not open to the appeal panel to conclude that mr. groia’s allegations lacked a reasonable ba- sis. and because the appeal panel accepted that the allegations were made in good faith, it was not reasonably open for it to fi nd mr. groia guilty of professional misconduct based on what he said. the appeal panel also failed to account for the evolving abuse of process law, the trial judge’s reaction to mr. groia’s behaviour, and mr. groia’s response — all factors which suggest mr. groia’s behaviour was not worthy of professional discipline on account of incivility. the fi nding of professional misconduct against him was therefore unreasonable. [159] la conclusion de manquement professionnel qu’a tirée le comité d’appel à l’encontre de m. groia était déraisonnable. le comité d’appel a utilisé les croyances juridiques sincères, mais erronées, de m. groia pour tirer la conclusion que ses allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite n’avaient aucun fondement raisonnable. or, comme je l’ai expliqué, les erreurs de droit de m. groia — prises conjointement avec le comporte- ment du procureur de la cvmo — constituaient le fondement raisonnable sur lequel s’appuyaient ses allégations. dans ce contexte, le comité d’appel ne pouvait pas conclure que les allégations m. groia étaient dénuées de fondement raisonnable. de sur- croît, compte tenu de son admission du fait que les allégations concernées avaient été formulées de bonne foi, le comité d’appel ne pouvait pas rai- sonnablement trouver m. groia coupable de man- quement professionnel sur la base de tels propos. le comité d’appel a également omis de prendre en compte non seulement l’évolution de l’état du droit en matière d’abus de procédure, mais aussi la réac- tion du juge du procès face au comportement de m. groia et la façon dont celui-ci s’est comporté après avoir reçu des directives. ce sont tous là des facteurs qui donnent à penser que le comportement de m. groia ne justifi ait pas que celui-ci soit frappé d’une sanction disciplinaire pour incivilité par son ordre professionnel. la conclusion de manquement professionnel tirée à son encontre était, par consé- quent, déraisonnable. [160] looking at the circumstances of this case as a whole, the following becomes apparent. mr. groia’s mistaken allegations were made in good faith and were reasonably based. the manner in which he raised them was improper. however, the very nature of mr. groia’s allegations — deliberate prosecutorial misconduct depriving his client of a fair trial — led him to use strong language that may well have been [160] compte tenu de l’ensemble des circons- tances de l’espèce, voici ce qui ressort nettement. les allégations erronées de m. groia étaient raison- nablement fondées et faites de bonne foi. la manière dont il les a soulevées était inappropriée. toutefois, la nature même de ces allégations — soit des alléga- tions de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite ayant pour effet de priver son client [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada la juge côté 841 inappropriate in other contexts. the frequency of his allegations was infl uenced by an underdeveloped abuse of process jurisprudence. the trial judge chose not to curb mr. groia’s allegations throughout the majority of phase one. when the trial judge and reviewing courts did give instructions, mr. groia appropriately modifi ed his behaviour. taking these considerations into account, the only reasonable disposition is a fi nding that he did not engage in professional misconduct. [161] i would allow the appeal and set aside the de- cision of the appeal panel with respect to the fi nding of professional misconduct against mr. groia and the penalty imposed. i would award costs to mr. groia in this court and in the courts below, as well as in the proceedings before the law society. because mr. groia, in the circumstances of this case, could not reasonably be found guilty of professional mis- conduct, the complaints against him are dismissed and there is no need to remit the matter back to the law society: giguère v. chambre des notaires du québec, 2004 scc 1, [2004] 1 scr 3, at para 66. d’un procès équitable — l’a emmené à utiliser un langage fort qui, dans d’autres contextes, aurait très bien pu être inapproprié. le fait que la jurisprudence était peu élaborée en matière d’abus de procédure a infl uencé la fréquence de ses allégations. le juge du procès a choisi de ne pas mettre un frein aux allégations de m. groia’s pendant la majeure partie de la première phase du procès. lorsque ce juge et les cours de révision lui ont donné des directives, m. groia a modifi é son comportement comme il se devait. tout bien considéré, la seule conclusion raisonnable qui puisse être tirée en l’espèce est que m. groia ne s’est pas rendu coupable de manque- ment professionnel. [161] je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et d’an- nuler la décision du comité d’appel relativement à la conclusion de manquement professionnel qu’il a tirée contre m. groia et à la peine qui avait été infl i- gée à ce dernier. je suis d’avis d’accorder les dépens à m. groia devant la cour et les juridictions d’ins- tances inférieures, de même que relativement aux procédures qui se sont déroulées devant le barreau. étant donné que, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, m. groia ne pouvait raisonnablement être trouvé coupable de manquement professionnel, les plaintes formulées contre lui sont rejetées et il n’est pas né- cessaire de renvoyer l’affaire au barreau : giguère c. chambre des notaires du québec, 2004 csc 1, [2004] 1 rcs 3, par 66. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [162] côté  j.  — i agree with my colleague, moldaver  j., that the law society appeal panel erred in fi nding that mr. groia committed profes- sional misconduct in the course of defending his client, mr felderhof. however, i write separately to express my disagreement as to the applicable standard of review. in my view, the appeal pan- el’s fi nding of professional misconduct is review- able on the correctness standard on the basis that the impugned conduct occurred in a courtroom, as discussed by brown ja in his dissenting reasons in the court of appeal (2016 onca 471, 131 or. (3d) 1). i concur with the majority’s disposition of this case because the appeal panel’s conclusion [162] la juge côté  — je suis d’accord avec mon collègue, le juge moldaver, pour dire que le comité d’appel du barreau a commis une erreur lors- qu’il a déclaré m. groia coupable de manquement professionnel dans le cadre de la défense de son client, m felderhof. cependant, je rédige des mo- tifs distincts afi n d’exprimer mon désaccord quant à la norme de contrôle applicable. à mon avis, la conclusion de manquement professionnel tirée par le comité d’appel est susceptible de révision en fonc- tion de la norme de la décision correcte, pour le motif que la conduite reprochée a eu lieu dans une salle d’audience, comme l’a expliqué le juge david brown de la cour d’appel dans ses motifs dissidents : 2016 842 groia v law society of upper canada côté j. [2018] 1 scr. that mr. groia committed professional misconduct was incorrect. [163] as always, when it comes to the standard of review, our approach is guided by dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190. that case prescribes a two- step analysis. first, we must look at our existing jurisprudence to ascer- tain whether the appropriate degree of deference has already been determined. second, if an anal- ysis of existing precedent does not prove fruitful, we must look to the relevant contextual factors to determine whether the correctness standard or the reasonableness standard is appropriate (dunsmuir, at paras 62-64). [164] applying that approach here, our existing ju- risprudence does not dictate the standard of review in this appeal. although law society of new brunswick v. ryan, 2003 scc 20, [2003] 1 scr 247, and doré v. barreau du québec, 2012 scc 12, [2012] 1 scr 395, involved professional misconduct al- legations, the context of this case is different in one critical — and dispositive — respect: the impugned conduct occurred before a judge in open court. as i discuss below, the fact that the relevant conduct occurred in a court of law implicates constitutional imperatives about the judiciary’s independence and its capacity to control its own processes. the nature of the impugned conduct therefore distinguishes this case from both ryan and doré. onca 471, 131 or (3d) 1. je souscris à la décision des juges majoritaires dans la présente affaire parce que la conclusion du comité d’appel selon laquelle m. groia s’est rendu coupable de manquement pro- fessionnel était incorrecte. [163] comme toujours, lorsqu’il est question de norme de contrôle, l’arrêt dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, doit guider notre démarche. cette décision prescrit une analyse en deux étapes. premièrement, nous devons examiner notre jurisprudence afi n de vérifi er si le degré de déférence approprié a déjà été établi. deu- xièmement, si l’analyse des précédents ne se révèle pas fructueuse, nous devons examiner les facteurs contextuels pertinents pour établir quelle norme de contrôle est appropriée, la norme de la décision cor- recte ou celle de la décision raisonnable : dunsmuir, par 62-64. [164] en appliquant cette approche en l’espèce, on constate que notre jurisprudence ne dicte pas la norme de contrôle devant être utilisée dans le présent pourvoi. bien que les arrêts barreau du nouveau- brunswick c. ryan, 2003 csc 20, [2003] 1 rcs. 247, et doré c. barreau du québec, 2012 csc 12, [2012] 1 rcs 395, traitaient d’allégations de man- quement professionnel, le contexte de la présente affaire diffère quant à un aspect fondamental et dé- terminant : la conduite reprochée est survenue devant un juge en audience publique. comme je l’explique plus loin, le fait que la conduite reprochée soit sur- venue dans une cour de justice met en cause des impératifs constitutionnels relatifs à l’indépendance de la magistrature et à sa capacité à contrôler ses propres procédures. par conséquent, la nature de la conduite reprochée distingue la présente cause des affaires ryan et doré. [165] turning to an analysis of the contextual fac- tors, dunsmuir instructs that “[d]eference will usually result where a tribunal is interpreting its own stat- ute”, as is the case here (para. 54 (emphasis added)). but this presumption is just that: a presumption that can be rebutted, not an inviolable command that is “carved in stone” (mclean v. british columbia (se- curities commission), 2013 scc 67, [2013] 3 scr. 895, at para 22). dunsmuir permits — indeed, it [165] en ce qui concerne l’analyse des facteurs contextuels, dunsmuir prévoit que « [l]orsqu’un tri- bunal administratif interprète sa propre loi constitu- tive [  ], la déférence est habituellement de mise », comme c’est le cas en l’espèce : par. 54 (je souligne). il ne s’agit toutefois que d’une présomption, une présomption qui peut être réfutée, et non un ordre in- violable qui est « immuable » : mclean c. colombie- britannique (securities commission), 2013 csc 67, [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada la juge côté 843 expressly envisions — that the presumption of rea- sonableness will be rebutted in “the exceptional other case” (rogers communications inc. v. society of composers, authors and music publishers of can- ada, 2012 scc 35, [2012] 2 scr 283, at para. 16 (emphasis in original)). [166] this is such a case. the fact that the im- pugned conduct occurred in a courtroom rebuts the presumption of reasonableness. i agree, on this point, with brown ja’s dissenting reasons in the court below: correctness review is required because the law society of upper canada’s inquiry into in- court professional misconduct “engages the contours of the constitutional relationship between the courts and government regulators” (ca reasons, at para 312). [167] judicial independence is, without question, a cornerstone of canadian democracy. it is essential to both the impartiality of the judiciary and the mainte- nance of the rule of law (reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3, at para 10). as chief justice dickson remarked more than 30 years ago: “the role of the courts as resolver of disputes, inter- preter of the law and defender of the constitution requires that they be completely separate in authority and function from all other participants in the justice system” (beauregard v. canada, [1986] 2 scr 56, at p. 73 (emphasis in original); see also mackeigan v. hickman, [1989] 2 scr 796, at pp 827-28). [2013] 3 rcs 895, par 22. dunsmuir permet, et même prévoit expressément que la présomption d’as- sujettissement à la norme de la décision raisonnable peut être réfutée dans une « situation exceptionnelle nouvelle » : rogers communications inc. c. société canadienne des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs de musique, 2012 csc 35, [2012] 2 rcs 283, par. 16 (en italique dans l’original). [166] tel est le cas en l’espèce. le fait que la con- duite reprochée soit survenue dans une salle d’au- dience permet de réfuter la présomption d’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable. sur ce point, je souscris aux motifs dissidents du juge brown de la cour d’appel : la norme de la décision correcte doit être appliquée parce que l’enquête du barreau du haut- canada relativement au manquement profes- sionnel en salle d’audience [traduction] « met en cause la relation constitutionnelle entre les tribunaux et les organismes de réglementation » : motifs de la ca, par 312. [167] l’indépendance judiciaire est, sans aucun doute, une pierre angulaire de la démocratie cana- dienne. elle est essentielle à l’impartialité de la ma- gistrature et au maintien de la primauté du droit : renvoi relatif à la rémunération des juges de la cour provinciale de l’île-du- prince- édouard, [1997] 3 rcs 3, par 10. comme l’a fait remarquer le juge en chef dickson il y a plus de 30 ans : « [l]e rôle des tribunaux en tant qu’arbitres des litiges, inter- prètes du droit et défenseurs de la constitution exige qu’ils soient complètement séparés, sur le plan des pouvoirs et des fonctions, de tous les autres par- ticipants au système judiciaire » : beauregard c. canada, [1986] 2 rcs 56, p. 73 (souligné dans l’original); voir aussi mackeigan c. hickman, [1989] 2 rcs 796, p 827-828. [168] an inquiry by a law society into a lawyer’s in- court conduct risks intruding on the judge’s func- tion of managing the trial process and his authority to sanction improper behaviour. it does so by casting a shadow over court proceedings — in effect, chilling potential speech and advocacy through the threat of ex post punishment, even where the trial judge of- fered the lawyer no indication that his or her conduct crossed the line. and it permits an administrative [168] une enquête d’un barreau quant à la conduite d’un avocat en salle d’audience risque d’empiéter sur la fonction de gestion de l’instance qu’exerce le juge et sur son pouvoir de sanctionner les compor- tements inappropriés. il en est ainsi parce que cette conduite peut avoir des répercussions négatives sur l’instance — en fait, en ayant un effet paralysant sur le discours des avocats et leur façon de s’exprimer ainsi que sur la défense de leur client en raison de la 844 groia v law society of upper canada côté j. [2018] 1 scr. body to second- guess the boundaries of permissible advocacy in a courtroom that is ultimately supervised by an independent and impartial judge. [169] i do not contest that the law society has the statutory authority to sanction in- court conduct. however, the contextual reality that must be consid- ered when determining the standard of review for such decisions is that the courtroom is “the work- place of the independent judiciary” (ca reasons, per brown ja, at para 312). to protect this inde- pendence, and the authority of judges to manage the proceedings before them in the manner they see fi t, the judiciary — not a regulatory body, a creature of the political branches of government — should have the fi nal say over the appropriateness of a lawyer’s conduct in that sphere. the reasonableness standard of review, which requires judicial deference to a law society’s disciplinary determinations, is inconsistent with this prerogative. therefore, correctness review is required to ensure proper respect for the judiciary’s constitutionally guaranteed place in our democracy. [170] assuming (without deciding) that the appeal panel adopted the correct test for professional mis- conduct, i conclude that its application of that test to mr. groia’s conduct was incorrect. as a result, i concur with the majority that the appeal panel erred in fi nding that mr. groia committed professional misconduct. menace d’une sanction a posteriori, même lorsque le juge du procès n’a donné à l’avocat aucune indi- cation que son comportement dépassait les bornes. elle permet en outre à un organisme administratif de mettre en doute les limites de ce qui est permis dans le cadre de la défense d’un client en salle d’au- dience, ce qui est ultimement supervisé par un juge indépendant et impartial. [169] je ne conteste pas que le barreau a le pou- voir légal de sanctionner le comportement en salle d’audience. cependant, pour déterminer la norme de contrôle applicable à ces décisions, il faut tenir compte de la réalité contextuelle, soit que la salle d’audience est [traduction] « le lieu de travail de la magistrature indépendante  »  : motifs de la ca, le juge brown, par 312. pour protéger cette indépendance, ainsi que le pouvoir du juge de gérer l’instance qui se déroule devant lui comme bon lui semble, la magistrature — et non un organisme de réglementation, qui est une création des organes po- litiques du gouvernement — devrait avoir le dernier mot quant au caractère approprié du comportement de l’avocat adopté dans ce contexte. la norme de contrôle de la décision raisonnable — qui exige que les juges fassent preuve de déférence envers les dé- cisions disciplinaires des barreaux — est contraire à cette prérogative. par conséquent, il faut appliquer la norme de la décision correcte pour que soit dûment respectée la place garantie à la magistrature par la constitution dans notre démocratie. [170] en supposant (sans décider) que le comité d’appel a adopté le bon test relativement au manque- ment professionnel, je conclus que son application de ce test à la conduite de m. groia était erronée. en conséquence, je partage l’avis des juges majoritaires selon lesquels le comité d’appel a commis une erreur en déclarant m. groia coupable d’un manquement professionnel. [171] as moldaver j. describes (at paras. 126-41), the appeal panel effectively disregarded its own stated approach, using mr. groia’s sincerely held but erroneous legal beliefs to support its conclusion that he engaged in professional misconduct. once that factor is set aside, there is little else upon which [171] comme le décrit le juge moldaver (aux par.  126-141), le comité d’appel a effectivement écarté l’approche qu’il avait lui- même énoncée, et s’est fondé sur les croyances juridiques sincères, mais erronées, de m. groia pour étayer sa conclusion que celui-ci s’était rendu coupable de manquement [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada la juge côté 845 a fi nding of professional misconduct could be cor- rectly made. in particular, i fi nd it relevant that the pre- [172] siding judge elected to adopt a relatively passive approach to confronting mr. groia’s aggressive tac- tics, even in the face of repeated requests from the prosecution to sanction his behaviour. this was well within the scope of legitimate options open to the judge in the context of this trial. but as a conse- quence, mr. groia was entitled to rely on the judge’s responses (or lack thereof) in calibrating his litiga- tion strategy. once the judge did intervene, mr. groia largely complied with his instructions. and the sec- ond phase of the trial ran smoothly. the appeal panel failed to give appropriate weight to these consider- ations. i also agree with moldaver j. (at paras. 143- [173] 47) that the uncertain state of the law regarding the manner in which abuse of process allegations should be raised weighs against a fi nding of professional misconduct. we rightly expect that lawyers will push the boundaries of the law, where appropriate, in ad- vancing the interests of their clients. the law would stagnate in the absence of creative and novel legal argumentation. although this does not give law- yers free licence to knowingly advance frivolous or completely baseless positions, we must be sensitive to the potential chilling effect on legal advocacy when assessing the jurisprudential context in which alleged misconduct occurs. here, i am prepared to err on the side of accepting that there was some pro- cedural uncertainty — which the appeal panel did not account for — that contextualizes the frequency of mr. groia’s allegations. this, too, undermines the correctness of the appeal panel’s ultimate con- clusion. professionnel. une fois cet élément mis de côté, peu d’autres éléments peuvent justifi er une conclusion de manquement professionnel. [172] plus particulièrement, j’estime pertinent que le juge qui a présidé l’audience ait choisi d’adopter une approche relativement passive face aux tactiques agressives de m. groia, même si la poursuite a de- mandé à plusieurs reprises que ce comportement soit sanctionné. cette approche faisait bel et bien partie des options légitimes dont pouvait se prévaloir le juge dans le contexte de ce procès. il en découle toutefois que m. groia était en droit de s’appuyer sur les réactions du juge (ou l’absence de réactions) pour ajuster sa stratégie d’instance. une fois que le juge est intervenu, m. groia s’est en grande partie conformé à ses directives. d’ailleurs, la deuxième phase du procès s’est déroulée sans heurts. le co- mité d’appel a omis d’apprécier ces éléments à leur juste valeur. [173] je suis également d’accord avec le juge moldaver (par. 143-147) pour dire que l’incertitude du droit concernant la façon dont les allégations d’abus de procédure devraient être soulevées milite contre une conclusion de manquement profession- nel. nous nous attendons à juste titre à ce que les avocats repoussent les limites du droit, s’il y a lieu, lorsqu’ils font valoir les intérêts de leurs clients. le droit stagnerait en l’absence d’arguments juridiques créatifs et novateurs. bien que les avocats n’aient pas pour autant carte blanche afi n de faire valoir sciemment des positions frivoles ou complètement dépourvues de fondement, nous devons être attentifs à l’effet paralysant possible sur les avocats dans le cadre de la défense de leurs clients, lorsque nous examinons le contexte jurisprudentiel dans lequel le manquement professionnel allégué s’est produit. en l’espèce, je suis prête à accepter qu’il y avait une certaine incertitude procédurale — dont le comité d’appel n’a pas tenu compte — qui contextualise la fréquence à laquelle m. groia a formulé ses alléga- tions. cette incertitude mine également la justesse de la conclusion ultime du comité d’appel. [174] for these reasons, i would allow the appeal. i agree with moldaver j.’s disposition as to costs. [174] pour ces motifs, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi. je souscris à la décision du juge moldaver 846 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. i also agree that there is no need to remit the matter back to the law society. sur les dépens. je conviens également qu’il n’y a pas lieu de renvoyer l’affaire au barreau. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. (dissent- les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe ing) — i. introduction (dissidents) — i. introduction [175] we have read the reasons of our colleague justice moldaver and agree with him on a number of key issues. we agree that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review: moldaver j.’s reasons (mr), at paras 43-57. we also agree that the simple fact that a lawyer’s behavior occurs in the courtroom does not deprive the law society of upper canada of its legitimate role in regulating the profession nor does it justify heightened judicial scrutiny: mr, at paras 53-56. lastly, we agree that, in articulat- ing a standard of professional misconduct, the law society appeal panel reasonably set out a contextual approach which will vary according to the particu- lar factual matrix in which it is applied: mr, at paras 77-80. [176] however, we disagree with justice moldaver’s disposition in this appeal. in our view, the appeal panel’s decision was reasonable. the panel set out an approach for assessing whether mr. groia had committed professional misconduct and faithfully applied it. its analysis was cogent, logical, trans- parent, and grounded in the evidence. its decision achieved a reasonable balance of its statutory objec- tives and an advocate’s freedom of expression. there is no basis to interfere. [175] nous avons lu les motifs de notre collègue le juge moldaver et nous sommes d’accord avec lui sur un bon nombre de points importants. nous convenons que la norme de contrôle applicable en l’espèce est celle de la décision raisonnable : motifs du juge moldaver, par 43-57. nous convenons éga- lement que le fait que le comportement d’un avocat se manifeste en salle d’audience n’a pour effet ni de priver le barreau du haut- canada de son rôle légitime consistant à réglementer la profession ni de justifi er un resserrement de l’examen judiciaire à ef- fectuer : motifs du juge moldaver, par 53-56. enfi n, nous convenons que, dans sa formulation de la norme applicable aux cas de manquements professionnels, le comité d’appel du barreau a su raisonnablement adopter une méthode contextuelle appelée à s’adap- ter au fondement factuel auquel elle s’applique : motifs du juge moldaver, par 77-80. [176] toutefois, nous ne souscrivons pas à l’opi- nion du juge moldaver quant à la façon de disposer du présent pourvoi. nous croyons que la décision du comité d’appel était raisonnable. en effet, il a énoncé une méthode pour évaluer si m. groia avait commis un manquement professionnel et il l’a fi dèlement sui- vie. il a procédé à une analyse convaincante, logique, transparente et fondée sur la preuve. sa décision représentait une mise en balance raisonnable des objectifs de sa loi habilitante et de la liberté d’ex- pression des avocats. rien ne justifi e de modifi er cette décision. [177] we also have a number of concerns about justice moldaver’s application of the reasonableness standard. respectfully, we are of the view that he fun- damentally misstates the appeal panel’s approach to professional misconduct, and reweighs the evidence to reach a different result. this is inconsistent with [177] de plus, nous avons quelques préoccupa- tions quant à la façon dont notre collègue applique la norme de la décision raisonnable. soit dit avec res- pect, nous sommes d’avis que son interprétation de la méthode établie par le comité d’appel en matière de manquement professionnel est fondamentalement [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 847 reasonableness review as it substitutes this court’s judgment for that of the legislature’s chosen decision maker. further, we have serious concerns about the impacts that will follow from our colleague’s analy- sis and disposition in this appeal. erronée, et qu’il soupèse à nouveau la preuve afi n d’arriver à un résultat différent. une telle façon de faire est incompatible avec l’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable puisqu’elle substitue la décision de la cour à celle du décideur choisi par le législateur. en outre, nous avons de sérieuses inquié- tudes au sujet des conséquences qu’auront l’analyse de notre collègue et sa conclusion en l’espèce. ii analysis ii analyse a the reasonableness standard a la norme de la décision raisonnable [178] judicial review upholds the rule of law and legislative supremacy: dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, at para 30. in most instances, both principles can be sustained by deferring to the legislature’s delegated decision maker: ibid., at para 49. such deference recognizes that delegated authorities will have greater expertise in matters under their scope of authority and are better situated than courts to choose from among the range of reasonable outcomes: ibid. [179] where, as here, the standard of review analy- sis leads to the application of reasonableness, defer- ence is not optional. in dunsmuir, this court defi ned reasonableness as concerned “mostly with the exist- ence of justifi cation, transparency and intelligibil- ity within the decision- making process” and “with whether the decision falls within a range of possi- ble, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in re- spect of the facts and law”: para 47. on one hand, reasonableness is a threshold that decision makers must satisfy with regard “both to the process of ar- ticulating the reasons and to outcomes”: ibid. on the other hand, reasonableness prescribes a method of review that requires courts to begin their analysis with “respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered”: para. 48, quoting d. dyz- enhaus, “the politics of deference: judicial review and democracy” in m. taggart, ed., the province of administrative law (1997), 279, at p 286. [178] le contrôle judiciaire contribue au respect de la primauté du droit et de la suprématie législa- tive : dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, par 30. dans la plupart des cas, il est possible de respecter ces deux principes en faisant preuve de déférence à l’endroit des décideurs investis de pouvoirs délégués par le législateur : ibid., par 49. ce faisant, on reconnaît que ces décideurs disposent d’une plus grande expertise que les cours de justice à l’égard de questions qui relèvent de leur com- pétence et qu’ils sont plus à même qu’elles de choisir parmi toutes les issues raisonnables possibles : ibid. [179] dans les cas où, comme en l’espèce, l’ana- lyse relative à la norme de contrôle mène à l’applica- tion de celle de la décision raisonnable, la déférence n’est pas une option. dans l’arrêt dunsmuir, la cour a statué que le caractère raisonnable tenait « princi- palement à la justifi cation de la décision, à la trans- parence et à l’intelligibilité du processus décisionnel, ainsi qu’à l’appartenance de la décision aux issues possibles acceptables pouvant se justifi er au regard des faits et du droit » : par 47. d’une part, le carac- tère raisonnable constitue un seuil suivant lequel il est essentiel qu’à la fois « la décision et sa justifi - cation possèdent les attributs de la raisonnabilité » : ibid. d’autre part, l’analyse du caractère raisonnable prescrit une méthode de contrôle qui exige des cours qu’elles entament leur analyse en prêtant « une at- tention respectueuse aux motifs donnés ou qui pour- raient être donnés à l’appui d’une décision » : par. 48, citant d. dyzenhaus, « the politics of deference : judicial review and democracy » dans m. taggart, dir., the province of administrative law (1997), 279, p 286. 848 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. in applying the reasonableness standard, [180] deference bars a reviewing court from conducting an exacting criticism of a decision in order to reach the result that the decision was unreasonable: law society of new brunswick v. ryan, 2003 scc 20, [2003] 1 scr 247, at para 56. it follows that a reviewing court also cannot supplement the decision maker’s reasoning for the purpose of undermining it. neither may a reviewing court reweigh evidence or contextual factors considered by the decision maker: canada (citizenship and immigration) v. khosa, 2009 scc 12, [2009] 1 scr 339, at para. 61; dr. q v. college of physicians and surgeons of british columbia, 2003 scc 19, [2003] 1 scr 226, at para. 41; british columbia (workers’ compensation appeal tribunal) v. fraser health authority, 2016 scc 25, [2016] 1 scr 587, at para. 38; suresh v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), 2002 scc 1, [2002] 1 scr 3, at para. 29; lake v. canada (minister of justice), 2008 scc 23, [2008] 1 scr 761, at para 34. [181] fundamentally, reviewing courts cannot sim- ply “pay lip service to the concept of reasonable- ness review while in fact imposing their own view”: dunsmuir, at para 48. at all times, the starting point of reasonableness review is the reasons for the deci- sion under review. [180] suivant la norme de la décision raisonnable, les cours de révision doivent, par déférence, s’abste- nir de procéder à une analyse trop critique et détail- lée d’une décision dans le but de pouvoir conclure qu’elle est déraisonnable : barreau du nouveau- brunswick c. ryan, 2003 csc 20, [2003] 1 rcs. 247, par.  56 il s’ensuit qu’une cour de révision n’est pas autorisée à suppléer aux motifs d’un déci- deur pour ainsi miner sa décision, pas plus qu’elle n’est autorisée à soupeser à nouveau les éléments de preuve ou les facteurs contextuels pris en compte par le décideur : canada (citoyenneté et immigration) c. khosa, 2009 csc 12, [2009] 1 rcs 339, par. 61; dr q c. college of physicians and surgeons of brit- ish columbia, 2003 csc 19, [2003] 1 rcs 226, par. 41; colombie- britannique (workers’ compen- sation appeal tribunal) c. fraser health authority, 2016 csc 25, [2016] 1 rcs 587, par. 38; suresh c. canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immi- gration), 2002 csc 1, [2002] 1 rcs 3, par. 29; lake c. canada (ministre de la justice), 2008 csc 23, [2008] 1 rcs 761, par 34. [181] essentiellement, les cours de révision ne peuvent pas simplement « invoquer [pour la forme] la notion de raisonnabilité pour imposer dans les faits leurs propres vues » : dunsmuir, par 48. le contrôle d’une décision suivant la norme de la décision rai- sonnable doit toujours avoir comme point de départ les motifs de la décision. b the appeal panel’s decision was reasonable b la décision du comité d’appel était raisonnable [182] for the reasons that follow, we would fi nd that the appeal panel’s decision was reasonable. [182] pour les motifs qui suivent, nous conclurions que la décision du comité d’appel était raisonnable. (1) the appeal panel’s approach to civility and professional misconduct (1) la méthode du comité d’appel en matière de civilité et de manquement professionnel [183] the appeal panel started its analysis by ex- amining lawyers’ professional conduct obligations and the concept of civility. it reviewed the rules and the codes of conduct, as they appeared at the time of the felderhof trial as well as related commentary, and noted the need to balance a lawyer’s expres- sive rights with his or her professional obligations: 2013 onlsap 41 (ap reasons), at paras. 202-20 (canlii). the appeal panel also highlighted the [183] dès le début de son analyse, le comité d’ap- pel s’est penché sur les obligations déontologiques des avocats et sur le concept de civilité. il a passé en revue les règles et les codes de déontologie, dans leur version en vigueur au moment du procès dans l’af- faire felderhof, ainsi que les commentaires qui s’y rapportaient, et il a souligné la nécessité d’atteindre un juste équilibre entre le droit d’un avocat à la li- berté d’expression et les obligations professionnelles [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 849 impact of uncivil behaviour on the administration of justice: ap reasons, at paras 228-31. the panel noted that incivility is about more than “hurt feel- ings”; attacks on the integrity of one’s opponent risk disrupting a trial and risk rendering opposing counsel ineffective: para 230. [184] following its detailed analysis of the im- portance of civility in the legal profession, the ap- peal panel articulated its approach to determining when uncivil courtroom behaviour crosses the line. this approach is “fundamentally contextual and fact- specifi c” so as to take into account the trial context and avoid a chilling effect on zealous advocacy: ap. reasons, at para 232. all of the surrounding cir- cumstances must be considered. the appeal panel noted that the trial judge’s reaction, while relevant to an assessment of misconduct, is not determina- tive: para 225. [185] the appeal panel then narrowed its focus to the issue arising in mr. groia’s case, “the extent to which zealous defence counsel may impugn the integrity of opposing counsel and make allegations of prosecutorial misconduct”: para 234. the panel stated: in our view, it is professional misconduct to make alle- gations of prosecutorial misconduct or that impugn the integrity of opposing counsel unless they are both made in good faith and have a reasonable basis. a bona fi de belief is insuffi cient; it gives too much licence to irresponsible counsel with sincere but nevertheless unsupportable sus- picions of opposing counsel   . qui lui incombent : 2013 onlsap 41 (motifs du comité d’appel), par. 202-220 (canlii). le comité d’appel a également mis en évidence l’incidence des comportements incivils sur l’administration de la justice : motifs du comité d’appel, par 228-231. en outre, il a indiqué que l’incivilité va au- delà des simples [traduction] « sentiments blessés »; les attaques portées contre l’intégrité d’un adversaire sont de nature à compromettre un procès et à saper l’effi cacité de l’avocat de la partie adverse : par 230. [184] après avoir analysé de façon poussée l’im- portance de la civilité au sein de la profession ju- ridique, le comité d’appel a énoncé une méthode servant à déterminer à quel moment les comporte- ments incivils adoptés en salle d’audience dépassent les bornes. cette méthode [traduction] « repose essentiellement sur le contexte et sur les faits », de telle sorte qu’elle tient compte du contexte du procès sans avoir un effet paralysant sur la défense passion- née des droits : motifs du comité d’appel, par 232. toutes les circonstances pertinentes doivent être exa- minées. selon le comité d’appel, même si elle est pertinente, la réaction du juge de première instance n’est pas déterminante pour l’évaluation d’un man- quement : par 225. [185] le comité d’appel s’est ensuite penché plus particulièrement sur la question que soulevait le dos- sier de m. groia, soit [traduction] « la mesure dans laquelle un avocat de la défense passionné peut attaquer l’intégrité des avocats de la partie adverse et formuler des allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite » : par 234. le comité d’appel a affi rmé ce qui suit : [traduction] à notre avis, le fait de formuler des allé- gations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite ou des allégations qui attaquent l’intégrité de l’avocat de la partie adverse constitue un manquement professionnel, sauf si ces allégations sont formulées de bonne foi en plus d’avoir un fondement raisonnable. une croyance sincère n’est pas suffi sante. le contraire ouvrirait trop grande la porte aux avocats irresponsables qui ont des soupçons sincères, mais non fondés, au sujet de l’avocat de l’autre partie  . in addition, even when a lawyer honestly and rea- sonably believes that opposing counsel is engaging in qui plus est, même lorsqu’un avocat croit sincèrement et raisonnablement que l’avocat de la poursuite adopte 850 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. prosecutorial misconduct or professional misconduct more generally, she must avoid use of invective to raise the issue. that is, it is unprofessional to make submissions about op- posing counsel’s improper conduct, to paraphrase justice campbell, in a ‘repetitive stream of invective’ that attacks that counsel’s professional integrity. [paras. 235-36] [186] notably, the appeal panel determined that any allegations of professional misconduct or that impugn the integrity of opposing counsel must be made in good faith and with a reasonable basis. even where these two requirements are met, lawyers must be respectful and avoid the use of invective. the appeal panel was clear that any such allegations must be considered in context; the requirement to consider good faith and reasonableness are necessar- ily informed by the way the trial unfolded. [187] we agree with cronk ja, writing for the majority of the ontario court of appeal, that the “highly contextual and fact- specifi c nature of inci- vility necessarily requires affording the disciplinary body leeway in fashioning a test that is appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case”: 2016 onca 471, 131 or (3d) 1, at para 125. here, there is no doubt that it was open to the appeal panel to adopt the approach it did. the panel’s reasoning was nuanced and fl exible, responsive to the par- ticular factual matrix in which it is applied. this approach fl owed directly from the panel’s thorough consideration of the rules, related commentary, and the jurisprudence. the adaptability of this approach ensures that it will not sanction zealous advocacy. it ensures that the context in which the impugned conduct occurred will be adequately accounted for, from the trial judge’s reaction to the “dynamics, complexity and particular burdens and stakes of the trial”: ap reasons, at para 233. importantly, the panel noted that professional misconduct is about more than “mere rudeness” (para. 211); rather, the focus is on allegations of prosecutorial misconduct or une conduite répréhensible ou, de façon plus générale, commet un manquement professionnel, il doit éviter de soulever la question en invectivant son confrère. pour ainsi dire, c’est un manque de professionnalisme que de faire, au sujet d’un manquement de l’avocat de l’autre partie, des représentations qui prennent la forme, pour reprendre les propos du juge campbell, [traduction] « d’une suite ininterrompue d’invectives » minant l’inté- grité professionnelle de l’avocat en question. [par. 235- 236] [186] plus précisément, le comité d’appel a conclu que les allégations de manquement professionnel, tout comme celles attaquant l’intégrité de l’avocat de la partie adverse, doivent être faites de bonne foi et avoir un fondement raisonnable. qui plus est, même lorsque ces deux conditions sont remplies, les avocats doivent demeurer respectueux et éviter les injures. le comité d’appel s’est exprimé claire- ment : de telles allégations doivent être examinées en fonction de leur contexte; l’obligation de tenir compte de la bonne foi et du caractère raisonnable des allégations repose forcément sur la façon dont s’est déroulé le procès. [187] à l’instar de la juge cronk de la cour d’ap- pel de l’ontario qui a rédigé les motifs majoritaires, nous estimons que, [traduction] « compte tenu de la nature hautement contextuelle et factuelle des questions d’incivilité, il est essentiel d’accorder à l’organisme disciplinaire la marge de manœuvre né- cessaire à la conception d’un test qui saura répondre aux circonstances d’une affaire donnée  »  : 2016 onca 471, 131 or (3d) 1, par 125. en l’espèce, le comité d’appel pouvait certainement utiliser la mé- thode qu’il a choisie. son raisonnement était nuancé, souple et adapté au fondement factuel auquel il s’ap- pliquait. cette méthode découlait directement de son examen approfondi des règles, des commentaires à leur sujet, et de la jurisprudence. l’adaptabilité de la méthode lui permet d’éviter de punir la défense passionnée des droits. elle garantit également que le contexte de la conduite reprochée sera bien pris en considération, de la réaction du juge de première instance [traduction] « à la dynamique, à la com- plexité, ainsi qu’aux diffi cultés et aux enjeux propres au procès » : motifs du comité d’appel, par 233. il importe de noter que, selon le comité d’appel, le [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 851 that impugn the integrity of an opponent: paras. 210 and 235. [188] respectfully, we consider that justice moldaver reformulates the appeal panel’s approach to professional misconduct. while he acknowledges the appropriateness of its chosen contextual ap- proach, he effectively reframes the appeal panel’s approach as consisting of three factors: (1) what the lawyer said; (2) the manner in which it was said; and (3) the trial judge’s reaction (mr, at para 36). tellingly, while not found in the appeal panel’s rea- sons, this formulation closely resembles the tests urged by mr. groia and the dissenting judge of the ontario court of appeal, both of whom advocated a correctness standard of review. as noted above, the panel did not opt for such a restrictive framework and instead adopted a fact- specifi c and contextual approach for ascertaining professional misconduct: ap reasons, at paras. 7 and 232. manquement professionnel va au- delà de la « simple impolitesse » (par. 211); l’accent est plutôt mis sur les allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite et sur celles qui attaquent l’intégrité d’une partie adverse : motifs du comité d’appel, par. 210 et 235. [188] soit dit avec respect, nous estimons que notre collègue procède à une reformulation de la méthode adoptée par le comité d’appel en matière de manquement professionnel bien qu’il recon- naisse la justesse de la méthode contextuelle retenue par le comité d’appel, dans les faits, notre collègue redéfi nit cette méthode, la faisant reposer sur trois facteurs : (1) ce qu’a dit l’avocat; (2) la façon dont il l’a dit; et (3) la réaction du juge du procès : motifs du juge moldaver, par 36. fait révélateur, même si elle ne fi gure pas dans les motifs du comité d’ap- pel, cette formulation s’apparente grandement aux tests réclamés avec insistance par m. groia et par le juge dissident de la cour d’appel de l’ontario qui préconisaient tous deux l’utilisation de la norme de contrôle de la décision correcte. or, comme nous l’avons mentionné précédemment, pour juger de l’existence ou non d’un manquement professionnel, le comité d’appel a rejeté ce cadre strict au profi t d’une méthode qui repose sur les faits et le contexte : motifs du comité d’appel, par. 7 et 232. (2) the appeal panel’s assessment of the case (2) l’évaluation de la présente affaire par le co- mité d’appel [189] we turn now to the appeal panel’s applica- tion of its approach to the facts of this case. in our view, the appeal panel’s analysis of the felderhof trial was a faithful and reasonable application of the approach it outlined. [189] passons maintenant à la façon dont le comité d’appel a appliqué sa méthode aux faits de l’espèce. à notre avis, l’analyse qu’il a faite du procès dans l’affaire felderhof constituait une application fi dèle et raisonnable de cette méthode. (a) whether mr. groia had a reasonable basis a) l’existence d’un fondement raisonnable aux for his allegations allégations de m. groia [190] because the appeal panel did not have the benefi t of hearing mr. groia’s testimony, it assumed that mr. groia “held an honest belief in his allega- tions of prosecutorial misconduct”: para 238. on this basis the appeal panel assumed mr. groia was acting in good faith. the appeal panel clearly stated, however, that “it is professional misconduct to make [190] puisque le comité d’appel n’a pas eu l’oc- casion d’entendre le témoignage de m. groia, il a présumé que ce dernier [traduction] « croyait hon- nêtement à ses allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite » : par 238. le comité d’appel a donc présumé que m. groia agissait de bonne foi. cependant, il a clairement affi rmé que 852 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. [such allegations]    unless they are both made in good faith and have a reasonable basis”: para. 235 (emphasis added). the appeal panel thus suggested that the law society can still consider the reasona- bleness of a lawyer’s allegations even where they are made in good faith, in that they arise from a mistaken but sincerely held belief. as such, the panel’s rea- sons focussed primarily on whether mr. groia had a “reasonable basis” for his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and his comments that impugned the integrity of his opponents. mr. groia argued that he had such a basis: ap reasons, at paras 239-40. the appeal panel disagreed. in our view, it was open to the appeal panel to do so. « de formuler de [telles allégations] constitue un manquement professionnel [  ] sauf si elles sont faites de bonne foi en plus d’avoir un fondement raisonnable » : par. 235 (nous soulignons). le co- mité d’appel a donc indiqué que le barreau peut se pencher sur le caractère raisonnable des allégations faites par un avocat, même si elles le sont de bonne foi, en ce sens qu’elles découlent d’une croyance sincère, bien qu’erronée. par conséquent, il a surtout concentré ses motifs sur la question de l’existence ou non d’un « fondement raisonnable », soit pour justifi er les allégations soulevées par m. groia de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite, soit pour justifi er ses commentaires at- taquant l’intégrité de ses adversaires. m. groia a fait valoir l’existence d’un tel fondement : motifs du comité d’appel, par 239-240. le comité d’appel n’était pas de cet avis. selon nous, le comité d’appel pouvait en arriver à cette conclusion. [191] the appeal panel’s reasons demonstrate that it considered both the factual and legal underpin- nings of mr. groia’s claims to determine whether they had a reasonable basis: [191] il ressort des motifs du comité d’appel que celui-ci a pris en considération les fondements, tant factuels que juridiques, des prétentions de m. groia pour évaluer si elles étaient raisonnablement fondées : our concern about the submissions quoted above is not merely that mr. groia was making incorrect legal submissions; that, of course, is not a basis for a fi nding of professional misconduct. our concern is that mr. groia appears to have been using those submissions as a platform to attack the prosecutors, and in particular to impugn their integrity, without a reasonable basis to do so. [traduction] notre préoccupation, en ce qui a trait aux prétentions rapportées ci- dessus, n’est pas seulement que m. groia a formulé des arguments juridiques erronés; cela ne saurait évidemment servir de fondement permet- tant de conclure à un manquement professionnel. nous sommes préoccupés par le fait que m. groia semble s’être servi de ces arguments comme tribune pour s’en prendre aux avocats de la poursuite, notamment en attaquant leur intégrité, sans fondement raisonnable.   .   . [mr. groia’s] submissions, in our view, directly attack the integrity of the prosecutors, by alleging that they can- not be relied upon to keep their ‘word’ and are lazy and incompetent   . further, they have no factual foundation. as a matter of the law of evidence that mr. groia ought to have known, mr. naster was perfectly entitled to object to mr. groia putting documents to a witness notwithstanding that the witness could not identify them and suggesting that they be marked as exhibits   . à notre avis, les observations [de m.  groia] s’en prennent directement à l’intégrité des avocats de la pour- suite, car elles avancent que ceux-ci, en plus de ne pas être fi ables pour ce qui est de tenir « parole », seraient pa- resseux et incompétents. [  ]. qui plus est, elles ne re- posent sur aucun fondement factuel. en vertu du droit de la preuve — que m. groia aurait dû connaître —, m.  naster avait parfaitement le droit tant de s’opposer à ce que m. groia porte des documents à l’attention d’un témoin même si celui-ci n’était en mesure de les identifi er que de proposer que ces documents soient inscrits en preuve.   .   . [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 853 in our review of the record, we could fi nd no evidentiary foundation for the allegations of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct at this point in the trial   . his submissions regarding the ‘conviction fi lter’ not only were wrong in law but did not have a reasonable basis. and again, these submissions amplifi ed and repeated comments made ear- lier in the trial, to the effect that the prosecutors were act- ing deliberately to make it impossible for mr. felderhof to get a fair trial. [emphasis added; paras. 280, 285 and 295.] [192] as the panel noted, being wrong on the law is itself not a basis for professional misconduct in most situations: para 280. however, it is clear from the passages cited above that the appeal panel was concerned with more than just whether mr. groia’s legal submissions were correct or not. errors of law may be so egregious that submissions based on those errors have no “reasonable basis”. put another way, allegations — made in good faith — may constitute professional misconduct if they have no reasonable legal basis. [193] in our view, it was open to the panel to con- sider both the factual and legal bases for the allega- tions at issue. the appeal panel’s mandate permits it to determine “any question of fact or law that arises in a proceeding before it”: law society act, rso 1990, c. l.8, s 4935(1). indeed, the law society rules govern civility and competence: rules of professional conduct (2000), rule  2.01 (now rule 31). one rule that mr. groia was accused of having breached prohibits “ill- considered or unin- formed criticism of the competence, conduct, ad- vice, or charges of other legal practitioners”: rules of professional conduct (2000), rule 6.03(1) com- mentary; see ap reasons, at paras. 203 and 208. this standard can only be applied with some reference to the basic legal information a responsible lawyer is expected to possess or seek out before criticizing another lawyer’s professional conduct. the appeal panel’s choice to require a reasonable basis for the notre examen du dossier n’a relevé dans la preuve au- cun fondement aux allégations de conduite répréhensible délibérée de la part des avocats de la poursuite à cette étape-ci du procès. [  ]. non seulement [l]es observations [de m. groia] au sujet d’un « fi ltre axé sur une condam- nation » étaient- elles erronées en droit, mais elles étaient dépourvues de tout fondement raisonnable. encore une fois, ces arguments ont amplifi é et répété les commen- taires déjà formulés pendant le procès selon lesquels les avocats de la poursuite agissaient délibérément pour que m. felderhof ne puisse avoir un procès équitable. [nous soulignons; par. 280, 285 et 295.] [192] comme l’a souligné le comité d’appel, dans la plupart des cas, le fait d’avoir tort quant au droit applicable ne constitue pas, en soi, le fondement d’un manquement professionnel : par 280. toutefois, les passages cités précédemment illustrent clairement que les préoccupations du comité d’appel ne se li- mitaient pas à la question de savoir si les arguments juridiques de m. groia étaient justes ou non. des erreurs de droit peuvent être si manifestes que les représentations qui reposent sur ces erreurs n’ont aucun « fondement raisonnable ». autrement dit, des allégations, même si elles sont faites de bonne foi, peuvent constituer un manquement profession- nel si elles sont dépourvues de fondement juridique raisonnable. [193] à notre avis, le comité d’appel était autorisé à examiner tant le fondement factuel que le fonde- ment juridique des allégations en cause la por- tée de son mandat lui permet de « décider de toute question de fait ou de droit qui est soulevée dans une instance introduite devant [lui] » : loi sur le barreau, lro 1990, c l8, par 4935(1). en effet, les règles du barreau régissent à la fois les questions de civilité et celles de compétence : code de déon- tologie (2000), règle 2.01 (maintenant la règle 31). l’une des règles que m. groia était accusé d’avoir enfreinte interdit à tout avocat de « critiquer à la légère la compétence, le comportement, les conseils ou les honoraires des autres praticiens juridiques » : ibid., règle 6.03(1), commentaires; voir les motifs du comité d’appel, par. 203 et 208. pour appliquer cette règle, il faut se rapporter aux connaissances juridiques minimales qu’un avocat responsable de- vrait normalement posséder ou chercher à acquérir 854 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. submissions indicates its intention to weed out egre- gious mistakes of law. [194] as such, the panel was entitled to consider whether there is a reasonable basis for the allega- tions where a lawyer alleges prosecutorial miscon- duct or impugns the integrity of opposing counsel. “reasonableness”, as opposed to “good faith”, im- plies consideration of whether the allegations, ob- jectively, had a legal or factual basis. this approach simply permits the appeal panel to consider, as a whole, the reasonableness of allegations that raise prosecutorial misconduct or impugn the integrity of opposing counsel, within the context of the proceed- ings. this is justifi ed by the serious consequences that irresponsible attacks can have on opposing coun- sel’s reputation as well as the public perception of the justice system. [195] following the appeal panel’s review of the evidence, the panel concluded that there was no reasonable basis (in fact or in law) for mr. groia’s al- legations against the ontario securities commission (osc) prosecutors. it held that there was “no founda- tion” for mr. groia’s allegations, and that there was nothing “to suggest that either the osc or the pros- ecutors were dishonest or intentionally attempting to subvert the defence” or that the prosecutors were “too busy or lazy to comply with their obligations”: paras. 266, 269, 304 and 306. while the prosecutor’s actions “may well have formed the basis for an ag- gressive attack on the crown’s case”, “they did not provide a reasonable basis for repeated allegations of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct”: ap reasons, at para 323. avant d’attaquer la conduite professionnelle d’un confrère. en décidant d’exiger que les allégations doivent être raisonnablement fondées, le comité d’appel témoigne de son intention d’écarter les cas d’erreurs de droit manifestes. [194] par conséquent, le comité d’appel était en droit de se demander s’il existait un fondement rai- sonnable aux allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite ou à celles par lesquelles m. groia attaquait l’intégrité des avocats de la partie adverse. dans l’examen du « caractère raisonnable » d’allégations, contrairement à celui de la « bonne foi » de la personne qui les formule, il faut se demander si les allégations avaient, de fa- çon objective, un fondement juridique ou factuel. cette approche permet simplement au comité d’ap- pel d’examiner, dans son ensemble, le caractère rai- sonnable des allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite ou de celles qui attaquent leur intégrité, dans le contexte de l’ins- tance. il est justifi é de procéder de la sorte compte tenu des graves conséquences que peuvent avoir des attaques irresponsables sur la réputation des avocats de la partie adverse ainsi que sur la perception qu’a le public du système de justice. [195] au terme de son examen de la preuve, le co- mité d’appel a conclu que les allégations de m. groia à l’égard des avocats de la commission des valeurs mobilières de l’ontario (cvmo) n’avaient aucun fondement raisonnable, qu’il soit juridique ou fac- tuel. il a conclu que ces allégations n’étaient [tra- duction] « pas fondées », et que « rien ne permettait de conclure que la cvmo ou les avocats de la pour- suite avaient été malhonnêtes ou avaient volontaire- ment tenté de saboter la défense » ou encore qu’ils étaient « trop occupés ou paresseux pour se confor- mer aux obligations qui leur incombaient » : par. 266, 269, 304 et 306. même si la conduite des avocats de la poursuite [traduction] « aurait bien pu jus- tifi er une attaque virulente de la cause du ministère public », elle « ne constituait pas un fondement rai- sonnable aux allégations répétées de conduite ré- préhensible délibérée de la part des avocats de la poursuite » : motifs du comité d’appel, par 323. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 855 [196] these conclusions were open to the appeal panel. they fl owed directly from the appeal panel’s thorough consideration of the evidence. the panel “reviewed mr. groia’s remarks in their context, often by relying on mr. groia’s own explanations in the course of the hearing panel proceeding” and gave mr. groia the benefi t of the doubt whenever possible: para 241. it considered the conduct of the prosecu- tors to determine whether mr. groia’s allegations had a basis in the record: see, eg, paras. 256-58, 268-69, 276, 285, 288, 295-96, 298, 300-305, 312, 314, 316 and 325. however, despite this balanced review of the evidence, the panel found that “[n]othing the prosecutors did justifi ed [mr. groia’s] onslaught”: para 322. in our view, it was open to the appeal panel to conclude there was no reasonable basis in fact or in law for mr. groia’s allegations of prosecu- torial misconduct and his comments that impugned the integrity of his opponents. [197] justice moldaver takes a different view of the appeal panel’s reasoning respecting the “reason- able basis” requirement. he suggests that the appeal panel determined that a lawyer’s bona fi de legal mistakes can never ground a fi nding of professional misconduct: paras 126-27. he therefore concludes that mr. groia’s good- faith (though mistaken) belief that the osc prosecutors’ actions were contrary to law in part “provided the reasonable basis for his allegations”: para. 138 (emphasis in original). respectfully, we are of the view that a reviewing court should give effect to the appeal panel’s deci- sion to adopt an approach with both subjective and objective considerations (ie to require “good faith” and a “reasonable basis”). we would not collapse the distinction between these criteria by restricting the appeal panel’s ability to assess the reasonableness of legal submissions to determining whether the lawyer was acting in good faith. [196] le comité d’appel était autorisé à tirer ces conclusions. ces dernières découlaient directement de son examen approfondi de la preuve. en effet, le comité [traduction] « a examiné les propos de m. groia en contexte, s’appuyant souvent sur les explications données par ce dernier au cours des procédures devant le comité d’audition », et il lui a donné le bénéfi ce du doute dans la mesure du pos- sible : par 241. il a aussi tenu compte de la conduite des avocats de la poursuite afi n de décider si, au re- gard du dossier, les allégations de m. groia étaient fondées : voir, p ex, par 256-258, 268-269, 276, 285, 288, 295-296, 298, 300-305, 312, 314, 316 et 325. or, malgré cet exercice équilibré d’examen de la preuve, le comité d’appel a conclu que [traduc- tion] « [l]es actions des avocats de la poursuite ne justifi aient aucunement les attaques de [m. groia] » : par 322. à notre avis, le comité d’appel pouvait conclure à l’absence de fondement raisonnable — qu’il soit factuel ou juridique — pour justifi er les allégations soulevées par m. groia de conduite ré- préhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite ou ses commentaires attaquant l’intégrité de ses adver- saires. [197] le juge moldaver perçoit différemment le raisonnement du comité d’appel en ce qui concerne l’exigence d’un « fondement raisonnable ». selon lui, le comité d’appel a conclu que les erreurs de droit commises de bonne foi par un avocat ne permettent, en aucun cas, de fonder une conclusion de manque- ment professionnel : par 126-127. par conséquent, à son avis, le fait que m. groia croyait sincèrement, quoiqu’erronément, à l’illégalité des actions des avo- cats de la cvmo « constitu[ait] [en partie] le fonde- ment raisonnable [de ses] allégations » : par. 138 (en italique dans l’original). avec égards, nous croyons que les cours de révision devraient donner effet à la décision du comité d’appel d’adopter une mé- thode fondée sur des considérations tant subjectives qu’objectives (c-à-d exiger « la bonne foi » et un « fondement raisonnable »). en outre, à notre avis, il faut se garder d’amalgamer ces critères en limitant le pouvoir du comité d’appel d’évaluer le caractère raisonnable d’arguments juridiques pour décider si l’avocat en cause agissait de bonne foi. 856 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. [198] the majority’s approach effectively creates a novel mistake of law defence: a lawyer will have a “reasonable basis” for allegations of misconduct anytime his beliefs as to the law — if they were correct — would create such a basis. this makes the “reasonable basis” requirement dependent on the subjective legal beliefs of the lawyer. as such, any accusations grounded in an honestly held legal belief will be immune from law society sanction, irrespective of how baseless that legal belief is. [199] however, the appeal panel explicitly re- jected the idea that whenever a lawyer’s accusations are based on an honestly held belief in the law, they necessarily have a “reasonable basis”. as discussed above, the panel was of the view that allegations must have a reasonable legal basis to be justifi able, and this inquiry should not focus solely on the sub- jective beliefs of the lawyer. it is not a respectful reading of the appeal panel’s reasons to articulate a novel test for professional misconduct, then fault the panel for failing to apply it. it was open to the appeal panel to hold that a lawyer who erroneously alleges prosecutorial misconduct or impugns the integrity of opposing counsel should not be shielded from professional sanction because of his or her own incompetence. [200] justice moldaver also takes issue with the appeal panel’s fi nding that mr. groia had no rea- sonable factual basis for his accusations. the appeal panel’s decision respecting mr. groia was based in part on its conclusion that it is professional mis- conduct to make allegations that “impugn the in- tegrity of opposing counsel” without a reasonable basis to do so: paras. 235, 320 and 324. the panel found that mr. groia “repeatedly cast aspersions” on mr. naster, accusing him of reneging on prom- ises when mr. naster contested the admissibility of certain documents: paras. 297, 299 and 319-20. the panel determined, however, that these allegations had no factual basis: [198] en réalité, l’approche adoptée par les juges majoritaires revient à créer une nouvelle défense fondée sur une erreur de droit : un avocat serait « rai- sonnablement fondé » à formuler des allégations de manquement dès lors que ses croyances juridiques, si elles s’avéraient, créeraient un tel fondement. ainsi, l’exigence d’un « fondement raisonnable » serait tributaire des croyances juridiques subjectives de l’avocat, et quiconque porterait des accusations sur la foi d’une croyance juridique sincère ne pourrait être puni par le barreau, et ce, même si cette croyance se révélait dénuée de fondement. [199] pourtant, le comité d’appel a explicitement rejeté l’idée selon laquelle les accusations portées par un avocat sur la foi d’une croyance juridique sincère ont nécessairement un « fondement raisonnable ». comme nous l’avons mentionné, le comité d’appel était d’avis que, pour être justifi ables, les allégations doivent avoir un fondement juridique raisonnable, et un tel examen ne devrait pas se limiter aux croyances personnelles de l’avocat. à notre avis, ce n’est pas faire preuve de la déférence voulue que de formuler un nouveau test en matière de manquement profes- sionnel et d’ensuite reprocher au comité de ne pas s’y être tenu. le comité d’appel pouvait conclure qu’un avocat qui allègue erronément la conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite ou qui porte atteinte à l’intégrité des avocats de la partie adverse ne peut pas être à l’abri d’une sanction professionnelle en raison de son incompétence. [200] notre collègue s’inscrit également en faux contre la conclusion du comité d’appel selon laquelle les accusations de m. groia n’avaient pas de fonde- ment factuel. le comité d’appel a fondé sa décision concernant m.  groia en partie sur sa conclusion voulant que le fait de formuler des allégations pour [traduction] « attaque[r] l’intégrité de l’avocat de la partie adverse » sans fondement raisonnable constitue un manquement professionnel : par. 235, 320 et 324. de l’avis du comité d’appel, m. groia « a dénigré à répétition » m. naster et l’a accusé de manquer à ses promesses lorsque celui-ci a contesté l’admissibilité de certains documents : par. 297, 299 et 319-320. or, le comité d’appel a conclu que ces allégations n’étaient pas fondées dans les faits : [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 857   . mr. groia had no reasonable basis on which to attack either the integrity of the prosecutors or their mo- tives. the prosecutors had not promised that they would introduce all relevant documents, regardless of the rules of evidence. they were under no obligation to call evi- dence favourable to the defence. they had not resiled from their promises. their positions on evidentiary issues were not improper and were often correct. [emphasis added; para 324] [201] justice moldaver states that it was “not reasonably open” to the appeal panel to fi nd that mr. groia’s allegations lacked a reasonable factual basis: mr, at para 134. this, according to his anal- ysis, is because the panel should have appreciated how mr. groia’s legal mistakes “coloured his un- derstanding of the facts”: mr, at para 135. with respect, the appeal panel was entitled to make the fi ndings of fact it made. reasonableness review of a decision requires deferential consideration of the ra- tionales of the decision maker. [traduction]   . m. groia n’avait aucun fondement raisonnable lui permettant d’attaquer l’intégrité ou les motivations des avocats de la poursuite. ces derniers ne s’étaient pas engagés à déposer en preuve tous les docu- ments pertinents, indépendamment des règles de preuve applicables. rien ne les obligeait à présenter de la preuve favorable à l’accusé. ils ne sont pas revenus sur leurs pro- messes. la position de la poursuite à l’égard des questions de preuve n’était pas inappropriée et était même souvent juste. [nous soulignons; par 324] [201] selon notre collègue, le comité d’appel « ne pouvait pas raisonnablement » conclure que les al- légations de m. groia n’avaient pas de fondement factuel : motifs du juge moldaver, par 134. suivant son analyse, il en est ainsi puisque le comité d’appel aurait dû tenir compte du fait que les erreurs juri- diques de m. groia « ont teinté sa compréhension de la situation » : ibid., par 135. soit dit en tout respect, le comité d’appel était autorisé de tirer sa conclusion. le contrôle selon la norme de la décision raisonnable exige que les raisonnements du décideur soient examinés avec retenue. (b) the appeal panel’s weighing of the evidence b) l’examen de la preuve par le comité d’appel in determining whether mr. groia’s allega- [202] tions crossed the line into professional misconduct, the appeal panel applied its expertise and decided how to assess the evidence as a whole. [203] the appeal panel focussed, for example, on the disrespectful manner in which mr. groia made his allegations: paras. 290, 299 and 328. the panel noted mr. groia’s sarcastic use of the word “government” to describe the osc’s lawyers. the panel found that it was wrong to use the term “as a way of casting aspersions on opposing counsel without a reasonable basis”: para 286. the panel also highlighted numer- ous instances in which mr. groia directly attacked the integrity of his opponents in a harsh and cutting way. on the issue of the admission of documents, mr. groia repeatedly commented that he could not enter a document “because the government isn’t prepared to stand by its representations to this court” and because the prosecutors “don’t live up to their promises”: ap reasons, at para 299. mr. groia also [202] afi n de décider si les allégations de m. groia dépassaient les bornes et constituaient un manque- ment professionnel, le comité d’appel a usé de son expertise et déterminé comment il allait apprécier la preuve dans son ensemble. [203] le comité d’appel s’est intéressé, par exem- ple, au manque de respect dont m. groia a fait preuve en formulant ses allégations : par. 290, 299 et 328. il a souligné le ton sarcastique avec lequel m. groia avait parlé du [traduction] « gouvernement » pour décrire les avocats de la cvmo. le comité a conclu qu’il était incorrect d’utiliser ce terme de manière à « dénigrer sans fondement raisonnable les avo- cats de la partie adverse » : par 286. il a aussi sou- ligné les nombreuses occasions où m. groia s’en est pris directement à l’intégrité de ses adversaires de façon sévère et blessante. s’agissant de l’admis- sion des documents en preuve, m. groia a maintes fois fait valoir qu’il ne pouvait déposer un docu- ment « parce que le gouvernement n’est pas prêt à honorer les déclarations qu’il a faites à la cour » et 858 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. remarked: “my friend doesn’t like the fact that he is being held to statements he made in open court. i am sorry. he made those submissions” and asked the judge: “is my friend ever going to explain to this court, or god forbid, ever apologize to this court for the government’s conduct in this case?”(ibid.) when arguing about the admissibility of a national post article, mr. groia said: “i am heartened to see that your honour is no more able to get a straight answer out of the prosecutor than the defence has been” (para 311). [204] the appeal panel also placed signifi cant weight on the cumulative impact of mr. groia’s com- ments: para 318. mr. groia’s comments built on one another throughout the course of the felderhof trial, and the panel therefore found it necessary to measure their cumulative effects rather than considering each in isolation: paras. 285 and 319. [205] following its consideration of the evidence as a whole, the appeal panel concluded that mr. groia had engaged in professional misconduct. while the appeal panel noted that certain of mr. groia’s com- ments did not cross the line into professional miscon- duct, it concluded that his conduct, when considered cumulatively, can “best be described as a relentless personal attack on the integrity and the bona fi des of the prosecutors”: paras. 252, 270, 280, 317 and 318. the panel also determined that mr. groia’s behav- iour had a negative impact on the trial and on the ad- ministration of justice: paras. 313 and 332. in light of all of the facts at play, the panel concluded that mr. groia’s allegations crossed the line and war- ranted sanction. parce que les avocats de la poursuite « ne respectent pas leurs promesses » : motifs du comité d’appel, par 299. m. groia a également affi rmé que : « mon ami n’apprécie pas qu’on le tienne aux déclarations qu’il a faites devant la cour. je suis navré. il a tenu ces propos ». il a ensuite demandé au juge : « à quand une explication ou — que dieu nous en pro- tège! — des excuses à la cour de la part de mon ami pour la conduite du gouvernement dans la présente affaire? » : ibid. dans ses représentations sur l’ad- missibilité d’un article du national post, m. groia s’est exclamé : « je me réjouis de constater que vous, votre honneur, n’êtes guère plus en mesure d’obtenir une réponse claire de l’avocat de la poursuite que ne l’a été la défense » : par 311. [204] le comité d’appel a aussi accordé beaucoup d’importance à l’effet cumulatif des commentaires de m. groia : par 318. ces commentaires s’addi- tionnaient au fur et à mesure qu’avançait le procès dans l’affaire felderhof, et c’est pourquoi le comité d’appel a jugé nécessaire d’en apprécier l’effet cu- mulatif plutôt que d’évaluer chaque commentaire séparément : par. 285 et 319. [205] après avoir examiné la preuve dans son en- semble, le comité d’appel a conclu que m. groia avait commis un manquement professionnel. même s’il a souligné que certains des commentaires de m. groia ne pouvaient être qualifi és de manquement professionnel, le comité d’appel a conclu que ses agissements, par leur effet cumulatif, pouvaient être [traduction] « décrits comme une attaque person- nelle et sans relâche menée contre l’intégrité et la bonne foi des avocats de la poursuite » : par. 252, 270, 280 et 317-318. le comité d’appel a également statué que le comportement de m. groia avait eu une incidence négative sur le procès et sur l’administra- tion de la justice : par. 313 et 332. à la lumière de tous les faits en cause, le comité d’appel a conclu que les allégations de m. groia dépassaient les bornes et devaient entraîner des sanctions. [206] in our view, it was open to the panel to weigh the evidence in the way it did. its fi ndings regard- ing the disrespectful way that mr. groia made his allegations were amply supported by the record, as were its conclusions on the cumulative effects of his [206] à notre avis, le comité d’appel pouvait soupeser la preuve comme il l’a fait. ses conclusions quant au manque de respect de m. groia dans la formulation de ses allégations, tout comme celles sur l’effet cumulatif de sa conduite, étaient amplement [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 859 conduct. ultimately, the reasons support the appeal panel’s conclusion that mr.  groia was engaged in professional misconduct: canada (director of investigation and research) v. southam inc., [1997] 1 scr 748, at para. 56; ryan, at para 47. both the evidentiary foundation and the logic of the reasons were sound: ibid. the decision is justifi able, intelli- gible, and transparent and falls within the range of reasonable outcomes: dunsmuir, at para 47. étayées par le dossier. en défi nitive, les motifs ap- puient la conclusion du comité d’appel selon laquelle m. groia a commis un manquement professionnel : canada (directeur des enquêtes et recherches) c. southam inc., [1997] 1 rcs 748, par. 56; ryan, par 47. tant le raisonnement derrière les motifs que la preuve qui les sous- tend étaient valables : ibid. il s’agit d’une décision justifi able, intelligible et transparente qui appartient aux issues raisonnables : dunsmuir, par 47. [207] justice moldaver takes issue with the way that the appeal panel weighed the evidence before it. he would reduce the weight assigned to the man- ner and effects of mr. groia’s comments because the state of the law regarding abuse of process was uncertain at the time of the felderhof trial: mr, at para 143. [207] notre collègue dénonce l’examen de la preuve faite par le comité d’appel. il réduirait l’im- portance accordée à la manière dont m.  groia a formulé ses commentaires et aux effets de ceux-ci, au motif que l’état du droit en matière d’abus de pro- cédure était incertain au moment du procès dans l’af- faire felderhof : motifs du juge moldaver, par 143. [208] we cannot agree that the appeal panel was unreasonable in failing to take such an approach. most notably, mr. groia never raised the unsettled state of the law regarding abuse of process before the appeal panel: see ap reasons, at para 239. to crit- icize the appeal panel’s reasons for failing to con- sider an argument never raised before it has no basis in reasonableness review. adding another matter that the appeal panel ought to have considered is a means of reweighing of evidence, which is inappropriate on deferential review: suresh, at para 29. [209] furthermore, whatever uncertainty there was regarding the timing of when abuse of process allega- tions should be made, there was no uncertainty about the underlying rules of professional ethics and law of evidence upon which mr. groia had launched his volleys of ill- considered attacks. [208] nous ne pouvons convenir qu’il était dérai- sonnable que le comité d’appel n’adopte pas cette approche. plus particulièrement, m. groia n’a jamais soulevé devant le comité d’appel la question de l’in- certitude entourant l’état du droit en matière d’abus de procédure : motifs du comité d’appel, par 239. reprocher au comité d’appel de ne pas avoir tenu compte d’un argument qu’on ne lui a jamais présenté n’est pas justifi é dans le cadre d’un contrôle effectué selon la norme de la décision raisonnable. en outre, le fait d’ajouter un élément à la liste de ceux que le comité d’appel devait prendre en considération revient à soupeser à nouveau la preuve, ce qui est inapproprié compte tenu de la déférence dont doit être empreint un tel contrôle : suresh, par 29. [209] qui plus est, même s’il régnait une quel- conque incertitude quant au moment où les alléga- tions d’abus de procédure devaient être faites, les règles sous- jacentes en matière de déontologie et de droit de la preuve sur la base desquelles m. groia a lancé sa salve d’attaques irréfl échies étaient sans équivoque. [210] justice moldaver also places significant weight on the trial judge’s reticence to intervene when mr. groia made his allegations: mr, at pa- ras. 136, 148–54 and 157. however, the appeal panel paid close attention to the interventions that the trial [210] notre collègue accorde également une grande importance au fait que le juge du procès était réticent à intervenir lorsque m. groia a formulé ses allégations : motifs du juge moldaver, par. 136, 148- 154 et 157. le comité d’appel a pourtant examiné 860 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. judge made in the course of the proceedings but noted that a trial judge’s interventions are not a deter- minative consideration: paras. 53-56, 76-77, 86-88, 90-91, 103, 263, 269, 272 and 281. the panel was entitled to determine that other factors warranted more weight in the circumstances of this case. [211] in the same vein, justice moldaver would also discount the manner in which mr. groia made his allegations on the basis that the trial judge had not intervened: mr, at para 157. in our view, the appeal panel was entitled to place substantial weight on mr. groia’s use of unnecessary invective: ap. reasons, at paras. 236 and 328. [212] justice moldaver uses the trial judge’s lack of intervention in respect of mr. groia’s legal errors as an indication that the panel was unreasonable in concluding that mr. groia’s allegations lacked a factual foundation: mr, at paras. 136 and 153. with respect, we consider that it is within the panel’s statutory responsibility to assess the reasonableness of lawyers’ submissions. the fact that the trial judge did not tell mr. groia that he was wrong in law did not require the panel to fi nd that his submissions were reasonable. [213] thus we cannot agree with justice moldaver’s application of the reasonableness standard. in our view, he misstates the appeal panel’s approach and reweighs the evidence in order to reach a different result. our colleague may have preferred choices other than those made by the appeal panel. however, that is no basis to intervene on judicial review and rebalance the scales. in reasonableness review, courts must resist the temptation to come to a conclusion different than the tribunal’s, particularly where there is a logical and evidentiary underpinning for the tribunal’s conclusions: southam, at paras 79-80. avec soin les interventions faites par le juge pen- dant les procédures, mais a souligné que celles-ci ne constituaient pas un facteur déterminant : par. 53-56, 76-77, 86-88, 90-91, 103, 263, 269, 272 et 281. le comité d’appel était en droit de conclure que, compte tenu des circonstances de l’espèce, il fallait accorder plus d’importance à d’autres facteurs. [211] dans le même ordre d’idées, notre collègue ne tiendrait pas compte de la manière dont m. groia a formulé ses allégations, au motif que le juge du procès n’est pas intervenu : motifs du juge moldaver, par 157. à notre avis, au contraire, le comité d’ap- pel était autorisé à accorder une grande importance à l’utilisation d’injures injustifi ées par m. groia : motifs du comité d’appel, par. 236 et 328. [212] pour notre collègue, le silence du juge du procès à l’égard des erreurs de droit de m. groia est une indication du caractère déraisonnable de la conclusion du comité d’appel selon laquelle les al- légations de m. groia étaient dépourvues de fon- dement factuel : motifs du juge moldaver, par. 136 et 153. soit dit en tout respect, nous croyons que le comité d’appel a le mandat d’évaluer le caractère rai- sonnable des prétentions que font valoir les avocats et qu’il n’était pas tenu de conclure que les préten- tions de m. groia étaient raisonnables du simple fait que le juge de première instance ne lui a pas indiqué que ses allégations étaient mal fondées en droit. [213] en conséquence, nous ne pouvons souscrire à la façon dont notre collègue a appliqué la norme de la décision raisonnable. à notre avis, son interpré- tation de la méthode adoptée par le comité d’appel est erronée et il soupèse à nouveau la preuve afi n d’arriver à un résultat différent. il est bien possible que notre collègue ait préféré que le comité d’appel rende une décision différente, mais cela ne justifi e pas qu’il intervienne en contrôle judiciaire et qu’il substitue sa décision à celle du comité. la cour qui procède à un contrôle selon la norme de la décision raisonnable doit résister à la tentation de tirer une conclusion différente de celle d’un décideur, surtout lorsque cette dernière n’est pas dénuée de logique ou de fondement dans la preuve : southam, par 79-80. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 861 (3) conclusion on the reasonableness of the ap- (3) conclusion quant au caractère raisonnable de peal panel’s decision la décision du comité d’appel [214] for over 200 years, the legislature has del- egated to the law society the authority to deter- mine both the rules of professional conduct for the profession and their interpretation: law society act, ss. 34(1) and 62(01)10. recognizing this exper- tise, this court has consistently held that law socie- ties should be afforded deference: doré v. barreau du québec, 2012 scc 12, [2012] 1 scr 395, at para. 45; ryan, at para 42. the law society is a spe- cialized body; here, it was applying its own rules to a specifi c case that fell well within the core of its expertise. [214] depuis plus de 200  ans, le barreau jouit du pouvoir délégué par le législateur de détermi- ner les règles de déontologie de la profession et leur interprétation : loi sur le barreau, par. 34(1) et al 62(01)10. reconnaissant cette expertise, la cour a systématiquement statué que les décisions des bar- reaux commandent la déférence : doré c. barreau du québec, 2012 csc 12, [2012] 1 rcs 395, par. 45; ryan, par 42. le barreau est un organisme spécia- lisé; en l’espèce, il appliquait ses propres règles à un dossier en particulier qui touchait au cœur même de son expertise. [215] because of the law society’s broad man- date, this is not one of the “rare occasions where only one ‘defensible’ outcome exists”: wilson v. atomic energy of canada ltd., 2016 scc 29, [2016] 1 scr 770, at para. 35, per abella j. the existence of reasonableness review is, rather, premised on the fact that “certain questions that come before ad- ministrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specifi c, particular result”: dunsmuir, at para 47. [216] for the reasons set out above, we are of the view that there is no basis on this record to inter- fere with the appeal panel’s decision. the panel articulated an approach for professional misconduct that fl owed directly from its consideration of the rules, commentary and jurisprudence. it faithfully followed its approach, based on the evidence respect- ing phase one of the felderhof trial, and concluded that mr. groia had no reasonable basis for the alle- gations he made against the osc prosecutors. it then weighed the whole of the evidence and determined that when considered in light of all of the relevant factors, mr. groia’s comments constituted profes- sional misconduct. the panel’s logic, rationales and conclusion were reasonable. [215] étant donné le vaste mandat du barreau, la présente affaire ne constitue pas l’une des « rares occasions [où] il n’y [a] qu’une seule issue “pou- vant se justifi er” » : wilson c. énergie atomique du canada ltée, 2016 csc 29, [2016] 1 rcs 770, par. 35, la juge abella. l’existence du contrôle selon la norme de la décision raisonnable repose plutôt sur la prémisse que « certaines questions soumises aux tribunaux administratifs n’appellent pas une seule solution précise » : dunsmuir, par 47. [216] pour ces motifs, nous sommes d’avis que le dossier en l’espèce ne révèle aucune raison d’inter- venir à l’égard de la décision du comité d’appel. ce dernier s’est doté d’une méthode en matière de man- quement professionnel qui découlait directement de son examen approfondi des règles, des commentaires à leur sujet, et de la jurisprudence. il a fi dèlement ap- pliqué cette méthode en fonction de la preuve se rap- portant à la première phase du procès dans l’affaire felderhof et a conclu que les allégations de m. groia à l’encontre des avocats de la cvmo n’avaient pas de fondement raisonnable. le comité d’appel a en- suite soupesé l’ensemble de la preuve et conclu que, à la lumière de tous les facteurs pertinents, les com- mentaires de m. groia constituaient un manque- ment professionnel. la logique, le raisonnement et la conclusion du comité d’appel étaient raisonnables. [217] we would also fi nd that the appeal panel’s decision proportionately balanced the value of free- dom of expression with its mandate to ensure that [217] nous sommes également d’avis que, dans sa décision, le comité d’appel a su mettre en balance de façon proportionnée l’importance de la liberté 862 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. lawyers conduct themselves professionally. as this court noted in doré, “[i]n the charter context, the reasonableness analysis is one that centres on pro- portionality, that is, on ensuring that the decision interferes with the relevant charter guarantee no more than is necessary given the statutory objec- tives”: para 7. the appeal panel was alert to the importance of lawyers’ expressive freedoms and the critical role of zealous advocacy in our system: ap reasons, at paras 214-17. in order to ensure that these principles were limited no more than necessary, the appeal panel adopted a contextual approach that took into account the dynamics of the courtroom setting: para 7. in addition, the appeal panel gave mr. groia the benefi t of the doubt and assumed that he acted in good faith. however, it was open to the appeal panel to determine that at a certain point, the cumulative effect of mr. groia’s allegations meant that the balance shifted and that there was a need for limits on mr. groia’s conduct. it was reasonable for the appeal panel to conclude that “[i]n the context of this trial, zealous advocacy did not require mr. groia to make unfounded allegations of prosecutorial mis- conduct”, to “impugn the integrity of his opponents” or to “frequently resort to invective” when describing them: para 328. [218] finally, we note that all of the adjudicators and judges who reviewed this decision on the stand- ard of reasonableness also concluded that the appeal panel’s ultimate fi nding of misconduct was reason- able. the only person to conclude that mr. groia’s conduct did not amount to misconduct was the dis- senting judge at the ontario court of appeal, who applied a correctness standard of review. this court should resist the temptation to substitute its view on what the appeal panel should have done. the focus on a reasonableness review is on the appeal panel’s actual reasons. in this case, the appeal panel’s deci- sion was reasonable. d’expression et son mandat consistant à veiller à ce que les avocats agissent de façon professionnelle. comme la cour l’a indiqué dans l’arrêt doré, dans le contexte « de la charte, [l’]analyse du caractère raisonnable porte avant tout sur la proportionnalité, soit, sur la nécessité d’assurer que la décision n’in- terfère avec la garantie visée par la charte pas plus qu’il n’est nécessaire compte tenu des objectifs visés par la loi » : par 7. le comité d’appel était conscient de l’importance du droit à la liberté d’expression dont jouissent les avocats et du rôle essentiel que joue la défense passionnée des droits dans notre système : motifs du comité d’appel, par 214-217. pour s’assurer que ces principes n’étaient pas limités au- delà du nécessaire, le comité d’appel a adopté une méthode contextuelle qui prend en compte la dynamique d’une salle de cour : par 7. de plus, il a donné le bénéfi ce du doute à m. groia et a tenu pour acquis que ce dernier avait agi de bonne foi. cela dit, le comité d’appel pouvait tout à fait conclure que l’effet cumulatif des allégations de m. groia a, à un certain point, créé un déséquilibre et qu’il devenait nécessaire d’imposer des limites à sa conduite. il était raisonnable que le comité d’appel conclue que, [traduction] « [d]ans le contexte du procès qui nous intéresse, la défense passionnée des droits de son client n’exigeait pas de m. groia qu’il formule des allégations non fondées de conduite répréhen- sible de la part des avocats de la poursuite », qu’il « attaque l’intégrité de ses adversaires » ou qu’il ait « fréquemment recours à des injures » pour les décrire : par 328. [218] enfi n, nous remarquons que tous les orga- nismes décisionnels et les juges qui ont contrôlé la décision en l’espèce selon la norme de la décision raisonnable ont, eux aussi, conclu au caractère rai- sonnable de la conclusion de manquement profes- sionnel à laquelle est arrivé le comité d’appel. seul le juge dissident de la cour d’appel de l’ontario, qui a appliqué la norme de contrôle de la décision correcte, a tiré la conclusion contraire. la cour de- vrait résister à la tentation de substituer son opinion à celle du comité d’appel quant à ce qu’il aurait dû faire. le contrôle judiciaire effectué selon la norme de la décision raisonnable porte sur les véritables motifs du comité d’appel. en l’espèce, la décision de ce dernier était raisonnable. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 863 c the impacts of allowing this appeal c les conséquences de la décision d’accueillir le présent pourvoi [219] we have a number of concerns about the implications that follow from justice moldaver’s reasons. respectfully, we are concerned that they immunize erroneous allegations from law society sanction, validate improper conduct and threaten to undermine the administration of justice and the culture change that this court has called for in recent years. [219] les répercussions de la décision de notre collègue sont, pour nous, source d’un certain nombre de préoccupations. nous craignons qu’elle protège les allégations erronées de toute réprimande par le barreau, entraîne la légitimation des comportements inappropriés et compromette l’administration de la justice et le changement de culture réclamé par la cour ces dernières années. (1) immunizing accusations based on honestly believed legal errors [220] as discussed, justice moldaver’s reasons ef- fectively create a mistake of law defence that immu- nizes lawyers from professional sanction whenever their allegations are based on honestly held legal beliefs. in our view, this approach would potentially immunize lawyers who make accusations based on erroneous, unsupportable or even reckless beliefs about the law. [221] allowing any honestly held legal belief to provide a “reasonable basis” for allegations of pros- ecutorial misconduct, taken to its logical conclusion, means that the more outrageous the lawyer’s legal belief is, the more justifi ed his allegations of im- propriety become. this approach creates an unduly high threshold for professional misconduct, one that could effectively dispossess the law societies of their regulatory authority respecting incivility anytime a lawyer can cloak his accusations in a subjective legal belief. (1) protection des accusations fondées sur des croyances juridiques sincères qui se révèlent erronées [220] comme nous l’avons noté, les motifs de notre collègue créent dans les faits une défense fondée sur une erreur de droit grâce à laquelle tout avocat qui formule des allégations sur la foi de croyances ju- ridiques sincères est immunisé contre les sanctions disciplinaires professionnelles. à notre avis, cette approche risque de protéger les avocats qui lancent des accusations en s’appuyant sur des croyances ju- ridiques qui sont erronées, insoutenables ou même téméraires. [221] permettre qu’une croyance juridique sin- cère puisse constituer le « fondement raisonnable » d’allégations d’inconduites de la part des avocats de la poursuite aura la conséquence logique sui- vante : plus les croyances juridiques d’un avocat seront outrancières, plus ses allégations d’actes ré- préhensibles seront justifi ées. cette approche crée un seuil exagérément élevé en matière de manquement professionnel, seuil qui pourrait, dans les faits, pri- ver les barreaux de leur pouvoir de réglementation en matière d’incivilité dès lors qu’un avocat est en mesure de défendre ses accusations au moyen d’une croyance juridique subjective. (2) validating uncivil conduct (2) légitimation d’actes d’incivilité [222] we are concerned that allowing this appeal will be seen as a validation of mr. groia’s conduct and will undermine the law society’s ability to sanc- tion unprofessional conduct. [222] nous craignons que le fait d’accueillir le présent pourvoi soit interprété comme légitimant la conduite de m. groia et mine le pouvoir du barreau de punir les cas de conduite non professionnelle. 864 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. [223] the appeal panel determined that even if a lawyer has a reasonable basis for an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, “she must avoid use of invective to raise the issue”: para 236. this is a reasonable approach. the rules of professional conduct were — and remain today — “crystal clear” that counsel must treat witnesses, other lawyers, and the court with fairness, courtesy and respect: r v. felderhof (2003), 235 dlr (4th) 131 (ont. ca) (felderhof (onca)), at para. 96; rules of professional conduct (2000), rules 4.01(1), 6.03(1) (now rules 2.1-1, 2.1-2, 5.1-1, 5.1-5, 5.6-1, 7.2-1 and 72-4). [223] le comité d’appel a conclu que, même lors- qu’un avocat est raisonnablement fondé à formuler une allégation de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite, [traduction] « il doit éviter de soulever la question en invectivant son confrère » : par 236. il s’agit d’une approche raison- nable. le code de déontologie était, tout comme il l’est encore aujourd’hui, [traduction] « limpide » quant au fait que les avocats doivent maintenir, à l’égard des témoins, des autres avocats et des tribu- naux, une attitude juste, courtoise et respectueuse : r c. felderhof (2003), 235 dlr (4th) 131 (ca. ont.) (felderhof (ca ont)), par. 96; code de déon- tologie (2000), règles 4.01(1) et 6.03(1); maintenant règles 2.1-1, 2.1-2, 5.1-1, 5.1-5, 5.6-1, 7.2-1 et 72-4. [224] in setting aside the decision of the appeal panel, justice moldaver, however, says little con- cerning the inappropriate manner in which mr. groia brought his allegations. instead, he says that “[s]trong language    will regularly be necessary to bring forward allegations of prosecutorial misconduct”: para 101. [224] or, tandis qu’il annule la décision du comité d’appel, notre collègue en dit très peu sur la manière inappropriée dont m. groia a formulé ses allégations. il affi rme plutôt que « [d]es propos forts [  ] seront régulièrement nécessaires pour présenter des alléga- tions de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite » : par 101. [225] with respect, we take a contrary view; we cannot agree with any suggestion that mr. groia’s conduct was permissible, let alone “necessary”. as the appeal panel noted, campbell j. initially found that it was “unnecessary” for mr. groia to make his submissions respecting prosecutorial misconduct in the “repetitive stream of invective” he did: r v. fel- derhof, 2002 canlii 41888 (ont. scj) (felderhof (onsc)), at para 271. he described mr. groia’s conduct as “appallingly unrestrained and on occa- sion unprofessional”, “inappropriate”, “extreme” and “unacceptable”: r v. felderhof, 2003 canlii 41569 (ont. scj) at paras. 18 and 21. the judge noted that on one occasion, mr. groia’s conduct more re- sembled “guerilla theatre than advocacy in court”: felderhof (onsc), at para.  91 rosenberg  ja. of the court of appeal substantially agreed with these characterizations and called mr. groia’s rhet- oric “improper”: felderhof (onca), at paras. 78- 82. it is true that the appeal panel did not treat the view of these two judges as determinative. it in fact recognized that the comments of campbell j. and rosenberg ja should be given limited weight: ap. reasons, at para 201. nonetheless, we note that after [225] soit dit en tout respect, nous sommes de l’avis contraire; nous ne pouvons convenir que m. groia était autorisé à agir comme il l’a fait, et encore moins que sa conduite était « nécessaire ». comme l’a souligné le comité d’appel, le juge campbell a initialement conclu qu’il n’était [tra- duction] « pas nécessaire » que les allégations de conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite formulées par m. groia prennent la forme d’une « suite ininterrompue d’invectives » comme ce fut le cas en l’espèce : r c. felderhof, 2002 can- lii 41888 (csj. ont.) (felderhof (csj. ont.)), par 271. le juge campbell a décrit la conduite de m. groia comme étant [traduction] « étonnam- ment cavalière et parfois non professionnelle  », « inappropriée », « extrême » et « inacceptable » : r c. felderhof, 2003 canlii 41569 (csj. ont.), par. 18 et 21. il a également indiqué que, à une occa- sion, la conduite de m. groia s’apparentait davantage à une « scène de théâtre de guérilla qu’au travail d’un avocat en cour » : felderhof (csj. ont.), par 91. le juge rosenberg de la cour d’appel de l’onta- rio était, pour l’essentiel, d’accord avec cette des- cription et a qualifié le discours de m.  groia de [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 865 reviewing the entire record of the felderhof trial, the panel came to a similar conclusion about mr. groia’s conduct. [226] we agree with the appeal panel that there is no excuse for the manner in which mr. groia brought his allegations: para 328. it is when lawyers are tested with challenging situations that the require- ments of civility become most important. when law- yers are raising diffi cult issues like prosecutorial misconduct, they are nonetheless “constrained by their profession to do so with dignifi ed restraint”: doré, at para.  68 (emphasis added) motions re- specting prosecutorial misconduct “can and should be conducted without the kind of rhetoric engaged in by [mr. groia]”: felderhof (onca), at para 96. zealous advocacy did not require that he “frequently resort to invective in describing opponents who were trying to do their jobs”: ap reasons, at para 328. [227] by assigning limited weight to the manner in which mr. groia brought his allegations, justice moldaver’s reasons can be read as setting a bench- mark for professional misconduct that permits sus- tained and sarcastic personal attacks on opposing counsel. in our view, there is simply no place in ca- nadian courtrooms for this type of conduct. deciding that the law society cannot sanction the allegations that mr. groia unleashed on his opponents sends the wrong message to those who look to this court for guidance. [traduction] « déplacé » : felderhof (ca. ont.), par 78-82. il est vrai que l’opinion de ces deux juges n’était pas déterminante pour le comité d’appel. en fait, celui-ci a même statué qu’il conviendrait d’ac- corder une importance limitée aux commentaires du juge campbell et à ceux du juge d’appel rosenberg : motifs du comité d’appel, par 201. nous remarquons néanmoins que, après avoir examiné tout le dossier du procès dans l’affaire felderhof, le comité d’ap- pel est arrivé à une conclusion similaire quant à la conduite de m groia. [226] à l’instar du comité d’appel, nous estimons qu’il était inexcusable de la part de m. groia d’avoir formulé ses allégations comme il l’a fait : par 328. en effet, c’est lorsque les avocats sont confrontés à des situations diffi ciles que les exigences de civilité se révèlent le plus nécessaires. les avocats qui sou- lèvent des questions diffi ciles, comme celle de la conduite répréhensible de la part des avocats de la poursuite, sont néanmoins « tenus par leur profession de s’exécuter avec une retenue pleine de dignité » : doré, par. 68 (nous soulignons). les requêtes rela- tives à la conduite répréhensible de la part d’avocats de la poursuite [traduction] « peuvent être — et devraient être — instruites sans le type de discours tenu par [m. groia] » : felderhof (ca. ont.), par 96. la défense passionnée des droits n’exigeait pas de m. groia qu’il ait [traduction] « fréquemment recours à des invectives pour décrire ses adversaires, qui ne cherchaient qu’à faire leur travail » : motifs du comité d’appel, par 328. [227] en accordant une importance limitée à la façon dont m. groia a formulé ses arguments, les motifs de notre collègue peuvent s’interpréter de sorte à établir une nouvelle norme en matière de manquement professionnel qui permettrait à un avo- cat de porter des attaques soutenues et sarcastiques à l’endroit d’un avocat de la partie adverse. à notre avis, ce type de conduite n’a tout simplement pas sa place devant les tribunaux canadiens. décider que le barreau ne peut pas punir m.  groia pour ses allégations à l’endroit de ses adversaires envoie le mauvais message à ceux qui s’en remettent aux enseignements de la cour. 866 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. (3) undermining the administration of justice (3) déconsidération de l’administration de la justice [228] finally, we are concerned about the broader impact of setting aside the appeal panel’s decision on the culture of the legal profession and the admin- istration of justice. [228] enfi n, nous avons des préoccupations quant à l’incidence générale que l’annulation de la décision du comité d’appel aura sur la culture de la profession juridique et sur l’administration de la justice. [229] the appeal panel quite reasonably stated that professionalism is a key component of the effi - cient resolution of disputes. uncivil, abrasive, hos- tile or obstructive conduct “necessarily impedes the goal of resolving confl icts rationally, peacefully, and effi ciently, in turn delaying or even denying justice”: ap reasons, at para. 218, quoting felderhof (onca), at para 83. it distracts not only counsel, who become preoccupied with defending their own integrity rather than advocating for their clients’ interests, but also triers of fact, who are required to weigh in on acrimonious personal disputes rather than focusing on the merits: see a.p reasons, at paras. 230-31 and 332. most importantly, though, unprofessional attacks erode the relationship of mu- tual respect that is crucial to resolving disputes effi - ciently. when this occurs, even minor disagreements become more protracted; issues that might have been resolved out of court become subject to vigorous argument, taking up court time and costing litigants money unnecessarily: see m. code, “counsel’s duty of civility: an essential component of fair trials and an effective justice system” (2007), 11 can. crim. lr 97, at p 105. [229] le comité d’appel a très raisonnablement décidé que le professionnalisme est essentiel à la résolution effi cace des différends. une conduite inci- vile, abrasive, hostile ou récalcitrante [traduction] « nuit forcément à la réalisation de l’objectif de rè- glement des confl its de façon rationnelle, pacifi que et effi cace et cause plutôt des retards, voire des dénis de justice » : motifs du comité d’appel, par. 218, ci- tant felderhof (ca ont), par 83. cela a pour effet de non seulement déconcentrer les avocats, qui se préoccupent alors de défendre leur intégrité plutôt que les intérêts de leurs clients, mais également les juges des faits, appelés à se prononcer sur des dif- férends personnels de nature acrimonieuse au lieu de concentrer leurs efforts sur le fond de l’affaire : motifs du comité d’appel, par. 230-231 et 332. le plus important, toutefois, c’est que les attaques mar- quées par un manque de professionnalisme érodent le rapport de respect mutuel par ailleurs essentiel à une résolution effi cace des différends. dans de tels cas, même les plus petites mésententes s’étirent et des questions qui auraient pu être réglées hors cours donnent lieu à des débats vigoureux qui accaparent les jours d’audience et entraînent des coûts inutiles pour les justiciables : voir m. code, « counsel’s duty of civility : an essential component of fair trials and an effective justice system » (2007), 11 rev. can. dp 97, p 105. [230] the appeal panel’s recognition of the im- portance of civility to the administration of justice is consistent with this court’s repeated calls to address access to justice concerns. in r v. jordan, 2016 scc 27, [2016] 1 scr 631, the majority challenged all participants in the justice system to “work in concert to achieve speedier trials” (para. 116), and pushed crown and defence counsel to collaborate when appropriate and use court time efficiently (para 138). the majority stated that “[a]ll courts, including this court, must be mindful of the impact [230] la reconnaissance par le comité d’appel de l’importance de la civilité en ce qui concerne l’ad- ministration de la justice est compatible avec les nombreuses demandes faites par la cour pour régler les problèmes d’accès à la justice. dans l’arrêt r c. jordan, 2016 csc 27, [2016] 1 rcs 631, les juges majoritaires ont mis au défi tous les participants au système de justice de « travailler de concert pour ac- célérer le déroulement des procès » (par. 116) et ont incité les avocats du ministère public et de la défense à collaborer, lorsque cela est indiqué, et à utiliser de [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada les juges karakatsanis, gascon et rowe 867 of their decisions on the conduct of trials”: para 139. similarly, in hryniak v. mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 scr 87, this court called for a culture change in the civil context as a means of promoting timely and affordable access to justice: para 2. the court specifi cally called on trial counsel to be cognizant of the pressures on the justice system and “act in a way that facilitates rather than frustrates access to justice”: para 32. finally, in r v. cody, 2017 scc 31, [2017] 1 scr 659, this court renewed the calls set out above, and set out specifi c guidance for judges and counsel alike to do what they can to improve the effi ciency of the justice system: paras 37-39. [231] condoning mr. groia’s conduct risks eroding civility in courtrooms and increasing the pressures on an already strained system. moreover, setting aside the decision of the appeal panel has the potential to undermine the ability of law societies to promote the effi cient resolution of disputes. law societies are important actors in the culture change we need. through their enabling legislation, they are provided with the authority to sanction lawyers who commit professional misconduct and, in turn, promote effi - ciency in our system. they should be empowered to do that, not undermined through second- guessing by the courts. their decisions respecting professional misconduct should be approached with deference. façon effi cace le temps du tribunal : par 138. les juges majoritaires ont précisé que « tous les tribu- naux, y compris la cour, devront tenir compte de l’impact de leurs décisions sur le déroulement des procès » : par 139. de même, dans l’arrêt hryniak c. mauldin, 2014 csc 7, [2014] 1 rcs 87, la cour a revendiqué un virage culturel dans le contexte de la justice civile afi n de favoriser l’accès expéditif et abordable à la justice : par 2. plus particulièrement, la cour a invité les avocats à se soucier des pressions subies par le système de justice et à « agir de manière à faciliter plutôt qu’à empêcher l’accès à la justice » : par 32. enfi n, dans l’arrêt r c. cody, 2017 csc 31, [2017] 1 rcs 659, la cour a réitéré les demandes énoncées précédemment en plus d’offrir aux juges et aux avocats des conseils quant à ce qu’ils peuvent faire pour rendre le système de justice plus effi cace : par 37-39. [231] cautionner la conduite de m. groia pour- rait nuire à la civilité dans les salles d’audience et augmenter la pression subie par un système déjà surchargé. qui plus est, l’annulation de la décision du comité d’appel risque de saper la capacité des barreaux à favoriser le règlement effi cace des dif- férends. les barreaux ont un rôle important à jouer dans le changement de culture qui doit s’opérer. ils sont investis, par leur loi habilitante, du pouvoir de sanctionner les avocats qui commettent un manque- ment professionnel et, ainsi, de favoriser l’effi cacité du système dans lequel nous évoluons. ils devraient être habilités à s’acquitter de leur mandat, et ce, sans que leur travail soit miné par une remise en ques- tion de leurs décisions par les cours de justice. les décisions qu’ils rendent en matière de manquement professionnel commandent la déférence. iii conclusion iii conclusion [232] we are of the view that this appeal should be dismissed. a respectful reading of the appeal panel’s reasons makes clear that the panel’s decision was a balanced decision that grappled with the diffi cult issues at play and arrived at a reasonable outcome. [232] nous sommes d’avis de rejeter le présent pourvoi. une lecture respectueuse des motifs du co- mité d’appel permet de constater que celui-ci a rendu une décision équilibrée s’attaquant aux questions diffi ciles en jeu et est arrivé à un résultat raisonnable. [233] perhaps unease with the appeal panel’s fi nd- ing of professional misconduct stems in part from the severity of the penalty that was handed down to [233] peut- être la sévérité de la peine infl igée à m. groia explique-t-elle la réticence éprouvée par certains relativement à la conclusion de manquement 868 groia v law society of upper canada karakatsanis, gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. mr groia. a one- month licence suspension and a $200,000 cost award may seem harsh to some, but that misses the point. that issue is not before us on this appeal, nor is it a basis upon which to disturb the appeal panel’s fi nding of misconduct. professionnel à laquelle est arrivé le comité d’appel. une suspension de permis d’un mois et l’adjudica- tion de 200 000 $ en dépens en sa défaveur peuvent paraître sévères. là n’est toutefois pas la question. cet enjeu n’est pas en cause dans le présent pourvoi et il ne justifi e pas de revenir sur la conclusion du comité d’appel. appeal allowed with costs, karakatsanis, gascon pourvoi accueilli avec dépens, les juges and rowe jj. dissenting. karakatsanis, gascon et rowe sont dissidents. procureurs de l’appelant : lerners, toronto; groia groia & company, toronto. & company, toronto. procureurs de l’intimé : lenczner slaght royce royce smith griffi n, toronto. smith griffi n, toronto. prosecutions: public prosecution service of canada, ottawa. procureur de l’intervenante la directrice des poursuites pénales : service des poursuites pénales du canada, ottawa. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’ontario : procureur général de l’ontario, toronto. of saskatchewan: attorney general of saskatche- wan, regina. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de la saskatchewan : procureur général de la saskatchewan, regina. procureur de l’intervenant le tribunal du bar- bunal: law society tribunal, toronto. reau : tribunal du barreau, toronto. lax o’sullivan lisus gottlieb, toronto; mccarthy tétrault, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante la société des plai- deurs  :  lax o’sullivan lisus gottlieb, toronto; mccarthy tétrault, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le barreau du québec : barreau du québec, mont réal. barreau du québec, mont réal. liberties association:  canadian civil liberties association, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante l’association cana- dienne des libertés civiles : association canadienne des libertés civiles, toronto. bia civil liberties association and the independent criminal defence advocacy society: arvay finlay, vancouver; farris, vaughan, wills & murphy, van- couver. procureurs des intervenantes british columbia civil liberties association et independent criminal defence advocacy society : arvay finlay, vancou- ver; farris, vaughan, wills & murphy, vancouver. [2018] 1 rcs. groia c barreau du haut- canada 869 societies of canada: thorsteinssons, vancouver; arvay finlay, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante la fédération des ordres professionnels de juristes du canada : thorsteinssons, vancouver; arvay finlay, vancouver. attorneys’ association: cavalluzzo, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association des procureurs de la couronne de l’ontario : caval- luzzo, toronto. lawyers association: allan rouben, barrister and solicitor, toronto; connolly obagi, ottawa; boland howe, aurora, ontario. procureurs de l’intervenante ontario trial law- yers association : allan rouben, barrister and so- licitor, toronto; connolly obagi, ottawa; boland howe, aurora, ontario. association: norton rose fulbright canada, mont- réal. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association du barreau canadien : norton rose fulbright canada, mont réal. yers’ association of ontario: addario law group, toronto; paradigm law group, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association of ontario : addario law group, to- ronto; paradigm law group, toronto.
[1] karakatsanis j. — this appeal and cross- appeal consider when the activities of a provincial crown corporation may be taxed by the federal gov- ernment. it requires this court to evaluate the scope of the intergovernmental immunity from taxation set out in s. 125 of the constitution act, 1867, and whether agreements entered into by two levels of government to pay the equivalent of “taxes” may be binding on other crown entities. version française du jugement des juges abella, moldaver, karakatsanis, brown, rowe et martin rendu par [1] la juge karakatsanis — les présents pour- voi et pourvoi incident portent sur la question de savoir dans quelles circonstances les activités d’une société de la couronne provinciale peuvent être assu- jetties à la taxation fédérale. pour trancher cette ques- tion, notre cour doit évaluer la portée de l’immunité fiscale intergouvernementale énoncée à l’art. 125 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 et établir si les accords conclus par deux ordres de gouvernement en vue du paiement de l’équivalent de « taxes » peuvent lier d’autres entités de la couronne. [2] in 1999, the legislature of british columbia cre- ated the british columbia investment management corporation (bci) to provide investment manage- ment services to the province’s public sector pension plans and other crown entities. on its creation, bci assumed ownership and management of the invest- ment assets held in pooled investment portfolios. at the same time, the legislature modernized its [2] en 1999, la législature de la colombie- britannique a créé la british columbia investment management corporation (bci) afin qu’elle four- nisse des services de gestion de placements aux régimes de retraite du secteur public de la province ainsi qu’à d’autres entités de la couronne. au mo- ment de sa création, bci a assumé la propriété en common law et a pris en charge la gestion des 572 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. public sector pensions by creating a joint trustee- ship structure whereby employers and employees would assume greater control over the management of pension monies. both of these changes were in- tended to create a degree of separation between the government and the management of its investment funds and the public sector pensions. [3] the attorney general of canada submits that these structural changes require bci to collect and remit federal goods and services tax1 (gst) on the costs it incurs in making investments in the portfolios on behalf of the public sector pension boards and other crown entities. because the investment as- sets are beneficially owned by private entities (the pension boards), they are not provincial “property” and are not constitutionally immune from federal taxation. even if bci is constitutionally immune, it must nevertheless pay gst pursuant to reciprocal taxation agreements signed by the federal and pro- vincial governments. placements détenus dans des portefeuilles de fonds communs de placement. à la même époque, la lé- gislature procédait à une modernisation de ses fonds de retraite du secteur public en créant une structure d’administration fiduciaire conjointe, dans le cadre de laquelle les employeurs et les employés exerce- raient un plus grand contrôle sur la gestion des fonds de pension. ces changements visaient tous les deux à créer une certaine distance entre le gouvernement et la gestion de ses fonds de placement et des fonds de retraite du secteur public. [3] le procureur général du canada soutient que ces changements structurels font en sorte que bci est tenue de percevoir et de verser la taxe fédérale sur les produits et services1 (la tps) à l’égard des frais engagés pour faire des placements dans les portefeuilles pour le compte des conseils des ré- gimes de retraite du secteur public, ainsi que pour d’autres entités de la couronne. étant donné que les placements sont détenus à titre bénéficiaire par des entités privées (les conseils des régimes de retraite), ils ne constituent pas une « propriété » provinciale et ne bénéficient pas de l’immunité prévue par la constitution à l’égard de la taxation fédérale. même si bci jouit de l’immunité constitutionnelle, elle doit néanmoins payer la tps conformément aux accords de réciprocité fiscale signés par les gouvernements fédéral et provincial. [4] bci argues that the provisions of the excise tax act, rsc 1985, c. e-15 (eta), do not capture the investment management activities it provides. as a provincial crown agent, it claims constitutional immunity from taxation with respect to the property that it legally owns, including the investment assets. and even if the province is bound by the agreements, bci is not a party to the agreements and is not sub- ject to them. [4] bci soutient que les dispositions de la loi sur la taxe d’accise, lrc 1985, c. e-15 (lta), ne visent pas les activités de gestion de placements qu’elle exerce. à titre de mandataire de la couronne pro- vinciale, elle revendique l’immunité fiscale consti- tutionnelle sur les biens dont elle est propriétaire en common law, y compris les placements. qui plus est, même si la province est liée par les accords, bci n’est pas partie à ceux-ci et n’y est pas assujettie. [5] the attorney general of british columbia largely agrees with bci, except on the applicability of the intergovernmental agreements, taking the position that the agreements apply to bci. [5] le procureur général de la colombie- britannique est en grande partie d’accord avec bci, sauf en ce qui concerne l’applicabilité des accords intergou- vernementaux; il soutient qu’ils s’appliquent à bci. 1 this matter concerns both the federal gst as well as the harmonized sales tax (hst) regime in force in british columbia from 2010- 2013; for simplicity, these reasons refer to gst only. 1 la présente affaire concerne à la fois le régime fédéral de la tps et le régime de la taxe de vente harmonisée (tvh) en vigueur en colombie- britannique de 2010 à 2013; par souci de simplicité, les présents motifs renvoient seulement à la tps. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 573 [6] like the courts below, i have concluded that the eta cannot apply to bci’s activities in managing the portfolios because it is constitutionally immune under s 125. the eta cannot impose gst on prop- erty legally owned by a crown agent. nevertheless, i also agree that both the province and bci are subject to the obligations set out in the intergovernmental agreements. [7] i would dismiss the appeal and the cross- appeal. [6] à l’instar des juridictions inférieures, je con- clus que la lta ne peut s’appliquer aux activités qu’exerce bci dans le cadre de la gestion des porte- feuilles, parce que bci jouit de l’immunité constitu- tionnelle prévue à l’art 125. la lta ne peut imposer la tps sur des biens appartenant en common law à un mandataire de la couronne. néanmoins, je conviens également que la province et bci sont toutes les deux assujetties aux obligations énoncées dans les accords intergouvernementaux. [7] je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi ainsi que le pourvoi incident. i background i contexte factuel [8] this matter involves a myriad of statutory and contractual relationships. i begin by summarizing the statutory framework governing bci, the nature of the intergovernmental agreements, and the events leading up to the present appeal and cross- appeal. after reviewing the approaches taken by the courts below, i consider the three substantive issues raised by the parties. [8] une multitude de relations contractuelles et de textes législatifs sont en cause dans la présente affaire. dans un premier temps, je résumerai le cadre législatif régissant bci, la nature des accords inter- gouvernementaux et les faits à l’origine du présent pourvoi et du pourvoi incident. après avoir passé en revue les démarches retenues par les juridictions inférieures, j’examinerai les trois questions de fond soulevées par les parties. a general statutory framework and history a cadre législatif et historique général (1) bci and the pooled investment portfolios (1) bci et les portefeuilles de fonds communs de placement [9] bci was established in 1999 by part 3 of the public sector pension plans act, sbc 1999, c. 44 (psppa).2 bci’s purpose is “to provide funds man- agement services, including the making of invest- ments and loans, for funds placed with [it]”: s 18(2). in fulfilling this purpose, bci receives and invests monies on behalf of various authorized entities. [9] bci a été établie en 1999 sous le régime de la partie 3 de la public sector pension plans act, sbc. 1999, c. 44 (« psppa »)2. elle a pour objet de [tra- duction] « fournir des services de gestion financière à l’égard des fonds qui lui sont confiés, notamment de faire des placements et de consentir des prêts » (par 18(2)). pour réaliser cet objet, bci reçoit et in- vestit des fonds au nom de diverses entités autorisées. [10] prior to the enactment of the psppa, large sums of money, including the public sector pension fund, were held and managed by british columbia’s minister of finance through the office of the chief investment officer. beginning in 1984, s. 36 of the [10] avant l’adoption de la psppa, des sommes im- portantes, notamment les fonds de pension du secteur public, étaient détenues et gérées par le ministre des finances de la colombie- britannique par l’entremise du bureau du directeur des placements. à compter de 2 the relevant statutory provisions cited throughout these reasons 2 les dispositions législatives pertinentes citées tout au long des are reproduced in the appendix. présents motifs sont reproduites à l’annexe. 574 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. financial administration act, sbc 1981, c. 15 (faa),3 empowered the minister to establish and operate “pooled investment portfolios” (portfolios). the portfolios’ structure allowed the minister to combine money from a variety of sources and invest it in a diversified group of assets. originally, money held in a portfolio could only be invested in low- risk debt securities. but in an effort to increase the rate of return of the portfolios, the faa was amended in 1989 to allow investment in a variety of financial instruments, including equities, options, and futures. [11] the operation of the portfolios was governed by the pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc. reg 84/86. the minister was responsible for invest- ing, managing and controlling all of the assets of the portfolios: s 3(2)4. when money from a “fund” (eg the public sector pension fund) was placed with the minister for investment in a portfolio, the fund was issued units of participation in the portfolio. ownership of any investment assets purchased by the minister was not attributable to any of the unit holders: s 3(4)5. rather, the value of a unit of partic- ipation reflected the fund’s proportionate investment in the portfolio: s 46. however, all of the assets of a portfolio were “held in trust by the minister” and had to be identified separately from the other property of the government: ss. 3(1) and 3(3).7 if the minister decided to terminate a portfolio, the net proceeds realized were to be distributed to the unit holders: s 118 1984, l’art. 36 de la financial admin istration act, sbc 1981, c. 15 (« faa »)3, autorisait le ministre à créer et à gérer des [traduction] « portefeuilles de fonds communs de placement » (« portefeuilles »). la structure des portefeuilles permettait au ministre de réunir des sommes provenant de différentes sources et de les investir dans un ensemble diversifié de pla- cements. à l’origine, les sommes détenues dans un portefeuille ne pouvaient être investies que dans des titres de créance à faible risque. cependant, avec pour objectif d’améliorer le taux de rendement des portefeuilles, le législateur a modifié la faa en 1989 de façon à autoriser les placements dans différents instruments financiers, notamment les actions, les options et les contrats à terme. [11] la gestion des portefeuilles était régie par le pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc. reg 84/86. le ministre était chargé d’investir, de gérer et de contrôler tous les éléments d’actif des portefeuilles (par 3(2)4). lorsque des sommes pro- venant d’un « fonds » (p ex le fonds de retraite du secteur public) étaient confiées au ministre pour être placées dans un portefeuille, le fonds recevait des uni- tés de participation dans ce portefeuille. la propriété des placements achetés par le ministre n’était attri- buable à aucun des détenteurs d’unités (par 3(4)5). la valeur d’une unité de participation correspondait plutôt à la part de l’investissement du fonds dans le portefeuille (art 46). toutefois, tous les éléments d’actif d’un portefeuille étaient [traduction] « déte- nus en fiducie par le ministre » et devaient être classés à part des autres biens du gouvernement (par. 3(1) et 3(3)7). si le ministre décidait de mettre fin à un portefeuille, le produit net réalisé devait être distribué aux détenteurs d’unités (art 118). [12] in the early 1990s, concerns arose over po- tential conflicts of interest because the minister supervised investment in companies with ties to british columbia and made policy decisions which [12] au début des années 1990, des préoccupations ont été soulevées concernant d’éventuels conflits d’in- térêts parce que le ministre exerçait une surveillance sur les placements dans des sociétés ayant des liens 3 section 43 of the current financial administration act, rsbc. 3 article 43 de l’actuelle financial administration act, rsbc. 1996, c 138. 1996, c 138. 4 section 4(2) in the updated pooled investment portfolios regu- 4 paragraphe  4(2) de la version à jour du pooled investment lation, bc. reg 447/99. 5 now s 4(4). 6 now s 5. 7 now ss. 4(1) and 4(3). 8 now s 14. portfolios regulation, bc reg 447/99. 5 par. 4(4) actuel. 6 art. 5 actuel. 7 par. 4(1) et 4(3) actuels. 8 art. 14 actuel. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 575 could affect their profitability. at the same time, the provincial and municipal governments, the prov- ince’s four public sector pension plans and the ma- jor public sector unions discussed at length how to modernize british columbia’s pension legislation. these events culminated in the introduction of the psppa, which established the framework for joint trusteeship of the public sector pension plans. [13] the purpose of joint trusteeship was to allow both pension plan members and their employers to participate in the management of the public sector pension plans. the psppa created infrastructure necessary to support the newly created boards of trustees of the pension plans. this included two new crown entities: (1) the british columbia pension corporation, tasked with providing administration services to the boards of trustees; and (2) bci. bci is a statutory agent of the government and the minister of finance is its only shareholder: ss. 16(5) and 17. at the second reading of the bill, the minister of finance explained the psppa’s goals: the second purpose of the bill is to provide an option for joint trusteeship of pension plans. joint trusteeship is based on the premise that plan members should share in the responsibility for and control over the pension plans in which they participate   . the bill provides for the possibility of transferring full responsibility for the operation of each of the public sector pension plans to a board of pension trustees, which would have equal representation from plan members and plan employers. the transfer of this responsibility will result in the pension plans being operated at arm’s length from government   . avec la colombie- britannique et qu’il prenait des déci- sions de politique générale susceptibles d’avoir une in- cidence sur leur rentabilité. pendant la même période, de longues discussions ont eu lieu entre le gouverne- ment provincial, les administrations municipales et les responsables des quatre régimes de retraite du secteur public de la province et des principaux syndicats du secteur public sur la façon de moderniser la législation de la colombie- britannique sur les pensions, à la suite desquelles le législateur a adopté la psppa, qui a établi le cadre de l’administration en fiducie conjointe des régimes de retraite du secteur public. [13] l’administration en fiducie conjointe visait à permettre tant aux participants aux régimes de retraite du secteur public qu’à leurs employeurs de participer à la gestion de ces régimes. la psppa a créé l’infrastructure nécessaire pour encadrer les nouveaux conseils des fiduciaires des régimes de retraite, qui comprenaient deux nouvelles entités de la couronne : (1) la british columbia pension corporation, chargée de fournir des services d’ad- ministration aux conseils des fiduciaires, et (2) bci. cette dernière est un mandataire légal du gouverne- ment et le ministre des finances en est le seul ac- tionnaire (par. 16(5) et art 17). lors de la deuxième lecture du projet de loi, la ministre des finances a expliqué en ces termes les buts de la psppa : [traduction] en deuxième lieu, le projet de loi vise à permettre l’administration en fiducie conjointe des ré- gimes de retraite. l’administration en fiducie conjointe repose sur l’idée que les participants aux régimes devraient assumer une part de la responsabilité et du contrôle relatifs aux régimes de retraite auxquels ils participent   . le projet de loi prévoit la possibilité que l’entière res- ponsabilité de la gestion de chacun des régimes de retraite du secteur public soit transférée à un conseil de fiduciaires du régime de retraite, qui serait composé d’un nombre égal de représentants des participants au régime et des employeurs. par suite du transfert de cette responsabilité, les régimes de retraite seront administrés de façon indé- pendante du gouvernement   .   .   . an arm’s-length relationship to government is necessary, since the pension trustees must have the unfettered ability l’absence de lien de dépendance avec le gouvernement est nécessaire, car les fiduciaires des régimes de retraite 576 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. to determine the quality and timeliness of the service provided to plan members in order to carry out their re- sponsibilities. doivent avoir la capacité absolue d’évaluer la qualité et la rapidité des services fournis aux participants aux régimes afin de s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités. the british columbia investment management cor- poration will be the successor organization to the office of the chief investment officer. it will provide investment management services to the public sector pension plans and other non- pension clients. [emphasis added.] la british columbia investment management cor- poration sera l’organisation qui succédera au bureau du directeur des placements. elle fournira des services de gestion de placements aux régimes de retraite du secteur public et à d’autres clients qui ne participent pas aux ré- gimes de retraite [je souligne.] (british columbia, official report of debates of the legislative assembly (hansard), vol. 16, no. 25, 3rd sess., 36th parl., july 14, 1999, at p.14409 (hon. j. macphail)) (colombie- britannique, official report of debates of the legislative assembly (hansard), vol. 16, no 25, 3e sess., 36e lég., 14 juillet 1999, p. 14409 (l’hon. joy macphail)) [14] with the enactment of the psppa, bci as- sumed the investment management responsibilities which formerly belonged to the minister. according to s. 18(4), bci “has the same powers, functions and duties in the provision of funds management services for funds placed with it    as the minister of finance would have if the funds had been placed with that minister under part 5 of the financial administra- tion act as it read on april 1, 1999”. as part of this transfer of responsibilities, the previously established portfolios were continued under the psppa: s 181. the unit holders continued to hold the same units as they did before and all assets of a portfolio previ- ously held by the minister continued to be held by bci. under the updated pooled investment portfo- lios regulation, bc. reg. 447/99 (regulation), the portfolios operate in substantially the same manner as when the minister managed them. [15] in 2013, bci was the fourth largest pension fund manager in canada, managing $102.8 billion in gross assets for 39 institutional clients. a significant portion of these funds are managed on behalf of british columbia’s four public sector pension plans. bci uses two different structures to manage the as- sets placed with it for investment. investments are either held in the portfolios or as segregated funds, separate and apart from the assets of the portfolios. only the portfolios are at issue in this appeal. [14] par suite de l’adoption de la psppa, bci a as- sumé les responsabilités de gestion des placements qui incombaient auparavant au ministre. suivant le par. 18(4), bci [traduction] « dispose des mêmes pouvoirs, fonctions et devoirs dans le cadre de la pres- tation des services de gestion à l’égard des fonds qui lui sont confiés [  ] que ceux dont disposerait le ministre des finances si les fonds lui avaient été confiés en vertu de la partie 5 de la financial administration act, telle qu’elle se lisait en date du 1er avril 1999 ». dans le cadre de ce transfert de responsabilités, les portefeuilles déjà constitués ont été maintenus sous le régime de la psppa (art 181). les détenteurs d’unités ont conservé celles qu’ils détenaient auparavant et bci a continué à détenir tous les éléments d’actif des portefeuilles que détenait auparavant le ministre. selon la version à jour du pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc. reg. 447/99 (règlement), les portefeuilles fonctionnent essentiellement de la même façon que lorsqu’ils étaient gérés par le ministre. [15] en 2013, bci était le quatrième plus important gestionnaire de fonds de pension du canada et gérait un actif brut d’une valeur de 102,8 milliards de dol- lars pour 39 clients institutionnels. une grande partie de ces fonds sont gérés pour le compte des quatre régimes de retraite du secteur public de la colombie- britannique. bci se sert de deux structures diffé- rentes pour gérer les actifs qui lui sont confiés à des fins d’investissement. les placements sont détenus dans des portefeuilles ou à titre de fonds distincts, séparément des actifs des portefeuilles. le présent pourvoi porte uniquement sur les portefeuilles. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 577 [16] section  20(2)(d) of the psppa requires bci’s board of directors to “have in place an equi- table fee system based on the user pay principle”. section 24(1) stipulates that bci must recover its operating costs from one of three sources: [16] aux termes de l’al. 20(2)d) de la psppa, le conseil d’administration de bci est tenu d’[traduc- tion] « avoir en place un système de cotisation équi- table fondé sur le principe de l’utilisateur- payeur ». le paragraphe 24(1) prévoit que bci doit recouvrer ses frais d’exploitation de l’une des trois sources suivantes : [traduction] (a) amounts charged to the funds for operating costs and capital expenditures necessarily incurred by the invest- ment management corporation on behalf of the funds it manages; a) les sommes imputées aux fonds au titre des frais d’ex- ploitation et des dépenses en capital que la société de gestion de placements a nécessairement engagés pour le compte des fonds qu’elle gère; (b) amounts charged to persons, organizations and other clients for services provided by the investment manage- ment corporation; b) les sommes imputées aux personnes, organisations et autres clients au titre des services que la société de gestion de placements a fournis; (c) income accruing from investments made by the invest- ment management corporation on its own behalf. c) les revenus des placements que la société de gestion de placements a réalisés pour son propre compte. for investments held in segregated funds, bci charges investment management fees to its clients and col- lects and remits gst on these amounts. but for the portfolios, bci recovers the costs of managing them from the income realized on the assets held in the portfolios and does not collect gst on these amounts. this aligns with the previous practice of the minister, who recovered management costs from the assets of the portfolios and did not collect or remit gst. dans le cas des placements détenus dans des fonds distincts, bci facture des frais de gestion à ses clients et perçoit et verse la tps sur ces montants. cependant, en ce qui concerne les portefeuilles, bci recouvre ses frais de gestion à même les revenus générés par les actifs qui y sont détenus et ne perçoit pas de tps sur ces montants. cette façon de procéder correspond à la pratique précédente du ministre, qui recouvrait les frais de gestion à même les actifs des portefeuilles et ne percevait ni ne versait la tps sur ces montants. (2) intergovernmental tax agreements (2) accords fiscaux intergouvernementaux [17] by virtue of two separate agreements (the agreements), the governments of british columbia and canada agreed to pay the other’s sales taxes in certain circumstances. the relevant reciprocal taxation agreement (rta), versions of which have been in place since before bci was formed in 1999, came into effect in july 2010. under the rta, can- ada agrees to pay certain provincial taxes and fees and the province agrees to pay the taxes imposed under the federal eta. provincial entities listed in schedule a of the rta may apply for a rebate of any gst paid — these entities would pay gst on their purchases of goods and services but would be entitled to a rebate of those amounts. bci was added [17] aux termes de deux accords distincts (les accords), le gouvernement de la colombie- britannique et celui du canada ont convenu de payer réciproquement leurs taxes de vente dans certaines circonstances. l’accord de réciprocité fiscale perti- nent (le reciprocal tax agreement (rta)), dont des versions étaient en vigueur avant la constitution de bci en 1999, est entré en vigueur en juillet 2010. selon cet accord, le canada convient de payer certains frais et taxes provinciaux et la province convient de payer les taxes exigées au titre de la lta fédérale. les entités provinciales figurant sur la liste de l’annexe a du rta peuvent demander un rem- boursement de la tps payée — ces entités paieraient 578 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. to schedule a in november 1999 but was removed in april 2003. [18] in november 2009, british columbia and can- ada also entered into the comprehensive integrated tax coordination agreement (citca). this agree- ment was part of the province’s decision to replace the provincial sales tax and the federal gst with a harmonized sales tax regime. under the citca, the province and canada agreed to pay hst on sup- plies purchased by their respective governments and agents. similar to the rta, the citca sets out a “pay and rebate” scheme whereby amounts of hst paid by provincial entities that would otherwise be constitutionally immune are rebated. the citca al- lows the province to determine whether any rebate is paid either to the government entity that paid the tax or to the province directly. the citca was in effect until april 2013, when the province withdrew from the hst regime and returned to a gst/pst model. la tps sur leurs achats de produits et services, mais auraient droit à un remboursement de ces sommes. bci a été ajoutée à l’annexe a en novembre 1999, mais a été retirée en avril 2003. [18] en novembre 2009, la colombie- britannique et le canada ont également conclu un accord global intégré de coordination fiscale, le comprehensive in- tegrated tax coordination agreement (« citca »). celui-ci découlait de la décision de la province de remplacer la taxe de vente provinciale et la tps fé- dérale par un régime de taxe de vente harmonisée. aux termes du citca, la province et le canada ont convenu de payer la tvh sur les fournitures achetées par leur gouvernement et mandataires respectifs. à l’instar du rta, le citca établit un régime de « paie- ment et remboursement » qui prévoit le rembourse- ment de la tvh versée par des entités provinciales qui jouiraient par ailleurs de l’immunité fiscale constitu- tionnelle. le citca permet à la province d’établir si un remboursement est versé à l’entité gouvernemen- tale qui a payé la taxe ou directement à la province. le citca est demeuré en vigueur jusqu’en avril 2013, lorsque la province a délaissé le régime de la tvh en faveur du modèle antérieur de tps- tvp. (3) bci’s petition for declaratory relief (3) requête en jugement déclaratoire de bci [19] following bci’s removal from schedule a of the rta in 2003, canada revenue agency (cra) began to question whether bci was entitled to claim immunity from gst in respect of the expenses it incurred in managing the portfolios. from 2006 on- wards, bci, the province and canada engaged in discussions about bci’s gst status with respect to its management of the portfolios. [20] unable to reach an agreement, cra opened a “supplier compliance” audit file in september 2013, covering the gst reporting periods of april 1, 2010 to march 31, 2013. the audit began in january 2014. [19] à la suite du retrait de bci de l’annexe a du rta en 2003, l’agence du revenu du canada (arc) a commencé à mettre en doute le droit de bci d’invoquer l’immunité à l’égard de la tps re- lativement aux frais qu’elle engageait dans le cadre de la gestion des portefeuilles. à compter de 2006, bci, la province et le canada ont eu des discussions au sujet de la question de savoir si les services de gestion des portefeuilles fournis par bci étaient assujettis à la tps. [20] comme les parties étaient incapables d’arriver à un accord, l’arc a ouvert un dossier de vérifica- tion de la « conformité des fournisseurs » en sep- tembre 2013, pour les périodes de déclaration de la tps allant du 1er avril 2010 au 31 mars 2013. la vérification a débuté en janvier 2014. [21] on  december  20, 2013, bci filed the pe- tition that gave rise to this matter in the supreme [21] le 20 décembre 2013, bci a saisi la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique de la requête [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 579 court of british columbia, seeking the following declarations: à l’origine de la présente affaire, afin d’obtenir les déclarations suivantes : a) as a statutory crown agent, bci is immune from taxation in respect of the assets it holds in the portfolios; and a) en qualité de mandataire légal de la couronne, bci bénéficie de l’immunité fiscale à l’égard des actifs qu’elle détient dans les portefeuilles; b) bci is not bound by either the rta or the citca or the payment obligations found in those agree- ments. b) bci n’est pas liée par le rta ou le citca, ni par les obligations de paiement énoncées dans ces accords. [22] canada sought to strike bci’s petition, ar- guing that the dispute should be heard by the tax court of canada, not the supreme court of british columbia. wong j. dismissed the motion, conclud- ing that bci’s pleadings raised a “plausible argu- ment which ought to be heard”: british columbia investment management corp. v. canada (attorney general), 2014 bcsc 1296, [2014] gstc 93, at paras 5-7. wong j.’s ruling was affirmed on appeal: 2015 bcca 373, 80 bclr (5th) 316. [23] in november 2015, the minister of national revenue issued notices of reassessment to bci. bci was assessed as owing $40,498,754.94 of gst and hst, plus interest and penalties, in respect of taxable supplies provided to the portfolios. in february 2016, bci filed notices of objection to the reassessments without prejudice to its position that the portfolios are immune from taxation, preserving its rights to challenge the assessments under the eta’s appeal provisions. [22] le canada a sollicité la radiation de la re- quête de bci, soutenant que le litige devait être ins- truit par la cour canadienne de l’impôt, et non par la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique. le juge wong a rejeté la requête, concluant que les actes de procédure de bci soulevaient un [traduc- tion] «  argument plausible qui devrait être exa- miné » (british columbia investment management corp c. canada (attorney general), 2014 bcsc 1296, [2014] gstc 93, par 5-7). la décision du juge wong a été confirmée en appel (2015 bcca 373, 80 bclr (5th) 316). [23] en novembre 2015, le ministre du revenu na- tional a établi des avis de nouvelle cotisation à l’égard de bci, selon lesquels celle-ci devait un montant de 40 498 754,94 $, plus intérêts et pénalités, attribuable à la tps et à la tvh à payer sur des fournitures taxables pour les portefeuilles. en février 2016, bci a déposé des avis d’opposition aux nouvelles cotisations, sans renoncer à sa position selon laquelle les portefeuilles bénéficient des immunités fiscales, préservant ainsi ses droits de contester les cotisations en vertu des disposi- tions de la lta prévoyant le droit d’appel. [24] bci’s petition was heard by weatherill j. in april and june of 2016. [24] le juge weatherill a instruit la requête de bci en avril et en juin 2016. b supreme court of british columbia, 2016 bcsc 1803, 90 bclr (5th) 126 (weatherill j.) b cour suprême de la colombie- britannique, 2016 bcsc  1803, 90  bclr  (5th) 126  (le juge weatherill) [25] weatherill j. first held that he had jurisdiction to decide the petition. he then proceeded to issue the following declaratory order: [25] le juge weatherill a d’abord conclu qu’il avait compétence pour trancher la requête. il a ensuite rendu l’ordonnance déclaratoire suivante : although by virtue of being a provincial crown agent [bci] is immune from taxation by canada under the eta [traduction] même si, du fait qu’elle est un mandataire de la couronne provinciale, [bci] bénéficie de l’immunité 580 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. in respect of assets it holds in pooled investment portfo- lios pursuant to the pooled investment portfolios regu- lation, bc. reg 447/99, it is nevertheless bound by the provisions of the rta and citca respecting those assets. [para. 173] [26] with respect to jurisdiction, weatherill j. ob- served that while the tax court had concurrent ju- risdiction over the immunity issue, it would not have jurisdiction to determine whether the agreements bind bci. because the two issues are linked and the dispute had been going on for 10 years, judicial economy and fairness militated in favour of deciding the issues together. [27] the chambers judge then held that bci, as a statutory agent mandated to manage the portfolios, enjoys the same tax immunity under s. 125 as the province does. because the psppa states that bci legally owns the portfolio assets, the eta trust pro- visions “cannot change the trust into something it is not”: paras. 132- 133. when the psppa was enacted, bci “simply stepped into the minister of finance’s shoes”: para 135. finally, weatherill j. concluded that s. 16(6) of the psppa places a specific obligation on bci to pay the same tax as the province pays, including the tax due under the agreements. [28] canada appealed the holding that bci is im- mune from taxation and bci cross- appealed with respect to the binding nature of the agreements. à l’égard de la taxation fédérale sous le régime de la lta à l’égard des actifs qu’elle détient dans des portefeuilles de fonds communs de placement en application du pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc reg 447/99, elle est néanmoins liée par les dispositions du rta et du citca concernant ces actifs. [par. 173] [26] pour ce qui est de la compétence, le juge weatherill a souligné que, même si la cour cana- dienne de l’impôt avait compétence concurrente sur la question de l’immunité, elle n’avait pas compé- tence pour décider si les accords liaient bci. étant donné que les deux questions étaient connexes et que le différend durait depuis une dizaine d’années, il était selon lui préférable, par souci d’économie judiciaire et d’équité, de trancher les questions en- semble. [27] le juge siégeant en son cabinet a ensuite con clu qu’en qualité de mandataire légal chargé de gérer les portefeuilles, bci bénéficiait de la même immunité fiscale que celle dont jouissait la pro- vince en vertu de l’art.  125 étant donné que la psppa prévoit que bci est propriétaire en common law des actifs des portefeuilles, les dispositions de la lta régissant les fiducies [traduction] «  ne peuvent transformer la fiducie en quelque chose qu’elle n’est pas » (par. 132- 133). lors de l’adoption de la psppa, bci « a simplement pris la place du ministre des fi nances » (par 135). enfin, le juge weatherill a conclu que le par. 16(6) de la psppa impose l’obligation spécifique à bci de payer la même taxe que la province, y compris celle exigible au titre des accords. [28] le canada a interjeté appel de la conclusion selon laquelle bci bénéficie de l’immunité fiscale, et bci a formé un appel incident à l’égard de la conclu- sion relative au caractère contraignant des accords. c court of appeal for british columbia, 2018 bcca 47, 5 bclr (6th) 237 (smith, willcock and goepel jja). c cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique, 2018 bcca 47, 5 bclr (6th) 237 (les juges smith, willcock et goepel) [29] the court of appeal for british columbia dismissed canada’s appeal and bci’s cross- appeal. writing for the court, willcock ja held that there was no reason to interfere with weatherill j.’s decision [29] la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a rejeté l’appel du canada et l’appel incident de bci. s’exprimant au nom de la cour, le juge willcock a décidé qu’il n’y avait aucune raison d’intervenir à [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 581 to take jurisdiction and consider the claim for declar- atory relief. [30] on the question of constitutional immunity, willcock ja pointed out that as an agent of the crown, bci itself is immune from taxation. thus, the question is whether a non- crown entity receives services when bci manages the portfolios. while a tax that applies to a private, beneficial interest in property legally owned by the crown is not barred by s. 125, two distinguishing factors arise in this case. first, there is no clear beneficial interest in the portfolios that is distinct from bci’s legal interest. second, absent the eta deeming rules, there would be no taxable transaction as bci would be both supplying and receiving the services as trustee. in willcock ja’s view, the eta deeming rules cannot apply to the statutory trust because a federal statute cannot reduce the scope of provincial immunity from taxation. [31] willcock ja also agreed that the agreements are binding on bci. while some intergovernmental agreements are merely political, the rta and citca were intended to create mutually binding obliga- tions. section 16(6) of the psppa establishes that the extent of bci’s immunity from taxation is no greater than that of the provincial crown. the phrase “liability to taxation” is broad enough to capture the contractual liability assumed by the province under the rta (para 155). l’égard de la décision du juge weatherill, qui s’est déclaré compétent et a instruit la requête en jugement déclaratoire. [30] pour ce qui est de la question de l’immunité constitutionnelle, le juge willcock a fait observer qu’en tant que mandataire de la couronne, bci elle- même bénéficiait de l’immunité fiscale. la question était donc de savoir si une entité qui n’est pas une entité de la couronne reçoit des services lorsque bci gère les portefeuilles. même si l’art. 125 n’in- terdisait pas l’imposition d’une taxe sur un intérêt bénéficiaire privé à l’égard d’un bien appartenant en common law à la couronne, deux facteurs dis- tinctifs intervenaient en l’espèce. d’abord, il n’y avait aucun intérêt bénéficiaire manifeste dans les portefeuilles qui était différent de l’intérêt en com- mon law de bci. en second lieu, sans les disposi- tions déterminatives de la lta, il n’y aurait aucune opération taxable, car bci serait à la fois le fournis- seur et l’acquéreur des services en qualité de fidu- ciaire. de l’avis du juge willcock, les dispositions déterminatives de la lta ne pouvaient s’appliquer à la fiducie d’origine législative parce qu’une loi fédérale ne peut restreindre la portée de l’immunité fiscale provinciale. [31] le juge willcock a également reconnu que les accords liaient bci. même si certains accords intergouvernementaux sont de nature purement po- litique, le rta et le citca visaient à créer des obligations mutuellement contraignantes le pa- ragraphe 16(6) de la psppa établit que la portée de l’immunité fiscale de bci n’est pas supérieure à celle de la couronne provinciale. l’expression [traduction] « assujettie à la taxation » est suffi- samment générale pour englober la responsabilité contractuelle qu’assume la province aux termes du rta (par 155). ii analysis ii analyse [32] my analysis proceeds as follows first, i conclude that the chambers judge did not err in ex- ercising his jurisdiction. next, i consider the oper- ation of the eta and determine that s. 125 renders the eta inapplicable with respect to the costs bci [32] mon analyse est la suivante : je conclue tout d’abord que le juge siégeant en son cabinet n’a pas commis d’erreur en exerçant sa compétence. ensuite, j’examine l’application de la lta et je conclus que l’art. 125 rend cette loi inapplicable en ce qui concerne 582 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. recovers from the portfolios. finally, i conclude that the agreements are binding on the province and bci is subject to the obligations set out in them by virtue of s. 16(6) of the psppa. les frais que bci recouvre des portefeuilles. enfin, j’estime que les accords lient la province et que bci est assujettie aux obligations qui y sont énoncées en vertu du par. 16(6) de la psppa. a a superior court’s discretion to decline juris- diction in favour of the tax court [33] before the chambers judge, the attorney gen- eral of canada argued that the constitutional immu- nity claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tax court. but on appeal, the parties accepted that the superior court had inherent jurisdiction over all aspects of bci’s petition. [34] nevertheless, canada submits that the cham- bers judge erred when he chose to exercise his ju- risdiction. in doing so, he usurped the jurisdiction of the tax court and effectively determined bci’s challenge to the reassessments. in canada’s view, a superior court should decline to exercise its ju- risdiction when another court with expertise in the core issues of a claim has concurrent jurisdiction. canada also submits that the chambers judge erred in considering the judicial economy of deciding the immunity and agreements issues together. because cra did not rely on the agreements in reassessing bci, the petition is premature. a pouvoir discrétionnaire d’une cour supérieure de décliner compétence en faveur de la cour canadienne de l’impôt [33] devant le juge siégeant en son cabinet, le pro- cureur général du canada a prétendu que la demande relative à l’immunité constitutionnelle relevait de la compétence exclusive de la cour canadienne de l’impôt. cependant, en appel, les parties ont admis que la cour supérieure était dotée d’une compétence inhérente à l’égard de tous les aspects de la requête de bci. [34] néanmoins, le canada fait valoir que le juge siégeant en son cabinet a commis une erreur lors- qu’il a décidé d’exercer sa compétence. ce faisant, il a usurpé la compétence de la cour canadienne de l’impôt et a en fait tranché la contestation de bci à l’égard des nouvelles cotisations de l’avis du canada, une cour supérieure devrait refuser d’exer- cer sa compétence lorsqu’une autre cour dotée d’une expertise au sujet des principales questions à tran- cher dans un litige a compétence concurrente. le canada ajoute que le juge siégeant en son cabinet a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a tenu compte du principe de l’économie des ressources judiciaires pour trancher ensemble les questions relatives à l’immunité et aux accords. étant donné que l’arc ne s’est pas fondée sur les accords pour établir une nouvelle cotisation à l’encontre de bci, la requête était prématurée. [35] the parties agree that the chambers judge’s discretionary decision to exercise his jurisdiction is entitled to deference. unless the chambers judge misdirected himself or came to a decision that is so clearly wrong that it resulted in an injustice, a re- viewing court should not interfere: canada (attorney general) v. fontaine, 2017 scc 47, [2017] 2 scr. 205, at para. 36; sattva capital corp. v. creston moly corp., 2014 scc 53, [2014] 2 scr 633, at para. 95; hryniak v. mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 [35] les parties conviennent qu’il faut faire preuve de déférence à l’égard de la décision discrétion- naire du juge siégeant en son cabinet d’exercer sa compétence. sauf si le juge siégeant en son cabi- net s’est fondé sur des considérations erronées ou a rendu une décision erronée au point de créer une injustice, le tribunal de contrôle ne devrait pas in- tervenir (canada (procureur général) c. fontaine, 2017 csc 47, [2017] 2 rcs 205, par. 36; sattva capital corp c. creston moly corp., 2014 csc 53, [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 583 scr 87, at para. 83; see also canadian imperial bank of commerce v. green, 2015 scc 60, [2015] 3 scr 801, at para. 95; miningwatch canada v. canada (fisheries and oceans), 2010 scc 2, [2010] 1 scr 6, at para 43. [36] in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdic- tion, a court must determine the essential nature of the claim. a superior court may decline to exer- cise its jurisdiction if it concludes a party is using “artful pleading” to bring a claim in an inappropri- ate forum: windsor (city) v. canadian transit co., 2016 scc 54, [2016] 2 scr 617, at paras. 25-27; canada (attorney general) v. telezone inc., 2010 scc 62, [2010] 3 scr 585, at para 78. however, a party is also entitled to make genuine strategic choices about how to pursue a claim. if the pleadings disclose a reasonable basis for pursuing a valid claim in a provincial superior court, the party advancing the claim is generally entitled to pursue it: windsor (city), at para. 27; telezone, at para 76. [37] any challenge to the correctness of a tax as- sessment under the eta falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tax court: tax court of can- ada act, rsc 1985, c. t-2, s. 12(1); eta, ss. 306, 309(1); see johnson v. minister of national revenue, 2015 fca 51, 469 nr 326, at paras. 21-23, cit- ing jp morgan asset management (canada) inc. v. canada (national revenue), 2013 fca 250, [2014] 2 fcr 557, at para. 82; sorbara v. canada (attor- ney general), 2009 onca 506, 98 or (3d) 673, at paras. 7-11; see generally aboriginal federated alli- ance inc. v. canada customs and revenue agency, 2002 abca 104, 303 ar 304, at paras. 16-18; smith v. canada, 2006 bcca 237, 61 bclr (4th) 231. [2014] 2 rcs 633, par. 95; hryniak c. mauldin, 2014 csc 7, [2014] 1 rcs 87, par. 83; voir égale- ment banque canadienne impériale de commerce c. green, 2015 csc 60, [2015] 3 rcs 801, par. 95; mines alerte canada c. canada (pêches et océans), 2010 csc 2, [2010] 1 rcs 6, par 43). [36] pour décider s’il exerce ou non sa compé- tence, le tribunal doit déterminer la nature essentielle de la demande. une cour supérieure peut refuser d’exercer sa compétence si elle conclut qu’une partie invoque d’« astucieux arguments » pour porter sa de- mande devant une juridiction inappropriée (windsor (city) c. canadian transit co., 2016 csc 54, [2016] 2 rcs 617, par. 25-27; canada (procureur général) c. telezone inc., 2010 csc 62, [2010] 3 rcs 585, par 78). cependant, une partie a également le droit de faire de véritables choix stratégiques quant à la façon de faire valoir ses droits. si les actes de procédure révèlent l’existence de motifs raisonnables de présen- ter une demande valide devant une cour supérieure provinciale, l’auteur de la demande est généralement admis à exercer son recours (windsor (city), par. 27; telezone, par 76). [37] toute contestation du bien- fondé d’une coti- sation fiscale établie en application de la lta relève de la compétence exclusive de la cour canadienne de l’impôt (loi sur la cour canadienne de l’im- pôt, lrc 1985, c. t-2, par. 12(1); lta, art. 306, par. 309(1); johnson c. ministre du revenu natio- nal, 2015 caf 51, 469 nr 326, par. 21-23, citant jp  morgan asset management (canada) inc c. canada (revenu national), 2013 caf 250, [2014] 2 rcf 557, par. 82; sorbara c. canada (attor- ney general), 2009 onca 506, 98 or (3d) 673, par. 7-11; voir, de façon générale, aboriginal feder- ated alliance inc c canada. customs and revenue agency, 2002 abca 104, 303 ar 304, par. 16-18; smith  c.  canada, 2006 bcca 237, 61 bclr. (4th) 231). [38] even where a claim does not challenge an assessment, a superior court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction in recognition of the specialization of the tax court: canada v. addison & leyen ltd., 2007 scc 33, [2007] 2 scr 793, at para. 11; see also [38] même lorsqu’une demande n’a pas pour objet la contestation d’une cotisation, une cour supérieure peut refuser d’exercer sa compétence en reconnaissance de l’expertise de la cour canadienne de l’impôt (canada c. addison & leyen ltd., 2007 584 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. d. jacyk, “the dividing line between the jurisdic- tions of the tax court of canada and other superior courts” (2008), 56 can. tax j. 661, at pp 685-86. in addison, this court cautioned against allowing “incidental litigation” to circumvent the tax appeal mechanisms established by parliament: para 11. but this does not mean an otherwise valid claim cannot proceed in superior court simply because it may impact a tax court proceeding. [39] in this case, the chambers judge determined that the core of bci’s petition was not an attack on the gst assessments but rather canada’s ability to tax bci in the first place. he also concluded that the constitutional immunity and agreements issues were linked — if the immunity claim was successful, the agreements were the only way bci could be required to pay gst. [40] like the court of appeal, i see no revers- ible error in the chambers judge’s analysis. both the scope and the timing of the petition support the chambers judge’s characterization of bci’s claim and his decision to exercise his jurisdiction. csc 33, [2007] 2 rcs 793, par. 11; voir égale- ment d. jacyk, « the dividing line between the jurisdictions of the tax court of canada and other superior courts » (2008), 56 rev fisc can 661, p.  685- 686) dans l’arrêt addison, notre cour a souligné qu’il ne fallait pas permettre qu’une « pro- cédure connexe  » serve à contourner le système d’appel établi par le parlement en matière fiscale (par 11). cependant, il ne s’ensuit pas qu’une de- mande par ailleurs valide ne peut être introduite de- vant la cour supérieure pour la simple raison qu’elle pourrait avoir une incidence sur une instance devant la cour canadienne de l’impôt. [39] en l’espèce, le juge siégeant en son cabinet a décidé que l’essentiel de la requête de bci ne consti- tuait pas une contestation des cotisations de tps, mais plutôt du pouvoir du canada d’imposer dès le départ une taxe à bci. il a également conclu que les questions relatives à l’immunité constitutionnelle et aux accords étaient connexes : si la demande rela- tive à l’immunité était retenue, les accords seraient la seule voie par laquelle bci pourrait être tenu de payer la tps. [40] à l’instar de la cour d’appel, je ne vois au- cune erreur donnant lieu à révision dans l’analyse du juge siégeant en son cabinet. tant la portée de la requête que le moment où elle a été introduite ap- puient la qualification de la demande de bci par le juge siégeant en son cabinet et sa décision d’exercer sa compétence. [41] first, the issues raised in bci’s petition go beyond the assessment of tax under the eta. fun- damentally, this case is about the rights, obligations and duties of a crown agent, under the constitution and at common law. while bci may have raised constitutional immunity during a tax court appeal, the petition concerns canada’s taxation authority over bci more generally. bci’s status under the agreements is also undoubtedly a live issue between the parties. while other disputes related to their op- eration may arise, declaratory relief — which the tax court cannot grant (see pintendre autos inc. v. the queen, 2003 tcc 818, 2004 dtc 2596, at para. 43; whitford v. the queen, 2008 tcc 359, 2008 gtc 638, at paras. 13-14) — would provide [41] d’abord, les questions soulevées dans la re- quête de bci vont au- delà de la cotisation fiscale établie sous le régime de la lta. la présente affaire porte essentiellement sur les droits, obligations et devoirs d’un mandataire de la couronne aux termes de la constitution et en common law. même si bci aurait pu soulever la question de l’immunité constitu- tionnelle dans le cadre d’un appel devant la cour ca- nadienne de l’impôt, sa requête concerne le pouvoir de taxation du canada à son endroit de façon plus générale. le statut de bci aux termes des accords est aussi sans aucun doute une question qui oppose les parties. bien que d’autres débats quant à leur application puissent naître, un jugement déclara- toire — que la cour canadienne de l’impôt ne peut [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 585 the answer to a long- standing disagreement about whether bci is subject to the agreements. [42] second, at the time bci filed its petition, the reassessments had not yet been issued (indeed the audit had not yet begun) so the tax court had no jurisdiction over the dispute: tax court of canada act, s. 12(1); eta, ss. 306, 309(1). i recognize that an assessment was issued before the petition was heard. but this does not change the fact that bci filed its petition in the only forum capable of deal- ing with it at the time. the history of this dispute also predates cra’s decision to audit bci. bci’s entitlement to constitutional immunity and its status under the agreements has been disputed since at least 2006. in my view, the chambers judge did not err in concluding that judicial economy favoured resolving both issues together. rendre (voir pintendre autos inc. c. la reine, 2003 cci 818, par. 43 (canlii); whitford c. la reine, 2008 cci 359, par. 13-14 (canlii)) — fournirait la réponse à un conflit qui perdure quant à la question de savoir si bci est assujettie aux accords. [42] en deuxième lieu, lorsque bci a déposé sa requête, les nouvelles cotisations n’avaient pas en- core été établies (d’ailleurs, la vérification n’avait pas encore commencé), de sorte que la cour canadienne de l’impôt n’avait pas compétence sur le litige (loi sur la cour canadienne de l’impôt, par. 12(1); lta, art. 306, par 309(1)). je reconnais qu’une cotisation a été établie avant l’instruction de la requête; mais il n’en demeure pas moins que bci a déposé sa requête devant la seule juridiction compétente pour l’ins- truire à l’époque. le différend qui oppose les parties est également antérieur à la décision de l’arc de mener une vérification à l’égard de bci. le droit de bci d’invoquer l’immunité constitutionnelle et son statut aux termes des accords sont contestés depuis au moins 2006. à mon avis, le juge siégeant en son cabinet n’a pas commis d’erreur en concluant qu’il était souhaitable, par souci d’économie judiciaire, de trancher les deux questions ensemble. b part ix of the excise tax act and constitutional b la partie ix de la loi sur la taxe d’accise et immunity from taxation l’immunité fiscale constitutionnelle [43] the courts below focussed primarily on bci’s claim to constitutional immunity and did not con- sider the operation of the eta in detail. obviously, such analysis would likely lie at the centre of any tax court proceedings challenging the reassess- ments. the record is also incomplete — it identifies only some of the portfolio unit holders and contains only some of the funds investment and management agreements between bci and a unit holder. further, it is not strictly necessary to examine how the eta operates in order to determine whether constitutional immunity applies. however, some discussion will assist in addressing arguments made by the parties and understanding the mechanism by which canada argues that the costs bci recovers from the portfolios are taxable. [43] les juridictions inférieures ont fait porter leur analyse principalement sur l’argument de bci relatif à l’immunité constitutionnelle et n’ont pas examiné en détail l’application de la lta. de toute évidence, une telle analyse serait probablement au cœur de toute instance devant la cour canadienne de l’im- pôt visant la contestation des nouvelles cotisations. de plus, le dossier est incomplet : il ne mentionne que quelques- uns des détenteurs d’unités des por- tefeuilles et ne comporte que certains des accords d’investissement et de gestion conclus entre bci et un détenteur d’unités. par ailleurs, il n’est pas stricte- ment nécessaire d’examiner la façon dont s’applique la lta pour décider si l’immunité constitutionnelle s’applique. toutefois, certaines observations seront utiles afin d’examiner les arguments soulevés par les parties et de mieux comprendre le mécanisme auquel le canada a recours pour faire valoir que les frais que bci recouvre des portefeuilles sont taxables. 586 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. (1) applying part ix of the excise tax act to a statutory trust [44] part ix of the eta governs the payment, col- lection and remittance of the federal gst (and hst, where applicable). according to s. 165, every re- cipient of a “taxable supply” must pay gst on the consideration paid for the supply. various other rules define the types of commercial activities that consti- tute a taxable supply. suppliers registered under the eta are required to collect gst and periodically remit it to the federal government: ss. 221(1), 225(1), 228(1) and 228(2). [45] there is no dispute that the investment man- agement services bci provides outside the context of the portfolios (ie in managing the segregated funds) are taxable supplies for gst purposes. thus, the issue under the eta does not relate to the nature of bci’s investment management activities but rather involves whether the portfolios can be considered a “recipient” of a taxable supply. [46] section 123(1) of the eta defines a “recipi- ent” with reference to either the person who is lia- ble to pay consideration for a supply of services or, if no consideration is payable, the person to whom a service is rendered. however, to fall within this definition, a recipient must also be a “person.” at common law, only natural persons and corpo- rations have legal personalities; a trust does not: waters’ law of trusts in canada (4th ed. 2012), by d w m waters,. mr. gillen and ld. smith, at pp 614-12. to capture transactions involving a wide range of entities, s. 123(1) broadly defines “person” as “an individual, a partnership, a cor- poration, the estate of a deceased individual, a trust, or a body that is a society, union, club, asso- ciation, commission or other organization of any kind”. the definition of “person” in s. 123(1) thus confers upon a trust “a separate, artificial legal identity for tax purposes”: value- added taxation (1) application de la partie ix de la loi sur la taxe d’accise aux fiducies d’origine législa- tive [44] la partie ix de la lta régit le paiement, la perception et le versement de la tps fédérale (et, le cas échéant, de la tvh). selon l’art. 165, l’acquéreur d’une « fourniture taxable » doit payer la tps sur la valeur de la contrepartie de la fourniture. diverses autres règles définissent les types d’activités com- merciales qui constituent une fourniture taxable. les fournisseurs inscrits au titre de la lta sont tenus de percevoir la tps et de la verser périodiquement au gouvernement fédéral (par. 221(1), 225(1), 228(1) et 228(2)). [45] il est indéniable que les services de ges- tion de placements que bci fournit en dehors du contexte des portefeuilles (c-à-d, dans le cadre de la gestion des fonds distincts) constituent des fournitures taxables aux fins de la tps. en consé- quence, la question qui se pose dans le cadre de l’application de la lta ne concerne pas la nature des activités de gestion de placements de bci, mais est plutôt celle de savoir si les portefeuilles peuvent être considérés comme un « acquéreur » d’une four- niture taxable. [46] selon le paragraphe 123(1) de la lta, l’« ac- quéreur » s’entend de la personne qui est tenue de payer la contrepartie de la fourniture du service qui lui est rendu ou, si nulle contrepartie n’est payable, la personne à qui un service est rendu. cependant, pour être visé par cette définition, l’acquéreur doit également être une « personne ». en common law, seules les personnes physiques et les personnes morales ont une personnalité juridique; les fidu- cies n’en ont pas (waters’ law of trusts in canada (4e éd. 2012), par d w m waters,. mr gillen et ld . smith, p.  614- 642). afin de comprendre les opérations mettant en cause un vaste éventail d’entités, le par.  123(1) confère une grande por- tée au terme « personne », le définissant de la fa- çon suivante : « particulier, société de personnes, personne morale, fiducie ou succession, ainsi que l’organisme qui est un syndicat, un club, une asso- ciation, une commission ou autre organisation ». [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 587 in canada: gst, hst, and qst (5th ed.  2015), at ¶12,030. [47] section 267.1(5) contains further trust rules, which deem a trustee’s activities to have been done by the trust and, in certain circumstances, deem a trustee to have supplied services to the trust: la définition du mot « personne » au par. 123(1) confère donc à la fiducie une [traduction] « iden- tité juridique artificielle distincte aux fins fiscales » (value- added taxation in canada : gst, hst, and qst (5e éd. 2015), ¶12,030). [47] le paragraphe 267.1(5) énonce également d’autres règles applicables aux fiducies; selon ces règles, les actes accomplis par un fiduciaire sont réputés accomplis par la fiducie et le fiduciaire est réputé, dans certaines circonstances, avoir fourni des services à la fiducie : activities of a trustee activités du fiduciaire (5) for the purposes of this part, where a person acts as trustee of a trust, (5) les présomptions suivantes s’appliquent dans le cadre de la présente partie lorsqu’une personne agit à titre de fiduciaire d’une fiducie : (a) anything done by the person in the person’s capac- ity as trustee of the trust is deemed to have been done by the trust and not by the person; and (b) notwithstanding paragraph (a), where the person is not an officer of the trust, the person is deemed to supply a service to the trust of acting as a trustee of the trust and any amount to which the person is entitled for acting in that capacity that is included in computing, for the purposes of the income tax act, the person’s in- come or, where the person is an individual, the person’s income from a business, is deemed to be consideration for that supply. a) tout acte qu’elle accomplit à ce titre est réputé ac- compli par la fiducie et non par elle; b) malgré l’alinéa a), si elle n’est pas un cadre de la fiducie, elle est réputée fournir à celle-ci un service de fiduciaire et tout montant auquel elle a droit à ce titre et qui est inclus, pour l’application de la loi de l’impôt sur le revenu, dans le calcul de son revenu ou, si elle est un particulier, dans le calcul de son revenu tiré d’une entreprise est réputé être un montant au titre de la contrepartie de cette fourniture. the combined effect of ss. 123(1) and 267.1(5) is to impose gst collection, remittance and payment obligations on trusts and trustees in certain circum- stances. les paragraphes 123(1) et 267.1(5) ont ensemble pour effet d’imposer aux fiducies et aux fiduciaires des obligations relatives à la perception, au verse- ment et au paiement de la tps dans certaines cir- constances. [48] applying the eta to bci and the portfolios is further complicated by the fact that bci is a pro- vincial crown agent. according to a long- standing rule of statutory interpretation, the crown is not bound by statute except by express words or nec- essary implication: r v eldorado nuclear ltd., [1983] 2 scr 551, at pp. 556-57, citing province of bombay v. city of bombay, [1947] ac 58 (pc); see also p w hogg,. p j monahan and w k wright,. liability of the crown (4th ed. 2011), at pp. 397- 406. [48] le fait que bci est un mandataire de la cou- ronne provinciale complique quelque peu l’appli- cation de la lta à bci et aux portefeuilles. selon un principe d’interprétation législative établi depuis longtemps, la couronne n’est liée par aucun texte législatif, si ce n’est par des termes exprès ou net- tement implicites (r c eldorado. nucléaire ltée, [1983] 2 rcs 551, p. 556- 557, citant province of bombay c. city of bombay, [1947] ac 58 (cp); voir également p w hogg,. p j monohan et w k wright, 588 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. for federal enactments,9 this rule is codified in s. 17 of the interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21: liability of the crown (4e éd. 2011), p. 397- 406). dans le cas des textes législatifs du gouvernement fédéral9, ce principe est codifié à l’art. 17 de la loi d’interpré- tation, lrc 1985, c. i-21 : her majesty not bound or affected unless stated non- obligation, sauf indication contraire 17 no enactment is binding on her majesty or affects her majesty or her majesty’s rights or prerogatives in any manner, except as mentioned or referred to in the enactment. the crown’s immunity from statute extends to both the crown in right of a province as well as crown agents, when the agent acts within the scope of its statutory purposes: alberta government telephones v. canada (canadian radio- television and telecom- munications commission), [1989] 2 scr 225, at p. 274; eldorado nuclear, at pp 565-66. in this case, s. 16(5) of the psppa declares [49] bci to be an agent of the government. section 29 of the interpretation act, rsbc 1996, c. 238, defines “government” as her majesty in right of british columbia, such that an agent of the government is an agent of the provincial crown. section 18(2) of the psppa states that bci’s purpose is to manage the funds placed with it for investment. thus, bci enjoys the benefit of crown statutory immunity when it manages the portfolios: see nova scotia power inc. v. canada, 2004 scc 51, [2004] 3 scr 53, at paras 13-18. [50] for a statute to be binding on the crown, the crown’s immunity from statute must be “clearly lifted”: canada (attorney general) v. thouin, 2017 scc 46, [2017] 2 scr 184, at para 20. section 122 of the eta expressly sets out the crown’s obligations in relation to the gst rules found in part ix: 17 sauf indication contraire y figurant, nul texte ne lie sa majesté ni n’a d’effet sur ses droits et prérogatives. l’immunité de la couronne à l’égard de l’application des lois vaut aussi pour la couronne du chef d’une pro- vince ainsi que pour les mandataires de la couronne, lorsqu’ils agissent dans le cadre des objectifs que leur attribue la loi (alberta government telephones c. canada (conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télé- communications canadiennes), [1989] 2 rcs 225, p. 274; eldorado nucléaire, p. 565- 566). [49] en l’espèce, le par. 16(5) de la psppa dé- signe bci à titre de mandataire du gouvernement. l’article 29 de l’interpretation act de la colombie- britannique, rsbc 1996, c. 238, définit le [tra- duction] « gouvernement » comme sa majesté du chef de la colombie- britannique, de sorte que tout mandataire du gouvernement est mandataire de la couronne provinciale. le paragraphe 18(2) de cette même loi dispose que bci est constituée pour gérer les fonds qui lui sont confiés à des fins d’investisse- ment. en conséquence, bci jouit de l’immunité d’ori- gine législative de la couronne lorsqu’elle gère les portefeuilles (voir nova scotia power inc c canada, 2004 csc 51, [2004] 3 rcs 53, par 13-18). [50] pour qu’un texte de loi lie la couronne, il doit y avoir une « dérogation claire à l’immunité » de la couronne (canada (procureur général) c. thouin, 2017 csc 46, [2017] 2 rcs 184, par 20). l’arti- cle 122 de la lta énonce expressément les obliga- tions de la couronne à l’égard des règles sur la tps qui se trouvent à la partie ix : 9 in british columbia, the situation is reversed; a provincial legislative enactment is binding on the government “[u]nless it specifically pro- vides otherwise”: interpretation act, rsbc 1996, c. 238, s 14(1). 9 en colombie- britannique, c’est l’inverse : un texte législatif provin- cial lie le gouvernement : [traduction] « sauf disposition contraire expresse » (interpretation act, rsbc 1996, c. 238, par 14(1)). [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 589 application sa majesté 122 this part is binding 122 la présente partie lie : (a) on her majesty in right of canada; and a) sa majesté du chef du canada; (b) on her majesty in right of a province in respect of obligations as a supplier to collect and to remit tax in respect of taxable supplies made by her majesty in right of the province. b) sa majesté du chef d’une province en ce qui con- cerne une obligation à titre de fournisseur de percevoir et de verser la taxe relative aux fournitures taxables qu’elle effectue. while part ix applies in its entirety to the federal crown, the provincial crown’s obligations are lim- ited to collecting and remitting gst. the provincial crown must therefore collect and remit gst when it makes taxable supplies to private parties: reference re goods and services tax, [1992] 2 scr 445 (gst reference), at pp 478-81. [51] the parties disagree about whether the lan- guage of the eta captures bci’s activities in man- aging the portfolios. [52] canada submits that there are no statutory im- pediments to requiring bci to collect and remit gst on the costs it recovers from the portfolios. canada’s analysis proceeds in two steps. first, ss. 123(1) and 267.1(5)(a) operate to separate the statutory trust from bci (the trustee) for tax purposes. thus, when bci provides investment management services to the portfolios, a taxable transaction occurs. second, when the province created bci to provide investment management services, it “cast itself as a service pro- vider through its agent”. as such, bci is required by s. 122(b) of the eta to collect and remit gst on the investment management services it supplies to the portfolios (af, at para 60). alors que la partie ix s’applique en entier à la cou- ronne fédérale, les obligations de la couronne pro- vinciale se limitent à percevoir et verser la tps. la couronne provinciale doit donc percevoir et verser la tps lorsqu’elle effectue des fournitures taxables pour des parties privées (renvoi relatif à la taxe sur les produits et services, [1992] 2 rcs 445 (renvoi relatif à la tps), p. 478- 481). [51] les parties ne s’entendent pas sur la question de savoir si le libellé de la lta comprend les acti- vités qu’exerce bci dans le cadre de la gestion des portefeuilles. [52] le canada soutient qu’aucune disposition lé- gislative ne l’empêche d’exiger de bci qu’elle per- çoive et verse la tps sur les frais qu’elle recouvre des portefeuilles. l’analyse du canada comporte deux vo- lets. d’abord, selon lui, le par. 123(1) et l’al 2671(5) a) s’appliquent de manière à établir une distinction entre la fiducie d’origine législative et bci (le fidu- ciaire) aux fins de l’imposition de la taxe. en consé- quence, lorsque bci fournit des services de gestion de placements pour les portefeuilles, une opération taxable a lieu. en second lieu, il soutient que lorsque la province a créé bci pour fournir des services de gestion de placements, elle [traduction] « s’est elle- même présentée comme une entreprise qui four- nit des services par l’entremise de son mandataire ». l’alinéa 122b) de la lta oblige donc bci à percevoir et à verser la tps sur les services de gestion de place- ments qu’elle fournit aux portefeuilles (ma, par 60). [53] there are two potential obstacles to canada’s approach to the portfolios. first, the respondents submit that because the eta does not expressly state that ss. 123(1) and 267.1(5) apply to the provincial [53] deux obstacles potentiels pourraient se po- ser relativement à la démarche du canada concer- nant les portefeuilles. d’abord, les intimées font valoir que, étant donné que la lta n’énonce pas 590 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. crown, those provisions do not operate with respect to the portfolios. second, it is not clear that the port- folios are “a trust” within the meaning of ss. 123(1) and 2671(5). if not, the portfolios are not persons for the purposes of the eta and cannot be liable to pay gst as the recipient of services. if this is the case, no taxable transaction exists as bci would simply be managing the assets it legally owns, rather than supplying a service to another “person”. i consider each of these potential hurdles in turn. expressément que les par. 123(1) et 267.1(5) s’ap- pliquent à la couronne provinciale, ces dispositions sont sans effet en ce qui concerne les portefeuilles. ensuite, il n’est pas certain que les portefeuilles constituent une « fiducie » au sens des par. 123(1) et 2671(5). dans la négative, les portefeuilles ne sont pas des personnes pour l’application de la lta et ils ne peuvent être tenus de payer la tps à titre d’acquéreurs de services. si tel est le cas, il n’y a pas d’opération taxable puisque bci ne ferait que gérer les actifs qu’elle possède en common law, plutôt que de fournir un service à une autre « personne ». je vais maintenant examiner chacun de ces obstacles potentiels à tour de rôle. (a) do sections 123(1) and 267.1(5) of the eta a) les paragraphes 123(1) et 267.1(5) de la lta apply to bci? s’appliquent- ils à bci? [54] turning first to the applicability of ss. 123(1) and 267.1(5) to bci, i disagree with the respondents that these provisions do not apply to the provin- cial crown. while s. 122(b) states that only collec- tion and remittance obligations are imposed on the provincial crown, it may be necessary to refer to ss. 123(1) and 267.1(5) to determine the scope of these obligations. for example, s. 221(1) imposes an obligation to collect gst on “[e]very person who makes a taxable supply”. the only way to understand the provincial crown’s obligations under this pro- vision is by referring to the definitions of “person” and “taxable supply” in s 123(1). section 122(b) also states that the provincial crown’s obligations arise from “[t]his part” (part ix) as a whole. there is no need to list specifically every provision that may apply to the provincial crown in determining its obligations as a supplier. [54] en ce qui concerne tout d’abord la question de savoir si les par. 123(1) et 267.1(5) s’appliquent à bci, je ne suis pas d’accord avec les intimées pour dire que ces dispositions ne s’appliquent pas à la couronne provinciale. même si l’al. 122b) prévoit que la couronne provinciale n’est assujettie qu’à des obligations de perception et de versement, il peut être nécessaire de recourir aux par. 123(1) et 267.1(5) pour déterminer la portée de ces obliga- tions par exemple, le par.  221(1) impose à «  la personne qui effectue une fourniture taxable » l’obli- gation de percevoir la tps. la seule façon de com- prendre les obligations qui incombent à la couronne provinciale au titre de cette disposition est de se reporter aux définitions des termes « personne » et « fourniture taxable » énoncées au par 123(1). par ailleurs, l’al. 122b) prévoit que les obligations de la couronne provinciale découlent de l’ensemble de « [l]a présente partie » (partie ix). il n’est pas nécessaire de dresser la liste de toutes les disposi- tions pouvant s’appliquer à la couronne provinciale pour déterminer les obligations qui lui incombent en qualité de fournisseur. [55] the central question in this appeal — whether the taxing mechanism created by the eta has the effect of requiring a province or its agent to pay tax out of its property — is properly viewed as a matter of characterization under s. 125 of the constitution act, 1867. the eta makes the recipient of services, [55] la principale question en litige dans le présent pourvoi — celle de savoir si le mécanisme de taxa- tion créé par la lta a pour effet d’obliger une pro- vince ou son mandataire à payer la taxe à même ses biens — peut être considérée à bon droit comme une question de qualification aux termes de l’art. 125 de [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 591 not the supplier, liable to pay gst: gst reference, at p 480. in this case, canada argues that the property held in trust is receiving services from bci. thus, if the portfolio assets are not characterized as property of the crown for the purposes of s. 125, then they do not enjoy statutory immunity under the eta either. in such a case, the provincial crown’s obligations would be limited to collecting and remitting gst for services provided to that private property, as ex- pressly required by s 122(b). (b) are the portfolios “a trust” for the purposes of part ix of the eta? [56] the second question under the eta is whether the portfolios fall within the meaning of “a trust” in ss. 123(1) and 2671(5). during oral arguments, counsel for canada argued that even though the port- folios do not appear to have all the qualities of a private law trust, they nonetheless are captured by the eta. counsel emphasized that because the psppa and the regulation state that the portfolio assets are “held in trust,” the portfolios must be treated as a trust for the purposes of the eta. la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. selon la lta, c’est l’acquéreur des services, et non le fournisseur, qui est tenu de payer la tps (renvoi relatif à la tps, p 480). dans le cas qui nous occupe, le canada soutient que les biens détenus en fiducie reçoivent des services de bci. en conséquence, si les éléments d’actif détenus dans les portefeuilles ne sont pas qualifiés comme étant la propriété de la couronne pour l’application de l’art. 125, ils ne peuvent pas non plus bénéficier de l’immunité d’origine législative sous le régime de la lta. dans ces conditions, les obligations de la couronne provinciale se limiteraient à la perception et au versement de la tps à l’égard des services fournis pour ces biens privés, comme l’exige expres- sément l’al 122b). b) les portefeuilles constituent- ils une « fidu- cie » pour l’application de la partie ix de la lta? [56] la deuxième question qui se pose dans le con- texte de la lta est celle de savoir si les portefeuilles constituent une « fiducie » au sens des par. 123(1) et 2671(5). au cours des plaidoiries, les avocats du canada ont fait valoir que même si les portefeuilles ne semblent pas posséder tous les attributs d’une fiducie de droit privé, ils sont néanmoins visés par la lta. ils ont souligné que, étant donné que la psppa et le règlement énoncent que les actifs des porte- feuilles sont [traduction] « détenus en fiducie », les portefeuilles doivent être considérés comme une fiducie pour l’application de la lta. [57] i disagree. the term “trust” is not defined in the eta. absent express direction to the contrary, undefined terms in a taxation statute must be inter- preted according to their established and accepted legal meaning: will- kare paving & contracting ltd. v. canada, 2000 scc 36, [2000] 1 scr 915, at pa- ras. 29-33; see also backman v. canada, 2001 scc 10, [2001] 1 scr 367, at para. 17; r v. dlw, 2016 scc 22, [2016] 1 scr 402, at para 20. in the case of a federal statute like the eta, s 81 of the interpretation act provides that, “unless otherwise provided by law, if in interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the rules, principles [57] je ne suis pas de cet avis. le terme « fidu- cie » n’est pas défini dans la lta. sauf indication contraire expresse, les termes non définis dans une loi fiscale doivent être interprétés suivant leur sens juridique bien établi et reconnu (will- kare paving & contracting ltd. c. canada, 2000 csc 36, [2000] 1 rcs 915, par. 29-33; voir également backman c. canada, 2001 csc 10, [2001] 1 rcs 367, par. 17; r c dlw, 2016 csc 22, [2016] 1 rcs 402, par 20). dans le cas d’une loi fédérale comme la lta, l’art 81 de la loi d’interprétation prévoit que « s’il est nécessaire de recourir à des règles, principes ou notions appartenant au domaine de la propriété et des droits civils en vue d’assurer l’application d’un texte dans une province, il faut, sauf règle de droit 592 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. and concepts in force in the province at the time the enactment is being applied”. since the eta does not define the term “trust” and the concept of a trust undoubtedly forms part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the concept as its exists in british columbia law. on this basis, unless the portfolios would be considered a trust at private law, they cannot be a “person” within the meaning of s 123(1). [58] the fact that the word “trust” is used, either in a statute or in a legal document, does not mean that an arrangement necessarily constitutes a private law trust. at private law, a trust exists where there has been (1) an express or implied declaration of trust, with (2) an alienation of property to a trustee (3) to be held for a specified beneficiary (alterna- tively, these requirements are described as the three “certainties” — certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter, and certainty of objects): schmidt v. air products canada ltd., [1994] 2 scr 611, at p. 655; waters’ law of trusts in canada, at p140. in british columbia v. henfrey samson be- [59] lair ltd., [1989] 2 scr 24, this court considered whether a provincial statutory trust constituted “prop- erty held    in trust” for the purposes of s. 47(a) of the bankruptcy act, rsc 1970, c. b-3 (a predecessor to s. 67(1) of the current bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c b-3). despite the fact that the provin- cial statute stated that the property was deemed to be held “in trust,” mclachlin j. concluded that it was not a “true trust” because the property impressed with the trust was not identifiable (it lacked certainty of subject matter): pp. 34-36; see also guarantee company of north america v. royal bank of canada, 2019 onca 9, 144 or (3d) 225. s’y opposant, avoir recours aux règles, principes et notions en vigueur dans cette province au moment de l’application du texte ». puisque la lta ne définit pas le terme « fiducie » et que le concept de fiducie ap- partient indubitablement au domaine de la propriété et des droits civils, il faut avoir recours au concept tel qu’il existe en droit en colombie- britannique. sur ce fondement, à moins que les portefeuilles ne soient considérés comme une fiducie en droit privé, ils ne peuvent être assimilés à des « personnes » au sens du par 123(1). [58] l’emploi du terme « fiducie », que ce soit dans une loi ou dans un document juridique, ne signifie pas qu’un arrangement constitue nécessairement une fiducie de droit privé. en droit privé, pour qu’il y ait fiducie, les conditions suivantes doivent être réunies : (1) il y a eu déclaration de fiducie expresse ou im- plicite, (2) les biens ont été confiés à un fiduciaire et (3) le fiduciaire détient les biens pour un bénéficiaire donné (ces exigences sont également appelées les trois « certitudes » : certitude quant à l’intention, certitude quant aux biens sujets à la fiducie et certi- tude quant aux bénéficiaires (schmidt c. air products canada ltd., [1994] 2 rcs 611, p. 655; waters’ law of trusts in canada, p 140)). [59] dans l’affaire colombie- britannique c. hen- frey samson belair ltd., [1989] 2 rcs 24, notre cour s’est demandé si une fiducie créée par une loi provinciale donnait lieu à des « biens détenus [  ] en fiducie » pour l’application de l’al. 47a) de la loi sur la faillite, lrc 1970, c. b-3 (disposition qui a été remplacée par le par. 67(1) de l’actuelle loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité, lrc 1985, c b-3). même si la loi provinciale prévoyait que les biens étaient réputés être détenus « en fiducie », la juge mclachlin a conclu qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’une « fiducie véri- table » parce qu’il était impossible de cerner les biens pouvant être considérés comme sujets à la fiducie (il n’y avait pas de certitude quant aux biens sujets à la fiducie) (p. 34-36; voir également guarantee com- pany of north america c. royal bank of canada, 2019 onca 9, 144 or (3d) 225). [60] in other cases, courts have held that the crown may assume trust- like obligations without creating a “true trust” in the private law sense: see ermineskin [60] dans d’autres affaires, les tribunaux ont re- connu que la couronne pouvait assumer des obli- gations semblables à celles d’une fiducie sans créer [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 593 indian band and nation v. canada, 2009 scc 9, [2009] 1 scr 222, at paras. 72-79; guerin v. the queen, [1984] 2 scr 335, at pp. 375, 378-79 and 386; attorney- general of british columbia v. es- quimalt and nanaimo r. co., [1950] 1 dlr 305 (pc), at p. 314; waters’ law of trusts in canada, at pp. 31-33; hogg, monahan and wright, at pp 370-72. [61] similarly, even where private parties purport to create a trust, those relationships may be scrutinized to determine their true nature for tax purposes. for example, a “bare trust” — where a trustee’s only obli- gation is to convey property to the beneficiary upon de- mand — is generally disregarded for tax purposes: see de mond v. the queen (1999), 99 dtc 893 (tcc);. m c cullity, “legal issues arising out of the use of business trusts in canada”, in tg. youdan, ed., equity, fiduciaries and trusts (1989), 181, at pp. 187- 188; canada revenue agency, gst/hst technical information bulletin b-068: bare trusts, january 20, 1993 (online); canada revenue agency, gst/hst policy statement p-015: treatment of bare trusts un- der the excise tax act, july 20, 1992 (online); income tax act, rsc 1985, c. 1 (5th supp.), s 104(1). in the present case, it is not clear whether the [62] psppa and the regulation contain sufficient lan- guage to satisfy the three certainties. for example, the statutory framework does not identify a benefi- ciary for the portfolio assets. une « fiducie véritable » au sens du droit privé (voir bande et nation indiennes d’ermineskin c. canada, 2009 csc 9, [2009] 1 rcs 222, par. 72-79; gue- rin c. la reine, [1984] 2 rcs 335, p. 375, 378- 379 et 386; attorney general of british columbia c. esquimalt and nanaimo r. co., [1950] 1 dlr. 305 (cp), p. 314; waters’ law of trusts in canada, p. 31-33; hogg, monohan et wright, p. 370- 372). [61] de façon similaire, même lorsque des parties privées entendent créer une fiducie, il faut examiner soigneusement les relations en question afin d’en déter- miner la véritable nature aux fins fiscales. par exemple, la « simple fiducie » — dans le cadre de laquelle la seule obligation du fiduciaire consiste à transférer sur demande le bien au bénéficiaire — est généralement écartée aux fins fiscales (voir de mond c. la reine 1999 canlii 466 (cci);. m c cullity, « legal issues arising out of the use of business trusts in canada », dans t g youdan, dir., equity, fiduciaries and trusts (1989), 181, p. 187- 188; agence du revenu du canada, bulletin d’information technique sur la tps/tvh b-068 : simples fiducies, 20 janvier 1993 (en ligne); agence du revenu du canada, énoncé de politique p-015 sur la tps/tvh : le traitement des simples- fiducies en vertu de la loi sur la taxe d’accise, 20 juillet 1992 (en ligne); loi de l’impôt sur le revenu, lrc 1985, c 1 (5e suppl), par 104(1)). [62] dans le cas qui nous occupe, il est difficile de savoir si la psppa et le règlement comportent des dispositions suffisamment étoffées pour que la pré- sence des trois certitudes soit établie. par exemple, le cadre législatif ne désigne pas de bénéficiaire pour les actifs des portefeuilles. [63] canada argues that the existence of a benefi- ciary is implied by the words “held in trust” in s. 4(1) of the regulation. in its view, a trust relationship cannot exist unless an entity other than bci holds beneficial title to the portfolio assets. canada further submits that the statutory framework makes clear that neither the crown nor bci is the beneficial owner of the assets. canada also describes the portfolios as “conceptually similar to a mutual fund trust”, a rec- ognized form of a common law trust which appears to be taxable under the eta: af, at para. 78; waters’ law of trusts in canada, at pp. 578- 602; ci. mutual [63] le canada soutient que les mots [traduction] « détenus en fiducie » au par. 4(1) du règle ment sous- entendent l’existence d’un bénéficiaire. à son avis, il ne peut y avoir de relation fiduciaire à moins qu’une entité autre que bci ne soit le titulaire du titre bénéfi- ciaire sur les actifs des porte feuilles. le canada ajoute qu’il ressort clairement du cadre législatif que ni la couronne ni bci n’est le propriétaire bénéficiaire de ces éléments d’actif. le canada décrit les portefeuilles comme étant [traduction] « semblables sur le plan conceptuel à des fiducies de fonds communs de pla- cement », c’est-à-dire une forme reconnue de fiducie 594 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. funds inc. v. canada, [1997] gstc 84 (tcc), at pp. 84-20 to 84-21, var’d [1999] 2 fc 613 (ca). [64] the problem with these arguments is that can- ada interprets the legislature’s use of the words “held in trust” as necessarily requiring the existence of a private law trust relationship. however, a statutory trust is not bound by ordinary trust principles: first vancouver finance v. mnr, 2002 scc 49, [2002] 2 scr 720, at para 34. it may well be that the province modelled the portfolios after a private law structure. and it would certainly be open to the prov- ince to bind bci to a trust relationship in the private law sense. however, such a conclusion requires an evaluation of whether the three certainties are met, not simply a reference to the phrase “held in trust.” [65] to summarize, in order for the portfolios to fall within the meaning of “a trust” in part ix of the eta, they must meet the common law require- ments. if the portfolios are not common law trusts, and they are not captured by any other provision of the eta, then bci is simply managing the assets it owns and no taxable transaction exists. whether a private law trust exists here is beyond the scope of this appeal. the shared assumption of the parties in this appeal was that the portfolios were a “trust” for the purposes of eta. therefore, no submissions were made as to this specific issue. given the incomplete record as well as my conclusion that s. 125 of the constitution act, 1867, immunizes the portfolios from taxation, it is unnecessary to decide the issue in this case. nevertheless, for the purpose of deter- mining the main issue in this appeal — whether bci enjoys constitutional immunity — i will proceed as if the portfolios are “a trust” within the meaning of part ix of the eta. on this assumption, bci would hold the portfolio assets in trust for the benefit of the unit holders. de common law qui semble être assujettie à la taxe en vertu de la lta (ma, par. 78; waters’ law of trusts in canada, p. 578- 602; ci. mutual funds inc. c canada, [1997] gstc 84 (cci), p. 84-20 à 84-21, mod. par [1999] 2 cf 613 (ca)). [64] le problème que posent ces arguments est que le canada interprète l’emploi par le législateur des mots [traduction] « détenus en fiducie » comme supposant nécessairement l’existence d’une relation de fiduciaire de droit privé. cependant, les règles habituelles applicables aux fiducies ne lient pas les fiducies d’origine législative (first vancouver fi- nance c. mrn, 2002 csc 49, [2002] 2 rcs 720, par 34). il se peut fort bien que la province ait créé les portefeuilles en s’inspirant d’une structure du droit privé. et il serait sans doute loisible à la pro- vince d’imposer à bci les contraintes d’une relation fiduciaire au sens du droit privé. toutefois, une telle conclusion nécessite une évaluation à savoir si les trois certitudes sont respectées, et non simplement une mention de l’expression « détenus en fiducie ». [65] en résumé, pour que les portefeuilles soient considérés comme une « fiducie » au sens de la par- tie ix de la lta, ils doivent respecter les exigences de la common law. si les portefeuilles ne sont pas des fidu- cies de common law et qu’ils ne sont visés par aucune autre disposition de la lta, bci gère simplement les actifs qui lui appartiennent et il n’y a aucune opération taxable. la question de savoir s’il existe une fiducie de droit privé en l’espèce dépasse le cadre du présent pourvoi. les parties dans l’affaire qui nous occupe avaient comme postulat commun que les portefeuilles constituaient une « fiducie » pour l’application de la lta. par conséquent, aucun argument n’a été présenté sur cette question précise. eu égard au dossier incom- plet et à ma conclusion selon laquelle les portefeuilles bénéficiaient de l’immunité fiscale en application de l’art. 125 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, il n’est pas nécessaire de répondre à la question en l’espèce. néanmoins, afin de trancher la principale question qui se pose dans le présent pourvoi, soit celle de savoir si bci bénéficie de l’immunité constitutionnelle, je vais partir du principe que les portefeuilles constituent une « fiducie » au sens de la partie ix de la lta. dans cette hypothèse, bci détiendrait les actifs du portefeuille en fiducie au profit des détenteurs d’unités. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 595 (2) section 125: constitutional immunity from (2) article 125 : l’immunité fiscale constitution- taxation nelle [66] section 125 of the constitution act, 1867, states: [66] l’article 125 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 est ainsi libellé : 125. no lands or property belonging to canada or any province shall be liable to taxation. 125. nulle terre ou propriété appartenant au canada ou à aucune province en particulier ne sera sujette à la taxation. [67] section 125 exists “to prevent one level of government from appropriating to its own use the property of the other, or the fruits of that property”: reference re exported natural gas tax, [1982] 1 scr 1004, at p 1078. intergovernmental immu- nity from taxation grants each level of government operational space to govern without interference. it also prevents one group of elected representatives from dictating how another legislative body should allocate the financial resources under its control: westbank first nation v. british columbia hydro and power authority, [1999] 3 scr 134, at pa- ras 17-19. in addition, s. 125 seeks to maintain the federal- provincial distribution of property set out in the constitution act, 1867: g v la. forest, the allocation of taxing power under the canadian constitution (2nd ed. 1981), at pp 182-83. [68] section 125 grants constitutional immunity from taxation when two requirements are met. first, the pith and substance of the impugned charge must constitute “taxation” within the meaning of ss. 91(3) or 92(2) of the constitution act, 1867. regulatory charges or user fees fall outside the scope of s. 125: westbank, at para.  31; exported natural gas, at p 1068. second, the subject matter of the tax must be property belonging to the federal crown in the case of a tax imposed by the provincial legislature and to the provincial crown in the case of a tax imposed by parliament: exported natural gas, at pp 1078-79. where these two prerequisites are met, s. 125 applies and renders otherwise valid taxation provisions inapplicable in respect of crown property: constitution act, 1982, s. 52(1); exported natural gas, at p 1067. [67] l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125 vise « à empê- cher un palier de gouvernement de s’approprier, pour son propre usage, les biens de l’autre palier de gouver- nement ou les fruits de ces biens » (renvoi relatif à la taxe sur le gaz naturel exporté, [1982] 1 rcs 1004, p 1078). l’immunité fiscale intergouvernementale accorde à chaque ordre de gouvernement l’espace opérationnel nécessaire pour gouverner sans interven- tion externe. elle empêche également un groupe de représentants élus de dicter à un autre organe législatif la façon de répartir les ressources financières dont il a le contrôle (première nation de westbank c. british columbia hydro and power authority, [1999] 3 rcs. 134, par 17-19). en outre, l’art. 125 a pour but de pré- server la répartition des biens entre les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux énoncée dans la loi constitu- tionnelle de 1867 (g v la forest,. the allocation of taxing power under the canadian constitution (2e éd. 1981), p. 182- 183). [68] l’article 125 confère l’immunité fiscale cons- titutionnelle lorsque deux conditions sont réunies. d’abord, le prélèvement contesté, de par son ca- ractère véritable, doit viser la « taxation » au sens du par. 91(3) ou 92(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. les redevances de nature réglementaire et les frais d’utilisation ne sont pas visés par l’art. 125 (westbank, par. 31; gaz naturel exporté, p 1068). ensuite, la taxe doit viser des biens appartenant à la couronne fédérale dans le cas d’une taxe imposée par la législature provinciale, et des biens appartenant à la couronne provinciale dans le cas d’une taxe im- posée par le parlement (gaz naturel exporté, p. 1078- 1079). lorsque ces deux conditions préalables sont établies, l’art. 125 s’applique et rend inapplicables les dispositions fiscales par ailleurs valides à l’égard des biens de la couronne (loi constitutionnelle de 1982, par. 52(1); gaz naturel exporté, p 1067). 596 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. [69] for the reasons that follow, i conclude that the eta’s mechanism for imposing gst on the portfo- lios would result in crown property being subject to taxation. therefore, s. 125 of the constitution act, 1867, renders the relevant provisions of part ix of the eta inapplicable in respect of the portfolios. [70] there is no question that the federal gst falls squarely within the meaning of “taxation” in s. 91(3) of the constitution act, 1867: gst reference, at pp 467-71. for the second requirement, as a stat- utory crown agent, bci enjoys the same consti- tutional immunity in respect of its property as the provincial crown does: westbank, at para. 1; see also city of halifax v. halifax harbour commissioners, [1935] scr 215;. re canadian broadcasting corp. assessment, [1938] 4 dlr 591 (ont. co. ct.), aff’d [1938] 4 dlr 764 (ont. ca). as such, this appeal turns on whether the property made liable for tax under the eta is property “belonging to” bci within the meaning of s 125. [71] courts have long held that s. 125 does not protect private interests from being taxed, even if the crown also has an interest in the property: see, eg,. calgary & edmonton land co. v. attorney- general of alberta (1911), 45 scr 170 (purchaser of federal lands liable for provincial tax despite the fact that canada still held bare legal title because the patent had not yet been issued); smith v. rur. mun. of vermillion hills (1916), 30 dlr 83 (pc) (lessee of federal lands liable for provincial tax levied on his leasehold); city of vancouver v. attorney- general of canada, [1944] scr 23 (legal owner of land taxed despite the fact that the crown leased the land and erected buildings on it); phillips and taylor v. city of sault ste. marie, [1954] scr 404 (federal employees living in houses owned by canada were liable for provincial tax payable by tenants of crown property). [69] pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclus que le mécanisme prévu dans la lta pour imposer la tps sur les portefeuilles aurait pour effet d’assujettir les biens de la couronne à la taxation. en conséquence, l’art. 125 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 rend inapplicables les dispositions pertinentes de la par- tie ix de la lta en ce qui a trait aux portefeuilles. [70] il ne fait aucun doute que la tps fédérale re- lève directement du sens donné au terme « taxation » que l’on trouve au par. 91(3) de la loi constitution- nelle de 1867 (renvoi relatif à la tps, p. 467- 471). pour ce qui est de la deuxième condition, en tant que mandataire légal de la couronne, bci jouit de la même immunité constitutionnelle à l’égard de ses biens que la couronne provinciale (westbank, par. 1; voir également city of halifax  c. halifax harbour commissioners, [1935] rcs 215; re canadian broadcasting corp. assessment, [1938] 4 dlr 591 (c. cté ont.), conf. par [1938] 4 dlr. 764 (ca ont)). en conséquence, le présent pour- voi porte sur la question de savoir si les biens as- sujettis à la taxe sous le régime de la lta sont des biens « appartenant » à bci aux termes de l’art 125. [71] les tribunaux reconnaissent depuis long- temps que l’art. 125 n’empêche pas la taxation des intérêts privés, même si la couronne détient elle aussi un intérêt dans le bien (voir, p ex, cal gary & edmonton land co. c. attorney- general of alberta (1911), 45 rcs 170 (l’acquéreur de bien- fonds fédéraux a été tenu de payer la taxe provinciale même si le canada avait conservé le simple titre en common law parce que les lettres patentes n’avaient pas encore été délivrées); smith  c.  rur mun of vermillion hills (1916), 30  dlr  83  (cp) (le locataire de bien- fonds fédéraux a été tenu de payer la taxe provinciale prélevée sur sa tenure à bail); city of vancouver c. attorney- general of canada, [1944] rcs 23 (une taxe a été imposée au pro- priétaire en common law d’un bien- fonds malgré le fait que la couronne avait loué le bien- fonds et construit des immeubles sur celui-ci); phillips and taylor c. city of sault ste. marie, [1954] rcs 404 (les employés fédéraux habitant dans des maisons appartenant au canada ont été tenus de payer la taxe provinciale imposée aux locataires des biens de la couronne)). [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 597 [72] however, the common thread in all these cases is that the taxing statute successfully captured a pri- vate interest in the property that was distinct from the crown’s interest. for example, in calgary & edmonton land co., the provincial statute imposed tax on “any person who has any right, title or estate whatsoever or any interest other than that of a mere occupant in any land”. the private purchaser’s inter- est in the land indisputably fell within this definition: pp 185-86. in the words of davies j., “[t]he interest of the crown whatever it might have been could not be taxed, but the beneficial interest of the appellants certainly was not exempted under [s. 125]”: p. 179 (emphasis added). [73] the legislation in smith contained similar comprehensive definitions which captured the les- see’s interest in crown land: see (1913), 6 sask. lr 366 (sc en banc). and in phillips and taylor, s. 32 of the assessment act, rso 1950, c. 24, imposed tax liability on “the tenant of land owned by the crown” — “tenant” was further defined as “any person who uses land belonging to the crown as or for the purposes of, or in connection with his residence”: p 406. because the “tenant” was the one who was liable to pay the tax, s. 125 was not engaged. [74] canada submits that calgary & edmonton land co. and smith (en banc) demonstrate that s. 125 only applies if the provincial crown (or bci) is the beneficial owner of the portfolio assets. since the statutory framework makes clear that bci is not the beneficiary, canada says s. 125 does not apply. [72] cependant, toutes ces décisions présentent un dénominateur commun : dans chacune d’elles, la loi fiscale s’appliquait à un intérêt privé dans le bien qui était distinct de l’intérêt de la couronne. par exemple, dans l’arrêt calgary & edmonton land co., la loi provinciale imposait une taxe à [traduc- tion] « toute personne détenant quelque droit ou titre que ce soit, ou un intérêt autre que celui du simple occupant d’un bien- fonds ». l’intérêt de l’acqué- reur privé dans le bien- fonds était incontestablement visé par cette définition (p. 185- 186). comme l’a expliqué le juge davies : [traduction] « l’intérêt de la couronne quel qu’il soit ne pouvait pas être taxé, mais l’intérêt bénéficiaire des appelants n’était certainement pas soustrait à la taxation en vertu de [l’art 125] » (p 179 (je souligne)). [73] la loi examinée dans l’arrêt smith compor- tait des définitions exhaustives similaires qui englo- baient l’intérêt du locataire dans le bien- fonds de la couronne (voir (1913), 6 sask. lr 366 (cs en formation plénière)). de plus, dans l’affaire phillips and taylor, l’art. 32 de la loi de l’ontario intitulée the assessment act, rso 1950, c. 24, assujettis- sait à la taxation [traduction] « le locataire d’un bien- fonds qui est la propriété de la couronne », le terme « locataire » était en outre défini comme [traduction] « la personne qui utilise un bien- fonds appartenant à la couronne à titre de résidence ou à des fins connexes » (p 406). étant donné que le « locataire » était la personne assujettie au paiement de la taxe, l’art. 125 ne s’appliquait pas. [74] de l’avis du canada, il ressort des arrêts cal- gary & edmonton land co. et smith (cs en for- mation plénière) que l’art. 125 ne s’applique que si la couronne provinciale (ou bci) est le propriétaire bénéficiaire des actifs détenus dans les portefeuilles. étant donné que le cadre législatif établit sans conteste que bci n’est pas le bénéficiaire, le canada affirme que l’art. 125 ne s’applique pas. [75] with respect, this asks the wrong question. rather, the issue is whether the taxing statute seeks to tax the crown’s interest in the property. in the cases relied on by canada, the tax was levied on the interest of the beneficiary, not the interest of the crown. these cases stand for the proposition that a [75] soit dit en toute déférence, j’estime que ce n’est pas la question qu’il faut se poser. il faut plu- tôt se demander si la loi fiscale vise à imposer une taxe sur l’intérêt de la couronne dans le bien. dans les décisions invoquées par le canada, la taxe était prélevée sur l’intérêt du bénéficiaire, et non sur celui 598 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. private beneficial interest can be taxed despite the existence of legal title in the crown. but if the tax is imposed on the crown’s interest in the property, then constitutional immunity applies. [76] pursuant to s.  4(1) of the regulation and s 181(3) of the psppa, bci, as trustee, legally owns the assets held in the portfolios. in this case, the eta places the burden of the tax on the portfolio assets to which bci holds legal title. bci, a crown agent, has thus successfully shown that it has an ownership interest in the property which bears the federal tax. i recognize that the beneficiaries of the trust may also be seen as bearing the burden of the tax. however, the key point is that the provincial crown’s interest is being taxed under federal law, which is not permitted by s 125. [77] section 125 is directly engaged when one level of government attempts to require the other to use what is legally crown property to pay tax. this is the case even if the crown holds the property as trustee unless there is another distinct private bene- ficial ownership interest that is the subject of the tax. accordingly, i agree with the intervener the attorney general of alberta that unless the tax is imposed di- rectly on the beneficiaries or their beneficial interest, the protection of s. 125 extends to the crown when it acts as a trustee. de la couronne. ces décisions permettent d’affirmer qu’un intérêt bénéficiaire privé peut faire l’objet d’une taxe malgré l’existence d’un titre en com- mon law de la couronne. cependant, si la taxe est imposée sur l’intérêt de la couronne dans le bien, l’immunité constitutionnelle s’applique. [76] suivant le par. 4(1) du règlement et le par 181(3) de la psppa, bci — en qualité de fiduciaire — est propriétaire en common law des éléments d’actif dé- tenus dans les portefeuilles. en l’espèce, la lta fait porter le fardeau de la taxe aux actifs détenus dans les portefeuilles sur lesquels bci détient le titre en com- mon law. en qualité de mandataire de la couronne, bci a donc réussi à établir qu’elle est titulaire d’un intérêt de propriété sur les biens qui supportent le far- deau de la taxe fédérale. je reconnais qu’on peut aussi considérer que les bénéficiaires de la fiducie supportent la charge de la taxe. toutefois, l’essentiel, c’est que l’intérêt de la couronne provinciale est taxé en vertu du droit fédéral, et que cela est interdit par l’art 125. [77] l’article 125 entre directement en jeu lors- qu’un ordre de gouvernement tente d’obliger l’autre à se servir de ce qui constitue légalement un bien de la couronne pour payer une taxe. il en est ainsi même si la couronne détient le bien en qualité de fiduciaire, à moins qu’il n’y ait un autre intérêt bé- néficiaire privé et distinct qui est assujetti à la taxe. en conséquence, je conviens avec l’intervenant, le procureur général de l’alberta, qu’à moins que la taxe ne soit imposée directement aux bénéficiaires, ou sur leur intérêt bénéficiaire, la couronne jouit de l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125 lorsqu’elle agit en qualité de fiduciaire. [78] this conclusion is consistent with the early case of quirt v. the queen (1891), 19 scr 510. in that case, the property of an insolvent bank was vested in the federal crown as trustee. this court unanimously held that the property vested in the crown could not be taxed: at pp. 514 (per ritchie cj), 518 (per strong j.), and 525 (per patterson j). while the crown also had a beneficial interest in the bank’s assets as its largest creditor, both strong j. and osler ja at the court of appeal held that the crown’s interest as trustee was sufficient for crown immunity to apply: see regina [78] cette conclusion concorde avec une ancienne dé- cision de notre cour, l’arrêt quirt c. the queen (1891), 19 rcs 510. dans cette affaire, les biens d’une banque insolvable avaient été dévolus à la couronne fédérale en qualité de fiduciaire. notre cour a décidé, à l’unanimité, que les biens dévolus à la couronne ne pouvaient pas être taxés (p. 514 (le juge en chef ritchie), p. 518 (le juge strong) et p. 525 (le juge patterson)). même si la couronne détenait également un intérêt bénéficiaire dans les actifs de la banque puisqu’elle était son plus im- portant créancier, le juge strong et le juge osler en cour [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 599 v. county of wellington (1890), 17 o a r 421, at p 444. in exported natural gas, the majority of this [79] court wrote, “[t]he fundamental constitutional pro- tection framed by s. 125 cannot depend on subtle nuances of form”: p 1078. relying on this statement, canada maintains that portfolio assets purchased with monies from the pension boards (which canada says are private, not public, bodies) do not belong to the crown within the meaning of s 125. while i agree with the general principle that constitutional protections should not turn on legal formalities, i disagree with canada on its application to this case for two reasons. [80] first, in exported natural gas, the court em- phasized a substantive approach in giving s. 125 a broad and generous interpretation, not a narrow one. that case involved the federal government’s attempt to impose an export levy on natural gas owned and produced by the province of alberta. the federal gov- ernment argued that s. 125 was not engaged because the tax resulted from alberta’s choice to engage in the commercial trading of natural gas. it was thus not a tax on crown property but rather on a transaction. the majority of the court rejected this formalistic approach and held that s. 125 applied because, in substance, the federal government was attempting to “exact a tax from the provincial crown in respect of its property”: pp 1078-80. exported natural gas thus stands for the proposition that s. 125 immunity does not depend on the label assigned to a particular charge. but the situation in the present appeal is reversed. here, canada argues that the court should disregard the fact that bci would be required to pay the tax using assets it legally owns because, in sub- stance, a non- crown entity would bear the burden of the tax. in my view, exported natural gas does not dictate such a result. d’appel avaient conclu que l’intérêt de la couronne en qualité de fiduciaire était suffisant pour que l’immunité de la couronne s’applique (voir regina c. county of wellington (1890), 17 oar 421, p 444). [79] dans l’arrêt gaz naturel exporté, les juges ma- joritaires de notre cour ont écrit que « [l]a protection fondamentale qu’offre l’art. 125 de la constitution ne peut pas reposer sur des nuances subtiles en ce qui concerne la forme » (p 1078). se fondant sur ces pro- pos, le canada soutient que les actifs des portefeuilles achetés à l’aide des fonds provenant des conseils des régimes de retraite (qui, selon lui, sont des orga- nismes privés et non publics) n’appartiennent pas à la couronne au sens de l’art 125. même si je souscris au principe général selon lequel l’applicabilité des protections constitutionnelles ne devrait pas dépendre de formalités juridiques, je ne partage pas l’avis du canada quant à l’application de ce principe à la pré- sente affaire pour les deux motifs qui suivent. [80] d’abord, dans l’arrêt gaz naturel exporté, la cour a adopté une approche axée sur le fond pour donner à l’art. 125 une interprétation large et généreuse plutôt qu’une interprétation restrictive. dans cette af- faire, le gouvernement fédéral tentait d’imposer une taxe à l’exportation sur le gaz naturel appartenant à la province de l’alberta et produit par celle-ci. le gouver- nement fédéral soutenait que l’art. 125 ne s’appliquait pas parce que la taxe découlait de la décision de l’al- berta de faire le commerce du gaz naturel. il ne s’agis- sait donc pas d’une taxe sur un bien de la couronne, mais d’une taxe sur une opération. la cour a rejeté à la majorité cette approche formaliste et conclu que l’art. 125 s’appliquait parce que, essentiellement, le gouvernement fédéral tentait « d’exiger le paiement par la couronne du chef de la province d’une taxe sur sa propriété » (p. 1078- 1080). l’arrêt gaz naturel exporté permet donc d’affirmer que l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125 ne dépend pas du qualificatif attribué à un prélèvement précis. toutefois, en l’espèce, la situation est inversée : le canada soutient que la cour ne devrait pas tenir compte du fait que bci serait tenue de payer la taxe au moyen des actifs dont il est propriétaire en common law parce que, essentiellement, une entité qui n’est pas une société de la couronne assumerait le fardeau de la taxe. à mon avis, l’arrêt gaz naturel exporté ne commande pas un tel résultat. 600 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. [81] second, canada’s approach to determining whether trust property falls within s. 125 treats legal ownership as irrelevant. according to canada, s. 125 applies to property “held in trust” by the crown only when it is clear that the crown is the beneficial owner. however, legal ownership is clearly a prop- erty interest and nothing in s. 125 warrants reading the phrase “property belonging to canada or any province” as requiring that property be beneficially owned by the crown. [82] canada further submits that s. 125 immunity applies only to the extent that the property held by the crown agent is available to discharge a govern- ment function. applying this test, canada says that the monies invested by the public sector pension boards fall outside the scope of s 125. [83] the difficulty with this submission is that it disregards the government objective underlying the portfolios’ existence. the portfolios were created to allow the province and other authorized entities to pool their monies for diversified investment. this purpose is underscored by the active role that bci plays as trustee of this statutory trust. bci has broad discretion over the investment and management of the portfolios, including the distribution and re- investment of any income: regulation, ss. 4(2) and 11. bci may also establish or terminate portfolios as it sees fit: regulation, ss. 2 and 14. this structure makes sense given the province’s interest in ensur- ing the public sector pension funds’ investments are managed well. for example, if the pension funds have a surplus, there may be a contribution holi- day. if there is a pension shortfall, the province’s consolidated revenue fund will satisfy any portion attributable to the government: psppa, s 251. [81] ensuite, selon la démarche préconisée par le canada pour déterminer si un bien en fiducie est visé par l’art. 125, la détention du titre de propriété en common law n’est pas pertinente. de l’avis du canada, l’art. 125 ne s’applique aux biens [tra- duction] « détenus en fiducie » par la couronne seulement lorsqu’il est évident que celle-ci en est le propriétaire bénéficiaire. toutefois, la propriété en common law est sans conteste un intérêt de pro- priété et rien dans l’art. 125 ne justifie d’interpréter l’expression « propriété appartenant au canada ou à [une] province en particulier » comme exigeant que la couronne détienne la propriété à titre bénéficiaire. [82] le canada ajoute que l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125 ne s’applique que lorsque les biens déte- nus par le mandataire de la couronne peuvent être utilisés pour l’exercice d’une fonction gouvernemen- tale. appliquant ce critère, le canada affirme que les sommes investies par les conseils des régimes de retraite du secteur public ne sont pas visées par l’art 125. [83] cet argument pose une difficulté, car il fait fi de l’objectif du gouvernement qui sous- tend l’exis- tence des portefeuilles : ceux-ci ont été créés pour permettre à la province et à d’autres entités autori- sées de mettre en commun leurs capitaux en vue de diversifier leurs placements. le rôle actif que joue bci en qualité de fiduciaire de cette fiducie d’ori- gine législative illustre cet objectif. bci dispose d’un large pouvoir discrétionnaire en ce qui a trait à l’investissement et à la gestion des portefeuilles, notamment la distribution et le réinvestissement des revenus (règlement, par. 4(2) et art 11). bci peut également constituer des portefeuilles ou y mettre fin selon ce qu’il juge indiqué (règlement, art. 2 et 14). cette structure est logique compte tenu de l’intérêt de la province à s’assurer que les investissements des fonds de pension du secteur public sont bien gérés. par exemple, en cas d’excédent dans les fonds de pension, il pourrait y avoir exonération de cotisa- tions. en cas de déficit, le montant correspondant à la portion attribuable au gouvernement sera prélevé sur le trésor de la province (psppa, art 251). in short, these features demonstrate that the [84] portfolios, including the british columbia legislature’s [84] en résumé, ces caractéristiques montrent que les portefeuilles, y compris le choix du législateur [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 601 choice to vest legal title of the portfolio assets in bci as trustee, fall within the “operational space” that s. 125 immunity from taxation affords to the province and bci. clearly, bci’s operations would be affected by imposing federal tax on the portfolios, thereby reduc- ing significantly the investment assets under bci’s control. while it is unnecessary to determine the outer bounds of s. 125 in this case, these aspects of bci’s statutory mandate indicate that its control over the assets goes far beyond that of a bare trustee (as was the case in calgary & edmonton land co) i leave for another day the question of whether s. 125 would apply to the activities of a crown trustee which do not involve an appropriate governmental function. [85] the british columbia legislature’s purpose in creating the portfolios also answers canada’s ob- jection that s. 125 immunity would confer an inap- propriate tax advantage on the unit holders. while canada may disagree with the legislature’s decision to create this investment structure, s. 125 gives both the federal and provincial governments freedom to carry out their constitutionally assigned mandates: westbank, at para 17. subject to constitutional limits on its authority, the legislature is free to pursue its own policy objectives, even if the federal government has different priorities. de la colombie- britannique d’attribuer à bci, en sa qualité de fiduciaire, le titre de propriété en com- mon law sur les actifs des portefeuilles, font partie de « l’espace opérationnel » que l’immunité fiscale prévue à l’art. 125 confère à la province et à bci. de toute évidence, l’imposition d’une taxe fédérale sur les portefeuilles toucherait les activités de bci, diminuant ainsi considérablement la valeur des actifs de placement relevant du contrôle de bci. même s’il n’est pas nécessaire de circonscrire avec préci- sion la portée de l’art. 125 en l’espèce, ces aspects du mandat que la loi confère à bci indiquent que son contrôle sur les actifs va bien au- delà de celui qu’exerce un simple fiduciaire (comme c’était le cas dans l’affaire calgary & edmonton land co). je re- mets à une autre occasion l’examen de la question de savoir si l’art. 125 s’appliquerait aux activités d’un fiduciaire de la couronne qui ne portent pas sur une fonction gouvernementale appropriée. [85] l’objectif que visait le législateur de la colombie- britannique lorsqu’il a créé les portefeuilles répond également à l’objection du canada selon laquelle l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125 conférerait un avan- tage fiscal indu aux détenteurs d’unités. bien que le canada ne souscrive peut- être pas à la décision du législateur provincial de créer cette structure d’in- vestissement, l’art. 125 donne tant au gouvernement fédéral qu’au gouvernement provincial la liberté né- cessaire pour exercer les fonctions que leur confère la constitution (westbank, par 17). sous réserve des limites constitutionnelles à sa compétence, la légis- lature peut poursuivre ses propres objectifs de prin- cipe, même si le gouvernement fédéral a des priorités différentes. [86] canada’s reliance on tax fairness between crown and non- crown suppliers as a reason not to apply s. 125 is also difficult to square with the existence of the rta. according to the rta’s pre- amble, one of its primary purposes is to address competitive inequities between government and non- government suppliers if crown immunity from taxation depended on whether it would create competitive inequity, there would be no need for voluntary agreements such as the rta. as such, neither fairness nor the possibility of hindering tax neutrality under the federal eta provides any basis [86] le fait que le canada invoque l’équité fiscale entre les fournisseurs de la couronne et les autres four- nisseurs pour justifier la non- application de l’art. 125 est aussi difficile à concilier avec l’existence du rta. selon le préambule de celui-ci, un de ses principaux objets est la lutte contre les iniquités sur le plan de la concurrence entre les fournisseurs du gouvernement et les autres fournisseurs. si l’immunité fiscale de la couronne dépendait du risque d’injustice pouvant en découler sur le plan de la concurrence, il ne serait pas nécessaire de conclure des accords volontaires comme le rta. en conséquence, ni les considérations liées 602 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. for restricting the constitutional protection granted to the province by s 125. in summary, the eta uses a legal fiction to [87] require a trust to pay tax on taxable services provided to it by its trustee. however, when the trustee is a provincial crown agent, this mechanism runs afoul of s. 125 because it imposes tax on property legally owned by the crown. the eta does not impose gst on a distinct private beneficial ownership interest in this case. therefore, the eta is constitutionally inapplicable to the portfolios. à l’équité ni le risque de compromettre la neutralité fiscale aux termes de la lta fédérale ne constituent des raisons valables de restreindre la protection consti- tutionnelle que l’art. 125 confère à la province. [87] en résumé, la lta recourt à une fiction juri- dique pour contraindre une fiducie à payer une taxe sur les services taxables que lui fournit son fiduciaire. cependant, lorsque le fiduciaire est un mandataire de la couronne provinciale, ce mécanisme contrevient à l’art. 125 parce qu’il impose une taxe sur des biens appartenant en common law à la couronne. la lta n’impose pas la tps sur un intérêt de propriété béné- ficiaire privé et distinct en l’espèce. en conséquence, la lta est constitutionnellement inapplicable aux portefeuilles. c the effect of intergovernmental tax agreements c l’effet des accords fiscaux intergouvernemen- on a statutory agent taux sur les mandataires légaux [88] bci, as appellant on the cross- appeal, submits that the court of appeal made two errors in holding that it is bound by the rta and the citca. first, bci argues that the agreements are political, not le- gal, in nature — they have not been implemented by legislation and lack the features necessary to demon- strate intent to create legal obligations. second, even if the agreements place obligations on the province, these commitments do not extend to bci. in its view, s. 16(6) of the psppa is of no assistance because the agreements do not create tax liability for the province, and thus bci, within the meaning of that section. the province disagrees, arguing that the agreements create binding obligations which apply to bci as a statutory agent. canada suggests the agreements may create such obligations. [88] bci, en qualité d’appelante dans le pourvoi incident, soutient que la cour d’appel a commis deux erreurs lorsqu’elle a conclu que bci était liée par le rta et le citca. premièrement, bci fait valoir que les accords sont de nature politique et non juridique : ils n’ont pas été mis en œuvre par une loi et ne possèdent pas les caractéristiques nécessaires pour démontrer que les parties avaient l’intention de créer des obligations juridiques. deuxièmement, même si les accords imposent des obligations à la province, ces engagements ne lient pas bci de l’avis de celle-ci, le par. 16(6) de la psppa n’est pas pertinent, parce que les accords n’assujettissent pas la province — et, par conséquent, bci — à la taxe aux termes de cette disposition. la province n’est pas de cet avis et soutient que les accords créent des obligations contraignantes qui s’appliquent à bci en sa qualité de mandataire légal. le canada laisse entendre que les accords pourraient créer de telles obligations. [89] the cross- appeal requires this court to de- termine whether bci is subject to the rta and the citca. this requires an assessment of whether the agreements impose legal obligations on the provin- cial crown, and if so, whether s. 16(6) of the psppa extends these obligations to bci. stated differently, the question throughout these proceedings has been [89] pour trancher le pourvoi incident, notre cour doit décider si bci est assujettie au rta et au citca. pour ce faire, elle doit évaluer si les accords imposent des obligations légales à la couronne provinciale et, dans l’affirmative, si le par. 16(6) de la psppa étend la portée de ces obligations à bci. en d’autres termes, la question qui s’est posée tout au long de [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 603 whether the agreements have the legal effect of re- moving the immunity from tax that bci would oth- erwise enjoy as a statutory agent. on this issue, the chambers judge’s order simply declared that bci is “bound by the provisions of the rta and citca respecting [the portfolio] assets” (para 173). the details of any specific obligations under the agree- ments are beyond the scope of the cross- appeal. [90] i would dismiss the cross- appeal. i agree with willcock ja that the language of the agreements demonstrates that the province and canada intended to create mutually binding obligations. although otherwise constitutionally immune from the eta’s operation, the province voluntarily agreed to pay gst to canada. i also agree with the court of appeal that s. 16(6) of the psppa is broad enough to encom- pass the liability assumed by the province under the agreements. because s. 16(6) ties bci’s tax immu- nities and obligations to those of the province, bci is generally subject to the obligations set out in the agreements to the same extent that the province is. l’instance est celle de savoir si les accords ont l’effet juridique d’écarter l’immunité fiscale dont bci joui- rait par ailleurs en qualité de mandataire légal. sur ce point, le juge siégeant en son cabinet a simplement déclaré dans son ordonnance que bci était [traduc- tion] « liée par les dispositions du rta et du citca concernant les actifs [détenus dans les portefeuilles] » (par 173). les détails des obligations spécifiques découlant des accords dépassent le cadre du pourvoi incident. [90] je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi incident. je conviens avec le juge willcock de la cour d’appel qu’il ressort du libellé des accords que la province et le canada avaient l’intention de créer des obli- gations mutuellement contraignantes. bien qu’elle jouisse par ailleurs de l’immunité constitutionnelle en ce qui concerne l’application de la lta, la pro- vince a accepté de son plein gré de payer la tps au canada. à l’instar de la cour d’appel, je reconnais également que le par. 16(6) de la psppa a une portée assez large pour englober l’obligation assumée par la province aux termes des accords. étant donné que le par. 16(6) rattache les immunités et obligations fiscales de bci à celles de la province, bci est gé- néralement assujettie aux obligations énoncées dans les accords dans la même mesure que la province. [91] there is no dispute that the respective minis- ters of finance exercised lawful authority when they entered into the agreements. the execution of both agreements by british columbia’s minister of fi- nance was authorized by order in council (citca: oic. no. 661/2009; rta: oic. no. 485/2010), pursuant to s. 4 of the ministry of intergovernmental relations act, rsbc 1996, c 303. in a similar fashion, ss. 32 and 33 of the federal- provincial fis- cal arrangements act, rsc 1985, c. f-8, authorize the federal minister of finance to enter into and carry out the requirements of reciprocal taxation agreements on behalf of canada. [91] nul ne conteste que les ministres des finances respectifs étaient légalement habilités à conclure les accords. la signature des deux accords par la mi- nistre des finances de la colombie- britannique a été autorisée par décret (citca : oic no 661/2009;. rta : oic no 485/2010), conformément à l’art. 4 de la ministry of intergovernmental relations act, rsbc 1996, c 303. dans le même ordre d’idées, les art. 32 et 33 de la loi sur les arrangements fis- caux entre le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces, lrc 1985, c. f-8, autorisent le ministre fédéral des finances à conclure des accords de réciprocité fiscale au nom du canada et à en appliquer les modalités. [92] as laskin cj made clear in reference re: anti- inflation act, [1976] 2 scr 373, the execution of an intergovernmental agreement by the proper sig- natory can make an agreement binding on the crown: at p. 433; see also northrop grumman overseas ser- vices corp v canada (attorney general), 2009 scc [92] comme l’a expliqué clairement le juge en chef laskin dans le renvoi relatif à la loi anti- inflation, [1976] 2 rcs 373, la couronne peut être liée par un accord intergouvernemental régulièrement signé (p. 433) (voir également northrop grumman over- seas services corp c canada (procureur général), 604 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. 50, [2009] 3 scr 309, at para 11. obviously, the legislature is entitled to enact legislation inconsistent with the government’s commitments under a prior agreement: reference re canada assistance plan (bc), [1991] 2 scr 525, at pp. 548-49; reference re pan- canadian securities regulation, 2018 scc 48, [2018] 3 scr 189, at paras. 62-71; see also s a kennett, “hard law, soft law and diplomacy: the emerging paradigm for intergovernmental co- operation in environmental assessment” (1993), 31 alta. l. rev. 644, at pp 653-54. however, this possibility does not prevent a court from determining the legal status of an intergovernmental agreement or interpreting its terms. in reference re canada assistance plan (bc),. sopinka j. described the difference between purely political questions, which cannot be answered by courts and those which have “a sufficient legal component to warrant the interven- tion of the judicial branch”: at p 545 in this case, the legal question is whether the agreements have the effect of modifying the rights and obligations of the province. [93] bci argues that the agreements do not have the force of law in british columbia because they have not been legislatively implemented: af on cross- appeal, at paras. 122- 123. i agree that legis- lation would be required to implement an intergov- ernmental agreement to the extent that it purports to modify provincial law: reference re: anti- inflation act, at p. 433; reference re pan- canadian securities regulation, at para 66. however, the issue in this case is narrower — it does not depend upon any mod- ification of provincial law. the issue here relates only to the nature of obligations voluntarily assumed by the province and whether those obligations extend to its statutory agent, bci. whether the agreements are “binding” on their signatories thus turns on whether the commitments they contain are legal or merely political in nature. 2009 csc 50, [2009] 3 rcs 309, par 11). bien entendu, une législature a le droit d’adopter une loi qui est incompatible avec des engagements pris par le gouvernement aux termes d’un accord antérieur (renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada (c-b), [1991] 2 rcs 525, p. 548- 549; renvoi relatif à la réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières, 2018 csc 48, [2018] 3 rcs. 189, par. 62-71; voir également s a kennett, « hard law, soft law and diplomacy : the emerging par- adigm for intergovernmental cooperation in envi- ronmental assessment » (1993), 31 alta l rev 644, p. 653- 654). toutefois, cette possibilité n’empêche pas le tribunal de déterminer le statut juridique d’un accord intergouvernemental ou d’en interpréter les modalités. dans le renvoi relatif au régime d’assis- tance publique du canada (c-b), le juge sopinka a expliqué la différence qui existe entre les questions purement politiques, qui ne peuvent être tranchées par les tribunaux, et celles qui « présentent un aspect suffisamment juridique pour justifier l’intervention des tribunaux » (p 545). en l’espèce, la question de droit qui se pose est de savoir si les accords ont pour effet de modifier les droits et obligations de la province. [93] bci soutient que les accords n’ont pas force de loi en colombie- britannique parce qu’ils n’ont pas été mis en œuvre par voie législative (ma pour le pourvoi incident, par. 122- 123). je conviens qu’une loi serait nécessaire pour mettre en œuvre un ac- cord intergouvernemental dans la mesure où il vise à modifier le droit provincial (renvoi relatif à la loi anti- inflation, p. 433; renvoi relatif à la réglementa- tion pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières, par 66). cependant, la question à trancher en l’espèce est plus restreinte, et elle ne dépend pas d’une modification du droit provincial. elle concerne uniquement la na- ture des obligations que la province a volontairement assumées et la mesure dans laquelle ces obligations valent aussi pour son mandataire légal, bci. la ques- tion de savoir si les accords sont « contraignants » pour leurs signataires dépend donc de la nature ju- ridique ou simplement politique des engagements qu’ils contiennent. intergovernmental agreements exist on a spec- [94] trum, ranging from the merely aspirational and political il existe toute une gamme d’accords intergou- [94] vernementaux, allant de ceux qui sont de simples [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 605 to those which resemble private law contracts and create legally enforceable obligations: see quebec (attorney general) v. moses, 2010 scc 17, [2010] 1 scr 557, at paras. 85-86, lebel and deschamps jj. (dissenting, but not on this point). as with private law contracts, intergovernmental agreements must be evaluated to determine whether the parties in- tended to create legal obligations: see esquimalt and nanaimo r. co., at pp. 311-12; south australia v. the commonwealth (1962), 108 clr 130 (hc). vœux pieux ou qui sont de nature politique jusqu’à ceux qui s’apparentent à des contrats de droit privé et qui créent des obligations juridiquement contrai- gnantes (voir québec (procureur général) c. moses, 2010 csc 17, [2010] 1 rcs 557, par. 85-86, les juges lebel et deschamps (dissidents, mais pas sur ce point)). comme pour tout contrat de droit privé, il faut analyser l’accord intergouvernemental pour sa- voir si les parties avaient l’intention de créer des obli- gations légales (voir esquimalt and nanaimo r. co., p. 311- 312; south australia c. the commonwealth (1962), 108 clr 130 (hc)). [95] various elements of an intergovernmental agree- ment may demonstrate an intention to create legal obligations: [95] divers éléments peuvent indiquer l’intention des parties de créer des obligations légales dans un accord intergouvernemental : • the subject matter: does the agreement deal with discrete commercial matters rather than broad questions of public policy? • l’objet : l’accord porte-t-il sur des questions commerciales précises plutôt que sur des ques- tions générales d’intérêt public? • the language used: do the terms of the agree- ment resemble a private law contract? for ex- ample, does it use mandatory language such as “shall” or “binding,” set out the duration of the agreement, or require audits or the publishing of financial statements? • the mechanism for resolving disputes: did the parties agree to refer disputes to arbitration or a designated court rather than resolving them by purely political means? • subsequent conduct: did the parties treat the agreement as binding, rely on it to their detri- ment or derive clear benefits from it? • les mots employés : la formulation de l’accord ressemble-t-elle à celle d’un contrat de droit privé? par exemple, est-ce que des obligations y sont exprimées, comme au moyen de l’em- ploi de l’indicatif présent; est-ce que la durée de l’accord est précisée, ou est-ce que l’accord exige des vérifications ou la production d’états financiers? • le mécanisme de règlement des différends  : les parties ont- elles convenu de soumettre leurs différends à l’arbitrage ou à un tribunal désigné plutôt que de les régler par des moyens purement politiques? • le comportement ultérieur des parties  : les parties ont- elles considéré l’accord comme contraignant, se sont- elles fondées sur celui-ci à leur détriment ou en ont- elles tiré des avan- tages clairs? see j. poirier, “intergovernmental agreements in canada: at the crossroads between law and pol- itics” in jp. meekison, h. telford and & h. lazar, eds., canada: the state of the federation 2002 — re- considering the institutions of canadian federalism (2004) 425, at pp. 430-34; kennett, at pp. 653-56; n. bankes, “co- operative federalism: third parties and intergovernmental agreements and arrange ments (voir j. poirier, « intergovernmental agreements in canada : at the crossroads between law and poli- tics », dans jp meekison,. h. telford et h. lazar, dir., canada : the state of the federation 2002 — re considering the institutions of canadian feder- alism (2004) 425, p. 430- 434; kennett, p. 653- 656; n. bankes, « co- operative federalism : third parties and intergovernmental agreements and arrangements 606 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. in canada and australia” (1991), 29 alta. l. rev. 792, at pp. 794 and 832; j. owen saunders, lnterjurisdic- tional issues in canadian water man agement (1988), at pp 95-99. i consider each factor in turn. in canada and australia » (1991), 29 alta l rev. 792, p. 794 et 832; j. owen saunders, lnterjurisdic- tional issues in canadian water management (1988), p 95-99). j’examinerai chacun de ces facteurs à tour de rôle. [96] in terms of the subject matter, the agreements deal with taxation, which is undoubtedly a question of government policy. however, each government’s commitment is limited to paying the existing sales taxes levied by the other government. the agree- ments do not involve the implementation of a new taxation regime or other broad policy goals. in ad- dition, the agreements are narrow in scope as they purport to apply only to canada, the province and their agents. [96] pour ce qui est de l’objet, les accords portent sur la taxation, ce qui est sans conteste une question de politique gouvernementale. toutefois, l’engagement de chaque gouvernement se limite au paiement des taxes de vente existantes perçues par l’autre gouver- nement. les accords ne prévoient ni la mise en œuvre d’un nouveau régime de taxation ni d’autres objectifs de principe généraux. de plus, les accords ont une portée restreinte car ils sont censés s’appliquer seule- ment au canada, à la province et à leurs mandataires. [97] as the court of appeal observed, the agree- ments set out detailed payment, collection and re- mittance obligations: paras 142-51. article 3 of the rta expressly states, “[t]his agreement is binding on canada, the province and their respective agents” (emphasis added). both set out a discrete time period during which the agreements are in force (rta, art. 15; citca, art. 42) and art. 15 of the rta spe- cifically refers to “rights or obligations which may have accrued to either party during the term of this agreement” (emphasis added). this language evinces an intention to agree to much more than merely “as- pirational” goals. [98] bci argues that the agreements must, at a minimum, contain a binding dispute resolution sys- tem in order to give rise to liability. otherwise, it says that the only consequences to a party for not honouring its commitments are political: af on cross- appeal, at para 165. [97] comme l’a fait remarquer la cour d’appel, les accords énoncent des obligations détaillées en matière de paiement, de perception et de versement (par. 142- 151). l’article 3 du rta prévoit expres- sément que [traduction] « [l]e présent accord lie le canada, la province et leurs mandataires respec- tifs » (je souligne). chacun des accords prévoit une période distincte durant laquelle il sera en vigueur (rta, art. 15; citca, art. 42), et l’art. 15 du rta renvoie spécifiquement aux « droits acquis ou [aux] obligations contractées par l’une ou l’autre des par- ties pendant la durée de l’application du présent accord » (je souligne). ce libellé témoigne de l’in- tention des parties de s’entendre sur bien plus que de simples « vœux pieux ». [98] bci fait valoir que les accords doivent, à tout le moins, comprendre un mécanisme contraignant de règlement des différends pour que la responsabilité des parties soit engagée. autrement, affirme-t-elle, les seules conséquences auxquelles s’expose la partie qui ne respecte pas ses engagements sont de nature politique (ma pour le pourvoi incident, par 165). [99] i am not persuaded that this is a decisive factor. as the court of appeal noted, commenta- tors have expressed varying views about the im- portance of a binding dispute resolution system: para. 148; see also k. horsman and g. morley, gov- ernment liability: law and practice (loose- leaf), at para 22040(3), citing d w mundell, “legal [99] je ne suis pas convaincue que ce facteur soit décisif. comme l’a souligné la cour d’appel, les commentateurs ont exprimé différents points de vue sur l’importance des mécanismes contraignants de règlement des différends (par. 148; voir également k. horsman et g. morley, government liability : law and practice (feuilles mobiles), par 22040(3), [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 607 nature of federal and provincial executive govern- ments: some comments on transactions between them” (1960), 2 osgoode hall lj 56;. poirier, at pp. 433-34; d. culat, “coveting thy neighbour’s beer: intergovernmental agreements dispute set- tlement and interprovincial trade barriers” (1992), 33 c de d. 617, at pp. 619-21; saunders, at p 96. in my view, while a mandatory mechanism for re- solving disputes may create a “strong presumption” that the parties intended to create legal obligations, it is not a prerequisite: see poirier, at p 433. [100] the nature of the mechanisms in the agree- ments for referring disputes to a third party for in- dependent consideration is disputed in this case. it is clear that a non- binding reference is available: see rta, art. 9; citca, arts. 38 to 41; see also court of appeal reasons, at paras 148-50. canada also argues that the eta’s statutory appeal mechanism would apply to any rta disputes related to the “ad- ministration or enforcement” of that act: see rta, art. 9(9); see also toronto district school board v. r., 2009 tcc 39, at para. 50 (canlii); ottawa hospital corp. v. r., 2010 tcc 53, at paras. 65-67 (canlii). however, whether any dispute resolution mechanism is binding is not determinative in this case. even absent a binding dispute resolution mechanism, the other factors indicate an intention to create legal, not merely political, obligations. [101] finally, for the parties’ subsequent conduct, the record does not indicate the extent to which the respective government signatories have carried out their commitments under the agreements (beyond bci’s objection that the agreements do not apply to it). however, both canada and the province take the position that the agreements create binding ob- ligations. this is a strong indicator that the parties intended to be bound by the agreements. citant d w mundell, « legal nature of federal and provincial executive governments : some com- ments on transactions between them » (1960), 2 osgoode hall lj 56;. poirier, p. 433- 434; d. culat, «  coveting thy neighbour’s beer  : intergovern- mental agreements dispute settlement and inter- provincial trade barriers » (1992), 33 c de d. 617, p. 619- 621; saunders, p 96). à mon avis, même si l’existence d’un mécanisme obligatoire de règlement des différends peut donner naissance à une « forte présomption » que les parties avaient l’intention de créer des obligations légales, il ne s’agit pas d’une condition préalable (voir poirier, p 433). [100] en l’espèce, la nature des mécanismes prévus dans les accords pour que les différends soient soumis à un tiers en vue d’un examen indépendant est contes- tée. il est évident que les parties peuvent soumettre leur différend à un tiers, mais elles n’y sont pas tenues (rta, art. 9; citca, art. 38 à 41; voir également les motifs de la cour d’appel, par. 148- 150). le canada soutient également que le mécanisme d’appel prévu par la lta s’appliquerait à tout différend découlant du rta concernant l’« application ou l’exécution » de cette loi (voir rta, par. 9(9); voir également conseil scolaire de district de toronto c. la reine, 2009 cci 39, par. 50 (canlii); corporation de l’hôpital d’ot- tawa c. la reine, 2010 cci 53, par. 65-67 (canlii)). toutefois, la question du caractère contraignant de tout mécanisme de règlement des différends n’est pas déterminante en l’espèce. même s’il n’y avait pas de mécanisme contraignant de règlement des différends, les autres facteurs indiquent que les parties avaient l’intention de créer des obligations juridiques, et non simplement politiques. [101] enfin, pour ce qui est du comportement ulté- rieur des parties, le dossier ne permet pas de savoir dans quelle mesure les gouvernements signataires respectifs se sont acquittés des engagements qu’ils avaient pris aux termes des accords (abstraction faite de l’objection de bci selon laquelle les accords ne s’appliquent pas dans son cas). toutefois, le canada et la province sont d’avis que les accords créent des obligations contraignantes. il s’agit là d’un indice clair que les parties avaient l’intention d’être liées par les accords. 608 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. [102] to summarize, in light of their clear wording, i have no difficulty in concluding that the agree- ments at issue in the cross- appeal resemble private law contracts and were intended to create legally binding obligations for canada and the province. [103] having concluded that the agreements im- pose binding obligations on the province, the re- maining question is whether these obligations have any impact on bci. in my opinion, in describing the extent of bci’s immunity from taxation, s. 16(6) of the psppa also encompasses the province’s choice to pay amounts which it would otherwise be con- stitutionally immune from paying. although the agreements have not been specifically implemented by british columbia’s legislature, the psppa ties bci’s tax obligations to those of the province. sec- tion  16(6) therefore provides the legislative link between the province’s immunities and obligations, under the constitution, and the agreements, and the immunities and obligations of bci. [104] section 16(6) states: [102] en résumé, à la lumière de leur libellé clair, je n’ai aucun mal à conclure que les accords en litige dans le pourvoi incident s’apparentent à des contrats de droit privé et qu’ils visaient à créer des obligations juridiquement contraignantes pour le canada et la province. [103] ayant conclu que les accords imposent des obligations contraignantes à la province, je dois maintenant établir si ces obligations ont quelque incidence sur bci. à mon avis, en précisant la por- tée de l’immunité fiscale de bci, le par. 16(6) de la psppa englobe également le choix de la pro- vince de payer des sommes qu’elle serait par ail- leurs dispensée de payer en vertu de son immunité constitutionnelle. même si les accords n’ont pas été expressément mis en œuvre par la législature de la colombie- britannique, la psppa rattache les obligations fiscales de bci à celles de la province. le paragraphe 16(6) établit donc le lien législatif qui existe entre les immunités et les obligations de la province, aux termes de la constitution et des accords, et celles de bci. [104] le paragraphe 16(6) de la psppa est ainsi libellé : [traduction] (6) the investment management corporation, as an agent of the government, is not liable for taxation except as the government is liable for taxation. (6) à titre de mandataire du gouvernement, la société de gestion de placements n’est assujettie à la taxation que dans la mesure où l’est le gouvernement. [105] bci raises three arguments for why s. 16(6) does not bind it to the province’s obligations un- der the agreements. first, it submits that s. 16(6) is “plainly drafted” to deal with its immunity and liabil- ity under provincial statutes of general application: af on cross- appeal, at paras 146-48. while i do not doubt that it serves this purpose, there is nothing in the wording of the provision to restrict its scope to only provincial taxation statutes. [105] bci invoque trois arguments pour soutenir que le par. 16(6) ne la soumet pas aux obligations qui incombent à la province aux termes des accords. d’abord, elle soutient que cette disposition traite [traduction] « en langage simple » de l’immunité dont elle jouit et des obligations qui lui incombent aux termes des lois provinciales de portée générale (ma pour le pourvoi incident, par. 146- 148). bien que je ne doute pas que cette disposition sert cet objectif, rien dans son libellé n’en restreint la portée aux lois fiscales provinciales. [106] second, bci argues that the amounts owed under the agreements are not “tax” but rather amounts paid in lieu of tax, which fall outside the scope of [106] en deuxième lieu, bci fait valoir que les sommes dues aux termes des accords ne constituent pas une « taxe », mais plutôt des sommes versées pour [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management la juge karakatsanis 609 s 16(6). because the agreements expressly preserve the province’s immunity from taxation (rta, art. 4; citca, art. 65), in its view, any references to “taxes” in the agreements are merely “shorthand”: af on cross- appeal, at para 149. [107] i disagree. bci’s approach implies that be- cause the province is constitutionally immune from federal taxation statutes, it cannot, by intergovern- mental agreement, choose to pay “tax.” however, it appears that the province has agreed to do precisely that. beginning with the citca, pursuant to art. 51, “the province agree[s] to pay the harmonized sales taxes in respect of supplies acquired by their respec- tive governments or by agents and entities thereof” (emphasis added). similarly, under art. 6(d) of the rta, the province agrees “to pay    the value- added tax in accordance with the [eta]”; art. 1 defines “value- added tax” as “any tax imposed or levied under part ix of the [eta]” (emphasis added). in light of this clear wording, i see no other way of characterizing these amounts other than as voluntarily- assumed tax liabilities. the fact that the province cannot have federal tax obligations imposed on it does not prevent the province from assuming those obligations if it chooses to do so. tenir lieu de taxes, qui ne sont pas visées par la portée du par 16(6). étant donné que les accords préservent expressément l’immunité fiscale de la province (rta, art. 4; citca, art. 65), bci estime que toute mention du mot « taxes » dans les accords n’est qu’un « renvoi commode » (ma pour le pourvoi incident, par 149). [107] je ne suis pas de cet avis. le raisonnement de bci sous- entend que parce que la province bénéficie de l’immunité constitutionnelle en ce qui a trait aux lois fiscales fédérales, elle ne peut, au moyen d’un accord intergouvernemental, décider de payer une « taxe ». cependant, il semble que c’est précisément ce que la province a convenu de faire. d’abord, en vertu de l’art. 51 du citca, la province convient [traduction] « de payer les taxes de vente harmoni- sées relativement aux fournitures effectuées par leurs gouvernements respectifs ou par leurs mandataires ou entités » (je souligne). de même, aux termes de l’al. 6d) du rta, la province s’engage [traduction] « à payer [  ] la taxe à la valeur ajoutée confor- mément à la [lta] » (je souligne); l’art. 1 définit ainsi la « taxe à la valeur ajoutée » : « toute taxe imposée ou perçue sous le régime de la partie ix de la [lta] » (je souligne). vu ce libellé clair, je ne vois pas comment ces sommes pourraient être considé- rées comme autre chose que des obligations fiscales volontairement assumées. le fait que la province ne peut se voir imposer d’obligations fiscales fédérales ne l’empêche pas d’assumer de telles obligations si elle choisit de le faire. [108] finally, bci submits that even if the prov- ince has voluntarily agreed to pay “tax”, it is not “liable” to pay tax under the agreements because it cannot be obligated to pay federal tax as imposed by a taxing statute: af on cross- appeal, at para 150. again, this argument conflicts with the express word- ing of the agreements. in similar fashion to the rta, art. 1 of the citca defines “harmonized sales taxes” as the federal and provincial components of the “tax payable under part ix of the excise tax act”. as a matter of constitutional law, the province is not obliged to pay federal tax under the eta. however, by entering into the agreements, the province has agreed to pay tax determined in accordance with the eta. thus, as long as the agreements are in force, the province is “liable for taxation” under the eta, [108] enfin, bci affirme que même si la province a convenu de son plein gré de payer une « taxe », elle n’est pas « assujettie » à la taxation aux termes des accords parce qu’elle ne peut être tenue de payer une taxe fédérale imposée par une loi fiscale (ma pour le pourvoi incident, par 150). encore là, cet argument contredit le libellé exprès des accords. l’article 1 du citca définit, d’une façon semblable au rta, les « taxes de vente harmonisées » comme étant les com- posantes fédérale et provinciale de la « taxe payable en vertu de la partie ix de la loi sur la taxe d’ac- cise ». sur le plan constitutionnel, la province n’est pas tenue de payer la taxe fédérale sous le régime de la lta. cependant, en concluant les accords, la province a accepté de la payer conformément à la lta. en conséquence, tant et aussi longtemps que les 610 canada v bc. investment management karakatsanis j. [2019] 4 scr. notwithstanding the fact that the source of this lia- bility lies in the agreements themselves. [109] textual nuances aside, there is a more fun- damental reason why bci’s immunity from taxation (constitutional, statutory, contractual or otherwise) must be the same as the province’s. section 16(6) directly ties bci’s liability for and immunity from tax to the liabilities and immunities of the province. in a similar fashion, both agreements indicate an intention to require the province’s agents to assume the same tax liabilities as the province: rta, art. 3; citca, art 51. by entering into the agreements, the provincial crown chose to pay taxes for which it would not otherwise have been liable. given that any immunity that bci enjoys is directly tied to the crown’s by s. 16(6) of the psppa, there is simply no basis for bci to assert that it is not generally subject to taxation on the same basis as the province. obviously, bci’s actual liability is determined by the terms of the taxing statute and this cross- appeal does not concern any specific obligations that bci might have under the agreements. in summary, the language of the rta and [110] the citca demonstrates that the province intended to bind itself to fulfill the obligations found in those agreements. section 16(6) of the psppa establishes that bci’s tax immunities and obligations follow those of the province. because the language of this provision is broad enough to include obligations vol- untarily assumed by the province, bci is generally subject to the obligations set out in the agreements to the same extent that the province would be. however, as noted above, the nature of any specific obligations under the agreements is beyond the scope of the cross- appeal. accords sont en vigueur, la province est « assujettie à la taxation » sous le régime de la lta, malgré le fait que cette obligation trouve sa source dans les accords eux- mêmes. [109] au- delà de ces nuances fondées sur le texte, il existe une raison plus fondamentale pour laquelle bci doit bénéficier de la même immunité fiscale (qu’elle soit d’origine constitutionnelle, législative, contrac- tuelle ou autre) que celle dont jouit la province. le paragraphe 16(6) rattache directement les obliga- tions fiscales de bci et les immunités fiscales dont elle jouit à celles de la province. de la même façon, il ressort des deux accords que les parties avaient l’intention d’assujettir les mandataires de la province aux mêmes obligations fiscales que la province (rta, art. 3; citca, art 51). en concluant les accords, la couronne provinciale a choisi de payer les taxes aux- quelles elle n’aurait pas autrement été assujettie. étant donné que l’immunité dont jouit bci est directement associée à celle de la couronne en application du par. 16(6) de la psppa, bci ne peut tout simplement pas prétendre qu’elle n’est généralement pas assujet- tie à la taxation de la même façon que la province. évidemment, l’obligation actuelle de bci est établie par les dispositions de la loi fiscale, et le pourvoi inci- dent ne porte pas sur les obligations particulières que bci pourrait avoir aux termes des accords. [110] en résumé, il ressort du libellé du rta et du citca que la province avait l’intention de s’enga- ger à s’acquitter des obligations énoncées dans ces accords. le paragraphe 16(6) de la psppa établit que les obligations et immunités fiscales de bci sont les mêmes que celles de la province. comme le li- bellé de cette disposition est suffisamment large pour inclure les obligations que la province a assumées de son plein gré, bci est généralement assujettie aux obligations énoncées dans les accords dans la même mesure que le serait la province. toutefois, comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, la nature des obligations précises prévues par les accords est une question qui dépasse le cadre du pourvoi incident. d conclusion d conclusion i would dismiss the appeal and the cross- [111] appeal. [111] je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi et le pour- voi incident. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 611 [112] because part ix of the eta attempts to re- quire a provincial agent to pay tax out of property legally held by the crown, s. 125 of the constitution act, 1867, renders the relevant eta provisions inap- plicable in respect of the portfolios. however, as a statutory crown agent and pursuant to s. 16(6) of the psppa, bci is subject to the obligations assumed by the province under the rta and citca. [112] étant donné que la partie ix de la lta vise à obliger le mandataire provincial à payer les taxes à même des biens détenus en common law par la couronne, l’art. 125 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 rend les dispositions pertinentes de la lta inap- plicables à l’égard des portefeuilles. toutefois, à titre de mandataire légal de la couronne et conformément au par. 16(6) de la psppa, bci est assujettie aux obligations que la province a assumées aux termes du rta et du citca. [113] as a result, the following declaratory order is appropriate: il y a donc lieu de rendre le jugement décla- [113] ratoire suivant : as a provincial crown agent, the british columbia invest- ment management corporation (bci) is immune from taxation by canada under the excise tax act, rsc 1985, c. e-15, in respect of assets bci holds in pooled invest- ment portfolios under the pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc. reg 447/99. under s. 16(6) of the public sector pension plans act, sbc 1999, c. 44, bci is nevertheless subject to the provisions of the reciprocal taxation agreement and the comprehensive integrated tax coordination agreement respecting those assets to the same extent as her majesty the queen in right of the province of british columbia. [114] all parties request costs in this court and in the courts below. in light of the mixed outcome for the parties, i am of the view that this is a case where no cost award is appropriate. en tant que mandataire de la couronne provinciale, la british columbia investment management corporation (bci) bénéficie de l’immunité fiscale à l’égard de la taxa- tion fédérale sous le régime de la loi sur la taxe d’accise, lrc 1985, c. e-15, à l’égard des actifs qu’elle détient dans des portefeuilles de fonds communs de placement en application du pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc reg 447/99. en vertu du par. 16(6) de la public sector pension plans act, sbc 1999, c. 44, bci est néanmoins assujettie aux dispositions du reciprocal tax agreement et de la comprehensive integrated tax coordination agreement concernant ces actifs dans la même mesure que l’est sa majesté la reine du chef de la province de la colombie- britannique. [114] toutes les parties sollicitent leurs dépens devant notre cour et devant les juridictions infé- rieures. étant donné que chacune des parties a obtenu partiellement gain de cause, je suis d’avis qu’il n’y a pas lieu d’adjuger de dépens en l’espèce. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par the chief justice (dissenting in part) — le juge en chef (dissident en partie) — i overview i aperçu [115] this case is about whether private parties can rely on the constitution to immunize themselves from paying tax on investment management services they receive from a crown corporation. here, private pension boards entered into contracts with the brit- ish columbia investment management corporation [115] la présente affaire porte sur la question de savoir si des parties privées peuvent se fonder sur la constitution pour se soustraire au paiement de la taxe sur les services de gestion de placements qu’elles reçoivent d’une société d’état. en l’espèce, les conseils privés des régimes de retraite ont conclu 612 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. (“bci”), a crown corporation that is an agent of the provincial government. under the contracts, bci agreed to hold the pension boards’ funds in trust and to provide them with investment management services in respect of those funds in exchange for payment. the pension boards elected not to pay bci for its services directly. instead, they arranged to pay it indirectly by allowing it to take its payment from the trust funds. if bci were paid directly by the pension boards, the boards would be taxable as the recipients of the services under the excise tax act, rsc 1985, c. e-15 (“eta”), and would therefore be liable to pay goods and services tax (“gst”). the indirect payment method elected by the pension boards and bci makes the trust property itself the recipient of the services under the eta and thus lia- ble to pay the tax. my colleague concludes that, as a result, bci’s provision of services is immune from taxation under s. 125 of the constitution act, 1867, because bci holds legal title to the trust property. [116] i cannot agree. bci’s legal title to the taxed property is insufficient to make it property “belong- ing to” the province, as s. 125 requires, because the property was entrusted to bci by private parties to hold and manage for their sole benefit in exchange for payment. the property is liable to taxation only because the private pension boards chose to make it the mechanism of payment for the services they re- ceived from bci. extending immunity under s. 125 to the circumstances of this case does not protect the constitutional values of federalism and democracy that s. 125 exists to promote. instead, it overshoots those purposes by giving private parties the benefit of immunity from taxation to which they are not entitled, protecting the province from adverse con- tractual consequences, and providing bci with an unjustified commercial advantage. des contrats avec la british columbia investment management corporation (« bci »), une société d’état mandataire du gouvernement provincial. aux termes de ces contrats, bci convenait de détenir en fiducie les fonds des conseils des régimes de retraite et de fournir à ces derniers des services de gestion de placements à l’égard de ces fonds contre paiement. les conseils des régimes de retraite ont choisi de ne pas payer bci directement pour ses services. ils ont plutôt pris des dispositions pour payer indirectement bci en lui permettant de se payer à même les fonds en fiducie. si bci était payée directement par les conseils des régimes de retraite, ceux-ci seraient imposables en tant qu’acquéreurs des services au sens de la loi sur la taxe d’accise, lrc 1985, c. e-15 (« lta ») et seraient donc tenus de payer la taxe sur les produits et services (« tps »). le mode de paiement indirect retenu par les conseils des ré- gimes de retraite et par bci fait en sorte que le bien en fiducie lui- même devient l’acquéreur des services aux termes de la lta, et est de ce fait assujetti à la taxe. ma collègue conclut donc que la prestation de services de bci fait l’objet de l’immunité fiscale prévue à l’art. 125 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 parce que bci détient un titre de propriété en common law sur les biens en fiducie. [116] je ne peux accepter ce point de vue le titre de propriété en common law que détient bci sur les biens taxés n’est pas suffisant pour faire en sorte que ces biens « appartiennent » à la province, comme l’exige l’art. 125, parce qu’ils ont été confiés à bci par des parties privées pour qu’elle les dé- tienne et les gère à leur seul profit contre paiement. les biens sont assujettis à la taxe seulement parce que les conseils privés des régimes de retraite ont choisi de se servir de ces biens comme mécanisme de paiement des services qu’ils ont reçus de bci. le fait d’étendre l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125 aux circonstances de la présente affaire ne protège pas les valeurs constitutionnelles du fédéralisme et de la démocratie que cet article cherche à promouvoir; cela va plutôt au- delà de ces objectifs en permettant à des parties privées de profiter de l’immunité fiscale à laquelle ils n’ont pas droit, tout en protégeant la province de certaines conséquences contractuelles préjudiciables et en conférant à bci un avantage commercial injustifié. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 613 i have had the benefit of reading the reasons [117] of my colleague karakatsanis j. i agree with her conclusion that the chambers judge appropriately assumed jurisdiction over this litigation. i also agree with her conclusion that bci is bound by the rele- vant intergovernmental taxation agreements (“agree- ments”) between british columbia and canada. my sole disagreement with my colleague is on the issue of immunity under s 125. [117] j’ai pris connaissance de l’opinion de ma collègue la juge karakatsanis je souscris à sa conclusion que le juge siégeant en son cabinet s’est à bon droit déclaré compétent à l’égard du présent litige. je souscris aussi à sa conclusion suivant la- quelle bci est liée par les accords fiscaux intergou- vernementaux applicables (« accords ») entre la colombie- britannique et le canada. le seul point sur lequel mon opinion diverge de la sienne concerne la question de l’immunité prévue à l’art 125. ii factual background ii contexte factuel [118] my colleague has skillfully outlined the com- plex factual underpinnings of this appeal. however, to clarify my position on the s. 125 immunity issue, i must provide some additional facts concerning the pension boards that are the unit holders of the pooled investment portfolios (“portfolios”) held in trust by bci and their relationship with bci. in this regard, i will make four points: [118] ma collègue a habilement exposé les faits complexes à l’origine du présent pourvoi. toutefois, pour bien préciser ma position sur la question de l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125, je dois donner cer- tains faits additionnels concernant les conseils des régimes de retraite, qui sont les détenteurs d’unités des portefeuilles de fonds communs de placement (« portefeuilles ») que bci détient en fiducie, ainsi que leur lien avec bci. à cet égard, je vais dévelop- per les quatre idées suivantes : (a) the unit holders are the beneficiaries of the funds a) bci holds in trust; (b) the pension boards, which form the “bulk” of b) the unit holders, are private parties; (c) the pension boards bear the real impact of the c) tax; and les détenteurs d’unités sont les bénéficiaires des fonds que bci détient en fiducie; les conseils des régimes de retraite, qui repré- sentent la « majeure partie » des détenteurs d’uni- tés, sont des parties privées; les conseils des régimes de retraite supportent dans les faits la charge de la taxe; (d) the pension boards would be the recipients of bci’s services under the eta but for the indirect payment method they have chosen. d) les conseils des régimes de retraite seraient les acquéreurs des services de bci au sens donné dans la lta n’eût été le mode de paiement indi- rect qu’ils ont choisi. a the unit holders are the beneficiaries of the a les détenteurs d’unités sont les bénéficiaires des funds bci holds in trust fonds que bci détient en fiducie [119] first, it is important to underline one essen- tial point. both my colleague and i have proceeded under the assumption that the portfolios are common law trusts. this being the case, there must be a benefi- cial interest in the portfolios distinct from bci’s legal interest. it would be incompatible with the existence of a common law trust for bci to be both the legal and the sole beneficial owner of the trust property [119] tout d’abord, il est important de souligner un point essentiel. ma collègue et moi sommes partis du principe que les portefeuilles sont des fiducies de common law. dès lors, l’intérêt bénéficiaire dans les portefeuilles doit être distinct de l’intérêt en common law de bci. il serait incompatible avec l’existence d’une fiducie de common law que bci soit à la fois propriétaire en common law des biens en fiducie 614 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. (see valard construction ltd. v. bird construction co., 2018 scc 8, [2018] 1 scr 224). the statutory and regulatory regime that governs the portfolios does not specifically identify a beneficial interest in them. however, as i will demonstrate, an analysis of this regime makes it clear that the beneficial in- terest rests with the unit holders. indeed, even had i accepted that the portfolios are sui generis statutory trusts, to which common law requirements would therefore not necessarily apply, based on this regime i still would have easily concluded that the beneficial interest in them rests with the unit holders. [120] bci is a creature of the public sector pen- sion plans act, sbc 1999, c. 44 (“psppa”). sec- tion 18(3) of the psppa allows certain defined persons (various government or trust- fund entities) to place money or securities with bci for investment. money or securities placed with bci under the authority of s. 18(3) are referred to as “funds” (s 15). funds are held by bci in one of two types of investment struc- tures: segregated investments, which are operated like standard investment or brokerage accounts, and portfolios. the operation of the portfolios is gov- erned primarily by the pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc. reg. 447/99 (“regulation”). this appeal is concerned with the tax consequences of the portfolios; however, i shall return to the segregated investments in my analysis below. bci collects and remits gst on the investment management services it provides to the segregated funds. et unique propriétaire bénéficiaire de ceux-ci (voir valard construction ltd. c. bird construction co., 2018 csc 8, [2018] 1 rcs 224). le régime légis- latif et réglementaire qui s’applique aux portefeuilles ne précise pas en quoi consiste l’intérêt bénéficiaire dans ceux-ci. toutefois, comme je vais le démontrer, il ressort clairement de l’analyse de ce régime que ce sont les détenteurs d’unités qui sont les titulaires de l’intérêt bénéficiaire. d’ailleurs, même si j’avais accepté que les portefeuilles sont des fiducies d’ori- gine législative sui generis qui ne seraient donc pas nécessairement soumises aux exigences de la com- mon law, j’aurais conclu sans hésiter, en me fondant sur ce régime, que ce sont les détenteurs d’unités qui sont titulaires de l’intérêt bénéficiaire dans les portefeuilles. [120] bci a été créée par la public sector pension plans act, sbc 1999, c. 44 (« psppa »). le pa- ragraphe 18(3) de la psppa permet à certaines per- sonnes définies (divers fonds en fiducie ou entités publiques) de placer de l’argent ou des titres auprès de bci à des fins de placement. les sommes d’argent et les titres confiés à bci en vertu du par. 18(3) sont appelés [traduction] « fonds » (art 15). les fonds sont détenus par bci dans l’un des deux types de structures de placement suivants : des placements distincts, qui sont gérés comme des comptes de place- ment ou de courtage ordinaires, ou des portefeuilles. la gestion des portefeuilles est encadrée principale- ment par le pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc. reg. 447/99 (« règlement »). le présent pourvoi porte sur les incidences fiscales des portefeuilles, mais je reviendrai sur les placements distincts plus loin dans mon analyse. bci perçoit et verse la tps sur les services de gestion de placements qu’elle fournit aux fonds distincts. [121] the “bulk” of the funding for the portfolios comes from bc’s four major public sector pension plans — the public service pension plan, the mu- nicipal pension plan, the teachers’ pension plan and the college pension plan — and from the workers’ compensation board. other amounts come from the bc government directly, including from the consolidated revenue fund. the amounts origi- nating directly from the province are said to “vary from time to time” (rf, at para. 10; affidavit of s. [121] la « majeure partie » des fonds des porte- feuilles provient de quatre importants régimes de re- traite du secteur public de la colombie- britannique, à savoir le régime de retraite de la fonction publique, le régime de retraite des employés municipaux, le régime de retraite des enseignants et le régime de retraite des enseignants du niveau collégial — ainsi que de la worker’s compensation board. les autres sommes proviennent directement du gouvernement de la colombie- britannique, notamment du trésor. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 615 newton, ar, vol. x, at p. 50), although logically the inverse of the “bulk” cannot be a particularly large percentage. bci utilizes the funds to make various investments, including through subsidiary corporations. in the regulation, a “participating fund” is [122] defined as a fund from which money or securities are used to purchase “unit[s] of participation” (“units”) in a portfolio (s 1). portfolios must be divided into units of equal value, and the proportionate interest at- tributed to each participating fund must be expressed by the number of units allocated to it (regulation, s 5(1)). on the last opening date of the calendar year,10 the aggregate of the income and net taxable capital gains of each portfolio for that year is pay- able to each participating fund in proportion to its participation in the portfolio (less any income and net taxable capital gains already paid to the partici- pating fund for that year) (s 10(1)). a participating fund can demand the payment to which it is entitled (s 10(2)). where it does so demand, the number of its units must be reduced proportionally to reflect the value of the payment (s 10(5)). if it does not so demand, it is deemed to have elected to contribute to the portfolio the income and net taxable capital gains to which it is entitled, and those amounts must be added to the carrying costs of the units held by the fund (ss. 10(3) and (4)). les sommes provenant directement de la province auraient [traduction] « fluctué au fil du temps » (mi, par. 10; affidavit de s. newton, da, vol. x, p. 50), même si, logiquement, le contraire de la « ma- jeure partie » ne peut représenter un pourcentage particulièrement élevé. bci utilise les fonds pour effectuer divers placements, notamment par l’entre- mise de filiales. [122] dans le règlement, un [traduction] « fonds participant » est défini comme étant un fonds à partir duquel des sommes d’argent ou des titres sont utilisés pour acheter des « unité[s] de participation » (« uni- tés ») dans un portefeuille (art 1). les portefeuilles doivent être divisés en unités de valeur égale, et l’in- térêt proportionnel attribué à chaque fonds participant doit être exprimé en fonction du nombre d’unités qui lui sont allouées (règlement, par 5(1)). lors de la dernière date d’ouverture de l’année civile10, le total des revenus et des gains en capital nets imposables de chaque portefeuille pour cette année est payable à chaque fonds participant au prorata de sa participation dans le portefeuille (déduction faite des revenus et gains en capital nets imposables déjà versés au fonds participant pour l’année en question) (par 10(1)). un fonds participant peut exiger le paiement auquel il a droit (par 10(2)). dans ce cas, le nombre de ses unités doit être réduit proportionnellement pour correspondre à la valeur du paiement (par 10(5)). s’il n’exige pas le paiement, le fonds participant est réputé avoir choisi de verser au portefeuille les reve- nus et les gains en capital nets imposables auxquels il a droit, et ces sommes doivent être ajoutées aux coûts de détention des unités détenus par le fonds (par. 10(3) et 10(4)). [123] assets invested in portfolios must be iden- tified separately from other property of bci (regu- lation, s 4(3)). the chief investment officer must report to the trustees or other persons responsible for funds “with respect to the management and invest- ment performance of the funds that they have placed [123] les placements détenus dans les portefeuilles doivent être désignés séparément des autres biens de bci (règlement, par 4(3)). le directeur des pla- cements doit rendre compte aux fiduciaires ou aux autres personnes responsables des fonds [traduc- tion] « de la gestion et du rendement des fonds qu’ils 10 “[o]pening date” is a term defined in the regulation as “a date when funds may purchase or realize units in a portfolio” (s 1). opening dates for each portfolio are set by the chief investment officer (regulation, s. 6(2)), a position created by s. 20 of the psppa. 10 le terme [traduction] « [d]ate d’ouverture » est défini dans le règlement : « date à laquelle les fonds peuvent acheter ou liquider des unités dans un portefeuille » (art 1). les dates d’ouverture de chacun des portefeuilles sont fixées par le directeur des pla- cements (règlement, par. 6(2)), un poste créé par l’art. 20 de la psppa. 616 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. with [bci]” (psppa, s 21(2)(b)). the psppa further recognizes that bci may make investments “on its own behalf” (s. 24(1)(c)), which are distinct from investments that it makes on behalf of participating funds as their agent (s 18(3)). the chief investment officer is empowered to terminate a portfolio but must then distribute the net proceeds realized to the unit holders (regulation, s 14). no part is payable on termination to bci or to the province (unless the province itself is a unit holder). [124] the investment management services that bci provides for the portfolios ultimately benefit the unit holders. it is the unit holders that are entitled to the income and capital gains generated by the portfolios while they exist. it is the unit holders that are entitled to the net proceeds on termination of the portfolios. neither bci nor the province has the abil- ity or right to appropriate portfolio assets. the only benefit bci derives from the portfolios is the recoup- ing of its operating costs and capital expenditures from the funds therein, which reduces the value of the units and the ultimate return realized by the unit holders (psppa, s 24(1)(a)). i note that the psppa allows bci to charge service fees directly to its cli- ents to cover these expenses (s 24(1)(b)). however, the funds investment and management agreement (“funds agreement”) between bci and the teachers’ pension board (discussed further below) demon- strates that bci charges such fees only with respect to segregated funds. bci recoups its operating costs and capital expenditures with respect to portfolios exclusively from the assets in the portfolios. ont confiés à [bci] » (psppa, al 21(2)b)). la psppa reconnaît en outre que bci peut effectuer des pla- cements « pour son propre compte » (al. 24(1)c)), qui sont distincts des placements qu’elle fait pour le compte des fonds participants en tant que man- dataire (al 18(3)). le directeur des placements est habilité à mettre fin à un portefeuille, mais il doit alors distribuer le produit net réalisé aux détenteurs d’unités (règlement, art 14). dans un tel cas, aucune part n’est payable à bci ou à la province (sauf si la province détient elle- même des unités). [124] les services de gestion de placements que fournit bci aux portefeuilles profitent ultimement aux détenteurs d’unités. ce sont eux qui ont droit aux revenus et aux gains en capital produits par les portefeuilles pendant qu’ils existent. ce sont eux qui ont droit au produit net lorsqu’il est mis fin aux portefeuilles. ni bci ni la province n’ont la capacité ou le droit de s’approprier les actifs du portefeuille. le seul avantage que bci retire des portefeuilles est la possibilité de recouvrer ses frais d’exploitation et ses dépenses en capital à même les fonds détenus dans les portefeuilles, ce qui réduit la valeur des unités et le rendement final réalisé par les déten- teurs d’unités (psppa, al 24(1)a)). je signale que la psppa permet à bci de facturer des frais de service directement à ses clients pour couvrir ces dépenses (al 24(1)b)). il ressort toutefois de l’accord d’in- vestissement et de gestion des fonds (« accord de gestion ») conclu entre bci et le conseil du régime de retraite des enseignants (dont il est question plus loin) que bci ne facture de tels frais que pour les fonds distincts. bci recouvre ses frais d’exploitation et ses dépenses en capital à l’égard des portefeuilles exclusivement sur les actifs se trouvant dans les portefeuilles. [125] the parties advanced various arguments con- cerning s. 4(4) of the regulation, which provides that “[o]wnership in any asset in a portfolio must not be attributed to a participating fund”. section 4(4) must be read in conjunction with s. 4(1), which states that “[a]ll the assets of a portfolio are held in trust” by bci. there is obviously a considerable differ- ence between the portfolios — vehicles intended for pooled investments in modern capital markets — and a more “traditional” trust reflecting divided interests [125] les parties ont fait valoir divers arguments au sujet du par. 4(4) du règlement, qui prévoit que [traduction] « [l]a propriété d’un élément d’actif détenu dans les portefeuilles ne peut être conférée à un fonds participant ». le paragraphe 4(4) doit être interprété à la lumière du par. 4(1), qui prévoit que [traduction] « [t]ous les éléments d’actif des portefeuilles sont détenus en fiducie par bci ». il y a évidemment une nette différence entre les por- tefeuilles — qui sont des véhicules pour des fonds [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 617 in a piece of real property. funds in each portfolio originate from several sources. section 4(4) indicates that unit holders cannot point to any particular asset in a portfolio and claim ownership of it. as canada argues, the unit holders instead are collectively enti- tled to all assets in a portfolio on a proportional basis, without possessing ownership rights in any particular asset (af, at para 78). [126] based on this regime, i am satisfied that the beneficial interest in the portfolios rests with the unit holders. my colleague has also accepted that if the portfolios are a common law trust, then the unit holders are the beneficiaries (para 65). the impor- tance of this conclusion must be stressed. it means that the unit holders are the beneficial owners of the portfolios. b the pension boards, which form the “bulk” of the unit holders, are private parties [127] moreover, the pension boards that are said to hold the “bulk” of the units in the portfolios are pri- vate entities. british columbia and bci have never suggested, in this court or the british columbia courts, that the pension boards are crown entities that are entitled to constitutional immunity from taxation. as i will explain, british columbia and bci were correct not to contest this point, as the pension boards cannot be equated with the provincial crown and are instead creatures of contract. communs de placement sur les marchés de capitaux modernes — et la fiducie plus « traditionnelle », structurée en fonction d’intérêts divis dans un bien immeuble. les fonds de chaque portefeuille pro- viennent de diverses sources. suivant le par. 4(4), les détenteurs d’unités ne peuvent pas désigner un élément d’actif particulier dans un portefeuille et en revendiquer la propriété. comme le fait valoir le canada, les détenteurs d’unités ont plutôt droit collectivement à tous les actifs d’un portefeuille sur une base proportionnelle, sans être titulaires de droits de propriété sur un élément d’actif en particulier (ma, par 78). [126] compte tenu de ce régime, je suis convaincu que ce sont les détenteurs d’unités qui sont titu- laires de l’intérêt bénéficiaire dans les portefeuilles. ma collègue reconnaît aussi que, si les portefeuilles constituent une fiducie de common law, les déten- teurs d’unités en sont les bénéficiaires (par.  65). l’importance de cette conclusion mérite d’être sou- lignée, car elle implique que les détenteurs d’unités sont les propriétaires bénéficiaires des portefeuilles. b les conseils des régimes de retraite, qui repré- sentent «  la majeure partie  » des détenteurs d’unités, sont des parties privées [127] de plus, les conseils des régimes de retraite qui détiendraient « la majeure partie » des unités dans les portefeuilles sont des entités privées. la colombie- britannique et bci n’ont jamais laissé en- tendre, que ce soit devant notre cour ou devant les tri- bunaux de la colombie- britannique, que les conseils des régimes de retraite sont des entités de l’état ayant droit à l’immunité fiscale constitutionnelle. comme je vais l’expliquer, la colombie- britannique et bci ont eu raison de ne pas contester ce point, car les conseils des régimes de retraite ne peuvent être assi- milés à la couronne provinciale; ils tirent leur exis- tence d’un contrat. [128] the public sector pension plans are governed by boards of trustees pursuant to contractual “joint trust” arrangements. although the makeup of the four public sector pension plan boards differs some- what, generally each board is comprised of an equal number of trustees appointed, on the one hand, by [128] les régimes de retraite du secteur public sont dirigés par des conseils de fiduciaires aux termes d’accords contractuels « d’administration en fiducie conjointe ». bien que la composition des conseils des quatre régimes de retraite du secteur public diffère quelque peu, chacun d’entre eux compte généralement 618 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. the province and the relevant employer(s) and, on the other, by the plan member union(s) and, in one case, the bc. government retired employees associa- tion. the public sector pension plans were not always run via this joint trust model. joint trust arrangements were initially introduced and imposed by the psppa when it was enacted in 1999. the provisions that did so were repealed following the successful negotia- tion of contractual joint trust agreements between the province, the employers and the unions. [129] i will refer to the public service pension plan joint trust agreement as an example of the four such public sector pension plan agreements. the pur- pose of the agreements is to “provide for the prudent management” of the pension plans and funds, while having plan members and employers “share the re- sponsibility of plan governance and share the risks and rewards of plan sponsorship” (preamble). the pre- existing pension plans and pension funds were continued under the joint trust agreements. pension funds are held in trust by the boards of trustees for the sole benefit of plan members, ie current and former employees (art 3). the power to amend or terminate the joint trust agreements resides solely with the boards of trustees (art 13). the pension boards were required to retain bci as investment manager for defined periods, after which they were given discretion to use other managers (arts 72 and 73). the four pension boards subsequently entered into funds investment and management agreements with bci.11 un nombre égal de fiduciaires nommés, d’une part, par la province et le ou les employeurs concernés et, d’autre part, par le ou les syndicats participant au ré- gime et, dans un cas, par la bc. government retired employees association. les régimes de retraite du secteur public n’ont pas toujours été gérés selon ce modèle d’administration en fiducie conjointe. les accords d’administration en fiducie conjointe ont été instaurés et imposés par la psppa lors de son adoption en 1999. les dispositions à cet effet ont été abro- gées à la suite de la négociation fructueuse d’accords contractuels d’administration en fiducie conjointe entre la province, les employeurs et les syndicats. [129] je me reporterai à l’accord relatif à l’admi- nistration en fiducie conjointe du régime de retraite de la fonction publique à titre d’exemple des quatre accords des régimes de retraite du secteur public. l’objet de ces accords est [traduction] « d’assurer une gestion prudente » des régimes et des fonds de pension, tout en veillant à ce que les participants au régime et les employeurs [traduction] «  se partagent la responsabilité de la gestion du régime, ainsi que les risques et les avantages que comporte l’adhésion au régime » (préambule). les régimes de retraite et les fonds de pension qui existaient auparavant ont été prorogés en vertu des accords d’administration en fiducie conjointe les fonds de pension sont détenus en fiducie par les conseils des fiduciaires, au seul profit des participants au régime, c’est-à-dire les employés actuels et anciens (art 3). seul le conseil des fiduciaires est habilité à modifier ou à résilier les accords d’administration en fiducie conjointe (art 13). les conseils des régimes de retraite étaient tenus de retenir les services de bci comme gestionnaire de placements pour des périodes déterminées, après quoi ils avaient toute la- titude pour recourir à d’autres gestionnaires (art 72 et 73). les quatre conseils des régimes de retraite ont par la suite conclu des accords d’investissement et de gestion des fonds avec bci11. 11 it is unclear whether thus far any pension board has opted to use a manager other than bci – canada says that this has not occurred, while bci says that there is no evidence on this point, given that the joint trust agreements do not require the appointment of a single, exclusive investment manager (af, at para. 16; rf, at fn 16). 11 on ne sait pas avec certitude si, jusqu’à présent, un conseil de régime de retraite a opté pour un autre gestionnaire que bci; le canada affirme que ce n’est pas le cas, alors que bci soutient que rien ne permet de l’affirmer, étant donné que les accords d’administration en fiducie conjointe n’exigent pas la nomination d’un seul gestionnaire exclusif de placements (ma, par. 16; mi, note 16). [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 619 [130] when the psppa was introduced in the leg- islature for second reading, the honourable min- ister joy macphail indicated that joint trusteeship would result in “transferring full responsibility for the operation of each of the public sector pension plans to a board of pension trustees”. the minister stated that “[t]he transfer of this responsibility will result in the pension plans being operated at arm’s length from government”. she explained that this arm’s length relationship was necessary because “pension trustees must have the unfettered ability to determine the quality and timeliness of the service provided to plan members in order to carry out their responsibilities” (british columbia, official report of debates of the legislative assembly (hansard), vol. 16, no. 25, 3rd sess., 36th parl., july 14, 1999, at p. 14409 (hon. j. macphail)). [131] the province’s involvement with the public sector pension plans is purely contractual. it is a party to the various joint trust agreements and ap- points a certain number of trustees directly pursuant to those agreements. however, the province retains no control over the trustees once appointed. in ad- dition, half of the contributions to the pension plans come from the provincial government through the public sector employers. however, once the con- tributions are made, such funds are impressed with the trust and governed by its contractual terms (see ehrcke v. public service pension board of trustees, 2004 bcsc 757, 32 bclr (4th) 388, at para 60). finally, like the plan members, the province (through the public sector employers) has certain responsi- bilities in the event of a pension shortfall and may be entitled to a contribution holiday in the event of a surplus. any surplus must remain within the pen- sion fund (public service pension plan joint trust agreement, art 103) and is subject to “equal owner- ship” (recitals, c(d)). there is also “equal sharing of responsibility” for any unfunded liabilities (recitals, c(c)). the psppa does not require the province’s consolidated revenue fund to make up any short- falls but merely gives the minister of finance the discretion to make up the portion of the unfunded liability attributable to the government (s 251). as [130] lors de la présentation de la psppa en deu- xième lecture, la ministre responsable du dossier, l’honorable joy macphail, a expliqué que l’admi- nistration en fiducie conjointe donnerait lieu [tra- duction] « au transfert de l’entière responsabilité de la gestion de chacun des régimes de retraite du secteur public à un conseil de fiduciaires ». elle a déclaré que « par suite du transfert de cette respon- sabilité, les régimes de retraite seront administrés de façon indépendante du gouvernement ». elle a expliqué qu’il était nécessaire qu’il n’y ait aucun lien de dépendance avec le gouvernement, car « les fiduciaires des régimes de retraite doivent avoir la ca- pacité absolue de déterminer la qualité et la rapidité de la prestation des services fournis aux membres des régimes afin de s’acquitter de leurs responsabi- lités » (colombie- britannique, official report of de- bates of the legislature assembly (hansard), vol. 16, no 25, 3e sess., 36e lég., 14 juillet 1999, p. 14409 (hon joy macphail)). [131] le rôle que joue la province en ce qui con- cerne les régimes de retraite du secteur public est purement contractuel. elle est partie aux divers ac- cords d’administration en fiducie conjointe et elle nomme un certain nombre de fiduciaires directement en application de ces accords. elle n’exerce cepen- dant aucun contrôle sur les fiduciaires une fois qu’ils sont nommés. par ailleurs, la moitié des cotisations aux régimes de retraite provient du gouvernement provincial par l’entremise des employeurs du sec- teur public. toutefois, une fois que les cotisations sont versées, ces fonds sont assujettis à la fiducie et sont régis par ses modalités contractuelles (voir ehrcke c. public service pension board of trustees, 2004 bcsc 757, 32 bclr (4th) 388, par 60). enfin, tout comme les participants au régime, la province (par l’entremise des employeurs du secteur public) a certaines responsabilités en cas de déficit du fonds de pension, et elle peut avoir droit à une exonération de cotisations en cas d’excédent. tout excédent doit demeurer dans le fonds de pension (ac- cord relatif à l’administration en fiducie conjointe du régime de retraite de la fonction publique, art 103), et cet excédent est la propriété de chacun [traduc- tion] « à parts égales » (préambule, cd)). l’accord prévoit également que chacun assume une « part égale de responsabilité » relativement à tout déficit 620 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. canada submitted, such obligations do not flow from provincial ownership of assets but are instead rooted in the contractual obligations the province has as- sumed in relation to its employees (transcript, p 39). [132] i thus agree with the conclusion of the su- preme court of british columbia in ehrcke that the pension boards are private bodies. in that case, neilson j. considered whether the public service pension board of trustees was a public body in or- der to determine whether its decisions were amena- ble to judicial review. although the context of this appeal is different, i agree with her conclusion that “the nature of the board of trustees, the source and nature of its powers, and the description of its decision- making powers as set out in the joint trust agreement lead to the inevitable conclusion that the board of trustees is a private body” (para 63). this is not solely because the pension boards are formally placed at arm’s length from the government. in sub- stance, their position can be analogized to that of the universities in mckinney v. university of guelph, [1990] 3 scr 229. in that case, the court held that universities do not form part of “government” within the meaning of s. 32 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. the following comment at pp. 272-74, adjusted for context, is applicable to the pension boards: actuariel (préambule, cc)). la psppa n’oblige pas le trésor de la province à combler tout déficit qui pourrait survenir, mais donne simplement au mi- nistre des finances le pouvoir discrétionnaire de combler la partie du déficit actuariel attribuable au gouvernement (art 251). comme l’a fait remarquer le canada, ces obligations ne résultent pas du fait que les actifs appartiennent à la province, mais sont plutôt des obligations contractuelles de la province envers ses employés (transcription, p 39). [132] je souscris à la conclusion de la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique dans l’affaire ehrcke selon laquelle les conseils des régimes de retraite sont des organismes privés. dans cette affaire, la juge neilson s’est penchée sur la question de savoir si le conseil des fiduciaires du régime de retraite de la fonction publique était un organisme public afin d’établir si ses décisions pouvaient faire l’objet d’un contrôle judiciaire. bien que le contexte du présent pourvoi soit différent, je souscris à sa conclusion suivant laquelle [traduc- tion] « la nature du conseil des fiduciaires, la source et la nature de ses pouvoirs et la façon dont ses pouvoirs décisionnels sont énoncés dans l’accord d’adminis- tration en fiducie conjointe mènent inévitablement à la conclusion qu’il s’agit d’un organisme privé » (par 63). cette conclusion ne reposait pas seulement sur le fait que les conseils des régimes de retraite n’ont officiellement aucun lien de dépendance avec le gou- vernement. essentiellement, leur situation peut se com- parer à celle des universités dont il était question dans l’affaire mckinney c. université de guelph, [1990] 3 rcs 229. dans cet arrêt, la cour a jugé que les universités ne faisaient pas partie du « gouvernement » au sens de l’art. 32 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. les propos suivants (aux p. 272- 274 de cet arrêt), adaptés en fonction du contexte, valent aussi pour les conseils des régimes de retraite : the fact is that each of the universities has its own govern- ing body. only a minority of its members    are appointed by the lieutenant- governor in council    . en réalité, chaque université a son corps dirigeant. seul un petit nombre de ses membres [  ] sont nommés par le lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil   .   . though the universities, like other private organi- zations, are subject to government regulations and in large measure depend on government funds, they manage their own affairs and allocate these funds    .   . bien que les universités, comme d’autres organismes privés, soient assujetties à la réglementation gouverne- mentale et dépendent en grande partie de fonds publics, elles dirigent leurs propres affaires et répartissent ces sommes   . [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 621   . though the legislature may determine much of the environment in which universities operate, the reality is that they function as autonomous bodies within that environment   .   . bien que la législature puisse délimiter en grande partie le milieu dans lequel les universités fonctionnent, la réalité est qu’elles fonctionnent comme des organismes autonomes dans ce milieu   . [133] accordingly, it is evident that neither the plan members nor the pension boards are entitled to the protection of s 125. as the applicable regime indicates, the pension boards are not the province or agents thereof. thus, the pension funds that belong to the pension boards do not qualify as “property belonging to    any province” under s 125. [134] it is not necessary to consider the percent- age of the funds in the portfolios that comes from the bc government directly, including from the consolidated revenue fund. canada acknowledges that bci holds these funds for the ultimate benefit of the province (af, at para 77). as the province holds a beneficial interest in these funds, s. 125 ap- plies and they are immune from federal taxation. [133] en conséquence, il est évident que ni les participants au régime ni les conseils des régimes de retraite n’ont droit à la protection de l’art 125. comme l’indique le régime applicable, les conseils des régimes de retraite ne sont pas assimilés à la province et ils n’en sont pas les mandataires. ainsi, les fonds de pension qui appartiennent aux conseils des régimes de retraite ne peuvent être considérés comme une « propriété appartenant à [  ] [une] province » au sens de l’art 125. [134] il n’est pas nécessaire de tenir compte du pourcentage des fonds dans les portefeuilles qui pro- vient directement du gouvernement de la colombie- britannique, notamment du trésor. le canada admet que bci détient ces fonds au profit ultime de la pro- vince (ma, par 77). comme la province détient un intérêt bénéficiaire dans les fonds en question, l’art. 125 s’applique et les fonds jouissent de l’im- munité fiscale fédérale. c the pension boards bear the real impact of the c les conseils des régimes de retraite supportent tax dans les faits la charge de la taxe [135] the real impact of the tax is borne by the unit holders because bci provides the services relating to the portfolios for the benefit of the unit holders alone. in substance, the gst is imposed in respect of services that bci provides to the private unit holders. only the pension boards’ choice to pay bci indi- rectly by permitting it to take its payment from the trust makes the portfolios the recipients under the eta of the services that bci provides. [135] ce sont les détenteurs d’unités qui supportent dans les faits la charge de la taxe parce que bci four- nit ses services relativement aux portefeuilles au seul profit des détenteurs d’unités. essentiellement, la tps est exigible sur les services que bci fournit aux détenteurs d’unités privés. seul le choix des conseils des régimes de retraite de payer bci indirectement en lui permettant de se payer à même la fiducie fait en sorte que les portefeuilles deviennent les acquéreurs au sens de la lta des services fournis par bci. [136] the characteristics of the portfolios demon- strate that the unit holders bear the real impact of the tax. to briefly recap, during the lifetime of the portfolios, all the income and capital gains generated from them accrue to the unit holders. on termination of the portfolios, the net proceeds flow entirely to the unit holders. bci cannot appropriate assets from the portfolios and receives nothing on their termination. [136] les caractéristiques des portefeuilles dé- montrent que les détenteurs d’unités assument dans les faits la charge de la taxe. pour résumer briève- ment, pendant la durée de vie des portefeuilles, tous les revenus et gains en capital produits par ceux-ci reviennent aux détenteurs d’unités. lorsqu’il est mis fin aux portefeuilles, le produit net est versé en tota- lité aux détenteurs d’unités. bci ne peut s’approprier 622 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. taxation of the portfolios therefore does not result in bci losing anything to which it would otherwise have had access without the tax. instead, taxation of the portfolios results in less income, capital gains and ultimate proceeds accruing to the unit holders. the only benefit bci receives from each portfolio is the recouping of its operating costs and capital expenditures with respect to that portfolio. such operating costs and capital expenditures arise only because bci is managing the portfolios for the ulti- mate benefit of the unit holders. [137] the funds agreement between bci and the teachers’ pension board further demonstrates that the unit holders enjoy substantial control over their funds even once they have been invested in the portfolios.12 as noted, the regulation empowers bci’s chief investment officer to terminate portfolios. however, the funds agreement empowers the pension board to direct bci to terminate a portfolio, although bci appears to retain discretion as to whether in fact to follow this direction (s 243). nonetheless, even if the pension board cannot order bci to terminate a portfolio, it has the ability to terminate the funds agreement on 180 days’ notice (s. 8), following which, inter alia, the pro- rated share of the invest- ments in a portfolio belonging to the board will be returned to the board (s 912). les éléments d’actif des portefeuilles et elle ne reçoit rien lorsqu’il y est mis fin. la taxation des porte- feuilles n’entraîne pas donc pour bci la perte d’un bien auquel elle aurait autrement eu accès sans cette taxe. la taxation des portefeuilles entraîne plutôt une diminution des revenus, des gains en capital et du produit final revenant aux détenteurs d’unités. le seul avantage que bci retire de chaque porte- feuille est la possibilité de recouvrer ses frais d’ex- ploitation et ses dépenses en capital relativement au portefeuille en question. de tels frais d’exploitation et dépenses en capital n’existent que parce que bci gère les portefeuilles au profit ultime des détenteurs d’unités. [137] l’accord de gestion conclu entre bci et le conseil du régime de retraite des enseignants dé- montre également que les détenteurs d’unités exercent un contrôle important sur leurs fonds, même après qu’ils ont été investis dans les portefeuilles12. comme nous l’avons mentionné, le règlement confère au directeur des placements de bci le pouvoir de mettre fin aux portefeuilles. toutefois, aux termes de l’ac- cord de gestion, le conseil du régime de retraite peut ordonner à bci de mettre fin à un portefeuille, bien que bci semble conserver son pouvoir discrétion- naire quant à l’opportunité de suivre ou non cette directive (art 243). néanmoins, même s’il n’a pas le pouvoir de donner l’ordre à bci de mettre fin à un portefeuille, le conseil du régime de retraite peut résilier l’accord de gestion moyennant un préavis de 180 jours (art. 8), après quoi, entre autres, la part proportionnelle des placements dans le portefeuille qui lui appartient lui sera restituée (art 912). [138] furthermore, the taxable transaction under the eta is the direct result of bci’s contractual ob- ligation to provide services to the private pension boards. in the funds agreement, bci agrees to pro- vide specified investment and management services to the teachers’ pension board (s 1122). the funds [138] de plus, l’opération taxable aux termes de la lta est la conséquence directe de l’obligation con- tractuelle de bci visant la prestation de services aux conseils privés des régimes de retraite. aux termes de l’accord de gestion, bci a convenu de fournir cer- tains services de placement et de gestion au conseil 12 although bci has entered into funds investment and management agreements with the boards of all four public sector pension plans, only the agreement with the teachers’ pension board is in the record. there is no suggestion that there are any substantial differences between it and the other three agreements – counsel for canada agreed during the hearing that it was “typical” (tran- script, at p 15). 12 bien que bci ait conclu des accords d’investissement et de gestion des fonds avec les conseils des quatre régimes de retraite du secteur public, seul l’accord qu’elle a signé avec le conseil du régime de retraite des enseignants a été versé au dossier. rien ne permet de penser qu’il existe des différences substantielles entre cet accord et les trois autres. l’avocat du canada a convenu lors de l’audience qu’il s’agissait d’un accord [traduction] « typique » (transcription, p 15). [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 623 agreement states that bci is acting as the board’s agent and is fulfilling the board’s responsibilities in providing those services (ss 21 and 22). the board also pays bci in consideration of those services (s 51 and sch. a, s 2). d the pension boards would be the recipients of bci’s services under the eta but for the indirect payment method they have chosen [139] the only reason why differing tax conse- quences may occur here is because the pension boards have agreed to a different form of payment where bci holds their property in trust. bci manages two types of funds: portfolios and segregated funds. it holds the portfolios in trust but does not hold the segregated funds in trust. for the segregated funds, bci bills the pension board directly for the costs and expenditures it incurs in providing the services (funds agreement, sch. a, s 5). however, bci and the pension board selected a different method of pay- ment for the portfolios. they agreed that the pension board would pay bci indirectly by permitting it to recover its costs and expenses from the portfolios (funds agreement, sch. a, ss 2-4). nothing in the psppa required bci to select this method of payment for the portfolios. in fact, s. 24(1) of the psppa gives it the discretion as to whether to recover its operating costs and capital expenditures by charging the funds it manages or by charging its clients for the services provided. du régime de retraite des enseignants (art 1122). l’accord de gestion précise que bci agit en qualité de mandataire du conseil et s’acquitte des responsa- bilités de ce dernier lorsqu’elle fournit ces services (art 21 et 22). le conseil paie par ailleurs bci en contrepartie de ces services (art 51 et ann. a, art 2). d les conseils des régimes de retraite seraient les acquéreurs des services de bci au sens donné dans la lta n’eût été le mode de paiement indi- rect qu’ils ont choisi [139] la seule raison pour laquelle il pourrait y avoir des conséquences fiscales différentes en l’es- pèce est que les conseils des régimes de retraite ont convenu d’utiliser un mode de paiement différent lorsque bci détient leurs biens en fiducie. bci gère deux types de fonds : les portefeuilles et les fonds distincts. elle détient les portefeuilles en fiducie, mais pas les fonds distincts. en ce qui concerne ces derniers, bci facture directement au conseil des régimes de retraite les frais et les dépenses qu’elle engage pour fournir ses services (accord de ges- tion, ann. a, art 5). toutefois, bci et le conseil des régimes de retraite ont choisi un mode de paiement différent pour les portefeuilles. ils ont convenu que ce dernier paierait bci indirectement en permettant à celle-ci de recouvrer ses frais et ses dépenses à même les portefeuilles (accord de gestion, ann. a, art 2-4). rien dans la psppa n’obligeait bci à choisir ce mode de paiement pour les portefeuilles. en fait, le par. 24(1) de la psppa lui donne le pouvoir discré- tionnaire de recouvrer ses frais d’exploitation et ses dépenses en capital en les facturant aux fonds qu’elle gère ou en facturant à ses clients les services fournis. [140] as a result of these contractual choices by bci and the pension board, the tax consequences under the eta differ. in the case of the segregated funds, the pension board is the “recipient” because it is liable under the funds agreement to pay consid- eration to bci for the taxable supply of investment management services (eta, s.  123(1) (definition of “recipient”)). accordingly, the pension board is liable to pay gst (eta, s 165(1)). in contrast, if it is assumed that the portfolios are a “trust” for the purposes of the eta, they are considered to be a “person” under the eta and bci is their trustee. [140] en raison de ces choix contractuels de bci et du conseil du régime de retraite, les conséquences fiscales au titre de la lta diffèrent. dans le cas des fonds distincts, le conseil du régime de retraite est l’« acquéreur » parce qu’il est tenu, aux termes de l’accord de gestion, de payer à bci la contrepartie de la fourniture taxable des services de gestion de placements (lta, par. 123(1), définition d’« acqué- reur »). en conséquence, le conseil du régime de re- traite est tenu de payer la tps (lta, par 165(1)). en revanche, en tenant pour acquis qu’ils sont une « fi- ducie » pour l’application de la lta, les portefeuilles 624 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. the canada revenue agency took the position that the portfolios themselves are the recipients of the services because bci as trustee recovers its costs and expenses from the portfolios, not directly from the pension boards. it is the fact that the portfolios themselves, rather than the pension boards, are the recipients under the eta that gives rise to immunity under s. 125 according to bci. [141] the contractual choices of bci and the pen- sion boards are the only reason why the recipients of the services bci supplies under the eta are the portfolios and not the pension boards. had bci and the pension boards agreed that bci would bill the boards directly for its services instead of taking its payment from the portfolios, the boards would have been the recipients under the eta and would thus have been liable to pay gst. sont considérés être une « personne » au sens de la lta et bci est leur fiduciaire. l’agence du revenu du canada a adopté la position selon laquelle les portefeuilles eux- mêmes sont les acquéreurs des services parce que bci, à titre de fiduciaire, recouvre ses frais et ses dépenses à même les portefeuilles, et non directement des conseils des régimes de retraite. l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125 s’applique, selon bci, parce que ce sont les portefeuilles eux- mêmes, et non les conseils des régimes de retraite, qui sont les acquéreurs au sens de la lta. [141] les choix contractuels de bci et des conseils des régimes de retraite sont la seule raison pour la- quelle les acquéreurs des services fournis par bci sous le régime de la lta sont les portefeuilles et non les conseils des régimes de retraite. si bci et les conseils des régimes de retraite avaient convenu que bci facturerait directement ses services à ces der- niers plutôt qu’elle se paye à même les portefeuilles, les conseils auraient été les acquéreurs au sens de la lta et ils auraient donc été tenus de payer la tps. iii section 125 of the constitution act, 1867 iii l’article 125 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 a test for immunity under section 125 a critère pour l’application de l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125 [142] section 125 of the constitution act, 1867, provides as follows: [142] l’article 125 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 est ainsi libellé : 125 no lands or property belonging to canada or any province shall be liable to taxation. 125 nulle terre ou propriété appartenant au canada ou à aucune province en particulier ne sera sujette à la taxation. [143] bci is a statutory agent of the provincial crown and thus has the same constitutional immu- nity from taxation under s. 125 as the provincial crown (westbank first nation v. british columbia hydro and power authority, [1999] 3 scr 134, at para 46). the two requirements for the provincial or federal crown (or its agent) to make a success- ful s. 125 claim are well established. first, the im- pugned charge must constitute “taxation” within the meaning of ss. 91(3) and 92(2) of the constitution act, 1867. the taxation powers in those sections are subject to s. 125 (see reference re exported natural gas tax, [1982] 1 scr 1004, at pp. 1054-55 and 1067 (“natural gas tax”)). there is no dispute in [143] bci est un mandataire légal de la couronne provinciale et bénéficie donc, en vertu de l’art. 125, de la même immunité fiscale constitutionnelle que celle dont jouit la couronne provinciale (première nation de westbank c. british columbia hydro and power authority, [1999] 3 rcs 134, par 46). les deux exigences que doivent respecter la couronne provinciale et la couronne fédérale — ou leurs man- dataires  — pour obtenir gain de cause dans une demande fondée sur l’art. 125 sont bien établies. premièrement, le prélèvement contesté doit consti- tuer une « taxation » au sens des par. 91(3) et 92(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. les pouvoirs de taxation prévus par ces dispositions sont assujettis à [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 625 this case that the charge canada seeks to levy on the portfolios (the gst) constitutes taxation. therefore, the dispute before the court concerns the second re- quirement for a successful s. 125 claim: whether the subject matter of the taxation — the portfolios — is property “belonging” to the crown or its agent, in this case bci. to determine whether this second requirement is met, it is necessary to consider the purposes of s 125. l’art. 125 (voir renvoi relatif à la taxe sur le gaz na- turel exporté, [1982] 1 rcs 1004, p. 1054- 1055 et 1067) (« gaz naturel exporté »)). nul ne conteste en l’espèce que le prélèvement que le canada cherche à percevoir sur les portefeuilles (la tps) consti- tue une taxe. pour cette raison, le différend dont la cour est saisie porte sur la deuxième exigence à respecter pour qu’une demande fondée sur l’art. 125 soit accordée : les biens assujettis à la taxe — les portefeuilles — sont des biens « appartenant » à la couronne ou à son mandataire, en l’espèce bci. pour établir si cette seconde exigence est respectée, il faut examiner les objets de l’art 125. b purposes of section 125 b les objets de l’article 125 [144] section 125 exists to protect two constitu- tional values: federalism and democracy. the pri- mary value served by s. 125 is federalism (westbank, at para 19). this court has thus identified one pur- pose of s.  125 as being “to prevent one level of government from appropriating to its own use the property of the other, or the fruits of that property” (natural gas tax, at p 1078). the placement of s. 125 in part viii of the constitution act, 1867, confirms this purpose. entitled “revenues; debts; assets; taxation”, part viii divides crown assets between canada and the provinces. section 125 pro- tects that division of assets by preventing one level of government from “unilaterally    alter[ing] the terms of the division of assets” by taxing lands or property that belong to another level of government (natural gas tax, at p 1066). by providing such protection, s. 125 ensures that each level of govern- ment possesses “sufficient operational space to gov- ern without interference” (westbank, at para 17). [144] l’article 125 vise à protéger deux valeurs constitutionnelles : le fédéralisme et la démocratie. la principale valeur que soutient l’art. 125 est le fédéralisme (westbank, par 19). selon notre cour, l’art. 125 vise « à empêcher un palier de gouver- nement de s’approprier, pour son propre usage, les biens de l’autre palier de gouvernement ou les fruits de ces biens » (gaz naturel exporté, p 1078). le fait que l’art. 125 se trouve à la partie viii de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 confirme cet objet. intitulée « revenus; dettes; actifs, taxe », la par- tie viii partage les biens de l’état entre le canada et les provinces. l’article 125 protège ce partage des biens en empêchant un ordre de gouvernement « d’agir unilatéralement pour modifier [ce] partage » au moyen de la taxation de terres ou de biens appar- tenant à l’autre ordre de gouvernement (gaz naturel exporté, p 1066). en assurant une telle protection, l’art. 125 garantit à chaque palier de gouvernement « suffisamment d’espace opérationnel pour gouver- ner sans intervention externe » (westbank, par 17). [145] section  125 also advances the constitu- tional value of democracy. as the court explained in westbank, at para. 19, intergovernmental taxation would permit the elected representatives at one level of government to determine how to spend taxes that the elected representatives at another level of government have levied. this would undermine the principle of no taxation without representation that this court recognized in eurig estate (re), [1998] 2 scr 565, at paras 30-32. by barring [145] l’article 125 favorise également la valeur constitutionnelle de la démocratie. comme l’a expli- qué la cour dans l’arrêt westbank, par. 19, la taxation entre gouvernements permettrait aux représentants élus d’un ordre de gouvernement de décider com- ment devraient être dépensées les taxes prélevées par les représentants élus d’un autre ordre de gouverne- ment. cela irait à l’encontre du principe suivant le- quel il n’y a pas de taxation sans représentation, que notre cour a reconnu dans l’arrêt succession eurig 626 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. intergovernmental taxation, s. 125 thus safeguards democracy at each of level of government. (re), [1998] 2 rcs 565, par 30-32. en interdisant la taxation entre gouvernements, l’art. 125 protège ainsi la démocratie à chaque ordre de gouvernement. c the interpretation of section 125 should not c l’interprétation de l’art. 125 ne doit pas aller overshoot these purposes au- delà de ces objets [146] the courts have been careful not to inter- pret  s.  125 in a way that overshoots these twin purposes for instance, in natural gas tax, at pp. 1054-55, this court restricted the protection of s. 125 to taxation under s. 91(3) or 92(2) and held that it was not a purpose of s. 125 to protect against proper regulatory action taken by either level of government. similarly, in westbank, at para. 33, the court emphasized that the exclusion of regulatory charges from the ambit of s. 125 ensures that s. 125 will provide only the “degree of operational space” to governments that its purposes require. such ju- dicial caution is entirely appropriate because it is a settled principle of constitutional interpretation that it is important not to overshoot the purpose of a provision. courts lack the power to “invent new obligations foreign to the original purpose of the provision” (caron v. alberta, 2015 scc 56, [2015] 3 scr 511, at para. 37, citing r v. blais, 2003 scc 44, [2003] 2 scr 236, at para 40). [147] courts have restricted the application of s. 125 to ensure that it does not overshoot its purposes in two ways that are relevant to this appeal. first, courts have been careful not to extend the protec- tion of s. 125 to private parties. as davies j. held in calgary & edmonton land co. v. attorney- general of alberta (1911), 45 scr 170, at p. 180, the pur- pose of s. 125 immunity is not to shield from taxation the beneficial interests of private parties in property to which the crown holds legal title. as my colleague explains at para. 71 of her reasons, courts have thus consistently rejected claims in which private parties sought to use the crown’s s. 125 immunity as a shield to avoid taxation. [146] les tribunaux se sont gardés d’interpréter l’art. 125 d’une façon qui irait au- delà de ce double objet. par exemple, dans l’arrêt gaz naturel exporté, aux p. 1054- 1055, notre cour a limité la protection de l’art. 125 à la taxation prévue aux par. 91(3) et 92(2) et a conclu que l’art. 125 n’avait pas pour objet d’as- surer une protection contre les mesures de réglemen- tation légitimes prises par un ordre de gouvernement. de même, dans l’arrêt westbank, par. 33, la cour a souligné que l’exclusion des redevances de nature réglementaire du champ d’application de l’art. 125 fait en sorte que cet article confère aux gouverne- ments seulement l’« espace opérationnel » que les objectifs de cet article exigent. une telle prudence de la part des tribunaux est tout à fait de mise parce que, selon un principe bien établi d’interprétation constitutionnelle, il est important de ne pas interpréter une disposition d’une façon qui va au- delà de son objet. les tribunaux n’ont pas le pouvoir d’« inventer de nouvelles obligations sans rapport avec l’objectif original de la disposition en litige » (caron c. alberta, 2015 csc 56, [2015] 3 rcs 511, par. 37, citant r. c. blais, 2003 csc 44, [2003] 2 rcs 236, par 40). [147] les tribunaux ont limité le champ d’applica- tion de l’art. 125 pour s’assurer qu’il n’excède pas son objet de deux façons qui nous intéressent en l’espèce. premièrement, les tribunaux se sont gardés d’étendre la protection de l’art. 125 aux parties privées. comme l’a déclaré le juge davies dans l’arrêt calgary & edmonton land co. c. attorney- general of alberta (1911), 45 rcs 170, p. 180, l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125 n’a pas pour objet de protéger contre la taxation les intérêts bénéficiaires que possèdent des parties privées sur des biens sur lesquels la couronne détient le titre de propriété en common law. comme l’explique ma collègue au par. 71 de ses motifs, les tribunaux ont donc systématiquement rejeté les de- mandes par lesquelles des parties privées tentaient, pour se soustraire à la taxation, de se prévaloir de l’im- munité dont jouit la couronne en vertu de l’art 125. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 627 in particular, this court has made it clear that [148] parliament can require private purchasers of provin- cial services to pay gst in respect of those services without running afoul of s.  125 in reference re goods and services tax, [1992] 2 scr 445 (“gst reference”), alberta argued that imposing the gst on taxable supplies made by the provinces amounted to taxation of the “fruits” of provincial property. the court rejected this argument. the gst was payable not by the provinces as the suppliers, but instead by the private parties purchasing provincial services as the recipients: gst reference, at pp 479-80. [149] second, courts have found that s. 125 is not intended to immunize the crown from contractual consequences or other adverse commercial effects that it may bear as a result of the taxation of a private party. for instance, in city of vancouver v. attorney- general of canada, [1944] scr 23,. vancouver taxed a private legal owner of land leased to canada based on the value of the land, which included the value of structures canada had erected as tenant. canada argued that the effect of the tax would be to leave it on the hook to pay, because the private party would either charge an increased rental fee or require canada to indemnify it for the taxes. this court conclusively rejected that argument and held that s. 125 did not protect canada from such adverse con- tractual or commercial consequences (at pp. 36-37, per davies j., p. 56, per rand j (taschereau j con- curring)). likewise, in phillips and taylor v. city of sault ste. marie, [1954] scr 404, at pp. 408-9, the court rejected the argument that the fact that canada might be contractually liable to pay a tax levied on an occupant of federal crown land was sufficient to engage s. 125 immunity. similarly, this court held that the gst does not offend s. 125 simply because it renders provincial property less commercially at- tractive than it would be if the tax did not apply (gst reference, at p 480). [148] en particulier, notre cour a bien précisé que le parlement peut obliger les acheteurs privés de services provinciaux à payer la tps sur ces ser- vices sans contrevenir à l’art 125. dans le renvoi relatif à la taxe sur les produits et services, [1992] 2 rcs 445 (« renvoi relatif à la tps »), l’alberta soutenait que l’imposition de la tps sur les fourni- tures taxables fabriquées par les provinces équiva- lait à taxer les « fruits » provenant des biens de la province. la cour a rejeté cet argument. ce n’était pas les provinces qui étaient tenues de payer la tps en tant que fournisseurs, mais plutôt les parties pri- vées qui achetaient des services provinciaux en tant qu’acquéreurs (renvoi relatif à la tps, p. 479- 480). [149] deuxièmement, les tribunaux ont conclu que l’art. 125 n’a pas pour objet de mettre l’état à l’abri des conséquences contractuelles ou d’autres effets commerciaux préjudiciables qu’il pourrait subir en raison de la taxation d’une partie privée. par exemple, dans l’affaire city of vancouver c. attorney- general of canada, [1944] rcs 23, la ville de vancouver avait taxé le propriétaire privé en common law d’un terrain que le canada lui avait loué en fonction de la valeur du terrain, qui compre- nait la valeur des structures que le canada y avait érigées à titre de locataire. le canada a fait valoir que l’imposition de cette taxe aurait pour effet qu’il serait tenu de payer, parce que la partie privée fac- turerait des frais de location plus élevés ou exigerait que le canada l’indemnise pour les taxes. la cour a catégoriquement rejeté cet argument et statué que l’art.  125 ne protégeait pas le canada contre de telles conséquences contractuelles ou commerciales préjudiciables (p. 36-37, le juge davies, p. 56, le juge rand (avec l’accord du juge taschereau)). de même, dans l’arrêt phillips and taylor c. city of sault ste. marie, [1954] rcs 404, p. 408- 409, la cour a rejeté l’argument selon lequel le fait que le canada pourrait être tenu contractuellement de payer une taxe imposée à l’occupant d’une terre appartenant au gouvernement fédéral était suffisant pour que s’applique l’immunité prévue à l’art 125. de façon similaire, notre cour a jugé que la tps ne contrevenait pas à l’art. 125 simplement parce qu’elle rend un bien de la province moins attrayant sur le plan commercial qu’il ne le serait si cette taxe ne s’appliquait pas (renvoi relatif à la tps, p 480). 628 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. [150] this line of jurisprudence reflects a concern not to overshoot s. 125’s purposes by favouring the commercial and contractual interests of the crown at the expense of those of private parties. the court recognized this concern in natural gas tax by stress- ing the narrowness of its holding that the proposed federal tax on provincial resource property was un- constitutional. at p. 1081, the court stated that it was not addressing a situation in which parliament was taxing the provision of a service by a province or the conduct by a province of business that only incidentally concerned the consumption of a provin- cial resource property. [151] such judicial caution is appropriate. an over- broad definition would overshoot the purpose of pro- tecting the division of assets. it would instead “shift the balance between private and public enterprise in favour of public ownership” by encouraging prov- inces to create crown corporations to manage activ- ities previously undertaken by private enterprise (g. bale, “reciprocal tax immunity in a federation — section 125 of the constitution act, 1867 and the proposed federal tax on exported natural gas” (1983), 61 can. bar rev. 652, at p 678). i take no position on whether such a shift is desirable from a public policy standpoint. that is for parliament and the provincial legislatures to decide. my point is that it forms no part of s. 125’s purposes to effect or incentivize such a shift. [150] cette jurisprudence témoigne du souci des tri- bunaux de ne pas aller au- delà des objets de l’art. 125 en favorisant les intérêts commerciaux et contractuels de l’état au détriment de ceux des parties privées. la cour a reconnu cette préoccupation dans l’arrêt gaz naturel exporté en soulignant la portée étroite de sa déclaration d’inconstitutionnalité de la taxe fé- dérale proposée sur les ressources provinciales. à la p. 1081, la cour a précisé qu’il n’était pas question dans cette affaire d’une situation où le parlement taxait la prestation d’un service fourni par une province ou l’exploitation par une province d’une entreprise liée seulement de façon accessoire à la consommation d’une ressource provinciale. [151] une telle prudence judiciaire s’impose. une définition trop large irait au- delà de l’objectif de protection du partage des biens, et aurait plutôt pour effet de [traduction] « modifier l’équilibre entre l’entreprise privée et l’entreprise publique en faveur de la propriété publique » en encourageant les provinces à créer des sociétés d’état pour gérer des activités jusqu’alors exercées par l’entreprise privée (g. bale, « reciprocal tax immunity in a federation — section 125 of the constitution act, 1867 and the proposed federal tax on exported natural gas » (1983), 61 r du b can. 652, p 678). je ne me prononce pas sur la question de savoir si un tel changement est souhaitable du point de vue de l’ordre public. c’est au parlement et aux législatures provinciales d’en décider ce que je tiens à dire, c’est qu’on ne peut invoquer les objets de l’art.  125 pour réaliser ou encourager un tel changement. iv section 125 does not apply to immunize bci’s iv l’article 125 n’exempte pas de la tps les ser- services from gst vices offerts par bci a in substance, the portfolios belong to the pri- vate pension boards a pour l’essentiel, les portefeuilles appartiennent aux conseils privés des régimes de retraite [152] the real issue is whether, in the circum- stances of this case, the property “belong[s] to” the crown and is thus immune under s 125. i hold that the property does not belong to the crown as s. 125 requires. section 125 does not immunize property that private parties have placed with the crown to hold in trust for their sole benefit from a tax on [152] la véritable question est celle de savoir si, eu égard aux circonstances de l’espèce, les biens « appart[iennent] » à l’état et bénéficient de ce fait de l’immunité prévue à l’art 125. je conclus que les biens n’appartiennent pas à l’état comme l’exige l’art 125. cette disposition n’exempte pas les biens que des parties privées ont confiés à l’état pour qu’il [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 629 services that they have contracted to receive from the crown in respect of that property. in these cir- cumstances, the property in substance belongs not to the crown but to the private parties, and the crown’s legal title as trustee does not trigger the immunity. i agree with my colleague that legal owner- [153] ship is clearly a property interest and that nothing limits the word “property” in s. 125 to beneficial interests in property. however, this is only part of the puzzle. the phrase “belonging to canada or any province” in s. 125 must also be given meaning. [154] it is appropriate in construing the scope of s. 125 immunity, as this court held in natural gas tax at p. 1078, to prevent such “subtle nuances of form” as the pension boards and bci employed in this case from reshaping the substance of the im- munity. it is true, as my colleague notes, that the court in natural gas tax made this comment in the context of interpreting s. 125 broadly, not narrowly. the court interpreted s. 125 broadly in that case so that its purpose of protecting against unilateral alterations to the division of assets in part viii of the constitution act, 1867, would be achieved. however, as i have explained, the courts have also been cau- tious not to overshoot the purposes of s. 125 in con- struing the limits of the immunity it provides. there is no reason why the same principle of substance over form should not apply to prevent s. 125 from overshooting its purposes. les détienne en fiducie à leur seul profit d’une taxe sur les services qu’elles se sont engagées par contrat à recevoir de l’état relativement aux biens en ques- tion. dans ces conditions, les biens pour l’essentiel n’appartiennent pas à l’état mais bien aux parties privées, et le titre en common law que détient l’état en tant que fiduciaire ne donne pas lieu à l’immunité fiscale. [153] je suis d’accord avec ma collègue pour dire que la propriété en common law est sans conteste un intérêt de propriété et que rien à l’art. 125 ne limite le mot « propriété » aux intérêts bénéficiaires dans un bien cependant, il ne s’agit que d’une pièce du casse- tête. il faut également donner un sens à l’expression « appartenant au canada ou à aucune province en particulier » que l’on trouve à l’art 125. [154] comme l’a déclaré notre cour dans l’arrêt gaz naturel exporté à la p. 1078, il convient, lors- qu’on interprète la portée de l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125, d’empêcher que des « nuances subtiles en ce qui concerne la forme » comme celles que les conseils des régimes de retraite et bci ont utilisées en l’espèce ne viennent changer la véritable nature de cette immunité. il est vrai, comme le fait observer ma collègue, que dans l’arrêt gaz naturel exporté, la cour a tenu pareils propos alors qu’elle donnait une interprétation large — et non étroite — à l’art 125. dans cet arrêt, la cour a interprété l’art. 125 de façon large pour donner effet à son objectif d’empêcher les modifications unilatérales au partage des biens prévu à la partie viii de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. toutefois, comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, les tribunaux se sont également gardés d’aller au- delà des objets de l’art. 125 en interprétant les limites de l’immunité prévue par cet article. il n’y a pas de raison pour laquelle le même principe voulant que le fond l’emporte sur la forme ne devrait pas s’ap- pliquer pour empêcher que l’art. 125 ait une portée qui va au- delà de ses objets. indeed, this court did apply the principle [155] of substance over form to prevent s. 125 from over- shooting its purposes in phillips and taylor. in that case, employees of the federal crown were required to use federal crown land as their residence in order to better perform their duties but had no legal interest [155] de fait, dans l’arrêt phillips and taylor, notre cour a appliqué le principe suivant lequel le fond l’emporte sur la forme pour éviter que l’art. 125 aille au- delà de ses objets. dans cette affaire, des employés de la couronne fédérale devaient utiliser des biens- fonds appartenant à la couronne fédérale 630 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. in the land. a provincial tax statute contained a pro- vision allowing a municipality to assess occupants of crown land in respect of that land regardless of their legal relationship with the federal crown con- cerning that land. the court held that the tax did not offend s 125. while in form the tenants had no legal interest in the land and the crown held both legal and beneficial title, in substance they occupied the crown land and thus could be assessed for taxes without offending s. 125 (phillips and taylor, at pp 407-8). [156] i would apply this same principle of sub- stance over form to interpret the phrase “belonging to canada or any province” in s 125. i am of the view that s. 125 does not immunize property that private parties have placed with the crown to hold in trust for their sole benefit from a tax on services that they have contracted to receive from the crown in respect of that property. in form, the crown does have a legal interest in the property, but in substance, the property belongs not to the crown but to the private parties. this court’s own jurisprudence on beneficial ownership makes this clear. as this court has stated, “[t]he beneficial owner of property has been de- scribed as ‘the real owner of property even though it is in someone else’s name’” (pecore v. pecore, 2007 scc 17, [2007] 1 scr 795, at para. 4, quoting csak v. aumon (1990), 69 dlr (4th) 567 (ont. hcj), at p 570). likewise, in valard construction, at para. 16, this court found that the very essence of a trust is that the trustee must hold property “for the benefit” of another such that the “real benefit of the property accrues, not to the truste[e], but to the ben- eficiaries or other objects of the trust”. the trustee may not hold the property for its own enjoyment, but only for that of the beneficiary (valard construction, at para 17). comme résidence afin de mieux s’acquitter de leurs fonctions, sans détenir d’intérêt en common law dans ces biens- fonds. une loi fiscale provinciale comportait une disposition qui permettait à la mu- nicipalité d’assujettir à une taxe foncière les oc- cupants de bien- fonds appartenant à la couronne, indépendamment de la nature de leur relation juri- dique avec la couronne fédérale concernant ce bien- fonds. la cour a jugé que la taxe ne contrevenait pas à l’art 125. même si, sur le plan de la forme, les locataires n’avaient aucun intérêt en common law dans les biens- fonds et que la couronne détenait à la fois le titre de propriété en common law et le titre bénéficiaire, sur le plan du fond, c’étaient eux qui oc- cupaient les biens- fonds de la couronne et pouvaient donc être assujettis à la taxe sans qu’il y ait atteinte à l’art. 125 (phillips and taylor, p. 407- 408). [156] j’appliquerais le même principe suivant lequel le fond l’emporte sur la forme pour inter- préter l’expression « appartenant au canada ou à aucune province en particulier » que l’on trouve à l’art 125. j’estime que l’art. 125 n’exempte pas les biens que les parties privées ont confiés à l’état pour qu’il les détienne en fiducie à leur seul profit de la taxe sur les services qu’elles se sont engagées par contrat à recevoir de l’état relativement aux biens en question. sur le plan de la forme, l’état a un intérêt en common law sur les biens, mais en ce qui a trait au fond, les biens n’appartiennent pas à l’état mais aux parties privées. cela ressort claire- ment de la jurisprudence de notre cour sur la pro- priété bénéficiaire. comme l’a déclaré notre cour : « [l]e propriétaire bénéficiaire d’un bien est [tra- duction] “le véritable propriétaire du bien même si ce dernier n’est pas à son nom” » (pecore c. pecore, 2007 csc 17, [2007] 1 rcs 795, par. 4, citant le jugement csak c. aumon (1990), 69 dlr (4th) 567  (hcj . ont.), p.  570) dans le même ordre d’idées, dans l’arrêt valard construction, par. 16, notre cour a jugé que la définition même de la fi- ducie suppose que le fiduciaire détient un bien « au profit » d’une autre personne « de façon à ce que ce bien profite concrètement non pas [au fiduciaire] mais aux bénéficiaires ou à la réalisation des fins de la fiducie ». le fiduciaire détient les biens en fiducie uniquement pour que le bénéficiaire puisse en jouir (valard construction, par 17). [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 631 [157] moreover, this obligation to hold property solely for the benefit of a private beneficiary runs counter to the very concept of public ownership un- der part viii of the constitution act, 1867, that s. 125 aims to protect. in natural resources and public property under the canadian constitution (1969), at p. 18, g v la. forest defined public ownership in part viii of the constitution act, 1867, as referring in part to the ability of a province to “administer and control for the provincial    benefit property vested in the queen”. as should be evident, as trustee bci is expressly precluded from administering and con- trolling the portfolios for its own benefit or for the benefit of its principal, british columbia. instead, it is required by law to administer and control them for the benefit of the private parties that have entrusted their money to it to manage as trustee. [157] de plus, cette obligation de détenir les biens au seul profit d’un bénéficiaire privé va à l’encontre du concept même des biens publics que l’on trouve à la partie viii de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 et que l’art. 125 vise à protéger. dans son ouvrage natural resources and public property under the canadian constitution (1969), p. 18, le professeur g v la. forest définit les biens publics dont il est question à la partie viii de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 comme renvoyant en partie au pouvoir d’une province [traduction] « de gestion et de maîtrise au nom de la province [  ] à l’égard des biens dont la propriété est dévolue à la couronne ». il va de soi qu’il est expressément interdit à bci, en tant que fi- duciaire, d’exercer son pouvoir de gestion et de maî- trise des portefeuilles pour son propre profit ou pour celui de son commettant, la colombie- britannique. la loi l’oblige plutôt à exercer son pouvoir de gestion et de maîtrise au profit des parties privées qui lui ont confié leur argent pour qu’elle le gère en sa qualité de fiduciaire. b extending the immunity would overshoot sec- b l’élargissement de l’immunité irait au- delà des tion 125’s purposes objets de l’art. 125 [158] the interpretation of s. 125’s ambit that i have adopted properly avoids overshooting the pur- poses of that provision because it does not extend immunity to private parties’ interests. on my col- league’s interpretation, the private pension boards can always immunize themselves from paying gst on the services they contracted to receive from bci. all they have to do is ask bci to hold their funds in trust instead of in a segregated account and then authorize bci to take its payment from the funds instead of billing the boards directly. the private parties derive all the real benefit from the immunity, not bci, since the portfolios subject to the tax do not belong to bci but are merely held in trust. in form, the property is owned by bci, but in substance, it belongs to the private parties. and as the funds agreement makes clear, in substance the private parties are using the property to pay bci for the investment management services it provides them. [158] l’interprétation de la portée de l’art. 125 que j’ai adoptée évite comme il se doit d’aller au- delà des objets de cet article, parce qu’elle ne permet pas l’application de l’immunité aux intérêts de par- ties privées. selon l’interprétation de ma collègue, les conseils privés des régimes de retraite peuvent toujours se soustraire au paiement de la tps exigée sur les services qu’ils se sont engagés par contrat à recevoir de bci. ils n’ont qu’à demander à bci de détenir leurs fonds en fiducie plutôt que dans un compte distinct, et ensuite à autoriser bci à se payer à même les fonds au lieu de facturer directement les conseils des régimes de retraite. ce sont les parties privées, et non bci, qui profitent véritablement de cette immunité, étant donné que les portefeuilles assujettis à la taxe n’appartiennent pas à bci, mais sont simplement détenus en fiducie. sur le plan de la forme, les biens sont la propriété de bci, mais sur le plan du fond, ils appartiennent aux parties privées. et comme l’accord de gestion l’indique clairement, sur le plan du fond, les parties privées se servent des biens afin de payer bci pour les services de gestion de placements qu’elle leur fournit. 632 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. [159] likewise, my interpretation avoids over- shooting s. 125’s purposes because it does not rely on adverse contractual consequences for the crown to extend the immunity. as noted previously, a tax does not offend s. 125 simply because it will result in ad- verse contractual consequences for the crown. this principle applies with full force here. the province’s obligations in the event of a pension shortfall are contractual in nature. the joint trust agreements re- quire the province as employer to share the cost of making up shortfalls equally with the plan members (public service pension plan joint trust agreement, s 103(b)). the province has no statutory obligation to fill an unfunded liability. instead, s 251(1) of the psppa merely provides the minister of finance with the discretion to do so. at paras. 83-84 of her reasons, my colleague relies on the remote prospect that taxing the trust property would create a shortfall for which the province would be liable to fill to jus- tify applying immunity. however, the jurisprudence indicates that it is improper to rely on this contractual consequence to do so. [160] furthermore, my interpretation avoids over- shooting s. 125’s purposes because it does not render the crown’s assets more commercially attractive by making them a tax haven for private parties. as i have explained, the funds agreement makes it clear that the pension boards are paying bci for the services it provides them and have simply selected the recovery of moneys from the portfolios as the mechanism of payment. the effect of this payment mechanism is to give bci a commercial advantage over private investment managers because investors that place their money with it to hold in trust do not have to pay gst on the investment management services they receive as long as payment is made from the trust funds. what is in substance a tax on the private recipients of provincial services does not engage s. 125, even if the effect of such taxation is to remove a commercial advantage that provincial property would otherwise enjoy (gst reference, at p 480). [159] en outre, cette interprétation évite que l’art. 125 excède ses objets parce qu’elle ne repose pas sur les conséquences contractuelles préjudiciables qu’en- traînerait pour l’état l’élargissement de l’immunité. comme je l’ai déjà signalé, une taxe ne contrevient pas à l’art. 125 simplement parce qu’elle aura des consé- quences contractuelles préjudiciables pour l’état. ce principe s’applique ici intégralement. les obligations de la province en cas de déficit du fonds de pension sont de nature contractuelle. les accords d’administra- tion en fiducie conjointe exigent que la province, à titre d’employeur, partage également les frais nécessaires pour combler les déficits avec les participants au ré- gime (accord d’administration en fiducie conjointe du régime de retraite de la fonction publique, al 103b)). la province n’a aucune obligation légale de combler un déficit actuariel; le par 251(1) de la psppa confère plutôt simplement au ministre des finances le pouvoir discrétionnaire de le faire. aux par. 83-84 de ses mo- tifs, ma collègue s’appuie sur la faible possibilité que la taxation des biens en fiducie puisse créer un déficit que la province serait tenue de combler pour justifier l’application de l’immunité. toutefois, il ressort de la jurisprudence qu’il ne convient pas de prendre appui sur une telle conséquence contractuelle pour le faire. [160] de plus, cette interprétation évite que l’art. 125 aille au- delà de ses objets parce qu’elle ne rend pas les biens de la couronne plus attrayants sur le plan commercial en faisant d’eux un paradis fiscal pour les parties privées. comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, l’accord de gestion indique clairement que les conseils des ré- gimes de retraite paient bci pour les services fournis et qu’ils ont simplement choisi le recouvrement de sommes à même les portefeuilles comme mode de paiement. celui-ci a pour effet de conférer à bci un avantage commercial par rapport aux gestionnaires de placements privés, car les investisseurs qui confient leur argent à bci pour qu’elle les détienne en fiducie n’ont pas à payer la tps sur les services de gestion de pla- cements qu’ils reçoivent, à condition que le paiement se fasse à même les fonds en fiducie. ce qui constitue dans les faits une taxe imposée aux acquéreurs pri- vés de services provinciaux ne fait pas entrer en jeu l’art. 125, même si cette taxe a pour effet de supprimer un avantage commercial dont jouiraient autrement ces biens provinciaux (renvoi relatif à la tps, p 480). [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 633 c extending the immunity would not advance section 125’s purposes c l’élargissement de l’immunité ne favoriserait pas la réalisation des objets de l’art. 125 [161] not only would extending the immunity over- shoot s. 125’s purposes, but it would also do nothing to advance those purposes. this case is far removed from s. 125’s objective of preventing one level of government from appropriating the property of the other, or the fruits of that property, to its own use. that objective is rooted in the need to preserve the division of crown assets between the federal and provincial governments effected by part viii of the constitution act, 1867. yet here, the portfolio funds were not originally provincial property. they were private property owned by private pension boards. bci did not purchase this property but merely agreed to manage it as the agent of the boards. while the boards permitted bci to assume legal title, they re- tained a full beneficial interest, and they agreed to pay bci for the services it provided them in respect of the property. [162] taxing the trust funds for bci’s services does not undermine the government objectives underlying the portfolios’ existence. i agree with my colleague’s conclusion that the bc. legislature created bci to pursue various public objectives. however, the relevant legislative objective in relation to the in- vestment management services that bci provides is much narrower. that objective is to require bci to recover the costs of the services it performs for clients (psppa, ss. 20(2)(d), 24(1)). as my colleague accepts at para. 16 of her reasons, the psppa gives bci a discretion as to how to do so. in addition to recovering its costs from the portfolios themselves (psppa, s. 24(1)(a)), bci can bill its clients directly for the services it provides (psppa, s 24(1)(b)). if bci bills its clients directly, as it does for the segre- gated funds, the clients are liable to pay gst. [161] non seulement l’élargissement de l’immu- nité irait au- delà des objets de l’art. 125, mais il ne favoriserait nullement leur réalisation. la présente affaire n’a pas grand- chose à voir avec l’objectif de l’art. 125 d’empêcher un ordre de gouvernement de s’approprier, pour son propre usage, les biens d’un autre ordre de gouvernement, ou les fruits de ces biens. cet objectif trouve sa source dans la nécessité de protéger le partage des biens de la couronne entre les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux, qui est prévu à la partie viii de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. pourtant, en l’espèce, les fonds détenus dans les portefeuilles n’appartenaient pas à l’origine à la province. il s’agissait de biens privés appartenant à des conseils privés de régime de retraite. bci n’a pas acheté ces biens, mais a simplement accepté de les gérer en qualité de mandataire des conseils. bien qu’ils aient autorisé bci à assumer le titre en common law, les conseils des régimes de retraite en ont conservé l’intérêt bénéficiaire intégral et ils ont accepté de payer bci pour les services fournis relativement à ces biens. [162] la taxation des fonds détenus en fiducie pour les services fournis par bci ne contrevient pas non plus aux objectifs gouvernementaux qui sous- tendent l’existence des portefeuilles je souscris à la conclusion de ma collègue suivant laquelle la législature de la colombie- britannique a créé bci en vue de la réalisation de divers objectifs publics. toutefois, l’objectif législatif qui nous intéresse en ce qui concerne les services de gestion de place- ments fournis par bci est beaucoup plus restreint. cet objectif consiste à exiger de bci qu’elle re- couvre les coûts des services qu’elle fournit à ses clients (psppa, al. 20(2)d) et par 24(1)). comme ma collègue le reconnaît au par. 16 de ses motifs, la psppa confère à bci le pouvoir discrétionnaire concernant la façon de le faire. en plus de recouvrer ses coûts à même les portefeuilles (psppa, al. 24(1) a)), bci peut facturer directement à ses clients les services fournis (psppa, al 24(1)b)). si bci facture les services directement à ses clients, comme elle le fait pour les fonds distincts, ceux-ci sont alors tenus de payer la tps. 634 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. [163] accordingly, holding that the immunity does not apply in the circumstances of this case would not undermine the bc. legislature’s decision to allow bci to hold the portfolio assets in trust, as my col- league suggests at para. 84 of her reasons. instead, it would merely impose appropriate tax consequences on a mode of payment for services chosen by bci and its private clients. nothing in the psppa or trust law requires the mode of payment that is said to give rise to s. 125 immunity. as noted previously, the psppa makes direct payment from the trust funds only one of multiple possible payment options avail- able and also permits bci to bill its clients directly for services rendered. as for trust law, a trust instru- ment may expressly provide for the remuneration of a trustee (oosterhoff on trusts: text, commentary and materials (9th ed. 2019), by a h oosterhoff,. r. chambers and m. mcinnes, at p 975). it is set- tled law that the parties to a trust instrument may agree that a trustee’s remuneration is payable directly by a person who assumes personal liability for it, instead of from the trust funds (lewin on trusts (19th ed. 2015), by l. tucker, n. le poidevin and j. brightwell, at para. 20- 249). [164] this undercuts the assertion that providing immunity is necessary to protect the province’s “op- erational space” to govern. the bc. legislature con- templated that bci would recover its costs from its clients, either directly or by charging the portfolios it operates for their benefit. the legislature is pre- sumed to know the prevailing case law (r v. penunsi, 2019 scc 39, [2019] 3 scr 91, at para.  59). accordingly, as the enactment of the psppa post- dated this court’s decision in the gst reference, the legislature must be taken to have understood that cli- ents would pay gst on services they received from bci if bci charged them directly. the legislature’s decision to still provide for this direct charge option in s. 24(1)(b) of the psppa indicates that it did not see the liability of private parties to pay gst on the investment management services they receive from bci as undermining the province’s operational space to govern. direct charges to bci’s clients are also wholly compatible with the trust structure that [163] en conséquence, le fait de conclure que l’im- munité ne s’applique pas en l’espèce n’irait pas à l’encontre de la décision du législateur de la colombie- britannique de permettre à bci de détenir les actifs des portefeuilles en fiducie, comme le suggère ma collègue au par. 84 de ses motifs. cette conclusion ne ferait qu’entraîner les conséquences fiscales qui s’im- posent sur le mode de paiement des services que bci et ses clients privés ont choisi. rien dans la psppa ou dans le droit des fiducies n’exige le recours au mode de paiement qui est censé donner lieu à l’immunité prévue à l’art 125. comme je l’ai déjà fait observer, la psppa ne fait du paiement direct à même les fonds en fiducie qu’une des nombreuses options de paie- ment possibles, et permet également à bci de facturer directement à ses clients les services rendus. pour ce qui est du droit des fiducies, un acte de fiducie peut prévoir expressément la rémunération d’un fiduciaire (oosterhoff on trusts : text, commentary and mate- rials (9e éd. 2019), a h oosterhoff,. r. chambers et m. mcinnes, p 975). il est de jurisprudence constante que les parties à un acte de fiducie peuvent convenir que la rémunération d’un fiduciaire sera payable di- rectement par une personne qui en assume la respon- sabilité personnelle, plutôt que sur les fonds détenus en fiducie (lewin on trusts (19e éd. 2015), l. tucker, n. le poidevin et j. brightwell, par. 20- 249). [164] ces éléments viennent également affaiblir l’argument selon lequel l’immunité est nécessaire pour protéger « l’espace opérationnel » dont la pro- vince a besoin pour gouverner. le législateur de la colombie- britannique a envisagé la possibilité que bci recouvre ses frais auprès de ses clients, soit directement, soit en les facturant aux portefeuilles qu’elle gère à leur profit. le législateur est présumé connaître l’ensemble du droit pertinent (r c. pe- nunsi, 2019 csc 39, [2019] 3 rcs 91, par 59). en conséquence, comme l’adoption de la psppa est postérieure à l’arrêt rendu par notre cour dans le renvoi relatif à la tps, il faut supposer que le législateur de la colombie- britannique avait compris que les clients paieraient la tps sur les services reçus de bci si celle-ci les leur facturait directement. le choix du législateur de prévoir quand même cette possibilité de facturation directe à l’al. 24(1)b) de la psppa indique qu’il n’a pas considéré que l’obli- gation des parties privées de payer la tps sur les [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 635 the bc. legislature authorized bci to use for the portfolio assets. moreover, i do not accept bci’s argument that requiring the portfolios to pay gst would put them at risk. bci and the pension boards remain free to ensure that the gst is not paid from the trust funds by agreeing that the boards will pay bci directly for its services, an option that is both provided for by the legislature and used by bci and the boards for the segregated funds. i would also note that bci plays a less active [165] role in relation to the management of the funds en- trusted to it by the pension boards than my colleague suggests. at para. 83 of her reasons, my colleague stresses the “active role” that bci plays as trustee largely by making reference to the regulation. yet considering the regulation in isolation from the funds agreement yields only a partial picture. the funds agreement in fact restricts the “active role” of bci to which my colleague refers by stipulating that bci provides investment management services as the agent of the teachers’ pension board and ex- ercises that board’s delegated authority (ss 21 and 22). the funds agreement does contemplate bci taking direction from the board regarding investment decisions, as evidenced by the provision exempting bci from liability if it complies with an express di- rection of the board concerning investment decisions (ss 243 and 1211). similarly, bci is obligated to convey the trust property to the teachers’ pension board upon demand (ss 82 and 912). i agree with my colleague that bci is not a bare trustee because the funds agreement does grant it discretionary authority to make specified independent investment decisions (trident holdings ltd. v. danand invest- ments ltd. (1988), 64 or (2d) 65 (ca), at p 75). nonetheless, the agency relationship, the taking of instructions from the pension board, and the obli- gation to convey the property to the pension board on demand are all elements consistent with a bare trust relationship and show that bci’s “active role” services de gestion de placements qu’ils reçoivent de bci nuirait à l’espace opérationnel dont la province a besoin pour gouverner. la facturation directe de bci à ses clients est également entièrement compa- tible avec la structure fiduciaire que le législateur de la colombie- britannique a permis à bci d’utiliser pour les actifs du portefeuille. de plus, je n’accepte pas l’argument de bci selon lequel le fait d’exiger que les portefeuilles paient la tps les exposerait à un risque. bci et les conseils des régimes de retraite sont libres de s’assurer que la tps n’est pas payée à même les fonds en fiducie en convenant que les conseils des régimes de retraite paieront directement bci pour ses services, une option prévue par le légis- lateur et utilisée par bci et les conseils de régimes de retraite pour les fonds distincts. [165] je tiens par ailleurs à souligner que bci joue un rôle moins actif que ce que laisse entendre ma col- lègue en ce qui concerne la gestion des fonds qui lui sont confiés par les conseils des régimes de retraite. au paragraphe 83 de ses motifs, ma collègue sou- ligne le « rôle actif » que joue bci à titre de fiduciaire en citant principalement le règlement. cependant, si l’on examine le règlement en faisant abstraction de l’accord de gestion, on n’obtient qu’une image partielle de la réalité. l’accord de gestion limite en fait le « rôle actif » de bci dont parle ma collègue en prévoyant que bci fournit des services de gestion de placements à titre de mandataire du conseil du régime de retraite des enseignants et qu’elle exerce les pouvoirs que lui délègue ce conseil (art 21 et 22). l’accord de gestion prévoit effectivement que bci reçoit des directives du conseil concernant les décisions de placements, comme en fait foi la dis- position exonérant bci de toute responsabilité si elle se conforme aux directives expresses qu’elle reçoit du conseil relativement aux décisions de pla- cement (art 243 et 1211). dans le même ordre d’idées, bci est tenue de remettre les biens qu’elle détient en fiducie au conseil du régime de retraite des enseignants sur demande de celui-ci (art 82 et 912). je suis d’accord avec ma collègue pour dire que bci n’est pas un simple fiduciaire parce que l’accord de gestion lui confère le pouvoir discrétion- naire de prendre des décisions de placement indé- pendantes précises (trident holdings ltd. c. danand investments ltd. (1988), 64 or (2d) 65 (ca), 636 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. is significantly restricted (see de mond v. the queen (1999), 99 dtc 893 (tcc), at paras 35-37). [166] finally, applying immunity does not advance the constitutional value of democracy because this case is not about the federal parliament deciding how taxes levied by the bc. legislature should be spent. the bc. legislature has already decided how it should spend its tax revenues. it authorized the payment of tax funds to private pension boards in order to meet bc’s contractual obligations to com- pensate provincial employees. once bc paid those funds to the private pension boards, they ceased to be public funds and became subject to the contractual terms of the joint trust agreements. the services at issue are thus provided by bci to private parties that agreed to pay for those services. all canada is trying to do is ensure that those private parties pay gst on those services. deeming the trust to be the recipient of those services is not an attempt to deprive bci of property that belongs to it. instead, it is simply a way to prevent private parties from using the trust formality to avoid paying gst on the management services they both pay for and receive in respect of funds held for their benefit. indeed, canada con- cedes that any funds that british columbia itself has invested from the consolidated revenue fund with bci, are held by bci for the benefit of the province (af, at para 77). p 75). toutefois, le rôle de mandataire, les direc- tives données par le conseil du régime de retraite et l’obligation de remettre les biens au conseil du régime de retraite sur demande sont tous des élé- ments compatibles avec un rôle de simple fiduciaire et démontrent que le « rôle actif » que joue bci est considérablement limité (voir de mond c. la reine, 1999 canlii 466 (cci), par 35-37). [166] enfin, l’élargissement de l’immunité ne fa- vorise pas la valeur constitutionnelle de la démo- cratie parce que la présente affaire ne porte pas sur une décision qu’aurait prise le législateur fédéral concernant la façon dont les taxes prélevées par la législature de la colombie- britannique devraient être dépensées. le législateur de cette province a déjà décidé comment il entendait dépenser ses recettes fis- cales. il a autorisé le versement des recettes fiscales aux conseils privés des régimes de retraite pour que la colombie- britannique respecte ses obligations contractuelles en matière de rémunération de ses employés provinciaux. une fois que la colombie- britannique a versé ces sommes aux conseils des régimes de retraite privés, elles ne sont plus des fonds publics; elles deviennent dès lors assujetties aux modalités contractuelles des accords d’admi- nistration en fiducie conjointe. les services en cause sont donc fournis par bci aux parties privées qui ont accepté de payer pour ces services. le canada tente simplement de s’assurer que ces parties privées paient la tps sur ces services. le fait que la fiducie soit réputée être l’acquéreur des services en question n’est pas une tentative de priver bci de biens qui lui appartiennent. il s’agit plutôt simplement d’un moyen d’empêcher les parties privées de recourir aux formalités de la fiducie pour éviter de payer la tps sur les services de gestion qu’ils paient et reçoivent à l’égard des fonds détenus à leur profit. le canada admet d’ailleurs que les fonds provenant du trésor que la colombie- britannique a elle- même investis auprès de bci sont détenus par celle-ci au profit de la province (ma, par 77). d the jurisprudence does not compel the result d la jurisprudence ne commande pas le résultat my colleague reaches auquel arrive ma collègue i further disagree with my colleague that the [167] jurisprudence compels the outcome she reaches. in [167] je ne suis pas non plus d’accord avec ma collègue pour dire que la jurisprudence commande le [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management le juge en chef 637 fact, the issue of whether s. 125 applies where the crown has legal title but no beneficial interest did not arise in any of the cases to which she refers. nor did any of those cases involve a private party success- fully structuring its contractual relationship with a government body so as to avoid tax by invoking the immunity created by s 125. [168] my colleague relies heavily on calgary & edmonton land co. and smith v. rural municipal- ity of vermilion hills (1914), 49 scr 563, aff’d (1916), 30 dlr 83 (pc), to support the proposi- tion that the taxation of any crown interest in prop- erty triggers the application of s 125. however, in neither of those cases did the taxing statute purport to tax the crown’s legal interest in land. instead, because the taxing statute did not expressly bind the federal crown, the courts applied the longstanding interpretive presumption that the provincial legisla- ture did not intend to tax the federal crown’s inter- ests in property or land (calgary & edmonton land co., at pp. 180, 184-85 and 192; smith (scc), at pp 564-65). accordingly, it was not necessary for the court to decide whether s. 125 would immunize property from taxation in circumstances where a private party had placed that property with the crown to hold in trust for its sole benefit. the statement by davies j. at p. 179 of calgary & edmonton land co. that any interest of the crown in property is immune under s. 125 was thus obiter. résultat auquel elle arrive. en réalité, la question de savoir si l’art. 125 s’applique lorsque l’état détient un titre en common law mais aucun intérêt bénéfi- ciaire n’a jamais été soulevé dans l’une ou l’autre des affaires citées par ma collègue. aucune de ces affaires ne concernait non plus une partie privée qui aurait réussi à structurer ses relations contractuelles avec un organisme gouvernemental de manière à pouvoir se soustraire à la taxe en invoquant l’immu- nité de l’art 125. [168] ma collègue attache une grande importance aux arrêts calgary & edmonton land co. et smith c. rural municipality of vermilion hills (1914), 49 rcs 563, conf. par (1916), 30 dlr 83 (cp), à l’appui de la proposition voulant que la taxation de tout intérêt de la couronne dans un bien donne lieu à l’application de l’art 125. toutefois, dans aucune des deux affaires qu’elle cite, la loi fiscale ne visait à taxer l’intérêt en common law détenu par la couronne sur un bien- fonds. en fait, comme la loi fiscale ne liait pas expressément la couronne fédérale, les tribunaux ont plutôt appliqué la pré- somption d’interprétation établie depuis longtemps selon laquelle le législateur provincial n’a pas l’in- tention de taxer les intérêts de la couronne fédérale dans des biens ou des terres (calgary & edmonton land co., p. 180, 184- 185 et 192; smith (csc), p. 564- 565). en conséquence, la cour n’avait pas à décider si l’art. 125 exempterait les biens de la taxe dans le cas où une partie privée a confié ses biens à la couronne pour qu’elle les détienne en fiducie à son seul profit. la déclaration du juge davies à la p. 179 de l’arrêt calgary & edmonton land co. suivant laquelle tout intérêt de la couronne dans un bien est exempté de la taxe en vertu de l’art. 25 n’était donc qu’une remarque incidente. [169] moreover, quirt v. the queen (1891), 19 scr 510, does not stand for the proposition that the crown’s legal ownership as trustee is sufficient to give rise to s. 125 immunity even when the crown lacks a beneficial interest. in that case, as my col- league acknowledges, not only was the crown the trustee of the insolvent bank’s assets, but it also had a substantial beneficial interest in the bank’s assets as its largest creditor. moreover, s. 125 was not even at issue in quirt. this court decided the case on [169] de plus, l’arrêt quirt c. the queen (1891), 19 rcs 510, ne permet pas d’affirmer que le titre de propriété en common law que possède la couronne en qualité de fiduciaire est suffisant pour donner lieu à l’immunité prévue à l’art. 125, même lorsque la cou- ronne ne possède pas d’intérêt bénéficiaire. comme le reconnaît ma collègue, dans cette affaire, la couronne était non seulement fiduciaire de l’actif de la banque insolvable, mais elle possédait également un inté- rêt bénéficiaire important dans l’actif de la banque 638 canada v bc. investment management the chief justice [2019] 4 scr. the basis that the federal crown was exempt from taxation because the ontario taxing statute explic- itly exempted property vested in the crown (quirt, at p. 514, per ritchie cj, p. 518, per strong j., p. 525, per patterson j. (strong and taschereau jj. concurring)) so too did the ontario courts. the divisional court explicitly held that it was unneces- sary to consider whether ontario had the constitu- tional power to tax federal property because of the express exemption in the taxing statute (regina v. county of wellington (1889), 17 or 615 (div. ct.), at p 619). as for the court of appeal, the passage of osler ja’s reasons relied on by my colleague in fact addresses the statutory exemption in the on- tario taxing statute, not the constitutional immunity in s. 125 (regina v. county of wellington (1890), 17 oar 421, at p 444). en tant que créancière la plus importante. de plus, l’art. 125 n’était même pas en jeu dans l’arrêt quirt. la cour a tranché cette affaire en partant du principe que la couronne fédérale était exonérée de la taxe parce que la loi fiscale ontarienne exemptait expres- sément les biens dévolus à la couronne (quirt, p. 514, le juge en chef ritchie, p. 518, le juge strong, p. 525, le juge patterson (avec l’appui des juges strong et taschereau)). les tribunaux de l’ontario ont fait de même la cour divisionnaire a expressément déclaré qu’il n’était pas nécessaire d’examiner si l’ontario avait le pouvoir constitutionnel de taxer les biens fédéraux en raison de l’exemption ex- presse prévue par la loi fiscale (regina c. county of wellington (1889), 17 or 615 (cour div.), p 619). quant à la cour d’appel de l’ontario, l’extrait des motifs du juge osler cité par ma collègue porte en fait sur l’exemption prévue par la loi fiscale onta- rienne et non sur l’immunité constitutionnelle de l’art. 125 (regina c. county of wellington (1890), 17 oar 421, p 444). v conclusion v conclusion [170] for these reasons, i would allow the appeal on the immunity issue. the beneficial interest in the portfolios rests with the unit holders. the private pension boards — which comprise a very significant portion of the unit holders — are not the provincial crown or agents thereof. section 125 does not im- munize the property they have placed with bci to hold in trust from gst liability for the services they receive from bci in respect of that property. [171] i agree with my colleague’s disposition on the issues relating to jurisdiction and the agreements. [170] pour ces motifs, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi en ce qui concerne la question de l’immu- nité. les détenteurs d’unités sont titulaires de l’inté- rêt bénéficiaire dans les portefeuilles. les conseils privés des régimes de retraite — qui comprennent une très grande partie des détenteurs d’unités — ne peuvent être assimilés à la couronne provinciale et ils n’en sont pas les mandataires. l’article 125 n’exempte pas les biens que les conseils des régimes de retraite ont confiés à bci pour qu’elle les détienne en fiducie de la tps pour les services qu’ils reçoivent de bci relativement à ces biens. [171] je suis d’accord avec la façon dont ma col- lègue tranche les questions relatives à la compétence et aux accords. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management 639 appendix annexe public sector pension plans act, sbc 1999, c. 44 public sector pension plans act, sbc 1999, c. 44 [traduction] british columbia investment management corpora- tion established constitution de la british columbia investment man- agement corporation 16 (1) a corporation, to be known as the british co- lumbia investment management corporation, is established and incorporated as a trust company authorized to carry on trust business and invest- ment management services as provided in this part. 16 (1) la société british columbia investment manage- ment corporation est créée et constituée en société de fiducie autorisée à exercer des activités fidu- ciaires ainsi qu’à offrir des services de gestion de placements en conformité avec la présente partie.   .   . (5) (6) the investment management corporation is an agent of the government. the investment management corporation, as an agent of the government, is not liable for taxation except as the government is liable for taxation. (5) (6) la société de gestion de placements est un man- dataire du gouvernement. à titre de mandataire du gouvernement, la société de gestion de placements n’est assujettie à la taxa- tion que dans la mesure où l’est le gouvernement. capital of the investment management corporation capital de la société de gestion de placements 17 (1) the capital of the investment management corpo- ration is one share with a par value of $10. 17 (1) le capital de la société de gestion de placements est constitué d’une action ayant une valeur nomi- nale de 10 $. (2) the share in the investment management corpora- tion must be issued to and registered in the name of the minister of finance and must be held by that minister on behalf of the government. (2) l’action doit être émise et inscrite au nom du mi- nistre des finances, qui la détient pour le compte du gouvernement. powers, functions and duties of the investment man- agement corporation pouvoirs, fonctions et devoirs de la société de gestion de placements 18   . (2) the purpose of the investment management cor- poration is to provide funds management services, including the making of investments and loans, for funds placed with the investment management corporation. 18   . (2) la société de gestion de placements a pour objet de fournir des services de gestion financière, no- tamment de faire des placements et de consentir des prêts à l’égard des fonds qui lui sont confiés.   .   . 640 (4) canada v bc. investment management [2019] 4 scr. (4) in addition to the powers, functions and duties of the investment management corporation as pro- vided in this part, the investment management corporation has the same powers, functions and duties in the provision of funds management ser- vices for funds placed with it under subsection (3) as the minister of finance would have if the funds had been placed with that minister under part 5 of the financial administration act as it read on april 1, 1999. en plus des pouvoirs, fonctions et devoirs que lui attribue la présente partie, la société de gestion de placements dispose des mêmes pouvoirs, fonc- tions et devoirs dans le cadre de la prestation des services de gestion à l’égard des fonds qui lui sont confiés au titre du paragraphe (3), que ceux dont disposerait le ministre des finances si les fonds lui avaient été confiés en vertu de la partie 5 de la financial administration act, dans sa version du 1er avril 1999. continuation of investment portfolios maintien des portefeuilles 18.1 (1) each portfolio established under bc. reg. 84/ 86, the pooled investment portfolios regulation, is continued under this act. 18.1 (1) les portefeuilles créés en vertu du bc reg. 84/86, le pooled investment portfolios regulation, sont maintenus en vertu de la présente loi. (2) (3) each participating fund allocated units of a port- folio immediately before january 1, 2000 must continue to be allocated those units of the portfo- lio with the investment management corporation holding those units as agent for the participating fund. all assets held under or in a portfolio by the min- ister of finance or the chief investment officer un- der the financial administration act immediately before january 1, 2000 must continue to be held under or in the portfolio, in trust, by the investment management corporation. (2) (3) les unités d’un portefeuille attribuées à un fonds participant immédiatement avant le 1er janvier 2000 demeurent attribuées à ce fonds et sont désormais détenues par la société de gestion de placements en qualité de mandataire du fonds. les éléments d’actif détenus dans un portefeuille par le ministre des finances ou par le directeur des placements en vertu de la financial administra- tion act immédiatement avant le 1er janvier 2000 demeurent ainsi détenus, en fiducie, par la société de gestion de placements. powers, functions and duties of the investment man- agement board pouvoirs, fonctions et devoirs du conseil de gestion des investissements 20   . (2) the investment management board must, through the investment management corporation and to the extent possible under the budget approved for the investment management corporation, do all of the following: 20   . (2) le conseil de gestion des investissements est tenu, par l’entremise de la société de gestion des inves- tissements et, dans la mesure du possible, dans les limites du budget approuvé à l’égard de celle-ci :   .   . (d) have in place an equitable fee system based d) on the user pay principle; d’avoir en place un système de cotisation équitable fondé sur le principe de l’utilisateur- payeur;   .   . [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management 641 operating costs and capital expenditures of the invest- ment management corporation frais d’exploitation et dépenses en capital de la société de gestion de placements 24 (1) the investment management corporation must re- cover its operating costs and capital expenditures from one or more of the following: 24 (1) la société de gestion de placements doit recouvrer ses frais d’exploitation et ses dépenses en capital de l’une ou plusieurs des sources suivantes : (a) amounts charged to the funds for operating costs and capital expenditures necessarily incurred by the investment management cor- poration on behalf of the funds it manages; (b) amounts charged to persons, organizations and other clients for services provided by the investment management corporation; (c) income accruing from investments made by the investment management corporation on its own behalf. a) b) c) les sommes imputées aux fonds au titre des frais d’exploitation et des dépenses en capi- tal que la société de gestion de placements a nécessairement engagés pour le compte des fonds qu’elle gère; les sommes imputées aux personnes, organisa- tions et autres clients au titre des services que la société de gestion de placements a fournis; les revenus des placements que la société de gestion de placements a réalisés pour son propre compte. appropriation for unfunded pension plan liability affectation pour déficit actuariel du régime de retraite 25.1 (1) if an actuarial valuation discloses that a pension plan has an unfunded liability, the minister of finance may, in accordance with generally ac- cepted accounting principles, allocate an expense to the consolidated revenue fund to amortize the portion of the unfunded liability that is attributable to the government. 25.1 (1) si une évaluation actuarielle révèle qu’un ré- gime de retraite a un déficit actuariel, le ministre des finances peut, conformément aux principes comptables généralement reconnus, imputer une dépense au trésor afin d’amortir la part du déficit actuariel qui est attribuable au gouvernement. pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc. reg. 447/ 99 pooled investment portfolios regulation, bc. reg. 447/99 [traduction] establishment of pooled investment portfolios création de portefeuilles de fonds communs de pla- cement 2 the investment management corporation may es- tablish one or more portfolios. 2 la société de gestion de placements peut créer un ou plusieurs portefeuilles. continuation of pooled investment portfolios maintien des portefeuilles de fonds communs de pla- cement 3 each portfolio established under bc. reg. 84/86 is continued under this regulation. 3 les portefeuilles créés en vertu du bc. reg. 84/86 sont maintenus en vertu du présent règlement. 642 canada v bc. investment management [2019] 4 scr. management of pooled investment portfolios gestion des portefeuilles de fonds communs de pla- cements 4 (1) all the assets of a portfolio are held in trust by the investment management corporation. 4 (1) tous les éléments d’actif des portefeuilles sont dé- tenus en fiducie par la société de gestion de pla- cements. (2) (3) subject to the act, the chief investment officer is responsible for investing money of a portfolio in categories of investment the chief investment officer considers desirable and for managing and controlling the portfolio. the investments of a portfolio must be identified separately from other property of the investment management corporation, with each investment recorded to show clearly the portfolio to which the investment belongs. (2) (3) (4) ownership in any asset in a portfolio must not be attributed to a participating fund. (4) sous réserve de la loi, le directeur des placements est chargé d’investir les sommes détenues dans les portefeuilles dans les catégories de placement qu’il estime indiquées ainsi que de la gestion et de la surveillance des portefeuilles. les investissements détenus dans les portefeuilles doivent être identifiés séparément des autres biens de la société de gestion de placements et chaque investissement doit être enregistré de façon à in- diquer clairement le portefeuille dans lequel il est détenu. la propriété d’un élément d’actif détenu dans les portefeuilles ne peut être conférée à un fonds participant. units of participation unités de participation 5 (1) a portfolio must be divided into units of partici- pation, that on any given day are of equal value, and the proportionate interest to be attributed to each participating fund must be expressed by the number of units allocated to it. 5 (1) les portefeuilles sont divisés en unités de parti- cipation qui sont en tout temps de valeur égale, la quote- part de chaque fonds participant étant exprimée selon le nombre d’unités qui lui sont attribuées. (2) the value of each full unit in a portfolio is (2) (a) on establishment of the portfolio, $1 million, and (b) on any subsequent date, the value determined by the chief investment officer. (3) (4) on establishment of a portfolio, the appropriate number of units must be allocated to each partic- ipating fund proportionate to its investment in the portfolio. subject to section 10 (4.1), the cost of a unit in a portfolio is the value of the units on the date of purchase. (3) (4) la valeur de chaque unité entière dans un porte- feuille est la suivante : a) b) à la création du portefeuille, un million de dollars; par la suite, la valeur déterminée par le di- recteur des placements. au moment de la création d’un portefeuille, le nombre approprié d’unités est attribué à chaque fonds participant en proportion de son investisse- ment dans le portefeuille. sous réserve du paragraphe 10 (4.1), le coût d’une unité dans un portefeuille correspond à la valeur des unités à la date de l’achat. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management 643 (5) a participating fund may hold a fraction of a unit calculated to 9 decimal places. (5) un fonds participant peut détenir une fraction d’unité, calculée à la 9e décimale près. investment of income and other proceeds placement des revenus et autres produits 11 subject to section 10, the chief investment officer may 11 sous réserve de l’article 10, le directeur des pla- cements peut (a) distribute any net income, net capital gains or other proceeds received by a portfolio to each participating fund in proportion to its participation in the portfolio, or (b) invest any net income, net capital gains or other proceeds received by a portfolio in that portfolio. a) b) distribuer tout revenu net, gain en capital net ou autre produit qu’il a reçu d’un portefeuille à chaque fonds participant en proportion de sa participation dans le portefeuille; investir tout revenu net, gain en capital net ou autre produit qu’il a reçu d’un portefeuille dans ce portefeuille. termination of a pooled investment portfolio cessation d’un portefeuille de fonds communs de pla- cement 14 the chief investment officer may terminate a port- folio and distribute to the unit holders the net pro- ceeds realized. 14 le directeur des placements peut mettre fin à un portefeuille et distribuer aux détenteurs d’unités le produit net réalisé. excise tax act, rsc 1985, c. e-15 loi sur la taxe d’accise, lrc 1985, c. e-15 part ix partie ix goods and services tax taxe sur les produits et services application sa majesté 122 this part is binding 122 la présente partie lie : (a) on her majesty in right of canada; and a) sa majesté du chef du canada; (b) on her majesty in right of a province in respect of obligations as a supplier to collect and to remit tax in respect of taxable supplies made by her majesty in right of the province. b) sa majesté du chef d’une province en ce qui con- cerne une obligation à titre de fournisseur de percevoir et de verser la taxe relative aux fournitures taxables qu’elle effectue. definitions définitions 123 (1) in section 121, this part and schedules v to x, 123 (1) les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à l’ar- ticle 121, à la présente partie et aux annexes v à x.   .   . 644 canada v bc. investment management [2019] 4 scr. person means an individual, a partnership, a corporation, the estate of a deceased individual, a trust, or a body that is a society, union, club, association, commission or other organization of any kind; (personne)   . recipient of a supply of property or a service means (a) where consideration for the supply is payable un- der an agreement for the supply, the person who is liable under the agreement to pay that consideration, (b) where paragraph (a) does not apply and considera- tion is payable for the supply, the person who is liable to pay that consideration, and (c) where no consideration is payable for the supply, (i) in the case of a supply of property by way of sale, the person to whom the property is delivered or made available, (ii) in the case of a supply of property otherwise than by way of sale, the person to whom possession or use of the property is given or made available, and acquéreur a) personne qui est tenue, aux termes d’une convention portant sur une fourniture, de payer la contrepartie de la fourniture; b) personne qui est tenue, autrement qu’aux termes d’une convention portant sur une fourniture, de payer la contrepartie de la fourniture; c) si nulle contrepartie n’est payable pour une four- niture : (i) personne à qui un bien, fourni par vente, est livré ou à la disposition de qui le bien est mis, (ii) personne à qui la possession ou l’utilisation d’un bien, fourni autrement que par vente, est trans- férée ou à la disposition de qui le bien est mis, (iii) personne à qui un service est rendu. par ailleurs, la mention d’une personne au profit de la- quelle une fourniture est effectuée vaut mention de l’ac- quéreur de la fourniture (recipient)   . (iii) in the case of a supply of a service, the person to whom the service is rendered, fourniture taxable fourniture effectuée dans le cadre d’une activité commerciale (taxable supply) and any reference to a person to whom a supply is made shall be read as a reference to the recipient of the sup- ply; (acquéreur)   . personne particulier, société de personnes, personne mo- rale, fiducie ou succession, ainsi que l’organisme qui est un syndicat, un club, une association, une commission ou autre organisation; ces notions sont visées dans des formulations générales impersonnelles ou comportant des pronoms ou adjectifs indéfinis (person) taxable supply means a supply that is made in the course of a commercial activity; (fourniture taxable)   .   . imposition of goods and services tax taux de la taxe sur les produits et services 165 (1) subject to this part, every recipient of a taxable supply made in canada shall pay to her majesty in right of canada tax in respect of the supply calculated at the rate of 5% on the value of the consideration for the supply. 165 (1) sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente partie, l’acquéreur d’une fourniture taxable effectuée au canada est tenu de payer à sa majesté du chef du canada une taxe calculée au taux de 5 % sur la valeur de la contre- partie de la fourniture. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management 645 tax in participating province taux de la taxe dans les provinces participantes (2) subject to this part, every recipient of a taxable supply made in a participating province shall pay to her majesty in right of canada, in addition to the tax imposed by sub- section (1), tax in respect of the supply calculated at the tax rate for that province on the value of the consideration for the supply. (2) sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente partie, l’acquéreur d’une fourniture taxable effectuée dans une province participante est tenu de payer à sa majesté du chef du canada, outre la taxe imposée par le para- graphe (1), une taxe calculée au taux de taxe applicable à la province sur la valeur de la contrepartie de la fourniture. collection of tax perception 221 (1) every person who makes a taxable supply shall, as agent of her majesty in right of canada, collect the tax under division ii payable by the recipient in respect of the supply. 221 (1) la personne qui effectue une fourniture taxable doit, à titre de mandataire de sa majesté du chef du ca- nada, percevoir la taxe payable par l’acquéreur en vertu de la section ii. calculation of net tax calcul de la taxe nette 228 (1) every person who is required to file a return under this division shall, in the return, calculate the net tax of the person for the reporting period for which the return is required to be filed, except where subsection (2.1) or (2.3) applies in respect of the reporting period. 228 (1) la personne tenue de produire une déclaration en application de la présente section doit y calculer sa taxe nette pour la période de déclaration qui y est visée, sauf si les paragraphes (2.1) ou (2.3) s’appliquent à la période de déclaration. remittance versement (2) where the net tax for a reporting period of a person is a positive amount, the person shall, except where subsection (2.1) or (2.3) applies in respect of the reporting period, remit that amount to the receiver general, (2) la personne est tenue de verser au receveur général le montant positif de sa taxe nette pour une période de déclaration dans le délai suivant, sauf les paragraphes (2.1) ou (2.3) s’appliquent à la période de déclaration : (a) where the person is an individual to whom subpar- agraph 238(1)(a)(ii) applies in respect of the reporting period, on or before april 30 of the year following the end of the reporting period; and a) si elle est un particulier auquel le sous- alinéa 238(1)a)(ii) s’applique pour la période, au plus tard le 30 avril de l’année suivant la fin de la période; (b) in any other case, on or before the day on or before which the return for that period is required to be filed. b) dans les autres cas, au plus tard le jour où la décla- ration visant la période est à produire. [267.1] [267.1] activities of a trustee activités du fiduciaire (5) for the purposes of this part, where a person acts as trustee of a trust, (5) les présomptions suivantes s’appliquent dans le cadre de la présente partie lorsqu’une personne agit à titre de fiduciaire d’une fiducie : (a) anything done by the person in the person’s capac- ity as trustee of the trust is deemed to have been done by the trust and not by the person; and a) tout acte qu’elle accomplit à ce titre est réputé ac- compli par la fiducie et non par elle; 646 canada v bc. investment management [2019] 4 scr. (b) notwithstanding paragraph (a), where the person is not an officer of the trust, the person is deemed to supply a service to the trust of acting as a trustee of the trust and any amount to which the person is entitled for acting in that capacity that is included in computing, for the purposes of the income tax act, the person’s in- come or, where the person is an individual, the person’s income from a business, is deemed to be consideration for that supply. b) malgré l’alinéa a), si elle n’est pas un cadre de la fiducie, elle est réputée fournir à celle-ci un service de fiduciaire et tout montant auquel elle a droit à ce titre et qui est inclus, pour l’application de la loi de l’impôt sur le revenu, dans le calcul de son revenu ou, si elle est un particulier, dans le calcul de son revenu tiré d’une entreprise est réputé être un montant au titre de la contrepartie de cette fourniture. reciprocal taxation agreement (canada — british columbia) reciprocal taxation agreement : canada — british columbia definitions 1. in this agreement: [traduction] définitions 1. les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent au présent accord.   .   . “federal act” means the excise tax act, rsc. 1985, c. e-15; « loi fédérale » la loi sur la taxe d’accise, lrc. 1985, c. e-15;   .   . “value- added tax” means any tax imposed or levied under part ix of the federal act. « taxe à la valeur ajoutée » toute taxe imposée ou perçue sous le régime de la partie ix de la loi fédérale. application application 3. this agreement is binding on canada, the province and their respective agents. 3. le présent accord lie le canada et la province et leurs mandataires respectifs. constitutional immunity immunité constitutionnelle 4. it is understood that neither canada nor the prov- ince is deemed, by reason of having entered into this agreement, to have surrendered or abandoned any of its powers, rights, privileges or authori- ties under the constitution of canada, or to have impaired any such powers, rights, privileges or authorities. 4. il est entendu que ni le canada ni la province n’est réputé, pour avoir conclu le présent accord, avoir cédé ou abandonné à l’autre les pouvoirs, droits, privilèges ou attributions qui lui sont conférés par la constitution du canada, ou être lésé dans l’un ou l’autre de ces pouvoirs, droits, privilèges ou attributions. agreement by the province engagement pris par la province 6. the province agrees: 6. la province s’engage :   .   . [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management 647 (d) to pay, subject to clauses 6(e) and 7(1) the value- added tax in accordance with the federal act; d) à payer, sous réserve de l’alinéa 6e) et du paragraphe 7(1), la taxe à la valeur ajoutée conformément à la loi fédérale; settlement of disputes under agreement règlement des litiges 9. (1) if the parties fail to agree on the interpretation or application of this agreement, a party can refer the matter in dispute to board established in accord- ance with subclause (2). 9. (1) si les parties ne peuvent s’entendre sur l’interpré- tation ou l’application du présent accord, l’une ou l’autre peut porter le litige devant le conseil constitué conformément au paragraphe (2).   .   . (9) this clause does not apply where a difference arises between the parties as to any matter related to the administration or enforcement of any act that imposes a tax that a party has agreed to pay. (9) le présent article ne s’applique pas en cas de litige entre les parties relatif à toute question liée à l’application d’une loi imposant une taxe ou un droit qu’une des parties s’est engagée à payer. duration durée 15. (1) this agreement shall end on december 31, 2015, except if either party terminates the agreement earlier by giving six months notice in writing to the other party. 15. (1) le présent accord demeure en vigueur jusqu’au 31 décembre 2015, sauf si l’une des parties le ré- voque par préavis écrit de six mois donné à l’autre partie. (2) no rights or obligations which may have accrued to either party during the term of this agreement are affected if this agreement ceases to have effect. (2) la révocation du présent accord n’a aucune in- cidence sur les droits acquis et les obligations contractées par l’une ou l’autre des parties pendant la durée de l’application du présent accord. comprehensive integrated tax coordination agree- ment between the government of canada and the government of british columbia comprehensive integrated tax coordination agree- ment between the governement of canada and the government of british columbia part i interpretation [traduction] partie i interprétation 1 in this agreement, 1 la définition qui suit s’applique à l’accord :   .   . “harmonized sales taxes” means the cvat and the pvat in respect of each participating province; « taxes de vente harmonisées » la tvac et la tvap relative à chaque province participante.   .   . 648 canada v bc. investment management [2019] 4 scr. part xiv dispute resolution partie xiv règlement des différends 38 best efforts will be exercised by federal and provincial officials to reach consensus in respect of issues arising in respect of matters governed by this agreement. 38 les fonctionnaires fédéraux et provinciaux s’efforcent d’en venir à un consensus au sujet des problèmes touchant des questions régies par l’accord. 39 subject to clause 40, issues not resolved by federal and provincial officials will be referred to the minister of finance (canada) and the ministers of finance of the relevant participating provinces. 39 sous réserve de l’article 40, les questions non réglées par les fonctionnaires fédéraux et provinciaux sont sou- mises au ministre des finances (canada) et aux ministres des finances des provinces participantes intéressées. 40 if the issue relates to the administration of the har- monized sales taxes contemplated by clause 29, the issue will be referred to the minister of national revenue, the minister of finance (british columbia) and, if applica- ble, to the appropriate minister of relevant participating provinces, with notice of same to the minister of finance (canada). if the issue relates to the collection of the harmo- nized sales taxes contemplated by clause 30, the issue will be referred to the minister of public safety, the minister of finance (british columbia) and, if applicable, to the appropriate minister of relevant participating provinces, with notice of same to the minister of finance (canada) and the minister of national revenue. 40 toute question qui a trait à l’administration des taxes de vente harmonisées prévue à l’article 29 est soumise au ministre du revenu national, au ministre des finances (colombie- britannique) et, s’il y a lieu, au ministre com- pétent des provinces participantes intéressées, et un avis en ce sens est adressé au ministre des finances (canada). toute question qui a trait à la perception des taxes de vente harmonisées prévue à l’article 30 est soumise au ministre de la sécurité publique, au ministre des finances (colombie- britannique) et, s’il y a lieu, au ministre com- pétent des provinces participantes intéressées, et un avis en ce sens est adressé au ministre des finances (canada) et au ministre du revenu national. 41 if an unresolved issue has been referred to the min- isters described in clauses 39 or 40, those ministers may refer the issue to a third party for consideration and advice. 41 les ministres mentionnés aux articles 39 ou 40 peuvent demander à un tiers d’examiner une question qui leur a été soumise et de les conseiller à cet égard. part xv partie xv term, amendment and termination durée, modification et résiliation 42 the terms and conditions of this agreement will continue in full force and effect, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this part, until the date that is specified by a party in a written notice that is delivered to the other party setting out the party’s desire to terminate this agreement. 42 les modalités de l’accord demeurent en vigueur, con- formément aux dispositions de la présente partie et sous réserve de ces dispositions, jusqu’à la date précisée par l’une des parties dans un avis écrit envoyé à l’autre, faisant état de son désir de mettre fin à l’accord.   . part xvi government purchases   . partie xvi achats de l’état 51 canada and the province agree to pay the harmonized sales taxes in respect of supplies acquired by their respec- tive governments or by agents and entities thereof. 51 le canada et la province conviennent de payer les taxes de vente harmonisées relativement aux fournitures effectuées par leurs gouvernements respectifs ou par les mandataires et entités de ceux-ci. [2019] 4 rcs. canada c bc. investment management 649 part xix miscellaneous partie xix divers 65 by entering into this agreement, neither party is deemed to surrender or abandon any of the powers, rights, privileges or authorities vested in either of them under the constitution acts, 1867- 1982 (or under any amendments to those acts) or otherwise, or to impair any of such pow- ers, rights, privileges or authorities. 65 en concluant l’accord, ni l’une ni l’autre des parties n’est réputée avoir cédé ou abandonné les pouvoirs, droits, privilèges ou attributions qui lui sont conférés par les lois constitutionnelles de 1867 à 1982 (et leurs modifications) ou autrement, ou être lésée dans l’un ou l’autre de ces pouvoirs, droits, privilèges ou attributions. appeal and cross- appeal dismissed without costs, pourvoi et pourvoi incident rejetés sans dépens, le wagner cj dissenting in part. juge en chef wagner est dissident en partie. appeal the attorney general of canada: attorney general of canada, vancouver. procureur de l’appelant/intimé à l’appel incident le procureur général du canada : procureur général du canada, vancouver. appeal the british columbia investment manage- ment corporation: lawson lundell, vancouver. procureurs de l’intimée/appelante à l’appel in- cident la british columbia investment management corporation : lawson lundell, vancouver. appeal her majesty the queen in right of the prov- ince of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. procureur de l’intimée/intimée à l’appel incident sa majesté la reine du chef de la province de la colombie- britannique : procureur général de la colombie- britannique, victoria. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. of alberta: attorney general of alberta, edmonton. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’ontario : procureur général de l’ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’alberta : procureur général de l’alberta, edmonton.
i. overview [1] this appeal concerns the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest in a person’s home. in particular, the court has been asked to delineate the proper balance under s 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms between an accused’s privacy interests in their home and valid law enforcement objectives, when the police search an accused’s home incident to their lawful arrest. as we will explain, a proper balancing of those factors requires modifying the common law standard governing searches incident to arrest. [2] this case arises in the aftermath of a volatile arrest in the home of the appellant, matthew stairs, for domestic violence. the police responded to a 9-1-1 caller who reported seeing a man repeatedly hitting a woman in a car. police officers promptly located the suspect car parked in the driveway of an unknown house. after a quick scan of the car’s interior, they knocked on the front door of the house and loudly announced their presence, but no one answered. fearing for the woman’s safety, the police entered the house. upon announcing their presence, a woman with fresh injuries to her face came up a flight of stairs leading from the basement. mr. stairs did not follow. instead, he ran past the bottom of the staircase and barricaded himself in the basement laundry room, where he was arrested a short time later. [3] after the arrest, the police conducted a visual clearing search of the basement living room area, from which mr. stairs and the woman had just emerged. the purpose of the search was to ensure that nobody else was present and that there were no hazards or weapons sitting out in the open. during the search, the police saw a clear container and a plastic bag in plain view containing methamphetamine. this resulted in mr. stairs being charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking (contrary to s 5(2) of the controlled drugs and substances act, sc 1996, c 19), in addition to charges of assault and breach of probation (contrary to ss. 266 and 733.1(1) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46). he was convicted of all charges at trial. [4] mr. stairs appealed his conviction for the drug offence on the basis that the drug evidence was improperly admitted. in a split decision, a majority of the court of appeal for ontario upheld the conviction. the dissenting judge would have set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal. [5] mr. stairs now appeals as of right to this court regarding his conviction for the drug offence. he argues that the common law standard for search incident to arrest must be modified for searches conducted in a home given the very high privacy interests that apply to a person’s home he asserts that where the police search for safety purposes, as alleged in his case, they can only do so if they have reasonable grounds to believe, or at least suspect, that there is an imminent threat to public or police safety. mr. stairs claims that this standard was not met and that the search of the basement living room by the police was therefore unconstitutional. further, he says, the methamphetamine seized by the police should have been excluded from the evidence and an acquittal must be entered with respect to the charge of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking. [6] the baseline common law standard for search incident to arrest requires that the individual searched has been lawfully arrested, that the search is truly incidental to the arrest in the sense that it is for a valid law enforcement purpose connected to the arrest, and that the search is conducted reasonably (r v. fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621, at paras. 21 and 27). in the past, this court has tailored this standard in several contexts to comply with s 8 of the charter. the search incident to arrest power has been eliminated for the seizure of bodily samples (r v. stillman, [1997] 1 scr. 607), and the standard has been modified in other situations presenting a heightened privacy interest in the subject matter of the search, such as strip searches, penile swabs, and cell phone searches (r v. golden, 2001 scc 83, [2001] 3 scr 679; r v. saeed, 2016 scc 24, [2016] 1 scr 518; fearon). [7] while we agree with mr. stairs that the common law standard should be modified — and made stricter — to reflect an accused’s heightened privacy interest in their home, we do not accept the test he proposes given the facts of this case, his submissions were directed solely to safety searches and did not extend to investigative purposes, such as evidence preservation and evidence discovery. [8] balancing the demands of effective law enforcement and a person’s right to privacy in their home, we conclude that the common law standard for a search of a home incident to arrest must be modified, depending on whether the area searched is within or outside the physical control of the arrested person. where the area searched is within the arrested person’s physical control, the common law standard continues to apply however, where the area is outside their physical control, but it is still sufficiently proximate to the arrest, a search of a home incident to arrest for safety purposes will be valid only if:  the police have reason to suspect that there is a safety risk to the police, the accused, or the public which would be addressed by a search; and  the search is conducted in a reasonable manner, tailored to the heightened privacy interests in a home. [9] given the factual matrix of this case, it is not necessary to decide whether reasonable suspicion also applies to investigation-related purposes, such as evidence preservation and evidence discovery. we leave this issue for another day. [10] applying the stricter standard to this case, the police, in our view, had reason to suspect that there was a safety risk in the basement living room and that their concerns would be addressed by a quick scan of the room, which was the least intrusive manner of search possible in the circumstances. it follows that mr. stairs’ s 8 charter rights were not breached, and the drug evidence was properly admitted. accordingly, we would dismiss the appeal. ii. facts [11] a civilian called 9-1-1 to report that he had witnessed a male driver striking his female passenger. the caller said the man was swerving on the road while hitting the woman in a “flurry of strikes”. at one point, the man had the woman in a headlock and she looked like she was “turtling” (huddling to protect herself). [12] three officers — officers brown, martin, and vandervelde — were dispatched to investigate the reported assault they quickly located a car closely matching the caller’s description parked in the driveway of an unknown home. the officers ran the plate number and were informed that the car was registered to mr. stairs’ father, who also lived at the home. the police also learned that mr. stairs was a known driver of the car and that he had cautions for escape risk, family violence, and violence. he was also listed as a high-risk offender. [13] after briefly looking inside the car, the police knocked on the front door of the house several times and loudly announced their presence, but no one answered. believing the woman might be in danger, two of the officers entered the house through an unlocked side door and then opened the front door for their colleague. the officers continued to announce their presence and shouted at everyone in the house to “come upstairs” with their “hands up” (2018 onsc 3747, 412 crr (2d) 95 (“pre-trial application reasons”), at para. 86). a woman, seen to be coming from the right side of the basement, made her way up to the first floor she had fresh injuries, including markings and swelling around her forehead and eyes, cuts on her cheek, and scratches. officer brown spoke with her briefly. he testified that while she was not combative, she was not cooperative either. officer martin, then a constable-in-training, remained upstairs with her, while the other two officers turned their attention to her assailant. [14] from the top of the stairs, officer vandervelde saw a man, who turned out to be mr. stairs, run past the bottom of the staircase from the right side of the basement to the left side officer vandervelde briefly made eye contact with him mr. stairs ignored the police commands to come upstairs with his hands up. instead, he locked himself in the basement laundry room adjacent to the living room from where he and the woman had just emerged. [15] officer vandervelde and officer brown moved downstairs to arrest mr. stairs on the way down, they took a quick look over their shoulders at the basement living room; their focus, however, was on mr. stairs, who by now was in the laundry room located to the left of the staircase. officer vandervelde had his firearm drawn, and officer brown had his taser drawn. at one point, mr. stairs opened the laundry room door, shrieked, and immediately closed the door. eventually, he came out and complied with the officers’ commands officer brown handcuffed and searched him, locating only a sum of money. officer brown also looked around the laundry room to confirm that no one else was there four minutes had passed from when the police knocked on the front door to the arrest. officer brown described the situation as fast-moving and dynamic. [16] after the arrest, officer vandervelde conducted a visual clearing search of the adjoining living room, which contained a coffee table, a couch, a television, and cabinets. from where he was standing, he could not see what was behind the couch or the television stand, so he walked behind the couch. there, he saw a transparent plastic tupperware container in plain view on the floor. it contained glass-like shards, which he believed to be methamphetamine. he said that the container was about a foot from the couch and that he did not have to move any items to see it. he also saw a ziplock bag next to the coffee table that looked like it contained methamphetamine. he did not open any doors or cupboards in the living room. [17] at a pre-trial application to exclude evidence, officer vandervelde maintained that the purpose of the clearing search was to confirm that “no one else was there” and that there were “no other hazards” (pre-trial application reasons, para. 282). when asked whether he was looking for weapons connected to the assault, he said: “not, not necessarily connected to the assault, no. you don’t want to be in a basement where weapons or firearms are sitting out in [the] open though” (ar, vol. i, at p 225). [18] officer vandervelde was shown a photo of the area behind the couch and asked in chief to put an “x” where he had found the tupperware container. he could not say exactly where, only that it was behind the couch in an open area on the ground. he also could not remember whether he removed the lid before or after he left the home. [19] after officer brown looked around the laundry room to confirm that no one else was there, he went upstairs to speak to the woman again at the pre-trial application, he testified that she provided little information. she denied that mr. stairs had assaulted her and insisted that they were just “playing around” (pre-trial application reasons, para. 28). iii decisions below [20] mr. stairs brought a pre-trial application alleging several violations of his rights under s 8 of the charter (the right against unreasonable search and seizure) and s 9 of the charter (the right against arbitrary detention). the only issue that remains before this court is whether the clearing search of the basement living room was a lawful search incident to arrest. our summaries of the decisions under review focus on this issue. a ontario superior court of justice, 2018 onsc 3747, 412 crr (2d) 95 (coats j.) [21] the trial judge found no breach of s 8 of the charter. it was reasonable for the officers to do a quick scan of the basement living room after mr. stairs was arrested. much as the officers had taken a passing over-the-shoulder look at the room on their way down to the basement, their focus at the time was on mr. stairs, who was, by then, in the laundry room. [22] the search had a valid objective. officer vandervelde testified that he went to the living room to make sure that no one else was there and that there were no other hazards this objective was reasonable because both the woman and mr. stairs had come from this area, the officers could not see fully into the living room as they came down the stairs, and their initial momentary glance did not completely address safety concerns. [23] the search and resulting seizure were lawful. the tupperware container and bag in which the methamphetamine was found were both in plain view and transparent while officer vandervelde could not mark the exact location of the tupperware container on a photo of the living room, this did not weaken his testimony about its general location. in addition, the trial judge accepted officer vandervelde’s testimony that he believed there was methamphetamine in the container and the plastic bag before picking them up. as a result, the trial judge found no basis to exclude the methamphetamine. b court of appeal for ontario, 2020 onca 678, 153 o.r (3d) 32 (fairburn acjo and harvison young ja,. nordheimer ja. dissenting) (1) majority — fairburn acjo and harvison young ja. [24] writing for the majority, fairburn acjo dismissed the appeal in her view, the trial judge correctly concluded that the search and subsequent seizure of the methamphetamine did not breach mr. stairs’ s 8 charter rights. [25] the central disagreement between the majority and the dissent concerned the applicability of this court’s decision in r v. macdonald, 2014 scc 3, [2014] 1 scr 37. there, the court held that the police needed reasonable grounds to believe that there was an imminent threat to public or police safety in order to enter and search a home. [26] the majority rejected the applicability of this test because the factual matrix in macdonald differed materially from this case. in the majority’s view, unlike macdonald, the search here was a search incident to a lawful arrest and the common law standard for search incident to arrest applied — ie, a search in the surrounding area of the arrest will be valid if the purpose of the search was a valid law enforcement objective connected to the arrest and the purpose was objectively reasonable in the circumstances. [27] the search of the basement living room met this standard the police searched the living room to ensure that no one else was there and that there were no other hazards. these safety concerns made sense in the circumstances: the police were in an unknown basement; they did not know how many people were in the house; they could not see behind the couch when coming down the stairs; and the living room was right next to the stairs, which the police needed to ascend to get mr. stairs out of the home safely. it was objectively reasonable for the police to take a quick visual scan of the basement living room. since the methamphetamine was in plain view, the police were entitled to seize it under the plain view doctrine accordingly, the majority dismissed mr. stairs’ appeal from his conviction on the drug offence. (2) dissent — nordheimer ja. [28] in dissent, nordheimer j.a would have allowed mr. stairs’ appeal, set aside his conviction on the drug offence, and entered an acquittal. in his view, this case was indistinguishable from macdonald. when the police engage in a safety search in a home without a warrant — even a search incident to a lawful arrest — they must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an imminent threat to public or police safety. [29] here, the police had no reasonable grounds to believe, or even suspect, that there would be weapons, hazards, or other people in the living room that would pose a threat. any concerns the police might have had about the possibility of guns amounted to no more than the type of vague safety concern that macdonald cautioned against. as a result, the dissenting judge found a s 8 charter breach. he would have excluded the evidence under s 24(2). iv. issues [30] this appeal raises two issues: (1) whether the search of the basement living room incident to arrest was unreasonable, contrary to s 8 of the charter; and (2) if so, whether the methamphetamine seized by the police should be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter. [31] for the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeal we are not persuaded that mr. stairs’ s 8 charter rights were violated. accordingly, we need not address s 24(2) of the charter. v analysis [32] this court has enunciated a two-part analytical approach for determining whether the common law standard for search incident to arrest should be modified to comply with s 8 of the charter (see stillman, golden, fearon, and saeed): (1) stage one: determine whether the search satisfies the common law standard for search incident to arrest. (2) stage two: if so, determine whether the standard must be modified to comply with s 8 of the charter, given the particular privacy interests and law enforcement objectives at stake. [33] applying this approach, we conclude that the common law standard for search incident to arrest in a home must be modified. a. stage one: the common law standard for search incident to arrest [34] the common law standard for search incident to arrest permits the police to search a lawfully arrested person and to seize anything in their possession or the surrounding area of the arrest to guarantee the safety of the police and the arrested person, prevent the person’s escape, or provide evidence against them (cloutier v. langlois, [1990] 1 scr 158, at pp. 180-81). this search power is “extraordinary” because, unlike other police powers, it requires neither a warrant nor reasonable and probable grounds (fearon, at paras. 16 and 45). [35] the common law standard for search incident to arrest is well established. as explained in fearon, at paras. 21 and 27, it requires that (1) the individual searched has been lawfully arrested; (2) the search is truly incidental to the arrest in the sense that it is for a valid law enforcement purpose connected to the arrest; and (3) the search is conducted reasonably. [36] under the second step, valid law enforcement purposes for search incident to arrest include (a) police and public safety; (b) preventing the destruction of evidence; and (c) discovering evidence that may be used at trial (fearon, at para. 75). [37] the police’s law enforcement purpose must be subjectively connected to the arrest, and the officer’s belief that the purpose will be served by the search must be objectively reasonable (r v. caslake, [1998] 1 scr 51, at para. 19). to meet this standard, the police do not need reasonable and probable grounds for the search. instead, they only require “some reasonable basis” to do what they did (caslake, at para. 20). this is a much lower standard than reasonable and probable grounds. [38] this court explained the distinction between the “some reasonable basis” standard and the higher “reasonable and probable grounds” standard in caslake, at para. 20: to give an example, a reasonable and probable grounds standard would require a police officer to demonstrate a reasonable belief that an arrested person was armed with a particular weapon before searching the person. by contrast, under the standard that applies here, the police would be entitled to search an arrested person for a weapon if under the circumstances it seemed reasonable to check whether the person might be armed. [39] mr. stairs does not dispute that the search of the living room met the common law standard for search incident to arrest. instead, his primary submission is that the standard must be modified for a search of a home incident to arrest given the heightened privacy interests implicated in a home. we will therefore move directly to stage two. b. stage two: determining whether the common law standard must be modified [40] in certain situations, the common law standard for search incident to arrest must be modified to give effect to s 8 of the charter as indicated, this court has modified the standard in several contexts to balance (a) the nature and extent of the privacy interests implicated; and (b) the importance of the police’s law enforcement objectives the jurisprudence includes a spectrum of standards, with some contexts requiring a higher threshold for a search incident to arrest than others. (1) the spectrum of search incident to arrest cases [41] to determine the appropriate standard in this case, we begin by reviewing the standards in other cases, starting with the most stringent we then place home searches on the spectrum. [42] in stillman, this court determined that the common law standard for search incident to arrest does not apply to the seizure of bodily substances, including hair samples, teeth impressions, and buccal swabs while bodily samples can help in investigating crimes, particularly for establishing identity, they are usually in no danger of disappearing if they are not immediately seized (para. 49) since the seizure of bodily substances invades an area of personal privacy essential to dignity and bodily integrity, the police must obtain a warrant. they cannot seize bodily samples incident to arrest without a warrant. [43] the next set of cases on the spectrum are golden and saeed, which modified the common law standard for strip searches and penile swabs, respectively. [44] in golden, the court noted that, unlike frisk searches, which this court considered in cloutier, strip searches are particularly invasive because they require the removal of clothing and visual inspection of a person’s private areas. “strip searches are inherently humiliating and degrading”, and inevitably involve a serious infringement of dignity and privacy (golden, at para. 90). strip searches also rarely need to be done immediately due to the low risk of disposal or loss of evidence. balancing these factors, the court determined that a strip search requires (a) reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest itself; and (b) reasonable and probable grounds to conclude that a strip search is necessary in the particular circumstances of the arrest, that is, some evidence suggesting the possibility that the person arrested has concealed weapons or evidence related to the reason for arrest (golden, at paras. 94 and 98). the strip search must also be done in a reasonable manner. the court provided guidelines for when, where, and how strip searches are to be conducted. [45] in saeed, the court looked to golden and determined that there must be reasonable grounds to believe that a penile swab will afford evidence of the offence for which the accused was arrested. while penile swabs are very intrusive and impact the accused’s dignity, in sexual assault cases there is a risk that highly reliable evidence will be lost, either through destruction of the evidence or degradation over time. to ensure that penile swabs are conducted in a reasonable and respectful manner, the court provided guidelines as to when, where, and how these tests are to be conducted. [46] lower down the spectrum than golden and saeed is fearon, where this court considered cell phone searches incident to arrest. to reflect the high expectation of privacy in cell phones, the court modified the search incident to arrest power in three ways. first, “[b]oth the nature and the extent of the search performed on the cell phone must be truly incidental to the particular arrest for the particular offence” (para. 76). second, the police are only permitted to search for the purpose of discovering evidence when the investigation would “be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest” (para. 80). third, “officers must make detailed notes of what they have examined on the cell phone” (para. 82). [47] the lowest point on the spectrum of cases is where no change is required. an example is caslake, where this court declined to modify the common law standard for searches of vehicles incident to arrest. the court found that there is no heightened expectation of privacy in a vehicle that would justify an exemption from the usual common law principles (para. 15). (2) assessing searches in the home [48] to situate this case on the spectrum of cases where the common law standard has been modified, we must consider the relevant privacy interests and the police’s law enforcement objectives in searches of a home incident to arrest. (a) privacy interest [49] this court has emphasized time and again that a person’s home attracts a high expectation of privacy. a fundamental and longstanding principle of a free society is that a person’s home is their castle (eccles v bourque, [1975] 2 scr 739, at pp. 742-43, per dickson j (as he then was), citing semayne’s case (1604), 5 co. rep. 91a, 77 er 194, at p 195). the home is “where our most intimate and private activities are most likely to take place” (r v. tessling, 2004 scc 67, [2004] 3 scr. 432, at para. 22). moreover, this court recognized in r v. silveira, [1995] 2 scr. 297, at para. 140, per cory j., that “[t]here is no place on earth where persons can have a greater expectation of privacy than within their ‘dwelling-house’”. [50] given the privacy interests in the home, warrantless searches of the home are prima facie unreasonable. this was confirmed in r v. feeney, [1997] 2 scr 13, where the court held that even if the police have an arrest warrant, they are not generally permitted to make an arrest in a home without a specific warrant permitting entry. parliament later codified the principles in feeney by introducing ss. 529 to 529.5 into the criminal code to govern when police may enter dwelling-houses to carry out arrests. [51] although people undoubtedly have a heightened privacy interest in their homes, searches of the home are nonetheless less intrusive than strip searches and penile swabs, which inevitably impact a person’s dignity as this court noted in stillman, “a violation of the sanctity of a person’s body is much more serious” than an intrusion into their home (para. 42, citing r v pohoretsky, [1987] 1 scr 945, at p 949). in our view, while home searches may reveal highly personal and confidential information, they do not invariably infringe dignity and bodily integrity, as contemplated in stillman, golden, and saeed. (b) police objectives [52] the police’s law enforcement objectives will vary in searches of a home incident to arrest apart from the person targeted, there may be others in the home, including potential victims needing help or aggressors posing a safety risk. while the circumstances of each case may differ, arrests within the home are often volatile and dynamic. [53] overall, the risks at play in the context of an in-home arrest are likely to be more pressing than those involved in strip searches and penile swabs. for strip searches, there is generally a low risk that hidden objects can be accessed or disposed of quickly (golden, at para. 93). for penile swabs, there are no safety risks at play. (c) balancing privacy and police objectives [54] balancing privacy interests in the home and police objectives leads us to conclude that home searches fall lower on the spectrum than golden and saeed. while home searches implicate serious privacy interests, they do not inevitably intrude into a person’s dignity and bodily integrity. in addition, the police objectives will often be pressing and time-sensitive in the context of in-home arrests. [55] given the placement of home searches on the spectrum of cases, we cannot accept the crown’s submission that the common law standard provides sufficient protection for searches incident to arrest conducted in a home, including safety searches. that standard is too low given the privacy interests in the home. nor do we accept mr. stairs’ position — in line with the dissent at the court of appeal — that police safety searches incident to arrest in a home require a reasonable belief of imminent harm. that standard is too high given the pressing police objectives at stake. a proper balancing of privacy and police objectives requires a modification of the common law standard that falls between those two poles. (3) modifications to the common law standard [56] to pass constitutional muster, the common law standard for search incident to arrest must be modified in two ways that make the standard stricter where the police search areas of the home outside the arrested person’s physical control:  the police must have reason to suspect that there is a safety risk to the police, the accused, or the public which would be addressed by a search; and  the search must be conducted in a reasonable manner, tailored to the heightened privacy interests in a home. [57] to facilitate comparison, we reiterate that the common law standard permits a search of the person arrested and the surrounding area of the arrest when (1) the arrest is lawful; (2) the search is incidental to the arrest, such that there is some reasonable basis for the search connected to the arrest and the search is for a valid law enforcement purpose, including safety, evidence preservation, or evidence discovery; and (3) the nature and extent of the search are reasonable. this standard was applied by the majority of the court of appeal in the case at hand. [58] we will now explain each of the two modifications. (a) reasonable suspicion required for areas outside the arrested person’s physical control (i) defining the surrounding area of the arrest [59] a search incident to arrest extends to the surrounding area of an arrest. however, this concept must be further calibrated to account for the unique considerations entailed by a search of a home. we must therefore distinguish between two subcategories within the surrounding area of an arrest: (a) the area within the physical control of the person arrested at the time of arrest; and (b) areas outside the physical control of that person, but which are part of the surrounding area because they are sufficiently proximate to the arrest. the purpose of this distinction is to recognize that the more extensive the warrantless search, the greater the potential for violating privacy. as we explain below, different standards must be applied to these subcategories. [60] the task of determining whether a particular area is part of the surrounding area of the arrest and which subcategory it falls under lies with the trial judge. consistent with this court’s jurisprudence, whether an area is sufficiently proximate to the arrest is a contextual and case-specific inquiry. the key question is whether there is a “link between the location and purpose of the search and the grounds for the arrest” (r v. nolet, 2010 scc 24, [2010] 1 scr 851, at para. 49). the inquiry is highly contextual; the determination must be made using a purposive approach to ensure that the police can adequately respond to the wide variety of factual situations that may arise. depending on the circumstances, the surrounding area may be wider or narrower. as one learned author notes: “a search incident to arrest can extend to the surrounding area, and so might include searching the building or vehicle in which the accused is arrested” (s. coughlan, criminal procedure (4th ed. 2020), at p 124). [61] when the police make an arrest, under the existing common law standard, they may conduct a pat-down search and examine the area within the physical control of the person arrested. but when the police go outside the zone of physical control, the standard must be raised to recognize that the police have entered a home without a warrant. in these circumstances, it is not enough to satisfy the existing common law standard, which requires some reasonable basis for the search. rather, the police must meet a higher standard: they must have reason to suspect that the search will address a valid safety purpose. we will say more about the reasonable suspicion standard in the section below. [62] a similar approach has been adopted in the united states, where the jurisprudence distinguishes between areas inside and outside the arrested person’s physical control. two cases, read together, illustrate this distinction. first, in chimel v. california, 395 u.s 752 (1969), at p 763, the u.s supreme court held that in the context of an in-home arrest, the search incident to arrest power permits police to search (a) the arrestee’s person, as in a frisk search; and (b) the area “within his immediate control”, meaning the area in which the arrested person might reach for a weapon or destructible evidence. [63] second, in maryland v. buie, 494 us 325 (1990), the us. supreme court considered areas outside those discussed in chimel. the court held that the police may engage in a protective sweep of a home after an arrest when there is a reasonable suspicion of danger. even so, the search is limited to a cursory inspection of the spaces where a person may be found and may last no longer than necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger. [64] these cases, while obviously not binding, provide helpful persuasive authority illustrating the need to establish different standards for searches of areas inside and outside the arrested person’s physical control. (ii) the nature of reasonable suspicion [65] when the police search incident to arrest in a home for safety purposes, they must have reason to suspect that a search of areas outside the physical control of the arrested person will further the objective of police and public safety, including the safety of the accused. this modified standard, which is stricter than the basic common law standard, respects the privacy interests in the home while allowing the police to effectively fulfil their law-enforcement responsibilities. [66] like the common law test, the purpose of the search must be subjectively connected to the arrest, and the officer’s belief that the purpose will be served by the search must be objectively reasonable. however, the objective requirement is stricter. to meet this stricter standard, the crown must establish “objective facts [that] rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, such that a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the police officer, would have held a reasonable suspicion” (r v. chehil, 2013 scc 49, [2013] 3 scr 220, at para. 45). [67] reasonable suspicion is a higher standard than the common law standard for search incident to arrest. as this court noted in caslake, the search incident to arrest power arises from the fact of the lawful arrest (para. 13). all that is required is “some reasonable basis” for doing what the police did based on the arrest (para. 20) the common law standard is less stringent than the reasonable suspicion standard because it permits searches based on generalized concerns arising from the arrest, while the reasonable suspicion standard does not. [68] by contrast, to establish reasonable suspicion, the police require a constellation of objectively discernible facts assessed against the totality of the circumstances giving rise to the suspicion of the risk this assessment must be “fact-based, flexible, and grounded in common sense and practical, everyday experience” (chehil, at para. 29). in addition, the police must have reason to suspect that the search will address the risk. however, reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than reasonable and probable grounds because it is based on a possibility rather than a probability (chehil, at para. 32). [69] whether the circumstances of a particular case give rise to reasonable suspicion must be assessed based on the totality of the circumstances (chehil, at para. 26). relevant considerations include (a) the need for a search; (b) the nature of the apprehended risk; (c) the potential consequences of not taking protective measures; (d) the availability of alternative measures; and (e) the likelihood that the contemplated risk actually exists (r v. golub (1997), 34 or (3d) 743 (ca), at p 758). (iii) the rationale for reasonable suspicion [70] golub provides helpful guidance on the rationale for the reasonable suspicion standard. that case involved the entry and search of a home incident to arrest. after making an arrest outside a residence, the police continued to suspect that there was another person inside the apartment with a loaded submachine gun. the court of appeal for ontario, per doherty ja, held that where the place to be searched is a home, the general principles set out in cloutier do not apply. justice doherty noted that this court’s decision in feeney represented a shift in the law that gave greater protection to privacy interests in the home over law enforcement interests in most cases. he then reasoned that since warrantless arrests in a home are not generally permissible, similar reasoning should apply to warrantless searches of a home incident to arrest (pp. 755-56). [71] justice doherty held that searches of a home incident to arrest should be “generally prohibited subject to exceptional circumstances where the law enforcement interest is so compelling that it overrides the individual’s right to privacy within the home” (p 756). the police must have “a reasonable suspicion, based on the particular circumstances of the arrest” (pp. 758-59) that they need to conduct the search to protect the safety of those at the scene of the arrest (p 758). [72] in golub, the police entered the home to conduct a search incident to arrest, whereas here the police were already lawfully in the home under exigent circumstances when they conducted the search incident to arrest. despite this difference, in our view, the principles which led the court in golub to require a standard of reasonable suspicion apply equally here. simply because the police have entered the home for a valid reason does not give them carte blanche to wander through the home at large where the circumstances do not call for it as we have explained, the more extensive the warrantless search, the greater the potential for violating privacy. thus, when the police search a home incident to arrest in areas outside the physical control of the arrested person at the time of arrest, they require reasonable suspicion. [73] in concluding that reasonable suspicion applies to searches of a home incident to arrest, doherty j.a balanced the privacy interests in the home and the relevant police objectives given the factual matrix in golub, he was particularly concerned about the police interest in protecting the safety of persons at the scene of the arrest in that regard, he made the following astute observations, with which we fully agree: . . . i am concerned with the police interest in protecting the safety of those at the scene of the arrest. this interest is often the most compelling concern at an arrest scene and is one which must be addressed immediately. in deciding whether the police were justified in taking steps to ensure their safety, the realities of the arrest situation must be acknowledged. often, and this case is a good example, the atmosphere at the scene of an arrest is a volatile one and the police must expect the unexpected. the price paid if inadequate measures are taken to secure the scene of an arrest can be very high indeed. just as it is wrong to engage in ex post facto justifications of police conduct, it is equally wrong to ignore the realities of the situations in which police officers must make these decisions [emphasis added; p 757.] [74] when assessing police conduct, the reviewing judge must be alive to the volatility and uncertainty that police officers face — the police must expect the unexpected this reality is inherent in the police’s exercise of their common law powers, as well as their statutory duties, including “the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and the protection of life and property” (r v. godoy, [1999] 1 scr 311, at para. 15 (emphasis deleted), citing dedman v the queen, [1985] 2 scr 2, at pp. 11-12; police services act, rso 1990, c. p.15, s 42). given their mandate, “police officers must be empowered to respond quickly, effectively, and flexibly to the diversity of encounters experienced daily on the front lines of policing” (r v. mann, 2004 scc 52, [2004] 3 scr 59, at para. 16). a reasonable suspicion standard ensures that the police may carry out these duties, while also balancing the enhanced privacy in a person’s home. (iv) no requirement for reasonable belief in imminent harm [75] in adopting a reasonable suspicion standard, we reject mr. stairs’ proposed standard of reasonable belief in imminent harm, which was endorsed by the dissenting judge at the court of appeal both mr. stairs and the dissenting judge relied on macdonald. however, macdonald is distinguishable. [76] in that case, the police attended mr. macdonald’s condominium in response to a noise complaint. when he partially opened the door to his unit, it appeared that he may have been holding a weapon behind his leg. after he refused to reveal what was behind his leg, the police pushed the door open further importantly, mr. macdonald was not under arrest he therefore retained a strong expectation of privacy in his home and the police required heightened grounds to justify entry — ie, a reasonable belief in imminent harm. in the present case, by contrast, the police had already entered the home under exigent circumstances and lawfully effected the arrest. mr. stairs’ expectation of privacy was thus significantly diminished (fearon, at para. 56, referencing r v. beare, [1988] 2 scr 387, at p 413). to be clear, “[t]he authority for the search does not arise as a result of a reduced expectation of privacy of the arrested individual”; however, it is a factor in assessing the standard for a search incident to arrest (caslake, at para. 17) it follows, in our view, that macdonald is distinguishable. [77] there are also independent reasons for rejecting a standard of reasonable belief in imminent harm for a home search incident to arrest. first, because a search incident to arrest typically occurs at the early stages of an investigation, the police will often be unable to show reasonable and probable grounds. setting the bar too high will prevent the police from acting promptly, taking immediate steps to address risks to their safety and the safety of others, including innocent bystanders. second, an imminence requirement would practically proscribe the search incident to arrest power, as it would simply restate the exigency exception. if there were exigent circumstances, the police could act solely on that basis. there would be no need for the power to search incident to arrest. (b) nature and extent of the search [78] the police must carefully tailor their searches incident to arrest in a home to ensure that they respect the heightened privacy interests implicated the search incident to arrest power does not permit the police to engage in windfall searches. the police are highly constrained when they go beyond the area within the physical control of the arrested person. [79] the search incident to arrest power only permits police to search the surrounding area of the arrest (cloutier, at pp. 180-81; coughlan, at p 124) this court’s guidance on how to determine what constitutes the surrounding area of the arrest remains constant as indicated, the key consideration is the link between the location and purpose of the search and the grounds for the arrest (nolet, at para. 49). [80] in addition, the nature of the search must be tailored to its specific purpose, the circumstances of the arrest, and the nature of the offence. as a general rule, the police cannot use the search incident to arrest power to justify searching every nook and cranny of the house. a search incident to arrest remains an exception to the general rule that a warrant is required to justify intrusion into the home. the search should be no more intrusive than is necessary to resolve the police’s reasonable suspicion. [81] further, it would be good practice for the police to take detailed notes after searching a home incident to arrest. they should keep track of the places searched, the extent of the search, the time of the search, its purpose, and its duration in some instances, insufficient notes may lead a trial judge to make adverse findings impacting the reasonableness of the search. (4) the applicable framework [82] in summary, a search of a home incident to arrest for safety purposes will comply with s 8 of the charter when the following requirements are met: (1) the arrest was lawful. (2) the search was incident to the arrest. the search will be incident to arrest when the following considerations are met: (a) where the area searched is within the arrested person’s physical control at the time of the arrest, the common law standard must be satisfied. (b) where the area searched is outside the arrested person’s physical control at the time of the arrest — but the area is sufficiently proximate to the arrest — the police must have reason to suspect that the search will further the objective of police and public safety, including the safety of the accused. (3) where the area searched is outside the arrested person’s physical control at the time of the arrest — but the area is sufficiently proximate to the arrest — the nature and the extent of the search must be tailored to the purpose of the search and the heightened privacy interests in a home. vi application [83] before this court, mr. stairs does not question the lawfulness of his arrest or the validity of the initial pat-down search and scan of the laundry room the outstanding issues are (a) whether the police had a reason to suspect that there were safety risks which justified the basement living room search; and (b) whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. a reasonable suspicion [84] the living room search met the standard for reasonable suspicion, both in terms of its subjective and objective components. (1) subjective component [85] it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the police subjectively believed there was a safety risk that would be addressed by conducting a clearing search of the living room this was a valid law enforcement purpose the officer who conducted the clearing search (officer vandervelde) testified that the search was performed to ensure that “no one else was there”, such as someone potentially posing a risk or needing assistance, and that there were “no other hazards”, such as weapons or firearms sitting out in the open (see pre-trial application reasons, at para. 282). (2) objective component [86] it was equally open to the trial judge to find that it was objectively reasonable for the police to clear the area for hazards and other occupants when assessing reasonableness, it is essential to properly contextualize the arrest and the surrounding circumstances here, the following factors figure prominently in the reason-to-suspect analysis: (a) the dynamic before and during the arrest; and (b) the nature of the offence for which mr. stairs was arrested. (a) the dynamic of the arrest [87] the situation was volatile and rapidly changing the police were responding to a civilian 9-1-1 call the caller reported that the male driver was swerving on the road while repeatedly striking the female passenger in a “flurry of strikes”. he continued hitting her, even though she was huddling to protect herself. [88] shortly thereafter, the police located the reported car parked in the driveway of an unknown home. despite loudly and repeatedly announcing themselves, no one answered the door. they entered the home because they feared that the assault was ongoing. when the woman emerged from the living room in the basement, she had fresh injuries to her face, supporting the police officers’ belief that she had been assaulted. moreover, mr. stairs disobeyed repeated commands. he behaved erratically, running across the basement from the living room and barricading himself in the laundry room. [89] from door knock to arrest, about four minutes elapsed. the situation was tense and the police had their weapons drawn. throughout this interaction, the police also knew that mr. stairs had a history of violence, including domestic violence, that he was an escape risk, and that he had been identified as a high-risk offender. (b) the nature of the offence [90] the arrest was for domestic assault. as this court recognized in godoy, at para. 21, privacy in the home must be balanced with the safety of other members of the household: one of the hallmarks of [domestic violence] is its private nature. familial abuse occurs within the supposed sanctity of the home. while there is no question that one’s privacy at home is a value to be preserved and promoted, privacy cannot trump the safety of all members of the household. if our society is to provide an effective means of dealing with domestic violence, it must have a form of crisis response. [91] for victims of domestic violence, the home is often not a safe haven. instead, it is a place that shields and enables their abuse. while privacy interests in the home are important, s 8 of the charter “was not intended to protect blindly privacy interests claimed in the context of criminal activities which are played out within one’s home” (silveira, at para. 119, per l’heureux-dubé j., concurring). in domestic violence cases, the police are not only concerned with the privacy and autonomy of the person arrested; they must also be alert to the safety of all members of the household, including both known and potential victims. [92] historically, victims of domestic violence did not receive the help they needed. domestic conflicts were considered “private” matters that did not warrant state intervention. more recently, “the courts, legislators, police and social service workers have all engaged in a serious and important campaign to educate themselves and the public on the nature and prevalence of domestic violence” (godoy, at para. 21). and yet, despite these advances, domestic violence persists it remains one of the most prevalent crimes in canada, accounting for more than a quarter of all violent crimes. in 2019, there were about 400,000 victims of violent crime reported to the police of these, 26 percent — over 100,000 people — were victimized by a family member (statistics canada, family violence in canada: a statistical profile, 2019 (march 2021), at p 4). [93] moreover, cases involving domestic violence are often emotionally charged and volatile (jensen v stemmer, 2007 mbca 42, 214 man r (2d) 64, at para. 98; l. ruff, “does training matter? exploring police officer response to domestic dispute calls before and after training on intimate partner violence” (2012), 85 police j 285) domestic dispute calls can be dangerous and even life-threatening for responding officers and persons at the scene (r v. dodd (1999), 180 nfld. & peir 145 (nlca), at para. 38). given the prevalence of domestic violence and its attendant risks, responding police officers must have the ability to assess and control the situation. in this case, that included confirming whether other individuals or hazards were in the surrounding area of the arrest. [94] the police often respond to domestic violence calls with limited information for example, they may not know if other family members, including children, are involved this is further exacerbated when victims at the scene of the arrest are uncooperative, a common phenomenon in the domestic violence context. for example, in r v. lowes, 2016 onca 519, the police responded to a 9-1-1 call in which a neighbour reported hearing a man threaten to kill a woman. the woman insisted to the police that no one else was in the apartment. the court of appeal found that the police would have been “derelict in their duty” had they accepted the woman’s response at face value (para. 12 (canlii)). [95] a similar situation played out here. despite fresh and visible injuries, the victim claimed that she and mr. stairs were just play fighting. this was not credible, given the nature of her injuries and since a civilian had witnessed an assault so violent that he reported his observations to 9-1-1. moreover, officer brown testified that based on his conversation with the victim, he believed that she “didn’t want to co-operate” (ar, vol. ii, at p 49) importantly, the police could not depend on her for reliable information about the presence of other people, other hazards, or the cause of her injuries, and there was no one else they could turn to for such information. it was thus objectively reasonable for the police to engage in a cursory search of the surrounding area of the arrest, including the basement living room. [96] our colleague justice karakatsanis maintains that the police acted on generalized suspicion, as opposed to reasonable suspicion. with respect, we disagree. in assessing whether the conduct of the police was objectively reasonable in the circumstances of this case, we are reminded of the invaluable insight provided by doherty j.a in golub, at p 757: in volatile circumstances where the police must expect the unexpected, it is “wrong to ignore the realities of the situations in which police officers must make these decisions”. while it is critical that the line between generalized suspicion and reasonable suspicion be maintained, in cases like the present one, we must assiduously avoid using twenty-twenty hindsight as the yardstick against which to measure instantaneous decisions made by the police. [97] although privacy interests in the home are important, they are not absolute. on the facts of this case, it was open to the trial judge to conclude that society’s interest in effective law enforcement should prevail over mr. stairs’ privacy interest in the basement living room. the trial judge did not err in concluding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to check the area to ensure that no other people (including potential victims) were present and no weapons or hazards were sitting out in the open. b nature and extent of the search [98] the search was conducted reasonably. it took place right after the arrest and the police merely conducted a visual scan of the living room area to ensure that no one else was present and that there were no weapons or hazards. [99] the spatial scope of the search was appropriate. the trial judge’s finding of fact that the living room was part of the surrounding area of the arrest reveals no error. the police appropriately limited the scope of their search. had they searched the upper floors of the home or other rooms, the search would have been unreasonable. but they did not do so they only cleared the basement living room area immediately adjacent to where mr. stairs had been arrested — the very area from which he and the victim had emerged just moments earlier. [100] moreover, the police searched what appeared to be a common living room space there was nothing about that space to suggest that a higher than normal expectation of privacy in the context of a home was warranted, such as one might reasonably expect in a bedroom. while it was revealed at trial that mr. stairs used the basement living room area as his main living space, at the time of the search there was no indication that it was being used as a bedroom. nor was the basement a separate apartment unit from the rest of the house. [101] finally, the police engaged in the most cursory of searches. they did a brief visual scan to see if anyone else or obvious weapons or hazards were in the area. they did not move any items or open doors or cupboards, which would not have been permissible in this case given their objective, the search was the least invasive possible. [102] counsel for mr. stairs submitted that if the applicable standard for a search incident to arrest in a home is modified to require reasonable suspicion, then she took “no issue with the applicability of the plain view doctrine” (transcript, at p 19). because this court did not have the benefit of any submissions on this issue, we leave for another day the important question of whether and how the common law plain view doctrine applies in the context of a search incident to arrest in a home given the concession on this record, and the findings of the trial judge, we would not disturb her conclusion that the seizure was authorized. vii disposition [103] for the reasons set out above, the search of the living room incident to arrest did not violate mr. stairs’ s 8 charter right against unreasonable search and seizure. the police had reason to suspect that there was a safety risk which would be addressed through a cursory visual clearing search. moreover, the search was tailored to its purpose — it was targeted, brief, and constrained. the evidence from the living room search was therefore properly admitted at trial. accordingly, we would dismiss the appeal. the reasons of karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. were delivered by karakatsanis j — i. overview [104] responding to a domestic violence call, police arrested matthew stairs in his home, searched his basement, and, in a discovery unrelated either to the nature of the arrest or the aim of the search, seized methamphetamine that was found behind a couch and next to a coffee table. mr. stairs was later charged with drug possession for the purpose of trafficking. the majority concludes that the police’s warrantless search and seizures complied with s 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. i disagree. [105] a home is not only shelter — it is a personal refuge and a trove of personal information. it occupies a unique place in s 8’s protections from unreasonable searches and seizures indeed, there is “no place on earth where persons can have a greater expectation of privacy” (r v. silveira, [1995] 2 scr 297, at para. 140). but privacy is not absolute, and must sometimes yield to competing law enforcement objectives. the question in this case is how to balance the two when police lawfully enter a home without a warrant, make an arrest, and seek to conduct a search incident to that arrest. does the charter require that special restrictions apply? [106] the question turns on the application of the common law search incident to arrest doctrine, which ordinarily entitles police to search the person arrested and their immediate surroundings for safety purposes, to preserve evidence from destruction, or to discover evidence that could be used at trial. the power is unusual because, as the authority to search derives from the arrest, it authorizes warrantless searches without the need for reasonable grounds or even reasonable suspicion. instead, police must only have “some reasonable basis” for the search (r v caslake, [1998] 1 scr 51, at para. 20). [107] like my colleagues, i conclude that the common law sets too low a bar for searches incident to arrest inside a home. privacy demands more. when officers seek to search a home for safety purposes — as they did here — the appropriate standard is reasonable suspicion of an imminent threat to police or public safety. [108] applied to this case, i conclude that the search and seizures were not justified. the police only searched the basement once mr. stairs had been handcuffed and the victim had gone upstairs, and absent any sign of weapons or other people. the searching officer gave no basis to ground a reasonable suspicion that anybody’s safety was at risk following mr. stairs’ arrest the search and seizures were therefore unlawful and violated mr. stairs’ s 8 rights i would exclude the evidence under s 24(2), set aside mr. stairs’ conviction, and enter an acquittal. ii. facts [109] responding to a 9-1-1 call from a civilian who witnessed a driver assaulting his female passenger, officers brown, vandervelde, and martin found the car at a residential address and ran the licence plate the car was associated with matthew stairs, an individual who carried cautions for escape risk, violence, and family violence. receiving no answer at the front door, the officers looked through windows and, seeing nobody in the house, entered through an unlocked side door. on the main level, no lights were on, but they could see light and heard music coming from the basement. officer vandervelde saw mr. stairs run across the bottom of the stairwell and a woman emerged from the basement with her hands up, displaying fresh facial injuries while officer martin attended to the woman upstairs, officers brown and vandervelde entered the basement with weapons drawn and eventually coaxed mr. stairs out of the laundry room, where he had barricaded himself. officer brown arrested and searched him, finding only money on his person. officer vandervelde then did a “sweep” of the basement and, about 10 feet from the arrest, saw a transparent tupperware container on the floor behind a couch, containing what looked like crystal methamphetamine a ziplock bag next to a coffee table also appeared to contain methamphetamine. police seized both items and also arrested the injured woman for drug possession. [110] mr. stairs was charged with possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking, and challenged the admissibility of the drugs under s 8 of the charter the trial judge dismissed his application, holding that police had lawfully arrested him, lawfully searched incident to arrest, and lawfully seized the evidence under the plain view doctrine (2018 onsc 3747, 412 crr (2d) 95 (pre-trial application reasons)). a majority at the ontario court of appeal agreed, holding that the search was authorized as a search incident to arrest, and the seizures of evidence were lawful under the plain view doctrine (2020 onca 678, 153 or (3d) 32). justice nordheimer, dissenting, would have held that the search failed to satisfy the standard of “objectively verifiable necessity” for a warrantless search of a home (r v. macdonald, 2014 scc 3, [2014] 1 scr 37, at para. 31). mr. stairs appeals to this court as of right. iii analysis [111] my reasons proceed in three parts. first, i consider the search incident to arrest power, and conclude that it authorizes a search where the officer reasonably suspects an imminent threat to police or public safety second, i consider the application of that standard to the evidence of this case, and conclude that the search and seizures were unlawful, and thus unconstitutional. lastly, i consider s 24(2) of the charter and conclude that the evidence should be excluded and the appeal allowed. a. the power to search incident to arrest (1) section 8 of the charter [112] section 8 of the charter confers the right “to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure” a search or seizure is only reasonable, and thus constitutional, when (1) it is authorized by law; (2) the law itself is reasonable; and (3) the search or seizure was carried out reasonably (r v. collins, [1987] 1 scr 265, at p 278) the scope of the right is determined by the underlying balance s 8 strikes between privacy interests and legitimate law enforcement objectives (hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at pp. 159-60). [113] like other charter rights, s 8 is a restraint on state power; it “is not in itself an authorization for governmental action” (hunter, at p 156) in hunter, the court held that prior judicial authorization — a warrant — is a precondition to a valid search or seizure, failing which the search or seizure would be presumptively unconstitutional (p 161). in entrusting the authorization to search to a judicial arbiter on a standard of reasonable and probable grounds, the warrant requirement “puts the onus on the state to demonstrate the superiority of its interest to that of the individual” and serves as a “means of preventing unjustified searches before they happen” (hunter, at p 160 (emphasis in original)). [114] the warrant requirement is a foundational check on police powers, and a cornerstone of our constitutional order. any exceptions should be “exceedingly rare” (r v. simmons, [1988] 2 scr 495, at p 527; r v. grant, [1993] 3 scr 223, at p 239). still, obtaining a warrant is not always feasible. in exigent circumstances — often defined as an imminent threat to police or public safety, or a risk of the imminent loss or destruction of evidence — the police may be authorized to search or seize evidence without one (criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, s 487.11; r v. feeney, [1997] 2 scr 13, at para. 52) such exceptions are justified not by diminished privacy interests, but by the pressing law enforcement objectives that overtake them when critical situations arise. (2) common law power to search incident to arrest [115] the police power to search incident to arrest is another common law exception to the warrant requirement. it is available where (1) the individual has been lawfully arrested; (2) the search is “truly incidental to the arrest in the sense that it is for a valid law enforcement purpose related to the reasons for the arrest”; and (3) the search is conducted reasonably (r v saeed, 2016 scc 24, [2016] 1 scr 518, at para. 37). its authority derives from the arrest itself; there is no independent need for reasonable and probable grounds (caslake, at para. 13). [116] the power is not unbounded. it only allows police to search the arrestee’s person and “to seize anything in his or her possession or immediate surroundings” (cloutier v langlois, [1990] 1 scr 158, at p 180) and the “truly incidental to arrest” criterion requires two things first, the search must relate to a valid law enforcement objective — protecting police or public safety, protecting evidence from destruction, or discovering evidence which could be used at trial — and must be subjectively and objectively reasonable in the circumstances (caslake, at paras. 19 and 21). second, the search must remain proximate in space and time to the arrest (caslake, at para. 25). it is, in short, a “focussed power”, whose scope turns on the “particular circumstances of the particular arrest” (r v. fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr. 621, at paras. 13 and 16). the objectives and scope of the search will depend on the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the arrest (caslake, at para. 25). [117] notwithstanding the power’s limitations, the court has remained cautious to prevent its overreach. the search incident to arrest power is an “extraordinary” one, not only because it permits warrantless searches, but because it may do so “in circumstances in which the grounds to obtain a warrant do not exist” (fearon, at para. 16). in some cases, the court has modified or tailored the common law framework to account for particularly compelling individual interests, restricting seizures of hair, buccal swabs, and teeth impressions (r v. stillman, [1997] 1 scr 607); strip searches (r v. golden, 2001 scc 83, [2001] 3 scr 679); cell phone searches (fearon); and penile swabs (saeed). the issue in this case is whether the strong privacy interests in a home also call for modifications to the exercise of this common law power. (3) searches in a home [118] to answer that question, s 8 requires that the privacy interests in a home and law enforcement interests be balanced. (a) privacy interests [119] for centuries, the law has recognized that every person’s home is their sanctuary (eccles v. bourque, [1975] 2 scr 739, at p 743). long a central restraint on state intrusions, the legal status of privacy in one’s home “significantly increased in importance with the advent of the charter” (feeney, at para. 43). today, there is no doubt that individuals have strong privacy interests in a home (silveira, at para. 140; feeney, at para. 43; r v. godoy, [1999] 1 scr 311, at para. 19; r v. tessling, 2004 scc 67, [2004] 3 scr 432, at para. 22; macdonald, at para. 26; r v. paterson, 2017 scc 15, [2017] 1 scr 202, at para. 46; r v. reeves, 2018 scc 56, [2018] 3 scr. 531, at para. 24). and this is true not only of arrested persons, but of other occupants, including in areas or items under shared control (reeves, at para. 37). however brief or circumscribed, police searches in homes threaten those compelling and comprehensive privacy interests and the interests that underlie them — dignity, integrity and autonomy (r v plant, [1993] 3 scr 281, at p 293) — all of which are vital to human flourishing. [120] my colleagues recognize that the privacy interests in a home are high (para. 49). but unlike them, i find it unhelpful to compare privacy in a home to a strip search or obtaining bodily samples (para. 51) privacy interests come in different forms — whether personal, territorial, or informational (tessling, at para. 20) — which are not easily equated. the focus in tailoring the common law framework is to reconcile the specific privacy interests at issue with the specific law enforcement interests that counterbalance them. whether a search of a home could be more or less invasive than body, cellphone or car searches is, in this respect, tangential; the key questions are when and how the undoubtedly strong privacy interests in a home ought to yield to varying policing objectives. [121] put simply, a home is the setting of individuals’ innermost lives: at once a shield from the outside world and a biographical record, its sanctity is indispensable. without it, personal privacy, dignity, integrity and autonomy would suffer. the high weight placed on a person’s security in their home, then, stands as a “bulwark” of protection, which “affords the individual a measure of privacy and tranquillity against the overwhelming power of the state” (silveira, at para. 41, per la forest j., dissenting, but not on this point). (b) law enforcement objectives [122] while privacy interests in a home are significant, so too are the interests in protecting police and public safety. police must be able to address the hazards that may arise in unfamiliar, and potentially hostile, environments, not least when investigating volatile offences like domestic violence. the cost of inadequate measures to protect safety “can be very high indeed”, and it would be unreasonable to “ask the police to place themselves in potentially dangerous situations” without equipping them to take reasonable defensive steps (r v. golub (1997), 34 or (3d) 743 (ca), at p 757). depending on the circumstances of the arrest, police may also need to assist others on the scene, including children. [123] to be sure, the law enforcement interests engaged by home searches in the domestic violence context may cut both ways. police searches may revictimize victims or uncover evidence of unrelated offences, which may discourage individuals from reporting. that is a particular concern in domestic violence, one of whose “hallmarks” is its private nature (godoy, at para. 21). again, this case is illustrative: shortly after arresting mr. stairs, police arrested the victim herself for drug possession. victims of domestic violence are often reluctant to seek police assistance and reluctant to cooperate when police arrive overly broad search powers can only compound that reluctance. [124] still, both sides of the scale carry significant weight when police encounter safety concerns in a home while the nature of privacy interests in a private home usually justifies a higher threshold, safety concerns pull strongly in the other direction. clearly, a right to search on a “reasonable basis” alone would give little effect to the powerful privacy interest yet a search power couched in undue restrictions could imperil police or the public balancing the two objectives under s 8, i agree that reasonable suspicion is an appropriate standard for searches based on safety, where police believe there may be an imminent threat to the police or others. [125] in reaching this conclusion, it follows that i would reject the submissions of mr. stairs, and the conclusion of the dissenting justice below (at paras. 76-78) that s 8 requires a standard of reasonable belief in imminent harm in this context but although i agree with my colleagues that reasonable belief — that is, reasonable and probable grounds (baron v. canada, [1993] 1 scr 416, at pp. 446-47) — sets too high a bar, i do not agree that the requirement that a safety risk be imminent should be rejected (moldaver and jamal jj.’s reasons, para. 77). the safety risks that arise from an arrest in a home, for which a warrant cannot feasibly be procured, will generally be imminent while this requirement may indeed overlap or “restate the exigency exception” (para. 77), consistency with other legal standards is not a reason to define this one more expansively imminence is a useful concept because it defines those circumstances where obtaining a warrant is not feasible. it signals that if police can get a warrant before searching a home, they should do so. (c) summary [126] in sum, the strong privacy interests in a home call for modifying the common law standard for search incident to arrest when the arrest occurs in a home. that balance is best struck by authorizing police to conduct a search incident to arrest when they reasonably suspect there is an imminent threat to the safety of police or the public. as it was not argued, i would leave for another day the question of whether searches for evidence inside a home incident to arrest are permissible under s 8. (4) the reasonable suspicion standard [127] i agree with my colleagues’ overview of the reasonable suspicion standard. some points, however, warrant emphasis. [128] while reasonable suspicion is a relatively low threshold imposed by the courts to meet s 8 of the charter, it still requires the officers to articulate some basis to suspect safety may be at risk. as in other searches incident to arrest, they must have both subjective and objective grounds for the search (caslake, at para. 21). and those grounds must correspond — officers “cannot rely on the fact that, objectively, a legitimate purpose for the search existed when that is not the purpose for which they searched” (caslake, at para. 27) the court’s task is to examine the evidence of the actual reasons for the search — and not whether reasonable suspicion could have justified the search. [129] in r v chehil, 2013 scc 49, [2013] 3 scr 220, the court outlined several principles to guide the reasonable suspicion standard’s application as my colleagues note, reasonable suspicion:  is “based on objectively discernible facts, which can then be subjected to independent judicial scrutiny [that] is exacting, and must account for the totality of the circumstances” (chehil, at para. 26);  is a higher standard than “mere suspicion” but lower than reasonable and probable grounds — it engages “reasonable possibility, rather than probability” (paras. 26-27, citing r v. kang-brown, 2008 scc 18, [2008] 1 scr 456, at para. 75); and  is “fact-based, flexible, and grounded in common sense and practical, everyday experience” (para. 29). [130] my colleagues also explain that reasonable suspicion does not permit searches “based on generalized concerns arising from the arrest” (para. 67). indeed, in chehil the court was clear that an “exacting” review of the basis for a search must be tied to the specific facts in question. citing the need for “a sufficiently particularized constellation of factors”, the court explained that a “constellation of factors will not be sufficient to ground reasonable suspicion where it amounts merely to a ‘generalized’ suspicion” (para. 30) and while recognizing the importance of officer training and experience in the assessment, it cautioned against allowing those factors to overwhelm the inquiry: an officer’s training and experience may provide an objective experiential, as opposed to empirical, basis for grounding reasonable suspicion. however, this is not to say that hunches or intuition grounded in an officer’s experience will suffice, or that deference is owed to a police officer’s view of the circumstances based on her training or experience in the field . . . a police officer’s educated guess must not supplant the rigorous and independent scrutiny demanded by the reasonable suspicion standard. [emphasis added; citation omitted; para. 47.] [131] i agree with my colleagues that the factors enumerated in golub in the context of a safety search — including the “nature of the apprehended risk, the potential consequences of not taking protective measures, the availability of alternative measures, and the likelihood of the contemplated danger actually existing” (golub, at p 758) — are a helpful guide to assessing when a risk will give rise to reasonable suspicion. ultimately, the task for the courts is, in each case, to apply the standard in light of the specific evidence before them, focusing on the reasons actually relied on by the officer. when the police lack a sufficient justification for a search, it is not the role of the crown or the judge to supply one after the fact the issue is whether the search was constitutional at the time it was carried out. (5) the scope of safety searches inside a home [132] alongside the reasonable suspicion standard, the permissible scope of a search serves as another limitation on the police’s ability to conduct a search incident to arrest inside a home this constrains searches in two ways: by the nature of the concerns animating the arrest, and by the need for temporal and spatial proximity between the search and the arrest. [133] just as the authority for a search incident to arrest derives from the arrest itself, a “search is only justifiable if the purpose of the search is related to the purpose of the arrest” (caslake, at para. 17; see also para. 13). an arrest that only gives rise to safety concerns cannot, without more, authorize a search for matters unrelated to safety — in an arrest for traffic violations, for instance, “once the police have ensured their own safety, there is nothing that could properly justify searching any further” (caslake, at para. 22). similarly, a warrantless arrest in a home that leads officers to reasonably suspect a need to neutralize threats, or to locate and assist victims, only allows them to conduct a search consistent with those particular concerns. there must be a purposive link to the nature of the arrest. [134] a search that falls within those parameters must also be spatially and temporally proximate to the arrest an arrest cannot lead the police too far afield. spatially, this court has said the items or places searched must fall within the “immediate surroundings” of the arrest (cloutier, at p 180). and although this court has resisted setting “strict limit[s] on the amount of time that can elapse between the time of search and the time of arrest”, police must, depending on the facts, conduct the search “within a reasonable period of time after the arrest” (caslake, at paras. 16 and 24). obviously, these limits are particularly important in a home. [135] i would not adopt, as my colleagues do, the american distinction between “areas inside and outside the arrested person’s physical control” (paras. 62-64). in our jurisprudence a search incident to arrest has always been framed as the authority to search the person arrested and their immediate surroundings in defining where the modified framework applies inside a home, i would distinguish between the arrestee’s person and their immediate surroundings this is because a search of an arrestee’s person (the ubiquitous “frisk” search) does not implicate their privacy interests in the home — they have the same personal privacy interests at home as in public areas beyond their person, however, engage broader territorial and informational interests which, in a home, are significant. the distinction based on a zone inside the arrested person’s control was not argued, its adoption is unnecessary, and it complicates the search incident to arrest framework. [136] in rare situations where safety concerns arise independently from the arrest, other doctrines may also apply. the common law police duty to protect life and safety, for instance, may justify police in carrying out a warrantless safety search in circumstances of “objectively verifiable necessity” (macdonald, at paras. 40-41). but those searches, too, cannot be “unbridled” (para. 41). they too must be conducted in a manner that reflects their purpose, namely to do what is “reasonably necessary” to allay the apprehended threat (para. 47 (emphasis in original)). [137] clearly, not all safety concerns are alike. as with determining whether the reasonable suspicion standard has been satisfied, the scope of a search will depend on a particularized assessment of the facts before the police but given that searches incident to arrest inside a home require an imminent safety risk, their scope will, in my view, often be limited. this is consistent with the power’s exceptional status under s 8. though “an invaluable tool in the hands of the police”, searches incident to arrest “inevitably intrude on an individual’s privacy interests” (saeed, at para. 1) they should intrude no more than necessary. in a home more than anywhere else, it ought to remain a “focussed power” (fearon, at para. 16). b application [138] applied to this case, i conclude that the search and the seizures fell outside the scope of the common law police powers and were therefore unconstitutional. [139] officer vandervelde, the officer who discovered the drugs, searched mr. stairs’ basement to identify hazards or other people — that is, for safety. there is thus no dispute that police had “one of the purposes for a valid search incident to arrest in mind when the search [was] conducted” (caslake, at para. 19) the question is whether the search — which turned up evidence that was unrelated to the reasons for the arrest or the nature of the search — was subjectively and objectively reasonable on the standard of reasonable suspicion. [140] the trial judge’s reasoning on this point was brief applying the unmodified common law search incident to arrest framework, she concluded that the search was both subjectively and objectively reasonable: the search had a valid objective. vandervelde testified that he searched to make sure no one else was there and that there were no other hazards. this is reasonable. both the male and the female had come from the living room area. neither brown nor vandervelde could see fully into the living room as they descended the stairs. the quick sweep as they descended the stairs did not fully address safety concerns. as set out above, there were parts of the living room they could not see. [para. 282] [141] the majority at the court of appeal reached the same conclusions: in the end, the police were able to articulate why they had safety concerns that articulation made sense they had descended into a basement where they had never been before, in a house they had never been in before. while the 9-1-1 caller said that there were two people in the car that he observed, that did not mean there were only two people in the home. nor did it mean that there were no other safety concerns hiding around corners. in particular, the police could not see behind the sofa from the doorway to the living room. it was not unreasonable to take a quick visual scan of the room in the circumstances. they had a person in handcuffs and needed to ascend the stairs, which were located right beside the living room, to safely get him out of the residence, all while the female remained on the first floor. the fact that the methamphetamine was sitting out in plain view meant that it could be seized. [paras. 67-68] [142] my colleagues find that it was “open to the trial judge to conclude that the police subjectively believed there was a safety risk”, since the officers testified they searched to ensure no other people or hazards were present (para. 85). and they explain that the search was objectively reasonable for two main reasons first, the dynamic before and during the arrest was “volatile and rapidly changing” (para. 87). the police entered the home fearing the assault was ongoing, encountered the victim with “fresh injuries to her face” (para. 88) and entered the basement with weapons drawn (para. 89) meanwhile, mr. stairs — who police knew had a history of violence — disobeyed police commands and “barricad[ed] himself in the laundry room” (para. 88). second, police arrested mr. stairs for domestic violence, an offence whose private nature can, perversely, turn the privacy in a home to the abuser’s advantage (para. 91). its prevalence, the safety risks it poses, and the factual uncertainties at the scene, mean police “must have the ability to assess and control the situation” (para. 93). police could not rely on the victim, who denied an assault had occurred and was reluctant to cooperate. taken together, “it was open to the trial judge to conclude that society’s interest in effective law enforcement should prevail over mr. stairs’ privacy interest in the basement living room” (para. 97). [143] i cannot agree with this analysis. [144] as i have explained, courts assessing the reasonableness of a police search must determine whether the officer’s own grounds for the search were reasonable. only those subjective grounds may be considered; courts “cannot rely on the fact that, objectively, a legitimate purpose for the search existed when that is not the purpose for which they searched” (caslake, at para. 27). [145] the subjective basis for the officers’ search must be found in the evidence of the officer conducting the search officer vandervelde testified as follows when asked what happened after mr. stairs’ arrest: . . . so once he was in handcuffs and i felt it was safe, i proceeded through the basement, make sure there’s no other obvious threats, any other people in that basement. never really know exactly what you’re looking for when you’re entering a house in a situation like this, so whether there’s firearms sitting out, like i said, other people that could be in the basement [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 212-13) [146] he later expanded on this answer: . . . so in terms of clearing the basement, as opposed to getting q. a search warrant what is the importance or significance of having to go through that clearing process? a. are on the scene. mostly just to ensure my safety and other officers’ safety that q. what sort of risks are presented if you don’t clear an area? other persons could be hiding in the basement; potential a. unsafely stored firearms or weapons, et cetera, you never really know what kind of hazards could be down there. [underlining added.] (ar, vol. ii, at p 229) [147] as i have explained, to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, the evidence must be “sufficiently particularized”; the search cannot rest on generalities, hunches, intuition or educated guesses (chehil, at paras. 30 and 47) but here the officer, at best, expressed a generalized concern about weapons or people that might be found “in a situation like this”. he admitted he “felt it was safe” and you “[n]ever really know exactly what you’re looking for” his evidence gave no basis to suggest he suspected that other assailants, victims, or weapons were present. as a rationale, “you never really know” could apply any time the police make an arrest in a home. it is not a constitutionally acceptable reason to search in a private home; subjectively, the reasonable suspicion standard was not met. [148] nor was this subjective justification objectively reasonable i note the following:  although the search of mr. stairs’ licence plate generated cautions for violence and family violence, there was no mention of weapons in the police dispatch, and nothing to suggest mr. stairs possessed any (pre-trial application reasons, at paras. 36, 76, 101 and 157).  officers brown and vandervelde visually scanned the basement when they entered. although they could not see the entire area, that scan satisfied them that they could turn their backs and focus on drawing mr. stairs out from the laundry room (paras. 58, 128 and 281).  officer brown found no weapons on mr. stairs (at para. 60) and had “no observations from the scene that anyone was in danger” (para. 50).  officer vandervelde only conducted the search “once [mr. stairs] was in handcuffs and [he] felt safe”, at a time when the victim was upstairs and in the company of officer martin (para. 89).  although the officers knew that mr. stairs’ father lived at the home, they never saw any signs of people aside from mr. stairs and the victim, and never asked either of them whether anyone else was present (paras. 55, 71, 81-84, 119 and 166-67). [149] there were, in sum, no particularized facts to justify a safety search, only generalized uncertainty about the presence of weapons or other people but with mr. stairs in handcuffs, the victim upstairs with officer martin, and no sign of weapons or other people, there was, quite simply, no apparent safety threat that is not objectively reasonable suspicion. [150] as the search was neither subjectively nor objectively reasonable, i conclude it was unlawful. [151] given that conclusion, there is no need to consider whether the seizures of the drugs were justified under the plain view doctrine. the question of whether and how the plain view doctrine applies inside a home has twice been raised, but not addressed, by this court (godoy, at para. 22; reeves, at para. 25). since the point was not argued before us, i would decline to do so here. [152] as a result, i conclude the search and the seizures of the evidence infringed mr. stairs’ s 8 rights. c. section 24(2) and disposition [153] the question becomes whether the evidence ought to be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter, in that its admission “would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” three lines of inquiry guide the analysis: (1) the seriousness of the charter-infringing state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the charter-protected interests of the accused; and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits (r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr 353 (grant (2009)), at para. 71). [154] as i would reach a different conclusion on the existence of a charter violation, no deference is owed to the trial judge’s alternative conclusions on this point (r v. le, 2019 scc 34, [2019] 2 scr 692, at para. 138). [155] first, the seriousness of the charter-infringing state conduct is assessed along a spectrum of culpability running from “inadvertent or minor violations” to “wilful or reckless disregard of charter rights” (grant (2009), at para. 74; see also le, at para. 143). in my view, the state conduct in this case falls on the higher end of that spectrum it was well known that private homes attract a high privacy interest and generally cannot be searched without a warrant to be sure, the officers cannot be faulted for not applying the legal framework adopted in this appeal, of which they had no notice. but that does not excuse their conduct, given the longstanding importance the law has accorded to privacy in this context in searching mr. stairs’ basement without reasonable justification, the searching officer disregarded his strong privacy interest and contrary to the trial judge’s finding (pre-trial application reasons, at para. 292), he cannot be taken to have acted in good faith, since he did not act “consistent[ly] with what [he] subjectively, reasonably, and non-negligently believe[d] to be the law” (le, at para. 147). in the circumstances, this inquiry favours exclusion. [156] second, since his privacy interests inside his home were significant, the unlawful search and seizures were a major incursion on mr. stairs’ charter-protected interests. this inquiry strongly favours exclusion. [157] lastly, the drugs were highly reliable evidence that was central to the crown’s case. the third inquiry pulls strongly in favour of inclusion. [158] when the first two inquiries together make a strong case for exclusion, “the third inquiry will seldom if ever tip the balance in favour of admissibility” (le, at para. 142). weighing all three, i conclude that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. i would find the evidence inadmissible. i would therefore allow the appeal, set aside mr. stairs’ conviction for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking, and enter an acquittal. the following are the reasons delivered by côté j — i. overview [159] there is agreement with my colleague karakatsanis j on the reasonable suspicion standard for searches incidental to arrest inside a home. i also agree with her application of this standard to the facts of this case. i, too, conclude that the search and seizure of the evidence infringed mr. stairs’ rights pursuant to s 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. [160] however, i must respectfully part ways with my colleague on the proper disposition of the appeal under s 24(2) of the charter. as i will explain, i would not exclude the unlawfully seized evidence. in the exceptional circumstances of this case, i would adopt the trial judge’s alternative conclusion that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. ii. section 24(2) analysis [161] i note at the outset that the trial judge found no breach, and thus her s 24(2) analysis was conducted in the alternative in this scenario, while the trial judge’s conclusion is not entitled to deference on appeal, her findings of fact related to s 24(2) are (r v. fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621, at para. 90; r v. pileggi, 2021 onca 4, 153 or (3d) 561, at para. 97; r v. kelsy, 2011 onca 605, 280 ccc (3d) 456, at para. 60, per rosenberg ja). in any event, and according due deference to the trial judge’s factual findings, i reach the same conclusion. i would decline to exclude the drug evidence seized as a result of the unlawful search. a. seriousness of the charter-infringing police conduct [162] although i have reservations about the officers’ conduct in this case, i conclude that the first factor set out in r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr 353, favours admission. [163] as my colleague karakatsanis j reaffirmed in r v. saeed, 2016 scc 24, [2016] 1 scr 518, at para. 126 (concurring in the result), “where the police act on a mistaken understanding of the law where the law is unsettled, their charter-infringing conduct is considered to be less serious” (citing r v. cole, 2012 scc 53, [2012] 3 scr 34, at paras. 86-87; r v. vu, 2013 scc 60, [2013] 3 scr 657, at paras. 69 and 71; see also r v. spencer, 2014 scc 43, [2014] 2 scr 212, at para. 77; fearon, at para. 93; s. c. hill, d. m. tanovich and l. p. strezos, mcwilliams’ canadian criminal evidence (5th ed. (loose-leaf)), at §19:40). [164] i therefore accept the crown’s submission that the seriousness of the infringement in this case is attenuated by the uncertainty of the law regarding residential searches incident to arrest at the relevant time. indeed, it appears this is the first time this court has considered the search incident to arrest power applied inside a home. disagreement among the members of this court and those of the court of appeal on the proper standard for and permissible scope of post-arrest residential safety searches illustrates the legal grey area in which police were operating if a dozen distinguished jurists cannot agree on the applicable law, how can we expect these officers to have understood and properly applied it on the fly? in my respectful view, as in vu, at para. 71, “[g]iven the uncertainty in the law at the time and the otherwise reasonable manner in which the search was carried out”, the seriousness of the police misconduct in this case was at the lowest end of the spectrum. [165] i would add that the trial judge in this case found as a fact that the police acted in “good faith” at all times during this “dynamic” arrest and search, believing their conduct was authorized by law (2018 onsc 3747, 412 crr (2d) 95 (“pre-trial application reasons”), at para. 292). as in vu, the cogent analysis of my colleagues on the applicable standard in this case “should serve to clarify the law” and “prevent this kind of confusion in the future” (para. 69). [166] that said, i acknowledge the difficulties with officer vandervelde’s evidence, as highlighted by the dissenting judge of the court of appeal (2020 onca 678, 153 or (3d) 32, at para. 100). but i do not see a sufficient evidentiary basis on which to interfere with the trial judge’s factual finding of good faith. i see nothing to suggest any systemic concerns regarding the police conduct in this case. further, i agree with the trial judge that there is “no evidence of a blatant or callous disregard of the charter rights by any of the three officers” (pre-trial application reasons, at para. 292). in my view, the unlawful search and seizure was the result of an honest one-off mistake, albeit one with serious implications for mr. stairs’ right to privacy. b. impact on mr. stairs’ charter right to privacy [167] i would accept the crown’s concession that the second grant factor favours exclusion. [168] as the trial judge recognized, an unlawful warrantless residential search violates privacy interests which lie at the very core of s 8. i agree with my colleague karakatsanis j that the sanctity of one’s home is an indispensable component of personal privacy (para. 121). [169] the police conduct in this case therefore had a serious impact on mr. stairs’ charter-protected privacy interests. c. society’s interest in adjudication on the merits [170] mr. stairs fairly concedes that the third grant factor “favours the admission of the evidence” (af, at para. 86). i would accept this concession. [171] i wish to underscore the fact that the police seized over 90 grams of crystal methamphetamine. this evidence is plainly reliable and, without it, the crown would have no case on mr. stairs’ charge for possession for the purpose of trafficking. the sentence for this charge represented 20 months of mr. stairs’ global 26-month sentence i agree with the crown that there is a significant public interest in an adjudication of the drug charge on its merits. d final balancing [172] balancing the three lines of inquiry above, i would decline to exclude the evidence under s 24(2). [173] going forward, with the benefit of this court’s guidance, it will be very difficult for police to justify admission in a similar scenario to the one at bar the modifications to the law my colleagues outline will require police to respect individual privacy rights within a home, by refraining from warrantless searches unless they reasonably suspect a search is necessary to address a safety risk. where no such risk exists which meets the requisite threshold, the arrestee’s s 8 privacy interests should generally prevail. in other words, police should secure the home and obtain a search warrant, which is not a particularly onerous task. [174] however, in the present case, i would not interfere with the trial judge’s finding that the police were acting in good faith on their understanding of unsettled law as i have explained, the justificatory standard for and permissible scope of a residential search incident to arrest were unclear at the relevant time. further, society has a strong interest in the adjudication of a charge involving a large quantity of a highly dangerous and pernicious street drug. [175] accordingly, i would adopt the trial judge’s alternative conclusion that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. iii disposition [176] for the foregoing reasons, i would decline to exclude the evidence seized in violation of mr. stairs’ s 8 rights. [177] in the result, i would dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction.
i. overview [1] this appeal arises from a criminal investigation conducted by the canadian forces national investigation service (“cfnis”) in the commonwealth of virginia in the united states the subject of the investigation, cpl. mcgregor, argues that the search and seizure of his electronic devices contravened s 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, and he seeks to exclude the evidence obtained from them. [2] in the court martial, cpl. mcgregor brought a motion to exclude the impugned evidence under s 24(2) of the charter. he was unsuccessful. the military judge convicted him on counts of voyeurism, possession of a device for surreptitious interception of private communications, sexual assault, and disgraceful conduct. that decision was affirmed by the court martial appeal court. [3] in this appeal, the court is invited to examine the extraterritorial application of the charter pursuant to s 32(1) of the charter. both parties rely on this court’s decision in r v hape, 2007 scc 26, [2007] 2 scr 292, which is the governing authority on the territorial reach and limits of the charter. cpl. mcgregor takes the position that the charter applied to the actions of the cfnis, whereas the crown argues that hape dictates the opposite outcome. for their part, the interveners have focused their submissions on whether the hape framework should be reaffirmed, modified, or overruled. [4] in the final analysis, i find it unnecessary to deal with the issue of extraterritoriality to dispose of this appeal. this is so because the cfnis did not violate the charter working within the constraints of its authority in virginia, the cfnis sought the cooperation of local authorities to obtain and execute a warrant under virginia law. the warrant which issued authorized the search, seizure, and analysis of cpl. mcgregor’s electronic devices expressly the evidence of sexual assault was discovered inadvertently by the investigators in the process of triaging the devices at the scene of the search; its incriminating nature was immediately apparent. although the warrant did not contemplate such evidence, the digital files in issue fell squarely within the purview of the plain view doctrine furthermore, the cfnis obtained canadian warrants before conducting an in-depth analysis of these devices it is difficult to see how the cfnis investigators could have acted differently to attain their legitimate investigative objectives. i conclude that they did not infringe cpl. mcgregor’s rights under s 8 of the charter. [5] this is not the right case for any reconsideration of the hape framework. in light of my conclusion that the actions of the cfnis conformed to the charter, reconsidering hape would make no difference to the outcome of this appeal. furthermore, the parties have not asked this court to reconsider hape, but rather, as noted above, have based their submissions on how it should apply to the facts of this case. therefore, i do not decide below whether the charter applies in this case; instead, i show that even if it were to apply, i would still dismiss the appeal. ii background [6] between august 2015 and march 2017, cpl. mcgregor was a non-commissioned member of the regular canadian armed forces posted to the canadian defence liaison staff at the canadian embassy in washington, d.c by virtue of his position in the united states, cpl. mcgregor held diplomatic agent status with immunity in respect of his person, property, and residence pursuant to the vienna convention on diplomatic relations, can. ts 1966 no. 29. [7] in 2017, another member of the canadian armed forces posted in washington, dc, discovered two audio recording devices in her residence she believed that cpl. mcgregor had placed them there, and she reported the discovery to her chain of command. upon investigating the matter, the cfnis concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe cpl. mcgregor had committed the offences of voyeurism and possession of a device for surreptitious interception of private communications. [8] the commanding officer could not issue a warrant under s 273.3 of the national defence act, rsc 1985, c. n-5, to authorize the search of cpl. mcgregor’s residence, as it was not located on the property of the canadian armed forces. mcpl. patridge, the lead cfnis investigator, sought the assistance of the alexandria police department for the purpose of obtaining a warrant under virginia law authorizing the search of cpl. mcgregor’s residence in alexandria. [9] the alexandria police department advised the cfnis that it could not apply for a warrant due to cpl. mcgregor’s diplomatic immunity under the vienna convention. this led to the issuance of a diplomatic note to the american department of state, in which the canadian embassy acknowledged that the “cfnis is cooperating with local authorities in virginia and would like to seek a search warrant to enter corporal mcgregor’s staff quarters in the company of local police to obtain evidence for the purposes of their investigation” (ar, vol. i, at p 128). in the note, the embassy waived cpl. mcgregor’s immunity with respect to his “private residence, as well as his papers, correspondence and property”, pursuant to article 30 of the vienna convention, but it expressly retained his “personal inviolability and immunity from arrest or detention” (p 128). [10] with the waiver of diplomatic immunity in hand, the alexandria police department obtained a warrant from a local magistrate under the law of virginia. the warrant authorized the search of cpl. mcgregor’s residence in alexandria as well as objects found therein — including electronic devices. the warrant further authorized the analysis of seized items. [11] on february 16, 2017, three cfnis members and the alexandria police department executed the search warrant. the alexandria police department breached the door, secured the premises, and invited the cfnis officers to conduct the search. the latter took control of the search. two forensic investigators, one from the cfnis and one from the alexandria police department, triaged most of the electronic devices found in the residence, scanning their contents to determine which items to seize. [12] in the triage process, the investigators discovered evidence relating to unforeseen offences — namely sexual assault and what they believed to be child pornography.1 cfnis’s forensic investigator, lieut. rioux, saw a video file depicting 1 the child pornography charges, however, were ultimately dropped. cpl. mcgregor filming himself while sexually touching a woman who appeared to be lying unconscious on a floor. [13] the investigators did not triage all of cpl. mcgregor’s devices in executing the search due to the time constraints set out in the warrant. the alexandria police department seized the devices containing incriminating evidence as well as those that were not triaged at the scene. the items seized at cpl. mcgregor’s residence included three fake smoke alarm cameras, two remote controls for these cameras, two personal audio recorders, an oval camera alarm clock, a small square camera alarm clock with a remote, laptops, storage devices, and compact discs. [14] the alexandria police department made a return before the virginia magistrate to account for the seized devices, although the cfnis had them in its custody at all times. following these events, the cfnis removed the devices to canada and obtained canadian warrants from the court martial for further analysis of their contents a cfnis investigator arrested cpl. mcgregor in washington, dc, and informed him of his right to counsel under s 10(b) of the charter. iii. judicial history [15] at first instance, the military judge held that the charter did not apply extraterritorially. he concluded that the search and seizure were in any event consistent with charter standards, and he noted that the evidence of sexual assault fell within the plain view doctrine. the military judge therefore admitted the evidence relating to the offence of sexual assault (2018 cm 4023). he subsequently convicted cpl. mcgregor of two counts of voyeurism, one count of possession of a device for surreptitious interception of private communications, one count of sexual assault, and one count of disgraceful conduct (2019 cm 4015). [16] in a unanimous opinion, the court martial appeal court affirmed the military judge’s decision. it agreed with his conclusion that the charter did not apply, and it held that the evidence did not affect trial fairness at common law. furthermore, the court martial appeal court concluded that even if the charter applied, the result would be the same because the search did not infringe cpl. mcgregor’s s 8 rights (2020 cmac 8, 8 cmar 481). iv. issues [17] this appeal raises two main issues: (i) did the charter apply extraterritorially to the cfnis investigators in the search of cpl. mcgregor’s residence in alexandria, virginia? (ii) did the cfnis investigators infringe cpl. mcgregor’s charter rights and, if so, should the resulting evidence be excluded? v analysis a extraterritorial application of the charter [18] the starting point of the analysis is the text of the constitution. the scope of application of the charter is delineated in s 32(1): 32 (1) this charter applies (a) to the parliament and government of canada in respect of all matters within the authority of parliament including all matters relating to the yukon territory and northwest territories; and (b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. this court’s decision in hape is the governing authority on the territorial reach and limits of the charter under s 32(1). under the hape framework, the charter generally cannot apply to canadian authorities involved in an investigation conducted abroad. this general rule is qualified by two exceptions: (1) consent by the foreign state to the application of canadian law (para. 106); and (2) canadian participation in a process that violates canada’s international law obligations (paras. 51-52 and 101; see also canada (justice) v. khadr, 2008 scc 28, [2008] 2 scr 125, at paras. 18-19). [19] unlike ordinary canadian citizens, members of the canadian armed forces bear the burden of the extraterritorial application of canadian criminal law (national defence act, ss. 67 and 1635). moreover, the agreement between the parties to the north atlantic treaty regarding the status of their forces, can t.s 1953 no. 13 — to which canada and the united states are signatories — governs the legal status under international law of military forces deployed for official purposes the agreement provides that the sending state can exercise criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over its military forces however, the agreement does not confer jurisdiction on the sending state to execute searches of residences located outside of military camps or establishments. [20] cpl. mcgregor contends that the charter applied extraterritorially to the search and seizure of his electronic devices by canadian military authorities he emphasizes that he was a member of the canadian armed forces required to be on foreign soil and that he was the target of a canadian-led investigation pursuant to the national defence act and the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 in cpl. mcgregor’s view, when the national defence act applies extraterritorially, so too should the charter as a matter of principle. to be clear, at the hearing before our court, cpl. mcgregor confirmed that he is asking the court to apply the charter only to the actions of the canadian authorities in executing the search. [21] as a preliminary matter, the parties agree that the issue of extraterritoriality should be resolved on the basis of the existing jurisprudence on s 32(1) of the charter. the interveners, however, invite our court to decide whether hape should be reaffirmed, modified, or overruled. many of their submissions draw on an extensive body of academic criticism in which the hape framework is challenged on various constitutional and international law grounds.2 [22] to be sure, this court has taken notice of scholarly writings in reconsidering the soundness of its own precedents (see canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, [2019] 4 scr 653, at paras. 39 and 209; nishi v. rascal trucking ltd., 2013 scc 33, [2013] 2 scr 438, at para. 28; canada v. craig, 2012 scc 43, [2012] 2 scr 489, at para. 29; ontario (attorney general) v. fraser, 2011 scc 20, [2011] 2 scr 3, at paras. 86-88, 146-48 and 235-46; r v. robinson, [1996] 1 scr 683, at para. 39; tolofson v. jensen, [1994] 3 scr 1022, at p 1042; r v. b (kg), [1993] 1 scr 740, at pp. 765-71; london drugs ltd. v. kuehne & nagel international ltd., [1992] 3 scr 299, at pp. 421-23; r v. bernard, [1988] 2 2 see, eg,. j. h. currie, “weaving a tangled web: hape and the obfuscation of canadian reception law” (2007), 45 can. yb. int’l l 55; k. roach, “r v. hape creates charter-free zones for canadian officials abroad” (2007), 53 crim. lq 1; a. attaran, “have charter, will travel? extraterritoriality in constitutional law and canadian exceptionalism” (2008), 87 can bar rev 515; o. delas and m. robichaud, “les difficultés liées à la prise en compte du droit international des droits de la personne en droit canadien: préoccupations légitimes ou alibis?” (2008), 21 rqdi 1; p-h. verdier, “international decisions: r v. hape” (2008), 102 am. j. int’l l 143; j. h. currie, “khadr’s twist on hape: tortured determinations of the extraterritorial reach of the canadian charter” (2008), 46 can. y.b int’l l 307; m. l. banda, “on the water’s edge? a comparative study of the influence of international law and the extraterritorial reach of domestic laws in the war on terror jurisprudence” (2010), 41 geo. j. int’l l 525; c. sethi, “does the charter follow the flag? revisiting constitutional extraterritoriality after r v hape” (2011), 20 dal j leg stud 102; c. i. keitner, “rights beyond borders” (2011), 36 yale j. int’l l 55, at pp. 86-87; m. milanovic, extraterritorial application of human rights treaties: law, principles, and policy (2011), at pp. 62-65; d. ireland-piper, “extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction: does the long arm of the law undermine the rule of law?” (2012), 13 melb. j. int’l l 122, at pp. 141-43; n. karazivan, “l’application de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés par les valeurs: l’article 32”, in e. mendes and s. beaulac, eds., canadian charter of rights and freedoms (5th ed. 2013), 241; c. mclachlan, foreign relations law (2014), at para. 8.55; p. m. saunders and r. j. currie, kindred’s international law: chiefly as interpreted and applied in canada (9th ed. 2019), at pp. 365-66; k. sun, “international comity and the construction of the charter’s limits: hape revisited” (2019), 45 queen’s lj 115, at pp. 144-47; k. w. gray, “that most canadian of virtues: comity in section 7 jurisprudence” (2020), 10:1 uwo. j. leg. stud. 1, at p 23; r. j. currie and j. rikhof, international & transnational criminal law (3rd ed. 2020), at pp. 623 and 632-39. scr 833, at pp. 865-68). this is not to say, of course, that the judiciary is bound to adopt the prevailing approach proffered in the scholarship or that academic criticism is a sufficient reason not to apply the principles of stare decisis (see fraser, at para. 86; r v tran, 2010 scc 58, [2010] 3 scr 350, at paras. 28-29; friesen v canada, [1995] 3 scr 103, at paras. 56 and 58; b (kg), at pp. 774-77). it is helpful to recall what i wrote with my colleagues brown and rowe jj in r v kirkpatrick, 2022 scc 33, at para. 248: criticism per se is not a reason to overrule one of our own judgments, but it may help a party make the case for overruling it on appropriate grounds.3 [23] i do not believe that this is an appropriate case in which to reconsider the extraterritorial application of the charter the parties do not contend that the hape framework should be revisited; they simply debate its application to the facts at hand. as a rule, which the court should depart from only in rare and exceptional circumstances, we should not overrule a precedent without having been asked to do so by a party. in this instance, only some interveners ask us to overturn hape; in doing so, they go beyond their proper role. doing what they are asking would mean deciding an issue that is not properly before us furthermore, as mentioned above, the extraterritorial application of the charter has no bearing on the disposition of the present appeal. indeed, the actions of the cfnis conformed to the charter, as the s 8 analysis below makes clear. simply put, i would dismiss the appeal even if i were to 3 though we were concurring in kirkpatrick, the majority did not consider itself to be departing from precedent (para. 97). it therefore did not refer to our discussion on stare decisis. accept cpl. mcgregor’s argument that the charter applies extraterritorially in the present context. [24] it is thus preferable to leave for another day any reconsideration of the hape framework. a restrained approach is amply supported by our jurisprudence. as sopinka j emphasized in phillips v nova scotia (commission of inquiry into the westray mine tragedy), [1995] 2 scr 97, “this court has said on numerous occasions that it should not decide issues of law that are not necessary to a resolution of an appeal. this is particularly true with respect to constitutional issues” (para. 6; see also r v. yusuf, 2021 scc 2, at paras. 3-5; canada (attorney general) v federation of law societies of canada, 2015 scc 7, [2015] 1 scr 401, at para. 86; law society of upper canada v. skapinker, [1984] 1 scr 357, at pp. 381-82; the queen in right of manitoba v. air canada, [1980] 2 scr 303, at p 320; attorney general (que.) v. cumming, [1978] 2 scr 605, at pp. 610-11; winner v. smt (eastern) ltd., [1951] scr 887, at p 901, per rinfret cj, rev’d in part [1954] ac 541 (pc);. john deere plow co v wharton, [1915] a.c 330 (pc), at p 339; citizens insurance co of canada v. parsons (1881), 7 app. cas. 96 (pc), at p 109; reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3, at paras. 301-2, per la forest j., dissenting). there are no “exceptional circumstances” (cumming, at p 611) that warrant departing from this general rule in the present appeal. therefore, i decline the interveners’ invitation to reconsider the proper approach to the extraterritorial application of the charter. i would add that, as my colleagues brown and rowe jj. noted in r v. sharma, 2022 scc 39, at para. 75, it is inappropriate for interveners to supplement the evidentiary record at the appellate level in the s 8 analysis which follows, i show that even if the charter were to apply to the actions of the cfnis, the appeal should still be dismissed. b. section 8 analysis [25] cpl. mcgregor argues that the search of his electronic devices violated his rights under s 8 of the charter, either because it was unauthorized by law or because it was conducted in an unreasonable manner. for the reasons outlined below, i reject both arguments and conclude that the conduct of the cfnis investigators was consistent with the requirements of the charter. (1) digital searches: general principles [26] section 8 of the charter guarantees “the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure”. a search is reasonable within the meaning of s 8 “if it is authorized by law, if the law itself is reasonable and if the manner in which the search was carried out is reasonable” (r v. collins, [1987] 1 scr 265, at p 278; see also r v. caslake, [1998] 1 scr 51, at para. 10; r v. nolet, 2010 scc 24, [2010] 1 scr 851, at para. 21; r v. vu, 2013 scc 60, [2013] 3 scr 657, at paras. 21-23; wakeling v. united states of america, 2014 scc 72, [2014] 3 scr 549, at para. 41; r v fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621, at para. 12; goodwin v british columbia (superintendent of motor vehicles), 2015 scc 46, [2015] 3 scr 250, at para. 48; r v. saeed, 2016 scc 24, [2016] 1 scr 518, at para. 36; r v. tim, 2022 scc 12, at para. 46). this court has established a presumption that “a search requires prior authorization, usually in the form of a warrant, from a neutral arbiter” (r v. m (mr), [1998] 3 scr 393, at para. 44, referring to hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at pp. 160-62; see also vu, at para. 22; r v. grant, [1993] 3 scr 223, at pp. 238-39). [27] in recent years, courts have grappled with the challenges posed by technological innovations in developing the law of search and seizure. this court’s jurisprudence on digital searches has consistently highlighted the “unique and heightened privacy interests in personal computer data” (r v. reeves, 2018 scc 56, [2018] 3 scr 531, at para. 35; see also fearon, at paras. 74, 132 and 197; r v. spencer, 2014 scc 43, [2014] 2 scr 212, at para. 50; vu, at paras. 40-41 and 47; r v. cole, 2012 scc 53, [2012] 3 scr 34, at para. 47; r v. morelli, 2010 scc 8, [2010] 1 scr 253, at paras. 105-6). [28] in vu, the court recognized that the “particular nature of computers” (para. 39) warrants specific constraints under s 8 of the charter on both the authorization and the reasonable performance of digital searches. in unanimous reasons written by cromwell j., the court established a presumptive “requirement of specific, prior authorization” applicable to digital searches, as summarized at para. 3: in practical terms, the requirement of specific, prior authorization means that if police intend to search computers found within a place with respect to which they seek a warrant, they must satisfy the authorizing justice that they have reasonable grounds to believe that any computers they discover will contain the things they are looking for. if, in the course of a warranted search, police come across a computer that may contain material for which they are authorized to search but the warrant does not give them specific, prior authorization to search computers, they may seize the device but must obtain further authorization before it is searched. this requirement, i add, extends to other electronic devices that have a “memory capacity akin to a computer” (para. 38) this broad category includes, for example, devices that store personal data, such as cellphones (fearon, at para. 52). [29] the fact that a search of an electronic device is expressly authorized by warrant does not mean that any file contained therein may be analyzed — even where no search protocol has been imposed. cromwell j stressed in vu that police officers are “bound, in their search, to adhere to the rule that the manner of the search must be reasonable” (para. 61). consequently, they cannot “scour the devices indiscriminately” (para. 61) but must limit their search to the types of files that are “reasonably necessary to achieve [the warrant’s] objectives” (para. 22) should “the officers realiz[e] that there was in fact no reason to search a particular program or file on the device, the law of search and seizure would require them not to do so” (para. 61; see also fearon, at paras. 57 and 78; reeves, at para. 35). (2) authorization of the search [30] in the circumstances of the present case, prior authorization to gain entry into cpl. mcgregor’s residence could be granted only by a local magistrate under the law of the commonwealth of virginia neither the criminal code nor the national defence act provides for the issuance of warrants authorizing the search of private residences located abroad. [31] given the limited reach of canadian law, the cfnis communicated with local authorities and availed itself of the only legal mechanism open to it. the cfnis first obtained the following diplomatic note from the canadian embassy: . . the embassy has to [sic] honour to waive the inviolability of corporal mcgregor’s private residence, as well as his papers, correspondence and property under article 30 of the vienna convention on diplomatic relations, for the exclusive purpose of executing a search warrant obtained for the purposes of the cfnis investigation. similarly, the embassy has the honour to waive corporal mcgregor’s immunity from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the united states of america to the limited extent necessary to allow the court of jurisdiction to issue the warrant required for this exclusive purpose. the embassy expressly retains any other applicable immunities, including his personal inviolability and his immunity from arrest or detention. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. i, at p 128) at the request of the cfnis, the alexandria police department then obtained a search warrant issued by a virginia magistrate i note that the virginia warrant meets the requirement of “specific, prior authorization” for digital searches established in vu. it expressly authorized not only the search of cpl. mcgregor’s residence but also the search and analysis of the electronic devices found therein: you are hereby commanded in the name of the commonwealth to forthwith search the following place, person or thing either in day or night . for the following property, objects and/or persons: camera, video recorder, other electronic audio/photo/video recording devices, computer, cell phone, other internet access devices, internet services devices, external electronic storage devices, and analysis of the seized items. photographing of the premise and/or seized items. [emphasis added.] (rr, at p 2) [32] nevertheless, cpl. mcgregor asserts that the cfnis’s participation in the search was not authorized by law. his first argument in this regard is that the search did not comply with s 8 of the charter because vu requires a separate warrant to authorize the search of electronic devices, that is, a warrant apart from the one authorizing the search of the residence itself. however, the court martial appeal court was correct to hold that the substance of vu is directed not at the form the search warrant takes but rather at the requirement of having independent grounds to search the electronic devices (vu, at para. 48). there were such grounds in this case, as the devices could reasonably be expected to contain evidence of the voyeurism offence. [33] cpl. mcgregor’s main argument regarding authorization is that the search fell outside the scope of the waiver of diplomatic immunity granted by canada under the vienna convention this is so, in his view, because the waiver of diplomatic immunity did not contemplate the search and seizure of his electronic devices, as it referred only to his residence in alexandria, virginia. [34] i would not give effect to this argument. accepting that the authority to conduct the search of the devices depended on the vienna convention, i find that on any reasonable interpretation of the canadian embassy’s diplomatic note, the waiver encompassed the search of both cpl. mcgregor’s private residence and his electronic devices the express reference to “corporal mcgregor’s . . property” in the diplomatic note plainly contradicts his submission that “[t]he waiver was limited to [his] residence . . . it did not target the contents of electronic devices” (af, at para. 187). cpl. mcgregor’s argument that the search of his devices was unauthorized by law thus fails. (3) reasonableness of the search [35] cpl. mcgregor further contends that the search was unreasonable pursuant to charter standards in that it was more intrusive than necessary. he argues that the investigators unjustifiably expanded the search of the electronic devices to offences of sexual assault and (what they believed to be) child pornography, whereas the warrant contemplated only the offences of breaking and entering, mischief, interception, harassment, and voyeurism in his view, once the investigators discovered this unanticipated evidence, the charter required them to stop the search, seize the electronic devices, and obtain a subsequent warrant permitting the analysis of the files in question. [36] i cannot accept this argument. it is uncontroversial that the virginia warrant did not encompass the investigation of sexual assault offences. but the discovery of unforeseen evidence does not invalidate the authorization to conduct a search for the purposes outlined in the original warrant. this principle is an old one, and it renders cpl. mcgregor’s argument meritless, at least as regards the evidence sought (see, for instance, canadian pacific wine co. v. tuley, [1921] 2 ac 417 (pc), at pp. 424-25). here, the investigators discovered the impugned evidence when they were in the process of triaging cpl. mcgregor’s electronic devices at the scene of the search, as was expressly authorized by warrant the investigators set aside the incriminating devices for seizure and further analysis. indeed, the cfnis obtained canadian warrants before further analyzing their contents in my view, this investigative process was consistent with s 8 of the charter. [37] nor does the admission of the unanticipated evidence found in the triage process infringe cpl. mcgregor’s s 8 rights. key to my reasoning is the application of the plain view doctrine to the files disclosing evidence of sexual assault. this common law doctrine defeats the presumption that seizures must be judicially authorized. our court’s jurisprudence teaches that two requirements must be satisfied for the plain view doctrine to apply: (1) the police officers must have a legitimate “prior justification for the intrusion into the place where the ‘plain view’ seizure occurred” (r v buhay, 2003 scc 30, [2003] 1 scr 631, at para. 37); and (2) the incriminating evidence must be in plain view in that it is “immediately obvious” and “discovered inadvertently” by the police (r v. law, 2002 scc 10, [2002] 1 scr 227, at para. 27; see also buhay, at para. 37) concerns have been expressed about the plain view doctrine in relation to electronic seizures (eg,. l. jørgensen, “in plain view?: r v jones and the challenge of protecting privacy rights in an era of computer search” (2013), 46 ubc. l. rev. 791). in light of the way this case was argued, i feel it is unnecessary to express a settled opinion on the limits of the doctrine. however, i am satisfied that it does apply in some form to electronic devices (r v. jones, 2011 onca 632, 107 or (3d) 241). in the case at bar, there can be no doubt that the doctrine applies. [38] a warrant usually provides a legitimate prior justification for the intrusion, thereby satisfying the first requirement of the plain view doctrine. this is not the case, however, where police officers carry out a search unreasonably. in the context of digital searches, the prior justification extends only to the types of files that are “reasonably necessary” for the proper execution of such a search (vu, at para. 22). in other words, there must be a reasonable nexus between the files examined and the purposes of the warrant for a search to satisfy the first requirement of the plain view doctrine. [39] even where police officers are initially justified in examining a digital file, the unanticipated evidence contained therein is not necessarily in plain view this court’s reasoning in law offers a useful illustration of the second requirement of the plain view doctrine. in that case, a police officer conducted a cursory examination of the documents in question and found “nothing facially wrong with [them]” (para. 27). the officer failed to “detec[t] anything incriminating through the unaided use of his senses”, as the incriminating nature of the evidence “came to light only after he examined, translated and photocopied several documents” (para. 27; see also buhay, at para. 37; r v. gill, 2019 bcca 260, at para. 59 (canlii)). consequently, this court rejected the argument that the documents were in plain view, since they “were neither discovered inadvertently nor immediately evident” (law, at para. 10). [40] applying the foregoing principles, i conclude that both requirements of the plain view doctrine are satisfied in the present case. the application of the plain view doctrine to digital searches may undoubtedly give rise to intricate issues, but this is a straightforward case the military judge correctly determined that the plain view doctrine applies to the evidence of sexual assault stored in cpl. mcgregor’s devices. [41] first, the investigators had a legitimate justification for their inspection of the files containing evidence of sexual assault at the scene of the search. as mentioned above, the virginia warrant meets the vu requirement of specific, prior authorization applicable to digital searches. moreover, the military judge found that “[t]he discovery of files relating to a potential sexual assault . . . occurred while looking for the types of files specifically sought and authorized” (voir dire decision, at para. 25 (canlii)). the investigators “demonstrat[ed] care to limit the impact of the search through screening and conduct of a targeted search that involved a minimum of personal information” (para. 27). in these circumstances, the initial search leading to the discovery of the files in issue satisfies the requirement of prior justification. [42] second, the digital files disclosing evidence of sexual assault were in plain view, given their inadvertent discovery and immediately apparent unlawfulness. the investigators came upon these files in the triage process, which was designed to quickly identify evidence of interception and voyeurism the military judge rejected “the submissions to the effect that the investigators continued to look into files they had no authority to look at under the terms of the warrant” (para. 25). he further noted that “any device that was assessed to contain potential child pornography and sexual assault files [was] set aside for seizure and further analysis back in canada” (para. 25). moreover, there was no need to closely examine the files to ascertain their incriminating nature — in contrast to the documents in law, which were not facially unlawful. i thus conclude that the impugned evidence was in plain view and that its seizure during the triage process did not violate s 8, either as part of a search carried out unreasonably or as an unreasonable seizure. [43] with respect for the contrary view of my colleagues karakatsanis and martin jj., i believe that the application of the plain view doctrine is necessary in this case i do not see on what basis the police could justify seizing either the devices containing, or the actual data constituting, the sexual assault evidence without resort to this doctrine. i agree that the devices were searched pursuant to the virginia warrant, but that warrant did not authorize the seizure of evidence of sexual assault. after all, it had been issued to search for and seize evidence of voyeurism. a warrant in and of itself is not authority to search for or seize anything which might afford evidence of any offence whatsoever; the plain view doctrine and/or s 489 of the criminal code could authorize such seizures, but only if their requirements are met. therefore, to be clear, i disagree with my colleagues karakatsanis and martin jj., and i see no need to discuss further their reasons on this issue. [44] in sum, the cfnis demonstrably observed the requirements of the charter. the investigators discovered the incriminating evidence in the execution of a digital search expressly authorized by a valid warrant. the evidence of sexual assault, although not contemplated in the original warrant, fell squarely within the purview of the plain view doctrine the cfnis seized the evidence in accordance with that doctrine and subsequently obtained canadian warrants before conducting an in-depth analysis of the files in issue. even on cpl. mcgregor’s view of the law, it is difficult to see how the cfnis could have more fully complied with the charter. in light of my conclusion that the investigative process was consistent with s 8 of the charter, it is unnecessary to address cpl. mcgregor’s argument that the evidence should be excluded under s 24(2). vi conclusion [45] for these reasons, i would dismiss the appeal and affirm cpl. mcgregor’s convictions. the following are the reasons delivered by karakatsanis and martin jj. — i. overview [46] in this case a member of the canadian armed forces facing trial in a canadian court seeks to invoke the protections of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms against actions taken by canadian officials abroad. corporal mcgregor asks to exclude the contents of certain electronic devices seized from his home by canadian and american officials in the state of virginia he argues that s 8 of the charter applies and his charter rights were breached because under canadian law a further warrant was required to search his devices. [47] while we agree that the appeal should be dismissed, we also comment on the central question directly at issue in this appeal: does the charter apply, pursuant to s 32, to canadian authorities’ investigative actions abroad in these circumstances? this was clearly the primary and threshold issue argued by the parties and multiple interveners, it was the reason leave to appeal was sought, and we received full submissions on both constitutional and international law the extraterritorial application of the charter is squarely before the court and it is an issue that arises infrequently, may easily escape judicial review, and has been subject to significant and sustained criticism by experts in international law. [48] while the extraterritoriality of the charter may arise in many different types of situations, we comment only on the particular question before us: that is, whether the charter applies for those people subject to canadian criminal law for acts committed abroad — whether by virtue of military service or otherwise — and for canadian officials whose investigations of offences transcend canada’s borders. [49] we begin by interpreting s 32(1) of the charter and conclude that the required purposive reading supports the conclusion that the charter applies extraterritorially to the conduct of canadian forces national investigation service (“cfnis”) officials while fulfilling their investigative duties in a foreign state and that a canadian court may assess that conduct for charter-compliance. this was also the reading of s 32 endorsed by the majority in r v. hape, 2007 scc 26, [2007] 2 scr. 292 however, they were further of the view that international law principles of jurisdiction required a more restrictive reading of s 32 we say that this restrictive reading is ripe for reconsideration as hape departed from and overruled previous authority without full argument on international law principles. further, according to scholars in the field, hape misapplied certain key principles of international law in reaching the conclusions it did. while we agree as a matter of error correction that the result is the same whether or not the charter applies, the application of the charter to canadian officials investigating canadians abroad is a pressing issue squarely raised in this appeal while there are significant questions about the correctness of hape’s conclusion that the charter does not apply to such investigative action, given the majority’s conclusion, we leave the determination of whether hape was wrongly decided to another day. ii. interpretation of section 32(1) of the charter [50] it is well established that the interpretation of the charter should be purposive, generous, and aimed at securing for individuals the full benefit of the charter’s protections (r v big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at p 344; hunter v southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at p 156) under this approach, the charter’s text and purpose support extraterritorial application and the conclusion that the charter applies to canadian authorities conducting investigations abroad. [51] nothing in the text of s 32 imposes or even suggests any territorial limitation. it expressly limits to whom the charter applies: the federal and provincial governments and legislatures. section 32(1) also expressly limits to what the charter applies: “. . . all matters within the authority . . .” of parliament and the legislatures. importantly, s 32(1) imposes no express limitation on where the charter applies (hape, at para. 161, per bastarache j). [52] nor can it be said that s 32(1)’s limitation of the charter’s scope to “all matters within the authority” of parliament and the legislatures implicitly imposes a territorial limit on the charter’s reach according to wilson j (with whom dickson cj agreed on this point) in operation dismantle inc. v. the queen, [1985] 1 scr 441, this phrase in s 32(1)(a), “like the corresponding words ‘within the authority of the legislature of each province’ . . ., [was] merely a reference to the division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the constitution act, 1867” (pp. 455 and 463-64). it simply describes “the subject-matters in relation to which the parliament of canada may legislate or the government of canada may take executive action” (p 464). in the context of s 32(1), therefore, those words do not imply or impose any territorial limitation to or on the charter to read them in that manner would not only be inconsistent with precedent (see c sethi, “does the charter follow the flag? revisiting constitutional extraterritoriality after r v hape” (2011), 20 dal j leg. stud. 102, at p 113; r. j. currie and j. rikhof, international & transnational criminal law (3rd ed. 2020), at pp. 633-34), but would also fail to acknowledge that canada has the constitutional authority to make laws with extraterritorial application (statute of westminster, 1931 (uk), 22 geo. 5, c 4, s 3; reference re offshore mineral rights of british columbia, [1967] scr 792, at p 816; hape, at paras. 66 and 68; see also interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21, s 8(3)). [53] if s 32(1) were meant to distinguish between acts of state actors on canadian soil or abroad, such a distinction could have easily been drawn expressly, as was done elsewhere in provisions like ss. 3, 6 and 23 of the charter, which draw distinctions based on citizenship (a attaran, “have charter, will travel? extraterritoriality in constitutional law and canadian exceptionalism” (2008), 87 can. bar rev. 515, at p 523; see also l. west, “canada stands alone: a comparative analysis of the extraterritorial reach of state human rights obligations” (ubc. l. rev., forthcoming), at pp. 8-10). taking into account what is not in s 32(1)’s text, but is elsewhere in the charter, confirms that no territorial limitation was intended. section 32(1)’s silence as to the charter’s territorial boundaries when other sections are based on citizenship or are specifically confined to canada was not an omission or the result of happenstance. it was instead a deliberate choice to not limit the charter’s territorial reach which must be respected. [54] the purpose of s 32 was to constrain state action within the newly established constitutional democracy. as this court has acknowledged, the words of s 32(1) “give a strong message that the charter is confined to government action. . [t]he charter is essentially an instrument for checking the powers of government over the individual” (mckinney v. university of guelph, [1990] 3 scr 229, at p 261). to permit state action abroad that is not constrained by the constitution would be inconsistent with our constitutional structure, which is premised on preventing arbitrary state conduct (reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at para. 70). the sole claim of government, including the executive, to exercise lawful authority “rests in the powers allocated to them under the constitution, and can come from no other source” (para 72) accordingly, there can be no lawful state action without corresponding constitutional limitations — no matter where the conduct takes place. as one commentator put it, “[t]he executive cannot act outside the constitution and still act within the rule of law. when it is invited to play on the international scene, it must come as it is: as a constitutional government — not an arbitrary one. it has no license to act arbitrarily away from home” (m. webb, “the constitutional question of our time: extraterritorial application of the charter and the afghan detainees case” (2011), 28 njcl 235, at p 256). [55] thus, a purposive interpretation of s 32(1) leads to the conclusion that the provision draws no distinction between domestic and extraterritorial application. rather, it sends a strong message that the charter is an instrument for checking the powers of the government over the individual and preventing state action that is inconsistent with the rights and freedoms it enshrines (mckinney, at p 261; see also hape, at para. 91). as a result, based on such an interpretation of s 32(1), the charter would apply to constrain canadian authorities conducting investigations, whether that conduct takes place inside or outside canada. iii the hape decision [56] in hape, lebel j., for the majority, also began with the text of s 32(1) of the charter and likewise concluded that it contained no express territorial limit (paras. 32 and 94). however, in that case, the majority of the court held the charter did not apply to the royal canadian mounted police’s search and seizure of banking documents in turks and caicos islands (paras. 2-14). the majority overturned r v. cook, [1998] 2 scr 597, and set out a new two-stage framework for determining whether a remedy is available for extraterritorial canadian state conduct alleged to have violated the charter at the first stage, the court must determine if the activity in question falls under s 32(1) by asking: (1) whether the conduct at issue is that of a canadian state actor; and (2) if so, whether, on the facts, there is an exception to the principle of sovereignty that would justify applying the charter to the state actor’s extraterritorial activities. if there is no exception and the charter does not apply, then at the second stage the court must ask if the evidence should be excluded from the trial because its admission would render the trial unfair (para. 113). [57] lebel j chose to look to prohibitive rules of customary international law to aid in the interpretation of s 32 of the charter (paras 35-39) customary international law is composed of norms that meet the two requirements of state practice and opinio juris: states must actually follow the norm and must view it as legally binding (para. 46). the majority in hape looked to the principle of sovereign equality, which rests upon respect for territorial sovereignty and is “inseparable” from the principle of non-intervention, and which provides that all states are sovereign and equal (paras. 40 and 45-46). the majority relied on the doctrine of adoption to conclude that the principles of non-intervention and territorial sovereignty should be relied on to interpret the charter’s scope they also applied the presumption of conformity, a principle of statutory interpretation that legislation will be presumed to conform with international law, unless its wording compels otherwise (paras. 39, 46 and 53). they held that in interpreting the charter’s scope, the court should seek to ensure compliance with canada’s binding obligations under international law where the charter’s express words are capable of supporting that construction. [58] the majority found that the comity of nations — defined as “the deference and respect due by other states to the actions of a state legitimately taken within its territory” — was another interpretive principle that aids in interpreting the charter’s extraterritorial reach (paras. 32-33, 47, 50 and 53-56, quoting morguard investments ltd. v. de savoye, [1990] 3 scr 1077, at p 1095). lebel j observed that comity encourages states to cooperate with each other to investigate transnational crime and, where one state assists another, to respect how assistance is given within a state’s territory. however, he made clear that comity “does not offer a rationale for condoning another state’s breach of international law” and that comity’s deference “ends where clear violations of international law and fundamental human rights begin” (paras. 51- 52). [59] having set out these additional interpretive principles, the majority reviewed and applied jurisdictional principles of international law. lebel j observed there are three forms of jurisdiction: prescriptive, enforcement, and adjudicative. prescriptive jurisdiction “is the power to make rules, issue commands or grant authorizations that are binding upon persons and entities” (para. 58) enforcement jurisdiction “is the power to use coercive means to ensure that rules are followed, commands are executed or entitlements are upheld” (ibid.) finally, adjudicative jurisdiction “is the power of a state’s courts to resolve disputes or interpret the law through decisions that carry binding force” (ibid). he also summarized several bases upon which a state may exercise its jurisdiction, including the territoriality, nationality, and universality principles (paras. 59-61). [60] the majority proceeded to discuss principles pertaining to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the canadian context. they stated that “it is a well-established principle that a state cannot act to enforce its laws within the territory of another state absent either the consent of the other state or, in exceptional cases, some other basis under international law” (para. 65). observing that, pursuant to the statute of westminster, 1931, canada has the authority to make laws having extraterritorial operation (para. 66), they noted that parliament’s ability to pass extraterritorial legislation is also informed by the above-mentioned interpretive principles. they concluded that while parliament can enact legislation inconsistent with these interpretive principles, any canadian law can only be enforced abroad with the consent of other states (paras. 67- 68). [61] with these principles in mind, the majority turned to a review of this court’s prior jurisprudence and explained why cook, the court’s previous decision allowing extraterritorial application of the charter to the actions of canadian police abroad, ought to be revisited in cook, the court had determined that the charter applied to the taking of the accused’s statement by canadian police in the united states in connection with an investigation of an offence to be prosecuted in canada. [62] the majority raised three criticisms of cook first, they noted that the decision failed to distinguish prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction (paras. 84-85). as they viewed the extraterritorial application of the charter as an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction, and since extraterritorial enforcement of canadian laws is not possible (without consent), they concluded that extraterritorial application of the charter is impossible (para. 85). [63] second, they noted practical and theoretical difficulties arose when the cook approach was applied to different facts, such as those in hape, where a warrant for the impugned search was not necessary under turks and caicos law (paras. 86-92). the majority concluded that, both theoretically and practically, the charter cannot apply to searches and seizures conducted abroad (paras. 86-92). [64] third, they found that cook failed to give proper consideration to the wording of s 32(1) (paras 93-95) interpreting s 32(1) in light of the interpretive principles discussed above, they concluded that extraterritorial enforcement actions were outside the scope of the charter section 32(1) states the charter applies to “matters within the authority of” parliament or the provincial legislatures having found that parliament and the provincial legislatures do not have jurisdiction to authorize enforcement abroad, the majority concluded that activities such as criminal investigations abroad are not “matters within the authority of” parliament or the provincial legislatures and are thus not captured by s 32(1) (para. 94). [65] despite finding that the charter generally could not be applied to the actions of canadian officials conducted as part of an investigation occurring abroad, hape identified three exceptions pursuant to which charter protections might apply. first, the charter could apply extraterritorially where the foreign state consented to the charter’s application (para 106) second, the principle of comity “may give way” where the participation of canadian officers in the investigative activities would violate canada’s international human rights obligations (para. 101). third, ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter could operate to exclude evidence obtained by canadian officials abroad, if admitting the evidence would result in an unfair trial (paras. 107-12). iv criticisms of hape [66] the decision in hape and its approach has been the subject of significant and sustained criticism by experts in international law.4 three main flaws in hape have 4 see k. roach, “r v. hape creates charter-free zones for canadian officials abroad” (2007), 53 crim. lq 1, at p 1; j. h. currie, “weaving a tangled web: hape and the obfuscation of canadian reception law” (2007), 45 can. yb. int’l l 55; g van ert, “canadian cases in public international law in 2006-7” (2007), 45 can. yb. int’l l 527, at pp. 544-55; j. h. currie, “khadr’s twist on hape: tortured determinations of the extraterritorial reach of the canadian charter” (2008), 46 can. yb. int’l l 307; a attaran, “have charter, will travel? extraterritoriality in constitutional law and canadian exceptionalism” (2008), 87 can. bar rev. 515; p-h. verdier, “international decisions: r v. been identified: (1) hape applied improper interpretive principles, including jurisdictional principles of international law and a principle of statutory interpretation, to its interpretation of s 32(1); (2) hape mischaracterized the extraterritorial application of the charter as an unlawful exercise of enforcement jurisdiction; and (3) hape’s three exceptions are inadequate. lebel j.’s reliance on and misapplication of these international law principles has generated the level and type of cogent criticism and doctrinal instability which calls for a reconsideration of this aspect of the hape decision. we look at each of these three main criticisms in turn. [67] first, a fundamental underpinning of hape was that s 32(1) ought to be interpreted in a way that ensures compliance with rules of international law that are binding on canada, which in this case led to a more restrictive reading of s 32 (para. 56) methodologically, imposing international law principles as an overlay to limit the scope of the charter undermines the purposive approach to charter interpretation (west, “canada stands alone”, at pp 9-10; cook, at para. 147, per bastarache j). rather, international law should generally be used to support or confirm hape” (2008), 102 am. j. int’l l 143; j. h. currie, “international human rights law in the supreme court’s charter jurisprudence: commitment, retrenchment and retreat — in no particular order” (2010), 50 sclr (2d) 423; m. l. banda, “on the water’s edge? a comparative study of the influence of international law and the extraterritorial reach of domestic laws in the war on terror jurisprudence” (2010), 41 geo. j. int’l l 525; c. sethi, “does the charter follow the flag? revisiting constitutional extraterritoriality after r v hape” (2011), 20 dal j leg stud 102; m. webb, “the constitutional question of our time: extraterritorial application of the charter and the afghan detainees case” (2011), 28 njcl 235; d. ireland-piper, “extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction: does the long arm of the law undermine the rule of law?” (2012), 13 melb. j. int’l l 122; c. mclachlan, foreign relations law (2014), at paras. 836-838 and 852-894;. r. j currie and j rikhof, international & transnational criminal law (3rd ed. 2020), at pp. 631-39; l. west, “‘within or outside canada’: the charter’s application to the extraterritorial activities of the canadian security intelligence service” (2023), 73 utlj 1; l. west, “canada stands alone: a comparative analysis of the extraterritorial reach of state human rights obligations” (ubc. l. rev., forthcoming). an interpretation arrived at through the purposive approach (r v bissonnette, 2022 scc 23, at para. 98; h s. fairley, “international law comes of age: hape v. the queen” (2008), 87 can. bar rev. 229, at p 236). moreover, jurisdictional principles of international law are not an appropriate basis for limiting the meaning of “authority” in s 32(1) as a matter of domestic constitutional law. parliament’s authority is plenary within the classes of subjects enumerated in s 91 of the constitution act, 1867 and extends to extraterritorial enforcement action, including actions that violate international law itself (statute of westminster, 1931, s 3; croft v dunphy, [1933] a.c 156 (pc), at p 163; society of composers, authors and music publishers of canada v. canadian assn. of internet providers, 2004 scc 45, [2004] 2 scr 427, at para. 141, per lebel j.; j. h. currie, “khadr’s twist on hape: tortured determinations of the extraterritorial reach of the canadian charter” (2008), 46 can. yb. int’l l 307, at pp. 318-19; hape, at paras. 39, 53 and 68; g van ert, “canadian cases in public international law in 2006-7” (2007), 45 can y.b int’l l 527, at p 551; west, “canada stands alone”, at pp 13-14) as well, concerns over international comity and the policy goal of increasing international cooperation between police forces should not be permitted to overtake a proper purposive interpretation or used to insulate state conduct from judicial review (currie and rikhof, at pp. 628-29). [68] additionally, hape applied the presumption of conformity — a principle of statutory interpretation (para. 53) — to its interpretation of s 32(1) (currie (2008), at p 315; sethi, at p 113; j. h. currie, “international human rights law in the supreme court’s charter jurisprudence: commitment, retrenchment and retreat — in no particular order” (2010), 50 sclr (2d) 423, at pp. 441-43 and 453-54). the presumptions used in charter interpretation are different from those used in statutory interpretation (hunter, at p 155). rather than presuming conformity, in the charter context we presume that the charter “provide[s] protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which canada has ratified”, creating a floor — but not a ceiling — for charter protections based on binding international human rights instruments (reference re public service employee relations act (alta.), [1987] 1 scr 313, at p 349, per dickson cj;. slaight communications inc. v. davidson, [1989] 1 scr 1038, at p 1056, quoted in hape, at para. 55; l. west, “‘within or outside canada’: the charter’s application to the extraterritorial activities of the canadian security intelligence service” (2023), 73 utlj 1, at p 39; currie (2008), at p 321). hape’s application of international law principles and statutory interpretation principles to its interpretation of s 32(1), contrary to the established purposive approach, suggests the need for reconsideration. [69] second, according to international law scholars, this portion of hape mischaracterizes the extraterritorial application of the charter as an unlawful exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. we agree with hape that canadian officials conducting an investigation abroad are exercising extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction (hape, at paras. 58, 64-65 and 105; currie and rikhof, at p 98). but, academics contend that when jurisdictional principles are properly applied, it becomes clear that requiring canadian officials to comply with the charter when abroad and allowing canadian courts to assess their conduct for such compliance are exercises of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction respectively, neither of which violate international law nor interfere with the sovereign authority of another state (van ert, at p 552; j. crawford, brownlie’s principles of public international law (9th ed. 2019), at p 462; see also currie (2008), at p 317) these criticisms leave hape’s analysis ripe for reconsideration. [70] furthermore, hape equated the application of the charter with a requirement that canadian procedure govern the investigation (paras. 84, 86 and 98), which muddied the analysis. applying the charter to the conduct of canadian officials acting abroad is not the same thing as requiring canadian laws of criminal procedure to govern the foreign investigation (currie and rikhof, at p 634). the charter does not govern the activities of foreign officials and canadian officials engaging in enforcement activities in another state are required to comply with that state’s laws (r. v terry, [1996] 2 scr 207, at para 19; r v harrer, [1995] 3 scr 562, at para. 15) state sovereignty is respected by gaining consent to participate in the investigation and by requiring that canadian officers conducting duties abroad comply with the laws of the foreign state. requiring canadian authorities to also abide by the charter does not preclude the need to respect foreign law prerequisites. [71] in addition, scholarship and foreign case law suggest comity concerns are minimal states routinely apply their domestic law to the actions of their officials abroad, without seeking the consent of the territorial state (m. milanovic, extraterritorial application of human rights treaties: law, principles, and policy (2011), at p 65; see, eg,. united states v. verdugo-urquidez, 494 us 259 (1990), at p 283, fn. 7, per brennan j., dissenting; c. mclachlan, foreign relations law (2014), at paras. 5154-5156;. smith v. ministry of defence, [2013] uksc 41, [2014] ac 52, at paras. 46-49; kaunda v. president of the republic of south africa, [2004] zacc 5, 2005 (4) s.a 235, at paras 42-44 and 228-29; young v attorney-general, [2018] nzca 307, [2018] 3 nzlr 827, at paras. 28-30; smith v. r., [2020] nzca 499, [2021] 3 nzlr 324, at para. 92; afghan nationals v minister for immigration, [2021] nzhc 3154, [2022] 2 nzlr 102, at para. 39; federal intelligence service — foreign surveillance, bverfg, 1 bvr 2835/17, decision of may 19, 2020 (germany), at paras. 91, 93-94, 101 and 104). this reality of state practice suggests that no norm of customary international law prohibits a state from regulating the actions of its officials abroad through its domestic law. and it indicates that comity is in no way offended by applying domestic law to state officials’ actions abroad because states do not view this as any breach of rules of courtesy or any violation of international law. [72] moreover, canada’s international human rights obligations support applying the charter extraterritorially the international covenant on civil and political rights, can. ts 1976 no. 47, which is ratified by and therefore binding on canada, “covers much of the same ground” and is “relevant to the interpretation of the charter” (p. w hogg and w. k. wright, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at § 36:28; bissonnette, at para. 99). the international covenant on civil and political rights has been interpreted as imposing extraterritorial obligations on state parties (article 2(1); legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied palestinian territory, advisory opinion, icj. reports 2004, p 136, at paras. 108-11; human rights committee, general comment no. 31: the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on states parties to the covenant, un. doc. ccpr/c/21/rev1/add13,. may 26, 2004, at para 12; munaf v romania, communication no. 1539/2006, un. doc. ccpr/c/96/d/1539/2006 (2009), at para. 14.2; lopez burgos v uruguay, communication no 52/1979, u.n doc. ccpr/c/13/d/52/1979 (1981), at para. 12.3; currie (2010), at pp. 440-41). because the charter is presumed to provide protections at least as great (slaight, at p 1056), it would follow that the charter should also extend to the actions of state officials when abroad. [73] third, critics contend that hape’s three exceptions — consent, violations of international human rights obligations, and trial fairness — are inadequate. they fail to provide the same robust protections as expressly contained in the charter. this is cause for concern and suggests the need to revisit hape’s conclusion. [74] scholars have pointed out that the consent exception proves illusory in many circumstances (attaran, at pp 534-36 and 538-39; west, “within or outside canada”, at pp. 37-39). moreover, if the extraterritorial application of the charter is not an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction (as international law scholars contend), the consent exception is based on: (1) the unsustainable notion of canadian officials asking for other states’ permission to apply canada’s constitutional limits to canada’s own conduct; and (2) the assumption that the territorial state would understand the question or should control the answer (van ert, at p 555). [75] academics have noted that the human rights exception leaves gaps where charter protections exceed the rights guaranteed in international human rights instruments (west, “within or outside canada” at p 39; currie (2008), at pp. 320-21). that gaps will arise is a given in light of the presumption that the charter provides protections at least as great as those provided for under canada’s international human rights obligations (slaight, at p 1056). as well, it is illogical for the nature of the breach to determine the application of the rights-protecting instrument (attaran, at p 520; see also amnesty international canada v. canada (chief of the defence staff), 2008 fc 336, [2008] 4 fcr 546, at paras. 312-13, aff’d 2008 fca 401, [2009] 4 fcr 149). doctrinally, the exception is inconsistent with the principle that treaties, the key source of canada’s international human rights obligations, do not take effect in canadian law directly unless they have been implemented through legislation and fails to recognize that the charter is the means by which canada has implemented many of these obligations (baker v canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), [1999] 2 scr 817, at para. 69; van ert, at p 553; j. h. currie, “weaving a tangled web: hape and the obfuscation of canadian reception law” (2007), 45 can. yb. int’l l 55, at pp. 80-81; currie and rikhof, at p 636; see also k. sun, “international comity and the construction of the charter’s limits: hape revisited” (2019), 45 queen’s lj 115, at p 145). and the “curious” result of the exception — that international human rights law, rather than the charter, is used to assess the actions of canadian officials acting abroad (van ert, at p 553) — creates uncertainty for canadian state actors acting abroad who are unlikely to be familiar with canada’s international human rights obligations (amnesty international, at para. 314; hape, at para. 173, per bastarache j). [76] finally, critics suggest the trial fairness exception also leaves gaps because it does not apply when an individual’s charter rights are breached in a manner that does not result in obtaining evidence that would place the fairness of the trial in question or when the charter-infringing state conduct never leads to a criminal trial in canada (k. roach, “r v hape creates charter-free zones for canadian officials abroad” (2007), 53 crim l.q 1, at p 2; currie and rikhof, at p 634) and, as originally outlined in harrer, the exception was intended to apply to circumstances where evidence was collected by foreign authorities to whom the charter does not apply. it was not intended to address the gap created by failing to apply the charter to canadian authorities. more significantly, in our view, the exception only provides the protections contained in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter these two rights alone are insufficient to guarantee a fully charter-compliant trial attempting to supercharge ss. 7 and 11(d) so that they can stand in the stead of all the other rights contained in the charter defeats the very purpose of the charter: to guarantee all the rights and freedoms set out within it. v conclusion on hape [77] the decision in hape remains important in many respects, such as its pronouncements on the incorporation of customary international law by the common law (see nevsun resources ltd. v. araya, 2020 scc 5, [2020] 1 scr 166, at para. 86; van ert, at p 555), on state sovereignty and sovereign equality, and on the interpretative principle that statutes are presumed to operate in conformity with canada’s international obligations (see canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, [2019] 4 scr 653, at para. 114; van ert, at p 555). [78] the court, however, had received no submissions on international law, and it departed from the theoretical foundation of this court’s prior jurisprudence on the application of the charter abroad even though no parties or interveners before the court in hape had asked for the previous jurisprudence to be revised or overruled (paras. 182, 184-86 and 189, per binnie j.) numerous theoretical and practical problems have unfortunately followed hape, as highlighted by the wealth of judicial and academic criticisms that have emerged in the last 15 years. [79] these are significant concerns. they go to the core of our jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application of the charter, to the practical implications of its application, and to the ensuing lack of consistency and predictability of this area of the law these concerns leave this portion of hape ripe for reconsideration however, given the majority’s decision not to address it, we would leave the determination of whether hape was wrongly decided to another day. [80] because we do not reach a conclusion as to whether hape was wrongly decided, we need not elaborate how the charter should apply abroad — an issue that was also not a major focus of the submissions in this appeal. however, we note that in our view the charter is sufficiently flexible to take foreign context and the associated concerns raised by the hape majority into account in the analysis, on a case-by-case basis as bastarache j recognized in hape (para 125), the charter “is a flexible document, amenable to contextual interpretation and permitting reasonable justifications of limitations to fundamental rights”. such flexibility could exist at both the breach and remedial stages foreign laws and procedures may be relevant in assessing whether there was a charter breach. and operational concerns arising from differences between canadian and foreign procedures might be addressed through a flexible application of remedial discretion under s 24. [81] in conclusion, we would add that while this court’s rules and guidance to the profession do place certain limits upon what interveners may argue, we disagree with our colleagues that the interveners went beyond their proper role in this case. while interveners must not introduce new issues, the role of interveners is to provide their own view of the legal issues by providing “useful . . . and different” submissions, thus bringing “broader perspectives” before the court (supreme court of canada, notice to the profession: november 2021 – interventions, november 15, 2021, (online)). several interveners in this case did precisely that when they asked this court to revisit hape: they proposed a different view of the core legal issue of whether the charter applied to the conduct of the cfnis officers. indeed, these interveners were granted leave to intervene on this basis: when seeking leave, they all clearly signaled their intent to criticize hape and suggest revisions to its framework, with the canadian constitution foundation specifically stating hape must be revisited (memorandum of argument, at para. 10). to hold that we cannot engage with this different view, simply because the parties themselves did not propose it, ignores the purpose of intervener submissions as set out in the notice to the profession and runs contrary to this court’s past practice in decisions that have relied on the frameworks proposed by interveners. [82] more importantly, any limitation on the role of interveners in no way limits the jurisdiction of this court to decide issues in a manner other than that proposed by the parties indeed, hape itself demonstrates that this court can overturn precedent without any invitation from the parties or interveners (para. 187, per binnie j). such a restriction also runs counter to the role of this court, which is not merely one of error correction rather, the role of the court, as an apex court, is oriented to the “development of the jurisprudence” by “deal[ing] with questions of ‘public importance’”, and much of the court’s work “necessarily [goes] beyond what [is] essential for the disposition of the particular case” (r v. henry, 2005 scc 76, [2005] 3 scr 609, at para. 53; reference re supreme court act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 scc 21, [2014] 1 scr 433, at para. 86). by “bringing broader perspectives before the court than those advanced by appellants and respondents”, and by advancing their own views on legal issues before the court, interveners help the court fulfill this institutional role (notice to the profession). vi application [83] assuming that, pursuant to s 32(1), the charter applied to the conduct of the officers during their investigation, cpl. mcgregor’s s 8 rights were not infringed. [84] a search is reasonable if it is authorized by law, if the law is reasonable, and if the search is conducted reasonably (r v. collins, [1987] 1 scr 265, at p 278). in r v. vu, 2013 scc 60, [2013] 3 scr 657, this court decided that specific prior authorization was required to search computers (paras. 3 and 47). this means “that if police intend to search any computers found within a place they want to search, they must first satisfy the authorizing justice that they have reasonable grounds to believe that any computers they discover will contain the things they are looking for” (para. 48). [85] we conclude, as does our colleague côté j., that those requirements are met in this case first, the warrant issued by a virginia magistrate specifically authorized the search of computers and electronic devices. as well, the reference to “corporal mcgregor’s . . property” (ar, vol. i, at p 128) in the diplomatic note brings the authorization under the waiver of diplomatic immunity. second, the law that authorized the search was reasonable in light of charter standards developed in our jurisprudence: as noted by both courts below, the grounds relied upon to obtain the warrant would have been sufficient in canada third, the search was conducted reasonably, as the warrant expressly authorized the process of triaging the electronic devices at the scene. [86] we disagree that applying the plain view doctrine is necessary in this case. the plain view doctrine permits seizure without a warrant in defined circumstances. cpl. mcgregor does not dispute seizure before this court. rather, he argued that the search was unauthorized by law or conducted in an unreasonable manner (af, at para. 185). he maintained that “once investigators had come across evidence of what they believed to be child pornography they ought to have ceased searching, seized the electronic devices, and obtained a subsequent warrant outlining same” (para. 200). they breached s 8, he argued, by instead “continu[ing] to search through the devices on scene for additional evidence”, in the course of which they viewed the files containing sexual assault evidence (ibid). in sum, his argument is that “[o]nce evidence of a new offence has been discovered in the execution of a search, in order to continue searching devices, investigators must obtain a subsequent warrant for that offence” (para. 199). [87] the court martial rejected cpl. mcgregor’s submissions that the police had “continued looking for child pornography and sexual assault files”, rather than for files relating to the offences covered by the virginia warrant (2018 cm 4023, at para. 25 (canlii) (emphasis added)). in this regard, the court martial noted that the instant case was a “completely different situation than what transpired in [r v. jones, 2011 onca 632, 107 o.r (3d) 241], where investigators, while looking for files relating to an alleged fraud, inadvertently discovered child pornography and from that point started looking for completely different kinds of files than what was envisaged by their initial warrant” (ibid. (emphasis added)). [88] because the police in jones — unlike in this case — intentionally searched for files beyond the scope of what the warrant authorized, they needed an alternate justification for that unwarranted search and attempted to rely on the plain view doctrine (jones, at para 26) in addition to improperly expanding the scope of the search, in jones police continued searching the individual hard drive that contained the evidence of child pornography after that evidence was discovered. here, by contrast, police did not continue a search for evidence of crimes other than those covered by the warrant. rather, they continued their search for evidence of voyeurism, as permitted by the warrant. and, they did not continue searching the devices that contained evidence of other offences. rather than continuing to search those devices, they “set aside for seizure and further analysis”, after obtaining a canadian warrant, “any device that was assessed to contain potential child pornography and sexual assault files” (voir dire decision, para. 25) cpl mcgregor’s arguments that the search was unlawful or unreasonable must therefore fail. the search was authorized by the virginia warrant and the police did not inappropriately expand the scope of their search. [89] as such, reliance on the plain view doctrine is unnecessary. the parties have not argued any seizure issue. and, in any event, the initial seizure of the device containing sexual assault evidence was judicially authorized by the virginia warrant, which allowed seizure of devices that may contain evidence of voyeurism. continued seizure and search of the device was judicially authorized by the subsequent canadian warrant because police set aside any devices that contained evidence of unrelated offences rather than continuing to search them, it is unnecessary to decide in this case whether continuing to search a particular device even after discovering evidence of an unrelated offence on that device could violate s 8. to the extent that cpl. mcgregor argues that discovering evidence of an unrelated offence on one device required police to not just cease searching that device, but also to refrain from searching any other devices (even for evidence of offences covered by the warrant), we reject that argument. discovering evidence of an unrelated offence neither authorizes police to begin searching for evidence pertaining to that unrelated offence nor requires them to entirely cease their search as to what the warrant authorized them to search for. that conclusion is all that is required to resolve the s 8 issue that cpl. mcgregor actually raised: the reasonableness of continuing to triage other devices after discovering evidence of child pornography. [90] in concluding that applying the plain view doctrine is necessary, the majority assumes that the files disclosing evidence of sexual assault were seized when they were seen by police, even though they were conducting a lawful search on the computer for voyeurism under a valid warrant. cpl. mcgregor never raised such an argument, nor did any of the interveners. our court has never decided the issue of when a particular file on a device is seized, as opposed to when the device (eg, a laptop) itself is seized. this court should not decide it in this case. unintended consequences may flow from deciding the issue without the benefit of any submissions and it is unnecessary to a resolution of the case. [91] further, the assumption that the files were seized when they were initially seen by police is highly questionable under existing precedent. in r v. dyment, [1988] 2 scr 417, this court offered general guidance on the “line between a seizure and a mere finding of evidence”, which we articulated as “the point at which it can reasonably be said that the individual had ceased to have a privacy interest in the subject matter” (p 435). in our view, simply seeing the file at cpl. mcgregor’s home did not likely constitute a seizure because he did not “ceas[e] to have a privacy interest in” it in the required sense (ibid.), as evidenced by the need for the subsequent canadian warrant. additionally, finding that a file is seized when it is “viewed” conflates merely seeing a file with seizing it. to analogize to physical files, this would suggest that the police seize every piece of paper that they view during the search of a file cabinet. [92] rather than deciding this complex question without the benefit of submissions, we would conclude that the initial seizure of the laptop was justified by the virginia warrant — as cpl. mcgregor accepts (af, at paras. 200-201) — and the subsequent search and seizure of its files was justified by the canadian warrant. the virginia warrant did not encompass the investigation of sexual assault offences and the officers discovered the file relating to the alleged sexual assault only while looking for the types of files specifically authorized by the warrant (voir dire decision, at para. 25). the virginia warrant did, however, authorize seizure of the electronic devices which may have contained evidence of voyeurism. the virginia warrant also authorized the search of the laptop’s files for evidence of voyeurism, which explains how the police found the sexual assault file and why they were acting lawfully when they saw it. at this point, the police chose a sound approach in the circumstances: they set aside the (already seized) laptop and subsequently obtained a canadian warrant that authorized them to search the content of the computers and electronic devices for the purpose of obtaining evidence of sexual assault (para. 20; ar, vol. i, at p 100) accordingly, their conduct did not exceed the bounds of prior judicial authorization and the plain view doctrine need not be relied upon. [93] in addition to being in lawful possession of the computer under the virginia warrant, we note that when the police discovered the sexual assault file, they may also have been authorized to take physical control of the laptop “temporarily, and for the limited purpose of safeguarding potential evidence of a crime until a search warrant” specific to sexual assault “could be obtained” (r v. cole, 2012 scc 53, [2012] 3 scr. 34, at para. 65 (emphasis deleted)). vu likewise contemplated seizure of computers so as to preserve evidence of an offence, even where the warrant did not provide authorization to search the computer for evidence of that offence, “assuming it may reasonably be thought to contain the sort of things that the warrant authorizes to be seized” (paras. 3 and 49) here, the police reasonably thought the laptop may have contained evidence of voyeurism and so were justified under the virginia warrant to seize the laptop in order to preserve the integrity of the data. [94] not only is reliance on the plain view doctrine superfluous and dependent on questionable assumptions regarding when a file is seized, whether or not to extend the plain view doctrine to the search of the content of a computer is a fraught issue that has not been addressed by this court. we have never endorsed the application of the doctrine to electronic files as set out by the ontario court of appeal in jones the search and seizure of personal computers marks an incredibly intrusive, extensive and invasive search of one’s privacy (r v. morelli, 2010 scc 8, [2010] 1 scr 253, at paras 2-3) to that end, we have required specific authorization for the search and seizure of computers (vu) and modified the common law approach to searches incident to arrest in the case of cell phones (r v. fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621). there are special considerations associated with electronic data which suggest we should not assume that the plain view doctrine applies, or that it applies without modification. additionally, we did not receive any submissions on the issue. we would leave that issue for another day. [95] as such, the police did not infringe s 8 of the charter and the evidence is admissible. we would dismiss the appeal. the following are the reasons delivered by rowe j — [96] i have read the reasons of justice côté, and agree with the entirety of her analysis. to be clear, justice côté’s reasons state the opinion of a majority of this court. [97] i have also read the reasons of justices karakatsanis and martin my colleagues use their reasons, at length, to criticize a precedent of this court, r v. hape, 2007 scc 26, [2007] 2 scr 292. their treatment of hape implies that its merits as a precedent can properly be questioned on this appeal. [98] i disagree with their approach, which goes beyond the issues raised by the parties and seeks, effectively, to overturn hape at the invitation of interveners. this invitation, as i explain below, exceeds the well-established limits on interveners. to be clear, i neither endorse nor refute my colleagues’ criticisms of hape; i take no position on the substantive merits of the hape framework. rather, i object to my colleagues’ methodology, which has led them to state an opinion on an issue that is not properly before this court. [99] while my colleagues are correct that the applicability of the charter was argued at length by the parties, their reasons do not explain the litigation fully: the parties disputed whether the charter applies in this case, assuming the application of hape as precedent. no party ⸺ not at trial, or before the court martial appeal court, or before this court ⸺ challenged hape rather, they sought to apply it, and its exceptions, to the facts of their dispute. counsel for the respondent argued that this case was a “straightforward application of hape” (rf, at para. 51) and, in oral submissions, urged the court not to revisit hape (transcript, at pp. 118-19) the appellant’s submissions focused on the applicability of the exceptions set out in hape (af, at paras. 86-181). the appellant did not ask this court to overturn hape, nor did he lead evidence at the lower courts to support overturning a precedent. the military judge and the court martial appeal court treated this case as an unremarkable application of the hape framework. [100] my colleagues’ insistence, then, that neither they nor the interveners have strayed from the issue before the court is untenable. the arguments on the merits of hape were advanced solely by interveners at this court, thereby introducing a new issue. this court’s practice direction, on which my colleagues rely (para. 82), cautions against this situation: interveners are to advance their own view of a legal issue before the court; they must not introduce new issues; and the court always retains a discretion to take any steps it sees fit to prevent unfairness to the parties (see notice to the profession: november 2021 — interventions, november 15, 2021 (online) (“notice of november 2021”)). [101] to that end, i disagree with my colleagues’ suggestion that the interveners’ submissions are simply a different perspective on a legal issue that is before the court. this would effectively mean that any time a governing precedent is relevant to deciding a case, interveners could insert themselves before this court to call for it to be overturned, thereby “piggy-backing” onto the parties’ dispute what amounts to a reference on a judicial decision which the interveners wish to overturn such an approach does not accord with the rules of this court in addition, as an important policy consideration, it runs the risk that this court will make ill-advised decisions, as they would be made without the benefit of lower court analysis, a proper evidentiary record, or submissions from those who would be affected (including vulnerable groups) but who had no notice that the issue would be placed before the court. it is this simple: the issue of whether hape should continue to govern was not before the lower courts, nor is it before this court in light thereof, i seek to explain the proper place of interveners relative to the discharge of this court’s adjudicative role. [102] while the discussion that follows is directed to the place of interveners, i note a separate methodological point. my colleagues rely heavily on what they perceive to be academic consensus that is critical of hape. i will not repeat what was set out at length in the concurring reasons in r v. kirkpatrick, 2022 scc 33, save to highlight that primarily relying on such an approach undermines stare decisis and leads to doctrinal instability (paras 246-49) academic criticism can be persuasive where it demonstrates a recognized basis to overturn precedent, but this court cannot depart from precedent “simply because a chorus of voices, even well-informed voices, expresses disagreement with our decisions” (para. 247, referring to canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v vavilov, 2019 scc 65, [2019] 4 scr 653, at para. 274, per abella and karakatsanis jj., concurring). moreover, i am concerned by my colleagues’ insistence that this court is free to depart from precedent at will, a fortiori, to do so without submissions or an evidentiary record (para. 82). adherence to precedent “furthers basic rule of law values such as consistency, certainty, fairness, predictability, and sound judicial administration” (r v sullivan, 2022 scc 19, at para. 64). departing from precedent in the absence of proper methodology necessarily jeopardizes those qualities of our legal system indeed, applying my colleagues’ implicit criteria, it would be hard to imagine a judgment of the court that could be considered secure. having made this point, i now return to the place of interveners. i. the place of interveners at the supreme court of canada [103] the purpose of an intervention is to “present the court with submissions which are useful and different from the perspective of a non‑party who has a special interest or particular expertise in the subject matter of the appeal” (r v. morgentaler, [1993] 1 scr 462, at p 463; see also r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr. 579, at para. 52; rules of the supreme court of canada, sor/2002-156, r 57(2)(b)). interveners provide additional perspectives on the legal issues raised by the parties and on the broader implications of the court’s decision depending on the context, interveners might highlight relevant jurisprudence, present insightful arguments, or clarify the potential analytical paths to resolving the issues placed before the court. interveners may also enhance accuracy by representing diverse cross-sections of the canadian public and furnishing an analysis informed by their particular experience or specialized expertise since the cases heard by this court are frequently matters of public importance, such experience and expertise can “assist the court in deciding complex issues that have effects transcending the interests of the particular parties before it” (barton, at para. 52) through their submissions, interveners inform the court of the direct and indirect consequences of the dispute on various stakeholders and on other areas of law in this way, interveners can often make important contributions. in order to do so, however, interveners must operate within recognized limits. the rules of the supreme court of canada clearly state these limits, and this court has issued practice directions, more than once, to remind potential interveners of the boundaries they must respect (see notice of november 2021; notice to the profession: march 2017 — allotting time for oral argument, march 2, 2017 (online)). [104] these constraints reflect a sound understanding of interveners’ place within the litigation and of the role of this court. while the court is often tasked with deciding issues that have implications extending beyond the parties, it remains an adjudicative body. the polycentric nature of a legal issue does not turn the court into a legislative committee or a royal commission (jh v. alberta (minister of justice and solicitor general), 2019 abca 420, 54 cpc (8th) 346, at paras. 25-27). the court’s process also remains firmly grounded in the adversarial system: the parties control their case and decide which issues to raise this does not change when the parties argue before the supreme court. indeed, the importance of this principle only increases: as an apex court, this court’s role is to adjudicate disputes with the benefit of trial-level findings of fact and appellate-level reasons on the issues fully argued by the parties. [105] such considerations help explain the specific limits placed on interventions. first, interveners are not parties. the purpose of an intervention is not to support a party — by which i mean the appellant(s) and respondent(s) — but to put forward the intervener’s own view of a legal issue already before the court. despite the involvement of interveners, the appeal remains a dispute between the parties (notice of november 2021, at point 2). consequently, interveners should not take a position on the outcome of the appeal (rules of the supreme court of canada, r 42(3); notice of november 2021, at point 3). [106] secondly, interveners must not raise new issues or “widen or add to the points in issue” (morgentaler, at p 463; reference re goods and services tax, [1992] 2 scr 445, at p 487; rules of the supreme court of canada, r 59(3); notice of november 2021, at point 4) interveners may, however, present their own legal arguments on the existing issues and make submissions on how those issues affect the interests of those whom they represent (see, eg,. mikisew cree first nation v. canada (minister of canadian heritage), 2005 scc 69, [2005] 3 scr 388, at para. 40; canada (justice) v. khadr, 2008 scc 29, [2008] 2 scr 143, at para. 18; barton, at para. 52). [107] interveners must be careful to distinguish between developing a permissible legal argument and adding prohibited new issues; the two are conceptually distinct. a fresh perspective or legal argument on an existing issue is not the same as the introduction of a new issue, outside the scope of the appeal or, even further, in contradiction to the parties’ submissions regarding the scope of the appeal. the former may assist the court’s deliberation, while the latter detracts from it. while in rare cases it may be difficult to distinguish between the two, this appeal is not such a case. by asking this court to overturn hape, certain interveners, upon whom justices karakatsanis and martin rely, have introduced what is clearly a new issue. [108] finally, interveners must not adduce further evidence or otherwise supplement the record without leave (rules of the supreme court of canada, r 59(1)(b)). they may, of course, use their submissions to explain the impact of the appeal on the group(s) they represent; this represents an appropriate exercise of their role. but they must take the case and the record as they find it, or seek leave to tender new material, such as supplementary legislative facts or contested studies (see, eg,. d. l. watt et al., supreme court of canada practice 2022 (2022), at pp. 369-70, referring to rjr. macdonald inc v canada (attorney general), bulletin of proceedings, june 10, 1994, at p 990, and anderson v. amoco canada oil and gas, bulletin of proceedings, march 19, 2004, p 453) this court, as always, retains a discretion to take any steps it sees fit where an intervener presents new evidence without leave or otherwise makes improper submissions (see notice of november 2021, at point 6). [109] in sum, an intervener can make useful contributions when it respects the rules, practice directions, and jurisprudence of this court. by contrast, it exceeds its role when it seeks to alter the nature of the litigation by usurping the role of the parties, expanding the issues before the court, or presenting new evidence. an intervention that contravenes these settled rules is improper, and has negative consequences for the parties, potential interveners, and the administration of justice. ii the consequences of improper interventions [110] interveners who stray beyond their proper role, first of all, cause prejudice to the parties by usurping control of the litigation. the parties — not interveners — are meant to control their own litigation they define the issues and the relief sought. proper intervention is consistent with this distribution of responsibilities because it is responsive to the issues the parties have raised improper intervention jeopardizes fairness by forcing the parties to respond to issues on which they did not adduce evidence at trial and by “tak[ing] the litigation away from those directly affected by it” (attorney-general of canada v. aluminum co. of canada (1987), 35 dlr (4th) 495 (bcca), at p 507; m (k.) v. m (h.), [1992] 3 scr 3, at pp. 4-5; see also r v. ns, 2021 onca 605, 497 crr (2d) 75, at para. 49). practical forms of unfairness may also befall the parties as a result of improper intervention, including increased legal costs, delays in responding to intervener submissions, or being forced to bring motions to strike parts of an intervener’s submissions. [111] secondly, and most fundamentally, interveners who improperly add to or expand the issues on appeal may cause deleterious effects to the proper administration of justice. the potential for inaccuracy increases where interveners invite the court to reason in the abstract without the benefit of lower court decisions or a full evidentiary record. [112] thirdly, improper interventions undermine the leave to appeal process. the court decides whether to grant or deny leave upon careful consideration of the existing record and the issues specifically raised by the parties where an intervener’s arguments fall outside of the set of issues for which leave has been granted, the court’s careful consideration at the leave stage is frustrated. [113] finally, potential interveners, whether organizations or attorneys general, decide whether to intervene based on the issues placed before the court by the parties. where interveners expand that set of issues, would-be interveners who have decided not to intervene are prejudiced they might have decided differently had they been made aware that new issues would be raised (see morgentaler, at pp. 463-64). by the time interveners have introduced the new issues, however, it is too late: the would-be interveners have already been deprived of the opportunity to present, and the court has been deprived of the opportunity to receive, valuable perspectives on these new issues. [114] the present appeal illustrates these serious consequences. raising the new issue of whether hape should continue to govern is an improper intervention it undercuts the parties’ control of their litigation and, in fact, runs contrary to their submissions that this court should apply hape it undermines the leave to appeal process and excludes would-be interveners who could make useful submissions on the extraterritorial application of the charter and, rather than further the accuracy of decision making, it invites the court to reason in the abstract without the benefit of lower court decisions, a full evidentiary record, or submissions from the parties. [115] this court’s rules, practice directions, and jurisprudence are carefully designed to avoid these consequences, while ensuring that interveners properly assist the court. it is therefore critical for interveners to adhere to these limits. when they do so, they can make useful contributions grounded in their expertise and experience. however, that is not what occurred in the present case, as certain interveners overstepped the well-established limits on their role. the issue of whether hape should continue to govern is not before the court. neither party has called this framework into question; indeed, both the appellant and respondent have relied on it. i therefore reject my colleagues’ decision to accept the invitation from certain interveners and revisit hape as precedent their reasons exacerbate the harms created by improper interventions and undermine the limits that preclude the introduction of new issues. in light of the foregoing, i endorse the reasons of justice côté. appendix relevant legislation and treaties agreement between the parties to the north atlantic treaty regarding the status of their forces, can. ts 1953 no. 13 article vii 1. subject to the provisions of this article, (a) the military authorities of the sending state shall have the right to exercise within the receiving state all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending state over all persons subject to the military law of that state; 3. in cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply: (a) the military authorities of the sending state shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation to (i) offences solely against the property or security of that state, or offences solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component of that state or of a dependent; 6. — (a) the authorities of the receiving and sending states shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offence. the handing over of such objects may, however, be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them. national defence act, rsc 1985, c. n-5 60 (1) the following persons are subject to the code of service discipline: (a) an officer or non-commissioned member of the regular force; 67 subject to section 70, every person alleged to have committed a service offence may be charged, dealt with and tried under the code of service discipline, whether the alleged offence was committed in canada or outside canada. 68 every person alleged to have committed a service offence may be charged, dealt with and tried under the code of service discipline, either in canada or outside canada. 93 every person who behaves in a cruel or disgraceful manner is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to less punishment. 130 (1) an act or omission (b) that takes place outside canada and would, if it had taken place in canada, be punishable under part vii, the criminal code or any other act of parliament, is an offence under this division . 273.3 subject to sections 273.4 and 273.5, a commanding officer who is satisfied by information on oath that there is in any quarters, locker, storage space or personal or movable property referred to in section 273.2 (a) anything on or in respect of which any offence against this act has been or is believed on reasonable grounds to have been committed, (b) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe will afford evidence with respect to the commission of an offence against this act, or (c) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any offence against the person for which a person may be arrested without warrant, may issue a warrant authorizing any officer or non-commissioned member named in the warrant, assisted by such other officers and non-commissioned members as are necessary, or a peace officer, to search the quarters, locker, storage space or personal or movable property for any such thing, and to seize and carry it before that commanding officer. vienna convention on diplomatic relations, can. ts 1966 no. 29 article 30 1. the private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission. article 31 1 a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state he shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction . article 32 1 the immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons enjoying immunity under article 37 may be waived by the sending state. 2. waiver must always be express. code of virginia — title 192. criminal procedure § 192-56. to whom search warrant directed; what it shall command; warrant to show date and time of issuance; copy of affidavit to be part of warrant and served therewith; warrants not executed within 15 days. a. the judge, magistrate, or other official authorized to issue criminal warrants shall issue a search warrant only if he finds from the facts or circumstances recited in the affidavit that there is probable cause for the issuance thereof. every search warrant shall be directed (i) to the sheriff, sergeant, or any policeman of the county, city, or town in which the place to be searched is located; (ii) to any law-enforcement officer or agent employed by the commonwealth and vested with the powers of sheriffs and police; or (iii) jointly to any such sheriff, sergeant, policeman, or law-enforcement officer or agent and an agent, special agent, or officer of the federal bureau of investigation, the bureau of alcohol, tobacco and firearms of the united states treasury, the united states naval criminal investigative service, the united states department of homeland security, any inspector, law-enforcement official, or police personnel of the united states postal service, or the drug enforcement administration the warrant shall (a) name the affiant, (b) recite the offense or the identity of the person to be arrested for whom a warrant or process for arrest has been issued in relation to which the search is to be made, (c) name or describe the place to be searched, (d) describe the property or person to be searched for, and (e) recite that the magistrate has found probable cause to believe that the property or person constitutes evidence of a crime (identified in the warrant) or tends to show that a person (named or described therein) has committed or is committing a crime or that the person to be arrested for whom a warrant or process for arrest has been issued is located at the place to be searched. the warrant shall command that the place be forthwith searched and that the objects or persons described in the warrant, if found there, be seized an inventory shall be produced before a court having jurisdiction of the offense or over the person to be arrested for whom a warrant or process for arrest has been issued in relation to which the warrant was issued as provided in § 192-57. any such warrant as provided in this section shall be executed by the policeman or other law-enforcement officer or agent into whose hands it shall come or be delivered. if the warrant is directed jointly to a sheriff, sergeant, policeman, or law-enforcement officer or agent of the commonwealth and a federal agent or officer as otherwise provided in this section, the warrant may be executed jointly or by the policeman, law-enforcement officer, or agent into whose hands it is delivered no other person may be permitted to be present during or participate in the execution of a warrant to search a place except (1) the owners and occupants of the place to be searched when permitted to be present by the officer in charge of the conduct of the search and (2) persons designated by the officer in charge of the conduct of the search to assist or provide expertise in the conduct of the search. b . search warrants authorized under this section for the search of any place of abode shall be executed by initial entry of the abode only in the daytime hours between 8:00 am. and 5:00 pm unless (i) a judge or a magistrate, if a judge is not available, authorizes the execution of such search warrant at another time for good cause shown by particularized facts in an affidavit or (ii) prior to the issuance of the search warrant, law-enforcement officers lawfully entered and secured the place to be searched and remained at such place continuously.
i. overview [1] a jury renders inconsistent verdicts when it finds an accused both guilty and not guilty of the same conduct. the respondent, rv, alleges that happened here. rv was charged with historical sexual offences against a single complainant. he was tried before a judge and jury. the jury convicted him of sexual interference under s 151 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, and invitation to sexual touching under s 152. the same jury acquitted him of sexual assault under s 271 based on the same evidence. [2] rv appealed his convictions to the court of appeal for ontario, asserting that they were inconsistent with his sexual assault acquittal and therefore unreasonable. the crown cross-appealed rv’s acquittal, maintaining that the charge to the jury was so unnecessarily confusing that it amounted to an error in law. the crown argued that despite what it characterized as conflicting authorities from both the supreme court of canada and the court of appeal for ontario concerning the impact of erroneous jury instructions on the inconsistent verdicts inquiry, the apparent inconsistency in the verdicts rendered by the jury in the present case could be explained by the erroneous jury instructions, such that the guilty verdicts could not be considered unreasonable. [3] writing for the majority, strathy cjo disagreed with the crown that there are conflicting supreme court of canada authorities on inconsistent verdicts the majority agreed, however, that it was necessary to clarify the court of appeal’s own jurisprudence on the role of jury instructions in inconsistent verdict cases. in so doing, the majority overturned its prior decisions in r v. sl, 2013 onca 176, 303 oac. 103; r v kdm, 2017 onca 510; and r v tyler, 2015 onca 599 — and, by implication, disagreed with the approach taken in other provinces (see, eg,. r v. tremblay, 2016 abca 30, 612 ar 147; r v. lbc, 2019 abca 505, 383 ccc. (3d) 331; r v. jdc, 2018 nsca 5). in the result, the majority held that there was no legal error in the jury instructions and that the convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching were unreasonable, as they were inconsistent with rv’s acquittal on the sexual assault charge. the majority quashed rv’s convictions and substituted verdicts of acquittal justice rouleau dissented on whether the jury instructions amounted to an error of law and on the appropriate remedy. the crown now appeals to this court it asks that rv’s convictions be restored and that his acquittal be set aside. [4] this case provides us with an opportunity to clarify the approach to be followed when verdicts are alleged to be inconsistent while the basic principles underlying inconsistent verdicts have been established by this court, we have yet to explicitly consider the impact of legally erroneous jury instructions on the inconsistent verdicts inquiry in doing so here, i seek to achieve a just balance between judicial integrity and fairness to the accused, while respecting the role of juries in our justice system. [5] as i will explain, the crown can seek to reconcile apparently inconsistent verdicts by showing, to a high degree of certainty, that the acquittal was the product of a legal error in the jury instructions, that the legal error did not impact the conviction, and that the error reconciles the inconsistency by showing that the jury did not find the accused both guilty and not guilty of the same conduct if the crown discharges its burden, appellate intervention on the conviction is not warranted because the verdicts are not actually inconsistent and thus not unreasonable on the basis of inconsistency. [6] for the reasons that follow, in the present case, i am respectfully of the view that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the charge of sexual assault by leaving the jury with the mistaken impression that the element of “force” required for sexual assault was different than the element of “touching” required for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching. in particular, the failure to instruct the jury in clear terms that the “force” required to establish sexual assault was one and the same as the “touching” required to establish the other two offences constituted non-direction amounting to misdirection the effect of this error on the apparently inconsistent verdicts is significant a review of the charge to the jury as a whole enables me to conclude, with a high degree of certainty, that the error was material to the acquittal. equally, i am satisfied that the error did not impact on the convictions; rather, it reconciles the apparent inconsistency in the verdicts. accordingly, the verdicts are not actually inconsistent and the convictions are not unreasonable on the basis of inconsistency. [7] in the result, i would allow the appeal and restore the convictions. i would also set aside the acquittal and, as i will explain, enter a stay of proceedings on the charge of sexual assault. ii background and proceedings below [8] rv was charged with historical sexual offences against the complainant, who was the daughter of rv’s partner at the time of the alleged offences. the charges, spanning 1995 to 2003, included sexual assault, sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching. a. ontario superior court of justice (vallee j., sitting with a jury) [9] rv’s trial lasted two days. the complainant was the only witness. she testified to multiple incidents of sexual abuse committed by r.v when she was between the ages of 7 and 13. according to her evidence, rv:  grabbed her hand and moved it to touch his penis;  touched her breast over her clothing;  touched her vagina over her clothing;  held her hand and used it to masturbate himself;  laid underneath her while he was unclothed and she was clothed, simulating intercourse and ejaculating on his stomach;  laid underneath her while he was clothed and she was unclothed, simulating intercourse; and  touched her head and pushed it down towards his penis. [10] the crown presented no other evidence at trial. the defence maintained that the complainant’s evidence was inconsistent and therefore not sufficiently credible to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. the defence also asserted that she was motivated to fabricate her evidence. [11] at the end of the trial, the trial judge instructed the jury on each of the offences separately, in the words provided by the pattern instructions in watt’s manual of criminal jury instructions (2nd ed 2015) the same evidence went to all three charges. [12] on the sexual assault charge, the trial judge instructed the jury that rv. could be found guilty if they were satisfied that the crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that rv intentionally applied force to the complainant and that the force took place in circumstances of a sexual nature (ar, at p 161). because the complainant was under the age of 16 at the time of the alleged incidents, consent was not an issue. if the jury was not satisfied that the force occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature, the trial judge instructed them that the result would be to find rv not guilty of sexual assault, but guilty of assault (ibid). [13] turning to the sexual interference charge, the trial judge instructed the jury that rv could be found guilty if the jury was satisfied that the complainant was under 16 years old at the time, that rv touched the complainant and that the touching was for a sexual purpose (pp. 162-63). [14] on the invitation to sexual touching charge, the trial judge instructed that rv could be found guilty if the jury was satisfied that the complainant was under 16 years old at the time, that rv invited the complainant to touch his body, and that the touching that rv invited was for a sexual purpose (p 166). [15] the jury was not given a written copy of the instructions to bring to the jury room. instead, the trial judge provided the jury with a verdict sheet, which listed the following verdicts that the jury could reach: count no. 1 — not guilty of sexual assault; guilty count no. 2 — not guilty of sexual interference; guilty count no. 3 — not guilty of invitation to sexual touching; guilty [p 174] [16] the trial judge also provided the jury with a decision tree for each charge. the decision tree for sexual assault listed “not guilty of sexual assault but guilty of assault” as an available verdict (p 223). [17] after approximately one hour of deliberation, the jury sent the following question to the trial judge regarding the available sexual assault verdicts: on the decision tree for count one, sexual assault versus the verdict sheet. there are only two choices to make on the verdict sheet, whereas the decision tree provides for three verdicts number one, guilty of sexual assault number two, not guilty of sexual assault but guilty of assault. number three, not guilty. what do we do? juror number five. [p 184] [18] to resolve the discrepancy between the verdict sheet and the decision tree for sexual assault, the trial judge provided the jury with a new verdict sheet containing the following amendment: count no. 1 not guilty of sexual assault not guilty of sexual assault but guilty of assault guilty of sexual assault [emphasis added; p 236.] [19] the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the charges of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, and not guilty on the charge of sexual assault. b court of appeal for ontario (2019 onca 664, 147 o.r (3d) 657) (strathy cjo,. rouleau, pardu, miller and trotter jja) [20] the court of appeal unanimously agreed that rv’s convictions were inconsistent with the acquittal and could not stand. the court, however, divided on the appropriate disposition of the crown’s cross-appeal and the remedy for rv’s appeal from his convictions. [21] after canvassing the inconsistent verdicts jurisprudence, the majority (strathy cjo and pardu and trotter jja) held that if rv was found guilty of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, he was necessarily guilty of sexual assault: the touching required for the two convictions satisfied the legal definition of force for sexual assault. having identified this inconsistency, the majority stated that the remaining issues were: (1) whether the allegedly confusing instruction on sexual assault could explain the inconsistency; (2) whether the crown’s cross-appeal could resolve the inconsistency; and if not, (3) whether a new trial could be ordered in the face of the acquittal. [22] as to the first issue, the majority found that the allegedly confusing instruction on sexual assault could not reconcile the verdicts because the cause of the inconsistent verdicts was a matter of pure speculation indeed, the concern about improper speculation led the majority to conclude that confusing instructions, even those amounting to a legal error, can never reconcile inconsistent verdicts as a matter of law. [23] regarding the second issue, the majority found that the crown’s cross-appeal could not succeed because the trial judge gave legally correct instructions. the trial judge expressly told the jury twice that any physical contact, even a gentle touch, could amount to the “force” necessary for sexual assault. she also linked “force” with “touching” in various places in her instructions since the crown could not demonstrate an error of law, the majority held that the acquittal had to stand. [24] given that the acquittal had to stand, the majority found that ordering a new trial on the convictions would invite the jury to return verdicts inconsistent with the acquittal, which would give rise to a claim of issue estoppel. accordingly, they set aside the convictions and directed verdicts of acquittal to be entered on the sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching charges. [25] in dissent, the minority (rouleau and miller jja) agreed to allow rv’s appeal on the claim of inconsistent verdicts but would have also allowed the crown’s cross-appeal on the basis of legally erroneous jury instructions specifically, in considering the entire context, it was reasonable to conclude that the jury would not have understood that mere “touching” constituted the “force” necessary to make out the offence of sexual assault given the structure of the charge to the jury, which consisted of an explanation of one count after another in isolation, the jury needed to be told how the three offences related to each other. the trial judge’s failure to provide this clarification amounted to an error of law that caused the jury to acquit rv on the sexual assault charge. [26] as to the appropriate remedy, the minority stated that where both the conviction and the acquittal are appealed, and the inconsistency in the verdicts is explained by an error of law in the jury instructions, the appropriate remedy is to order a new trial on all the charges. iii. issues [27] i would restate the main issues in this appeal as follows: (1) can a legal error in jury instructions reconcile apparently inconsistent verdicts? (2) what is the appropriate disposition of an inconsistent verdicts appeal where there is an error of law in the jury instructions? (3) were the verdicts rendered by the jury in rv’s case inconsistent? iv analysis a. inconsistent verdicts [28] the criminal code does not expressly identify inconsistent verdicts as a ground for setting aside a conviction for an appellate court to interfere with a conviction on the ground that it is inconsistent with an acquittal, the court must find that the guilty verdict is unreasonable (r v. pittiman, 2006 scc 9, [2006] 1 scr. 381, at para. 6, citing criminal code, s 686(1)(a)(i)). the accused bears the burden of establishing that a verdict is unreasonable (pittiman, at para. 6). [29] in an appeal involving inconsistent verdicts, the applicable test to determine whether a verdict of a jury is unreasonable is: “are the verdicts irreconcilable such that no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could possibly have rendered them on the evidence?” (pittiman, at para. 10). put another way, a conviction is unreasonable and must be set aside where the verdicts cannot be reconciled on any rational or logical basis and no properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could have rendered the verdicts it did based on the evidence (r v. mcshannock (1980), 55 ccc (2d) 53 (ont. ca), at p 56; pittiman, at paras. 6-7). [30] when verdicts cannot be reconciled and a jury that was properly instructed returns a conviction that is not supportable on the evidence presented at trial, the only available inference is that the jury acted unreasonably in arriving at the conviction (r. v. biniaris, 2000 scc 15, [2000] 1 scr 381, at para. 39). the jury may have reached a compromised verdict, misunderstood the evidence, or nullified by choosing to not apply the law — any of those paths to inconsistent verdicts reflects unreasonableness. in such cases, the conviction itself is unreasonable and appellate intervention is warranted. [31] the ultimate inquiry for appellate courts then is whether the verdicts are actually inconsistent. apparently inconsistent verdicts can be reconciled on the basis that the offences themselves are “temporally distinct, or are qualitatively different, or dependent on the credibility of different complainants or witnesses” (pittiman, at para. 8) if verdicts are reconciled to reveal a theory on which the jury could have returned the verdicts without acting unreasonably, the verdicts are consistent and appellate intervention is not warranted. [32] in my view, there are also cases, such as the one at hand, where the crown can reconcile apparently inconsistent verdicts on the basis that they were the result of a legal error in the jury instructions. for such cases, i propose the following approach. (1) analytical framework [33] where the crown attempts to rebut an apparent inconsistency on the basis of a legal error, the burden shifts from the accused to the crown. that burden is heavy. the crown must satisfy the court to a high degree of certainty that there was a legal error in the jury instructions and that the error: (1) had a material bearing on the acquittal; (2) was immaterial to the conviction; and (3) reconciles the inconsistency by showing that the jury did not find the accused both guilty and not guilty of the same conduct. [34] if the court can find that these elements are satisfied with a high degree of certainty, the verdicts are not actually inconsistent. instead, the legal error caused the jury to convict the accused either on different evidence or a different element than it believed was necessary for the charge on which it acquitted the accused. any apparent inconsistency in the verdicts is thus reconciled, as the jury did not find the accused both guilty and not guilty of the same conduct it follows that the jury did not act unreasonably in rendering their verdicts. [35] in assessing whether the crown has satisfied its burden, the court must not engage in improper speculation about what the jury did and did not do. the appellate court must be able to retrace the reasoning of the jury with a sufficiently high degree of certainty to exclude all other reasonable explanations for how the jury rendered its verdicts. if it can, any concern about speculation falls away. [36] this approach respects the ordinary deference afforded to the presumed reasonableness of the jury by asking “whether the [apparently inconsistent verdicts] are supportable on any theory of the evidence consistent with the legal instructions given by the trial judge” (pittiman, at para. 7) where the conviction is supported by the evidence, as is always required, and the verdicts are not actually inconsistent, the jury’s entering of a conviction against the accused is not unreasonable and the conviction appeal should be dismissed. a jury does not act improperly by relying on a trial judge’s legal error. put another way, the appellate court simply concludes that the jury acted reasonably based on the evidence and instructions before it the conviction is thus reasonable and appellate intervention is not warranted. [37] i pause here to note that my colleague, brown j., disagrees with the reconciliation framework i have proposed on the basis that our jurisprudence and the appeals scheme enacted in s 686(4) of the criminal code preclude an appellate court from inquiring into the jury’s reasons for arriving at a verdict (brown j.’s reasons, at paras. 82-85). yet that is not what s 686(4) says, nor is it what parliament intended. indeed, our jurisprudence shows that although appellate courts cannot engage in improper speculation, they regularly consider the impact of jury instructions on a jury’s verdict. for instance, reviewing a crown appeal from a jury’s verdict of acquittal on the basis of a legal error at trial requires considering whether the error likely affected the verdict (r v graveline, 2006 scc 16, [2006] 1 scr 609, at paras. 14-17); reviewing a jury’s verdict of guilty in light of legally erroneous jury instructions can require assessing whether the error was harmless in that it could not reasonably be expected to have changed the jury’s verdict (criminal code, s 686(1)(b)(iii); see, eg,. r v. khela, 2009 scc 4, [2009] 1 scr 104, at paras. 59-60; r v. illes, 2008 scc 57, [2008] 3 scr 134, at paras. 21-23); and fresh evidence applications ask whether the fresh evidence could reasonably be expected to have affected the jury’s verdict (palmer v. the queen, [1980] 1 scr 759, at p 775; see also r v. hay, 2013 scc 61, [2013] 3 scr 694, at paras. 70-75). each of these commonplace appellate matters requires a reviewing court to consider what the jury may have been thinking and whether they might reasonably have changed their minds if the trial had unfolded differently. indeed, my colleague is content to engage in that consideration himself as he concludes that the misdirection in the present case “might reasonably be thought to have had a material bearing on the acquittal” (para. 103) the framework i have proposed calls for nothing more. [38] further, and with respect to my colleague, what i have said is meant to supplement — not change — the law as set out in pittiman; nor is it intended to change the law in r v. jf, 2008 scc 60, [2008] 3 scr 215, which restated the principles in pittiman as follows: “. . . verdicts are deemed inconsistent — and therefore unreasonable as a matter of law — if no properly instructed jury could reasonably have returned them both . . .” (para. 23). in the instant case, the court of appeal interpreted this formulation to mean that appellate courts reviewing verdicts for inconsistency should not look at jury instructions in assessing reasonableness. with respect, pittiman and jf should not be read in this manner. in jf, this court was not establishing a rule of law that jury instructions must be presumed correct. in fact, it could not have been doing so: the question of whether the verdicts are supportable on any theory of the evidence necessarily involves considering which elements the jury was instructed on (pittiman, at para. 7). as explained, such considerations are routine. if pittiman and jf required departing from this principle, the court would have said so explicitly. it did not. [39] jf was a case in which the jury instructions did not disclose a clear error permitting the appellate court to retrace the jury’s reasoning with any degree of certainty since the court could not determine why the jury returned the different verdicts, it declined to uphold the conviction on the basis that the legal error could reconcile the verdicts (para. 21) jf’s approach remains appropriate where the appellate court cannot conclude with a high degree of certainty that the legal error caused the inconsistent verdicts. if, however, a court is able to reach that conclusion, no issue of improper speculation arises. to the contrary, impugning the verdicts of the jury when the appellate court knows the error belongs to the trial judge would damage the legal process as paciocco j.a explained in r v plein, 2018 onca 748, 365 ccc (3d) 437, “it is not an appropriate outcome to deem a demonstrably reasonable conviction to be unreasonable because of an inconsistent acquittal that is grounded in a clear legal error” (para. 42) while plein was a judge alone trial, the principle is applicable in a trial by judge and jury so long as the reviewing court is able to retrace the jury’s reasoning to the high degree of certainty required. [40] further, the reconciliation framework i have proposed addresses the apprehensions that led the court in j.f to caution, in obiter, against legitimizing a conviction based on an error of law. nothing i have said suggests that an error of law in the instructions to the jury necessarily makes improper verdicts proper or inconsistent verdicts consistent (see jf, at para. 23). an appellate court that has found a legal error material to the acquittal must go on to determine the impact of that error on the conviction. if the error can be isolated to the acquittal, it is not the error itself that reconciles the verdicts, but rather the further determination that the error did not affect the conviction. that conclusion is consistent with jf. (2) remedy [41] on finding that a legal error shows that apparently inconsistent verdicts are not actually inconsistent, the appropriate remedy depends on whether the crown has cross-appealed the acquittal. i turn to this issue now. (a) crown cross-appeal [42] in cases where the crown has cross-appealed, the acquittal must be set aside if the crown succeeds in proving that it was based on an error of law “which might reasonably be thought . . to have had a material bearing on the acquittal” (graveline, at para. 14). the next question is what should follow from setting aside that acquittal. [43] for the most part, the criminal code provides the answer section 686(4)(b) of the code instructs appellate courts allowing an appeal from an acquittal entered by a jury to order a new trial. generally, all interconnected charges should be returned for retrial (pittiman, at para. 14). in line with the test i have outlined, it may well be difficult for the appellate court to isolate the error to the acquittal, and a conviction cannot stand if it arises from an error of law. unless the appellate court can conclude with a high degree of certainty that the legal error did not taint the conviction, setting aside the acquittal on a charge interconnected with a conviction will require retrial on all charges. [44] where an appellate court can isolate the legal error to the acquittal, that charge should be the only one sent back for a new trial and the conviction should stand. the error did not taint the conviction, so it should remain in place unless, of course, the conviction is found to be unreasonable on a ground other than inconsistency. if a retrial is sought, it should only proceed on the charge for which the accused was acquitted. however, a retrial on the acquittal charge may raise res judicata concerns, such as the plea of autrefois convict or a s 11(h) canadian charter of rights and freedoms application. those claims may well be available to the accused upon a retrial, yet the possibility of such claims does not preclude an appellate court from ordering a retrial (criminal code, s 686(4)). if, prior to a retrial, an accused chooses to raise any of these issues, that is their prerogative — i certainly do not foreclose the accused from doing so however, granting a special plea of autrefois convict or a s 11(h) charter application is discretionary, something for first instance judges to determine based on the circumstances before them. as such, i decline to decide whether these claims would preclude a retrial in all circumstances. [45] that said, when an appellate court is satisfied that the acquittal is the product of a legal error and cannot stand, the most appropriate remedy, depending on the circumstances, may be to enter a stay of proceedings rather than sending the matter back for a retrial (criminal code, s 686(8)). (b) absence of a crown cross-appeal [46] the parties disagree about what happens when the crown has not cross-appealed but nonetheless asserts that a legal error reconciles apparently inconsistent verdicts. [47] here, as indicated, the crown cross-appealed rv’s acquittal on the sexual assault charge. accordingly, the issue of whether the crown must cross-appeal where it seeks to reconcile apparently inconsistent verdicts on the basis of erroneous jury instructions is not before us. nor indeed has that issue ever been squarely before this court. [48] having regard to the bedrock principle of our adversarial system that where an accused makes an argument, the crown is entitled to rebut it, there is a viable argument that the crown need not cross-appeal to rebut an inconsistent verdict allegation raised by an accused. that said, i recognize that there are tenable arguments to the contrary, relating to the integrity of the legal process and the legitimacy of verdicts. in the end, i consider it prudent to leave the issue outstanding until it comes squarely before us. b application to the facts [49] in the present case, rv appealed his sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching convictions on the basis that they were inconsistent with his sexual assault acquittal. the crown conceded that the verdicts were apparently inconsistent, but cross-appealed from the acquittal on the basis that the verdicts were not actually inconsistent since they could be reconciled by the erroneous jury instructions. specifically, the crown’s position was that the instructions mistakenly led the jury to believe that the element of “force” required to make out the offence of sexual assault was different than the element of “touching” required to make out the offences of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching. [50] i agree that the verdicts rendered by the jury are inconsistent on their face. given that the three charges have near identical elements and were based on the same evidence at trial, the jury should have either convicted or acquitted rv of all three charges. guided by the approach i have proposed, i must now decide whether there was a legal error in the jury instructions and if so, whether it reconciles the apparent inconsistency if the inconsistency can be reconciled, the verdicts are not actually inconsistent and therefore not unreasonable on the basis of inconsistency if the inconsistency cannot be reconciled, the verdicts rendered by the jury here will necessarily be unreasonable as a matter of law. (1) the legal error [51] sections 151, 152 and 271 of the criminal code use different terms to describe similar acts. sexual interference under s 151 requires proof of touching, and invitation to sexual touching under s 152 requires proof that the accused counselled, invited or incited the complainant to touch. sexual assault, for its part, is not defined under s 271 instead, sexual assault is a s 265(1) assault made applicable to sexual circumstances by s 265(2) a person commits a sexual assault by applying force intentionally to another person, directly or indirectly, in circumstances of a sexual nature (criminal code, s 265(1)(a); r v. chase, [1987] 2 scr 293, at p 302; r v. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 scr 330, at para. 24). [52] the word “force” is commonly understood to mean physical strength, “violence, compulsion, or constraint exerted upon or against a person” (r v. barton, 2017 abca 216, 55 alta l.r (6th) 1, at para. 202, aff’d 2019 scc 33, citing merriam-webster dictionary (online)). however, as a legal term of art, the element of force has been interpreted to include any form of touching (r v. cuerrier, [1998] 2 scr 371, at para. 10; ewanchuk, at paras. 23-25; r v. ja, 2011 scc 28, [2011] 2 scr 440, at para. 23) put simply, although the words “touch” or “touching” and “force” are distinct, in some circumstances, including those that apply here, they mean the same thing in law. [53] many cases demonstrate that instructions on the law of sexual assault when an accused is also charged with sexual interference or invitation to sexual touching is a source of bewilderment and confusion for juries (see, eg,. tremblay; lbc;. jdc;. sl;. kdm). the question in the present case is whether the jury was correctly instructed on the relationship between the elements of force and touching. [54] viewed in isolation, parts of the trial judge’s instruction on sexual assault indicate that any form of touching could amount to force. specifically, she stated that “[f]orce includes any physical contact, even a gentle touch” (ar, at p 154) — wording that the court of appeal for ontario endorsed in sl. nevertheless, as this court stated in barton, at para. 54: when considering arguments of alleged misdirection, the appellate court must review the charge as a whole from a functional perspective, asking whether the jury was properly, not perfectly, equipped to decide the case, keeping in mind that it is the substance of the charge, not adherence to a set formula, that matters . . . . [emphasis added.] [55] having regard to the jury charge as a whole and its substance, i am satisfied that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the charge of sexual assault by leaving the jury with the mistaken impression that the element of “force” required for sexual assault was different than the element of “touching” required for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching with respect, this error was one of non-direction amounting to misdirection. [56] in instructing the jury on the sexual assault offence, the trial judge stated that the elements were: i that [rv] intentionally applied force to [the complainant]; ii that the force that [rv] intentionally applied took place in circumstances of a sexual nature. [emphasis added.] (ar, at p 153) [57] in her summary at the end of the sexual assault instruction, she stated: if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [rv] intentionally applied force to [the complainant] in circumstances of a sexual nature, you must find [rv] guilty of sexual assault. [emphasis added; p 161.] [58] after her instructions relating to sexual assault, the trial judge gave instructions on sexual interference and on invitation to sexual touching in her explanation for sexual interference, she stated that the elements were that the complainant was under 16 years old at the time, that rv “touched” the complainant and that the “touching” was for a sexual purpose (p 162) she then provided the following definition of “touching”: the contact may be direct, for example, touching with a hand or other body part, or indirect, for example, touching with an object. force is not required but accidental touching is not enough. [emphasis added; p 164.] [59] in her explanation for invitation to sexual touching, the trial judge stated that the elements were that the complainant was under 16 years old, that rv invited the complainant to “touch” his body and that the “touching” that rv invited was for a sexual purpose (p 166). she then provided the following definition of “touching”: the proposed touching must involve intentional physical contact with any part of a person’s body. force is not required but accidental touching is not enough. [emphasis added; p 168.] [60] in my respectful view, given the way the instructions were organized — an explanation of one count after another — the trial judge needed to instruct the jury on how the three offences related to each other she should have either clarified the relationship between the elements of touching and force, or simply used the word “touching” to describe all three offences. alternatively, since the trial judge chose not to provide a copy of the charge, she could have indicated on the decision tree that force and touching were, in effect, interchangeable terms. without any of these clarifications, i am satisfied that the trial judge’s non-direction amounted to misdirection. [61] this misdirection was compounded by the trial judge’s further error in leaving simple assault as an available verdict to the jury. in her instructions, she stated: if you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [rv] intentionally applied force to [the complainant] in circumstances of a sexual nature, you must find [rv] not guilty of sexual assault, but guilty of assault. [emphasis added; p 161.] [62] not only did the trial judge instruct the jury on simple assault, she also included simple assault as an available verdict on the decision tree on sexual assault: (ar, at p 223) [63] rather than correcting this error when the jury sent a question about the discrepancy between the decision tree on sexual assault and the verdict sheet, the trial judge deepened the error by adding simple assault to the verdict sheet. the inclusion of simple assault in the decision tree and verdict sheet emphasized the difference between the use of the word “force” for sexual assault and the use of “touching” for the other two offences. further, the decision tree repeatedly identified the requisite conduct for sexual and simple assault as “force”. [64] i appreciate that the trial judge relied on pattern instructions. trial judges understandably rely heavily on such instructions. however, pattern instructions are not a panacea: they must be molded to reflect the intricacies of each case (r v. mack, 2014 scc 58, [2014] 3 scr 3, at paras. 48-50; r v. rodgerson, 2015 scc 38, [2015] 2 scr 760, at paras. 51-52; r v. jacquard, [1997] 1 scr 314, at para. 13). to the extent that pattern instructions are inapplicable to the facts or law at issue, they must be adjusted. in particular, trial judges must be careful to not put verdicts to the jury that do not arise on the evidence (r v. haughton (1992), 11 or (3d) 621 (ca), at p 625, aff’d [1994] 3 scr 516) further, trial judges should avoid relying on pattern instructions that use the word “force” in sexual assault and “touching” in sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching because such instructions encourage confusion and erroneous reasoning for these reasons, the trial judge’s reliance on pattern instructions was no insulation from legal error. [65] based on all of the foregoing, i am able to conclude with a high degree of certainty that the jury did not understand that any form of touching constituted the force required to make out the offence of sexual assault. in the circumstances of this case, it was essential that the jury be disabused of the notion that force is, in law, different from touching. the trial judge did not do so here. respectfully, this non-direction amounted to a legal error. (2) the legal error was material and isolated to the acquittal, and it reconciles the apparent inconsistency [66] the legal error led the jury to return a verdict of acquittal on the sexual assault charge. the jury mistakenly believed that sexual assault, but not the other two charges, required force beyond mere touching. as a result, the jury acquitted rv of sexual assault: they were not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he applied force, in the colloquial sense, to the complainant. on the same evidence, they convicted the accused of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching because they were satisfied that he touched the complainant in circumstances of a sexual nature. [67] importantly, retracing the jury’s reasoning in this way does not involve speculation or conjecture. the instructions explain exactly how the jury came to their verdict on the sexual assault charge: if you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [rv] intentionally applied force to [the complainant], you must find him not guilty your deliberations would be over. [emphasis added.] (ar, at p 159) [68] this was the only basis upon which the jury could have acquitted rv of sexual assault. the jury was instructed by the trial judge and by the decision tree that if they were not satisfied on the second element of sexual assault — whether the force was applied in circumstances of a sexual nature — the final verdict would be not guilty of sexual assault but guilty of assault. since the jury did not find rv guilty of simple assault, the rational inference is that they were not satisfied of the force element and acquitted rv on that basis. [69] further, the legal error was isolated to the acquittal the trial judge’s instructions on sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching were legally correct in that the jury was properly instructed on the essential elements of those offences and on the evidence the error in the instruction on sexual assault did not colour the instructions on the remaining offences. i can thus conclude, to a high degree of certainty, that the error pertained solely to the sexual assault charge, not to the sexual interference or sexual invitation charges. [70] finally, the legal error reconciles the apparent inconsistency in that the jury did not find rv both guilty and not guilty of the same conduct. the jury found rv. guilty of sexual touching. it found him not guilty of applying force, in the colloquial sense, to the complainant in circumstances of a sexual nature. force beyond touching was lacking, hence the acquittal; mere touching was not lacking, hence the convictions. those two findings are consistent. [71] in sum, the framework i have set out is satisfied and accordingly the convictions are not actually inconsistent with the acquittal. [72] since i have found that the verdicts are not actually inconsistent, the convictions are not unreasonable on that basis. rv does not allege any other basis by which his convictions might be unreasonable, and for good reason: they are supportable on the evidence tendered at trial and consistent with the jury instructions on those two offences. accordingly, rv’s appeal from his convictions should have been dismissed. (3) the applicable remedy [73] i turn now to the appropriate disposition for the sexual assault charge. as i explained, the ordinary remedy in cases such as this — where the crown has cross-appealed and reconciled the inconsistent verdicts by isolating an error of law to the acquittal — is to let the conviction stand and send just the acquittal back for retrial. however, the circumstances of this case justify the court entering a stay of the proceeding rather than ordering a retrial. [74] under s 686(8) of the criminal code, a court of appeal has the power whenever it exercises “any of the powers conferred by subsection (2), (4), (6) or (7) . . . [to] make any order, in addition, that justice requires” the criminal code also vests that power in this court (s 695(1)). for an appellate court to issue an order under its s 686(8) residual power, three requirements must be met (r v. thomas, [1998] 3 scr 535). first, the court must have exercised one of the triggering powers conferred under s 686(2), (4), (6) or (7) second, the order issued must be ancillary to the triggering power. consistent with the provision’s “broad remedial purpose”, this court has taken a flexible approach in determining whether the order is “in addition” to the exercise of the triggering power (r v hinse, [1995] 4 scr 597, at para. 30) in particular, the additional order need not directly advance the exercise of the triggering power (hinse, at paras. 31-32; see, eg,. r v power, [1994] 1 scr 601, at pp. 615-18; r v. provo, [1989] 2 scr 3, at pp. 19-21; terlecki v. the queen, [1985] 2 scr 483, at pp. 483-84) it is enough that the ancillary order not be “at direct variance with the court’s underlying judgment” (thomas, at para. 17; see also r v. warsing, [1998] 3 scr 579, at paras. 72-74). third and finally, the order must be one that “justice requires”. [75] here, the three requirements justify ordering a stay of proceedings on the sexual assault charge. first, the court’s s 686(8) residual jurisdiction is triggered by allowing the crown’s appeal and setting aside the acquittal under s 686(4)(b). section 686(8) provides for residual jurisdiction where the appellate court “exercises any of the powers conferred by subsection . . . (4)” allowing an appeal and setting aside the verdict of acquittal constitutes one of those powers it therefore triggers s 686(8) jurisdiction even without a further order of new trial (r v bellusci, 2012 scc 44, [2012] 2 scr 509, at para. 39; r v. smith, 2004 scc 14, [2004] 1 scr 385, at para. 22). [76] consistent with the second requirement, ordering a stay would be ancillary to the triggering power under s 686(4). staying the proceeding would not be at direct variance with the judgment setting aside the acquittal. this court has previously held that an ancillary order is at direct variance with the underlying judgment when an appellate court sets aside a conviction and orders a retrial limited to entering one of two possible convictions (warsing, at para. 73). because setting aside a conviction returns the accused to a condition of presumptive innocence, an appellate court does not have jurisdiction under s 686(8) to set aside a conviction and then deny the jury the option of finding the accused not guilty (thomas, at para. 22). however, staying a proceeding is not at odds with setting aside an acquittal. setting aside an acquittal, like setting aside a conviction, puts the accused in a position of presumptive innocence. as staying a proceeding is tantamount to a finding of not guilty, it is perfectly consistent with the presumptive innocence that attaches when this court sets aside the acquittal (r v. jewitt, [1985] 2 scr 128, at pp. 147-48; r v kalanj, [1989] 1 scr 1594, at p 1601; r v. puskas, [1998] 1 scr 1207, at para. 1). ordering a stay is therefore “in addition” to — that is, ancillary to — the power exercised under s 686(4). [77] finally, justice requires a stay of this proceeding before the court of appeal, the crown represented that it would not seek to retry the sexual assault charge in the event of a retrial order (para. 179, per rouleau ja, dissenting). it has repeated that representation before this court (transcript, at p 44). bearing that in mind, i am satisfied that ordering a retrial on the sexual assault charge would needlessly risk an abuse of process application (see jewitt, at p 148). it would also bring no benefit to the administration of justice. taking those factors together, justice requires a stay rather than sending the charge back for retrial. v conclusion [78] it is incumbent upon the crown as a participant in the justice system to make the trial process less burdensome, not more. the crown fails in that regard when it proceeds with duplicative counts. doing so not only increases the length of the trial; it also places a greater burden on trial judges and juries by increasing, as it does, the complexity of jury instructions (rodgerson, at para. 46). drafting jury instructions is difficult trial judges must deal with pressures to ensure the instructions are comprehensive and comprehensible, despite limited resources and time constraints (rodgerson, at para. 50). [79] moreover, as the court of appeal majority observed, correctly in my view, the crown proceeding on duplicative counts, in jury trials such as this one, is a recipe for inconsistent verdicts. such duplication is particularly illogical where, as here, this court’s decision in kienapple v. the queen, [1975] 1 scr 729, will result in at least one of the charges being stayed at the sentencing stage. the framework i have described outlines a solution to the problem presented by inconsistent verdicts, but the optimal solution would be for the crown to avoid needless duplication in the first place (rodgerson, at para. 45). [80] the crown’s appeal is allowed, the court of appeal’s order is set aside, and rv’s convictions are restored. the acquittal on rv’s charge of sexual assault is set aside and the proceeding on that charge is stayed, and the matter is remitted to the court of appeal for rv’s sentence appeal. the reasons of brown and kasirer jj. were delivered by brown j — [81] that the verdicts in this case are inconsistent is not in dispute. what divides us is what to do about it ⸺ or, more precisely, what a court can and cannot do about it our jurisprudence and the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, compel an inescapable, if unfortunate, result: a new trial on all three charges. my colleagues find such a result unpalatable ⸺ so unpalatable, that they seek to escape the otherwise inescapable by effectively overruling aspects of the relevant jurisprudence (notably, r. v jf, 2008 scc 60, [2008] 3 scr 215), and eliding the limits of the code ⸺ indeed, re-writing (or, more accurately, re-legislating) one of the code’s limits on curial jurisdiction. [82] specifically, my colleagues restore the respondent’s convictions on the basis that the verdicts are not inconsistent in the minds of the jury, and are therefore reasonable. but this ignores that the inconsistency of the verdicts is the very reason this appeal is before us. again, there is no dispute that the verdicts are inconsistent. and yet, the fact of the inconsistency sends my colleagues off on a search to discover why the inconsistency exists this is possible, they say, because what matters is not the actual legal elements of the offences themselves, but instead how they were likely understood in the minds of the jury ⸺ as can best be guessed by the reviewing court. and having pasted together a plausible explanation for why the jury reached inconsistent verdicts, it follows (ex hypothesi) that what appear to be inconsistent verdicts are no longer inconsistent: they are reconcilable, by pointing to misdirection. [83] this, however, ignores the appeals scheme of the criminal code and the law as it stands, which make clear that it simply does not matter why the inconsistency exists, or whether it can be explained away with a “high degree of certainty” (majority reasons, at para. 33). to explain, the code codifies the common law rule of jury secrecy and provides asymmetrical rights of appeal to a convicted person and the crown (s 649 and r v. pan, 2001 scc 42, [2001] 2 scr 344; ss. 675 and 676). these rules inform the remedies available on appeal, which depend on whether an appeal is from a conviction or an acquittal, and whether an appeal is from the verdict of a judge alone or a jury (ss. 686(2) to (4)). to succeed on an appeal from acquittal, the crown must establish legal error that “might reasonably be thought, in the concrete reality of the case at hand, to have had a material bearing” on the verdict (r v. graveline, 2006 scc 16, [2006] 1 scr 609, at para. 14) and, of significance here, where the crown successfully appeals from a verdict of acquittal by a jury, the only available remedy is a new trial (s 686(4)(b)(i)). [84] it is plain from this scheme that parliament’s crafting of the appeals provisions in the code was governed by a fundamental truth about jury trials: we can never know for certain how a jury reached its verdict. a reviewing court can, of course, examine the verdict and the record, including the evidence, the arguments of counsel and the instructions of the trial judge. but a reviewing court cannot inquire into the jury’s reasons for arriving at the verdict (pan, at para. 46) this is why, where the crown successfully establishes legal error that meets the graveline threshold, a conviction cannot be substituted for the acquittal. again, parliament, in specifying a new trial as the sole remedy, proceeded on the basis that ⸺ unlike in a judge alone trial ⸺ a reviewing court can only speculate about why the jury acquitted the accused. as a majority of this court said in r v. morin, [1988] 2 scr 345, at p 374, it cannot “predict with certainty what happened in the jury room”. [85] the significance of all of this is as follows: my colleagues think they know the precise effect and extent of the trial judge’s legal error in misdirecting the jury. but while they may think they know this (even to the “high degree of certainty” that they claim), and while i may think that my colleagues’ suppositions may well have merit, none of this matters in crafting the code’s provisions governing appeals from jury verdicts, parliament did not care about the degrees of certainty at the reviewing court. what parliament thought significant is that the absence of reasons for judgment by a jury means a reviewing court can never be certain what was in the minds of the jury. my colleagues undermine that clear legislative intent. [86] my colleagues’ line of reasoning also does violence to jf. they dispute this, saying that jf (and, for that matter, r v. pittiman, 2006 scc 9, [2006] 1 scr. 381) should not be read as precluding the review of jury instructions in assessing the consistency of verdicts. but that is not the issue here, and indeed nobody suggests such a reading in pittiman and jf, proper instruction is said to be presumed for the purposes of determining whether the verdicts are actually legally inconsistent. this is the basis on which a reviewing court can determine, as here, that a conviction for sexual interference and an acquittal for sexual assault arising out of the same delict are fundamentally inconsistent. [87] but my colleagues also say ⸺ and here they do run afoul of jf, their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding ⸺ that jf does not preclude an inquiry into why a jury returned inconsistent verdicts, pointing to the absence of a clear error in the jury instructions in that case as explaining why the court could not embark upon the same inquiry that my colleagues do here. this is a plainly erroneous reading of fish j.’s reasoning for the court in that case, where he wrote that “[i]n any event, as a matter of legal process and the legitimacy of verdicts, i would decline to uphold the respondent’s conviction on the ground that it can be reconciled with his acquittal on another count of the same indictment on the basis of a legal error at trial” (para. 21 (underlining added)). the insertion of the phrase “in any event” could not be clearer: the existence of a legal error does not reconcile inconsistent verdicts. that is an aspect of j.f which my colleagues, albeit without acknowledging as much, effectively overrule. [88] the novelty of the framework now developed by my colleagues is revealed in their analogy to the reasoning of paciocco ja in r v. plein, 2018 onca 748, 365 ccc (3d) 437, wherein he held that “close examination of the trial judge’s reasons for judgment and court record [may provide a] rational or logical basis that can reconcile the verdicts” (para. 28 (emphasis added)). but, as his reasons indicate, that was a case in which a judge, sitting alone, rendered inconsistent verdicts. at the risk of stating the obvious, this is inapplicable to juries. but my colleagues are undeterred: “. . . so long as the reviewing court is able to retrace the jury’s reasoning to the high degree of certainty required”, the appellate review is akin to considering the reasons of a trial judge (para. 39 (emphasis added)). but retracing a jury’s reasoning, irrespective of the “degree of certainty”, is a type of review that: (1) parliament has precluded; (2) this court has never sanctioned; and (3) is, as a practical matter, impossible. on that last point ⸺ practical impossibility ⸺ my colleagues’ framework requires a reviewing court to be able to “exclude all other reasonable explanations for how the jury rendered its verdicts” (para. 35). but of course, that will never be possible. the best they can do is guess. and here, the possibility that the jury could have nullified or compromised (concluding, for example, that two convictions for approximately the same delict were sufficient, and three excessive) is, on my colleagues’ guess, unreasonable, and thus ruled out. [89] my colleagues respond by stating that commonplace appellate matters “requir[e] a reviewing court to consider . . . whether [jury members] might reasonably have changed their minds if the trial had unfolded differently” (para. 37), and point to (inter alia) the graveline threshold of whether an error might reasonably be thought to have affected the result. this is, of course, true. but that proposition is not what divides us here. pointing to instances that require reviewing courts to consider whether an error or omission might reasonably be thought to have affected the result (and, if so, whether a new trial should follow) is a distraction my colleagues, with respect, are doing something quite different specifically, they say that, despite convictions and an acquittal for the same delict, and despite the existence of a legal error at trial, it is possible for them to conclude that the jury certainly thought the respondent is guilty. there is a world of difference between an appellate court saying (1) “this error, viewed objectively, may have made a difference to the jury”, and (2) “i know what this jury, viewed subjectively, was thinking” the latter is unprecedented indeed, were this simply the “routine” matter that my colleagues say it is (at para. 38), they would not have to invent a new framework ⸺ let alone a new framework that breaks from this court’s precedent ⸺ to do it. [90] my colleagues go further still to avoid being taken as having overruled jf. on this point, insisting that nothing in their analysis “suggests that an error of law in the instructions to the jury necessarily makes improper verdicts proper or inconsistent verdicts consistent” ⸺ which would, of course, be contradictory to jf ⸺ because “[i]f the error can be isolated to the acquittal, it is not the error itself that reconciles the verdicts, but rather the further determination that the error did not affect the conviction” (para. 40). but there is simply no meaningful difference between (1) finding that an error reconciles inconsistent verdicts, and (2) finding them reconciled by the “determination that the error did not affect the conviction”. under their framework of analysis, an error is found, the jury’s reasoning is (somehow) carefully retraced and reconstructed, and a determination is made that ⸺ in the jury’s minds ⸺ the offences were different. the error reconciles the inconsistent verdicts. [91] my colleagues conclude as much here, finding that in this case “the legal error reconciles the apparent inconsistency” (para. 70) this holding is manifestly inconsistent with jf, where fish j wrote that “[i]mproper instructions do not make . . . inconsistent verdicts consistent” (para. 23). it is also at odds with pittiman, where charron j offered the following routes to reconcile potentially inconsistent verdicts in the case of a single accused charged with multiple offences: the offences may be “temporally distinct, or . . . qualitatively different, or dependent on the credibility of different complainants or witnesses” (para. 8) i note the omission in charron j.’s reasons of any reference to considering jury instructions; indeed, it could not have occurred to her to do so, since (until now) verdicts like those in the case at bar were considered actually inconsistent, not potentially or apparently inconsistent. [92] in restoring the respondent’s convictions, my colleagues say that this will be a rare result. i disagree. the result they reach is an invitation to routine speculation into the reasoning process of the jury, something (again) that the criminal code ⸺ by its provisions regarding crown appeals from jury verdicts ⸺ specifically precludes. it will invite confirmation bias: the verdicts are inconsistent and the jury was misdirected, and so therefore the misdirection must explain away the inconsistency just as importantly, it does not discourage the crown from over-charging or drafting confusing indictments; if anything, it does the opposite, by eliminating any consequences. none of this is desirable ⸺ and yet, by ignoring the clear requirements of this court’s judgments and the criminal code, this is precisely what my colleagues’ reasons will achieve. [93] i turn, then, to the question of the remedy to be given here where a convicted person establishes that jury verdicts are unreasonable on the basis of inconsistency, a new trial will usually be the appropriate remedy (pittiman, at para. 14). the only other available remedy is an acquittal (s 686(2)(a)) which remedy is appropriate depends entirely on the outcome of the crown appeal from acquittal. [94] when deciding a crown appeal from an acquittal by a jury, an appellate court may either (1) dismiss the appeal, or (2) allow the appeal, set aside the verdict, and order a new trial (s 686(4)). where the crown can establish legal error that might reasonably be thought to have affected the result (graveline, at para. 14), the remedy of a new trial ⸺ and the unavailability of a substituted guilty verdict ⸺ is consistent with the criminal code, the common law, and the intention of parliament. [95] my colleagues strain to avoid this reality, but it comes down to this: the law provides an answer to the very situation before us. since pittiman and jf, the law has not changed the only thing that has changed is that my colleagues are now presented with a case where they find the law’s operation leads to a result which they are unable to accept. but their reasoning ignores the legal process and legitimacy of verdicts concerns underlying jf and pittiman. [96] my colleagues rely on ss. 686(4)(b) and 686(8) to allow the crown appeal and enter a stay. while s 686(8) empowers an appellate court, where exercising the powers under s 686(4), to “make any order, in addition, that justice requires”, my colleagues depart from the strictures of this provision. my colleagues are not making an additional order under s 686(4), but are instead making an alternative order. this is unsanctioned by the criminal code. in exercising a power not found in s 686, my colleagues are legislating themselves a discretion that parliament did not. [97] it is of course true that in r v. bellusci, 2012 scc 44, [2012] 2 scr 509, fish j held, in obiter, that, with respect to s 686(4), “an appellate court need not order a new trial or enter a verdict of guilty in order to trigger the application of s 686(8)” (para. 39). in that case, fish j concluded that s 686(8) authorizes an appellate court to order a continuation of a trial, as opposed to a new trial. it is also true that s 686(8) allows an appellate court to enter a stay when an acquittal is set aside but further proceedings would constitute an abuse of process (r v. hinse, [1995] 4 scr 597, at paras. 22-23). but s 686(8) still requires that the order be fundamentally ancillary and supplemental ⸺ not alternative ⸺ and not at direct variance with the underlying judgment (hinse, at para. 31; r v. thomas, [1998] 3 scr 535, at para. 17). [98] my colleagues find that those requirements are met here because a stay is tantamount to a finding of not guilty which, they say, is perfectly consistent with the position of presumptive innocence to which the respondent is restored following the setting aside of the acquittal but this fails to account for the majority’s underlying judgment in this case, which also includes restoring convictions for the same delict on the basis that they were untainted by legal error. issuing an order that is tantamount to a finding of not guilty ⸺ and one that purports to restore the presumptive innocence of the respondent ⸺ is totally inconsistent with the majority’s underlying judgment that affirms the respondent’s guilt of the very same criminal conduct. [99] in entering a stay, my colleagues rely on the assurance of the crown that it would not proceed with a new trial on the sexual assault charge this assurance, however, has no legal significance whatsoever. had the crown not made this assurance, what would my colleagues have done? in fairness, i acknowledge they attempt to answer this in a normal case ⸺ in which the crown has appealed an inconsistent acquittal and not made any assurances of not pursuing a new trial, and where a reviewing court can isolate the effects of a legal error to the acquittal and conclude that the conviction is unaffected ⸺ my colleagues say the solution should be to send the acquittal back for a retrial, leaving the conviction to stand. they acknowledge that the issue of res judicata, including the plea of autrefois convict and s 11(h) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, might arise. but with respect, this ignores the problem that my colleagues’ framework creates. where an accused chooses not to plead autrefois convict or raise a s 11(h) challenge (and absent the crown’s assurance that it will not proceed with a new trial), my colleagues’ solution places the accused in jeopardy for an offence for which he or she already stands convicted, raising the prospect of ⸺ if a trial actually proceeds ⸺ a jury rendering inconsistent verdicts once again. [100] that said, i am content with my colleagues’ proposal to leave the question of the necessity of a crown appeal undecided until that issue comes squarely before us. [101] appellate courts like ours operate within certain statutory constraints when deciding a crown appeal from an acquittal by a jury. it is for this reason that, on an appeal from acquittal by a jury, this court has described the question as merely whether a misdirection “might reasonably be thought, in the concrete reality of the case at hand, to have had a material bearing on the acquittal” (graveline, at para. 14) this also explains why parliament’s chosen remedy, where that threshold is met, is a new trial. [102] of course, my colleagues’ difficulty in ordering a new trial on the sexual assault charge is that they also wish to restore the convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, which are plainly inconsistent with the acquittal. but avoiding this difficulty is precisely why this court has previously described the appropriate disposition in these circumstances ⸺ that is, where the crown has appealed from an acquittal on the basis that it is inconsistent with a conviction on another charge ⸺ as being a new trial on all charges (pittiman, at para. 14; jf, at paras. 40-41). [103] that is what is required here. i agree with my colleagues that the jury was misdirected in this case on the basis of the confusing charge, the discrepancy between the decision tree and the verdict sheet, the fact that common assault was said to be an available verdict, and overreliance on model jury instructions (r v. hebert, [1996] 2 scr 272, at para. 8; r v. rodgerson, 2015 scc 38, [2015] 2 scr 760, at para. 51). i also agree that this misdirection amounted to legal error that might reasonably be thought to have had a material bearing on the acquittal (graveline, at para. 14) it follows that the only available remedy in response to the crown appeal is the order of a new trial. but to order a new trial on one count and not the others is to put the respondent in jeopardy for something for which he was convicted (and then, following the court of appeal for ontario decision, acquitted). i would therefore allow the appeal in part and order a new trial on all three charges. appeal allowed, brown and kasirer jj. dissenting in part. solicitor general, appeals, education & prosecution policy branch, edmonton.
[1] these appeals raise issues of fundamental importance to the rights and liabilities of canadian universities and their students under the copyright act.1 background [2] access copyright is a collective society under the copyright act it licences and administers reproduction rights in published literary works throughout canada, with the exception of quebec, on behalf of creators and publishers who own the copyright in those works access copyright is not an assignee or an exclusive licensee of the copyright held by its members, which means that access copyright does not have the right to sue for infringement of its members’ copyright and that access copyright’s members are free to licence their rights to users directly or through intermediaries other than access copyright. [3] york university is the third largest university in canada. it consists of 11 faculties providing undergraduate, graduate, and professional programs and courses taught primarily at 2 campuses in toronto. at the time of the trial, york had over 3,000 full and part-time faculty and over 45,000 full-time equivalent students york was established by the government of ontario through the york university act, 1959, 1 unless otherwise stated, the provisions referenced throughout these reasons are to the version of the copyright act, rsc 1985, c. c-42, in force at the time of trial and judgment, prior to the coming into force of the budget implementation act, 2018, no. 2, sc 2018, c 27, which amended certain parts of the collective administration regime. so 1959, c 145, and continued under the york university act, 1965, so 1965, c 143. its statutory objectives are “the advancement of learning and the dissemination of knowledge” and “the intellectual, spiritual, social, moral and physical development of its members and the betterment of society” (s 4 of the york university act, 1965). [4] those who teach at york university select and make available copies of published works, including works falling within access copyright’s repertoire, to students enrolled in courses for educational purposes learning materials are distributed through two main methods: course packs and the learning management system. a course pack is a compilation of printed materials, printed internally at york or through external printshops. the learning management system is an online platform through which instructors can make course materials available to their students electronically. [5] from 1994 to 2010, access copyright and york maintained a steady legal relationship pursuant to the terms of a licence agreement which permitted professors at york to make copies of published works in access copyright’s repertoire and set the applicable royalties by 2010, the royalties payable to access copyright under the licence consisted of an annual blanket fee of $3.38 per full-time equivalent student in addition to $0.10 per page copied into a course pack for sale or distribution to students. access copyright would collect these royalties and distribute payments to its members, and conduct any usage monitoring incidental to the licence. the agreement between access copyright and york reflected a “model licence” negotiated by the association of universities and colleges of canada, and all members of the aucc were likewise licensed by access copyright. [6] the relationship between access copyright and york deteriorated as licence renewal negotiations were underway in 2010, with the acrimony eventually culminating in the appeals before this court. access copyright says that york started freely using materials it was obliged to pay for and that it failed to negotiate in good faith. york responded that the precipitating factors were based on legitimate decisions to obtain usage rights from sources other than access copyright and to make more complete use of its legal entitlement to fair dealing. [7] unsure that it would be able to reach an agreement with york before the expiry of its licence in january 2011, access copyright filed a proposed tariff with the copyright board of canada in march 2010 for post-secondary educational institutions covering the years 2011-2013 the proposed tariff contemplated an increase in the annual blanket fee to $45 per full-time equivalent student for use of the works within access copyright’s repertoire, without a per page rate. this would have amounted to a flat annual fee of over two million dollars payable by york. [8] access copyright’s view was that board approval of a tariff would create a mandatory legal relationship between access copyright and york (and other universities), effectively supplanting the voluntary licensing agreement that had set out the parties’ rights and liabilities for the preceding 16 years. in access copyright’s view, the full amount of the approved royalties would be payable by york as soon as york made a single infringing use of a work within access copyright’s repertoire, regardless of whether or not york agreed to be bound by a licence on the approved terms. [9] access copyright’s proposed tariff was published in the canada gazette. just over 100 individuals and institutions filed objections. [10] in light of the rapidly approaching licence expiry date, access copyright applied to the copyright board in october 2010 asking it to certify a tariff on an interim basis, generally matching the pre-existing licence agreement, to operate from january 1, 2011 until the board approved a final tariff. on december 23, 2010, the board granted access copyright’s request for an interim tariff, based on the previous licence agreement royalty rate of $0.10 per page for course packs and $3.38 per full- time equivalent student (reprographic reproduction 2011-2013, interim statement of royalties to be collected by access copyright (post-secondary educational institutions) (re) (2011), 92 cpr (4th) 434). [11] after the interim tariff took effect on january 1, 2011, york initially paid the approved royalties. but in july 2011, prior to the start of the academic year, york informed access copyright that it would not continue as a licensee. york claimed that its copying activities involving access copyright’s repertoire constituted fair dealing and, in any event, the interim tariff was not enforceable against it. [12] a hearing was held by the board in january 2016. york and some other universities had withdrawn from the proceedings in april 2012 and were not represented at the hearing. on december 6, 2019, the board approved final tariffs for the years 2011-2017 (statements of royalties to be collected by access copyright for the reprographic reproduction, in canada, of works in its repertoire, cb-cda 2019- 082 (online)). the royalties for universities were fixed at a blanket rate of $24.80 per full-time equivalent student from 2011-2014 and $14.31 per full-time equivalent student from 2015-2017. [13] in its decision, the board did not comment on whether the tariffs created a mandatory legal relationship between access copyright and universities who do not sign a licensing agreement. [14] access copyright went to the federal court to enforce the interim tariff for copying activities engaged in by york and its employees from september 1, 2011 to december 31, 2013. access copyright identified cases of copying conducted by 5 professors involving 87 works within access copyright’s repertoire it claimed that this copying was not licensed or exempted by the concept of fair dealing. accordingly, it said, york was liable to pay, in full, the royalties set out in the interim tariff. york said that the tariff was not enforceable against it because, among other reasons, york had not agreed to be bound by its terms. [15] york counterclaimed for a declaration that any copying conducted within its “fair dealing guidelines for york faculty and staff”, issued november 13, 2012, was protected by the fair dealing rights in ss. 29, 29.1 and 29.2 of the act. [16] at the federal court, the case management judge bifurcated the trial into two phases phase i included all issues relating to whether the interim tariff was enforceable against york; whether york was responsible for the copying activities of the five professors; and york’s counterclaim that it was entitled to a declaration that “any reproductions made that fall within the guidelines set out in york’s ‘fair dealing guidelines for york faculty and staff (11/13/12)’ . . constitute fair dealing” the amount of unauthorized copying and york’s quantum of liability under the tariff was to be determined at phase ii, if necessary. these appeals arise solely from phase i of the trial. [17] the trial judge found that the interim tariff was enforceable against york and that neither its fair dealing guidelines nor its actual practices constituted fair dealing (2017 fc 669, [2018] 2 fcr 43). [18] the federal court of appeal allowed york’s appeal on the tariff enforcement action but dismissed its appeal on the fair dealing counterclaim. the court held that board approved tariffs are voluntary for users. if a user who chooses not to be licensed under a tariff makes an unauthorized use of a work, the remedy is an infringement action which access copyright does not have standing to assert because it does not own the copyright in any of the works and is not an exclusive licensee or an assignee. while this disposed of the dispute between the parties, the court went on to evaluate york’s appeal on the fair dealing counterclaim. it concluded that york could not establish that all copying within its guidelines is fair and refused to issue the declaration (2020 fca 77, 174 cpr (4th) 1). [19] for the following reasons, i agree with the federal court of appeal that the tariff is not enforceable against york university but i would not grant york’s requested declaration, nor endorse the fair dealing analysis conducted by the federal court and the federal court of appeal. analysis [20] the question on access copyright’s appeal is whether s 68.2(1) of the copyright act empowers access copyright to enforce royalty payments set out in a copyright board approved tariff against a user who chooses not to be bound by a licence on the approved terms more specifically, the issue is whether access copyright can extract from york the royalties set out in the interim tariff despite the fact that york chose not to be bound by a licence. while this appeal only concerns the interim tariff, it is common ground that the effect of an interim tariff and a final tariff is the same. [21] as a collective society that administers a licensing scheme in respect of reproduction rights applicable to its repertoire of published works, access copyright operates within the act’s regime for “collective administration in relation to rights under sections 3, 15, 18 and 21”, known as the “general regime” (ss. 70.1 to 706). [22] pursuant to s 70.12, a collective society operating in the general regime may, “for the purpose of setting out by licence the royalties and terms and conditions relating to classes of uses”, either (a) file a proposed tariff with the board or (b) enter into agreements with users. a collective society that chooses to file a proposed tariff does so under s 70.13, which permits it to “file with the board a proposed tariff . . . of royalties to be collected by the collective society for issuing licences” in this case, access copyright filed a proposed tariff with the board setting out the royalties it proposed to collect for issuing reproduction licences to post-secondary educational institutions. [23] when a collective society files a proposed tariff with the board, s 70.15(1) requires the board to “certify the tariffs as approved, with such alterations to the royalties and to the terms and conditions related thereto as the board considers necessary, having regard to any objections to the tariffs”. here, the board approved an interim tariff in response to access copyright’s proposal. [24] the board’s power to modify and approve a collective society’s proposed tariff is one of three sources of the board’s supervisory and price-setting authority over a collective society’s royalties in the general regime. the board may also fix royalties when a collective society and individual user are unable to agree on terms and one party applies to the board (ss. 70.2 to 70.4), or alter royalties if the parties make an agreement without board intervention that is then filed with the board (ss. 70.5 to 706). [25] once a tariff is approved under s 70.15(1), the resulting legal consequences are established by ss. 70.15(2) and 7017. [26] section 70.15(2) says that s 68.2(1), which is found in the act’s separate regime for the collective administration of performing rights and communication rights, applies “with such modifications as the circumstances require”: 68.2 (1) without prejudice to any other remedies available to it, a collective society may, for the period specified in its approved tariff, collect the royalties specified in the tariff and, in default of their payment, recover them in a court of competent jurisdiction. [27] of related relevance is s 70.17, which states: 70.17 subject to section 70.19, no proceedings may be brought for the infringement of a right referred to in section 3, 15, 18 or 21 against a person who has paid or offered to pay the royalties specified in an approved tariff. [28] the issue in this case is one of statutory interpretation, which, as this court has repeatedly said, is an exercise in discerning legislative intent by looking at the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the text in the context of the statute’s scheme and objectives. [29] access copyright argues that s 68.2(1), incorporated by reference in s 70.15(2), means that any person who makes an otherwise unauthorized use of a work captured by an approved tariff is liable to be sued for royalties, regardless of whether the user agrees to be bound by a licence on the approved terms. this is known as the “mandatory tariff” theory. in this case, that means that any use of a work in access copyright’s repertoire that was not separately licensed or authorized by fair dealing would trigger york’s liability to pay the full annual blanket rate of $3.38 per full-time equivalent student (and by extension the substantially higher rates approved under the final tariffs), in addition to the per-page rate applicable to course pack copies. a single unauthorized use would result in liability to pay six figure annual fees under the interim tariff, and over one million dollars per year under the 2011-2014 final tariff. [30] york rejects the mandatory tariff theory. in its view, s 68.2(1) only grants a collective society the right to collect defaulted payments from a user who has agreed to be bound by a licence on the approved terms a collective society is required to provide licences pursuant to the terms of an approved tariff, since s 70.17 immunizes a person who pays or offers to pay the royalties from an infringement action. but the licence cannot be forced on a user. a user is entitled to obtain its rights through other means and, if the user makes an unauthorized use, the appropriate remedy is an action for infringement (see generally ariel katz, “spectre: canadian copyright and the mandatory tariff — part i” (2015), 27 ipj 151 (“spectre i”), and ariel katz, “spectre: canadian copyright and the mandatory tariff — part ii” (2015), 28 ipj. 39 (“spectre ii”)). while access copyright’s inability to initiate infringement actions in respect of its repertoire may cause it difficulties, this is the consequence of its freely chosen contractual arrangements with its members. section 68.2(1) does not provide a collective infringement remedy. i agree. [31] the analysis starts with the text of s 682(1). the provision is silent on who the collective society may collect royalties from and on what conditions. access copyright argues nonetheless that its “plain meaning” is that a board approved tariff is mandatory. access copyright reads words into the provision, positing that a collective society may sue for unpaid royalties against a user who makes a use of a work within the society’s repertoire when the use is not separately licensed or exempted by fair dealing, conditions that are found nowhere in the text of the act. [32] where parliament sees fit to create a mandatory duty to pay, it does so with “clear and distinct legal authority showing that this was parliament’s intent” (canadian broadcasting corp v sodrac 2003 inc., [2015] 3 scr 615, at para. 107, per rothstein j). under s 19, for example, a performer is “entitled . . . to be paid equitable remuneration” and a user is “liable to pay royalties” under s 81, eligible authors, performers and makers have a “right to receive remuneration” from manufacturers and importers of blank media, and s 82(1) prescribes a corresponding duty to pay, stating that manufacturers and importers are “liable . . . to pay a levy to the collecting body”. there is no such language creating a duty to pay approved royalties to a collective society that operates a licensing scheme anywhere in the act. [33] turning to the legislative context, the combined effect of ss. 68.2(1) and 70.17 creates a dichotomy between users who choose to be licensed pursuant to the terms of a board approved tariff, and those who choose not to acquire a licence but may be liable for damages for infringement. [34] copyright infringement constitutes an unauthorized exercise of the owner’s exclusive right (s 27), and a licence constitutes an authorization to make a particular use that would otherwise be infringing (elizabeth f judge and daniel j. gervais, intellectual property: the law in canada (2nd ed. 2011), at p 146; eli lilly & co v novopharm ltd., [1998] 2 scr 129, at para. 49, per iacobucci j.) it is therefore “elementary” that a person cannot simultaneously be an infringer and a licensee (composers, authors and publishers association of canada, ltd. v. sandholm holdings ltd., [1955] ex. cr 244, at p 254). in the context of the provisions at issue in this case, a person who has paid or offered to pay the royalties under s 70.17 has become a licensee and may be liable for defaulted payments under s 682(1). a person who has not paid or offered to pay is not licensed and may be liable for infringement. [35] section 68.2(1) ensures that a collective society has a remedy for defaulted payments from voluntary licensees and that actions for recovery can be brought in federal court (see sandholm holdings ltd., at pp. 249-50). [36] this court’s decision in sodrac provides direct support for this interpretation of ss. 68.2(1) and 7017. sodrac involved the effect of ss. 70.2 to 70.4 of the act, which apply when a collective society and a specific individual user are unable to agree on licensing royalties. either party may apply to the board (s 70.2(1)), and the board “may fix the royalties and their related terms and conditions in respect of a licence” (s 702(2)). unlike a general tariff proposed under s 70.13 and approved under s 70.15, the board’s royalty fixing role in this context is limited to the specific parties before it if the board fixes royalties, then s 70.4 sets out the legal consequences: 70.4 where any royalties are fixed for a period pursuant to subsection 70.2(2), the person concerned may, during the period, subject to the related terms and conditions fixed by the board and to the terms and conditions set out in the scheme and on paying or offering to pay the royalties, do the act with respect to which the royalties and their related terms and conditions are fixed and the collective society may, without prejudice to any other remedies available to it, collect the royalties or, in default of their payment, recover them in a court of competent jurisdiction. [37] interpreting s 70.4, rothstein j held that royalties fixed by the board pursuant to s 70.2 are not binding on the user. the board does not have the “power to force these terms on a user who, having reviewed the terms, decided that engaging in licensed copying is not the way to proceed” (sodrac, at para. 108). a user who does not accept a licence but engages in a protected use “will remain liable for infringement” (ibid). [38] in reaching this conclusion, rothstein j observed that the text of s 70.4 is permissive, showing that “a user whose copying activities were the subject of a s 70.2 proceeding may avail itself of the terms and conditions established by the board as a way to gain authorization to engage in the activity contemplated in the board proceeding” (para. 106 (emphasis in original)). section 68.2(1) does not itself specify that a user “may” avail itself of the tariff terms but read alongside s 70.17, the combined effect creates the same voluntary trigger for acquiring a licence under s 70.17 a user can acquire a licence and immunize themselves from infringement proceedings if they have “paid or offered to pay the royalties” this is identical to s 70.4, where a user “may . . . subject to the related terms and conditions fixed by the board and to the terms and conditions set out in the scheme and on paying or offering to pay the royalties, do the act”. paying or offering to pay is a permissive act triggering licence acquisition in both cases. [39] as matter of legislative coherence, it would be incongruous if royalties fixed in the context of licence negotiations between a collective society and a specific user were voluntary, but those set in a general tariff were mandatory. [40] access copyright argued in the alternative that pursuant to s 68.2(1) board approved royalties operate as a remedy for infringement against a user who has not accepted a licence. but there is nothing in the legislation to suggest that parliament intended that board approved tariffs operate as pre-determined infringement damages. parliament is well aware of how to create a statutory damages scheme it did so in s 38.1, which was enacted in 1997 at the same time as key collective administration amendments section 68.2(1) could not have been meant to silently create a second statutory damages scheme, where “amounts are predetermined by the board, and then imposed without regard to the actual circumstances of the case and without any proportionality to either the user’s behaviour or copyright owners’ actual damage” (“spectre ii”, at p 58). [41] access copyright also identifies various provisions throughout the act which it says support the mandatory tariff theory and are inconsistent with the voluntary tariff theory. it observes that s 70.12 creates a distinction between royalties set out in a tariff (s 70.12(a)) and those reached by agreement (s 70.12(b)), and argues that this means royalties set out in a tariff must be binding without an agreement. but nothing about the possibility of the parties reaching a mutual agreement in subs. (b) suggests that the licence terms fixed by the board in response to a proposed tariff under subs. (a) must be mandatory on users section 70.12 simply offers collective societies in the general regime a degree of flexibility that does not exist in the performing rights regime, where collective societies are required to file proposed tariffs. [42] it also argues that s 70.191, which says that an approved tariff “does not apply where there is an agreement between a collective society and a person authorized to do an act”, supports the mandatory tariff theory if tariffs are optional, access copyright says, there would be no need to provide that a tariff does not apply when there is an agreement, because the user could simply “opt out” of the tariff. but this overlooks the purpose of s 70.191, which is to prevent both a collective and a user from abandoning an agreement after a tariff is approved. this is consistent with the voluntary tariff theory. a user is free to choose whether or not to accept a licence, but a tariff does not permit a user to abandon its agreements. [43] finally, access copyright isolates ss. 38.2, 30.02 and 30.3, which provide certain benefits to educational institutions and are tied to the existence of an approved tariff, and argues that these benefits would not exist if the tariff were optional. [44] but none of these provisions provide support for the mandatory tariff theory. section 38.2 says that a copyright owner who has not authorized a collective society to authorize reprographic reproduction of the owner’s work may recover, in proceedings against an educational institution, a maximum of the royalties that would have been payable under any agreement entered into with the collective society or a tariff certified by the board under s 7015. this provision puts a cap on the damages an owner can recover against an educational institution in respect of reprographic rights it is premised on the assumption that the board will set fair and equitable royalties, but it does not suggest that such royalties are mandatory. [45] section 30.02 exempts educational institutions from infringement in respect of digital reproduction of works, but this benefit is contingent on the acceptance of a licence it applies only if the educational institution “has a reprographic reproduction licence under which the institution is authorized to make reprographic reproductions of works in a collective society’s repertoire”. accordingly, it does not support access copyright’s argument. [46] section 30.3(1) says that an educational institution does not infringe copyright when copies are made using a self-service photocopier installed by the institution, provided that a notice warning of copyright infringement is posted. this exemption applies if at least one triggering condition is met, including that “a tariff has been approved in accordance with section 70.15” (s 30.3(2)(c)) or “a collective society has filed a proposed tariff in accordance with section 70.13” (s 30.3(2)(d)) york argues that s 30.3, properly interpreted, means that the educational institution can only take advantage of the exemption if it has in fact accepted a licence under an approved or proposed tariff. in my view, it is neither necessary nor prudent to come to a firm conclusion about the proper interpretation of s 30.3 in this case. it is enough to observe that the provision does not generate by inference the “clear and distinct legal authority” required to impose the burdens of a licence on a non-consenting user (sodrac, at para. 107). [47] turning to legislative purpose, the objects of the statutory scheme governing collective administration are best understood in their historical context. [48] the story of collective administration of copyright in canada begins in the early 20th century. canada’s first domestic copyright legislation was the copyright act, 1921, sc 1921, c 24, which followed the british copyright act, 1911 (uk), 1 & 2 geo. 5, c 46 the 1921 act did not provide for the collective administration of copyright the first regime regulating any form of collective society in canada was created in the 1930s in response to the emergence of early performing rights societies, who had acquired control of the vast majority of popular musical and dramatico- musical compositions and were therefore able to exercise monopolistic power (vigneux v. canadian performing right society, ltd., [1943] scr 348 (“vigneux (1943)”), at p 352, per duff cj, dissenting, but not on this point; vigneux v. canadian performing right society, ltd., [1945] ac 108 (pc)). [49] in the report of the royal commission appointed to investigate the activities of the canadian performing rights society, limited, and similar societies (1935) (“parker report”), judge james parker recognized that these societies had benefits for copyright owners and users, but regulation was necessary: competition no longer exists. a monopoly, or super-monopoly, has arisen. no one quarrels with the author, composer and publisher pooling their rights and placing them in a central bureau for the purpose of collecting a fair fee for the same and of preventing infringement thereof it is an inevitable monopoly existing for the convenience of the owner and the user; but it should not be exercised arbitrarily and without restraint. [p 19] [50] when the parker report was published, parliament had already made amendments requiring performing rights societies to file with the minister at the copyright office lists of works within their repertoire and statements of proposed licence royalties, and permitting the minister to conduct an investigation and revise royalties that were contrary to the public interest (see the copyright amendment act, 1931, sc 1931, c 8, and an act to amend the copyright amendment act, 1931, sc 1935, c 18) judge parker recommended further amendments, including the creation of a tribunal to approve tariffs. his rationale was as follows: the position now is that the society, having a monopoly of the performing rights in copyright music, has also the right to impose whatever fees it chooses. where other monopolies have existed, it has been found necessary to have some independent body analyse and pass on the tariffs of fees that may be charged, e.g freight rates, express rates, telephone rates, etc. if the society can continue to dictate its own terms, and pursue a policy of greatly increasing those terms, then finally the community will be prevented from listening to its music. [p 49] [51] parliament adopted judge parker’s recommendations in an act to amend the copyright amendment act, 1931, sc 1936, c 28. following these amendments, the copyright appeal board was required to approve a performing rights society’s proposed statement of royalties with any necessary modifications. sections 10b(8) and 10b(9) of the copyright act, rsc 1927, c 32, set out the effect of an approved statement these provisions are the earliest predecessors to ss. 68.2(1) and 70.17 respectively: (8) the statements of fees, charges or royalties so certified as approved by the copyright appeal board shall be the fees, charges or royalties which the society, association or company concerned may respectively lawfully sue for or collect in respect of the issue or grant by it of licences for the performance of all or any of its works in canada during the ensuing calendar year in respect of which the statements were filed as aforesaid. (9) no such society, association or company shall have any right of action or any right to enforce any civil or summary remedy for infringement of the performing right in any dramatico-musical or musical work claimed by any such society, association or company against any person who has tendered or paid to such society, association or company the fees, charges or royalties which have been approved as aforesaid. [52] the cases interpreting these provisions and their subsequent iterations held that an approved statement of royalties put a cap on what the societies could charge for a licence but did not bind an unwilling user to the terms of a licence the regime qualified the rights of the societies by vesting a “statutory license” in favour of “everybody who pays or tenders” the approved fee (vigneux (1943), at p 353, per duff cj; see also p 364, per rinfret j). users were entitled to choose whether or not to accept a licence on the board-approved terms (maple leaf broadcasting co v. composers, authors and publishers assn. of canada ltd., [1954] scr 624, at p 630, per cartwright j). [53] strayer j made the point most clearly in performing rights organization of canada ltd. v. lion d’or (1981) ltée (1987), 16 ftr 104. users could choose to accept a licence, failing which they could be liable as an infringer: it will be noted that [s 50(9), which was equivalent to s 10b(8) of the 1936 amendments] deals only with the enforcement of licences: the subsection refers to the amounts which the society “may . . sue for or collect in respect of the issue or grant by it of licences . . .” i take this to mean that if a person performing these works refuses to take out a licence then s 50(9) has no application. . . . if the society wishes to recover for use of the performing rights, it must then bring an action for infringement of copyright. [emphasis in original, para. 9.] [54] this was consistent with the purpose of the regime, enacted as parliament became “aware of the necessity of regulating the exercise of the power acquired by” performing rights societies (vigneux (1943), at p 352, per duff cj). it would be discordant with this purpose to empower a society to foist a licence on an unwilling user. [55] until 1988, the copyright act only dealt with the collective administration of performing rights. it did not contain any provisions concerning other rights. a new regime, known now as the “general regime”, was created by amendments in 1988 and 1997 (an act to amend the copyright act and to amend other acts in consequence thereof, rsc 1985, c 10 (4th supp.), formerly sc 1988, c 15; an act to amend the copyright act, sc 1997, c 24). the heart of the debate about statutory purpose and the corresponding disagreement as to the correct interpretation of the relevant provisions turns on the 1988 and 1997 amendments. [56] prior to these amendments, the act was subject to a number of studies and reports which found that technological change had made it easier for users to access information and harder for individual creators to control unauthorized reproduction. expanding collective administration beyond performance rights was one proposed solution, as a 1984 white paper on copyright observed: organized exercise of copyright is needed for two major reasons: - - changing technological circumstances, which have greatly expanded opportunities for unauthorized reproduction and use of copyright-protected material; the high costs of transactions, which may be so great as to make it impracticable for copyright owners to negotiate individually with users, such as in the case of photocopying, access to copyright material by educational users, or use of musical works by radio stations. in those circumstances, it may be in the interest of all parties to provide cooperative mechanisms for the enforcement of rights and the collection of fees. (consumer and corporate affairs, from gutenberg to telidon: a white paper on copyright: proposals for the revision of the canadian copyright act (1984) (“1984 white paper”), at pp. 61-62) [57] access copyright’s core argument is that, unlike the user-protection purpose of the 1936 amendments, the 1988 and 1997 amendments expanding collective administration were meant to protect copyright owners and that parliament intended to make approved tariffs binding in furtherance of this purpose. owners would otherwise be required to enforce their copyrights against institutional copiers through individual infringement actions, an illusory protection. [58] this argument, with respect, conflates two distinct statutory purposes: the purpose for expanding collective administration to rights beyond public performance; and the separate purpose for regulating the collective societies that emerged from the expanded regime while parliament expanded collective administration to protect copyright creators and owners, it simultaneously vested the board with price-setting powers to protect users from the potentially unfair exertion of the new societies’ market power. the board’s power to approve a collective society’s proposed tariff is a part of its regulatory price-setting role. [59] it is undeniable that a significant reason for expanding the collective administration regime was to protect creators, who experienced difficulties asserting their rights amidst technological change. they were interested in acting collectively but were concerned that without regulation and protection from prosecution for conspiracy, new collective societies would run into competition law problems (see, eg, 1984 white paper, at pp. 62-63) as a result, parliament amended the act to sanction and govern collective administration for rights beyond public performance, making room for new collective societies to form as and when market forces demanded. [60] this brought many benefits for copyright owners. by facilitating the users’ ability to clear large numbers of copyrights through a single source and reducing transaction costs, collective societies made it easier to acquire rights and, as a corollary, for owners to be paid. as the collective societies coalition intervening in this appeal noted, the “purpose of collective administration is to facilitate an efficient, functioning marketplace for the exchange of copyright-protected works” (see also entertainment software association v society of composers, authors and music publishers of canada, [2012] 2 scr 231, at para. 11, per abella and moldaver jj). [61] collective societies were also able more effectively to monitor the use of works within their repertoire and, in some cases, to assist copyright owners with infringement actions, as was the case when access copyright funded the litigation leading to this court’s decision in cch canadian ltd v law society of upper canada, [2004] 1 scr 339 (“spectre i”, at fn. 70). as the federal court of appeal aptly observed in its reasons: the assumption underlying access copyright’s argument . . is that effective enforcement requires mandatory tariffs. with respect, this is not self evident. the advantage of collective societies is that they allow rights holders to pool their resources to enable them to economically enforce their rights this advantage exists even in the absence of mandatory tariffs. [para. 203] [62] and collective societies could initiate infringement actions in respect of their repertoire if they are in fact exclusive licensees or assignees of the copyright, which access copyright is not (see s 41.23 of the current copyright act; see also euro- excellence inc. v. kraft canada inc., [2007] 3 scr 20). [63] collective societies are also able to assert a stronger bargaining position than individual copyright owners. a particular collective society’s strength will depend on the value they are able to offer to users and the extent to which they can position themselves as the sole or main source for acquiring rights. this was the case for the performing rights societies that parliament looked to as a viable model for other collectives. as judge parker said in 1935, “unless the user obtains a licence to perform the repertoire of canadian performing right society, he has no other supply” (p 19). and in the ensuing decades the situation remained much the same the absence of meaningful alternatives to dealing with a performing rights society made their tariffs “effectively mandatory even if de jure they were not” (“spectre i”, at p 158). [64] but a collective society’s market power and effectiveness at achieving its goals is not guaranteed by the copyright act. nothing in the act is designed to prop-up collectives that have become less valuable to users and/or rights-holders. as professor daniel j. gervais explains: . . canadian rightsholders may create a new collective management organization if they are dissatisfied with an existing one in fact, users themselves could do the same, as was suggested by a well-known author in the area of reprography. [emphasis in original.] (“collective management of copyright and neighbouring rights in canada: an international perspective” (2002), 1 cjlt 21, at p 26; see also department of canadian heritage, collective management of copyright and neighbouring rights in canada: an international perspective (2001), at p 26; howard p. knopf, “copyright collectivity in the canadian academic community: an alternative to the status quo?” (1999), 14 ipj 109.) [65] if a collective society does not have a large enough repertoire or other sources emerge to provide better value, users may find that the collective is not “the most cost-effective way to obtain licences”, and might prefer to “negotiate with the right-holders directly, or through other intermediaries” (“spectre i”, at p 159). [66] this takes us to the purpose of a tariff certified by the board setting licensing royalties pursuant to s 70.15, which is one of three ways in which the board may become involved in setting fair prices in the general regime. in addition to its tariff approval power, the board may fix royalties when a collective society and individual user are unable to agree on terms and one party applies to the board (ss. 70.2 to 704). and even when the parties make an agreement without board intervention, the collective society will only be immunized from prosecution under the competition act, rsc 1985, c. c-34, if it files the agreement with the board, following which the board may examine the agreement and, after hearing from the commissioner of competition and the parties, alter the royalties (ss. 70.5 to 706). given that licensing royalties are always subject to the possibility of board scrutiny one way or another, a collective society may see benefits of efficiency in obtaining the board’s advance approval of a general tariff that applies to many users. [67] operating together, these price-setting powers of the board protect users from the potential exertion of unfair market power by collective societies. this was clearly the purpose of the 1936 amendments empowering the copyright appeal board to approve statements of royalties. government reports and legislative history show that this purpose persisted through the 1988 and 1997 amendments. [68] in the debates on the 1988 amendments, the hon flora macdonald, minister of communications and sponsoring minister of the amendments, explained that the proposed system “has been in operation for about 50 years for musical performances and is working well”, and that the existing system should be expanded to other areas of copyright (house of commons debates, vol. vi, 2nd sess., 33rd parl., june 15, 1987, at p 7109) she acknowledged that collective administration was beneficial for copyright owners, but went on to provide a caution based on the lessons of the early performing rights societies, observing that collective societies can “achieve such a dominant bargaining position that the interests of potential customers are not sufficiently safeguarded” (house of commons debates, vol. vi, 2nd sess., 33rd parl., june 26, 1987, at p 7667). [69] the government reports leading to the amendments are to the same effect. a sub-committee report on the revision of copyright observed that the “system presently used with respect to the performing rights in musical works” served as a well- working model for an expanded collective administration regime (house of commons, sub-committee of the standing committee on communications and culture on the revision of copyright, a charter of rights for creators (1985), at p 85). and the 1984 white paper suggested that “[t]o protect the public from possible excesses by copyright societies, they would be subject to the control of the revised copyright appeal board” (p 62). [70] access copyright argues that parliament demonstrated its intent to make board approved tariffs mandatory when it amended the predecessor to s 68.2(1) in 1988 by removing the words “in respect of the issue or grant by it of licences”, which strayer j had relied on in lion d’or to conclude that a user could choose whether or not to accept a licence this would have been a perplexing way for parliament to express its intent to make such a radical change in the law, particularly given that the statutory context continued to clearly demonstrate that approved tariffs were part of a copyright licensing scheme. collective societies that administer traditional copyright, as opposed to equitable remuneration rights, do so by operating a “licensing scheme” (s 2 “collective society” (a)). when a collective society works in the general regime, it operates a “licensing scheme” (s 701). and when a collective society proposes a tariff under s 70.12(a), it does so to set out “by licence” royalties and terms and conditions of use. [71] access copyright’s interpretation of s 68.2(1) is not only unsupported by the purpose of the board’s price-setting role, it is, respectfully, also in direct conflict with that purpose instead of operating as a part of a scheme designed to control collective societies’ potentially unfair market power, access copyright’s interpretation would turn tariffs into a plainly anti-competitive tool, boosting collective societies’ power to the detriment of users. [72] the legal consequence of access copyright’s mandatory tariff theory would be that a user would be liable to pay royalties in full as soon as it became responsible for any infringing use of a work within a collective society’s repertoire. under the final 2011-2014 access copyright tariff for post-secondary educational institutions, for example, york would be liable to pay $24.80 for each of its 45,000 full time equivalent students, totalling over one million dollars per year, as soon as it made a single infringing use within access copyright’s repertoire for a university that attempts to clear its copyright obligations using alternative licences and fair dealing, a single infringing use — one that was not authorized by fair dealing or independently licensed — could thereby become a tripwire making the university liable to pay the full royalties in a tariff this “sword of damocles”, as the intervener the canadian association of research libraries aptly put it, renders a university’s freedom to clear its copyright obligations without involving access copyright completely illusory. [73] it is, with respect, no answer to say that the board can set fair and flexible payment structures. the board is in the business of setting general tariffs for a large category of users and is inherently limited in its ability to direct itself to each user’s unique needs. moreover, on access copyright’s theory, in order to ensure it does not find itself responsible for an exorbitant licence fee that takes no account of its individual circumstances, a user would be forced to invest significant resources into participation in board proceedings whenever a collective society proposed a tariff. as access copyright points out, the tariff-setting process is time consuming and expensive. forcing all users potentially caught by the ambit of a tariff to participate in a board hearing would limit users’ ability to obtain their rights from other sources and, in turn, limit the competitiveness of other sources as against established collectives. that is the antithesis of the purpose of s 682(1). [74] the source of access copyright’s grievance, it seems to me, stems not so much from the voluntary nature of an approved tariff, but from the fact that access copyright cannot initiate infringement actions on behalf of its members. to the extent that this is a problem, it has nothing to do with s 68.2(1) and is largely outside the scope of this appeal but it is important to recall that access copyright chooses to operate on the terms of a non-exclusive licence that does not give it the right to sue for infringement in respect of the rights it administers. nothing compels access copyright and its members to operate this way. [75] the preceding review of the text, legislative context, purpose and supporting jurisprudence all lead, in my respectful view, to the conclusion that s 68.2(1) does not make tariffs approved by the copyright board pursuant to s 70.15 mandatory against users who choose not to be licensed on the approved terms. [76] it is of course open to parliament to amend the copyright act if and when it sees fit to make collective infringement actions more readily available. but under the existing relevant legislation in this appeal, an approved tariff is not binding against a user who does not accept a licence. [77] i would therefore dismiss access copyright’s appeal this brings us to york’s appeal from the dismissal of its counterclaim seeking declaratory relief. [78] in response to access copyright’s action to enforce the interim tariff at the federal court, york filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that “any reproductions made that fall within the guidelines set out in york’s ‘fair dealing guidelines for york faculty and staff (11/13/12)’ . . . constitute fair dealing”. [79] york’s counterclaim was connected to its defence to access copyright’s action to enforce the interim tariff. the fairness of copying under york’s guidelines was only a live issue between the parties if the tariff was enforceable against york. [80] having found that the interim tariff was enforceable, the trial judge assessed york’s fair dealing counterclaim. he found that the guidelines were not fair either in their terms or their application and refused to grant the declaration. the court of appeal found that the tariff was not enforceable and, therefore, “york’s guidelines as a defence to access copyright’s action does not arise because the tariff is not mandatory and access copyright cannot maintain a copyright infringement action” (para. 206). but the court of appeal nonetheless considered york’s appeal from the trial judge’s refusal to issue a declaration that its guidelines were fair. it agreed with the trial judge that the guidelines were unfair and dismissed york’s request for a declaration. [81] york’s appeal to this court seeks the declaration from this court that was denied by the federal court and the federal court of appeal. [82] in my view, it is not appropriate to entertain york’s request for declaratory relief in these proceedings this court recently stated the test for when declaratory relief may be granted in daniels v. canada (indian affairs and northern development), [2016] 1 scr 99, per abella j.: the party seeking relief must establish that the court has jurisdiction to hear the issue, that the question is real and not theoretical, and that the party raising the issue has a genuine interest in its resolution. a declaration can only be granted if it will have practical utility, that is, if it will settle a “live controversy” between the parties. [citation omitted; para. 11.] daniels drew on solosky v. the queen, [1980] 1 scr 821, where dickson j stated that declaratory relief is a remedy availing to “persons sharing a legal relationship, in respect of which a ‘real issue’ concerning the relative interests of each has been raised and falls to be determined” (p 830). and most recently in newfoundland and labrador (attorney general) v. uashaunnuat (innu of uashat and of mani‑utenam), 2020 scc 4, the court emphasized that “[f]airness requires that the parties affected by declaratory relief be heard” (para. 42, per wagner cj and abella and karakatsanis jj). [83] in light of the conclusion on access copyright’s appeal that the interim tariff is not mandatory and is therefore unenforceable against york, there is no live dispute between the parties this is not an action for infringement, since access copyright has no standing to bring such an action. and the copyright owners who do have standing to bring an infringement action in respect of york’s copying activities are not parties to these proceedings and, as a result, have not had the opportunity to advance arguments or adduce evidence about how york’s guidelines interact with and affect their copyrighted works. the undesirable consequence of assessing fair dealing guidelines in the absence of a genuine dispute between proper parties is that the analysis is inevitably anchored in aggregate findings and general assumptions without a connection to specific instances of works being copied. all of this makes consideration of the guidelines in this case inappropriate. [84] it is true that in cch, the court granted a declaration to the law society that it “does not infringe copyright when a single copy of a reported decision, case summary, statute, regulation or limited selection of text from a treatise is made by the great library in accordance with its access policy” (para. 76) but it did so in the context of a live infringement action brought by proper parties, and where the law society relied on its “practices and policies” to show that its dealings were fair (para. 63). [85] there is no doubt, as york argued, that guidelines are important to an educational institution’s ability to actualize fair dealing for its students. as professor samuel e. trosow writes, a “general lack of understanding about basic copyright rights and obligations” serves as a “serious impedimen[t] . . . to the realization of fair dealing as a substantive users’ right” in the educational context (“bill c-32 and the educational sector: overcoming impediments to fair dealing”, in michael geist, ed., from “radical extremism” to “balanced copyright”: canadian copyright and the digital agenda (2010), 541, at p 542) institutionalized guidelines can help overcome this impediment. [86] but the usefulness of guidelines in theory does not provide the court with a sound basis for entertaining declaratory relief without a live dispute between the parties or when those whose rights are at stake are not privy to the proceedings. [87] while i therefore agree that the requested declaration should not be granted, this should not be construed as endorsing the reasoning of the federal court and federal court of appeal on the fair dealing issue there are some significant jurisprudential problems with those aspects of their judgments that warrant comment. [88] in commenting on those errors, it is important to emphasize that our reasons do not decide the issue of fair dealing, which can only be determined in a factual context. rather, the objective is to correct some aspects of the reasoning from the courts under review which, respectfully, depart from this court’s jurisprudence. while correcting the errors committed by the federal court and court of appeal favours the position argued before this court by york, these reasons address only some of the factors that make up the fair dealing analysis, an analysis that requires consideration of facts and factors not addressed here. [89] the main problem with their analysis was that they approached the fairness analysis exclusively from the institutional perspective. this error tainted their analysis of several fairness factors. by anchoring the analysis in the institutional nature of the copying and york’s purported commercial purpose, the nature of fair dealing as a user’s right was overlooked and the fairness assessment was over before it began. [90] this court’s modern fair dealing doctrine reflects its more general “move away from an earlier, author-centric view which focused on the exclusive right of authors and copyright owners to control how their works were used in the marketplace” (society of composers, authors and music publishers of canada v bell canada, [2012] 2 scr 326 (“socan”), at para. 9, per abella j.) the court is “at the vanguard in interpreting copyright law as a balance between copyright rights and user rights”, and its understanding of fair dealing is no exception (myra j. tawfik, “the supreme court of canada and the ‘fair dealing trilogy’: elaborating a doctrine of user rights under canadian copyright law” (2013), 51 alta. l. rev. 191, at p 195). fair dealing is “[o]ne of the tools employed to achieve the proper balance between protection and access in the act” (socan, at para. 11). [91] accordingly, to understand and apply fair dealing doctrine requires first understanding the copyright balance copyright law has public interest goals the relationship between members of the public and copyrighted works is not merely the “consequence of the author-work relationship” (carys j craig, “locke, labour and limiting the author’s right: a warning against a lockean approach to copyright law” (2002), 28 queen’s l.j 1, at p 6) put differently, the public benefits of our system of copyright are much more than “a fortunate by-product of private entitlement” (pp. 14-15, cited in socan, at para. 9). [92] instead, increasing public access to and dissemination of artistic and intellectual works, which enrich society and often provide users with the tools and inspiration to generate works of their own, is a primary goal of copyright. “excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole” (théberge v. galerie d’art du petit champlain inc., [2002] 2 scr 336, at para. 32, per binnie j). [93] but it is also true that just rewards for copyright creators provide necessary incentives, ensuring that there is a steady flow of creative works injected into the public sphere. as binnie j put it, “[i]n crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self- defeating to undercompensate them” (para. 31). a proper balance ensures that creators’ rights are recognized, but authorial control is not privileged over the public interest. [94] ultimately, owners’ rights and the public interest should not conflict with one another. as professor tawfik explains, copyright law has long been an “integrated system that encouraged creators to generate knowledge, industry to disseminate it and users to acquire it and, hopefully, reshape it into new knowledge” (“history in the balance: copyright and access to knowledge”, in geist, from “radical extremism” to “balanced copyright”, 69, at p 70). creators’ rights and users’ rights are mutually supportive of copyright’s ends. [95] in terms of the proper role of fair dealing and other exceptions to copyright in this normative framework, professor michael geist explains that: the core of fair dealing is fairness — fairness to the copyright owner in setting limits on the use of their work without permission and fairness to users to ensure that fair dealing rights can be exercised without unnecessarily restrictive limitations. (“fairness found: how canada quietly shifted from fair dealing to fair use”, in michael geist, ed., the copyright pentalogy: how the supreme court of canada shook the foundations of canadian copyright law (2013), 157, at p 181) or, as professor craig puts it: fundamentally, copyright policy assumes that the restriction of the public’s use of works through the creation of private rights can further the public’s interest in the widespread creation and distribution of works. the limits to these private rights, defined by fair dealing and other exceptions — and circumscribed by the boundaries of the public domain — are therefore essential to ensure that the copyright system does not defeat its own ends. (“locking out lawful users: fair dealing and anti-circumvention in bill c-32”, in geist, from “radical extremism” to “balanced copyright”, 177, at p 179) [96] the resulting judicial framework for fair dealing was set out in cch, where mclachlin cj set out a two-step test for assessing fair dealing under s 29 of the act, which states: 29 fair dealing for the purpose of research, private study, education, parody or satire does not infringe copyright. the party invoking fair dealing must prove first that the dealing was for an allowable purpose and, second, that it was fair. six non-exhaustive factors provide a framework for assessing fairness, which is ultimately a question of fact: the purpose of the dealing; the character of the dealing (which concerns the number of copies made or distributed and whether the copies are retained or destroyed after use); the amount of the dealing (which concerns the proportion of the work dealt with and the importance of that part); alternatives to the dealing; the nature of the work; and the effect of the dealing on the work (para. 53; see also socan, at para. 13; alberta (education) v canadian copyright licensing agency (access copyright), [2012] 2 scr 345, at para. 12, per abella j). [97] it was common ground in this case that york’s teachers make copies for their students for the allowable purpose of education at the first step of the analysis. [98] but at the second step, where fairness is assessed, the federal court and federal court of appeal approached the analysis from an institutional perspective only, leaving out the perspective of the students who use the materials. both perspectives should be taken into account. [99] in the educational context, instructors are facilitating the education of each of their individual students who have fair dealing rights (alberta (education), at paras. 22-23). however, courts are not required to completely ignore the institutional nature of a university’s copying practices and adopt the fiction that copies are only made for individual isolated users when an institution is defending its copying practices, its aggregate copying is necessarily relevant, for example, to the character of the dealing and the effect of the dealing on the work (see, eg,. cch, at paras. 55 and 72; socan, at para. 42; alberta (education), at paras. 30 and 33). [100] in this case, as in alberta (education), “the key problem is in the way the [trial judge] approached the ‘purpose of the dealing’ factor” in the fairness analysis (para. 15). in fact, both the federal court and the federal court of appeal erred in an almost identical fashion to the copyright board in alberta (education). there, the issue was whether copies of short excerpts of textbooks and other literary works made by secondary school teachers and provided to students as assigned reading constituted fair dealing for the purpose of “research or private study” the case arose prior to the enactment of the copyright modernization act, s.c 2012, c 20, which added “education” as a permissible purpose. the board found that the copies were for the permissible purpose of research or private study at the first stage of the analysis, but the predominant purpose at the second stage was “instruction”, which fell outside of research or private study. [101] this court rejected the board’s approach in a passage that is directly apposite to the present appeal: . . . fair dealing is a “user’s right”, and the relevant perspective when considering whether the dealing is for an allowable purpose under the first stage of cch is that of the user . . . . this does not mean, however, that the copier’s purpose is irrelevant at the fairness stage. if . . . the copier hides behind the shield of the user’s allowable purpose in order to engage in a separate purpose that tends to make the dealing unfair, that separate purpose will also be relevant to the fairness analysis. in the case before us, however, there is no such separate purpose on the part of the teacher. teachers have no ulterior motive when providing copies to students. . . [t]hey are there to facilitate the students’ research and private study. it seems to me to be axiomatic that most students lack the expertise to find or request the materials required for their own research and private study, and rely on the guidance of their teachers. they study what they are told to study, and the teacher’s purpose in providing copies is to enable the students to have the material they need for the purpose of studying. [paras. 22-23] and in socan, the court similarly explained that the “predominant perspective” when assessing the purpose of the dealing was “that of the ultimate users of the previews” (para. 34). [102] in other words, contrary to the federal court of appeal’s view, in the educational context it is not only the institutional perspective that matters when teaching staff at a university make copies for their students’ education, they are not “hid[ing] behind the shield of the user’s allowable purpose in order to engage in a separate purpose that tends to make the dealing unfair”. [103] it was therefore an error for the court of appeal, in addressing the purpose of the dealing, to hold that it is only the “institution’s perspective that matters” and that york’s financial purpose was a “clear indication of unfairness” (paras. 238 and 241). funds “saved” by proper exercise of the fair dealing right go to the university’s core objective of education, not to some ulterior commercial purpose (see lisa macklem and samuel trosow, “fair dealing, online teaching and technological neutrality: lessons from the covid-19 crisis” (2020), 32 ipj 215, at p 238). the purpose of copying conducted by university teachers for student use is for the student’s education. but in every case, all relevant facts must be taken into account in order to determine the fairness of the dealing. [104] and the trial judge’s criticism of york’s guidelines on the basis that different portions of a single work could be distributed to different students, such that an author’s entire work could end up being distributed in the aggregate, is also contradicted by socan, which held that “[s]ince fair dealing is a ‘user’s’ right, the ‘amount of the dealing’ factor should be assessed based on the individual use, not the amount of the dealing in the aggregate” (para. 41; see also alberta (education), at para. 29). [105] and while it is true that “aggregate dissemination” is “considered under the ‘character of the dealing’ factor” (socan, at para. 42; see also cch, at para. 55; alberta (education), at para. 29), as this court cautioned in socan, “large-scale organized dealings” are not “inherently unfair” (para. 43) in socan, where copies could easily be distributed across the internet in large numbers, this court warned that focussing on the “aggregate” amount of dealing could “lead to disproportionate findings of unfairness when compared with non-digital works” (para. 43) by extension, the character of the dealing factor must be carefully applied in the university context, where dealings conducted by larger universities on behalf of their students could lead to findings of unfairness when compared to smaller universities. this would be discordant with the nature of fair dealing as a user’s right. [106] at the end of the day, the question in a case involving a university’s fair dealing practices is whether those practices actualize the students’ right to receive course material for educational purposes in a fair manner, consistent with the underlying balance between users’ rights and creators’ rights in the act. since we are not deciding the merits of the fair dealing appeal brought by york, there is no reason to answer the question in this case. [107] in light of these reasons, i would dismiss york’s appeal from the dismissal of its counterclaim but, in the circumstances, without costs. [108] i would dismiss access copyright’s appeal with costs. appeals dismissed. solicitors for the appellant/respondent york university: borden ladner gervais, ottawa; osler, hoskin & harcourt, toronto. agency (“access copyright”): torys, toronto; canadian copyright licensing agency, toronto. solicitor for the intervener société québécoise de gestion collective du droit de reproduction (copibec): cabinet payette, lévis. solicitors for the interveners the authors alliance and ariel katz: lenczner slaght, toronto. jfk law corporation, vancouver. solicitor for the interveners the canadian association of university teachers and the canadian federation of students: canadian association of university teachers, ottawa. solicitor for the intervener the samuelson-glushko canadian internet policy and public interest clinic: university of ottawa, ottawa. international et chaire l. r. wilson sur le droit des technologies de l’information et du commerce électronique: faculté de droit, université de montréal, montréal. publishers of canada: gowling wlg (canada), ottawa. wlg (canada), toronto. agency ltd., the canadian retransmission collective, connect music licensing service inc and société de gestion collective des droits des producteurs de phonogrammes et de vidéogrammes du québec: stohn hay cafazzo dembroski richmond, toronto. and association québécoise de la production médiatique: stohn hay cafazzo dembroski richmond, toronto.
[1] in canada, the right to speak in the official language of one’s choice in certain courts is a fun- damental and substantive right that is recognized in both constitutional and quasi- constitutional laws. any person who appears in the courts in question must be able to exercise this right freely. when a per- son asks a judge of one of these courts for permission to speak in the official language of his or her choice, the judge’s answer must be yes. [1] au canada, le droit de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix devant certains tribunaux est un droit fondamental et substantiel, reconnu par des lois de nature constitutionnelle et quasi constitution- nelle. toute personne se présentant devant ces tribu- naux doit pouvoir l’exercer librement. lorsqu’une personne demande à un juge de ces tribunaux si elle peut s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix, une réponse affirmative s’impose. [2] that is not what happened at a hearing in the tax court of canada (“tcc”), however. some of the witnesses as well as counsel for one of the parties indicated that they wanted to speak in french, but the judge presiding the case asked them to speak in english instead so as to accommodate one of the parties, who was unilingual. confusing the rights of the various people involved in the case, the judge prevented the witnesses and counsel from speaking in french in the absence of an interpreter to trans- late what they had to say into english. in so doing, he violated the fundamental language rights of all these individuals. as for the unilingual party, he had a separate right under the official languages act, rsc 1985, c. 31 (4th supp.) (“ola”), to have an interpreter translate the testimony and pleadings for him, but he did not benefit from this right despite having indicated that he wanted to avail himself of it. the federal court of appeal (“fca”) ordered that a new hearing be held before a different judge. we agree that this is what is required in the circum- stances. [2] lors d’une audience devant la cour canadienne de l’impôt (« cci »), ce ne fut toutefois pas le cas. certains des témoins ainsi que l’avocat d’une partie au litige ont manifesté le désir de s’exprimer en français, mais le juge saisi de l’affaire les a plutôt invités à le faire en anglais afin de se montrer accom- modant envers l’une des parties qui était unilingue. confondant les droits des différentes personnes en cause, le juge a fait en sorte que les témoins et l’avo- cat ne puissent s’exprimer en français en l’absence d’un interprète pour traduire leurs propos en anglais. ce faisant, il a porté atteinte aux droits linguistiques fondamentaux de toutes ces personnes. quant à la partie unilingue qui avait le droit distinct à un in- terprète pour traduire les témoignages et plaidoi- ries en vertu de la loi sur les langues officielles, lrc 1985, c. 31 (4e suppl.) (« llo »), elle n’en a pas bénéficié même si elle avait exprimé le souhait de s’en prévaloir. la cour d’appel fédérale (« caf ») a ordonné la tenue d’une nouvelle audience devant un juge différent. nous sommes d’accord pour conclure que cela s’impose dans les circonstances. [3] this appeal affords this court an opportunity to consider the duties judges and lawyers must dis- charge in order to protect the language rights of individuals involved in proceedings in certain courts as well as the remedies that are available when those rights are not upheld. in our opinion, a purposive interpretation of the language rights in question leads to the conclusion that judges are required to [3] ce pourvoi permet à notre cour de se pencher sur les obligations qui échoient aux juges et aux avocats afin de protéger les droits linguistiques des personnes impliquées dans des procédures devant certains tribunaux, ainsi que sur les réparations pos- sibles lorsque ces droits ne sont pas respectés. à notre avis, interprétés de manière téléologique, ces droits linguistiques exigent que le juge contribue 268 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. participate actively in protecting them. while it is true that lawyers have a role to play in this regard in accordance with their ethical duties, a lawyer’s failure to intervene does not release a judge from his or her duties. when language rights are violated, the appropriate remedy will generally be to order a new hearing. activement à leur protection. bien que les avocats aient un rôle à jouer à cet égard en vertu de leurs obligations déontologiques, leur non- intervention ne relève pas les juges de leurs obligations. lorsque ces droits ne sont pas respectés, la réparation convenable sera généralement la tenue d’une nouvelle audience. ii background ii contexte (1) origin of the case (1) l’origine du litige [4] in 2012, the appellant, kassem mazraani, was working as a personal insurance representative for the respondent industrial alliance insurance and financial services inc. (“industrial”). his contract stipulated that he was self- employed. after six months, industrial terminated the contract, which it was entitled to do if a representative failed to make any sales for five consecutive weeks. [4] en 2012, l’appelant, kassem mazraani, travaille comme représentant en assurances de personnes au- près de l’intimée industrielle alliance, assurance et services financiers inc. (« industrielle »). son contrat stipule qu’il est un travailleur autonome. au bout de six mois, industrielle résilie le contrat en vertu de son droit d’y mettre fin lorsqu’un représentant n’effectue aucune vente pendant cinq semaines consécutives. [5] following the termination, mr. mazraani asked the canada employment insurance commission to consider this employment to be insurable employ- ment, which would enable him to obtain employment insurance benefits. to that end, he sought a determi- nation that he had been an employee of industrial. the commission concluded that his employment had not been insurable employment. in accordance with the procedure set out in the employment insurance act, sc 1996, c. 23 (“eia”), mr. mazraani appealed the commission’s decision to the canada revenue agency (“cra”), which upheld it. he then took the case to the tcc. he was not represented by counsel in that court. [5] à la suite de cette résiliation, m. mazraani demande à la commission de l’assurance- emploi du canada de considérer ce travail comme un emploi assurable, ce qui lui permettrait d’obtenir des presta- tions d’assurance- emploi. à cette fin, il tente de faire reconnaître qu’il était un employé d’industrielle. la commission conclut que son travail n’est pas un em- ploi assurable. suivant la procédure prévue à la loi sur l’assurance‑ emploi, lc 1996, c. 23 (« lae »), m. mazraani fait appel de cette décision auprès de l’agence du revenu du canada (« arc »), qui la confirme. il porte ensuite l’affaire devant la cci. il n’y est pas représenté par avocat. (2) individuals and entities involved in the tcc (2) les personnes et entités impliquées devant la proceedings cci [6] at first, mr. mazraani and the other respondent, the minister of national revenue (“mnr”), were the only parties in the tcc proceedings. the mnr was defending the cra’s decision under the eia. industrial intervened as a party in the tcc because the case was calling its business model into question. mr. mazraani was in fact one of 400 insurance rep- resentatives who had signed the same contract with industrial and were working in similar conditions [6] au départ, le litige devant la cci n’oppose que m. mazraani et l’autre intimée, la ministre du revenu national (« mrn »). celle-ci défend la dé- cision prise par l’arc en vertu de la lae. puisque le litige remet en question son modèle d’affaires, industrielle intervient en tant que partie devant la cci. m. mazraani est en effet l’un de 400 repré- sentants en assurances ayant signé le même contrat avec industrielle et travaillant dans des conditions [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 269 for 50 agencies that all followed the same model for the training of and services to representatives. a conclusion that mr. mazraani was an employee could therefore affect the status of those 400 representa- tives both under the eia and under the act respecting labour standards, cqlr, c n-11, the act respecting occupational health and safety, cqlr, c s-21, the act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, cqlr, c a-3001, and the labour code, cqlr, c c-27. [7] because of the issues raised by this case, it was industrial that called most of the witnesses in the tcc proceedings. indeed, the mnr called only one witness, ms.  lambert, the cra officer who had made the ruling that was being appealed. her testimony was peripheral, because the exercise of characterizing the contract between mr. mazraani and industrial had to be performed anew in the tcc. industrial called all the key witnesses, including mr. michaud, its senior vice- president, sales and administration, who described the company and its human resources structure; ms. beaudet, a lawyer working for industrial, who outlined the representa- tives’ contracts and industrial’s legal obligations to its representatives; mr. charbonneau and ms. woo, two other representatives who were self- employed in theory and who testified about their respective re- lationships with industrial; and, finally, mr. leclerc, an employee of industrial who was the manager of the agency where mr. mazraani worked and who explained his relationship with his representatives and with mr mazraani. [8] moreover, the mnr left it to industrial to pres- ent the legal arguments in support of the position that mr. mazraani’s contract was a contract for services and not a contract of employment. indeed, the argu- ment of counsel for the mnr in the tcc is limited to 7 pages of the transcript, while that of counsel for industrial, mr. turgeon, takes up over 200 pages. similaires auprès de 50 agences qui appliquent toutes le même modèle en matière de formation et de ser- vices aux représentants. une conclusion selon la- quelle m. mazraani était un employé pourrait ainsi avoir une incidence sur le statut de ces 400 représen- tants tant sous le régime de la lae que sous celui de la loi sur les normes du travail, rlrq, c n-11, de la loi sur la santé et la sécurité du travail, rlrq, c s-21, de la loi sur les accidents du travail et les maladies professionnelles, rlrq, c a-3001, et du code du travail, rlrq, c c-27. [7] compte tenu des enjeux que soulève cette affaire, c’est industrielle qui présente la majorité des témoins devant la cci. la mrn appelle de fait un seul témoin, mme lambert, l’agente de l’arc qui a pris la décision portée en appel. son témoi- gnage est périphérique, puisque la caractérisation du contrat liant m. mazraani et industrielle doit être effectuée de nouveau devant la cci. industrielle présente tous les témoins clés, ce qui inclut : son vice- président principal, ventes et administration, m. michaud, qui décrit l’entreprise et sa structure de ressources humaines; une avocate travaillant chez industrielle, me beaudet, qui résume les contrats des représentants et les obligations juridiques d’in- dustrielle envers ceux-ci; deux autres représentants, en théorie travailleurs autonomes, m. charbonneau et mme woo, qui témoignent quant à leurs relations respectives avec industrielle; et, enfin, un employé d’industrielle, m. leclerc, directeur de l’agence où m. mazraani travaillait, qui explique sa relation avec ses représentants et ce dernier. [8] en outre, la mrn laisse industrielle prendre en charge la présentation de l’argumentation juridique au soutien de la thèse selon laquelle le contrat de m. mazraani est un contrat de service, et non un contrat de travail. la plaidoirie de l’avocat de la mrn devant la cci se limite d’ailleurs à 7 pages de transcription, tandis que celle de l’avocat d’indus- trielle, me turgeon, s’étend sur 200 pages. (3) conduct of the hearing in the tcc (3) le déroulement de l’audience devant la cci [9] the rules of procedure that generally apply in tcc proceedings provide for a mechanism by which [9] les règles de procédure généralement appli- cables devant la cci prévoient un mécanisme selon 270 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. parties can give the court and the other party advance notice of the official language in which they and their witnesses will be speaking and, where necessary, request that the court make an interpreter availa- ble to them (tax court of canada rules (general procedure), sor/90- 688a, ss. 101, 102(5), 123 and form 123). however, mr. mazraani’s case in the tcc was conducted in accordance with an infor- mal procedure. sections 18.15 and 18.29(1)(b) of the tax court of canada act, rsc 1985, c. t-2, provide that certain appeals, including those arising under part iv of the eia, “shall be dealt with by the court as informally and expeditiously as the circum- stances and considerations of fairness permit”. what is more, such appeals are not subject to the usual rules of evidence. one example of this is that the rules of procedure specific to an appeal such as that of mr. mazraani indicate neither how parties are to advise the court of the language in which they, their counsel or their witnesses wish to speak nor how they can request the presence of an interpreter. lequel les parties peuvent au préalable informer la cour et l’autre partie de la langue officielle dans la- quelle elles et leurs témoins s’exprimeront et, s’il y a lieu, demander de bénéficier des services d’un interprète fournis par la cour (règles de la cour ca‑ nadienne de l’impôt (procédure générale), dors/90- 688a, art. 101, par. 102(5), art. 123 et formulaire 123). le litige qui implique m. mazraani devant la cci suit toutefois une procédure informelle. l’article 18.15 et l’al 1829(1)b) de la loi sur la cour canadienne de l’impôt, lrc 1985, c. t-2, précisent en effet que certains appels, dont ceux prévus à la partie iv de la lae, « sont entendus d’une manière informelle et le plus rapidement possible, dans la mesure où les circonstances et l’équité le permettent ». ces appels n’ont pas non plus à respecter les règles habituelles en matière de preuve. à titre d’exemple, les règles de procédure propres à un appel comme celui de m. mazraani n’indiquent ni comment une partie peut avi- ser la cour de la langue dans laquelle elle, son avocat ou ses témoins souhaitent s’exprimer, ni comment elle peut requérir la présence d’un interprète. [10] this procedural gap was problematic from the first day of the hearing. the judge commenced the hearing in english and spoke in english with mr.  mazraani while the judge was discussing industrial’s notice of intervention, which had been drafted in french, mr. mazraani told him that he had trouble understanding french. the judge im- mediately put the document aside and continued the hearing without any further discussion of the matter. despite this first sign that industrial wished to proceed in french whereas mr. mazraani was more comfortable doing so in english, the judge did nothing to make things clear, inquire into each par- ty’s intention and ensure that everyone understood their language rights. [10] cette lacune procédurale cause des ennuis dès la première journée de l’audience. le juge com- mence celle-ci en anglais et échange dans cette langue avec m. mazraani. alors que le juge dis- cute de l’avis d’intervention d’industrielle, rédigé en français, m. mazraani l’informe qu’il comprend mal cette langue. le juge met alors immédiatement ce document de côté et poursuit l’audience sans plus de discussion sur le sujet. malgré cette première in- dication qu’industrielle souhaite procéder en français bien que m. mazraani soit plus à l’aise de le faire en anglais, le juge n’intervient pas pour clarifier les choses, s’informer des intentions de chacun et s’assurer que tous comprennent leurs droits linguis- tiques. [11] the hearing was scheduled to last only one day, but mr. mazraani’s testimony turned out to be long, which meant that it had to be adjourned to the following day. on the second day of the hearing, industrial’s first witness, mr. michaud, was called to give evidence. he stated that he wished to testify in french. the judge then asked mr. mazraani if he needed an interpreter. mr. mazraani answered that he did. the judge informed counsel for industrial that [11] l’audience ne devait durer qu’une journée, mais le témoignage de m. mazraani s’avère long, ce qui requiert l’ajournement de celle-ci au lende- main. le deuxième jour de l’audience, le premier témoin d’industrielle, m. michaud, est appelé à la barre. il indique vouloir témoigner en français. le juge demande alors à m. mazraani s’il a besoin d’un interprète. ce dernier répond par l’affirmative. le juge informe l’avocat d’industrielle qu’il est prêt à [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 271 he was prepared to allow mr. michaud to testify in french but that he would then have to adjourn the hearing and put it off until another day so that an interpreter could attend to translate the witness’s tes- timony. after consulting with mr. michaud, counsel for industrial suggested that mr. michaud might in- stead testify in english, using a few words in french if necessary. the judge agreed to proceed in this way. he added that it was better to be “pragmatic” and to try proceeding like this, at the risk of having to adjourn the hearing should there be any problems. mr. michaud gave his testimony in this way. permettre à m. michaud de témoigner en français, mais qu’il devra alors suspendre l’audience et la reporter à un autre jour afin qu’un interprète soit présent pour traduire son témoignage. après consul- tation avec m. michaud, l’avocat d’industrielle sug- gère plutôt que ce dernier témoigne en anglais en utilisant quelques mots en français si nécessaire. le juge accepte de procéder ainsi. il ajoute qu’il vaut mieux être [traduction] « pragmatique » et tenter d’instruire l’affaire de cette manière, quitte à suspendre l’audience si des problèmes surviennent. m. michaud livre son témoignage de cette façon. in mr. mazraani’s view, this brief exchange [12] is crucial. he argues that mr. turgeon and the judge thus agreed to a compromise regarding the language to be spoken by industrial’s witnesses that would apply throughout the hearing. but that is not what the transcript shows, and in any event, such an agreement could not have bound any subsequent witnesses. we will return to this below. [12] selon m. mazraani, ce bref échange est cru- cial. à son avis, me turgeon et le juge ont ainsi convenu d’un compromis sur la langue des témoins d’industrielle, valable pour toute la durée de l’au- dience. ce n’est toutefois pas ce que la transcription indique, sans compter que, de toute façon, cela ne saurait lier un témoin subséquent. nous y revien- drons. [13] the case required additional hearing days. twenty days later, on the third day of the hearing, counsel for the mnr asked about examining his witness, ms. lambert, in french if mr. mazraani did not object. because mr. mazraani did object, ms. lambert testified in english. that same day, mr. charbonneau, a witness called by industrial, asked the judge for permission to testify in french, stressing that he was more comfortable in that lan- guage and that he was surprised to have to give his testimony in english. but the judge asked him to make an effort and to testify in english. unlike on the second day, the judge did not mention to the wit- nesses or to mr. mazraani that it would be possible to adjourn the hearing until an interpreter could be called in. [13] l’instruction de l’affaire nécessite des jour- nées additionnelles d’audience. vingt jours plus tard, au troisième jour de l’audience, l’avocat de la mrn demande d’interroger son témoin, mme lambert, en français si m. mazraani n’y voit pas d’objection. étant donné que m. mazraani s’y oppose, elle té- moigne en anglais. le même jour, m. charbonneau, témoin appelé par industrielle, demande quant à lui au juge de témoigner en français, soulignant qu’il est plus à l’aise dans cette langue et qu’il est surpris de devoir le faire en anglais. mais le juge l’invite à faire un effort et à témoigner en anglais. contrairement à ce qu’il a fait le deuxième jour, le juge ne mentionne pas aux témoins ou à m. mazraani la possibilité que l’audience soit suspendue le temps de convoquer un interprète. [14] at the end of the fourth day of the hearing, it was adjourned again. two weeks later, on the fifth day, mr. leclerc, another witness for industrial who had started testifying in english of his own accord, quickly showed signs of difficulty speaking that lan- guage. even though counsel for industrial insisted a number of times that the witness give his evidence in french, the judge always steered the testimony back to english. that same day, when counsel for [14] à la fin du quatrième jour de l’audience, celle-ci est encore ajournée. deux semaines plus tard, au cinquième jour, m. leclerc, un autre té- moin d’industrielle qui avait de lui- même commencé son témoignage en anglais, présente rapidement des signes indiquant qu’il éprouve de la difficulté à s’exprimer dans cette langue. bien que l’avocat d’industrielle insiste à plusieurs reprises pour que ce témoin dépose en français, le juge ramène toujours 272 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. industrial mentioned that he intended to present his argument in french the following day, which he considered necessary if he was to serve his client properly, the judge insisted that he do the best he could in english. the next day, when counsel spoke in french a few times, the judge intervened to ask him to continue in english. le témoignage vers l’anglais. ce même jour, lorsque l’avocat d’industrielle affirme qu’il entend plaider en français le lendemain, ce qu’il estime nécessaire afin de bien servir les intérêts de sa cliente, le juge insiste pour qu’il fasse de son mieux en anglais. le lendemain, lorsque l’avocat s’exprime en français à quelques reprises, le juge intervient pour l’inviter à poursuivre en anglais. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire a tax court of canada, 2016 tcc 65 a cour canadienne de l’impôt, 2016 cci 65 in a lengthy judgment, the judge ruled in [15] mr. mazraani’s favour, concluding that mr. mazraani was an employee of industrial. in his analysis of the evidence, the judge wrote scathingly about in- surance companies in general and industrial’s wit- nesses in particular. in his opinion, industrial had given “misleading” evidence (para. 177), and its position on its relationship with its employees was a self- serving “embellishment” of reality (para 205). among other things, he suggested that the witnesses had played with words and syntax to avoid telling the whole truth. to him, their testimony was “trou- bling”, as “[s]ome of their statements embellished reality, others were misleading and still others bor- dered on perjury” (para 223). he was particularly critical of mr. michaud and mr. leclerc, accusing them of being none too candid and of making mis- leading statements. in his view, this conclusion was justified by, among other things, contradictions in mr. leclerc’s testimony and certain choices of words by mr. michaud, which were imprecise. [16] the judge also took shots at counsel for industrial, whom he accused of having incited his witnesses to distort the truth and to mislead the court. finally, the judge accused industrial, on the basis of his criticisms of the witnesses, of not having been forthcoming. he added that industrial’s attitude had been the cause of the numerous delays in the case: the hearing that had been scheduled to take one day ended up taking six. in concluding, the judge ordered industrial, even though it was an intervener, to pay costs, relying on the tcc’s residual power to prevent and discourage any abuse of its process. [15] dans un long jugement, le juge tranche en faveur de m. mazraani et conclut qu’il était un em- ployé d’industrielle. dans son analyse de la preuve, le juge écorche les compagnies d’assurance en gé- néral et les témoins d’industrielle en particulier. à son avis, industrielle a présenté une preuve « trom- peuse » (par. 177) et sa conception de sa relation avec ses employés est une description « embelli[e] » de la réalité qui sert ses propres intérêts (par 205). il reproche notamment aux témoins de jouer sur les mots et la syntaxe pour éviter de présenter toute la vérité. selon le juge, leur témoignage est « trou- blant », car « [c]ertaines de leurs déclarations em- belliss[ent] la réalité, d’autres induis[ent] en erreur et [sont] à la limite du parjure » (par 223). il blâme tout particulièrement mm. michaud et leclerc, les accusant de manquer de franchise et de faire des déclarations trompeuses. des contradictions dans le témoignage de m. leclerc ainsi que des choix de mots de m. michaud, qui manqueraient de précision, justifieraient entre autres cette conclusion. [16] les commentaires du juge éclaboussent aussi l’avocat d’industrielle, qu’il accuse d’avoir incité ses témoins à déformer la vérité et à induire le tribunal en erreur. enfin, le juge invoque les critiques qu’il a adressées aux témoins pour reprocher à industrielle son manque de collaboration. l’attitude d’indus- trielle aurait d’ailleurs été la cause des nombreux retards ayant marqué l’affaire : l’audience qui devait durer une journée aura en fin de compte duré six jours. finalement, le juge condamne industrielle — pourtant partie intervenante — aux dépens, invo- quant le pouvoir résiduel de la cci de prévenir et décourager les abus de sa procédure. [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 273 b federal court of appeal, 2017 fca 80, [2018] b cour d’appel fédérale, 2017 caf 80, [2018] 1 fcr 495 1 rcf 495 [17] industrial appealed the tcc’s decision on the grounds that the language rights of its witnesses and counsel had been violated and that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the judge’s part. the fca allowed the appeal in a judgment delivered from the bench. in written reasons that it deposited afterwards, it held that the judge could not seek a shortcut around the language rights of the people involved. the rights in question are con- stitutional and quasi- constitutional in nature and must be protected proactively. moreover, the right to speak in the courts in the official language of one’s choice under s. 133 of the constitution act, 1867 is unrelated to the ability to speak correctly in one language or the other. the fca found that the judge should not have agreed to the compromise regarding mr. michaud’s testimony that had been suggested by counsel for industrial on the second day of the hearing. as well, he should not have treated the requests of mr. charbonneau, ms. lambert and mr. turgeon as requests for accommodation, but as the legitimate exercise of their protected right to speak in the official language of their choice. the fca added that mr. mazraani’s rights had also been violated, as there were long periods when testimony, in particular that of mr. leclerc, was given in french without being translated for mr. mazraani by an interpreter even though he had clearly stated that he needed interpretation services. [17] industrielle porte en appel le jugement de la cci aux motifs que les droits linguistiques de ses té- moins et de son avocat ont été enfreints et qu’il existe une crainte raisonnable de partialité de la part du juge. la caf accueille l’appel séance tenante. dans des motifs écrits qu’elle dépose subséquemment, elle statue que le juge ne pouvait transiger sur les droits linguistiques des personnes impliquées. il s’agit de droits de nature constitutionnelle et quasi constitu- tionnelle, qui doivent être protégés par des mesures proactives. de plus, le droit de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix devant les tribunaux prévu à l’art. 133 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 n’a rien à voir avec la capacité à s’exprimer correc- tement dans une langue ou l’autre. la caf conclut qu’en l’occurrence, le juge n’aurait pas dû accepter le compromis suggéré par l’avocat d’industrielle le deuxième jour de l’audience quant au témoignage de m. michaud. le juge n’aurait pas dû traiter non plus les demandes de m. charbonneau, de mme lambert et de me turgeon comme des demandes d’accommo- dement, mais comme l’exercice légitime de leur droit protégé de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de leur choix. la caf note en outre que les droits de m. mazraani ont eux aussi été violés, puisque de longues portions de témoignages en français, notamment celui de m. leclerc, n’ont jamais été traduits à l’intention de m. mazraani par un interprète, alors qu’il avait clairement mentionné avoir besoin de tels services. [18] finally, the fca found that there was no indi- cation that the witnesses and mr. turgeon had agreed to speak in english or that they had only asserted their rights after the fact for tactical reasons. it therefore ordered a new hearing before a different judge, mak- ing it clear that the parties would not be permitted to adduce the transcript of the first hearing in evidence. [18] la caf juge enfin que rien n’indique que les témoins et me turgeon avaient consenti à s’exprimer en anglais, ni qu’ils n’invoquent leurs droits qu’après coup, de manière stratégique. elle ordonne donc la tenue d’une nouvelle audience devant un juge diffé- rent en précisant que les parties ne pourront y déposer en preuve les transcriptions de la première audience. iv issues iv questions en litige [19] mr. mazraani’s appeal to this court raises two questions: [19] le pourvoi de m. mazraani devant notre cour soulève deux questions : 1 were the language rights of the parties, the wit- nesses or counsel at the hearing in the tcc vi- olated? 1 les droits linguistiques des parties, des témoins ou de l’avocat présents à l’audience devant la cci ont- ils été violés? 274 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. 2. if so, is it appropriate to order a new hearing? 2 dans l’affirmative, est-il approprié d’ordonner la tenue d’une nouvelle audience? before answering these questions, we must first determine (1) the nature of the language rights in question; (2) the responsibilities in this regard of judges and officials of the courts concerned, or of the lawyers involved; (3) how language rights are to be exercised and whether they can be waived; and, lastly, (4) the remedies that are available should these rights be violated. avant de répondre à ces questions, nous devons d’abord cerner (1) la nature des droits linguistiques en jeu, (2) les responsabilités qui incombent à ce chapitre aux juges et à l’administration des tribunaux visés, ou aux avocats en cause, (3) la manière dont les droits linguistiques doivent être exercés et s’il est possible d’y renoncer, et enfin, (4) les mesures de réparation possibles en cas de violation. v analysis v analyse a language rights a les droits linguistiques [20] english and french are the official languages of canada. there are a number of laws that pro- tect an individual’s right to speak in the official lan- guage of his or her choice. in r v. beaulac, [1999] 1 scr 768, this court established the principles that must guide the interpretation of any right that is intended to protect the equal status of canada’s official languages and to ensure full and equal access to the country’s institutions by anglophones and francophones alike (paras. 15 and 25). first of all, language rights are substantive rights, not procedural rights (para 28). this means that the state has a duty to ensure that they are implemented (para. 24), and also that they cannot be interfered with (para 28). next, “[l]anguage rights must in all cases be inter- preted purposively, in a manner consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in canada” (para. 25 (emphasis in orig- inal)). finally, language rights are distinct from the principles of fundamental justice, which require, for example, that an accused be able to understand and be understood at his or her trial (paras. 25 and 41). these rights have a purpose that is unique to them, namely the preservation and protection of “of- ficial language communities where they do apply” (para 25). they do not relate to the person’s ability to speak one language or another. indeed, those who are bilingual are no less entitled to exercise them than those who are unilingual. [20] le français et l’anglais sont les langues offi- cielles du canada. plusieurs lois protègent le droit d’une personne de s’exprimer dans la langue offi- cielle de son choix. dans l’arrêt r c. beaulac, [1999] 1 rcs 768, notre cour a établi les principes qui doivent guider l’interprétation de tout droit censé protéger l’égalité de statut des langues officielles du canada et l’égalité d’accès des francophones et des anglophones aux institutions du pays (par. 15 et 25). d’abord, les droits linguistiques sont des droits substantiels, et non procéduraux (par 28). il s’ensuit que l’état a l’obligation d’assurer leur mise en œuvre (par. 24) et qu’on ne peut y déroger (par 28). ensuite, « [l]es droits linguistiques doivent dans tous les cas être interprétés en fonction de leur objet, de façon compatible avec le maintien et l’épanouissement des collectivités de langue officielle au canada » (par. 25 (soulignement dans l’original)). enfin, ces droits se distinguent des principes de justice fondamentale, lesquels requièrent par exemple qu’un accusé soit en mesure de comprendre son procès et de s’y faire comprendre (par. 25 et 41). ils ont un but qui leur est unique, soit le maintien et la protection « des col- lectivités de langue officielle là où ils s’appliquent » (par 25). ils ne sont pas fonction de la capacité de l’intéressé de s’exprimer dans une langue ou dans une autre. en effet, les personnes bilingues peuvent tout autant les invoquer que les personnes unilingues. [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 275 (1) language rights in federal courts (1) les droits linguistiques devant les tribunaux fédéraux [21] certain language rights concern access to certain courts in canada. there are two legislative provisions in the canadian constitution whose effect is to recognize the rights in question. this court has held that the purpose of these provisions is “to ensure full and equal access to the legislatures, the laws and the courts for francophones and anglophones alike” (reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721, at p. 739; see also beaulac, at para 22). [21] certains droits linguistiques concernent l’ac- cès à certains tribunaux au canada. deux disposi- tions législatives ayant pour effet de reconnaître ces droits sont inscrites dans la constitution canadienne. notre cour a reconnu que ces articles ont pour objet « d’assurer aux francophones et aux anglophones l’accès égal aux corps législatifs, aux lois et aux tribunaux » (renvoi relatif aux droits linguistiques au manitoba, [1985] 1 rcs 721, p. 739; voir aussi beaulac, par 22). [22] the first, s. 133 of the constitution act, 1867, provides in part as follows: [22] le premier, l’art. 133 de la loi constitution‑ nelle de 1867, prévoit entre autres ceci : 133    either of those [official] languages may be used by any person or in any pleading or process in or issuing from any court of canada established under this act, and in or from all or any of the courts of quebec. 133    dans toute plaidoirie ou pièce de procédure par- devant les tribunaux ou émanant des tribunaux du canada qui seront établis sous l’autorité de la présente loi, et par- devant tous les tribunaux ou émanant des tribunaux de québec, il pourra être fait également usage, à faculté, de l’une ou de l’autre de ces langues [officielles]. [23] the second, s. 19 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, reads as follows: [23] le second, l’art. 19 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés, énonce quant à lui ce qui suit : 19 (1) either english or french may be used by any person in, or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any court established by parliament. (2) either english or french may be used by any per- son in, or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any court of new brunswick. [24] the tcc is a court established by parliament, and both sections apply in this case. they protect the right to use english and french in the tcc. 19 (1) chacun a le droit d’employer le français ou l’anglais dans toutes les affaires dont sont saisis les tri- bunaux établis par le parlement et dans tous les actes de procédure qui en découlent. (2) chacun a le droit d’employer le français ou l’an- glais dans toutes les affaires dont sont saisis les tribunaux du nouveau- brunswick et dans tous les actes de procédure qui en découlent. [24] la cci est un tribunal établi par le parlement et ces deux dispositions trouvent application en l’es- pèce. elles protègent le droit d’employer le français et l’anglais devant la cci. [25] there are other language rights applicable to certain courts that are instead quasi- constitutional in nature. this is true of the rights provided for in the ola (thibodeau v. air canada, 2014 scc 67, [2014] 3 scr 340, at para. 12, quoting lavigne v. canada (office of the commissioner of official languages), 2002 scc 53, [2002] 2 scr 773, at para. 23, in [25] d’autres droits linguistiques qui touchent cer- tains tribunaux sont plutôt de nature quasi consti- tutionnelle. c’est le cas des droits prévus à la llo (thibodeau c. air canada, 2014 csc 67, [2014] 3 rcs 340, par. 12, citant lavigne c. canada (com‑ mis sa riat aux langues officielles), 2002 csc 53, [2002] 2 rcs 773, par. 23, citant canada (procureur 276 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. turn quoting canada (attorney general) v. viola, [1991] 1 fc 373 (ca), at p 386). sections 14 and 15 of the ola, which are relevant to the case at bar, govern the exercise of these constitutional rights in federal courts such as the tcc: général) c. viola, [1991] 1 cf 373 (ca), p 386). les articles 14 et 15 de la llo qui sont pertinents en l’espèce aménagent l’exercice de ces droits constitu- tionnels devant les tribunaux fédéraux comme la cci : 14 english and french are the official languages of the federal courts, and either of those languages may be used by any person in, or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any federal court. 14 le français et l’anglais sont les langues officielles des tribunaux fédéraux; chacun a le droit d’employer l’une ou l’autre dans toutes les affaires dont ils sont saisis et dans les actes de procédure qui en découlent. 15 (1) every federal court has, in any proceedings before it, the duty to ensure that any person giving evidence be- fore it may be heard in the official language of his choice, and that in being so heard the person will not be placed at a disadvantage by not being heard in the other official language. (2) every federal court has, in any proceedings conducted before it, the duty to ensure that, at the request of any party to the proceedings, facilities are made available for the simultaneous interpretation of the proceedings, including the evidence given and taken, from one official language into the other. [26] there is an important distinction between the right guaranteed in ss. 14 and 15(1) of the ola — the right to speak in the official language of one’s choice — and the right guaranteed in s. 15(2) of the ola — the right to an interpreter. whereas ss. 14 and 15(1) give any person the right to use, and any witness the right to speak in, the official language of his or her choice without being placed at a dis- advantage, s. 15(2) protects the right of parties to understand what happens in hearings in which they participate. these rights are distinct and need not be asserted in parallel: a person is fully entitled to choose to testify in a given language without wor- rying about whether an interpreter will be present. the exercise of the fundamental right to speak in the official language of one’s choice does not depend on whether an interpreter is present. 15 (1) il incombe aux tribunaux fédéraux de veiller à ce que tout témoin qui comparaît devant eux puisse être entendu dans la langue officielle de son choix sans subir de préjudice du fait qu’il ne s’exprime pas dans l’autre langue officielle. (2) il leur incombe également de veiller, sur demande d’une partie, à ce que soient offerts, notamment pour l’audition des témoins, des services d’interprétation simul- tanée d’une langue officielle à l’autre langue. [26] il existe une distinction importante entre le droit garanti à l’art. 14 et au par. 15(1) de la llo, soit le droit de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix, et celui garanti au par. 15(2) de la llo, soit le droit à un interprète. alors que les premiers confèrent à chacun et à tout témoin le droit de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix sans subir de dé- savantage, le second protège le droit des parties de comprendre ce qui se passe à l’audience à laquelle ils prennent part. ces droits sont distincts et n’ont pas à être invoqués en parallèle; une personne peut tout à fait choisir de témoigner dans une langue sans se soucier de la présence ou non d’un interprète. la présence de l’interprète ne conditionne pas l’exercice du droit fondamental de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix. [27] furthermore, this court held in beaulac that these rights must be interpreted in light of their ob- jective, which is described in s. 2 of the ola: [27] l’arrêt beaulac prescrit par ailleurs que ces droits doivent être interprétés en fonction de leur objet, qui est prévu à l’art. 2 de la llo : the objective of protecting official language minorities, as set out in s. 2 of the official languages act, is realized l’objectif de protéger les minorités de langue officielle, exprimé à l’art. 2 de la loi sur les langues officielles, est [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 277 by the possibility for all members of the minority to exer- cise independent, individual rights which are justified by the existence of the community. language rights are not negative rights, or passive rights; they can only be enjoyed if the means are provided. [para. 20] thus, the rights provided for in the ola will not help achieve the ola’s objectives unless all mem- bers of the community can exercise them and are provided with the means to do so. these language rights must be understood as individual and personal rights. they must also be interpreted as guaranteeing access to services of equal quality, as this is the only interpretation that allows their objective to be fully achieved (beaulac, at para 22). the federal courts to which ss. 14 and 15 of the ola apply must there- fore provide the resources and procedures that are needed in order to respond to requests from parties and witnesses under these sections. moreover, given the quasi- constitutional nature of the ola, ss. 14 and 15 apply even to a hearing in one of those courts that is conducted in accordance with an informal or simplified procedure. atteint par le fait que tous les membres de la minorité peuvent exercer des droits indépendants et individuels qui sont justifiés par l’existence de la collectivité. les droits linguistiques ne sont pas des droits négatifs, ni des droits passifs; ils ne peuvent être exercés que si les moyens en sont fournis. [par. 20] ainsi, les droits prévus par la llo ne permettront d’atteindre les objectifs énoncés par celle-ci que si tous les membres de la collectivité peuvent exercer ces droits et si des moyens leur sont fournis pour qu’ils puissent le faire ces droits linguistiques doivent être conçus comme des droits individuels et personnels. ils doivent aussi être interprétés comme garantissant l’accès à des services de qualité égale, car seule cette interprétation permet la pleine réali- sation de leur objet (beaulac, par 22). les tribunaux fédéraux qui sont visés par les art. 14 et 15 de la llo doivent donc prévoir les ressources et les procédures nécessaires pour répondre aux demandes des parties et des témoins en vertu de ces articles. en outre, vu la nature quasi constitutionnelle de la llo, ces dispositions s’appliquent même lorsqu’une audience suit une procédure informelle ou allégée devant ces tribunaux. [28] from this perspective, ss. 14 and 15(1) of the ola restate the essence of the right guaranteed in s. 19(1) of the charter beaulac requires nothing less. language rights are not procedural rights re- lated to the dispute that brought the parties before the court in question. rather, they are fundamental rights related to access of the parties and their witnesses to that court in the official language of their choice. absent vigilance on the judge’s part, this bilingual status is purely symbolic. a purposive reading of s. 19(1) of the charter requires that the court attach the utmost importance to the protection of each per- son’s right to speak in the official language of his or her choice. [28] de ce point de vue, l’art. 14 et le par. 15(1) de la llo reprennent l’essence du droit garanti au par. 19(1) de la charte. l’arrêt beaulac ne com- mande rien de moins. les droits linguistiques ne sont pas des droits procéduraux se rapportant au litige qui amène deux parties devant le tribunal visé. il s’agit de droits fondamentaux touchant l’accès de ces par- ties et de leurs témoins à ce tribunal dans la langue officielle de leur choix. sans la vigilance du juge, ce statut bilingue n’est que symbolique. une lecture téléologique du par. 19(1) de la charte exige que la protection du droit de chacun de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix se voie accorder une importance primordiale par le tribunal. [29] a number of courts that have the constitu- tional duty to allow any person to speak in the of- ficial language of his or her choice have therefore adopted special measures to facilitate the exercise and assertion of this right. as we mentioned above, the tax court of canada rules (general procedure) include standard forms that require the parties to [29] plusieurs tribunaux qui ont l’obligation cons- titutionnelle de permettre à chacun de s’y expri- mer dans la langue officielle de son choix ont par conséquent mis en place des mesures particulières pour faciliter l’exercice et la revendication de ce droit. comme nous l’avons souligné, les règles de la cour canadienne de l’impôt (procédure générale) 278 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. specify the language in which their witnesses will be testifying. this requirement has the advantage of making it clear that the choice of language is not to be made by the court or by the other party, and also of encouraging discussions with witnesses on this sub- ject and ensuring that the other party is informed in this regard. the federal courts have enacted similar rules (federal courts rules, sor/98- 106, rr. 314 and 347). however, the tcc’s rules that apply to cases like the case at bar in which a simplified procedure is followed are silent in this regard (tax court of canada rules (informal procedure), sor/90- 688b). [30] regarding the right to an interpreter, given that only mr. mazraani could have raised the issue of the judge’s failure to act on his request under s. 15(2) of the ola, and that he has not invoked that violation in this court, there is no need to consider the nature of that right or how it is to be exercised. we note, however, that although the costs of interpretation services are usually paid for by the federal courts and the tcc (federal courts rules, rr. 93 and 283; tax court of canada rules (general procedure), ss. 101 and 102), the rules for proceedings to which a simplified procedure applies do not mention this pos- sibility. moreover, whereas the rules of the federal courts include a mechanism for asking the courts’ officials to provide interpretation services (federal courts rules, rr. 31 and 93), the tcc’s rules are less clear on this point. prévoient des formulaires normalisés qui obligent les parties à préciser la langue dans laquelle les témoins s’exprimeront. cette exigence a l’avantage d’établir clairement que le choix de la langue n’appartient ni au tribunal, ni à l’autre partie, et de favoriser des discussions sur ce sujet avec les témoins tout en en informant l’autre partie. les cours fédérales ont aussi adopté des règles semblables (règles des cours fédérales, dors/98- 106, règles 314 et 347). toute- fois, les règles de la cci qui régissent les affaires instruites suivant une procédure simplifiée comme la présente espèce sont silencieuses sur cette question (règles de la cour canadienne de l’impôt (procédure informelle), dors/90- 688b). [30] en ce qui concerne le droit aux services d’un interprète, puisque seul m. mazraani aurait pu faire valoir que le juge n’a pas donné suite à sa demande fondée sur le par. 15(2) de la llo et qu’il n’invoque pas cette violation devant nous, il n’y a pas lieu de se pencher sur la nature ou les modalités d’exercice de ce droit. nous remarquons cependant que si les coûts des services d’interprète sont normalement assumés par les cours fédérales et la cci (règles des cours fédérales, règles 93 et 283; règles de la cour canadienne de l’impôt (procédure générale), art. 101 et 102), les règles propres aux instances suivant la procédure allégée ne mentionnent pas cette possibilité. de plus, alors que les règles des cours fédérales prévoient un mécanisme pour demander les services d’un interprète à l’administration de ces cours (règles des cours fédérales, règles 31 et 93), celles de la cci sont moins claires à ce sujet. [31] that being said, the absence of rules to fa- cilitate the exercise of the rights provided for in the ola does not mean that those rights do not exist. on the contrary, the ola requires that in every case the tcc, a federal court, provide interpretation services at the request of a party and allow every person to speak in the official language of his or her choice. it is of course desirable for the rules of procedure of the federal courts that have such duties to provide litigants with the tools needed to facilitate the asser- tion and exercise of the rights in question. but when potential language- related difficulties are not identi- fied and managed ahead of time by way, for example, of an adequate proactive institutional infrastructure, [31] cela dit, l’absence de règles permettant de faciliter l’exercice des droits prévus par la llo ne si- gnifie pas que ces droits n’existent pas. au contraire, la llo oblige dans tous les cas la cci, un tribunal fédéral, à offrir les services d’un interprète sur de- mande d’une des parties et à permettre à chacun de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix. il est certes souhaitable que les règles de procédure des tribunaux fédéraux à qui incombent pareilles obligations fournissent aux justiciables les outils requis pour faciliter la revendication et l’exercice de ces droits. toutefois, lorsque les difficultés poten- tielles liées à la langue ne sont pas établies et gérées d’avance par la mise en place, par exemple, d’une [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 279 the roles of the judge and of counsel for the parties in protecting the language rights of individuals par- ticipating in a hearing become particularly important. infrastructure institutionnelle adéquate et proactive, les rôles du juge et des avocats des parties au cha- pitre de la protection des droits linguistiques des participants à une audience prennent alors toute leur importance. (2) roles of the judge and of counsel (2) les rôles du juge et des avocats [32] with this in mind, it should be noted that it is the judge of the federal court in question who is primarily responsible for upholding the language rights of witnesses, of parties and of any individual who appears before him or her. there are two reasons for this. first, it is because language rights are “a fun- damental tool for the preservation and protection of official language communities where they do apply” (beaulac, at para. 25) and must be interpreted in a way that supports the achievement of that objective. as this court pointed out in beaulac, it is more sensible not to assume that lawyers will systemati- cally inform the parties (and in the instant case, the witnesses) of their language rights (para 37). this conclusion also flows naturally from the fact that language rights are not procedural, but substantive rights. and it is just as valid in the context of s. 19 of the charter. [33] second, the courts are responsible for dis- charging this duty in light of the very words of ss. 14 and 15 of the ola. section 14 does not require that a specific request be made or that a special procedure be followed so that one language or the other can be used in the court in question. it merely decrees that the two official languages have equal status in the sense that any person can use one or the other in the federal courts. this means that individuals should have to do no more than speak in the official language of their choice in order to exercise their right. moreover, s. 15 provides that it is incumbent on the court to ensure that the rights of the parties and the witnesses are upheld. this responsibility is intentionally assigned to the court in the ola: s. 2(c) provides that one of the act’s purposes is in fact to “set out the powers, duties and functions of federal institutions with respect to the official languages of canada”. this role is particularly important in the [32] dans cette perspective, il importe de rappe- ler qu’il incombe d’abord et avant tout au juge du tribunal fédéral visé de veiller au respect des droits linguistiques des témoins, des parties et de toute personne qui comparaît devant lui, et ce, pour deux raisons. premièrement, cela s’impose puisque les droits linguistiques sont « un outil essentiel au main- tien et à la protection des collectivités de langue officielle là où ils s’appliquent » (beaulac, par. 25) et qu’ils doivent être interprétés de manière à per- mettre la réalisation de cet objectif. comme notre cour le souligne dans beaulac, il est plus prudent de ne pas tenir pour acquis que les avocats informeront systématiquement les parties (et en l’occurrence les témoins) de leurs droits linguistiques (par 37). cette conclusion découle aussi naturellement du fait que les droits linguistiques ne sont pas des droits procé- duraux, mais des droits substantiels. en outre, cette conclusion s’impose tout autant dans le contexte de l’art. 19 de la charte. [33] deuxièmement, cette obligation incombe aux tribunaux aux termes mêmes des art. 14 et 15 de la llo. l’article 14 n’exige pas qu’une demande par- ticulière soit formulée ou qu’une procédure spéciale soit suivie pour qu’une langue ou l’autre puisse être utilisée devant le tribunal visé. il édicte simplement que les deux langues officielles ont un statut égal, en ce sens que chacun peut employer l’une ou l’autre devant les tribunaux fédéraux. ainsi, une personne ne devrait pas avoir à faire davantage que de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix pour exercer son droit. de plus, selon l’art. 15, il appartient au tri‑ bunal de veiller à ce que les droits des parties et des témoins soient respectés. la llo attribue à dessein cette responsabilité au tribunal : suivant l’al. 2c), l’un de ses objets est justement « de préciser les pouvoirs et les obligations des institutions fédérales en matière de langues officielles ». ce rôle est particulièrement important dans le cas des témoins, car ceux-ci, bien 280 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. case of witnesses, given that, even though they are called by one of the parties, they do not necessarily have the same interests as that party and will there- fore not always be informed of their rights by the party’s counsel, whose priority is to defend his or her client’s interests and to win the case. [34] consequently, a judge cannot ask a person to speak in an official language other than the language of the person’s choice. a request to that effect is in and of itself a violation of s. 14 of the ola, s. 19 of the charter and s. 133 of the constitution act, 1867. judges of the courts to which these sections apply must have no doubt that all witnesses are well aware of their right to speak in the official language of their choice before testifying. a witness’s choice in this regard must be informed. any sign that a witness is uncomfortable in one language or wishes to speak in the other official language must not be disregarded, as that could result in a violation of the witness’s language rights. [35] in fact, when a judge sees that a party will be calling a witness to testify — or will be arguing — in an official language the other party does not under- stand, the judge must inform the other party of his or her right to an interpreter. the judge can always, and must in many cases, adjourn the hearing so that arrangements can be made for the services of an interpreter. it goes without saying that the parties should be encouraged to plan for and request inter- pretation services in advance. [36] that being said, a party’s decision not to exer- cise his or her right to an interpreter should never be used to force other parties, witnesses or lawyers to speak in that party’s official language. we also find it risky for a judge to offer to translate testimony to help a party understand it. judges do not often have the expertise that is needed to translate testimony correctly, and their intervention could be problem- atic in the event of an appeal should the translation prove to be erroneous. such a substitution of roles is not advisable. qu’appelés par une partie, n’ont pas nécessairement les mêmes intérêts que cette dernière et ne seront donc pas toujours informés de leurs droits par l’avo- cat de la partie, qui cherche avant tout à faire valoir les intérêts de son client et à gagner sa cause. [34] par conséquent, un juge ne peut demander à une personne de s’exprimer dans une autre langue officielle que la langue de son choix. une telle de- mande constitue en soi une violation des art. 14 de la llo, 19 de la charte et 133 de la loi constitu‑ tionnelle de 1867. les juges des tribunaux visés par ces dispositions ne doivent avoir aucun doute que chaque témoin est bien au fait de son droit de s’ex- primer dans la langue officielle de son choix avant le début de son témoignage. le choix du témoin à ce chapitre doit être éclairé. le tribunal ne saurait faire abstraction de quelque indication qu’un témoin est mal à l’aise dans une langue, ou qu’il souhaite parler dans l’autre langue officielle, sans qu’il en découle une violation des droits linguistiques de cette personne. [35] de fait, lorsqu’un juge constate qu’une partie appellera un témoin ou plaidera dans une langue officielle que l’autre partie ne comprend pas, il doit informer cette dernière de son droit à un interprète. il peut toujours, et devra dans plusieurs cas, ajour- ner l’audience pour permettre que les services d’un interprète puissent être retenus. il va sans dire qu’il convient d’encourager les parties à prévoir et à de- mander à l’avance la présence d’un interprète. [36] cela dit, la décision d’une partie de ne pas se prévaloir de son droit à un interprète ne doit ja- mais être utilisée pour contraindre les autres par- ties, les témoins ou les avocats à s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de cette partie. en outre, nous estimons hasardeux pour un juge d’offrir de traduire des témoignages pour permettre à une partie de les comprendre. les juges n’ont souvent pas l’expertise requise pour traduire correctement des témoignages, et leur intervention risque de poser problème en appel si la traduction s’avère erronée. une telle subs- titution des rôles est à déconseiller. [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 281 it is also true that lawyers have certain ethical [37] duties, such as that of acting in the best interests of their clients (code of professional conduct of lawyers, cqlr, c. b-1, r 31, s 23). these duties could be violated should the lawyer fail to inform his or her client and the witnesses who are called of their rights, or to insist personally on arguing in the official language in which he or she can serve the client properly. however, these duties, which are complementary to that of the judge, do not relieve the judge of his or her responsibilities in this regard. the language rights of a party or a witness as well as the corollary duty of the court and the judge to uphold them come into play even before anyone intervenes in that regard. while it is true that lawyers are en- couraged to intervene should a violation occur, a lawyer’s failure to formally object to the violation of a person’s language rights does not excuse a failure by the court to discharge its duties (see r v. dow, 2009 qcca 478, [2009] rjq 679, at paras. 58 et seq). nor can a failure to intervene constitute a form of implicit waiver of the right to make an informed personal choice of language. [38] when language rights are violated, the law- yer’s conduct or interventions can of course be con- sidered, as can the degree of connection between the violations in question and the rights and interests of the party who is asking for a new hearing, when de- ciding on the appropriate remedy. the injury suffered by a witness whose language rights are violated by a judge even though counsel for the party who called the witness has intervened is just as great as the in- jury suffered in a situation in which the judge fails to react to a violation of the witness’s language rights by that same lawyer. this distinction has no effect on the conclusion that the judge failed to take proactive measures to uphold the substantive rights provided for in the legislative provisions discussed above. the two situations may call for different remedies, however. a party may not attempt to save resources by, for example, sacrificing his or her witnesses’ rights and then invoke those rights in order to obtain a new hearing. similarly, a lawyer who, although not compromising the language rights of the witnesses he or she calls, is indifferent when it comes to up- holding their rights will be hard pressed to convince [37] par ailleurs, il est vrai qu’un avocat est tenu de respecter certaines obligations déontologiques, par exemple celle d’agir dans le meilleur intérêt de son client (code de déontologie des avocats, rlrq, c. b-1, r 31, art 23). il pourrait faillir à ces obli- gations s’il omettait d’informer de leurs droits son client et les témoins qu’il appelle, ou s’il n’insistait pas de son côté pour plaider dans la langue officielle qui lui permet de servir son client comme il se doit. néanmoins, ces obligations complémentaires à celle du juge ne relèvent pas ce dernier de ses responsa- bilités en la matière. les droits linguistiques d’une partie ou d’un témoin, et l’obligation corollaire du tribunal et du juge d’en assurer le respect, entrent en jeu avant même que quiconque n’intervienne à cet égard. si l’intervention des avocats en cas de violation est encouragée, leur omission de s’opposer formellement au non- respect des droits linguistiques d’une personne n’excuse pas l’omission du tribunal de s’acquitter de ses obligations (voir r c. dow, 2009 qcca 478, [2009] rjq 679, par. 58 et suiv). l’absence d’intervention ne peut pas non plus consti- tuer une forme de renonciation implicite au droit à un choix personnel et éclairé en matière de langue. [38] certes, en cas de violation des droits lin- guistiques, le comportement ou les interventions de l’avocat pourront être examinés au moment de déci- der quelle réparation est convenable, au même titre que le degré de connexité entre les violations repro- chées et les droits et intérêts de la partie qui demande une nouvelle audience. un témoin dont les droits linguistiques sont violés par un juge malgré l’inter- vention de l’avocat de la partie qui l’appelle souffre tout autant que celui dont les droits linguistiques sont violés à l’initiative de ce même avocat dans l’indifférence du juge. cette distinction n’affecte en rien la conclusion que le juge n’a pas su agir de manière proactive pour assurer le respect des droits substantiels prévus par les dispositions législatives déjà mentionnées. ces deux situations peuvent toute- fois appeler des réparations différentes. une partie ne peut tenter d’économiser des ressources, par exemple en sacrifiant les droits de ses témoins, et ensuite invo- quer ces droits pour obtenir une nouvelle audience. de même, un avocat qui, sans compromettre les droits linguistiques des témoins qu’il appelle, affi- cherait une attitude indifférente à l’égard du respect 282 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. a court that the violation of those rights was harmful to his or her client or impaired the client’s interests. in such circumstances, the court might conclude that the party is trying to take advantage of the violation for purely tactical purposes. [39] finally, we are sensitive to the fact that the rise in the number of parties who appear in court without counsel to represent them can cause addi- tional problems for judges when it comes to imple- menting the protection of language rights. judges must sometimes adapt the procedure to account for the fact that such individuals are unfamiliar with the justice system in order, for example, to ensure that proceedings are conducted efficiently and to pre- clude the use of purely tactical manoeuvres by more experienced adverse parties. however, the presence of a party who is not represented by counsel does not result in the suspension of anyone’s fundamental rights. as is explained in the statement of principles on self‑ represented litigants and accused persons (2006) (online) established by the canadian judi- cial council, which this court endorsed in pintea v. johns, 2017 scc 23, [2017] 1 scr 470, one of the measures a judge can take to ensure that such individuals can fully understand and participate in a proceeding is to engage in case management ac- tivities. a judge should also take the time to explain the process to the parties and to ensure that they are aware of the options that are available to them in this area. by contrast, an attempt to simplify the hearing in this regard without properly consulting the parties and the witnesses with respect to their options and their needs could lead to unnecessary complications. in the case at bar, taking measures such as these would undoubtedly have been preferable and could have mitigated the impact of mr. mazraani’s being unrepresented while ensuring that everyone’s lan- guage rights were respected. de leurs droits, pourra difficilement convaincre un tribunal que la violation de ces droits a nui à son client ou a porté atteinte à ses intérêts. dans de tels cas, le tribunal pourra alors conclure que la partie tente de tirer avantage de ces violations à des fins purement stratégiques. [39] en terminant, nous sommes sensibles au fait que la présence accrue de parties non représentées par avocat devant les tribunaux peut soulever des difficultés additionnelles pour les juges au chapitre de la mise en œuvre de la protection des droits lin- guistiques. les juges doivent parfois ajuster le pro- cessus pour tenir compte du fait que ces personnes ne sont pas familières avec le système de justice afin, par exemple, de favoriser le déroulement efficace de l’instance et de prévenir l’emploi de manœuvres purement stratégiques par une partie adverse plus ex- périmentée. toutefois, la présence d’une partie non représentée par avocat n’entraîne pas la suspension des droits fondamentaux de quiconque. comme il est expliqué dans l’énoncé de principes concernant les plaideurs et les accusés non représentés par un avocat (2006) (en ligne) établi par le conseil cana- dien de la magistrature, auquel notre cour a souscrit dans l’affaire pintea c. johns, 2017 csc 23, [2017] 1 rcs 470, l’un des moyens que peut prendre un juge pour favoriser la pleine compréhension et la participation de ces personnes est la mise en place de mesures de gestion d’instance. un juge devrait aussi prendre le temps d’expliquer la procédure aux parties et de vérifier si elles sont bien au fait des choix qui s’offrent à elles en la matière. à l’opposé, une tenta- tive de simplifier l’audience à cet égard sans consul- ter adéquatement les parties et les témoins quant à leurs choix et à leurs besoins risque de susciter des complications inutiles. en l’occurrence, le recours à de tels moyens aurait sans doute été préférable et aurait pu permettre d’atténuer l’incidence résultant du fait que m. mazraani se représentait seul, tout en assurant le respect des droits linguistiques de chacun. (3) exercising the right to speak in the official (3) l’exercice du droit de s’exprimer dans la language of one’s choice langue officielle de son choix [40] with these guideposts in mind, it bears repeat- ing that the right at issue in this case is that of speak- ing in the official language of one’s choice. as this [40] ces balises posées, il convient de rappeler que le droit en cause ici est celui de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix. comme notre [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 283 court explained in beaulac, language rights protect a person’s right to make a personal choice that does not depend on external factors such as the person’s command of the chosen language or his or her lin- guistic heritage: “  . canadians [have the freedom] to freely assert which official language is their own language” (para 34). when a person exercises this right, there is thus no need to verify whether he or she speaks better in one language or the other. a person may choose to stick to a single official language or may even change his or her mind while testifying. [41] the nature of this right becomes particularly significant when it must be determined how a person can exercise it or assert it, and how it can be waived. mr. mazraani’s arguments require that these points be clarified. mr. mazraani alleges that industrial’s witnesses and counsel either took full advantage of their right and chose to speak in english, or waived their right to speak in french through mr. turgeon, who, on the second day of the hearing, proposed that it proceed in english with some sentences in french if necessary. [42] in our view, it seems inappropriate to speak in this regard of “waiver” of a right, be it directly or through counsel. the right is not a right to speak in one’s mother tongue or in a language that the court deems to be the person’s language: it is the right to make a personal choice. if what the right protected was merely speaking in one official language or the other, it would protect nothing: a person must speak a language in order to talk and must, at least summar- ily, choose one of the two languages before speaking. what the courts concerned must protect is not just the fact of speaking in one of the official languages, but also the free and informed nature of the choice to speak in one of them rather than the other. cour l’explique dans beaulac, les droits linguis- tiques protègent le droit d’une personne de faire un choix personnel, qui ne dépend pas de facteurs externes comme la maîtrise de la langue choisie ou le patrimoine linguistique de la personne : «    les. canadiens sont libres d’affirmer que l’une ou l’autre langue officielle est la leur » (par 34). en consé- quence, quand une personne exerce ce droit, il n’y a pas lieu de vérifier si elle s’exprime mieux dans une langue ou l’autre. une personne peut choisir de s’en tenir à une seule langue officielle, ou même changer d’avis au cours de son témoignage. [41] la nature de ce droit prend toute sa significa- tion lorsque vient le temps de déterminer comment une personne peut l’exercer ou le revendiquer, et comment elle peut y renoncer. l’argumentation de m. mazraani commande de préciser ces notions. celui-ci prétend que les témoins et l’avocat d’in- dustrielle ont soit profité pleinement de leur droit et choisi de parler en anglais, soit renoncé à leur droit de s’exprimer en français par l’entremise de me turgeon, qui, le deuxième jour de l’audience, aurait proposé que celle-ci se déroule en anglais avec quelques phrases en français si nécessaire. [42] il nous semble inadéquat de parler à cet égard d’une « renonciation » à un droit, que ce soit direc- tement ou par l’entremise d’un avocat. le droit n’est pas celui de s’exprimer dans sa langue maternelle ou dans une langue que le tribunal juge être celle de la personne : il s’agit du droit de faire un choix person- nel. si le droit protégeait le simple fait de parler une langue officielle ou l’autre, il ne protégerait rien : une personne doit s’exprimer dans une langue pour parler et elle doit au moins sommairement choisir l’une des deux avant de s’exprimer. ce que les tribunaux visés doivent protéger, c’est non seulement le fait de s’ex- primer dans une des langues officielles, mais aussi le caractère libre et éclairé du choix de s’exprimer dans l’une plutôt que l’autre. [43] as a result, any “waiver” of language rights should at the very least be as informed as the waiver of the right to an interpreter guaranteed by s. 14 of the charter that was discussed in r v. tran, [1994] 2 scr 951: it “has to be clear and unequivocal and must be done with full knowledge of the rights the [43] par conséquent, toute « renonciation » aux droits linguistiques devrait à tout le moins être éclai- rée, au même titre que la renonciation au droit à un interprète garanti à l’art. 14 de la charte décrite dans r c. tran, [1994] 2 rcs 951 : elle « doit être claire et sans équivoque et doit être faite en pleine 284 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. procedure was enacted to protect and the effect that waiver will have on those rights” (pp 996-97). from this perspective, it seems wrong to speak of an in- formed “waiver” of an informed choice. if the choice is informed, there is no waiver, but only a choice; if the choice is not informed, a waiver of the choice cannot be informed either. the two go hand in hand. [44] the principles enunciated by this court in tran remain relevant: in the instant case, as in tran, the exercise of the language rights depended on a choice made by the holder of the rights. the mere fact of speaking in one official language does not always reflect an exercise of those rights. individuals who are unaware of their language rights could think that they are required to speak in the other official language. in the context of language rights, the court must have no doubt, before concluding that the rights in question were properly exercised and rejecting an allegation that they have been violated, that the person has made a free and informed choice to speak in one official language or the other. [45] the “assertion” of the right to speak in one official language is subject to no particular form. in our view, while there are a number of signs that would suffice to alert a judge with respect to his or her duties, none of them are necessary on their own. for example, the fact that a witness began his or her testimony in one language or switched to a language after having testified for some time in the other official language will generally be sufficient as an indication in due form of the witness’s choice to speak in that language. in fact, if a person switches languages during certain parts of his or her testimony or asks to speak in the other official language, that could be a sign that the person’s original choice was not informed. vigilance on the judge’s part thus remains necessary, especially in the presence of indi- viduals, such as witnesses, who may not be informed as regards this right. in any event, given that the right to speak in the official language of one’s choice is distinct from the parties’ right to an interpreter under s. 15(2) of the ola, the right to speak in the official language of one’s choice does not have to be “asserted” by submitting a request for an interpreter connaissance des droits que la procédure vise à pro- téger et de l’effet de la renonciation sur ces droits » (p. 996- 997). de ce point de vue, il nous apparaît inexact de parler d’une « renonciation » éclairée à un choix éclairé. si le choix est éclairé, il n’y aura aucune renonciation, seulement un choix; si le choix n’est pas éclairé, alors la renonciation au choix ne pourra pas l’être non plus. les deux vont de pair. [44] les enseignements de notre cour dans l’ar- rêt tran demeurent pertinents, puisqu’ici comme alors, l’exercice des droits linguistiques repose sur un choix fait par leur titulaire. le seul fait de s’expri- mer dans une langue officielle ne reflète pas toujours l’exercice de ces droits. une personne qui n’est pas au fait de ses droits linguistiques pourrait penser qu’elle doit s’exprimer dans l’autre langue officielle. dans le contexte des droits linguistiques, le tribunal concerné ne doit pas avoir de doute que la personne a choisi de manière libre et éclairée de s’exprimer dans une langue ou dans l’autre avant de conclure que les droits en question ont été correctement exer- cés et qu’une allégation de violation de ceux-ci doit être rejetée. [45] la « revendication » du droit de s’exprimer dans une langue officielle n’est soumise à aucune forme particulière. nous considérons que si plusieurs indices sont suffisants pour éveiller l’attention du juge sur ses obligations, aucun n’est en soi néces- saire. par exemple, le fait pour un témoin de parler dans une langue dès le début de son témoignage, ou encore de changer de langue après avoir témoigné un certain temps dans l’autre langue officielle, sera généralement suffisant pour constituer une indication en bonne et due forme du choix de cette personne de s’exprimer dans cette langue. de fait, si une per- sonne change de langue durant certaines portions de son témoignage ou demande à s’exprimer dans l’autre langue officielle, cela pourrait constituer un indice que son choix initial n’était pas éclairé. la vigilance du juge demeure donc nécessaire, surtout en présence de personnes qui risquent de ne pas être informées de ce droit, par exemple les témoins. dans tous les cas, comme le droit de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix est dissocié du droit des parties à un interprète prévu au par. 15(2) de la llo, le droit de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 285 to an official of the court or to the judge. it is for the party who wishes to obtain the services of an inter- preter to apply for them. de son choix n’a pas à être « revendiqué » par la pré- sentation à l’administration du tribunal concerné ou au juge d’une demande sollicitant la présence d’un interprète. il revient à la partie qui souhaite obtenir les services d’un interprète de présenter elle- même une demande en ce sens. (4) possible remedies in the event of a violation (4) les réparations en cas de violation [46] finally, any remedy that is granted when lan- guage rights have not been upheld must itself also support the achievement of the objective of these fundamental rights, namely the full and equal par- ticipation of linguistic minorities in the country’s institutions, or more specifically in the courts in question (beaulac, at paras. 54 and 56). furthermore, because language rights are not procedural rights, the fact that a violation has had no impact on the fairness of the hearing is in principle not relevant to the remedy (ibid). indeed, even if there was no error in the decision on the merits, the language rights in question would be compromised if no remedy was granted (see belende v. patel, 2008 onca 148, 89 or (3d) 494, at para 24). in beaulac and in other cases concerning s. 530 [47] of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, which provides for the right of an accused to be tried by a judge who speaks the same official language as him or her, a finding that this right has been violated has usu- ally led to a new preliminary inquiry (r v. munkonda, 2015 onca 309, 126 or (3d) 646, at paras. 148-49) or a new trial (dow, at para. 106; r v. potvin (2004), 69 or (3d) 641, at paras. 37 and 41). new hearings have also been ordered in civil proceedings (belende; kilrich industries ltd. v. halotier, 2007 ykca 12, 161 crr (2d) 331, at paras. 5 et 106). moreover, a failure to take the language rights provided for in the ola into account has been characterized as an error of law (ewonde v. canada, 2017 fca 112, at paras. 14 and 28 (canlii)). the fca has also concluded in a civil context that denying a party the right to a hearing in the official language of her choice amounted to a denial of natural justice (beaudoin v. canada, [1993] 3 fc 518 (ca), at pp 526-27). [46] enfin, toute réparation accordée lorsque les droits linguistiques ne sont pas respectés doit elle aussi permettre la réalisation de l’objet de ces droits fondamentaux, soit une participation pleine et égale des minorités linguistiques aux institutions du pays, en l’occurrence, les tribunaux visés (beaulac, par. 54 et 56). de plus, les droits linguistiques n’étant pas des droits procéduraux, la réparation n’est en prin- cipe pas influencée par l’absence d’incidence sur l’équité de l’audience (ibid). les droits linguistiques seraient en effet compromis si aucune réparation n’était accordée lorsque la décision au fond n’est entachée d’aucune erreur (voir belende c. patel, 2008 onca 148, 89 or (3d) 502, par 24). [47] dans l’arrêt beaulac, ainsi que dans d’autres affaires portant sur l’art. 530 du code criminel, lrc. 1985, c. c-46, lequel énonce le droit d’un accusé de subir son procès devant un juge qui parle sa langue officielle, la constatation d’une violation de ce droit a entraîné le plus souvent la tenue d’une nouvelle en- quête préliminaire (r c. munkonda, 2015 onca 309, 126 or (3d) 691, par. 148- 149) ou d’un nouveau procès (dow, par. 106; r c. potvin (2004), 69 or. (3d) 654, par. 37 et 41). de nouvelles audiences ont aussi été ordonnées dans un contexte civil (belende; kilrich industries ltd. c. halotier, 2007 ykca 12, par. 5 et 106 (canlii)). le fait de ne pas tenir compte des droits linguistiques prévus à la llo a d’ailleurs été qualifié d’erreur de droit (ewonde c. canada, 2017 caf 112, par. 14 et 28 (canlii)). la caf a aussi déjà conclu, dans un contexte civil, que nier à une partie le droit à une audience dans la langue officielle de son choix constitue un déni de justice naturelle (beaudoin c. canada, [1993] 3 cf 518 (ca), p. 526- 527). [48] thus, a new hearing will generally be an ap- propriate remedy for most language rights violations. [48] ainsi, une nouvelle audience constituera géné- ralement une réparation convenable dans la plupart 286 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. a new hearing is needed because such a violation de- prives one party of the possibility of having access to canadian justice in the official language of his or her choice. because the violation occurred in the context of a judicial proceeding, only a new process con- ducted in a manner respectful of everyone’s rights represents a true affirmation of language rights. a judge’s failure to take the rights of the persons before him or her into account constitutes both an error of law and a denial of natural justice independently of the quality of his or her judgment and the absence of substantive errors. des cas de violation de droits linguistiques. la né- cessité d’une nouvelle audience s’explique par le fait qu’une telle violation prive une partie de la pos- sibilité d’avoir accès à la justice canadienne dans la langue officielle de son choix. la violation ayant eu lieu dans le cadre d’une procédure judiciaire, seule la reprise du processus dans le respect des droits de tous représente une réelle affirmation des droits linguistiques. le fait pour un juge de ne pas tenir compte des droits des personnes présentes devant lui constitue à la fois une erreur de droit et un déni de justice naturelle, indépendamment de la qualité de son jugement et de l’absence d’erreur de fond. [49] parties may seek such a remedy if they allege that their language rights or those of their counsel have been violated: the right of a party to speak in the official language of his or her choice implies that the party’s counsel can speak in an official language that suits the party, be it a language that the party personally understands or the language in which the party believes his or her counsel will be most effective. on the other hand, a party cannot rely on a violation of the language rights of the opposing party or those of counsel for the opposing party in support of the remedy being sought. [49] une partie pourra demander une telle répa- ration si elle allègue la violation de ses droits lin- guistiques ou de ceux de son avocat : le droit d’une partie de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix implique que son avocat puisse s’exprimer dans une langue officielle qui sied à celle-ci, que ce soit une langue qu’elle- même comprend, ou la langue par laquelle elle croit que son avocat sera le plus efficace. inversement, une partie ne pourra pas invoquer la violation des droits linguistiques de la partie adverse ou de l’avocat de cette dernière pour justifier la réparation recherchée. [50] as for witnesses, whether it is appropriate for a party to claim that their rights have been violated will depend on the context. a judge who must deter- mine whether that is the case must consider, among other things, the relationship between the party and the witness, the importance of the testimony to the party’s case, and the relationship between the party’s language interests and those of the witness. where a violation of a witness’s rights entails a violation of the party’s right to conduct the case in the official language of his or her choice, there is in effect a violation of the party’s language rights. similarly, where the violation of an important witness’s lan- guage rights has an impact on the judge’s perception or assessment of that witness’s testimony, this will give the affected party a genuine interest to raise the violation. the connection between the violation of a witness’s language rights and the party who is asking for a new hearing must of course be estab- lished precisely: a party must not benefit unduly from violations that have little to do with his or her own [50] quant aux témoins, le contexte permettra de conclure s’il est approprié pour une partie de soule- ver la violation de leurs droits. les juges appelés à évaluer si c’est le cas devront notamment considérer la relation entre la partie et le témoin, l’importance du témoignage pour la cause de la partie, et la re- lation entre les intérêts linguistiques de la partie et ceux du témoin. lorsque la violation des droits d’un témoin entraîne une violation du droit d’une partie de mener sa cause dans la langue officielle de son choix, il y a alors, dans les faits, violation des droits linguis- tiques de cette partie. de même, lorsque la violation des droits linguistiques d’un témoin important a une incidence sur la perception ou l’évaluation de son témoignage par le juge, cette violation confère à la partie touchée un intérêt réel à la soulever. le lien entre la violation des droits linguistiques d’un témoin et la partie qui demande une nouvelle audience doit bien sûr être établi avec rigueur : une partie ne doit pas profiter indûment de violations qui ont peu à voir avec ses propres droits et intérêts. toutefois, de [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 287 rights and interests. generally speaking, however, the courts should favour the existence of effective remedies for violations of witnesses’ language rights. manière générale, les tribunaux devraient favoriser l’existence de réparations efficaces des violations des droits linguistiques des témoins. [51] that being said, if the violation of a person’s language rights has had a genuine impact on the party who is asking for a new hearing, that remedy should be granted where the violation in question brings the administration of justice into disrepute. this will generally be the case given that language rights have a systemic aspect and that the individual right also exists in favour of the community. a violation that seems minor at a personal level will nonetheless have some weight simply because it contributes to putting a brake on the full and equal participation of members of official language communities in the country’s institutions and undermines the equality of status of the official languages. moreover, a vi- olation of language rights can shake the public’s confidence in the administration of justice: if a judge gives an advantage at a hearing to members of one language group to the detriment of the other group, that could be perceived as a sign of bias (munkonda, at para 63). [52] however, a remedy cannot be disproportion- ate in relation to the scale of the language rights violation, its recurrence and its impact on personal dignity. a short- term violation or one that is rela- tively harmless for its victim might not justify or- dering a new hearing. the same is true of a violation that seems to have been raised for purely tactical pur- poses, such as when a party showed no concern about it at the hearing. on the other hand, the courts must be sensitive to the fact that unrepresented parties may have more difficulty intervening at the hearing to as- sert their language rights and those of their witnesses. [51] cela étant, si la violation des droits linguis- tiques d’une personne a réellement une incidence sur la partie qui demande une nouvelle audience, cette réparation devra être accordée lorsque la violation en question déconsidère l’administration de la jus- tice. ce sera généralement le cas puisque les droits linguistiques comportent un aspect systémique et que le droit individuel existe aussi en faveur de la communauté. une violation qui semble mineure sur le plan individuel aura néanmoins un certain poids du seul fait qu’elle contribue à freiner la pleine et égale participation des membres des communautés linguistiques officielles aux institutions du pays et à miner l’égalité de statut des langues officielles. en outre, la violation de droits linguistiques peut ébranler la confiance du public dans l’administra- tion de la justice : le fait pour un juge d’avantager un groupe linguistique au détriment d’un autre lors d’une audience pourrait être perçu comme un signe de partialité (munkonda, par 63). [52] toutefois, une réparation ne peut être dispro- portionnée par rapport à l’ampleur de la violation des droits linguistiques, sa persistance et son incidence sur la dignité de l’individu. une violation de courte durée ou peu préjudiciable à la personne qui la subit pourrait ne pas justifier la tenue d’une nouvelle au- dience. il en va de même d’une violation qui paraît soulevée à des fins purement stratégiques, notam- ment lorsqu’une partie s’y est montrée indifférente à l’audience. en revanche, les tribunaux doivent être sensibles au fait que les parties non représentées peuvent avoir plus de difficulté à intervenir à l’au- dience pour faire respecter leurs droits linguistiques et ceux de leurs témoins. [53] furthermore, practical considerations, such as the length and complexity of a hearing and the signif- icance of its impact on the individuals participating in it, or the relative importance of the testimony at issue, might also justify a court’s contemplating a remedy other than a new hearing. it should be borne in mind that upholding language rights does not re- quire perfection and that, for example, saying a few [53] de plus, des considérations d’ordre pratique, telles la longueur d’une audience, sa complexité et son incidence considérable sur les personnes y par- ticipant, ou encore l’importance relative du témoi- gnage en cause, pourraient aussi justifier le tribunal d’envisager une réparation autre qu’une nouvelle audience. il convient de rappeler que le respect des droits linguistiques n’exige pas la perfection et que, 288 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. words in the other language does not automatically constitute a violation of those rights (munkonda, at para. 109; potvin, at para 37). par exemple, quelques mots prononcés dans l’autre langue ne constituent pas systématiquement une vio- lation de ces droits (munkonda, par. 109; potvin, par 37). [54] therefore, when a new hearing is not justified, the court can award costs if the violation resulted from, among other things, the conduct of one of the parties, or declare that the rights of a party or a wit- ness were violated. it is also open to a person whose rights under the ola have not been upheld to make a complaint by means of the mechanism established in that act (see ss. 58 et seq). finally, there may be situations that lend themselves to the develop- ment of more creative remedies under s. 24(1) of the charter (doucet‑ boudreau v. nova scotia (minister of education), 2003 scc 62, [2003] 3 scr 3, at paras 24-45). but the decision not to order a new hearing must always be carefully explained in light both of the violation’s seriousness and of the reme- dy’s impact. [54] aussi, lorsque la tenue d’une nouvelle audience n’est pas justifiée, le tribunal peut accorder des dépens si la violation résulte entre autres du comportement de l’une des parties, ou déclarer que les droits d’une partie ou d’un témoin ont été enfreints. une personne dont les droits prévus par la llo ne sont pas respec- tés pourrait aussi porter plainte suivant le mécanisme établi par cette loi (voir art. 58 et suiv). certaines situations pourraient enfin se prêter à l’élaboration de réparations plus créatives, en vertu du par. 24(1) de la charte (doucet‑ boudreau c. nouvelle‑ écosse (ministre de l’éducation), 2003 csc 62, [2003] 3 rcs 3, par 24-45). mais la décision de ne pas or- donner une nouvelle audience devra toujours être justifiée rigoureusement, en fonction de la gravité tant de la violation que de l’incidence de la réparation. b application to the facts b l’application aux faits [55] with these considerations in mind, we are of the opinion that the two questions raised in this case must be answered in the affirmative. the lan- guage rights of several witnesses and of counsel for industrial were not upheld in the tcc, the impact of those violations has been established and the circum- stances of the case require a new hearing. [55] sur la foi de ces considérations, nous sommes d’avis que les deux questions soulevées en l’espèce commandent une réponse affirmative les droits linguistiques de plusieurs témoins et de l’avocat d’industrielle devant la cci n’ont pas été respec- tés, l’incidence de ces violations est établie et les circonstances requièrent ici la tenue d’une nouvelle audience. (1) language rights violations at issue (1) les violations des droits linguistiques en cause [56] several individuals who participated in this case had their language rights infringed at the hear- ing in the tcc. [56] plusieurs des personnes ayant pris part à cette affaire ont vu leurs droits linguistiques enfreints à l’audience devant la cci. [57] first of all, the judge placed on mr. michaud the burden of the informal nature of the proceedings and of the fact that mr. mazraani, who was not rep- resented by counsel, had not informed anyone that he needed an interpreter. asking the witness to choose between having the hearing adjourned and testifying in english was incompatible with the witness’s right under s. 15(1) of the ola to be heard in the official language of his choice. [57] d’abord, le juge a fait porter à m. michaud le poids du caractère informel des procédures et du fait que m. mazraani, qui n’était pas représenté par un avocat, n’avait avisé personne qu’il avait besoin d’un d’interprète. demander au témoin de choisir entre reporter l’audience ou témoigner en anglais allait à l’encontre du droit reconnu à celui-ci par le par. 15(1) de la llo d’être entendu dans la langue officielle de son choix. [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 289 in addition, counsel for the mnr seems to [58] have subordinated his witness’s right to speak in french to mr. mazraani’s authorization. in the cir- cumstances, and in light of what the witness and her lawyer said, the judge should have intervened to explain that the right to testify in the official language of one’s choice is unconditional. [58] de plus, l’avocat de la mrn a semblé su- bordonner le droit de son témoin de s’exprimer en français à l’autorisation de m. mazraani. dans les circonstances, et compte tenu des propos du témoin et de son avocat, le juge aurait dû intervenir pour expliquer que le droit de témoigner dans la langue officielle de son choix est inconditionnel. [59] then, on the third day of the hearing, the judge denied mr. charbonneau the right to speak in french despite his having clearly asked to speak that language on beginning his testimony. on that day, mr. turgeon, counsel for industrial, began examin- ing his witness in french. but the judge intervened to ask him to proceed in english, after which the judge interrupted the lawyer, who had just begun to give his answer, the full content of which will never be known, and addressed the witness directly to ask whether he spoke english. the judge’s insistence in this regard clearly made mr. charbonneau uncom- fortable: [59] ensuite, le troisième jour de l’audience, m. char bonneau s’est vu refuser le droit de s’expri- mer en français par le juge, malgré sa demande claire à cet effet dès le début de son témoignage. ce jour-là, me turgeon, l’avocat d’industrielle, commence à interroger son témoin en français. le juge intervient toutefois pour lui demander de procéder à l’interro- gatoire en anglais, puis, interrompant l’avocat qui amorce tout juste sa réponse dont on ne connaîtra jamais la teneur complète, il s’adresse directement au témoin pour vérifier auprès de lui s’il parle l’anglais. à l’évidence, m. charbonneau est mal à l’aise devant cette insistance du juge : justice archambault: [translation] is it possi- ble to — [original in english] to do it in english? le juge archambault : est-ce que c’est possible de — [traduction] de le faire en anglais? [original in english] mr. turgeon: oh, oh yeah, i’m sorry, i’m not sure — me turgeon : [traduction] oh, oh oui, je suis désolé, je ne suis pas certain — justice archambault: can you speak    . le juge archambault : [traduction] pouvez- vous parler   . [translation] mr. charbonneau: can i just say something? m. charbonneau : est-ce que je peux mentionner quelque chose? justice archambault: yes. le juge archambault : oui. mr. charbonneau: yes, as a matter of fact, i’m better in french … m charbonneau  : oui, en fait je suis mieux en français … justice archambault: yes. le juge archambault : oui. mr.  charbonneau: … and i’m a little surprised because at work our meetings are basically, everything is done in french. m. charbonneau : … et puis je suis un petit peu surpris parce que dans le fond les réunions qu’on fait à notre bureau, tout se passe en français. 290 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. justice archambault: uh- huh. le juge archambault : m’hm. mr. charbonneau: can i answer in french? justice archambault: but the taxpayer … the person before us today whose … whose appeal this is … m. charbonneau : est-ce que je peux répondre en français? le juge archambault : mais le contribuable … la personne qui est devant nous aujourd’hui dont c’est … dont c’est l’appel … mr. charbonneau: yes. m. charbonneau : oui. justice archambault: … tells us that he has trou- ble understanding french. so we’re asking witnesses as much as possible to speak in english. are you relatively comfortable speaking english? le juge archambault : … nous dit qu’il a de la difficulté à comprendre le français. donc on demande autant que possible aux témoins de s’exprimer en anglais. est-ce que vous vous sentez relativement à l’aise pour parler en anglais? mr. charbonneau: well, i’ll try … m. charbonneau : ben je vais essayer … justice archambault: yes, fine. le juge archambault : oui, d’accord. mr. charbonneau: … to do my best … m. charbonneau : … le mieux que je peux … justice archambault: all right. le juge archambault : d’accord. mr. charbonneau: … and we’ll be able to … m. charbonneau : … pis on va pouvoir … justice archambault: we all make mistakes in english, so please don’t worry about that. le juge archambault : on fait tous des fautes en anglais, soyez tout à fait à l’aise de ce côté-là. mr. charbonneau: thank you. [emphasis added.] m. charbonneau : merci. [nous soulignons.] [60] in our opinion, this passage illustrates a clear violation of the constitutional right to speak in the official language of one’s choice in a federal court. although the judge had a duty under s. 15(1) of the ola and s. 19(1) of the charter to take proactive measures to ensure that mr. charbonneau’s rights were upheld, he instead asked mr. charbonneau not to assert his right but to testify in a language chosen by the judge in the interest of the other party. he continued this insistence even in response to a direct question: [translation] “can i answer in french?” what is more, when mr. charbonneau tried to ex- plain himself, perhaps to qualify his response and to limit his undertaking to answer in english, the judge interrupted him. [60] à notre avis, ce passage illustre une violation claire du droit constitutionnel de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix devant un tribunal fédéral. bien que, suivant les par. 15(1) de la llo et 19(1) de la charte, le juge soit tenu de prendre des mesures proactives pour s’assurer du respect des droits de m. charbonneau, ce dernier est plutôt invité à ne pas revendiquer son droit et à témoigner dans une langue choisie par le juge dans l’intérêt de l’autre partie. cette insistance continue de se ma- nifester même en réponse à une question directe : « est-ce que je peux répondre en français? » qui plus est, alors que m. charbonneau tente de s’expliquer, peut- être pour nuancer sa réponse et limiter son en- gagement à répondre en anglais, le juge l’interrompt. [61] similarly, the judge should never have in- sisted on the fifth day of the hearing that mr. leclerc [61] de même, le juge n’aurait jamais dû insister pour que le témoignage de m. leclerc, le cinquième [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 291 testify primarily in english. this is true even though mr. leclerc had stated at the beginning of his testi- mony that he would be speaking in english. indeed, counsel for industrial repeatedly reminded his wit- ness of his right to testify in french by explicitly inviting him to answer in that language, but the judge prevented the witness from exercising this right ei- ther directly, by telling him to speak english, or indirectly, by asking him questions in english. in the context of this testimony, which was clearly tense, the witness could quite certainly have interpreted these interventions by the judge as calls to order. in fact, at one point in his testimony, mr. leclerc him- self stated that he would answer in french, before immediately changing his mind and saying that he would do so in english. this clearly shows that at this point in the hearing, the question of language had become problematic. the discussions on this point were intense and arduous. one exchange between the judge and counsel for industrial on mr. leclerc’s right to testify in french illustrates this in no uncer- tain terms: justice archambault: [original in english] you know, i’ve let you go, but, you know, technically he’s your witness and you ask leading questions. i would prefer if you ask him what do you do with — [translation] jour de l’audience, se déroule principalement en anglais. cela reste vrai même si m. leclerc avait in- diqué au début de son témoignage qu’il s’exprimerait en anglais. en l’occurrence, l’avocat d’industrielle a à plusieurs reprises rappelé à son témoin son droit de déposer en français en l’invitant explicitement à répondre dans cette langue, mais le juge l’a empêché d’exercer ce droit soit directement, en lui enjoignant de parler en anglais, soit indirectement, en l’interro- geant lui- même en anglais. dans le contexte de ce témoignage, à l’évidence tendu, ces interventions du juge ont très certainement pu être interprétées par le témoin comme des rappels à l’ordre. de fait, à un moment de son témoignage, m. leclerc a lui- même indiqué qu’il répondrait en français, pour ensuite immédiatement se raviser et annoncer qu’il le ferait en anglais cela démontre bien qu’à ce stade de l’audience, la question de la langue était devenue un problème. les discussions sur ce point étaient char- gées et ardues. un échange entre le juge et l’avocat d’industrielle sur le droit de m. leclerc de témoigner en français l’illustre de façon on ne peut plus claire : le juge archambault : [traduction] vous savez, je vous ai laissé faire, mais, vous savez, en principe, il est votre témoin et vous lui posez des questions suggestives. je préférerais que vous lui demandiez que faites- vous de — mr. turgeon: okay. but y’know it’s not easy either, my lord, as my mother tongue is not english. me turgeon : ok. mais disons que c’est pas facile non plus, monsieur le juge, du fait que ma langue maternelle n’est pas l’anglais. justice archambault: uh- huh. le juge archambault : m’hm. mr. turgeon: it’s not the witness’s either, and that’s where things get absolutely difficult. i’m trying to find a way for us … i understand that we have to speak in english, but i don’t think that can be done to the detriment of one of the parties either. me turgeon : le témoin non plus, et là ça devient absolument difficile. j’essaye de retrouver une façon où on … je comprends qu’il faut parler en anglais, mais je pense pas que ça peut être fait au détriment d’une des parties, par ailleurs. justice archambault: i understand you very well, but you know … you’re a lawyer. you do litigation, so you know the difference. le juge archambault : je comprends très bien, mais vous savez … vous êtes un avocat. vous faites du droit litigieux, donc vous connaissez la différence. mr. turgeon: yes, yes, my lord, i know the rule. me turgeon : oui, oui, monsieur le juge, je connais la règle. 292 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. justice archambault: okay. le juge archambault : ok. mr. turgeon: but i’m trying to see here how we can “manage” a situation, because in litigation, generally the rule is that it’s always in the witness’s language. that’s the universal rule, always. me turgeon : mais ici j’essaye de voir comment on peut « manager » une situation, parce que quand on fait du litige, généralement la règle c’est que c’est toujours dans la langue du témoin. ça c’est la règle universelle tout le temps. justice archambault: and so if we want to do it in both languages, interpretation services must be requested. le juge archambault : et donc si on veut le faire dans les deux langues, il faut demander un service d’in- terprètes. mr. turgeon: okay, but i don’t have a problem. i’m comfortable in both languages. me turgeon : ok, mais moi, j’ai pas de problème là. je suis à l’aise dans les deux langues. justice archambault: yes, i understand, but [orig- inal in english] we’re faced with a situation where we have the taxpayer — le juge archambault : oui, je comprends, mais [traduction] nous nous trouvons dans une situation où le contribuable — [original in english] mr. turgeon: yeah. [traduction] me turgeon : oui. justice archambault: — who says he doesn’t un- derstand [french] and — le juge archambault : — affirme qu’il ne com- prend pas [le français] et — mr. turgeon: but he should then require — me turgeon : mais il devrait alors exiger — justice archambault: but the issue is we’re trying to do the best under — le juge archambault : cependant, il faut dire que nous essayons d’agir au mieux dans — mr. turgeon: yeah, yeah, but i just want the court to — i understand the objection, my lord. me turgeon : oui, oui, mais je veux juste que la cour — je comprends l’objection, monsieur le juge. justice archambault: i do understand it makes it a little bit more difficult for you but i know you can handle it. [emphasis added.] le juge archambault : je comprends que ça vous rend la tâche un peu plus difficile, mais je sais que vous en êtes capable. [nous soulignons.] [62] mr. turgeon was thus insistent in raising the applicable procedural law and his witness’s right to speak in the official language of his choice. when the question of an interpreter came up again, he tried to explain to the judge that mr. mazraani could request an interpreter, noting first that the interpreter would not be there in his interest, but the judge interrupted him. the fact that the lawyer then chose to continue his examination-in- chief does not have the effect of lightening the judge’s responsibility to favour the protection of the witness’s language rights. just as in the case of mr. charbonneau, the violation of mr. leclerc’s rights was serious, wilful and repeated, [62] maître turgeon a ainsi insisté pour soulever le droit procédural applicable et le droit de son témoin de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix. lorsque la question de l’interprète a refait surface, il a tenté d’expliquer au juge que m. mazraani pourrait demander la présence d’un interprète, non sans avoir rappelé que cet interprète ne serait pas présent dans son intérêt à lui, mais le juge l’a interrompu. que l’avocat ait alors choisi de continuer son interroga- toire en chef n’a pas pour effet d’atténuer la respon- sabilité qu’avait le juge de favoriser la protection des droits linguistiques du témoin. tout comme pour m. charbonneau, la violation des droits était grave, [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 293 and it resulted in several confrontations between the judge and counsel for industrial. [63] lastly, the judge violated mr. turgeon’s con- stitutional rights and his rights under s. 14 of the ola by denying him the right to present his argument in french in this discussion that took place in english on the fifth day of the hearing: volontaire et répétée dans le cas de m. leclerc, et elle a mené à plusieurs confrontations entre le juge et l’avocat d’industrielle. [63] enfin, les droits constitutionnels de me turgeon ainsi que ses droits prévus à l’art. 14 de la llo ont été violés par le juge lorsque celui-ci lui a refusé le droit de plaider en français le cinquième jour de l’audience dans cet échange qui a eu lieu en anglais : [traduction] mr. turgeon: just to be clear, everything i have here is in french. i intend to plead in french tomorrow. we may resume for the witness but i don’t think i will serve correctly my client if i’m not doing — me turgeon : juste pour que les choses soient bien claires, tout ce que j’ai ici est en français. j’ai l’intention de plaider en français demain. nous pouvons poursuivre en ce qui a trait au témoin, mais je ne crois pas que je vais bien servir les intérêts de mon client si je ne — justice archambault: okay. le juge archambault : d’accord. mr. turgeon: and all the precedent[s] are mainly in french. me turgeon : et toute la jurisprudence est principale- ment en français. justice archambault: okay. anyway, do your best tomorrow. le juge archambault : d’accord. quoi qu’il en soit, faites de votre mieux demain. mr. turgeon: okay. me turgeon : d’accord. justice archambault:   . but i would encourage you to do [the] best you can do in english. le juge archambault :   . je vous encourage toutefois à faire de votre mieux en anglais. mr. turgeon: okay. me turgeon : d’accord. justice archambault: but, you know, if you need to do it in french i’ll let you do it and we’ll translate if nec- essary. that will just slow the process. [emphasis added.] le juge archambault : mais vous savez, si vous avez besoin de vous exprimer en français, je vais vous laisser faire et nous traduirons au besoin. ça ne fera que ralentir le processus. [nous soulignons.] mr.  turgeon’s assertion of his right to speak in french was perfectly clear. while he was explain- ing the reason for his choice and why he considered it important, the judge interrupted him, apparently to tell him that he could argue in french, but the judge then qualified this by asking mr. turgeon to do the best he could in english, specifying that if he insisted on speaking french, “[t]hat will just slow the process”. la revendication par me turgeon de son droit de s’exprimer en français était limpide. alors qu’il ex- pliquait la raison et l’importance de ce choix à ses yeux, le juge l’a interrompu, apparemment pour lui dire qu’il pourrait plaider en français, ce qui a par la suite été nuancé lorsqu’il a demandé à me turgeon de faire de son mieux en anglais en précisant que s’il insistait pour parler français, [traduction] « [ç]a ne fera que ralentir le processus ». 294 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. [64] on the sixth and final day of the hearing, mr. turgeon therefore presented his argument mainly in english. the judge observed that mr. turgeon was less fluent in that language and even made the following comment, in english: “   it is apparent that you don’t practice as much in english   ”. the judge nonetheless repeatedly asked him to speak english when he was presenting certain ideas in french. the judge eventually had to let mr. turgeon clarify certain aspects of his argument in french, as he could see that the lawyer was having trouble speaking in english, and mr. turgeon himself said “[m]y english is very bad”. the judge’s insistence that mr. turgeon speak english during most of his argument constitutes a flagrant violation of the law- yer’s language rights. [65] although this has no impact on our analysis or on our conclusions, we would like to point out in closing that s. 15(2) of the ola was also not complied with at the hearing in the tcc. as the fca noted, despite the pressure exerted by the judge, a number of parts of the testimony of industrial’s witnesses and the presentation of its argument took place in french. yet mr. mazraani had stated, on the second day of the hearing, that he would need an interpreter if the hearing was to proceed in french much of the time. despite this, the judge did not inform him of his right to be provided an interpreter at the tcc’s expense or of the procedure to follow to request one. because mr. mazraani was an unrepresented party, a proactive approach would have been particularly appropriate in this case. even though mr. mazraani has not raised this violation in this court, it did nev- ertheless occur. and what is more, it was the source of all the other violations against industrial and its witnesses, who were ultimately made to bear the burden of this absence of an interpreter. [64] au sixième et dernier jour de l’audience, me turgeon a donc surtout plaidé en anglais. le juge a constaté qu’il était moins habile dans cette langue et a même fait remarquer ce qui suit en anglais : [traduction] «    il est évident que vous ne prati- quez pas aussi souvent en anglais    ». le juge lui a néanmoins demandé à de multiples reprises de s’ex- primer en anglais lorsque celui-ci présentait certaines idées en français. il a dû finalement lui permettre de préciser certains aspects de son argumentation en français devant le constat que me turgeon avait de la difficulté à s’exprimer en anglais et l’affirmation suivante de celui-ci : [traduction] « [m]on anglais est très mauvais ». cette insistance du juge pour que me turgeon s’exprime en anglais durant la ma- jeure partie de sa plaidoirie constitue une violation flagrante des droits linguistiques de l’avocat. [65] bien que cela n’influe ni sur notre analyse, ni sur nos conclusions, nous soulignons en terminant que le par. 15(2) de la llo n’a pas été respecté non plus lors de l’audience devant la cci. comme le fait remarquer la caf, malgré la pression exercée par le juge, plusieurs portions des témoignages des témoins d’industrielle et de sa plaidoirie ont été livrées en français. or, m. mazraani avait indiqué, et ce, dès le deuxième jour de l’audience, qu’il aurait besoin d’un interprète si l’instruction allait se dérouler une bonne partie du temps en français. malgré cela, le juge ne l’a pas informé de son droit à un interprète aux frais de la cci et de la procédure à suivre pour en faire la demande. comme m. mazraani était une partie non représentée, une approche proactive était tout particulièrement de mise en l’espèce. bien que m. mazraani ne soulève pas cette violation devant nous, il n’en demeure pas moins qu’elle a bel et bien eu lieu. elle est du reste la source de toutes les autres violations subies par industrielle et ses témoins, à qui l’on a fait porter en définitive le poids de l’absence de cet interprète. (2) impact of the violations (2) l’incidence des violations [66] the language rights violations in question in this case were not only numerous, they had an undeniable impact on the witnesses, on the parties and on the hearing. and much of the judge’s harsh criticism, in his reasons, of mr. michaud, mr. leclerc [66] en l’espèce, non seulement ces violations des droits linguistiques ont été multiples, mais elles ont eu une incidence indéniable sur les témoins, les parties et l’audience. dans ses motifs, plusieurs des sévères critiques dirigées par le juge contre [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 295 and counsel for industrial was in fact directly related to problems that are difficult to separate from the language issue. m. michaud, m. leclerc et l’avocat d’industrielle sont en effet directement liées à des problèmes dif- ficiles à dissocier de la question de la langue. [67] for example, the judge faulted mr. michaud for using certain expressions that he saw as signs of misleading or evasive testimony, such as “to be honest with you” (para. 226), as well as “make sure”, which (in his view) had been used in place of “super- vise” or “compliance” (paras 240-42). he seems to have seen bad faith in what may simply have been an awkward use of expressions in a language in which the witness was not fluent. in mr. leclerc’s case, the judge seems to have [68] accepted that the witness’s vocabulary was limited and imprecise, and he did not fault mr. leclerc for sometimes choosing vague words. yet he concluded that the word “help” was for mr. leclerc a synonym of “supervise” and “control” (footnote 239). this interpretation of mr. leclerc’s testimony, which was unfavourable to industrial and had been made possi- ble because the witness was speaking in a language in which everyone — including the judge — ac- knowledged that he was not fluent, may certainly have influenced the finding that mr.  leclerc had contradicted himself (paras 235-37). conversely, the judge did not consider the witness’s difficulties in speaking in order to determine whether the parts of his testimony that seemed contradictory were in fact contradictory. while it is admittedly difficult to determine the extent to which the violations affected the judge’s perception of the testimony, these exam- ples as a whole suffice to establish that the impact of the violations was probably not insignificant. [67] par exemple, le juge a reproché à m. michaud l’utilisation de certaines expressions qui lui sem- blaient être des signes d’un témoignage trompeur ou évasif, comme « to be honest with you » ([traduc- tion] « pour être bien franc avec vous ») (par. 226) et « to make sure » (« nous assurer ») en lieu et place (à son avis) des mots « supervise » (« superviser ») et « compliance » (« conformité ») (par. 240- 242). il semble que le juge ait vu de la mauvaise foi là où il y avait peut- être simplement une utilisation maladroite d’expressions tirées d’une langue que le témoin ne maîtrisait pas. [68] dans le cas de m. leclerc, le juge semble avoir accepté que le témoin ne possédait qu’un voca- bulaire limité et peu précis, et il ne lui a pas reproché son choix de mots parfois vagues. il a cependant conclu que le mot « help » ([traduction] « aider ») pour m. leclerc est un synonyme de « supervise » (« superviser ») et « control » (« contrôler ») (note en bas de page 239). cette interprétation, défavorable à industrielle, du témoignage de m. leclerc, rendue possible parce que le témoin s’exprimait dans une langue que tous, y compris le juge, reconnaissaient qu’il ne maîtrisait pas, a certainement pu influencer la conclusion selon laquelle m. leclerc se contre- disait (par. 235- 237). inversement, le juge n’a pas tenu compte des difficultés du témoin à s’exprimer pour déterminer si les passages de son témoignage qui semblaient contradictoires l’étaient réellement. bien qu’il soit certes difficile d’évaluer l’ampleur de l’incidence des violations sur la perception des témoignages par le juge, tous ces exemples suffisent pour établir que cette incidence n’est vraisemblable- ment pas mineure. [69] as for mr. turgeon, counsel for industrial, he was undeniably asking his own witness, mr. leclerc, leading questions, as underlined by the judge (para 234). this may explain why the judge stated in his reasons that he believed mr. leclerc was mis- leading the court with the help of mr. turgeon, which is a serious accusation to make against a lawyer (para 235). but on at least two occasions when the [69] quant à l’avocat d’industrielle, me turgeon, celui-ci a indéniablement posé des questions sug- gestives à son propre témoin, m. leclerc, comme le souligne le juge (par 234). cela peut expliquer pourquoi ce dernier a affirmé dans ses motifs qu’il croyait que m. leclerc induisait le tribunal en erreur avec l’aide de me turgeon, une accusation grave à l’endroit d’un avocat (par 235). toutefois, à au 296 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. judge raised this issue, mr. turgeon explained that he was asking such questions because he was trying to obtain clear testimony despite the language barrier. the judge did not mention these explanations in his reasons. moins deux reprises, lorsque le juge a soulevé ce fait, me turgeon a expliqué qu’il posait de telles questions parce qu’il tentait d’obtenir un témoignage clair mal- gré la barrière linguistique. le juge n’a pas fait état de ces explications dans son jugement. [70] moreover, nothing in the record suggests that these witnesses and mr.  turgeon “waived” their right, or knowingly chose to testify or to argue in english. yet that is what mr. mazraani submits. in this regard he argues, first, that all of industrial’s witnesses and its counsel were bound by the sug- gestion that had been made on the second day of the hearing to the effect that mr. michaud would testify in english with, where needed, some sentences in french and that, consequently, no interpreter would be called in. [70] par ailleurs, rien au dossier ne permet de sou- tenir que ces témoins et me turgeon ont « renoncé » à leur droit, ou choisi en toute connaissance de cause de témoigner ou de plaider en anglais. c’est pour- tant ce que prétend m. mazraani. à ce chapitre, il avance dans un premier temps que tous les témoins et l’avocat d’industrielle étaient liés par la suggestion qui avait été faite au deuxième jour de l’audience et suivant laquelle m. michaud témoignerait en an- glais avec quelques phrases en français, au besoin, et qu’ainsi aucun interprète ne serait convoqué. [71] we cannot accept this argument. to begin, it is clear from the transcript that this suggestion applied only to mr. michaud, and to no one else. on the second day of the hearing, when the judge de- clared that the hearing would have to be adjourned if mr. michaud testified in french, mr. turgeon replied, “let me see if he —”, and the judge asked whether he wanted to take a break to discuss how they should proceed, for mr. michaud’s testimony only (emphasis added). the compromise suggested by mr. turgeon after the break referred to mr. michaud, and not gen- erally to industrial’s witnesses: “well, what we pro- pose [is] that we have the testimony in english and the witness will do the best    he can   . but at some point, he may, if it    comes to very technical issues, he may ask to testify in french and we may briefly translate it to the other parties” (emphasis added). that was the proposal the judge agreed to, and it was not renewed for any other witness. [71] nous ne pouvons retenir cet argument. d’abord, il est clair à la lecture de la transcription que cette suggestion ne s’appliquait qu’à m. michaud, sans plus. le deuxième jour de l’audience, lorsque le juge déclare que l’audience devra être suspendue si ce dernier témoigne en français, me turgeon répond, [traduction] « [v]oyons s’il — » et le juge lui offre de prendre une pause pour discuter des modalités de ce seul témoignage (nous soulignons). le compromis suggéré par me turgeon au retour de la pause fait mention de m. michaud, et non des témoins d’in- dustrielle en général : [traduction] « bon, nous proposons que le témoignage soit livré en anglais et que le témoin fasse de son mieux. [  ]. cependant, à certains moments, celui-ci pourra, s’il [  ] s’agit de questions très techniques, celui-ci pourra demander de s’exprimer en français et nous pourrons traduire brièvement ces déclarations à l’intention des autres parties » (nous soulignons). c’est cette offre que le juge a acceptée et elle n’a été renouvelée pour aucun autre témoin. [72] also, the courts in question have a duty to protect the language rights of every person. they must therefore consider each case individually. this proactive role must be performed even if counsel for a party seems to agree that the language rights of the witnesses he or she calls can be compromised. a party cannot decide on the language in which all of its witnesses will testify unless the witnesses [72] ensuite, les tribunaux visés ont le devoir de protéger les droits linguistiques de toute personne. il leur faut donc examiner chaque cas individuellement. ce rôle proactif doit être joué même si l’avocat d’une partie semble accepter que les droits linguistiques des témoins appelés par celle-ci puissent être com- promis. une partie ne peut décider de la langue du témoignage de tous ses témoins, sans que ceux-ci [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 297 confirm that that language is in fact their informed personal choice. ne confirment qu’il s’agit bel et bien de leur choix personnel et éclairé. [73] mr. mazraani then argues, second, that the witnesses themselves chose to speak in english and that language rights do not require a judge to prevent a person who seems to be a francophone from speak- ing in english, and vice versa. with respect, this argument does not take into account the adequacy of the choice so made, an aspect that is in fact protected by the constitution act, 1867, the charter and the ola. any person who addresses a federal court may do so in the official language of his or her choice. the question the judge must ask is not whether the person chose an official language given that that choice is inevitable, but whether the person’s choice was free and informed. it was not free and informed if the person who made the choice wrongly believed that he or she had to speak in the language of the judge or of a party. since three people participating in the hearing in the tcc clearly stated that they wanted to speak in french and were all told that they had to continue in english, we cannot conclude that their choice to speak in english was free and informed; quite the contrary. [74] as we mentioned above, if a lawyer refrains for tactical reasons from intervening in response to a language rights violation, it is possible that a party who seeks to obtain a sanction for that violation will not be granted a new hearing. but that is not what happened in this case. counsel for industrial took appropriate steps to assert his own rights as well as the rights of his client and his witnesses. the question of language was raised on the second day of the hearing, at the time of mr. michaud’s appearance. mr. turgeon also tried to examine his next francophone witness, mr.  charbonneau, in french. he tried to respond to the judge’s request to proceed with the examination in english, but was interrupted by the judge, who then spoke directly to the witness. when the witness himself indicated that he wished to speak in french, the judge told him that it would be better if he spoke in english. in these circumstances, while it is true that others might have considered it necessary to reiterate their disagreement more firmly, mr. turgeon’s decision to comply seems in our view to be nothing more than a [73] dans un deuxième temps, m. mazraani fait valoir que les témoins auraient choisi d’eux- mêmes de parler en anglais, et que les droits linguistiques n’exigent pas d’un juge qu’il empêche une personne qui semble francophone de parler en anglais, et vice- versa. avec égards, cet argument ne tient pas compte de la qualité du choix ainsi fait, aspect qui est précisé- ment protégé par la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, la charte et la llo. toute personne qui s’adresse à un tribunal fédéral peut le faire dans la langue officielle de son choix. la question que le juge doit se poser n’est pas de savoir si la personne a choisi une langue officielle, ce choix étant inévitable, mais plutôt de savoir si elle a choisi cette langue de manière libre et éclairée. le choix n’est pas libre et éclairé si la personne qui le fait croit à tort qu’elle doit s’exprimer dans la langue du juge ou d’une partie. puisque trois participants à l’audience devant la cci ont clairement indiqué vouloir parler en français, et se sont tous fait répondre qu’ils devaient continuer en anglais, nous ne pouvons conclure qu’ils ont choisi l’anglais de manière libre et éclairée, bien au contraire. [74] comme nous l’avons mentionné précédem- ment, le fait qu’un avocat s’abstienne pour des raisons stratégiques d’intervenir lorsque survient une violation de droits linguistiques pourra parfois empêcher une partie qui souhaiterait faire sanction- ner cette violation d’obtenir une nouvelle audience. toutefois, ce n’est pas ce qui s’est produit en l’oc- currence. l’avocat d’industrielle a pris des mesures appropriées pour revendiquer ses propres droits, ainsi que les droits de sa cliente et ceux de ses témoins. la question de la langue a été soulevée dès le deuxième jour de l’audience, au moment de la comparution de m. michaud. maître turgeon a de plus tenté d’inter- roger en français son témoin francophone suivant, m charbonneau. il a tenté de répondre à la demande du juge de procéder en anglais à l’interrogatoire, mais il a été interrompu par ce dernier, qui s’est alors adressé directement au témoin. lorsque le témoin lui- même a indiqué vouloir parler en français, le juge a expliqué qu’il valait mieux qu’il s’exprime en anglais. dans ces circonstances, s’il est vrai que d’autres auraient pu juger nécessaire de réitérer 298 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. wise and informed choice not to insist further in the face of the judge’s directions. [75] a confrontation in this regard did nevertheless eventually take place on the fifth day of the hearing, when mr. turgeon repeatedly intervened, as he saw clearly that the violation of mr. leclerc’s rights was causing the witness great difficulty and was threat- ening to affect the quality of his testimony. the tran- script reveals a tense situation in which the witness switched back and forth between french and english in accordance with the contradictory instructions of the lawyer and the judge, and a strong assertion by mr. turgeon of mr. leclerc’s right to be examined and to testify in the official language of his choice. the transcript also shows that an attempt was made to point out that an interpreter must be requested by the party who requires one and not by the witness, counsel or the other party, but that this was cut short by the judge’s insistence that it was necessary to adapt to the situation at hand. [76] in this case, counsel for industrial clearly did not remain silent in order to benefit from the vio- lations in a purely tactical manner with the goal of eventually having a ground for appeal in the event of an unfavourable decision. the witnesses’ language rights were not used as an ace up his sleeve, but were on the contrary clearly raised from the start of the hearing and reiterated forcefully throughout it. his choice to defer to the judge’s instructions to present his argument and examine the witnesses in english resulted from the judge’s insistence that this was nec- essary, and was not a tactical move on counsel’s part. leur désaccord avec plus de fermeté, la décision de me turgeon d’obtempérer ne nous semble rien de plus qu’un choix sage et avisé de ne pas insister davantage devant les directives du juge. [75] la confrontation sur cette question a néanmoins fini par avoir lieu, au cinquième jour de l’audience, lorsque me turgeon a multiplié ses interventions, voyant bien que la violation des droits de m. leclerc lui créait de sérieuses difficultés et menaçait d’affecter la qualité de son témoignage. la transcription révèle un témoignage tendu, le témoin oscillant entre le fran- çais et l’anglais suivant les instructions contradictoires de l’avocat et du juge, ainsi qu’une revendication forte par me turgeon du droit de m. leclerc d’être interrogé et de témoigner dans la langue officielle de son choix. la transcription fait aussi état d’une ten- tative de rappeler que l’interprète doit être convoqué par la partie qui a besoin de ses services et non par le témoin, l’avocat ou l’autre partie, tentative à laquelle a coupé court l’insistance du juge sur le fait qu’il fallait s’adapter à la situation telle qu’elle était. [76] en l’espèce, l’avocat d’industrielle n’est certes pas resté coi afin de tirer avantage de ces violations de manière purement stratégique, dans le but de pou- voir compter éventuellement sur un motif d’appel en cas de décision défavorable. les droits linguistiques des témoins n’ont pas été utilisés comme un atout caché dans la manche de l’avocat d’industrielle, mais ont au contraire été clairement invoqués dès le début de l’audience et réitérés avec force tout au long de celle-ci. le choix de l’avocat d’industrielle de s’en remettre aux instructions du juge lui intimant de plaider en anglais et d’interroger les témoins en anglais résulte de l’insistance de ce dernier sur le fait que cette façon de faire était nécessaire, et non d’une manœuvre stratégique de la part du premier. [77] the fact that counsel for the mnr, the re- spondent in the tcc proceeding, did not insist on the rights of industrial’s witnesses and of his own witness, ms. lambert, does not change anything. the mnr was in this case defending an administra- tive decision that did not really affect her, whereas industrial, although an intervener, was defending its business model. the mnr called only one witness, [77] que l’avocat de la mrn, partie intimée devant la cci, n’ait pas insisté sur les droits des témoins d’industrielle et de son témoin, mme lambert, n’y change rien. la mrn défendait en l’espèce une déci- sion administrative qui avait peu d’effet sur elle, alors qu’industrielle, bien que partie intervenante, défen- dait son modèle d’affaires. la mrn n’a appelé qu’un seul témoin, dont le témoignage était secondaire, [2018] 3 rcs. mazraani c industrielle alliance les juges gascon et côté 299 whose testimony was secondary, and argued for only a few minutes in defence of the original decision, leaving it to counsel for industrial to deal with all the evidence concerning the relationship between mr. mazraani and industrial and to present argu- ments on the law regarding contracts of employment and contracts for services. the real issues were those of industrial, not those of the mnr. et n’a plaidé que quelques minutes pour défendre la décision initiale, laissant l’avocat d’industrielle traiter de toute la preuve portant sur la relation entre m. mazraani et industrielle et plaider le droit relatif aux contrats de travail et de service. les enjeux vé- ritables étaient ceux d’industrielle, pas de la mrn. (3) ordering a new hearing (3) la tenue d’une nouvelle audience [78] thus, in light of the facts of this case, the order for a new hearing was fully justified. in this regard, industrial complains first about the violation of the language rights of its counsel, mr. turgeon, a com- plaint that it can in fact make. mr. turgeon’s right to speak in the official language of his choice is related to his client’s right to participate in the hearing in the official language of its choice. in addition, industrial can to the same extent complain about the violation of the rights of the witnesses it called. one of the witnesses, mr. michaud, is in fact one of its senior executives. moreover, it is clear from the transcript of the exchanges between counsel for industrial, the judge, and witnesses michaud, charbonneau and leclerc that industrial wished to conduct its case in french to the extent possible. and the language rights of these three witnesses are consonant with those of industrial. the violations were numerous and, in some cases, serious and repeated, and they brought the administration of justice into disrepute. [78] aussi, compte tenu des faits de l’espèce, l’or- donnance intimant la tenue d’une nouvelle audience est amplement justifiée. sous ce rapport, industrielle se plaint d’abord de la violation des droits linguis- tiques de son avocat, me turgeon, qu’elle peut de fait invoquer. le droit de celui-ci de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix rejoint celui de sa cliente de participer à l’audience dans la langue offi- cielle de son choix. de plus, industrielle peut tout au- tant se plaindre de la violation des droits des témoins qu’elle a appelés. l’un des témoins, m. michaud, est d’ailleurs l’un de ses dirigeants. il ressort par ailleurs clairement des transcriptions des interactions entre l’avocat d’industrielle, le juge et les témoins michaud, charbonneau et leclerc, qu’industrielle souhaitait dans la mesure du possible mener sa cause en français. les droits linguistiques de ces trois témoins sont du reste en harmonie avec ceux d’industrielle. les violations ont été nombreuses et, dans certains cas, graves et persistantes, et elles déconsidèrent l’administration de la justice. [79] furthermore, the violation of the rights of all of these individuals clearly had an impact on the conduct of the hearing and even on its outcome. the points for which the judge faulted industrial’s witnesses and counsel in his reasons were attrib- uted to the party itself, which was ordered to pay costs despite its status as an intervener. as the judge explained, these costs were intended to sanction industrial’s failure to be forthcoming and its respon- sibility for the length and the complexity of the hear- ing, which had verged on an abuse of process. the conclusion that the witnesses were not very credible and that their testimony was “troubling” (para. 223) and, “to put it in the best possible light”, misleading [79] en outre, la violation des droits de toutes ces personnes a clairement eu une incidence sur le déroulement de l’audience, voire sur son résultat. les reproches formulés par le juge aux témoins et à l’avocat d’industrielle dans son jugement ont été imputés à la partie elle- même, qui a été condamnée aux dépens malgré son statut de partie intervenante. au dire du juge, ces dépens devaient sanctionner le manque de collaboration d’industrielle et sa res- ponsabilité pour la longueur et la complexité de l’audience, ce qui frisait l’abus de procédure. la conclusion que les témoins étaient peu crédibles et offraient des témoignages « troublant[s] » (par. 223) qui, « pour être poli », induisaient en erreur (par. 237) 300 mazraani v industrial alliance gascon and côté jj. [2018] 3 scr. (para. 237) inevitably affected the judge’s assessment of the evidence. a immanquablement influé sur l’évaluation de la preuve par le juge. vi conclusion vi conclusion [80] we would accordingly dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the fca ordering a new hear- ing before a different judge of the tcc. because industrial is not seeking costs, each party will bear its own costs in this court, as, moreover, was the case in the fca. [80] en conséquence, nous sommes d’avis de re- jeter l’appel et de confirmer l’arrêt de la caf qui ordonne la tenue d’une nouvelle audience devant un autre juge de la cci. puisqu’industrielle ne demande pas de dépens, chaque partie supportera ses propres frais devant notre cour, comme ce fut d’ailleurs le cas devant la caf. appeal dismissed. pourvoi rejeté. solicitors for the appellant:  milosevic fiske, procureurs de l’appelant  :  milosevic fiske, toronto. toronto. insurance and financial services inc.: fasken mar‑ tineau dumoulin, mont réal. procureurs de l’intimée industrielle alliance, as‑ surance et services financiers inc. : fasken marti‑ neau dumoulin, mont réal. tional revenue: attorney general of canada, mont‑ réal. procureur de l’intimée la ministre du revenu national : procureur général du canada, mont réal. procureur de l’intervenant le barreau du québec : barreau du québec, mont réal. barreau du québec, mont réal. solicitor for the intervener the canadian bar procureur de l’intervenante l’association du association: nicolas m. rouleau, toronto. barreau canadien : nicolas m. rouleau, toronto. ristes d’expression française de l’ontario: juristes power, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association des ju‑ ristes d’expression française de l’ontario : juristes power, ottawa. solicitor for the intervener the commissioner of official languages for canada:  office of the commissioner of official languages, gatineau. procureur de l’intervenant le commissaire aux langues officielles du canada : commissariat aux langues officielles, gatineau.
[1] the chief justice — a majority of this court is of the opinion to dismiss the appeals with costs throughout, substantially for the reasons of the court of appeal save for the matters addressed in obiter. [1] le juge en chef — la cour, à la majorité, est d’avis de rejeter les appels avec dépens devant toutes les cours, essentiellement pour les motifs qu’a exposés la cour d’appel sauf pour ce qui est des points dont elle traite en obiter. justice côté is dissenting. her reasons will [2] follow. [2] la juge côté est dissidente. ses motifs seront publiés ultérieurement. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [3] côté j. (dissenting) — this case raises the question of whether the quebec superior court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment of funds deposited in a bank account outside quebec. it questions the real or personal nature of such a remedy and illustrates the clash be- tween property law and banking law, which must ul- timately be resolved on the basis of well- established principles of civil law, namely the principles relating to mandate. [4] on december 11, 2019, a majority of this court dismissed the appeals in a judgment rendered from the bench. my dissenting reasons were to follow. [3] la juge côté  (dissidente) — la présente affaire soulève la question de savoir si la cour su- périeure du québec a compétence pour délivrer un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement de fonds déposés dans un compte bancaire à l’extérieur du québec. elle met en cause la nature réelle ou personnelle d’un tel recours, et illustre le conflit entre le droit des biens et le droit bancaire, lequel doit ultime- ment être résolu sur le fondement de principes bien établis du droit civil, à savoir les principes relatifs au mandat. [4] le 11 décembre 2019, une majorité de cette cour a rejeté les pourvois dans un jugement rendu séance tenante mes motifs dissidents devaient suivre. [5] here they are. [5] les voici. [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 475 i the parties i les parties [6] the respondent in these appeals is instrubel, nv (“instrubel”), a dutch company having its prin- cipal place of business in the netherlands. it is in- corporated under the laws of belgium, where it also has offices. the record does not show that instrubel has any connection with or business in quebec or canada. [6] l’intimée dans les présents pourvois est instru- bel, nv (« instrubel »), une société néerlandaise dont le principal établissement se trouve aux pays- bas. elle est constituée sous le régime des lois de la belgique, où elle a aussi des bureaux. le dossier n’indique pas qu’instrubel ait un quelconque lien avec le québec ou le canada, ou y exercerait une quelconque activité. [7] the appellants include the republic of iraq (“iraq”) and three parties that were involved in ar- bitration proceedings against instrubel: the ministry of industry of the republic of iraq, the ministry of defence of the republic of iraq and the salah aldin state establishment.1 the iraqi entity most relevant to these appeals is the iraqi civil aviation authority (“icaa”), the agency responsible for the regulation of iraq’s airspace. [7] les appelantes incluent la république d’iraq (« iraq ») et trois parties ayant pris part à une pro- cédure d’arbitrage contre instrubel : le ministry of industry of the republic of iraq, le ministry of de- fence of the republic of iraq et le salah aldin state establishment1. l’entité iraquienne la plus perti- nente en l’espèce est l’iraqi civil aviation authority (« icaa »), l’agence chargée de régir l’espace aérien de l’iraq. [8] the final appellant, the international air trans- port association (“iata”), is the global trade asso- ciation for the international air transport industry. its membership includes over 290 airlines present in more than 120 countries representing 82 percent of the world’s air traffic. its purposes, objectives and aims include the promotion of safe, regular and eco- nomical air transport for the benefit of the peoples of the world. one of iata’s roles is to liaise with government bodies around the world, like icaa, including “on matters affecting international air transport such as safety, flight operations, industry standards, economic regulation, and training”: ar, vol. ii, at p 45. while iata’s headquarters are in montréal, its operations are worldwide. it is present in more than 61 countries, and has executive offices in geneva, switzerland. [8] la dernière appelante, l’international air trans- port association (« iata »), est l’association mon- diale de commerce pour l’industrie internationale du transport aérien. elle compte parmi ses membres plus de 290 compagnies aériennes présentes dans plus de 120 pays représentant 82 p. 100 du trafic aérien mondial. ses objectifs incluent la promotion d’un transport aérien sécuritaire, régulier et économique au profit des nations du monde. l’un des rôles de l’iata consiste à assurer la liaison avec les organismes gou- vernementaux à travers le monde, comme l’icaa, y compris [traduction] « quant à des questions touchant le transport aérien international comme la sécurité, les opérations aériennes, les normes de l’in- dustrie, la réglementation économique et la forma- tion » : da, vol. ii, p 45. bien qu’elle ait son siège à montréal, l’iata exerce ses activités dans le monde entier. elle est présente dans plus de 61 pays et a des bureaux administratifs à genève, en suisse. ii background ii contexte [9] in the late 1980s and in 1990, instrubel en- tered into five contracts with various iraqi entities [9] à la fin des années 1980 et en 1990, instrubel a conclu cinq contrats avec diverses entités iraquiennes 1 in these reasons, i refer to these appellants collectively as the “iraqi appellants”. 1 dans les présents motifs, j’utilise l’expression «  appelantes iraquiennes » pour désigner collectivement ces appelantes. 476 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. for the supply of military equipment in the form of night vision goggles and thermal imaging tech- nology. following the invasion of kuwait in 1990, the united nations security council imposed an embargo on goods coming from or going to iraq. at the time, instrubel’s five contracts were in various states of performance. pour la fourniture d’équipement militaire consis- tant en des lunettes de vision nocturne et une tech- nologie d’imagerie thermique. après l’invasion du koweït en 1990, le conseil de sécurité des nations unies a imposé un embargo sur les marchandises en provenance ou à destination de l’iraq. à l’époque, les cinq contrats d’instrubel étaient à divers stades d’exécution. instrubel submitted a claim for non- performance [10] of the contracts and for lost profits to the international court of arbitration of the international chamber of commerce in paris on january 27, 1992. two arbitration awards in favour of instrubel were issued on february 6, 1996 and march 12, 2003. the value of the awards on the latter date was approximately can$32 million, plus interest. [10] le 27 janvier 1992, instrubel a présenté à la cour internationale d’arbitrage de la chambre de commerce internationale à paris une réclamation pour inexécution de contrat et pour pertes de profits. deux sentences arbitrales ont été rendues en faveur d’instrubel le 6 février 1996 et le 12 mars 2003. à cette dernière date, la valeur des sentences s’élevait à environ 32 millions $ ca, l’intérêt en sus. [11] neither icaa nor even the republic of iraq was a party to the arbitration proceedings. most im- portantly, iata had no connection whatsoever with the arbitration proceedings. [11] ni l’icaa ni même la république d’iraq n’étaient parties à la procédure d’arbitrage fait encore plus important, l’iata n’avait aucun lien avec cette procédure. [12] a decade later, on march 11, 2013, instrubel filed in the quebec superior court a motion for the homologation, recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards made outside quebec, alleging that it had “only recently learned that the republic of iraq possesses significant assets in the province of quebec”: ar, vol. i, at p 41. at the time of the court of appeal’s decision on the issue in these appeals, instrubel had not received payment of the amounts due pursuant to the arbitration awards. [13] believing that the recovery of payment for the arbitration awards was in jeopardy, on july 30, 2013, instrubel sought and obtained from the quebec su- perior court a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment of the air navigation and aerodrome charges billed and collected by iata on behalf of icaa. on august 5, 2013, the iraqi appellants brought a motion to quash a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment on a number of grounds, including instrubel’s failure to disclose material in- formation, insufficient and misleading allegations, and foreign state immunity. [12] une décennie plus tard, le 11 mars 2013, ins- trubel déposait devant la cour supérieure du québec une requête visant à faire homologuer, reconnaître et exécuter des sentences arbitrales rendues à l’extérieur du québec, alléguant n’avoir [traduction] « appris que récemment que la république d’iraq possède des actifs importants dans la province de québec » : da, vol. i, p 41. lors du prononcé de l’arrêt de la cour d’appel sur la question en litige dans les pré- sents pourvois, intrubel n’avait pas reçu paiement des sommes dues en vertu des sentences arbitrales. [13] croyant que le recouvrement du montant des sentences arbitrales était en péril, le 30 juillet 2013, instrubel demandait à la cour supérieure du québec et obtenait de celle-ci un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement des redevances de navigation aérienne et d’aérodrome facturées et perçues par l’iata pour le compte de l’icaa. le 5 août 2013, les appelantes iraquiennes présentaient une requête en annulation d’un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement invoquant un certain nombre de motifs, notamment l’omission d’instrubel de communiquer des renseignements importants, la présence d’allégations insuffisantes et trompeuses et l’immunité des états étrangers. [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 477 [14] meanwhile, on august 12, 2013, iata filed a solemn declaration of the garnishee against the garnishment, stating that it “does not currently have in its possession any sums of money, securities or movable property that is marked as belonging to [the iraqi appellants]”: ar, vol. ii, at p 3. iata acknowledged in this negative declaration that it held funds “in trust for the benefit of” icaa, but maintained that it could not pay them out to instrubel because they had to be remitted to icaa and because the funds were immune from execution: p 3. [15] on september 16, 2013, the superior court heard the iraqi appellants’ motion to quash a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment. the par- ties had agreed to focus their arguments on instrubel’s alleged failure to disclose material information and on the insufficiency of its allegations, leaving questions surrounding the funds’ immunity from seizure for a later date. on november 12, 2013, the superior court dismissed the motion to quash and upheld the seizure before judgment by garnishment. [16] on november 14, 2013, instrubel contested iata’s solemn declaration, arguing that it was not a true negative declaration given that it merely in- dicated that iata did not hold sums “marked” as belonging to the iraqi appellants; instrubel reserved its rights to contest the declaration on the ground “that the amounts held by iata do ultimately belong to [the iraqi appellants]”: ar, vol. i, at p 69. that contestation, as far as the record shows, remains outstanding. [17] on december 11, 2013, the superior court granted a motion by iata to limit the amount purported to be seized under the writ of seizure to can$90  million it ordered the release of all amounts in excess of can$90 million and permitted iata to transfer the can$90 million to the trust account held by iata’s lawyers in montréal. [14] dans l’intervalle, le 12 août 2013, l’iata déposait une déclaration solennelle du tiers- saisi à l’encontre de la saisie- arrêt, selon laquelle elle [traduction] « n’a actuellement en sa possession aucune somme d’argent, aucune sûreté, ni aucun bien meuble désignés comme appartenant aux [appelantes iraquiennes] » : da, vol. ii, p 3. l’iata a reconnu dans cette déclaration négative qu’elle détenait des fonds « en fiducie au profit de » l’icaa, mais elle a soutenu qu’elle ne pouvait pas verser ceux-ci à instrubel parce qu’ils devaient être remis à l’icaa et parce que les fonds bénéficiaient d’une immunité d’exécution : p 3. [15] le 16 septembre 2013, la cour supérieure a entendu la requête en annulation d’un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement présentée par les appelantes iraquiennes. les parties avaient convenu de concen- trer leurs arguments sur l’omission alléguée d’instru- bel de communiquer des renseignements importants et sur le caractère insuffisant de ses allégations, et de remettre à plus tard l’examen des questions relatives à l’immunité des fonds à l’égard d’une saisie. le 12 novembre 2013, la cour supérieure a rejeté la requête en annulation et a confirmé la saisie- arrêt avant jugement. [16] le 14 novembre 2013, instrubel contestait la déclaration solennelle de l’iata, faisant valoir qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’une véritable déclaration négative, car elle indiquait simplement que l’iata ne déte- nait pas des sommes [traduction] « désigné[es] » comme appartenant aux appelantes iraquiennes; ins- trubel s’est réservée le droit de contester la décla- ration au motif « que les fonds détenus par l’iata appartiennent en fin de compte aux [appelantes iraquiennes] » : da, vol. i, p 69. selon ce qu’il appert du dossier, cette contestation demeure en suspens. [17] le 11 décembre 2013, la cour supérieure ac- cueillait une requête présentée par l’iata en vue de limiter à 90 millions $ ca le montant visé par le bref de saisie. elle a ordonné la mainlevée de la saisie à l’égard de toute somme excédant 90 millions $ ca et a permis à l’iata de transférer le 90 millions $ ca dans le compte en fiducie détenu par les avocats de l’iata à montréal. 478 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. [18] two years later, on september 28, 2015, the iraqi appellants filed an amendment to their mo- tion to quash a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment, arguing that the quebec superior court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ because the property seized consisted of funds deposited in a bank account in switzerland. [18] deux ans plus tard, le 28 septembre 2015, les appelantes iraquiennes amendaient leur requête en annulation d’un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement, soutenant que la cour supérieure du québec n’avait pas compétence pour décerner le bref parce que le bien saisi consistait en des fonds déposés dans un compte bancaire en suisse. iii judgments below iii jugements des instances inférieures a quebec superior court, 2016 qccs 1184 a cour supérieure du québec, 2016 qccs 1184 (hamilton j.) (le juge hamilton) [19] the superior court, per hamilton j. (as he then was), granted the iraqi appellants’ amended motion to quash a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment in part, based on the jurisdiction ground alone. [20] hamilton  j characterized the relationship between iata and icaa as one of mandate: para. 57 (canlii). given that relationship, the funds collected by iata on icaa’s behalf belonged to icaa and iata had an obligation to remit them. thus, this was not a situation in which the funds belonged to iata and iata then owed a debt to icaa. hamilton j. held that the ownership of the funds did not change merely because iata deposited them in a bank ac- count: para.  58 he also found that although the comingling of funds in a bank account can affect ownership rights, this was not the case here because the funds belonging to icaa were readily identifi- able: para 59. [19] la cour supérieure, sous la plume du juge hamilton (maintenant juge à la cour d’appel du québec), a accueilli en partie la requête amendée en annulation d’un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement présentée par les appelantes iraquiennes, sur le seul fondement de l’argument relatif à la compétence. [20] le juge hamilton a qualifié la relation entre l’iata et l’icaa de relation de mandat : par. 57 (canlii). vu cette relation, les fonds perçus par l’iata pour le compte de l’icaa appartenaient à l’icaa et l’iata avait l’obligation de les remettre. en conséquence, il ne s’agissait pas d’une situation où les fonds appartenaient à l’iata et où l’iata avait donc une dette envers l’icaa. le juge hamilton a affirmé que le droit de propriété sur les fonds n’avait pas changé simplement parce que l’iata avait dé- posé ceux-ci dans un compte bancaire : par 58. il a également conclu que, bien que le regroupement de fonds dans un compte bancaire puisse avoir une incidence sur les droits de propriété, ce n’était pas le cas en l’espèce parce que les fonds appartenant à l’icaa étaient facilement identifiables : par 59. [21] hamilton j. went on to say that if iata had owed a debt to icaa, the jurisdiction issue would have been easier to resolve because iata’s status as a party domiciled in quebec owing a debt to icaa would have meant that the asset in question (the debt) could be seized in quebec: para 60. since he did not find this to be the case, he had to determine whether the superior court could issue a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment where the garnishee was domiciled in quebec but the property held by the garnishee was outside quebec: para 61. [21] le juge hamilton a ajouté que si l’iata avait eu une dette envers l’icaa, la question de la com- pétence aurait été plus facile à résoudre parce que le statut de l’iata en tant que partie domiciliée au québec ayant une dette envers l’icaa aurait signi- fié que le bien en question (la dette) pouvait être saisi au québec : par 60. étant donné que le juge hamilton n’a pas conclu que tel était le cas, il devait décider si la cour supérieure pouvait décerner un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement dans le cas où le tiers- saisi est domicilié au québec, mais où le bien [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 479 hamilton j. considered the nature of a seizure be- fore judgment by garnishment, finding that it is not merely a personal order affecting only the garnishee, but that it also has an impact on the property seized: para 74. thus, given that the seized property in this case consisted of funds held in a bank account in switzerland, the court would be placing funds held in a swiss bank account under the judicial control of quebec authorities. since the primary jurisdiction with respect to assets lies with the court of the place where they are located, hamilton j. concluded that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment that extended to assets held by the garnishee outside quebec: paras 76-77. détenu par celui-ci se trouve à l’extérieur de cette province : par 61. le juge hamilton s’est penché sur la nature de la saisie- arrêt avant jugement, concluant qu’elle ne constitue pas simplement une ordonnance personnelle n’ayant un effet que sur le tiers- saisi, mais qu’elle a également une incidence sur le bien saisi : par 74. en conséquence, comme le bien saisi en l’espèce consistait en des fonds détenus dans un compte bancaire en suisse, le tribunal se serait trouvé à placer sous contrôle judiciaire des autorités qué- bécoises des fonds détenus dans un compte bancaire suisse. comme la compétence principale à l’égard des actifs est conférée au tribunal du lieu où ceux-ci sont situés, le juge hamilton a conclu que la cour supérieure n’avait pas compétence pour décerner un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement qui s’étendait à des actifs détenus par le tiers- saisi à l’extérieur du québec : par 76-77. b quebec court of appeal, 2019 qcca 78 (schrager ja,. rochette and healy jja con- curring) b cour d’appel du québec, 2019 qcca 78 (le juge schrager, avec l’accord des juges rochette et healy) [22] the court of appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the amended motion to quash a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment. while the court of appeal did not expressly overturn the superior court’s characterization of the relationship between iata and icaa as being one of mandate, it nevertheless found that the characterization of the relationship was not relevant to ascertaining the type of obligation owed by iata to icaa. accordingly, it was of the view that iata’s obligation towards icaa was a debt and that “this is so irrespective of the characterization of the contract between iata and icaa as a mandate or some sui generis relation- ship”: para. 43 (canlii). the court of appeal found that funds in a bank account held by a mandatary for his or her mandator do not give rise to real rights: para 34. in this sense, icaa never owned the debts due to it from various airlines and does not now own the funds collected in satisfaction of those debts: para 43. in the court of appeal’s view, iata owed money to icaa, and that debt was located at the place where it was collectible, which is ordinarily the domicile of the account debtor, in this case montréal: para 42. [22] la cour d’appel a accueilli l’appel et a re- jeté la requête amendée en annulation d’un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement. bien qu’elle n’ait pas expressément infirmé la qualification de la relation entre l’iata et l’icaa par la cour supérieure comme étant une relation de mandat, la cour d’appel a néan- moins conclu que la qualification de la relation n’était pas pertinente lorsqu’il s’agissait de déterminer le type d’obligation qu’avait l’iata envers l’icaa. en conséquence, elle a jugé que l’obligation qu’avait l’iata envers l’icaa était une dette et qu’[traduc- tion] « il en est ainsi, que l’on qualifie le contrat entre l’iata et icaa de mandat ou de quelconque relation sui generis » : par. 43 (canlii). la cour d’appel a conclu que les fonds que détient un mandataire pour son mandant dans un compte bancaire ne font pas naître de droits réels : par 34. en ce sens, l’icaa n’a jamais été propriétaire des dettes qu’avaient en- vers elle diverses compagnies aériennes et elle n’est pas maintenant propriétaire des fonds perçus pour acquitter ces dettes : par 43. selon la cour d’appel, l’iata devait de l’argent à l’icaa et cette dette était située au lieu où elle pouvait être perçue, soit habituellement le domicile du débiteur, en l’espèce montréal : par 42. 480 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. [23] the court of appeal disagreed with the su- perior court’s analysis regarding the identifiability of the funds belonging to icaa in the bank account held by iata: para 36. in order to be traceable, funds must be identified and not merely quantified. given the comingling of funds in this case, the court of appeal concluded that they could not be traced. [24] the court of appeal found that the superior court had effectively ascribed attributes of a trust to the money deposited in the bank account. the court of appeal added that, if icaa had indeed taken such a position, it would not have succeeded: para 44. it referred to its previous jurisprudence to the effect that a bank account does not constitute a patrimony by appropriation. it noted that, in this case, it was not disputed that iata was the owner and titleholder of the bank account and that it had full power and control over it. this was so despite the fact that, as between it and icaa, the funds “belonged” to icaa. the court of appeal thus held that it was not a possible outcome to characterize the right of a party having no contract with a bank, nor title or authority to the bank account, as a real right in the funds in the account, absent a trust or patrimony by appropriation, which did not exist here: paras 47-48. thus, the situs of the bank account did not change the situs of the debt, which was quebec. iata was the debtor of a personal right owed to icaa, which could be the subject of a garnishment order issued by the courts of quebec: para 51. [23] la cour d’appel n’a pas souscrit à l’analyse de la cour supérieure en ce qui a trait au caractère identifiable des fonds appartenant à l’icaa dans le compte bancaire détenu par l’iata : par 36. pour être traçables, les fonds doivent pouvoir être identi- fiés et non pas simplement quantifiés. vu leur regrou- pement en l’espèce, la cour d’appel a conclu que les fonds n’étaient pas traçables. [24] la cour d’appel a conclu que la cour su- périeure avait de fait conféré les attributs d’une fiducie à l’argent déposé dans le compte bancaire. elle a ajouté que, si l’icaa avait effectivement fait valoir un tel point de vue, elle n’aurait pas réussi : par 44. la cour d’appel a fait référence à sa ju- risprudence antérieure selon laquelle un compte bancaire ne cons titue pas un patrimoine d’affecta- tion. elle a souligné qu’en l’espèce, il n’était pas contesté que l’iata était propriétaire et titulaire du compte bancaire et qu’elle avait plein pouvoir et contrôle sur celui-ci. il en était ainsi malgré le fait qu’entre l’icaa et elle, les fonds « apparte- naient » à l’icaa. la cour d’appel a donc statué que ne constituait pas une issue possible le fait de qualifier le droit d’une partie n’ayant aucun contrat avec une banque, ni aucun titre ou pouvoir sur le compte bancaire, de droit réel dans les fonds déte- nus dans le compte, en l’absence d’une fiducie ou d’un patrimoine d’affectation, ce qu’il n’y avait pas en l’espèce : par 47-48. en conséquence, le lieu où est situé le compte bancaire ne change pas le lieu où est située la dette, c’est-à-dire au québec. l’iata était débitrice envers l’icaa d’un droit personnel, lequel pouvait faire l’objet d’une ordonnance de saisie- arrêt rendue par les tribunaux du québec : par 51. iv issue iv question en litige [25] these appeals raise the question of whether the quebec superior court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment where the garnishee is located in the province but the property is located outside the province, and where the parties and the transaction giving rise to the seizure have no connection with quebec. [25] les présents pourvois soulèvent la question de savoir si la cour supérieure du québec a compétence pour délivrer un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement lorsque le tiers- saisi se trouve dans la province, mais que le bien visé est situé à l’extérieur de celle-ci, et que les parties et la transaction donnant lieu à la saisie n’ont aucun lien avec le québec. [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 481 v analysis v analyse a jurisdiction of the quebec superior court over seizures before judgment by garnishment a compétence de la cour supérieure du québec à l’égard des saisies- arrêts avant jugement [26] given that the proceedings arose before the coming into force of the new code of civil pro- cedure, cqlr, c c-2501, in 2016, these appeals must be decided under the former code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25 (“ccp”). [26] vu que l’instance a pris naissance avant l’en- trée en vigueur du nouveau code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501, en 2016, les présents pourvois doivent être tranchés suivant l’ancien code de pro- cédure civile, rlrq, c. c-25 (« cpc »). [27] a seizure before judgment is a provisional measure which preserves a plaintiff’s right where there is reason to fear that the recovery of his or her debt is in jeopardy: art 733 ccp. the effect of seizure by garnishment is to place sums of money and movable property belonging to the debtor “un- der judicial control” and to make the garnishee the guardian of that property: 626. the effect of seizure by garnishment is to place under judicial control the sums of money and movable property belonging to the debtor and to make the garnishee the guardian thereof. [27] une saisie avant jugement est une mesure provisionnelle qui protège le droit d’un demandeur lorsqu’il est à craindre que le recouvrement de sa créance ne soit mis en péril : art 733 cpc. la saisie- arrêt a pour effet de mettre « sous main de justice » les sommes et les meubles appartenant au débiteur et de constituer le tiers- saisi gardien de ces derniers : 626. la saisie- arrêt a pour effet de mettre sous main de justice les sommes et les meubles appartenant au débi- teur, et de constituer le tiers- saisi gardien de ces derniers. seizure before judgment by garnishment is therefore carried out in rem and directly affects the property in question: c. belleau et al., précis de procédure civile du québec (5th ed. 2015), vol. 2, by d. ferland and b. emery, eds., at nos. 2-1137, 2-1141 and 2-2375. la saisie- arrêt avant jugement s’effectue donc in rem et affecte directement les biens en question : c. belleau et autres, précis de procédure civile du québec (5e éd. 2015), vol. 2, par d. ferland et b. emery, dir., nos 2-1137, 2-1141 et 2-2375. [28] in its factum and at the hearing in this court, instrubel identified various points of similarity be- tween seizures before judgment by garnishment and injunctive relief, such as mareva injunctions. while instrubel acknowledged that these measures are not identical, it pointed to the fact that both seizures before judgment by garnishment and mareva injunc- tions have elements of real remedies and personal remedies: rf, at para 127. [28] dans son mémoire et à l’audience devant notre cour, instrubel a mis en évidence divers points de ressemblance entre les saisies- arrêts avant jugement et les injonctions, telles les injonctions mareva. bien qu’elle ait reconnu que ces mesures ne sont pas iden- tiques, instrubel a souligné que les saisies- arrêts avant jugement et les injonctions mareva arborent toutes deux des aspects qui relèvent des réparations réelles et des réparations personnelles : mi, par 127. [29] this may be so. however, the court must give effect to the fundamental distinctions between those two remedies, regardless of any perceived similar- ities. despite instrubel’s submissions, one cannot ignore the fact that the criteria for granting a mareva injunction are significantly more onerous than the cri- teria for issuing a writ of seizure before judgment by [29] c’est peut- être le cas. cependant, la cour doit donner effet aux distinctions fondamentales entre ces deux réparations, en dépit de toute ressem- blance perçue. malgré les observations d’instrubel, on ne saurait faire abstraction du fait que les critères pour octroyer une injonction mareva sont nettement plus exigeants que les critères d’octroi d’un bref de 482 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. garnishment. there is good reason for this. a mareva injunction is an exceptional remedy, which is directed at the person of the defendant and limits his or her freedom to act: see belleau et al., at no 2-1141. seizure before judgment by garnishment, on the other hand, affects property. while a mareva injunction directly affects the defendant’s actions, seizure by garnishment affects the garnishee only incidentally, and only inasmuch as the garnished property is con- cerned: see cinar corporation v. xanthoudakis, 2005 canlii 23655, at paras. 9-10 (que. sup. ct). [30] the rules of private international law found in book ten of the civil code of québec (“ccq”) must be considered in order to decide this case. given that a seizure by garnishment is carried out in rem, the rules governing quebec authorities’ jurisdiction over real actions must be considered: [translation] “a real action is tied to property and may therefore be brought against any person in possession of the prop- erty: it is instituted ‘in rem’ and follows the property into whatever hands it is situated” (r. savoie and l-p taschereau,. procédure civile, vol. i, introduc- tion, théorie générale, organisation judiciaire, ac- tion en justice (1973), at p 73). as hamilton j. said, “[t]he primary jurisdiction with respect to assets is the court of the place where the assets are located”: para 76. under art 3152 ccq,. quebec courts have jurisdiction over a real action “if the property in dispute is situated in québec”. thus, to determine whether the quebec superior court had jurisdic- tion to issue the writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment, i must look to the location of the property in question. saisie- arrêt avant jugement. il y a une bonne rai- son à cela. une injonction mareva est un remède exceptionnel qui vise la personne du défendeur et qui limite sa liberté d’agir : voir belleau et autres, no 2-1141. la saisie- arrêt avant jugement, par contre, a une incidence sur les biens. si l’injonction mareva a une incidence directe sur les actes du défendeur, la saisie- arrêt n’a qu’une incidence accessoire sur le tiers- saisi, et seulement dans la mesure où les biens faisant l’objet de la saisie- arrêt sont visés : voir cinar corporation c. xanthoudakis, 2005 canlii 23655, par 9-10 (cs qc). il faut examiner les règles de droit interna- [30] tional privé figurant dans le livre dixième du code civil du québec (« ccq ») pour trancher la pré- sente affaire. vu qu’une saisie- arrêt s’effectue in rem, les règles régissant la compétence des autorités québécoises sur les actions réelles doivent être exa- minées : « l’action réelle s’attache aux biens et peut donc être intentée à l’encontre de toute personne en possession des biens : elle s’exerce “in rem”, et suit les biens en quelques mains qu’ils se trouvent » (r. savoie et l-p. taschereau, procédure civile, t. i, introduction, théorie générale, organisation judiciaire, action en justice (1973), p 73). comme l’a affirmé le juge hamilton, [traduction] « [l]a compétence principale à l’égard des actifs relève du tribunal du lieu où ceux-ci sont situés » : par 76. suivant l’art 3152 ccq, les tribunaux québécois ont compétence sur une action réelle « si le bien en litige est situé au québec ». en conséquence, pour déterminer si la cour supérieure du québec avait compétence pour décerner le bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement, je dois prendre en considération le lieu où est situé le bien en cause. [31] the importance of looking to the location of the property, rather than to that of its owner — or of the garnishee — cannot be emphasized enough. the enactment of art.  3152  ccq represented a departure from the past. the legislature recog- nized the need to resolve the confusion arising from the possibility of grounding the jurisdiction of quebec courts in the defendant’s domicile even where the dispute concerned property located out- side quebec: see c. emanuelli, droit internatio- nal privé québécois (3rd ed. 2011), at pp 133-34. [31] on ne saurait trop insister sur l’importance de prendre en considération le lieu où est situé le bien, plutôt que celui où se trouve son propriétaire ou encore le tiers- saisi. l’adoption de l’art 3152 ccq. représentait une rupture avec le passé. le législa- teur a reconnu la nécessité de dissiper la confusion découlant de la possibilité de fonder la compétence des tribunaux québécois sur le domicile du défen- deur même lorsque le litige concernait un bien si- tué à l’extérieur du québec  : voir c emanuelli, droit international privé québécois (3e éd. 2011), [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 483 the minister’s commentary illustrates this new approach: p. 133- 134. les commentaires du ministre illustrent cette nouvelle approche : [translation] this article, which is new law, confers jurisdiction over real actions on the quebec authorities in the place where the property is situated, thereby aligning the applicable law (art. 3097) and adjudicative jurisdiction. unlike article 73 ccp, which deals with the jurisdiction of quebec courts over real and mixed actions, article 3152 does not base jurisdiction on the defendant’s domicile. this criterion is more relevant to mixed actions than it is to real actions. [emphasis added.] cet article, de droit nouveau, attribue une compétence en matière d’action réelle aux autorités québécoises de la situation du bien, établissant ainsi la concordance entre la loi applicable (art. 3097) et la compétence juridictionnelle. contrairement à l’article 73 cpc relatif à la compétence des tribunaux du québec en matière d’action réelle et d’action mixte, l’article 3152 ne retient pas la compétence fondée sur le domicile du défendeur. ce critère est plus pertinent en matière d’action mixte qu’en matière d’action réelle. [je souligne.] (ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), at p. 2012) (ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, t. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), p. 2012) this focus on the property’s location is, moreover, supported by arts. 3138 and 3140 ccq, which, as explained by academic commentators, give quebec authorities jurisdiction to order provisional or con- servatory measures, or emergency measures, where the property is located in quebec: see emanuelli, at p. 134; g. goldstein and e. groffier, droit inter- national privé, vol. ii, règles spécifiques (2003), at p. 299; see also j-g castel,. droit international privé québécois (1980), at p 829. cet accent mis sur le lieu où est situé le bien est en outre étayé par les art. 3138 et 3140 ccq qui, comme l’ont expliqué certains auteurs, confèrent aux autorités québécoises le pouvoir d’ordonner des mesures provisoires ou conservatoires, ou encore de prendre des mesures d’urgence, lorsque le bien est si- tué au québec : voir emanuelli, p. 134; g. goldstein et e. groffier, droit international privé, t. ii, règles spécifiques (2003), p. 299; voir aussi j-g. castel, droit international privé québécois (1980), p 829. [32] in summary, a seizure before judgment by garnishment is effected in rem and, in this sense, a request for a writ of seizure constitutes a real action within the meaning of the rules of private interna- tional law. quebec courts generally have jurisdiction to issue a writ of seizure only where the property in question is located in quebec: see goldstein and groffier, at p 299. i now turn to the property in dispute in these appeals. [32] en résumé, une saisie- arrêt avant jugement s’effectue in rem et, en ce sens, une réquisition pour la délivrance d’un bref de saisie constitue une action réelle au sens des règles de droit international privé. les tribunaux québécois sont généralement com- pétents pour décerner un bref de saisie seulement lorsque le bien en cause est situé au québec : voir goldstein et groffier, p 299. j’examine maintenant le bien en litige dans les présents pourvois. b the garnished property b le bien faisant l’objet de la saisie- arrêt [33] instrubel filed a request for a writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment directed at “the sums or moveable property belonging to [the iraqi appellants]”. according to instrubel, it had a right to seize the following: [33] instrubel a déposé une réquisition pour l’émis- sion d’un bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement visant [traduction] «  les sommes ou les meubles ap- partenant aux [appelantes iraquiennes] ». instrubel soutient qu’elle avait le droit de saisir ce qui suit : all aerodrome charges and air navigation charges of the republic of iraq billed and/or collected and/or otherwise [traduction] toutes les redevances d’aérodrome et de navigation aérienne de la république d’iraq qui sont 484 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. already held by the international air transport associa- tion, either at its head office in montréal or at any of its worldwide branches, on behalf of the republic of iraq. [emphasis added.] facturées et/ou perçues et/ou par ailleurs déjà détenues par l’international air transport association, que ce soit à son siège social à montréal ou à l’une de ses succursales à travers le monde, au nom de la république d’iraq. [je souligne.] (ar, vol. i, at p. 48) (da, vol. i, p. 48) these charges are also referred to as “e&f charges”. ces redevances sont également appelées [traduc- tion] « redevances e&f ». [34] in support of its application for seizure be- fore judgment by garnishment, instrubel filed an affidavit sworn by markus johannes dekker in which the property sought to be seized is described as fol- lows: [34] à l’appui de sa réquisition de saisie- arrêt avant jugement, instrubel a déposé un affidavit souscrit par markus johannes dekker, dans lequel le bien visé par la saisie est décrit comme suit : instrubel has reason to believe that the republic of iraq owns assets that are located in the province of québec. more precisely, those assets are the air navigation charges imposed by the republic of iraq and comprised of, inter alia, fly- over fees, airport maintenance fees and route maintenance fees. such air navigation charges are payable by airlines and countries to the republic of iraq in order to be granted the permission to fly over their airspace. all of said aerodrome charges and air navigation charges are billed and/or collected and/or otherwise already held by the international air transport association (“iata”), either by/through its head office in canada or by/through any of its worldwide branches, on behalf of the republic of iraq, as represented by the iraqi civil aviation authority for the account of the state of iraq. the iata has its canadian head office at 800 place victoria, in the city and district of montréal, the whole as appears from an extract of the iraq aeronautical information publication (“aip”) commu- nicated herewith as exhibit r-15. [traduction] instrubel a des raisons de croire que la république d’iraq possède des actifs situés dans la province de québec. plus précisément, il s’agit des redevances de navigation aérienne imposées par la république d’iraq, lesquelles comprennent notamment les frais de survol aérien, les frais d’entretien aéroportuaire et les frais d’entretien des routes. les compagnies aériennes et les pays versent à la république d’iraq de telles redevances pour être autorisés à survoler son espace aérien. toutes ces redevances d’aérodrome et de naviga- tion aériennes sont facturées et/ou perçues et/ou par ailleurs déjà détenues par l’international air transport association (« iata »), que ce soit par/par l’entremise de son siège social au canada ou par/par l’entremise de l’une de ses succursales à travers le monde, au nom de la république d’iraq, représentée par l’iraqi civil aviation authority pour le compte de l’état d’iraq l’iata a son siège social canadien au 800, place victoria, dans la ville et le district de montréal, le tout tel qu’il appert d’un extrait de la publication d’information aéronautique («  aip  ») de l’iraq communiquée avec les présentes comme pièce r-15.   .   . instrubel seeks the authorization of a judge of the superior court of quebec to seize the aerodrome charges and air navigation charges in the hands of iata held on behalf of the republic of iraq in an amount suffi- cient to satisfy the partial award and the final award, as instrubel demande à un juge de la cour supérieure du québec l’autorisation de faire saisir entre les mains de l’iata les redevances d’aérodrome et de navigation aériennes détenues pour le compte de la république d’iraq s’élevant à un montant suffisant pour que soit acquitté le [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 485 described in the request for a writ of seizure accompa- nying the present affidavit. [emphasis added.] montant dû en application de la sentence partielle et de la sentence finale, lequel est précisé dans la réquisition pour la délivrance d’un bref de saisie qui accompagne le présent affidavit. [je souligne.] (ar, vol. ii, at p. 29) (da, vol. ii, p. 29) [35] the writ of seizure before judgment by gar- nishment, as issued on july 30, 2013, states the fol- lowing: [35] le bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement qui a été décerné le 30 juillet 2013 est rédigé en ces termes : [traduction] seizure of amounts of money, securities or movables saisie de sommes d’argent, de sûretés ou de meubles we order you, garnishee, to appear before the court at the courthouse of montreal located at 1, notre- dame street on august 13, 2013, in room 1.110, at 9:00 am to declare under oath the amounts of money, securities or movables belonging to [the iraqi appellants] which are in your possession for whatever purpose or grounds, and to hold them until the court has ruled upon the matter. nous vous enjoignons, partie tierce- saisie, de compa- raître en notre cour, au palais de justice de montréal, situé au 1, rue notre- dame, le 13 août 2013, salle 1.110, à 9 h, afin de déclarer sous serment les sommes d’argent, sûretés ou meubles appartenant aux [appelantes iraquiennes] que vous détenez pour quelque cause ou à quelque titre que ce soit. vous ne devez en aucun cas vous en dessaisir avant que le tribunal n’ait statué. we order you, [iraqi appellants], to appear on the date and at the time and place shown above to answer to the request contained in the declaration to be served in ac- cordance with the law and to give the reasons that this seizure should not be declared proper and valid. [emphasis added.] nous vous enjoignons, [appelantes iraquiennes], de comparaître au lieu, à la date et à l’heure ci- dessus men- tionnés pour répondre à la demande contenue dans la déclaration devant être signifiée en conformité avec la loi et pour faire valoir les motifs pour lesquels la présente saisie ne serait pas déclarée bonne et valable. [je souligne.] (ar, vol. i, at p. 49) (da, vol. i, p. 49) [36] the above- quoted passages perfectly illustrate instrubel’s view — which was the right view — of the nature of the property at the time it sought to seize it. according to its affidavit and the writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment as issued, instrubel understood that the property was owned by icaa and was only held by iata on behalf of icaa. instrubel knew perfectly well that it was not seizing property belonging to iata — that is, found in iata’s patrimony — as it is now suggesting in this court. [36] les passages précités illustrent parfaitement le point de vue d’instrubel — lequel était le bon — quant à la nature du bien au moment où elle a cherché à le saisir. selon son affidavit et le bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement tel qu’il a été délivré, instrubel comprenait que le bien appartenait à l’icaa et qu’il était seulement détenu par l’iata pour le compte de l’icaa. instrubel savait très bien qu’elle ne saisissait pas un bien appartenant à l’iata — c’est-à-dire un bien faisant partie du patrimoine de l’iata — comme elle le suggère maintenant devant notre cour. [37] this may be thought to be an overly formal- istic conclusion. however, seizures — including sei- zures before judgment by garnishment — constitute harsh and exceptional measures that interfere with [37] on peut penser qu’il s’agit là d’une conclu- sion trop formaliste. or, les saisies — y compris les saisies- arrêts avant jugement — constituent des me- sures sévères et exceptionnelles qui portent atteinte 486 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. private individuals’ property and are therefore sub- ject to stringent formal conditions: belleau et al., at no 2-1142. this is one of the technical areas of the law in which it is important that courts apply such conditions rigorously. a writ of seizure before judgment can be issued only where the requesting party has complied with all formal conditions pre- scribed by law: théberge v. galerie d’art du petit champlain inc., 2002 scc 34, [2002] 2 scr 336, at para. 7 (“the respondent must find authority for the seizure in the code of civil procedure read in light of the copyright act. if he cannot find author- ity in the legislation, then it does not exist and the seizure was wrongful.”); tri- tex co. inc. v. gideon, [1999] rjq 2324 (ca), at pp. 2331-32 (“a writ of seizure may therefore be issued only in circum- stances where the rules governing this procedure have been strictly observed.”); lavallée v. st- germain, [1994] rdj 291 (ca), at p. 294 ([translation] “[s]eizure before judgment is a draconian and se- vere procedure and therefore demands scrupulous compliance with procedural requirements and a true basis in law”). à des biens privés et qui sont donc soumises à des conditions formelles strictes  : belleau et autres, no 2-1142. il s’agit d’un de ces domaines techniques du droit où il importe que les tribunaux appliquent de telles conditions rigoureusement. un bref de saisie avant jugement ne peut être délivré que lorsque la partie qui le demande a respecté toutes les condi- tions formelles prescrites par la loi : théberge c. galerie d’art du petit champlain inc., 2002 csc 34, [2002] 2 rcs 336, par. 7 (« c’est dans le code de procédure civile, interprété à la lumière de la [loi sur le droit d’auteur], que l’intimé doit puiser son pouvoir de saisie. si la législation ne l’habilite pas à pratiquer une saisie, alors il ne possède pas ce pouvoir et la saisie a été pratiquée à tort. »); tri- tex co. inc. c. gideon, [1999] rjq 2324 (ca), p. 2331- 2332 ([traduction] « un bref de saisie ne peut donc être délivré que dans les situations où les règles régissant cette procédure ont été respectées de manière stricte. »); lavallée c. st- germain, [1994] rdj 291 (ca), p. 294 (« [l]a saisie avant juge- ment est une procédure draconienne, sévère et qui exige donc un respect scrupuleux de la procédure et donc une base légale véridique »). c nature of the legal relationship between iata c nature de la relation juridique entre l’iata et and icaa l’icaa [38] on march 3, 2004, iata and icaa entered into a contract for the “establishment of a route facility charges billing and collection system on behalf of the state of iraq” (“contract”, reproduced in ar, vol. ii, at pp. 6 et seq). under the contract, icaa mandated iata to bill and collect the air navigation charges due to icaa from participating airlines. specifically, the contract’s preamble states the following: [38] le 3 mars 2004, l’iata et l’icaa ont conclu un contrat pour [traduction] « l’établissement d’un système de facturation et de perception des rede- vances d’installations et de services de route pour le compte de l’état d’iraq » (« contrat », reproduit dans da, vol. ii, p. 6 et suiv). en vertu du contrat, l’icaa a mandaté l’iata de facturer et de percevoir les redevances de navigation aérienne que les compa- gnies aériennes participantes devaient à l’icaa. plus particulièrement, le préambule du contrat se lit ainsi : [traduction] whereas [icaa] wishes to delegate the task of the op- eration of a route facility charges billing and collection system to iata    . attendu que [l’icaa] souhaite déléguer à l’iata la tâche d’exploiter un système de facturation et de per- ception des redevances d’installations et de services de route   .   .   . [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 487 whereas [icaa] has instructed the operators2 con- cerned to pay the route facility charges for the services provided on the routes prescribed in the iraqi aeronautical information publication (aip) to iata acting as its agent; [footnote added.] attendu que [l’icaa] a demandé aux opérateurs2 concernés de verser à l’iata, agissant comme son agent, les redevances d’installations et de services de route pour les services fournis sur les routes prévues dans la publi- cation d’information aéronautique (aip) de l’iraq; [note en bas de page ajoutée.] the contract also provides as follows: le contrat prévoit également ce qui suit : [traduction] 7.2 remittance of charges to [icaa] 7.2 remise des redevances à [l’icaa] iata will remit to [icaa] the route facility charges col- lected on [icaa]’s behalf, less the agreed administrative fees as detailed in annex 2 to this contract, only upon and to the extent of iata’s receipt of payment of the concerned charges. such remittance will be executed in accordance with the schedule set out in annex 3. [emphasis added.] [39] the contract is governed by swiss law. how- ever, given that no proof was made of swiss law, hamilton j. properly characterized the contract on the basis of quebec law: para. 57; see art. 2809 para. 2 ccq. this approach was not questioned by the court of appeal, and i do not propose to do so here. l’iata remet à [l’icaa] les redevances d’installations et de services de route perçues pour le compte de [l’icaa], déduction faite des frais d’administration convenus, dont les détails figurent à l’annexe 2 du présent contrat, et ce, uniquement à compter de la réception par l’iata du paie- ment des redevances en question et dans la mesure où elle reçoit celles-ci. cette remise est effectuée conformément à l’échéancier qui figure à l’annexe 3. [je souligne.] [39] le contrat est régi par le droit suisse. cepen- dant, comme aucune preuve du droit suisse n’a été faite, le juge hamilton a à bon droit qualifié le contrat au regard du droit québécois : par. 57; voir art. 2809 al 2 ccq. la cour d’appel n’a pas remis en ques- tion cette approche et je n’ai pas l’intention de le faire ici. [40] the contract establishes a relationship of man- date whereby iata acts as mandatary for icaa, the mandator. the relationship was, correctly in my view, characterized as such by hamilton j. the court of appeal did not seriously dispute this characterization in saying that iata has an obligation to icaa in the nature of a debt and that “this is so irrespective of the characterization of the contract between iata and icaa as a mandate or some sui generis relationship”. instrubel itself did not seem to take issue with this characterization at the hearing in this court. [40] le contrat établit une relation de mandat où l’iata agit comme mandataire de l’icaa, le man- dant. c’est ainsi que le juge hamilton a, à juste titre à mon avis, qualifié la relation. la cour d’appel n’a pas sérieusement contesté cette qualification en affir- mant que l’iata avait envers l’icaa une obligation de la nature d’une dette et qu’[traduction] « il en est ainsi, que l’on qualifie le contrat entre l’iata et icaa de mandat ou de quelconque relation sui gene- ris ». instrubel ne semble pas non plus avoir contesté cette qualification à l’audience devant notre cour. [41] i see no reason to question hamilton j.’s con- clusion that the contract establishes a relationship of [41] je ne vois aucune raison de remettre en ques- tion la conclusion du juge hamilton selon laquelle 2 the operators listed in annex 4 of the contract consist of various airlines authorized to use iraq’s airspace: p 18. for greater clarity, i use the term “airlines” rather than “operators” throughout these reasons. 2 les opérateurs énumérés à l’annexe 4 du contrat comprennent diverses compagnies aériennes autorisées à utiliser l’espace aérien iraquien : p 18. par souci de clarté, j’emploie l’expres- sion « compagnies aériennes » plutôt qu’« opérateurs » dans les présents motifs. 488 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. mandate. the relationship between iata and icaa, both as appears from the contract and from the reality on the ground, bears all the traditional hallmarks of a mandate. mandate has two essential aspects: first, the mandator (icaa) confers upon the mandatary (iata) the power to represent him or her; and sec- ond, this representation must occur in the perfor- mance of a juridical act with a third person: art. 2130 para 1 ccq;. a. popovici, la couleur du mandat (1995), at p 18. [42] this concept of representation is undeniably present here. iata collects charges on behalf of icaa, not on its own behalf: see preamble, arts. 1, 3 and 7.2 and annex 1 of the contract, and preamble and art 11 of the contract amendment no 1. these charges are due to icaa from airlines that have the right to fly in the iraqi airspace iata therefore represents icaa in its dealings with third parties (airlines). [43] the nature of iata’s role as regards third parties is also consistent with the existence of a man- date relationship with icaa insofar as it involves the performance of juridical acts with third parties. iata’s role is not merely to collect payment from the airlines flying through iraq’s airspace. the contract is clear that “iata has the exclusive right to estab- lish and operate the route facility charges billing and collection system”: art. 3 (emphasis added). airlines are required to pay route facility charges to iata “according to the provisions communicated by iata”: art 6c. there is no doubt that, in entering into the contract, icaa entrusted iata with the performance of juridical acts with the airlines flying through iraq’s airspace. le contrat établit une relation de mandat. la relation entre l’iata et l’icaa, tel qu’il appert du contrat et de la réalité sur le terrain, présente toutes les caractéristiques traditionnelles d’un mandat le mandat comporte deux aspects essentiels : premiè- rement, le mandant (l’icaa) confère au mandataire (l’iata) le pouvoir de le représenter, et, deuxième- ment, cette représentation se fait dans l’accomplis- sement d’un acte juridique avec un tiers : art. 2130 al 1 ccq;. a. popovici, la couleur du mandat (1995), p 18. [42] cette notion de représentation est indénia- blement présente en l’espèce. l’iata perçoit les redevances pour le compte de l’icaa, et non pour son propre compte : voir le préambule, les art. 1, 3 et 7.2 et l’annexe 1 du contrat, ainsi que le préambule et l’art 11 de l’avenant no 1 du contrat. ces redevances sont dues à l’icaa par les compagnies aériennes qui ont le droit de voler dans l’espace aérien iraquien. l’iata représente donc l’icaa dans ses rapports avec les tiers (les compagnies aériennes). [43] la nature du rôle de l’iata à l’égard des tiers s’accorde également avec l’existence d’une relation de mandat avec l’icaa dans la mesure où elle im- plique l’accomplissement d’actes juridiques avec des tiers. le rôle de l’iata ne consiste pas simplement à percevoir les paiements des compagnies aériennes qui traversent l’espace aérien iraquien. le contrat stipule clairement que [traduction] « l’iata a le droit exclusif d’établir et d’exploiter le système de facturation et de perception des redevances d’ins- tallations et de services de route » : art. 3 (je sou- ligne) les compagnies aériennes sont tenues de payer à l’iata les redevances d’installations et de services de route « conformément aux dispositions communiquées par l’iata » : art 6c. il n’y a aucun doute qu’en concluant le contrat, l’icaa a confié à l’iata l’accomplissement d’actes juridiques avec les compagnies aériennes qui traversent l’espace aérien iraquien. [44] iata also has informational obligations con- sistent with those of a mandatary under art. 2139 ccq, since it must regularly render account to icaa for the operation of the route facility charges collection system: art 73 of the contract. thus, [44] l’iata a en outre des obligations d’informa- tion conformes à celles d’un mandataire en application de l’art 2139 ccq, car elle doit régulièrement rendre compte à l’icaa relativement à l’exploitation du système de perception des redevances d’installations [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 489 while iata has full financial control of the process, it must report to icaa each month. [45] finally, the contract could not be clearer that iata’s obligation with respect to the e&f charges is to remit them to icaa. this exact language is clearly used in the contract. such language is con- sistent with a mandatary’s remittance obligations under art. 2185 para 1 ccq. thus, i am in entire agreement with hamilton j. that the relationship between iata and icaa is one of mandate. i am moreover of the view that this conclusion is central to the disposition of these appeals. et de services de route : art 73 du contrat. ainsi, bien qu’elle ait le plein contrôle financier du processus, l’iata doit rendre compte à l’icaa tous les mois. [45] enfin, le contrat stipule on ne plus clairement que l’obligation de l’iata à l’égard des redevances e&f consiste à remettre celles-ci à l’icaa. ces termes exacts sont clairement utilisés dans le contrat. de tels termes sont conformes aux obligations du mandataire de remettre en application de l’art. 2185 al 1 ccq. en conséquence, je souscris entière- ment à l’opinion du juge hamilton selon laquelle la relation entre l’iata et l’icaa est une relation de mandat. de plus, je suis d’avis que cette conclusion est centrale pour l’issue des présents pourvois. (1) effects of the mandate on the parties’ patri- (1) effets du mandat sur le patrimoine des parties monies [46] a relationship of mandate impacts parties’ patrimonial situation. the effects of the acts con- cluded by the mandatary on behalf of the mandator are reflected directly in the mandator’s patrimony: popovici, at pp. 18-19 and 49; see also arts. 2146 and 2157 ccq. the notion of representation is once again fundamental. the juridical acts that the mandatary performs with third parties are binding on the mandator. that reality will be reflected in the mandator’s patrimony, since it is the mandator’s pat- rimony, rather than the mandatary’s, which becomes bound to the third parties’ patrimonies. where the mandate is performed properly, the mandatary as- sumes no obligation towards third parties. [46] une relation de mandat a une incidence sur la situation patrimoniale des parties. les effets des actes accomplis par le mandataire pour le compte du mandant se reflètent directement dans le patrimoine du mandant : popovici, p. 18-19 et 49; voir aussi les art. 2146 et 2157 ccq. l’idée de représentation est, encore une fois, fondamentale. les actes juridiques que le mandataire accomplit avec des tiers lient le mandant. cette réalité se reflétera dans le patrimoine du mandant, puisque c’est son patrimoine, plutôt que celui du mandataire, qui devient lié à celui des tiers. lorsque le mandat est bien exécuté, le mandataire n’assume aucune obligation envers les tiers. [47] these principles have been affirmed by this court in the past. in victuni ag v. minister of rev- enue of quebec, [1980] 1  scr  580, the court recognized that an asset purchased by a manda- tary on a mandator’s behalf is in fact owned by the mandator: p 583. in that case, two companies had incorporated another company, victuni, and mandated it to purchase land in its own name. the court had to consider whether victuni owned the land in question or whether it had an indebtedness equal to the value of the land to the two companies that had mandated it to make the purchase. the court found that victuni had bought the land in its own name but that it had done so in its capacity as [47] ces principes ont été confirmés par notre cour dans le passé. dans victuni ag c. ministre du revenu du québec, [1980] 1 rcs 580, la cour a reconnu qu’un bien acheté par un mandataire pour le compte d’un mandant appartient en fait au mandant : p 583. dans cette affaire, deux sociétés avaient constitué une autre société, victuni, et avaient chargé celle-ci d’acheter un terrain en son propre nom. la cour de- vait déterminer si victuni était propriétaire du terrain en question ou si elle avait une dette ou obligation d’un montant égal à la valeur du terrain envers les deux sociétés qui l’avaient chargée de faire l’achat. la cour a conclu que victuni avait acheté le terrain en son propre nom, mais qu’elle l’avait fait en sa 490 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. mandatary for the two other companies, which were the real owners and for which victuni held the land. thus, it found that qualité de mandataire des deux autres sociétés, qui étaient les vrais propriétaires du terrain et pour le compte desquelles victuni détenait celui-ci. elle a donc conclu ce qui suit : [u]nder the general principles of the law of mandate, it is clear that the obligation of a mandatary towards the man- dator is not a debt. the person who has bought property on behalf of a third party who wishes to remain unknown is no more indebted for the price paid than he is the owner of the property. the true owner is the mandator, and the ob- ligation of the mandatary nominee is to render an account to the mandator and deliver over what he has received on his behalf. what he receives, even if it is money, does not belong to him: he is obliged to keep it separate from his own property. it is a crime for him to take control of it so as to make himself a debtor thereof instead of a mandatary. [emphasis added; citation omitted; pp 584-85]. en vertu des principes généraux du mandat il est clair que l’obligation d’un mandataire envers son mandant n’est pas une dette. celui qui a acheté un immeuble pour le compte d’un tiers qui veut rester inconnu, n’est pas plus débiteur du prix payé qu’il n’est propriétaire de l’im- meuble. le vrai propriétaire c’est le mandant et l’obliga- tion du mandataire prête- nom c’est de rendre compte au mandant et de lui remettre ce qu’il perçoit pour lui. ce qu’il reçoit, même si c’est de l’argent, ne lui appartient pas, il est obligé de le tenir à part de ses biens. c’est un crime pour lui que de s’en emparer de façon à se constituer débiteur au lieu de mandataire. [je souligne; référence omise; p. 584- 585.] [48] in the instant case, the court of appeal did not apply victuni on the ground that this court had distinguished it in another case, quebec (revenue) v. caisse populaire desjardins de montmagny, 2009 scc 49, [2009] 3 scr 286, at para 27. i disagree with the court of appeal. the context of montmagny was materially distinct, having nothing to do with the situation in victuni, which was more similar to the situation now before this court. indeed, in order to resolve the issue in victuni, the court had to analyze and apply principles of civil law. as is clear from the beginning of the paragraph quoted above, the case was decided on the basis of those principles. it cannot be disregarded simply because the out- come concerned taxation. the court’s conclusions in victuni regarding the law of mandate stand and must be given effect. in my view, victuni is good law. it clearly stated that there is a general principle in the law of mandate that a mandatary’s obligation towards a mandator is not a debt. [48] en l’espèce, la cour d’appel n’a pas appli- qué l’arrêt victuni, au motif que notre cour l’avait distingué dans un autre dossier, québec (revenu) c. caisse populaire desjardins de montmagny, 2009 csc 49, [2009] 3 rcs 286, par 27. je suis en désaccord avec la cour d’appel. le contexte de l’af- faire montmagny était substantiellement différent, n’ayant rien à voir avec la situation dans victuni, qui ressemble davantage à la situation en l’espèce. en ef- fet, pour trancher la question litigieuse dans victuni, la cour devait analyser et appliquer des principes de droit civil. comme il ressort clairement du début du paragraphe précité, cette affaire a été tranchée sur la base de ces principes. on ne peut en faire abstrac- tion simplement parce que son résultat concernait la fiscalité. les conclusions de la cour dans victuni en ce qui concerne le droit du mandat demeurent et il faut leur donner effet. à mon avis, l’arrêt victuni est bien fondé. il y a clairement été statué qu’il existe un principe général en droit du mandat selon lequel l’obligation d’un mandataire envers le mandant n’est pas une dette. [49] applying the principles enunciated in victuni to this case, i find that when iata deals with third parties (airlines), the effects of those dealings are re- flected not in iata’s patrimony, but rather in icaa’s patrimony. for instance, the contract is clear that iata is not to be held liable for any loss of income or delay in payment where there is a dispute with an [49] l’application à la présente affaire des prin- cipes énoncés dans victuni m’amène à conclure que, lorsque l’iata traite avec des tiers (les compagnies aériennes), les effets de ces opérations se reflètent non pas dans le patrimoine de l’iata, mais plutôt dans celui de l’icaa. à titre d’exemple, le contrat prévoit clairement que l’iata ne doit pas être tenue [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 491 airline over a certain charge: art 71. this is because the third party’s relationship is with icaa, not with iata. responsable des pertes de revenus ou des retards de paiement lorsqu’il y a un différend avec une compa- gnie aérienne à propos d’une redevance en particu- lier : art 71. il en est ainsi parce que la relation du tiers est avec l’icaa, et non avec l’iata. i conclude from this that the seized property [50] forms part of icaa’s patrimony. [50] je conclus de ce qui précède que le bien saisi fait partie du patrimoine de l’icaa. (2) the mandatary’s obligation towards the (2) l’obligation du mandataire envers le mandant mandator is not a debt n’est pas une dette [51] where, as in this case, a contract of mandate entails the transfer of goods or property between third parties and the mandatary, the mandatary’s obligation towards the mandator is not a debt. a debt presupposes an owing patrimony. however, as i explained above, the mandatary’s patrimony is not engaged under a contract of mandate. rather, it is the mandator’s patrimony that is affected: popovici, at pp 18-19. the mandatary acts as the “holder” (as opposed to the “owner”) of the property, which he or she must hand over or, in the case of sums, remit to the mandator: arts. 2184 and 2185 para 1 ccq. as i previously mentioned, the contract is explicit in this regard: “iata will remit to [icaa] the route facility charges collected on [icaa]’s behalf”. i therefore respectfully disagree with the court [52] of appeal when it stated that iata’s obligation is “a debt and [that] this is so irrespective of the character- ization of the contract between iata and icaa as a mandate or some sui generis relationship”: para 43. in my view, this disregards the consequences of the relationship of mandate. furthermore, it is unclear what the court of appeal meant when it referred to the existence of “some sui generis relationship”. [51] lorsque, comme en l’espèce, un contrat de mandat implique le transfert de marchandises ou de biens entre des tiers et le mandataire, l’obligation du mandataire envers le mandant n’est pas une dette. une dette présuppose un patrimoine débiteur. cependant, comme je l’ai expliqué précédemment, le patrimoine du mandataire n’est pas en jeu dans un contrat de mandat. c’est plutôt le patrimoine du mandant qui est touché : popovici, p 18-19. le mandataire agit comme « détenteur » (et non pas comme « proprié- taire ») du bien, ou des sommes, qu’il doit remettre au mandant : art. 2184 et art. 2185 al 1 ccq. comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, le contrat est explicite à cet égard : [traduction] « l’iata remet à [l’icaa] les redevances d’installations et de services de route perçues pour le compte de [l’icaa] ». [52] par conséquent, avec égards, je ne souscris pas à l’affirmation de la cour d’appel portant que l’obligation de l’iata est [traduction] « une dette et [qu’]il en est ainsi, que l’on qualifie le contrat entre l’iata et l’icaa de mandat ou de quelconque relation sui generis » : par 43. à mon avis, cela fait abstraction des conséquences de la relation de mandat. de plus, ce que la cour d’appel voulait dire lorsqu’elle s’est référée à l’existence d’une « quelconque relation sui generis » n’est pas clair. [53] i am in further disagreement with the court of appeal’s assertion that icaa never owned the debts due to it from the airlines: para 43. the contract is clear and limpid to the contrary. icaa is the air- lines’ creditor — it is to icaa that the airlines owe charges for using iraq’s airspace: art 3. the right to the payments from the airlines has always belonged to icaa. the payments therefore also belong to [53] je ne souscris pas non plus à l’affirmation de la cour d’appel selon laquelle l’icaa n’a jamais été propriétaire des dettes qu’avaient envers elle les compagnies aériennes : par 43. le contrat prévoit clairement et sans équivoque le contraire. l’icaa est la créancière des compagnies aériennes — c’est à l’icaa que ces dernières doivent des redevances pour l’utilisation de l’espace aérien iraquien : art 3. 492 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. icaa, although they are collected and held by iata on its behalf. [54] a mandatary’s obligation towards a mandator is thus different in nature than a debt. the mandatary must hand over the property, or remit the sums, that he or she has received to the mandator. this explains why the mandatary may hold property entrusted to him or her without owning it: see victuni; laplante v. the queen, 2017 tcc 118, 2017 dtc 1071, at para. 72; 9172- 0904 québec inc. v. commission des relations du travail, 2010 qccs 3397, [2010] rjdt 1091, at para. 45; laporte v. lauzon, 2007 qccs 6226, [2008] rjq 478, at para 73. the property is not available to the mandatary for reasons other than the performance of the mandate: le droit aux paiements par les compagnies aériennes a toujours appartenu à l’icaa. les paiements appar- tiennent donc eux aussi à l’icaa, même s’ils sont perçus et détenus par l’iata pour son compte. [54] l’obligation du mandataire envers le man- dant est donc de nature différente de la dette. le mandataire doit remettre le bien, ou les sommes, qu’il a reçus au mandant. cela explique pourquoi le mandataire peut détenir, sans en être le propriétaire, le bien qui lui est confié : voir victuni; laplante c. la reine, 2017 cci 118, par. 72; 9172- 0904 québec inc. c. commission des relations du travail, 2010 qccs 3397, [2010] rjdt 1091, par. 45; laporte c. lauzon, 2007 qccs 6226, [2008] rjq 478, par 73. le bien n’est pas à la disposition du manda- taire pour d’autres fins que l’exécution du mandat : [translation] regardless of whether there is a trust or a mandate, what is important to defeat the trustee’s seisin is that the property be held by the bankrupt for a third party, that it be identifiable as such in the bankrupt’s hands and that it not be available to the bankrupt for purposes other than the performance of the mandate. [emphasis added.] qu’il s’agisse d’un trust ou d’un mandat, ce qui est important pour faire échec à la saisine du syndic, c’est que le bien soit tenu par le failli pour un tiers, qu’il soit identifiable comme tel entre ses mains et ne soit pas à sa disposition pour d’autres fins que l’exécution du mandat. [je souligne.] (yachting & sports pigeon inc. (1995), 2 cbr. (4th) 236 (que. sup. ct.), at para. 16) (yachting & sports pigeon inc. (1995), 2 cbr. (4th) 236 (cs. qc), par. 16) the mandatary’s patrimony is affected only in the sense that it is charged with the obligation to hand over the property, or remit the sums, to the mandator. the property, or the sums, never actually enter the mandatary’s patrimony because they continue to belong to the mandator. this means that the mandata- ry’s obligation cannot be a debt, since the mandatary owes nothing. le patrimoine du mandataire est affecté seulement en ce que ce dernier est chargé de l’obligation de re- mettre le bien, ou les sommes, au mandant. le bien, ou les sommes, n’entrent jamais véritablement dans le patrimoine du mandataire, parce qu’ils continuent d’appartenir au mandant. cela signifie que l’obli- gation du mandataire ne saurait être une dette, car celui-ci ne doit rien. [55] the contract provides that iata’s adminis- trative fees for fulfilling the mandate are to be de- ducted from the gross amount received from the airlines and collected by iata on icaa’s behalf: art 72 and annex 2. this is consistent with art. 2185 para 1 ccq, which reads as follows: [55] le contrat stipule que les frais d’administra- tion de l’iata pour l’exécution du mandat seront dé- duits du montant brut reçu des compagnies aériennes et perçu par l’iata pour le compte de l’icaa : art 72 et annexe 2. cela s’accorde avec l’art. 2185 al 1 ccq, rédigé en ces termes : 2185 a mandatary is entitled to deduct what the mandator owes him by reason of the mandate from the sums he is required to remit. 2185 le mandataire a le droit de déduire, des sommes qu’il doit remettre, ce que le mandant lui doit en raison du mandat. [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 493 it is noteworthy that the wording of art.  2185 para 1 ccq supports the position that the man- datary does not become the owner of the sums col- lected and does not owe a debt in an equivalent amount to the mandator. the use of the term “remit” is very telling. the mandatary has to remit what he or she has received. the legislature did not say that the mandatary has to “reimburse” what he or she has received, nor that the mandatary “owes” any money to the mandator. indeed, it is only when the mandatary does not act in accordance with the man- date that he or she may owe a debt to the mandator. in such cases, the legislature is clear: the mandatary must “indemnify the mandator by paying” a certain amount (art. 2146 para 2 ccq). il convient de souligner que le libellé de l’art. 2185 al 1 ccq appuie la thèse selon laquelle le manda- taire ne devient pas propriétaire des sommes perçues et qu’il n’a pas une dette d’un montant équivalent envers le mandant. l’emploi du mot « remettre » est très révélateur. le mandataire doit remettre ce qu’il ou elle a reçu. le législateur n’a pas dit que le mandataire doit « rembourser » ce qu’il a reçu ni que le mandataire « doit » de l’argent au mandant. en fait, c’est seulement lorsque le mandataire n’agit pas conformément au mandat qu’il ou elle peut avoir une dette envers le mandant. dans de tels cas, le lé- gislateur est clair : le mandataire doit « indemniser le mandant en payant » une certaine somme (art. 2146 al 2 ccq). [56] in the present case, iata has an obligation to remit the sums it collected to icaa; this obligation is distinct from any debt it might owe to icaa. indeed, the property at issue here — the sums in the swiss bank account — has always belonged and continues to belong to icaa. the quebec superior court would have had jurisdiction to issue the writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment only if the seized property was located in the province of quebec: emanuelli, at pp. 69 and 134. it is therefore necessary to determine the geographical location of the property. [56] en l’espèce, l’iata a une obligation de re- mettre les sommes qu’elle a perçues à l’icaa; cette obligation est distincte de toute dette qu’elle pourrait avoir envers l’icaa. en effet, le bien en cause en l’espèce — les sommes détenues dans le compte bancaire suisse — a toujours appartenu à l’icaa et continue de lui appartenir. la cour supérieure du québec n’aurait eu compétence pour délivrer le bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement que si le bien saisi était situé dans la province de québec : emanuelli, p. 69 et 134. il faut donc déterminer le lieu où se trouve le bien. d where was the property located at the time of d où était situé le bien au moment de la saisie- the seizure before judgment by garnishment? arrêt avant jugement? [57] in order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider the impact of banking law, if any, on the relationships and obligations described above it is widely accepted that when a customer deposits money in a bank account, the customer is making a loan to the banking institution: n. l’heureux and m. lacoursière, droit bancaire (5th ed. 2017), at pp. 120-21; m h ogilvie,. bank and customer law in canada (2nd ed. 2013), at p 239. the bank may deal with the sums as it sees fit (within regulatory constraints), but it remains liable to repay the amount to the customer. [57] pour répondre à cette question, il faut exami- ner l’incidence du droit bancaire, s’il en est, sur les relations et les obligations décrites précédemment. il est largement reconnu que lorsqu’un client dépose de l’argent dans un compte bancaire, le client consent un prêt à l’institution bancaire : n. l’heureux et m. lacoursière, droit bancaire (5e éd. 2017), p. 120- 121; m.  h.  ogilvie, bank and customer law in canada (2e éd. 2013), p 239. la banque peut dispo- ser des sommes comme bon lui semble (sous réserve des restrictions réglementaires applicables), mais elle demeure tenue de les rembourser au client. [58] however, the deposit of the sums does not affect characterization. money that is deposited re- mains property: n. leclerc, l’argent en monnaie, [58] cependant, le dépôt des sommes n’a aucune incidence sur la qualification. un dépôt d’argent demeure un bien : n. leclerc, l’argent en monnaie, 494 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. un lexique: des biens économiques en droit privé canadien (2008), at p 55. the banking contract has effect only as between the contracting parties: harp investments inc. (syndic de), [1992] rjq 1581 (sup. ct.), at p 1585. i am of the view that, for the purposes of issuing a writ of seizure by garnishment, the patrimonial impact of the contract of mandate between iata and icaa remains unscathed by the fact that the sums to be remitted to the mandator were deposited in a bank account: harp, at p 1586. the sums belong to icaa. while iata may have a right of a personal nature to require repayment of the sums from the bank, it has ultimately never owned them — they continue to belong to icaa. un lexique : des biens économiques en droit privé ca- nadien (2008), p 55. le contrat bancaire n’a d’effet qu’entre les parties contractantes : harp investments inc. (syndic de), [1992] rjq 1581 (cs), p 1585. j’estime qu’aux fins de la délivrance d’un bref de saisie- arrêt, le fait que les sommes à remettre au mandant aient été déposées dans un compte bancaire ne change rien à l’effet patrimonial du contrat de mandat entre l’iata et l’icaa : harp, p 1586. les sommes appartiennent à l’icaa. bien que l’iata puisse avoir un droit de nature personnelle d’exiger de la banque leur remboursement, elle n’a jamais ultimement été propriétaire de ces sommes; celles-ci continuent d’appartenir à l’icaa. [59] it is important to keep in mind that three types of contracts are in play here: first, the contract of mandate between iata and icaa; second, the agree- ments between iata and the airlines concerning the collection of the charges; and finally, the loan between iata and the bank. as mandatary, iata col- lects and holds the sums on icaa’s behalf and may deposit them in a bank account. this operation results in iata being the bank’s lender. such a status is far from being inconsistent with the law of mandate, since the deposit of sums in a bank account simply means that the mandatary is managing the property entrusted to him or her: art 2136 ccq. [60] banking law is certainly important. the world’s economy is, in many respects, built upon banking, and banking law principles help to regulate the daily deal- ings of a commercial society. but banking law cannot be used to deny commercial realities whenever it is convenient to do so. the sums collected by iata on behalf of icaa never left icaa’s patrimony and thus continued to belong to it. the funds deposited remain identifiable and belong to icaa. iata acted only as an administrator of icaa’s property in depositing the funds. at best, iata is the bank’s lender. [59] il importe de garder à l’esprit que trois types de contrats sont en cause en l’espèce : d’abord, le contrat de mandat entre l’iata et l’icaa; ensuite, les ententes entre l’iata et les compagnies aériennes en ce qui a trait à la perception des redevances; enfin, le prêt entre l’iata et la banque. en tant que man- dataire, l’iata perçoit et détient les sommes pour le compte de l’icaa et peut les déposer dans un compte bancaire. par suite de cette opération, l’iata devient le prêteur de la banque. un tel rôle est loin d’être incompatible avec le droit du mandat, puisque le dépôt de sommes dans un compte bancaire signifie simplement que le mandataire administre le bien qui lui est confié : art 2136 ccq. [60] le droit bancaire est certainement important. l’économie mondiale repose à bien des égards sur l’activité bancaire et les principes de droit bancaire aident à régir les opérations quotidiennes d’une so- ciété commerciale. cependant, le droit bancaire ne saurait être utilisé pour nier des réalités commer- ciales chaque fois qu’il nous convient de le faire. les sommes perçues par l’iata pour le compte de l’icaa ne sont jamais sorties du patrimoine de l’icaa et continuent donc de lui appartenir. les fonds déposés demeurent identifiables et appar- tiennent à l’icaa. l’iata a agi seulement en tant qu’administrateur du bien de l’icaa en déposant les fonds. tout au plus, l’iata est le prêteur de la banque. i am of the view that the bank account in [61] this case, although in iata’s name, is for practical [61] j’estime que le compte bancaire en l’espèce, bien qu’il soit au nom de l’iata, équivaut en pratique à un [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 495 purposes equivalent to a trust account. iata depos- ited the sums it collected on behalf of icaa in that account. indeed, iata said as much in its solemn declaration: “iata had in its possession an amount of usd166,652,878.55 that according to the books of iata is held in trust for the benefit of the iraqi civil aviation authority” (ar, vol. ii, at p. 3 (em- phasis added)). until transferred to icaa’s bank account in new york pursuant to the contract (spe- cifically art 72), the sums in the swiss bank account were held for the benefit of iata’s mandator. iata could not deal with the funds as it saw fit; it could only remit them in accordance with the terms of the contract and its role as mandatary. i disagree with the court of appeal’s view [62] of hamilton j’s analysis and its assertion that “had icaa taken such position [that the account consti- tuted a trust account], it would not have succeeded”: para 44. i find nothing “incongruous” about the re- sult reached by hamilton j.: para 49. while i accept that the intervening contract between a customer that deposits money and a bank is a loan, this fact has no bearing on the capacity in which the customer loans the money to the bank. between the bank and the accountholder, the lender is the accountholder and the borrower is the bank. but this has no impact on the characterization of the relationship that the accountholder may have with a third party. compte en fiducie. l’iata a déposé dans ce compte les sommes qu’elle a perçues pour le compte de l’icaa. c’est d’ailleurs ce que l’iata a affirmé dans sa dé- claration solennelle : [traduction] « l’iata avait en sa possession un montant de 166 652 878,55 $ us qui, selon les documents comptables de l’iata, est détenu en fiducie au profit de l’iraqi civil aviation authority » (da, vol. ii, p. 3 (je souligne)). jusqu’à ce qu’elles soient transférées dans le compte bancaire de l’icaa à new york conformément au contrat (plus particulièrement l’art 72), les sommes dans le compte bancaire suisse étaient détenues au profit du mandant de l’iata. cette dernière ne pouvait pas disposer des fonds comme bon lui semblait : elle ne pouvait que les remettre conformément aux stipulations du contrat et à son rôle de mandataire. [62] je suis en désaccord avec l’opinion de la cour d’appel quant à l’analyse faite par le juge hamilton et avec son affirmation voulant que [traduction] « si l’icaa avait fait valoir un tel point de vue [selon lequel le compte constituait un compte en fiducie], elle n’aurait pas réussi » : par 44. à mon avis, le résultat auquel est arrivé le juge hamilton n’a rien d’[traduction] « incongru » : par 49. bien que j’accepte que le contrat entre un client qui dépose de l’argent et une banque soit un prêt, ce fait n’a aucune incidence sur la qualité en vertu de laquelle le client prête l’argent à la banque. entre la banque et le titulaire du compte, le prêteur est le titulaire du compte et l’emprunteur est la banque. cependant, cela n’a aucun effet sur la qualification de la relation que peut avoir le titulaire du compte avec un tiers. [63] consider the following. what effect would it have had on the characterization of the relation- ship between iata and icaa — and on the own- ership of the funds — if instead of depositing the money collected in a bank account, iata had put the money — assuming that it was cash — in a safety deposit box at the same bank? in my view, it would not have made any difference at all, provided that the funds in the safety deposit box could be easily traced. [63] considérons ce qui suit. si au lieu de déposer l’argent perçu dans un compte bancaire, l’iata avait mis l’argent — en présumant qu’il s’agissait d’argent comptant — dans un coffre à cette même banque, quel effet cela aurait-il eu sur la qualification de la relation entre l’iata et l’icaa, et sur la propriété des fonds? j’estime que cela n’aurait rien du tout changé, dans la mesure où les fonds mis dans le coffre étaient facilement traçables. [64] on this issue of the funds’ traceability, i agree with hamilton j.’s analysis. as he concluded, de- spite the comingling of funds in the account, the funds belonging to icaa were readily identifiable: [64] sur cette question de la traçabilité des fonds, je souscris à l’analyse du juge hamilton. comme il l’a conclu, malgré le regroupement des fonds dans le compte, les fonds appartenant à l’icaa 496 iata v instrubel côté j. [2019] 4 scr. paras 58-59. the parties filed joint stipulations ac- knowledging that iata maintained records of the e&f charges collected on icaa’s behalf. iata filed an affidavit confirming that it kept detailed records of icaa’s funds in the account. i therefore disa- gree with the court of appeal’s analysis concerning the traceability of the funds: paras 36-41. this is a question of fact, and hamilton j.’s finding could not be interfered with absent a palpable and overriding error. in my view, the evidence was sufficient to con- clude, as he did, that the funds remained identifiable and thus continued to belong to icaa. étaient facilement identifiables  : par.  58-59 les parties ont déposé des déclarations conjointes dans lesquelles elles reconnaissaient que l’iata tenait des registres des redevances e&f perçues pour le compte de l’icaa. l’iata a déposé un affidavit confirmant qu’elle tenait des registres détaillés des fonds qu’avait l’icaa dans le compte. je suis donc en désaccord avec l’analyse de la cour d’appel en ce qui a trait à la traçabilité des fonds : par 36-41. il s’agit d’une question de fait et la conclusion du juge hamilton ne pouvait être modifiée en l’absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante. à mon avis, la preuve était suffisante pour conclure, comme il l’a fait, que les fonds demeuraient identifiables et continuaient donc d’appartenir à l’icaa. [65] a bank account  — and sums deposited in it  —  is located at the branch where the account is held: emanuelli, at p.  69. this is why a writ of seizure by garnishment must be served at that branch: l’heureux and lacoursière, at p. 182; see also belleau et al., at no 2-2344. in this case, the bank account in which iata kept the sums it col- lected on icaa’s behalf was located in switzerland, more specifically in geneva. this is not surprising given that iata has executive offices in geneva. the geographical location of the property in dispute here is switzerland. [65] un compte bancaire — et les sommes qui y sont déposées — est situé à la succursale où est détenu le compte : emanuelli, p 69. c’est pourquoi un bref de saisie- arrêt doit être signifié à cette suc- cursale : l’heureux et lacoursière, p. 182; voir aussi belleau et autres, no 2-2344. en l’espèce, le compte bancaire dans lequel l’iata gardait les sommes qu’elle percevait pour le compte de l’icaa était situé en suisse, et plus particulièrement à genève. cela n’est pas surprenant vu que l’iata a des bu- reaux administratifs à genève. le bien en litige en l’espèce se trouve en suisse. [66] an in rem action directed at sums located in switzerland is beyond the jurisdiction of the quebec superior court, since it has jurisdiction only if the property in dispute is located in quebec: art 3152 ccq. [66] la cour supérieure du québec n’est pas com- pétente pour connaître d’une action in rem visant des sommes situées en suisse, car elle n’a compé- tence que si le bien en litige est situé au québec : art 3152 ccq. [67] i add that the subsequent transfer of some of the funds to the trust account held by iata’s lawyers in quebec does not change my conclusion. the sums were brought to quebec pursuant to an agreement that was meant to have no bearing on the parties’ rights. the moment at which the jurisdiction of the quebec superior court must be considered is when the writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment was requested and issued. at that time, the sums were in switzerland. [67] j’ajoute que le transfert subséquent de cer- tains des fonds dans le compte en fiducie détenu par les avocats de l’iata au québec ne change pas ma conclusion. les sommes ont été transférées au québec conformément à une entente qui était censée n’avoir aucune incidence sur les droits des parties. le moment auquel la compétence de la cour supé- rieure du québec doit être examinée est celui où le bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement a été demandé et délivré. à ce moment-là, les sommes se trouvaient en suisse. [2019] 4 rcs. iata c instrubel la juge côté 497 vi conclusion vi conclusion [68] given that the property in dispute is located outside quebec, i conclude that the quebec superior court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment. [68] vu que le bien en litige est situé à l’extérieur du québec, je conclus que la cour supérieure du québec n’avait pas compétence pour délivrer le bref de saisie- arrêt avant jugement. [69] i would accordingly allow the appeals with costs throughout, and reinstate hamilton j.’s judg- ment. [69] j’accueillerais donc les pourvois avec dépens devant toutes les cours, et je rétablirais la décision du juge hamilton. judgment accordingly. jugement en conséquence. solicitors for the appellant/intervener the in- ternational air transport association: mcmillan, montréal. procureurs de l’appelante/intervenante interna- tional air transport association : mcmillan, mont- réal. public of iraq, the ministry of industry of the repub- lic of iraq, the ministry of defence of the republic of iraq and the salah aldin state establishment: lcm attorneys inc., montréal. procureurs des appellants/intervenants republic of iraq, ministry of industry of the republic of iraq, ministry of defence of the republic of iraq et salah aldin state establishment  :  lcm avocats inc., montréal. procureurs de l’intimée : imk, montréal. of arbitrators (canada) inc.: mccarthy tétrault, montréal. procureurs de l’intervenante chartered institute of arbitrators (canada) inc. : mccarthy tétrault, montréal.
i. introduction people with mental illnesses face persistent stigma and prejudicial treatment in canadian society, which has imposed profound and widespread social, political, and legal disadvantage on them. in particular, discriminatory perceptions that those with mental illnesses are inherently and indefinitely dangerous persist these perceptions have served to support some of the most unjust treatment of those with mental illnesses. as this case demonstrates, such perceptions still find some expression in legislation. section 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms prevents such discrimination from being given the force of law this appeal requires the court to apply the equality guarantee to the manner in which those found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (ncrmd) of sexual offences are treated by ontario’s sex offender registry regime it also provides an opportunity to set out a consistent set of principles applicable to granting remedies for legislation that violates the charter. in ontario, christopher’s law (sex offender registry), 2000, so 2000, c 1 (christopher’s law), requires those who are either convicted or found ncrmd of a sexual offence to physically report to a police station to have their personal information added to the province’s sex offender registry. they must continue to report in person at least once a year to keep their information up to date. they must also report every time certain information changes even when individuals are no longer required to report or when they die, information previously gathered about them under the registry is retained. those who are found guilty of a sexual offence can be exempted from reporting in the first place by receiving a discharge under s 730 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, can be removed from the registry upon receipt of a free pardon, and can be exempted from continuing to report upon receipt of either a free pardon or criminal record suspension there is therefore some opportunity, based on an individualized assessment, to be exempted from the sex offender registry. by contrast, everyone found ncrmd must report upon discharge by a provincial review board or court, without exception, no one found ncrmd can ever be removed from the registry, and no one found ncrmd can ever be exempted from reporting. this is so even if they have received a discharge from a review board. g, the respondent, was found ncrmd of two sexual offences and then absolutely discharged by the ontario review board (orb). his record in the 19 years since those offences occurred has been spotless. nevertheless, as christopher’s law currently stands, g will have to report and will be a registered “sex offender” for the rest of his life. his information will remain in the registry even after he passes away. he has no opportunity for removal. in my view, christopher’s law draws discriminatory distinctions between people found guilty and people found ncrmd of sexual offences on the basis of mental disability, contrary to s 15(1) of the charter. these discriminatory distinctions cannot be justified in a free and democratic society i would therefore dismiss the appeal and uphold the court of appeal’s orders declaring christopher’s law to be of no force or effect as it applies to those found ncrmd and granted an absolute discharge, suspending the declaration of invalidity for 12 months, and exempting g from that suspension by relieving him of further compliance with the legislation and ordering that his information be deleted from the registry immediately. ii background in september 2001, g experienced his first and only manic episode a month later, he was charged with two counts of sexually assaulting his then-wife, one count of unlawfully confining her, and one count of harassment the two incidents underlying the charges occurred as a result of that manic episode. in june 2002, g was found ncrmd. when g appeared before the orb in july 2002, he received a conditional discharge. in august 2003, the orb ordered that he be absolutely discharged on the basis that “[t]here is simply no evidence to find that [g] is a significant risk to the safety of the public” (2017 onsc 6713, 401 crr (2d) 297, at para 17) g has not engaged in criminal activity since being absolutely discharged approximately 17 years ago. he has adhered to treatment and his symptoms have been in full remission. he has maintained stable employment and has strong and supportive relationships with his family. g was placed on the provincial sex offender registry in august 2004, and on the federal registry in january 2005 since then, g has fully complied with his reporting obligations. he has reported in person annually as required by christopher’s law and has complied with other requirements imposed by the federal sex offender information registration act, sc 2004, c 10 (soira). g brought an application challenging christopher’s law (and the federal registry, which is not at issue in this appeal) as it applies to persons found ncrmd who have been absolutely discharged under part xx.1 of the criminal code in respect of offences giving rise to registration. he took the position that the inability of people in his situation to be granted an exemption or be removed from the registry violates ss. 7 and 15(1) of the charter. g’s application was dismissed at first instance, but his appeal was allowed in part. a ontario superior court of justice (2017 onsc 6713, 401 crr (2d) 297) (lederer j.) relying on the evidence of the government’s expert witness, the application judge found that, although it is not possible to predict the risk of recidivism with certainty using actuarial data, the risk of reoffending for a person found ncrmd is no less than that of an individual found guilty he concluded that, from the perspective of risk assessment, it makes little difference whether the sexual offence results in a criminal conviction or a finding of ncrmd, because people who have been found ncrmd have criminal recidivism rates that are substantially higher than the rates of first-time offending among individuals with no criminal history. dealing with the s 7 claim, the application judge accepted that g’s liberty interest is engaged but rejected g’s argument that his security of the person interest is engaged. relying on the conclusion of the ontario court of appeal in r v. dyck, 2008 onca 309, 90 o.r (3d) 409, at para 106, that the registration and reporting requirements were “quite modest”, the application judge concluded that any deprivation of liberty is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. the application judge also found no violation of s 15(1). he found that christopher’s law does not distinguish between those found ncrmd and those found guilty of an offence, either on the face of the law or in its impact. this is because the distinction between those found guilty and those found ncrmd is not found in christopher’s law and because the impact of christopher’s law is “modest”. b ontario court of appeal (2019 onca 264, 145 or (3d) 161) (doherty, van rensburg and hourigan jja). on appeal, doherty j.a for a unanimous court of appeal upheld the application judge’s dismissal of g’s s 7 argument he agreed with the application judge that christopher’s law engages g’s liberty interest but not his security of the person interest. he also agreed that the deprivation of liberty conforms to the principles of fundamental justice, relying on the court of appeal’s prior decisions in dyck and r v. long, 2018 onca 282, 45 cr (7th) 98. however, doherty j.a allowed the appeal on the basis of g’s s 15(1) claim. he found that the effects of christopher’s law distinguish between convicted persons and persons found ncrmd on the basis of disability convicted persons, doherty ja reasoned, can access mechanisms that allow them to avoid registration in the first place, to be relieved of reporting requirements, or to be removed from the registry. persons found ncrmd cannot access comparable “exit ramps”, even once they have been absolutely discharged. doherty ja concluded that those distinctions are discriminatory because they foster the stereotypical idea that persons found ncrmd are inherently and perpetually dangerous. doherty ja also concluded that the law violates the s 15(1) right of those found ncrmd who receive an absolute discharge by failing to provide them with individualized treatment, citing winko v british columbia (forensic psychiatric institute), [1999] 2 scr 625. substantive equality, in his view, mandates that those found ncrmd and absolutely discharged have some opportunity for individualized assessment as a precondition for being subject to registry obligations. because the law does not minimally impair equality rights, doherty ja. concluded that the s 15(1) breaches are not justified under s 1. there was no evidence the public safety objective of christopher’s law would be undermined by extending exemptions to persons found ncrmd who have been absolutely discharged he reasoned that exemptions have already been extended to convicted persons without apparent damage to this objective. as to remedy, doherty j.a suspended the declaration of invalidity for 12 months to allow the legislature to determine the appropriate response. however, he exempted g from the suspension by ordering that he be immediately removed from and relieved of obligations under the registry. doherty ja reached the same conclusions with respect to the federal sex offender regime under soira; the attorney general of canada did not appeal the decision. iii. issues the attorney general of ontario appeals the order declaring christopher’s law to be without force or effect as it applies to those found ncrmd and absolutely discharged, as well as the order that g be immediately removed from and relieved of his obligations under the registry. the following issues, relating to whether the sex offender scheme infringes the rights of those found ncrmd, arise in this case: a does christopher’s law violate s 15(1)? b if so, is it justified as a reasonable limit under s 1 of the charter? c does christopher’s law violate s 7? d what is the appropriate remedy? was the declaration of invalidity properly suspended for some period of time? if so, was g properly granted an individual exemption from that suspension? i begin by outlining the relevant aspects of christopher’s law and part xx.1 of the criminal code, then turn to the issues in this appeal. iv christopher’s law christopher’s law establishes a registry containing, among other things, the names, dates of birth, addresses, personal and business phone numbers, employers, descriptions, and photographs of ontario residents who have been convicted or found ncrmd in respect of a sexual offence, along with the sexual offence in question (s 2; christopher’s law (sex offender registry), 2000, o. reg. 69/01 (christopher’s law regulation), s 2). christopher’s law imposes three distinct types of burdens on registrants. first, registrants must comply with initial reporting requirements that, broadly, apply upon release into the community. second, registrants must continue to report at least once a year and within seven days of specified events, such as changing their addresses or names third, registrants’ information persists in the registry, subject to removal only in the event that a registrant receives a free pardon (s 9.1; christopher’s law regulation, s 2(3)). i explain these burdens in more detail below. registrants must present themselves in person at a police station or other designated place to comply with their initial reporting requirements within seven days of release from custody, release on parole, release following absolute or conditional discharge after being found ncrmd, and becoming resident in ontario (s 3(1); christopher’s law regulation, s 12). this initial in-person reporting obligation takes 45-60 minutes to complete at a police station. registrants must present themselves at least once a year to fulfil their ongoing reporting obligations (s 3(1)(f) and (g)). they must provide a wide variety of information identified in the regulations, including their name and any present or past aliases, their addresses, their personal and business phone numbers, the name of their employers, their photograph, their physical description, their driver’s licence number, their licence plate number, the characteristics of the car they regularly use, and the educational institutions in which they are enrolled (s 3(2); christopher’s law regulation, s 2) it takes 30-60 minutes to fulfil the annual reporting obligation. registrants are also required to report every time they change their address, change their name, and become or cease to be an ontario resident. registrants must comply with the reporting obligations for 10 years if the maximum sentence for the sexual offence of which they were convicted or found ncrmd is 10 years or less (s 7(1)(a)). they must comply for life if the maximum sentence is greater than 10 years or if they were convicted or found ncrmd of more than one sexual offence (s 7(1)(b) and (c)). there is no reporting obligation for those who receive conditional or absolute discharges under s 730 of the criminal code, because s 730(3) deems those individuals not to have been convicted of the offence, and s 3 of christopher’s law only captures persons who have been convicted or found ncrmd of an offence. under s 7(4) of christopher’s law, a registrant is no longer required to report upon receiving either a free pardon or a criminal record suspension a free pardon deems the recipient to have never committed the offence of which they were convicted (criminal code, s 748(3)). a free pardon may be granted either under the crown’s prerogative of mercy or under s 748 of the criminal code. historically, the prerogative of mercy and the free pardon, one of the remedies the prerogative can provide, have been exercised to correct wrongful convictions and to compassionately ameliorate the impacts of convictions (hinse v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 35, [2015] 2 scr 621, at para. 28; g t trotter, “justice, politics and the royal prerogative of mercy: examining the self-defence review” (2001), 26 queen’s lj 339). a record suspension is granted by the national parole board to those who have been convicted of an offence good conduct in the period since the end of imprisonment or probation is among the circumstances to be considered in granting a record suspension (criminal records act, rsc 1985, c. c-47, ss. 4 and 41). under s 9.1 of christopher’s law, a registrant will be removed from the registry upon receiving a free pardon at the time of g’s registration, s 9.1 also provided that a registrant would be removed from the registry upon receiving what is now referred to as a record suspension. however, while a record suspension removes the reporting requirement, it no longer leads to removal from the registry (christopher’s law (sex offender registry) amendment act, 2011, so 2011, c 8, ss. 1(1) and 6). finally, there is no mechanism for removing registrants’ information upon a successful appeal, nor when they pass away instead, the registrant’s date of death is added to the registry (christopher’s law regulation, s 2(1) 10). information contained in the registry can be disclosed to police forces within and outside canada for crime prevention and law enforcement purposes, and disclosed publically by a chief of police or designate under certain circumstances (s 10(2) and (3); police services act, rso 1990, c. p.15, s 41(1.1) and (12)). significantly, christopher’s law requires police forces to make reasonable efforts to verify an offender’s address at least once a year, which may consist of attending at a registrant’s home (s 4(2)). it does not set limits on the number of checks that can be conducted for verification purposes and does not require police forces to give registrants notice of verification efforts. registrants who fail to comply with christopher’s law are subject to a maximum fine of $25,000 or up to a year’s imprisonment for a first offence and a maximum fine of $25,000 or up to two years’ imprisonment less a day for a subsequent offence (s 11). v criminal code, part xx.1 part xx.1 of the criminal code sets out the “assessment-treatment system” that applies to persons who are exempt from criminal responsibility and receive a verdict of ncrmd by virtue of ss. 16(1) and 672.34 (winko, at para. 16). part xx.1 provides for the establishment of provincial review boards, with the responsibility to hold hearings to determine whether to grant persons found ncrmd conditional or absolute discharges under s 672541. in winko, at para. 20, this court described the purposes of part xx.1, a scheme founded on the “twin goals of fair treatment [for those found ncrmd] and public safety”: . . . the purpose of part xx.1 is to replace the common law regime for the treatment of those who offend while mentally ill with a new approach emphasizing individualized assessment and the provision of opportunities for appropriate treatment. . . . [the ncrmd finding] triggers a balanced assessment of the offender’s possible dangerousness and of what treatment-associated measures are required to offset it. throughout the process the offender is to be treated with dignity and accorded the maximum liberty compatible with part xx.1’s goals of public protection and fairness to the ncr accused. [para. 43] following a disposition or review hearing, a review board may order an absolute discharge, a conditional discharge, or a hospital detention (s 672.54) in arriving at a disposition that is “necessary and appropriate in the circumstances”, review boards must take into account the safety of the public, along with the mental condition of the person found ncrmd, their reintegration into society, and their other needs (s 672.54) conditions relating to treatment may only be included in a disposition if the accused consents to the condition (s 67255). 1 though part xx.1 also empowers courts to make such orders in certain circumstances, review boards are responsible for making the large majority of these orders (department of justice, research and statistics division, the review board systems in canada: an overview of results from the mentally disordered accused data collection study (2006), at p 2) that is why i refer to review boards throughout these reasons. in general, disposition hearings are held within 45 days of an ncrmd verdict, and disposition review hearings are held no more than 12 months after the most recent disposition or disposition review hearing (ss. 672.47 and 67281). the review board must absolutely discharge any person found ncrmd unless it concludes, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, that the person poses a “significant risk of committing a serious criminal offence” (winko, at para. 57; see also s 67254(a)). if the review board cannot make the required positive finding of significant risk, jurisdiction under part xx.1 falls away — the criminal law cannot legitimately restrain that individual’s liberty any further (winko, at para. 33). this constitutional imperative, coupled with the individualized review that the review board must undertake at least annually in every person’s case, illustrate part xx.1’s rejection of “invidious” stereotypical notions that persons with mental illnesses are inherently dangerous (winko, at paras. 35, 47 and 89) risk cannot be assumed; it must be positively found and it must be found based on evidence considered within an individualized assessment of a person’s circumstances. vi analysis a does christopher’s law infringe the equality rights of those found ncrmd? (1) general principles the equality guarantee has a powerful remedial purpose (law v. canada (minister of employment and immigration), [1999] 1 scr 497, at para. 3; see also andrews v. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143, at p 171) as abella j noted in quebec (attorney general) v. a, 2013 scc 5, [2013] 1 scr 61, the “root of s 15 is our awareness that certain groups have been historically discriminated against, and that the perpetuation of such discrimination should be curtailed” (para. 332) — though, of course, historical discrimination need not be demonstrated for a court to find that a law infringes s 15(1). the equality guarantee seeks to prevent and remedy discrimination against groups subject to social, political, and legal disadvantage in canadian society (r v. swain, [1991] 1 scr 933, at p 994; see also eldridge v british columbia (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr 624, at para. 54) it expresses a commitment to recognizing the essential, inalienable equal worth of all persons through the law (andrews, at p 171; eldridge, at para. 54) in andrews, the launching pad of the court’s charter equality jurisprudence, mcintyre j. observed that the “worst oppression will result from discriminatory measures having the force of law” (p 172). the equality guarantee means that discriminatory laws will have no force at all. the court asks two questions in determining whether a law infringes s 15(1). first, does the challenged law, on its face or in its impact, draw a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground? if a law is facially neutral, it may draw a distinction indirectly where it has an adverse impact upon members of a protected group. second, if it does draw a distinction, does it impose “burdens or [deny] a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating . disadvantage”, including “historical” disadvantage? (see centrale des syndicats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2018 scc 18, [2018] 1 scr 522, at para. 22, citing kahkewistahaw first nation v. taypotat, 2015 scc 30, [2015] 2 scr 548, at paras 19-20, and quebec v a, at paras 323-24 and 327; see also quebec v a, at para. 332, quebec (attorney general) v alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, 2018 scc 17, [2018] 1 scr 464, at paras. 25-28, and fraser v canada (attorney general), 2020 scc 28, at paras. 27 and 30, per abella j.) the first step — whether the law creates a distinction based on enumerated or analogous grounds — is not a preliminary merits test or “an onerous hurdle designed to weed out claims on technical bases” (quebec v. alliance, at para. 26). it is aimed at ensuring that those who access the protection of s 15(1) are those it is designed to protect (alliance, at para. 26). in cases involving laws that draw distinctions in their impact, the disproportionate impact on a protected group is enough — the disproportionate impact need not be caused by the protected ground (fraser, at para. 70). the second step asks whether the challenged law imposes a burden or denies a benefit in a manner that is discriminatory. importantly, it does not matter to either step of the analysis whether the challenged law created the social, political or legal disadvantage of protected groups (centrale des syndicats, at para. 32, citing vriend v. alberta, [1998] 1 scr 493, at paras. 84 and 97; fraser, at para. 71). if the law reinforces, perpetuates, or exacerbates their disadvantage, it violates the equality guarantee and thereby gives discrimination the force of law. the ultimate issue in s 15(1) cases is whether the challenged law violates the animating norm of substantive equality (quebec v. a, at para. 325, citing withler v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 12, [2011] 1 scr 396, at para. 2; fraser, at para. 42; r v kapp, 2008 scc 41, [2008] 2 scr 483, at para. 14). substantive equality focuses both steps of the s 15(1) analysis on the concrete, material impacts the challenged law has on the claimant and the protected group or groups to which they belong in the context of their actual circumstances, including historical and present-day social, political, and legal disadvantage an appreciation of the role substantive equality has played in our jurisprudence is necessary to understand why many of the arguments the attorney general presented to this court must be rejected. this court’s conception of substantive equality has developed in opposition to formal equality approaches. formal equality is limited to equality “before the law”, and sees equality as a principle fulfilled by “treating likes alike” (andrews, at pp. 165-68 and 170; centrale des syndicats, at para. 27) formalist approaches to equality rights involve a “decontextualized application of objectified rules and definitions” that fails to account for, among others, conditions of material inequality, the concrete impacts that laws have on individuals and groups, and the manner in which individuals’ choices are embedded in their social and economic surroundings (s. mcintyre, “answering the siren call of abstract formalism with the subjects and verbs of domination”, in f. faraday, m. denike and m. k. stephenson, eds., making equality rights real: securing substantive equality under the charter (2nd ed. 2009), 99, at p 105; fraser, at para. 89; quebec v a., at para. 342, citing m. young, “unequal to the task: ‘kapp’ing the substantive potential of section 15”, in s. rodgers and s. mcintyre, eds., the supreme court of canada and social justice: commitment, retrenchment or retreat (2010), 183, at pp. 190-91 and 196). in andrews, this court interpreted the charter’s broadly worded equality rights guarantee as a clear repudiation of the formalism that had dominated under the canadian bill of rights, sc 1960, c 44, whose more limited equality guarantee was rendered ineffectual by narrow interpretation (p 170) recognizing that identical treatment may produce inequality and that different treatment may not always produce inequality, the court properly highlighted the law’s impact on individual claimants and groups as the main consideration (pp. 164-65). since then, the court has remained vigilant in its jurisprudence in guarding the s 15(1) analysis from incursions by formal equality approaches (see centrale des syndicats, at paras. 25-26; withler, at para. 43) to this end, it has eschewed a formalistic analysis based on “mirror comparator groups” because the search for the “proper” comparator group obscured the oppressive nature of some laws (withler, at para. 2); it has rejected discriminatory intent as a necessary element of discrimination in favour of focusing on a law’s concrete impacts (eldridge, at para. 62; andrews, at p 173); and it has held fast to the view that the adverse effects of a facially neutral law can constitute discrimination contrary to s 15(1) (eldridge, at paras. 77-78; andrews, at p 173). emerging from the foundation laid in andrews, substantive equality concerns itself with historical or current conditions of disadvantage, products of the persistent systemic discrimination that continues to oppress groups (fraser, at para. 42) substantive equality demands an approach “that looks at the full context, including the situation of the claimant group and . . . the impact of the impugned law” on the claimant and the groups to which they belong, recognizing that intersecting group membership tends to amplify discriminatory effects (centrale des syndicats, at para. 27, quoting withler, at para. 40) or can create unique discriminatory effects not visited upon any group viewed in isolation. it must remain closely connected to “real people’s real experiences” (egan v canada, [1995] 2 scr 513, at para 53, per l’heureux-dubé j.): it must not be applied “with one’s eyes shut” (mcintyre, at p 103). further, as wilson j reasoned in andrews, at p 153: “it is consistent with the constitutional status of s 15 that it be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to ensure the ‘unremitting protection’ of equality rights in the years to come.” (2) distinction based on the enumerated ground of mental disability the first step is to identify a distinction made on the face of the law or in its impact based on an enumerated or analogous ground. the attorney general submits before this court that christopher’s law does not draw a distinction by denying those found ncrmd access to exit ramps. the attorney general says the denial of a benefit to those found ncrmd results from distinctions drawn by the federal legislation, which is outside the ontario legislature’s control. here, there are clear distinctions drawn based on the enumerated ground of mental disability. offenders found guilty can be exempted from having to report and register in the first place by receiving a discharge in their sentencing hearing. convicted registrants can be removed from the registry by receiving a free pardon, and can be relieved of the obligation to continue to report upon receipt of a free pardon or record suspension a discharge, as a possible result of a sentencing hearing, is necessarily tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused (see r v. campbell, 2013 bcca 43, 334 bcac 16, at para. 27). both free pardons and record suspensions are granted following some assessment of the offender’s individual circumstances. these existing mechanisms, as they apply to those found guilty, provide opportunities, based on some level of individualized assessment, for exemption, removal, or relief from the sex offender registry. but there is no way for those found ncrmd to be exempted from having to report and register, to be removed from the registry once they have been put on it, or to be relieved of the obligation of continuing to report. these distinctions flow from the manner in which christopher’s law interacts with federal legislation, including the criminal code and criminal records act. however, legislation does not exist in a vacuum — christopher’s law imposes a scheme of obligations on persons convicted of or found ncrmd in respect of sexual offences. it is layered on top of the consequences of findings made under the criminal code by design even if the legislature made these distinctions inadvertently, a substantive equality analysis considers distinctions that are unintentional or result from the law’s interaction with other statutes or circumstances. these are core lessons of this court’s jurisprudence (fraser, at paras. 31-34, 41-47 and 69; andrews, at p 173; eldridge, at paras. 62 and 77-78) the combined effect of multiple statutes is particularly important for those with mental illnesses, as their lives are often regulated by what the intervener, the canadian mental health association, ontario, calls a “complex web of statutes and regulations” (if, at para. 7). here, it is determinative that those found ncrmd have no opportunity to be exempted from initial registration, removed from the registry, or relieved of the obligation to report, whereas opportunities for exemption, removal, and relief are available to those found guilty of the same offences. this distinction arises precisely because of the ncrmd regime. ncrmd individuals are plainly subjected to different treatment based on the enumerated ground of mental disability. the attorney general argues that the distinction identified — the lack of removal or exemption mechanisms — could be cured by removing those mechanisms for all individuals, so those found criminally responsible for sexual offences are treated the same as those found ncrmd. such a proposal invites at least two other constitutional concerns. first, the s 15(1) analysis is not merely concerned with formal distinctions apparent on the face of a law eliminating overt distinctions may not amount to eliminating all relevant distinctions. thus, i cannot accept the premise on which the attorney general’s argument appears to rest — that withholding exit ramps from all persons to whom christopher’s law applies would necessarily be consistent with s 15(1). it does not follow inexorably from the fact that all who are subject to the sex offender registry would be treated the same on the face of the law that the law would not impose a heavier burden on persons found ncrmd. second, eliminating all removal and exemption mechanisms would invite the concern that such a scheme could fail s 7 scrutiny in respect of all registrants. of course, the court need not address this hypothetical situation: whether the existing regime as it applies to those found guilty is compatible with s 7 of the charter is beyond the scope of this appeal. (3) discrimination step two of the s 15(1) analysis asks whether the distinction drawn is a discriminatory one, that is, “whether it imposes burdens or denies benefits in a way that reinforces, perpetuates, or exacerbates disadvantage” (centrale des syndicats, at para. 30). the attorney general argues that christopher’s law includes persons found ncrmd in the registry based on actuarial data about risk, and therefore does not stereotype them highlighting that pardons and record suspensions are inappropriate for persons found ncrmd, who have not been convicted of a crime, the attorney general submits that doherty j.a erred in finding that a process of individualized assessment is constitutionally required by s 15(1) the attorney general argues that the comparatively modest impact of the registry on individuals should allow the government to proceed based on statistical generalizations. g supports doherty ja’s analysis he submits that, by denying those found ncrmd access to exit ramps, christopher’s law effectively presumes that those found ncrmd have no prospect for rehabilitation and accordingly perpetuates disadvantage and negative stereotypes about persons with mental illness. ontario has decided to subject persons found ncrmd of sexual offences to the registry, so g says it must consider the needs and circumstances of that group. i have no difficulty concluding that the denial of exit ramps to those found ncrmd and discharged is discriminatory. in our society, persons with disabilities regrettably “face recurring coercion, marginalization, and social exclusion” (r devlin and d pothier, “introduction: toward a critical theory of dis-citizenship”, in d pothier and r. devlin, eds., critical disability theory: essays in philosophy, politics, policy, and law (2006), 1, at p 1). as this court has recognized, “[t]his historical disadvantage has to a great extent been shaped and perpetuated by the notion that disability is an abnormality or flaw” (eldridge, at para. 56). in reality, persons with disabilities are not flawed, nor can they all be painted with the same brush while they may share experiences of “[s]tigma, discrimination, and imputations of difference and inferiority” (d. wasserman et al., “disability: definitions, models, experience” in e. n. zalta et al., eds., stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (2016) (online), at §3.2), diversity within those labelled disabled is not the exception but the rule (see, eg,. e barnes, the minority body: a theory of disability (2016), at p 9). section 15’s promise of respect for “the equal worth and human dignity of all persons” (eldridge, at para. 54) requires that those with disabilities be considered and treated as worthy and afforded dignity in their plurality. and s 15’s guarantee that discrimination not be given the force of law requires careful attention to the diverse impacts that government action will have on those with disabilities. the stereotyping, exclusion, and marginalization experienced by persons with disabilities is also visited on those with mental illnesses (p. bracken and p. thomas, postpsychiatry (2005), at pp. 79-100). the prejudicial idea that those with mental illnesses are inherently and perpetually dangerous, along with other stigmatizing, prejudicial notions, has led to profound disadvantage for individuals living with mental illnesses (winko, at paras. 35-37; swain, at p 994; p. w. corrigan and a. c. watson, “understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental illness” (2002), 1 world psychiatry 16). this disadvantage has deep historical roots (h. stuart, j. arboleda-flórez and n. sartorius, paradigms lost: fighting stigma and the lessons learned (2012), at pp. 103-11): mental illnesses are not like other illnesses, because they regularly cause people to lose their rights and freedoms in ways that are unimaginable in other health conditions . historically, the care of the mentally ill has been deplorable. during the great confinement in the early part of the 1800s, hospital officials in europe had the authority to round up and imprison people who were mentally ill (termed then madmen and idiots), along with beggars, vagabonds, criminals, the unemployed, and other undesirables. the characterization of the mentally ill as wild beasts justified their forcible confinement and social banishment. [emphasis deleted; p 103.] though the early 19th century’s most abhorrent treatment of those with mental illnesses has been left behind, stigmatizing attitudes persist in canadian society to this day (h. stuart et al., “stigma in canada: results from a rapid response survey” (2014), 59 can. j. psychiatry s27). as stuart, arboleda-flórez, and sartorius observe, “perceptions of violence and risk of violence are central to . . . support for coercive treatments, legislative solutions, and justifications for social inequities and injustices” (p 108). while discriminatory attitudes and impacts against those with mental illnesses regrettably persist, they must not be given the force of law (andrews, at p 172). the attorney general submits that the distinctions drawn by christopher’s law are not discriminatory because they are based on statistical generalizations and “empirical fact” and impose only “modest” impacts on registrants. i cannot agree. the relevant question is whether christopher’s law imposes burdens or denies benefits in a manner that reinforces, perpetuates, or exacerbates disadvantage there is no threshold requirement of severity. the distinctions drawn by christopher’s law reinforce and further the stigmatizing idea that those with mental illness are inherently and permanently dangerous and, in so doing, perpetuate the disadvantage they experience. as doherty ja recognized, they “reflec[t] an assumption that persons who committed criminal acts while ncrmd do not change, but rather pose the same ongoing and indeterminate risk they posed at the time of the offence” (ca reasons, at para. 122). in addition to being stigmatized as dangerous, forced compliance with registry requirements, as the intervener the empowerment council notes, can also contribute to a “double stigma” for those found ncrmd, as a result of being considered both “mentally ill” and a “sexual offender” (r v. cc, 2007 abpc 337, 435 ar 215, at paras. 18, 43, 59 and 84; r v. redhead, 2006 abca 84, 384 ar 206, at para. 31). the law thus imposes a burden on people found ncrmd in a manner that violates the norm of substantive equality in two respects: the law itself invokes prejudicial and stereotypical views about persons with mental illnesses, feeding harmful stigma; and the law puts those found ncrmd in a worse position than those found guilty both effects perpetuate the historical and enduring disadvantage experienced by persons with mental illnesses. for g, being denied access to exemption and removal mechanisms based on individualized assessment means that he will be registered as a sex offender for the rest of his life; he may be subject to random police checks and will have to report at least annually for the rest of his life; and his information will never be removed from the registry, even after death, no matter what he does. his ncrmd finding, absolute discharge, spotless compliance record, consistent employment, strong family relationships — none of that matters. by withholding exit ramps, christopher’s law signals that the law considers g a perpetual threat to the public. that the state will not take its eyes off g suggests that, in the opinion of the law, he will always be dangerous. the attorney general’s argument that government’s intention not to stereotype is relevant to the s 15(1) analysis betrays a profound misunderstanding of equality rights — which protect substantive equality. as this court has repeatedly said, “a discriminatory purpose or intention is not a necessary condition of a s 15(1) violation” (eldridge, at para. 62; quebec v. a, at paras. 328-29 and 331-33). as abella j held in quebec v a, if the impugned measure “widens the gap between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of society” or reinforces, perpetuates, or exacerbates historical disadvantage, then it is discriminatory (para. 332; quebec v. alliance, at para. 25). the question is not whether there is some legitimate basis upon which the distinction exists or “widens the gap” (see fraser, at paras. 79-80 and 177). that is relevant only to the proportionality analysis under s 1 of the charter. the focus is on the law’s real impact on the claimant and the groups to which they belong (withler, at para. 2). in sum, christopher’s law infringes s 15(1) of the charter by requiring those found ncrmd to comply with the sex offender registry without providing them with opportunities for exemption and removal based on individualized assessment. while the opportunities for exemption and removal that exist for those found guilty involve some kind of individualized assessment, i need not determine the nature or extent of the opportunities that must be provided for those found ncrmd. that is not a determination to be made in the abstract — subject to the requirements of the charter, the legislature may choose from a range of policy options. b. is christopher’s law a reasonable limit on equality rights? the attorney general must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the infringement of s 15(1) is justified under s 1 first, there must be a pressing and substantial objective for the infringing measure. second, the infringing measure must not disproportionately interfere with s 15(1) rights in furtherance of that objective. the second part of the oakes test has three parts the state must demonstrate the infringement is rationally connected to the objective, the means chosen to further the objective interfere as little as reasonably possible with the s 15(1) right, and the benefits of the infringing measure outweigh its negative effects (see r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at pp. 138-40; vriend, at paras. 109-10; alberta v. hutterian brethren of wilson colony, 2009 scc 37, [2009] 2 scr 567, at paras. 48, 53 and 76-78). the attorney general’s burden is not to establish that the legislative scheme as a whole is a reasonable limit on s 15(1) that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, but to justify the infringing measure itself. as this court has underscored, “it is the infringing measure and nothing else which is sought to be justified” (rjr-macdonald inc v canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at para. 144; toronto star newspapers ltd v canada, 2010 scc 21, [2010] 1 scr 722, at para. 20). the objective of the infringing measure is thus the proper focus of the analysis; however, it may be necessary to situate the infringing measure in the context of the broader legislative scheme to understand the limitation’s function (vriend, at para. 111). the parties agree that the purpose of christopher’s law is to assist in the investigation and prevention of sexual offences g concedes that that purpose is pressing and substantial and that the limits it places on charter rights are rationally connected to that purpose. in effect, he acknowledges that requiring all persons found ncrmd to comply with christopher’s law without any opportunity for exemption or removal based on individualized assessment is rationally connected to assisting in investigating and preventing sexual offences (ca reasons, at para. 141). (1) minimal impairment i agree with the court of appeal that christopher’s law is not minimally impairing of the s 15(1) rights of those who were found ncrmd of a sexual offence and discharged. christopher’s law itself includes mechanisms by which, after some form of individualized assessment of their circumstances, offenders who were not found ncrmd can be removed from the registry (free pardon), relieved of the obligation to report (free pardon and record suspension), or exempted from reporting in the first place (discharge under s 730 of the criminal code). the inclusion of any method of exempting and removing those found ncrmd from the registry based on individualized assessment would be less impairing of their s 15(1) rights and could actually increase the registry’s effectiveness by narrowing its application to individuals who pose a greater risk to the community. i would reject the attorney general’s submission that risk assessments can never be certain, and therefore the object of the legislation can only be achieved by a mandatory and permanent registry for all those found ncrmd. first, the same could be said for all those found guilty of sexual offences: the individualized assessments that occur when an absolute discharge, a free pardon, or a record suspension is granted can equally never predict risk with certainty. second, the minimal impairment requirement requires only that the objective be substantially achieved (hutterian brethren, at paras. 53-55). individual assessment does not need to perfectly predict risk — certainty cannot be the standard. there was no evidence that providing persons found ncrmd with the opportunity to be exempted or removed from the registry based on an individualized assessment of their circumstances would significantly lessen the usefulness of the registry to law enforcement. indeed, as doherty ja noted, there is “no evidence that, while the objective of the legislation is consistent with exceptions and exemptions for persons found guilty, it is somehow undermined by comparable exceptions and exemptions for persons found ncrmd” (ca reasons, at para. 145). i accordingly conclude that the attorney general has not met his burden under s 1 to demonstrate that the infringing measure is not minimally impairing of the right and therefore has not justified the s 15(1) infringement. c does christopher’s law infringe the right to life, liberty and security of the person? given that i have concluded that christopher’s law violates s 15(1) in its application to persons found ncrmd and that g’s s 7 claim does not extend beyond those persons, it is not necessary to address whether christopher’s law also violates s 7. as i will explain, because the privacy and liberty interests of those found ncrmd are the very interests that are unequally burdened by christopher’s law, they inform the remedy for the breach of s 15(1). it is therefore not necessary to determine whether there is also a breach of s 7 in order to inform the appropriate remedy further, addressing some of the s 7 arguments would have an impact on the broader issue of the nature of the registry’s effects on all registrants and whether the entire scheme complies with s 7; such determinations are best left for another case. even so, these reasons should not be taken as agreeing with the ontario court of appeal’s approach to s 7 in this case, or in dyck and long. those approaches rest on the conclusion in those cases that the legislation’s intrusion on liberty is “modest”, a conclusion that has been challenged. i make no further comment on this point, given that a s 7 challenge to the federal sex offender registry is currently before the courts (see r v. ndhlovu, 2020 abca 307, rev’g 2016 abqb 595, 44 alta. lr. (6th) 382). d what is the appropriate remedy? the court of appeal issued a declaration that christopher’s law is of no force or effect insofar as it applies to those found ncrmd of a sexual offence and granted an absolute discharge by a provincial review board. it suspended the effect of that declaration for a year but exempted g from the suspension, ordering that his information be immediately removed from the registry. the parties submit that the effect of any declaration that christopher’s law is of no force or effect should be suspended, but disagree on whether g should be immediately exempted from that suspension the attorney general submits that individual exemptions from suspensions should not be granted except in extreme cases where, absent an exemption, the claimant will not benefit from the declaration. the intervener, the david asper centre for constitutional rights, submits that issuing the appropriate remedy in this appeal will require clarification of this court’s remedial jurisprudence by returning to the principles that underlie the remedies it has granted in the past. in recent years, academic commentators have urged that remedies for unconstitutional laws be determined in a more principled, coherent, and transparent way in particular, our jurisprudence dealing with suspensions of declarations of invalidity, and the exemption of individuals from those suspensions, has been criticized for unduly compromising the protection of rights by failing to grant meaningful remedies (see, eg,. r. leckey, “the harms of remedial discretion” (2016), 14 i con 584, at pp. 591-93), and for diminishing the quality of decision making by failing to transparently explain the basis for a suspension (see, eg,. g. r. hoole, “proportionality as a remedial principle: a framework for suspended declarations of invalidity in canadian constitutional law” (2011), 49 alta l rev 107, at pp. 118 and 123) i would accept the asper centre’s invitation to articulate a principled approach to remedies for legislation that violates the charter. as i shall explain, this court’s leading decision on remedies for laws that violate the charter, schachter v. canada, [1992] 2 scr 679, has provided helpful guidance on how to craft a responsive and effective remedy for unconstitutional laws for nearly three decades. but, in some respects, this court’s remedial jurisprudence has moved beyond schachter by employing and building on schachter’s guidance in determining the form and breadth of declarations of invalidity, suspending the effect of those declarations, and exempting individuals from suspensions, this court’s remedial practice has come to coalesce around a group of core remedial principles. recognizing those remedial principles and explicitly identifying approaches that strike the right balance between them will encourage greater consistency and transparency in remedial decision making. as i will explain, i conclude that suspensions of declarations of invalidity should be rare, granted only when an identifiable public interest, grounded in the constitution, is endangered by an immediate declaration to such an extent that it outweighs the harmful impacts of delaying the declaration’s effect and when declarations are suspended, granting individual exemptions pursuant to s 24(1) of the charter will often balance the interests of the litigant, the broader public, and the legislature in a manner that is “appropriate and just”. (1) principled remedial discretion section 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982, reads: 52. (1) the constitution of canada is the supreme law of canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. section 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982, provides in absolute terms that laws inconsistent with the constitution are of no force or effect to the extent of the inconsistency. although it states the legal result where there is conflict between a law and the constitution, s 52(1) does not explicitly provide courts with a grant of remedial jurisdiction.2 a general declaration pursuant to courts’ statutory or inherent jurisdiction is the means by which they give full effect to the broad terms of s 52(1). 2 unlike, eg, the constitution of south africa, s 172(1)(a), which specifically mandates courts to “declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency”. that a law is “of no force or effect” only “to the extent of the inconsistency” with the constitution means that a court faced with a constitutional challenge to a law must determine to what extent it is unconstitutional and declare it to be so our jurisprudence teaches us that a measure of discretion is inevitable in determining how to respond to an inconsistency between legislation and the constitution. there is a theory, consonant with the blackstonian declaratory theory of the law, that “judges never make law, but merely discover it” (canada (attorney general) v. hislop, 2007 scc 10, [2007] 1 scr 429, at para. 79). on this view, when a law is unconstitutional, courts and other decision-makers have no remedial discretion — s 52(1) renders unconstitutional laws of no force or effect from the moment of their enactment (see, eg,. nova scotia (workers’ compensation board) v martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2 scr 504, at para. 28). however, while s 52(1) is the substantive basis of constitutional invalidity, the public and the state will often disagree about whether a given law is unconstitutional and, if so, to what extent our legal order, grounded in related principles of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law, requires that there be an institution empowered to finally determine a law’s constitutionality; s 52(1) confirms “[t]he existence of an impartial and authoritative judicial arbiter” to determine whether the law is of no force and effect (reference re supreme court act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 scc 21, [2014] 1 scr 433, at para. 89) even in the absence of a formal declaration, s 52(1) operates to prevent the application of unconstitutional laws for example, because of the limits of its statutory jurisdiction, a tribunal or a provincial court’s determination that legislation is unconstitutional has no legal effect beyond the decision itself; nevertheless, it must refuse to give effect to legislation it considers unconstitutional (see, eg,. martin, at para. 31; r v lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr 130, at para. 15) thus, the reach of a judicial determination of the unconstitutionality of a law will be limited in the absence of statutory or inherent jurisdiction to issue a general declaration of invalidity. as i will explain, while s 52(1) recognizes the primacy of the constitution, including the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and groups guaranteed by the charter, fashioning constitutional remedies inevitably implicates other — at times, competing — constitutional principles (k roach, “principled remedial discretion under the charter” (2004), 25 sclr (2d) 101, at pp. 112-13). courts must strike an appropriate balance between these principles in determining how to give effect to s 52(1) in a manner that best aligns with our broader constitutional order. kent roach argues, and the intervener the asper centre submits, that charter remedies should be granted in accordance with “principled discretion”: a middle ground between “strong” or “pure” discretion, which would give judges free rein to fashion remedies as they see fit, and “rule-based” discretion, which would tightly constrain judges with hard-and-fast rules (roach (2004), at pp. 102 and 107-13). i agree. pure discretion has the benefit of being endlessly adaptable to any factual context, but has the clear downside of permitting results based on “the wills and whims of a person or a group of people” (roach (2004), at p 107, quoting p. birks, “three kinds of objections to discretionary remedialism” (2000), 20 uwa l rev 1, at p 15). it also fails to encourage transparent reasoning — if the decision-maker can do anything, there is less incentive to explain the basis for the decision rule-based discretion, by contrast, has the benefit of being applicable in different contexts in a predictable way. however, it does not encourage courts to engage with the purposes behind the rules and tends to lead to mechanical application of those rules, which can produce unfair results in individual cases (roach (2004), at pp. 109-10 and 140). a review of this court’s jurisprudence shows that it favours principled discretion, which requires judges to consider multiple, competing remedial principles and resolve conflicts between them while justifying their prioritization of certain considerations over others. “remedial principles”, in this sense, are more general than rules and, unlike rules, may conflict and be weighed differently (roach (2004), at pp. 111-13, citing r dworkin, taking rights seriously (1977)) articulating the core general principles that structure the exercise of principled remedial discretion will assist in promoting principled, transparent, and consistent approaches to s 52(1) remedies. schachter provided remedial principles of this kind, identifying twin principles of respect for the purposes of the charter and respect for the legislature, and thereby guiding the discretion of canadian courts for nearly three decades. but in the process of applying that approach, this court has sometimes articulated additional relevant or analogous principles as i will explain, when legislation violates the charter, courts have been guided by the following fundamental remedial principles, grounded in the constitution, in determining the appropriate remedy, applying them at every stage: a charter rights should be safeguarded through effective remedies. b the public has an interest in the constitutional compliance of legislation. c the public is entitled to the benefit of legislation. d courts and legislatures play different institutional roles. safeguarding rights lies at the core of granting charter remedies because the charter exists to protect rights, freedoms, and inherent dignity; this purpose inheres in the charter as a whole (see vriend, at para. 153; canadian egg marketing agency v. richardson, [1998] 3 scr 157, at para. 57). the court’s purposive approach to constitutional remedies ensures that the effective vindication and protection of rights is at the core of the remedies it grants for legislation that violates the charter (osborne v. canada (treasury board), [1991] 2 scr 69, at p 104). the rule of law is explicitly recognized in the preamble to the charter, which says that “canada is founded upon principles that recognize . . . the rule of law”. it is also implicitly recognized in the preamble to the constitution act, 1867, which says canada has “a constitution similar in principle to that of the united kingdom” (see reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721, at p 750). two facets of the rule of law are foundational here: the government must act within the law and there must be positive laws to preserve order in society. this court has recognized that adherence to the principle of the rule of law means that the impact of legislation, even unconstitutional legislation, extends beyond those whose rights are violated — it is bad for all of society for unconstitutional legislation to “remain on the books” (r v. nur, 2015 scc 15, [2015] 1 scr 773, at para. 51; see also canada (attorney general) v. downtown eastside sex workers united against violence society, 2012 scc 45, [2012] 2 scr 524 (swuav), at para. 31). but the public interest cuts both ways — the public is also entitled to the benefit of legislation, which individuals rely upon to organize their lives and protect them from harm (manitoba language rights, at pp. 748-49 and 757) laws validly enacted by democratically elected legislatures “are generally passed for the common good” and there is accordingly a “public interest” in legislation that “weighs heavily in the balance” of remedial discretion (manitoba (attorney general) v. metropolitan stores ltd., [1987] 1 scr 110, at p 135; see also harper v. canada (attorney general), 2000 scc 57, [2000] 2 scr 764, at para. 9). legislation is enacted by the legislature, which is sovereign in the sense that, within its constitutional ambit, it has “exclusive authority to enact, amend, and repeal any law as it sees fit” (reference re pan-canadian securities regulation, 2018 scc 48, [2018] 3 scr 189, at para 54; constitution act, 1867, ss 91 to 95; constitution act, 1982, ss. 44 and 45). this fact serves as an important constraint on courts’ exercise of their remedial authority. parliamentary sovereignty is an expression of democracy, because it accords exclusive legislative authority to parliament and the provincial legislatures, each of which includes an elected chamber without whose consent no law can be made (constitution act, 1867, ss. 17, 40, 48, 55 and 91; charter, ss. 3 and 4; reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at paras. 62-65). even so, the courts remain “guardians of the constitution and of individuals’ rights under it” (hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at p 169) — “[d]eference ends . . . where the constitutional rights that the courts are charged with protecting begin” (doucet-boudreau v. nova scotia (minister of education), 2003 scc 62, [2003] 3 scr 3, at para. 36). this is because “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of [the courts] to say what the law is” (marbury v. madison, 5 us (1 cranch) 137 (1803), at p 177). these remedial principles — fundamental aspects of our constitutional order, including democracy and the rule of law — are reflected in the court’s remedial decisions since the charter came into force. (2) schachter in schachter, this court set out a general approach to granting remedies for legislation that violates the charter schachter endorsed remedies tailored to the breadth of rights violations, thereby allowing constitutionally compliant aspects of unconstitutional legislation to be preserved schachter also recognized that, in rare circumstances, the effect of a declaration of invalidity could be suspended for a period of time to protect the public interest. at the core of schachter was its recognition that flexibility is necessary to arrive at appropriate remedies involving legislation, and its endorsement of remedies short of a full declaration of invalidity. lamer cj made clear that “[d]epending upon the circumstances, a court may simply strike down, it may strike down and temporarily suspend the declaration of invalidity, or it may resort to the techniques of reading down or reading in” (p 695). different types of remedy can be granted because the circumstances may implicate general remedial principles in different ways. schachter recognized the “twin guiding principles” of “respect for the role of the legislature and the purposes of the charter” (p 715) that play a key role in determining the type of remedy that would be ordered. schachter held that the first step in choosing the appropriate remedy is defining the extent of the inconsistency between the legislation and the charter. the second step is determining the form of the declaration beyond the extent of the inconsistency, schachter said that the form of a remedy would be influenced by courts’ respect for the role of the legislature. the general rule is that tailored remedies should only be granted when a court can fairly conclude that the legislature would have enacted the law as it would be modified by the court (pp. 697 and 700). schachter also endorsed the use of suspended declarations — declarations that legislation is unconstitutional, but whose effect is suspended for some period of time. lamer cj reasoned that a delayed order could be justified based on the effect of an immediate declaration on the public and that, by contrast, the roles of courts and legislatures should not enter into the question of whether to suspend a declaration (p 717). finally, schachter considered how s 52(1) remedies could be combined with individual remedies for charter violations. lamer cj concluded that individual remedies under s 24(1) of the charter “will rarely be available in conjunction with” remedies involving legislation (p 720). much of schachter remains good guidance three decades later. however, as i will explain, the jurisprudence on charter remedies has built upon the foundation of schachter and moved beyond it in some ways while schachter wisely advised courts to consider the principled basis for their remedial decisions, those remedial principles have since been further developed. in part, the guidelines schachter endorsed for determining the extent of rights violations were tied to an articulation of the oakes test that has since been overtaken. aspects of its discussion of suspended declarations have been overlooked by courts and criticized in academic commentary for their failure to rely on coherent principles and encourage transparent application finally, its admonition against combining s 52(1) and individual remedies has frequently not been followed. since schachter, this court has granted at least 60 s 52(1) remedies for charter breaches in my view, the guidelines given in schachter should be clarified and updated in light of those decisions. (3) the form and breadth of section 52(1) declarations as our jurisprudence demonstrates, and the language of s 52(1) directs, the first step in crafting an appropriate s 52(1) remedy in a given case is determining the extent of the legislation’s inconsistency with the constitution. courts should bear in mind both “the manner in which the law violates the charter and the manner in which it fails to be justified under s 1” (schachter, at p 702) in crafting tailored remedies. (while this general guideline remains useful, courts should bear in mind that the oakes test has evolved since schachter was decided, such that it now focuses on justifying the infringing measure rather than the law as a whole (compare schachter, at pp. 703-5 and rjr-macdonald, at para. 144).) the nature and extent of the underlying charter violation lays the foundation for the remedial analysis because the breadth of the remedy ultimately granted will reflect at least the extent of the breach. defining the extent of the constitutional defect by reference to the substantive violation of the charter safeguards the rights of all those directly affected by ensuring that the law is cured of all its constitutional defects it also serves the broader public interest in having government act in accordance with the constitution. these remedies reach beyond the claimant — and can even be granted when the claimant is not directly affected by the law — because “[n]o one should be subjected to an unconstitutional law” (nur, at para. 51; see also r v big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at p 313). this step of the analysis therefore reflects the charter’s rights-protecting purpose, the public’s interest in constitutional compliance, and the text of s 52(1) — the law is of no force or effect to the full extent of its inconsistency with the constitution. for example, in some cases where a criminal offence’s effects on particular groups of people or in certain circumstances have been found unconstitutional, all of those people and circumstances have been exempted from criminal liability (see, eg,. carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331; r v. sharpe, 2001 scc 2, [2001] 1 scr 45, as interpreted in r v. barabash, 2015 scc 29, [2015] 2 scr 522; r v. appulonappa, 2015 scc 59, [2015] 3 scr 754, as interpreted in r v. rajaratnam, 2019 bcca 209, 376 ccc (3d) 181; r v. smith, 2015 scc 34, [2015] 2 scr 602). the same is true for mandatory minimum penalties, which can be invalidated even when the applicant is not directly affected (see, eg,. nur; lloyd). on the other hand, it also follows from s 52(1) that to the extent they are not inconsistent with the constitution, the public is entitled to the benefit of laws passed by the legislature. tailored remedies that address the precise constitutional flaw can permit a court to both safeguard the constitutional rights of all those affected and preserve the constitutional aspects of the law. many of the court’s tailored remedies reflect both these principles the criminal offences considered in carter, sharpe, smith, and appulonappa, for example, were declared of no force or effect only to the extent that they violated rights, preserving their constitutionally compliant effects. the second step is determining the form that a declaration should take. in doing so, schachter explained that remedies other than full declarations of invalidity should be granted when the nature of the violation and the intention of the legislature allows for them. full statutory schemes or acts are rarely struck down in their entirety — to my knowledge, this court has only done so on eight occasions.3 to ensure the public has the benefit of enacted legislation, remedies of reading down, reading in, and severance, tailored to the breadth of the violation, should be employed when possible so that the constitutional aspects of legislation are preserved (schachter, at p 700; vriend, at paras. 149-50). crucially, in canada, the declaration issued cures the law’s unconstitutionality a declaration that fails to do so, like the kind suggested by my colleagues, justice côté and justice brown, at para. 248 of their reasons, is more akin to the declaration of “inconsistency” or “incompatibility” made in jurisdictions where courts do not have the authority to strike down unconstitutional legislation (see, eg, 3 see saskatchewan federation of labour v saskatchewan, 2015 scc 4, [2015] 1 scr 246, at para. 97; alberta (information and privacy commissioner) v. united food and commercial workers, local 401, 2013 scc 62, [2013] 3 scr 733, at para. 40; nova scotia (workers’ compensation board) v. martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2 scr 504, at para. 118; mackin v. new brunswick (minister of finance), 2002 scc 13, [2002] 1 scr 405, at para. 88; rjr-macdonald inc. v. canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at paras. 176-77; ramsden v. peterborough (city), [1993] 2 scr. 1084, at p 1108; r v. généreux, [1992] 1 scr 259, at pp. 309-10; r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at pp. 355-56. attorney-general v. taylor, [2018] nzsc 104, [2019] 1 nzlr 213; human rights act 1998 (uk), 1998, c 42, s 4(4) and (6)). reading down is when a court limits the reach of legislation by declaring it to be of no force and effect to a precisely defined extent reading down is an appropriate remedy when “the offending portion of a statute can be defined in a limited manner” (schachter, at p 697). inversely, reading in is when a court broadens the grasp of legislation by declaring an implied limitation on its scope to be without force or effect reading in is an appropriate remedy when the inconsistency with the constitution can be defined as “what the statute wrongly excludes rather than what it wrongly includes” (schachter, at p 698, emphasis in original) severance is when a court declares certain words to be of no force or effect, thereby achieving the same effects as reading down or reading in, depending on whether the severed portion serves to limit or broaden the legislation’s reach. severance is appropriate where the offending portion is set out explicitly in the words of the legislation these forms of remedy illustrate a court’s flexibility in responding to a constitutional violation. however, if granted in the wrong circumstances, tailored remedies can intrude on the legislative sphere schachter cautioned that tailored remedies should only be granted where it can be fairly assumed that “the legislature would have passed the constitutionally sound part of the scheme without the unsound part” and where it is possible to precisely define the unconstitutional aspect of the law (p 697, citing attorney-general for alberta v. attorney-general for canada, [1947] ac 503 (pc), at p 518) if it appears unlikely that the legislature would have enacted the tailored version of the statute, tailoring the remedy would not conform to its policy choice and would therefore undermine parliamentary sovereignty (schachter, at pp. 705-6; hunter, at p 169) the significance of the remaining portion of the statute must be considered, and tailored remedies should not be granted when they would interfere with the legislative objective of the law as a whole (schachter, at pp. 705-15). for example, in vriend, iacobucci j read “sexual orientation” into the individual’s rights protection act, rsa 1980, c i-2, because the term was sufficiently precise and because the legislature would rather have included that protection than sacrificed the entire scheme (paras. 155-60 and 167-69) in r v hall, 2002 scc 64, [2002] 3 scr 309, mclachlin cj severed part of the tertiary ground for denying bail because the rest of the provision “is capable of standing alone without doing damage to parliament’s intention” (para. 44) this court has granted a remedy short of full invalidity of a statutory provision at least 24 times.4 nonetheless, a tailored remedy will frequently 4 see frank v. canada (attorney general), 2019 scc 1, [2019] 1 scr 3, at para. 83; r v. krj, 2016 scc 31, [2016] 1 scr 906, at para. 96; r v. appulonappa, 2015 scc 59, [2015] 3 scr 754, at paras. 83-85; r v smith, 2015 scc 34, [2015] 2 scr 602, at paras. 30-31; canada (attorney general) v. federation of law societies of canada, 2015 scc 7, [2015] 1 scr 401, at paras. 67- 115; carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at paras. 126-27, 132 and 147; canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1102, at para. 164; saskatchewan (human rights commission) v whatcott, 2013 scc 11, [2013] 1 scr 467, at para. 164; charkaoui v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2007 scc 9, [2007] 1 scr 350, at para. 142; r v. hall, 2002 scc 64, [2002] 3 scr 309, at paras. 22, 44 and 45; dunmore v. ontario (attorney general), 2001 scc 94, [2001] 3 scr 1016, at para. 70; r v. ruzic, 2001 scc 24, [2001] 1 scr 687, at paras. 1, 55 and 101; r v. sharpe, 2001 scc 2, [2001] 1 scr 45, at paras. 128-29; little sisters book and art emporium v. canada (minister of justice), 2000 scc 69, [2000] 2 scr. 1120, at paras. 105 and 159; corbiere v. canada (minister of indian and northern affairs), [1999] 2 scr 203, at paras. 23-24 and 114-18; vriend v alberta, [1998] 1 scr 493, at paras. 148-79; reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3, at paras 276 and 294; benner v canada (secretary of state), [1997] 1 scr 358, at paras. 103-5; miron v. trudel, [1995] 2 scr 418, at paras. 176-81; r v. laba, [1994] 3 scr 965, at pp. 1011-16; r v. grant, [1993] 3 scr 223, at pp. 243-45; r v. morales, [1992] 3 scr 711, at pp. 741-43; osborne v. canada (treasury board), [1991] 2 scr 69, at pp. 101-6; r v. hess, not be appropriate this court has opted to fully invalidate a provision at least 55 times.5 these include the cases dealing with mandatory minimum penalties referenced [1990] 2 scr 906, at pp. 933-34; attorney general of quebec v. quebec association of protestant school boards, [1984] 2 scr 66, at p 88. 5 note that some of the cases listed here are also listed at footnote 4, supra, since they contain both full invalidations of certain legislative provisions, as well as only partial invalidations of other provisions. see r v. morrison, 2019 scc 15, [2019] 2 scr 3, at para. 73; frank v. canada (attorney general), 2019 scc 1, [2019] 1 scr 3, at para. 83; r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr 599, at para. 98; quebec (attorney general) v. alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, 2018 scc 17, [2018] 1 scr 464, at paras. 5, 23 and 58; conférence des juges de paix magistrats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2016 scc 39, [2016] 2 scr 116, at para. 103; canada (attorney general) v. chambre des notaires du québec, 2016 scc 20, [2016] 1 scr 336, at para. 4; r v. safarzadeh-markhali, 2016 scc 14, [2016] 1 scr 180, at para. 74; r. v. lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr 130, at para. 56; r v. nur, 2015 scc 15, [2015] 1 scr. 773, at para. 119; canada (attorney general) v. federation of law societies of canada, 2015 scc 7, [2015] 1 scr 401, at paras. 67 and 115; mounted police association of ontario v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 1, [2015] 1 scr 3, at paras. 154 and 158; canada (attorney general) v. whaling, 2014 scc 20, [2014] 1 scr 392, at paras. 81-89; canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1102, at para. 164; r v. tse, 2012 scc 16, [2012] 1 scr 531, at paras. 100-103; quebec (education recreation and sports) v. nguyen, 2009 scc 47, [2009] 3 scr. 208, at para. 46; greater vancouver transportation authority v. canadian federation of students — british columbia component, 2009 scc 31, [2009] 2 scr 295, at paras. 89-91; health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn. v. british columbia, 2007 scc 27, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para. 168; charkaoui v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2007 scc 9, [2007] 1 scr 350, at para 142; r v demers, 2004 scc 46, [2004] 2 scr 489, at paras. 56 and 58; nova scotia (worker’s compensation board) v. martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2 scr 504, at para. 118; figueroa v. canada (attorney general), 2003 scc 37, [2003] 1 scr 912, at para. 93; trociuk v. british columbia (attorney general), 2003 scc 34, [2003] 1 scr 835, at paras. 43 and 46; sauvé v. canada (chief electoral officer), 2002 scc 68, [2002] 3 scr 519, at para. 64; lavallee, rackel & heintz v. canada (attorney general), 2002 scc 61, [2002] 3 scr 209, at paras. 47-48; r v. guignard, 2002 scc 14, [2002] 1 scr 472, at paras. 32 and 34; dunmore v. ontario (attorney general), 2001 scc 94, [2001] 3 scr 1016, at para. 70; ufcw,. local 1518 v. kmart canada ltd., [1999] 2 scr 1083, at paras. 79-80; m v. h., [1999] 2 scr 3, at paras. 136-45; thomson newspapers co. v. canada (attorney general), [1998] 1 scr 877, at para. 131; libman v. quebec (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr 569, at para. 86; reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3, at para. 292; r v. heywood, [1994] 3 scr 761, at pp. 803-4; sauvé v. canada (attorney general), [1993] 2 scr 438, at pp. 439-40; kourtessis v. mnr, [1993] 2 scr 53, at pp. 89-90 and 117; r v. zundel, [1992] 2 scr 731, at p 778; schachter v. canada, [1992] 2 scr 679, at p 725; r v. bain, [1992] 1 scr 91, at pp. 104 and 164-65; r v. wholesale travel group inc., [1991] 3 scr 154, at pp. 207-8 and 255; r v. sit, [1991] 3 scr 124, at p 130; r v. seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577, at p 630; tétreault-gadoury v. canada (employment and immigration commission), [1991] 2 scr 22, at pp. 38-47; r v. swain, [1991] 1 scr 933, at p 1021; committee for the commonwealth of canada v. canada, [1991] 1 scr 139, at pp. 164-66, 226-27 and 251; r v. arkell, [1990] 2 scr 695, at p 702; r v. martineau, [1990] 2 scr 633; rocket v. royal college of dental surgeons of ontario, [1990] 2 scr 232, at pp. 251-53; mahe v alberta, [1990] 1 scr 342, at pp. 394-96; edmonton journal v alberta (attorney general), [1989] 2 scr 1326, at pp. 1351 and 1368; black v. law society of alberta, [1989] 1 scr 591, at pp. 633-34; andrews v. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143; ford v quebec (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 712, at p 745; devine v quebec (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 790, at p 812; corporation professionnelle des médecins du québec v. thibault, [1988] 1 scr 1033, at pp. 1045-46; r v. morgentaler, [1988] 1 scr 30, at pp. 80 and above — the goal of a mandatory minimum sentence is to remove judicial discretion, so tailoring the declaration to reintroduce that discretion would distort the provision so that it no longer conformed to its legislative purpose (r v ferguson, 2008 scc 6, [2008] 1 scr 96, at paras. 50 and 53). lamer c.j was also conscious of the limitation of the judicial role, explaining in schachter that tailored remedies should not be granted when they do not “flo[w] with sufficient precision from the requirements of the constitution”, because although courts are capable of determining what the constitution requires, they are not well-suited to making “ad hoc choices from a variety of options” (p 707). in sum, consistent with the principle of constitutional supremacy embodied in s 52(1) and the importance of safeguarding rights, courts must identify and remedy the full extent of the unconstitutionality by looking at the precise nature and scope of the charter violation. to ensure the public retains the benefit of legislation enacted in accordance with our democratic system, remedies of reading down, reading in, and severance, tailored to the breadth of the violation, should be employed when possible so that the constitutional aspects of legislation are preserved (schachter, at p 700; vriend, at paras. 149-50) to respect the differing roles of courts and legislatures foundational to our constitutional architecture, determining whether to strike down legislation in its entirety or to instead grant a tailored remedy of reading in, reading 184; r v. smith (edward dewey), [1987] 1 scr 1045, at p 1081; r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at p 142; re bc. motor vehicle act, [1985] 2 scr 486, at p 521; hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at p 169. down, or severance, depends on whether the legislature’s intention was such that a court can fairly conclude it would have enacted the law as modified by the court this requires the court to determine whether the law’s overall purpose can be achieved without violating rights. if a tailored remedy can be granted without the court intruding on the role of the legislature, such a remedy will preserve a law’s constitutionally compliant effects along with the benefit that law provides to the public. the rule of law is thus served both by ensuring that legislation complies with the constitution and by securing the public benefits of laws where possible. (4) suspending the effect of section 52(1) declarations there are times when an immediately effective declaration of invalidity would endanger an interest of such great importance that, on balance, the benefits of delaying the effect of that declaration outweigh the cost of preserving an unconstitutional law that violates charter rights. in total, this court has suspended declarations of invalidity in 23 out of approximately 90 decisions in which it declared legislation to be of no force or effect for violating the charter.6 the approach to suspensions has varied over the last 35 6 carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331; saskatchewan federation of labour v. saskatchewan, 2015 scc 4, [2015] 1 scr 245; mounted police association of ontario v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 1, [2015] 1 scr 3; canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1102; alberta (information and privacy commissioner) v. united food and commercial workers, local 401, 2013 scc 62, [2013] 3 scr 733; r v. tse, 2012 scc 16, [2012] 1 scr 531; quebec (education, recreation and sports) v. nguyen, 2009 scc 47, [2009] 3 scr 208; health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn v british columbia, 2007 scc 27, [2007] 2 scr 391; charkaoui v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2007 scc 9, [2007] 1 scr 350; r v. demers, 2004 scc 46, [2004] 2 scr 489; nova scotia years. suspensions were initially recognized to be available when necessary to protect against serious threats to the rule of law then, in schachter, this court took an approach to granting suspensions based on determining whether cases fit into one of a list of categories — threats to the rule of law, threats to public safety, or underinclusive benefits — based on the public interest in the law’s interim application. since then, many cases have gone beyond the schachter categories to grant suspensions for other reasons, including concerns related to the roles and capacities of courts and legislatures. the 12 declarations of invalidity for charter violations after schachter between 1992 and 1997 — from zundel to benner — took immediate effect. by contrast, between 2003 and 2015 — from trociuk to carter — 13 out of 17 s 52(1) declarations were suspended. those more recent cases have been criticized for suspending declarations too frequently and without sufficient explanation this case gives the court an opportunity to recalibrate the remedial principles that guide the judicial discretion to delay the effect of a declaration of invalidity. suspensions of declarations of invalidity have attracted significant concern even as they have come to be used in jurisdictions around the world, including canada, germany, south africa, hong kong, and indonesia (see, eg,. leckey; s jhaveri, “sunsetting suspension orders in hong kong”, in p. j yap, ed., constitutional (worker’s compensation board) v. martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2 scr 504; figueroa v. canada (attorney general), 2003 scc 37, [2003] 1 scr 912; trociuk v british columbia (attorney general), 2003 scc 34, [2003] 1 scr 835; r v. guignard, 2002 scc 14, [2002] 1 scr 472; mackin v. new brunswick (minister of finance), 2002 scc 13, [2002] 1 scr 405; dunmore v. ontario (attorney general), 2001 scc 94, [2001] 3 scr 1016; ufcw,. local 1518 v. kmart canada ltd., [1999] 2 scr 1083; corbiere v. canada (minister of indian and northern affairs), [1999] 2 scr 203; m v h., [1999] 2 scr 3; reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3; schachter v. canada, [1992] 2 scr. 679, ; r v. bain, [1992] 1 scr 91; and r v. swain, [1991] 1 scr 933. remedies in asia (2019), 49). while most accept that there will be some circumstances when the immediate enforcement of rights must give way to other constitutional concerns, opinions vary on the appropriate underlying principles and the right balance between them. some argue suspensions should only be granted in “extreme cases” in order to prevent “legal chaos” (b bird, “the judicial notwithstanding clause: suspended declarations of invalidity” (2019), 42 man l.j 23, at pp. 39 and 46). others suggest that suspensions can be granted to “remand complex issues to legislative institutions” (s choudhry and k roach, “putting the past behind us? prospective judicial and legislative constitutional remedies” (2003), 21 sclr (2d) 205, at p 232), giving them the first opportunity to respond to a finding of unconstitutionality. still others endorse an approach based on proportionality, which would import considerations from the oakes test to require the government to demonstrate that a suspension is justified (hoole, at pp. 136-47; b ryder, “suspending the charter” (2003), 21 sclr (2d) 267, at pp. 282-83) but all commentators recognize some discretion to grant suspensions in canada. while ss 52(1) does not explicitly provide the authority to suspend a declaration,7 in adjudicating constitutional issues, courts “may have regard to unwritten postulates which form the very foundation of the constitution of canada” (manitoba 7 unlike, eg, the constitution of south africa, s 172(1)(b)(ii), which grants a court the power to “make any order that is just and equitable, including . . . an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect”. language rights, at p 752; see also r v. comeau, 2018 scc 15, [2018] 1 scr 342, at para. 52). the power to suspend the effect of a declaration of invalidity should be understood to arise from accommodation of broader constitutional considerations and is included in the power to declare legislation invalid (see koo sze yiu v chief executive of the hksar, [2006] 3 hklrd 455, at para. 35). this is only one way in which giving immediate and retroactive effect to the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the charter must, at times, yield to other imperatives. this reflects the “clear distinction between declaring an act unconstitutional and determining the practical and legal effects that flow from that determination” (air canada v british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 1161, at p 1195) as examples, even when a declaration of invalidity is made, other legal doctrines, including the de facto doctrine, res judicata, and the law of limitations, may restrict its retrospective reach (hislop, at para. 101). the idea that the effect of a declaration could be suspended originally aimed to protect against a potential emergency. in 1985, in manitoba language rights, nearly all of manitoba’s legislation was declared unconstitutional for being enacted in english alone. the court issued a temporary declaration that the laws were valid in order to give the legislature the chance to re-enact them. the court grounded this move in the constitutional principle of the rule of law, explicitly recognized in the preambles to the constitution act, 1867, and the charter, and implicit in the “very nature of a constitution” (manitoba language rights, at p 750) the rule of law requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws to govern society; a legal vacuum, along with the inevitable legal chaos, would have violated that principle (p 753). the period of temporary validity ran from the date of judgment “to the expiry of the minimum period necessary for translation, re-enactment, printing and publishing” (p 767). the court suspended the effect of a declaration of invalidity for the first time in a charter case in swain, in which automatic detention for those acquitted on what was then called the ground of “insanity” was found unconstitutional. lamer cj. suspended the declaration due to a concern that if the provision was immediately struck down, judges would have to free “those who may well be a danger to the public” (p 1021). in schachter, lamer c.j recognized three categories of cases in which suspensions could be granted: threats to the rule of law, threats to public safety, and underinclusive legislation (pp. 715-16) the first category flows directly from manitoba language rights; the second corresponds with swain; and the third category represents the circumstances of schachter itself, in which immediate invalidity of the law would have deprived those entitled to financial benefits under the law without providing any remedy for those directly excluded from the benefits in question. all three categories reflect constitutionally grounded considerations, including recognizing the public’s interest in legislation passed for its benefit suspending the effect of a declaration is one tool that allows courts to preserve the rights and entitlements that existing schemes extend to the public. schachter’s categorical approach has resulted in uncertainty about when suspensions will be granted some decisions have gone beyond the schachter categories. for example, a suspension was endorsed where it promoted a co-operative solution in the aboriginal rights context (r v powley, 2003 scc 43, [2003] 2 scr 207, at para. 51) and granted where it was analogous to a schachter category (trociuk, at para. 43). in other cases, failing to fit into a schachter category has been given as an explanation for declining to grant a suspension (boudreault, at para. 98; hislop, at para. 121). at times, the court has provided no explanation for suspending the effect of its declaration (mounted police association, at para. 158; saskatchewan federation of labour, at para. 103). academic commentators have noted the lack of transparent reasoning in some of this court’s decisions to grant suspensions (roach (2004); hoole, at pp. 118-23). a principled approach makes it possible to reconcile these cases on suspended declarations, and encourage consistency and transparency. as i will explain, the government bears the onus of demonstrating that a compelling public interest, like those included in schachter, supports a suspension. these compelling interests cannot be reduced to a closed list of categories, but will be related to a remedial principle grounded in the constitution — typically, the principle that the public is entitled to the benefit of legislation or that courts and legislatures play different institutional roles. the categorical approach in schachter has been overtaken by the underlying remedial principles that animated those categories. this is not surprising, given that schachter had a limited number of cases to draw from in establishing its categorical approach. as well, the relevance of some of the underlying principles has evolved in our jurisprudence lamer cj specifically noted in schachter that “whether to delay the application of a declaration of [invalidity] should . . . turn not on considerations of the role of the courts and the legislature, but rather on considerations . . . relating to the effect of an immediate declaration on the public” (p 717, emphasis added). nonetheless, since the late 1990s, the general principle that courts and legislatures have different roles and competencies has informed how the court exercises its jurisdiction to suspend the effect of its declarations for a period of time. no fewer than 10 decisions of this court have relied on the differing capacities and roles of legislatures and courts when suspending declarations’ effects.8 roach has argued that the dicta in schachter quoted in the previous paragraph should be rejected or qualified in light of these decisions, and institutional roles should be explicitly recognized as a legitimate rationale for granting suspensions (roach (2004), at p 144). 8 corbiere v. canada (minister of indian and northern affairs), [1999] 2 scr 203, at paras. 118-19; m v. h., [1999] 2 scr 3, at para. 147; ufcw,. local 1518 v. kmart canada ltd., [1999] 2 scr. 1083, at para. 79; charkaoui v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2007 scc 9, [2007] 1 scr. 350, at para. 140; health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn. v. british columbia, 2007 scc 27, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para. 168; quebec (education, recreation and sports) v. nguyen, 2009 scc 47, [2009] 3 scr 208, at para. 46; r v. tse, 2012 scc 16, [2012] 1 scr 531, at para. 102; alberta (information and privacy commissioner) v united food and commercial workers, local 401, 2013 scc 62, [2013] 3 scr 733, at para. 41; figueroa v. canada (attorney general), 2003 scc 37, [2003] 1 scr 912, at para. 93; dunmore v. ontario (attorney general), 2001 scc 94, [2001] 3 scr 1016, at para. 66. on the most expansive version of that view, suspensions allow the legislature to determine the remedy for its own breach of the constitution, thereby “eliminat[ing] or dilut[ing] the counter-majoritarian objection to judicial review [of statutes]” (choudhry and roach, at p 227). in my view, this presupposes an unduly narrow view of the role of courts. respecting the legislature cannot come at the expense of the functions the constitution assigns to the judiciary: giving effect to constitutional rights and making determinations of law. although institutional roles can be relevant to remedial discretion, the decisions that rely on them have by and large failed to transparently explain how those roles can legitimately motivate suspensions (hoole, at pp. 118-23). the relevance of institutional roles to granting suspensions cannot be divorced from the underlying rationale for granting suspensions in the first place: avoiding the harmful and undesirable consequences of an immediate declaration. in my view, schachter and the cases that have come since are best reconciled by recognizing that allowing the legislature to fulfil its law making role can be a relevant consideration in whether to grant a suspension, but only when the government demonstrates that an immediately effective declaration would significantly impair the ability to legislate. in determining whether to exercise remedial discretion to suspend a declaration of invalidity, the court should consider whether and to what extent the government has demonstrated that an immediately effective declaration would have a limiting effect on the legislature’s ability to set policy. in the vast majority of cases, as bruce ryder recognizes, “[a] suspended declaration neither enlarges nor diminishes the range of constitutional choices open to a legislature” (p 285). for example, in m v. h., in which the court found unconstitutional the definition of “spouse” denying benefits to same-sex spouses, the effect of a declaration of invalidity was suspended because “if left up to the courts, these issues could only be resolved on a case‑by‑case basis at great cost to private litigants and the public purse. thus . . . the legislature ought to be given some latitude in order to address these issues in a more comprehensive fashion” (para. 147). however, an immediately effective declaration would not have prevented the legislature from addressing the issues more comprehensively in light of the court’s decision. by contrast, there may be some cases where an immediate declaration could create legal rights that could narrow the range of constitutional policy choices available to the government or undermine the effectiveness of its policy choices as i shall explain, this case offers an example of a situation in which the legal rights created by the declaration of invalidity could undermine the effectiveness of the legislature’s policy choices. even so, avoiding such restrictions on the ability to legislate is but a relevant consideration, and may not be sufficient to justify a suspension of invalidity. the benefit achieved (or harm avoided) by the suspension must then be transparently weighed against countervailing fundamental remedial principles, namely the principles that charter rights should be safeguarded through effective remedies and that the public has an interest in constitutionally compliant legislation. this includes considering factors such as the significance of the rights infringement (bedford, at para. 167) — for example, the weight given to ongoing rights infringement will be especially heavy when criminal jeopardy is at stake — and the potential that the suspension will create harm such as legal uncertainty (leckey, at pp. 594-95). albeit in different constitutional contexts, the constitutional courts of south africa and germany have similarly recognized that the propriety of a constitutional remedy short of an immediate declaration of invalidity is a question of balancing the harms of failing to immediately protect rights against the harms of an immediate declaration (see, eg,. coetzee v government of the republic of south africa, [1995] zacc 7, 1995 (4) sa 631, at para. 76; bverfg, 2 bvc 62/14, decision of january 29, 2019 (germany), at paras. 136-37). however, a balancing approach does not mean that suspensions will be easier to justify. a categorical approach may have been intended to provide narrow circumstances in which an unconstitutional law may continue to apply temporarily, but it has not had that effect a balancing approach permits courts to engage with the underlying principles and ensure that a delayed declaration is not ordered unless there are compelling reasons to do so. the appropriate balance will result in suspensions only in rare circumstances. given the imperative language of s 52(1), and the importance of the fundamental remedial principles of constitutional compliance and of providing an effective remedy that safeguards the rights of those directly affected, there is a strong interest in declarations with immediate effect. indeed, leaving unconstitutional laws on the books can lead to legal uncertainty and instability, especially if those laws are criminal prohibitions, which compel multiple actors (including police, crown prosecutors, and the public) to conduct themselves in a certain way (leckey, at pp. 594-95). public confidence in the constitution, the laws, and the justice system is undermined when an unconstitutional law continues to have legal effect without a compelling basis. and, of course, the violation of constitutional rights weighs heavily in favour of an immediate declaration of invalidity a principled approach requires these countervailing factors to be weighed and does not allow for a suspension to be granted simply because the case engages, for example, public safety in practice, therefore, a principled approach is disciplined and would be more stringent than a categorical approach, because any suspension must be specifically justified. thus, i agree with the submissions of the asper centre that the government bears the onus of demonstrating that the importance of another compelling interest grounded in the constitution outweighs the continued breach of constitutional rights. in each case, the specific interest, and the manner in which an immediate declaration would endanger that interest, must be identified and, where necessary, supported by evidence. suspensions of declarations of invalidity will be rare. indeed, this aligns with this court’s recent practice. this court has not suspended the effect of a declaration of invalidity since its decision in carter over five years ago, making 13 immediately effective declarations that legislation was of no force or effect for violating the charter over that period.9 9 r v. morrison, 2019 scc 15, [2019] 2 scr 3; frank v. canada (attorney general), 2019 scc 1, [2019] 1 scr 3; r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr 599, at para. 98; quebec (attorney general) v. alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, 2018 scc 17, [2018] 1 scr 464; conférence des juges de paix magistrats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2016 scc 39, [2016] 2 scr 116; r v. krj, 2016 scc 31, [2016] 1 scr 906; canada (attorney general) v. chambre des notaires du québec, 2016 scc 20, [2016] 1 scr 336; r v. when deciding whether to grant a suspension, a court must also determine its length. in hong kong, the court of final appeal has said that suspensions should not be granted for longer than “necessary” (koo sze yiu, at para. 41). in corbiere, on the other hand, suspending the effect of the declaration for a relatively long period allowed the legislature greater flexibility in putting its capacity to consult to use (paras. 119 and 121, per l’heureux-dubé j). in carter v. canada (attorney general), 2016 scc 4, [2016] 1 scr 14, the extension of a suspension was accompanied by a process by which any rights holder could apply for a remedy under s 24(1) to alleviate the harmful impact of the unconstitutional provision. in my view, the onus to demonstrate the appropriate length of time remains with the government and there is no “default” length of time such as 12 months in manitoba language rights, in the absence of submissions, this court considered itself ill-equipped to determine the appropriate length of time for manitoba’s legislature to re-enact all of its legislation in both english and french (p 769). it is the government’s responsibility to make a case for the length of the suspension it seeks. i add this. my colleagues contend that s 33 of the charter is an express and, thus, more legitimate source of authority that allows parliament or a provincial legislature to suspend the effect of a declaration of invalidity. since the constitution safarzadeh-markhali, 2016 scc 14, [2016] 1 scr 180; r v. lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr. 130; r v appulonappa, 2015 scc 59, [2015] 3 scr 754; r v. smith, 2015 scc 34, [2015] 2 scr 602, at para. 32; r v. nur, 2015 scc 15, [2015] 1 scr 773; canada (attorney general) v. federation of law societies of canada, 2015 scc 7, [2015] 1 scr 401. gives parliament and the provincial legislatures this power, my colleagues suggest that suspension is legislative in nature and at odds with the judicial role. this is an unsustainable proposition. section 33 permits parliament or a provincial legislature to temporarily exempt an act from the application of rights and freedoms guaranteed by ss. 2 and 7 to 15 of our charter, even for purely political reasons (charter, ss. 32(1) and 33(1) and (2); quebec association of protestant school boards, at p 86).when a court determines that a law violates the charter in a manner that cannot be justified in a free and democratic society under s 1, the court must grant the appropriate remedy this includes, in some rare cases, delaying the effects of a declaration of invalidity based on a compelling public interest court-ordered suspension leaves parliament and the legislatures free to respond to the declaration of invalidity, including by using s 33 (see vriend, at paras. 139 and 178) the court cannot shirk its responsibility to remedy constitutional violations simply because s 33 permits parliament or a legislature to exceptionally override certain charter rights and freedoms. the court has the authority — and responsibility — to determine whether a declaration of invalidity should be suspended it is not for the courts to direct or encourage parliament and the provincial legislatures to use their exceptional authority to override charter rights and freedoms. in sum, the effect of a declaration should not be suspended unless the government demonstrates that an immediately effective declaration would endanger a compelling public interest that outweighs the importance of immediate constitutional compliance and an immediately effective remedy for those whose charter rights will be violated. the court must consider the impact of such a suspension on rights holders and the public, as well as whether an immediate declaration of invalidity would significantly impair the legislature’s democratic authority to set policy through legislation. the period of suspension, where warranted, should be long enough to give the legislature the amount of time it has demonstrated it requires to carry out its responsibility diligently and effectively, while recognizing that every additional day of rights violations will be a strong counterweight against giving the legislature more time. (5) individual remedies — exemptions from suspensions where a declaration of invalidity is suspended, it often raises the issue of whether the claimant should receive an individual remedy or exemption from that suspension. the attorney general argues that individual exemptions from suspensions should not be granted except in extreme circumstances where the claimant will not benefit from the declaration absent an exemption. he says individual exemptions create uncertainty and undermine the rule of law by applying laws to everyone except the claimants who challenged them he says granting individual exemptions usurps the role of the legislature by imposing judicial discretion where the statute precludes it. the attorney general also relies on a “rule” endorsed in demers that s 24(1) remedies cannot be combined with s 52(1) remedies, precluding courts from granting a s 24(1) individual remedy during the suspension period (para. 62). however, in demers, at para. 61, iacobucci and bastarache jj. drew that conclusion from a passage in schachter cautioning that “where the declaration of invalidity is temporarily suspended, a s 24 remedy will not often be available” (p 720, emphasis added) because such a remedy would undermine the suspension when it came to giving an individual remedy during a period of suspension, lamer cj reasoned that it would be “tantamount” to giving the declaration retroactive effect. to the extent that demers reads schachter as setting out a hard-and-fast rule against combining s 24(1) and s 52(1) remedies, it misreads that case. as i will explain, s 24(1) is too flexible to be restricted in this way. as other jurisprudence of this court suggests, individual exemptions from suspensions will often be an “appropriate and just” remedy when an individual claimant has braved the storm of constitutional litigation and obtained a declaration whose benefit “enures to society at large” (demers, at para. 99, per lebel j.) on the other hand, where an exemption would undermine the rationale for the suspension, this will be a strong countervailing factor against granting an exemption. section 24(1) of the charter provides: 24. (1) anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. this court has said that to be “appropriate and just”, a s 24(1) remedy should meaningfully vindicate the right of the claimant, conform to the separation of powers, invoke the powers and function of a court, be fair to the party against whom the remedy is ordered, and allow s 24(1) to evolve to meet the challenges of each case (doucet-boudreau, at paras. 55-59) in particular, an effective remedy that meaningfully vindicates the rights and freedoms of the claimant will take into account the nature of the rights violation and the situation of the claimant, will be relevant to the claimant’s experience and address the circumstances of the rights violation, and will not be “smothered” in procedural delays and difficulties (para. 55). the court’s approach to s 24(1) remedies must stay flexible and responsive to the needs of a given case (para. 59). this court’s jurisprudence makes clear that granting individual remedies while the effects of declarations of invalidity are suspended can be appropriate and just. the court granted a worker disability benefits for chronic pain during the suspension of a declaration that provisions were invalid for excluding chronic pain from the workers’ compensation system (martin, at paras. 121-22) the court has acquitted individuals of criminal or quasi-criminal charges stemming from unconstitutional laws despite suspending the effects of the declarations of invalidity (guignard, at para. 32; bain, at pp. 105 and 165; see also corbiere, at paras. 22-23). a rule that individual claimants cannot be exempted from suspensions of declarations of invalidity would improperly fetter the broad discretion afforded under s 24(1) of the charter for courts to grant remedies they “conside[r] appropriate and just in the circumstances.” remedial discretion is a fundamental feature of the charter. a bar on exempting individual claimants would often be unfair to the claimant, especially given that it is a court’s decision to grant a suspension that makes the individual remedy necessary. while the reason the suspension was granted is no doubt an important consideration in granting a s 24(1) remedy — and, as i explain below, should be taken into account when the court is considering granting an exemption — brendan brammall has aptly described a strict rule as prioritizing fairness to government “over all countervailing reasons, such as providing an effective remedy” (“a comment on doucet-boudreau v. nova scotia (minister of education) and r v. demers” (2006), 64 ut. fac. l. rev. 113, at p 117). in my view, when the effect of a declaration is suspended, an individual remedy for the claimant will often be appropriate and just the importance of safeguarding constitutional rights weighs heavily in favour of an individual remedy. the concern for vindicating individual rights with effective remedies reaches back to blackstone and dicey, and continues to have force in the present day (see k. roach, “dialogic remedies” (2019), 17 i con 860, at pp. 862-65). exempting only the claimant from a suspension may appear unfair at first glance (see, in the context of prospective remedies, choudhry and roach, at p 223, fn. 65, citing harper v virginia department of taxation, 509 u.s 86 (1993); reynoldsville casket co. v. hyde, 514 us 749 (1995)). but the claimant is not in the same position as others subject to the impugned law in a key respect: the claimant who brings a successful constitutional challenge has done the public interest a service by ensuring that an unconstitutional law is taken off the books — the claimant has pursued the “right of the citizenry to constitutional behaviour by parliament” (thorson v. attorney general of canada, [1975] 1 scr 138, at p 163). while, as the attorney general submits, it is in the public interest for laws to apply to everyone uniformly, immediate remedies for claimants are also in the public interest. the practical realities of bringing a constitutional challenge may reduce the incentive for rights claimants to bring cases that carry substantial societal benefits (leckey, at pp. 594-95; brammall, at p 119, fn 44, quoting demers, at para. 99, per lebel j.; see also department of justice, research and statistics division, “the costs of charter litigation” (2016)). individual exemptions can temper any further disincentive caused by suspensions (leckey, at p 607). as a result, courts should focus not only on the case or legislation before them, but also encourage charter compliance in the long term through their s 24(1) remedies (vancouver (city) v ward, 2010 scc 27, [2010] 2 scr 28, at paras. 29 and 38). like the decision of whether to suspend a declaration of invalidity despite the continued rights violation, there must be a compelling reason to deny the claimant an immediately effective remedy. two examples seem apparent. first, a court must consider whether and to what degree granting an exemption in the claimant’s particular circumstances would undermine the interest motivating the suspension in the first place thus, the ability of the legislature to fashion policy responses to the declaration and the public interest in the interim operation of the legislation will be important considerations in determining whether an exemption can be granted. for example, when the effect of a declaration is suspended to protect public safety, an individual exemption would not be appropriate and just if it would endanger public safety. evidence of the individual claimant’s situation, which the court will likely have, will inform whether this is the case. second, courts may also have a compelling reason to refrain from granting an individual exemption where practical considerations like judicial economy make it inappropriate to do so for instance, if a large group or class of claimants comes forward, it may not be practical — or even possible — to conduct the individual assessments necessary to grant them all individual exemptions. ultimately, the public is well served by encouraging litigation that furthers the public interest by uncovering unconstitutional laws claimants, unlike others similarly situated, invest time and resources to pursue matters in the public interest — and those investments can pay dividends for others directly affected, especially those without the means to challenge the law themselves. thus, if an exemption is otherwise appropriate and just, they should be exempted from suspensions in the absence of a compelling reason not to exemptions from suspensions will often be necessary to balance the interests of the litigant, the broader public, and the legislature. (6) general remedial principles for legislation that violates the charter as i have explained, running through this court’s remedial practice — from determining the form and breadth of remedies involving legislation, to suspending the effect of those remedies, to exempting litigants from suspensions — are recurring touchstones these guide the principled discretion that this court exercises when granting remedies for legislation that violates the charter. safeguarding rights lies at the core of that remedial approach. section 52(1) calls for courts to invalidate any legislation to the extent it violates the charter. the charter “constrain[s] government action in conformity with certain individual rights and freedoms, the preservation of which [is] essential to the continuation of a democratic, functioning society in which the basic dignity of all is recognized” (richardson, at para. 57) the fundamental principle that courts should provide meaningful remedies for the violation of constitutional rights (doucet-boudreau, at para. 25) shapes the form and breadth of the declaration, acts as a strong counterweight against suspending the effect of such a declaration, and weighs in favour of granting an individual remedy in tandem with a suspension. it is a defining feature of our society, reflected in s 52(1) and required by the rule of law, that state laws and state action must comply with the constitution (swuav, at para. 31; canadian council of churches v canada (minister of employment and immigration), [1992] 1 scr 236, at p 250; secession reference, at para. 72). that the public has an interest in the constitutional compliance of the laws that govern it can be seen throughout this court’s remedial decisions. courts ensure that a remedy covers the full scope of charter violations; while this plays an important rights-protecting function, it also serves the public interest, ensuring that the government acts in accordance with the law — “[c]ompliance with charter standards is a foundational principle of good governance” (ward, at para. 38). the importance of constitutional compliance weighs against suspension of the declaration, and in favour of an individual exemption from any suspension. another aspect of the rule of law, reflected in s 52(1)’s caution that laws are of no force or effect only “to the extent of the inconsistency” with the constitution, is the entitlement to a positive order of laws that organizes society and protects it from harm the public has an interest in preserving legislation duly enacted by its democratically elected legislatures, to the extent it is not unconstitutional. this is why courts will tailor remedies to retain constitutional aspects of an unconstitutional law where possible and will temporarily suspend the effect of a declaration when an immediate order would undermine the public interest by depriving the public of laws passed for its benefit. in contrast, concerns about legal instability may weigh against suspension. finally, running through this court’s remedial practice for unconstitutional legislation is respect for the role of the legislature coupled with an understanding of the duties of the judicial role. when determining the form and breadth of remedies, courts will preserve as much of the law as possible to respect the legislature’s policy choices, following its discernible intention when doing so but courts will not shrink from performing their duty to protect rights through s 52(1) remedies, determining the full extent of inconsistencies with the constitution and declaring legislation to be of no force or effect when necessary suspensions can be granted when the legislature’s democratic role as policymaker would be so seriously undermined by an immediately effective declaration that it outweighs important countervailing principles in such circumstances, if an exemption would undermine that role, it will weigh against an individual remedy. as i have explained, these constitutional considerations, drawn from our constitutional text and the broader architecture of our constitutional order and the rule of law, have repeatedly arisen in this court’s decisions on s 52(1) remedies for charter violations and give rise to four foundational principles: a charter rights should be safeguarded through effective remedies. b the public has an interest in the constitutional compliance of legislation. c the public is entitled to the benefit of legislation. d courts and legislatures play different institutional roles. in my view, these remedial principles provide the groundwork for meaningful remedies in different contexts they provide guidance to courts and encourage them to transparently explain remedial results. they will not always lead to agreement on the correct outcome; their value is in transparency, helping those who disagree articulate their specific points of disagreement. (7) application to this case (a) what form and breadth should the remedy take? the first step in determining the breadth and form of a s 52(1) remedy is determining the extent of the law’s inconsistency with the charter, which is defined by the nature of the substantive rights violation. here, christopher’s law limits s 15(1) of the charter by requiring those found ncrmd to comply with the sex offender registry upon discharge without providing them with any opportunities for exemption and removal based on individualized assessment it draws distinctions based on the enumerated ground of mental disability by extending opportunities for exemption and removal to those found guilty of a sexual offence but denying them to those found ncrmd. those distinctions are discriminatory because they perpetuate the historical and enduring disadvantage experienced by persons with mental illnesses. the s 15(1) infringement was found not to be minimally impairing of the right because making any form of individualized assessment that could lead to exemption and removal available to those found ncrmd would be less impairing of the right. turning to the second step, a court must determine whether a tailored remedy would be appropriate, rather than a declaration of invalidity applying to the whole of the challenged law. given the limited and precisely defined nature of the violation in the context of the overall scheme of the sex offender registry, some form of tailored remedy was clearly appropriate to respond to the unconstitutionality. the legislature would no doubt have enacted christopher’s law to apply to those convicted of a sexual offence even if it could not include those found ncrmd and granted a discharge. in this case, reading in an individualized assessment requirement would intrude on the legislative sphere — there are many ways to provide for such an assessment and “it is the legislature’s role to fill in the gaps, not the court’s” (schachter, at p 705). on the other hand, a declaration reading down christopher’s law such that it is of no force or effect to the extent it applies to everyone unconstitutionally affected effectively vindicates rights without interfering with aspects of the statute’s operation unaffected by the finding of unconstitutionality. granting a tailored remedy here will better protect the public’s interest in legislation enacted for its benefit and will better respect the role of the legislature, while also safeguarding charter rights and realizing the public’s interest in constitutionally compliant legislation. there is one final issue respecting the proper scope of the declaration in this case although g’s argument that christopher’s law violates s 15(1) of the charter, which has been accepted by this court and by the court of appeal, applies to all those found ncrmd of sexual offences who have been discharged, g framed his constitutional challenge to cover only those who have been absolutely discharged. the order of the court of appeal and the constitutional questions the parties stated before this court were also limited. should the s 52(1) declaration be limited in this way? in my view, the formal limits on the scope of g’s application do not reflect the substance of the constitutional issue before the court, as argued by the parties. g’s arguments on s 15(1) apply to all those found ncrmd of a sexual offence who do not have access to exemption and removal mechanisms based on individualized assessment: that is, all those found ncrmd who have been discharged. the attorney general’s central s 1 argument attempting to justify the s 15(1) violation — that this court should defer to the legislature’s determination that all those found ncrmd in respect of a sexual offence should be registered because they are more likely to reoffend than a member of the general public is to commit a first-time offence and there is no way to predict with certainty whether they will reoffend — also applies to all those found ncrmd of course, those conditionally discharged have the opportunity to obtain an absolute discharge following each annual disposition review hearing before the review board. however, had g’s application been framed to include all those found ncrmd of a sexual offence and discharged, the attorney general may have brought other evidence to support his s 1 arguments, and addressed the differential risks — in particular the risk of reoffending posed by those found ncrmd of a sexual offence and conditionally discharged. because i cannot conclude that the attorney general had the “fullest opportunity to support the validity” of christopher’s law in relation to those conditionally discharged, like the court of appeal, i would limit the declaration to those who have been found ncrmd of a sexual offence and absolutely discharged (guindon v. canada, 2015 scc 41, [2015] 3 scr 3, at paras. 19 and 22). (b) was the effect of the declaration properly suspended? as noted above, the terms of s 52(1) and the need to safeguard charter rights and ensure constitutional compliance of all legislation weigh heavily in favour of an immediately effective declaration however, those must be balanced against protecting the public’s interest in legislation passed for its benefit. to do so, the court must consider the nature and extent of both the continued rights violations and the danger to an identified public interest that could flow from an immediate declaration of invalidity. the attorney general has identified public safety as the public interest that justifies a suspension. the importance of this interest, and its appropriate weight in the analysis, is informed by the danger posed by those found ncrmd of sexual offences and granted absolute discharges by a provincial review board. the criminal code requires provincial review boards to absolutely discharge any person found ncrmd who does not pose a significant risk of committing a serious criminal offence (winko, at para. 57). if a person poses that type of risk, the review board may discharge them subject to conditions it considers appropriate (criminal code, s 672.54(b)) the review board’s “paramount consideration” in making any disposition is public safety. the application judge found those discharged after an ncrmd finding to be at a statistically higher risk of offending than the general population. those who are absolutely discharged therefore may pose some elevated risk of committing criminal offences granting an immediate declaration would endanger the public interest in safety from sexual offences to some extent because some individuals who still pose a greater risk to offend would be relieved of their reporting obligations. those individuals would also be able to apply to have their personal information removed from the database pursuant to s 24(1) (see, eg,. boudreault, at paras. 107-9). the application judge found that the registry contributed to public safety by enhancing the ability of police to prevent and investigate sexual offences. immediately relieving a group of people who may pose some risk of committing sexual offences from the obligation to report or permitting them to seek removal of their information could detract from this enhanced ability the threat to public safety is therefore meaningful however, given that persons found ncrmd who pose the highest demonstrable risk to reoffend are not given absolute discharges, this threat is limited. the other public interest at stake is respect for the legislature’s ability to enact its preferred rights-respecting scheme granting an immediate declaration of invalidity could risk compromising the legislature’s ability to fulfil its role as policymaker because allowing everyone found ncrmd of a sexual offence and absolutely discharged to be removed from the sex offender registry could restrict the effectiveness of the new version of christopher’s law eventually enacted by the ontario legislature in response to these reasons identifying those individuals and requiring them to register and report again — or to undergo individualized assessment of some kind — would likely be impracticable because their information simply would not be retained in the interim. balanced against these considerations is the significance of the rights violation that the suspension would temporarily prolong christopher’s law treats those found ncrmd and discharged in accordance with a persistent, demeaning stereotype. the law compels them to report in person to a police station, subjects them to the spectre of random police checks at their residence, and retains their personal information without providing an opportunity to determine whether they pose sufficient risk to justify that intrusion on their liberty and privacy importantly, granting a suspension also runs counter to the public’s interest in constitutionally compliant legislation. here, there is an ongoing threat to public safety, although it is limited as the group of individuals whose information would no longer be tracked consists entirely of persons who the review board has deemed do not pose a significant threat to public safety. the legislature’s ability to address that gap in public safety would, however, be appreciably restricted by an immediate declaration. this is a close call. but on balance, the combination of these two legitimate interests (public safety and preserving the legislature’s latitude to respond to the finding of unconstitutionality) justifies temporarily depriving those affected of the immediate benefit of this judgment and allowing the violation to persist. the parties agree with the 12-month suspension ordered by the court of appeal. i see no basis to interfere with that determination. however, in future, courts will expect more detailed submissions on the length of time required. (c) should g have been exempted from the suspension? the final question is whether it was appropriate and just to exempt g from the suspension the attorney general submits that, because of a lack of “expert forensic risk assessment”, it was not. although judges may not have the expertise to conduct such forensic assessments themselves, they are well-suited to deciding and frequently charged with making determinations relating to public safety and risk in other contexts, including those that lead to exemption and removal from the sex offender registry. when judges decide whether to absolutely or conditionally discharge someone found guilty of an offence, they consider the best interests of the accused and the public interest (criminal code, s 730). further, a judge deciding whether to make a termination or exemption order in respect of a person subject to the federal sex offender registry must determine whether the impact of compliance on the applicant “would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature” (criminal code, ss. 490.016(1) and 490.023(2); bill c-16, sex offender information registration act, 3rd sess., 37th parl., 2004, s 20).10 these are not decisions that require expert forensic evidence. and the adjudicative task of assessing risk in a particular case, in order to grant a remedy that is appropriate and just in the claimant’s circumstances, is distinct from the legislative task of creating a regime designed to assess risk. 10 under the previous version of s 490.012(4) of the criminal code, in effect until 2011, courts considered a number of relevant factors when deciding whether to refuse to make an initial order requiring compliance with soira, such as the nature of the offence, the offender’s risk to reoffend, the offender’s criminal record, the impact on the offender’s privacy and liberty interests, stigmatizing effects registration may have, and other matters relating to the offender’s present and future personal circumstances (see r v. debidin, 2008 onca 868, 94 or (3d) 421, at paras. 65-70; r v. redhead, 2006 abca 84, 384 ar 206, at paras. 30-31). though the discretion not to make a compliance order under s 490.012(4) has been removed, the wording in that provision is very similar to that of ss. 490.016(1) and 490.023(2) (martin’s annual criminal code, by m. henein, m. rosenberg and e. l. greenspan (2019), at pp. 1018-19). the only difference since 2011 is that the current provisions refer to effectively preventing crimes of a sexual nature in addition to effectively investigating them. the court of appeal granted g an individual exemption from christopher’s law. doherty ja concluded that an exemption did not undermine the suspension; it was difficult to envision a constitutionally compliant legislative scheme that would not exempt g from the registry the exercise of the court’s discretion deserves deference the orb, an expert tribunal, determined that g was not at significant risk of committing a serious criminal offence 17 years ago. his record since his release has been spotless and there is no indication that he poses a risk to public safety. an exemption would ensure he receives an effective remedy — nearly six years have passed since he filed his notice of application and his case has been argued in three levels of court he should not be denied the benefit of his success on the constitutional merits. the individual exemption to the suspension by definition lasts only as long as the suspension by itself. whether g will be caught by new legislation, while highly unlikely, will depend on whether he comes within its terms. courts cannot grant an exemption to legislation that has not yet been enacted, because they cannot predict the outcome of the legislative process. vii conclusion for these reasons, i would dismiss the appeal with costs. the following are the reasons delivered by rowe j — i agree with justices côté and brown regarding s 15(1) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (at paras. 221-24), and regarding the general approach to ordering an individual exemption under s 24(1) from the suspended effect of a declaration of invalidity under s 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982 (interspersed among paras. 273-93). on the proper approach to suspending a declaration of invalidity under s 52(1), however, i would reaffirm schachter v. canada, [1992] 2 scr 679. as the court stated in that case, a declaration of invalidity should be suspended only in certain circumstances, where: (1) an immediate declaration of invalidity would pose a potential danger to the public; (2) it would otherwise threaten the rule of law; or (3) the law is underinclusive and the court cannot determine properly whether to cancel or extend its benefits, but rather should provide an opportunity for the legislature to decide that. i would not treat these categories as closed. nor would i abandon them in favour of some loosely defined exercise of discretion. rather, they should be extended only where an immediate declaration would infringe some constitutional principle. the court should depart from a precedent such as schachter only in “compelling circumstances” (canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, at para. 18). for example, a precedent can be revisited if it is “unsound in principle”, “unworkable and unnecessarily complex to apply”, or if it has “attracted significant and valid judicial, academic, and other criticism” (vavilov, at para. 20). in recent years, the court has departed from the approach set out in schachter without sufficient reflection it has suspended declarations beyond schachter’s categories and without regard to the reasoning underlying those categories. some suspensions have been ordered without reference to schachter. this gap between theory and practice — between precedent and its application — is noted by justice karakatsanis (at paras. 106 and 125) and by justices côté and brown (paras. 233-35). such a gap invites reflection. but, that does not mean the precedent should be abandoned, as my colleagues favour. upon reflection, i would affirm the approach in schachter, as i shall explain. i. schachter is sound in principle schachter is grounded in a view that suspended declarations of invalidity need be reserved for exceptional circumstances, as s 52(1) does not imbue courts with a remedial discretion the starting point for reflecting on schachter is whether that interpretation of s 52(1) is sound. in line with the purposive approach to constitutional interpretation, the language of s 52(1) needs to be understood in the context of the character and larger objects of the constitution act, 1982 (r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at p 344; law society of british columbia v. trinity western university, 2018 scc 32, [2018] 2 scr 293, at paras. 178-85, per rowe j.; r v. comeau, 2018 scc 15, [2018] 1 scr 342, at para. 39). aside from the circumstance of unlawfully obtained evidence (s 24(2)), the constitution act, 1982, provides two remedies for unlawful state action the contrast between these is instructive: a) where rights or freedoms have been infringed, s 24(1) states that a court may provide “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances”. it is “difficult to imagine language which could give the court a wider and less fettered discretion” (mills v. the queen, [1986] 1 scr 863, at p 965). b) an individual who complains not of a particular infringement but of an unconstitutional law can seek a remedy under s 52(1). unlike s 24(1), s 52(1) refers neither to judicial process, nor to discretion rather, a law that is inconsistent with the constitution “is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect”. thus, while under s 24(1) the courts have wide discretion to craft remedies for specific infringements, no such discretion is conferred under s 52(1) with respect to unconstitutional laws. the rationale for this dichotomy can be seen in the language of s 1: “the canadian charter of rights and freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” the power to limit constitutional rights has been entrusted to the legislatures rather than to the courts. on a purposive interpretation, the absence of remedial discretion in s 52(1) is no oversight. the constitution act, 1982, does not give courts a choice as to whether to give effect to canadians’ right to be free from unconstitutional laws the constitution is not an equitable remedy or a writ of grace that lies in the favour of the courts. it confers rights of which canadians are entitled to immediate protection. but the constitution act, 1982, is not the whole constitution. the constitution act, 1982’s first decade revealed situations in which this immediate approach to s 52(1), unqualified, would cause conflict with other constitutional principles an immediate declaration of invalidity in reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721, would have threatened the rule of law. an immediate declaration of invalidity in r v. swain, [1991] 1 scr 933, would have posed a potential danger to the public, thereby depriving canadians of the protection of the law, which is an aspect of the rule of law. in these cases, resolution of the conflict between competing constitutional principles called for a suspended declaration. as well, schachter addressed an ambiguity latent within s 52(1). when a law offers an underinclusive benefit, there may be no unique “extent of the inconsistency” to strike down. it might be possible to render the scheme constitutional by severing words (r v. morales, [1992] 3 scr 711), reading in words (vriend v. alberta, [1998] 1 scr 493), reading down the scheme (canada (attorney general) v federation of law societies of canada, 2015 scc 7, [2015] 1 scr 401), or striking down the scheme altogether. because the appropriate remedy cannot always be discerned by a court in situations of underinclusive benefits, the supremacy of the legislature as a constitutional principle legitimately comes to bear; a declaration of suspended invalidity provides an opportunity for this to be given effect. for example, schachter concerned a financial benefit that was available to adoptive parents, but not to natural parents. reading in natural parents would have massively expanded and transformed the benefit, causing the court (as chief justice lamer noted) to act beyond its proper institutional role. conversely, striking the benefit down altogether would have harmed many adoptive parents without benefiting the plaintiffs. a suspension of the declaration of invalidity ensured that the legislation would be made constitutional, but left the means of so doing to parliament. the remark in schachter that the decision to suspend a s 52(1) remedy turns on “the effect of an immediate declaration on the public” rather than “considerations of the role of the courts and the legislature” (p 717) must be understood in this context institutional considerations by themselves do not provide a constitutional basis for a suspension rather, it is only in a situation of underinclusiveness where the proper s 52(1) remedy is unclear that such institutional considerations may have an effect on whether to order a suspension, as indeed was the case in schachter (pp. 721-24). in this view, the schachter categories exemplify circumstances in which countervailing constitutional principles constitute a valid basis to suspend an immediate declaration of invalidity that would otherwise follow by virtue of s 52(1). while in my view the three categories are not exhaustive, a court should suspend a declaration of invalidity only if there is a constitutional basis for doing so. by necessary implication, the inherent jurisdiction of a court is not a sound or sufficient legal basis to depart from the immediate effect of s 52(1). ii. schachter can be workable while the court has departed from schachter, this does not indicate that there are conceptual flaws with the approach in schachter. i say this mindful of cases such as canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, in which this court struck down offences relating to sex work. chief justice mclachlin indicated that “[w]hether immediate invalidity would pose a danger to the public or imperil the rule of law . . . may be subject to debate”, but suspended the declaration because “moving abruptly from a situation where prostitution is regulated to a situation where it is entirely unregulated would be a matter of great concern to many canadians” (para. 167). was a suspension legally justified in bedford? i am not confident that the concerns noted by the chief justice constitute a valid legal basis for continuing to subject canadians to laws rendered unconstitutional by virtue of s 52(1). nor have the schachter categories proved unworkable or difficult to apply in practice. academics have had little difficulty identifying cases in which the court has departed from schachter: b. ryder, “suspending the charter” (2003), 21 sclr. (2d) 267; c. mouland, “remedying the remedy: bedford’s suspended declaration of invalidity” (2018), 41 man. lj 281, at pp. 289-90; l. weinrib, suspended invalidity orders out of sync with constitution, august 21, 2006 (online); r. leckey, “the harms of remedial discretion” (2016), 14 i con 584; s. burningham, “a comment on the court’s decision to suspend the declaration of invalidity in carter v. canada” (2015), 78 sask l rev 201; g r hoole, “proportionality as a remedial principle: a framework for suspended declarations of invalidity in canadian constitutional law” (2011), 49 alta. l. rev. 107. in the six years after schachter, its categories were applied without difficulty. according to ryder’s count, only two out of sixteen s 52(1) remedies were suspended (ryder, pp. 294-97). schachter did not prove unworkable in practice; the problem was that it was too often honoured in the breach. it had been tested, it had worked well, and it can continue to do so. iii alternative approaches are not preferable justice karakatsanis suggests that the schachter categories be replaced by what she calls a “principled discretion”. this is distinguished from what she refers to as “complete discretion” by four principles: a charter rights should be safeguarded through effective remedies. b the public has an interest in the constitutional compliance of legislation. c the public is entitled to the benefit of legislation. d courts and legislatures play different institutional roles. [para. 94] i take no issue with these four statements. but, they lack analytic structure. rather, they are so indeterminate and truistic as to provide no meaningful guidance. while they are compatible with the court’s uneven jurisprudence, they are equally compatible with very different choices they present less a constraint on judicial discretion than a vocabulary for justifying ad hoc decisions. my colleague says that a “principled” approach is better as it requires justification this is not persuasive all decisions require justification whether the framework is expressed using principles or categories, what is at issue is whether it constrains discretion  as the schachter framework does  or whether in reality it throws open the door to judicial fiat. i am concerned that the discretionary approach justice karakatsanis advocates will lead to a continuation of current trends, in which declarations of invalidity are suspended in a way that varies with the length of the chancellor’s foot. more fundamentally, i see no legitimate basis to read remedial discretion into s 52(1). the provision admits of no such discretion. rather, it is only by virtue of competing constitutional principles or ambiguity within s 52(1) itself that one can justify suspending a declaration of invalidity statutes that are inconsistent with the constitution are of no effect. nothing can revive them. the only basis on which they can be ordered to be enforced notwithstanding their illegality is that to declare them to be immediately illegal would offend some other constitutional principle. courts have no inherent authority to make legal that which is not. in this i differ fundamentally with my colleague. my colleague writes at paras. 120-21: while s 52(1) does not explicitly provide the authority to suspend a declaration, in adjudicating constitutional issues, courts “may have regard to unwritten postulates which form the very foundation of the constitution of canada” (manitoba language rights, at p 752; see also r v. comeau, 2018 scc 15, [2018] 1 scr 342 at para. 52). [footnote omitted] the power to suspend the effect of a declaration of invalidity should be from accommodation of broader constitutional understood considerations and is included in the power to declare legislation invalid. . to arise she also writes, at para. 85, that “[a] general declaration pursuant to courts’ statutory or inherent jurisdiction is the means by which they give full effect to the broad terms of s 52(1)”. respectfully, i disagree. this suggests that superior courts possess a form of inherent authority sufficient to override express provisions of the constitution. on occasion courts have been called on to answer questions concerning the relationship of institutions of the state for which no answer is provided in the written constitution, eg. in reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217. on such rare and exceptional occasions courts “may have regard to unwritten postulates which form the very foundation of the constitution of canada”, which might be called structural analysis. but, in such instances, courts provide an answer as to the authority of the legislature or the executive where the written constitution is silent where the constitution is explicit, as s 52(1) is, more is required the power to suspend a declaration of invalidity is not “included” in s 52(1); rather, it contradicts s 52(1). thus, in order to justify a suspension, one must rely on a countervailing constitutional principle. as for justices côté and brown’s approach, the rule of law is not the only constitutional principle that can justify suspending a declaration of invalidity. notably, on a purposive interpretation, underinclusive benefits call for a court to order a suspension so as to give proper place to the legislature in framing a remedy. iv applying schachter in this case, the declaration of invalidity was suspended on the basis of public safety concerns. the analysis above suggests that courts cannot suspend a declaration of invalidity simply because an immediate declaration might create some risk to public safety. rather, the risk to public safety must be sufficient to infringe the constitutional principle of the rule of law, so that the court is forced to reconcile two conflicting constitutional principles. the threshold for suspending a declaration of invalidity can be illustrated by the cases in which the court has invoked the public safety rationale. in swain, the court struck down the power to detain accused who were acquitted “by reason of insanity”, as it was phrased at the time. in r v. demers, 2004 scc 46, [2004] 2 scr. 489, the court struck down the scheme for detaining those found unfit to stand trial. in charkaoui v canada (citizenship and immigration), 2007 scc 9, [2007] 1 scr. 350, the court struck down a scheme for detaining foreign nationals or permanent residents on grounds of security. in all three cases, an immediate declaration would have released individuals who were held in custody because they posed a danger to public safety. the risk to public safety was high, as would be expected to justify reading into the constitution a discretion to suspend a declaration of invalidity. in this case, neither party focused their submissions on the suspension. in addition, this court refused to stay the 12-month suspension (ontario (attorney general) v. g, 2019 scc 36), which thus expired on april 4, 2020, rendering the issue moot in the circumstances, there is no cause to decide whether the declaration was properly suspended. the issue of the exemption order is also moot. the respondent does not need to be exempted from legislation that is already of no force or effect. as a result, although i am in substantial agreement with the approach to individual exemptions set out by justices côté and brown, there is no cause to decide whether the individual exemption was rightly ordered. v conclusion rather than departing from schachter and replacing it with another approach, i would affirm it, with the explanations that i have set out above. in the result, i would dismiss the appeal. the following are the reasons delivered by côté and brown jj. — i. overview while we agree with our colleague karakatsanis j.’s conclusion that christopher’s law infringes mr. g’s charter right to equal treatment under the law, we write separately to constitutionally ground the usage of suspended declarations of invalidity in a way our colleague does not in our view, suspended declarations of invalidity — which allow for the ongoing infringement of charter rights — ought to be granted as a measure of last resort, and only to protect the rule of law. relatedly, we respectfully disagree with our colleague that this court’s remedial jurisprudence since schachter v. canada, [1992] 2 scr 679, “has come to coalesce around a group of core remedial principles” (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 82). to the contrary, our reading of this court’s jurisprudence reveals none of the principles our colleague identifies instead, unmoored from the rule of law, it has produced inconsistent and unprincipled results. a return to first principles is necessary. our colleague would also grant mr. g an individual exemption from the suspended declaration with respect, doing so here would exceed the institutional competence of this court and intrude into legislative domain. for the reasons that follow, we would uphold the 12-month suspension of the declaration of invalidity we would not, however, grant the respondent an individual exemption. ii. section 15(1) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms before we embark on our discussion of remedy, we offer these observations on our colleague’s treatment of s 15(1) of the charter. in our view, the s 15(1) issue is easily disposed of. christopher’s law (sex offender registry), 2000, so 2000, c 1 (“christopher’s law”), draws a distinction between persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (“ncrmd”) and persons found guilty. and that distinction exacerbates pre-existing disadvantage by perpetuating the stereotype that persons with mental illness are inherently dangerous (kahkewistahaw first nation v. taypotat, 2015 scc 30, [2015] 2 scr 548, at paras. 19-20). persons found guilty have several “exit ramps” leading away from the obligation to comply with christopher’s law’s sex-offender registry: a conditional or absolute discharge under s 730 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, a pardon, or a record suspension (christopher’s law, ss. 1(1) “offender” and “pardon”, 7(4) and 91). persons found ncrmd, by contrast, do not, even where the ontario review board determines that they no longer pose a significant threat to public safety and grants them an absolute discharge. as a result, those persons found ncrmd in respect of more than one sex offence, or in respect of a sex offence with a maximum sentence of more than 10 years, must — categorically and without exception — comply with christopher’s law for the rest of their lives (s 7(1)(b-c)). this constitutes differential treatment on the basis of an enumerated ground: mental disability the proper remedy is to require the legislature to provide persons found ncrmd who have been absolutely discharged with an opportunity for exemption and removal from the christopher’s law registry. this disposes fully of the merits of the s 15(1) issue our colleague, however, goes further, and in extensive obiter dicta discusses adverse-effects discrimination and “substantive equality” (paras. 41-69). her doctrinal statements are not remotely relevant to the issues raised by this appeal, especially considering this is not an adverse-effects case the distinction in this case is facially apparent: christopher’s law explicitly states that persons found ncrmd — persons with a mental disability — and those who are “convicted” must comply with its registry (ss. 1(1) “offender”, 2 and 8(1)(c)). it then explicitly exempts from compliance with the registry those who have received a pardon, those who have received a record suspension, and those who have received a conditional or absolute discharge under s 730 of the code. however, a person found ncrmd is ineligible to receive a pardon, a record suspension, or a discharge under s 730 because they are deemed under the code to have committed no crime (ss. 16(1), 672.1(1), 672.34 and 672.35) a discriminatory result such as this one, that arises from reading two or more statutes together, is not adverse-effects discrimination in cases of adverse-effects discrimination, the discriminatory law appears facially neutral, and causation is the central issue: whether, in spite of its apparent neutrality, the impugned law augments pre-existing disadvantage in its effect (vriend v alberta, [1998] 1 scr 493, at paras. 75-76) consequently, in those cases, the claimant has “more work to do” (withler v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 12, [2011] 1 scr 396, at para. 64). here, there is simply no work to be done nor any causal connection wanting: the statutes, read together, draw a facial distinction on the basis of mental disability. thus, our silence on paragraphs 41-69 of our colleague’s reasons should not be taken as tacit approval of their content. we simply do not see them as offering actual reasons for her judgment, but “commentary . . . or exposition” instead (r v. henry, 2005 scc 76, [2005] 3 scr 609, at para. 57). iii suspended declarations of invalidity as we see it, there are three principal reasons why only a threat to the rule of law should warrant a suspended declaration of invalidity. first, this was what the court envisioned in assuming for the first time the power to issue a suspended declaration in reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721 (“manitoba reference”). secondly, the constitution commands such a result: the text contemplates immediate declarations as the norm, subject only to a rule of law concern. thirdly, lessons learned in the wake of schachter about the practical implications of suspended declarations reveal why a discretionary approach focused on “remedial principles” is undesirable, and why a constitutional tether to the rule of law is so essential. we will address each point in turn. a. the genesis and evolution of suspended declarations to understand the necessarily exceptional quality of suspended declarations, it is helpful to recount the unprecedented circumstances of manitoba reference. because manitoba had failed to enact its legislation in english and french, virtually all of its laws passed over more than nine decades were poised to become invalid declaring those laws immediately invalid, however, would have created a “legal vacuum . . . with consequent legal chaos” of intolerable proportions (p 747). all of manitoba’s governing bodies created by law including courts, tribunals, public offices, and school boards would have been stripped of legal authority the composition of the manitoba legislature would have been called into question. the legal order that regulated the affairs of manitobans “since 1890 [would have been] destroyed and [their] rights, obligations and other effects arising under [the unilingual] laws [would have become] invalid and unenforceable” (p 749; see also pp. 747-48). an unprecedented “state of emergency” was imminent (p 766). in response, the court created the suspended declaration, modelled after the doctrine of state necessity. the doctrine of state necessity, reserved for exceptional circumstances like an insurrection or forging a new constitution, allows a government temporary reprieve from complying with its constitution in order to address a public emergency and preserve the rule of law (manitoba reference, at p 761). by accepting for itself the authority to take similar emergency action, the court was taking a momentous step, since the precedents on state necessity cited by the court involved emergency action being taken by the executive or legislative branches, not by courts (pp. 763 and 765-66) further, for obvious reasons the doctrine of state necessity is potentially dangerous, and must be “severely circumscribe[d]” and “narrowly and carefully applied” in order to constitute an affirmation of, rather than an affront to, the rule of law (m. m. stavsky, “the doctrine of state necessity in pakistan” (1983), 16 cornell int’l l.j 341, at pp. 344 and 342; see also p 354; manitoba reference, at pp. 758-59). the line between using the doctrine as a veil for usurpation of authority and using it to safeguard the constitutional order from harm is fine. for this reason, at the core of the doctrine lies the premise that “courts should be reluctant to permit deviations from constitutional norms” (stavsky, at p 344). recognizing the magnitude of this step and its potential threat to the division of powers and the rule of law, the court in manitoba reference tightly constrained the use of suspended declarations it concluded that a suspended declaration should only be used “in order to preserve the rule of law . . . under conditions of emergency, when it is impossible to comply with” constitutional rights (p 763 (emphasis added)). the operative focus must be whether a “failure to [suspend the declaration] would lead to legal chaos” (p 766) or, in other words, whether a suspended declaration is necessary “to preserve the rule of law the constitution was meant to constitute” (b. ryder, “suspending the charter” (2003), 21 sclr (2d) 267, at p 268) in short, the court in manitoba reference “clearly viewed a temporary suspension of constitutional requirements as extraordinary” (ryder, at p 268). it was contingent on the exigency: “to avoid a state of emergency” (manitoba reference, at p 763). since manitoba reference, however, this court has lost its way. the court now suspends declarations of invalidity almost as a matter of course, often with no justification or attention to the rule of law.11 in our view, most of the cases in which suspended declarations have issued since manitoba reference do not come close to reaching the high threshold it decreed. rather, suspended declarations have become 11 e.g mounted police association of ontario v canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 1, [2015] 1 scr 3, at para. 158; saskatchewan federation of labour v. saskatchewan, 2015 scc 4, [2015] 1 scr 245, at para. 103; ufcw,. local 1518 v kmart canada ltd., [1999] 2 scr 1083, at para. 79-80; health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn v british columbia, 2007 scc 27, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para. 168; r v. guignard, 2002 scc 14, [2002] 1 scr 472, at paras. 32 and 34; trociuk v. british columbia (attorney general), 2003 scc 34, [2003] 1 scr 835, at paras. 43 and 46; figueroa v. canada (attorney general), 2003 scc 37, [2003] 1 scr 912, at para. 93; corbiere v. canada (minister of indian and northern affairs), [1999] 2 scr. 203, at para. 24; carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para. 128. this court’s “remedial instrument of choice”, applied “casually” and as a matter of “routine” or “preference” while affording only “lip service . . . to the dangers of allowing continued violations of charter rights and freedoms” (g. r. hoole, “proportionality as a remedial principle: a framework for suspended declarations of invalidity in canadian constitutional law” (2011), 49 alta. l. rev. 107, at pp. 110-11; ryder, at pp. 271-72 and 280; s. choudhry and k. roach, “putting the past behind us? prospective judicial and legislative constitutional remedies” (2003), 21 sclr. (2d) 205, at p 228; s. burningham, “a comment on the court’s decision to suspend the declaration of invalidity in carter v canada” (2015), 78 sask l rev 201, at p 202; r. leckey, “remedial practice beyond constitutional text” (2016), 64 am. j. comp. l 1 (“leckey, ‘remedial’”), at p 23). in other words, this court has been issuing suspended declarations, and even extending those suspensions, with little constitutional or jurisprudential grounding. for instance, in both canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, and carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, the court offered meagre reasons for suspending a declaration of invalidity in bedford, the court suspended the declaration of invalidity on the enigmatic notion that leaving prostitution unregulated “would be a matter of great concern to many canadians”, despite finding that it was “subject to debate” whether an immediate declaration would endanger the public or otherwise imperil the rule of law (para. 167) even more remarkably, in carter, the court gave no reasons for suspending its declaration of invalidity (para. 128). the result is that the court’s use of suspended declarations has become wholly detached from the principled foundations stated in manitoba reference that animated the existence of what was supposed to be considered a measure of last resort. today, that remedy has become the norm, rather than the exception. we do not take our colleague as disagreeing with this proposition. but her solution presupposes that there were some other principles quietly at work in the cases. with respect, we are not remotely convinced that this is so. nor do we agree with our colleague that schachter is the vaccine. indeed, it is the germ. prior to schachter (but after manitoba reference), this court assumed “that laws inconsistent with the new charter should be declared invalid immediately [and, in the process,] affirmed the primacy and inviolability of the rights and freedoms entrenched in the charter” (ryder, at p 268). after schachter, however, this court’s posture changed. statistics bear this out: by our count, out of the 44 times this court has declared a law invalid for unconstitutionality since schachter, it has suspended that declaration 23 times (that is, 52 per cent of the time).12 and those numbers have been 12 the total number of 44 is current to the beginning of this year. it excludes cases involving mandatory minimums (which, by their nature, must be struck down immediately: karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 114) and those cases where the court rectified the constitutional flaw through a tailored remedy, such as severance or reading in the cases included in this number are as follows (cases with suspended declarations are in bold): r v. morrison, 2019 scc 15, [2019] 2 scr 3, at para. 73; quebec (attorney general) v. alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, 2018 scc 17, [2018] 1 scr 464, at paras. 3 and 5; r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr 599, at para. 98; conférence des juges de paix magistrats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2016 scc 39, [2016] 2 scr 116, at para. 103; saskatchewan federation of labour v. saskatchewan, 2015 scc 4, [2015] 1 scr 245, at para. 103; r v. smith, 2015 scc 34, [2015] 2 scr 602, at paras. 30-32; mounted police association of ontario v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 1, [2015] 1 scr 3, at paras. 154 and 158; carter v canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para. 128; canada (attorney general) v. whaling, 2014 scc 20, [2014] 1 scr 392, at paras. 88-89; canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at paras. 166-69; alberta (information and privacy commissioner) v united food and commercial workers, local 401, 2013 scc 62, [2013] 3 scr 733, at trending upwards: between 2003 and 2015, that number rose to 74 per cent of declarations (see also ryder, at p 272; hoole, at p 114; j. b. kelly, governing with the charter: legislative and judicial activism and framers’ intent (2005), at p 175). the smallest inconvenience associated with an immediate declaration, and circumstances that pale in comparison to the grave situation the court faced in manitoba reference, will now lead the court to temporarily suspend the operation of the charter. this slippage is due to a move away from the principle stated in manitoba reference. schachter shifted the considerations that can justify a suspended declaration para. 41; r v tse, 2012 scc 16, [2012] 1 scr 531, at paras. 100-103; quebec (education, recreation and sports) v nguyen, 2009 scc 47, [2009] 3 scr 208, at para. 46; greater vancouver transportation authority v canadian federation of students — british columbia component, 2009 scc 31, [2009] 2 scr 295, at paras. 89-91; r v. db, 2008 scc 25, [2008] 2 scr 3, at para. 95; health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn v. british columbia, 2007 scc 27, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para. 168; charkaoui v canada (citizenship and immigration), 2007 scc 9, [2007] 1 scr 350, at para. 140; canada (attorney general) v. hislop, 2007 scc 10, [2007] 1 scr 429, at para. 121; chaoulli v. quebec (attorney general), 2005 scc 35, [2005] 1 scr 791; r v. demers, 2004 scc 46, [2004] 2 scr 489, at paras. 56-60; figueroa v canada (attorney general), 2003 scc 37, [2003] 1 scr 912, at para. 93; nova scotia (workers’ compensation board) v. martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2 scr. 504, at para. 119; trociuk v. british columbia (attorney general), 2003 scc 34, [2003] 1 scr. 835, at paras. 43 and 46; mackin v. new brunswick (minister of finance), 2002 scc 13, [2002] 1 scr 405, at para. 77; r v. guignard, 2002 scc 14, [2002] 3 scr 472, at paras. 32 and 34; sauvé v. canada (chief electoral officer), 2002 scc 68, [2002] 3 scr 519, at para. 64; lavallee, rackel & heintz v. canada (attorney general), 2002 scc 61, [2002] 3 scr 209, at paras. 47-48; dunmore v. ontario (attorney general), 2001 scc 94, [2001] 3 scr 1016, at para. 66; r v. ruzic, 2001 scc 24, [2001] 1 scr 687, at paras. 1, 55 and 101; little sisters book and art emporium v. canada (minister of justice), 2000 scc 69, [2000] 2 scr 1120, at paras. 105 and 159; ufcw,. local 1518 v. kmart canada ltd., [1999] 2 scr 1083, at para. 79; corbiere v. canada (minister of indian and northern affairs), [1999] 2 scr 203, at paras. 24 and 118; m. v. h., [1999] 2 scr 3, at paras. 136-45; thomson newspapers co. v. canada (attorney general), [1998] 1 scr 877, at para. 131; eldridge v. british columbia (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr. 624, at para. 96; libman v. quebec (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr 569, at para. 86; benner v. canada (secretary of state), [1997] 1 scr 358, at paras. 103-5; reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3, at para. 292; rjr- macdonald inc. v. canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at paras. 176-77; r v. heywood, [1994] 3 scr 761, at pp. 803-4; sauvé v canada (attorney general), [1993] 2 scr 438, at pp. 439-40; ramsden v peterborough (city), [1993] 2 scr 1084, at p 1108; baron v canada, [1993] 1 scr 416, at pp. 453-55; r v. zundel, [1992] 2 scr 731, at p 778. away from the rule of law to “the effect of an immediate declaration on the public” (p 715; see also pp. 716-17). further, schachter expressly recognized two additional circumstances in which a suspended declaration of invalidity could issue: threats to public safety and under-inclusive legislation (p 715) it also made clear (as our colleague does with her reasons) that these categories are not exhaustive (p 719). additionally, schachter explicitly required courts to consider whether a suspended declaration should issue in each case (pp. 715 and 717). unsurprisingly, after schachter courts began to find other reasons for issuing suspended declarations, one of which became this court’s primary justification for suspending a declaration: affording the legislature the time it needs to craft a response and choose between charter-compliant regimes (e.g eldridge v british columbia (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr 624, at para. 96; dunmore v. ontario (attorney general), 2001 scc 94, [2001] 3 scr 1016, at para. 66; ufcw,. local 1518 v. kmart canada ltd., [1999] 2 scr 1083, at para. 79; r v. guignard, 2002 scc 14, [2002] 1 scr 472, at para. 32). but this justification strikes us as irrelevant. the judiciary’s choice between an immediate and suspended declaration has no impact on the range of constitutional options open to a legislature in the aftermath of a successful charter challenge. as professor ryder explains: a key flaw [in the court’s] line of reasoning is that suspended declarations do not in fact offer anything to the legislature that it does not already have. by emphasizing the role of suspended declarations in fostering legislative choice, and dialogue with affected groups, the court seems to be suggesting that suspensions have the effect of enlarging a legislature’s range of choices and consultative possibilities. but this is not necessarily the case. whether the operation of a declaration of invalidity is immediate or delayed, a legislature faces the exact same range of constitutional possibilities. it is free to disagree with the legal regime that follows upon a court’s choice of an immediate declaration of invalidity and substitute some other constitutional option. it is also free to consult as widely as it wishes in the design of a new charter-compliant legal regime. [p 281] (see also p 285.) respectfully, the proper response to this rampant misuse of suspended declarations is not, as our colleague proposes, to expand the schachter categories in reliance on newly divined “remedial principles” and “recurring touchstones” (paras. 82 and 153). in practice, this will result in a measure of broad discretion that is anomalous in a legal regime committed to the rule of law and the protection of rights. schachter’s discretion bred inconsistent and unprincipled results, and we see no reason to believe our colleague’s appeal to a “broader [constitutional] architecture” (para. 158) will be any different rather, the more appropriate response is to return our focus to the constitution, and particularly its founding principle of the rule of law, in order to ensure the proper vindication of charter rights and carefully circumscribe the situations in which a suspended declaration can issue. b. the constitution (1) section 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982, and section 33(1) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms section 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982, provides the following: the constitution of canada is the supreme law of canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. the text could not be clearer: its use of the present tense “is” contemplates, by definition, only immediate declarations of invalidity. indeed, on “a plain reading of this provision, the invalidation of any law found to be ultra vires the constitution should be immediate” (b bird, “the judicial notwithstanding clause: suspended declarations of invalidity” (2019), 42 man. lj 23, at p 32, citing hoole, at p 110; see also pp. 34-36) in other words, suspended declarations are, by their nature, “in tension with the clear words of s 52(1) that contemplate that unconstitutional legislation is of no force and effect” (k. roach, constitutional remedies in canada (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), at §141540). to be sure, once it is found that a statute is inconsistent with the constitution, “consequences for that legislation flow directly from the constitution’s status as supreme law” (leckey, “remedial”, at p 30): courts have “not only the power, but the duty, to regard the inconsistent statute . . . as being no longer ‘of force or effect’” (r v. big m drug mart ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295, at p 353 (emphasis added)). while we commonly refer to a court “striking down” a law, in reality, “the law has failed by operation of s 52 of the constitution act, 1982”, because s 52(1) “confers no discretion on judges” (r v. ferguson, 2008 scc 6, [2008] 1 scr 96, at para. 35). it is a “provision that suggests that declarations of invalidity can only be given immediate effect” (reference re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3, at para. 99 (emphasis added)). unlike the constitutions of other countries, such as the constitution of the republic of south africa, at s 172(1)(b),13 nothing in the text of our constitution expressly empowers canadian courts to issue suspended declarations (and even in south africa, suspended declarations are rare, as the “general assumption” is that the constitutional court of south africa will issue an immediate declaration (leckey, “remedial”, at p 20)). the framers of our constitution could easily have suggested such a power by including the words “will be . . . of no force or effect” (and indeed, this is how this court has been reading s 52(1) in the wake of schachter). instead, the constitution limits the role of courts to declaring a law “is of no force or effect”. therefore, when exercising such a judicially created power to suspend a declaration of invalidity, this court must be judicious, measured and principled. we stress “judicially created” for a reason, which also goes to the need for restraint: while our constitution does not expressly permit courts to suspend a declaration of invalidity, it does provide a means for parliament and legislatures to do so in certain cases under s 33(1) in other words, by keeping on life support a law that has been struck down for unconstitutionality, a court is effectively stepping into a role assigned by the constitution to the legislative branch and, indeed, is legislating. as bird persuasively explains: 13 see also: scotland act, 1998 (uk), 1998, c 46, at ss. 102(2)-102(3). [w]here the constitution assigns a specific power to a branch of government, th[e] principle of exclusivity applies. it is intuitive to say that a function expressly assigned to one branch of government by the constitution must not be performed by another branch. . this, i submit, is the case with suspended declarations of invalidity . in the canadian constitution, the only branch of government that is expressly permitted to give life to an unconstitutional law is the legislature by way of the “notwithstanding clause”. [pp. 43-44] indeed, s 33(1) suggests that, in cases to which it applies, legislatures, and not courts, are best positioned to know when a suspended declaration is desirable and if so, for how long (see d. newman, “canada’s notwithstanding clause, dialogue, and constitutional identities” in g. sigalet, g. webber and r. dixon, eds., constitutional dialogue: rights, democracy, institutions (2019), 209, at pp. 230-31). this, in fact, is a primary purpose of s 33(1): to allow a legislature to consider the impact of a court’s decision on considerations “in respect of which only the legislature has institutional capacity” (newman, at p 218 (see also p 224); see also hon. a. e. blakeney, “the notwithstanding clause, the charter, and canada’s patriated constitution: what i thought we were doing” (2010), 19 constitutional forum 1, at p 5; j. d. whyte, “sometimes constitutions are made in the streets: the future of the charter’s notwithstanding clause” (2007), 16 constitutional forum 79, at p 83; p. h. russell, “standing up for notwithstanding” (1991), 29 alta l rev 293, at pp. 308-9; p. c. weiler, “rights and judges in a democracy: a new canadian version” (1984), 18 u. mich. j. l. reform 51, at p 86). at bottom, s 33(1) is a “factor that should serve to constrain the use of the suspended declaration” (e macfarlane, “dialogue, remedies, and positive rights: carter v canada as a microcosm for past and future issues under the charter of rights and freedoms” (2017), 49 ottawa l. rev. 107, at p 120). our colleague says in response that a “court cannot shirk its responsibility to remedy constitutional violations simply because [of] s 33” (para. 137). with respect, this misses our point. we agree that a court must remedy constitutional violations. our point is that s 33(1) militates against her position that courts have broad discretion to delay remedying such violations instead, “[c]ourts should respect the entire constitutional structure, including the possibility of using the override when exercising remedial discretion” (roach, constitutional remedies, at §14.1450 (emphasis added)). all this fortifies our view that, so as not to engorge or strain the judicial function, court-ordered suspended declarations ought to be confined to addressing threats to the rule of law. (2) rule of law given that s 52(1) does not expressly allow for suspended declarations, a court’s authority to suspend must be found elsewhere in the constitution. in particular, suspended declarations should be grounded not in appeals to abstruse “broader constitutional considerations” or to a heretofore undiscovered ancillary power to a court’s “inherent jurisdiction” to declare legislation invalid (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at paras. 121 and 85), but in the constitutional principle of the rule of law. the rule of law has long been considered “a fundamental postulate of our constitutional structure” (per rand j., roncarelli v. duplessis, [1959] scr 121, at p 142). this is evidenced by its invocation in the single-sentence preamble to the charter: “canada is founded upon principles that recognize . . . the rule of law”. the rule of law is proclaimed by our written constitution to be the “very foundation” on which our country, and its charter, rest (bcgeu v. british columbia (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 214, at p 229). it occupies hallowed ground as the “root of our system of government” and a “vital . . . assumptio[n]” on which our constitution is based (reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217 (“secession reference”), at paras. 70 and 49). the centrality of the rule of law to our constitutional order is what led to the creation of suspended declarations in manitoba reference in the first place. rights under the charter may be temporarily judicially displaced only where necessary “to preserve the rule of law” (p 763) and to ensure its “continuity” (p 753). by relying on the protection of the rule of law as the justification for suspended declarations, courts are able to “recognize [both] the unconstitutionality of [the impugned] laws and the legislature’s duty to comply with the ‘supreme law’ of this country” while upholding the constitution (manitoba reference, at p 753; hunter v southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at p 169). indeed, just as much as it is the court’s role to safeguard the rights guaranteed in the charter (hunter v. southam, at p 169), it is also the court’s responsibility to ensure that the rule of law is not “transgress[ed]” (manitoba reference, at p 753). where an immediate declaration would transgress the rule of law, the court would be “abdicat[ing]” its role as “protector and preserver of the constitution” (p 753) to allow such a state of affairs to arise. in such instances, then, the court is not fulfilling an impermissible legislative role as it otherwise would be by granting a suspended declaration, but an assuredly judicial role this is not a novel interpretation, but simply the circumspect guidance that the court in manitoba reference offered when recognizing this extraordinary judicial remedy. there is no basis in our constitution for this court to have departed from this guidance. our colleague can point to no other part of our written constitution that could ground a court-ordered temporary suspension of charter rights, and fails to identify a single case that shows why limiting suspended declarations to threats to the rule of law is unworkable, relative to the medley of “underlying”, “competing”, “general”, “countervailing” constitutional or remedial “principles” and “touchstones” to which she points (paras. 89, 92, 102, 126, 131-132 and 153). in this regard, we find the extra-judicial commentary of justice scalia apt: [w]e should recognize that, at the point where an appellate judge says that the remaining issue must be decided on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, or by a balancing of all the factors involved, he begins to resemble a finder of fact more than a determiner of law. to reach such a stage is, in a way, a regrettable concession of defeat — an acknowledgment that we have passed the point where “law,” properly speaking, has any further application. and to reiterate the unfortunate practical consequences of reaching such a pass when there still remains a good deal of judgment to be applied: equality of treatment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a multi-tiered judicial system, impossible to achieve; predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is impaired. i stand with aristotle, then — which is a pretty good place to stand — in the view that “personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an exact pronouncement.” [emphasis added; footnote omitted.] (a. scalia, “the rule of law as a law of rules” (1989), 56 u. chicago l. rev. 1175, at p 1182) our constitution makes an exact pronouncement on the matter of suspended declarations: they are exceptional. immediate declarations must be the norm, absent a rule of law concern. there is no need to go further. it is worthwhile to describe a few instances where an impending threat to the rule of law warrants a suspended declaration. the prototypical instance of a threat to the rule of law is an existential one, as in manitoba reference. there, as noted above, the court was concerned with “a legal vacuum” and that the “constitutional guarantee of rule of law [could] not tolerate such chaos and anarchy” (pp. 747, 753 and 758). there is, however, a second form of threat to the rule of law that may give rise to a suspended declaration of invalidity: a threat to public safety. as explained in manitoba reference, a tenet of the rule of law is that a state’s people should not “be allowed to perish for the sake of the constitution; on the contrary, a constitution should exist for the preservation of the state and the welfare of the people” (p 766, citing attorney general of the republic v. mustafa ibrahim, [1964] cyprus law reports 195, at p 237 (emphasis deleted)). in other words, the rule of law requires that this court ensure an “order of positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order” (p 749). normative order is lost where public safety is put at risk indeed, “[l]aw and order are indispensable elements of civilized life” (p 749) and the rule of law has long implied “the existence of public order” (w. i. jennings, the law and the constitution (5th ed 1959), at p 43, cited in manitoba reference, at p 749) the rule of law “vouchsafes to the citizens and residents of the country a stable, predictable and ordered society” (secession reference, at para. 70). maintaining public safety, in this sense at least, is therefore an instance of preserving the rule of law. our colleague, following schachter, lists “underinclusive” benefits or legislation as one of her non-exhaustive categories qualifying for suspension (paras. 118 and 124). she pronounces, without citing any authority in support, that the categories “reflect constitutionally grounded considerations”, which are said (again, without citing to any authority) to include “recognizing the public’s interest in legislation passed for its benefit” (para. 124). there is, in our respectful view, no legal rule, and certainly no constitutional principle or the even more amorphous “constitutionally grounded considerations”, to support under-inclusiveness as a category qualifying for suspension. with great respect, the creation of this category in schachter was ill-conceived, inconsistent as it is with the strictures of manitoba reference. further, even on its own terms, it cannot stand according to schachter, the impetus for recognizing under-inclusive benefits as a category that justifies suspending a declaration is the concern that “striking down the law immediately would deprive deserving persons of benefits” (p 715; see also pp. 716 and 721) however, to the extent that a law is under-inclusive, the appropriate response is not to strike down the benefits for all because, in these rare situations, the “extent of the inconsistency” under s 52(1) refers to the legislation’s omission, or failure to provide benefits to a certain group. the other aspects of the legislation will not have been declared unconstitutional and, as our colleague quite rightly observes, “[t]he public has an interest in preserving legislation duly enacted . . . to the extent it is not unconstitutional” (para. 156). explained in another way, striking down benefits is only warranted where the benefits are prohibited, not where they are under-inclusive schachter’s apprehension of depriving benefits from deserving persons (which grounded the justification for suspension) then withers away the more appropriate response in such cases is not suspension, but resort to the other tools in a court’s remedial toolbox, such as severance or reading in critically, a court can simply issue a declaration stating that the legislation is unconstitutional to the extent it does not extend benefits to a particular group and requiring that — after the government determines the best method for extending those benefits — the benefits be provided retroactively (eg. tétreault-gadoury v. canada (employment and immigration commission), [1991] 2 scr 22, at pp. 46-47). clearly then, under-inclusive benefits can be remedied without “depriv[ing] deserving persons of benefits”, and there is therefore no corresponding need to suspend a declaration to avoid this state of affairs. but our colleague goes further, identifying yet another category, beyond those listed in schachter, that could justify a suspended declaration a suspension should also be granted, we are told, when “an immediately effective declaration would have a limiting effect on the legislature’s ability to set policy” (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 130 (emphasis added)) this category requires refinement a mere “limiting effect” on policy-making, whatever that means, is surely insufficient to warrant the continued infringement of charter rights. we say a suspended declaration is warranted only where it can be demonstrated that the immediate vesting of rights — and the concomitant gathering of reliance and expectation interests around the new legal regime, or the development of substantial administrative structures (ryder, at pp. 281 and 285) — would preclude the government from creating or maintaining “an actual order of positive laws” to govern society (manitoba reference, at p 749; see also northern pipeline construction co. v. marathon pipe line co., 458 us 50 (1982), at pp. 88-89). these cases will be extremely rare because, as we will explain below, the legislature is well equipped to respond promptly to immediate declarations of invalidity and to avoid the accrual of vested interests (for example, by invoking s 33(1) where applicable or by enacting new or amended legislation). without a tether to the rule of law, our colleague’s novel category, paired with her call to “respect . . . the role of the legislature” (para. 157), will, over time, allow the flawed rationale of deference to the convenience of the legislature — one of the central causes, if not the cause, of the unprincipled expansion of suspended declarations — to resurface. indeed, her new category is practically indistinguishable from that rationale. if the history of suspended declarations that we have recounted is any indicator of future trends, governments and courts will frequently dodge the constitutional mandate of s 52(1) by claiming that an immediate declaration has an ostensible “limiting effect” on (para. 130), or would “significantly impair” (paras. 129 and 139) or “undermine” (para. 157), the legislature’s ability to enact its “preferred” (para. 176) scheme (eg. guignard, at paras. 23 and 29-31, and ryder, at pp. 271, 272, 286 and 288). while we appreciate our colleague’s efforts to strive to bring greater consistency and transparency to remedial decision making, we see her enunciation of various “core” or “fundamental” “touchstones” and “principles” as promoting uncertainty and unpredictability instead. worse, their dubious status only exacerbates the obscurity. it is unclear whether these principles are constitutional, non-constitutional, or constitutive of a new hybrid category. overall, it is difficult to know how to reconcile our colleague’s statement that “suspensions of declarations of invalidity should be rare” (para. 83) with the imprecision of her expanded principles and categories that justify their usage. there is, quite simply, no need to broaden the “narrow circumstances” in which a suspended declaration can issue (contra karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 132). indeed, and as we explain below, there is good reason for not doing so, since it only risks unduly compromising the enforcement of rights. in sum, as we see the matter, a suspended declaration of invalidity may be constitutionally issued by a court only to counter a threat to the constitutional principle of the rule of law, which includes threats to public safety. and indeed, a suspended declaration must issue in such circumstances, because “[f]or the court to allow such a situation to arise and fail to resolve it would be an abdication of its responsibility as protector and preserver of the constitution” (manitoba reference, at p 753). c. lessons learned post-schachter before applying the foregoing to the facts of this case, we add the following considerations that warrant a return to first principles — that is, that warrant reinstating the rule of law as the sole justification for suspended declarations of invalidity. these considerations are, in effect, lessons that follow from schachter’s jurisprudential progeny that show why it is essential to confine judicial discretion. first, restraint is imperative because suspending a declaration will often pull a court beyond its institutional competence and capacity on several occasions where this court has suspended a declaration of invalidity, the legislature has chosen not to enact new legislation (choudhry and roach, table b, at pp. 257-66). or, as in corbiere v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 15, [2015] 1 scr 331, “the new electoral regime instantiated by the government was virtually identical to what would have resulted from the immediate invalidation of the impugned law” (hoole, at p 125; see also pp. 124 and 126). such a deeply regrettable state of affairs should lead us to reflect, even if only briefly, on its significance: this court, mistakenly believing it had the institutional competence to properly assess whether a suspended declaration was necessary, allowed injury to the charter rights of canadians to persist unnecessarily. the dangers of judicial activism — indeed, of judicial legislation — are on full display. conversely, when an immediate declaration of invalidity is issued, “one may not speak of judicial activism . . . rather, even though the declaration is channeled through the court, it is in truth issued by [s 52(1) of] the original constitution” (g. c. n. webber, “originalism’s constitution”, in g. huscroft and b. w. miller, eds., the challenge of originalism: theories of constitutional interpretation (2011), 147, at pp. 166-67; see also ferguson, at para. 35, and nova scotia (workers’ compensation board) v. martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2 scr 504, at para. 28). the responsibility for responding to the declaration of invalidity then, as our constitution intended, falls to the legislature — the branch with the competence and toolbox necessary to craft an appropriate response. not only do legislatures have the ability in certain cases to respond to an immediate declaration of invalidity by using s 33(1) (as discussed above), but they may also enact amended legislation before or upon release of the court’s decision (hoole, at pp. 120-21 and 134; eg. schachter, at pp. 690 and 724-25; figueroa v. canada (attorney general), 2003 scc 37, [2003] 1 scr 912, at para. 92). as stavsky explains: a legislature is a functioning entity, fully capable of responding to any set of circumstances the contention that legislatures act too slowly in emergency situations is erroneous. . . .there are no inherent barriers in the legislative system that prevent expedient action when it is necessary. [p 345] in the end, it must not be forgotten that before schachter, immediate declarations of invalidity were the established practice, and some of the court’s most striking decisions were rendered in this fashion without any adverse consequences (eg. big m drug mart; r v. morgentaler, [1988] 1 scr 30; saumur v. city of quebec, [1953] 2 scr 299; r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103). we are unaware of any reports that parliament or the legislature had difficulty responding to immediate declarations of invalidity then, and it would be pure conjecture on this court’s part to wonder if they will now. secondly, a return to a norm of immediate declarations would have the effect of avoiding this court’s particularly arbitrary and uninformed exercise of determining the length of a suspension. in manitoba reference, the court recognized its limits in this regard: “as presently equipped, the court is incapable of determining the period of time during which” a suspended declaration should govern (p 769). nothing we have seen in the intervening 35 years persuades us that this has fundamentally changed. a court’s institutional incapacity to estimate the amount of time required is only heightened “if there is no majority in government, if party discipline is weakened or if the unelected upper house of canada’s federal parliament exercises its powers” (k. roach, “the separation and interconnection of powers in canada: the role of courts, the executive and the legislature in crafting constitutional remedies” (2018), 5 j. int’l comp. l 315, at p 335). it is no surprise then that, as in the case at bar (see karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 179), this court often “appears unwilling to articulate why [its] long period[s] of suspension [are] appropriate,” (a van kralingen, “the dialogic saga of same-sex marriage: egale, halpern, and the relationship between suspended declarations and productive political discourse about rights” (2004), 62 u.t fac l rev 149, at p 176; e.g corbiere, at para. 27) and simply resorts to its standard durations of six months, a year, or 18 months with little guidance or consistency (hoole, at p 122). there is, consequently, a strong chance courts will overshoot the mark and allot the legislature more time than it requires. that was the case in corbiere, where the 18-month suspension acted “as a sedative, not a stimulant”, excusing the legislature from acting forthwith (c. mouland, “remedying the remedy: bedford’s suspended declaration of invalidity” (2018), 41 man. lj 281, at p 331; see also macfarlane, at p 118). in the end, the legislature waited until the seventh month before even beginning to respond (mouland, at p 331). to allow for an unconstitutional state of affairs, and the maintenance of its “harmful . . . effects [including] exacerbating existing disadvantage and marginalization” (r. leckey, bills of rights in the common law (2015) (“leckey, bills”), at pp. 173-74) to persist for a day longer than necessary is offensive to our constitutional order. thus, we strongly reject any notion that affording the legislature “time” is on its own a sufficient justification for extending the harms associated with the law in the first place. this brings us to our third point. it also behooves us to consider the harms inflicted on charter claimants and other affected rights holders by this court’s liberal and unprincipled use of suspended declarations. in allowing an unconstitutional law to remain in force, a court not only withholds the immediate relief to a successful claimant to which he or she is expressly entitled under s 52(1) of our constitution, but also sustains the law’s capacity to produce harm. in the process, the significance of the right at issue is diluted. for this reason, the improper use of suspended declarations pose “a threat to the very idea of constitutional supremacy” (choudhry and roach, at p 230) precisely because they “impose substantial costs on litigants” (leckey, bills, at p 170) who must bear the brunt of the unenforced norm (see r. leckey, suspended declarations of invalidity and the rule of law, march 12, 2014 (online); burningham, at p 206; and macfarlane, at p 120). similarly, suspended declarations can exacerbate pre-existing disadvantage. dean leckey highlights how “the delayed declaration risk[s] leveraging factual differences among members [of a litigant’s class] into arbitrary and unjust legal effects” (r leckey, “the harms of remedial discretion” (2016), 14 i con 584, at p 592). mouland echoes this when she writes of “horizontal inequity” (p 338) as a harm incurred by suspended declarations for instance, in the context of an unconstitutional criminal law, “individuals arrested and charged under the unconstitutional provisions late in the [suspended declaration period] would be much less likely to receive a conviction before that period elapsed than those arrested and charged earlier” (leckey, at p 592) the arbitrariness of this result is not only temporally based however, as an individual’s access to resources and socioeconomic position are also determinative: “individuals with decent legal advice . . . know not to plead guilty under the law, but to keep their file open until the suspension lapse[s],” whereas those without such advice, typically the marginalized and vulnerable, may not (p 592). further, prosecutorial discretion in charging may be informed by whether the crown in a particular jurisdiction has knowledge of the government’s intention (or lack thereof) to replace the legislation (and if so, with what), resulting in further arbitrary distinctions among those in the claimant’s class (p 595) ultimately, “incarcerating individuals convicted under an interdiction known to violate rights” engenders marginalization and “intensifies concerns for the rule of law and for justice generally” (p 593; see also p 595). in addition to its potential to extend harm, the routine use of suspended declarations risks discouraging rights holders from bringing charter claims forward in the first place. commentators have suggested that suspended declarations “contribute to a chilling effect on constitutional litigation in canada. . . . [t]here is a legitimate risk that suspended declarations add to the already steep disincentives against individuals initiating constitutional challenges” (hoole, at p 131; see also ryder, at p 287). we see a case in point in our colleague’s “balancing the harms” (para. 131) approach, which adds one more step at which claimants must assert their rights against other factors. it cannot be anything but discouraging for potential charter claimants to know that, under our colleague’s test, even where the government fails to justify the infringement of their charter rights under s 1, they must be ready to parry any “identifiable public interest” (para. 83; see also paras. 117, 139 and 171) that the government can muster to justify allowing that infringement to persist. in contemplating a test for suspended declarations then, we must recognize that the balancing at the s 1 stage has already been resolved in favour of the protection of the charter right. for a court to then alter this balance against the protection of that right strikes us as a monumental and unfortunate step. this is especially so where a court has already concluded that there is no rational connection between a law’s charter infringement and its objective (contra figueroa, at paras. 86 and 92-93): if an impugned law is not rationally serving the interests it purports to in the first place, we fail to see why the law should remain temporarily in effect. again, we would return to first principles. courts should legitimize a deviation from the initial balance struck only where the weighty interest in originally protecting the right is outweighed by a threat to the rule of law. a final point of concern. suspended declarations, if used improperly (as we see this court having used them), can actually undermine the rule of law they were designed to preserve in at least two ways first, suspended declarations can lead to uncertainty in the law for example, this court’s suspended declaration in bedford caused such significant uncertainty that “police and prosecution units across the country took different approaches to laying charges under the provisions maintained temporarily in effect, generating [extensive] litigation” and concern about unjust imprisonment (leckey, bills, at p 176; see also hoole, at pp. 125-26) secondly, suspended declarations can “lessen the consequences for lawmakers of enacting laws that violate the [charter, which] in turn, reduces the incentives for complying with rights when making [the] law” (leckey, bills, at p 177; see also schachter, at p 728, per la forest j.: “it is the duty of the courts to see that . . . laws conform to constitutional norms and declare them invalid if they do not. this imposes pressure on legislative bodies to stay within the confines of their constitutional powers from the outset”). professor ryder explains: one result of routinely suspending declarations of invalidity when legislation unjustifiably infringes charter rights and freedoms is that the costs to lawmakers of risking charter violations may no longer be apparent. . . . lawmakers might be getting the message that they take no significant risks if they pass laws without serious regard for charter rights and freedoms. . . . the consequences of drafting laws that may violate the charter, from a government’s point of view, may be nothing worse than litigation and a second chance at drafting charter-compliant legislation a few years down the road. [p 288] in other words, suspended declarations have actually become an invitation for governments to be bolder with their legislation, because the potentially negative consequences of doing so have been so largely contained, or are uncertain to occur. a remedy initially designed to serve the rule of law, in the absence of being grounded in the constitution, now risks causing, even promoting, its violation (ryder, at p 288). we would therefore return to the familiar rule of law path that was set in manitoba reference, and that is entirely within the province of the judiciary. and we would leave the concerns for policy-making constraints to those orders of the state (legislative and executive) that know of such matters. d conclusion this court’s use of suspended declarations as an instrument of remedial delegation to the legislature is not only “at odds with the precepts of canada’s constitutional model . . . [but] has [also] produced a problem of analytic incoherency, exacerbated flawed institutional assumptions that impose undue costs on charter claimants, and caused unnecessary injury to charter rights” (hoole, at p 147). beyond upholding the constitutional principle of the rule of law, we see no defensible justification — at least no judicially cognizable justification — for a court to suspend the enforcement of constitutional rights. if the court’s concern with using immediate declarations is deferential restraint, we say that true deference lies in conforming to the constitution, and not in “engag[ing] in a discretionary exercise each time” (leckey, bills, at p 178; see also p 177). it is tempting, and indeed it is venerable judicial methodology to scrutinize decided cases to discern principles that allow us to reconcile those cases with each other, and to identify a path forward in deciding a present case. but it must be borne in mind what is at stake fundamentally, “[i]t is the duty of the courts to uphold the constitution, not to seal its suspension” (reference re anti-inflation act, [1976] 2 scr 373, at pp. 463-64). unless, therefore, an immediate declaration of invalidity would transgress the rule of law — the very “foundation of [our] [c]onstitution” (manitoba reference, at p 766) — the charter must not be abrogated. we return again to professor ryder, who makes the point compellingly: . . . suspended declarations . . . appea[r] to conflict with [s 52(1)] and section 1 of the charter these sections place on governments the responsibility for demonstrating that limits on rights and freedoms are justified, and they place on the judiciary the responsibility for declaring invalid laws that have not been so justified. . . . judges partially abdicate their constitutional obligations the if responsibility for initially bringing invalid legislation into compliance with constitutional norms whenever a range of charter-compliant options exists. they grant legislatures to remedial dialogue should follow after the judiciary has exercised its section 52 responsibilities; it should not provide a reason for temporarily abdicating those responsibilities in the first place. [emphasis in original; p 282.] with great respect to our colleague who strives to find meaningful principles in what is a haphazard body of case law, it is time to restore discipline and restraint to this court’s approach to suspended declarations, and re-impose narrow conditions that give practical effect to its statements that the suspended declaration is a “high standard” to meet and an “extraordinary step” (r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr 599, at para. 98; carter v. canada (attorney general), 2016 scc 4, [2016] 1 scr 13, at para. 2). as we see it, this can only be done by turning back the clock to manitoba reference and reverting to its sound guidance that suspended declarations ought to be unusual and exigent, reserved exclusively for those cases where the rule of law is imperilled. the solution is not to rely on “principles” in decided cases that simply are not there to be seen. as was said by lord shaw of dunfermline more than a century ago, “[t]o remit the maintenance of constitutional right to the region of judicial discretion is to shift the foundations of freedom from the rock to the sand” (scott v. scott, [1913] ac 417 (hl), at p 477). when it comes to protecting charter rights from undue suspension, it must be the law, our constitution — not pure discretion (which our colleague only nominally rejects) — that is in command. accordingly, this court should not shy away from using immediate declarations of invalidity in the future. in most cases, immediate declarations are necessary to enforce protected rights, uphold constitutionalism, and vindicate the rule of law. we now turn to applying this approach to the case at bar. e. application in our view, granting an immediate declaration of invalidity in this case would threaten public safety and, therefore, the rule of law. we find the concerns in this case to be of the nature and magnitude of those that warranted suspended declarations in r v. swain, [1991] 1 scr 933, at p 1021 (holding that the detention of all persons found not guilty by reason of (what was then called) “insanity” was arbitrary because some will not be dangerous at the time of sentencing) and r v. demers, 2004 scc 46, [2004] 2 scr 489, at paras. 56-57 (holding that absolute discharges must be available to permanently unfit accused who do not pose a significant threat to public safety). in swain, the court considered that an immediate declaration would mean that “judges will be compelled to release into the community all insanity acquittees, including those who may well be a danger to the public” (p 1021). because of potentially “serious consequences” (p 1021) to public safety, the court issued a six-month suspended declaration of invalidity (p 1022). likewise, in demers, the court found that “striking down the legislation could create a danger to public safety” (para. 57) as it would, by necessary implication of its holding, have given absolute discharges to some unfit accused who did pose a threat to society. similarly, in this case, an immediate declaration would mean that the christopher’s law registry would not apply to all persons found ncrmd who have been granted absolute discharges by the ontario review board. while we are confident christopher’s law captures persons who do not pose a significant risk of reoffending, we are equally confident that it also captures many who do the application judge accepted dr. hanson’s evidence that, in general, persons found ncrmd pose an elevated risk of committing another sexual offence as compared to the general population, and further, that those who receive an absolute discharge have an increased probability of offending (2017 onsc 6713, 401 crr (2d) 297, at paras. 102, 103, 112 and 165). an absolute discharge cannot be equated with an absence of a risk of recidivism (ferguson v. regional mental health care st. thomas, 2010 onca 810, 271 oac 104, at paras. 1, 3 and 41-45; kassa (re), 2019 onca 313, at paras. 33-35 (canlii)). indeed, in some cases, the review board might not have granted an absolute discharge had they known the person found ncrmd was not going to be subject to christopher’s law. most importantly, it must be remembered that the “recidivism risk” we are referring to in this case is the risk of committing sexual offences, “violent crimes that . . . cause profound harm” to our most vulnerable (r v. friesen, 2020 scc 9, at para. 5) removing all absolutely discharged persons found ncrmd from the christopher’s law registry would significantly hamper the prevention and investigation of these offences. given that an immediate declaration of invalidity would remove persons found ncrmd who are potentially dangerous from the registry, it would, like in swain and demers, create a lacuna in the regime that would undoubtedly pose a danger to the public and thus threaten the rule of law. in addition to public safety, our colleague adds what she considers an additional justification to suspend the declaration of invalidity: she would suspend the declaration on the basis of “preserving the legislature’s latitude to respond to the finding of unconstitutionality” (para. 178). with respect, there is no reason to suppose that difficulty in getting persons found ncrmd back on the registry (see para. 176) would reduce the number of ways in which the legislature could provide an opportunity for exemption, or otherwise undermine the effectiveness of that policy choice (para. 130) the legislature could simply enact amended legislation that, like the current version of christopher’s law, requires everyone who falls under its jurisdiction to report forthwith, subject to penalty (ss. 3(1) and 11(1)). in any event, and for the reasons we have already given, the practical difficulties that a government may face in rolling out constitutionally compliant legislation cannot justify suspending charter rights. indeed, to us this indicates how dangerously close our colleague’s new category comes to the impermissible rationale of legislative deference from which this court should disassociate itself. rather than depending on vague notions of “the public’s interest in legislation enacted for its benefit” and “the role of the legislature” (para. 166), we would instead ground a suspended declaration of invalidity here solely on the threat to the rule of law that would otherwise manifest in the form of a threat to public safety. nor do we see any need for our colleague to invoke “the significance of the rights violation that the suspension would temporarily prolong” in this case (para. 177). were our colleague’s new approach to suspended declarations grounded in the constitutional principle of the rule of law, such commentary would not be necessary. indeed, it appears to be necessitated only by what we see as our colleague’s unsound “balancing” approach, since showing that it works in practice requires her to identify some concern to place on the respondent’s side of the scale to weigh against suspending the declaration (para. 177). iv. individual exemptions if a suspended declaration of invalidity should be rare, then an individual exemption from that suspension must be exceedingly so indeed, this court’s jurisprudence dictates that, in order to respect the role of the legislature, the limits of a court’s institutional capacity, and the potential for horizontal unfairness, an individual exemption is only appropriate in highly “unusual cases where additional s 24(1) relief is necessary to provide the claimant with an effective remedy” (ferguson, at para. 63 (emphasis added); see also schachter, at p 720; demers, at paras. 62-63). we see no reason to depart from this. a helpful consideration in determining whether an individual exemption is necessary to provide an “effective” remedy is to ask the question the interveners, the david asper centre for constitutional rights, and the attorney general of canada, posit: whether an exemption is necessary to prevent “irreparable harm” to the interests the charter was designed to protect during the suspension (asper centre factum, at para. 2; agc factum, at para. 55; roach, constitutional remedies, at §§14.60, 14.910, 14.930 and 141790). the case for irreparable harm must be so significant that it overcomes the weighty need to leave the manner of addressing a constitutional infringement to the legislature. for example, an exemption may be warranted where the litigant needs urgent medical treatment or to ensure the claimant is released from custody. in our view, the test from ferguson gives flexible interpretation to the words “appropriate and just” in s 24(1) and allows courts to adhere to their role as defender of fundamental rights by minimizing any injustice caused by the suspension while also — by limiting exemptions to exceptional cases — allowing the legislature to discharge its singular role in formulating complex and multi-faceted legislation. considered here, this is not one of those rare cases where an individual exemption is warranted. there is, to speak plainly, nothing highly unusual about this case: a delayed remedy will not deprive mr. g of an effective one, nor preclude him from accessing the government’s new opportunity for exemption in whatever form that may take further, a suspended declaration of 12 months means that mr. g will, at most, have to report to the police station one more time (for approximately 30-60 minutes (sup. ct. reasons, at para. 58)) as part of his obligation to report annually (see christopher’s law, at ss. 3(1)(f)-(g)). this is a far cry from “irreparable harm”. we are, therefore, in respectful disagreement with our colleague’s decision to grant mr. g an individual exemption. what is particularly troubling, however, is that our colleague’s reasons appear to establish a presumption in favour of individual exemptions in all cases (“if an exemption is otherwise appropriate and just, they should be exempted from suspensions in the absence of a compelling reason not to” (para. 152)). we therefore proceed to offer two important reasons why an individual exemption is inappropriate in this case, and in turn, why setting such a presumption and departing from the collective wisdom of schachter, demers, and ferguson, is imprudent. first, in this case, as in most, crafting an individual exemption will exceed the competence of a court and encroach on what is at bottom an issue for resolution by the legislature this court has long made clear that filling gaps in unconstitutional legislation is a task for the legislature, not the judiciary: hunter v. southam, at p 169; see also schachter, at pp. 705 and 707. in the case at bar, the legislature is in a far better position than this court — indeed it is its role — to determine, through research and study, what the appropriate mechanism is to provide persons found ncrmd with the opportunity for exemption, who has the necessary expertise to grant those exemptions, and which factors ought to inform that inquiry indeed, there are a plethora of options for the legislature to choose from. our colleague even acknowledges as much: . . . reading in an individualized assessment requirement would intrude on the legislative sphere — there are many ways to provide for such an assessment and “it is the legislature’s role to fill in the gaps, not the court’s” (schachter, at p 705). [emphasis added; para. 165.] (see also para. 183.) the court of appeal similarly notes that, because the sex offender information registration act, s.c 2004, c 10 (“soira”), has been invalidated in ontario, the ontario legislature and parliament will have to consult one another as to the best way to provide exemptions for those unconstitutionally affected: there are several ways in which parliament and the ontario legislature could make the sex offender registry legislation compliant with s 15(1) of the charter. those choices engage various policy considerations. there is also a need for a co-ordinated response by the two legislative bodies. the evaluation of the mechanics of implementing a co-ordinated response are best left to parliament and the legislature. those policy considerations and (2019 onca 264, 145 or (3d) 161, at para. 150) however, while acknowledging “reading in an individualized assessment requirement would intrude on the legislative sphere” (para. 165), our colleague effectively does just that by granting an individual exemption to mr. g. our reading-in jurisprudence teaches us that “if it is not clear that parliament would have passed the scheme with the modifications being considered by the court” (in this case, allowing courts to determine who should and should not be on the christopher’s law registry), “then for the court to make these modifications would represent an inappropriate intrusion into the legislative sphere” (ferguson, at para. 51 (see also para. 50); see also r v 974649 ontario inc., 2001 scc 81, [2001] 3 scr 575, at paras. 74-75). put differently, in attempting to provide an effective remedy, courts must not “leap into the kind of decisions and functions for which [their] design and expertise are manifestly unsuited” (doucet-boudreau v. nova scotia (minister of education), 2003 scc 62, [2003] 3 scr 3, at para. 57). this concern, and the related need to avoid dictating the content of new legislation, should govern our decisions on whether to issue an individual exemption (roach, constitutional remedies, at §14901). the legislature may, for example, conclude that only the ontario review board has the requisite expertise to determine whether a person who has been absolutely discharged should be subject to christopher’s law, and that courts are institutionally ill-suited to make any legitimate assessment of persons found ncrmd. indeed, as j. barrett and r. shandler observe, “courts simply lack the medical expertise and institutional knowledge necessary” to assess the dangerousness of a person found ncrmd (mental disorder in canadian criminal law (loose-leaf), at §11.1(a)(i)(b), citing r v peckham (1994), 93 ccc (3d) 443 (ont ca), at para. 39; see also ferguson (onca), at para. 11). this is particularly true in the case of sexual offences, given that, according to the evidence of the appellant’s expert, dr hanson, it often takes considerable time for sexual recidivism to manifest. dr. hanson, whose evidence was accepted by the application judge, testified that while most non-sexual recidivists will be identified within five years, new sexual recidivists are identified even after long periods, with studies showing that recidivism rates increase significantly after 10 years of being offence-free. this aligns with our collective knowledge that sexual offences, for various reasons, “can all too often be invisible to society” and remain undiscovered for years (friesen, at para. 67). in light of these considerations, it seems to us profoundly ill-advised for this court to short-circuit the legislative process and gift unto itself the ability to grant exemptions from the registry, even for mr. g and even temporarily. to be clear, we do not say that mr. g is likely to reoffend. our point is simply that what mr. g has shown is that persons found ncrmd who have been granted absolute discharges are entitled to “opportunities for exemption and removal” (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 161), and that this court cannot assume for itself the mantle of deciding what form these opportunities should take. in other words, the “benefit of [mr. g’s] success” (ibid., at para. 182) is that, like those who are found guilty of a sexual offence, he is entitled to the opportunity for exemption and removal from the registry, not that he must necessarily be removed. we are, further, in respectful disagreement with our colleague’s rationale that judges “are well-suited to deciding and frequently charged with making determinations” such as the one she has made for mr. g (para. 181) our colleague points specifically to termination and exemption orders in respect of a person subject to soira under ss. 490.016(1) and 490.023(2) of the code (para. 181) without deciding the issue, we note that appellate courts have concluded that the “very high” standard (r v. redhead, 2006 abca 84, 384 ar 206, at para. 43) to be met by an applicant seeking a termination or exemption order pursuant to these sections does not focus on risk instead, it focuses on those rare cases where the applicant’s unique circumstances make the impact of registration on their liberty and privacy interests particularly severe and something more than “the normal inconvenience [someone] would incur in complying with the requirements of registration” (r v rl, 2007 onca 347, at para. 7 (canlii); see also paras. 2-6 and 8; see also r v. debidin (2008), 94 or (3d) 421, at paras. 32, 68, 70 and 80; redhead, at paras. 3, 21, 31 and 37-43). the court of appeal for ontario, for example, has concluded that “[i]t is error to enhance the impact on an offender or to dilute the public interest in registration on the basis of a diminished risk of recidivism. indeed, it may be open to question whether accurate forecasts of the unlikelihood of recidivism can even be made [by courts]” (debidin, at para. 70) moreover, we find our colleague’s reference to judicial discretion under soira particularly curious, given that parliament has amended s 490.012(4) of the code, thereby eliminating the possibility for a sentencing judge to refuse to issue an order to comply with the registry (see protecting victims from sex offenders act, sc 2010, c 17, at s 5). the other two examples our colleague offers, discharges under s 730 and record suspensions issued by the parole board of canada (not courts) under s 4.1(1) of the criminal records act, rsc 1985, c. c-47, do not — as she amply recognizes throughout her reasons — apply to or address the unique circumstances of persons found ncrmd. in any event, these are all modes of assessment that parliament, not courts, has deemed appropriate. in conclusion, and with respect, there are unresolved contradictions in our colleague’s reasoning she accepts that this court does not have the institutional competence to craft a new regime that would determine who should be on the registry and who should not, evidenced by her decision to issue a declaration of invalidity and not some other remedy. yet, this decision is ultimately “at cross-purposes” (hislop, at para. 92) with her conclusion that this court, and thereby other courts, has the institutional competence to assess for itself the level of risk posed by persons found ncrmd and to issue corresponding exemptions. we add a second reason for not granting an individual exemption here, and generally against establishing a presumption in favour of doing so granting an individual exemption in this case, as in most cases, raises concerns of horizontal unfairness — that is, of treating the litigant better than others who are similarly situated. it is, in our respectful view, inappropriate to reward (even temporarily) only the litigant who was able to fund extensive constitutional litigation. there are undoubtedly other persons found ncrmd — perhaps those who are more vulnerable, or have committed less egregious offences than mr. g — who are just as, if not more, in need of relief. our colleague responds that “the claimant is not in the same position as others subject to the impugned law in a key respect: [he] has done the public interest a service by ensuring that an unconstitutional law is taken off the books” (para. 148). respectfully, we are unconvinced that there exists any principled reason why an individual constitutional remedy ought to become a device to reward a successful litigant for “brav[ing] the storm of constitutional litigation” (para. 142). the fact that a litigant has prevailed will entitle them to judgment in their favour, and may also entitle them to an order for costs to indemnify them for expenses sustained (see british columbia (minister of forests) v okanagan indian band, 2003 scc 71, [2003] 3 scr 371, at para. 21). but in a constitutional case involving the validity of a statute of general applicability, a litigant should not be entitled to a better or more immediate constitutional remedy than all other persons similarly situated merely because they brought the case. as this court recognized in canada (attorney general) v. downtown eastside sex workers united against violence society, 2012 scc 45, [2012] 2 scr. 524, many members of our society, particularly the marginalized, are simply “unable to participate in a court challenge” for various reasons beyond cost, such as “risk of public exposure [and loss of privacy], fear for [their] personal safety, and the potential loss of social services, income assistance . . . and [future education or] employment opportunities” (paras. 6 and 71) several of these factors, in addition to the “stigmatizing, prejudicial notions [that have] led to profound disadvantage for individuals living with mental illnesses” (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 62), have no doubt encumbered persons found ncrmd from challenging christopher’s law. considered in this light, our colleague’s justification for individual exemptions falls away. further, it is worth considering what is to happen if a legislature ultimately decides to deem court-ordered exemptions inappropriate in its future regime. here the risk of horizontal unfairness, which is associated with the rule of law, and of “creating further inequities” in the process (miron v. trudel, [1995] 2 scr 418, at para. 179) looms large, since this leaves all other persons found ncrmd in an inferior position relative to mr. g, who received a special court-ordered exemption from which they are precluded (see k. roach, “dialogic judicial review and its critics” (2004), 23 sclr. (2d) 49, at p 84). in our colleague’s view, a claimant should only be denied an individual exemption for a “compelling reason” (para. 149). she offers two examples. first, an individual exemption should be denied only where it “would undermine the interest motivating the suspension in the first place” (para. 150) she says that, where a declaration is suspended to protect public safety, an individual exemption would be inappropriate if it would endanger public safety. but again, judges are not well-suited to conduct an individualized assessment as to whether an exemption would endanger public safety in cases such as this one, whether evidence of the individual claimant’s situation is available or not. secondly, our colleague says that an individual exemption should be denied where practical considerations such as “judicial economy” (para. 151) make it inappropriate to grant one. she offers the example of a large group of claimants, where it might be impractical or impossible to conduct the individualized assessments necessary to grant individual exemptions to each claimant we agree that in cases involving a large number of claimants, a court might be disinclined to conduct multiple individual assessments. indeed, such reticence might well be apt in cases involving a single claimant, where — as here — the court lacks the competence to conduct even a single assessment. this suggests a converse danger, which is that a court confronted with multiple claimants could — as our colleague does in this case — simply skate over the assessments and grant exemptions all around. all that said, we observe that our colleague gives no guidance as to how the practical considerations she raises might, in a difficult case, be weighed against the supposed constitutional imperatives she identifies. respectfully, we view our colleague’s reasons on the matter of an individual exemption, considered in their totality, as internally inconsistent. first, they acknowledge that “tailored remedies should only be granted when a court can fairly conclude that the legislature would have enacted the law as it would be modified by the court” (para. 103), and that “although courts are capable of determining what the constitution requires, they are not well-suited to making ‘ad hoc choices from a variety of options’” (para. 115 (citation omitted)) then, without any evidence of the legislature’s intention and without any expert assessment of mr. g,14 they grant him an individual exemption our colleague’s statements that “the legislature may choose from a range of policy options” (para. 70) or “any form of individualized assessment” (para. 162) are undermined by her later conjecture that it will be “highly unlikely” that mr. g will be caught by the new legislation (para. 183). in this way, our colleague has usurped the legislative function and is legislating not just in effect, but in fact. in reality, 14 we highlight that no forensic risk assessment was ever made as to mr. g. the respondent’s expert dr. brink, did not examine the respondent, nor did the appellant’s expert dr. hanson. the only witness who assessed the respondent was his treating physician, who had no expertise in forensic assessment and who was found by both courts below to be unreliable (ago factum, at para. 96; sup. ct. reasons, at paras. 64-68; ca reasons, at paras. 48-49). amended legislation may capture mr. g, or it may not — it is not the role of the judiciary to postulate on whether or how the legislature will respond. in the end, the proliferation of individual exemptions is simply the unfortunate upshot of failing to properly confine the use of suspended declarations (see karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 146: “it is a court’s decision to grant a suspension that makes the individual remedy necessary”) we would reject our colleague’s post-hoc solution that “[i]ndividual exemptions can temper any further disincentive caused by suspensions” (para. 148). rather, the more appropriate response is to closely circumscribe the use of suspended declarations, as mandated by the constitution. once suspended declarations are properly limited to the exceptional situations where the rule of law is imperilled, the concern for providing an immediate remedy to the claimant fades. v conclusion for all these reasons, we are unable to join our colleague’s reasons, which to us represent an unbridled expansion of judicial discretion, with regard to issuing both suspended declarations and individual exemptions. we agree with our colleague that christopher’s law infringes mr. g’s charter right to equal treatment under the law, and that the declaration of invalidity was properly suspended. however, the suspension should be constitutionally grounded in the principle of the rule of law and the threat to public safety that would manifest otherwise. consistent with manitoba reference, at p 769, we would have invited submissions from the attorney general of ontario as to the minimum period necessary for christopher’s law to be made constitutionally compliant in the absence of that evidence, we would simply uphold the 12-month suspension of the declaration of invalidity consistent with the limited role of the judiciary vis-à-vis the legislature, we would not grant the respondent an individual exemption from that suspension. we would therefore allow the appeal in part.
[1] the appellant, erhard haniffa, was 1 of 104 people arrested over the course of “project raphael”, an online investigation of the york regional police which targeted the buyer side of the juvenile sex work market. his appeal was heard together with three others, each concerning the doctrine of entrapment in the context of the project raphael online police investigation the companion cases, with reasons released concurrently, are r v. ramelson, 2022 scc 44, r v. jaffer, 2022 scc 45 and r v. dare, 2022 scc 47. like two of the other three appellants, mr. haniffa’s appeal is from an order of the court of appeal for ontario dismissing his conviction appeal and his appeal from the application judge’s dismissal of his entrapment application. [2] mr haniffa’s appeal concerns the bona fide inquiry prong of the entrapment doctrine in relation to project raphael. because i consider these issues at length in ramelson and because the disposition of this appeal is necessarily the same, my reasons here are brief. [3] on march 22, 2016, while browsing the escort subdirectory of backpage.com, mr. haniffa responded to an ad purportedly placed by “jamie”. the ad indicated she was 18 years old (the minimum age allowed by the website), and described her as “young shy fresh and new”, “super new to this and pretty shy” and as having a friend who is “young like me” (ar, vol. vi, at p 5). communicating with mr. haniffa by text, the undercover officer (uc) eventually revealed to him that “she” was 15 years old: [11:13 – haniffa]: u busy? [13:09 – uc]: im free tn after school [13:13 – haniffa]: what time is school done? [13:19 – uc]: 330 . [14:35 – uc]: r u ok if im not quite 18 yet? [14:53 – haniffa]: is this like a cop thing or something? [14:53 – haniffa]: can u call u? [15:00 – uc]: .no silly [15:01 – haniffa]: how old r u? . [16:18 – uc]: im 15 to be hones but i look older hun [16:20 – haniffa]: mm [16:20 – haniffa]: ok so where will u be working? [16:24 – uc]: why the mm babe [16:27 – haniffa]: as in mm ok (ar, vol. vi, at pp. 13-15) [4] when mr. haniffa arrived at the designated hotel room, he was arrested. he was charged with 3 offences: telecommunicating with a person he believed to be under the age of 18 years, for the purpose of committing an offence under s 286.1(2) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor), contrary to s 172.1(1)(a); telecommunicating with a person he believed to be under the age of 16 years for the purpose of committing an offence under s 152 (invitation to sexual touching), contrary to s 172.1(1)(b); and communicating to obtain sexual services for consideration from a person under 18 years, contrary to s 2861(2). [5] mr. haniffa was convicted at trial of all three counts, but his conviction under s 172.1(1)(a) was stayed pursuant to kienapple v. the queen, [1975] 1 scr. 729. he then brought an application for a stay of proceedings on the basis that he had been entrapped. [6] the application judge dismissed the application, concluding that project raphael was a bona fide inquiry. the court of appeal then dismissed mr. haniffa’s appeal for its reasons in r v. ramelson, 2021 onca 328, 155 or (3d) 481, which addressed the common issue of whether the individuals arrested through project raphael were entrapped (2021 onca 326, 155 or (3d) 523, at para. 46). [7] in this appeal, mr. haniffa adopts the questions in issue as set out in the appellant’s factum in ramelson, and acknowledges that “the facts of the present case are sufficiently similar, so that the same conclusions must follow” (af, at para. 41). many of his arguments mirror those raised in ramelson, but he raises some additional points inspector truong’s evidence, he says, was insufficient to ground reasonable suspicion: it was based too heavily on his personal experiences, failed to show the targeted offences were prevalent, and failed to explain how a user would actually locate a juvenile sex worker through the website, given its parameters. and given the potential breadth of investigations into spaces, the police should be limited, in the context of bona fide inquiries, to offering the same offences they suspect are occurring; they should not be entitled to offer those that are only rationally connected and proportionate (see r v. mack, [1988] 2 scr 903, at p 958). [8] for the reasons given in ramelson, i would not accede to these arguments. as i explained there, the police had reasonable suspicion over a sufficiently precise space and the mack standard of “rationally connected and proportionate” applies and was satisfied. project raphael was thus a bona fide inquiry. i conclude that mr. haniffa was not entrapped. [9] for these reasons, i would dismiss mr. haniffa’s appeal.
[1] since this court’s landmark decision in haida nation v. british columbia (minister of forests), 2004 scc 73, [2004] 3 scr 511, the duty to con- sult has played a critical role in ensuring that aborig- inal and treaty rights receive meaningful protection. grounded in the honour of the crown, this duty [1] depuis l’arrêt de principe nation haïda c. colombie- britannique (ministre des forêts), 2004 csc 73, [2004] 3 rcs 511, l’obligation de consul- ter a joué un rôle central pour garantir une véritable protection aux droits ancestraux et issus de traités. ancrée dans le principe de l’honneur de la couronne, 782 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. requires the crown to consult (and if appropriate, ac- commodate) aboriginal peoples before taking action that may adversely affect their asserted or established rights under s. 35 of the constitution act, 1982. the appellant mikisew cree first nation argues that the crown had a duty to consult them on the develop- ment of environmental legislation that had the poten- tial to adversely affect their treaty rights to hunt, trap, and fish. this court must therefore answer a vexing question it has left open in the past: does the duty to consult apply to the law- making process? i conclude that it does not. two constitutional [2] principles — the separation of powers and parlia- mentary sovereignty — dictate that it is rarely ap- propriate for courts to scrutinize the law- making process. the process of law- making does not only take place in parliament. rather, it begins with the development of legislation. when ministers develop legislation, they act in a parliamentary capacity. as such, courts should exercise restraint when deal- ing with this process. extending the duty to consult doctrine to the legislative process would oblige the judiciary to step beyond the core of its institutional role and threaten the respectful balance between the three pillars of our democracy. it would also trans- pose a consultation framework and judicial remedies developed in the context of executive action into the distinct realm of the legislature. thus, the duty to consult doctrine is ill- suited to the law- making process; the law- making process does not constitute “crown conduct” that triggers the duty to consult. l’obligation en question exige que cette dernière consulte les peuples autochtones (et, s’il y a lieu, trouve des accommodements) avant de prendre des mesures susceptibles d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits protégés par l’art. 35 de la loi consti- tutionnelle de 1982 faisant l’objet d’une revendica- tion ou dont l’existence a été établie. l’appelante, la mikisew cree first nation, soutient que la couronne avait l’obligation de la consulter en ce qui concerne l’élaboration d’une loi de protection environnemen- tale susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits de ses membres de chasser, de piéger et de pêcher garantis par traité. la cour doit donc ré- pondre à une question épineuse laissée à ce jour sans réponse : l’obligation de consulter s’applique-t-elle au processus législatif? je conclus par la négative. compte tenu de [2] l’existence de deux principes constitutionnels — la séparation des pouvoirs et la souveraineté parlemen- taire —, il est rarement approprié que les tribunaux examinent de près le processus législatif. celui-ci ne se déroule pas uniquement au parlement. il com- mence plutôt par l’élaboration des projets de loi. à ce stade, les ministres s’acquittent de fonctions parlementaires. cela étant, les tribunaux doivent faire preuve de retenue lorsqu’ils se penchent sur ce processus. étendre la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter au processus législatif obligerait l’or- gane judiciaire à outrepasser les aspects essentiels de son rôle institutionnel et menacerait l’équilibre respectueux qui règne entre les trois piliers de notre démocratie. cela transposerait aussi un cadre de consultation et les recours judiciaires élaborés en relation avec des actes de l’exécutif dans la sphère distincte du législateur. par conséquent, la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter ne convient pas au pro- cessus législatif; un processus qui ne constitue pas une « conduite de la couronne », élément déclen- cheur de l’obligation de consulter. [3] this is not to suggest, however, that when the legislation undermines s. 35 rights, aboriginal groups would be left without a remedy. clearly, if legislation infringes s. 35, it may be declared invalid pursuant to s. 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982. further, the crown’s honour may well require judicial interven- tion where legislation may adversely affect — but [3] cela ne veut toutefois pas dire que, lorsque la loi porte atteinte aux droits protégés par l’art. 35, les groupes autochtones ne disposent d’aucun re- cours. évidemment, si une loi enfreint cette dispo- sition, elle peut être déclarée invalide en application du par. 52(1) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982. en outre, l’honneur de la couronne peut fort bien [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge karakatsanis 783 does not necessarily infringe — aboriginal or treaty rights. however, the resolution of such questions must be left to another day. in this appeal, the issue was framed in terms of whether the duty to consult doctrine should apply to the law- making process. i find that it should not. commander l’intervention des tribunaux lorsqu’une loi est susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits ancestraux et issus de traités, sans néces- sairement y porter atteinte. il faudra toutefois régler ces questions à une autre occasion. dans le présent pourvoi, la question en litige est celle de savoir si la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter devrait s’ap- pliquer au processus législatif. je conclus que non. ii background ii contexte [4] the mikisew are a band within the meaning of the indian act, rsc 1985, c. i-5, whose tradi- tional territory is situated primarily in northeastern alberta. this is a region of immense beauty; it in- cludes, for example, the lands and waters around lake athabasca, as well as the peace- athabasca delta. this region is also home to significant existing and proposed oil sands development. [4] les mikisew forment une bande, au sens de la loi sur les indiens, lrc 1985, c. i-5, dont le territoire ancestral se trouve principalement dans le nord- est de l’alberta. c’est une région d’une im- mense beauté qui comprend les terres et les eaux des environs du lac athabasca ainsi que le delta paix- athabasca, et qui accueille des projets, proposés et existants, d’exploitation des sables bitumineux. [5] the mikisew are descendants of an aboriginal group that, along with a number of other first na- tions, adhered to treaty no. 8 with her majesty in 1899. under treaty no. 8, first nations ceded a large amount of land — much of what is now northern alberta, northeastern british columbia, northwest- ern saskatchewan, and the southern portion of the northwest territories — to the crown in exchange for certain guarantees. among these guarantees was a provision protecting the right of the signatories to hunt, trap, and fish: and her majesty the queen hereby agrees with the said indians that they shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore described, subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by the government of the country, acting under the authority of her majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes. [5] les mikisew sont les descendants d’un groupe autochtone qui, avec plusieurs autres premières na- tions, a conclu le traité no 8 avec sa majesté en 1899. aux termes de ce traité, les premières na- tions ont cédé à la couronne une vaste superficie de terres — qui représente une grande partie de ce qui constitue aujourd’hui le nord de l’alberta, le nord- est de la colombie- britannique, le nord- ouest de la saskatchewan et la partie sud des territoires du nord- ouest — en contrepartie de certaines garanties, dont celle que leurs droits de chasse, de piégeage et de pêche seraient protégés : [traduction] et sa majesté la reine convient par les présentes avec les dits indiens qu’ils auront le droit de se livrer à leurs occupations ordinaires de la chasse au fusil, de la chasse au piège et de la pêche dans l’étendue de pays cédée telle que ci- dessus décrite, subordonnées à tels règlements qui pourront être faits de temps à autre par le gouvernement du pays agissant au nom de sa majesté et sauf et excepté tels terrains qui de temps à autre pourront être requis ou pris pour des fins d’établissements, de mine, de commerce de bois, ou autres objets. [6] the mikisew’s claim relates to two pieces of omnibus legislation that had significant effects on canada’s environmental protection regime. in april 2012, the federal minister of finance introduced [6] la contestation des mikisew concerne deux lois omnibus qui ont eu une incidence importante sur le régime canadien de protection environnemen- tale. au mois d’avril 2012, le ministre fédéral des 784 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. bill c-38 (enacted as the jobs, growth and long- term prosperity act, sc 2012, c. 19), which received royal assent in june 2012. later that year, the minister introduced bill c-45 (enacted as the jobs and growth act, 2012, sc 2012, c. 31), which received royal assent in december 2012. [7] these bills were broad in scope. together, they resulted in the repeal of the canadian environmental assessment act, sc 1992, c. 37, and the enact- ment of the canadian environmental assessment act, 2012, sc 2012, c. 19, s 52. they also resulted in significant amendments to the protection regime under the fisheries act, rsc 1985, c. f-14, as well as amendments to the species at risk act, sc 2002, c.  29, and the navigable waters protection act, which was renamed the navigation protection act, rsc 1985, c n-22. [8] the mikisew were not consulted on either of these omnibus bills at any stage in their development or prior to the granting of royal assent. [9] the mikisew brought an application for judicial review under ss. 18 and 18.1 of the federal courts act, rsc 1985, c. f-7, seeking various declarations and orders concerning the respondent ministers’ duty to consult them with respect to the introduction and development of the omnibus bills. finances a présenté le projet de loi c-38 (adopté sous le nom de loi sur l’emploi, la croissance et la prospérité durable, lc 2012, c. 19), qui a reçu la sanction royale au mois de juin 2012. plus tard cette année-là, le ministre a présenté le projet de loi c-45 (adopté sous le nom de loi de 2012 sur l’emploi et la croissance, lc 2012, c. 31), qui a reçu la sanction royale au mois de décembre 2012. [7] ces projets de loi avaient une large portée. ensemble, ils ont mené à l’abrogation de la loi ca- nadienne sur l’évaluation environnementale, lc. 1992, c. 37, et à l’adoption de la loi canadienne sur l’évaluation environnementale (2012), lc 2012, c. 19, art 52. ils apportaient également d’importantes modifications au régime de protection mis en place par la loi sur les pêches, lrc 1985, c. f-14, et ils modifiaient la loi sur les espèces en péril, lc 2002, c. 29, ainsi que la loi sur la protection des eaux na- vigables, qui a été renommée la loi sur la protection de la navigation, lrc 1985, c n-22. [8] aucune consultation n’a été menée auprès des mikisew quant aux deux projets de loi omnibus ni à quelque étape que ce soit de leur élaboration ni avant qu’ils ne reçoivent la sanction royale. [9] les mikisew ont présenté une demande de con trôle judiciaire en vertu des art. 18 et 18.1 de la loi sur les cours fédérales, lrc 1985, c. f-7, par laquelle ils sollicitaient diverses déclarations et ordonnances relatives à l’obligation des ministres intimés de les consulter en ce qui concerne la pré- sentation et l’élaboration des projets de loi omnibus. [10] the reviewing judge, hughes j., determined that the proceedings were not precluded by s. 2(2) of the federal courts act and that they presented a justiciable issue (2014 fc 1244, 470 ftr 243). he explained that judicial intervention in the law- making process is inconsistent with the separation of powers. therefore, if the development of policy by ministers triggers a duty to consult, the judiciary cannot enforce this duty before a bill is introduced into parliament. the reviewing judge then turned to determining whether a duty to consult was triggered in this case. he assumed that the steps that cabinet ministers take during the law- making process prior [10] le juge hughes, saisi de la demande de contrôle, a conclu que le par. 2(2) de la loi sur les cours fédérales n’avait pas pour effet d’exclure l’ins- tance et que cette dernière comportait une question justiciable : 2014 cf 1244, 470 ftr 243. il a pré- cisé qu’une intervention judiciaire dans le processus législatif contreviendrait au principe de la séparation des pouvoirs. par conséquent, si l’élaboration d’une politique par les ministres déclenchait une obligation de consulter, les tribunaux ne peuvent voir à son application avant qu’un projet de loi soit déposé au parlement. le juge hughes s’est ensuite demandé s’il existait une obligation de consulter en l’espèce. [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge karakatsanis 785 to introducing a bill into parliament can constitute crown conduct triggering the duty to consult. he found that the proposals contained in the omnibus bills may adversely affect the mikisew’s treaty rights. therefore, he concluded that the duty to consult was triggered. the mikisew were entitled to notice of the provisions of the omnibus bills that reasonably might have been expected to affect their treaty rights, as well as an opportunity to make submissions. the federal court granted a declaration to this effect. [11] the federal court of appeal allowed the ap- peal (2016 fca 311, [2017] 3 fcr 298). the ma- jority, de montigny and webb jja, concluded that the reviewing judge erred by conducting a judicial review of legislative action contrary to the federal courts act. in its view, when ministers develop pol- icy, they act in a legislative capacity and their actions are immune from judicial review. the majority also held that the reviewing judge’s decision was incon- sistent with the principles of parliamentary sover- eignty, the separation of powers, and parliamentary privilege. these principles dictate that courts cannot supervise the legislative process. further, imposing a duty to consult in the legislative process would be impractical and would fetter parliament’s law- making capacity. il a tenu pour acquis que les mesures que prennent les ministres du cabinet avant le dépôt d’un projet de loi au parlement peuvent constituer une conduite de la couronne qui déclenche l’obligation de consulter. il a conclu que les propositions contenues dans les projets de loi omnibus étaient susceptibles d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits des mikisew ga- rantis par traité. il a donc déclaré que l’obligation de consulter s’appliquait. les mikisew avaient le droit de recevoir un avis les informant des dispositions des projets de loi omnibus qui, raisonnablement, pouvaient porter préjudice à leurs droits issus de traités et de se voir offrir la possibilité de présenter des observations. la cour fédérale a rendu une or- donnance déclaratoire en ce sens. [11] la cour d’appel fédérale a accueilli l’appel : 2016 caf 311, [2017] 3 rcf 298. les juges de montigny et webb, majoritaires, ont conclu que le juge saisi de la demande de contrôle avait commis une erreur en procédant au contrôle judiciaire d’une mesure législative en contravention de la loi sur les cours fédérales. selon la cour d’appel, lorsque les ministres élaborent une politique, ils agissent à titre de législateurs et leurs actions ne sont pas assujetties au contrôle des tribunaux. les juges majoritaires ont également conclu que la décision de première instance ne respectait pas les principes de la souve- raineté parlementaire, de la séparation des pouvoirs et du privilège parlementaire. ces principes exigent que les tribunaux s’abstiennent de superviser le pro- cessus législatif. de plus, imposer une obligation de consulter dans le cadre du processus législatif serait peu pratique et entraverait la capacité législative du parlement. [12] concurring, pelletier ja concluded that the federal courts act did not preclude the mikisew’s claim. while the federal court may not have been validly seized of an application for judicial review, he determined that it nonetheless had jurisdiction over the matter under s. 17 of the federal courts act, as the mikisew sought relief against the crown. pelletier ja noted that it may be problematic to conclude that legislative action can never trigger the duty to consult. however, he concluded that the duty to consult is not triggered by legislation of general application that causes effects which are not limited [12] dans des motifs concordants, le juge pelletier a conclu que la loi sur les cours fédérales ne faisait pas obstacle à la demande des mikisew. selon lui, bien que la cour fédérale n’ait peut- être pas été vala- blement saisie d’une demande de contrôle judiciaire, elle avait néanmoins compétence sur l’affaire en vertu de l’art. 17 de la loi sur les cours fédérales, puisque les mikisew demandaient réparation contre la couronne. le juge pelletier a signalé qu’il pour- rait se révéler problématique de conclure qu’une mesure législative ne peut en aucun cas déclencher l’obligation de consulter. toutefois, il a conclu que 786 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. to the specific rights at issue. since the omnibus legislation was of this nature, the duty to consult was not triggered. cette obligation ne prend pas naissance s’il s’agit d’une loi d’application générale dont les effets ne sont pas limités aux droits en cause. comme les lois omnibus appartenaient à cette catégorie, l’obligation de consulter n’entrait pas en jeu. iii analysis a jurisdiction iii analyse a compétence [13] for the federal court to have jurisdiction over a claim, it must have a statutory grant of jurisdic- tion (windsor (city) v. canadian transit co., 2016 scc 54, [2016] 2 scr 617, at para 34). [13] pour que la cour fédérale puisse avoir com- pétence, la loi doit la lui avoir attribuée : windsor (city) c. canadian transit co., 2016 csc 54, [2016] 2 rcs 617, par 34. [14] two potential statutory grants of jurisdiction are live in this appeal: ss. 17 and 18 of the federal courts act. i will address each in turn. [14] deux dispositions potentiellement attributives de compétence interviennent dans le présent pour- voi : les art. 17 et 18 de la loi sur les cours fédérales. je traiterai de chacune d’elles à tour de rôle. (1) section 17 of the federal courts act (1) article 17 de la loi sur les cours fédérales [15] the mikisew did not advance s. 17 as a basis for jurisdiction at first instance or in their submis- sions before this court. however, pelletier ja at the federal court of appeal held that s. 17 was a basis for jurisdiction in this case. further, while the mikisew’s initial application was framed as a judicial review under s. 18 (not s. 17), the federal courts rules, sor/98- 106, provide that “[a]n originating document shall not be set aside only on the ground that a different originating document should have been used” (rule 57). [15] les mikisew n’ont pas invoqué l’art. 17 en tant que disposition attributive de compétence ni en première instance ni dans leur plaidoirie devant la cour. or, le juge pelletier, de la cour d’appel fédérale, a déclaré que cette disposition conférait une compétence en l’espèce. de plus, bien que la première demande des mikisew ait été qualifiée de demande de contrôle judiciaire visée à l’art. 18 (et non à l’art. 17), les règles des cours fédérales, dors/98- 106, prévoient que « [l]a cour n’annule pas un acte introductif d’instance au seul motif que l’instance aurait dû être introduite par un autre acte introductif d’instance » : règle 57. [16] section  17(1) of the act provides that the “federal court has concurrent original jurisdic- tion in all cases in which relief is claimed against the crown”. further, s. 2(1) of the act defines the “crown” as “her majesty in right of canada”. how- ever, i agree that her majesty in right of canada does not extend to executive actors when they are exercising “legislative power” (fédération franco- ténoise v. canada, 2001 fca 220, [2001] 3 fc 641, at para 58). here, as i will explain, the mikisew challenge actions which are uniformly legislative in character. it follows that their application is not [16] aux termes du par. 17(1) de la loi, la « cour fédérale a compétence concurrente, en première ins- tance, dans les cas de demande de réparation contre la couronne ». en outre, le par. 2(1) de la loi définit la « couronne » comme étant « sa majesté du chef du canada ». je reconnais toutefois que ce nom ne s’étend pas aux acteurs de l’exécutif qui exercent un « pouvoir législatif » : fédération franco- ténoise c. canada, 2001 caf 220, [2001] 3 cf 641, par 58. en l’espèce, comme je l’expliquerai, les mikisew contestent des mesures qui sont uniformément de na- ture législative. par conséquent, leur demande ne vise [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge karakatsanis 787 against “the crown” in its executive capacity. thus, the federal court lacked s. 17 jurisdiction over the mikisew’s claim. pas « la couronne » dans l’exercice de sa fonction exécutive. l’article 17 ne confère donc pas à la cour fédérale compétence sur la demande des mikisew. (2) section 18 of the federal courts act (2) article 18 de la loi sur les cours fédérales [17] the mikisew brought this case as an appli- cation for judicial review of the development of the omnibus legislation by the respondent ministers un- der ss. 18 and 18.1 of the federal courts act. i agree with the conclusions and reasons of the majority of the federal court of appeal that the federal court was not validly seized of an application for judicial review in this case. [18] the federal courts act does not allow for judicial review of parliamentary activities. indeed, ss. 18 and 18.1 only grant the federal court jurisdic- tion to judicially review action taken by “any federal board, commission or other tribunal”. a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” is defined in the act, subject to certain exceptions, as a body exercis- ing statutory powers or powers under an order made pursuant to a prerogative of the crown (s. 2; see also strickland v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 37, [2015] 2 scr 713, at para 64). section 2(2) specifies that “federal board, commission or other tribunal” does not include “the senate, the house of commons, any committee or member of either house”. thus, i agree that s. 2(2) is designed “to preclude judicial review of the legislative process at large” (ca reasons, at para 32). as i will ex- plain further below, cabinet and ministers do not act pursuant to statutory powers when developing legislation; rather, they act pursuant to powers un- der part iv of the constitution act, 1867. as such, when developing legislation, they do not act as a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” within the meaning of s. 2 (see shade v. canada (attorney general), 2003 fct 327, 230 ftr 53, at para 34). [17] les mikisew ont déposé la présente demande de contrôle judiciaire, en application des art. 18 et 18.1 de la loi sur les cours fédérales, à l’égard du processus d’élaboration des lois omnibus par les ministres intimés. je souscris aux conclusions et aux motifs des juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel fédérale selon lesquels la cour fédérale n’a pas été saisie à bon droit de la demande de contrôle judi- ciaire en l’espèce. [18] la loi sur les cours fédérales n’autorise pas le contrôle judiciaire des activités parlementaires. en effet, les art. 18 et 18.1 ne confèrent à la cour fédérale que la compétence de contrôler les actions d’un « office fédéral ». il s’agit, au sens de la loi, sous réserve de certaines exceptions, d’un organisme exerçant une compétence ou des pouvoirs prévus par une loi ou par une ordonnance prise en vertu d’une prérogative royale : art. 2; voir aussi strickland c. canada (procureur général), 2015 csc 37, [2015] 2 rcs 713, par 64. le paragraphe 2(2) précise que « le sénat, la chambre des communes, tout comité de l’une ou l’autre chambre, tout sénateur ou député » sont exclus de la définition d’« office fédéral ». cette disposition vise donc à « empêcher le contrôle judi- ciaire de la filière législative en général » : cour d’ap- pel, par 32. comme je l’expliquerai plus en détail ultérieurement, le cabinet et les ministres n’agissent pas en application de pouvoirs que leur confère la loi lorsqu’ils élaborent les textes législatifs; ils agissent plutôt en vertu des pouvoirs qui leur sont dévolus par la partie iv de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. ainsi, dans le cadre de leur fonction de législateurs, ils n’agissent pas comme un « office fédéral » au sens de l’art. 2 : voir shade c. canada (procureur général), 2003 cfpi 327, par. 34 (canlii). [19] nonetheless, the parties have made extensive submissions on the substantive issues in this appeal. in these circumstances, it is important for this court to determine whether the duty to consult applies to the law- making process. [19] quoi qu’il en soit, les parties ont présenté des observations détaillées sur les questions de fond sou- levées dans le présent pourvoi. dans les circonstances, il est important que la cour détermine si l’obligation de consulter s’applique au processus législatif. 788 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. b the honour of the crown and the duty to con- b l’honneur de la couronne et l’obligation de sult consulter [20] the duty to consult is grounded in the honour of the crown (haida nation, at para 16). thus, i turn first to the principles that underlie the honour of the crown and its relationship with the duty to consult. [21] the honour of the crown is a foundational principle of aboriginal law and governs the relation- ship between the crown and aboriginal peoples. it arises from “the crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the control of that people” and goes back to the royal procla- mation of 1763 (haida nation, at para. 32; manitoba metis federation inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2013 scc 14, [2013] 1 scr 623, at para 66). it recognizes that the tension between the crown’s assertion of sovereignty and the pre- existing sover- eignty, rights and occupation of aboriginal peoples creates a special relationship that requires that the crown act honourably in its dealings with aboriginal peoples (manitoba metis, at para. 67; b. slattery, “aboriginal rights and the honour of the crown” (2005), 29 sclr (2d) 433, at p 436). [22] the underlying purpose of the honour of the crown is to facilitate the reconciliation of these in- terests (manitoba metis, at paras 66-67). one way that it does so is by promoting negotiation and the just settlement of aboriginal claims as an alterna- tive to litigation and judicially imposed outcomes (taku river tlingit first nation v. british columbia (project assessment director), 2004 scc 74, [2004] 3 scr 550, at para 24). this endeavour of recon- ciliation is a first principle of aboriginal law. [20] l’obligation de consulter est fondée sur le principe de l’honneur de la couronne : nation haïda, par 16. je vais donc traiter dans un premier temps des principes qui sous- tendent l’honneur de la couronne et de son lien avec l’obligation de consulter. [21] l’honneur de la couronne est un principe fondamental du droit des autochtones qui régit la relation entre la couronne et les peuples autochtones. il tire son origine de « l’affirmation par la couronne de sa souveraineté sur un peuple autochtone et [de] l’exercice de fait de son autorité sur des terres et ressources qui étaient jusque-là sous l’autorité de ce peuple », et il remonte à la proclamation royale de 1763 : nation haïda, par. 32; manitoba metis federation inc. c. canada (procureur général), 2013 csc 14, [2013] 1 rcs 623, par 66. il reconnaît que la tension entre l’affirmation de la souveraineté de la couronne, d’une part, et la souveraineté, les droits et l’occupation préexistants des peuples au- tochtones, d’autre part, donne naissance à une rela- tion particulière, qui exige que la couronne agisse honorablement envers ces derniers : manitoba metis, par. 67; b. slattery, « aboriginal rights and the honour of the crown » (2005), 29  sclr (2d) 433, p 436. [22] l’objectif qui sous- tend le principe de l’hon- neur de la couronne est celui de faciliter la réconci- liation de ces intérêts : manitoba metis, par 66-67. il contribue à l’atteinte de cet objectif notamment en favorisant la négociation et le règlement juste des revendications autochtones comme solution de rechange aux recours judiciaires et aux résultats im- posés par les tribunaux : première nation tlingit de taku river c. colombie- britannique (directeur d’évaluation de projet), 2004 csc 74, [2004] 3 rcs 550, par 24. cette entreprise de réconcilia- tion est un principe de base du droit des autochtones. [23] the honour of the crown is always at stake in its dealings with aboriginal peoples (r v. badger, [1996] 1 scr 771, at para. 41; manitoba metis, at paras 68-72). as it emerges from the crown’s asser- tion of sovereignty, it binds the crown qua sovereign. [23] l’honneur de la couronne est toujours en jeu lorsque cette dernière traite avec les peuples autoch- tones : r c. badger, [1996] 1 rcs 771, par. 41; manitoba metis, par 68-72. comme il découle de l’affirmation de la souveraineté de la couronne, il [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge karakatsanis 789 indeed, it has been found to apply when the crown acts either through legislation or executive conduct (see r v. sparrow, [1990] 1 scr 1075, at pp. 1110 and 1114; r v. van der peet, [1996] 2 scr 507, at para. 231, per mclachlin j., as she then was, dis- senting; haida nation; manitoba metis, at para 69). [24] as this court stated in haida nation, the hon- our of the crown “is not a mere incantation, but rather a core precept that finds its application in concrete practices” and “gives rise to different du- ties in different circumstances” (paras. 16 and 18). when engaged, it imposes “a heavy obligation” on the crown (manitoba metis, at para 68). indeed, because of the close relationship between the honour of the crown and s. 35, the honour of the crown has been described as a “constitutional principle” (beckman v. little salmon/carmacks first nation, 2010 scc 53, [2010] 3 scr 103, at para 42). that said, this court has made clear that the duties that flow from the honour of the crown will vary with the situations in which it is engaged (manitoba metis, at para 74). determining what constitutes honourable dealing, and what specific obligations are imposed by the honour of the crown, depends heav- ily on the circumstances (haida nation, at para. 38; taku river, at para. 25; rio tinto alcan inc. v. car- rier sekani tribal council, 2010 scc 43, [2010] 2 scr 650, at paras 36-37). lie celle-ci en sa qualité de souveraine. en effet, la cour a déjà jugé que le principe de l’honneur de la couronne s’applique quand cette dernière agit soit par le truchement d’une mesure législative, soit dans l’exercice de sa fonction exécutive : voir r c. sparrow, [1990] 1 rcs 1075, p. 1110 et 1114; r. c. van der peet, [1996] 2 rcs 507, par. 231 (la juge mclachlin, plus tard juge en chef, dissidente); nation haïda; manitoba metis, par 69. [24] comme l’a statué la cour dans nation haïda, l’honneur de la couronne « [n’est] pas simplement [  ] une belle formule, mais [  ] un précepte fon- damental qui peut s’appliquer dans des situations concrètes » et qui « fait naître différentes obligations selon les circonstances » : par. 16 et 18. lorsqu’il est engagé, il fait peser « une lourde obligation » sur la couronne : manitoba metis, par 68. en effet, vu l’existence d’un lien étroit entre l’art. 35 et le principe de l’honneur de la couronne, ce dernier a été qualifié de « principe constitutionnel » : beckman c. première nation de little salmon/carmacks, 2010 csc 53, [2010] 3 rcs 103, par 42. toutefois, la cour a clairement indiqué que les obligations qui en découlent varient en fonction de la situation : manitoba metis, par 74. la réponse à la question de savoir ce qui constitue un comportement honorable et quelles obligations découlent de l’honneur de la couronne sont fortement tributaires des circons- tances : nation haïda, par. 38; taku river, par. 25; rio tinto alcan inc. c. conseil tribal carrier sekani, 2010 csc 43, [2010] 2 rcs 650, par 36-37. [25] the duty to consult is one such obligation. in instances where the crown contemplates executive action that may adversely affect s. 35 rights, the honour of the crown has been found to give rise to a justiciable duty to consult (see eg. haida nation, taku river, mikisew cree first nation v. canada (minister of canadian heritage), 2005 scc 69, [2005] 3 scr 388, and little salmon). this obli- gation has also been applied in the context of stat- utory decision- makers that — while not part of the executive — act on behalf of the crown (clyde river (hamlet) v. petroleum geo- services inc., 2017 scc 40, [2017] 1 scr 1069, at para 29). these cases demonstrate that, in certain circumstances, crown conduct may not constitute an “infringement” of [25] l’obligation de consulter est une de ces obli- gations. dans les cas où la couronne envisage de prendre une mesure exécutive susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits protégés par l’art. 35, la cour a jugé que le principe de l’honneur de la couronne donne lieu à une obligation de consulter justiciable : voir, p ex,. nation haïda; taku river; première nation crie mikisew c. canada (ministre du patrimoine canadien), 2005 csc 69, [2005] 3 rcs. 388; little salmon. cette obligation a aussi été jugée applicable lorsqu’un décideur habilité par la loi — ne faisant pas partie de l’exécutif — agit au nom de la couronne : clyde river (hameau) c. petroleum geo- services inc., 2017 csc 40, [2017] 1 rcs 1069, par 29. il ressort de ces arrêts que, dans certaines 790 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. established s. 35 rights; however, acting unilaterally in a way that may adversely affect such rights does not reflect well on the honour of the crown and may thus warrant intervention on judicial review. [26] the duty to consult jurisprudence makes clear that the duty to consult is best understood as a “valuable adjunct” to the honour of the crown (little salmon, at para 44). the duty to consult en- sures that the crown acts honourably by preventing it from acting unilaterally in ways that undermine s. 35 rights. this promotes reconciliation between the crown and aboriginal peoples first, by providing procedural protections to s. 35 rights, and second, by encouraging negotiation and just settlements as an alternative to the cost, delay and acrimony of litigating s. 35 infringement claims (clyde river, at para. 1; haida nation, at paras. 14 and 32; mikisew cree, at para 63). [27] the duty to consult has been recognized in a variety of contexts. for example, in haida nation, this court recognized a duty to consult when the crown contemplated the replacement and transfer of tree farm licences that had the potential to affect asserted but unproven aboriginal rights. in mikisew cree, the court recognized that the contemplation of “taking up” lands under treaty no. 8 could ad- versely affect the mikisew’s rights under the treaty and thus required consultation. crown conduct need not have an immediate impact on lands and resources to trigger the duty to consult. this court has rec- ognized that “high- level management decisions or structural changes to [a] resource’s management” may also trigger a consultative duty (carrier sekani, at para. 47; see also para 44). however, to date, the duty to consult has only been applied to executive conduct and conduct taken on behalf of the execu- tive. circonstances, la conduite de la couronne peut ne pas constituer une « atteinte » à des droits visés à l’art. 35 ayant été établis. toutefois, agir unilatéra- lement d’une manière susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur ces droits ternit l’honneur de la couronne et peut de ce fait justifier une intervention à l’issue d’un contrôle judiciaire. [26] il ressort clairement de la jurisprudence rela- tive à l’obligation de consulter qu’il faut la considé- rer comme un « complément valable » à l’honneur de la couronne : little salmon, par 44. elle garantit que la couronne agit honorablement en l’empê- chant d’agir unilatéralement d’une façon qui porte atteinte aux droits visés à l’art 35. cela favorise la réconciliation entre elle et les peuples autochtones, d’abord en fournissant une protection procédurale à ces droits, ensuite en encourageant la négociation et les règlements justes comme solution de rechange aux frais, aux retards et à l’acrimonie découlant de procédures judiciaires intentées pour débattre d’al- légations de contravention à l’art. 35 : clyde river, par. 1; nation haïda, par. 14 et 32; première nation crie mikisew, par 63. [27] l’existence de l’obligation de consulter a été reconnue dans divers contextes. par exemple, dans nation haïda, la cour l’a reconnue lorsque la couronne a envisagé le remplacement et le transfert de concessions de fermes forestières susceptibles d’avoir une incidence sur des droits ancestraux re- vendiqués, mais non établis. dans première nation crie mikisew, la cour a reconnu que le fait d’envi- sager la « prise » de terres visées par le traité no 8 était susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits des mikisew issus de ce traité et commandait donc la tenue d’une consultation. l’incidence de la conduite de la couronne sur les terres et les res- sources n’a pas à être immédiate pour que l’obliga- tion de consulter soit déclenchée. la cour a reconnu que « la décision prise en haut lieu ou la modification structurelle apportée à la gestion [d’une] ressource » peut en effet aussi déclencher l’obligation de consul- ter : carrier sekani, par. 47, voir aussi le par 44. en revanche, jusqu’à présent, l’obligation de consulter n’a été appliquée qu’aux actes posés par l’exécutif ou en son nom. [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge karakatsanis 791 [28] the mikisew’s treaty rights are protected under s. 35 of the constitution act, 1982, and the crown’s dealings with those rights engage the hon- our of the crown. here, the mikisew argue that their hunting, trapping, and fishing rights under treaty no. 8 may be adversely affected by the crown’s conduct. this court has repeatedly found that the honour of the crown governs treaty making and im- plementation, and requires the crown to act in a way that accomplishes the intended purposes of treaties and solemn promises it makes to aboriginal peoples (manitoba metis, at paras. 73 and 75; mikisew cree, at para. 51; r v. marshall, [1999] 3 scr 456, at para.  44; badger, at paras.  41 and 47). treaty agreements are sacred; it is always assumed that the crown intends to fulfill its promises. no appearance of “sharp dealing” will be permitted (badger, at para 41). [29] however, the question in this appeal is whether the honour of the crown gives rise to a justicia- ble duty to consult when ministers develop legisla- tion that could adversely affect the mikisew’s treaty rights. when confronted with a novel case like this, the court must determine whether the duty to consult is the appropriate means to uphold the honour of the crown. this court has explicitly left open the ques- tion of whether the law- making process is “crown conduct” that triggers the duty to consult (carrier sekani, at para. 44; clyde river, at para 28). i turn to analyzing this issue now. [28] les droits issus de traités des mikisew sont protégés par l’art. 35 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 et les actes de la couronne touchant ces droits engagent l’honneur de la couronne. en l’espèce, les mikisew soutiennent que la conduite de la couronne est susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur leurs droits de chasse, de piégeage et de pêche protégés par le traité no 8. la cour a affirmé à maintes reprises que le principe de l’honneur de la couronne régit la conclusion des traités ainsi que leur mise en œuvre et exige que la couronne agisse de manière à ce que les traités et les promesses solennelles qu’elle fait aux peuples autochtones atteignent leur but : manitoba metis, par. 73 et 75; première nation crie mikisew, par. 51; r c. marshall, [1999] 3 rcs 456, par. 44; badger, par. 41 et 47. les traités sont sacrés; il est toujours présumé que la couronne entend respecter ses promesses. aucune apparence de « manœuvres malhonnêtes » n’est permise : badger, par 41. [29] or, dans le présent pourvoi, il s’agit de savoir si l’honneur de la couronne déclenche une obliga- tion de consulter justiciable, lorsque des ministres élaborent des projets de loi susceptibles d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits issus de traités des mikisew. lorsqu’elle est saisie, comme en l’espèce, d’une affaire sans précédent, la cour doit décider si c’est en invoquant l’obligation de consulter qu’une partie peut demander le respect du principe de l’hon- neur de la couronne. dans le passé, la cour a ex- pressément choisi de laisser en suspens la question de savoir si le processus d’élaboration des lois consti- tue une « conduite de la couronne » qui déclenche l’obligation de consulter : carrier sekani, par. 44; clyde river, par 28. je vais maintenant procéder à l’analyse de cette question. c the duty to consult during the law- making c l’obligation de consulter durant le processus process législatif [30] the mikisew submit that the development of policy by ministers leading to the formulation and introduction of a bill that may affect s. 35 rights triggers the duty to consult. in their view, ministers act in an executive capacity, not a parliamentary ca- pacity, when developing legislation. thus, conclud- ing that legislative development triggers the duty to consult does not offend the separation of powers or [30] les mikisew font valoir que l’élaboration par les ministres d’une politique menant à la rédac- tion et à la présentation d’un projet de loi suscep- tible d’avoir une incidence sur les droits protégés par l’art.  35 déclenche l’obligation de consulter. selon eux, lorsqu’ils élaborent une loi, les ministres exercent des fonctions exécutives et non pas légis- latives. il ne serait donc pas contraire au principe 792 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. parliamentary privilege. further, concluding other- wise would leave some claimants whose s. 35 rights are affected by legislation without an effective rem- edy. indeed, legislation may abolish crown over- sight of or involvement in resource development and thereby remove crown conduct that would trigger the duty to consult. additionally, requiring claimants to proceed by way of a s. 35 infringement claim to vindicate their rights places an onerous burden on them. [31] the respondents submit that the development of legislation by ministers is legislative action that does not trigger the duty to consult, as this would be inconsistent with parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers. these principles dictate that courts cannot supervise the law- making process. the respondents ground their argument on the premise that ministers act in a parliamentary capacity, not an executive capacity, when developing legislation. furthermore, they suggest that, while the duty to consult is not triggered by legislative action, this does not leave claimants without an effective remedy. once legislation has passed, it can be challenged under the sparrow framework if it infringes s. 35 rights. additionally, decisions made under the new or amended legislation may trigger the duty to consult. [32] for the reasons that follow, i conclude that the law- making process — that is, the development, passage, and enactment of legislation — does not trigger the duty to consult. the separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty dictate that courts should forebear from intervening in the law- making process. therefore, the duty to consult doctrine is ill- suited for legislative action. de la séparation des pouvoirs ou du privilège par- lementaire de conclure que l’élaboration d’une loi déclenche l’obligation de consulter. de plus, selon eux, conclure autrement priverait les demandeurs aux prises avec une loi qui a une incidence sur leurs droits protégés par l’art. 35 d’un recours efficace. en effet, des lois peuvent abolir la surveillance et la participation de la couronne à l’exploitation des ressources et, par conséquent, éliminer la conduite de la couronne qui déclencherait l’obligation de consulter. qui plus est, exiger des demandeurs qu’ils présentent une demande fondée sur la violation de l’art. 35 pour défendre leurs droits leur imposerait un lourd fardeau. [31] les intimés soutiennent plutôt que l’élabora- tion d’une loi par des ministres est une mesure légis- lative qui ne déclenche pas l’obligation de consulter, puisque cela serait incompatible avec les principes de souveraineté parlementaire et de séparation des pou- voirs. selon ces principes, les tribunaux ne peuvent pas superviser le processus législatif. les intimés fondent leur thèse sur la prémisse que les ministres exercent des fonctions parlementaires, et non pas des fonctions exécutives, lorsqu’ils élaborent des projets de loi. de plus, selon eux, les demandeurs ne sont pas privés d’un recours utile du fait que le processus législatif ne déclenche pas l’obligation de consulter. une fois la loi adoptée, ils peuvent la contester, conformément au cadre d’analyse établi par l’arrêt sparrow, si elle porte atteinte aux droits protégés par l’art 35. en outre, des décisions prises en application de la nouvelle loi ou de la loi modifiée peuvent donner naissance à l’obligation de consulter. [32] pour les motifs exposés ci- après, je conclus que le processus législatif — à savoir l’élaboration, l’adoption et la promulgation d’une loi — ne donne pas naissance à l’obligation de consulter. les prin- cipes de la séparation des pouvoirs et de la sou- veraineté parlementaire exigent que les tribunaux s’abstiennent d’intervenir dans le processus légis- latif la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter ne convient donc pas relativement à l’action législative. [33] the mikisew ask us to recognize that the duty to consult applies to ministers in the development of legislation. there is no doubt overlap between [33] les mikisew nous demandent de reconnaître que l’obligation de consulter s’applique aux mi- nistres pendant l’élaboration des projets de loi. de [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge karakatsanis 793 executive and legislative functions in canada; cab- inet, for instance, is “a combining committee — a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the leg- islative part of the state to the executive part of the state” (reference re canada assistance plan (bc), [1991] 2 scr 525, at p. 559, quoting w. bagehot, the english constitution (1872), at p. 14 (emphasis in original)). i do not accept, however, the mikisew’s submission that ministers act in an executive capac- ity when they develop legislation. the legislative development at issue was not conducted pursuant to any statutory authority; rather, it was an exercise of legislative powers derived from part iv of the constitution act, 1867. as the majority of the court of appeal noted, the departmental statutes relied on by the mikisew to show that the ministers acted in an executive capacity when developing legislation do not “refer even implicitly to    the development of legislation for introduction into parliament” (ca. reasons, at para. 28; department of indian affairs and northern development act, rsc 1985, c. i-6; department of the environment act, rsc 1985, c. e-10; department of fisheries and oceans act, rsc 1985, c. f-15; department of transport act, rsc 1985, c. t-18; department of natural re- sources act, sc 1994, c. 41; financial administra- tion act, rsc 1985, c f-11). toute évidence, au canada, il y a un chevauche- ment entre les fonctions exécutives et législatives; le cabinet, par exemple, est « un comité combiné de telle sorte qu’il sert, comme un trait d’union ou une boucle, à rattacher la partie législative à la par- tie exécutive du gouvernement » : renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada (c-b), [1991] 2 rcs 525, p. 559, citant w. bagehot, la constitution anglaise (1869), p 19. toutefois, je ne suis pas d’accord avec les mikisew pour dire que les ministres exercent des fonctions exécutives lorsqu’ils élaborent des projets de loi. en l’espèce, l’élaboration des textes de loi ne relevait pas d’un pouvoir conféré par voie législative; il s’agissait plutôt de l’exercice de pouvoirs législatifs qui sont dévolus par la partie iv de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. comme les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel l’ont souligné, les lois habilitantes sur les- quelles s’appuient les mikisew pour démontrer que les ministres exerçaient des fonctions exécutives lorsqu’ils ont élaboré les projets de loi « ne ren- voient aucunement, même implicitement, [à] l’élabo- ration des projets de loi pour dépôt au parlement » : motifs de la cour d’appel, par. 28; loi sur le mi- nistère des affaires indiennes et du nord canadien, lrc 1985, c. i-6; loi sur le ministère de l’envi- ronnement, lrc 1985, c. e-10; loi sur le minis- tère des pêches et des océans, lrc 1985, c. f-15; loi sur le ministère des transports, lrc 1985, c. t-18; loi sur le ministère des ressources natu- relles, lc 1994, c. 41; loi sur la gestion des fi- nances publiques, lrc 1985, c f-11. [34] the development of legislation by ministers is part of the law- making process, and this process is generally protected from judicial oversight. further, this court’s jurisprudence makes clear that, if cab- inet is restrained from introducing legislation, then this effectively restrains parliament (canada assis- tance plan, at p 560). this court has emphasized the importance of safeguarding the law- making process from judicial supervision on numerous occasions. in reference re resolution to amend the constitution, [1981] 1 scr 753, a majority of the court stated that “[c]ourts come into the picture when legisla- tion is enacted and not before” (p 785). in canada assistance plan, the court underscored that “[t]he formulation and introduction of a bill are part of the [34] l’élaboration de projets de loi par les ministres fait partie intégrante du processus législatif, un pro- cessus qui est généralement à l’abri du contrôle ju- diciaire. de plus, la jurisprudence de la cour établit clairement que, si le cabinet n’est pas autorisé à présenter un projet de loi, cela revient à restreindre le pouvoir du parlement : régime d’assistance pu- blique du canada, p 560. dans le passé, la cour a souvent insisté sur l’importance de protéger le proces- sus législatif contre la surveillance judiciaire. dans le renvoi : résolution pour modifier la constit ution, [1981] 1 rcs 753, les juges majoritaires de la cour ont déclaré que « [l]es tribunaux interviennent quand une loi est adoptée et non avant » : p 785. dans l’arrêt régime d’assistance publique du canada, la cour a 794 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. legislative process with which the courts will not meddle” (p 559). [35] longstanding constitutional principles un- derlie this reluctance to supervise the law- making process. the separation of powers is “an essential feature of our constitution” (wells v. newfoundland, [1999] 3 scr 199, at para. 52; see also ontario v. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr 3, at para 27). it recognizes that each branch of government “will be unable to fulfill its role if it is unduly interfered with by the others” (criminal lawyers’ association, at para 29). it dictates that “the courts and parliament strive to respect each other’s role in the conduct of public affairs”; as such, there is no doubt that parliament’s legislative activities should “proceed unimpeded by any external body or institution, including the courts” (canada (house of commons) v. vaid, 2005 scc 30, [2005] 1 scr 667, at para 20). recognizing that a duty to consult applies during the law- making process may require courts to improperly trespass onto the legislature’s domain. [36] parliamentary sovereignty mandates that the legislature can make or unmake any law it wishes, within the confines of its constitutional author- ity. while the adoption of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms transformed the canadian system of government “to a significant extent from a system of parliamentary supremacy to one of con- stitutional supremacy” (reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at para. 72), democ- racy remains one of the unwritten principles of the constitution (secession reference, at paras 61-69). recognizing that the elected legislature has specific consultation obligations may constrain it in pursuing its mandate and therefore undermine its ability to act as the voice of the electorate. souligné que « [l]a rédaction et le dépôt d’un projet de loi font partie du processus législatif dans lequel les tribunaux ne s’immiscent pas » : p 559. [35] des principes constitutionnels établis depuis longtemps justifient cette réticence à surveiller le processus législatif. le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs est « un élément essentiel de notre consti- tution » : wells c. terre- neuve, [1999] 3 rcs 199, par. 52; voir également ontario c. criminal law yers’ association of ontario, 2013 csc 43, [2013] 3 rcs. 3, par 27. il reconnaît qu’un organe du gouverne- ment « ne peut jouer son rôle lorsqu’un autre empiète indûment sur lui » : criminal lawyers’ association, par 29. il exige que « les tribunaux et le parlement s’efforcent de respecter leurs rôles respectifs dans la conduite des affaires publiques »; ainsi, il ne fait aucun doute que le parlement doive pouvoir « exer- cer ses activités législatives libre de toute ingérence de la part d’organismes ou d’institutions externes, y compris les tribunaux » : ca nada (chambre des com- munes) c. vaid, 2005 csc 30, [2005] 1 rcs 667, par 20. si l’on devait reconnaître qu’une obligation de consulter s’applique au processus législatif, cela risquerait d’obliger les tribunaux à s’ingérer indû- ment dans la sphère du législateur. [36] le principe de la souveraineté parlementaire suppose que l’assemblée législative peut adopter ou abroger une loi à son gré, dans les limites des pouvoirs que lui confère la constitution. bien que l’adoption de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés ait « dans une large mesure [  ] fait passer le système canadien de gouvernement de la supré- matie parlementaire à la suprématie constitution- nelle » (renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, [1998] 2  rcs  217, par.  72), la démocratie de- meure l’un des principes non écrits de la constitution (par 61-69). si l’on devait reconnaître que l’assem- blée législative élue a des obligations précises en matière de consultation, cela risquerait de lui nuire dans l’accomplissement de son mandat et donc de miner sa capacité de se faire la voix de l’électorat. [37] parliamentary privilege, a related constitu- tional principle, also demonstrates that the law- making process is largely beyond the reach of judicial interference. it is defined as “the sum of the [37] le principe constitutionnel connexe du privi- lège parlementaire confirme lui aussi que le proces- sus législatif est largement hors de la portée d’une intervention judiciaire. il est défini comme étant « la [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge karakatsanis 795 privileges, immunities and powers enjoyed by the senate, the house of commons and provincial legis- lative assemblies, and by each member individually, without which they could not discharge their func- tions” (vaid, at para 29(2)). once a category of parlia- mentary privilege is established, “it is for parliament, not the courts, to determine whether in a particular case the exercise of the privilege is necessary or ap- propriate” (vaid, at para. 29(9) and paras. 47-48 (em- phasis in original)). canadian jurisprudence makes clear that parliamentary privilege protects control over “debates or proceedings in parliament” (vaid, at para. 29(10); j. p. j. maingot, parliamentary immu- nity in canada (2016), at pp. 166-71; see also new brunswick broadcasting co. v. nova scotia (speaker of the house of assembly), [1993] 1 scr 319, at p. 385; p. w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at s 17;. article 9 of the uk. bill of rights of 1689). the existence of this privilege generally prevents courts from enforcing procedural constraints on the parliamentary process. [38] applying the duty to consult doctrine during the law- making process would lead to significant judicial incursion into the workings of the legisla- ture, even if such a duty were only enforced post- enactment. the duty to consult jurisprudence has developed a spectrum of consultation requirements that fit in the context of administrative decision- making processes. directly transposing such execu- tive requirements into the legislative context would be an inappropriate constraint on legislatures’ ability to control their own processes. somme des privilèges, immunités et pouvoirs dont jouissent le sénat, la chambre des communes et les assemblées législatives provinciales ainsi que les membres de chaque chambre individuellement, sans lesquels ils ne pourraient s’acquitter de leurs fonc- tions » : vaid, par 29(2). une fois qu’une catégorie de privilèges parlementaires est établie, « c’est au parlement, et non aux tribunaux, qu’il revient de déterminer si l’exercice de ce privilège est néces- saire ou approprié dans un cas particulier » : vaid, par. 29(9) et par. 47-48 (en italique dans l’original). il ressort à l’évidence de la jurisprudence canadienne que le privilège parlementaire met les [traduc- tion] « débats ou travaux du parlement » à l’abri du contrôle judiciaire : vaid, par. 29(10); j p j maingot,. parliamentary immunity in canada (2016), p. 166- 171; voir également new brunswick broadcasting co. c. nouvelle- écosse (président de l’assemblée législative), [1993] 1 rcs 319, p. 385; p w hogg,. constitutional law of canada (5e éd. suppl.), par 17; art. 9 du bill of rights de 1689 du royaume- uni. l’existence de ce privilège empêche par ailleurs gé- néralement les tribunaux d’assujettir le processus parlementaire à des contraintes procédurales. [38] l’application de la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter durant le processus législatif donnerait lieu à une ingérence importante des tribunaux dans les travaux du législateur, et ce, même s’ils ne s’ac- quittaient de cette obligation qu’après l’adoption de la loi. la jurisprudence sur l’obligation de consul- ter a fait naître une gamme d’exigences en matière de consultation qui sont adaptées au contexte du processus décisionnel administratif. transposer ces exigences qui relèvent de l’exécutif directement dans la sphère législative entraverait indûment la capacité des assemblées législatives d’être maîtresses de leurs propres procédures. [39] the administrative law remedies normally available for breach of a duty to consult would fur- ther invite inappropriate judicial intervention into the legislature’s domain. the crown’s failure to consult can lead to a number of remedies, including quashing the decision at issue or granting injunctive relief, damages, or an order to carry out consultation prior to proceeding further with the proposed action (carrier sekani, at paras. 37 and 54; clyde river, at para. 24; [39] les recours propres au droit administratif qui peuvent être normalement intentés pour manquement à l’obligation de consulter inciteraient davantage les tribunaux à intervenir indûment dans la sphère du législateur. l’omission par la couronne de mener des consultations peut donner lieu à diverses mesures réparatrices dont l’annulation de la décision en cause ou l’octroi d’une injonction, de dommages- intérêts ou d’une ordonnance enjoignant à la couronne de 796 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. k. roach, constitutional remedies in canada (2nd ed. (loose- leaf)), at ¶15.820 to 15980). thus, if a duty to consult applied to the law- making process, it would require the judiciary to directly interfere with the development of legislation. i recognize that the mikisew only sought declaratory relief in this case. however, their rationale for seeking declaratory relief was that canada was considering changing its environmental protection framework at the time of this litigation. the mikisew acknowledged that it may be appropriate, in future litigation, for courts to consider granting ancillary relief requiring further consultation on the challenged legislation, a stay of further implementation of the challenged legislation, or judicial supervision. such remedies could signifi- cantly fetter the will of parliament. [40] applying a duty to consult to the development of legislation by ministers, as the mikisew propose, also raises practical concerns. if the duty to consult is triggered by the development of legislation by ministers, but not later in the law- making process, this may limit the possibility of meaningful accom- modation. changes made to the proposed bill at the policy development stage to address concerns raised during consultation may be undone by parliament, as it is free to amend the proposed law. additionally, the introduction of private member bills would not trigger the duty, rendering the approach incongruous. the mikisew’s proposed approach could also be dif- ficult to apply where ministers pursue both executive conduct and parliamentary conduct in the cabinet decision- making process. in the long chain of events contributing to the development of legislation, dis- entangling what steps the duty to consult applies to (because they are executive) and what actions are immune (because they are parliamentary) would be an enormously difficult task. procéder à des consultations avant de donner suite à l’action proposée : carrier sekani, par. 37 et 54; clyde river, par. 24; k. roach, constitutional rem- edies in canada (2e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), ¶15.820 à 15980. par conséquent, si une obligation de consulter s’appliquait au processus législatif, il faudrait que les tribunaux interviennent directement dans l’élaboration des projets de loi. je reconnais que les mikisew s’en sont tenus à solliciter une ordonnance déclaratoire en l’espèce. toutefois, ils ont invoqué à l’appui de leur demande le fait que le canada envisageait de modifier son régime de protection environnementale à l’époque où la procédure a été entamée. de plus, ils ont indiqué qu’il pourrait convenir, dans des litiges futurs, que les tribunaux examinent des réparations accessoires consistant à faire en sorte que la loi contestée fasse l’objet de plus amples consultations, qu’il soit sursis à sa mise en œuvre ou qu’elle soit soumise au contrôle judiciaire. de telles mesures pourraient entraver consi- dérablement la volonté du parlement. [40] assujettir le processus d’élaboration des pro- jets de loi par les ministres à une obligation de consul- ter, comme le proposent les mikisew, soulèverait aussi des préoccupations d’ordre pratique. en effet, si l’obligation de consulter devait être déclenchée au stade de l’élaboration d’un projet de loi par les ministres, plutôt qu’à un stade ultérieur du processus législatif, les possibilités de trouver des mesures d’ac- commodement utiles pourraient s’en trouver limitées. en effet, des amendements apportés à un projet de loi au stade de l’élaboration de la politique sous- jacente, pour tenir compte de préoccupations soulevées pen- dant des consultations, pourraient être supprimés par le parlement, puisqu’il peut modifier une loi propo- sée. de plus, le dépôt de projets de loi d’initiative par- lementaire ne donnerait pas naissance à l’obligation de consulter, ce qui rendrait l’approche incongrue. celle proposée par les mikisew pourrait aussi être difficile à appliquer lorsque les ministres exercent à la fois des fonctions exécutives et parlementaires dans le cadre du processus décisionnel du cabinet. dans la longue série de démarches accomplies pour élaborer une loi, il serait extrêmement difficile de départager les étapes assujetties à l’obligation de consulter (parce qu’elles relèvent du pouvoir exécutif) et les actions qui n’y sont pas subordonnées (parce qu’elles relèvent du pouvoir législatif). [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge karakatsanis 797 [41] for these reasons, the duty to consult doctrine is ill- suited to be applied directly to the law- making process. [41] pour les motifs qui précèdent, la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter est mal adaptée pour s’ap- pliquer directement au processus législatif. [42] that said, parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers are not the only constitutional principles relevant to this appeal. the duty to consult was recognized to help protect the constitutional rights enshrined in s. 35 and uphold the honour of the crown — itself a constitutional principle (little salmon, at para 42). [43] the mikisew argue that if the duty to consult does not apply to the legislative process, aborig- inal or treaty rights will be subject to inconsist- ent protection. when the executive or a statutory decision- maker takes action that may affect asserted or established s. 35 rights, the honour of the crown imposes a duty to consult. as noted above, this pre- vents the crown from acting unilaterally in a way that could erode s. 35 rights and promotes the ongo- ing process of reconciliation. in contrast, if the state takes the same action through legislative means, the aboriginal communities whose rights are potentially affected may be left without effective recourse. if such legislation infringes s. 35 rights, it may be de- clared of no force and effect pursuant to s. 52 of the constitution act, 1982 (see sparrow). however, if the effects of the legislation do not rise to the level of infringement, or if the rights are merely asserted (and not established), an aboriginal group will not be able to successfully challenge the constitutional validity of the legislation through a sparrow claim. further, there may be situations where legislation effectively removes future consultation obligations by removing crown decision- making that would otherwise have triggered the duty to consult. [42] cela dit, la souveraineté parlementaire et la sé- paration des pouvoirs ne sont pas les seuls principes constitutionnels en cause dans le présent pourvoi. l’existence de l’obligation de consulter a été recon- nue pour aider à protéger les droits constitutionnels consacrés par l’art. 35 et pour préserver l’honneur de la couronne, qui a lui aussi le statut de principe constitutionnel : little salmon, par 42. [43] les mikisew prétendent que si l’obligation de consulter ne s’appliquait pas au processus législatif, les droits ancestraux ou issus de traités bénéficie- raient d’une protection variable. lorsque l’exécu- tif ou un organisme décisionnel habilité par la loi prendrait une mesure susceptible d’avoir une inci- dence sur les droits, revendiqués ou établis, visés à l’art. 35, l’honneur de la couronne donnerait lieu à une obligation de consulter. comme je l’ai souligné précédemment, cela empêcherait la couronne d’agir unilatéralement d’une manière qui risquerait de mi- ner les droits protégés par l’art. 35 et favoriserait le processus de réconciliation en cours. en revanche, si l’état prenait la même mesure par voie législative, les collectivités autochtones dont les droits seraient susceptibles d’être touchés ne disposeraient pos- siblement d’aucun recours utile. si cette loi por- tait atteinte aux droits visés à l’art. 35, elle pourrait être déclarée inopérante par application de l’art. 52 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 : voir sparrow. cependant, si les effets de la loi ne constituaient pas une atteinte à des droits protégés ou si les droits n’étaient que revendiqués (et non établis), le groupe autochtone ne pourrait pas contester avec succès la validité constitutionnelle de la loi suivant le cadre d’analyse établi dans l’arrêt sparrow. de plus, il pourrait survenir des situations où la loi supprimerait effectivement l’obligation future de consulter en sup- primant le processus décisionnel de la couronne qui aurait autrement déclenché l’obligation de consulter. [44] i accept that these are valid concerns. it is of little import to aboriginal peoples whether it is the executive or parliament which acts in a way that may adversely affect their rights. the relationship [44] j’admets qu’il s’agit là de préoccupations légitimes. il importe peu aux peuples autochtones de savoir qui de l’exécutif ou du parlement agit d’une manière susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable 798 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. of aboriginal peoples “with the crown or sovereign has never depended on the particular representa- tives of the crown involved” (williams lake indian band v. canada (aboriginal affairs and northern development), 2018 scc 4, [2018] 1 scr 83, at para. 130, quoting mitchell v. peguis indian band, [1990] 2 scr 85, at p. 109, per dickson cj). as noted above, the honour of the crown binds the crown qua sovereign. indeed, permitting the crown to do by one means that which it cannot do by an- other would undermine the endeavour of reconcilia- tion, which animates aboriginal law. the principle of reconciliation and not rigid formalism should drive the development of aboriginal law. [45] given these concerns, it is worth noting that the duty to consult is not the only means to give effect to the honour of the crown when aboriginal or treaty rights may be adversely affected by legislation. other doctrines may be developed to ensure the consistent protection of s. 35 rights and to give full effect to the honour of the crown through review of enacted legislation. [46] for example, it may not be consistent with s. 35 to legislate in a way that effectively removes future crown conduct which would otherwise trigger the duty to consult. i note that, in ross river dena council v. yukon, 2012 ykca 14, 358 dlr (4th) 100, the yukon court of appeal held that “[s]tatutory regimes that do not allow for consultation and fail to provide any other equally effective means to ac- knowledge and accommodate aboriginal claims are defective and cannot be allowed to subsist” (para. 37; see also constitution act, 1982, s 52(1)). sur leurs droits. les rapports des peuples autoch- tones « avec la couronne ou le souverain n’ont ja- mais été fonction des représentants particuliers de la couronne visée » : williams lake indian band c. canada (affaires autochtones et développement du nord), 2018 csc 4, [2018] 1 rcs 83, par. 130, citant mitchell c. bande indienne peguis, [1990] 2 rcs 85, p. 109, le juge en chef dickson. comme je l’ai déjà souligné, l’honneur de la couronne lie celle-ci en qualité de souveraine. en effet, si l’on permettait à la couronne de faire par un moyen ce qu’elle ne peut pas faire par un autre, cela compro- mettrait l’entreprise de réconciliation qui sous- tend le droit des autochtones. c’est le principe de récon- ciliation, et non pas un formalisme rigide, qui doit dicter l’évolution de ce domaine du droit. [45] étant donné ces préoccupations, il convient de souligner que l’obligation de consulter n’est pas le seul moyen de donner effet au principe de l’honneur de la couronne quand une loi est susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits ancestraux ou issus de traités. les tribunaux peuvent créer d’autres doctrines pour assurer la protection uniforme des droits protégés par l’art. 35 et donner pleinement effet à l’honneur de la couronne en contrôlant la loi adoptée. [46] par exemple, il n’est peut- être pas conforme à l’art. 35 de légiférer de façon à empêcher une con- duite future de la couronne qui déclencherait autre- ment l’obligation de consulter. je relève que, dans ross river dena council c. yukon, 2012 ykca 14, 358 dlr (4th) 100, la cour d’appel du yukon a jugé que [traduction] « [l]es régimes légaux qui ne prévoient pas la tenue de consultation ou un autre moyen tout aussi efficace de reconnaître les revendi- cations des autochtones et de prendre des mesures d’accommodement sont viciés et ne devraient pas être maintenus » : par. 37; voir également la loi constitutionnelle de 1982, par 52(1). [47] other forms of recourse may also be available. for example, declaratory relief may be appropriate in a case where legislation is enacted that is not con- sistent with the crown’s duty of honourable dealing toward aboriginal peoples (see manitoba metis, at paras. 69 and 143). a declaration is available without il est également possible d’accorder d’autres [47] formes de réparation. par exemple, il peut convenir de prononcer un jugement déclaratoire dans un cas où le législateur adopte une loi incompatible avec l’obligation de la couronne d’agir honorablement envers les peuples autochtones  : voir manitoba [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge karakatsanis 799 a cause of action (ibid, at para 143). further, as this court has previously held, declaratory relief may be an appropriate remedy even in situations where other forms of relief would be inconsistent with the sep- aration of powers (see canada (prime minister) v. khadr, 2010 scc 3, [2010] 1 scr 44, at para 2). [48] to be clear, legislation cannot be challenged on the basis that the legislature failed to fulfill the duty to consult. the duty to consult doctrine does not apply to the legislature. however, if other forms of recourse are available, the extent of any consultation may well be a relevant consideration, as it was in sparrow, when assessing whether the enactment is consistent with constitutional principles. in sparrow, this court held that, when there has been a prima fa- cie infringement of a s. 35 right, the “first considera- tion” in determining whether the legislation or action can be justified is the honour of the crown (p 1114). and an important part of that inquiry is whether the aboriginal group in question was consulted on the impugned measure (sparrow, at p. 1119; see also badger, at para. 97; tsilhqot’in nation v. british columbia, 2014 scc 44, [2014] 2 scr 257, at paras. 77, 80 and 125; delgamuukw v. british co- lumbia, [1997] 3 scr 1010, at para 168). metis, par. 69 et 143. il est possible d’obtenir un jugement déclaratoire sans avoir de cause d’action : ibid., par 143. en outre, comme la cour l’a déjà affirmé, ce type de jugement peut être la mesure de redressement qui convient, même dans les situations où d’autres types de mesures ne seraient pas compa- tibles avec le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs : voir canada (premier ministre) c. khadr, 2010 csc 3, [2010] 1 rcs 44, par 2. [48] en clair, on ne peut pas contester une loi pour le motif que le législateur ne s’est pas acquitté de l’obligation de consulter. la doctrine relative à cette obligation ne s’applique pas au législateur. toutefois, si d’autres formes de réparation peuvent être accor- dées, l’étendue de toute consultation, le cas échéant, pourrait fort bien constituer un facteur pertinent — comme elle l’a été dans sparrow — lorsque vient le temps d’évaluer si le texte de loi est compatible avec les principes constitutionnels. dans sparrow, la cour a établi que, lorsqu’il y a eu violation à première vue d’un droit protégé par l’art. 35, l’honneur de la cou- ronne est « le premier facteur » à examiner pour dé- terminer si la mesure législative ou l’action en cause est justifiable : p 1114. en outre, dans l’analyse, il est notamment important de savoir si le groupe au- tochtone en cause a été consulté au sujet de la mesure contestée : sparrow, p. 1119; voir également badger, par. 97; nation tsilhqot’in c. colombie- britannique, 2014 csc 44, [2014] 2 rcs 257, par. 77, 80 et 125; delgamuukw c. colombie- britannique, [1997] 3 rcs 1010, par 168. [49] however, the issue of whether other protec- tions are, or should be, available is not squarely be- fore the court in this appeal. as discussed above, the federal court was not validly seized of the ap- plication in this case, so no relief can be granted. moreover, the mikisew framed their claim exclu- sively around whether the duty to consult doctrine should apply to the legislative process. we have not received sufficient submissions on how to ensure that the honour of the crown is upheld other than through the specific mechanism of the duty to consult. a different context attracts different considerations. i would note that there are important distinctions between judicial review of administrative action in the duty to consult context and judicial review of [49] cependant, dans le présent pourvoi, la cour n’est pas directement saisie de la question de savoir si d’autres mesures de protection existent ou devraient exister. comme je l’ai souligné précédemment, en l’espèce, la cour fédérale n’a pas été régulièrement saisie de la demande; la cour ne peut donc pas ac- corder de réparation. qui plus est, les mikisew ont axé leur demande exclusivement sur le fait de savoir si la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter devrait s’appliquer au processus législatif. les parties nous ont fait part de trop peu d’observations sur la manière dont il conviendrait d’assurer le respect de l’honneur de la couronne, si ce n’est par le truchement du mé- canisme précis de l’obligation de consulter. un autre contexte ferait intervenir d’autres considérations. je 800 mikisew cree first nation v canada karakatsanis j. [2018] 2 scr. legislation (doré v. barreau du québec, 2012 scc 12, [2012] 1 scr 395, at para 36). souligne qu’il y a des différences importantes entre le contrôle judiciaire d’une mesure administrative à la lumière de l’obligation de consulter et le contrôle judiciaire d’une loi : doré c. barreau du québec, 2012 csc 12, [2012] 1 rcs 395, par 36. iv conclusion iv conclusion [50] for the reasons set out above, i conclude that no aspect of the law- making process — from the development of legislation to its enactment — trig- gers a duty to consult. in the duty to consult context, “crown conduct” has only been found to include executive action or action taken on behalf of the executive. i would not expand the application of the duty to consult doctrine to the legislative process. [51] finally, my conclusions respecting the duty to consult do not apply to the process by which sub- ordinate legislation (such as regulations or rules) is adopted, as such conduct is clearly executive rather than parliamentary (see n. bankes, “the duty to consult and the legislative process: but what about reconciliation?” (2016) (online), at p 5). further- more, this conclusion does not affect the enforce- ability of treaty provisions, implemented through legislation, that explicitly require pre- legislative con- sultation (see eg. nisga’a final agreement (1999), c. 11, paras. 30 and 31; nisga’a final agreement act, sbc 1999, c. 2; nisga’a final agreement act, sc 2000, c 7). manner and form requirements (ie. procedural restraints on enactments) imposed by legislation are binding (hogg, at s 123(b); see also r v. mercure, [1988] 1 scr 234). [50] pour les motifs exposés précédemment, je conclus qu’aucun aspect du processus législatif — du stade de l’élaboration jusqu’à la promulgation — ne déclenche l’obligation de consulter. dans le contexte de cette obligation, la cour a jugé que la « conduite de la couronne » englobe uniquement les actes accomplis par l’exécutif, ou en son nom. je suis d’avis de ne pas étendre l’application de la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter au processus législatif. [51] enfin, mes conclusions au sujet de l’obligation de consulter ne s’appliquent pas au processus dans le cadre duquel des mesures législatives subordonnées (comme des règlements ou des règles) sont prises, puisque ce processus relève clairement du pouvoir exécutif et non du pouvoir législatif : voir n. bankes, « the duty to consult and the legislative process : but what about reconciliation? » (2016) (en ligne), p 5. qui plus est, mes conclusions n’ont aucune inci- dence sur le caractère exécutoire des dispositions de traités, mis en œuvre au moyen de lois, qui exigent expressément des consultations préalables : voir, p ex, accord définitif nisga’a (1999), c. 11, art. 30 et 31; nisga’a final agreement act, sbc 1999, c. 2; loi sur l’accord définitif nisga’a, lc 2000, c 7. dans ces cas, les modalités et les formes re- quises par la loi (p ex, les contraintes procédurales relatives à l’édiction des lois) doivent nécessairement être appliquées : hogg, par 123(b); voir également r c. mercure, [1988] 1 rcs 234. [52] i add this. even though the duty to consult does not apply to the law- making process, it does not necessarily follow that once enacted, legislation that may adversely affect s. 35 rights is consistent with the honour of the crown. the constitutional principles — such as the separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty — that preclude the ap- plication of the duty to consult during the legislative process do not absolve the crown of its duty to act [52] j’ajouterais ceci. même si l’obligation de con- sulter ne s’applique pas au processus législatif, il ne s’ensuit pas nécessairement que, une fois adoptée, une loi susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits protégés par l’art. 35 est conforme au principe de l’honneur de la couronne. les prin- cipes constitutionnels — comme la séparation des pouvoirs et la souveraineté parlementaire — qui soustraient le processus législatif à l’obligation de [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 801 honourably or limit the application of s 35. while an aboriginal group will not be able to challenge leg- islation on the basis that the duty to consult was not fulfilled, other protections may well be recognized in future cases. simply because the duty to consult doctrine, as it has evolved to regulate executive con- duct, is inapplicable in the legislative sphere, does not mean the crown qua sovereign is absolved of its obligation to conduct itself honourably. [53] for these reasons, i would dismiss the appeal. consulter ne relèvent pas pour autant la couronne de son obligation d’agir honorablement ni ne restrei- gnent l’application de l’art 35. même si un groupe autochtone sera empêché de contester une loi en invoquant un manquement à l’obligation de consul- ter, les tribunaux pourront possiblement reconnaître l’existence d’autres mesures de protection dans des causes à venir. ce n’est pas parce que la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter, qui a évolué de manière à encadrer la conduite de l’exécutif, ne s’applique pas dans la sphère législative que la couronne, en sa qualité de souveraine, est libérée de son obligation de se comporter honorablement. [53] pour les motifs exposés précédemment, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. the reasons of abella and martin jj. were de- version française des motifs des juges abella et livered by martin rendus par [54] abella j. — i agree with justice karakatsanis that the appeal should be dismissed on the grounds that judicial review under the federal courts act, rsc 1985, c. f-7, is not available for the actions of federal ministers in the parliamentary process (ss. 2(2), 18 and 181). but, in my respectful view, the enactment of legislation with the potential to adversely affect rights protected by s. 35 of the con- stitution act, 1982 does give rise to a duty to consult, and legislation enacted in breach of that duty may be challenged directly for relief. [54] la juge abella — je souscris à l’opinion de la juge karakatsanis selon laquelle le pourvoi devrait être rejeté au motif que le contrôle judiciaire prévu par la loi sur les cours fédérales, lrc  1985, c. f-7, ne peut être exercé à l’encontre de mesures prises par des ministres fédéraux dans le cadre du processus parlementaire : par. 2(2), art. 18 et 181. cela dit, à mon avis, l’adoption de lois qui sont sus- ceptibles d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits protégés par l’art. 35 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 fait naître une obligation de consulter, et les lois adoptées en violation de cette obligation peuvent être contestées directement en vue d’obtenir réparation. [55] the honour of the crown governs the rela- tionship between the government of canada and indigenous peoples. this obligation of honour gives rise to a duty to consult and accommodate that ap- plies to all contemplated government conduct with the potential to adversely impact asserted or estab- lished aboriginal and treaty rights, including, in my view, legislative action. the duty to consult arises based on the effect, not the source, of the government action. the crown’s overarching responsibility to act honourably in all its dealings with indigenous peoples does not depend on the formal label applied to the type of action that the government takes with respect to aboriginal rights and interests protected [55] le principe de l’honneur de la couronne régit la relation qui unit le gouvernement du canada et les peuples autochtones. ce principe fait naître une obligation de consulter et d’accommoder applicable à toutes les mesures gouvernementales envisagées susceptibles d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits ancestraux et issus de traités, revendiqués ou établis, y compris, à mon avis, aux mesures législa- tives. l’obligation de consulter découle de l’effet, et non de la source, de la mesure gouvernemen- tale. la responsabilité fondamentale de la couronne d’agir honorablement dans tous ses rapports avec les peuples autochtones ne dépend pas de l’étiquette officielle que l’on appose au genre de mesures que 802 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. by s. 35 of the constitution act, 1982. as a consti- tutional imperative, the honour of the crown cannot be undermined, let alone extinguished, by the legis- lature’s assertion of parliamentary sovereignty. [56] the analysis in this case must begin with the fundamental principle of canadian aboriginal law that the government’s relationship with indigenous peoples is governed by the honour of the crown (haida nation v british columbia (minister of forests), [2004] 3 scr 511, at para. 17; beckman v. little salmon/carmacks first nation, [2010] 3 scr 103, at para 62). according to this princi- ple, servants of the crown must conduct themselves with honour when acting on behalf of the sovereign (manitoba metis federation inc. v. canada (attorney general), [2013] 1 scr 623, at para 65). the hon- our of the crown is always at stake in its dealings with indigenous peoples, whether through the exer- cise of legislative power (see r v. sparrow, [1990] 1 scr 1075, at p. 1114) or executive authority (see r v. badger, [1996] 1 scr 771, at para. 41; haida nation, at para 16). [57] the position that the honour of the crown does not bind parliament strikes me as untenable in light of this court’s aboriginal law jurisprudence. the honour of the crown arises from the crown’s de facto control over land and resources previously in the control of aboriginal peoples, and its asserted sovereignty over those peoples (haida nation, at para. 32; manitoba metis federation, at para 66). at the time of french and british colonization, indig- enous peoples were living in distinct societies, with their own social and political structures, as well as laws and interests in land (mitchell v. mnr, [2001] 1 scr 911, at para. 9 (per mclachlin cj)). while english policy was to acknowledge and respect cer- tain rights of occupation for indigenous inhabit- ants, the underlying premise was that “sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the crown” (sparrow, at p 1103). with this assumed sovereignty, arose the obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and prend le gouvernement à l’égard des droits et in- térêts ancestraux protégés par l’art.  35 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982. comme il s’agit d’un im- pératif constitutionnel, le principe de l’honneur de la couronne ne saurait être miné, et encore moins écarté, par l’affirmation de la souveraineté parlemen- taire du législateur. [56] en l’espèce, l’analyse doit débuter par le principe fondamental du droit canadien des au- tochtones voulant que les rapports du gouvernement avec les peuples autochtones soient régis par le prin- cipe de l’honneur de la couronne : nation haïda c. colombie- britannique (ministre des forêts), [2004] 3 rcs 511, par. 17; beckman c. première nation de little salmon/carmacks, [2010] 3 rcs 103, par.  62 selon ce principe, les fonctionnaires de la couronne doivent se comporter honorablement lorsqu’ils agissent au nom du souverain : manitoba metis federation inc. c. canada (procureur géné- ral), [2013] 1 rcs 623, par 65. l’honneur de la couronne est toujours en jeu lorsque cette dernière transige avec les peuples autochtones, que ce soit en exerçant ses pouvoirs législatifs (voir r c. sparrow, [1990] 1 rcs 1075, p.  1114) ou ses pouvoirs exécutifs (voir r c. badger, [1996] 1 rcs 771, par. 41; nation haïda, par 16). [57] la position selon laquelle le principe de l’hon- neur de la couronne ne lie pas le parlement me paraît indéfendable à la lumière de la jurisprudence de la cour en droit des autochtones. l’honneur de la couronne découle de l’exercice de fait de l’autorité de cette der- nière sur les terres et les ressources que contrôlaient antérieurement les peuples autochtones et de l’affirma- tion par elle de sa souveraineté sur ces peuples : nation haïda, par. 32; manitoba metis federation, par 66. à l’époque de la colonisation française et britannique, les peuples autochtones vivaient au sein de sociétés dis- tinctes et possédaient leurs propres structures sociales et politiques, ainsi que des lois et des intérêts dans les terres : mitchell c. mrn, [2001] 1 rcs 911, par. 9 (la juge en chef mclachlin). bien que la politique britannique reconnaissait et respectait certains droits d’occupation des peuples autochtones, elle reposait sur le principe que « la souveraineté et la compétence législative, et même le titre sous- jacent, à l’égard de ces terres revenaient à sa majesté » : sparrow, p 1103. [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 803 honourably (mitchell, at para. 9; manitoba metis federation, at paras 66-67). [58] as a result, the ultimate purpose of the honour of the crown is the reconciliation of pre- existing indigenous societies with the assertion of crown sov- ereignty (manitoba metis federation, at para 66). reconciliation is the “fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty rights” (mikisew cree first nation v. canada (minister of canadian heritage), [2005] 3 scr 388, at para.  1 (per binnie j)). the purpose of s. 35 of the constitution act, 1982, is to facilitate this reconciliation (taku river tlingit first nation v. british columbia (pro- ject assessment director), [2004] 3 scr 550, at para 42). [59] the honour of the crown defines the historic relationship between the government and indigenous peoples in which contemporary rights are to be un- derstood (sparrow, at p 1108). the honour of the crown has deep roots as a concept in aboriginal law and can be traced back to the royal proclamation of 1763, a fundamental document which this court has described as “analogous to the   . magna carta” (calder v. attorney- general of british columbia, [1973] scr 313, at p. 395 (per hall j)). the hon- our of the crown has since received constitutional status with the entrenchment of s. 35 and is therefore a constitutional imperative, giving rise to obligations on the crown which are enforced by the courts (j. timothy s. mccabe, the honour of the crown and its fiduciary duties to aboriginal peoples (2008), at p 53). cette souveraineté présumée a fait naître l’obliga- tion de traiter les peuples autochtones équitablement et honorablement : mitchell, par. 9; manitoba metis federation, par 66-67. [58] en conséquence, l’objectif fondamental du principe de l’honneur de la couronne est la récon- ciliation des sociétés autochtones préexistantes avec l’affirmation de la souveraineté de la couronne : manitoba metis federation, par 66. la réconcilia- tion est l’« objectif fondamental du droit moderne relatif aux droits ancestraux et issus de traités » : première nation crie mikisew c. canada (ministre du patrimoine canadien), [2005] 3 rcs 388, par. 1 (le juge binnie). l’objet de l’art. 35 de la loi consti- tutionnelle de 1982 est de favoriser cette réconci- liation : première nation tlingit de taku river c. colombie- britannique (directeur d’évaluation de projet), [2004] 3 rcs 550, par 42. [59] le principe de l’honneur de la couronne dé- finit les rapports historiques qui unissent le gou- vernement et les peuples autochtones, et les droits contemporains doivent être définis en fonction de ces rapports : sparrow, p 1108. il s’agit d’un concept profondément enraciné en droit des autochtones dont on peut retracer les origines dans la proclamation royale de 1763, un document fondamental que la cour a décrit comme étant « analogue [à] la magna carta » : calder c. procureur général de la colombie- britannique, [1973] rcs 313, p. 395 (le juge hall). depuis, ce principe a acquis un statut constitutionnel avec l’enchâssement de l’art. 35 et est donc devenu un impératif constitutionnel qui donne naissance à des obligations de la couronne que les tribunaux sont appelés à faire respecter : j. timothy s. mccabe, the honour of the crown and its fiduciary duties to aboriginal peoples (2008), p 53. [60] but the honour of the crown is not itself a cause of action. rather, it speaks to the way in which the crown’s specific obligations must be fulfilled (manitoba metis federation, at para.  73). these obligations vary depending on the circumstances. in negotiating and applying treaties, the crown must act with integrity and honour, and avoid even the appearance of sharp dealing (haida nation, at para. 19; badger, at para. 41; r v. marshall, [1999] [60] le principe de l’honneur de la couronne ne constitue toutefois pas en soi une cause d’action. il s’agit plutôt d’un principe qui concerne la façon dont la couronne doit s’acquitter d’obligations spéci- fiques : manitoba metis federation, par 73. ces obli- gations varient selon les circonstances. lorsqu’elle négocie et applique des traités, la couronne doit agir avec intégrité et honneur et éviter la moindre appa- rence de manœuvres malhonnêtes : nation haïda, 804 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. 3 scr 456, at para 4). where the government enacts regulations that infringe on aboriginal rights, the honour of the crown demands that those meas- ures be justified (sparrow, at p 1109). and when the government contemplates conduct that might adversely affect aboriginal or treaty rights, the hon- our of the crown gives rise to a duty to consult and accommodate. [61] grounded in the honour of the crown, the duty to consult arises from the assertion of crown sovereignty and aims to advance the process of rec- onciliation (mccabe, at p. 90; haida nation, at pa- ras. 45 and 59). it serves an important role in the “process of fair dealing and reconciliation that be- gins with the assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution” (haida nation, at para 32). where the duty arises, it requires mean- ingful consultation between the government and the affected group. this means a meaningful effort by the government to act in a manner that is consist- ent with the honour of the crown in that particular context (dwight g. newman, revisiting the duty to consult aboriginal peoples (2014), at pp 88-89). consultation obligations can be viewed as falling on a spectrum, which accommodates the different contexts in which more or less consultation is neces- sary to fulfill its purpose (newman, at p. 89; haida nation, at para 43). [62] i see this duty as being more than a “means” to uphold the honour of the crown. the obligation arises because it would not be honourable to make important decisions that have an adverse impact on aboriginal and treaty rights without efforts to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate those interests. the crown must act honourably in defining the rights guaranteed by s. 35 and in reconciling them with other societal rights and interests. this implies a duty to consult (haida nation, at para 20). the question is not whether the duty to consult is appropriate in the circumstances, but whether the decision is one to which the duty to consult applies. par. 19; badger, par. 41; r c. marshall, [1999] 3 rcs 456, par 4. lorsque le gouvernement prend un règlement qui porte atteinte aux droits ancestraux, l’honneur de la couronne exige que cette mesure soit justifiée : sparrow, p 1109. et lorsque le gouverne- ment envisage une mesure susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits ancestraux ou issus de traités, l’honneur de la couronne fait naître une obligation de consulter et d’accommoder. [61] ancrée dans le principe de l’honneur de la couronne, l’obligation de consulter découle de l’af- firmation de la souveraineté de la couronne et vise à favoriser le processus de conciliation : mccabe, p. 90; nation haïda, par. 45 et 59. elle joue un rôle important dans le « processus de négociation hono- rable et de conciliation qui débute au moment de l’af- firmation de la souveraineté et se poursuit au- delà du règlement formel des revendications » : nation haïda, par 32. cette obligation, lorsqu’elle existe, exige qu’il y ait une véritable consultation entre le gou- vernement et le groupe touché, c’est-à-dire un effort réel de la part du gouvernement d’agir en conformité avec le principe de l’honneur de la couronne dans ce contexte précis : dwight g. newman, revisiting the duty to consult aboriginal peoples (2014), p 88-89. on peut utiliser la notion de continuum pour inter- préter l’obligation de consulter, qui tient compte des diverses situations selon que la consultation est plus ou moins nécessaire pour atteindre son objectif : newman, p. 89; nation haïda, par 43. [62] j’estime que l’obligation de consulter n’est pas qu’un « moyen » de respecter le principe de l’honneur de la couronne. l’obligation prend nais- sance parce qu’il ne serait pas honorable pour la couronne de prendre des décisions importantes qui ont un effet préjudiciable sur les droits ancestraux et issus de traités sans faire l’effort de consulter les peuples autochtones et, le cas échéant, de trouver des accommodements à leurs préoccupations. la couronne doit agir honorablement lorsqu’elle définit les droits garantis par l’art. 35 et les concilie avec d’autres droits et intérêts sociétaux. cette obligation emporte celle de consulter : nation haïda, par 20. il ne s’agit pas de savoir si l’obligation de consulter convient dans les circonstances, mais de savoir si l’obligation de consulter s’applique à la décision. [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 805 [63] because the honour of the crown infuses the entirety of the government’s relationship with indig- enous peoples, the duty to consult must apply to all exercises of authority which are subject to scrutiny under s 35. this includes, in my view, the enactment of legislation. like the infringement analysis under sparrow, the duty to consult does not discriminate based on the type of government action, but rather is triggered based on the potential for adverse effects. [64] this conclusion flows from the jurisprudential development of the duty to consult from an aspect of the infringement analysis in sparrow to an inde- pendent obligation in haida nation. sparrow was the court’s first opportunity to consider the legal impact of s. 35, and to sketch a framework which would give appropriate weight to the constitutional nature of the words “recognized and affirmed” (sparrow, at p 1106). acknowledging the importance of context and an incremental approach to s. 35, dickson cj. and la forest j. proposed a justificatory test that would require the government to establish not only that it had a valid legislative objective, but that the legislative action was consistent with the honour of the crown. they held, at p. 1114:    the honour of the crown is at stake in dealings with aboriginal peoples. the special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis aboriginals must be the first consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in question can be justified. [63] comme l’honneur de la couronne imprègne l’ensemble des rapports du gouvernement avec les peuples autochtones, l’obligation de consulter doit s’appliquer à l’exercice de tous les pouvoirs qui sont assujettis à un examen fondé sur l’art 35. à mon sens, ces pouvoirs comprennent l’adoption des lois. à l’instar de l’analyse de l’atteinte fondée sur l’arrêt sparrow, l’obligation de consulter s’applique indé- pendamment du genre de mesure gouvernementale en cause et prend naissance dès lors qu’il y a un risque d’effets préjudiciables. [64] cette conclusion découle de l’évolution ju- risprudentielle de l’obligation de consulter, qui est passée d’un aspect de l’analyse de l’atteinte dans l’arrêt sparrow à une obligation indépendante dans nation haïda. c’est dans l’arrêt sparrow que la cour a eu l’occasion pour la première fois d’examiner les conséquences juridiques de l’art. 35 et d’ébau- cher un cadre d’analyse qui accorderait au caractère constitutionnel des mots « reconnus et confirmés » l’importance qui lui revient  : sparrow, p.  1106. reconnaissant l’importance du contexte et la fa- çon progressive d’aborder l’art. 35, le juge en chef dickson et le juge la forest ont proposé un test de justification qui obligerait le gouvernement à établir non seulement qu’il avait un objectif législatif valide, mais aussi que la mesure législative était conforme au principe de l’honneur de la couronne. ils sont arrivés, à la p. 1114, à la conclusion suivante :    l’honneur de sa majesté est en jeu lorsqu’elle transige avec les peuples autochtones. les rapports spéciaux de fiduciaire et la responsabilité du gouvernement envers les autochtones doivent être le premier facteur à examiner en déterminant si la mesure législative ou l’action en cause est justifiable. determining whether the crown’s legislative actions were consistent with the honour of the crown would include, depending on the circumstances, an inquiry into whether the aboriginal group in question had been consulted (sparrow, at p. 1119; see also r. v. nikal, [1996] 1 scr 1013, at para. 110; r v. gladstone, [1996] 2 scr 723, at para 64). pour déterminer si les mesures législatives de la couronne étaient conformes au principe de l’hon- neur de la couronne, il faudrait, selon les circons- tances, examiner si le groupe autochtone en question a été consulté : sparrow, p. 1119; voir également r c. nikal, [1996] 1 rcs 1013, par. 110; r c. gladstone, [1996] 2 rcs 723, par 64. [65] consultation took on an even greater role in delgamuukw v. british columbia, [1997] 3 scr. [65] la consultation a joué un rôle encore plus impor- tant dans l’arrêt delgamuukw c. colombie- britannique, 806 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. 1010, an aboriginal title case, where lamer cj first acknowledged that consultation was a procedural “duty”. in his view, while the nature and scope of the obligation would vary with the circumstances, “[t]here is always a duty of consultation” (para 168). lamer cj drew from his recent comments on the doctrine of priority in gladstone, which described a right that was both procedural and substantive: “.  .  . at the stage of justification the government must demonstrate both that the process by which it allocated the resource and the actual allocation of the resource which results from that process reflect the prior interest of [a]boriginal rights holders in the fishery” (gladstone, at para 62). by analogy, in the aboriginal title context, this might entail that “gov- ernments accommodate the participation of [a]bo- riginal peoples in the development of the resources of british columbia” (delgamuukw, at para 167). as lamer cj explained, this duty of consultation flowed from the fiduciary relationship between the crown and aboriginal peoples (ibid., at para 168). [66] through these early justification cases, the honour of the crown had emerged as a fundamen- tal backdrop against which the enactment of leg- islation would be measured. it required not only a substantive outcome which gave adequate weight to the aboriginal rights and interests at stake, but a manner of dealing that was in keeping with the spe- cial relationship between the crown and aboriginal rights- holders in particular, the court identified consultation as a significant consideration in as- sessing whether the government’s infringement of aboriginal or treaty rights was justified under s 35. this did not change based on the kind of government action in question; even in sparrow, which involved a challenge to the federal fisheries act, rsc 1970, c. f-14, the importance of notice and consultation in the context of regulatory conservation measures was acknowledged (p 1119). [1997] 3 rcs 1010, une affaire portant sur un titre ancestral, où le juge en chef lamer a reconnu pour la première fois que la consultation était une « obliga- tion » procédurale. à son avis, bien que la nature et la portée de l’obligation varieraient selon les circons- tances, « [i]l y a toujours obligation de consulter » : par 168. le juge en chef lamer s’était inspiré de ses commentaires récents sur la doctrine relative à l’ordre de priorité dans l’arrêt gladstone, qui décrivaient un droit à la fois procédural et substantiel : « [à] l’étape de la justification, l’état doit démontrer que les modalités de répartition de la ressource ainsi que la répartition elle- même reflètent l’intérêt prioritaire des titulaires des droits ancestraux à l’égard de cette pêcherie » : gladstone, par 62. par analogie, dans le contexte d’un titre ancestral, cela pourrait vouloir dire que « les gou- vernements prennent en compte la participation des peuples autochtones à la mise en valeur des ressources de la colombie- britannique » : delgamuukw, par 167. comme le juge en chef lamer l’a expliqué, cette obli- gation de consulter découle des rapports de fiduciaire qui existe entre la couronne et les peuples autoch- tones : ibid., par 168. [66] ces premières décisions en matière de justifi- cation ont établi que l’honneur de la couronne était un principe fondamental dont il fallait tenir compte pour évaluer les mesures législatives adoptées. ce principe exigeait non seulement un résultat concret qui accordait l’importance qui leur revient aux droits et aux intérêts ancestraux en jeu, mais également une façon de transiger qui cadrait avec la relation particu- lière qu’entretient la couronne avec les titulaires de droits ancestraux. plus précisément, la cour a affirmé que la consultation était un facteur important dont il fallait tenir compte pour évaluer si l’atteinte aux droits ancestraux ou issus de traités par le gouverne- ment était justifiée au regard de l’art 35. le genre de mesure gouvernementale en cause ne change rien à l’importance de cette consultation; ainsi, dans l’arrêt sparrow, où l’on contestait la loi sur les pêcheries, lrc 1970, c. f-14, une loi fédérale, la cour a reconnu l’importance d’informer et de consulter les groupes autochtones visés lorsqu’il est question de mesures de conservation réglementaires : p 1119. [67] although these cases looked at consultation to determine whether an infringement was justified, it [67] bien que, dans ces arrêts, la cour se soit pen- chée sur la consultation pour décider si l’atteinte était [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 807 was the process prior to the infringement which en- gaged the honour of the crown. as a matter of logic, then, the crown’s duty to consult is not dependent on the finding that an infringement resulted, but is, instead, a component of the crown’s overarching ob- ligation to deal honourably with indigenous peoples when regulating their rights. this is exactly the rea- soning that led to the court’s landmark recognition of a free- standing duty to consult in haida nation, taku river and mikisew cree. in the companion appeals haida nation and [68] taku river, mclachlin cj found that a legal duty to consult and accommodate arose when the crown had knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the aboriginal right or title, and contem- plated conduct that might adversely affect it (haida nation, at para. 31; taku river, at paras 24-25). as mclachlin cj explained, the existence of this legal duty to consult, prior to proof of claims, was neces- sary to understand the court’s previous decisions which considered consultation where confirmation of the right and justification of an alleged infringement were litigated at the same time. the duty to consult could not depend on either the existence of a proven right, or, by extension, proof of infringement. the fact that crown behaviour before the determination of the right could be considered in the context of justification negated any arguments to the contrary (haida nation, at para 34). justifiée, c’est le processus suivi avant l’atteinte qui a engagé l’honneur de la couronne. ainsi, en toute logique, l’obligation qui incombe à la couronne de consulter ne dépend pas de la conclusion qu’il y a eu atteinte, mais constitue plutôt une composante de l’obligation primordiale de la couronne d’agir honorablement envers les peuples autochtones lors- qu’elle réglemente leurs droits. c’est exactement le raisonnement qui a mené la cour à reconnaître l’obligation indépendante de consulter dans les arrêts de principe nation haïda, taku river et première nation crie mikisew. [68] dans les pourvois connexes nation haïda et taku river, la juge en chef mclachlin a conclu que l’obligation légale de consulter et d’accommoder prend naissance dès lors que la couronne a connais- sance, concrètement ou par imputation, de l’exis- tence potentielle d’un titre ou de droits ancestraux et envisage des mesures susceptibles d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur ces droits ou ce titre : nation haïda, par. 31; taku river, par 24-25. comme la juge en chef mclachlin l’a expliqué, l’existence de cette obligation légale de consulter le groupe intéressé, avant qu’il ait apporté la preuve de sa revendication, était nécessaire pour comprendre les décisions anté- rieures de la cour dans lesquelles elle a examiné la consultation, où la confirmation du droit et celle de la justification de l’atteinte reprochée ont été débat- tues en même temps. l’obligation de consulter ne pouvait dépendre de l’existence d’un droit prouvé ou, par extension, de la preuve de l’atteinte. le fait que le comportement de la couronne adopté avant l’établissement du droit pouvait être examiné dans le contexte de la justification réfutait tout argument à l’effet contraire : nation haïda, par 34. [69] while haida nation and taku river were primarily concerned with protecting unproven claims during the treaty negotiation process, mikisew cree made clear that the duty to consult arose in respect of established rights as well. the parties had asked what obligations the crown owed when exercising its power under treaty no. 8 to take up portions of the mikisew’s surrendered lands “from time to time” binnie  j explicitly rejected an approach that would find each subsequent “taking up” by the crown to be an infringement of the mikisew’s treaty [69] alors que les arrêts nation haïda et taku river concernaient principalement la protection des re- vendications non établies durant le processus de négociation de traités, l’arrêt première nation crie mikisew a clairement indiqué que l’obligation de consulter prend également naissance à l’égard de droits établis. les parties avaient demandé quelles étaient les obligations de la couronne lorsqu’elle exerce le pouvoir que lui confère le traité no 8 de prendre des terres cédées par les mikisew « de temps à autre ». le juge binnie a explicitement rejeté une 808 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. rights, requiring justification under the sparrow test (paras.  31-32). instead, he concluded that where the crown’s contemplated course of action would adversely affect those treaty rights, a duty to con- sult was triggered (para 34). although “taking up” was clearly anticipated by the treaty, the crown was obliged to manage the process honourably (paras. 31 and 33). [70] through this trilogy of decisions, the court affirmed that the crown’s obligation to consult and accommodate indigenous groups arises inde- pendently from its obligation to justify infringe- ments of aboriginal and treaty rights. in the duty to consult context, the controlling question is not whether the limit on rights is justified, but “what is required to maintain the honour of the crown and to effect reconciliation between the crown and the aboriginal peoples with respect to the interests at stake” (haida nation, at para 45). in this sense, the trilogy represents a shift towards mutual reconcilia- tion between aboriginal and crown sovereignty, and a further step towards embracing the honour of the crown as a limit on crown sovereignty in relation to indigenous peoples (mark d. walters, “the morality of aboriginal law” (2006), 31 queen’s lj 470, at pp 513-14). approche qui conclurait que chaque « prise » ef- fectuée subséquemment par la couronne serait une atteinte aux droits issus de traités des mikisew, qui devrait être justifiée conformément au test énoncé dans l’arrêt sparrow : par 31-32. il a plutôt conclu que lorsque la mesure envisagée par la couronne est susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur ces droits issus de traités, l’obligation de consulter de- vient applicable : par 34. même si la « prise » était clairement prévue par le traité, la couronne était tenue de gérer le processus de façon honorable : par. 31 et 33. [70] dans cette trilogie de décisions, la cour a confirmé que l’obligation de la couronne de consul- ter et d’accommoder les groupes autochtones prend naissance indépendamment de son obligation de justifier les atteintes aux droits ancestraux et issus de traités. dans le contexte de l’obligation de consulter, la question décisive n’est pas de savoir si l’atteinte aux droits est justifiée, mais consiste plutôt à détermi- ner « ce qui est nécessaire pour préserver l’honneur de la couronne et pour concilier les intérêts de la couronne et ceux des autochtones » : nation haïda, par 45. en ce sens, la trilogie marque un change- ment en faveur de la conciliation de la souveraineté autochtone et de celle de la couronne et contribue à percevoir l’honneur de la couronne comme une limite à sa souveraineté dans le contexte de ses relations avec les peuples autochtones : mark d. walters, « the morality of aboriginal law » (2006), 31 queen’s lj 470, p. 513- 514. [71] haida nation established a new legal frame- work in which to understand the government’s ob- ligations towards indigenous peoples, organized around the principle of the honour of the crown (jamie d dickson, the honour and dishonour of the crown: making sense of aboriginal law in canada (2015), at p 116). this is the overarching framework in which the duty to consult, and the obligation to justify infringements, must now be understood. under the sparrow analysis, government conduct could always be scrutinized for consistency with the honour of the crown, including the duty of consultation, irrespective of whether that conduct was executive or legislative in nature. no longer con- fined to the justification context, the duty to consult [71] l’arrêt nation haïda a établi un nouveau cadre juridique pour nous permettre de comprendre les obligations du gouvernement envers les peuples au- tochtones, articulées autour du principe de l’honneur de la couronne : jamie d. dickson, the honour and dishonour of the crown  : making sense of aboriginal law in canada (2015), p 116. il s’agit du cadre fondamental dans lequel l’obligation de consulter, et l’obligation de justifier les atteintes, doivent désormais être interprétées. suivant le cadre d’analyse établi par l’arrêt sparrow, la mesure gou- vernementale pourrait toujours être scrutée pour dé- terminer si elle est compatible avec l’honneur de la couronne, y compris l’obligation de consulter, peu importe que cette mesure ait été de nature exécutive [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 809 now forms “part of the essential legal framework” of aboriginal law in canada (little salmon/carmacks, at para 69). like the sparrow inquiry, the duty to consult doctrine infuses the field of governmental action, requiring consultation wherever the potential for adverse effects on claimed or established s. 35 rights arises. [72] subsequent appeals have reinforced this ex- pansive understanding of the duty to consult. in rio tinto alcan inc. v. carrier sekani tribal council, [2010] 2  scr  650, mclachlin c.j reiterated the “generous, purposive approach” that applies to the duty to consult (para 43) “[g]overnment ac- tion” triggering the duty was not confined to the exercise of statutory powers. further, it included “strategic, higher level decisions” that could have an impact on aboriginal rights or claims (carrier sekani, at para. 44, citing jack woodward, native law (loose- leaf), vol. 1, at p 5-41). as mclachlin cj explained, high- level management decisions or structural changes to resource management may set the stage for future decisions that will have a direct adverse impact on lands and resources, and leave aboriginal groups with a lost or diminished constitutional right to have their interests considered (carrier sekani, at para 47). this is itself an adverse impact sufficient to trigger the haida nation duty to consult and accommodate. ou législative. n’étant plus limitée au contexte de la justification, l’obligation de consulter fait désormais « partie du cadre juridique essentiel » du droit des autochtones au canada : little salmon/carmacks, par.  69. à l’instar de l’analyse préconisée dans sparrow, la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter imprègne la sphère des mesures gouvernementales, exigeant une consultation chaque fois que ces me- sures sont susceptibles d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits revendiqués ou établis protégés par l’art 35. [72] des pourvois subséquents ont renforcé cette interprétation élargie de l’obligation de consulter. dans l’arrêt rio tinto alcan inc. c. conseil tribal carrier sekani, [2010] 2 rcs 650, la juge en chef mclachlin a réitéré que c’est « l’approche généreuse et téléologique » qui s’applique à l’obligation de consulter : par 43. la « mesure gouvernementale » qui donne naissance à l’obligation n’était pas limi- tée à l’exercice de pouvoirs conférés par la loi. en outre, elle comprenait toute [traduction] « déci- sion stratégique prise en haut lieu » qui était sus- ceptible d’avoir un effet sur des droits ancestraux ou des revendications autochtones : carrier sekani, par. 44, citant jack woodward, native law (feuilles mobiles), vol. 1, p 5-41. comme la juge en chef mclachlin l’a expliqué, les décisions prises en haut lieu ou les modifications structurelles apportées à la gestion des ressources peuvent ouvrir la voie à d’autres décisions qui auront un effet préjudiciable direct sur les terres et les ressources et peuvent faire en sorte que les groupes autochtones soient dépouil- lés en tout ou en partie de leur droit constitutionnel de voir leurs intérêts pris en considération : carrier sekani, par 47. il s’agit là même d’un effet préjudi- ciable qui suffit à déclencher l’obligation de consul- ter et d’accommoder reconnue par nation haïda. [73] more recently, in clyde river (hamlet) v. petroleum geo- services inc., [2017] 1 scr 1069, and the companion case chippewas of the thames first nation v. enbridge pipelines inc., [2017] 1 scr 1099, the court considered whether an ad- ministrative scheme, namely the national energy board’s approval process, could trigger a duty to consult noting that the board was the “vehicle through which the crown acts”, the court held [73] plus récemment, dans l’arrêt clyde river (hameau) c. petroleum geo- services inc., [2017] 1 rcs 1069, et le pourvoi connexe chippewas of the thames first nation c. pipelines enbridge inc., [2017] 1 rcs 1099, la cour a examiné si un régime administratif, à savoir le processus d’approbation de l’office national de l’énergie, pouvait donner naissance à l’obligation de consulter. indiquant que l’office est le « moyen par lequel la couronne agit », 810 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. that its decisions would constitute crown conduct that implicated the duty to consult (clyde river, at para. 29; chippewas, at para 29). the crown cannot avoid its duty to consult, or the honour of the crown, by delegating decision- making power to a tribunal established by parliament. [74] but i do not see this extension of the duty to consult into the administrative context as a rejection of its application in other aspects of the government’s relationship with indigenous peoples, especially since that question was expressly left open by this court (carrier sekani, at para. 44; see also clyde river, at para 28). in clyde river, the court reiter- ated that relevant crown conduct was to be defined based not on its form, but on its potential for adverse impacts, at para. 25: crown conduct which would trigger the duty is not re- stricted to the exercise by or on behalf of the crown of stat- utory powers or of the royal prerogative, nor is it limited to decisions that have an immediate impact on lands and resources. the concern is for adverse impacts, however made, upon aboriginal and treaty rights and, indeed, a goal of consultation is to identify, minimize and address adverse impacts where possible (carrier sekani, at pa- ras 45-46) [emphasis added.] [75] although the law of judicial review, which ap- plies to the exercise of statutory powers or the royal prerogative, is often implicated in consultation cases, the duty to consult itself attaches to all exercises of crown power, including legislative action. la cour a conclu que ses décisions constitueraient une mesure de la couronne emportant l’obligation de consulter : clyde river, par. 29; chippewas, par 29. ainsi, la couronne ne peut se soustraire ni à son obli- gation de consulter ni à l’honneur de la couronne, en déléguant ses pouvoirs décisionnels à un tribunal établi par le parlement. [74] je ne vois toutefois pas cet élargissement du champ d’application de l’obligation de consulter dans le contexte administratif comme un rejet de son application dans d’autres aspects des rapports du gouvernement avec les peuples autochtones, d’autant plus que la cour s’est expressément abstenue de se prononcer sur cette question : carrier sekani, par. 44; voir également clyde river, par 28. dans clyde river, par. 25, la cour a réitéré que les mesures pertinentes prises par la couronne devaient être dé- finies non pas selon leur forme, mais selon les effets préjudiciables qu’elles peuvent causer : les mesures de la couronne susceptibles de donner nais- sance à l’obligation de consulter ne se limitent pas à l’exer- cice, par la couronne ou en son nom, de la prérogative royale ou de pouvoirs conférés par la loi, et ne se limitent pas non plus aux décisions qui ont une incidence immé- diate sur les terres et les ressources. il faut se demander si la mesure a des effets préjudiciables, quelle qu’en soit la cause, sur des droits ancestraux ou issus de traités. d’ailleurs, un des objectifs de la consultation consiste à cerner les effets préjudiciables, à les réduire au minimum et à y remédier si possible (carrier sekani, par 45-46). [je souligne.] [75] bien que le droit régissant le contrôle judi- ciaire, qui s’applique à l’exercice de pouvoirs lé- gislatifs ou de la prérogative royale, soit souvent en cause dans des affaires de consultation, l’obligation de consulter elle- même se rapporte à tout exercice des pouvoirs de la couronne, y compris aux mesures législatives. [76] haida nation and sparrow provide distinctive analyses based not on the type of government action at issue, but on the nature of the engagement with s. 35 rights. sparrow provides a framework for de- termining whether government action, including the exercise of legislative or executive authority, consti- tutes an infringement of s. 35 rights, and whether that [76] les arrêts nation haïda et sparrow four- nissent des analyses distinctes non pas selon le genre de mesure gouvernementale en litige, mais selon la nature de l’intervention dans les droits garantis par l’art 35. l’arrêt sparrow établit un cadre d’ana- lyse pour déterminer si la mesure gouvernemen- tale, y compris l’exercice d’un pouvoir législatif ou [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 811 infringement can be justified. haida nation, on the other hand, obliges the government to consult when it contemplates action that has the potential to ad- versely affect those same rights and claims. together, these complementary obligations ensure that the honour of the crown is upheld throughout all actions which engage its special relationship with aboriginal peoples. the government has both the obligation to consult, and the obligation to justify infringements — neither duty takes away from the other, and each can be owed and breached independently. [77] the coextensive nature of these two duties was confirmed in tsilhqot’in nation v. british co- lumbia, [2014] 2 scr 257 (per mclachlin cj). as this case makes clear, the procedural duty to consult applies in addition to the government’s sub- stantive obligation to act in a way that is consistent with aboriginal and treaty rights guaranteed by s. 35 (para 80). to justify an infringement, the crown must demonstrate that it complied with its procedural duty at the time that the action was contemplated, that the infringement is backed by a compelling and substantial objective, and that the public benefit achieved is proportionate to any adverse effect on the aboriginal interest (tsilhqot’in, at para 125). the same analysis applies whether the infringing action is legislative or executive in nature (paras. 77 and 125). exécutif, constitue une atteinte aux droits protégés par l’art. 35, et si cette atteinte peut être justifiée. l’arrêt nation haïda, en revanche, oblige le gouver- nement à consulter lorsqu’il envisage une mesure qui est susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur ces mêmes droits et revendications. ensemble, ces obli- gations complémentaires veillent à ce que l’honneur de la couronne soit préservé dans l’ensemble des mesures qui font intervenir sa relation particulière avec les peuples autochtones. le gouvernement a à la fois l’obligation de consulter et l’obligation de justifier les atteintes — aucune obligation n’enlève quoi que ce soit à l’autre, et l’existence de l’une ainsi que le manquement qui peut en découler ne dépendent pas de l’autre. [77] l’existence conjointe de ces deux obliga- tions a été confirmée par l’arrêt nation tsilhqot’in c. colombie- britannique, [2014] 2 rcs 257 (la juge en chef mclachlin). comme il y est claire- ment indiqué, l’obligation procédurale de consul- ter s’applique en plus de l’obligation substantielle qui incombe au gouvernement d’agir en conformité avec les droits ancestraux et issus de traités protégés par l’art. 35 : par 80. pour justifier une atteinte, la couronne doit démontrer qu’elle s’est acquittée de son obligation procédurale au moment où la mesure était envisagée, que l’atteinte poursuit un objectif impérieux et réel, et que l’avantage qu’en retire le public est proportionnel à tout effet préjudiciable de la mesure sur l’intérêt autochtone : tsilhqot’in, par 125. la même analyse s’applique, que la mesure soit de nature législative ou exécutive : par. 77 et 125. [78] because the rationale for the duty to con- sult applies equally as in the executive context, it would make little sense to adopt a different analyt- ical approach where legislative action is impugned. ongoing consultation is preferable to the backward- looking approach of subsequent challenges, since it protects s. 35 rights from irreversible harm and enhances reconciliation. most importantly, this ap- proach recognizes that the legislative sphere is not excluded from the honour of the crown, which at- taches to all exercises of sovereignty. both grounded in the honour of the crown, the haida nation and sparrow frameworks cover all arenas of decision- making equally, providing for consultation where the [78] puisque le fondement même de l’obligation de consulter s’applique aussi bien en contexte exé- cutif qu’en contexte législatif, il ne serait pas lo- gique d’adopter une approche analytique différente lorsqu’une mesure législative est contestée. il est préférable de mener des consultations tout au long du processus plutôt que d’adopter l’approche qui consisterait à contester la mesure après coup, puisque la consultation protège les droits garantis par l’art. 35 d’un préjudice irréparable et favorise la réconci- liation. plus important encore, cette façon de faire reconnaît que la sphère législative n’échappe pas au principe de l’honneur de la couronne, qui se rattache à tout exercice de la souveraineté. tous deux ancrés 812 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. potential for adverse effects arises, and the obligation to provide justification where infringements result. to revive a pre-haida nation state of affairs in this context would essentially extinguish the honour of the crown in the legislative process by conflating the government’s duty to consult with its distinct obligation to justify infringements. [79] endorsing such a void in the honour of the crown would also leave a corresponding gap in the s. 35 framework. haida nation provides consulta- tion remedies on a reduced threshold, based on the potential for adverse effects on a claimed or asserted right. if legislative decisions were only subject to the sparrow framework, indigenous groups with estab- lished rights would be required to meet the more onerous infringement threshold in order to access consultation rights, and those with unproven claims would be excluded entirely. adverse effects which do not rise to the level of a prima facie infringe- ment would be without remedy, leaving aboriginal rights- holders vulnerable to the same government objectives carried out through legislative, rather than executive, action. dans le principe de l’honneur de la couronne, les cadres d’analyse établis par les arrêts nation haïda et sparrow englobent tous les champs du processus décisionnel également, exigeant une consultation dès l’existence potentielle d’effets préjudiciables et l’obligation de justifier toute atteinte qui pourrait en découler. rétablir la situation qui existait avant l’arrêt nation haïda dans ce contexte reviendrait essentiellement à soustraire le processus législa- tif de l’application du principe de l’honneur de la couronne en confondant l’obligation de consulter du gouvernement avec son obligation distincte de justifier les atteintes. [79] approuver une telle lacune dans le principe de l’honneur de la couronne laisserait également un vide dans le cadre d’analyse régissant l’art 35. l’arrêt nation haïda donne ouverture à des mesures de consultation après l’atteinte d’un seuil réduit, en fonction de l’existence potentielle d’effets pré- judiciables sur un droit revendiqué ou établi. si les décisions législatives étaient uniquement assujetties au cadre d’analyse énoncé dans l’arrêt sparrow, les groupes autochtones ayant des droits établis seraient tenus de satisfaire au critère d’atteinte le plus sévère pour exercer leurs droits d’être consultés, et ceux dont les revendications ne sont pas établies seraient totalement exclus. les effets préjudiciables qui ne s’élèveraient pas au rang d’atteinte prima facie ne pourraient être redressés, laissant les titulaires de droits ancestraux vulnérables aux mêmes objectifs gouvernementaux réalisés grâce à des mesures lé- gislatives plutôt qu’exécutives. [80] this result would be contrary to the spirit of the court’s decision in haida nation and would sit uncomfortably with the approach adopted in mikisew cree. where the government takes up land under treaty no. 8, it is not appropriate to move directly to a sparrow analysis; the court must first consider whether the process was compatible with the honour of the crown (mikisew cree, at paras. 57 and 59). action which would adversely affect the mikisew’s guaranteed rights to hunt, fish, and trap, triggers a duty to consult, whether or not an infringement results (para 34). the underlying premise of the decision in mikisew cree would be frustrated if the same action could be carried out through legislation [80] ce résultat serait contraire à l’esprit de l’arrêt nation haïda de la cour et cadrerait difficilement avec l’approche adoptée dans l’arrêt première nation crie mikisew. lorsque le gouvernement prend des terres en application du traité no 8, il ne convient pas de passer directement à une analyse fondée sur l’arrêt sparrow; le tribunal doit d’abord examiner si le processus était compatible avec l’honneur de la couronne : première nation crie mikisew, par. 57 et 59. une mesure qui aurait un effet préjudiciable sur les droits de chasse, de pêche et de piégeage garantis aux mikisew déclencherait l’obligation de consulter, peu importe qu’il y ait eu atteinte ou pas : par 34. la prémisse qui sous- tend la décision dans [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 813 without consultation. notably, while mikisew cree dealt with the “taking up” clause, treaty no. 8 sim- ilarly subjects the mikisew’s treaty rights to “such regulations as may from time to time be made by the government of the country, acting under the authority of her majesty”. this process, too, must be carried out with honour. [81] as this discussion reveals, there is no doctrinal or conceptual justification which would preclude a duty to consult in the legislative context. but this appeal calls on this court to consider whether and how the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and privilege constrain the justiciability of the duty to consult when applied to legislative action. [82] parliamentary sovereignty invokes the concept that parliament has the power to make or unmake any law whatever (peter w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at p 12-1). parliamentary privilege or immunity describes the set of powers and privileges possessed by the federal houses of parliament and provincial legislative assemblies that are necessary to their capacity to function as legisla- tive bodies (hogg, at p 1-13). première nation crie mikisew serait contrecarrée si la même mesure pouvait être exécutée au moyen d’une loi sans consultation. fait à noter, bien que l’arrêt première nation crie mikisew portait sur la disposi- tion régissant la « prise », le traité no 8 assujettit de la même façon les droits issus de traités des mikisew à [traduction] « tels règlements qui pourront être faits de temps à autre par le gouvernement du pays agissant au nom de sa majesté ». ce processus doit également être exécuté avec honneur. [81] comme le révèle la présente analyse, il n’existe aucune justification, sur les plans tant doc- trinal que conceptuel, qui exclurait l’obligation de consulter dans le contexte législatif. le présent appel invite toutefois la cour à examiner si et comment les principes de la souveraineté parlementaire et du privilège parlementaire restreignent le pouvoir des cours de justice de faire respecter l’obligation de consulter lorsqu’elle est appliquée à la prise de mesures législatives. [82] la souveraineté parlementaire fait appel au concept selon lequel le parlement détient le pou- voir d’adopter et d’abroger quelque loi que ce soit : peter w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5e éd. suppl.), p 12-1. le privilège ou l’immunité parle- mentaire décrit l’ensemble des pouvoirs et privilèges dont jouissent les chambres du parlement fédéral et les assemblées législatives provinciales qui sont né- cessaires pour qu’elles puissent fonctionner comme entités législatives : hogg, p 1-13. [83] i do not share the view of my colleagues that the separation of powers and parliamentary privilege necessarily immunize the law- making process from judicial scrutiny to assess adequate consultation with indigenous peoples. the government’s obligation to consult on the enactment of legislation which regulates aboriginal rights has been considered a jus- ticiable issue since the court’s decision in sparrow first identified consultation as a relevant marker of justification. with respect, it is difficult to see how assessing consultation under the sparrow justifica- tion analysis would not similarly offend these prin- ciples. and i fail to see how these principles would preclude enforcing the duty to consult under s. 35, but not modern treaty provisions implemented by [83] je ne partage pas l’opinion de mes collègues selon laquelle la séparation des pouvoirs et le pri- vilège parlementaire immunisent nécessairement le processus législatif contre le contrôle judiciaire qui viserait à évaluer s’il y a eu une consultation adéquate des peuples autochtones. l’obligation du gouvernement de consulter lorsqu’il édicte des lois qui réglementent des droits ancestraux est consi- dérée comme une question que les tribunaux sont appelés à faire respecter depuis que la cour, dans l’arrêt sparrow, a reconnu pour la première fois que la consultation est un indicateur pertinent de la justification. à mon avis, il est difficile de voir comment le fait d’évaluer la consultation dans le cadre de l’analyse de la justification préconisée par 814 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. legislation which provide for crown consultation with first nations in respect of legislative develop- ments and amendments.4 it seems to me that the issues in this appeal [84] require this court to reconcile, not choose between, protecting the legislative process from judicial in- terference and protecting aboriginal rights from the legislative process. as my colleagues explain, the concepts of parliamentary sovereignty and parlia- mentary privilege are central to ensuring that the leg- islative branch of government is able to do its work without undue interference (ontario v criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, [2013] 3 scr 3, at paras. 28-29; canada (house of commons) v. vaid, [2005] 1 scr 667, at para. 41; new bruns- wick broadcasting co. v. nova scotia (speaker of the house of assembly), [1993] 1 scr 319, at p 389). but these concepts cannot displace the honour of the crown. the jurisprudence makes clear that the right of aboriginal groups to be consulted on deci- sions that may adversely affect their interests is not merely political, but a legal right with constitutional force (haida nation, at paras. 10 and 34; sparrow, at pp 1103-4). i do not accept an approach that re- places an enforceable legal right to consultation, with a vague and unenforceable right to “honourable dealing”. the duty to consult is not a suggestion to consult, it is a duty, just as the honour of the crown is not a mere “incantation” or aspirational goal (haida nation, at para 16). l’arrêt sparrow ne contreviendrait pas de la même façon à ces principes. je ne vois en outre pas com- ment ces principes compromettraient l’application de l’obligation de consulter consacrée à l’art. 35, mais pas les dispositions des traités modernes mis en œuvre par une loi qui prévoit que la couronne doit consulter les premières nations lorsqu’elle élabore et modifie des lois4. il me semble que les questions soulevées par [84] le présent appel exigent que la cour concilie la pro- tection du processus législatif de l’interférence des tribunaux et celle des droits des autochtones du processus législatif, plutôt que de choisir entre elles. comme l’expliquent mes collègues, les concepts de souveraineté et de privilège parlementaires sont fondamentaux pour assurer que la branche législative du gouvernement est en mesure de s’acquitter de son travail sans interférence indue : ontario c. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, [2013] 3 rcs 3, par. 28-29; canada (chambre des communes) c. vaid, [2005] 1 rcs 667, par. 41; new brunswick broadcasting co. c. nouvelle- écosse (président de l’assemblée législative), [1993] 1 rcs 319, p 389. ces concepts ne peuvent toutefois pas supplanter le principe de l’honneur de la couronne. la jurispru- dence indique clairement que le droit des groupes autochtones d’être consultés quant aux décisions susceptibles d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur leurs intérêts n’est pas simplement politique. il s’agit d’un droit juridique ayant force constitutionnelle : nation haïda, par. 10 et 34; sparrow, p. 1103- 1104. je ne saurais accepter une approche qui remplace un droit juridique exécutoire d’être consulté par le droit vague et non exécutoire à ce que le gouvernement « se conduise honorablement ». l’obligation de consulter n’est pas une suggestion de consulter, il s’agit d’une obligation, tout comme l’honneur de la couronne n’est pas simplement une « belle formule » ou un objectif ambitieux : nation haïda, par 16. [85] there is no doubt that the honour of the crown and the corresponding duty to consult may have an impact on the legislative process. but that is [85] il ne fait aucun doute que l’honneur de la couronne et l’obligation correspondante de consul- ter peuvent avoir une incidence sur le processus 4 factum of the joint interveners, champagne and aishihik first nations, kwanlin dün first nation, little salmon carmacks first nation, first nation of na- cho nyak dun, teslin tlingit council, and the first nations of the maa- nulth treaty society. 4 mémoire des intervenants conjoints, champagne and aishihik first nations, kwanlin dün first nation, little salman carmacks first nation, first nation of na- cho nyak dun, teslin tlingit council, et first nations of the maa- nulth treaty society. [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 815 inevitable if the guarantee under s. 35 is to be taken seriously. adjustments to the legislative process can- not justify the erasure of constitutionally mandated rights. indeed, there would be little point in having a constitution if legislatures could proceed as if it did not exist when expedient. in sparrow, the court found it impossible [86] to conceive of s. 35 as anything other than a con- stitutional limit on the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty (p 1109). it seems to me quite ironic that parliamentary sovereignty would now be used as a shield to prevent the mikisew’s claim for con- sultation. with respect, such an approach reactivates the happily silenced spirit of st. catherine’s mill- ing and lumber co. v. the queen (1888), 14 app. cas 46 (pc), where aboriginal rights were “de- pendent upon the good will of the sovereign” (p 54). [87] the fact that these rights are political in im- plication does not detract from their enforceability in law, but highlights their essential role in reconciling aboriginal and crown sovereignty. our constitution places a responsibility on the executive and leg- islative branches, along with indigenous leaders, to collaborate and reconcile competing claims and historical grievances (dickson, at p 146). this has been described as a generative constitutional order, which “mandates the crown to negotiate with abo- riginal peoples for the recognition of their rights in a contemporary form that balances their needs with the interests of the broader society” (brian slattery, “aboriginal rights and the honour of the crown” (2005), 29  sclr  (2d) 433, at p.  436; carrier sekani, at para 38). this process is supported by the judiciary’s role in enforcing the honour of the crown, and holding the crown accountable where that stand- ard is not met. unilateral action is the very antithesis of honour and reconciliation, concepts which under- lie both the duty to consult and the very premise of modern aboriginal law (mitchell, at para 11). législatif. cela est toutefois inévitable si l’on veut prendre au sérieux la garantie prévue à l’art 35. la nécessité d’ajuster le processus législatif ne peut jus- tifier l’effacement des droits garantis par la consti- tution. en effet, il ne servirait à rien d’avoir une constitution si les assemblées législatives pouvaient procéder comme si elle n’existait pas lorsque c’est opportun. [86] dans l’arrêt sparrow, la cour a jugé im- possible de concevoir l’art. 35 comme autre chose qu’une limite constitutionnelle à l’exercice de la souveraineté parlementaire : p 1109. il me semble plutôt ironique que le principe de la souveraineté parlementaire soit désormais utilisé comme bouclier pour bloquer la revendication des mikisew de leur droit d’être consultés. à mon avis, une telle approche ranime l’esprit heureusement réprimé de la décision st. catherine’s milling et lumber co. c. the queen (1888), 14 app cas 46 (cp), dans laquelle les droits ancestraux [traduction] « dépendaient du bon vouloir du souverain » : p 54. [87] le fait que ces droits ont une incidence poli- tique n’enlève rien à leur force exécutoire en droit. cela met plutôt en relief leur rôle essentiel pour concilier la souveraineté autochtone et celle de la couronne. suivant notre constitution, il incombe aux pouvoirs exécutif et législatif, ainsi qu’aux dirigeants autochtones, de collaborer et de concilier les revendi- cations opposées et les griefs historiques : dickson, p 146. il s’agit de ce qu’on a appelé l’ordre consti- tutionnel génératif, qui [traduction] « requiert que la couronne négocie avec les peuples autochtones pour que leurs droits soient reconnus dans leur état actuel, qui met en balance leurs besoins, d’une part, et les intérêts de la société en général, d’autre part » : brian slattery, « aboriginal rights and the honour of the crown » (2005), 29 sclr (2d) 433, p. 436; carrier sekani, par 38. ce processus est soutenu par le pouvoir judiciaire, qui a comme rôle de faire res- pecter l’honneur de la couronne et de tenir celle-ci responsable lorsque cette norme n’est pas respectée. la mesure prise unilatéralement est l’antithèse même des principes d’honneur et de réconciliation, qui sous- tendent tant l’obligation de consulter que le fon- dement même du droit moderne des autochtones : mitchell, par 11. 816 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. [88] cases which advocate against intrusion into the parliamentary process must therefore be read in the context of a duty that is not only a consti- tutional imperative, but a recognition of the limits of crown sovereignty itself. the unique nature of s. 35 means that its limits can be distinguished from cases which considered the impact of other rights and obligations on parliamentary sovereignty. in new brunswick broadcasting co., broadcasting companies had challenged the nova scotia house of assembly’s ban on television cameras as being contrary to s. 2(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, which protects freedom of the press and other media communication. mclachlin j. was of the view that the reallocation of powers effected by the charter did not go to the extreme of removing the legislature’s inherent constitutional right to ex- clude strangers from its chamber (p 389). however, while the charter defines a sphere of rights for indi- viduals that are protected from state action, the ma- jority of the constitution, including s. 35, allocates power between governing entities, such as the divi- sion of powers between the provincial and federal governments, or the separation of powers between the branches of government. in the same way, s. 35 defines the relationship between the sovereignty of the crown and the “aboriginal peoples of canada”, mandating a process of reconciliation between the crown and indigenous groups. [88] les décisions qui préconisent une protection contre l’ingérence dans le processus parlementaire doivent donc être interprétées dans le contexte d’une obligation qui ne constitue pas seulement un impé- ratif constitutionnel, mais qui consiste en une re- connaissance des limites de la souveraineté de la couronne elle- même. la nature unique de l’art. 35 signifie que l’on peut établir une distinction entre ses limites et les décisions qui ont examiné les effets d’autres droits et obligations sur la souveraineté par- lementaire. dans l’arrêt new brunswick broadcast- ing co., des sociétés de radiodiffusion ont contesté l’interdiction des caméras de télévision imposée par l’assemblée législative de la nouvelle- écosse en faisant valoir qu’elle était contraire à l’al. 2b) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés, qui protège la liberté de la presse et des autres moyens de com- munication. la juge mclachlin était d’avis que la réaffectation des pouvoirs occasionnée par la charte n’allait pas jusqu’à éliminer le droit constitutionnel inhérent du parlement d’exclure les étrangers de son enceinte : p 389. toutefois, bien que la charte définisse un ensemble de droits individuels qui sont protégés contre les mesures de l’état, la majeure partie de la constitution, y compris l’art. 35, répartit les pouvoirs entre les entités gouvernantes, comme la séparation des pouvoirs entre les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux, ou la séparation des pouvoirs entre les différentes branches de l’état. de la même façon, l’art. 35 définit la relation entre la souverai- neté de la couronne et les « peuples autochtones du canada », qui exige de concilier les intérêts de la couronne et ceux des groupes autochtones. [89] similarly, in authorson v. canada (attorney general), [2003] 2 scr 40 (per major j.), the issue was whether the canadian bill of rights, rsc. 1985, app. iii, provided any due- process protections for veterans when parliament enacted legislation to make interest debt unenforceable. major j. noted that “parliamentary tradition makes it clear that the only procedure due any citizen of canada is that proposed legislation receive three readings in the senate and house of commons and that it receive royal assent” (para 37). but the relevance of this decision is nec- essarily limited by its context as a bill of rights case, which, unlike the constitution act, 1982, ap- plies only to enacted legislation. as well, major j.’s [89] de même, dans l’arrêt authorson c. canada (procureur général), [2003] 2 rcs 40 (le juge major), la question consistait à savoir si la décla- ration canadienne des droits, lrc 1985, app. iii, prévoyait des garanties d’application régulière de la loi aux anciens combattants lorsque le législateur a édicté la loi pour rendre une créance d’intérêts inexécutoire. le juge major a fait remarquer que selon la « tradition parlementaire, il est clair que tout ce qu’un citoyen canadien peut exiger, sur le plan procédural, c’est qu’un projet de loi fasse l’objet de trois lectures à la chambre des communes et au sénat et qu’il reçoive la sanction royale » : par 37. mais la pertinence de cette décision est forcément [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 817 concern that the interpretation of the bill of rights urged by the applicants “would effectively amend the canadian constitution” (para. 41) is less compelling in the s. 35 context, where the limitations do in fact result from a constitutional amendment. further, as s. 35 makes clear, it is inappropriate to equate aboriginal peoples with “any citizen of canada”, particularly when considering the procedural rights owed under the constitution. [90] in fact, other cases specifically contemplate the imposition of constitutional norms on the legis- lative process. for example, reference re resolution to amend the constitution, [1981] 1 scr 753, re- lied on in authorson, noted that the self- definitional nature of legislative procedure is “subject to any overriding constitutional or self- imposed statutory or indoor prescription” (p 785). and reference re canada assistance plan (bc), [1991] 2 scr 525, which articulates a strong protection for the formu- lation and introduction of a bill against court inter- vention, specifically leaves aside the issue of review under the charter where a guaranteed right could be affected (p 559). as discussed above, although new brunswick broadcasting co. suggests that pro- cedural requirements will not readily be imposed in the charter context, i am doubtful as to whether that reasoning is compelling when faced with a constitu- tional imperative under s 35. limitée par son contexte, soit la déclaration cana- dienne des droits, qui, contrairement à la loi consti- tutionnelle de 1982, s’applique uniquement aux lois édictées. de plus, la préoccupation du juge major selon laquelle l’interprétation de la déclaration ca- nadienne des droits préconisée par les demandeurs « modifierait la constitution canadienne » (par. 41) est moins convaincante dans le contexte de l’art. 35, où les restrictions découlent de fait d’une modifi- cation constitutionnelle. de plus, comme l’art. 35 l’indique clairement, il ne convient pas d’assimiler les peuples autochtones à « un citoyen canadien », particulièrement lorsqu’il est question des droits procéduraux prévus par la constitution. [90] en fait, d’autres décisions envisagent ex- pressément l’imposition de normes constitution- nelles au processus législatif. par exemple, dans le renvoi : résolution pour modifier la constitution, [1981] 1  rcs  753, sur lequel est fondé l’arrêt authorson, la cour a indiqué que l’auto- définition de la procédure législative s’exerce « sous réserve de prescriptions constitutionnelles prépondérantes, ou de prescriptions auto- imposées par la loi ou in- ternes » : p 785. et, dans le renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada (c-b), [1991] 2 rcs 525, qui établit que la rédaction et le dépôt d’un projet de loi ne devraient absolument pas faire l’objet d’une intervention des tribunaux, la cour ne traite expressément pas de la question de l’examen fondé sur la charte lorsqu’il pourrait être porté at- teinte à un droit garanti : p 559. comme je l’ai déjà dit, bien que l’arrêt new brunswick broadcasting co. donne à penser que des exigences procédurales ne seront pas facilement imposées dans le contexte de la charte, je doute que ce raisonnement soit convain- cant en présence de l’impératif constitutionnel établi à l’art 35. [91] while the judiciary must respect the separate roles of each institution in our constitutional order, its own role is to maintain the rule of law and protect the rights guaranteed by the constitution (criminal lawyers’ association, at paras. 28-29; new bruns- wick broadcasting co., at p 389). it would be a mistake, in my respectful view, to interpret parlia- mentary sovereignty in a way that eradicates the obligations under the honour of the crown that arose [91] bien que le pouvoir judiciaire doive respecter les rôles distincts de chaque institution dans notre ordre constitutionnel, son propre rôle consiste à veil- ler au respect du principe de la primauté du droit et à protéger les droits garantis par la constitution : cri- minal lawyers’ association, par. 28-29; new bruns- wick broadcasting co., p 389. à mon avis, il serait erroné d’interpréter la souveraineté parlementaire de manière à écarter les obligations découlant de 818 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. at its assertion. like all constitutional principles, parliamentary sovereignty must be balanced against other aspects of our constitutional order, including the duty to consult (zachary davis, “the duty to consult and legislative action” (2016), 79 sask. l. rev. 17, at pp 21-22) “sovereign will” alone does not itself indicate legitimacy in the context of a constitutional democracy characterized by com- peting values, rights, and obligations (reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at pa- ras 61-63). [92] although parliamentary sovereignty cannot displace the honour of the crown, its force as a con- stitutional principle must be given adequate weight to achieve an appropriate balance between these con- cepts. the flexibility inherent in the duty to consult doctrine should be used to account for the wider area of discretion that legislatures must be afforded in the legislative context. since the content of the duty to consult depends heavily on the circumstances, i see no reason why the unique challenges raised in the legislative sphere cannot be addressed by the spec- trum of consultation and accommodation duties that may arise (delgamuukw, at para. 168; haida nation, at paras 43-45). commonly observed duties of con- sultation such as notice to affected parties and the opportunity to make submissions are hardly foreign to the law- making process. further, not every legisla- tive effort will attract a duty of consultation. the duty is only triggered where the crown, with knowledge of the potential existence of the aboriginal right or title in question, contemplates enacting legislation that might adversely affect it. these potential im- pacts must be sufficiently foreseeable and direct to engage the honour of the crown. l’honneur de la couronne qui ont pris naissance dès lors que la souveraineté a été proclamée. comme tous les principes constitutionnels, la souveraineté parlementaire doit être mise en balance avec d’autres aspects de notre ordre constitutionnel, dont l’obli- gation de consulter : zachary davis, « the duty to consult and legislative action » (2016), 79 sask l. rev. 17, p 21-22. la « volonté souveraine » à elle seule n’atteste pas en soi de la légitimité dans le contexte d’une démocratie constitutionnelle carac- térisée par des valeurs, des droits et des obligations opposés : renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, [1998] 2 rcs 217, par 61-63. [92] même si la souveraineté parlementaire ne peut supplanter l’honneur de la couronne, il importe de donner à sa force en tant que principe constitution- nel le poids qui convient afin d’atteindre un juste équilibre entre ces concepts. la souplesse inhérente à la doctrine de l’obligation de consulter devrait être utilisée pour tenir compte du pouvoir discré- tionnaire plus large dont le législateur doit pouvoir jouir dans le contexte législatif. puisque la portée de l’obligation de consulter est fortement tributaire des circonstances, je ne vois pas pourquoi l’éven- tail des obligations de consulter et d’accommoder qui peuvent prendre naissance ne suffit pas pour répondre aux difficultés singulières soulevées dans la sphère législative : delgamuukw, par. 168; nation haïda, par 43-45. des obligations de consulter vues couramment comme celle d’aviser les parties concer- nées et de leur donner l’occasion de présenter des observations ne sont pas étrangères au processus législatif. en outre, les mesures législatives ne vont pas toutes donner naissance à une obligation de con- sulter. cette obligation est déclenchée uniquement lorsque la couronne, ayant connaissance de l’exis- tence potentielle du droit ou du titre ancestral en cause, envisage d’adopter une loi qui pourrait avoir un effet préjudiciable sur ce droit ou ce titre. ces ef- fets potentiels doivent être suffisamment prévisibles et directs pour engager l’honneur de la couronne. [93] the procedure and scope of remedies availa- ble where the government breaches its duty to con- sult in the law- making process will also necessarily be limited by the constitutional balance between the judiciary and the legislature. on judicial review of [93] la procédure applicable et l’étendue des me- sures de réparation lorsque le gouvernement manque à son obligation de consulter dans le contexte du processus législatif seront forcément aussi limitées par la mise en balance constitutionnelle entre le [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 819 executive action, consultation challenges are often initiated prior to the decision being made, and com- mon remedies include an order for consultation, appointment of a mediator, and ongoing court super- vision (newman, at p. 78; clyde river, at para 24). conversely, in my view institutional constraints in the legislative context require that applicants chal- lenge existing legislation. it would unduly interfere with the legislative process to allow direct challenges to a legislature’s procedure prior to the enactment of legislation. parliament has exclusive control over its own proceedings, which should be respected by the courts (new brunswick broadcasting co., at p 386). while it is not the role of the courts to dic- tate the procedures legislatures adopt to fulfill their consultation obligations, they may consider whether the chosen process accords with the special relation- ship between the crown and indigenous peoples of canada. this need not be any more onerous than the judicial oversight already conducted under the sparrow justification inquiry. [94] challenging existing legislation on proce- dural grounds is not a novel proposition in canadian law. in british columbia teachers’ federation v. british columbia, [2016] 2 scr 407, rev’g (2015), 71 bclr (5th) 223 (ca), the majority of the court endorsed donald ja’s approach to collective bargaining rights under s. 2(d) of the charter in the british columbia court of appeal that would per- mit courts to consider a lack of consultation in the legislative context. donald ja in his dissent held that parliament could not act unilaterally through legislation to amend employment terms without sat- isfying its constitutional obligations to engage in pre- legislative consultation as a substitute for collective bargaining under s 2(d). similar to the duty to con- sult in the aboriginal context, freedom of association in the labour relations context guarantees the right to a meaningful process in which to pursue workplace goals (health services and support — facilities sub- sector bargaining assn. v. british columbia, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para. 94; saskatchewan federation pouvoir judiciaire et le pouvoir législatif. dans le cadre du contrôle judiciaire d’une mesure exécutive, les recours relatifs à la consultation sont souvent intentés avant que la décision soit prise, et les ré- parations habituelles comprennent notamment une ordonnance enjoignant à la couronne de consulter, la nomination d’un médiateur et une supervision judiciaire continue : newman, p. 78; clyde river, par 24. inversement, à mon sens, les contraintes institutionnelles dans le contexte législatif exigent que les demandeurs contestent la loi existante. au- to riser les contestations directes de la procédure parlementaire avant l’adoption de la loi empiéterait indûment sur le processus législatif. le parlement a le contrôle exclusif de ses propres débats, qui doivent être respectés par les tribunaux : new brunswick broadcasting co., p 386. bien que les tribunaux n’aient pas le rôle de dicter les procédures que les législateurs doivent adopter pour respecter leur obli- gation de consulter, ils peuvent néanmoins examiner si le processus choisi concorde avec la relation par- ticulière qu’entretient la couronne avec les peuples autochtones du canada. cet exercice n’a pas à être plus exigeant que le contrôle judiciaire déjà effectué dans le cadre de l’analyse de la justification fondée sur l’arrêt sparrow. [94] contester une loi existante sur le fondement de vices de procédure n’est pas nouveau en droit canadien. dans l’arrêt british columbia teachers’ fed eration c. colombie- britannique, [2016] 2 rcs. 407, inf. (2015), 71 bclr (5th) 223 (ca), les juges majoritaires de la cour ont approuvé la dé- marche suivie par le juge donald de la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique relativement au droit de négocier collectivement garanti par l’al. 2d) de la charte, qui permettrait aux tribunaux de prendre en considération l’absence de consultation dans le contexte législatif. dans sa dissidence, le juge donald a conclu que le parlement ne pouvait agir unilaté- ralement au moyen d’une mesure législative pour modifier des modalités d’emploi sans s’acquitter de ses obligations constitutionnelles de tenir une consul- tation antérieure à l’adoption de la loi comme substi- tut à la négociation collective protégée par l’al 2d). semblable à l’obligation de consulter dans le contexte autochtone, la liberté d’association en contexte de relations du travail garantit le droit à un processus de 820 mikisew cree first nation v canada abella j. [2018] 2 scr. of labour v. saskatchewan, [2015] 1 scr 245, at para 53). [95] in his reasons, donald ja recognized that it made no difference to the employees’ s. 2(d) rights whether the terms of employment were captured in a traditional collective agreement or through the pas- sage of legislation (para 287). even in the legislative context, a charter breach could be grounded in the government’s failure to consult in good faith prior to enactment. donald ja was alive to the responsibil- ity of the courts to monitor and restrain government actions to maintain a check on power imbalance in the labour relations context. “[a]n obligation to con- sult in this context does not unduly restrict the legis- lature any more than all the other rights and freedoms enumerated in the charter restrict the legislature” (para 293). nor does the honour of the crown under s. 35 of the constitution act, 1982. [96] however, this does not mean that a successful haida nation challenge will necessarily invalidate legislation. the duty to consult is about encouraging governments to consider their effects on indigenous communities and consult proactively, and should not replace the sparrow infringement test or become a means by which legislation is routinely struck down (see newman, at p 63). in this sense, the duty to con- sult differs from constitutional (and self- imposed) manner and form requirements, which are another accepted instance of court review of legislative pro- cesses (see eg. reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721; gallant v. the king, [1949] 2 dlr 425  (peisc) (per campbell cj)). failure to comply with a manner and form requirement will result in the legislation being inva- lid, as there is “no doubt as to the binding character of the rules in the constitution” (hogg, at pp. 12-11, 12-18 and 12-19). however, the duty to consult is a constitutional obligation that must be satisfied, not a négociation collective véritable permettant la réalisa- tion d’objectifs liés au travail : health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn. c. colombie- britannique, [2007] 2 rcs 391, par. 94; saskatchewan federation of labour c. saskatchewan, [2015] 1 rcs 245, par 53. [95] dans ses motifs, le juge donald de la cour d’appel a reconnu que le fait que les modalités d’em- ploi soient exprimées dans une convention collective traditionnelle ou au moyen de l’adoption d’une loi ne faisait aucune différence quant aux droits garantis aux employés par l’al. 2d) : par 287. même dans le contexte législatif, une violation de la charte peut découler du défaut du gouvernement de consulter de bonne foi avant l’adoption de la loi. le juge donald était conscient de la responsabilité des tribunaux de surveiller et de restreindre les mesures gouverne- mentales afin de contrôler le déséquilibre des forces en contexte de relations du travail. [traduction] « [l]’obligation de consulter dans ce contexte ne res- treint pas indûment le législateur, pas plus d’ailleurs que tous les autres droits et libertés protégés par la charte ne restreignent le législateur » : par 293. il en est de même pour l’obligation qui incombe à la couronne en application de l’art. 35 de la loi consti- tutionnelle de 1982 d’agir honorablement. [96] toutefois, cela ne signifie pas qu’une contes- tation fondée sur l’arrêt nation haïda, si elle était accueillie, invaliderait nécessairement la loi. l’obli- gation de consulter vise à encourager les gouverne- ments à tenir compte des effets des mesures qu’ils adoptent sur les collectivités autochtones et à consul- ter de façon proactive. elle ne devrait pas remplacer le test de l’atteinte énoncé dans l’arrêt sparrow ou devenir un moyen de routine pour invalider la loi : newman, p 63. en ce sens, l’obligation de consul- ter diffère des modalités et de la forme requises (et auto- imposées) en matière constitutionnelle, qui per- mettent également le contrôle judiciaire du processus législatif : voir, p ex, renvoi :. droits linguistiques au manitoba, [1985] 1 rcs 721; gallant c. the king, [1949] 2 dlr 425 (cs î-p-é) (le juge en chef campbell). le défaut de se conformer à une modalité et à une forme requises entraîne l’invalidité de la loi, puisque [traduction] « le caractère exé- cutoire des règles dans la constitution ne fait aucun [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada la juge abella 821 rule of procedure itself. the test is what will uphold the honour of the crown and effect reconciliation in those circumstances (haida nation, at para 45). [97] without ruling out the possibility that in cer- tain cases legislation enacted in breach of the duty to consult could be struck down by the reviewing court, a declaration will generally be the appropriate rem- edy. declaratory relief in these circumstances recog- nizes that the ultimate purpose of the duty to consult is reconciliation, which “is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense” (haida nation, at para 32). in manitoba metis federation, a declaration was issued to the effect that canada did not act diligently to fulfill the specific obligation to the métis contained in s. 31 of the manitoba act, 1870, sc 1870, c 3. this constituted a failure of another specific obliga- tion flowing from the honour of the crown — the duty to purposively and diligently fulfill constitu- tional obligations (dickson, at p 116). declarations are a narrow remedy that may be ordered whether or not consequential relief is available (manitoba metis federation, at para 143). in the legislative context, a declaration allows courts to shape the legal framework while respecting the constitutional role of another branch of government to act within those constraints (canada (prime minister) v. khadr, [2010] 1 scr 44, at paras 46-47). doute » : hogg, p. 12-11, 12-18 et 12-19. toutefois, l’obligation de consulter est une obligation constitu- tionnelle qu’il faut respecter, et non une règle de pro- cédure en soi. le test consiste à déterminer ce qui est nécessaire pour préserver l’honneur de la couronne et pour concilier les intérêts dans ces circonstances : nation haïda, par 45. [97] sans écarter la possibilité que, dans certains cas, une loi adoptée en violation de l’obligation de con sul ter puisse être invalidée par une cour de révision, la mesure de redressement généralement appropriée prendra la forme d’une déclaration. le jugement déclaratoire dans ces circonstances recon- naît que l’objectif fondamental de l’obligation de consulter est la conciliation, qui « ne constitue pas une réparation juridique définitive au sens usuel du terme » : nation haïda, par 32. dans l’arrêt mani- toba metis federation, la cour a prononcé un juge- ment déclarant que le canada n’avait pas agi avec diligence dans l’exécution de l’obligation précise en- vers les métis prévue à l’art. 31 de la loi de 1870 sur le manitoba, sc 1870, c 3. ce défaut a entraîné un manquement à une autre obligation précise découlant de l’honneur de la couronne — l’obligation de s’ac- quitter de ses obligations constitutionnelles de façon téléologique et avec diligence : dickson, p 116. les jugements déclaratoires constituent une réparation d’une portée restreinte, qui peut être ordonnée, peu importe si une mesure de redressement consécutive peut être accordée  : manitoba metis federation, par 143. en contexte législatif, le jugement décla- ratoire permet aux tribunaux de façonner le cadre juridique tout en respectant le rôle constitutionnel d’une autre branche de l’état d’agir à l’intérieur de ces limites : canada (premier ministre) c. khadr, [2010] 1 rcs 44, par 46-47. [98] therefore, an indigenous group will be enti- tled to declaratory relief where the crown has failed to consult during the process leading to the enact- ment of legislation that could adversely affect its interests. such a remedy has the practical effect of clarifying what the obligations and rights of both parties are in their special relationship and process of reconciliation (mohawks of the bay of quinte v. canada (minister of indian affairs and northern [98] par conséquent, un groupe autochtone a droit à un jugement déclaratoire si la couronne ne l’a pas consulté durant le processus menant à l’édiction d’une loi qui pourrait avoir un effet préjudiciable sur ses intérêts. une mesure de redressement de ce type a l’effet concret de clarifier quels sont les obligations et les droits des deux parties dans le contexte de leur relation particulière et du processus de conci- liation : mohawks of the bay of quinte c. ministre 822 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. development) (2013), 434 ftr 241, at para. 61 (per rennie j)). des affaires indiennes et du nord canadien, 2013 cf 669, par. 61 (canlii) (le juge rennie). i disposition i dispositif [99] since the federal court lacked jurisdiction to consider a judicial review under ss. 18 and 18.1 of the federal courts act, the appeal should be dismissed. [99] puisque la cour fédérale n’avait pas compé- tence pour examiner la demande de contrôle judi- ciaire fondée sur les art. 18 et 18.1 de la loi sur les cours fédérales, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par brown j. — i. introduction le juge brown — i. introduction [100] this appeal presents two issues. first, does the federal courts act, rsc 1985, c. f-7, author- ize judicial review of the impugned conduct which underlies mikisew cree first nation’s application for judicial review? and, secondly, does the impugned conduct in this case trigger the duty to consult? i would answer both questions in the nega- [101] tive. i agree with the reasons of the majority of the federal court of appeal (2016 fca 311, [2017] 3 fcr 298). sections 2(1), 2(2) and 18.1 of the federal courts act preclude judicial review of the development, drafting or introduction of the om- nibus bills. ministers of the crown engaged in the development, drafting or introduction of legislation are acting as legislators empowered by part iv of the constitution act, 1867. they are not a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” within the meaning of the federal courts act and are, there- fore, not subject to judicial review when acting in that capacity. [100] le présent pourvoi soulève deux questions. premièrement, la loi sur les cours fédérales, lrc. 1985, c. f-7, autorise-t-elle le contrôle judiciaire de la conduite contestée qui sous- tend la demande d’un tel contrôle présentée par la mikisew cree first na- tion (ci- après la « première nation crie mikisew »)? et, deuxièmement, la conduite contestée en l’espèce donne-t-elle naissance à l’obligation de consulter? [101] je répondrais à ces deux questions par la négative. je souscris aux motifs exposés par les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel fédérale : 2016 caf 311, [2017] 3 rcf 298. les paragraphes 2(1) et 2(2) ainsi que l’art 181 de la loi sur les cours fédérales empêchent le contrôle judiciaire de l’éla- boration, de la rédaction ou du dépôt des projets de loi omnibus. lorsque les ministres de la couronne participent à l’élaboration, à la rédaction ou au dé- pôt d’un projet de loi, ils agissent à titre de législa- teurs et tirent leur pouvoir de la partie iv de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, et non pas à titre d’« office fédéral » au sens de la loi sur les cours fédérales. les décisions prises par les ministres lorsqu’ils s’ac- quittent de leurs fonctions législatives ne peuvent donc pas faire l’objet d’un contrôle judiciaire. [102] further, the separation of powers and parlia- mentary privilege apply to parliamentary proceed- ings and to the process leading to the introduction of a bill in the house of commons. the development, drafting and introduction of the omnibus bills are immune from judicial interference. in addition, none [102] de plus, les principes de la séparation des pouvoirs et du privilège parlementaire s’appliquent aux activités parlementaires ainsi qu’au processus menant au dépôt d’un projet de loi à la chambre des communes. l’élaboration, la rédaction et le dé- pôt des projets de loi omnibus sont ainsi à l’abri [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 823 of the actions taken in relation to the development, drafting and introduction of the omnibus bills can be characterized as “crown conduct” which triggers the duty to consult. in this case, the impugned conduct is, in its entirety, an exercise of legislative power (that is, part of the law- making process) and is therefore not executive conduct, to which the duty to consult applies. [103] while my colleague karakatsanis j. appears to accept that parliamentary privilege and the sepa- ration of powers preclude judicial imposition of the duty to consult (paras. 2 and 38-50), her conclu- sions are, with respect, less than categorical on this point (para. 2: “courts should exercise restraint”; paras. 2, 32 and 41: “the duty to consult doctrine is ill- suited”; para. 29: “whether the duty to consult is the appropriate means”; para. 32: “courts should forebear from intervening in the law- making pro- cess”; para. 35: “this reluctance to supervise the law- making process”; para. 38: “an inappropriate constraint”; para. 40: “an enormously difficult task” (emphasis added throughout)). for the reasons which follow (under the heading “ii. c. the development, introduction, consideration and enactment of bills is not ‘crown conduct’ triggering the duty to con- sult”), whether a court may impose a duty to consult upon the process by which legislative power is exer- cised is not a question of mere “restraint”, “forbear- ance”, “reluctance”, or of deciding whether imposing a duty to consult would be an “ill- suited” or “inap- propriate” constraint upon that exercise of power. rather, it is a question of constitutionality going to the limits of judicial power, which should receive from a majority of this court a clear and constitu- tionally correct answer. d’interventions judiciaires en outre, aucune des actions menées dans le contexte de l’élaboration, de la rédaction et du dépôt des projets de loi omni- bus ne peut être considérée comme une « conduite de la couronne » donnant naissance à l’obligation de consulter. en l’espèce, la conduite contestée re- lève entièrement de l’exercice du pouvoir législatif (c’est-à-dire qu’elle fait partie intégrante du proces- sus législatif) et ne constitue donc pas une conduite de l’exécutif à laquelle s’applique l’obligation de consulter. [103] ma collègue la juge karakatsanis semble convenir que le privilège parlementaire et la sépa- ration des pouvoirs empêchent les cours de justice d’imposer l’obligation de consulter : par. 2 et 38-50. j’estime en tout respect que ses conclusions sont loin d’être catégoriques à cet égard (par. 2 : « les tribunaux doivent faire preuve de retenue »; par. 2, 32 et 41 : « [l]a doctrine de l’obligation de consulter ne convient pas »; par. 29 : « si c’est en invoquant l’obligation de consulter »; par. 32 : « que les tribu- naux s’abstiennent d’intervenir dans le processus législatif »; par. 35 : « cette réticence à surveiller le processus législatif »; par. 38 : « entraverait indû- ment »; par. 40 : « il serait extrêmement difficile » (italiques ajoutés)). pour les motifs qui suivent (sec- tion intitulée « ii c. l’élaboration, le dépôt, l’exa- men et l’adoption des projets de loi ne constituent pas des “conduites de la couronne” qui donnent naissance à l’obligation de consulter »), la question de savoir si une cour de justice peut imposer l’obli- gation de consulter dans le contexte du processus par lequel s’exerce le pouvoir législatif n’est pas qu’une simple question de « retenue », d’« abstention » ou de « réticence », ou une question de décider si l’im- position d’une telle obligation créerait une contrainte « indue » ou qui « ne convient pas » à cet exercice du pouvoir. il s’agit plutôt d’une question de constitu- tionnalité touchant aux limites du pouvoir judiciaire, une question à laquelle une majorité des juges de la cour devrait donner une réponse claire et correcte sur le plan constitutionnel. [104] my colleague would, however, go further, raising — and then leaving open — the possibility that legislation which does not infringe s. 35 rights but may “adversely affect” them, might be found to [104] ma collègue irait toutefois plus loin, en sou- levant — mais sans trancher la question — la possi- bilité qu’une loi qui ne porte pas atteinte aux droits protégés par l’art. 35, mais qui serait « susceptible 824 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. be inconsistent with the honour of the crown. (pa- ras. 3 and 25). in so doing, however, she undercuts the same principles which have led her to conclude that imposing the duty to consult would be “inap- propriate” in the circumstances of this case. further, by raising the possibility (without, i note, having been asked to do so by any party to this appeal) that validly enacted and constitutionally compliant legis- lation which has not or could not be the subject of a successful s. 35 infringement claim can nonetheless be declared by a court to be “not consistent with [the honour of the crown]” (para. 47), my colleague would throw this area of the law into significant un- certainty. such uncertainty would have deleterious effects on indigenous peoples, and indeed on all who rely upon the efficacy of validly enacted and constitutionally compliant laws. [105] i therefore cannot endorse karakatsanis j.’s reasons. while agreeing with her that the appeal should be dismissed, i write separately in an attempt to bring some analytical clarity to the matter. the facts, decisions below and relevant legislation are outlined in my colleague’s reasons. d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur [eux] », pourrait être jugée incompatible avec l’honneur de la cou- ronne : par. 3 et 25. ce faisant, elle mine toutefois les principes mêmes qui l’ont menée à conclure que l’imposition de l’obligation de consulter constituerait une entrave « indue » dans les circonstances de la présente cause. en outre, en soulevant la possibilité (je le souligne, sans qu’aucune des parties au présent appel n’en ait fait la demande) qu’une loi valable- ment adoptée et conforme à la constitution, qui n’est pas ou ne pourrait être contestée avec succès sur le fondement de l’art. 35, peut néanmoins être déclarée « incompatible avec [l’honneur de la couronne] » (par. 47) par une cour, ma collègue sèmerait une grande incertitude dans ce domaine du droit. une telle incertitude nuirait aux peuples autochtones, et, de fait, à toutes les personnes qui se fient sur l’effi- cacité des lois valablement adoptées et conformes à la constitution. [105] je ne peux donc pas souscrire aux motifs de la juge karakatsanis. je suis certes d’avis, comme elle, que l’appel devrait être rejeté, mais je rédige des motifs distincts pour tenter d’apporter à la question une certaine clarté sur le plan analytique. les faits, les décisions des instances inférieures ainsi que la législation pertinente sont exposés dans les motifs de ma collègue. ii analysis ii analyse a the federal courts act precludes review of legislative policy development and implemen- tation through omnibus bills by the ministers and the governor general in council a la loi sur les cours fédérales empêche le con- trôle de l’élaboration et de la mise en œuvre de politiques législatives au moyen de projets de loi omnibus par les ministres et le gouverneur général en conseil [106] first principles are instructive. the federal court is not a court of inherent jurisdiction. it fol- lows that parliament must grant jurisdiction in order for the federal court to hear and decide a matter (canada (attorney general) v. telezone inc., 2010 scc 62, [2010] 3 scr 585, at para. 43; ito — in- ternational terminal operators ltd. v. miida elec- tronics inc., [1986] 1 scr 752, at p 766). and, by enacting ss. 18, 18.1 and 28 of the federal courts act, parliament granted to the federal court and the federal court of appeal exclusive jurisdiction [106] les principes de base sont instructifs. la cour fédérale ne jouit pas d’une compétence inhé- rente. le législateur doit donc lui conférer la compé- tence voulue pour qu’elle puisse entendre et trancher une affaire : canada (procureur général) c. telezone inc., 2010 csc 62, [2010] 3 rcs 585, par. 43; ito — international terminal operators ltd. c. miida electronics inc., [1986] 1 rcs 752, p 766. en adoptant les art. 18, 18.1 et 28 de la loi sur les cours fédérales, le législateur a accordé à la cour fédérale et à la cour d’appel fédérale la compétence exclusive [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 825 to review the actions taken or decisions made by a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”. pour contrôler les actes posés par un « office fédé- ral » ou les décisions prises par un tel « office ». [107] section 2(1) of the federal courts act de- fines “federal board, commission or other tribunal” as follows: [107] le paragraphe 2(1) de la loi sur les cours fédérales définit ainsi le terme « office fédéral » : definitions 2 (1) in this act, définitions 2 (1) les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.   .   . federal board, commission or other tribunal means any body, person or persons having, exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an act of parliament or by or under an order made pursuant to a prerogative of the crown, other than the tax court of canada or any of its judges, any such body constituted or established by or under a law of a province or any such person or persons appointed under or in accordance with a law of a province or under section 96 of the constitution act, 1867; office fédéral conseil, bureau, commission ou autre or- ganisme, ou personne ou groupe de personnes, ayant, exerçant ou censé exercer une compétence ou des pou- voirs prévus par une loi fédérale ou par une ordonnance prise en vertu d’une prérogative royale, à l’exclusion de la cour canadienne de l’impôt et ses juges, d’un organisme constitué sous le régime d’une loi provinciale ou d’une personne ou d’un groupe de personnes nommées aux termes d’une loi provinciale ou de l’article 96 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. [108] the senate and house of commons are ex- pressly excluded from this definition by s. 2(2) of the federal courts act: [108] le sénat et la chambre des communes sont expressément exclus de cette définition aux termes du par. 2(2) de la loi sur les cours fédérales : senate and house of commons sénat et chambre des communes (2) for greater certainty, the expression federal board, commission or other tribunal, as defined in subsection (1), does not include the senate, the house of commons, any committee or member of either house, the senate ethics officer, the conflict of interest and ethics commissioner with respect to the exercise of the jurisdiction or powers re- ferred to in sections 41.1 to 41.5 and 86 of the parliament of canada act, the parliamentary protective service or the parliamentary budget officer. (2) il est entendu que sont également exclus de la défini- tion de office fédéral le sénat, la chambre des communes, tout comité de l’une ou l’autre chambre, tout sénateur ou député, le conseiller sénatorial en éthique, le commis- saire aux conflits d’intérêts et à l’éthique à l’égard de l’exercice de sa compétence et de ses attributions visées aux articles 41.1 à 41.5 et 86 de la loi sur le parlement du canada, le service de protection parlementaire et le directeur parlementaire du budget. [109] taken together, ss. 2(1) and 2(2) identify the source of “the jurisdiction or powers” being ex- ercised as the principal determinant of whether a decision- maker falls within the definition of a “fed- eral board, commission or other tribunal” (anisman v. canada border services agency, 2010 fca 52, 400 nr 137, at paras. 29-31; air canada v. toronto port authority, 2011 fca 347, [2013] 3 fcr 605, at para. 47; d j m. brown and j m. evans, with [109] ensemble, les para. 2(1) et 2(2) précisent que la source de la « compétence ou des pouvoirs » exer- cés est le facteur principal pour juger si un décideur est visé ou non par la définition d’« office fédéral » : anisman c. canada (agence des services frontaliers), 2010 caf 52, par. 29-31 (canlii); air canada c. administration portuaire de toronto, 2011 caf 347, [2013] 3  rcf  605, par.  47; d.  j.  m.  brown et j m evans, avec le concours de d. fairlie, judicial 826 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. the assistance of d. fairlie, judicial review of ad- ministrative action in canada (loose- leaf), at topic 2:4310). and, the removal of legislative actors from the definition of “federal board, commission or other tribunal” statutorily affirms the general principle, to which i return below, that where the source of au- thority for exercising jurisdiction or powers is found in the law governing the legislative process, such an exercise is not judicially reviewable. [110] mikisew cree first nation’s application for judicial review was directed at the respondent ministers’ failure to consult regarding the devel- opment of “environmental policies”, including the implementation of such policies through the devel- opment and introduction of the two omnibus bills (jobs, growth and long- term prosperity act, sc. 2012, c. 19 — bill c-38; jobs and growth act, 2012, sc 2012, c. 31 — bill c-45; notice of applica- tion, ar, at p 122). official actions undertaken by the executive which are neither granted by the constitution nor properly understood as an exercise of a crown prerogative must flow from “statutory authority clearly granted and properly exercised” (babcock v. canada (attorney general), 2002 scc 57, [2002] 3 scr 3, at para 20). [111] mikisew cree first nation has not, however, identified any point in the course of the omnibus bills’ development, drafting or introduction at which the ministers were exercising a statutory power or a crown prerogative. rather, and as the majority of the court of appeal recognized (at para. 28), the departmental legislation relied upon by mikisew cree first nation (af, at para. 101, fn. 109) for its claim that the ministers were exercising their executive powers as ministers of the crown dur- ing the policy development phase of law- making refers only to the scope of the ministers’ mandate and their duties and functions in carrying out their mandate (see department of fisheries and oceans act, rsc 1985, c. f-15; department of indian affairs and northern development act, rsc 1985, c. i-6; department of the environment act, rsc. 1985, c. e-10; department of transport act, rsc. 1985, c. t-18; department of natural resources review of administrative action in canada (feuilles mobiles), rubrique 2:4310. en outre, le retrait des législateurs de la définition d’«  office fédéral  » confirme légalement le principe général, sur lequel je reviendrai plus loin, selon lequel l’exercice de la compétence ou des pouvoirs n’est pas susceptible de contrôle judiciaire lorsqu’il tire son origine du droit régissant le processus législatif. [110] la demande de contrôle judiciaire présentée par la première nation crie mikisew était fondée sur le fait que les ministres intimés ne l’avaient pas consultée dans le cadre de l’élaboration de [traduc- tion] « politiques environnementales », y compris lors de la mise en œuvre de ces politiques par l’éla- boration et le dépôt de deux projets de loi omnibus : la loi sur l’emploi, la croissance et la prospérité du- rable, lc 2012, c. 19 — projet de loi c-38; la loi de 2012 sur l’emploi et la croissance, lc 2012, c. 31 — projet de loi c-45; avis de demande, da, p 122. les actes officiels posés par le pouvoir exécutif, qui ne sont ni prévus par la constitution ni perçus à juste titre comme un exercice d’une prérogative de la couronne, doivent relever « d’un pouvoir clairement conféré par la loi et exercé de façon régulière » : babcock c. canada (procureur général), 2002 csc 57, [2002] 3 rcs 3, par 20. [111] la première nation crie mikisew n’a toute- fois relevé aucun moment pendant l’élaboration, la rédaction ou le dépôt des projets de loi omnibus où les ministres ont exercé un pouvoir conféré par une loi ou une prérogative de la couronne. au contraire, comme l’ont reconnu les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel (par. 28), les lois habilitantes invo- quées par la première nation crie mikisew (ma, par. 101, note en bas de page 109) pour établir que les ministres exerçaient des pouvoirs exécutifs à titre de ministres de la couronne au cours de la phase d’élaboration des projets de loi ne font référence qu’à la portée du mandat des ministres ainsi qu’aux obligations et fonctions dont ils peuvent s’acquitter dans l’exécution de leur mandat : voir loi sur le ministère des pêches et des océans, lrc 1985, c. f-15; loi sur le ministère des affaires indiennes et du nord canadien, lrc 1985, c. i-6; loi sur le ministère de l’environnement, lrc 1985, c. e-10; [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 827 act, sc 1994, c. 41; financial administration act, rsc 1985, c f-11). [112] i note that none of these statutes make ex- press or implicit reference to the development of leg- islation for introduction in parliament. the ministers were not exercising power in a ministerial — that is, executive — capacity. and it follows that none of the impugned actions or decisions cited in mikisew cree first nation’s application for judicial review were made by a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”. as a result, the majority of the court of appeal correctly held that the courts below were not validly seized of this matter. [113] this conclusion is also compelled by part iv of the constitution act, 1867 — entitled “legislative power”. part iv sets out, inter alia, the powers of both houses of parliament — the house of commons and the senate — in respect of whose exercise par- liament is sovereign, subject only to the limits of its legislative authority as set out in the constitution act, 1867. the development, introduction and considera- tion of bills in the house of commons are all neces- sary exercises of legislative power in the law- making process. while cabinet ministers are members of the executive, they participate in this process — for example, by presenting a government bill — not in an executive capacity, but in a legislative capacity. loi sur le ministère des transports, lrc 1985, c. t-18; loi sur le ministère des ressources natu- relles, lc 1994, c. 41; loi sur la gestion des fi- nances publiques, lrc 1985, c f-11. [112] je constate qu’aucune de ces lois ne traite expressément ou implicitement de l’élaboration des projets de loi en vue de leur dépôt au parlement. les ministres n’exerçaient pas des fonctions minis- térielles, c’est-à-dire exécutives. il s’ensuit donc qu’aucune des mesures ou des décisions contestées dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire de la première nation crie mikisew n’a été prise par un « office fédéral ». les juges majoritaires de la cour d’ap- pel ont donc conclu à bon droit que les tribunaux d’instances inférieures n’avaient pas été valablement saisis de l’affaire. [113] cette conclusion s’impose également compte tenu de la partie iv de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, intitulée « pouvoir législatif ». en effet, cette partie  décrit, notamment, les pouvoirs des deux chambres du parlement — la chambre des com- munes et le sénat — à l’égard desquels le parlement est souverain, sous réserve uniquement des limites à son pouvoir législatif établies par la loi constitu- tionnelle de 1867. l’élaboration, le dépôt et l’examen des projets de loi par la chambre des communes sont tous des exercices nécessaires du pouvoir législatif dans le cadre du processus législatif. bien que les ministres du cabinet soient des membres de l’exé- cutif, ils participent à ce processus — par exemple, en présentant des projets de loi gouvernementaux — en leur capacité législative, et non pas en leur capa- cité exécutive. [114] mikisew cree first nation’s application for judicial review therefore impugns the conduct of ministers who were acting as members of parlia- ment and who were, like all members of parliament, empowered to legislate by part iv of the constitu- tion act, 1867. this fortifies my conclusion that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to consider mikisew cree first nation’s application for judicial review. [114] la demande de contrôle judiciaire de la pre- mière nation crie mikisew vise donc à contester la conduite adoptée par certains ministres qui agissaient à titre de députés et qui étaient, comme tous les dé- putés, habilités à légiférer par la partie iv de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. cela renforce ma conclu- sion voulant que la cour fédérale n’avait pas com- pétence pour examiner cette demande de contrôle judiciaire. [115] even absent this jurisdictional bar, however, the separation of powers, parliamentary privilege, the [115] cela dit, même en faisant fi de cet obstacle juridictionnel, tant la séparation des pouvoirs que le 828 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. scope of judicial review properly understood and this court’s jurisprudence on the duty to consult all lead me to conclude that mikisew cree first nation’s application for judicial review cannot succeed. b the formulation and introduction of bills is protected from judicial review by the separa- tion of powers and by parliamentary privilege privilège parlementaire, la portée bien interprétée du contrôle judiciaire et la jurisprudence de la cour sur l’obligation de consulter m’amènent à conclure que la demande de contrôle judiciaire de la première nation crie mikisew ne peut pas être accueillie. b la formulation et le dépôt des projets de loi échappent au contrôle judiciaire du fait de la séparation des pouvoirs et du privilège parle- mentaire (1) separation of powers (1) la séparation des pouvoirs [116] there was disagreement, before this court and the court of appeal, about the scope of activ- ity which is protected by the separation of powers and by parliamentary privilege. mikisew cree first nation argues that, while the formulation and in- troduction of a bill before parliament is unreview- able legislative action, the development of policies that inform the formulation and introduction of a bill is carried out by public servants at the direction of ministers, and must therefore be viewed as exec- utive conduct that is judicially reviewable. by con- trast, canada contends that the entire law- making process — from initial policy development to royal assent — is legislative activity that cannot be super- vised by the courts. [117] i agree with the majority of the court of appeal that the entire law- making process — from initial policy development to and including royal assent — is an exercise of legislative power which is immune from judicial interference. as this court explained in ontario v. criminal lawyers’ associa- tion of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr 3, at para. 28, the making of “policy choices” is a legisla- tive function, while the implementation and adminis- tration of those choices is an executive function. this precludes judicial imposition of a duty to consult in the course of the law- making process. [116] tant devant la cour que devant la cour d’ap- pel fédérale, les parties ont exprimé leur désaccord quant à la portée de l’activité qui est protégée par les principes de séparation des pouvoirs et de privilège parlementaire. la première nation crie mikisew convient que la formulation et le dépôt d’un projet de loi au parlement sont des mesures législatives qui échappent à tout contrôle judiciaire. elle plaide toutefois que l’élaboration des politiques qui sous- tendent cette formulation et ce dépôt est effectuée par des fonctionnaires à la demande de ministres et doit donc être considérée comme une conduite de l’exé- cutif susceptible de contrôle judiciaire. en revanche, le canada soutient que l’ensemble du processus lé- gislatif — de l’élaboration initiale des politiques à la sanction royale — est une activité législative qui ne peut pas être supervisée par les cours de justice. [117] je souscris à l’opinion des juges majori- taires de la cour d’appel selon laquelle l’ensemble du processus législatif — de l’élaboration initiale des politiques à la sanction royale inclusivement — constitue un exercice du pouvoir législatif qui est à l’abri de l’ingérence des tribunaux. comme la cour l’a expliqué dans l’arrêt ontario c. criminal law- yers’ association of ontario, 2013 csc 43, [2013] 3 rcs 3, par. 28, les « choix politiques » relèvent du pouvoir législatif, tandis que leur mise en œuvre et leur administration incombent au pouvoir exécutif. cela empêche les tribunaux d’imposer une obligation de consulter dans le cadre du processus législatif. [118] the separation of powers protects the pro- cess of legislative policy- making by cabinet and [118] le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs met en outre le processus d’élaboration par le cabinet [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 829 the preparation and introduction of bills for consid- eration by parliament (and provincial legislatures) from judicial review. again in criminal lawyers’ association, at para. 28, this court recognized each branch of the canadian state as having a distinct role: des principes directeurs en matière de législation ainsi que la préparation et le dépôt des projets de loi aux fins d’examen par le parlement (et par les législatures) à l’abri du contrôle judiciaire. toujours dans l’arrêt criminal lawyers’ association, par. 28, la cour a reconnu que chaque pouvoir de l’état ca- nadien a un rôle distinct : the legislative branch makes policy choices, adopts laws and holds the purse strings of government, as only it can authorize the spending of public funds. the executive implements and administers those policy choices and laws with the assistance of a professional public service. the judiciary maintains the rule of law, by interpreting and applying these laws through the independent and impartial adjudication of references and disputes, and protects the fundamental liberties and freedoms guaranteed under the charter. le pouvoir législatif fait des choix politiques, adopte des lois et tient les cordons de la bourse de l’état, car lui seul peut autoriser l’affectation de fonds publics. l’exécutif met en œuvre et administre ces choix politiques et ces lois par le recours à une fonction publique compétente. le judiciaire assure la primauté du droit en interprétant et en appliquant ces lois dans le cadre de renvois et de litiges sur lesquels il statue de manière indépendante et impartiale, et il défend les libertés fondamentales garanties par la charte. in order for each branch to fulfill its role, it must not be “unduly interfered with by the others” (criminal lawyers’ association, at para 29). or, un pouvoir ne peut pas jouer son rôle lorsqu’un « autre empiète indûment sur lui » : criminal law- yers’ association, par 29. [119] admittedly, the separation of powers in our parliamentary system “is not a rigid and absolute structure” (wells v. newfoundland, [1999] 3 scr. 199, at para. 54) which follows neatly drawn lines. ministers of the crown play an essential role in, and are an integral part of, the legislative process (reference re canada assistance plan (bc), [1991] 2 scr 525, at p 559). the fact that “except in cer- tain rare cases, the executive frequently and de facto controls the legislature” (wells, at para. 54) does not, however, mean that ministers’ dual membership in the executive and legislative branches of the cana- dian state renders their corresponding executive and legislative roles indistinguishable for the purposes of judicial review. in re canada assistance plan, at p. 559, this court rejected british columbia’s argu- ment that, while parliamentary privilege protected internal parliamentary procedures, the doctrine of legitimate expectations could nevertheless apply to the executive, so as to preclude it from developing and introducing the impugned bill: “the formulation and introduction of a bill”, the court said, “are part of the legislative process with which the courts will not meddle    [i]t is not the place of the courts [119] certes, il faut reconnaître que, dans notre système parlementaire, la séparation des pouvoirs « n’est pas une structure rigide et absolue » (wells c. terre- neuve, [1999] 3 rcs 199, par. 54) qui respecte des limites clairement établies. les ministres de la couronne jouent un rôle essentiel dans le pro- cessus législatif dont ils font partie intégrante : renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada (c-b), [1991] 2 rcs 525, p 559 « [s]auf dans de rares cas, l’exécutif contrôle, fréquemment et de fait, le législatif » : wells, par 54. cela ne signifie pas pour autant que l’appartenance des ministres aux pouvoirs tant exécutif que législatif de l’état canadien rend leurs rôles dans l’une ou l’autre de ces branches indissociables aux fins du contrôle judiciaire. dans le renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada, p. 559, la cour a rejeté l’argument de la colombie- britannique selon lequel, bien que le privilège parlementaire protège les procédures parle- mentaires internes, la théorie de l’expectative légitime pourrait tout de même s’appliquer à l’exécutif de fa- çon à l’empêcher d’élaborer et de déposer le projet de loi contesté. selon la cour, « [l]a rédaction et le dépôt d’un projet de loi font partie du processus législatif 830 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. to interpose further procedural requirements in the legislative process.” [120] as a matter of applying this court’s juris- prudence, then, the legislative process begins with a bill’s formative stages, even where the bill is de- veloped by ministers of the crown. while a min- ister acts in an executive capacity when exercising statutory powers to advance government policy, that is not what happened here. the named ministers took a set of policy decisions that eventually led to the drafting of a legislative proposal which was submitted to cabinet. this ultimately led to the for- mulation and introduction of the omnibus bills in the house of commons. all of the impugned actions form part of the legislative process of introducing bills in parliament and were taken by the ministers acting in a legislative capacity. [121] moreover, the impugned actions in this case did not become “executive” as opposed to “legis- lative” simply because they were carried out by, or with the assistance of, public servants. public servants making policy recommendations prior to the formulation and introduction of a bill are not “executing” existing legislative policy or direction. their actions, rather, are directed to informing po- tential changes to legislative policy and are squarely legislative in nature. dans lequel les tribunaux ne s’immiscent pas. [  ] [i]l n’appartient pas aux tribunaux judiciaires d’inter- caler dans le processus législatif d’autres exigences procédurales. » [120] selon la jurisprudence de la cour, le pro- cessus législatif débute lorsque le projet de loi est à l’étape embryonnaire, et ce, même quand il est éla- boré par des ministres de la couronne. un ministre agit en sa capacité exécutive lorsqu’il exerce des pouvoirs prévus par la loi dans le but de faire avancer une politique du gouvernement; ce n’est toutefois pas ce qui s’est produit en l’espèce. les ministres dési- gnés ont pris une série de décisions politiques, qui ont mené à la rédaction d’une proposition législative présentée ultérieurement au cabinet. c’est cette pro- position qui a finalement conduit à l’élaboration des projets de loi omnibus et à leur dépôt à la chambre des communes. ainsi, toutes les mesures contestées appartenaient au processus législatif qui consiste à déposer des projets de loi au parlement et elles ont été prises par des ministres qui agissaient en leur capacité législative. [121] en outre, les mesures contestées en l’espèce ne sont pas devenues « exécutives », plutôt que « lé- gislatives », du simple fait qu’elles ont été accom- plies par des fonctionnaires, ou avec leur aide. en effet, les fonctionnaires qui formulent des recom- mandations de politiques avant l’élaboration et le dépôt d’un projet de loi n’« exécutent » pas des po- litiques ou des directives législatives existantes. au contraire, leurs mesures visent à orienter les change- ments qui seront éventuellement apportés aux poli- tiques législatives et elles sont de nature strictement législative. (2) parliamentary privilege (2) le privilège parlementaire [122] imposing a duty to consult with respect to legislative policy development would also be con- trary to parliamentary privilege, understood as free- dom from interference with “the parliamentary work of a member of parliament — ie, any of the mem- ber’s activities that have a connection with a proceed- ing in parliament” (j p j maingot,. parliamentary immunity in canada (2016), at p.  16 (emphasis added)). this is no anachronism or technical nicety. [122] il serait aussi contraire au privilège par- lementaire d’imposer une obligation de consulter relativement à l’élaboration des politiques législa- tives puisque ce privilège consiste en une protection contre l’ingérence dans [traduction] « le travail parlementaire des députés — c-à-d dans toute acti- vité de ceux-ci ayant un lien avec les travaux du par- lement » : j p j maingot,. parliamentary immunity in canada (2016), p. 16 (je souligne). il ne s’agit pas [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 831 parliamentary privilege is “the necessary immunity that the law provides for members of parliament   . in order for these legislators to do their legislative work, ‘including the assembly’s work in holding the government to account’” (maingot, at p. 15, citing canada (house of commons) v. vaid, 2005 scc 30, [2005] 1 scr 667, at para 46). since “holding the government to account” is the raison d’être of parlia- ment (maingot, at p. 317, citing w. gladstone, uk. house of commons debates (hansard), january 29, 1855, at p. 1202; see also vaid, at para. 46), parlia- mentary privilege is therefore essential to allowing parliament to perform its constitutional functions. as this court said in re canada assistance plan, at p. 560, “[a] restraint    in the introduction of leg- islation is a fetter on the sovereignty of parliament itself.” parliament therefore has the right to “exer- cise unfettered freedom in the formulation, tabling, amendment, and passage of legislation” (galati v. canada (governor general), 2015 fc 91, [2015] 4 fcr 3, at para 34). [123] i acknowledge that parliamentary privilege operates within certain constraints imposed by the constitution of canada. for example, in reference re manitoba language rights, [1985] 1 scr 721, the court held that s. 23 of the manitoba act, 1870, sc 1870, c. 3, entrenches a mandatory require- ment to enact, print and publish provincial statutes in both official languages. in doing so, it imposed a constitutional duty on the manitoba legislature with respect to the manner and form by which legislation could be validly enacted. other manner and form requirements are contained in part iv of the consti- tution act, 1867 (for example, in s. 48 (“quorum of house of commons”) and s. 49 (“voting in house of commons”), and in s. 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982). d’un anachronisme ou d’une subtilité technique. le privilège parlementaire est [traduction] « l’indis- pensable immunité que le droit accorde aux députés [  ] pour leur permettre d’effectuer leur travail législatif, “y compris leur tâche de demander des comptes au gouvernement” » : maingot, p. 15, citant canada (chambre des communes) c. vaid, 2005 csc 30, [2005] 1 rcs 667, par 46. comme la tâche qui consiste à « demander des comptes au gouver- nement » est la raison d’être du parlement (maingot, p. 317, citant w. gladstone, débats de la chambre des communes du royaume- uni (hansard), 29 jan- vier 1855, p. 1202; voir aussi vaid, par. 46), le prin- cipe du privilège parlementaire est essentiel pour que le parlement s’acquitte de ses fonctions constitution- nelles. comme la cour l’a déclaré dans le renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada, p. 560, « [t]oute restriction imposée au pouvoir [  ] de déposer des projets de loi constitue une limitation de la souveraineté du parlement lui- même.  » le parlement a donc le droit « d’exercer une liberté ab- solue pour ce qui est de la formulation, du dépôt, de la modification et de l’adoption d’une loi » : galati c. canada (gouverneur général), 2015 cf 91, [2015] 4 rcf 3, par 34. [123] je reconnais que le privilège parlementaire s’applique sous réserve de certaines contraintes im- posées par la constitution du canada. par exemple, dans le renvoi : droits linguistiques au manitoba, [1985] 1 rcs 721, la cour a conclu que l’art. 23 de la loi de 1870 sur le manitoba, sc 1870, c. 3, consacre une exigence d’adopter, d’imprimer et de publier les lois de la province dans les deux lan- gues officielles. elle impose ainsi à la législature du manitoba une obligation constitutionnelle quant aux modalités et à la forme de l’adoption valide de ses lois. d’autres exigences quant aux moda- lités et à la forme sont énoncées à la partie iv de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 : par exemple, à l’art.  48 («  quorum de la chambre des commu- nes »), à l’art. 49 (« votation dans la chambre des communes »), et au par. 52(1) de la loi constitu- tionnelle de 1982. [124] mikisew cree first nation argues that s. 35 of the constitution act, 1982 also creates a manner and form requirement which applies to the legislative [124] la première nation crie mikisew soutient que l’art. 35 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 a aussi pour effet de créer une exigence quant aux 832 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. process in the form of a constitutional and justiciable duty to consult. but the duty to consult is distinct from the constitutionally mandated manner and form requirements with which parliament must comply in order to enact valid legislation. applied to the exer- cise of legislative power, it is a claim not about the manner and form of enactment, but about the proce- dure of (or leading to) enactment. and, as this court said in authorson v. canada (attorney general), 2003 scc 39, [2003] 2 scr 40, at para. 37, “the only procedure due any citizen of canada is that proposed legislation receive three readings in the senate and house of commons and that it receive royal assent”. in a similar vein, although legisla- tion which substantially interferes with the right to collective bargaining protected by s. 2(d) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms can be declared invalid, “[l]egislators are not bound to con- sult with affected parties before passing legislation” (health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn. v. british columbia, 2007 scc 27, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para 157). in short, while the constitution’s status as the supreme law of canada operates to render of no force and effect enacted legislation that is inconsistent with its provisions, it does not empower plaintiffs to override parliamen- tary privilege by challenging the process by which legislation was formulated, introduced or enacted. modalités et à la forme applicables au processus législatif qui se traduit par une obligation constitu- tionnelle de consulter que peuvent sanctionner les tribunaux. or, l’obligation de consulter se distingue des exigences quant aux modalités et à la forme imposées par la constitution que doit respecter le lé- gislateur afin d’adopter une loi valide. s’agissant de l’exercice du pouvoir législatif, la demande ne vise pas les modalités et la forme de l’adoption des lois, mais plutôt la procédure suivie pour l’adoption des lois ou pour y mener. en outre, comme la cour l’a affirmé dans l’arrêt authorson c. canada (procureur général), 2003 csc 39, [2003] 2 rcs 40, par. 37, « tout ce qu’un citoyen canadien peut exiger, sur le plan procédural, c’est qu’un projet de loi fasse l’objet de trois lectures à la chambre des commu- nes et au sénat et qu’il reçoive la sanction royale ». dans le même ordre d’idées, bien qu’une loi qui entrave de façon substantielle l’exercice du droit de négociation collective protégé par l’al. 2d) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés puisse être déclarée invalide, « [l]e législateur n’est pas tenu de consulter les parties visées avant d’adopter une mesure législative » : health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn. c. colombie- britannique, 2007 csc 27, [2007] 2 rcs 391, par 157. en résumé, bien que la constitution soit la loi suprême du canada et qu’elle rende inopérante toute loi incompatible avec ses dispositions, elle ne permet pas aux demandeurs d’écarter le privi- lège parlementaire en contestant le processus qui a conduit à la formulation, au dépôt ou à l’adoption d’une loi. [125] understanding the development and discus- sion of policy options related to the development and introduction of bills as being legislative in nature is most consistent with our law’s understanding of the scope of judicial review (in the sense of judicial review for constitutionality, as opposed to judicial review of administrative action) judicial review is “the power to determine whether [a] particular law is valid or invalid” (p w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at p. 15-2 (emphasis added)). it therefore contemplates review of enacted legislation for constitutional compliance and does not, as a general rule, contemplate the exposure of legislative processes to judicial scrutiny. [125] considérer que l’élaboration et l’analyse des options politiques relatives à la formulation et au dépôt des projets de loi sont de nature législative est plus conforme à l’interprétation en droit canadien de la portée du contrôle judiciaire (dans le sens de contrôle judiciaire de la constitutionnalité plutôt que de contrôle judiciaire d’une mesure administrative). le contrôle judiciaire est [traduction] « le pouvoir de déterminer si [une] loi en particulier est valide ou invalide » : p w hogg,. constitutional law of canada (5e éd. suppl.), p. 15-2 (je souligne). il s’agit donc de l’examen de lois sanctionnées afin d’en assu- rer la constitutionnalité, et non pas, en règle générale, de l’examen du processus législatif par les tribunaux. [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 833 [126] this view is, moreover, consistent with the text of s. 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982: “   any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution is, to the extent of the incon- sistency, of no force or effect”. it is also consist- ent with this court’s balancing in r v. sparrow, [1990] 1 scr 1075, at p. 1109, and tsilhqot’in nation v. british columbia, 2014 scc 44, [2014] 2 scr 257, at paras. 77-78, of legislative author- ity with the rights guaranteed in s. 35 and the goal of reconciliation by requiring that “government” jus- tify enacted legislation that infringes s 35. this is, i stress, distinct from the framework governing con- templated or actual crown conduct taken under a power conferred in an enacted statute — to which framework i now turn. c the development, introduction, consideration and enactment of bills is not “crown conduct” triggering the duty to consult in haida nation v. british columbia (min- [127] ister of forests), 2004 scc 73, [2004] 3 scr. 511, at para. 35, this court set out the three ele- ments which, taken together, trigger a duty to con- sult: (i) the crown must have knowledge — actual or constructive — of a potential aboriginal claim or right; (ii) the crown must contemplate conduct; and (iii) the contemplated crown conduct must have the potential to adversely affect an aboriginal claim or aboriginal or treaty right. the duty to consult and, where necessary, to accommodate the interests of in- digenous peoples is grounded in the honour of the crown (haida nation, at para 16). [126] de plus, ce point de vue cadre avec le libellé du par. 52(1) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 selon lequel la constitution « rend inopérantes les dispositions incompatibles de toute autre règle de droit ». il concorde également avec la mise en ba- lance faite par la cour dans les arrêts r c. sparrow, [1990] 1 rcs 1075, p. 1109, et nation tsilhqot’in c. colombie- britannique, 2014 csc 44, [2014] 2 rcs 257, par. 77-78, du pouvoir législatif, d’une part, et des droits garantis par l’art. 35 ainsi que de l’objectif de réconciliation, d’autre part, selon la- quelle le « gouvernement » doit justifier toute mesure législative qui porte atteinte à l’art 35. je tiens à sou- ligner que cette situation diffère du cadre régissant une conduite — envisagée ou réelle — adoptée par la couronne en vertu d’une loi habilitante. je vais maintenant examiner ce cadre. c l’élaboration, le dépôt, l’examen et l’adoption des projets de loi ne constituent pas des « con- duites de la couronne » qui donnent naissance à l’obligation de consulter [127] dans l’arrêt nation haïda c colombie- britannique (ministre des forêts), 2004 csc 73, [2004] 3 rcs 511, par. 35, la cour a énoncé les trois éléments qui, pris ensemble, donnent naissance à une obligation de consulter : (i) la couronne doit avoir connaissance, concrètement ou par imputation, de l’existence potentielle d’un droit ou titre ances- tral, (ii) la couronne doit envisager une conduite, et (iii) cette conduite doit être susceptible d’avoir un ef- fet préjudiciable sur une revendication autochtone ou sur un droit ancestral ou issu de traités. l’obligation de consulter les peuples autochtones et, si néces- saire, de prendre en compte leurs intérêts découle du principe de l’honneur de la couronne : nation haïda, par 16. [128] “crown conduct” triggering the duty to con- sult must, however, be understood as excluding the parliamentary (and, indeed judicial) functions of the canadian state. the crown represents a collection of powers and privileges, and the term “crown” is pri- marily but not exclusively used to denote two aspects of the canadian state: the monarch and the executive. in one sense, no activity of the state is independ- ent of the crown (o. hood phillips, p. jackson and [128] il faut toutefois comprendre que la « conduite de la couronne  » qui fait naître l’obligation de consulter, exclut les fonctions parlementaires (et, de fait, judiciaires) de l’état canadien. la couronne représente un ensemble de pouvoirs et de privilèges et le terme « couronne » est principalement, mais non exclusivement, utilisé pour désigner deux aspects de l’état canadien : le monarque et l’exécutif. en un sens, aucune activité de l’état n’est indépendante de 834 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. p. leopold, o. hood phillips & jackson: consti- tutional and administrative law (8th ed. 2001), at para 2-020). that said, parliamentary and judicial functions have been clearly separated from crown control: magna carta (1215); case of proclama- tions (1611), 12 co. rep. 74, 77 er 1352;. bill of rights of 1689; act of settlement of 1701; refer- ence re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217, at para 63. the preamble to the constitution act, 1867, which proclaims canada’s constitution to be “similar in principle to [the constitution] of the united kingdom” is, as lamer cj recognized, the “grand entrance hall” through which the principles affirmed in these legal instruments have become a part of canada’s constitutional architecture (refer- ence re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3, at para. 109; see also paras. 83, 87 and 107). [129] before us, counsel for mikisew cree first nation disputed this, suggesting that the language of legislative enactment clauses in canada (“  . her majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the senate and the house of commons of canada, enacts as follows   ”) signifies crown control of the process of legislative enactment (transcript, at p 149). but this misconceives the significance of the reference to “her majesty” in those clauses. it does not signify, as he argued, that “[l]egislation is crown action” (transcript, at p 149). rather, it sim- ply records the role of the crown-in- parliament in the legislative process of enacting laws. la couronne : o. hood phillips, p. jackson et p. leo- pold, o. hood phillips & jackson : constitutional and administrative law (8e éd. 2001), par 2-020. cela dit, les fonctions parlementaires et judiciaires ont été clairement soustraites au contrôle de la cou- ronne : magna carta (1215); case of proclamations (1611), 12 co. rep. 74, 77 er 1352;. bill of rights de 1689; act of settlement de 1701; renvoi rela- tif à la sécession du québec, [1998] 2 rcs 217, par 63. le préambule de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, selon lequel la constitution du canada « re- pos[e] sur les mêmes principes [constitutionnels] que celle du royaume- uni », est, comme le juge en chef lamer l’a reconnu, le « portail de l’édifice constitu- tionnel » par l’entremise duquel les principes énon- cés dans ces instruments juridiques font désormais partie de l’architecture même de la constitution du canada : renvoi relatif à la rémunération des juges de la cour provinciale de l’île-du- prince- édouard, [1997] 3 rcs 3, par. 109; voir également par. 83, 87 et 107. [129] devant la cour, l’avocat de la première nation crie mikisew a contesté cette affirmation, laissant plutôt entendre que le libellé des formules d’édiction du canada («   . sa majesté, sur l’avis et avec le consentement du sénat et de la chambre des communes du canada, édicte    ») signifie que la couronne exerce un contrôle sur le proces- sus d’adoption des lois : transcription, p 149. or, il s’agit d’une mauvaise interprétation de la mention de « sa majesté » dans ces formules. cette mention ne signifie pas, comme il l’a plaidé, que [traduction] « [l]a loi constitue une mesure de la couronne » : transcription, p 149. elle ne fait que rendre compte du rôle de la couronne au parlement dans le proces- sus législatif d’adoption des lois. [130] by way of explanation, parliament consists of the house of commons, the senate and the queen (constitution act, 1867, s 17). the scope of the queen’s legislative role — that is, the role of the crown-in- parliament — embraces “three determina- tive acts that are part of parliament’s core functions as a legislative body: royal recommendation, royal consent and royal assent” (c. robert, “the role of the crown-in- parliament: a matter of form and substance”, in m. bédard and p. lagassé, eds., the [130] je m’explique : le parlement est composé de la chambre des communes, du sénat et de la reine : loi constitutionnelle de 1867, art 17. l’étendue du rôle législatif de la reine — c’est-à-dire, le rôle de la couronne au parlement — comprend [traduction] « trois actes déterminants qui relèvent des fonctions principales du parlement à titre d’organe législatif : la recommandation royale, le consentement royal et la sanction royale » : c. robert, « the role of the crown-in- parliament : a matter of form and [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 835 crown and parliament (2015), 95, at p. 96 (emphasis added)). [131] royal recommendation, which is retained in s. 54 of the constitution act, 1867, provides for the procedure to be followed in respect of authorizing expenditure of public monies. royal consent is a practice based on a convention limiting parliament’s right to take measures infringing the crown preroga- tive or other crown rights and interests. of relevance here, however, is royal assent. this is because royal assent is what is conferred by the language of leg- islative enactment clauses relied upon by mikisew cree first nation’s counsel. royal assent is also expressly required by s. 55 of the constitution act, 1867, which provides that, upon a bill passed by both the house of commons and the senate being presented to the governor general for the queen’s assent, the queen’s assent (or withholding of con- sent, or reservation of the bill) shall be declared. [132] sections 54 and 55 appear within part iv of the constitution act, 1867 and are therefore des- ignated by the constitution as falling within “leg- islative power”. this makes sense, because royal recommendation, royal consent and royal assent are distinct from other exercises of crown author- ity. unlike, for example, statutory bodies such as the national energy board, or ministers of the crown acting under delegated statutory powers, the crown-in- parliament does not “exis[t] to exercise executive power as authorized by legislatures”; and, the steps taken as part of the parliamentary process of law- making, including royal assent, are not “the vehicle through which the crown acts” (clyde river (hamlet) v. petroleum geo- services inc., 2017 scc 40, [2017] 1 scr 1069, at para 29). as this court noted in clyde river, at paras. 28-29: substance », dans m. bédard et p. lagassé, dir., la couronne et le parlement (2015), 95, p. 96 (je souligne). [131] la recommandation royale dont il est ques- tion à l’art. 54 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 constitue la procédure à suivre pour autoriser la dé- pense de deniers publics. le consentement royal est une pratique fondée sur une convention qui limite le droit du parlement de prendre des mesures por- tant atteinte à la prérogative de la couronne ou à d’autres droits et intérêts de la couronne. cependant, en l’espèce, c’est la sanction royale qui est perti- nente, car c’est l’acte prévu par les formules d’édic- tion invoquées par l’avocat de la première nation crie mikisew. la sanction royale est aussi expressé- ment exigée par l’art. 55 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, qui prévoit que, lorsqu’un projet de loi voté par la chambre des communes et le sénat est pré- senté au gouverneur- général pour la sanction de la reine, ce dernier déclare qu’il le sanctionne (ou re- fuse cette sanction, ou qu’il réserve le projet de loi) au nom de la reine. [132] les articles  54 et 55 se trouvent dans la partie iv de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 et se rapportent donc, aux termes de la constitution, au « pouvoir législatif ». cela est logique parce que la recommandation royale, le consentement royal et la sanction royale sont distincts des autres exer- cices du pouvoir de la couronne. contrairement, par exemple, aux organismes d’origine législative comme l’office national de l’énergie, ou aux mi- nistres de la couronne qui agissent en vertu d’un pouvoir délégué par la loi, la couronne au parlement « [n’]existe [pas] pour exercer le pouvoir de nature exécutive que le législateur concerné l’autorise à exercer »; en outre, les étapes suivies dans le cadre du processus parlementaire d’élaboration des lois, y compris la sanction royale, ne sont pas « le moyen par lequel la couronne agit » : clyde river (hameau) c. petroleum geo- services inc., 2017 csc 40, [2017] 1 rcs 1069, par 29. comme l’a déclaré la cour aux par. 28-29 de cet arrêt : it bears reiterating that the duty to consult is owed by the crown. in one sense, the “crown” refers to the person- ification in her majesty of the canadian state in exercising il importe de répéter que l’obligation de consulter incombe à la couronne en un sens, la «  couronne  » s’entend de la personnification de sa majesté de l’état 836 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. the prerogatives and privileges reserved to it. the crown also, however, denotes the sovereign in the exercise of her formal legislative role (in assenting, refusing assent to, or reserving legislative or parliamentary bills), and as the head of executive authority (mcateer v. canada (attorney general), 2014 onca 578, 121 or (3d) 1, at para. 51; p w. hogg, p j. monahan and w k. wright, liability of the crown (4th ed. 2011), at pp. 11-12; but see carrier sekani, at para 44). for this reason, the term “crown” is commonly used to symbolize and denote executive power   . by this understanding, the neb is not, strictly speak- ing, “the crown”. nor is it, strictly speaking, an agent of the crown, since — as the neb operates independently of the crown’s ministers — no relationship of control exists between them (hogg, monahan and wright, at p 465). as a statutory body holding responsibility under s. 5(1)(b) of cogoa, however, the neb acts on behalf of the crown when making a final decision on a project application. put plainly, once it is accepted that a regulatory agency exists to exercise executive power as authorized by leg- islatures, any distinction between its actions and crown action quickly falls away. in this context, the neb is the vehicle through which the crown acts. hence this court’s interchangeable references in carrier sekani to “gov- ernment action” and “crown conduct” (paras 42-44). it therefore does not matter whether the final decision maker on a resource project is cabinet or the neb. in either case, the decision constitutes crown action that may trigger the duty to consult. as rennie ja said in dissent at the federal court of appeal in chippewas of the thames, “[t]he duty, like the honour of the crown, does not evap- orate simply because a final decision has been made by a tribunal established by parliament, as opposed to cabinet” (para 105). the action of the neb, taken in furtherance of its statutory powers under s. 5(1)(b) of cogoa to make final decisions respecting such testing as was proposed here, clearly constitutes crown action. [emphasis added.] canadien dans l’exercice des prérogatives et des privilèges qui lui sont réservés. cependant, la couronne désigne aussi la souveraine dans l’exercice de son rôle législatif officiel (lorsqu’elle sanctionne les projets de loi, qu’elle refuse de les sanctionner ou qu’elle réserve sa décision), et en tant que chef du pouvoir exécutif (mcateer c. canada (attorney general), 2014 onca 578, 121 or (3d) 1, par. 51; p w hogg,. p j monahan et w k wright,. liabil- ity of the crown (4e éd. 2011), p. 11-12; mais voir carrier sekani, par 44). pour cette raison, le mot « couronne » est couramment employé comme symbole du pouvoir exécutif et pour désigner ce pouvoir  . selon cette interprétation, l’oné n’est pas, à propre- ment parler, « la couronne ». il n’est pas non plus, à pro- prement parler, un mandataire de la couronne, étant donné que — comme l’oné exerce ses activités de manière indépendante des ministres de la couronne — il n’existe entre eux aucun lien de dépendance (hogg, monahan et wright, p 465). cependant, en tant qu’organisme créé par la loi à qui incombe la responsabilité visée à l’al. 5(1)b) de la lopc, l’oné agit pour le compte de la couronne lorsqu’il prend une décision définitive à l’égard d’une demande de projet. en termes simples, dès lors que l’on accepte qu’un organisme de réglementation existe pour exercer le pouvoir de nature exécutive que le législateur concerné l’autorise à exercer, toute distinction entre les mesures de cet organisme et celles de la couronne dis- paraît rapidement. dans ce contexte, l’oné est le moyen par lequel la couronne agit, d’où l’emploi interchangeable dans carrier sekani des expressions « mesure gouverne- mentale » et « mesure [  ] de la couronne » (par 42-44). par conséquent, il importe peu que le décideur ultime dans un projet soit le cabinet ou l’oné. dans les deux cas, la décision constitue une mesure de la couronne qui peut donner naissance à l’obligation de consulter. comme l’a affirmé en dissidence le juge rennie de la cour d’appel fédérale dans chippewas of the thames, « [l]’obligation, comme l’honneur de la couronne, ne s’envole pas en fumée simplement parce qu’une décision sans appel a été rendue par un tribunal établi par le parlement, plu- tôt que par le cabinet » (par 105). la mesure prise par l’oné dans l’exercice du pouvoir qu’il possède, en vertu de l’al. 5(1)b) de la lopc, de prendre la décision ul- time concernant des essais tels ceux proposés en l’espèce, constitue manifestement une mesure de la couronne. [je souligne.] [133] this description of the various and distinct aspects of crown authority (and also, it follows, crown conduct) affirms that the exercise of crown [133] cette description des divers aspects distincts du pouvoir de la couronne (et donc de la conduite de la couronne) confirme que l’exercice de son pouvoir [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 837 authority in enacting legislation (“assenting, refusing assent to, or reserving legislative or parliamentary bills”) is legislative. it is not an instance of “crown conduct” — that is, executive conduct — which can trigger the duty to consult. dans l’adoption des lois (« lorsqu’elle sanctionne les projets de loi, qu’elle refuse de les sanction- ner ou qu’elle réserve sa décision ») est de nature législative. il ne s’agit pas d’une « conduite de la couronne » — c’est-à-dire d’une conduite de nature exécutive — qui peut donner naissance à l’obligation de consulter. d the honour of the crown d l’honneur de la couronne [134] the foregoing is an answer to the concurring reasons at the court of appeal of pelletier ja, who suggested that declaratory relief would be available under s. 17 of the federal courts act, which provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act or any other act of parliament, the federal court has concurrent original jurisdiction in all cases in which relief is claimed against the crown.” simply put, the reference in s. 17 to “the crown” does not include the crown acting in its legislative capacity. (see fédération franco- ténoise v. canada, 2001 fca 220, [2001] 3 fc 641, at para 58) [135] it also follows from the foregoing that, con- trary to the submissions of mikisew cree first na- tion, and to the views of my colleague abella  j. that “the duty to consult    attaches to all exer- cises of crown power, including legislative action” (para. 75), the crown does not enact legislation. parliament does. the honour of the crown does not bind parliament. [134] ce qui précède constitue une réponse aux motifs concordants du juge pelletier en cour d’appel, qui a laissé entendre que l’art. 17 de la loi sur les cours fédérales — qui prévoit que « [s]auf disposi- tion contraire de la présente loi ou de toute autre loi fédérale, la cour fédérale a compétence concurrente, en première instance, dans les cas de demande de ré- paration contre la couronne » — permet de solliciter un jugement déclaratoire. or, en un mot, la référence à la « couronne » dans cette disposition ne vise pas la couronne lorsqu’elle s’acquitte de ses fonc- tions législatives : voir fédération franco- ténoise c. canada, 2001 caf 220, [2001] 3 cf 641, par 58. [135] il ressort également de ce qui précède que, contrairement aux prétentions de la première nation crie mikisew ainsi qu’à l’opinion exprimée par ma collègue la juge abella selon laquelle « l’obligation de consulter [  ] se rapporte à tout exercice des pouvoirs de la couronne, y compris aux mesures législatives » (par. 75), la couronne n’adopte pas les lois. c’est le parlement qui le fait. or, le principe de l’honneur de la couronne ne lie pas le parlement. [136] while my colleague karakatsanis j. appears to accept that conclusion so far as the duty to consult goes, she also raises the possibility that legislation which does not infringe s. 35 rights but “may ad- versely affect” them might nonetheless be inconsist- ent with the honour of the crown (paras. 3, 25, 44 and 52). as she sees it, independent of any infringe- ment claim, a rights claimant could seek a declaration that validly enacted and constitutionally compliant legislation — none of which, in law, is the result of crown conduct — nonetheless fails to “give effect to the honour of the crown” (para 45). otherwise, where “the effects of the legislation do not rise to the level of infringement, or if the rights are merely [136] ma collègue la juge karakatsanis semble accepter cette conclusion, du moins en ce qui a trait à l’obligation de consulter. elle évoque cependant aussi la possibilité qu’une loi qui ne porte pas atteinte aux droits protégés par l’art. 35, mais qui est « sus- ceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur » ceux-ci, peut néanmoins être incompatible avec l’honneur de la couronne : par. 3, 25, 44 et 52. selon sa vision de la question, indépendamment de toute revendication invoquant l’atteinte aux droits, celui qui réclame des droits pourrait solliciter un jugement déclarant qu’une loi valablement adoptée et conforme à la constitution — deux caractéristiques qui, en droit, ne découlent pas de la conduite de la couronne — « [ne] 838 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. asserted (and not established), an aboriginal group will not be able to successfully challenge the consti- tutional validity of the legislation through a sparrow claim” (para 43). permitting the crown “to do by one means” (presumably, by legislating) “that which it cannot do by another” (presumably acting pursuant to legislative authority) would “undermine the en- deavour of reconciliation” (para. 44), which entails “promoting negotiation and the just settlement of aboriginal claims as an alternative to litigation and judicially imposed outcomes” (para 22). [137] it follows, says my colleague, that “the duty to consult is not the only means to give effect to the honour of the crown when aboriginal or treaty rights may be adversely affected by legislation” (para 45). while acknowledging that “the issue of whether other protections are, or should be, available is not squarely before the court in this appeal” (para. 49), she nevertheless speculates that “[o]ther doctrines may be developed” (para 45). while “[w]e have not received sufficient submissions on how to en- sure that the honour of the crown is upheld other than through the specific mechanism of the duty to consult” (para. 49), she nonetheless proposes that “declaratory relief may be appropriate in a case where legislation is enacted that is not consistent with the crown’s duty of honourable dealing toward aboriginal peoples” (para 47). i note, first of all, that much of my col- [138] league’s speculation is inapplicable here. mikisew cree first nation’s rights are not merely asserted. they are established treaty no. 8 rights. as such, the only concern posited by my colleague which could conceivably arise here is that those rights might be “affected”, albeit not actually infringed, by the leg- islation which is the subject of this appeal. donn[e néanmoins pas] effet au principe de l’honneur de la couronne » : par 45. autrement, « si les effets de la loi ne constituaient pas une atteinte à des droits protégés ou si les droits n’étaient que revendiqués (et non établis), le groupe autochtone ne pourrait pas contester avec succès la validité constitutionnelle de la loi suivant le cadre d’analyse établi dans l’ar- rêt sparrow » : par 43. permettre à la couronne de « faire par un moyen » (présumément en adoptant des lois) « ce qu’elle ne peut pas faire par un autre » (présumément en agissant en vertu de son pouvoir législatif) « compromettrait l’entreprise de récon- ciliation » : par. 44, ce qui suppose de « favoris[er] la négociation et le règlement juste des revendica- tions autochtones comme solution de rechange aux recours judiciaires et aux résultats imposés par les tribunaux » : par 22. [137] ainsi, affirme ma collègue, « l’obligation de consulter n’est pas le seul moyen de donner effet au principe de l’honneur de la couronne quand une loi est susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur les droits ancestraux ou issus de traités » : par 45. tout en reconnaissant que « la cour n’est pas directement saisie de la question de savoir si d’autres mesures de protection existent ou devraient exister » (par. 49), elle avance l’hypothèse que « [l]es tribunaux peuvent créer d’autres doctrines » : par 45. même si « [l]es parties nous ont fait part de trop peu d’observations sur la manière dont il conviendrait d’assurer le respect de l’honneur de la couronne, si ce n’est par le truche- ment du mécanisme précis de l’obligation de consul- ter » (par. 49), elle propose néanmoins qu’il « peut convenir de prononcer un jugement déclaratoire dans un cas où le législateur adopte une loi incompatible avec l’obligation de la couronne d’agir honorable- ment envers les peuples autochtones » : par 47. [138] tout d’abord, je note qu’une part impor- tante de l’hypothèse de ma collègue est inapplicable en l’espèce. les droits de la première nation crie mikisew ne sont pas simplement revendiqués. ce sont des droits consacrés par le traité no 8. à ce titre, la seule préoccupation soulevée par ma collègue qui pourrait vraisemblablement se concrétiser en l’es- pèce, c’est qu’il y ait « un effet préjudiciable » sur ces droits, sans qu’il leur soit porté atteinte, par les lois en cause dans le présent appel. [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 839 in any event, and in my respectful view, [139] having acknowledged that there is no demonstrated infringement in this case, my colleague is search- ing for a problem to solve (while at the same time expressly declining to solve it). and she believes she has found that problem in what she sees as the potentially dishonourable conduct of the crown in enacting non- rights- infringing (although rights-“af- fecting”) legislation —which, as i have already made clear, is not really a problem since, as a matter of constitutional law, “the crown” does not enact leg- islation. in other words, my colleague undercuts the very constitutional principles of separation of powers and parliamentary privilege, and the constitutional limits that they impose upon judicial supervision of the legislative process, which support her con- clusion that no duty to consult is owed in respect of that process, including legislative enactment. and in so doing, she endorses the potential engorgement of judicial power — not required by the law of our constitution, but rather precluded by it — at the expense of legislatures’ power over their processes. far from preserving what my colleague calls “the respectful balance between the    pillars of our democracy” (para. 2), this conveys inter- institutional disrespect. it would be no more “respectful” (or con- stitutionally legitimate) for a legislature to purport to direct this court or any other court on its own deliberative processes. [139] quoi qu’il en soit, à mon avis, puisqu’elle a reconnu qu’il n’y avait pas d’atteinte prouvée en l’es- pèce, ma collègue cherche un problème à résoudre (tout en refusant expressément de le résoudre). elle croit en outre avoir trouvé ce problème dans ce qu’elle perçoit comme la conduite potentiellement déshonorable adoptée par la couronne lorsqu’elle a adopté des mesures législatives qui ne portent pas atteinte aux droits (même si elles ont « un effet pré- judiciable » sur eux) — ce qui, je l’ai déjà exprimé clairement, n’est pas vraiment un problème, puisque, en droit constitutionnel, « la couronne » n’adopte pas les lois. autrement dit, ma collègue mine les principes constitutionnels mêmes que sont la sé- paration des pouvoirs et le privilège parlementaire, ainsi que les limites constitutionnelles qu’ils fixent au contrôle judiciaire du processus législatif qui, pré- cisément, étayent sa conclusion que ce processus, y compris l’adoption de lois, n’est pas assujetti à une obligation de consulter. ce faisant, elle donne son aval à l’enflure du pouvoir judiciaire — que notre constitution non seulement ne requiert pas, mais proscrit — au détriment du pouvoir des assemblées législatives sur leurs procédures. loin de préserver ce que ma collègue appelle « l’équilibre respectueux qui règne entre les [  ] piliers de notre démocra- tie » (par. 2), cela mène au manque de respect entre les institutions. il ne serait pas plus « respectueux » (ou légitime sur le plan constitutionnel) qu’une as- semblée législative provinciale s’estime autorisée à donner des directives à la cour ou à toute autre cour de justice sur leurs processus délibératifs. [140] even putting that objection aside, my col- league’s reasons invoking the honour of the crown appear to leave open the possibility that validly en- acted legislation (which has not been or could not be the subject of a s. 35 infringement claim) might be declared to be “not consistent with [the honour of the crown]” (para. 47) due to some failure to uphold the honour of the crown. but in doing so, she runs up against those same constitutional principles of separation of powers and parliamentary privilege which furnish the entire constitutional basis for her conclusion that no duty to consult is owed in respect of legislative processes. the honour of the crown is not a cause of action itself; rather, it speaks to how obligations that attract it must be fulfilled (manitoba [140] même en faisant fi de cette objection, les motifs de ma collègue fondés sur l’honneur de la couronne semblent ne pas écarter la possibilité qu’une loi valablement adoptée (qui n’est pas ou ne pourrait être contestée avec succès sur le fondement de l’art. 35) puisse être déclarée « incompatible avec [l’honneur de la couronne] » (par. 47) parce que le législateur n’aurait pas respecté l’honneur de la cou- ronne. ce faisant, elle se heurte aux mêmes principes constitutionnels de la séparation des pouvoirs et du privilège parlementaire qui constituent la totalité du fondement constitutionnel de sa conclusion selon la- quelle le processus législatif n’est pas assujetti à une obligation de consulter. l’honneur de la couronne n’est pas en soi une cause d’action; ce principe sert 840 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. metis federation inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2013 scc 14, [2013] 1 scr 623, at para 73). while she finds that the enforceable duty to con- sult flowing from the honour of the crown does not apply to the law- making process, my colleague, in substance, proceeds to treat the honour of the crown as the potential source of an enforceable obligation on legislators to either refrain from passing certain legislation because it “affects” rights writ large, or not to do so without consultation. [141] in this regard, my colleague’s reference to “[o]ther forms of recourse [such as] declaratory re- lief    where legislation is enacted that is not con- sistent with the crown’s duty of honourable dealing” (para. 47), is telling. for what, precisely, would a court grant “recourse”? absent a s. 35 infringement, the answer is nothing, unless the duty to consult flowing from the honour of the crown is itself be- ing treated as applicable to the law- making process, despite my colleague’s conclusion to the contrary. irrespective, then, of how a court might cast the spec- ulative “[o]ther doctrines [that] may be developed” (para. 45) — for example, as a duty to accommodate, a duty not to “affect” rights, or as some fiduciary obligation — the resulting obligation would be, in substance, reducible either to the obligation which the mikisew cree first nation asks the court to impose here, or to some other formulation that still runs into the separation of powers and parliamentary privilege. while, therefore, i acknowledge that my colleague holds that there can be no enforceable duty to consult in the legislative process, the logic of her reasons nevertheless risks leading her toward the result advocated by abella j., albeit via the circuitous and uncertain route of further litigation. plutôt à déterminer comment il faut s’acquitter des obligations qui y sont assujetties : manitoba metis federation inc. c. canada (procureur général), 2013 csc 14, [2013] 1 rcs 623, par 73. or, tout en concluant que l’obligation de consulter justiciable qui découle de l’honneur de la couronne ne s’ap- plique pas au processus législatif, ma collègue, en substance, traite ensuite l’honneur de la couronne comme la source potentielle d’une obligation jus- ticiable incombant aux législateurs de s’abstenir d’adopter certaines lois parce qu’elles « ont un effet préjudiciable » sur des droits au sens large, ou de ne pas le faire sans consultation. [141] à cet égard, le renvoi de ma collègue à « d’autres formes de réparation [tel] un jugement dé- claratoire dans un cas où le législateur adopte une loi incompatible avec l’obligation de la couronne d’agir honorablement    » est éloquent : par 47. pour quelle raison, précisément, une cour accorderait- elle une « réparation »? s’il n’est pas porté atteinte à l’art. 35, la réponse est qu’il n’y a aucune raison d’accorder une « réparation », à moins que l’obli- gation de consulter qui découle de l’honneur de la couronne soit elle- même traitée comme si elle était applicable au processus législatif, en dépit de la conclusion contraire de ma collègue. ainsi, indépen- damment de la façon dont une cour pourrait présenter les hypothétiques « autres doctrines » (par. 45) qui pourraient être élaborées — par exemple, comme une obligation d’accommodement, comme une obli- gation de ne pas « avoir un effet préjudiciable » sur les droits en cause, ou comme une obligation fidu- ciaire —, il en résulterait une obligation qui serait, en substance, réductible soit à l’obligation que la première nation crie mikisew demande à la cour d’imposer en l’espèce, soit à une quelconque autre formulation qui se butte encore une fois à la sépara- tion des pouvoirs et au privilège parlementaire. en conséquence, tout en reconnaissant que ma collègue déclare qu’il ne peut y avoir d’obligation de consulter justiciable dans le cadre du processus législatif, la logique de ses motifs risque néanmoins de la mener vers le résultat que préconise la juge abella, bien que par le truchement du parcours tortueux et incertain de litiges supplémentaires. [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge brown 841 [142] this brings me to a further objection. by raising (and then leaving undecided) this quixotic argument about the honour of the crown — which neither the appellant nor any of the intervenors even thought to raise — my colleague karakatsanis j. would cast the law into considerable uncertainty. it is worth reflecting upon just who would bear the brunt of this uncertainty. in this regard, there is a degree of irony in my colleague’s emphasis upon the honour of the crown as facilitating “reconciliation” which, she says, entails “promoting negotiation and the just settlement of aboriginal claims as an alternative to litigation and judicially imposed outcomes” (para. 22 (emphasis added)). the effect of my colleague’s reasons would be quite the opposite. she invites s. 35 rights holders — that is, indigenous peoples themselves — to spend many years and considera- ble resources litigating on the faint possibility that they have identified some “other form of recourse” that this court finds “appropriate”. in other words, even though “[t]rue reconciliation is rarely, if ever, achieved in courtrooms” (clyde river, at para. 24), it is to the courtroom that my colleague’s unresolved speculation would direct them. the burden of achiev- ing reconciliation is thereby placed upon the one group of canadians whose assertion of sovereignty is not what demands reconciliation with anyone or anything. [142] cela m’amène à formuler une objection supplémentaire. en soulevant (puis en laissant en suspens) cet argument chimérique quant à l’honneur de la couronne — que ni l’appelant ni aucun des intervenants n’ont même songé à soulever —, ma collègue la juge karakatsanis jetterait le droit dans une incertitude considérable. il vaut la peine de se de- mander qui souffrirait du poids de cette incertitude. à cet égard, il est ironique que ma collègue insiste pour dire que l’honneur de la couronne favorise la pro- motion de la « réconciliation » qui, dit- elle, suppose de « favoris[er] la négociation et le règlement juste des revendications autochtones comme solution de rechange aux recours judiciaires et aux résultats im- posés par les tribunaux » : par. 22 (italiques ajoutés). les motifs de ma collègue auraient pourtant l’effet opposé. elle invite les titulaires des droits protégés par l’art. 35 — soit les peuples autochtones eux- mêmes — à consacrer des années et des ressources considérables à des litiges sur la foi d’une faible pos- sibilité qu’ils aient identifié d’« autres formes de ré- paration » que la cour juge « convenir ». autrement dit, même si « [o]n ne parvient que rarement, voire jamais, à une véritable réconciliation dans une salle d’audience » (clyde river, par. 24), c’est vers les salles d’audience que la spéculation laissée en sus- pens par ma collègue les dirigerait. le fardeau de la réconciliation pèserait ainsi précisément sur le seul groupe de canadiens dont l’affirmation de souverai- neté n’est pas ce qui a besoin d’être réconcilié avec qui que ce soit ou quoi que ce soit. [143] as my colleague rowe j. explains (paras. 160- 65), the effects of the legal uncertainty generated by karakatsanis j.’s reasons would also be felt by legislators, who are, in essence, being told that they cannot enact legislation that “affects” (but does not infringe) certain rights that might exist — and that, if they do, they may be subject to as- yet unrecognized “recourse”. this would leave legislators in the dark, possibly for many years, about the efficacy of supply bills (and, therefore, of government budgets), and of legislation relating to matters as diverse as the deliv- ery of health care and education, environmental pro- tection, transportation infrastructure, agriculture and industrial activity, even where — it bears emphasizing — such legislation is validly enacted and fully com- pliant with aboriginal and treaty rights guaranteed by [143] comme l’explique mon collègue, le juge rowe (par. 160- 165), les effets de l’incertitude juri- dique que créeraient les motifs de la juge karakatsanis seraient également ressentis par les législateurs à qui l’on dit, essentiellement, qu’ils ne peuvent pas adopter des lois qui « ont un effet préjudiciable » sur certains droits qui pourraient exister (mais sans y porter atteinte) — et que, s’ils le font, ils pourraient être sujets à un «  recours  » qui n’est pas encore reconnu. les législateurs seraient donc dans le noir, possiblement durant de nombreuses années, quant à l’efficacité des projets de loi de crédit (et donc des budgets du gouvernement), et de la législation rela- tive à des questions aussi diverses que l’offre de soins de santé et d’éducation, la protection de l’environ- nement, l’infrastructure du transport, l’agriculture et 842 mikisew cree first nation v canada brown j. [2018] 2 scr. s 35. it would also generate intolerable uncertainty for governments charged with implementing such legislation, and for all those who pursue economic or other activities in reliance upon the efficacy of validly enacted and constitutionally compliant laws. l’activité industrielle, même si — cela mérite d’être souligné — cette législation est validement adoptée et totalement conforme aux droits ancestraux et is- sus de traités protégés par l’art 35. cette situation créerait en outre une incertitude intolérable pour les gouvernements responsables de mettre en œuvre une telle législation, et pour tous ceux qui exercent des activités économiques ou autres en se fiant sur l’ef- ficacité de lois valablement adoptées et conformes à la constitution. iii conclusion iii conclusion [144] an apex court should not strive to sow uncer- tainty, but rather to resolve it by, wherever possible (as here), stating clear legal rules. to be clear, then: judicial review of the legislative process, including post- facto review of the process of legislative enact- ment, for adherence to s. 35 and for consistency with the honour of the crown, is unconstitutional. [145] that this is so should not, however, be seen to diminish the value and wisdom of consulting in- digenous peoples prior to enacting legislation that has the potential to adversely impact the exercise of aboriginal or treaty rights. consultation during the legislative process, including the formulation of policy, is an important consideration in the jus- tification analysis under s. 35 (sparrow, at p. 1119; tsilhqot’in, at paras 77-78). but the absence or in- adequacy of consultation may be considered only once the legislation at issue has been enacted, and then, only in respect of a challenge under s. 35 to the substance or the effects of such enacted legislation (as opposed to a challenge to the legislative process leading to and including its enactment). [144] une cour de justice qui se trouve au som- met de l’appareil judiciaire ne devrait pas chercher à semer l’incertitude, mais plutôt à la dissiper en énonçant chaque fois que cela est possible, comme c’est le cas en l’espèce, des règles de droit claires. pour bien me faire comprendre, je le répète : pro- céder au contrôle judiciaire du processus législatif, en contrôlant notamment, après le fait, le processus d’adoption des lois pour vérifier la conformité à l’art. 35 et à l’honneur de la couronne, est incons- titutionnel. [145] le fait qu’il en soit ainsi ne diminue pas la valeur et la sagesse inhérentes à la consultation des peuples autochtones avant l’adoption de lois suscep- tibles d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur l’exercice de droits ancestraux ou issus de traités. la consultation durant le processus législatif, y compris à l’étape de l’élaboration de la politique, est une considéra- tion importante dans l’analyse de la justification au regard de l’art. 35 : sparrow, p. 1119; tsilhqot’in, par 77-78. cela dit, l’absence de consultation ou les lacunes de ce processus ne peuvent être exami- nées qu’une fois la loi adoptée, et encore, unique- ment dans le contexte d’une contestation, fondée sur l’art. 35, de la teneur de la loi ainsi adoptée ou de ses effets (par opposition à une contestation du processus législatif jusqu’à l’édiction inclusivement de la loi en question). [146] i would therefore dismiss the appeal. [146] je rejetterais donc le pourvoi. [147] canada does not seek costs. the federal court of appeal awarded canada its costs when it struck the federal court’s declaration. as canada [147] le canada ne sollicite aucuns dépens. la cour d’appel fédérale a adjugé les dépens au canada quand elle a annulé le jugement déclaratoire de la [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge rowe 843 did not ask us to upset that order, i would not do so. i would make no order as to costs in this court. cour fédérale. comme le canada ne nous a pas de- mandé de modifier cette ordonnance, je m’abstien- drais de le faire. je ne rendrais aucune ordonnance au sujet des dépens devant la cour. the reasons of moldaver, côté and rowe jj. were version française des motifs des juges moldaver, delivered by côté et rowe rendus par [148] rowe j. — i concur with the reasons of jus- tice brown. in particular, i would adopt his analysis with respect to the lack of jurisdiction of the federal court to conduct the review under the federal courts act, rsc 1985, c. f-7; the distinction between the crown and the legislature; the preparation of legislation as a legislative function; the separation of powers, notably between the legislature and the judiciary; and the critical importance of maintaining parliamentary privilege. [148] le juge rowe — je souscris aux motifs du juge brown. en particulier, je fais mienne son ana- lyse relative à l’absence de compétence de la cour fédérale pour procéder au contrôle prévu par la loi sur les cours fédérales, lrc 1985, c. f-7, à la dis- tinction entre la couronne et le pouvoir législatif, à la préparation des lois en tant que fonction législative, à la séparation des pouvoirs — notamment entre le législatif et le judiciaire —, et à l’importance cruciale de maintenir le privilège parlementaire. [149] to this i would add three main points. first, contrary to submissions made by the appellant mikisew cree first nation, the fact that the duty to consult has not been recognized as a procedural re- quirement in the legislative process does not leave aboriginal claimants without effective means to have their rights, which are protected under s. 35 of the constitution act, 1982, vindicated by the courts. sec- ond, recognizing a constitutionally mandated duty to consult with indigenous peoples during the process of preparing legislation (and other matters to go be- fore the legislature for consideration, notably budg- ets) would be highly disruptive to the carrying out of that work. finally, an additional and serious con- sequence to the appellant’s suggested course of ac- tion would be the interventionist role that the courts would be called upon to play in order to supervise interactions between indigenous parties and those preparing legislation (and other measures) for con- sideration by parliament and by provincial legisla- tures. [149] j’ajouterais à cela trois principaux éléments. en premier lieu, contrairement aux prétentions de l’appelante la mikisew cree first nation, le fait que l’obligation de consulter n’a pas été reconnue comme exigence procédurale dans le cadre du processus législatif ne prive pas les demandeurs autochtones de tout moyen efficace de faire reconnaître par les tribunaux les atteintes à leurs droits protégés par l’art. 35 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982. en se- cond lieu, si l’on reconnaissait l’existence d’une obligation constitutionnelle de consulter les peuples autochtones durant le processus de l’élaboration des projets de loi (et à propos d’autres questions devant être soumises pour examen aux assemblées législa- tives, notamment les budgets), cela perturberait gran- dement l’exécution de ce travail. en troisième lieu, la démarche préconisée par l’appelante aurait une autre conséquence sérieuse : les tribunaux seraient appelés à intervenir pour superviser les interactions entre les parties autochtones et les responsables de l’élaboration des projets de loi (et d’autres mesures) soumis à l’examen du parlement et des législatures provinciales. i effective means exist to vindicate and protect i. rights under section 35 il existe des moyens efficaces de défendre et de protéger les droits garantis par l’art. 35 [150] counsel for the mikisew claims that in the absence of the extension of the duty to consult into [150] l’avocat des mikisew prétend que, si l’obli- gation de consulter n’était pas étendue au processus 844 mikisew cree first nation v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. the law- making process, their right to be meaning- fully consulted by the crown would be rendered unenforceable. this assertion hinges on an under- standing of “crown conduct” to include law- making functions; an understanding that my colleague jus- tice brown has properly rejected. this does not mean that the mikisew are without avenue to pursue their treaty rights in the face of impugned legislation. législatif, il serait impossible de faire respecter leur droit d’être consultés utilement par la couronne. cette affirmation repose sur l’idée qu’une « conduite de la couronne » englobe les fonctions législatives, une idée que mon collègue le juge brown a rejetée à juste titre. cela ne veut pas dire que les mikisew ne disposent d’aucun recours pour exercer leurs droits issus de traités et contester les projets de loi en cause. [151] as i shall explain more fully below, the means to challenge an alleged infringement of the mikisew’s treaty rights are well established in r v. sparrow, [1990] 1 scr 1075, and subsequent cases (see eg. tsilhqot’in nation v. british columbia, 2014 scc 44, [2014] 2 scr 257; lax kw’alaams indian band v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 56, [2011] 3 scr 535; paul v. british columbia (forest appeals commission), 2003 scc 55, [2003] 2 scr. 585; mitchell v. mnr, 2001 scc 33, [2001] 1 scr 911; r v. marshall, [1999] 3 scr 456; delgamuukw v. british columbia, [1997] 3 scr. 1010). as well, the mikisew can allege a failure by the crown to fulfill its duty to consult when con- templating government action, as required by haida nation v. british columbia (minister of forests), 2004 scc 73, [2004] 3 scr 511, and subsequent cases (see eg. ktunaxa nation v. british columbia (forests, lands and natural resource operations), 2017 scc 54, [2017] 2 scr 386; behn v. moulton contracting ltd., 2013 scc 26, [2013] 2 scr 227; beckman v. little salmon/carmacks first nation, 2010 scc 53, [2010] 3 scr 103; rio tinto alcan inc. v. carrier sekani tribal council, 2010 scc 43, [2010] 2 scr 650). [151] comme je l’expliquerai davantage plus loin, les moyens de contester l’atteinte aux droits issus de traités des mikisew sont bien établis dans r c. sparrow, [1990] 1 rcs 1075, et dans les ar- rêts subséquents : voir, p ex, . nation tsilhqot’in c. colombie- britannique, 2014 csc 44, [2014] 2 rcs 257; bande indienne des lax kw’alaams c. canada (procureur général), 2011 csc 56, [2011] 3 rcs 535; paul c. colombie- britannique (for- est appeals commission), 2003 csc 55, [2003] 2 rcs 585; mitchell c. mrn, 2001 csc 33, [2001] 1 rcs 911; r c. marshall, [1999] 3 rcs 456; delgamuukw c colombie- britannique, [1997] 3 rcs 1010. les mikisew peuvent aussi reprocher à la couronne d’avoir manqué à son obligation de consulter au moment d’envisager la prise d’une me- sure gouvernementale, comme l’exigent l’arrêt na- tion haïda c. colombie- britannique (ministre des forêts), 2004 csc 73, [2004] 3 rcs 511, et la ju- risprudence subséquente : voir, p ex,. ktunaxa na- tion c. colombie- britannique (forests, lands and natural resource operations), 2017 csc 54, [2017] 2 rcs 386; behn c. moulton contracting ltd., 2013 csc 26, [2013] 2 rcs 227; beckman c. première nation de little salmon/carmacks, 2010 csc 53, [2010] 3 rcs 103; rio tinto alcan inc. c. conseil tribal carrier sekani, 2010 csc 43, [2010] 2 rcs 650. [152] the appellant asks this court to recognize that the duty to consult is triggered by the preparation of legislation, in other words, at the policy devel- opment stage of law making. on a practical level, this can be seen as moving the procedural duty first recognized in haida nation from executive decision making, either through the operation of legislation, or otherwise (rio tinto, at para. 43), all the way to the initial stages of the legislative process. as the law stands, the avenue by which aggrieved aboriginal [152] l’appelante demande à la cour de recon- naître que l’obligation de consulter est déclenchée par l’élaboration d’un projet de loi, autrement dit, à l’étape de la réflexion sur les orientations du proces- sus législatif. sur le plan pratique, on peut voir cette proposition comme un déplacement de l’obligation procédurale, reconnue la première fois dans nation haïda, de la décision de l’exécutif — que ce soit par l’application d’un projet de loi ou par un autre moyen (rio tinto, par. 43) — aux toutes premières étapes [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge rowe 845 rights holders can challenge the constitutionality of legislation under s. 35 is through the infringement/ justification framework laid out by this court in sparrow, as affirmed recently in tsilhqot’in (see paras 118-25). the mikisew’s proposal would short- circuit this process by mandating that consultation occur before any ink is spilled in the drafting of a bill. all legislation that could potentially have an adverse effect on an aboriginal right or claim would be presumptively unconstitutional unless adequate consultation had occurred. practically, this would transform pre- legislative consultation from a factor in the sparrow framework (as described below), to a constitutional requirement. such consultation would be not only with proven rights holders, but with any- one with an unproven aboriginal interest that might be adversely impacted by contemplated legislation. [153] it is not warranted to extend the law in this way. section 35 rights are not absolute. like other provisions of the constitution act, 1982, s. 35 is both supported and confined by broader constitutional principles. the honour of the crown arises from the fiduciary duty that canada owes to indigenous peoples following the assertion of sovereignty; it is an overarching guide to canada’s dealings with indigenous peoples: taku river tlingit first na- tion v. british columbia (project assessment direc- tor), 2004 scc 74, [2004] 3 scr 550, at para. 24, quoted with approval in manitoba metis federation inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2013 scc 14, [2013] 1 scr 623, at para 66. the current juris- prudence provides for protection and vindication of aboriginal rights and for upholding the constitu- tional principles of parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers. it is important to continue to do both. this can be done while upholding the honour of the crown. du processus législatif. dans l’état actuel du droit, c’est grâce au cadre d’analyse relatif à l’atteinte et à la justification exposé par la cour dans sparrow et confirmé récemment dans tsilhqot’in (voir les par. 118- 125), que les titulaires lésés de droits an- cestraux peuvent contester la constitutionnalité d’une loi sur le fondement de l’art 35. la proposition des mikisew court- circuiterait ce processus en exigeant qu’il y ait consultation avant même le début de la rédaction d’un projet de loi. toute mesure législa- tive susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur un droit ancestral ou une revendication autochtone serait présumée inconstitutionnelle à moins qu’il y ait eu une consultation adéquate. en pratique, cela trans- formerait la consultation prélégislative, un facteur du cadre énoncé dans sparrow (décrit ci- après), en une exigence constitutionnelle. pareille consultation se tiendrait non seulement auprès des titulaires de droits établis, mais également auprès de quiconque a un droit ancestral non établi qui pourrait être compromis par la mesure législative envisagée. [153] rien ne justifie d’étendre la règle de droit de cette façon. les droits prévus à l’art. 35 ne sont pas absolus. à l’instar d’autres dispositions de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982, l’art. 35 s’appuie sur des principes constitutionnels plus larges, tout en étant restreint par ceux-ci. l’honneur de la couronne découle de l’obligation fiduciaire qui incombe au canada envers les peuples autochtones depuis l’af- firmation de sa souveraineté; il s’agit d’un principe directeur des relations du canada avec les peuples autochtones : première nation tlingit de taku river c. colombie- britannique (directeur d’évaluation de projet), 2004 csc 74, [2004] 3 rcs 550, par. 24, cité avec approbation dans manitoba métis federa- tion inc. c. canada (procureur général), 2013 csc 14, [2013] 1 rcs 623, par 66. la jurisprudence actuelle prévoit la protection et la défense des droits ancestraux ainsi que le respect des principes consti- tutionnels de la souveraineté parlementaire et de la séparation des pouvoirs. il importe de poursuivre ces deux objectifs, ce qui peut se faire tout en préservant l’honneur de la couronne. [154] legislation said to infringe an aboriginal or treaty right can be challenged under the infringement/ justification framework in sparrow. to establish a [154] il est possible de contester une loi qui porte- rait atteinte à un droit ancestral ou issu de traités en recourant au cadre d’analyse relatif à l’atteinte et à la 846 mikisew cree first nation v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. s. 35 violation, a party must first demonstrate that it holds an aboriginal right that remains unextin- guished as of the enactment of the constitution act, 1982 (r v. van der peet, [1996] 2 scr 507;. r. v. sappier, 2006 scc 54, [2006] 2 scr 686), or a treaty right (r v. badger, [1996] 1 scr 771;. delgamuukw). next, the party must establish that there has been a prima facie infringement of that right by way of an unreasonable limitation, undue hardship, or the denial of the preferred means of exercising the right: (sparrow, at pp 1112-13). once a prima facie infringement has been established, the burden shifts to the crown to show that the inter- ference was based on a valid legislative objective and that the interference was consistent with the crown’s honour and fiduciary duty to indigenous peoples. along with other factors, including compen- sation and minimizing the infringement, any prior consultation is considered in determining whether the infringement was justified. it is settled jurispru- dence that where a right is infringed and where that infringement has not been justified (to the requisite legal standard), then the courts will grant a sub- stantive remedy to prevent the infringement or (if that is not possible) to mitigate its consequences for those whose s. 35 rights were infringed. in the case of infringing legislation, provisions found not to be justified will be a nullity and will not authorize any regulatory action (p. w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. (loose- leaf)), at p 28-62). justification formulé dans sparrow. pour établir une violation de l’art. 35, une partie doit d’abord démon- trer qu’elle détient un droit ancestral qui n’était pas éteint lors de l’adoption de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 (r c. van der peet, [1996] 2 rcs 507;. r c. sappier, 2006 csc 54, [2006] 2 rcs 686), ou un droit issu de traités (r c. badger, [1996] 1 rcs 771;. delgamuukw). ensuite, la partie doit établir qu’il y a eu atteinte prima facie à ce droit du fait d’une restriction déraisonnable, d’une contrainte excessive ou de la privation du moyen préféré d’exer- cer le droit : sparrow, p. 1112- 1113. une fois l’at- teinte prima facie établie, il incombe à la couronne de démontrer que l’atteinte en cause repose sur un objectif législatif régulier et qu’elle est conforme au principe de l’honneur de la couronne et à l’obliga- tion fiduciaire de celle-ci envers les peuples autoch- tones. au même titre que d’autres facteurs, y compris l’indemnisation et le fait de minimiser l’atteinte, toute consultation préalable est prise en compte pour décider si l’atteinte était justifiée. il est bien établi par la jurisprudence que, s’il y a atteinte à un droit et si celle-ci n’a pas été justifiée (en fonction de la norme juridique applicable), les tribunaux accordent une réparation substantielle afin de la prévenir ou (si cela est impossible) afin d’atténuer les conséquences pour ceux et celles qui sont victimes d’une violation de leurs droits protégés par l’art 35. dans le cas d’une disposition législative qui porte atteinte aux droits protégés, cette disposition sera nulle et n’autorisera aucune prise de règlement si le tribunal conclut que l’atteinte est injustifiée : p w hogg,. constitutional law of canada (5e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), p 28-62. [155] the significance of prior consultation in the infringement/justification analysis is a strong incen- tive for law makers to seek input from indigenous communities whose interests may be affected by nascent legislation. this is exemplified by provinces which have recognized the importance of consulting indigenous peoples prior to enacting legislation that has the potential to adversely impact the exercise of treaty or aboriginal rights in the province (see eg. saskatchewan, “first nation and métis consultation policy framework” (june 2010) (online), at p. 5; manitoba, “interim provincial policy for crown consultations with first nations, métis commu- nities and other aboriginal communities” (may 4, [155] l’importance que revêt une consultation pré- alable dans l’analyse relative à l’atteinte et à la justi- fication incite fortement les législateurs à demander l’avis des communautés autochtones dont les intérêts peuvent être touchés par une loi en devenir. à titre d’exemple, des provinces ont reconnu l’importance de consulter les peuples autochtones avant d’adopter une loi susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur l’exercice de droits ancestraux ou issus de traités dans la province : voir, p ex,. sas katchewan, « first nation and métis consultation policy framework » (juin 2010) (en ligne), p. 5; manitoba, « interim provincial policy for crown consultations with first nations, métis communities and other aboriginal [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge rowe 847 2009) (online), at p.  1; quebec, interministerial support group on aboriginal consultation, interim guide for consulting the aboriginal communities (2008), at p 4). however, good public policy does not necessarily equate to a constitutional right. it is for each jurisdiction, federal, provincial and territo- rial, to decide on the modalities for consultation in the context of sparrow. [156] i turn now to the duty to consult recognized in haida nation. the duty to consult arises when three conditions are met. first, the crown must have knowledge, actual or constructive, of a potential aboriginal right or claim. second, there must be crown conduct or a decision that is contemplated. finally, the conduct must have the potential to ad- versely affect an aboriginal right or claim. on the part of the crown, the duty to consult serves two distinct objectives: first is a fact- finding function, as through consultation the crown learns about the content of the interest or right, and how the pro- posed crown conduct would impact that interest or right. the second objective is practical; the crown must consider whether and how the aboriginal in- terests should be accommodated. the crown must approach the process with a view to reconciling in- terests. where it is shown that the duty to consult has not been fulfilled, the decision in question will be quashed and, in effect, the decision maker will be told to “go back and do it again”, this time with adequate consultation. where consultation has been adequate, but the duty to accommodate has not been fulfilled, various remedies can arise, both procedural and substantive. communities » (4 mai 2009) (en ligne), p. 1; québec, groupe interministériel de soutien sur la consultation des autochtones, guide intérimaire en matière de consultation des communautés autochtones (2008), p 4. cela dit, une bonne politique publique n’équi- vaut pas nécessairement à un droit constitutionnel. il appartient à chaque gouvernement — fédéral, pro- vincial ou territorial — de décider des modalités de la consultation à la lumière de l’arrêt sparrow. [156] je passe maintenant à l’obligation de con- sulter reconnue dans nation haïda elle prend naissance lorsque trois conditions sont réunies. pre mièrement, la couronne doit avoir connais- sance, concrètement ou par imputation, de l’exis- tence potentielle du droit ancestral revendiqué. deuxièmement, la couronne doit envisager une mesure ou une décision. troisiè mement, la mesure doit être susceptible d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur le droit ancestral revendiqué en question. du point de vue de la couronne, l’obligation de consul- ter sert deux objectifs distincts : elle a d’abord pour fonction d’établir les faits, car, grâce à la consul- tation, la couronne se renseigne sur la teneur de l’intérêt ou du droit en cause de même que sur l’incidence qu’aurait la mesure qu’elle envisage sur cet intérêt ou sur ce droit. le second objectif est d’ordre pratique : la couronne doit s’interroger sur l’opportunité d’accommoder les intérêts des autochtones et sur la façon de s’y prendre. elle doit aborder le processus en cherchant à concilier les intérêts. si l’on démontre qu’il y a eu manquement à l’obligation de consulter, la décision en question sera annulée et, dans les faits, on dira au décideur de « refaire ses devoirs », cette fois en procédant à une consultation adéquate. si la consultation s’est révélée adéquate, mais qu’il y a manquement à l’obligation d’accommoder, plusieurs réparations tant procédurales que substantielles peuvent être accordées. [157] this court stated in rio tinto that any poten- tial for adverse impact as a result of crown conduct will trigger the duty to consult and accommodate. the court further stated that the duty may arise with respect to “high- level managerial or policy deci- sions” (para 87). the policy decisions at issue in rio tinto were made by the executive in regards [157] la cour a affirmé dans rio tinto que toute possibilité qu’une mesure de la couronne ait un ef- fet préjudiciable donne naissance à l’obligation de consulter et d’accommoder. toujours selon la cour, cette obligation peut prendre naissance à l’égard de « décisions de gestion ou politiques qui sont prises en haut lieu » (par 87). les décisions politiques en 848 mikisew cree first nation v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. to a particular development project; in that case, the impugned decision concerned the sale of power produced from a hydroelectric dam on the nechako river. the court’s statement needs to be understood in the context in which it was made; it does not sup- port the proposition that a duty to consult is consti- tutionally mandated in the law- making process. this is reinforced by the requirement that the impugned decision would result in potential adverse impacts. this court held that there must be a “causal rela- tionship between the proposed government conduct or decision and a potential for adverse impacts on pending aboriginal claims or rights” (para. 45 (em- phasis added)). counsel for the mikisew rely heavily on the reasons given by this court in rio tinto. but rio tinto does not support the conclusion that the duty to consult must apply to the legislative process. in fact, this court explicitly left open the question of whether “government conduct” attracting the duty to consult includes the legislative process (para 44). [158] while bills c-38 (enacted as jobs, growth and long term prosperity act, sc 2012, c. 19) and c-45 (enacted as jobs and growth act, 2012, sc 2012, c. 31) modified the regulatory framework for certain waterways, the use of those waters was not thereby returned to a situation of laissez- faire. environmental regulation, provincial and territorial as well as federal, continues to apply. the appellants submit that the reduction in federal environmental oversight “profoundly affects” treaty rights by re- moving an environmental assessment process that would trigger the duty to consult (af, at para 13). however, this is not the type of adverse effect that was contemplated in haida nation and subsequent jurisprudence. what is protected by s. 35 is the abo- riginal or treaty right itself. a specific set of arrange- ments for environmental regulation is not equivalent to a s. 35 right, and in particular is not equivalent to the treaty right relied on by the mikisew in this case. as this court stated in rio tinto: “the defini- tion of what constitutes an adverse effect [does not] extend to adverse impacts on the negotiating posi- tion of an aboriginal group” (para 50). the adverse cause dans rio tinto ont été prises par l’exécutif au sujet d’un projet de développement en particulier. dans cette affaire, la décision attaquée portait sur la vente de l’électricité produite à partir d’un bar- rage hydroélectrique situé sur la rivière nechako. il est nécessaire de replacer l’affirmation de la cour dans le contexte où elle a été faite, ce qui permet de conclure qu’elle n’étaye pas la proposition selon la- quelle la constitution impose l’obligation de consul- ter durant le processus législatif. cette conclusion est renforcée par l’exigence que la décision attaquée soit susceptible d’avoir des effets préjudiciables. la cour a jugé qu’il doit y avoir un « lien de causalité entre la mesure ou la décision envisagée par le gouvernement et un effet préjudiciable éventuel sur une revendi- cation autochtone ou un droit ancestral » : par. 45 (italiques ajoutés). l’avocat des mikisew s’appuie en grande partie sur les motifs donnés par la cour dans rio tinto. or, cet arrêt n’étaye pas la conclusion que l’obligation de consulter doit s’appliquer au proces- sus législatif. en fait, la cour a explicitement laissé en suspens la question de savoir si une « mesure gou- vernementale » emportant l’obligation de consulter inclut le processus législatif : par 44. [158] bien que les projets de loi c-38 (adopté en tant que loi sur l’emploi, la croissance et la pros- périté durable, lc 2012, c. 19) et c-45 (adopté en tant que loi de 2012 sur l’emploi et la croissance, lc 2012, c. 31) aient modifié le cadre réglementaire applicable à certains cours d’eau, l’usage de ceux-ci n’est pas revenu de ce fait à un état de laissez- faire. la réglementation provinciale, territoriale et fédérale en matière d’environnement continue de s’appliquer. les appelants soutiennent que la réduction de la surveil- lance environnementale par le gouvernement fédéral [traduction] « nuit profondément » aux droits issus de traités en supprimant un processus d’évaluation en- vironnementale qui donnerait naissance à l’obligation de consulter : ma, par 13. cependant, il ne s’agit pas du type d’effet préjudiciable envisagé dans nation haïda et la jurisprudence subséquente. ce que protège l’art. 35, c’est le droit ancestral ou issu de traités lui- même. un ensemble précis de dispositions en vue de la réglementation environnementale n’est pas équivalent à un droit protégé par l’art. 35, et tout particulièrement n’est pas équivalent au droit issu d’un traité sur lequel se fondent les mikisew en l’espèce. comme la cour [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge rowe 849 impact must be to the future exercise of the right itself (para 46). [159] in summary, when legislation has been adopted, those who assert that the effect of the leg- islation is to infringe s. 35 rights have their remedies under sparrow. those who assert that government decisions made pursuant to the legislation’s author- ity will adversely affect their claims will have their remedies under haida nation. other crown conduct beyond decisions made pursuant to statutory author- ity may also attract the duty to consult (rio tinto, at para 43). where new situations arise that require the adaptation or extension of this jurisprudence, the courts provide a means for such development of the law. but, no such requirement has been shown on the facts of this case. l’a mentionné dans rio tinto, « [l]’effet préjudiciable ne s’entend pas [  ] d’une répercussion négative sur la position de négociation d’un groupe autochtone » : par 50. le préjudice doit toucher l’exercice futur du droit lui- même : par 46. [159] en résumé, quand une loi est adoptée, les parties qui soutiennent qu’elle a pour effet de porter atteinte aux droits protégés par l’art. 35 disposent de recours fondés sur l’arrêt sparrow. celles qui pré- tendent qu’une décision prise par le gouvernement en vertu du pouvoir que lui confère cette loi nuira à un droit qu’elles revendiquent disposeront de recours fondés sur nation haïda. d’autres mesures gouver- nementales, outre les décisions prises en vertu d’un pouvoir conféré par la loi, peuvent aussi donner nais- sance à l’obligation de consulter : rio tinto, par 43. lorsque surviennent de nouvelles situations où il faut adapter ou étendre la jurisprudence précitée, les tribunaux constituent un moyen de faire ainsi évoluer le droit. le besoin de le faire n’a toutefois pas été démontré au vu des faits de l’espèce. ii consequences for the separation of powers ii conséquences pour la séparation des pouvoirs in order to understand the consequences of [160] imposing a duty to consult on the process of pre- paring legislation for consideration by parliament and by provincial legislatures, one needs to begin by understanding the many steps involved in this process. (i make no comment on territorial legisla- tures, as they operate with notable differences from parliament and provincial legislatures.) counsel for the mikisew was of considerable assistance in this regard by placing before the court and referring in his submissions to a document prepared by the privy council office identifying the many steps involved (canada, privy council, guide to making federal acts and regulations (2nd ed. 2001), at p 59). with slight paraphrasing, these steps are as follows: [160] pour saisir les conséquences de l’imposition de l’obligation de consulter lors de l’élaboration des projets de loi qui seront soumis à l’examen du parlement ou des législatures provinciales, il faut tout d’abord comprendre les nombreuses étapes de ce processus. (je ne me prononce pas sur les législa- tures territoriales en raison des différences notables qui existent entre leur fonctionnement et celui du parlement ainsi que des législatures provinciales.) l’avocat des mikisew a été d’un grand secours à cet égard en portant à la connaissance de la cour — et en mentionnant lors de sa plaidoirie — un document dans lequel le bureau du conseil privé énumère les nombreuses étapes à suivre : canada, conseil privé, lois et règlements : l’essentiel (2e éd 2001), p 61. en paraphrasant légèrement ce document, les étapes en question sont les suivantes : preparation préparation 1 the department prepares analyses and plans; ministerial approval is required to proceed with policy consultations. 1 le ministère prépare des analyses et des plans; il faut obtenir l’approbation ministérielle pour procéder à des consultations concernant les orientations. 850 mikisew cree first nation v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. 2 the prime minister reviews and approves machinery- related issues (where applicable). 2 le premier ministre examine et approuve les questions liées aux rouages (s’il y a lieu). 3 the sponsoring minister makes a decision on the policy options and recommendations to cabinet. 3 le ministre décide des solutions possibles et des recommandations à faire au cabinet. 4 the memorandum to cabinet is prepared. 4 le mémoire au cabinet est rédigé. 5 the memorandum to cabinet is subject to inter- 5 le mémoire au cabinet fait l’objet de consulta- departmental consultation. tions interministérielles. 6 the memorandum to cabinet is approved by the deputy minister and senior management. 6 le mémoire au cabinet est approuvé par le sous- ministre et la haute direction. 7 the memorandum to cabinet is approved by the sponsoring minister, and sent to the privy council office. 7 le mémoire au cabinet est approuvé par le mi- nistre parrain et envoyé au bureau du conseil privé. 8 the privy council office briefs the chair of the 8 le bureau du conseil privé renseigne le pré- cabinet committee. sident du comité du cabinet. 9 the cabinet committee considers the memo- randum to cabinet, and the privy council office issues a committee report. 9 le comité du cabinet examine le mémoire au cabinet et le bureau du conseil privé rend pu- blic un rapport de comité. 10 cabinet ratifies the committee report, and the privy council office issues a record of deci- sion. 10 le cabinet ratifie le rapport de comité et le bu- reau du conseil privé rend public un compte rendu de décision. 11 the department of justice prepares a draft bill with the assistance of the legislation section drafting team, the sponsoring department, and the departmental legal services unit. 11 le ministère de la justice prépare un avant- projet de loi avec l’aide de l’équipe de rédaction de la section de la législation, le ministère parrain et les services juridiques ministériels. 12 the bill is approved by appropriate senior offi- cials in the sponsoring department. 12 le projet de loi est approuvé par les hauts fonc- tionnaires compétents du ministère parrain. 13 the sponsoring minister reviews and signs off 13 le ministre parrain étudie et signe le projet de on the bill. loi. 14 the government house leader reviews the bill. 14 le leader du gouvernement à la chambre des communes étudie le projet de loi. 15 the government house leader seeks delegated authority from cabinet to approve the bill for introduction. 15 le leader du gouvernement à la chambre des communes demande au cabinet le pouvoir dé- légué d’approuver le dépôt du projet de loi. 16 the privy council office issues the bill. 16 le bureau du conseil privé rend le projet de loi public. the house of commons la chambre des communes 17 the government house leader gives notice of the bill’s introduction. 17 le leader du gouvernement à la chambre des communes donne un avis du dépôt du projet de loi. [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge rowe 851 18 the bill is introduced in the house of commons: 18 le projet de loi est déposé à la chambre des first reading. communes : première lecture. 19 the bill proceeds to second reading (approval in 19 le projet de loi passe à la deuxième lecture principle). (approbation des orientations). 20 the bill is considered in committee (clause by 20 le projet de loi est étudié en comité (étude ar- clause consideration). ticle par article). 21 the committee reports on the bill, including any recommended amendments. 22 the bill proceeds to third reading and final ap- proval by the house of commons. 21 le comité fait rapport sur le projet de loi et re- commande, le cas échéant, des amendements à celui-ci. 22 le projet de loi passe à la troisième lecture et à l’approbation finale de la chambre des commu- nes. the senate le sénat 23 the bill is introduced in the senate: first reading. 23 le projet de loi est déposé au sénat : première lecture. 24 the bill proceeds to second reading (approval in 24 le projet de loi passe à la deuxième lecture principle). (approbation des orientations). 25 the bill is considered in committee (clause by 25 le projet de loi est étudié en comité (étude ar- clause consideration). ticle par article). 26 the committee reports on the bill, including any recommended amendments. 26 le comité fait rapport sur le projet de loi et re- commande, le cas échéant, des amendements à celui-ci. 27 the bill proceeds to third reading and final 27 le projet de loi passe à la troisième lecture et à approval by which the senate. l’approbation finale du sénat. royal assent sanction royale 28 the bill receives royal assent from the governor 28 le projet de loi reçoit la sanction royale de la general. part du gouverneur général. 29 the legislation (now a statute) comes into effect upon royal assent or (if the statute so provides) at a later date. 29 le texte législatif (désormais une loi) entre en vigueur à la sanction royale ou (si la loi le pré- voit) à une date ultérieure. operation of the legislation application de la loi 30 regulations are made and decisions are taken pursuant to the authority conferred by the legis- lation. 30 des règlements et des décisions sont pris, en vertu du pouvoir conféré par la loi. [161] the situation is similar in the provinces, ex- cept for the fact that their legislatures are unicameral, ie, they have no upper house corresponding to the senate. the focus of the mikisew’s argument was on [161] le portrait est le même dans les provinces, mis à part le fait que leur législature est unicamérale; autrement dit, elles n’ont pas de chambre haute cor- respondant au sénat. l’argumentation des mikisew 852 mikisew cree first nation v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. the first 16 steps listed above, relating to preparation of legislation which they mischaracterize as crown conduct. justice brown has dealt with the confusion in the mikisew’s position in conflating the crown and the legislature. (for an example, see the use of the ambiguous term “legislative processes” in para. 50 and elsewhere in their factum.) if the dis- tinction between the crown and the legislature were cast aside, then the next logical step would be to say that the duty to consult extends to consideration by parliament (or provincial legislatures), as set out in steps 17 to 29 above. [162] from another perspective, why should the duty to consult relate only to legislation? why not budgetary measures (including the estimates)? these are prepared for parliament’s consideration and ar- guably they could infringe s. 35 rights or adversely affect claims to such rights. [163] if one breaches the separation of powers and treats the legislature as part of the crown, then all of this can follow. the consequences of the foregoing are profound and warrant careful reflection. and, i would repeat, the consequences would relate not only to the parliament of canada, but also to the legislatures of the provinces. portait principalement sur les 16 premières étapes énumérées précédemment, qui ont trait à l’élabora- tion des projets de loi, une tâche qu’ils qualifient à tort de conduite de la couronne. le juge brown a traité de la confusion dans la position des mikisew du fait qu’ils amalgament la couronne et le par- lement ou les législatures provinciales : voir, par exemple, l’utilisation du terme ambigu « legislative processes » ([traduction] « processus législatifs ») au par. 50 et à d’autres endroits dans leur mémoire. si la distinction entre la couronne et le parlement ou les législatures provinciales était écartée, la prochaine chose logique à faire serait de dire que l’obligation de consulter s’étend à l’étude du projet de loi par le parlement ou par les législatures provinciales, soit aux étapes 17 à 29 décrites précédemment. [162] d’un autre point de vue, pourquoi l’obli- gation de consulter devrait- elle viser uniquement les projets de loi? pourquoi ne viserait- elle pas les mesures budgétaires (dont le budget des dépenses)? ces mesures sont destinées à l’examen du parlement et l’on pourrait soutenir qu’elles sont susceptibles de porter atteinte aux droits protégés par l’art. 35 ou d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur la revendication de ces droits. [163] si quelqu’un transgresse le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs et considère le parlement ou les législatures provinciales comme faisant partie de la couronne, toutes les répercussions susmen- tionnées peuvent s’ensuivre. les conséquences de ce qui précède seraient profondes et méritent mûre réflexion. en outre, je le répète, les conséquences toucheraient non seulement le parlement canadien, mais aussi les législatures provinciales. [164] the first 16 steps involved in the preparation of legislation show that this is not a simple pro- cess. rather, it is a highly complex process involv- ing multiple actors across government. imposing a duty to consult at this stage could effectively grind the day-to- day internal operation of government to a halt. what is now complex and difficult could become drawn out and dysfunctional. inevitably, disputes would arise about the way that this obliga- tion would be fulfilled. this is why the separation of powers operates the way it does. the courts are [164] les 16 premières étapes de l’élaboration des projets de loi démontrent qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un processus simple. c’est plutôt un processus fort complexe qui mobilise de nombreux acteurs au sein du gouvernement. l’imposition de l’obligation de consulter à ce stade pourrait en fait paralyser le fonctionnement interne au quotidien du gouverne- ment. ce qui est aujourd’hui complexe et difficile risquerait de devenir interminable et dysfonctionnel. inévitablement, des différends se soulèveraient quant à la façon de s’acquitter de cette obligation. voilà [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge rowe 853 ill- equipped to deal with the procedural complexities of the legislative process. consider the following practical questions that would arise if this court were to recognize a duty to consult in the preparation of legislation. [165] four questions (each with several facets) arise directly from what the mikisew are seeking: (a) which types of legislation would trigger the duty to consult? would it be only legislation whose focus was the situation of indigenous peoples? arguably not; rather, it would extend to many laws of general application (as on the facts of this case). pourquoi le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs fonctionne comme il le fait. les tribunaux sont mal outillés pour traiter des considérations procédurales complexes associées au processus législatif. songez aux questions pratiques suivantes qui se poseraient si la cour devait reconnaître l’existence d’une obli- gation de consulter durant l’élaboration des projets de loi. [165] quatre questions (comportant toutes plu- sieurs facettes) découleraient directement de ce que réclament les mikisew : a) quels types de lois donneraient naissance à l’obligation de consulter? serait-ce seulement les lois dont le point de mire est la situation des peuples autochtones? on pourrait soutenir que non; cette obligation s’étendrait plutôt à de nombreuses lois d’application générale (comme en l’espèce). (b) in giving effect to the duty, which indigenous groups would need to be consulted? how would they be identified? in the case of legislation of general application might not the duty require consultation with all aboriginal groups within the jurisdiction? b) pour donner effet à l’obligation, quels groupes autochtones faudrait-il consulter? de quelle ma- nière seraient- ils identifiés? dans le cas d’une loi d’application générale, l’obligation requerrait- elle que l’on consulte tous les groupes autoch- tones se trouvant dans le ressort en cause? (c) at what stage (in the 16 step process) is con- sultation to take place? might the duty require consultation to take place at more than one stage, as one moves from formulating policy options, to deciding on a recommended approach, to con- sideration and approval (possibly with changes) by cabinet committee and then full cabinet, to the drafting of the bill and its approval for introduction? (d) what would be needed to fulfill the duty to con- sult in various circumstances? how would this be decided and by whom? c) à quel stade (du processus en 16 étapes) la con sultation devrait- elle avoir lieu? se pour- rait-il que l’obligation exige de consulter à plus d’une étape, quand on passe de la formulation des orientations possibles au choix d’une dé- marche recommandée, à l’étude et à l’appro- bation (peut- être avec des changements) d’un comité du ca binet, puis de tout le cabinet, à la rédaction du projet de loi et à l’approbation de son dépôt? d) que faudrait-il faire pour s’acquitter de l’obli- gation de consulter dans différentes situations? de quelle manière conviendrait-il de trancher cette question et à qui reviendrait cette décision? (e) three further questions arise from the logical extension of the framework that the mikisew are asking this court to adopt: e) trois autres questions découleraient de l’élaris- sement logique du cadre que les mikisew récla- ment à la cour : (f) if the preparation of legislation that might affect s. 35 rights triggers the duty to consult, then would not that duty also be triggered by the f) si l’élaboration d’un projet de loi susceptible de porter atteinte aux droits protégés par l’art. 35 donnait naissance à l’obligation de consulter, 854 mikisew cree first nation v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. preparation of other measures for parliament’s consideration, notably the budget, including the estimates? (g) and, if the duty to consult extended to consid- eration by parliament and provincial legisla- tures, then would not there also be significant and likely unforeseeable consequences for the operation of legislative assemblies, affecting their powers and privileges? (h) the relationship among the institutions of the executive and between them and parliament are complex. what would be the impact on the operation of cabinet, on the role of the prime minister or premier as the head of cabinet, and on the responsibility of the ministry to the legis- lature? would there not be significant and likely unforeseeable consequences for the conventions, practices and procedures by which cabinet op- erates and its relationship to the legislature? [166] the careful reader of the foregoing list of 30 steps will have noted a reference to “policy consul- tations” in step 1. as a matter of practice and in fur- therance of good public administration, consultation on policy options in the preparation of legislation is very often undertaken. but, it is not constitutionally required. cette obligation ne serait- elle pas aussi déclen- chée par la préparation d’autres mesures sou- mises à l’étude du parlement, notamment le budget, y compris le budget des dépenses? g) de plus, si l’obligation de consulter s’étendait à l’étude par le parlement et par les législatures provinciales, n’aurait- elle pas vraisemblable- ment d’importantes conséquences imprévisibles sur le fonctionnement des assemblées législa- tives qui nuiraient aux pouvoirs et aux privilèges de ces dernières? h) le rapport entre les institutions de l’exécutif et celui entre elles et le parlement sont complexes. quel serait l’impact sur le fonctionnement du cabinet, sur le rôle du premier ministre à titre de chef du cabinet ainsi que sur la responsabilité du ministère envers le parlement ou une législa- ture provinciale? n’y aurait-il pas d’importantes conséquences vraisemblablement imprévisibles pour les conventions, les pratiques et les procé- dures régissant le fonctionnement du cabinet et sa relation avec le parlement ou les législatures provinciales? [166] le lecteur attentif de la liste précédente com- portant 30 étapes aura constaté la mention des « con- sultations concernant les orientations » à l’étape 1. en pratique, et pour favoriser une bonne administra- tion publique, les consultations sur les orientations possibles durant l’élaboration des projets de loi sont monnaie courante. elles ne sont toutefois pas exi- gées par la constitution. [167] similarly, i would note again that under the jurisprudence, consultation is a factor in the justifica- tion of any s. 35 infringement under sparrow. thus, where an infringement of rights protected under s. 35 is possible by virtue of the adoption of legislation, there is strong incentive to consult. as mentioned above, it is fundamentally different to impose a con- stitutionally mandated duty to consult, the operation of that would inevitably be supervised by the courts. if parliament or a provincial legislature wishes to bind itself to a manner and form requirement in- corporating the duty to consult indigenous peoples before the passing of legislation, it is free to do so (hogg, at p 12-12). but the courts will not infringe [167] de même, je tiens à souligner de nouveau que, selon la jurisprudence, la consultation est un facteur de la justification de toute violation de l’art. 35 suivant le cadre d’analyse établi dans sparrow. ainsi, lorsque l’adoption d’une loi risque de porter atteinte aux droits protégés par l’art. 35, il y a une forte incitation à consulter. comme je l’ai mentionné précédemment, l’imposition d’une obligation de consulter prescrite par la constitution est fondamentalement différente et son application serait forcément contrôlée par les tribunaux. si le parlement ou une législature provinciale souhai- taient se lier par une exigence de moyen ou de forme qui comporterait l’obligation de consulter [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge rowe 855 on the discretion of legislatures by imposing addi- tional procedural requirements on legislative bodies (authorson v. canada (attorney general), 2003 scc 39, [2003] 2 scr 40). [168] finally, i note that legislation itself will not ordinarily give rise to an infringement of rights under s 35. when it does, an infringement claim may be brought under sparrow. rather, what is ordinarily the case is that it is crown conduct, whether through the exercise of authority conferred by legislation, or by its own authority, that gives rise to an infringement of rights or to adverse effects to a claimed right. in such instances, haida nation and the cases following it impose a duty to consult and, where necessary, to accommodate. with respect to the duty to consult, the crown’s actions are reviewable by the courts un- der the general principles of judicial review (haida nation). these principles do not allow for courts to review decisions of a legislative nature on grounds of procedural fairness (attorney general of canada v. inuit tapirisat of canada, [1980] 2 scr 735, at pp 758-59). as a general rule, no duty of procedural fairness is owed by the government in the exercise of any legislative function (reference re canada assistance plan (bc),  [1991] 2  scr  525, at p. 558; wells v. newfoundland, [1999] 3 scr 199, at para. 59; authorson, at para 41). les peuples autochtones avant l’adoption des lois, ils seraient libres de le faire : hogg, p 12-12. cela dit, les cours ne vont pas s’ingérer dans le pou- voir discrétionnaire des assemblées législatives en imposant des exigences procédurales supplémen- taires à des organismes législatifs : authorson c. canada (procureur général), 2003 csc 39, [2003] 2 rcs 40. [168] je précise enfin que la loi elle- même ne porte habituellement pas atteinte à des droits protégés par l’art 35. lorsque c’est le cas, il est possible d’inten- ter un recours pour atteinte en application de l’arrêt sparrow. en temps normal, c’est plutôt une conduite de la couronne, que ce soit par l’exercice d’un pou- voir que lui confère la loi ou en vertu de son propre pouvoir, qui porte atteinte à des droits ou qui a des effets préjudiciables sur un droit revendiqué. nation haïda et les arrêts qui l’ont suivi imposent alors une obligation de consulter et, s’il y a lieu, une obligation d’accommoder. quant à l’obligation de consulter, les mesures de la couronne sont susceptibles de contrôle judiciaire selon les principes généraux en la matière : nation haïda. ces principes ne permettent pas aux tribunaux de contrôler des décisions de na- ture législative pour des motifs d’équité procédurale : procureur général du canada c. inuit tapirisat du canada, [1980] 2 rcs 735, p. 758- 759. règle générale, le gouvernement n’a pas à faire preuve d’équité procédurale dans l’exercice de fonctions législatives : renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada (c-b), [1991] 2 rcs 525, p. 558; wells c. terre- neuve, [1999] 3 rcs 199, par. 59; authorson, par 41. iii the role of the court iii le rôle de la cour [169] as surely as night follows day, if such a duty were to be imposed, disagreements would arise as to the foregoing questions and many others. how would such disagreements be resolved? where a constitutionally mandated duty exists, affected par- ties would inevitably turn to the courts. thus, courts would be drawn into a supervisory role as to the operation of a duty to consult in the preparation of legislation (as well as, in all likelihood, other matters, notably budgets, requiring approval by the legislature). i agree with justice brown’s discussion [169] aussi certainement que la nuit succède au jour, si pareille obligation devait être imposée, il y aurait des mésententes sur les questions susmen- tionnées et sur bien d’autres. comment de telles mésententes seraient- elles réglées? en présence d’une obligation imposée par la constitution, les parties concernées s’adresseraient inévitablement aux tribunaux. ces derniers seraient par conséquent appelés à surveiller l’exécution d’une obligation de consulter durant l’élaboration des projets de loi (tout comme, selon toute vraisemblance, d’autres mesures, 856 mikisew cree first nation v canada rowe j. [2018] 2 scr. on the impact of imposing a duty to consult on the separation of powers. [170] i would add the following point. if the courts were to impose a duty to consult on the preparation of legislation, would not the next logical step be for the courts to impose a duty to consult on legislatures in their consideration of legislation? in such an even- tuality, one would have to situate “consultations” somewhere in the sequence of first reading, second reading, committee stage, report stage, third reading, royal assent. if a legislature chooses to participate in consultation with indigenous peoples pursuant to sparrow, at what stage that consultation takes place is a matter of discretion. yet the trial judge in this case suggested just such a remedy — that affected groups would be able to make submissions in parliament. the trial judge’s order stated that the duty arose “at the time that each of the [bills] was introduced into parliament” (2014 fc 1244, 470 ftr 243, at para 112). such a result offends the separation of powers and would necessarily engage the courts in regulating the exercise by parliament and legislatures of their powers and privileges. that would be a pro- found change in our system of government. notamment les budgets, qui nécessitent l’approba- tion du parlement ou d’une législature provinciale). je souscris à l’analyse du juge brown relative aux conséquences de l’imposition d’une obligation de consulter sur la séparation des pouvoirs. [170] j’ajouterais ce qui suit. si les tribunaux de- vaient imposer une obligation de consulter durant l’élaboration des projets de loi, la prochaine chose qu’ils devraient faire en toute logique ne serait- elle pas d’imposer aux assemblées législatives une obli- gation de consulter durant leur étude des projets de loi? en pareil cas, il faudrait situer les « consulta- tions » quelque part aux étapes de la première lecture, de la deuxième lecture, de l’étude en comité, du rap- port, de la troisième lecture et de la sanction royale. si le parlement ou une législature décidait de prendre part à une consultation avec des peuples autochtones conformément à l’arrêt sparrow, le stade auquel se tiendrait cette consultation relèverait de son pouvoir discrétionnaire. c’est pourtant la réparation que le juge du procès a suggérée en l’espèce : la possibilité pour les groupes touchés de présenter des obser- vations au parlement. le juge du procès a affirmé dans son ordonnance que l’obligation de consulter a pris naissance « à l’époque où chacun des projets de loi [  ] a été déposé au parlement » : 2014 cf 1244, par. 111 (canlii). ce résultat contrevient au principe de la séparation des pouvoirs et il amènerait nécessairement les tribunaux à encadrer l’exercice par le parlement et les législatures de leurs pouvoirs et privilèges. cela transformerait de fond en comble notre système de gouvernement. iv conclusion iv conclusion [171] this brings me full circle, back to whether there is a “gap” in the jurisprudence that needs to be filled. as i have set out above, no such gap exists. vindicating s. 35 rights does not require imposition of a duty to consult in the preparation of legislation. indeed, the imposition of such a duty would be con- trary to the distinction between the crown and the legislature. it would offend the separation of pow- ers. it would encroach on parliamentary privilege. it would involve the courts in supervising matters that they have always held back from doing. in short, imposing such a duty would not provide needed [171] me voilà revenu au point de départ, soit à la question de savoir s’il y a dans la jurisprudence une « lacune » qui doit être comblée. comme je l’ai expliqué précédemment, il n’existe aucune lacune de ce genre. la défense des droits protégés par l’art. 35 n’exige pas l’imposition d’une obligation de consul- ter durant l’élaboration des projets de loi. en fait, l’imposition d’une telle obligation irait à l’encontre de la distinction entre la couronne et les assemblées législatives. elle contreviendrait au principe de la séparation des pouvoirs. elle empiéterait sur le pri- vilège parlementaire. elle amènerait les tribunaux à [2018] 2 rcs. mikisew cree first nation c canada le juge rowe 857 protection for s. 35 rights. rather, it would offend foundational constitutional principles and create rather than resolve problems. superviser des questions qu’ils se sont toujours abste- nus de superviser. bref, l’imposition d’une telle obli- gation n’offrirait pas aux droits garantis par l’art. 35 la protection dont ils ont besoin. elle contreviendrait plutôt à des principes constitutionnels fondamentaux et poserait des problèmes plutôt que d’en résoudre. [172] for the above reasons, i would dismiss the appeal with no costs ordered. [172] pour les motifs qui précèdent, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi sans adjuger de dépens. appeal dismissed. pourvoi rejeté. procureurs de l’appelant : jfk law corporation, victoria and vancouver. victoria et vancouver. procureur des intimés : procureur général du of canada, ottawa. canada, ottawa. of quebec: attorney general of quebec, québec. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné- rale du québec : procureure générale du québec, québec. of new brunswick: attorney general of new bruns- wick, fredericton. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral du nouveau- brunswick : procureur général du nouveau- brunswick, fredericton. of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de la colombie- britannique : procureur général de la colombie- britannique, victoria. of saskatchewan: attorney general of saskatchewan, regina. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de la saskatchewan : procureur général de la saskatchewan, regina. of alberta: attorney general of alberta, edmonton. solicitors for the interveners the champagne and aishihik first nations, the kwanlin dün first nation, the little salmon carmacks first nation, the first nation of na- cho nyak dun, the teslin tlingit council, and the first nations of the maa- nulth treaty society: ratcliff & company, north vancouver. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’alberta : procureur général de l’alberta, edmonton. procureurs des intervenants champagne and aishihik first nations, kwanlin dün first nation, little salmon carmacks first nation, first nation of na- cho nyak dun, teslin tlingit council, first nations of the maa- nulth treaty society : ratcliff & company, north vancouver. 858 mikisew cree first nation v canada [2018] 2 scr. nations: assembly of first nations, ottawa. procureur de l’intervenante l’assemblée des pre- mières nations : assemblée des premières nations, ottawa. of the crees (eeyou istchee) and the cree nation government: gowling wlg (canada), mont réal. procureurs des intervenants le grand conseil des cris (eeyou istchee) et le gouvernement de la nation crie : gowling wlg (canada), mont réal. procureurs de l’intervenante la fédération mé- federation inc.: pape salter teillet, toronto. tisse du manitoba : pape salter teillet, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant advocates for the rule of law: mccarthy tétrault, toronto. rule of law : mccarthy tétrault, toronto. sovereign indigenous nations: federation of sov- ereign indigenous nations, saskatoon; westaway law group professional corporation, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenante federation of sov- ereign indigenous nations : federation of sover- eign indigenous nations, saskatoon; westaway law group professional corporation, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenant gitanyow hereditary itary chiefs: grant huberman, vancouver. chiefs : grant huberman, vancouver.
i. overview [1] some of the most pernicious crimes are the hardest to investigate. to draw those crimes into the open, the police, acting undercover, sometimes create occasions for people to commit the very crimes they seek to prevent done properly, such techniques may cast new light on covert offending, unveiling harms that would otherwise go unpunished but taken too far, they may tempt the vulnerable or the morally wavering into criminality, and virtue-test many others, threatening privacy and the public’s confidence in the justice system. they demand caution. [2] the stakes are highest on the internet while the medium has made activities more efficient, widespread, and harder to track, it has also allowed state surveillance to become, potentially, ever more expansive. the dilemmas this creates for balancing law enforcement with civil liberties, the rule of law, and the repute of the justice system are ongoing. this appeal, and its companion appeals, raise one of them. [3] between 2014 and 2017, “project raphael”, an online investigation of the york regional police (yrp), led to the arrests of 104 men for child luring and related offences. ads posted by the police on the escort subdirectory of backpage.com spurred text-message conversations, where an undercover officer, after agreeing to provide sexual services, revealed themselves to be a juvenile all those who took up the invitation to visit the designated hotel room were arrested among them was the appellant in this case, mr ramelson, as well as the three appellants in the related appeals (mr. jaffer (r v. jaffer, 2022 scc 45), mr. haniffa (r v. haniffa, 2022 scc 46), and mr. dare (r v. dare, 2022 scc 47)). they argue they were entrapped. [4] when the police lack reasonable suspicion that the individual is already engaged in criminal activity, the entrapment doctrine forbids them from offering opportunities to commit offences unless they do so in the course of a “bona fide inquiry”: that is, where they (1) reasonably suspect that crime is occurring in a sufficiently precise space; and (2) have a genuine purpose of investigating and repressing crime (r v ahmad, 2020 scc 11, at para 20) that test applies to investigations in physical and virtual spaces alike. but as this court noted in ahmad, “state surveillance over virtual spaces is of an entirely different qualitative order than surveillance over a public space” (para 37) there, the court considered those differences in the context of surveillance that transpired in the investigative “space” of a phone number. this appeal, and the three related appeals, require us to do the same in the context of the internet. [5] at its core, the entrapment doctrine recognizes that sometimes “the ends do not justify the means” (r v mack, [1988] 2 scr 903, at p 938) given the internet’s potential reach, there is a strong public interest in ensuring that online police investigations do not unduly intrude on public life. in assessing whether an online space is sufficiently precise to ground the police’s reasonable suspicion, then, the internet’s unique features must be considered being informational rather than geographical, online spaces flout the limitations of physical spaces; they may lead people to behave differently than they do in person; and their use can raise distinct rights concerns, notably over privacy. unlike physical spaces, an online space’s parameters may say little about whether the space of an investigation was sufficiently precise. instead, the space must be viewed with particular attention to its functions and interactivity to ensure that the space has been “carefully delineate[d] and tightly circumscribe[d]” (ahmad, at para. 39). the factors discussed by this court in ahmad — in particular, the number of activities and people affected, the interests of privacy and free expression, and the availability of less intrusive investigative techniques — may assist in that assessment they may be key to ensuring that the purview of an online police investigation was no “broader than the evidence allow[ed]” (para. 41). [6] applied here, i agree with the court of appeal for ontario that the application judge erred by failing to consider factors beyond the number of people affected by the police investigation. on the correct analysis, the police had reasonable suspicion over a sufficiently precise space and the offences the police offered were rationally connected and proportionate to the offence they reasonably suspected was occurring. mr. ramelson was therefore not entrapped. i would dismiss the appeal. ii. facts a project raphael [7] like much else, the market for juvenile sex work migrated to the internet over the past decade. recognizing a need to adapt their techniques, the yrp became a canadian leader in efforts to address the issue proactively — by searching for crimes, rather than waiting for them to be reported. whether those efforts went too far, and crossed from legitimate investigation into entrapment, is the question in this case. [8] inspector thai truong joined the yrp as an officer in 2002, and joined its drugs and vice enforcement unit soon thereafter. from 2008 onward, he investigated the commercial sexual exploitation of young girls and women that assignment coincided with a shift in the yrp’s approach with little experience investigating juvenile sex work offences before 2008 — despite the many anecdotal signs that they were occurring — the police realized, in insp. truong’s words, “that unless you really look for it, you’re not going to find it” (ar, vol ii, at pp. 24-25) they began educating themselves on the problem, surveying its prevalence, and, eventually, designing investigations that were adapted to its clandestine nature. [9] juvenile sex work found many homes on the internet, and lacking the means to pursue all of them, the yrp’s focus eventually settled on the escort subdirectory of backpage. as a forum dedicated to the sexual services market, with hundreds of ads per night in the greater toronto area alone, the volume of illegal activity on the platform was immense and much of it was apparently underage, a reality reinforced for insp truong at every turn, from professional conferences; contacts with community groups and non-governmental organizations; and the dozens of investigations into juvenile sex work — including interviews with hundreds of sex workers — that he assisted in over his career. [10] proactive investigations into sex work can target either the “seller side” or the “buyer side” of the market. in december 2013, the yrp launched a seller-side vice probe that, in the 2 weeks it was live, identified 31 sex workers in the york region subpage on backpage who appeared to be juveniles, 9 of whom were in fact underage. it also found that those who came in contact with the investigation first started selling sex, on average, at 14.8 years old. [11] while insightful, such investigations were, to insp. truong’s mind, only a partial success. because selling sex is not itself illegal, the police depended upon sex worker cooperation but whether fearing their pimps, anxious for their livelihoods, lacking a home to return to, or refusing to see themselves as victims, sex workers were often reluctant to assist. locating the juveniles had done little to abate the juvenile sex work market so, changing course, insp truong devised a buyer-side investigation called “project raphael”, which the yrp launched in 2014. [12] with few models to go on, insp. truong was inspired by an investigation in british columbia, where undercover police, posing as juveniles, placed ads on craigslist offering sex workers aged 18, with descriptors suggesting youth project raphael placed similar ads on backpage, listing the age as 18 (the minimum the website would permit) and using words like “tight”, “young”, “new” or “fresh” in the ad’s text, emulating common backpage advertisements for the youngest sex workers (2019 onsc 6894 (first ruling on entrapment), at para. 11 (canlii); ar, vol. ii, at p 135). when potential clients responded, the police, imitating an adolescent’s idiom, arranged a sexual transaction. when the client agreed, the police revealed the sex worker was underage. when the client continued to engage, the police invited them to a hotel room. and when the client opened the door, the police arrested them. [13] the police were aware that this design would capture more than just the most determined sexual predators. as insp. truong explained, those who clicked on the police’s ads could be divided into three groups: (1) those “who were looking strictly for adult females”; (2) those who “were not specifically looking but were open to engaging in sex with underage females when the opportunity presented itself”; and (3) those “who contacted the ad specifically looking to have sex with an underage female” (first ruling on entrapment, at para. 14). the project’s focus was on the second and third groups. but the only way to tell which category a buyer fell into, on insp. truong’s account, was to communicate with them. and the project never attempted to track or categorize the responses. [14] the investigation occurred in four phases, whose form evolved over time. the first phase, in 2014, listed an email address with the number “16” as a further clue to the poster’s age, but the flood of responses so deluged the officers that they restricted communications to text thereafter. for similar reasons, the police eventually lowered the disclosed age from 16 to 14, to concentrate resources on the most serious offences. intentionally or not, this had the effect of exposing those caught to more serious charges for luring minors under 16. [15] although never recorded, the number of responses was “overwhelming”. and the number of arrests was significant. in 2014-15, posing most often as a 16-year- old, the police made a total of 32 arrests in 8 days online. in 2016, with the age lowered to 15, the police made 53 arrests in 8 days. and in 2017, with the age further lowered to 14, the police made 19 arrests in 4 days. in total, project raphael led to the arrest of 104 people, all in only 20 days of operation. b corey daniel ramelson [16] mr ramelson was among those arrested in 2017 on march 27, he messaged “michelle”, aged 18, who was described as a “tight brand new girl . who is sexy and young with a tight body”, with a “young friend if your [sic] interested too” (ar, vol. i, at p 130). the ad featured three faceless photographs of an undercover officer in her 30s, wearing a t-shirt from a local high school after 27 minutes of somewhat sporadic conversation, and having agreed to a transaction, the undercover officer (uc) revealed their “true” ages: [16:28 – uc]: just so you know we under 18. some guys freak out and i don’t want problems. we are small and it’s obvious. [16:29 – ramelson]: i’m cool with it. i’ll be gentle as long as you’re sexy and willing . [16:31 – uc]: we are both willing. we’re 14 but will both be turning 15 this year. that cool? we are buddies and very flexable [sic]?? [16:32 – ramelson]: should be lots of fun [16:32 – ramelson]: are those read [sic] photos from the ads. those girls look a bit older [16:36 – uc]: they are both us. [16:37 – ramelson]: ok. i’m going to leave now (ar, vol. i, at pp. 133-34; see also first ruling on entrapment, at para. 20.) [17] arriving at the hotel room two hours later, mr. ramelson was arrested. he was charged with three offences:  telecommunicating with a person he believed was under the age of 16 years for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under s 152 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (invitation to sexual touching) contrary to s 172.1(1)(b) (child luring under 16);  communicating for the purpose of obtaining for consideration the sexual services of a person under the age of 18 years, contrary to s 286.1(2) (communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor); and  telecommunicating to make an arrangement with a person to commit an offence under s 152 (invitation to sexual touching) contrary to s 172.2(1)(b) (arrangement to commit sexual offences against a person under 16). [18] he was tried and convicted of all three offences in 2019 (2019 onsc 4061). he then applied to stay proceedings on the basis of entrapment. iii. judicial decisions a rulings on entrapment application, ontario superior court of justice (de sa j.) [19] justice de sa initially dismissed mr. ramelson’s entrapment application in november 2019 while the police lacked reasonable suspicion over mr. ramelson specifically, they “had a reasonable basis to believe that individuals” — whether actively seeking juveniles or not — were “routinely involved in the purchase of sexual services from juvenile prostitutes on backpage.com” (first ruling on entrapment, at paras. 51-52) project raphael was thus a bona fide inquiry he rejected mr. ramelson’s further argument that he had been induced. [20] this court then released its decision in ahmad, where it considered how the principles of bona fide inquiries apply in virtual spaces the judge invited the parties to make further submissions. and in separate reasons, issued in october 2020, he revised his conclusion: mr. ramelson had been entrapped. [21] backpage, he now concluded, was too broad a space to support reasonable suspicion the website was not “dedicated to underage prostitution” — indeed, the “overwhelming majority” of the activity in even its escort subsection did not involve juveniles (2020 onsc 5030, 67 c.r (7th) 96 (second ruling on entrapment), at para. 24). given the age listed, and the photos in the ad, “there would be no reasonable basis to infer the caller contacting the ad would be looking for an underage girl” (para. 27 (emphasis in original)). nor did any such inference arise from the texts, and the “bait and switch” of announcing the age late in the conversation raised “clear entrapment concerns” (para. 29). since the language in the ads was “known by police to draw in a much broader pool of individuals than simply individuals looking for ‘underage’ girls” (para. 31), the officer should have done more to confirm that mr. ramelson was himself looking for one before inviting him to commit crimes. lacking reasonable suspicion over the space, or over mr. ramelson personally, the police’s offer amounted to entrapment. b court of appeal for ontario, 2021 onca 328, 155 o.r (3d) 481 (juriansz, tulloch and paciocco jja) [22] the crown’s appeal from the application judge’s decision to stay mr. ramelson’s conviction was heard together with three defence appeals from conviction (involving the appellants in the companion appeals before this court in jaffer, haniffa and dare). concluding that the application judge in mr. ramelson’s case had erred in finding project raphael was not a bona fide inquiry, the court of appeal allowed the crown’s appeal and set aside the application judge’s order. in three separate decisions, the court also dismissed the related defence appeals. [23] in mr. ramelson’s matter, juriansz ja explained that it was open to the application judge to find that the police had reasonable suspicion that the criminal activity under investigation was taking place on the escort section of backpage (the offences under ss 286.1(2) and 172.1(1)(b)) first, while the yrp lacked detailed statistics, insp. truong, who had extensive experience with the offences, gave sufficient evidence to show police had a reasonable suspicion that customers were going onto backpage to obtain sexual services from persons they knew or believed to be under 18 contrary to s 2861(2). [24] and while the same could not be said for the child luring offence in s 172.1(1)(b), which concerned a person believed to be 16 rather than 18, that offence was nonetheless rationally connected and proportionate to the s 286.1(2) offence. given their shared elements, including the use of telecommunication, the police, in posing as a juvenile, would inevitably offer an opportunity to commit a child luring offence under s 172.1(1) when offering an opportunity to commit the s 286.1(2) offence. since the police had reason to believe that juvenile sex workers, on average, first started selling sex under the age of 15, the offences of child luring under 16 (s 172.1(1)(b)) and child luring under 18 (s 172.1(1)(a)) were both rationally connected to the s 286.1(2) offence and child luring under 16 is not “much more serious”, nor “totally unrelated” to the s 286.1(2) offence (para. 89). [25] however, the application judge erred in assessing whether the virtual space was sufficiently precisely defined in particular, he failed to consider other relevant factors beyond the number of people affected by the investigation: including, the “number and nature of activities affected, the nature and level of the privacy interest affected, and the importance of the virtual space to freedom of expression” (para. 97). reviewing the relevant ahmad factors anew, the court concluded that project raphael was a bona fide inquiry and mr. ramelson had not been entrapped. iv. issues [26] the case raises two broad issues:  how does the bona fide inquiry prong of the entrapment doctrine apply in the context of online police investigations?  did the application judge err in concluding that mr. ramelson was entrapped? (i) did the police have reasonable suspicion that the s 286.1(2) offence was occurring in a space defined with sufficient precision? (ii) if so, were the police entitled to offer the opportunity to commit child luring offences under ss. 172.1 and 172.2 of the criminal code? [27] my reasons proceed as follows. first, i review the law of entrapment and consider how the bona fide inquiry prong accounts for the unique features of online spaces. those features — in particular, that the internet’s boundaries are informational rather than geographical; that people behave differently online than they do in person; and that internet use raises distinct rights concerns — call for greater attention to the functions and interactivity of online spaces when assessing whether that space was sufficiently precise to ground reasonable suspicion. [28] second, i apply that framework to this case and conclude, like the court of appeal, that the application judge erred in failing to consider circumstances beyond the number of people affected by the investigation. on a proper analysis, the police had reasonable suspicion that the criminal activity in question was occurring in a sufficiently precise space and the child luring offences were rationally connected and proportionate to the s 286.1(2) offence. project raphael was thus a bona fide inquiry and mr. ramelson was not entrapped. v legal framework a. the entrapment doctrine [29] whatever their utility in fighting crime, some police techniques are “unacceptable in a free society with strong notions of fairness, decency, and privacy” (ahmad, at para. 16). entrapment is one of them. it is not a traditional defence, but a form of abuse of process whose only remedy is a stay of proceedings. it may occur in two ways: (a) the authorities provide a person with an opportunity to commit an offence without acting on a reasonable suspicion that this person is already engaged in criminal activity or pursuant to a bona fide inquiry; (b) although having such a reasonable suspicion or acting in the course of a bona fide inquiry, they go beyond providing an opportunity and induce the commission of an offence. (mack, at pp. 964-65) [30] as a form of abuse of process, the entrapment doctrine flows from courts’ inherent jurisdiction to protect the justice system’s integrity, a power necessary to preserve “the respect and support of the community”, upon which the rule of law depends (r v. conway, [1989] 1 scr 1659, at p 1667; see mack, at p 938). like abuse of process, the entrapment doctrine censures state conduct that “violates our notions of ‘fair play’ and ‘decency’ and which shows blatant disregard for the qualities of humanness which all of us share” (mack, at p 940). [31] entrapment recognizes that “police involvement in the commission of a crime can bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (ahmad, at para. 16). when the police offer opportunities to commit crimes without reasonable suspicion, or induce their commission, they may transgress several expectations: that the police will not intrude on privacy; that they will not randomly test the public’s propensity to commit crimes, and still less manufacture them; that they, of all actors, will not act unlawfully for the purpose of entrapping others; and that they will not squander public resources on any of the above (mack, at p 958). violating those expectations reflects poorly on law enforcement, but it may also diminish confidence in the justice system more generally. [32] the remedy for entrapment is a stay of proceedings — the “most drastic remedy a criminal court can order” (r v. babos, 2014 scc 16, [2014] 1 scr 309, at para. 30) — not because the accused is entitled to an acquittal, but because the crown “is disentitled to a conviction” (r v. jewitt, [1985] 2 scr 128, at p 148; mack, at p 944). a stay of proceedings ends prosecutions that infringe basic norms, marking courts’ refusal to “condone or be seen to lend a stamp of approval to behaviour which transcends what our society perceives to be acceptable on the part of the state” (mack, at p 942). [33] yet law enforcement also serves an important public interest. the police must innovate if they are to match offenders’ ingenuity. some offences, too, are hard to investigate: whether because they are “consensual”; because they “victimize those who are reluctant or unable to report them”; or because they may “lead to such great harm that they must be actively prevented” (ahmad, at para 18) and so drastic a remedy as a stay of proceedings calls for some restraint these realities entitle the police to “considerable latitude” in their investigations (mack, at p 917), such that a finding of entrapment should issue only in the “clearest of cases” (p 976). [34] the doctrine thus strives to balance competing imperatives: “the rule of law, and the need to protect privacy interests and personal freedom from state overreach . . .” on the one hand, and “the state’s legitimate interest in investigating and prosecuting crime” on the other (ahmad, at para. 22; see mack, at pp. 941-42). below, i consider what that balance requires in the context of police investigations into online spaces. b bona fide inquiries and the internet (1) overview [35] the central issue on appeal is whether project raphael was a bona fide inquiry. this has two criteria: the police must have had (1) reasonable suspicion over a sufficiently precise space; and (2) a genuine purpose of investigating and repressing crime (ahmad, at para. 20). satisfying those criteria entitles the police to present “any person associated with the area with the opportunity to commit the particular offence” — even without individualized suspicion in the person investigated (r v. barnes, [1991] 1 scr 449, at p 463 (emphasis in original)). [36] bona fide inquiries serve a useful purpose. in some cases, without knowing who might offend, the police may reasonably suspect that certain criminal activity is occurring within a given space. and, depending on the crime investigated, proactive methods may be necessary. the bona fide inquiry prong recognizes the legitimacy of such investigations, even as it seeks to confine them within careful limits. [37] the court has twice applied this prong of the entrapment doctrine in barnes, the police suspected that considerable drug trafficking was occurring in a six- block area of vancouver’s granville mall the court held that since the police’s suspicions were reasonable, they were entitled, acting in good faith, to approach anybody associated with the space with an offer to purchase drugs. in ahmad, the court considered two separate appeals in which police suspected that two phone numbers were being used for dial-a-dope operations but since their suspicion was based on anonymous, unverified and uncorroborated tips, the court held that the police did not have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity for the phone number itself, and so were not acting under a bona fide inquiry. [38] barnes loomed large in the courts below. for the court of appeal, it was the “archetypical example” of a bona fide inquiry (para. 23), showing that such investigations can potentially target thousands of people (para. 79) and for the application judge in jaffer, a companion case, “an analogy c[ould] readily be drawn”, in the internet context, “to the investigation of a geographical area in which specific crimes are known to be occurring to police” (ar,. jaffer, vol. i, at p 26). [39] yet the analogy calls for scrutiny physical spaces and actions are inherently limited in ways that virtual spaces and actions are not. the police in barnes could have interacted with only so many people, approaching them one-by-one. and a physical space confines; it encloses people and things, and exhibits cycles of bustle and calm virtual spaces may escape those limits, inviting multitudes at all hours and distances, thus defying the boundaries we take for granted in the physical world. this explains why the internet “provides fertile ground for sowing the seeds of unlawful conduct on a borderless scale” (r v. hamilton, 2005 scc 47, [2005] 2 scr 432, at para. 30) and it explains why online police investigations may bear far-reaching implications for state surveillance, civil liberties and the rule of law. [40] the space of the police investigation in ahmad — a phone number — was inherently limited: functionally, it only allowed the police to contact the person who could answer the phone. yet the court foresaw that privacy would be a major concern in virtual investigations more generally. the “breadth of some virtual places . . ., the ease of remote access to a potentially large number of targets that technology provides law enforcement, and the increasing prominence of technology as a means by which individuals conduct their personal lives”, it wrote, made state surveillance over virtual spaces qualitatively different than surveillance in public spaces (paras 36-37) the nature of those differences falls to be further considered here, in the context of the internet. [41] this appeal, then, requires the court to apply ahmad, to further address how virtual and physical spaces differ, and to consider what those differences imply for the law. i look first at online spaces before considering the bona fide inquiry prong in more detail. (2) online spaces [42] like any evolving technology, even an expansive definition of the internet risks a quick obsolescence. and over time, the internet has proven to be many things: social and anti-social, informative and mis-informative, and marked by clusters of hyperactivity and landscapes of inactivity still, some general features can be identified. [43] while sustained by a vast physical infrastructure, the internet, at least as most users experience it, is first and foremost a network of information and a means of connecting with others. that information is stored on servers but is accessible from an increasing array of devices in many physical locations. to say that individuals gather in online “spaces” means only that people have accessed shared information, wherever they happen to be geographically — which, today, may be from nearly anywhere. [44] freed of geographical constraints, online spaces permit unique experiences. they are permeable, allowing users to seamlessly traverse from one space to another. they are often interactive, facilitating that movement and encouraging users to express themselves and engage with content they can also be coded to enable varying levels of supervision, regulation or control. the internet can be manipulated in ways that physical spaces cannot. [45] and its information comes in all types functionally, the internet encompasses the most public and the most private human behaviour. it is the largest megaphone or billboard ever conceived, allowing publishers to connect with audiences far vaster than could ever physically congregate yet many millions also conduct private activities online, confident that their information — whether touching their work, social or personal lives — will remain as secure from general circulation as if they had transacted in person. [46] with that range of behaviour comes a range of candour some online locations, like search engines, allow people to explore notions that they would be loath to air in public; others, like some forms of social media, allow users to dissimulate behind veneers of their choosing. still others, like those dedicated to sexual activity, may encompass both poles online behaviour, in other words, may be radically transparent, radically disingenuous, or both. people do not always act online as they do in person. [47] this, combined with its ubiquity, helps explain why the internet raises “a host of new and challenging questions about privacy” (r v. spencer, 2014 scc 43, [2014] 2 scr 212, at para 1) virtual police investigations may produce vast amounts of highly personal information, in contexts where people may be unusually uninhibited, engaged in forms of self-discovery, or seeking anonymity. the mere threat of state intrusion into those spaces may promote self-censorship, or the abstention from those spaces altogether, with costs to free expression and the exchange of ideas so essential in a vibrant democracy. [48] nor do privacy concerns end with online interactions. the internet collects traces — information about a user’s physical location, online activity, and more — in ways that in-person interactions typically do not (spencer, at para. 46) this data collection often occurs without a user’s awareness or consent, and those traces may persist indefinitely. they can spread with prodigious speed and reach, making it still more likely those traces will persist. and they can be compiled, dissected and analyzed to lend new insights into who we are as individuals or populations. as the rights and autonomy implications of those insights have become clearer, the divisions over how data is collected, protected and mobilized have in turn sharpened. [49] online spaces, in short, differ from physical spaces in at least three ways: the internet, being informational rather than geographical, sheds many of the physical world’s limitations in terms of scale and functions; people behave differently when online; and virtual spaces raise unique rights concerns. as ahmad stated, online spaces are qualitatively different. [50] in my view, the greatest consequence of these differences for bona fide inquiries is that the boundaries of an online “space” only tell part of the story. while intuitive, geographical analogies are imperfect. there is no simple way to compare a six-block area of a city to its online equivalent, except perhaps via those spaces’ functions and even then, similar functions may conceal deeper differences in experience. in an era when a single tweet may attract more traffic than an entire mall, the parameters of a virtual space may be a poor proxy for the scope of a police investigation. [51] to respect the entrapment doctrine’s underlying balance of first principles, then, courts assessing whether an online police investigation was bona fide must pay close attention to the space’s functions and interactivity — that is, to the permeability, interconnectedness, dynamism and other features that make the internet a distinctive milieu for law enforcement. even tailored online investigations may represent a broad and profound invasion into peoples’ lives. given the potential of online investigations to impact many more individuals than an equivalent investigation in a physical space, the nature of those impacts deserve scrutiny. how the police act on the internet may matter as much or more as where they act. (3) bona fide inquiries and reasonable suspicion [52] the question becomes how the test for bona fide inquiries applies in the context of virtual spaces; a question this court first addressed in ahmad as noted, bona fide inquiries must satisfy two criteria before the police may offer an opportunity to commit an offence: the police must have (1) a reasonable suspicion over a sufficiently precise space; and (2) a genuine purpose of investigating and repressing crime (ahmad, at para. 20). the second criterion was not raised as an issue in this case. the issue, instead, is whether the police had reasonable suspicion over a sufficiently precise space. [53] reasonable suspicion is itself a familiar standard, applicable in other contexts (ahmad, at para. 30) it is not onerous; it requires only the reasonable possibility, not probability, that crime is occurring (r v. chehil, 2013 scc 49, [2013] 3 scr 220, at para. 27) yet it still subjects police actions to “exacting curial scrutiny”, to ensure they were founded on objective evidence rather than on profiling, stereotyping or other improper grounds (ahmad, at paras. 24-25) as an objective standard, it “protects everyone from random testing”, whether they are tempted to commit crimes in the space or not (para. 27 (emphasis in original)). [54] in its application, reasonable suspicion requires “a constellation of objectively discernible facts assessed against the totality of the circumstances” (r v. stairs, 2022 scc 11, at para. 68). it is “fact-based, flexible, and grounded in common sense and practical, everyday experience” (chehil, at para. 29). it eschews generalities; the suspicion must be “sufficiently particularized” (para 30) and while it may be informed by an officer’s training and experience, it must be concretely grounded; it cannot rest on hunches, intuition, or mere educated guesses (para. 47). [55] the phrase “random virtue testing” has denoted police investigations that overstep the entrapment doctrine’s limits (see mack, at p 956; barnes, at p 463). some degree of “randomness” is inherent in bona fide inquiries: in approaching individuals without suspecting their personal involvement in crime, it is “inevitable” that such investigations “might unfortunately result in attracting into committing a crime someone who would not otherwise have had any involvement in criminal conduct” (mack, at p 956). in general, this risk only increases as a space is defined more broadly. and a broadly defined space could also cause an investigation to unduly burden the public’s ability to “go about their daily lives without courting the risk that they will be subjected to the clandestine investigatory techniques of agents of the state” (ahmad, at para. 39, citing barnes, at p 480, per mclachlin j., dissenting). [56] the space where police reasonably suspect crime is occurring must therefore be “carefully delineate[d]” and “defined with sufficient precision”, to “ensure the police have narrowed their scope so that the purview of their inquiry is no broader than the evidence allows” (ahmad, at paras. 39 and 41). this is all the more critical in virtual spaces, which, lacking the constraints inherent in physical spaces, can be extremely vast in reach. while true of all spaces police may investigate, it is particularly important that online spaces are “defined narrowly and with precision” (para. 43). [57] in ahmad, the court listed six factors that may illuminate the assessment of whether the police investigation was properly tailored: (1) the seriousness of the crime in question; (2) the time of day and the number of activities and persons who might be affected; (3) whether racial profiling, stereotyping or reliance on vulnerabilities played a part in the selection of the location; (4) the level of privacy expected in the area or space; (5) the importance of the virtual space to freedom of expression; and (6) the availability of other, less intrusive investigative techniques (para. 41). [58] the ahmad factors are contextual guides; they are neither exhaustive nor mandatory. and while they help in maintaining the entrapment doctrine’s underlying balance between “the state’s interest in investigating crime and the law’s constraint against unwarranted intrusion into individuals’ personal lives” (para. 63), the factors do not themselves require balancing all six factors will not always be relevant or helpful — an otherwise overbroad police inquiry, for instance, is not saved by the fact that it did not involve profiling or stereotyping. but nor should one factor be allowed to overwhelm the inquiry. even those convicted of the most serious offences may have been entrapped; conversely, those acting in the most private spaces will not necessarily be entrapped. the analysis is always contextual. [59] the court in ahmad also made clear that the reasonable suspicion analysis turns not only on a space’s physical characteristics, but on whether the police “have narrowed their scope so that the purview of their inquiry is no broader than the evidence allows” (para. 41). this necessarily engages with the nature of the police’s suspicions, including the type and extent of the criminal activity suspected, and the nature of their investigation indeed, the factors expressly address the “seriousness of the crime in question” and an investigation’s impacts on people and activities in the time and place in which it occurs (para. 41) this reflects the fact that reasonable suspicion of particular criminal activity, in bona fide inquiries, is not freestanding; it exists in relation to a particular space and justifies the state in offering opportunities to commit certain crimes to “any person associated with the area” (barnes, at p 463 (emphasis in original)). the space, the crimes and the nature of the investigation all influence the acceptable purview of the police’s inquiry the entire context, in short, determines whether the space of an investigation was sufficiently precise. [60] still, to date, the need for sufficient precision has played relatively little role in this court’s cases. the investigation in barnes grew out of suspicion of drug trafficking in the six-block area of a city, and took place in that same broad space, a narrower investigation being “unrealistic” in the circumstances (p 461) the dial-a- dope investigation in ahmad, too, both originated in and occurred in the virtual space of a phone number, a space that, functionally, could hardly have been more tailored. and in inherently limited spaces like those, the scope of police actions can typically only extend so far, attenuating the risks that police actions will exceed what the evidence permits. [61] but such scrutiny will often be crucial when the police investigate broader virtual spaces like a website, for at least two reasons. [62] first, in permeable and interactive spaces like websites, which can be subdivided in various ways, the “space” of an inquiry will not necessarily be intuitive. project raphael, for instance, grew out of the police’s suspicion that crime was occurring through user-created ads for the youngest sex workers posted in the escort subdirectory of backpage; yet it was designed to only offer opportunities to those users who entered and responded to police-created ads, which were modeled after those user- created ads the possibility of creating subspaces like this — such as postings, messages or hyperlinks within a broader website — suggests that the descriptions of online spaces may be more dynamic than those of physical spaces. and it suggests that the ways subspaces are embedded in, or relate to other online spaces may be critical for understanding how the space of an inquiry was “premised upon and tethered to reasonable suspicion” (ahmad, at para. 20) the space — which both grounds reasonable suspicion and defines the inquiry’s purview — should thus be “carefully delineate[d]” (para. 39) the area of an online police investigation calls for close attention. [63] second, whether an online space was sufficiently precise may turn as much on the space’s functions and interactivity as it does on its parameters. as noted, the internet may allow the police to reach many more people, in more targeted or invasive ways, than equivalent investigations into physical spaces for instance, the investigation in barnes (where the police acted as in-person buyers) was unlikely to generate the flood of responses that overwhelmed the yrp in project raphael’s first “phase” (where the police acted as online sellers). nor, without great efforts, could it have produced the same record of users’ personal information, including phone numbers, which was produced automatically through texting. and a website may allow the police to “fabricate identities and ‘pose’ as others to a degree that would not be possible in a public space like the granville mall” (ahmad, at para. 37) — for example by veiling their identities through images or other digital representations. [64] such functions may require tailoring the location of an online inquiry to a degree that was unnecessary in either barnes or ahmad, where the space’s scope and functions were already limited. they may, for example, require the police to focus on more carefully delineated spaces and target their opportunities to particular subspaces or to particular ways in which users engage with the space. this is especially true in places frequented by vulnerable groups, such as racial, religious or sexual minorities, or in spaces whose use carries important rights implications, where the need for precision is particularly critical (see ahmad, at paras. 169-70, per moldaver j., dissenting; d. m. tanovich, “rethinking the bona fides of entrapment” (2011), 43 ubc. l rev 417, at p 432; k. roach, “entrapment and equality in terrorism prosecutions: a comparative examination of north american and european approaches” (2011), 80 miss. lj 1455, at pp. 1474-75; r v. stack, 2022 onca 413 (raising but not deciding whether the accused was entrapped on grindr, a “dating and hookup” app for men seeking men)). [65] a space’s functions may also, in some cases, call for attention to how the space facilitates or inhibits data collection. the internet’s ability to collect traces may cut in different directions. because the accused bears the burden of proof in entrapment applications, a lack of data about the scope of an investigation — such as how many people it contacted, and in what ways — could raise fairness concerns yet indiscriminate data collection, without appropriate safeguards, would raise clear privacy concerns. generally speaking, and insofar as an online space permits, police should consider whether to collect and retain data relevant to understanding an investigation’s scope, while taking care to do so in a way that minimizes the costs to privacy. [66] the ahmad factors, again, may assist an online space’s functions and interactivity can greatly influence factors like the “number of activities and persons who might be affected”, the “level of privacy expected”, the “importance of the virtual space to freedom of expression” or whether the police’s methods were sufficiently narrow as compared to “other, less intrusive investigative techniques” (para. 41). these, alongside other concerns, may be critical in assessing whether the space was “defined narrowly and with precision” (para. 43). [67] none of this is to say that broad online spaces cannot be sufficiently precise. in ahmad, the court explained that “entire websites or social media platforms will rarely, if ever, be sufficiently particularized to support reasonable suspicion” (para. 43). indeed, multi-functional virtual spaces — perhaps typical of much internet use — will usually be too broad to support reasonable suspicion. but in other spaces, the criminality may be so pervasive that it supports a reasonable suspicion over the entire area (see r v. nelson, 2021 bcca 192, at paras. 13-19 (canlii) (trafficking fentanyl and carfentanil on the dark web)). the circumference of a sufficiently precise online location may vary. [68] in sum, the internet’s unique features are inescapable in assessing whether the location is sufficiently precise to ground reasonable suspicion. online spaces are qualitatively different (ahmad, at para. 37) — and those differences must be considered. c rationally connected and proportionate opportunities [69] a second doctrinal issue arises from the facts of this case the police suspected that the offence of communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor (s 286.1(2)) was occurring on backpage but the backpage website prevented the police from directly advertising sexual services by someone under the age of 18; instead, they had to reveal a younger age in conversation. yet the age they revealed — 14 years — exposed mr. ramelson to more serious offences of child luring a person under 16. this raises the further question: what type of link must exist between the offence suspected and the offence offered? [70] citing mack, the court of appeal concluded that the child luring under 16 offences were not “totally unrelated” or “much more serious” offences than the s 286.1(2) offence, which concerned a person under 18 years old (para. 89). yet the phrases “totally unrelated” and “much more serious” only served in mack to identify cases that clearly met the standard; they were not the standard itself that standard remains the one set in mack: that the crime that police offer must be rationally connected and proportionate to the offence they suspect is occurring. [71] in the companion appeal haniffa, mr haniffa argues that bona fide inquiries, being inherently broader than investigations into individuals, ought to be restricted to offering opportunities to commit the same offences that the police suspect are occurring. but given the restrictions on bona fide inquiries that i have discussed above, such a distinction is, in my view, unnecessary. and it could unduly hinder the police’s ability to investigate certain offences. i would therefore reject it. vi application [72] mr. ramelson’s appeal raises two issues of application: (1) whether the police had reasonable suspicion over a sufficiently precise space; and (2) if so, whether the child luring offences he was charged with were rationally connected and proportionate to the s 286.1(2) offence. [73] like the court of appeal (at paras. 96-97), i conclude that the application judge erred by failing to properly consider the broader context beyond the number of people affected by the investigation. on the proper analysis, i conclude that project raphael was bona fide and mr. ramelson was not entrapped. i consider each issue in turn. a did the police have reasonable suspicion in a sufficiently precise space? [74] the police suspected that the s 286.1(2) offence (communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor) was occurring within ads posted in the escort subdirectory of the york region backpage whose content suggested extreme youth. i agree with the court of appeal that the application judge erred in finding that space was insufficiently precise to ground reasonable suspicion. [75] whether the police had reasonable suspicion turns on insp truong’s testimony. in some cases, a single officer’s testimony may fail to support reasonable suspicion, particularly if too closely tied to their own “personal conclusions” rather than objective fact (ahmad, at para. 24 (emphasis deleted)). but here, it was sufficient. insp. truong’s testimony was grounded in his direct and indirect experiences in law enforcement: the yrp had identified 85 juvenile sex workers between 2011 and 2016; the 2013 seller-side initiative, which located 9 juveniles in 2 weeks and found that those investigated entered the industry at 14.8 years old on average; he had participated in many conferences and conversations in his professional circles; and he had interviewed hundreds of sex workers in his several years specializing in sex work-related crimes — all of which pointed to a pervasive problem stemming from a particular type of online ad on backpage. [76] this, in my view, amply showed the reasonable possibility that the s 286.1(2) offence was occurring in the space indeed, it suggested that the offence was occurring regularly. if the yrp were to address offences related to juvenile sex work, ads in the york region escort subdirectory of backpage for the youngest sex workers were places to do so. [77] the question becomes whether the officers’ reasonable suspicion related to a space that was sufficiently precise mr. ramelson submits that the application judge was correct to find that project raphael’s scope was overbroad, since the investigation extended to an “entire website” in stressing the need to click on and respond to the ads, and downplaying the need for closer targeting to those seeking juveniles, the court of appeal’s approach will “result in almost any website or social media platform being defined as narrow, even if in practice it is extremely wide” (af, at para. 47) and the court further discounted the number of people affected by the investigation, which was significant the crown responds that the space was sufficiently precise: the escort section was already limited by nature, and the information in the ads further filtered out potential respondents, to the extent that backpage’s parameters allowed. the court of appeal’s review of the ahmad factors — which emphasized the seriousness of the crime and the difficulty investigating it — reflected the correct approach. [78] i agree that the application judge erred while correctly stressing the number of people affected by the investigation, he failed to properly consider the entire context — in particular, the seriousness of the crimes and the difficulty investigating them via alternative techniques. like the court of appeal, a review of the full context leads me to conclude that the online space in which project raphael offered opportunities was defined with sufficient precision to ground the police’s reasonable suspicion i begin with the virtual space’s definition, which must be carefully delineated, including, as i have explained, with a view to the space’s functions and interactivity. [79] at its most general, the yrp’s suspicions arose within the york region escort subdirectory of the backpage website. there was, to all appearances, an active hub of crime; specific posts advertising the youngest sex workers appeared daily, and unremittingly, within that broader space. and in designing project raphael, the yrp sought to replicate those posts, aiming to attract those who were either actively seeking a juvenile or were at least indifferent to encountering one the space — grounding reasonable suspicion and defining the investigation’s purview — was the particular type of ads within the york region escort subdirectory of backpage that emphasized the sex worker’s extreme youth. [80] to be sure, that space differed markedly from the physical spaces of traditional investigations first, at a granular level, the location where the police’s suspicions first arose (the user-created ads in that subdirectory) was not identical to the location where the police later offered their opportunities (the police-created ads in the escort subdirectory); indeed, the police-posted ads did not exist until the police created them. those specific ads, therefore, could not generate the reasonable suspicion upon which project raphael was grounded: the reasonable suspicion standard “insists on an objective assessment of the information the police actually had” (ahmad, at para. 29). that assessment turns instead on the police’s suspicions over a certain type of ad for the youngest sex workers that was arising continually, and without the police’s involvement, within the broader york region escort subdirectory of backpage. the relationship between those user-created ads and the police-created ads — both being the same type of ads within the same subdirectory — is thus integral to the space’s definition: it explains how the police-created ads could be “premised upon and tethered to reasonable suspicion” (para. 20). [81] second, project raphael illustrates how an investigation’s design may shape — and tailor — the nature of an online space according to its functions and interactivity. in modeling project raphael on common, independently posted ads for the youngest sex workers, the police consciously designed their ads to be functionally analogous to pre-existing ads, and to draw in a similar audience. and in listing a phone number for users to text message — a step made necessary by their functional inability to communicate through the website with those who merely clicked on the ad — the police shaped how they would interact with users and, ultimately, how they would offer opportunities to commit the offences. the space’s functions and interactivity, in other words, permitted the police to design project raphael in a way that narrowed the investigation’s scope. [82] i therefore disagree with mr. ramelson that the police’s investigation extended to an “entire website”. even the escort subdirectory as a whole was not an entire website and users within that broader space had to take interactive steps to locate the youngest sex workers. unlike in barnes, where anybody within the six-block area could have been approached by the police, backpage users would only encounter the police if they clicked on particular ads, entering police-designed subspaces, and then messaged the listed phone number. while anyone within the escort subdirectory could view the links to those postings, project raphael was not designed to interact with everyone within that broader space, let alone within the backpage website as a whole. [83] as noted, the ads themselves were designed, in word and image, to signal youth. in mr. ramelson’s case, the ad called the sex worker a “tight brand new girl . . . who is sexy and young with a tight body”, with a “young friend if your interested too”. the photo featured a faceless woman wearing a t-shirt that bore the name of a local high school. and her stated age was the minimum compatible with the space’s parameters. while online information cannot always be taken at face value, and while other steps could have been taken — in one of the related appeals, jaffer, the police included the number “16” in an email address, for instance — these were clear hints that the sex worker might have been underage. this further narrowed the space within which the police offered their opportunities. [84] mr. ramelson was among those who took things still further: by not only browsing the escort subdirectory, and clicking on the hint-adorned ad, but by messaging the affiliated phone number and arranging an encounter — all before the police mentioned the sex worker’s age it was at this point — when the police mentioned the sex worker’s age — that they provided him with the opportunity to commit the offences under ss. 286.1(2), 172.1 and 172.2 (see ahmad, at paras. 63-64; r v. ghotra, 2020 onca 373, 455 dlr (4th) 586, at paras. 30-31, aff’d 2021 scc 12). by agreeing to proceed with the transaction, all the elements of the offences were satisfied (r v. levigne, 2010 scc 25, [2010] 2 scr 3, at para. 23). [85] these features limited project raphael’s purview still, being an online investigation, the number of people it affected was potentially far greater than an analogous investigation in a physical space, even with users having to take steps to encounter the police because the police never kept statistics, there are no precise numbers but most who responded to the police’s ads, it appears, immediately disengaged once they were told the sex worker’s age (ca reasons, at paras. 141-42). this supports an inference that project raphael affected many who would not have offended independently. for the application judge, this was a crucial concern. and i agree that that this raises legitimate concerns. [86] much of project raphael’s breadth lay in the nature of the police’s offer. the point is again made clear through a comparison with barnes the police there approached people individually, seeking those with easy access to drugs who were willing sellers. this necessarily limited the number of people who could actually take advantage of the opportunity here, by contrast, the investigation occurred online, through ads potentially available to everyone in the escort subdirectory, and sought those who, already intent on a sexual transaction, were willing buyers. this made it more likely that users would avail themselves of the police’s opportunity, and more likely that the investigation would ensnare those who would not have committed the offences on their own. [87] a related issue was project raphael’s conscious targeting of those who were only indifferent about the sex worker’s age. this troubled the application judge: he noted that it captured individuals who were not seeking to commit the suspected offence. by definition, such people may not have offended absent the police’s offer, suggesting that their inclusion in project raphael may have manufactured crimes that would not have occurred on their own — one of the key risks targeted by the entrapment doctrine (barnes, at p 459; ahmad, at para. 28). [88] in this specific context, however, i agree with the court of appeal that the “merely indifferent” were legitimate targets of the investigation (para. 124) as inchoate offences, the s 286.1(2) and child luring offences target those who, knowing the person’s age, or being willfully blind to it, decide to pursue sexual activity anyway — regardless of whether they initially sought a juvenile or whether they actually carry out the agreement. aiming to “close the cyberspace door” before things proceed any further (r v legare, 2009 scc 56, [2009] 3 scr 551, at para. 25), the offences embody a particularly proactive approach to crime, criminalizing mere agreements to proceed in the face of certain facts. capturing the “merely indifferent” only reflects the nature of the offence it reflects parliament’s own judgment about when such conversations cross a line, and suggests there is a legitimate law enforcement interest in the police intervening at a relatively early stage. [89] another key concern was privacy. i agree with the court of appeal that project raphael “intruded upon an intensely personal privacy interest” (para. 135). the text message communications that followed for users who clicked on the ads and contacted the phone number disclosed intimate details about those users’ sexual preferences, details they would naturally expect would remain confidential from the state. [90] privacy and free expression interests are often interrelated, since a loss of privacy often precedes self-censorship. the court of appeal also concluded that, being illegal and falling outside traditional categories of expression valued in a democratic society, buyers’ expression in this case carried little weight (para. 136) for similar reasons, it concluded that project raphael did not intrude on other public activities of value (paras. 127-29). but although crime was apparently pervasive within the types of ads targeted by the investigation, communications in those spaces were not necessarily illegal — a person may communicate with a sex worker without intending to hire them for sex. and the police’s presence in an online space may chill any of the expression in that space, legal or illegal. still, i agree that project raphael did not intrude on public activities of great value and the privacy interests in this case were greatly attenuated. [91] most importantly, these factors were only part of the context in which police offered the opportunities in project raphael. the nature of the offences and the lack of alternative investigative techniques were key factors in this case; yet ones the application judge mentioned only briefly (second ruling on entrapment, at para. 22). [92] the offences were not only apparently prevalent; they were serious and difficult to investigate except through proactive methods. all involved communications to arrange a sexual encounter with a minor, a “very real threat”, for which parliament, recognizing their gravity, has criminalized preparatory actions to the intended conduct itself (r v. morrison, 2019 scc 15, [2019] 2 scr 3, at paras. 39-40). the difficulty investigating “consensual” crimes of this type has long been recognized, even before those crimes moved online (kirzner v. the queen, [1978] 2 scr 487, at pp. 492-93; amato v. the queen, [1982] 2 scr 418, at p 457, per estey j., dissenting, but not on this point; mack, at pp. 916-17; ahmad, at para. 18) and sting operations have become “an important tool — if not the most important tool — available to the police in detecting offenders who target children and preventing them from doing actual harm to children” (r v. friesen, 2020 scc 9, at para. 94). given the “considerable latitude” police are owed in their investigations (mack, at p 917), sting operations like project raphael should not be foreclosed lightly. [93] in all the circumstances, i would conclude that ads posted in backpage’s escort subdirectory emphasizing the sex worker’s extreme youth were a sufficiently precise space to ground reasonable suspicion. project raphael carefully tailored the ads in which police provided the opportunity to commit the offences. the broader escort subdirectory was designed to facilitate sex-work related crimes, limiting the targeted audience like the user-created ads, the police-created ads indicated extreme youth, including showing the person wearing a t-shirt with the logo of a local high school. users had to interact with those ads by text message to encounter the police. this was a serious inchoate offence involving juveniles and it is unclear what alternative methods of investigation the police might have employed — the limitations of a seller- side investigation having already been demonstrated although the investigation impacted many individuals, in context, “the purview of the police inquiry [went] no broader than the evidence allow[ed]” (ahmad, at para. 41). b were the offences rationally connected and proportionate? [94] mr. ramelson’s final argument is that even if the police had reasonable suspicion that the s 286.1(2) offence was being committed on the escort subdirectory of backpage, it did not allow them to offer the opportunity to commit other, more serious offences under ss. 172.1(1)(b) and 172.2(1)(b) in other words, having reasonable suspicion that users were committing offences in respect of those under 18 did not allow them to offer opportunities in respect of those under 16. that “bait-and- switch” exposed mr. ramelson to a much longer sentence, for offences that were too remote from the police’s suspicion. [95] i disagree. while the police indeed lacked reasonable suspicion over the child luring offences, they were nonetheless rationally connected and proportionate to the s 286.1(2) offence. [96] i note first that the question only arises because of a lack of specificity in the evidence grounding the police’s reasonable suspicion — while the police had reason to suspect that sex workers under 16 were active on backpage, there was too little evidence that buyers were seeking them specifically as the court of appeal correctly noted, the focus had to be on the buyers’ intentions (para. 73). [97] some basic features of the offences suggest they are rationally connected. for one, they capture similar conduct, criminalizing telecommunications for the purpose of committing a sexual offence with a person under a specified age. the court of appeal noted their shared elements, explaining that the police would inevitably offer the opportunity to commit child luring in the course of offering the opportunity to commit the s 286.1(2) offence (para. 86). [98] the difference in age is concerning. yet it rested on an evidentiary basis: those sex workers identified in the yrp’s 2013 seller-side investigation, for instance, first started selling sex at age 14.8 on average. even small differences in age can, of course, make a big difference in sexual offences but in light of the facts, it is unsurprising, in my view, that their investigation into juvenile sex work would target buyers looking for those under 16. [99] in my view, offering the opportunity to commit the child luring offences was not disproportionate. to use this court’s language in mack, whether child luring is a “much more serious” offence than the s 286.1(2) offence might be an indicator of proportionality granted, luring a person under the age of 16 is more serious and “subject to a longer period of incarceration” than committing the s 286.1(2) offence in respect of a person under 18 (ca reasons, at para. 89). in some cases, differences in seriousness and punishment will go too far. here, however, luring a person under 16 is not a disproportionately more serious crime than communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor. with a gap of six months separating the offences’ mandatory minimum sentences, they remain comparable. [100] i would therefore not accede to mr. ramelson’s argument. the offences were rationally connected and proportionate, such that the police could offer opportunities to commit them given their reasonable suspicion in the s 286.1(2) offence. vii conclusion [101] for these reasons, i conclude that the police had reasonable suspicion in a space defined with sufficient precision, and the offences offered were rationally connected and proportionate to each other the police’s genuine law enforcement purpose is not at issue. project raphael was thus a bona fide inquiry and mr. ramelson was not entrapped. i would dismiss the appeal.
[1] the writ of habeas corpus is an ancient legal remedy that remains fundamental to individual lib- erty and the rule of law today. dating back to the 13th century, this writ guarantees the individual’s protection from unlawful deprivations of liberty. entrenched in s. 10(c) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, the right to habeas corpus permits those in detention to go before a provincial superior court and demand to know whether the detention is justified in law. if the relevant authority cannot provide sufficient justification, the person must be released. [1] le bref d’habeas corpus est une ancienne me- sure de réparation juridique qui demeure fondamen- tale aujourd’hui pour la liberté individuelle et la primauté du droit. remontant au 13e siècle, ce bref garantit la protection de la personne contre les pri- vations illégales de liberté. enchâssé dans la charte canadienne des droits et libertés, à l’al. 10c), le droit à l’habeas corpus permet à ceux qui sont détenus de s’adresser à une cour supérieure provinciale et de revendiquer de savoir si la détention est justifiée en droit. si l’autorité compétente ne peut fournir une justification suffisante, la personne doit être libérée. [2] despite the importance of habeas corpus, this court has carved out two limited exceptions to its availability. first, a provincial superior court should decline jurisdiction to entertain an application for habeas corpus where a prisoner is using the applica- tion to attack the legality of their conviction or sen- tence, as this is properly accomplished through the ordinary appeal mechanisms set out in the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (see r v. gamble, [1988] 2 scr 595, at pp 636-37). second, a provincial superior court should also decline jurisdiction where the legislator has put in place “a complete, compre- hensive and expert statutory scheme which provides for a review at least as broad as that available by way of habeas corpus and no less advantageous” (may v. ferndale institution, 2005 scc 82, [2005] 3 scr 809, at para 40). this second exception has come to be known as the peiroo exception (see [2] malgré l’importance de l’habeas corpus, la cour a élaboré deux exceptions restreintes qui em- pêchent d’y avoir recours. premièrement, la cour supérieure provinciale devrait refuser d’exercer sa compétence pour entendre une demande d’habeas corpus lorsqu’un détenu utilise cette demande pour contester la légalité de sa déclaration de culpabilité ou de la peine qui lui a été infligée, puisque c’est au moyen des mécanismes d’appel habituels qui sont énoncés dans le code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, qu’il convient de présenter une telle contestation (voir r c. gamble, [1988] 2 rcs 595, p. 636- 637). deuxièmement, la cour supérieure provinciale devrait également refuser d’exercer sa compétence lorsque le législateur a mis en place « un régime complet, exhaustif et spécialisé prévoyant une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus » (may [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 477 peiroo v. canada (minister of employment and im- migration) (1989), 69 or (2d) 253 (ca)). in this case, mr. chhina applied for habeas [3] corpus, arguing that his immigration detention had become unlawful under the charter because of its length and uncertain duration. he also challenged his detention on the basis that he was being held in inappropriate lockdown conditions at a maximum security unit. [4] this court must determine whether the alberta court of queen’s bench erred in declining its ju- risdiction to entertain mr. chhina’s application for habeas corpus on the basis that the immigration and refugee protection act, sc 2001, c. 27 (irpa), satisfies the second exception. [5] the parties do not contest that the statutory scheme set out in the irpa provides a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for the review of immigration matters generally. this was the con- clusion reached by the ontario court of appeal in peiroo. what this case emphasizes, however, is that the determination of whether such a scheme is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus must be considered with respect to the particular basis upon which the lawfulness of the detention is challenged. [6] therefore, the peiroo exception does not bar habeas corpus applications with respect to all dep- rivations of liberty arising from the immigration scheme. rather the question here is whether the irpa provides a review procedure that is at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus regarding the specific challenges to the legality of the detention raised by the habeas corpus application. c. établissement ferndale, 2005 csc 82, [2005] 3 rcs 809, par 40). cette seconde exception est maintenant appelée l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo (voir peiroo c. canada (minister of employ- ment and immigration) (1989), 69 or (2d) 253 (ca)). [3] en l’espèce, m. chhina a présenté une demande d’habeas corpus, faisant valoir que sa détention aux fins d’immigration était devenue illégale au regard de la charte, en raison de sa longueur et de sa du- rée incertaine. il a également contesté sa détention au motif qu’il était détenu dans des conditions de confinement cellulaire inappropriées dans une unité à sécurité maximale. [4] la cour doit trancher la question de savoir si la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta a commis une erreur en refusant d’exercer sa compétence pour entendre la demande d’habeas corpus de m. chhina au motif que la loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, lc 2001, c. 27 (lipr), satisfait à la seconde exception. [5] les parties ne contestent pas le fait que le ré- gime législatif établi par la lipr prévoit une pro- cédure complète, exhaustive et spécialisée pour l’examen en général de questions en matière d’im- migration. c’est la conclusion qu’avait tirée la cour d’appel de l’ontario dans l’arrêt peiroo. ce que la présente affaire souligne cependant, c’est que, pour décider si un régime est aussi large et aussi avanta- geux que celui de l’habeas corpus, il faut l’examiner en fonction des motifs particuliers qui sont invoqués pour contester la légalité de la détention. [6] l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo n’em- pêche donc pas de présenter des demandes d’habeas corpus relativement à toutes les privations de liberté découlant du régime législatif applicable en matière d’immigration. la question à trancher en l’espèce est donc plutôt celle de savoir si la lipr prévoit une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus en ce qui a trait aux remises en cause spécifiques de la légalité de la détention formulées dans la demande d’habeas corpus. 478 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. in my view, it does not. mr. chhina did not [7] challenge his immigration status, deportation order or detention order as failing to respect the irpa. rather, he claimed that his continued detention had become unlawful because its length, conditions and uncertain duration violated his charter rights. the irpa does not provide for review that is at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus for such matters. mr. chhina was therefore entitled to have his application for habeas corpus heard by a judge of the alberta court of queen’s bench. [7] à mon avis, ce n’est pas le cas. m. chhina n’a pas remis en cause son statut d’immigration ni n’a contesté les mesures d’expulsion ou de mise en détention prises à son égard en soutenant que ces me- sures ne respectaient pas la lipr. il a plutôt allégué que son maintien en détention était devenu illégal parce que la longueur de sa détention, les conditions dont elle était assortie ainsi que sa durée incertaine portaient atteinte aux droits qui lui sont garantis par la charte. la lipr ne prévoit pas de contrôle aussi large et aussi avantageux que ne le fait le recours en habeas corpus pour de telles questions. m. chhina avait donc droit à ce que sa demande d’habeas cor- pus soit entendue par un juge de la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta. ii background ii faits [8] the respondent, tusif chhina, entered canada under another name in december 2006 and obtained refugee status approximately two years later. in feb- ruary 2012, mr. chhina’s refugee status was vacated and he was declared inadmissible to canada due to both misrepresentations in his refugee application and his involvement in criminal activity. a deporta- tion order was issued against him. [9] following time spent in criminal custody, mr. chhina was taken into immigration detention in april 2013. however, in light of delays in ob- taining travel documents from pakistan, mr. chhina was released with conditions seven months later. mr. chhina failed to respect his conditions and dis- appeared for a year, but he was eventually taken back into immigration custody in november 2015. he was detained in the calgary remand centre, a maximum security unit which keeps inmates on lockdown 22 and a half hours a day. pursuant to s. 57 of the irpa, immigration officials reviewed mr. chhina’s deten- tion on a monthly basis, each time upholding the decision that he should be detained. [8] l’intimé, tusif chhina, est entré au canada sous un autre nom en décembre 2006, et il a obtenu le statut de réfugié approximativement deux  ans plus tard. en février 2012, le statut de réfugié de m. chhina a été annulé, et il a été déclaré interdit de territoire au canada, à la fois parce que sa demande d’asile comportait de fausses déclarations et parce qu’il avait participé à des activités criminelles. une mesure d’expulsion a été prise contre lui. [9] après avoir passé du temps en détention au cri- minel, m. chhina a été mis en détention aux fins de l’immigration en avril 2013. toutefois, étant donné les délais pour obtenir des documents de voyage de la part du pakistan, m. chhina a été mis en liberté sous conditions sept mois plus tard. il n’a pas respecté les conditions qui lui avaient été infligées et il a disparu pendant un an. il a toutefois fini par être remis en dé- tention aux fins de l’immigration en novembre 2015. il a été placé au calgary remand center, une unité à sécurité maximale qui garde les détenus en confi- nement cellulaire 22 heures et demie par jour. les agents de la fonction publique ont contrôlé le bien- fondé de la détention de m. chhina mensuellement, conformément à l’art. 57 de la lipr, et ils ont conclu chaque fois qu’il y avait lieu de confirmer la décision de le détenir. [10] mr. chhina filed his habeas corpus appli- cation in may 2016, arguing that his immigration [10] m. chhina a déposé sa demande d’habeas corpus en mai 2016, faisant valoir que sa détention [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 479 detention had become unlawful both because it had become lengthy and indeterminate and because the conditions of his detention were “inappropri- ate” (court of queen’s bench of alberta reasons, no. 160576914x1, september 2, 2016 (unreported), at p 2). at the time of his application before the alberta court of queen’s bench, he had spent a total of 13 months in immigration detention. [11] the chambers judge declined jurisdiction to consider mr. chhina’s application for habeas cor- pus, citing the irpa as a comprehensive legislative framework that would satisfy the peiroo exception. [12] the alberta court of appeal (2017 abca 248, 56 alta. lr (6th) 1) reversed that decision, holding that the chambers judge should have ex- ercised his discretion to hear mr. chhina’s habeas corpus application. given the importance of the writ, the court noted that exceptions to the availability of habeas corpus must be limited and well- defined. as such, a chambers judge should decline to hear habeas corpus applications only in limited circumstances, beyond which the decision to decline jurisdiction constitutes an error of law. [13] while acknowledging the holding in peiroo, greckol ja, writing for the court, concluded that the exception does not bar habeas corpus applica- tions in all immigration- related matters. she distin- guished mr. chhina’s challenge noting that, unlike the applicant in peiroo, mr. chhina did not con- test determinations regarding his inadmissibility or deportation. instead, he challenged the legality of his detention, incidental to those determinations, on charter grounds. the outcome of mr. chhina’s habeas corpus application would have no effect on his immigration status or deportation order but, if successful, would affect his immediate liberty. aux fins de l’immigration était rendue illégale, parce qu’elle était devenue trop longue et d’une durée in- déterminée, et parce que les conditions dont elle était assortie étaient [traduction] « inappropriées » (motifs de la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta, no 160576914x1, 2 septembre 2016 (décision non publiée), p 2). au moment de la présentation de sa demande devant la cour du banc de la reine de l’al- berta, il avait passé un total de 13 mois en détention aux fins de l’immigration. [11] le juge siégeant en son cabinet a refusé d’exer- cer sa compétence pour examiner la demande d’ha- beas corpus de m. chhina puisque, selon lui, la lipr constituait un cadre législatif exhaustif qui satisfaisait à l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo. [12] la cour d’appel de l’alberta (2017 abca 248, 56 alta. lr (6th) 1) a infirmé cette décision, et elle a déclaré que le juge siégeant en son cabinet aurait dû exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour entendre la demande d’habeas corpus de m chhina. étant donné l’importance du bref, elle a aussi fait remarquer que les exceptions à la disponibilité de l’habeas corpus devaient être restreintes et bien définies. ainsi, un juge siégeant en son cabinet ne devrait refuser d’en- tendre des demandes d’habeas corpus que dans des circonstances limitées, au- delà desquelles la décision par un tribunal de décliner sa compétence constitue une erreur de droit. [13] tout en prenant acte de ce qui avait été décidé dans l’arrêt peiroo, la juge greckol, s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel, a conclu que l’exception n’empêchait pas de présenter des demandes d’ha- beas corpus dans toutes les affaires liées à l’immi- gration. elle a distingué la remise en cause formulée par m. chhina de celle plaidée dans peiroo en sou- lignant que, contrairement à la demanderesse dans cette dernière affaire, m. chhina ne contestait pas les décisions sur son interdiction de territoire ou sur son expulsion. il remettait plutôt en cause la légalité de sa détention, accessoire à ces décisions, en se fondant sur la charte. l’issue de la demande d’habeas corpus de m. chhina n’aurait aucun effet sur son statut d’immigration ou sur la mesure d’ex- pulsion prise contre lui, mais, si elle était accueillie, cela entraînerait immédiatement sa mise en liberté. 480 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. [14] through this lens, greckol  j.a saw clear differences between the review and relief available via the irpa process as compared to an application for habeas corpus, finding the latter broader and more advantageous where the challenge related to the length and indeterminate nature of the deten- tion. as such, the peiroo exception did not apply to mr. chhina’s case and the matter was remitted to the court of queen’s bench for a hearing on the merits of the habeas corpus application. [15] travel documents were subsequently obtained for mr. chhina and he was removed from canada in september 2017. thus, the arguments regarding his detention are now moot. but as mr. chhina’s case illustrates, habeas corpus applications are often evasive of review, as the shifting factual circum- stances frequently render the application moot before appellate review can be obtained (mission institu- tion v. khela, 2014 scc 24, [2014] 1 scr 502, at para 14). given the importance of clearly delineat- ing the exceptions to habeas corpus, it is appropriate for this court to consider the legal issues raised by mr. chhina’s appeal notwithstanding its mootness. no party has objected to this court doing so. [14] de ce point de vue, la juge greckol a perçu des différences manifestes entre le contrôle ainsi que la mesure de réparation qui existent dans le cadre du processus établi par la lipr et ceux qui sont ap- plicables dans le contexte d’une demande d’habeas corpus, ces derniers étant, selon elle, plus larges et plus avantageux lorsque la remise en cause est liée à la longueur et à la durée indéterminée de la dé- tention. ainsi, l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo ne s’appliquait pas au cas de m. chhina, et l’affaire a été renvoyée à la cour du banc de la reine pour que celle-ci tienne une audience sur le fond de la demande d’habeas corpus. [15] par la suite, des documents de voyage ont été obtenus pour m. chhina et il a été renvoyé du canada en septembre 2017. les arguments au sujet de sa détention sont donc maintenant théoriques. cela dit, comme l’illustre le cas de m. chhina, les de- mandes d’habeas corpus échappent souvent à l’exa- men judiciaire, puisqu’un changement dans les faits a fréquemment pour résultat que la demande devient théorique avant de pouvoir être examinée en appel (établissement de mission c. khela, 2014 csc 24, [2014] 1 rcs 502, par 14). étant donné l’impor- tance de définir clairement les limites des exceptions à l’habeas corpus, il convient que la cour étudie les questions juridiques soulevées par le pourvoi de m. chhina, malgré son caractère théorique. aucune partie ne s’est opposée à ce que la cour procède à cet examen. iii issues iii questions en litige [16] this appeal concerns the scope and applica- tion of the peiroo exception, providing the court with an opportunity to clarify when a complete, com- prehensive and expert statutory scheme provides for review that is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus such that an applicant will be precluded from bringing an application for habeas corpus.1 [16] le présent pourvoi a trait à la portée et à l’ap- plication de l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo, ce qui donne à la cour une occasion de clarifier quand un régime législatif complet, exhaustif et spécialisé prévoit un examen aussi large et aussi avantageux que l’habeas corpus, de sorte qu’il sera interdit à un détenu de présenter une demande d’habeas corpus1. 1 although mr. chhina sought to argue before this court that the common law peiroo exception violates s. 10(c) of the charter and cannot be saved under s. 1, he failed to file a notice of constitutional question within the specified timeline. accordingly, that argument is not before the court in this appeal. 1 même si m. chhina a tenté de plaider devant la cour que l’ex- ception de common law établie par l’arrêt peiroo contrevient à l’al. 10c) de la charte et ne peut pas être justifiée au regard de l’article premier, il n’a pas déposé d’avis de question constitution- nelle dans les délais impartis. la cour n’est donc pas saisie de cet argument dans le cadre du présent pourvoi. [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 481 iv analysis iv analyse [17] provincial superior courts have inherent juris- diction to hear habeas corpus applications (may, at para 29). an application for habeas corpus requires the applicant to establish a deprivation of liberty and to raise a legitimate ground for questioning the le- gality of that deprivation. if this is accomplished, the onus then shifts to the authority in question to show that the deprivation of liberty is lawful. in order for detention to be lawful, the decision- maker must have authority to order detention, the decision- making process must be fair, and the decision to detain must be both reasonable and compliant with the charter (may, at para. 77; r v. khela, 2009 scc 4, [2009] 1 scr 104, at para 72). changes in conditions or orders leading to further deprivations of liberty may also be challenged in the same manner. where, as here, the application is brought with certiorari in aid, the court hearing the application conducts its review on the basis of the record that resulted in the deci- sion (j. farbey, r j sharpe and s. atrill, the law of habeas corpus (3rd ed. 2011), at p. 45; mission institution v. khela, at para. 35; r v. miller, [1985] 2 scr 613, at p 624). [17] les cours supérieures provinciales possèdent une compétence inhérente pour entendre les de- mandes d’habeas corpus (may, par 29). ce type de demande exige du demandeur qu’il établisse l’exis- tence d’une privation de liberté et qu’il avance un motif légitime pour contester la légalité de cette privation. une fois que cela est fait, le fardeau est renversé, et il appartient à l’autorité qui le détient de démontrer que la privation de liberté est légale. pour qu’il en soit ainsi, le décideur doit avoir le pouvoir de l’ordonner, le processus décisionnel doit être équitable et la décision de mise en déten- tion doit être raisonnable et conforme à la charte (may, par.  77; r c khela, 2009  csc  4, [2009] 1 rcs 104, par 72). les modifications qui sont apportées aux conditions ou aux ordonnances et qui mènent à d’autres privations de liberté peuvent éga- lement être contestées de la même manière. lorsque, comme en l’espèce, la demande est assortie d’un cer- tiorari auxiliaire, le tribunal qui entend la demande effectue son examen en fonction du dossier qui a donné lieu à la décision (j. farbey, r j. sharpe et s. atrill, the law of habeas corpus (3e éd. 2011), p. 45; établissement de mission c. khela, par. 35; r. c. miller, [1985] 2 rcs 613, p 624). [18] the writ of habeas corpus is not a discretion- ary remedy; it issues as of right where the applicant successfully challenges the legality of a detention. a provincial superior court may not decline jurisdiction to hear such an application merely because alternative remedies are available (may, at paras. 34 and 44). such a court may only decline jurisdiction where the legislator has put in place “a complete, comprehen- sive and expert statutory scheme which provides for a review at least as broad as that available by way of habeas corpus and no less advantageous” (may, at para. 40; r v. bird, 2019 scc 7, [2019] 1 scr 409, at para 65). as mr. chhina’s case illustrates, this analysis must be undertaken regarding the nature of the specific challenge to the legality of the detention raised in the habeas corpus application. [18] la demande d’habeas corpus n’est pas un recours discrétionnaire; elle est accueillie d’office lorsque le demandeur réussit à remettre en cause la légalité d’une détention. une cour supérieure provin- ciale ne peut décliner sa compétence d’entendre une telle demande simplement parce qu’il existe d’autres recours (may, par. 34 et 44). elle peut le faire seule- ment lorsque le législateur a mis en place « un régime complet, exhaustif et spécialisé prévoyant une procé- dure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avanta- geuse que celle de l’habeas corpus » (may, par. 40; r c. bird, 2019 csc 7, [2019] 1 rcs 409, par 65). comme l’illustre le cas de m. chhina, l’analyse doit s’effectuer à la lumière de la nature de la remise en cause spécifique soulevée dans la demande d’habeas corpus quant à la légalité de la détention. [19] habeas corpus — which roughly translates to “produce the body” — was a familiar phrase in 13th century english civil procedure; it required [19] l’habeas corpus — que l’on peut traduire à peu près par « que tu aies le corps pour le sou- mettre » — était une expression familière dans le 482 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. the defendant of an action to be brought physically before the court (farbey, sharpe and atrill, at p 2). during the 15th and 16th centuries, habeas corpus took on its modern form, permitting an applicant to demand justification for their detention (at p. 4) and becoming the “great and efficacious writ in all man- ner of illegal confinement” (w. blackstone, com- mentaries on the laws of england, book iii: of private wrongs (2016), by t p gallanis, at p 89). habeas corpus has never been “a static, narrow, formalistic remedy”; rather, over the centuries, it “has grown to achieve its grand purpose — the pro- tection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their lib- erty” (may, at para. 21, citing jones v. cunningham, 371 us 236 (1962), at p 243). [20] habeas corpus continues to hold a vital and distinguished place in canada’s modern legal land- scape. before the advent of the charter, s. 2 of the canadian bill of rights, sc 1960, c. 44, established that no law of canada would be construed or applied so as to deprive a person of a determination on the validity of their detention, and provided for release where that detention was found to be unlawful. in 1982, habeas corpus became a constitutional right entrenched in s. 10(c) of the charter: domaine de la procédure civile anglaise au 13e siècle; cette procédure exigeait que l’on présente physi- quement le défendeur à une action devant le tri- bunal (farbey, sharpe et atrill, p 2). au cours des 15e et 16e siècles, l’habeas corpus a pris sa forme moderne, permettant à un demandeur de réclamer une justification pour sa détention (p. 4) et deve- nant le [traduction] « grand bref efficace pour tous les cas de détention illégale » (w. blackstone, commentaries on the laws of england, livre iii : of private wrongs (2016), par t p gallanis, p 89). l’habeas corpus n’a jamais été [traduction] « un recours statique, étroit et formaliste »; au cours des siècles, sa portée « s’est [plutôt] élargie afin qu’il puisse remplir son objet premier — la protection des individus contre l’érosion de leur droit de ne pas se voir imposer de restrictions abusives à leur liberté » (may, par. 21, citant jones c. cunningham, 371 us 236 (1962), p 243). [20] l’habeas corpus continue d’occuper une place essentielle et prestigieuse dans le paysage juridique moderne au canada. avant l’adoption de la charte, l’art. 2 de la déclaration canadienne des droits, sc 1960, c. 44, prescrivait qu’aucune loi du canada ne serait interprétée ou ne s’appliquerait de manière à priver une personne de voir être jugée la validité de sa détention, et prévoyait que cette personne serait libérée si sa détention était décla- rée illégale. en 1982, l’habeas corpus est devenu un droit constitutionnel, enchâssé à l’al. 10c) de la charte : 10 everyone has the right on arrest or detention 10 chacun a le droit, en cas d’arrestation ou de dé- tention :   .   . (c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the deten- tion is not lawful. c) de faire contrôler, par habeas corpus, la légalité de sa détention et d’obtenir, le cas échéant, sa libération. [21] the review of legality under habeas corpus is broad, often protecting and interacting with other charter rights, including: the right to life, liberty and security of the person, as guaranteed by s. 7; the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, as guaranteed by s. 9; and the right not to be subjected [21] le contrôle de la légalité d’une détention sous le régime de l’habeas corpus a une large portée, pro- tégeant et interagissant souvent avec d’autres droits protégés par la charte, notamment le droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne, protégé par l’art. 7; le droit à la protection contre la détention [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 483 to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, as guaranteed by s 12. [22] the case of dumas v. leclerc institute, [1986] 2 scr 459, helpfully illustrates different circum- stances in which a deprivation of liberty may arise, and thus, different ways in which a detention may be challenged. a deprivation of liberty may relate to (1) the initial decision requiring the detention; or to a further deprivation of liberty based on (2) a change in the conditions of the detention; or (3) the continuation of the detention. [23] while not exhaustive, this list may be particu- larly helpful in pinpointing the nature of a challenge to a deprivation of liberty for reasons beyond those underlying an initial order. as i shall explore in more detail below, these three categories can assist in ex- plaining the relevant case- law. for example, in the immigration context, a finding of inadmissibility may lead to a detention order that constitutes an initial deprivation of liberty: this is the first dumas category (peiroo). the transfer of prisoners from a lower to a higher security institution is emblematic of the second type of deprivation: a change in cir- cumstances resulting in an additional deprivation of liberty (may). the third type of deprivation out- lined in dumas can speak to extended detentions or detentions of uncertain duration, which may en- gage ss. 7 and 9 of the charter, as was argued here (and in chaudhary v. canada (minister of public safety and emergency preparedness), 2015 onca 700, 127 or (3d) 401, and ogiamien v. ontario (community safety and correctional services), 2017 onca 839, 55 imm. lr (4th) 220). ou l’emprisonnement arbitraires, protégé par l’art. 9; et le droit à la protection contre tous traitements ou peines cruels et inusités, protégé par l’art 12. [22] l’affaire dumas c. centre de détention le- clerc, [1986] 2 rcs 459, est utile pour illustrer différentes circonstances dans lesquelles peut surve- nir une privation de liberté et, de ce fait, différentes manières possibles de contester une détention. une privation de liberté peut être liée à (1) la décision initiale exigeant la mise en détention, ou à une autre privation de liberté fondée sur (2) un changement dans les conditions de la détention ou (3) la conti- nuation de la détention. [23] bien qu’elle ne soit pas exhaustive, cette liste peut s’avérer particulièrement utile pour détermi- ner la nature d’une remise en cause relativement à une privation de liberté fondée sur des motifs indé- pendants de ceux qui sous- tendaient l’ordonnance initiale. comme je le verrai plus en détail ultérieure- ment, ces trois catégories peuvent aider à expliquer la jurisprudence applicable. par exemple, dans le contexte de l’immigration, une conclusion d’inter- diction de territoire peut mener à une mesure de mise en détention constituant une privation initiale de liberté : il s’agit de la première catégorie de dumas (peiroo). le transfèrement de détenus d’un établis- sement à sécurité moins élevée vers un établissement plus sécurisé est l’exemple type du deuxième type de privation : un changement de circonstances donnant lieu à une privation additionnelle de liberté (may). le troisième type de privation exposé dans dumas peut comprendre les détentions prolongées ou celles dont la durée est incertaine, qui peuvent mettre en jeu les art. 7 et 9 de la charte, comme on l’a fait valoir en l’espèce (ainsi que dans chaudhary c. canada (min- ister of public safety & emergency preparedness), 2015 onca 700, 127 or (3d) 401, et ogiamien c. ontario (community safety and correctional ser- vices), 2017 onca 839, 55 imm lr (4th) 220). [24] regardless of how a deprivation of liberty arises, the importance of the “great writ of liberty” underlies the general rule  that exceptions to the availability of habeas corpus must be limited and carefully defined. [24] sans égard à la manière dont une privation de liberté a lieu, l’importance du « grand bref de la liberté » sous- tend la règle générale selon laquelle les exceptions à la disponibilité de l’habeas corpus doivent être circonscrites et bien définies. 484 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. [25] to date, this court has recognized only two instances where a provincial superior court may de- cline to hear a habeas corpus application. the first allows a provincial superior court to decline jurisdic- tion where a prisoner seeks to attack the legality of their conviction or sentence, determinations properly challenged through the appeal mechanisms set out in the criminal code (gamble, at p 636). the sec- ond exception arose in the field of immigration law. in peiroo, the applicant sought issuance of a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, contesting a finding that there was no credible basis for her refugee claim and arguing that there was therefore no basis for a removal order issued against her. the ontario court of appeal found that the immigration act, rsc 1985, c. i-2, then in force established a comprehensive scheme regulating the determination and review of immigration claims in a manner that was “as broad as or broader than the traditional scope of review by way of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid” (peiroo, at p 261). [26] both of these exceptions acknowledge the development of sophisticated procedural vehicles in our modern legal system and their ability to fully protect fundamental rights such as habeas corpus. [25] à ce jour, la cour n’a reconnu que deux cas dans lesquels une cour supérieure provinciale peut refuser d’entendre une demande d’habeas corpus. le premier permet à une telle cour de décliner sa compé- tence lorsqu’un détenu cherche à contester la légalité de sa déclaration de culpabilité ou de la peine infli- gée, ces décisions pouvant être remises en cause au moyen de mécanismes d’appel décrits dans le code criminel (gamble, p 636). la seconde exception a émergé dans le contexte du droit de l’immigration. dans peiroo, la demanderesse visait à ce que soit délivré un bref d’habeas corpus assorti d’un certio- rari auxiliaire, en contestant une conclusion selon laquelle sa demande d’asile n’avait aucun fondement crédible et en faisant valoir que, par conséquent, rien ne justifiait la prise d’une mesure de renvoi contre elle. la cour d’appel de l’ontario a conclu que la loi sur l’immigration, lrc 1985, c. i-2, alors en vigueur, établissait un régime exhaustif régissant l’examen des demandes en matière d’immigration et la prise de décision à leur égard, de sorte que ce régime avait une [traduction] « portée [  ] au moins aussi large que la portée traditionnelle de l’habeas corpus assorti d’un certiorari auxiliaire » (peiroo, p 261). [26] ces deux exceptions reconnaissent l’élabo- ration de véhicules procéduraux sophistiqués dans notre système juridique moderne ainsi que le fait que ceux-ci sont en mesure d’offrir une protection complète des droits fondamentaux, au même titre que l’habeas corpus. [27] statutory appeals in criminal matters, previ- ously circumscribed by the common law writs of certiorari and error, were introduced some 500 years after habeas corpus (v m del buono, “the right to appeal in indictable cases: a legislative history” (1978), 16 alta. lr 446, at p 448). although the court affirmed the criminal code exception in the context of a charter challenge in gamble, the rule pre- empting habeas corpus applications where a stat- utory appeal is available long pre- dates the charter (see: in re trepanier (1885), 12 scr 111; in re sproule (1886), 12 scr 140, at p. 204; goldhar v. the queen, [1960] scr 431, at p. 439; morrison v. the queen, [1966] scr 356; karchesky v. the [27] en matière criminelle, les appels prévus par la loi, qui étaient antérieurement circonscrits par les brefs de certiorari et l’erreur en common law, ont été introduits quelque 500 ans après l’habeas corpus (v m del buono, « the right to appeal in indictable cases : a legislative history » (1978), 16 alta. lr 446, p 448). bien que la cour ait confirmé dans gamble l’exception relative au code criminel dans le contexte d’une contestation fondée sur la charte, la règle écartant les demandes d’habeas corpus dans les cas où un appel prévu par la loi pouvait être interjeté a existé bien avant la charte (voir : in re trepanier (1885), 12 rcs 111;. in re sproule (1886), 12 rcs 140, p. 204; goldhar c. [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 485 queen, [1967] scr 547, at p. 551; korponay v. kulik, [1980] 2 scr 265). [28] the irpa, for its part, is a product of the rise of the modern administrative state: a parallel justice system established alongside the courts of law to pro- vide accessible, expert, and expeditious adjudication of a broad spectrum of claims. for example, the deci- sion in pringle v. fraser, [1972] scr 821, holding that the immigration act, rsc 1952, c. 325, ousted provincial superior court jurisdiction to entertain a writ of certiorari, was an early recognition of the possibility that a legislature could create alternative avenues of review through administrative bodies. [29] both of these exceptions target similar con- cerns, primarily the “need to restrict the growth of collateral methods of attacking convictions or other deprivations of liberty” (may, at para 35). by af- firming such statutory schemes, the standard set out in may ensures the constitutional right to habeas corpus is protected, while also realizing judicial economy, avoiding duplicative proceedings, and re- ducing the possibility of inconsistent decisions and forum shopping. [30] at issue in this appeal is the scope of the peiroo exception and, more specifically, whether that exception precludes habeas corpus for all deter- minations made under immigration legislation. the appellant argues that it does, pointing to this court’s description of the peiroo exception in may, where we stated: “in matters of immigration law, because parliament has put in place a complete, comprehen- sive and expert statutory scheme which provides for a review at least as broad as that available by way of habeas corpus and no less advantageous, habeas corpus is precluded” (may, at para 40). the queen, [1960] rcs 431, p. 439; morrison c. the queen, [1966] rcs 356;. karchesky c. the queen, [1967] rcs 547, p. 551; korponay c. kulik, [1980] 2 rcs 265). [28] la lipr, quant à elle, est un produit de l’avène- ment de l’état administratif moderne : un système de justice parallèle au système judiciaire afin de faciliter l’accès à une instance spécialisée et expéditive pour un large éventail de demandes. par exemple, l’arrêt rendu dans pringle c. fraser, [1972] rcs 821, — dans lequel la cour a jugé que la loi sur l’immigra- tion, src 1952, c. 325, écartait la compétence des cours supérieures provinciales d’entendre une de- mande de bref de certiorari — constituait une recon- naissance précoce de la possibilité qu’une législature puisse créer d’autres modes d’examen par l’entremise d’organismes administratifs. [29] ces deux exceptions visent à répondre à des préoccupations similaires, soit principalement à « la nécessité d’endiguer la multiplication des moyens indirects de contester des déclarations de culpabilité ou d’autres privations de la liberté » (may, par 35). en confirmant de tels régimes législatifs, la norme énoncée dans may garantit que le droit constitution- nel à l’habeas corpus est protégé, tout en faisant une économie des ressources judiciaires, en évitant le dédoublement des instances et en réduisant la possi- bilité que des décisions incohérentes soient rendues ainsi que la recherche du tribunal le plus favorable. [30] la question à trancher dans le présent pour- voi est celle de la portée de l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo et, plus précisément, celle de savoir si cette exception écarte le recours à l’habeas corpus relativement à toutes les décisions prises sous le régime législatif applicable en matière d’immigra- tion. l’appelant fait valoir que tel est bel et bien le cas. il invoque la description qu’a faite la cour de l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo dans may, où nous avons affirmé que, « en droit de l’immigration, le recours de l’habeas corpus est écarté parce que le législateur a mis en place un régime complet, exhaus- tif et spécialisé prévoyant une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus » (may, par 40). 486 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. in my view, this statement was never intended [31] to preclude habeas corpus review of every detention arising in the immigration context, whatever the nature of the challenge to the legality of the deten- tion. i do not see may as standing for such a broad proposition. i say this for three reasons. [32] first, the irpa was not before the court in may. in that case, a number of federal prisoners who were transferred from minimum to medium- security institutions brought habeas corpus applications to challenge this transfer to a more restrictive form of custody. the warden of the institution argued that the corrections and conditional release act, sc 1992, c. 20 (ccra), set out a comprehensive statutory scheme that provided effective remedies compara- ble to habeas corpus — a proposition this court did not accept. in that context, the court compared the ccra not to the irpa (although it was then in force), but rather to the immigration act considered in peiroo. the court concluded that, unlike the im- migration scheme, the corrections statute did not guarantee impartial review, articulate specific and effective remedies, or even provide clear grounds upon which transfer decisions could be reviewed (may, at para 62). [31] à mon avis, cette affirmation n’a jamais eu pour but d’écarter l’examen au regard de l’habeas corpus relativement à toutes les mises en détention en contexte d’immigration, quelle que soit la nature de la remise en cause de la légalité de la détention. selon moi, l’arrêt may ne fait pas une proposition aussi large, et ce, pour trois raisons. [32] premièrement, la lipr n’était pas en cause devant la cour lorsque celle-ci a été saisie de la cause may. dans cette affaire, un certain nombre de détenus dans des établissements fédéraux avaient été transfé- rés d’un établissement à sécurité minimale à un autre à sécurité moyenne. ils ont présenté des demandes d’habeas corpus pour remettre en cause ce transfère- ment vers une forme de détention plus contraignante. le directeur de l’établissement a fait valoir que la loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, lc 1992, c. 20 (lscmlc), établissait un régime législatif complet qui offrait des recours comparables à l’habeas corpus — une proposition que la cour n’a pas acceptée. dans ce contexte, cette dernière a comparé la lscmlc, non pas à la lipr (même si cette dernière était en vigueur), mais plutôt à la loi sur l’immigration examinée dans peiroo. elle a conclu que, contrairement au régime applicable en matière d’immigration, la loi en matière correction- nelle ne garantissait pas la tenue d’un contrôle impar- tial, ne créait pas de mesures de réparation spécifiques et efficaces, ou même ne fournissait pas de motifs clairs en fonction desquels les décisions de transfère- ment pouvaient être examinées (may, par 62). [33] second, the jurisprudence relied on by the court in may — peiroo, pringle, and reza v. can- ada, [1994] 2 scr 394, — did not stand for the broad proposition that habeas corpus will never be available where the detention is related to immigra- tion matters. may must be understood in light of the cases cited; the court did not purport to extend their holdings. neither pringle nor reza dealt specifically with habeas corpus. pringle was concerned with certiorari, a writ which, unlike habeas corpus, is not constitutionally protected. reza did not involve an application for habeas corpus, but a challenge to the constitutionality of the immigration act on other grounds. even peiroo did not provide that habeas corpus could never lie in the immigration context. [33] deuxièmement, la jurisprudence sur laquelle s’est fondée la cour dans may  — soit les arrêts peiroo, pringle et reza c. canada, [1994] 2 rcs. 394, — n’appuyait pas la proposition générale se- lon laquelle il ne serait jamais possible de recourir à l’habeas corpus lorsque la détention est liée aux questions d’immigration. il faut interpréter l’arrêt may à la lumière des causes citées; la cour n’a pas eu l’intention d’étendre leurs conclusions. ni l’arrêt pringle ni l’arrêt reza n’ont traité spécifiquement de l’habeas corpus. l’arrêt pringle portait sur le certiorari, un bref qui, contrairement à celui d’ha- beas corpus, n’est pas protégé par la constitution. l’arrêt reza ne concernait pas non plus une demande d’habeas corpus, mais bien une contestation de la [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 487 it simply determined that the immigration act then in force was “as broad as or broader” than habeas corpus for “immigration matters” like ms. peiroo’s claim. ms. peiroo had argued that the adjudicator erred in finding she had no credible basis for her refugee claim and that her detention was therefore ordered illegally. constitutionnalité de la loi sur l’immigration pour d’autres motifs. même l’arrêt peiroo n’a pas pres- crit que l’habeas corpus ne pourrait jamais servir dans le contexte de l’immigration. il a simplement décidé que la loi sur l’immigration alors en vigueur était « au moins aussi large » que l’habeas corpus pour des [traduction] « questions d’immigration » comme celle de mme peiroo. celle-ci avait soutenu que le décideur avait commis une erreur en concluant qu’elle n’avait aucun fondement crédible pour sa de- mande d’asile et que sa détention était donc illégale. [34] finally, may itself urges us to interpret ex- ceptions to the availability of habeas corpus restric- tively: [34] enfin, l’arrêt may lui- même nous a incités à interpréter restrictivement les exceptions qui limitent l’accès à l’habeas corpus : given the historical importance of habeas corpus in the protection of various liberty interests, jurisprudential developments limiting habeas corpus jurisdiction should be carefully evaluated and should not be allowed to expand unchecked. the exceptions to habeas corpus jurisdiction and the circumstances under which a superior court may decline jurisdiction should be well defined and limited. [para. 50] [35] for these reasons, i do not think may should be interpreted as holding that the peiroo exception bars all habeas corpus applications that arise in the immigration context, regardless of the grounds raised to challenge detention. [36] two recent ontario court of appeal cases — chaudhary and ogiamien — recognized that the peiroo exception does not bar all habeas corpus applications targeting a deprivation of liberty that arises from the immigration scheme. l’importance historique de l’habeas corpus dans la protection de diverses formes de liberté justifie un examen soigneux de toute évolution jurisprudentielle restreignant la compétence en matière d’habeas corpus et ne permet pas de le laisser se développer sans contrôle. il importe que les exceptions à la compétence en matière d’habeas corpus et les circonstances dans lesquelles une cour supé- rieure peut décliner compétence demeurent bien définies et circonscrites. [par. 50] [35] pour ces motifs, j’estime qu’il ne faudrait pas donner à l’arrêt may un sens qui serait tel que l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo écarte toutes les demandes d’habeas corpus qui se présentent dans le contexte de l’immigration, sans égard aux motifs invoqués pour remettre en cause la détention. [36] deux arrêts récents de la cour d’appel de l’ontario — chaudhary et ogiamien — ont reconnu que l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo n’interdisait pas toutes les demandes d’habeas corpus visant une privation de liberté découlant du régime législatif applicable en matière d’immigration. in chaudhary, rouleau ja, writing for the [37] court, distinguished the case before him from peiroo by noting that the applicant in peiroo had challenged aspects of her refugee status itself — an immigration determination for which the irpa provided review as broad as habeas corpus — whereas the multiple applicants in chaudhary challenged their deten- tions on the grounds that the extended duration or [37] dans l’arrêt chaudhary, le juge rouleau, au nom de la cour d’appel, a distingué l’affaire dont il était saisi de l’affaire peiroo, en faisant remar- quer que la demanderesse dans cette dernière avait remis en cause des aspects de son statut même de réfugiée — une décision en matière d’immigration pour laquelle la lipr prévoyait un contrôle aussi large que l’habeas corpus — alors que les multiples 488 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. indeterminacy of detention offended s. 7 of the char- ter. the court of appeal concluded that the irpa was not as broad or advantageous as habeas corpus with respect to such queries. moreover, the appli- cants challenged only their detention: the outcome of the applications would have no effect on their immigration status. ultimately, provincial superior court jurisdiction was a necessary complement to the statutory scheme in order to protect the constitutional right to habeas corpus. [38] sharpe ja addressed similar facts in ogiam- ien, finding that a 25- month detention — on the basis of an outstanding deportation order — was subject to habeas corpus review. although the court found it was unnecessary to consider mr. ogiamien’s con- tention that he should have been detained in an im- migration holding centre rather than in a maximum security facility — given that specific complaint had been dealt with in a separate application — it noted that the principle applied in chaudhary was not re- stricted to situations involving lengthy detentions of uncertain duration. instead, the principle rested upon the superior court’s broad residual jurisdic- tion to entertain habeas corpus applications subject only to the framework set out in may (ogiamien, at paras 38-42). i agree with the chaudhary and ogiamien ap- [39] proach, adopted by the court of appeal in this case. this approach properly flows from the principles set out by this court in may. demandeurs dans l’affaire chaudhary contestaient leur détention au motif que leur durée prolongée ou leur caractère indéterminé contrevenaient à l’art. 7 de la charte. la cour d’appel a conclu que la lipr n’avait pas une portée aussi large ou avantageuse que l’habeas corpus en rapport avec de telles questions. de plus, les demandeurs ne remettaient en cause que leur détention; l’issue des demandes n’allait avoir aucun effet sur leur statut en matière d’immi- gration. en fin de compte, la compétence des cours supérieures provinciales constituait un complément nécessaire au régime législatif pour protéger le droit constitutionnel à l’habeas corpus. [38] le juge sharpe de la cour d’appel s’est pen- ché sur des faits similaires dans l’arrêt ogiamien, et il a conclu qu’une détention de 25 mois — en raison d’une mesure d’expulsion toujours en vigueur — était sujette à un examen par voie d’habeas corpus. bien que la cour d’appel ait conclu qu’il n’était pas nécessaire de prendre en considération la prétention de m. ogiamien selon laquelle il aurait dû être dé- tenu dans un centre de surveillance de l’immigration plutôt que dans un établissement à sécurité maxi- male — étant donné que cette plainte spécifique avait été étudiée dans le cadre d’une demande distincte —, elle a fait remarquer que le principe appliqué dans l’arrêt chaudhary n’était pas limité aux situations comportant de longues détentions dont la durée était incertaine. au lieu de cela, le principe reposait sur la vaste compétence résiduelle de la cour supérieure d’entendre les demandes d’habeas corpus, sous ré- serve seulement du cadre établi dans may (ogiamien, par 38-42). [39] je souscris à l’approche préconisée par les arrêts chaudhary et ogiamien, qu’a adoptée la cour d’appel dans la présente affaire. cette approche dé- coule comme il se doit des principes énoncés par la cour dans may. in sum, the peiroo exception can be more [40] clearly articulated as follows: an application for ha- beas corpus will be precluded only when a complete, comprehensive and expert scheme provides for re- view that is at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus with respect to the challenges raised by the habeas corpus application. an administrative [40] en somme, l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo peut être exprimée plus clairement ainsi : une demande d’habeas corpus n’est écartée que lorsqu’il existe un régime complet, exhaustif et spécialisé pré- voyant une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus, à la lumière des remises en cause de la détention [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 489 scheme may be sufficient to safeguard the interests protected by habeas corpus with respect to some types of challenges, but may also need to be re- examined with respect to others. it is thus essential to consider how the challenge to the unlawful detention is framed in the habeas corpus application. énoncées dans la demande d’habeas corpus un régime administratif peut suffire pour sauvegarder les droits protégés par l’habeas corpus relativement à certains types de contestations, mais il peut s’avérer nécessaire de l’examiner à nouveau dans d’autres cas. il est donc essentiel de prendre en compte la manière dont la remise en cause de la légalité de la détention est formulée dans la demande d’habeas corpus. a determining when the exception applies a la détermination des circonstances dans les- quelles s’applique l’exception [41] how, then, does a court determine whether there is “a complete, comprehensive and expert stat- utory scheme which provides for a review at least as broad as that available by way of habeas corpus and no less advantageous” such that an applicant will be precluded from bringing an application for habeas corpus (may, at para. 40)? [41] comment, alors, un tribunal détermine-t-il s’il existe « un régime complet, exhaustif et spécia- lisé prévoyant une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus », de sorte qu’un demandeur sera empêché de présenter une demande d’habeas corpus (may, par. 40)? [42] first, it is necessary to ask upon what basis the legality of the detention is being challenged. in other words, what are the grounds in the applicant’s habeas corpus application? reference to the cate- gories in dumas may be helpful to this inquiry. is the applicant challenging an initial decision that re- sulted in detention, such as a removal order? are they challenging the conditions of their detention? or are they challenging the length and uncertain duration of their detention? precisely delineating the grounds for the habeas corpus application is necessary in order to determine whether there is an effective statutory remedy to address those grounds. [42] premièrement, il faut se demander quel est le fondement de la remise en cause de la légalité de la détention. en d’autres termes, il faut déterminer quels sont les motifs invoqués au soutien de la de- mande d’habeas corpus. la référence aux catégories énumérées dans dumas peut être utile à cet examen. le demandeur conteste-t-il une décision initiale qui a entraîné la détention, comme une mesure de ren- voi? conteste-t-il les conditions de sa détention? ou conteste-il la durée de sa détention et son caractère incertain? il est nécessaire de circonscrire précisé- ment les fondements de la demande d’habeas corpus afin de déterminer s’il existe un recours légal efficace pour répondre à ces motifs. [43] second, it is necessary to ask whether there is a complete, comprehensive and expert scheme that is as broad and advantageous as habeas cor- pus in relation to the specific grounds in the habeas corpus application. elements of the irpa detention review scheme may speak to whether the scheme is complete, comprehensive and expert. however, the main issue in this case, and the focus of the parties’ submissions, is whether irpa review is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus with respect to the specific basis upon which mr. chhina challenged the legality of his detention. in this inquiry, it may [43] deuxièmement, il faut se demander s’il existe une procédure complète, exhaustive et spécialisée qui soit aussi large et avantageuse que l’habeas cor- pus relativement aux fondements spécifiques de la demande d’habeas corpus. certains éléments du régime de contrôle de la détention établi par la lipr permettent d’affirmer que le régime est complet, ex- haustif et spécialisé. toutefois, la principale question en litige en l’espèce, et celle sur laquelle se sont concentrées les observations des parties, est celle de savoir si le processus de contrôle établi par la lipr est aussi large et avantageux que l’habeas corpus en 490 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. be helpful to look at whether a statutory scheme fails entirely to include the grounds set out in the application for habeas corpus. if so, the scheme will not be as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus. the scheme will also fail to oust habeas corpus if it provides for review on the grounds in the application, but the review process is not as broad and advan- tageous as that available through habeas corpus, considering both the nature of the process and any advantages each procedural vehicle may offer. [44] as i shall explain, applying this framework to the facts of mr. chhina’s case reveals that while the statutory scheme set out in the irpa, including judicial review, may provide adequate review with respect to some matters, it is unable to effectively address the challenge raised by mr. chhina’s appli- cation in a manner that is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus. ce qui a trait aux fondements spécifiques de la remise en cause par m. chhina de la légalité de sa déten- tion. dans le cadre de cet examen, il peut s’avérer utile d’examiner si le régime légal est muet quant aux fondements énoncés dans la demande d’habeas corpus. si c’est le cas, ce régime n’est pas aussi large et avantageux que l’habeas corpus. le régime ne pourra pas non plus écarter l’habeas corpus s’il pré- voit un examen fondé sur les motifs invoqués dans la demande, mais que cet examen n’est pas aussi large et avantageux que celui de l’habeas corpus, en pre- nant en considération tant la nature de la procédure d’examen que tous les avantages pouvant être offerts par chacun des véhicules procéduraux. [44] comme je l’expliquerai, si on applique ce cadre aux faits de l’affaire de m. chhina, on observe que, bien que le régime établi par la lipr (y compris le contrôle judiciaire) puisse prévoir une procédure d’examen adéquate en rapport avec certaines ques- tions, il ne peut répondre efficacement à la remise en cause formulée dans la demande de m. chhina d’une manière aussi large et avantageuse que ne le ferait l’habeas corpus. b identifying the grounds of mr. chhina’s chal- b la détermination des fondements de la remise lenge en cause invoqués par m. chhina [45] the first step is to identify the grounds raised in the habeas corpus application. mr. chhina chal- lenged the legality of his detention on two grounds: that he was being held in inappropriate conditions and that the duration of his detention had become indeterminate and overly lengthy. mr. chhina ar- gued that the length and duration of his detention violated his rights under ss. 7 and 9 of the charter because there was no reasonable prospect that the immigration- related purposes justifying his deten- tion would be achieved within a reasonable time. the courts below proceeded on the basis of this second ground: that the lengthy detention of indeterminate duration violated the charter. [45] il faut avant tout identifier les fondements de la demande d’habeas corpus. m. chhina a contesté la légalité de sa détention pour deux motifs : parce qu’il était détenu dans des conditions inappropriées et parce que la durée de sa détention était devenue indétermi- née et excessivement longue. m. chhina a fait valoir que la longueur et la durée de sa détention violait ses droits protégés par les art. 7 et 9 de la charte, parce qu’il n’y avait aucune perspective raisonnable que les objectifs liés à l’immigration qui justifiaient sa détention soient atteints dans un délai raisonnable. les tribunaux d’instance inférieure ont fondé leur dé- cision sur ce deuxième motif, à savoir que la détention prolongée d’une durée indéterminée violait la charte. [46] unlike in peiroo, mr. chhina’s application for habeas corpus had nothing to do with whether his inadmissibility or deportation were rightly or wrongly decided. [46] contrairement à la demande en cause dans l’affaire peiroo, la demande d’habeas corpus de m. chhina n’avait rien à voir avec la question de sa- voir si les décisions sur son interdiction de territoire ou son expulsion étaient bien fondées ou erronées. [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 491 c the irpa statutory review scheme c le régime légal d’examen établi par la lipr [47] in determining whether the scheme provides for review as broad and advantageous as habeas cor- pus, the court should look at the actual alternatives for detention review realistically available to some- one in mr. chhina’s circumstances. as this court stated in may, a “purposive approach    requires that we look at the entire context”, which in that case included the relative disadvantages of judicial review in the federal court (may, at para 65). this examination may include any administrative adjudi- cators, tribunals, and internal appeal mechanisms, as well as available judicial review or statutory appeal routes. in this case, i consider both the immigration division and the judicial review processes in the federal courts. i begin first with a general overview of how the [48] irpa scheme functions before considering whether it offers review as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus. the irpa provides a detailed scheme to deal with the review of detention in the immigration context. just as in the criminal context, a depriva- tion of liberty ordered pursuant to the irpa must always be justified. release is the default except where the minister establishes that: the detainee is a danger to the public or is unlikely to appear at a hearing; the minister is inquiring as to inadmissi- bility due to security risks, human rights violations or criminality; or the minister has concerns about establishing the person’s identity (irpa, s 58(1)). each of these grounds of detention is determined in accordance with a list of immigration- specific factors set out in the immigration and refugee protection regulations, sor/2002- 227, ss. 244 to 249 (irpr). [47] pour décider si le régime prévoit un examen aussi large et aussi avantageux que l’habeas corpus, le tribunal doit examiner les solutions de rechange véritables au contrôle de la détention dont peut réa- listement se prévaloir quelqu’un qui se trouve dans la situation de m chhina. comme l’a déclaré la cour dans may, une « démarche téléologique oblige [  ] à l’examen de l’ensemble du contexte », qui, dans cette affaire, comprenait les inconvénients relatifs au contrôle judiciaire devant la cour fédérale (may, par 65). cet examen peut notamment viser à vérifier l’existence de recours à des arbitres ou à des tribu- naux administratifs, de mécanismes d’appel internes ou de processus de contrôle judiciaire ou d’appel prévus par la loi. en l’espèce, je tiens compte tant de la section de l’immigration que des processus de contrôle judiciaire qui peuvent se dérouler devant les cours fédérales. [48] je commencerai en donnant un aperçu géné- ral de la façon dont fonctionne le régime établi par la lipr. j’examinerai ensuite s’il donne lieu à un contrôle aussi large et avantageux que l’habeas cor- pus. la lipr prévoit un régime détaillé qui permet le contrôle de la détention dans le contexte de l’immi- gration. tout comme dans le contexte criminel, une privation de liberté ordonnée au titre de la lipr doit toujours être justifiée. la mise en liberté est l’option par défaut, sauf lorsque le ministre démontre que le détenu constitue un danger pour la sécurité publique ou se soustraira vraisemblablement à une procédure; lorsque le ministre enquête sur l’interdiction de terri- toire en raison de risques de sécurité, d’atteinte aux droits de la personne ou de criminalité; ou lorsqu’il est préoccupé par le fait que l’identité de la personne n’a pas été prouvée (lipr, par 58(1)). chacun de ces motifs de détention est déterminé en fonction d’une liste de critères spécifiques à l’immigration dressée dans le règlement sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, dors/2002- 227, art. 244 à 249 (ripr). [49] once an initial detention order has been made, the irpa review process provides for peri- odic internal review of detention by members of the immigration division of the immigration and refugee board, who are appointed in accordance [49] une fois que la mesure initiale de mise en dé- tention a été prise, la procédure d’examen de la lipr en prévoit le contrôle interne périodique par des commissaires de la section de l’immigration de la commission de l’immigration et du statut de réfugié, 492 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. with the public service employment act, sc 2003, c. 22 (irpa, ss. 151 and 172(2)). a member of the immigration division must conduct an initial review within 48 hours of an individual being taken into immigration custody, as well as a review within the 7 following days, and additional reviews every 30 days thereafter (irpa, s 57). [50] the irpa also explicitly provides for judi- cial review of those decisions by the federal court (irpa, s 72). an appeal from this judicial review is available to the federal court of appeal on a certified question of general importance (irpa, s 74(d)). all the review processes are intimately linked, as judicial review is circumscribed by the statutory mandate of the original decision- maker. [51] lastly, it should be noted that immigration officials are experts in applying their statutory man- date. given its role in judicial review, the federal court has also developed significant familiarity with the immigration context and contributes an addi- tional layer of immigration- related expertise. [52] as this examination reveals, the review pro- cess set out in the irpa is detailed and clear. the grounds for ordering or continuing detention are clear. independent review is assured by judicial re- view through the federal courts. clear remedies, namely release, exist. nommés conformément à la loi sur l’emploi dans la fonction publique, lc 2003, c. 22 (lipr, art. 151 et par 172(2)). un premier contrôle doit être effectué par un commissaire de la section de l’immigration dans les 48 heures suivant le début de la détention aux fins de l’immigration; il doit ensuite y avoir un nouveau contrôle dans les 7 jours suivants, puis d’autres tous les 30 jours par la suite (lipr, art 57). [50] la lipr prévoit en outre explicitement le contrôle judiciaire de ces décisions par la cour fé- dérale (lipr, art 72). un appel de ce contrôle ju- diciaire peut être interjeté devant la cour d’appel fédérale sur une question certifiée de portée géné- rale (lipr, al 74d)). les procédures d’examen sont toutes intimement liées, puisque le contrôle judi- ciaire est circonscrit par le mandat que la loi confère au premier décideur. [51] en dernier lieu, soulignons que les fonction- naires de l’immigration sont experts dans l’exercice du mandat que leur confère la loi. vu son rôle lors du contrôle judiciaire, la cour fédérale a elle aussi acquis une connaissance approfondie du contexte de l’immigration et apporte un surcroît d’expertise en cette matière. [52] comme la présente analyse le révèle, le pro- cessus de contrôle établi par la lipr est détaillé et clair. les motifs pour ordonner la détention ou son maintien sont clairs. l’examen indépendant est assuré par un contrôle judiciaire qu’effectuent les cours fédérales. il existe une mesure de réparation évidente, soit la mise en liberté. [53] however, as i shall explain, irpa proceedings do not provide for review as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus with respect to the specific basis upon which mr. chhina has challenged the legality of his detention. [53] toutefois, comme je l’expliquerai, la procé- dure prescrite par la lipr ne prévoit pas un contrôle aussi large et avantageux que celle en habeas corpus en ce qui a trait au fondement spécifique de la contes- tation par m. chhina de la légalité de sa détention. d is review under the irpa as broad and advan- tageous as habeas corpus? d le contrôle sous le régime de la lipr est-il aussi large et avantageux que l’habeas corpus? [54] the scope of review under the irpa must, of course, actually include the grounds mr. chhina has raised. [54] la portée du contrôle prévue par la lipr doit, bien entendu, effectivement viser les motifs invoqués par m chhina. [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 493 [55] once the minister has established grounds for detention, immigration officers and members of the immigration division must consider factors which may weigh in favour of release, set out at s. 248 of the irpr: [55] une fois que le ministre a établi les motifs de la détention, les agents d’immigration et les commis- saires de la section de l’immigration doivent prendre en compte des critères, dont la liste est dressée à l’art. 248 du ripr, qui peuvent favoriser la mise en liberté : (a) the reason for detention; a) le motif de la détention; (b) the length of time in detention; b) la durée de la détention; (c) whether    that detention is likely to continue and, c) if so, [how long];    l’évaluation de la durée probable de la détention et, dans l’affirmative, [la durée de cette prolonga- tion]; (d) any unexplained delays or unexplained lack of diligence caused by the department, the canada border services agency or the person concerned; and d) les retards inexpliqués ou le manque inexpliqué de diligence de la part du ministère, de l’agence des services frontaliers ou de l’intéressé; (e) the existence of alternatives to detention. e) l’existence de solutions de rechange à la détention. [56] to this list, the federal court of appeal has added that the decision- maker must be mindful of the principles applicable to s. 7 of the charter (canada (minister of citizenship & immigration) v. thana- balasingham, 2004 fca 4, [2004] 3 fcr 572, at para 14). [56] à cette liste, la cour d’appel fédérale a ajouté que le décideur devait prendre en compte les prin- cipes applicables à l’art. 7 de la charte (canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immigration) c. thanabalasingham, 2004 caf 4, [2004] 3 rcf. 572, par 14). [57] mr. chhina challenged the length, uncertain duration and conditions of his detention. the con- ditions in which a person is detained are notably absent from the language of s. 248 of the irpr. counsel for the appellant conceded as much, adding that the conditions of detention are properly within the ambit of the provincial correctional authorities or the canadian border services agency, not the immigration division (brown v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2017 fc 710, 25 admin. lr. (6th) 191, at para 138). the immigration division has no explicit power to examine harsh or illegal conditions. this is to be contrasted with habeas cor- pus, which provides for review of any unlawful form of detention. the inability of a scheme to respond to the specific ground raised in an application of habeas corpus would mean that the scheme does not preclude habeas corpus. however, this ground of mr. chhina’s habeas corpus application was not [57] monsieur chhina a contesté la durée de sa détention, le caractère incertain de cette durée ainsi que les conditions de cette détention. il importe de noter que nulle part dans le texte de l’art. 248 de la ripr n’est-il question des conditions dans lesquelles une personne est détenue. le procureur de l’appelant l’a d’ailleurs reconnu, ajoutant que les conditions de détention relèvent des autorités correctionnelles provinciales ou de l’agence des services frontaliers du canada, et non de la section de l’immigration (brown c. canada (citoyenneté et immigration), 2017 cf 710, 25 admin. lr (6th) 191, par 138). la section de l’immigration n’est investie d’aucun pouvoir explicite de contrôler les conditions difficiles ou illégales. en revanche, l’habeas corpus permet l’examen de toute forme illégale de détention. si un régime est incapable de traiter le motif particu- lier soulevé dans une demande d’habeas corpus, il s’ensuit que ce régime n’écarte pas l’habeas corpus. 494 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. addressed by the court of appeal, nor was it argued before this court. in contrast to the absence of conditions, the [58] regulations do provide for consideration of the length and likely duration of detention (irpr, s. 248(c) and (d)). the question thus becomes whether review of the length and duration of detention under the irpa is as broad and advantageous as that available through habeas corpus. this requires consideration of the nature of the review process and any advan- tages provided by each procedural vehicle. i conclude that the irpa does not provide for [59] review as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus where the applicant alleges their immigration deten- tion is unlawful on the grounds that it is lengthy and of uncertain duration. taken as a whole, the scheme falls short in at least three important ways. first, the onus in detention review under the irpa is less advantageous to detainees than in habeas corpus proceedings. second, the scope of review before the federal courts is narrower than that of a provincial superior court’s consideration of a habeas corpus application. third, habeas corpus provides a more timely remedy than that afforded by judicial review. cela dit, la cour d’appel n’a pas traité de ce motif de la demande d’habeas corpus de m. chhina, et il n’a pas non plus été plaidé devant la cour. [58] contrairement à ce qu’il en est relativement aux conditions de la détention, le règlement prévoit effectivement la prise en compte de sa durée et du fait qu’elle est susceptible de se prolonger (ripr, al. 248c) et d)). la question est donc de savoir si l’examen de la durée et de la prolongation de la détention sous le régime de la lipr est aussi large et avantageux que celui qui découle d’une demande d’habeas corpus. pour trancher cette question, il faut se pencher sur la nature de la procédure d’examen ainsi que sur tous les avantages fournis par chacun des véhicules procéduraux. [59] je conclus que la lipr ne permet pas un con- trôle aussi large et aussi avantageux que celui mené dans le contexte d’une demande d’habeas corpus lorsque le demandeur allègue que sa détention aux fins de l’immigration est illégale au motif qu’elle est longue et de durée incertaine. considéré globale- ment, le régime est insuffisant à au moins trois égards importants. premièrement, le fardeau dont doit s’ac- quitter le détenu lors du contrôle de sa détention sous le régime de la lipr lui est moins favorable que celui qui lui incombe dans le cadre d’une instance d’ha- beas corpus. deuxièmement, la portée du contrôle devant les cours fédérales est plus étroite que celle de l’examen par une cour supérieure provinciale d’une demande d’habeas corpus. troisièmement, l’habeas corpus fournit un recours plus rapidement accessible que celui du contrôle judiciaire. [60] under the irpa, the minister need only make out a prima facie case for continued detention (eg, indicate that the detainee is a continued flight risk) in order to shift the onus to the detainee to justify re- lease. while the irpa places the onus on the minister to demonstrate a ground for detention (irpa, s. 58), the regulations simply state that the length and likely duration of detention (among other factors) “shall be considered before a decision is made on detention or release” (irpr, s 248). the federal court has interpreted the regulations as imposing the onus on the detainees to demonstrate that their continued detention would be unlawful in light of the s. 248 [60] sous le régime de la lipr, il suffit que le ministre établisse une preuve prima facie qu’il y a lieu de maintenir la détention (p ex, en indiquant que le détenu risque toujours de prendre la fuite) pour qu’il incombe au détenu de justifier sa mise en liberté. si la lipr impose bel et bien au ministre le fardeau d’établir un motif de détention (lipr, art.  58), le règlement affirme simplement que le temps passé en détention et la durée probable de celle-ci (entre autres facteurs) « doivent être pris[es] en compte avant qu’une décision ne soit prise quant à la détention ou la mise en liberté » (ripr, art 248). la cour fédérale a interprété le règlement comme [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 495 factors (thanabalasingham, at para. 16; chaudhary, at para. 86; canada (public safety and emergency preparedness) v. lunyamila, 2016 fc 1199, [2017] 3 fcr 428). this understanding of who bears the onus is consistent with the general principle that a charter applicant bears the onus of establishing a charter infringement. in addition, while s. 248 provides that an immigration division member must consider certain factors, the regulations provide no guidance as to how the length and duration of deten- tion are to be considered and, crucially, when these factors might be outweighed by others — such as the reason for detention. thus, as rouleau ja has correctly observed, the irpa does not require the minister to explain or justify the length and uncer- tain duration of a detention, because the minister need only establish one of the grounds at s. 58 of the scheme in order to shift the onus to the detainee (chaudhary, at para 86). this contrasts sharply with habeas corpus where, subject to raising a legitimate ground, the onus is on the minister to justify the legality of the detention in any respect. as noted by this court in mission institution v. khela, the onus in habeas corpus is of particular historical significance: imposant le fardeau au détenu de démontrer que la poursuite de sa détention serait illégale à la lumière des facteurs énumérés à l’art. 248 (thanabalasin- gham, par. 16; chaudhary, par. 86; canada (sécurité publique et protection civile) c. lunyamila, 2016 cf 1199, [2017] 3 rcf 428). cette interprétation est conforme au principe général selon lequel l’auteur d’une demande fondée sur la charte a le fardeau d’en établir l’atteinte. en outre, même si l’art. 248 prévoit qu’un commissaire de la section de l’immi- gration doit examiner certains facteurs, le règlement ne donne aucune ligne directrice quant à la façon de prendre en compte la durée et sa prolongation ainsi que, et cela est crucial, quant au moment où ces cri- tères pourraient être écartés par d’autres — comme le fondement de la détention. par conséquent, comme l’a souligné à juste titre le juge rouleau de la cour d’appel, la lipr n’oblige pas le ministre à expliquer ou à justifier la durée d’une détention et le caractère incertain de cette durée, car il suffit qu’il établisse un seul des motifs énoncés à l’art. 58 du régime pour dé- placer le fardeau sur le détenu (chaudhary, par 86). cela contraste nettement avec la procédure d’habeas corpus, dans le cadre de laquelle le ministre a le fardeau de justifier la légalité de la détention à tous égards, à moins que ne soit soulevée un doute quant à la légalité de la restriction à sa liberté. comme l’a souligné la cour dans établissement de mission c. khela, le fardeau de la preuve dans le contexte d’une demande d’habeas corpus revêt une importance his- torique particulière : this particular shift in onus is unique to the writ of habeas corpus. shifting the legal burden on the detaining author- ities is compatible with the very foundation of the law of habeas corpus, namely that a deprivation of liberty is permissible only if the party effecting the deprivation can demonstrate that it is justified. [para. 40] ce déplacement particulier du fardeau de la preuve est propre au bref d’habeas corpus. l’attribution de ce fardeau aux autorités carcérales exprime le fondement même du droit en matière d’habeas corpus, selon lequel une priva- tion de liberté n’est autorisée que lorsque la personne qui l’a ordonné peut démontrer qu’elle est justifiée. [par. 40] [61] further, on judicial review to the federal court, the onus lies squarely upon the applicant to establish that the decision is unreasonable (mission institution v. khela, at para 40). [61] en outre, dans le cadre d’un contrôle judiciaire en cour fédérale, le fardeau d’établir que la décision est déraisonnable repose carrément sur le demandeur (établissement mission c. khela, par 40). [62] moreover, under the irpa the minister may satisfy its onus by relying on reasons given at a prior detention hearing. this practice has been encouraged by the federal courts, which have held that, while [62] de plus, suivant la lipr, le ministre peut s’ac- quitter de son fardeau en se fondant sur des motifs donnés lors d’une audience antérieure sur la déten- tion. cette pratique a été encouragée par les cours 496 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. previous detention decisions are not binding, “if a member chooses to depart from prior decisions to detain, clear and compelling reasons for doing so must be set out” (thanabalasingham, at para. 10; see also, among others: canada (public safety and emergency preparedness) v. mehmedovic, 2018 fc 729, at para. 19 (canlii); canada (public safety and emergency preparedness) v. torres, 2017 fc 918, at para. 20 (canlii); canada (minister of public safety and emergency preparedness) v. karimi- arshad, 2010 fc 964, 373 ftr 292, at para 16). in other words, immigration officials may rely entirely on reasons given by previous officials to order continued detention and remain fully compliant with the irpa scheme. in practice, the periodic reviews mandated by the irpa are susceptible to self- referential reason- ing, instead of constituting a fresh and independent look at a detainee’s circumstances. [63] thus, the scheme fails to provide the detainee with the fresh and focussed review provided by ha- beas corpus, where the minister bears the onus. the fresh evidence filed before this court emphasizes the above points. an external audit commissioned by the chair of the immigration and refugee board offers a timely, and frankly unfortunate, picture of how the scheme is being administered for those in long- term detention. the 2018 audit highlights how, in practice, detainees do not receive the full benefit of the scheme: – – – in principle, the immigration division should place the onus on the minister to continue de- tention; in practice they often fail to do so (2017/ 2018, audit, at p. 18); in principle, the immigration division should be approaching each detention review afresh; in practice, the immigration division is overly reliant on past detention review decisions (2017/ 2018, audit, pp. 31-32); in principle, the immigration division should be impartial and independent from the cana- dian border services agency; in practice, the fédérales qui ont jugé que, bien qu’il ne soit pas lié par les décisions antérieures relatives à la détention, « il faut, dans les cas où un commissaire décide d’al- ler à l’encontre des décisions antérieures ordonnant la détention d’une personne, que des motifs clairs et convaincants soient énoncés » (thanabalasingham, par. 10; voir aussi, notamment : canada (sécurité publique et protection civile) c. mehmedovic, 2018 cf 729, par. 19 (canlii); canada (sécurité publique et protection civile) c. torres, 2017 cf 918, par. 20 (canlii); canada (sécurité publique et protection civile) c karimi- arshad, 2010  cf  964, par.  16 (canlii)). autrement dit, un agent d’immigration peut se fier entièrement aux motifs prononcés par les agents qui l’ont précédé pour ordonner le maintien en détention, et toujours se conformer en tout point au régime créé par la lipr. en pratique, les examens périodiques prévus par la lipr sont susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un raisonnement autoréférentiel, au lieu de constituer un examen nouveau et indépendant de la situation du détenu. [63] en conséquence, le régime n’offre pas au dé- tenu le contrôle nouveau et précis que procure l’ha- beas corpus, où le ministre assume le fardeau. les nouveaux éléments de preuve déposés devant la cour mettent en évidence les points susmentionnés. une vérification externe demandée par le président de la commission de l’immigration et du statut de réfugiés donne, en temps opportun, un portrait franchement désolant de la façon dont le régime est administré pour les personnes en détention de longue durée. la vérification de 2018 souligne comment, en pratique, les détenus ne tirent pas pleinement parti du régime : – – – en principe, la section de l’immigration devrait imposer au ministre le fardeau pour le maintien de la détention; en pratique, elle omet souvent de le faire (2017/2018, vérification, p. 18); en principe, la section de l’immigration devrait reprendre à neuf chaque contrôle de la détention; en pratique, elle s’appuie excessivement sur des décisions antérieures en matière de contrôle de la détention (2017/2018, vérification, p. 31-32); en principe, la section de l’immigration devrait être impartiale et indépendante de l’agence des services frontaliers du canada; en pratique, [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 497 immigration division often overly relies on the canada border services agency’s submissions (2017/2018, audit, pp. 17-18); and – in principle, the immigration division should be reviewing irpa detentions for compliance with ss. 7, 9, and 12 of the charter; in practice, as a result of their failure to consider each detention review afresh, they do not do so (2017/2018, audit, pp 31-32). [64] the second disadvantage of the irpa scheme is the scope of review. as a practical matter, the im- migration division does not conduct a fresh review of each periodic detention, as discussed above; as such, the scope of review before the federal courts is correspondingly narrower than review on habeas corpus. the broad review provided by habeas cor- pus grapples with detention as a whole. this case, for example, required a holistic consideration of mr. chhina’s charter rights and how they may have been violated — not by an individual decision but by the overall context of his detention. this type of inquiry is closely tied to the expertise of the pro- vincial superior courts (may, at para. 68; see also mission institution v. khela, at para. 45; chaudhary, at para 102). relief through judicial review on the other hand, may be sought only with respect to a sin- gle decision, which in the irpa context is generally the most recent 30- day review (federal courts rules, sor/98- 106, r 302). dans bien des cas, la section de l’immigration s’appuie excessivement sur les observations de l’agence canadienne des services frontaliers (2017/2018, vérification, p. 17-18); – en principe, la section de l’immigration devrait examiner les détentions ordonnées sous le ré- gime de la lipr pour juger de leur conformité au regard des art. 7, 9 et 12 de la charte; en pra- tique, faute de reprendre à neuf chaque contrôle de la détention, elle ne le fait pas (2017/2018, vérification, p 31-32). [64] le deuxième désavantage du régime créé par la lipr réside dans la portée du contrôle. sur le plan pratique, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, la section de l’immigration ne procède pas à neuf chaque fois qu’elle fait un examen périodique des motifs de la détention; ainsi, la portée du contrôle devant les cours fédérales est comparativement plus étroite que celle du contrôle par voie d’habeas corpus. le large examen que permet de faire une demande d’habeas corpus porte sur la détention dans son ensemble. par exemple, la présente cause requérait un examen global des droits que la charte garantit à m. chhina et de la façon dont ils ont pu être violés — non pas par une décision en particulier, mais par le contexte général de sa détention. ce type d’analyse est étroi- tement lié à l’expertise des cours supérieures pro- vinciales (may, par. 68; voir aussi établissement de mission c. khela, par. 45; chaudhary, par 102). en revanche, on ne peut demander une réparation au moyen d’un contrôle judiciaire qu’à l’encontre d’une seule décision, laquelle, dans le contexte de la lipr, est habituellement celle rendue à l’issue du plus récent contrôle aux 30 jours des motifs de dé- tention (règles des cours fédérales, dors/98- 106, art 302). [65] further, the remedies available on judicial re- view are more limited and less advantageous to a de- tainee than on habeas corpus. although the federal courts do have limited powers of mandamus — the power to require a decision- maker to take positive action, such as requiring the immigration division to release a detainee — i am aware of no cases in which release has been ordered. to the extent that they can exercise this power, the remedy is granted [65] de plus, les réparations auxquelles le contrôle judiciaire donne ouverture sont plus limitées et moins avantageuses pour un détenu que celles auxquelles peut mener une demande d’habeas corpus. bien que les cours fédérales détiennent des pouvoirs limités pour rendre des ordonnances de mandamus — le pouvoir d’obliger un décideur à prendre une mesure concrète, par exemple d’obliger la section de l’im- migration à libérer un détenu —, je n’ai connaissance 498 canada (psep) v chhina karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. only where “certain relatively rarely occurring pre- requisites are met” (canada (citizenship and im- migration) v. tennant, 2018 fca 132, at para. 28 (canlii)). instead, a successful judicial review will generally result in an order for redetermination, re- quiring further hearings to obtain release and thereby extending detention. this is to be contrasted with habeas corpus, where release is ordered immediately once the relevant authority has failed to justify the deprivation of liberty. [66] lastly, habeas corpus provides a more timely remedy than those available through the irpa. leave is required for judicial review of a detention decision made under the irpa, and perfecting an application for leave on judicial review can take up to 85 days (irpa, s. 72(2)(b); federal courts citizenship, immi- gration and refugee protection rules, sor/93-22, rr. 10(1), 11 and 13). as the federal court has ac- knowledged, even in the best of circumstances, it is thus impracticable for judicial review to occur before the next 30- day detention review has been held, ren- dering the outcome of the judicial review moot (can- ada (citizenship and immigration) v. b386, 2011 fc 175, [2012] 4 fcr 220, at para. 13; chaudhary, at para 94). the remedy of a rehearing restarts the review process, leading to further delays. this cycle of mootness at the judicial review stage acts as a barrier to timely and effective relief. d’aucune affaire où la libération a été ordonnée. dans la mesure où ce pouvoir peut être exercé, la répara- tion n’est accordée que « lorsque certaines conditions préalables relativement rares sont réunies » (canada (citoyenneté et immigration) c. tennant, 2018 caf 132, par. 28 (canlii)). généralement, une demande de contrôle judiciaire accueillie donne plutôt lieu à une ordonnance de réexamen, lequel nécessite la tenue d’audiences supplémentaires pour obtenir la libération et allonge de ce fait la détention. en re- vanche, dans le cas d’une demande d’habeas corpus, la libération est ordonnée dès que l’autorité compé- tente n’a pas été en mesure de justifier la privation de liberté. [66] enfin, l’habeas corpus permet d’obtenir une réparation plus rapidement que ne le permet la lipr. le contrôle judiciaire d’une décision relative à une détention sous le régime de la lipr requiert l’obten- tion préalable d’une autorisation. or, la mise en état d’une demande d’autorisation de contrôle judiciaire peut prendre jusqu’à 85 jours (lipr, al. 72(2)b); règles des cours fédérales en matière de citoyen- neté, d’immigration et de protection des réfugiés, dors/93-22, par. 10(1) et art. 11 et 13). comme l’a reconnu la cour fédérale, même dans le meilleur des cas, il est donc impossible d’obtenir le contrôle judi- ciaire avant la tenue du prochain contrôle de la déten- tion, soit dans un délai de 30 jours, rendant théorique le résultat du contrôle judiciaire en question (ca- nada (citoyenneté et immigration) c. b386, 2011 cf 175, [2012] 4 rcf 220, par. 13; chaudhary, par 94). la réparation sous forme de réexamen fait recommencer le processus de contrôle, occasion- nant d’autres délais. cette succession de résultats à caractère théorique au stade du contrôle judiciaire fait obstacle à une réparation efficace applicable en temps opportun. in contrast, the importance of habeas cor- [67] pus as a “swift and imperative remedy” has long been recognized (mission institution v. khela, at para. 3; in re storgoff, [1945] scr 526, at p 591). courts across the country have acknowledged this by enacting rules that prioritize the hearing of ha- beas corpus applications. habeas corpus writs are “returnable immediately” before a superior court judge in ontario, and the hearing of habeas corpus [67] par contre, l’importance de l’habeas corpus en tant que [traduction] « recours rapide et im- pératif » est reconnue depuis longtemps (établis- sement de mission c. khela, par. 3; in re storgoff, [1945] rcs 526, p 591). des ressorts partout au pays l’ont reconnu en adoptant des règles faisant en sorte de prioriser l’audition des demandes d’ha- beas corpus le bref d’habeas corpus est «  rap- portable immédiatement  » devant un juge d’une [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge karakatsanis 499 applications have priority over other business of the court in both quebec and nova scotia (habeas cor- pus act, rso 1990, c. h.1, s. 1(1); code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01, art. 82 para. 3; nova scotia civil procedure rules, r 713(1); see also criminal procedure rules of the supreme court of the northwest territories, canada gazette, si/98-78, ss. 103 to 107). the advantages habeas corpus offers with respect to timeliness are especially relevant to an application like mr. chhina’s, which was primar- ily concerned with the duration of his detention. in sum, the irpa fails to provide relief that [68] is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus in response to mr. chhina’s challenge to the legality of the length and uncertain duration of his detention. cour supérieure de l’ontario et l’instruction d’une demande d’habeas corpus a priorité sur toutes les autres affaires dont le tribunal est saisi au québec et en nouvelle- écosse (loi sur l’habeas corpus, lro 1990, c h1, par. 1(1); code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501, art 82 al 3;. règles de procédure civile de la nouvelle- écosse, par 713(1); voir aussi règles de procédure en matière criminelle de la cour suprême des territoires du nord- ouest, tr/98-78, art. 103 à 107). les avantages offerts par l’habeas corpus en ce qui a trait à la promptitude sont particulièrement pertinents à l’égard d’une demande comme celle de m. chhina, qui portait principale- ment sur la durée de sa détention. [68] en résumé, la lipr n’offre pas un recours aussi large et avantageux que la demande d’ha- beas corpus pour répondre à la remise en cause de m. chhina quant à la légalité de la durée de sa dé- tention ou de son caractère incertain. v motion to vary the record v la requête en modification du dossier [69] on appeal before this court, the respondent brought a motion to vary the record and file new ev- idence. this new evidence included a troubling audit that found examples of maladministration within the irpa scheme, resulting in some detainees being kept in a cycle of long- term detention. [70] while the evidence was not necessary to re- solve this appeal, it is admissible pursuant to palmer v. the queen, [1980] 1 scr 759, at p 775. the evidence is new, relevant, credible and confirmatory in that it provides statistical evidence supporting the argument that the irpa scheme is not as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus for lengthy deten- tions, particularly with regards to the onus borne by the applicant at each successive detention review. in this case, even without regard to this evidence, it was clear that the statutory scheme, including judicial review at the federal courts, is not as advantageous as habeas corpus given the nature of the challenge. [69] dans le cadre du pourvoi devant la cour, l’intimé a présenté une requête en modification de dossier et pour être autorisé à déposer de nouveaux éléments de preuve. ceux-ci comprenaient une vé- rification troublante qui a relevé des exemples de mauvaise administration au sein du régime créé par la lipr, faisant en sorte que plusieurs détenus sont maintenus en un cycle de détention de longue durée. [70] les éléments de preuve en question n’étaient pas nécessaires pour trancher le présent pourvoi, mais ils sont admissibles, en application de l’arrêt palmer c. la reine, [1980] 1 rcs 759, p 775. ces éléments de preuve sont nouveaux, pertinents, plausibles et confirmatifs, en ce qu’ils offrent des éléments statis- tiques pour appuyer l’argument selon lequel le régime de la lipr n’est pas aussi large et avantageux que celui de l’habeas corpus eu égard aux détentions de longue durée, en particulier au regard du fardeau im- posé au demandeur à chacun des contrôles successifs de sa détention. dans la présente affaire, même en ne tenant pas compte de ces éléments de preuve, il est évident que le régime légal, y compris le contrôle judi- ciaire en cour fédérale, n’est pas aussi avantageux que l’habeas corpus, vu la nature de la remise en cause. 500 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. vi conclusion vi conclusion [71] habeas corpus is a fundamental and historic remedy which allows individuals to seek a determi- nation as to the legality of their detention. a provin- cial superior court should decline its habeas corpus jurisdiction only when faced with a complete, com- prehensive and expert scheme which provides re- view that is at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus with respect to the grounds raised by the applicant. although our legal system continues to evolve, habeas corpus “remains as fundamental to our modern conception of liberty as it was in the days of king john” and any exceptions to its availa- bility must be carefully limited (charkaoui v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2007 scc 9, [2007] 1 scr 350, at para 28). the irpa has been held to be a complete, comprehensive and expert scheme for immigration matters generally, but it is unable to respond to mr. chhina’s challenge in a manner that is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus and the alberta court of queen’s bench erred in declining to hear mr. chhina’s habeas corpus application. for these reasons, i would allow the motion to adduce new evidence and dismiss the appeal with costs on the basis agreed by the parties. [71] l’habeas corpus constitue un recours fon- damental et historique qui permet à des personnes de solliciter une décision quant à la légalité de leur détention. une cour supérieure provinciale ne devrait refuser d’exercer sa compétence relative à l’habeas corpus que lorsqu’elle est en présence d’un régime complet, exhaustif et spécialisé qui prévoit une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus, relative- ment aux motifs soulevés par le demandeur. l’évo- lution de notre système juridique se poursuit, mais l’habeas corpus « demeure aussi fondamental dans notre conception moderne de la liberté qu’il l’était à l’époque du roi jean », et toute exception à sa dispo- nibilité doit être circonscrite avec soin (charkaoui c. canada (citoyenneté et immigration), 2007 csc 9, [2007] 1 rcs 350, par 28). il a bel et bien été jugé que le régime de la lipr était complet, exhaustif et spécialisé pour les questions d’immigration de ma- nière générale, mais il ne peut répondre à la remise en cause formulée par m. chhina d’une façon aussi vaste et avantageuse que l’habeas corpus. la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta a donc commis une erreur en refusant d’entendre sa demande d’habeas corpus. pour ces motifs, je suis d’avis d’accueillir la requête en en production de nouveaux éléments de preuve et de rejeter le pourvoi avec les dépens adjugés conformément à l’entente convenue par les parties. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [72] abella j. (dissenting) — i share the major- ity’s view that there should be assertive and rigor- ous scrutiny of the lawfulness of any deprivation of liberty. that is why, in my respectful view, the immigration and refugee protection act, sc 2001, c. 27 (irpa), should be interpreted in a way that guarantees the fullest possible range of scrutiny for detention, including the conditions of detention. i see nothing in the language of the act that precludes such a comprehensive review. in fact, i think the basis for the entire scheme requires it. on the other hand, interpreting it in a way that restricts the contours of the scrutiny unduly interferes with the rights of the detainee and with the legislature’s intention that [72] la juge abella (dissidente) — je conviens avec la majorité que la légalité de toute privation de liberté devrait faire l’objet d’un examen ferme et rigoureux. c’est pourquoi, à mon avis, la loi sur l’im- migration et la protection des réfugiés, lc 2001, c. 27 (lipr), doit être interprétée de telle sorte qu’elle garantit le contrôle le plus exhaustif qui soit des mo- tifs de la détention, notamment des conditions de détention. je ne vois rien dans la loi qui empêche un contrôle aussi exhaustif. en fait, j’estime que toute son économie l’exige. par ailleurs, une interprétation qui restreint la portée du contrôle porte indûment atteinte aux droits du détenu et ne respecte pas l’in- tention du législateur qui souhaitait une intégration [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 501 those rights be fully and generously integrated with the purposes of the whole scheme. complète et généreuse de ces droits avec l’objet de l’ensemble du régime. [73] moreover, interpreting the act in a way that excludes the possibility of reviewing all aspects of immigration detention, including its conditions and lawfulness, essentially and inappropriately reads out the detention review process in irpa. why would any detainee settle for a partial review of his or her detention under irpa if they could receive a more expansive one under habeas corpus? by narrowing the range of detention review available under irpa, the majority’s interpretation has the effect of elevat- ing habeas corpus into the only meaningful route offering detainees a full review of their detention. this relegates the act to a second- best role, and cre- ates a two- tier process of detention review whereby those who choose the act’s menu are deemed to be consigned to a lesser remedial buffet. [74] the better approach is to continue to read the language of irpa in a manner that is as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus and ensures the com- plete, comprehensive and expert review of immigra- tion detention that it was intended to provide, as all of this court’s previous jurisprudence has done. it is far more consistent with the purposes of the scheme to breathe the fullest possible remedial life into the act than to essentially invite detainees to avoid the exclusive scheme and pursue their analogous reme- dies elsewhere. [73] qui plus est, une interprétation de la loi qui écarte la possibilité d’examiner tous les aspects de la détention aux fins de l’immigration, y compris ses conditions et sa légalité, exclut à toutes fins utiles et de manière inappropriée le processus de contrôle des motifs de la détention établi par la lipr. pourquoi un détenu se contenterait-il d’un contrôle partiel de sa détention en application de la lipr s’il peut bénéfi- cier d’un examen plus large en recourant à l’habeas corpus? en restreignant la portée du contrôle des motifs de la détention que prévoit la lipr, l’inter- prétation préconisée par les juges majoritaires fait en sorte que l’habeas corpus devient le seul recours utile dont disposent les détenus qui souhaitent ob- tenir un contrôle complet de leur détention. en plus de reléguer le rôle de la loi au second plan, cette interprétation crée un processus de contrôle de la détention à deux niveaux dans le cadre duquel ceux qui choisissent le menu prévu par la loi disposent d’un buffet de mesures de réparation plus restreint. [74] il est préférable de continuer à interpréter les dispositions de la lipr d’une manière qui soit aussi large et avantageuse que l’habeas corpus et qui assure l’examen complet, exhaustif et spécialisé de la détention aux fins de l’immigration qu’elle était censée offrir, comme l’a fait toute la jurispru- dence antérieure de la cour. une interprétation qui insuffle le plus d’éléments réparateurs possible dans la loi s’harmonise bien davantage avec l’économie de celle-ci qu’une interprétation qui incite à toutes fins utiles les détenus à éviter le régime exclusif et à exercer leurs recours analogues ailleurs. i background i faits [75] tusif ur rehman chhina was born in pa- kistan. he entered canada in december 2006 and obtained refugee status under a false name. when the minister of citizenship and immigration discov- ered mr. chhina’s misrepresentation, he applied to the refugee protection division of the immigration and refugee board to remove mr. chhina’s refugee status. [75] tusif ur rehman chhina est né au pakistan. il est entré au canada en décembre 2006 et a ob- tenu le statut de réfugié sous un faux nom. lorsque le ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immigration a été mis au courant de la fausse déclaration de m. chhina, il a demandé à la section de la protection des réfugiés de la commission de l’immigration et du statut de réfugié de retirer à m. chhina son statut de réfugié. 502 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. [76] the refugee protection division granted the minister’s application in february 2012. it deter- mined that mr. chhina was inadmissible to canada on the basis of serious criminality, and issued a de- portation order against him. in response to the depor- tation order, the canadian border services agency began taking steps to obtain the necessary travel documents for mr. chhina’s return to pakistan. [77] before he could be deported from canada, mr. chhina was convicted of various criminal of- fences and incarcerated for three years. when he was released in april 2013, mr. chhina was taken imme- diately into immigration detention on the grounds that he would likely pose a danger to the public and would be unlikely to appear for his removal from canada if released. [78] as required by the act, a member of the im- migration division of the immigration and refu- gee board reviewed mr. chhina’s detention within 48 hours of this detention and again within 7 days. thereafter, the immigration division reviewed his detention at least every 30 days. his release was ordered on terms and conditions by leeann king after a detention review in november 2013. member king explained: [i]t will be an indeterminate amount of time before pa- kistan issues a travel document if they even ever do be- cause there’s no way to know what the holdup is at this point after full cooperation from mr. chhina and his fam- ily    . [76] la section de la protection des réfugiés a fait droit à la demande du ministre en février 2012. elle a conclu que m. chhina était interdit de ter- ritoire au canada pour grande criminalité et a pris une mesure d’expulsion contre lui par suite de cette mesure, l’agence des services frontaliers du canada a entrepris des démarches pour obtenir les titres de voyage nécessaires au retour de m. chhina au pakistan. [77] avant même que la mesure d’expulsion puisse être exécutée, m.  chhina a été déclaré coupable de diverses infractions criminelles et il a été incar- céré pendant trois ans. lorsqu’il a été mis en liberté en avril 2013, m. chhina a immédiatement été placé dans un centre de détention aux fins de l’immigration au motif qu’il constituait un danger pour la sécurité publique et qu’il se soustrairait vraisemblablement à son renvoi du canada s’il était mis en liberté. [78] ainsi que l’exige la loi, un commissaire de la section de l’immigration de la commission de l’immigration et du statut de réfugié a procédé au contrôle des motifs de la détention de m. chhina dans les 48 heures, puis à nouveau 7 jours plus tard. par la suite, la section de l’immigration a procédé à un nouveau contrôle des motifs de la détention de m. chhina au moins tous les 30 jours. la commis- saire leeann king a ordonné la mise en liberté sous condition de m. chhina après un contrôle des motifs de sa détention effectué en novembre 2013. voici les explications qu’elle a alors données : [traduction] [u]ne période indéterminée s’écoulera avant que les autorités du pakistan délivrent un titre de voyage, si jamais elles le font, parce qu’il n’y a aucun moyen de savoir à ce moment-ci ce qui empêche les choses d’avancer, malgré l’entière collaboration de m. chhina et de sa famille   . so what i have to consider is the regulations under 248 which are borrowed verbatim from the decision of sahin which relates to section 7 of the charter and detaining peo- ple for lengthy and indeterminate amounts of time when there are alternatives to look at, alternatives to detention that could reduce the risks posed. je dois donc tenir compte des facteurs énumérés à l’art. 248 du règlement, qui sont tirés textuellement de la décision sahin. celle-ci concerne l’art. 7 de la charte et la détention de personnes pour des périodes longues et indéterminées lorsqu’existent des solutions de rechange à la détention qui pourraient réduire les risques connexes. (ar, vol. ii, at p. 106) (da, vol. ii, p. 106) [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 503 [79] mr. chhina breached the conditions of his release by failing to report to the canadian border services agency as required. border services is- sued a warrant for his arrest in december 2013, but mr. chhina could not be located for a year. he was finally arrested by the police in december 2014 for crimes committed since his release. he was detained on those criminal charges until november 2015, at which point he was again taken directly into immi- gration detention. [80] the immigration division reviewed his de- tention the next day and ordered his continued de- tention on the bases that he was unlikely to appear for removal from canada and that he posed a danger to the public. the immigration division continued to review mr.  chhina’s detention as required by ss. 57 and 58 of irpa and s. 248 of the immigration and refugee protection regulations, sor/2002- 227 (regulations), which guarantee immigration detain- ees like mr. chhina an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before the immigration division at least every 30 days. [81] border services continued its efforts to return mr. chhina to pakistan. it requested travel docu- ments from pakistan on three occasions over three and one half years. pakistan did not accede to these requests. while pakistan had at one time acknowl- edged that mr. chhina was a pakistani citizen, it sub- sequently resiled from that position and said it would not issue a travel document because it could not verify mr. chhina’s national status. border services learned that pakistan refused to issue a travel doc- ument in december 2015 and then made efforts to establish his true identity. [79] m. chhina n’a pas respecté les conditions de sa mise en liberté en omettant de se présenter à l’agence des services frontaliers du canada, comme il devait le faire. l’agence a délivré un mandat d’arrestation contre lui en décembre 2013, mais m. chhina a dis- paru pendant un an. il a finalement été arrêté par la police en décembre 2014 pour des crimes commis après sa mise en liberté. il a été détenu relativement à ces accusations criminelles jusqu’en novembre 2015, après quoi il a été de nouveau conduit directement dans un centre de détention aux fins de l’immigration. [80] la section de l’immigration a procédé au contrôle des motifs de la détention de m. chhina le lendemain et a ordonné le maintien de celle-ci au motif qu’il se soustrairait vraisemblablement à son renvoi du canada et qu’il constituait un danger pour la sécurité publique. la section de l’immigration a continué à contrôler les motifs de la détention de m. chhina, ainsi que l’exigent les art. 57 et 58 de la lipr et l’art. 248 du règlement sur l’immigra- tion et la protection des réfugiés, dors/2002- 227 (règlement), qui garantissent aux personnes déte- nues aux fins de l’immigration, comme m. chhina, la possibilité de contester la légalité de leur détention devant la section de l’immigration au moins tous les 30 jours. [81] l’agence des services frontaliers du ca- nada a poursuivi ses démarches en vue de renvoyer m. chhina au pakistan. elle a demandé des titres de voyage au pakistan à trois reprises sur une période de trois ans et demi. le pakistan n’a pas obtempéré aux demandes en question. même s’il avait déjà reconnu à un certain moment que m. chhina était un citoyen pakistanais, le pakistan est revenu sur cette position par la suite et a affirmé qu’il ne délivrerait pas de titre de voyage, parce qu’il ne pouvait pas vérifier la nationalité de m chhina. après avoir appris en dé- cembre 2015 que le pakistan refusait de délivrer un titre de voyage, l’agence des services frontaliers du canada a entrepris des démarches pour établir la véritable identité de m chhina. [82] mr. chhina pursued the statutory remedies available to him to challenge the lawfulness of his continued detention under irpa. but he also sought to access the alternative remedy of habeas corpus [82] m. chhina a exercé les recours que la lipr mettait à sa disposition pour contester la légalité de son maintien en détention. cependant, il a également tenté de recourir à la procédure d’habeas corpus en 504 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. by emphasizing the constitutional nature of his chal- lenge based on ss. 7, 9 and 12 of the canadian char- ter of rights and freedoms. insistant sur la nature constitutionnelle de sa contes- tation fondée sur les art.  7, 9 et 12 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. [83] the application judge in the court of queen’s bench, mahoney j., declined to exercise habeas cor- pus jurisdiction on the basis that the irpa scheme for immigration detention review provides a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for the review of immigration division decisions. he found that the case was an immigration matter within the jurisdic- tion and expertise of the federal court. [84] the alberta court of appeal held that the application judge erred in declining to exercise ha- beas corpus jurisdiction. in its view, habeas corpus review offers greater advantages to detainees like mr. chhina than the irpa scheme. [85] the alberta court of appeal’s decision, which followed and endorsed the court of appeal for on- tario’s decision in chaudhary v. canada (minister of public safety & emergency preparedness) (2015), 127 or (3d) 401 (ca), departed from settled law. this court has repeatedly held that the irpa scheme for the review of immigration detention decisions is a complete, comprehensive and expert scheme that is at least as broad as, and no less advantageous than, review by way of habeas corpus. i see no reason to depart from it now. if anything, this case presents an opportunity to confirm that the process and sub- stance of detention reviews under irpa should be as advantageous as habeas corpus, so that detainees get expeditious access to the fullest possible review of the terms and conditions of their detention. [83] le juge mahoney, qui siégeait comme juge des requêtes à la cour du banc de la reine, a refusé d’exercer sa compétence en matière d’habeas corpus au motif que les dispositions de la lipr concernant le contrôle des motifs de la détention aux fins de l’immi- gration prévoyaient une procédure complète, exhaus- tive et spécialisée pour le contrôle des décisions de la section de l’immigration. il a conclu que l’affaire concernait une question d’immigration relevant de la compétence et de l’expertise de la cour fédérale. [84] la cour d’appel de l’alberta a conclu que le juge des requêtes avait commis une erreur en refu- sant d’exercer sa compétence en matière d’habeas corpus. de l’avis de la cour d’appel, la procédure d’habeas corpus était plus avantageuse que le régime créé par la lipr pour les détenus comme m chhina. [85] en rendant cette décision, la cour d’appel de l’alberta a souscrit à l’arrêt rendu par la cour d’ap- pel de l’ontario dans l’affaire chaudhary c. canada (minister of public safety & emergency prepared- ness) (2015), 127 or (3d) 401 (ca), mais s’est écartée des principes juridiques établis. en effet, la cour a répété à maintes reprises que les dispositions de la lipr concernant le contrôle des décisions rela- tives à la détention aux fins de l’immigration consti- tuent un régime complet, exhaustif et spécialisé qui prévoit une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus. je ne vois aucune raison de conclure différemment aujourd’hui. la présente affaire offre plutôt l’oc- casion de confirmer que les règles de procédure et de fond qui régissent le contrôle des motifs de la détention sous le régime de la lipr devraient être aussi avantageuses que celles de l’habeas corpus, de manière à ce que les détenus puissent bénéficier en temps opportun du contrôle le plus complet qui soit des conditions de leur détention. ii analysis ii analyse [86] habeas corpus, the traditional route to as- sessing the lawfulness of deprivations of liberty, has [86] les fondements historiques de l’habeas cor- pus — la procédure traditionnelle servant à évaluer [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 505 historic roots which have spawned a variety of statu- tory remedies whose goal is to preserve the same pro- tections. these can be found, among other statutes, in the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, which confers jurisdiction on appellate courts to correct the errors of a lower court and release the applicant (see, for example, r v. gamble, [1988] 2 scr 595, at pp. 636-37; r v. pearson, [1992] 3 scr 665 (bail review); staetter v. british columbia (adult foren- sic psychiatric services), 2017 bcca 68 (review board custodial dispositions)). [87] they are also found in irpa. their legitimacy as a genuine alternative to habeas corpus was judi- cially considered and endorsed in pringle v. fraser, [1972] scr 821;. peiroo v. canada (minister of employment & immigration) (1989), 69 or (2d) 253 (ca), leave to appeal refused, [1989] 2 scr. x; reza v canada, [1994] 2  scr  394; may v. ferndale institution, [2005] 3 scr 809. each of these decisions emphasized that the habeas cor- pus-like remedies available in what was intended to be an exclusive statutory scheme, were “as broad as or broader than the traditional scope of review by way of habeas corpus” (peiroo, at p 261). la privation de la liberté — sont aussi la source de différents recours d’origine législative qui visent à offrir les mêmes protections. ces recours sont prévus notamment dans le  code criminel, lrc  1985, c. c-46, qui habilite les cours d’appel à corriger les erreurs des juridictions d’instances inférieures et à li- bérer le demandeur (voir, par exemple, r c. gamble, [1988] 2 rcs 595, p.  636- 637; r c pearson, [1992] 3 rcs 665 (révision de l’ordonnance de mise en liberté sous caution); staetter c british columbia (adult forensic psychiatric services), 2017 bcca 68 (ordonnances de détention de la commission d’examen)). [87] des recours de cette nature sont également prévus dans la lipr. leur légitimité en tant que so- lution de rechange valable à la procédure d’habeas corpus a été examinée par les tribunaux et reconnue dans les arrêts pringle c. fraser, [1972] rcs 821;. peiroo c. canada (minister of employment & im- migration) (1989), 69 or (2d) 253 (ca), auto- risation d’appel refusée, [1989] 2 rcs x;. reza c. canada, [1994] 2 rcs 394;. may c. établissement ferndale, [2005] 3 rcs 809. dans chacune de ces décisions, il a été reconnu que les recours semblables à l’habeas corpus qui peuvent être exercés en appli- cation d’un régime légal conçu pour être un régime exclusif avaient une [traduction] « portée au moins aussi large que celle traditionnelle de l’habeas cor- pus » (peiroo, p 261). [88] the issue in this appeal is whether that re- mains the case, namely, that the immigration scheme is able to continue to provide as fulsome a package of protections as does habeas corpus, or whether the scheme no longer provides analogous benefits, thereby justifying a departure from our jurispru- dence. [88] le présent pourvoi soulève la question de savoir si cela est toujours le cas, c’est-à-dire si le ré- gime d’immigration peut continuer à offrir un éven- tail de protections aussi complet que la procédure d’habeas corpus, ou s’il n’offre plus des avantages analogues, ce qui justifierait de nous écarter de notre jurisprudence. [89] statutory schemes like irpa that replace ha- beas corpus with equally effective remedies have long been upheld (judith farbey and robert j. sharpe, with simon atrill, the law of habeas corpus (3rd ed. 2011), at p 49). as the court of appeal for ontario recently observed in ogiamien v. ontario (community safety and correctional services) (2017), 55 imm. lr (4th) 220 (ont. ca), habeas corpus cannot be used to mount a collateral attack on immigration [89] les régimes établis par des lois comme la lipr qui remplacent l’habeas corpus par des recours tout aussi efficaces sont reconnus depuis longtemps (judith farbey et robert j sharpe, avec simon atrill, the law of habeas corpus (3e éd. 2011), p 49). ainsi que la cour d’appel de l’ontario l’a récemment sou- ligné dans l’arrêt ogiamien c. ontario (community safety and correctional services) (2017), 55 imm. lr (4th) 220 (ca ont), on ne peut pas se servir 506 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. decisions for which a comprehensive review process exists (para 14). [90] the statutory scheme for immigration de- tention review set out in irpa, together with the regulations and the immigration division rules, sor/2002- 229, mandates prompt, regular, acces- sible and charter-compliant review of immigration detention decisions by the immigration division of the immigration and refugee board, an independent, quasi- judicial administrative tribunal with special- ized knowledge of immigration matters, including immigration detention. [91] the irpa scheme was intended to provide the same fulsome, charter-compliant review of immi- gration detention as habeas corpus. section 3(3)(d) of irpa codifies the immigration division members’ obligation to exercise their discretion in accordance with the charter: de l’habeas corpus pour contester incidemment des décisions en matière d’immigration pour lesquelles il existe déjà un processus du contrôle exhaustif (par 14). [90] le régime légal établi par la lipr, le règle- ment et les règles de la section de l’immigration, dors/2002- 229, en matière de contrôle des motifs de la détention aux fins de l’immigration exige un examen rapide, régulier, accessible et conforme à la charte des décisions rendues en la matière par la section de l’immigration de la commission de l’im- migration et du statut de réfugié, qui est un tribunal administratif quasi judiciaire indépendant possédant des connaissances spécialisées dans ce domaine, notamment en ce qui concerne la détention aux fins de l’immigration. [91] le régime établi par la lipr vise à assurer le même contrôle complet et conforme à la charte de la détention aux fins de l’immigration que celui qu’offre l’habeas corpus. l’alinéa 3(3)d) de la lipr codifie l’obligation qu’ont les commissaires de la section de l’immigration d’exercer leur pouvoir dis- crétionnaire conformément à la charte : application interprétation et mise en œuvre (3) this act is to be construed and applied in a manner that (3) l’interprétation et la mise en œuvre de la présente loi doivent avoir pour effet :   .   . (d) ensures that decisions taken under this act are consist- ent with the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination and of the equality of english and french as the official languages of canada; d) d’assurer que les décisions prises en vertu de la présente loi sont conformes à la charte canadienne des droits et libertés, notamment en ce qui touche les principes, d’une part, d’égalité et de protection contre la discrimination et, d’autre part, d’égalité du français et de l’anglais à titre des langues officielles du canada; [92] this means that the charter governs the ex- ercise of discretion under the act and informs the interpretation of its provisions in a manner that al- lows for the fullest possible review of a detainee’s loss of liberty. the act must therefore be interpreted in a way that does not circumscribe its purposes but instead gives it the widest possible scope for imple- menting its objectives through rigorous substantive [92] la charte encadre par conséquent l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire prévu par la loi et pro- pose, en ce qui concerne l’interprétation du régime lui- même, certaines balises qui permettent d’en in- terpréter les dispositions d’une manière qui assure le contrôle le plus complet possible de la privation de liberté du détenu. il faut donc interpréter la loi d’une manière qui n’en restreint pas l’objet, mais [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 507 detention review. the application of the charter to the irpa scheme guarantees the full panoply of rights to detained individuals. this extends to matters of timeliness and access to the statutory remedies, the nature of the review, onus and expertise. [93] the suggestion that a full review of detention can only occur under habeas corpus is a bow to the seductive attraction of the label without recogniz- ing that it unnecessarily fetters the comprehensive review of the lawfulness of detention provided in the act. it also departs from a long-standing juris- prudential consensus: that the irpa scheme for the review of immigration detention decisions provides a remedy to detainees that is at least as broad, and no less advantageous than review by way of habeas corpus. in my respectful view, there is no principled reason to abandon the sound logic in pringle, peiroo, reza and may. [94] at the time pringle was decided in 1972, the immigration appeal board act, sc 1966-67, c. 90, had recently been amended to provide a scheme for the review of deportation orders by the immigration appeal board, an independent administrative tribu- nal vested with all the powers of a superior court of record. the applicant appealed to the board after an immigration official issued a deportation order against him. at the same time, he commenced cer- tiorari proceedings in the superior court to have the deportation order quashed. his application for certiorari was dismissed at first instance but granted on appeal to the court of appeal for ontario. before this court, the appeal turned on whether the superior court had certiorari jurisdiction to quash a depor- tation order made pursuant to the immigration act, rsc 1952, c 325. qui lui donne au contraire la plus large portée qui soit afin d’assurer la réalisation de ses objectifs par un contrôle rigoureux de la détention. l’application de la charte au régime établi par la lipr garantit aux détenus une protection qui découle de toute la panoplie des droits, ce qui comprend les questions de célérité et d’accès aux recours prévus par la loi, la nature du contrôle, le fardeau de la preuve et l’ex- pertise. [93] l’idée selon laquelle un examen complet de la détention ne peut avoir lieu que dans le cadre de l’habeas corpus s’explique sans doute par l’étiquette séduisante que l’on accole à cette procédure. elle méconnaît toutefois qu’on restreint ainsi inutilement le contrôle exhaustif de la légalité de la détention prévu par la loi. elle fait également fi d’un principe qui fait consensus depuis longtemps dans la juris- prudence, soit que le régime établi par la lipr pour assurer le contrôle des décisions relatives à la déten- tion aux fins de l’immigration offre aux détenus un recours au moins aussi large et aussi avantageux que le contrôle exercé par voie d’habeas corpus. à mon avis, il n’y a aucune raison de principe qui justifie d’écarter le raisonnement solide suivi dans les arrêts pringle, peiroo, reza et may. [94] au moment où la décision a été rendue dans l’affaire pringle en 1972, le législateur venait de modifier la loi sur la commission d’appel de l’im- migration, sc 1966-67, c 90, afin de créer un ré- gime de contrôle des ordonnances d’expulsion par la commission d’appel de l’immigration, un tribunal administratif indépendant investi de tous les pouvoirs d’une cour supérieure d’archives le demandeur avait interjeté appel auprès de la commission après qu’un enquêteur en matière d’immigration eut rendu une ordonnance d’expulsion contre lui. au même moment, il a présenté une demande de certiorari devant la cour supérieure afin de faire annuler cette ordonnance. sa demande de certiorari a été rejetée en première instance, mais la cour d’appel de l’on- tario y a fait droit. devant la cour, le pourvoi concer- nait la question de savoir si la cour supérieure avait compétence en matière de certiorari pour annuler une ordonnance d’expulsion rendue en application de la loi sur l’immigration, src 1952, c 325. 508 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. [95] laskin j. concluded that amendments to the immigration appeal board act establishing the im- migration appeal board and conferring certain power to it had “brought into the law a wider avenue for initial appeal from deportation orders than theretofore existed” (p 825). he wrote: [the immigration appeal board act] and the immigration act, and the regulations promulgated under each of them, constitute a code for the administration of immigration matters and for the review of proceedings in such matters. there is no common law of immigration. parliament’s authority to establish such a code is not challenged; nor is parliament’s authority to deny or remove certiorari juris- diction from provincial superior courts over deportation orders. [p. 825] [96] laskin j. held that the amended immigration appeal board act, with its new scheme for the ad- ministrative review of immigration deportation or- ders, ousted the certiorari jurisdiction of the superior court. he rejected the contention that parliament, in enacting the new immigration scheme, had not clearly expressed an intention that the scheme should remove certiorari jurisdiction from the provincial superior courts. on the contrary, he saw s. 22 of the scheme as expressly endowing the immigration appeal board with “sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of fact or law, including questions of jurisdiction”. in laskin j.’s view, the plain meaning of the statute was to exclude any other court or tribunal from entertaining the same proceedings: [95] le juge laskin a conclu que les modifications apportées à la loi sur la commission d’appel de l’immigration en vue de constituer la commission d’appel de l’immigration et de la doter de certains pouvoirs avaient « élargi, par rapport au régime anté- rieur, les voies de recours pour les appels au premier degré à l’encontre des ordonnances d’expulsion » (p 825). le juge laskin a également formulé les remarques suivantes : [la loi sur la commission d’appel de l’immigration] et la loi sur l’immigration, ainsi que les règlements établis en vertu de chacune d’elles, constituent un code à la fois de l’administration des matières relatives à l’immigration et de la révision des procédures faites en ces matières. il n’y a pas de common law de l’immigration. l’autorité du parlement d’établir un tel code n’est pas contestée, pas plus que ne l’est son autorité de refuser ou d’enlever aux cours supérieures provinciales la compétence en matière de certiorari quant aux ordonnances d’expulsion. [p. 825- 826] [96] le juge laskin a décidé que la loi sur la com- mission d’appel de l’immigration et son nouveau régime relatif au contrôle administratif des ordon- nances d’expulsion avaient eu pour effet d’écarter la compétence de la cour supérieure en matière de certiorari. il a rejeté l’argument selon lequel le lé- gislateur n’avait pas clairement exprimé, dans le nouveau régime d’immigration, son intention que le régime retire aux cours supérieures provinciales leur compétence en matière de certiorari. au contraire, il a estimé que l’art. 22 du régime conférait expres- sément à la commission d’appel de l’immigration la « compétence exclusive pour entendre et décider toutes questions de fait ou de droit, y compris les questions de compétence ». selon le juge laskin, le sens ordinaire du texte législatif illustre qu’il visait clairement à empêcher que tout autre cour de jus- tice ou tribunal administratif soit saisi de la même demande : the result i would reach goes beyond literal justifi- cation in the language of s 22. the facts of the present case show the incompatibility of the appellate jurisdiction vested in the board with the survival of certiorari in pro- vincial superior courts. it was not suggested that the appeal to the board would be aborted by proceedings to quash taken in the supreme court of ontario. in fact, fraser did la conclusion à laquelle j’en arriverais va au- delà du sens littéral des termes de l’art 22. les faits de l’es- pèce démontrent que la juridiction d’appel conférée à la commission est inconciliable avec le maintien de la compétence en matière de certiorari des cours supérieures provinciales. il n’a pas été avancé que des procédures en annulation engagées en cour suprême de l’ontario feraient [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 509 not abandon his appeal upon taking certiorari proceed- ings. however, i do not propose to deal with this case as if an election of remedies had been made and that this must determine the outcome. certainly, the likelihood of two conflicting decisions (each ultimately appealable to this court) has nothing to commend it. the only practical resolution is to recognize the exclusiveness of the special procedure ordained by parliament. [p. 827] [97] laskin j. compared certiorari to habeas corpus, holding that both are remedial proceedings whose “availability may depend on whether [they are] pre- scribed as a remedy by the competent legislature” (p. 826, citing in re storgoff, [1945] scr 526). these remedies have “no necessary ongoing life in relation to all matters for which [they] could be used, if com- petent excluding legislation is enacted” (pp 826-27). [98] the principles articulated in pringle were adopted in peiroo. in peiroo, the applicant made a refugee claim in canada. the convention ref- ugee determination division of the immigration and refugee board determined there was no cred- ible basis to her claim and issued a removal order pursuant to the provisions of what was then the immigration act, rsc 1985, c i-2. ms. peiroo was placed in immigration detention. she sought to contest the finding of no credible basis and the removal order by applying to the provincial superior court for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid. her application was dismissed and she appealed to the court of appeal for ontario. échouer l’appel interjeté à la commission. en fait, fraser n’a pas abandonné son appel en engageant des procédures en certiorari. cependant, je n’ai pas l’intention de traiter cette affaire comme si un choix de recours s’était exercé et que ce choix dictait la décision à prendre. certes, la possibilité de deux décisions contradictoires (chacune pouvant faire l’objet d’un appel ultime à cette cour) n’a rien de recommandable. la seule solution pratique est de reconnaître l’exclusivité de la procédure spéciale prescrite par le parlement. [p. 827] [97] après avoir comparé le certiorari à l’habeas corpus, le juge laskin a conclu qu’il s’agissait, dans les deux cas, de mesures de réparation dont l’« appli- cation dépend de la question de savoir si la législature compétente le[s] prescrit comme recours » (p. 826, citant l’arrêt in re storgoff, [1945] rcs 526). ces recours « ne s’appliqu[ent] pas nécessairement à toutes les matières à l’égard desquelles on pourrait [les] employer, si une loi valide d’exclusion est adop- tée » (p 827). [98] les principes formulés dans pringle ont été adoptés dans l’arrêt peiroo. dans cette dernière af- faire, la demanderesse avait présenté une demande d’asile au canada. la section du statut de réfugié de la commission de l’immigration et du statut de réfu- gié avait conclu à l’absence de fondement crédible de cette demande et avait pris une mesure de renvoi conformément aux dispositions de ce qui était alors la loi sur l’immigration, lrc 1985, c i-2. ma- dame peiroo a été placée dans un centre de détention aux fins de l’immigration. elle a tenté de contester la conclusion d’absence de fondement crédible et la mesure de renvoi en présentant à la cour supérieure provinciale une demande d’habeas corpus avec cer- tiorari auxiliaire. sa demande a été rejetée et elle a interjeté appel devant la cour d’appel de l’ontario. [99] the court of appeal considered whether it should decline to exercise its habeas corpus juris- diction to review ms. peiroo’s detention in favour of the alternative remedies available to her to challenge the impugned immigration decisions. catzman ja, writing for the court, noted that habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that does not generally lie where there is an alternative remedy available (see peiroo, at p. 257, citing cameron harvey, the [99] la cour d’appel s’est demandé si elle devait refuser d’exercer sa compétence en matière d’habeas corpus pour contrôler la détention de mme peiroo et si elle devait accorder la préférence aux autres recours dont celle-ci disposait pour contester les dé- cisions rendues contre elle en matière d’immigration. s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel de l’ontario, le juge catzman a souligné que l’habeas corpus était un recours extraordinaire qui ne pouvait généralement 510 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. law of habeas corpus in canada (1974), at p. 13; roger salhany, canadian criminal procedure (4th ed. 1984), at p 521). [100] catzman ja compared habeas corpus with the available remedies under the immigration act to challenge removal orders and credible basis find- ings. the act expressly provided for an appeal with leave to the federal court of canada. catzman ja. observed that the grounds and scope of review set out in the appeal provisions of the federal court act, rsc 1985, c. f-7, “are as broad as, and — in the power to examine erroneous findings of fact — probably broader than, those on which the [superior court] exercises its jurisdiction on applications for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid” (p 258). pas être exercé lorsqu’il existait un autre recours (voir peiroo, p. 257, citant cameron harvey, the law of habeas corpus in canada (1974), p. 13; roger salhany, canadian criminal procedure (4e éd. 1984), p 521). [100] le juge catzman a comparé l’habeas corpus aux recours que la loi sur l’immigration permettait d’exercer pour contester les mesures de renvoi et les conclusions relatives au fondement crédible. la loi prévoyait expressément un appel devant la cour fé- dérale du canada, avec l’autorisation de celle-ci. le juge catzman a souligné que les motifs et la portée du contrôle prévus par les dispositions de la loi sur la cour fédérale, lrc 1985, c. f-7, en matière d’appel [traduction] « sont aussi larges, et — en ce qui concerne le pouvoir d’examiner des conclusions de fait erronées — probablement plus larges que ceux qui constituent le fondement de la compétence exercée par [la cour supérieure] dans les demandes d’habeas corpus avec certiorari auxiliaire » (p 258). [101] catzman ja concluded that the review and appeal mechanisms contemplated in the act were “as broad as or broader than the traditional scope of review by way of habeas corpus”. as a result, the statutory scheme did not run afoul of the principle that individuals “should not be refused the ancient remedy of habeas corpus on account of the avail- ability of some less expeditious and advantageous alternative remedy” (p. 258, citing r v. governor of pentonville prison, ex parte azam, [1973] 2 all er 741 (ca), at p. 758, aff’d [1973] 2 all er 765 (hl)). he explained: [101] le juge catzman a conclu que la portée des mécanismes de contrôle et d’appel prévus par la loi était [traduction] « aussi large ou plus large que celle traditionnelle de l’habeas corpus ». en conséquence, le régime légal n’allait pas à l’encontre du principe selon lequel « il n’y a pas lieu de refuser l’accès à l’ancien recours en habeas corpus en raison de l’existence d’un autre recours moins rapide et moins avantageux » (p. 258, citant r c. governor of pentonville prison, ex parte azam, [1973] 2 all er 741 (ca), p. 758, conf. par [1973] 2 all er 765 (hl)). voici les ex- plications qu’il a données à ce sujet : parliament has established in the [immigration act], par- ticularly in the recent amendments which specifically address the disposition of claims of persons in the position of the appellant, a comprehensive scheme to regulate the determination of such claims and to provide for review and appeal in the federal court of canada of decisions and orders made under the act, the ambit of which review and appeal is as broad as or broader than the traditional scope of review by way of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid. in the absence of any showing that the available review and appeal process established by parliament is inappropriate or less advantageous than the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the [provincial superior court], it is my view that this court should, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to [traduction] le législateur a établi dans la [loi sur l’immigration], plus particulièrement dans les modifica- tions récentes concernant précisément le traitement des revendications de personnes dans la situation de l’appe- lante, un régime exhaustif comportant des procédures de contrôle et d’appel, devant la cour fédérale du canada, des décisions et ordonnances prises en vertu de la loi, procédures dont la portée est au moins aussi large que celle de l’habeas corpus avec certiorari auxiliaire. en l’absence de quelque preuve que ce soit que les procédures de contrôle et d’appel prévues par le législateur sont ina- déquates ou moins avantageuses que la compétence de la cour suprême de l’ontario en matière d’habeas corpus, je suis d’avis que la cour devrait, dans l’exercice de son [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 511 grant relief upon the application for habeas corpus in the present case, which clearly falls within the purview of that statutory review and appeal process. i am fortified in this conclusion by the observation that similar considerations appear to have moved the supreme court of canada to hold that where there is a legislative initiative purporting to provide a whole scheme or code for the administration and review of proceedings in a field like immigration (pringle v. fraser    [1972] scr 821), or human rights (board of governors of seneca college of applied arts & technology v. bhadauria    [1981] 2 scr 181   ), such a scheme should not be by- passed, either by evolving a new cause of action (as in bhadauria) or by the use of a prerogative writ (as in pringle). both jurisprudence and logic would suggest that this court should leave the review of immigration matters with the federal court of canada, which has review and appeal jurisdiction with respect to many aspects of immigration law and which has geographical jurisdiction throughout canada, and thus can deal with claims of refugee claimants wherever their point of entry. [pp. 261-62] [102] this became known as “the peiroo excep- tion”, namely, where parliament has put in place a complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme providing for review of detention that is at least as broad as, and no less advantageous than ha- beas corpus review, superior courts should decline to exercise their habeas corpus jurisdiction in favour of that statutory scheme. [103] this court applied the peiroo exception in reza. like peiroo, reza involved a refugee claim. mr. reza claimed protection in canada as a conven- tion refugee. a tribunal established under the transi- tional provisions of the immigration act, rsc 1985, c. 28 (4th supp.), determined that there was no cred- ible basis to his claim and issued a deportation order against him. mr. reza was unsuccessful at his review by an immigration officer on humanitarian grounds and sought leave to commence judicial review of the immigration officer’s decision in the federal court. pouvoir discrétionnaire, refuser d’accorder la réparation demandée en l’espèce dans le cadre de la demande d’ha- beas corpus qui s’inscrit nettement dans le régime de contrôle et d’appel prévu par la loi. cette conclusion est renforcée par le fait que des consi- dérations similaires semblent avoir incité la cour suprême du canada à statuer que lorsque le législateur a instauré un régime ou un code complet pour l’administration et l’examen des procédures dans un domaine comme l’immi- gration (pringle c. fraser [  ] [1972] rcs 821), ou les droits de la personne (seneca college c. bhadauria [  ] [1981] 2 rcs 181 [  ]), il n’y a pas lieu de contour- ner ce régime, que ce soit en créant une nouvelle cause d’action (comme dans l’arrêt bhadauria) ou en utilisant le bref de prérogative (comme dans l’arrêt pringle). tant la jurisprudence que la logique justifient la cour de laisser le contrôle des affaires d’immigration à la cour fédérale du canada, qui est habilitée à réviser, que ce soit dans le cadre d’un appel ou d’un contrôle judiciaire, de nombreux aspects du droit de l’immigration et dont la compétence territoriale couvre l’ensemble du canada, ce qui lui permet de traiter les demandes des demandeurs d’asile, quel que soit le lieu de leur point d’entrée. [p. 261- 262] [102] c’est ce qu’on en est venu à appeler l’« ex- ception établie par l’arrêt peiroo », selon laquelle, lorsque le législateur a instauré un régime com- plet, exhaustif et spécialisé prévoyant une procé- dure d’examen de la détention aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus, les cours supérieures devraient refuser d’exercer leur compé- tence en matière d’habeas corpus et donner prépon- dérance au régime ainsi établi par la loi. [103] la cour a appliqué l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo dans l’arrêt reza, qui, comme l’affaire peiroo, portait sur une revendication du statut de réfu- gié. m. reza avait revendiqué au canada le statut de réfugié au sens de la convention. un tribunal consti- tué sous le régime des dispositions transitoires de la loi sur l’immigration, lrc 1985, c 28 (4e suppl), avait conclu que la revendication de m. reza n’avait pas de fondement crédible et avait donc pris une me- sure d’expulsion contre lui. m. reza n’a pas obtenu gain de cause dans sa demande de contrôle pour des considérations humanitaires soumise à un agent d’im- migration. il a ensuite demandé à la cour fédérale l’autorisation de présenter une demande de contrôle judiciaire de la décision de l’agent en question. 512 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. [104] mr. reza subsequently challenged the con- stitutionality of the immigration act in the superior court. the motion judge stayed the constitutional challenge because the federal court had concurrent jurisdiction and was the more appropriate forum for the challenge. concluding that he was bound by peiroo, he said: in the absence of any showing that the available review process and appeal process is inappropriate or less advan- tageous than the habeas corpus jurisdiction of this court, this court should, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to grant relief on a habeas corpus application. both juris- prudence and logic would support that this court should leave the review of the immigration matters with the fed- eral court of canada:  re peiroo (1989), 69 or (2d) 253 (oca). to the same effect is the ca decision in sheperd (1989) 52 ccc (3d) 386. i am of course bound by these decisions. the case at bar does not involve an application for habeas corpus relief, but the relief sought, by way of dec- laration and injunctive relief, is also discretionary in this court. the federal court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in this application and in my view the principles set out by the ca in peiroo and in sheperd are applicable to the case at bar. the circumstances described by campbell in bembeneck 69 ccc (3d) 34 which influenced the court to take jurisdiction, are not present here. [104] par la suite, m. reza a contesté la constitu- tionnalité de la loi sur l’immigration devant la cour supérieure. le juge des requêtes a ordonné le sursis de la contestation constitutionnelle au motif que la cour fédérale avait compétence concurrente sur la question et qu’il était plus approprié que ce soit cette dernière qui tranche la contestation constitutionnelle. s’estimant lié par l’arrêt peiroo, le juge des requêtes a déclaré : [traduction] en l’absence de toute preuve que les pro- cédures de contrôle et d’appel sont inadéquates ou moins avantageuses que la compétence de notre cour en matière d’habeas corpus, notre cour devrait, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, refuser d’accorder la réparation demandée dans le cadre d’une demande d’habeas corpus. tant la jurisprudence que la logique justifient notre cour de laisser à la cour fédérale du canada le contrôle des affaires d’immigration : re peiroo (1989), 69 or (2d) 253 (cao). la décision de la ca dans sheperd (1989) 52 ccc (3d) 386 est au même effet. je suis évidemment lié par ces arrêts. en l’espèce, il ne s’agit pas d’une demande d’habeas corpus, mais la réparation demandée au moyen du juge- ment déclaratoire et de l’injonction, relève également du pouvoir discrétionnaire de notre cour. la cour fédérale a compétence pour accorder la réparation demandée et, à mon avis, les principes énoncés dans les arrêts de la ca peiroo et sheperd s’appliquent en l’espèce. les cir- constances décrites par campbell dans bembeneck 69 ccc (3d) 34, qui ont amené la cour à exercer sa com- pétence, ne se retrouvent pas en l’espèce. as to whether the process is less advantageous in the federal court, as indicated, the relief is available in that court and in my view the requirement of leave in that court to make a claim for a declaratory judgment does not make the process less advantageous    . quant à savoir si le processus est moins avantageux en cour fédérale, comme on l’a indiqué, cette dernière peut accorder la réparation et, à mon avis, l’obligation d’obtenir son autorisation pour demander un jugement déclaratoire ne rend pas le processus moins avantageux  . accordingly, it is my view that this proceeding should en conséquence, je suis d’avis de surseoir à la présente be stayed and i so order. [pp. 399- 400] procédure. [p. 399- 400] [105] a majority in the court of appeal for ontario reversed the motion judge’s decision. this court al- lowed the appeal on the basis of the comprehensive scheme dealing with the same issues. the immigra- tion act in force at the time gave the federal court an exclusive statutory mandate over immigration mat- ters. as in peiroo, the court found that parliament, in [105] les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel de l’ontario ont infirmé la décision du juge des re- quêtes. notre cour a fait droit à l’appel en raison de l’existence d’un régime complet portant sur les mêmes questions. la loi sur l’immigration alors en vigueur conférait à la cour fédérale un mandat ex- clusif en matière d’immigration. comme dans l’arrêt [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 513 enacting the immigration act and granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal court, intended the fed- eral court to be the appropriate forum for deciding immigration cases. this weighed against the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, suggesting instead that the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal court demonstrated legislative intent to bar individuals from pursuing parallel remedies in the superior courts. [106] second, the factors of expertise and expe- rience also favoured the federal court’s exclusive mandate over immigration matters. the federal court has expertise in immigration law, administrative law, and federal court procedure. while on the surface mr. reza’s case appeared to be a constitutional one, at its core the nature of the charter challenge was fundamentally linked with immigration policy and process. [107] third, superior courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction in immigration cases where the federal court has concurrent jurisdiction to avoid issues of forum- shopping, inconsistent decision making and multiplicity of proceedings (see also reference re constitution act, 1867, s. 92(10)(a) (1988), 64 or (2d) 393 (ca)). peiroo, la cour a conclu que, en adoptant la loi sur l’immigration et en attribuant à la cour fédérale une compétence exclusive, le législateur souhaitait que cette dernière soit le tribunal approprié pour trancher les affaires d’immigration. cette conclusion militait contre l’exercice d’une compétence concurrente et permettait plutôt de penser que l’attribution légale d’une compétence exclusive à la cour fédérale dé- montrait que le législateur avait l’intention d’empê- cher les particuliers d’exercer des recours parallèles devant les cours supérieures. [106] deuxièmement, les facteurs de l’expertise et de l’expérience favorisaient également le mandat ex- clusif de la cour fédérale en matière d’immigration. en effet, la cour fédérale possède une expertise en droit de l’immigration et en droit administratif, ainsi qu’en ce qui avait trait à sa procédure. même si, à première vue, le cas de m. reza semblait être d’ordre constitutionnel, sa contestation constitutionnelle était essentiellement liée à des questions de politique et de processus d’immigration. [107] troisièmement, lorsque la cour fédérale a une compétence concurrente, les cours supérieures devraient refuser d’exercer leur compétence en ma- tière d’immigration pour éviter les problèmes que représentent la recherche du tribunal le plus favo- rable, le manque d’uniformité des décisions et la multiplicité des instances (voir également reference re constitutional act, 1867, s.  92(10)(a) (1988), 64 or (2d) 393 (ca)). [108] the motion judge had therefore rightly de- clined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that parlia- ment had created a comprehensive scheme of review of immigration matters and the federal court was an effective and appropriate forum. [108] le juge des requêtes a donc refusé à bon droit d’exercer sa compétence au motif que le législateur avait créé un régime complet de contrôle en matière d’immigration et que la cour fédérale était un tribu- nal efficace et approprié. [109] this court considered pringle, peiroo and reza in may. in may, we confirmed two exceptions to the availability of habeas corpus: it is not availa- ble to challenge the legality of a criminal conviction where a statute provides for a right of appeal; and it is not available “in matters of immigration law, because parliament has put in place a complete, comprehen- sive and expert statutory scheme which provides for a review at least as broad as that available by way [109] la cour s’est penchée sur les arrêts pringle, peiroo et reza dans l’affaire may où nous avons confirmé deux exceptions à la possibilité de recourir à l’habeas corpus. d’abord, on ne peut se prévaloir de l’habeas corpus pour contester la légalité d’une dé- claration de culpabilité lorsqu’une loi prévoit un droit d’appel. ensuite, le recours à l’habeas corpus est écarté « [en droit de l’immigration] parce que le lé- gislateur a mis en place un régime complet, exhaustif 514 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. of habeas corpus and no less advantageous, habeas corpus is precluded”, namely the peiroo exception (para 40). [110] the grievance procedures under s. 81(1) of the corrections and conditional release regula- tions, sor/92- 620, were at issue in may: et spécialisé prévoyant une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus », ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo (par 40). [110] la procédure de règlement des griefs prévue au par. 81(1) du règlement sur le système correction- nel et la mise en liberté sous condition, dors/92- 620, était en litige dans l’affaire may : 81 (1) where an offender decides to pursue a legal remedy for the offender’s complaint or grievance in addition to the complaint and grievance procedure referred to in these regulations, the review of the complaint or grievance pursuant to these regulations shall be deferred until a de- cision on the alternate remedy is rendered or the offender decides to abandon the alternate remedy. 81 (1) lorsque le délinquant décide de prendre un recours judiciaire concernant sa plainte ou son grief, en plus de présenter une plainte ou un grief selon la procédure prévue dans le présent règlement, l’examen de la plainte ou du grief conformément au présent règlement est suspendu jusqu’à ce qu’une décision ait été rendue dans le recours judiciaire ou que le détenu s’en désiste. [111] the court concluded that this language did not reveal a legislative intention to oust the supe- rior courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction (para 60). instead, the statute was found to contemplate that an inmate may choose to pursue a remedy like habeas corpus in addition to filing an administrative griev- ance. the language reflected a legislative intent that the statutory scheme operate in conjunction with the superior courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction. [112] the court held that for immigration detain- ees seeking to challenge their continued detention as a violation of their charter rights, the irpa scheme governing matters of immigration law was a com- plete, comprehensive and expert scheme that is at least as broad as, and no less advantageous than review by way of habeas corpus in terms of exper- tise, onus, the nature of the remedy, and timeliness. provincial superior courts should, as a result, decline to exercise their concurrent jurisdiction to review immigration detention by way of habeas corpus in favour of review before the immigration division and the federal court under the irpa scheme. [111] la cour a conclu que le libellé de cette dis- position ne révélait pas une intention du législateur d’écarter la compétence des cours supérieures en matière d’habeas corpus (par 60). elle a plutôt es- timé qu’on avait envisagé la possibilité qu’un dé- tenu puisse choisir d’intenter un recours judiciaire, comme un recours en habeas corpus, en plus de déposer un grief administratif. le libellé de la loi révélait l’intention du législateur de faire en sorte que le régime législatif s’applique conjointement avec la compétence des cours supérieures en matière d’habeas corpus. [112] la cour a jugé que, s’agissant des détenus cherchant à contester leur maintien en détention aux fins de l’immigration pour violation de leurs droits protégés par la charte, le régime établi par la lipr pour régir les questions relatives au droit de l’im- migration constituait un régime complet, exhaustif et spécialisé prévoyant une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus en ce qui avait trait à l’expertise, au fardeau de la preuve, à la nature du recours et à célérité. les cours supérieures provinciales devaient par conséquent refuser d’exercer leur compétence concurrente pour contrôler les motifs de la détention aux fins de l’immigration par voie d’habeas corpus et reconnaître la compétence conférée à la section de l’immigration et à la cour fédérale par le régime établi par la lipr. [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 515 [113] section 162(1) of irpa confirms the clear legislative intent to grant exclusive original jurisdic- tion to the immigration division over immigration matters: [113] le paragraphe 162(1) de la lipr confirme que le législateur avait de toute évidence l’intention d’accorder à la section de l’immigration une com- pétence exclusive sur les questions d’immigration : sole and exclusive jurisdiction compétence exclusive 162  (1) each division of the board has, in respect of proceedings brought before it under this act, sole and ex- clusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction. 162 (1) chacune des sections a compétence exclusive pour connaître des questions de droit et de fait — y compris en matière de compétence — dans le cadre des affaires dont elle est saisie. in pringle, laskin j. found that this language barred courts from entertaining the types of immigration proceedings over which the board had been granted exclusive statutory authority. this specialized and exclusive expertise underlies the peiroo exception to the availability of habeas corpus review in immi- gration matters. [114] this court has consistently endorsed the peiroo exception limiting the availability of habeas corpus review for immigration matters. in the ab- sence of evidence that the “complete, comprehen- sive and expert statutory scheme” does not provide for a review at least as broad and no less advanta- geous than habeas corpus, i see no reason to disturb the court’s jurisprudence by opening an alternative route, one that will lead to the forum shopping, inconsistent decision making, and multiplicity of proceedings the court warned against in reza. there is nothing in the language of the statutory scheme that restricts the scope of irpa detention review to a partial review which must be supplemented by habeas corpus. on the contrary, the irpa scheme is structured to provide detainees with at least the same rights they would receive on habeas corpus review. dans l’arrêt pringle, le juge laskin a conclu que ce libellé empêchait les tribunaux de connaître du type de procédures en matière d’immigration pour lesquelles la loi avait attribué une compétence ex- clusive à la commission. cette expertise spécialisée et exclusive est à la base de l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo en ce qui concerne la possibilité de recourir à l’habeas corpus en matière d’immigration. [114] la cour a constamment reconnu l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo qui limite la possibilité d’exercer un recours en habeas corpus en matière d’immigration. à défaut de preuve que le « régime [d’examen] complet, exhaustif et spécialisé prév[u par la loi] » a une portée au moins aussi large que la procédure d’habeas corpus et est tout aussi avanta- geux, je ne vois aucune raison d’écarter la jurispru- dence de la cour en permettant l’exercice d’un autre recours qui se traduira par la recherche du tribunal le plus accommodant, un manque d’uniformité dans les décisions et une multiplication des instances, ce contre quoi la cour a mis en garde dans l’arrêt reza. rien dans le libellé de la loi ne limite la portée du contrôle des motifs de la détention prévue par la lipr à un contrôle partiel qu’il faut compléter par un habeas corpus. au contraire, le régime de la lipr est structuré de manière à accorder aux détenus au moins les mêmes droits que ceux qu’ils obtiendraient dans le cadre d’un contrôle par voie d’habeas corpus. [115] to begin, the irpa scheme for immigra- tion detention review provides that all detentions must be reviewed regularly. individuals detained for immigration purposes have the right to appear before the immigration division within 48 hours following their initial detention (s 57(1)). a second [115] rappelons tout d’abord que, selon le mé- canisme établi par la lipr en matière de contrôle des motifs de la détention aux fins de l’immigra- tion, toute détention doit faire l’objet de contrôles réguliers. les individus détenus aux fins d’immi- gration ont le droit de comparaître devant la section 516 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. review must take place during the next 7 days, and regular reviews at least once every 30 days thereafter (s 57(2)). the detainee may make an application to the immigration division requesting a detention review before the expiry of the 7 or 30- day period (immigration division rules, r 9). review hearings are structured to be expeditious and accessible, and they must be dealt with as informally and quickly as the circumstances and considerations of fairness and natural justice permit. [116] the irpa scheme provides that immigra- tion officers are responsible for bringing the de- tainee before the immigration division for all review hearings (s 57(3)). the immigration division has a corresponding power to order immigration officials to bring the detainee to a location specified by the division (immigration division rules, r 23). the immigration division can also facilitate access to the remedy by requiring the parties to appear at a conference to discuss any matter that would make the proceedings more fair and efficient, or to participate in scheduling the proceedings (immigration division rules, rr. 20(1) and 21). de l’immigration dans les 48 heures suivant le dé- but de leur détention (par 57(1)). un autre contrôle doit avoir lieu dans les 7 jours suivant le premier contrôle, puis au moins tous les 30 jours par la suite (par 57(2)). le détenu peut demander à la section de l’immigration le contrôle des motifs de sa détention avant l’expiration du délai de 7 jours ou de 30 jours, selon le cas (règles de la section de l’immigration, art 9). les contrôles sont structurés de manière à être rapides et accessibles et doivent se dérouler de façon aussi informelle et rapide que le permettent les circonstances, de même que les considérations d’équité et de justice naturelle. [116] la lipr prévoit que l’agent d’immigration est chargé d’amener le détenu devant la section de l’immigration pour tous les contrôles de sa déten- tion (par 57(3)). la section de l’immigration a le pouvoir correspondant d’ordonner aux autorités de l’immigration d’amener le détenu au lieu précisé par la section de l’immigration (règles de la section de l’immigration, art 23). la section de l’immi- gration peut également faciliter l’exercice de ce re- cours en exigeant que les parties participent à une conférence pour discuter de toute question afin que les procédures soient plus équitables et efficaces, ou qu’elles collaborent à la préparation de l’échéancier de l’affaire (règles de la section de l’immigration, par. 20(1) et art 21). [117] upon conducting a detention review, the immigration division may order the continued de- tention of a detainee, their unconditional release, or their release on any conditions the immigration division considers necessary the immigration division makes its decisions in furtherance of the purposes of irpa, which include protecting public safety and maintaining the security of canadian so- ciety (s 3(1)(h)). [117] lors du contrôle des motifs de la détention, la section de l’immigration peut ordonner le main- tien en détention du détenu, sa mise en liberté sans condition ou sa libération aux conditions qu’elle juge nécessaires. lorsqu’elle rend ses décisions, la section de l’immigration tient compte des objets de la lipr, notamment celui de protéger la sécurité publique et de garantir la sécurité de la société ca- nadienne (al 3(1)h)). [118] while the majority of detention review hearings occur before the immigration division, a detainee who is dissatisfied with the immigration division’s decision, whether on charter grounds or otherwise, may apply for leave and judicial review to the federal court (irpa, s 72(1)). i agree with the comments of catzman ja in peiroo, rejecting the argument that the requirement for leave to appeal [118] même si, la plupart du temps, le contrôle des motifs de la détention a lieu devant la section de l’immigration, le détenu insatisfait d’une décision de cette dernière peut saisir la cour fédérale d’une demande d’autorisation et de contrôle judiciaire que ce soit ou non pour des motifs fondés sur la charte (lipr, par 72(1)). je souscris aux propos du juge catzman qui, dans l’arrêt peiroo, a écarté l’argument [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 517 immigration decisions to the federal court rendered that remedy less advantageous than habeas corpus, where leave is not required. catzman ja wrote: i consider the suggested distinction to be more appar- ent than real. in order to succeed on an application for habeas corpus, an applicant must show reasonable and probable ground for his complaint: habeas corpus act, rso 1980, c. 193, s 1(1). the requirement for leave imposed by s 831(1) is clearly intended to be one of a series of screening mechanisms created by the act to discour[a]ge the assertion of spurious or meritless claims. i have difficulty accepting that an applicant who is in a position to show reasonable and probable ground for com- plaint regarding the decision or order in respect of which he seeks review would fail to be accorded the requisite leave to bring an application for such review. indeed, counsel have advised that such leave was granted in the present case     [p. 259] [119] mr. chhina’s application for judicial review before the federal court was, in fact, expedited. it took one week less to be heard and decided than his application for habeas corpus before the alberta court of queen’s bench. [120] in any event, the requirement for leave to ap- peal to the federal court does not change the nature of the comprehensive detention review process under irpa, which is governed by s. 58 of irpa and s. 248 of the regulations. the immigration division must order the release of a detainee unless the minister has satisfied the immigration division that one or more of the grounds in s. 58(1) of irpa are met: selon lequel l’obligation de demander l’autorisation d’interjeter appel des décisions en matière d’immi- gration devant la cour fédérale rendait ce recours moins avantageux que l’habeas corpus, pour lequel aucune autorisation n’était requise. voici ce que le juge catzman a écrit : [traduction] la distinction suggérée me semble plus apparente que réelle. pour obtenir gain de cause dans sa demande d’habeas corpus, le demandeur doit démontrer l’existence de motifs raisonnables et probables justifiant sa plainte (loi sur l’habeas corpus, lro 1980, c. 193, par 1(1)). l’obligation d’obtenir une autorisation qui est énoncée au par 831(1) est de toute évidence censée faire partie d’une série de mesures de filtrage prévues par la loi pour décourager la présentation de demandes fallacieuses ou non fondées. j’ai du mal à accepter qu’un demandeur qui est en mesure de démontrer l’existence de motifs raisonnables et probables justifiant sa plainte en ce qui a trait à la décision ou à l’ordonnance dont il demande le contrôle n’obtienne pas l’autorisation requise pour pré- senter cette demande en fait, les avocats ont indiqué que cette autorisation avait effectivement été accordée en l’espèce    [p. 259] [119] la demande de contrôle judiciaire dont m. chhina a saisi la cour fédérale a effectivement fait l’objet d’un traitement accéléré. son instruction et la décision à son égard ont nécessité une semaine de moins que la demande d’habeas corpus qu’il avait présentée à la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta. [120] en tout état de cause, l’obligation d’obtenir de la cour fédérale l’autorisation d’en appeler ne change rien à l’exhaustivité du contrôle des motifs de la détention qui est prévu par la lipr et qui est encadré par l’art. 58 de la lipr et par l’art. 248 du règlement. la section de l’immigration doit pronon- cer la mise en liberté du détenu, sauf si le ministre la convainc qu’il est satisfait à l’un ou l’autre des critères énumérés au par. 58(1) de la lipr : (a) the detainee is a danger to the public; a) le détenu constitue un danger pour le public; (b) the detainee is unlikely to appear for examina- tion, an admissibility hearing, removal from canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order by the minister; b) le détenu se soustraira vraisemblablement au contrôle, à l’enquête ou au renvoi du canada, ou à la procédure pouvant mener à la prise par le ministre d’une mesure de renvoi; 518 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. (c) the minister is taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that the detainee is inad- missible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality, criminality or organized criminality; c) le ministre prend les mesures voulues pour en- quêter sur les motifs raisonnables de soupçonner que le détenu est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité, pour atteinte aux droits humains ou inter- nationaux ou pour grande criminalité, criminalité ou criminalité organisée; (d) the detainee’s identity has not been, but may be, established; or d) l’identité du détenu n’a pas été prouvée, mais peut l’être; (e) if the detainee is a designated foreign national, the minister is of the opinion that the identity of the detainee has not been established. [121] if s. 58 grounds are established, s. 248 of the regulations requires the immigration division to consider the following additional factors to deter- mine if detention should continue: e) si le détenu est un étranger désigné, le ministre est d’avis que l’identité du détenu n’a pas été prouvée. [121] dès lors que l’existence des motifs de dé- tention énumérés à l’art. 58 est constatée, l’art. 248 du règlement exige que la section de l’immigration tienne compte des critères additionnels qui suivent pour décider si la détention doit être maintenue : (a) the reason for detention; a) le motif de la détention; (b) length of time in detention; b) la durée de la détention; (c) factors that may assist in determining how long detention is likely to continue; c) les éléments permettant l’évaluation de la durée probable de la détention; (d) delays or lack of diligence on the detainee or the government’s part; and d) les retards ou le manque inexpliqué de diligence de la part du détenu ou du gouvernement; (e) alternatives to detention. e) les solutions de rechange à la détention. [122] the factors in s. 248 of the regulations cod- ify the factors articulated by rothstein j. in sahin v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), [1995] 1 fc 214 (td). the s. 248 factors were endorsed by this court in charkaoui v. canada (citi- zenship and immigration), [2007] 1 scr 350. they ensure that extended periods of detention do not violate the charter. [122] les facteurs énumérés à l’art. 248 du règle- ment codifient ceux que le juge rothstein a énon- cés dans le jugement sahin c. canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immigration), [1995] 1 cf. 214 (1re inst). la cour a repris à son compte les facteurs énumérés à l’art. 248 dans l’arrêt charkaoui c. canada (citoyenneté et immigration), [2007] 1 rcs 350. ils garantissent qu’aucune période de détention prolongée n’enfreint la charte. [123] as rothstein j. noted in sahin, through irpa, “parliament has dealt with the right of society to be protected from those who pose a danger to society and the right of canada to control who enters and remains in this country” (p 229). to achieve these purposes, the irpa scheme confers upon members [123] comme le juge rothstein l’a noté dans le jugement sahin, au moyen de la lipr, le législateur « traite du droit qu’a la société d’être protégée contre ceux qui constituent une menace pour la sécurité publique et du droit qu’a le canada de contrôler ceux qui entrent et demeurent dans notre pays » [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 519 of the immigration division the power to detain individuals in anticipation of their likely danger to the public or likely failure to appear for removal from canada. [124] when making a decision as to whether to de- tain or release an individual under irpa, immigration division members must always exercise their discre- tion in a way that accords with the charter (see irpa, s 3(3)(d)). there is a statutory presumption in favour of release before the immigration division, which “shall order the release” of a detainee unless it is satisfied that at least one of the grounds set out in s. 58 of irpa is met, taking into account the factors in s. 248 of the regulations. [125] significantly, the mandatory s. 248 inquiry on review before the immigration division requires the division to assess the lawfulness of ongoing immigration detention without placing any onus on the detainee. unlike habeas corpus applications, where the detainee must raise a legitimate ground upon which to question the lawfulness of his or her detention, the minister bears the onus throughout of justifying the detention before the immigration division. the detainee bears no onus to produce evidence as to any of the factors enunciated in s. 58 of irpa or s. 248 of the regulations. (p 229). pour atteindre ces objectifs, le régime de la lipr confère aux commissaires de la section de l’immigration le pouvoir de détenir des individus en raison du danger qu’ils constituent pour le public ou du fait qu’ils se soustrairont vraisemblablement à leur renvoi du canada. [124] lorsqu’elle décide de détenir ou de libérer un individu sous le régime de la lipr, la section de l’immigration doit toujours exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire en conformité avec la charte (voir lipr, al 3(3)d)). il existe une présomption légale pour la mise en liberté par la section de l’immigra- tion, qui « prononce la mise en liberté » du détenu, à moins qu’elle soit convaincue qu’il a été satisfait à au moins un des motifs énumérés à l’art. 58 de la lipr, compte tenu des facteurs énumérés à l’art. 248 du règlement. [125] il importe de signaler que le contrôle prescrit par l’art. 248 oblige la section de l’immigration à se prononcer sur la légalité du maintien en détention de l’individu sans lui imposer quelque fardeau de preuve que ce soit. contrairement aux demandes d’habeas corpus dans le cadre desquelles le détenu doit invoquer un motif légitime pour contester la légalité de sa détention, tout au long du processus établi par la lipr c’est au ministre qu’il incombe de justifier la détention de l’intéressé devant la section de l’immigration. le détenu n’a pas à produire d’élé- ments de preuve en ce qui concerne les facteurs énoncés aux art. 58 de la lipr et 248 du règlement. [126] to the extent that the federal court of ap- peal in canada (minister of citizenship and immi- gration) v. thanabalasingham, [2004] 3 fcr 572, and the court of appeal for ontario in chaudhary reached the contrary conclusion, they were, in my respectful view, wrongly decided moreover, the holding in chaudhary that the minister can satisfy his or her onus before the immigration division “simply by relying on the reasons given at prior detention hearings” (para. 87) is inconsistent with the immigration division’s obligation to conduct a fresh inquiry into the lawfulness of detention at each review. at each immigration division hearing, detainees are entitled to the same fresh review of their detention as they would be on habeas corpus [126] dans la mesure où elles ont conclu le con- traire, la cour d’appel fédérale, dans l’arrêt canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immigration) c. thanabalasingham, [2004] 3 rcf 572, et la cour d’appel de l’ontario, dans l’arrêt chaudhary, ont, à mon avis, rendu des décisions erronées. de plus, la conclusion formulée par la cour d’appel dans l’arrêt chaudhary — suivant laquelle le ministre peut se dé- charger du fardeau de la preuve qui lui incombe de- vant la section de l’immigration [traduction] « en se contentant de reprendre les motifs exposés lors des contrôles antérieurs de la détention » (par. 87) — est incompatible avec l’obligation de la section de l’im- migration de reprendre depuis le début le contrôle de la légalité de la détention à chaque contrôle. en effet, 520 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. review. in cases like mr. chhina’s, the immigration division must always reassess the prior evidence in light of the detainee’s charter arguments. in particular, where a detainee challenges [127] their detention as a violation of the charter, the time between the prior and present review hearing will constitute new evidence that must inform the immigration division’s application of s. 58 of irpa and s. 248 of the regulations. it is not enough for the minister to rely on previous immigration division decisions to satisfy the immigration division on the s. 58 and s. 248 inquiry. the integrity of the irpa process is dependent on a fulsome review of the lawfulness of detention, including its charter com- pliance, at every review hearing. [128] the charter both guides the exercise of dis- cretionary administrative decision making under irpa and informs our interpretation of the scheme it- self. the irpa scheme must therefore be interpreted harmoniously with the charter values that shape the contours of its application. as justices iacobucci and arbour stated in application under s 8328 of the criminal code (re), [2004] 2 scr 248:. the modern approach [to statutory interpretation] recog- nizes the multi- faceted nature of statutory interpretation. textual considerations must be read in concert with leg- islative intent and established legal norms. lors de chaque audience de la section de l’immigra- tion, le détenu a droit au même nouveau contrôle de la légalité de sa détention qu’à celui auquel il aurait droit dans le cadre d’un recours en habeas corpus. dans un cas comme celui de m. chhina, la section de l’immigration doit toujours réévaluer les éléments de preuve antérieurs à la lumière des moyens fondés sur la charte qu’invoque le détenu. [127] plus particulièrement, lorsque le détenu con- teste sa détention au motif qu’elle contrevient à la charte, le temps qui s’est écoulé entre le contrôle précédent et le contrôle en cours constitue un nouvel élément de preuve dont la section de l’immigration doit tenir compte pour appliquer les art. 58 de la lipr et 248 du règlement. le ministre ne peut pas se contenter d’invoquer les décisions antérieures de la section de l’immigration pour convaincre celle-ci de l’existence des critères exigés dans le cadre du contrôle effectué en application des art. 58 et 248. l’intégrité du processus prévu par la lipr dépend de la tenue d’un examen complet de la légalité de la détention, y compris de sa conformité avec la charte, lors de chaque contrôle des motifs de la détention. [128] la charte à la fois encadre la façon dont sont rendues les décisions administratives discré- tionnaires sous le régime de la lipr et propose des balises sur l’interprétation du régime lui- même. le régime de la lipr doit par conséquent être inter- prété en harmonie avec les valeurs consacrées par la charte qui définissent les paramètres de son appli- cation. ainsi que les juges iacobucci et arbour l’ont déclaré dans la demande fondée sur l’art 8328 du code criminel (re), [2004] 2 rcs 248 :. l’approche contemporaine [en matière d’interprétation législative] tient compte de la nature diversifiée de l’in- terprétation législative. les considérations relatives au texte doivent être interprétées de concert avec l’intention du législateur et les normes juridiques établies. underlying this approach is the presumption that leg- islation is enacted to comply with constitutional norms, including the rights and freedoms enshrined in the char- ter    . this presumption acknowledges the centrality of constitutional values in the legislative process, and more broadly, in the political and legal culture of canada. [paras. 34-35] cette approche est fondée sur la présomption que le texte législatif édicté respecte les normes constitution- nelles, y compris les droits et libertés consacrés par la charte [  ]. cette présomption reconnaît le rôle crucial des valeurs constitutionnelles dans le processus législatif et, de façon plus générale, dans la culture politique et juridique canadienne. [par. 34-35] [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 521 importing charter principles into the ex- [129] ercise of administrative discretion under irpa re- quires that immigration division members apply the scheme in a manner that is at least as rigorous and fair as habeas corpus review. it is not enough that a statutory scheme is as broad and advantageous on paper as habeas corpus review, the scheme must also be applied in a manner that preserves the rights of detainees and the integrity of the process in the most comprehensive way possible. [130] that means that in carrying out their duties under the irpa scheme, members of the immigration division must ensure the fullest possible review of immigration detention. this includes, and has always included, an obligation to weigh the pur- poses served by immigration detention against the detained individual’s ss. 7, 9 and 12 charter rights. the immigration division’s inquiry into the lawful- ness of detention must take into account the detained individual’s s. 7 charter right not to be deprived of liberty except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, his or her s. 9 right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, and the s. 12 right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. as rothstein j. observed in sahin, “it is not the words of [irpa] that vest adjudicators with such jurisdiction, but rather, the application of charter principles to the exercise of discretion under [the scheme]” (p 230). [129] transposer les principes consacrés par la charte dans l’exercice des pouvoirs discrétionnaires administratifs prévus par la lipr oblige les commis- saires de la section de l’immigration à appliquer ce régime d’une manière au moins aussi rigoureuse et équitable que n’est appliqué le recours en habeas corpus. il ne suffit pas qu’un régime établi par une loi ait une portée au moins aussi large et soit aussi avan- tageuse en théorie que le recours en habeas corpus; encore faut-il qu’on puisse appliquer ce régime de manière à protéger les droits des détenus et l’intégrité du processus de la façon la plus exhaustive possible. il s’ensuit que, pour exercer les fonctions que [130] leur confère le régime établi par la lipr, les commis- saires de la section de l’immigration doivent veiller à ce que la détention aux fins de l’immigration fasse l’objet du contrôle le plus complet possible. ceci comprend — et a toujours compris — l’obligation de mettre en balance les objets de la détention aux fins de l’immigration et les droits garantis aux détenus par les art. 7, 9 et 12 de la charte. le contrôle de la légalité de la détention auquel procèdent les com- missaires de la section de l’immigration doit tenir compte du droit que reconnaît l’art. 7 de la charte au détenu de ne pas être privé de sa liberté, sauf en conformité avec les principes de justice fondamen- tale, de son droit garanti par l’art. 9 de ne pas être détenu ou emprisonné arbitrairement et du droit que lui reconnaît l’art. 12 de ne pas être soumis à des trai- tements ou à des peines cruelles et inusitées. ainsi que le juge rothstein l’a souligné dans le jugement sahin « l’arbitre ne tient pas cette compétence des termes de [la lipr], mais de l’application des prin- cipes consacrés par la charte à l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire prévu [par le régime] » (p 230). [131] that, in my respectful view, necessarily in- cludes the immigration division’s ability to con- sider the conditions of detention. a comprehensive, charter-infused analysis of immigration detention may reveal that the length or conditions of detention are such that continued detention is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice (s. 7), is arbitrary because it is no longer reasonably further- ing the state objective (s. 9) and/or amounts to cruel and unusual punishment (s 12). the application of ss. 7, 9 and 12 of the charter to the irpa scheme [131] à mon avis, cela comprend nécessairement la capacité de la section de l’immigration de se pen- cher sur les conditions de détention. une analyse exhaustive, fondée sur la charte, de la détention aux fins de l’immigration peut révéler que la durée ou les conditions de détention sont telles que le maintien en détention n’est pas conforme aux principes de justice naturelle (art. 7), est arbitraire parce qu’elle ne permet pas la réalisation d’un objectif de l’état (art. 9) ou constitue une peine cruelle et inusitée (art 12). l’application des art. 7, 9 et 12 de la charte 522 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. brings to light the immigration division’s obligation to assess the length, future duration and conditions of detention when balancing the state’s objectives against the detained individual’s rights. [132] the irpa scheme therefore ensures the protection of other charter rights by calling on the immigration division to consider whether deten- tions have become unlawful because of their length, uncertain duration and conditions. there is no prin- cipled reason to interpret the review provisions in a way that precludes scrutiny of conditions. why apply a narrow, constrictive interpretation of a remedial statute when a wider, more protective interpretation is not only available, it is mandated by the purposes underlying the scheme. as these reasons seek to clar- ify, the s. 248 factors guide the immigration division in assessing whether ongoing detention is justified pursuant to the charter based on: au régime de la lipr fait ressortir l’obligation qu’a la section de l’immigration d’évaluer la durée actuelle et future de la détention, ainsi que les conditions de celle-ci lorsqu’elle met en balance les objectifs de l’état avec les droits individuels des détenus. [132] le régime de la lipr assure donc la protec- tion des autres droits garantis par la charte en pres- crivant que la section de l’immigration se demande si la détention est devenue illégale du fait de sa durée, de l’incertitude de sa durée ou de ses conditions. il n’existe aucune raison de principe pour interpréter les dispositions relatives au contrôle de telle sorte qu’elles empêchent l’examen des conditions de la détention. pourquoi appliquer une interprétation étroite et res- trictive à une loi réparatrice lorsqu’une interprétation plus large et qui assure une plus grande protection est non seulement disponible, mais exigée par l’objet sous- jacent du régime? comme les présents motifs visent à le clarifier, les facteurs énumérés à l’art. 248 offrent des repères à la section de l’immigration pour déterminer, selon les critères suivants, si le maintien en détention est justifié au regard de la charte : (a) the reason for detention; a) le motif de la détention; (b) length of time in detention; b) la durée de la détention; (c) factors that may assist in determining how long detention is likely to continue; c) les éléments permettant l’évaluation de la durée probable de la détention; (d) delays or lack of diligence on the detainee or the government’s part; and d) les retards ou le manque inexpliqué de diligence de la part du détenu ou du gouvernement; (e) alternatives to detention. e) les solutions de rechange à la détention. [133] section 248(a) requires the immigration di- vision to weigh the state’s immigration objectives against the detained individual’s right to be free from arbitrary or indefinite restraints on liberty. as in ha- beas corpus review assessing compliance with the charter, the immigration division must assess the strength of the reason for detention. a prior, fact- driven immigration division determination that the individual constitutes a flight risk or a danger to the public is entitled to deference on both irpa and habeas corpus review (see thanabalasingham, at para. 10 (irpa review) and brown v. canada (public [133] l’alinéa 248a) exige que la section de l’im- migration mette en balance les objectifs de l’état en matière d’immigration et le droit du détenu de ne pas être privé de façon arbitraire ou indéfinie de sa liberté. comme dans le cas d’un recours en habeas corpus dans le cadre duquel la conformité avec la charte est évaluée, la section de l’immigration doit évaluer la solidité des motifs justifiant la détention. une décision antérieure de la section de l’immigration, reposant sur des faits, selon laquelle l’individu risque de s’évader ou constitue un danger pour le public appelle la re- tenue tant lors d’un contrôle effectué dans le cadre [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 523 safety) (2018), 420 dlr (4th) 124 (ont. ca), at para. 29 (habeas corpus review)). the greater the danger posed to the public, the stronger the justifi- cation for ongoing detention (sahin, at p. 231 (irpa review); ali v. canada (minister of public safety and emergency preparedness) (2017), 137 or (3d) 498 (ca), at para. 24 (habeas corpus review)). [134] as for s. 248(b), the justification for con- tinued detention decreases as the length of time in detention increases. the immigration division must accord “significant weight” to the length of deten- tion (see sahin, at pp 231-32). the strength of an immigration detainee’s argument that his ongoing detention has become a violation of the charter increases with each subsequent review hearing. the detaining authorities bear a correlative onus to jus- tify continued detention in the face of a continually solidifying charter claim. a longer period of deten- tion signifies that immigration authorities have had more time to effect removal, which they are expected to do as soon as reasonably possible. accordingly, the evidentiary burden on the detaining authority to justify continued immigration detention increases as the length of detention increases. this approach to the length of detention is no different from habeas corpus (see chaudhary, ali and brown). de la lipr que d’un recours en habeas corpus (voir thanabalasingham, par. 10 (contrôle effectué dans le cadre de la lipr) et brown c. canada (public safety) (2018), 420 dlr (4th) 124 (ca ont), par. 29 (contrôle effectué dans le cadre d’une demande d’ha- beas corpus)). plus grand est le risque pour le public, plus solides sont les motifs justifiant le maintien en détention (sahin, p. 231 (contrôle effectué dans le cadre de la lipr); ali c. canada (minister of public and emergency preparedness) (2017), 137 or (3d) 498 (ca), par. 24 (contrôle effectué dans le cadre d’une demande d’habeas corpus)). [134] s’agissant de l’al. 248b), la force des motifs justifiant le maintien en détention faiblit au fur et à mesure que la durée de la détention se prolonge. un facteur qui doit « peser lourd » dans la balance lorsque la section de l’immigration se prononce sur le maintien en détention est la durée de la détention (voir sahin, p. 231- 232). la solidité de l’argument de l’individu détenu aux fins de l’immigration sui- vant lequel son maintien en détention est devenu une violation de la charte augmente avec chaque contrôle subséquent de sa détention. les autorités qui le détiennent ont le fardeau corrélatif de justifier son maintien en détention lorsqu’est invoqué un moyen fondé sur la charte qui ne cesse de prendre de la vigueur. une période de détention qui se prolonge signifie que les autorités de l’immigration ont eu plus de temps pour procéder au renvoi, une mesure qu’elles sont censées exécuter dès qu’il est raisonna- blement possible qu’elles le fassent. en conséquence, le fardeau de la preuve dont doivent s’acquitter les autorités qui détiennent l’intéressé pour justifier son maintien en détention s’alourdit au fur et à mesure que la détention se prolonge. cette conception de la durée de la détention n’est pas différente de celle qui s’applique dans le cadre d’une demande d’habeas corpus (voir chaudhary, ali et brown). [135] the anticipated future length of detention in s. 248(c) of the regulations requires an estimation of how long detention is likely to continue. a detention that is lawful for the purpose of removal may become arbitrary and in violation of s. 9 of the charter when it becomes unhinged from its immigration- related purpose. where removal appears unlikely and the future duration of detention cannot be ascertained, [135] la durée prévue de la détention dont il est question à l’al. 248c) du règlement exige une es- timation de la durée probable de la détention. une détention légitime aux fins du renvoi peut devenir ar- bitraire et contraire à l’art. 9 de la charte lorsqu’elle ne se rattache plus à ses fins d’immigration. lorsque le renvoi semble peu probable et que la durée future de la détention ne peut pas être déterminée, ce facteur 524 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. this is a factor that weighs in favour of release (sahin, at p. 231; charkaoui, at para 115). milite pour la libération (sahin, p. 231; charkaoui, par 115). [136] that is the same inquiry as in habeas corpus review. as rouleau ja noted in chaudhary: a detention cannot be justified if it is no longer reasonably necessary to further the machinery of immigration control. where there is no reasonable prospect that the detention’s immigration- related purposes will be achieved within a reasonable time (with what is reasonable depending on the circumstances), a continued detention will violate the detainee’s ss. 7 and 9 charter rights and no longer be legal. [para. 81] [137] the immigration division is, moreover, bet- ter positioned to assess and address the future dura- tion of detention than the superior courts on habeas corpus review. as létourneau ja held for the court in canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. li, [2010] 2 fcr 433 (ca), the short 30- day period between each immigration division review “allows for an estimation based on actual facts and pending proceedings instead of an estimation based on speculation as to potential facts and proceedings” (para 66). the immigration division obtains an ac- curate picture of the detention every 30 days. it can assess progress over time by reviewing past proceed- ings and anticipating pending proceedings to guard against a violation of the detainee’s charter rights. [136] il s’agit de la même analyse que dans le cadre d’une demande d’habeas corpus. ainsi que le juge rouleau l’a fait observer dans l’arrêt chaudhary : [traduction] [une] détention n’est pas justifiée si elle n’est plus raisonnablement nécessaire pour faciliter les formalités d’immigration. lorsqu’il n’y a aucune chance que les objectifs de la détention dans le contexte de l’im- migration soient atteints dans un délai raisonnable — la question de savoir ce qui est raisonnable dépendant des circonstances —, le maintien en détention viole les droits garantis au détenu par les art. 7 et 9 de la charte et sa détention n’est plus légale. [par. 81] [137] la section de l’immigration est par ailleurs mieux placée pour évaluer et trancher la question de la durée future de la détention que ne le sont les cours supérieures saisies d’une demande d’habeas corpus. comme le juge létourneau l’a déclaré dans l’arrêt canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immigra- tion) c. li, [2010] 2 rcf 433 (ca), le court laps de temps de 30 jours qui s’écoule entre les contrôles ef- fectués par la section de l’immigration « permet d’ef- fectuer une estimation fondée sur les faits concrets et les procédures en instance, au lieu de s’en remettre à une estimation fondée sur des spéculations portant sur des faits et des procédures éventuels » (par 66). la section de l’immigration obtient un portrait fidèle de la détention tous les 30 jours. elle peut évaluer les progrès dans le temps en examinant les instances antérieures et en anticipant l’évolution de l’instance en cours pour éviter une violation des droits garantis au détenu par la charte. [138] section 248(d) requires a consideration of delays or lack of diligence on the part of the de- tained individual or the immigration authorities. as rothstein j. held in sahin and this court held in charkaoui, unexplained delay or lack of diligence should count against the offending party (sahin, at p. 231; charkaoui, at para 114). superior courts re- viewing immigration detention for compliance with ss. 7, 9 and 12 of the charter undertake the same inquiry. they look to the complexity of effecting the applicant’s removal from canada, the reasonableness of the steps taken by immigration authorities to effect [138] l’alinéa 248d) exige que l’on tienne compte des retards ou du manque de diligence de la part du détenu ou des autorités de l’immigration. ainsi que le juge rothstein l’a déclaré dans le jugement sahin et que la cour l’a rappelé dans l’arrêt charkaoui, les retards et les manques de diligence inexpliqués doivent être retenus contre la personne qui en est responsable (sahin, p. 231; charkaoui, par 114). les cours supérieures qui contrôlent la détention aux fins de l’immigration pour en vérifier la confor- mité avec les art. 7, 9 et 12 de la charte se livrent à la même analyse. elles examinent la complexité [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 525 removal, and the extent to which the applicant has prolonged their detention by failing to cooperate with immigration authorities’ removal efforts (see brown, at para. 36; canada v. dadzie, 2016 onsc 6045, at para. 46 (canlii)). in dadzie, a foreign national detained under [139] irpa applied to be released by way of habeas cor- pus. clark j. applied the charkaoui and sahin princi- ples about delay and diligence in immigration review in the habeas corpus context (para 36). mr. dadzie’s lack of cooperation led clark j. to conclude that mr. dadzie had not met his onus of showing that his detention had been exceptionally lengthy. [140] finally, s. 248(e) of the regulations requires the immigration division to consider alternatives to detention. alternatives to detention include outright release; a bond or guarantee; reporting requirements; confinement to a specific geographic area; and de- tention in a less restrictive form (sahin, at p 231). an assessment of the conditions of detention is a vital component of the inquiry into alternatives to detention under s 248(e). given the immigration di- vision’s statutory mandate to assess alternatives to de- tention; the requirement to make charter- compliant decisions; and its ability to exercise discretion as to the terms of release, the division’s power to release a detainee on conditions must include an ability to modify the conditions of detention. like the provin- cial superior courts on habeas corpus review, immi- gration division members must be taken to have the power to release the detainee from a “prison within a prison” pursuant to s. 58(3) (see r v. miller, [1985] 2 scr 613, at p. 637, per le dain j.; robert j. sharpe, the law of habeas corpus (1976), at p 149). du renvoi du demandeur du canada, le caractère raisonnable des mesures prises par les autorités de l’immigration pour procéder au renvoi et la mesure dans laquelle le demandeur a prolongé sa déten- tion en refusant de collaborer à son renvoi avec les autorités (voir brown, par. 36; canada c. dadzie, 2016 onsc 6045, par. 46 (canlii)). [139] dans l’affaire dadzie, un ressortissant étran- ger détenu en application de la lipr demandait sa mise en liberté par voie d’habeas corpus. le juge clark a appliqué les principes dégagés dans les dé- cisions charkaoui et sahin au sujet des retards et du manque de diligence en matière de contrôle de la détention aux fins de l’immigration dans le contexte de l’habeas corpus (par 36). le manque de col- laboration de m. dadzie a amené le juge clark à conclure qu’il ne s’était pas acquitté du fardeau qui lui incombait de démontrer que sa détention avait été exceptionnellement longue. [140] enfin, l’al. 248e) du règlement oblige la section de l’immigration à tenir compte de l’exis- tence de solutions de rechange à la détention. parmi celles-ci, mentionnons la libération pure et simple, la mise en liberté sous caution, les obligations de se rapporter aux autorités, la résidence surveillée à un lieu précis et la détention sous une forme moins restrictive de liberté (sahin, p 231). l’évaluation des conditions de détention est un élément essentiel de l’analyse des solutions de rechange à la déten- tion prévue à l’al 248e). comme la loi confie à la section de l’immigration la mission d’envisager des solutions de rechange à la détention et que les décisions de la section de l’immigration doivent être conformes à la charte et compte tenu du fait que la section de l’immigration jouit d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire en ce qui concerne les conditions de mise en liberté, son pouvoir de libérer un détenu sous conditions doit comporter celui de modifier ses conditions de détention. à l’instar des cours supé- rieures provinciales saisies d’une demande d’habeas corpus, la section de l’immigration doit être consi- dérée comme ayant le pouvoir de libérer un détenu d’une « prison au sein d’une prison » en vertu du par. 58(3) (voir r c. miller, [1985] 2 rcs 613, p. 637, le juge le dain; robert j. sharpe, the law of habeas corpus (1976), p 149). 526 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. in sum, the process of review before the [141] immigration division governed by s. 58 of irpa and s. 248 of the regulations demands that the division consider the reasons for detention; the length of time in detention; the anticipated future length of deten- tion; delays or lack of diligence; and the availability, effectiveness and appropriateness of alternatives to detention, including changes in the conditions of detention. these are the same considerations that superior courts weigh to assess whether ongoing immigration detention violates ss. 7, 9 or 12 of the charter on habeas corpus review. [142] the immigration division has the same con- stitutional mandate as well as an overarching duty to give effect to “a legislative initiative purporting to provide a whole scheme    for the administra- tion and review of proceedings in    immigration” (peiroo, at p. 262; see also reza v. canada (1992), 11  or  (3d) 65  (ca), at p.  80) mr.  chhina is attempting to ignore the body explicitly and exclu- sively tasked with carrying out the purposes of irpa by wrapping his immigration detention with a char- ter ribbon. [143] this court in reza rejected the applicant’s similar attempt to bypass the immigration scheme in search of a favourable constitutional disposition. in so doing, we acknowledged that the expertise of the immigration division in immigration matters extends to the constitutional aspects of immigra- tion matters. as la forest j. wrote in cuddy chicks ltd. v. ontario (labour relations board), [1991] 2 scr 5:. it must be emphasized that the process of charter deci- sion making is not confined to abstract ruminations on constitutional theory. in the case of charter matters which arise in a particular regulatory context, the ability of the decision maker to analyze competing policy concerns is critical    . [141] en somme, le processus de contrôle de la section de l’immigration régi par les art. 58 de la lipr et 248 du règlement exige que la section de l’immigration examine les motifs de la détention, sa durée, la durée anticipée du prolongement de la détention, les retards ou le manque de diligence, puis, l’existence, l’efficacité et l’opportunité des solutions de rechange à la détention, y compris les changements dans les conditions de détention. il s’agit des mêmes considérations que celles dont une cour supérieure saisie d’une demande d’habeas cor- pus tient compte pour déterminer si le maintien de la détention de l’immigrant viole ou non les art. 7, 9 ou 12 de la charte. [142] la section de l’immigration a le même man- dat constitutionnel ainsi que l’obligation primordiale de donner effet à [traduction] « une mesure légis- lative qui est censée établir un régime complet [  ] pour l’administration et la révision des procédures [  ] en matière d’immigration » (peiroo, p. 262; voir également reza c. canada (1992), 11 or (3d) 65  (ca), p.  80) m.  chhina tente de faire fi de l’organe expressément et exclusivement chargé de réaliser les objectifs de la lipr en se parant du ruban de la charte pour contester sa détention aux fins de l’immigration. [143] dans l’arrêt reza, la cour a déjoué des ten- tatives semblables faites par le demandeur pour pas- ser outre au régime d’immigration en vue d’obtenir une solution constitutionnelle en sa faveur. nous reconnaissions ainsi que l’expertise de la section de l’immigration en matière d’immigration s’étendait aux aspects constitutionnels des questions d’immi- gration. comme le juge la forest l’écrivait dans l’arrêt cuddy chicks ltd. c. ontario (commission des relations de travail), [1991] 2 rcs 5 :. il faut souligner que le processus consistant à rendre des décisions à la lumière de la charte ne se limite pas à des ruminations abstraites sur la théorie constitutionnelle. lorsque des questions relatives à la charte sont soulevées dans un contexte de réglementation donné, la capacité du décisionnaire d’analyser des considérations de principe opposées est fondamentale   .   .   . [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina la juge abella 527 it is apparent, then, that an expert tribunal    can bring its specialized expertise to bear in a very functional and productive way in the determination of charter issues which make demands on such expertise. [pp. 16-18] il est donc évident qu’un tribunal spécialisé [  ] peut appliquer son expertise de façon très fonctionnelle et pro- ductive à trancher les questions relatives à la charte qui requièrent cette expertise. [p. 16-18] [144] despite mr.  reza’s attempt to recast his challenge as a constitutional one, the court recog- nized that his charter arguments were fundamentally grounded in immigration policy. the same is true of mr. chhina’s charter complaints, which arose in relation to the immigration division’s decisions to continue his detention. these are matters which lie at the heart of immigration policy. the immigration division is the most appropriate forum to integrate charter rights within the overall scheme and pur- poses of irpa. [145] properly interpreted, it is clear from the preceding review that the irpa scheme for the re- view of immigration detention offers a remedy to detainees that is at least as broad, and no less ad- vantageous than review by way of habeas corpus. it provides for the fullest possible review of the merits of a challenge to immigration detention. and where an individual is subject to an immigration deten- tion that is said to violate his or her ss. 7, 9 and 12 charter rights, the immigration division’s review process, guided by s. 58 of irpa and s. 248 of the regulations, allows for at least the same substantive assessment as that undertaken by superior courts on habeas corpus review. [146] this court has repeatedly affirmed that ha- beas corpus will not lie if the statutory alternative provides a remedy that is at least as favourable. in my respectful view, it does. mr. chhina’s case is therefore captured by the peiroo exception to the availability of habeas corpus review. the superior court properly declined to exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction in favour of the complete, comprehen- sive and expert scheme to which mr. chhina was entitled under the act. [144] malgré les tentatives faites par m. reza pour qualifier sa contestation de constitutionnelle, la cour a reconnu que ses arguments fondés sur la charte reposaient essentiellement sur des politiques d’im- migration. il en va de même pour les moyens que m. chhina tire en l’espèce de la charte et qui dé- coulent des décisions de la section de l’immigration de prolonger sa détention. ce sont là des questions qui se situent au cœur même des politiques d’immi- gration. la section de l’immigration est le forum qui convient le mieux pour intégrer les droits garantis par la charte à l’économie de la lipr et à ses objets. [145] il ressort de l’analyse qui précède que, si on l’interprète correctement, le régime de contrôle des motifs de la détention aux fins de l’immigration établi par la lipr offre aux détenus un recours dont la portée est au moins aussi large et aussi avanta- geux que celle de la procédure d’habeas corpus. ce régime prévoit l’examen le plus complet possible du bien- fondé de la remise en cause de la détention aux fins de l’immigration. et lorsque l’individu détenu par les autorités de l’immigration se prétend victime d’une violation des droits qui lui sont garantis par les art. 7, 9 et 12 de la charte, le processus de contrôle de la section de l’immigration, encadré par les art. 58 de la lipr et 248 du règlement, permet au moins le même examen approfondi que celui qu’effectue une cour supérieure saisie d’une demande d’habeas corpus. [146] la cour a affirmé à maintes reprises qu’il n’y a pas ouverture à l’habeas corpus si la solution de rechange prévue par la loi offre un recours tout aussi favorable. à mon avis, c’est effectivement le cas en l’espèce. le cas de m. chhina tombe par conséquent sous le coup de l’exception établie par l’arrêt peiroo, ce qui le rend irrecevable à présenter une demande d’habeas corpus. la cour supérieure a refusé à bon droit d’exercer sa compétence¸ en matière d’habeas corpus au profit du régime complet, exhaustif et spécialisé auquel m. chhina pouvait avoir recours selon la loi. 528 canada (psep) v chhina abella j. [2019] 2 scr. [147] i would allow the appeal. [147] je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi. appeal dismissed, abella j. dissenting. pourvoi rejeté, la juge abella est dissidente. procureur des appelants : procureur général du canada, vancouver. canada, vancouver. calgary; jackman, nazami & associates, toronto; laishley reed, toronto. procureurs de l’intimé : nota bene law, calgary; jackman, nazami & associates, toronto; laishley reed, toronto. detention network: sekhar law office, toronto; maija martin, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant end immigration de- tention network : sekhar law office, toronto; maija martin, toronto. tion of refugee lawyers: jared will & associates, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association ca- nadienne des avocats et avocates en droit des réfu- giés : jared will & associates, toronto. international- canada: wilson, christen, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante defence for chil- dren international- canada : wilson, christen, to- ronto. tional canada (english branch): community legal services- ottawa, ottawa; university of ottawa, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenant amnesty interna- tional canada (english branch) : community le- gal services- ottawa, ottawa; université d’ottawa, ottawa. legal aid services programme: york university, osgoode hall law school, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant community & legal aid services programme : york university, osgoode hall law school, toronto. for refugees: edelmann & co. law corporation, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenant le conseil canadien pour les réfugiés : edelmann & co. law corpora- tion, vancouver. law clinic: stockwoods, toronto; queen’s prison law clinic, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante queen’s prison law clinic : stockwoods, toronto; queen’s prison law clinic, toronto. hu man rights trust: battista smith migration law group, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant le fonds égale canada pour les droits de la personne : battista smith mi gration law group, toronto. civil liberties association: frances mahon law, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante british columbia civil liberties association : frances mahon law, vancouver. [2019] 2 rcs. canada (sppc) c chhina 529 lib erties association:  borden ladner gervais, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana- dienne des libertés civiles : borden ladner gervais, toronto. law association: borys law, kingston; mccarten wallace, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante canadian prison law association : borys law, kingston; mccarten wallace, toronto.
i. overview [1] in 2011, the appellant, resolute fp canada inc. (“resolute”) — a forest products company — received an unexpected electricity bill the respondent hydro-québec, relying on a clause of a power contract dating from 1926, sought to significantly increase the price of electricity purchased from it by resolute, citing taxes or charges hydro-québec paid to the quebec government that it could, under the 1926 contract, claim from resolute. [2] resolute sees this as unfair. it asserts that, because hydro-québec was not incorporated until the 1940s, it had not signed the 1926 contract, which remains in effect and instead binds resolute and the gatineau power company (“gatineau power”), a private electricity producer. hydro-québec counters that this is not true, because even though gatineau power continues to exist, it assigned that contract to hydro-québec in 1965 at one stage of the nationalization of electricity in quebec, and the canadian international paper company (“cip”), resolute’s corporate predecessor, consented to that assignment in advance in the original contract. [3] resolute in turn argues that, properly understood, the contract between gatineau power and hydro-québec merely made the latter a mandatary for purposes of managing the 1926 contract, as opposed to a true party to the contract in its own name. as well, it would be unacceptable to consider the 1965 arrangement between gatineau power and hydro-québec, which was concluded without resolute’s knowledge, to be a valid assignment of contract. to do so would be to impose on it, without its consent, a counterparty in the 1926 contract with which it has not agreed to do business. resolute says it owes nothing to hydro-québec in this regard, because it is a debtor only to gatineau power. it therefore seeks a declaration that the taxes or charges being claimed by hydro-québec, the effect of which is to raise the price of electricity, cannot be claimed from it — a declaration that was granted at trial (2016 qccs 3862), but was then denied on appeal (2019 qcca 30). [4] in this appeal, this court is asked to reconsider the conditions for and effects of assignment of contract, a juridical operation by which, according to the conclusion of the court of appeal, the assignor, gatineau power, a contracting party, had carried out an inter vivos transfer to the assignee, hydro-québec, of claims and debts arising from the 1926 contract with the assigned party, which had since become resolute.1 [5] conventional assignment of contract, which is viewed sometimes as the addition of an assignment of claims to a transfer of debts and sometimes as the transfer of a contract as a whole, has long been a source of uncertainty among jurists. one might assume that this uncertainty, which is conceptual and moral in nature, results in part from the absence of a nominate scheme in the civil codes. although the civil code of lower canada (“cclc”) and the civil code of québec (“ccq”) do regulate certain specific forms of assignment of contract (eg assignment/transfer of lease in arts. 1870 to 1873 ccq and arts. 1619 and 1655 cclc; assignment/transfer of a contract of insurance in arts. 2475 and 2476 ccq and arts. 2577 and 2578 cclc), they provide no explicit general scheme for this well-known business practice. [6] thus, civilians have long raised questions about assignment of contract because, according to a subjective conception, the contract is [translation] “a relationship, not property”, and “a contractual relationship cannot be assigned, since, 1 see, eg, the definition of “assignment of contract” proposed in the context of the civil code of lower canada in private law dictionary and bilingual lexicons (2nd ed. 1991), by p-a. crépeau, ed., at p 37. like a debt, it has no patrimonial value” (see the description by j. flour, j-l. aubert, and é savaux, les obligations, vol. 3, le rapport d’obligation (8th ed 2013), at no. 400 (emphasis deleted)). from a moral perspective — and this relates directly to the points raised by resolute in its appeal — the fact that the assigned party did not consent to the assignment between the assignor and the assignee is the central concern. some authors have pointed out that it could be unfair to impose on the assigned party a new debtor who might prove to be unreliable, if not insolvent, after the assignment of the contract. even more fundamentally, the principles of binding force and relativity of contract are sometimes seen as a complete bar to the transfer of a contract if the assignment would impose on the assigned party a new contracting party and new undertakings to which it has not consented (see the explanations of f. levesque, précis de droit québécois des obligations: contrat, responsabilité, exécution et extinction (2014), at paras. 928 and 1019; and of j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obligations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at no. 1042). [7] despite this uncertainty and the apparent silence of the general law, however, assignment of contract is firmly rooted in commercial life, and it enables contracting parties, as in this case, to meet complex objectives (see, eg,. d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (3rd ed. 2018), at no. 3227). this appeal confirms that assignment of contract has a key role to play as a business technique, given that, being a contract itself, assignment has a legitimate malleability that is supported by the principle of autonomy of the will here, the parties set up a novel assignment mechanism, one with a translatory effect on the rights and obligations under the contract, although that effect is temporally limited by a lease to which the assignment is accessory. in this case, the technique of assignment made it possible, at one stage of the nationalization of electricity, to balance the interests of the assignor, gatineau power, and that company’s secured creditors with those of the government and hydro-québec and even, despite the objections it now raises, those of resolute in the assigned contract. [8] in fact, the dispute between the parties shows how assignment of contract — seen as a transfer to the assignee not merely of rights and obligations but also of the contract itself — can be achieved in a manner that, while protecting the interests of the assigned party, is compatible with the principles of binding force and relativity of contract in addition to being a composite technique comprising two mechanisms involving the transfer of, respectively, claims and debts under a contract, assignment represents first and foremost, in this case, a legal mechanism by which one party to the 1926 contract, the assignor, gatineau power, transferred its [translation] “status as contracting party”2 to a third person, the assignee, hydro-québec, in a manner that is consistent with the moral foundation of relativity of the original contract. overall, the answer to resolute’s objections, the most important of which is that it did not consent to the operation, lies in legal rules that protect the assigned party’s interests by requiring that party’s consent in order for the assignment to be valid. the interpretation i propose here is thus consistent with an important current in quebec doctrine and jurisprudence, 2 i take this expression from lluelles and moore, at no. 3238. it is based on the notion provided for in the new definition of assignment of contract in art. 1216 para. 1 of the french code civil, which was adopted in the 2016 reform of the law of obligations and which i will discuss below, that a party can [translation] “assign his status as party to the contract”. as well as with recently reformed french law. according to all these authorities, there is no conceptual or moral bar to the assignment of a contract, seen as a patrimonial asset in itself, provided that the operation protects the interests of the assigned party. ii background [9] in 1926, cip and gatineau power signed a synallagmatic contract of successive performance for the supply of electric power in which gatineau power undertook to deliver 40,000 kw of electricity per month to cip, while the latter undertook in exchange to pay for that electricity. in the preamble to the contract, the parties mentioned that gatineau power was building hydroelectric plants on the gatineau river and that cip wished to obtain electrical energy from those plants for the operation of its mills. the original term of the contract was 40 years, a term that cip had an option to renew for additional 10-year periods. it is admitted that the 1926 contract has been renewed several times and is still in effect. it is also admitted that, as a result of various transactions that are not at issue in this case, resolute is the holder of cip’s rights and obligations under the 1926 contract. [10] the 1926 contract provided for a stable price for electricity however, art. 20 provided that cip would accept any increases in the price that might result from future increases in taxes or charges levied by the provincial or federal government on electrical energy generated from water power: the purchaser agrees that if during the term of this agreement any future dominion or province tax or charge is levied upon electrical energy generated from water power in such manner as to increase the taxes and charges presently effective then the amount of such tax or charge, but not more than the amount of the increase shall be added to the billing for electrical energy under this agreement. (ar, vol. i, at p 174) this price adjustment clause was never invoked by gatineau power. [11] the contract contains a number of provisions concerning the quantities of electricity to be delivered by gatineau power and the terms for payment of the price for that electricity, even including a clause that gives gatineau power the right to request that payments be made “in gold coin” (art. 15) it also provides for mutual undertakings related to the sale of electricity, including clauses concerning renewal (art. 21), dispute settlement (arts. 18 and 19), and civil liability of the parties in the event of personal injury or damage to property (art. 7) in addition to art. 20 with respect to the price, two provisions are of particular relevance to the issues in this case. in art. 17, the parties agreed that the contract was to be subject to both present and future provincial and federal regulation and they stipulated in art. 22 that “[t]his agreement shall enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the successors or assigns of both parties”. [12] in the early 1960s, the quebec government acquired the capital stock of a number of private power production companies, including gatineau power. since then, gatineau power has been a [translation] “wholly owned subsidiary” of hydro-québec (af, at para. 7) this phase of the nationalization of electricity followed the creation of hydro-québec and the expropriation of a montréal company in 1944; that expropriation had included all the movable and immovable property used in the production of electricity as well as the bulk of the expropriated company’s contracts. in this new phase involving gatineau power, the quebec government was no longer acting by way of expropriation, but instead purchased shares of the companies concerned, which was a method contemplated by law (see an act respecting the quebec hydro-electric commission, rsq 1941, c 98a (inserted into the revised statutes by sq 1944, c 22), s 40, to which act the 1965 contract refers). [13] thus, in 1965, hydro-québec entered into a bilateral contract with gatineau power that was part of a broader process designed to unify the management and operations of gatineau power and the other private companies whose shares hydro-québec had already purchased this contract provided for the sale of all of gatineau power’s movable property to hydro-québec and the lease to the latter of all of the former’s immovables for a term of 25 years it further provided that hydro-québec would assume certain responsibilities toward gatineau power’s creditors, including with respect to bonds subscribed to under a trust deed referred to in the contract. the contract was subject to approval by the “holders of the bonds” in question hydro-québec was to benefit from the revenue derived from gatineau power’s power contracts, and was entitled to use the premises leased from the latter as if they were its own. [14] according to the parties’ agreed statement of admissions, this contract is still in effect. until 2011, the year when the dispute between the parties arose, gatineau power’s financial statements in fact indicated that the 1965 lease continued to apply, having been tacitly renewed. [15] the central question in the case is as follows: did the 1965 contract make hydro-québec resolute’s other contracting party by way of an assignment of the 1926 contract? [16] there is almost no evidence in the record regarding the circumstances of formation of the 1965 contract, and evidence of the parties’ conduct since the contract was signed is fragmentary. what we do know, however, is that since at least 1999, all bills for electricity supplied under the 1926 contract have been issued by hydro-québec. in 1986, 1996 and 2006, notices of renewal of the 1926 contract were sent to [translation] “gatineau power company c/o hydro-québec”. according to a record dated 2012 from quebec’s enterprise register and to undisputed testimony, gatineau power is inactive, has no employees actively working for it and does not even have a bank account. it is domiciled at hydro-québec’s head office, and hydro-québec appoints its officers and directors. [17] in 1982, cip and hydro-québec entered into a contract for the supply of additional power. the new contract identified hydro-québec as [translation] “[t]he provider [that] already supplies the subscriber with 40,000kw of power” and referred explicitly to the contract originally entered into “between gatineau power and canadian international paper company” in 1926 (art. 4a)) gatineau power did not participate in that agreement, which is binding on resolute as cip’s successor. [18] in 1996, the province passed the act respecting the régie de l’énergie, sq. 1996, c 61, which granted hydro-québec, with a few exceptions, a monopoly over the distribution of electric power in quebec (s 62). [19] between 2005 and 2009, gatineau power assigned to hydro-québec three power plants on the gatineau river that hydro-québec had been leasing from it and that had supplied cip before the nationalization. after the assignment of these three plants, gatineau power still owned immovables, as can be seen from its financial statements in 2011, gatineau power reported that these fixed assets had an unconsolidated value of approximately $18 million. it is admitted that gatineau power owns a hydroelectric power plant on the ottawa river. [20] starting in 2007, hydro-québec had two levies imposed on it: a new amount fixed by s 32 of the hydro-québec act, cqlr, c h-5 (“hqa”), and an amount provided for in s 68 of the watercourses act, cqlr, c. r-13 (“wa”), from which it had previously been exempted the levied amounts are paid into the generations fund, a fund established by the quebec government in 2006 for the purpose of reducing the public debt. [21] on november 30, 2011, hydro-québec sent abibow canada inc., cip’s successor, which has since become resolute, an electricity bill for over $3 million. a covering letter referred to the 1926 contract, including the price adjustment clause. a significant portion of the amount hydro-québec was now claiming from resolute corresponded to an increase in the price of electricity that resulted from the levies imposed on hydro-québec over the preceding three years under s 32 of the hqa and s 68 of the wa. [22] resolute objects to this increase. it paid the bill from hydro-québec under protest and filed an action in the superior court for a declaratory judgment and for reimbursement it asked the court to declare that it did not owe the amount being claimed from it to either hydro-québec or gatineau power. a. judgment of the quebec superior court (le bel j.) [23] the superior court granted resolute’s amended motion to institute proceedings for a declaratory judgment. it declared that hydro-québec could not claim the levies under s 32 of the hqa and s 68 of the wa from resolute, and also could not claim arrears or administrative fees related to those levies. the trial judge ordered that the overpayments be reimbursed. [24] the trial judge declined to find that the effect of the 1965 contract was that gatineau power had assigned to hydro-québec the rights and obligations it had agreed to in 1926. she observed that there was no indication that the 1965 contract had been brought to resolute’s attention. she also noted that resolute was still benefiting from the 1926 contract, the existence of which had been confirmed in 1982 when it entered into the contract with hydro-québec for additional power. [25] the trial judge wrote that [translation] “[i]t is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment [an] assignment of contract [would have taken] place”, adding that since the nationalization of electricity, hydro-québec has held all the shares in gatineau power and “managed its assets and contracts” (para. 53 (canlii)). she pointed out that hydro-québec had decided to acquire gatineau power’s three plants on the gatineau river that were covered by the acts of assignment concluded in the 2000s. she went on to say that, if those transactions were to have any effect on the application and interpretation of the 1926 contract, hydro-québec had “never informed [resolute fp] in due time[, and i]t is difficult to find that these transactions effected an assignment of contract” (para. 54). [26] even if art. 22 of the 1926 contract did authorize an assignment of the contract, the trial judge added, such a change could not be set up against the other party to the contract [translation] “without first being brought to its attention” (para. 55). in any event, if there had been an assignment of contract, such an assignment would not have released gatineau power from its obligations (para. 56). [27] the trial judge concluded that the parties to the 1926 contract are still gatineau power and resolute, and that hydro-québec cannot avail itself of art. 20 of the 1926 contract (para. 60). [28] the trial judge also expressed the opinion that the amounts claimed by hydro-québec do not constitute a “tax or charge” within the meaning of art. 20 of the 1926 contract, but are instead amounts already belonging to the government that are being allocated to the reduction of the public debt (paras. 65-66). in this context, she concluded that it cannot be said that the amounts thus taken from hydro-québec, which already belonged to the province, are a “tax or charge” within the meaning of the 1926 contract (para. 67). b. judgment of the quebec court of appeal (vauclair, marcotte and roy jja) [29] in a unanimous decision, the court of appeal allowed hydro-québec’s appeal in part. it declared that the levies provided for in s 32 of the hqa and s 68 of the wa constituted taxes or charges that were payable by resolute to hydro-québec under art. 20 of the 1926 contract. it also confirmed that hydro-québec could not claim arrears from before october 2011 and that, as the superior court had decided, hydro-québec had to reimburse the overpayments. [30] the court of appeal began by examining the question whether the levies at issue were taxes or charges within the meaning of art. 20 of the 1926 contract it stated that the words “tax or charge” must be given their ordinary meaning here (para. 12 (canlii)) the court proposed to follow quebec (attorney general) v. algonquin développements côte-ste-catherine inc (développements hydroméga inc.), 2011 qcca 1942, [2011] rjq 1967, in which it had been held that [translation] “the amounts payable under section 68 of the watercourses act constitute a tax” (ca reasons, at para. 13). as for the levy under s 32 of the hqa, the court of appeal held that it was not necessary to determine whether it constituted a tax or a charge, since the 1926 contract applied to both (para. 15). [31] the court of appeal rejected resolute’s argument that the levies constituted an [translation] “allocation” of government revenues rather than “taxation”; in its view, resolute was “confusing the legal nature — tax or charge — of the fees payable to the government with the place where the levied amounts are deposited” (para. 16). on this point, the court of appeal therefore concluded that the trial judge had made a reviewable error in holding that the 1926 contract did not apply to the levies payable under s 68 of the wa and s 32 of the hqa (para. 19). [32] the court of appeal then sought to identify the parties to the 1926 agreement in light of hydro-québec’s argument that the 1965 contract had effected an assignment of that contract from gatineau power (assignor) to hydro-québec (assignee). [33] the court reviewed the provisions of the 1965 contract in its view, the mandate concerned only the immovables, given that hydro-québec had purchased gatineau power’s movable property. quoting art. 6 of the 1965 contract, the judges stated that the 1926 contract, including the right to demand the supply of electricity and the obligation to pay for it, had been sold as movable property, and stressed that [translation] “[t]he parties provided that contracts, as negotiable instruments, were included in the sale” and that money and electricity are movable property (para. 26). the court of appeal also noted that hydro-québec retained all revenue from power contracts, “whereas a mandatary would have collected them in order to remit them to its mandator” (para. 28). [34] the court observed, relying on nc. hutton ltd. v. canadian pacific forest products ltd., 1999 canlii 13538 (que. ca), that the parties to the 1926 contract had consented in advance to a possible assignment of their contract. [35] in sum, the court was of the view that the trial judge had [translation] “made a reviewable error in holding that the 1926 [c]ontract had not been assigned to hydro-québec” (para. 40). hydro-québec could therefore bill resolute under art. 20 of the 1926 contract for the amount of the charges paid to the government. but it could not bill for charges relating to the period preceding october 2011, as the trial judge had not erred regarding retroactivity and arrears. this conclusion with respect to arrears was not appealed to this court. iii analysis [36] resolute raises two main objections to the court of appeal’s conclusion that the levies provided for in s 32 of the hqa and s 68 of the wa constitute taxes or charges that are payable to hydro-québec under art. 20 of the 1926 contract. [37] first, resolute submits that hydro-québec cannot invoke art. 20, because in its view the only parties to that contract are itself and gatineau power resolute disputes the characterization adopted by the court of appeal in its analysis of the 1965 contract — that it effected an assignment of contract — insisting that the trial judge made no reviewable error in interpreting that agreement in any event, even if the characterization of the agreement as an assignment of contract were found to be correct, resolute maintains that it never consented to such an assignment, which means that the purported assignment would not be valid and could not be set up against it. what is more, that assignment could not render its obligations more onerous, which would be the case, resolute argues, if the price fixed in 1926 were increased as hydro-québec requests. [38] second, resolute maintains that, even if hydro-québec were a party to the 1926 contract, the levies provided for in s 32 of the hqa and s 68 of the wa are not a “tax or charge” on electricity generated from water power within the meaning of art. 20 of that contract. [39] it should be noted that the two contracts at the heart of the litigation were entered into before the ccq came into force the parties essentially agree that whether the cclc or the ccq is applied does not affect the outcome of the litigation. they did not dwell on this point, nor did the superior court and the court of appeal consider it necessary to detail the differences between the two codes in order to resolve the case. a. is hydro-québec a party to the 1926 contract, and can it invoke that contract with respect to resolute? [40] resolute disputes the court of appeal’s conclusion it maintains that hydro-québec is, as the trial judge stated, a mandatary and not an assignee of gatineau power under the 1965 contract. because hydro-québec is doing business with resolute as a representative of gatineau power, it cannot invoke art. 20 of the 1926 contract in its own name in order to increase the price for electricity. [41] resolute advances, in support of the trial judge’s interpretation of the 1965 contract, three arguments that i propose to discuss in turn: (1) hydro-québec did not allege assignment of contract, and even argued the contrary at trial; (2) the court of appeal intervened on the highly factual issue of contractual interpretation without identifying a palpable and overriding error on the trial judge’s part; and (3) the court of appeal erred in concluding that the sale of gatineau power’s movable property to hydro-québec entailed an assignment of the 1926 contract after doing so, i will consider resolute’s alternative arguments on its first ground of appeal: (4) it had not consented to the assignment; (5) the assignment could not be set up against it; and (6) the effect of the assignment of contract was to render its obligations under the 1926 contract more onerous. (1) hydro-québec’s position at trial [42] resolute asserts that hydro-québec did not allege at trial that there had been an assignment of the 1926 contract, and that counsel for hydro-québec even recognized in his arguments before the trial judge that there had been no assignment. [43] this argument was rightly rejected by the court of appeal (para. 39). the trial judge — who heard the evidence and arguments — understood hydro-québec to be essentially arguing that it was resolute’s other contracting party and that the 1926 contract had been assigned (see paras. 34 and 44). in her analysis, she not only referred to that argument several times, but also took it into account and formally rejected it (paras. 59 and 60). [44] resolute in fact made submissions on this point at trial (plaintiff’s outline of argument of april 26, 2016, rr, at paras. 3 and 23-80; see also ar, vol. vi, at pp. 137-72). one of the key issues raised in this case, in its view, was [translation] “who is resolute’s other contracting party?” not long after saying that, it noted that “it’s a question of interpretation of d-1 [the 1965 contract] that brings us here today”. resolute aptly summed up the two possibilities: “assignment or mandate”. [45] the court of appeal took note of resolute’s argument that the respondents had admitted that no assignment had been made. observing that hydro-québec had framed its arguments [translation] “differently”, the court rejected this argument (para. 39). i agree with its reasons. i would point out that the respondents’ position has at all times been that art. 20 of the 1926 contract applies and that hydro-québec may request a price increase (see, eg,. ar, vol. vii, at pp. 118-19, 124, 126 and 144; see also ar, vol. viii, at pp. 27 and 39; defendants’ outline of argument of may 4, 2016, rr, at paras. 1, 7, 20, 25, 29-34, 85, 106 and 109). a hydro-québec manager even testified at trial that he had had no knowledge of the gatineau power company or of its activities before taking over the file at issue in this case in 2011. [46] a review of the transcript of the hearing at trial supports a conclusion that the apparent incoherence in the parties’ positions can be explained in part by the fact that there was some confusion as to the scope of the agreed statement of admissions (see, on this point, ar, vol. viii, at pp. 1-19) counsel for the respondents at trial seems to have assumed that the 1926 contract [translation] “has effect as between abibow canada inc. and hydro-québec”. the objection of counsel for resolute on this point had taken him “by surprise” in the middle of oral argument after this exchange, the parties agreed that the question “who is a contracting party?” in respect of the 1926 contract, to quote counsel for resolute, remained to be answered. this can also be seen from hydro-québec and gatineau power’s notice of appeal. [47] logically, it is clear that hydro-québec can only avail itself of the 1926 contract’s price increase clause if it is resolute’s other contracting party. there is every reason to believe that the trial judge understood that hydro-québec had made no concession in this regard either in its pleadings or in its argument in fact, in their defence, hydro-québec and gatineau power formally denied the following allegation by resolute in its motion to institute proceedings: [translation] “to the best of resolute fp’s knowledge, the contract was not assigned by gatineau power to [hydro-québec], but [hydro-québec] is responsible for administering it and for collecting the amounts payable to gatineau power in the latter’s name”. when all is said and done, the trial judge clearly understood that the assignment issue was central to the case, and she disposed of this argument in her reasons. (2) intervention of the court of appeal [48] resolute argues that, because the court of appeal identified no palpable and overriding error by the trial judge, it could not overrule her interpretation of the 1965 contract in resolute’s view, the court of appeal merely proposed a different interpretation of that contract and thereby failed to show deference to the interpretation adopted by the trial judge. [49] resolute is of course right that, in accordance with the principles set out by this court in uniprix inc. v. gestion gosselin et bérubé inc., 2017 scc 43, [2017] 2 scr 59, the interpretation of the 1965 contract proposed by the trial judge must be accepted absent a palpable and overriding error let us take a closer look at the approaches taken in turn by the superior court and the court of appeal in order to determine whether this court should intervene in the case at bar. [50] in discussing the facts, the trial judge quoted various clauses of the 1965 contract (arts. 3, 4, 5, 8, 9a), 9b) and 9g)), but did not explicitly analyze them she certainly did not quote arts. 6 and 7 of that contract the quotation reproducing the above-mentioned provisions of the 1965 contract was in fact [translation] “taken from the plaintiff’s [resolute’s] memorandum” (para. 15, note 6) and was preceded by an introductory phrase, added in the memorandum, in which that contract was called the “lease / mandate (d-1)” (para. 15) it can also be seen that the trial judge was concerned more with the question of the “exact moment [an] assignment of contract [would have taken] place” than with the basis in the 1965 agreement that would confirm or refute a conclusion to that effect (para. 53). that being said, she nonetheless stated that, in the 1965 contract, gatineau power “named [hydro-québec] mandatary for the management of its operations and contracts” (para. 51) and that it is hydro-québec that “has . . . managed [gatineau power’s] assets and contracts” (para. 53). given the trial judge’s conclusions on the meaning of the contract, it can be assumed that, in her view, the articles she quoted established a mandate to manage the 1926 contract and were inconsistent with an interpretation to the effect that there was an assignment from gatineau power to hydro-québec the trial judge also relied on certain factors extrinsic to the 1965 contract, such as the nationalization of electricity and the parties’ actions after entering into the contract, in support of her interpretation (see para. 51). her analysis, based as it was on evidence intrinsic and extrinsic to the contract, was thus at the second step of the interpretation exercise described by this court in uniprix, at paras. 36-37, namely the identification, in the absence of clear language, of the common intention of the parties. [51] the respondents argue that errors in “characterizing” the 1965 contract led the trial judge to conclude that there was a mandate rather than an assignment of contract, which implies that the standard for intervention in this case is that of an error of law. but i agree with resolute that the standard is palpable and overriding error. characterization of a contract often requires that it first be interpreted (see uniprix, at paras. 39-40). even though the ultimate question relates to the characterization of the contract — its association with the proper normative category, that is, with assignment of contract or mandate — it seems clear to me that, in this case, this step is in large part the result of an “interpretation exercise”, to use the expression of wagner j (as he then was) and gascon j in uniprix (para. 43) that result necessarily depends on the meaning to be given to the clauses of the contract that condition hydro-québec’s exercise of its rights and fulfillment of its obligations. [52] thus, it was open to the court of appeal to intervene only if the trial judge had made a palpable and overriding error but while resolute is right about the applicable standard, it is mistaken in submitting that the court of appeal was not justified in intervening in this case. [53] i wish to be clear that there is no suggestion that the court of appeal identified the wrong standard here, that is, that it sought an error of law and not a palpable and overriding error it is true that the court of appeal referred to a [translation] “reviewable error” in the trial judge’s finding that the 1926 contract had not been assigned to hydro-québec (para. 40) this expression — which encompasses any error that justifies an appellate court’s intervention — is perfectly adequate to indicate that the trial judge had made an error of the type identified in uniprix (see also, eg,. salomon v. matte-thompson, 2019 scc 14, [2019] 1 scr. 729, at paras. 40-42). [54] a careful reading of the court of appeal’s reasons shows that it was of the view that the trial judge had made a palpable error in concluding on the basis of her interpretation of the 1965 contract that the mandate established in that contract was not limited to the management of immovables, but included the management of contracts (see paras. 25 and 28). the court of appeal also identified, in interpreting the 1965 contract and in assessing the parties’ actions after entering into the contract, errors that confirmed, contrary to the trial judge’s interpretation, that the 1926 contract had been assigned in 1965 (see para. 32). the court considered these to be overriding errors in that they had led the trial judge to find that the 1926 contract had not been assigned by the 1965 contract (see para. 40). i cannot therefore accept resolute’s argument that the court of appeal intervened without identifying a palpable and overriding error on the trial judge’s part. [55] as to this court’s role at this stage of the litigation, it is also shaped by the standard of appellate intervention. as was explained in uniprix: in the case at bar, this court’s role is in fact limited to deciding whether the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in applying the relevant principles of interpretation to . . . the contract . . . . [para. 44] [56] thus, our role consists in determining whether the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in interpreting the 1965 contract, not whether she made the exact error identified by the court of appeal. [57] as i will explain below, although i disagree with the court of appeal’s interpretation regarding certain clauses of the contract, i agree with its view that the 1965 agreement effected an assignment of the 1926 contract and — with all due respect — that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in her interpretation of that agreement in stating that gatineau power had named hydro-québec [translation] “mandatary for the management of its operations and contracts” (paras. 15 and 51). this error can also be seen in the trial judge’s assertion that gatineau power had not assigned its rights and obligations to hydro-québec (see para. 53). the trial judge’s findings were incompatible with the words of the 1965 contract and disregarded clauses that relate directly to the issue raised in this case: whether the rights and obligations under the 1926 contract were assigned with respect, the content of her reasons suggests that the totality of the 1965 contract was not considered. more specifically, given the objectives stated in the preamble of that contract and the circumstances in which it was concluded, the 1926 contract was assigned by the combined effect of arts. 4 through 8 of the 1965 contract. [58] the 1965 contract, which was entered into following the acquisition of all of gatineau power’s capital stock by hydro-québec in one phase of the nationalization of electricity, concerns a wide range of relations between the two companies, but does not refer specifically to the 1926 contract. the trial judge described the 1965 contract as a [translation] “mandate, sale and lease agreement” (para. 51). it is true that it has characteristics of each of these three juridical operations. the fact that the 1965 contract has, among other things, a sale component, a lease component and a mandate component is not in dispute. nor, of course, is there anything to bar a subsidiary from selling assets to its parent company or to preclude the existence of a lease or mandate between companies that are thus related. but it is the balance between these elements that was, i find, misunderstood at trial because of a palpable and overriding error. as i will endeavour to explain, the trial judge erred in stating, in relation to gatineau power’s operations as an electricity producer, that hydro-québec had been “manag[ing] its assets and contracts” since the nationalization of electricity (para. 53). [59] the trial judge’s conclusion suggests that hydro-québec is, in managing assets and contracts under the contract, acting in gatineau power’s name as mandatary and in its interest as administrator of the property of another with respect for the contrary view, to say without qualification that hydro-québec manages gatineau power’s assets is to disregard the totality of the contract and the approach according to which each clause of a contract is interpreted in light of the others so that each is given the meaning that flows from the contract as a whole. [60] i find that these errors justify appellate intervention to reverse the trial judge’s finding that no assignment of contract resulted from the 1965 contract. (3) interpretation of the 1965 contract (a) overview of the applicable legal principles [61] it should be noted that it is necessary, in interpreting a contract, to seek “[t]he common intention of the parties” (art. 1425 ccq) while taking into account, in the words of the ccq, “the nature of the contract, the circumstances in which it was formed, the interpretation which has already been given to it by the parties or which it may have received, and usage” (art. 1426 ccq). each clause is to be interpreted “in light of the others” so that each one is given the meaning derived from the contract as a whole (art. 1427 ccq). in this case, none of these considerations suggest that gatineau power and hydro-québec intended to achieve anything other than the assignment contemplated in the text of the contract. [62] to begin, it should be borne in mind that mandate is a contract by which the mandator confers upon the mandatary the power to represent him or her in “the performance of a juridical act” (art. 2130 ccq; see also c. fabien, “mandate”, in reform of the civil code, vol. 2-c, obligations vii, viii (1993), at pp. 3-5; a. popovici, la couleur du mandat (1995), at pp. 17-18) an essential aspect of the contract of mandate is that mandataries are not personally liable to third persons except in very specific circumstances, in particular when they act in their own names, exceed their powers or commit faults in the performance of their mandates (fabien, at pp. 15-17). [63] furthermore, the law imposes two duties on mandataries a mandatary must (1) “act honestly and faithfully in the best interests of the mandator, and . . . avoid placing himself in a position where his personal interest is in conflict with that of his mandator” (art. 2138 para. 2 ccq; see also fabien, at pp. 8-9; pincourt (ville de) v. construction cogerex ltée, 2013 qcca 1773, at paras. 180-81 (canlii)); and (2) “act with prudence and diligence” in performing the mandate (art. 2138 para. 1 ccq). regarding the first duty, it is important to bear in mind that even mandataries charged with full administration of the property of others cannot use the mandator’s property for their own needs or purposes (art. 1310 ccq; see also groupe sutton-royal inc. (syndic de), 2015 qcca 1069, at para. 122 (canlii)). as professor cantin cumyn observes, the duty to act faithfully [translation] “prohibits using the powers in the personal interest of the person in whom they are invested” (“le pouvoir juridique” (2007), 52 mcgill l.j 215, at p 231; see also m. cantin cumyn and m. cumyn, l’administration du bien d’autrui (2nd ed 2014), at nos. 301 et seq.) as for the second duty, professor cantin cumyn explains that the conduct of an administrator of the property of others will be prudent and diligent “if it is consistent with the conduct expected of a person who . . . acts for another or in an interest other than his or her own” (cantin cumyn (2007), at p 233 (emphasis added); see also cantin cumyn and cumyn, at nos. 272 et seq). [64] it should also be mentioned that assignment of contract is known in quebec civil law and that there is every indication that this operation was part of the positive law in 1965. it is true that before hutton, there were some who argued that the idea of assigning a contract, as a legal relationship, was conceptually problematic and that the assignment of debts caused difficulties in light of the principle of relativity of contract. that being said, baudouin ja did not in that case, in explaining how assignment of contract can be effected in quebec law by combining the assignment of claims and the transfer of debts, invent a novel juridical operation for quebec law. in its instructively helpful explanation in hutton, the court of appeal simply explained itself more completely on the subject than any court before it had, because courts had [translation] “rarely had occasion to address the issue” (p 8). i would add that the original contract in that case — which included a clause authorizing an assignment of contract — had been concluded in 1959 (p 2), while the assignment of the contract had been effected in 1990 (pp. 4-5). as in the case at bar, therefore, all the events took place while the cclc was still in force. [65] baudouin ja cited in particular some cases in which the autonomy and viability of an assignment of contract had been recognized, including a unanimous judgment of this court penned by mignault j in 1925, that is, one year before the conclusion of the 1926 contract and long before the conclusion of the 1965 contract of assignment, the two that are at issue in the instant case (see aqueduc du lac st. jean v. fortin, [1925] scr 192) mignault j explained in that case, regarding one of the assignees, that it had been put “in the place [of the assignor] with respect to those contracts” (p 195) in hutton, baudouin ja also quoted the superior court, which had noted that [translation] “[t]he courts have recognized a broader operation called ‘assignment of contract’” and that this operation implies that “everything is assigned, ie, the obligations and rights inherent in the contract” (general accident insurance co v cie de chauffage gaz naturel, [1978] c.s 1160 (que.), at p 1164; see also banque royale du canada v. pg du québec, [1976] cs 634 (que.), at p 635). [66] in this court, resolute is not really challenging the concept of assignment of contract, but is instead suggesting that, in the instant case, the 1965 contract provides for a mandate. in the alternative, it proposes that, if there is an assignment of contract, that assignment is not valid and cannot be set up against it. i therefore do not see any legal obstacle to the possible application of assignment of contract to the facts of this case. i would also point out that art. 22 of the 1926 contract confers on the parties a right to assign the contract — it is similar to the clause at issue in hutton — which strongly suggests that the parties to that agreement considered assignment of contract to be a valid juridical operation. [67] it is true that, as resolute observes, according to the subjective conception of contract, the contract is viewed as a legal relationship but it is also possible to consider the contract from another angle, as being patrimonial in nature it is this conception that helps to explain the fact that a contract can be assigned. the authors of quebec civil law explain this as follows in commenting on the law under the former code: most of the rules in title three [the title of the civil code of lower canada on obligations] envision an obligation in its character as a relationship between debtor and creditor. but an obligation is also a species of property, which can have an existence and value independent of the specific performance that it commands viewed in this light, the claim that the obligation represents can be transferred, as can any type of property. the code contemplates three distinct operations by which claims may be transferred: the assignment of a contract; the assignment of claims; and delegation. [emphasis added.] (j e c brierley and r a macdonald, eds., quebec civil law: an introduction to quebec private law (1993), at no. 555.) [68] to the same effect, lluelles and moore, after observing that a minority of commentators are opposed to viewing contracts as assignable property, conclude that, [translation] “[b]eing patrimonial in nature, a contract can be assigned, especially given that the assignment furthers the purposes of the contract by ensuring the survival of its binding force” (no. 3226; see also aqueduc du lac st. jean, at p 195). in short, while i agree that a contract can easily be regarded as a legal relationship, i am of the opinion that, conceptually, there is no impediment to the conclusion reached by the court of appeal in this regard. [69] although the 1965 contract establishes, in art. 9, a mandate for other purposes, we will see below that the key clauses of that contract, the effect of which was to assign the 1926 contract, are incompatible with the very essence of the concepts of mandate and administration of the property of others this is true in particular because hydro-québec undertakes personally to perform obligations and acts in its own interest in exercising its rights with regard to the 1926 contract it is easier to understand the source of the disagreement between the parties in this case by bearing in mind the fundamental distinction in civil law between a “power” and a “legal right”. a power, like one granted to a mandatary or to an administrator of the property of others, [translation] “can be defined as a prerogative conferred upon one person in the interests of another person or for the achievement of a goal”. a legal right, which includes a real right and a personal right, “is a prerogative that confers a benefit upon its holder, in the holder’s own interest” (cantin cumyn (2007), at p 225; see also cantin cumyn and cumyn, at nos. 79 et seq). the powers of an administrator of the property of others thus enable the administrator “to autonomously carry out juridical acts that have effects with regard to another person or in a patrimony other than his or her own” (cantin cumyn (2007), at pp. 230-31 (emphasis added); see also p 223). a legal right, on the contrary, has effects with regard to its holder or in the holder’s patrimony. in short, whereas a legal right is considered to be an “egoistic” prerogative, a power has an “altruistic” nature (p 225) as professor popovici points out, the difference between an assignment of contract and a mandate is a difference in kind: [translation] “in an assignment of contract, each party acts in his or her personal interest, whereas a mandatary and a substitute mandatary act in the mandator’s interest” (p 138). [70] as we will see below, the 1965 contract confers certain powers of administration on hydro-québec. however, gatineau power, in selling its movables and leasing its immovables to the state-owned enterprise, transferred legal rights to hydro-québec that the latter may exercise in its own interest, which is something that a mandatary or an administrator of the property of others cannot do. what is more, hydro-québec took on personal obligations that are incompatible with the functions of a mandatary or an administrator of the property of others, who as a general rule does not give undertakings in his or her own name this operation means that the 1965 contract is one that could be characterized as a contract of “sale, lease, assignment and mandate” whose assignment component was necessary in order to achieve the objective of nationalizing electricity stated in the preamble. (b) factors intrinsic to the 1965 contract [71] let us take a closer look at what the parties said in the provisions of the contract itself. [72] in the absence of evidence from the time of formation of the contract that would indicate the common intention of the parties, the four recitals of the preamble to the agreement are particularly important for the purpose of identifying the objectives of the parties to the contract, gatineau power and hydro-québec it is true that a preamble is not generally intended to create obligations, but it will be helpful in this case to make connections between the undertakings of hydro-québec on the one hand and the expectations of gatineau power on the other. [73] the preamble refers first to the status and purpose of hydro-québec it mentions hydro-québec’s constituent statute and states that hydro-québec was incorporated for the purposes of generating, acquiring, selling, transmitting and distributing electric power throughout the province (see also an act respecting the quebec hydro-electric commission, s 29). [74] the second recital states a fundamental purpose of the contract: “to unify the management of the company and those of the other electric power companies whose shares [hydro-québec] has purchased” (ar, vol. iii, at p 96). gatineau power was to be integrated into the state-owned enterprise’s provincial network. this desire for unification is confirmed by the fourth recital: “in order to achieve the desired unification”, gatineau power agreed in the contract to sell its movable property to hydro-québec and to lease to the latter its “immoveables, constructions, apparatus and plant” (p 97). this arrangement would allow hydro-québec to run these facilities as it saw fit with a view to discharging its obligations the third recital completes the picture by stressing that, in this contract, hydro-québec was making a commitment to gatineau power’s creditors, in particular by stating that it and the province have “unconditionally guaranteed the repayment in capital, interests and premium, if any, of the bonds issued by the company” (p 96). the contract sets out a series of obligations that hydro-québec agreed to perform, thereby assuming personal liability. [75] in short, the preamble announces what the clauses of the contract will confirm: the arrangement between gatineau power and hydro-québec was to unify the subsidiary, gatineau power, and the parent company, hydro-québec, with the agreement of certain secured creditors of gatineau power (“the holders of the bonds of the company in accordance with the provisions of the trust deed”), who, moreover, had to approve the contract (ar, vol. iii, at p 102, art. 16) the objectives of the parties as stated in the preamble provide insight into the fundamental structure of the contract hydro-québec undertook to assume liability for gatineau power’s obligations in return, hydro-québec was to control the production of energy under gatineau power’s power supply contracts for the term of the 1965 contract and would receive the revenue derived from it. in a statement of gatineau power’s commitments taken from its financial statements, this arrangement was described as an exchange: [translation] under a contract in effect since january 1, 1966, the parent company undertook to advance to the company such monies as would be required for it to fulfill all its obligations. in consideration, the company undertook to lease its fixed assets to the parent company and to allow the parent company to benefit from the revenue deriving from them for a term of 25 years in exchange for an annual rental in an amount equal to the depreciation on its assets. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. iii, at p 92; see also pp. 41-92.) [76] to conclude that hydro-québec acts only in gatineau power’s name and in its interest in managing its assets and contracts is inconsistent with the objectives stated in the preamble the contract forms part of the process of nationalization of electricity: it is hydro-québec that is charged with “generating, acquiring, selling, transmitting and distributing electric power and energy throughout the province of quebec” (ar, vol. iii, at p 96). it does so in its own name, in accordance with the law, and not in the name or in the interest of others; for the most part, it does so by exercising rights it holds, not by exercising powers in gatineau power’s interest. [77] the 1965 contract confirms this business reality: operationally, gatineau power can no longer generate, acquire, sell, transmit or distribute electricity, because it no longer has the resources to do so. the assets needed in order to generate and sell electricity are now controlled by hydro-québec as set out in the contract, the unification of gatineau power’s operations with the rest of the network was to be achieved by two principal means: the sale of gatineau power’s movable property to hydro-québec and the lease of the former’s immovable property to the latter the preamble does not mention the mandate in this regard — a mandate that exists, but that the parties did not see as reflecting the fundamental relationship established between them in the contract. [78] article 1 of the contract provides that the lease granted by gatineau power to hydro-québec concerns “all its immoveables, constructions, apparatus and plant”, which are then defined as the “leased premises”. the parties excluded from the lease certain corporeal property used in the production of electricity that was being sold to the state-owned enterprise (art. 2). hydro-québec was to operate the leased premises “as it would its own”; it would have full and complete use and enjoyment of the leased premises for the term of the lease, and would also be fully responsible for maintaining them (p 97, art. 4) at various points in the contract, the parties specified that hydro-québec would be responsible for managing, operating and maintaining the leased premises (see arts. 4, 5 and 14). [79] the initial term of the lease of the leased premises was fixed at 25 years (art. 3), and the annual rent was to be equal to the annual depreciation on gatineau power’s capital assets “plus the interest payments payable on the funded debt during that year” (ar, vol. iii, at p 101, art. 13) according to gatineau power’s consolidated financial statements dated december 31, 2011, the lease, which had been [translation] “tacitly renewed”, was still in effect when hydro-québec issued its increased bill (ar, vol. iii, at p 92). it should be noted that despite the sale of the plants on the gatineau river, gatineau power continues to this day to own immovables to which the lease applies, including, as can be seen from the agreed statement of admissions filed by the parties at trial, a plant on the ottawa river. [80] the lease of the immovables deprives the lessor of the water power needed in order to generate hydroelectricity. it is not gatineau power that has full enjoyment of the immovables, because the very first clause of the contract provides that hydro- québec “shall be vested with the full and complete use and enjoyment of the leased premises”. this is consistent with the nature of the civil law contract of lease: regarding use and enjoyment of the leased property, the lessor does not simply grant powers to the lessee, but undertakes to provide the lessee, in return for a rent, with the enjoyment of the property for the term of the lease. thus, the lessee has a personal claim against the lessor and exercises it in his or her own interest; from the perspective of use and enjoyment, the lessee does not exercise powers in the lessor’s interest. [81] in short, as regards the operational site for electricity production — the use and enjoyment of the leased premises — hydro-québec does not manage the assets in gatineau power’s name. the words “manage” and “management” used in arts. 4 and 5 of the 1965 contract cannot refer to the concept of management that is central to a mandate or to the administration of the property of others. a lessee manages the leased premises, as hydro-québec does in this case, in its own interest and not in the interest of any mandator or beneficiary as professor cantin cumyn and professor cumyn explain, status as a lessee must not be confused with status as an administrator of the property of others: [translation] outline of subtitle an administrator of the property of others is a person who is vested with powers over property or a patrimony that is not the administrator’s own. it follows that this status does not apply to someone who exercises a right over the property of others nor is it consistent with legal relationships arising out of contracts for the performance of services that do not involve the exercise of powers of representation or personal powers. lessees and borrowers. status as an administrator of the property of others is, a fortiori, inapplicable to the holder of a personal right to the enjoyment of a thing belonging to another under a lease, a loan for use or another agreement that produces legal effects of the same nature. such contracts make the lessee, borrower or other user merely a creditor of enjoyment of the thing (jus ad rem). rights under them are exercised as against the other contracting party; they do not confer direct prerogatives in respect of things belonging to others such that the holders’ legal status could be confused with that of an administrator of the property of others. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted; nos. 153 and 155.] [82] as for the movable property, it was sold and transferred to hydro-québec as provided for in art. 6. this sale included corporeal and incorporeal property that was not covered by the lease, such as accounts receivable. the effect of the 1965 contract is that hydro-québec owns the movables that are essential to the production of electricity; it does not manage them in gatineau power’s name. had there been no sale, these movables might have been characterized as immovables by destination and remained in the patrimony of the owner of the immovables. but as of the day on which hydro-québec took possession of the leased premises, it acquired all rights of enjoyment in the means of production of electricity, which it exercises in its own name and not in the name or in the interest of another the sale of movable property is incompatible with the existence of any mandate or power of administration in the name of another in respect of the property in question it was understood that hydro-québec’s ownership of the movable property required for the production of electricity together with effective control of the immovables under the lease would enable hydro-québec to produce electricity on gatineau power’s premises in performing the 1926 contract, and that it would be doing so in its own interest. [83] hydro-québec also gave other personal undertakings in relation to gatineau power (art. 15), as well as to that company’s employees (art. 11) and creditors (arts. 10, 13 and 16), that are at first blush incompatible with the existence of a relationship of mandator and mandatary. [84] hydro-québec’s undertaking to the secured creditors under gatineau power’s trust deed was clearly a fundamental aspect of the 1965 contract. the interest in the agreement of the “holders of the bonds” and of their trustee was a guarantee of protection of their investment in gatineau power gatineau power, in a non-arm’s length transaction with its parent company, was selling all its movable property to that company, and the result may have been that the guarantee did not include the property in question. gatineau power was retaining the immovables, but was leasing them to hydro-québec for rent equal to the annual depreciation. to protect the interest of the creditors in question in the circumstances, hydro-québec gave them a guarantee that gatineau power would fulfill its obligations (art. 10). this undertaking was to continue “until the bonds of the company are repaid” (art. 13; see also art. 15) article 15 specifically provides that hydro-québec “undertakes to advance to [gatineau power] such monies as will be required . . . to fulfil all its obligations, including the obligations in respect of all bonds issued” (p 101) a key fact is that the agreement between gatineau power and hydro-québec had to be approved by the holders of the bonds (art. 16). [85] hydro-québec’s undertaking in relation to gatineau power’s creditors was thus substantial. it is therefore easy to understand that, in exchange for honouring that undertaking, the state-owned enterprise required, as was agreed in art. 8, that it “benefit from the entire revenue deriving from the leased premises” for the term of the agreement (ar, vol. iii, at p 99). [86] in light of hydro-québec’s personal undertaking to gatineau power and to that company’s secured creditors, it is unthinkable that this revenue was to be paid to hydro-québec as a mandatary. hydro-québec’s personal undertaking meant that it was to benefit from gatineau power’s revenues, including those resulting from the 1926 contract, for the duration of its undertaking (or, as art. 8 provides, “during the continuance of this agreement” (p 99)). furthermore, the fact that these amounts were to be paid directly to hydro-québec would, if they were to belong to gatineau power, be contrary to the principle that no administrator may mingle administered property with his or her own property. [87] given this background, what does the 1965 contract say about whether the 1926 contract was assigned? the court of appeal held that the 1926 contract was sold, together with the movable property used for the production of electricity, under art. 6 of the 1965 contract its reasoning was that the contracts, as negotiable instruments, were included in the sale and that the property involved in that transaction — money and electricity — was movable property. resolute disputes that interpretation, noting correctly that art. 5 applies expressly to rights under “power contracts” and that art. 4 applies to “all the duties for which [gatineau power] is or may be liable”, including the obligation to supply electricity. [88] i agree with resolute that the assignment of the 1926 contract is not dealt with solely by the sale of movable property under art. 6 my reading of the 1965 contract leads me to conclude that art. 6 explicitly applies only to claims due under the 1926 contract, and only to those in the form of “accounts receivable”, a point that resolute does not dispute. in my opinion, there are also other provisions involving the assignment of rights or obligations under the contract, including art. 5, which expressly refers to “power contracts” i nevertheless agree with the court of appeal that the 1965 contract does not name hydro-québec mandatary of gatineau power in relation to its power contracts rather, the entire 1926 contract was assigned by the combined operation of arts. 4 through 8 of the 1965 contract, as interpreted having regard to the objectives stated in the preamble and to the totality of the 1965 contract. [89] to conclude that gatineau power mandated hydro-québec to manage the 1926 contract as its representative would in fact be incompatible with arts. 4 through 8 of the 1965 contract, which derogated from the general mandate provided for in art. 9. in those clauses, gatineau power, the assignor, transferred to hydro-québec the claim relating to the payment for electricity sold to resolute and the obligation to supply resolute with electricity it transferred them for the term of the agreement, and in particular of the lease established by the 1965 contract the transfer of claims and obligations attests to a broader intention to assign the contract to a third person, an assignment to which, as i will explain below, the assigned party — now resolute — consented and in which it acquiesced, and one that did not render its obligations more onerous. [90] regarding, first of all, the claims that were exigible in 1965 but had not yet been settled by gatineau power’s clients, the “accounts receivable”, there was indeed an assignment of claims in art. 6, which resolute concedes. [91] next, it can be seen that the 1965 contract expressly provided for the transfer to hydro-québec of certain debts that were already due in art. 7 of the agreement, gatineau power transferred to hydro-québec “all deposits which it has from its customers to guarantee the payment of their accounts” hydro-québec explicitly assumed responsibility for those debts: “the commission agrees to assume the obligations of the company in relation to such deposits”. article 7 is not a simple indication of payment, as would be the case in the context of a mandate, in which the mandatary does not have a personal obligation (see popovici, at p 278; hamel v. banque de montréal, 2008 qccs 3603, at paras. 67-70 (canlii)): here, hydro-québec was to honour the debts personally, subject to the validity of such a transfer. [92] thus, the 1965 contract contains an initial indication of the existence of an assignment in relation to the payable debts and exigible claims, an assignment that is incompatible with a mandate. that being said, the transfers carried out in arts. 6 and 7 related only to assets or liabilities that were already in gatineau power’s patrimony. but the 1926 contract is a synallagmatic contract of successive performance that has effect throughout its term. what, then, was to happen in the case of gatineau power’s future claims and debts, that is, its future claims for payment for electricity sold to resolute and its obligation to supply resolute with that electricity? [93] the answer can be found in arts. 5 and 8 for the transfer of claims, and art. 4 for the transfer of future debts. [94] the parties agreed, in art. 5, to a specific provision referring to, among other things, power contracts such as the one at issue: to assist in the management, operation and maintenance of the leased premises, it is hereby agreed that the company shall make available and furnish to the commission all the rights, franchises and privileges which it has and all the advantages which it enjoys under all agreements, purchase agreements, power contracts and all other contracts of whatever nature and kind to which it is a party but only to the extent that it may legally do so without violating any of the provisions thereof. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. iii, at p 98) [95] article 5 applies to all rights, advantages and privileges under power contracts this description is, on the basis of its very words, sufficiently broad to encompass future claims payable by resolute in respect of electricity purchased under the 1926 contract. it can be seen by reading art. 4 that this undertaking was intended to assist hydro-québec in its use and enjoyment of the leased premises as lessee: it involves an extension of the rights provided for in the lease this would enable hydro-québec to personally honour the undertaking it was agreeing to in art. 4. [96] a subsequent provision, art. 8, states that hydro-québec is to benefit from the entire revenue deriving from the leased premises, which includes revenue from the sale of electricity the amount paid belongs to hydro-québec, the assignee of the claim; hydro-québec does not collect it as gatineau power’s mandatary. the reference in this clause to “meter readings” helps make it clear that the revenue derived from “power contracts” that is mentioned in art. 5 belongs to hydro-québec and is paid to it directly, and not through gatineau power. there is no indication that these amounts are to be paid to hydro-québec as a representative of gatineau power. quite the contrary: the contract provides that hydro-québec has a right to that revenue, which it can in the event of non-payment claim directly from the debtors in its own name. i would add that a mandatary or an administrator must not, in principle, mingle his or her property with that of the mandator or the beneficiary. the interpretation of these clauses proposed by resolute is incompatible with this fundamental principle, the purpose of which is to prevent conflicts of interest. [97] this means that, so long as arts. 5 and 8 of the 1965 contract apply, hydro-québec is the creditor of the amount resolute must pay in consideration for the electricity it purchases under the 1926 contract, subject to the rules with respect to the validity and setting up of this assignment. [98] as for art. 4 of the 1965 contract, it concerns the obligations assumed by hydro-québec for the term of the agreement: the commission shall, during the continuance of this agreement, manage, operate and maintain the leased premises as it would its own, make all repairs, reconstructions, improvements and additions to the leased premises, perform to the fullest extent and to the complete exoneration of the company all the duties for which the company is or may be liable. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. iii, at p 97) [99] by this stipulation, the parties provided for a personal undertaking by hydro-québec to perform all of gatineau power’s obligations, which amounts to a transfer of both present and future debts. here, too, the contract has a broad embrace. indeed, for the term of the agreement, hydro-québec undertakes in its own name to perform “all the duties for which the company is or may be liable” (art. 4) this includes the prestations owed to resolute under the 1926 contract insofar as art. 4 applies, hydro-québec is thus the debtor of this obligation once again, because hydro-québec undertakes personally to perform gatineau power’s obligations, there is a real transfer of debts and not a simple indication of payment by gatineau power to a mandatary (see lluelles and moore, at para. 3111) hydro-québec is therefore an assignee, if not a delegate, of this obligation, subject of course to the rules with respect to the validity and setting up of such a transfer. [100] the use of the word “perform” in art. 4 of the 1965 contract is not on its own enough to justify a conclusion that there is instead a mandate in this case. the broader context of this clause and of the contract weighs against the existence of a mandate first, i note that it is also important not to disregard the phrase “to the complete exoneration of the company”, which confirms that hydro-québec was assuming personal liability and acting in its own interest, a strong indication that its undertaking extended beyond the responsibility incumbent upon a mandatary. it should be mentioned that the contract of assignment considered in hutton also included the phrase “to the complete and entire exoneration of the assignor” (p 4) second, the assignment effected by the 1965 contract must be placed in its specific context, that of an imperfect assignment. i will return to this, but suffice it to say for now that the word “perform” is not incompatible with the tripartite relationship that results from an imperfect assignment, as can be seen from the reasons of abella j in modern cleaning concept inc v comité paritaire de l’entretien d’édifices publics de la région de québec, 2019 scc 28 (“modern cleaning (scc)”), at paras. 39-42. [101] i would add that the rights and obligations assigned by gatineau power under these articles are broad and are not limited solely to claims (amounts to be collected) and debts (electricity to be supplied). there is every reason to believe that, where the “power contracts” in question are concerned, gatineau power transferred the entire contract to hydro-québec, which means that hydro-québec, by that very fact, assumed responsibility for the entire contract as well as for all the related rights, and that it received from gatineau power the status of party to the 1926 contract. [102] but what can be said of the mandate under art. 9? in that article, the parties provided for a general mandate empowering hydro-québec to act on behalf of gatineau power “in all things, matters, deeds, acts and transactions”, and set out a non-exhaustive list of actions hydro-québec can take in gatineau power’s name, such as collecting income “belonging to the company”, cashing cheques, signing documents and purchasing immovable property. it is true that the scope of this mandate is broad. but it should be noted that this general mandate does not explicitly apply to the 1926 contract. certain of the listed powers relate to the leased premises, such as the power to give mainlevée of a hypothecary claim on an immovable belonging to gatineau power (art. 9d)) or the right to sell “such of the leased premises as are no longer necessary or useful” (art. 9f)). these powers must of course be exercised in gatineau power’s interest. nevertheless, this general mandate does not negate gatineau power’s fundamental obligation under the lease to provide hydro-québec with the enjoyment of the leased premises and does not preclude hydro-québec from exercising its right of enjoyment in its own interest. [103] in other words, there is no denying that the 1965 contract gives hydro-québec a mandate, but contrary to resolute’s argument, the scope of the general mandate given by gatineau power notwithstanding, it does not take precedence over the special rules departing from it that are provided for in the contract and apply expressly to “power contracts” and the rights and obligations related to them as resolute itself argues, art. 5 of the contract establishes a special regime applicable to “power contracts” for the term of the lease. this special regime is not the same as the one with respect to the “things, matters, deeds, acts and transactions” that are referred to in the general clause: specialia generalibus derogant (special, specific provisions derogate/deviate from general ones: g. cornu, dictionary of the civil code (2014), at p 533; f gendron, l’interprétation des contrats (2nd ed 2016), at p 91 ([translation] “specific clauses take precedence over general clauses, just as an exception takes precedence over the rule from which it departs”)). [104] in short, if the contract is read as a whole, taking into account the objectives stated in the preamble, the trial judge’s interpretation to the effect that hydro-québec [translation] “has . . managed” gatineau power’s assets and contracts must be rejected. that conclusion does not account for several clauses of the contract that she did not consider, and as a result there are palpable errors in her reading of the agreement, and in particular in her statement that the mandate provided for in the 1965 contract extends to the administration of the 1926 contract. the effect of these errors was that the trial judge did not see that, for the term of the lease, gatineau power had not simply conferred powers over the 1926 contract on hydro-québec; rather, it had transferred rights and obligations to hydro-québec, subject to an extinctive term. on entering into the 1965 contract, hydro-québec undertook personally to perform the obligations provided for in the 1926 contract, including the obligation to supply electricity to gatineau power’s customers. at the same time, hydro-québec obtained a right to all the advantages of the 1926 contract, including the right to be paid, personally, for the electricity it is contractually obliged to supply to resolute. (c) term of the 1965 contract [105] and what can be said about the term of the agreement? [106] i note that neither the trial judge nor the court of appeal addressed this issue. the existence of an extinctive term was not considered as a factor relevant to the analysis, perhaps because, despite the sale of the three plants on the gatineau river, the lease established by the 1965 contract continues to apply. because of the arguments raised by resolute in this court, however, i feel i must explain why the term imposed by the parties does not preclude the existence of an assignment of contract. [107] as long as the agreement remains in effect, the contract is assigned — this is an act of alienation that transfers, at the very least for the term of the lease, the claims and debts resulting from the 1926 contract. in arts. 4 and 8, the term is explicit, that is, “during the continuance of this agreement”, whereas art. 5 indicates that the purpose of the transfer of claims is “[t]o assist in the management . . . of the leased premises”. in resolute’s view, an assignment of contract is, by its very nature, an act of permanent alienation. resolute argues in its factum that [translation] “[t]he limited term of the assumption of [gatineau power’s] obligations by hydro-québec is a complete bar to the existence of an assignment”. [108] my view is that, contrary to resolute’s argument, there is no legal bar to an assignment of contract being limited in time if the parties agree to this, subject to the rules concerning the assigned party’s consent the autonomy of the will of the parties to the contract permits them to organize their affairs in this way. [109] it is true that an assignment of contract is ordinarily an act of alienation that definitively transfers rights and obligations from the assignor’s patrimony to that of the assignee, and it is also true that, [translation] “[i]n an assignment of contract, the assignor usually transfers all of his or her rights of claim” (baudouin and jobin, at no. 1046 (emphasis added)). as a result, the word “assignment” is often considered a synonym of “sale”, which admits of a translatory effect that resolute characterizes as “permanent” (af, at para. 55; relying on its interpretation of m tancelin, des obligations en droit mixte au québec (7th ed. 2009), at no. 1268). [110] however, i would start by pointing out that there are authors who stress the fact that assignment of claim is distinct from sale in the ccq and that, in this regard, the model of sale of a personal right does not necessarily apply (see p-g. jobin and m. cumyn, la vente (4th ed. 2017), at no. 1). as well, lluelles and moore state that, in an assignment of claim, the relationship of the assignor and the assignee is [translation] “primarily governed by the stipulations of [their] agreement” (no. 3184; see also nesterenko v. skierka, 2010 qccs 3613, [2010] rjq 2007, at paras. 68-70, quoting in particular alberta (treasury branches) v mnr, [1996] 1 scr 963, at paras. 22 and 35). this principle also applied when referring to the “sale” of claims in the cclc (see place québec inc. v. desmarais, [1975] ca 910 (que.), at p 912; general accident, at p 1164; denis cimaf inc. v. caisse populaire d’amos, 1997 canlii 10252 (que. ca), at pp. 7-9; l. sarna, “assignments of book accounts, assignor’s warranties and standing to sue” (1978), 56 can. bar rev. 626, at pp. 636 and 643-47). [111] although an assignment of contract is usually a definitive act of alienation, nothing prevents the parties, on the basis of freedom of contract, from altering such an arrangement in fact, as noted in the scholarly literature, the general conditions for validity of a contract apply to an assignment of contract (see lluelles and moore, at no. 3230; see also baudouin and jobin, at no. 1041). the special rules with respect to its validity do not relate to its term, and the assignment is, like any contract, subject to the general provisions of the ccq, including those relating to the term of the contract (arts. 1508 et seq ccq). in my view, therefore, the parties were free to limit the translatory effect of the assignment in time so as to tailor it to the business model that was consistent with their objectives and to protect the interests of the “holders of the bonds” of gatineau power, who had to approve the arrangement. [112] furthermore, even though an assignment is a translatory act through which rights and obligations are transferred from one patrimony to another, a type of act that is ordinarily absolute, there is nothing in the civil law that precludes the parties from devising a translatory act or an act of alienation whose effects are not, as resolute puts it, “permanent”. although a transfer can be pure and simple, a translatory act can be accompanied with conditions or with any other stipulation that is compatible with public order. a resolutive condition that affects the transfer by contract of a right of ownership is a helpful example: when the resolutive condition is fulfilled, the translatory act transferring the right of ownership is annulled with retroactive effect (see m. cantin cumyn, “essai sur la durée des droits patrimoniaux” (1988), 48 r du b 3, at pp. 12-13). the ccq provides, in arts. 1110, 1113 and 1114, that superficies can result from transfer of the right of accession and that this can be fixed for an extinctive term i would observe, without saying more on this subject, that, in the opinion of certain authors, a transfer of ownership can be accompanied with an extinctive term and thus be considered to have created the equivalent of “temporary ownership”: [translation] “the principle is that ownership will return to the original owner, who alienated with an extinctive term . . .” (j. carbonnier, droit civil (2004), vol. ii, at no. 751; see also w demontmollin marler, the law of real property — quebec (1932), at no. 64: “a person may be temporary owner . . . . ownership, then, is incomplete: 1o when it will end at a certain time or by the happening of some event; or 2o when the thing owned is subject to some real right in favour of another”; the author gives as an example, in the case of a substitution, the temporary transfer to the institute of property that is to go to the substitute upon the opening of the substitution). [113] one example relating specifically to the assignment of contract is modern cleaning (scc), in which this court considered the assignment of a contract by a cleaning services company to a franchisee. in that case, a cleaning contract with a client bank had been assigned to the franchisee with the bank’s consent the assigning company contractually reserved the right to take the contract back should the franchisee fail to perform it (see modern cleaning (scc), at para. 48; comité paritaire de l’entretien d’édifices publics de la région de québec v. modern concept d’entretien inc., 2017 qcca 1237 (“modern concept (ca)”), at para. 197, note 63 (canlii)). this may be viewed, therefore, as an assignment of contract that was not “permanent”, because the parties’ intention was to make a reconveyance of the contract possible if that were necessary similarly, the assignor retained [translation] “significant supervisory powers over any possible transfer of the cleaning contracts by the franchisee to a third person” (modern concept (ca), at para. 197) accordingly, despite the assignment, it could not be said unequivocally that the cleaning contract “belong[ed]” to the assignee or that the assignee could freely dispose of it (ibid). [114] this example clearly illustrates the fact that, contrary to resolute’s argument, an assignment of contract is not always a translatory act entailing a definitive alienation it serves to show the malleability of assignment of contract freedom of contract is therefore key: assignment of contract does not follow a single model but may on the contrary, like any contract, be tailored to the intention of the parties, provided that it is consistent with the rules governing its validity. [115] in the instant case, the assignment of the 1926 contract had full translatory effect — the assignor, gatineau power, transferred all of its rights and all of its obligations under this “power contract” to the assignee, hydro-québec — but only for the term of the agreement. the contract’s structure is clear: for the term of the lease of the leased premises, gatineau power assigns its rights and advantages under “power contracts” to hydro-québec, while at the same time and for the same term, hydro-québec is to perform all of gatineau power’s obligations, including the obligation to supply gatineau power’s customers with electricity (see arts. 4 and 5 of the 1965 contract). in practical terms, gatineau power has assigned the 1926 contract to hydro-québec for the term of the lease on the immovable property (see arts. 4, 5 and 8, and in particular the phrase “during the continuance of this agreement” in arts. 4 and 8). for as long as hydro-québec is the lessee of the “leased premises”, it has a personal right to all revenue and advantages under the “power contracts”, but it must also “perform to the fullest extent and to the complete exoneration of [gatineau power] all the duties for which [gatineau power] is or may be liable”. these are attributes of an assignment of contract — the rights belong to the assignee, and the assignee’s liability for the obligations is personal — and not of mandate but these rights and obligations are only transferred to the assignee for the term of the lease. this extinctive term terminates the lease as well as the transfer of rights and obligations under “power contracts” which are accessory to the lease. this makes sense: for the term of the lease, hydro-québec controls all the means of electricity production, and gatineau power would accordingly not be able to personally perform its obligations the fact that hydro-québec gave a personal undertaking that it would perform them was reassuring for the “holders of the bonds”. [116] this mechanism was perfectly suited to the sale of electricity by successive performance that was effected in 1926: every month from the time of the assignment, hydro-québec would have the obligation to deliver electricity to resolute in gatineau power’s place and the right to be paid for that delivery in its own name however, hydro-québec’s assumption of the obligations and its right to all the revenue, like its status as a party to the contract, is temporary and is accessory to the lease and to its obligations to the “holders of the bonds” (on the relationship between a principal contract and an accessory contract [translation] “intended to support another agreement”, see g. goubeaux, la règle de l’accessoire en droit privé (1969), at p 75). [117] what will happen when the 1965 contract expires, and more specifically when the lease terminates? the ccq provides that obligations are extinguished by, among other things, the expiry of an extinctive term (arts. 1517 and 1671; see also baudouin and jobin, at no. 559; art. 1138 ccbc). if the assignment is terminated, that does not mean that the object of the assignment — the 1926 contract — ceases to exist, and it might be assumed that the contract would then be reconveyed by operation of law from the assignee, hydro-québec, to the assignor, gatineau power. although the termination of the 1965 contract should logically put an end to the assignment, that question is not before the court and i will not give a definitive answer to it. because the evidence shows that the lease continues to run, the assignment of contract continues to have effects. even if i were to accept resolute’s interpretation to the effect that the term of the “agreement” referred to in arts. 4 and 8 of the 1965 contract is limited to the term of the lease, i would conclude that the assignment of contract is still in effect.3 3 i note that the term of the 1965 contract is not necessarily that of the lease. the contract involves other term bonds in favour of the “holders of the bonds” (see arts. 13 and 15). thus, the words “during the continuance of this agreement”, found in particular in arts. 4 and 8, could correspond to a term longer than that of the lease. but it is clear that the term of the agreement cannot be shorter than that of the lease. (d) factors extrinsic to the 1965 contract [118] it cannot be concluded that the assignment of the 1926 contract expired as a result of the sale of the three plants on the gatineau river on the basis that they were the specific plants that were supplying cip at the time. as we have seen, despite that sale, the lease provided for in the 1965 contract on which the assignment is based continued to be in effect, because gatineau power leased “all its immoveables” to hydro-québec in addition, the 1965 agreement transferred all of gatineau power’s claims and obligations without distinguishing contracts on the basis of the plants to which they related i recall as well the objective of unification and the supply of electricity referred to in the 1965 contract resolute’s mill is now supplied by hydro-québec’s integrated network, and it is not possible to say that the electricity it receives comes from a particular plant. [119] i would add that, as the court of appeal mentioned, other factors extrinsic to the contract confirm that there was an assignment of contract and that that assignment is still in effect (paras. 32-38). the evidence shows, for example, that, since at least 1999, all bills for electricity supplied under the 1926 contract have been issued by hydro-québec. [120] moreover, in 1982, hydro-québec and cip entered into a contract for the distribution of additional power. this was a new contract, one to which gatineau power was not a party, that referred expressly to the 1926 contract. like the respondents, i see this as an extrinsic factor that tends to confirm that the 1965 contract effected an assignment. it is true that hydro-québec’s bill distinguishes electricity supplied under the 1926 contract. however, this distinction exists because there are two different rates: one for the original block from 1926 and another for the additional block from 1982. [121] there are also two facts that the trial judge did not discuss but that were raised, and rightly so, by the court of appeal. first, resolute availed itself, for power supplied under both the 1926 contract and the 1982 contract, of the interruptible electricity option, a form of financial compensation offered only to hydro-québec’s customers. as the court of appeal explained, resolute could not have received this compensation if hydro-québec was not its other contracting party (ca reasons, at para. 35). second, it should be pointed out that in responding to hydro-québec’s claim in 2011, resolute did not argue that gatineau power was still its other contracting party (ca reasons, at para. 38). rather, it argued that the amounts at issue were not a “tax or charge”, which implied that they [translation] “are not contemplated by article 20 of the [1926] contract”. i see these facts as other extrinsic indications of an intention to assign the 1926 contract in entering into the 1965 agreement. [122] the lease therefore remained in effect in 2011, when hydro-québec claimed, as assignee of the 1926 contract, the agreed payment for electricity as increased under art. 20 of that contract. with all due respect, the 1965 contract does not, as the trial judge stated, indicate that gatineau power mandated hydro-québec to manage the 1926 contract, but instead stipulates that gatineau power assigned the latter contract to the state-owned enterprise, at least for the period of the lease of the immovables. (4) consent to the assignment of contract [123] i note that the parties, in their arguments concerning, among other things, the role of consent, relied on both the dualistic conception and the unitary conception of assignment of contract to explain why the assigned party’s consent is, or is not, required in order for such an operation to be valid. in my opinion, the outcome of the case remains the same regardless of which conception is chosen. however, given that the back-and-forth between the two conceptions of assignment of contract has been a recurring theme in this case, a theme that is also reflected in the academic literature and the case law, it seems appropriate to me to briefly explain why the unitary conception of assignment of contract is legitimate in quebec law and how it can help in elucidating the outcome of this case. [124] some jurists adopt a dualistic conception according to which assignment of contract is defined as the addition of an assignment of claim to an assignment of debt or delegation of payment (see baudouin and jobin, at no. 1034). others instead see assignment of contract as the transfer of the contract itself to a third person, thus placing the focus on the object of the contract — its economic cause — and in their view assignment of contract serves to [translation] “maintain the binding force of the contract even though the identity of one of the contracting parties has changed” (l. aynès, la cession de contrat et les opérations juridiques à trois personnes (1984), at p 21; see also p 170). [125] in quebec, the court of appeal’s decision in hutton is sometimes cited as an example of the dualistic approach because of the fact that baudouin ja, in explaining the assignment of the contract, broke the parties’ operation down into an assignment of claim and an assignment of debt. he did so to assist him in articulating why, in his view, the transfer of debts required in particular the assigned party’s consent. i find baudouin ja’s exercise helpful in clarifying both why this consent is necessary and why it can be given in advance. but it must not be forgotten that, even while he was breaking down the contract in hutton, baudouin ja was considering the assignment of the contract as a whole — a conception that was compatible with the one adopted by this court in aqueduc du lac st. jean in 1925. [126] in the unitary approach, the focus is in fact on the transfer of the contractual relationship as a whole — claims, debts, potestative rights and other undertakings. from this perspective, the operation is understood to involve a transfer of status as a contracting party to the assignee, while leaving the original contract intact this approach is especially apposite in circumstances in which the parties are disputing the transfer not only of claims and debts, but also of other undertakings made in the original contract. in the case at bar, aside from the provisions of the 1926 contract with respect to the delivery of power and the price to be paid for it, the parties are concerned in particular with arts. 17 (application of present and future provincial and federal laws) and 22 (transferability of the contract) of that contract given the relevance of these articles to hydro-québec’s claim based on the price increase clause. resolute states in its factum that it does not matter whether the dualistic approach or the unitary approach is taken in analyzing the central issue in its appeal, that is, whether its consent was necessary to the assignment from gatineau power to hydro-québec. i take note of that, but i would stress that the unitary approach is particularly helpful in making it clear that, if hydro-québec acquired the status of party to the 1926 contract, that enabled it to demand, in its own name and by reason of its status, the increased price resulting from the two levies. [127] the circumstances clarify the fact that assignment effects [translation] “the replacement of a party by a third person” (lluelles and moore, at no. 3214 (footnote omitted); see also modern concept (ca), at paras. 149-50, aff’d 2019 scc 28; or, in the case of an imperfect assignment, the addition of a new party, lluelles and moore, at no. 3217). viewed from this perspective, the unitary approach is an elegant solution that serves to stress the parties’ freedom of contract and to connect the law to the factual reality. as mignault j put it in aqueduc du lac st. jean, the assignee is thus put [translation] “in the place” of the assignor (p 195). moreover, this approach is echoed by the manner in which a recent reform of french law incorporated assignment of contract into that country’s code civil. in the 2016 reform, the french legislature explicitly adopted the unitary conception of assignment of contract by allowing a party to [translation] “assign his status as party to the contract” (french code civil, art. 1216; see j. colliot, “la cession de contrat consacrée par le code civil” (2016), 4 rjo 31, at p 40). [128] in the case at bar, it will be more useful to review, in accordance with the unitary approach, the entirety of the contractual relationship from 1926 that was assigned by gatineau power to hydro-québec rather than focusing only on the addition of claims and debts in accordance with the dualistic approach. the assignment included not only resolute’s claim — the supply of electricity — and its debt — payment of the price for that service — but also art. 17, in which the parties agreed that the contract would be subject to present and future provincial and federal regulation, and art. 22, in which the parties provided that “[t]his agreement shall enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the successors or assigns of both parties”. [129] i now turn to resolute’s arguments. [130] resolute submits that the assignment of contract agreed to in 1965 by the assignor, gatineau power, and the assignee, hydro-québec, could not be valid without its consent no matter which conception is adopted it argues that it, as the assigned party, was affected the most by the assignment of the 1926 contract. in its opinion, that operation imposed on it a contracting party, hydro-québec, with which it had not contracted, thereby violating the principle of relativity of contract while exposing it to risks it had never accepted. the substitution of hydro-québec as a contracting party — to which resolute did not consent — resulted in an increase in the price paid for electricity and thus in an unforeseen consequence of an assignment made without its knowledge but, resolute says, any assignment of contract, whether viewed as the assignment of a whole or as a transfer of claims and debts, requires the assigned party’s consent. [131] the respondents counter that the assignment of contract did not require resolute’s consent, because it was imperfect. because gatineau power remained bound as personal surety, the assignment caused no injury to resolute in any event, the respondents argue, the 1926 contract contains a clause in which consent is given to a possible assignment of the contract. [132] the parties’ difference of opinion reflects a significant disagreement in the scholarly literature on the question whether an assignment of contract requires the assigned party’s consent. for some authors, the assigned party’s consent is essential to the validity of the assignment, while for others, it is required only in order to release the assignor from his or her obligations to the assigned party. a claim, on the one hand, can validly be assigned without the assigned party’s consent (see, in the context of the ccq, art. 1637). in the case of a debt, on the other hand, there is some disagreement as to whether consent must be obtained from the party that is the creditor. according to one approach, the creditor’s interest in the debtor’s identity, and particularly in the debtor’s solvency, makes it inappropriate to transfer a debt without the creditor’s consent but there are others who argue that an imperfect assignment of debt (or delegation of payment) is possible without the creditor’s consent, because the assigned party, or delegatee, retains his or her remedies against the original other contracting party (on this disagreement, see m. cumyn, “la délégation du code civil du québec: une cession de dette?” (2002), 43 c de d 601). [133] the same disagreement exists if assignment of contract is analyzed as a transfer of the contractual relationship as a whole. given the absence of a formal rule on this point in the civil code of québec, a number of authors take the position that the assigned party’s consent is necessary in order to protect the binding force of the original contract that is being transferred others are of the view that the assigned party’s consent is required only where the assignor seeks to be released from his or her debt. according to proponents of this approach, an imperfect assignment of contract can be made without the assigned party’s consent, because that party retains his or her remedies against the original other contracting party (see the explanations given by lluelles and moore, at nos. 3234 et seq). [134] this being said, was resolute’s consent required in order for the assignment to be valid? [135] it will be useful to begin the analysis by pointing to a major concession made by hydro-québec that helps clarify the issue in this court, hydro-québec acknowledges that neither cip nor resolute consented to release gatineau power from its obligations under the 1926 contract. an assignment of contract that does not release the assignor from his or her obligations is characterized as an imperfect assignment (see modern cleaning (scc), at paras. 41-43). insofar as the assignment was valid, it did not release gatineau power: resolute thus has two debtors bound to supply it with electricity, because the assignment added a new contracting party (hydro-québec), as opposed to definitively replacing the original contracting party (gatineau power) (see lluelles and moore, at no. 3217). [136] the real question is therefore whether resolute’s consent was necessary in order for an imperfect assignment of the 1926 contract to be valid. [137] in hutton, baudouin j.a discussed the difference of opinion among authors with respect to the requirement of consent and drew on french law to resolve the question. he found that the assigned party’s consent is necessary in order for an assignment of contract to be valid but that, in the case of an imperfect assignment, [translation] “consent to a possible assignment can be given in advance, upon entering into the original undertaking, for example” (p 9) the court of appeal adopted that position by taking a dualistic approach to assignment of contract; it clearly reached that conclusion because there was an assignment of debt. [138] in my opinion, baudouin ja’s reasoning suggests that if the conception of assignment of the contract as a whole is adopted, the assigned party’s consent is required. if assignment is seen as the transfer of the contract itself, which implies the transfer of party status to the assignee, it is easy to understand why, from the standpoint of both relativity of the assignment and binding force of the assigned contract, the assigned party’s consent is necessary (at least in the absence of a legislative provision to the contrary). [139] it is true that assignment of contract implies not the creation of a new relationship, but a transfer of the original contract. in order to give effect to the principle of relativity of contract (see art. 1440 ccq), however, the transfer of the existing contract to a new contracting party requires the consent of a party like resolute on which a new partner is imposed that has [translation] “characteristics” not possessed by the assignor, as baudouin ja put it (hutton, at p 9). the principle of binding force of contract also leads to the conclusion that the assignee cannot assert him or herself as a new contracting party of the assigned party without the latter’s consent (see arts. 1434 and 1439 ccq). [140] of course, the addition of hydro-québec as a debtor, through an imperfect assignment of contract under which gatineau power remained bound by the 1926 contract, was not in itself particularly hazardous for the creditor, resolute. the latter obtained the possibility of having remedies against two debtors, including the one with which it had originally contracted, and was therefore protected should the new other contracting party become insolvent. but the assignment, though imperfect, resulted in hydro-québec becoming resolute’s principal debtor, which was not without significance for resolute. such an assignment may require adjustments by the assigned party, which is now dealing with a new contracting party with which it has never done business the situation in this case shows that it is preferable — in order to ensure conformity with the general principles of the law of contracts and to protect the assigned party — to require the assigned party’s consent even where the assignment of contract is imperfect. although gatineau power remained in the picture as a debtor, resolute had to deal with a new contracting party that could, because of its status, demand a price increase. [141] i therefore consider it preferable to follow hutton and to hold, as proposed in much of the academic literature, that the assigned party’s consent must be obtained in order for an assignment of contract to be valid (see, eg,. levesque, at para. 1017; lluelles and moore, at no. 3236). [142] furthermore, this has continued to be the applicable solution in french law even since the 2016 reform of that country’s law of obligations. assignment of contract, which is now provided for in the french code civil, requires the [translation] “agreement” of the assigned party, which may be given in advance (art. 1216).4 requiring the assigned party’s agreement means that effect can be given to the principles of binding force of contract and relativity of agreements (see colliot, at p 35). the french code civil also requires the assigned party’s express consent in order for the assignor to be discharged, thereby addressing the legitimate concern that the assigned party will be faced with a new debtor party that is insolvent or unreliable 4 article 1216 of the french code civil provides: [translation] a contracting party, the assignor, may assign his status as party to the contract to a third party, the assignee, with the agreement of his own contractual partner, the person subject to assignment. this agreement may be given in advance, notably in a contract concluded between the future assignor and person subject to assignment, in which case assignment takes effect as regards the person subject to assignment when the contract concluded between the assignor and the assignee is notified to him or when he acknowledges it. an assignment must be established in writing, on pain of nullity. (art. 1216-1) i note that in the new french law, the reference is to the “agreement” rather than the “consent” of the assigned party, which indicates that this authorization can be given in advance and that it does not necessarily result in the discharge of the assignor (colliot, at p 44). from this standpoint, the assigned party does not consent to the assignment in the narrow sense of the word — in that he or she does not formally accept the assignment as a juridical act — but authorizes it. this being said, “consent” is the word used in quebec law by almost all authors and in almost all the decided cases, and i will use it in these reasons in order to avoid confusion. [143] in my view, even in the absence of express rules concerning assignment of contract in the ccq, the same justifications with regard to the assigned party’s consent are relevant in quebec because of the general principles of the law of contracts. resolute is therefore correct in arguing that its consent was necessary in order for the assignment of the 1926 contract to be valid, given that the assignment had the effect of transferring party status to hydro-québec, a third person from resolute’s standpoint. [144] however, i must stress that it was held in hutton that the assigned party’s consent can be given in advance. in that case, it had been given in advance, at the time of signing of the original contract, in the form of consent to a possible assignment. and that is also what had happened in modern cleaning (scc), as can be seen from the facts of that case (see para. 42). in the instant case, the parties’ disagreement over the need for resolute’s consent is moot, since it is clear from the very words of art. 22 of the 1926 contract that the parties did consent in advance to any possible assignment of the contract. [145] resolute argues that art. 22 is not a blank cheque given to gatineau power for any assignment of contract, but merely a [translation] “reference to the rule that personal rights are transferable to successors”. it asks this court not to follow hutton on this point, citing an alberta judgment, lee v. pointe of view developments (encore) inc., 2010 abqb 558, 35 alta. lr (5th) 42, in which the court of queen’s bench held that a clause in the original contract did not amount to consent to the assignment of the contract. but unlike in the case at bar, the parties in that case had provided that the contract could be assigned only to “permitted assigns” (paras. 3 and 15). that case is therefore in no way comparable to this one. [146] hutton, on the other hand, bears strong similarities to the instant case.5 i find the explanation given by baudouin j.a in that case particularly helpful: by consenting to a future assignment, the assigned party [translation] “assumed the risk that it might become bound to a contracting party whose characteristics might not all be to its liking!” (p 9). this was the risk — negotiated and assumed — that cip ran in 1926 by accepting art. 22 of its contract with gatineau power. 5 article 15 of the contract at issue in hutton read as follows: this agreement shall enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto, the successor of hutton and the successor and assigns of hygrade neither this agreement, nor any of the rights, interests, privileges or obligations hereunder, shall be assignable or transferable by hutton. [emphasis deleted; p 2] [147] in short, resolute is right to insist that its consent was necessary in order for the assignment of the contract to be valid, but cip had in fact consented to the assignment in advance in the 1926 contract as a result, gatineau power validly transferred its status as party to the contract to the assignee, hydro-québec. gatineau power thus serves as a personal surety against any future breach by hydro-québec of its obligations (see lluelles and moore, at no. 3114). the fact that the assignment in this case is imperfect does not change the outcome, since it is nonetheless hydro-québec that, as a principal debtor that also has party status, supplies electricity and can therefore raise the price of the electricity under art. 20. (5) setting up of the assignment of contract [148] because the assigned party can have consented in advance to a possible assignment of contract without being a party to the act of assignment should one be effected, it will be necessary to consider the conditions that must be met in order for that operation to be set up against the assigned party. it is clear that an assignment can be set up against an assigned party who is a party to the act of assignment or who consented to it at the time it was entered into. if consent was given in advance, however, the assignment of a contract cannot be set up against the assigned party if he or she was never informed of the assignment. this is what resolute argues in the alternative: even if there was an assignment of contract, it was not informed of the assignment until 2016, upon the commencement of the appeal proceeding. as a result, it was not possible to set the assignment up against resolute before that date. on my reading of the record, however, it has been possible to set the assignment up against resolute since well before the litigation began. [149] in the absence of express rules on assignment of contract, the conditions for setting up such an assignment can be understood by considering the rules with respect to assignment of claim an assignment of claim may be set up against the assigned party “as soon as [that party] has acquiesced in it or received a copy or a pertinent extract of the act of assignment or any other evidence of the assignment which may be set up against the assignor” (art. 1641 ccq). lluelles and moore explain that [translation] “[a]cquiescence does not require any particular form. it can therefore be implied, but mere knowledge of the assignment does not suffice” (no. 3170 (footnotes omitted)). the cclc had a slightly different wording but followed the same logic, as it required the signification and delivery of the act of sale to, or acceptance of the assignment by, the assigned debtor (art. 1571; see immobilière natgen inc. v 2897041 canada inc., [1998] rdi 545 (que. ca), at p 548). [150] in the instant case, the evidence does not show when cip was made aware of the 1965 assignment, but it does indicate that cip knew it was doing business with hydro-québec well before the litigation began and that it had acquiesced in that situation. as i mentioned above, cip and hydro-québec signed a new contract in 1982 for the distribution of additional power — additional in relation to what was provided for in the 1926 contract the court of appeal rightly noted, at para. 32, that [translation] “[i]t is hydro-québec that has supplied resolute with electricity since 1965 and that issues bills, and it is hydro-québec to which resolute makes payments and to which cip turned in order to obtain additional power and to enter into a new agreement in 1982”. [151] i therefore conclude that the assignment of contract may be set up against resolute. (6) more onerous obligations resulting from the assignment of contract [152] resolute argues, continuing with the theme that the assignment of contract was unfair to it, that even if the assignment was valid and may be set up against it, the assignment could not have the effect of authorizing hydro-québec to claim payment of the increased price for electricity supplied to it that would, it says, render its obligations more onerous than the ones to which cip consented in 1926, because gatineau power did not pay the taxes in question. resolute relies for this on the rule against making an assignment of claim (and therefore, by extension, an assignment of contract) “that is injurious to the rights of the debtor or that renders his obligation more onerous” (art. 1637 para. 2 ccq; see also, in the context of the cclc,. caisse populaire de maria v. beauvais et verret inc., [1994] rdj 592 (que. sup. ct.), at p 596). [153] this argument must fail. the increase in the price of electricity resulted not from the assignment of contract, but from legislative changes. any possible difference between the rule under the ccq and the one under the cclc is therefore immaterial, because resolute’s argument is unfounded in any case. [154] as we know, the parties to the 1926 contract expressly provided in art. 17 that they would be subject to future provincial laws and that those laws would affect their contractual relationship. in 2007, hydro-québec lost the benefit of the exemption under s 68 of the wa, and an additional levy was established in the hqa. the increase in electricity rates resulting from those legislative changes was a risk that cip had clearly agreed to take in arts. 17 and 20 of the 1926 contract. in other words, the cause of the price increase was not the assignment of the contract in 1965, but the amendments made to the legislation in 2007. the assignment did not in itself render resolute’s obligation more onerous. [155] i conclude that the assignment of the 1926 contract had full effect with respect to resolute and that hydro-québec is entitled, as a party to that contract, to claim payment from it for the taxes and charges contemplated in art. 20. b can hydro-québec claim payment of the levies provided for in section 32 of the hqa and section 68 of the wa? [156] hydro-québec is claiming, pursuant to art. 20 of the 1926 contract, an increased amount for electricity supplied to resolute it explains that the levies provided for in s 68 of the wa and s 32 of the hqa were added to resolute’s bill dated november 30, 2011 as well as to that company’s bills for the preceding three years. [157] in resolute’s view, the court of appeal erred in concluding that those levies are taxes or charges within the meaning of the 1926 contract. first, it submits that hydro-québec’s status as a mandatary of the government means that the amounts levied under s 32 of the hqa and s 68 of the wa constitute an allocation of public funds already belonging to the government, and not taxes or charges in the legal sense. second, resolute argues that the levies in question cannot be considered to be taxes or charges within the meaning of art. 20 of the 1926 contract, because to characterize them as such would be inconsistent with the parties’ intention at the time they entered into that agreement. third, resolute maintains that any claim for payment of the amounts levied under the wa was either extinguished by prescription or tacitly waived by the respondents, given that in 65 years, gatineau power had never passed the bill on to the other contracting party. [158] as the court of appeal explained, the trial judge had first expressed the opinion that the act to reduce the debt and establish the generations fund, cqlr, c. r-2201, had not imposed a new tax, because the tax in question had already existed before being extended to hydro-québec in 2007 the levy at issue is thus a “tax” according to this conclusion of the superior court (see ca reasons, at para. 11). yet the trial judge had then accepted resolute’s argument that the levy in question is not a “tax”, because in her view it constitutes an allocation of public funds given these apparent contradictions, the court of appeal was justified in intervening. in any event, as it explained, it had not been essential for the trial judge to answer the question whether the levy at issue is a “tax”, as art. 20 of the 1926 contract applies to both taxes and charges (para. 14). [159] i will now consider each of resolute’s three arguments. (1) hydro-québec’s status [160] resolute submits that the government cannot tax hydro-québec because that would amount to taxing itself. this argument must fail. [161] mandataries of the government must pay taxes if the law so requires. as gérard v la forest wrote before becoming a judge, “[a] province may tax its own instrumentalities, such as crown corporations and municipalities” (the allocation of taxing power under the canadian constitution (2nd ed. 1981), at p 175). and this court affirmed in westbank first nation v british columbia hydro and power authority, [1999] 3 scr 134, that a province may tax its agents (or mandataries) (para. 40) moreover, s 16 of the hqa expressly provides that hydro-québec must pay certain taxes. i would add that there is in the record an admission that the quebec government has billed hydro-québec for the amount of the levies provided for in the two acts in question. [162] resolute’s argument that the government does not generate any revenue by taxing hydro-québec disregards the distinct juridical personality of the state-owned enterprise. although hydro-québec is a “mandatary of the state” (hqa, s 311), it is nonetheless a separate entity (see, eg,. hqa, ss. 312 and 313). the amounts collected from the taxation of hydro-québec differ from the revenues collected by the government when hydro-québec declares dividends, even though all of hydro-québec’s shares are owned by the government the government and hydro-québec cannot be lumped together as resolute proposes. [163] furthermore, resolute has not identified an error in the court of appeal’s conclusion that the amounts payable under s 68 of the wa constitute a tax (para. 13). since there is nothing to indicate that the word “tax” is given a special meaning in the contract, the court of appeal was right to intervene, relying in particular on algonquin. it is true that algonquin concerned taxes paid by a private business and turned on, among other things, the distinction between a tax and a charge (para. 46). but the nature of the levy did not change as a result of being imposed on hydro-québec. in any event, even if hydro-québec’s status made the levy a charge, that would be of no consequence in the case at bar, given that the contract applies to any “tax or charge”. [164] for the same reasons, the levy under s 32 of the hqa does not cease to be a tax or charge because it is imposed on hydro-québec. regardless of exactly how the levy is characterized, a plain reading of this section confirms that its effect is to impose on hydro-québec under s 16 of the hqa the payment of a “tax or charge . . . levied upon electrical energy generated from water power” within the meaning of art. 20 of the 1926 contract. furthermore, contrary to resolute’s submission, the absence of an enforcement mechanism in the statute does not make the levy any less of a tax that is “enforceable by law” (af, at para. 135, quoting 620 connaught ltd v canada (attorney general), 2008 scc 7, [2008] 1 scr 132, at para. 22): the levy becomes payable by operation of law. [165] resolute argues that what is at issue here is not a tax or a charge, but an allocation of government revenues. however, the fact that the legislature decided to allocate the collected amounts to the generations fund does not change the nature of the levy. i agree with the court of appeal: the appellant, like the trial judge (sup. ct. reasons, at paras. 64 and 67), is confusing the nature of the levy with the place where it is to be deposited (para. 16). [166] the court of appeal was therefore right to conclude that art. 20 of the 1926 contract applies to the levies provided for in s 32 of the hqa and s 68 of the wa. (2) meaning of the words “tax or charge” intended by the parties [167] resolute points out that the words “tax or charge” used in the 1926 contract may have a meaning different than the one given to them in a statute; what is important in this case is the meaning of these words based on the common intention of the parties in 1926. in resolute’s view, that intention is clear: art. 20 of the contract concerns a “tax or charge” payable to a stranger to the contract — a government — and not to a contracting party. resolute is thus suggesting a variation on its argument concerning the legal nature of the levies: the parties’ intention was to authorize the company having an obligation to supply electricity to apply a future tax or charge collected by a government to the price paid by the purchaser, not to allow the company to unilaterally increase the price of electricity for its own benefit. [168] this argument cannot be accepted. even if it is assumed that the parties did not foresee the nationalization of electricity when they entered into the 1926 contract, increases in taxes or charges were expressly provided for in the contract, as was the possible impact of those increases on the price of electricity. the parties also stipulated that the agreement would be subject to future provincial laws (art. 17) and that the contract could be assigned (art. 22). [169] resolute’s argument that the parties sought to limit the effects of arts. 17 and 20 to payments made to governments that are strangers to the contract by excluding a situation in which payments are made to a government through a corporation it owns must also be rejected. as we have seen, the imposed taxes and charges are payable to the government, which is a stranger to the contract, and not to hydro-québec, a party to the contract the charges paid to the government actually increase the cost of producing the electricity supplied by hydro-québec, whose juridical personality and patrimony are distinct from those of the government. [170] resolute also argues, again on the basis of its analysis regarding the common intention of the parties, that the charge provided for in s 68 of the wa is not a “future” charge within the meaning of the 1926 contract, because this statutory levy already existed when the contract was renewed in 2006 this argument is not persuasive. it is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the words used in art. 20. any charge imposed after 1926 is a “future” charge within the meaning of arts. 17 and 20 of the contract this is easy to explain: the purchaser has the right to renew the contract indefinitely without renegotiating the price, but the seller is protected in the event that electricity costs rise as a result of a new tax or charge a reading of the contract suggests that the parties’ intention was to have the price for electricity remain stable, subject to the imposition of new taxes and charges, such that the seller company’s net revenue would remain constant but it would not be penalized if its production costs rose because of an unforeseen tax or charge levied upon electricity. since the purchaser company has the option to renew or not to renew the contract, it is protected from any future price increase that is excessive: in the event of an increase in taxes or charges, it can choose not to renew the agreement. [171] resolute submits that the levy provided for in the hqa relates not to “electrical energy”, the term used in art. 20 of the 1926 contract, but to “water power” (hqa, s 32) this argument must also fail in art. 20 of the contract, the parties specified that the amounts in question would be levied “upon electrical energy generated from water power”, but they did not make the distinction suggested by resolute the words of art. 20 do not exclude electricity from the “water power [hydro-québec] develops”, which are the words used in s 32 para. 2 hqa. the act provides that the rate of the levy is computed in kilowatt-hours, which clearly suggests, contrary to resolute’s argument, that the levy relates to electricity. [172] in sum, all of resolute’s arguments to the effect that the court of appeal misunderstood the intention of the parties to the 1926 contract are rejected. (3) waiver or prescription [173] resolute’s final argument is that any claim for payment of the tax under the wa was extinguished by prescription or tacitly waived. before being imposed in s 68 of the wa, this charge had existed since 1946 under s 3 of the act to insure the progress of education, s.q 1946, c 21 at the hearing, the parties were unable to explain why gatineau power had never billed resolute for it. the legislative history shows that the appellant’s argument is unfounded, however. [174] the fact is that from 1946 to 1964, the act to insure the progress of education barred gatineau power from billing resolute for the charge section 19 para. 1 provided that “[n]o holder or owner of hydraulic powers shall increase the rates of his electricity services or obtain an increase in such rates, by reason of the contribution he pays or which he shall be called upon to pay to the education fund”. the next paragraph provided that charges, including the one provided for in s 3, “must be borne exclusively by those upon whom this act imposes them, and [that] they cannot, directly or indirectly, claim the reimbursement thereof from anyone, notwithstanding any past or future arrangement or agreement to the contrary” (after 1946, no legislation altered the substance of this provision: an act to amend the act to insure the progress of education, s.q 1947, c 32, s 9; an act to assure budgetary control of certain expenditures, sq 1961, c 8, s 18). gatineau power therefore could not avail itself of art. 20 of the 1926 contract. [175] as of 1965, the charge incorporated into s 68 of the wa was no longer accompanied with a prohibition against increasing electricity rates or claiming a reimbursement of the charge. however, hydro-québec was exempted from the charge until 2007 (see act to reduce the debt and establish the generations fund, sq 2006, c 24). accordingly, there was no extinction by prescription or tacit waiver as a result of the renewals in 1996 and 2006. [176] i conclude that the words “tax or charge” in art. 20 of the 1926 contract encompass the two levies at issue that were imposed under s 32 of the hqa and s 68 of the wa, and i would therefore declare that those levies are payable by resolute to hydro-québec under that agreement. the court of appeal did not err in reaching this conclusion like the court of appeal, given the absence of the attorney general of quebec, i will not address the question whether hydro-québec will be required to pay the levy provided for in s 32 of the hqa in the future such that it will be entitled to an increase on the basis of that levy. to dispose of the case, it will suffice to note that the quebec government required hydro-québec to pay the charges at issue and that the latter was entitled to apply them to the amount billed to resolute. iv conclusion [177] i would dismiss the appeal with costs. introduction [178] the nationalization of the production and distribution of electricity was a flagship project of the quiet revolution in quebec at the time, the quebec government created a state-owned enterprise, hydro-québec, to take control of quebec’s electricity market after initially using expropriation to take over private electricity producers, hydro-québec opted instead to proceed by way of agreement in order to acquire those companies and complete the nationalization process. this case raises the following question: how are two companies to be unified in the context of a takeover? does unification necessarily imply that one company is completely absorbed by the company that acquires it, such that it then becomes merely an empty shell? or is it possible to devise a more flexible form of unification with takeover terms and a phased approach that will ensure the target company’s survival? [179] according to my colleague kasirer j., nationalization necessarily means complete absorption. since the nationalization of electricity, the target companies, such as the gatineau power company (“gatineau power”), have, in his view, become nothing more than empty shells that serve no purpose and have no legal existence. he therefore considers it highly unlikely that a parent company like hydro-québec could, in some cases, be a mandatary of its subsidiary, gatineau power like the court of appeal (2019 qcca 30), he relies exclusively on the 1965 contract to arrive at that conclusion. [180] the central question raised by this appeal concerns the relativity of a power contract entered into in 1926 by gatineau power and the canadian international paper company (“cip”), the predecessor of the appellant, resolute fp canada inc. (“resolute”). the principle of relativity of contract means that a contract has “effect only between the contracting parties” and that “it does not affect third persons” (art. 1440 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”)). as a result, third persons cannot rely on the content of a contract for their own benefit, except in a few very limited cases. specifically, the question is therefore whether hydro-québec, a third person in relation to the 1926 contract, can avail itself of the price adjustment clause in that contract in order to pass on to resolute the taxes or charges it paid under s 32 of the hydro-québec act, cqlr, c. h-5 (“hqa”), and s 68 of the watercourses act, cqlr, c. r-13 (“wa”). hydro-québec is retroactively claiming more than $3 million in taxes or charges from resolute on the basis of that clause. to succeed in superior court, hydro-québec and gatineau power therefore had the burden of showing that hydro-québec was also a party to the contract allegedly, hydro-québec became a party to the 1926 contract as a result of an assignment of that contract in its favour. [181] this appeal is a typical case involving the correction of errors allegedly found in the trial judge’s decision. first, this appeal requires this court to consider the judicial contract between the parties to the proceedings in order to understand the nature of the debate that took place in the superior court. second, the appeal requires this court to look carefully at the trial judge’s reasons in order to determine whether she made a reviewable error in disposing of the arguments presented to her, since the court of appeal limited itself to stating that she had made a reviewable error, without identifying or describing it (see hydro-québec v. matta, 2020 scc 37, at para. 34). [182] a careful reading of the pleadings, the parties’ outlines of argument and the transcript of the oral argument in the superior court shows that hydro-québec and gatineau power did not argue that the 1965 contract had effected an assignment. in fact, they described that contract in their defence as a [translation] “mandate, sale and lease agreement” (ar, vol. i, at p 44) hydro-québec and gatineau power argued that the assignment had occurred at the earliest in 1982, when resolute’s predecessor and hydro-québec entered into a contract for the supply of additional electric power. in the alternative, hydro-québec and gatineau power submitted that the assignment had occurred in 1997, when the act respecting the régie de l’énergie, s.q 1996, c 61, gave hydro-québec the exclusive right to distribute electricity in quebec, or in 2005-2006, when gatineau power transferred the ownership of its power plants to hydro-québec. [183] the trial judge correctly understood that the issue was whether the contract had been assigned either in 1982, in 1997 or in 2005-2006 (2016 qccs 3862). in my view, she decided the case as it had been presented to her, without making a reviewable error. nor did she make such an error by accepting resolute’s argument, which was not contested at trial, that the 1965 contract had not effected an assignment. the judge was bound by the judicial contract between the parties, in which the characterization of the 1965 contract was not in dispute. it was not argued before her, either by resolute or by hydro-québec and gatineau power, that the 1965 contract had effected an assignment. in this regard, hydro-québec and gatineau power, on which the burden of proof rested, proposed no interpretation of the 1965 contract to that effect. [184] as a result, the trial judge did not have to consider the interpretation of the 1965 contract in detail, which, and i say this with great respect, the court of appeal erred in doing, as does my colleague kasirer j. in any event, even if the characterization of the 1965 contract had been part of the judicial contract and the judge had therefore considered it at length, in my view, the words of that contract, its object and the parties’ subsequent conduct confirm the existence of a mandate. although gatineau power did sell the vast majority of its movable property and lease all its immovables, it did not “assign” its power contracts deprived of its production tools, gatineau power mandated hydro-québec to supply its customers with the electricity that gatineau power was normally required by contract to supply to them to facilitate the performance of that task, gatineau power made its rights under the power contracts available to hydro-québec, though without assigning them, so that hydro-québec could assert those rights as a mandatary acting in gatineau power’s name. the parties also stipulated that hydro-québec’s remuneration for its services as mandatary was to be equal to the revenue derived from carrying on gatineau power’s operations. [185] since the trial judge did not make a reviewable error in finding that the 1926 contract had not been assigned to hydro-québec, gatineau power’s status as a party to the 1926 contract was not transferred to hydro-québec hydro-québec is therefore a third person in relation to that contract, and the relativity of the contract prevents it from invoking the price adjustment clause to pass on the taxes or charges for which it may be liable. [186] as for gatineau power, it cannot pass on the taxes or charges either, as the evidence does not show that it paid them. in any event, even if gatineau power had paid them, it could not pass them on to resolute because it was not legally bound to pay them for the years for which they are being claimed. the charges provided for in s 32 hqa and s 68 wa are in fact levied only on holders of water power. the price increase is being claimed for 2009 to 2011. however, gatineau power has not been a holder of water power since well before 2009; hydro-québec has been the holder of that power since 1965, first in its capacity as lessee and then, as of 2005-2006, in its capacity as owner. [187] in light of the conclusion i reach, i see no need to comment on the theoretical debate between the unitary and dualistic approaches to assignment of contract. [188] for the reasons that follow, i would allow the appeal. ii. summary of the relevant facts [189] in 1926, gatineau power entered into a power contract with resolute’s corporate predecessor — cip — for a term of 40 years the contract gave cip an option to renew it unilaterally for additional 10-year periods resolute and its predecessors renewed the 1926 contract several times, with the result that it is still in force. the 1926 contract contains a clause authorizing gatineau power to raise the price of electricity by an amount equal to the increases in any “tax” or “charge” payable by it (art. 20, reproduced in ar, vol. iii, at p 110). the 1926 contract also contains the following stipulation: “this agreement shall enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the successors or assigns of both parties” (art. 22). [190] in 1946, the act to insure the progress of education, sq 1946, c 21, was enacted the purpose of that statute was to create a special fund to finance public education in quebec, some of the contributions to which were to come from a charge levied on the electricity generated by holders of hydraulic powers in the public domain and owners of hydraulic powers in the private domain (ss. 2 and 3c and d). the quebec hydro-electric commission — hydro-québec’s predecessor — was also required to pay a share of its revenues into the fund (s 3e) in 1961, s 13 of the act to assure budgetary control of certain expenditure, sq 1961, c 8, changed how the amounts were allocated by providing that, from then on, the charges were to be paid into the consolidated revenue fund. as a result of the 1964 statute revision, this charge became the one provided for in s 68 wa. the charge under s 68 wa is one of the two charges at the centre of this case. [191] it is not in dispute that gatineau power was bound to pay this charge as of 1946. however, the record does not show whether gatineau power paid the charge. nor is it in dispute that the price adjustment clause in the 1926 contract was not invoked until 2011, 65 years later, as discussed below. [192] in 1963, the quebec government began nationalizing electricity production in quebec as a result, the quebec hydro-electric commission acquired all of gatineau power’s shares in 1964 and 1965 gatineau power thus became a wholly owned subsidiary of the commission and of its successor, hydro-québec. [193] in 1965, following the purchase of gatineau power’s shares, hydro-québec entered into a contract with gatineau power to unify the management of the two companies. the trial judge described the content of the 1965 contract as follows: [translation] in 1965, electricity was nationalized. [gatineau power] continued to exist, but [hydro-québec] acquired all of its shares a mandate, sale and lease agreement was entered into on may 12, 1965, between [hydro-québec] and [gatineau power], and under this agreement, [gatineau power] leased its immovables to [hydro-québec], sold it its movable assets, and named [hydro-québec] mandatary for the management of its operations and contracts consequently, [gatineau power] retained ownership of the three plants situated on the gatineau river — paugan, chelsea, and [rapides]-farmer — but they were leased to [hydro-québec] this agreement was entered into for a term of twenty-five years, but there is nothing to indicate that it came to an end at the expiration of that term. it was therefore tacitly renewed upon its expiry, at least until 2005-2006, when the plants in question were assigned to [hydro-québec]. [emphasis added; para. 51 (canlii).] [194] it is important to note that, in the defence filed in superior court, hydro-québec and gatineau power both referred to the 1965 contract as a [translation] “mandate, sale and lease agreement” moreover, a manager from hydro-québec testified that, to his knowledge, that contract had not effected an assignment. [195] in 1982, resolute’s predecessor and hydro-québec entered into a contract, in which gatineau power did not participate, for the supply of electric power in addition to that provided for in the 1926 contract. importantly, the 1982 contract describes the 1926 contract as being between resolute’s predecessor and gatineau power only. moreover, the contract entered into in 1982 makes no reference to the existence of the 1965 contract between gatineau power and hydro-québec on this point, hydro-québec and gatineau power conceded in the superior court that [translation] “the evidence does not show that cip [resolute’s predecessor] had knowledge of the 1965 agreement when it signed the 1982 contract” (outline of argument of hydro-québec and gatineau power at trial, at para. 78, reproduced in rr, at p 61). the trial judge described the situation as follows: [translation] of course, there is nothing to indicate that this 1965 agreement was ever brought to the attention of [resolute] [resolute] continued to benefit from the 1926 agreement, the existence of which was recognized and confirmed when it entered into an agreement with [hydro-québec] in 1982 to obtain the additional power it required. furthermore, for a great many years, [resolute] received a single invoice for the electricity provided to its gatineau mill, which was issued by and paid to [hydro-québec]. the invoice did, however, indicate the electricity provided under the 1926 agreement separately [emphasis added; para. 52.] as the judge noted, hydro-québec is responsible for supplying resolute with the electricity owed under the 1926 contract on behalf of gatineau power. hydro-québec issues a single invoice both for the original power supplied under the 1926 contract and for the additional power provided for in the 1982 contract, but it takes care to indicate the electricity supplied under the 1926 contract separately from the rest of the electricity delivered to resolute. [196] resolute and its predecessors renewed the 1926 contract several times, ie in 1986, 1996 and 2006 each notice of renewal contained similar language indicating that gatineau power was the recipient: [translation] registered mail gatineau power company c/o hydro-québec mr. jean bernier secretary general 75 dorchester boulevard west montréal, quebec h2z 1a4 (ar, vol. ii, at p 1) [197] in 1997, the act respecting the régie de l’énergie gave hydro-québec the exclusive right to distribute electricity in quebec, with some limited exceptions. [198] in 2005-2006, gatineau power transferred its three plants on the gatineau river to hydro-québec, without resolute being informed. [199] in 2006, the national assembly of quebec created the generations fund, which was to be used to repay quebec’s public debt (act to reduce the debt and establish the generations fund, cqlr, c. r-2201, s 2) at the same time, the quebec legislature amended the hqa and the wa to make hydro-québec subject to the charges provided for in those statutes (s 32 hqa; s 68 wa) and to specify that the amounts were to be paid into the generations fund. [200] hydro-québec began paying the taxes or charges under s 32 hqa and s 68 wa in january 2007 however, it was not until nearly five years later, in december 2011, that the price adjustment clause in the 1926 contract was invoked for the first time.6 hydro-québec — not gatineau power — sent resolute an invoice, retroactively claiming more than $3 million for the charges paid by hydro-québec to the quebec government on the electricity produced during the preceding three years. resolute objected to that retroactive claim, which was how this dispute originated. [201] the parties entered into a payment under protest agreement under that agreement, resolute paid the amounts claimed by hydro-québec in order to avoid paying interest and additional administrative fees until a judgment was rendered on the merits of the case. the agreement also provided that resolute was to bring a motion to institute proceedings for a declaratory judgment within the time agreed upon and that, if it did not do so, hydro-québec would keep the amounts accordingly, in 6 hydro-québec sent resolute a letter dated november 30, 2011 referring to its right to invoke the price adjustment clause in the 1926 contract, a letter to which an invoice dated december 1, 2011 was attached. the trial judge stated that the price adjustment was claimed in november 2011 (at para. 42, quoted at para. 218 of these reasons), whereas the parties state that it was on december 1, 2011 (af, at para. 16; rf, at para. 22, fn. 26). although this is not determinative, i will refer to the latter of these dates, ie. december 1, 2011, as the parties do. september 2012, resolute filed a motion in superior court to institute proceedings for a declaratory judgment. iii. issue [202] the question before the trial judge was whether hydro-québec could avail itself of the price adjustment clause in the 1926 contract in order to pass on to resolute the taxes or charges it paid under s 32 hqa and s 68 wa. the judge answered this question in the negative. hydro-québec and gatineau power are asking this court to reach a contrary conclusion. the court’s answer to the question turns on the application of the proper standard for intervention in the trial judge’s decision, understood in its factual and procedural context. [203] after considering the factual and procedural context of this case, i am of the view that the trial judge did not make a reviewable error in finding that the 1926 contract had not been assigned she clearly understood the arguments made by hydro-québec and gatineau power, on which the burden of proof rested, and she disposed of them without making an error that warranted the court of appeal’s intervention. iv standards for appellate intervention [204] in uniprix inc. v. gestion gosselin et bérubé inc., 2017 scc 43, [2017] 2 scr 59, this court explained that the characterization of a contract must “be considered to be a question of mixed fact and law” (at para. 42) when it “involves the consideration of a multitude of facts” (at para. 41), such as the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract and how the parties subsequently applied it (para. 29; see 3091-5177 québec inc (éconolodge aéroport) v lombard general insurance co. of canada, 2018 scc 43, [2018] 3 scr 8, at para. 18; churchill falls (labrador) corp. v. hydro-québec, 2018 scc 46, [2018] 3 scr 101, at para. 49). in such a case, the applicable standard for appellate intervention is palpable and overriding error, unless there is an extricable error of law. [205] this court has reiterated on many occasions that appellate courts must take a highly deferential approach to mixed questions, like the characterization of a contract, because the answer to such questions is “intertwined with the weight assigned to the evidence” by the trial judge, who is in a much better position than an appellate court to assess and weigh such matters (housen v nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at para. 32, see also paras. 12-14 and 18; see benhaim v st-germain, 2016 scc 48, [2016] 2 scr 352, at para. 37). [206] in this case, the applicable standard is palpable and overriding error. the court has to review the trial judge’s characterization of the parties’ legal relationship, a task that required her to consider a multitude of facts. indeed, to determine whether hydro-québec had become a party to the 1926 contract as a result of an assignment, the trial judge relied on the wording of the contractual documents in question, the factual context surrounding them, the arguments made by hydro-québec and gatineau power themselves concerning any of the three points in time when the assignment could have occurred and, above all, the parties’ subsequent conduct. the judge actually found several facts that, in her view, negated the existence of an assignment:  gatineau power continues to exist and had not been dissolved;  gatineau power had retained ownership of the plants until 2005-2006;  the notices of renewal of the 1926 contract had all been addressed to gatineau power care of hydro-québec, which suggested that hydro-québec had a mandate to receive them on behalf of gatineau power;  the electricity invoices sent to resolute indicated the electricity supplied under the 1926 contract separately; and  resolute had never been informed that gatineau power had assigned the 1926 contract to hydro-québec and, in this sense, there was no evidence that hydro-québec had observed the formalities for setting up the alleged assignment of the contract against it (paras. 16, 20 and 51-54). it was therefore in light of this factual context that the trial judge concluded that the 1926 contract had not been assigned to hydro-québec and [translation] “that the parties to the 1926 agreement remain [gatineau power] and [resolute]” (para. 60). [207] this court’s task is not to review the court of appeal’s reasons and its interpretation of the 1965 contract, but rather to review the superior court’s decision (uniprix, at para. 44). v trial judge’s decision [208] to determine whether the trial judge made a reviewable error in concluding as she did, it is important to consider the arguments presented to her and the manner in which she disposed of them. [209] the 1926 contract states that the only contracting parties are cip, resolute’s predecessor, and gatineau power the principle of relativity of contract therefore prevents hydro-québec from invoking the price adjustment clause in the 1926 contract as a result, hydro-québec and gatineau power had the burden of proving that resolute owed hydro-québec the taxes or charges claimed under that contract. though the burden of proof was on hydro-québec and gatineau power, it was instead resolute that filed the motion to institute proceedings for a declaratory judgment, as provided for in the payment under protest agreement this meant that resolute was the plaintiff for the purposes of the litigation and presented its case first. [210] in its motion, resolute alleged that, to its knowledge, the 1926 contract had not been assigned to hydro-québec by gatineau power when hydro-québec and gatineau power filed their defence, the parameters of the debate became clearer in their defence, they denied resolute’s allegation that there had been no assignment. however, they did not explain when and how an assignment had occurred in fact, hydro-québec and gatineau power instead alleged that hydro-québec had been supplying the electricity owed under the 1926 contract since entering into the 1965 contract, the one they described as a “mandate, sale and lease agreement”: [translation] since acquiring the gatineau power company and entering into the mandate, sale and lease agreement referred to above, hydro-québec has been supplying all the electricity under all the above-mentioned contracts for supplying the gatineau mill; [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. i, at p 48; see also p 44.) [211] resolute, technically the plaintiff from a procedural standpoint, presented its case first at the hearing before the trial judge. because hydro-québec and gatineau power had denied its allegation that no assignment had occurred, resolute undertook to argue that the 1965 contract had not effected an assignment, even though hydro-québec and gatineau power had not argued, either in their defence or in their outline of argument, that the 1965 contract had done so. [212] after indicating that, in its opinion, the [translation] “central issue is the identity . . . [of] the contracting party” (ar, vol. vi, at p 126), resolute argued that “gatineau [power] has always been the contracting party under the contract at issue” (p 128). resolute began by stating that hydro-québec acted as a mandatary under the 1965 contract. it heavily emphasized the fact that hydro-québec and gatineau power “call it the mandate, sale and lease agreement” (p 129) resolute then set about showing that the 1982 contract for additional electric power and the acts of transfer of the plants in 2005-2006 had also not effected an assignment. according to resolute, the 1982 contract recognized the “existence in black and white” of the 1926 contract and was “a separate contract” (pp. 159 and 162). as for the acts of transfer of the plants, resolute argued that they had transferred only the ownership of the plants and had not assigned the contracts and that, in any event, the formalities for setting up the acts against it had not been observed. [213] it was then the turn of hydro-québec and gatineau power to present their arguments to the trial judge. their main argument was that the principle of relativity of contract was not relevant. once a tax or charge was levied, the price adjustment clause in the 1926 contract would be triggered and the price would then automatically be increased by an amount equal to the applicable taxes or charges this was true regardless of whether or not there had been an assignment. the following excerpts from the transcript give a clear picture of the main argument made by hydro-québec and gatineau power: [translation] [counsel for hydro-québec and gatineau power]: . so our contention is that the exercise we have just done disposes of the question, that is, it’s sufficient to read the contract to determine what the price will be. and all of this is very logical, because the power is supplied by the plants in the context, context, hydroelectric development on the gatineau river, supplied to the paper mill by these works, as stated in the second recital, in a long-term context so if the very specific trigger in article 20 occurs, the price changes automatically. regardless of whether the contract was assigned or not assigned, performed by a mandatary or not, the price changes. it’s a pricing formula. what i’m alleging, basically, what i’m arguing is that, especially at the start of the quotation, the concept of the binding force of contracts. therefore, the contract is, in my opinion, it’s clear, its context is well understood, its application is obvious, in our view, there is a price adjustment clause that applies. the party that has to pay more won’t be pleased, of course, but beyond that, it’s an application of the principle of binding force of contracts . i will explain it to you again, since it’s my first argument. when i said to you, that argument disposes of the case, that’s it. in other words, we look at the contract of nineteen twenty-six (1926), we see that it contains a pricing formula, and we simply apply the article. is there a new tax? yes. and i think it’s reasonable to say that this clause will be applied from the first (1st) of january two thousand seven (2007), because that was when both gatineau and hydro-québec became subject to the tax that is the argument, the contract is applied. it isn’t written that it has to be gatineau that pays or hydro-québec that pays. they are subject to a tax. is there a new tax? yes. judge: you, what you’re saying is that ultimately the effect of 16 and 68 is that, in any case, regardless of who pays, hydro-québec and gatineau power are subject. [counsel for hydro-québec and gatineau power]: exactly. judge: and hydro-québec doesn’t need to say all the time, well, here i am acting as mandatary . . . it comes to the same thing. [counsel for hydro-québec and gatineau power]: that is exactly right it isn’t tied to the person who pays or doesn’t pay . but from the moment there’s a tax, that is, the suppliers, and whatever they may be, gatineau, hydro, mandataries or not, they are both subject to it. the debate ends there. so that is our main argument and it disposes of the issue. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. vii, at pp. 113, 118 and 171-74) [214] i would add that, when counsel for hydro-québec and gatineau power began his oral argument, he expressed his surprise at the fact that resolute had devoted so much energy to the issue of assignment even though, in his view, it was merely an alternative argument. in my opinion, this confusion resulted from the fact that resolute argued first even though it did not have the burden of proof: [translation] [counsel for hydro-québec and gatineau power]: . ok then, i will start with my outline of argument so in our view, the . . . everything i heard from my colleagues yesterday about the assignment of the contract, in our view, it’s an alternative argument, alternative, alternative, i should even say, that comes at the very end. so yes, i discuss it in my arguments, but it’s at the very end, the last section of my outline, section e. judge: in fairness to your colleagues, i think they tried to anticipate your arguments in order to make complete submissions. [counsel for hydro-québec and gatineau power]: yes, absolutely. i don’t hold it against them, but ok. judge: they could not guess ahead of time . [counsel for hydro-québec and gatineau power]: perhaps. judge: . . . the order in which you would do it. [counsel for hydro-québec and gatineau power]: that’s right, and i think the same thing because we are also getting various kinds of arguments. so in our view, it’s really a contract application case, a case on the application of the nineteen twenty-six (1926) contract. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. vii, at pp. 91-92) [215] hydro-québec and gatineau power then presented their alternative argument that, if an assignment of contract was necessary for the price adjustment clause to apply, the assignment had occurred at one of the following three points in time: 1. the assignment had taken place in 1982 when resolute’s predecessor and hydro-québec entered into a contract for the supply of additional electric power. 2. in the alternative, if the court was of the view that the 1982 contract had not effected an assignment, hydro-québec had become a party to the 1926 contract by operation of law when the act respecting the régie de l’énergie gave it the exclusive right to distribute electricity in quebec. 3. and if that alternative argument was not accepted and the court was of the view that the change in the regulatory framework had not substituted hydro-québec for gatineau power under the 1926 contract, the assignment had taken place when hydro-québec became the owner of gatineau power’s plants in 2005-2006 under the acts of transfer of the immovables. [216] when the trial judge’s decision is read carefully in light of the parties’ respective outlines of argument and the transcript of the oral argument, it therefore becomes clear that although the question of assignment was in issue, the arguments presented by hydro-québec and gatineau power in the superior court were very different from those presented in the court of appeal and in this court. at no time did hydro-québec and gatineau power argue in the superior court that the 1965 contract had effected an assignment of the 1926 contract rather, they argued that the assignment had occurred either in 1982, when hydro-québec and resolute’s predecessor entered into a contract for the supply of additional electric power, or in 1997, when hydro-québec became the exclusive distributor of electricity under the act respecting the régie de l’énergie, or in 2005-2006, when gatineau power transferred the ownership of its power plants to hydro-québec. thus, hydro-québec and gatineau power did not dispute the claim made by resolute in superior court that the 1965 contract had not effected an assignment. nor did they go to the trouble of analyzing the 1965 contract in order to show the contrary. [217] the trial judge clearly understood the parties’ arguments and the parameters of the debate. at paras. 25-34 and 42-45 of her reasons, she described the arguments of hydro-québec and gatineau power. she explained that they were arguing in the alternative [translation] “that, since the 1982 agreement, [hydro-québec] has been [resolute’s] sole provider of electricity and its other contracting party” (para. 28 (emphasis added)). the central argument with respect to assignment was therefore that hydro-québec had become a party to the 1926 contract, but only as a result of the 1982 contract. the following passages from the trial judge’s decision are enlightening: [translation] as [hydro-québec] points out in paragraph 74 of its memorandum: since the 1982 agreement, hydro-québec provides all the electricity to the gatineau mill and invoices any energy use, including the 40,000kw pool that was the subject of the 1926 agreement. payments are made to hydro-québec by [resolute] and its authors hydro-québec found invoices dating back to 1999 confirming this fact. in the alternative, the defendants argue that, since the 1982 agreement, [hydro-québec] has been the plaintiff’s sole provider of electricity and its other contracting party. since 1982, the plaintiff cannot reasonably claim that it thought that [gatineau power] was its electricity provider. [emphasis added; paras. 19 and 28.] [218] the judge went on to say that the central question was whether hydro-québec and gatineau power had discharged their burden of proving that hydro-québec could invoke the price adjustment clause by demonstrating [translation] “that it has acquired the rights of [gatineau power] under the 1926 agreement”: [translation] [hydro-québec] is the party invoking article 20 of the 1926 agreement, and it has done so since november of 2011, resulting in the dispute brought before us today. to succeed, therefore, [hydro-québec] must demonstrate that it has acquired the rights of [gatineau power] under the 1926 agreement and that article 20 of that agreement applies if the court agrees with [hydro-québec’s] arguments on this matter, it will then determine whether the plaintiff [resolute] is right to claim that [hydro-québec] cannot claim three years of arrears or administrative fees. [paras. 42-43] [219] when the trial judge then turned to the analysis of the issue of assignment, there is every indication that she clearly understood the fact that the argument of hydro-québec and gatineau power that hydro-québec had become a party to the 1926 contract centred around three possible points in time, none of which related to the 1965 contract: [translation] according to [hydro-québec], the 1926 agreement should now be read and interpreted as if [hydro québec] itself had become [resolute’s] contracting party. it is not entirely clear whether it is arguing that we should merely substitute the name hydro-québec for that of gatineau power when reading the agreement, or whether the contracting party is both hydro-québec and gatineau power. this change the nationalization of electricity, the fact that [hydro-québec] holds 100% of the shares of [gatineau power], the wording of the 1982 agreement [would have] occurred for many reasons: between [hydro-québec] and [resolute], the effect of the act respecting the régie de l’énergie which enshrined the “exclusive right to distribute of hydro-québec when carrying out its power distribution activities”, the assignment of the paugan, chelsea, and rapides-farmer plants in 2005-2006 which allegedly extinguished “hydro-québec’s obligations with respect to these plants, as a supposed mandatary”, which in a way finalized the agreement assignment that was otherwise expressly authorized under article 22 of the 1926 agreement [emphasis added; paras. 44-45.] [220] before i analyze how the superior court judge disposed of these arguments, it is important to note that she was well aware of the fact that hydro-québec and gatineau power were not contesting resolute’s argument that the 1965 contract had not effected an assignment of the 1926 contract, as can be seen from paras. 19 and 28 of her reasons. the judge thus understood that hydro-québec and gatineau power were standing by the position taken in their defence that the 1965 contract was a “mandate, sale and lease agreement”. what they were relying on instead was the effect on the parties’ legal relationship of the 1982 contract, the enactment of the act respecting the régie de l’énergie, and the acts transferring ownership of the plants. that being said, let us look at these arguments. [221] first, the judge rejected the argument that the assignment had taken place in 1982 when hydro-québec and resolute’s predecessor entered into a contract for the supply of additional electric power. in her view, clause 4a) of the 1982 contract was concerned only with the supply of additional electric power and did not affect the relativity of the 1926 contract in fact, she was of the view that the 1982 contract [translation] “expressly provides” that the 1926 contract is only between gatineau power and cip, resolute’s predecessor: [translation] in 1982, an agreement was entered into between cip, now [resolute], and [hydro-québec] for the supply of additional power to the gatineau mill (d-7). the agreement expressly provides that: 4(a) the provider already supplies the subscriber with 40,000kw of power, called the original firm power, in accordance with the agreement between gatineau power and canadian international paper company, dated july 19, 1926, . of course, there is nothing to indicate that this 1965 agreement was ever brought to the attention of [resolute]. [resolute] continued to benefit from the 1926 agreement, the existence of which was recognized and confirmed when it entered into an agreement with [hydro-québec] in 1982 to obtain the additional power it required furthermore, for a great many years, [resolute] received a single invoice for the electricity provided to its gatineau mill, which was issued by and paid to [hydro-québec] the invoice did, however, indicate the electricity provided under the 1926 agreement separately. [emphasis added; paras. 18 and 52.] the trial judge therefore did not hold that the 1982 contract had effected an assignment, as hydro-québec and gatineau power had argued at paras. 71 et seq. of their outline of argument (reproduced in rr, at pp. 59-62) and at the hearing. [222] second, hydro-québec and gatineau power submitted that hydro-québec had become a contracting party through [translation] “the effect of the act respecting the régie de l’énergie which enshrined the ‘exclusive right to distribute of hydro-québec when carrying out its power distribution activities’” (trial reasons, at para. 45, citing outline of argument of hydro-québec and gatineau power at trial, at para. 86, reproduced in rr, at p 62) the judge did not specifically discuss this argument, but it can be assumed that she rejected it implicitly, since she analyzed the issue of whether hydro-québec could invoke the price adjustment clause exclusively on the basis of assignment of contract and not by operation of law. [223] finally, the judge rejected the third assignment argument made by hydro-québec and gatineau power, namely that the assignment of the 1926 contract had taken place when gatineau power transferred its paugan, chelsea and rapides-farmer power plants to hydro-québec in 2005-2006. according to that logic, even if hydro-québec had been a mandatary under the 1965 contract, the mandate would have ended in 2005-2006 when it became the owner of the power plants in question from that moment on, according to hydro-québec, it could no longer logically act as a mandatary responsible for operating the power plants it owned. the object of the mandate having been accomplished, it would have come to an end. at the hearing, hydro-québec and gatineau power presented this argument in the following manner: [translation] [counsel for hydro-québec and gatineau power]: . the only thing that can be argued by the plaintiff is that perhaps hydro-québec went a bit far, perhaps it took over the contract, perhaps it shouldn’t have this is a debate that could take place, but between two companies, not between cip and hydro-québec or gatineau this relationship is not shared with the customer that consumes the electricity. so that is the point i want to make about this, that if there is any doubt that it was hydro-québec in its capacity as mandatary, well, clearly, since the transfers [of the power plants in 2005-2006], as we have seen, the articles in question of the sixty-five (1965) agreement on that point, to the effect that hydro-québec is a mandatary, well, they no longer apply. their object has been accomplished. hydro-québec holds, is the owner of the “leased premises”. it can’t act as a mandatary for another; they belong to it. and the acts of transfer say so, including water power, buildings, it’s all in the acts, and my colleague even argued that before you yesterday. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. viii, at pp. 48-49) [224] the trial judge was also not persuaded by this last argument made by hydro-québec and gatineau power. in her view, the fact that they had not adduced any evidence showing that they had brought the acts of transfer of the power plants to resolute’s attention — and thus the fact that they had not observed the formalities for setting up the assignment of the 1926 contract against it — showed that the acts transferring ownership of the power plants could not be interpreted as having assigned the 1926 contract: [translation] thus, it was [hydro-québec] that decided that the [transfer] of the three [gatineau power] plants to [hydro-québec] would be opportune, and when it would take place. if these transactions were to have any effect on the application and interpretation of the 1926 agreement, [hydro-québec] never informed [resolute] in due time it is difficult to find that these transactions effected an assignment of contract when [resolute] was never informed of their execution [emphasis added; para. 54.] [225] after disposing of the argument that there had been an assignment at one of the three points in time proposed by hydro-québec and gatineau power, the judge accepted resolute’s uncontested argument that the 1965 contract had not effected an assignment but had instead made hydro-québec a mandatary of gatineau power (paras. 15 and 52-53). [226] is there a reviewable error in that decision by the trial judge? vi appellate intervention [227] in my view, the trial judge did not make a reviewable error either in analyzing the three arguments made by hydro-québec and gatineau power with respect to assignment, or in accepting resolute’s uncontested argument concerning the 1965 contract. [228] the court of appeal nevertheless reversed the trial judge’s findings in this regard, limiting itself to stating that she had made a reviewable error without explaining how, in assessing the facts, she had supposedly made an error so palpable and overriding that it was in the nature of a [translation] “beam in the eye” (j.g v. nadeau, 2016 qcca 167, at para. 77 (canlii), quoted in benhaim, at para. 39; salomon v. matte-thompson, 2019 scc 14, [2019] 1 scr 729, at para. 33; matta, at paras. 33-34). the court of appeal analyzed the case from a new angle, without regard for the superior court’s findings of fact and the judicial contract before it as my colleague brown j pointed out in nelson (city) v mowatt, 2017 scc 8, [2017] 1 scr 138, “[i]t is not the role of appellate courts to second-guess the weight to be assigned to the various items of evidence” simply on the basis of “a difference of opinion” (para. 38). [229] the court of appeal did not consider the arguments made by the parties in superior court and how the trial judge had disposed of them instead, it chose to disregard the parties’ judicial contract and to reject resolute’s uncontested argument. the court of appeal took no account of the judge’s analysis of the argument concerning assignment at one of the three points in time mentioned above, and it decided to consider how the 1965 contract should be interpreted. because the court of appeal proceeded in that manner, it is not surprising that it was unable to explain where the judge had supposedly made a palpable and overriding error or an error of law in her reasoning, and what the nature of that error was, otherwise than by stating categorically that there was a [translation] “reviewable error” (para. 40 (canlii)). [230] the court of appeal’s analysis focused exclusively on the interpretation of the 1965 contract. in its view, this new [translation] “legal argument” could be raised on appeal because the evidence was in the record and the trial judge had dealt with the question of assignment (para. 39) first of all, i note that this is a mixed question and not a question of law, as i indicated above. in fact, the characterization of the 1965 contract was already before the trial judge, who accepted resolute’s uncontested argument, supported by the evidence, that the 1965 contract had not effected an assignment. the court of appeal should not have assumed the role of a trial court and improperly set about analyzing the 1965 contract, as a trial judge would have done by applying the facts to the law for the first time. rather, it should have considered whether the judge had made a reviewable error by adhering to the judicial contract entered into by the parties and by relying on the factual evidence concerning the parties’ subsequent conduct. [231] it was open to the trial judge to conclude as she did in light of the factual and procedural context of the case and the arguments made by the parties, as i explain below. a arguments concerning assignment at three possible points in time [232] to begin with, i am of the view that the judge did not err in rejecting the arguments made by hydro-québec and gatineau power concerning assignment at one of the following three points in time. [233] with regard to the first point in time — when the 1982 contract was entered into — the trial judge did not make a reviewable error in interpreting that contract as not effecting an assignment. the only part of that contract of a dozen pages that refers to the 1926 contract is clause 4a), reproduced above. however, that clause simply refers to the fact that, as the supplier, hydro-québec “already supplies the subscriber with 40,000kw of power . . in accordance with the agreement between gatineau power and canadian international paper company, dated july 19, 1926”. there are no words in clause 4a) of the 1982 contract that would suggest that the 1926 power contract was assigned or transferred somehow. [234] in addition, the 1982 contract could not assign the 1926 contract unless gatineau power participated in the 1982 contract. however, it was not a party to that contract. [235] the question of whether hydro-québec supplies that original power as a mandatary or as an assignee is simply not discussed in the 1982 contract. faced with a clause so inexplicit, the trial judge properly relied on the facts relating to the parties’ subsequent conduct, which, in her view, made the argument that there had been an assignment of contract implausible. [236] with regard to the second possible point in time when an assignment would have occurred according to hydro-québec and gatineau power, namely when the act respecting the régie de l’énergie came into force in 1997, the trial judge took note of the argument but did not address it in her analysis. presumably, she was of the view that the act respecting the régie de l’énergie would not have affected the relativity of the 1926 contract. in any event, hydro-québec and gatineau power do not suggest in this court that the judge should have accepted that argument. [237] as for the third possible point in time when an assignment would have occurred, namely when the ownership of the plants was transferred in 2005-2006, i am of the view that the trial judge did not make any error. given that an assignment of claim or of contract requires certain formalities to be observed for the setting up of the assignment (art. 1571 of the civil code of lower canada (“cclc”); art. 1641 ccq;. j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obligations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at nos. 1043-45), the judge was quite right to reject this argument in the absence of such evidence the contracts in question are, after all, recent ones (2005-2006) in view of the parties’ lengthy contractual relationship there is no legitimate reason for having failed to document the fact that the alleged assignment could be set up against resolute. in addition to the absence of such evidence, a reading of these acts of transfer reveals no so-called assignment of contracts. [238] to conclude, the judge did not err in rejecting the three arguments made by hydro-québec and gatineau power. the next question is whether intervention was warranted because of the fact that, after rejecting those three arguments, the judge accepted resolute’s uncontested argument that the 1965 contract had not effected an assignment. b uncontested argument that the 1965 contract did not effect an assignment [239] in my view, the trial judge did not make a palpable and overriding error in accepting resolute’s argument — uncontested before her — that the 1965 contract had not effected an assignment. the evidence in the record supported such a conclusion, and it was entirely justified for her to accept that argument made by resolute. i reiterate that the burden of proof rested not on resolute, but rather on hydro-québec and gatineau power. moreover, even though the judge did not have to undertake a detailed interpretation of the terms of the 1965 contract, whose characterization was not in dispute, i am of the opinion that the parties’ subsequent conduct confirms her conclusion in this regard. (1) subsequent conduct of the parties [240] article 1426 ccq calls for consideration of the parties’ subsequent conduct when interpreting a contract. this rule is based on the following premise: it is assumed that the parties seek to perform their obligations rather than to evade them, and that their conduct until the day a dispute arises is an indicator of their common intention crystallized earlier in their contract (s. grammond, “the interpretation of contracts in civil law” (2010), 52 sclr (2d) 411, at pp. 421-22; s. grammond, “interprétation des contrats”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations (loose-leaf), vol. 1, by p-c. lafond, ed., fasc. 6, at no. 10). [241] the honourable justice sébastien grammond of the federal court has explained that in the case of long-term contracts, like the one at issue here, the parties’ subsequent conduct takes on even greater importance: this method is particularly useful when dealing with long-term contracts, also called “relational contracts”. the more time has elapsed, the more compelling the subsequent conduct of the parties will be as evidence of their original intent. for example, in cases involving long-term commercial leases, a lessor who attempted, several years after the beginning of the lease, to impose additional fees on the lessee based on a new interpretation of the contract, had his prior contrary practice set up against him. [pp. 422-23] (see also f. gendron, l’interprétation des contrats (2nd ed. 2016), at pp. 116-17.) [242] as noted above, the judge relied largely on the facts put before her. in her view, the parties’ subsequent conduct made the argument that there had been an assignment less plausible than the argument that there was a mandate. i agree. [243] first, the judge noted that hydro-québec and gatineau power, on which the burden of proving an assignment rested, had not proved that the [translation] “1965 agreement was ever brought to the attention of [resolute]” (at para. 52), with the result that it was “difficult to pinpoint the exact moment [an] assignment of contract [would have taken] place and [hydro-québec would have become] the contracting party of [resolute] under the 1926 agreement” (para. 53). the trial judge can hardly be faulted for considering the absence of evidence that the formalities for the setting up of an assignment had been observed compliance with these formalities is essential to avoid causing injury to one party when the other contracting party is replaced by another. the absence of such evidence makes it difficult to establish the existence of an assignment. yet there was no evidence clearly showing that a copy or an extract of some act — the 1965 contract, the 1982 contract or the acts of transfer of the power plants in 2005-2006 — had been sent to resolute to comply with the formalities for setting up an assignment against it. hydro-québec and gatineau power were unable to tell the trial judge what would constitute evidence that an assignment had been set up against resolute. [244] it was only before the court of appeal and this court that hydro-québec and gatineau power referred to the 1982 contract as an implicit indication that resolute was aware of an alleged assignment that would have taken place in 1965. even if it is assumed that hydro-québec and gatineau power could raise this new argument on appeal, i am of the view that it would not have sufficed to alter the trial judge’s finding of fact. the relevant passage in the 1982 contract reads as follows: [translation] 4- additional contract power a) the provider already supplies the subscriber with 40,000kw of power, called the original firm power, in accordance with the agreement between gatineau power and canadian international paper company, dated july 19, 1926, as amended on october 1, 1930. b) in addition, the supplier undertakes to supply to the subscriber and the subscriber undertakes to purchase from december 16, 1981 and to use 123,845kw of additional contract power at the rates and on the conditions established in this contract the available additional power that the subscriber may purchase and use under this contract shall not exceed 135,000 kilovolt-amperes without the prior written authorization of the distributor. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. iii, at p 114) [245] this evidence is not very probative. first of all, the 1982 contract refers to the 1926 contract but does not say a single word about the 1965 contract. in the absence of any reference to the act of assignment, it is very difficult to view the 1982 contract as evidence of the setting up of the 1965 contract against resolute. moreover, the 1982 contract is for the supply of electricity in addition to that provided for in the 1926 contract. there is nothing expressly indicating that hydro-québec may have become resolute’s other contracting party under the 1926 contract. the 1982 contract, which, i would add, makes just one reference to the 1926 contract in clause 4a), merely states that hydro-québec is responsible for supplying electricity under that contract the wording of the contract does not exclude the possibility of hydro-québec acting as supplier in its capacity as a mandatary rather than as an assignee finally, the 1982 contract continues to indicate that resolute’s predecessor and gatineau power are the parties to the 1926 contract, as the trial judge in fact noted (paras. 18 and 52). [246] second, gatineau power’s financial statements approved by its directors (s 227 of the business corporations act, cqlr, c. s-31.1), all of whom are appointed by hydro-québec in its capacity as sole shareholder, reflect the existence of a mandate. the following excerpt from the financial statements is enlightening: [translation] note 4 undertakings and contingencies lease of capital assets under a contract in effect since january 1, 1966, hydro-québec undertook to advance to gatineau power company such monies as would be required for it to fulfill all its obligations. in consideration, the company undertook to lease its capital assets and to allow hydro-québec to benefit from the revenue deriving from them for a term of twenty-five years, in exchange for an annual rental in an amount equal to the depreciation on its capital assets, excluding those held by its subsidiaries. this contract was tacitly renewed and remains in effect between the parties [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. iii, at p 48) the content of this note was reproduced in the financial statements for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. [247] the financial statements confirm that gatineau power leases its immovables to hydro-québec and that hydro-québec can operate the facilities and benefit from the revenue deriving from them for the term of the contract. nowhere is it stated that gatineau power assigned its rights to the revenue from the power contracts for a specified term rather, gatineau power simply “allow[ed]” hydro-québec to receive the revenue. [248] third, in 1986, 1996 and 2006, resolute and its predecessors sent notices of renewal of the 1926 contract addressed to [translation] “[gatineau power] c/o hydro-québec” (trial reasons, at para. 20) in the mind of resolute and its predecessors, gatineau power remained their other contracting party and hydro-québec was its mandatary responsible for sending invoices, collecting payment and receiving notices of renewal or any other correspondence intended for gatineau power. at no time did hydro-québec, despite being aware of the 1965 contract, see fit to “correct” this so-called “mistake” made by resolute. [249] fourth, all the invoices sent to resolute by hydro-québec indicated the electricity supplied under the 1926 contract separately from that supplied under the 1982 contract (trial reasons, at para. 52). [250] fifth, a manager from hydro-québec testified that he was not aware that there had been an assignment of the 1926 contract to hydro-québec and that, in his opinion, the 1965 contract had not had that effect although an admission of law concerning the characterization of the 1965 contract was not binding on the superior court, the statements made by hydro-québec’s witness were nonetheless relevant in assessing the common intention of the parties (see uniprix, at para. 29). [251] finally, the fact that hydro-québec did not invoke the price adjustment clause until 2011, even though it had been subject to the taxes or charges since january 1, 2007, contradicts the argument that there was an assignment of contract. [252] as noted by justice grammond, “[t]he more time has elapsed, the more compelling the subsequent conduct of the parties will be as evidence of their original intent.” for example, in skyline holdings inc. v. scarves and allied arts inc., 2000 canlii 9274 (que. ca), the lessor allowed several years to pass before it reinterpreted the leases, on its accountant’s recommendation, in order to charge its lessees administrative fees that had never previously been charged (para. 30) the court of appeal relied on that post-contract conduct to find that the parties had never intended the lessees in question to have to pay such administrative fees (para. 31). [253] in richer v. mutuelle du canada (la), cie d’assurance sur la vie, [1987] rjq 1703 (ca), the lease contained an escalation clause under which the rent could be adjusted to cover increases in municipal taxes and operating costs. for six years, the lessor raised the rent by an amount equal to the tax increase (p 1707). at the end of the sixth year, a new senior manager working for the lessor reinterpreted the rent adjustment clause so that administrative fees of 12 percent could be charged in addition to the amount of the tax increase (pp. 1707-8) in the court of appeal’s view, the parties’ subsequent conduct showed that they had interpreted the clause as permitting only the tax amount to be passed on, without it being possible for administrative fees to be added to that amount and for the lessor to derive a profit from them. the court of appeal therefore rejected that opportunistic interpretation. [254] in the instant case, hydro-québec, which considers itself to be a party to the 1926 contract, allowed nearly five years to pass before it invoked the price adjustment clause indeed, hydro-québec has been paying the taxes or charges provided for in the hqa and the wa since january 2007 yet, it was not until december 1, 2011 that it sent resolute a letter accompanied by an invoice retroactively claiming more than $3 million from resolute for the preceding three years, which were not yet prescribed. that letter bears all the hallmarks of an opportunistic, after-the-fact interpretation of the parties’ legal situation in order to treat it as an assignment that allowed hydro-québec to inflate the price, even though it had originally regarded it as a mandate. [255] the following quotation from rainboth v o’brien (1915), 24 b.r 88 (que.), aptly summarizes the situation that exists here: in regard to such a question, a long period of inaction on the part of a claimant, in circumstances in which inaction tends to confirm the version of his adversary whilst, if his own version were the true one, he would have had reason to have acted and spoken, affords a strong support to the version of the adversary. [pp. 93-94] [256] before turning to the next point, i would note that it is not appropriate to rely on the fact that, in 2011, resolute did not argue initially, in its response to the invoice for more than $3 million, that gatineau power was still its other contracting party (kasirer j.’s reasons, at para. 121). in their agreed statement of admissions, the parties recorded the fact that resolute was not admitting that the 1926 contract bound hydro-québec. as a result, no reliance can be placed on this “failure” by resolute prior to the agreed statement of admissions. (2) judicial contract between the parties [257] in addition to rendering a decision consistent with the evidence in the record, the trial judge cannot be faulted for giving effect to the judicial contract between the parties. i am therefore of the view that she did not make a palpable and overriding error by accepting resolute’s uncontested argument after she rejected the three arguments made by hydro-québec and gatineau power it bears repeating that hydro-québec and gatineau power did not dispute the fact that the 1965 contract had made hydro-québec a mandatary and had not assigned the 1926 power contract. they offered no interpretation of the terms of the 1965 contract that would give it a scope different from that proposed by resolute. in light of the arguments presented at trial by hydro-québec and gatineau power, it is understandable why the judge, in her analysis of the assignment argument, did not consider the terms of the 1965 contract in detail at paras. 44-60 of her reasons but merely referred to it as a “mandate, sale and lease agreement” at paras. 15 and 51, in her description of the factual context. she did so simply because hydro-québec and gatineau power had themselves described the contract as such and had not argued the contrary, even though the burden of proof was on them. [258] only resolute discussed how the terms of the 1965 contract should be interpreted however, it did so to establish that the contract had not effected an assignment, despite the fact that it did not have the burden of proof. hydro-québec and gatineau power, which did have that burden, made no attempt to show the contrary. if they intended to rely on the 1965 contract to show that there had been an assignment to hydro-québec, they had to allege and argue this. they did not do so. rather, their position was that the 1965 contract was a “mandate, sale and lease agreement” and that the assignment had occurred later, in 1982 at the earliest. [259] in such circumstances, it is justified for a trial judge to accept an uncontested argument and not to undertake a needless interpretation exercise to require otherwise would undermine the very foundations of our adversarial system. [260] article 10 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“ccp”), reiterates the adversarial nature of our civil justice system. as a result of this, it is the parties who “control the course of their case”, not the courts (art. 19 para. 1 ccp). not long ago, this court reaffirmed the importance of this principle in our adversarial system: although the power of judges to intervene in the conduct of civil proceedings has become increasingly broad, judges generally do not play an active part in the search for truth (l. ducharme and c-m. panaccio, l’administration de la preuve (4th ed 2010), at p 7; technologie labtronix inc v technologie micro contrôle inc., [1998] rjq 2312 (ca), at p 2325). in an accusatory and adversarial system, the delicate task of bringing the truth to light falls first and foremost to the parties (see art. 2803 ccq; arts. 76 and 77 ccp). in this context in which the objective of seeking the truth remains the priority, the quebec legislature has established general rules of evidence to govern and facilitate this process, which remains under the control of the parties (see l. ducharme, “rapports canadiens — première partie: la vérité et la législation sur la procédure civile en droit québécois”, in travaux de l’association henri capitant des amis de la culture juridique française, vol. 38, la vérité et le droit — journées canadiennes (1987), 657). [emphasis added.] (imperial oil v. jacques, 2014 scc 66, [2014] 3 scr 287, at para. 25) [261] accordingly, the courts cannot base their decisions on arguments or rationales that have not been debated (art. 17 para. 2 ccp; see also compagnie d’assurances générales co-operators v. coop fédérée, 2019 qcca 1678, at para. 46 (canlii), aff’d 2020 scc 41) the principle of proportionality and of proper administration of judicial resources requires nothing less of them (art. 18 ccp). otherwise, if the courts had a mandate to conduct their own inquiry and to consider the arguments that should, in their view, have been raised by the parties, the civil justice system would be turned on its head. the courts would also have to invest considerable resources to redefine the factual and legal debate delineated by the parties to the proceedings. [262] the issues between the parties become joined once both sides have presented their arguments; the judicial contract then reflects the procedural relationship (lien d’instance) between the parties with respect to the questions that are in issue and those that are not in dispute, in accordance with an approach that likens this relationship to a contractual one (h. reid, with s. reid, dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien (5th ed. 2015), at p 152, “contrat judiciaire”; gervais v. association canadienne de protection médicale, 2007 qccs 4564, at para. 33 (canlii)). [263] the trial judge is also bound by this judicial contract (janacek v bell canada, [2001] rjq 584 (ca), at para. 11; godbout v. pagé, 2017 scc 18, [2017] 1 scr 283, at paras. 85-87, per côté j., dissenting; d. ferland and b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (5th ed. 2015), vol. 1, at no. 1-83). this means that the judge cannot disregard the contract and rule on a ground or an argument that is not in issue: [translation] the procedural legal relationship is that of the parties. the hearing is conducted by the parties. the factual and legal grounds are raised by the parties. it is on the basis of the parties’ respective arguments that the trial judge must decide. (droit de la famille — 871, [1990] rjq 2107 (ca), at p 2108) [264] this holds true even when the judicial contract relates to a question of law, unless it is a matter of public order that would allow the judge to go beyond the parties’ consent (janacek, at para. 11). although an admission of law is not, strictly speaking, binding on the courts, they must nonetheless take note of a party’s decision not to contest, and thus to acknowledge, the existence of a legal situation. such an approach preserves the essence of our adversarial system, as noted by duval hesler ja (as she then was) of the quebec court of appeal: our judicial system is an adversarial one and the initiative of adopting a position, leading evidence and choosing arguments rests on the parties. in addition, it is debatable whether admissions made in first instance can be revoked in appeal. and while it is true that the law itself cannot be the object of an admission, nothing prevents a party from acknowledging the existence of a legal situation and limiting the debate before the court to the consequences that flow from that situation. [emphasis added.] (apple canada inc. v. st-germain, 2010 qcca 1376, [2010] rjq 1627, at paras. 138 and 142; see also sunoco inc. v. église vie et réveil inc., les ministères d’alberto carbone, 2002 canlii 62388 (que. ca), at para. 6.) [265] the judicial contract therefore forms the basis of our adversarial system, since it determines the task given to the judge in his or her search for judicial truth. the truth that the trial judge must seek to ascertain lies somewhere between the two competing versions given by the opposing parties; it does not lie in the aspects that are not disputed by either side: [translation] the adversary principle is essential to procedure, as it is a principle of public order without the opposition between the respective claims of the two parties, the case could not exist or be tried. from this constructive dialectic emerges the truth, the most just result for the judge. through the clash of the competing versions presented by the parties, the judge is supposed to perceive, at least symbolically, the manner in which the law must resolve the case, and the judge understands how the law applies to the situation at hand. essentially, the judge chooses how to make good and fair use of the law. [emphasis added.] (c. piché, “le ‘dialogue’ des parties et la vérité plurielle comme nouveau paradigme de la procédure civile québécoise” (2017), 62 mcgill lj 901, at p 917) indeed, it is the “parties [who] are in charge of establishing the truth” and who “control how that truth is brought to light” (p 920). subject to public order, the judge’s task is primarily to look where the parties ask him or her to look — not elsewhere. although the more active role played by judges under modern civil procedure allows them to manage cases in a sound and proportionate manner, these powers do not permit them to reframe the debate (p 920). [266] it is important to note that the role of a court that has to render a declaratory judgment is limited to resolving a “genuine problem” between the parties with respect to the scope of a specific juridical act; the court must therefore take care to remain within the defined parameters of the debate before it so as to avoid prejudicing the future legal arguments raised by the parties or the interests of third persons who are not parties to the proceeding (art. 142 ccp;. lizotte v. aviva, compagnie d’assurance du canada, 2015 qcca 152, at paras. 35-36 (canlii), aff’d 2016 scc 52, [2016] 2 scr 521; see also 4077334 canada inc. (solutions voysis ip) v. sigmasanté, 2013 qccs 2859, at para. 18 (canlii)). [267] as i have already stated, it was hydro-québec and gatineau power that bore the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that there had been an assignment of the 1926 contract that had purportedly added or substituted hydro-québec as a contracting party. if they failed to discharge their burden, the 1926 contract had to be applied as written, that is, as being only between the parties named in that contract — gatineau power and resolute, in its capacity as cip’s successor. there is no justification for finding that a party has discharged its burden on the basis of a contrary argument that the party has not contested. if the judge had held otherwise, she would in fact have been shifting the burden of proof to resolute. [268] the core of the issue forming the judicial contract between the parties had to do with the assignment at one of the three suggested points in time. the window of time in question was therefore the period from 1982 to 2005-2006 the parties’ procedural relationship did not encompass the characterization of the 1965 contract. the trial judge focused her analysis on the core of that issue. after she rejected the arguments of hydro-québec and gatineau power, all that remained was resolute’s uncontested argument that the 1965 contract had not effected an assignment either. in her view, that legal situation was confirmed by the absence of evidence of the setting up of an assignment against resolute (para. 52). moreover, the evidence in the record concerning the parties’ subsequent conduct did not permit her to depart from that conclusion, as discussed above. indeed, the absence of evidence of the setting up of an assignment against resolute was in addition to the financial statements making no reference to any assignment, the notices of renewal all addressed to gatineau power, the invoices indicating the electricity supplied under the 1926 contract separately from that supplied under the 1982 contract, the testimony of a hydro-québec manager confirming that there had been no assignment, and the opportunistic reinterpretation of the parties’ legal situation in order to treat it as an assignment rather than a mandate. all of this taken together made the argument that there was a mandate more plausible than the argument that there had been an assignment. [269] for all these reasons, i cannot find that the trial judge made any reviewable error whatsoever. her conclusion that there had been no assignment and that the 1965 contract had made hydro-québec a mandatary of gatineau power for the purposes of the 1926 contract should have been left undisturbed. with respect, i am of the view that the court of appeal should not have intervened. [270] the foregoing is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. my colleague makes a detailed analysis of the 1965 contract and concludes that it was a contract of assignment — even though hydro-québec and gatineau power never took that position at trial, as they themselves identified the 1965 contract as a “mandate, sale and lease agreement” and did not dispute the characterization proposed by resolute to the same effect. for all these reasons, i do not think it is appropriate for me to engage in an exercise that was not fully before the trial judge. vii adjustment in the price of electricity [271] status as a party to the 1926 contract is what makes it possible to invoke the price adjustment clause in order to pass on any “tax” or “charge” paid in other words, hydro-québec can increase the price of the electricity supplied to resolute only if it is a party to the 1926 contract. [272] however, hydro-québec is not a party to the 1926 contract, as it simply has a mandate to supply the electricity owed under that contract and to receive payments from resolute, the customer. since the trial judge did not make a reviewable error in finding that the 1926 contract had not been assigned to hydro-québec, gatineau power did not transfer its status as a party to that contract to hydro-québec. [273] only gatineau power and resolute are parties to the 1926 contract. relativity of contract means that the 1926 contract has “effect only between the contracting parties” and that “it does not affect third persons”. this is a fundamental principle of contract law to which there are only very limited exceptions. however, none of the exceptions applies here the relativity of the 1926 contract therefore prevents hydro-québec from invoking the price adjustment clause to pass on the charges it paid under the hqa and the wa. [274] if gatineau power had paid the charges itself, it would not, in any event, have been able to pass them on to resolute. to be able to pass on the charges, gatineau power would have had to be legally bound to pay them. however, it was not bound to pay them during the period at issue, for the following reasons. the essential condition for being subject to the charges provided for in s 32 hqa and s 68 wa is being a holder of water power the respondents are claiming the price increase for 2009 to 2011, but during that time it was hydro-québec that held the water power that formerly belonged to gatineau power. hydro-québec has been the holder of that power since 1965, first in its capacity as lessee under the 1965 contract and then, as of 2005-2006, in its capacity as owner under the acts of transfer it entered into with gatineau power. [275] in the alternative, even if it were to be found that there was an assignment, i am of the opinion that resolute would not be required to pay either the charge under s 32 hqa or the one under s 68 wa. [276] in the case of the charge under s 32 hqa, hydro-québec could not pass it on to resolute because hydro-québec is not legally bound to pay it. section 32 of the hqa sets out four conditions for this charge to be payable: (1) the water power forms part of the public domain; (2) the minister of natural resources and wildlife or the minister of sustainable development, environment and parks has placed the water power at hydro-québec’s disposal; (3) the government has authorized the water power to be placed at hydro-québec’s disposal; and (4) the water power is required for the objects of hydro-québec. however, the second and third conditions are not met. the water power in question was not placed at hydro-québec’s disposal by one of the two ministers, since all of it was acquired from gatineau power without their involvement. as well, the respondents have conceded that no government authorization was granted with regard to the water power in question. [277] if, as i said, it were to be found that there was an assignment, the charge under s 68 wa could be claimed by hydro-québec only as of december 17, 2012 — the day on which resolute first received a copy of the 1965 contract. this is because the assignment could not be set up against resolute unless hydro-québec observed the formalities provided for by law for that purpose (art. 1571 cclc; art. 1641 ccq). however, resolute did not become aware of a potential assignment until december 17, 2012, when hydro-québec sent it a copy of the 1965 contract as an attachment to its defence. [278] furthermore, if there had been an assignment, its effect would not, however, have been to render resolute’s obligations more onerous, because gatineau power was bound to pay the charge under s 68 wa between its introduction in 1946 and the alleged assignment taking effect on january 1, 1966, as resolute concedes. prior to the assignment, gatineau power would have been entitled to pass on that charge as long as it actually paid it, which the record does not show if there had been an assignment, resolute’s obligations would therefore have remained unchanged with regard to the charge provided for in s 68 wa. viii conclusion [279] for the reasons stated above, i would allow the appeal and restore the trial judge’s decision.
i. introduction la cour — i. introduction [1] a number of attempts to develop and implement a national system for the regulation of canadian cap- ital markets in a manner that is compatible with the country’s federal structure have been made since the 1930s. at issue in these appeals is the constitution- ality of a recent proposal by the federal government and the governments of ontario, british columbia, saskatchewan, new brunswick, prince edward island and yukon to implement a national coopera- tive capital markets regulatory system (“cooperative system”). [2] the structure of the cooperative system builds on the guidance provided by this court in reference re securities act, 2011 scc 66, [2011] 3 scr 837. its main components include a model provincial and territorial statute known as the capital markets act (“model provincial act”) that deals primarily with the day-to- day aspects of the securities trade, a fed- eral statute known as the capital markets sta bility act (“draft federal act”) that is aimed at preventing and managing systemic risk and which establishes criminal offences relating to financial markets, and a national securities regulator that is to be overseen by the federal minister of finance and the ministers responsible for capital markets regulation in the par- ticipating provinces1 (“authority”). [1] plusieurs initiatives ont été entreprises pour éla- borer et mettre en place un régime national de régle- mentation des marchés de capitaux canadiens d’une manière qui est compatible avec la structure fédérale du pays depuis les années 1930. les présents pourvois portent sur la constitutionnalité d’une récente proposi- tion par le gouvernement fédéral et les gouvernements de l’ontario, de la colombie- britannique, de la sas- katchewan, du nouveau- brunswick, de l’île-du- prince- édouard et du yukon concernant la mise en place d’un régime coopératif national de réglementation des mar- chés de capitaux (« régime coopératif »). [2] la structure du régime coopératif s’appuie sur les enseignements de la cour suprême du canada dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobi‑ lières, 2011 csc 66, [2011] 3 rcs 837. ses princi- pales composantes comprennent une loi provinciale et territoriale type intitulée loi sur les marchés des capitaux (« loi provinciale type ») portant principa- lement sur les aspects courants du commerce des valeurs mobilières, une loi fédérale intitulée loi sur la stabilité des marchés des capitaux (« ébauche de la loi fédérale ») visant la prévention et la gestion du risque systémique et créant des infractions crimi- nelles relatives aux marchés financiers, ainsi qu’un organisme national de réglementation des valeurs mobilières qui serait surveillé par le ministre fédéral des finances et les ministres responsables de la ré- glementation des marchés de capitaux des provinces participantes1 (« autorité »). [3] on july 15, 2015, the government of quebec referred two questions pertaining to the cooperative system to the quebec court of appeal: [3] le 15 juillet 2015, le gouvernement du québec soumettait à la cour d’appel du québec deux ques- tions relativement au régime coopératif : 1 does the constitution of canada authorize the im- plementation of pan- canadian securities regulation under the authority of a single regulator, according to the model established by the most recent publication 1 la constitution du canada autorise-t-elle la mise en place d’une réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières sous la gouverne d’un organisme unique selon le modèle prévu par la plus récente publication du 1 in these reasons, references to “provinces” participating in the cooperative system include participating territories. 1 dans les présents motifs, la mention des « provinces » participant au régime coopératif vaut également mention des territoires participants. 202 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. of the “memorandum of agreement regarding the cooperative capital markets regulatory system”? « protocole d’accord concernant le régime coopératif de réglementation des marchés des capitaux »? 2 does the most recent version of the draft of the federal “capital markets stability act” exceed the authority of the parliament of canada over the general branch of the trade and commerce power under subsection 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867? 2 la plus récente version de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale intitulée « loi sur la stabilité des marchés des capi- taux » excède-t-elle la compétence du parlement du canada sur le commerce selon le paragraphe 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867? [4] a majority of the quebec court of appeal (the “majority”) answered both questions in the nega- tive. in response to the first question, the majority concluded that the cooperative system was uncon- stitutional for two reasons: (a) because the process for amending the model provincial act effectively fetters the sovereignty of the respective participat- ing provinces’ legislatures and (b) because the pro- cess for making federal regulations is inconsistent with the principle of federalism. as to the second question, the majority held that the draft federal act is within parliament’s jurisdiction over the gen- eral branch of the trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867, but took issue with the provisions of the draft federal act (ss. 76 to 79) that pertain to the making of federal regulations. in the majority’s opinion, the provisions in question, if not removed, render the entire draft federal act unconstitutional. [5] the dissenting judge would have declined to answer the first question. in his view, it is not for courts to rule on the constitutional validity of in- tergovernmental agreements that are of a political nature and lack the force of law. had the first ques- tion been limited to the two draft statutes, however, he would have answered in the affirmative; he saw no issues pertaining either to the delegation of law- making authority or to the principle of parliamen- tary sovereignty. turning to the second question, the dissenting judge agreed with the majority that the draft federal act fell within the general branch of parliament’s trade and commerce power, but found nothing problematic about the manner by which federal regulations were to be made under ss. 76 to 79 of the draft federal act. [4] les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel du québec (les « juges majoritaires ») ont répondu aux deux questions par la négative. en réponse à la pre- mière question, ils ont conclu que le régime coopératif était inconstitutionnel pour deux raisons : a) parce que le processus de modification de la loi provinciale type entrave effectivement la souveraineté respective des législatures des provinces participantes; et b) parce que le processus de prise des règlements fédéraux est incompatible avec le principe du fédéralisme. quant à la seconde question, les juges majoritaires ont sta- tué que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale relève du volet gé- néral de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce prévue au par. 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, mais ont critiqué les dis- positions de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale (art. 76 à 79) qui portent sur la prise des règlements fédéraux. selon les juges majoritaires, si elles ne sont pas retirées, ces dispositions rendent l’ensemble de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale inconstitutionnelle. [5] le juge dissident aurait refusé de répondre à la première question. à son avis, il n’appartient pas aux tribunaux de se prononcer sur la validité constitutionnelle d’accords intergouvernementaux qui sont de nature politique et qui n’ont pas force de loi. cependant, si la première question s’était limitée aux deux projets de loi, il y aurait répondu par l’af- firmative; il n’a relevé aucun problème relativement à la délégation du pouvoir de légiférer ou au principe de la souveraineté parlementaire. en ce qui concerne la seconde question, le juge dissident s’est dit en accord avec les juges majoritaires, selon lesquels l’ébauche de la loi fédérale relevait du volet général de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce. il a conclu cependant qu’il n’y a rien de problématique dans la façon dont les règlements fédéraux doivent être pris sous le régime des art. 76 à 79 de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale. [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 203 [6] the attorney general of canada appeals the quebec court of appeal’s opinion on both ques- tions. the attorney general of british columbia appeals only the opinion on the first question, while the attorney general of quebec appeals only the opinion on the second question. [7] for the reasons that follow, the attorney gen- eral of canada’s appeal is allowed, the attorney general of british columbia’s appeal is allowed, and the attorney general of quebec’s appeal is dis- missed. with respect to the first question posed by the reference, we find that the cooperative system does not improperly fetter the legislatures’ sover- eignty, nor does it entail an impermissible delegation of law- making authority. we therefore answer that question in the affirmative. as to the second question, we answer it in the negative: our view is that the sub- ject matter of the draft federal act falls within the general branch of parliament’s trade and commerce power pursuant to s. 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867. [6] le procureur général du canada porte en appel l’avis de la cour d’appel du québec quant aux deux questions. le procureur général de la colombie- britannique interjette appel de l’avis concernant la première question seulement, tandis que l’appel de la procureure générale du québec se limite à l’avis relatif à la seconde question. [7] pour les motifs qui suivent, le pourvoi du procu- reur général du canada est accueilli, tout comme ce- lui du procureur général de la colombie- britannique, et le pourvoi de la procureure générale du québec est rejeté. en ce qui concerne la première question posée par le renvoi, nous concluons que le régime coopératif n’entrave pas indûment la souveraineté des législatures, pas plus qu’il ne comporte une dé- légation inacceptable du pouvoir de légiférer. nous y répondons par l’affirmative. quant à la seconde question, nous sommes d’avis d’y répondre par la né- gative : nous estimons que l’objet de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale relève du volet général de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce conférée par le par. 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. ii background ii contexte [8] canada is one of the only industrialized coun- tries in the world that does not have a national se- curities regulator. this is largely attributable to the constitutional division of provincial and federal pow- ers as set out in part vi of the constitution act, 1867. as a result of their jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)) and matters of a merely local nature (s. 92(16)), the provincial legislatures — and not parliament — have the authority to legislate in respect of the securities trade within their respective borders. the result is a nationwide patchwork of provincial regulatory schemes and the absence of a truly national approach to regulating capital markets. [8] le canada est l’un des seuls pays industrialisés au monde à ne pas avoir d’organisme national de ré- glementation des valeurs mobilières. cette situation est en grande partie attribuable au partage constitu- tionnel des compétences fédérales et provinciales établi à la partie vi de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. puisqu’elles ont compétence sur la propriété et les droits civils (par. 92(13)) et sur les matières d’une nature purement locale (par. 92(16)), les législatures provinciales — et non le parlement — ont le pouvoir de légiférer en matière de commerce des valeurs mobilières à l’intérieur de leurs frontières respec- tives. il en résulte un ensemble disparate de régimes provinciaux de réglementation à l’échelle du pays et l’absence d’une véritable approche nationale pour la réglementation des marchés de capitaux. [9] in spite of this constitutional impediment, however, various attempts to centralize or stand- ardize the regulation of securities in canada have been made for over 80 years (see: d. johnston, k. [9] toutefois, malgré cet obstacle constitutionnel, diverses tentatives en vue de centraliser et d’uni- formiser la réglementation des valeurs mobilières ont été faites au canada depuis plus de 80 ans : voir 204 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. doyle rockwell and c. ford, canadian securities regulation (5th ed. 2014), at pp 634-62). although proposals aimed at establishing a national securities regulator have not succeeded, certain interprovincial initiatives aimed at coordinating regulatory functions have. these include the adoption by some provincial securities commissions of various national and mul- tilateral instruments (which are standardized rules and regulations respecting specific aspects of the securities trade), as well as the implementation of the “passport regime”, which allows market partic- ipants to have access to the capital markets of other participating jurisdictions while dealing with a single principal regulator and complying with harmonized legislative provisions (johnston et al., at pp 91-94). detailed discussions about the impetus behind and response to the various proposals and initiatives that have been put forward over the past several decades can be found elsewhere (see: reference re securities act, at paras. 11-28; a. d. harris, white paper — a symposium on canadian securities regulation: harmonization or neutralization? (2002); johnston et al., at pp 634-62). d. johnston, k. doyle rockwell et c. ford, cana‑ dian securities regulation (5e éd. 2014), p. 634- 662. même si les propositions visant à établir un organisme national de réglementation ont échoué, certaines initiatives interprovinciales ayant pour ob- jectif de coordonner les fonctions de réglementation ont réussi. ces initiatives comprennent l’adoption par certaines commissions provinciales des valeurs mobilières de divers documents nationaux et multi- latéraux (qui constituent des règlements uniformisés concernant certains aspects du commerce des valeurs mobilières) ainsi que la mise en place du « régime de passeport », qui permet aux acteurs du marché d’ac- céder aux marchés de capitaux des autres provinces participantes, et ce, sous l’autorité d’un organisme de réglementation unique et en se conformant à des dispositions législatives harmonisées : johnston et autres, p 91-94. des analyses détaillées de la raison d’être des différentes propositions et initiatives pré- sentées au cours des dernières décennies, et des ré- ponses qu’elles ont suscitées, peuvent être consultées ailleurs : voir renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 11-28; a d harris,. white paper — a symposium on canadian securities regulation : harmonization or neutralization? (2002); johnston et autres, p. 634- 662. a reference re securities act (2011) a le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobi‑ [10] in 2009, the federal government responded to recommendations from a body known as the expert panel on securities regulation by preparing draft federal legislation, the proposed canadian secu‑ rities act, order in council pc 2010- 667, which would establish a national scheme for the regula- tion of capital markets under the oversight of a na- tional securities regulator. the stated purposes of the proposed canadian securities act were “to provide protection to investors” (s. 9(a)), “foster fair, efficient and competitive capital markets” (s. 9(b)) and “con- tribute    to the integrity and stability of [canada’s] financial system” (s 9(c)). lières (2011) [10] en 2009, le gouvernement fédéral donnait suite aux recommandations d’une entité connue sous le nom de groupe d’experts sur la réglementation des valeurs mobilières en préparant une ébauche de loi fédérale — la proposition concernant une loi canadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières, décret cp 2010- 667 — qui visait la création d’un régime national de réglementation des marchés de capitaux sous la surveillance d’un organisme na- tional de réglementation des valeurs mobilières. la proposition concernant une loi canadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières avait pour objets de « protéger les investisseurs » (al. 9a)), de « favoriser des marchés des capitaux justes, efficaces et compé- titifs » (al. 9b)) et de « contribuer [  ] à l’intégrité et à la stabilité du système financier [du canada] » (al 9c)). [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 205 [11] the proposed canadian securities act was designed to regulate all aspects of capital markets, and it therefore dealt in large part with the day-to- day aspects of the trade in securities (like registration requirements, prospectus filings and disclosure obli- gations). although much of this scheme overlapped with provincial securities laws, it also contained pro- visions for the regulation of systemic risk in capital markets — risk that represents a threat to the stability of the country’s economy. it is important to note, as well, that this proposed national regulatory scheme was not intended to immediately displace provin- cial securities legislation once the federal legisla- tion was enacted by parliament. rather, the scheme was designed to function on an “opt-in” basis, each province retaining the right to choose whether to par- ticipate in the scheme or instead to keep its existing regulatory framework in place. [12] the constitutionality of the proposed cana‑ dian securities act was at issue before this court in reference re securities act. specifically, the federal government sought from this court an advisory opin- ion as to whether the enactment of the proposed ca‑ nadian securities act, which this court described as “a comprehensive foray by parliament into the realm of securities regulation” (para. 2), would constitute a valid exercise of parliament’s power over trade and commerce pursuant to s. 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867. [11] la proposition concernant une loi cana‑ dienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières a été conçue de manière à réglementer tous les as- pects des marchés de capitaux et portait donc, dans une large mesure, sur les aspects courants du com- merce des valeurs mobilières (comme les exigences concernant l’inscription, le dépôt des prospectus et les exigences relatives à la communication de renseignements) même si une grande partie du régime chevauchait les lois provinciales sur les va- leurs mobilières, il contenait également des dispo- sitions sur la réglementation du risque systémique lié aux marchés de capitaux — risque qui constitue une menace pour la stabilité de l’économie cana- dienne. il importe également de souligner que le régime national de réglementation proposé n’était pas censé remplacer immédiatement la législation provinciale sur les valeurs mobilières une fois la loi fédérale adoptée par le parlement. le régime devait plutôt fonctionner sur la base d’une « participation volontaire  », chaque province pouvant toujours choisir d’y participer ou de conserver son cadre de réglementation existant. [12] la constitutionnalité de la proposition concer‑ nant une loi canadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières était en cause devant notre cour dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières. plus précisément, le gouvernement fédéral sollicitait l’avis consultatif de la cour sur la question de savoir si l’adoption de la proposition concernant une loi ca‑ nadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières — que la cour a décrite comme « une intrusion massive par le parlement dans le domaine de la réglementa- tion des valeurs mobilières » (par. 2) — constituerait un exercice valide de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce conférée par le par. 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. [13] this court unanimously held that it would not, and rejected the federal government’s argument that the securities market had “evolved from a provincial matter to a national matter affecting the country as a whole” (para 4). having determined that the main thrust of the proposed canadian securities act was to regulate on an exclusive basis all aspects of the trade in securities in canada, this court went on to conclude that the constitutionality of the draft statute [13] la cour a statué, à l’unanimité, que ce n’était pas le cas, et a rejeté l’argument du gouvernement fédéral selon lequel le marché des valeurs mobi- lières avait « évolué, passant d’une matière provin- ciale à une matière nationale touchant l’ensemble du pays » : par 4. après avoir établi que l’objet principal de la proposition concernant une loi canadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières consistait à réglementer, à titre exclusif, tous les aspects du 206 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. could not be supported by parliament’s general trade and commerce power. [14] this court analyzed the s. 91(2) issue in ac- cordance with the five indicia set out in general motors of canada ltd. v. city national leasing, [1989] 1 scr 641, and based its conclusion on the final three indicia: (a) the detailed regulation of capital markets is not a matter that engages trade as a whole, but instead relates to the securities trade in particular; (b) the provinces have the constitutional capacity to legislate in respect of most matters cov- ered by the proposed canadian securities act and can delegate regulatory powers to a single national securities regulator if they so choose; and (c) the successful operation of this regulatory scheme would not be jeopardized should any one province decline to participate, especially given that this proposed scheme would function on an “opt-in” basis. in the end, this court held that “the day-to- day regulation of all aspects of trading in securities and the conduct of those engaged in this field of activity    simply cannot be described as a matter that is truly national in importance and scope making it qualitatively different from provincial concerns” (reference re securities act, at para 125). [15] although this court found that legislation purporting to regulate all aspects of the trade in se- curities was outside parliament’s sphere of legislative authority, it acknowledged that certain aspects of securities regulation may nevertheless fall within the federal sphere of jurisdiction, including the preven- tion and management of systemic risk in canadian capital markets. indeed, it is clear from this court’s reasons that the preservation of capital markets and the maintenance of canada’s economic stability are matters that are beyond provincial concern, and therefore fall within parliament’s jurisdiction over trade and commerce. commerce des valeurs mobilières au canada, la cour a conclu que la constitutionnalité du projet de loi ne pouvait trouver appui dans la compétence générale du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce. [14] la cour a analysé la question du par. 91(2) conformément aux cinq critères établis dans l’arrêt general motors of canada ltd. c. city national leasing, [1989] 1  rcs  641, et a conclu sur la base des trois derniers critères : a) la réglementation détaillée des marchés de capitaux n’est pas une ques- tion qui met en jeu le commerce dans son ensemble, mais concerne plutôt le commerce des valeurs mo- bilières en particulier; b) les provinces disposent du pouvoir constitutionnel de légiférer sur la plupart des matières visées par la proposition concernant une loi canadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières et peuvent déléguer leurs pouvoirs de réglementation à un seul organisme national de réglementation des valeurs mobilières si elles le souhaitent; et c) l’ap- plication du régime de réglementation ne serait pas compromise si une province refusait d’y partici- per, d’autant plus que le régime proposé fonction- nerait sur la base d’une « participation volontaire ». ultimement, la cour a conclu que « la réglementa- tion courante de tous les aspects du commerce des valeurs mobilières et de la conduite des participants à ce secteur d’activités [  ] ne peut tout simplement pas constituer un enjeu d’importance et de portée véritablement nationales qui le rend différent, sur le plan qualitatif, des enjeux provinciaux » : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par 125. [15] bien que la cour ait conclu qu’une loi dont l’objectif était de réglementer tous les aspects du commerce des valeurs mobilières ne relevait pas de la compétence législative du parlement, elle a re- connu que certains aspects de la réglementation des valeurs mobilières pouvaient néanmoins relever de la compétence fédérale, notamment la prévention et la gestion du risque systémique lié aux marchés de capitaux canadiens. en effet, il ressort clairement des motifs de la cour que la préservation des marchés de capitaux et le maintien de la stabilité économique du canada sont des questions qui vont au- delà des enjeux provinciaux et, par conséquent, relèveraient de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce. [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 207 b securities regulation and cooperative feder‑ b la réglementation des valeurs mobilières et le alism fédéralisme coopératif [16] while it is true that this court found the proposed canadian securities act to be unconstitu- tional, it nevertheless recognized that a scheme based on a cooperative approach to the regulation of secu- rities in canada — one under which the provinces would address issues falling within their powers over property and civil rights and matters of a local nature while also leaving room for parliament to address genuinely national concerns — might be constitu- tional (reference re securities act, at paras. 130-33; see also para 9). given that the attorneys general of canada and british columbia, as well as several of the interveners, submit that the cooperative system follows this cooperative approach, a word about co- operative federalism is in order here. [17] cooperative federalism is an interpretative aid that is used when “interpreting constitutional texts to consider how different interpretations impact the balance between federal and provincial interests” (r v. comeau, 2018 scc 15, [2018] 1 scr 342, para 78). where possible, courts should favour a harmonious reading of statutes enacted by the fed- eral and provincial governments which allows for them to operate concurrently (rogers communi‑ cations inc. v. chateauguay (city), 2016 scc 23, [2016] 1 scr 467, at para 38). this principle is based on the presumption that “parliament intends its laws to co- exist with provincial laws” (alberta (attorney general) v. moloney, 2015 scc 51, [2015] 3 scr 327, at para 27). [16] s’il est vrai que la cour a jugé inconstitution- nelle la proposition concernant une loi canadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières, elle a tout de même reconnu qu’un régime fondé sur une approche coopérative en matière de réglementation des valeurs mobilières au canada — régime suivant lequel les provinces se chargeraient des questions relevant de leur compétence sur la propriété et les droits civils et les matières d’une nature locale tout en permettant au parlement de s’occuper des enjeux d’une nature véritablement nationale — pourrait être constitution- nel : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 130- 133; voir aussi par 9. étant donné que les procureurs généraux du canada et de la colombie- britannique, ainsi que plusieurs des intervenants, soutiennent que le régime coopératif s’inscrit dans cette approche coopérative, il convient ici de dire quelques mots sur le fédéralisme coopératif. [17] le fédéralisme coopératif est un outil d’in- terprétation utilisé pour interpréter «  des textes constitutionnels [de manière à tenir] compte des répercussions des différentes interprétations sur l’équilibre entre les intérêts du fédéral et ceux des provinces » : r c. comeau, 2018 csc 15, [2018] 1 rcs 342, par 78. dans la mesure du possible, les tribunaux doivent favoriser une interprétation cohérente des lois fédérales et provinciales de ma- nière à permettre qu’elles s’appliquent concurrem- ment : rogers communications inc. c. châteauguay (ville), 2016 csc 23, [2016] 1 rcs 467, par 38. ce principe relève de la présomption selon laquelle « le parlement a voulu que ses lois coexistent avec les lois provinciales » : alberta (procureur général) c. moloney, 2015 csc 51, [2015] 3 rcs 327, par 27. [18] cooperative federalism is often applied “to facilitate interlocking federal and provincial legis- lative schemes and to avoid unnecessary constraints on provincial legislative action” (quebec (attorney general) v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 14, [2015] 1 scr 693, at paras 17-19). broadly speaking, it “accommodates overlapping jurisdiction and encourages intergovernmental cooperation”, and therefore discourages courts from interfering with [18] on a souvent recours au fédéralisme coopé- ratif « pour faciliter l’intégration des régimes légis- latifs fédéra[l] et provinciaux et éviter l’imposition de contraintes inutiles aux interventions législatives provinciales » : québec (procureur général) c. ca‑ nada (procureur général), 2015 csc 14, [2015] 1 rcs 693, par 17-19. de façon générale, il « permet le chevauchement des compétences et [  ] encourage la coopération intergouvernementale » et décourage 208 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. cooperative regulatory schemes so long as they are not incompatible with the boundaries dictated by the constitution act, 1867 (reference re securities act, at para. 57, citing opseu v. ontario (attorney general), [1987] 2 scr 2, at p. 18; canada (at‑ torney general) v. phs community services society, 2011 scc 44, [2011] 3 scr 134, at para. 63; ref‑ erence re securities act, at paras 61-62). we stress that cooperative federalism may be used neither to “override nor [to] modify the division of powers it- self” (rogers communications inc. v. chateauguay (city), at para. 39), nor to impose “limits on the otherwise valid exercise of legislative competence” (quebec (attorney general) v. canada (attorney general), at para. 19; reference re securities act, at paras 61-62). it cannot, therefore, be used to make ultra vires legislation intra vires. by fostering co- operation between parliament and the legislatures within the existing constitutional boundaries, how- ever, cooperative federalism works to support, rather than supplant, the division of legislative powers (see: canadian western bank v. alberta, 2007 scc 22, [2007] 2 scr 3, at para 22). [19] this modern view of federalism sees part vi of the constitution act, 1867 as a set of boundaries within which provinces and the federal government are free to give full effect to “canadian federalism’s constitutional creativity and cooperative flexibility” (fédération des producteurs de volailles du québec v. pelland, 2005 scc 20, [2005] 1 scr 292, at para 15). in short, cooperative federalism allows “different levels of government [to] work together on the ground to leverage their unique constitutional powers in tandem to establish a regulatory regime that may be ultra vires the jurisdiction of one legis- lature on its own” (comeau, at para 87). [20] among the issues in the present case is whether the cooperative system is consistent with this cooperative approach to the constitutional divi- sion of federal and provincial powers. par conséquent l’ingérence des tribunaux dans les ré- gimes de réglementation coopératifs tant que ceux-ci ne sont pas incompatibles avec les limites dictées par la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ni ne les modifient : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 57, citant sefpo c. onta rio (procureur géné‑ ral), [1987] 2 rcs 2, p. 18; ca nada (procureur général) c. phs community services society, 2011 csc 44, [2011] 3 rcs 134, par. 63; renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par 61-62. nous tenons à souligner que le fédéralisme coopératif ne peut servir « ni [à] l’emporter sur le partage [des compétences] lui- même ni [à] le modifier » (rogers communications inc. c. châteauguay (ville), par. 39), pas plus qu’il ne peut imposer « des limites à l’exer- cice par ailleurs valide d’une compétence législative » (québec (procureur général) c. canada (procureur général), par. 19; renvoi relatif à la loi sur les va‑ leurs mobilières, par 61-62). il ne peut donc servir à rendre intra vires une loi ultra vires. en favorisant la coopération entre le parlement et les législatures à l’intérieur des limites constitutionnelles existantes, le fédéralisme coopératif appuie le partage des com- pétences législatives au lieu de le supplanter : voir banque canadienne de l’ouest c. alberta, 2007 csc 22, [2007] 2 rcs 3, par 22. [19] selon cette vision moderne du fédéralisme, la partie vi de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 consti- tue un ensemble de limites à l’intérieur desquelles les provinces et le gouvernement fédéral sont libres de donner pleinement effet à « la créativité consti- tutionnelle et [à] la souplesse coopérative du fédé- ralisme canadien » : fédération des producteurs de volailles du québec c. pelland, 2005 csc 20, [2005] 1 rcs 292, par 15. en somme, le fédéralisme coo- pératif permet à « différents ordres de gouvernement [de travailler] de concert au départ pour tirer parti en tandem des pouvoirs constitutionnels qui leur sont propres afin d’établir un régime réglementaire qui pourrait outrepasser la compétence d’une assemblée législative à elle seule » : comeau, par 87. [20] parmi les questions en litige en l’espèce, il y a celle de savoir si le régime coopératif est compa- tible avec cette approche coopérative en matière de partage constitutionnel des compétences fédérales et provinciales. [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 209 c the cooperative system c le régime coopératif [21] the framework of the cooperative system is set out in an agreement between the federal gov- ernment and the governments of ontario, british columbia, saskatchewan, new brunswick, prince edward island and yukon (together the “participating jurisdictions”) which is known as the “memoran- dum of agreement regarding the cooperative capital markets regulatory scheme” (“memorandum”). this system has four primary components, which are as follows: (1) uniform provincial and territorial legislation: the cooperative system’s first component in- volves the standardization of provincial and territorial legislation respecting the day-to- day aspects of the securities trade. to this end, the memorandum provides that each participating province is to enact a statute that mirrors the model provincial act. the model provincial act purports to address all matters respecting capital markets that fall within provincial or territorial jurisdiction (memorandum, s. 3(a)(i)), includ- ing the registration of dealers and certain other market participants, prospectus requirements, disclosure and proxies, takeover and issuer bids, derivatives trading, and civil liability. impor- tantly, the model provincial act does not have legal force within any participating province unless the province’s legislature enacts it into law. (2) complementary federal legislation: the uni- form provincial and territorial securities legisla- tion is to be complemented by a federal statute, that is, the draft federal act. the draft federal act is more limited in scope, as it addresses only criminal matters, matters relating to systemic risk in canada’s capital markets, and national data collection (memorandum, s 3(a)(ii)). the federal government undertakes to seek the en- actment by parliament of legislation that mirrors this draft statute (s 83). [21] le cadre du régime coopératif est établi dans un accord entre le gouvernement fédéral et les gou- vernements de l’ontario, de la colombie- britannique, de la saskatchewan, du nouveau- brunswick, de l’île-du- prince- édouard et du yukon (collectivement, les « juridictions participantes »), connu sous le nom de « protocole d’accord concernant le régime coopé- ratif de réglementation des marchés des capitaux » (« protocole d’accord »). le régime est constitué des quatre principales composantes suivantes : (1) législation provinciale et territoriale uniforme : la première composante du régime coopératif concerne l’uniformisation des lois provinciales et territoriales régissant les aspects courants du commerce des valeurs mobilières. à cette fin, le protocole d’accord prévoit que chaque province participante doit adopter une loi qui reflète en tous points la loi provinciale type. la loi provinciale type concerne toutes les questions de compétence provinciale ou territoriale ayant trait aux marchés de capitaux (protocole d’accord, sous-al. 3a)(i)), notamment l’inscription des courtiers et de cer- tains autres acteurs du marché, les exigences re- latives aux prospectus, la communication et les procurations, les offres publiques d’achat et de rachat, le commerce des instruments dérivés et la responsabilité civile. fait important, la loi pro- vinciale type n’a pas force de loi dans la province participante tant et aussi longtemps que la légis- lature de celle-ci ne l’a pas adoptée. (2) législation fédérale complémentaire : la loi provinciale et territoriale uniforme en matière de valeurs mobilières doit être accompagnée d’une loi fédérale, c-à-d l’ébauche de la loi fédérale. l’ébauche de la loi fédérale a une portée plus limitée, puisqu’elle porte seulement sur les ques- tions de droit criminel et les questions relatives au risque systémique dans les marchés de capitaux canadiens et à la collecte de données à l’échelle nationale : protocole d’accord, sous-al 3a)(ii). le gouvernement fédéral s’engage à demander au parlement de promulguer une loi qui reflète en tous point cette ébauche : art 83. (3) a national regulator: the memorandum con- templates a delegation by the federal government (3) organisme national de réglementation  : le protocole d’accord prévoit la délégation par le 210 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. (pursuant to s. 73 of the draft federal act) and the participating provinces (pursuant to s. 202 of the model provincial act) of certain regu- latory powers to a single operationally inde- pendent capital markets regulatory authority (the authority). the intention is that the authority will become the sole entity responsible for ad- ministering both the federal and provincial co- operative system legislation, and will fulfill all relevant regulatory, enforcement and adjudica- tive functions relating to the trade in securities under these statutes as enacted (memorandum, s 3(a)(iii)). as of now, a draft of the authority’s enabling legislation has not yet been published. gouvernement fédéral (en vertu de l’art. 73 de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale) et par les provinces participantes (en vertu de l’art. 202 de la loi pro- vinciale type) de certains pouvoirs de réglementa- tion à un organisme unique de réglementation des marchés de capitaux indépendant sur le plan opé- rationnel (l’autorité). l’intention est que l’auto- rité devienne la seule entité chargée d’appliquer la législation, tant fédérale que provinciale, relative au régime coopératif, et qu’elle s’acquitte de toutes les fonctions de réglementation et d’application de la loi et des fonctions juridictionnelles pertinentes ayant trait au commerce des valeurs mobilières sous le régime de ces lois, telles qu’elles ont été adoptées : protocole d’accord, sous-al 3a)(iii). à l’heure actuelle, aucune ébauche de la loi habili- tante de l’autorité n’a encore été publiée. (4) the council of ministers: finally, the authority and its board of directors are to operate un- der the supervision of a council of ministers, which will comprise the ministers responsible for capital markets regulation in each participat- ing province and the federal minister of finance (memorandum, s 3(a)(iv)). (4) conseil des ministres : enfin, l’autorité et son conseil d’administration doivent être supervi- sés par un conseil des ministres, composé des ministres responsables de la réglementation des marchés de capitaux de chacune des pro- vinces participantes et du ministre fédéral des finances : protocole d’accord, sous-al 3a)(iv). [22] each of these components is integral to the cooperative system’s ultimate objective: to establish a unified and cooperative system for the regulation of capital markets in canada in a manner that accords with the constitutional division of powers. this ob- jective is expressed in s 22 of the memorandum, which reads as follows: [22] chacune de ces composantes est indispen- sable à la réalisation de l’objectif ultime du régime coopératif : l’instauration d’un régime coopératif et unifié de réglementation des marchés de capitaux au canada conformément au partage constitutionnel des compétences. cet objectif est exprimé à l’art 22 du protocole d’accord, dont voici le texte : in entering into this [memorandum] and participating in the cooperative system, each of the participating juris- dictions is addressing matters within its constitutional ju- risdiction and is neither surrendering nor impairing any of its jurisdiction, with respect to which it remains sovereign. en participant au présent [protocole d’accord] et au régime coopératif, chaque partie traite de questions qui relèvent de ses compétences constitutionnelles et ne cède et ne com- promet aucune de ses compétences, à l’égard desquelles elle demeure souveraine. [23] the parties to the agreement are the executive branches of the governments of the participating jurisdictions. by signing the memorandum, each undertakes to establish the cooperative system on the basis set out in the memorandum (s 101(a)). [23] les parties à l’accord sont les différents exé- cutifs issus des gouvernements des juridictions par- ticipantes. en signant le protocole d’accord, chacune des parties s’engage à instaurer le régime coopératif selon les principes énoncés dans le protocole d’ac- cord : al 101a). [24] the memorandum makes clear that the two proposed statutes — the draft federal act and the [24] le protocole d’accord indique clairement que les deux lois proposées — l’ébauche de la loi fédérale [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 211 model provincial act — remain subject to legisla- tive approval (s. 3(a)(i) and (ii)). what this means is that neither has any legal effect unless and until the applicable legislatures enact them into law. it is for this reason that the executive signatories of the participating jurisdictions have agreed, in s 101(b) of the memorandum, “to use their best efforts to cause their respective legislatures to enact or ap- prove” legislation that is substantially the same as the proposed statutes (see also ss 81 and 83). [25] the council of ministers plays an impor- tant role in the overall operation of the cooperative system. its duties, which are listed in s 42 of the memorandum, include proposing amendments to the draft federal act and the model provincial act. section 5.6 of the memorandum provides that proposed amendments to the draft federal act re- quire consultation between the federal minister of finance and the other members of the council of ministers. proposals to amend the model provincial act, by contrast, are subject to a vote and must be approved by (a) at least 50 percent of all members of the council of ministers, and (b) the members of the council of ministers from each “major capital markets jurisdiction”  —  which, at present, are ontario and british columbia (s 55). it must be ob- served, however, that those voting requirements ap- ply only to proposals to amend the model provincial act, which provides content to the commitments of the executive signatories, but which remains sub‑ ject to legislative approval. we also note that s 57 of the memorandum — which requires enhanced majority approval from the council of ministers for certain listed fundamental changes — does not apply to proposals to amend the model provincial act. put simply, s 55 does not purport to apply to the amendment of legislation after it has been enacted into law in a participating province. as we will explain below, the power to enact, amend and repeal legislation lies exclusively in the hands of the legislatures, and cannot be subject to the approval of the council of ministers. et la loi provinciale type — demeurent assujetties à l’approbation législative (sous-al. 3a)(i) et (ii)), ce qui signifie que ces lois n’ont aucun effet juridique tant et aussi longtemps qu’elles n’ont pas été adoptées par les législatures concernées. c’est pour cette raison que les signataires représentant le pouvoir exécutif des juridictions participantes ont convenu, à l’al 101b) du protocole d’accord, de « tout mettre en œuvre pour amener leur assemblée législative respective à promul- guer ou approuver » des lois qui ressemblent essentiel- lement aux lois proposées : voir aussi art 81 et 83. [25] le conseil des ministres joue un rôle im- portant dans le fonctionnement global du régime coopératif ses devoirs, énumérés à l’art.  4.2 du protocole d’accord, comprennent le fait de proposer des modifications à l’ébauche de la loi fédérale et à la loi provinciale type. l’article 5.6 du protocole d’accord prévoit que les propositions de modifica- tion de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale nécessitent des consultations entre le ministre fédéral des finances et les autres membres du conseil des ministres. en revanche, les propositions visant à modifier la loi provinciale type sont assujetties à un vote et doivent être approuvées par a) au moins 50 pour 100 des membres du conseil des ministres et b) les membres du conseil des ministres de chaque « partie ayant de grands marchés des capitaux » — qui sont, à l’heure actuelle, l’ontario et la colombie- britannique  : art.  55. cependant, il convient de souligner que ces exigences en matière de vote s’appliquent uni- quement aux propositions de modification de la loi provinciale type, laquelle détermine la teneur des engagements des signataires représentant les diffé- rents pouvoirs exécutifs, mais qui demeure assujettie à l’approbation législative. nous ajoutons également que l’art 57 du protocole d’accord, suivant lequel certaines modifications fondamentales qui y sont énumérées nécessitent l’accord d’une majorité élar- gie du conseil des ministres, ne s’applique pas aux propositions de modification de la loi provinciale type. autrement dit, l’art 55 n’est pas censé s’appli- quer à la modification de la loi une fois que celle-ci a été adoptée dans une province participante. comme nous l’expliquerons plus loin, le pouvoir d’adopter, de modifier et d’abroger des lois relève exclusive- ment des législatures et ne saurait être assujetti à l’approbation du conseil des ministres. 212 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. [26] the memorandum contemplates the possibil- ity that other provinces and territories will join the cooperative system at a later date: s. 11(a) requires that participating jurisdictions “use their best efforts and work together to secure the agreement of the government of each non- participating jurisdiction of canada to participate in the cooperative system on the basis of the terms of [the memorandum]”. accession by a non- participating jurisdiction re- mains subject to the approval of the council of ministers (ss 57(b) and 11(b)). the memorandum also sets out a mechanism by which participating jurisdictions can withdraw from the cooperative system. section 13 reads as follows: [26] le protocole d’accord évoque la possibilité que d’autres provinces et territoires se joignent au régime coopératif à une date ultérieure; l’al. 11a) exige que les juridictions participantes «  colla- bore[nt] et déploie[nt] leurs meilleurs efforts dans le but d’obtenir l’adhésion au régime coopératif de tous les gouvernements des provinces et territoires non participants du canada sur la base des modalités du [protocole d’accord] ». l’adhésion d’une juridic- tion non participante demeure assujettie à l’approba- tion du conseil des ministres : al 57b) et 11b). le protocole d’accord établit également le mécanisme permettant aux juridictions participantes de se retirer du régime coopératif. l’article 13 se lit comme suit : a participating jurisdiction may withdraw from the cooperative system by providing at least six months’ written notice to the other participating jurisdictions. a minister of a participating jurisdiction that has provided written notice to any other participating jurisdiction of its intention to withdraw from the cooperative system will no longer be entitled to vote as a member of the council of ministers. une partie peut se retirer du régime coopératif en donnant par écrit un préavis d’au moins six mois aux autres parties. le ministre d’une partie qui a donné à toute autre partie un préavis écrit de son intention de se retirer du régime coopératif n’aura plus le droit de vote en tant que membre du conseil des ministres. the [authority] shall use all reasonable efforts to facil- itate an expeditious withdrawal and the transfer and/or assignment of employees, assets and contracts relating to capital markets regulation in a withdrawing participating jurisdiction as of the effective withdrawal date. l’[autorité] déploiera tous les efforts raisonnables pour faciliter promptement le retrait et le transfert ou l’affecta- tion des employés, des actifs et des contrats se rapportant à la réglementation des marchés des capitaux dans la partie à la date d’entrée en vigueur du retrait. [27] another important aspect of the cooperative system is the authority’s power to make regulations pursuant to both the draft federal act and the model provincial act. both statutes provide that any regu- lations proposed by the authority must be approved by the council of ministers before they come into force (model provincial act, s. 206; draft federal act, s 76). section 5.2 of the memorandum, which sets out the mechanism by which the council of ministers approves or rejects regulations submit- ted by the authority’s board of directors, reads as follows: [27] un autre aspect important du régime coo- pératif est le pouvoir de l’autorité de prendre des règlements tant en vertu de l’ébauche de la loi fédé- rale qu’en vertu de la loi provinciale type. les deux lois prévoient que tous les règlements proposés par l’autorité doivent être approuvés par le conseil des ministres avant leur entrée en vigueur : loi provin- ciale type, art. 206; ébauche de la loi fédérale, art 76. l’article 5.2 du protocole d’accord, qui établit le mé- canisme par lequel le conseil des ministres approuve ou rejette les règlements présentés par le conseil d’administration de l’autorité, est ainsi libellé : 5.2 voting on a regulation made by the board of di- rectors 5.2 vote à propos d’un règlement pris par le conseil d’administration (a) a regulation made by the board of directors subsequent to the initial regulations will be put before the council of ministers before it comes a) un règlement pris par le conseil d’administration une fois les règlements initiaux pris sera soumis au conseil des ministres avant d’entrer en vigueur. [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 213 into force. unless the council of ministers has asked that the board of directors reconsider the regulation or the council of ministers has decided to reject the regulation within a specified period, the regulation will be considered to have been approved by the council of ministers. the council of ministers must request that the board of directors reconsider a regulation before the council of ministers makes a decision to reject the regulation. a request by the council of ministers to the board of directors to reconsider a regulation must be approved by: b) c) (b) (c) à moins que le conseil des ministres ne demande au conseil d’administration de réexaminer le rè- glement ou que le conseil des ministres ne décide de le refuser dans un délai précisé, le règlement sera réputé avoir été approuvé par le conseil des ministres. le conseil des ministres doit demander au conseil d’administration de réexaminer un règlement avant de rejeter ce dernier. une telle demande de réexamen doit être approu- vée par : (i) at least 50 [percent] of all members of the council of ministers; and (i) au moins 50 % des membres du conseil des ministres; (ii) any one of the members of the council of ministers from the major capital markets jurisdictions and from canada taken to- gether. (ii) l’un ou l’autre des ministres représentant les parties ayant de grands marchés des capitaux ou représentant le canada. (d) a decision to reject a regulation that has been re- considered by the board of directors at the request of the council of ministers and once again put before the council of ministers before it comes into force must be approved by: d) la décision de rejeter un règlement que le conseil d’administration a réexaminé à la demande du conseil des ministres et présenté à nouveau devant ce dernier avant son entrée en vigueur doit être approuvée par : (i) at least 50 [percent] of all members of the council of ministers; and (i) au moins 50 % des membres du conseil des ministres; (ii) a majority of the members of the council of ministers from the major capital markets jurisdictions and from canada taken to- gether. (ii) la majorité des membres du conseil des ministres représentant les parties ayant de grands marchés des capitaux ou représentant le canada. [28] the council of ministers is thus required to request that the board of directors reconsider a pro- posed regulation before it can reject the regulation outright. moreover, any decision to request the re- consideration of a proposed regulation must be ap- proved by at least half of the members of the council of ministers and by any one member from the major capital markets jurisdictions and the federal gov- ernment. a decision to reject a regulation that has been reconsidered by the board of directors must be approved by at least half of the former and by a majority of the latter. a proposed regulation that the [28] par conséquent, le conseil des ministres doit demander au conseil d’administration de réexaminer le projet de règlement avant de rejeter carrément ce dernier. de plus, la décision de demander le réexa- men d’un projet de règlement doit être approuvée, d’une part, par au moins la moitié des membres du conseil des ministres et, d’autre part, par un membre représentant les parties ayant de grands marchés de capitaux ou représentant le gouvernement fédéral. quant à la décision de rejeter un règlement que le conseil d’administration a réexaminé, elle doit être approuvée par au moins la moitié des membres du 214 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. council of ministers has not rejected or requested that it be reconsidered will be deemed to have been approved (memorandum, s 52(a)). conseil des ministres et par la majorité des membres du conseil des ministres représentant les parties ayant de grands marchés de capitaux ou représentant le canada. le projet de règlement qui ne fait pas l’objet d’un rejet ou d’une demande de réexamen par le conseil des ministres est réputé avoir été ap- prouvé : protocole d’accord, al 52a). iii opinion of the quebec court of appeal — 2017 iii avis de la cour d’appel du québec — 2017 qcca 756 qcca 756 [29] as mentioned above, the following two ques- tions were referred to the quebec court of appeal: [29] comme nous l’avons mentionné précédem- ment, les deux questions suivantes ont été soumises à la cour d’appel du québec : 1 does the constitution of canada authorize the im- plementation of pan- canadian securities regulation under the authority of a single regulator, according to the model established by the most recent publica- tion of the “memorandum of agreement regarding the cooperative capital markets regulatory system”? 1 la constitution du canada autorise-t-elle la mise en place d’une réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières sous la gouverne d’un organisme unique selon le modèle prévu par la plus récente publication du « protocole d’accord concernant le régime coopératif de réglementation des marchés des capitaux »? 2 does the most recent version of the draft of the federal “capital markets stability act” exceed the authority of the parliament of canada over the general branch of the trade and commerce power under subsection 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867? 2 la plus récente version de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale intitulée « loi sur la stabilité des marchés des capi- taux » excède-t-elle la compétence du parlement du canada sur le commerce selon le paragraphe 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867? the reference was heard by a panel of five judges. le renvoi a été entendu par une formation de cinq juges. [30] with respect to the first question, the ma- jority  —  composed of duval  hesler  cjq and bouchard, savard and mainville jja — found the cooperative system to be unconstitutional, for two main reasons. [30] en ce qui concerne la première question, les juges majoritaires — à savoir la juge en chef duval hesler et les juges bouchard, savard et mainville — ont conclu que le régime coopératif était incons- titutionnel pour deux raisons principales. [31] first, the majority held that the mechanism for amending the model provincial act, as set out in the memorandum, effectively subjects the leg- islative jurisdiction of the participating provinces to the approval of an external entity: the council of ministers. in the majority’s view, the terms of the memorandum had to be understood as prohibiting all participating provinces from amending their se- curities legislation without the consent of the council of ministers, while also requiring the legislative implementation of all amendments dictated by the council of ministers. this, it held, conflicts with [31] premièrement, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que le mécanisme de modification de la loi provinciale type, comme l’établit le protocole d’ac- cord, assujettit en réalité la compétence législative des provinces participantes à l’approbation d’une en- tité extérieure : le conseil des ministres. selon eux, les modalités du protocole d’accord devaient être interprétées comme empêchant toutes les provinces participantes de modifier leurs lois portant sur les valeurs mobilières sans le consentement du conseil des ministres, tout en imposant la mise en œuvre législative de toutes les modifications dictées par le [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 215 the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, which protects a legislature’s freedom to enact, amend and repeal legislation as it sees fit. [32] second, the majority held that the involve- ment of the council of ministers in the making of regulations pursuant to the draft federal act under- mines the validity of that act “by permitting certain provinces to exercise what amounts to a veto over federal initiatives that seek to guard against systemic risks related to capital markets which would have material adverse effects on the canadian economy as a whole” (para 56). on this point, the majority expressed the opinion that a provincial veto is in- compatible with the general branch of the trade and commerce power and accordingly calls the constitu- tional validity of the draft federal act into question, as it “negates the very necessity of pan- canadian federal legislation to counter systemic risks on a national scale” (para. 90; see also para 95). the majority added that the involvement of the council of ministers in the making of regulations under the draft federal act amounts to an abdication of federal jurisdiction. [33] schrager ja (the “dissenting judge”) took the position that the analysis of the scheme’s consti- tutional validity should be limited to the two draft statutes — the model provincial act and the draft federal act — and should not encompass the terms of the memorandum, given that the memorandum is an intergovernmental agreement that lacks the force of law. he would have answered this first question posed by the reference, amended accordingly, in the affirmative. in his view, both of the statutes are constitutional, as they entail neither the delegation of legislative authority nor the abdication of parlia- mentary sovereignty. although he found that s 55 of the memorandum does have the effect of limit- ing a provincial legislature’s authority to amend its legislation, he observed that such a limitation is not incorporated into either the draft federal act or the model provincial act. conseil des ministres. cela, ont- ils affirmé, va à l’en- contre du principe de la souveraineté parlementaire, qui protège la liberté de la législature d’adopter, de modifier et d’abroger des lois comme elle l’entend. [32] deuxièmement, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que la participation du conseil des ministres à la prise des règlements sous le régime de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale sape la validité constitutionnelle de cette loi « en permettant à certaines provinces d’exercer un droit de veto effectif sur les initiatives fédérales visant à prémunir les risques systémiques liés aux marchés des capitaux qui sont susceptibles d’avoir des conséquences négatives importantes sur l’économie canadienne dans son ensemble » : par 56. à ce sujet, les juges majoritaires se sont dits d’avis qu’un veto provincial est incompatible avec le volet général de la compétence en matière de trafic et de commerce et, par conséquent, met en cause la validité constitutionnelle de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, car un tel veto « ni[e] la nécessité même d’une intervention législative fédérale pan- canadienne afin de contrer les risques systémiques à l’échelle nationale » : par. 90; voir aussi par 95. les juges majoritaires ont ajouté que la participation du conseil des ministres à la prise de règlements sous le régime de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale équivaut à une abdication de la compétence fédérale. [33] le juge schrager (le «  juge dissident  ») était pour sa part d’avis que l’analyse de la validité constitutionnelle du régime devait se limiter aux deux ébauches de loi — la loi provinciale type et l’ébauche de la loi fédérale — et ne devait pas porter sur les modalités du protocole d’accord, étant donné que ce dernier constitue un accord intergouverne- mental n’ayant pas force de loi. il aurait répondu à la première question posée par le renvoi — modifiée en conséquence — par l’affirmative. à son avis, les deux lois étaient constitutionnelles, car elles ne com- portaient ni délégation de la compétence législative ni abdication de la souveraineté parlementaire. bien qu’il ait conclu que l’art 55 du protocole d’accord a pour effet de restreindre le pouvoir de la législature provinciale de modifier sa loi, il a fait remarquer que cette restriction n’est incorporée ni dans la l’ébauche de la loi fédérale ni dans la loi provinciale type. 216 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. [34] to the extent that he was bound to consider the first question with reference to the terms of the memorandum, the dissenting judge would have declined to do so because, in his view, it is not for the courts to pronounce on the constitutional validity of intergovernmental agreements. he also found it problematic that the court of appeal did not have be- fore it a draft of the authority’s enabling legislation. [35] in response to the second question, the major- ity concluded that the draft federal act is not ultra vires parliament under s. 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867, except with respect to ss. 76 to 79, which set out the role of the council of ministers in the making of regulations. given the stated purposes of the draft federal act, the definition of “systemic risk” provided therein, and the limitations imposed on the scope of the authority’s delegated regula- tory powers, the majority found that the pith and substance of the draft federal act is to promote the stability of the canadian economy by managing systemic risk in capital markets — risk which could have material adverse effects on the economy as a whole. following this court’s guidance in reference re securities act, the majority had little trouble con- cluding that this is a subject matter that falls within parliament’s jurisdiction over trade and commerce. [36] however, the majority took issue with ss. 76 to 79 of the draft federal act, which require that all regulations made by the authority pursuant to the draft federal act be approved by the council of ministers. in the majority’s view, these provisions have the effect of conferring on certain provinces a veto over federal regulations, and therefore “negates the very necessity of pan- canadian federal legisla- tion to counter systemic risks on a national scale” (para 90). the majority concluded on this basis that ss. 76 to 79 would render the draft federal act unconstitutional as a whole if they are not removed from it. [34] dans la mesure où il était tenu d’examiner la première question par rapport aux modalités du protocole d’accord, le juge dissident aurait refusé de le faire parce que, à son avis, il n’appartient pas aux tribunaux de se prononcer sur la validité consti- tutionnelle des accords intergouvernementaux. il a également jugé problématique que la cour d’appel ne dispose pas d’une ébauche de la loi constitutive de l’autorité. [35] en réponse à la seconde question, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que l’ébauche de la loi fé- dérale n’excédait pas la compétence conférée au parlement par le par. 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, sauf pour ce qui est des art. 76 à 79, qui énoncent le rôle du conseil des ministres dans la prise de règlements. compte tenu des objets énoncés dans l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, de la définition de « risque systémique » qui y figure et des limites imposées aux pouvoirs de réglementation délégués de l’autorité, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que le caractère véritable de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale est de promouvoir la stabilité de l’économie canadienne par la gestion du risque systémique lié aux marchés de capitaux, lequel risque est susceptible d’avoir des conséquences négatives importantes sur l’économie dans son ensemble. s’inspirant des enseignements de la cour dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, les juges majoritaires n’ont eu aucun mal à conclure que cet objet relève de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce. [36] cependant, les juges majoritaires ont critiqué les art. 76 à 79 de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, qui exigent que tous les règlements pris par l’autorité sous le régime de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale soient approuvés par le conseil des ministres. à leur avis, ces dispositions ont pour effet de conférer à certaines provinces un droit de veto à l’égard de la régle- mentation fédérale, et donc de « nier la nécessité même d’une intervention législative fédérale pan- canadienne afin de contrer les risques systémiques à l’échelle nationale » : par 90. pour cette raison, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que les art. 76 à 79 rendraient l’ébauche de la loi fédérale inconstitu- tionnelle dans son ensemble s’ils n’en étaient pas retirés. [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 217 [37] the dissenting judge would have found the draft federal act in its entirety to represent a valid exercise of parliament’s general trade and commerce power. although he agreed that the subject matter of the draft legislation falls within parliament’s jurisdic- tion under s. 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867, he did not find that ss. 76 to 79 render the draft federal act unconstitutional. he noted that parliament has the power to delegate regulatory authority as it sees fit and to structure the body to which it delegates authority in any manner that is deemed appropriate to the task. in the dissenting judge’s view, therefore, the fact that such a body may be populated by min- isters of provincial governments does not invalidate the delegation of any such regulatory authority or un- dermine the inherently federal nature of the statute. [37] le juge dissident a conclu que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale en entier constituait un exercice valide de la compétence générale du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce. même s’il était d’accord que l’objet de la loi proposée relève de la compétence du parlement conférée par le par. 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, il n’a pas été d’avis que les art. 76 à 79 rendraient l’ébauche de la loi fédérale inconstitutionnelle. il a souligné que le parlement a le pouvoir de déléguer son pouvoir de réglementation comme il l’entend, et d’organiser comme bon lui semble la structure de l’organisme auquel il délègue ce pouvoir. selon le juge dissident, le fait que cet organisme puisse être composé de ministres des gou- vernements provinciaux n’invalide pas la délégation de tels pouvoirs de réglementation, pas plus qu’il ne mine la nature intrinsèquement fédérale de la loi. iv positions of the parties iv position des parties [38] with respect to the first question posed by the reference, the attorneys general of canada and british columbia, supported by those of ontario, prince edward island, saskatchewan and new brun- swick, submit that the proposed cooperative system is constitutional. they argue that the majority erred in interpreting the memorandum, taking the position that it neither purports to nor has the effect of binding the legislatures of the participating provinces, and does not require them to abdicate their legislative au- thority either. in particular, the attorneys general of canada and british columbia dispute the majority’s understanding of the principle of parliamentary sov- ereignty: in their submission, the executive is sim- ply incapable of binding the legislature by way of cooperative agreements. their opinion is that the majority’s conception of parliamentary sovereignty would, if accepted, limit the ability of provinces and the federal government to cooperate in the pursuit of common objectives, and would ultimately frustrate the application of cooperative federalism. [38] en ce qui concerne la première question posée par le renvoi, les procureurs généraux du canada et de la colombie- britannique — appuyés par ceux de l’ontario, de l’île-du- prince- édouard, de la sas- katchewan et du nouveau- brunswick — soutiennent que le régime coopératif proposé est constitutionnel. ils affirment que les juges majoritaires ont com- mis une erreur dans leur interprétation du protocole d’accord, estimant que celui-ci n’a ni pour objet ni pour effet de lier les législatures des provinces par- ticipantes, et qu’il ne les oblige pas à abdiquer leur compétence législative. en particulier, les procureurs généraux du canada et de la colombie- britannique contestent la façon dont les juges majoritaires com- prennent le principe de la souveraineté parlemen- taire; selon leurs observations, l’exécutif est tout simplement incapable de lier la législature au moyen d’accords de coopération. ils soutiennent que sous- crire à la façon dont les juges majoritaires conçoivent la souveraineté parlementaire limiterait la capacité des provinces et du gouvernement fédéral de colla- borer à la poursuite d’objectifs communs et finirait par entraver l’application du fédéralisme coopératif. [39] the attorneys general of canada and brit- ish columbia (as well as the interveners that sup- port their position) agree with the court of appeal that the draft federal act is intra vires parliament, [39] les procureurs généraux du canada et de la colombie- britannique (de même que les interve- nants qui appuient leur position) conviennent avec la cour d’appel que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale relève 218 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. but disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the council of ministers’ involvement in reviewing fed- eral regulations renders the draft federal act un- constitutional. they submit that the existence of a “provincial veto” is factually inaccurate, and add that the manner in which a statute delegates regula- tory powers cannot affect that statute’s constitution- ality, since the legislature remains free to delegate such regulatory powers as it sees fit. [40] the attorneys general of quebec and al- berta, together with the barreau du québec and the institute for governance of private and public organizations — agree with the majority that the cooperative system is unconstitutional. they sub- mit that the proposed scheme requires participating provinces to surrender their legislative jurisdiction by undertaking to enact the model provincial act and to refrain from unilaterally amending that leg- islation, the result being a violation of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. they also argue that this transfer of legislative authority to the council of ministers effectively creates a legislative body that is not contemplated by the constitution. this, they contend, represents a colourable attempt to amend the constitution and is incompatible with the rule re- specting legislative delegation. [41] turning to the second question, the attorneys general of canada, ontario and new brunswick submit that the draft federal act falls within parlia- ment’s general trade and commerce power. in their view, the proposed act relates, in pith and substance, to the promotion and protection of the stability of the country’s financial system by managing sys- temic risk in capital markets. this, they argue, falls squarely within the general branch of the trade and commerce power, in accordance with this court’s decision in reference re securities act. de la compétence du parlement, mais rejettent la conclusion des juges majoritaires selon laquelle la participation du conseil des ministres à l’examen des règlements fédéraux rend l’ébauche de la loi fédérale inconstitutionnelle. ils soutiennent que l’existence d’un « veto provincial » est inexacte sur le plan fac- tuel et ajoutent que la façon dont une loi délègue les pouvoirs de réglementation ne saurait compromettre la constitutionnalité de cette loi, car la législature demeure libre de déléguer de tels pouvoirs de régle- mentation comme elle l’entend. [40] en revanche, les procureurs généraux du québec et de l’alberta — auxquels se joignent le barreau du québec et l’institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques — conviennent avec les juges majoritaires que le régime coopé- ratif est inconstitutionnel ils soutiennent que le régime proposé oblige les provinces participantes à renoncer à leur compétence législative en s’en- gageant à adopter la loi provinciale type et à s’abs- tenir de modifier unilatéralement cette loi une fois promulguée, de sorte qu’il en résulte une violation du principe de la souveraineté parlementaire. ils soutiennent également que le transfert de cette com- pétence législative au conseil des ministres crée de fait un corps législatif qui n’est pas prévu dans la constitution, ce qui, prétendent- ils, constitue une tentative déguisée de modifier la constitution et va à l’encontre de la règle en matière de délégation de pouvoirs législatifs. [41] quant à la seconde question, les procureurs généraux du canada, de l’ontario et du nouveau- brunswick soutiennent que l’ébauche de la loi fédé- rale relève de la compétence générale du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce. à leur avis, le caractère véritable de cette ébauche se rapporte à la promotion et à la protection de la stabilité du système financier du pays par la gestion du risque systémique lié aux marchés de capitaux, ce qui, soutiennent- ils, relève clairement du volet général de la compétence en matière de trafic et de commerce, conformément à l’avis consultatif de la cour dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières. [42] the attorney general of quebec, together with the attorney general of alberta, the barreau du [42] la procureure générale du québec, ainsi que le procureur général de l’alberta, le barreau du [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 219 québec and the institute for governance of private and public organizations, submits that the draft federal act is beyond parliament’s general trade and commerce power. as the management of systemic risk is a purpose that animates the regulation of secu- rities generally, it is not helpful in drawing a line be- tween provincial and federal jurisdiction. moreover, and even assuming the draft federal act’s pith and substance can be characterized as the management of systemic risk, the attorney general of quebec takes the view that the constitutionality of this pro- posed legislation still cannot be supported under the general trade and commerce power on the basis of the general motors indicia: the draft federal act is concerned solely with the securities industry, there is no evidence that the provinces are incapable of enacting and enforcing similar measures, and given the realities of the trade in securities, one province’s failure to regulate will not jeopardize the regulation of securities in other jurisdictions. [43] the attorney general of manitoba agrees with the attorney general of quebec that the draft federal act is ultra vires, but takes a slightly differ- ent approach. manitoba accepts that parliament has the authority to legislate for the purpose of manag- ing systemic risk, as this court held in reference re securities act. given that the provinces also have the authority to legislate for this purpose, and in light of the inherently amorphous nature of the concept of “systemic risk”, manitoba instead argues that fed- eral authority over systemic risk must be confined to urgent circumstances that demonstrably require uniform national action. manitoba submits that the draft federal act fails to meet this standard and would simply duplicate provincial regulation of the same risks for the same purposes without employing a qualitatively different approach. qué bec et l’institut sur la gouvernance d’organisa- tions privées et publiques, affirment que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale excède la compétence générale du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce. étant donné que la gestion du risque systémique est un objet qui sous- tend la réglementation des valeurs mobilières en général, cet objet n’est guère utile pour tracer une ligne de démarcation exacte entre les compétences provinciales et fédérales. de plus, même en supposant que le caractère véritable de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale puisse être considéré comme étant la gestion du risque systémique, la procureure générale du québec est d’avis que la constitutionnalité de la loi proposée ne peut toujours pas trouver appui dans la compétence générale en matière de trafic et de commerce suivant les critères établis dans l’arrêt general motors : l’ébauche de la loi fédérale porte uniquement sur le secteur des valeurs mobilières, rien n’indique que les provinces ne sont pas en mesure d’adopter et d’appliquer des mesures similaires et, compte tenu des réalités du commerce des valeurs mobilières, l’omission par une province de réglementer ne compromettra pas la réglementation des valeurs mobilières dans d’autres provinces. [43] le procureur général du manitoba est d’ac- cord avec la procureure générale du québec pour dire que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale est ultra vires, mais adopte une approche légèrement différente. il reconnaît que le parlement a le pouvoir de légiférer pour gérer le risque systémique, comme l’a conclu la cour dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les va‑ leurs mobilières. comme les provinces peuvent elles aussi légiférer à cette même fin, et compte tenu du caractère intrinsèquement imprécis de la notion de « risque systémique », le manitoba fait plutôt valoir que la compétence fédérale en matière de risque systémique doit se limiter aux circonstances urgentes nécessitant manifestement une action nationale uni- forme. le manitoba soutient que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale ne satisfait pas à cette norme et qu’elle ferait simplement double emploi avec la réglementation provinciale visant les mêmes risques aux mêmes fins, sans emprunter une approche qualitativement différente. 220 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. v analysis v analyse a question #1: does the constitution of canada authorize the implementation of pan‑ canadian securities regulation under the authority of a sin‑ gle regulator, according to the model established by the most recent publication of the “memoran‑ dum of agreement regarding the cooperative capital markets regulatory system”? a question no 1 : la constitution du canada auto‑ rise‑t‑elle la mise en place d’une réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières sous la gouverne d’un organisme unique selon le modèle prévu par la plus récente publication du « pro‑ tocole d’accord concernant le régime coopératif de réglementation des marchés des capitaux »? [44] this first question requires this court to con- sider whether the cooperative system, as set out in the memorandum, is constitutional. as noted above, the majority answered this question in the nega- tive, for two reasons. first, it held that the involve- ment of the council of ministers in the proposal of amendments to the model provincial act (as set out in ss 42 and 5.5 of the memorandum) fetters the law- making powers of the provincial legislatures, and therefore contravenes the principle of parlia- mentary sovereignty (paras 57-81). second, it found the requirement that proposed regulations under the draft federal act be approved by the council of ministers (draft federal act, ss.  76 to 79), cou- pled with the mechanism by which the council of ministers approves or rejects such proposed regula- tions (memorandum, s 52), has the effect of giving certain provinces a “veto” over federal intervention in capital markets (para 87). this, in the majority’s view, is incompatible with the constitutional founda- tion for federal jurisdiction under the general trade and commerce power (para 95). [44] cette première question amène la cour à se demander si le régime coopératif, tel qu’il est éta- bli dans le protocole d’accord, est constitutionnel. comme nous l’avons mentionné précédemment, les juges majoritaires ont répondu à cette question par la négative, pour deux raisons. premièrement, ils ont conclu que la participation du conseil des ministres aux propositions visant à modifier la loi provinciale type (comme le prévoient les art 42 et 5.5 du protocole d’accord) entrave l’exercice des pouvoirs de légiférer des législatures provinciales, et contrevient par conséquent au principe de la souve- raineté parlementaire : par 57-81. deuxièmement, ils ont conclu que l’exigence voulant que les projets de règlement pris sous le régime de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale soient approuvés par le conseil des ministres (ébauche de la loi fédérale, art. 76 à 79), conjuguée au mécanisme par lequel le conseil des ministres approuve ou rejette ces projets de règle- ment (protocole d’accord, art 52), a pour effet de conférer à certaines provinces un « droit de veto » sur l’intervention fédérale dans les marchés de capi- taux (par. 87), ce qui, affirment- ils, est incompatible avec l’assise constitutionnelle de la compétence fé- dérale générale en matière de trafic et de commerce (par 95). [45] the arguments advanced by the attorney general of quebec in this court are consistent with the majority’s conclusions. quebec contends that the effect of s 55 of the memorandum is to bind the legislatures of the respective participating provinces by (a) prohibiting them from amending their secu- rities legislation without the consent of the council of ministers, and by (b) requiring that they enact all amendments to the model provincial act that are approved by the council of ministers. in quebec’s [45] les arguments soumis par la procureure géné- rale du québec devant notre cour s’accordent avec les conclusions des juges majoritaires. le québec prétend que l’art 55 du protocole d’accord a pour effet de lier les législatures des provinces partici- pantes : a) en les empêchant de modifier leurs lois portant sur les valeurs mobilières sans le consente- ment du conseil des ministres; et b) en les obligeant à adopter toutes les modifications à la loi provinciale type approuvées par le conseil des ministres. selon [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 221 submission, this amounts to an impermissible fetter- ing of the legislatures’ sovereign authority. le québec, cela constitue une entrave inadmissible à l’exercice du pouvoir souverain des législatures. [46] the attorney general of quebec also submits that this aspect of the cooperative system is con- trary to the prohibition against legislative delegation, as it effectively requires each of the participating provinces to “surrender their jurisdiction over se- curities in order to hand it over to a composite body which none of them controls” (rf, at para 77). as a final point, quebec adds that the effect of the memorandum is to create a legislative body that is not contemplated in the constitution. [47] for the reasons that follow, we respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion and are un- able to accept the position advanced by quebec. (1) parliamentary sovereignty and the fettering of provincial legislative authority [48] the proposition that the council of ministers’ involvement in amending the model provincial act is inconsistent with the principle of parliamentary sov- ereignty rests on two erroneous premises: first, that the memorandum purports to bind the legislatures of the participating provinces and second, that it is actually capable of doing so. as we will explain, the terms of the memorandum do not and cannot fetter the legislatures’ primary law- making authority. [46] la procureure générale du québec soutient également que cet aspect du régime coopératif est contraire à l’interdiction visant la délégation de pou- voirs législatifs, car il oblige en fait les provinces participantes à « abandonne[r] leur compétence en matière de valeurs mobilières, afin de la confier à un organisme composite qu’aucune d’entre d’elles ne contrôle » : mi, par 77. en dernier lieu, le qué- bec ajoute que le protocole d’accord a pour effet de créer un corps législatif qui n’est pas prévu dans la constitution. [47] avec égards, pour les motifs qui suivent, nous ne pouvons nous rallier à la conclusion des juges majoritaires et ne pouvons souscrire à la position soutenue par le québec. (1) la souveraineté parlementaire et l’entrave à l’exercice de la compétence législative des provinces [48] la thèse voulant que la participation du con- seil des ministres à la modification de la loi provin- ciale type contrevienne au principe de la souveraineté parlementaire repose sur deux prémisses erronées : premièrement, que le protocole d’accord vise à lier les législatures des provinces participantes, et deu- xièmement, qu’il est réellement capable de le faire. comme nous l’expliquons plus loin, les modalités du protocole d’accord n’entravent pas, ni ne peuvent entraver, le pouvoir primaire de légiférer des légis- latures. (a) terms of the memorandum a) les modalités du protocole d’accord [49] section  4.2 of the memorandum provides that the council of ministers will be responsible for, among other things, proposing amendments to the model provincial act, the draft federal act, and the authority’s charter documentation. the voting rules applicable to approval by the council of ministers of a proposal to amend the model provincial act are set out in s 55, which reads as follows: [49] l’article 4.2 du protocole d’accord prévoit que le conseil des ministres sera notamment responsable de proposer des modifications à la loi provinciale type, à l’ébauche de la loi fédérale et aux documents relatifs à la charte de l’autorité. les règles concer- nant le vote relatif à l’approbation par le conseil des ministres d’une proposition de modification à la loi provinciale type sont énoncées à l’art 55, qui est rédigé comme suit : 222 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. 5.5 voting on a proposal to amend provincial and territorial legislation 5.5 vote à propos d’une proposition visant à modi- fier la législation provinciale et territoriale a proposal to amend the capital markets act must be approved by: une proposition visant à modifier la loi sur les marchés des capitaux doit être approuvée par : (a) (b) at least 50 [percent] of all members of the council of ministers; and the members of the council of ministers from each major capital markets jurisdiction. a) b) au moins 50 % des membres du conseil des mi- nistres; les membres du conseil des ministres de chaque partie ayant de grands marchés des capitaux. [50] it is clear from these sections that the council of ministers’ role is limited to proposals for amend- ments to the model provincial act — a model statute which, by definition, remains “subject to legislative approval” (s 3(a)(i)). sections 4.2 and 5.5 refer ex- clusively to the proposed legislation on which this cooperative system is based, and do not contemplate that the council of ministers will have any formal involvement in the amendment of legislation that has already been enacted by provincial legislatures. this is key: nowhere does the memorandum imply that the legislatures of the participating provinces are required to implement the amendments made to the model provincial act that have been approved by the council of ministers, or that they are precluded from making any other amendments to their secu- rities laws. indeed, the terms of the memorandum do not even require that the provisions of the model provincial act themselves be enacted into law by the legislatures of the participating provinces: the fact that the executive signatories are bound to “use their best efforts to cause their respective legisla- tures to enact or approve the cooperative system legislation” (s 101; see also s 81) shows that these legislatures remain free to reject the proposed stat- utes (as amended) if they so choose. [50] il est clair de ces articles que le rôle du conseil des ministres se limite aux propositions de modifi- cations à la loi provinciale type — une loi type qui, par définition, demeure assujettie à « l’approbation législative » : sous-al 3a)(i). les articles 4.2 et 5.5 visent uniquement la législation proposée sur la- quelle repose le régime coopératif et ne prévoient pas que le conseil des ministres jouera un rôle officiel dans la modification des lois déjà adoptées par les législatures provinciales. il s’agit là de l’élément clé : rien dans le protocole d’accord ne suggère que les législatures des provinces participantes sont te‑ nues de mettre en œuvre les modifications à la loi provinciale type approuvées par le conseil des mi- nistres, ou qu’il leur est interdit d’apporter d’autres modifications à leurs lois en matière de valeurs mo- bilières. en effet, les termes du protocole d’accord n’obligent même pas les législatures des provinces participantes à légiférer pour adopter les dispositions de la loi provinciale type elles- mêmes; le fait que les signataires représentant les différents pouvoirs exécutifs soient tenus de «  tout mettre en œuvre pour amener leur assemblée législative respective à promulguer ou approuver la législation sur le régime coopératif » (art 101; voir aussi art 81) démontre que les législatures demeurent libres de rejeter les lois proposées (dans leur version modifiée) si elles choisissent de le faire. [51] we also note that neither of ss 42 and 5.5 was incorporated into the model provincial act. in our view, this further undermines the submission that the council of ministers has a formal role to play in the legislative process. and the fact that the model provincial act’s definition of “council of ministers” refers to the memorandum cannot be understood [51] nous tenons également à souligner que ni l’art 42 ni l’art 55 n’a été incorporé dans la loi provinciale type. à notre avis, cet élément mine en- core plus l’argument selon lequel le conseil des ministres a un rôle officiel à jouer dans le processus législatif. et le fait que la définition de « conseil des ministres » contenue dans la loi provinciale type [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 223 as incorporating the voting rules of s 55 into the statutory scheme (see: ca reasons, at para 75). incor poration by reference requires clear language (northrop grumman overseas services corp v. can ada (at torney general), 2009 scc 50, [2009] 3 scr 309, at paras. 11-12; citing with approval ul canada inc. v. québec (procureur général), [1999] rjq 1720 (sup. ct.), at p. 1741, citing n. bankes, “co- operative federalism: third parties and inter- governmental agreements and arrangements in can- ada and australia” (1991), 29 alta. l. rev. 792, at p 832). similarly, a legislature intending to bind itself to rules respecting the manner and form by which the statute is to be amended must do so in clear terms (see: reference re canada assistance plan (bc), [1991] 2 scr 525, at pp. 561-64; canadian tax payers federation v. ontario (min‑ ister of finance) (2004), 73 or (3d) 621 (scj), at para 49). [52] we therefore reject the proposition that the cooperative system, as set out in the memorandum, purports to fetter the law- making powers of the par- ticipating provinces’ legislatures. renvoie au protocole d’accord ne saurait être inter- prété comme incorporant les règles relatives au vote prévues à l’art 55 dans le régime législatif : voir les motifs de la ca, par 75. l’incorporation par renvoi nécessite un libellé clair : northrop grum‑ man overseas services corp. c. canada (procu‑ reur général), 2009 csc 50, [2009] 3 rcs 309, par. 11-12, citant en l’approuvant ul canada inc. c. québec (procureur général), [1999] rjq 1720 (cs), p. 1741, citant n. bankes, « co- operative federalism : third parties and intergovernmental agreements and arrangements in canada and aus- tralia » (1991), 29 alta. l. rev. 792, p 832. de la même façon, la législature qui a l’intention de s’en- gager à respecter des règles quant à la manière et à la forme selon lesquelles la loi est censée être modifiée doit le faire en termes clairs : voir renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada (c‑b), [1991] 2 rcs 525, p. 561- 564; canadian tax‑ payers federation c. ontario (minister of finance) (2004), 73 or (3d) 621 (csj), par 49. [52] par conséquent, nous rejetons la thèse voulant que le régime coopératif, tel qu’il est établi dans le protocole d’accord, vise à entraver l’exercice des pouvoirs de légiférer des législatures des provinces participantes. (b) parliamentary sovereignty b) la souveraineté parlementaire [53] at a broader level, the majority’s reasoning reflects a misunderstanding of the principle of par- liamentary sovereignty. in short, the executive is incapable of interfering with the legislature’s power to enact, amend and repeal legislation. an executive agreement that purports to bind the parties’ respec- tive legislatures cannot, therefore, have any such effect. [53] de façon générale, le raisonnement des juges majoritaires témoigne d’une incompréhen- sion du principe de la souveraineté parlementaire. en somme, le pouvoir exécutif est incapable de res- treindre le pouvoir de la législature d’adopter, de modifier et d’abroger des lois. un accord conclu par différents exécutifs et censé lier les législatures res- pectives des parties ne peut donc avoir un tel effet. [54] parliamentary sovereignty is a foundational principle of the westminster model of government, and it is based on a recognition that the legislature’s power to make laws exists without any legal limits or constraints (p. j. monahan, b. shaw and p. ryan, constitutional law (5th ed. 2017), at p 85). in its traditional form, parliamentary sovereignty means that the legislature has the exclusive authority to enact, amend, and repeal any law as it sees fit, and [54] la souveraineté parlementaire est un prin- cipe fondateur du modèle de gouvernement de westminster qui repose sur la reconnaissance du fait que le pouvoir de la législature de faire des lois ne connaît aucune limite ou contrainte juridique : p j monahan,. b. shaw et p. ryan, constitutional law (5e éd. 2017), p 85. dans sa forme tradition- nelle, la souveraineté parlementaire signifie que la législature jouit du pouvoir exclusif d’adopter, de 224 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. that there is no matter in respect of which it may not make laws. as explained by a v dicey:. the principle of parliamentary sovereignty means nei- ther more nor less than this, namely that parliament thus defined has, under the english constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of england as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of parliament. modifier et d’abroger des lois comme elle l’entend et aucun sujet n’échappe à son pouvoir de légiférer. comme l’a expliqué a v dicey : [traduction] le principe de la souveraineté parle- mentaire veut tout simplement dire que le parlement, ainsi défini, a, en vertu de la constitution anglaise, le droit de faire ou d’abroger quelque loi que ce soit; de plus, le droit anglais ne reconnaît à aucun individu ou organisme le droit de déroger aux lois du parlement ou de les annuler. (a v. dicey, introduction to the study of the law of the constitution (10th ed. 1959), at pp. 39-40) (a v. dicey, introduction to the study of the law of the constitution (10e éd. 1959), p. 39-40) [55] the sovereignty of the legislature is central to the united kingdom’s uncodified constitutional structure (jackson v. her majesty’s attorney gen‑ eral, [2005] ukhl 56, [2006] 1 ac 262, at para. 9 (per lord bingham)). because there are no constit- uent instruments that either restrict the uk. parlia- ment’s jurisdiction over certain subject matters or enshrine certain civil rights and liberties, “[a]ny law, upon any subject matter, is within parliament’s com- petence” (p. w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at p 12-1). parliamentary sover- eignty therefore means that the legislative branch of government has supremacy over the executive and the judiciary: both must act in accordance with stat- utory enactments, and neither can usurp or interfere with the legislature’s law- making function. [55] la souveraineté de la législature est un élé- ment essentiel de la structure constitutionnelle non codifiée du royaume- uni : jackson c. her majesty’s attorney general, [2005] ukhl 56, [2006] 1 ac. 262, par. 9 (lord bingham). comme il n’existe pas d’acte constitutif restreignant la compétence du par- lement du royaume- uni à l’égard de certains sujets ou enchâssant certains droits et libertés civils, [tra- duction] « [n]’importe quelle loi, sur n’importe quel sujet, relève de la compétence du parlement » : p. w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5e éd. suppl.), p 12-1. la souveraineté parlementaire signi- fie donc que le pouvoir législatif du gouvernement l’emporte sur les pouvoirs exécutif et judiciaire, qui doivent tous deux agir conformément aux textes lé- gislatifs et ne peuvent usurper la fonction législative de la législature ou y nuire. [56] while the principle of parliamentary sover- eignty is an equally important feature of canadian law, various aspects of our written constitution have qualified the basic diceyan rule that parliament has the power “to make or unmake any law whatever”. one such qualification lies in the federal structure of the canadian state, which restricts the subject matters over which each legislature has jurisdic- tion. the distribution of legislative power between parliament and the provincial legislatures is set out in part vi of the constitution act, 1867. since neither level of government has the power to legislate in respect of matters that fall within the exclusive com- petence of the other, the sovereignty of parliament and of the provincial legislatures has been limited [56] si le principe de la souveraineté parlementaire est tout aussi important en droit canadien, plusieurs aspects de notre constitution écrite ont toutefois restreint la règle de dicey selon laquelle le parlement a le pouvoir [traduction] « de faire ou d’abroger quelque loi que ce soit ». l’une de ces restrictions tient à la structure fédérale de l’état canadien, qui li- mite les sujets sur lesquels chaque législature a com- pétence. la répartition du pouvoir législatif entre le parlement et les législatures provinciales est établie à la partie vi de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. étant donné qu’aucun des ordres de gouvernement n’a le pouvoir de légiférer sur les matières qui relèvent de la compétence exclusive de l’autre, la souveraineté du parlement et des législatures provinciales est limitée [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 225 in canada since confederation. this was explained by the judicial committee of the privy council in hodge v. the queen (1883), 9 app. cas 117 (pc), as follows: when the british north america act [now known as the constitution act, 1867] enacted that there should be a legislature for ontario, and that its legislative assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the prov- ince and for provincial purposes in relation to matters enumerated in sect. 92, it conferred    authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by sect. 92 as the imperial parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow. within these limits of subjects and area the local legislature is supreme, and has the same author- ity as the imperial parliament, or the parliament of the dominion, would have had under like circumstances    . [emphasis added; p 132]. given this constitutional division of powers, there- fore, neither parliament nor the provincial legisla- tures have the authority to enact laws that touch on all subject matters. rather, the effect of parliamentary sovereignty in the context of canadian federalism is that parliament and the provincial legislatures are supreme with respect only to matters that fall within their respective spheres of jurisdiction. [57] further limits were placed upon parliamen- tary sovereignty in canada following the enact- ment of the constitution act, 1982, a constitutional document which (among other things) protects the various civil rights and freedoms enshrined in the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (ss. 1 to 34), recognizes and affirms existing aboriginal and treaty rights (s. 35), and provides that any laws which are inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution are, “to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect” (s 52(1)). not only does this constitutional instrument impose substantive limits on the content of statutory enactments, but it also codifies the authority of superior courts to review legislation for constitutional compliance (an au- thority that had previously been only assumed to exist). professor monahan et al. had the following to say about the effect of the constitution act, 1982 au canada depuis la confédération. c’est ce qu’a expliqué le comité judiciaire du conseil privé dans hodge c. the queen (1883), 9 app cas 117 (cp) : [traduction] en décrétant que l’ontario avait droit à une législature et qu’il appartenait en exclusivité à son assemblée législative d’adopter des lois pour la province et pour des fins provinciales relativement aux catégories de sujets énumérés à l’art. 92, l’acte de l’amérique du nord britannique [maintenant connu sous le nom de loi constitutionnelle de 1867] lui conféra [  ] une autorité aussi complète et aussi vaste, dans les limites prescrites par l’art. 92, que le parlement impérial, dans la plénitude de ses attributions, possédait et pouvait conférer. dans les limites des sujets précités et à l’intérieur de ce cadre, la législature locale est souveraine et possède le même pouvoir que le parlement impérial ou le parlement du dominion aurait, dans des circonstances analogues   . [nous soulignons; p 132]. compte tenu de ce partage constitutionnel des com- pétences, ni le parlement ni les législatures provin- ciales n’ont, par conséquent, le pouvoir d’adopter des lois qui touchent tous les sujets. dans le contexte du fédéralisme canadien, la souveraineté parlemen- taire fait plutôt en sorte que le parlement et les lé- gislatures provinciales sont souverains uniquement quant aux matières qui relèvent de leur compétence respective. [57] d’autres limites furent apportées à la souve- raineté parlementaire au canada par l’adoption de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982, un document consti- tutionnel qui (entre autres choses) protège les divers droits et libertés civils enchâssés dans la charte ca‑ nadienne des droits et libertés (art. 1 à 34), reconnaît et confirme les droits existants, ancestraux ou issus de traités (art. 35), et rend « inopérantes les dispo- sitions incompatibles de toute autre règle de droit » (par 52(1)). non seulement ce document constitu- tionnel assujettit-il le contenu des textes législatifs à des limites de fond, mais il codifie aussi le pouvoir des cours supérieures de contrôler les mesures légis- latives afin d’en vérifier la conformité constitution- nelle (pouvoir dont l’existence avait été jusque-là simplement présumée). le professeur monahan et ses coauteurs ont tenu les propos suivants au sujet de l’effet de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 sur les 226 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. on the principles of parliamentary supremacy and of the rule of law: principes de la suprématie parlementaire et de la primauté du droit : all laws, regardless of the subject matter, are subject to review on the basis that they offend fundamental rights of individuals or groups under the charter, or indigenous rights under [s 35]   . in this sense, the principle of constitutionalism and the rule of law — which requires that all actions of the state must be authorized by law and consistent with constitutional requirements — has now significantly narrowed the principle of parliamentary supremacy in canada. [p. 86] in reference re secession of quebec, [1998] [58] 2 scr 217, this court observed that, “with the adoption of the charter, the canadian system of gov- ernment was transformed to a significant extent from a system of parliamentary supremacy to one of con- stitutional supremacy” (para 72). this is of course true, insofar as the constitution places limits on the law- making powers of parliament and the provincial legislatures. however, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty remains foundational to the structure of the canadian state: aside from these constitutional limits, the legislative branch of government remains supreme over both the judiciary and the executive. [59] an important corollary to parliamentary sov- ereignty is the rule that the executive cannot unilat- erally fetter the legislature’s law- making power. this rule was illustrated in reference re anti‑ inflation act, [1976] 2 scr 373, in which this court was called upon to decide, among other things, whether an intergovernmental agreement between the gov- ernments of canada and ontario that purported to render certain portions of the federal anti‑ inflation act, sc 1974-75-76, c. 75, applicable to that prov- ince’s public sector could in fact achieve this end. writing for a court that was unanimous on this point, laskin cj answered this question in the negative, reasoning as follows: [traduction] toutes les lois, peu importe l’objet, sont susceptibles de contrôle au motif qu’elles portent at- teinte aux droits fondamentaux individuels ou collectifs que garantit la charte ou aux droits ancestraux prévus à [l’art 35] [  ]. en ce sens, le principe du constitutionna- lisme et la primauté du droit — qui exigent que tous les actes de l’état soient autorisés par la loi et conformes aux exigences constitutionnelles — ont maintenant restreint de façon importante le principe de la suprématie parlemen- taire au canada. [p. 86] [58] dans le renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, [1998] 2 rcs 217, la cour a fait observer que, « dans une large mesure, l’adoption de la charte avait fait passer le système canadien de gouverne- ment de la suprématie parlementaire à la suprématie constitutionnelle » : par 72. cela est évidemment vrai, dans la mesure où la constitution apporte des limites aux pouvoirs de légiférer du parlement et des législatures provinciales, mais le principe de la souveraineté parlementaire reste un élément fon- damental de la structure de l’état canadien; outre ces limites constitutionnelles, le pouvoir législatif du gouvernement l’emporte toujours sur le pouvoir exécutif et le pouvoir judiciaire. [59] un important corollaire du principe de la sou- veraineté parlementaire réside dans la règle selon laquelle l’exécutif ne peut entraver unilatéralement l’exercice du pouvoir de légiférer de la législature. cette règle est illustrée par le renvoi relatif à la loi anti‑ inflation, [1976] 2 rcs 373, où la cour a été appelée à décider, entre autres choses, si un accord entre les gouvernements du canada et de l’ontario, qui était censé étendre l’application de certaines parties de la loi fédérale intitulée loi anti‑ inflation, sc 1974-75-76, c. 75, au secteur public de cette province, pouvait effectivement parvenir à cette fin. s’exprimant au nom de la cour, unanime sur ce point, le juge en chef laskin a répondu par la négative à cette question, expliquant ainsi son raisonnement : if the agreement alone has the effect contended for, it imposes the guidelines and accompanying sanctions on the provincial public sector, thereby altering the existing si l’accord seul a l’effet prétendu, il impose les indi- ca teurs et leurs sanctions au secteur public provincial et, par le fait même, modifie la loi existante de l’ontario et [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 227 law of ontario and precluding changes in that law that are inconsistent with the guidelines: see s. 4(1) of the anti‑ inflation act. i am unable to appreciate how the provincial executive, suo motu, can accomplish such a change. i agree, of course, that the executive or a minister author- ized by it may be the proper signatory to an agreement to which the government of ontario is a party. that, how- ever, is merely a formality of execution; and even if the agreement is binding upon the government of ontario as such, on the analogy of treaties which may bind the contracting parties but yet be without domestic force, that would not make the agreement part of the law of ontario binding upon persons purportedly affected by it. [emphasis added; pp 432-33] empêche d’y apporter des modifications incompatibles avec les indicateurs : voir art 4(l) de la loi anti‑ inflation. je ne vois pas comment le pouvoir exécutif provincial pourrait, de son chef, effectuer de tels changements. na- turellement, je suis d’accord que l’exécutif, ou un ministre autorisé par lui, peut régulièrement signer un accord au- quel le gouvernement de l’ontario est partie. toutefois, cela ne vise que la formalité de la signature; même si l’accord lie le gouvernement de l’ontario comme tel, par analogie avec les traités qui peuvent lier les parties contractantes mais sans avoir d’effet en droit interne, il ne devient pas une loi de l’ontario à l’égard des personnes qu’il prétend obliger à s’y conformer. [nous soulignons; p. 432- 433.] [60] the rule that the executive cannot bind the legislature is perhaps more clearly exemplified by the decision of supreme court of south australia in west lakes ltd. v. south australia (1980), 25 sasr. 389 — a decision that was cited by the majority of the quebec court of appeal in its reasons. at issue in west lakes was a provision in an agreement between the state of south australia and a land developer, which could be interpreted as giving the developer a veto over any amendment to the statute that enacted the agreement into law. when a bill to amend that statute was later introduced into the parliament of south australia, the developer sought a declaration that the covenants contained in the agreement were binding upon the state and an injunction restraining the state from taking any step or being party to any step to further the bill. the supreme court of south australia unanimously held that the developer was not entitled to such relief, relying in part on the prin- ciple of parliamentary sovereignty. of particular note for the purpose of these appeals, king cj stated that ministers of the state, as members of parliament, were “free to propose, to consider, to discuss, and to vote for any bill unconstrained by a contract entered into on behalf of the state” (pp 390-91). [60] la règle voulant que l’exécutif ne puisse lier la législature est peut- être encore plus évidente dans la décision rendue par la cour suprême de l’australie- méridionale dans l’affaire west lakes ltd. c. south australia (1980), 25 sasr 389 — une décision citée par les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel du québec dans leurs motifs. l’affaire west lakes portait sur une clause d’une entente entre l’état de l’australie- méridionale et un promoteur immobilier qui pouvait être interprétée comme conférant au pro- moteur un droit de veto sur toute modification à la loi de mise en œuvre de l’entente. plus tard, lorsqu’un projet visant à modifier cette loi a été déposé au parlement de l’australie- méridionale, le promoteur a demandé un jugement déclarant que les engagements pris dans l’entente liaient l’état, et une injonction empêchant l’état de prendre des mesures ou de par- ticiper à la prise de mesures visant à faire progresser le projet de loi. se fondant en partie sur le principe de la souveraineté parlementaire, la cour suprême de l’australie- méridionale a conclu, à l’unanimité, que le promoteur n’avait pas droit à une telle réparation. il convient tout particulièrement de souligner, aux fins des présents pourvois, que le juge en chef king a affirmé que les ministres d’état, en tant que députés, étaient [traduction] « libres de proposer, d’étudier, de discuter et de voter n’importe quel projet de loi sans aucune contrainte émanant d’un contrat conclu pour le compte de l’état » (p. 390- 391). [61] returning to the case at hand, the majority of the quebec court of appeal took issue with ss 42 and 5.5 of the memorandum, concluding that the combined effect of these sections is to fetter the [61] revenant à l’affaire qui nous occupe, les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont critiqué les art 42 et 5.5 du protocole d’accord, statuant que ces articles ont pour effet combiné d’entraver l’action 228 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. sovereignty of the legislatures of the participating provinces (at para 62). not only does this represent a misunderstanding of the terms of the memorandum themselves, but it also rests on the flawed premise that the executive signatories are actually capable of binding the legislatures of their respective juris- dictions to implement any amendments dictated by the council of ministers, and of precluding those legislatures from amending their own securities laws without the approval of the council of ministers. in light of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, this cannot in fact be the case. [62] when an action of the executive branch ap- pears to clash with the legislature’s law- making pow- ers, parliamentary sovereignty can be invoked for the purpose of determining the legal effect of the im- pugned executive action, but not its underlying valid‑ ity. for example, the executive of one province may act within the confines of its constitutional author- ity when entering into an intergovernmental agree- ment with that of another province. if a term in such an agreement purports to bind the province’s legis- lature, the result is not that the agreement itself is constitutionally invalid; the principle of parliamen- tary sovereignty simply means that the legislature’s hands cannot be tied, and therefore that the impugned term is ineffective. in other words, because the legis- lature’s law- making powers are supreme over the ex- ecutive, the latter cannot bind the former. the result is that any executive agreement that purports to fetter the legislature is not inherently unconstitutional, but will quite simply not have the desired effect. des législatures des provinces participantes : par 62. non seulement cette conclusion constitue-t-elle une mauvaise compréhension des modalités mêmes du protocole d’accord, mais elle repose aussi sur la prémisse erronée que les signataires représentant les différents pouvoirs exécutifs sont réellement ca‑ pables d’obliger les législatures dans leur territoire respectif à mettre en œuvre les modifications dictées par le conseil des ministres et de les empêcher de modifier leurs propres lois sur les valeurs mobilières sans l’approbation du conseil des ministres. compte tenu du principe de la souveraineté parlementaire, cela ne peut en fait être le cas. [62] lorsqu’une action du pouvoir exécutif semble être en conflit avec les pouvoirs de légiférer de la législature, la souveraineté parlementaire peut être invoquée pour déterminer l’effet juridique de l’ac- tion exécutive contestée, mais non sa validité sous- jacente. par exemple, l’exécutif d’une province peut respecter les limites de sa compétence constitution- nelle en concluant un accord intergouvernemental avec celui d’une autre province. si un tel accord contient une modalité censée lier la législature pro- vinciale, il ne s’ensuit pas que l’accord est lui- même constitutionnellement invalide; le principe de la sou- veraineté parlementaire signifie tout simplement que les mains de la législature ne peuvent être liées et que, par conséquent, la modalité contestée ne produit aucun effet. en d’autres termes, comme les pou- voirs de légiférer de la législature l’emportent sur les pouvoirs de l’exécutif, celle-ci ne peut être liée par ce dernier. il en résulte qu’un accord de l’exécutif censé entraver l’action de la législature n’est pas intrinsèquement inconstitutionnel; il ne produira tout simplement pas l’effet souhaité. [63] this understanding of the principle of par- liamentary sovereignty is firmly established in this court’s jurisprudence. the advisory opinion in ref‑ erence re canada assistance plan (bc) is par- ticularly illustrative in this regard. at the centre of that case was an agreement entered into in 1967 be- tween the governments of canada and british co- lumbia, pursuant to the canada assistance plan, sc 1966-67, c. 45 (“plan”). section 4 of the plan authorized the federal government to enter into agreements with individual provinces to share the [63] cette interprétation du principe de la souverai- neté parlementaire est bien établie dans la jurispru- dence de la cour. l’avis consultatif dans le renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada (c‑b) en est un bon exemple. un accord intervenu en 1967 entre les gouvernements du canada et de la colombie- britannique dans le cadre du régime d’assistance publique du canada, sc 1966- 1967, c. 45 (« régime ») était au cœur de cette affaire. l’article 4 du régime habilitait le gouvernement fédéral à conclure avec chaque province des accords [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 229 cost of expenditures on social assistance and wel- fare, and s. 5 authorized payments to each contract- ing province of roughly 50 percent of that province’s eligible expenditures. the plan also provided that any such agreement would continue in force so long as the relevant provincial law remained in operation (s. 8(1)), and could be amended or terminated only by mutual consent or by giving one year’s notice (s 8(2)). in response to a budget deficit, however, the federal government introduced legislation into parliament that would limit the growth of payments to financially stronger provinces — including british columbia — to less than 50 percent. this court re- jected the government of british columbia’s chal- lenge to the bill (which was eventually passed into law). sopinka j., writing for a unanimous court, held on the basis of the principle of parliamentary sover- eignty that parliament was free to amend the plan as it did, and that the terms of the agreement could not restrict its power to effect such change. on this, he specifically acknowledged that the federal executive “could not bind parliament from exercising its pow- ers to legislate amendments to the plan” (p. 548), and that parliamentary sovereignty “prevents a leg- islative body from binding itself as to the substance of its future legislation” (p 563). [64] a similar issue arose in wells v. newfound‑ land, [1999] 3 scr 199, in which this court con- sidered a claim for damages brought by mr. wells, a member of the public utilities board, after amend- ments made to the public utilities act, rsn 1970, c. 322, by the newfoundland house of assembly had led to his position being abolished. as per the terms of his appointment, he was entitled to serve as a commissioner of the board during good be- haviour until the age of 70. this court found that these terms were part of an enforceable contract of employment with the crown and could thus form the basis of a claim for breach of contract. relying on the opinion in reference re canada assistance plan, however, it unanimously affirmed that this employ- ment contract did not in any way fetter the house of assembly’s authority to restructure or eliminate the prévoyant le partage des frais engagés au titre de l’assistance publique et de la protection sociale, et l’art. 5 permettait de payer à chacune des provinces contractantes environ 50 pour 100 de leurs dépenses admissibles. le régime prévoyait également qu’un tel accord resterait en vigueur tant que la législa- tion provinciale était appliquée (par. 8(1)) et qu’il ne pouvait être modifié ou résilié que par consen- tement mutuel ou à la suite d’un préavis d’un an (par.  8(2)). toutefois, pour remédier à un déficit budgétaire, le gouvernement fédéral a déposé devant le parlement un projet de loi limitant l’augmentation des paiements effectués aux provinces les plus fortes financièrement, dont la colombie- britannique, à moins de 50 pour 100. la cour a rejeté la contesta- tion du gouvernement de la colombie- britannique à l’égard de ce projet de loi, qui a finalement été adopté. s’exprimant au nom d’une cour unanime, le juge sopinka s’est fondé sur le principe de la souve- raineté parlementaire pour statuer qu’il était loisible au parlement de modifier le régime comme il l’avait fait, et que les conditions de l’accord ne pouvaient restreindre son pouvoir d’effectuer pareille modifica- tion. à ce sujet, il a expressément reconnu que l’exé- cutif fédéral « ne pouvait prendre un engagement qui empêcherait le parlement d’exercer ses pouvoirs de légiférer pour modifier le régime » (p. 548), et que la souveraineté parlementaire « vient empêcher un corps législatif de se lier les mains en ce qui concerne la teneur de sa législation future » : p 563. [64] une question similaire s’est posée dans l’arrêt wells c. terre‑ neuve, [1999] 3 rcs 199, où la cour s’est penchée sur une action en dommages- intérêts intentée par m. wells, un membre de la pu- blic utilities board, après que des modifications à la public utilities act, rsn 1970, c. 322, apportées par l’assemblée législative de terre- neuve, aient mené à l’abolition de son poste. selon les condi- tions de sa nomination, il avait le droit d’exercer ses fonctions de commissaire à titre inamovible jusqu’à l’âge de 70 ans. la cour a conclu que ces conditions faisaient partie d’un contrat de travail exécutoire avec la couronne, et qu’elles pouvaient donc fonder une action pour rupture de contrat. se fondant sur le renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada, elle a toutefois confirmé à l’unanimité que ce contrat de travail ne limitait aucunement le 230 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. public utilities board pursuant to its constitutionally protected law- making powers. although this court found that mr. wells was still entitled to pursue a claim for breach of contract against the government of newfoundland, it relied on the principle of parlia- mentary sovereignty in affirming the primacy of the legislature’s will over acts of the executive. interestingly, in both reference re canada [65] assistance plan and wells, this court supported its decision by quoting the following passage from the supreme court of south australia in west lakes: pouvoir de l’assemblée législative de restructurer ou d’éliminer la public utilities board dans le cadre de l’exercice des pouvoirs de légiférer que lui garantit la constitution. bien que la cour ait conclu que m. wells avait toujours le droit d’intenter une ac- tion pour rupture de contrat contre le gouvernement de terre- neuve, elle s’est appuyée sur le principe de la souveraineté parlementaire pour confirmer la primauté de la volonté de la législature sur les actes de l’exécutif. [65] fait intéressant, tant dans le renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du canada que dans l’arrêt wells, la cour justifie sa décision en citant le passage suivant de la décision de la cour suprême de l’australie- méridionale dans l’affaire west lakes : ministers of state cannot, however, by means of contrac- tual obligations entered into on behalf of the state fetter their own freedom, or the freedom of their successors or the freedom of other members of parliament, to propose, consider and, if they think fit, vote for laws, even laws which are inconsistent with the contractual obligations. [p. 390] [traduction] les ministres d’état ne sauraient toutefois, au moyen d’obligations contractées pour le compte de l’état, imposer des restrictions à leur propre liberté, à celle de leurs successeurs ou à celle d’autres députés, de proposer, d’étudier et, s’ils le jugent opportun, de voter des lois, fussent- elles incompatibles avec les obligations contractuelles. [p. 390] [66] parallels can be drawn between the effect of executive agreements and that of international trea- ties. as the privy council explained in the labour conventions case (attorney‑ general for canada v. attorney‑ general for ontario, [1937] ac 326 (pc)), at p. 348, the valid exercise of the federal government’s treaty- making power is distinct from the legislative enactment of such agreements into do- mestic law. though the federal government may have the authority to enter into international agreements upon subjects falling within the legislative compe- tence of the provinces, the individual provinces will only be bound by the terms of such an agreement once their respective legislatures enact them into law (thomson v. thomson, [1994] 3 scr 551, at pp. 611-12, citing p. w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (3rd ed. 1992), at p 294). [66] on peut établir un parallèle entre l’effet des accords exécutifs et ceux des traités internationaux. comme l’a indiqué le conseil privé dans l’affaire des relations du travail (attorney‑ general for can‑ ada c. attorney‑ general for ontario, [1937] ac. 326 (cp)), p. 348, l’exercice valide du pouvoir du gouvernement fédéral de conclure des traités se dis- tingue de l’adoption de ces traités en droit interne. bien que le gouvernement fédéral ait le pouvoir de conclure des accords internationaux sur des sujets relevant de la compétence législative des provinces, les différentes provinces ne seront liées par les mo- dalités d’un tel accord que lorsque leur législature respective aura légiféré pour les adopter : thomson c. thomson, [1994] 3 rcs 551, p. 611- 612, citant p w hogg,. constitutional law of canada (3e éd. 1992), p 294. [67] in short, the foregoing makes clear that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is precisely what preserves the provincial legislatures’ right to enact, amend and repeal their securities legislation [67] en somme, il ressort clairement de ce qui précède que le principe de la souveraineté parle- mentaire est précisément ce qui protège le droit des législatures provinciales d’adopter, de modifier [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 231 independently of the council of ministers’ approval. therefore, even if the memorandum actually pur- ported to fetter this legislative power, it would be merely ineffective in this regard (since it cannot bind the legislature), and not constitutionally invalid. et d’abroger leurs lois relatives aux valeurs mobi- lières indépendamment de l’approbation du conseil des ministres. par conséquent, même si le protocole d’accord devait réellement viser à entraver l’exer- cice de ce pouvoir de légiférer, il serait tout sim- plement inopérant à cet égard — puisqu’il ne peut lier la législature — et non constitutionnellement invalide. (c) political and legal effects c) les effets politiques et juridiques [68] we would pause at this juncture to distin- guish the memorandum’s political effects from its legal effects. while the memorandum does not and cannot legally bind the participating provinces’ re- spective legislatures, its political objective is never- theless to achieve uniformity in provincial securities laws across canada (memorandum, s 1). achiev- ing such uniformity will effectively require that the legislatures of the participating provinces en- act a statute that mirrors the model provincial act, as amended from time to time. the memorandum therefore envisages an important role for the council of ministers; provinces that wish to participate in this coordinated approach to the regulation of capital markets will likely find it necessary to implement any amendments to the model provincial act that may be proposed and approved by the council of minis- ters. practically speaking, therefore, the council of ministers may well play an important political role in the area of securities regulation if the cooperative system operates as planned. [68] nous ouvrons ici une parenthèse pour distin- guer les effets politiques du protocole d’accord de ses effets juridiques. s’il est vrai que le protocole d’accord ne lie pas ni ne saurait lier juridiquement les législatures respectives des provinces participantes, son objectif politique n’en est pas moins d’assurer l’uniformité des lois provinciales sur les valeurs mobilières dans l’ensemble du canada (protocole d’accord, art 1). pour atteindre une telle uniformité, les législatures des provinces participantes devront, en fait, adopter une loi qui reflète en tous points la loi provinciale type, avec ses modifications successives. le protocole d’accord prévoit donc un rôle impor- tant pour le conseil des ministres; les provinces qui souhaitent participer à cette approche coordonnée en matière de réglementation des marchés de capitaux estimeront vraisemblablement nécessaire de mettre en œuvre toutes les modifications à la loi provinciale type qui pourront être proposées et approuvées par le conseil des ministres. sur le plan pratique, le conseil des ministres pourrait donc jouer un rôle politique important dans le domaine de la réglementation des valeurs mobilières si le régime coopératif fonctionne comme prévu. [69] the majority below went one step further. it rejected the proposition that the memorandum is merely a political undertaking that is not legally enforceable, and instead found it necessary to as‑ sume that the mechanisms set out in the memoran- dum — including the involvement of the council of ministers in proposing and approving legisla- tive amendments — will have their intended effect (para 70). with this, we do not agree: the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is precisely the rea- son why we cannot rely on such an assumption. any de facto control that the executive may be [69] les juges majoritaires en appel sont allés plus loin. ils ont rejeté la thèse voulant que le protocole d’accord ne soit qu’un engagement politique n’ayant aucune force exécutoire et ont plutôt conclu qu’il fallait présumer que les mécanismes prévus dans le protocole d’accord — notamment la participation du conseil des ministres à la proposition et à l’approba- tion des modifications législatives — auront l’effet recherché : par 70. nous ne pouvons souscrire à cette conclusion; le principe de la souveraineté parlemen- taire est précisément ce qui nous empêche d’être en accord avec une telle présomption. le fait que l’on 232 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. said to have over the legislature is irrelevant to our analysis: it is of no avail to point to the fusion of powers which characterizes the westminster system of government. that the executive through its control of a house of commons majority may in practice dictate the position the house of commons takes on the scope of parliament’s auditing function is not, with all respect to the contrary position taken by jerome acj, constitutionally cognizable by the judiciary. puisse dire que l’exécutif exerce un contrôle de fait sur la législature n’est pas pertinent dans le cadre de notre analyse : il ne sert à rien d’insister sur la centralisation des pou- voirs qui caractérise le système de gouvernement hérité de westminster. avec égards pour l’opinion contraire du juge en chef adjoint jerome, la possibilité que, grâce à sa majorité à la chambre des communes, l’exécutif dicte en pratique à cette dernière la position qu’elle doit prendre quant à l’étendue des attributions du parlement en matière de vérification, ne relève pas sur le plan constitutionnel de la compétence du judiciaire. (canada (auditor general) v. canada (minister of energy, mines and resources), [1989] 2 scr 49, at p. 103) (canada (vérificateur général) c. canada (ministre de l’énergie, des mines et des ressources), [1989] 2 rcs 49, p. 103) although the executive signatories may at present view uniformity in securities laws as a desirable goal, the sovereign and democratic will of their re- spective legislatures entitles the latter to disagree, or to change their mind at some point in the future. [70] we also recognize that the operation of the cooperative system will require a significant com- mitment from its participants. for example, the par- ticipating provinces will be required to effectively dissolve their existing securities commissions, and to merge the administration of those commissions into the authority’s organizational structure (as con- templated in ss 92 and 9.3 of the memorandum). once this has been done, it would undoubtedly be impractical for those provinces to extricate them- selves from the cooperative system at a later date. although these practical considerations are of no consequence to this court’s analysis, they are likely to weigh heavily in the exercise of each jurisdiction’s sovereign will — especially given that, at present, no draft of the authority’s enabling legislation has yet been published. même si les signataires représentant les différents pouvoirs exécutifs peuvent aujourd’hui être d’avis que l’uniformité des lois sur les valeurs mobilières est un objectif souhaitable, la volonté souveraine et démocratique de leur législature respective permet à ces législatures de ne pas être d’accord ou de changer d’idée dans un avenir plus ou moins proche. [70] nous reconnaissons également que la mise en œuvre du régime coopératif nécessitera un en- gagement important de la part de ses participants. par exemple, les provinces participantes devront effectivement dissoudre leur commission des valeurs mobilières existante et en fusionner l’administra- tion avec la structure organisationnelle de l’autorité (comme le prévoient les art 92 et 9.3 du protocole d’accord). une fois cela fait, il sera sans doute très difficile, en pratique, pour ces provinces de s’extirper du régime coopératif à une date ultérieure. même si ces considérations d’ordre pratique n’ont aucune incidence sur l’analyse de la cour, elles risquent de peser lourd dans l’exercice de la volonté souveraine de chaque province — surtout compte tenu du fait que, à l’heure actuelle, aucune ébauche de la loi habilitante de l’autorité n’a été présentée. [71] to conclude on this point, we are of the view that neither the principle of parliamentary sover- eignty nor the terms of the memorandum themselves allow us to conclude, as did the majority of the court [71] pour conclure sur ce point, nous sommes d’avis que ni le principe de la souveraineté parlemen- taire ni les modalités du protocole d’accord comme telles ne nous permettent de conclure, comme l’ont [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 233 of appeal, that this cooperative agreement either is capable of binding, or purports to bind, the legis- latures of the various participating provinces. as is clear from the foregoing, legislatures in canada are constrained only by the constitution — and are oth- erwise free to enact laws that they consider desirable and politically appropriate. fait les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel, que cet accord de coopération est capable de lier les législatures des différentes provinces participantes ou qu’il vise à le faire. comme il ressort clairement de ce qui précède, les législatures canadiennes ont pour seule contrainte la constitution; elles sont par ailleurs libres d’adopter les lois qu’elles estiment souhaitables et appropriées sur le plan politique. (2) delegation of law- making powers (2) la délégation des pouvoirs de légiférer [72] a second (and related) basis upon which the attorney general of quebec claims that the cooper- ative system is unconstitutional pertains to the limits on a legislature’s authority to delegate law- making powers to some separate person or body. quebec submits that the memorandum effectively requires that each participating province transfer the power to unilaterally amend its securities legislation to the council of ministers. this is because, on quebec’s interpretation of the memorandum, the legislature of each participating province (a) will be obliged to enact the provisions of the model provincial act into law and to implement any amendments to those pro- visions that are approved by the council of ministers, and (b) will be otherwise prohibited from amending that legislation. quebec claims that this amounts to a direct transfer of legislative authority from the legis- latures of the participating provinces to the council of ministers, the result being that those provinces will effectively surrender their ability to legislate in respect of the regulation of capital markets. [72] le deuxième motif (connexe au premier) sur lequel s’appuie la procureure générale du québec pour affirmer que le régime coopératif est inconsti- tutionnel concerne les limites imposées au pouvoir des législatures de déléguer des pouvoirs de légiférer à une personne ou un organisme. le québec soutient que le protocole d’accord oblige en fait chacune des provinces participantes à transférer le pouvoir de modifier unilatéralement sa propre législation en ma- tière de valeurs mobilières au conseil des ministres. il en est ainsi suivant l’interprétation du protocole d’accord par le québec, car a) les législatures des provinces participantes seront tenues d’adopter par voie législative les dispositions de la loi provinciale type et de mettre en œuvre toutes les modifications à ces dispositions qui seront approuvées par le conseil des ministres et b) il leur sera par ailleurs interdit de modifier leur loi. selon le québec, cela équivaut à un transfert direct de la compétence législative des législatures des provinces participantes au conseil des ministres, si bien que ces provinces renonceront en pratique à leur capacité de légiférer en matière de réglementation des marchés de capitaux. [73] before we address this issue, it is necessary to briefly explain the concept of delegation. parliamen- tary sovereignty means that the legislature has the authority to enact laws on its own and the authority to delegate to some other person or body certain administrative or regulatory powers, including the power to make binding but subordinate rules and regulations. accordingly, the power to make such rules and regulations is sometimes referred to as a “subordinate law- making power”. this kind of del- egation occurs quite frequently in the administrative state, where statutory schemes often merely “set out the legislature’s basic objects”, such that “most of the [73] avant d’aborder cette question, il est néces- saire d’expliquer brièvement la notion de délégation. la souveraineté parlementaire signifie que la législa- ture a compétence pour adopter elle- même des lois et pour déléguer à d’autres personnes ou organismes certains pouvoirs administratifs ou réglementaires, no- tamment le pouvoir de prendre des règlements contrai- gnants, mais subordonnés. c’est pourquoi le pouvoir de prendre de tels règlements est parfois qualifié de « pouvoir législatif subordonné ». ce type de déléga- tion se produit assez fréquemment dans l’état adminis- tratif, où les régimes législatifs se contentent souvent d’énoncer « les grands objectifs [  ] arrêtés par le 234 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. heavy lifting [gets] done by regulations, adopted by the executive branch of government under orders-in- council” (b. mclachlin, pc,. administrative tribu‑ nals and the courts: an evolutionary relationship, may 27, 2013 (online), see also hogg (5th ed.), at pp. 14-1 and 14-2). législateur », de sorte que « le gros de la gouvernance se fai[t] désormais par voie réglementaire, conformé- ment à des décrets de l’exécutif » : b. mclachlin, cp,. tribunaux administratifs et tribunaux judiciaires : une relation en évolution, 27 mai 2013 (en ligne); voir aussi hogg (5e éd.), p. 14-1 et 14-2. [74] it should be noted that a delegated power is rooted in and limited by the governing statute, which of course takes precedence over every exercise of that power. more importantly, the sovereign legis- lature always ultimately retains the complete au- thority to revoke any such delegated power (hodge, at p. 132; r. tuck, “delegation — a way over the constitutional hurdle” (1945), 23 can. bar rev. 79, at p 89). [74] il convient de souligner que le pouvoir dé- légué trouve sa source dans la loi habilitante et est limité par celle-ci, laquelle loi habilitante a évidem- ment préséance sur tout exercice de ce pouvoir. fait plus important, la législature souveraine conserve toujours ultimement le pouvoir absolu de révoquer tout pouvoir ainsi délégué : hodge, p. 132; r. tuck, « delegation — a way over the constitutional hur- dle » (1945), 23 r du b can. 79, p 89. [75] while it is true that a legislature has broad authority to delegate subordinate law- making powers to a person or administrative body, canadian courts have nevertheless espoused the principle that a leg- islature of one level of government may not delegate to a legislature of the other level its primary authority to legislate — that is, its authority to enact, amend and repeal statutes — in respect of matters that fall within its exclusive jurisdiction under part vi of the constitution act, 1867. this was made clear in attorney general of nova scotia v. attorney general of canada, [1951] scr 31, which concerned a bill that provided for the delegation of nova scotia’s jurisdiction over employment in certain industries to parliament, and the delegation of federal juris- diction over indirect taxation to the legislature of nova scotia. at issue was whether parliament and a provincial legislature could, by statutory enactment, delegate or transfer their exclusive jurisdiction to legislate in respect of particular subject matters to one another. this court held that they could not, reasoning that the bill had the effect of redistribut- ing jurisdiction over these heads of power in a way that would be fundamentally incompatible with the division of federal and provincial powers as set out in ss. 91 and 92 of the constitution act, 1867. it was on this basis that the proposed bill was deemed unconstitutional. [75] s’il est vrai que la législature dispose de vastes pouvoirs l’autorisant à déléguer des pouvoirs de prendre des mesures législatives subordonnées à une personne ou à un organisme administratif, les tribu- naux canadiens ont néanmoins adopté le principe se- lon lequel la législature d’un ordre de gouvernement ne peut déléguer à la législature d’un autre ordre son pouvoir de légiférer primaire — c’est-à-dire son pou- voir d’adopter, de modifier et d’abroger des lois — relativement aux matières relevant de sa compétence exclusive selon la partie vi de la loi constitution‑ nelle de 1867. c’est ce qui a été clairement établi dans attorney general of nova scotia c. attorney general of canada, [1951] rcs 31, qui portait sur un pro- jet de loi prévoyant la délégation au parlement de la compétence de la nouvelle- écosse en matière d’em- ploi dans certains secteurs, et la délégation à la législa- ture de la nouvelle- écosse de la compétence fédérale en matière de taxation indirecte. il s’agissait de savoir si le parlement et la législature provinciale pouvaient, par l’adoption d’un texte législatif, se déléguer ou se transférer mutuellement leur pouvoir exclusif de lé- giférer relativement à un objet en particulier. la cour a conclu qu’il ne leur était pas possible le faire, esti- mant que le projet de loi avait pour effet de redistribuer la compétence à l’égard de ces chefs de compétence d’une manière qui serait fondamentalement incompa- tible avec le partage constitutionnel des compétences fédérales et provinciales établi aux art. 91 et 92 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. c’est sur ce fondement que le projet de loi a été jugé inconstitutionnel. [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 235 [76] to put it simply: while parliament or a provin- cial legislature may delegate the regulatory authority to make subordinate laws (like binding rules and regulations) in respect of matters over which it has jurisdiction to another person or body, it is neverthe- less barred from transferring its primary legislative authority — that is, its authority to enact, amend and repeal statutes — with respect to a particular matter over which it has exclusive constitutional jurisdiction to a legislature of the other level of government. [76] pour dire les choses simplement, bien que le parlement ou une législature provinciale puisse déléguer à une autre personne ou un autre organisme le pouvoir de réglementation permettant d’adopter des mesures législatives subordonnées (comme des règles et des règlements contraignants) sur des ma- tières qui relèvent de sa compétence, il lui est interdit de transférer à une législature de l’autre ordre de gouvernement sa compétence législative primaire — c’est-à-dire le pouvoir d’adopter, de modifier et d’abroger des lois — sur une matière en particulier à l’égard de laquelle la constitution lui confère la compétence exclusive. [77] before this court, the attorney general of quebec contends that the memorandum is designed to implement the very type of scheme that this court prohibited in nova scotia: [77] devant notre cour, la procureure générale du québec prétend que le protocole d’accord est conçu de façon à mettre en place le type même de régime interdit par la cour dans l’arrêt nova scotia : even though the delegation will not be made to a tradi- tional legislature, it will be made to a body that, for all intents and purposes, will exercise legislative powers. the decisive criterion is that each participating province will surrender its jurisdiction over securities. [rf, at para. 78] in quebec’s submission, therefore, nova scotia should be understood as prohibiting both the direct transfer of power from one legislature to another and “any scheme resulting in substantially similar effects, namely, the centralization, transfer, abdica- tion or delegation of provincial legislative powers” (rf at para 72). underlying this submission is the principle that a provincial legislature lacks the power to transfer its primary legislative authority to any other person or body — in this case, the council of ministers — so as to bypass the legislative process altogether. même si le destinataire de la délégation n’est pas une législature traditionnelle, il s’agit d’un organe qui exer- cera, à toutes fins utiles, un pouvoir législatif. le critère déterminant est que chaque province participante aban- donne sa compétence en matière de valeurs mobilières. [mi, par. 78] selon le québec, l’arrêt nova scotia devrait donc être interprété comme interdisant à la fois le transfert direct de pouvoirs d’une législature à une autre et « tout mécanisme qui entraîne des effets substantiel- lement semblables, c’est-à-dire la centralisation, le transfert, l’abdication ou la délégation d’une com- pétence législative provinciale » : mi, par 72. cet argument repose sur le principe suivant lequel la législature provinciale ne peut transférer sa compé- tence législative primaire à une autre personne ou un autre organisme — en l’espèce, le conseil des ministres — de manière à court- circuiter le processus législatif. [78] we respectfully reject this argument on the basis that it rests on a misunderstanding of how the cooperative system was designed to operate. neither the memorandum nor the model provincial act empowers the council of ministers to unilaterally amend the provinces’ securities legislation. further, no part of the cooperative system imposes any le‑ gal limit on the participating provinces’ legislative [78] en toute déférence, nous rejetons cet argu- ment, au motif qu’il représente une mauvaise com- préhension de la façon dont le régime coopératif a été conçu pour fonctionner. ni le protocole d’accord ni la loi provinciale type n’habilite le conseil des ministres à modifier unilatéralement la législation des provinces en matière de valeurs mobilières. de plus, le régime coopératif n’impose aucune limite 236 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. authority to enact, amend and repeal their respective securities laws as they see fit. [79] what this means is that the council of min- isters’ role in approving amendments to the model provincial act is plainly distinguishable from the delegation of primary legislative authority that was prohibited in nova scotia. whereas in nova scotia the impugned bill would have permitted parliament to legislate directly in respect of certain provincial matters and the legislature of nova scotia to legis- late directly in respect of certain federal matters, the cooperative system does not allow the council of ministers to bypass the provincial legislatures at all; its role is instead to make amendments to a model statute that has no force of law until a provincial legislature gives it such force. for this reason, the proper implementation of the cooperative system in accordance with the terms of the memorandum will not result in any abdication of a participating province’s primary legislative authority. juridique au pouvoir législatif des provinces partici- pantes d’adopter, de modifier et d’abroger leurs lois respectives en matière de valeurs mobilières comme elles l’entendent. [79] ainsi, le rôle du conseil des ministres dans l’approbation des modifications à la loi provinciale type se distingue clairement de la délégation de la compétence législative primaire interdite dans l’arrêt nova scotia. alors que dans cet arrêt, le projet de loi contesté aurait permis au parlement de légiférer directement sur des matières provinciales et à la législature de la nouvelle- écosse de légiférer direc‑ tement sur des matières fédérales, le régime coopé- ratif ne permet aucunement au conseil des ministres de court- circuiter les législatures provinciales; son rôle consiste plutôt à modifier une loi type qui n’a pas force de loi tant qu’une législature provinciale ne la lui donne pas. pour ce motif, s’il est mis en œuvre correctement, conformément aux modalités du protocole d’accord, le régime coopératif n’en- traînera en aucun cas l’abdication de la compétence législative primaire des provinces participantes. [80] we similarly reject the proposition that the terms of the memorandum (s 55 in particular) have the effect of creating “an unprecedented legislative body” — ie the council of ministers — “whose establishment is incompatible with the current archi- tecture of the constitution” (rf, at para 95). again, because the provisions of the model provincial act (as amended from time to time by the council of ministers) will only have the force of law if and when they are properly enacted by the legislature of a participating province, the council of ministers is and remains subordinate to the sovereign will of the legislature. [80] nous rejetons également la thèse voulant que les modalités du protocole d’accord (l’art 55 en particulier) aient pour effet de créer « un organe lé- gislatif inédit » — le conseil des ministres — « dont la mise en place est incompatible avec l’architecture actuelle de la constitution » : mi, par 95. encore une fois, comme les dispositions de la loi provinciale type (avec leurs modifications successives par le conseil des ministres) n’auront force de loi qu’après avoir été dûment adoptées par la législature d’une province participante, le conseil des ministres est — et demeure — soumis à la souveraineté de la législature. (3) conclusion with respect to the first refer- (3) conclusion quant à la première question du ence question renvoi [81] in light of the arguments presented before us, we thus see no constitutional impediment to the im- plementation of the cooperative system in accord- ance with the terms set out in the memorandum. our answer to the first question posed by the reference is therefore: “yes”. [81] compte tenu des arguments qui nous ont été présentés, nous ne voyons aucun obstacle constitu- tionnel à la mise en place du régime coopératif selon les modalités énoncées dans le protocole d’accord. notre réponse à la première question posée par le renvoi est donc : « oui ». [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 237 b question #2: does the most recent version of the draft of the federal “capital markets stability act” exceed the authority of the parliament of canada over the general branch of the trade and commerce power under subsection 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867? b question no  2  : la plus récente version de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale intitulée « loi sur la stabilité des marchés des capitaux  » ex‑ cède‑t‑elle la compétence du parlement du ca‑ nada sur le commerce selon le paragraphe 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867? [82] the second question posed by this refer- ence raises the same issue as the one considered in reference re securities act: whether proposed federal securities legislation falls within parliament’s jurisdiction over trade and commerce, pursuant to s. 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867. before pro- ceeding, however, we wish to reaffirm that policy considerations and practical effects are irrelevant to the question before this court (see: reference re securities act, at para. 90; reference re firearms act (can.), 2000 scc 31, [2000] 1 scr 783, at para 18). our concern is with legislative compe‑ tence, not with policy. [83] in the court of appeal, the majority con- cluded that parliament has the constitutional author- ity to enact the draft federal act, with the exception of the provisions relating to the role and powers of the council of ministers in the making of federal regulations. it found that the pith and substance of the draft federal act is “to promote the stability of the canadian economy by managing systemic risks related to capital markets having the potential to have material adverse effects on the canadian economy” (para 128). characterizing the legislation in this manner, the majority relied on this court’s advisory opinion in reference re securities act to conclude that the draft federal act is intra vires parliament pursuant to the general branch of the trade and commerce power (paras 129-35). but the majority then held that ss. 76 to 79 of the draft fed- eral act, which require that the council of ministers approve all federal regulations, were irreconcilable with the purposes of the proposed federal legislation (paras 137-38). its conclusion was therefore that these provisions, unless removed from the legisla- tion, would render the draft federal act unconstitu- tional as a whole. [82] la seconde question posée par ce renvoi soulève la même question que celle examinée dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières : celle de sa- voir si une loi fédérale proposée sur les valeurs mobi- lières relève de la compétence conférée au parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce par le par. 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. avant d’aller plus loin, nous tenons toutefois à réaffirmer que les consi- dérations de politique générale et les effets pratiques n’ont rien à voir avec la question dont nous sommes saisis : voir renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mo‑ bilières, par. 90; renvoi relatif à la loi sur les armes à feu (can.), 2000 csc 31, [2000] 1 rcs 783, par 18. nous nous intéressons à la compétence législative et non aux enjeux de politique générale. [83] en cour d’appel, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que le parlement a le pouvoir constitutionnel d’adopter l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, à l’exception des dispositions portant sur le rôle et les pouvoirs du conseil des ministres à l’égard de la prise des règlements fédéraux. ils ont conclu que le caractère véritable de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale est « [de pro- mouvoir] la stabilité de l’économie canadienne par la gestion des risques systémiques liés aux marchés des capitaux qui sont susceptibles d’avoir des consé- quences négatives importantes sur l’économie cana- dienne » : par 128. ayant ainsi qualifié la loi, les juges majoritaires se sont fondés sur l’avis consultatif de la cour dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mo‑ bilières pour conclure que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale relève du volet général de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce : par. 129- 135. cela dit, les juges majoritaires ont ensuite statué que les art. 76 à 79 de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, qui exigent que le conseil des ministres approuve tous les règlements fédéraux, étaient irréconciliables avec les objets de la législation fédérale proposée : par. 137- 138. ils ont donc conclu que ces dispositions, si elles n’étaient pas retirées de la loi, rendraient l’ébauche de la loi fédérale inconstitutionnelle dans son ensemble. 238 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. [84] the dissenting judge, while in substantial agreement with the majority, would not have con- cluded that ss. 76 to 79 invalidate the draft federal act. in his view, parliament has the power to delegate the authority to make rules and regulations “in the manner it chooses, to whom it chooses” (para 206). he therefore did not consider the involvement of the council of ministers in the making of federal regulations to be problematic. [84] même s’il était d’accord pour l’essentiel avec les juges majoritaires, le juge dissident n’a pas conclu que les art. 76 à 79 invalident l’ébauche de la loi fédérale. à son avis, le parlement a le pouvoir de déléguer son pouvoir d’adopter des règlements « de la façon qui lui plaît et à qui bon lui semble » : par 206. la participation du conseil des ministres à la prise des règlements fédéraux ne posait donc selon lui aucun problème. [85] we agree with the dissenting judge, and therefore answer the second question posed by the reference in the negative. applying the principles de- veloped by this court in reference re securities act, we conclude that the draft federal act falls within parliament’s general trade and commerce power. moreover, the manner in which the draft federal act delegates the power to make regulations accords with parliament’s constitutional powers, which means that ss. 76 to 79 of the draft federal act have no impact on its constitutionality. [85] nous partageons l’avis du juge dissident et, par conséquent, répondons par la négative à la se- conde question posée par le renvoi. en appliquant les principes élaborés par la cour dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, nous concluons que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale relève de la compé- tence générale du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce. de plus, la façon dont l’ébauche de la loi fédérale délègue le pouvoir de prendre des règlements respecte les pouvoirs constitutionnels du parlement, si bien que les art. 76 à 79 de l’ébauche de la loi fédé- rale n’ont aucune incidence sur sa constitutionnalité. (1) constitutional validity of the draft federal (1) la validité constitutionnelle de l’ébauche de act la loi fédérale [86] the two- stage analytical framework for the review of legislation on federalism grounds is well established in the jurisprudence: quebec (attorney general) v. canada (attorney general), at para. 28; reference re securities act, at paras. 63-65; ref‑ erence re firearms act (can.), at para 15. at the first stage (the “characterization stage”), the court considers the law’s purpose and its effect with a view to identifying the true subject matter — the pith and substance — of the law in question. once the court has completed this exercise, it then moves on to the second stage (the “classification stage”) and deter- mines whether the subject matter of the challenged legislation falls within the head of power being relied on to support the legislation’s validity. where it does, the legislation will be upheld on the basis that it is intra vires, and therefore valid. [86] le cadre d’analyse en deux étapes applicable au contrôle d’une loi pour des motifs fondés sur le fédéralisme est bien établi dans la jurisprudence : québec (procureur général) c. canada (procureur général), par. 28; renvoi relatif à la loi sur les va‑ leurs mobilières, par. 63-65; renvoi relatif à la loi sur les armes à feu (can.), par 15. à la première étape (l’étape de la « qualification »), la cour doit examiner l’objet de la loi ainsi que ses effets afin de déterminer l’objet véritable — le caractère vé‑ ritable — de la loi en question. une fois qu’elle a terminé cet exercice, la cour passe à la deuxième étape (l’étape de la « classification ») et évalue si l’objet de la loi contestée relève du chef de compé- tence invoqué pour soutenir la validité de la loi. dans l’affirmative, la loi est confirmée puisqu’intra vires et, par conséquent, valide. (a) characterization of the draft federal act a) la qualification de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale [87] on the question of characterization, we agree with the majority of the court of appeal that the [87] en ce qui concerne la qualification, nous convenons avec les juges majoritaires de la cour [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 239 pith and substance of the draft federal act is “to control systemic risks having the potential to create material adverse effects on the canadian economy” (para 124). indeed, we find that the draft federal act’s purpose, its structure and the limits it imposes upon the exercise of the authority’s delegated power all support the conclusion that it has this narrow ob- jective. importantly, this singular focus distinguishes the draft federal act from the proposed canadian securities act at issue in reference re securities act, which went beyond the regulation of nationally sig- nificant systemic risk to regulate day-to- day aspects of the trade in securities as well (paras. 97 and 100). [88] the draft federal act’s preamble refers to “the stability of canada’s financial system” and to the “detection, prevention and management of sys- temic risk”. it adds that “events and circumstances in domestic and international capital markets can have a profound effect on the stability of canada’s financial system and on the canadian economy as a whole”. the dual purposes of the draft federal act are clearly expressed in s. 4: d’appel que le caractère véritable de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale est « d’endiguer les risques systémiques susceptibles d’avoir des conséquences négatives importantes sur l’économie canadienne dans son ensemble » : par 124. en effet, nous estimons que l’objet de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale ainsi que sa structure et les limites qu’elle impose à l’exercice du pouvoir délégué de l’autorité étayent tous la conclusion selon laquelle la loi fédérale poursuit cet objectif restreint fait important, cet objectif singulier distingue l’ébauche de la loi fédérale de l’ébauche de la proposition concernant une loi ca‑ nadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières en cause dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, qui ne se limitait pas à la réglementation du risque systémique d’une importance nationale mais visait aussi à réglementer les aspects courants du commerce des valeurs mobilières : par. 97 et 100. [88] le préambule de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale mentionne la « stabilité du système financier cana- dien » et le « repérage, la prévention et la gestion [  ] des risques systémiques ». il précise que « les réalités des marchés des capitaux intérieurs et internationaux et les événements qui s’y déroulent peuvent avoir de graves conséquences sur la stabilité du système financier canadien ainsi que sur l’ensemble de l’éco- nomie canadienne ». le double objet de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale est clairement exprimé à l’art. 4 : 4 the purposes of this act are, as part of the canadian 4 la présente loi a pour objet, dans le cadre du régime capital markets regulatory framework, canadien de réglementation des marchés des capitaux : (a) to promote and protect the stability of canada’s fi- nancial system through the management of systemic risk related to capital markets; and a) de promouvoir et de protéger la stabilité du système financier canadien par la gestion des risques systémiques liés à ces marchés; (b) to protect capital markets, investors and others from financial crimes. b) de protéger notamment ces marchés et les investisseurs contre les crimes financiers. this provision, when read together with the author- ity’s statutory mandate (s. 6), suggests that the fed- eral government’s role in regulating capital markets is limited to the detection, prevention and manage- ment of risk to the stability of the canadian economy, as well as to the protection against financial crimes. these stated purposes are not nearly as broad as those of the proposed legislation that was at issue lue en corrélation avec le mandat statutaire de l’au- torité (art. 6), cette disposition donne à penser que le rôle du gouvernement fédéral dans la réglementation des marchés de capitaux se limite au repérage, à la prévention et à la gestion du risque systémique pour la stabilité de l’économie canadienne, ainsi qu’à la protection contre les crimes financiers. tels qu’énon- cés, ces objets sont loin d’être aussi vastes que ceux 240 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. in reference re securities act, namely “to provide investor protection, to foster fair, efficient and com- petitive capital markets and to contribute to the in- tegrity and stability of canada’s financial system” (para 95). de la proposition de loi en cause dans le renvoi re‑ latif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, à savoir : « protéger les investisseurs, établir des mécanismes visant à garantir des marchés des capitaux équitables, efficaces et compétitifs et contribuer à l’intégrité et à la stabilité du système financier canadien » : par 95. [89] effect is given to the purposes listed in s. 4 by the substance of the draft federal act, the terms of which carefully limit federal authority to the man- agement of threats to the stability of the canadian economy. the regulatory powers authorized by the draft federal act are engaged solely when such threats may foreseeably affect national economic interests. [89] la teneur de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, dont les modalités limitent soigneusement le pouvoir fé- déral à la gestion des menaces à la stabilité de l’éco- nomie canadienne, donne effet aux objets énoncés à l’art 4. les pouvoirs de réglementation autorisés par l’ébauche de la loi fédérale n’entrent en jeu que lorsque de telles menaces peuvent de manière pré‑ visible nuire aux intérêts économiques nationaux. [90] the cornerstone of the draft federal act is the prevention and control of “systemic risk related to capital markets”, which is defined in s. 3 as follows: 3 in this act, systemic risk related to capital markets means a threat to the stability of canada’s financial system that originates in, is transmitted through or impairs cap- ital markets and that has the potential to have a material adverse effect on the canadian economy. for the purposes of this definition, systemic risk can be understood as having three constituent elements: (a) it must represent a threat to the stability of the country’s financial system as a whole; (b) it must be connected to the capital markets; and (c) it must have the potential to have a material adverse effect on the canadian economy. it is noteworthy that this definition does not encompass every economic risk that may relate to capital markets, but is limited to those that pose a sufficiently significant threat to the canadian economy. [90] la pierre angulaire de l’ébauche de la loi fé- dérale est la prévention et le contrôle du « risque systémique lié aux marchés des capitaux », terme défini à l’art. 3 de la façon suivante : 3 dans la présente loi, risque systémique lié aux mar- chés des capitaux s’entend d’une menace à la stabilité du système financier canadien qui, d’une part, émane des marchés des capitaux, est propagée au sein ou par l’en- tremise de ceux-ci ou les entrave et, d’autre part, est sus- ceptible d’avoir des conséquences négatives importantes sur l’économie canadienne. pour l’application de cette définition, le risque sys- témique peut être interprété comme se composant des trois éléments suivants : a) il doit constituer une menace à la stabilité du système financier du pays dans son ensemble; b) il doit être lié aux marchés de capitaux; et c) il doit être susceptible d’avoir des conséquences négatives importantes sur l’économie canadienne. il convient de souligner que cette défini- tion ne vise pas chaque risque économique pouvant être lié aux marchés de capitaux, mais seulement ceux qui constituent une menace suffisamment im- portante à l’économie canadienne. [91] the concept of “systemic risk” is invoked throughout the draft federal act as a means of lim- iting the scope of federal regulatory powers. this is made clear in part 2, which empowers the au- thority to make an order designating a benchmark as “systemically important” (s. 18) and to prescribe [91] la notion de « risque systémique » revient tout au long de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale pour limiter la portée des pouvoirs fédéraux en matière de régle- mentation. cela ressort clairement de la partie 2, qui habilite l’autorité à rendre une ordonnance désignant un indice de référence comme étant « d’importance [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 241 by regulation a product to be “systemically impor- tant” (s. 20) or a practice to be “systemically risky” (s 22). where such an order or regulation is made, the authority is also given the power to “prescribe requirements, prohibitions and restrictions” respect- ing these benchmarks (s. 19), products (s. 21) or practices (s 23). [92] the draft federal act constrains the exercise of each of these powers in several ways. first, the authority does not have the power to make any such designation or prescription unless the benchmark, product or practice “could pose a systemic risk re- lated to capital markets” (ss. 18 and 20). second, any regulations prescribing requirements, prohibitions or restrictions respecting a designated benchmark, product or practice may be made only “in order to address a systemic risk related to capital markets” (ss. 19 and 21). third, the authority’s power under s. 24 to make an urgent order can likewise be exer- cised only for the purpose of addressing “a serious and immediate systemic risk to the capital markets”. finally, in designating a benchmark or prescribing a product or practice, the authority must consider a number of factors, including whether there are any relevant existing provincial regulations (ss. 18(2), 20(2) and 22(2)). these requirements indicate that the effect of the draft federal act is to address any risk that “slips through the cracks” and poses a threat to the canadian economy (ca reasons, at para. 197 (per schrager ja, dissenting)). systémique » (art. 18) et à désigner par règlement un produit comme étant « d’importance systémique » (art. 20) ou une pratique comme « comportant des risques systémiques » (art 22). lorsqu’une telle ordonnance est rendue ou un tel règlement est pris, l’autorité est également habilitée à « prévoir des exigences, interdictions et restrictions » concernant ces indices de référence (art. 19), produits (art. 21) ou pratiques (art 23). [92] l’ébauche de la loi fédérale restreint l’exer- cice de chacun de ces pouvoirs de plusieurs façons. premièrement, l’autorité ne peut procéder à une désignation ou prévoir des éléments par règlement que si l’indice de référence, le produit ou la pratique peuvent « poser un risque systémique lié aux marchés des capitaux » : art. 18 et 20. deuxièmement, les rè- glements prévoyant des exigences, des interdictions ou des restrictions concernant un indice de référence, un produit ou une pratique ne peuvent être pris que « [p]our parer à un risque systémique lié aux mar- chés des capitaux » : art. 19 et 21. troisièmement, les pouvoirs permettant à l’autorité, en vertu de l’art. 24, de rendre une ordonnance d’urgence ne peuvent également être exercés que « pour parer à un grave et imminent risque systémique lié aux marchés des capitaux ». enfin, lorsqu’elle désigne un indice de référence, un produit ou une pratique, l’autorité doit tenir compte d’un certain nombre de facteurs, notamment la question de savoir s’il existe des rè- glements provinciaux pertinents : par. 18(2), 20(2) et 22(2). ces exigences indiquent que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale a pour effet de parer à tout risque qui passe entre les « mailles du filet » et qui constitue une menace à l’économie canadienne : motifs de la ca, par. 197 (le juge schrager, dissident). [93] the same is true of part 1 of the draft federal act, which deals with the collection and disclosure of information. section 9 confers on the authority the power to make regulations pertaining to the keeping and provision of records and information, but only for the purposes of “monitoring activity in capital markets or detecting, identifying or mitigating sys- temic risk related to capital markets”, or “conducting policy analysis related to the authority’s mandate and the purpose of [the draft federal act]”. similar restrictions are placed on the chief regulator’s [93] il en va de même de la partie 1 de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, qui porte sur la collecte et la com- munication de renseignements. l’article 9 habilite l’autorité à prendre des règlements concernant la tenue de dossiers et la conservation et la fourniture de dossiers et de renseignements, mais seulement en vue « de surveiller les activités menées sur les marchés des capitaux ou de repérer, de cerner ou d’atténuer les risques systémiques liés à ces mar- chés » ou « d’analyser les orientations concernant l’objet de [l’ébauche de la loi fédérale] et la mission 242 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. authority to require that records and information be provided to him or her (s. 10(1)) and on the author- ity’s right to disclose information obtained under the draft federal act to various specified bodies (s 15(1)). [94] part 3 of the draft federal act deals with the administration and enforcement of the act. it provides, among other things, for (a) the authority’s power to conduct inquiries into matters relating to compliance with the draft federal act (ss. 28 to 32), and (b) the power of a tribunal (which is to be established under legislation known as the capital markets regulatory authority act) to make certain orders where it is deemed “necessary to address a systemic risk related to capital markets” (s 39). parts 4 and 5 concern offences, and the validity of their provisions is not at issue in this court. part 6 contains various general provisions relating to the operation of the draft federal act, including the procedure for making regulations. parts 7 and 8 contain tran- sitional provisions and consequential amendments, respectively. [95] thus, unlike the proposed legislation that was at issue in reference re securities act, the draft federal act does not purport “to regulate, on an exclusive basis, all aspects of securities trading in canada” (reference re securities act, at para 106). it does not contain provisions that go to the day-to- day regulation of all aspects of securities trading, like requirements for the registration of dealers, prospec- tus filing and disclosure obligations. the extent to which the statutory powers under the draft federal act permit the regulation of these matters remains circumscribed by the requirement of systemic risk, which is a significant threshold that must be met be- fore those powers can be exercised (af (canada), at para 94). the management of risk which falls below this threshold — that is, risk that does not pose a threat to the canadian economy as a whole — lies outside the scope of the draft federal act. de l’autorité ». des restrictions similaires sont im- posées au pouvoir du régulateur en chef d’exiger qu’on lui fournisse des dossiers et des renseigne- ments (par. 10(1)) et au droit de l’autorité de com- muniquer des renseignements obtenus sous le régime de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale à certains organismes qui y sont précisés (par 15(1)). [94] la partie 3 de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale porte sur l’administration et le contrôle d’application de la loi. entre autres choses, a) elle habilite l’autorité à mener des enquêtes sur toute question concernant le respect de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale (art. 28 à 32), et b) elle habilite un tribunal — devant être établi conformément à une loi intitulée loi sur l’autorité de réglementation des marchés des capitaux — à rendre certaines ordonnances s’il l’estime « nécessaire pour parer à un risque systémique lié aux marchés des capitaux » (art 39). les parties 4 et 5 portent sur les infractions, et la validité des dispositions qu’elles contiennent n’est pas en cause devant nous. la partie 6 énonce les diverses dispositions générales relatives à l’application de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, y compris la façon dont les règlements doivent être pris. les par- ties 7 et 8 contiennent respectivement des dispositions transitoires et des modifications corrélatives. [95] ainsi, contrairement à la législation proposée qui était en cause dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, l’ébauche de la loi fédérale ne vise pas à « réglementer, à titre exclusif, tous les aspects du commerce des valeurs mobilières au canada » : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par 106. elle ne contient aucune disposition portant sur la réglementation des aspects courants du com- merce des valeurs mobilières, comme les exigences relatives à l’inscription des courtiers, au dépôt des prospectus et à la communication de renseignements. la mesure selon laquelle les pouvoirs prévus par l’ébauche de la loi fédérale permettent la réglemen- tation de ces matières demeure circonscrite par la présence obligatoire d’un risque systémique. cette exigence constitue un seuil élevé à atteindre avant que ces pouvoirs puissent être exercés : ma (canada), par 94. la gestion du risque qui ne franchit pas ce seuil — c’est-à-dire celui qui ne constitue pas une menace à l’économie canadienne dans son ensemble — échappe à la portée de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale. [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 243 [96] properly understood, therefore, the intention is not that the draft federal act will displace pro- vincial and territorial securities legislation. it was instead designed to complement these statutes by addressing economic objectives that are considered to be national in character. interprétée correctement, l’ébauche de la loi [96] fédérale ne vise donc pas à remplacer les lois provin- ciales et territoriales sur les valeurs mobilières. elle a plutôt été conçue de manière à compléter ces lois en s’attaquant aux objectifs économiques considérés comme de nature nationale. [97] when the draft federal act is viewed as a whole, its pith and substance clearly does not relate, as quebec suggests, to regulation of the trade in securities generally (rf, paras 111-16). rather, its subject matter accords with its stated purposes: “to promote and protect the stability of canada’s finan- cial system through the management of systemic risk related to capital markets” (s. 4(a)), and “to protect capital markets, investors and others from financial crimes” (s 4(b)). [97] si l’on considère l’ébauche de la loi fédérale dans son ensemble, il est clair que son caractère véritable n’est pas, comme l’affirme le québec, la réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobilières en général : mi, par. 111- 116. l’objet de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale concorde plutôt avec ses objectifs énoncés, soit « de promouvoir et de protéger la stabi- lité du système financier canadien par la gestion des risques systémiques liés [aux marchés de capitaux] » (al. 4a)) et « de protéger notamment ces marchés et les investisseurs contre les crimes financiers » (al 4b)). (b) classification of the draft federal act b) la classification de l’ébauche de la loi fédé‑ [98] we now turn to the question of whether the draft federal act, so characterized, falls within fed- eral jurisdiction. we observe, at the outset, that there is no dispute regarding parliament’s authority to enact the provisions related to criminality in capital markets (ie. parts 4 and 5). at issue is the validity of the balance of the draft federal act — that is, those portions that are regulatory in nature. [99] the attorney general of canada, supported by a number of interveners, submits that parliament has the constitutional jurisdiction to enact the draft federal act pursuant to the general trade and com- merce power, one of two branches of parliament’s ju- risdiction under s. 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867 (citizens insurance co. of canada v. parsons (1881), 7 app. cas 96 (pc), at p. 113; general motors, at pp 656-57). the other branch under s. 91(2) is the power over international and interprovincial trade and commerce. rale [98] nous passons maintenant à la question de savoir si l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, ainsi quali- fiée, relève de la compétence fédérale. d’entrée de jeu, nous tenons à souligner que nul ne conteste le pouvoir du parlement d’adopter les dispositions por- tant sur la criminalité liée aux marchés de capitaux (c-à-d les parties 4 et 5). ce qui est en cause, c’est la validité des autres dispositions de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale — c’est-à-dire celles qui sont de nature réglementaire. [99] le procureur général du canada, appuyé par un certain nombre d’intervenants, soutient que le parlement a compétence constitutionnelle pour adopter l’ébauche de la loi fédérale en vertu de la compétence générale en matière de trafic et de commerce, l’un des deux volets de la compétence que possède le parlement au titre du par. 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 : citizens insurance co. of canada c. parsons (1881), 7 app. cas. 96 (cp), p. 113; general motors, p. 656- 657. l’autre volet du par. 91(2) est la compétence en matière de trafic et de commerce internationaux et inter- provinciaux. 244 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. [100] the scope of parliament’s jurisdiction over trade and commerce has been greatly influenced by “the need to reconcile the general trade and com- merce power of the federal government with the provincial power over property and civil rights” (general motors, at p 659). the concern here is that an overly broad interpretation of the general branch under s. 91(2) could entirely supplant the provinces’ jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)) and over matters of a purely local nature (s. 92(16)), while an unduly narrow interpretation could leave this branch “vapid and meaningless” (general motors, at p 660). [101] bearing these concerns in mind, this court has developed an approach that seeks to limit the general branch to matters of a genuinely national scope — matters that are “qualitatively different from anything that could practically or constitution- ally be enacted by the individual provinces either separately or in combination” (attorney general of canada v. canadian national transportation, ltd., [1983] 2 scr 206, at p 267). the regulation of such matters, which are irreducible to individual transactions, specific industries or local markets, will necessarily transcend local concerns and must therefore, by their very nature, “be regulated fed- erally, or not at all” (reference re securities act, at para. 87; see also m. lavoie, “understanding trade as a whole in the securities reference” (2013), 46 ubc. l. rev. 157, at p 160). [100] la portée de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce a été grandement influencée par « [le] besoin de concilier la compé- tence générale en matière [de trafic] et de commerce que possède le gouvernement fédéral avec la compé- tence provinciale en matière de propriété et de droits civils » : general motors, p 659. l’inquiétude est qu’une interprétation trop large du volet général de la compétence conférée par le par. 91(2) puisse supplan- ter complètement la compétence des provinces sur la propriété et les droits civils (par. 92(13)) et sur les matières d’une nature purement locale (par. 92(16)), et qu’une interprétation trop étroite puisse quant à elle rendre cette compétence « insipide et dépour- vue de sens » (general motors, p 660). [101] compte tenu de ces préoccupations, la cour a élaboré une méthode visant à limiter le volet gé- néral aux matières qui sont de portée véritablement nationale, c’est-à-dire à celles qui sont « [d]u point de vue qualitatif [  ] différente[s] de ce que les provinces, agissant séparément ou conjointement, pourraient pratiquement ou constitutionnellement adopter » : procureur général du canada c. trans‑ ports nationaux du canada, ltée, [1983] 2 rcs. 206, p 267. la réglementation de ces matières, qui ne se limitent pas à des opérations individuelles, à des secteurs particuliers ou à des marchés locaux, transcende nécessairement l’enjeu local, et « c’est [donc] au fédéral — et à nul autre — qu’il appar- tient de [  ] réglementer » ces matières, compte tenu de leur nature : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 87; voir aussi m. lavoie, « understanding trade as a whole in the securities reference » (2013), 46 ubc. l. rev. 157, p 160. [102] this delicate balance between federal and provincial jurisdiction has been safeguarded by the application of several indicia that this court has rec- ognized as useful in identifying matters that prop- erly fall within the general branch under s. 91(2) (see: macdonald v. vapor canada ltd., [1977] 2 scr 134;. canadian national transportation, ltd.; general motors, at p. 662; kirkbi ag v. rivtik hold‑ ings inc., 2005 scc 65, [2005] 3 scr 302, at paras 16-18). these indicia assist the courts in an- swering the “ultimate question” with respect to clas- sification within the general trade and commerce [102] cet équilibre délicat entre les compétences fédérale et provinciales a pu être maintenu par l’ap- plication de plusieurs critères que la cour a jugé utiles pour déterminer les objets qui relèvent à juste titre du volet général du par. 91(2) : voir macdonald c. vapor canada ltd., [1977] 2 rcs 134;. trans‑ ports nationaux du canada, ltée; general motors, p. 662; kirkbi ag c. gestion rivtik holdings inc., 2005 csc 65, [2005] 3 rcs 302, par 16-18). ces critères aident les tribunaux à répondre à l’« ultime question » qui se pose lorsqu’il s’agit de classer une loi comme relevant de la compétence générale en [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 245 power: “whether the act, viewed in its entirety, ad- dresses a matter of genuine national importance and scope going to trade as a whole in a way that is distinct and different from provincial concerns” (reference re securities act, at para. 124; see also para 83). where a close examination of the statute yields an affirmative answer, the absence of federal power to legislate in respect of the subject matter would create a constitutional gap, which this court has described as “constitutional anathema in a fed- eration” (reference re securities act, at para 83). matière de trafic et de commerce : « la [l]oi, consi- dérée dans son entièreté, intéresse-t-elle une matière d’importance et de portée véritablement nationales touchant le commerce dans son ensemble et distincte des enjeux provinciaux » : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 124; voir aussi par 83. lorsqu’un examen attentif de la loi mène à une ré- ponse affirmative, l’absence de pouvoir fédéral de légiférer relativement à la matière créerait une lacune constitutionnelle qui, selon la cour, « répugne sur le plan constitutionnel à l’esprit fédératif » : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par 83. [103] the five general motors indicia are as fol- lows: [103] les cinq critères de l’arrêt general motors sont les suivants : (1) is the law part of a general regulatory scheme? (1) la loi s’inscrit- elle dans un régime général de réglementation? (2) is the scheme under the oversight of a regulatory (2) le régime fait-il l’objet de surveillance constante agency? par un organisme de réglementation? (3) is the law concerned with trade as a whole rather than with a particular industry? (3) la loi porte-t-elle sur le commerce dans son en- semble plutôt que sur un secteur en particulier? (4) is the scheme of such a nature that the provinces, acting alone or in concert, would be constitution- ally incapable of enacting it? (4) le régime est-il d’une nature telle que la cons- ti tution n’habiliterait pas les provinces, seules ou de concert, à l’adopter? (5) would a failure to include one or more provinces or localities in the scheme jeopardize its success- ful operation in other parts of the country? (5) l’omission d’inclure une seule ou plusieurs provinces ou localités dans le régime en compromettrait- elle l’application dans d’autres parties du pays? although these inquiries are neither exhaustive nor determinative of a law’s validity under the general trade and commerce power, affirmative answers to these questions will strongly suggest that the sub- ject matter of a federal enactment is “genuinely a national economic concern” (canadian national transportation, at p. 268; see also general motors, at p 662-63). bien que ces questions ne soient ni exhaustives ni déterminantes quant à la validité de la loi au regard de la compétence générale en matière de trafic et de commerce, des réponses affirmatives donnent forte- ment à penser que l’objet du texte législatif fédéral est « vraiment une question économique d’intérêt na- tional » : transports nationaux du canada, p. 268; voir aussi general motors, p. 662- 663. in general motors, affirmative answers with [104] respect to these indicia supported the validity of a federal statute that regulated anti- competitive behav- iour. dickson cj, writing for the court, described the impugned combines investigation act, rsc. 1970, c.  c-23 (now the competition act, rsc. 1985, c. c-34) as “a complex scheme of competition [104] dans l’arrêt general motors, des réponses affirmatives données à l’égard de ces critères sou- tenaient la validité d’une loi fédérale qui réglemen- tait les pratiques monopolistiques. le juge en chef dickson, s’exprimant au nom de la cour, a qualifié la loi contestée intitulée loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions, src 1970, c. c-23 (maintenant 246 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. regulation aimed at improving the economic welfare of the nation as a whole” which was “designed to control an aspect of the economy that must be reg- ulated nationally if it is to be successfully regulated at all” (p 682). the subject matter of the legislation therefore fell within parliament’s power over trade and commerce even though the provinces are also competent to “deal with competition in the exer- cise of their legislative powers in such fields as con- sumer protection, labour relations, marketing and the like” (p 682). [105] this court unanimously reached the op- posite conclusion in analyzing the constitutional validity of the proposed canadian securities act in 2011, finding that its enactment would be ultra vires parliament pursuant to the general trade and commerce power:    the day-to- day regulation of all aspects of trading in securities and the conduct of those engaged in this field of activity that the [challenged statute] would sweep into the federal sphere simply cannot be described as a matter that is truly national in importance and scope making it qualitatively different from provincial concerns. (reference re securities act, at para. 125) la loi sur la concurrence, lrc 1985, c. c-34) de « système complexe de réglementation de la concur- rence qui vise à accroître le bien- être économique du pays dans son ensemble », qui était « conç[u] pour surveiller un aspect de l’économie qui doit être régle- menté à l’échelle nationale si l’on veut que cet aspect soit réglementé efficacement » : p 682. l’objet de la loi relevait donc de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce même si les provinces peuvent également « traiter de concurrence dans l’exercice de leurs pouvoirs législatifs dans des domaines comme la protection du consommateur, les relations de travail, la commercialisation et ainsi de suite » : p 682. [105] la cour, à l’unanimité, est parvenue à la conclusion contraire lorsqu’elle a analysé la validité constitutionnelle de la proposition concernant une loi canadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobi‑ lières en 2011, estimant que son adoption excéderait la compétence générale du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce :    la réglementation courante de tous les aspects du commerce des valeurs mobilières et de la conduite des participants à ce secteur d’activités, que la [loi contestée] aurait pour effet de rattacher à la compétence fédérale, ne peut tout simplement pas constituer un enjeu d’importance et de portée véritablement nationales qui le rend différent, sur le plan qualitatif, des enjeux provinciaux. (renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 125) importantly, however, this court found that [106] some aspects of securities regulation are actually national in character (reference re securities act at paras. 6, 7 and 131). in particular, it recognized that the “preservation of capital markets to fuel canada’s economy and maintain canada’s financial stabil- ity” is one aspect of securities regulation that may fall within the general trade and commerce power (reference re securities act, at para. 114; see also paras. 97 and 123). this court therefore accepted that parliament is competent to enact legislation that pursues these “genuine national goals”, which include the management of systemic risk and na- tionwide data collection (paras. 121 and 123). this [106] fait important, cependant, la cour a conclu que certains aspects de la réglementation des valeurs mobilières sont en réalité de nature nationale : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 6, 7 et 131. en particulier, elle a reconnu que le « main- tien des marchés des capitaux pour nourrir l’écono- mie canadienne et assurer la stabilité financière du pays » est un aspect de la réglementation des valeurs mobilières qui pourrait relever de la compétence gé- nérale en matière de trafic et de commerce : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 114; voir aussi par. 97 et 123. la cour a donc reconnu que le parlement a compétence pour adopter une loi qui vise à atteindre de tels « objectifs véritablement [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 247 was central to this court’s analysis of the general motors indicia — particularly respecting the fourth inquiry, which pertains to the provinces’ capacity to implement the proposed regulatory scheme. [107] more specifically, this court endorsed the concept of “systemic risk” as a useful way to differ- entiate matters that are genuinely national in scope from matters of merely local concern. it accepted the definition of systemic risk as “risks that occasion a ‘domino effect’ whereby the risk of default by one market participant will impact the ability of others to fulfil their legal obligations, setting off a chain of negative economic consequences that pervade an entire financial system” (reference re securities act, para. 103, citing m j trebilcock,. national securities regulator report (2010)). this court also relied on expert evidence in concluding that “sys- temic risk is an emerging reality, ill- suited to local legislation” (para 104). [108] reference re securities act settled a num- ber of issues pertaining to the relationship between securities regulation and the general branch of the trade and commerce power under s 91(2). the guid- ance it offers will be helpful to us as we analyze the constitutional validity of the draft federal act in accordance with the general motors criteria. nationaux », comme la gestion du risque systémique et la collecte de données à l’échelle du pays : par. 121 et 123. il s’agissait d’un élément essentiel de l’ana- lyse de la cour quant aux critères établis dans l’ar- rêt general motors — particulièrement en ce qui concerne la quatrième question, qui porte sur la ca- pacité des provinces de mettre en place le régime de réglementation proposé. [107] plus précisément, la cour a souscrit à l’idée que le « risque systémique » peut servir à différen- cier les matières de portée véritablement nationale de celles qui sont seulement de nature locale. elle a accepté la définition suivante des risques systé- miques : [traduction] «    risques qui entraînent un “effet domino” où le risque de défaillance d’un participant du marché nuit à la faculté des autres de s’acquitter de leurs obligations juridiques et pro- voque une série de chocs économiques néfastes qui se répercutent dans l’ensemble d’un système finan- cier » : renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mo‑ bilières, par. 103, citant m j trebilcock,. national securities regulator report (2010). la cour s’est également appuyée sur la preuve d’expert pour con- clure que « les risques systémiques constituent une réalité émergente qui se prête mal à une législation locale » : par 104. [108] le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières a réglé un certain nombre de questions portant sur la relation entre la réglementation des va- leurs mobilières et le volet général de la compétence en matière de trafic et de commerce que confère le par 91(2). les enseignements énoncés dans ce renvoi nous aideront à analyser la validité constitutionnelle de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale au regard des critères établis dans l’arrêt general motors. [109] neither of the first two indicia is at issue here: it is common ground that the draft federal act creates a general regulatory scheme that operates under the oversight of a regulatory agency (rf, at para 124). [109] les premier et deuxième critères ne sont pas en cause en l’espèce; nul ne conteste que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale crée un régime général de régle- mentation qui fonctionne sous la surveillance d’un organisme de réglementation : mi, par 124. [110] regarding the third indicium, the attorney general of canada submits that the draft federal act is concerned with trade as a whole rather than with the regulation of the securities industry in particular. [110] quant au troisième critère, le procureur gé- néral du canada soutient que l’ébauche de la loi fédé- rale porte sur le commerce dans son ensemble plutôt que sur la réglementation du secteur des valeurs 248 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. the attorney general of quebec counters that secu- rities trading takes place within a specific industry or segment of the economy, and that the law applicable to it is therefore distinguishable from competition law or trade- marks law. [111] although this court held in reference re securities act that the impugned legislation in that case was concerned not with trade as a whole but rather with the regulation of the securities market in particular, the draft federal act is qualitatively dif- ferent. unlike the proposed canadian securities act, it does not “descen[d] into the detailed regulation of all aspects of trading in securities” (at para. 114 (emphasis in original)); rather, federal intervention in capital markets is instead limited to addressing issues and risk of a systemic nature that may represent a ma- terial threat to the stability of canada’s financial sys- tem. in other words, the regulation of systemic risk in capital markets goes to promoting the stability of the economy generally, not the stability of one eco- nomic sector in particular. securities transactions are one of the principal means by which money moves from suppliers to consumers throughout the country (reference re securities act, at para 113). for this reason, the draft federal act is not concerned only with regulating capital markets specifically, but in- stead addresses economic matters of national scope which transcend the concerns of any one province. it is therefore akin to the combines investigation act that was at issue in general motors, in that both are aimed at stamping out risks and practices that are un- healthy to the canadian economy. that parliament’s trade and commerce power is exercised in a way that affects particular industries is not inherently objec- tionable, so long as the focus of that exercise is on matters that affect trade as a whole. mobilières en particulier. la procureure générale du québec rétorque que le commerce des valeurs mobilières s’inscrit dans un secteur ou un segment de l’économie en particulier et que le droit qui lui est applicable se distingue ainsi du droit de la concur- rence ou du droit des marques de commerce. [111] s’il est vrai que la cour a conclu dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières que la loi contestée dans cette affaire ne portait pas sur le commerce dans son ensemble, mais bien sur la réglementation du marché des valeurs mobilières en particulier, l’ébauche de la loi fédérale est différente sur le plan qualitatif. contrairement à la proposition concernant une loi canadienne intitulée loi sur les valeurs mobilières, elle ne « se préoccup[e] [pas] de la réglementation détaillée de tous les aspects du commerce des valeurs mobilières » (par. 114 (en italique dans l’original)); l’intervention fédérale dans les marchés de capitaux se limite plutôt à s’occuper des problèmes et du risque d’une nature systémique pouvant constituer une menace réelle à la stabilité du système financier canadien. autrement dit, ré- glementer le risque systémique dans les marchés de capitaux vise à favoriser la stabilité de l’éco- nomie dans son ensemble et non celle de certains secteurs d’activités en particulier. les transactions de valeurs mobilières constituent l’un des principaux moyens par lesquels fournisseurs et consommateurs échangent de l’argent partout au pays : renvoi rela‑ tif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par 113. par conséquent, la portée de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale ne se limite pas à la réglementation des marchés de capitaux en particulier, mais vise plutôt des enjeux économiques de portée nationale qui transcendent les préoccupations de toute province. l’ébauche de la loi fédérale s’apparente donc à la loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions qui était en cause dans l’affaire general motors, en ce que les deux lois visent à enrayer des risques et des pratiques qui nuisent à la santé de l’économie canadienne. que la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce soit exercée d’une manière qui a des répercussions sur des secteurs en particulier n’est pas en soi répréhensible, dans la mesure où cet exercice porte essentiellement sur des matières touchant le commerce dans son ensemble. [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 249 [112] like the majority of the court of appeal, we can do no better than to reiterate what this court stated back in 2011: [112] à l’instar des juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel, nous ne pouvons faire autrement que de réitérer les propos qu’a tenus la cour en 2011 : we accept that preservation of capital markets to fuel canada’s economy and maintain canada’s financial stabil- ity is a matter that goes beyond a particular “industry” and engages “trade as a whole” within the general trade and commerce power as contemplated by the general motors test. legislation aimed at imposing minimum standards applicable throughout the country and preserving the sta- bility and integrity of canada’s financial markets might well relate to trade as a whole. (reference re securities act, para. 114) [113] turning now to the fourth indicium, we are of the view that the provinces, acting alone or in concert, would be incapable of enacting a scheme like the one set out in the draft federal act. relying on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, this court in reference re securities act observed that “[t]he provinces, acting in concert, lack the consti- tutional capacity to sustain a viable national scheme aimed at genuine national goals such as management of systemic risk or canada- wide data collection” (para. 121), given that each of the provinces “re- tain[s] the ability to resile from an interprovincial scheme” (para 119). in other words, the fact that any one province can opt against participating in (or can subsequently resile from) such a cooperative scheme could seriously impair that scheme’s capacity to pro- tect the canadian economy from systemic risk. the draft federal act, with its carefully tailored scope, constitutes a response to this provincial incapacity, with parliament stepping in to fill this constitutional gap. nous reconnaissons que le maintien des marchés des capitaux pour nourrir l’économie canadienne et assurer la stabilité financière du pays est une question qui va au- delà d’un « secteur » en particulier et met en jeu « le commerce dans son ensemble » visé par le pouvoir général en matière de trafic et de commerce au sens où il faut l’entendre selon le test formulé dans general motors. une loi qui vise à fixer des normes minimales applicables dans l’ensemble du pays et qui vise à assurer la stabilité et l’intégrité des marchés financiers du canada pourrait fort bien avoir trait au commerce dans son ensemble. (renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, par. 114) [113] en ce qui concerne maintenant le quatrième critère, nous estimons que les provinces, seules ou de concert, seraient incapables d’adopter un régime du type établi dans l’ébauche de la loi fédérale. se fondant sur le principe de la souveraineté parlemen- taire, la cour a fait observer dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières que « [l]es pro- vinces, agissant de concert, sont dépourvues de la capacité constitutionnelle de maintenir un régime national viable visant à atteindre des objectifs véri- tablement nationaux telles l’atténuation des risques systémiques ou la collecte de données à l’échelle nationale » (par. 121), étant donné que chaque pro- vince « pourr[a] toujours soustraire [son] adhésion à un régime interprovincial » (par 119). en d’autres termes, le fait qu’une province puisse choisir de ne pas adhérer au régime coopératif ou de se retirer d’un tel régime pourrait sérieusement nuire à la capacité du régime de protéger l’économie canadienne contre le risque systémique. l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, dont la portée a été soigneusement circonscrite, re- médie à cette incapacité des provinces, en faisant en sorte que le parlement intervienne pour combler cette lacune constitutionnelle. [114] we accept that the provinces can and do regulate systemic risk in their capital markets. however, our federalism jurisprudence supports the principle that a subject matter can have both federal [114] nous reconnaissons que les provinces peuvent réglementer, et réglementent, le risque sys- témique lié à leurs marchés de capitaux respec- tifs. toutefois, notre jurisprudence portant sur le 250 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. and provincial aspects (hodge, at p. 130; multiple access ltd. v. mccutcheon, [1982] 2 scr 161, at p. 181; rio hotel ltd. v. new brunswick (liquor licensing board), [1987] 2 scr 59, at p. 65; law society of british columbia v. mangat, 2001 scc 67, [2001] 3 scr 113, at para 23). in such a case, the double aspect doctrine permits the provinces to legislate in pursuit of a valid provincial objective and parliament to do the same in pursuit of a separate federal objective. while provinces have the capacity to legislate in respect of systemic risk in their own capital markets, they do so from a local perspective and therefore in a manner that cannot effectively address national concerns which transcend their own respective concerns. as this court made clear in multiple access ltd., at p. 175, “[t]he validity of the federal legislation must be determined without heed to the    [provincial] legislation” (see also: general motors, at pp 680-82). [115] our conclusion with respect to the fifth in- dicium largely flows from our conclusion as to the fourth. given our discussion on that subject, we are of the view that the effective management of sys- temic risk requires market- wide regulation, such that any one jurisdiction’s failure to participate would jeopardize the scheme’s successful operation. put simply, the management of systemic risk across ca- nadian capital markets must be regulated federally, if at all. once again, this court’s reasons in reference re securities act effectively compel an affirmative answer to the final inquiry: fédéralisme appuie le principe selon lequel un ob- jet peut avoir à la fois un aspect fédéral et un as- pect provincial : hodge, p. 130; multiple access ltd. c. mccutcheon, [1982] 2 rcs 161, p. 181; rio hotel ltd. c. nouveau‑ brunswick (commission des licences et permis d’alcool), [1987] 2 rcs 59, p. 65; law society of british columbia c. mangat, 2001 csc 67, [2001] 3 rcs 113, par 23. dans un tel cas, la règle du double aspect permet aux pro- vinces de légiférer pour réaliser un objectif provin- cial valide et au parlement de faire de même pour réaliser un objectif fédéral distinct. les provinces ont la capacité de légiférer relativement au risque sys- témique lié à leurs marchés de capitaux, mais elles le font d’un point de vue local et, par conséquent, d’une manière qui ne peut aborder des enjeux na‑ tionaux qui transcendent les préoccupations qui leur sont propres. comme l’a clairement indiqué la cour dans multiple access ltd., p. 175, « [i]l faut déter- miner la validité de la loi fédérale sans tenir compte de la loi [provinciale] » : voir aussi general motors, p. 680- 682. [115] notre conclusion quant au cinquième critère découle en grande partie de celle concernant le qua- trième. compte tenu de notre analyse à cet égard, nous estimons que la gestion efficace du risque systé- mique nécessite une réglementation du marché dans son ensemble, si bien que le fait pour une province de ne pas y participer compromettrait l’application du régime. en termes simples, c’est au fédéral qu’il ap- partient de réglementer, le cas échéant, la gestion du risque systémique dans les marchés de capitaux ca- nadiens. encore une fois, les motifs de la cour dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières commandent effectivement une réponse affirmative à la dernière question : the fifth and final general motors inquiry is whether the absence of a province from the scheme would prevent its effective operation. on lesser regulatory matters the answer might well be no. however, when it comes to genuine national goals, related to fair, efficient and com- petitive markets and the integrity and stability of canada’s financial system, including national data collection and prevention of and response to systemic risks — the answer must be yes — much for the reasons discussed under the fourth question. on these matters a federal regime would abordons maintenant la cinquième et dernière étape de l’analyse tirée de general motors : la non- adhésion d’une province au régime en entraverait- elle le fonction- nement? en ce qui a trait à des questions réglementaires de moindre importance, la question pourrait certainement appeler une réponse négative. or, lorsqu’il s’agit d’ob- jectifs véritablement nationaux, visant à favoriser des marchés équitables, efficaces et compétitifs et à assurer l’intégrité et la stabilité du système financier canadien, notamment par la collecte de données, la prévention des [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 251 be qualitatively different from a voluntary interprovincial scheme. [para. 123] in our view, the general motors framework [116] leads to the conclusion that the draft federal act addresses a matter of genuine national importance and scope that relates to trade as a whole. the pres- ervation of the integrity and stability of the canadian economy is quite clearly a matter with a national dimension, and one which lies beyond provincial competence. moreover, the fact that the federal gov- ernment’s foray into securities regulation under the draft federal act is limited to achieving these ob- jectives supports the validity of this proposed stat- ute. given our conclusions with respect to each of the general motors indicia, we therefore classify the legislation at issue in this case as falling within parliament’s power over trade and commerce pursu- ant to s. 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867. risques systémiques et l’intervention en cas de besoin, il faut répondre par l’affirmative — pour des raisons essen- tiellement identiques à celles avancées dans l’analyse du quatrième critère. dans ces derniers cas, un régime fédéral différerait, au plan qualitatif, d’un régime interprovincial à participation volontaire. [par. 123] [116] nous estimons que le cadre d’analyse établi dans l’arrêt general motors mène à la conclusion que l’ébauche de la loi fédérale porte sur une matière d’importance et de portée véritablement nationales touchant le commerce dans son ensemble. la préser- vation de l’intégrité et de la stabilité de l’économie canadienne est très clairement une matière qui a une dimension nationale et qui excède la compétence provinciale. de plus, le fait que l’intrusion du gou- vernement fédéral dans la réglementation des valeurs mobilières sous le régime de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale se limite à l’atteinte de ces objectifs appuie sa validité. compte tenu de nos conclusions quant à chacun des critères de l’arrêt general motors, nous classons la loi en cause comme relevant de la com- pétence générale en matière de trafic et de commerce conférée au parlement par le par. 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. (2) regulations under the draft federal act: sections 76 to 79 (2) les règlements pris sous le régime de l’ébau- che de la loi fédérale : les art. 76 à 79 [117] before concluding, we will briefly address the argument that the council of ministers’ role in the making of regulations under the draft federal act undermines the validity of this draft statute. the majority of the court of appeal accepted that this was a proper basis on which to find that the draft federal act is ultra vires. [117] avant de conclure, nous traiterons briève- ment de l’argument voulant que le rôle du conseil des ministres dans la prise de règlements sous le régime de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale en sape la validité. les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont reconnu qu’il s’agissait d’un motif valable pour déclarer l’ébauche de la loi fédérale ultra vires. [118] the involvement of the council of ministers in the making of regulations is set out in ss. 76 to 79 of the draft federal act. broadly speaking, those provisions require that the authority submit proposed regulations to the council of ministers for approval, and confer onto the council of ministers the power either to approve any proposed regulation, to reject it, or to return it to the authority for reconsideration. approval from the council of ministers, whether ex- press or implied, is necessary before a regulation can be made (see: s. 79 of the draft federal act). [118] la participation du conseil des ministres à la prise de règlements est énoncée aux art. 76 à 79 de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale. de façon générale, ces dispositions obligent l’autorité à remettre tout projet de règlement au conseil des ministres pour approbation et confèrent au conseil des ministres le pouvoir d’approuver le projet de règlement, de le rejeter ou de le renvoyer à l’autorité pour réexamen. l’approbation du conseil des ministres, qu’elle soit expresse ou implicite, est nécessaire à la prise du rè- glement : voir art. 79 de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale. 252 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. [119] the mechanism applicable to the approval or rejection of regulations by the council of ministers is set out in s 52 of the memorandum (reproduced above, at para 27). the majority below found that this section, when combined with ss. 76 to 79 of the draft federal act, confers on “a majority of min- isters responsible for regulating capital markets in the participating provinces, or a majority of minis- ters representing major capital markets jurisdictions (currently ontario and british columbia)”, a “veto right” over proposed federal regulations (para 87). in the majority’s opinion, the possibility of a pro- vincial veto “undermine[s] the constitutional foun- dation of the [draft] federal act” (para. 137), since it belies the idea that the legislation’s subject matter truly “relates to matters that transcend interests of a purely local and provincial nature” (para. 96; see also para 95). [120] the dissenting judge did not subscribe to the majority’s reasoning on this point. he observed that parliament may delegate regulatory authority over subject matters that fall within its jurisdiction, and can structure the internal processes of subordinate regulatory bodies in such manner as it deems most appropriate. in his view, how regulatory authority is delegated under the draft federal act cannot under- mine the act’s validity. [119] le mécanisme applicable à l’approbation ou au rejet des règlements par le conseil des ministres est établi à l’art 52 du protocole d’accord (reproduit précédemment, au par 27). les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont conclu que cet article, conju- gué aux art. 76 à 79 de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale, confère à « une majorité de ministres responsables de la réglementation des marchés des capitaux des provinces participantes ou une majorité de ministres représentant les provinces participantes ayant de grands marchés des capitaux (en l’occurrence la colombie- britannique et l’ontario) » un « droit de veto » sur les projets de règlement fédéraux (par 87). selon les juges majoritaires, la possibilité d’un droit de veto provincial « sape l’assise constitutionnelle de [l’ébauche de la loi fédérale] » (par. 137), car elle contredit l’idée que l’objet de la loi concerne réel- lement « des matières qui transcendent les intérêts de nature locale et provinciale » (par. 96; voir aussi par 95). [120] le juge dissident n’a pas souscrit au rai- sonnement des juges majoritaires sur ce point. il a fait remarquer que le parlement peut déléguer son pouvoir de réglementation à l’égard d’objets qui relèvent de sa compétence et organiser les processus internes des organismes de réglementation subor- donnés comme il l’entend. selon lui, la façon dont le pouvoir de réglementation est délégué en vertu de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale ne peut saper la validité de la loi. [121] we agree with the dissenting judge. there is nothing problematic about the way in which the draft federal act delegates the power to make regu- lations to the authority under the supervision of the council of ministers. [121] nous sommes d’accord avec le juge dissi- dent. il n’y a rien de problématique dans la façon dont l’ébauche de la loi fédérale délègue à l’autorité le pouvoir de prendre des règlements sous la super- vision du conseil des ministres. [122] at the outset, we note that the majority found that the mechanism for making regulations under the draft federal act effectively confers on the partici- pating provinces a “veto right”. it is clear from s 52 of the memorandum that any request by the council of ministers to have the authority reconsider a pro- posed regulation must be approved by a majority of the members of the council of ministers, and by one member representing the major capital markets jurisdictions and the federal government. moreover, [122] tout d’abord, nous soulignons que les juges majoritaires ont conclu que le mécanisme de prise de règlements prévu à l’ébauche de la loi fédérale confère effectivement un « droit de veto » aux pro- vinces participantes. le libellé de l’art 52 indique clairement que toute demande du conseil des mi- nistres visant à faire réexaminer un projet de rè- glement par l’autorité doit être approuvée par la majorité des membres du conseil des ministres et par un représentant des parties ayant de grands marchés [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 253 a decision to reject a proposed regulation after it has been reconsidered by the authority must be ap- proved by a majority of the members of the council of ministers and a majority of those members rep- resenting the major capital markets jurisdictions and the federal government. and it should be borne in mind that, in the absence of the requisite support for either a request to reconsider or a rejection, the regulation will be considered to have been approved by the council of ministers (s 52(a)). as a result, any attempts to block proposed federal regulations require the support of a majority of the council of ministers as well as some level of support from the major capital markets jurisdictions and the federal minister of finance. no one province can therefore be said to have a “veto” power in this respect; at most, it is possible for a group of provinces acting together to reject a proposed federal regulation. as we will explain, however, this is not problematic. [123] as noted above under the analysis of the first reference question, a corollary to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is that the legislature has the broad authority to delegate administrative pow- ers — including the power to make legally binding rules and regulations — to a subordinate body, like the governor general in council, the lieutenant governor in council, an administrative agency or a crown corporation. the draft federal act is an excellent example of this: it sets out a broad frame- work for the regulation of systemic risk in capital markets, but delegates extensive administrative pow- ers, including the power to make regulations, to the authority. we repeat that this form of delegation of administrative powers is entirely consistent with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, since the delegated authority can always be revoked by the sovereign legislature and its scope remains limited by and subject to the terms of the governing statute (r v. furtney, [1991] 3 scr 89). to borrow the words of the judicial committee of the privy council in hodge: de capitaux ou un représentant du gouvernement fédéral. de plus, la décision de rejeter un projet de règlement après son réexamen par l’autorité doit être approuvée par la majorité des membres du conseil des ministres et par la majorité des membres repré- sentant les parties ayant de grands marchés de capi- taux ou représentant le gouvernement fédéral. par ailleurs, il faut rappeler qu’à défaut de l’appui requis à l’égard d’une demande de réexamen ou d’un rejet, le règlement est considéré comme ayant été approuvé par le conseil des ministres : al 52a). ainsi, toute tentative visant à bloquer la prise de projets de rè- glement fédéraux doit obtenir l’appui de la majorité des membres du conseil des ministres en plus d’un certain appui des parties ayant de grands marchés de capitaux et du ministre fédéral des finances. on ne peut donc pas affirmer qu’une province a un pouvoir de « veto » à cet égard; il est tout au plus possible que des provinces agissent de concert en vue de rejeter un projet de règlement fédéral. comme nous l’ex- pliquerons, toutefois, cela n’est pas problématique. [123] comme nous l’avons souligné précédem- ment dans notre analyse de la première question du renvoi, le principe de la souveraineté parlemen- taire a pour corollaire que la législature jouit du vaste pouvoir de déléguer des pouvoirs administra‑ tifs — notamment le pouvoir d’établir des règlements juridiquement contraignants — à un organisme su- bordonné, comme le gouverneur général en conseil, le lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil, un organisme administratif ou une société d’état. l’ébauche de la loi fédérale en est un excellent exemple; elle énonce un cadre général pour la réglementation du risque systémique lié aux marchés de capitaux, mais dé- lègue de vastes pouvoirs administratifs, dont le pou- voir de prendre des règlements, à l’autorité. nous le répétons, cette forme de délégation de pouvoirs ad- ministratifs est tout à fait conforme au principe de la souveraineté parlementaire, car le pouvoir délégué peut toujours être révoqué par la législature souve- raine et sa portée demeure limitée par les termes de la loi habilitante et assujettie à ceux-ci : r c. furtney, [1991] 3 rcs 89. pour reprendre les propos du comité judiciaire du conseil privé dans hodge : it was argued at the bar that a legislature committing important regulations to agents or delegates effaces itself. [traduction] on a soutenu à la barre que la législa- ture qui confie la prise de règlements importants à un 254 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. that is not so. it retains its powers intact, and can, when- ever it pleases, destroy the agency it has created and set up another, or take the matter directly into its own hands. how far it shall seek the aid of subordinate agencies, and how long it shall continue them, are matters for each legis- lature, and not for the courts of law, to decide. [emphasis added; p 132] [124] this court has confirmed that the legisla- ture retains a significant degree of latitude in decid- ing how it will delegate administrative law- making powers pertaining to matters within its jurisdiction. while parliament cannot transfer primary legislative authority to a provincial legislature (and vice versa), this court has not taken issue with federal legislation that delegated administrative powers to a creature of a provincial legislature (pei. potato marketing board v. h. b. willis inc., [1952] 2 scr 392) or that incorporated by reference provincial legislation as amended from time to time (coughlin v. ontario highway transport board, [1968] scr 569). [125] it is therefore important to note the distinc- tion between the constitutionality of legislation and the legislature’s authority to delegate administrative powers to a subordinate person or body. even though a statute’s subject matter may fall within the juris- diction of the enacting legislature, that statute may still contravene the rule against legislative delegation if it purports to transfer primary legislative author- ity to the other level of government. conversely, a statute that delegates administrative powers, includ- ing a subordinate law- making power, to a statutory body may be struck down as unconstitutional if its subject matter is ultra vires the enacting legislature. in respect of matters over which a legislature has competence, however, the statutory delegation of administrative powers cannot undermine the under- lying validity of that statute itself. in the words of laskin cj in reference re agricultural products marketing association, [1978] 2 scr 1198, at p. 1225, “delegation    cannot impeach the assertion of power”. mandataire ou à un délégataire s’efface. ce n’est pas le cas. ses pouvoirs restent intacts, et elle peut, quand bon lui semble, mettre fin au mandat qu’elle a établi et en créer un autre, ou prendre elle- même les choses en main. la mesure dans laquelle elle fera appel à des mandats subordonnés et la durée pendant laquelle elle les maintiendra sont des questions qu’il appartient à chaque législature, et non aux cours de justice, de trancher. [nous soulignons; p 132] [124] la cour a confirmé que la législature con- serve une grande latitude pour déterminer la façon dont elle délègue des pouvoirs administratifs auto- risant la prise de mesures législatives se rapportant aux matières qui relèvent de sa compétence. s’il est vrai que le parlement ne peut transférer sa com- pétence législative primaire à une législature pro- vinciale (et vice- versa), la cour n’a rien perçu de problématique dans une loi fédérale qui déléguait des pouvoirs administratifs à une entité créée par une lé- gislature provinciale (pei. potato marketing board c. h. b. willis inc., [1952] 2 rcs 392) ou qui in- corporait par renvoi une loi provinciale et ses modi- fications postérieures (coughlin c. ontario highway transport board, [1968] rcs 569). [125] il importe par conséquent de souligner la distinction entre la constitutionnalité d’une loi et le pouvoir d’une législature de déléguer des pouvoirs administratifs à une personne ou un organisme su- bordonnés. bien que l’objet d’une loi puisse relever de la compétence de la législature qui l’a adoptée, cette loi peut néanmoins contrevenir à la règle in- terdisant la délégation de pouvoirs législatifs si elle vise à transférer une compétence législative primaire à l’autre palier de gouvernement. inversement, une loi qui délègue de simples pouvoirs administratifs, notamment le pouvoir de prendre des règlements, à un organisme créé par la loi peut être déclarée in- constitutionnelle si son objet excède la compétence de la législature qui l’a adoptée. s’agissant d’objets sur lesquels la législature a compétence, par contre, la délégation de pouvoirs administratifs prévue par une loi ne peut saper la validité sous- jacente de la loi elle- même. pour reprendre les propos du juge en chef laskin dans le renvoi relatif à la loi sur l’or‑ ganisation du marché des produits agricoles, [1978] 2 rcs 1198, p. 1225, la « délégation [  ] ne remet pas en cause la répartition des pouvoirs ». [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 255 [126] with this in mind, we turn to a second issue on the subject of the delegation of powers under the draft federal act: is the manner in which the draft federal act delegates law- making powers to the authority, under the oversight of the council of ministers, problematic from the perspective of feder- alism or the constitutional division of powers? in our view, the answer is quite clearly “no”. in exercising its sovereign legislative powers, parliament has the authority to confer on a statutory body — in this case, the council of ministers — the power to approve or reject proposed subordinate regulations, even if some members of that body are representatives of certain provinces. the delegation of administrative powers in a manner solicitous of (or even dependent upon) provincial input is in no way incompatible with the principle of federalism, provided that the delegating legislature has the constitutional authority to legislate in respect of the applicable subject matter. [127] and as we explained above, the draft federal act is intra vires parliament pursuant to the general trade and commerce power, notwithstanding the fact that provincial representatives will be involved in the making of regulations. to put it simply, the general motors framework is not concerned with whether a particular subject matter relating to trade can only be dealt with through direct, unfettered federal action; rather, its purpose is to identify aspects of the econ- omy that the provinces, acting either individually or collectively, lack the capacity to regulate effectively. for this reason, the fact that some regulations might never be adopted because of provincial opposition does not change the reality that the regulations that are adopted must, by their very nature, be respected by all the provinces if the objectives underlying the draft federal act are to be achieved. the dissenting judge’s comments in this regard are particularly apt: [126] ayant ces principes à l’esprit, nous passons maintenant à une deuxième question portant sur la délégation de pouvoirs sous le régime de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale : la façon dont l’ébauche de la loi fé- dérale délègue des pouvoirs de légiférer à l’autorité, sous la surveillance du conseil des ministres, est- elle problématique sous l’angle du fédéralisme ou du partage constitutionnel des pouvoirs? à notre avis, la réponse est clairement « non ». lorsqu’il exerce ses pouvoirs législatifs souverains, le parlement a le pouvoir de conférer à un organisme créé par la loi — en l’espèce, le conseil des ministres — le pouvoir d’approuver ou de rejeter des projets de règlement subordonnés, même si certains membres de cet organisme sont des représentants de certaines provinces. la délégation de pouvoirs administratifs qui se soucie (voire dépend) de l’avis des provinces n’est aucunement incompatible avec le principe du fédéralisme, dans la mesure où la législature ayant procédé à la délégation a compétence constitution- nelle pour légiférer relativement à l’objet visé. [127] et comme nous l’avons expliqué ci- dessus, l’ébauche de la loi fédérale relève de la compétence générale du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce, et ce, même si des représentants des pro- vinces participeront à l’élaboration des règlements. en termes simples, le cadre d’analyse de l’arrêt gen‑ eral motors ne vise pas à savoir si l’objet en question se rapportant au commerce ne peut être réglé que par une intervention fédérale qui soit directe et libre d’entrave; il cherche plutôt à relever les aspects de l’économie que les provinces, seules ou de concert, ne peuvent réglementer efficacement. pour ce mo- tif, la possibilité que certains règlements puissent ne jamais être pris en raison d’une opposition des provinces ne change rien au fait que les règlements qui le sont doivent, de par leur nature même, être res- pectés par toutes les provinces pour que les objectifs qui sous- tendent l’ébauche de la loi fédérale soient atteints. les remarques du juge dissident à cet égard sont particulièrement justes :    parliament is free to delegate [in the manner set out in attorney general of nova scotia v. attorney general for canada, [1951] scr 31, and pei. potato marketing board v. h. b. willis inc., [1952] 2 scr 392] and in such regard to constitute the body (the authority) to whom it    le parlement est libre de déléguer ses fonctions ré- glementaires [conformément aux arrêts attorney gen eral of nova scotia c. attorney general. of canada, [1951] rcs 31, et pei. potato marketing board c. h. b. willis inc., [1952] 2 rcs 392], et, à cet égard, de constituer 256 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation the court [2018] 3 scr. delegates regulatory functions. parliament may determine the internal workings of such body and the process of ap- proval of the regulations it proposes. the fact that the body approving the regulations (ie the council [of ministers]) is populated with ministers of provincial governments does not invalidate the delegation. parliament can choose to structure the internal mechanics and approval process of the regulatory body in such manner deemed appropriate to the task. [emphasis added.] l’organisme (l’autorité) auquel il délègue ses fonctions. le parlement peut déterminer le fonctionnement interne d’un tel organisme, dont le processus d’approbation des rè- glements proposés par ce dernier. le fait que l’organisme proposant ces règlements (le conseil [des ministres]) soit composé de ministres des gouvernements provinciaux n’invalide pas la délégation. le parlement peut choisir comme bon lui semble d’organiser la structure interne de l’organisme de réglementation ainsi que les particularités du processus d’approbation des règlements de cet orga- nisme. [nous soulignons.] (ca reasons, at para. 205 (per schrager ja, dis- senting)) (motifs de la ca, par. 205 (le juge schrager, dis- sident)) it therefore follows that we answer the sec- [128] ond reference question in the negative. [128] il s’ensuit par conséquent que nous répon- dons à la seconde question soumise par renvoi par la négative. vi conclusion vi conclusion [129] for the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the cooperative system does not run afoul of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty or the rule respecting the legislature’s authority to dele- gate law- making powers. moreover, we hold that the enactment of the draft federal act falls within parliament’s power over trade and commerce under s. 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867. [130] again, however, we note that our advisory opinion is limited to the constitutionality of the co- operative system. it is up to the provinces to deter- mine whether participation is in their best interests. this advisory opinion does not take into considera- tion many of the political and practical complexities relating to this cooperative system, and in particular those that may arise if a participating jurisdiction decides to withdraw at some later date. moreover, with respect to the content of the authority’s ena- bling statute (which has not yet been published), we note that it will have to be carefully drafted so as to respect the limits on overlapping, yet distinct federal and provincial authority. [129] pour les motifs qui précèdent, nous sommes d’avis que le régime coopératif ne va pas à l’encontre du principe de la souveraineté parlementaire ou de la règle concernant le pouvoir de la législature de délé- guer des pouvoirs de légiférer. de plus, nous sommes d’avis que l’adoption de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale relève de la compétence du parlement en matière de trafic et de commerce prévue au par. 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867. [130] encore une fois, cependant, nous tenons à souligner que notre avis consultatif ne porte que sur la constitutionnalité du régime coopératif. il appar- tient aux provinces de décider s’il est dans leur inté- rêt d’y participer. le présent avis consultatif ne prend pas en considération bon nombre des difficultés poli- tiques et pratiques liées à ce régime coopératif, et par- ticulièrement celles qui peuvent se présenter si une juridiction participante décide de se retirer à une date ultérieure. en outre, en ce qui concerne le contenu de la loi habilitante de l’autorité (qui n’a pas encore été publiée), nous rappelons qu’elle devra être soigneuse- ment rédigée de manière à respecter les limites impo- sées au pouvoir fédéral et au pouvoir provincial qui, bien qu’ils soient distincts, se chevauchent. [131] when and whether to relinquish a degree of autonomy over the regulation of securities for the [131] la question de savoir si et quand il convient de renoncer à un certain degré d’autonomie en [2018] 3 rcs. renvoi : réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières la cour 257 purpose of achieving national uniformity is entirely a matter of political choice. this too is a valid exercise of parliamentary sovereignty. the various jurisdic- tions have an unquestioned and equally sovereign right to join or to reject the cooperative system. matière de réglementation des valeurs mobilières afin d’assurer l’uniformité nationale relève entièrement du choix politique. il s’agit là aussi d’un exercice valide de la souveraineté parlementaire. chacune des juridictions participantes a le droit incontestable et tout aussi souverain d’adhérer au régime coopératif ou de le rejeter. [132] we answer the questions referred by the gov- ernment of quebec as follows: [132] nous répondons aux questions soumises par le gouvernement du québec de la façon suivante : question #1: does the constitution of canada authorize the implementation of pan- canadian securities regulation under the authority of a single regulator, according to the model established by the most recent publication of the “memorandum of agreement regarding the cooperative capital markets regulatory system”? question no 1 : la constitution du canada autorise-t-elle la mise en place d’une réglementation pancanadienne des va- leurs mobilières sous la gouverne d’un organisme unique selon le modèle prévu par la plus récente publication du « protocole d’accord concernant le régime coopératif de réglementation des marchés des capitaux »? answer: yes. réponse : oui. question #2: does the most recent version of the draft of the federal “capital markets stability act” exceed the authority of the parliament of canada over the general branch of the trade and commerce power under subsec- tion 91(2) of the constitution act, 1867? question no 2 : la plus récente version de l’ébauche de la loi fédérale intitulée « loi sur la stabilité des marchés des capitaux » excède-t-elle la compétence du parlement du canada sur le commerce selon le paragraphe 91(2) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867? answer: no. réponse : non. accordingly, the attorney general of canada’s ap- peal is allowed, the attorney general of british co- lumbia’s appeal is allowed, and the attorney general of quebec’s appeal is dismissed. par conséquent, le pourvoi du procureur général du canada est accueilli, le pourvoi du procureur général de la colombie- britannique est accueilli et le pour- voi de la procureure générale du québec est rejeté. appeals of the attorney general of canada and of the attorney general of british columbia allowed. appeal of the attorney general of quebec dismissed. pourvois du procureur général du canada et du procureur général de la colombie‑ britannique accueillis. pourvoi de la procureure générale du québec rejeté. procureur du procureur général du canada  : attorney general of canada, mont réal. procureur général du canada, mont réal. procureurs de la procureure générale du québec : bernard, roy (justice québec), mont réal. bernard, roy (justice québec), mont réal. lumbia: attorney general of british columbia, vic‑ toria. procureur du procureur général de la colombie‑ britannique : procureur général de la colombie‑ britannique, victoria. 258 reference re pan- canadian securities regulation [2018] 3 scr. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant la procureure générale de l’ontario : procureure générale de l’ontario, toronto. of new brunswick: attorney general of new bruns‑ wick, fredericton. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné‑ ral du nouveau‑ brunswick : procureur général du nouveau‑ brunswick, fredericton. of manitoba: attorney general of manitoba, win‑ nipeg. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné‑ ral du manitoba : procureur général du manitoba, winnipeg. of prince edward island: stewart mckelvey, char‑ lottetown. procureurs de l’intervenant le procureur géné‑ ral de l’île‑du‑ prince‑ édouard : stewart mckelvey, charlottetown. of saskatchewan: attorney general for saskatche‑ wan, regina. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné‑ ral de la saskatchewan : procureur général de la saskatchewan, regina. of alberta: attorney general of alberta, edmonton. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné‑ ral de l’alberta : procureur général de l’alberta, edmonton. procureurs de l’intervenant le barreau du qué‑ lavery, de billy, mont réal. bec : lavery, de billy, mont réal. solicitors for the intervener the institute for gov ernance of private and public organizations: langlois avocats, québec. procureurs de l’intervenant l’institut sur la gou‑ vernance d’organisations privées et publiques  : langlois avocats, québec.
i. introduction i. introduction [1] the oil and gas industry is a lucrative and important component of alberta’s and canada’s economy. the industry also carries with it certain [1] l’industrie pétrolière et gazière est une com- posante lucrative et importante de l’économie al- bertaine et canadienne cette industrie entraîne [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 167 unavoidable environmental costs and consequences. to address them, alberta has established a com- prehensive cradle-to- grave licensing regime that is binding on companies active in the industry. a company will not be granted the licences that it needs to extract, process or transport oil and gas in alberta unless it assumes end-of- life responsibilities for plugging and capping oil wells to prevent leaks, dismantling surface structures and restoring the sur- face to its previous condition. these obligations are known as “reclamation” and “abandonment” (environmental protection and enhancement act, rsa 2000, c. e-12 (“epea”), s. 1(ddd), and oil and gas conservation act, rsa  2000, c.  o-6 (“ogca”), s 1(1)(a)). [2] the question in this appeal is what happens to these obligations when a company is bankrupt and a trustee in bankruptcy is charged with distrib- uting its assets among various creditors according to the rules in the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3 (“bia”). redwater energy cor- poration (“redwater”) is the bankrupt company at the centre of this appeal. its principal assets are 127 oil and gas assets — wells, pipelines and facilities — and their corresponding licences. a few of redwa- ter’s licensed wells are still producing and profitable. the majority of the wells are spent and burdened with abandonment and reclamation liabilities that exceed their value. également certains coûts et certaines conséquences inévitables pour l’environnement. pour y faire face, l’alberta a mis en place un régime complet de dé- livrance de permis du berceau à la tombe qui lie les sociétés actives dans l’industrie une société n’obtiendra pas les permis dont elle a besoin pour extraire, traiter ou transporter du pétrole et du gaz en alberta, à moins qu’elle n’assume les responsabilités de fin de vie consistant à obturer et à fermer les puits de pétrole afin d’éviter les fuites, à démanteler les structures de surface ainsi qu’à remettre la surface dans son état antérieur. ces obligations sont appe- lées la [traduction] « remise en état » et l’« aban- don » (environmental protection and enhancement act, rsa 2000, c. e-12 (« epea »), al. 1(ddd) et oil and gas conservation act, rsa 2000, c. o-6 (« ogca »), al 1(1)(a)). [2] la question en l’espèce est de savoir ce qu’il advient de ces obligations lorsqu’une société est en faillite et qu’un syndic de faillite est chargé de ré- partir ses biens entre divers créanciers conformément aux règles prévues dans la loi sur la faillite et l’in­ solvabilité, lrc 1985, c. b-3 (« lfi »). redwater energy corporation (« redwater ») est la société en faillite au cœur du présent pourvoi. son actif est principalement composé de 127 biens pétroliers et gaziers — puits, pipelines et installations — et des permis correspondants. quelques- uns des puits auto- risés de redwater sont encore productifs et rentables. la majorité est tarie et grevée de responsabilités rela- tives à l’abandon et à la remise en état qui excèdent leur valeur. [3] the alberta energy regulator (“regulator”) and the orphan well association (“owa”) are the appellants in this court. (for simplicity, i will refer to the regulator when discussing the appellants’ position, unless otherwise noted.) the regulator administers alberta’s licensing regime and enforces the abandonment and reclamation obligations of licensees. the regulator has delegated to the owa, an independent non- profit entity, the authority to abandon and reclaim “orphans”, which are oil and gas assets and their sites left behind in an improperly abandoned or unreclaimed state by defunct compa- nies at the close of their insolvency proceedings. the regulator says that, one way or another, the [3] l’alberta energy regulator (« organisme de réglementation  ») et l’orphan well association (« owa ») sont les appelants devant notre cour (pour simplifier, je les appellerai l’organisme de ré- glementation au moment d’analyser la position des appelants, sauf indication contraire). l’organisme de réglementation administre le régime de délivrance de permis de l’alberta et assure le respect, par les titu- laires de permis, des obligations relatives à l’abandon et à la remise en état. l’organisme de réglementation a délégué à l’owa, une entité indépendante sans but lucratif, le pouvoir d’abandonner et de remettre en état les « orphelins » — les biens pétroliers et gaziers ainsi que leurs sites délaissés ou non réclamés sans 168 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. remaining value of the redwater estate must be ap- plied to meet the abandonment and reclamation ob- ligations associated with its licensed assets. [4] redwater’s trustee in bankruptcy, grant thorn- ton limited (“gtl”), and redwater’s primary se- cured creditor, alberta treasury branches (“atb”), oppose the appeal. (for simplicity, i will refer to gtl when discussing the respondents’ position, unless otherwise noted.) gtl argues that, since it has dis- claimed redwater’s unproductive oil and gas assets, s 1406(4) of the bia empowers it to walk away from those assets and the environmental liabilities asso- ciated with them and to deal solely with redwater’s producing oil and gas assets. alternatively, gtl argues that, under the priority scheme in the bia, the claims of redwater’s secured creditors must be sat- isfied ahead of redwater’s environmental liabilities. relying on the doctrine of paramountcy, gtl says that alberta’s environmental legislation regulating the oil and gas industry is constitutionally inopera- tive to the extent that it authorizes the regulator to interfere with this arrangement. [5] the chambers judge (2016 abqb 278, 37 cbr. (6th) 88) and a majority of the court of ap peal (2017 abca 124, 47 cbr (6th) 171) agreed with gtl. the regulator’s proposed use of its statutory powers to enforce redwater’s compliance with abandonment and reclamation obligations during bankruptcy was held to conflict with the bia in two ways: (1) it im- posed on gtl the obligations of a licensee in relation to the redwater assets disclaimed by gtl, contrary to s 1406(4) of the bia; and (2) it upended the prior- ity scheme for the distribution of a bankrupt’s assets established by the bia by requiring that the “provable claims” of the regulator, an unsecured creditor, be paid ahead of the claims of redwater’s secured creditors. que les processus en question n’aient été correcte- ment effectués par les sociétés liquidées à la fin de leur procédure d’insolvabilité. l’organisme de régle- mentation affirme que, d’une façon ou d’une autre, la valeur restante de l’actif de redwater doit être utilisée pour satisfaire aux obligations d’abandon et de remise en état qui sont associées à ses biens visés par des permis. [4] le syndic de faillite de redwater, grant thorn- ton limited (« gtl »), et le principal créancier garanti de redwater, alberta treasury branches (« atb »), s’opposent au pourvoi (pour simplifier, je les appel- lerai gtl au moment d’analyser la position des in- timées, sauf indication contraire). gtl soutient que, comme il a renoncé aux biens pétroliers et gaziers inexploités de redwater, le par 1406(4) de la lfi l’investit du pouvoir de les délaisser et de se soustraire aux engagements environnementaux qui s’y rattachent et de s’occuper uniquement des biens pétroliers et ga- ziers productifs de redwater. gtl soutient subsidiai- rement que, d’après le régime de priorité établi dans la lfi, il faut acquitter les réclamations des créanciers garantis de redwater avant de respecter ses engage- ments environnementaux. invoquant la doctrine de la prépondérance, gtl affirme que la législation envi- ronnementale de l’alberta réglementant l’industrie pétrolière et gazière est constitutionnellement inopé- rante dans la mesure où elle autorise l’organisme de réglementation à se mêler de cet arrangement. [5] le juge siégeant en cabinet (2016 abqb 278, 37 cbr (6th) 88) et les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel (2017 abca 124, 47 cbr (6th) 171) ont donné raison à gtl. l’utilisation proposée par l’organisme de réglementation des pouvoirs que lui confère la loi pour contraindre redwater à respecter les obligations d’abandon et de remise en état au cours de la faillite a été jugée incompatible avec la lfi de deux façons : (1) elle imposait à gtl les obligations d’un titulaire de permis relativement aux biens de redwater auxquels gtl avait renoncé, ce qui est contraire au par 1406(4) de la lfi; (2) elle renversait le régime de priorité établi par la lfi pour le partage des biens d’un failli en exigeant que le paiement de ses « réclamations prouvables », en tant que créancier ordinaire, soit effectué avant celui des réclamations des créanciers garantis de redwater. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 169 [6] martin ja, as she then was, dissented. she would have allowed the regulator’s appeal on the basis that there was no conflict between alberta’s en- vironmental legislation and the bia. martin ja was of the view that: (1) s 1406 of the bia did not op- erate to relieve gtl of redwater’s obligations with respect to its licensed assets; and (2) the regulator was not asserting any provable claims, so the priority scheme in the bia was not upended. [7] for the reasons that follow, i would allow the appeal. although my analysis differs from hers in some respects, i agree with martin ja that the reg- ulator’s use of its statutory powers does not create a conflict with the bia so as to trigger the doctrine of federal paramountcy. section 14.06(4) is concerned with the personal liability of trustees, and does not empower a trustee to walk away from the environ- mental liabilities of the estate it is administering. the regulator is not asserting any claims provable in the bankruptcy, and the priority scheme in the bia is not upended. thus, no conflict is caused by gtl’s status as a licensee under alberta legislation. alberta’s regulatory regime can coexist with and apply alongside the bia. [6] la juge d’appel martin, maintenant juge de notre cour, n’était pas d’accord elle aurait ac- cueilli l’appel de l’organisme de réglementation au motif qu’il n’y avait pas de conflit entre la lé- gislation environnementale de l’alberta et la lfi. la juge martin a estimé que : (1) l’art 1406 de la lfi n’a pas eu pour effet de libérer gtl des obli- gations de redwater à l’égard de ses biens visés par des permis; (2) l’organisme de réglementation ne faisait valoir aucune réclamation prouvable, de sorte que le régime de priorité de la lfi n’était pas renversé. [7] pour les motifs qui suivent, j’accueillerais le pourvoi. bien que mon analyse diffère de la sienne à certains égards, je conviens avec la juge martin que l’utilisation par l’organisme de réglementation des pouvoirs que lui confère la loi ne crée pas de conflit avec la lfi de façon à mettre en jeu la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale. le paragraphe 14.06(4) intéresse la responsabilité personnelle du syndic et il ne l’investit pas du pouvoir de se soustraire aux engagements environnementaux liant l’actif qu’il administre. l’organisme de réglementation ne fait valoir aucune réclamation prouvable en matière de faillite, et le régime de priorité de la lfi n’est pas renversé. donc, le statut de gtl en tant que titulaire de permis au sens de la loi albertaine n’est à l’origine d’aucun conflit le régime de réglementation de l’alberta peut coexister et s’appliquer conjointement avec la lfi. ii background ii contexte a alberta’s regulatory regime a le régime de réglementation de l’alberta [8] the resolution of the constitutional questions and the ultimate outcome of this appeal depend on a proper understanding of the complex regulatory regime which governs alberta’s oil and gas industry. i will therefore describe that regime in considerable detail. [8] le règlement des questions constitutionnelles et l’issue finale du présent pourvoi reposent sur une compréhension adéquate du régime complexe de réglementation qui régit l’industrie pétrolière et ga- zière de l’alberta. je vais donc décrire ce régime de façon très détaillée. [9] in order to exploit oil and gas resources in alberta, a company needs three things: a property interest in the oil or gas, surface rights and a licence issued by the regulator. in alberta, mineral rights are typically reserved from ownership rights in land. [9] pour exploiter des ressources pétrolières et ga- zières en alberta, une société a besoin de trois choses : un intérêt de propriété sur le pétrole ou le gaz, des droits de surface et un permis délivré par l’organisme de réglementation. en alberta, les droits miniers sont 170 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. about 90 percent of alberta’s mineral rights are held by the crown on behalf of the public. [10] a company’s property interest in the oil or gas it seeks to exploit typically takes the form of a mineral lease with the crown (but occasionally with a private owner). the company also needs surface rights so it can access and occupy the physical land located above the oil and gas and place the equip- ment needed to pump, store and haul away the oil and gas. surface rights may be obtained through a lease with the landowner, who is often a farmer or rancher (but is occasionally the crown). where a landowner does not voluntarily grant surface rights, alberta law authorizes the surface rights board to issue a right of entry order in favour of an “operator”, that is, the person having the right to a mineral or the right to work it (surface rights act, rsa 2000, c. s-24, ss. 1(h) and 15). [11] canadian courts characterize a mineral lease that allows a company to exploit oil and gas resources as a profit à prendre. it is not disputed that a profit à prendre is a form of real property interest held by the company (berkheiser v. berkheiser, [1957] scr 387). a profit à prendre is fully assignable and has been defined as “a non- possessory interest in land, like an easement, which can be passed on from generation to generation, and remains with the land, regardless of changes in ownership” (f. l. stewart, “how to deal with a fickle friend? alberta’s trou- bles with the doctrine of federal paramountcy”, in j. p. sarra and b. romaine, eds., annual review of insolvency law 2017 (2018), 163 (“stewart”), at p 193). solvent and insolvent companies alike will often hold profits à prendre in both producing and unproductive or spent wells. there are a variety of potential “working interest” arrangements whereby several parties can share an interest in oil and gas resources. généralement soustraits des droits de propriété sur les terres. environ 90 p. 100 des droits miniers de l’al- berta sont détenus par la couronne au nom du public. [10] l’intérêt de propriété d’une société dans le pé- trole ou le gaz qu’elle cherche à exploiter prend gé- néralement la forme d’un bail d’exploitation minière avec la couronne (mais parfois avec un propriétaire privé). la société a également besoin de droits de surface, afin de pouvoir accéder au terrain physique situé au- dessus du pétrole et du gaz, de l’occuper, ainsi que d’installer l’équipement nécessaire pour pomper, stocker et transporter le pétrole de même que le gaz. on obtient les droits de surface au moyen d’un bail avec le propriétaire foncier, dans bien des cas un agriculteur ou un éleveur (mais parfois la couronne). lorsqu’un propriétaire foncier n’accorde pas volontairement des droits de surface, la loi alber- taine autorise le surface rights board (conseil des droits de surface) à rendre une ordonnance d’accès aux terres en faveur d’un [traduction] « exploi- tant », soit la personne qui a droit à une substance minérale ou le droit de la travailler (surface rights act, rsa 2000, c. s-24, al. 1h) et art 15). [11] les tribunaux canadiens qualifient le bail d’exploitation minière permettant à une société d’ex- ploiter des ressources pétrolières et gazières de profit à prendre. il n’est pas contesté qu’un profit à prendre constitue une forme d’intérêt détenue par la société sur un bien réel (berkheiser c. berkheiser, [1957] rcs 387). un profit à prendre est entièrement ces- sible et il a été défini comme [traduction] « un in- térêt foncier sans possession, comme une servitude, qui peut être transmis de génération en génération et qui reste avec la terre, indépendamment des change- ments de propriétaire » (f l stewart, « how to deal with a fickle friend? alberta’s troubles with the doctrine of federal paramountcy », dans j p sarra et b. romaine, dir., annual review of insolvency law 2017 (2018), 163 (« stewart »), p 193). les sociétés, qu’elles soient solvables ou insolvables, détiennent souvent des profits à prendre tant dans les puits productifs que dans les puits inexploités ou épuisés. il existe une foule d’ententes potentielles de « participation directe » par lesquelles plusieurs par- ties peuvent partager un intérêt dans des ressources pétrolières et gazières. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 171 [12] the third thing a company needs in order to access and exploit alberta’s oil and gas resources, and the one most germane to this appeal, is a licence issued by the regulator. the ogca prohibits any person without a licence from commencing to drill a well or undertaking any operations preparatory or incidental to the drilling of a well, and from com- mencing to construct or operate a facility (ss. 11(1) and 12(1)). the pipeline act, rsa 2000, c. p-15, similarly prohibits the construction of pipelines with- out a licence (s 6(1)). the profit à prendre in an oil and gas deposit may be bought and sold without reg- ulatory approval. however, it is of little practical use on its own, as, without the licence associated with a well, the purchaser cannot “continue any drilling operations, any producing operations or any injecting operations” (ogca, s. 11(1)), and, without the li- cence associated with a facility, the purchaser cannot “continue any construction or operation” (ogca, s 12(1)). [13] the three relevant licensed assets in the al- berta oil and gas industry are wells, facilities and pipelines. a “well” is defined, inter alia, as “an orifice in the ground completed or being drilled    for the production of oil or gas” (ogca, s 1(1)(eee)). a “fa- cility” is broadly defined and includes any building, structure, installation or equipment that is connected to or associated with the recovery, development, production, handling, processing, treatment or dis- posal of oil and gas resources (ogca, s 1(1)(w)). a “pipeline” is defined as “a pipe used to convey a substance or combination of substances”, including associated installations (pipeline act, s 1(1)(t)). [12] la troisième chose — celle qui se rapporte le plus au présent pourvoi — dont une société a besoin pour avoir accès aux ressources pétrolières et ga- zières de l’alberta ainsi que pour les exploiter, c’est un permis délivré par l’organisme de réglementation. l’ogca interdit à toute personne non titulaire d’un permis de commencer le forage d’un puits, y compris les activités préparatoires ou accessoires à cette fin, ou d’amorcer la construction ou l’exploitation d’une installation (par. 11(1) et 12(1)). la pipeline act, rsa 2000, c. p-15, interdit également la construc- tion de pipelines sans permis (par 6(1)). le profit à prendre dans des gisements de pétrole et de gaz peut être acheté et vendu sans approbation réglementaire. cependant, cela n’a qu’une utilité pratique restreinte en soi, puisque, sans le permis associé à un puits, l’acheteur ne peut pas [traduction] « poursuivre une opération de forage, d’exploitation ou d’injec- tion » (ogca, par. 11(1)), et sans le permis associé à une installation, l’acheteur ne peut pas [traduc- tion] « poursuivre la construction ou l’exploitation » (ogca, par 12(1)). [13] les trois biens visés par des permis pertinents dans l’industrie pétrolière et gazière de l’alberta sont les puits, les installations et les pipelines. le « puits » est défini, entre autres, comme [traduction] « un orifice dans le sol complété ou en cours de forage pour la production de pétrole ou de gaz » (ogca, al 1(1)(eee)). l’« installation » est définie au sens large et englobe tous les bâtiments, structures, ins- tallations et matériaux qui sont liés ou associés à la récupération, à la mise en valeur, à la production, à la manutention, au traitement ou à l’élimination de res- sources pétrolières et gazières (ogca, al 1(1)(w)). le « pipeline » est défini comme [traduction] « un tuyau utilisé pour transporter une substance ou une combinaison de substances », y compris les installa- tions connexes (pipeline act, al 1(1)(t)). [14] the licences a company needs to recover, pro- cess and transport oil and gas are issued by the reg- ulator. the regulator is not an agent of the crown. it is established as a corporation by s. 3(1) of the responsible energy development act, sa 2012, c r-173 (“reda”). it exercises a wide range of powers under the ogca and the pipeline act. it also acts as the regulator in respect of energy resource [14] les permis dont une société a besoin pour récupérer, traiter ainsi que transporter le pétrole et le gaz sont délivrés par l’organisme de réglementation. ce dernier n’est pas un mandataire de la couronne. il est constitué en société par le par. 3(1) de la respon­ sible energy development act, sa 2012, c r-173 (« reda »). l’organisme de réglementation exerce un large éventail de pouvoirs en vertu de l’ogca 172 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. activities under the epea, alberta’s more gen- eral environmental protection legislation (reda, s 2(2)(h)). the regulator’s mandate is set out in the reda and includes “the efficient, safe, orderly and environmentally responsible development of energy resources in alberta” (s 2(1)(a)). the regulator is funded almost entirely by the industry it regulates, and it collects its budget through an administration fee (stewart, at p. 219; reda, ss. 28 and 29; alberta energy regulator administration fees rules, alta. reg 98/2013). [15] the regulator has a wide discretion when it comes to granting licences to operate wells, facili- ties and pipelines. on receiving an application for a licence, the regulator may grant the licence subject to any conditions, restrictions and stipulations, or it may refuse the licence (ogca, s. 18(1); pipeline act, s 9(1)). licences to operate a well, facility or pipeline are granted subject to obligations that will one day arise to abandon the underlying asset and reclaim the land on which it is situated. [16] “abandonment” refers to “the permanent dismantlement of a well or facility in the manner prescribed by the regulations or rules” made by the regulator (ogca, s 1(1)(a)). specifically, the aban- donment of a well has been defined as “the process of sealing a hole which has been drilled for oil or gas, at the end of its useful life, to render it environ- mentally safe” (panamericana de bienes y servicios sa v. northern badger oil & gas ltd., 1991 abca 181, 81 alta. lr (2d) 45 (“northern badger”), at para 2). the abandonment of a pipeline refers to its “permanent deactivation    in the manner prescribed by the rules” (pipeline act, s 1(1)(a)). “reclamation” includes “the removal of equipment or buildings”, “the decontamination of buildings   . land or water”, and the “stabilization, contouring, maintenance, conditioning or reconstruction of the surface of the land” (epea, s 1(ddd)). a further duty et de la pipeline act. il agit également à titre d’or- ganisme de réglementation des activités liées aux ressources énergétiques sous le régime de l’epea, la loi albertaine plus générale sur la protection de l’environnement (reda, al.  2(2)(h)) le mandat de l’organisme de réglementation est énoncé dans la reda et comprend [traduction] « la mise en valeur efficiente, sûre, ordonnée et respectueuse de l’environnement des ressources énergétiques en al- berta » (al 2(1)(a)). l’organisme de réglementation est financé presque entièrement par l’industrie qu’il réglemente et il recueille ses recettes budgétaires au moyen de frais administratifs (stewart, p. 219; reda, art. 28 et 29; alberta energy regulator ad­ ministration fees rules, alta. reg 98/2013). [15] l’organisme de réglementation jouit d’un large pouvoir discrétionnaire lorsqu’il s’agit de dé- livrer des permis d’exploitation de puits, d’installa- tions et de pipelines. à la réception d’une demande de permis, l’organisme de réglementation peut accor- der le permis sous réserve de certaines conditions, restrictions et stipulations, ou il peut refuser le per- mis (ogca, par. 18(1); pipeline act, par 9(1)). les permis d’exploitation d’un puits, d’une installation ou d’un pipeline sont accordés sous réserve d’obli- gations qui se manifesteront un jour d’abandonner le bien sous- jacent et de remettre en état le terrain sur lequel il est situé. [16] le terme [traduction] « abandon » désigne « le démantèlement permanent d’un puits ou d’une installation de la manière prescrite par les règlements ou les règles » pris par l’organisme de réglementation (ogca, al 1(1)(a)). plus précisément, l’abandon d’un puits a été défini comme [traduction] « l’ob- turation d’un trou qui a été foré pour le pétrole ou le gaz, à la fin de sa vie utile, afin de le rendre sûr sur le plan environnemental » (panamericana de bienes y servicios sa c. northern badger oil & gas ltd., 1991 abca 181, 81 alta lr (2d) 45 (« northern badger »), par 2). l’abandon d’un pi- peline fait référence à sa [traduction] « mise hors service permanente [  ] de la manière prescrite par les règles » (pipeline act, al 1(1)(a)). la remise en état comprend [traduction] « l’enlèvement des bâtiments et de l’équipement », « la décontamination des bâtiments, du terrain ou de l’eau », ainsi que [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 173 binding on those active in the alberta oil and gas in- dustry is remediation, which arises where a harmful or potentially harmful substance has been released into the environment (epea, ss. 112 to 122). as the extent of any remediation obligations that may be associated with redwater assets is unclear, i will not refer to remediation separately from reclamation, unless otherwise noted. as has been done throughout this litigation, i will refer to abandonment and recla- mation jointly as end-of- life obligations. [17] a licensee must abandon a well or facility when ordered to do so by the regulator or when required by the rules or regulations. the regulator may order abandonment when “the regulator con- siders that it is necessary to do so in order to protect the public or the environment” (ogca, s 27(3)). under the rules, a licensee is required to abandon a well or facility, inter alia, on the termination of the mineral lease, surface lease or right of entry, where the regulator cancels or suspends the licence, or where the regulator notifies the licensee that the well or facility may constitute an environmental or safety hazard (oil and gas conservation rules, alta. reg. 151/71, s 3012). section 23 of the pipeline act requires licensees to abandon pipelines in similar sit- uations. the duty to reclaim is established by s. 137 of the epea. this duty is binding on an “operator”, a broader term which encompasses the holder of a licence issued by the regulator (epea, s 134(b)). reclamation is governed by the procedural require- ments set out in regulations (conservation and rec­ lamation regulation, alta. reg 115/93). la « stabilisation, l’établissement des courbes de niveau, l’entretien, le conditionnement ou la recons- truction de la surface du terrain » (epea, al 1(ddd)). une autre obligation qui incombe à ceux qui œuvrent dans l’industrie pétrolière et gazière de l’alberta est celle de la décontamination, qui prend naissance lorsqu’une substance nocive ou potentiellement nocive a été rejetée dans l’environnement (epea, art. 112 à 122). puisque l’on ne connaît pas l’étendue des obligations de décontamination, s’il en est, qui peuvent être associées aux biens de redwater, je ne traiterai pas la décontamination séparément de la remise en état, sauf indication contraire. comme cela a été fait tout au long du présent litige, je qualifierai conjointement l’abandon et la remise en état d’obli- gations de fin de vie. [17] le titulaire de permis doit abandonner un puits ou une installation lorsque l’organisme de ré- glementation le lui ordonne, ou lorsque les règles ou les règlements l’exigent. l’organisme de réglemen- tation peut ordonner l’abandon lorsqu’il [traduc- tion] « l’estime nécessaire pour protéger le public ou l’environnement » (ogca, par 27(3)). selon les règles, le titulaire de permis est tenu d’abandonner un puits ou une installation, notamment, à la rési- liation du bail d’exploitation minière, du bail de surface ou de l’accès aux terres, lorsque l’organisme de réglementation annule ou suspend le permis, ou lorsqu’il avise le titulaire de permis que le puits ou l’installation peut constituer un danger pour l’envi- ronnement ou la sécurité (oil and gas conservation rules, alta. reg. 151/71, art 3012). l’article 23 de la pipeline act oblige les titulaires de permis à abandonner des pipelines dans des situations sem- blables. l’obligation de remise en état est prévue par l’art. 137 de l’epea. cette obligation s’impose à un « exploitant », terme plus large qui englobe le titulaire d’un permis délivré par l’organisme de réglementation (epea, al 134(b)). la remise en état est régie par les exigences procédurales fixées dans le règlement (conservation and reclamation regulation, alta. reg 115/93). [18] the licensee liability rating program, which was, at the time of redwater’s insolvency, set out in directive 006: licensee liability rating (llr) program and license transfer process (march 12, [18] le programme d’évaluation de la responsa- bilité du titulaire de permis, qui était, au moment de l’insolvabilité de redwater, établi dans la directive 006 : licensee liability rating (llr) program and 174 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. 2013) (“directive 006”) is one means by which the regulator seeks to ensure that end-of- life obliga- tions will be satisfied by licensees rather than be- ing offloaded onto the alberta public. as part of this program, the regulator assigns each company a liability management rating (“lmr”), which is the ratio between the aggregate value attributed by the regulator to a company’s licensed assets and the aggregate liability attributed by the regulator to the eventual cost of abandoning and reclaiming those assets. for the purpose of calculating the lmr, all the licences held by a given company are treated as a package, without any segregation or parcelling of assets. a licensee’s lmr is calculated on a monthly basis and, where it dips below the prescribed ra- tio (1.0 at the time of redwater’s insolvency), the licensee is required to pay a security deposit. the security deposit is added to the licensee’s “deemed assets” and must bring its lmr back up to the ratio prescribed by the regulator. if the required security deposit is not paid, the regulator may cancel or suspend the company’s licences (ogca, s 25). as an alternative to posting security, the licensee can perform end-of- life obligations or transfer licences (with approval) in order to bring its lmr back up to the prescribed level. license transfer process (12 mars 2013) (« directive 006 ») constitue un moyen par lequel l’organisme de réglementation vise à s’assurer que les titulaires de permis rempliront les obligations de fin de vie, au lieu que celles-ci soient en fin de compte assu- mées par le public albertain. dans le cadre de ce programme, l’organisme de réglementation attribue à chaque société une cote de gestion de la responsa- bilité (« cgr »), qui représente le rapport entre la valeur totale attribuée par l’organisme de réglemen- tation aux biens d’une société qui sont visés par des permis et la responsabilité totale que l’organisme de réglementation attribue aux coûts éventuels de l’abandon et de la remise en état de ces biens. pour les besoins du calcul de la cgr, tous les permis détenus par une société donnée sont traités comme un tout, sans isolement ou morcellement des biens. la cgr d’un titulaire de permis est calculée sur une base mensuelle et, lorsqu’elle tombe sous le ratio prescrit (1,0 à l’époque de l’insolvabilité de redwater), le titulaire de permis est tenu de verser un dépôt de garantie. le dépôt de garantie est ajouté aux [traduction] « biens réputés » du titulaire de permis, qui doit ramener sa cgr au ratio prescrit par l’organisme de réglementation. si le dépôt de garantie requis n’est pas payé, l’organisme de ré- glementation peut annuler ou suspendre les permis de la société (ogca, art 25). comme solution de rechange au versement d’une garantie, le titulaire de permis peut exécuter les obligations de fin de vie ou transférer des permis (avec approbation), afin de ramener sa cgr au niveau prescrit. [19] licences can be transferred only with the reg- ulator’s approval. the regulator uses the licensee liability rating program to ensure that end-of- life obligations will not be negatively affected by licence transfers. upon receipt of an application to transfer one or more licences, the regulator assesses how the transfer, if approved, would affect the lmr of both the transferor and the transferee. at the time of redwater’s insolvency, if both the transferor and the transferee would have a post- transfer lmr equal to or exceeding 1.0, the regulator would approve the transfer, absent other concerns. following the chambers judge’s decision in this case, the regulator implemented changes to its policies, including the requirement that transferees have an lmr of 2.0 or [19] les permis ne peuvent être transférés qu’avec l’approbation de l’organisme de réglementation. ce dernier utilise le programme d’évaluation de la res- ponsabilité du titulaire de permis pour éviter que les transferts de permis aient un effet néfaste sur les obli- gations de fin de vie. à la réception d’une demande de transfert d’un ou de plusieurs permis, l’organisme de réglementation évalue la façon dont le transfert, s’il est approuvé, influerait sur la cgr du cédant et du cessionnaire. à l’époque de l’insolvabilité de red- water, si le cédant et le cessionnaire devaient avoir, après le transfert, des cgr égales ou supérieures à 1,0, l’organisme de réglementation approuverait le transfert en l’absence d’autres préoccupations. après la décision du juge siégeant en cabinet dans [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 175 higher immediately following any licence transfer: alberta energy regulator, licensee eligibility — alberta energy regulator measures to limit en­ vironmental impacts pending regulatory changes to address the redwater decision, june 20, 2016 (online). for the purposes of this appeal, i will be referring to the regulatory regime as it existed at the time of redwater’s insolvency. [20] as discussed in greater detail below, if either the transferor or the transferee would have a post- transfer lmr below 1.0, the regulator would refuse to approve the licence transfer. in such a situation, the regulator would insist on certain remedial steps being taken to ensure that neither lmr would drop below 10. although directive 006, as it was in the 2013 version, required both the transferee and trans- feror to have a post transfer lmr of at least 1.0, during this litigation, the regulator stated that, when licensees are in receivership or bankruptcy, its work- ing rule is to approve transfers as long as they do not cause a deterioration in the transferor’s lmr, even where its lmr will remain below 1.0 following the transfer. the explanation for this working rule is that it helps to facilitate purchases. the regulator’s po- sition is that the licensee liability rating program continues to apply to the transfer of licences as part of insolvency proceedings. la présente affaire, l’organisme de réglementation a apporté des changements à ses politiques, y compris l’exigence selon laquelle les cessionnaires devaient avoir une cgr de 2,0 ou plus immédiatement après tout transfert de permis : alberta energy regulator, licensee eligibility — alberta energy regulator measures to limit environmental impacts pend­ ing regulatory changes to address the redwater decision, 20 juin 2016 (en ligne). pour les besoins du présent pourvoi, je ferai référence au régime de réglementation tel qu’il existait à l’époque de l’in- solvabilité de redwater. [20] comme il est expliqué plus en détail ci- dessous, si le cédant ou le cessionnaire devait avoir une cgr inférieure à 1,0 après le transfert, l’orga- nisme de réglementation refuserait d’approuver le transfert de permis. dans une telle situation, l’orga- nisme de réglementation insisterait pour que certaines mesures correctives soient prises afin de s’assurer qu’aucune des deux cgr ne descende en dessous de 1,0. même si la directive 006, dans sa version de 2013, exigeait que le cessionnaire ainsi que le cédant aient des cgr d’au moins 1,0 après le transfert, au cours de ce litige, l’organisme de réglementation a déclaré que, lorsque les titulaires de permis sont sous séquestre ou en faillite, sa règle pratique est d’ap- prouver les transferts tant qu’ils n’entraînent pas une détérioration de la cgr du cédant, même si la cgr du cédant demeurerait inférieure à 1,0 après le trans- fert. l’explication donnée pour cette règle pratique est qu’elle vise à faciliter les achats. l’organisme de réglementation fait valoir que le programme d’éva- luation de la responsabilité du titulaire de permis continue de s’appliquer au transfert de permis dans le cadre de la procédure d’insolvabilité. [21] the ogca, the pipeline act and the epea all contemplate that a licensee’s regulatory obliga- tions will continue to be fulfilled when it is subject to insolvency proceedings. the epea achieves this by including the trustee of a licensee in the defini- tion of “operator” for the purposes of the duty to reclaim (s 134(b)(vi)). the epea also specifically provides that an order to perform reclamation work (known as an “environmental protection order”) may be issued to a trustee (ss. 140 and 142(1)(a)(ii)). the epea imposes responsibility for carrying out the [21] l’ogca, la pipeline act ainsi que l’epea envisagent toutes que les obligations réglementaires d’un titulaire de permis continuent d’être respectées pendant qu’il fait l’objet d’une procédure d’insolva- bilité. l’epea y parvient en incluant le syndic d’un titulaire de permis dans la définition d’« exploitant » pour l’application de l’obligation de remettre en état (sous-al 134(b)(vi)). l’epea prévoit aussi expressé- ment la possibilité qu’une ordonnance de remise en état (appelée [traduction] « ordonnance de protec- tion de l’environnement ») soit adressée à un syndic 176 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. terms of an environmental protection order on the person to whom the order is directed (ss. 240 and 245). however, absent gross negligence or wilful misconduct, a trustee’s liability in relation to such an order is expressly limited to the value of the as- sets in the bankrupt estate (s 240(3)). the ogca and the pipeline act take a more generic approach to applying the various obligations of licensees to trustees in the insolvency context: they simply in- clude trustees in the definition of “licensee” (ogca, s. 1(1)(cc); pipeline act, s 1(1)(n)). as a result, every power which these acts give the regulator against a licensee can theoretically also be exercised against a trustee. [22] despite this, alberta’s regulatory regime does contemplate the possibility that some of a licen- see’s end-of- life obligations will remain unfulfilled when the insolvency process has run its course. the regulator may designate wells, facilities, and their sites as “orphans” (ogca, s 70(2)(a)). a pipeline is defined as a “facility” for the purposes of the orphan regime (ogca, s 68(d)). directive 006 stated that “a well, facility, or pipeline in the llr program is eligible to be declared an orphan where the licen- see of that licence becomes insolvent or defunct” (s 71). an “orphan fund” has been established for the purpose of paying for, inter alia, the abandon- ment and reclamation of orphans (ogca, s 70(1)). the orphan fund is financed by an annual industry- wide levy paid by licensees of wells, facilities and unreclaimed sites (s 73(1)). the amount of the levy is prescribed by the regulator based on the estimated cost of abandoning and reclaiming orphans in a given fiscal year (s 73(2)). (art. 140 et sous-al 142(1)(a)(ii))). l’epea impose la responsabilité d’exécuter une ordonnance de protection de l’environnement à la personne visée par l’ordon- nance (art. 240 et 245). cependant, faute de négligence grave ou d’inconduite délibérée, la responsabilité du syndic à l’égard d’une telle ordonnance est expressé- ment limitée à la valeur des éléments de l’actif du failli (par 240(3)). l’ogca et la pipeline act adoptent une approche plus générique pour appliquer les diverses obligations d’un titulaire de permis aux syndics dans le contexte de l’insolvabilité; elles incluent simplement le syndic dans la définition de [traduction] « titu- laire de permis » (ogca, al. 1(1)(cc); pipeline act, al 1(1)(n)). en conséquence, tout pouvoir que ces lois confèrent à l’organisme de réglementation à l’encontre d’un titulaire de permis peut, en théorie, s’exercer également contre un syndic. [22] malgré cela, le régime de réglementation de l’alberta envisage la possibilité qu’une partie des obligations de fin de vie d’un titulaire de permis demeure insatisfaite à la fin du processus d’insol- vabilité. l’organisme de réglementation peut dési- gner des puits, des installations et leurs sites comme [traduction] « orphelins » (ogca, al 70(2)(a)). un pipeline est défini comme une « installation » pour l’application du régime relatif aux orphelins (ogca, al 68(d)). la directive 006 disposait qu’un [traduction] « puits, une installation ou un pipe- line visé par le programme d’évaluation de la res- ponsabilité du titulaire de permis peut être déclaré orphelin lorsque le titulaire de ce permis devient insolvable ou est liquidé » (art 71). un « fonds pour les puits orphelins » a été créé dans le but de payer, entre autres choses, l’abandon et la remise en état des puits orphelins (ogca, par 70(1)). le fonds pour les puits orphelins est financé au moyen d’une redevance annuelle, à l’échelle de l’industrie, payée par les titulaires de permis de puits et d’installations ainsi que de sites non remis en état (par 73(1)). le montant de la redevance est prescrit par l’organisme de réglementation en fonction du coût estimatif de l’abandon et de la remise en état des puits orphelins au cours d’un exercice donné (par 73(2)). [23] the regulator has delegated its statutory au- thority to abandon and reclaim orphans to the owa (orphan fund delegated administration regula tion, [23] l’organisme de réglementation a délégué le pouvoir que lui confère la loi d’abandonner et de remettre en état les puits orphelins à l’owa (orphan [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 177 alta. reg. 45/2001), a non- profit organization over- seen by an independent board of directors it is funded almost entirely through the industry- wide levy described above, 100 percent of which is remit- ted to it by the regulator. the owa has no power to seek reimbursement of its costs. however, once it has completed its environmental work, it may be reimbursed up to the value of any security deposit held by the regulator to the credit of the licensee of the orphans. in recent years, the number of orphans in alberta has increased rapidly. for example, the number of new orphan wells increased from 80 in the 2013-14 years to 591 in the 2014-15 years. [24] at issue in this appeal is the applicability during bankruptcy of two powers conferred on the regulator by the provincial legislation. both are designed to ensure that licensees satisfy their end-of- life obligations. [25] the first power at issue in this appeal is the regulator’s power to order a licensee to abandon licensed assets, which is accompanied by statutory powers for the enforcement of such orders. where a well or facility has not been abandoned in accord- ance with a direction of the regulator or the rules or regulations, the regulator may authorize any person to abandon the well or facility or may do so itself (ogca, s 28). where the regulator or the person it has designated performs the abandonment, the costs of doing so constitute a debt payable to the regulator. an order of the regulator showing these costs may be filed with and entered as a judgment of the alberta court of queen’s bench and then enforced according to the ordinary procedure for enforcement of judgments of that court (ogca, s 30(6)). a similar scheme applies with respect to pipelines (pipeline act, ss. 23 to 26). fund delegated administration regulation, alta. reg. 45/2001), un organisme sans but lucratif su- pervisé par un conseil d’administration indépendant. cette entité est presque entièrement financée par la re- devance décrite ci- dessus qui a été établie dans toute l’industrie, et la totalité de cette redevance est remise à l’owa par l’organisme de réglementation. l’owa n’a pas le pouvoir de demander le remboursement de ses frais. toutefois, une fois ses travaux environ- nementaux terminés, l’owa peut être remboursée jusqu’à concurrence de la valeur du dépôt de garantie détenu, le cas échéant, par l’organisme de réglemen- tation au profit du titulaire de permis associé au puits orphelin. au cours des dernières années, le nombre de puits orphelins a augmenté rapidement en alberta. par exemple, le nombre de nouveaux puits orphelins est passé de 80 en 2013-2014 à 591 en 2014-2015. [24] ce qui est en cause dans le présent pourvoi, c’est l’applicabilité, durant la faillite, de deux pou- voirs conférés à l’organisme de réglementation par la législation provinciale. les deux sont conçus pour garantir que les titulaires de permis remplissent les obligations de fin de vie qui leur incombent. [25] le premier pouvoir en cause dans le présent pourvoi est celui dont dispose l’organisme de ré- glementation d’ordonner à un titulaire de permis d’abandonner des biens visés par des permis, auquel s’ajoutent les pouvoirs que la loi confère pour faire exécuter de telles ordonnances. lorsqu’il y a eu dé- laissement d’un puits ou d’une installation sans que le processus d’abandon ait été effectué conformé- ment aux directives de l’organisme de réglementa- tion, ou aux règles et règlements, l’organisme peut autoriser toute personne à effectuer ce processus à l’égard du puits ou de l’installation, ou s’en charger lui- même (ogca, art 28). quand l’organisme de ré- glementation ou la personne qu’il a désignée procède à l’abandon, les frais liés à cette opération constituent une dette payable à l’organisme de réglementation. une ordonnance de l’organisme de réglementation indiquant ces frais peut être déposée à la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta, inscrite comme un ju- gement de cette cour, puis exécutée conformément à la procédure ordinaire d’exécution des jugements de cette cour (ogca, par 30(6)). un régime semblable s’applique aux pipelines (pipeline act, art. 23 à 26). 178 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. [26] a licensee that contravenes or fails to comply with an order of the regulator, or that has an out- standing debt to the regulator in respect of aban- donment or reclamation costs, is subject to a number of potential enforcement measures. the regulator may suspend operations, refuse to consider licence applications or licence transfer applications (ogca, s. 106(3)(a), (b) and (c)), or require the payment of security deposits, generally or as a condition of granting any further licences, approvals or trans- fers (ogca, s. 106(3)(d) and (e)). where a licensee contravenes the act, regulations or rules, any order or direction of the regulator, or any condition of a licence, the regulator may prosecute the licensee for a regulatory offence and a fine may be imposed as a penalty, although the licensee can raise a due dil- igence defence (ogca, ss. 108 and 110). a similar scheme applies with respect to pipelines (pipeline act, ss. 51 to 54) and the epea contains similar debt- creating provisions with respect to environ- mental protection orders. the epea also provides for the prosecution of regulatory offences in cases of non- compliance, with an available due diligence defence. however, as noted, a trustee’s liability in relation to environmental protection orders is capped at estate assets, unless the trustee is guilty of gross negligence or wilful misconduct (epea, ss. 227 to 230, 240 and 245). [26] le titulaire de permis qui contrevient ou ne se conforme pas à une ordonnance de l’organisme de réglementation, ou qui a une dette impayée envers ce dernier relativement aux frais d’abandon ou de remise en état, est assujetti à un certain nombre de mesures d’exécution potentielles. l’organisme de réglementation peut suspendre les activités, refuser d’étudier des demandes de permis ou de transfert de permis (ogca, al. 106(3)(a), (b) et (c)), ou exiger le paiement des dépôts de garantie, de façon générale ou comme condition à l’octroi d’autres permis, ap- probations ou transferts (ogca, al. 106(3)(d) et (e)). lorsqu’un titulaire de permis contrevient à la loi, aux règlements ou aux règles, à toute ordonnance ou directive de l’organisme de réglementation ou à toute condition d’un permis, l’organisme de réglementa- tion peut intenter une poursuite contre le titulaire de permis pour infraction réglementaire, et ce dernier est passible d’une amende en guise de pénalité, bien qu’il puisse invoquer la défense de diligence raison- nable (ogca, art. 108 et 110). un régime semblable s’applique aux pipelines (pipeline act, art. 51 à 54). l’epea contient elle aussi des dispositions simi- laires relatives à la création de dettes et afférentes aux ordonnances de protection de l’environnement, en plus de prévoir la poursuite d’infractions régle- mentaires en cas d’inobservation, avec la possibilité d’invoquer une défense de diligence raisonnable. toutefois, comme il a été mentionné, la responsabi- lité du syndic en ce qui concerne les ordonnances de protection de l’environnement se limite aux éléments de l’actif, sauf s’il est responsable de négligence flagrante ou d’inconduite délibérée (epea, art. 227 à 230, 240 et 245). [27] the second power at issue in this appeal is the regulator’s power to impose conditions on a licen- see’s transfer of its licence(s). as when it initially grants a licence, the regulator has broad powers to consent to the transfer of a licence subject to any conditions, restrictions and stipulations or to reject the transfer (ogca, s 24(2)). under directive 006 and its 2016 replacement, the regulator can reject a transfer even where both parties would have the required lmr after the transfer or where a secu- rity deposit is available to be posted in compliance with lmr requirements. in particular, the regulator may determine that it is not in the public interest to [27] le second pouvoir en cause dans le présent pourvoi est celui que possède l’organisme de ré- glementation d’imposer des conditions au transfert, par un titulaire, d’un ou de plusieurs de ses permis. tout comme au moment où il octroie un permis au départ, l’organisme de réglementation jouit de vastes pouvoirs pour consentir au transfert d’un permis sous réserve de conditions, restrictions et stipula- tions, ou pour rejeter le transfert (ogca, par 24(2)). suivant la directive 006 et le texte qui l’a remplacée en 2016, l’organisme peut rejeter un transfert, même si les deux parties auraient la cgr requise après le transfert, ou même quand un dépôt de garantie [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 179 approve the licence transfer based on the compliance history of one or both parties or their directors, of- ficers or security holders, or based on the risk posed by the transfer to the orphan fund. [28] where a proposed transaction would cause the transferor’s lmr to deteriorate below 1.0 (or simply to deteriorate, in the case of an insolvent transferor), the regulator insists that one of the following con- ditions be met before it will approve the transaction: (i) that the transferor perform abandonment, recla- mation, or both, thus reducing its deemed liabilities, or (ii) that the transferor post a security deposit, thus increasing its deemed assets. alternatively, the trans- action may be structured to avoid any deterioration of the transferor’s lmr by “bundling” the licences for spent wells with the licences for producing wells. a transaction in which the licenses for spent wells are retained while the licences for producing wells are transferred will almost always cause a considerable deterioration in a company’s lmr. [29] during this appeal, there was significant dis- cussion of other regulatory regimes which alberta could have adopted to prevent environmental costs as- sociated with the oil and gas industry from being of- floaded onto the public. what alberta has chosen is a licensing regime which makes such costs an inherent part of the value of the licensed assets. this regime has the advantage of aligning with the polluter- pays principle, a well- recognized tenet of canadian envi- ronmental law. this principle assigns polluters the responsibility for remedying environmental damage for which they are responsible, thereby incentivizing companies to pay attention to the environment in the course of their economic activities (imperial oil ltd. v. quebec (minister of the environment), 2003 scc 58, [2003] 2 scr 624, at para 24). the licensee liability rating program essentially requires licen- sees to apply the value derived from oil and gas assets during the productive portions of the life cycle of peut être versé conformément aux exigences rela- tives à la cgr. plus particulièrement, l’organisme de réglementation peut décider qu’il n’est pas dans l’intérêt public d’approuver le transfert de permis compte tenu des antécédents de conformité de l’une des parties, ou des deux, ou de leurs administrateurs, dirigeants ou détenteurs de titres, ou encore du risque que présenterait le transfert à l’égard du fonds pour les puits orphelins. [28] lorsqu’une transaction proposée entraînerait une détérioration de la cgr du cédant en deçà de 1,0 (ou simplement une détérioration dans le cas d’un cédant insolvable), l’organisme de réglementation insiste sur le respect d’une des conditions suivantes avant d’approuver la transaction : (i) que le cédant effectue les processus d’abandon et/ou de remise en état, réduisant ainsi ses passifs réputés; (ii) que le cédant verse un dépôt de garantie, augmentant ainsi ses biens réputés. la transaction pourrait également être structurée de manière à éviter toute détérioration de la cgr du cédant par le « regroupement » des per- mis relatifs aux puits épuisés et de ceux liés aux puits productifs. une transaction au cours de laquelle on conserve les permis des puits épuisés tandis que les permis des puits productifs sont transférés entraîne- rait presque toujours une détérioration considérable de la cgr d’une société. [29] au cours du présent pourvoi, il a été beaucoup question d’autres régimes de réglementation que l’alberta aurait pu adopter pour éviter que les coûts environnementaux associés à l’industrie pétrolière et gazière ne soient passés au public. ce que l’al- berta a choisi, c’est un régime de permis qui fait de ces coûts une partie inhérente de la valeur des biens visés par les permis. ce régime a l’avantage de s’accorder avec le principe du pollueur- payeur, un précepte bien reconnu du droit canadien de l’en- vironnement. ce principe attribue aux pollueurs la charge de réparer les dommages environnementaux dont ils sont responsables, ce qui incite les sociétés à se soucier de l’environnement dans le cadre de leurs activités économiques (cie pétrolière impériale ltée c. québec (ministre de l’environnement), 2003 csc 58, [2003] 2 rcs 624, par 24). le programme d’évaluation de la responsabilité des titulaires de per- mis exige essentiellement que les titulaires de permis 180 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. the assets to the inevitable cost of abandoning those assets and reclaiming their sites at the end of those life cycles. [30] ultimately, it is not the role of this court to decide the best regulatory approach to the oil and gas industry. what is not in dispute is that, in adopting its current regulatory regime, alberta has acted within its constitutional authority over property and civil rights in the province and over the “development, conservation and management of non- renewable nat- ural resources    in the province” (constitution act, 1867, ss. 92(13) and 92a(1)(c)). alberta has devised a complex regulatory apparatus to address important policy questions concerning when, by whom and in what manner the inevitable environmental costs associated with oil and gas extraction are to be paid. its solution is a licensing regime that depresses the value of key industry assets to reflect environmental costs, backstopped by a levy on industry in the form of the orphan fund. alberta intended that apparatus to continue to operate when an oil and gas company is subject to insolvency proceedings. [31] however, the insolvency of an oil and gas company licensed to operate in alberta also engages the bia. the bia is federal legislation that governs the administration of a bankrupt’s estate and the or- derly and equitable distribution of property among its creditors. it is validly enacted pursuant to par- liament’s constitutional authority over bankruptcy and insolvency (constitution act, 1867, s 91(21)). just as alberta’s regulatory regime reflects its con- sidered choice about how to address the important policy questions raised by the environmental risks of oil and gas extraction, the bia reflects parliament’s considered choice about how to balance important policy objectives when a bankrupt’s assets are, by definition, insufficient to meet all of its various obli- gations. to the extent that there is an operational con- flict between the alberta regulatory regime and the appliquent la valeur dérivée des biens pétroliers et gaziers pendant les parties productives du cycle de vie des biens au coût inévitable de l’abandon de ces biens et de la remise en état de leurs sites à la fin de ce cycle de vie. [30] en fin de compte, il ne revient pas à notre cour de décider de la meilleure approche réglementaire pour l’industrie pétrolière et gazière. ce qui n’est pas contesté, c’est qu’en adoptant son régime de régle- mentation actuel, l’alberta a agi dans les limites de sa compétence constitutionnelle en matière de propriété et de droits civils dans la province ainsi que dans le domaine de l’« exploitation, [de la] conservation et [de la] gestion des ressources naturelles non renouve- lables [  ] de la province » (loi constitutionnelle de 1867, par. 92(13) et al 92a(1)c)). l’alberta a mis au point un appareil réglementaire complexe pour régler d’importantes questions de politique concernant le moment où, par qui et de quelle manière les coûts environnementaux inévitables associés à l’extraction du pétrole et du gaz doivent être payés. sa solution est un régime d’octroi de permis qui fait baisser la valeur des principaux éléments d’actif de l’industrie pour refléter les coûts environnementaux, lequel est soutenu par une redevance sur l’industrie sous forme de fonds pour les puits orphelins. l’alberta voulait que cet appareil continue à fonctionner lorsqu’une société pétrolière et gazière fait l’objet d’une procé- dure d’insolvabilité. [31] par contre, l’insolvabilité d’une société pé- trolière et gazière autorisée à exercer ses activités en alberta met aussi en jeu la lfi, une loi fédérale qui régit l’administration de l’actif d’un failli ainsi que la répartition ordonnée et équitable des biens entre ses créanciers. elle a été valablement promulguée dans l’exercice de la compétence constitutionnelle du parlement en matière de banqueroute et de faillite (loi constitutionnelle de 1867, par 91(21)). tout comme le régime de réglementation de l’alberta té- moigne de son choix réfléchi quant à la façon d’abor- der les questions de politique importantes soulevées par les risques environnementaux liés à l’extraction du pétrole et du gaz, la lfi témoigne du choix ré- fléchi du parlement concernant la manière d’équili- brer des objectifs de politique importants lorsque les biens d’un failli sont, de par leur nature, insuffisants [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 181 bia, or that the alberta regulatory regime frustrates the purpose of the bia, the doctrine of paramountcy dictates that the bia must prevail. pour satisfaire à toutes ses obligations diverses. et, pour autant qu’il y ait un conflit d’application entre le régime de réglementation de l’alberta et la lfi, ou que le régime de réglementation de l’alberta entrave la réalisation de l’objet de la lfi, la doctrine de la prépondérance commande que la lfi l’emporte. b the relevant provisions of the bia b les dispositions applicables de la loi sur la [32] here, i simply wish to note the sections of the bia at issue in this appeal. these sections will deter- mine whether the doctrine of paramountcy applies. i will discuss the purposes of the bia and the various issues raised by s 1406 in greater detail below. [33] the central concept of the bia is that of a “claim provable in bankruptcy”. several provisions of the bia form the basis for delineating the scope of provable claims. the first is the definition provided in s. 2: claim provable in bankruptcy, provable claim or claim provable includes any claim or liability provable in pro- ceedings under this act by a creditor   . [34] “creditor” is defined in s. 2 as “a person hav- ing a claim provable as a claim under this act”. faillite et l’insolvabilité [32] à ce stade-ci, je tiens simplement à souligner les articles de la lfi qui sont en cause dans le présent pourvoi. ce sont ces articles qui détermineront si la doctrine de la prépondérance s’applique. j’analyserai plus en détail ci- après les objets de la lfi ainsi que les différentes questions soulevées par l’art 1406. [33] le concept central de la lfi est celui d’une « réclamation prouvable en matière de faillite ». plusieurs dispositions de la lfi servent de fonde- ment pour circonscrire la portée des réclamations prouvables. la première est la définition que l’on trouve à l’art. 2 : réclamation prouvable en matière de faillite ou réclama- tion prouvable toute réclamation ou créance pouvant être prouvée dans des procédures intentées sous l’autorité de la présente loi par un créancier. [34] le terme « créancier » est défini à l’art. 2 comme une « [p]ersonne titulaire d’une réclamation prouvable à ce titre sous le régime de la présente loi ». [35] the definition of “claim provable” is com- pleted by s. 121(1): [35] la définition de « réclamation prouvable » se termine au par. 121(1) : all debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt’s discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this act. toutes créances et tous engagements, présents ou futurs, auxquels le failli est assujetti à la date à laquelle il devient failli, ou auxquels il peut devenir assujetti avant sa libéra- tion, en raison d’une obligation contractée antérieurement à cette date, sont réputés des réclamations prouvables dans des procédures entamées en vertu de la présente loi. [36] a claim may be provable in a bankruptcy pro- ceeding even if it is a contingent claim. a “contingent claim is ‘a claim which may or may not ever ripen into a debt, according as some future event does or does not happen’” (peters v. remington, 2004 abca [36] une réclamation peut être prouvable dans une procédure de faillite même s’il s’agit d’une réclama- tion éventuelle. une [traduction] « réclamation éventuelle est “une réclamation qui peut ou non se transformer en une créance, selon qu’un événement 182 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. 5, 49 cbr (4th) 273, at para. 23, quoting garner v. newton (1916), 29 dlr 276 (man. kb), at p 281). sections 121(2) and 135(1.1) provide guid- ance on when a contingent claim will be a provable claim: 121 (2) the determination whether a contingent or un- liquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such a claim shall be made in accordance with section 135. futur se produit ou non” » (peters c. remington, 2004 abca 5, 49 bcr (4th) 273, par. 23, citant gar­ ner c. newton (1916), 29 dlr 276, (br. man.), p 281. les paragraphes 121(2) et 135(1.1) donnent des indications sur le moment où une réclamation éventuelle deviendra une réclamation prouvable : 121 (2) la question de savoir si une réclamation éventuelle ou non liquidée constitue une réclamation prouvable et, le cas échéant, son évaluation sont décidées en application de l’article 135.   .   . 135 (1.1) the trustee shall determine whether any contin- gent claim or unliquidated claim is a provable claim, and, if a provable claim, the trustee shall value it, and the claim is thereafter, subject to this section, deemed a proved claim to the amount of its valuation. 135 (1.1) le syndic décide si une réclamation éventuelle ou non liquidée est une réclamation prouvable et, le cas échéant, il l’évalue; sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, la réclamation est dès lors réputée prouvée pour le montant de l’évaluation. in newfoundland and labrador v. abitibi­ [37] bowater inc., 2012 scc 67, [2012] 3 scr 443 (“abitibi”), at para. 26, this court interpreted the foregoing provisions of the bia and articulated a three- part test for determining when an environ- mental obligation imposed by a regulator will be a provable claim for the purposes of the bia and the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc. 1985, c. c-36 (“ccaa”): first, there must be a debt, a liability or an obligation to a creditor. second, the debt, liability or obligation must be incurred before the debtor becomes bankrupt. third, it must be possible to attach a monetary value to the debt, liability or obligation. [emphasis in original.] [37] dans l’arrêt terre­ neuve­et­ labrador c. abitibi bowater inc., 2012 csc 67, [2012] 3 rcs. 443 (« abitibi »), par. 26, notre cour a interprété les dispositions précédentes de la lfi et a formulé un critère tripartite afin de décider quand une obliga- tion environnementale imposée par un organisme de réglementation sera une réclamation prouvable pour l’application de la lfi et de la loi sur les ar­ rangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, lrc 1985, c. c-36 (« lacc ») : premièrement, on doit être en présence d’une dette, d’un engagement ou d’une obligation envers un créancier. deuxièmement, la dette, l’engagement ou l’obligation doit avoir pris naissance avant que le débiteur ne devienne failli. troisièmement, il doit être possible d’attribuer une valeur pécuniaire à cette dette, cet engagement ou cette obligation. [en italique dans l’original.] i will address the abitibi test in greater detail [38] below. [38] j’aborderai le critère de l’arrêt abitibi plus en détail ci- dessous. [39] once bankruptcy has been declared, credi- tors of the bankrupt must participate in one collec- tive bankruptcy proceeding if they wish to enforce their provable claims. section 69.3(1) of the bia thus provides for an automatic stay of enforcement of provable claims outside the bankruptcy proceed- ing, effective as of the first day of bankruptcy. [39] une fois la faillite déclarée, les créanciers du failli doivent participer à l’unique procédure collective de faillite s’ils souhaitent faire valoir leurs réclama- tions prouvables. le paragraphe 69.3(1) de la lfi pré- voit donc une suspension automatique de l’exécution des réclamations prouvables en dehors de la procédure de faillite, à compter du premier jour de la faillite. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 183 [40] the bia establishes a comprehensive priority scheme for the satisfaction of the provable claims asserted against the bankrupt in the collective pro- ceeding. section 141 sets out the general rule, which is that all creditors rank equally and share rateably in the bankrupt’s assets. however, the rule set out in s. 141 applies “[s]ubject to [the bia]”. section 136(1) lists the claims of preferred creditors and the order of priority for their payment. it also states that this order of priority is “[s]ubject to the rights of secured cred- itors”. under s 693(2), the stay of proceedings does not prevent secured creditors from realizing their security interest. the bia therefore sets out a priority scheme for paying claims provable in bankruptcy, with secured creditors being paid first, preferred creditors second and unsecured creditors last (see alberta (attorney general) v. moloney, 2015 scc 51, [2015] 3 scr 327, at paras 32-35). [41] essential to this appeal is s 1406 of the bia, which deals with various environmental matters in the bankruptcy context. i will now reproduce s 1406(2) and s 1406(4), the two portions of the s 1406 scheme that are directly implicated in this appeal. the balance of s 1406 can be found in the appendix at the conclu- sion of these reasons. [40] la lfi établit un régime de priorité complet pour l’acquittement des réclamations prouvables présentées contre le failli dans la procédure col- lective l’article  141 énonce la règle générale, à savoir que tous les créanciers ont un rang égal et une part proportionnelle des biens du failli. toutefois, la règle énoncée à l’art.  141 s’applique «  [s]ous réserve des autres dispositions de [la lfi]  » le paragraphe  136(1) énumère les réclamations des « créanciers privilégiés » et fixe l’ordre de prio- rité dans lequel ils doivent recevoir leur paiement. cet ordre établi par le par. 136(1) l’est « [s]ous ré- serve des droits des créanciers garantis ». selon le par 693(2), la suspension des procédures n’em- pêche pas les créanciers garantis de réaliser leur garantie. la lfi instaure donc un régime de prio- rité pour le versement des réclamations prouvables en matière de faillite, les créanciers garantis étant payés en premier, les créanciers privilégiés en deu- xième et les créanciers non garantis en dernier (voir alberta (procureur général) c. moloney, 2015 csc 51, [2015] 3 rcs 327, par 32-35). [41] l’article 14.06 de la lfi, qui traite de di- verses questions environnementales dans le con- texte de la faillite, est essentiel pour statuer sur le présent pourvoi. je vais maintenant reproduire les par 1406(2) et 14.06(4), les deux parties du régime prévu à l’art.  14.06 qui sont directement en cause dans le présent pourvoi le reste de l’art 1406 se trouve en annexe à la fin des pré- sents motifs. [42] section 14.06(2) reads as follows: [42] voici le texte du par 1406(2) : (2) notwithstanding anything in any federal or provincial law, a trustee is not personally liable in that position for any environmental condition that arose or environmental damage that occurred (a) before the trustee’s appointment; or (b) after the trustee’s appointment unless it is estab- lished that the condition arose or the damage occurred as a result of the trustee’s gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in the province of quebec, the trustee’s gross or intentional fault. (2) par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, le syndic est, ès qualités, dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle découlant de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement survenu avant ou après sa nomination, sauf celui causé par sa négligence grave ou son inconduite délibérée ou, dans la province de québec, par sa faute lourde ou intentionnelle. 184 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. [43] section 14.06(4) reads as follows: [43] voici le texte du par 1406(4) : (4) notwithstanding anything in any federal or provincial law but subject to subsection (2), where an order is made which has the effect of requiring a trustee to remedy any environ- mental condition or environmental damage affecting property involved in a bankruptcy, proposal or receivership, the trustee is not personally liable for failure to comply with the order, and is not personally liable for any costs that are or would be incurred by any person in carrying out the terms of the order, (4) par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, mais sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le syndic est, ès qualités, dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle découlant du non- respect de toute ordonnance de réparation de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement et touchant un bien visé par une faillite, une proposition ou une mise sous séquestre administrée par un séquestre, et de toute responsabilité personnelle relativement aux frais engagés par toute personne exécutant l’ordonnance : (a) if, within such time as is specified in the order, within ten days after the order is made if no time is so specified, within ten days after the appointment of the trustee, if the order is in effect when the trustee is appointed, or during the period of the stay referred to in paragraph (b), the trustee a) si, dans les dix jours suivant l’ordonnance ou dans le délai fixé par celle-ci, dans les dix jours suivant sa nomination si l’ordonnance est alors en vigueur ou pendant la durée de la suspension visée à l’alinéa b) : (i) complies with the order, or (i) il s’y conforme, (ii) on notice to the person who issued the order, abandons, disposes of or otherwise releases any interest in any real property, or any right in any immovable, affected by the condition or damage; (ii) il abandonne, après avis à la personne ayant rendu l’ordonnance, tout droit sur l’immeuble en cause ou tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause, en dispose ou s’en dessaisit; (b) during the period of a stay of the order granted, on application made within the time specified in the order referred to in paragraph (a), within ten days after the order is made or within ten days after the appointment of the trustee, if the order is in effect when the trustee is appointed, by b) pendant la durée de la suspension de l’ordonnance qui est accordée, sur demande présentée dans les dix jours suivant l’ordonnance visée à l’alinéa a) ou dans le délai fixé par celle-ci, ou dans les dix jours suivant sa nomination si l’ordonnance est alors en vigueur : (i) the court or body having jurisdiction under the law pursuant to which the order was made to enable the trustee to contest the order, or (i) soit par le tribunal ou l’autorité qui a compé- tence relativement à l’ordonnance, en vue de per- mettre au syndic de la contester, (ii) the court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy for the purposes of assessing the economic viability of complying with the order; or (ii) soit par le tribunal qui a compétence en matière de faillite, en vue d’évaluer les conséquences éco- nomiques du respect de l’ordonnance; (c) if the trustee had, before the order was made, aban- doned or renounced or been divested of any interest in any real property, or any right in any immovable, affected by the condition or damage. c) si, avant que l’ordonnance ne soit rendue, il avait abandonné tout droit sur l’immeuble en cause ou tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause ou y avait renoncé, ou s’en était dessaisi. [44] as i will discuss, a main point of contention between the parties is the very different interpreta- tions they ascribe to s 1406(4) of the bia. i note that s 1406(4)(a)(ii), which is relied upon by gtl, refers to a trustee who “abandons, disposes of or otherwise releases any interest in any real property”. [44] comme je l’expliquerai, un point de discorde important entre les parties tient aux interprétations fort différentes qu’elles donnent au par 1406(4) de la lfi. je remarque que le sous-al 1406(4)a)(ii), sur lequel s’appuie gtl, parle du syndic qui « abandonne [  ] tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause, en dispose [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 185 the word “disclaim” is used in these reasons, as it has been throughout this litigation, as a shorthand for these terms. ou s’en dessaisit ». dans les présents motifs, le mot « renoncer » sert à raccourcir ces termes, comme cela a été le cas tout au long du litige qui nous occupe. i turn now to a brief discussion of the events [45] of the redwater bankruptcy. [45] je vais maintenant procéder à une brève ana- lyse des faits entourant la faillite de redwater. c the events of the redwater bankruptcy c les faits entourant la faillite de redwater [46] redwater was a publicly traded oil and gas company. it was first granted licences by the regu- lator in 2009. on january 31 and august 19, 2013, atb advanced funds to redwater and, in return, was granted a security interest in redwater’s present and after- acquired property. atb lent funds to redwater with full knowledge of the end-of- life obligations associated with its assets. in mid- 2014, redwater began to experience financial difficulties. upon ap- plication by atb, gtl was appointed receiver for redwater on may 12, 2015. at that time, redwater owed atb approximately $51 million. [46] redwater était une société pétrolière et gazière cotée en bourse. l’organisme de réglementation lui a octroyé ses premiers permis en 2009. le 31 janvier et le 19 août 2013, atb a avancé des fonds à redwater et, en contrepartie, s’est vu accorder une sûreté sur les biens actuels et futurs de redwater. atb a prêté des fonds à redwater en pleine connaissance des obliga- tions de fin de vie associées à ses biens. au milieu de 2014, redwater a commencé à éprouver des difficultés financières. sur demande d’atb, gtl a été nommé séquestre de redwater le 12 mai 2015. à cette époque, redwater devait environ 5,1 millions de dollars à atb. [47] upon being advised of the receivership, the regulator sent gtl a letter dated may 14, 2015, setting out its position. the regulator noted that the ogca and the pipeline act included both re- ceivers and trustees in the definition of “licensee”. the regulator stated that it was not a creditor of redwater and that it was not asserting a “provable claim in the receivership”. accordingly, notwith- standing the receivership, redwater remained ob- ligated to comply with all regulatory requirements, including abandonment obligations for all licensed assets. the regulator stated that gtl was legally obligated to fulfill these obligations prior to distribut- ing any funds or finalizing any proposal to creditors. it warned that it would not approve the transfer of any of redwater’s licences unless it was satisfied that both the transferee and the transferor would be in a position to fulfill all regulatory obligations. it requested confirmation that gtl had taken posses- sion of redwater’s licensed properties and that it was taking steps to comply with all of redwater’s regulatory obligations. [47] après avoir été informé de la mise sous sé- questre, l’organisme de réglementation a envoyé à gtl une lettre datée du 14 mai 2015 exposant sa position. l’organisme de réglementation a fait remar- quer que l’ogca et la pipeline act incluaient à la fois les séquestres et les syndics dans la définition d’un « titulaire de permis ». l’organisme de réglementation a déclaré qu’il n’était pas un créancier de redwater et qu’il ne faisait pas valoir une [traduction] « ré- clamation prouvable dans le cadre de la mise sous séquestre ». ainsi, malgré la mise sous séquestre, redwater demeurait tenue de se conformer à toutes les exigences réglementaires, y compris les obligations d’abandon, pour tous les biens visés par des permis. l’organisme de réglementation a déclaré que gtl était légalement tenu de remplir ces obligations avant de distribuer des fonds ou de finaliser toute proposi- tion aux créanciers. l’organisme de réglementation a averti qu’il n’approuverait pas le transfert de l’un ou l’autre permis de redwater à moins d’être convaincu que le cessionnaire et le cédant seraient en mesure de s’acquitter de toutes les obligations réglementaires. il a demandé la confirmation que gtl avait pris pos- session des biens de redwater visés par des permis et qu’il prenait des mesures pour se conformer à toutes les obligations réglementaires de redwater. 186 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. [48] at the time it ran into financial difficulties, redwater was licensed by the regulator for 84 wells, 7 facilities and 36 pipelines, all in central alberta. the vast majority of its assets were these oil and gas assets. at the time gtl was appointed receiver, 19 of the wells and facilities were producing and the remaining 72 were inactive or spent. there were working interest participants in several of the wells and facilities. redwater’s lmr did not drop below 1.0 until after it went into receivership, so it never paid any security deposits to the regulator. [49] by september 2015, redwater’s lmr had dropped to 093. the net value of its deemed assets and its deemed liabilities was negative $553,000. the 19 producing wells and facilities for which redwater was the licensee would have had an lmr of 2.85 and a deemed net value of $4152 million. the remain- ing 72 wells and facilities for which redwater was the licensee would have had an lmr of 0.30 and a deemed net value of negative $4705 million. given that redwater was in receivership, the regulator’s position was that it would approve the transfer of redwater’s licences only if the transfer did not cause a deterioration in its lmr. [48] à l’époque où elle a connu des difficultés financières, redwater avait des permis délivrés par l’organisme de réglementation concernant 84 puits, 7 installations et 36 pipelines, tous situés dans le centre de l’alberta. la grande majorité de ses éléments d’actif étaient ces biens pétroliers et gaziers. au moment de la nomination de gtl comme séquestre, 19 des puits ou installations étaient productifs, tandis que les 72 autres étaient inactifs ou taris. il y avait des participants en participation directe dans plu- sieurs puits et installations. la cgr de redwater n’est tombée en dessous de 1,0 qu’après la mise sous séquestre de celle-ci et, en conséquence, redwater n’a jamais versé de dépôt de garantie à l’organisme de réglementation. [49] en septembre 2015, la cgr de redwater avait chuté à 0,93. la valeur nette de ses biens réputés moins ses passifs réputés était égale à un montant négatif de 553 000 $. les 19 puits et installations productifs pour lesquels redwater était titulaire de permis avaient une crg de 2,85 et une valeur nette réputée de 4,152 millions de dollars. les 72 autres puits ou installations pour lesquels redwater était titulaire de permis auraient eu une cgr de 0,30 et une valeur nette réputée négative de 4,705 millions de dollars. puisque redwater était sous séquestre, l’organisme de réglementation a mentionné qu’il n’approuverait le transfert des permis de redwater que si cela n’occasionnait pas une détérioration de sa cgr. [50] in its second report to the alberta court of queen’s bench dated october  3, 2015, gtl ex- plained why it had concluded that it could not meet the regulator’s requirements. gtl had concluded that the cost of the end-of- life obligations for the spent wells would likely exceed the sale proceeds for the productive wells. it viewed a sale of the non- producing wells — even if bundled with producing wells — as unlikely. if such a sale were possible, the purchase price would be reduced by the end-of- life obligations, negating the benefit to the estate. based on this assessment, by letter dated july 3, 2015, gtl informed the regulator that it was taking possession and control only of redwater’s 17 most productive wells (including a leaking well that was subsequently abandoned), 3 associated facilities and 12 associated [50] dans son deuxième rapport à la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta daté du 3 octobre 2015, gtl a expliqué pourquoi il avait conclu qu’il ne pouvait pas satisfaire aux exigences de l’organisme de régle- mentation. d’après gtl, le coût des obligations de fin de vie des puits taris dépasserait probablement le produit de la vente des puits productifs. il considérait comme improbable la vente des puits inexploités, même s’ils étaient regroupés avec les puits produc- tifs. si une telle vente était possible, le prix d’achat serait réduit au regard des obligations de fin de vie, annulant ainsi le bénéfice pour l’actif. sur la base de cette évaluation, par lettre datée du 3 juillet 2015, gtl a informé l’organisme de réglementation qu’il prenait possession et contrôle seulement des 17 puits les plus productifs de redwater (y compris un puits [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 187 pipelines (“retained assets”), and that, pursuant to para. 3(a) of the receivership order, it was not taking possession or control of any of redwater’s other li- censed assets (“renounced assets”). gtl’s position was that it had no obligation to fulfill any regulatory requirements associated with the renounced assets. [51] in response, on july 15, 2015, the regula- tor issued orders under the ogca and the pipeline act requiring redwater to suspend and abandon the renounced assets (“abandonment orders”). the orders required abandonment to be carried out im- mediately where there were no other working inter- est participants and, by september 18, 2015, where there were other working interest participants. the regulator stated that it considered the renounced assets an environmental and safety hazard and that s 3012(d) of the oil and gas conservation rules required a licensee to abandon wells or facilities so considered. in issuing the abandonment orders, the regulator also relied on ss. 27 to 30 of the ogca and ss. 23 to 26 of the pipeline act. if the abandonment orders were not complied with, the regulator threat- ened to abandon the assets itself and to sanction redwater through the use of s. 106 of the ogca. the regulator further stated that, once abandonment had taken place, the surface would need to be reclaimed and reclamation certificates obtained in accordance with s. 137 of the epea. qui fuyait et qui a été abandonné par la suite), ainsi que de 3 installations et de 12 pipelines connexes (« biens conservés »), et qu’en vertu du par. 3a) de l’ordonnance de mise sous séquestre, il ne prenait pas possession ou contrôle de tous les autres éléments d’actif de redwater visés par des permis (« biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation »). selon gtl, il n’était aucunement tenu de satisfaire aux exigences réglementaires en lien avec les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. [51] le 15 juillet 2015, l’organisme de réglemen- tation a réagi en rendant des ordonnances au titre de l’ogca et de la pipeline act enjoignant à redwater de suspendre l’exploitation des biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation et de les abandonner (« ordon- nances d’abandon »). les ordonnances exigeaient que l’abandon soit effectué sur-le- champ dans les cas où il n’y avait pas d’autres participants en participation directe, et, au plus tard le 18 septembre 2015, dans ceux où il y avait d’autres participants en participation directe. l’organisme de réglementation a déclaré qu’il considérait les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation comme un danger pour l’environnement et la sécurité, et que l’al 3012(d) des oil and gas conservation rules obligeait le titulaire de permis à abandonner ces puits ou installations. lorsqu’il a rendu les or- donnances d’abandon, l’organisme de réglementa- tion s’est également fondé sur les art. 27 à 30 de l’ogca et sur les art. 23 à 26 de la pipeline act. si les ordonnances d’abandon n’étaient pas respectées, l’organisme de réglementation menaçait d’effectuer lui- même le processus d’abandon des biens et de sanctionner redwater par l’application de l’art. 106 de l’ogca. l’organisme a ajouté qu’une fois qu’il y avait eu abandon, la surface devait être remise en état et il fallait obtenir des certificats de remise en état conformément à l’art. 137 de l’epea. [52] on september 22, 2015, the regulator and the owa filed an application for a declaration that gtl’s renunciation of the renounced assets was void, an order requiring gtl to comply with the abandon- ment orders, and an order requiring gtl to “fulfill the statutory obligations as licensee in relation to the abandonment, reclamation and remediation” of all of redwater’s licensed properties (ar, vol. ii, at p 41). the regulator did not seek to hold gtl [52] le 22 septembre 2015, l’organisme de ré- glementation et l’owa ont déposé une demande en vue d’obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que l’abandon par gtl des biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation était nul, une ordonnance obligeant gtl à se conformer aux ordonnances d’abandon, de même qu’une ordonnance enjoignant à gtl de [traduction] « remplir les obligations légales en tant que titulaire de permis concernant l’abandon, 188 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. liable for these obligations beyond the assets remain- ing in the redwater estate. gtl brought a cross- application on october 5, 2015, seeking approval to pursue a sales process excluding the renounced assets. gtl sought a court order directing that the regulator could not prevent the transfer of the li- cences associated with the retained assets on the basis of, inter alia, the lmr requirements, failure to comply with the abandonment orders, refusal to take possession of the renounced assets or any out- standing debts owed by redwater to the regulator. gtl did not seek to foreclose the possibility that the regulator might have some other valid reason to reject a proposed transfer. [53] a bankruptcy order was issued for red water on october 28, 2015, and gtl was appointed as trus- tee. gtl sent another letter to the regulator on no- vember 2, 2015, this time invoking s 1406(4)(a)(ii) of the bia in relation to the renounced assets. the abandonment orders remain outstanding. la remise en état et la décontamination » de tous les biens de redwater visés par des permis (ar, vol. ii, p 41). l’organisme de réglementation n’a pas cherché à tenir gtl responsable de ces obliga- tions au- delà des éléments qui faisaient encore partie de l’actif de redwater. le 5 octobre 2015, gtl a présenté une demande reconventionnelle visant à obtenir l’autorisation de poursuivre un processus de vente excluant les biens faisant l’objet de la renon- ciation. gtl a demandé au tribunal de rendre une ordonnance interdisant à l’organisme de réglementa- tion d’empêcher le transfert des permis associés aux biens conservés en raison, notamment, des exigences relatives à la cgr, du non- respect des ordonnances d’abandon, du refus de prendre possession des biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation ou des dettes en souffrance de redwater envers l’organisme de régle- mentation. gtl n’a pas cherché à exclure la possi- bilité que l’organisme de réglementation ait un autre motif valable de rejeter un transfert proposé. [53] le 28 octobre 2015, une ordonnance de fail- lite a été rendue à l’égard de redwater, et gtl a été nommé syndic. gtl a envoyé une autre lettre à l’or- ganisme de réglementation le 2 novembre 2015, dans laquelle il invoquait cette fois le sous-al 1406(4)a)(ii) de la lfi à l’égard des biens faisant l’objet de la re- nonciation. les ordonnances d’abandon sont toujours pendantes. d judicial history d historique judiciaire (1) court of queen’s bench of alberta (1) la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta [54] the chambers judge concluded that s 1406 of the bia was designed to permit trustees to disclaim property where this was a rational economic decision in light of the environmental condition affecting the property. personal liability of the trustee was not a condition precedent to the power to disclaim. the chambers judge accordingly found an operational conflict between s 1406 of the bia and the defi- nition of “licensee” in the ogca and the pipeline act. under s 1406 of the bia, gtl could renounce assets and not be responsible for the associated en- vironmental obligations. however, under the ogca and the pipeline act, gtl could not renounce li- censed assets because the definition of “licensee” [54] le juge siégeant en cabinet a conclu que l’art 1406 de la lfi visait à permettre aux syn- dics de renoncer à un bien lorsqu’il s’agissait d’une décision économique rationnelle compte tenu du fait lié à l’environnement et touchant le bien. la responsabilité personnelle du syndic n’était pas une condition préalable au pouvoir de renonciation. le juge siégeant en cabinet a donc conclu à un conflit d’application entre l’art 1406 de la lfi et la défi- nition de « titulaire de permis » que l’on trouve dans l’ogca et la pipeline act. en vertu de l’art 1406 de la lfi, gtl pouvait renoncer aux biens et ne pas être responsable des obligations environnementales qui y étaient associées. cependant, aux termes de l’ogca [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 189 included receivers and trustees, so gtl remained liable for environmental obligations. [55] applying the test from abitibi, the chambers judge concluded that, although in a “technical sense” it was not sufficiently certain that the regulator or the owa would carry out the abandonment orders and assert a monetary claim to have its costs reimbursed, the situation met what was intended by the court in abitibi because the abandonment orders were “in- trinsically financial” (para 173). forcing gtl, as a “licensee”, to comply with the abandonment orders would therefore frustrate the bia’s overall purpose of equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s assets, as the regulator’s claim would be given a super priority to which it was not entitled, ahead of the claims of secured creditors. it would also frustrate the purpose of s 1406, by which parliament had legislated as to environmental claims in bankruptcy and had specif- ically chosen not to give them a super priority. the conditions imposed by the regulator on transfers of the licences for the retained assets further frustrated s 1406 by including the renounced assets in the calculation for determining the approval of a sale. et de la pipeline act, gtl ne pouvait renoncer aux biens visés par des permis parce que la définition de « titulaire de permis » comprenait le séquestre et le syndic, si bien que gtl demeurait responsable des obligations environnementales. [55] appliquant le critère de l’arrêt abitibi, le juge siégeant en cabinet a conclu que, bien qu’au [tra- duction] « sens technique », il n’était pas suffisam- ment certain que l’organisme de réglementation ou l’owa exécuteraient les ordonnances d’abandon et feraient valoir une réclamation pécuniaire pour obtenir le remboursement de leurs frais, la situa- tion répondait à l’intention de la cour dans abitibi car les ordonnances d’abandon étaient « intrinsè- quement financières » (par 173). forcer gtl en tant que « titulaire de permis » à se conformer aux ordonnances d’abandon irait donc à l’encontre de l’objectif global de la lfi de partage équitable des biens du failli, puisque l’organisme de réglemen- tation se verrait accorder, pour sa réclamation, une superpriorité à laquelle il n’avait pas droit, avant les réclamations des créanciers garantis. cela entrave- rait aussi la réalisation de l’objet de l’art 1406, par lequel le parlement a légiféré sur les réclamations environnementales en cas de faillite et a expressé- ment fait le choix de ne pas leur accorder une super- priorité. les conditions imposées par l’organisme de réglementation sur les transferts de permis rela- tifs aux biens conservés ont contrecarré davantage l’article 14.06 en incluant les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation dans le calcul pour décider de l’approbation d’une vente. [56] the chambers judge approved the sale proce- dure proposed by gtl. he declared that the ogca and the pipeline act were inoperative to the extent that they conflicted with the bia by deeming gtl to be the “licensee” of the renounced assets; that gtl was entitled to disclaim the renounced assets pursuant to s 1406(4)(a)(ii) and (c), and was not subject to any obligations in relation to those assets; that the abandonment orders were inoperative to the extent that they required gtl to comply or to provide security deposits; and that directive 006 was inoperative to the extent it conflicted with s 1406 of the bia. lastly, he declared that the regulator, in exercising its discretion to approve a transfer of the [56] le juge siégeant en cabinet a approuvé la pro- cédure de vente proposée par gtl. il a déclaré que l’ogca et la pipeline act étaient inopérantes dans la mesure où elles entraient en conflit avec la lfi, en considérant gtl comme le « titulaire des permis » relatifs aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation, que gtl avait le droit de renoncer à ces biens au titre du sous-al 1406(4)a)(ii) et de l’al 1406(4)c), et qu’il n’était assujetti à aucune obligation à l’égard de ces biens, que les ordonnances d’abandon étaient inopérantes dans la mesure où elles obligeaient gtl à s’y conformer ou à fournir des dépôts de garantie et que la directive 006 était inopérante dans la mesure où elle entrait en conflit avec l’art 1406 de la lfi. 190 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. licences for the retained assets, could not consider the renounced assets for the purpose of calculat- ing redwater’s lmr before or after the transfer, nor could it consider any other issue involving the renounced assets. enfin, il a déclaré que l’organisme de réglementa- tion, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire d’approuver un transfert des permis relatifs aux biens conservés, ne pouvait pas tenir compte des biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation pour le calcul de la cgr de redwater, avant ou après le transfert, ni tenir compte de toute autre question liée aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. (2) court of appeal of alberta (2) la cour d’appel de l’alberta (a) majority reasons a) les motifs majoritaires [57] slatter ja, for the majority, dismissed the appeals. he stated that the constitutional issues in the appeals were complementary to the primary is- sue, which was the interpretation of the bia. sec- tion  14.06 did not exempt environmental claims from the general bankruptcy regime, other than the super priority in s 1406(7), which would rarely, if ever, have any application to oil and gas wells. section  14.06(4) did not “limit the power of the trustee to renounce    properties to those circum- stances where it might be exposed to personal lia- bility” (para 68). additionally, the word “order” in s 1406(4) had to be given a wide meaning. [58] slatter ja identified the essential issue as “whether the environmental obligations of red- water meet the test for a provable claim” (para 73). he agreed with the chambers judge that the third branch of the abitibi test was met, but concluded that that test had been met “in both a technical and substantive way” (para 76). the regulator’s pol- icies essentially stripped away from the bankrupt estate enough value to meet environmental obliga- tions. requiring the depositing of security, or di- verting value from the bankrupt estate, clearly met the standard of “certainty”. the regulator’s poli- cies required that the full value of the bankrupt’s assets be applied first to environmental liabilities, creating a super priority for environmental claims. slatter j.a concluded that, “[n]otwithstanding their intended effect as conditions of licensing, the regulator’s policies [had] a direct effect on prop- erty, priorities, and the trustee’s right to renounce [57] le juge slatter, au nom des juges majoritaires, a rejeté les appels. il a déclaré que les questions constitutionnelles des appels étaient complémen- taires à la question principale, l’interprétation de la lfi. l’article 14.06 n’a pas soustrait les récla- mations environnementales au régime général de faillite, à l’exception de la superpriorité prévue au par.  14.06(7), qui s’appliquerait rarement, voire jamais, aux puits de pétrole et de gaz le para- graphe 14.06(4) n’a pas [traduction] « limité le pouvoir du syndic de renoncer [  ] aux biens dans des circonstances où il pourrait s’exposer à une res- ponsabilité personnelle » (par 68). en outre, il fallait donner un sens large au mot « ordonnance » qui figure au par 1406(4). [58] le juge slatter a décidé que la question essen- tielle était de savoir [traduction] « si les obliga- tions environnementales de redwater satisf[aisaient] au critère de la réclamation prouvable » (par 73). il était d’accord avec le juge siégeant en cabinet quant au respect du troisième volet du critère d’abitibi, mais il a conclu que ce critère avait été respecté « tant sur le plan technique que sur le fond » (par 76). les politiques de l’organisme de réglementation ont essentiellement privé l’actif du failli d’une valeur suffisante pour respecter les obligations environne- mentales. exiger le dépôt d’une garantie, ou détour- ner la valeur de l’actif du failli, répond clairement à la norme de « certitude ». les politiques de l’or- ganisme de réglementation exigeaient que la pleine valeur des biens du failli soit d’abord appliquée aux engagements environnementaux, créant ainsi une su- perpriorité pour les réclamations environnementales. le juge slatter a estimé que, « [n]onobstant leur effet [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 191 assets, all of which [were] governed by the bia” (para 86). [59] in terms of constitutional analysis, slatter ja concluded that the role of gtl as a “licensee” under the ogca and the pipeline act was “in oper- ational conflict with the provisions of the bia” that exempted trustees from personal liability, allowed them to disclaim assets and established the priority of environmental claims (para 89). it also frustrated the bia’s purpose of “managing the winding up of insol- vent corporations and settling the priority of claims against them” (para 89). as such, the regulator could not “insist that the trustee devote substantial parts of the bankrupt estate in satisfaction of the environmental claims in priority to the claims of the secured creditor” (para 91). prévu en tant que conditions associées aux permis, les politiques de l’organisme de réglementation ont eu un effet direct sur les biens, les priorités et le droit du syndic de renoncer à des biens, qui étaient tous régis par la lfi » (par 86). [59] sur le plan de l’analyse constitutionnelle, le juge slatter a conclu que le rôle de gtl en tant que « titulaire de permis » au sens de l’ogca et de la pipeline act était [traduction] « en conflit d’application avec les dispositions de la lfi » qui dégageaient les syndics de toute responsabilité per- sonnelle, qui leur permettaient de renoncer à des biens et qui établissaient la priorité des réclamations environnementales (par 89). ce rôle entravait éga- lement la réalisation de l’objet de la lfi consistant à « gérer la liquidation des sociétés insolvables et à régler la priorité des réclamations à leur encontre » (par 89). ainsi, l’organisme de réglementation ne pouvait pas « insister pour que le syndic consacre une partie substantielle de l’actif du failli à l’ac- quittement des réclamations environnementales, par priorité sur les réclamations du créancier garanti » (par 91). (b) dissenting reasons b) les motifs dissidents [60] martin ja dissented. in contrast to the ma- jority, she stressed the constitutional dimensions of the case, in particular the need for co- operative fed- eralism in the area of the environment, and noted that the doctrine of paramountcy should be applied with restraint. she concluded that the regulator was not asserting a provable claim within the meaning of the abitibi test. it was not enough for a regula- tory order to be “intrinsically financial” for it to be a claim provable in bankruptcy (para. 185, quoting the chambers judge’s reasons, at para 173). there was not sufficient certainty that the ordered abandonment work would be done, either by the regulator or by the owa, and there was “no certainty at all that a claim for reimbursement would be made” (para 184). martin ja was also of the view that the regulator was not a creditor of redwater — or, if it was a creditor in issuing the abandonment orders, it was at least not one in enforcing the conditions for the transfer of licences. the regulator had to be able to maintain control over the transfer of licences during [60] la juge martin a exprimé sa dissidence. contrairement aux juges majoritaires, elle a souligné les dimensions constitutionnelles de l’affaire, en parti- culier la nécessité d’un fédéralisme coopératif dans le domaine de l’environnement, et a fait remarquer que la doctrine de la prépondérance devait être appliquée avec retenue. elle a conclu que l’organisme de régle- mentation ne faisait pas valoir de réclamation prou- vable au sens du critère d’abitibi. il ne suffisait pas qu’une ordonnance réglementaire soit [traduction] « intrinsèquement financière » pour qu’il s’agisse d’une réclamation prouvable en matière de faillite (par. 185, citant les motifs du juge siégeant en cabinet, par 173). il n’était pas suffisamment certain que les travaux d’abandon ordonnés soient accomplis, soit par l’organisme de réglementation soit par l’owa, et il n’y avait « aucune certitude qu’une demande de rem- boursement soit présentée » (par 184). la juge martin estimait elle aussi que l’organisme de réglementation n’était pas un créancier de redwater — ou, s’il était un créancier au moment de rendre les ordonnances 192 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. a bankruptcy, and there was no reason why such regulatory requirements could not coexist with the distribution of the bankrupt’s estate. [61] with regard to s 1406,. martin ja accepted the regulator’s argument that s 1406(4) allowed a trustee to renounce real property in order to avoid personal liability but did not prevent the assets of the bankrupt estate from being used to comply with environmental obligations. however, she went be- yond this. in her view, s 1406(4) to (8) were enacted together as a statutory compromise. martin ja con- cluded that a trustee’s power to disclaim assets under s 1406 simply had no applicability to alberta’s regulatory regime. the ability to renounce under s 1406(4) had to be read in conjunction with the other half of the compromise — the crown’s super priority over the debtor’s real property established by s 1406(7). licence conditions were not the sort of “order” contemplated by s 1406(4), nor were licences the kind of “real property” contemplated by that provision. the balance struck by s 1406 was not effective when there was no “real property of the debtor” in which the crown could take a super priority (para 210). [62] as there was no entitlement under the bia to renounce the end-of- life obligations imposed by alberta’s regulatory regime, there was no opera- tional conflict in enforcing those obligations under provincial law. nor was there any frustration of pur- pose. the regulator was not asserting any claims provable in bankruptcy: “the continued application of [alberta’s] regulatory regime following bank- ruptcy did not determine or reorder priorities among creditors, but rather value[d] accurately the assets available for distribution” (para 240). d’abandon, il ne l’était pas dans l’application des conditions de transfert des permis. l’organisme de réglementation devait être en mesure de conserver la maîtrise du transfert des permis pendant une faillite, et il n’y avait aucune raison pour que de telles exi- gences réglementaires ne puissent pas coexister avec le partage de l’actif du failli. [61] en ce qui concerne l’article 14.06, la juge martin a retenu l’argument de l’organisme de régle- mentation selon lequel le par 1406(4) permettait à un syndic de renoncer aux biens réels afin d’évi- ter d’engager sa responsabilité personnelle, mais n’empêchait pas que l’on se serve des éléments de l’actif du failli pour se conformer aux obligations environnementales. cependant, elle est allée plus loin. selon elle, les par 1406(4) à (8) ont été adoptés ensemble à titre de compromis d’ordre législatif. la juge martin a conclu que le pouvoir du syndic de renoncer aux biens en vertu de l’art 1406 n’était tout simplement pas applicable dans le régime de réglementation de l’alberta. la faculté de renoncer en vertu du par 1406(4) devait être interprétée en corrélation avec l’autre moitié du compromis, la superpriorité de la couronne sur les biens réels du débiteur établie par le par 1406(7). les conditions relatives aux permis n’étaient pas le genre d’« ordon- nance » envisagé par le par 1406(4), ni les permis le genre de « bien réel » envisagé par cette disposition. l’équilibre atteint par l’art 1406 n’était pas solide lorsqu’il n’y avait pas de [traduction] « bien réel du débiteur » à l’égard duquel la couronne pouvait prendre une superpriorité (par 210). [62] comme il n’y avait aucun droit, aux termes de la lfi, de renoncer aux obligations de fin de vie imposées par le régime de réglementation [de l’al- berta], aucun conflit d’application ne résultait de l’exécution de ces obligations sous le régime du droit provincial. et il n’existait pas non plus d’entrave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral. l’organisme de réglementation ne faisait valoir aucune réclamation prouvable en matière de faillite  : [traduction] « l’application continue du régime de réglemen- tation [de l’alberta] après la faillite n’a pas fixé ou réarrangé les priorités parmi les créanciers, mais a plutôt donné lieu à une évaluation juste des biens pouvant être répartis » (par 240). [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 193 iii analysis iii analyse a the doctrine of paramountcy a la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale [63] as i have explained, alberta legislation grants the regulator wide- ranging powers to ensure that companies that have been granted licences to operate in the alberta oil and gas industry will safely and properly abandon oil wells, facilities and pipelines at the end of their productive lives and will reclaim their sites. gtl seeks to avoid being subject to two of those powers: the power to order redwater to aban- don the renounced assets and the power to refuse to allow a transfer of the licences for the retained assets due to unmet lmr requirements. there is no doubt that these are valid regulatory powers granted to the regulator by valid alberta legislation. gtl seeks to avoid their application during bankruptcy by virtue of the doctrine of federal paramountcy, which dictates that the alberta legislation empowering the regulator to use the powers in dispute in this appeal will be inoperative to the extent that its use of these powers during bankruptcy conflicts with the bia. [64] the issues in this appeal arise from what has been termed the “untidy intersection” of provincial environmental legislation and federal insolvency legislation (nortel networks corp., re, 2012 onsc 1213, 88 cbr (5th) 111, at para 8). paramountcy issues frequently arise in the insolvency context. given the procedural nature of the bia, the bank- ruptcy regime relies heavily on the continued op- eration of provincial laws. however, s. 72(1) of the bia confirms that, where there is a genuine conflict between provincial laws concerning property and civil rights and federal bankruptcy legislation, the bia prevails (see moloney, at para 40). in other words, bankruptcy is carved out from property and civil rights but remains conceptually part of it. valid provincial legislation of general application continues to apply in bankruptcy until parliament legislates pursuant to its exclusive jurisdiction in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency. at that point, [63] comme je l’ai expliqué, la législation alber- taine accorde à l’organisme de réglementation des pouvoirs étendus pour s’assurer que les sociétés qui ont obtenu des permis d’exploitation dans l’industrie pétrolière et gazière de l’alberta abandonneront, de façon appropriée et sécuritaire, les puits de pé- trole, installations et pipelines à la fin de leur vie productive, et remettront en état leurs sites. gtl cherche à éviter d’être assujetti à deux de ces pou- voirs : celui d’ordonner à redwater d’abandonner les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation et celui de refuser de permettre le transfert des permis rela- tifs aux biens conservés à cause du non- respect des exigences relatives à la cgr. il s’agit là sans aucun doute de pouvoirs réglementaires valables accordés à l’organisme de réglementation par une loi alber- taine valide. gtl cherche à éviter leur application au cours de la faillite en invoquant la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale, selon laquelle la loi de l’alberta habilitant l’organisme de réglementation à utiliser les pouvoirs qui sont en litige dans le cadre du présent pourvoi est inopérante dans la mesure où son exercice de ces pouvoirs pendant la faillite entre en conflit avec la lfi. [64] les questions en litige dans le présent pour- voi découlent de ce qu’on a appelé [traduction] l’« intersection désordonnée » de la législation pro- vinciale sur l’environnement et de la législation fédé- rale sur l’insolvabilité (nortel networks corp., re, 2012 onsc 1213, 88 cbr (5th) 111, par 8). les questions de prépondérance se posent souvent dans le contexte de l’insolvabilité. étant donné la nature procédurale de la lfi, le régime de faillite repose en grande partie sur l’application continue des lois pro- vinciales. toutefois, le par. 72(1) de la lfi confirme qu’en cas de conflit véritable entre les lois provinciales concernant la propriété et les droits civils et la légis- lation fédérale sur la faillite, la lfi l’emporte (voir moloney, par 40). en d’autres termes, la faillite est issue de la propriété et des droits civils, mais elle en fait toujours partie conceptuellement. les lois pro- vinciales valides d’application générale continuent de s’appliquer dans le domaine de la faillite jusqu’à ce 194 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. the provincial law becomes inoperative to the extent of the conflict (see husky oil operations ltd. v. minister of national revenue, [1995] 3 scr 453, at para 3). [65] over time, two distinct forms of conflict have been recognized. the first is operational conflict, which arises where compliance with both a valid federal law and a valid provincial law is impossible. operational conflict arises “where one enactment says ‘yes’ and the other says ‘no’, such that ‘com- pliance with one is defiance of the other’” (saskatch­ ewan (attorney general) v. lemare lake logging ltd., 2015 scc 53, [2015] 3 scr 419, at para. 18, quoting multiple access ltd. v. mccutcheon, [1982] 2 scr 161, at p 191). the second is frustration of purpose, which occurs where the operation of a valid provincial law is incompatible with a fed- eral legislative purpose. the effect of a provincial law may frustrate the purpose of the federal law, even though it does “not entail a direct violation of the federal law’s provisions” (canadian western bank v. alberta, 2007 scc 22, [2007] 2 scr 3, at para 73). the party relying on frustration of purpose “must first establish the purpose of the relevant fed- eral statute, and then prove that the provincial legis- lation is incompatible with this purpose” (lemare, at para. 26, quoting quebec (attorney general) v. canadian owners and pilots association, 2010 scc 39, [2010] 2 scr 536, at para 66). que le parlement légifère en vertu de sa compétence exclusive en matière de faillite et d’insolvabilité. la loi provinciale devient alors inopérante dans la mesure du conflit (voir husky oil operations ltd. c. ministre du revenu national, [1995] 3 rcs 453, par 3). [65] au fil du temps, deux formes distinctes de conflit ont été reconnues. la première est le conflit d’application, qui survient lorsqu’il est impossible de se conformer en même temps à une loi fédérale valide et à une loi provinciale valide. il y a conflit d’application lorsqu’« une loi dit “oui” et l’autre dit “non”, de sorte que “l’observance de l’une en- traîne l’inobservance de l’autre” » (saskatchewan (procureur général) c. lemare lake logging ltd., 2015 csc 53, [2015] 3 rcs 419, par. 18, citant multiple access ltd. c. mccutcheon, [1982] 2 rcs. 161, p 191). la seconde est l’entrave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral, qui se produit lorsque l’applica- tion d’une loi provinciale valide est incompatible avec l’objet d’une loi fédérale. l’effet d’une loi pro- vinciale peut contrecarrer la réalisation de l’objet de la loi fédérale, « sans toutefois entraîner une violation directe de ses dispositions » (banque canadienne de l’ouest c. alberta, 2007 csc 22, [2007] 2 rcs 3, par 73). la partie qui invoque l’entrave à la réalisa- tion d’un objet fédéral « doit d’abord établir l’objet de la loi fédérale pertinente et ensuite prouver que la loi provinciale est incompatible avec cet objet » (lemare, par. 26, citant québec (procureur général) c. canadian owners and pilots association, 2010 csc 39, [2010] 2 rcs 536, par 66). [66] under both branches of paramountcy, the bur- den of proof rests on the party alleging the conflict. this burden is not an easy one to satisfy, as the doc- trine of paramountcy is to be applied with restraint. conflict must be defined narrowly so that each level of government may act as freely as possible within its respective sphere of constitutional authority. “[h]ar- monious interpretations of federal and provincial legislation should be favoured over an interpretation that results in incompatibility    [i]n the absence of ‘very clear’ statutory language to the contrary” (lemare, at paras. 21 and 27). “it is presumed that parliament intends its laws to co- exist with provin- cial laws” (moloney, at para 27). as this court found in lemare, at paras. 22-23, the application of the [66] aux deux volets de la prépondérance, la charge de la preuve incombe à la partie qui allègue l’existence du conflit. il n’est pas facile de s’en ac- quitter, puisque la doctrine de la prépondérance doit être appliquée avec retenue. le conflit doit être défini de façon étroite pour que chaque ordre de gouverne- ment puisse agir aussi librement que possible dans sa sphère de compétence constitutionnelle respective. « [l]es tribunaux doivent donner aux lois provinciale et fédérale une interprétation harmonieuse plutôt qu’une interprétation qui donne lieu à une incompati- bilité [  ] [e]n l’absence d’un texte législatif “clair” à cet effet » (lemare, par. 21 et 27). « on présume que le parlement a l’intention de faire coexister ses lois avec les lois provinciales » (moloney, par 27). [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 195 doctrine of paramountcy should also give due weight to the principle of co- operative federalism. this prin- ciple allows for interplay and overlap between fed- eral and provincial legislation. while co- operative federalism does not impose limits on the otherwise valid exercise of legislative power, it does mean that courts should avoid an expansive interpretation of the purpose of federal legislation which will bring it into conflict with provincial legislation. comme le conclut notre cour aux par. 22 et 23 de l’arrêt lemare, l’application de la doctrine de la pré- pondérance devrait également tenir dûment compte du principe du fédéralisme coopératif. ce principe permet l’interaction ainsi que le chevauchement entre les lois fédérales et provinciales. bien que le fédéralisme coopératif n’impose pas de limites à l’exercice par ailleurs valide du pouvoir législatif, cela signifie que les tribunaux devraient éviter de donner à l’objet de la loi fédérale une interprétation large qui le mettrait en conflit avec la loi provinciale. [67] the case law has established that the bia as a whole is intended to further “two purposes: the equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s assets among his or her creditors and the bankrupt’s financial reha- bilitation” (moloney, at para. 32, citing husky oil, at para 7). here, the bankrupt is a corporation that will never emerge from bankruptcy. accordingly, only the former purpose is relevant. as i will discuss below, the chambers judge also spoke of the purposes of s 1406 as distinct from the broader purposes of the bia. this court has discussed the purpose of specific provisions of the bia in previous cases — see, for example, lemare, at para 45. [67] la jurisprudence a établi que la lfi dans son ensemble est censée favoriser l’atteinte de « deux objectifs : le partage équitable des biens du failli entre ses créanciers et la réhabilitation financière du failli » (moloney, par. 32, citant husky oil, par 7). en l’espèce, la faillie est une société qui ne s’extirpera jamais de la faillite. donc, seul le premier objectif est pertinent. comme je vais l’expliquer ci- dessous, le juge siégeant en cabinet a également affirmé que l’objet de l’art 1406 se distinguait des objets plus larges de la lfi. notre cour a analysé l’objet de certaines dispositions de la lfi dans des décisions antérieures (voir, par exemple, lemare, par 45). [68] gtl has proposed two conflicts between the alberta legislation establishing the disputed powers of the regulator during bankruptcy and the bia, either of which, it says, would have provided a suf- ficient basis for the order granted by the chambers judge. [68] gtl a relevé deux conflits entre la législation albertaine établissant les pouvoirs contestés de l’or- ganisme de réglementation pendant la faillite et la lfi, et l’un ou l’autre aurait constitué, selon lui, un fondement suffisant pour l’ordonnance rendue par le juge siégeant en cabinet. [69] the first conflict proposed by gtl results from the inclusion of trustees in the definition of “li- censee” in the ogca and the pipeline act. gtl says that s 1406(4) releases it from all environmental liability associated with the renounced assets after a valid “disclaimer” is made. but as a “licensee”, it can be required by the regulator to satisfy all of redwater’s statutory obligations and liabilities, which disregards the “disclaimer” of the renounced assets. gtl further notes the possibility that it may be held personally liable as a “licensee”. in response, the regulator says that s 1406(4) is concerned pri- marily with protecting trustees from personal liabil- ity in relation to environmental orders, and does not affect the ongoing responsibilities of the bankrupt [69] le premier conflit avancé par gtl découle de l’ajout des syndics à la définition de « titulaire de permis » qui figure dans l’ogca et la pipeline act. gtl affirme que le par 1406(4) le soustrait à tout engagement environnemental associé aux biens fai- sant l’objet d’une « renonciation » valide. toutefois, comme il est « titulaire de permis », l’organisme de réglementation peut l’obliger à s’acquitter de toutes les obligations et de tous les engagements légaux de redwater, faisant ainsi abstraction de la « renoncia- tion » aux biens en cause. gtl souligne en outre la possibilité qu’il soit tenu personnellement respon- sable en tant que « titulaire de permis ». l’organisme de réglementation réplique que le par 1406(4) a pour objectif premier de mettre les syndics à l’abri de toute 196 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. estate. thus, as long as a trustee is protected from personal liability, no conflict arises from its status as a “licensee” or from the fact that the bankrupt estate remains responsible under provincial law for the ongoing environmental obligations associated with “disclaimed” assets. [70] the second conflict proposed by gtl is that, even if s 1406(4) is only concerned with a trustee’s personal liability, the regulator’s use of its statutory powers effectively reorders the priorities in bank- ruptcy established by the bia. such reordering is said to be caused by the fact that the regulator requires the expenditure of estate assets to comply with the abandonment orders and to discharge or secure the environmental liabilities associated with the re- nounced assets before it will approve a transfer of the licences for the retained assets (in keeping with the lmr requirements). these end-of- life obliga- tions are said by gtl to be unsecured claims held by the regulator, which cannot, under the bia, be satisfied in preference over the claims of redwater’s secured creditors. in response, the regulator says that, on the proper application of the abitibi test, these environmental regulatory obligations are not provable claims in bankruptcy. accordingly, says the regulator, the provincial laws requiring the red- water estate to satisfy these obligations prior to the distribution of its assets to secured creditors do not conflict with the priority scheme in the bia. [71] i will consider each alleged conflict in turn. responsabilité personnelle à l’égard des ordonnances environnementales et que cette disposition n’a aucune incidence sur les responsabilités continues de l’actif du failli. ainsi, tant qu’un syndic est à l’abri de toute responsabilité personnelle, son statut de « titulaire de permis » et le fait que l’actif d’un failli demeure responsable, aux termes du droit provincial, des obli- gations environnementales continues associées aux éléments le composant et faisant l’objet de la renon- ciation ne sont à l’origine d’aucun conflit. [70] le second conflit allégué par gtl est que, même si le par 1406(4) ne porte que la responsabilité personnelle d’un syndic, l’exercice par l’organisme de réglementation des pouvoirs que lui confère la loi réarrange de fait les priorités établies par la lfi en matière de faillite. un tel réarrangement serait imputable au fait que l’organisme de réglementation exige la dépense d’éléments d’actif pour respecter les ordonnances d’abandon ainsi que pour libérer ou garantir les engagements environnementaux associés aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation avant d’approuver un transfert des permis liés aux biens conservés (conformément aux exigences relatives à la cgr). ces obligations de fin de vie sont considé- rées par gtl comme étant une créance ordinaire de l’organisme de réglementation, que la lfi ne per- met pas d’acquitter de préférence aux réclamations des créanciers garantis de redwater. l’organisme de réglementation réplique que, si l’on applique correc- tement le critère d’abitibi, ces obligations réglemen- taires environnementales ne sont pas des réclamations prouvables en matière de faillite. en conséquence, selon l’organisme de réglementation, les lois provin- ciales exigeant que l’actif de redwater satisfasse à ces obligations avant le partage, entre les créanciers garantis, des éléments dont il est composé n’entre pas en conflit avec le régime de priorité de la lfi. j’examinerai chacun des conflits allégués, [71] l’un après l’autre. b is there a conflict between the alberta regula­ tory scheme and section 14.06 of the bia? b y a­t­il un conflit entre le régime de réglementa­ tion albertain et l’art 1406 de la lfi? [72] as a statutory scheme, s 1406 of the bia raises numerous interpretive issues. as noted by martin ja, the only matter concerning s 1406 on [72] en tant que régime législatif, l’art 1406 de la lfi soulève de nombreuses questions d’interpréta- tion. comme l’a fait remarquer la juge martin, le seul [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 197 which all the parties to this litigation can agree is that it “is not a model of clarity” (ca reasons, at para 201). given the confusion caused by attempts to interpret s 1406 as a coherent scheme during this litigation, parliament may very well wish to re- examine s 1406 during its next review of the bia. [73] at its core, this appeal raises the issue of whether there is a conflict between specific alberta legislation and the bia gtl submits that there is such a conflict. it argues that, because it “dis- claimed” the renounced assets under s 1406(4) of the bia, it should cease to have any responsibilities, obligations or liability with respect to them. and yet, it notes, as a “licensee” under the ogca and the pipeline act, it remains responsible for aban- doning the renounced assets. furthermore, those assets continue to be included in the calculation of redwater’s lmr. gtl suggests an additional con- flict with s 1406(2) of the bia based on its possible exposure, as a “licensee”, to personal liability for the costs of abandoning the renounced assets. [74] i have concluded that there is no conflict. various arguments were advanced during this appeal concerning the disparate elements of the s 1406 scheme. however, the provision upon which gtl in fact relies in arguing that it is entitled to avoid its responsibilities as a “licensee” under the alberta legislation is s 1406(4). as i have noted, gtl and the regulator propose very different interpretations of s.  1406(4). however, s.  14.06(4) is clear and unambiguous when read on its own: where it is in- voked by a trustee, the result is that “the trustee is not personally liable” for failure to comply with certain environmental orders or for the costs incurred by any person in carrying out the terms of such or- ders. the provision says nothing about the liability of the “bankrupt” or the “estate” — distinct con- cepts referenced many times throughout the bia. section 14.06(4), on its own wording, does not sup- port the interpretation urged upon this court by gtl. point concernant l’art 1406 sur lequel toutes les par- ties au présent litige ont pu s’entendre est le fait que ce [traduction] « n’est pas un modèle de clarté » (motifs de la cour d’appel, par 201). vu la confusion semée par les tentatives d’interpréter l’art 1406 comme un régime cohérent lors du présent litige, le parlement pourrait fort bien vouloir réexaminer cet article durant sa prochaine étude de la lfi. [73] fondamentalement, le présent pourvoi porte sur la question de savoir s’il existe un conflit entre une loi albertaine en particulier et la lfi. gtl sou- tient que oui et affirme que, comme il a « renoncé » aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation en vertu du par 1406(4) de la lfi, il peut cesser d’assumer toute responsabilité ou obligation ou tout engage- ment à l’égard de ces biens. pourtant, aux dires de gtl, en tant que « titulaire de permis », il reste chargé de les abandonner de plus, ceux-ci sont toujours inclus dans le calcul de la cgr de red- water. gtl prétend qu’il y a un autre conflit avec le par 1406(2) de la lfi du fait que sa responsabilité personnelle comme « titulaire de permis » peut être engagée relativement aux frais d’abandon des biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. [74] j’ai conclu à l’absence de conflit. différents arguments ont été présentés lors du pourvoi au su- jet des éléments disparates du régime instauré par l’art 1406. cependant, la disposition qu’invoque en fait gtl pour affirmer avoir le droit d’échapper à ses responsabilités en tant que « titulaire de per- mis » en application de la législation albertaine est le par 1406(4). rappelons que gtl et l’organisme de réglementation proposent des interprétations fort différentes du par 1406(4). toutefois, à la simple lecture de ses termes, le par 1406(4) est clair et sans équivoque : lorsqu’il est invoqué par un syn- dic, « le syndic est dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle » découlant du non- respect de certaines ordonnances environnementales ou relativement aux frais engagés par toute personne exécutant ces or- donnances. la disposition ne dit rien à propos de la responsabilité du « failli » ou de l’« actif », des notions distinctes mentionnées à maintes reprises dans la lfi. le texte même du par 1406(4) n’étaye pas l’interprétation que gtl nous exhorte à retenir. 198 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. in my view, s 1406(4) sets out the result of [75] a trustee’s “disclaimer” of real property when there is an order to remedy any environmental condition or damage affecting that property. regardless of whether “disclaimer” is understood as a common law power or as a power deriving from some other statu- tory source, the result of a trustee’s “disclaimer” of real property where an environmental order has been made in relation to that property is that the trustee is protected from personal liability, while the ongoing liability of the bankrupt estate is unaffected. the interpretation of s 1406(4) as being concerned with the personal liability of the trustee and not with the liability of the bankrupt estate is supported not only by the plain language of the section, but also by the hansard evidence, a previous decision of this court and the french version of the section. furthermore, not only is the plain meaning of the words “person- ally liable” clear, but the same concept is also found in both s 1406(12) and s 1406(2), which specifi- cally state that the trustee is not personally liable. in particular, in my view, it is impossible to coherently read s 1406(2) as referring to personal liability and yet read s 1406(4) as somehow referring to the liability of the bankrupt estate. [76] given that s 1406(4) dictates that “disclaimer” only protects trustees from personal liability, then, even assuming that gtl successfully “disclaimed” in this case, no operational conflict or frustration of pur- pose results from the fact that the regulator requires gtl, as a “licensee”, to expend estate assets on aban- doning the renounced assets. furthermore, no con- flict is caused by continuing to include the renounced assets in the calculation of redwater’s lmr. finally, given the restraint with which the doctrine of para- mountcy must be applied, and given that the regulator has not attempted to hold gtl personally liable as a “licensee” for the costs of abandonment, no conflict with s 1406(2) or s 1406(4) is caused by the mere theoretical possibility of personal liability under the ogca or the pipeline act. [75] à mon avis, le par 1406(4) expose le résultat d’une « renonciation » du syndic à un bien réel en cas d’ordonnance de réparation de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement et touchant ce bien. que l’on voit la « renonciation » comme un pouvoir reconnu par la common law ou un pouvoir découlant d’une quelconque autre source législative, la « renoncia- tion » d’un syndic à des biens réels en réaction à une ordonnance environnementale visant ces biens dégage le syndic de toute responsabilité personnelle, alors que la responsabilité continue de l’actif du failli n’est pas touchée. l’idée que le par 1406(4) vise la responsabilité personnelle du syndic, et non celle de l’actif du failli, est étayée non seulement par le texte clair de l’article, mais également par les débats parlementaires, un arrêt de notre cour et la version française de l’article. de plus, non seulement le sens ordinaire des mots « responsabilité person- nelle » est-il clair, mais on retrouve également le même concept aux par 1406(12) et (2), lesquels disposent expressément que le syndic est dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle. en particulier, il me paraît impossible d’interpréter de manière cohérente le par 1406(2) comme mentionnant la responsabi- lité personnelle tout en interprétant le par 1406(4) comme renvoyant d’une façon ou d’un autre à la responsabilité de l’actif du failli. [76] comme le par 1406(4) dispose que la « re- nonciation » dégage uniquement le syndic de toute responsabilité personnelle, à supposer même que gtl ait « renoncé » avec succès à des biens en l’es- pèce, l’organisme de réglementation ne cause aucun conflit d’application ni n’entrave la réalisation d’un objet fédéral en exigeant de gtl à titre de « titulaire de permis » qu’il se serve d’éléments de l’actif pour abandonner les biens faisant l’objet de la renoncia- tion. en outre, il n’y a aucun conflit du fait que ces biens soient toujours inclus dans le calcul de la cgr de redwater. enfin, vu la retenue avec laquelle il faut appliquer la doctrine de la prépondérance, et vu que l’organisme de réglementation n’a pas tenté de tenir gtl personnellement responsable en tant que « titu- laire de permis » des frais d’abandon, aucun conflit avec les par 1406(2) ou (4) n’est causé par la simple possibilité théorique de responsabilité personnelle en application de la ogca ou de la pipeline act. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 199 in what follows, i will begin by interpret- [77] ing s 1406(4) and explaining why, based on its plain wording and other relevant considerations, the provision is concerned solely with the personal liability of the trustee, and not with the liability of the bankrupt estate. i will then explain how, despite their superficial similarity, s 1406(4) and s 1406(2) have different rationales, and i will demonstrate that, on a proper understanding of the scheme crafted by parliament, s 1406(4) does not affect the liability of the bankrupt estate. to conclude, i will demonstrate that there is no operational conflict or frustration of purpose between the alberta legislation and s 1406 of the bia in this case, with particular reference to the question of gtl’s protection from personal liability. [77] dans les paragraphes qui suivent, je vais d’abord interpréter le par.  14.06(4) et expliquer pourquoi, compte tenu de sa formulation claire et d’autres considérations pertinentes, la disposition ne concerne que la responsabilité personnelle du syndic, et non la responsabilité de l’actif du failli. je vais ensuite expliquer en quoi, malgré leur similitude superficielle, la raison d’être du par 1406(4) diffère de celle du par 1406(2), et démontrer que, si l’on comprend bien le régime conçu par le parlement, le par 1406(4) n’influe pas sur la responsabilité de l’actif du failli. pour conclure, je démontrerai qu’il n’y a aucun conflit d’application ni aucune entrave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral entre la législation albertaine et l’art 1406 de la lfi dans la présente affaire, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la protec- tion de gtl contre toute responsabilité personnelle. (1) the correct interpretation of section 14.06(4) (1) l’interprétation juste du par 1406(4) (a) section 14.06(4) is concerned with the per­ a) le paragraphe 14.06(4) s’attache à la res­ sonal liability of trustees ponsabilité personnelle du syndic [78] i have concluded that s 1406(4) is concerned with the personal liability of trustees, and not with the liability of the bankrupt estate. i emphasize here the well- established principle that, “[w]hen a federal statute can be properly interpreted so as not to inter- fere with a provincial statute, such an interpretation is to be applied in preference to another applicable construction which would bring about a conflict be- tween the two statutes” (canadian western bank, at para. 75, quoting attorney general of canada v. law society of british columbia, [1982] 2 scr 307, at p 356). [78] j’ai conclu que le par 1406(4) s’attache à la responsabilité personnelle du syndic et non à la responsabilité de l’actif du failli. je souligne ici le principe bien établi selon lequel «  [c]haque fois qu’on peut légitimement interpréter une loi fédérale de manière qu’elle n’entre pas en conflit avec une loi provinciale, il faut appliquer cette interprétation de préférence à toute autre qui entraînerait un conflit » (banque canadienne de l’ouest, par. 75, citant pro­ cureur général du canda c. law society of british columbia, [1982] 2 rcs 307, p 356). [79] section 14.06(4) says nothing about the “bank- rupt estate” avoiding the applicability of valid pro- vincial law. in drafting s 1406(4),. parliament could easily have referred to the liability of the bankrupt estate. parliament chose instead to refer simply to the personal liability of a trustee. notably, s 1406(7) and s 1406(8) both refer to a “debtor in a bankruptcy”. parliament’s choice in this regard cannot be ignored. i agree with martin ja that there is no basis on which to read the words “the trustee is not personally liable” in s 1406(4) as encompassing the liability of the bankrupt estate. as noted by martin ja, it [79] le paragraphe 14.06(4) est muet à propos de « l’actif du failli » qui évite l’applicabilité d’une loi provinciale valide. lorsqu’il a rédigé le par 1406(4), le parlement aurait pu aisément parler de la respon- sabilité de l’actif du failli. le parlement a plutôt choisi de mentionner uniquement la responsabilité personnelle du syndic. fait à noter, les par 1406(7) et (8) parlent tous deux du « débiteur ». ce choix du parlement ne peut être ignoré. je conviens avec la juge d’appel martin qu’il n’y aucune raison de considérer que les mots « le syndic est [  ] dé- gagé de toute responsabilité personnelle » figurant 200 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. is apparent from the express language chosen by parliament that s 1406(4) was motivated by and aimed at concerns about the protection of trustees, not the protection of the full value of the estate for creditors. nothing in the wording of s 1406(4) sug- gests that it was intended to extend to estate liability. [80] the hansard evidence leads to the same con- clusion. jacques hains, director, corporate law policy directorate, department of industry canada, noted the following during the 1996 debates preced- ing the enactment of s 1406(4) in 1997: au par 1406(4) visent la responsabilité de l’actif du failli. comme l’a signalé la juge martin, il ressort des termes exprès choisis par le parlement que le 14.06(4) découlait du souci de protéger les syndics et se voulait une réponse à ce souci, et non de protéger la pleine valeur de l’actif au bénéfice des créanciers. le texte du par 1406(4) ne porte aucunement à croire qu’il devait s’étendre à la responsabilité de l’actif. [80] les débats parlementaires mènent à la même conclusion. jacques hains, directeur de la direction de la politique des lois commerciales au ministère d’industrie canada, a souligné ce qui suit pen- dant les débats tenus en 1996 avant l’adoption du par 1406(4) l’année suivante : the aim is to provide a better definition of the liability of insolvency professionals and practitioners in order to encourage them to accept mandates where there may be problems related to the environment. it is hoped that this will reduce the number of abandoned sites both for the benefit of the environment and the safeguard of businesses and jobs. l’objectif est de mieux définir la responsabilité des pro- fessionnels de l’insolvabilité, des praticiens de façon à les encourager à accepter des mandats où il pourrait peut- être y avoir des problèmes en matière d’environnement, de façon à réduire le nombre de sites abandonnés au pays, pour le bénéfice de l’environnement et la sauvegarde des entreprises et des emplois qui en dépendent. (standing committee on industry, evidence, no. 16, 2nd sess., 35th parl., june 11, 1996, at 15:49-15:55, as cited in ca reasons, at para 197) (comité permanent de l’industrie, témoignages, no 16, 2e sess., 35e lég., 11 juin 1996, entre 15 h 49 et 15 h 55, cité dans les motifs de la cour d’appel, par 197). several months later, mr. hains stated: plusieurs mois plus tard, m. hains a mentionné que : what parliament tried to do in 1992 was to provide a relief to insolvency practitioners    because they were at risk when they accepted a mandate to liquidate an insol- vent business. under environmental laws, therefore, they could have been subject to personal liability to clean up the environment. i am speaking of personal liability here, meaning “out of their own pockets.” [l]es dispositions [ont été] adoptées par le parlement en 1992 en vue d’alléger le fardeau de ceux qui travaillent dans le domaine de l’insolvabilité [  ] parce que le man- dat de liquider une entreprise insolvable leur impose des risques. en vertu du droit environnemental, par consé- quent, ils auraient pu être tenus personnellement respon- sables d’un accident environnemental et obligés de verser les dommages- intérêts. (proceedings of the standing committee on banking, trade and commerce, no. 13, 2nd sess., 35th parl., november 4, 1996, at p. 15) (délibérations du comité sénatorial permanent des banques et du commerce, no 13, 2e sess., 35e lég., 4 novembre 1996, p. 16) mr. hains proceeded to explain how the 1997 amend- ments were intended to improve on the 1992 reforms to the bia that had included the original version of s 1406(2) (as discussed further below), but he gave m. hains a ensuite expliqué en quoi les modifica- tions de 1997 visaient à améliorer la réforme de la lfi en 1992 qui comprenait la première version du par 1406(2) (comme nous le verrons plus loin), mais [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 201 no indication that the focus had somehow shifted away from a trustee’s “personal liability”. il n’a pas laissé entendre que l’accent n’était plus mis sur la « responsabilité personnelle » du syndic. [81] prior to the enactment of the 1997 amend- ments, g. marantz, legal advisor to the department of industry canada, noted that they were intended to “provide the trustee with protection from being chased with deep- pocket liability” (standing com- mittee on industry, evidence, no. 21, 2nd sess., 35th parl., september 25, 1996, at 17:15, as cited in ca reasons, at para 198). i agree with the reg- ulator that the legislative debates give no hint of any intention by parliament to immunize bankrupt estates from environmental liabilities. the notion that s 1406(4) was aimed at encouraging trustees in bankruptcy to accept mandates, and not at limiting estate liability, is further supported by the fact that the provision was inserted under the general heading “appointment and substitution of trustees”. [82] furthermore, in drafting s 1406(4),. parlia- ment chose to use exactly the same concept it had used earlier in s 1406(2): by their express wording, where either provision applies, a trustee is not “per- sonally liable”. this cannot have been an oversight given that s 1406(4) was added to the bia some five years after the enactment of s 1406(2). since both provisions deal expressly with the protection of trus- tees from being “personally liable”, it is very difficult to accept that they could be concerned with differ- ent kinds of liability. by their wording, s 1406(2) and s 1406(4) are clearly both concerned with the same concept. indeed, if one interprets s 1406(4) as extending to estate liability, then there is no prin- cipled reason not to interpret s 1406(2) in the same way however, it is undisputed that this was not parliament’s intention in enacting s 1406(2). [81] avant l’adoption des modifications de 1997, gordon marantz, conseiller juridique au ministère d’industrie canada, a fait remarquer qu’elles visaient à «  empêcher le syndic d’être poursuivi pour de fortes sommes » (comité permanent de l’industrie, témoignages, no 21, 2e sess., 35e lég., 25 septembre 1996, à 17  h  15, cité dans les motifs de la cour d’appel, par 198)). je conviens avec l’organisme de réglementation que les débats législatifs ne donnent aucun indice d’une intention du parlement de mettre les biens des faillis à l’abri de toute responsabilité environnementale. l’idée que le par 1406(4) avait pour objectif d’inciter les syndics de faillite à accep- ter des mandats, et non de limiter la responsabilité de l’actif, est étayée davantage par l’insertion de la disposition sous la rubrique générale « nomination et remplacement des syndics ». [82] de plus, au moment de rédiger le par 1406(4), le parlement a décidé d’utiliser la même notion qu’il avait employé précédemment au par 1406(2) : de par leur libellé explicite, lorsque l’une ou l’autre disposi- tion s’applique, le syndic est dégagé de toute « respon- sabilité personnelle ». il ne peut s’agir d’une erreur, car le par 1406(4) a été inséré dans la lfi quelque cinq ans après l’adoption du par 1406(2). puisque les deux dispositions visent expressément à protéger les syndics contre toute « responsabilité personnelle », il est très difficile d’accepter qu’elles puissent concer- ner différents types de responsabilité. d’après leurs termes, le par 1406(2) et le par 1406(4) traitent manifestement du même concept. en effet, si l’on considère que le par 1406(4) s’étend à la responsabi- lité de l’actif, il n’y a aucune raison de principe de ne pas donner la même interprétation au par 1406(2). toutefois, personne ne conteste que ce n’était pas l’intention qu’avait le parlement au moment d’adop- ter le par 1406(2). [83] similarly, parliament has also chosen to use the same concept found in both s.  14.06(4) and s 1406(2) in a third part of the 14.06 scheme, namely s 1406(12). this provision states that a trustee carrying on the business of a debtor or con- tinuing the employment of a debtor’s employees is [83] dans le même ordre d’idées, le parlement a aussi choisi d’utiliser la même notion figurant aux par 1406(4) et 14.06(2) dans une troisième partie du régime établi par l’art 1406, soit le par 1406(12). selon cette disposition, le syndic qui continue l’ex- ploitation de l’entreprise du débiteur ou lui succède 202 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. not “personally liable” in respect of certain enumer- ated liabilities, including as a successor employer. although this provision is not directly raised in this litigation, by its own terms, it clearly does not and cannot refer to the liability of the bankrupt estate. again, it is difficult to conceive of how parliament could have specified that a trustee is not “personally liable”, using the ordinary, grammatical sense of that phrase, in both s 1406(12) and s 1406(2), but then intended the phrase to be read in a completely different and illogical manner in s 1406(4). all three provisions refer to the personal liability of a trustee, and all three must be interpreted consistently. indeed, i note that the concept of a trustee being “not person- ally liable” is also used consistently in other parts of the bia unrelated to the s 1406 scheme — see, for example, s. 80 and s 197(3). [84] this interpretation of s 1406(4) is also bol- stered by the french wording of s 1406. the french versions of both s 1406(2) and s 1406(4) refer to a trustee’s protection from personal liability “ès qualités”. this french expression is defined by le grand robert de la langue française (2nd ed. 2001) dictionary as referring to someone acting “à cause d’un titre, d’une fonction particulière”, which, in english, would mean acting by virtue of a title or specific role. the robert & collins dictionary (on- line) translates “ès qualités” as in “one’s official capacity”. in using this expression in s 1406(4),. parliament is therefore stating that, where “dis- claimer” properly occurs, a trustee, is not personally liable, in its capacity as trustee, for orders to remedy any environmental condition or damage affecting the “disclaimed” property. these provisions are clearly not concerned with the concept of estate liability. the french versions of s.  14.06(2) and s.  14.06(4) thus utilize identical language to de- scribe the limitation of liability they offer trustees. it is almost impossible to conceive of parliament using identical language in two such closely related provisions and yet intending different meanings. accordingly, a trustee is not personally liable in its comme employeur est dégagé de toute « responsa- bilité personnelle » à l’égard de certains engage- ments énumérés, notamment comme successeur de l’employeur. bien qu’elle n’ait pas été directement soulevée en l’espèce, cette disposition, de par ses propres termes, ne traite manifestement pas et ne peut traiter de la responsabilité de l’actif du failli. là encore, il est difficile de concevoir comment le parlement aurait pu préciser qu’un syndic est « dé- gagé de toute responsabilité personnelle » suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical de cette expression au par 1406(12) et au par 1406(2), et souhaiter par la suite que l’on donne à cette expression une interprétation tout à fait différente et illogique au par 1406(4). les trois dispositions traitent toutes de la responsabilité personnelle d’un syndic et il faut les interpréter uniformément. en effet, je signale que l’idée selon laquelle le syndic est « dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle » est aussi reprise systématiquement dans d’autres parties de la lfi étrangères au régime de l’art 1406, par exemple l’art. 80 et le par 197(3). [84] l’interprétation qui précède du par 1406(4) est également renforcée par la version française de l’art 1406. les versions françaises des par 1406(2) et (4) indiquent que le syndic est, « ès qualités », dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle. selon le dictionnaire le grand robert de la langue française (2e éd. 2001), cette expression française désigne la personne qui agit « à cause d’un titre, d’une fonction particulière »; en anglais, elle désigne la personne agissant « by virtue of a title or specific role ». dans le dictionnaire robert & collins (en ligne), cette expression décrit la personne qui agit en «  one’s official capacity ». en utilisant cette expression au par 1406(4), le parlement prévoit ainsi qu’en cas de « renonciation » valide, le syndic est, ès qualités, dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle à l’égard d’ordonnance de réparation de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement et touchant le bien auquel il a été « renoncé ». ces dispositions ne portent ma- nifestement pas sur la notion de responsabilité de l’actif. les versions françaises des par 1406(2) et (4) emploient donc les mêmes mots pour décrire la limitation de responsabilité qu’elles offrent aux syndics. il est presque impossible de concevoir que le parlement emploie les mêmes termes dans deux [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 203 official capacity as representative of the bankrupt estate where it invokes s 1406(4). [85] prior to this litigation, the case law on s 1406 was somewhat scarce. however, this court has con- sidered the s 1406 scheme once before, in gmac commercial credit corp. — canada v. tct. logis­ tics inc., 2006 scc 35, [2006] 2  scr  123 in that case, comments made by both the majority and the dissenting judge support my conclusion that s 1406(4) is concerned only with the personal lia- bility of trustees. abella j., writing for the majority, explained that “where parliament has intended to confer immunity on trustees or receivers from cer- tain claims, it has done so explicitly” (para 67). as examples of this principle, she referred to 1406(12) and, most notably for our purposes, to s 1406(4), which she described as follows: “trustee immune in certain circumstances from environmental liabilities” (para 67). in her dissent, deschamps j explained that a “trustee is not personally bound by the bank- rupt’s obligations” (para 91). she noted that trustees are protected by the provisions that confer immunity upon them, including s 1406 (12), (2) and (4). [86] although the dissenting reasons focus on the source of the “disclaimer” power in s 1406(4), nothing in this case turns on either the source of the “disclaimer” power or on whether gtl successfully “disclaimed” the renounced assets. i would note that, while the dissenting reasons rely on a purported common law power of “disclaimer”, the court has been referred to no cases — and the dissenting rea- sons have cited none — demonstrating the exist- ence of a common law power allowing trustees to “disclaim” real property. in any case, regardless of the source of the “disclaimer” power, nothing in s 1406(4) suggests that, where a trustee does “dis- claim” real property, the result is that it is simply free to walk away from the environmental orders applica- ble to it. quite the contrary — the provision is clear that, where an environmental order has been made, dispositions aussi intimement liées et leur attribue pourtant des sens différents. en conséquence, le syn- dic est dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle en sa qualité officielle de représentant de l’actif du failli lorsqu’il invoque le par 1406(4). [85] avant le présent litige, la jurisprudence sur l’art 1406 était relativement peu abondante. notre cour a cependant examiné le régime de l’art 1406 une fois auparavant, dans société de crédit commer­ cial gmac — canada c. tct. logistics inc., 2006 csc 35, [2006] 2 rcs 123. dans cet arrêt, les commentaires de la majorité et de la juge dissidente étayent ma conclusion selon laquelle le par 1406(4) ne porte que sur la responsabilité personnelle des syndics. la juge abella a expliqué, au nom des juges majoritaires, que « lorsque le législateur a voulu protéger les syndics ou les séquestres contre certains recours, il l’a fait explicitement » (par 67). à titre d’exemples de manifestation de ce principe, elle a cité le par 1406(12) et, notamment pour les fins qui nous occupent, le par 1406(4), qu’elle a décrits ainsi : « protection du syndic dans certaines circons- tances contre les ordonnances en matière environ- nementale » (par 67). dans ses motifs dissidents, la juge deschamps a expliqué que le « [syndic] n’est pas tenu personnellement aux obligations du failli » (par 91). elle a signalé que les syndics étaient pro- tégés par les dispositions qui leur conférait une im- munité, dont les par 1406 (12), (2) et (4). [86] bien que les motifs dissidents mettent l’ac- cent sur la source du pouvoir de « renonciation » prévu au par 1406(4), la présente affaire ne porte aucunement sur la source de ce pouvoir ou sur la question de savoir si gtl a « renoncé » avec suc- cès aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. je me contente de signaler brièvement que, même si les juges dissidents s’appuient sur un supposé pouvoir de « renonciation » en common law, les parties n’ont renvoyé à la cour aucune décision — et les juges dissidents n’en ont cité aucune — at- testant l’existence d’un pouvoir en common law qui permet au syndic de «  renoncer  » à un bien réel. quoi qu’il en soit, peu importe la source de ce pouvoir, rien dans le par 1406(4) ne donne à penser que le syndic « renonçant » à des biens réels peut tout simplement se soustraire aux ordonnances 204 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. the result of an act of “disclaimer” is the cessation of personal liability. no effect of “disclaimer” on the liability of the bankrupt estate is specified. had parliament intended to empower trustees to walk away entirely from assets subject to environmental liabilities, it could easily have said so. [87] additionally, as i have mentioned, s 1406(4)’s scope is not narrowed to a “disclaimer” in its formal sense. under s 1406(4)(a)(ii), a trustee is not per- sonally liable for an environmental order where the trustee “abandons, disposes of or otherwise releases any interest in any real property”. this appeal does not, however, require us to decide what constitutes abandoning, disposing of or otherwise releasing real property for the purpose of s 1406(4), and i there- fore leave the resolution of this question for another day. nor does this appeal require us to decide the effects of a successful divestiture under s. 20 of the bia. section 20 of the bia was not raised or relied upon by gtl as providing it with the authority to walk away from all responsibility, obligation or lia- bility regarding the renounced assets. [88] the dissenting reasons argue that certain other parts of the s 1406 scheme make the most sense if s 1406(4) limits estate liability. other than s 1406(2), none of these provisions is in issue in this litigation, and none of them was relied on by gtl. regardless, in view of the clear and unambiguous wording of s 1406(4), less weight should be given to its statutory context. this is particularly so given that the proposed alternative interpretation would require the court to read words such as “personally” out of the subsection. as has been noted, when the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, their ordinary meaning plays a dominant role in the interpretive process (canada trustco mortgage co. v. canada, 2005 scc 54, [2005] 2 scr 601, at para 10). ultimately, the consequences of a trustee’s “disclaimer” are clear — protection from personal liability, not from estate liability. there is no ambi- guity on the face of s 1406(4). this court has no environnementales qui s’appliquent à eux. bien au contraire, la disposition prévoit clairement que, si une ordonnance environnementale a été rendue, la « renonciation » emporte la cessation de la respon- sabilité personnelle. on ne fait état d’aucun effet de la renonciation sur la responsabilité de l’actif du failli. si le parlement avait voulu investir les syndics du pouvoir de délaisser entièrement les biens visés par des engagements environnementaux, il aurait pu le faire aisément. [87] en outre, comme je l’ai mentionné, le par 1406(4) ne vise pas uniquement la « renonciation » au sens for- mel. d’après le sous-al 1406(4)(a)(ii), le syndic est dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle à l’égard d’une ordonnance environnementale lorsqu’il « aban- donne [  ] tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause, en dispose ou s’en dessaisit ». le présent pourvoi ne nous oblige cependant pas à décider ce qui constitue l’aban- don, la disposition ou le dessaisissement d’un bien réel pour l’application du par 1406(4), et je remets le règlement de ce point à une autre occasion. le pourvoi ne nous oblige pas non plus à décider des effets d’une renonciation réussie en vertu de l’art. 20 de la lfi. gtl n’a pas invoqué cet article ni soutenu qu’il lui accordait le pouvoir d’abandonner toute responsabilité ou obligation ou tout engagement applicable aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. [88] d’après les juges dissidents, d’autres par- ties du régime de l’art 1406 sont plus sensées si le par 1406(4) limite la responsabilité de l’actif. à l’exception du par 1406(2), aucune de ces disposi- tions n’était en litige dans la présente affaire et aucune d’elles n’a été invoquée par gtl. quoi qu’il en soit, étant donné le libellé clair et sans équivoque de ce pa- ragraphe, le poids à accorder à son contexte législatif est amoindri. cela est d’autant plus vrai que l’autre interprétation proposée obligerait la cour à écarter des mots comme « personnelle » du paragraphe. tel qu’il a été mentionné, lorsque le libellé d’une dispo- sition est précis et sans équivoque, le sens ordinaire des mots joue un rôle primordial dans le processus d’interprétation (hypothèques trustco canada c. canada, 2005 csc 54, [2005] 2 rcs 601, par 10). en dernière analyse, les conséquences de la « renon- ciation » du syndic sont claires : l’immunité contre la responsabilité personnelle, et non celle de l’actif. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 205 option other than to accede to the clear intention of parliament. le paragraphe 14.06(4) ne souffre à première vue d’aucune ambiguïté. notre cour n’a d’autre choix que d’accéder à l’intention manifeste du parlement. i turn now to the relationship between [89] s 1406(2) and (4). je passe maintenant au rapport entre les [89] par 1406(2) et (4). (b) how section  14.06(4) is distinguishable b) la manière dont le par 1406(4) se distingue from section 14.06(2) du par 1406(2) [90] in this case, gtl relied solely on s 1406(4) in purporting to “disclaim” the renounced assets. however, as i will explain, gtl is fully protected from personal liability for the environmental liabili- ties associated with those assets whether it is under- stood as having “disclaimed” the renounced assets or not. however, it cannot simply “walk away” from the renounced assets in either case. [91] regardless of whether gtl can access s 1406(4) (in other words, regardless of whether it has “disclaimed”), it is already fully protected from personal liability in respect of environmental matters by s 1406(2). section 14.06(2) protects trus- tees from personal liability for “any environmental condition that arose or environmental damage that occurred”, unless it is established that the condition arose or the damage occurred after the trustee’s ap- pointment and as a result of their gross negligence or wilful misconduct. in this case, it is not disputed that the environmental condition or damage leading to the abandonment orders arose or occurred prior to gtl’s appointment. section 14.06(2) provides trus- tees with protection from personal liability as broad as that provided by s 1406(4). although, on the face of the provisions, there are two ways in which s 1406(4) may appear to offer broader protection, neither of them withstands closer examination. [90] en l’espèce, gtl s’est fondé uniquement sur le par 1406(4) pour prétendre « renoncer » aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. or, comme je l’expliquerai, que l’on considère ou non que gtl a « renoncé » aux biens en question, il est entièrement protégé contre toute responsabilité personnelle à l’égard des engagements environnementaux associés à ces biens. toutefois, il ne peut tout simplement pas les « délaisser » dans un cas comme dans l’autre. [91] que gtl puisse ou non se prévaloir du par 1406(4) (autrement dit, qu’il ait « renoncé » ou non aux biens en question), il est déjà entièrement à l’abri de toute responsabilité personnelle en matière environnementale par application du par 1406(2). ce paragraphe dégage les syndics de toute respon- sabilité personnelle découlant de « tout fait ou dom- mage lié à l’environnement », sauf celui causé par sa négligence grave ou son inconduite délibérée après sa nomination. en l’espèce, personne ne conteste que le fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement à l’origine des ordonnances d’abandon est survenu avant la nomination de gtl. le paragraphe 14.06(2) offre aux syndics une protection contre toute responsabi- lité personnelle aussi large que celle fournie par le par 1406(4). bien qu’à la lecture des dispositions, le par 1406(4) semble offrir de deux manières une protection plus large, aucune d’entre elles ne résiste à un examen plus approfondi. [92] first, the regulator submits that the protec- tion offered by s 1406(4) should be distinguished from that offered by s 1406(2) on the basis that the former is concerned with orders while the latter is concerned with environmental obligations generally. i agree with the dissenting reasons that a persuasive distinction cannot be drawn between liability for an environmental condition or environmental damage [92] en premier lieu, l’organisme de réglementa- tion soutient qu’il y a lieu de distinguer la protection offerte par le par 1406(4) de celle accordée par le par 1406(2) car le premier concerne les « ordon- nances » tandis que le deuxième intéresse les obliga- tions environnementales en général. je conviens avec les juges dissidents qu’il est impossible d’établir une distinction convaincante entre la responsabilité d’un 206 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. (purportedly covered by s 1406(2)) and liability for failure to comply with an order to remedy such a condition or such damage (purportedly covered by s 1406(4)). as the dissenting reasons note, “[t]his distinction is entirely artificial” (para 212). the un- derlying liability addressed through environmental orders is the liability provided for in s 1406(2): an “environmental condition that arose or environmen- tal damage that occurred”. second, on the face of s 1406(4), no exceptions are carved out for gross negligence or wilful misconduct post- appointment, unlike in s 1406(2). however, s 1406(4) is ex- pressly made “subject to subsection (2)”. i agree with the dissenting reasons that the only possible interpretation of this proviso is that, where the trustee has caused an environmental condition or environ- mental damage through its wilful misconduct or gross negligence, the trustee will still be personally liable, regardless of its reliance on s 1406(4). [93] it follows that s 1406(4) does not provide trustees with protection from personal liability any broader than the protection provided by s 1406(2). despite this, in my view, parliament had good rea- sons for enacting s 1406(4) in 1997. the first was to make it clear to trustees that they had complete protection from personal liability in respect of en- vironmental conditions and damage (absent wilful misconduct or gross negligence), especially in situ- ations where they have “disclaimed”. the hansard evidence shows that one of the impetuses for the 1997 reforms was the desire of trustees for further certainty. the second was to clarify the effect of a trustee’s “disclaimer”, on the liability of the bank­ rupt estate for orders to remedy an environmental condition or damage. in other words, s 1406(4) makes it clear not just that a trustee who “disclaims” real property is exempt from personal liability under environmental orders applicable to that property, but also that the liability of the bankrupt estate is unaf- fected by such “disclaimer”. fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement (prétendu- ment visé par le par 1406(2)) et celle découlant du non- respect d’une ordonnance de réparation du fait ou dommage en question (prétendument visé par le par 1406(4)). comme l’indiquent les motifs dissi- dents, « [c]ette distinction est tout à fait artificielle » (par 212). la responsabilité sous- jacente sur laquelle portent les ordonnances environnementales découle du « fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement » et est prévue au par 1406(2). en second lieu, à la lecture du par 1406(4), celui-ci ne prévoit aucune excep- tion pour négligence grave ou inconduite délibérée après la nomination, contrairement au par 1406(2). le paragraphe 14.06(4) s’applique toutefois expres- sément « sous réserve du paragraphe (2) ». je suis d’accord avec les juges dissidents pour dire que, d’après la seule interprétation que l’on peut donner à cette disposition, le syndic ayant causé un fait ou un dommage lié à l’environnement par son inconduite délibérée ou sa négligence grave engagerait toujours sa responsabilité personnelle même s’il invoque le par 1406(4). [93] ainsi, le par 1406(4) n’offre pas aux syndics une protection contre la responsabilité personnelle plus large que celle fournie par le par 1406(2). mal- gré cela, j’estime que le parlement avait de bonnes raisons d’adopter le par 1406(4) en 1997. la pre- mière était de préciser aux syndics qu’ils étaient entièrement dégagés de toute responsabilité person- nelle à l’égard des faits et dommages liés à l’envi- ronnement (en l’absence d’inconduite délibérée ou de négligence grave), surtout dans des cas où ils ont « renoncé » à des biens. les débats parlementaires indiquent que la réforme de 1997 prenait sa source notamment dans le vœu des syndics d’obtenir une certitude accrue. la réforme visait aussi à clarifier l’effet qu’a la « renonciation » d’un syndic sur la responsabilité de l’actif du failli relativement aux ordonnances de réparation d’un fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement. en d’autres termes, il res- sort du par 1406(4) non seulement que le syndic « renonçant » à des biens réels échappe à toute res- ponsabilité personnelle à l’égard des ordonnances environnementales qui visent ces biens, mais aussi que pareille renonciation n’a aucune incidence sur la responsabilité de l’actif du failli. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 207 in 1992, parliament turned its attention to the [94] potential liability of trustees in the environmental context and enacted s 1406(2). the provision orig- inally stated that trustees were protected from per- sonal liability for any environmental condition that arose or any environmental damage that occurred “(a) before [their] appointment    or (b) after their appointment except where the condition arose or the damage occurred as a result of their failure to exer- cise due diligence”. the hansard evidence demon- strates that trustees were unhappy with the original language of s 1406(2). as mr. hains explained, they complained that the due diligence standard was “too vague. no one knows what it does and it may vary from one case to another. with the vagueness of the standard and what may be required to satisfy it, and with the risk of personal liability, the trustees were not even interested in investigating how they might exercise due diligence” (proceedings of the standing senate committee on banking, trade and commerce, no. 13, 2nd sess., 35th parl., novem- ber 4, 1996, at pp 15-16). [95] as a result, parliament made reforms to the bia in 1997. these reforms not only changed the standard of protection offered to trustees by s 1406(2) by adopting the current language, but also introduced s 1406(4). as is evident from their shared language, the provisions were intended to work together to clarify a trustee’s protection from personal liability for any environmental condition or damage. section 14.06(4) provided the certainty that trustees had been seeking in the years prior to 1997. for the first time, it explicitly linked the concept of “disclaimer” to the scheme protecting trustees from environmental liability. whether it is understood as a common law power or as a reference to other statu- tory provisions, the concept of “disclaimer” predates s.  14.06(4) itself, as well as the 1992 version of s 1406(2) “disclaimer” is also applicable in other contexts, such as in relation to executory contracts, as discussed in new skeena forest products inc. v. don hull & sons contracting ltd., 2005 bcca 154, 251 dlr (4th) 328. [94] en 1992, le parlement s’est penché sur la responsabilité potentielle des syndics en matière environnementale et a édicté le par 1406(2). cette disposition prévoyait au départ que le syndic était dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle décou- lant d’un fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement survenu « a) avant sa nomination [  ]; ou b) après sa nomination, sauf d’un fait ou dommage causé par son omission d’agir avec la prudence voulue ». il appert des débats parlementaires que les syndics étaient insatisfaits du libellé initial du par 1406(2). comme l’explique m. hains, ils se sont plaints que la norme de diligence raisonnable était « trop vague. nul ne sait comment l’interpréter, et les interpréta- tions peuvent varier d’une affaire à l’autre. étant donné le libellé trop vague de la norme, le fait que l’on ignore ce qu’il faut faire pour y satisfaire et le risque de responsabilité personnelle, les syndics ne cherchaient même pas à savoir de quelle manière ils pourraient faire preuve de diligence raisonnable. » (délibérations du comité sénatorial permanent des banques et du commerce, no 13, 2e sess., 35e lég., 4 novembre 1996, p 15-16). [95] en conséquence, le parlement a réformé la lfi en 1997. cette réforme a non seulement modifié la norme visant la protection que le par 1406(2) offre aux syndics par l’adoption du texte actuel, mais elle a aussi introduit le par 1406(4). comme le montrent à l’évidence les termes qu’ils ont en com- mun, les dispositions étaient censées s’appliquer ensemble pour clarifier l’immunité de responsabilité personnelle dont bénéficient les syndics à l’égard de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement. le paragraphe 14.06(4) leur offre la certitude qu’ils recherchaient avant 1997. pour la première fois, il établissait en termes exprès un lien entre la notion de « renonciation » et le régime dégageant les syndics de toute responsabilité environnementale. qu’on le voit comme un pouvoir de common law ou un renvoi à d’autres dispositions légales, le concept de « re- nonciation » précède le par 1406(4) lui- même ainsi que la version de 1992 du par 1406(2). il peut aussi y avoir « renonciation » dans différents contextes, tel celui des contrats exécutoires étudiés dans new skeena forest products inc. c. don hull & sons contracting ltd., 2005 bcca 154, 251 dlr (4th) 328. 208 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. [96] prior to 1997, the effects of a “disclaimer” of real property on environmental liability was unclear. in particular, it was unclear what effect “disclaimer” might have on the liability of the bankrupt estate, given that environmental legislation imposed liabil- ity based on the achievement of the status of owner, party in control or licensee (see j. klimek, insol­ vency and environment liability (1994), at p 4-19). by enacting s 1406(4),. parliament clarified that the effect of the “disclaimer” of real property was to limit the personal liability of the trustee for orders to remedy any environmental condition or damage, but not to limit the liability of the bankrupt estate. par- liament could have merely updated the language of s 1406(2) in 1997, but this would have left the ques- tion of “disclaimer” and estate liability unaddressed. knowledge of the impact of “disclaimer” could be important to a trustee who is deciding whether to accept a mandate. section 14.06(4) thus went a con- siderable way towards resolving the vagueness of which trustees had complained prior to 1997. [97] a notable aspect of the scheme crafted by parliament is that s 1406(4) applies “[n]otwith- standing anything in any federal or provincial law”. in enacting s 1406(4),. parliament specified the ef- fect of the “disclaimer” of real property solely in the context of environmental orders. the effect of “disclaimer” on liability in other contexts was not addressed. parliament was concerned with orders to remedy any environmental condition or damage, where, liability frequently attaches based on the sta- tus of owner, party in control, or licensee. parliament did not want trustees to think that they could avoid the estate’s environmental liability through the act of “disclaiming”. accordingly, it used specific lan- guage indicating that the effect of the “disclaimer” of real property on orders to remedy an environmental condition or damage is merely that the trustee is not personally liable. it is possible that the effect of “disclaimer” on the liability of the bankrupt estate might be different in other contexts. [96] avant 1997, on ne savait pas quels effets la « renonciation » à des biens réels avait sur la res- ponsabilité environnementale. plus précisément, on ne connaissait pas l’effet que pouvait avoir la re- nonciation sur la responsabilité de l’actif du failli, vu que la législation environnementale imposait une responsabilité fondée sur l’acquisition du statut de propriétaire, de partie en possession du bien ou de titulaire de permis (voir j. klimek, insolvency and environment liability (1994), p 4-19). en adoptant le par 1406(4), le parlement a précisé que la « re- nonciation » à des biens réels avait pour effet de limiter la responsabilité personnelle du syndic, et non celle de l’actif du failli, aux ordonnances de répara- tion de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement. le parlement aurait pu se contenter d’actualiser le texte du par 1406(2) en 1997, mais cela aurait laissé en suspens la question de la « renonciation » et de la responsabilité de l’actif. la connaissance de l’inci- dence de la « renonciation » pourrait avoir de l’im- portance pour le syndic qui décide d’accepter ou non un mandat. le paragraphe 14.06(4) a donc dissipé considérablement l’imprécision dont se plaignaient les syndics avant 1997. [97] un aspect digne de mention du régime conçu par le parlement est l’application du par 1406(4) « [p]ar dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial ». en adoptant ce paragraphe, le parlement a précisé l’effet de la « renonciation » à des biens réels uniquement dans le contexte des ordonnances environnemen­ tales. l’effet de la « renonciation » sur la responsa- bilité dans d’autres contextes n’a pas été abordé. le parlement se souciait des ordonnances de réparation de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement où la responsabilité est fréquemment engagée en raison du statut de propriétaire, de partie ayant le contrôle du bien ou de titulaire de permis. le parlement ne voulait pas que les syndics croient pouvoir échapper à la responsabilité environnementale de l’actif par la « renonciation ». il a donc utilisé des termes précis pour indiquer que le seul effet de la « renonciation » à des biens réels sur des ordonnances de réparation d’un fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement est que le syndic est dégagé de toute responsabilité person- nelle. il se peut que la « renonciation » ait un effet différent sur la responsabilité de l’actif du failli dans d’autres contextes. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 209 [98] section 14.06(4) thus makes it clear that “dis- claimer” by the trustee has no effect on the bankrupt estate’s continuing liability for orders to remedy any environmental condition or damage. the liability of the bankrupt estate is, of course, an issue with which s 1406(2) is absolutely unconcerned. thus, it can be seen that s 1406(4) and s 1406(2) are not in fact the same — they may provide trustees with the same protection from personal liability, but only the former has any relevance to the question of estate liability. section 14.06(2) protects trustees without having to be invoked by them — it does not speak to the results of a trustee’s “disclaimer”. [99] where a trustee has “disclaimed” real prop- erty, it is not personally liable under an environmen- tal order applicable to that property, but the bankrupt estate itself remains liable. of course, the fact that the bankrupt estate remains liable even where a trustee invokes s 1406(4) does not necessarily mean that the trustee must comply with environmental obli- gations in priority to all other claims. the priority of an environmental claim depends on the proper application of the abitibi test, as i will discuss below. [100] accordingly, regardless of whether gtl is properly understood as having “disclaimed”, the result is the same. given that the environmental con- dition or damage arose or occurred prior to gtl’s appointment, it is fully protected from personal li- ability by s 1406(2). however, “disclaimer” does not empower a trustee to simply walk away from the “disclaimed” assets when the bankrupt estate has been ordered to remedy any environmental condition or damage. the environmental liability of the bank- rupt estate remains unaffected. [98] le paragraphe 14.06(4) établit donc claire- ment que la « renonciation » du syndic n’a aucun effet sur la responsabilité continue de l’actif du failli pour ce qui est des ordonnances de réparation de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement. bien entendu, il n’est absolument pas question de la res- ponsabilité de l’actif du failli au par 1406(2). ainsi, on constate que les par 1406(4) et (2) sont effec- tivement différents : ils fournissent peut- être aux syndics la même protection contre la responsabilité personnelle, mais seul le premier se rapporte à la res- ponsabilité de l’actif. le paragraphe 14.06(2) protège les syndics sans qu’ils aient à l’invoquer; il est muet sur les résultats de la « renonciation » d’un syndic. [99] le syndic ayant « renoncé » à des biens réels est dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle à l’égard d’une ordonnance environnementale applicable à ces biens, mais l’actif du failli lui- même demeure respon- sable. bien sûr, le fait que la responsabilité de l’actif du failli demeure engagée même lorsque le syndic invoque le par 1406(4) ne veut pas nécessairement dire que le syndic doit respecter les obligations envi- ronnementales et qu’elles ont priorité sur toutes les autres réclamations. la priorité d’une réclamation environnementale dépend de la bonne application du critère d’abitibi, comme je l’expliquerai plus loin. [100] en conséquence, peu importe si l’on consi- dère que gtl a « renoncé » ou non à des biens, le résultat est le même. puisque le fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement est survenu avant la nomination de gtl, ce dernier est entièrement protégé contre toute responsabilité personnelle par le par 1406(2). en revanche, la « renonciation » n’habilite pas le syndic à tout simplement délaisser les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation quand on l’enjoint à répa- rer un fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement. la responsabilité environnementale de l’actif du failli demeure inchangée. [101] i offer the following brief comment on the balance of the s 1406 scheme, although, as men- tioned, none of those provision is actually in issue before this court. the dissenting reasons argue that interpreting s 1406(4) as being concerned solely with the personal liability of trustees creates interpre- tive issues with the balance of the s 1406 scheme. [101] j’aimerais faire de brèves observations sur le reste du régime de l’art 1406 même si, comme je l’ai mentionné, aucune de ces dispositions n’est de fait en litige devant notre cour. les juges dissidents soutiennent que l’on créerait des problèmes d’inter- prétation avec le reste du régime de l’art 1406 si on interprétait le par 1406(4) comme visant uniquement 210 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. in my view, this is not a reason to ignore the plain meaning of s 1406(4). no principle of statutory interpretation requires that the plain meaning of a provision be contorted to make its scheme more coherent. this court has been tasked with inter- preting s 1406(4), and, in my view, the wording of s 1406(4) admits of only one interpretation. la responsabilité personnelle des syndics. à mon avis, ces difficultés ne justifient pas que l’on fasse abstraction du sens clair du par 1406(4). aucun prin- cipe d’interprétation législative ne requiert que l’on déforme le sens clair d’une disposition pour en rendre le régime plus cohérent. notre cour s’est vu confier la tâche d’interpréter le par 1406(4) et j’estime que son libellé ne permet qu’une seule interprétation. (2) there is no operational conflict or frustra- tion of purpose between section 14.06(2) and section 14.06(4) of the bia and the al- berta regulatory scheme (2) il n’y a pas de conflit d’application ni d’en- trave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral entre les par 1406(2) et (4) de la lfi et le régime de réglementation de l’alberta [102] the operational conflicts between the bia and the alberta legislation alleged by gtl arise from its status as a “licensee” under the ogca and the pipeline act. as i have just demonstrated, s 1406(4) does not empower a trustee to walk away from all re- sponsibilities, obligations and liabilities with respect to “disclaimed” assets. rather, it clarifies a trustee’s protection from environmental personal liability and makes it clear that a trustee’s “disclaimer” does not affect the environmental liability of the bankrupt estate. regardless of whether gtl effectively “dis- claimed” the renounced assets, it cannot walk away from them. in light of the proper interpretation of s 1406(4), no operational conflict is caused by the fact that, under alberta law, gtl, as a “licensee”, remains responsible for abandoning the renounced assets utilizing the remaining assets of the redwater estate. likewise, no operational conflict is caused by the fact that the end-of- life liabilities associated with the renounced assets continue to be included in the calculation of redwater’s lmr. [102] les conflits d’application entre la lfi et la législation albertaine allégués par gtl résultent de sa qualité de « titulaire de permis » au sens de l’ogca et de la pipeline act. comme je viens de le démontrer, le par 1406(4) n’investit pas le syndic du pouvoir de se soustraire à l’ensemble des responsabilités, obli- gations ou engagements à l’égard de biens auxquels il a été « renoncé ». il clarifie plutôt l’exonération de responsabilité personnelle dont jouit le syndic et précise que sa « renonciation » n’a aucune incidence sur la responsabilité environnementale de l’actif du failli. que gtl ait bel et bien « renoncé » ou non aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation, il ne peut les délaisser. vu l’interprétation qu’il convient de donner au par 1406(4), aucun conflit d’application n’est imputable au fait que, suivant le droit albertain, gtl demeure, en qualité de « titulaire de permis », tenu d’abandonner les biens faisant l’objet de la re- nonciation et d’utiliser les autres éléments de l’actif de redwater. de même, le fait que les obligations de fin de vie associées aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation sont toujours prises en compte dans le calcul de la cgr de redwater ne donne lieu à aucun conflit d’application. [103] thus, regardless of whether it has effec- tively “disclaimed”, s 1406(2) fully protects gtl from personal liability in respect of environmental matters affecting the redwater estate. gtl notes that, on the face of the ogca and the pipeline act, there is nothing specifically preventing the regulator from holding it personally liable as a “licensee” for the costs of carrying out the abandonment orders. gtl submits that the mere possibility that it may [103] donc, qu’il ait « renoncé » effectivement ou non aux biens, gtl est entièrement protégé par le par 1406(2) contre toute responsabilité personnelle à l’égard de questions environnementales touchant l’actif de redwater. gtl signale qu’à première vue, l’ogca et la pipeline act n’empêchent aucune- ment en termes exprès l’organisme de réglemen- tation de le tenir personnellement responsable, à titre de « titulaire de permis », du coût d’exécution [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 211 be held personally liable for abandonment under the alberta legislation creates an operational conflict with the protection from personal liability provided by s 1406(2) of the bia. [104] there is no possibility of trustees facing per- sonal liability for reclamation or remediation — they are specifically protected from such liability by the epea, absent wilful misconduct or gross negligence. gtl is correct that its potential personal liability for abandonment as a “licensee” is not similarly capped at estate assets under the ogca and the pipeline act. the regulator submits that “[w]hile the definition of a licensee does not explicitly provide that the receiv- er’s liability is limited to assets in the insolvency es- tate, such federal requirements are obviously read in to the provision and [are] explicitly included in other legislation administered by the [regulator], namely the [epea]” (af, at para. 104 (footnote omitted)). for its part, gtl says that it is no answer that the regulator’s practice is to impose liability only up to the value of the estate because, as atb argues, with- out a specific statutory provision, “[p]ractices can change without notice” (atb’s factum, at para 106). [105] i reject the proposition that the inclusion of trustees in the definition of “licensee” in the ogca and the pipeline act should be rendered inoperative by the mere theoretical possibility of a conflict with s 1406(2). such an outcome would be inconsistent with the principle of restraint which underlies para- mountcy, as well as with the principles of cooperative federalism. the inclusion of trustees in the definition of “licensee” is an important part of the alberta reg- ulatory regime. it confers on them the privilege of operating the licensed assets of bankrupts while also ensuring that insolvency professionals are regulated during the lengthy periods of time when they manage oil and gas assets. des ordonnances d’abandon. toujours selon gtl, la simple possibilité que la législation albertaine l’oblige à effectuer l’abandon crée un conflit d’appli- cation avec l’exonération de responsabilité person- nelle qu’accorde le par 1406(2) de la lfi. [104] les syndics ne peuvent être personnellement tenus de remplir des obligations de remise en état ou de décontamination — ils sont expressément exoné- rés de cette responsabilité par l’epea en l’absence d’inconduite délibérée ou de négligence grave de leur part. gtl a raison de dire que son éventuelle obliga- tion, en tant que « titulaire de permis », de procéder à l’abandon n’est pas, de façon similaire, limitée aux éléments de l’actif en application de l’ogca et de la pipeline act. l’organisme de réglementation fait valoir que, [traduction] « [b]ien que la définition de “titulaire de permis” ne prévoit pas explicitement que la responsabilité du séquestre se limite aux élé- ments de l’actif du failli, cette exigence fédérale figure manifestement par interprétation dans la dis- position et est explicitement prévue dans une autre loi, à savoir [l’epea], qu’applique [l’organisme de réglementation] » (ma, par. 104 (note en bas de page omise)). pour sa part, gtl affirme que la pratique de l’organisme de réglementation de n’imposer une responsabilité que jusqu’à concurrence de la va- leur de l’actif ne constitue pas une réponse valable, étant donné que, comme le prétend atb, faute d’une disposition légale expresse, [traduction] « [l]es pratiques peuvent changer sans préavis » (mémoire d’atb, par 106). [105] je rejette la proposition selon laquelle l’ajout des syndics à la définition de « titulaire de permis » dans l’ogca et la pipeline act devrait être déclaré inopérant en raison de la simple possibilité théorique de conflit avec le par 1406(2). une telle issue serait incompatible avec le principe de la retenue qui sous- tend celui de la prépondérance fédérale, ainsi qu’avec le principe du fédéralisme coopératif. l’ajout des syn- dics à la définition de « titulaire de permis » constitue un aspect important du régime de réglementation albertain. il leur confère le privilège d’exploiter les biens des faillis qui sont visés par des permis, tout en s’assurant que les professionnels de l’insolvabilité sont encadrés au cours des longues périodes pendant lesquelles ils gèrent les biens pétroliers et gaziers. 212 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. importantly, the situation in this case is com- [106] pletely different from the one before the court in moloney. in that case, gascon j rejected the argu- ment that there was no operational conflict because the bankrupt could voluntarily pay a provincial debt post discharge or could choose not to drive. he noted that “the test for operational conflict cannot be lim- ited to asking whether the respondent can comply with both laws by renouncing the protection afforded to him or her under the federal law or the privilege he or she is otherwise entitled to under the provincial law” (para 60). in the instant case, gtl retains both the protection afforded to it under the federal law (no personal liability) and the privilege to which it is entitled under the provincial law (ability to op- erate the bankrupt’s assets in a regulated industry). gtl is not being asked to forego doing anything or to voluntarily pay anything. nor is it urged that the regulator could avoid conflict by declining to apply the impugned law during bankruptcy, as in moloney, at para 69. this is not a situation in which the regulator might decline to apply the provincial law, but a situation in which the provincial law can be — and has been — applied during bankruptcy without conflict. [107] according to the evidence in this case, the ogca and the pipeline act have included trustees in the definition of “licensee” for 20 years now, and, in that time, the regulator has never attempted to hold a trustee personally liable. the regulator does not look beyond the assets remaining in the bankrupt estate in seeking compliance with the bankrupt’s environmental obligations. if the regulator were to attempt to hold gtl personally liable under the abandonment orders, this would create an opera- tional conflict between the ogca and the pipeline act, and s 1406(2) of the bia, rendering the former two acts inoperative to the extent of the conflict. as it stands, however, gtl can both be protected from personal liability by s 1406(2) and comply with the alberta regime in administering the redwater estate as a “licensee”. [106] fait important, la situation en l’espèce est complètement différente de celle dont a été saisie notre cour dans moloney. dans cette affaire, le juge gascon a rejeté l’argument selon lequel il n’y avait pas de conflit d’application parce que le failli pouvait vo- lontairement payer une dette provinciale postérieure à la libération ou choisir de ne pas conduire. le juge gascon a signalé que « l’analyse relative au conflit d’application ne saurait se limiter à la question de savoir si l’intimé peut se conformer aux deux lois en renonçant soit à la protection que lui offre la loi fédé- rale, soit au droit dont il bénéficie en vertu de la loi provinciale » (par 60). dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, gtl conserve à la fois la protection que lui confère la loi fédérale (aucune responsabilité personnelle) et le privilège auquel il a droit en vertu de la loi provinciale (faculté d’exploiter l’actif du failli dans une industrie réglementée). on ne demande pas à gtl de renoncer à faire quelque chose ni de payer volontairement quoi que ce soit. on ne soutient pas non plus que l’orga- nisme de réglementation puisse éviter le conflit en re- fusant d’appliquer les mesures législatives contestées pendant la faillite (comme dans moloney, par 69). nous ne sommes pas en présence d’une situation où l’organisme de réglementation pourrait refuser d’ap- pliquer la loi provinciale, mais d’une situation où la loi provinciale peut être appliquée — et l’a été — pendant la faillite sans qu’il y ait de conflit. [107] selon la preuve produite en l’espèce, les dé- finitions de « titulaire de permis » dans l’ogca et la pipeline act incluent depuis une vingtaine d’années les syndics et, durant cette période, l’organisme de régle- mentation n’a jamais essayé d’engager la responsabilité personnelle d’un syndic. l’organisme de réglementation ne va pas au- delà des éléments qui font encore partie de l’actif du failli en recherchant le respect de ses obliga- tions environnementales. si l’organisme de réglemen- tation devait tenter d’obliger personnellement gtl à se conformer aux ordonnances d’abandon, cela engendre- rait un conflit d’application entre, d’une part, l’ogca et la pipeline act et, d’autre part, le par 1406(2) de la lfi, ce qui rendrait les deux premières lois inopérantes dans la mesure de ce conflit. or, à l’heure actuelle, gtl peut à la fois être dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle en vertu du par 1406(2) et respecter le régime albertain en administrant l’actif de redwater à titre de « titulaire de permis ». [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 213 [108] the suggestion, in the dissenting reasons, that the regulator is seeking to hold gtl personally liable is untrue. no one disputes that significant value remains in the redwater estate. although the reg- ulator’s entitlement is, of course, dependent on the priorities established by the bia, the history of this regulatory system demonstrates that there are ways for the regulator to access that value without holding gtl personally liable. it is not this court’s role to mandate a particular mechanism for the regulator to achieve that end. even if this was not the case, the fact that redwater’s assets have already been sold and are currently being held in trust means that personal liability is no longer a concern. there is no operational conflict. [109] i turn now to frustration of purpose. the chambers judge identified a number of purposes of s 1406 in his reasons. gtl relies on three of them, namely: “limit[ing] the liability of insolvency pro- fessionals, so that they will accept mandates despite environmental issues”; “reduc[ing] the number of abandoned sites in the country”; and “permit[ing] receivers and trustees to make rational economic assessments of the costs of remedying environmen- tal conditions, and giv[ing] receivers and trustees the discretion to determine whether to comply with orders to remediate property affected by these condi- tions” (chambers judge’s reasons, at paras 128-29). [110] the burden is on gtl to establish the spe- cific purposes of s 1406(2) and s 1406(4) if it wishes to demonstrate a conflict. this has been de- scribed as a “high” burden, requiring “[c]lear proof of purpose” (lemare, at para 26). in my view, based on the plain wording of s 1406(2) and s 1406(4) (a “trustee is not personally liable”) and the hansard evidence, it is evident that the purpose of these provi- sions is to protect trustees from personal liability in respect of environmental matters affecting the estates they are administering. [108] la suggestion faite dans les motifs dissidents selon laquelle l’organisme de réglementation tente d’engager la responsabilité personnelle de gtl est inexacte. personne ne conteste que l’actif de red- water a toujours une grande valeur. bien que le droit de l’organisme de réglementation soit naturellement tributaire des priorités établies par la lfi, l’historique du régime de réglementation en cause démontre que l’organisme de réglementation dispose de moyens pour obtenir cette valeur sans engager la respon- sabilité personnelle de gtl. il n’appartient pas à notre cour de prescrire un mécanisme en particulier à cette fin. même si ce n’était pas le cas, le fait que les biens de redwater ont déjà été vendus et qu’ils sont actuellement détenus en fiducie signifie que la responsabilité personnelle ne pose plus problème. il n’y a pas de conflit d’application. [109] je me penche maintenant sur l’entrave à la réa- lisation d’un objet fédéral. le juge siégeant en cabinet a relevé dans ses motifs un certain nombre d’objets de l’art 1406. gtl s’appuie sur trois d’entre eux, à savoir : [traduction] « limiter la responsabilité des professionnels de l’insolvabilité, afin qu’ils acceptent des mandats en dépit des problèmes environnemen- taux »; « réduire le nombre de sites délaissés dans le pays »; et « permettre aux séquestres et aux syndics de procéder à des évaluations économiques rationnelles des coûts de réparation des faits liés à l’environne- ment, et donner aux séquestres ainsi qu’aux syndics le pouvoir discrétionnaire de déterminer s’il y a lieu de se conformer aux ordonnances de décontamination des biens touchés par ces faits » (motifs du juge siégeant en cabinet, par 128-129). [110] il incombe à gtl d’établir les objectifs pré- cis des par 1406(2) et (4) s’il souhaite démontrer qu’il y a conflit. notre cour a qualifié ce fardeau d’« élevé » et ajouté qu’il faut « une preuve claire de l’objet » (lemare, par 26). à mon avis, compte tenu du libellé clair des par 1406(2) et (4) (« le syndic est, ès qualité, dégagé de toute responsabilité person- nelle ») et des débats parlementaires, l’objectif de ces dispositions est manifestement de dégager les syn- dics de toute responsabilité personnelle à l’égard de questions environnementales touchant l’actif qu’ils administrent. 214 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. [111] this purpose is not frustrated by the inclu- sion of trustees in the definition of “licensee” in the ogca and the pipeline act. the regulator’s position is that it would never attempt to hold a trustee person- ally liable. trustees have been considered licensees under these acts for over 20 years, and they have yet to face the scourge of personal liability. to find an essential part of alberta’s regulatory regime inopera- tive based on the theoretical possibility of frustration of purpose would be inconsistent with the principles of paramountcy and cooperative federalism. to date, alberta’s regulatory regime has functioned as in- tended without frustrating the purpose of s 1406(2) or s 1406(4) of the bia. in arguing that s.  14.06  has the broader [112] goals of reducing the number of abandoned sites (in the non- technical sense of “abandoned”) and encouraging trustees to accept mandates, gtl relies on what it calls “the available extrinsic evidence and the actual words and structure of that section” (gtl’s factum, at para 91). in my view, the argu- ments it advances are insufficient for gtl to meet its high burden and demonstrate that the purpose of s 1406(2) and s 1406(4) should be defined as including these broader objectives. reducing the number of unaddressed sites and encouraging trus- tees to accept mandates may be positive side effects of s 1406(2) and s 1406(4), but it is a stretch to see them as the purpose of the provisions. like the provision at issue in lemare, it is more plausible that they serve a “simple and narrow purpose” (para 45). [111] cet objectif n’est pas été entravé par l’ajout des syndics à la définition de « titulaire de permis » dans l’ogca et la pipeline act. l’organisme de réglementation a soutenu qu’il n’essaierait jamais d’engager la responsabilité personnelle d’un syndic. les syndics sont considérés comme des « titulaires de permis » dans ces lois depuis plus de 20 ans et ils n’ont pas encore été confrontés au fléau de la respon- sabilité personnelle. déclarer inopérante une partie essentielle du régime de réglementation de l’alberta en raison de la possibilité théorique d’entrave à un objectif fédéral irait à l’encontre des principes de la prépondérance fédérale et du fédéralisme coopératif. jusqu’à présent, le régime de réglementation alber- tain fonctionne de la manière prévue sans entraver l’objectif des par 1406(2) ou (4) de la lfi. [112] pour soutenir que l’art 1406 a comme objec- tif général de réduire le nombre de sites abandonnés (au sens non technique du terme) et d’encourager les syndics à accepter des mandats, gtl se fonde sur ce qu’il appelle [traduction] « la preuve extrinsèque disponible et le libellé de cette disposition » (mé- moire de gtl, par 91). à mon avis, les arguments qu’il avance ne lui permettent pas de s’acquitter du fardeau élevé qui lui incombe et de démontrer que l’objectif des par 1406(2) et (4) devrait être défini de manière à inclure ces objectifs généraux. réduire le nombre de sites délaissés et encourager les syn- dics à accepter des mandats peuvent être des effets secondaires positifs des par 1406(2) et (4), mais il serait exagéré de dire qu’il s’agit des objectifs de ces dispositions. comme dans le cas de la disposition en litige dans lemare, il est plus plausible que ces dispositions aient un « simple et restreint » (par 45). [113] regardless, even if it is assumed that such broader goals are part of the purpose of s 1406(2) and s 1406(4), the evidence does not show that they are frustrated by the inclusion of trustees in the statutory definition of “licensee”. relying on statements made by gtl in the second report, atb asserts that, if trustees continue to be considered licensees and if environmental claims continue to be binding on estates, then, in situations akin to that of the redwater insolvency, trustees will refuse to accept appointments. the fact that, prior to this lit- igation, it had been settled in alberta since at least [113] quoi qu’il en soit, même si l’on tient pour acquis que les par 1406(2) et (4) ont de tels ob- jectifs généraux, la preuve ne démontre pas que la réalisation de ces objectifs est entravée par l’ajout des syndics à la définition légale de « titulaire de permis ». s’appuyant sur des affirmations de gtl dans le deuxième rapport, atb prétend que, si les syndics sont toujours considérés comme des « titu- laires de permis » et les réclamations environnemen- tales continuent de lier l’actif, les syndics refuseront la nomination dans des situations semblables à celle de l’insolvabilité de redwater. à cette prétention [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 215 northern badger that certain ongoing environmental obligations in the oil and gas industry continue to be binding on bankrupt estates must be weighed against this bald allegation. it was also well estab- lished that the regulator would never attempt to hold insolvency professionals personally liable for such obligations. as noted by the canadian association of petroleum producers, there is nothing to suggest that this well- established state of affairs has led insol- vency professionals to refuse to accept appointments or has increased the number of orphaned sites. there is no reason why the regulator and trustees cannot continue to work together collaboratively, as they have for many years, to ensure that end-of- life obli- gations are satisfied, while at same time maximizing recovery for creditors. sommaire il faut opposer le fait qu’avant le pré- sent litige, il était établi en alberta, depuis au moins l’arrêt northern badger, que certaines obligations environnementales continues dans l’industrie pétro- lière et gazière liaient toujours l’actif du failli. il était aussi bien établi que l’organisme de réglementation n’aurait jamais essayé de tenir les professionnels de l’insolvabilité personnellement responsables de telles obligations. comme l’a fait remarquer l’as- sociation canadienne des producteurs pétroliers, rien n’indique que cet état de fait bien établi a conduit les professionnels de l’insolvabilité à refuser la no- mination ou augmenté le nombre de sites orphelins. il n’y a aucune raison pour laquelle l’organisme de réglementation et les syndics ne peuvent pas pour- suivre leur collaboration, comme ils le font depuis de nombreuses années, pour assurer le respect des obligations de fin de vie tout en maximisant le re- couvrement au profit des créanciers. (3) conclusion on section 14.06 of the bia (3) conclusion sur l’art 1406 de la lfi [114] there is no conflict between the alberta legislation and s 1406 of the bia that makes the definition of “licensee” in the former inapplicable insofar as it includes gtl. gtl continues to have the responsibilities and duties of a “licensee” to the extent that assets remain in the redwater estate. nonetheless, gtl submits that, even if it cannot walk away from the renounced assets by invoking s 1406(4), the environmental obligations associ- ated with those assets are unsecured claims of the regulator for the purposes of the bia. gtl says that the order of priorities in the bia requires it to satisfy the claims of redwater’s secured creditors before the regulator’s claims, which rank equally with the claims of other unsecured creditors. according to gtl, the regulator’s attempts to use its statutory powers to prioritize its environmental claims con- flict with the bia. i will now consider this alleged conflict, which turns on the abitibi test. [114] il n’y a aucun conflit entre la législation al- bertaine et l’art 1406 de la lfi par suite duquel la définition de « titulaire de permis » dans la première est inapplicable dans la mesure où elle vise gtl. ce dernier conserve les responsabilités et obliga- tions d’un « titulaire de permis » tant qu’il reste des éléments dans l’actif de redwater. gtl plaide néanmoins que, même s’il ne peut délaisser les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation en invoquant le par 1406(4), les obligations environnementales qui y sont associés sont des réclamations non garanties de l’organisme de réglementation pour l’application de la lfi. gtl affirme que l’ordre de priorités fixé dans la lfi l’oblige à acquitter les réclamations des créanciers garantis de redwater avant celles de l’or- ganisme de réglementation, lesquelles occupent le même rang que les réclamations des autres créanciers ordinaires. d’après gtl, les tentatives de l’orga- nisme de réglementation d’utiliser les pouvoirs que lui accorde la loi pour faire primer ses réclamations environnementales entrent en conflit avec la lfi. je vais maintenant me pencher sur ce conflit allégué, qui fait intervenir le critère d’abitibi. 216 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. c the abitibi test: is the regulator asserting claims provable in bankruptcy? [115] the equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s assets is one of the purposes of the bia. it is achieved through the collective proceeding model. creditors of the bankrupt wishing to enforce a claim prova- ble in bankruptcy must participate in the collective proceeding. their claims will ultimately have the priority assigned to them by the bia. this ensures that the bankrupt’s assets are distributed fairly. this model avoids inefficiency and chaos, thus maximiz- ing global recovery for all creditors. for the collec- tive proceeding model to be viable, creditors with provable claims must not be allowed to enforce them outside the collective proceeding. [116] it is well established that a provincial law will be rendered inoperative in the context of bank- ruptcy where the effect of the law is to conflict with, reorder or alter the priorities established by the bia. both martin ja and the chambers judge dealt with the altering of bankruptcy priorities under the frustra- tion of purpose branch of paramountcy. in my view, it could also be plausibly advanced that a provincial law that has the effect of reordering bankruptcy pri- orities is in operational conflict with the bia — such was the conclusion in husky oil, at para 87. for the purposes of this appeal, there is no need to decide which would be the appropriate branch of the para- mountcy analysis. under either branch, the alberta legislation authorizing the regulator’s use of its dis- puted powers will be inoperative to the extent that the use of these powers during bankruptcy alters or reorders the priorities established by the bia. c le critère d’abitibi : l’organisme de réglemen­ tation fait­il valoir des réclamations prouvables en matière de faillite? [115] la répartition équitable des biens du failli est l’un des objectifs de la lfi. elle est réalisée par le truchement du modèle de la procédure collective. les créanciers du failli souhaitant faire valoir une réclamation prouvable en matière de faillite doivent participer à la procédure collective. leurs réclama- tions recevront en fin de compte la priorité qui leur a été attribuée par la lfi. cela assure la répartition équitable des biens du failli. ce modèle évite l’inef- ficacité et le chaos, maximisant ainsi le recouvre- ment global au profit de tous les créanciers. pour que le modèle de la procédure collective soit viable, les créanciers ayant des réclamations prouvables ne doivent pas être autorisés à les faire valoir en dehors de la procédure collective. [116] il est bien établi qu’une loi provinciale de- vient inopérante dans le contexte d’une faillite si elle a pour effet d’entrer en conflit avec l’ordre de priorité établi par la lfi, de le réarranger ou de le modifier. la juge martin et le juge siégeant en ca- binet ont tous les deux traité de la modification des priorités en matière de faillite en fonction du volet « entrave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral » de la doctrine de la prépondérance. à mon avis, il pourrait aussi être plausiblement avancé qu’une loi provin- ciale ayant pour effet de réarranger les priorités en matière de faillite est en conflit d’application avec la lfi; telle était la conclusion dans husky oil, au par 87. pour les besoins du présent pourvoi, il n’est pas nécessaire de décider quel serait le bon volet de l’analyse relative à la prépondérance. dans l’un ou l’autre volet, la loi albertaine autorisant l’organisme de réglementation à exercer ses pouvoirs contestés sera inopérante, dans la mesure où l’exercice de ces pouvoirs pendant la faillite modifie ou réarrange les priorités établies par la lfi. [117] gtl says that this is precisely the effect of the obligations imposed on the redwater estate by the regulator through the use of its statutory powers, even if it cannot walk away from the renounced assets by invoking s 1406(4). parliament has as- signed a particular rank to environmental claims [117] gtl affirme que, même si le fait d’invoquer le par 1406(4) ne lui permet pas de délaisser les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation, les obliga- tions imposées à l’actif de redwater par l’organisme de réglementation au moyen de l’exercice des pou- voirs que lui confère la loi font exactement cela. le [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 217 that are provable in bankruptcy. it is accepted that the limited super priority for environmental claims created by s 1406(7) of the bia does not apply here, and accordingly, says gtl, the regulator is an ordinary creditor as regards its environmental claims — in other words, neither a secured nor a preferred creditor. the regulator’s environmental claims are thus to be paid rateably with those of redwater’s other ordinary creditors under s. 141 of the bia. gtl argues that, to comply with the abandonment orders or lmr requirements, the redwater estate will have to expend funds prior to distributing its assets to the secured creditors, and that this amounts to the regulator using its statutory powers to create for itself a priority in bankruptcy to which it is not entitled. [118] however, only claims provable in bank- ruptcy must be asserted within the single proceed- ing. other claims are not stayed upon bankruptcy and continue to be binding on the estate. in abitibi, this court clearly stated that not all environmental obligations enforced by a regulator will be claims provable in bankruptcy. as a matter of principle, bankruptcy does not amount to a licence to disregard rules. the regulator says that it is not asserting any claims provable in the bankruptcy, so the redwater estate must comply with its environmental obliga- tions, to the extent that assets are available to do so. [119] the resolution of this issue turns on the proper application of the abitibi test for determining whether a particular regulatory obligation amounts to a claim provable in bankruptcy. to reiterate: first, there must be a debt, a liability or an obligation to a creditor. second, the debt, liability or obligation must be incurred before the debtor becomes bankrupt. third, it must be possible to attach a monetary value to the debt, liability or obligation. [emphasis in original; para 26]. parlement a attribué un rang donné aux réclamations environnementales qui sont prouvables en matière de faillite. il est admis que la superpriorité limitée créée par le par 1406(7) de la lfi pour les réclamations de cette nature ne s’applique pas en l’espèce et, en consé- quence, affirme gtl, l’organisme de réglementation est un créancier ordinaire à l’égard de ces réclama- tions, c’est-à-dire qu’il n’est ni un créancier garanti ni un créancier privilégié. les réclamations environ- nementales de l’organisme de réglementation doivent donc être acquittées au prorata avec celles des autres créanciers ordinaires de redwater en application de l’art. 141 de la lfi. gtl soutient que, pour respecter les ordonnances d’abandon ou les exigences relatives à la cgr, il devra dépenser des fonds avant de partager ses biens entre les créanciers garantis. cela équivaut, pour l’organisme de réglementation, à utiliser les pou- voirs que lui confère la loi pour se créer une priorité en matière de faillite à laquelle il n’a pas droit. [118] toutefois, on doit faire valoir uniquement les réclamations prouvables en matière de faillite dans le cadre de la procédure unique. les réclamations non prouvables ne sont pas suspendues à la faillite et elles lient toujours l’actif. dans l’arrêt abitibi, notre cour a clairement déclaré que les obligations environnemen- tales appliquées par un organisme de réglementation ne sont pas toutes des réclamations prouvables en ma- tière de faillite. en principe, la faillite n’équivaut pas à une autorisation de faire fi des règles. l’organisme de réglementation dit qu’il ne fait valoir aucune ré- clamation prouvable dans la faillite et que l’actif de redwater doit respecter ses obligations environne- mentales dans la mesure des biens dont il dispose. [119] le règlement de cette question requiert que l’on applique correctement le critère d’abitibi pour déterminer si une obligation réglementaire précise équivaut à une réclamation prouvable en matière de faillite. il y a lieu de réitérer ce critère : premièrement, on doit être en présence d’une dette, d’un engagement ou d’une obligation envers un créancier. deuxièmement, la dette, l’engagement ou l’obligation doit avoir pris naissance avant que le débiteur ne devienne failli. troisièmement, il doit être possible d’attribuer une valeur pécuniaire à cette dette, cet engagement ou cette obligation. [en italique dans l’original; par 26] 218 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. [120] there is no dispute that in this appeal, the second part of the test is met. accordingly, i will discuss only the first and the third parts of the test. [121] in this court, the regulator, supported by various interveners, raised two concerns about how the abitibi test has been applied, both by the courts below and in general. the first concern is that the “creditor” step of the abitibi test has been inter- preted too broadly in cases such as the instant appeal and nortel networks corp., re, 2013 onca 599, 368 dlr (4th) 122 (“nortel ca”), and that, in effect, this step of the test has become so pro forma as to be practically meaningless. the second con- cern has to do with the application of the “monetary value” step of the abitibi test by the chambers judge and slatter ja. this step is generally called the “sufficient certainty” step, based on the guidance provided in abitibi. the argument here is that the courts below went beyond the test established in abitibi by focusing on whether redwater’s regula- tory obligations were “intrinsically financial”. under abitibi, the sufficient certainty analysis should have focused on whether the regulator would ultimately perform the environmental work and assert a mone- tary claim for reimbursement. il est incontestable que, dans le présent pour- [120] voi, la deuxième partie du critère est respectée. en conséquence, je ne traiterai que des première et troi- sième parties. [121] devant notre cour, l’organisme de régle- mentation, avec l’appui de divers intervenants, a soulevé deux préoccupations quant à la façon dont le critère d’abitibi avait été appliqué, tant par les tribunaux d’instance inférieure que par les cours en général. la première préoccupation concerne le fait que l’étape « créancier » du critère a reçu une interprétation trop large dans des affaires analogues à celle en l’espèce et nortel networks corp., re, 2013 onca 599, 368 dlr (4th) 122 (« nortel ca ») et qu’en réalité, cette étape du critère est si aisément franchie qu’elle n’est appliquée que pour la forme et qu’elle n’a pratiquement plus de sens. la seconde préoccupation a trait à l’application de l’étape « valeur pécuniaire » du critère d’abitibi par le juge siégeant en cabinet et le juge slatter. cette étape reçoit généralement le nom de «  certitude suffisante  », compte tenu des directives données dans abitibi. on soutient par là que les tribunaux d’instance inférieure sont allés au- delà du critère établi dans l’arrêt abitibi en se concentrant sur la question de savoir si les obligations réglementaires de redwater étaient « intrinsèquement financières ». suivant l’arrêt abitibi, l’analyse de la certitude suf- fisante aurait dû être axée sur la question de savoir si l’organisme de réglementation effectuerait lui- même, au bout du compte, les travaux environne- mentaux et ferait valoir une réclamation pécuniaire pour le remboursement. [122] in my view, both concerns raised by the regulator have merit. as i will demonstrate, abitibi should not be taken as standing for the proposition that a regulator is always a creditor when it exercises its statutory enforcement powers against a debtor. on a proper understanding of the “creditor” step, it is clear that the regulator acted in the public interest and for the public good in issuing the abandonment orders and enforcing the lmr requirements and that it is, therefore, not a creditor of redwater. it is the public, not the regulator or the general revenue fund, that is the beneficiary of those environmen- tal obligations; the province does not stand to gain [122] les deux préoccupations exprimées par l’or- ganisme de réglementation me paraissent fondées. comme je vais le démontrer, l’arrêt abitibi ne doit pas être considéré comme soutenant la thèse qu’un organisme de réglementation est toujours un créan- cier lorsqu’il exerce les pouvoirs d’application qui lui sont dévolus par la loi à l’encontre d’un débiteur. d’après le sens qu’il convient de donner à l’étape « créancier », il est clair que l’organisme de régle- mentation a agi dans l’intérêt public et pour le bien public en rendant les ordonnances d’abandon et en assurant le respect des exigences relatives à la cgr, et qu’il n’est donc pas un créancier de redwater. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 219 financially from them. although this conclusion is sufficient to resolve this aspect of the appeal, for the sake of completeness, i will also demonstrate that the chambers judge erred in finding that, on these facts, there is sufficient certainty that the regulator will ultimately perform the environmental work and assert a claim for reimbursement. to conclude, i will briefly comment on why the effects of the end-of- life obligations do not conflict with the priority scheme in the bia. c’est le public, et non l’organisme de réglementation ou le fonds d’administration du gouvernement, qui bénéficie de ces obligations environnementales; la province n’est pas en mesure d’en bénéficier finan- cièrement. bien que cette conclusion suffise pour trancher cet aspect du pourvoi, par souci d’exhaus- tivité, je vais aussi démontrer que le juge siégeant en cabinet a eu tort de conclure qu’au vu des faits de l’espèce, il est suffisamment certain que l’or- ganisme de réglementation exécutera au bout du compte les travaux environnementaux et présentera une demande de remboursement pour conclure, je me prononcerai brièvement sur les raisons pour lesquelles les effets des obligations de fin de vie n’entrent pas en conflit avec le régime de priorité établi dans la lfi. (1) the regulator is not a creditor of redwater (1) l’organisme de réglementation n’est pas un [123] the regulator and the supporting interveners are not the first to raise issues with the “creditor” step of the abitibi test. in the six years since abitibi was decided, concerns about the “creditor” step and the fact that, as it is commonly understood, it will seem- ingly be satisfied in all — or nearly all — cases have also been expressed by academic commentators, such as a. j. lund, “lousy dentists, bad drivers, and abandoned oil wells: a new approach to rec- onciling provincial regulatory regimes with federal insolvency law” (2017), 80 sask. l. rev. 157, at p. 178, and stewart. this court has not had an op- portunity to comment on abitibi since it was decided. however, the interpretation of the “creditor” step adopted by lower courts, including the majority of the court of appeal in this case, has focused on certain comments found at para. 27 of abitibi, and the “creditor” step has accordingly been found to be satisfied whenever a regulator exercises its enforce- ment powers against a debtor (see, for example, ca. reasons, at para. 60; nortel ca, at para 16). créancier de redwater [123] l’organisme de réglementation et les inter- venants qui l’appuient ne sont pas les premiers à cerner des problèmes relativement à l’étape « créan- cier » du critère d’abitibi. pendant les six années qui ont suivi l’arrêt abitibi, des problèmes au su- jet de cette étape et le fait que, dans son acception courante, cette étape sera toujours — ou presque toujours — franchie ont aussi été énoncés par des commentateurs universitaires tels que a j lund, « lousy dentists, bad drivers, and abandoned oil wells : a new approach to reconciling provincial regulatory regimes with federal insolvency law » (2017), 80 sask l. rev. 157, p. 178, et m stewart. notre cour n’a pas eu l’occasion de commenter l’arrêt abitibi depuis qu’il a été rendu. par contre, l’interprétation de l’étape « créancier » retenue par des juridictions inférieures, notamment la majo- rité de la cour d’appel en l’espèce, a mis l’accent sur certaines remarques faites au par. 27 de l’arrêt abitibi. sur cette base, ces tribunaux ont conclu que l’étape « créancier » est franchie chaque fois qu’un organisme de réglementation exerce à l’encontre d’un débiteur son pouvoir d’appliquer la loi (voir, par exemple, les motifs de la cour d’appel, par. 60; nortel ca, par 16). [124] gtl submits that these lower courts have correctly interpreted and applied the “creditor” step. [124] selon gtl, les juridictions inférieures sus- mentionnées ont bien interprété et appliqué l’étape 220 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. it further submits that, because of abitibi, the 1991 alberta court of appeal decision in northern badger is of no assistance in analyzing the creditor issue. conversely, the regulator forcefully argues that abitibi must be understood in the context of its own unique facts and that it did not overrule northern badger. relying on northern badger, the regulator argues that a regulator exercising a power to enforce a public duty is not a creditor of the individual or corporation subject to that duty. like martin ja,. i agree with the regulator on this point. if, as gtl urges and the majority of the court of appeal con- cluded, the “creditor” step is satisfied whenever a regulator exercises its enforcement powers against a debtor, then it is hard to imagine a situation in which the “creditor” step would not be satisfied by the actions of an environmental regulator. stewart was correct to suppose that “[s]urely, the court did not intend this result” (p 189). for the “creditor” step to have meaning, “there must be situations where the other two steps could be met    but the order [or obligation] is still not a provable claim because the regulator is not a creditor of the bankrupt” (attorney general of ontario’s factum, at para 39). « créancier ». il ajoute qu’à la suite de l’arrêt abitibi, l’arrêt northern badger rendu en 1991 par la cour d’appel de l’alberta n’est d’aucun secours pour analyser la question du créancier. à l’inverse, l’or- ganisme de réglementation soutient avec vigueur qu’il faut situer l’arrêt abitibi dans le contexte des faits qui lui sont propres, et qu’il n’a pas infirmé northern badger. se fondant sur cet arrêt, l’orga- nisme de réglementation plaide qu’un organisme de réglementation exerçant un pouvoir pour faire respecter un devoir public n’est pas un créancier de la personne ou de la société assujettie à ce devoir. à l’instar de la juge martin, je partage l’avis de l’or- ganisme de réglementation sur ce point. si, comme l’exhorte gtl et le concluent les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel, l’étape « créancier » est franchie chaque fois qu’un organisme de réglementation exerce ses pouvoirs d’application à l’encontre d’un débiteur, il est difficile d’imaginer une situation où les actes d’un organisme de réglementation ne franchiraient pas l’étape « créancier ». monsieur stewart avait raison de supposer que [traduction] « la cour ne souhaitait sûrement pas ce résultat » (p 189). pour que l’étape « créancier » ait un quel- conque sens [traduction] «  il doit y avoir des situations dans lesquelles les deux autres étapes du critère d’abitibi sont franchies […], mais l’or- donnance [ou l’obligation] environnementale n’est toujours pas une réclamation prouvable car l’or- ganisme de réglementation n’est pas un créancier du failli » (mémoire de la procureure générale de l’ontario, par 39). [125] before further explaining my conclusion on this point, i must address a preliminary issue: the fact that the regulator conceded in the courts below that it was a creditor. it is well established that con- cessions of law are not binding on this court: see ocean port hotel ltd. v. british columbia (general manager, liquor control and licensing branch), 2001 scc 52, [2001] 2 scr 781, at para. 44; m. v. h., [1999] 2 scr 3, at para. 45; r v. sappier, 2006 scc 54, [2006] 2 scr 686, at para 62. as noted by l’heureux- dubé j., in dissent, but not on this point, in r v. elshaw, [1991] 3 scr 24, at p. 48, “the fact that an issue is conceded below means nothing in and of itself”. although concessions by the parties are often relied upon, it is ultimately for [125] avant d’expliquer davantage ma conclusion sur ce point, je dois traiter d’une question prélimi- naire  : l’organisme de réglementation a concédé devant les juridictions inférieures qu’il était un créan- cier. il est bien établi que les concessions de droit ne lient pas notre cour : voir ocean port hotel ltd. c. colombie­ britannique (general manager, liquor control & licensing branch), 2001 csc 52, [2001] 2 rcs 781, par. 44; m c. h., [1999] 2 rcs. 3, par. 45; r c. sappier, 2006 csc 54, [2006] 2 rcs 686, par 62). comme l’a fait remarquer la juge l’heureux- dubé (dissidente, mais non sur ce point) dans r c. elshaw, [1991] 3 rcs 24, p. 48, « un aveu fait devant une instance inférieure ne si- gnifie rien en soi ». bien que l’on se fonde souvent [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 221 this court to determine points of law. for several rea- sons, no fairness concerns are raised by disregarding the regulator’s concession in this case. [126] first, in a letter to gtl dated may 14, 2015, the regulator advanced the position that it was “not a creditor of [redwater]”, but, rather, had a “stat- utory mandate to regulate the oil and gas industry in alberta” (gtl’s record, vol. 1, at p 78). i note that this was the initial communication between the regulator and gtl, only two days after the latter’s appointment as receiver of redwater’s property. sec- ond, the issue of whether the regulator is a creditor was discussed in the parties’ factums. third, during oral arguments before this court, the regulator was questioned about its concession. counsel made the undisputed point that higher courts are not bound by such concessions and took the position that, on the correct interpretation of abitibi, the regulator was not a creditor. fourth, when the regulator’s status as a creditor was raised as an issue before this court, opposing counsel did not argue that they would have adduced further evidence on the issue had it been raised in the courts below. finally, a proper under- standing of the “creditor” step of the abitibi test is of fundamental importance to the proper functioning of the national bankruptcy scheme and of provincial environmental schemes throughout canada. i con- clude that this case is one in which it is appropriate to disregard the regulator’s concession in the courts below. sur les concessions des parties, il revient en fin de compte à notre cour de statuer sur des points de droit. pour plusieurs raisons, on ne suscite aucune préoccupation en matière d’équité en ne tenant pas compte de la concession faite par l’organisme de réglementation en l’espèce. [126] premièrement, dans une lettre adressée à gtl en date du 14 mai 2015, l’organisme de régle- mentation soutient qu’il était [traduction] « non pas un créancier de [redwater] », mais avait plutôt « pour mandat légal de réglementer l’industrie pé- trolière et gazière de l’alberta » (dossier de gtl, vol. 1, p 78). je constate qu’il s’agissait de la pre- mière communication entre l’organisme de régle- mentation et gtl et qu’elle est survenue seulement deux jours après la nomination de ce dernier comme séquestre des biens de redwater. deuxièmement, les parties ont traité dans leurs mémoires de la ques- tion de savoir si l’organisme de réglementation est un créancier. troisièmement, au cours de sa plai- doirie devant notre cour, l’organisme de réglemen- tation a été interrogé à propos de sa concession. l’avocate a signalé le point non contesté que les tribunaux supérieurs ne sont pas liés par de telles concessions, et a soutenu que, si l’on interprète correctement l’arrêt abitibi, l’organisme de régle- mentation n’était pas un créancier. quatrièmement, quand le statut de l’organisme de réglementation en tant que créancier a été évoqué devant notre cour, les avocats des parties adverses n’ont pas prétendu qu’ils auraient présenté des éléments de preuve supplémentaires sur ce point s’il avait été soulevé devant les juridictions inférieures enfin, le sens qu’il convient de donner à l’étape « créancier » du critère d’abitibi est d’une importance fondamentale pour le bon fonctionnement du régime national de faillite et des régimes environnementaux provin- ciaux partout au canada. je conclus qu’il est indiqué en l’espèce de ne pas tenir compte de la concession faite par l’organisme de réglementation devant les juridictions inférieures. [127] returning to the analysis, i note that the unique factual matrix of abitibi must be kept in mind in that case, newfoundland and labrador expropriated most of abitibibowater’s property in the province without compensation. subsequently, [127] pour revenir à l’analyse, je signale qu’il ne faut pas oublier la matrice factuelle unique de l’arrêt abitibi. dans cette affaire, terre- neuve-et- labrador a exproprié la plupart des biens d’abitibibowater dans la province, sans indemnisation. par la suite, 222 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. abitibibowater was granted a stay under the ccaa. it then filed a notice of intent to submit a claim to arbitration under the north american free trade agreement between the government of canada, the government of the united mexican states and the government of the united states of america, can. ts 1994. no. 2 (“nafta”), for losses resulting from the expropriation. in response, newfoundland’s minister of environment and conservation ordered abitibibowater to remediate five sites pursuant to the environmental protection act, snl 2002, c e-142 (“epa”). three of the five sites had been expropri- ated by newfoundland and labrador. the evidence led to the conclusion that “the province never truly intended that abitibi was to perform the remediation work”, but instead sought a claim that could be used as an offset in connection with abitibibowater’s nafta claim (abitibi, at para 54). in other words, the province sought a financial benefit from the re- mediation orders. [128] in this appeal, it is not disputed that, in seek- ing to enforce redwater’s end-of- life obligations, the regulator is acting in a bona fide regulatory capacity and does not stand to benefit financially. the regulator’s ultimate goal is to have the envi- ronmental work actually performed, for the benefit of third- party landowners and the public at large. there is no colourable attempt by the regulator to recover a debt, nor is there an ulterior motive on its part, as there was in abitibi. the distinction between the facts of this appeal and those of abitibi becomes even clearer when one examines the comprehensive reasons of the chambers judge in abitibi. the crux of the findings of gascon j (as he then was) is found at paras. 173-76: abitibibowater s’est vu accorder une suspension en vertu de la lacc. elle a ensuite déposé un avis d’in- tention de soumettre une réclamation à l’arbitrage au titre de l’accord de libre­ échange nord­ américain entre le gouvernement du canada, le gouverne­ ment des états­ unis mexicains et le gouvernement des états­ unis d’amérique, r.t can 1994 no  2 (« alena »), pour les pertes résultant de l’expro- priation. en réponse, le ministre de l’environnement et de la conservation de terre- neuve a ordonné à abitibibowater de décontaminer cinq sites confor- mément à l’environmental protection act, snl. 2002, c e-142 (« epa »). trois des cinq sites avaient été expropriés par la province. la preuve a mené à la conclusion que « la province n’avait jamais vrai- ment eu l’intention qu’abitibi exécute les travaux [de décontamination] » (abitibi, par. 54) et qu’elle cherchait plutôt à faire valoir une réclamation qui pourrait être utilisée à titre compensatoire au regard de la demande d’indemnisation d’abitibibowater fondée sur l’alena. autrement dit, la province voulait tirer un avantage financier des ordonnances de décontamination. [128] en l’espèce, personne ne conteste qu’en cherchant à assurer le respect des obligations de fin de vie incombant à redwater, l’organisme de réglementation agit de bonne foi à titre d’autorité de réglementation et il n’est pas en mesure d’obtenir un avantage financier. l’objectif ultime de l’organisme de réglementation est de faire exécuter les travaux environnementaux au profit des tiers propriétaires terriens et de la population en général. l’organisme de réglementation n’a pas fait de tentative déguisée de recouvrer une créance et il n’y avait pas de motif oblique de sa part, comme c’était le cas dans abitibi. la distinction entre les faits du présent pourvoi et ceux de l’affaire abitibi ressort encore plus claire- ment lorsqu’on examine les motifs exhaustifs du juge siégeant en cabinet dans abitibi. le cœur des conclusions du juge gascon (maintenant juge de notre cour) se trouve aux par. 173-176 :    the province stands as the direct beneficiary, from a monetary standpoint, of abitibi’s compliance with the epa orders. in other words, the execution in nature of the epa orders would result in a definite credit to the province’s [traduction]    la province bénéficie directement, d’un point de vue financier, du respect par abitibi des ordon- nances fondées sur l’epa. en d’autres termes, l’exécution en nature des ordonnances fondées sur l’epa se traduirait [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 223 own “balance sheet”. abitibi’s liability in that regard is an asset for the province itself. par un crédit certain au propre « bilan » de la province. le passif d’abitibi à cet égard constitue un actif de la province elle- même. with all due respect, this is not regulatory in nature; it is rather purely financial in reality. this is, in fact, closer to a debtor- creditor relationship than anything else. this is quite far from the situation of the detached regulator or public enforcer issuing order for the public good. here, the province itself derives the direct pecuni- ary benefit from the required compliance of abitibi to the epa orders. the province stands to directly gain in the outcome. none of the cases submitted by the province bear any similarity to the fact pattern in the present pro- ceedings. soit dit en tout respect, il ne s’agit pas d’une affaire de nature réglementaire; il s’agit plutôt en fait d’une affaire purement financière. cela s’apparente effective- ment davantage à une relation créancier- débiteur qu’à autre chose. nous sommes assez loin du cas de l’organisme de réglementation ou d’application de la loi qui a rendu de manière objective une ordonnance dans l’intérêt pu- blic. en l’espèce, la province elle- même tire directement l’avantage pécunaire du respect obligatoire, par abitibi, des ordonnances epa. la province peut tirer profit du résultat. aucune des affaires soumises par la province ne ressemble un tant soit peu aux faits à l’origine de la présente instance. from this perspective, it is the hat of a creditor that best fits the province, not that of a disinterested regulator. sous cet angle, la province a agi plus comme un créan- cier que comme un organisme de réglementation désin- téressé. (abitibibowater inc., re, 2010 qccs 1261, 68 cbr. (5th) 1) (abitibibowater inc., re, 2010 qccs 1261, 68 cbr. (5th) 1) [129] this court recognized in abitibi that the province “easily satisfied” the creditor requirement (para 49). it was therefore not necessary to con- sider at any length how the “creditor” step should be understood or how it would apply in other factual situations. however, even at para. 27 of abitibi, the paragraph relied on by the majority of the court of appeal, deschamps j made a point of noting that “[m]ost environmental regulatory bodies can be creditors in respect of monetary or non- monetary obligations imposed by the relevant statutes” (em- phasis added). the interpretation of the “creditor” step adopted by the majority of the court of appeal and urged upon this court by gtl leaves no room for a regulator that enforces obligations not to be a creditor, though this possibility was clearly con- templated by para. 27 of abitibi. as noted above, gtl’s interpretation leaves the “creditor” step with no independent work to perform. [129] notre cour a reconnu dans abitibi qu’il était « facile [pour la province] de répondre » à l’exi- gence relative au créancier (par 49). il n’était donc pas nécessaire d’analyser en profondeur le sens de l’étape « créancier » ou la manière dont elle s’appli- querait dans d’autres situations factuelles. or, même au par. 27 de l’arrêt abitibi, le paragraphe sur lequel se fondent les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel, la juge deschamps a pris soin de souligner que « [l]a plupart des organismes administratifs peuvent agir à titre de créanciers en relation avec les obligations pé- cuniaires ou non pécuniaires imposées par ces lois » (italiques ajoutés). l’interprétation de l’étape « créan- cier » qu’ont retenue les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel et que gtl nous a exhortés à faire nôtre exclut la possibilité qu’un organisme de réglementa- tion faisant respecter des obligations ne soit pas un créancier, alors que cette possibilité a été clairement envisagée au par. 27 de l’arrêt abitibi. comme je l’ai mentionné ci- dessus, l’interprétation de gtl prive l’étape « créancier » de toute fonction indépendante. 224 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. [130] northern badger established that a regulator enforcing a public duty by way of non- monetary or- der is not a creditor. i reject the claim in the dissenting reasons that northern badger should be interpreted differently. first, i note that whether the regulator has a contingent claim is relevant to the sufficient certainty test, which presupposes that the regulator is a creditor. i cannot accept the proposition in the dissenting reasons that northern badger was con- cerned with what would become the third prong of the abitibi test. in northern badger, laycraft cja. accepted that abandonment was a liability and identi- fied the issue as “whether that liability is to the board so that it is the board which is the creditor” (para 32). second, the underlying scenario here with regards to redwater’s end-of- life obligations is exactly the same as in northern badger — a regulator is order- ing an entity to comply with its legal obligations in furtherance of the public good. this reasoning from northern badger was subsequently adopted in cases such as strathcona (county) v. fantasy construction ltd. (trustee of), 2005 abqb 794, 261 dlr (4th) 221, at paras. 23-25, and lamford forest products ltd. (re) (1991), 86 dlr (4th) 534. [130] l’arrêt northern badger a établi qu’un organisme de réglementation faisant respecter un devoir public au moyen d’une ordonnance non pé- cuniaire n’est pas un créancier. je rejette la préten- tion faite dans les motifs dissidents selon laquelle northern badger devrait recevoir une interpréta- tion différente. premièrement, je souligne que le point de savoir si l’organisme de réglementation a une réclamation éventuelle relève du critère de la certitude suffisante, lequel suppose au préalable que l’organisme de réglementation est un créan- cier je ne peux accepter la proposition énoncée dans les motifs dissidents selon laquelle northern badger porte sur ce qui allait devenir le troisième volet du critère d’abitibi. dans northern badger, après avoir reconnu que l’abandon constituait une responsabilité, le juge d’appel laycraft a dit qu’il s’agissait de savoir [traduction] « si cette res- ponsabilité appartient à l’office, ce qui fait de lui le créancier » (par 32). deuxièmement, le scénario sous- jacent en l’espèce quant aux obligations de fin de vie qui incombent à redwater est exactement le même que dans northern badger : un organisme de réglementation ordonne à une entité de se confor- mer à ses obligations légales pour le bien public. ce raisonnement exact tiré de northern badger a été adopté par la suite dans des décisions telles strathcona (county) c. fantasy construction ltd. (trustee of), 2005 abqb 794, 261 dlr (4th) 221, par. 23-25, et lamford forest products ltd. (re) (1991), 86 dlr (4th) 534. [131] i cannot agree with the suggestion by the majority of the court of appeal in this case that northern badger “is of limited assistance” in the application of the abitibi test (para 63). rather, i agree with martin ja that abitibi did not over- turn the reasoning in northern badger, but instead “emphasized the need to consider the substance of provincial regulation in assessing whether it cre- ates a claim provable in bankruptcy” (para 164). as martin ja noted, even following abitibi, the law continues to be that “public obligations are not provable claims that can be counted or compromised in the bankruptcy” (para 174). abitibi clarified the scope of northern badger by confirming that a regu- lator’s environmental claims will be provable claims under certain circumstances. it does not stand for the [131] je ne puis souscrire à l’opinion des juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel en l’espèce selon laquelle northern badger [traduction] «  n’est guère utile » dans l’application du critère d’abitibi (par 63). je partage plutôt l’avis de la juge  martin voulant que l’arrêt abitibi n’ait pas infirmé le rai- sonnement de northern badger, et qu’il ait au contraire « mis en relief le besoin de prendre en considération la teneur du règlement provincial pour déterminer s’il crée une réclamation prou- vable en matière de faillite » (par 164). comme l’a signalé la juge martin, même depuis l’arrêt abitibi, l’état du droit reste inchangé : « les obligations pu- bliques ne sont pas des réclamations prouvables qui peuvent être comptabilisées ou compromises dans la faillite » (par 174). l’arrêt abitibi a éclairci la [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 225 proposition that a regulator exercising its enforce- ment powers is always a creditor. the reasoning in northern badger was simply not applicable on the facts of abitibi, given the actions of the province as outlined above. in abitibi, deschamps j noted that insol- [132] vency legislation had evolved in the years since northern badger. that legislative evolution did not, however, change the meaning to be ascribed to the term “creditor”. in this regard, i agree with the conclusion in strathcona county v fantasy construction ltd. (trustee of), 2005 abqb 559, 256 dlr (4th) 536, that the amendments to the bia dealing with environmental matters in the years following northern badger cannot be interpreted as having overturned the reasoning in that case. as should be clear from the earlier discussion of s 1406, the amendments to the bia do not speak to when a regulator enforcing an environmental claim is a creditor. [133] the conclusion that the reasoning in northern badger continues to be relevant since abitibi and the amendments to insolvency legislation also finds support in the writings of academic commentators. stewart’s position is that, while abitibi discussed northern badger, it did not overturn it. he urges this court to clarify that there remains “a distinction be- tween a regulatory body that is a creditor because it is enforcing a debt, and a regulatory body that is not a creditor because it is enforcing the law” (p 221). similarly, lund argues that a court should “consider the importance of the public interests protected by the regulatory obligation when deciding whether the debtor owes a debt, liability or obligation to a creditor” (p 178). portée de northern badger en confirmant que les réclamations environnementales d’un organisme de réglementation seront des réclamations prouvables dans certains cas. il ne permet pas d’affirmer qu’un organisme de réglementation exerçant ses pou- voirs d’application est toujours un créancier le raisonnement de l’arrêt northern badger ne s’ap- pliquait tout simplement pas aux faits de l’affaire abitibi, étant donné les agissements de la province décrits précédemment. [132] dans abitibi, la juge deschamps a signalé que la législation en matière d’insolvabilité avait évolué au cours des années qui ont suivi northern badger. cette évolution législative n’a en revanche pas modifié le sens à attribuer au terme « créan- cier ». à cet égard, je souscris à la conclusion du juge burrows dans strathcona county c. fantasy construction ltd. (trustee of), 2005 abqb 559, 256 dlr (4th) 536, suivant laquelle les modifica- tions en matière d’environnement qui ont été appor- tées à la lfi au cours des années suivant northern badger ne peuvent être interprétées comme ayant infirmé le raisonnement de cet arrêt. tel qu’il devrait ressortir clairement de mon analyse précédente de l’art 1406, les modifications à la lfi ne traitent pas des cas où un organisme de réglementation fai- sant valoir une réclamation environnementale est un créancier. [133] les écrits de commentateurs universitaires appuient également la conclusion voulant que le raisonnement de l’arrêt northern badger conserve sa pertinence depuis abitibi et les modifications à la loi sur l’insolvabilité. monsieur stewart estime que, même si l’arrêt abitibi traite de northern badger, il ne l’a pas infirmé. il exhorte notre cour à préciser qu’il subsiste une distinction entre [traduction] « l’organisme de réglementation qui agit comme créancier car il recouvre une dette et celui qui n’est pas un créancier car il applique la loi » (p 221). de même, mme lund fait valoir qu’un tribunal devrait [traduction] « prendre en considération l’impor- tance que revêtent les intérêts publics protégés par l’obligation réglementaire au moment de décider si le débiteur a une dette, un engagement ou une obli- gation envers un créancier » (p 178). 226 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. [134] for the foregoing reasons, abitibi cannot be understood as having changed the law as sum- marized by laycraft cja. i adopt his comments at para. 33 of northern badger: the statutory provisions requiring the abandonment of oil and gas wells are part of the general law of alberta, binding every citizen of the province. all who become licensees of oil and gas wells are bound by them. similar statutory obligations bind citizens in many other areas of modern life   . but the obligation of the citizen is not to the peace officer, or public authority which enforces the law. the duty is owed as a public duty by all the citizens of the community to their fellow citizens. when the citizen subject to the order complies, the result is not the recovery of money by the peace officer or public authority, or of a judgment for money, nor is that the object of the whole process. rather, it is simply the enforcement of the general law. the enforcing authority does not become a “creditor” of the citizen on whom the duty is imposed. [135] based on the analysis in northern badger, it is clear that the regulator is not a creditor of the redwater estate. the end-of- life obligations the regulator seeks to enforce against redwater are pub- lic duties. neither the regulator nor the government of alberta stands to benefit financially from the en- forcement of these obligations. these public duties are owed, not to a creditor, but, rather, to fellow citizens, and are therefore outside the scope of “prov- able claims”. i do not intend to suggest, however, that a regulator will be a creditor only where it acts exactly as the province did in abitibi. there may very well be situations in which a regulator’s actions fall somewhere between those in abitibi and those in the instant case. notably, unlike some previous cases, the regulator has performed no environmental work itself. i leave such situations to be addressed in future cases in which there are full factual records. here, it is clear that the regulator is seeking to enforce redwater’s public duties, whether by issuing the abandonment orders or by maintaining the lmr [134] pour les motifs qui précèdent, on ne peut juger que l’arrêt abitibi a modifié le droit, comme l’a résumé le juge en chef laycraft. je fais miennes les remarques qu’il fait au par.  33 de northern badger : [traduction] les dispositions légales qui exigent l’aban- don de puits de pétrole et de gaz font partie du droit com- mun de l’alberta et lient chaque citoyen de la province. toutes les personnes qui acquièrent un permis d’exploita- tion de puits de pétrole ou de gaz doivent les respecter. des obligations légales semblables lient les citoyens dans bien d’autres secteurs de la vie moderne [  ]. mais l’obligation incombant au citoyen n’est pas envers l’agent de la paix ou l’autorité publique qui applique la loi. l’obligation est établie comme une obligation à caractère public qui doit être respectée par l’ensemble des citoyens de la collec- tivité à l’égard de leurs concitoyens. lorsque le citoyen visé par l’ordonnance s’y conforme, le résultat n’est pas perçu comme le recouvrement d’une somme d’argent par un agent de la paix ou l’autorité publique, ni comme l’exécution d’un jugement ordonnant le paiement d’une somme d’argent; d’ailleurs, cela ne constitue pas non plus l’objectif de l’ensemble du processus. il faut plutôt y voir l’application du droit commun. l’organisme d’application de la loi ne devient pas un « créancier » du citoyen à qui incombe l’obligation. [135] étant donné l’analyse effectuée dans north­ ern badger, il est clair que l’organisme de réglemen- tation n’est pas un créancier de l’actif de redwater. les obligations de fin de vie que l’organisme de réglementation veut imposer à redwater sont de nature publique. ni l’organisme de réglementation ni le gouvernement de l’alberta ne peuvent bénéficier financièrement de l’exécution de ces obligations. ces obligations à caractère public sont non pas envers un créancier, mais envers les concitoyens et échappent donc à la portée des « réclamations prouvables ». je ne veux toutefois pas laisser entendre par là qu’un or- ganisme de réglementation n’est un créancier que s’il se comporte d’une manière identique à la province dans abitibi. il peut fort bien exister des situations où les agissements d’un organisme de réglementation se situent quelque part entre ceux dans abitibi et ceux en l’espèce. signalons que, contrairement à certains cas antérieurs, l’organisme de réglementation n’a exécuté aucuns travaux environnementaux lui- même. je laisse aux tribunaux disposant de dossiers factuels [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 227 requirements. the regulator is not a creditor within the meaning of the abitibi test. i reject the suggestion that the foregoing [136] analysis somehow overrules the first prong of the abitibi test. the facts in abitibi were not compara- ble to the facts of this appeal. although this court discussed northern badger in abitibi, it merely ref- erenced the subsequent amendments to the bia, and did not overturn the earlier decision. the court was clear that the ultimate outcome “must be grounded in the facts of each case” (para 48). the dissenting reasons claim that, given the foregoing analysis, it will be nearly impossible to find that regulators are ever creditors. abitibi itself shows this not to be the case. furthermore, as i have said, there may well be cases that fall between abitibi and the present case. however, if abitibi is read as requiring only a deter- mination of whether the regulator has exercised an enforcement power, it will in fact be impossible for a regulator not to be a creditor. the dissenting reasons do not seriously deny this, merely suggesting that regulators can publish guidelines or issue licences. the regulator does both, yet, under the approach taken in the dissenting reasons, it is powerless to take any practical steps in the public interest regarding its guidelines or licences without qualifying as a credi- tor. as i have explained, abitibi clearly contemplates a place for regulators who are not creditors. complets le soin de résoudre pareilles situations à l’avenir. dans la présente affaire, il est clair que l’organisme de réglementation cherche à faire res- pecter les devoirs à caractère public de redwater, que ce soit en rendant les ordonnances d’abandon ou en maintenant les exigences relatives à la cgr. l’organisme de réglementation n’est pas un créancier au sens du critère d’abitibi. [136] je rejette la thèse voulant que l’analyse qui précède écarte d’une façon ou d’une autre le premier volet du critère d’abitibi. les faits de l’affaire abitibi n’étaient pas comparables à ceux de l’espèce. bien que notre cour ait examiné l’arrêt northern badger dans abitibi, elle s’est contentée de mentionner les modifications subséquentes à la lfi et n’a pas in- firmé l’arrêt antérieur. la cour a été claire : l’is- sue finale « doit être fondée sur les faits de chaque affaire » (par 48). selon les motifs dissidents, vu l’analyse exposée précédemment, il sera presque impossible de juger que des organismes de réglemen- tation sont des créanciers. l’arrêt abitibi démontre lui- même que ce n’est pas le cas. de plus, comme je l’ai dit, il peut fort bien exister des cas qui se situent entre l’affaire abitibi et celle qui nous occupe. par contre, si l’on considère qu’abitibi exige uniquement que le tribunal décide si l’organisme de réglemen- tation a exercé un pouvoir d’application, il sera en fait impossible pour un organisme de réglementation de ne pas être un créancier. les motifs dissidents ne nient pas sérieusement cette opinion et donnent seulement à penser que les organismes de régle- mentation peuvent publier des lignes directrices ou délivrer des permis. l’organisme de réglementation fait les deux mais, selon l’approche adoptée dans les motifs dissidents, il est dépourvu de moyens pour prendre quelque mesure concrète que ce soit dans l’intérêt public à propos de ses lignes directrices ou de permis sans avoir le statut de créancier. comme je l’ai expliqué, l’arrêt abitibi accorde clairement une place aux organismes de réglementation qui ne sont pas des créanciers. [137] strictly speaking, this is sufficient to dispose of this aspect of the appeal. however, additional guidance on the sufficient certainty analysis may prove helpful in future cases. accordingly, i turn now to a discussion of the “sufficient certainty” step and [137] cela suffit, à proprement parler, pour tran- cher cet aspect du pourvoi cependant, d’autres indications sur l’analyse de la certitude suffisante pourraient se révéler utiles à l’avenir en consé- quence, je passe maintenant à l’analyse de l’étape 228 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. of the reasons why the abandonment orders and the lmr conditions both fail on this step of the abitibi test. abitibi test. de la « certitude suffisante » et des raisons pour les- quelles les ordonnances d’abandon et les conditions liées à la cgr ne franchissent pas cette étape du critère d’abitibi. (2) there is no sufficient certainty that the regulator will perform the environmental work and advance a claim for reimburse- ment (2) il n’est pas suffisamment certain que l’orga- nisme de réglementation exécutera les tra- vaux environnementaux et présentera une demande de remboursement [138] the “sufficient certainty” test articulated in paras. 30 and 36 in abitibi essentially does no more than reorganize and restate the requirements of the relevant provisions of the bia. section 121(2) pro- vides that contingent claims may be provable claims. in other words, contingent debts or liabilities owed by a bankrupt to a creditor may be, but are not nec- essarily, provable claims. section 135(1.1) provides for the valuation of such a claim. a contingent claim must be capable of valuation under s 135(11) — it cannot be too remote or speculative — in order to be a provable claim under s 121(2). [139] before the third step of the abitibi test can even be reached, a regulator must already have been shown to be a creditor. i have concluded that, on the facts of this case, the regulator is not a creditor of redwater. however, for the purpose of explain- ing how i differ from the chambers judge on the “sufficient certainty” analysis, i will proceed as if the regulator were, in fact, a creditor of redwater in respect of the abandonment orders and lmr requirements. these end-of- life obligations do not directly require redwater to make a payment to the regulator rather, they are obligations requiring redwater to do something. as discussed in abitibi, if the regulator were in fact a creditor, end-of- life obligations would be its contingent claims. [138] le critère de la «  certitude suffisante  » énoncé aux par. 30 et 36 de l’arrêt abitibi ne fait essentiellement que restructurer et reformuler les exigences des dispositions applicables de la lfi. selon le par. 121(2), des réclamations éventuelles peuvent constituer des réclamations prouvables. aut- rement dit, les dettes que devra peut- être le failli à un créancier peuvent constituer des réclamations prouvables, mais pas nécessairement l’être. le para- graphe 135(1.1) prévoit l’évaluation d’une réclama- tion éventuelle, qui doit être évaluable suivant cette disposition; elle ne doit pas être trop éloignée ou conjecturale pour constituer une réclamation prou- vable au sens du par 121(2). [139] avant de pouvoir atteindre la troisième étape du critère d’abitibi, il faut déjà avoir fait la démons- tration que l’organisme de réglementation est un créancier. au vu des faits de l’espèce, j’ai conclu que l’organisme de réglementation n’est pas un créancier de redwater. toutefois, afin d’expliquer pourquoi je me dissocie du juge siégeant au cabinet à l’égard de l’analyse de la « certitude suffisante », je vais pro- céder comme si l’organisme de réglementation était effectivement un créancier de redwater en ce qui concerne les ordonnances d’abandon et les exigences de la cgr. ces obligations de fin de vie n’exigent pas directement de redwater qu’elle fasse un paiement à l’organisme de réglementation. elles l’obligent plutôt à faire quelque chose. comme l’indique l’arrêt abitibi, si l’organisme de réglementation était en fait un créan- cier, les obligations de fin de vie constitueraient ses réclamations éventuelles. [140] what a court must determine is whether there are sufficient facts indicating the existence of an environmental duty that will ripen into a financial liability owed to a regulator. in determining whether [140] ce que le tribunal doit décider, c’est s’il y a suffisamment de faits indiquant qu’il existe une obligation environnementale de laquelle résultera une dette envers un organisme de réglementation. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 229 a non- monetary regulatory obligation of a bankrupt is too remote or too speculative to be included in the bankruptcy proceeding, the court must apply the general rules that apply to future or contingent claims. it must be sufficiently certain that the contin- gency will come to pass — in other words, that the regulator will enforce the obligation by performing the environmental work and seeking reimbursement. [141] i will now discuss the abandonment orders and the lmr requirements in turn and demonstrate how they fail to satisfy the “sufficient certainty” step of the abitibi test. pour établir si une obligation réglementaire non pé- cuniaire du failli est trop éloignée ou trop conjectu- rale pour être incluse dans la procédure de faillite, le tribunal doit appliquer les règles générales qui visent les réclamations futures ou éventuelles. il doit être suffisamment certain que l’éventualité se concrétisera ou, en d’autres termes, que l’organisme de réglementation fera respecter l’obligation en exé- cutant les travaux environnementaux et en sollicitant le remboursement de ses frais. [141] je vais maintenant analyser les ordonnances d’abandon de même que les exigences relatives à la cgr à tour de rôle et démontrer en quoi elles ne franchissent pas l’étape de la « certitude suffisante » du critère d’abitibi. (a) the abandonment orders a) les ordonnances d’abandon [142] the regulator has issued orders under the ogca and the pipeline act requiring redwater to abandon the renounced assets. even if the regulator were a creditor of redwater, the abandonment orders would still have to be capable of valuation in order to be included in the bankruptcy process. in my view, it is not established either by the chambers judge’s fac- tual findings or by the evidence that it is sufficiently certain that the regulator will perform the abandon- ments and advance a claim for reimbursement. the claim is too remote and speculative to be included in the bankruptcy process. [142] l’organisme de réglementation a rendu, au titre de l’ogca et de la pipeline act, des ordon- nances enjoignant à redwater d’abandonner les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. même si l’organisme de réglementation était un créancier de redwater, les ordonnances d’abandon doivent tout de même pouvoir faire l’objet d’une évaluation pour être incluses dans le processus de faillite. à mon avis, ni les conclusions de fait du juge siégeant en cabinet ni la preuve n’établissent qu’il est suffi- samment certain que l’organisme de réglementation procédera à l’abandon et présentera une demande de remboursement. la réclamation est trop éloignée et conjecturale pour être incluse dans la procédure de faillite. [143] the chambers judge acknowledged that it was “unclear” whether the regulator would perform the abandonments itself or would deem the wells subject to the abandonment orders to be orphans (para 173). he stated that, in the latter case, the owa would probably carry out the abandonments, although it was not clear when they would be com- pleted. indeed, the chambers judge acknowledged that, given the owa’s resources, it could take as long as 10 years for it to get around to performing the required environmental work on the redwater prop- erty. he nonetheless concluded that — even though the “sufficient certainty” step was not satisfied in a [143] le juge siégeant en cabinet a reconnu qu’il n’était [traduction] « pas clair » si l’organisme de réglementation effectuerait lui- même le processus d’abandon ou s’il considérerait les puits assujet- tis aux ordonnances d’abandon comme orphelins (par 173). il a dit que, dans ce dernier cas, l’owa se chargerait probablement de l’abandon, mais on ne savait pas quand cette tâche serait menée à terme. en effet, le juge siégeant en cabinet a admis qu’étant donné les ressources de l’owa, cela pourrait lui prendre jusqu’à 10 ans avant qu’elle amorce les tra- vaux environnementaux nécessaires sur la propriété de redwater il a conclu néanmoins que, même 230 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. “technical sense” — the situation met what had been intended in abitibi. that conclusion was at least partly based on his finding that the abandonment orders were “intrinsically financial” (para 173). [144] in my view, the chambers judge did not make a finding of fact that the regulator would carry out the abandonments itself. as noted, he acknowledged that it was “unclear” whether the regulator would per- form the abandonments. this can hardly be deemed a finding of fact deserving of deference. in my view, considered as a whole, the evidence in this case leads to the conclusion that the regulator will not abandon the renounced assets itself. [145] the regulator is not in the business of per- forming abandonments. it has no statutory duty to do so. abandonment is instead an obligation of the licensee. the evidence of the regulator’s affiant was that the regulator very rarely abandons properties on behalf of licensees and virtually never does so where the licensee is in receivership or bankruptcy. the affiant stated that the regulator had no intention of abandoning redwater’s licensed assets. as noted by the chambers judge, it is true that, in its letter to gtl dated july 15, 2015, the regulator threat- ened to perform the abandonments itself, but the regulator subsequently took no steps to follow up on that threat. even if this letter should be accorded any weight, the contradiction between it and the regulator’s subsequent affidavits at the very least makes it difficult to say with anything approaching sufficient certainty that the regulator intends to carry out the abandonments. these facts distinguish this case from abitibi, in which the restructuring judge’s findings were based on the premise that the province would most likely perform the remediation work itself. si l’étape de la « certitude suffisante » n’a pas été franchie au « sens technique », la situation répondait à la norme voulue dans abitibi. cette conclusion re- posait, du moins en partie, sur la sienne voulant que les ordonnances d’abandon soient « intrinsèquement financières » (par 173). [144] à mon avis, le juge siégeant en cabinet n’a pas tiré la conclusion de fait que l’organisme de réglemen- tation se chargerait lui­ même des travaux d’abandon. je le rappelle, il a reconnu qu’il n’était « pas clair » si l’organisme de réglementation s’en occuperait. on peut difficilement dire qu’il s’agit qu’une conclusion de fait qui commande la déférence. prise dans son ensemble, la preuve en l’espèce me semble mener à la conclusion selon laquelle l’organisme de réglementa- tion ne procèdera pas lui- même à l’abandon des biens auxquels il a été renoncé. [145] dans le cadre de ses activités, l’organisme de réglementation n’effectue pas lui- même les travaux d’abandon. il n’est pas tenu par la loi de le faire. il s’agit plutôt d’une obligation incombant au titulaire de permis. dans son affidavit, le déposant de l’or- ganisme de réglementation a déclaré que celui-ci procédait très rarement à l’abandon de biens au nom des titulaires de permis et qu’il ne le faisait pratique- ment jamais dans le cas d’un titulaire de permis sous séquestre ou en faillite. le déposant a déclaré que l’organisme de réglementation n’avait pas l’inten- tion d’abandonner les biens de redwater visés par des permis. comme l’a signalé le juge siégeant en cabinet, il est vrai que, dans sa lettre adressée à gtl en date du 15 juillet 2015, l’organisme de réglemen- tation a menacé d’effectuer lui- même ces processus, mais il n’a rien fait par la suite pour mettre cette menace à exécution. même si l’on devrait accorder de l’importance à cette lettre, la contradiction entre elle et les affidavits subséquents de l’organisme de réglementation font en sorte à tout le moins qu’il est difficile de dire avec quoi que ce soit de comparable à une certitude suffisante que l’organisme de régle- mentation compte effectuer le processus d’abandon. ces faits distinguent la présente affaire d’abitibi, où les conclusions du juge chargé de la restructuration reposaient sur la prémisse que la province exécu- terait fort probablement elle- même les travaux de décontamination. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 231 [146] below, i will explain why the owa’s in- volvement is insufficient to satisfy the “sufficient certainty” test. first, i note that any reliance the chambers judge placed on the intrinsically financial nature of the abandonment orders was an error. in this regard, i am in complete agreement with martin ja. considering whether an order is intrinsically financial is an erroneous interpretation of the third step of the abitibi test. it is too broad and would result in a provable claim being found even where the existence of a monetary claim in bankruptcy is merely speculative. thus, in nortel ca, juriansz ja. rightly rejected the argument that the abitibi test did not require a determination that the regulator would perform the environmental work and claim reim- bursement, and that it was sufficient for there to be an environmental order requiring an expenditure of funds by the bankrupt estate. he held the following, at paras. 31-32:   . as i read it, the supreme court’s decision is clear: ongoing environmental remediation obligations may be reduced to monetary claims that can be compromised in ccaa proceedings only where the province has per- formed the remediation work and advances a claim for reimbursement, or where the obligation may be considered a contingent or future claim because it is “sufficiently certain” that the province will do the work and then seek reimbursement. the respondents’ approach is not only inconsistent with abitibibowater inc., re, it is too broad. it would re- sult in virtually all regulatory environmental orders being found to be provable claims. as deschamps j observed, a company may engage in activities that carry risks. when those risks materialize, the costs are borne by those who hold a stake in the company. a risk that results in an en- vironmental obligation becomes subject to the insolvency process only when it is in substance monetary and is in substance a provable claim. [146] j’expliquerai ci- après pourquoi l’interven- tion de l’owa est insuffisante pour satisfaire au critère de la « certitude suffisante ». premièrement, je constate que le juge siégeant en cabinet a eu tort de tabler sur le caractère « intrinsèquement finan- cier » des ordonnances d’abandon. je suis entière- ment d’accord avec la juge martin sur ce point. se demander si une ordonnance est « intrinsèquement financière » constitue une interprétation erronée de la troisième étape du critère d’abitibi. elle est trop large et conduirait à la conclusion qu’il y a une « ré- clamation prouvable » même lorsque l’existence d’une réclamation pécuniaire en matière de faillite ne relève que de la conjecture. ainsi, dans l’arrêt nortel ca, le juge juriansz a rejeté à juste titre l’ar- gument selon lequel le critère d’abitibi n’exigeait pas qu’il soit décidé que l’organisme de réglemen- tation exécuterait les travaux environnementaux et demanderait un remboursement, et qu’il suffisait qu’il y ait une ordonnance environnementale exi- geant une dépense de fonds par l’actif du failli. il a déclaré ce qui suit, aux par. 31-32 : [traduction]   . selon moi, la décision de la cour su- prême est claire : les obligations continues de déconta- mination environnementale peuvent être réduites à des réclamations pécuniaires pouvant être compromises dans des procédures fondées sur la lacc seulement lorsque la province a exécuté les travaux de décontamination et qu’elle présente une demande de remboursement, ou lorsque l’obligation peut être considérée comme une récla- mation éventuelle ou future, parce qu’il est « suffisamment certain » que la province fera le travail et cherchera ensuite à obtenir un remboursement. l’approche des intimées n’est pas seulement incom- patible avec celle de l’arrêt abitibi, elle est trop large. il en résulterait que pratiquement toutes les ordonnances réglementaires en matière d’environnement soient consi- dérées comme des réclamations prouvables. comme l’a fait remarquer la juge deschamps, une société peut exer- cer des activités qui comportent des risques. lorsque ces risques se matérialisent, les coûts sont supportés par ceux qui détiennent une participation dans la société. un risque qui entraîne une obligation environnementale n’est soumis au processus d’insolvabilité que lorsqu’il est en substance pécuniaire et qu’il constitue en substance une réclamation prouvable. 232 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. [147] as the chambers judge correctly acknowl- edged, the fact that the regulator would not conduct the abandonments itself does not mean that it would wash its hands of the renounced assets. rather, if necessary, it would designate them as orphans pursu- ant to the ogca and leave them for the owa. i am not suggesting that a regulator can strategically avoid the “sufficient certainty” test simply by delegating environmental work to an arm’s length organization. i would not decide, as the regulator urges, that the abitibi test always requires that the environmental work be performed by the regulator itself. however, the owa’s true nature must be emphasized. there are strong grounds to conclude that, given the particular features of this regulatory context, the owa is not the regulator. [148] the creation of the owa was not an at- tempt by the regulator to avoid the bia order of priorities in bankruptcy it is a non- profit or- ganization with its own mandate and independent board of directors, and it operates as a financially independent entity pursuant to legally delegated authority. although the owa’s board includes a representative of the regulator and a represent- ative of alberta environment and parks, its inde- pendence is not in question. the owa’s 2014-2015 annual report indicates that five out of six voting directors represent industry. the owa uses a risk assessment tool to prioritize when and how it will perform environmental work on the many hun- dreds of orphans in alberta. there is no suggestion that the regulator has any say in the order in which the owa chooses to perform environmental work. the 2014-2015 annual report also states that, since 1992, 87 percent of the money collected and in- vested to fund owa activities has been provided by industry via the orphan levy. the regulator, at para. 99 of its factum, hints obliquely that addi- tional provincial or federal funding may be forth- coming in the future, but even if it materializes, it will be almost entirely in the form of loans. i can- not accept the suggestion in the dissenting reasons [147] comme l’a reconnu à bon droit le juge sié- geant en cabinet, ce n’est pas parce que l’organisme de réglementation n’effectuerait pas lui- même les travaux d’abandon qu’il se laverait les mains des biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. il les quali- fierait plutôt, au besoin, d’orphelins conformément à l’ogca et les confiera à l’owa. je ne prétends pas qu’un organisme de réglementation puisse stratégiquement éviter le critère de la « certitude suffisante » en déléguant simplement des travaux environnementaux à une organisation indépen- dante je ne déciderai pas, comme l’organisme de réglementation nous a exhortés à le faire, que le critère d’abitibi exige toujours que les travaux environnementaux soient exécutés par l’organisme lui- même. cependant, la véritable nature de l’owa doit être soulignée il y a des motifs sérieux de conclure que, vu les caractéristiques propres à ce contexte réglementaire, l’owa n’est pas l’orga- nisme de réglementation. [148] la création de l’owa ne représentait pas une tentative de l’organisme de réglementation pour évi- ter l’ordre de priorité fixé en matière de faillite par la lfi. c’est un organisme sans but lucratif doté de son propre mandat et de son propre conseil d’administra- tion indépendant, et il fonctionne comme une entité financièrement indépendante en vertu du pouvoir qui lui est délégué par la loi. bien qu’un représentant de l’organisme de réglementation et un représentant d’alberta environment and parks siègent au conseil d’administration de l’owa, son indépendance n’est pas mise en question. le rapport annuel 2014-2015 de l’owa indique que cinq des six directeurs votants représentent l’industrie. l’owa se sert d’un outil d’évaluation des risques pour décider, en ordre de priorité, quand et de quelle manière elle exécutera des travaux environnementaux sur les centaines de puits orphelins de l’alberta. personne ne prétend que l’organisme de réglementation a son mot à dire sur l’ordre dans lequel l’owa décide d’exécuter des travaux environnementaux. le rapport annuel 2014-2015 ajoute que, depuis 1992, 87 p. 100 de l’argent recueilli et investi pour financer les activi- tés de l’owa est fourni par l’industrie via la rede- vance pour les puits orphelins. au paragraphe 99 de son mémoire, l’organisme de réglementation laisse [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 233 that the regulator and the owa are “inextricably intertwined” (para 273). [149] even assuming that the owa’s abandonment of redwater’s licensed assets could satisfy the “suffi- cient certainty” test, i agree with martin ja that it is difficult to conclude that there is sufficient certainty that the owa will in fact perform the abandonments. i also agree with her view that there is no certainty that a claim for reimbursement will be advanced should the owa ultimately abandon the assets. [150] the dissenting reasons suggest that the facts of this appeal are more akin to those of northstar aerospace inc., re, 2013 onca 600, 8 cbr (6th) 154, than to those of nortel ca, arguing that the “sufficient certainty” test is satisfied because, as in northstar, there is no purchaser to take on redwater’s assets and the debtor itself is insolvent, so only the owa can perform the work. in my view, northstar is easily distinguishable. in that case, the bankrupt had been voluntarily carrying out remediation prior to its bankruptcy. after it made its assignment into bank- ruptcy, the ministry of the environment (“moe”) took over the remediation activities itself, purporting to do so on a without prejudice basis. jurianz ja. found that the fact that the moe had already under- taken remediation activities made it sufficiently cer- tain that it would do so. as i will now demonstrate, the facts here are very different. entendre indirectement que la province ou le gou- vernement fédéral pourrait accorder à l’avenir des fonds supplémentaires à l’owa mais, même si cette possibilité se concrétise, les fonds seront presque entièrement consentis sous forme de prêts. je ne peux accepter la proposition des juges dissidents selon laquelle l’organisme de réglementation et l’owa sont « inextricablement liés » (par 273). [149] à supposer même que l’abandon par l’owa des biens de redwater visés par des permis puisse satisfaire au critère de la « certitude suffisante », je conviens avec la juge martin qu’il est difficile de conclure à la certitude suffisante que l’owa se char- gera effectivement des travaux d’abandon et qu’il n’y a aucune certitude qu’une demande de rembourse- ment sera présentée si l’owa finit par abandonner les biens. [150] les motifs dissidents laissent croire que les faits de l’espèce s’apparentent davantage à ceux de l’affaire northstar aerospace inc., re, 2013 onca 600, 8 cbr (6th) 154, qu’à ceux de nortel ca, faisant valoir qu’il est satisfait au critère de la « cer- titude suffisante » car, tout comme dans northstar, personne ne veut acheter les biens de redwater et la débitrice elle- même est insolvable; en conséquence, seule l’owa peut exécuter les travaux. il me semble facile de distinguer l’affaire northstar de celle qui nous occupe. dans cette affaire, le failli effectuait de son plein gré des travaux de décontamination avant sa faillite. après que le failli eu fait cession de ses biens, le ministre de l’environnement (« me ») a pris lui- même la relève des activités de décontamination et il entendait le faire sans préjudice. selon le juge jurianz, comme le me avait déjà entrepris des acti- vités de décontamination, il était suffisamment cer- tain qu’il s’en occuperait. comme je le démontrerai maintenant, les faits de l’espèce sont fort différents. [151] at the beginning of this litigation, the owa estimated that it would take 10 to 12 years to get through the backlog of orphans. by 2015, that back- log was increasing rapidly, and it may well have continued to increase at the same or an even greater speed in the intervening years, as submitted by the regulator. if anything, this suggests the possibility of an even larger backlog. there is no indication that [151] au début du présent litige, l’owa a estimé qu’il lui faudrait de 10 à 12 ans pour résorber l’ar- riéré d’orphelins. cet arriéré augmentait rapidement en 2015 et il peut fort bien avoir continué de croître tout aussi ou encore plus rapidement au cours des années suivantes, comme le soutient l’organisme de réglementation. cela tend plutôt à établir que l’arriéré pourrait encore augmenter. rien n’indique 234 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. the renounced assets would have a particularly high priority in the backlog. even if the potential addi- tional funding materializes, the regulator submits that it will be a generation or more before the owa can address its existing inventory of orphans. [152] the dissenting reasons rely on the chambers judge’s conclusion that the owa would “proba- bly” perform the abandonments eventually, while downplaying the fact that he also concluded that this would not “necessarily [occur] within a definite timeframe” (paras. 261 and 278, citing the cham- bers judge’s reasons, at para 173). given the most conservative timeline — the 10 years discussed by the chambers judge — it is difficult to predict any- thing occurring with sufficient certainty. much could change within the next decade, both in terms of gov- ernment policy and in terms of the willingness of those in the alberta oil and gas industry to discharge environmental liabilities. this is not at all the same situation as in northstar, in which the moe had already commenced environmental work. [153] perhaps more to the point, this lengthy time- line means that, should it ultimately perform the work, the owa will not advance a claim for reim- bursement. advancement of a claim is an element of the test that is just as essential as performance of the work. the owa itself has no ability to seek reimbursement of its costs from licensees and, al- though the costs of abandonment carried out by a person authorized by the regulator constitute a debt payable to the regulator under s. 30(5) of the ogca, no evidence has been adduced that the regulator has exercised its power to recover such costs in comparable cases. there is a good reason for this: the reality is that, by the time the owa got around to abandoning any of redwater’s wells, the estate would be finalized and gtl long since dis- charged. in sum, the chambers judge erred in failing to consider whether the owa can be treated as the regulator and in failing to appreciate that, even if it can, it is not sufficiently certain that the owa will qu’une priorité particulièrement grande serait ac- cordée dans l’arriéré aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. même si la possibilité d’attribuer des fonds supplémentaires se concrétise, l’organisme de réglementation fait valoir que cela prendra une géné- ration ou plus avant que l’owa ne puisse s’occuper de son inventaire actuel d’orphelins. [152] les motifs dissidents se fondent sur la con- clusion du juge siégeant en cabinet selon laquelle l’owa effectuerait « probablement » le processus d’abandon, tout en minimisant le fait qu’il a égale- ment conclu que l’owa ne le ferait pas « nécessai- rement dans un délai précis » (par. 261 et 278, citant les motifs du juge siégeant en cabinet, par 173). vu l’échéancier le plus conservateur — celui de 10 ans dont a parlé le juge siégeant en cabinet —, il est dif- ficile de prédire quoi que ce soit avec une certitude suffisante la donne pourrait changer considéra- blement au cours de la prochaine décennie, tant au chapitre de la politique gouvernementale qu’à celui de la volonté de l’industrie pétrolière et gazière de l’alberta de s’acquitter de ses responsabilités envi- ronnementales. il ne s’agit pas du tout de la même situation que dans northstar, où le me avait déjà amorcé les travaux environnementaux. [153] plus particulièrement, ce long échéancier garantit que, s’il finit par exécuter les travaux, l’owa ne présentera pas de demande de remboursement. la présentation de la demande est un élément tout aussi essentiel du critère que l’exécution des tra- vaux. l’owa lui- même ne peut faire rembourser ses frais par les titulaires de permis et, même si les coûts des processus d’abandon effectués par la per- sonne autorisée par l’organisme de réglementation constituent une dette payable à cet organisme sui- vant le par. 30(5) de l’ogca, on n’a produit aucune preuve montrant que l’organisme de réglementation a exercé son pouvoir de recouvrer ces frais dans des cas analogues, et pour cause : le fait est qu’au moment où l’owa en arriverait à abandonner l’un ou l’autre des puits de redwater, la liquidation de l’actif serait terminée et gtl serait libéré depuis longtemps. en somme, le juge siégeant en cabinet a eu tort de ne pas se demander si l’owa peut être assimilé à l’organisme de réglementation et en ne [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 235 in fact perform the abandonments and advance a claim for reimbursement. [154] accordingly, even if the regulator had acted as a creditor in issuing the abandonment orders, it cannot be said with sufficient certainty that it would perform the abandonments and advance a claim for reimbursement. considérant pas que, même s’il peut l’être, il n’est pas suffisamment certain qu’il effectuera dans les faits le processus d’abandon et présentera une demande de remboursement. [154] en conséquence, même si l’organisme de réglementation avait agi comme un créancier en ren- dant les ordonnances, on ne saurait dire avec une certitude suffisante qu’il effectuerait les processus d’abandon et présenterait une demande de rembour- sement. (b) the conditions for the transfer of licenses b) les conditions liées au transfert de permis [155] i will deal briefly with the lmr conditions for the transfer of licences. much of the foregoing analysis with regard to the abandonment orders also applies to these conditions. as noted by martin ja, the requirement of regulatory approval for li- cence transfers is difficult to compare directly with the remediation orders at issue in abitibi. however, this court confirmed that the abitibi test applies to a class of regulatory obligations that is broader than “orders” in moloney, at paras 54-55. the lmr conditions are a “non- monetary obligation” for the redwater estate, since they must be satisfied before the regulator will approve the transfer of any of redwater’s licences. however, it is notable that, even apart from the lmr conditions, licences are far from freely transferrable. the regulator will not approve the transfer of licences where the transferee is not a licensee under the ogca, the pipeline act, or both. the regulator also reserves the right to reject a pro- posed transfer where it determines that the transfer is not in the public interest, such as where the transferee has outstanding compliance issues. [155] je traiterai brièvement des conditions rela- tives à la cgr dont est assorti le transfert de permis. une grande partie de l’analyse qui précède concer- nant les ordonnances d’abandon vaut tout autant pour ces conditions. comme l’a souligné la juge martin, il est difficile de comparer directement la nécessité d’obtenir une approbation réglementaire pour les transferts de permis et les ordonnances de décon- tamination en litige dans abitibi. or, notre cour a confirmé aux par. 54-55 de moloney que le critère d’abitibi s’applique à une catégorie d’obligations réglementaires plus large que les « ordonnances ». les conditions relatives à la cgr forment une « obli- gation non pécuniaire » de l’actif de redwater, car elles doivent être remplies avant que l’organisme de réglementation n’approuve le transfert de tout permis de redwater. cependant, il convient de noter que, même mises à part les conditions relatives à la cgr, les permis sont loin d’être librement transférables. l’organisme n’approuvera pas le transfert des permis si le cessionnaire n’est pas un titulaire de permis au sens de l’ogca ou de la pipeline act ou des deux. l’organisme de réglementation se réserve également le droit de rejeter un transfert proposé lorsqu’il juge que le transfert n’est pas dans l’intérêt public, comme dans un cas où le cessionnaire a des problèmes non résolus touchant à la conformité. in a sense, the factors suggesting an absence [156] of sufficient certainty are even stronger for the lmr requirements than for the abandonment orders. there is a debt enforcement scheme under the ogca and the pipeline act in respect of abandonment, but [156] en un sens, les facteurs laissant croire qu’il n’y a pas de certitude suffisante militent encore plus fortement en faveur des exigences relatives à la cgr que des ordonnances d’abandon. l’ogca et la pipeline act prévoient un régime de recouvrement 236 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. there is no such scheme for the lmr requirements. the regulator’s refusal to approve licence transfers unless and until the lmr requirements have been satisfied does not give it a monetary claim against redwater. it is true that compliance with the lmr requirements results in a reduction in the value of the bankrupt estate. however, as discussed earlier, not every obligation that diminishes the value of the bankrupt estate, and therefore the amount available to secured creditors, satisfies the “sufficient cer- tainty” step. the question is not whether an obliga- tion is intrinsically financial. [157] compliance with the lmr conditions prior to the transfer of licences reflects the inherent value of the assets held by the bankrupt estate. without licences, redwater’s profits à prendre are of limited value at best. all licences held by redwater were re- ceived by it subject to the end-of- life obligations that would one day arise. these end-of- life obligations form a fundamental part of the value of the licensed assets, the same as if the associated costs had been paid up front. having received the benefit of the renounced assets during the productive period of their life cycles, redwater cannot now avoid the associated liabilities. this understanding is consist- ent with daishowa­ marubeni international ltd. v. canada, 2013 scc 29, [2013] 2 scr 336, which dealt with the statutory reforestation obligations of holders of forest tenures in alberta. this court unan- imously held that the reforestation obligations were “a future cost embedded in the forest tenure that serves to depress the tenure’s value at the time of sale” (para 29). de créances en matière d’abandon, mais il n’existe aucun régime de ce genre pour les exigences liées à la cgr. le refus de l’organisme de réglementa- tion d’approuver les transferts de permis jusqu’à ce que ces exigences aient été satisfaites ne lui donne pas une réclamation pécuniaire contre redwater. certes, le respect des exigences relatives à la cgr entraîne une diminution de la valeur de l’actif du failli. toutefois, comme nous l’avons vu plus tôt, toute obligation qui diminue la valeur de l’actif du failli, et donc la somme que peuvent recouvrer les créanciers garantis, ne franchit pas nécessairement l’étape de la « certitude suffisante ». il ne s’agit pas de savoir si une obligation est intrinsèquement financière. [157] le respect des conditions liées à la cgr avant le transfert des permis reflète la valeur inhé- rente des biens détenus par l’actif du failli. sans les permis, les profits à prendre appartenant à redwater ont, au mieux, peu de valeur. tous les permis dé- tenus par redwater ont été reçus par elle, sous ré- serve d’obligations de fin de vie qui prendraient naissance un jour. ces obligations constituent une part fondamentale de la valeur des biens visés par des permis, comme si les frais connexes avaient été payés d’emblée. ayant reçu le bénéfice des biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation pendant la période productive de leur cycle de vie, redwater ne peut plus éviter les engagements connexes. cette inter- prétation concorde avec l’arrêt daishowa­ marubeni international ltd. c. canada, 2013 csc 29, [2013] 2 rcs 336, qui portait sur les obligations légales de reboisement des détenteurs de tenures fores- tières en alberta. notre cour a conclu à l’unanimité que les obligations relatives au reboisement consti- tuaient « un coût futur inhérent à la tenure forestière qui a pour effet d’en diminuer la valeur au moment de la vente » (par 29). [158] the fact that regulatory requirements may cost money does not transform them into debt col- lection schemes. as noted by martin ja, licensing requirements predate bankruptcy and apply to all licensees regardless of solvency. gtl does not dis- pute the fact that redwater’s licences can be trans- ferred only to other licensees nor that the regulator retains the authority in appropriate situations to [158] la possibilité que des exigences réglemen- taires coûtent de l’argent ne les transforme pas en régimes de recouvrement de créances. comme l’a fait remarquer la juge martin, les exigences en ma- tière de permis précèdent la faillite et s’appliquent à tous les titulaires de permis, peu importe leur solvabilité. gtl ne conteste pas le fait que les per- mis de redwater ne peuvent être transférés qu’à [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton le juge en chef 237 reject proposed transfers due to safety or compli- ance concerns. there is no difference between such conditions and the condition that the regulator will not approve transfers where they would leave the requirement to satisfy end-of- life obligations unad- dressed. all these regulatory conditions depress the value of the licensed assets. none of them creates a monetary claim in the regulator’s favour. licensing requirements continue to exist during bankruptcy, and there is no reason why gtl cannot comply with them. d’autres titulaires de permis, ni le fait que l’orga- nisme de réglementation conserve le pouvoir, dans les situations qui s’y prêtent, de rejeter les transferts proposés en raison de préoccupations relatives à la sécurité ou à la conformité. il n’y a aucune dif- férence entre ces conditions et celle voulant que l’organisme de réglementation n’approuve pas les transferts qui laisseraient en suspens l’exigence de satisfaire aux obligations de fin de vie. toutes ces conditions réglementaires font baisser la valeur des biens visés par des permis. aucune ne donne naissance à une réclamation pécuniaire en faveur de l’organisme de réglementation. les exigences en matière de permis subsistent pendant la faillite, et il n’y a aucune raison pour laquelle gtl ne peut s’y conformer. (3) conclusion on the abitibi test (3) conclusion sur le critère d’abitibi [159] accordingly, the end-of- life obligations binding on gtl are not claims provable in the red water bankruptcy, so they do not conflict with the general priority scheme in the bia. this is not a mere matter of form, but of substance. requiring redwater to pay for abandonment before distribut- ing value to creditors does not disrupt the priority scheme of the bia. in crafting the priority scheme set out in the bia, parliament intended to permit regulators to place a first charge on real property of a bankrupt affected by an environmental condi- tion or damage in order to fund remediation (see s 1406(7)). thus, the bia explicitly contemplates that environmental regulators will extract value from the bankrupt’s real property if that property is affected by an environmental condition or damage. although the nature of property ownership in the alberta oil and gas industry meant that s 1406(7) was unavailable to the regulator, the abandonment orders and the lmr replicate s 1406(7)’s effect in this case. furthermore, it is important to note that redwater’s only substantial assets were af- fected by an environmental condition or damage. accordingly, the abandonment orders and lmr requirements did not seek to force redwater to fulfill end-of- life obligations with assets unrelated to the environmental condition or damage. in other words, recognizing that the abandonment orders and lmr requirements are not provable claims [159] en conséquence, les obligations de fin de vie incombant à gtl ne sont pas des réclamations prouvables dans la faillite de redwater et n’entrent donc pas en conflit avec le régime de priorité gé- néral instauré dans la lfi. ce n’est pas une simple question de forme, mais de fond. obliger redwater à payer l’abandon avant de répartir la valeur entre les créanciers ne perturbe pas le régime de priorité établi dans la lfi. au moment d’élaborer ce ré- gime, le parlement voulait permettre aux organismes de réglementation d’imposer une charge prioritaire sur le bien réel du failli touché par un fait ou dom- mage lié à l’environnement en vue de financer la décontamination (voir le par 1406(7)). ainsi, la lfi envisage explicitement la possibilité que des organismes de réglementation tire une valeur des biens réels du failli touchés par un fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement. bien que l’organisme de ré- glementation n’ait pu se prévaloir du par 1406(7), compte tenu de la nature de la propriété des biens dans l’industrie pétrolière et gazière de l’alberta, les ordonnances d’abandon et la cgr reproduisent l’effet du par 1406(7) en l’espèce. de plus, il im- porte de souligner que les seuls biens de valeur de redwater étaient touchés par un fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement. les ordonnances d’abandon et exigences relatives à la cgr n’avaient donc pas pour objet de forcer redwater à s’acquitter des obli- gations de fin de vie avec des biens étrangers au fait 238 orphan well assn v grant thornton the chief justice [2019] 1 scr. in this case does not interfere with the aims of the bia — rather, it facilitates them. [160] bankruptcy is not a licence to ignore rules, and insolvency professionals are bound by and must comply with valid provincial laws during bankruptcy. they must, for example, comply with non- monetary obligations that are binding on the bankrupt estate, that cannot be reduced to provable claims, and the effects of which do not conflict with the bia, not- withstanding the consequences this may have for the bankrupt’s secured creditors. the abandonment orders and the lmr requirements are based on valid provincial laws of general application — exactly the kind of valid provincial laws upon which the bia is built. as noted in moloney, the bia is clear that “[t]he ownership of certain assets and the existence of particular liabilities depend upon provincial law” (para 40). end-of- life obligations are imposed by valid provincial laws which define the contours of the bankrupt estate available for distribution. [161] finally, as noted earlier, the bia’s general purpose of facilitating financial rehabilitation is not relevant for a corporation such as redwater. corporations with insufficient assets to satisfy their creditors will never be discharged from bankruptcy because they cannot satisfy all their creditors’ claims in full (bia, s 169(4)). thus, no conflict with this purpose is caused by the conclusion that the end-of- life obligations binding redwater are not provable claims. ou dommage lié à l’environnement. autrement dit, la reconnaissance que les ordonnances d’abandon et exigences relatives à la cgr ne sont pas des récla- mations prouvables en l’espèce facilite l’atteinte des objets de la lfi au lieu de la contrecarrer. [160] la faillite n’est pas un permis de faire abs- traction des règles, et les professionnels de l’insol- vabilité sont liés par les lois provinciales valides au cours de la faillite. à titre d’exemple, ils doivent res- pecter les obligations non pécuniaires liant l’actif du failli qui ne peuvent être réduites à des réclamations prouvables et dont les effets n’entrent pas en conflit avec la lfi, sans égard aux répercussions que cela peut avoir sur les créanciers garantis du failli. les ordonnances d’abandon et exigences relatives à la cgr reposent sur des lois provinciales valides d’ap- plication générale et elles représentent exactement le genre de loi provinciale valide sur lequel se fonde la lfi. tel qu’il est signalé dans moloney, la lfi indique clairement que « [l]a propriété de certains biens et l’existence de dettes particulières relèvent du droit provincial » (par 40). les obligations de fin de vie sont imposées par des lois provinciales valides qui définissent les contours de l’actif du failli susceptible d’être partagé. [161] enfin, rappelons que l’objet général de la lfi de favoriser la réhabilitation financière ne concerne pas une société comme redwater les sociétés n’ayant pas assez de biens pour satisfaire leurs créanciers ne seront jamais libérées de leur faillite puisqu’elles ne peuvent acquitter entière- ment toutes les réclamations de leurs créanciers (lfi, par 169(4)). ainsi, la conclusion selon laquelle les obligations de fin de vie incombant à redwater ne sont pas des réclamations prouvables n’est à l’origine d’aucun conflit avec cet objet. iv conclusion iv conclusion [162] there is no conflict between alberta’s reg- ulatory regime and the bia requiring portions of the former to be rendered inoperative in the con- text of bankruptcy. although gtl remains fully protected from personal liability by federal law, it cannot walk away from the environmental liabilities of the bankrupt estate by invoking s 1406(4). on a [162] il n’y a aucun conflit entre le régime de ré- glementation de l’alberta et la lfi en raison duquel des parties du premier doivent être inopérantes dans le contexte de la faillite. bien que gtl demeure entièrement dégagé de toute responsabilité person- nelle par le droit fédéral, il ne peut se soustraire aux engagements environnementaux qui lient l’actif du [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 239 proper application of the abitibi test, the redwater estate must comply with ongoing environmental ob- ligations that are not claims provable in bankruptcy. [163] accordingly, the appeal is allowed. in al­ berta energy regulator v. grant thornton limited, 2017 abca 278, 57 alta. lr (6th) 37, wakeling ja declined to stay the precedential effect of the court of appeal’s decision. as he noted, the inter- ests of the regulator itself were already protected. pursuant to earlier orders of the alberta courts, gtl had already sold or renounced all of redwater’s as- sets, and the sale proceeds were being held in trust. accordingly, the regulator’s request for an order that the proceeds from the sale of redwater’s assets be used to address redwater’s end-of- life obligations is granted. additionally, the chambers judge’s declara- tions in paras. 3 and 5-16 of his order are set aside. failli en invoquant le par 1406(4). d’après une juste application du critère d’abitibi, l’actif de redwater doit respecter les obligations environnementales continues qui ne sont pas des réclamations prou- vables en matière de faillite. [163] en conséquence, le pourvoi est accueilli. dans alberta energy regulator c. grant thornton limited, 2017 abca 278, 57 alta. lr (6th) 37, le juge wakeling a refusé de suspendre l’effet de pré- cédent de l’arrêt rendu par la cour d’appel. comme il l’a fait remarquer, les intérêts de l’organisme de réglementation lui- même étaient déjà protégés. conformément aux ordonnances rendues auparavant par les tribunaux albertains, gtl avait déjà vendu l’ensemble des biens de redwater ou y avait renoncé et le produit de la vente a été détenu en fiducie. ainsi, la cour rend l’ordonnance demandée par l’organisme de réglementation selon laquelle le produit de la vente des biens de redwater doit être utilisé pour satisfaire aux obligations de fin de vie de redwater. en outre, les déclarations du juge siégeant en cabinet qui figurent aux par. 3 et 5-16 de son ordonnance sont annulées. [164] as the successful party in the appeal, the regulator would normally be entitled to its costs. however, the regulator specifically did not seek costs. accordingly, there will be no order made as to costs. [164] puisqu’il a gain de cause dans le cadre de ce pourvoi, l’organisme de réglementation aurait nor- malement droit aux dépens. toutefois, il a expressé- ment mentionné ne pas les demander. c’est pourquoi aucune ordonnance ne sera rendue à cet égard. the reasons of moldaver and côté jj. were de- version française des motifs des juges moldaver livered by et côté rendus par côté j (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i. introduction i. introduction [165] redwater energy corporation (“redwater”) is a bankrupt oil and gas company. its estate prin- cipally consists of two types of properties or as- sets: valuable, producing oil wells and facilities that are still capable of generating revenue; and value- negative, non- producing assets, including depleted wells that are subject to onerous environmental li- abilities. redwater’s receiver and trustee in bank- ruptcy, grant thornton limited (“gtl”), purports to have disclaimed ownership of the non- producing [165] redwater energy corporation (« redwater ») est une société pétrolière et gazière en faillite. son actif se compose principalement de deux types de biens : des puits de pétrole et des installations pétro- lières de valeur productifs qui sont encore suscep- tibles de générer un revenu; et des biens inexploités ayant une valeur négative, notamment des puits taris auxquels se rattachent de lourds engagements en- vironnementaux. le séquestre et syndic de faillite de redwater, grant thornton limited (« gtl »), 240 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. assets. it did so in order to sell the valuable, produc- ing wells separately — unencumbered by the lia- bilities attached to the disclaimed properties — and to distribute the proceeds of that sale to the estate’s creditors. [166] however, alberta law does not recognize gtl’s disclaimers as enforceable shortly after gtl’s appointment as receiver, the alberta energy regulator (“aer”) issued “abandonment orders” for the disclaimed assets, directing redwater and its working interest participants to carry out envi- ronmental work on those properties. specifically, the aer sought to have gtl “abandon” the non- producing properties, which meant to render the wells environmentally safe according to the aer’s directives. it later notified gtl that it would refuse to approve any sale of redwater’s valuable assets un- less gtl did one of three things: sell the disclaimed properties in a single package with the producing wells and facilities; complete the abandonment and reclamation work itself; or post security to cover the environmental liabilities associated with the dis- claimed properties. [167] the evidence reveals that none of these options is economically viable. the net value of redwater’s 127 licensed properties is negative, so no rational purchaser would ever agree to buy them as a package. this is precisely why gtl opted to disclaim the burdensome properties in the first place. as to the remaining options, gtl cannot under- take or guarantee the abandonment and reclamation work because the environmental liabilities attached to the disclaimed assets exceed the estate’s realizable value — and in any event, gtl could not access the funds necessary to satisfy these commitments until after a sale of the estate’s valuable assets was completed. the effect of the aer’s position, then, is to hamper gtl in its administration of the estate, preventing it from realizing any value for any of redwater’s creditors, including the aer. and the aer’s position effectively leaves the valuable and producing wells in limbo, creating a real risk that prétend avoir renoncé à la propriété des biens inex- ploités, et ce, afin de vendre séparément les puits de valeur productifs — non grevés des engagements se rattachant aux biens visés par les renonciations — et de répartir le produit de cette vente entre les créan- ciers de l’actif. [166] toutefois, la loi albertaine ne reconnaît pas de force exécutoire aux renonciations de gtl. peu de temps après la nomination de gtl à titre de séquestre, l’alberta energy regulator (« aer ») a rendu des « ordonnances d’abandon » à l’égard des biens visés par les renonciations, ordonnant à redwater et à ses participants en participation directe d’exécuter des travaux environnementaux sur ceux-ci. en particulier, l’aer souhaitait que gtl « abandonne » les biens inexploités, ce qui signifie rendre les puits sûrs pour l’environnement, selon les directives de l’aer. il a ensuite avisé gtl qu’il refuserait d’approuver toute vente des biens de valeur de redwater à moins que gtl ne fasse l’une des trois choses suivantes : vendre les biens visés par les renonciations avec les puits et les ins- tallations productifs comme un tout unique; achever elle- même les travaux d’abandon et de remise en état; ou verser un dépôt de garantie pour couvrir les engagements environnementaux liés aux biens visés par les renonciations. [167] la preuve révèle qu’aucune de ces possibi- lités n’est viable sur le plan économique. la valeur nette des 127 biens de redwater qui sont visés par des permis est négative, de sorte qu’aucun acheteur sensé n’accepterait de les acquérir ensemble. c’est précisément pour cette raison que gtl a choisi de renoncer aux biens représentant un fardeau en pre- mier lieu. quant aux autres possibilités, gtl ne peut ni exécuter les travaux d’abandon et de remise en état ni en garantir l’exécution parce que les engagements environnementaux se rattachant aux biens visés par les renonciations dépassent la valeur de réalisation de l’actif et que, de toute façon, gtl ne pourrait obtenir les sommes nécessaires pour satisfaire à ces engagements qu’après avoir procédé à la vente des biens de valeur se trouvant dans l’actif. la position de l’aer a donc pour effet d’entraver gtl dans son administration de l’actif, l’empêchant de réaliser une quelconque valeur pour l’un ou l’autre des créanciers [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 241 they, too, will become “orphans” — assets that are unable to be sold to another company and are left entirely unrealized. [168] according to wagner cj,. gtl is without recourse because federal law enables it only to pro- tect itself from personal liability and because the aer was entitled to assert its environmental liability claims outside of the bankruptcy process. i disagree on both points. in my view, two aspects of alberta’s regulatory regime conflict with the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3 (“bia”). this result flows from a proper and accurate understand- ing of fundamental principles of constitutional and insolvency law. [169] first, alberta’s statutes regulating the oil and gas industry define the term “licensee” as includ- ing receivers and trustees in bankruptcy. the effect of this definition is that insolvency professionals are subject to the same obligations and liabilities as redwater itself — including the obligation to comply with the aer’s abandonment orders and the risk of personal liability for failing to do so. the bia, however, permits a trustee in bankruptcy to disclaim assets encumbered by environmental liabilities. this power was available to gtl in the circumstances of this case, and gtl validly disclaimed the non- productive assets. the result is that it is no longer subject to the environmental liabilities associated with those assets. because alberta’s statutory re- gime does not recognize these disclaimers as lawful (by virtue of the fact that receivers and trustees are regulated as licensees, who cannot disclaim assets), there is an unavoidable operational conflict between federal and provincial law. alberta’s legislation gov- erning the oil and gas sector should therefore be held inoperative to the extent that it does not recognize the legal effect of gtl’s disclaimers. de redwater, y compris l’aer. la position de l’aer place de fait les puits de valeur productifs dans une situation incertaine, créant un risque réel qu’ils deviennent, eux aussi, des [traduction] « orphe- lins » — des biens qui ne peuvent être vendus à une autre société et dont la valeur demeure entièrement non réalisée. [168] selon le juge en chef wagner, gtl est sans recours parce que la loi fédérale ne l’autorise qu’à se dégager de toute responsabilité personnelle, et que l’aer avait le droit de faire valoir ses réclama- tions environnementales en dehors du processus de faillite. je suis en désaccord sur les deux points. à mon avis, deux aspects du régime de réglementation albertain entrent en conflit avec la loi sur la fail­ lite et l’insolvabilité, lrc 1985, c. b-3 (« lfi »). une compréhension adéquate et fidèle des principes fondamentaux du droit constitutionnel et du droit de l’insolvabilité conduit à ce résultat. [169] d’abord, les lois albertaines qui règlementent l’industrie pétrolière et gazière précisent que le terme [traduction] « titulaire de permis » vise les sé- questres et syndics de faillite. cette définition a pour effet d’assujettir les professionnels de l’insolvabi- lité aux mêmes obligations et responsabilités que redwater elle- même — notamment l’obligation de se conformer aux ordonnances d’abandon de l’aer et le risque d’engager sa responsabilité personnelle pour ne pas l’avoir fait. la lfi, par contre, autorise le syndic de faillite à renoncer aux éléments d’ac- tif grevés d’engagements environnementaux. gtl disposait de ce pouvoir dans les circonstances de l’espèce et elle a valablement renoncé aux biens inexploités. elle n’est donc plus assujettie aux en- gagements environnementaux liés à ces biens. étant donné que le régime législatif albertain ne reconnaît pas la légalité de ces renonciations (en raison du fait que les séquestres et les syndics sont réglementés comme des titulaires de permis, qui ne peuvent re- noncer à des biens), il y a un conflit d’application inévitable entre la loi fédérale et la loi provinciale. la loi albertaine régissant l’industrie pétrolière et gazière devrait donc être déclarée inopérante dans la mesure où elle ne reconnaît pas l’effet juridique des renonciations de gtl. 242 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [170] second, the aer has required that gtl sat- isfy redwater’s environmental liabilities ahead of the estate’s other debts, which contravenes the bia’s priority scheme. because the abandonment orders are “claims provable in bankruptcy” under the three- part test outlined by this court in newfoundland and labrador v. abitibibowater inc., 2012 scc 67, [2012] 3 scr 443 — from which this court should not depart either explicitly or implicitly — the aer cannot assert those claims outside the bankruptcy process. to do so would frustrate an essential pur- pose of the bia: distributing the estate’s value in accordance with the statutory priority scheme. nor can the aer achieve the same result indirectly by imposing conditions on the sale of redwater’s val- uable assets. the province’s licensing scheme ef- fectively operates as a debt collection mechanism in relation to a bankrupt company: it prevents gtl from discharging its duties as trustee unless the aer’s environmental claims are satisfied. as such, it should be held inoperative as applied to redwater under the second prong of the paramountcy test, frustration of purpose. [170] ensuite, l’aer a exigé que gtl acquitte les engagements environnementaux de redwater avant les autres dettes de l’actif, ce qui contrevient au régime de priorité établi par la lfi. comme les ordonnances d’abandon sont des «  réclamations prouvables en matière de faillite » selon le test à trois volets énoncé par la cour dans l’arrêt terre­ neuve­et­ labrador c. abitibibowater inc., 2012 csc 67, [2012] 3 rcs 443 — test dont notre cour ne devrait pas s’écarter explicitement ou implici- tement — l’aer ne peut faire valoir ces réclama- tions en dehors du processus de faillite. agir ainsi entraverait la réalisation d’un objet essentiel de la lfi : le partage de la valeur de l’actif conformément au régime de priorités établi par la loi. l’aer ne peut pas non plus atteindre indirectement le même résultat en imposant des conditions à la vente des biens de valeur de redwater. le régime provincial de délivrance de permis sert en fait de mécanisme de recouvrement de créances à l’endroit d’une so- ciété en faillite : il empêche gtl de s’acquitter de ses obligations à titre de syndic si les réclamations environnementales de l’aer ne sont pas réglées. par conséquent, il devrait être déclaré inopérant en ce qui concerne redwater, suivant le second volet du critère de la prépondérance, l’entrave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral. ii background ii contexte [171] redwater was a publicly traded oil and gas company that operated wells, pipelines and other facilities in central alberta. in mid- 2014, it suffered a number of financial setbacks following a series of acquisitions and unsuccessful drilling initiatives. as a result, it became unable to meet its obligations to its largest secured creditor, atb financial, which commenced enforcement proceedings. [171] redwater était une société pétrolière et ga- zière cotée en bourse qui exploitait des puits, des pipelines et d’autres installations dans le centre de l’alberta. au milieu de l’année 2014, elle a connu plusieurs déboires financiers à la suite d’une sé- rie d’acquisitions et d’initiatives de forage infruc- tueuses. elle n’a donc plus été en mesure de respecter ses obligations envers son plus important créancier garanti, atb financial, qui a introduit une procédure d’exécution. [172] gtl was appointed as redwater’s receiver on may 12, 2015. upon its appointment, but before taking possession of any aer- licensed properties, gtl carried out an analysis of the economic vi- ability and marketability of redwater’s assets. it determined that only a portion of the company’s properties was actually saleable and that it would not [172] le 12  mai  2015, gtl a été nommé sé- questre de redwater. après sa nomination, mais avant de prendre possession de quelconque bien visé par un permis délivré par l’aer, gtl a pro- cédé à une analyse de la viabilité économique et de la valeur commerciale des biens de redwater. elle a déterminé que seule une partie des biens de la [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 243 be in redwater’s best interests — or in the interests of its creditors — for gtl, as receiver, to take pos- session of the non- producing properties. it therefore informed the aer on july 3, 2015, that it would take possession of only 20 of redwater’s 127 li- censed wells and facilities. on november 2, 2015, shortly after its appointment as trustee, gtl again disclaimed the same non- producing properties it had previously renounced in its capacity as receiver. [173] according to gtl’s assessment, redwater’s valuable assets were worth $4.152  million and would generate significant value for the estate’s creditors if they were sold at auction. on the other hand, the net value of the non- producing proper- ties was -$4.705 million, reflecting the extensive abandonment and reclamation liabilities owed to the aer. the net value of the estate as a whole was -$0553 million. this was why, in gtl’s business judgment, a sale of all the estate’s assets together was simply not realistic. [174] the aer responded to gtl’s first disclaimer notice by issuing the abandonment orders which required redwater to carry out environmental work on the non- producing properties that gtl had dis- claimed. but the aer’s enforcement efforts were not limited to the debtor’s estate itself. in its initial appli- cation that spurred this litigation, the aer filed suit against gtl seeking three principal remedies: (1) a declaration that gtl’s disclaimers were void and un- enforceable; (2) an order compelling gtl, in its ca- pacity as receiver, to comply with the abandonment orders issued in relation to a portion of redwater’s assets; and (3) an order compelling gtl to fulfill its obligations as licensee under alberta’s legisla- tion, specifically in relation to the abandonment, reclamation and remediation of redwater’s licensed properties. société était réellement vendable, et qu’il ne serait pas dans l’intérêt supérieur de redwater — ni dans l’intérêt de ses créanciers — que gtl, à titre de séquestre, prenne possession des biens inexploités. elle a donc informé l’aer le 3 juillet 2015 qu’elle prendrait possession de seulement 20 des 127 puits et installations de redwater visés par un permis. le 2 novembre 2015, peu après sa nomination à titre de syndic, gtl a encore une fois renoncé aux biens inexploités auxquels elle avait déjà renoncé en sa qualité de séquestre. [173] selon l’estimation de gtl, les biens de va- leur de redwater valaient 4,152 millions de dollars et créeraient une valeur importante pour les créan- ciers de l’actif s’ils étaient vendus aux enchères. par contre, la valeur nette des biens inexploités était de -4,705 millions de dollars, reflétant les engage- ments énormes relatifs à l’abandon et à la remise en état envers l’aer. la valeur nette de l’ensemble de l’actif était de -0,553 million de dollars. c’est pourquoi, selon le jugement d’affaire de gtl, une vente de l’ensemble des biens de l’actif n’était tout simplement pas réaliste. [174] l’aer a répondu au premier avis de renon- ciation de gtl en rendant les ordonnances d’aban- don qui obligeaient redwater à exécuter des travaux environnementaux sur les biens inexploités auxquels gtl avait renoncé. mais les mesures d’exécution prises par l’aer ne visaient pas uniquement l’actif de la débitrice en tant que tel. dans sa demande ini- tiale ayant donné naissance au présent litige, l’aer a intenté une poursuite contre gtl, sollicitant trois me- sures de réparation principales : (1) un jugement dé- claratoire portant que les renonciations de gtl sont nulles et non exécutoires; (2) une ordonnance obli- geant gtl, en sa qualité de séquestre, à se conformer aux ordonnances d’abandon rendues à l’égard d’une partie des biens de redwater; et (3) une ordonnance contraignant gtl à respecter les obligations que lui impose la loi albertaine en tant que titulaire de permis, concernant plus précisément l’abandon, la remise en état et la décontamination des biens de redwater visés par des permis. [175] the genesis of this litigation, then, was a clear and forceful effort by the aer to require gtl [175] le présent litige tire donc son origine d’un effort manifeste et vigoureux de l’aer dans le but 244 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. to satisfy redwater’s environmental obligations. to understand why the aer took that approach, it is important to note that it had provincial law on its side. under the oil and gas conservation act, rsa 2000, c. o-6 (“ogca”) and the pipeline act, rsa 2000, c. p-15 (“pla”), the term “licensee” is defined to include receivers and trustees in bank- ruptcy (ogca, s. 1(1)(cc); pla, s 1(1)(n)). as a re- sult, insolvency professionals become subject to the same regulatory obligations as the insolvent debtor itself by effectively stepping into its shoes. they can therefore be compelled to carry out abandonment and reclamation work on the direction of the aer (ogca, s. 27; pla, s. 23; oil and gas conservation rules, alta. reg. 151/71 (“ogca rules”), s 3012); to reimburse anyone else who does abandonment work (ogca, ss. 29 and 30; pla, s. 25); to pay the orphan fund levy for any of the debtor’s as- sets (ogca, s. 74); to provide a security deposit, under certain circumstances, at the aer’s request (ogca rules, s 1100(2)); and to pay a fine for failing to comply with an order made by the aer (ogca, ss.  108 and 110(1); pla, ss.  52(2) and 54(1)). these liabilities are all personal in nature. other comparable legislation expressly limits the liability of insolvency professionals. for example, the environmental protection and enhancement act, rsa 2000, c. e-12, states that the liability of a re- ceiver or trustee under an environmental protection order “is limited to the value of the assets that the person is administering”, absent “gross negligence or wilful misconduct” (s 240(3)). alberta’s oil and gas statutory regime, however, does not include such a clause protecting receivers and trustees. and as the aer’s initial application makes clear, the aer itself viewed these obligations as personal. this was why it sued gtl to compel it, among other things, to comply with its obligations as a licensee under provincial law. d’obliger gtl à acquitter les obligations environ- nementales de redwater. pour comprendre pour- quoi l’aer a agi de la sorte, il est important de souligner que l’aer avait la loi provinciale de son côté. aux termes de l’oil and gas conservation act, rsa 2000, c. o-6 (« ogca »), et de la pipe­ line act, rsa 2000, c. p-15 (« pla »), le terme [traduction] «  titulaire de permis  » est défini de façon à inclure les séquestres et les syndics de faillite (ogca, al. 1(1)(cc); pla, al 1(1)(n)). les professionnels de l’insolvabilité deviennent par le fait même assujettis aux mêmes obligations régle- mentaires que le débiteur insolvable lui- même, en se mettant de fait à sa place. ils peuvent donc être contraints d’exécuter des travaux d’abandon et de remise en état sur ordre de l’aer (ogca, art. 27; pla, art. 23; oil and gas conservation rules, alta. reg. 151/71 (« règles prises en vertu de l’ogca »), art.  3.012), de rembourser n’importe qui d’autre effectue les travaux d’abandon (ogca, art. 29 et 30; pla, art. 25), de payer au fonds pour les puits orphelins la redevance requise à l’égard de n’im- porte lequel des biens du débiteur (ogca, art. 74), de verser un dépôt de garantie, dans certaines cir- constances, à la demande de l’aer (règles prises en vertu de l’ogca, par 1100(2)) et de payer une amende pour avoir omis de se conformer à une or- donnance de l’aer (ogca, art. 108 et par. 110(1); pla, par. 52(2) et 54(1)). ces obligations sont toutes de nature personnelle. d’autres lois comparables limitent expressément la responsabilité des profes- sionnels de l’insolvabilité. par exemple, l’environ­ mental protection and enhancement act, rsa. 2000, c. e-12, prévoit que la responsabilité du sé- questre ou du syndic à l’égard d’une ordonnance de protection environnementale [traduction] « ne dépasse pas la valeur des biens qu’administre cette personne », en l’absence de « négligence grave ou d’inconduite délibérée » (par 240(3)). le régime législatif albertain en matière de pétrole et de gaz ne contient toutefois aucune disposition semblable visant à protéger les séquestres et les syndics. et, comme il ressort de sa demande initiale, l’aer con- sidérait lui- même ces obligations comme des obli- gations personnelles. c’est pourquoi il a poursuivi gtl afin de le contraindre, notamment, à respecter les obligations que lui impose la loi provinciale en tant que titulaire de permis. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 245 [176] the aer also exercised its enforcement power in another capacity. in addition to issuing the abandonment orders, the aer imposed restric- tions and conditions on the sale of redwater’s as- sets — conditions that effectively required gtl to satisfy those same obligations before a sale could be approved. thus, even if gtl defied the aer’s request to abandon the non- producing properties, it would still be unable to discharge its duties as receiver and trustee. [177] both the chambers judge and the majority of the court of appeal found in favour of gtl on each prong of the paramountcy test, concluding that there is an operational conflict and a frustration of purpose (2016 abqb 278, 33 alta. lr (6th) 221; 2017 abca 124, 50 alta. lr (6th) 1). they agreed with gtl and atb financial that the provisions of alberta’s statutory regime permitting the aer to enforce compliance with redwater’s environmen- tal abandonment and reclamation obligations were constitutionally inoperative during bankruptcy. the aer and the orphan well association (“owa”) then appealed to this court. [176] l’aer a également exercé son pouvoir de faire appliquer la loi à un autre titre. en plus de rendre les ordonnances d’abandon, l’aer a imposé des restrictions et conditions à la vente des biens de redwater — conditions qui obligent en fait gtl à satisfaire auxdites obligations avant même qu’une vente puisse être approuvée. par conséquent, même si gtl n’accédait pas à la demande de l’aer visant l’abandon des biens inexploités, il ne serait toujours pas en mesure de s’acquitter de ses obligations à titre de séquestre et de syndic. [177] le juge en cabinet et les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont tous donné raison à gtl quant à chacun des volets du test de la prépondérance, concluant qu’il existe un conflit d’application et une entrave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral (2016 abqb 278, 33 alta. lr (6th) 221; 2017 abca 124, 50 alta. lr (6th) 1). ils ont convenu avec gtl et atb financial que les dispositions du régime législatif albertain permettant à l’aer d’assurer le respect des obligations d’abandon et de remise en état de redwater étaient constitutionnellement ino- pérantes durant une faillite. l’aer et l’orphan well association (« owa ») se sont ensuite pourvus de- vant la cour. iii analysis iii analyse [178] the constitution act, 1867, grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to regulate matters relating to bankruptcy and insolvency (s 91(21)). in the exercise of that jurisdiction, parliament enacted the bia, “a complete code governing bankruptcy” (alberta (attorney general) v. moloney, 2015 scc 51, [2015] 3 scr 327, at para. 40; see also husky oil operations ltd. v. minister of national revenue, [1995] 3 scr 453, at para 85). the bia outlines, among other things, the powers, duties and functions of receivers and trustees responsible for administering bankrupt or insolvent estates and the scope of claims that fall within the bankruptcy process (see bia, ss. 16 to 38 and 121 to 154). [178] la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 confère au gouvernement fédéral la compétence exclusive pour réglementer la faillite et l’insolvabilité (par 91(21)). dans l’exercice de cette compétence, le parlement a édicté la lfi, « un code complet en matière de faillite » (alberta (procureur général) c. moloney, 2015 csc 51, [2015] 3 rcs 327, par. 40; voir aussi husky oil operations ltd. c. ministre du revenu na­ tional, [1995] 3 rcs 453, par 85). la lfi expose notamment les pouvoirs, obligations et attributions des séquestres et syndics chargés d’administrer l’ac- tif du failli ou l’actif insolvable ainsi que la portée des réclamations qui relèvent du processus de faillite (voir lfi, art. 16 à 38 et 121 à 154). [179] although the operation of the bia “depends upon the survival of various provincial rights” (molo­ ney, at para. 40), this is true only to the extent that “substantive provisions of any [provincial] law or [179] quoique l’application de la lfi « dépend[e] de la subsistance de divers droits provinciaux » (molo­ ney, par. 40), ce n’est vrai que dans la mesure où « les dispositions de droit substantif d’une [  ] loi ou 246 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. statute relating to property    are not in conflict with [the bia]” (bia, s 72(1)). when a conflict arises, the bia necessarily prevails (moloney, at paras. 16 and 29; saskatchewan (attorney general) v. lemare lake logging ltd., 2015 scc 53, [2015] 3 scr 419, at para 16). this reflects the constitutional principle that federal laws are paramount (canadian western bank v. alberta, 2007 scc 22, [2007] 2 scr 3, at para 32). règle de droit [provinciale] concernant la propriété [  ] [ne sont pas] incompatibles avec la [lfi] » (lfi, par 72(1)). lorsqu’il y a un conflit, la lfi doit préva- loir (moloney, par. 16 et 29; saskatchewan (procureur général) c. lemare lake logging ltd., 2015 csc 53, [2015] 3 rcs 419, par 16). cela reflète le principe constitutionnel selon lequel les lois fédérales sont prépondérantes (banque canadienne de l’ouest c. alberta, 2007 csc 22, [2007] 2 rcs 3, par 32). [180] the respondents in this appeal — gtl and atb financial — posit two distinct conflicts be- tween the federal and provincial legislation. first, they argue that the bia grants receivers and trus- tees the power to disclaim any interest in any real property, even where they are not at risk of personal liability by virtue of their possession of the property. this disclaimer power enables trustees to renounce valueless and liability- laden property of a bankrupt in pursuit of their primary goal, which is to maximize global recovery for all creditors. the respondents argue that gtl validly disclaimed the non- producing assets and therefore cannot be held responsible for carrying out the abandonment orders; nor can the aer make any sale of redwater’s assets conditional on the fulfillment of obligations with respect to the disclaimed properties. [181] second, they argue that the aer’s abandon- ment orders constitute “claims provable in bank- ruptcy”. in their view, it would undermine the bia’s priority scheme if the aer could assert those claims outside the bankruptcy process — and ahead of the estate’s secured creditors — whether by compelling gtl to carry out those orders or by making the sale of redwater’s valuable assets conditional on the fulfillment of those obligations. [180] les intimées en l’espèce — gtl et atb financial — plaident qu’il existe deux conflits dis- tincts entre la législation fédérale et la législation provinciale. d’abord, ils soutiennent que la lfi con- fère aux séquestres et aux syndics le pouvoir de re- noncer à tout intérêt sur un bien réel, même lorsque le séquestre ou le syndic ne risque pas d’engager sa responsabilité personnelle du fait qu’il est en posses- sion du bien. ce pouvoir de renonciation permet aux syndics de renoncer aux biens sans valeur et grevés d’engagements du failli en vue d’atteindre leur ob- jectif premier : maximiser le recouvrement global pour tous les créanciers. les intimées soutiennent que gtl a valablement renoncé aux biens inexploi- tés et qu’il ne peut donc être tenu responsable de l’exécution des ordonnances d’abandon; l’aer ne peut pas non plus faire dépendre la vente des biens de redwater de l’acquittement d’obligations à l’égard des biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. [181] ensuite, ils soutiennent que les ordonnances d’abandon de l’aer constituent des « réclamations prouvables en matière de faillite ». à leur avis, ce se- rait saper le régime de priorités établi par la lfi que de permettre à l’aer de faire valoir ces réclamations en dehors du processus de faillite — et en priorité par rapport aux créanciers garantis de l’actif — que ce soit en obligeant gtl à exécuter ces ordonnances, ou en faisant dépendre la vente des biens de valeur de redwater de l’acquittement de ces obligations. [182] in my view, gtl and atb financial have satisfied their burden of demonstrating a genuine inconsistency between federal and provincial law under both branches of the paramountcy test in what follows, i first discuss the operational con- flict that arises between alberta’s regulatory regime and s 1406(4) of the bia. i then turn to the second [182] à mon avis, gtl et atb financial se sont acquittés de leur fardeau de démontrer qu’il existe une incompatibilité véritable entre la loi fédérale et la loi provinciale selon les deux volets du test de la prépondérance. dans les paragraphes qui suivent, j’analyse d’abord le conflit d’application qui existe entre le régime de réglementation albertain et le [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 247 branch of the paramountcy analysis, frustration of purpose. par 1406(4) de la lfi. j’examine ensuite le second volet de l’analyse relative à la prépondérance, l’en- trave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral. a operational conflict a conflit d’application [183] the first branch of the paramountcy test is op- erational conflict. an operational conflict arises where “it is impossible to comply with both laws” (moloney, at para. 18) — “where one enactment says ‘yes’ and the other says ‘no’”, or where “the same citizens are being told to do inconsistent things” (multiple access ltd. v. mccutcheon, [1982] 2 scr 161, at p. 191; see also lemare lake, at para 18). [183] le premier volet du test de la prépondérance est le conflit d’application. il y a conflit d’application lorsqu’« il est impossible de respecter les deux lois » (moloney, par. 18) — « lorsqu’une loi dit “oui” et que l’autre dit “non” », ou lorsque l’« on demande aux mêmes citoyens d’accomplir des actes incompa- tibles » (multiple access ltd. c. mccutcheon, [1982] 2 rcs 161, p. 191; voir aussi lemare lake, par 18). [184] in essence, an operational conflict analysis is an exercise in statutory interpretation: the court must ascertain the meaning of each competing enactment in order to determine whether dual compliance is possible. although this interpretation exercise takes place within the guiding confines of cooperative fed- eralism, a concept that allows for some interplay and overlap between federal and provincial legislation, this court recently set out the limits to this concept: [c]ooperative federalism may be used neither to “over- ride nor [to] modify the division of powers itself” (rogers communications inc. v. châteauguay (city), [2016 scc 23, [2016] 1 scr 467] at para. 39), nor to impose “limits on the otherwise valid exercise of legislative competence” (quebec (attorney general) v. canada (attorney general), [2015 scc 14, [2015] 1 scr 693] at para. 19; reference re securities act, [2011 scc 66, [2011] 3 scr 837] at paras 61-62). it cannot, therefore, be used to make ultra vires legislation intra vires. by fostering cooperation be- tween parliament and the legislatures within the existing constitutional boundaries, however, cooperative federalism works to support, rather than supplant, the division of leg- islative powers (see: canadian western bank v. alberta, 2007 scc 22, [2007] 2 scr 3, at para 22). (reference re pan­ canadian securities regulation, 2018 scc 48, [2018] 3 scr 189, at para. 18) [184] l’analyse relative au conflit d’application relève essentiellement de l’interprétation des lois : la cour doit déterminer le sens de chaque loi concur- rente afin de décider s’il est possible de respecter les deux lois. bien que cette démarche d’interprétation s’effectue à l’intérieur du cadre directeur du fédéra- lisme coopératif, une notion qui permet une certaine interaction et un certain chevauchement entre la loi fédérale et la loi provinciale, notre cour a récemment fixé les limites de cette notion : [l]e fédéralisme coopératif ne peut servir « ni [à] l’em- porter sur le partage [des compétences] lui- même ni [à] le modifier » (rogers communications inc. c. châteauguay (ville), [2016 csc 23, [2016] 1 rcs 467] par. 39), pas plus qu’il ne peut imposer « des limites à l’exercice par ailleurs valide d’une compétence législative » (québec (procureur général) c. canada (procureur général), [2015 csc 14, [2015] 1 rcs 693] par. 19; renvoi relatif à la loi sur les valeurs mobilières, [2011 csc 66, [2011] 3 rcs 837] par 61-62). il ne peut donc servir à rendre intra vires une loi ultra vires. en favorisant la coopéra- tion entre le parlement et les législatures à l’intérieur des limites constitutionnelles existantes, le fédéralisme coo- pératif appuie le partage des compétences législatives au lieu de le supplanter : voir banque canadienne de l’ouest c. alberta, 2007 csc 22, [2007] 2 rcs 3, par 22. (renvoi relatif à la réglementation pancanadienne des valeurs mobilières, 2018 csc 48, [2018] 3 rcs 189, par. 18) [185] properly understood, cooperative feder- alism operates as a straightforward interpretive interprété correctement, le fédéralisme coo- [185] pératif fait office de simple présomption en matière 248 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. presumption — one that supports, rather than sup- plants, the modern approach to statutory interpre- tation. this court recognized as much in moloney, where gascon j wrote that courts should “favour an interpretation of the federal legislation that allows the concurrent operation of both laws” on the basis of a presumption “that parliament intends its laws to co- exist with provincial laws” (para 27). but where “the proper meaning of the provision” — one that is not limited to “a mere literal reading of the pro- visions at issue” — cannot support a harmonious interpretation, it is beyond this court’s power to create harmony where parliament did not intend it (para. 23; see also pan­ canadian securities regula­ tion, at para. 18; lemare lake, at paras. 78-79, per côté j., dissenting, but not on this point). [186] in my view, my colleague places undue re- liance on the principle of cooperative federalism to narrow the scope of federal law and find a harmo- nious interpretation where no plausible one exists. courts must be especially careful about using co- operative federalism to interpret legislative provi- sions narrowly in a case like this where parliament expressly envisioned that the disclaimer right could come into conflict with provincial law. this is ev- ident from the very first line of s 1406(4), which states that the disclaimer power applies “[n]otwith- standing anything in any federal or provincial law”. the notion that judicial restraint should compel a different interpretation is therefore belied by the fact that parliament considered, acknowledged and accepted the potential for conflict. to rely on judicial restraint, then, to avoid a conflict between federal and provincial law is to disregard parliament’s express instruction. simply put, this is not a case where a drastic power is to be assumed from the statute; it is one where such a power is clearly provided for. in my view, reliance on cooperative federalism must never result in an interpretation of s 1406(4) that is inconsonant with its language, context and purpose. d’interprétation — qui appuie, sans la supplanter, la méthode moderne d’interprétation des lois. la cour l’a reconnu dans l’arrêt moloney, où le juge gascon a écrit que les tribunaux doivent « favoris[er] une in- terprétation de la loi fédérale permettant une appli- cation concurrente des deux lois » en se fondant sur la présomption « que le parlement a voulu que ses lois coexistent avec les lois provinciales » (par 27). mais lorsque «  le sens qu’il convient de donner à la disposition  »  — sens qui ne se limite pas à « une lecture littérale de la disposition en cause » — ne peut appuyer une interprétation harmonieuse, la cour n’a pas le pouvoir de créer l’harmonie là où le parlement n’a pas eu l’intention de le faire (moloney, par. 23; voir aussi réglementation pan­ canadienne des valeurs mobilières, par. 18; lemare lake, par. 78-79, la juge côté, dissidente, mais non sur ce point). [186] à mon avis, mon collègue se fonde indû- ment sur le principe du fédéralisme coopératif pour limiter la portée d’une loi fédérale et trouver une in- terprétation harmonieuse là où il n’en existe aucune qui soit plausible. les tribunaux doivent être très prudents lorsqu’il s’agit de se fonder sur le fédé- ralisme coopératif pour interpréter étroitement des dispositions législatives dans un cas comme l’es- pèce, où le parlement a expressément prévu que le droit de renonciation pouvait entrer en conflit avec le droit provincial. cela ressort à l’évidence de la toute première ligne du par 1406(4), qui énonce que le pouvoir de renonciation s’applique « [p]ar déro- gation au droit fédéral et provincial ». l’idée selon laquelle la retenue judiciaire devrait commander une interprétation différente est donc contredite par le fait que le parlement a envisagé, reconnu et accepté la possibilité de conflit. recourir à la retenue judiciaire pour éviter un conflit entre le droit fédéral et le droit provincial équivaut donc à faire fi de la directive expresse du parlement. autrement dit, il ne s’agit pas en l’espèce d’un cas où un pouvoir draconien doit être déduit de la loi; il s’agit d’un cas où un tel pouvoir est clairement prévu. à mon avis, le recours au principe du fédéralisme coopératif ne doit jamais donner lieu à une interprétation du par 1406(4) qui est incompatible avec son libellé, son contexte et son objet. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 249 it is undisputed in this appeal that alberta [187] law does not recognize gtl’s disclaimers of assets licensed by the aer as enforceable to the extent that they relieve gtl of the obligation to satisfy the environmental liabilities associated with the assets. as receiver and trustee, gtl steps into redwater’s shoes as a “licensee” under provincial law; and, gtl submits, it can therefore, without the disclaimers, be held liable for the debtor’s abandonment and recla- mation obligations in the same manner as redwater itself. the question, then, is whether the bia permits gtl to disclaim these properties and what legal effect results from such disclaimer. il n’est pas contesté en l’espèce que la loi al- [187] bertaine ne reconnaît pas de force exécutoire aux re- nonciations de gtl à des biens visés par un permis délivré par l’aer dans la mesure où elles soustraient gtl à l’obligation de respecter les engagements en- vironnementaux liés aux biens. à titre de séquestre et de syndic, gtl remplace redwater en tant que « titulaire de permis » selon la loi provinciale, et gtl soutient qu’il peut par conséquent, en l’absence des renonciations, être tenu responsable des obliga- tions d’abandon et de remise en état de la débitrice au même titre que redwater elle- même. il s’agit donc de savoir si la lfi autorise gtl à renoncer à ces biens et quel est l’effet de cette renonciation en droit. [188] section 14.06 of the bia, reproduced in full in the appendix, outlines a trustee’s powers and du- ties with respect to environmental liabilities and the disclaimer of property. specifically, s 1406(4) states that the trustee is “not personally liable for failure to comply” with an order requiring it to “remedy any environmental condition or environmental damage af- fecting property involved in a bankruptcy”, provided that the trustee “abandons, disposes of or otherwise releases any interest in any real property    affected by the condition or damage” within the statutory timeframes. the timing of gtl’s disclaimers is not at issue here. [188] l’article 14.06 de la lfi, reproduit intégrale- ment en annexe, décrit les pouvoirs et responsabilités du syndic quant aux engagements environnementaux et à la renonciation aux biens. plus précisément, le par 1406(4) prévoit que le syndic est « dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle découlant du non- respect » d’une ordonnance l’obligeant à « répar[er] [  ] tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement et touchant un bien visé par une faillite », pourvu que le syndic « abandonne [  ] tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause, en dispose ou s’en dessaisit » dans les délais prévus par la loi. le moment des renonciations de gtl n’est pas en litige en l’espèce. [189] my colleague concludes that, regardless of whether gtl could have properly invoked the dis- claimer power in this case, the effect of any such dis- claimer would simply be to protect it from personal liability. he states that, in any event, the exercise of the disclaimer power was unnecessary in this case because gtl was already fully protected from per- sonal liability through the operation of s 1406(2). further, he argues, because the aer has not sought to hold gtl personally liable, there is no conflict between federal and provincial law on the facts of this case. with respect, i disagree with this approach to the language of the bia, which does not properly account for fundamental principles of constitutional and insolvency law. i will begin by addressing the proper scope of the disclaimer power provided to trustees, explaining that the actual existence of a risk of personal liability is not a necessary condition for [189] mon collègue conclut que, peu importe si gtl avait pu invoquer à juste titre le pouvoir de renonciation en l’espèce, cette renonciation a sim- plement pour effet de le dégager de toute responsa- bilité personnelle. selon lui, en tout état de cause, il était inutile d’exercer le pouvoir de renonciation dans la présente affaire parce que gtl était déjà entièrement à l’abri de toute responsabilité person- nelle par application du par 1406(2). il soutient en outre que, comme l’aer n’a pas cherché à tenir gtl personnellement responsable, il n’y a aucun conflit entre la loi fédérale et la loi provinciale en l’espèce. avec égards, je ne suis pas d’accord avec cette interprétation du libellé de la lfi, qui ne tient pas dûment compte des principes fondamentaux du droit constitutionnel et du droit de l’insolvabilité. je commencerai par traiter de la portée que doit avoir le pouvoir de renonciation accordé aux syndics, en 250 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. the exercise of this power and that, while protec- tion from personal liability is one effect of a valid disclaimer, it is not the only one. in my view, this interpretation makes s 1406(4) consistent with the remainder of the section and is therefore to be pre- ferred. with respect, i do not accept that parlia ment intended s 1406(4) simply to protect trustees from the exact same liability that it had already addressed through s.  14.06(2) subsection (4)  must have a meaningful role to play within parliament’s bank- ruptcy and insolvency regime; i reject the suggestion that parliament crafted a superfluous provision. i will also deal briefly with the aer’s argument that the disclaimer power is not available at all in the context of alberta’s oil and gas statutory regime. in my view, it is available in this context. expliquant que l’existence d’un risque de respon- sabilité personnelle ne constitue pas une condition essentielle à l’exercice de ce pouvoir et que, même si la protection contre toute responsabilité person- nelle est un effet d’une renonciation valide, ce n’est pas le seul. à mon avis, cette interprétation fait en sorte que le par 1406(4) s’accorde avec le reste de l’article et il convient donc de la privilégier. avec égards, je n’accepte pas que le parlement voulait par ce paragraphe mettre simplement les syndics à l’abri de la même responsabilité, ce qu’il avait déjà fait au par 1406(2). le paragraphe (4) doit avoir un rôle significatif à jouer dans le régime de faillite et d’insolvabilité du parlement; je rejette la thèse selon laquelle le parlement a conçu une disposition superflue. je me pencherai aussi brièvement sur l’ar- gument de l’aer selon lequel il n’est pas du tout possible d’exercer le pouvoir de renonciation dans le contexte du régime législatif de l’alberta en matière de pétrole et de gaz. j’estime qu’il peut être exercé dans ce contexte. (1) the power to disclaim under section 14.06(4) (1) le pouvoir de renonciation en vertu du par. 14.06(4) [190] the “natural meaning which appears when the provision is simply read through” (canadian pa­ cific air lines ltd. v. canadian air line pilots assn., [1993] 3 scr 724, at p. 735) is that s 1406(4) assumes and incorporates a pre- existing common law right to disclaim property in the context of bank- ruptcy and insolvency (see l. silverstein, “rejection of executory contracts in bankruptcy and reorgan- ization” (1964), 31 u. chi. l. rev. 467, at pp. 468- 72; new skeena forest products inc. v. don hull & sons contracting ltd., 2005 bcca 154, 251 dlr (4th) 328, at paras.  24-31; re thompson knitting co., ltd., [1925] 2 dlr 1007 (ont. sc. (app. div.), at p 1008). this right is in keeping with the fundamental objective of court officers in insolvencies: the maximization of recovery for creditors as a whole by realizing the estate’s valu- able assets. by allowing trustees to disclaim assets with substantial liabilities, this power enables them to administer the estate in the most efficient manner and to avoid significant costs of administration that would reduce creditor recovery. section 14.06(4) [190] le « sens naturel qui se dégage de la simple lecture de la disposition dans son ensemble » (lignes aériennes canadien pacifique ltée c. assoc ca­ nadienne des pilotes de lignes aériennes, [1993] 3 rcs 724, p. 735) est que le par 1406(4) pré- sume et incorpore un droit préexistant en common law de renoncer à des biens dans le contexte de la faillite et de l’insolvabilité (voir l. silverstein, « rejection of executory contracts in bankruptcy and reorganization » (1964), 31 u. chi. l. rev. 467, p. 468-472; new skeena forest products inc. c. don hull & sons contracting ltd., 2005 bcca 154, 251  dlr  (4th) 328, par.  24-31; re thompson knitting co., ltd., [1925] 2 dlr 1007 (cs. ont. (div. app.), p 1008). ce droit est en accord avec l’ob- jectif fondamental poursuivi par les officiers de la cour en insolvabilité : maximiser le recouvrement au bénéfice de l’ensemble des créanciers par la réalisa- tion des éléments de valeur de l’actif. en permettant aux syndics de renoncer à des biens grevés d’enga- gements substantiels, ce pouvoir donne aux syndics la faculté d’administrer l’actif le plus efficacement [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 251 recognizes and supports this foundational principle of insolvency law. [191] this reading offers the clearest and most obvious explanation for the manner in which the pro- vision is drafted, in that it plainly describes a result or legal effect of disclaimer: a trustee “is not personally liable for failure to comply” with an environmental order “if    the trustee    abandons, disposes of or otherwise releases any interest in any real prop- erty” (s 1406(4)). we should interpret s 1406(4) as authorizing the act of disclaimer in light of the principle that “[t]he legislator does not speak in vain” (bell expressvu limited partnership v. rex, 2002 scc 42, [2002] 2 scr 559, at para. 37, citing attorney general of quebec v. carrières ste­ thérèse ltée, [1985] 1 scr 831, at p 838). if a trustee did not have the power to disclaim property, and if that power were not recognized and provided for in the statute, a provision describing the effect of such a disclaimer would serve no purpose. [192] the aer submits that property may be dis- claimed only where it is necessary for a trustee to avoid personal liability with respect to an environ- mental order. this interpretation entirely inverts the language of the provision, turning a stated effect of disclaimer into a necessary condition that cir- cumscribes the exercise of the power. the opera- tive clauses are neither written nor ordered in this manner. rather, s 1406(4) expresses the disclaimer right in unqualified terms and emphasizes that a trustee may not be held liable whenever that right is exercised. if parliament truly intended to condition the right to disclaim property on the actual existence of a risk of personal liability, “it is hard to conceive of a more convoluted and sibylline way of stating something that could be so easily expressed in clear and direct terms” (mitchell v. peguis indian band, [1990] 2 scr 85, at p 124). possible et leur épargne des frais considérables d’ad- ministration qui réduiraient le recouvrement au profit des créanciers. le paragraphe 14.06(4) reconnaît et appuie ce principe fondamental du droit de l’insol- vabilité. [191] cette interprétation offre l’explication la plus claire et la plus évidente de la façon dont la dispo- sition est rédigée, en ce qu’elle décrit simplement un résultat ou effet juridique d’une renonciation : le syndic est « dégagé de toute responsabilité person- nelle découlant du non- respect » d’une ordonnance environnementale « si [  ] il abandonne [  ] tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause, en dispose ou s’en dessaisit » (al 1406(4)). nous devons interpréter le par 1406(4) comme autorisant l’acte de renon- ciation à la lumière du principe selon lequel « le législateur ne parle pas pour ne rien dire » (bell expressvu limited partnership c. rex, 2002 csc 42, [2002] 2 rcs 559, par. 37, citant procureur général du québec c. carrières ste­ thérèse ltée, [1985] 1 rcs 831, p 838). si le syndic n’avait pas le pouvoir de renoncer à des biens et si ce pouvoir n’était pas reconnu et prévu dans la loi, une disposi- tion décrivant l’effet d’une telle renonciation n’aurait aucune utilité. [192] l’aer soutient qu’il est possible de renon- cer à un bien uniquement lorsque cela est nécessaire pour que le syndic échappe à toute responsabilité personnelle à l’égard d’une ordonnance environne- mentale. cette interprétation inverse complètement le libellé de la disposition, transformant un effet énoncé de la renonciation en condition essentielle circonscrivant l’exercice du pouvoir. les dispositions applicables ne sont ni rédigées ni ordonnées de cette façon. le paragraphe 14.06(4) exprime plutôt le droit de renonciation en des termes qui ne comportent aucune restriction et fait ressortir que le syndic ne peut être tenu responsable quand ce droit est exercé. si le parlement avait vraiment voulu rendre le droit de renoncer à un bien tributaire de l’existence d’un risque de responsabilité personnelle, « il est difficile d’imaginer une façon plus compliquée et sibylline d’exprimer quelque chose qui pouvait être dit si faci- lement dans des termes clairs et directs » (mitchell c. bande indienne peguis, [1990] 2 rcs 85, p 124). 252 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [193] my colleague adopts a slightly different ap- proach. rather than accepting the argument that the risk of personal liability is a necessary condition to the exercise of the disclaimer power in s 1406(4), he concludes that protection from personal liability for non- compliance with environmental orders is the only consequence of a valid disclaimer. therefore, he says, the bankrupt’s estate is not relieved of its obligations under the environmental orders and the trustee can be compelled to expend the entirety of the estate’s assets on compliance. with respect, this also cannot be the correct reading of the subsec- tion. nor do i believe that the brief references to s 1406(4) in gmac commercial credit corp. — canada v tct. logistics inc., 2006 scc 35, [2006] 2 scr 123 — a case in which this subsection was not directly in issue and this court was not tasked with interpreting it in any meaningful way — pro- vide much assistance in this case. [193] mon collègue adopte une approche légè- rement différente. au lieu d’accepter l’argument selon lequel le risque d’engager la responsabilité personnelle est une condition essentielle à l’exercice du pouvoir de renonciation prévu au par 1406(4), il conclut que la protection contre toute responsa- bilité personnelle pour non- respect d’ordonnance environnementale est l’unique conséquence d’une renonciation valide. par conséquent, dit-il, l’actif du failli n’est pas déchargé des obligations que lui imposent les ordonnances environnementales et on peut contraindre le syndic à consacrer la valeur en- tière de l’actif au respect des ordonnances. avec égards, il ne peut s’agir de la lecture correcte du par 1406(4). je ne crois pas non plus que les brèves mentions de ce paragraphe dans société de crédit commercial gmac — canada c. tct. logistics inc., 2006 csc 35, [2006] 2 rcs 123, une affaire où le par 1406(4) n’était pas directement en cause et où notre cour n’avait pas à l’interpréter de façon significative, se révèlent fort utiles en l’espèce. [194] i accept that the opening words of s 1406(4) refer to the personal liability of the trustee. however, when the words of the subsection are read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the ob- ject of the act, and the intention of parliament”, as the courts are required to do (see rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27;. bell expressvu, at para. 26, quoting e. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87), their meaning becomes apparent. [194] certes, le début du par 1406(4) parle de la responsabilité personnelle du syndic. cependant, lorsqu’on lit les termes du paragraphe « dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et gram- matical qui s’harmonise avec l’[économie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur », tel que doivent le faire les tribunaux (voir rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27;. bell expressvu, par. 26, citant e. driedger, construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p. 87), leur sens devient apparent. [195] section 14.06(4) both assumes and relies on the common law power of trustees to disclaim assets, a power that the majority of the court of ap peal de- scribed as “commonplace” (para 47). even my col- league appears to accept that this disclaimer power “predates” s 1406(4) itself (at para 95). indeed, the majority of the court of appeal recognized that “[s]ection 14.06 does not appear to create a right in a trustee to abandon properties without value, but rather assumes that one exists upon bankruptcy” (para.  63) this is the only rational explanation for why parliament made the effects of s 1406(4) available when the trustee “abandons, disposes of or otherwise releases any interest in any real prop- erty”. while avoiding personal liability is one effect [195] le paragraphe 14.06(4) tient pour acquis et repose sur le pouvoir des syndics en common law de renoncer à des biens, un pouvoir dont l’exercice est [traduction] « monnaie courante », affirment les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel (par 47). même mon collègue semble accepter que ce pouvoir de renonciation «  précède  » le par.  14.06(4) lui- même (par 95). en effet, les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont reconnu que « [l]’article 14.06 ne semble pas créer le droit du syndic d’abandonner des biens sans valeur; il en tient plutôt l’existence pour acquise en cas de faillite » (par 63). c’est la seule explication logique pour laquelle le parlement a laissé le par 1406(4) produire ses effets lorsque le syndic « abandonne [  ] tout intérêt sur le bien [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 253 of the appropriate exercise of this power, it is not the only effect. disclaimer operates to “determine, as from the date of the disclaimer, the rights, in- terests and liabilities” in the disclaimed property (r. goode, principles of corporate insolvency law (4th ed. 2011), at p 202). by properly disclaiming certain assets, the trustee is relieved of any liabilities associated with the disclaimed property and loses the ability to sell the property for the benefit of the estate. the author frank bennett, writing about the admin- istration of the bankrupt’s real property, explains that “[w]here the trustee disclaims its interest, the dis- claimer releases and disclaims any and all right, title and interest to the property” (bennett on creditors’ and debtors’ rights and remedies (5th ed. 2006), at p. 482 (footnote omitted)). [196] the majority asserts that s 1406(4) does not allow a trustee to “walk away” from assets and the environmental liabilities associated with them (paras. 86, 100 and 102). however, disclaiming prop- erty does have precisely this effect. it permits the trustee not to realize assets that would provide no value to the estate’s creditors and whose realization would therefore undermine the trustee’s fundamental objective. a recognized purpose of the disclaimer power is to “avoid the continuance of liabilities in respect of onerous property which would be payable as expenses of the liquidation, to the detriment of un- secured creditors” (goode, at p. 200 (footnote omit- ted)). these principles are no less valid in relation to valueless real property than they are in relation to unprofitable and burdensome executory contracts. indeed, there has been no suggestion in this appeal, including from the aer and the owa, that trustees can never disclaim onerous real property. réel en cause, en dispose ou s’en dessaisit ». bien que la protection contre toute responsabilité per- sonnelle soit un effet de l’exercice régulier de ce pouvoir, ce n’est pas le seul. la renonciation sert à [traduction] « déterminer, à partir de sa date, les droits, intérêts et engagements » sur le bien auquel le syndic a renoncé (r. goode, principles of corporate insolvency law (4e éd. 2011), p 202). en renonçant à bon droit à certains biens, le syndic est dégagé de toute responsabilité associée aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation et ne peut plus vendre les biens au profit de l’actif. dans le contexte de l’administra- tion des biens réels du failli, l’auteur frank bennett explique que [traduction] « [l]orsque le syndic renonce à son intérêt, la renonciation emporte des- saisissement de tout droit, titre et intérêt sur le bien en question » (bennett on creditors’ and debtors’ rights and remedies (5e éd. 2006), p. 482 (note en bas de page omise)). [196] les juges majoritaires font valoir que le par 1406(4) n’autorise pas le syndic à « délais- ser » des biens ou à se soustraire aux engagements environnementaux qui s’y rattachent (par. 86, 100 et 102). or, c’est exactement ce qu’entraîne la re­ nonciation à des biens. elle permet au syndic de ne pas réaliser des biens qui ne seraient pas profitables aux créanciers de l’actif et compromettraient par le fait même son objectif principal. le pouvoir de renonciation a pour objet reconnu [traduction] « [d’]éviter la poursuite des engagements à l’égard de biens onéreux qui seraient payables aux dépens de la liquidation, et ce, au détriment des créanciers non garantis » (goode, p. 200 (note en bas de page omise)). ces principes valent tout autant dans le cas des biens réels sans valeur que dans celui des contrats exécutoires non rentables et contraignants. en fait, personne n’a laissé entendre en l’espèce, pas même l’aer ou l’owa, que les syndics ne peuvent jamais renoncer à des biens réels onéreux. [197] this explanation of the disclaimer power is borne out by gtl’s actions in the instant case. after assessing the economic viability and marketability of redwater’s assets, gtl determined that it would be most beneficial to redwater’s creditors as a whole if it disclaimed the non- producing, liability- laden assets. [197] cette explication du pouvoir de renonciation est confirmée par les agissements de gtl en l’espèce. après avoir estimé la viabilité économique et la qua- lité marchande des biens de redwater, gtl a décidé que ce qui serait le plus profitable aux créanciers de redwater dans leur ensemble, ce serait qu’il renonce aux biens inexploités et grevés d’engagements. 254 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [198] parliament’s recognition of this common law disclaimer power in s 1406(4) is not new. the power is also referred to in another section, albeit in a broader context. section 20(1) of the bia, provides trustees with the ability to “divest” themselves of “any real property or immovable of the bankrupt” generally. however, the disclaimer power itself does not derive from this section. nor is a trustee required to invoke s. 20(1) in order to exercise the disclaimer power described in s 1406(4), which incorporates that power and spells out the particular effects of its exercise in the specific context of environmental remediation orders. in any event, this court is not required in this appeal to comment on the full effects of s 20(1). [199] under my colleague’s interpretation, it is unclear why parliament chose to enact the disclaimer mechanism. it is surely true that parliament could have achieved the same outcome through the use of simpler language. had it merely intended to protect trustees from personal liability for failure to com- ply with environmental orders, it could have easily done so directly — in fact, it had already done so in s 1406(2). there is no reason why parliament would have attempted to achieve this relatively straight- forward result through the convoluted mechanism of requiring trustees to disclaim property while at the same time not intending such disclaimer to have its “commonplace” common law effects. there is a reason why parliament has referred to the power to disclaim in s 1406(4); we must give effect to this choice and to the words that parliament has used. [198] la reconnaissance par le parlement, au par.  14.06(4), de ce pouvoir de renonciation en common law n’a rien de nouveau. le pouvoir est aussi mentionné dans une autre disposition, quoique dans un contexte plus général. le paragraphe 20(1) de la lfi donne au syndic la possibilité de « renon- cer » à « un immeuble ou [à] un bien réel du failli » en général. le pouvoir de renonciation lui- même ne découle cependant pas de cette disposition. le syndic n’est pas non plus obligé d’invoquer le par. 20(1) pour exercer le pouvoir de renonciation décrit au par 1406(4), lequel incorpore ce pouvoir et expose certains effets de son exercice dans le contexte précis des ordonnances de décontamina- tion environnementale quoi qu’il en soit, notre cour n’a pas à commenter en l’espèce tous les effets du par 20(1). [199] suivant l’interprétation de mon collègue, la raison pour laquelle le parlement a choisi d’instau- rer le mécanisme de renonciation n’est pas claire. il ne fait aucun doute que le parlement aurait pu atteindre le même résultat en employant un langage plus simple. si le parlement comptait simplement protéger les syndics contre toute responsabilité per- sonnelle découlant du non- respect d’ordonnances environnementales, il aurait pu aisément le faire di- rectement; en fait, il l’avait déjà fait au par 1406(2). il n’y a aucune raison pour laquelle le parlement aurait tenté d’obtenir ce résultat relativement simple par le mécanisme alambiqué consistant à exiger des syndics qu’ils renoncent aux biens, tout en évitant que cette renonciation ait « couramment » des effets en common law. il y a une raison pour laquelle le parlement a mentionné le pouvoir de renonciation au par 1406(4); nous devons donner effet à ce choix et aux mots qu’il a utilisés. it follows, then, that i respectfully disagree [200] that s 1406(4) only protects trustees from specific types of personal liability. but it does not follow that the estate is relieved of its liabilities once a trustee exercises the disclaimer power — a miscon- ception that is pervasive in the aer’s submissions and the majority’s analysis. the disclaimed property ultimately reverts to the estate at the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings, as is the case with un- realized assets (see bia, s. 40; see also bennett, at [200] par conséquent, avec égards, je ne suis pas d’accord pour dire que le par 1406(4) protège les syndics uniquement contre certains types de respon- sabilité personnelle. mais cela ne signifie pas que l’actif est déchargé de ses engagements une fois que le syndic exerce son pouvoir de renonciation — une idée fausse qui est omniprésente dans les observa- tions de l’aer et l’analyse de la majorité. le bien visé par une renonciation retourne ultimement dans l’actif à l’issue du processus de faillite, comme c’est [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 255 p 528). the estate remains liable for the remediation obligations attached to the land. whether the estate has sufficient assets capable of satisfying those li- abilities at that point in time is a separate question that is unrelated to the underlying fact of ongoing liability. in any case, the regulatory scheme contin- ues to apply with respect to the retained assets. in referring repeatedly to the idea that disclaimer does not “immunize bankrupt estates from environmental liabilities” (para. 81), the majority misunderstands the impact and purpose of the disclaimer power. the estate itself is not relieved of environmental obligations. as i have noted, the trustee does not take possession of the bankrupt’s assets in order to continue the life of the bankrupt indefinitely. the trustee’s function is to realize on the estate’s val- uable assets and maximize global recovery for all creditors. allowing the trustee to deal only with the value- positive assets to achieve this goal does not relieve the estate of its environmental obligations. as a result, the disclaimer power, and its incorpora- tion into s 1406(4), is entirely consistent with the foundational principles of insolvency law. le cas pour les biens non réalisés (voir lfi, art. 40; voir aussi bennett, p 528). l’actif demeure respon- sable des obligations de décontamination qui se ratta- chent au terrain. la question de savoir si les éléments d’actif sont suffisants pour satisfaire à ces engage- ments à ce moment précis est une question distincte qui n’a aucun rapport avec le fait sous- jacent de la responsabilité continue. dans tous les cas, le régime de réglementation continue de s’appliquer aux biens conservés. en exprimant maintes fois l’idée que la renonciation ne met pas « les biens des faillis à l’abri de toute responsabilité environnementale » (par. 81), la majorité se méprend sur l’incidence et l’objet du pouvoir de renonciation. l’actif en soi n’est pas libéré des obligations environnementales. comme je l’ai noté, le syndic ne prend pas possession des biens du failli en vue de poursuivre indéfiniment la vie du failli. il a pour fonction de réaliser les biens de valeur de l’actif et de maximiser le recouvrement global au profit de tous les créanciers. permettre au syndic de s’occuper uniquement des biens de valeur pour atteindre cet objectif ne libère pas l’actif de ses obligations environnementales. ainsi, le pouvoir de renonciation et son incorporation au par 1406(4) s’accordent parfaitement avec les principes fonda- mentaux du droit de l’insolvabilité. [201] in s 1406(4),. parliament has expressly re- ferred to this disclaimer power and spelled out the particular effects flowing from its proper exercise. by doing so, it has purposefully incorporated the disclaimer power into its statutory scheme to achieve its desired purposes. [201] au paragraphe 14.06(4), le parlement a men- tionné expressément ce pouvoir de renonciation et exposé les effets particuliers découlant de son exer- cice approprié. il a incorporé ainsi à dessein à son régime législatif le pouvoir de renonciation pour en réaliser les objectifs visés. [202] my interpretation of s 1406(4) finds ample support in the hansard evidence. in the debates preced- ing the enactment of s 1406(4) in 1997, jacques hains, a director in the department of industry canada who had been involved in drafting the amendments to the bia, discussed the new options being provided to trustees when faced with an environmental remediation order: [202] mon interprétation du par 1406(4) est am- plement étayée par les débats parlementaires. lors des débats qui ont précédé l’adoption du par 1406(4) en 1997, jacques hains, directeur au ministère d’in- dustrie canada qui avait participé à la rédaction des modifications à la lfi, a discuté des nouvelles solutions qui s’offraient aux syndics aux prises avec des ordonnances de décontamination environne- mentale : first, he could decide to carry out the order and remedy the environmental damage, the costs to be charged as costs of administration from the bankrupt’s assets. premièrement, ils pourraient décider de se conformer à l’ordonnance et d’effectuer la dépollution, dont les coûts seraient des coûts d’administration des actifs du failli. 256 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. the second option would be to challenge this order to remedy before the appropriate courts; these two options are already to be found in environmental legislation. comme deuxième option, ils pourraient contester devant les tribunaux compétents cette ordonnance de dépollution; ces deux options sont déjà prévues dans les lois en matière d’environnement. the third option would be for the monitor to apply to the appropriate court for a period of stay to assess the eco- nomic viability of complying with the order, whether it is worth the trouble and whether the assets are sufficient to cover the clean up costs. la troisième option du praticien consisterait à demander à un tribunal compétent du temps de réflexion pour évaluer s’il est économique de se conformer à l’ordonnance ou non, si cela en vaut la peine et si les actifs sont suffisants pour couvrir les frais de dépollution. as a fourth option, if he considers that this course has absolutely no economic viability, he may give notification that he has renounced the real property to which the order applies. [emphasis added.] comme quatrième option, s’il croit que ce n’est abso- lument pas une décision économique, il pourra signifier qu’il abandonne les sites faisant l’objet de l’ordonnance. [je souligne.] (standing committee on industry, evidence, no. 16, 2nd sess., 35th parl., june 11, 1996, at 15:45 to 15:50) the above passage makes no reference to the per- sonal liability of a trustee who is considering whether to invoke the “fourth option” and disclaim the prop- erty. mr. hains was clear that the decision to disclaim is based on the “economic viability” of complying with the remediation orders, specifically “whether the assets are sufficient to cover the clean up costs”. this makes sense only in the context of the trus- tee’s obligation to maximize economic recovery for creditors. (comité permanent de l’industrie, témoignages, no 16, 2e sess., 35e lég., 11 juin 1996, entre 15 h 45 et 15 h 50) le passage précité ne mentionne aucunement la res- ponsabilité personnelle du syndic qui se demande s’il y a lieu de se prévaloir de la « quatrième option » et de renoncer au bien. m. hains a clairement affirmé que la décision de renoncer repose sur la viabilité « économique » du respect des ordonnances de dé- contamination, tout particulièrement sur la question de savoir « si les actifs sont suffisants pour couvrir les frais de dépollution ». cela n’est logique que dans le contexte de l’obligation du syndic de maximiser le recouvrement au profit des créanciers. [203] several months later, mr. hains reiterated this fourth option, explaining that, after assessing the economic viability of complying with the order and “knowing that the bill will be too expensive and will not be economically viable, the trustees are then out of it and can abandon that piece of property subject to the order” (proceedings of the standing senate com­ mittee on banking, trade and commerce, no. 13, 2nd sess., 35th parl., november 4, 1996, at p. 13:68 (emphasis added)). this description plainly reflects the function of the disclaimer power, which does indeed allow trustees to “walk away” from liability- laden assets that will not contribute to maximizing creditor recovery. [203] plusieurs mois plus tard, m. hains a répété cette quatrième option, expliquant qu’après avoir évalué s’il est économique de se conformer à l’or- donnance et « sachant que la facture sera trop élevée et que la proposition ne sera donc pas économique- ment viable, le syndic peut s’en laver les mains et abandonner la propriété visée par l’ordonnance » (délibérations du comité sénatorial permanent des banques et du commerce, no 13, 2e sess., 35e leg., 4 novembre 1996, p. 13:68 (je souligne)). cette des- cription traduit clairement la fonction du pouvoir de renonciation, qui permet au syndic de « délaisser » les biens grevés d’engagement qui ne contribuent pas à maximiser le recouvrement au profit des créanciers. [204] mr. hains’ answers to questions from the house of commons standing committee further [204] les réponses de m. hains aux questions du comité permanent de la chambre des communes [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 257 confirms this interpretation of the disclaimer power. the following exchange is very telling: confirment elles aussi cette interprétation du pouvoir de renonciation. l’échange qui suit est fort éloquent : mr. lebel [member of parliament for chambly]: when a trustee decides to give up the land and realize[s] assets elsewhere, for example by making a profit from the sale of assets, having released himself from the obligation to clean up the land, he would be sharing a dividend realized from other profitable assets and telling the creditors to manage as best they can with the real property. if the creditors are not willing to touch it, he will then tell the government to clean it up. in such a case, each of the bankruptcy credi- tors would also    stand to earn a small dividend, as it is referred to in bankruptcy law. m. lebel [député de chambly] : lorsque le syndic dé- cide de renoncer au terrain et réalise des actifs par ailleurs, par exemple en faisant un profit par la vente d’actifs, s’étant libéré de son obligation de dépolluer le terrain, il partage un dividende réalisé sur d’autres actifs rentables et dit aux créanciers de s’organiser avec le terrain. si les créanciers ne veulent pas y toucher, il dit au gouvernement de le dépolluer. à ce moment-là, chacun des autres créan- ciers de la faillite ressort avec un petit dividende. c’est ainsi qu’on appelle cela en droit de la faillite. do you not think that your bill should require the trustee to carry out a clean-up from the assets of the bankruptcy before the dividends are distributed? ne pensez- vous pas que votre projet de loi devrait forcer le syndic à faire la décontamination à même les actifs de la faillite avant de distribuer des dividendes? mr. hains: it’s an excellent question that was put to me only three weeks ago by colleagues from the department of the environment of quebec, whom i was meeting to discuss this subject. there were a number of matters of interest to them, particularly the one raised by mr lebel. [emphasis added.] m. hains : c’est une excellente question qui m’a été posée il y a à peine trois semaines par des collègues du minis- tère de l’environnement du québec, que j’ai rencontrés pour parler de ce sujet-là. il y avait des questions qui les intéressaient, notamment celle que m. lebel soulève. [je souligne.] (standing committee on industry, june 11, 1996, at 16:55) (comité permanent de l’industrie, 11 juin 1996, à 16 h 55) mr. hains went on to reference various other features of the scheme to assuage mr. lebel’s concerns and noted that provincial environmental agencies would be responsible for performing the remediation work. significantly, at no point did mr. hains contradict mr. lebel’s understanding of the bill’s provisions. nor did he take issue with the premise underlying the question: that the new legislation does not “re- quire the trustee to carry out a clean-up from the assets of the bankruptcy” before they are distributed to creditors. mr. hains did not claim that provincial regulators might still enforce such a requirement. m. hains a ensuite mentionné plusieurs autres ca- ractéristiques du régime pour dissiper les préoc- cupations de m. lebel et a fait remarquer que les organismes de réglementation environnementaux provinciaux devraient exécuter les travaux de dé- contamination. fait important, m. hains ne contredit jamais la conception que m. lebel se fait des dispo- sitions du projet de loi. il ne conteste pas non plus la prémisse qui sous- tend la question : la nouvelle loi ne « force [  ] pas le syndic à faire la décontamination à même les actifs de la faillite » avant leur répartition entre les créanciers. m. hains ne prétend pas que les organismes de réglementation provinciaux peuvent toujours assurer le respect d’une telle exigence. [205] this exchange between mr.  lebel and mr. hains clearly demonstrates the collective un- derstanding of all parties that the proposed amend- ments, containing what would become s 1406(4), specifically did not require the trustee to expend [205] cet échange entre mm. lebel et hains dé- montre clairement que toutes les parties s’entendent pour dire que les modifications proposées, lesquelles contiennent ce qui allait devenir le par 1406(4), n’obligeaient pas expressément le syndic à dépenser 258 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. the estate’s assets to comply with environmental remediation orders. the drafters of s 1406(4) thus turned their minds directly to this issue, and their understanding of the provision’s effects was contrary to that proposed by the majority. [206] based on these references to hansard, i cannot agree with the majority’s statement that the legislative debates provide “no hint” of a parliamen- tary intention to relieve trustees of the obligation to expend estate assets on environmental remediation (para 81). this intention was clearly expressed on multiple occasions. [207] as courts must read statutory provisions in their entire context, and as parliament is presumed to craft sections and subsections of legislation as parts of a coherent whole, it is important to carefully examine the other subsections of s 1406. this is true regardless of whether a party to litigation seeks to apply them or to put them directly in issue (major- ity reasons, at paras. 88 and 101). significantly, the immediate statutory context surrounding s 1406(4) confirms that a trustee’s right to disclaim property is not limited in the manner suggested by the aer or my colleague. four provisions adjacent to s 1406(4) support this conclusion. [208] first, s 1406(5) provides that a court may stay an environmental order “for the purpose of en- abling the trustee to assess the economic viability of complying with the order”. assessing “economic viability” is, on its face, broader than assessing the risk of personal liability. this provision indicates that a trustee is entitled to disclaim assets based on a rational economic analysis geared toward maximiz- ing the value of the estate, and not merely in order to protect itself from personal liability. otherwise, there would be no reason for parliament to permit a court to grant a stay for the purpose of assessing economic viability. this understanding is consistent with the fundamental principles of insolvency law and with the hansard evidence, as noted above, as well as with one of the recognized justifications for the dis- claimer power more generally: to allow a trustee les biens de l’actif pour respecter les ordonnances de décontamination environnementale. les rédacteurs du par 1406(4) se sont ainsi directement attardés à cette question et leur conception des effets de la disposition contredisait celle proposée par les juges majoritaires. [206] étant donné les extraits précédents des débats parlementaires, je ne peux souscrire à l’affirmation des juges majoritaires selon laquelle les débats légis- latifs ne donnent « aucun indice » d’une intention du parlement de relever les syndics de l’obligation de consacrer des biens de l’actif à la décontamination environnementale (par 81). le parlement a claire- ment manifesté cette intention à maintes reprises. [207] puisque les tribunaux doivent lire les dis- positions législatives dans leur contexte global, et que le parlement est présumé rédiger les articles et paragraphes d’une loi comme un tout cohérent, il importe d’examiner avec soin les autres paragraphes de l’art 1406. il en est ainsi, peu importe qu’une partie au litige cherche à les appliquer ou à les mettre directement en cause (motifs des juges majoritaires, par. 88 et 101). fait révélateur, le contexte immédiat du par 1406(4) confirme que le droit du syndic de renoncer à des biens n’est pas limité de la façon suggérée par l’aer ou mon collègue. quatre dis- positions adjacentes au par 1406(4) étayent cette conclusion. [208] premièrement, le par 1406(5) prévoit que le tribunal peut suspendre une ordonnance environne- mentale « [e]n vue de permettre au syndic d’évaluer les conséquences économiques du respect de l’ordon- nance ». évaluer les « conséquences économiques » a, à première vue, une portée plus large qu’évaluer le risque de responsabilité personnelle. cette dispo- sition indique que le syndic a le droit de renoncer à des biens en se fondant sur une analyse économique rationnelle visant à maximiser la valeur de l’actif, et non simplement afin de se prémunir contre une responsabilité personnelle. sinon, le parlement n’au- rait aucune raison d’autoriser le tribunal à accorder une suspension en vue de permettre l’évaluation des conséquences économiques. cette interprétation s’accorde avec les principes fondamentaux du droit de l’insolvabilité et les débats parlementaires, tel que [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 259 “to complete the administration of the liquidation without being held up by continuing obligations on the company under    continued ownership and possession of assets which are of no value to the estate” (goode, at p 200). [209] second, s 1406(7) grants the government a super priority for environmental claims in cases where it has already taken action to remedy the con- dition or damage. this provision would serve little purpose if a government regulator could assert a super priority for all environmental claims, as the aer effectively purports to do here by refusing to recognize gtl’s disclaimers as lawful. it also sug- gests that parliament specifically envisioned that the government could obtain a super priority and leapfrog other creditors, but only where the govern- ment itself has already remediated the environmental damage. an analogous argument was central to the reasoning in abitibi, where this court observed that the existence of a crown priority limited to the con- taminated property and certain related property under s 118(8) of the companies’ creditors ar rangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36, undercut the argument that parliament “intended that the debtor always satisfy all remediation costs” in circumstances where that express priority was inapplicable and where the crown had no further priority with respect to the totality of the estate’s assets (para 33). je l’ai signalé précédemment, de même qu’avec l’une des justifications reconnues du pouvoir de renon- ciation de façon plus générale : permettre au syndic [traduction] « de mener à terme la liquidation sans être freiné par les obligations permanentes de la société [  ] en conservant la propriété et la pos- session de biens qui n’augmentent en rien la valeur de l’actif » (goode, p 200). [209] deuxièmement, le par.  14.06(7) accorde au gouvernement une superpriorité à l’égard des réclamations environnementales dans les cas où il a déjà pris des mesures pour réparer le fait ou le dommage. cette disposition serait fort peu utile si un organisme de réglementation gouvernemental pouvait faire valoir une superpriorité à l’égard de toutes les réclamations environnementales, comme l’aer a effectivement la prétention de le faire en l’espèce, en refusant de reconnaître la légalité des renonciations de gtl. elle donne également à pen- ser que le parlement a expressément prévu que le gouvernement pouvait obtenir une superpriorité et devancer les autres créanciers, mais seulement lorsqu’il a lui- même déjà réparé le dommage lié à l’environnement. un argument analogue a consti- tué l’élément central du raisonnement dans abitibi, où la cour a fait remarquer que l’existence d’une priorité de la couronne portant uniquement sur les biens contaminés et certains biens connexes en vertu du par 118(8) de la loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, lrc 1985, c. c-36, mine l’argument selon lequel le parle ment a eu « l’intention d’obliger le débiteur à supporter dans tous les cas tous les coûts des travaux de dé- contamination » dans les situations où ce droit de priorité exprès était inapplicable et où la couronne ne disposait d’aucune autre priorité sur l’ensemble des biens de l’actif (par 33). [210] third, s 1406(6) provides that claims for costs of remedying an environmental condition or environmental damage cannot rank as costs of ad- ministration if the trustee has disclaimed the prop- erty in question. again, if the aer could effectively assert a super priority by compelling gtl to use all of redwater’s assets to satisfy its outstanding environmental liabilities, this provision would be unnecessary, because the costs of environmental [210] troisièmement, le par 1406(6) prévoit que les réclamations visant les frais de réparation du fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement ne peuvent faire partie des frais d’administration si le syndic a renoncé au bien en question. encore une fois, si l’aer pouvait effectivement faire valoir une super- priorité en obligeant gtl à utiliser tous les biens de redwater pour satisfaire aux engagements environ- nementaux non acquittés de celle-ci, cette disposition 260 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. remediation would rank ahead of administrative costs in the priority structure. moreover, s 1406(6) highlights the potential for a direct conflict between federal and provincial law. a trustee cannot comply with the aer’s instruction to pay environmental costs as part of its administration of the estate while simultaneously complying with the bia’s require- ment that such costs not be included in the trus- tee’s administrative costs. this further raises the spectre of bankruptcy professionals being forced to expend their own funds under alberta’s regulatory regime — a notion that parliament clearly rejected by amending the bia in response to panamericana de bienes y servicios sa v. northern badger oil & gas ltd., 1991 abca 181, 81 dlr (4th) 280 (see ca reasons, at para 63). this is a risk that is not adequately addressed under my colleague’s interpretation. [211] fourth, s 1406(2) already deals with the circumstances in which a trustee can be held per- sonally liable for a bankrupt’s environmental lia- bilities. under this provision, personal liability can arise only where environmental damage occurs as a result of the trustee’s gross negligence or wilful misconduct. if a risk of personal liability is, in fact, a necessary condition to disclaim under s 1406(4), or if protection from personal liability is the only effect of disclaimer, this would mean that the disclaimer power is available or useful only in cases where the underlying environmental condition arises after the trustee’s appointment and the trustee is responsible for gross negligence or wilful misconduct. ne serait pas nécessaire parce que les frais de décon- tamination environnementale passeraient avant les frais d’administration dans l’ordre de priorité. de plus, le par 1406(6) fait ressortir la possibilité d’un conflit direct entre la loi fédérale et la loi provinciale. le syndic ne peut pas obtempérer à la directive de l’aer lui indiquant de supporter les frais environ- nementaux dans le cadre de son administration de l’actif tout en respectant l’exigence de la lfi selon laquelle ces frais ne font pas partie des frais d’admi- nistration du syndic. cela fait également apparaître le spectre de l’obligation pour les professionnels de la faillite de dépenser leurs propres fonds en applica- tion du régime de réglementation albertain, une idée que le parlement a clairement rejetée en modifiant la lfi en réaction à l’arrêt panamericana de bienes y servicios sa c. northern badger oil & gas ltd., 1991 abca 181, 81 dlr (4th) 280 (voir motifs de la cour d’appel, par 63). c’est un risque auquel l’interprétation de mon collègue ne répond pas adé- quatement. [211] quatrièmement, le par 1406(2) traite déjà des circonstances dans lesquelles le syndic peut être tenu personnellement responsable des engagements environnementaux du failli. selon cette disposition, la responsabilité personnelle du syndic ne peut être engagée que si le dommage lié à l’environnement est imputable à sa négligence grave ou à son inconduite délibérée. si le risque de responsabilité personnelle constitue, en fait, une condition essentielle à la re- nonciation prévue par le par 1406(4), ou si la pro- tection contre toute responsabilité personnelle est le seul effet de la renonciation, cela signifie que le pouvoir de renonciation ne peut être exercé ou n’est utile que dans les cas où le fait sous- jacent lié à l’en- vironnement prend naissance après la nomination du syndic et où ce dernier est responsable de négligence grave ou d’inconduite délibérée. [212] this obvious absurdity cannot be sidestepped by trying to distinguish between liability for environ- mental damage (purportedly covered by s 1406(2)) and liability for a failure to comply with an order to remedy such damage (purportedly covered by s 1406(4)). this distinction is entirely artificial. if the aer issues an abandonment order in relation to a licensed property, it effectively creates liability for [212] on ne saurait contourner ce résultat manifes- tement absurde en tentant d’établir une distinction entre la responsabilité découlant d’un dommage lié à l’environnement (qui serait visée par le par 1406(2)) et la responsabilité découlant du non­ respect de toute ordonnance de réparation de ce dommage (qui serait visée par le par 1406(4)). cette distinction est tout à fait artificielle. si l’aer rend une ordonnance [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 261 the underlying condition itself — liability that would still be encompassed by s 1406(2). this is evident from the marginal note for s 1406(2), “[l]iability in respect of environmental matters”, which is ca- pacious enough to include liability that flows from a failure to comply with an environmental order. in any event, it is difficult to imagine why parliament would intend to immunize a trustee from personal liability for an environmental condition, but still hold the trustee liable for a failure to comply with an order to remedy that exact same condition — and then further, permit the trustee to avoid that very liability by disclaiming the property, but either not permit the trustee to disclaim that property in any other circumstance or make it pointless to do so. this convoluted reasoning not only misreads s 1406(4), but also rewrites s 1406(2) in the process. it effec- tively creates a sector specific exemption from bank- ruptcy law that would prohibit many receivers and trustees that operate in the oil and gas industry from disclaiming assets (see n. bankes, majority of the court of appeal confirms chief justice wittmann’s redwater decision, may 3, 2017 (online)). [213] i also cannot accept that parliament enacted s 1406(4) simply to protect trustees from personal liability in the narrow subset of circumstances not already covered by s 1406(2) — namely where an environmental condition or environmental damage arises after a trustee’s appointment and as a result of the trustee’s gross negligence or wilful miscon- duct — for two main reasons. firstly, the terms of the provision itself belie this theory. the opening lines of s 1406(4) expressly make the limitation of liability “subject to subsection (2)”. this indicates that parliament deliberately intended subs. (2) to supersede subs. (4) in the determination of liability. thus, where a trustee has caused an environmental condition or environmental damage through its wil- ful misconduct or gross negligence, the trustee will still be personally liable, despite any valid disclaimer d’abandon à l’égard d’un bien visé par un permis, il crée effectivement une responsabilité découlant du fait sous- jacent lui- même — une responsabilité qui serait toujours visée par le par 1406(2). cela ressort clairement de la note marginale du par 1406(2), « [r]esponsabilité en matière d’environnement », qui est suffisamment vaste pour englober la respon- sabilité découlant du non- respect d’une ordonnance environnementale. quoi qu’il en soit, il est difficile d’imaginer pourquoi le parlement voudrait mettre le syndic à l’abri d’une responsabilité personnelle découlant d’un fait lié à l’environnement, tout en tenant néanmoins le syndic responsable du non- respect d’une ordonnance de réparation concernant exactement le même fait — pour ensuite permettre au syndic d’être dégagé de cette même responsabilité en renonçant au bien, mais en ne permettant pas au syndic de renoncer à ce bien dans d’autres circons- tances ou en rendant inutile cette renonciation. non seulement ce raisonnement alambiqué constitue-t-il une mauvaise interprétation du par 1406(4), mais il équivaut en même temps à une reformulation du par 1406(2). cela revient en fait à créer une exemp- tion sectorielle à l’application du droit de la faillite qui empêcherait les séquestres et les syndics qui exercent leurs activités dans l’industrie pétrolière et gazière de renoncer à des biens (voir n. bankes, majority of the court of appeal confirms chief jus­ tice wittmann’s redwater decision, 3 mai 2017 (en ligne)). [213] je ne peux non plus accepter que le parle ment a adopté le par 1406(4) dans le simple but de proté- ger les syndics contre toute responsabilité personnelle dans le sous- ensemble restreint de circonstances qui ne sont pas déjà visées par le par 1406(2) — à savoir celles où un fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement survient après la nomination du syndic et à cause de sa négligence grave ou de son inconduite délibé- rée — pour deux raisons principales. tout d’abord, le texte de la disposition contredit lui- même cette théorie. les premières lignes du par 1406(4) li- mitent expressément la responsabilité « sous réserve du paragraphe (2) ». le parlement tenait donc à ce que le par. (2) l’emporte sur le par. (4) pour ce qui est de déterminer la responsabilité. ainsi, le syndic ayant causé un fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement par son inconduite délibérée ou sa négligence grave 262 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. under subs (4). secondly, there is no evidence, or in- deed any rationale, to explain why parliament would have drafted s 1406(4) to protect trustees in such narrow circumstances, through the method of dis- claiming property, and to shield them from liability where they cause environmental issues through their own wrongdoing. [214] the majority of this court accepts that, on its interpretation, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between the protection from personal liability provided by subs. (2) and that provided by subs (4). indeed, the majority appears to believe that such a distinction is not even necessary, accepting that “s 1406(4) does not provide trustees with protection from personal liability any broader than the protec- tion provided by s 1406(2)” (para 93). however, the effect of this interpretation is to render subs. (4) entirely meaningless and redundant. trustees would have no reason to exercise their power to disclaim assets, as the only effect of doing so would be to pro- tect them from personal liability from which they are already fully shielded by subs (2). section 14.06(4) would therefore serve no purpose whatsoever within parliament’s bankruptcy regime i cannot under- stand the logic of parliament explicitly referring to, and incorporating, the ability of trustees to dis- claim assets — and specifically outlining one con- sequence of that power — simply to mandate that such an action has no meaningful effect. we must presume that parliament does not speak in vain and did not craft a pointless provision (canada (attorney general) v. jti­ macdonald corp., 2007 scc 30, [2007] 2 scr 610, at para 87). it is a trite principle of statutory interpretation that every provision of a statute should be given meaning: engagera toujours sa responsabilité personnelle, mal- gré toute renonciation dûment effectuée en vertu du par (4). ensuite, aucune preuve, ni raison en fait, n’explique pourquoi le parlement aurait rédigé le par 1406(4) afin de protéger les syndics dans des situations aussi particulières, par la renonciation à des biens, et de les mettre à l’abri de leur responsabilité lorsqu’ils endommagent l’environnement par leurs propres actes répréhensibles. [214] les juges majoritaires reconnaissent que, d’après leur interprétation, on ne peut établir de distinction utile entre l’immunité de responsabilité personnelle accordée par le par. (2) et celle fournie par le par (4). en effet, ils semblent croire que cette distinction n’est même pas nécessaire, acceptant que « le par 1406(4) n’offre pas aux syndics une protection contre la responsabilité personnelle plus large que celle fournie par le par 1406(2) » (par 93). cette interprétation a cependant pour effet de rendre le par. (4) tout à fait dénué de sens et redondant. le syndic n’aurait aucune raison d’exercer son pouvoir de renoncer à des biens, car cette mesure ne servirait qu’à le protéger contre la responsabilité personnelle dont le par. (2) le met déjà entièrement à l’abri. ainsi, le par 1406(4) n’aurait absolument aucune utilité dans le régime de faillite du parlement. je ne peux saisir la logique, pour le parlement, de mentionner explicitement et d’incorporer le pouvoir du syndic de renoncer à ces biens — et d’énoncer en termes exprès une conséquence de ce pouvoir — simple- ment pour disposer que cette mesure n’a aucun effet utile. nous devons présumer que le parlement ne parle pas pour ne rien dire et qu’il n’a pas rédigé une disposition inutile (canada (procureur géné­ ral) c. jti­ macdonald corp., 2007 csc 30, [2007] 2 rcs 610, par 87). un principe reconnu d’in- terprétation législative veut que chaque disposition d’une loi reçoive un sens : it is presumed that every feature of a legislative text has been deliberately chosen and has a particular role to play in the legislative design. the legislature does not include unnecessary or meaningless language in its statutes;    it does not make the same point twice. [traduction] on présume que chaque caractéristique d’un texte de loi a été délibérément choisie et a un rôle précis à jouer dans le cadre législatif. le législateur n’em- ploie pas de termes inutiles ou dénués de sens dans ses lois; [  ] il ne dit pas la même chose deux fois. (r. sullivan, statutory interpretation (3rd ed. 2016), at p. 43) (r. sullivan, statutory interpretation (3e éd. 2016), p. 43) [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 263 [215] this evident absurdity cannot be avoided by suggesting that s 1406(4) was created to clarify to trustees that they may be required to expend the entire value of a bankrupt estate to comply with environmental orders, despite valid disclaimers. if parliament’s intent was truly to undermine the dis- claimer power in this way, it is difficult to conceive of a more convoluted, tortuous and unclear method to achieve this result than s 1406(4). had parliament simply sought to make clear to trustees that dis- claimer would not allow them to relieve themselves from satisfying environmental liabilities, it could easily have done so directly rather than enacting a provision that describes protection from personal liability they do not actually face. [216] section 14.06, when read as a whole, indi- cates that subs. (4) does more than merely protect trustees from personal liability. my colleague has declined to even consider the remaining subsections of s 1406 that i have discussed, other than subs (2). nonetheless, he says that the plain meaning of a pro- vision cannot be “contorted to make its scheme more coherent” (para 101). the conclusion that would re- sult from such an approach would be that parliament simply intended to craft a largely incoherent frame- work. i disagree that we should reach this conclu- sion here. as dickson j (as he then was) stated in morgentaler v. the queen, [1976] 1 scr 616, at p. 676: “we should pay parliament the respect of not assuming readily that it has enacted legislative inconsistencies or absurdities.” a determination that parliament designed s 1406 as an incoherent whole is inconsistent with the role of the courts in statutory interpretation, which is to read the words of a statute in their entire context, harmoniously with the scheme of the statute. as ruth sullivan has noted: il est impossible d’éviter cette absurdité évi- [215] dente en affirmant que le par 1406(4) visait à pré- ciser au syndic qu’il devait dépenser toute la valeur de l’actif d’un failli pour se conformer à des ordon- nances environnementales en dépit de renonciations valides. si le parlement avait vraiment eu l’intention de miner ainsi le pouvoir de renonciation, il est diffi- cile d’imaginer un moyen plus alambiqué, tortueux et vague d’atteindre ce résultat que le par 1406(4). si le parlement avait simplement voulu préciser au syndic que la renonciation ne leur permettrait pas d’être dégagés de l’obligation de respecter les en- gagements environnementaux, il lui aurait été facile de le faire directement, plutôt que d’adopter une disposition décrivant une immunité de responsabilité personnelle dont le syndic n’a pas besoin. [216] lu dans son ensemble, l’art 1406 indique que le par. (4) ne se borne pas à dégager les syndics de toute responsabilité personnelle. mon collègue a même refusé d’examiner les autres paragraphes de l’art 1406 dont j’ai parlé, sauf le par (2). peu importe, dit-il, on ne peut « déforme[r] le sens clair d’une disposition pour en rendre le régime plus co- hérent » (par 101). cette approche mènerait à la con clusion selon laquelle le parlement voulait sim- plement concevoir un cadre incohérent en grande partie. je suis en désaccord avec cette conclusion. tel que l’a mentionné le juge dickson (plus tard juge en chef) dans morgentaler c. la reine, [1976] 1 rcs 616, p. 676 : « nous devons avoir envers le parlement la courtoisie de ne pas présumer aisément qu’il a édicté des incohérences ou des absurdités ». la conclusion que le parlement a conçu l’art 1406 comme un tout incohérent est incompatible avec la tâche confiée aux tribunaux dans l’interprétation législative, laquelle consiste à lire les termes d’une loi dans leur contexte global en harmonie avec l’éco- nomie de la loi comme l’a fait remarquer ruth sullivan : it is presumed that the provisions of legislation are meant to work together, both logically and teleologically, as parts of a functioning whole. the parts are presumed to fit together logically to form a rational, internally consist- ent framework; and because the framework has a purpose, the parts are also presumed to work together dynamically, [traduction] les dispositions d’une loi sont présu- mées fonctionner ensemble, tant logiquement que téléo- logiquement, comme les diverses parties d’un tout. les parties sont présumées s’assembler logiquement pour former un cadre rationnel, intrinsèquement cohérent; et parce que ce cadre a un objet, ses éléments sont aussi 264 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. each contributing something toward accomplishing the intended goal. présumés s’appliquer ensemble de façon dynamique, cha- cun contribuant à la réalisation de l’objectif visé. the presumption of coherence is also expressed as a presumption against internal conflict. it is presumed that the body of legislation enacted by a legislature does not contain contradictions or inconsistencies, that each provi- sion is capable of operating without coming into conflict with any other. [footnote omitted.] la présomption de cohérence se traduit également par une présomption d’absence d’incompatibilité intrinsèque. il est présumé que l’ensemble des textes législatifs édictés par une législature ne comporte pas de contradictions ou d’incohérences et que chaque disposition peut être appli- quée sans entrer en conflit avec une autre. [note en bas de page omise.] (sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at p. 337; see also r v. lth, 2008 scc 49, [2008] 2 scr 739, at para 47) (sullivan on the construction of statutes (6e éd. 2014), p. 337; voir aussi r c. lth, 2008 csc 49, [2008] 2 rcs 739, par 47) [217] where it is possible to read the provisions of a statute — especially the various subsections of a single section — in a consistent manner, that interpretation is to be preferred over one that results in internal inconsistency. in my view, as i have set out above, it is possible to read s 1406(4) coher- ently with the remainder of the section. this is the interpretation that parliament is presumed to have intended. in this case, i see no compelling reason to depart from this presumption. [218] my colleague’s analysis is reminiscent of the strictly textual or literal approach to statutory interpretation — the “plain meaning rule” — that this court squarely rejected in rizzo. this is appar- ent from the fact that he relies strictly on what he alleges to be the “clear and unambiguous” word- ing of s 1406(4), while discounting the context of the provision. with respect, i am of the view that the court should rely on the predominant and well- established modern approach to statutory interpre- tation: the words of an act must be “‘read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament”’ (rizzo, at para. 21; bell expressvu, at para. 26, both quoting driedger, at p 87). [217] quand il est possible d’interpréter les dis- positions d’une loi — surtout les divers paragraphes d’un même article — de façon cohérente, il faut privilégier cette interprétation à une interprétation qui donne lieu à une incohérence intrinsèque. à mon avis, et comme je l’ai déjà dit, il est possible de lire le par 1406(4) de façon cohérente avec le reste de l’article. voilà l’interprétation que le parlement est présumé avoir donnée à ce paragraphe. en l’espèce, je ne vois aucune raison impérieuse de s’écarter de cette présomption. [218] l’analyse de mon collègue rappelle la mé- thode purement textuelle ou littérale d’interprétation des lois — la « règle du sens ordinaire » — que notre cour a rejetée sans équivoque dans rizzo. cela res- sort du fait qu’il se fonde strictement sur ce qu’il prétend être le texte « clai[r] et non ambig[u] » du par 1406(4), tout en ne tenant pas compte du contexte de la disposition. avec égards, j’estime que la cour devrait recourir à la méthode prédominante et bien établie d’interprétation des lois : il faut lire les termes d’une loi « dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’[économie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur » (rizzo, par. 21; bell expressvu, par. 26, citant tous les deux driedger, p 87). in rizzo, iaccobucci j explained that “stat- [219] utory interpretation cannot be founded on the word- ing of the legislation alone” (para 21). the court of appeal in rizzo, which had adopted the plain [219] dans l’arrêt rizzo, le juge iaccobucci a expli- qué que « l’interprétation législative ne peut pas être fondée sur le seul libellé du texte de loi » (par 21). la cour d’appel saisie de l’affaire rizzo, qui avait retenu [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 265 meaning interpretation, “did not pay sufficient at- tention to the scheme of the [act], its object or the intention of the legislature; nor was the context of the words in issue appropriately recognized” (para 23). in interpreting s 1406(4) of the bia, the [220] majority similarly relies on the supposed plain mean- ing of the words of the provision but does not pay sufficient attention to the scheme of s 1406 as a whole; nor does it appropriately recognize the con- text of the words. [221] even if we were to leave aside the wording of the provision itself and its immediate statutory context, a purposive interpretation would lead to the same result. consider the consequences of the analysis of the aer or the analysis of my colleague in other cases like this, where an oil company’s environmental liabilities exceed the value of its re- alizable assets. insolvency professionals, knowing in advance that they can be compelled to funnel all of the estate’s remaining assets toward those environmental liabilities (either because they can- not disclaim value- negative assets absent a risk of personal liability or because their disclaimer will be ineffective to prevent this), will never accept mandates in the first place. this is sensible business practice: if the estate’s entire realizable value must go toward its environmental liabilities, leaving noth- ing behind to cover administrative costs, insolvency professionals will have nothing to gain — and much to lose — by stepping in to serve as receivers and trustees, irrespective of whether they are protected from personal liability. debtors and creditors alike, knowing that this is the case, will have no reason to even petition for bankruptcy. the result is that none of a bankrupt estate’s assets will be sold — not even an oil company’s valuable wells — and the number of orphaned properties will increase. this is a far cry from the objectives of the 1997 amend- ments to the bia as discussed in parliament, which were to “encourage [insolvency professionals] to accept mandates” and to “reduce the number of abandoned sites” (standing committee on industry, june 11, 1996, at 15:49). it is difficult to imagine that parliament would have intended a construction l’interprétation fondée sur le sens ordinaire, « n’a pas accordé suffisamment d’attention à l’économie de la [loi], à son objet ni à l’intention du législateur; le contexte des mots en cause n’a pas non plus été pris en compte adéquatement » (par 23). [220] en interprétant le par 1406(4) de la lfi, la majorité s’appuie elle aussi sur le supposé sens ordinaire des mots de la disposition mais n’ac- corde pas suffisamment d’attention à l’économie de l’art.  14.06 dans son ensemble; elle ne prend pas non plus adéquatement en compte le contexte de ces mots. [221] même si nous faisions abstraction du libellé de la disposition elle- même et de son contexte lé- gislatif immédiat, une interprétation téléologique mènerait au même résultat. considérons les consé- quences de l’analyse de l’aer ou de celle de mon collègue dans d’autres cas comme celui qui nous occupe, où les engagements environnementaux de la société pétrolière excèdent la valeur de son ac- tif réalisable. les professionnels de l’insolvabilité, sachant d’avance qu’ils peuvent être contraints de canaliser tous les autres éléments d’actif vers ces engagements environnementaux (soit parce qu’ils ne peuvent renoncer à des biens ayant une valeur néga- tive en l’absence du risque d’engager leur responsa- bilité personnelle, soit parce que leur renonciation n’empêchera pas cette éventualité de se produire), n’accepteront jamais de mandats au départ. il s’agit là d’une pratique commerciale sensée : si toute la valeur réalisable de l’actif doit être dirigée vers ces engagements environnementaux, et qu’il ne reste rien pour couvrir les frais administratifs, les profession- nels de l’insolvabilité n’auront rien à gagner — et beaucoup à perdre  — en acceptant d’exercer les fonctions de séquestre et de syndic, indépendamment de la question de savoir s’ils sont protégés contre toute responsabilité personnelle. les débiteurs tout comme les créanciers, sachant qu’il en est ainsi, n’auront aucune raison de même présenter une re- quête de mise en faillite. il s’ensuit qu’aucun des biens de l’actif du failli ne sera vendu — pas même les puits de valeur de la société pétrolière — et que le nombre de biens orphelins augmentera. cela est bien loin des objectifs des modifications apportées à la lfi en 1997 qui ont été débattues au parlement 266 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. of s 1406(4) that explicitly undermines its stated purposes. [222] the majority appears to accept that the pur- poses of s 1406(4) of the bia included encourag- ing insolvency professionals to accept mandates in cases where there may be environmental liabilities (paras.  80-81). however, merely protecting trus- tees from personal liability in such cases will fail to achieve parliament’s desired result. as i have ex- plained, even where prospective trustees face no risk of personal liability, they will be reluctant to accept mandates if provincial entities can require the entire value of a bankrupt’s realizable estate to be applied to satisfy environmental obligations. [223] since i have explained that s 1406(4) pro- vides trustees with the power to disclaim assets even where there is no risk of personal liability, it is now necessary to briefly consider whether this power was available to gtl on the facts of this case. here, the statutory conditions to the exercise of this power were met. the abandonment orders clearly relate to the remediation of an “environmental condition” (or “tout fait    lié à l’environnement” in the french version of the bia, which can be translated literally as “any fact    related to the environment”). indeed, even the aer and the owa have never contested this point. in response to such orders, gtl was therefore entitled to exercise the disclaimer power provided for in s 1406(4). et qui devaient « encourager [les professionnels de l’insolvabilité] à accepter des mandats » et « réduire le nombre de sites abandonnés » (comité permanent de l’industrie, 11 juin 1996 à 15 h 49). il est difficile d’imaginer que le parlement aurait privilégié une interprétation du par 1406(4) qui nuit explicitement aux objectifs qu’il a énoncés. [222] la majorité semble reconnaître que le par 1406(4) de la lfi a eu notamment pour objectif d’encourager les professionnels de l’insolvabilité à accepter des mandats dans des cas où il existe peut- être des engagements environnementaux (par 80-81). or, le simple fait de mettre les syndics à l’abri de la responsabilité personnelle en pareil cas ne permettra pas d’atteindre le résultat escompté par le parlement. comme je l’ai expliqué, même lorsque les syndics potentiels ne courent aucun risque d’engager leur res- ponsabilité personnelle, ils seront réticents à accepter des mandats si des entités provinciales peuvent exiger que toute la valeur de l’actif réalisable d’un failli serve à acquitter des obligations environnementales. [223] ayant expliqué que le par 1406(4) confère aux syndics le pouvoir de renoncer à des biens même en l’absence d’un risque de responsabilité person- nelle, je dois maintenant me demander brièvement si gtl disposait de ce pouvoir à la lumière des faits de la présente affaire. en l’espèce, les conditions sta- tutaires préalables à l’exercice de ce pouvoir étaient réunies. les ordonnances d’abandon se rapportent clairement à la réparation de « tout fait [  ] lié à l’en- vironnement » (dans la version française de la lfi) ou d’une « condition environnementale » (une traduction littérale du terme « environmental condition » dans la version anglaise de la lfi). en effet, même l’aer et l’owa n’ont jamais contesté ce point. en réaction à de telles ordonnances, gtl pouvait donc exercer le pouvoir de renonciation prévu au par 1406(4). (2) section 14.06(4) applies to alberta’s oil and (2) le paragraphe 14.06(4) s’applique à l’indus- gas industry trie pétrolière et gazière de l’alberta [224] the aer raised an additional argument that the right of disclaimer is entirely inapplicable in the context of the statutory regime governing the oil and gas industry due to the role played by third- party surface landowners and the nature of the property [224] l’aer a également soutenu que le droit de renonciation ne s’applique aucunement dans le contexte du régime législatif régissant l’industrie pétrolière et gazière en raison du rôle joué par les tiers propriétaires de droits de surface et de la nature [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 267 interests involved which rendered the crown’s super priority under s 1406(7) impractical. martin ja. (as she then was), writing in dissent at the alberta court of appeal, reached the same conclusion. with respect, i cannot agree. parliament did not make the disclaimer power in s 1406(4) conditional on the availability of the crown’s super priority. [225] in delineating what interests may be dis- claimed by a trustee under s 1406(4),. parliament used exceptionally broad language. the trustee is permitted to disclaim “any interest” in “any real property”. while redwater’s aer- issued licences may not be real property, all of the parties accept that profits à prendre and surface leases can be char- acterized as real property interests. in the context of this case, it is these interests that gtl truly sought to disclaim. the aer argued that s 1406(4) permits the disclaimer only of “true real property”, meaning land currently or previously owned by the bankrupt, without any third- party landowners. this interpreta- tion is not consistent with the actual language used by parliament. had parliament intended to restrict the disclaimer power solely to fee simple interests, it could have stated this, rather than referring to “any interest in any real property”. [226] further, the alberta oil and gas industry is far from the only natural resource sector in which companies traditionally operate on the land of third parties, whether the crown or private landowners. the potential liability of trustees would explode if the mere presence of these third- party landowners rendered the disclaimer power in s 1406(4) entirely inapplicable. the language of the section is clearly broad enough to capture the statutory regime gov- erning alberta’s oil and gas sector. des droits de propriété en cause qui empêchaient la couronne de se prévaloir de la superpriorité dont elle jouit en vertu du par 1406(7). la juge martin (maintenant juge de notre cour), dissidente en cour d’appel de l’alberta, est parvenue à la même conclu- sion. avec égards, je ne peux partager son avis. le parlement n’a pas rendu le pouvoir de renonciation prévu au par 1406(4) conditionnel à la possibilité pour la couronne de se prévaloir de sa superpriorité. [225] en décidant des intérêts auxquels peut re- noncer un syndic en vertu du par 1406(4), le parle- ment a utilisé des mots exceptionnellement larges. il est permis au syndic de renoncer à « tout intérêt » sur « le bien réel ». bien que les permis réglemen- taires de redwater ne soient peut- être pas des biens réels, toutes les parties reconnaissent que les profits à prendre et droits de surface peuvent être qualifiés d’intérêts sur des biens réels. dans le contexte de la présente affaire, ce sont les droits auxquels gtl veut vraiment renoncer. l’aer a soutenu que le par 1406(4) autorise uniquement la renonciation à de « véritables biens réels », soit un terrain qui appar- tient ou appartenait au failli, sans tiers propriétaires fonciers. cette interprétation ne s’accorde pas avec les mots employés par le parlement. si ce dernier avait voulu ne restreindre le pouvoir de renonciation qu’aux intérêts en fief simple, il aurait pu le dire plu- tôt que de parler de « tout intérêt sur le bien réel ». [226] de plus, l’industrie pétrolière et gazière de l’alberta est loin d’être le seul secteur de ressources naturelles où les sociétés exercent depuis longtemps leurs activités sur le terrain de tiers, qu’il s’agisse de la couronne ou de propriétaires privés. la res- ponsabilité potentielle des syndics exploserait si la simple présence de ces tiers propriétaires fonciers écartait complètement l’application du pouvoir de renonciation prévu au par 1406(4). le texte du para- graphe est manifestement assez large pour embrasser le régime législatif régissant le secteur pétrolier et gazier de l’alberta. (3) conclusion on operational conflict (3) conclusion sur le conflit d’application [227] in light of this interpretation of s 1406(4),. i agree with both courts below that there is an oper- ational conflict to the extent that alberta’s statutory [227] compte tenu de cette interprétation du par 1406(4), je suis d’accord avec les deux tribu- naux d’instance inférieure pour dire qu’il y a un 268 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. regime holds receivers and trustees liable as “li- censees” in relation to the disclaimed assets (see chambers judge reasons, at para. 181; ca reasons, at para 57). this conflict is far from hypothetical. under federal law, gtl is entitled to disclaim the bankrupt’s assets affected by the abandonment or- ders. under the bia, gtl cannot be compelled to take action with respect to properties it has validly disclaimed, since the act of disclaimer relieves it of any rights, interests and liabilities in respect of the disclaimed properties. but under provincial law, the aer can order gtl to abandon the disclaimed assets, among other things (see para 11). this is exactly what happened here. not only did the aer order gtl to complete the work, but it also made the sale of redwater’s valuable assets conditional on gtl either abandoning the non- producing prop- erties itself or packaging those properties with the estate’s valuable assets for the purposes of any sale. in doing so, the aer impermissibly disregarded the effect of gtl’s disclaimers. this remains the case, irrespective of whether gtl could (or would) ever be held personally liable for the costs of abandoning the properties above and beyond the entire value of the estate. [228] my colleague claims that the aer “has never attempted to hold a trustee personally liable” (para 107). what is clear is that, on the facts of this case, the aer directly sought to require gtl to perform or pay for the abandonment work itself, whether this is referred to as personal liability or not. it is critical to observe that this litigation be- gan when the aer filed an application seeking to compel gtl to comply with its obligations as a licensee, including the obligation to abandon the non- producing properties. practically speaking, this amounted to an effort to hold gtl personally liable. where else would the money required to abandon the disclaimed properties have come from? the value of the estate as a whole was negative, and the aer refused to permit gtl to sell the valuable properties on their own. no purchaser would have agreed to buy all of the assets together. therefore, conflit d’application dans la mesure où le régime législatif albertain tient les séquestres et les syndics responsables en tant que « titulaires de permis » rela- tivement aux biens faisant l’objet d’une renonciation (voir les motifs du juge en cabinet, par. 181; motifs de la cour d’appel, par 57). ce conflit est loin d’être hypothétique. en vertu de la loi fédérale, gtl peut renoncer aux biens du failli touchés par les ordon- nances d’abandon. selon la lfi, gtl ne peut être contraint de prendre des mesures à l’égard des biens auxquels il a valablement renoncé puisque l’acte de renonciation le libère de tous les droits, intérêts et obligations à l’égard des biens visés par la renon- ciation. mais selon la loi provinciale, l’aer peut notamment ordonner à gtl d’abandonner les biens ayant fait l’objet d’une renonciation (voir par 11). c’est exactement ce qui s’est passé en l’espèce. non seulement l’aer a-t-il ordonné à gtl de mener les travaux à terme, mais il a aussi rendu la vente des biens de valeur de redwater conditionnelle à l’aban- don des biens inexploités par gtl lui- même ou de la vente de ces biens avec les biens de valeur de l’actif comme un tout unique. en agissant ainsi, l’aer a indûment fait abstraction de l’effet des renonciations de gtl. cela demeure vrai indépendamment de la question de savoir si gtl pouvait (ou allait) être tenue personnellement responsable des frais d’aban- don des biens susmentionnés au- delà de la valeur totale de l’actif. [228] mon collègue prétend que l’aer « n’a ja- mais essayé d’engager la responsabilité personnelle d’un syndic » (par 107). ce qui est clair, c’est qu’à la lumière des faits de l’espèce, l’aer a directe- ment tenté de contraindre gtl à exécuter ou à payer lui- même les travaux d’abandon, que l’on qualifie cela de responsabilité personnelle ou non. il est pri- mordial de faire remarquer que le présent litige a commencé lorsque l’aer a déposé une demande visant à contraindre gtl à respecter ses obligations en tant que titulaire de permis, notamment l’obliga- tion d’abandonner des biens inexploités. sur le plan pratique, cela constituait une tentative de tenir gtl personnellement responsable. où d’autre aurait-on pris l’argent nécessaire à l’abandon des biens vi- sés par les renonciations? la valeur de l’actif dans son ensemble était négative, et l’aer a refusé de permettre à gtl de vendre isolément les biens de [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 269 gtl had no way to recoup any value from the es- tate, as redwater was bankrupt and no longer gen- erating income. the only source of funds, in this scenario, was gtl itself. this is why the aer filed suit to compel gtl to carry out redwater’s aban- donment obligations. as this makes clear, i cannot agree with the suggestion that the provincial regime has never been utilized to hold trustees personally liable in contravention of federal law. that is pre- cisely what happened in this very case. [229] this conclusion cannot be avoided by refer- ring to the fact that, pursuant to orders of the alberta courts, gtl has already sold the valuable redwater assets and the proceeds are being held in trust pend- ing the outcome of this appeal (see majority reasons, at para 108). this is precisely the result the aer sought to prevent by precluding gtl from selling only the valuable properties, without the disclaimed ones. gtl was able to do so only as a direct result of this litigation. [230] my colleague states that, if the aer “were to attempt to hold gtl personally liable under the abandonment orders, this would create an opera- tional conflict between the ogca and the pipeline act, and s 1406(2) of the bia, rendering the former two acts inoperative to the extent of the conflict” (para 107). thus, even on my colleague’s interpre- tation of s 1406 — which. i do not accept — an operational conflict does exist on the facts of this case, specifically as a result of the aer’s applica- tion to the alberta court of queen’s bench seeking to have gtl personally satisfy the environmental obligations associated with the disclaimed assets. valeur. personne n’aurait consenti à acheter les biens tous ensemble. gtl ne disposait par conséquent d’aucun moyen de recouvrer une quelconque valeur de l’actif, car redwater était en faillite et ne générait plus aucun revenu. la seule source de fonds, dans ce scénario, était gtl lui- même. c’est pourquoi l’aer a intenté une poursuite visant à contraindre gtl à exécuter les obligations d’abandon de redwater. il est donc clair que je ne puis souscrire à l’idée que le régime provincial n’a jamais été utilisé pour tenir les syndics personnellement responsables en violation de la loi fédérale. c’est justement ce qui s’est passé dans la présente affaire. [229] on ne peut éviter cette conclusion en invo- quant le fait que, conformément aux ordonnances des tribunaux albertains, gtl a déjà vendu les biens de valeur de redwater et que le produit de leur vente est détenu en fiducie en attendant l’issue du présent pourvoi (voir les motifs de la majorité, par 108). c’est exactement le résultat que l’aer a cherché à prévenir en empêchant gtl de vendre uniquement les biens de valeur, sans les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. gtl n’est parvenu à le faire qu’à la suite du présent litige. [230] mon collègue dit que, si l’aer « devait ten- ter d’obliger personnellement gtl à se conformer aux ordonnances d’abandon, cela engenderait un conflit d’application entre, d’une part, l’ogca et la pipeline act et, d’autre part, le par 1406(2) de la lfi, ce qui rendrait les deux premières lois ino- pérantes dans la mesure de ce conflit » (par 107). ainsi, même d’après l’interprétation donnée par mon collègue à l’art 1406 — que je ne retiens pas — il existe bel et bien un conflit d’application eu égard aux faits de l’espèce, surtout du fait de la demande présentée par l’aer à la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta pour que gtl respecte personnellement les obligations environnementales associées aux biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation. [231] all of that being said, creditors with provable claims can still seek payment in accordance with the bia’s priority scheme (abitibi, at para 98). as i discuss below, the aer’s environmental claims re- main valid as against the redwater estate, and it may pursue those claims through the normal bankruptcy [231] tout cela étant dit, les créanciers ayant des réclamations prouvables peuvent toujours demander un paiement conformément au régime de priorité établi par la lfi (abitibi, par 98). comme je l’ex- plique plus loin, les réclamations environnementales de l’aer demeurent valides à l’égard de l’actif de 270 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. process. thus, even if s 1406(4) does not permit gtl to disclaim the non- producing wells and relieve itself of the environmental obligations associated with them, it is nevertheless the case that the aer cannot compel gtl to satisfy its claims ahead of those of redwater’s secured creditors. redwater, et il peut faire valoir ces réclamations dans le cadre du processus normal de faillite. donc, même si le par 1406(4) n’autorise pas gtl à renoncer aux puits inexploités et à se libérer des obligations en- vironnementales qui s’y rattachent, il n’en demeure pas moins que l’aer ne peut pas contraindre gtl à régler ses propres réclamations avant celles des créanciers garantis de redwater. b frustration of purpose b entrave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral [232] the second branch of the paramountcy test is frustration of purpose. even where dual compliance with both federal and provincial law is, strictly speak- ing, possible, provincial legislation or provisions will nevertheless be rendered inoperative to the extent that they have the effect of frustrating a valid federal legislative purpose (moloney, at para. 25; bank of montreal v. hall, [1990] 1 scr 121, at pp. 154-55; canadian western bank, at para 73). the focus of the analysis is on the effect of the provincial legislation or provisions, not its purpose (moloney, at para. 28; husky oil, at para 39). [232] le second volet du test de la prépondérance est l’entrave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral. même lorsqu’il est à proprement parler possible de se confor- mer à la fois à la loi fédérale et à la loi provinciale, la loi ou les dispositions provinciales seront néanmoins rendues inopérantes dans la mesure où elles ont pour effet d’entraver la réalisation d’un objet valide d’une loi fédérale (moloney, par. 25; banque de mont réal c. hall, [1990] 1 rcs 121, p. 154-155; banque ca­ nadienne de l’ouest, par 73). l’analyse est axée sur l’effet de la loi ou des dispositions provinciales, et non sur son objet (moloney, par. 28; husky oil, par 39). [233] this court has repeatedly recognized that one of the purposes of the bia is “the equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s assets among his or her creditors” (moloney, at para. 32; husky oil, at para 7). it achieves this goal through a collective proceeding model — one that maximizes creditors’ total recovery and promotes order and efficiency by distributing the estate’s assets in accordance with a designated priority scheme (century services inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2010 scc 60, [2010] 3 scr 379, at para 22). all claims that are “provable in bankruptcy” are subject to this priority scheme. exercises of provincial power that have the effect of altering bankruptcy priorities are there- fore inoperative because they frustrate parliament’s purpose of equitably distributing the estate’s assets in accordance with the federal statutory regime (abitibi, at para. 19; husky oil, at para 32). [233] la cour a maintes fois reconnu que l’un des objets de la lfi est « le partage équitable des biens du failli entre ses créanciers  » (moloney, par. 32; husky oil, par 7). elle réalise cet objectif au moyen d’un modèle de procédure collective — modèle qui maximise le recouvrement intégral au profit des créanciers et fait régner l’ordre et l’ef- ficacité en partageant les biens de l’actif confor- mément à un régime de priorité désigné (century services inc. c. canada (procureur général), 2010 csc 60, [2010] 3 rcs 379, par 22). toutes les réclamations « prouvables en matière de faillite » sont assujetties à ce régime de priorité. les exer- cices d’un pouvoir provincial ayant pour effet de modifier les priorités en matière de faillite sont donc inopérants parce qu’ils entravent la réalisa- tion de l’objectif du parlement d’assurer le partage équitable des biens de l’actif conformément au régime établi par la loi fédérale (abitibi, par. 19; husky oil, par 32). [234] the question here is whether the environ- mental claims asserted by the aer (ie, the aban- donment orders) are provable in bankruptcy. if they [234] il s’agit de savoir en l’espèce si les récla- mations environnementales que fait valoir l’aer (c-à-d les ordonnances d’abandon) sont prouvables [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 271 are, then the aer is not permitted to assert those claims outside of the bankruptcy process and ahead of redwater’s secured creditors because this would frustrate the purpose of the federal priority scheme. rather, it must abide by the bia and seek recovery from the estate through the normal bankruptcy pro- cedures (abitibi, at para 40). in abitibi, this court established a three- part [235] test, rooted in the language of the bia, to determine whether a claim is provable in bankruptcy: “first, there must be a debt, a liability or an obligation to a creditor. second, the debt, liability or obligation must be incurred before the debtor becomes bank­ rupt. third, it must be possible to attach a monetary value to the debt, liability or obligation” (para. 26 (emphasis in original)). since there is no dispute that redwater’s environmental obligations arose before it became bankrupt, i limit my analysis below to the first and third prongs of the abitibi test: whether the liability is owed to a creditor, and whether it is possible to attach a monetary value to that liability. [236] the first prong of the abitibi test asks whether the debt, liability or obligation at issue is owed by a bankrupt entity to a creditor. deschamps j., writing for a majority of the court, suggested that this is not an exacting requirement: “the only determination that has to be made at this point is whether the reg- ulatory body has exercised its enforcement power against a debtor. when it does so, it identifies itself as a creditor, and the requirement of this stage of the analysis is satisfied” (para. 27 (emphasis added)). though i would not go so far as to suggest that the analysis under the first prong is merely perfunctory or pro forma, and circumstances may well exist where it is not satisfied, deschamps j made clear in abitibi that “[m]ost environmental regulatory bodies can be creditors”, again stressing that government entities cannot systematically evade the priority requirements of federal bankruptcy legislation under the guise of enforcing public duties (para. 27 (emphasis added)). en matière de faillite. si elles le sont, l’aer n’est pas autorisé à faire valoir ces réclamations en dehors du processus de faillite et avant les créanciers garantis de redwater, car cela entraverait la réalisation de l’objet du régime de priorité fédéral. il doit plutôt se conformer à la lfi et tenter de recouvrer de l’actif par le truchement de la procédure normale de faillite (abitibi, par 40). [235] dans abitibi, la cour a établi un test à trois volets, fondé sur le libellé de la lfi, pour déterminer si une réclamation est prouvable en matière de fail- lite : « premièrement, on doit être en présence d’une dette, d’un engagement ou d’une obligation envers un créancier. deuxièmement, la dette, l’engagement ou l’obligation doit avoir pris naissance avant que le débiteur ne devienne failli. troisièmement, il doit être possible d’attribuer une valeur pécuniaire à cette dette, cet engagement ou cette obligation » (par. 26 (en italique dans l’original)). comme personne ne conteste le fait que les obligations environnemen- tales de redwater ont pris naissance avant que cette dernière ne devienne faillie, je limiterai mon analyse ci- dessous aux premier et troisième volets du test établi dans abitibi : la question de savoir si l’enga- gement est dû à un créancier, et celle de savoir s’il est possible d’attribuer une valeur pécuniaire à cet engagement. [236] le premier volet du test abitibi pose la ques- tion de savoir si la dette, l’engagement ou l’obli- gation en cause sont dus par une entité faillie à un créancier. s’exprimant au nom des juges majori- taires, la juge deschamps a laissé entendre qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une exigence rigoureuse : « [à] cette étape, la seule question à trancher est de savoir si l’organisme administratif a exercé, à l’encontre d’un débiteur, son pouvoir de faire appliquer la loi. lors- qu’il le fait, il s’identifie alors comme créancier et la condition de cette étape est respectée » (par. 27 (je souligne)). je n’irais pas jusqu’à dire que l’analyse à effectuer au premier volet est une simple analyse superficielle ou pro forma et il peut fort bien exister des cas où il n’est pas satisfait à ce volet, mais la juge deschamps indique clairement dans abitibi que «  [l]a plupart des organismes administratifs [environnementaux] peuvent agir à titre de créan- ciers » (par. 27 (je souligne)), soulignant encore une 272 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. even martin ja, writing in dissent at the court of appeal in this case, acknowledged that “abitibi cast[s] the creditor net widely” (para 186). the lan- guage of abitibi admits of no ambiguity, uncertainty or doubt in this regard. [237] the majority suggests that applying abitibi on its own terms will make it “impossible for a reg- ulator not to be a creditor” (para. 136 (emphasis in original)). without seeking to speculate on all possi- ble scenarios, i would simply note that there will be many obvious circumstances in which regulators are not even exercising enforcement powers against par- ticular debtors and the analysis from abitibi can be concluded at a very early stage. provincial regulators do many things that do not qualify as enforcement mechanisms against specific parties. for example, a regulatory agency may publish guidelines for the benefit of all actors in a certain industry or it may issue a license or permit to an individual. in such cases, any discussion of frustrating federal purposes will not go far. however, as deschamps j expressly acknowledged, the first prong of the test will have very broad application. this court should not feel compelled to limit its scope when abitibi employed clear language in full recognition of its wide- ranging effects. fois que les entités gouvernementales ne sauraient systématiquement se soustraire aux exigences en matière de priorité de la loi fédérale sur la faillite sous le couvert de l’obligation de faire respecter les devoirs publics. même la juge d’appel martin, dans les motifs dissidents qu’elle a rédigés, a reconnu que [traduction] « l’arrêt abitibi ratisse large en ce qui a trait à la qualité de créancier » (par 186). le texte de cet arrêt ne laisse place à aucune ambiguïté, incertitude ou doute à cet égard. [237] les juges majoritaires soutiennent que, si l’on applique tel quel l’arrêt abitibi, cela « exclut la possibilité qu’un organisme de réglementation ne soit pas un créancier » (par. 136 (en italique dans l’original)). sans vouloir conjecturer tous les scéna- rios possibles, je ferai simplement remarquer qu’il existe de nombreuses situations évidentes où des organismes de réglementation n’exercent même pas de pouvoirs d’application à l’encontre de débiteurs en particulier, et l’analyse tirée d’abitibi peut être menée à terme très tôt. les organismes de régle- mentation font bien des choses qui ne participent pas de mécanismes d’application à l’encontre de certaines parties. par exemple, un organisme de ré- glementation peut publier des lignes directrices pour le bien de tous les acteurs d’une industrie donnée, ou encore délivrer une licence ou un permis à un parti- culier. dans ces cas, toute analyse de l’entrave à la réalisation d’objets fédéraux sera brève. or, comme l’a explicitement reconnu la juge deschamps, le premier volet du test sera d’application très large. notre cour ne devrait pas se sentir contrainte d’en restreindre la portée alors que des termes clairs sont employés dans cet arrêt pour reconnaître sans réserve ses vastes effets. [238] here, there is no doubt that the aer exer- cised its enforcement power against a debtor when it issued orders requiring redwater to perform the environmental work on the non- producing proper- ties. the reasoning is simple: redwater owes a debt to the aer, and the aer has attempted to enforce that debt by issuing the abandonment orders, which require redwater to make good on its obligation. if redwater (or gtl, as the receiver and trustee) does not abide by those orders — to the detriment of the estate’s other creditors — it can be held liable [238] en l’espèce, il ne fait aucun doute que l’aer a exercé son pouvoir d’appliquer la loi à l’encontre d’une débitrice lorsqu’il a rendu les ordonnances enjoignant à redwater d’accomplir les travaux en- vironnementaux sur les biens inexploités. le rai- sonnement est simple : redwater a une dette envers l’aer, et l’aer a tenté de recouvrer cette créance en rendant les ordonnances d’abandon, qui enjoignent à redwater d’honorer son obligation. si redwater (ou gtl, en tant que séquestre et syndic) ne res- pecte pas ces ordonnances — au détriment des autres [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 273 under provincial law. this is, by any definition, an exercise of enforcement power, which is precisely what abitibi describes. in fact, the aer itself con- ceded this point twice — first before the court of queen’s bench, and again at the court of appeal (chambers judge reasons, at para. 164; ca reasons, at para 73). [239] the conclusion that i reach with respect to the aer’s status as a creditor follows from a straight- forward application of abitibi. my colleague, how- ever, seeks to reformulate this prong of the test. he suggests that a regulator is acting as a creditor only where it is not acting in the public interest and where the regulator itself, or the general revenue fund, is the beneficiary of the environmental obligation. he endorses the holding allegedly made in northern badger that “a regulator enforcing a public duty by way of non- monetary order is not a creditor” (para 130). [240] in my view, it is neither appropriate nor nec- essary in this case to attempt to redefine this prong of abitibi and narrow the broad definition of “creditor” provided by deschamps j. this court should leave her clear description of the provable claim standard to stand on its own terms. respectfully, i disagree with the manner in which the majority is attempting to reformulate the “creditor” analysis, for a number of reasons. créanciers de l’actif — elle peut être tenue respon- sable en application de la loi provinciale. il s’agit, par définition, de l’exercice d’un pouvoir d’appliquer la loi, ce qui est précisément ce que décrit l’arrêt abitibi. en fait, l’aer a lui- même concédé ce point à deux reprises — la première fois devant la cour du banc de la reine, et la deuxième fois devant la cour d’appel (motifs du juge en cabinet, par. 164; motifs de la cour d’appel, par 73). [239] la conclusion que je tire quant au statut de créancier de l’aer découle d’une application pure et simple de l’arrêt abitibi. mon collègue, en revanche, cherche à reformuler ce volet du critère. il soutient qu’un organisme de réglementation agit comme créancier seulement lorsqu’il ne le fait pas dans l’intérêt public et lorsque l’organisme lui- même, ou le trésor, est le bénéficiaire de l’obligation environ- nementale. il fait sienne la conclusion qui aurait été tirée dans northern badger selon laquelle « un orga- nisme de réglementation faisant respecter un devoir public au moyen d’une ordonnance non pécuniaire n’est pas un créancier » (par 130). [240] à mon sens, il n’est ni approprié ni néces- saire en l’espèce d’essayer de redéfinir ce volet du critère abitibi et de restreindre le large sens attribué par la juge deschamps au mot « créancier ». la cour devrait s’en tenir à la description claire que fait la juge deschamps de la norme de la réclamation prouvable. avec égards, je ne puis me rallier à la façon dont les juges majoritaires tentent de refor- muler l’analyse relative au « créancier », et ce, pour plusieurs raisons. [241] firstly, i do not believe that this case repre- sents an appropriate opportunity to revisit the “cred- itor” stage of the abitibi test. the aer conceded in both of the courts below that it was in fact a credi- tor of gtl. as a direct result of these concessions, neither the alberta court of queen’s bench nor the majority of the court of appeal directly addressed this issue; instead, they merely provided cursory comments. this issue appears to have been raised for the first time by martin ja in her dissenting judgment. however, even her analysis is relatively brief, comprising only three paragraphs and con- sisting mainly of the statement that the costs of [241] premièrement, je ne crois pas que la présente affaire soit une bonne occasion de revoir l’étape « créancier » du critère abitibi. l’aer a concédé devant les deux tribunaux d’instance inférieure qu’il était en effet un créancier de gtl. ces concessions ont pour conséquence directe que la question n’a été abordée directement ni par la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta ni par les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel, qui se sont plutôt contentés de for- muler de brefs commentaires. cette question semble avoir été soulevée pour la première par la juge d’ap- pel martin dans ses motifs dissidents. toutefois, même son analyse est relativement brève, ne compte 274 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. abandonment are “not owed to the regulator, or to the province” (para 185). while it is true that the parties briefly addressed this issue in their written and oral submissions to this court, it was clearly not a substantial focus of their arguments. without the benefit of considered reasons from the lower courts or thorough submissions on the continued application of the first prong of the test formulated in abitibi, this court should not attempt to signifi- cantly alter it. [242] secondly, the majority states that no fairness concerns are raised by disregarding the aer’s con- cessions below. it makes this point predominantly because the issue was raised and argued before this court and because of the aer’s unilateral assertion in its letter to gtl in may 2015 however, it is important to note that the effect of the aer’s con- cessions was that gtl and atb financial were no longer required to adduce any evidence on this issue (s n lederman,. a w bryant and m k fuerst,. the law of evidence in canada (5th ed. 2018), at p 1387). this point is important given that the ma- jority’s reformulation of the “creditor” requirement under the first prong of the test is highly fact- specific and dependent on the circumstances of the particular case. as a direct result of the aer’s concession in the alberta court of queen’s bench, we cannot know what evidence gtl or atb financial could have adduced on this issue. therefore, there may indeed be real prejudice occasioned to these parties by dis- regarding the aer’s concession at this point in time. que trois paragraphes et se limite principalement à l’affirmation portant que les coûts liés à l’abandon ne sont pas dûs à [traduction] « l’organisme de régle- mentation ou à la province » (par 185). bien que les parties aient abordé succinctement la question dans leurs observations écrites et leurs plaidoiries présen- tées à la cour, ce n’était clairement pas au cœur de leur argumentaire. en l’absence de motifs réfléchis des tribunaux d’instance inférieure ou d’observations exhaustives sur l’application continue du premier volet du test formulé dans abitibi, la cour ne devrait pas tenter de le modifier substantiellement. [242] deuxièmement, selon les juges majoritaires, on ne soulève aucune préoccupation en matière d’équité en ne tenant pas compte de la concession faite par l’aer devant les tribunaux d’instance in- férieure. la majorité apporte cette précision prin- cipalement parce que la question a été soulevée et débattue devant la cour et en raison de l’affirmation unilatérale contenue dans la lettre de l’aer adressée à gtl en mai 2015. il importe toutefois de noter que les concessions de l’aer ont eu pour effet que gtl et atb financial ne sont plus tenus de présen- ter de la preuve à cet égard (s n. lederman, a w. bryant et m.  k fuerst, the law of evidence in canada (5e éd. 2018), p 1387). il s’agit d’un point important étant donné que la reformulation, par les juges majoritaires, de l’exigence « créancier » au premier volet du test est largement tributaire des faits et dépend des circonstances de l’affaire en cause. la concession de l’aer devant la cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta a pour résultat direct qu’il nous est impossible de savoir quels éléments de preuve gtl ou atb financial aurait présentés à ce sujet. par conséquent, ne pas tenir compte de la concession à ce moment-ci pourrait bien causer un véritable préjudice aux parties. [243] thirdly, my colleague relies on the fact that the chambers judge in abitibi found that the province had already expropriated three of the five sites for which it issued remediation orders and was likely us- ing the orders as a means to offset abitibibowater’s nafta claims. while the chambers judge did in fact make these findings, they were inconsequential to deschamps j.’s analysis on the “creditor” prong of the test. when applying the test to the facts of [243] troisièmement, mon collègue s’appuie sur le fait que, dans abitibi, le juge en cabinet a conclu que la province avait déjà exproprié trois des cinq sites pour lesquels elle avait émis des ordonnances exigeant la décontamination et qu’elle utilisait vrai- semblablement ces ordonnances pour compenser les réclamations d’abitibibowater fondées sur l’alena. bien que le juge en cabinet soit effecti- vement arrivé à ces conclusions, celles-ci n’ont eu [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 275 abitibi, she explained that the first prong was “eas- ily satisfied” because “the province had identified itself as a creditor by resorting to [environmental protection act, snl 2002, c e-142] enforcement mechanisms” (abitibi, at para 49). she placed no reliance on the fact that the province might itself derive a financial benefit from its actions and was not enforcing a purely public duty. her analysis was in no way based on a finding that the province’s actions were a “colourable attempt” to recover a debt or that they demonstrated an “ulterior motive” (majority reasons, at para 128). [244] fourthly, in my view, it is incorrect to rely on northern badger in this case. that decision does not support my colleague’s position in the manner he alleges. the issue in northern badger was also whether environmental remediation orders could be considered claims provable in bankruptcy. however, the crux of the dispute was whether “enforcing the re- quirement for the proper abandonment of oil and gas wells” (p. 57) gave rise to a provable claim because it would require the receiver to expend funds. laycraft cja never addressed the question of whether the regulator could be said to have a contingent claim because it would complete the abandonment work itself and assert a claim for reimbursement. it was in the context of the regulator requiring the receiver to fulfill the abandonment obligations itself that the alberta court of appeal discussed the enforcement of a public duty. it is important to carefully examine what the court of appeal actually said in this regard: aucune incidence sur l’analyse de la juge deschamps relativement au volet « créancier » du test. appli- quant le test aux faits dans l’affaire abitibi, elle a expliqué qu’il était « facile de répondre » au pre- mier volet étant donné que « la province s’est elle- même présentée comme créancière en ayant recours aux mécanismes d’application de l’[environmental protection act, snl 2002, c e-142] » (abitibi, par 49). elle n’a pas tenu compte du fait que la pro- vince pourrait elle- même tirer un avantage financier de ses actions et qu’elle n’appliquait pas un devoir purement public. son analyse ne reposait aucune- ment sur la conclusion suivant laquelle les mesures de la province étaient une « tentative déguisée » de recouvrer une créance ou témoignaient de « motifs obliques » (motifs des juges majoritaires, par 128). [244] quatrièmement, il me paraît incorrect de s’appuyer sur l’arrêt northern badger en l’espèce. cet arrêt n’étaye pas la position de mon collègue comme il l’affirme. l’arrêt northern badger por- tait également sur la question de savoir si des or- donnances de décontamination environnementale pouvaient être considérées comme des réclamations prouvables en matière de faillite. le nœud du litige consistait toutefois à établir si [traduction] « l’ap- plication de l’exigence concernant l’abandon de puits de pétrole et de gaz » (p. 57) donnait naissance en soi à une réclamation prouvable parce qu’elle exigerait du séquestre qu’il débourse des fonds. le juge en chef laycraft de la cour d’appel n’a jamais abordé la question de savoir s’il était possible d’affirmer que l’organisme de réglementation pouvait faire valoir une réclamation éventuelle du fait qu’il achèverait lui- même les travaux et présenterait une demande de remboursement. c’est dans le contexte où l’or- ganisme de réglementation exige du séquestre qu’il s’acquitte lui­ même des obligations liées à l’abandon que la cour d’appel de l’alberta s’est prononcée sur l’exécution d’un devoir public par l’organisme de réglementation. il est important d’examiner avec soin les propos tenus par la cour d’appel à cet égard : the statutory provisions requiring the abandonment of oil and gas wells are part of the general law of alberta, binding every citizen of the province. all who become licensees of oil and gas wells are bound by them. similar statutory obligations bind citizens in many other areas of [traduction] les dispositions statutaires exigeant l’abandon des puits de pétrole et de gaz font partie des lois d’application générale de l’alberta et lient tous les citoyens de la province. quiconque devient titulaire de permis relativement à de tels puits y est assujetti. les 276 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. modern life. rules relating to health, or the prevention of fires, or the clearing of ice and snow, or the demolition of unsafe structures are examples which come to mind. but the obligation of the citizen is not to the peace officer, or public authority which enforces the law. the duty is owed as a public duty by all the citizens of the community to their fellow citizens. when the citizen subject to the order complies, the result is not the recovery of money by the peace officer or public authority, or of a judgment for money, nor is that the object of the whole process. rather, it is simply the enforcement of the general law. the enforcing authority does not become a “creditor” of the citizen on whom the duty is imposed. it is true that this board has the power by statute to create in its own favour a statutory debt if it chooses to do so. it may, under sections 91(1) and (2) of the oil and gas conservation act (discussed above) do the work of abandonment itself and become a creditor for the sums expended. but the board has not done so in this case. rather it is simply in the course of enforcing observance of a part of the general law of alberta. [emphasis added; paras 33-34] [245] as is evident from para.  34 of northern badger, quoted above, the court of appeal never stated in that case that a regulator is not — or can- not be — a creditor when it is acting to enforce a public duty. in abitibi, when referring to northern badger, deschamps j. explained that the alberta court of appeal “found that the duty to undertake remediation work is owed to the public at large until the regulator exercises its power to assert a mone- tary claim” (abitibi, at para. 44 (emphasis added)). laycraft cja accepted that when the regulator fulfills an environmental obligation itself and asserts a claim for reimbursement, it does indeed “become a creditor for the sums expended”. even in this sit- uation, the public is still the ultimate beneficiary of the remediation work. this is largely consistent with deschamps j.’s formulation of the test for a prova- ble claim. in fact, this court simply extended this principle in abitibi, concluding that a regulator may also be a creditor with a provable contingent claim citoyens sont liés par des obligations statutaires similaires dans de nombreux domaines de la vie moderne. notons, par exemple, les règles relatives à la santé, à la préven- tion des incendies, à l’enlèvement de la glace et de la neige ou à la démolition des structures non sécuritaires. mais l’obligation qui incombe au citoyen n’incombe pas au policier ou à l’autorité publique qui applique la loi. l’obligation est établie comme une obligation à caractère public qui doit être respectée par l’ensemble des citoyens de la collectivité à l’égard de leurs concitoyens. lorsque le citoyen visé par l’ordonnance s’y conforme, le résultat n’est pas perçu comme le recouvrement d’une somme d’argent par un agent de la paix ou l’autorité publique, ni comme l’exécution d’un jugement ordonnant le paiement d’une somme d’argent; d’ailleurs, cela ne constitue pas non plus l’objectif de l’ensemble du processus. il faut plutôt y voir l’application d’une loi générale. l’organisme d’application de la loi ne devient pas un « créancier » du citoyen à qui incombe l’obligation. il est vrai que la loi autorise l’office à créer une créance légale en sa faveur s’il le désire. en vertu des par. 91(1) et (2) de l’oil and gas conservation act (analysée pré- cédemment), l’office peut exécuter lui- même les travaux d’abandon et devenir créancier à l’égard des sommes dé- pensées. mais il n’a pas procédé de cette façon en l’espèce. en réalité, il applique simplement une partie des lois d’ap- plication générale de l’alberta. [je souligne; par 33-34] [245] comme il ressort du par. 34 précité de l’arrêt northern badger, la cour d’appel n’a jamais men- tionné dans cette affaire qu’un organisme de régle- mentation n’a pas — ou ne peut avoir — le statut de créancier lorsqu’il fait respecter un devoir public. en parlant de northern badger dans l’arrêt abitibi, la juge deschamps a expliqué que la cour d’appel de l’alberta a « conclu que l’obligation d’entreprendre les travaux de décontamination est due au public en général jusqu’à ce que l’organisme administratif exerce son pouvoir de faire valoir une réclamation pécuniaire » (abitibi, par. 44 (je souligne)). le juge laycraft a reconnu que l’organisme de règlemen- tation qui s’acquitte lui- même d’une obligation environnementale et présente une demande de rem- boursement devient effectivement [traduction] « créancier à l’égard des sommes dépensées ». même dans une telle situation, le public demeure l’ultime bénéficiaire des travaux de décontamination, ce qui cadre largement avec la norme de la réclamation [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 277 when it is sufficiently certain that the regulator will perform the remediation work and advance a claim for reimbursement. this is precisely the situation with the aer and the owa here, as i will explain in more detail below. the alberta court of appeal did not frame the issue in terms of the three- part test that would later be developed in abitibi; it did not divide its analysis of whether a provable claim existed. however, viewed properly, deschamps j. dealt with the concerns raised in northern badger under the third prong of the abitibi test. it is not appropriate to duplicate these principles under the first prong as well, as the majority proposes. for this reason, it is misguided to rely on northern badger in this appeal to conclude that the aer is not a creditor. [246] however, even if the majority were correct about the reasoning in northern badger with respect to whether regulators enforcing public duties can be creditors — which i do not concede — i do not accept its conclusion that abitibi did not overturn that reasoning. the court was well aware of the decision in northern badger and cited it directly. despite this, deschamps j., when formulating the first prong of the test, made no distinction between regulators acting in the public interest and regula- tors acting for their own benefit. instead, she stated that “the only determination that has to be made” (para. 27) is whether the regulator is exercising its enforcement powers against a debtor. in referring to northern badger, she expressly noted that “[t]he real question is not to whom the obligation is owed, as this question is answered by the statute, which determines who can require that it be discharged” (paras. 27 and 46 (emphasis added)). prouvable énoncée par la juge deschamps. en fait, notre cour a simplement élargi ce principe dans abitibi, concluant que l’organisme de réglementation peut également avoir le statut de créancier relative- ment à une revendication éventuelle prouvable s’il est suffisamment certain qu’il exécutera les travaux de décontamination et présentera une demande de remboursement comme je l’expliquerai plus en détail, il s’agit précisément de la situation dans la- quelle se trouvent l’aer et owa en l’espèce. la cour d’appel de l’alberta n’a pas formulé la question sous l’angle du test à trois volets qui a été élaboré par la suite dans abitibi; elle n’a pas divisé son analyse de la question de savoir s’il existait une réclamation prouvable. toutefois, il est juste de considérer que la juge deschamps a traité des préoccupations expri- mées dans northern badger en fonction du troisième volet du test abitibi. il ne convient pas de reprendre ces principes au premier volet également, comme le propose la majorité. c’est pourquoi il est malavisé de se fonder sur l’arrêt northern badger en l’espèce pour conclure que l’aer n’est pas un créancier. [246] cependant, même si les juges majoritaires avaient raison quant au raisonnement dans l’arrêt northern badger à savoir si un organisme de régle- mentation faisant respecter un devoir public peut avoir le statut de créancier — ce que je ne concède pas — je ne retiens pas leur conclusion portant que l’arrêt abitibi n’a pas écarté ce raisonnement. la cour était bien au fait de la décision rendue dans northern badger et l’a citée textuellement. mal- gré cela, lorsqu’elle a formulé le premier volet du test, la juge deschamps n’a établi aucune distinction entre les organismes de réglementation qui agissent dans un intérêt public et ceux qui agissent dans leur propre intérêt. elle a plutôt affirmé que « la seule question à trancher » (par. 27) est de savoir si l’or- ganisme exerce ses pouvoirs d’application de la loi à l’encontre d’un débiteur. en mentionnant l’arrêt northern badger, elle a souligné expressément que « [l]a véritable question n’est pas de savoir à qui est due l’obligation, puisque la loi y répond en indiquant qui peut en exiger l’exécution » (par. 27 et 46 (je souligne)). [247] finally, and perhaps most importantly, sug- gesting that a regulator is not acting as a creditor [247] enfin, et fait peut- être plus important encore, laisser entendre qu’un organisme de réglementation 278 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. where its environmental enforcement activities are aimed at the public good and are for the benefit of the public effectively overrules the first prong of the abitibi test. under my colleague’s approach, it is no longer the case that the only determination that has to be made at the creditor stage of the analysis is “whether the regulatory body has exercised its enforcement power against a debtor” (abitibi, at para 27). instead, the court must consider whether the regulatory body is enforcing a public duty and whether it stands to benefit financially from the ful- fillment of the obligation in question. [248] provincial regulators, in exercising their stat- utory environmental powers, will, in some sense, virtually always be acting in some public interest or for the benefit of some segment of the public. under my colleague’s reformulation of the first prong of the abitibi test, it will be nearly impossible to find that regulators acting to protect environmental interests are ever creditors, outside the facts of abitibi itself. as a result, provincial entities will be able to com- pletely disregard the bia’s priority scheme as long as they can plausibly point to some public interest that is furthered by their actions. such a result strips abitibi of its central holding and entitles provincial regulators to easily upend parliament’s purpose of providing an equitable recovery scheme in bank- ruptcy for all creditors. in my view, it is insufficient to simply note [249] that the facts of abitibi differ from those of the present appeal (majority reasons, at para.  136). deschamps j.’s broad articulation of the first prong of the test was in no way made dependent upon the particular facts of abitibi. she sought to provide a clear general framework for determining when a regulator will be classified as a creditor — a frame- work that the majority’s reasons effectively rewrite. n’agit pas comme créancier quand ses activités de protection de l’environnement visent le bien public et profitent au public écarte dans les faits le premier volet du test abitibi suivant l’approche de mon collègue, la question de savoir « si l’organisme [de réglementation] a exercé, à l’encontre d’un débi- teur, son pouvoir de faire appliquer la loi » (abitibi, par. 27) n’est plus la seule question à trancher à l’étape « créancier » de l’analyse. le tribunal doit plutôt se demander si l’organisme de réglementation fait respecter un devoir public et s’il peut tirer un avantage financier de l’acquittement de l’obligation en question. [248] dans l’exercice des pouvoirs que la loi leur confie en matière d’environnement, les organismes de réglementation provinciaux agissent, en quelque sorte, toujours dans un intérêt public ou au bénéfice d’une partie de la population. selon le premier volet du test abitibi reformulé par mon collègue, il sera presque impossible de conclure que les organismes de réglementation protégeant les droits environne- mentaux sont des « créanciers » à l’extérieur du cadre de l’arrêt abitibi lui- même. par conséquent, les entités provinciales pourront totalement ignorer le régime de priorité de la lfi tant qu’elles sont en mesure de relever un quelconque intérêt public qui est servi par leurs actions. pareil résultat vide l’arrêt abitibi de sa conclusion centrale et permet aux orga- nismes de réglementation provinciaux de faire obs- tacle aisément à l’objectif du parlement d’instaurer un régime équitable de recouvrement des créances en matière de faillite au bénéfice de tous les créanciers. [249] à mon avis, il ne suffit pas de noter sim- plement que les faits de l’affaire abitibi diffèrent de ceux de l’espèce (motifs des juges majoritaires, par 136). les termes larges employés par la juge deschamps pour formuler le premier volet du test n’étaient aucunement tributaires des faits propres à cette affaire. elle a cherché à établir un cadre général clair indiquant dans quelles circonstances l’orga- nisme de réglementation sera considéré comme un créancier, un cadre effectivement remanié dans les motifs de la majorité. [250] further, it is worth noting that this court in moloney followed abitibi in applying the broad [250] en outre, il convient de souligner que, dans moloney, la cour a suivi l’arrêt abitibi en [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 279 definition of “creditor”. in moloney, this court con- cluded that the province of alberta was acting as a creditor even though the debt it was collecting was reimbursement for compensating a third party who had been injured by the debtor in a car accident (para 55). i fail to see how any meaningful distinc- tion can be drawn between that situation and a situ- ation in which a regulator seeks reimbursement for the costs incurred to remedy environmental damage caused to the land of third parties by the debtor. [251] “[g]reat care should be taken” before this court overturns or overrules one of its prior deci- sions (teva canada ltd. v. td canada trust, 2017 scc 51, [2017] 2 scr 317, at para 65). it is “a step not to be lightly undertaken” (canada v. craig, 2012 scc 43, [2012] 2 scr 489, at para 24). in order to do so, “the court must be satisfied based on compelling reasons that the precedent was wrongly decided and should be overruled” (craig, at para. 25; see also teva, at para 65). the reasons for exer- cising such caution are clear and sound, namely to ensure “certainty, consistency and institutional le- gitimacy” and to recognize that “the public relies on our disciplined ability to respect precedent” (teva, at para 65). when this court decides that it is necessary to depart from one of its past decision, it should be clear about what it is doing and why. appliquant la définition large de « créancier ». dans cette affaire, la cour a conclu que la province de l’alberta agissait à titre de créancier même si la créance qu’elle cherchait à recouvrer était le rem- boursement d’une indemnité versée à une tierce partie blessée par le débiteur dans un accident de voiture (par 55). je ne vois pas en quoi il est pos- sible d’établir quelque véritable distinction que ce soit entre cette situation et celle d’un organisme de réglementation qui chercherait à obtenir le rem- boursement des dépenses engagées pour réparer des dommages environnementaux causés au terrain d’un tiers par le débiteur. [251] « [u]ne grande prudence s’impose » avant que notre cour n’infirme ou n’écarte l’un de ses précédents (teva canada ltée c. td canada trust, 2017 csc 51, [2017] 2 rcs 317, par 65). cette étape ne peut être accomplie « à la légère » (ca­ nada c. craig, 2012 csc 43, [2012] 2 rcs 489, par 24). pour ce faire, la cour doit « être convain- cue, pour des raisons impérieuses, que la décision est erronée et qu’elle devrait être écartée » (craig, par. 25; voir aussi teva, par 65). il y de bonnes rai- sons qui, clairement, justifient de prendre une telle précaution, à savoir assurer « la certitude, la cohé- rence et la légitimité institutionnelle » et reconnaître que « le public s’attend à ce que nous respections scrupuleusement nos précédents » (teva, par 65). lorsque la cour juge nécessaire de s’écarter de l’un de ses précédents, sa décision et ce qui la motive devraient être clairs. [252] despite these clear admonitions against this court too easily overturning its own precedents, that is precisely what the majority proposes to do in this case. its approach effectively overrules the unequivocal definition of “creditor” provided in abitibi — a considered decision rendered by a ma- jority of this court a mere six years ago. not only does the majority fail to provide compelling reasons why deschamps j.’s clear definition is wrong, but it also does not acknowledge that it is overturn- ing a recent decision of this court, rejecting the suggestion that this is the impact of its reasoning (para.  136) further, this is being done without complete and robust submissions on the issue. such an approach to our own precedents does not serve [252] malgré ces mises en garde claires contre l’idée pour la cour d’écarter trop aisément ses propres précé- dents, c’est précisément ce que les juges majoritaires proposent de faire en l’espèce. leur approche revient, dans les faits, à infirmer la définition sans équivoque de « créancier » énoncée dans l’arrêt abitibi — une décision réfléchie rendue par les juges majoritaires de la cour il y a six ans à peine. en plus de ne fournir aucune raison impérieuse qui expliquerait en quoi la définition claire de la juge deschamps est erronée, les juges majoritaires, dans leurs motifs, ne reconnaissent pas qu’ils écartent une décision récente de la cour et rejettent la proposition que c’est là l’incidence de leur raisonnement (par 136). qui plus est, ils ont pris leur décision en l’absence d’observations complètes 280 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. the goals of certainty, consistency or institutional legitimacy. [253] this court should continue to apply the “creditor” prong of the test as it was clearly artic- ulated in abitibi. deschamps j.’s definition ensures that provincial regulators are not able to easily ap- propriate for themselves a higher priority in bank- ruptcy and undermine parliament’s priority scheme. it advances the goals of orderliness and fairness in insolvency proceedings. under that broad standard, the aer plainly acted as a creditor with respect to the redwater estate. that is likely why it conceded this point in both of the courts below. [254] since there is no dispute that the second prong of the abitibi test is satisfied, i turn next to the third prong, which asks whether it is sufficiently certain that the regulator will perform the work and make a claim for reimbursement. as explained in abitibi in the context of an environmental order: with respect to the third requirement, that it be possible to attach a monetary value to the obligation, the question is whether orders that are not expressed in monetary terms can be translated into such terms. i note that when a regu- latory body claims an amount that is owed at the relevant date, that is, when it frames its order in monetary terms, the court does not need to make this determination, because what is being claimed is an “indebtedness” and therefore clearly falls within the meaning of “claim” as defined in s. 12(1) of the ccaa. et étoffées à ce sujet. adopter une telle approche à l’égard de nos propres précédents ne permet pas d’at- teindre les objectifs de certitude, de cohérence ou de légitimité institutionnelle. [253] la cour devrait continuer d’appliquer l’ana- lyse relative au « créancier » telle qu’elle a été clai- rement formulée dans l’arrêt abitibi. la définition de la juge deschamps empêche les organismes de réglementation provinciaux de s’approprier faci- lement un rang supérieur en matière de faillite et de saper le régime de priorité du parlement. cette définition favorise l’atteinte des objectifs d’ordre et d’équité dans les procédures d’insolvabilité. suivant ce critère général, l’aer a clairement agi comme créancier relativement à l’actif de redwater, et c’est probablement pour cette raison qu’il a concédé ce point devant les deux tribunaux d’instance inférieure. [254] puisque personne ne conteste qu’il est satis- fait au second volet du test abitibi, je passe main- tenant au troisième volet, qui pose la question de savoir s’il est suffisamment certain que l’organisme de réglementation exécutera les travaux et présentera une demande de remboursement. comme l’explique l’arrêt abitibi, dans le contexte d’une ordonnance environnementale : en ce qui concerne la troisième condition, soit qu’il doit être possible d’attribuer à l’obligation une valeur pé- cuniaire, la question est de savoir si des ordonnances qui ne sont pas formulées en termes pécuniaires peuvent être formulées en de tels termes. je souligne que lorsqu’un or- ganisme administratif réclame une somme qui est due à la date pertinente, il formule ainsi son ordonnance en termes pécuniaires. le tribunal n’a alors aucune détermination à faire à cette étape car ce qui est réclamé est une « dette » et est, par conséquent, clairement visé par la définition d’une « réclamation » prévue au par. 12(1) de la lacc.   .   . the criterion used by courts to determine whether a contingent claim will be included in the insolvency process is whether the event that has not yet occurred is too re- mote or speculative (confederation treasury services ltd. (bankrupt), re (1997), 96 oac 75). in the context of an environmental order, this means that there must be suffi- cient indications that the regulatory body that triggered the le critère retenu par les tribunaux pour décider si une réclamation éventuelle sera incluse dans le processus d’in- solvabilité est celui qui consiste à déterminer si l’événe- ment non encore survenu est trop éloigné ou conjectural (confederation treasury service ltd (bankrupt), re (1997), 96 oac 75). dans le contexte d’une ordon- nance environnementale, cela signifie qu’il doit y avoir [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 281 enforcement mechanism will ultimately perform remedia- tion work and assert a monetary claim to have its costs re- imbursed. if there is sufficient certainty in this regard, the court will conclude that the order can be subjected to the insolvency process. [emphasis added; paras. 30 and 36.] in my view, it is sufficiently certain that ei- [255] ther the aer or the owa will ultimately perform the abandonment and reclamation work and assert a monetary claim for reimbursement. therefore, the fi- nal prong of the abitibi test is satisfied. the chambers judge made three critical findings of fact — each of which is entitled to deference on appeal (housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at para. 10) — that easily support this conclusion. [256] first, wittmann cj found that gtl was not in possession of the disclaimed properties and, in any event, “has no ability to perform any kind of work on these assets” because the environmental liabilities exceeded the value of the estate itself (para. 170; see also abitibi, at para. 53 where the court stated that: “abitibi had no means to perform the remediation work”). he discounted the possibility that any of redwater’s working interest participants would step in to perform the work, even for the small number of redwater’s licensed assets for which such partners existed (chambers judge reasons, at para 171). in sum, he concluded that “there is no other party who could be compelled to carry out the abandonment work” (para 172). des indications suffisantes permettant de conclure que l’organisme administratif qui a eu recours aux mécanismes d’application de la loi effectuera en fin de compte des travaux de décontamination et présentera une réclamation pécuniaire afin d’obtenir le remboursement de ses débours. si cela est suffisamment certain, le tribunal conclura que l’ordonnance peut être assujettie au processus d’insolva- bilité. [je souligne; par. 30 et 36] [255] à mon avis, il est suffisamment certain que l’aer ou l’owa effectuera ultimement les travaux d’abandon et de remise en état et fera valoir une réclamation pécuniaire afin d’obtenir un rembour- sement. il est donc satisfait au dernier volet du test abitibi. le juge en cabinet a tiré trois conclusions de fait cruciales — chacune d’elles commandant la déférence en appel (housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, par. 10) — qui appuient aisément cette conclusion. [256] premièrement, le juge en chef wittmann a conclu que gtl n’était pas en possession des biens vi- sés par les renonciations et, de toute façon, il [traduc- tion] « ne peut pas exécuter de travaux sur les biens » parce que les engagements environnementaux dépas- saient la valeur de l’actif même (par. 170; voir égale- ment abitibi, par. 53, où la cour a dit que : « abitibi ne disposait d’aucune ressource pour exécuter les travaux »). il a écarté la possibilité que les participants en participation directe de redwater se chargent de le faire même à l’égard des quelques biens visés par des permis de redwater pour lesquels de tels partenaires existaient (motifs du juge en cabinet, par 171). bref, il a conclu [traduction] « qu’il n’existe aucune autre partie susceptible d’être contrainte d’exécuter les travaux d’abandon » (par 172). [257] two decisions of the ontario court of appeal highlight why this is important. in nortel networks corp., re, 2013 onca 599, 6 cbr (6th) 159, juriansz ja found that the “sufficient certainty” standard was not satisfied in respect of certain sites because those sites had already been sold so the purchasers could be compelled to carry out the work on the basis that they were jointly and severally li- able for the remediation obligations (paras 39-40). but in northstar aerospace inc., re, 2013 onca 600, 8 cbr (6th) 154, juriansz ja found that the [257] deux décisions de la cour d’appel de l’on- tario font ressortir pourquoi cela est important. dans nortel networks corp., re, 2013 onca 599, 6 cbr (6th) 159, le juge juriansz a conclu qu’il n’était pas satisfait au critère de la « certitude suffi- sante » relativement à certains sites parce que ceux-ci avaient déjà été achetés. les acheteurs pouvaient par conséquent être contraints d’exécuter les travaux parce qu’ils étaient solidairement responsables des obligations de décontamination (par 39-40). mais dans northstar aerospace inc., re, 2013 onca 600, 282 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. “sufficient certainty” standard was satisfied because there was no purchaser that could be compelled by the regulator to complete the work. while it is true that fresh evidence on appeal revealed that the ministry of the environment had commenced the re- mediation work, juriansz ja found that the fact that there were no subsequent purchasers had grounded the application judge’s implicit conclusion regarding sufficient certainty (paras 16-17). the present case is like northstar, which is perfectly applicable to the facts of this case: there is no purchaser to take on redwater’s assets, and the debtor itself is insolvent. the chambers judge in this case concluded that there was no other party who could be compelled to carry out the work. [258] second, in light of the fact that neither gtl nor redwater’s working interest participants would (or could) undertake this work, wittmann cj found as a fact that “the aer will ultimately be responsi- ble for [the abandonment] costs” (para 171). he concluded that “the aer has the power [to seek recovery of abandonment costs] and has actually performed the work on occasion” (para 168). in fact, in this very case, “the aer has expressly stated an intention to seek reimbursement for the costs of abandoning the renounced assets” (para 172). this conclusion finds ample support in the record. in a cover letter sent with the abandonment orders on july 15, 2015, the aer unambiguously stated that if redwater failed to abandon the disclaimed prop- erties in accordance with its instructions, “the aer will, without further notice, use its process to have the properties abandoned” (gtl’s record, vol. i, at p. 102 (emphasis added)). the letter further stated that “[t]he aer will exercise all remedies available to it to recover the costs from the liable parties” (p. 102 (emphasis added)). the chambers judge did not err in relying on these unequivocal statements from the aer itself — to the effect that it will have the abandonment work performed and seek reim- bursement — to conclude that sufficient certainty existed in this case. 8 cbr (6th) 154, le juge juriansz a conclu qu’il était satisfait au critère de la « certitude suffisante » parce qu’il n’y avait pas d’acheteur qui pouvait être contraint d’exécuter les travaux par l’organisme de réglementation. certes, les éléments de preuve nou- veaux déposés en appel révèlent que le ministère de l’environnement avait amorcé les travaux de décon- tamination, mais le juge juriansz a conclu que l’ab- sence d’acheteurs subséquents justifiait la conclusion implicite du juge de première instance quant à la certitude suffisante (par 16-17). la présente affaire s’apparente à northstar, qui s’applique parfaitement aux faits de l’espèce : il n’y a aucun acheteur pour prendre en charge les biens de redwater, et la dé- bitrice elle- même est insolvable. le juge en cabinet en l’espèce a conclu qu’il n’existe aucune autre par- tie qui pourrait être contrainte d’exécuter les travaux. [258] deuxièmement, compte tenu du fait que ni gtl ni les participants en participation directe de redwater ne voudraient (ou ne pourraient) entre- prendre ces travaux, le juge en chef wittmann a tiré la conclusion de fait selon laquelle [traduction] « l’aer sera en fin de compte responsable des frais [d’abandon] » (par 171). il a conclu que « l’aer a le pouvoir [de tenter de recouvrer les frais d’abandon] et a réellement exécuté les travaux à l’occasion » (par 168). dans les faits, en l’espèce, « l’aer a expressément manifesté l’intention de demander le remboursement des frais liés à l’abandon des biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation » (par 172). cette conclusion est amplement étayée par le dossier. dans la lettre du 15 juillet 2015 accompagnant les ordon- nances d’abandon, l’aer a déclaré sans équivoque que, si redwater ne procède pas à l’abandon des biens visés par les renonciations conformément aux directives de l’aer, [traduction] « l’aer utili- sera, sans autre avis, sa procédure pour faire aban- donner les biens » (dossier de gtl, vol. i, p. 102 (je souligne)) la lettre indiquait également que « [l’]aer exercera tous les recours dont il dispose pour recouvrer les frais des parties responsables » (p. 102 (je souligne)). le juge siégeant en cabinet n’a pas commis d’erreur en se fondant sur ces décla- rations sans équivoque de l’aer lui- même — selon lesquelles il fera exécuter les travaux d’abandon et demandera un remboursement — pour conclure qu’il y avait une certitude suffisante en l’espèce. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 283 [259] although there is some contrary evidence in the record — principally, the remarks of an aer affi- ant, who stated that the aer would not abandon the properties — wittmann cj did not commit any pal- pable and overriding error by giving more weight to the letter that the aer sent contemporaneously with the abandonment orders. likewise, to the extent that the aer sent other correspondence stating that it was not a creditor and that it was not asserting a provable claim, wittmann cj did not err in discounting these self- serving statements as insufficiently probative on the ultimate legal questions. there is therefore no basis to disturb these factual findings or to reweigh this evidence on appeal. [260] even if the aer’s admission that it would abandon the properties itself is not sufficient on its own, wittmann cj made a third critical finding of fact: the aer’s only “realistic alternativ[e] to per- forming the remediation work itself” was to deem the renounced assets to be orphan wells (para 172). in this circumstance, he found that “the legislation and evidence shows that if the aer deems a well an orphan, then the owa will perform the work” (para. 166 (emphasis added)). [261] in light of these factual determinations, wittmann cj rightly concluded that the “sufficient certainty” standard of abitibi was satisfied. he elabo- rated on the legal basis for that conclusion as follows: does this situation meet the sufficient certainty crite- rion as described in abitibibowater? the answer is no in a narrow and technical sense, since it is unclear whether the aer will perform the work itself or if it will deem the properties subject to the orders, orphans. if so, the owa will probably perform the work, although not necessarily within a definite timeframe. however, the situation does meet, in my opinion, what was intended by the majority of the court in abitibibowater    in the result, i find that although not expressed in monetary terms, the aer orders are in this case intrinsically financial. [para. 173] [259] bien qu’il y ait certains éléments de preuve contraires au dossier — notamment les propos d’un déclarant de l’aer selon lesquels l’aer ne pro- céderait pas à l’abandon des biens — le juge en chef wittmann n’a pas commis d’erreur manifeste et dominante en accordant plus de poids à la lettre que l’aer a envoyée en même temps que les or- donnances d’abandon. de même, dans la mesure où l’aer a envoyé d’autres lettres dans lesquelles il déclarait ne pas être un créancier et ne pas faire valoir une réclamation prouvable, le juge en chef wittmann n’a pas commis d’erreur en faisant abstraction de ces déclarations intéressées parce qu’elles n’étaient pas suffisamment probantes quant aux questions de droit ultimes. il n’y a donc aucune raison de modifier ces conclusions de fait ou d’apprécier de nouveau ces éléments de preuve en appel. [260] même si la déclaration de l’aer selon la- quelle il procéderait lui- même à l’abandon des biens n’est pas suffisante en soi, le juge en chef wittmann a tiré une troisième conclusion de fait cruciale : la seule [traduction] « solution réaliste [qui s’offre à l’aer] autre que celle d’effectuer lui- même les travaux de décontamination » était de considérer les biens faisant l’objet de la renonciation comme des puits orphelins (par 172). il a conclu qu’en pareil cas, « les disposi- tions législatives et les éléments de preuve démontrent que, si l’aer considère un puits comme orphelin, l’owa exécutera les travaux » (par. 166 (je souligne)). [261] à la lumière de ces conclusions de fait, le juge en chef wittmann a eu raison de conclure qu’il était satisfait à la norme de « certitude suffisante » énoncée dans abitibi. il a précisé ainsi le fondement juridique de cette conclusion : [traduction] la situation répond- elle au critère de la cer- titude suffisante décrit dans l’arrêt abitibibowater? au sens strict et technique du terme, la réponse est non, car il n’est pas clair si l’aer effectuera lui- même les travaux ou s’il considérera les biens visés par les ordonnances comme or- phelins. dans l’affirmative, l’owa exécutera probablement les travaux, mais pas nécessairement dans un délai précis. la situation correspond toutefois, à mon avis, à ce qu’ont voulu les juges majoritaires de la cour dans abitibibowater   . par conséquent, je conclus que, bien qu’elles ne soient pas formulées en termes pécuniaires, les ordonnances de l’aer sont, en l’espèce, intrinsèquement financières. [par. 173] 284 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [262] my colleague does not specify the standard of review he applies in overturning wittmann cj’s application of the third prong of the abitibi test to this case. nevertheless, he disagrees with the cham- bers judge and holds that the “sufficient certainty” standard is not satisfied. he offers two reasons for overruling wittmann cj’s finding; but in doing so, he does not identify any palpable and overriding error (or, even under the non- deferential standard of correctness, any true error) in the chambers judge’s ultimate conclusion. [263] the first reason — the purported legal error of determining that the abandonment orders are “intrinsically financial” — is little more than a dis- traction. even if this is an erroneous application of abitibi, it is evident that wittmann cj was of the view, at a minimum, that either the aer or the owa would complete the abandonment work. and as i describe below, this alone is enough to satisfy the “sufficient certainty” standard. my colleague over- emphasizes the import of this stray comment in the context of a thorough set of reasons that otherwise faithfully applies the correct standard. any legal er- ror on this basis, to the extent that one exists, does not displace the result that the chambers judge reached. [264] the second reason is more substantial. ac- cording to wagner cj, whether the aer will perform the abandonment work itself or delegate that task to the owa is dispositive, since it was the province itself that undertook the reclamation work in abitibi. here, he suggests, “the owa is not the regulator” (para. 147) and thus the involvement of the owa “is insufficient to satisfy the ‘sufficient certainty’ test” (para 146). [262] mon collègue ne précise pas la norme de contrôle qu’il applique en infirmant l’application par le juge en chef wittmann du troisième volet du test abitibi à la présente affaire. néanmoins, il est en dé- saccord avec le juge en cabinet et conclut qu’il n’est pas satisfait au volet de la « certitude suffisante ». il donne deux raisons pour infirmer la conclusion du juge en chef wittmann; mais ce faisant, il ne relève aucune erreur manifeste et dominante (ni même une véritable erreur selon la norme de la décision cor- recte, qui ne commande aucune déférence) dans la conclusion ultime du juge en cabinet. [263] la première raison, la prétendue erreur de droit consistant à décider que les ordonnances d’abandon sont [traduction] « intrinsèquement financières », n’est guère plus qu’une distraction. même s’il s’agit d’une application erronée de l’arrêt abitibi, il est mani- feste que le juge en chef wittmann a estimé, au moins, que l’aer ou l’owa mènerait à terme les travaux d’abandon. et comme je l’explique plus loin, cela suffit en soi pour satisfaire à la norme de « certitude suffisante ». mon collègue surestime l’importance de ce commentaire isolé dans le contexte d’un ensemble de motifs étoffés où la norme appropriée est par ail- leurs fidèlement appliquée. toute erreur de droit de ce genre, dans la mesure où il en existe une, n’écarte en rien le résultat auquel est arrivé le juge en cabinet. [264] la deuxième raison est plus sérieuse. se- lon le juge en chef wagner, la question de savoir si l’aer effectuera lui- même les travaux d’abandon ou s’il déléguera cette tâche à l’owa est déterminante, car c’est la province elle- même qui a procédé aux travaux de décontamination dans abitibi. dans l’af- faire qui nous occupe, suggère-t-il, « l’owa n’est pas l’organisme de réglementation » (par. 147) et, en conséquence, l’intervention de l’owa « est in- suffisante pour satisfaire au critère de la “certitude suffisante” » (par 146). [265] accepting, for a moment, the potential rel- evance of this distinction, i am of the view that any uncertainty as to whether the aer would delegate the reclamation work to the owa is questionable. my colleague’s emphasis on the self- serving remarks of an aer affiant and the fact that the aer took no immediate steps to perform the abandonment work [265] acceptant pour un instant la pertinence éven- tuelle de cette distinction, j’estime que toute incerti- tude quant à la question de savoir si l’aer déléguerait l’exécution des travaux de décontamination à l’owa est discutable. l’importance qu’accorde mon collègue aux propos intéressés d’un déclarant de l’aer et au fait que l’aer n’a rien fait sur-le- champ pour exécuter [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 285 itself amounts to little more than post hoc appellate fact finding, especially in light of the aer’s own statement. although wittmann cj suggested that it was “unclear” whether the aer would complete this work itself, his other findings of fact and law — that the aer has the statutory power to perform the work, that it has actually done so in the past, and that it expressly stated its intention to seek reimbursement here — suggest otherwise. regardless, wittmann cj’s remark that the “sufficient certainty” standard was not satisfied “in a narrow and technical sense” must be read in this context: he was simply suggest- ing that there was some uncertainty as to “whether the aer will perform the work itself” as opposed to delegating the work to the owa (para 173). he was not implying — let alone concluding as a matter of law — that gtl had failed to prove the third prong of the abitibi test. that reading would vastly over- state, and completely decontextualize, the meaning of a few isolated words in his reasons. [266] the more important problem, though, is that any distinction between the performance of the abandonment work by the aer and its performance by the owa is meaningless. form is elevated over substance if it is concluded that the “sufficient cer- tainty” standard is not satisfied when a regulatory body’s delegate, as opposed to the regulatory body itself, performs the work. and despite my colleague’s suggestion that a regulatory body cannot act strate- gically to evade abitibi, that is precisely what his analysis permits. lui- même les travaux d’abandon ne constitue rien de moins qu’une appréciation des faits après coup en appel, surtout compte tenu de la propre déclara- tion de l’aer. bien que le juge en chef wittmann ait affirmé qu’il n’était [traduction] « pas clair » si l’aer effectuerait lui- même les travaux, ses autres conclusions de fait et de droit — que la loi confère à l’aer le pouvoir d’exécuter les travaux, qu’il l’a réellement fait dans le passé et qu’il a expressément manifesté l’intention de demander un remboursement en l’espèce — indiquent le contraire. quoi qu’il en soit, la remarque du juge en chef wittmann selon la- quelle il n’était pas satisfait à la norme de « certitude suffisante » « au sens strict et technique » doit être interprétée dans ce contexte : il voulait tout simple- ment dire qu’il y avait une certaine incertitude quant à savoir « si l’aer effectuera[it] lui- même les travaux » au lieu de déléguer les travaux à l’owa (par 173). il ne sous- entendait pas — et concluait encore moins en droit — que gtl n’avait pas réussi à établir le troisième volet du test abitibi. cette interprétation exagère considérablement le sens de quelques mots isolés contenus dans ses motifs, et sort complètement ces mots de leur contexte. [266] le problème le plus important, cependant, c’est que toute distinction entre l’exécution des tra- vaux d’abandon par l’aer et leur exécution par l’owa est dénuée de sens c’est faire passer la forme avant le fond que de conclure qu’il n’est pas satisfait à la norme de « certitude suffisante » lorsque le délégataire de l’organisme de réglemen- tation, et non l’organisme de réglementation lui- même, effectue les travaux. et malgré l’affirmation de mon collègue selon laquelle un organisme de réglementation ne saurait stratégiquement éviter l’arrêt abitibi, c’est précisément ce que son analyse permet de faire. [267] we are told that the “owa’s true nature” (majority reasons, at para. 147) — and therefore what purports to distinguish this case from impermissible examples of strategic delegation — rests on four factors: (1) the owa is a non- profit organization; (2) it has an independent board of directors; (3) it has its own mandate and determines “when and how it will perform environmental work” (para. 148); and (4) it is “financially independent” (para. 148) as it is [267] on nous dit que la «  véritable nature de l’owa » (motifs majoritaires, par. 147) — et, par conséquent, ce qui est censé distinguer la présente affaire des exemples inadmissibles de délégation stratégique — repose sur quatre facteurs : (1) l’owa est un organisme sans but lucratif; (2) elle a un con- seil d’administration indépendant; (3) elle dispose de son propre mandat et décide « quand et de quelle ma- nière elle exécutera des travaux environnementaux » 286 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. funded “almost entirely” by a tax on the oil and gas industry (para 23). (par. 148); (4) elle est « financièrement indépen- dante » (par. 148) et « presque entièrement » finan- cée par une taxe imposée à l’industrie pétrolière et gazière (par 23). [268] the first point is true, but irrelevant. why does an organization’s non- profit status have any bearing on whether it is being used as a vehicle to avoid the “sufficient certainty” standard under abitibi? [268] le premier point est exact, mais non perti- nent. pourquoi le statut d’organisme sans but lucratif aurait-il une incidence sur la question de savoir s’il est utilisé comme moyen d’éviter la norme de « cer- titude suffisante » fixée dans abitibi? [269] the second point is not accurate. the aer appoints members of the owa’s board of directors, as does another provincial body, alberta environment and parks — underscoring the extent to which the provincial government can influence the owa’s ac- tivities. [269] le deuxième point est inexact l’aer nomme les membres du conseil d’administration de l’owa, comme le fait un autre organisme provincial, alberta environment and parks — ce qui fait res- sortir à quel point le gouvernement provincial peut influencer les activités de l’owa. [270] the third point overstates the owa’s level of independence the orphan fund delegated administration regulation, alta reg.  45/2001, gives the aer substantial power to influence the owa’s decision making section  3(2)(b) of the regulation expressly states that, in fulfilling its delegated powers, duties and functions, the owa must act in accordance with “applicable require- ments, guidelines, directions and orders of the [aer]”. the regulation also mandates that the owa provide information to the aer on request and regularly submit reports indicating or contain- ing its budget, “goals, strategies and performance measures”, activities for the previous year and financial statements (s 6). the aer appears to be able to exercise substantial control and oversight over the owa if it so chooses, including over the manner in which the owa carries out its environ- mental work. [270] le troisième point surestime l’indépendance de l’owa. le orphan fund delegated adminis­ tration regulation, alta. reg. 45/2001, accorde à l’aer le pouvoir important d’influencer la prise de décisions de l’owa. l’alinéa 3(2)(b) du règlement dispose en termes exprès que, dans l’exercice des pouvoirs, obligations et attributions qui lui sont déléguées, l’owa doit se conformer aux [traduc- tion] « conditions, lignes directrices, directives et ordonnances applicables de [l’aer] ». le règle- ment exige que l’owa fournisse sur demande des renseignements à l’aer et dépose périodiquement des rapports décrivant son budget de même que ses « objectifs, stratégies, mesures du rendement », activités de l’année précédente et états financiers (art 6). l’aer semble être à même d’exercer beau- coup d’emprise et de surveillance sur l’owa, si tel est son désir, y compris sur la manière dont l’owa effectue ses travaux environnementaux. [271] the fourth point is also inaccurate and would probably be irrelevant even if it were accurate. the province has provided funding to the owa in the past, including a $30 million contribution in 2009 and an additional $50,000 in 2012, and it has an- nounced that it will loan the owa an additional $230 million (see af, at para. 99 (alluding to this loan); recall abitibi, at para. 58 where the court stated that: “earmarking money may be a strong [271] le quatrième point est lui aussi inexact et il n’aurait probablement aucune pertinence même s’il était exact. la province a fourni des fonds à l’owa dans le passé, notamment une contribution de 30 mil- lions de dollars en 2009 et une somme supplémen- taire de 50 000 $ en 2012, et elle a annoncé qu’elle prêtera une somme supplémentaire de 230 millions de dollars à l’owa (voir le ma, par. 99 (faisant al- lusion à ce prêt); rappelons ce que la cour a affirmé [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 287 indicator that a province will perform remediation work”). in any event, it is important to note the more [272] salient features of the owa and its relationship with the aer (and, more generally, with the provincial government). the owa operates under legal au- thority delegated to it by the aer and in accordance with a memorandum of understanding it has signed with both the aer and alberta environment and parks. the orphan fund itself is administered by the aer, which prescribes and collects industry contributions and remits the funds to the owa. the owa cannot increase the industry levy without first obtaining approval from the alberta treasury board. in addition, the ogca makes clear that abandon- ment costs incurred by any person authorized by the aer — which would include the owa — constitute a debt payable to the aer (ogca, s 30(5)). the re- cord shows that the aer has remitted abandonment costs to the owa in the past, in the form of security deposits and amounts recovered through successful enforcement action against licensees. [273] the aer and the owa are therefore inextri- cably intertwined. we should see this arrangement for what it is: when the aer exercises its statutory powers to declare a property an “orphan” under s. 70(2) of the ogca, it effectively delegates the abandonment work to the owa. treating the owa’s work as mean- ingfully different from abandonment activities carried out by the aer turns a blind eye to this reality and does nothing to further the underlying principles of paramountcy. to the contrary, it provides provincial regulators with an easy way to evade the test of abitibi through strategic behaviour, thereby undermining the legitimate federal interest in enforcing the bia’s pri- ority scheme. it should not matter which body carries out the work (see ca reasons, at para. 78; ogca, s 70(1)(a)(ii)). dans abitibi, par. 58 : « [l]e fait de prévoir un budget peut constituer un indicateur clair qu’une province exécutera des travaux de décontamination »). [272] quoi qu’il en soit, il importe de souligner les caractéristiques plus saillantes de l’owa et de sa relation avec l’aer (et, de façon plus générale, avec le gouvernement provincial). l’owa agit en vertu du pouvoir légal qui lui est délégué par l’aer et confor- mément au protocole d’entente qu’elle a signé avec l’aer et alberta environment and parks. le fonds pour les puits orphelins est lui- même administré par l’aer, qui fixe et recueille les contributions de l’in- dustrie et remet les fonds à l’owa. l’owa ne peut pas augmenter les prélèvements qu’elle effectue au- près de l’industrie sans d’abord obtenir l’approbation du conseil du trésor de l’alberta. de plus, l’ogca indique clairement que les frais liés à l’abandon en- gagés par toute personne autorisée par l’aer — y compris l’owa — constituent une dette payable à l’aer (ogca, par 30(5)). le dossier révèle que l’aer a versé des frais d’abandon à l’owa dans le passé, sous la forme de dépôts de garantie et de sommes recouvrées grâce à des mesures de recouvre- ment réussies à l’encontre des titulaires de permis. [273] l’aer et l’owa sont donc inextricablement liés. il faut reconnaître cet arrangement pour ce qu’il est : lorsque l’aer exerce le pouvoir de déclarer un bien [traduction] « orphelin » que lui confère le par. 70(2) de l’ogca, il délègue effectivement l’exé- cution des travaux d’abandon à l’owa. considérer les travaux de l’owa comme significativement dif- férents des activités d’abandon menées par l’aer ne tient pas compte de cette réalité et n’aide en rien à favoriser l’application des principes sous- jacents de la prépondérance. au contraire, cela donne aux organismes de réglementation provinciaux un moyen facile d’échapper au test abitibi par l’adoption d’un comportement stratégique, minant ainsi l’intérêt légi- time du gouvernement fédéral à assurer le respect du régime de priorité établi par la lfi. il importe peu de savoir qui effectue les travaux (voir les motifs de la cour d’appel, par. 78; ogca, sous-al 70(1)(a)(ii)). [274] the majority faults the chambers judge for “failing to consider whether the owa can be treated as the regulator” (para 153). however, the chambers [274] la majorité reproche au juge en cabinet de « ne pas se demander si l’owa [pouvait] être assi- milé à l’organisme de réglementation » (par 153). 288 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. judge cannot have erred by failing to appreciate a level of independence that simply does not exist. [275] the majority also offers an alternative conclu- sion: it is not sufficiently certain that even the owa will perform the abandonment work (para 149). whether the chambers judge’s conclusion to the con- trary amounts to a palpable and overriding error, or something else, we are not told. [276] again, such an approach would permit the aer to benefit from strategic gamesmanship by manipulating the timing of its intervention in order to escape the insolvency regime and strip redwater of its assets. this arbitrary line- drawing exercise, in which a period of 10 years before the wells are aban- doned is too long (but presumably some shorter time line would not be), has no basis in law. as slatter ja. convincingly observed in his reasons, the aer cannot insist that security be posted to cover environ- mental costs, but at the same time argue that it may be a long time before the orphan well association actually does the remediation. if the regulator takes security for remediating redwater’s orphan wells, those funds cannot be used for any other purpose. if security is taken, it is no answer that the security might be held for an indef- inite period of time; the consequences to the insolvency proceedings and distribution of funds to the creditors are immediate and certain. further, if security is taken, the environmental obligation has clearly been reduced to monetary terms. [emphasis added; para 79]. le juge en cabinet ne peut toutefois avoir fait erreur en n’appréciant pas une indépendance qui n’existe tout simplement pas. [275] la majorité tire aussi une conclusion subsi- diaire : il n’est pas suffisamment certain que même l’owa exécutera les travaux d’abandon (par 149). quant à savoir si la conclusion contraire du juge en cabinet équivaut à une erreur manifeste et do- minante, ou à quelque chose d’autre, on ne nous le dit pas. [276] là encore, une telle approche permettrait à l’aer de tirer profit de manœuvres stratégiques en manipulant le moment de son intervention afin de se soustraire au régime d’insolvabilité et de dépouiller redwater de ses biens. cet exercice de délimitation arbitraire, dans lequel une période de 10 ans avant que les puits fassent l’objet d’un abandon est trop longue (mais selon lequel une période plus courte ne le serait présumément pas), n’a aucun fondement en droit. comme le juge slatter l’a fait observer de manière convaincante dans ses motifs, l’aer [traduction] ne peut exiger qu’un dépôt de garantie soit versé pour couvrir les frais environnementaux, et en même temps faire valoir qu’il pourrait s’écouler beaucoup de temps avant que l’orphan well association procède réellement à la décontamination. si l’organisme de régle- mentation prend un dépôt de garantie afin de décontaminer les puits orphelins de redwater, ces fonds ne peuvent être utilisés à aucune autre fin. si un dépôt de garantie est pris, il ne suffit pas de répondre que ce dépôt pourrait être conservé pendant une période indéterminée; les consé- quences pour la procédure d’insolvabilité et la distribution des fonds aux créanciers sont immédiates et certaines. de plus, si un dépôt de garantie est pris, l’obligation environ- nementale est clairement réduite à une obligation formulée en termes pécuniaires. [je souligne; par 79] [277] moreover, the owa’s estimate of 10 to 12 years was put forward at the start of this litigation more than 3 years ago. whether that estimate re- mains accurate after the province’s proposed infusion of nearly a quarter of a billion dollars into the orphan fund (af, at para. 99)1 — money that will undoubt- [277] de plus, l’estimation de 10 à 12 ans de l’owa a été mise de l’avant au début du présent litige il y a plus de 3 ans. la question de savoir si cette estimation demeure exacte après l’injection proposée par la pro- vince de près d’un quart de milliard de dollars dans le fonds pour les puits orphelins (ma, par. 99)1 — des 1 i am assuming that the aer’s factum is accurate in referring to the existence and amount of this loan (which no other party contested). 1 je suppose que le mémoire de l’aer est exact quand il fait état de l’existence et du montant de ce prêt (des faits qui n’ont pas été contestés par une autre partie). [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 289 edly speed up the owa’s abandonment efforts — is an open question. in any case, the changing factual context highlights the essential problem with the ma- jority’s approach: pinning the constitutional analysis on the timing of the owa’s intervention is arbitrary and irrational, as it causes the result to shift based on decisions made by the very actor that stands to benefit from a finding that the “sufficient certainty” standard is not satisfied. [278] all that aside, the chambers judge’s rec- ognition that the owa will “probably” abandon the properties should be enough (chambers judge reasons, at para 173). concluding otherwise is not justified, since it would mean applying a stricter certainty requirement than is called for by abitibi itself deschamps j expressly rejected an alter- native standard — a “likelihood approaching cer- tainty”  —  adopted by mclachlin  c.j in dissent (abitibi, at para 60). but here, dismissing as in- sufficient the chambers judge’s conclusion that the owa would “probably” complete the work essen- tially means requiring a “likelihood approaching certainty”. since abitibi does not require absolute certainty, or even a likelihood approaching certainty, wittmann cj did not err in concluding that the third prong was satisfied (see the oxford english dictionary (online), which defines “probably” as “with likelihood (though not with certainty)”; “al- most certainly; as far as one knows or can tell; in all probability; most likely”). sommes qui accéléreront sans doute les efforts d’aban- don de l’owa — demeure sans réponse. quoi qu’il en soit, le contexte factuel changeant met en lumière le problème fondamental que pose l’approche de la ma- jorité : arrimer l’analyse constitutionnelle au moment de l’intervention de l’owa est arbitraire et irrationnel, car cette approche a pour effet d’inverser le résultat en fonction de décisions prises par l’acteur même qui peut bénéficier de la conclusion selon laquelle il n’est pas satisfait à la norme de « certitude suffisante ». [278] mis à part tout ce qui précède, la recon- naissance par le juge en cabinet que l’owa aban- donnera [traduction] « probablement » les biens devrait suffire (motifs du juge en cabinet, par 173). il n’est pas justifié de conclure le contraire, car cela reviendrait à appliquer une norme plus stricte en matière de certitude que celle que commande l’arrêt abitibi lui- même. la juge deschamps a expressé- ment rejeté la norme subsidiaire — une « proba- bilité proche de la certitude » — qu’a adoptée la juge en chef mclachlin dans ses motifs dissidents (abitibi, par 60). mais en l’espèce, rejeter comme insuffisante la conclusion du juge en cabinet se- lon laquelle l’owa mènerait « probablement » à terme les travaux revient essentiellement à exiger une « probabilité proche de la certitude ». étant donné que l’arrêt abitibi n’exige pas une certitude absolue, ni même une probabilité proche de la certitude, le juge en chef wittmann n’a pas commis d’erreur en concluant qu’il était satisfait au troisième volet du test (voir l’oxford english dictionary (en ligne), qui définit [traduction] « probablement » comme « selon la vraisemblance (mais sans certitude) »; « presque certainement; pour autant que l’on sache ou que l’on puisse le dire; selon toute vraisemblance; vraisemblablement »). [279] after concluding that it is not sufficiently certain that the aer will abandon the sites, the ma- jority goes on to find that the aer’s licence transfer restrictions similarly do not satisfy the abitibi test. this is so, it says, because the aer’s refusal to ap- prove a licence transfer does not give it a monetary claim against redwater and because compliance with the licensee management ratio (“lmr”) conditions “reflects the inherent value of the assets held by the bankrupt estate” (para 157). at the outset, i wish to [279] après avoir conclu qu’il n’est pas suffisam- ment certain que l’aer abandonnera les sites, la majorité juge que les restrictions imposées par l’aer au transfert de permis ne satisfont pas non plus au test abitibi. il en est ainsi, dit- elle, parce que le refus de l’aer d’approuver le transfert d’un permis ne lui confère pas une réclamation pécuniaire contre redwater et que le respect des conditions liées au ratio de gestion du titulaire de permis (« rgtp ») « reflète la valeur inhérente des biens détenus par 290 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. make clear that i have already concluded that, since gtl lawfully disclaimed the non- producing prop- erties under s 1406(4) of the bia, an operational conflict arises to the extent that the aer included those disclaimed properties in calculating redwater’s lmr for the purpose of imposing conditions on the sale of redwater’s assets. in the analysis that follows, i reach that same conclusion under the frustration of purpose aspect of the paramountcy test as well. i take issue with the majority’s conclusion [280] regarding the lmr conditions for two reasons. first, this approach elevates form over substance, disre- garding gascon j.’s admonition in moloney that “[t]he province cannot do indirectly what it is precluded from doing directly” (para. 28; see also husky oil, at para 41). refusing to approve a sale of redwater’s assets unless gtl satisfies redwater’s environmental liabilities is no different, in substance, from directly ordering redwater or gtl to undertake that work. this is because the aer achieves the exact same thing — the fulfillment of redwater’s environmental obligations — by making any sale conditional on gtl completing the work itself, posting security or packaging the non- producing assets into the sale, which reduces the sale price by the exact amount of those liabilities and ensures that the purchaser can be compelled, as the subsequent “licensee” under pro- vincial law, to comply with the abandonment orders. l’actif du failli » (par 157). tout d’abord, je tiens à préciser une chose : j’ai déjà conclu qu’étant donné que gtl a légalement renoncé aux bien inexploités en vertu du par 1406(4) de la lfi, il y a un conflit d’application dans la mesure où l’aer a inclus ces biens visés par les renonciations dans le calcul du rgtp de redwater afin d’imposer des conditions à la vente des actifs de redwater. dans l’analyse qui suit, j’arrive également à la même conclusion en m’appuyant sur le second volet concernant l’en- trave à la réalisation d’un objet fédéral du test de la prépondérance. [280] je suis en désaccord avec la conclusion de la majorité quant aux conditions relatives au rgtp pour deux raisons. d’abord, cette approche fait pas- ser la forme avant le fond, ignorant la mise en garde du juge gascon dans l’arrêt moloney selon laquelle « [l]a province ne peut faire indirectement ce qu’il lui est interdit de faire directement » (par. 28; voir aussi husky oil, par 41). refuser d’approuver la vente des biens de redwater à moins que gtl ne satisfasse aux obligations environnementales de redwater n’est pas différent, au fond, que d’or- donner directement à redwater ou à gtl de pro- céder à ces travaux. il en est ainsi parce que l’aer atteint exactement le même résultat — le respect des obligations environnementales de redwater — en faisant dépendre la vente de l’exécution des travaux par gtl lui- même, du versement par celle-ci d’un dépôt de garantie ou de l’inclusion des biens inex- ploités dans la vente, ce qui réduit le prix de vente du montant exact de ces engagements et permet de contraindre l’acheteur, en tant que « titulaire de permis » subséquent sous le régime de la loi provin- ciale, à se conformer aux ordonnances d’abandon. [281] the only difference between these two exer- cises of provincial power is the means by which the aer has opted to enforce the underlying obligations. the abandonment orders carry a threat of liability for non- compliance; imposing conditions on the sale of redwater’s assets, on the other hand, does not cre- ate a liability in a formal sense, but it does preclude any sale from occurring unless and until those obli- gations are satisfied. since the trustee must sell the assets in order to carry out its mandate, the effect of imposing conditions on the sale of redwater’s assets [281] la seule différence entre ces deux exercices d’un pouvoir provincial est le moyen par lequel l’aer a choisi de faire exécuter les obligations sous- jacentes les ordonnances d’abandon com- portent un risque de responsabilité pour non- respect; l’imposition de conditions à la vente des actifs de redwater, par contre, ne crée pas formellement de responsabilité, mais empêche effectivement toute vente de se réaliser tant et aussi longtemps qu’il n’est pas satisfait à ces obligations étant donné que le syndic doit vendre les biens afin de remplir [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 291 is the same as that of issuing abandonment orders — and, as my colleague acknowledges, it is the effect of provincial action, not its intent or its form, that is central to the paramountcy analysis (para. 116; see also husky oil, at para 40). in either case, then, the effect of the aer’s action is to create a debt enforce- ment scheme — one that requires the environmental obligations owed to the aer to be discharged ahead of the bankrupt’s other debts. [282] second, it is irrelevant to this analysis that the licensing requirements predate redwater’s bank- ruptcy and apply to all licensees. this is no different from abitibi, where the obligation to close down and remediate the properties predated abitibibowater’s bankruptcy and could also have been said to consti- tute an “inherent” limitation on the value of the regu- latory licence. yet the obligations at issue there were provable claims. so too here. alberta is, of course, free to affect the priority of claims in non- bankruptcy contexts. for example, it can leverage its licensing power to condition the sale of assets by solvent cor- porations on the payment of outstanding debts to the province. but “once bankruptcy has occurred [the bia] determines the status and priority of the claims” (husky oil, at para. 32, quoting a j roman and m j sweatman, “the conflict between canadian provincial personal property security acts and the federal bankruptcy act: the war is over” (1992), 71 can. bar rev. 77, at p 79). son mandat, l’effet de l’imposition de conditions à la vente des biens de redwater est le même que celui des ordonnances d’abandon — et, comme le reconnaît mon collègue, c’est l’effet de l’action provinciale, et non son intention ou sa forme, qui est au cœur de l’analyse relative à la prépondérance (par. 116; voir aussi husky oil, par 40). l’effet de l’action de l’aer est donc, dans les deux cas, de créer un régime de recouvrement des créances — qui exige que les obligations environnementales en- vers l’aer soient acquittées avant les autres dettes du failli. [282] ensuite, le fait que les exigences en matière de permis précèdent la faillite et s’appliquent à tous les titulaires de permis n’est pas pertinent pour les besoins de la présente analyse. la situation n’est pas différente de celle dans l’affaire abitibi, où l’obliga- tion de fermer et de décontaminer les biens précédait la faillite d’abitibibowater et aurait également pu être considérée comme constituant une limite « inhé- rente » à la valeur du permis réglementaire. pourtant, les obligations en cause dans cette affaire étaient des réclamations prouvables. c’est également le cas en l’espèce. il est certes loisible à l’alberta de modifier l’ordre de priorité des réclamations dans un contexte autre que celui d’une faillite. par exemple, elle peut se servir de son pouvoir de délivrer des permis pour faire dépendre la vente des biens des sociétés sol­ vables du paiement des dettes impayées envers la province. mais « dès qu’il y a faillite, c’est [la lfi] qui détermine le statut et l’ordre de priorité des récla- mations » (husky oil, par. 32, citant a j roman et m j sweatman, « the conflict between canadian provincial personal property security acts and the federal bankrupcy act : the war is over » (1992), 71 r du b can. 77, p 79). in this case, imposing conditions on the sale [283] of redwater’s valuable assets does result in a mon- etary debt in the aer’s favour, whether in the form of: (1) the posting of security; (2) actual comple- tion of the environmental work; or (3) the sale of the non- producing properties to another entity that is then regulated as a “licensee” and, as such, can be compelled under provincial law to complete the work. in each case, the result is the same: the aer is conditioning any sale of redwater’s assets on its [283] en l’espèce, l’imposition de conditions à la vente des actifs de valeur de redwater entraîne bel et bien une créance pécuniaire en faveur de l’aer, que ce soit sous forme : (1) de versement d’un dépôt de garantie; (2) d’achèvement réel des travaux envi- ronnementaux; ou (3) de vente des biens inexploités à une autre entité qui est alors réglementée comme « titulaire de permis » et qui peut ainsi être contrainte en application de la loi provinciale à mener à bien les travaux. dans un cas comme dans l’autre, le résultat 292 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. ability to recover a pre- existing debt owed to it by the bankrupt. [284] an approach which artificially separates the abandonment orders and the transfer requirements in order to treat them as analytically distinct under the abitibi test would cause the paramountcy anal- ysis to turn on irrelevant subtleties in the manner or form in which the province has chosen to exercise its power. the two measures must be seen in tandem as the aer’s means of enforcing a debt against the redwater estate. as i have described, there is no meaningful difference in the bankruptcy context be- tween a formal abandonment order directing a trustee to engage in remediation work and a rigid licensing system that imposes the exact same obligations as a condition of sale — a sale that, if the trustee is to carry out its mandate, must occur. the only effect of the majority’s analysis is to encourage regulators to collect on their debts in more creative ways. none of this serves the purposes of paramountcy; and, more critically, nothing in that analysis offers insolvency professionals (or regulators, for that matter) clear guidance as to the types of obligations that will or will not satisfy the abitibi test. [285] since it is sufficiently certain that the aer (or the owa, as its delegate) will complete the aban- donment and reclamation work, all three prongs of the abitibi test are satisfied. the abandonment orders are provable claims, and therefore the aer may not compel redwater or its trustee to fulfill the obligations in question outside of the bia’s priority scheme. likewise, the aer may not condition the sale of redwater’s valuable assets on the perfor- mance of those same obligations. est le même : l’aer fait dépendre la vente des biens de redwater de sa capacité de recouvrer une dette préexistante que lui devait le failli. [284] une approche qui différencie artificiellement les ordonnances d’abandon et les exigences relatives au transfert afin de leur réserver un traitement dis- tinct sur le plan analytique en application du critère abitibi ferait reposer l’analyse relative à la prépon- dérance sur des subtilités non pertinentes concernant la manière dont la province a choisi d’exercer son pouvoir ou la forme que prend ce choix. les deux mesures doivent être considérées ensemble comme le moyen employé par l’aer pour recouvrer une créance à l’encontre de l’actif de redwater. comme je l’ai expliqué, il n’existe aucune différence signi- ficative dans le contexte de la faillite entre une or- donnance officielle d’abandon enjoignant au syndic de procéder à des travaux de décontamination et un système de délivrance de permis rigide qui impose exactement les mêmes obligations comme condi- tion de la vente — une vente qui, si le syndic veut remplir son mandat, doit avoir lieu. le seul effet qu’a l’analyse de la majorité est d’encourager les organismes de réglementation à trouver des façons plus ingénieuses de recouvrer leurs créances. rien de tout cela ne sert les fins de la prépondérance; et, fait plus important, rien dans cette analyse ne donne aux professionnels de l’insolvabilité (ni aux organismes de réglementation, d’ailleurs) des indications claires quant aux types d’obligations qui peuvent ou non satisfaire au test abitibi. [285] comme il est suffisamment certain que l’aer (ou l’owa, sa délégataire) achèvera les tra- vaux d’abandon et de remise en état, il est satisfait aux trois volets du test abitibi. les ordonnances d’abandon sont des réclamations prouvables, et l’aer ne peut donc contraindre redwater ou son syndic à acquitter les obligations en cause à l’exté- rieur du régime de priorité établi par la lfi. de la même façon, l’aer ne peut faire dépendre la vente des biens de valeur de redwater de l’exécution de ces mêmes obligations. [286] towards the end of its analysis, the ma- jority makes the point that the aer’s enforcement actions in this case facilitate, rather than frustrate, [286] vers la fin de son analyse, la majorité sou- tient que les mesures d’application prises par l’aer en l’espèce favorisent, au lieu de contrecarrer, la [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 293 parliament’s intentions behind the bia priority scheme due to the super priority for environmental remediation costs set out in s 1406(7) (para 159). respectfully, i completely reject this contention. no party attempted to argue that the super priority in subs. (7) was applicable on the facts of this case. indeed, it is clear that it is not, as the majority itself acknowledges. i cannot accept that where parliament has set out a particular super priority for the crown for environmental remediation costs, secured against specific real property assets of the bankrupt, and where certain conditions are met, it somehow “fa- cilitates” parliament’s priority scheme to, in effect, impose that super priority over other assets, in the absence of those statutory conditions being satisfied. it is wrong to rely on s 1406(7) to recognize an ef- fective super priority for the aer in circumstances where the terms of that subsection are inapplicable. doing so clearly undermines the detailed and com- prehensive priority scheme that parliament set out in the bia to achieve its purposes. had parliament wished to extend a crown super priority for environ- mental remediation costs beyond the circumstances in s 1406(7), it could have done so. [287] as a final note, gtl and atb financial ad- vance alternative arguments that some aspects of alberta’s statutory regime, including the definition of “licensee”, frustrate the purposes of the 1997 amendments to the bia — purposes that, they say, include protecting insolvency professionals from liability and reducing the number of orphaned sites. réalisation des intentions du parlement qui sous- tendent le régime de priorité de la lfi en raison de la superpriorité prévue au par 1406(7) pour les frais de décontamination environnementale (par 159). avec égards, je rejette entièrement cette prétention. aucune partie n’a tenté de faire valoir que la su- perpriorité visée au par. (7) s’appliquait aux faits de l’espèce. en effet, elle ne s’applique clairement pas, comme le reconnait elle- même la majorité. je ne peux accepter que, dans les cas où le parlement a conféré à la couronne une superpriorité lorsque certaines conditions sont réunies pour les frais de décontamination environnementale et l’a garantie par une sûreté sur certains biens réels du failli, on « favorise » d’une façon ou d’une autre le régime de priorité du parlement en imposant dans les faits cette superpriorité sur d’autres biens alors que ces conditions statutaires ne sont pas remplies. il est erroné d’invoquer le par 1406(7) pour reconnaître à l’aer une superpriorité dans des situations où les conditions de ce paragraphe ne s’appliquent pas. agir de la sorte sape clairement le régime de priorité détaillé et complet que le parlement a établi dans la lfi pour réaliser ses objectifs. si le parlement avait souhaité étendre une superpriorité de la couronne pour des frais de décontamination environnementale dans d’autres cas que ceux visés au par 1406(7), il aurait pu le faire. [287] en terminant, gtl et atb financial font valoir des arguments subsidiaires selon lesquels cer- tains aspects du régime de réglementation albertain, notamment la définition de « titulaire de permis », entravent la réalisation des objets des modifications apportées à la lfi en 1997 — objets qui, affirment- ils, comprennent la protection des professionnels de l’insolvabilité contre la responsabilité et la réduction du nombre de sites orphelins. [288] it is not strictly necessary for me to address these arguments, since i have already found that there is an operational conflict (the alberta regime’s failure to recognize the lawfulness of gtl’s disclaimers) as well as a frustration of purpose on other grounds (in- terference with the bia’s priority scheme). i would note, however, that gtl has stated that it would immediately seek a discharge if it were required to carry out the abandonment work, which would result [288] il n’est pas strictement nécessaire que j’exa- mine ces arguments, car j’ai déjà conclu qu’il existe un conflit d’application (la non- reconnaissance par le régime albertain de la légalité des renonciations de gtl) ainsi qu’une entrave à la réalisation d’objet pour d’autres motifs (atteinte au régime de prio- rité établi par la lfi). je tiens toutefois à souligner que gtl a déclaré qu’elle demanderait immédiate- ment une libération si elle était tenue d’exécuter les 294 orphan well assn v grant thornton côté j. [2019] 1 scr. in the remaining redwater assets being surrendered to the owa. the result in this circumstance, which does not appear to be acknowledged, or which ap- pears to be ignored, in my colleague’s reasons, would be more orphaned oil wells. to the extent, then, that the 1997 amendments were intended to reduce the number of orphaned properties, that purpose is also frustrated by preventing a receiver or trustee from disclaiming value- negative assets. travaux d’abandon, ce qui entraînerait la cession du reste des biens de redwater à l’owa. il en résulte- rait, ce qui ne semble pas être reconnu ou paraît être passé sous silence dans les motifs de mon collègue, un nombre plus élevé de puits de pétrole orphelins. dans la mesure où les modifications de 1997 étaient censées entraîner une réduction du nombre de biens orphelins, la réalisation de cet objet est également entravée en empêchant le séquestre ou le syndic de renoncer aux biens ayant une valeur négative. iv conclusion iv conclusion [289] there is much to be said in the context of this appeal about which outcome will optimally balance environmental protection and economic develop- ment. on the one hand, enforcing the aer’s reme- diation orders would effectively wipe out the estate’s remaining value and leave all of its creditors (except the aer) without any recovery. it would also likely discourage insolvency professionals from accepting mandates in cases such as this one — potentially resulting in more orphaned properties across the province. on the other hand, permitting gtl to dis- claim the non- producing wells and preventing the aer from enforcing environmental obligations be- fore the estate’s value is depleted would leave open the question of who, exactly, should foot the bill for remediating the affected land. il y a beaucoup à dire, dans le contexte du [289] présent pourvoi, sur l’issue qui établirait un équilibre optimal entre la protection de l’environnement et le développement économique d’une part, faire exécuter les ordonnances de décontamination de l’aer aurait pour effet d’éliminer la valeur restante de l’actif et priverait tous ses créanciers (sauf l’aer) de tout recouvrement. en outre, cela découragerait vraisemblablement les professionnels de l’insolva- bilité d’accepter des mandats dans des cas comme celui qui nous occupe, ce qui pourrait occasionner une augmentation du nombre de biens orphelins dans l’ensemble de la province. d’autre part, permettre à gtl de renoncer aux puits inexploités en empêchant l’aer de faire exécuter les obligations environne- mentales avant que l’actif soit épuisé laisserait sans réponse la question de savoir qui, exactement, devrait payer la facture de la décontamination des terrains concernés. [290] whatever the merits of these competing po- sitions, in matters of statutory interpretation this court is one of law, not of policy. as the majority recognizes, at para. 30, “it is not the role of this court to decide the best regulatory approach to the oil and gas industry”; decisions on these matters are made — indeed, they have been made — by legis- lators, not judges. and the law in this case supports only one outcome. but this does not mean that the aer is without options to protect the public from bearing the costs of abandoning oil wells. it could adjust its lmr requirements to prevent other oil companies from reaching the point of bankruptcy with unfunded abandonment obligations (as it has already done since this litigation began). it could [290] quel que soit le bien- fondé de ces positions opposées en matière d’interprétation statutaire, notre cour est un tribunal de droit, et non de politique. comme le reconnaît la majorité (par. 30), « il ne revient pas à notre cour de décider de la meilleure approche réglementaire pour l’industrie pétrolière et gazière » : les décisions sur ces enjeux sont prises — et ont d’ailleurs été prises — par les législateurs, et non par les juges. et le droit en l’espèce n’appuie qu’une seule issue. mais cela ne veut pas dire qu’au- cune solution ne s’offre à l’aer pour empêcher le public d’avoir à supporter les frais liés à l’abandon des puits de pétrole. il pourrait ajuster ses exigences relatives à la rgtp afin d’éviter que d’autres socié- tés pétrolières soient acculées à la faillite en raison [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton la juge côté 295 adopt strategies used in other jurisdictions, such as requiring the posting of security up- front so that abandonment costs are not borne entirely at the end of an oil well’s life cycle. one of the interveners, the canadian bankers’ association, noted that such sys- tems of up- front bonding are prevalent in american jurisdictions. the aer could work with industry to increase levies so that the orphan fund has suf- ficient resources to respond to the recent increase in the number of orphaned properties. it could seek judicial intervention in cases where it suspects that a company is strategically using insolvency as a voluntary step to avoid its environmental liabilities (sydco energy inc. (re), 2018 abqb 75, 64 alta. lr (6th) 156, at para 84). and, as i have noted, it can continue to apply the province’s statutory regime to all assets of an insolvent or bankrupt debtor that are retained by a receiver or trustee, including wells and facilities that the receiver or trustee seeks to operate rather than sell. [291] the aer may not, however, disregard fed- eral bankruptcy law in the pursuit of otherwise valid statutory objectives. yet that is precisely what it has done here by effectively displacing the “polluter- pays” principle enacted by parliament in favour of a “lender- pays” regime, in which responsibility for the bankrupt’s environmental liabilities is transferred to the estate’s creditors. our paramountcy jurispru- dence does not permit that result. d’obligations d’abandon non financées (comme il l’a déjà fait depuis que le présent litige a commencé). il pourrait adopter les stratégies utilisées dans d’autres ressorts, comme exiger dès le début le versement d’un dépôt de garantie afin que les frais liés à l’aban- don ne soient pas entièrement supportés à la fin du cycle de vie du puits de pétrole. l’une des interve- nants, l’association des banquiers canadiens, a fait remarquer que de tels systèmes de dépôts de garantie au départ abondent dans les états américains. l’aer pourrait collaborer avec l’industrie pour augmenter les prélèvements afin que le fonds pour les puits orphelins dispose de ressources suffisantes pour ré- pondre à la récente augmentation du nombre de biens orphelins. il pourrait solliciter l’intervention des tribunaux dans les cas où il soupçonne une société d’utiliser stratégiquement l’insolvabilité comme une mesure facultative lui permettant de se soustraire à ses engagements environnementaux (sydco energy inc. (re), 2018 abqb 75, 64 alta. lr (6th) 156, par 84). et, comme je l’ai mentionné, il peut conti- nuer d’appliquer le régime législatif provincial à tous les biens d’un débiteur insolvable ou en faillite qui sont conservés par un séquestre ou un syndic, y compris les puits et installations que le séquestre ou le syndic veut exploiter plutôt que de les vendre. [291] l’aer ne peut pas, cependant, faire abstrac- tion du droit fédéral de la faillite pour atteindre des objectifs statutaires par ailleurs valides. or, c’est pré- cisément ce qu’il a fait en l’espèce en écartant effec- tivement le principe du « pollueur- payeur » adopté par le parlement en faveur d’un régime du « prêteur- payeur », dans le cadre duquel la responsabilité à l’égard des engagements environnementaux du failli passe aux créanciers de l’actif. notre jurisprudence en matière de prépondérance n’admet pas ce résultat. [292] for the foregoing reasons, i would dismiss the appeal and affirm the orders made by the cham- bers judge. [292] pour les motifs qui précèdent, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi et de confirmer les ordonnances rendues par le juge en cabinet. 296 orphan well assn v grant thornton [2019] 1 scr. appendix annexe bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3 14.06 (1) no trustee is bound to assume the duties of trus- tee in matters relating to assignments, bankruptcy orders or proposals, but having accepted an appointment in rela- tion to those matters the trustee shall, until discharged or another trustee is appointed in the trustee’s stead, perform the duties required of a trustee under this act. loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité, lrc 1985, c. b-3 14.06 (1) le syndic n’est pas tenu d’assumer les fonctions de syndic relativement à des cessions, à des ordonnances de faillite ou à des propositions concordataires; toutefois, dès qu’il accepte sa nomination à ce titre, il doit accomplir les fonctions que la présente loi lui impose, jusqu’à ce qu’il ait été libéré ou qu’un autre syndic ait été nommé à sa place. (1.1) in subsections (1.2) to (6), a reference to a trustee means a trustee in a bankruptcy or proposal and includes (1.1) les paragraphes (1.2) à (6) s’appliquent également aux syndics agissant dans le cadre d’une faillite ou d’une proposition ainsi qu’aux personnes suivantes : (a) an interim receiver; a) les séquestres intérimaires; (b) a receiver within the meaning of subsection 243(2); and b) les séquestres au sens du paragraphe 243(2); (c) any other person who has been lawfully appointed to take, or has lawfully taken, possession or control of any property of an insolvent person or a bankrupt that was acquired for, or is used in relation to, a business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt. c) les autres personnes qui sont nommément habilitées à prendre — ou ont pris légalement — la possession ou la responsabilité d’un bien acquis ou utilisé par une personne insolvable ou un failli dans le cadre de ses affaires.   .   . (2) notwithstanding anything in any federal or provincial law, a trustee is not personally liable in that position for any environmental condition that arose or environmental damage that occurred (a) before the trustee’s appointment; or (b) after the trustee’s appointment unless it is estab- lished that the condition arose or the damage occurred as a result of the trustee’s gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in the province of quebec, the trustee’s gross or intentional fault. (2) par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, le syndic est, ès qualités, dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle découlant de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement survenu avant ou après sa nomination, sauf celui causé par sa négligence grave ou son inconduite délibérée ou, dans la province de québec, par sa faute lourde ou intentionnelle. (3) nothing in subsection  (2) exempts a trustee from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by a law referred to in that subsection. (3) le paragraphe (2) n’a pas pour effet de soustraire le syndic à une obligation de faire rapport ou de communi- quer des renseignements prévue par le droit applicable en l’espèce. (4) notwithstanding anything in any federal or provin- cial law but subject to subsection (2), where an order is made which has the effect of requiring a trustee to remedy (4) par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, mais sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le syndic est, ès qualités, dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle découlant du [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton 297 any environmental condition or environmental damage affecting property involved in a bankruptcy, proposal or receivership, the trustee is not personally liable for failure to comply with the order, and is not personally liable for any costs that are or would be incurred by any person in carrying out the terms of the order, non- respect de toute ordonnance de réparation de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement et touchant un bien visé par une faillite, une proposition ou une mise sous séquestre administrée par un séquestre, et de toute responsabilité personnelle relativement aux frais engagés par toute personne exécutant l’ordonnance : (a) if, within such time as is specified in the order, within ten days after the order is made if no time is so specified, within ten days after the appointment of the trustee, if the order is in effect when the trustee is appointed, or during the period of the stay referred to in paragraph (b), the trustee a) si, dans les dix jours suivant l’ordonnance ou dans le délai fixé par celle-ci, dans les dix jours suivant sa nomination si l’ordonnance est alors en vigueur ou pendant la durée de la suspension visée à l’alinéa b) : (i) complies with the order, or (i) il s’y conforme, (ii) on notice to the person who issued the order, abandons, disposes of or otherwise releases any interest in any real property, or any right in any immovable, affected by the condition or damage; (ii) il abandonne, après avis à la personne ayant rendu l’ordonnance, tout droit sur l’immeuble en cause ou tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause, en dispose ou s’en dessaisit; (b) during the period of a stay of the order granted, on application made within the time specified in the order referred to in paragraph (a), within ten days after the order is made or within ten days after the appointment of the trustee, if the order is in effect when the trustee is appointed, by b) pendant la durée de la suspension de l’ordonnance qui est accordée, sur demande présentée dans les dix jours suivant l’ordonnance visée à l’alinéa a) ou dans le délai fixé par celle-ci, ou dans les dix jours suivant sa nomination si l’ordonnance est alors en vigueur : (i) the court or body having jurisdiction under the law pursuant to which the order was made to enable the trustee to contest the order, or (i) soit par le tribunal ou l’autorité qui a compé- tence relativement à l’ordonnance, en vue de per- mettre au syndic de la contester, (ii) the court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy for the purposes of assessing the economic viability of complying with the order; or (ii) soit par le tribunal qui a compétence en matière de faillite, en vue d’évaluer les conséquences éco- nomiques du respect de l’ordonnance; (c) if the trustee had, before the order was made, aban- doned or renounced or been divested of any interest in any real property, or any right in any immovable, affected by the condition or damage. c) si, avant que l’ordonnance ne soit rendue, il avait abandonné tout droit sur l’immeuble en cause ou tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause ou y avait renoncé, ou s’en était dessaisi. (5) the court may grant a stay of the order referred to in subsection (4) on such notice and for such period as the court deems necessary for the purpose of enabling the trustee to assess the economic viability of complying with the order. (5) en vue de permettre au syndic d’évaluer les consé- quences économiques du respect de l’ordonnance, le tri- bunal peut en ordonner la suspension après avis et pour la période qu’il estime indiqués. (6) if the trustee has abandoned or renounced any inter- est in any real property, or any right in any immovable, affected by the environmental condition or environmental (6) si le syndic a abandonné tout droit sur l’immeuble en cause ou tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause ou y a renoncé, les réclamations pour les frais de réparation du 298 orphan well assn v grant thornton [2019] 1 scr. damage, claims for costs of remedying the condition or damage shall not rank as costs of administration. fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement et touchant le bien ne font pas partie des frais d’administration. (7) en cas de faillite, de proposition ou de mise sous sé- questre administrée par un séquestre, toute réclamation de sa majesté du chef du canada ou d’une province contre le débiteur pour les frais de réparation du fait ou dommage lié à l’environnement et touchant un de ses immeubles ou biens réels est garantie par une sûreté sur le bien en cause et sur ceux qui sont contigus à celui où le dommage est survenu et qui sont liés à l’activité ayant causé le fait ou le dommage; la sûreté peut être exécutée selon le droit du lieu où est situé le bien comme s’il s’agissait d’une hy- pothèque ou autre garantie sur celui-ci et, par dérogation aux autres dispositions de la présente loi et à toute règle de droit fédéral et provincial, a priorité sur tout autre droit, charge, sûreté ou réclamation visant le bien. (7) any claim by her majesty in right of canada or a province against the debtor in a bankruptcy, proposal or receivership for costs of remedying any environmental condition or environmental damage affecting real property or an immovable of the debtor is secured by security on the real property or immovable affected by the environmental condition or environmental damage and on any other real property or immovable of the debtor that is contiguous with that real property or immovable and that is related to the activity that caused the environmental condition or environmental damage, and the security (a) is enforceable in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the real property or immovable is located, in the same way as a mortgage, hypothec or other security on real property or immovables; and (b) ranks above any other claim, right, charge or secu- rity against the property, despite any other provision of this act or anything in any other federal or provincial law. (8) despite subsection 121(1), a claim against a debtor in a bankruptcy or proposal for the costs of remedying any environmental condition or environmental damage affecting real property or an immovable of the debtor shall be a provable claim, whether the condition arose or the damage occurred before or after the date of the filing of the proposal or the date of the bankruptcy. (8) malgré le paragraphe 121(1), la réclamation pour les frais de réparation du fait ou dommage lié à l’environne- ment et touchant l’immeuble ou le bien réel du débiteur constitue une réclamation prouvable, que la date du fait ou dommage soit antérieure ou postérieure à celle de la faillite ou du dépôt de la proposition. appeal allowed, moldaver and côté jj. dis­ pourvoi accueilli, les juges moldaver et côté senting. sont dissidents. solicitors for the appellants:  bennett jones, procureurs des appelants : bennett jones, calgary; calgary; alberta energy regulator, calgary. alberta energy regulator, calgary. solicitors for the respondents:  blake, cassels & graydon, calgary; cassels brock & blackwell, calgary; gowling wlg (canada), calgary. procureurs des intimées : blake, cassels & gray­ don, calgary; cassels brock & blackwell, calgary; gowling wlg (canada), calgary. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné­ rale de l’ontario : procureure générale de l’ontario, toronto. of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de la colombie­ britannique : procureur général de la colombie­ britannique, victoria. [2019] 1 rcs. orphan well assn c grant thornton 299 of saskatchewan: attorney general of saskatchewan, regina. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné­ ral de la saskatchewan : procureur général de la saskatchewan, regina. of alberta: attorney general of alberta, edmonton. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné­ ral de l’alberta : procureur général de l’alberta, edmonton. solicitor for the intervener ecojustice canada society: ecojustice clinic at the university of ottawa, ottawa. procureur de l’intervenante ecojustice canada society : clinique ecojustice à l’université d’ot­ tawa, ottawa. ciation of petroleum producers: lawson lundell, calgary. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana­ dienne des producteurs pétroliers : lawson lundell, calgary. procureurs de l’intervenante greenpeace ca­ ada: stockwoods, toronto. nada : stockwoods, toronto. association: university of calgary public interest law clinic, calgary. procureur de l’intervenante action surface rights association : university of calgary public interest law clinic, calgary. ciation of insolvency and restructuring profession­ als: mcmillan, calgary. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana­ dienne des professionnels de l’insolvabilité et de la réorganisation : mcmillan, calgary. ers’ association: norton rose fulbright canada, calgary. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association des banquiers canadiens : norton rose fulbright ca­ nada, calgary.
i. overview [1] parliament and courts have increasingly recognized the grave harms which flow from the wide variety of sexual offences prohibited in the criminal code, rsc. 1985, c. c-46. over the years, the substantive elements of some sexual offences have been modified: consent is now expressly defined in the criminal code; procedures were introduced to address thorny evidentiary questions; testimonial assistance is available to vulnerable witnesses; and sentencing provisions and principles reflect the seriousness of sexual offences. [2] in 2004, concerned about the sexual abuse and abduction of children, parliament passed the sex offender information registration act, s.c 2004, c 10 (soira or act). through this legislation, parliament sought to help police investigate crimes of a sexual nature by creating a national sex offender registry. at the time, a sex offender would only be placed on the registry if the crown prosecutor first chose to apply to the court for an order requiring the offender to comply with soira. moreover, the legislation gave sentencing judges the discretion to exclude offenders from the registry if the effects of the order on their privacy or liberty interests were grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society. [3] these two separate safeguards were removed in 2011 following the enactment of the protecting victims from sex offenders act, sc 2010, c 17. instead, s 490.012 of the criminal code now requires the mandatory registration of all offenders who have been found guilty of any one of the 27 different sexual offences designated in s 490011(1)(a). now each and every such sexual offender is compelled to register their personal information on canada’s national sex offender registry, regardless of their individual risk of reoffending in addition to compulsory soira orders, parliament also imposed a mandatory lifetime registration for offenders who commit more than one offence, irrespective of the nature or timing of the offences and even if they are part of the same transaction (s 490013(21)). [4] in this case, the appellant, eugene ndhlovu, pled guilty in 2015 to two counts of sexual assault against two complainants at a party in 2011. he was 19 years old at the time at sentencing, the judge was tasked with tailoring a proportionate sentence that was fit in relation to both mr. ndhlovu and the sexual assaults he committed. after canvassing his background and the evidence, the judge found that mr. ndhlovu was unlikely to reoffend. however, due to parliament’s amendments in 2011, the criminal code obliged the judge to issue an order requiring mr. ndhlovu to comply with soira, and for the rest of his life. [5] as a result, like all other such offenders, he would be required to report to a police station and forced to supply extensive personal information which would be placed on canada’s national sex offender registry soira also imposes ongoing reporting requirements which are numerous, invasive and extensive; including that offenders must keep their information up to date, report their plans for any travel lasting seven or more consecutive days and report any change to their home or employment address. he would have to report annually to the police and be subject to random police checks non-compliance with any of the reporting obligations associated with registration carries the threat of prosecution, a maximum of two years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both (criminal code, s 490031(1)). his presence in the database would mean he would be among the list of persons police may consider to be of interest in their investigations, which may generate further interactions with the police. the impact on mr. ndhlovu and anyone subject to these provisions is considerable. the scope of the personal information registered, the frequency at which offenders are required to update their information, the ongoing monitoring by the state, and the threat of prosecution and imprisonment all interfere with what it means to be free in canada. [6] this appeal requires this court to determine whether parliament complied with the canadian charter of rights and freedoms when it chose to remove prosecutorial and judicial discretion from s 490.012 and introduced, under s 490013(21), lifetime registration for offenders convicted of more than one designated sexual offence through s 490.012, parliament sought to capture information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sexual offences. similarly, s 490013(21) is designed to give police a longer period of access to information on offenders at a greater risk of reoffending. [7] even when parliament acts with a laudable purpose, it must still legislate in a constitutional manner and comply with the charter it failed to do so when it enacted ss. 490.012 and 490013(21). these measures infringe the liberty interest under s 7 of the charter because registration has a serious impact on the freedom of movement and on the freedom to make fundamental choices of people who are not at an increased risk of reoffending over their lifetime. [8] because the mandatory registration of those offenders who are not at an increased risk of reoffending does not assist police, it is inconsistent with the principle of fundamental justice against overbreadth mandatory and lifetime registration overshoot the mark: subjecting sex offenders who do not have an increased risk of reoffending to obligatory reporting requirements is not connected to parliament’s purpose of capturing information that assists police prevent and investigate sex offences. requiring lifetime registration also goes too far and denies the rights of some individuals in a way that bears no relation to parliament’s objective. [9] there are offenders who, because of their individual characteristics, are at a negligible risk of reoffending further, the reality is that 75 to 80 percent never reoffend. based on the crown’s statistical evidence, there are also a significant number of sex offenders who are at no greater risk of reoffending than members of the general criminal population. as a result, s 490.012 applies to offenders for whom there is no real possibility that their information may ever assist police — and there is no discretion to exclude such persons from the wide reach of soira’s onerous and ongoing obligations. in addition, the crown’s expert evidence established that committing more than one sexual offence without an intervening conviction is not associated with a greater risk of reoffending. [10] the two challenged provisions, therefore, suffer from the same constitutional defect they both use categorical and unyielding proxies that are too broad, resulting in the measures casting too wide a net. to the extent they require the registration, sometimes for life, of offenders who demonstrate no increased risk of reoffending, they threaten the liberty interests of offenders in a manner which is overbroad and violates s 7 of the charter. [11] nor are they justified under s 1 because they are not minimally impairing of charter rights and the deleterious effects of the provisions outweigh their salutary ones the blanket and blunt requirement that all designated sex offenders must be registered, and those convicted of more than one offence must be registered for life, restricts the liberty of offenders who are not at an increased risk of reoffending without any evidence that doing so enhances the ability of police to prevent and investigate sex crimes while the crown has asserted that it believes it is necessary to include all offenders for the registry to be as effective as the crown wants it to be, any such avowal is insufficient to meet its burden of proof under which it is required to justify, not merely explain, the infringement on liberty critically, the crown has adduced no evidence that demonstrates how these provisions are effective in helping police prevent and investigate sex crimes. indeed, the sparse information in the record points in the opposite direction. [12] we would allow the appeal and declare ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) of no force or effect under s 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982. a one-year suspension of the declaration is appropriate for mandatory registration, given concerns about public safety and the many ways parliament could remedy the provision’s overbreadth. an immediate declaration, however, is warranted for lifetime registration for offenders convicted of more than one offence. ii. facts and judicial history a facts [13] mr. ndhlovu pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault in june 2015. the convictions resulted from sexual assaults charged on a single indictment against two complainants at a house party in 2011. mr. ndhlovu touched both of the complainants’ buttocks and one of the complainant’s thighs later in the evening, one of the complainants awoke to mr. ndhlovu inserting his fingers inside her vagina. after she motioned to him to stop, he tried to reinsert his fingers. the complainant pushed him and told him to stop, but mr. ndhlovu instead tried to remove her bra. the complainant once again told him to stop and he fled. mr. ndhlovu was 19 years old at the time of the offences. b. judicial history (1) first instance proceedings [14] three proceedings before moen j are pertinent to this appeal. [15] the first was a sentencing hearing in which moen j was tasked with tailoring a fit and proportional punishment. she found that six months’ imprisonment and three years’ probation were warranted in all the circumstances in reaching this conclusion, she took into account the characteristics of the offender, as well as the gravity of the offences he committed. she received evidence concerning mr. ndhlovu, including a presentence report. she noted that mr. ndhlovu took responsibility for his actions and was remorseful he had no criminal history his offences related to excessive alcohol consumption, but he had stopped drinking to excess he had the support of his family and community. [16] importantly, based on the evidence placed before her by the crown and defence, the sentencing judge found that mr. ndhlovu was “unlikely to offend again” (ar, vol. ii, at p 38) moen j stated that he “will be safe to release into the community. i have absolutely no concerns that [he] will re-offend. nor does the crown suggest that [he] will” (p 38). [17] despite this finding, due to his conviction for two designated offences, mr. ndhlovu was subject to mandatory lifetime registration in canada’s national sex offender registry pursuant to ss. 490.012(1) and 490013(21) of the criminal code. following sentencing, mr. ndhlovu brought an application to challenge both provisions as contrary to ss. 7 and 12 of the charter. [18] the second hearing addressed whether this mandatory lifetime registration breached those charter rights the crown called the evidence of det arlene may hove, a police investigator with the edmonton police service (eps), who was responsible for administering access to the database for police in the edmonton area. [19] moen j concluded ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) breached s 7 of the charter (2016 abqb 595, 44 alta l.r (6th) 382 (abqb reasons (2016))) the purpose of the provisions was “to protect vulnerable people including children in society, by allowing police quick access to current information on convicted sex offenders” (para. 87). the provisions deprived an offender’s liberty and the deprivation was “quite onerous” given the depth of information, the continuing obligation to report changes, the annual in-person reporting requirements, and the consequences of breaching the order, along with random checks and registration for life (para. 52). she also noted the stigma of being on the registry, the fear that this information may not be kept confidential and how random compliance checks at home and at work risked divulging their registration status. [20] the provisions offended the principles of fundamental justice. while not arbitrary, the provisions were overbroad: registering offenders with little or no recidivism risk, like the appellant, did not advance soira’s purpose. the measures were therefore “broader than necessary” (para. 116) they were also grossly disproportionate, given the onerous cumulative effects of registering. having found the provisions breached s 7, moen j declined to address the defence’s arguments on s 12 of the charter. [21] following moen j.’s s 7 ruling, the crown sought to justify the provisions under s 1 of the charter. a third hearing was held to address whether the provisions were justified under s 1 and, at this time, the crown submitted expert evidence from dr. robert karl hanson about recidivism rates and the risk associated with sexual offenders subsequently committing further offences the defence called dr. kristen marie zgoba who gave evidence on recidivism rates and also addressed the efficacy and impact of sex offender registries. [22] moen j concluded s 1 did not save the impugned provisions (2018 abqb 277, 68 alta. lr (6th) 89). she agreed that the public interest addressed by parliament was the protection of society through the effective and quick investigation of crimes of a sexual nature by providing police with rapid access to information about known sex offenders. while this was a sufficiently pressing and substantial objective, the means chosen to achieve it was not proportional. removing judicial discretion and requiring mandatory and sometimes lifetime registration was not rationally connected to this objective, in part because there was no evidence before either her, or the parliamentary committee and senate committee studying the 2011 amendments, that “there would be more arrests made more quickly as a result of the 2011 amendments” (para. 44). the removal of judicial discretion was not minimally impairing because the crown “produced no evidence that suggested that judicial discretion had caused any difficulty for the police in their investigations of sexual offences” (para. 110) in addition, the evidence established that the mandatory imposition of lifetime registration does not minimally impair the rights of persons convicted of at least two sexual offences. when comparing registration’s proven costs with the claimed benefits of having everyone on the registry, moen j relied heavily on the evidence of the crown expert to conclude that the deleterious effects of the impugned provisions outweighed any salutary effects. thus, she declared ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) of no force or effect, and declined to order mr. ndhlovu to register. (2) court of appeal [23] a majority at the court of appeal of alberta (slatter and schutz jja) allowed the crown’s appeal, concluding that neither provision violated s 7 (2020 abca 307, 12 alta. lr (7th) 225). the majority held the purpose of s 490.012 was to “require mandatory registration of all sex offenders convicted of designated offences” (para. 74) the fact that all convicted sex offenders have an increased propensity to commit sex crimes in the future provides the necessary connection between mandatory registration under s 490.012 and the purpose of the legislation. thus, the measure was not overbroad, since a certain degree of recidivism risk was not a “necessary prerequisite” (para. 95). [24] lifetime registration was also not overbroad. the majority held the purpose of s 490013(21) was “to further public safety by subjecting sex offenders who are at enhanced risk of re-offending to a longer period of registration” (para. 103, quoting r. v. long, 2018 onca 282, 45 cr (7th) 98, at para. 102). parliament could infer that committing more than one sexual offence is a proxy for an increased recidivism risk, warranting a longer registration period. nor were ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) grossly disproportionate if not strictly modest, the measures were “reasonable and not dissimilar to many other reporting obligations that routinely occur as part of the everyday life of all canadians, who are state-compelled to provide information from time to time” (para. 130). [25] khullar ja, in dissent, disagreed that the provisions complied with s 7. while she agreed the provisions were not grossly disproportionate, they were overbroad the provisions had the same purpose as the overall act: to assist law enforcement in preventing and investigating sexual crimes by centralizing information about convicted sex offenders. it was unnecessary to register offenders at negligible risk of reoffending, like the appellant, to further the provisions’ objective. the crown’s argument that the difficulties of predicting risk necessitated the registration of all offenders should be addressed under s 1, as moen j concluded yet, there was no evidence to show the measures’ salutary effects outweighed their deleterious effects. the breach of the charter right was not justified. iii. issues [26] mr. ndhlovu appeals on the ground that the court of appeal erred in its determination that ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) of the criminal code comply with s 7 of the charter. as such, the following issues arise on this appeal: (a) do ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) of the criminal code breach s 7 of the charter? (b) if so, are the breaches justified under s 1 of the charter? (c) if they are not justified, what is the appropriate remedy? iv analysis [27] we begin our analysis with a survey of soira, its history and the obligations it imposes on offenders, concluding that the provisions interfere with the liberty interests of those required to register. we turn next to identifying parliament’s objective in enacting these provisions, ultimately determining that the provisions are overbroad and therefore the limit on liberty is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice finding a breach of s 7, we proceed to examine whether the breach is justified under s 1 of the charter. we conclude that it is not: ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) are not minimally impairing of charter rights and the deleterious effects of the provisions outweigh their salutary ones. finally, we conclude by determining the appropriate remedy. a. sex offender information registration act (1) the challenged provisions [28] two provisions in the criminal code which govern the registration of offenders under soira are at issue in this appeal the first is s 490.012, which provides that a court “shall” make an order requiring sex offenders convicted of designated offences to comply with soira for the applicable period specified in s 490013. subsection (1) provides: “when a court imposes a sentence on a person for [a] . . . designated offence . . . , it shall make an order in form 52 requiring the person to comply with the sex offender information registration act for the applicable period specified in section 490013”. similar language is used in subss. (2) and (3) of the same provision. [29] the second is s 490013(21), one of several measures that sets out the applicable registration period, or the length of time that an offender is required to comply with soira. the orders have 3 different durations — 10 years, 20 years or life — depending on the maximum punishment for the offence or if the offence was prosecuted summarily section 490013(21) provides that “[a]n order made under subsection 490.012(1) applies for life if the person is convicted of . . . more than one . . . designated offence”. [30] having set out the challenged provisions, we survey soira’s history and canvass the overall scheme and the obligations it imposes on offenders in greater detail. (2) the history of soira [31] soira came into force in 2004. soira established a national registry of sex offenders it was modelled on ontario’s registry, created by christopher’s law (sex offender registry), 2000, so 2000, c 1 (christopher’s law), which was the first registry in canada ontario’s registry was enacted in 2001 following the recommendation of a provincial inquest into the abduction and murder of an 11-year-old boy by a convicted sex offender (library of parliament, bill c-16: sex offender information registration act, legislative summary 470e, february 16, 2004, at p 8). parliament followed suit with a national registry after calls mounted for an interprovincial database of sex offenders unlike christopher’s law, soira is maintained by the royal canadian mounted police, although in conjunction with local and provincial police services who oversee the administration of and access to the registry in designated regions. [32] when soira came into force, it was largely seen as a tool to help police stop the sexual abuse and abduction of children, a type of investigation where “time is of the essence” (house of commons, standing committee on public safety and national security, statutory review of the sex offender information registry act: report of the standing committee on public safety and national security, 2nd sess., 40th parl., december 2009, at pp. 3-4). the act stated that the registry’s purpose was to help police investigate crimes of a sexual nature (s 2(1), as it read in 2004) to manage the enrollment of offenders in the registry, parliament added several measures to the criminal code and under these provisions, prosecutors exercised discretion over whether to bring an application to register an offender moreover, if prosecutors brought an application, judges could still exempt the offender from the registry if they were “satisfied that the person ha[d] established that, if the order were made, the impact on them, including on their privacy or liberty, would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through the effective investigation of crimes of a sexual nature” (see criminal code, s 490.012(4), as it read in 2004). [33] in 2011, both soira and the criminal code were amended by way of the protecting victims from sex offenders act. the objective of helping police prevent sex offences was added to soira’s purpose statement in s 2(1). further, prosecutorial discretion and judicial discretion to impose soira orders were removed from the provisions of the criminal code from that point forward, s 490.012 provided that soira orders were mandatory for offenders convicted of designated offences. parliament also added s 490013(21) to the criminal code, which mandated lifetime registration for individuals convicted of more than one designated offence the constitutionality of both these amendments is at issue in this case. [34] as well, before the 2011 amendments, police needed to show they were investigating a crime and had reasonable grounds to suspect the crime was of a sexual nature before they could consult the registry (soira, s 16(2)(a), as it read in 2004). in 2011, however, the reasonable grounds requirement was removed. thus, since 2011, police are now able to consult the registry to either prevent or investigate sex offences, whether or not they reasonably suspect an offence was or will be committed (soira, s 16(2)(a)). [35] since soira’s inception, many offences have led to registration under the act. section 490.011(1)(a) of the criminal code presently designates 27 offences that lead to automatic registration under s 490.012(1) when a sentence is imposed or a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder is rendered for those offences the list of designated offences spans a broad range of criminal activity, including sexual assault, exposure, and withholding or destroying travel documents to facilitate the trafficking of persons under 18 years of age. soira’s ambit is amplified by designated offences like sexual assault, which can be committed in innumerable ways the conduct captured by sexual assault includes everything from touching a complainant’s buttocks over clothing to prolonged, violent assaults. soira, as a result, captures a highly varied and diverse group of offenders. the number and breadth of designated sexual offences means that the net of sexual offenders subject to soira is itself cast widely — many are subject to its provisions. [36] soira is nearly 20 years old. despite its long existence, there is little or no concrete evidence of the extent to which it assists police in the prevention and investigation of sex offences. det. hove, an investigator with the eps who administers the registry in the edmonton region, testified before the sentencing judge; she could only speculate how soira could be used to help the eps prevent sexual offences. moreover, she noted she received only about 15 requests from police to access the registry for an investigative purpose in her 2 years administering the registry the experts at trial were unaware of any study of soira’s efficacy. (3) the legislative scheme and reporting requirements under soira [37] soira imposes many obligations on offenders to report to a registration centre in person (ss. 4 and 4.1) and provide personal information for the purpose of the registry (s 5), on an ongoing basis. soira also imposes corresponding obligations on the police officers administering the registry to collect certain information and keep it confidential (s 8). access to the information contained in soira is restricted to certain persons, including police who, since 2011, require access for “the purpose of preventing or investigating a crime of a sexual nature” (s 16(2)(a)). [38] offenders must comply with soira for the applicable registration period specified under s 490.013 of the criminal code offenders, however, can seek a termination order, which (if granted) releases the offender from soira obligations before the end of the applicable registration period (s 490016(1)). the order is only granted if a judge is satisfied that continuing the offender’s registration is grossly disproportionate “to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature, to be achieved by the registration of information relating to sex offenders under . . [soira]” (s 490016(1)). moreover, an offender can only bring an application for a termination order after several years have elapsed (s 490.015(1)) in the case of lifetime registration following a conviction for more than one offence under s 490013(21), a termination order can be sought 20 years after the order to comply with soira was made (s 490015(1)(c)). [39] registered offenders are subject to many reporting requirements. following an order made pursuant to s 490.012(1), offenders must report in person to a registration centre, which are police stations designated with administering the registry in a geographic region at the centre, the offender must provide extensive personal information, including their name, date of birth, gender, the address of their principal and secondary residences, the address of every place of employment or volunteer location, the name of their employer or volunteer supervisor and a description of the work done, the address of every educational institution at which they are enrolled, their height and weight, a description of every physical distinguishing mark that they have, and the licence plate number, make, model, body type, year of manufacture and colour of every vehicle registered in their name or that they use regularly (soira, s 5(1)) they must also report a contact phone number for each location where they can be reached and every mobile phone and pager in their possession (s 5(1)(f)). they must supply information relating to all driver’s licenses and passports they may hold. the registration centre may take their photograph and record their eye colour and hair colour. [40] offenders must update their information in person yearly (ss. 4(3) and 4.1(1)) they must also report in person at the registration centre any changes in primary or secondary address and name. they must also report in person if they receive a driver’s licence or passport (s 41(1)). [41] moreover, offenders must notify the registration centre within seven days of any change regarding their employment or volunteering information (ss. 5(1)(d) and 51). they must also notify the registration centre if they intend to be away from their primary or secondary residence for seven or more consecutive days (s 6(1)). specifically, offenders must notify the registration centre, before departure, of their departure and return dates and of every address or location at which they expect to stay, whether the addresses or locations are in or outside canada (s 6(1)(a)) similar reporting requirements are imposed on offenders who decide, after departure, not to be at their primary or secondary residence for seven or more consecutive days (s 6(1)(b)). [42] failing to comply with soira brings serious consequences for offenders. the criminal code makes it an offence for an offender to fail to comply with soira’s reporting obligations without “reasonable excuse” (s 490.031(1)) non-compliance with any of these conditions may result in prosecution, with penalties of up to 2 years’ imprisonment, up to $10,000 in fines, or both (s 490031(1)). the risks are clearly high for offenders if they fail to adhere to soira’s numerous requirements. [43] further, police officers conduct random compliance checks to verify the information on the registry. at a minimum, offenders are subject to at least one annual verification of their residential address. det. hove of the eps also testified the current policy in edmonton was to restrict compliance checks to the offender’s primary residence, although soira does not restrict where these checks are carried out. nothing, as a result, prevents officers from showing up at an offender’s place of employment. thus, as the sentencing judge found, “offenders on the registry will be subject to further police interference due to the investigatory, and now preventative steps taken by police officers in relation to sex crimes” (abqb reasons (2016), at para. 59). [44] a number of appellate courts have concluded soira’s reporting requirements have a “minimal” or “modest” impact on registered offenders (see long, at para. 147; r v. debidin, 2008 onca 868, 94 or (3d) 421, at para. 82; r v. dyck, 2008 onca 309, 90 or (3d) 409, at paras. 104-6; r v. cross, 2006 nsca 30, 241 nsr (2d) 349, at paras. 50 and 66; r v. c (ss), 2008 bcca 262, 234 ccc (3d) 365, at para. 55). the court of appeal in this case, while finding that the measures were “not strictly modest”, equated registration to everyday reporting obligations. [45] with respect, we cannot agree rather, the impact on anyone subject to soira’s reporting requirements is considerable. the requirements impact privacy and liberty, personal interests that are fundamental to society: liberty of movement and choice, mobility, and freedom from state monitoring or intrusion in our personal lives. the scope of the personal information registered, the frequency at which offenders are required to update their information, the ongoing monitoring by the state, and, of course, the threat of imprisonment make the conditions onerous. they simply cannot be compared to reporting requirements that “routinely occur as part of the everyday life” such as those associated with filing income tax forms, obtaining a driver’s licence or a passport, or registering with banks or telephone companies (see dyck, at para. 110). [46] additionally, the cost of compliance varies from offender to offender based on their life circumstances. while soira’s reporting requirements are always serious, offenders whose job requires regular, prolonged travel will frequently need to take additional measures to remain in compliance. even worse, offenders who experience homelessness, substance use issues, and cognitive or mental health challenges may find compliance extremely difficult (see, eg,. r v. jdm, 2006 abca 294, 417 ar 186, at para. 9; r v desmeules, 2006 qccq 16773, at paras. 25-27 (canlii)) quite simply, we must recognize the full scope of the restrictions that are imposed by soira orders — both physical and informational — to properly assess the constitutionality of ss. 490.012 and 490013(21). [47] the act thus imposes numerous exacting obligations concerning initial registration, ongoing reporting, state monitoring and possible prosecution and imprisonment. we turn now to consider whether the challenged provisions breach s 7 of the charter. b. sections 490.012 and 490013(21). infringe section 7 of the charter [48] section 7 of the charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” [49] in order to demonstrate a violation of s 7, the claimant must first show that the law interferes with their life, liberty or security of the person once they have established that s 7 is engaged, they must then show that the deprivation in question is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice (carter v canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para. 55). [50] in the first section we conclude that the provisions interfere with the liberty interests of those required to register we then identify parliament’s objective in enacting these provisions, ultimately determining that the provisions are overbroad. finding a breach of s 7, we next examine whether the breach is justified under s 1 of the charter and explain why it is not. (1) sections 490.012 and 490013(21). interfere with the offender’s liberty [51] underlying the rights in s 7 is a concern for the protection of individual autonomy and dignity (carter, at para. 64) liberty protects “the right to make fundamental personal choices free from state interference” (blencoe v british columbia (human rights commission), 2000 scc 44, [2000] 2 scr 307, at para. 54; see r v. clay, 2003 scc 75, [2003] 3 scr 735, at paras. 31-32). liberty also protects against physical restraint ranging from actual imprisonment or arrest (r v. malmo-levine, 2003 scc 74, [2003] 3 scr 571, at para. 89; fleming v. ontario, 2019 scc 45, [2019] 3 scr 519, at para. 65) to the use of state power to compel attendance at a particular place (r v. beare, [1988] 2 scr 387, at p 402). [52] the crown properly concedes soira engages the liberty interest of the accused but argues that the infringement is limited, analogous to fingerprinting, and exists only to the extent soira compels attendance at a particular time and place. the similarities between a mandatory soira order and the fingerprinting order considered in beare certainly support a finding that s 7 is engaged here in beare, there was a deprivation of liberty because the order obliged “a person to appear at a specific time and place and oblige[d] that person to go through an identification process on pain of imprisonment for failure to comply” (p 402). [53] however, the nature and extent of the deprivations at issue are much greater here than in beare. soira does not merely oblige offenders to appear once at a specific time and place and provide one type of personal information rather, it creates an ongoing obligation to report extensive information, subject to random checks and other compliance measures, under threat of prosecution and punishment by way of imprisonment, fines, or both this creates continuous state monitoring that can last decades and for some offenders, like mr. ndhlovu, a lifetime. [54] the impact of a soira order on an offender’s liberty can only fairly be described as serious. the most obvious impact on liberty is the risk of prosecution and imprisonment for failure to meet the reporting requirements without “reasonable excuse” indeed, there are numerous reported cases involving offenders who have received terms of imprisonment for failing to comply with soira orders (eg,. r v. dt, 2021 canlii 85816 (nl. prov. ct.), at para. 56; r v. callahan, 2021 canlii 41952 (n.l prov ct.), at para. 62; r v firingstoney, 2017 abqb 343, at paras. 178-79 (canlii); r v. caruana, 2016 oncj 367, at para. 7 (canlii)). [55] but the mandatory measures also involve constraints on liberty that are insidious and pervasive for all those who must comply. that offenders must report to a registration centre within tight timelines to provide the information of any changes in primary or secondary address, or name, as well as if they receive a driver’s licence or passport, under threat of penalty, is a clear deprivation of liberty. it compels offenders to structure their travel and residency on an ongoing basis to remain in compliance with soira (see, eg,. r v. gew, 2006 abqb 317, 396 ar 149, at paras. 19 and 25, where the court considered the impact on an offender who worked in the trucking industry). there are burdens associated with the ongoing obligations to maintain the currency of the information on the registry. the potential of imprisonment makes the deprivation even more severe (re b.c motor vehicle act, [1985] 2 scr 486, at p 515). [56] as noted above, the impact on liberty can also be aggravated by an offender’s life circumstances for persons experiencing homelessness or frequent changes in housing, complying with soira’s requirement in s 4.1(1)(a) to report in person any changes to the location of their “main” residence (regardless of whether they have a formal address) is an extremely onerous obligation, that can be virtually impossible to respect, even more so since it can last for their lifetime. [57] it is clear to us that ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) interfere with offenders’ liberty in serious ways. liberty is obviously undermined when personal information is collected, under threat of imprisonment, for the very purpose of monitoring a person in the community and promptly identifying the person’s whereabouts in the course of a criminal investigation. [58] finally, to be clear, we make no finding as to whether soira orders constitute punishment under the krj test (r v. krj, 2016 scc 31, [2016] 1 scr. 906). this question was neither raised nor argued by either party before us, and we would not speculate, without the benefit of submissions, on whether soira orders engage s 11 of the charter and, if they do, whether they would survive a charter challenge. (2) the purpose of sections 490.012 and 490013(21) [59] the first step in an overbreadth analysis is to determine the purpose of the challenged provisions (r v. safarzadeh-markhali, 2016 scc 14, [2016] 1 scr 180, at para. 24; r v. moriarity, 2015 scc 55, [2015] 3 scr 485, at para. 24). it is to that preliminary question that we now turn. [60] several principles have emerged to assist a court in properly characterizing a law’s purpose. [61] the focus is on the purpose of the challenged provisions, not of the entire act in which they appear, although a correspondence between those purposes may sometimes occur (moriarity, at paras. 29 and 48; rjr-macdonald inc v canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at para. 144). [62] the law’s purpose should be succinct, precise, and characterized at the appropriate level of generality, which “resides between the statement of an ‘animating social value’ — which is too general — and a narrow articulation” that amounts to a virtual repetition of the challenged provision, divorced from its context (safarzadeh-markhali, at para. 27, quoting moriarity, at para. 28). [63] a law’s purpose is distinct from the means used to achieve that purpose (safarzadeh-markhali, at para. 26; moriarity, at para. 27). [64] to determine an impugned law’s purpose, courts may consider: statements of purpose in the legislation, if any; the text, context, and scheme of the legislation; and extrinsic evidence such as legislative history and evolution (safarzadeh-markhali, at para. 31; moriarity, at para. 31). [65] soira’s overall purpose is readily identified. the statement of purpose in s 2(1) of soira states the act aims “to help police services prevent and investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of certain information relating to sex offenders” in this case, there is no question that the statement of purpose fully reflects parliament’s aims in enacting soira. both at the time it was enacted and when it was later amended, parliament emphasised the act was designed to assist police. moreover, it has clearly indicated that soira is intended to assist police in the prevention and investigation of sex offences. however, the challenge in this case is not to the act as a whole, but is confined to two particular sections of the criminal code: one that provides no judicial discretion to exempt offenders from the registry and another that requires lifetime registration for those convicted of more than one designated sexual offence. [66] when assessing the purpose of these challenged provisions, several sources of legislative interpretation closely tie these two provisions to soira’s overall purpose. [67] to begin, soira and ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) of the criminal code form an integrated legislative scheme. the provisions subject offenders to the reporting requirements listed in soira. when parliament enacts related legislation dealing with the same subject, the legislation is presumed to offer a coherent and consistent treatment of the subject (r. sullivan, the construction of statutes (7th ed. 2022), at § 1304). as a result, the provisions must be interpreted in conjunction with the scheme established under the act. soira’s overall purpose informs the interpretation of the challenged provisions’ purpose. [68] the connection between the purpose of the provisions and soira’s overall purpose is reinforced by other provisions in soira. section 2(2) of soira lists three principles that must guide the act’s interpretation two emphasize that information collected and disclosed under the act is intended to assist police prevent and investigate sex offences (s 2(2)(a) and (c)(i)). since the criminal code provisions similarly affect the scope of information collected in the database, s 2(2) of soira implies the provisions should be read as closely tied to the overall aim of assisting police. [69] turning to legislative history, statements made during the amendment process indicate that the specific purpose of mandatory registration is to capture information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences. no extrinsic aids, however, shed light on the purpose of lifetime registration. [70] mandatory registration was introduced following a report by the standing committee on public safety and national security on soira’s operation and efficacy (statutory review of the sex offender information registry act: report of the standing committee on public safety and national security) the standing committee’s mandate was to identify amendments to ensure the registry is “best able to fulfill the purpose for which it was enacted” (p 2) among its recommendations, the report expressed concerns that soira’s inclusion rate was too low. only around 50 percent of sex offenders were registered in the database (p 8) the standing committee recommended eliminating prosecutorial discretion importantly, the standing committee concluded that judicial discretion to exempt offenders where the measures were grossly disproportionate should be maintained (p 9). [71] parliament, however, opted to eliminate all discretion. before parliament, the minister of public safety and his representatives reiterated the standing committee’s concerns on soira’s low inclusion rate. the minister remarked before the standing senate committee on legal and constitutional affairs that some recidivistic offenders were “falling through the cracks” because prosecutors were failing to bring applications and judges were excluding offenders when applications were brought (proceedings of the standing senate committee on legal and constitutional affairs, no. 3, 3rd sess., 40th parl., april 14, 2010, at p 32). similarly, in the house of commons, the minister’s parliamentary secretary echoed the concerns that soira was under-inclusive and its ability to assist police was undermined as a result (house of commons debates, vol. 145, no. 112, 3rd sess., 40th parl., december 7, 2010). [72] the majority at the court of appeal concluded that the purpose of mandatory registration was to register all sex offenders. while such a purpose may find some support in parts of the hansard, we cannot agree with this characterization of the provision’s purpose first, it replicates the error warned against in moriarity, at paras. 27-28: it fails to adequately distinguish between ends and means, which forecloses any separate inquiry into the connection between them in this way, it immunizes mandatory registration from review for overbreadth second, it fails to consider mandatory registration in light of the act’s overall purpose. parliament did not enact soira just for the sake of creating a database of all sex offenders rather, parliament enacted soira to create a repository of information that assists police prevent and investigate sex offences. [73] legislative provisions often encompass a range of objectives: from broad societal values to the specific means enacted to advance those goals. the legislative statements may well include the aspirational goals that animate the legislation, the specific objectives, and the anticipated effect of the provisions. as noted above, the court must articulate the objective of the provision at the appropriate level of generality, in light of the provision itself, the statutory regime and any external evidence. here, mandatory registration must be interpreted in light of soira’s explicit overall purpose to help police prevent and investigate sex offences. taking this broader context into account, we conclude the purpose of mandatory registration is to capture information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences. [74] turning to lifetime registration for more than one offence, we conclude that its purpose is to give police a longer period of access to information on offenders at a greater risk of reoffending as noted, no legislative history sheds light on the purpose of s 490013(21). it must be discerned from its text and the overall legislative scheme. to begin, soira imposes lifetime registration periods in several scenarios. before s 490013(21) was added in 2011, lifetime registration only applied when an offender committed relatively more serious offences that warrant longer sentences (s 490.013(2)(c)) or if they were or had been subject to a previous soira order (s 490.013(3) and (4)) the challenged provision also targets scenarios where more than one offence is committed, but goes further than the former s 490.013(3) and (4), as it applies where more than one offence was committed whether or not the offender was already subject or was subject at any time to a soira order. [75] given the language of the provision, in the context of the existing scheme, we agree with the court of appeal that parliament’s basis for seeking a longer period of access when more than one offence is committed must be that it believed that these offenders were more likely to reoffend relative to other sex offenders given this greater risk of harm, parliament preferred to have the offender’s information available on the registry as long as possible. this is consistent with parliament’s approach to target offenders who commit more serious offences when s 490013(21) was introduced in 2011, the criminal code already imposed lifetime registration for more serious offences. parliament appears to have provided for longer registration in the face of a greater risk of harm, either because the offence was more serious (as in s 490.013(2)(c)), or because the risk of recidivism was higher (s 490013(21)). thus, we conclude that the purpose of the measure is to give police a longer period of access to information on offenders at a greater risk of reoffending. [76] in sum, soira was not enacted with complete or total registration as an end in itself. it was enacted to help police prevent and investigate sex offences. the purpose of both challenged measures in the criminal code is closely tied to this overall purpose. the specific purpose of s 490.012 is to capture information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences. the means to achieve this purpose is mandatory registration. section 490013(21) was similarly designed to give police a longer period of access to information on offenders at a greater risk of reoffending. the means to achieve this purpose is lifetime registration for sex offenders who commit more than one designated offence. (3) the challenged measures are overbroad [77] having identified the purpose of the measures, the next step is to determine whether they are overbroad. a law is overbroad when it is so broad in scope that it includes some conduct that bears no relation to its purpose, making it arbitrary in part (canada (attorney general) v bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at para. 112) in other words, overbreadth addresses the situation where there is no rational connection between the purpose of the law and some, but not all, of its impacts (para. 112). [78] the court in bedford clarified that a law is overbroad even if it overreaches in only a single case (paras. 113 and 123). a law cannot deprive the life, liberty, or security of the person of even one individual in a way that is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice. as a consequence, laws that are broadly drawn to make enforcement more practical run afoul of s 7 should they deprive the liberty of even one person in a way that does not serve the law’s purpose (para. 113). the court in bedford concluded that enforcement practicality may justify a broad law under s 1 of the charter (para. 144), but it “is no answer to a charge of overbreadth under s 7” (safarzadeh-markhali, at para. 53, citing bedford, at para. 113). (a) mandatory registration [79] the sentencing judge concluded that mandatory registration (s 490.012) is overbroad as it leads to the registration of offenders who are not at an increased risk of committing a future sex offence. we agree. as we explained, the purpose of mandatory registration is to capture information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences registering offenders who are not at an increased risk of reoffending bears no connection to this purpose. the provision is overbroad. [80] at the s 1 hearing, the crown adduced expert evidence on statistical sexual recidivism rates by the testimony of dr. hanson, a clinical psychologist most of dr. hanson’s testimony was focused on structured approaches to conducting risk assessments of sexual offending according to this expert evidence, however, the majority of sexual offenders — about 75 to 80 percent — never actually reoffend. before the sentencing judge, the crown conceded that the registry captures people who will never reoffend. [81] to overcome that hurdle, the crown relies on two interrelated arguments. first, it argues the connection between the effects of s 490.012 on all offenders and its objective is predicated on the fact that, although not all sexual offenders reoffend, they are, as a group, all at an enhanced risk of reoffending based on statistical evidence. a conviction is a logical, practical and sufficient proxy for an enhanced risk of committing a sexual offence. second, there are no reliable means to identify those who are not at an enhanced risk to reoffend at sentencing. [82] as we will demonstrate, however, the crown’s submissions are flawed. we proceed in three parts. first, the crown’s reasoning ignores that some individual circumstances may allow a court to identify offenders that are not at an increased recidivism risk. second, the crown’s position is not supported by the expert statistical evidence presented at trial: it is inaccurate to say that all sexual offenders are at an enhanced risk of reoffending third, the overbroad nature of s 490.012 cannot be salvaged by the difficulty with risk assessments at sentencing: such arguments should be dealt with under s 1. [83] to summarize our analysis, we see no error in the sentencing judge’s or khullar ja’s conclusion that including offenders who are not at an increased risk of reoffending on the registry bears no connection to mandatory registration’s purpose. subjecting all offenders, regardless of their future risk, to continuing and onerous reporting requirements, random compliance checks, possible prosecution, and imprisonment does not bear a connection to the purpose of the measure. in this case, moen j found at first instance, based on evidence at the sentencing hearing, that mr. ndhlovu was such an offender: she had “absolutely no concerns that [he] will re-offend”. [84] the extent to which requiring all offenders to register is necessary due to the difficulties in assessing risk is an argument grounded in enforcement practicality or administrative convenience it relates to justification rather than overbreadth while mandatory registration has the attraction of simplicity and ease, the convenience of requiring every sex offender to register does not make it constitutional. an offender’s personal circumstances may show there is no increased risk of reoffending [85] the crown’s focus on the recidivism risk of sex offenders faces an obvious difficulty. in certain cases, an offender’s personal circumstances mean they are not at an increased risk of reoffending, undermining any real possibility that their information on the registry will ever prove useful to police. but a rough proxy like a prior conviction for a sex offence does not readily account for those circumstances. this common sense argument is consistent with the crown expert’s testimony. [86] trials based on historical sexual offences are commonplace in our courts. an offender who committed a sexual offence in the past is sometimes only convicted and sentenced decades later, when they are at an advanced age and have highly limited mobility. subjecting such offenders to soira would obviously bear no connection to the purpose of capturing information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences. the conclusion that these personal circumstances may have a bearing on recidivism risk, yet are not captured in statistical models, is consistent with the crown expert’s testimony. [87] the crown’s expert, dr. hanson, rightly admitted the limitations on the statistics that formed the basis of his testimony. he recognized statistical models have inherent limits: even the best studies or models cannot account for all personal characteristics that influence one’s likelihood of reoffending. bearing in mind that an effect on one person’s liberty that bears no connection to s 490.012’s purpose is sufficient to make it overbroad (bedford, at para. 123), the breach here becomes obvious. we are satisfied that the personal circumstances of some offenders mean they are at no increased risk of reoffending. [88] consider, for instance, the offender in r v. tlb, 2006 abqb 533, 403 ar 293, aff’d 2007 abca 135, 404 ar 283. the offender was wheelchair-bound due to cerebral palsy, unable to work, and required daily assistance from a caregiver to assist with her personal needs (paras. 8-9). she was convicted of child pornography and sexual interference offences involving her six-year-old child she was pressured to make images of her child and to commit a sexual act with her son after entering into an online relationship with a man who was a pedophile (paras. 2-7). after the incident was disclosed, her son was apprehended from her care (para. 6). at sentencing, tlb was exempted from complying with soira — under the previous provisions — on the grounds it would be “grossly disproportionate” (para. 80). her risk of reoffending was very low based on the assessment of a clinical and forensic psychologist (para. 65). her offences were directed against her child, who was no longer in her care, and she did not have contact with any other children (para. 65). [89] tlb’s personal circumstances make it highly improbable that she would reoffend. there is no increased risk that an offender like tlb would ever commit another sex offence nor did anything in her pattern of offending suggest that her location or identity would not be readily ascertainable without soira if police investigated her for a future offence as a result, her registration would not be connected to the objective of capturing information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences focusing only on tlb’s convictions neglects all of the unique circumstances in her case that make it highly improbable that police would ever benefit from her registration. [90] these examples illustrate the constitutional infirmity of s 490.012 under s 7. the question is not whether sexual offenders are generally at an increased risk of reoffending, but rather whether there are some offenders who are not. this is because a law that has an overbroad impact on even one individual is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice (bedford, at para. 123). as tlb illustrates, in some cases, the personal circumstances of an offender will undermine any increased risk of reoffending. there is, as a result, no connection between subjecting an offender like tlb to soira and the purpose of capturing information that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences. mandatory registration is overbroad since some sex offenders are not at an increased statistical risk of reoffending [91] the expert evidence, which the sentencing judge accepted, made clear that there is no perceptible difference in sexual recidivism risk at the time of sentencing between the lowest-risk sexual offenders — the bottom 10 percent — and the population of offenders with convictions for non-sexual criminal offences in both instances, about two percent of individuals — whether they be the lowest-risk sexual offenders or the people with a criminal record unrelated to a sexual offence — commit a sexual offence over the next five years. [92] mandatory registration is overbroad to the extent it sweeps in these lowest-risk sex offenders as a result of their risk profile, there is no connection between subjecting them to a soira order and the objective of capturing information that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences because they are not at an increased risk of reoffending the purpose of the provision is not advanced by including these offenders. [93] the crown nevertheless contends that the measures are not overbroad since sex offenders are, as a group, at an enhanced risk of recidivism. it adds that even the lowest-risk sex offender is more dangerous than members of the general public. it further argues that, in any event, all sexual offenders present a more than de minimis risk of committing a further sexual offence and that parliament is entitled to legislate in order to mitigate this risk of harm. in our view, none of these arguments is sufficient to cure the provision’s overbreadth. [94] first, we agree that the commission of a sexual offence is one of many empirically validated predictors of increased sexual recidivism. but so are other factors, such as age, unusual or atypical sexual interests, sexual preoccupation, lifestyle instability or poor cognitive problem solving (to name a few) recidivism risk also varies depending on the pattern of offences: for instance, whether the offence is a non-contact sexual offence, or whether it is committed against a child, a stranger, an acquaintance or a family member. yet the expert evidence makes clear that valid risk assessments must consider a range of risk relevant variables — there is no single factor that, on its own, yields an offender’s recidivism risk. in short, many factors affect a sex offender’s recidivism risk. [95] as a result, although an offender may be part of a group that is generally — in other words, on average — at an enhanced risk of reoffending, this does not hold true for every individual in the group. to be clear, an overbreadth analysis does not focus on the group, but on the individuals within that group. as explained above, while a previous conviction for a sexual offence is a risk factor, about 10 percent of the individuals with a prior conviction for a sex offence are not, at time of sentencing, at an enhanced risk of reoffending when compared to the general criminal population. focusing only on the commission of a past sexual offence inevitably detracts the focus from the other variables affecting an offender’s recidivism risk this is hardly surprising, considering that sexual offences cover a broad range of conduct and that sex offenders are not a uniform group. [96] second, there is no evidence to support the crown’s reliance on an enhanced rate of offending relative to the general public the crown’s own expert could only speculate and testified that the rate of sexual offending by those without any prior conviction for any offence had not been established. [97] third, a de minimis risk of harm or risk of reoffending is insufficient to avoid overbreadth the crown relies on malmo-levine for the proposition that parliament is entitled to enact measures that mitigate a more than de minimis risk of harm, a point accepted by the majority at the court of appeal (para. 89). since all sex offenders are allegedly at a more than de minimis risk of reoffending, the crown says parliament complied with s 7 when it elected to include relatively low-risk offenders in the registry. [98] as we note above, only about 20 to 25 percent of the sex offender group actually reoffend, and 10 percent of the group are at about a 2 percent chance of reoffending after 5 years and within the rates of recidivism, the range of conduct captured — and the degree of harm — varies dramatically. nonetheless, we agree that “the precise weighing and calculation of the nature and extent of the harm is parliament’s job” (malmo-levine, at para. 133) however, the question in an overbreadth analysis is not whether parliament perceived a more than de minimis risk of harm when it enacted a law. rather, the question is whether the law is so broad in scope that it has some impact on a s 7 interest that bears no connection to the law’s purpose (bedford, at para. 112). [99] the difference between these two questions is illustrated by an early decision in this court’s overbreadth jurisprudence, r v. heywood, [1994] 3 scr 761. in heywood, the court considered a provision that made it an offence for certain offenders to loiter in or near school grounds, playgrounds, public parks, or bathing areas (then s 179(1)(b) of the criminal code) the purpose of the measure was to protect children from becoming victims of sexual offences (p 794). the court struck down the measure for overbreadth because it applied to locations where children were not likely to be present, such as every part of all public parks in canada, including vast and remote wilderness parks (p 795) clearly, however, the measure applied to sex offenders who would, according to the crown’s logic, pose a more than de minimis risk of harm. nevertheless, the provision breached s 7 of the charter because it impacted the liberty of offenders in a manner that bore no connection to its purpose while heywood predates bedford and carter, it remains a paradigmatic application of the overbreadth principle (h stewart, fundamental justice: section 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (2nd ed. 2019), at p 154). [100] quite simply, the crown cannot rely on the fact that any offender has a risk — albeit not an increased risk — to commit a sexual offence in the future. if a mere risk of committing a future criminal offence could provide the requisite connection to meet the bedford threshold, such a threshold would be met, by reason of logic, in every case where forward-looking measures are implemented by parliament. if one accepts the basic premise that it is impossible to predict the future with absolute certainty, then, by definition, anyone has a risk of committing a criminal offence in the future. if risk is all it takes to make a measure depriving individuals from their liberty compliant with s 7, the law on overbreadth would be deprived of its normative value. [101] in the end, the evidence — accepted by the sentencing judge — demonstrates that s 490.012 catches offenders who, at the time of their release, are no longer at significant risk to reoffend the commission of a past sexual offence, therefore, is an inexact proxy for those offenders whose information may assist police. a proxy of such a broad nature, which applies to a large number of people and a broad range of conduct, inevitably captures individuals who are not at an increased risk of committing the criminal conduct that parliament sought to prevent and investigate with the registry. (iii) uncertainty at sentencing cannot cure section 490.012’s overbreadth [102] the crown submits s 490.012 is not overbroad, since the risk of recidivism is difficult to assess and even expert assessments are error-prone. thus, it says, there is no other alternative that would capture the information to assist police. there are two difficulties with the crown’s argument. [103] first, as discussed above, the crown cannot save a law from overbreadth for reasons of “administrative convenience” or to make enforcement more practical (singh v. minister of employment and immigration, [1985] 1 scr 177, at p 219; see bedford, at para. 113; carter, at para. 88; safarzadeh-markhali, at para. 53). as the crown relies on the same concern here, it does not save mandatory registration under s 7, but must be addressed under s 1. [104] it is worth elaborating on why questions of enforcement practicality are generally not addressed under s 7 of the charter this type of argument implicitly accepts that an individual’s rights are breached but holds it is justified for the sake of a benefit to the public — making the administration or enforcement of a law more practical or convenient. as a result, the argument goes to the heart of the s 1 analysis: the justification of a breach of an individual’s rights in pursuit of a greater public good (ie, laws that are easier to enforce or administer), rather than the “narrower” question under s 7, which concerns “whether the impugned law infringes individual rights” (bedford, at para. 125). considerations of enforcement practicality balance harm to an individual’s rights against a benefit to the public and so fall at the core of s 1. they are appropriately addressed as part of the crown’s burden under s 1 as a result. [105] since bedford, the court has consistently rejected arguments premised on enforcement practicality and administrative convenience under s 7 of the charter. in bedford, the court concluded that the criminal offence of living on the avails of prostitution was overbroad. the purpose of the offence was “to target pimps and the parasitic, exploitative conduct in which they engage” (para. 137) the offence was overbroad to the extent it captured persons who were not in exploitative business relationships with sex workers, including accountants and receptionists (para. 142). the attorneys general of canada and ontario argued the law needed to be broadly drawn due to the blurry line between exploitative and non-exploitative relationships (para. 143). the court concluded this argument, premised on enforcement practicality, was better addressed under s 1 of the charter (para. 144). [106] later, in carter, the court considered a challenge to a criminal prohibition on assisted dying. the purpose of the prohibition was to protect vulnerable individuals from committing suicide in a moment of weakness (para. 78). the court concluded the prohibition was overbroad to the extent it applied to individuals who were not vulnerable (para. 86) in reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the crown’s argument that the law needed to be broadly drawn due to the difficulty of conclusively identifying vulnerable individuals (paras. 87-88). the court again held this argument was properly addressed under s 1 (para. 88). [107] a year later, in safarzadeh‑markhali, the court considered a challenge to a provision that barred offenders who were denied bail due to a prior conviction from receiving enhanced credit for presentence custody. the provision’s purpose was “to enhance public safety and security by increasing violent and chronic offenders’ access to rehabilitation programs” (para. 47 (emphasis deleted)). the court concluded it was overbroad since it applied to offenders who did not pose a threat to public safety or security, including those denied bail for non-violent prior offences, such as missing a court date (paras. 52-53). the crown argued that the provision cast a broad net since that was more practical than identifying only those offenders that posed a public safety risk (para. 53) the court, citing bedford, held this concern for enforcement practicality did not save the provision from overbreadth under s 7 (para. 53). [108] bedford, carter, and safarzadeh-markhali all affirm that parliament cannot rely on enforcement practicality or administrative convenience to immunize a law from overbreadth under s 7 of the charter. the proper approach is to address such considerations under s 1 the crown’s attempts to rely on enforcement practicality under s 7 similarly fail in this case. [109] moreover, judges make risk assessments routinely, including those informed by expert assessments notwithstanding these assessments may not be certain, they are capable of being well informed by an individual’s personal circumstances and the best expert evidence clearly, there are instances where a sentencing judge can reasonably conclude that it is remote or implausible that an offender’s information will ever prove useful to police. [110] finally, in the past, judges may have improperly exempted offenders on the basis of gross disproportionality by relying on myths and stereotypes about sexual assaults (see j. benedet, “a victim-centred evaluation of the federal sex offender registry” (2012), 37 queen’s l.j 437) to the extent some trial judges may have interpreted the former exemption too broadly, those trial decisions are always subject to appellate review and guidance this cannot render an unconstitutional law constitutional. [111] thus, mandatory registration is overbroad. since it captures offenders who are not at an increased risk to reoffend, s 490.012 breaches s 7 of the charter. (b) lifetime registration [112] lifetime registration of those convicted of more than one sexual offence (s 490013(21)) is also overbroad. [113] the crown’s expert distinguished between two categories of offenders who commit more than one offence. the first is an offender, like mr. ndhlovu, who commits more than one sex offence without an intervening conviction. the second is an offender who, after being convicted of a sex offence, goes on to commit another offence dr. hanson explained that committing more than one offence without an intervening conviction is not associated with an enhanced recidivism risk. as he put it, “individuals who are convicted of . . two or three offences at the same sentencing occasion are the same risk as an individual who is convicted of one” (ar, vol. ii, at p 196) he noted, however, that committing another offence after a conviction did substantially increase recidivism risk. [114] dr. hanson’s evidence establishes that lifetime registration for more than one offence without an intervening conviction is overbroad the purpose of the measure is to give police a longer period of access to information on offenders at a greater risk of reoffending yet, as the expert evidence establishes, the measure captures some offenders who are not at a relatively greater risk of reoffending because their two or more offences were committed, for example, in a single transaction. section 490013(21), however, provides no discretion to exempt offenders in this circumstance. [115] the crown submits parliament was entitled to rely on a common sense inference that committing more than one offence on a single occasion increases recidivism risk. we would not give effect to this argument. the expert evidence clearly undermines the plausibility of any such inference. for this reason, we agree with the defence that s 490013(21) is overbroad. (4) gross disproportionality [116] having concluded the measures are overbroad, we need not decide whether they are grossly disproportionate. that said, we would not foreclose the possibility that the effects of the provisions may be grossly disproportionate to their purposes in some cases as discussed above, the impact on anyone who is subject to the reporting requirements of a soira order is considerable. the personal information registered, the frequency at which offenders are required to update their information and the threat of imprisonment make the conditions onerous they are not routine reporting requirements section 490.012 previously allowed for an exemption to ensure no individual would be subject to a grossly disproportionate order. that option, however, is no longer available. c. sections 490.012 and 490013(21). are not justified under section 1 of the charter [117] having concluded that ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) breach s 7 of the charter, it remains to determine whether the measures can be justified under s 1. the crown submits the measures are saved by s 1. we do not accept this submission. [118] the crown bears the burden of establishing that the challenged measures’ infringement of s 7 is justified under s 1 of the charter. to meet its burden under s 1, the crown must show the infringement is “demonstrably justified”, which means the infringing measures must be justified based on a “rational inference from evidence or established truths” (rjr-macdonald, at para. 128) bare assertions will not suffice: evidence, supplemented by common sense and inference, is needed (r v. sharpe, 2001 scc 2, [2001] 1 scr 45, at para. 78). [119] a breach of the charter is justified under s 1 when the challenged law has a “pressing and substantial object and . . . the means chosen are proportional to that object” (carter, at para. 94). the law is proportionate where the means adopted are rationally connected to the law’s objective, minimally impairing of the right in question, and the law’s salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects (r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at pp. 136-40) the focus of the analysis is on the infringing measures, not on the overall legislative scheme. thus, the crown’s burden requires it to show the challenged measures, and not soira as a whole, impose a reasonable limit on s 7 (ontario (attorney general) v g, 2020 scc 38, at para. 72, citing rjr-macdonald, at para. 144; toronto star newspapers ltd v canada, 2010 scc 21, [2010] 1 scr 721, at para. 20). [120] the defence concedes that the prevention and investigation of sex crimes is a pressing and substantial purpose. we agree. parliament’s goals in enacting soira are laudable. in our view, this holds true for the specific objectives of the provisions at issue. parliament’s efforts to provide tools to police that make it easier to prevent and investigate sex offences are clearly aligned with the public’s interest in preventing sex crimes and bringing sex offenders to justice. [121] furthermore, the measures are rationally connected to their objectives. the standard is not onerous; oakes requires a rational connection, not a complete rational correspondence (r v. appulonappa, 2015 scc 59, [2015] 3 scr 754, at para. 80; health services and support — facilities subsector bargaining assn v british columbia, 2007 scc 27, [2007] 2 scr 391, at para. 148). this test is met here. since a conviction for a sexual offence is a reliable indicator of an increased risk of reoffending and committing another sex offence after a conviction can increase recidivism risk, it is reasonable to suppose the provisions may further their respective objectives (alberta v. hutterian brethren of wilson colony, 2009 scc 37, [2009] 2 scr 567, at para. 48). yet, as we explain, the measures fail the other branches of the oakes test. (1) sections 490.012 and 490013(21). are not minimally impairing of an offender’s rights [122] a key issue on this appeal is whether the measures are minimally impairing of an offender’s rights to be minimally impairing, the challenged provisions must interfere with s 7 “as little as reasonably possible in order to achieve the[ir] legislative objective” (rjr-macdonald, at para. 160) the analysis turns on whether there are alternative, less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner (krj, at para. 70). the crown bears the burden of showing no less drastic means are available (safarzadeh-markhali, at para. 63). a court need not find that the alternative measures “satisfy the objective to exactly the same extent or degree as the impugned measure[s]” (hutterian brethren, at para. 55 (emphasis in original)). instead, it suffices that the alternative measures “substantially” achieve the challenged measures’ objective (paras. 55 and 60) for this reason, the court in g rejected the crown’s argument that since recidivism risk could not be perfectly predicted, the mandatory and permanent registration of offenders who were found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in ontario’s sex offender registry was minimally impairing. the court concluded that absolute certainty in risk assessments cannot be expected (para. 75) for similar reasons, we conclude the crown has not discharged its burden on this step. [123] the crown argues that mandatory soira orders (s 490.012) are necessary to achieve “parliament’s objective of providing police with a comprehensive source of information on convicted sexual offenders, and particularly those who reoffend” and “to achieve an offender inclusion rate similar to that of the ontario registry” (rf, at paras. 162-63) this argument, however, is based on a flawed premise, since it mischaracterizes s 490.012’s objective as stated above, the purpose is to capture information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences. the means chosen is the registration of all sex offenders. the crown’s argument under minimal impairment inappropriately shifts the characterization of mandatory registration’s purpose. [124] when the purpose of mandatory registration is properly characterized, it is apparent that the crown has not met its burden under minimal impairment. to begin, the crown concedes that restoring judicial discretion in the registration process would allow for a 90 percent inclusion rate of offenders in the registry. yet the crown did not adduce any evidence to explain why an inclusion rate of 90 percent would not substantially achieve s 490.012’s purpose of capturing information that assists police prevent and investigate sex offences. specifically, no evidence or plausible argument was provided to explain why a discretion to exclude offenders from soira where the impacts are likely too onerous or unrelated to s 490.012’s purpose would not substantially achieve parliament’s aims. in fact, the crown did not adduce any evidence about the difficulties faced by police in preventing or investigating sexual offences before 2011, when a form of judicial discretion was in place indeed, the crown’s expert, dr. hanson, was unable to find any study of soira’s efficacy or consequences before the 2011 amendments. [125] there is also no persuasive evidence that the difficulties in assessing recidivism risk renders judicial discretion incompatible with parliament’s goals. judges frequently assess risk. as noted, this court said in g at the minimal impairment stage, “[i]ndividual assessment does not need to perfectly predict risk — certainty cannot be the standard” (para. 75) a variety of tools are available to improve the accuracy of judicial risk assessments, including expert evidence alternatively, parliament can enumerate specific criteria to guide judges on when registering an offender is unlikely to advance the scheme’s objective we do not accept the crown’s submission that reliable, tailored alternatives are simply not available. there is, it would seem, a variety of measures that parliament may introduce, keeping in mind the measures must neither be overbroad nor grossly disproportionate. [126] in essence, the crown’s argument rests on the proposition that all offenders must be registered unless the defence can demonstrate that judicial discretion will not hamper the police’s ability to prevent and investigate sex offences the unproven premise is that police can only effectively prevent and investigate sex offences if all designated offenders are registered. the assumption appears to be that if some are good, more is better, and all is best. the court in carter rejected a similar argument at the minimal impairment stage because it “effectively reverses the onus under s 1, requiring the claimant whose rights are infringed to prove less invasive ways of achieving the prohibition’s object” (para. 118). the same concern in carter arises in this case. it is the crown, not mr. ndhlovu, who bears the burden under s 1. rather than call evidence that shows less infringing measures would fail to substantially achieve the measure’s objective, the crown relies on assertion and conjecture. that is not enough to meet its burden under s 1. as the court stated in carter, at para. 119, “[j]ustification under s 1 is a process of demonstration, not intuition or automatic deference to the government’s assertion of risk” (citing rjr-macdonald, at para. 128). [127] nor has the crown met its burden on lifetime registration (s 490013(21)). as noted, the expert evidence indicates that offenders who commit more than one offence without an intervening conviction have no increased recidivism rate relative to offenders who commit a single offence. the crown has not explained why exempting this category of offenders would not achieve s 490013(21)’s purpose — that is, to give police a longer period of access to information on offenders at a greater risk of reoffending — in a real and substantial manner. [128] consequently, as in g, the crown has failed to tender the evidence needed to discharge its burden at the minimal impairment stage. there is no basis on which to conclude that alternative measures do not achieve the purpose of ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) in a real and substantial manner. (2) sections 490.012 and 490013(21)’s. deleterious effects outweigh their salutary effects [129] at the heart of the s 1 analysis is the determination of whether the salutary effects outweigh the negative impacts of the challenged measures. this is the final stage of the proportionality inquiry in oakes. we conclude that the crown has also not met its burden at this stage. [130] the final stage requires a court to weigh the harm to the claimant’s rights against the public benefits conferred by the challenged measure, by asking whether “the benefits which accrue from the limitation [of the claimant’s rights] are proportional to its deleterious effects” (krj, at para. 77, quoting thomson newspapers co. v. canada (attorney general), [1998] 1 scr 877, at para. 125). the final stage of the oakes test, as a result, involves a broader assessment than in the prior stages of “whether the benefits of the impugned law are worth the cost of the rights limitation” (hutterian brethren, at para. 77). benefits that are speculative and marginal in nature carry less weight when balanced against a measure’s significant and tangible deleterious effects (krj, at para. 92; thomson newspapers co., at paras. 129-30). [131] the crown’s evidence on the challenged measures’ benefits is insufficient to meet its burden under s 1. the goal of capturing information that assists police to prevent and investigate sex offences is obviously an important consideration in whether the provisions’ overbreadth is justified under s 1. so too is the aim of giving police longer access to the information of offenders at greater risk of reoffending to the extent the provisions succeed, they are strongly in the public interest. [132] the crown’s arguments on the benefits of ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) are premised on the alleged benefits flowing from the sex offender registry the crown’s evidence on its efficacy was, however, limited, both on the investigation and prevention of sexual offences. the crown cites evidence in its factum regarding the general benefits of sex offender registries specifically, it relies on dr. zgoba’s testimony that some studies in the united states found registries may assist police in detaining offenders more quickly if they reoffend. yet the experts also testified that the united states’ registries were public and therefore not comparable to soira the crown, moreover, identified no cases where soira helped police solve or prevent a sex offence, either before or after the challenged measures were introduced. in fact, at the s 1 hearing, the crown called the registry’s national database manager with the rcmp and, on cross-examination, he testified that he was unaware of any offences that were solved using soira. [133] it is, moreover, unclear how soira could even prevent a sex offence. det. hove provided only a hypothetical example where the police used the database to intercept an offender after witnessing some suspicious behaviour. in theory, of course, the registry might prevent offences if a serial offender is apprehended using it, preventing future assaults by that person, but no evidence was adduced to support this hypothesis. [134] more significantly, the crown has adduced no evidence that demonstrates the salutary effects of the challenged measures. under s 1, the onus is on the crown to justify the specific infringing measures, not the overall scheme (g, at para. 72). the crown did not adduce any evidence on the difficulties that police faced in investigating sexual offences with soira before the 2011 amendments and how the amendments mitigated these difficulties no evidence was adduced to demonstrate the benefit of registering every sex offender, without regard for their risk of reoffending to the contrary, we note that dr. hanson, the crown’s own expert, testified that “[b]lanket policies that treat all sex offenders as ‘high risk’ waste resources by over-supervising lower risk offenders and risk diverting resources from the truly high-risk offenders who could benefit from increased supervision and human service” (ar, vol. ii, at p 236). no more evidence was presented on the benefits that flow from police having longer access to the information of offenders who have committed multiple offences without an intervening conviction. [135] in this case, we must weigh those potential and theoretical benefits against the impact on registrants the impact on anyone who is subject to the reporting requirements of a soira order is considerable to reiterate, soira’s reporting requirements are not routine: the scope of the personal information registered, the frequency at which offenders are required to update their information and, above all, the threat of imprisonment make the conditions onerous. additionally, these effects are more acute when considering their effects on marginalized populations, such as people experiencing homelessness. considering these deleterious impacts, the sparse evidence on the provisions’ benefits and the fact that the registration of approximately 10 percent of offenders who have the lowest recidivism risk does not serve the provisions’ purpose, we conclude the crown did not meet its burden at this stage either. as result, the crown has not shown that ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) are saved under s 1 of the charter. v result and remedy [136] we would allow the appeal and declare ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) of no force or effect under s 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982. on mandatory registration, we find a one-year suspension of the declaration is appropriate given concerns about public safety and since there are many ways parliament could address the legislative gap for individualized assessment (g, at para. 165) an immediate declaration, however, is appropriate for lifetime registration. [137] the framework governing charter remedies was recently revisited in g. once the court has determined the extent of the law’s inconsistency with the charter (para. 160), the next step is to determine whether a tailored remedy would be appropriate (such as reading down, reading in, or severance), rather than a declaration of invalidity applying to the whole of the challenged law (para. 163). a. section 490.012 [138] the crown submits that “[a] tailored remedy is not appropriate in this case” (rf, at para. 175). since the issue is the mandatory registration of all sex offenders, its unconstitutionality does not lend itself to such a remedy as the crown notes, reading down s 490.012 so that it would simply not apply to offenders who are not at an increased risk of reoffending or who suffer grossly disproportionate impacts would, in practice, reinstate judicial discretion and contradict parliament’s clear intention to remove all judicial discretion to exempt offenders at the time of sentencing from the registry (r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr 599, at para. 100; schachter v canada, [1992] 2 scr 679, at p 718) we agree with the crown that the appropriate remedy is a declaration of invalidity. [139] declarations should be suspended when the government demonstrates that “an immediately effective declaration of invalidity would endanger an interest of such great importance that, on balance, the benefits of delaying the effect of that declaration outweigh the cost of preserving an unconstitutional law that violates charter rights” (g, at para. 117; see also paras. 133, 139 and 156). declaring s 490.012 to be of no force or effect immediately would effectively preclude courts from imposing soira orders on any offenders, including those at high risk of recidivism granting an immediate declaration could therefore endanger the public interest in preventing and investigating sexual offences committed by high-risk offenders, undermining public safety balanced against this consideration is the significance of the rights violation that the suspension would temporarily prolong. granting a suspension also runs counter to the public’s interest in legislation that complies with the constitution. on balance, however, the circumstances justify a suspension of the declaration of invalidity for 12 months. [140] a declaration of invalidity is presumed to operate retroactively (r v. albashir, 2021 scc 48, at paras. 34 and 38) however, in this case, a retroactive application of the declaration at the conclusion of the suspension could frustrate the compelling public interests that require a period of transition, creating uncertainty and removing the protection that justifies the suspension in the first place (paras. 46, 52 and 72) specifically, a retroactive declaration would undermine the purpose of the suspension (ie, ensuring high-risk offenders are registered on soira for public safety). moreover, a prospective declaration of invalidity would not unduly prejudice offenders who have been registered since 2011 but whose rights under s 7 are still violated. those offenders will be able to ask for a personal remedy pursuant to s 24(1) of the charter in order to be removed from the registry if they can demonstrate that soira’s impacts on their liberty bears no relation or is grossly disproportionate to the objective of s 490012. [141] finally, we would grant mr. ndhlovu a remedy under s 24(1) and exempt him from the suspension of the declaration. it is generally desirable that a claimant who brings a successful constitutional challenge benefit from their efforts in litigating the issue (g, at paras. 148 and 182). further, the crown only adduced expert evidence on recidivism risk at the s 1 hearing, after the sentencing judge had made a determination that mr. ndhlovu was at little risk to reoffend. while the crown’s expert, dr. hanson, opined someone with some of the same characteristics as mr. ndhlovu would have an enhanced risk of reoffending, one that was about average for sex offenders, he indicated risk assessment is an individualized exercise involving many variables that is precisely what the sentencing judge did in this case in finding that mr. ndhlovu was unlikely to reoffend. moen j found that he “will be safe to release into the community. i have absolutely no concerns that [he] will re-offend. nor does the crown suggest that [he] will.” nor does the crown argue on appeal that the sentencing judge made a palpable and overriding error in making this finding of fact. based on this finding, there is no connection between subjecting mr. ndhlovu to a soira order and the objective of capturing information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences. b. section 490013(21) [142] with respect to lifetime registration, the crown conceded a suspension would not be appropriate we agree: an immediate declaration is appropriate given those offenders will remain registered and there is no “gap” for parliament to fill. as a result, the existing provisions that dictate a length of registration will operate, pending any new constitutional provision that would target offenders who commit more than one offence for instance, those convicted of offences with a maximum term of imprisonment of 2 to 5 years will receive a 10-year registration order, while those convicted of an offence with a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 to 14 years would receive a 20-year registration order (s 490013(2)). here, there is no compelling reason to rebut the presumption of retroactive application of the declaration of invalidity. section 490013(21) is therefore declared invalid. because the declaration affects all those impacted by the enactment of the provision since 2011, offenders who are subject to a lifetime order pursuant to this provision after having been convicted of more than one sexual offence without an intervening conviction can seek a s 24(1) remedy to change the length of their registration. vi conclusion [143] we would allow the appeal the judgment of the court of appeal of alberta is set aside. sections 490.012 and 490013(21) of the criminal code infringe s 7 of the charter, and the crown has not demonstrated the infringement is justified under s 1. the provisions are therefore declared of no force or effect under s 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982. the declaration in respect of s 490.012 is suspended for one year and applies prospectively. mr. ndhlovu is exempted from the suspension of the declaration an immediate declaration is granted for s 490013(21) and applies retroactively. the reasons of wagner c.j and moldaver, côté and brown jj were delivered by brown j — i. introduction [144] i agree with the majority that mandatory lifetime registration in s 490013(21) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, is overbroad. the court of appeal erred in saying there was no evidence to displace the “common sense inference” that individuals convicted of multiple offences at one time pose a greater risk of reoffending than those convicted of a single offence. the expert evidence was clear and uncontested: they do not. it therefore cannot reasonably be said that mandatory lifetime registration accords with the principles of fundamental justice. nor can this be justified under s 1 of the charter, since parliament could have crafted a narrower regime that distinguishes multiple sequential offences from prior convictions. [145] i depart from the majority, however, on the constitutionality of s 490012. in finding it unconstitutional, my colleagues fixate on the removal of judicial discretion to exempt offenders who do not pose an “increased risk” to reoffend. but the exercise of discretion was the very problem that prompted parliament to amend the criminal code to provide for automatic registration of sex offenders under the sex offender information registration act, sc 2004, c 10 (“soira”). specifically, many judges had exercised their discretion to exempt offenders in a manifestly improper manner, and the registry’s low inclusion rate undermined its efficacy. the evidence is clear that even low risk sex offenders, relative to the general criminal population, pose a heightened risk to commit another sexual offence it is also clear that it cannot be reliably predicted at the time of sentencing which offenders will reoffend. in the face of that uncertain risk, parliament was entitled to cast a wide net. ii background [146] while the majority has summarized the background to this matter, i would stress a few points. [147] the appellant pled guilty to sexual offences committed against two complainants, rd and cb, at a party hosted by rd. a pre-sentence report led the sentencing judge to find he was a low risk to reoffend, that he would “be safe to release into the community”, and that she had “absolutely no concerns that [he] will re-offend” (ar, vol. ii, at p 38) she sentenced the appellant to six months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ probation. [148] the sentencing judge granted the mandatory dna order, but adjourned the imposition of a soira order, instead expressly inviting counsel to challenge the constitutional validity of the amended provisions. she also volunteered her own view that it is “completely disproportionate in circumstances of a case like this to -- to put someone on a sex offender registry for the balance of their life” (p 49). after seeking instructions, defence counsel confirmed that she would seek an adjournment to bring a constitutional challenge. the sentencing judge allowed the adjournment and explained why she had raised it: “. . i consider this to be much harsher than any term imprisonment. so i thought it was time” (p 50). [149] after the hearing, the sentencing judge, unsurprisingly given her earlier statement, declared the provisions to be overbroad and grossly disproportionate to the extent they remove judicial discretion to refuse to register offenders who present no risk of reoffending (2016 abqb 595, 44 alta l.r (6th) 382 (“abqb reasons (2016)”)). she was not satisfied that including people like the appellant on the registry would help police prevent and investigate sexual crimes subjecting all offenders, regardless of their future risk, to onerous reporting requirements, random compliance checks, and internal stigma goes further than is necessary to accomplish the goal of protecting the public. she further held that the limits on s 7 could not be saved under s 1 (2018 abqb 277, 68 alta. lr (6th) 89). [150] a majority at the court of appeal of alberta overturned her ruling (2020 abca 307, 12 alta. lr (7th) 225). as to overbreadth, the sentencing judge defined the purpose of the legislation too narrowly. sections 490.012 and 490013(21) must be assessed in light of soira’s broader purpose: to protect society from recidivist sexual offenders low risk does not equate to no risk according to the majority, the commission of a sex offence is a reasonable proxy for the risk of recidivism and the appellant is an offender who, by virtue of being convicted of more than one offence, poses enhanced risk in dissent, khullar j.a held that ss. 490.012 and 490013(21) limit the appellant’s privacy and liberty rights under s 7. the appellant was unlikely to reoffend and the provisions requiring him to register for life overreach in their effect. she concluded that the crown failed to justify the limits as minimally impairing and proportionate. iii analysis a overview of section 7 analysis [151] the appellant says the removal of discretion deprives offenders of liberty in a manner that is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. he raises three such principles: arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality. all three are concerned with “failures of instrumental rationality” (canada (attorney general) v bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at para. 107, quoting h. stewart, fundamental justice: section 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (2012), at p 151) first, arbitrariness describes the absence of a rational connection between the law’s purpose and the impugned effect on the individual, or where “it can be shown that the impugned effect undermines the objective of the law” (r v michaud, 2015 onca 585, 127 o.r (3d) 81, at para. 69, citing bedford, at para. 111). next, a law will be overbroad where it captures “some conduct” unrelated to its purpose, recognizing that a law can be rational in some cases but overreach in others (bedford, at paras. 112 and 117 (emphasis deleted)) finally, gross disproportionality will be found where “the law’s effects on life, liberty or security of the person are so grossly disproportionate to its purposes that they cannot rationally be supported” (michaud, at para. 71, quoting bedford, at para. 120). as i explain below, s 490.012 accords with all these principles. [152] the s 7 analysis proceeds in four stages. first, i consider the purpose of s 490.012(1), which is to help police prevent and investigate sexual crimes by requiring the registration of certain information relating to sex offenders next, i address why automatic registration is neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate in light of that objective in the final section, i turn to overbreadth as i will explain, automatic registration does not go further than necessary to achieve its purpose, because all sex offenders pose a higher risk to reoffend and the risk of recidivism cannot be reliably predicted at the time of sentencing the sentencing judge erred in concluding otherwise, and my colleagues in the majority perpetuate this error. b. identifying the purpose of section 490.012 [153] section 490.012 contains no explicit statement of the purpose of automatic registration. the broader legislative scheme offers some clues, though. section 2(1) of soira states that “[t]he purpose of this act is to help police services prevent and investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of certain information relating to sex offenders.” the guiding principles of the legislation include: (a) police having rapid access to certain information relating to sex offenders; (b) ensuring such information is current and reliable by collecting it on an ongoing basis; and (c) protecting the privacy and rehabilitation interests of sex offenders by requiring that the information be collected only to enable police services to prevent or investigate crimes of a sexual nature and restricting access to the information (s 2(2)). [154] extrinsic evidence reveals that parliament amended the statutory scheme in response to concerns that the registry’s efficacy was compromised by the exclusion of nearly half of all convicted sex offenders parliament’s reason for creating the registry and the data on the number of offenders being registered themselves substantiate these concerns. [155] the creation of sex offender registries in canada was prompted by a growing public concern about “protecting children and other vulnerable victims from sex offenders through a system of careful monitoring of convicted sex offenders” (r. v. long, 2018 onca 282, 45 cr (7th) 98, at para. 86). that concern was exemplified by the enactment of ontario’s registry in 2001, which applied automatically to everyone in the province who was convicted of, or was already serving a sentence for, a listed sexual offence (christopher’s law (sex offender registry), 2000, so 2000, c 1, s 2). the national registry soon followed in 2004. [156] but after several years, lawmakers queried whether the registry was fulfilling its purposes. the government struck a standing committee in 2009 to review soira. the committee gathered evidence and recommended specific amendments “to help police departments prevent crimes of a sexual nature, solve them more quickly, and more effectively supervise sex offenders in the community” (house of commons, standing committee on public safety and national security, statutory review of the sex offender information registry act: report of the standing committee on public safety and national security, 2nd sess., 40th parl., december 2009, at p 2). [157] when the committee compared the two registries, it found a significant divergence in the inclusion rate: ontario’s registry included the names of 96.84% of sex offenders, while only approximately 50% of offenders were included on the national registry (house of commons, standing committee on public safety and national security, evidence, no. 15, 2nd sess., 40th parl., april 21, 2009, at p 4; standing committee on public safety and national security, december 2009, at p 8). and while the ontario registry was consulted 475 times per day, the national registry was only consulted an average of 165 times per year (standing committee on public safety and national security, december 2009, at p 5) accordingly, the committee recommended, among other things, that registration should be automatic for offenders found guilty of a designated sexual offence, as is the case in ontario, except in rare circumstances where the impact on the offender would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest. [158] the government provided a written response, explaining that it would adopt most of the committee’s recommendations by asking parliament to enact the protecting victims from sex offenders act, sc 2010, c 17. with respect to automatic registration, the government agreed that the current model “presented concerns as some convicted sex offenders have not been included on the registry in cases where the crown prosecutor has not made an application or judges have concluded that the offender met the ‘grossly disproportionate’ test” (government response to the fifth report of the standing committee on public safety and national security entitled statutory review of the sex offender information registry act, april 12, 2010 (online)). the amendments responded to those concerns by creating “a fully automatic inclusion model”, to make the registry “as effective as possible when police are investigating crimes of a sexual nature” (government response). [159] the same themes emerge from the legislative committees and debates. during second reading of bill c-34, protecting victims from sex offenders act, 2nd sess., 40th parl., 2009, the minister of public safety emphasized that mandatory inclusion would eliminate the “flaw” in the current legislation that allows convicted sex offenders to avoid being added to the registry, “which hampers future police investigations and exposes canadians to greater risk” (house of commons debates, vol. 144, no. 67, 2nd sess., 40th parl., june 3, 2009, at p 4148). put another way, the amendment aimed to remove a “loophole” that meant the police had “no access to information on some convicted sex offenders during the investigation of a crime, either because a crown attorney has not sought an order for them to register or the presiding judge has declined to grant one” (house of commons debates, vol. 144, no. 70, 2nd sess., 40th parl., june 8, 2009, at p 4324). as rcmp inspector nezan explained to the standing committee on public safety and national security, police were concerned about recidivists “falling through the cracks”: the absence of an automatic inclusion on the registry of all offenders convicted of sexual crimes has led to the inconsistent application of the law across the country. someone convicted of molesting a child in one province may be ordered to the registry, while in another province they may not. given the difficulty of determining which sex offender will reoffend and which will not, this means that some of the recidivists are falling through the cracks. [emphasis added.] (april 21, 2009, at p 3) [160] in light of this evidence of legislative intent, the statements of purpose put forward by both the sentencing judge and the majority of the court of appeal should be rejected the sentencing judge held that the purpose of soira was “to protect vulnerable people including children in society, by allowing police quick access to current information on convicted sex offenders” (abqb reasons (2016), at para. 87; see para. 85) nothing in the legislative text or proceedings reveals such a narrow purpose. public safety for vulnerable persons and children, though likely a desirable effect of the legislation, was not a cited purpose (soira, s 2(1)). the legislation was intended to increase safety for all, not just vulnerable persons (r v. redhead, 2006 abca 84, 384 ar 206, at paras. 37-38; r v. tas, 2018 skqb 183, at para. 79 (canlii); long, at para. 89). for the majority at the court of appeal, the legislative purpose of s 490.012 was broader: “. . . to require mandatory registration of all sex offenders convicted of designated offences” (para. 74). but that statement erroneously conflates the purpose of the law with the means for achieving the purpose. the court of appeal’s reasoning is circular: if mandatory registration is the purpose, then requiring mandatory registration will always be rationally connected to that purpose. [161] the foregoing evidence supports khullar ja’s understanding of the purpose of the automatic registration requirement imposed by s 490.012(1) as conforming to the overall statutory objective: “. . . to help police services prevent and investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of certain information relating to sex offenders” (para 198; soira, s 2(1)) this statement of purpose is sufficiently precise and succinct to frame the s 7 analysis. it is similar to the majority’s statement of purpose, being “to capture information about offenders that may assist police prevent and investigate sex offences” (para. 73) i depart from the majority, however, in its conclusion that automatic registration of sex offenders is not rationally connected to the objective of helping police prevent and investigate sexual offences. as i explain below, it clearly is. c arbitrariness [162] the sentencing judge did not find s 490.012 to be arbitrary, saying it was “not the case that there is no connection between providing police with up-to-date information on previous sex offenders and the goal of investigating and preventing sexual crimes” (abqb reasons (2016), at para. 92) the majority below agreed (para. 42). [163] the appellant has not demonstrated any error in those conclusions. there is a clear connection between having accurate and up-to-date information about persons more likely to commit sexual offences and the investigation and prevention of sexual crimes. mandatory registration of convicted sex offenders in soira is not arbitrary. d gross disproportionality [164] the sentencing judge concluded that mandatory registration is grossly disproportionate. she found that the cumulative effects of registration were significant, taking into account not only the scope of the reporting requirements, but also the other deleterious effects on offenders, such as the impact of random compliance checks, the risk of information being divulged during those checks, and the potentially far-reaching effects on an offender’s privacy (abqb reasons (2016), at para. 124). the majority, while not reaching a conclusion on gross disproportionality, observes that soira conditions are “onerous and ongoing” (para. 9; see also paras. 45, 56, 83, 116 and 135). [165] with respect, to describe soira conditions as “onerous” strips that term of all meaning the court of appeal for ontario has characterized the effects of registration on liberty as “modest”, relative to the important state interest (r v. dyck, 2008 onca 309, 90 or (3d) 409 (“dyck (ca)”), at paras. 104, 106 and 109; long, at para. 147). applying dyck and long, the court of appeal in this case concluded the soira requirements were, “if not strictly modest, reasonable and not dissimilar to many other reporting obligations that routinely occur as part of the everyday life of all canadians, who are state-compelled to provide information from time to time” (para. 130). moreover, these conditions that my colleagues find so “onerous” flow from the very fact that it is a registry. a registry is effective only when it has complete and up-to-date information; absent those conditions, there would be no point to even having it. my colleagues, i note, do not describe conditions of a registry that would be less “onerous” while still allowing it to be effective. [166] i agree that the sentencing judge erred in characterizing the impact of registration. soira conditions do not prevent offenders from going anywhere or doing anything (ca reasons, at para. 131, citing dyck (ca), at paras. 106 and 111; r v. debidin, 2008 onca 868, 94 or (3d) 421, at para. 82; transcript, at p 145). the appellant raised concerns that the information might be leaked, but these concerns are entirely speculative access to the registry is strictly controlled the reporting is confidential and use of the information is strictly limited to police for the prevention and investigation of sexual offences (dyck (ca), at para. 119; r v cross, 2006 nsca 30, 241 nsr (2d) 349, at para. 84(6)). while the appellant also testified to the “stigma” he experiences from being constantly labelled a sex offender, any stigma flows from the convictions themselves, not registration (ca reasons, at paras. 135-37, citing r v c (ss), 2008 bcca 262, 234 ccc (3d) 365, at paras. 47-48; dyck (ca), at para. 118; cross, at para 55) further, as khullar j.a observed, “[a]nxiety caused by a law is not usually considered an infringement of liberty” (para. 224) and the sentencing judge did not make a finding that the appellant’s concerns deprived him of his security of the person (paras. 225-26). [167] not only does my conclusion align with appellate jurisprudence, but it also avoids the serious doctrinal difficulties posed by the majority’s reasons. if the majority is correct that soira orders have a “serious” and “considerable” impact on an offender’s liberty (see paras. 7, 45, 54, 57 and 135), the test for punishment as set out in r v krj, 2016 scc 31, [2016] 1 scr 906, at para. 41, per karakatsanis j., would likely be met. and yet, this would be inconsistent with appellate jurisprudence consistently holding that sex offender registry requirements do not amount to punishment (see cross; dyck (ca);. r v. hooyer, 2016 onca 44, 129 or (3d) 81, at para. 45). [168] further, the majority’s conclusion would likely engage s 11(i) of the charter, such that no one convicted of a sexual offence prior to 2004 could be required to register on the soira registry, and that parliament could not enact a new soira law that expressly applies retroactively. equally alarming are the long-term implications of the majority’s conclusion. unlike other types of punishment, soira requirements do not significantly limit lawful activities in which the accused can engage, where the accused can go, or with whom an accused can communicate or associate. the “most obvious impact on liberty”, according to the majority, is the risk of imprisonment for failure to meet the reporting requirements without “reasonable excuse” (para. 54). on that logic, other measures that appellate courts have previously concluded were not punishment may now constitute punishment. while my majoritarian colleagues “make no finding as to whether soira orders constitute punishment under the krj test” (para. 58), that is entirely beside the point. the point is that it is implicit in their analysis that these orders likely constitute punishment. this is no mere theoretical concern. it is hardly unprecedented, after all, for a court to expressly decline to decide an issue while, at the same time, effectively deciding it by adopting a particular line of reasoning (see, eg, and taken together, r v. moriarity, 2015 scc 55, [2015] 3 scr 485, at para. 30; r v. stillman, 2019 scc 40, [2019] 3 scr 144, at paras. 97-109 and 113). [169] further, and even where the impacts on an offender’s liberty and privacy interests are more than modest, those impacts must be considered in context an offender who is placed on the registry has already been tried and convicted of a designated sexual offence (long, at para. 147). until now, a soira order has not been characterized as a sentence or a punishment, but a consequence of conviction (redhead, at para. 12). a person convicted of a serious crime should expect a significant loss of personal privacy (r v f (pr) (2001), 57 o.r (3d) 475 (ca), at para. 18, per rosenberg ja;. r v. beare, [1988] 2 scr 387, at p 413). and the impacts must be measured against the inherent severity of the offending conduct (c.a reasons, at paras. 79-81 and 232) the duration of a soira order is directly connected to the maximum term of imprisonment for that sexual offence (s 490013(2)). by linking the length of time for reporting to the severity of the offence, parliament built proportionality into the legislative scheme (if,. attorney general of nova scotia, at para. 64). [170] another consideration militating against the appellant’s arguments on gross disproportionality is the availability of a termination order. the regime permits offenders to apply to terminate soira orders after (a) 5 years, if they are subject to an order for 10 years; (b) 10 years if they are subject to a 20-year order; and (c) 20 years if they are subject to a lifetime order (s 490015(1)). the termination provision allows judges to assess the impacts of soira at a later date when the offender can demonstrate they have been in the community without reoffending, rather than making “speculative predictions of future dangerousness” based on the limited evidence available at sentencing (j benedet, “a victim-centred evaluation of the federal sex offender registry” (2012), 37 queen’s lj 437, at p 468). termination orders are undoubtedly rare, since an offender must meet the “high standard” of showing the impact on the offender’s privacy or liberty is “grossly disproportionate to the public interest” (s 490.016(1); redhead, at para. 43). but if there is truly a disproportionate impact, a termination order will be available (r v dyck (2005), 203 ccc (3d) 365 (ont. scj), at para. 125). [171] finally, the sentencing judge failed to consider the impacts of soira in light of its aim: to investigate and prevent sexual offences. as khullar ja held, “[t]his is not the kind of case where the objective is simply not important enough to warrant the level of infringement of liberty that it imposes” (para. 232) soira imposes a burden on offenders, but that burden is not “totally out of sync” with the objectives (bedford, at para. 120) i agree with the attorney general of nova scotia that characterizing reporting obligations as “grossly disproportionate” in this context risks trivializing that term (if, at para. 61). e overbreadth [172] a law is overbroad, the court explained in r v safarzadeh-markhali, 2016 scc 14, [2016] 1 scr 180, if it goes “further than reasonably necessary to achieve its legislative goals” (para. 50). there is a heavy onus on the party alleging that legislation is overbroad: as noted above, the root question is whether the law is inherently bad because there is no connection, in whole or in part, between its effects and its purpose this standard is not easily met the evidence may, as in morgentaler, show that the effect actually undermines the objective and is therefore “inconsistent” with the objective or the evidence may, as in chaoulli, show that there is simply no connection on the facts between the effect and the objective, and the effect is therefore “unnecessary”. regardless of how the judge describes this lack of connection, the ultimate question remains whether the evidence establishes that the law violates basic norms because there is no connection between its effect and its purpose. this is a matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis, in light of the evidence. [underlining added.] (bedford, at para. 119, per mclachlin cj) [173] having identified the purpose of s 490.012(1), the question here is whether automatic registration of all offenders goes further than reasonably necessary to achieve the objective of helping police prevent and investigate sexual crimes by requiring the registration of certain information the sentencing judge acknowledged there was a statistical probability that a sex offender will reoffend, but concluded the law was overbroad because it captured individuals who have little or no chance of reoffending (abqb reasons (2016), at para. 119). the crown does not dispute that the registry may impose obligations on offenders who never end up reoffending, but emphasizes that all convicted sex offenders pose a higher risk and it is impossible to say at the time of sentencing that a particular offender poses no risk of reoffending. [174] the crown’s argument is supported by the expert evidence offenders convicted of a sexual offence are five to eight times more likely to reoffend than those convicted of a non-sexual offence. both experts agreed that the recidivism risk cannot be determined with certainty at the time of sentencing. dr. zgoba explained that a risk assessment cannot guarantee whether any individual will reoffend. both experts also testified that observed recidivism rates underestimate the true rates of sexual reoffending. professor benedet makes a similar point, saying recidivism studies do not typically measure whether offenders commit further offences (or have already committed other offences in the past) for which they were never apprehended or charged (“long and ndhlovu: the federal sex offender registry and section 7 of the charter” (2018), 45 cr (7th) 132; see also standing committee on public safety and national security, april 21, 2009, at p 9). [175] the crown’s argument is also supported by logic and experience. assessing future risk is “inherently imprecise” (long, at para. 125) the court of appeal for ontario has confirmed that, as a group, sex offenders will always pose “a greater risk than the rest of the population for engaging in that activity” and, thus, a prior conviction for a sex offence is “a reliable indication of risk and a proper method of assessing that risk” (dyck (ca), at para. 100) more recently, the court in r v. bpm, 2019 bcpc 156, dismissed a similar overbreadth argument. it concluded that all sex offenders should be registered because, “as a matter of common sense and experience, individuals who are convicted of sex crimes have an increased propensity to commit sex crimes in the future” (para. 48 (canlii), quoting long, at para. 119). inspector nezan explained in his standing committee on public safety and national security testimony that predicting recidivism is “very difficult” and that, from a police perspective, it is “dangerous” to use a risk-based assessment to determine which offenders should be registered (april 21, 2009, at p 8). [176] the majority ignores this evidence, instead hinging its analysis on two premises: (1) that certain offenders do not pose an “increased risk” of reoffending; and (2) that registering such offenders bears no connection to the purpose indeed, the phrase “increased risk” is repeated 20 times in the majority’s reasons (see paras. 7-8, 10-11, 79, 82-83, 85, 87, 89-90, 92, 100-101, 111, 121 and 138). [177] my colleagues do not explain their basis for rejecting the expert evidence that an offender’s risk cannot be determined with certainty at the time of sentencing. they accept that “the commission of a sexual offence is one of many empirically validated predictors of increased sexual recidivism” (para. 94) in the same breath, however, they assert that, “[i]n certain cases, an offender’s personal circumstances mean they are not at an increased risk of reoffending, undermining any real possibility that their information on the registry will ever prove useful to police” (para. 85). my colleagues boldly promenade where experts fear to tread, leaning on the term “increased” to avoid particularizing what they rely on to characterize this risk as such. in support, they claim to cite multiple “examples” (para. 90) of offenders whose likelihood of reoffending is “highly improbable” (para. 89) but in substance they cherry pick just one such example: an exceptional case involving an offender who was wheelchair bound. that my colleagues can point to only a single, extreme case where it was clear at the time of sentencing that the offender did not pose an “increased risk” tends to prove my point, not theirs. [178] the majority’s analysis suffers from a further flaw. my colleagues assert that uncertainty in predicting the risk of reoffending is irrelevant in overbreadth, since enforcement practicality can only be considered under s 1 they rely on carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, bedford and safarzadeh‑markhali, where this court held that difficulties in defining the scope of the law to adequately serve the legislative purpose are not relevant in overbreadth (majority reasons, at paras. 103-7). [179] but unlike those instances, here parliament did not struggle to define the scope of the law in enacting s 490.012, parliament deliberately chose not to distinguish between more serious and less serious sexual offences or higher risk and lower risk offenders instead, parliament required registration for all sex offenders based on a shared characteristic: a heightened risk of committing a future sexual offence. the government can enact legislation that treats all individuals with a common characteristic in the same manner, without offending s 7, provided there is a rational connection between that characteristic and the government’s purpose. and here, there is a “logical link” between automatic registration on the basis of a sex conviction and the purpose of s 490012. on the information available at the time of sentencing, every person convicted of a designated offence poses a heightened risk of committing another sexual offence as compared to persons convicted of non-sexual offences. [180] the enhanced risk may be marginal in some cases, but “parliament is not required to precisely calibrate recidivism risk” (c.a reasons, at para 89) nor is “[p]erfect symmetry between the social science measuring rates of recidivism and the reach of the registry” required (c (ps) v. british columbia (attorney general), 2007 bcsc 895, 222 ccc (3d) 230, at para. 118; see also r v sharpe, 2001 scc 2, [2001] 1 scr 45, at para. 89). parliament is entitled to act on reasoned apprehension of harm even if on some points “the jury is still out” (r v. malmo-levine, 2003 scc 74, [2003] 3 scr 571, at para. 78). as the majority at the court of appeal explained, any exclusion of convicted sex offenders based on perceived seriousness of an offence or likelihood of recidivism necessarily results in the police not having information on some offenders who do, in fact, reoffend (para. 93). [181] it was within parliament’s purview to draw a line based on that known increased risk of unknown degree, rather than leaving it to prosecutors and judges to weigh if an offender poses an “increased risk” in each case. once it is demonstrated that the harm sought to be avoided is more than trivial, “the precise weighing and calculation of the nature and extent of the harm is parliament’s job” (malmo-levine, at para. 133). after that threshold is reached, the legislature is “entitled to make policy choices within a reasonable range of options” (dyck (ca), at para. 124). a small risk of serious harm is sufficient. [182] my colleagues overlook another important reason that parliament drew that line: to fix a flaw in the registry that allowed judges to exempt offenders who they deemed not to be “predators”, contrary to the legislative intent professor benedet observes that, prior to the amendments, some judges granted exemptions based not on the impact of registration on the offender (as required by the statutory provision) but on whether the offender was the type of person for whom the registry was intended — in other words, a “real” sex offender (benedet (2012); transcript, at p 85). the category of “real” sex offender has been, at times, defined so narrowly as to exclude offenders who sexually assaulted people they knew, child pornography users, opportunistic offenders, and historic offenders. a few examples are telling. [183] beginning with r v. have, 2005 oncj 27, 194 ccc (3d) 151, a line of decisions found that the aim of the registry was to assist police in the investigation of crimes by “predatory strangers” and offenders who do not fit this model should be exempted in have, the offender pled guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography after police seized a large quantity of files from his computer. duncan j. characterized the circumstances as “exceptional”, because possession of child pornography is one of the few sexual offences that does not directly harm a victim and the accused had established that he had no propensity to act on his sexual interests. according to duncan j., the “fundamental assumption” that the accused, because of his past conduct, had a propensity to commit a sexual crime in the future was “considerably weaker” than in most cases the value of registration in those circumstances was “negligible”, the impact on the accused was “substantial”, and the balance, in his view, was grossly disproportionate. [184] following have, caldwell j in r v. burke, 2005 oncj 422, found that the impact of soira registration on the accused was grossly disproportionate and declined to make an order. mr. burke was convicted of sexual assault after trial. the judge found that he grabbed the complainant, got on top of her, and began kissing her, touching her breasts, and touching her under her shorts in the area of her vagina (paras. 2 and 4 (canlii)). at sentencing, he did not present any evidence of his risk of reoffending, but the judge inferred it was low based on his lack of criminal history (paras. 59 and 63). caldwell j found it “extremely significant that [soira] obligations are on-going for a minimum of ten years and that the individual is potentially subject to conviction, fine and/or imprisonment if they provide inaccurate information” (para. 17). mr. burke’s offence was “on the lower end of the spectrum” (para. 58), and therefore, the public interest in his registration was “substantially lower than the interest in registering the type of offender upon whom the registry was modelled” (para. 64). [185] notably, both judges found that registration was a significant intrusion for offenders who were not predatory strangers and remarked that an overly inclusive registry could be counter-productive because it could dilute police resources (have, at p 157; burke, at para. 39) those propositions have been discredited by appellate courts. the court of appeal of alberta in redhead rejected the conclusion from have that the registry’s purpose was limited to investigating predatory offenders with a propensity to commit similar offences in the future specifically, it addressed the argument that the accused was not the type of offender covered by soira because he did not have a criminal history of the same nature, the offence was less serious, and the risk of reoffending was low. the court held: we do not agree the language of s 490.012 does not suggest its application is so limited rather, the absence of such limiting language reflects parliament’s recognition of predictable repetitive behaviour of sexual offenders, and the inordinate consequences of sexual offences for victims of any age. [para. 38] [186] the british columbia court of appeal followed redhead in r v. y (bt), 2006 bcca 331, 210 ccc (3d) 484, overturning a decision granting an exemption to an offender who had sexually abused his daughter over a six-year period. the trial judge found that he was not a “predatory stranger” and thus not caught within the purpose of the legislation. rowles ja wrote that, by focusing the purpose of soira on a particular class of offender, the trial judge “created a classification scheme that parliament did not enact” (para. 39). the court of appeal for ontario also rejected the predatory stranger model in debidin, observing that soira “does not distinguish between the predatory stranger and the opportunistic friend, relative or custodian” (para. 77). [187] yet, judges did not only exempt offenders deemed to be non-predatory or unlikely to reoffend even violent offenders who were likely recidivists have been exempted from soira in r v bss, 2006 bcpc 135, the accused pled guilty to sexual assault and assault against his wife. he had a serious drinking problem and had a history of violence. on the day of the first offence, he raped his wife. he was assessed as posing a high risk of future violence against her nevertheless, baird ellan prov. ct. j exempted the accused from registration, following have and burke which held that the purpose of the registry was to deal with predatory offenders and it was not “designed to address this kind of offence” (para. 82 (canlii)), whatever that means. [188] judges have granted exemptions even where the victim was a stranger and the offences were highly predatory. in r v. worm, 2005 abpc 92, the accused pled guilty to sexual assault and assault with a weapon he grabbed the complainant’s buttocks as she was jogging and threatened bystanders with a knife before running away. he was assessed at a low to moderate risk of recidivism, with the risk increasing significantly during periods of intoxication. though the offender was a drunk predatory stranger armed with a weapon, the sentencing judge nevertheless found that the impact of registration would be grossly disproportionate “having regard to the circumstances and severity of the offence” (para. 53 (canlii)). [189] perhaps most concerning is r v. randall, 2006 nspc 38, 247 nsr (2d) 205, where the accused was convicted of internet luring after inviting an undercover police officer, believed to be a 13-year-old girl, to meet him for sexual activity. he insisted on meeting for sex, rejecting her suggestion that they go shopping instead. the accused arrived with packets of condoms and was arrested. the sentencing judge found that the accused was in denial about his behaviour, but still granted an exemption because he was assessed at a low risk of reoffending, “his conduct was not predatory” but rather “poor judgment”, he was not considered a “hunter,” and he had no prior sexual offences (para. 16) the judge was also concerned that registration would severely affect the accused because he would “carry a stigma” and his privacy would be impacted (para. 15). it is difficult to imagine a more predatory activity than online child luring (benedet (2012), at p 455) — yet that was not enough for the offender to be caught by soira. [190] and finally, exemptions have been granted to offenders who occupied positions of trust and abused vulnerable victims. in r v. aldea, 2005 skqb 461, 271 sask r 272, a priest prostituted underage girls in the church rectory and took pornographic photographs of each of them the court held that an exemption was justified, “having regard to the nature of his vocation, his current living circumstances”, and his low risk to reoffend (para. 40). in r v. s (mw), 2007 bcsc 1188, 52 cr. (6th) 77, a doctor was convicted of sexually assaulting female patients under the guise of medical examinations over a 20-year period, including having sexual intercourse with one patient. though the offender had little insight into his crimes and insisted the assaults were “misunderstandings” on the part of the victims, the psychologists assessed him as a low risk to reoffend because he was no longer practicing medicine (paras. 17 and 67). bruce j granted an exemption, noting that the public interest served by registration was “minimal to non-existent” (para. 72), soira’s impact on him would be “substantial” (para. 74), and he was “not the type of person parliament had in mind when it created the soira registry” (para. 76). [191] those cases ⸺ and many others decided prior to the amendments in 2011 ⸺ demonstrate that judges too often found “reasons” to exempt offenders who committed offences they viewed as less serious, who had no prior history of sexual offending, or who did not appear to pose a high risk (or, to use the majority’s phrase, an “increased risk”) to strangers. they also “provide a window into judicial thinking about the relative seriousness of types of sexual offending, and show that the exercise of judicial discretion in the area of sexual assault is fraught with the persistence of problematic assumptions about what a ‘real’ sex offender looks like” (benedet (2012), at p 440). [192] as if to remove all doubt on this point, similar assumptions about what a “real” sex offender looks like were also relied upon by the sentencing judge in this case. she found that “low risk” offenders, such as the appellant, fall in the category of offenders who should not be captured by soira, and therefore the law is overbroad. but this reasoning is flawed for two reasons. first, it ignores that “the purpose of the regime is not limited to tracking predators” and the appellant nonetheless poses a heightened risk of reoffending (tas, at para. 79; see long, at para. 89). secondly, it assumes that offenders who commit “minor” sex crimes are less likely to reoffend. there is no evidence supporting this assumption both experts testified that the seriousness of a sexual offence is a poor predictor of recidivism on its own the registry aims to help police prevent and investigate all sexual crimes. under s 7, the court’s task is not to assess the law’s efficacy but simply to compare the objective with its effects (bedford, at para. 123) here, the objective (preventing and investigating sexual offences) is clearly furthered by its effect (registering all sex offenders) because we do not know who will reoffend, but we know that many will, with serious effects. [193] on that point, i would endorse the comments of the court of appeal that digital penetration of a sleeping victim is never “minor” or “de minimis” conduct (paras 77-84) all forms of sexual violence are morally blameworthy, precisely because they involve wrongful exploitation and denial of the victim’s dignity as a human being (r v. friesen, 2020 scc 9, at para. 89, citing r v. mabior, 2012 scc 47, [2012] 2 scr 584, at paras. 45 and 48). this court has recently described the serious harms that flow from sexual offences, particularly against children, which “are notorious for their devastating impact, often ruining the lives of their victims, and of those whose lives intersect with those victims as they move into adulthood” (krj, at para. 131). sentencing judges must “properly understand the wrongfulness of sexual offences” and “the profound harm that they cause” (friesen, at para. 50). [194] given what appears to have been a persistent, routine failure to appreciate the seriousness of these offences, it can be confidently predicted that the rampant misuse of judicial discretion prior to the amendments will recur once automatic registration is removed there is a remarkable consistency of views between the judgment in have, which viewed the possession of child pornography as essentially a victimless crime, and the sentencing judge’s reasons in this case, which refused to characterize the penetration of a sleeping woman as a major sexual assault. indeed, and as schutz ja wrote, the sentencing judge’s own conclusions prove parliament’s point in making all orders mandatory: “. . . different judges may make different assessments about the seriousness of criminal conduct and an offender’s risk to reoffend” (ca. reasons, at para. 79). this explains parliament’s decision to remove judicial discretion to include all offenders convicted of a designated offence. [195] parliament sought to avoid those chronic and improper exercises of judicial discretion by drawing a clear line: all sexual offences are serious and all sex offenders pose a heightened risk both premises are backed by expert evidence, judicial precedents, and logic. the majority’s reasons suggest that judicial discretion cannot be fettered. but following the majority’s analysis to its inevitable conclusion, parliament could never remove judicial discretion from a criminal law scheme. and yet, is that not what all legislation does to some extent? this court’s role is limited to examining legislation for charter compliance, not second-guessing policy decisions. operating within that confine, i am constrained to conclude that s 490.012 is appropriately tailored to its purpose of helping the police prevent and investigate sexual crimes, and does not limit an offender’s s 7 rights in a manner that bears no connection to its objective. iv conclusion [196] i would allow the appeal in part. section 490.012 is constitutional. appeal allowed, wagner c.j and moldaver, côté and brown jj. dissenting in part. and specialized prosecutions office, edmonton. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of canada: attorney general of canada, vancouver. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of quebec: attorney general of quebec, québec. general of nova scotia, halifax. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. solicitors for the intervener the criminal lawyers’ association (ontario): daniel brown law, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the canadian civil liberties association: henein hutchison, toronto. the hiv legal network: henein hutchison, toronto; hiv & aids legal clinic ontario, toronto. montréal.
[1] this appeal considers the circumstances under which, in an application to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment rendered by default against a per- son residing in quebec, that person can be found to have submitted to the foreign authority’s jurisdiction. [2] the facts of this case illustrate a dilemma that persons doing business outside of their home juris- diction sometimes face when they are sued abroad before a court that they believe has no jurisdiction over the dispute. they must decide whether to defend themselves against the foreign lawsuit and try to secure a favourable decision, or whether to abstain from doing so. one motivation for the latter is to avoid being found to have submitted to the foreign jurisdiction by a court of their home jurisdiction that is asked to recognize and enforce an unfavourable foreign decision. this choice no doubt involves an assessment of the comparative risks and benefits of protecting the assets located in each jurisdiction. ultimately, it is up to each defendant to determine the best way to approach this conundrum, and each must bear the consequences of the strategy chosen. [1] le présent pourvoi porte sur une demande en reconnaissance et en exécution d’un jugement par défaut rendu hors du québec contre un résidant de cette province et sur les circonstances dans lesquelles il est possible de conclure que ce dernier a reconnu la compétence du tribunal étranger. [2] les faits de l’affaire illustrent le dilemme de- vant lequel se trouvent parfois les personnes qui font des affaires à l’extérieur de leur province lorsqu’elles sont poursuivies à l’étranger devant un tribunal qui, selon elles, n’a pas compétence sur le litige. elles doivent choisir entre se défendre contre la poursuite dont elles font l’objet à l’étranger en espérant ob- tenir une décision favorable, ou s’en abstenir. elles peuvent être enclines à opter pour ce second choix pour éviter qu’un tribunal de leur province, saisi d’une demande en reconnaissance et en exécution d’une décision éventuellement défavorable rendue par le tribunal étranger, conclue qu’elles ont reconnu la compétence de ce dernier. cette décision suppose nécessairement une comparaison des risques et des avantages que comporte la protection des biens que possède l’intéressé dans chaque ressort. en défini- tive, c’est à chaque défendeur qu’il appartient de trouver la meilleure façon d’aborder ce problème délicat et d’assumer les conséquences de la stratégie qu’il choisit. [3] the appellant, mr. barer, a quebec resident, was sued personally together with two companies he allegedly controlled — central bearing corpora- tion ltd. (“cbc”) and barer engineering company of america (“bec”) — before the united states district court, central division for the district of utah (“utah court”). the suit was brought by the respondent, knight brothers llc (“knight”), which [3] l’appelant, m. barer, qui réside au québec, a été poursuivi à titre personnel, conjointement avec deux sociétés dont il aurait eu le contrôle — central bearing corporation ltd. (« cbc ») et barer engi- neering company of america (« bec ») —, devant la cour de district des états- unis, division centrale du district de l’utah (« tribunal de l’utah »). l’inti- mée, knight brothers llc (« knight »), avait intenté [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 593 claimed that bec had a balance owing under a con- tract between them. knight argued that mr. barer had fraudulently misrepresented that the defendants would pay a certain amount, that the corporate veil of the two companies should be lifted, and that all the defendants had been unjustly enriched. [4] cbc abstained from presenting any defence, while bec defended itself on the merits and filed a counterclaim. mr. barer took a third approach and presented preliminary arguments in a motion to dis- miss. he argued that (1) knight’s claim for fraudu- lent misrepresentation was barred at law; (2) the utah court did not have jurisdiction over him personally; and (3) knight had failed to show that the corpo- rate veil should be lifted. a utah judge dismissed mr. barer’s motion. [5] a default judgment was eventually rendered by the utah court against all three defendants (“utah decision”). knight then sought to have that deci- sion recognized in quebec and declared enforceable against mr barer. the superior court ruled that the utah court’s jurisdiction could be recognized on three possible grounds. two of them related to the contract between knight and bec and the promise to pay allegedly made by mr barer. however, the main ground for recognizing the utah decision was the fact that mr. barer had submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction. the court of appeal dismissed mr. barer’s appeal. [6] i agree with the courts below that the juris- diction of the utah court must be recognized, and i would dismiss the appeal. by presenting substan- tive arguments in his motion to dismiss, mr. barer submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction in accord- ance with art. 3168(6) of the civil code of québec (“ccq” or “civil code”). this is sufficient in this case to establish any substantial connection that may be required by art 3164 ccq. une poursuite et affirmait que bec avait un solde dû aux termes d’un contrat intervenu entre elles. knight soutenait aussi que m. barer avait faussement dé- claré que les défendeurs allaient payer une certaine somme, qu’il fallait lever le voile de la personna- lité morale des deux sociétés et que les défendeurs s’étaient tous injustement enrichis. [4] cbc n’a pas présenté de défense, tandis que bec s’est défendue sur le fond et a présenté une demande reconventionnelle. m. barer a préféré une troisième approche : il a soulevé des moyens prélimi- naires dans le cadre d’une requête en irrecevabilité. il a fait valoir que : (1) la demande de knight fondée sur de fausses déclarations était irrecevable en droit; (2) le tribunal de l’utah n’avait pas compétence à son égard à titre personnel; et (3) knight n’avait pas démontré qu’il y avait lieu de lever le voile de la personnalité morale. un juge de l’utah a rejeté la requête de m barer. [5] le tribunal de l’utah a subséquemment rendu un jugement par défaut contre les trois défendeurs (« décision de l’utah »). knight a alors demandé la reconnaissance de cette décision au québec et une déclaration selon laquelle elle est opposable à m barer. la cour supérieure a jugé que la compé- tence du tribunal de l’utah pouvait être reconnue, et ce, pour trois motifs. deux de ces motifs avaient trait au contrat intervenu entre knight et bec et à la promesse de payer qu’aurait faite m barer. le principal motif pour reconnaître la décision de l’utah tenait toutefois au fait que m. barer avait reconnu la compétence du tribunal qui l’avait rendue. la cour d’appel a débouté m. barer de son appel. [6] je conviens avec les cours d’instances infé- rieures qu’il y a lieu de reconnaître la compétence du tribunal de l’utah et je suis d’avis de rejeter le pour- voi. en présentant des arguments sur le fond dans le contexte de sa requête en irrecevabilité, m. barer a bel et bien reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah comme le prévoit le par. 3168(6) du code civil du québec (« ccq » ou « code civil »). cela suffit en l’espèce pour établir tout rattachement important que peut exiger l’art 3164 ccq. 594 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. ii background a the dispute ii contexte a différend [7] mr. barer is a resident of quebec. he is the president and secretary of cbc, which is based in montréal, and acting president and secretary of bec, which is based in vermont. in 2007, bec was awarded a contract to install machinery at a military base located in utah. in 2008, it subcontracted part of the work to knight, whose head office is in that state. knight’s responsibilities included installing a new foundation. the work was carried out at the military base in 2008 and 2009. [7] m. barer réside au québec. il est président et secrétaire de cbc, une société dont le siège est situé à montréal. il est président par intérim et secrétaire de bec, dont le siège se trouve au vermont. en 2007, bec a obtenu un contrat en vue de l’installation de machinerie sur une base militaire dans l’utah. en 2008, elle a sous- traité une partie des travaux à knight, dont le siège est situé dans l’utah. cette dernière était notamment chargée de construire de nouvelles fondations. les travaux ont été exécutés sur la base militaire en 2008 et en 2009. [8] in 2009, a dispute arose as to the amount owed to knight for the work related to the foundation: a first amount had been specified in the original con- tract, but knight had demanded a higher sum in a subsequent purchase order. while bec argued that it was liable only for the initial amount, knight alleged that bec had provided it with incomplete infor- mation and was liable for the excess costs. knight further contended that, at some point, mr. barer had verbally promised to pay the increased price and that it had performed its obligations under the con- tract relying on that promise. according to knight, the total revised price for the work performed was us$619,805. [8] en 2009, un différend a surgi au sujet du mon- tant dû à knight pour les travaux de fondations : un premier montant avait été stipulé au contrat initial, mais knight réclamait une somme plus élevée en vertu d’un bon de commande ultérieur. bec affirmait qu’elle n’était tenue de payer que le montant initial, mais knight soutenait que bec lui avait fourni des renseignements incomplets et qu’elle devait assumer les coûts excédentaires. knight faisait aussi valoir que, à un certain moment, m. barer avait promis verbalement de payer le prix majoré, et qu’elle avait satisfait à ses obligations contractuelles sur la foi de cette promesse. selon knight, le prix total révisé pour les travaux effectués se chiffrait à 619 805 $ us. b the legal proceedings in utah b action intentée dans l’utah [9] knight initiated proceedings before the utah court against bec, cbc and mr. barer personally for a balance allegedly owing of us$431,160 under the contract between itself and bec. knight asserted five causes of action. it claimed that (1) bec and cbc had breached the contract; (2) the defendants had been unjustly enriched; (3) bec was the alter ego of cbc; (4) bec and cbc were the alter egos of mr. barer; and (5) mr. barer had fraudulently misrepresented that the defendants would pay the increased price for the foundation work. [9] knight a intenté un recours devant le tribu- nal de l’utah contre bec et cbc, ainsi que contre m. barer à titre personnel, pour un solde impayé de 431 160 $ us qu’elle estimait lui être dû aux termes du contrat conclu avec bec. knight a invoqué cinq causes d’action : (1) bec et cbc n’avaient pas res- pecté le contrat; (2) les défendeurs s’étaient enri- chis injustement; (3) bec était l’alter ego de cbc; (4) bec et cbc étaient les alter ego de m. barer; et (5) m. barer avait faussement affirmé que les dé- fendeurs paieraient le prix majoré pour les travaux de fondations. [10] the three defendants accepted service of knight’s complaint and entered their appearance [10] les trois défendeurs ont accepté la signifi- cation de la demande de knight et ont déposé un [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 595 before the utah court in april 2010. they all filed a notice of non- opposition when knight sought to amend its complaint, and they were required to re- spond by mid- july. from that point on, each defend- ant pursued a different course of action. [11] bec, the party to the contract with knight, filed an answer, defence and counterclaim. its written answer and defence did not raise the issue of jurisdic- tion but denied the facts underlying knight’s claim. its counterclaim alleged that knight had unlawfully interfered with its property. for its part, cbc pre- sented a motion to allow its counsel to withdraw on the ground that it did not recognize the utah court’s jurisdiction and would not participate in the proceedings. as it did not defend itself, it was found in default by a court clerk. lastly, mr. barer brought a motion to have the claim asserted against him per- sonally dismissed on a preliminary basis before it was heard on its merits. [12] mr. barer raised three arguments in support of his motion: (1) knight had failed to state sufficient facts to establish that bec and cbc were his alter egos; (2) the fraudulent misrepresentation claim was barred by the pure economic loss rule; and (3) the utah court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. the utah court dismissed the motion and al- lowed the case to proceed to trial. avis de comparution devant le tribunal de l’utah en avril 2010. ils ont tous déposé un avis de non- opposition lorsque knight a cherché à modifier sa demande et ils devaient tous répondre à celle-ci au plus tard à la mi- juillet. à partir de ce moment-là, chacun des défendeurs a adopté sa propre stratégie. [11] bec, qui avait signé le contrat avec knight, a déposé une réponse, une défense et une demande reconventionnelle. dans sa réponse et sa défense écrites, elle n’a pas soulevé la question de la com- pétence, mais elle a nié les faits sur lesquels reposait la demande de knight. dans sa demande reconven- tionnelle, elle a soutenu que knight avait illégale- ment porté atteinte à ses biens. pour sa part, cbc a présenté une requête pour que son avocat soit au- torisé à cesser d’occuper, en expliquant qu’elle ne reconnaissait pas la compétence du tribunal de l’utah et qu’elle ne participerait pas à l’instance. comme elle n’a pas présenté de défense, son défaut a été constaté par un préposé du greffe du tribunal. enfin, m. barer a présenté une requête sollicitant le rejet de la demande présentée contre lui à titre personnel au stade préliminaire, soit avant son examen au fond. [12] m. barer a invoqué trois arguments au soutien de sa requête : (1) knight n’avait pas allégué suffi- samment de faits pour démontrer que bec et cbc étaient ses alter ego; (2) la demande fondée sur les fausses affirmations était irrecevable en raison de la règle relative aux pertes purement financières; et (3) le tribunal de l’utah n’avait pas compétence personnelle à son égard. le tribunal de l’utah a rejeté la requête et autorisé l’instruction de la cause. [13] on the question of jurisdiction, the utah court found that knight had supported its alter ego claim with “several exhibits”: (1)  “copies of payments made to [knight] from the common account in [cbc]’s name”; (2) “a certified copy from the mon- treal, canada, registrar of companies which show[s] that [cbc] is registered as doing business under the names of [bec] and [another entity]”; and (3) “an affidavit stating that [knight]’s information support- ing its alter ego and instrumentality claims initially came from an unnamed confidential source — a for- mer employee of the barer entities” (ar, vol. ii, at pp 100-101). the utah court stressed that the [13] sur la question de la compétence, le tribunal de l’utah a conclu que knight avait étayé sa préten- tion tirée de l’existence d’un alter ego en soumet- tant [traduction] « plusieurs pièces à l’appui », à savoir : (1) « des copies des versements effectués à [knight] sur le compte conjoint au nom de [cbc] »; (2)  «  une copie certifiée conforme provenant du registraire des entreprises de montréal, canada, in- diquant que [cbc] y est inscrite comme exerçant ses activités sous les dénominations sociales de [bec] et d’[une autre entité] »; et (3) « un affidavit attestant que les renseignements fournis par [knight] à l’appui de ses prétentions sur l’existence d’un alter ego et 596 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. allegations attributed to that employee and reflected in knight’s complaint “must be accepted as true for purposes of this motion” (ar, vol. ii, at p 102). it concluded that knight had made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. since mr. barer had not established considerations that “would render juris- diction unreasonable” (ar, vol. ii, at p. 101), his first argument was rejected. in the view of the utah court, having the entire dispute, including the related alter ego claims, heard in one action furthered the interest of the international justice system. [14] on the alter ego issue, the utah court, build- ing on its conclusions regarding jurisdiction, found that knight’s allegations — which had to be assumed to be true on a motion to dismiss — “state a claim for an alter ego claim” (ar, vol. ii, at pp 103-5). finally, the utah court rejected mr. barer’s third argument, namely that knight had no cause of action because its claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was barred by the pure economic loss rule. it rea- soned that though this argument could be raised to bar a purely contractual claim, knight’s claim was also based on the law of quasi- contracts and unjust enrichment, which are not subject to the rule against recovery for pure economic loss. d’un intermédiaire lui avait été fournis à l’origine par une source confidentielle non identifiée, en l’occur- rence un ex- employé du groupe barer » (da, vol. ii, p 100-101). le tribunal de l’utah a souligné que les allégations attribuées à cet employé et reprises dans la demande de knight « doivent être tenues pour avérées aux fins de la présente requête » (da, vol. ii, p 102). il en a conclu qu’il avait été démon- tré à première vue qu’il avait compétence. puisque m. barer n’avait pas établi l’existence de facteurs qui « rendraient l’exercice de cette compétence dérai- sonnable » (da, vol. ii, p. 101), son premier moyen a été rejeté. pour le tribunal de l’utah, il était dans l’intérêt du système de justice internationale que la totalité du différend, y compris les prétentions connexes ayant trait à l’alter ego, fasse l’objet d’une seule et même action. [14] s’appuyant sur ses conclusions concernant sa compétence, le tribunal de l’utah a par ailleurs jugé que les allégations de knight — qui doivent être tenues pour avérées dans le contexte d’une requête en irrecevabilité — [traduction] « démontrent le bien- fondé de la demande qui repose sur l’existence d’un alter ego » (da, vol. ii, p 103-105). enfin, le tribunal de l’utah a rejeté le troisième moyen invo- qué par m. barer, à savoir que knight n’avait aucune cause d’action parce que sa réclamation fondée sur l’existence de fausses déclarations était irrecevable en raison de la règle relative aux pertes purement financières. le tribunal a expliqué que, même si ce moyen pouvait être invoqué pour faire déclarer irre- cevable une demande de nature purement contrac- tuelle, la réclamation de knight était également fondée sur les règles du droit des quasi- contrats et de l’enrichissement sans cause qui, elles, ne sont pas assujetties au principe interdisant l’indemnisation des pertes purement financières. [15] after the dismissal of mr. barer’s motion in january 2011, all three defendants were ordered to participate in a settlement conference. in february 2011, mr. barer was also granted an extension to file an answer and defence, but he ultimately never did. his failure to file such a response was noted by a court clerk. the settlement conference was held in november 2011. mr. barer attended, but his law- yer indicated that he was present to comply with the [15] après le rejet de la requête de m. barer en jan- vier 2011, les trois défendeurs ont été tenus de parti- ciper à une conférence de règlement à l’amiable. en février 2011, m. barer a également obtenu une proro- gation du délai qui lui avait été imparti pour déposer une réponse et une défense. en fin de compte, il n’en a jamais déposé. son défaut de déposer une réponse a été constaté par un préposé du greffe. la conférence de règlement à l’amiable a eu lieu en novembre 2011. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 597 court order and that this was not a waiver of con- testation of jurisdiction. as for bec, it participated in some of the proceedings until, in the summer of 2012, the utah court granted knight’s motion for a default judgment, which was entered by a court clerk against all three defendants for us$431,160, plus interest. that judgment did not provide reasons in support of the order. it was later amended to make the defendants jointly and severally liable. m. barer y a participé; son avocat a toutefois expli- qué qu’il n’était présent que pour respecter l’ordon- nance du tribunal et que sa présence n’emportait pas renonciation à contester la compétence de celui-ci. quant à bec, elle a participé à certaines procédures jusqu’à ce que, à l’été de 2012, le tribunal de l’utah fasse droit à la demande de jugement par défaut de knight, qu’un préposé du greffe a enregistré contre les trois défendeurs pour un montant de 431 160 $ us, intérêts en sus. ce jugement n’était pas motivé. il a par la suite été modifié pour déclarer les défendeurs solidairement responsables. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire [16] knight filed an originating application before the superior court to have the utah decision recog- nized and declared enforceable in quebec against mr. barer and cbc. both jointly filed a defence, which was followed by knight’s answer to plea and ultimately by an amended defence. knight filed 18 exhibits, mr. barer and cbc, 4. the exhibits in- cluded only one affidavit — that of the lawyer who represented the defendants in utah. as these vari- ous steps show, an application for recognition and enforcement is an adversarial judicial proceeding to which the general rules of civil procedure apply, even though the judge hearing such an application should not delve into the merits of the case (kuwait airways corp. v. iraq, 2010 scc 40, [2010] 2 scr 571, at para 20). [16] knight a déposé une demande introductive d’instance devant la cour supérieure afin de faire reconnaître la décision de l’utah au québec et de la faire déclarer opposable à m. barer et à cbc. ces derniers ont déposé une défense conjointe, qui a été suivie par la réponse de knight et, finalement, par une défense modifiée. knight a déposé dix- huit pièces tandis que m. barer et cbc en ont déposé quatre. parmi ces pièces, il n’y avait qu’un affida- vit — soit celui de l’avocat qui représentait les dé- fendeurs dans l’utah. comme ces diverses mesures l’illustrent, une demande en reconnaissance et en exécution donne ouverture à un débat contradictoire régi par les règles générales de la procédure civile, même si le juge saisi de cette demande ne doit pas examiner le fond de l’affaire (kuwait airways corp. c. irak, 2010 csc 40, [2010] 2 rcs 571, par 20). a superior court of quebec a cour supérieure du québec [17] in brief reasons delivered orally, the superior court granted knight’s application in recognition and enforcement of a judgment rendered outside quebec since knight had decided against seek- ing to have the utah decision declared enforceable against cbc, the trial judge was concerned only with mr barer. the judge recognized the utah deci- sion, declared it enforceable in quebec, and ordered mr. barer to pay knight a total of can$1,238,283. [17] dans de brefs motifs prononcés à l’audience, la cour supérieure a fait droit à la demande de knight en reconnaissance et en exécution du jugement rendu hors  du québec. comme knight avait renoncé à demander que la décision de l’utah soit déclarée op- posable à cbc, le juge de première instance n’avait à se prononcer que relativement à m barer. le juge a reconnu la décision de l’utah, l’a déclarée exécutoire au québec, et a condamné m. barer à verser à knight la somme totale de 1 238 283 $ ca. [18] the judge concluded that mr. barer had sub- mitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction in accordance [18] le juge a conclu que m.  barer avait re- connu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah comme 598 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. with art 3168(6) ccq by raising substantive ar- guments in his motion to dismiss. he found that the evidence presented by knight in challenging mr. barer’s motion to dismiss also supported this conclusion; it constituted “sufficient proof under quebec law that the requirements to grant juris- diction to the utah court over [mr.] barer” were satisfied (2016 qccs 3471, at para. 17 (canlii) (“sup. ct. reasons”)). the judge noted that similar evidence had not been presented before either the quebec or the foreign courts in the other cases upon which mr. barer relied in his submissions, that is, zimmermann inc. v. barer, 2016 qcca 260, and cortas canning and refrigerating co. v. suidan bros. inc./suidan frères inc., [1999] rjq 1227 (sup. ct). for this reason, he found that these cases did not assist mr barer. le prévoit le par 3168(6) ccq en invoquant des moyens de fond dans sa requête en irrecevabilité. il a estimé que les éléments de preuve présentés par knight dans sa contestation de la requête en irre- cevabilité de m. barer appuyaient également cette conclusion  et qu’ils constituaient [traduction] « une preuve suffisante en droit québécois que les conditions d’attribution de la compétence du tribunal de l’utah à l’égard de m. barer » étaient remplies (2016 qccs 3471, par. 17 (canlii) (« motifs de la cs »)). le juge de première instance a souligné l’absence d’éléments de preuve semblables devant les tribunaux québécois ou les tribunaux étrangers dans les autres affaires citées par m. barer à l’ap- pui de ses prétentions, à savoir zimmermann inc. c. barer, 2016 qcca 260, et cortas canning and refrigerating co. c. suidan bros. inc./suidan frères inc., [1999] rjq 1227 (cs). il a donc estimé que ces décisions n’étaient d’aucun secours pour m barer. [19] the trial judge ended his remarks by stating that art.  3168(3) and (4) ccq could also have served as a basis for the jurisdiction of the utah court, “in as much as the acceptance of the alleged promise to pay by [mr.] barer was received in utah and that same was to be performed in that state” (para. 20 (emphasis added)). [19] le juge de première instance a clos ses obser- vations en déclarant que les par. 3168(3) et (4) ccq. auraient également pu fonder la compétence du tri- bunal de l’utah, [traduction] « puisque l’accepta- tion de la présumée promesse de [m.] barer de payer avait été reçue dans l’utah et devait être exécutée dans cet état » (par. 20 (italiques ajoutés)). b court of appeal of quebec b cour d’appel du québec [20] mr.  barer appealed the superior court’s judgment to the court of appeal. knight responded with an application for the summary dismissal of the appeal or, alternatively, for the provision of a suretyship. a first panel unanimously dismissed the application, simply stating that “[t]he appellant may have a viable appeal” (2016 qcca 1400, at para.  2 (canlii) (“c.a reasons (2016)”)). the panel nevertheless stressed that it was “perhaps dubitante” in dismissing the application and ob- served that, “as the trial judge noted, the appellant does appear to have consented to the jurisdiction of the us district court for the district of utah as his motion to dismiss raised jurisdictional but also non- jurisdictional grounds” (paras.  2-3) it therefore ordered mr. barer to deposit can$25,000 to guarantee the payment of the appeal costs and [20] m. barer a interjeté appel du jugement de la cour supérieure à la cour d’appel. knight a ré- pliqué par une demande en rejet sommaire de l’ap- pel ou, à titre subsidiaire, en cautionnement. une première formation a rejeté la demande de knight à l’unanimité, se contentant de déclarer que [tra- duction] « [l’]appelant a peut- être un appel viable » (2016 qcca 1400, par. 2 (canlii) (« motifs de la ca (2016) »)). elle a néanmoins souligné qu’elle rejetait cette demande « non sans certaines hésita- tions », signalant que « comme le juge de première instance l’a noté, l’appelant semble effectivement avoir reconnu la compétence de la cour de district des états- unis pour le district de l’utah, puisque sa requête en irrecevabilité soulevait non seulement des moyens déclinatoires, mais aussi des moyens distincts des questions de compétence » (par 2-3). [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 599 the judgment amount should his appeal be unsuc- cessful. [21] on the merits of the appeal, a second panel of the court of appeal dismissed mr. barer’s ap- peal in a two- sentence judgment delivered orally, which stated: “without endorsing all the reasons of the judge of first instance, we are nevertheless all of the view that there were sufficient elements to allow to conclude as he did. for these reasons, the appeal is dismissed with costs” (2017 qcca 597, at paras. 1-2 (canlii)). the reasons were silent as to which segments of the judgment below were en- dorsed and which were not. ainsi, cette formation a condamné m. barer à fournir 25 000 $ ca pour garantir le paiement des frais de l’appel et du montant du jugement s’il n’obtenait pas gain de cause en appel. [21] sur le fond, une seconde formation de la cour d’appel a rejeté l’appel de m. barer dans une dé- cision de deux phrases prononcée à l’audience et formulée ainsi : [traduction] « sans souscrire à tous les motifs du juge de première instance, nous sommes néanmoins tous d’avis qu’il y avait suffi- samment d’éléments pour lui permettre d’en arriver à la conclusion qu’il a tirée. pour ces motifs, l’appel est rejeté avec dépens » (2017 qcca 597, par. 1-2 (canlii)). les motifs ne précisent pas quelles parties du jugement de l’instance inférieure sont entérinées et quelles ne le sont pas. iv issue iv question en litige [22] the question to resolve in this appeal is whether the lower courts properly recognized the utah court’s jurisdiction over the dispute between knight and mr. barer personally. to answer this question, i will consider the general principles gov- erning the recognition of foreign decisions under the civil code, including the applicable burden of proof, before turning to the application of arts. 3168(3), 3168(4), 3168(6) and 3164 ccq relied upon as potential grounds for the utah court’s jurisdiction. [22] la question à résoudre dans le présent pourvoi est celle de savoir si c’est à bon droit que les cours d’instances inférieures ont reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah sur le litige opposant knight à m. barer à titre personnel. pour répondre à cette ques- tion, je vais examiner les principes généraux prévus au code civil régissant la reconnaissance des décisions étrangères — notamment ceux relatifs au fardeau de preuve applicable —, avant de passer à l’application des par. 3168(3), (4) et (6) et de l’art 3164 ccq qui sont invoqués en tant que dispositions pouvant donner compétence au tribunal de l’utah. v analysis v analyse a general principles for the recognition of for- eign decisions under the ccq and applicable burden of proof a principes généraux prévus au code civil régis- sant la reconnaissance des décisions étrangères et le fardeau de preuve applicable [23] in accordance with the aim of facilitating the free flow of international trade, art. 3155  ccq. establishes the principle that a decision rendered outside quebec will generally be recognized and declared enforceable in the province (g. goldstein, droit international privé, vol. 2, compétence inter- nationale des autorités québécoises et effets des dé- cisions étrangères (art. 3134 à 3168 ccq) (2012), at para. 3155 550; h. kélada, reconnaissance et [23] conformément à l’objectif de favoriser la flui- dité des échanges internationaux, l’art 3155 ccq. établit le principe selon lequel toute décision rendue hors du québec doit être reconnue et déclarée exé- cutoire au québec, sauf exception (g. goldstein, droit international privé, vol. 2, compétence in- ternationale des autorités québécoises et effets des décisions étrangères (art.  3134 à 3168  ccq) (2012), par. 3155 550; h. kélada, reconnaissance et 600 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. exécution des jugements étrangers (2013), at p. 41; canada post corp. v. lépine, 2009 scc 16, [2009] 1 scr 549, at para 22). article 3155 ccq then lists six exceptions that allow quebec courts to de- part from that general principle and refuse to recog- nize a foreign decision. the first of these exceptions concerns decisions rendered by an authority that had no jurisdiction over the dispute under the civil code: exécution des jugements étrangers (2013), p. 41; so- ciété canadienne des postes c. lépine, 2009 csc 16, [2009] 1 rcs 549, par 22). l’article 3155 ccq. énumère ensuite six exceptions qui permettent aux tribunaux québécois de déroger à ce principe général et de refuser de reconnaître une décision étrangère. la première de ces exceptions a trait aux décisions ren- dues par une autorité qui n’était pas compétente pour décider du différend selon les règles du code civil : 3155 a decision rendered outside québec is recognized and, where applicable, declared enforceable by the québec authority, except in the following cases: 3155 toute décision rendue hors du québec est reconnue et, le cas échéant, déclarée exécutoire par l’autorité du québec, sauf dans les cas suivants : (1) the authority of the state where the decision was rendered had no jurisdiction under the provisions of this title; 1° l’autorité de l’état dans lequel la décision a été rendue n’était pas compétente suivant les dispositions du présent titre; (2) the decision, at the place where it was rendered, is subject to an ordinary remedy or is not final or en- forceable; 2° la décision, au lieu où elle a été rendue, est sus- ceptible d’un recours ordinaire, ou n’est pas définitive ou exécutoire; (3) the decision was rendered in contravention of the fundamental principles of procedure; 3° la décision a été rendue en violation des principes essentiels de la procédure; (4) a dispute between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same subject has given rise to a decision rendered in québec, whether or not it has become final, is pending before a québec authority, first seized of the dispute, or has been decided in a third state and the decision meets the conditions necessary for it to be recognized in québec; 4° un litige entre les mêmes parties, fondé sur les mêmes faits et ayant le même objet, a donné lieu au québec à une décision passée ou non en force de chose jugée, ou est pendant devant une autorité québécoise, première saisie, ou a été jugé dans un état tiers et la décision remplit les conditions nécessaires pour sa reconnaissance au québec; (5) the outcome of a foreign decision is manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in inter- national relations; 5° le résultat de la décision étrangère est manifes- tement incompatible avec l’ordre public tel qu’il est entendu dans les relations internationales; (6) the decision enforces obligations arising from the taxation laws of a foreign state. 6° la décision sanctionne des obligations découlant des lois fiscales d’un état étranger. [24] the framework established by art 3155 ccq. has been described as creating a presumption of va- lidity in favour of the foreign decision, a presumption that is rebutted when a quebec court holds that one of the listed exceptions applies (ministère de la jus- tice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de so- ciété (1993), at p. 2015; h. p. glenn, “recognition of foreign judgments in quebec” (1997), 28 can. bus. lj 404, at p. 406; yousuf v. jannesar, 2014 [24] on a dit au sujet du régime établi par l’art 3155 ccq qu’il crée une présomption de va- lidité de la décision étrangère et que cette présomption est réfutée lorsqu’un tribunal québécois juge qu’une des exceptions énumérées s’applique (ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, t. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), p. 2015; h. p. glenn, « recognition of foreign judgments in quebec » (1997), 28 rev. can. dr. comm. 404, p. 406; yousuf c. jannesar, 2014 [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 601 qcca 2096, at paras. 18-20 (canlii); mutual trust co. v. st- cyr (1996), 144 dlr (4th) 338 (ca), at pp 347-48). one would expect the onus to be on the party opposing recognition to displace this pre- sumption of validity of the foreign decision and to establish one of the grounds for denying recognition or enforcement (j. a. talpis, with the collaboration of s. l. kath, “if i am from grand- mère, why am i being sued in texas?” responding to inappropri- ate foreign jurisdiction in quebec- united states crossborder litigation (2001), at p. 161; goldberg v. think glass le verre repensé inc., 2016 qccs 6456, at para. 23 (canlii); jules jordan video inc. v. 144942 canada inc., 2014 qccs 3343, at para. 51 ( canlii)). under the general rule governing the allo- cation of the burden of proof between parties found in art 2803 ccq, “a person seeking to assert a right shall prove the facts on which the claim is based”, while a person who argues that a right is null, modified or extinguished bears the burden of prov- ing the facts underlying that position. the burden of proving that an exception applies thus normally falls on the party seeking to rely on the exception (l. ducharme, précis de la preuve (6th ed. 2005), at nos. 122-23; abel skiver farm corp. v. town of sainte- foy, [1983] 1 scr 403, at p. 421; lavallée v. imhof, 2018 qccs 2031, at para. 32 (canlii)). [25] still, some legislative provisions impose that onus of proof on the party seeking recognition of a foreign decision. one example is art. 786 para. 1 of the former code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25 (“former ccp”) (now art. 508 para. 1 of the current code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“new ccp”)). it requires the party seeking recognition to attach to the application “an attestation emanating from a competent foreign public officer stating that the decision is no longer, in the state in which it was rendered, subject to ordinary remedy and that it is final or enforceable”. the party seeking recogni- tion thus bears the burden of establishing — in the manner prescribed — that the foreign decision is final or enforceable, and therefore, that the second exception found in art 3155 ccq does not apply. similarly, where a foreign decision is rendered by default, art 3156 ccq requires the party seek- ing recognition to establish that the third excep- tion in art 3155 ccq does not apply (see yousuf, qcca 2096, par. 18-20 (canlii); mutual trust co. c. st- cyr, [1996] rdj 623 (ca), p 632-633). on s’attendrait ainsi à ce qu’il incombe à la partie qui s’oppose à la reconnaissance de la décision étrangère de repousser la présomption de validité dont celle-ci bénéficie et d’établir un des motifs permettant de refuser de la reconnaître ou de l’exécuter (j a tal- pis, avec la collaboration de s l kath, « if i am from grand- mère, why am i being sued in texas? » responding to inappropriate foreign jurisdiction in quebec- united states crossborder litigation (2001), p. 161; goldberg c. think glass le verre repensé inc., 2016 qccs 6456, par. 23 ( canlii); jules jordan video inc. c. 144942 canada inc., 2014 qccs 3343, par. 51 (canlii)). en effet, selon la règle générale énoncée à l’art 2803 ccq qui régit la répartition du fardeau de la preuve entre les parties, « celui qui veut faire valoir un droit doit prouver les faits qui sou- tiennent sa prétention », tandis que celui qui soutient qu’un droit est nul, a été modifié ou est éteint doit prouver les faits sur lesquels est fondée sa prétention. le fardeau de prouver qu’une exception s’applique incombe donc normalement à la partie qui tente de s’en prévaloir (l. ducharme, précis de la preuve (6e éd. 2005), nos 122-123; abel skiver farm corp c. ville de sainte- foy, [1983] 1 rcs 403, p. 421; la- vallée c. imhof, 2018 qccs 2031, par. 32 (canlii)). [25] certaines dispositions législatives font toute- fois reposer le fardeau de cette preuve sur les épaules de la personne qui cherche à faire reconnaître la déci- sion étrangère. on en trouve un exemple à l’art. 786 al. 1 de l’ancien code de procédure civile, rlrq, c. c-25 (« ancien cpc ») (maintenant l’art. 508 al. 1 du nouveau code de procédure civile, rlrq, c. c-25.01 (« nouveau cpc »)), qui oblige celui qui demande la reconnaissance d’une décision étrangère à joindre à sa demande « l’attestation d’un officier public étranger compétent affirmant que la décision n’est plus, dans l’état où elle a été rendue, suscep- tible d’appel ou qu’elle est définitive ou exécutoire ». il incombe donc à celui qui demande la reconnais- sance d’établir — selon les modalités prescrites — que la décision étrangère est définitive ou exécutoire et, partant, que la deuxième exception prévue à l’art 3155 ccq ne s’applique pas. compte tenu de l’art 3156 ccq, celui qui demande la reconnais- sance doit établir que la troisième exception prévue 602 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. at paras. 20-23, and art. 786 para. 2 of the former ccp (now art. 508 para. 2 of the new ccp)). [26] with respect to the first exception in art 3155 ccq,. title four of book ten of the civil code specifies the circumstances in which quebec courts will recognize foreign jurisdiction. the pur- pose of these rules is not to teach lessons to foreign authorities about the outer limits of their own juris- diction, but rather to determine whether it is appro- priate to integrate specific decisions rendered outside quebec into the province’s legal system. such rec- ognition of a foreign authority’s jurisdiction by local courts in accordance with the rules prescribed by local law has been referred to by many authors as the [translation] “indirect international jurisdiction” (“compétence internationale indirecte”) or “indirect jurisdiction” (“compétence indirecte”) of the foreign authority (g. goldstein, “compétence internatio- nale indirecte du tribunal étranger”, in jurisclasseur québec — droit international privé (loose- leaf), by p-c. lafond, ed., fasc. 11, at para. 2; h. p. glenn, “droit international privé”, in la réforme du code civil (1993), vol. 3, at para. 125; j a. talpis and j-g. castel, “interpreting the rules of private international law”, in reform of the civil code (1993), vol. 5b, at no. 485; see also mutual trust, at p 348). [27] in personal actions of a patrimonial nature like the one in the instant case, art 3168 ccq lists six situations where quebec courts will find that a for- eign authority has indirect international jurisdiction: à l’art 3155 ccq ne s’applique pas lorsqu’une décision étrangère est rendue par défaut (voir yousuf, par. 20-23, et l’art. 786 al. 2 de l’ancien cpc (main- tenant l’art. 508 al. 2 du nouveau cpc)). [26] en ce qui concerne la première exception prévue à l’art 3155 ccq, le titre quatrième du livre dixième du code civil précise les circonstances dans lesquelles les tribunaux québécois reconnaissent la compétence des autorités étrangères. l’objectif de ces règles n’est pas de donner des leçons aux autorités étrangères quant aux limites de leur propre compé- tence, mais plutôt de déterminer s’il convient d’in- corporer certaines décisions rendues hors du québec dans l’ordre juridique interne. la compétence de tribunaux étrangers ainsi reconnue par les tribunaux locaux en fonction des règles du droit interne est désignée par de nombreux auteurs sous le vocable « compétence internationale indirecte » (« indirect international jurisdiction ») ou « compétence in- directe » (« indirect jurisdiction ») (g. goldstein, « compétence internationale indirecte du tribunal étranger », dans jurisclasseur québec — droit inter- national privé (feuilles mobiles), par p-c lafond, dir., fasc. 11, par. 2; h p glenn, « droit international privé », dans la réforme du code civil (1993), t. 3, par. 125; j. a. talpis et j-g. castel, « interprétation des règles du droit international privé », dans la réforme du code civil (1993), t. 3, no 485; voir éga- lement mutual trust, p 633). [27] dans le cas des actions personnelles à carac- tère patrimonial, comme celle dont il s’agit en l’es- pèce, l’art 3168 ccq énumère six situations dans lesquelles les tribunaux québécois doivent conclure à la compétence internationale indirecte des autorités étrangères : 3168 in personal actions of a patrimonial nature, the jurisdiction of foreign authorities is recognized only in the following cases: 3168 dans les actions personnelles à caractère patrimo- nial, la compétence des autorités étrangères n’est reconnue que dans les cas suivants : (1) the defendant was domiciled in the state where the decision was rendered; 1° le défendeur était domicilié dans l’état où la dé- cision a été rendue; (2) the defendant possessed an establishment in the state where the decision was rendered and the dispute relates to its activities in that state; 2° le défendeur avait un établissement dans l’état où la décision a été rendue et la contestation est relative à son activité dans cet état; [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 603 (3) injury was suffered in the state where the decision was rendered and it resulted from a fault which was committed in that state or from an injurious act or omission which occurred there; 3° un préjudice a été subi dans l’état où la décision a été rendue et il résulte d’une faute qui y a été commise ou d’un fait dommageable qui s’y est produit; (4) the obligations arising from a contract were to be performed in that state; 4° les obligations découlant d’un contrat devaient y être exécutées; (5) the parties have submitted to the foreign authori- ties the present or future disputes between themselves arising out of a specific legal relationship; however, renunciation by a consumer or a worker of the juris- diction of the authority of his place of domicile may not be set up against him; 5° les parties leur ont soumis les litiges nés ou à naître entre elles à l’occasion d’un rapport de droit déterminé; cependant, la renonciation du consommateur ou du tra- vailleur à la compétence de l’autorité de son domicile ne peut lui être opposée; (6) the defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign authorities. 6° le défendeur a reconnu leur compétence. this exhaustive enumeration of grounds and the use of the word “only” signal that the recognition of a foreign authority’s indirect international jurisdiction requires the party seeking recognition to establish the existence of one of the enumerated grounds. [28] because of the manner in which they are both structured, arts. 3155(1) and 3168 ccq may seem to give contradictory indications as to which party bears the burden of establishing the existence — or absence — of a ground for recognizing jurisdiction. here, mr. barer argues that knight, the party seeking recognition of a foreign decision in quebec, must prove the facts that justify the recognition of the utah court’s jurisdiction under art 3168 ccq. for its part, knight contends that it is incumbent on mr. barer, the party opposing recognition, to estab- lish the absence of any grounds for recognition. it stresses that lack of jurisdiction is an exception to the general principle that foreign decisions should be recognized. cette énumération exhaustive, de même que l’em- ploi de la proposition « n’est reconnue que dans les cas suivants », indique que celui qui demande la reconnaissance doit démontrer l’existence d’un des cas énumérés à cet article pour que la compétence internationale indirecte de l’autorité étrangère puisse être reconnue. [28] en raison de leur formulation respective, le par. 3155(1) et l’art 3168 ccq peuvent sembler donner des indications contradictoires quant à la personne à qui il incombe d’établir l’existence — ou l’inexistence — d’un motif permettant de reconnaître la compétence. en l’espèce, m. barer soutient que knight, qui demande qu’une décision étrangère soit reconnue au québec, doit prouver les faits qui justi- fient la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal de l’utah en application de l’art 3168 ccq. pour sa part, knight soutient qu’il incombe à m. barer, la personne qui s’oppose à la reconnaissance, d’éta- blir qu’aucun critère de compétence ne s’applique. elle souligne que l’absence de compétence est une exception au principe général de la reconnaissance du jugement étranger. in my view, mr.  barer’s approach is the [29] correct one. any tension between arts. 3155 and 3168 ccq dissipates when one considers that the foreign authority’s jurisdiction is one of the facts on which an applicant’s claim is based. indeed, a party seeking recognition of a foreign decision has [29] j’estime que l’approche préconisée par m. ba- rer est la bonne. toute tension entre les art. 3155 et 3168 ccq disparaît lorsqu’on considère que la compétence de l’autorité étrangère est un des faits sur lesquels se fonde la prétention du demandeur. en effet, celui qui cherche à faire reconnaître une 604 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. no right arising from that decision in quebec unless the foreign authority had jurisdiction pursuant to the rules of the civil code. [30] the indirect international jurisdiction of a foreign authority is therefore best conceptualized as a precondition to the recognition of its decision. a finding of foreign jurisdiction logically precedes a finding that a foreign judgment is enforceable in quebec. as professor emanuelli puts it: [transla- tion] “[f]or a foreign decision to be recognized in quebec and to be capable of being declared enforce- able in the province, it must have been rendered by an authority that had jurisdiction under the quebec rules on the international jurisdiction of foreign au- thorities. this is what emerges, a contrario, from article 3155(1) ccq” (c. emanuelli, droit inter- national privé québécois (3rd ed. 2011), at no. 279 (emphasis added; footnote omitted); see also kélada, at p 43). in worthington corp. v. atlas turner inc., [2004] rjq 2376, the quebec court of appeal also opined that [translation] “[f]oreign judgments are recognized in quebec if they were rendered by a court that had jurisdiction under the civil code’s provisions on private international law. articles 3155 and 3164 state this expressly” (para. 16 (emphasis added)). [31] legislative history further supports this view. initially, the legislature had contemplated using ex- press language that would place the onus on the defendant in what is now art. 3155 (“unless the de- fendant proves that”; see draft art 3133). however, the national assembly did not adopt this wording, but rather changed it to the current “except in the following cases” in order to [translation] “enable quebec authorities to verify, of their own motion, whether the foreign decision meets the conditions set out in the article” (sous- commissions des ins- titutions, “étude détaillée du projet de loi 125 — code civil du québec”, journal des débats, vol. 31, no. 28, 1st sess., 34th leg., december 3, 1991, at p. 1141 (emphasis deleted)). décision étrangère ne peut faire valoir un droit en vertu de cette décision au québec que si l’autorité étrangère est compétente selon les règles du code civil. [30] la meilleure façon de concevoir la compé- tence internationale indirecte d’une autorité étrangère consiste donc à l’envisager comme une condition préalable à la reconnaissance de sa décision. la re- connaissance de la compétence du tribunal étranger précède logiquement la conclusion que le jugement de ce tribunal est exécutoire au québec. ainsi que le professeur emanuelli l’explique : « [p]our qu’une décision étrangère soit reconnue au québec et soit susceptible d’y être déclarée exécutoire, il faut en premier lieu qu’elle ait été rendue par une autorité compétente en vertu des règles québécoises rela- tives à la compétence internationale des autorités étrangères. c’est ce qui ressort a contrario de l’ar- ticle 3155(1º) ccq » (c. emanuelli, droit inter- national privé québécois (3e éd. 2011), no 279 (je souligne; note en bas de page omise); voir également kélada, p 43). dans l’arrêt worthington corp c. atlas turner inc., [2004] rjq 2376, la cour d’ap- pel du québec s’est également dite d’avis que « les jugements étrangers sont reconnus au québec s’ils ont été rendus par un tribunal compétent suivant les dispositions du code civil en matière de droit inter- national privé. les articles 3155 et 3164 l’affirment expressément » (par. 16 (je souligne)). [31] l’historique législatif appuie également cette théorie. au départ, le législateur avait envisagé la possibilité d’employer dans ce qui est maintenant l’art. 3155 des termes explicites qui auraient fait re- poser le fardeau de la preuve sur les épaules du défen- deur (« à moins que le défendeur ne fasse l’une des preuves suivantes »; voir l’ébauche de l’art 3133). or, l’assemblée nationale n’a pas retenu ce libellé, le remplaçant plutôt par le texte actuel : « sauf dans les cas suivants », afin de «    permettre aux autorités du québec de contrôler d’office la conformité de la décision étrangère avec les conditions énumérées à l’article    » (sous- commission des institutions, « étude détaillée du projet de loi 125 — code civil du québec », journal des débats, vol. 31, no 28, 1re sess., 34e lég., 3 décembre 1991, p. 1141 (souli- gnement omis)). [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 605 in fact, in performing its role under [32] art 3158 ccq of “verifying whether the decision with respect to which recognition or enforcement is sought meets the requirements prescribed in this title”, the quebec enforcing court must ascertain that the foreign authority had jurisdiction over the matter under the rules of the civil code (lépine, at para. 24; zimmermann, at para. 13 (canlii); iraq (state of) v. heerema zwijndrecht, bv, 2013 qcca 1112, at para. 15 (canlii); hocking v. haziza, 2008 qcca 800, at para. 39 (canlii)). again, this is an indication that a finding of jurisdiction precedes a finding of recognition. in this regard, the quebec court must make a positive finding of jurisdiction; it cannot limit itself to determining whether the party opposing recognition has satisfactorily proved lack of jurisdiction. nor can the quebec court rely on the presumption of normality (see c. piché, la preuve civile (5th ed. 2016), at nos. 156 et seq.) to find that the foreign authority had jurisdiction: that authority did not consider the quebec rules governing indi- rect international jurisdiction when it rendered its decision. it follows that, in law, the indirect inter- national jurisdiction requirements imposed by the civil code for the recognition of a foreign authority’s jurisdiction over a matter are not satisfied simply because the opposing party has failed to prove lack of jurisdiction. [33] the party seeking recognition of a foreign de- cision thus bears the burden of proving the facts upon which the foreign authority’s indirect international jurisdiction is based. this allocation of the burden of proof is in line with the well- established rule that the plaintiff in an action before a quebec court bears the burden of proving the facts upon which the court’s jurisdiction is based when it is challenged by the defendant (piché, at no. 161; transax technologies inc. v. red baron corp. ltd., 2017 qcca 626, at para. 13 (canlii); shamji v. tajdin, 2006 qcca 314, at para. 16 (canlii); bank of montreal v. hydro aluminum wells inc., 2002 canlii 3111 (que. ca), at para. 12; baird v. matol botanical international ltd., [1994] rdj 282 (ca), at p 283). [32] en fait, lorsqu’il exerce le rôle qui lui incombe, en application de l’art 3158 ccq, de « vérifier si la décision dont la reconnaissance ou l’exécu- tion est demandée remplit les conditions prévues au présent titre », le tribunal d’exécution québécois doit s’assurer que l’autorité étrangère avait compé- tence sur le sujet suivant les règles du code civil (lépine, par. 24; zimmermann, par. 13 (canlii); iraq (state of) c. heerema zwijndrecht, bv, 2013 qcca 1112, par. 15 (canlii); hocking c. haziza, 2008 qcca 800, par. 39 (canlii)). voilà une autre indi- cation qu’il faut conclure à la compétence avant de pouvoir tirer une conclusion sur la reconnaissance. à ce propos, le tribunal du québec doit s’assurer de la compétence du tribunal étranger; il ne peut pas se contenter de juger si la personne qui s’oppose à la reconnaissance a démontré de façon satisfaisante le défaut de compétence. il ne peut pas non plus s’ap- puyer sur le principe de la présomption de normalité (voir c. piché, la preuve civile (5e éd. 2016), nos 156 et suiv.) pour conclure que l’autorité étrangère avait compétence. en effet, celle-ci n’a pas examiné les principes du droit québécois en matière de compé- tence internationale indirecte pour rendre sa déci- sion. il s’ensuit qu’elle ne peut pas, en droit, être considérée comme ayant satisfait aux exigences du code civil en matière de compétence internationale indirecte pour que sa compétence puisse être recon- nue relativement à une affaire, simplement parce que la partie adverse n’a pas prouvé qu’elle n’était pas compétente. [33] il incombe donc à la personne qui demande la reconnaissance d’une décision étrangère de prou- ver les faits sur lesquels se fonde la compétence internationale indirecte de l’autorité étrangère. cette répartition du fardeau de la preuve s’accorde avec la règle bien établie selon laquelle, dans une action introduite devant un tribunal du québec, il appartient au demandeur d’établir les faits sur lesquels repose la compétence du tribunal en cas de contestation de celle-ci par le défendeur (piché, no 161; transax technologies inc. c. red baron corp ltd, 2017 qcca 626, par. 13 (canlii); shamji c. tajdin, 2006 qcca 314, par. 16 (canlii); bank of montreal c. hydro aluminum wells inc., 2002 canlii 3111 (ca. qc), par. 12; baird c. matol botanical international ltd., [1994] rdj 282 (ca), p 283). 606 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. i add that it would hardly be reasonable to [34] require the parties opposing recognition to bear the burden of establishing the foreign authority’s lack of indirect international jurisdiction. arti- cle  3168  ccq lists six alternative grounds for recognizing jurisdiction in personal actions of a pat- rimonial nature, but a single one suffices to recognize the jurisdiction of the foreign authority (emanuelli (2011), at no. 290; hocking, at para 187). if defend- ants were required to prove a lack of indirect interna- tional jurisdiction, they would have to disprove each of the six possibilities listed in art 3168 ccq. that would place them in the awkward position of having to prove a series of negatives. [34] j’ajouterai qu’il ne serait guère raisonnable d’obliger celui qui s’oppose à la reconnaissance à éta- blir le défaut de compétence internationale indirecte de l’autorité étrangère. l’article 3168 ccq énu- mère six critères distincts constitutifs de compétence, mais la présence d’un seul d’entre eux suffit à établir celle de l’autorité étrangère dans le cadre d’une ac- tion personnelle à caractère patrimonial (emanuelli (2011), no 290; hocking, par 187). si le défendeur avait l’obligation de prouver le défaut de compétence internationale indirecte, il serait tenu de réfuter un à un les six cas de figure énumérés à l’art 3168 ccq, ce qui le placerait dans la position délicate d’avoir à prouver une série d’hypothèses négatives. [35] in this case, knight relies on three grounds to establish the jurisdiction of the utah court under art 3168 ccq, namely the grounds set out in the third, fourth and sixth subparagraphs of that article. i will briefly discuss the first two grounds before turning to the third and main one. [35] dans le cas qui nous occupe, knight invoque trois chefs de compétence du tribunal de l’utah au titre de l’art 3168 ccq, en l’occurrence ceux pré- vus à ses troisième, quatrième et sixième alinéas. je vais aborder brièvement les deux premiers, avant de passer au troisième, le principal qui est en jeu en l’espèce. b article 3168(3) and (4) ccq. b paragraphes 3168(3) et (4) ccq. [36] article 3168(3) ccq provides that the ju- risdiction of a foreign authority is recognized in quebec if both the injury and the fault that gave rise to the injury occurred in the state where the decision was rendered. for its part, art 3168(4) ccq states that a foreign authority’s jurisdiction is recognized where its decision concerns “obligations arising from a contract [that] were to be performed in that state”. in a short obiter, the superior court found that [37] these two subparagraphs “could” justify the recog- nition of the utah court’s jurisdiction because “the acceptance of the alleged promise to pay by [mr.] barer was received in utah and that same was to be performed in that state” (sup. ct. reasons, at para. 20 (emphasis added)). it is unclear whether the court of appeal agreed with this aspect of the trial judgment. in my view, knight did not meet its burden of proof in this regard, and this suffices to conclude that it cannot rely on these two grounds here. [36] le paragraphe 3168(3) ccq prévoit que la compétence des autorités étrangères est reconnue au québec si à la fois le préjudice et la faute dont il résulte sont survenus dans l’état où la décision a été rendue. pour sa part, le par 3168(4) ccq. dispose que la compétence d’une autorité étrangère est reconnue lorsque sa décision concerne « [l]es obligations découlant d’un contrat [qui] devaient [  ] être exécutées [dans l’état où elle se trouve] ». [37] dans une brève remarque incidente, la cour supérieure a conclu que ces deux paragraphes [tra- duction] « pourraient » justifier la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal de l’utah parce que « la présumée promesse de [m.] barer de payer avait été acceptée dans l’utah et devait y être exécutée » (motifs de la cs, par. 20 (je souligne)). on ne sait par ailleurs pas avec certitude si la cour d’appel a avalisé cet aspect du jugement de première instance. pour ma part, je conclus que knight ne s’est pas acquittée du fardeau de la preuve qui lui incombait à cet égard, ce qui suffit pour conclure qu’elle ne peut invoquer ces deux motifs en l’espèce. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 607 in support of its position, knight argues [38] mainly that in view of art 3158 ccq,. quebec courts cannot verify whether there was a promise to pay or whether mr. barer, under the alter ego doctrine, was personally bound by the contract be- tween knight and bec. according to knight, this was already decided by the utah court, and quebec courts should refrain from questioning the merits of the utah decision. this position is flawed for three reasons. [39] first, knight relies on the utah court’s pre- liminary decision denying mr. barer’s motion to dismiss in order to establish a basis for recognizing the utah court’s jurisdiction. however, that decision was not final, and is therefore not recognizable in quebec pursuant to art 3155(2) ccq. in addition, in this case, knight seeks recognition of the utah decision, namely the final default judgment rendered against mr. barer, not the preliminary decision on mr. barer’s motion to dismiss. it is only that default judgment that is contemplated by art 3158 ccq, and no reasons were provided in support of it. it is simply an order to pay a sum of money, nothing more. finally, the utah court’s prima facie findings in its judgment dismissing mr. barer’s preliminary motion were based on allegations deemed to be true and were made for the sole purpose of deciding whether to allow the case to proceed to trial. [38] à l’appui de sa thèse, knight insiste surtout sur le fait que, eu égard à l’art 3158 ccq, les tribunaux québécois ne peuvent pas réexaminer la question de savoir si une promesse de payer a été faite ou si m. barer, suivant la doctrine de l’alter ego, était personnellement obligé aux termes du contrat conclu entre elle et bec. en effet, selon knight, cette question a déjà été tranchée par le tribunal de l’utah et les cours du québec devraient s’abstenir de remettre en question le bien- fondé de cette décision. cet argument est mal fondé, et ce, pour trois raisons. [39] premièrement, knight se fonde sur la déci- sion préliminaire par laquelle le tribunal de l’utah a rejeté la requête en irrecevabilité de m. barer pour tenter de démontrer l’existence d’un motif justifiant la reconnaissance de la compétence de ce tribunal. or, cette décision n’était pas définitive et ne pouvait donc pas, aux termes du par 3155(2) ccq, être reconnue au québec. de plus, dans le cas qui nous occupe, knight demande la reconnaissance de la décision de l’utah, en l’occurrence le jugement par défaut définitif rendu contre m. barer, et non de la décision préliminaire sur la requête en irrecevabilité de m barer. or, c’est uniquement ce jugement par défaut qu’envisage l’art 3158 ccq, et il n’est pas motivé. il s’agit d’une condamnation à payer une somme d’argent, rien de plus. enfin, les conclusions prima facie tirées par le tribunal de l’utah dans son jugement rejetant la requête préliminaire de m. barer étaient fondées sur des allégations tenues pour avé- rées et avaient uniquement pour objet de décider de permettre ou non que l’affaire soit instruite. [40] to be clear, the fact that the utah decision was a default judgment is not a reason to refrain from recognizing and enforcing it in quebec. foreign default judgments can be recognized in quebec on the same footing as other decisions, as long as the requirements of arts 3156 ccq and 786 para. 2 of the former ccp (now art 508 para 2 of the new ccp) are met (yousuf, at paras. 17-19; see also, under the common law, beals v. saldanha, 2003 scc 72, [2003] 3 scr 416, at para 31). it is also not a requirement per se that the foreign decision be supported by reasons (g. goldstein, “principes généraux et conditions générales de reconnaissance et d’exécution”, in jurisclasseur québec — droit [40] en clair, le fait que la décision de l’utah ait été un jugement par défaut n’est pas une raison pour refuser de la reconnaître et de l’exécuter au québec. les jugements de ce type rendus à l’étranger sont susceptibles d’être reconnus au québec au même titre que les autres décisions, dès lors qu’il est satis- fait aux exigences des art 3156 ccq et 786 al. 2 ancien cpc (maintenant l’art 508 al 2 nouveau. cpc) (yousuf, par. 17-19; voir également, en com- mon law, beals c. saldanha, 2003 csc 72, [2003] 3 rcs 416, par 31). il n’est pas non plus indis- pensable que la décision étrangère soit motivée (g. goldstein, « principes généraux et conditions générales de reconnaissance et d’exécution », dans 608 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. international privé (loose- leaf), by p-c. lafond, ed., fasc. 10, at para. 71; society of lloyd’s v. alper, 2006 qccs 1203, at paras. 82-87 (canlii)). [41] still, knight could not merely rely on the alle- gations in its own proceedings before the utah court in order to establish that court’s jurisdiction over mr. barer according to the rules of the civil code. it had to adduce evidence before the quebec enforcing court to meet its burden of establishing the grounds for recognition of the foreign authority’s jurisdiction listed in art 3168 ccq upon which it was relying. as previously mentioned, an application for recog- nition and enforcement “is a judicial demand that gives rise to an adversarial relationship to which the general rules of civil procedure apply” (kuwait airways, at para 20). in this context, the parties are not exempted from the requirement imposed by art 2803 ccq. the applicant must prove the facts on which its right to recognition and enforcement of the foreign decision is based. it is the role of the quebec enforcing court to look at that evidence to ensure that the foreign authority had jurisdiction un- der the rules of the civil code (heerema, at para. 15; zimmermann, at para. 13; mutual trust, at p 348). in zimmermann, which coincidentally also [42] involved mr. barer and his companies, the quebec court of appeal refused to recognize and enforce against mr.  barer personally a default judgment rendered by the united states district court for the district of vermont against him and bec. as in the present case, the party seeking recognition argued that the foreign authority had accepted that bec was mr. barer’s alter ego and that quebec courts could not re- examine that finding. the court of appeal rightly rejected that argument and held that the trial judge had not erred in requiring that evidence be adduced to prove the facts constituting the basis for recognition of the vermont court’s jurisdiction (zimmermann, at para 20). because the party seek- ing recognition had not adduced evidence that jus- tified lifting the corporate veil, the court of appeal jurisclasseur québec — droit international privé (feuilles mobiles), par p-c. lafond, dir., fasc. 10, par. 71; society of lloyd’s c. alper, 2006 qccs 1203, par. 82-87 (canlii)). [41] malgré tout, selon les règles du code civil, knight ne pouvait pas pour autant s’en remettre ex- clusivement aux allégations formulées dans les actes de procédure qu’elle a elle- même déposés devant le tribunal de l’utah pour établir la compétence de ce dernier à l’égard de m barer. elle devait sou- mettre des éléments de preuve au tribunal d’exécu- tion québécois pour s’acquitter de son fardeau de démontrer l’existence des chefs de compétence de l’autorité étrangère énumérés à l’art 3168 ccq. sur lesquels elle se fondait. je le répète, une requête en reconnaissance et en exécution d’un jugement étranger «  constitue une demande en justice qui donne ouverture à un débat contradictoire régi par les règles générales de la procédure civile » (kuwait airways, par.  20) dans ce contexte, les parties ne sont pas exemptées des exigences énoncées à l’art 2803 ccq. le demandeur doit prouver les faits sur lesquels se fonde le droit qu’il invoque à la reconnaissance et à l’exécution de la décision étran- gère. il appartient au tribunal d’exécution québécois d’examiner la preuve pour s’assurer que le tribunal étranger avait compétence suivant les règles énon- cées au code civil (heerema, par. 15; zimmermann, par. 13; mutual trust, p 633). [42] dans l’affaire zimmermann — qui, par coïn- cidence, concernait également m. barer et ses so- ciétés —, la cour d’appel du québec a refusé de reconnaître et d’opposer personnellement à m. barer un jugement par défaut qui avait été rendu contre lui et contre bec par la cour de district des états- unis pour le district du vermont. comme c’est le cas en l’espèce, la partie qui demandait la reconnaissance du jugement étranger affirmait que, selon le tribunal étranger, bec était l’alter ego de m. barer et que les tribunaux québécois ne pouvaient pas réexaminer cette conclusion. la cour d’appel a écarté à bon droit cet argument et estimé que le juge de première ins- tance n’avait pas commis d’erreur en exigeant la pré- sentation d’éléments de preuve pour établir les faits constituant le fondement de la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal du vermont (zimmermann, [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 609 refused to recognize the vermont court’s jurisdiction over mr. barer personally under art 3168(4) ccq, as only bec was a party to the contract involved. [43] the trial judge below distinguished the pres- ent case from zimmermann on the basis that “the proof made before the utah court for the motion to dismiss as referred to in the judgment, exhibit p-45,    constitutes sufficient proof under quebec law that the requirements to grant jurisdiction to the utah court over [mr.] barer [were] valid” (sup. ct. reasons, at para 17). with respect, i find that there are two problems with this reasoning. first, as ex- plained, the current proceedings are concerned with the final utah decision, not the preliminary decision. the trial judge’s analysis was therefore predicated on the wrong decision. second, the judge gave undue conclusory effects to the prima facie findings made by the utah court in its decision denying mr. barer’s motion. quebec enforcing courts are required to look at issues that may have been settled in the foreign decision inasmuch as it is necessary to be satisfied that the criteria for recognition and enforcement provided in title four are met, notably the grounds for recognition of foreign authorities’ jurisdiction. par 20). comme la partie qui demandait la recon- naissance n’avait pas présenté d’éléments de preuve justifiant la levée du voile de la personnalité morale, et que seule bec était partie au contrat en cause, la cour d’appel a refusé de reconnaître la compétence du tribunal du vermont à l’égard de m. barer à titre personnel en application du par 3168(4) ccq. [43] le juge de première instance a établi une dis- tinction entre la présente espèce et l’affaire zim- mermann au motif que [traduction] « la preuve soumise au tribunal de l’utah au soutien de la re- quête en irrecevabilité dont il est question dans le jugement (pièce p-4.5) [  ] suffit, en droit québé- cois, pour établir que les conditions d’attribution de la compétence au tribunal de l’utah à l’égard de [m.] barer [étaient] valides » (motifs de la cs, par 17). en toute déférence, j’estime que ce rai- sonnement est problématique à deux égards. en pre- mier lieu, comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, la présente instance concerne la décision définitive rendue par le tribunal de l’utah, et non sa décision préliminaire. l’analyse du juge de première instance ne portait donc pas sur la bonne décision. en second lieu, ce dernier a indûment accordé des effets déterminants aux conclusions prima facie tirées par le tribunal de l’utah dans sa décision de rejeter la requête de m barer. les tribunaux d’exécution québécois sont tenus d’examiner des questions qui peuvent avoir été tranchées par la décision étrangère dans la mesure où cela est nécessaire pour s’assurer qu’il est satis- fait aux critères de reconnaissance et d’exécution prévus au titre quatrième, notamment au regard des motifs permettant de reconnaître la compétence des autorités étrangères. [44] evidence to that effect was therefore re- quired here, and knight failed to provide any with regard to either art. 3168(3) or art. 3168(4) insofar as mr. barer was personally concerned. the exhibits it filed before the superior court were essentially limited to documents reflecting the progress of the proceedings in utah (p-2, p-2.1, p-2.2, p-2.3, p-3, p-4.1, p-4.2, p-4.3, p-4.4, p-4.5, p-5, p-7, p-8, p-9, p-10). the three remaining exhibits were a report of the enterprise registrar of quebec (p-1), a currency converter report (p-6) and a table explaining the calculation of interest (p-11). none of these exhibits [44] il était donc nécessaire de présenter des élé- ments de preuve à cet égard en l’espèce. or, en ce qui concerne tant le par. 3168(3) que le par. 3168(4), knight n’en a présenté aucun en ce qui a trait à m. barer à titre personnel. les pièces que knight a déposées devant la cour supérieure consistaient essentiellement en des documents relatant le dérou- lement de l’instance dans l’utah (p-2, p-2.1, p-2.2, p-2.3, p-3, p-4.1, p-4.2, p-4.3, p-4.4, p-4.5, p-5, p-7, p-8, p-9, p-10). les trois autres pièces étaient un re- levé du registraire des entreprises du québec (p-1), un état de conversion de devises (p-6) et un tableau 610 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. support a finding that quebec courts should recog- nize the utah court’s jurisdiction over mr. barer under art. 3168(3) or (4) ccq. accordingly, the superior court could not, on this record, recognize the utah court’s jurisdiction under either of those subparagraphs. [45] this brings me to the third ground for rec- ognition relied on by knight and considered by the trial judge, namely submission to jurisdiction under art 3168(6) ccq. on this ground, though, i con- sider that the lower courts were justified to conclude as they did. as stated, a single ground suffices to recognize jurisdiction (emanuelli (2011), at no. 290; hocking, at para 187). expliquant le calcul des intérêts (p-11). aucune de ces pièces ne permet de conclure que les tribunaux québécois devraient reconnaître la compétence du tribunal de l’utah à l’égard de m. barer en applica- tion des par. 3168(3) ou (4) ccq. par conséquent, au vu du dossier, la cour supérieure ne pouvait pas reconnaître la compétence de ce tribunal en se fon- dant sur l’un ou l’autre de ces deux paragraphes. je passe maintenant au troisième motif de [45] reconnaissance invoqué par knight et examiné par le juge de première instance, en l’occurrence le critère de la reconnaissance de la compétence énoncé au par 3168(6) ccq. ce critère justifiait selon moi que les cours d’instances inférieures en arrivent à la conclusion qu’elles ont tirée. comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, il suffit qu’il soit satisfait à un seul des cri- tères de compétence prévus à l’art. 3168 pour établir la compétence de l’autorité étrangère (emanuelli (2011), no 290; hocking, par 187). c article 3168(6) ccq. c paragraphe 3168(6) ccq. [46] submission has long been recognized in que- bec case law as a basis for a court’s jurisdiction; once a party has submitted to a court’s jurisdiction, the party can no longer challenge it (see vaughan v. campbell (1855), 5 lc rep 431 (sup. ct.); see also g. goldstein and j. a. talpis, l’effet au québec des jugements étrangers en matière de droits patrimo- niaux (1991), at p. 117; g. goldstein and e. groffier, droit international privé, vol. i, théorie générale (1998), at no 183). the civil code now expressly provides in art. 3168(6)  ccq that the jurisdic- tion of foreign authorities is recognized when “the defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign authorities”. [46] la jurisprudence québécoise admet depuis longtemps la reconnaissance de la compétence d’un tribunal comme un motif permettant d’en asseoir la compétence; d’ailleurs, dès lors qu’une partie a reconnu la compétence d’un tribunal, elle ne peut plus la contester (voir vaughan c. campbell (1855), 5 lc rep 431 (cs); voir également g. goldstein et j.  a.  talpis, l’effet au québec des jugements étrangers en matière de droits patrimoniaux (1991), p. 117; g. goldstein et e. groffier, droit interna- tional privé, t. i, théorie générale (1998), no 183). le code civil prévoit maintenant explicitement au par. 3168(6) la reconnaissance de la compétence des autorités étrangères lorsque « le défendeur [l’]a reconnu[e]    ». [47] the trial judge found that, in accordance with this subparagraph, mr. barer had submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction by “raising a substantive issue” in his motion to dismiss (para. 16 (emphasis added)). although the court of appeal dismissed mr. barer’s appeal from that decision, we do not know whether the panel hearing the appeal on the merits agreed with this conclusion. i note that the other panel that heard knight’s application for the [47] le juge de première instance a conclu que m. barer avait reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’application de ce paragraphe [traduction] « en soulevant une question de fond » dans sa requête en irrecevabilité (par. 16 (italiques ajoutés)). bien que la cour d’appel ait débouté m. barer de son appel de cette décision, nous ne savons pas si la formation qui a entendu l’ap- pel sur le fond a souscrit à cette conclusion. je relève [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 611 summary dismissal of mr. barer’s appeal articu- lated the threshold for submission to jurisdiction slightly differently than the trial judge. it opined that mr. barer appeared to have consented to the utah court’s jurisdiction as he had raised “non- jurisdictional grounds” to dismiss knight’s com- plaint (ca reasons (2016), at para. 3 (emphasis added)). [48] before this court, knight argues that mr. barer submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction as a result of (1) his motion to dismiss; (2) a motion to extend time to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint; and (3) his subsequent participation in a settlement conference. contrary to the other two grounds, the procedural facts underlying this claim under art 3168(6) ccq are all supported by the exhibits filed before the superior court. there are therefore no concerns about knight’s burden of proof that arise in this regard. [49] i add two clarifications. first, submission to ju- risdiction is a question of mixed fact and law (natha v. cook, 2016 abca 100, 616 ar 276, at para. 11; ward v. nackawic mechanical ltd., 2015 nbca 1, 429 nbr (2d) 228, at para. 15; fleckenstein v. hutchison, 2009 abca 320, 460 ar 386, at para 18). indeed, deciding whether a defendant has submitted to jurisdiction involves applying a legal standard to a set of facts, weighing these facts and drawing inferences (housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at para 26). as such, the determination that a defendant has submitted to a court’s jurisdiction is not to be overturned absent palpable and overriding error, provided no extrica- ble legal questions have been identified (housen, at para. 36; st- jean v. mercier, 2002 scc 15, [2002] 1 scr 491, at paras 48-49). que l’autre formation, qui a examiné la demande en rejet sommaire de l’appel de m. barer présentée par knight, a formulé le critère permettant de recon- naître la compétence de façon légèrement différente de celle proposée par le juge de première instance. cette formation s’est dite d’avis que m. barer sem- blait avoir acquiescé à la compétence du tribunal de l’utah, puisqu’il avait soulevé [traduction] « des moyens non liés à la question de la compétence » pour obtenir le rejet de la demande de knight (motifs de la ca (2016), par. 3 (italiques ajoutés)). [48] devant notre cour, knight soutient que m. barer a reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah par suite de : (1) sa requête en irrecevabi- lité; (2) une requête en prorogation du délai qui lui était imparti pour déposer une réponse ou pour ré- pondre autrement à la demande; et (3) sa participa- tion subséquente à une conférence de règlement à l’amiable. contrairement à ce qui était le cas pour les deux autres moyens, les faits procéduraux qui sous- tendent cet argument tiré du par 3168(6) ccq. sont tous étayés par des pièces déposées devant la cour supérieure. aucune question ne se pose donc au sujet du fardeau de la preuve de knight à cet égard. [49] j’ajoute deux précisions. premièrement, la question de la reconnaissance de la compétence est une question mixte de fait et de droit (natha c. cook, 2016 abca 100, 616 ar 276, par. 11; ward c. nackawic mechanical ltd., 2015 nbca 1, 429 rn-b (2e) 228, par. 15; fleckenstein c. hutch- ison, 2009 abca 320, 460 ar 386, par 18). en effet, pour déterminer si le défendeur a reconnu la compétence du tribunal, il faut appliquer une norme de droit à une série de faits, soupeser ces faits et tirer des conclusions (housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, par 26). la conclusion sui- vant laquelle le défendeur a reconnu la compétence du tribunal ne doit donc pas être infirmée, sauf erreur manifeste et déterminante, pourvu qu’aucune ques- tion juridique isolable n’ait été identifiée (housen, par. 36; st- jean c. mercier, 2002 csc 15, [2002] 1 rcs 491, par 48-49). [50] second, the trial judge applied quebec law in order to decide whether mr. barer had submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction because “in the absence [50] deuxièmement, le juge de première instance a appliqué le droit québécois pour décider si m. barer avait reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah 612 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. of the proof of the utah law, the court must presume it is the equivalent of quebec law and apply same” (para 13). mr. barer contends that the burden was rather on knight to prove that he had submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction under the law of that state. i agree with the trial judge that submission to jurisdiction under art 3168(6) ccq must be assessed under quebec law. and this would have been true even if the parties had proven the content of utah law. [51] as discussed, the rationale for art 3168 ccq. is not to ensure that the foreign authority properly followed its own procedural rules. the aim is to en- sure that giving effect to the foreign decision would not conflict with quebec law’s conceptions of pro- cedural fairness and orderly administration of justice (goldstein, fasc. 11, at para 2). the rules of indirect international jurisdiction set out in the civil code — including art. 3168 — are quebec rules, and their requirements are therefore assessed in accordance with quebec law. for the purpose of determining indirect international jurisdiction, enforcing courts are accordingly not bound by the legal characteriza- tion of the facts made by foreign authorities (civil code revision office, report on the québec civil code, commentaries, vol. ii (1978), at p. 994; j. a. talpis and g. goldstein, “analyse critique de l’avant- projet de loi du québec en droit internatio- nal privé” (1988), 91 r du n. 606, at pp. 627-28; zimmermann, at paras 13-20). quebec courts have to determine whether “the defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign authorit[y]” pursuant to art 3168(6) ccq in light of the meaning that quebec law gives to these terms. parce que [traduction] « faute de preuve concer- nant le droit de l’utah, la cour doit présumer que celui-ci équivaut au droit québécois et appliquer ce dernier » (par 13). m. barer affirme qu’il incombait plutôt à knight de prouver qu’il avait reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah suivant les règles de droit de cet état. je suis d’accord avec le juge de première instance pour dire que la reconnaissance de la compétence visée au par 3168(6) ccq doit être évaluée en fonction du droit québécois. cela aurait d’ailleurs été vrai même si les parties avaient prouvé la teneur des règles de droit de l’utah. [51] comme nous l’avons vu, l’art 3168 ccq. n’a pas pour objet de vérifier si l’autorité étrangère a bien suivi ses propres règles de procédure. il vise à garantir que l’exécution de la décision étrangère n’entrerait pas en conflit avec les notions d’équité procédurale et de bonne administration de la justice du droit québécois (goldstein, fasc. 11, par 2). les règles de la compétence internationale indirecte pré- vues au code civil — notamment à son art. 3168 — sont des règles du québec, et leurs exigences sont par conséquent évaluées selon le droit québécois. pour se prononcer sur la compétence internationale indirecte, le tribunal d’exécution n’est pas lié par les qualifications juridiques attribuées aux faits par le tribunal étranger (office de révision du code civil, rapport sur le code civil du québec, commentaires, vol. ii (1978), p. 1010; j a talpis et g. goldstein, « analyse critique de l’avant- projet de loi du québec en droit international privé » (1988), 91 r du n. 606, p. 627-628; zimmermann, par 13-20). il doit dé- terminer si « le défendeur a reconnu [la] compé- tence [de l’autorité étrangère] » comme le prévoit le par 3168(6) ccq en fonction du sens que le droit québécois donne à ces termes. (1) submission to jurisdiction under quebec (1) reconnaissance de la compétence en droit law québécois [52] under quebec law, submission to jurisdiction can be either explicit or implicit (kélada, at p. 544; f. sabourin, “compétence internationale relative aux actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial et effets des décisions étrangères”, in jurisclasseur québec — droit international privé (loose- leaf), by p-c. lafond, ed., fasc. 25, at para. 26; alimport [52] en droit québécois, la reconnaissance de la compétence peut être explicite ou implicite (kélada, p. 544; f. sabourin, « compétence internationale relative aux actions personnelles à caractère patri- monial et effets des décisions étrangères  », dans jurisclasseur québec — droit international privé (feuilles mobiles), par p-c. lafond, dir., fasc. 25, [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 613 (empresa cubana importadora de alimentos) v. vic- toria transport ltd., [1977] 2 scr 858, at p. 863; bombardier transportation v smc pneumatics (uk) ltd., 2009 qcca 861, at para. 50 (canlii); international image services inc v ellipse fic- tion/ellipse programme, 1995 canlii 10253 (que. ca), at p. 5; forest fibers inc. v. csav norasia container lines ltd., 2007 qccs 4794, at para. 44 (canlii); 171486 canada inc. v. rogers cantel inc., [1995] rdj 91 (sup. ct.), at para 37). it must nev- ertheless be clear (rogers cantel, at para. 37; forest fibers, at para. 44; conserviera spa v. paesana import- export inc., 2001 canlii 24802 (que. sup. ct.), at paras 63-64). after having submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign authority, a defendant cannot withdraw its consent for that authority to decide the dispute. the orderly administration of justice re- quires that, once jurisdiction has been validly estab- lished, the case proceed in the same forum regardless of the changing whims of the parties. [53] the laconic art. 3168(6) does not explain the meaning of the terms “submitted to the jurisdiction”, and the question of whether some acts amount to submission has divided authors and judges alike. the authorities agree on one thing, however: there is enduring confusion, notably about the standard applicable in situations where a defendant presents both jurisdictional and non- jurisdictional arguments before a court (goldstein (2012), at para. 3168 590; talpis (2001), at p.  113; goldstein, fasc.  11, at para. 29; goldstein and groffier, at no. 183; cor- tas canning, at pp 1241-42). assessing whether mr. barer did in fact submit to the utah court’s jurisdiction therefore requires a consideration of the legislative history that led to the adoption of the cur- rent wording of art 3168(6) ccq and an analysis of academic and judicial views regarding whether defences on the merits constitute submission where jurisdiction is also contested. par. 26; alimport (empresa cubana importadora de alimentos) c. victoria transport ltd., [1977] 2 rcs 858, p. 863; bombardier transportation c. smc pneu matics (uk) ltd., 2009 qcca 861, par. 50 (canlii); international image services inc. c. el- lipse fiction/ellipse programme, 1995 canlii 10253 (ca qc), p. 5; forest fibers inc. c. csav nora- sia container lines ltd., 2007 qccs 4794, par. 44 (canlii); 171486 canada inc. c. rogers cantel inc., [1995] rdj 91 (cs), par 37). elle doit toutefois être claire (rogers cantel, par. 37; forest fibers, par. 44; conserviera spa c. paesana import- export inc., 2001 canlii 24802 (cs. qc), par 63-64). le défendeur qui a reconnu la compétence d’une autorité étrangère ne peut pas par la suite retirer son acquies- cement à faire trancher le litige par cette autorité. pour la bonne administration de la justice, il est nécessaire que, dès lors que la compétence a été valablement établie, l’affaire soit instruite par le même for, indé- pendamment des caprices des parties. [53] le libellé laconique du par. 3168(6) ne précise pas ce qu’il faut entendre par la reconnaissance de la compétence et la question de savoir si certains actes sont assimilables à une reconnaissance divise tant les auteurs que les juges. dans leurs propos, ceux-ci s’entendent toutefois sur un point  : il existe une confusion persistante, notamment en ce qui concerne la norme applicable dans les situations où le défen- deur invoque devant le tribunal à la fois des moyens déclinatoires et des moyens qui ne concernent pas la compétence (goldstein (2012), par. 3168 590; talpis (2001), p. 113; goldstein, fasc. 11, par. 29; goldstein et groffier, no 183; cortas canning, p 1241-1242). pour juger si m. barer a effectivement reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah, il y a donc lieu de se pencher sur l’historique législatif à l’origine de l’adoption du texte actuel du par 3168(6) ccq. et d’analyser les opinions doctrinales et jurispru- dentielles relatives aux moyens de défense sur le fond susceptibles d’emporter reconnaissance de la compétence lorsque celle-ci est également contestée. (a) legislative history of article 3168 ccq. a) historique législatif de l’art 3168 ccq. [54] article  3168(6)  ccq is the result of a lengthy process of consultation and reflection un- dertaken by the quebec legislature. in 1975, the civil [54] le paragraphe 3168(6) ccq est l’aboutis- sement d’un long processus de consultation et de réflexion mené par le législateur québécois. en 1975, 614 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. code revision office presented the legislature with a first draft of what would become book ten of the civil code dedicated to private international law. the draft article concerning the recognition of a foreign authority’s jurisdiction described in some detail the acts that would amount to submission: l’office de révision du code civil a soumis au légis- lateur une première version de ce qui devait deve- nir le livre dixième du code civil consacré au droit international privé. le projet d’article concernant la reconnaissance de la compétence des tribunaux étrangers décrivait en détail les actes qui pourraient constituer une telle reconnaissance : article 63 article 63 the court of origin is considered to have jurisdiction when: le tribunal d’origine est considéré comme compétent dans les cas suivants :   .   . 6 the defendant has contested on the merits without chal- lenging the jurisdiction of the court or making reservation thereto; nevertheless such jurisdiction is not recognized if the defendant has contested on the merits in order to resist the seizure of property or to obtain its release, or if the law of quebec would in this case give exclusive jurisdiction to its courts; 6 lorsque le défendeur a procédé au fond sans décliner la compétence du tribunal d’origine ou faire de réserve sur ce point; toutefois, cette compétence ne sera pas reconnue si le défendeur a procédé au fond pour s’opposer à une saisie ou en obtenir la mainlevée, ou si le droit du québec accorde dans ce cas compétence exclusive à ses tribunaux;   .   . (civil code revision office, report on private in- ternational law (1975), at pp. 145 and 147 (empha- sis added)) (office de révision du code civil, rapport sur le droit international privé (1975), p. 144 et 146 (je souligne)) [55] along the same lines, the draft article deal- ing with the jurisdiction of quebec courts provided that “the courts of quebec have general jurisdiction when    the defendant has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of quebec courts, either expressly or by contesting on the merits without reservation as to jurisdiction” (p 119). both draft provisions were modelled on the 1971  hague convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters (commentaires du ministre de la justice, at pp. 2009 and 2026, in refer- ence to the finalized versions of the draft provisions). [55] le projet d’article relatif à la compétence des tribunaux québécois prévoyait, dans le même ordre d’idées, que « les tribunaux du québec ont compétence générale dans les cas suivants : [  ] le défendeur s’est soumis à leur compétence, soit expressément, soit en s’expliquant sur le fond sans réserve touchant la compétence » (p. 116 et 118). ces deux dispositions s’inspiraient de la convention de 1971 de la haye sur la reconnaissance et l’exé- cution des jugements étrangers en matière civile et commerciale (commentaires du ministre de la justice, p. 2009 et 2026, relativement aux versions finales des projets de dispositions). [56] however, the draft book on private interna- tional law received “several critiques” and underwent “a large number of amendments — to the point of making it unrecognizable” by the time a draft civil code was introduced in the national assembly in 1990 (talpis and castel, at no 3). the bill did not [56] le projet de livre sur le droit international privé a toutefois fait l’objet « de bien des critiques » et d’« un nombre considérable de modifications au point de le rendre méconnaissable » lorsque le projet de code civil a été présenté à l’assemblée nationale en 1990 (talpis et castel, no 3). le projet de loi [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 615 even contain an article on the recognition of a foreign authority’s jurisdiction in actions of a patrimonial nature. as for the article on quebec courts’ jurisdic- tion in such actions, it no longer described which acts amounted to submission; it simply referred to cases where the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of a quebec court (draft art 3126). this wording was apparently preferred to the previous one. [57] in the end, the provision that would become art 3168 ccq was added to the draft in an amend- ment proposed by the minister of justice. he indi- cated that subparagraph 6 was meant to mirror the provision on submission to quebec courts. for that purpose, the minister suggested using exactly the same expression in french (sous- commission des institutions, “étude détaillée du projet de loi 125 — code civil du québec”, journal des débats, vol. 31, no. 32, 1st sess., 34th leg., december 9, 1991, at pp 1285-1331). [58] two conclusions stem from this legislative history. first, the legislature considered but rejected a draft article that would have required quebec courts to deny recognition of foreign decisions so long as the defendant had contested jurisdiction before argu- ing the merits of the dispute. second, mr. barer’s ar- gument that art 3168(6) ccq should be interpreted more restrictively than art. 3148 para 1(5) ccq — the mirror article on the jurisdiction of quebec courts — must be rejected. although it is true that some of the grounds for recognizing a foreign au- thority’s jurisdiction under art. 3168 are more limited than those listed in art. 3148 for establishing the jurisdiction of quebec courts, there is no such asym- metry between art. 3168(6) and art. 3148 para 1(5). there is no reason to draw a distinction between these two provisions where the legislature chose not to draw one. the criterion for submission set out in art. 3168(6) does not differ from that set out in art. 3148 para 1(5) ccq (goldstein and groffier, at no. 183; sabourin, at para 26). ne renfermait même pas d’article sur la reconnais- sance de la compétence d’un tribunal étranger sur les actions à caractère patrimonial. quant à l’article portant sur la compétence des tribunaux québécois sur de telles actions, il ne précisait plus les actes qui emportaient reconnaissance de la compétence; il mentionnait uniquement les cas dans lesquels le défendeur s’est soumis à la compétence des tribu- naux du québec (projet d’art 3126). il semble que ce libellé ait été préféré au texte antérieur. [57] au bout du compte, ce qui allait devenir l’art 3168 ccq a été ajouté au projet de loi par suite d’un amendement proposé par le ministre de la justice, qui a expliqué que le paragraphe 6 vi- sait à établir un équivalent à l’article portant sur la reconnaissance de la compétence des tribunaux québécois. à cette fin, le ministre a suggéré d’em- ployer exactement la même expression en français (sous- commission des institutions, « étude détaillée du projet de loi 125 — code civil du québec », journal des débats, vol. 31, no 32, 1re sess., 34e lég., 9 décembre 1991, p 1285-1331). [58] cet historique législatif permet de tirer deux conclusions. premièrement, le législateur a envi- sagé, puis écarté, un projet d’article qui aurait obligé les tribunaux québécois à refuser de reconnaître les décisions étrangères dès lors que le défendeur au- rait décliné leur compétence avant de débattre du fond de l’affaire deuxièmement, l’argument de m. barer suivant lequel le par 3168(6) ccq de- vrait être interprété de façon plus restrictive que l’art 3148 al 1(5) ccq — l’article correspondant qui concerne la compétence des tribunaux québé- cois — doit être rejeté. s’il est vrai que certains des critères de reconnaissance de la compétence d’une autorité étrangère prévus à l’art. 3168 sont plus res- trictifs que ceux énumérés à l’art. 3148 applicables lorsqu’il s’agit d’établir la compétence des tribunaux québécois, l’asymétrie que m. barer invoque entre le par. 3168(6) et l’art. 3148 al. 1(5) n’existe pas. il n’y a aucune raison d’établir une distinction entre ces deux dispositions, là où le législateur a décidé de ne pas en faire. le critère de la reconnaissance de la com- pétence établi au par. 3168(6) ne diffère pas de celui qui est prévu à l’art. 3148 al 1(5) ccq (goldstein et groffier, no 183; sabourin, par 26). 616 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. (b) academic and judicial views regarding de- fences on the merits where jurisdiction is contested b) doctrine et jurisprudence concernant les moyens de défense sur le fond lorsque la compétence est contestée [59] that being said, since 1994, quebec courts and commentators have fleshed out the key concept of submission to jurisdiction — the linchpin of both art. 3168(6) and art. 3148 para 1(5) ccq. [60] some acts are consistently viewed as amount- ing to submission. explicitly recognizing that the foreign tribunal had jurisdiction, in a transaction for example (lvh corporation (las vegas hilton) v. lalonde, 2003 canlii 27646 (que. sup. ct.), at pa- ras. 24-25), is one such act. defending the action on its merits without contesting the court’s jurisdic- tion also constitutes submission (kadar v. reichman (succession), 2014 qcca 1180, 1 etr (4th) 9, at paras. 40-42; lagassé v. mcelligott, [1993] rdj. 323 (ca), at paras. 14-15; mutual trust, at p. 348; d’alessandro v. mastrocola, 2007 qccs 4164, at para. 8 (canlii); canadian logistics systems limited v 129726 canada inc., 1997 canlii 6840 (cq), at para 3). in such cases, the defendant’s conduct unequivocally signals to the court and the plaintiff that there is acceptance of the forum’s jurisdiction. conversely, it is also uncontentious that some courses of action are sufficient to indicate that a defendant has not submitted to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. simply refraining from appearing before the court in question is one (zimmermann inc. v. barer, 2014 qccs 3404, at para. 71 (canlii); labs of virginia inc. v. clintrials bioresearch ltd., [2003] rjq 1876 (sup. ct.), at para 39). appearing merely to contest jurisdiction in a timely manner is another (goldstein (2012), at para. 3148 580; talpis, at p 113). [59] cela étant, depuis 1994, les tribunaux du québec et les auteurs ont étoffé le concept clé de la reconnaissance de la compétence — l’élément central du par. 3168(6) et du par. 5 de l’art. 3148 al 1 ccq. [60] certains actes sont systématiquement consi- dérés comme emportant reconnaissance de la compé- tence. c’est le cas, par exemple, de la reconnaissance explicite de la compétence d’un tribunal étranger découlant de la signature d’une transaction (lvh corporation (las vegas hilton) c. lalonde, 2003 canlii 27646 (cs. qc), par 24-25). il en va de même lorsque l’affaire est plaidée au fond sans que la compétence du tribunal soit contestée (kadar c. reichman (succession), 2014 qcca 1180, 1 etr. (4th) 9, par. 40-42; lagassé c. mcelligott, [1993] rdj 323 (ca), par. 14-15; mutual trust, p. 633; d’alessandro c mastrocola, 2007 qccs 4164, par. 8 (canlii); canadian logistics systems limited c. 129726 canada inc., 1997 canlii 6840 (cq), par 3). en pareil cas, par sa conduite, le défendeur indique sans équivoque au tribunal et au demandeur qu’il s’en remet au for saisi. à l’inverse, il est égale- ment admis que certains comportements permettent à eux seuls de conclure que le défendeur n’a pas reconnu la compétence du for choisi par le deman- deur. le simple fait de s’abstenir de comparaître de- vant le tribunal en question en est un (zimmermann inc. c. barer, 2014 qccs 3404, par. 71 (canlii); labs of virginia inc. c. clintrials bioresearch ltd., [2003] rjq 1876 (cs), par 39). la comparution dans le simple but de contester la compétence en temps opportun en est un autre (goldstein (2012), par. 3148 580; talpis, p 113). [61] i note that quebec courts have also considered whether certain procedural steps other than filing a defence on the merits can amount to submission. a defendant who participated in proceedings without raising substantive arguments may have never sub- mitted to the court’s jurisdiction. this determination will normally depend on whether the procedural acts in question, when assessed objectively, reveal [61] je souligne que les tribunaux du québec se sont également demandé si certaines mesures procé- durales autres qu’une défense sur le fond pouvaient constituer une reconnaissance. le défendeur qui a participé à une instance sans soulever d’arguments de fond pourrait ne pas avoir reconnu pour autant la compétence du tribunal. cela dépend normalement de la question de savoir si les mesures procédurales [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 617 the defendant’s implicit decision to have the dispute settled by the forum. in this regard, each case must be assessed on its own facts (goldstein (2012), at para. 3148 580; richter et associés v. coopers et lybrand, 2013 qccs 1945, at para. 63 (canlii)). [62] for instance, some procedural steps have been found to demonstrate implicitly but clearly, by their very nature, the defendant’s consent to have the dispute settled by the forum. these have included presenting a cross demand (lagassé, at pp. 325-26); applying to have the action transferred to another district within the same jurisdiction (education re- sources institute inc. (teri) v. chitaroni, 2003 canlii 21712 (cq), at para. 17; mfi export finance inc. v. rother international sa de cv inc., 2004 canlii 16200 (que. sup. ct.), at paras. 80-81); and call- ing upon a third party to take up the defendant’s defence (canada (procureur général) v. st- julien, 2010 qccs 2723, at paras. 40-41 (canlii)). par- ticipating in the proceedings to a significant extent without ever contesting jurisdiction may also amount to submitting to jurisdiction (alimport, at p. 863; ellipse fiction/ellipse programme, at para. 26; can- field technologies inc. v. servi- metals canada inc., 1999 canlii 10839 (que. sup. ct.), at para. 40; jules jordan video, at paras 63-70). courts must indeed protect the plaintiff’s legitimate interest in knowing, at some point in the proceedings, whether or not the defendant has submitted to jurisdiction. en question révèlent, lorsqu’elles sont évaluées de manière objective, que le défendeur a implici- tement décidé de faire trancher le litige par le for saisi. à cet égard, chaque cas est un cas d’espèce (goldstein (2012), par. 3148 580; richter et associés c. coopers et lybrand, 2013 qccs 1945, par. 63 (canlii)). [62] ainsi, certaines démarches procédurales ont été considérées comme des mesures démontrant implicitement, mais clairement, de par leur nature, que le défendeur consentait à ce que le litige soit tranché par le for saisi. ces mesures comprennent la présentation d’une demande reconventionnelle (lagassé, p.  325-326); la demande de renvoi du dossier dans un autre district du même ressort (education resources institute inc. (teri) c. chi- taroni, 2003 canlii 21712 (cq), par.  17; mfi export finance inc. c. rother international sa de cv inc., 2004 canlii 16200 (cs qc), par. 80-81); et la mise en cause d’un tiers pour qu’il défende le défendeur (canada (procureur général) c. st- julien, 2010 qccs 2723, par. 40-41 (canlii)). le fait de participer relativement activement à l’ins- tance sans contester la compétence peut également équivaloir à la reconnaissance de celle-ci (alimport, p. 863; ellipse fiction/ellipse programme, par. 26; canfield technologies inc. c. servi- metals canada inc., 1999 canlii 10839 (cs. qc), par. 40; jules jordan video, par 63-70). les tribunaux doivent ef- fectivement protéger le droit légitime du demandeur de savoir, à une certaine étape de l’instance, si le défendeur a reconnu ou non la compétence. [63] on the other hand, some procedural acts do not necessarily indicate that a defendant has sub- mitted to jurisdiction. for instance, bringing an ap- plication to quash a seizure before judgment, for security for costs or to replace one’s lawyer does not always imply such recognition (mfi export, at pa- ras. 74-76; g. van den brink bv v. heringer, 1994 carswellque 2235 (wl can.) (sup. ct.)), nor does asking for a postponement (see rogers cantel) or reaching and producing an agreement with the other party as to the conduct of the proceedings (shamji, at para. 17; dorais v. saudi arabian general in- vestment authority, 2013 qccs 4498, at para. 18 (canlii)). a combination of these steps may also, [63] à l’inverse, le fait de prendre d’autres mesures procédurales n’indique pas nécessairement que le défendeur a reconnu la compétence du tribunal. par exemple, si le défendeur a reconnu un cautionnement pour les frais de justice ou la permission pour qu’un avocat cesse d’occuper, cela ne suppose pas toujours qu’il y a eu une telle reconnaissance (mfi export, par. 74-76; g. van den brink bv c. heringer, 1994 carswellque 2235 (wl can.) (cs)), ni d’ailleurs le fait de solliciter une remise (voir rogers cantel) ou de conclure et de produire un accord entre les par- ties au sujet du déroulement de l’instance (shamji, par. 17; dorais c. saudi arabian general investment authority, 2013 qccs 4498, par. 18 (canlii)). dans 618 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. depending on the circumstances, not be enough to amount to submission (forest fibers, at paras. 41- 44). that said, opinions vary widely on the legal characterization of some acts that lie between these various examples. [64] one particularly contentious debate concerns a defendant’s choice to present a defence on the mer- its at the same time as its jurisdictional arguments, when a decision on jurisdiction is pending, or after the jurisdictional arguments have been rejected by the court. the confusion stems in part from the idea, developed by some, that a defendant should not be taken to have submitted to jurisdiction when it was merely attempting to “save its skin”. the logic of this approach to submission, as professors goldstein and groffier explained in 1998, is that submission should be concerned with the intention of the defendant (para 183). if a party presents an argument on the merits not in the belief that the court has jurisdic- tion, but because this appears to be the best way to avoid the negative consequences that may result from non- participation in the proceedings, this should not be taken to amount to submission (para 183). professors goldstein and groffier stressed that this approach would benefit the administration of justice, as it would encourage full participation by all parties to the dispute (para 183). i note, however, that they did not base this approach on existing jurisprudence and authorities, but rather merely expressed their opinion as to what the law should be. certains cas, une combinaison de ces mesures ne sera pas suffisante non plus pour emporter reconnaissance (forest fibers, par 41-44). cela étant dit, les avis sont très partagés en ce qui concerne la qualification juridique des situations intermédiaires qui se situent entre ces divers exemples. [64] le cas du défendeur qui choisit de présenter une défense au fond en même temps que ses moyens déclinatoires, ou encore pendant qu’une décision sur la compétence est attendue ou après que le tri- bunal a rejeté ses moyens déclinatoires, reste des plus controversés. la confusion découle en partie de l’idée défendue par certains suivant laquelle il n’y a pas lieu de présumer que le défendeur a re- connu la compétence lorsqu’il a agi dans le seul but de « sauver les meubles ». ainsi que l’ont expliqué les professeurs goldstein et groffier en 1998, cette approche repose sur le raisonnement selon lequel la reconnaissance devrait être fondée sur l’intention du défendeur (par 183). ainsi, selon eux, lorsqu’une partie présente un argument sur le fond, non pas parce qu’elle croit le tribunal compétent, mais parce que cela semble être la meilleure façon d’éviter les conséquences défavorables pouvant découler de l’ab- sence de participation à l’instance, cette attitude ne devrait pas être considérée comme une reconnais- sance (par 183). pour les professeurs goldstein et groffier, cette approche servirait l’administration de la justice, car elle encouragerait toutes les parties au litige à participer pleinement à l’instance (par 183). je souligne cependant que ces auteurs ne se sont pas fondés sur la jurisprudence et la doctrine existantes pour proposer cette approche; ils ont plutôt simple- ment exprimé leur avis sur ce que devrait être le droit. [65] this approach was endorsed in a 1999 quebec superior court decision, cortas canning, upon which mr. barer relied heavily before both this court and the courts below. in that case, the superior court was asked to recognize and enforce a default judg- ment rendered by a texas court. the defendants had taken many procedural steps in texas after having reserved their right to contest jurisdiction, such as presenting a motion for an extension of time and two motions to dismiss, agreeing to a motion by their counsel to cease representing them, filing a joint status report and attending a settlement conference [65] cette approche a été approuvée dans le juge- ment cortas canning rendu par la cour supérieure du québec en 1999 et sur lequel m. barer a beaucoup tablé tant devant notre cour que devant les cours d’instances inférieures. dans cette affaire, la partie requérante avait demandé à la cour supérieure de reconnaître et de déclarer exécutoire un jugement par défaut rendu par un tribunal du texas. les dé- fendeurs avaient pris de nombreuses mesures pro- cédurales dans cet état après avoir réservé leur droit de contester la compétence du tribunal. de fait, ils avaient présenté une demande en prorogation, deux [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 619 (pp 1229-30). they had then ceased participating in the proceedings and a default judgment had been rendered against them. to determine whether these acts constituted submission to jurisdiction, the judge considered the “save your skin” approach discussed by professors goldstein and groffier: requêtes en irrecevabilité et une requête pour que leur avocat soit autorisé à cesser d’occuper, en plus de déposer un rapport d’étape conjoint et d’assister à une conférence de règlement à l’amiable (p. 1229- 1230). ils ont ensuite cessé de participer à l’instance et un jugement par défaut a été rendu contre eux. pour décider si ces mesures constituaient une re- connaissance de la compétence, la juge a examiné l’approche dite de « sauver les meubles » préconisée par les professeurs goldstein et groffier : the authors appear to favour the possibility that a de- fendant be allowed the possibility to “save his skin” in a foreign jurisdiction without submitting to this foreign jurisdiction   . this line of reasoning is, in the opinion of the court, legally sound. [i]t allows a defendant to raise at the begin[n]ing of a trial the question of jurisdiction; it gives a defendant time to evaluate the risk- reward equation that must be made before accepting to submit to a foreign jurisdiction. [p. 1244] [traduction] les auteurs semblent être favorables à l’idée de permettre au défendeur de « sauver les meubles » devant le tribunal étranger sans reconnaître la compétence de ce dernier. [  ]. de l’avis de la cour, ce raisonnement est bien fondé en droit. [i]l permet au défendeur de soulever la question de la compétence au début de l’instruction et lui donne le temps de soupeser comme il se doit les risques et les avantages de chaque avenue avant d’accepter de reconnaître la compétence du tribunal étranger. [p. 1244] adopting this approach, the judge considered that the defendants had not submitted to the texas court’s jurisdiction (at p 1244). la juge a retenu cette approche et a estimé que les défendeurs n’avaient pas reconnu la compétence du tribunal du texas (p 1244). [66] though cortas canning was never followed on this specific point of law, the idea that the pres- entation of substantive arguments by a defendant would not amount to implicit submission so long as the defendant raised the jurisdictional issue in a timely manner appeared elsewhere in jurisprudence. for example, the quebec court of appeal in bom- bardier, at para. 59, and ortega figueroa v. jenckel, 2015 qcca 1393, at paras. 58-59 and 64 (canlii), briefly referred to this understanding of submission to jurisdiction in concluding that a party had not sub- mitted to a court’s jurisdiction, despite having argued the merits of the case, when that party had contested jurisdiction in a timely manner. this approach was also noted in commentary and textbooks (sabourin, at para. 35; p. ferland and g. laganière, “le droit international privé”, in collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2017-2018, vol. 7, contrats, sûretés, publicité des droits et droit international privé (2017), 253, at pp 304-5). this approach is, however, far from being universally accepted; early on, recognized scholars either pointed out its limi- tations or simply rejected it: see talpis, at p. 115; c. [66] bien que la décision cortas canning n’ait jamais été suivie sur ce point de droit précis, l’idée que la présentation d’arguments de fond par le défen- deur n’emporterait pas une reconnaissance implicite de la compétence de sa part, pourvu qu’il soulève la question de la compétence en temps opportun, a été évoquée ailleurs dans la jurisprudence. à titre d’exemple, dans les arrêts bombardier, par.  59, et ortega figueroa c. jenckel, 2015 qcca 1393, par. 58-59 et 64 (canlii), la cour d’appel du québec a fait allusion à cette conception de la reconnais- sance de la compétence du tribunal lorsqu’elle a conclu qu’une partie n’a pas reconnu cette compé- tence, même si elle a plaidé le fond du litige, dès lors qu’elle a contesté cette compétence en temps oppor- tun. cette approche a également été signalée dans des commentaires et des ouvrages de doctrine (sabourin, par. 35; p. ferland et g. laganière, « le droit inter- national privé », dans collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2017-2018, vol. 7, contrats, sûretés, publicité des droits et droit international privé (2017), 253, p 304-305). elle est cependant loin de faire l’unanimité; des universitaires reconnus 620 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. emanuelli, droit international privé québécois (1st ed. 2001), at no 276. [67] with respect, i am of the view that this under- standing of submission to a foreign authority hardly serves the administration of justice. it would allow a defendant that has unsuccessfully made full submis- sions on evidence and law before a court to contest the court’s jurisdiction later in enforcement pro- ceedings in other jurisdictions. absent a ground for recognizing jurisdiction other than the defendant’s submission, the plaintiff would then have to retry the matter anew in jurisdictions where the defendant has assets. this would lead to a significant waste of judicial resources and open the door to the possibility of contradictory decisions. moreover, plaintiffs who invest time and resources in judicial proceedings in a jurisdiction are entitled to some certainty regarding whether or not the defendants have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. [68] i note that even professor goldstein has subsequently qualified the position he adopted in 1998 with professor groffier. in a book published in 2012, he noted that allowing the mere fact that lack of jurisdiction was argued to shield defendants from being found to have submitted to jurisdic- tion could be considered too restrictive a position (goldstein (2012), at para 3148 580). i agree that this approach would indeed be too narrow. it would protect more than a defendant’s legitimate inter- est in having the case heard before a competent tribunal; it would also allow the defendant to du- plicate proceedings and thereby unfairly obtain mul- tiple chances of securing a favourable decision. moreover, such an approach would significantly frustrate the general principle that foreign decisions are to be recognized by quebec courts. finally, it would go against the legislature’s choice not to codify a definition of submission that treats ob- jections to jurisdiction as shields against findings of submission. this “save your skin” approach to submission to jurisdiction, which allows defendants en ont en effet rapidement souligné les limites ou l’ont tout simplement rejetée : voir talpis, p. 115; c. emanuelli, droit international privé québécois (1re éd. 2001), no 276. [67] à mon avis, cette compréhension de la recon- naissance de la compétence du tribunal étranger ne sert pas vraiment l’administration de la justice. elle permettrait à un défendeur qui a présenté sans suc- cès des arguments complets sur la preuve et le droit devant un tribunal d’en contester ultérieurement la compétence dans le cadre de procédures d’exécution engagées dans un autre ressort. en l’absence d’un critère de compétence autre que la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal étranger par le défendeur, le demandeur serait alors tenu de reprendre l’affaire au complet dans un autre ressort où le défendeur a des actifs. cela entraînerait un important gaspillage de ressources judiciaires et mènerait possiblement au prononcé de décisions contradictoires. de plus, le de- mandeur qui investit temps et ressources pour mener à bien un recours dans un ressort donné devrait jouir d’une certaine assurance quant à la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal de ce ressort faite par le défendeur. [68] je souligne que même le professeur goldstein a subséquemment nuancé le point de vue qu’il avait adopté en 1998 avec la professeure groffier. dans un ouvrage publié en 2012, il a expliqué que la position selon laquelle le simple fait d’avoir plaidé le défaut de compétence permettrait au défendeur d’échapper à une conclusion de reconnaissance de la compétence pourrait être jugée trop restrictive (goldstein (2012), par 3148 580). j’estime que cette approche aurait effectivement une portée trop étroite. elle protége- rait davantage que l’intérêt légitime du défendeur à ce que l’affaire soit instruite devant un tribunal compétent; elle lui permettrait aussi de multiplier les procédures et, par le fait même, ses chances d’obtenir une décision favorable, ce qui serait inéquitable. en outre, cette approche porterait gravement atteinte au principe général voulant que les tribunaux du québec soient tenus de reconnaître les décisions étrangères. enfin, elle irait à l’encontre du choix du législateur de ne pas codifier une définition de la reconnaissance de la compétence qui traite les exceptions déclina- toires comme des moyens de se protéger contre une [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 621 to present substantive arguments without submitting to jurisdiction, should be rejected. [69] in my view, a defendant submits to juris- diction when the defendant presents substantive arguments which, if accepted, would resolve the dispute — or part of the dispute — on its merits. it is true, as stressed by mr.  barer, that quebec defendants sued abroad sometimes face a difficult strategic choice. either they defend the foreign law- suit and try to protect their assets in that jurisdiction, or they refrain from doing so in order to be able to challenge the foreign court’s jurisdiction in eventual recognition proceedings in quebec (see goldstein and talpis, at p 118). however, if they attempt to take advantage of the proceedings before the foreign court to obtain a judgment that would definitively settle the dispute, they must bear the consequences of their choice it would be unfair if defendants could have the opportunity of convincing the for- eign authority of the merits of their case while at the same time preserving their right to challenge the jurisdiction of that authority later if they are ultimately displeased with its decision. to use a colloquial expression, they would have “two kicks at the can” or, put another way, what amounts to a legal “mulligan”.1 conclusion de reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal. cette approche, qui permet au défendeur soucieux de « sauver les meubles » de présenter des arguments de fond sans reconnaître par là la compé- tence du tribunal, doit être rejetée. [69] à mon avis, un défendeur reconnaît la com- pétence du tribunal saisi lorsqu’il présente des argu- ments de fond qui, s’ils étaient retenus, permettraient de trancher le litige sur le fond, en tout ou en partie. certes, comme l’a fait remarquer m. barer, le dé- fendeur québécois poursuivi à l’étranger est par- fois placé devant un choix stratégique difficile. de deux choses l’une : soit il conteste l’action intentée à l’étranger et tente de protéger les actifs qu’il y pos- sède, soit il s’en abstient afin de pouvoir contester la compétence du tribunal étranger dans une éventuelle demande de reconnaissance présentée au québec (voir goldstein et talpis, p 118). il n’en demeure pas moins que s’il cherche à tirer profit de l’instance introduite devant le tribunal étranger afin d’obtenir un jugement qui scellerait définitivement le sort du litige, il doit assumer les conséquences de son choix. il serait inéquitable que le défendeur ait la possibilité de convaincre l’autorité étrangère du bien- fondé de ses allégations tout en conservant son droit de décli- ner ultérieurement la compétence de cette autorité si, en définitive, il est insatisfait de sa décision. pour utiliser une expression courante, ils auraient alors droit à une « seconde chance » de faire instruire le litige ou à ce qui a été aussi appelé un « deuxième essai » (« legal mulligan »1). [70] in this regard, i agree with professors ema- nuelli and talpis that parties who choose to advance substantive arguments to further their positions in a forum thereby consent, perhaps begrudgingly, to the jurisdiction of that authority (emanuelli (2011), at [70] à cet égard, je conviens avec les professeurs emanuelli et talpis que les parties qui choisissent de faire valoir des arguments de fond pour étayer leur thèse devant un tribunal acquiescent par le fait même, peut- être à contrecœur, à la compétence de 1 i do not take credit for this expression previously used by oth- ers in different contexts: see, for instance, doherty ja in r. v. 1275729 ontario inc. (2005), 203 ccc (3d) 501, at para. 43; dunphy j. in birch hill equity partners management inc. v. rogers communications inc., 2015 onsc 7189, 128 or (3d) 1, at para. 7, and more recently my colleague brown j. in canada (attorney general) v fairmont hotels inc., 2016 scc 56, [2016] 2 scr 720, at para 39. see also armoyan v. armoyan, 2013 nsca 99, 334 nsr (2d) 204, at para. 287, and canada (canadian environmental assessment agency) v. taseko mines limited, 2018 bcsc 1034, at para. 54 (canlii). 1 en anglais, certains juges ont parfois utilisé le mot « mulligan » pour évoquer ce scénario. voir, par exemple, le juge doherty, de la cour d’appel de l’ontario, dans l’arrêt r c. 1275729 ontario inc.  (2005), 203  ccc  (3d) 501, par.  43; le juge  dunphy dans birch hill equity partners management inc c rogers communications inc., 2015 onsc 7189, 128  or  (3d) 1, par. 7, et plus récemment, mon collègue le juge brown dans l’arrêt canada (procureur général) c. hôtels fairmont inc., 2016 csc 56, [2016] 2 rcs 720, par 39. voir également armoyan c. armoyan, 2013 nsca 99, 334 nsr (2d) 204, par. 287, et canada (canadian environmental assessment agency) c. taseko mines limited, 2018 bcsc 1034, par. 54 (canlii). 622 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. no. 290; talpis, at p 113). this, in my view, is the case regardless of whether the jurisdictional argu- ment has been rejected outright, is under consider- ation by the court, or is simply being raised by the defendant and has yet to be considered. by deciding to present substantive arguments that could, if ac- cepted, definitively resolve the matter on its merits, a defendant submits to jurisdiction. this is what both the superior court and the court of appeal found was the situation here. i see no reason to interfere with this finding. cette autorité (emanuelli (2011), no  290; talpis, p 113). il en est ainsi, à mon sens, que le moyen déclinatoire ait ou non été carrément rejeté, qu’il soit ou non à l’étude par le tribunal ou qu’il soit ou non simplement soulevé par le défendeur et n’ait pas encore été examiné. lorsqu’il décide de présenter des arguments de fond qui pourraient, s’ils étaient retenus, permettre de trancher définitivement le litige sur le fond, le défendeur reconnaît la compétence du tribunal étranger. c’est ce qui s’est produit en l’espèce, de l’avis tant de la cour supérieure que de la cour d’appel. je ne vois aucune raison de modifier cette conclusion. (2) mr. barer’s submission to the utah court’s (2) reconnaissance par m. barer de la compé- jurisdiction tence du tribunal de l’utah [71] mr. barer did not submit a defence on the merits before the utah court. but in his motion to dismiss, he did present at least one argument pertain- ing to the merits of the action against him, which, had it been accepted, would have led to a final conclusion in his favour. mr. barer’s argument that knight’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim was barred at law by the pure economic loss rule could have led the utah court to conclusively dismiss that claim. such a ruling would have attracted the authority of res judi- cata and precluded knight from asserting that claim in another jurisdiction. mr. barer’s argument based on the pure economic loss rule was thus akin to a defence on the merits for the purposes of submitting to the utah court’s jurisdiction. as indicated above, the exhibits filed by knight before the superior court establish the procedural facts underlying its claim under art 3168(6) ccq. [71] m. barer n’a pas présenté de défense sur le fond devant le tribunal de l’utah. cependant, dans sa requête en irrecevabilité, il a invoqué au moins un argument qui avait trait au bien- fondé de l’action intentée contre lui et qui, s’il avait été retenu, se serait traduit par une conclusion définitive qui lui aurait été favorable. en effet, l’argument de m. barer selon lequel l’allégation de knight relative aux fausses déclarations était irrecevable en raison de la règle relative aux pertes purement financières aurait pu conduire le tribunal de l’utah à rejeter définitivement cette allégation. cette conclusion aurait acquis force de chose jugée et empêché knight de faire valoir cette allégation devant un autre tribunal. l’argument de m. barer fondé sur les pertes purement financières s’apparentait donc à un moyen de défense sur le fond aux fins de la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal de l’utah. comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, les pièces déposées par knight en cour supérieure éta- blissent les faits d’ordre procédural qui sous- tendent sa réclamation fondée sur le par 3168(6) ccq. [72] in my view, the same policy considerations which justify denying the “save your skin” exception apply in such a case. mr. barer attempted to take advantage of the proceedings initiated by knight in utah to resolve part, if not all, of the dispute between them. that being so, mr. barer cannot ask quebec courts to shield him from the consequences of having lost a legal battle that he chose to undertake in utah. such a request is unwarranted and contrary to both [72] à mon avis, les mêmes considérations de principe qui justifient le rejet de l’approche dite de « sauver les meubles » s’appliquent en pareil cas. m. barer a tenté de profiter des poursuites engagées par knight dans l’utah pour régler en partie, sinon en totalité, le différend qui les opposait. dans ces conditions, il ne peut pas demander aux tribunaux du québec de le protéger des conséquences de la perte de la bataille juridique qu’il a choisi de mener [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 623 the principle of comity and the efficient use of inter- national judicial resources. in short, mr. barer seized the opportunity to obtain a favourable final decision from the utah court. pursuant to art 3168(6) ccq, he is thereby foreclosed from arguing that the utah court did not have jurisdiction. [73] despite this, mr. barer contends that this le- gal standard of submission should not apply in his particular case, as he had no choice but to present all of his preliminary exceptions together in the course of the utah proceedings. put otherwise, he should not be held to have submitted to jurisdiction simply because he abided by the rules of procedure and presented substantive arguments along with his ju- risdictional challenge in his motion to dismiss. he relies in this regard on comments such as those of professor talpis, who wrote that dans cet état. cette demande n’est pas justifiée et va à l’encontre tant du principe de courtoisie judiciaire que de celui de l’utilisation efficace des ressources judiciaires internationales. bref, m. barer s’est pré- valu de l’occasion qui lui était offerte d’obtenir une décision définitive favorable du tribunal de l’utah. selon le par 3168(6) ccq, il ne peut plus main- tenant prétendre que ce tribunal n’avait pas compé- tence. [73] malgré cela, m.  barer soutient que cette norme juridique applicable à la reconnaissance ne devrait pas s’appliquer dans son cas, puisqu’il n’avait d’autre choix que de présenter tous ses moyens pré- liminaires ensemble dans le cadre de l’instance in- troduite dans l’utah. autrement dit, il ne devrait pas être réputé avoir reconnu la compétence du tribunal en cause simplement parce qu’il s’est conformé aux règles de procédure et qu’il a présenté des arguments de fond tout en contestant la compétence dans le cadre de sa requête en irrecevabilité. il se fonde à cet égard sur des commentaires semblables à ceux formulés par le professeur talpis :    there is some merit to [the save your skin] approach in cases where the defendant’s acts were done out of ne- cessity — for example, where he could not contest ju- risdiction without filing a plea to the merits at the same time (as in quebec’s simplified procedure) or where his acts stemmed from some urgency to avoid severe conse- quences     [p. 115] [traduction]    [l’]approche [« sauver les meubles »] est bien fondée dans une certaine mesure lorsque le défen- deur a agi par nécessité, par exemple, lorsqu’il n’aurait pas pu contester la compétence sans plaider en même temps sur le fond (comme dans le cas de la procédure simplifiée du québec) ou lorsqu’il était urgent pour lui d’agir pour éviter de graves conséquences    [p. 115] [74] i note that mr. barer did not seek to establish the content of utah procedural law regarding the presentation of preliminary exceptions, but he argues that it must be presumed to be the same as quebec procedural law. he submits that, in quebec, parties have to present all of their preliminary exceptions at the same time. [74] je souligne que m. barer n’a pas tenté d’éta- blir la teneur des règles de procédure de l’utah con- cernant la présentation de moyens préliminaires. il soutient plutôt qu’il y a lieu de présumer que ces règles sont identiques à celles du québec où, selon lui, les parties doivent présenter tous leurs moyens préliminaires ensemble. [75] i recognize that in some circumstances, the fact that a party was required to present all of its arguments together could have some bearing on the submission analysis. as professor talpis has noted, some defendants may find themselves in a position where they must carry out certain acts in order to properly challenge the court’s jurisdiction (talpis, at p 115). the world’s judicial systems operate in [75] je reconnais que, dans certains cas, l’obliga- tion pour une partie de présenter tous ses arguments ensemble pourrait avoir une certaine incidence sur l’analyse de la reconnaissance de la compétence. comme le souligne le professeur talpis, il se peut que certains défendeurs se trouvent dans une si- tuation où ils doivent prendre certaines mesures pour pouvoir contester en bonne et due forme la 624 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. a myriad of different ways and do not necessarily always divide issues of jurisdiction from the merits in the same manner. still, this is of no assistance to mr. barer here. first, he did not establish that, despite this submission to the utah court’s jurisdiction, he had indeed no choice but to proceed as he did in utah. second, in any event, i would reject his argu- ment even if quebec law was applicable. it is true that art 2809 para 2 ccq pro- [76] vides that if the foreign applicable law has not been pleaded or if its content has not been established, courts will apply quebec law (emanuelli (2011), at no. 444; goldstein and groffier, at no 100). this rule is justified by the need to clarify the legal norm to apply to resolve the dispute before the court rather than by the questionable and criticized presumption that existed under the civil code of lower canada to the effect that the foreign law whose content has not been established is deemed identical to que- bec law (see bégin v. bilodeau, [1951] scr 699;. j-g. castel, “la preuve de la loi étrangère et des actes publics étrangers au québec” (1972), 32 r. du b. 338, at pp. 354 et seq.; emanuelli (2011), at no. 444; goldstein and groffier, at no. 99; i. zajtay, “l’application du droit étranger: science et fictions” (1971), 23 ridc 49, at pp 58-59). compétence du tribunal (talpis, p 115). les règles de procédure judiciaire varient grandement d’un état à l’autre et ne distinguent pas toujours de la même manière les questions de compétence des questions de fond. ces considérations ne sont toutefois d’aucun secours pour m. barer en l’espèce. d’abord, il n’a pas établi que, en dépit de cette reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal de l’utah qui allait en dé- couler, il n’avait effectivement d’autre choix que de procéder comme il l’a fait dans cet état. ensuite, en tout état de cause, je rejetterais son argument même si le droit québécois s’appliquait. il est vrai que, selon l’art. 2809 al 2 ccq, [76] lorsque le droit étranger applicable n’a pas été al- légué ou que sa teneur n’a pas été établie, les tri- bunaux appliquent le droit en vigueur au québec (emanuelli (2011), no 444; goldstein et groffier, no 100). cette règle est justifiée par la nécessité de clarifier la norme juridique à appliquer pour trancher le litige dont est saisie la cour plutôt que de recourir à la présomption douteuse et critiquée que prévoyait le code civil du bas- canada et selon laquelle le droit étranger non établi était réputé identique à celui du québec (voir bégin c. bilodeau, [1951] rcs 699;. j-g. castel, « la preuve de la loi étrangère et des actes publics étrangers au québec » (1972), 32 r. du b. 338, p. 354 et suiv.; emanuelli (2011), no 444; goldstein et groffier, no 99; i. zajtay, « l’applica- tion du droit étranger : science et fictions » (1971), 23 ridc 49, p 58-59). [77] in the case at hand, however, quebec courts are not called upon to apply utah procedural law. indeed, quebec courts never have to apply foreign procedural law, as art 3132 ccq provides that “[p]rocedure is governed by the law of the court seized of the matter”. when considering whether mr. barer had to present all of his preliminary ex- ceptions together before the utah court in 2010, as he claims, it must rather be determined whether mr. barer was, in fact, put in a position where he had no choice but to proceed as he did. the relevant procedural rule has already been applied in 2010 by the utah court. what is left for quebec courts to decide is whether, as a matter of fact, mr. barer had no choice but to present certain arguments as a result of certain procedural rules. they must then [77] cela dit, dans la présente affaire, les cours du québec ne sont pas appelées à appliquer les règles de procédure de l’utah. d’ailleurs, elles ne sont jamais tenues d’appliquer les règles de procédure d’un ressort étranger, car l’art 3132 ccq énonce que « [l]a procédure est régie par la loi du tribunal saisi ». lorsqu’on se penche sur la question de savoir si m. barer était, comme il l’affirme, tenu de présen- ter ensemble tous ses moyens préliminaires devant le tribunal de l’utah en 2010, il faut en fait décider s’il se trouvait effectivement dans une situation où il n’avait d’autre choix que d’agir comme il l’a fait. le tribunal de l’utah a déjà appliqué la règle de procédure pertinente en 2010. la seule question que les cours du québec doivent maintenant se poser est celle de savoir si, en fait, m. barer n’avait d’autre [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 625 assess whether this fact has some bearing in the sub- mission to jurisdiction analysis. in this context, the rule of subsidiary application of quebec law under art 2809 para 2 ccq does not apply. [78] in essence, mr. barer seeks to avoid the con- sequences that would normally attach to the steps he undertook abroad and to what otherwise established his submission to jurisdiction. he raises, in effect, an exception, and so bears the burden of proof in this re- gard (art. 2803 para 2 ccq). however, he failed to establish that, as a result of utah procedural law, he had no choice in 2010 but to proceed as he did when he presented substantive arguments in his motion to dismiss before the utah court. none of the evidence he adduced before the superior court supports that claim. in particular, the affidavit of his utah counsel does not state this. his argument therefore cannot succeed. the superior court made no palpable and overriding error in determining that submission to jurisdiction was established on this record. in any event, even if mr. barer were right that [79] we should presume that the procedural rules applied in 2010 by the utah court were the same as the ones that would have been applied in quebec at that time, his argument would still be rejected. the former ccp, in force in 2010, simply provided as follows: 151.5 subject to article 159 and any agreement between the parties, all preliminary exceptions must be raised orally at the time of presentation of the action or application   . choix que de présenter certains arguments en raison de l’application de certaines règles de procédure. elles doivent ensuite se demander si ce fait a une incidence sur l’analyse de la reconnaissance de la compétence. dans ce contexte, la règle de l’appli- cation subsidiaire du droit du québec que prévoit l’art 2809 al 2 ccq ne s’applique pas. [78] essentiellement, m. barer cherche à éviter les conséquences qui devraient normalement dé- couler des mesures qu’il a prises à l’étranger et de ce qui a par ailleurs établi sa reconnaissance de la compétence. il soulève en réalité une exception et c’est donc à lui qu’incombe le fardeau de l’établir (art. 2803 al 2 ccq). or, il n’a pas démontré que, en raison de l’application des règles de procédure de l’utah, il n’avait d’autre choix que de procéder comme il l’a fait en 2010 en invoquant des argu- ments de fond dans le cadre de la requête en irrece- vabilité dont il a saisi le tribunal de l’utah. aucun des éléments de preuve qu’il a présentés devant la cour supérieure n’appuie cette affirmation. ce n’est d’ailleurs pas ce que dit l’affidavit de son avocat de l’utah. en conséquence, son argument ne peut pas être retenu. la cour supérieure n’a commis aucune erreur manifeste et déterminante en jugeant que, à la lumière de ce dossier, la reconnaissance de la compétence avait été établie. [79] en tout état de cause, même si m. barer avait raison d’affirmer que nous devrions présumer que les règles de procédure appliquées en 2010 par le tribunal de l’utah étaient les mêmes que celles qui se seraient appliquées au québec à l’époque, son argu- ment ne pourrait pas être retenu. l’ancien cpc, en vigueur en 2010, prévoyait simplement ce qui suit : 151.5 lors de la présentation de la demande et sous réserve de l’article 159 et d’une entente entre elles, les parties doivent proposer ensemble et oralement les moyens préliminaires qu’elles entendent faire valoir  .   .   . 159 unless otherwise agreed by the parties in accord- ance with article 151.1, preliminary exceptions and the conclusions sought must be disclosed in writing to the opposite party before the date of presentation of the action 159 sauf entente entre les parties conformément à l’ar- ticle  151.1, les moyens préliminaires et leurs conclu- sions doivent être dénoncés par écrit à la partie adverse avant la date de présentation de la demande introductive 626 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. or application, failing which the court may refuse the presentation of preliminary exceptions. d’instance; à défaut de ce faire, le tribunal peut refuser la présentation de ces moyens. [80] while these articles required that prelimi- nary exceptions be raised at a specific time, they did not require that the exceptions always be pre- sented or pleaded together. even where the parties could not agree on a timeline, they could disclose their preliminary exceptions in due time and plead some of them after the “presentation of the action” with the court’s permission (art 1516(2) of the for- mer ccp;. québecor world inc. v. gravel, 2003 canlii 36991 (cq)). they could, of course, de- cide to present them separately. and it is recognized that jurisdictional issues must always be decided first (marcoux v. banque laurentienne du canada, 2011 qcca 2034, at para. 20 (canlii); lagassé, at para 15). therefore, even under quebec law, the assertion that mr. barer would have been required to present all of his preliminary arguments together at the same time, as he did before the utah court, without making any distinctions as to their impor- tance or hierarchy, is not established. [80] bien que ces dispositions exigeaient que les moyens préliminaires soient invoqués à un mo- ment précis, elles ne prescrivaient pas qu’ils soient toujours présentés ou invoqués ensemble. même lorsque les parties n’arrivaient pas à s’entendre sur un échéancier donné, elles pouvaient présenter leurs moyens préliminaires en temps opportun et plaider certains d’entre eux après la «  présenta- tion de la demande  » avec la permission du tri- bunal (par 1516(2) de l’ancien cpc;. québecor world inc. c. gravel, 2003 canlii 36991 (cq)). bien entendu, elles pouvaient aussi décider de les présenter séparément. qui plus est, il est reconnu que les questions de compétence doivent toujours être tranchées en tout premier lieu (marcoux c. banque laurentienne du canada, 2011 qcca 2034, par. 20 (canlii); lagassé, par 15). en consé- quence, même en droit québécois, l’allégation selon laquelle m. barer aurait été tenu de présenter tous ses moyens préliminaires ensemble et en même temps comme il l’a fait devant le tribunal de l’utah, sans faire de distinction quant à leur importance ou quant à leur ordre de priorité, n’a pas été établie. [81] i thus conclude that mr. barer submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction in accordance with art 3168(6) ccq by presenting substantive ar- guments in his motion to dismiss that, if accepted, would have resolved all or part of the dispute. this suffices to justify recognizing and enforcing the utah decision against him in quebec. [81] j’en conclus que m. barer a reconnu la com- pétence du tribunal de l’utah comme le prévoit le par.  3168(6) ccq en présentant des arguments de fond dans sa requête en irrecevabilité, qui, s’ils avaient été retenus, auraient résolu le litige en tout ou en partie. cela suffit pour justifier de reconnaître la décision de l’utah au québec et de la lui opposer. [82] this conclusion is supported by the course of action mr. barer pursued even after his motion to dismiss was rejected. following the dismissal, he obtained an extension of time to respond to knight’s complaint and participated in a settlement confer- ence. as previously indicated, such acts are gen- erally not understood as amounting to submission in quebec law. they do not necessarily betray an implicit understanding that the court is the appro- priate forum to resolve the dispute. if these were the only steps relied upon by knight to support the ar- gument that mr. barer submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction, they would hardly suffice. in this case, [82] cette conclusion est par ailleurs étayée par le comportement qu’a adopté m. barer même après avoir été débouté de sa requête en irrecevabilité. en effet, à la suite du rejet de cette procédure, il a obtenu une prorogation du délai qui lui était imparti pour répondre à la demande de knight et il a pris part à une conférence de règlement à l’amiable. comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, ces gestes ne sont généralement pas considérés en soi comme une reconnaissance de la compétence en droit québécois. ils ne révèlent pas nécessairement une reconnaissance tacite que le tribunal est le forum approprié pour trancher le litige. s’il s’agissait là des seules démarches invoquées [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 627 however, these two acts followed the presentation of mr. barer’s substantive arguments and their ultimate rejection by the utah court. they therefore contra- dict mr. barer’s assertion that he presented those arguments only because he was required to do so by utah procedural law. mr. barer could have ceased all involvement with the utah court once it had rejected his jurisdictional argument. he did not do so. to this extent, i would agree with knight that these acts reinforce the finding that mr. barer submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction by deciding to proceed the way he did and by presenting substantive arguments along with his jurisdictional challenge. par knight pour soutenir que m. barer a reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah, elles ne suffiraient pas. cependant, dans la présente affaire, ces deux démarches ont été entreprises après la présentation des arguments de fond de m. barer et leur rejet sub- séquent par le tribunal de l’utah. en ce sens, elles contredisent la prétention de m. barer selon laquelle il n’a présenté ces arguments que parce qu’il était tenu de le faire suivant les règles de procédure de l’utah. il aurait pu cesser de participer à l’instance devant le tribunal de l’utah après que celui-ci eut rejeté son moyen déclinatoire. or, ce n’est pas ce qu’il a fait dans cette mesure, je conviens avec knight que ce comportement renforce la conclusion selon laquelle m. barer a reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah en décidant de procéder comme il l’a fait et en présentant des arguments de fond en même temps qu’il contestait la compétence. d article 3164 ccq. d article 3164 ccq. [83] finally, mr.  barer contends that the trial judge misread this court’s decision in spar aero- space ltd. v. american mobile satellite corp., 2002 scc 78, [2002] 4 scr 205, and erred in conclud- ing that the substantial connection test, set out in art 3164 ccq, is not an additional criterion to be satisfied by the party seeking recognition of a foreign judgment. according to mr. barer, the mere fact that he submitted to jurisdiction is not sufficient to entail recognition if knight cannot also demonstrate that the dispute had a substantial connection with utah. [84] this last argument of mr. barer must fail as well. article 3164 sets out the general principle for recognition of foreign authorities’ jurisdiction. it reads as follows: [83] en dernier lieu, m. barer soutient que le juge de première instance a mal interprété l’arrêt rendu par notre cour dans spar aerospace ltée c. ameri- can mobile satellite corp., 2002 csc 78, [2002] 4 rcs 205, et qu’il a commis une erreur en concluant que le facteur du rattachement important énoncé à l’art 3164 ccq ne constitue pas un critère ad- ditionnel que doit respecter la partie qui sollicite la reconnaissance d’un jugement étranger selon m. barer, le simple fait qu’il a lui- même reconnu la compétence ne suffit pas à lui seul pour emporter reconnaissance si knight ne peut pas démontrer en outre que le litige se rattachait de façon importante à l’utah. [84] ce dernier argument de m. barer ne peut pas non plus être retenu. l’article 3164, dont le texte est reproduit ci- après, énonce le principe général qui sous- tend la reconnaissance de la compétence des autorités étrangères : 3164 the jurisdiction of foreign authorities is established in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction applicable to québec authorities under title three of this book, to the extent that the dispute is substantially connected with the state whose authority is seized of the matter. 3164 la compétence des autorités étrangères est établie suivant les règles de compétence applicables aux autorités québécoises en vertu du titre troisième du présent livre dans la mesure où le litige se rattache d’une façon impor- tante à l’état dont l’autorité a été saisie. 628 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. [85] this court’s decision in spar provides little help on this issue. that decision was concerned with whether quebec courts had jurisdiction to hear a dispute. it addressed neither the indirect international jurisdiction of foreign courts nor the recognition of foreign decisions. the passage relied upon by the trial judge at para. 12 of his reasons related not to the “substantial connection” requirement set out in art 3164 ccq, but rather to the common law doc- trine of jurisdiction simpliciter, which also requires a substantial connection between the dispute and the forum. [86] nevertheless, this court did subsequently consider the interplay between arts. 3164 and 3168 ccq in lépine. in that decision rendered in 2009, justice lebel stated: article 3164 ccq provides that a substantial con- nection between the dispute and the originating court is a fundamental condition for the recognition of a judgment in quebec. articles 3165 to 3168 then set out, in more specific terms, connecting factors to be used to determine whether, in certain situations, a sufficient connection ex- ists between the dispute and the foreign authority. the application of specific rules, such as those in art. 3168 respecting personal actions of a patrimonial nature, will generally suffice to determine whether the foreign court had jurisdiction. however, it may be necessary in consider- ing a complex legal situation involving two or more parties located in different parts of the world to apply the general principle in art. 3164 in order to establish jurisdiction and have recourse to, for example, the forum of necessity. [emphasis added; para 36] [85] l’arrêt de notre cour dans l’affaire spar est peu utile à cet égard. cette affaire soulevait la ques- tion de savoir si les cours du québec avaient com- pétence pour connaître d’un litige. elle ne portait ni sur la compétence internationale indirecte des tribunaux étrangers ni sur la reconnaissance des décisions rendues à l’étranger. le passage que le juge de première instance a invoqué au par. 12 de ses motifs ne concernait pas le facteur du « rattache[- ment] important » énoncé à l’art 3164 ccq, mais plutôt la doctrine de la simple reconnaissance de compétence appliquée en common law, qui exige elle aussi un rattachement important entre l’objet du litige et l’état étranger. [86] quoi qu’il en soit, notre cour s’est sub- séquemment penchée sur l’interaction entre les art. 3164 et 3168 ccq. en effet, dans l’arrêt lépine rendu en 2009, le juge lebel a formulé les remarques suivantes : l’article 3164 ccq établit comme condition fonda- mentale de la reconnaissance d’un jugement au québec l’existence d’un lien important entre le litige et le tribunal d’origine. les articles 3165 à 3168 énoncent ensuite de manière plus spécifique des facteurs de rattachement per- mettant de conclure à la présence d’un lien suffisant entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère dans certaines situations. en général, le recours à des règles spécifiques, comme celles de l’art. 3168 applicable aux actions personnelles à carac- tère patrimonial, permettra de statuer sur la compétence du tribunal étranger. cependant, il se peut qu’une situation juridique complexe où plusieurs parties se trouvent dans des fors différents impose le recours au principe général de l’art. 3164 pour déterminer la compétence et recourir par exemple au for de nécessité. [je souligne; par 36]. this passage from lépine lends itself to two pos- sible readings. on the one hand, it can be read as saying that in some situations, the specific rules in art 3168 ccq may not uphold the general principle of substantial connection set out in art 3164 ccq. for instance, there may be uncommon or peculiar circumstances in which, despite art. 3168 being sat- isfied, there is no substantial connection between the dispute and the state where the decision was rendered. this could notably be the case in blatant situations of forum shopping (see goldstein and ce passage de l’arrêt lépine peut être interprété de deux façons. d’une part, il peut vouloir dire que, dans certains cas, il est possible que les règles spéci- fiques décrites à l’art 3168 ccq ne confirment pas le principe général du rattachement important énoncé à l’art 3164 ccq. par exemple, il pourrait y avoir des situations inhabituelles ou particulières dans les- quelles aucun rattachement important n’existe entre le litige et l’état qui a rendu la décision, et ce, même si l’un des critères de l’art. 3168 est établi. il pourrait en être ainsi dans les cas manifestes de recherche du [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 629 groffier, at no. 175; goldstein, fasc. 11, at para. 53; cortas canning, at pp 1237-39). when this is the case, a separate analysis could be required under art 3164 ccq to ensure that there is a substantial connection between the dispute and the foreign court. on the other hand, this passage could also be read as recognizing the availability of art 3164 ccq as an independent basis for recognizing the jurisdiction of foreign authorities, but not as creating a separate requirement once one of the conditions listed under art 3168 ccq is met. [87] i recognize that professors emanuelli, talpis and castel, along with some court decisions, have put forward the view that art 3164 ccq requires a substantial connection between the dispute and the forum even where a ground for recognition of the for- eign authority’s jurisdiction under art 3168 ccq. is established (emanuelli (2011), at no. 290; talpis and castel, at no. 485; zimmermann (que. ca), at para. 12; heerema, at paras. 23 and 26; hocking, at paras. 181-84; jules jordan video, at paras. 54-55; bil’in (village council) v. green park international inc., 2009 qccs 4151, [2009] rjq 2579, at pa- ras. 61 and 74-75; labs of virginia inc., at paras. 30 and 40). but as justice lebel explained in lépine, the fact remains that arts. 3164 and 3168 ccq will generally overlap and accord entirely. both provi- sions enunciate similar principles, with different degrees of precision. once one of the conditions under art 3168 ccq is satisfied, the substantial connection requirement in art 3164 ccq will in most cases be satisfied as well. i note in this regard that the language used by justice lebel (“generally suffice”) is flexible and not as categorical as that used in some academic writing published before lépine (such as “always sufficient”) (see g. saumier, “the recognition of foreign judgments in quebec — the mirror crack’d?” (2002), 81 can. bar rev. 677, at p 689). tribunal le plus favorable (voir goldstein et groffier, no 175; goldstein, fasc. 11, par. 53; cortas canning, p 1237-1239). dans un tel cas de figure, une analyse distincte fondée sur l’art 3164 ccq pourrait s’avé- rer nécessaire pour vérifier qu’il existe bel et bien un rattachement important entre le tribunal étranger et le litige. d’autre part, le passage précité des motifs du juge lebel pourrait être interprété comme admettant qu’il est possible de recourir à l’art 3164 ccq à titre de fondement indépendant pour la reconnais- sance de la compétence des tribunaux étrangers, sans qu’il crée pour autant une exigence supplémentaire lorsqu’il a par ailleurs été satisfait à l’une des condi- tions énoncées à l’art 3168 ccq. [87] je reconnais que, selon les professeurs ema- nuelli, talpis et castel, et selon certains arrêts, l’art 3164 ccq exige qu’il existe un rattachement important entre le litige et le for saisi, même lorsqu’un des critères de la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal étranger énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq est établi (emanuelli (2011), no 290; talpis et castel, no 485; zimmermann (ca. qc), par. 12; heerema, par. 23 et 26; hocking, par. 181-184; jules jordan video, par. 54-55; bil’in (village council) c. green park international inc., 2009 qccs 4151, [2009] rjq 2579, par. 61 et 74-75; labs of virginia inc., par. 30 et 40). cependant, comme l’a expliqué le juge lebel dans l’arrêt lépine, il n’en demeure pas moins que, de manière générale, les art. 3164 et 3168 ccq se chevauchent et sont en parfaite harmonie l’un avec l’autre. les deux dispositions énoncent des principes similaires, à des degrés de précision différents. dès qu’il est satisfait à l’une des conditions prévues à l’art 3168 ccq, il est, dans la plupart des cas, également satisfait au critère du rattachement important énoncé à l’art 3164 ccq. je souligne à cet égard que le juge lebel a employé une formulation souple (« [e]n général [  ] permet- tra »), moins catégorique que certaines autres utili- sées dans des textes publiés avant l’arrêt lépine (par exemple [traduction] « toujours suffisant ») (voir g. saumier, « the recognition of foreign judgments in quebec — the mirror crack’d? » (2002), 81 r. du b can. 677, p 689). it is not necessary to resolve this issue in the [88] instant case. regardless of how this passage from [88] cela dit, il n’est pas nécessaire de résoudre cette question dans le présent arrêt. quelle que soit 630 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. lépine is read, the outcome remains the same here. i therefore consider it more advisable for the court to leave this specific issue for another day, especially given that it has not been thoroughly canvassed and discussed by the parties and the courts below. when a majority of the court elects to leave an issue for an- other day, this does not put into question the strength or authority of the appellate courts’ jurisprudence on that issue. the mere fact that concurring or dis- senting judges choose to address the point anyway does not change this. in the instant case, it is clear that mr. barer’s position is not supported by either of the readings of lépine outlined above. mr. barer’s submission to jurisdiction under art 3168(6) ccq. clearly establishes a substantial connection between the dispute and the utah court (jules jordan video, at para 55). even on a reading of lépine that would call for a separate analysis under art 3164 ccq, such an analysis would be required only in uncom- mon or peculiar circumstances, as “[t]he application of    art 3168    will generally suffice to deter- mine whether the foreign court had jurisdiction” (lépine, at para 36). here, the fact that mr. barer participated in the legal proceedings in utah to the extent of submitting to the utah court’s jurisdiction suffices amply and raises no question as to whether the dispute is substantially connected with utah and the utah court. to the contrary, as stressed by the utah judge in his reasons for dismissing mr. barer’s motion to dismiss, it is in the interests of justice that the “entire dispute including the alter ego claims” be decided by one forum (ar, vol. ii, at p 103). l’interprétation donnée au passage précité de l’arrêt lépine, l’issue reste la même en l’espèce. dans les circonstances, j’estime qu’il est plus judicieux que notre cour reporte cette question précise à un autre jour, d’autant plus qu’ici, elle n’a fait l’objet d’aucun examen et d’aucune discussion approfondis par les parties et les cours d’instances inférieures. lorsque les juges majoritaires de notre cour décident de re- porter une question à un autre jour, cela ne remet pas en cause la force ou l’autorité de la jurisprudence des cours d’appel sur la question. le simple fait que les opinions concordantes ou dissidentes choisissent d’aborder ce point n’y change rien non plus en l’espèce, la position de m. barer n’est clairement pas étayée par l’une ou l’autre des interprétations de l’arrêt lépine décrites précédemment. sa reconnais- sance de la compétence du tribunal de l’utah comme le prévoit le par 3168(6) ccq établit clairement un rattachement important entre ce tribunal et le litige (jules jordan video, par 55). même l’inter- prétation de l’arrêt lépine qui exigerait une analyse distincte au titre de l’art 3164 ccq n’y donnerait lieu que dans des circonstances inhabituelles et par- ticulières puisque « [e]n général, le recours à [  ] l’art 3168 [  ] permettra de statuer sur la compé- tence du tribunal étranger » (lépine, par 36). en l’espèce, le fait que m. barer a participé à l’instance dans l’utah au point où il a reconnu la compétence du tribunal de cet état suffit amplement et ne soulève aucune question quant au rattachement important du litige avec cet état et avec ce tribunal. bien au contraire, ainsi que l’a souligné le juge de l’utah dans les motifs qu’il a exposés pour rejeter la requête en irrecevabilité de m. barer, il est dans l’intérêt de la justice que [traduction] « l’ensemble du litige, y compris les allégations d’alter ego », soit tranché par un seul tribunal (da, vol. ii, p 103). [89] relying upon the mirror principle in art.  3164  ccq, my colleague brown  j opines that the utah court’s jurisdiction is rooted here in one of the general provisions of title three of the book on private international law in the ccq, namely art. 3139: [89] s’appuyant sur le principe équivalent énoncé à l’art 3164 ccq, mon collègue le juge brown exprime l’avis que la compétence du tribunal de l’utah est ancrée en l’espèce dans l’une des disposi- tions générales du titre troisième du livre sur le droit international privé du ccq, à savoir l’art. 3139 : 3139 where a québec authority has jurisdiction to rule on the principal demand, it also has jurisdiction to rule on an incidental demand or a cross demand. 3139 l’autorité québécoise, compétente pour la demande principale, est aussi compétente pour la demande incidente ou reconventionnelle. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge gascon 631 he suggests that relying upon art 3164 ccq is necessary given that neither art 3168(6) ccq nor, for that matter, art 3168(4) ccq is sufficient to establish the utah court’s indirect international ju- risdiction under the ccq. indeed, if either one of these provisions applied, my colleague considers that there would be no need to resort to art 3164 ccq. at all (see brown j.’s reasons, at para 122). [90] because of the conclusion i have reached and the explanations i have already offered, it is not necessary for me to consider whether art. 3164 ccq could, in this case, establish an independent basis for a foreign authority’s jurisdiction if none of the conditions in art. 3168 ccq were met. i note, however, that knight did not raise or rely upon art. 3164 or 3139 ccq to discharge its burden in this respect and to establish jurisdiction in its recog- nition proceedings. neither did the courts below. in my view, this makes sense. without commenting on the entire scope of art. 3139 ccq in the absence of any argument about it, i note that it is highly doubtful that this provision could even apply in the current context. there is a “principal demand” instituted by knight jointly against three defendants, bec, cbc and mr. barer, but there is no “cross demand”, and nor is knight’s proceeding against mr. barer an “in- cidental demand” under quebec civil or procedural law. in quebec law, “incidental demand” refers to the forced or voluntary intervention of a third party whose presence is necessary to resolve the main dis- pute (arts. 184 to 190 of the new ccp;. transcore linklogistics v. mike’s transport and auto haul inc., 2014 qcca 776, at para. 29 (referring to arts. 216 and 217 of the former ccp) (canlii); h. kélada, les incidents (2nd ed 2003)). common examples are a recourse in warranty (see, eg,. grecon dimter inc. v. jr. normand inc., 2005 scc 46, [2005] 2 scr 401) or a third party claim (lapointe rosen- stein marchand melançon llp v. cassels brock & blackwell llp, 2016 scc 30, [2016] 1 scr 851, at para 33). there has also been no consolidation of proceedings pursuant to art. 210 of the new ccp. consolidation requires two or more separate pro- ceedings (or actions), not merely one proceeding with multiple defendants. mr. barer is not a third party who is being forced into the dispute by way of selon mon collègue, il faut s’appuyer sur l’art. 3164 ccq, puisque ni le par 3168(6) ccq — ni d’ail- leurs le par 3168(4) ccq — ne suffit à son avis pour établir la compétence internationale indirecte du tribunal de l’utah au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’application du code civil. de fait, si l’une ou l’autre de ces dispositions s’appliquait, mon collègue estime qu’il serait inutile de recourir à l’art 3164 ccq. (voir les motifs du juge brown, par 122). [90] compte tenu de la conclusion à laquelle je suis arrivé et des explications que j’ai déjà fournies, il n’est pas nécessaire que j’examine la question de savoir si l’art 3164 ccq aurait pu, en l’espèce, établir un fondement indépendant de la compétence d’un tribunal étranger s’il n’avait été satisfait à au- cune des conditions énumérées à l’art 3168 ccq. néanmoins, je souligne que knight n’a invoqué ni l’art. 3164 ni l’art. 3139 du ccq pour établir la com- pétence dans sa demande de reconnaissance et pour s’acquitter de son fardeau à cet égard. elle ne s’est pas fondée sur ces dispositions. les cours d’instances inférieures ne l’ont pas fait non plus. à mon avis, cela est logique. sans commenter sur l’ensemble de la portée de l’art 3139 ccq faute de plaidoirie sur ce point par quiconque, je signale qu’il est fort douteux que cette disposition puisse même s’appliquer dans le présent contexte. knight a présenté une « demande principale » contre trois défendeurs conjointement, bec, cbc et m barer. il n’y a toutefois aucune « demande reconventionnelle » en l’espèce, et la procédure intentée par knight contre m. barer n’est pas une « demande incidente » au regard du droit civil ou du droit de la procédure du québec. en droit québécois, une « demande incidente » s’entend de l’intervention forcée ou volontaire d’un tiers lorsque sa présence est nécessaire à la résolution du litige principal (art. 184 à 190 nouveau cpc;. transcore linklogistics c. mike’s transport and auto haul inc., 2014 qcca 776, par. 29 (qui renvoie aux art. 216 et 217 ancien cpc) (canlii); h. kélada, les inci- dents (2e éd 2003)). deux exemples courants de ce type de demandes sont la demande en garantie (voir, p ex, grecon. dimter inc. c. jr. normand inc., 2005 csc 46, [2005] 2 rcs 401) ou celle de mise en cause (lapointe rosenstein marchand melançon sencrl c. cassels brock & blackwell llp, 2016 csc 30, [2016] 1 rcs 851, par 33). il ne s’agit 632 barer v knight brothers llc gascon j. [2019] 1 scr. a proceeding that can be characterized as an “inci- dental demand”. he is a co- defendant sued directly in a “principal demand”. to the extent that insta holding limited v. 9247-5334 québec inc., 2017 qccs 432, relied upon by my colleague suggests otherwise, i respectfully disagree. i note that, in any event, the court in that case found that jurisdiction against the co- defendant sued directly by the plaintiff was grounded in art. 3148 para. 1(3) ccq. [91] what is more, even if art 3139 ccq could apply in this manner, knight has not adduced evi- dence to support the required degree of “connexity” between mr. barer and bec (grecon, at para 31). the mere fact that mr. barer played a key role in the negotiations with knight is not enough. to suggest that this fact alone makes the claim “incidental” is to effectively cast aside limited liability and read art 3139 ccq as a free pass to pierce the corporate veil, which it is not. pas non plus ici d’une jonction d’instances au sens de l’art. 210 du nouveau cpc. celle-ci survient lorsqu’il est question de deux instances (ou actions) ou plus, et non pas en présence simplement d’une instance visant plusieurs défendeurs. m. barer n’est pas un tiers mis en cause contre son gré dans le cadre d’une procédure qui pourrait être qualifiée de « demande incidente ». il est un codéfendeur poursuivi directement dans le cadre d’une « demande principale ». dans la mesure où la décision insta holding limited c. 9247-5334 québec inc., 2017 qccs 432, sur laquelle se fonde mon collègue suggérerait qu’il en est autrement, je n’y souscris pas. je souligne par ailleurs que, dans cette cause, la cour avait de toute façon conclu que la compétence du tribunal sur le codéfendeur pour- suivi directement par le demandeur était fondée sur l’art. 3148 al 1(3) ccq. [91] à tous égards, même si l’art 3139 ccq pou- vait s’appliquer comme le suggère mon collègue, knight n’a présenté aucune preuve pour étayer le degré de «  connexité  » nécessaire entre bec et m. barer (grecon, par 31). le seul fait que ce der- nier a joué un rôle clé dans les négociations avec knight ne suffit pas. prétendre que ce fait à lui seul rend la demande « incidente » revient à faire fi de la responsabilité limitée et équivaut à interpréter l’art 3139 ccq comme un laissez- passer pour lever le voile de la personnalité morale, ce qu’il n’est pas. [92] i add this if the person relying upon art 3164 ccq cannot first demonstrate that the jurisdiction of the foreign authority is established in accordance with the rules found in title three of the book on private international law in the ccq, the substantial connection factor provided for under that provision will remain insufficient in and of itself. any analysis thereof would thus be pointless. [92] j’ajouterai ce qui suit. si la personne qui s’ap- puie sur l’art 3164 ccq ne peut pas d’abord dé- montrer que la compétence du tribunal étranger est établie suivant les règles énoncées au titre troisième du livre sur le droit international privé du code civil, le facteur du rattachement important prévu dans cette disposition demeurera insuffisant à lui seul. toute analyse de ce facteur serait alors inutile. vi conclusion vi conclusion [93] to sum up, i agree with the courts below that mr. barer submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction in accordance with art 3168(6) ccq. presenting substantive arguments that could, if accepted by the court, definitively resolve the matter on its merits is inherently incompatible with the position that the [93] en résumé, je conviens avec les cours d’ins- tances inférieures que m. barer a reconnu la com- pétence du tribunal de l’utah au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’application du par 3168(6) ccq. la présentation d’arguments de fond qui, s’ils étaient retenus par le tribunal, permettraient de trancher [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 633 court lacks jurisdiction over a dispute. mr. barer’s submission to the utah court’s jurisdiction suffices to recognize the jurisdiction of that court under the quebec rules of indirect international jurisdiction. the fact that knight failed to meet its burden of proof under art. 3168(3) and (4) ccq is not deter- minative. and given that the dispute has a substantial connection with utah in light of mr. barer’s submis- sion to the jurisdiction, art 3164 ccq does not bar the recognition of the utah court’s default judgment rendered against him. i would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. définitivement le litige sur le fond est foncièrement incompatible avec l’argument selon lequel le tribunal n’a pas compétence sur le litige. la reconnaissance par m. barer de la compétence du tribunal de l’utah suffit à établir la compétence de ce tribunal selon les principes du droit québécois en matière de com- pétence internationale indirecte. le fait que knight ne se soit pas acquittée du fardeau de la preuve qui lui incombait en application des par.  3168(3) et (4) ccq n’est pas déterminant. qui plus est, étant donné qu’il existe un rattachement important entre le litige et l’utah compte tenu de la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal de cet état par m. barer, l’art 3164 ccq n’empêche pas la reconnaissance du jugement par défaut rendu contre lui par ce tri- bunal. je suis donc d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi avec dépens. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par brown j. — i. introduction le juge brown — i. introduction [94] while i share my colleague gascon j.’s view that the appeal should be dismissed, i arrive at that conclusion by a different path. in my respectful view, and for the reasons given by my colleague côté j. at paras. 210 to 232 of her reasons, mr. barer has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the utah court within the meaning of art. 3168(6) of the civil code of québec (“ccq” or “civil code”). i am, however, persuaded that the jurisdiction of the utah court has been established under arts. 3168(4), 3164 and 3139 ccq, and i write to explain why. [94] bien que je partage l’avis de mon collègue le juge gascon suivant lequel le présent pourvoi devrait être rejeté, j’arrive à cette conclusion par un chemin différent. à mon avis, et pour les raisons exposées par ma collègue la juge côté aux par. 210 à 232 de ses motifs, m. barer n’a pas reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’application du par. 3168(6) du code civil du québec (« ccq » ou « code civil »). je suis tou- tefois persuadé que la compétence de ce tribunal a été établie au titre du par. 3168(4), et des art. 3164 et 3139 ccq, et je vais expliquer pourquoi. ii analysis ii analyse a article 3168(4) ccq. a paragraphe 3168(4) ccq. [95] i agree with my colleagues that, when de- ciding whether to recognize a foreign decision, a quebec court must review the evidence submitted to ensure that the foreign authority had jurisdiction under the rules of the ccq:. gascon j.’s reasons, at para. 41; côté j.’s reasons, at para. 186; iraq (state of) v. heerema zwijndrecht, bv, 2013 qcca 1112, [95] comme mes collègues, je suis d’avis que, lorsqu’il est appelé à décider s’il doit reconnaître ou non une décision rendue par une autorité étrangère, le tribunal québécois doit examiner la preuve sou- mise pour s’assurer que l’autorité en question avait compétence suivant les règles du code civil : motifs du juge gascon, par. 41; motifs de la juge côté, 634 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. at para. 15 (canlii); zimmermann inc. v. barer, 2016 qcca 260, at para. 13 (canlii). unlike my colleagues, however, i find the record placed before us sufficient to decide this question. [96] indeed, the record includes materials filed by mr. barer, containing some useful admissions: see arts. 2850 et seq. of the ccq;. c. piché, la preuve civile (5th ed. 2016), at nos. 1043 et seq. on the basis of these admissions, i consider as proven the following facts: par. 186; iraq (state of) c. heerema zwijndrecht, bv, 2013 qcca 1112, par. 15 (canlii); zimmermann inc. c. barer, 2016 qcca 260, par. 13 (canlii). toutefois, à la différence de mes collègues, j’estime que le dossier dont nous sommes saisis est suffisant pour nous permettre de trancher cette question. [96] en effet, le dossier comprend des documents déposés par m. barer qui renferment certains aveux utiles : voir art. 2850 et suiv ccq;. c. piché, la preuve civile (5e éd. 2016), nos 1043 et suiv. sur la foi de ces aveux, je tiens pour avérés les faits suivants : • mr. barer resides in montréal, quebec (ar, • m.  barer réside à montréal (québec) (da, vol. ii, at p. 90); vol. ii, p. 90); • • in 2007, the barer engineering company of america (“bec”) was awarded a contract to install machinery at a military base located in utah (ar, vol. ii, at p. 75);2 • en 2007, la barer engineering company of america (« bec ») a obtenu un contrat en vue de l’installation de machinerie sur une base mi- litaire, dans l’utah (da, vol. ii, p. 75)2; in 2008, bec subcontracted part of the work to knight brothers llc (“knight”) for a number of tasks, including the installation of a new foun- dation (ar, vol. ii, at p. 75); and • en 2008, bec a sous- traité une partie des tra- vaux à knight brothers llc (« knight »), à qui elle a notamment confié la tâche d’installer de nouvelles fondations (da, vol. ii, p. 75); et • mr. barer has had a “key role” in dealing with knight, given his status as president of bec (ar, vol. ii, at pp 81-82). • m. barer a joué un « rôle clé » dans les échanges avec knight, en sa qualité de président de bec (da, vol. ii, p 81-82). i also consider as proven the following facts, [97] admitted in materials filed by bec: [97] je tiens également pour avérés les faits sui- vants, qui ont été admis dans les documents déposés par bec : • bec is a vermont corporation and its principal business office is located in burlington, vermont (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 123 and 131); and • bec est une société du vermont dont le bureau principal est situé à burlington, au vermont (da, vol. ii, p. 123 et 131); et • mr. barer is secretary and acting president of bec, as also admitted by mr. barer personally (ar, vol. ii, at p 123). • m. barer est le secrétaire et président par intérim de bec, comme il l’a lui- même admis (da, vol. ii, p 123). 2 see ar, vol ii, at p.  96: “the parties agree that in 2007, defendant barer engineering company of america (barer engineering) was awarded a contract to install machinery at hill air force base in utah. in 2008, plaintiff and barer engineering entered into a contract regarding work that plaintiff was to per- form, including installing a new foundation” (emphasis added); see also p. 107: “the parties agree there was a contract.” 2 voir da, vol. ii, p. 96 : [traduction] « les parties conviennent que la défenderesse barer engineering company of america (barer engineering) a obtenu, en 2007, un contrat en vue de l’ins- tallation de machinerie sur la base aérienne hill dans l’utah. en 2008, la demanderesse et barer engineering ont conclu un contrat concernant des travaux que la demanderesse devait exécuter, y compris l’installation de nouvelles fondations » (je souligne); voir aussi p. 107 : « les parties s’entendent pour dire qu’un contrat a été conclu. » [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 635 [98] knight, “a utah limited liability company and a licensed contractor with the state of utah, with its principal place of business located in salt lake county, utah”,3 initiated proceedings before the utah court against bec, central bearing corpo- ration ltd. (“cbc”) and mr. barer personally for a balance allegedly owing under the contract between itself and bec. there can be no doubt that the utah court had jurisdiction at least over this contractual “dispute” pursuant to art 3168(4) ccq, which reads as follows: [98] knight, [traduction] « une société à respon- sabilité limitée et une entreprise détenant un permis d’exploitation délivré par l’état de l’utah et dont le principal lieu d’affaires est situé dans le comté de salt lake, dans l’utah3 » a intenté un recours contre bec, central bearing corporation ltd. (« cbc ») et m. barer personnellement devant le tribunal de l’utah pour recouvrer le solde qu’elle estimait lui être dû aux termes du contrat intervenu entre elle et bec. il ne fait aucun doute que le tribunal de l’utah avait compétence, à tout le moins sur ce « litige » contractuel, au titre du par 3168(4) ccq, qui dis- pose : 3168 in personal actions of a patrimonial nature, the jurisdiction of foreign authorities is recognized only in the following cases: 3168 dans les actions personnelles à caractère patrimo- nial, la compétence des autorités étrangères n’est reconnue que dans les cas suivants :   .   . (4) the obligations arising from a contract were to be performed in that state; 4o les obligations découlant d’un contrat devaient y être exécutées; [99] knight asserted five causes of action against three co- defendants. it claimed that (1) bec and cbc breached the contract; (2) the defendants had been unjustly enriched; (3) bec was the alter ego of cbc; (4) bec and cbc were the alter egos of mr. barer; and (5) mr. barer fraudulently misrepre- sented that the defendants would pay an increased price for the foundation work: gascon j.’s reasons, at para 9. clearly, these five claims are all so closely connected that one might argue — irrespective of the identity of each particular defendant to each par- ticular claim — that they represent merely different aspects of a single contractual “dispute” over which there can be no doubt that the utah court had juris- diction pursuant to art 3168(4) ccq. it is, in this regard, worth noting that art 3168 ccq “sets out six specific grounds for assessing the jurisdiction of foreign courts rendering judgments in personal ac- tions of a patrimonial nature” and “deals in turn with jurisdiction based on connections with the defend- ant and jurisdiction based on connections with the [99] knight a fait valoir cinq causes d’action contre trois codéfendeurs. elle a soutenu que : (1) bec et cbc n’avaient pas respecté le contrat; (2) les dé- fendeurs s’étaient enrichis injustement; (3)  bec était l’alter ego de cbc; (4) bec et cbc étaient les alter ego de m. barer; et (5) m. barer avait af- firmé de manière inexacte et frauduleuse que les défendeurs paieraient le prix majoré pour les travaux de fondations : motifs du juge gascon, par 9. de toute évidence, ces cinq réclamations sont toutes si étroitement liées qu’il serait possible de soutenir — indépendamment de l’identité de chaque défendeur eu égard à chaque réclamation — qu’elles consistent simplement en différents aspects d’un seul « litige » contractuel, à l’égard duquel il ne fait aucun doute que le tribunal de l’utah avait compétence au titre du par 3168(4) ccq. il convient de noter, à cet égard, que l’art 3168 ccq [traduction] « énonce expressément six facteurs justifiant la reconnais- sance de la compétence de tribunaux étrangers qui rendent des jugements dans des actions personnelles 3 ar, vol. ii, at p 43. this is also admitted in materials filed by bec: see ar, vol. ii, at p 131. see also af, at p 3. 3 da, vol. ii, p 43. ces faits sont également admis dans des pièces versées au dossier par bec : voir da, vol. ii, p 131. voir aussi ma, p 3. 636 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. subject of litigation”: g. saumier, “the recognition of foreign judgments in quebec  — the mirror crack’d?” (2002), 81 can. bar rev. 677, at p. 687 (emphasis added); c. emanuelli, droit international privé québécois (3rd ed. 2011), at no 397. arti- cle 3168(4) ccq deals with jurisdiction based on connections with the subject- matter of the dispute — not with jurisdiction based on connections with the defendant. in the case at bar, all co- defendants seem clearly “connected” to the subject- matter of the dis- pute, which is contractual by nature, and which falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the utah court pursuant to art 3168(4) ccq. à caractère patrimonial » et « se rapporte tour à tour à la compétence fondée sur des liens avec le défendeur et celle fondée sur des liens avec l’objet du litige » : g. saumier, « the recognition of foreign judgments in quebec — the mirror crack’d? » (2002), 81 r du b can. 677, p. 687 (je souligne); c. emanuelli, droit international privé québécois (3e éd. 2011), no 397. le paragraphe 3168(4) ccq vise la compétence fondée sur des liens avec l’objet du litige, et non celle fondée sur des liens avec le défendeur. en l’espèce, tous les codéfendeurs semblent clairement « liés » à l’objet du litige, qui est de nature contractuelle, et qui relève carrément de la compétence du tribunal de l’utah en application du par 3168(4) ccq. [100] my colleagues nonetheless assume that, in respect of the claims of alter ego and fraud, art 3168(4) ccq conferred no jurisdiction on the utah court over the co- defendant, mr. barer, per- sonally, because he was not a party to the contract. i have two points in response. [100] mes collègues tiennent toutefois pour acquis que, en ce qui concerne les allégations d’alter ego et de fraude, le par 3168(4) ccq ne confère aucune compétence au tribunal de l’utah sur le codéfendeur, m. barer, personnellement, parce qu’il n’était pas partie au contrat. je leur opposerais deux remarques. [101] first, restricting the application of art. 3168(4) ccq to situations where the defendant is a party to the contract would, at least in some circumstances, have the impermissible effect of imposing upon a plaintiff the burden of proving, before a quebec court, its allegations of alter ego or fraud in order to justify the lifting of the corporate veil pursuant to art 317 ccq: see, eg,. zimmermann, at para 22. i say “impermissible”, because whether to lift the corporate veil is a substantive legal issue (and not a jurisdictional issue) concerning “the status and ca- pacity of a legal person”, and is therefore governed by “the law of the state under which it is consti- tuted, subject, with respect to its activities, to the law of the place where they are carried on”: art. 3083 para 2 ccq; see p. martel, business corporations in canada: legal and practical aspects (loose- leaf), at p 1-100. and yet, art 3158 ccq provides that the quebec court deciding whether to recognize and enforce a foreign court’s decision must “confin[e] itself to verifying whether the [foreign decision]   . meets the requirements prescribed in [title four]” — that is, to considering whether the ccq’s require- ments for recognizing the decision have been met. the quebec court cannot review the merits or retry the case or parts of the case. it follows that normally [101] premièrement, restreindre l’application du par 3168(4) ccq aux seuls cas où le défendeur est partie au contrat pourrait, du moins dans certaines circonstances, avoir l’effet inacceptable d’obliger le demandeur à prouver devant le tribunal québécois ses allégations d’alter ego ou de fraude pour justifier la levée du voile de la personnalité morale en applica- tion de l’art 317 ccq : voir, p ex, zimmermann, par 22. j’emploie le qualificatif « inacceptable », parce que la question de savoir s’il y a lieu ou non de lever le voile de la personnalité morale est une question juridique de fond (et non une question de compétence) qui concerne «  l’état et la capacité d’une personne morale » et qui est par conséquent régie par « la loi de l’état en vertu de laquelle elle est constituée, sous réserve, quant à son activité, de la loi du lieu où elle s’exerce » : art. 3083 al 2 ccq; voir p. martel, la société par actions au québec, vol.  i, les aspects juridiques (feuilles mobiles), par 1-2903. et pourtant, l’art 3158 ccq prévoit que le tribunal québécois appelé à se prononcer sur l’opportunité de reconnaître et de déclarer exécutoire la décision d’un tribunal étranger doit « se limite[r] à vérifier si la décision dont la reconnaissance ou l’exé- cution est demandée remplit les conditions prévues [au titre quatrième] », c’est-à-dire à vérifier s’il a été [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 637 a defendant should not be able to resist recognition and enforcement on the ground that the foreign au- thority should not have lifted the corporate veil. as explained by professor talpis: where a foreign judgment has been obtained against a quebec parent company resulting from an act, fault, prej- udice or obligation caused by its subsidiary in the foreign forum, the critical question is whether the foreign court had jurisdiction over the parent in the eyes of quebec law. faced with a motion to enforce the foreign judgment in quebec, a parent company will not be able to resist rec- ognition and enforcement on the ground that the court of origin should not have pierced the corporate veil of its sub- sidiary. even where the foreign court was erroneous, there is no longer any review on the merits (art 3158 ccq), nor any defense grounded in the argument that the foreign court applied a different law from that which would have been applied by the quebec court, such as the law on alter ego status for example (art 3157 ccq). nor is veil- piercing manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in international relations. satisfait aux exigences prévues au ccq en matière de reconnaissance de la décision étrangère. le tribu- nal québécois ne peut pas examiner le fond du litige ni rejuger l’affaire, que ce soit en tout ou en partie. le défendeur ne devrait donc normalement pas pou- voir contester la reconnaissance et l’exécution du jugement étranger au motif que l’autorité étrangère n’aurait pas dû lever le voile. comme l’explique le professeur talpis : [traduction] lorsqu’un jugement étranger a été ob- tenu contre une société mère québécoise à la suite d’un acte, d’une faute, d’un préjudice ou d’une obligation de sa filiale sur le territoire du for, la question cruciale est celle de savoir si le tribunal étranger a compétence sur la société mère aux yeux du droit québécois. face à une requête en exécution du jugement étranger au québec, la société mère ne pourra pas s’opposer à la reconnais- sance et à l’exécution de ce jugement en faisant valoir que le tribunal d’origine n’aurait pas dû lever le voile de la personnalité morale de sa filiale. même lorsque le tri- bunal étranger a commis une erreur, il n’est plus possible d’examiner le fond de la décision (art 3158 ccq), ni d’invoquer de moyen de défense tiré de l’argument que le tribunal étranger a appliqué des règles de droit différentes de celles qui auraient été appliquées par le tribunal qué- bécois, comme, par exemple, celles concernant la qualité d’alter ego (art 3157 ccq). la décision de lever le voile de la personnalité morale n’est pas non plus manifestement incompatible avec l’ordre public selon la conception qui a cours dans les échanges internationaux. (j. a. talpis, with the collaboration of s l. kath, “if i am from grand- mère, why am i being sued in texas?” responding to inappropriate foreign jurisdiction in quebec- united states crossborder litigation (2001), at p. 117) (j. a. talpis, avec la collaboration de s l kath, « if i am from grand- mère, why am i being sued in texas? » responding to inappropriate foreign jurisdiction in quebec- united states crossborder litigation (2001), p. 117) see also cortas canning and refrigerating co. v. suidan bros. inc./suidan frères inc., [1999] rjq. 1227 (sup. ct.), at p. 1233: voir aussi cortas canning and refrigerating co. c. suidan bros. inc./suidan frères inc., [1999] rjq. 1227 (cs), p. 1233 : piercing the corporate veil is not against public order as understood in the international context and such a finding by a competent court should be upheld in quebec. [traduction] lever le voile de la personnalité morale n’est pas contraire à l’ordre public tel qu’il est entendu dans le contexte international, et une décision à cet égard prise par une cour compétente devrait être maintenue au québec.   .   . 638 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. piercing of the corporate veil is possible under quebec law and remains, in many ways, a question of facts to be appreciated by the courts. in the case at bar, it is difficult to argue that such a finding, even in a judgement rendered by default, violates the rules of public order as they are understood in the international context. [102] in other words, the corporate veil furnishes protection against liability, not against the jurisdic- tion of a foreign authority: see art 309 ccq;. houle v. canadian national bank, [1990] 3 scr 122, at p. 178; brunette v. legault joly thiffault, sencrl, 2018 scc 55, [2018] 3 scr 481, at para. 27; sa- lomon v. salomon & co., [1897] ac 22 (hl). again, i say the lifting of the corporate veil is a substantive legal issue which must be determined by the competent authority according to the applicable law. it is not a jurisdictional issue. it follows that a defendant domiciled in the foreign authority’s state cannot escape the jurisdiction of that foreign author- ity by invoking the corporate veil — even if he or she can ultimately escape liability according to the applicable law: art 3168(1) ccq. nor, as i will ex- plain below, can a defendant escape the jurisdiction of a foreign authority if a claim made against him is “connected” to a contractual dispute over which that foreign authority has jurisdiction and if that claim or that defendant is “substantially” connected to the foreign authority’s state: arts. 3168(4), 3164 and 3139 ccq. il est possible de lever le voile de la personnalité morale en droit québécois et une décision à cet égard demeure, à bien des égards, une question d’appréciation des faits qui relève des tribunaux. dans la présente affaire, il est difficile de soutenir qu’une telle décision, même prise dans le cadre d’un jugement rendu par défaut, viole les règles d’ordre public telles qu’on les entend dans le contexte international. [102] autrement dit, le voile de la personnalité morale offre une protection contre la responsabilité, et non contre la compétence d’une autorité étrangère : voir l’art 309 ccq;. houle c. banque canadienne nationale, [1990] 3 rcs 122, p. 178; brunette c. legault joly thiffault, sencrl, 2018 csc 55, [2018] 3 rcs 481, par. 27; salomon c. salomon & co., [1897] ac 22 (hl). je le répète, la question de savoir s’il y a lieu ou non de lever le voile de la personnalité morale est une question juridique de fond qui doit être tranchée par l’autorité compétente conformément au droit applicable. il ne s’agit pas d’une question de compétence. il s’ensuit que le dé- fendeur domicilié dans l’état de l’autorité étrangère ne peut pas échapper à la compétence de cette autorité en invoquant le voile de la personnalité morale — et ce, même s’il peut au bout du compte échapper à toute responsabilité selon le droit applicable  : par. 3168(1)  ccq. comme je l’expliquerai plus loin, le défendeur ne peut pas non plus échapper à la compétence de l’autorité étrangère si une allégation formulée contre lui est « liée » à un litige de nature contractuelle à l’égard duquel l’autorité étrangère a compétence et si cette allégation ou ce défendeur se rattache de façon « importante » à l’état de l’autorité étrangère : par. 3168(4) et art. 3164 et 3139 ccq. [103] for example, in marble point energy ltd. v. stonecroft resources inc., 2009 qccs 3478, aff’d 2011 qcca 141, the quebec superior court recog- nized the jurisdiction of a foreign authority (the east- ern caribbean supreme court) over two defendants domiciled in quebec who had been ordered to pay costs in a principal action instituted therein against corporate entities of which they were shareholders and directors: paras. 2, 4, 47, 53-54 and 57-62 ( canlii). the superior court emphasized that the lifting of the corporate veil by the foreign authority was not contrary to public order: paras 62-73. it also empha- sized that the order to pay costs was “accessory” to [103] par exemple, dans la décision marble point energy ltd. c. stonecroft resources inc., 2009 qccs 3478, conf. par 2011 qcca 141, la cour supérieure du québec a reconnu la compétence d’une autorité étrangère (la cour suprême des caraïbes orientales) sur deux défendeurs domiciliés au québec, à qui cette dernière avait ordonné de payer des dépens dans le cadre d’une action principale intentée contre des sociétés dont ils étaient actionnaires et administra- teurs : par. 2, 4, 47, 53-54 et 57-62 (canlii). la cour supérieure a souligné que la décision de l’autorité étrangère de lever le voile de la personnalité morale n’était pas contraire à l’ordre public : par 62-73. elle [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 639 the principal action over which the foreign author- ity clearly had jurisdiction (para. 57) and drew on arts. 3164 and 3139 ccq to recognize the jurisdic- tion of that foreign authority over the two shareholders and directors domiciled in quebec: paras. 59 and 61. because the foreign authority had jurisdiction over the principal action, it also had jurisdiction to apply its own procedural rules relating to “non- party costs”: para 58. this follows from art 3132 ccq, which provides — just as art 3083 ccq provides that the lifting of the corporate veil is governed by the law of the state where the activities of the legal person are carried on — that procedure is governed by the law of the court seized of the matter. see g. goldstein and e. groffier, droit international privé, vol. ii, règles spécifiques (2003), at no. 485: a aussi rappelé que l’adjudication des dépens était « accessoire » à l’action principale à l’égard de la- quelle l’autorité étrangère avait manifestement com- pétence (par. 57) et elle s’est fondée sur les art. 3164 et 3139 ccq pour reconnaître la compétence de cette autorité étrangère sur les deux actionnaires et administrateurs domiciliés au québec : par. 59 et 61. comme l’autorité étrangère pouvait statuer sur l’action principale, elle avait aussi compétence pour appliquer ses propres règles de procédure concernant la condamnation aux dépens de personnes qui ne sont pas partie à l’action (les « non- party costs ») : par 58. cela découle de l’art 3132 ccq, qui pré- voit que la procédure est régie par la loi du tribunal saisi — tout comme l’art 3083 ccq prévoit que la décision de lever le voile de la personnalité morale est régie par la loi de l’état où la personne morale exerce ses activités. voir g. goldstein et e. groffier, droit international privé, t. ii, règles spécifiques (2003), no 485 : [translation]    the effects of the judgment, in terms of procedure, depend on the law of the court seized of the matter, including the need for service, the scope of res judicata, binding force, remedies (appeal, opposition by a third party), time limits for remedies, incidental de- mands and costs: all of this relates, not to the nature of the rights at issue, but to the organization of the court and the administration of state justice. [emphasis added; footnote omitted.]    les effets du jugement, en tant que procédure, dé- pendent de la loi du tribunal saisi, comme la nécessité d’une signification, l’étendue de l’autorité de chose jugée, la force exécutoire, les voies de recours (appel, tierce- opposition), leurs délais, les demandes incidentes et les dépens : tout ceci relève, non de la nature des droits liti- gieux, mais de l’organisation du tribunal et de l’adminis- tration de la justice étatique. [je souligne; note en bas de page omise.] [104] i therefore find myself in respectful disa- greement with my colleague côté j.’s statement that, where presented with a decision on the merits ren- dered by a foreign authority, “a quebec court would apply quebec law to the foreign authority’s factual findings to determine whether it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil for the purpose of recogniz- ing the decision on the basis of art 3168(4) ccq”: para. 208 (emphasis in original). such a practice would be precluded by art 3158 ccq, which pro- vides that a quebec court cannot “conside[r] the mer- its of the decision”; see also art 3157 ccq;. talpis, at p 117. it is also precluded by art 3083 ccq, which signifies that, in the case at bar, the lifting of the corporate veil is governed by utah law. effectively, my colleague would deny recognition on the basis that the utah court did not apply quebec law, even [104] soit dit en tout respect, je suis donc en désac- cord avec la déclaration de ma collègue la juge côté, selon laquelle, s’il est saisi d’une décision rendue au fond par une autorité étrangère, « le tribunal québécois appliquerait le droit québécois aux conclusions de fait de l’autorité étrangère pour déterminer s’il convient de percer le voile corporatif afin de reconnaître la décision au titre du par 3168(4) ccq » : par. 208 (en italique dans l’original). l’article 3158 ccq, qui prévoit qu’un tribunal québécois ne peut « procéder à l’examen au fond de cette décision », interdirait une telle pratique : voir aussi l’art 3157 ccq;. talpis, p 117. l’article 3083 ccq l’interdirait aussi, de sorte que, dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, la déci- sion de lever le voile de la personnalité morale est donc régie par la loi de l’utah. en fait, ma collègue nierait la reconnaissance de la compétence au motif 640 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. though “[n]on-adherence to quebec law by the for- eign court, even where the quebec law is of a man- datory character, will not justify non- recognition on grounds of public order”: h. p. glenn, “recognition of foreign judgments in quebec” (1997), 28 can. bus. lj 404, at p 407. [105] my second point in response to my col- leagues’ premise that art 3168(4) ccq can find no application if the defendant is not a party to the contract is that such a premise is incompatible with the recent decision of this court in lapointe rosen- stein marchand melançon llp v. cassels brock & blackwell llp, 2016 scc 30, [2016] 1 scr 851. in lapointe, hundreds of gm canada dealers had launched class proceedings “against gm canada in ontario, alleging that [it] had forced them to sign the wind- down agreements in breach of provincial franchise laws”: para 10. they also alleged that an ontario law firm had been negligent in the legal advice it gave to them: para 10. the law firm made third party claims against several quebec law firms for contribution and indemnity on the basis of their having given the dealers independent legal advice: para 15. the issue was “whether the ontario courts should assume jurisdiction over [the] third party claim[s]”: para 2. que le tribunal de l’utah n’a pas appliqué la loi du québec, même si [traduction] « la non- adhésion à la loi du québec par le tribunal étranger, même lorsqu’elle a un caractère impératif, ne justifie pas la non- reconnaissance de la compétence pour des motifs d’ordre public » : h p glenn, « recognition of foreign judgments in quebec » (1997), 28 rev. can. dr. comm. 404, p 407. [105] ma seconde observation en réponse à la prémisse de mes collègues suivant laquelle le par 3168(4) ccq ne s’applique pas si le défen- deur n’est pas partie au contrat tient au fait que, selon moi, cette prémisse est incompatible avec la décision récente de la cour dans la cause lapointe rosenstein marchand melançon sencrl c. cassels brock & blackwell llp, 2016 csc 30, [2016] 1 rcs 851. dans cette affaire, des cen- taines de concessionnaires gm du canada avaient intenté un recours collectif en ontario « contre gm canada en ontario, alléguant que [cette dernière] les avait forcés à signer le contrat de retrait progres- sif en violation des lois provinciales sur les fran- chises » : par 10. ils alléguaient également qu’un cabinet d’avocats ontarien leur avait donné des avis juridiques entachés de négligence : par 10. le ca- binet d’avocats a présenté une demande de mise en cause contre plusieurs cabinets d’avocats québécois en vue d’obtenir de leur part une contribution et une indemnité au motif qu’ils avaient fourni des avis juridiques indépendants aux concessionnaires : par 15. il s’agissait de « savoir si les tribunaux on- tariens [devaient] se déclarer compétents à l’égard d’une demande de mise en cause » : par 2. [106] the quebec law firms argued that, because they were not domiciled or resident in ontario and did not carry on business there, there was an insuf- ficient connection between the third party claims and the ontario courts: para 16. this court rejected that argument. observing that “[t]he nucleus of the claim against [the ontario law firm], as well as that of [the ontario law firm]’s third party claim against the [quebec] lawyers [was]    a tort claim for profes- sional negligence” (para. 38), the court framed the issue (at para. 39) as “whether a contract connected with [the] dispute was made in ontario”, as required by the fourth connecting factor identified in club [106] les cabinets d’avocats québécois ont plaidé que, comme ils n’étaient ni domiciliés ni résidents en ontario et qu’ils n’y faisaient pas affaires, il n’y avait pas de rattachement suffisant entre les demandes de mise en cause et les tribunaux de l’ontario : par 16. la cour a rejeté cet argument. signalant que « [t]out comme les demandes de mise en cause introduites par [le cabinet d’avocats ontarien] contre les avocats [québécois] [  ], la réclamation contre [le cabinet d’avocats ontarien] consiste en une action en respon- sabilité délictuelle fondée sur la négligence profes- sionnelle » (par. 38), la cour a expliqué, au par. 39 de ses motifs, qu’il s’agissait de déterminer « si un [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 641 resorts ltd. v. van breda, 2012 scc 17, [2012] 1 scr 572. the court in lapointe answered that question affirmatively, stressing the following (at paras. 32 and 44): the fourth factor also promotes flexibility and commer- cial efficiency. as seen in van breda, all that is required is a connection between the claim and a contract that was made in the province where jurisdiction is sought to be assumed. a “connection” does not necessarily require that an alleged tortfeasor be a party to the contract. to so narrow the fourth presumptive factor would unduly narrow the scope of van breda, and undermines the flexibility required in private international law. contrat lié à ce litige a été conclu en ontario » au sens du quatrième facteur de rattachement défini dans l’arrêt club resorts ltd. c. van breda, 2012 csc 17, [2012] 1 rcs 572. dans l’arrêt lapointe, la cour a répondu par l’affirmative à cette question, en sou- lignant ce qui suit aux par. 32 et 44 : le quatrième facteur favorise également la souplesse et l’efficacité commerciale. nous avons vu dans van breda qu’il suffit qu’il existe un lien entre la demande et le contrat conclu dans la province où le tribunal est prié de se déclarer compétent. pour qu’il y ait un « lien », il n’est pas nécessaire que le prétendu auteur du délit soit une partie au contrat. le fait de circonscrire ainsi le quatrième facteur de rattachement créant une présomption aurait pour effet de restreindre indûment la portée de l’arrêt van breda et mine la souplesse qu’exige le droit international privé.   .   . it is worth noting that nothing in van breda suggests that the fourth factor is unavailable when more than one contract is involved, or that a different inquiry applies in these circumstances. nor does van breda limit this factor to situations where the defendant’s liability flows immedi- ately from his or her contractual obligations, or require that the defendant be a party to the contract: pixiu solutions inc. v. canadian general- tower ltd., 2016 onsc 906, at para. 28 (canlii). it is sufficient that the dispute be “connected” to a contract made in the province or territory where jurisdiction is proposed to be assumed: van breda, at para 117. this merely requires that a defendant’s con- duct brings him or her within the scope of the contractual relationship and that the events that give rise to the claim flow from the relationship created by the contract: pa- ras 116-17 [underlining added.] il convient de faire remarquer que rien dans van breda ne laisse croire que l’on ne peut se prévaloir du quatrième facteur lorsque plus d’un contrat est en cause, ou qu’une analyse différente s’applique dans ces circonstances. cet arrêt ne limite pas non plus l’application de ce facteur aux situations où la responsabilité du défendeur découle immé- diatement de ses obligations contractuelles, et il n’exige pas que les défendeurs soient des parties au contrat : pixiu solutions inc c. canadian general- tower ltd., 2016 onsc 906, par. 28 (canlii). il suffit qu’il « existe un lien » entre le litige et un contrat conclu dans la province ou le territoire où un tribunal entend se déclarer com- pétent : van breda, par 117. il faut simplement que la relation contractuelle s’étende à la conduite d’un défen- deur et que les faits qui donnent ouverture à la demande découlent de la relation créée par le contrat : par 116-117. [je souligne.] [107] significantly, in supporting this conclusion the court referred by analogy to art 3139 ccq. (at para. 33): [107] fait important, pour étayer cette conclusion, la cour a établi une analogie avec l’art 3139 ccq. (par. 33) : flexibility in applying the fourth factor does not amount to jurisdictional overreach. conflict rules vary from one jurisdiction to another. in quebec, for example, under art. 3148 of the civil code of québec, quebec authori- ties have jurisdiction over an action in extra- contractual liability where a fault was committed in quebec or the injury was suffered there. nonetheless, under art. 3139, if a quebec authority has jurisdiction to rule on the prin- cipal demand, it would also have jurisdiction to rule on l’application souple du quatrième facteur n’équi- vaut pas à un excès de compétence. les règles de droit international privé varient d’une province à l’autre. au québec, par exemple, aux termes de l’art. 3148 du code civil du québec, les autorités québécoises sont compé- tentes dans le cas d’une action en responsabilité extra- contractuelle lorsqu’une faute a été commise au québec ou qu’un préjudice y a été subi. cependant, aux termes de l’art. 3139, l’autorité québécoise compétente pour la 642 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. an incidental demand, which could include a third party claim. in a case like the one before us — and subject to any forum non conveniens argument — if the main con- tract had been made in quebec and governed by the laws of quebec, quebec would have jurisdiction not only over quebec lawyers sued in the principal demand, but also over any ontario lawyers sued by the quebec lawyers in third party claims for any professional fault allegedly committed in ontario by the ontario lawyers. [emphasis added.] [108] this leads me to consider whether and on what conditions art 3139 ccq can be invoked to establish the jurisdiction of a foreign authority against a particular co- defendant. as will be ex- plained in further detail below, answering this ques- tion requires interpreting art 3164 ccq, since the scope of art 3168(4) ccq cannot be determined in isolation. (in that sense, i agree with my colleague côté j. “that art 3168(4) ccq is insufficient on its own to establish jurisdiction against mr. barer”: para 209). but this does not mean that the mere fact that mr. barer is not a party to the contract pre- cludes art 3168(4) ccq’s application in the cir- cumstances of this case. i say it can apply, and it can support a finding of the utah court’s jurisdiction over the whole dispute — that is, over both the object of the dispute and the parties: j a. talpis and j-g. castel, “interpreting the rules of private international law”, in reform of the civil code (1993), vol. 5b, at no. 486; van breda, at paras. 79 and 99. this is so even if art 3168(4) ccq deals with jurisdiction based on connections with the subject- matter of the dispute, and not with jurisdiction based on connec- tions with the defendant — so long as other provi- sions of the ccq, such as arts. 3164 and 3139, confirm that the utah court could assert its juris- diction against mr. barer, personally. as this court explained in grecon dimter inc. v. jr. normand inc., 2005 scc 46, [2005] 2 scr 401 (at para. 19), since the private international law of quebec has been codified, “the general principles of interpre- tation of the civil code apply to the determination of the scope of the relevant provisions”, and “[t]he courts must therefore interpret the rules as a coherent whole”, in light of the principles of comity, order and fairness, which inspire the interpretation of the demande principale est aussi compétente pour la demande incidente, ce qui inclut une demande de mise en cause. ainsi, dans un cas comme celui qui nous occupe — et sous réserve de tout argument relatif à la doctrine du forum non conveniens — si le contrat principal avait été conclu au québec et était régi par les lois québécoises, les autorités québécoises auraient compétence non seulement sur les avocats québécois poursuivis dans la demande principale, mais aussi sur les avocats de l’ontario poursuivis par les avocats du québec dans des demandes de mise en cause pour toute faute professionnelle commise en ontario par les avocats ontariens. [je souligne.] [108] cela m’amène à me demander si et à quelles conditions l’art 3139 ccq peut être invoqué pour opposer la compétence d’une autorité étrangère à un codéfendeur en particulier. comme je l’expliquerai plus en détail ultérieurement, pour répondre à cette question, il faut interpréter l’art 3164 ccq, car on ne peut pas circonscrire de façon isolée la portée du par 3168(4) ccq (en ce sens, je suis d’accord avec ma collègue la juge côté, qui écrit « que le par 3168(4) ccq ne permet pas en soi d’établir la compétence à l’égard de m. barer » : par 209). cela ne signifie toutefois pas que le simple fait que m. ba- rer ne soit pas partie au contrat empêche l’application du par 3168(4) ccq en l’espèce. je suis d’avis que cette disposition peut s’appliquer et qu’elle peut étayer une conclusion reconnaissant la compétence du tribunal de l’utah à l’égard de l’ensemble du li- tige — c-à-d à l’égard tant de son objet que des par- ties : j a. talpis et j-g. castel, « interprétation des règles du droit international privé », dans la réforme du code civil (1993), t. 3, no 486; van breda, par. 79 et 99. il en est ainsi, même si le par 3168(4) ccq. porte sur la compétence fondée sur l’existence de rattachements avec l’objet du litige, et non sur celle fondée sur l’existence de rattachements avec le dé- fendeur — dans la mesure où d’autres dispositions du code civil, comme les art. 3164 et 3139, confir- ment que le tribunal de l’utah pouvait se déclarer compétent à l’égard de m. barer personnellement. ainsi que la cour l’a expliqué dans l’arrêt grecon dimter inc. c. jr. normand inc., 2005 csc 46, [2005] 2 rcs 401, par. 19, puisque le droit inter- national privé québécois est codifié, « les principes généraux d’interprétation du code civil s’appliquent à la détermination de la portée de ses dispositions » et « [l]es tribunaux doivent donc interpréter les règles [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 643 various private international law rules: see also spar aerospace ltd. v. american mobile satellite corp., 2002 scc 78, [2002] 4 scr 205, at para 23. comme un tout cohérent » à la lumière des principes de courtoisie, d’ordre et d’équité qui servent de guide à l’interprétation des différentes règles de droit in- ternational privé : voir aussi spar aerospace ltée c. american mobile satellite corp., 2002 csc 78, [2002] 4 rcs 205, par 23. b article 3164 ccq. b article 3164 ccq. i recognize, as i dive deeply into the waters [109] of art 3164 ccq, that — falling as it does within title four of book ten of the ccq — it is “closely related” to title three, in that both titles set out the rules on the international jurisdiction of quebec authorities and the recognition of foreign judgments: canada post corp v. lépine, 2009 scc 16, [2009] 1 scr 549, at para 18. [110] article 3164 ccq is the opening provision of chapter ii of title four, entitled “jurisdiction of foreign authorities”, and provides: [109] j’admets, au moment où je m’apprête à abor- der de front l’art 3164 ccq que, comme il fait partie du titre quatrième du livre dixième du code civil, il est « étroitement lié » au titre troisième, dans la mesure où l’on trouve dans ces deux titres des règles qui ont trait à la compétence internationale des autorités québécoises et à la reconnaissance des ju- gements étrangers : société canadienne des postes c. lépine, 2009 csc 16, [2009] 1 rcs 549, par 18. [110] l’article 3164 ccq est le premier du cha- pitre deuxième du titre quatrième intitulé « de la compétence des autorités étrangères ». il est ainsi libellé : 3164 the jurisdiction of foreign authorities is established in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction applicable to québec authorities under title three of this book, to the extent that the dispute is substantially connected with the state whose authority is seized of the matter. 3164 la compétence des autorités étrangères est établie suivant les règles de compétence applicables aux autorités québécoises en vertu du titre troisième du présent livre dans la mesure où le litige se rattache d’une façon impor- tante à l’état dont l’autorité a été saisie. [111] the abundant doctrinal commentary on this subject makes plain that two distinct but re- lated interpretational issues arise from the text of art.  3164  ccq. first, by referring generally to “the rules on jurisdiction applicable to québec au- thorities under title three”, does art 3164 ccq. authorize a quebec court to recognize the jurisdic- tion of a foreign authority on the basis of one of the “general provisions” situated in chapter i of that title, such as the provision granting jurisdic- tion for reasons of administrative convenience (that is, “jurisdiction to rule  on an incidental demand or a cross demand” where it has “jurisdiction to rule on the principal demand”?: art 3139 ccq). secondly, can the requirement of a “substantial connection” between the dispute and the foreign authority’s state be applied by a quebec court so as to reject a foreign exercise of jurisdiction despite il ressort de l’abondante doctrine qui existe [111] sur le sujet que le texte de l’art 3164 ccq sou- lève deux questions d’interprétation distinctes, mais connexes. en premier lieu, en mentionnant de façon générale les « règles de compétence applicables aux autorités québécoises en vertu du titre troisième », l’art 3164 ccq autorise-t-il un tribunal québécois à reconnaître la compétence d’une autorité étrangère en application d’une des « dispositions générales » du chapitre premier du titre en question, telle que celle qui confère la compétence à l’autorité québé- coise pour des raisons de commodité administrative (c-à-d, la disposition qui prévoit que l’autorité qué- bécoise peut connaître de la « demande incidente ou reconventionnelle » lorsqu’elle est « compétente pour la demande principale »? : art 3139 ccq). en second lieu, le tribunal québécois peut-il appli- quer le critère du « rattachement important » entre 644 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. one of the jurisdictional criteria provided for in art 3168 ccq being satisfied? [112] for the reasons that follow, i would answer the first question affirmatively, particularly where — as here — it cannot be doubted that the utah court had jurisdiction over the main contractual “dispute” between knight and bec under art 3168(4) ccq, and where there is a “substantial connection” between the foreign authority’s state and the co- defendant, mr. barer, or the claim made against him. (although, and as i will explain below, the claim against the co- defendant must also be “connected” to the contract.) the second question, however, i would answer in the negative. le litige et l’état du tribunal étranger de manière à refuser de reconnaître la compétence de ce tribunal étranger même s’il est satisfait à l’un des critères de compétence prévus à l’art 3168 ccq? [112] pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de répondre par l’affirmative à la première question, d’autant plus lorsque, comme en l’espèce, on ne peut pas douter que le tribunal de l’utah avait compétence en application du par 3168(4) ccq sur le « litige » principal de nature contractuelle qui opposait knight et bec, et lorsqu’il y a un « rattachement important » entre l’état de l’autorité étrangère et le codéfendeur, m. barer, ou l’allégation formulée contre lui. (bien que, comme je vais l’expliquer plus loin, l’allégation formulée contre le codéfendeur doive également être « liée » au contrat.) je répondrais cependant par la négative à la seconde question. (1) does article 3164 ccq. authorize a que- bec court to recognize the jurisdiction of a foreign authority on the basis of one of the “general provisions” situated in chapter i of title three? (1) l’article 3164 ccq autorise-t-il un tribunal québécois à reconnaître la compétence d’une autorité étrangère en application d’une des « dispositions générales » du chapitre pre- mier du titre troisième? [113] the general principle under the ccq. is that foreign judgments are entitled to recogni- tion and enforcement by quebec courts if the for- eign court had jurisdiction to render the decision: art 3155(1) ccq. according to art 3164 ccq, the recognized grounds for such jurisdiction are es- sentially those available to quebec courts as listed under title three. this is the principle of jurisdic- tional reciprocity, or the “mirror principle”: lépine, at paras. 24-25; saumier, at p. 681; g. goldstein and e. groffier, droit international privé, vol. i, théorie générale (1998), at no 175. [114] title three is divided into two chapters: chapter  i (“general provisions”) and chapter  ii (“special provisions”). as explained by professor saumier (at p. 690), the jurisdiction of a foreign court should be assessed by looking to both chapters: [113] le principe général consacré par le code civil veut que toute décision rendue hors du québec soit reconnue et déclarée exécutoire par le tribunal québécois si le tribunal étranger avait compétence pour rendre la décision : par 3155(1) ccq. aux termes de l’art 3164 ccq, les chefs de compétence reconnus au tribunal étranger sont essentiellement les mêmes que ceux reconnus au tribunal québécois au titre troisième. c’est ce qu’on appelle le principe de la réciprocité de la compétence ou « principe du miroir » : lépine, par. 24-25; saumier, p. 681; g. goldstein et e. groffier, droit international privé, t. i, théorie générale (1998), no 175. [114] le titre troisième se divise en deux chapitres : le chapitre premier (« dispositions générales ») et le chapitre deuxième (« dispositions particulières »). comme la professeure saumier l’explique (p. 690), la compétence du tribunal étranger s’apprécie en tenant compte des deux chapitres : when it comes time to assess the jurisdiction of a for- eign court, the mirror principle enshrined in article 3164 [traduction] lorsqu’il s’agit de vérifier la compé- tence du tribunal étranger, le principe du miroir consacré [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 645 refers back to title three. the reference to title three in article 3164 contains n[o] words of limitation. this suggests that the reference to reciprocity applies to the entirety of title three, including the general and the spe- cific provisions in that title. in other words, if the foreign court’s jurisdiction does not correspond to any specific jurisdictional basis recognized under chapter ii of title three, recourse may be had to the general provisions of chapter i of the same title. [115] (i note here, as it becomes significant below, that chapter i of title three consists of seven articles spelling out the “general provisions” governing the international jurisdiction of quebec courts. the first provision sets out the general jurisdictional criterion under quebec private international law: the domicile of the defendant (art 3134 ccq). two articles then allow an otherwise competent quebec court to decide not to exercise its jurisdiction — in the case of forum non conveniens (art 3135 ccq) or lis alibi pendens (art 3137 ccq). the remaining four general provisions each grant an exceptional jurisdiction to a quebec court for reasons of neces- sity, protection of assets and people, administrative convenience, or emergency: arts. 3136, 3138, 3139 and 3140 ccq, respectively.) [116] professor saumier continues (at p. 691) to conclude that chapter  i of title three therefore has two different effects upon the analysis under art 3164 ccq: first, of allowing a quebec court to deny recognition on the basis that the foreign author- ity should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction; and, secondly, of extending the admitted jurisdiction of the foreign authority beyond that provided for in title four. i turn now to consider each of these effects upon the proper interpretation of the general reference to title three in art 3164 ccq. à l’art. 3164 renvoie au titre troisième. la mention de ce titre dans cette disposition n’est assortie d’aucun terme limitatif, ce qui permet de penser que la mention de la réciprocité vaut pour la totalité du titre troisième, soit tant pour ses dispositions générales que pour ses dispositions particulières. en d’autres termes, si la compétence du tribunal étranger ne correspond à aucun des chefs de com- pétence expressément reconnus au chapitre deuxième du titre troisième, on peut recourir aux dispositions générales du chapitre premier de ce même titre. [115] (je signale ici, car cela deviendra important plus loin, que le chapitre premier du titre troisième est constitué de sept articles qui énoncent les « dis- positions générales » définissant la compétence in- ternationale des tribunaux québécois. la première disposition énonce le critère général de compétence en droit international privé québécois : le domicile du défendeur (art 3134 ccq). cet article est suivi de deux autres, qui permettent au tribunal québécois, par ailleurs compétent, de décliner sa compétence pour cause de forum non conveniens (art 3135 ccq) ou de litispendance (art 3137 ccq). les quatre autres dispositions générales confèrent chacune une compé- tence exceptionnelle à l’autorité québécoise pour cause de nécessité, de protection de biens ou de personnes, de commodité administrative ou de situation d’urgence : art. 3136, 3138, 3139 et 3140 ccq, respectivement.) [116] la professeure saumier poursuit (p. 691) en concluant que le chapitre premier du titre troisième entraîne deux conséquences différentes sur l’analyse de l’art 3164 ccq : en premier lieu, il permet au tribunal québécois de refuser de reconnaître le jugement étranger au motif que le tribunal d’origine aurait dû décliner sa compétence et, en second lieu, il a pour effet d’étendre la compétence reconnue de l’autorité étrangère au- delà de celle prévue au titre quatrième. je vais maintenant examiner chacune de ces conséquences sur l’interprétation qu’il convient de donner de la mention générale du titre troisième qui figure à l’art 3164 ccq. (a) the denial of recognition on the basis that the foreign authority should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction a) refus de reconnaître la compétence du tribu- nal étranger au motif qu’il aurait dû décliner sa compétence in lépine, this court had to decide whether “the [117] jurisdictional rules in arts. 3164 to 3168 incorporate, [117] dans l’affaire lépine, la cour était appelée à décider si « [l]es règles de compétence contenues 646 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. by reference to title three, the doctrine of forum non conveniens”: para 27. more precisely, the court had to determine whether “a quebec court [can] refuse to recognize a judgment rendered outside quebec be- cause, in its opinion, the foreign court should, pursuant to that doctrine, have declined jurisdiction over the case”: para 27. the court decided it could not, not- withstanding “that the application of this doctrine finds support, at first glance, in the very broad wording of the reference to title three in art 3164 ccq”: para 34. as the court explained, however (at paras. 34 and 36): aux art. 3164 à 3168 incorporent [  ] par renvoi au titre troisième la doctrine du forum non conveniens » : par 27. plus précisément, la cour devait déterminer si « le tribunal québécois [peut] refuser de reconnaître un jugement rendu à l’extérieur du québec parce que, selon lui, le tribunal étranger aurait dû se dessaisir du litige » : par 27. la cour a répondu par la négative à cette question, même si « le libellé très large du renvoi au titre troisième figurant à l’art 3164 ccq invite à première vue à cette application » : par 34. comme la cour l’a cependant expliqué (par. 34 et 36) : enforcement by the quebec court depends on whether the foreign court had jurisdiction, not on how that jurisdiction was exercised, apart from the exceptions provided for in the civil code of québec. to apply forum non conveniens in this context would be to overlook the basic distinction between the establishment of jurisdiction as such and the exercise of jurisdiction. l’exequatur du tribunal québécois dépend de l’existence de la compétence du tribunal étranger, et non des modalités de l’exercice de celle-ci, hormis les exceptions prévues par le code civil du québec. le recours au forum non conveniens dans ce contexte fait fi de la distinction de base entre la détermination de la compétence proprement dite et son exercice.   .   . . . . the court of appeal added an irrelevant factor to the analysis of the foreign court’s jurisdiction: the doctrine of forum non conveniens. this approach introduces a de- gree of instability and unpredictability that is inconsistent with the standpoint generally favourable to the recognition of foreign or external judgments that is evident in the provisions of the civil code. it is hardly consistent with the principles of international comity and the objectives of facilitating international and interprovincial relations that underlie the civil code’s provisions on the recognition of foreign judgments. in sum, even when it is applying the general rule in art. 3164, the court hearing the application for recognition cannot rely on a doctrine that is incompat- ible with the recognition procedure. [emphasis added.] . . . l’arrêt de la cour d’appel ajoute un élément non pertinent à l’analyse de la compétence du tribunal étran- ger : la doctrine du forum non conveniens. cette approche introduit ainsi un élément d’instabilité et d’imprévisibilité qui s’accorde mal avec l’attitude en principe favorable à la reconnaissance des jugements étrangers ou externes qu’expriment les dispositions du code civil. elle ne res- pecte guère les principes de courtoisie internationale et les objectifs de facilitation des échanges internationaux et interprovinciaux qui sous- tendent les dispositions du code civil sur la reconnaissance des jugements étrangers. en somme, même dans le cas où il a recours à la règle générale prévue à l’art. 3164, le tribunal de l’exequatur ne peut s’appuyer sur une doctrine incompatible avec la procédure de reconnaissance. [je souligne.] (b) the extension of the admitted jurisdiction of the foreign authority beyond that provided for in title four b) extension de la compétence reconnue de l’autorité étrangère au- delà de celle prévue au titre quatrième [118] conversely, the court expressly left the door open in lépine to extending the foreign authority’s admitted jurisdiction on the basis of the general refer- ence to title three in art 3164 ccq (at para. 36): [118] en revanche, toujours dans l’arrêt lépine, la cour a expressément laissé la porte ouverte à l’extension de la compétence reconnue de l’autorité étrangère sur le fondement du renvoi général au titre troisième énoncé à l’art 3164 ccq (par. 36) : article 3164 ccq provides that a substantial con- nection between the dispute and the originating court is a l’article 3164 ccq établit comme condition fonda- mentale de la reconnaissance d’un jugement au québec [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 647 fundamental condition for the recognition of a judgment in quebec. articles 3165 to 3168 then set out, in more specific terms, connecting factors to be used to determine whether, in certain situations, a sufficient connection exists between the dispute and the foreign authority. the application of specific rules, such as those in art. 3168 respecting per- sonal actions of a patrimonial nature, will generally suffice to determine whether the foreign court had jurisdiction. however, it may be necessary in considering a complex legal situation involving two or more parties located in different parts of the world to apply the general principle in art. 3164 in order to establish jurisdiction and have recourse to, for example, the forum of necessity. [emphasis added.] l’existence d’un lien important entre le litige et le tribunal d’origine. les articles 3165 à 3168 énoncent ensuite de manière plus spécifique des facteurs de rattachement per- mettant de conclure à la présence d’un lien suffisant entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère dans certaines situations. en général, le recours à des règles spécifiques, comme celles prévues à l’art. 3168 applicables aux actions per- sonnelles à caractère patrimonial, permettra de statuer sur la compétence du tribunal étranger. cependant, il se peut qu’une situation juridique complexe où plusieurs parties se trouvent dans des fors différents impose le recours au prin- cipe général de l’art. 3164 pour déterminer la compétence et recourir par exemple au for de nécessité. [je souligne.] [119] my colleague gascon j. says this passage from lépine could be read to mean that “there may be uncommon or peculiar circumstances in which, de- spite art. 3168 being satisfied, there is no substantial connection between the dispute and the state where the decision was rendered”, so that the jurisdiction of the foreign court could not be recognized: para. 86 (emphasis added). respectfully, i do not think such a reading of this passage is sustainable. in my view, it clearly signifies that there may be uncommon or pe- culiar circumstances which, despite art 3168 ccq. not being satisfied, may nevertheless present a “sub- stantial connection” between the dispute and the foreign authority such that the jurisdiction of the foreign court could be recognized through, for ex- ample, the “forum of necessity” doctrine codified in art 3136 ccq. this could arise — says the court in lépine (at para. 36) — in the presence of “a complex legal situation involving two or more parties located in different parts of the world”. [119] selon mon collègue le juge gascon, ce pas- sage de l’arrêt lépine pourrait indiquer qu’« il pour- rait y avoir des situations inhabituelles ou particulières dans lesquelles aucun rattachement important n’existe entre le litige et l’état qui a rendu la décision, et ce, même si l’un des critères de l’art. 3168 est établi », de sorte qu’il n’est pas possible de reconnaître la com- pétence du tribunal étranger : par. 86 (je souligne). soit dit en tout respect, je ne pense pas qu’on puisse interpréter ce passage de cette façon. à mon avis, il signifie clairement qu’il peut se présenter des situa- tions inhabituelles ou particulières dans lesquelles, même si les critères de l’art 3168 ccq n’ont pas été établis, il existe quand même un « rattachement important » entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère, de sorte que l’on pourrait en reconnaître la compétence par application, par exemple, de la théorie du « for de nécessité » codifiée à l’art 3136 ccq. selon ce que la cour a expliqué dans l’arrêt lépine (par. 36), « une situation juridique complexe où plusieurs par- ties se trouvent dans des fors différents » pourrait ainsi justifier le recours à l’art. 3164 lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer la compétence. [120] this is amply supported by pertinent doc- trine. as patrick ferland and guillaume laganière explain: [120] cette démarche est amplement étayée par la doctrine. ainsi que les auteurs patrick ferland et guillaume laganière l’expliquent : [translation] in the absence of a specific provision, reference will therefore have to be made to the rules in title three to determine whether the jurisdiction exercised by the foreign authority should be recognized. some suggest that the rules qualifying the application of the conflict rules relating to the jurisdiction of quebec authorities (forum non conveniens, forum of necessity, lis pendens, jurisdiction over incidental demands and cross demands, etc.) might sauf disposition spécifique, il faudra donc se reporter aux règles du titre troisième pour déterminer s’il convient de reconnaître la compétence exercée par l’autorité étran- gère. selon certains, les règles modulant l’application des règles de conflit relatives à la compétence des autorités québécoises (forum non conveniens, for de nécessité, litis- pendance, compétence à l’égard des demandes incidentes et reconventionnelles, etc.) pourraient devoir être prises en 648 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. have to be taken into account in the analysis undertaken by the quebec court. however, others argue that they should not be taken into account. in canada post corp. v. lépine, the supreme court of canada answered this question in the negative for the doctrine of forum non conveniens, noting that the wording of article 3155 ccq requires the court hearing the application for recognition to ask whether the foreign authority had jurisdiction, not whether it should have exercised that jurisdiction. however, the [supreme] court left the door open to the application of other provi- sions, such as article 3136 ccq (forum of necessity). [emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] compte dans l’analyse effectuée par le tribunal québécois. selon d’autres, toutefois, elles ne devraient pas l’être. dans l’arrêt société canadienne des postes c. lépine, la cour suprême du canada a tranché la question par la néga- tive en ce qui a trait à la doctrine du forum non conveniens, soulignant que le libellé de l’article 3155 ccq requiert du tribunal d’exequatur qu’il se demande si l’autorité étrangère était compétente, et non si elle aurait dû exercer cette compétence. la cour [suprême] a cependant laissé la porte ouverte à l’application d’autres dispositions telles que l’article 3136 ccq (for de nécessité). [je souligne; notes en bas de page omises.] (“le droit international privé”, in collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2017-2018, vol. 7, contrats, sûretés, publicité des droits et droit inter- national privé (2017), 253, at p. 302) (« le droit international privé », dans collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2017-2018, vol. 7, contrats, sûretés, publicité des droits et droit international privé (2017), 253, p. 302) in a similar vein, professor g. goldstein [121] says: [121] dans le même ordre d’idées, le professeur g. goldstein écrit : [translation] the court nonetheless accepted [in lépine] that while, in principle, jurisdiction depends on specific jurisdictional rules  — whether express rules, such as art 3168 ccq, or implicit rules drawn from the quebec rules on direct jurisdiction, which are made bilat- eral under art 3164 ccq — it remains possible, through the same provision, to make the general rules applicable to quebec’s direct jurisdiction, such as art 3136 ccq, bilateral in order, for example, to recognize the jurisdiction of a foreign court as the forum of necessity. malgré ceci, la cour admet [dans l’affaire lépine] que si, en principe, la compétence dépend de règles de compétence spécifiques, soit expresses, comme l’article 3168 ccq, soit implicites et tirées par bilatéralisation des règles de com- pétence directes québécoises, selon l’article 3164 ccq, il reste possible de bilatéraliser par le biais de la même disposition les règles générales applicables à la compétence directe québécoise, comme l’article 3136 ccq, de manière par exemple à reconnaître compétence à un tribunal étranger en tant que for de nécessité.   .   . . . . this solution is consistent with the internationalist approach taken by the civil code of québec, because it remains true that only the bilateral application of the doc- trine of forum non conveniens [art 3135 ccq] through art 3164 ccq has the potential to be unfavourable to the recognition of foreign judgments. under art 3135 ccq, indirect jurisdiction may be taken away from a foreign court even though, in principle, it obtained that jurisdiction in accordance with our rules, whereas all the other general provisions that could be applied through art 3164 ccq, such as art 3136 ccq, have the opposite effect of giving the foreign court, on an exceptional basis, indirect juris- diction that did not arise under the normal specific rules. [underlining added; footnote omitted.] . . . cette solution respecte la logique d’ouverture à l’inter- national du code civil du québec, puisqu’il reste exact que seule la bilatéralisation de la théorie du forum non conve- niens [art 3135 ccq] par le biais de l’article 3164 ccq. présente un potentiel défavorable à la reconnaissance des jugements étrangers. en effet, l’article 3135 ccq aboutit éventuellement à retirer la compétence indirecte au tribunal étranger qu’il avait pourtant obtenue en principe selon nos règles, alors que toutes les autres dispositions générales sus- ceptibles d’être utilisées par le biais de l’article 3164 ccq, comme l’article 3136 ccq, permettent au contraire de donner exceptionnellement une compétence indirecte au tribunal étranger qui ne découlait pas des règles spécifiques normales. [je souligne; note en bas de page omise.] (droit international privé, vol. 2, compétence in- ternationale des autorités québécoises et effets des (droit international privé, vol. 2, compétence in- ternationale des autorités québécoises et effets des [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 649 décisions étrangères (art.  3134 à 3168  ccq) (2012), at pp. 405-6) décisions étrangères (art.  3134 à 3168  ccq) (2012), p. 405-406) [122] i am therefore of the view that art. 3164 ccq authorizes a quebec court to recognize the ju- risdiction of a foreign authority on the basis of one of the “general provisions” situated in chapter i of title three (arts. 3136,4 3138, 3139 and 3140 ccq). this is consistent with “the basic principle laid down in art 3155 ccq    that any decision rendered by a foreign authority must be recognized unless an exception applies”: lépine, at para 22. this is also consistent with the practice at the quebec courts: in ortega figueroa v. jenckel, 2015 qcca 1393, the court of appeal held that arts. 3138 and 3140 ccq. could be used by a quebec court to recognize the jurisdiction of a foreign authority. it follows “that in personal actions of a patrimonial nature, satisfying the jurisdictional requirement under article 3168 is always sufficient but not necessarily essential for recognition under québec law”: saumier, at p 689. [123] my colleague gascon j. notes in this regard that “the language used by justice lebel [in lépine] is flexible (“generally suffice”), and not as categorical as some academic writing that were published before lépine (such as “always sufficient”)”: para 87. this supports, he says, a “possible” reading of lépine (at para. 36), “requir[ing] a substantial connection be- tween the dispute and the forum even where a ground for recognition of the foreign authority’s jurisdiction under art 3168 ccq is established”: para. 87; see also côté j.’s reasons, at para 260. but, and again re- spectfully, i do not view this as a “possible” reading of lépine, as it does not account for a critical passage of lebel j.’s reasons for the court on this point. it is true that lebel j. said (at para. 36) that “[t]he ap- plication of specific rules, such as those in art. 3168 respecting personal actions of a patrimonial nature, will generally suffice to determine whether the for- eign court had jurisdiction”. for lebel j., however, [122] je suis par conséquent d’avis que l’art. 3164 ccq autorise le tribunal québécois à reconnaître la compétence du tribunal étranger en application d’une des « dispositions générales » énoncées au chapitre premier du titre troisième (art. 31364, 3138, 3139 et 3140 ccq). cela s’accorde avec « [le] principe fondamental [établi par l’art 3155 ccq selon le- quel] toute décision rendue par une autorité étrangère doit être reconnue, sauf exception » : lépine, par 22. cette façon de voir s’accorde également avec la pra- tique des tribunaux québécois. en effet, dans l’arrêt ortega figueroa c. jenckel, 2015 qcca 1393, la cour d’appel a jugé que les tribunaux québécois pouvaient appliquer les art. 3138 et 3140 ccq pour reconnaître la compétence d’un tribunal étranger. il s’ensuit que [traduction] « dans les actions per- sonnelles à caractère patrimonial, le fait de satisfaire aux exigences en matière de compétence prévues à l’art. 3168 est toujours suffisant, mais pas nécessaire- ment essentiel à la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal étranger en droit québécois » : saumier, p 689. [123] mon collègue le juge gascon fait remar- quer à cet égard que « le juge lebel [dans lépine] a employé une formulation souple (« [e]n général [  ] permettra »), moins catégorique que certaines autres utilisées dans des textes publiés avant l’arrêt lépine (par exemple [traduction] « toujours suf- fisant ») » : par 87. ce choix de mots appuie, selon lui, une interprétation « possible » de l’arrêt lépine selon laquelle le par. 36 « exige qu’il existe un rat- tachement important entre le litige et le for saisi, même lorsqu’un des critères de la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal étranger énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq est établi » : par. 87; voir aussi les motifs de la juge côté, par 260. or, à mon sens, il ne s’agit pas d’une interprétation « possible » de l’arrêt lépine, puisqu’elle ne tient pas compte d’un passage crucial des motifs du juge lebel, qui s’est exprimé au nom de la cour à cet égard. il est vrai que le juge lebel a affirmé (par. 36) qu’« [e]n général, le recours 4 a caveat: art 3136 ccq may be applied only if one of the parties raises it, as the court cannot apply it of its own motion: spar, at para. 69; grecon, at para 33. 4 mise en garde : l’art 3136 ccq ne s’applique que si l’une des parties l’invoque, étant donné que le tribunal ne peut l’appliquer d’office : spar, par. 69; grecon, par 33. 650 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. it follows that “[t]he application of [such] specific rules” will sometimes be insufficient “to determine whether the foreign court had jurisdiction”, so that (and this is the critical passage) “it may be neces- sary    to apply the general principle in art. 3164 in order to establish jurisdiction” (emphasis added), and not in order to deny jurisdiction despite one of the specific rules (such as those in art. 3168) being satisfied. hence lebel j.’s reference, in the same passage, to the forum of necessity as a basis for es- tablishing the foreign authority’s jurisdiction via the mirror principle in circumstances where “[t]he ap- plication of specific rules, such as those in art. 3168 respecting personal actions of a patrimonial nature”, is insufficient to do so. [124] my colleague gascon j. fairly acknowledges that my understanding of this passage from lépine is also “possible”: para. 86; see also côté j.’s rea- sons, at para 260. regrettably, i cannot reciprocate; in my view, what he presents as the other possible meaning is incompatible with a complete reading of this passage. à des règles spécifiques, comme celles de l’art. 3168 applicables aux actions personnelles à caractère pa- trimonial, permettra de statuer sur la compétence du tribunal étranger ». toutefois, il s’ensuit selon lui que, parfois, « le recours à [ces] règles spécifiques » ne permettra pas « de statuer sur la compétence du tribunal étranger », si bien (et c’est le passage cru- cial) « [qu’]il se peut [qu’une situation] [  ] impose le recours au principe général de l’art. 3164 pour déterminer la compétence » (je souligne) et non pour nier la compétence, même s’il est satisfait à une des règles spécifiques (comme celles de l’art 3168). c’est ce qui explique la mention, par le juge lebel, dans le même passage, du for de nécessité comme fondement pour déterminer la compétence du tribu- nal étranger (c-à-d, pour établir cette compétence, comme l’exprime la version anglaise de ce passage) par le truchement du principe du miroir dans des situations où « le recours à des règles spécifiques, comme celles de l’art. 3168 applicables aux actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial » ne permet pas de le faire. [124] mon collègue le juge gascon reconnaît à juste titre que ma compréhension de ce passage de l’arrêt lépine est aussi « possible » : par. 86; voir aussi les motifs de la juge côté, par 260. je ne peux malheureusement en dire autant de la sienne. à mon avis, ce qu’il présente comme étant un autre sens possible est incompatible avec le reste du passage en question. i acknowledge that art 3168 ccq provides [125] that “[i]n personal actions of a patrimonial nature, the jurisdiction of foreign authorities is recognized only” if one of the subparagraphs of that article is satisfied. but in my view the significance of this exclusive language of “only” is clear, and should not be overstated. in other words, while art 3168 ccq. derogates from the “mirror principle”’s applica- tion, it only does so in a particular circumstance. to explain, recall that the “mirror principle” stated in art 3164 ccq provides that the jurisdiction of the foreign authority should be decided in ac- cordance with the rules on jurisdiction applicable to quebec authorities under title three one of title three’s provisions — art 3148 ccq — ad- dresses personal actions of a patrimonial nature. j’admets que l’art.  3168  ccq prévoit [125] que « [d]ans les actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial, la compétence des autorités étran- gères n’est reconnue que dans les cas suivants » d’un des cas de figure décrits aux paragraphes de cette disposition. cela dit, à mon avis, le sens de ce caractère exclusif de la formulation « n’est re- connue que dans les cas suivants » est clair et on ne devrait pas y accorder une importance indue. en d’autres termes, l’art.  3168 ccq ne déroge au « principe du miroir » que d’une façon parti- culière. pour mieux illustrer mon propos, je rap- pelle que, selon le « principe du miroir » énoncé à l’art.  3164 ccq, la compétence de l’autorité étrangère est établie conformément aux règles de compétence applicables aux autorités québécoises [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 651 and, absent the exclusive language contained in art 3168 ccq, the text of art 3164 ccq would direct the quebec court to decide the jurisdiction of a foreign authority by applying one of the sub- paragraphs of art. 3148 para 1 ccq. the exclu- sive language used in art 3168 ccq, however, indicates clearly that, notwithstanding the “mirror principle”, art 3148 ccq cannot be applied to determine the jurisdiction of the foreign authority in such circumstances. [126] what the exclusive language in art. 3168 ccq does not do, however, is preclude entirely a quebec court from recognizing the jurisdiction of a foreign authority on the basis of one of the “general provisions” situated in chapter  i of title three. indeed, it is the very purpose of “general provisions” to complement and modify the application of “special provisions”, such as art 3168 ccq. as explained by professor saumier, “[t]hese four exceptional cases [arts. 3136, 3138, 3139 and 3140 ccq] obviously assume that the québec courts are not otherwise competent, in the international sense, to hear the claim”: p 690. i therefore also agree with professor goldstein, who writes (at p. 116): [translation] the “general” provisions of chapter i of title three of the code concerning the international jurisdiction of quebec courts supplement and mod- ify the solutions offered by the “specific” provisions of chapter ii (art 3148 ccq) and cover exactly the same area. how else can the application of, for example, arts. 3135, 3136 and 3138 ccq be contemplated? in reality, the situations in which most of the general pro- visions (arts. 3135 to 3140 ccq) may apply are more specific than those that normally arise under the so- called specific provisions (arts.  [3141] to 3154  ccq), the only exception being art 3134 ccq. these rules are of general application in the sense that they can apply in any case nevertheless, all of these cases are more specific than those contemplated by the normal rules on jurisdiction that are characterized as “specific”. in other words, the “general” rules apply on an exceptional basis, while the “specific” rules are of general application   ! [emphasis in original.] prévues au titre troisième. une des dispositions de ce titre, en l’occurrence l’art 3148 ccq, concerne les actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial. si les termes exclusifs que l’on trouve à l’art 3168 ccq. n’existaient pas, l’art 3164 ccq obligerait le tri- bunal québécois à établir la compétence du tribu- nal étranger en appliquant un des paragraphes de l’art. 3148 al 1 ccq. le libellé exclusif employé à l’art 3168 ccq indique toutefois clairement que, malgré le « principe du miroir », on ne peut pas ap- pliquer l’art 3148 ccq pour établir la compétence d’un tribunal étranger en pareil cas. [126] le libellé exclusif de l’art 3168 ccq n’en- lève cependant pas totalement au tribunal québécois la faculté de reconnaître la compétence de l’autorité étrangère en application d’une des « dispositions gé- nérales » qui figure au chapitre premier du titre troi- sième. en effet, les « dispositions générales » visent précisément à compléter et à modifier les modalités d’application de « dispositions particulières », telles que l’art 3168 ccq. comme la professeure saumier l’explique : [traduction] « [c]es quatre cas d’ex- ception [soit ceux visés aux art. 3136, 3138, 3139 et 3140 ccq] tiennent évidemment pour acquis que les tribunaux québécois ne sont par ailleurs pas com- pétents, au sens international, pour statuer sur la de- mande » : p 690. j’abonde par conséquent aussi dans le sens du professeur goldstein lorsqu’il écrit (p. 116) : les dispositions « générales » du chapitre i du titre iii du code sur la compétence internationale des tribunaux québé- cois complètent et modifient les solutions données par les dispositions « spécifiques » du chapitre 2 (art 3148 ccq) et elles ont exactement le même domaine. comment, autre- ment, envisager l’application par exemple des articles 3135, 3136 et 3138 ccq?. en réalité, les situations donnant poten- tiellement lieu à l’application de la majorité des dispositions générales (art. 3135 à 3140 ccq) sont plus spécifiques que celles découlant normalement des pseudo- dispositions spé- cifiques (art. [3141] à 3154 ccq) : la seule exception étant l’article 3134 ccq. ces règles sont d’application générale dans le sens où elles peuvent s’appliquer dans n’importe quel cas. néanmoins, tous ces cas sont plus spécifiques que ceux envisagés par les règles normales de compétence qua- lifiées de « spécifiques ». en d’autres termes, les règles dites « générales » sont d’application exceptionnelle, dérogatoire, alors que les règles dites « spécifiques » sont d’application générale. . . ! [en italique dans l’original.] 652 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. [127] the doctrine on this point is therefore con- sistent in the view that it is possible for a quebec court to recognize the jurisdiction of a foreign au- thority on the basis of one of the “general provi- sions” situated in chapter i of title three, including art 3139 ccq. indeed, and recalling my earlier point (at paras. 113-14) that the jurisdiction of a foreign court should be assessed by looking to both chapters i (“general provisions”) and ii (“special provisions”) of title three, the doctrine also consist- ently maintains that chapter i’s general provisions continue to have application to an analysis under art 3164 ccq, even where a “personal action of a patrimonial nature” is at stake: [translation] for the reasons already stated, the heads of jurisdiction established by article 3168 must be assessed in light of the general provisions of chapter i of title three. thus    the foreign authority’s jurisdiction may be recog- nized when the quebec authority would have exercised its jurisdiction in such a situation as the forum of necessity, to order provisional or conservatory measures, to rule on an incidental demand or a cross demand or, in cases of emergency or serious inconvenience, to protect a person or the person’s property. [127] la doctrine est donc constante à ce sujet : un tribunal québécois peut reconnaître la compétence d’un tribunal étranger en application d’une des « dis- positions générales » énoncées au chapitre premier du titre troisième, y compris l’art 3139 ccq. en effet, et je reprends ici l’argument que j’ai soulevé précédemment (par.  113-114), la compétence du tribunal étranger s’apprécie en fonction à la fois du chapitre premier (« dispositions générales ») et du chapitre deuxième (« dispositions particu- lières ») du titre troisième. les auteurs de doctrine s’entendent en outre pour dire que les dispositions générales du chapitre premier restent pertinentes pour l’analyse requise relativement à l’application de l’art 3164 ccq, même lorsqu’il s’agit d’une « action personnelle à caractère patrimonial » : pour les raisons déjà indiquées, les chefs de compétence établis par l’article 3168 doivent être appréciés à la lu- mière des dispositions générales du premier chapitre du troisième titre. ainsi, [  ] la compétence de l’autorité étrangère peut être reconnue quand l’autorité québécoise aurait exercé sa compétence dans une telle situation comme forum de nécessité, pour ordonner des mesures provisoires ou conservatoires, pour statuer sur une de- mande incidente ou reconventionnelle, ou en cas d’ur- gence ou d’inconvénients sérieux, pour protéger une personne ou ses biens.   .   . the non- exclusive nature of articles 3165 to 3168 is indicated by the fact that the phrase “in the absence of any special provision” was removed from the wording of what became article 3164. see article 3141 of bill 125 [civil code of québec, bill 125, 1st sess., 34th leg. (quebec), éditeur officiel du québec, 1991]. the mirror principle therefore became the dominant principle, and not merely a supplementary one, for determining foreign jurisdiction. however, the special provisions in articles 3165 to 3168 exclude the heads of jurisdiction applicable to quebec authorities in the areas indicated by those provisions, in accordance with the principle that special provisions have primacy. [footnote omitted.] l’absence d’un caractère exclusif des articles 3165- 3168 est indiquée par l’élimination de la phrase « en l’absence de disposition particulière » du texte de ce qui est devenu l’article 3164. voir l’article 3141 du projet de loi 125 [code civil du québec, projet de loi 125, 1re sess., 34e lég. (québec), éditeur officiel du québec, 1991]. le principe du miroir est devenu ainsi le principe dominant, et non pas simplement un principe supplémentaire, dans la détermination de la compétence étrangère. les disposi- tions particulières des articles 3165-3168 écartent cepen- dant les chefs de compétence applicables aux autorités québécoises dans les domaines qu’elles indiquent, en vertu du principe de la primauté du texte spécial. [note en bas de page omise.] (h. p. glenn, “droit international privé”, in la ré- forme du code civil (1993), vol. 3, 669, at pp. 778 and 798-99 (fn. 250)) (h. p. glenn, « droit international privé », dans la réforme du code civil (1993), t. 3, 669, p. 778 et 798-799 (note en bas de page 250)) [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 653 [translation] in referring to the quebec rules on juris- diction, art 3164 ccq does not limit them to the specific rules (arts. 3141 to 3154 ccq) and therefore refers implicitly to arts. 3134 to 3140 ccq as well. en effet, l’article 3164 ccq, renvoyant aux règles de compétence québécoises, ne limite aucunement celles-ci aux règles spécifiques (art. 3141 à 3154 ccq), mais renvoie donc implicitement aussi aux articles  3134 à 3140 ccq.   .   . conversely, the exceptional jurisdiction of the foreign authority might be justified even where there would be no jurisdiction under the normal rules, for example to act as the forum of necessity (art 3136 ccq), to hear an inci- dental demand or a cross demand over which it would not normally have jurisdiction (art 3139 ccq), or to take emergency or provisional measures or protect a person and the person’s property (art. 3138 or 3140 ccq). inversement, la compétence exceptionnelle de l’au- torité étrangère pourrait se justifier même en l’absence de compétence selon les règles normales, par exemple, sur la base du for de nécessité (art 3136 ccq), pour connaître d’une mesure incidente ou reconventionnelle sur laquelle elle ne serait pas normalement compétente (art 3139 ccq) ou pour prendre des mesures d’urgence ou provisoires ou pour protéger une personne et ses biens (art. 3138 ou 3140 ccq).   .   . however, the logical consequences of accepting the mirror principle without any precise limits do not end there. we mentioned above that art 3164 ccq does not apply in principle where specific jurisdictional rules have been expressly adopted for foreign courts (the rules in arts. 3165 to 3168 ccq). it is in fact not possible to rely on that provision to formulate express rules on foreign jurisdiction in a bilateral fashion, because those rules have already been expressly written and are worded differently from the rules for the quebec courts. however, just as the specific rules on jurisdiction in quebec may be modified through the effect of the general rules on juris- diction in quebec (arts. 3134 to 3140 ccq), as a result of art. 3164, it may be thought that the express rules on foreign jurisdiction may also be modified on a discretion- ary basis through arts. 3134 to 3140 ccq! [underlining added; footnotes omitted.] mais là ne s’arrêtent pas les conséquences logiques de l’admission sans limites précises du principe du mi- roir. nous avons, en effet, mentionné plus haut que l’ar- ticle 3164 ccq ne jouait pas en principe lorsque des règles de compétence spécifiques avaient été expressé- ment adoptées pour les tribunaux étrangers (il s’agit des articles 3165 à 3168 ccq). effectivement, il n’est pas possible de faire appel à cette disposition pour formuler de façon bilatérale les règles de compétence étran- gères expresses, puisqu’elles sont déjà expressément rédigées, avec une formulation différente de celles des tribunaux québécois. toutefois, de la même façon que les règles de compétence québécoises spécifiques sont sujettes à modification par l’effet des règles de compé- tence québécoises générales (art. 3134 à 3140 ccq), par l’effet de l’article 3164, on peut considérer que les règles de compétence étrangères expresses sont elles aussi sujettes à modification discrétionnaire en vertu des articles 3134 à 3140 ccq! [je souligne; notes en bas de page omises.] (goldstein and groffier (1998), at no. 175) (goldstein et groffier (1998), no 175) [traduction] b the “little mirror” doctrine b la théorie du « petit miroir » article 3164 ccq also allows a court evaluating the jurisdiction of a foreign authority to refer to the general discretionary rules applicable to the exercise of jurisdiction l’article 3164 ccq permet également au tribunal qui juge de la compétence d’un tribunal étranger de faire appel aux règles discrétionnaires générales applicables à l’exercice 654 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. by the quebec authorities under title three (ie, arts. 3134 to 3140 ccq). par les tribunaux québécois de leur compétence en applica- tion du titre troisième (c-à-d aux art. 3134 à 3140 ccq).   .   . while art 3164 ccq authorizes only the applica- tion of the “little mirror doctrine” to matters set forth in title three, it would seem that if applicable to matters there in set fo[r]th, there is no reason why it should not also apply to personal matters of a patrimonial nature (art 3168 ccq) [footnote omitted.] bien que l’art 3164 ccq permette d’appliquer la « théorie du petit miroir » uniquement aux cas prévus au titre troisième, il semblerait que, si elle s’applique aux cas qui y sont énoncés, il n’y a aucune raison pour laquelle cette théorie ne devrait pas s’appliquer égale- ment aux actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial (art 3168 ccq) [note en bas de page omise.] (talpis, at p. 107) (talpis, p. 107) [translation]    even though art 3168 ccq did not give the foreign court jurisdiction in that case, its juris- diction could still be recognized under art 3136 ccq. because there was no court before which the plaintiff could be required to institute the proceedings, or as an extension of its principal jurisdiction, recognized by our rules, to a matter for which it had jurisdiction to rule on an incidental demand or a cross demand [art 3139 ccq], or on the ba- sis of an emergency [art 3140 ccq], or for the purpose of ordering a conservatory measure [art 3138 ccq]. these solutions seem to us to be very reasonable in prac- tice and are consistent with the internationalist perspective underlying quebec private international law since the enactment of the civil code of québec. [text in brackets in original.]    même si l’article 3168 ccq ne donne pas compétence au tribunal étranger en l’espèce, on pourrait quand même la lui reconnaître soit selon l’article 3136 ccq parce qu’il n’existait aucun tribunal devant lequel on pouvait exiger que le demandeur aille intenter l’action, soit en cas d’extension de compétence principale, reconnue par nos règles, à une question sujette à une compétence incidente ou reconventionnelle [art 3139 ccq], soit pour un motif d’urgence [art 3140 ccq] ou encore pour ordonner une mesure conservatoire [art 3138 ccq]. ces solutions nous paraissent très raisonnables en pratique et corres- pondent à l’optique internationaliste qui sous- tend le droit international privé québécois depuis l’adoption du code civil du québec. [texte entre crochets dans l’original.] (goldstein, at p. 439) (goldstein, p. 439) (2) can the requirement of a “substantial connection” between the dispute and the foreign authority be applied by a quebec court so as to reject a foreign exercise of jurisdiction despite one of the jurisdictional criteria provided for in article 3168 ccq. being satisfied? (2) le tribunal québécois peut-il appliquer le critère du « rattachement important » entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère de manière à re- fuser de reconnaître la compétence de ce tri- bunal même s’il est satisfait à l’un des critères de compétence prévus à l’art 3168 ccq? [128] let me take stock. article 3164 ccq, in my view, authorizes recognition by a quebec court of a foreign authority’s jurisdiction on the basis of one of the “general provisions” in title three, including chapter i thereof, and including art 3139 ccq. therein. this brings me to the second interpretational issue that arises from the text of art. 3164, being whether a quebec court may apply the requirement of a “substantial connection” between the dispute [128] faisons le point. selon moi, l’art 3164 ccq. autorise le tribunal québécois à reconnaître la compé- tence d’une autorité étrangère en se fondant sur une des « dispositions générales » du titre troisième, y compris le chapitre premier de celui-ci et l’art 3139 ccq qui s’y trouvent. cela m’amène à la deuxième question d’interprétation qui découle du libellé de l’art. 3164, soit celle de savoir si un tribunal québécois peut ap- pliquer le critère du « rattachement important » entre [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 655 and the state whose authority is seized of the matter, so as to reject a foreign court’s exercise of juris- diction even where one of art. 3168’s jurisdictional criteria is satisfied. le litige et l’état dont l’autorité est saisie de manière à refuser de reconnaître la compétence de ce tribunal étranger même lorsqu’il est satisfait à l’un des critères de compétence prévus à l’art 3168. [129] the “real and substantial connection test” is both a constitutional principle and, at common law, a general organizing principle of private in- ternational law: van breda, at para 22 “before a court can assume jurisdiction over a claim, a ‘real and substantial connection’ must be shown between the circumstances giving rise to the claim and the jurisdiction where the claim is brought”: lapointe, at para. 25, referring to van breda, at paras. 22-24; society of composers, authors and music publishers of canada v. canadian assn. of internet providers, 2004 scc 45, [2004] 2 scr 427, at para. 60; tolof- son v. jensen, [1994] 3 scr 1022, at p. 1049; hunt v. t&n plc, [1993] 4 scr 289, at pp. 325-26 and 328; morguard investments ltd. v. de savoye, [1990] 3 scr 1077, at pp 1108-10. [129] le « critère du lien réel et substantiel » cons ti- tue à la fois un principe constitutionnel et, en common law, un principe directeur général de droit interna- tional privé : van breda, par 22 « avant qu’une cour puisse se déclarer compétente à l’égard d’une demande, il faut lui démontrer l’existence d’un lien “réel et substantiel” entre les circonstances à l’origine de la demande et le ressort où la demande est présen- tée » : lapointe, par. 25, faisant référence à van breda, par. 22-24; société canadienne des auteurs, composi- teurs et éditeurs de musique c. assoc. canadienne des fournisseurs internet, 2004 csc 45, [2004] 2 rcs. 427, par. 60; tolofson c. jensen, [1994] 3 rcs. 1022, p. 1049; hunt c. t&n plc, [1993] 4 rcs. 289, p. 325-326 et 328; morguard investments ltd. c. de savoye, [1990] 3 rcs 1077, p 1108-1110. in van breda, the court responded to “a [130] perceived need for greater direction on how [the real and substantial connection test] applies” (para. 67) by identifying a non- exhaustive list of four presump- tive connecting factors that, prima facie, entitle a court to assume jurisdiction over a dispute: “(a) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province; (b) the defendant carries on business in the province; (c) the tort was committed in the province; and (d) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province”: para 90. as the court described, the presumption as applied to any factor can be rebutted (at para. 81): [130] dans l’arrêt van breda, la cour a répondu à un besoin apparent de « directives complémentaires sur la façon d’[  ] appliquer [le critère du lien réel et substantiel] » (par. 67) en dressant une liste non exhaustive de quatre facteurs de rattachement créant une présomption autorisant, à première vue, un tri- bunal à se déclarer compétent à l’égard d’un litige : « a) le défendeur a son domicile dans la province ou y réside; b) le défendeur exploite une entreprise dans la province; c) le délit a été commis dans la province; d) un contrat lié au litige a été conclu dans la province » : par 90. comme la cour l’a expliqué, la présomption de compétence que fait naître l’un ou l’autre de ces facteurs peut être réfutée (par. 81) : the defendant might argue that a given connection is inappropriate in the circumstances of the case. in such a case, the defendant will bear the burden of negating the presumptive effect of the listed or new factor and convinc- ing the court that the proposed assumption of jurisdiction would be inappropriate. if no presumptive connecting factor, either listed or new, applies in the circumstances of a case or if the presumption of jurisdiction resulting from such a factor is properly rebutted, the court will lack jurisdiction on the basis of the common law real and substantial connection test  . le défendeur pourra plaider qu’un lien donné est inappro- prié dans les circonstances de l’affaire. dans un tel cas, il incombera au défendeur de réfuter la présomption créée par le facteur — énuméré ou nouveau — et de convaincre la cour qu’une déclaration de compétence serait inoppor- tune. si aucun facteur de rattachement — énuméré ou nouveau — créant une présomption ne s’applique dans les circonstances de l’affaire, ou si la présomption de com- pétence que fait naître ce facteur est valablement réfutée, la cour n’aura pas compétence en vertu du critère du lien réel et substantiel de la common law  . 656 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. [131] this framework is inspired largely by the uniform court jurisdiction and proceedings trans- fer act (“cjpta”), which focuses mainly on the as- sumption of jurisdiction: uniform law conference of canada (online) section  3(e) provides that a court may assume jurisdiction if “there is a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or territory] and the facts on which the proceeding against that person is based” (text in brackets in orig- inal). section 10 enumerates various circumstances in which such a connection would be presumed to exist. in a number of subsequent provincial and ter- ritorial statutes, the legislative scheme proposed in the cjpta has been adopted: see, eg,. court juris- diction and proceedings transfer act, sbc 2003, c. 28; court jurisdiction and proceedings transfer act, ss 1997, c. c-41.1; court jurisdiction and proceedings transfer act, sns 2003 (2nd sess.), c. 2; court jurisdiction and proceedings transfer act, sy 2000, c. 7; see also van breda, at para 41. [132] the connecting factors identified in van breda are substantially derived from rule 17.02 of the ontario rules of civil procedure, rro 1990, reg. 194 (“service outside ontario without leave”): van breda, at paras. 43, 83 and 87-88. to be clear, these service ex juris rules are purely procedural and do not by themselves determine the issue of the juris- diction of the ontario courts; the substantive source of jurisdiction is instead the presence of a “real and sub- stantial connection”: muscutt v. courcelles (2002), 60 or (3d) 20 (ca), at paras. 50-52; saumier, at p 712. as professor saumier explained (prior to van breda), “[i]n the canadian common law provinces, jurisdiction simpliciter is established through a com- bination of compliance with rules of service and the ‘real and substantial connection’ requirement derived from morguard”: p 693. [131] ce cadre s’inspire en grande partie de la loi uniforme sur la compétence des tribunaux et le renvoi des instances (« luctri »), qui est principalement axée sur la déclaration de compétence : conférence pour l’harmonisation des lois au canada (en ligne). l’alinéa 3e) prévoit qu’un tribunal peut se déclarer compétent s’il « existe un lien réel et substantiel entre [province ou territoire qui adopte la loi] et les faits sur lesquels est fondée l’instance » (texte entre cro- chets dans l’original). l’article 10 énonce diverses situations dans lesquelles l’existence d’un tel lien serait présumée. plusieurs provinces et territoires ont adopté subséquemment des lois inspirées par le régime législatif proposé dans la luctri : voir, p ex, la. court jurisdiction and proceedings transfer act, sbc 2003, c. 28; la loi sur la compétence des tribunaux et le renvoi des instances, ls 1997, c c-411; la court jurisdiction and proceedings transfer act, sns 2003 (2e sess), c. 2; la loi sur la compétence des tribunaux et le renvoi des instances, ly 2000, c. 7; voir aussi van breda, par 41. [132] les facteurs de rattachement énoncés dans l’arrêt van breda découlent principalement de la règle 17.02 des règles de procédure civile de l’on- tario, rro 1990,. règl. 194 (« signification en dehors de l’ontario sans autorisation du tribunal ») : van breda, par. 43, 83 et 87-88. en fait, ces règles relatives aux significations ex juris sont strictement des règles de procédure et ne tranchent pas en elles- mêmes la compétence des tribunaux de l’ontario; le critère de droit substantiel qui constitue la source de la compétence réside plutôt dans l’existence d’un « lien réel et substantiel » : muscutt c. courcelles (2002), 60 or (3d) 20 (ca), par. 50-52; saumier, p 712. comme l’a expliqué la professeure saumier (avant l’arrêt van breda), [traduction] « dans les provinces de common law canadiennes, la simple re- connaissance de compétence est établie par la preuve du respect tant des règles relatives à la signification que du critère du “lien réel et substantiel” découlant de l’arrêt morguard » : p 693. [133] so much for the common law. the functional equivalent of jurisdiction simpliciter in quebec law “is found in the relevant provisions on jurisdiction in title three of book ten of the civil code”: saumier, at p 693 “unlike their common law counterparts, [133] voilà pour la common law l’équivalent pratique de la règle de la simple reconnaissance de compétence en droit québécois [traduction] « se trouve dans les dispositions pertinentes sur la com- pétence énoncées au titre troisième du livre dixième [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 657 [however,] these rules are not merely procedural, they actually confer jurisdiction on québec courts”, and “[t]he possibility that the criteria in the code are to be construed as merely presumptive indicia of ju- risdiction” is not supported by the ccq:. saumier, at pp. 693 (fn. 51) and 694 (emphasis added). in spar, this court considered whether the [134] threshold of a “real and substantial connection” should be used when determining whether or not a quebec authority has international jurisdiction under art 3148 ccq. two of the appellants had argued that quebec courts could not assume jurisdiction on the basis of either an “injurious act” or “damage” in quebec under art 3148 ccq, since (the argument went) this court had, in morguard and in hunt, im- posed the additional condition that there be a “real and substantial connection” between the forum and the action (at para. 45), and that this also bound the courts of quebec. the court, however, flatly rejected this argument (at para. 50), adding (at paras. 55-57 and 63): as mentioned above, book ten of the ccq sets out the private international law rules for the province of quebec and must be read as a coherent whole and in light of the principles of comity, order and fairness. in my view, it is apparent from the explicit wording of art. 3148, as well as the other provisions of book ten, that the system of private international law is designed to ensure that there is a “real and substantial connection” between the action and the province of quebec and to guard against the improper assertion of jurisdiction. du code civil » : saumier, p 693 « [toutefois], contrairement à leur équivalent en common law, ces règles ne sont pas simplement procédurales; elles confèrent bel et bien une compétence aux tribunaux québécois », et « [l]’idée selon laquelle les critères du code devraient être considérés comme de simples indices de présomption de compétence » n’est pas appuyée par le code civil : saumier, p. 693 (note en bas de page 51) et 694 (je souligne). [134] dans l’arrêt spar, la cour s’est interrogée sur l’opportunité d’appliquer le critère du « lien réel et substantiel » pour décider si l’art. 3148  ccq. confère une compétence internationale aux autori- tés du québec. deux des appelantes avaient sou- tenu que les tribunaux québécois ne pouvaient se déclarer compétents sur un « fait dommageable » ou sur un « préjudice » survenu ou subi au québec, au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’application de l’art 3148 ccq, étant donné que (toujours selon les appelantes) dans les arrêts morguard et hunt, la cour avait ajouté une nouvelle exigence, celle de l’existence d’un « lien réel et substantiel » entre le tribunal et l’action (par. 45), et que cette exigence liait également les tribunaux québécois. or, la cour a catégoriquement rejeté cet argument (par. 50) et a ajouté les commentaires suivants (par. 55-57 et 63) : comme nous l’avons mentionné précédemment, le livre dixième du ccq énonce les règles de droit interna- tional privé applicables dans la province de québec. les dispositions de ce livre doivent s’interpréter comme un tout cohérent et en fonction des principes de courtoisie, d’ordre et d’équité. selon moi, il ressort des termes ex- plicites de l’art. 3148 et des autres dispositions du livre dixième que ce système de droit international privé vise à assurer la présence d’un « lien réel et substantiel » entre l’action et la province de québec, et à empêcher l’exercice inapproprié de la compétence du for québécois. looking at the wording of art. 3148 itself, it is arguable that the notion of a “real and substantial connection” is already subsumed under the provisions of art. 3148(3), given that each of the grounds listed (fault, injurious act, damage, contract) seems to be an example of a “real and substantial connection” between the province of quebec and the action. indeed, i am doubtful that a plaintiff who succeeds in proving one of the four grounds for jurisdic- tion would not be considered to have satisfied the “real and à l’examen du libellé même de l’art. 3148, on peut sou- tenir que la notion de « lien réel et substantiel » se trouve déjà subsumée sous les dispositions du par 3148(3). en effet, chacun des motifs énumérés (la faute, le fait dom- mageable, le préjudice, le contrat) semble être un exemple de situations qui constituent un « lien réel et substantiel » entre la province de québec et l’action. en fait, je doute que le demandeur qui réussit à prouver l’un des quatre motifs d’attribution de compétence ne soit pas considéré 658 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. substantial connection” criterion, at least for the purposes of jurisdiction simpliciter. comme ayant satisfait au critère du « lien réel et substan- tiel », du moins aux fins de la simple reconnaissance de compétence. next, from my examination of the system of rules found in book ten, it seems that the “real and substantial connection” criterion is captured in other provisions, to safeguard against the improper assumption of jurisdiction. in particular, it is my opinion that the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as codified at art. 3135, serves as an im- portant counterweight to the broad basis for jurisdiction set out in art 3148. in this way, it is open to the appellants to demonstrate, pursuant to art. 3135, that although there is a link to the quebec authorities, another forum is, in the interests of justice, better suited to take jurisdiction. ensuite, après examen du système de règles contenues dans le livre dixième, il me semble que le critère du « lien réel et substantiel » s’incarne dans d’autres dispositions afin d’offrir une protection contre l’exercice injustifié de compétence de la part d’un tribunal. plus particulièrement, à mon avis, la doctrine du forum non conveniens, telle que codifiée à l’art. 3135, constitue un contrepoids important à la large assise juridictionnelle prévue à l’art 3148. ainsi, les appelantes peuvent démontrer, en conformité avec l’art. 3135, que malgré l’existence d’un lien avec les auto- rités du québec, il y a un autre tribunal qui, dans l’intérêt de la justice, est mieux à même d’exercer sa compétence.   .   . in the case at bar, it seems reasonable to conclude that the requirement for a “real and substantial connection” between the action and the authority asserting jurisdiction is reflected in the overall scheme established by book ten. in my view, the appellants have not provided, nor does there seem to be, given the context of this case, any basis for the courts to apply the morguard constitutional principle in order to safeguard against this action being heard in a forum with which it has no real and substantial connection. [emphasis added.] en l’espèce, il paraît raisonnable de conclure que l’exi- gence relative à l’existence d’un « lien réel et substantiel » entre l’action et l’autorité qui se déclare compétente se dégage de l’économie générale du livre dixième. à mon avis, les appelantes n’ont fourni aucun motif permettant aux tribunaux d’appliquer le principe constitutionnel établi dans l’arrêt morguard  — aucun ne semble res- sortir non plus compte tenu du contexte de la présente affaire — de manière à empêcher qu’un tribunal qui n’a aucun lien réel et substantiel avec l’action n’en soit saisi. [je souligne.] see also infineon technologies ag v. option con- sommateurs, 2013 scc 59, [2013] 3 scr 600, at para. 45: “any one of the four individual factors listed in art. 3148(3) would constitute a sufficient connection with the province to ground jurisdiction”. voir aussi infineon technologies ag c. option con- sommateurs, 2013 csc 59, [2013] 3 rcs 600, par. 45 : « chacun des quatre facteurs mentionnés au par. 3148(3) créerait un lien suffisant avec la pro- vince pour fonder la compétence ». in sum, book ten of the ccq, stating as [135] it does the private international law of quebec, en- capsulates within its terms the requirement for a “real and substantial connection” between the action and the foreign authority’s state. in other words, a “real and substantial connection” does not oper- ate as an additional condition to those contained in art 3168 ccq; rather, it is given expression by the scheme contained within book ten, includ- ing art. 3168 itself. as this court later reiterated in lépine, “[a]s a whole, these rules [set out in title three] ensure compliance with the basic requirement that there be a real and substantial connection between [135] en somme, le livre dixième du code civil, qui énonce les règles de droit international privé applicables au québec, englobe l’exigence relative à l’existence d’un « lien réel et substantiel » entre l’action et l’état de l’autorité étrangère. autrement dit, l’existence d’un « lien réel et substantiel » ne constitue pas une condition supplémentaire par rap- port à celles énoncées à l’art 3168 ccq; elle se dégage plutôt de l’ensemble du régime décrit au livre dixième, y compris de l’art. 3168 lui- même. comme la cour l’a réitéré plus tard dans l’arrêt lépine, « [l’]ensemble de ces règles [énoncées au titre troi- sième] assure le respect de l’exigence fondamentale [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 659 the quebec court and the dispute, as this court noted in spar”: para 19. in that case, the court therefore concluded that “the ontario superior court of justice had jurisdiction pursuant to art 3168 ccq, since the corporation, the defendant to the action, had its head office in ontario”, which “connecting factor in itself justified finding that the ontario court had jurisdiction”: para. 38 (emphasis added). [136] contrary, then, to the opinion expressed by my colleague côté j. at paras. 260 and 262 of her reasons, it seems to me that lépine does (at least implicitly) reject the necessity of an independent in- quiry into the existence of a “substantial connection” when a finding of jurisdiction is based on the express provisions of art 3168 ccq: see emanuelli, at no 2911 ([translation] “the general rules on the international jurisdiction of foreign courts (in- cluding those set out in article 3168 ccq) are applicable as they stand, and the substantial con- nection requirement is interpreted strictly [fn. 635: with this solution, it is sufficient that, under arti- cle 3168 ccq, the foreign courts have “jurisdic- tion, in the strict sense, over the dispute”: canada post corp. v. lé pine, supra, at para 37]. it is not a separate condition, and it does not allow the doctrine of forum non conveniens to be applied. protection for quebec applicants lies elsewhere: in the rules concerning natural justice. this is the position taken by the su preme court in lépine” (emphasis added)). simi larly, bich ja remarked in hocking v. haziza, 2008 qcca 800 (at para. 175, fn. 50 (canlii)) upon the consistency between the view that a “substantial connection” between the dispute and the foreign authority within the meaning of art 3164 ccq is not a requirement that must be satisfied in addition to one of the subparagraphs of art 3168 ccq, and the approach taken by this court respecting the inter- pretation of art 3148 ccq in spar (and, i would add, in lépine). i also observe that art 3168 ccq. provides that the jurisdiction of a foreign author- ity “is recognized only” (in french: n’est reconnue que) — not “can be recognized only” (in french: ne peut être reconnue que) — thereby indicating that the satisfaction of any one of the six grounds enumerated de l’existence d’un “lien réel et substantiel” entre le tribunal québécois et le litige, comme l’a rappelé la cour dans l’arrêt spar » : par 19. toujours dans l’arrêt lépine, la cour a donc conclu que « [l’]exis- tence même de la compétence de la cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario ne fait pas de doute selon l’art 3168 ccq, puisque la société, défenderesse à l’action, a établi son siège social en ontario », le- quel « facteur de rattachement justifiait à lui seul la reconnaissance de la compétence du for ontarien » : par. 38 (je souligne). [136] ainsi, contrairement à l’opinion exprimée par ma collègue la juge côté aux par. 260 et 262 de ses motifs, je suis d’avis que l’arrêt lépine rejette bel et bien (du moins implicitement) la nécessité de procéder à une analyse indépendante de l’existence d’un « ratta- chement important » lorsque la conclusion quant à la compétence est fondée sur les dispositions expresses de l’art 3168 ccq : voir emanuelli, no 291.1 (« les règles générales sur la compétence internationale des tribunaux étrangers (notamment, celles contenues dans l’article 3168 ccq) sont applicables telles quelles et l’exigence d’un lien étroit est interprétée strictement [note en bas de page 635 : en vertu de cette solution, il suffit que selon l’article 3168 ccq les tri- bunaux étrangers aient « compétence au sens strict sur le litige » : société canadienne des postes c. lépine, supra, par 37]. elle n’est pas une condition à part et ne permet pas l’application de la théorie du forum non conveniens. la protection des requérants québé- cois se situe ailleurs : dans les règles qui concernent la justice naturelle. c’est la position adoptée par la cour suprême dans l’affaire lépine » (je souligne)). dans la même veine, la juge bich de la cour d’appel du québec a signalé dans l’arrêt hocking c. haziza, 2008 qcca 800 (par. 175, note en bas de page 50 (canlii)), la convergence entre l’opinion selon la- quelle l’existence d’un « rattachement important » entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’application de l’art 3164 ccq ne constitue pas une exigence à laquelle il faut satisfaire en plus de satisfaire à l’une des conditions prévues à l’un des paragraphes de l’art 3168 ccq, d’une part, et l’approche retenue par la cour au sujet de l’inter- prétation de l’art 3148 ccq dans l’arrêt spar (ainsi que, selon moi, dans l’arrêt lépine), d’autre part. je remarque aussi qu’aux termes de l’art 3168 ccq, la 660 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. in art 3168 ccq is sufficient to establish the juris- diction of a foreign authority. [137] my colleague côté j. nonetheless concludes that while “there will be exceptional circumstances in which, despite the presence of one of the connect- ing factors under art 3168 ccq, further analysis will be required under art 3164 ccq to determine whether there is a substantial connection between the foreign state and the dispute”: para. 236; see also para. 251 (“there may be exceptional circumstances where there will be no substantial connection be- tween the dispute and the foreign state even though one of the factors in art 3168 ccq is technically present”). this would, if correct, mean that a quebec court could disregard its affirmative finding under art 3168 ccq of the jurisdiction of a foreign au- thority and conclude, after a subjective assessment of all the circumstances of the case, that there is no “substantial connection” between the dispute and the foreign authority, such that the foreign authority had no jurisdiction over the dispute. with respect, this seems to me to be in error. compétence d’une autorité étrangère « n’est reconnue que » dans certains cas (en anglais : « is recognized only ») — et non « ne peut être reconnue que » (en anglais : « can be recognized only ») —, ce qui in- dique que le respect de l’un des six motifs énumérés à l’art 3168 ccq est suffisant pour établir la com- pétence d’un tribunal étranger. [137] ma collègue la juge côté conclut néan- moins qu’« il y aura des circonstances exception- nelles où, malgré la présence de l’un des facteurs de rattachement énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq, il fau- dra procéder à une analyse plus poussée, fondée sur l’art 3164 ccq, afin de déterminer s’il existe un rattachement important entre l’état étranger et le li- tige » : par. 236; voir aussi le par. 251 (« il peut y avoir des circonstances exceptionnelles où il n’existe pas de rattachement important entre le litige et l’état étranger — même lorsque l’un des facteurs énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq est, strictement parlant, présent »). si tel était effectivement le cas, cela signifierait qu’un tribunal québécois pourrait faire fi de sa conclusion affirmative quant à la compétence de l’autorité étran- gère en application de l’art 3168 ccq et conclure, après une appréciation subjective de l’ensemble des circonstances de l’affaire, qu’il n’existe pas de « rat- tachement important » entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère, de sorte que celle-ci ne pouvait se déclarer compétente à l’égard du litige. soit dit en tout respect, ce raisonnement me semble erroné. [138] côté j.’s conclusion rests in part on what i see as a misreading of a passage from this court’s reasons in lépine (para. 36) and i have explained my views as to the true significance of that passage. my colleague, however, also quite fairly points to authority (other than lépine) supporting her inter- pretation of the relationship between arts. 3164 and 3168 ccq: at para. 238; see, for example, hocking, at paras. 181-87 and 199; zimmermann, at para. 12 (referring to hocking); heerema, at paras. 23 and 26 (albeit in obiter, and referring to a decision of an inferior court). in my respectful view, however, these authorities are mistaken and on this point should be rejected. [138] la conclusion de la juge côté repose en partie sur ce qui m’apparaît être une mauvaise interprétation du passage tiré des motifs de la cour dans l’arrêt lépine (par. 36), dont j’ai déjà expliqué quel est le sens véritable selon moi. ma collègue cite cependant à juste titre des sources (autres que l’arrêt lépine) qui appuient son interprétation de la relation entre les art. 3164 et 3168 ccq : par. 238; voir, par exemple, hocking, par. 181-187 et 199; zimmermann, par. 12 (mentionnant l’arrêt hocking); heerema, par. 23 et 26 (quoique dans le cadre d’une remarque incidente, et mentionnant une décision d’une juridiction d’ins- tance inférieure). or, selon moi, cette jurisprudence est erronée et devrait être rejetée sur ce point. [139] to begin, the view that art 3164 ccq re- quires that there be a substantial connection between [139] tout d’abord, l’affirmation selon laquelle l’art 3164 ccq exige un rattachement important [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 661 the dispute and the forum, even where one of the conditions for jurisdiction of a foreign authority is established under art. 3168  ccq finds no sup- port, and indeed is inconsistent with, the text of art 3164 ccq itself. for convenience, i repeat that text here: entre le litige et le tribunal étranger, même lorsqu’un des critères de la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal étranger énoncé à l’art.  3168  ccq. est établi, n’est nullement appuyée par le texte de l’art 3164 ccq; elle est même incompatible avec celui-ci. par souci de commodité, je reproduis cette disposition de nouveau ici : 3164 the jurisdiction of foreign authorities is established in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction applicable to québec authorities under title three of this book, to the extent that the dispute is substantially connected with the state whose authority is seized of the matter. 3164 la compétence des autorités étrangères est établie suivant les règles de compétence applicables aux autorités québécoises en vertu du titre troisième du présent livre dans la mesure où le litige se rattache d’une façon impor- tante à l’état dont l’autorité a été saisie. [140] as this text makes express, any concern for a “substantial connection” arises only where the ju- risdiction of a foreign authority is established on the provisions of title three. it follows that, whatever the reference in art 3164 ccq signifies, it does not apply when a finding of jurisdiction is grounded not on a provision within title three, but rather of title four, including arts. 3165 to 3168 ccq. i observe in this regard that professor talpis acknowledges (at pp. 105-6), while arguing that the “substantial connection” test must be satisfied in addition to one of the subparagraphs of art 3168 ccq, that in this respect his position is inconsistent with the text of art 3164 ccq: [140] comme cette disposition le prévoit expressé- ment, la question de l’existence d’un « rattachement important » se pose uniquement lorsque la compé- tence d’une autorité étrangère est établie en appli- cation des dispositions du titre troisième. il s’ensuit que, indépendamment de ce que le renvoi figurant à l’art 3164 ccq peut signifier, cette disposition ne s’applique pas lorsque la reconnaissance de la compétence repose non pas sur une disposition du titre troisième, mais plutôt sur une disposition du titre quatrième, y compris les art. 3165 à 3168 ccq. je constate à ce propos que, tout en faisant valoir qu’il doit être satisfait au critère du « rattachement important » ainsi qu’à l’une des conditions énoncées aux paragraphes de l’art 3168 ccq, le profes- seur talpis reconnaît (p. 105-106) que, à cet égard, son point de vue est incompatible avec le texte de l’art 3164 ccq :. first, the requirements of art 3168 ccq for personal actions of a patrimonial nature must be fulfilled   . [traduction] premièrement, il doit être satisfait aux conditions énoncées à l’art 3168 ccq à l’égard des actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial  . second, it is necessary to fulfill the “substantial con- nection” requirement of art 3164 ccq,   . deuxièmement, il est nécessaire de satisfaire à l’exigence du « rattachement important » énoncée à l’art 3164 ccq,   . as indicated, it applies to title iii but, in my opinion, may perhaps also apply to the specific rules within title iv. comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, cette exigence s’ap- plique au titre troisième, mais pourrait aussi s’appliquer, selon moi, aux règles particulières qui figurent au titre quatrième.   .   . according to art 3164 ccq, the jurisdiction un- der evaluation must be one with which the dispute is suivant l’art 3164 ccq, il doit exister un rattache- ment important entre le litige et l’autorité qui en a été 662 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. substantially connected. this qualifier to the recognition of the authority of the foreign court is, according to the text of the provision, limited to use in matters for which no spe- cific rule is provided, although recently it has been used to call into question the jurisdiction of a foreign authority in personal matters of a patrimonial nature (art 3168 ccq) [referring to cortas canning; underlining added; footnote omitted.] [141] the reasons of bich ja in hocking, to which côté j. refers in her reasons (at para. 244), also con- tain an admission that such an interpretation of the relationship between arts. 3164 and 3168 ccq. essentially has the effect of rewriting art 3164 ccq. (at para. 183): saisie. cette condition préalable à la reconnaissance de la compétence du tribunal étranger ne peut être appliquée, suivant le texte de cette disposition, que dans les cas pour lesquels aucune règle spécifique n’est prévue, bien qu’elle ait récemment été invoquée pour remettre en question la compétence d’une autorité étrangère dans des actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial (art 3168 ccq) [citant le jugement cortas canning; je souligne; note en bas de page omise.] [141] les motifs que la juge bich de la cour d’ap- pel a rédigés dans l’arrêt hocking, et auxquels la juge côté renvoie au par. 244 de ses motifs, comportent également l’admission qu’une telle interprétation de la relation entre les art. 3164 et 3168 ccq a es- sentiellement pour effet de récrire l’art 3164 ccq. (par. 183) : [translation] in other words, the substantial connec- tion test formulated in art 3164 ccq applies both to the jurisdiction rules in title three and to those that, as the case may be, replace, clarify or limit these rules, as though the provision stated the following: autrement dit, l’exigence du rattachement important que formule l’article  3164  ccq s’applique tant aux règles de compétence du titre troisième qu’à celles qui, le cas échéant, les remplacent, les précisent ou les restrei- gnent comme si la disposition énonçait que : 3164 the jurisdiction of foreign authorities is es- tablished in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction applicable to quebec authorities under title three of this book or according to the rules that follow, to the extent that the dispute is substantially connected with the country whose authority is seized of the case. [underlining added.] 3164 la compétence des autorités étrangères est éta- blie suivant les règles de compétence applicables aux autorités québécoises en vertu du titre troisième du présent livre ou selon les règles qui suivent dans la mesure où le litige se rattache d’une façon importante à l’état dont l’autorité a été saisie. [je souligne.] to be clear, this is not how the quebec legislator has chosen to phrase art 3164 ccq. indeed, by adopting art 3164 ccq, the quebec legislator makes plain its intention that the express provisions of art 3168 ccq would not be subject to the addi- tional criterion of a “substantial connection” which later court decisions, to which côté j. refers, have imposed. as explained by professor goldstein (at p. 437): or, ce n’est pas ainsi que le législateur québécois a choisi de formuler l’art 3164 ccq. en fait, en adoptant cette disposition, le législateur québécois a exprimé clairement son intention que les dispositions expresses de l’art 3168 ccq ne comportent pas le critère additionnel de « rattachement important » im- posé par certaines décisions judiciaires ultérieures, auxquelles renvoie la juge côté. comme l’a expliqué le professeur goldstein (p. 437) : [translation]    when article 3168 ccq was enacted, it did not appear that the substantial connection require- ment in article 3164 ccq could also apply to the express rules on indirect jurisdiction so that indirect jurisdiction could be reviewed on a case-by- case basis. it is the courts that have recently interpreted article 3164 ccq in this manner     [text in brackets omitted.]    lors de l’adoption de l’article 3168 ccq, il n’était pas apparu que l’exigence d’un rattachement étroit figurant à l’article 3164 ccq pouvait aussi s’appliquer aux règles de compétence indirecte expresses de manière à contrôler ponctuellement la compétence indirecte. c’est la jurispru- dence qui a récemment interprété l’article 3164 ccq en ce sens    [éléments entre crochets omis.] [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 663 [142] the better approach, in my view — and the approach that conforms to the quebec legislator’s in- tention — is to conclude, as did this court in lépine, that “[a]rticles 3165 to 3168    set out, in more spe- cific terms, connecting factors to be used to determine whether, in certain situations, a sufficient connection exists between the dispute and the foreign authority”: para 36. in other words, art 3168 ccq is not sub- ject to any additional requirement of a “substantial connection” because it incarnates both the “mirror principle” and the requirement of a “substantial con- nection” enunciated in art 3164 ccq. more pre- cisely, the provisions of art 3168 ccq (a) mirror those of art 3148 ccq, to which art 3164 ccq. refers by cross- reference to title three, but (b) are also more restrictive than those of art 3148 ccq, precisely in order to ensure the existence of a “sub- stantial connection” between the dispute and the foreign authority: [142] à mon avis, la meilleure approche — et celle qui est compatible avec l’intention du législateur — consiste à conclure, comme l’a fait la cour dans l’ar- rêt lépine, que « [l]es articles 3165 à 3168 énoncent [  ] de manière plus spécifique des facteurs de rat- tachement permettant de conclure à la présence d’un lien suffisant entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère dans certaines situations » : par 36. autrement dit, l’art 3168 ccq n’est pas assujetti à une exigence supplémentaire liée à l’existence d’un « rattache- ment important », parce qu’il englobe à la fois le « principe du miroir » et l’exigence du « rattache- ment important » énoncée à l’art 3164 ccq. plus précisément, les dispositions de l’art 3168 ccq. a) sont le reflet de celles de l’art 3148 ccq, auquel renvoie l’art 3164 ccq en faisant référence au titre troisième, mais b) sont également plus restrictives que celles de l’art 3148 ccq, précisément pour assurer l’existence d’un « rattachement important » entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère : in commercial matters the mirror principle is weak- ened, however, by the existence of article 3168, which establishes particular grounds for jurisdiction of foreign authorities “in personal actions of a patrimonial nature”. the provisions of article 3168 are generally more restric- tive than those of its mirror equivalent, article 3148, which establishes jurisdictional grounds for quebec authorities for the same types of cases. [traduction] en matière commerciale, le principe du miroir est toutefois affaibli par l’existence de l’ar- ticle 3168, qui établit des chefs de compétence précis applicables aux autorités étrangères « dans les actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial ». de façon générale, l’article 3168 est plus restrictif que son pendant, l’ar- ticle 3148, qui établit les chefs de compétence applicables aux autorités québécoises dans les mêmes types d’affaires. (glenn (1997), at p. 409) (glenn (1997), p. 409) see also talpis, at p. 104: voir également talpis, p. 104 : however, in other civil and commercial matters, the grounds for the jurisdiction of foreign courts are far more restrictive than for those of quebec. this departure from the mirror- image approach was deemed necessary to pro- tect defendants from inappropriately- taken foreign juris- diction and to further the civil and private international law policy goals of securing legal certainty and foreseeability of law. [traduction] cependant, dans les autres affaires ci- viles et commerciales, les chefs de compétence des tribu- naux étrangers sont beaucoup plus restreints que ceux qui s’appliquent aux tribunaux du québec. cette entorse au principe du miroir a été jugée nécessaire afin de protéger les défendeurs contre l’exercice irrégulier de la compétence du for étranger, et pour promouvoir les principes directeurs du droit civil et du droit international privé, soit assurer la certitude juridique et favoriser la prévisibilité du droit. [143] indeed, according to art. 3168(1), recogni- tion of the jurisdiction of a foreign authority rests on the defendant having been domiciled in the foreign state, whereas mere residence in quebec will suf- fice for domestic jurisdiction: art. 3148 para 1(1). [143] d’ailleurs, suivant le par. 3168(1), pour que la compétence de l’autorité étrangère soit reconnue, il est nécessaire que le défendeur soit domicilié dans l’état étranger tandis que, dans le cas des autorités québécoises, il suffit que le défendeur ait sa résidence 664 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. similarly, while art. 3168(3) requires that both the damage and the injurious act took place in the for- eign jurisdiction, the domestic rule is significantly less stringent, requiring only one or the other, but not both: art. 3148 para 1(3). in a contractual dispute, foreign jurisdiction is grounded under art. 3168(4) on the place of performance of “the obligations arising from” the contract, while the jurisdiction of quebec courts is recognized merely on “one of the obliga- tions” being due in the province: art. 3148 para 1(3). the “overall effect” of art. 3168 is clearly “one of narrowing the reflection of québec jurisdictional bases when the mirror is turned toward foreign ju- risdictions”: saumier, at p. 688; see also labs of virginia inc. v. clintrials bioresearch ltd., [2003] rjq 1876 (sup. ct.), at paras 20-30. adding a further requirement of substantial connection would, professor saumier correctly adds (at p. 689 (fn. 42)), “see[m] excessive” (and i would also add, redundant) in light of these already stricter conditions for recog- nizing foreign jurisdiction. see also j. walker, castel & walker: canadian conflict of laws (6th ed. (loose- leaf)), at p. 14-24: “in principle, article 3164 is not relevant when special rules of jurisdiction like those found in article 3168 of the civil code are applicable as the grounds for establishing the jurisdiction of for- eign authorities in personal actions of a patrimonial nature are more restrictive than those applicable to the international jurisdiction of quebec authorities in similar actions” (footnote omitted). au québec : art. 3148 al 1(1). dans le même ordre d’idées, tandis que le par. 3168(3) exige à la fois que le préjudice ait été subi dans l’état étranger et que la faute y ait été commise pour que la compétence des autorités étrangères soit reconnue, la règle est beau- coup moins stricte en ce qui concerne les autorités québécoises, puisque seule l’une ou l’autre de ces deux conditions doit être établie, et non les deux : art 3148 al 1(3). dans les litiges contractuels, la compétence des autorités étrangères repose, suivant le par. 3168(4), sur le lieu d’exécution des « obliga- tions découlant » du contrat, tandis que la compé- tence des tribunaux québécois est reconnue si « une [seule] des obligations » découlant du contrat doit être exécutée dans la province : art 3148 al 1(3). l’article 3168 a manifestement pour [traduction] « effet global » « de restreindre la portée des chefs de compétence reconnus à l’égard des autorités québé- coises lorsqu’on applique le principe du miroir aux autorités étrangères » : saumier, p. 688; voir aussi labs of virginia inc. c. clintrials bioresearch ltd., [2003] rjq 1876 (cs), par 20-30. comme le souligne à juste titre la professeure saumier (p. 689 (note en bas de page 42)), l’ajout d’une autre exi- gence, soit l’existence d’un rattachement important [traduction] « semble excessif » — je dirais même redondant —, étant donné que les conditions rela- tives à la reconnaissance des autorités étrangères sont déjà plus strictes. voir aussi j. walker, castel & walker : canadian conflict of laws (6e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), p. 14-24 : [traduction] « en principe, l’article 3164 n’est pas pertinent lorsque des règles de compétence spéciales, comme celles figurant à l’article 3168 du code civil, servant à déterminer la compétence d’autorités étrangères dans des actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial sont plus res- trictives que celles relatives à la compétence inter- nationale des autorités québécoises dans des actions similaires » (note en bas de page omise). [144] this narrower scope for recognizing a for- eign authority’s jurisdiction under art 3168 ccq. stands in contrast to arts. 3166 (dealing with mat- ters of filiation where the child or a parent is dom- iciled in, or is a national of, a foreign state) and 3167 ccq (dealing with matters of divorce where certain connections exist with a foreign state), each of which expands the scope of jurisdiction of foreign [144] ces conditions plus strictes auxquelles est assujettie la reconnaissance de la compétence des au- torités étrangères en application de l’art 3168 ccq. sont bien différentes de celles qui sont énoncées à l’art. 3166 (qui concerne la compétence en matière de filiation lorsque l’enfant ou l’un de ses parents est domicilié dans un état étranger ou a la nationa- lité qui y est rattachée) et à l’art 3167 ccq (qui [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 665 authorities, relative to quebec courts: saumier, at p 682. according to art 3166 ccq,. quebec courts will recognize foreign jurisdiction in terms of filia- tion based either on domicile or nationality, whereas quebec jurisdiction can only flow from domicile. article 3167 ccq is also more generous in its recognition of foreign divorces than the divorce act, rsc 1985, c. 3 (2nd supp.), s 22. this “broaden- ing effect” is explained, however, by “the principle of validation in matters of status that has received general approval in international instruments and modern private international law codifications”: saumier, at p. 682; see also ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), at pp 2024-25. to impose an additional cri- terion of “substantial connection” in these two cases “would contradict the favor validatis principle said to underlie these broadening provisions”: saumier, at p 683. [145] i therefore agree with the statement of the superior court judge in this case (at para. 12 (canlii)) that “the real and substantial connection test is not an additional criterion that should be found in quebec law” and that “the dispositions of book ten of the civil code which includ[e] article 3168 subsum[e] the real and substantial connection test as expressed by the common law jurisprudence”. concerne les actions en matière de divorce lorsque certains liens existent avec un état étranger), deux dispositions qui élargissent la portée de la com- pétence des autorités étrangères comparativement à celle des tribunaux québécois : saumier, p 682. suivant l’art 3166 ccq, les tribunaux québécois reconnaissent la compétence des autorités étran- gères en matière de filiation sur le fondement du domicile ou de la nationalité, tandis que seul le do- micile constitue un chef de compétence, s’agissant des autorités québécoises. l’article 3167 ccq est également plus généreux que l’art. 22 de la loi sur le divorce, lrc 1985, c 3 (2e suppl), en matière de reconnaissance des divorces étrangers. cette [tra- duction] « portée élargie » s’explique toutefois par « le principe de validation qui s’applique en matière d’état civil et qui est généralement approuvé dans les instruments internationaux et dans les co- difications modernes du droit international privé » : saumier, p. 682; voir aussi ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), p 2024-2025. imposer un critère additionnel de « rattachement important » dans ces deux cas-là « irait à l’encontre du principe favor validatis qui sous- tend apparemment ces dispositions élargissant la portée de la compétence » : saumier, p 683. [145] en conséquence, je souscris aux remarques formulées par le juge de la cour supérieure en l’espèce (par. 12 (canlii)), selon lesquelles [traduction] « le critère du lien réel et substantiel n’est pas un critère supplémentaire dont il y a lieu de reconnaître l’exis- tence en droit québécois » et « le critère du “lien réel et substantiel” énoncé dans la jurisprudence de common law est subsumé dans les dispositions du livre dixième du code civil, dont l’article 3168 ». [146] all this having been said, i stress that the mere fact that the substantial connection test has been subsumed into art 3168 ccq does not signify that the existence of such a connection is no longer relevant to deciding whether a party has submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign authority. the provisions of art 3168 ccq are intended to establish a sub- stantial connection between the dispute or the parties and the foreign authority’s state. where, therefore, a quebec court is considering whether a defendant has [146] cela dit, je souligne que le simple fait que le critère du lien réel et substantiel ait été subsumé dans l’art 3168 ccq ne signifie pas que l’existence d’un tel lien n’est plus pertinente pour décider si une partie a reconnu la compétence d’un tribunal étran- ger. les dispositions de l’art 3168 ccq visent à établir l’existence d’un rattachement important entre le litige ou les parties et l’autorité étrangère. par conséquent, lorsqu’un tribunal québécois examine si un défendeur a reconnu la compétence d’une autorité 666 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign authority within the meaning of art 3168(6) ccq, it must look for factors sufficient to establish a substantial connection between the defendant and the foreign authority. this is precisely why i agree with my col- league côté j. that mr. barer has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the utah court merely by presenting one argument pertaining to the merits of the action in his motion to dismiss. this single act does not, in and of itself, suffice to establish a substantial con- nection between mr. barer and the utah court and, therefore, does not constitute implicit submission under art 3168 ccq. [147] my colleague côté j. adds, however, that “[t]he relevance of a distinct substantial connection requirement is illustrated by the case law”: para 249. i acknowledge that the case law does not show its irrelevance. but it certainly does not illustrate the centrality of such a requirement. the result in cortas canning, a decision relied on by my colleague, was driven principally by the quebec superior court’s evident concern — albeit expressed in obiter dicta — about recognizing a $9 million judgment rendered by default on a contract for $96 worth of merchan- dise purchased in texas. such an award was viewed as so “extremely high in the circumstances” that the outcome of the decision could be considered as “manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in international relations” within the meaning of art 3155(5) ccq: pp. 1231 and 1241; see also mckinnon v. polisuk, 2009 qccs 5778; talpis, at pp. 171-72 (“if a disproportionate damage award is accompanied by other questionable circum- stances, such as a sizable discrepancy between the harm actually done to the plaintiff and the amount claimed, as was the case in cortas canning, then it seems that a quebec court might be willing to employ the public order grounds to refuse to recog- nize the decision” (footnote omitted)); emanuelli, at no. 299 ([translation] “some quebec court decisions have suggested that a foreign monetary award that substantially exceeds what would have been awarded by a quebec court may be contrary to quebec public order under international law, es- pecially if it corresponds to punitive or exemplary étrangère au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’appli- cation du par 3168(6) ccq, il doit rechercher des facteurs suffisants pour établir l’existence d’un rat- tachement important entre le défendeur et l’autorité étrangère. c’est précisément la raison pour laquelle je suis d’accord avec ma collègue la juge côté pour dire que m. barer n’a pas reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah du simple fait qu’il a présenté un unique argument quant au bien- fondé de l’action dans sa requête en irrecevabilité. ce seul acte ne suf- fit pas en soi à établir l’existence d’un rattachement important entre m. barer et le tribunal de l’utah et, par conséquent, ne constitue pas une reconnaissance implicite au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’applica- tion de l’art 3168 ccq. [147] ma collègue la juge côté ajoute toutefois que « [l]a jurisprudence illustre la pertinence d’une exi- gence distincte de rattachement important » : par 249. je reconnais qu’il ne ressort pas de la jurisprudence qu’il s’agit d’un facteur non pertinent, mais on ne peut certainement pas en inférer qu’il s’agit d’une exigence fondamentale. dans la décision cortas canning, sur laquelle s’est fondée ma collègue, le facteur détermi- nant pour l’issue de l’affaire a été — bien qu’elle ait été formulée dans une remarque incidente — la pré- occupation évidente de la cour supérieure du québec quant à la reconnaissance d’un jugement par défaut de 9 m$ rendu en lien avec un contrat relatif à l’achat au texas de produits d’une valeur de 96 $. la cour supérieure a considéré que le montant auquel avaient été condamnés les défendeurs était [traduction] « extrêmement élevé dans les circonstances », de sorte que le résultat pouvait être considéré « manifeste- ment incompatible avec l’ordre public tel qu’il est entendu dans les relations internationales », critère prévu au par 3155(5) ccq : p. 1231 et 1241; voir aussi mckinnon c. polisuk, 2009 qccs 5778; tal pis, p. 171-172 ([traduction] « si, en plus d’une condam- nation à des dommages- intérêts disproportionnés, on est en présence d’autres circonstances controversées, comme un écart considérable entre le préjudice effec- tivement causé au demandeur et le montant réclamé, comme c’était le cas dans l’affaire cortas canning, il semble que le tribunal québécois pourrait être enclin à invoquer des motifs d’ordre public pour refuser de reconnaître la décision » (note en bas de page omise)); emanuelli, no 299 (« certaines décisions judiciaires [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 667 damages. this position    seems correct to us” (footnote omitted)); beals v. saldanha, 2003 scc 72, [2003] 3 scr 416, at paras. 71 et seq. and 219 et seq.; convention on choice of court agreements (2005): art 11 (i should add that i make no comment on whether it is possible to deny recognition under art 3155(5) ccq on the basis of excessive awards of punitive or compensatory damages.) [148] nor does hocking, another decision relied on by my colleague at para. 250 of her reasons, support her statement. in hocking, bich ja concluded that none of the connecting factors of art 3168 ccq. were met with respect to quebec class members; indeed, bich ja concluded that art 3168(6) ccq. could not apply in the context of a class action be- cause the quebec class members had not chosen the ontario court, thus breaking with “the premise of a choice of forum made by the party instituting the action” on which art 3168(6) ccq is based: para 214. i acknowledge that bich ja added (at para. 220) that [translation] “even supposing that art 3168(6) ccq justified a priori the jurisdiction of the ontario court”, art 3164 ccq would prevent it, but this does not illustrate an absolute need for a distinct substantial connection requirement in order to deny recognition in such circumstances. rather, hocking is simply an example of a case in which art 3168(6) ccq was not satisfied. québécoises ont laissé entendre qu’une condamna- tion pécuniaire étrangère, excédant substantiellement ce qu’aurait accordé un tribunal québécois, peut être contraire à l’ordre public québécois au sens du droit in- ternational, surtout si elle correspond à des dommages punitifs ou exemplaires. cette position [  ] nous paraît juste » (note en bas de page omise)); beals c. saldanha, 2003 csc 72, [2003] 3 rcs 416, par. 71 et suiv. et par. 219 et suiv.; convention sur les accords d’élection de for (2005) : art 11 (j’ajouterais que je ne me prononce aucunement sur la question de savoir s’il est possible de refuser de reconnaître un jugement au titre du par 3155(5) ccq au motif que les dommages- intérêts punitifs ou compensatoires octroyés sont excessifs.) [148] l’arrêt hocking, sur lequel ma collègue s’est aussi fondée au par.  250 de ses motifs, n’appuie pas non plus sa position. dans ce jugement, la juge bich de la cour d’appel a conclu qu’aucun des fac- teurs de rattachement énumérés à l’art 3168 ccq. n’était respecté en ce qui concerne les membres d’un groupe québécois; en fait, elle a conclu que le par 3168(6) ccq ne pouvait pas s’appliquer dans le contexte d’un recours collectif parce que les membres du groupe québécois n’avaient pas choisi le tribunal ontarien, ce qui ne respectait pas « la prémisse d’un choix de for effectué par celui qui a institué l’action » sur laquelle repose le par 3168(6) ccq : par 214. je reconnais que la juge bich a ajouté (par. 220) qu’« à supposer même que le paragraphe 3168(6) ccq. justifie ici, a priori, la compétence du tribunal on- tarien », l’art 3164 ccq l’empêcherait, mais cela ne démontre pas une nécessité absolue qu’il y ait une exigence de rattachement important distincte pour nier la reconnaissance du tribunal dans de telles circonstances. l’arrêt hocking est plutôt simplement un exemple de cas où il n’avait pas été satisfait au par 3168(6) ccq. [149] all this said, i concede that a quebec court must conduct an independent inquiry into the ex- istence of a “substantial connection” between the dispute and the foreign authority where the court bases its conclusion regarding the foreign authority’s jurisdiction on one of the “general provisions” in chapter i of title three. this follows from the text of art 3164 ccq, and its reference to title three. [149] cela étant, j’admets qu’un tribunal québécois doit mener une analyse indépendante relativement à l’existence d’un « rattachement important » entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère lorsque la conclusion sur la compétence de ce dernier repose sur une des « dispositions générales » du chapitre premier du livre troisième. c’est ce qui découle du libellé de l’art 3164 ccq et du renvoi au livre troisième qui 668 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. the approach taken by the quebec court of appeal in ortega is therefore correct5 (at paras. 36, 41 and 42 (canlii)): s’y trouve. en conséquence, l’approche qu’a suivie la cour d’appel du québec dans l’arrêt ortega est la bonne5 (par. 36, 41 et 42 (canlii)) : [translation] where, as here, none of the specific connecting factors set out in articles 3165 to 3168 ccq. is applicable, it must also be shown, in accordance with article 3164 ccq, that the dispute is substantially con- nected with the state whose authority is seized of the matter   . lorsque, comme en l’espèce, aucun des facteurs spécifiques de rattachement énoncés aux articles 3165 à 3168  ccq ne trouve application, il y a également lieu de démontrer, conformément à l’article 3164 ccq, l’existence d’un lien important entre le litige et l’état dont l’autorité a été saisie  .   .   . the addition of this substantial connection requirement in article 3164 ccq in fact goes back to this idea of a real and substantial connection between the court and the subject matter of the dispute. l’ajout à l’article 3164 ccq de cette exigence d’un rattachement important est en fait un rappel de cette idée de lien réel et substantiel entre le tribunal et l’objet du litige. this imperative requires the quebec court inquiring into the jurisdiction of the foreign court (where that juris- diction does not result from articles 3166 to 3168 ccq) to consider and look at all the circumstances connecting the dispute to the foreign authority. this could lead to a finding that the foreign authority, in the absence of such a connection, does not have jurisdiction. [emphasis added.] cet impératif oblige le tribunal québécois qui s’inter- roge sur la compétence du tribunal étranger (dans le cas où celle-ci ne résulte pas des articles 3166 à 3168 ccq) à envisager et à examiner toutes les circonstances ratta- chant le litige à l’autorité externe. un tel examen pourrait se solder par le constat que celle-ci, en l’absence d’un tel lien, n’est pas compétente. [je souligne.] given this acknowledgement, i reject the criticism that my position “render[s] the express words used by the quebec legislature largely without effect, at least in the context of personal actions of a patrimo- nial nature”: see côté j.’s reasons, at para 248. cela étant, je rejette la critique selon laquelle ma po- sition « ferait perdre presque tout effet aux termes ex- près employés par le législateur québécois, du moins dans le contexte des actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial » : voir les motifs de la juge côté, par 248. [150] i add, however, that it is unnecessary, in order to determine this appeal, to decide whether a quebec court must also conduct a similar inquiry where it bases its conclusion regarding the foreign authori- ty’s jurisdiction on one of the “special provisions” in chapter ii of title three (for example, in matters of nullity of marriage (art 3144 ccq, to which art 3164 ccq refers by cross- reference to title three) or in matters of succession (art 3153 ccq, to which art 3164 ccq refers by cross- reference to title three)). support for arguments in each direction can be found in the authorities (contrast, for example, spar, at paras. 55 and 63; ortega, at para. 41; talpis and castel, at no. 486; and goldstein, at p. 391, with [150] j’ajoute toutefois que, pour trancher le pré- sent pourvoi, il n’est pas nécessaire de décider si un tribunal québécois doit également mener une analyse semblable lorsqu’il fonde sa conclusion au sujet de la compétence de l’autorité étrangère sur une des « dispositions particulières » du chapitre deuxième du titre troisième (par exemple, en matière de nul- lité du mariage (art 3144 ccq, auquel renvoie l’art 3164 ccq en faisant référence au titre troi- sième) ou en matière successorale (art 3153 ccq, auquel renvoie l’art 3164 ccq en faisant référence au titre troisième)). l’une et l’autre des positions trouvent appui dans la doctrine et dans la jurispru- dence (pour s’en convaincre, il suffit de comparer, 5 it therefore seems to me that there is no uniformity among what my colleague presents as “the prevailing jurisprudence of the court of appeal”: côté j.’s reasons, at paras. 235 and 238. 5 il me semble donc qu’il n’y a pas d’uniformité dans ce que ma collègue présente comme « la jurisprudence dominante à la cour d’appel » : motifs de la juge côté, par. 235 et 238. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 669 spar, at para. 57, and lépine, at paras. 32-36), and it is not necessary for me to decide it here. because, however, of the extensive discussion of this subject in the reasons of my colleague côté j., i feel obliged to state more explicitly some of the arguments that can be found in the authorities in favor of each position. [151] on one hand, it might be argued that any discretionary power “to deny recognition on the ba- sis of the absence of a substantial connection”, as suggested by my colleague côté j., at para. 261 of her reasons, is incompatible with the decision of this court in lépine, which held that a quebec court should not have the discretionary power to deny rec- ognition on the basis that the foreign authority should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. as fairly acknowl- edged by my colleague côté j. at para. 263 of her reasons, an inquiry into the existence of a substantial connection “does introduce a certain degree of dis- cretion”. however, in lépine, at para. 36, this court made clear that an “approach [which] introduces a degree of instability and unpredictability    is in- consistent with the standpoint generally favourable to the recognition of foreign or external judgments that is evident in the provisions of the civil code” (emphasis added). [152] on the other hand, as explained by my col- league, this court in spar, at para. 57, noted that “the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as codified at art. 3135, serves as an important counterweight to the broad basis for jurisdiction set out in art 3148”. yet, this court later held in lépine that the doc- trine of forum non conveniens does not extend to the recognition of foreign decisions. as my colleague explains (at para. 256 of her reasons), it is therefore possible to argue that “this makes the substantial connection requirement in art 3164 ccq all the more necessary as a safeguard against inappropriate assumptions of jurisdiction” where a quebec court bases its conclusion regarding the foreign authority’s jurisdiction on one of the “special provisions” in chapter ii of title three; see also reasons of côté j., at para 262. in my view, however, there is no such par exemple, les remarques formulées dans les arrêts spar, par. 55 et 63; ortega, par. 41; talpis et castel, no 486; et goldstein, p. 391, avec spar, par. 57, et lépine, par 32-36). il n’est donc pas nécessaire que je tranche cette question ici. étant donné l’analyse ap- profondie qu’en fait ma collègue la juge côté dans ses motifs, je me sens toutefois tenu d’expliciter certains arguments présentés dans la doctrine et la jurispru- dence en appui à chacune des positions. [151] d’une part, on pourrait soutenir que tout pou- voir discrétionnaire de « refuser de reconnaître une décision en raison de l’absence de rattachement im- portant », comme le suggère ma collègue la juge côté au par. 261 de ses motifs, est incompatible avec l’arrêt lépine, où la cour a statué qu’un tribunal québécois ne devrait pas avoir le pouvoir discrétionnaire de re- fuser la reconnaissance parce que l’autorité étrangère aurait dû décliner sa compétence en application de la doctrine du forum non conveniens. comme l’a re- connu à juste titre ma collègue la juge côté au par. 263 de ses motifs, une analyse concernant l’existence d’un rattachement important « introduit un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire ». cependant, au par. 36 de l’arrêt lépine, la cour a affirmé sans détour qu’une « ap- proche [qui] introduit ainsi un élément d’instabilité et d’imprévisibilité [  ] s’accorde mal avec l’attitude en principe favorable à la reconnaissance des jugements étrangers ou externes qu’expriment les dispositions du code civil » (je souligne). [152] d’autre part, comme l’explique ma collègue, la cour a déclaré au par. 57 de l’arrêt spar que « la doctrine du forum non conveniens, telle qu’elle est codifiée à l’art. 3135, constitue un contrepoids im- portant à la large assise juridictionnelle prévue à l’art 3148 ». la cour a toutefois ajouté par la suite, dans l’arrêt lépine, que cette doctrine ne s’étend pas à la reconnaissance des décisions étrangères. comme l’explique ma collègue au par. 256 de ses motifs, il est par conséquent possible de soutenir que « cela rend l’exigence du rattachement important énoncée à l’art 3164 ccq d’autant plus nécessaire comme protection contre les déclarations inappropriées de compétence » lorsque le tribunal québécois fonde sa conclusion au sujet de la compétence de l’autorité étrangère sur l’une des « dispositions particulières » du chapitre deuxième du titre troisième; voir aussi 670 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. necessity where a quebec court bases its finding of jurisdiction on the express (and already more restric- tive) provisions of art 3168 ccq, as explained by professor goldstein (at p. 437): les motifs de la juge côté, par 262. à mon avis, cela n’est toutefois pas nécessaire dans les cas où le tribunal québécois fonde sa conclusion quant à la compétence sur les dispositions expresses (et déjà plus restrictives) de l’art 3168 ccq, comme l’ex- plique le professeur goldstein (p. 437) : [translation] if the heads of jurisdiction given to the quebec court by article 3148 ccq    are compared with those given to the foreign court by article 3168 ccq, it can be seen not only that the latter provision uses lim- iting language but also that the mirror principle in arti- cle 3164 ccq    is not adhered to for personal actions of a patrimonial nature. si l’on compare les chefs de compétence donnés au tribu- nal québécois par l’article 3148 ccq [  ] et ceux qui découlent de l’article 3168 ccq, au bénéfice du tribunal étranger, en plus de la formulation limitative de cette disposition [  ], on constate que le principe du miroir de l’article 3164 ccq [  ] n’est pas respecté pour les actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial. …this restrictive approach is understandable given that the doctrine of forum non conveniens, set out in ar- ticle 3135 ccq    in relation to the jurisdiction of quebec courts, does not appear in the rules on indirect jurisdiction, which could favour forum shopping abroad. in addition, when article 3168 ccq was enacted, it did not appear that the substantial connection requirement in article 3164 ccq could also apply to the express rules on indirect jurisdiction so that indirect jurisdiction could be reviewed on a case-by- case basis. it is the courts that have recently interpreted article 3164 ccq in this manner   . [emphasis added; text in brackets omitted.] …cette attitude restrictive s’explique dans la mesure où la théorie du forum non conveniens, consacrée dans l’ar- ticle 3135 ccq [  ] pour la compétence des tribunaux québécois, ne figure pas pour les règles de com pé tence indi- recte, ce qui pourrait favoriser le forum shopping à l’étran- ger. de plus, lors de l’adoption de l’article 3168 ccq, il n’était pas apparu que l’exigence d’un rattachement étroit figurant à l’article 3164 ccq pouvait aussi s’ap- pliquer aux règles de compétence indirecte expresses de manière à contrôler ponctuellement la compétence indi- recte. c’est la jurisprudence qui a récemment interprété l’article 3164 ccq en ce sens    [je souligne; texte entre crochets omis.] (3) application to this case (3) application à la présente affaire [153] for the foregoing reasons, i have concluded that art 3164 ccq authorizes a quebec court to recognize the jurisdiction of a foreign authority on the basis of one of the “general provisions” situated in chapter i of title three, including art 3139 ccq, to the extent that the dispute is substantially con- nected with the state whose authority is seized of the matter. article 3139 ccq states: [153] pour les motifs exposés précédemment, j’ai conclu que l’art. 3164  ccq autorise le tribunal québécois à reconnaître la compétence de l’autorité étrangère en se fondant sur une des « dispositions générales » du chapitre premier du titre troisième, y compris l’art 3139 ccq, dans la mesure où le litige se rattache d’une façon importante à l’état dont l’au- torité a été saisie. voici le libellé de l’art 3139 ccq : 3139 where a québec authority has jurisdiction to rule on the principal demand, it also has jurisdiction to rule on an incidental demand or a cross demand. 3139 l’autorité québécoise, compétente pour la demande principale, est aussi compétente pour la demande incidente ou reconventionnelle. [154] the purpose of art 3139 ccq is that of administrative convenience — specifically, “to en- sure the efficient use of judicial resources and effi- ciency in the administration of justice by fostering the joinder of proceedings”: grecon, at para. 30 (emphasis added). in grecon, this court noted that [154] l’article 3139 ccq vise la commodité ad- ministrative. il vise plus précisément « l’économie des ressources judiciaires et l’efficacité de l’administration de la justice en favorisant la réunion d’instances » : grecon, par. 30 (je souligne). dans l’arrêt grecon, la cour a noté que l’art 3139 ccq « prévoit donc [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 671 art 3139 ccq “establishes an exception to the principle that the jurisdiction of the quebec court is determined on a case-by- case basis” and “expands considerably the potential scope of the jurisdiction of the quebec authority”: para 29. it added that “[t]his expanded scope suggests that art 3139 ccq must be interpreted narrowly so as not to indirectly enlarge the international jurisdiction of the quebec author- ity”: para 29. accordingly, art 3139 ccq cannot supersede a forum selection clause or arbitration clause between the relevant parties, because “the application of art 3139 ccq is subordinate to the application of art. 3148 para 1(2) ccq, which gives full effect to a clear intention, expressed in a valid and exclusive choice of forum clause, to submit a dispute to the jurisdiction of foreign authorities”: para 37. [155] the court must nevertheless bear in mind that art 3139 ccq is a jurisdiction-granting pro- vision, and that its operation assumes that, absent this provision, the court would not be competent, in the jurisdictional sense, to hear the “incidental demand or    cross demand”: saumier, at p. 703; spar, at para. 22 (“[t]hese rules [in book ten of the ccq] cover a broad range of interrelated topics, including: the jurisdiction of the court (art. 3136, 3139 and 3148 ccq)” (emphasis added)). in my view, the term “incidental demand”, as that term appears in art 3139 ccq, is sufficiently broad to cover vol- untary and forced intervention of third persons in the proceeding, including an incidental demand in war- ranty, and the consolidation of proceedings, whether or not they involve the same parties, and whether or not they arise from the same source or from related sources: see arts. 184 to 190 and 210 of the new code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“new ccp”); see also côté j.’s reasons, at paras. 206 and 283 (“there is no doubt that [the precise meaning of ‘incidental demand’] must be defined on the basis of quebec procedural law”). indeed, this point finds ample support in the quebec doctrine. professor goldstein explains the following, at pp. 111-12: une exception au principe que la compétence du tri- bunal québécois se détermine pour chaque demande en particulier » et « élargit aussi considérablement la portée potentielle de la compétence des autorités québécoises » : par 29. la cour a ajouté que « [c]ette portée élargie suggère une interprétation restrictive de l’art 3139 ccq afin de ne pas étendre indirecte- ment la compétence internationale des autorités qué- bécoises » : par 29. par conséquent, l’art 3139 ccq. ne peut pas avoir préséance sur une clause d’élection de for ou sur une clause d’arbitrage convenue par les parties, parce que « l’application de cette disposition est subordonnée à celle de l’art. 3148 al 1(2) ccq. qui reconnaît pleinement l’effet d’une intention claire exprimée dans une clause d’élection de for valide et exclusive de soumettre un litige à la juridiction d’au- torités étrangères » : par 37. [155] la cour ne doit cependant pas perdre de vue que l’art 3139 ccq est une disposition at- tributive de compétence, ce qui suppose que, sans cette disposition, le tribunal ne serait pas compétent, au sens juridictionnel, pour instruire la « demande incidente ou reconventionnelle » : saumier, p. 703; spar, par. 22 (« [c]es règles [du livre dixième du ccq] couvrent un vaste éventail de sujets étroi- tement liés, y compris : la compétence du tribunal (art. 3136, 3139 et 3148 ccq) » (je souligne)). à mon avis, l’expression « demande incidente » qui figure à l’art 3139 ccq est suffisamment large pour couvrir l’intervention volontaire et forcée de tiers dans l’instance, notamment dans le cadre d’une demande incidente en garantie et d’une demande en jonction d’instances, qu’elles concernent ou non les mêmes parties et qu’elles découlent ou non de la même source ou de sources connexes : voir les art. 184 à 190 et 210 du nouveau code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501 (« nouveau cpc »); voir aussi les motifs de la juge côté, par. 206 et 283 (« il ne fait aucun doute [que le sens précis de « demande incidente »] doit être défin[i] en fonction du droit procédural québécois »). de fait, ce point est ample- ment étayé par la doctrine québécoise. le professeur goldstein explique ce qui suit, aux p. 111-112 : [translation]    the definition of an “incidental” action must depend on quebec law, [and] reference may [there- fore] be made to title iv of book ii of the code of civil    la définition de l’action « incidente » doit dépendre du droit québécois, on peut [donc] se tourner vers le titre  iv du livre  ii du code de procédure civile qui 672 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. procedure, which deals with “incidental proceedings”. that title covers, among other things, the voluntary inter- vention of a third party (arts. 208 et seq. ccp), forced in- tervention (arts. 216 et seq. ccp), including an incidental action in warranty, and the joinder of actions (arts. 270 et seq. ccp), whether or not they involve the same par- ties (art 271 ccp) or originate from the same source or related sources (art 270 ccp). thus, it is foreseeable that a quebec court with jurisdiction over an action for separation from bed and board under art 3146 ccq. will assume jurisdiction under art 3139 ccq over an accessory action for child custody or support. similarly, in an international situation, it can be imagined that a quebec court with jurisdiction over an action by a suc- cession under art 3153 ccq will assume jurisdiction over an action relating to the preliminary issue of whether an adoption is valid. [emphasis added; footnote omitted.] porte sur les « incidents », c’est-à-dire les procédures incidentes. on y trouve notamment l’intervention volon- taire d’un tiers (art 208 cpc et s), l’intervention forcée (art 216 cpc et s), y compris l’action en garantie inci- dente, et la réunion d’actions (art 270 cpc et s) entre les mêmes parties ou non (art.  271  cpc), provenant ou non de la même source ou d’une source connexe (art 270 cpc). ainsi, on peut envisager que le tribu- nal québécois compétent sur une action en séparation de corps selon l’article 3146 ccq, prenne compétence en vertu de l’article 3139 ccq sur une action accessoire en pension alimentaire ou en garde d’enfant. de même, en situation internationale, on peut imaginer qu’un tribunal québécois, compétent sur une action successorale selon l’article 3153 ccq, prenne compétence sur une action relative à la question préalable de la validité d’une adop- tion. [je souligne; note en bas de page omise.] relatedly, arts. 216, 270 and 271 of the old code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25 (“old ccp”) now correspond, respectively and among others, to arts. 184 and 210 of the new ccp: see l. chamber- land, ed., le grand collectif: code de procédure ci- vile — commentaires et annotations (2nd ed. 2017), at pp. 961 and 1165. article 210 of the new ccp on the “consolidation and separation of proceedings” is situated under the chapter on “incidental proceedings relating to pleadings”. it follows, then, that the term “incidental demand” in art 3139 ccq should be read as including a “related” claim: see, eg,. droit de la famille — 131294, 2013 qcca 883, at pa- ras. 54-57 (canlii); emanuelli, at no. 173 ([trans- lation] “article 3154(1) ccq, which concerns matrimonial regimes, is a specific application of the general rule in article 3139. the rule should also be followed for the jurisdiction of quebec authorities over accessory measures in an action for separation or annulment” (emphasis added; footnotes omitted)). of course, and while art 3139 ccq does not men- tion this factor expressly, there must nonetheless be “some connexity” between the principal action and the incidental action: grecon, at para 31. as explained by professor talpis (at p. 36): “in some situations the actions may be related in ways that make jurisdiction against co- defendants possible under article 3139 ccq” (emphasis added). dans le même ordre d’idées, les art. 216, 270 et 271 de l’ancien code de procédure civile, rlrq, c. c-25 (« ancien cpc ») correspondent mainte- nant, respectivement et entre autres, aux art. 184 et 210 nouveau cpc : voir l. chamberland, dir., le grand collectif : code de procédure civile — com- mentaires et annotations (2e éd. 2017), p. 961 et 1165. l’article 210 du nouveau cpc sur la « jonction et la disjonction d’instances » se trouve dans le chapitre sur « les incidents concernant les actes de procé- dure ». l’expression « demande incidente » qui figure à l’art 3139 ccq doit donc être interprétée comme incluant une demande « connexe » : voir, p ex, droit de la famille — 131294, 2013 qcca 883, par. 54- 57 (canlii); emanuelli, no 173 (« la règle générale prévue à l’article 3139 trouve une application particu- lière dans les dispositions de l’article 3154(1) ccq, qui concerne les régimes matrimoniaux. elle devrait également être suivie en ce qui concerne la compé- tence des autorités québécoises à l’égard de mesures accessoires à une action en séparation ou en nullité » (je souligne; notes en bas de page omises)). bien entendu, et même si l’art 3139 ccq ne mentionne pas expressément ce facteur, il doit exister un « élé- ment de connexité » entre les actions principale et incidente : grecon, par 31. ainsi que l’explique le professeur talpis (p. 36) : [traduction] « dans certaines situations, les actions peuvent être reliées entre elles de telle sorte qu’elles permettent de recon- naître la compétence à l’endroit des codéfendeurs en application de l’article 3139 ccq » (je souligne). [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 673 [156] this kind of “derivative jurisdiction”, i also observe, is hardly uncommon in civil law systems. in french law, see, eg,. p. mayer and v. heuzé, droit international privé (11th ed. 2014), at p. 205: [156] je signale également que ce type de « compé- tence dérivée » n’est pas rare dans les systèmes de droit civil. en droit français, voir, p ex,. p. mayer et v. heuzé, droit international privé (11e éd. 2014) (p. 205) : [translation] also transposed to international juris- diction are the rules on derivative jurisdiction, which ex- tend the jurisdiction of the court seized of a certain demand to other demands related to it. the court therefore has jurisdiction to hear related actions brought against a num- ber of defendants as long as one of them — in respect of whom the demand must be real and serious — is domiciled in france    [emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.] see also art. 8a of switzerland’s loi fédérale sur le droit international privé; art. 6(1) of the convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (2007) (lugano convention); art. 9 of belgium’s loi portant le code de droit international privé. sont également transposées à la compétence interna- tionale les règles de compétence dérivée, qui étendent la compétence du tribunal saisi d’une certaine demande à d’autres demandes, connexes à celle-ci. le tribunal est ainsi compétent pour connaître d’actions connexes for- mées contre plusieurs défendeurs dès lors que l’un d’entre eux — à l’égard duquel la demande doit présenter un caractère réel et sérieux — est domicilié en france   . [en italique dans l’original; notes en bas de page omises.] voir aussi l’al. 8a de la loi fédérale sur le droit international privé de la suisse; le par. 6(1) de la convention concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale (2007) (convention de lugano); art. 9 de la loi portant le code de droit international privé de la belgique. [157] further, an “incidental demand” is not lim- ited to a recourse in warranty: see, eg, art. 184 para. 3 of the new ccp6. a plaintiff thus has the right to force the intervention of a third person in order to fully resolve the dispute: see bourdages v. québec (gouvernement du) (ministère des trans- ports), 2016 qccs 5066; fonds d’assurance res- ponsabilité professionnelle du barreau du québec v. gariépy, 2005 qcca 60, at para. 33 ([trans- lation] “forced impleading is a procedure that is legally equivalent to adding to the principal action, as instituted, a new defendant who is there to respond to and oppose the conclusions of the principal demand” (footnote omitted)); constructions alcana ltée v. cégep régional de lanaudière, 2006 qcca 1494; see also allard v. mozart ltée, [1981] ca 612;. cgu [157] qui plus est, une « demande incidente » n’est pas nécessairement une « demande en garantie » : voir, p ex, l’art. 184 al. 3 nouveau cpc6. un de- mandeur peut donc forcer l’intervention d’un tiers pour permettre une solution complète du litige : voir bourdages c. québec (gouvernement du) (ministère des transports), 2016 qccs 5066; fonds d’assu- rance responsabilité professionnelle du barreau du québec c. gariépy, 2005 qcca 60, par. 33 (« la procédure de mise en cause forcée est juridiquement l’équivalent de l’adjonction à l’action principale, telle qu’intentée, d’un nouveau défendeur qui est là pour répondre et combattre les conclusions de la de- mande principale » (note en bas de page omise)); constructions alcana ltée c. cégep régional de la- nau dière, 2006 qcca  1494; voir aussi allard c. 6 article 184 of the new ccp reads as follows: 6 l’article 184 nouveau cpc se lit comme suit : 184. intervention is either voluntary or forced. 184. l’intervention est volontaire ou forcée.   .   . intervention is forced when a party impleads a third person so that the dispute may be fully resolved or so that the judgment may be set up against that third person. it is also forced when a party intends to exercise a recourse in warranty against the third person. elle est forcée lorsqu’une partie met un tiers en cause pour qu’il intervienne à l’instance afin de permettre une solution complète du litige ou pour lui opposer le jugement; elle est aussi forcée si la partie prétend exercer une demande en garantie contre le tiers. 674 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. v. wawanesa, compagnie mutuelle d’assurances, 2005 qcca 320, [2005] rra  312; kingsway general insurance co. v. duvernay plomberie et chauffage inc., 2009 qcca 926, [2009] rjq 1237. in insta holding limited v. 9247-5334 québec inc., 2017 qccs 432, at paras. 17-20 (canlii), for exam- ple, the quebec superior court characterized a direct claim of a plaintiff against a foreign defendant whose co- defendant was alleged to be his alter ego as a “forced intervention” within the meaning of art. 184 of the new ccp and, accordingly, as an “incidental demand” for the purpose of art 3139 ccq; see also marble point energy ltd., at paras. 57-59 and 61. mozart ltée, [1981] ca 612;. cgu c. wawanesa, compagnie mutuelle d’assurances, 2005 qcca 320, [2005] rra 312;. kingsway general insurance co. c. duvernay plomberie et chauffage inc., 2009 qcca 926, [2009] rjq 1237. dans insta holding limited c. 9247-5334 québec inc., 2017 qccs 432, par. 17-20 (canlii), par exemple, la cour supérieure du québec a caractérisé la demande directe d’un de- mandeur contre un défendeur étranger dont le codéfen- deur était prétendument son alter ego d’« intervention forcée » au sens de l’art. 184 nouveau cpc et donc de « demande incidente » aux fins de l’art 3139 ccq; voir aussi marble point energy ltd., par. 57-59 et 61. [158] my colleague gascon j. stresses that knight’s proceeding against mr. barer is not an “incidental demand”, but rather a “principal demand” instituted jointly against bec and cbc: see para.  90; see also côté j.’s reasons, at paras. 275 and 281-285. in his view, the fact that mr. barer “is a co- defendant sued directly” precludes a finding that he is being sued by way of a proceeding that can be character- ized as an “incidental demand” for the purpose of art 3139 ccq: para 90. had mr. barer been added as a co- defendant after the institution of a “principal demand” against bec or cbc via forced interven- tion, or had a separate proceeding against mr. barer been joined to a “principal demand” against bec or cbc via consolidation of proceedings, my col- league reasons that the proceeding against mr. barer would have become an “incidental demand” for the purpose of art 3139 ccq. in my respectful view, the fact that mr. barer has been sued directly as a co- defendant, and not added after the institution of a “principal demand” against bec or cbc, is a dis- tinction of no legal significance to the jurisdiction of the utah court: [translation] “[it does not matter whether a person was] brought into the proceeding at the outset [or] could have been brought in through an incidental application in the course of the proceed- ing. the objective is the same: to allow the dispute to be fully resolved or the judgment to be set up against the person”: insta holding, at para 19. [158] mon collègue le juge gascon souligne que la poursuite intentée par knight contre m. barer n’est pas une « demande incidente », mais plutôt une « demande principale » visant conjointement bec et cbc : voir par. 90; voir aussi les motifs de la juge côté, par. 275 et 281-285. à son avis, le fait que m. barer « est un codéfendeur poursuivi directement » nous empêche de conclure qu’il est poursuivi dans le cadre d’une procédure qui pourrait être qualifiée de « demande incidente » aux fins de l’art 3139 ccq : par 90. mon collègue a conclu que si m. barer avait été ajouté comme codéfendeur à la suite d’une intervention forcée après l’introduction d’une « demande principale » contre bec ou cbc, ou si une procédure distincte contre m. barer avait été jointe à la « demande principale » contre bec ou cbc dans le cadre d’une jonction d’instances, la poursuite intentée contre lui serait devenue une « de- mande incidente » aux fins de l’art 3139 ccq. soit dit en tout respect, selon moi, le fait que m. barer a été poursuivi directement comme codéfendeur, et non ajouté comme partie après l’introduction d’une « demande principale » contre bec ou cbc, constitue une distinction qui n’a aucune pertinence juridique sur la compétence du tribunal de l’utah : « [peu importe si l’on a été] introduit dans l’instance dès le début [ou si l’on] aurait pu l’être en cours d’instance sous forme d’incident. l’objectif est le même : permettre une solution complète du litige ou lui opposer le jugement » : insta holding, par 19. [159] i recognize that professor talpis says “art 3139 ccq does not permit assertion of ju- risdiction over a co- defendant over whom the court [159] je reconnais que selon le professeur talpis, [traduction] « l’art 3139 ccq ne permet pas à un tribunal de se déclarer compétent à l’endroit [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 675 lacks jurisdiction by the sole fact that it has juris- diction over the other defendant”: pp. 37-38 (fn. 43) (emphasis added), citing sorel- tracy terminal mari- time v. fsl. ltd., je 2001-641 (que. sup. ct.); see also glenn, “droit international privé”, at p. 748; talpis and castel, at no 437. in my view, the sub- sisting authority of this statement is doubtful, based as it is on jurisprudence which held art. 75 of the old ccp7 to be inapplicable in private international law cases, because of its use of the word “district” (which was interpreted as referring to one of the districts of the province of quebec only): trower & sons, ld. v. ripstein, [1944] ac 254 (pc);. cornwall chrysler plymouth ltd. v. lapolla, [1974] ca 490;. h p. glenn, “la compétence internationale et le fabricant étranger” (1985), 45 r du b. 567, at pp. 570-71; emanuelli, at no 173. [160] prior to the adoption of the ccq in 1994, the international jurisdiction of quebec courts was indeed governed by the old ccp. the ccq now sets out in book ten a code governing private in- ternational law, whose rules “subsum[e] or comple- men[t] the rules of civil procedure found in the [old ccp]”:. spar, at para 22. it is therefore “necessary to be circumspect, in considering the cases in which the principles applicable prior to the reform of the civil code were applied, when it comes to deter- mining the scope of art 3139 ccq”:. grecon, at para 56. moreover, this interpretation of art. 75 of the old ccp was not universally shared: see, for ex- ample, municipalité du village de st- victor v. allianz du canada, [1996] rdj 123 (ca); see also h. kélada, les conflits de compétences et la reconnais- sance des jugements étrangers en droit international privé québécois (2001), at p. 44 (suggesting that art 75 ccp should also apply to defendants not domiciled in quebec provided that one of the co- defendants resides or is domiciled in the province); d’un codéfendeur à l’égard duquel il n’a pas com- pétence du seul fait qu’il a compétence sur l’autre défendeur » : p. 37-38 (note en bas de page 43) (je souligne), citant la décision sorel- tracy terminal maritime c. fsl. ltd., je 2001-641 (cs. qc); voir aussi glenn, « droit international privé », p. 748; talpis et castel, no 437. à mon avis, il est permis aujourd’hui de douter du bien- fondé de cette affirma- tion, puisqu’elle repose sur des décisions portant que l’art. 75 ancien cpc7 ne s’appliquait pas en matière de droit international privé, en raison de l’emploi dans cette disposition du mot « district » (qui a été interprété comme un mot renvoyant à un des dis- tricts de la province de québec seulement) : trower & sons, ld c ripstein, [1944] ac  254  (cp);. cornwall chrysler plymouth ltd. c. lapolla, [1974] ca 490; h p glenn, « la compétence internatio- nale et le fabricant étranger » (1985), 45 r du b. 567, p. 570-571; emanuelli, no 173. [160] avant l’adoption du code civil en 1994, la compétence internationale des tribunaux québécois était effectivement régie par l’ancien cpc. le code civil renferme désormais à son livre dixième un code régissant le droit international privé, dont les règles « subsum[e]nt ou complèt[e]nt les règles de procédure civile prescrites par [l’ancien cpc] » :. spar, par 22. dès lors, « il faut examiner la jurisprudence appli- quant les principes qui prévalaient antérieurement à la réforme du code civil avec prudence lorsque vient le temps d’apprécier la portée de l’art 3139 ccq » :. grecon, par.  56 de plus, cette interprétation de l’art. 75 ancien cpc ne faisait pas l’unanimité : voir, p ex, municipalité du village de st- victor c. allianz du canada, [1996] rdj 123 (ca); voir aussi h. kélada, les conflits de compétences et la re- connaissance des jugements étrangers en droit inter- national privé québécois (2001), p. 44 (suivant lequel l’art. 75 ancien cpc devait également s’appliquer aux défendeurs non domiciliés au québec pourvu qu’un des codéfendeurs réside au québec ou y soit 7 article 75 of the old ccp reads as follows: 7 voici le texte de l’art. 75 ancien cpc : 75. an action against several defendants domiciled in different districts, if it is a personal or mixed action, may be instituted in the court before which any of them may be summoned; but if it is a real action, it must be instituted in the court of the place where the object of the dispute is situated. 75. si l’action est formée contre plusieurs défendeurs do- miciliés dans des districts différents, elle peut être portée au tribunal devant lequel l’un ou l’autre pourrait être assigné, s’il s’agit d’une action personnelle ou mixte; mais s’il s’agit d’une action réelle, elle doit être portée devant le tribunal du lieu où est situé l’objet en litige. 676 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. d. ferland and b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (4th ed. 2003), vol. 1, at p. 180 (interpret- ing art. 75 of the old ccp as including defendants who are domiciled inside or outside of quebec). [161] this is not to say that the rules of the old ccp have no subsisting influence. for example, the substance of art. 71 of the old ccp,8 which this court has interpreted as authorizing a quebec court to exercise its jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in warranty that had no domicile, residence, place of business or property in quebec (a s g industries inc. v. corporation superseal, [1983] 1 scr 781), has been “reiterate[d]” by art 3139 ccq:. grecon, at para 55. similarly, the quebec court of appeal has recently held that “the joinder of causes of action [against a particular defendant] is permitted in the context of international jurisdiction”: e. hofmann plastics inc. v. tribec metals ltd., 2013 qcca 2112, at para. 12 (canlii). more precisely, the quebec court of appeal has decided that art. 3148 para 1(3) ccq. “[does] not require that each potential cause of ac- tion bear a connecting factor to quebec and that one cause of action is enough to grant jurisdiction”: poppy industries canada inc. v. diva delights ltd., 2018 qcca 163, at para. 32 (canlii). domicilié); d. ferland et b. emery, précis de pro- cédure civile du québec (4e éd. 2003), vol. 1, p. 180 (suivant lesquels l’art. 75 ancien cpc s’appliquait tant aux défendeurs qui étaient domiciliés au québec qu’à ceux qui n’y étaient pas domiciliés). [161] cela ne veut pas dire que les règles de l’ancien cpc n’ont plus aucune influence. ainsi, l’essence de l’art. 71de l’ancien cpc8 — que la cour a interprété comme une disposition autorisant le tribunal québé- cois à exercer sa compétence sur un défendeur en ga- rantie étranger qui n’avait aucun domicile, résidence, bureau ou bien au québec (a s g industries inc. c. corporation superseal, [1983] 1 rcs 781) — a été « rep[rise] » dans l’art 3139 ccq :. grecon, par 55. dans le même ordre d’idées, la cour d’appel du québec a récemment décidé que [traduction] « la réunion de causes d’action [contre un défen- deur spécifique] est autorisée dans le contexte de la compétence internationale » : e. hofmann plas- tics inc. c. tribec metals ltd., 2013 qcca 2112, par. 12 (canlii). plus précisément, la cour d’appel du québec a décidé que l’art. 3148 al 1(3) ccq. [traduction] « n’exige pas qu’il y ait un facteur de rattachement entre chaque cause d’action potentielle et le québec, et que l’existence d’un tel facteur pour une seule cause d’action suffit pour que la compé- tence soit reconnue » : poppy industries canada inc. c. diva delights ltd., 2018 qcca 163, par. 32 (canlii). [162] this tends to affirm, and i conclude, that in personal actions of a patrimonial nature, the ju- risdiction of a foreign authority over a particular co- defendant can be established in accordance with art 3139 ccq, even where that co- defendant is not a party to the contract upon which the foreign authority’s jurisdiction is grounded, (a) if that foreign authority has jurisdiction over the main contractual dispute pursuant to art 3168(4) ccq, (b) if there is “some connexity” between the contract and the claim made against the co- defendant (grecon, at para. 31) or, in other words, if the claim against the co- defendant is “connected” to the contract [162] cela tend à confirmer — et c’est la conclu- sion à laquelle j’en arrive — que dans les actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial, il est possible d’établir la compétence d’une autorité étrangère sur un codéfendeur spécifique en application de l’art 3139 ccq, même lorsque ce codéfendeur n’est pas partie au contrat constituant le fondement de la compétence de l’autorité en question, a) si cette autorité étrangère a compétence sur le litige contrac- tuel principal en application du par 3168(4) ccq, b) s’il y a un « élément de connexité » entre le con- trat et la réclamation formulée contre le codéfen- deur (grecon, par. 31) ou si, en d’autres termes, 8 article 71 of the old ccp reads as follows: 8 voici le libellé de l’art. 71 ancien cpc : 71. the incidental action in warranty must be taken before the court in which the principal action is pending. 71. la demande incidente en garantie doit être portée devant le tribunal où la demande principale est pendante. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 677 (lapointe, at paras. 32, 33 and 44), and (c) if there is a “substantial connection” between the dispute (that is, the co- defendant or the claim made against him) and the foreign authority’s state: art 3164 ccq. as this court explained in van breda (at para. 99): i should add that it is possible for a case to sound both in contract and in tort or to invoke more than one tort. would a court be limited to hearing the specific part of the case that can be directly connected with the jurisdiction? such a rule would breach the principles of fairness and ef- ficiency on which the assumption of jurisdiction is based. the purpose of the conflicts rules is to establish whether a real and substantial connection exists between the forum, the subject matter of the litigation and the defendant. if such a connection exists in respect of a factual and legal situation, the court must assume jurisdiction over all as- pects of the case. the plaintiff should not be obliged to litigate a tort claim in manitoba and a related claim for res- titution in nova scotia. that would be incompatible with any notion of fairness and efficiency. [emphasis added.] [163] it follows that, in this case, the utah court had jurisdiction over the main contractual dispute between knight and bec under art 3168(4) ccq, and the claims of alter ego and fraud made against the co- defendant, mr. barer, personally, were clearly “connected” to the contract. i also agree with my colleague gascon j. that there is “no question as to whether the dispute is substantially connected to utah and the utah court” (para. 88), thus satisfying art 3164 ccq — meaning, in the circumstances of this case, that there was a sufficiently substantial connection between utah and both the object of the dispute and the parties. la réclamation formulée contre le codéfendeur est « liée » au contrat (lapointe, par. 32, 33 et 44), et c) si le litige (c-à-d le codéfendeur ou l’allégation formu- lée contre lui) « se rattache d’une façon importante » à l’état dont l’autorité a été saisie : art 3164 ccq. ainsi que la cour l’a expliqué dans l’arrêt van breda (par. 99) : il convient de préciser qu’un recours pourrait être fondé à la fois sur un contrat et un délit, ou sur plus d’un délit. le tribunal devrait-il alors se limiter à n’entendre que la partie du recours pouvant se rattacher directement au ressort? une telle règle porterait atteinte aux principes d’équité et d’efficacité qui sous- tendent la déclaration de compétence. les règles de droit international privé visent à établir s’il existe un lien réel et substantiel entre le tri- bunal, l’objet du litige et le défendeur. si l’existence d’un lien à l’égard d’une situation factuelle et juridique a été établie, le tribunal doit se déclarer compétent relativement à tous les aspects du recours. le demandeur ne devrait pas être tenu d’intenter une action en responsabilité délic- tuelle au manitoba et une demande connexe de restitution en nouvelle- écosse. la création d’une telle situation ne respecterait aucun principe d’équité et d’efficacité. [je souligne.] [163] il s’ensuit que, dans la présente affaire, le tribunal de l’utah avait compétence en application du par.  3168(4)  ccq sur le litige contractuel principal qui opposait knight et bec, et qu’il existe un « lien » évident entre le contrat et les al- légations d’alter ego et de fraude formulées contre le codéfendeur, m. barer, personnellement. je con- viens également avec mon collègue le juge gascon que l’existence d’un «  rattachement important du litige avec [l’utah] et avec ce tribunal » « ne soulève aucune question  »  (par.  88), ce qui sa- tisfait aux exigences de l’art.  3164  ccq  — de sorte que, dans les circonstances de la présente cause, il existait un rattachement suffisamment important entre l’utah et à la fois l’objet du litige et les parties. [164] as for the substantial connection between utah and the co- defendant, mr. barer, it is worth bearing in mind not only that mr. barer “participated in the legal proceedings in utah” (gascon j.’s rea- sons, at para. 88), but also that he admits to having had a “key role” (given his status as president of [164] en ce qui a trait au rattachement important entre l’utah et le codéfendeur, m. barer, il vaut la peine de garder à l’esprit non seulement que ce der- nier « a participé à l’instance dans l’utah » (motifs du juge gascon, par. 88), mais également qu’il admet avoir joué un [traduction] « rôle clé » (en sa qualité 678 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. bec) in dealing with knight, a utah corporation, for the performance of a contract that was to be executed in utah: ar, vol. ii, at pp 81-82. this is, therefore, not a case where the defendant was “re- motely associated with a contract”: côté j.’s reasons, at para 199. nor is this a case that “would undermine the certainty and predictability which the specific connecting factors in the ccq are intended to promote” (côté j.’s reasons, at para. 286), since it would have been entirely predictable that mr. barer could be subject to the jurisdiction of the utah court in the event of a dispute with knight. as explained by this court in beals, at para. 25, referring to moran v. pyle national (canada) ltd., [1975] 1 scr 393, at p. 409, “where individuals carry on business in another    jurisdiction, it is reasonable that those individuals be required to defend themselves there when an action is commenced”. [165] while i am of the view that, in the circum- stances of this case, there is a sufficiently substan- tial connection between utah and the co- defendant, mr. barer, i should add that, according to relevant case law, it is not absolutely necessary to prove the existence of a substantial connection between the foreign authority’s state and the defendant, particu- larly where (as here) such a connection clearly sub- sists between the foreign authority’s state and the subject- matter of the dispute: see beals, at para. 23 (“[a] substantial connection with the subject matter of the action will satisfy the real and substantial con- nection test even in the absence of such a connection with the defendant to the action”); cima plastics corp. v. sandid enterprises ltd., 2011 onca 589, 341 dlr (4th) 442, at paras. 17-18; oakley v. barry (1998), 158 dlr (4th) 679 (nsca);. o’brien v. canada (attorney general) (2002), 210 dlr (4th) 668 (nsca);. duncan (litigation guardian of) v. neptunia corp. (2001), 53 or (3d) 754 (scj), at para. 41 (“it is clear that a real and substantial con- nection between the forum province and the subject matter of the litigation, not necessarily the defendant, is sufficient to meet the test”); muscutt, at para. 74; van breda v. village resorts limited, 2010 onca 84, 98 or (3d) 721, at para. 86 (“i see no reason to depart from what we said in muscutt, at paras. 54-74, in rejecting the argument that assumed jurisdiction de président de bec) auprès de knight, qui est une société de l’utah, aux fins de l’exécution d’un contrat qui devait avoir lieu dans l’utah : da, vol. ii, p 81-82. il ne s’agit par conséquent pas d’un cas où le défen- deur était « li[é] de loin à un contrat » : motifs de la juge côté, par 199. nous ne sommes pas non plus en présence d’une situation où « la certitude et la prévisi- bilité que visent à promouvoir les facteurs de rattache- ment précis énoncés dans le ccq s’en trouveraient minés » (motifs de la juge côté, par. 286), puisqu’il était tout à fait prévisible que m. barer pourrait être assujetti à la compétence du tribunal de l’utah en cas de différend avec knight. comme la cour l’a expli- qué au par. 25 de l’arrêt beals, en faisant référence à l’arrêt moran c. pyle national (canada) ltd., [1975] 1 rcs 393, p. 409, il « est raisonnable d’obliger les particuliers qui exploitent une entreprise dans un autre ressort [  ] à opposer une défense à l’action intentée contre eux dans ce ressort ». [165] même si je suis d’avis que, dans les circons- tances de la présente cause, il existe un rattachement suffisamment important entre l’utah et le codé- fendeur, m. barer, je devrais ajouter que, suivant la jurisprudence pertinente, il n’est pas absolument nécessaire de prouver l’existence d’un rattachement important entre l’état de l’autorité étrangère et le défendeur, particulièrement lorsque, comme en l’es- pèce, un tel lien subsiste clairement entre cet état et l’objet du litige : voir beals, par. 23 (« [l]’existence d’un lien substantiel avec l’objet de l’action permet de satisfaire au critère du “lien réel et substantiel”, même en l’absence d’un tel lien avec le défendeur à l’ac- tion »); cima plastics corp c. sandid enter prises ltd., 2011 onca 589, 341 dlr (4th) 442, par. 17- 18; oakley c. barry (1998), 158 dlr (4th) 679 (ca n-é);. o’brien c. canada (attorney gen eral) (2002), 210 dlr (4th) 668 (ca n-é);. duncan (litigation guardian of) c. neptunia corp. (2001), 53 or (3d) 754 (csj), par. 41 ([traduction] « il est clair que le lien réel et substantiel entre la province du for et l’objet du litige, et pas nécessaire- ment le défendeur, est suffisant pour qu’il soit satis- fait au test »); muscutt, par. 74; van breda c. village resorts limited, 2010 onca 84, 98 or (3d) 721, par. 86 ([traduction] « je ne vois aucune raison de m’écarter de ce que la cour a affirmé aux par. 54 à 74 de muscutt, en rejetant l’argument selon lequel [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 679 should focus solely or primarily upon the nature and extent of the defendant’s contacts with the jurisdic- tion. we concluded, at para. 74, that ‘[w]hile the de- fendant’s contact with the jurisdiction is an important factor, it is not a necessary factor’”); g d. watson, qc, and f. au, “constitutional limits on service ex juris: unanswered questions from morguard” (2000), 23 adv. q. 167, at p. 200 (“in complex lit- igation involving multiple defendants in different jurisdictions, insisting on a substantial connection between each defendant and the forum can lead to a multiplicity of actions and inconsistent findings”). [166] as for the substantial connection between utah and the subject- matter of the dispute, it is worth bearing in mind not only that the utah court had jurisdiction over the main contractual dispute un- der art 3168(4) ccq, but also that the lifting of the corporate veil is governed “by the law of the state under which [the legal person, ie,. bec] is constituted [ie,. vermont], subject, with respect to its activities, to the law of the place where they are carried on [ie,. utah]”: art 3083 ccq. meaning, the alter ego claim made against mr. barer personally is governed by utah law, which represents a further indicator of a substantial connection between utah and the subject- matter of the whole dispute, includ- ing the alter ego claim. [167] my colleague côté j. stresses that utah’s conflict of laws rules directed the utah court to apply vermont law to the alter ego claim: see ar, vol. ii, at pp. 95 et seq.; côté j.’s reasons, at para 273. but this is of no legal significance to this case. what mat- ters here is that, under quebec law, it is the internal law of utah, and therefore the state of utah itself, which holds the most substantial connection with the alter ego claim: see art 3080 ccq. as explained by professor emanuelli (at no. 398): la compétence assumée devrait porter exclusivement ou principalement sur la nature et l’étendue des liens entre le défendeur et le ressort en cause. nous avons conclu, au par. 74, que “[s]’il est vrai que le lien entre le défendeur et le ressort est un facteur impor- tant, il n’est pas essentiel” »); g d. watson, cr, et f. au, « constitutional limits on service ex juris : unanswered questions from morguard » (2000), 23 adv q 167, p. 200 ([traduction] « dans les instances complexes où sont en cause maints défen- deurs dans différents ressorts, l’exigence d’un lien substantiel entre chaque défendeur et le ressort peut contribuer à multiplier les actions et mener à des conclusions contradictoires »). [166] en ce qui a trait au rattachement important entre l’utah et l’objet du litige, il convient de garder à l’esprit que le tribunal de cet état avait compétence à l’égard du litige principal de nature contractuelle en application du par 3168(4) ccq, mais aussi que la possibilité de lever le voile de la personnalité morale est régie par « la loi de l’état en vertu de laquelle [la personne morale, en l’occurrence, bec] est consti- tuée [c-à-d le vermont], sous réserve, quant à son activité, de la loi du lieu où elle s’exerce [c-à-d. l’utah] » : art 3083 ccq. il s’ensuit que l’allégation d’alter ego formulée contre m. barer personnelle- ment est régie par la loi de l’utah, ce qui constitue un autre indice de l’existence d’un rattachement important entre cet état et l’objet de l’ensemble du litige, dont l’allégation d’alter ego. [167] ma collègue la juge côté souligne que, aux termes des règles de conflits de lois de l’utah, le tri- bunal de cet état devait appliquer la loi du vermont pour statuer sur l’allégation d’alter ego : voir da, vol. ii, p. 95 et suiv.; motifs de la juge côté, par 273. or, cela n’a aucune incidence sur le plan juridique pour l’affaire dont nous sommes saisis. ce qui im- porte en l’espèce, c’est que, suivant le droit québé- cois, ce sont les règles de droit interne de l’utah, et par conséquent l’état de l’utah lui- même, qui présentent les liens les plus étroits avec la question de l’alter ego : voir l’art 3080 ccq. comme l’explique le professeur emanuelli (no 398) : [translation] to formulate its national conflict rules, the quebec legislature made a choice among various pour formuler ses règles de conflit nationales, le légis- lateur québécois fait un choix entre différents facteurs de 680 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. connecting factors based on the type of legal issues to which each conflict rule was intended to apply. for each type of issue, there are therefore one or more connecting factors and one or more conflict rules. the purpose of this choice is normally to ensure that the competent law is the law most closely connected with the situation in issue. [emphasis added; footnote omitted.] [168] my colleague côté  j suggests that my approach “conflates conflict rules with the re- quirements for recognizing a foreign decision”: para 270. but with respect, it is hardly uncommon for courts called upon to resolve jurisdictional is- sues to consider choice of law rules. for example, the applicable law is a relevant factor to a forum non conveniens analysis: spar, at para.  71; van breda, at para.  105; éditions écosociété inc v. banro corp., 2012 scc 18, [2012] 1 scr 636, at para. 49; breeden v. black, 2012 scc 19, [2012] 1 scr 666, at paras. 23-25 and 32-33; op penheim forfait gmbh v. lexus maritime inc., 1998 canlii 13001 (que. ca), at para. 18; s. g. a. pitel and n. s. rafferty, conflict of laws (2010), at p. 126 (“[j]urisdiction issues usually arise at the very be- ginning, so they arise much more often than choice of law issues, which mainly arise at trial. however, the role of the applicable law in the forum non conveniens    requires consideration, at a much earlier stage in the proceedings, of the applicable law, and therefore of the choice of law rules to identify that law”). as explained by the quebec court of appeal in ortega, at paras. 42 and 46, the “substantial connection” test of art. 3164  ccq. [translation] “requires the quebec court in- quiring into the jurisdiction of the foreign court (where that jurisdiction does not result from ar- ticles 3166 to 3168 ccq) to consider and look at all the circumstances connecting the dispute to the foreign authority”, and “a comprehensive anal- ysis requires    consideration of each and every circumstance to determine its relevance and then its effect on the degree of connection” (emphasis added). it is, therefore, hardly unorthodox to sug- gest that art 3083 ccq is relevant to ascertaining the strength of the connection between the alter ego claim and the state of utah. as explained by walker, at pp. 11-54 and 11-55 (discussing the presumptive rattachement, selon le type de questions juridiques auquel chaque règle de conflit est destinée à s’appliquer. à chaque type de questions correspondent ainsi un ou plusieurs facteurs de rattachement et une ou plusieurs règles de conflit. ce choix vise normalement à faire en sorte que la loi compétente soit celle qui présente les liens les plus étroits avec la situation en cause. [je souligne; note en bas de page omise.] [168] ma collègue la juge côté affirme que mon approche équivaut à «  confond[re] les règles de conflit avec les conditions de reconnaissance des décisions étrangères » : par 270. soit dit en tout respect, j’estime qu’il n’est guère inhabituel que les tribunaux appelés à trancher des questions de compé- tence examinent les règles régissant le choix du droit applicable. par exemple, la loi applicable au litige est un facteur pertinent dans le cadre d’une analyse relative au forum non conveniens : spar, par. 71; van breda, par. 105; éditions écosociété inc. c. banro corp., 2012 csc 18, [2012] 1 rcs 636, par. 49; breeden c. black, 2012 csc 19, [2012] 1 rcs 666, par. 23-25 et 32-33; oppenheim forfait gmbh c. lexus maritime inc., 1998 canlii 13001 (ca. qc), par. 18; s. g. a. pitel et n. s. rafferty, conflict of laws (2010), p. 126 ([traduction] « [l]es questions de compétence sont généralement soulevées d’em- blée, elles sont donc beaucoup plus souvent soule- vées que les questions concernant le choix du droit applicable, lesquelles sont principalement formulées au procès. toutefois, l’analyse relative au forum non conveniens qui s’intéresse au rôle de la loi applicable au litige [  ] exige l’examen, à un stade beaucoup plus précoce des procédures, du droit applicable et, par conséquent, des règles régissant le choix de cette loi pour arrêter la décision à cet égard »). comme l’a expliqué la cour d’appel du québec aux par. 42 et 46 de l’arrêt ortega, l’exigence du « rattachement important » prévue à l’art 3164 ccq « oblige le tribunal québécois qui s’interroge sur la compétence du tribunal étranger (dans le cas où celle-ci ne résulte pas des articles 3166 à 3168 ccq) à envisager et à examiner toutes les circonstances rattachant le litige à l’autorité externe” et “une analyse globale nécessite [  ] un examen de toutes et chacune des circons- tances pour déterminer d’abord leur pertinence et ensuite leur effet respectif sur l’intensité du lien de rattachement » (je souligne). on ne saurait donc [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 681 real and substantial connections identified by the uniform law conference): while jurisdiction and choice of law in the conflict of laws are ordinarily understood to be discreet forms of analysis, in this context they may be related   . this approach to defining the underlying principle supporting jurisdiction based on a real and substantial connection is consistent with an observation made by the supreme court of canada in moran v. pyle. referring to cheshire, 8th ed., 1970, p. 281, dickson j. (as he then was) noted, “it would not be inappropriate to regard a tort as having occurred in any country substantially affected by the defendant’s activities or its consequences and the law of which is likely to have been in the reasonable contem- plation of the parties.” while this observation was made in respect of jurisdiction over claims in tort, it may have broader relevance. as mentioned above, the interest in regulating activities in the forum is, at bottom, justifiable as a result of the close connection between those activi- ties and the legal context that is likely to have been in the reasonable contemplation of the parties. [emphasis in original; footnote omitted.] qualifier de peu orthodoxe l’affirmation selon la- quelle l’art 3083 ccq est pertinent pour apprécier la force du rattachement entre la situation visée par l’allégation d’alter ego et l’état de l’utah. comme l’a expliqué la professeure walker, p. 11-54 et 11- 55 (qui traite des liens réels et substantiels créant une présomption dont a fait état la conférence pour l’harmonisation des lois) : [traduction] bien qu’il soit généralement entendu que la compétence et le choix du droit applicable en cas de conflits des lois relèvent d’analyses distinctes, dans le présent contexte, elles peuvent être liées  . cette définition du principe sous- jacent à la reconnais- sance de la compétence sur le fondement de l’existence de liens réels et substantiels est compatible avec une re- marque de la cour suprême du canada dans moran c. pyle. renvoyant à cheshire, 8e éd., 1970, p. 281 qui, sous la plume du juge dickson (plus tard juge en chef), a écrit « qu’il conviendrait à la rigueur de considérer un délit civil comme étant survenu dans tout pays qui a été substantiellement tou- ché par les activités du défendeur ou par ses conséquences et dont la loi, vraisemblablement, a été raisonnablement envi- sagée par les parties ». cette remarque visait la compétence en matière de responsabilité délictuelle, mais elle peut avoir une portée plus large. comme il a été mentionné précédem- ment, l’intérêt qu’il y a à contrôler les activités dans l’état du for est, au fond, justifiable en raison des liens étroits entre ces activités et le contexte juridique susceptible d’avoir été envisagé par les parties. [en italique dans l’original; note en bas de page omise.] [169] i acknowledge, of course, that “the juris- diction simpliciter and forum non conveniens anal- yses should be based on different factors”: haaretz. com v. goldhar, 2018 scc 28, [2018] 2 scr 3, at para. 90; van breda, at para 56. but this principle is driven by the distinction between establishing jurisdiction and declining to exercise jurisdiction (or, as this court put it in van breda (at para. 19), between “assuming jurisdiction (jurisdiction simplic- iter)” and “deciding whether to decline to exercise it (forum non conveniens)”). in the context of the recognition of a foreign judgment, however, there is no need to distinguish between the factors relevant to “the jurisdiction simpliciter and forum non conven- iens analyses”, since a quebec court cannot refuse to recognize such a judgment on the basis that the [169] je reconnais, bien sûr, que « l’analyse de la simple reconnaissance de compétence et celle rela- tive au forum non conveniens devraient s’appuyer sur différents facteurs » : haaretz.com c. goldhar, 2018 csc 28, [2018] 2 rcs 3, par. 90; van breda, par 56. ce principe découle toutefois de la distinc- tion qui doit être faite entre le fait de déterminer la compétence et celui pour un tribunal de décliner sa compétence (ou, pour reprendre les termes de la cour dans l’arrêt van breda, au par. 19, entre « la déclaration de compétence (la simple recon- naissance de compétence) » et les « décisions sur l’opportunité de décliner compétence (le forum non conveniens) »). dans le contexte de la reconnais- sance d’un jugement étranger, il n’est toutefois pas nécessaire d’établir une distinction entre les facteurs 682 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. foreign authority should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to the forum non conveniens doctrine: lépine. if the “substantial connection” test of art 3164 ccq must be satisfied in order to rec- ognize the foreign authority’s jurisdiction — which is the case if the quebec court intends to base its find- ing of jurisdiction on one of the “general provisions” in chapter i of title three — then the quebec court must, in my respectful view, consider all relevant factors, including the applicable law: ortega, at pa- ras. 42 and 46. i reiterate that the applicable law should be considered under the “substantial connec- tion” test of art 3164 ccq in order to extend the foreign authority’s admitted jurisdiction — not in order to deny it by impermissibly applying the forum non conveniens doctrine. [170] despite our disagreements, my colleagues and i all agree that “it is in the interests of justice that the ‘entire dispute including the alter ego claims’ be decided by one forum”: gascon j.’s reasons, at para. 88; see also côté j.’s reasons, at para 274. the question is, which forum? under art 3148 ccq, the quebec authorities do not have jurisdiction over bec, which is based in vermont. according to my colleagues gascon and côté jj., the utah court has no jurisdiction over mr. barer under arts. 3168(3) or (4) ccq, due to a lack of evidence. but if there is a lack of evidence, it is only because mr. barer has chosen not to present a defense against the claims of alter ego and fraud, and because the utah court cannot otherwise assert jurisdiction over him since he is domiciled in quebec. in such a “situation in- volving two or more parties located in different parts of the world” (lépine, at para. 36), however, and where there is a substantial connection between their dispute and utah, it is in my view not only desirable but necessary in the interests of justice and in light of the “guiding principle” of international comity, which underpins the various private international law rules (spar, at paras. 15 and 17), to recognize the jurisdiction of the utah court in respect of the “entire pertinents pour mener à bien les « analyses relatives à la simple reconnaissance de compétence et celle relative au forum non conveniens » puisqu’un tri- bunal québécois ne peut pas refuser de reconnaître un tel jugement au motif que l’autorité étrangère aurait dû décliner sa compétence en application de la doctrine du forum non conveniens : lépine. s’il faut qu’il soit satisfait au critère du « rattachement important  » prévu à l’art.  3164  ccq pour que la compétence de l’autorité étrangère soit recon- nue  — ce qui est le cas si le tribunal québécois entend fonder sa conclusion de compétence sur une des « dispositions générales » du chapitre premier du titre troisième —, le tribunal québécois doit, à mon avis, analyser l’ensemble des facteurs pertinents, y compris le droit applicable : ortega, par. 42 et 46. je réitère que le droit applicable devrait être examiné au regard du critère du « rattachement important » de l’article 3164 ccq pour étendre la compétence reconnue du tribunal étranger, et non pour la nier par l’application indue de la doctrine du forum non conveniens. [170] malgré nos désaccords, mes collègues et moi nous entendons pour dire qu’« il est dans l’intérêt de la justice que “l’ensemble du litige, y compris les allégations d’alter ego”, soit tranché par un seul tribunal » : motifs du juge gascon, par. 88; voir aussi les motifs de la juge côté, par 274. fort bien. mais de quel tribunal parle-t-on? suivant l’ar- ticle 3148 ccq, les autorités québécoises n’ont pas compétence sur bec, dont le bureau principal est situé au vermont. de l’avis de mes collègues, les juges gascon et côté, le tribunal de l’utah n’a pas compétence sur m.  barer en application des par. 3168(3) ou (4) ccq, en raison de l’insuffisance de la preuve à ce sujet. cependant, si la preuve est insuffisante, c’est uniquement parce que m. barer a choisi de ne pas présenter de défense à l’encontre des allégations d’alter ego et de fraude, et parce que le tribunal de l’utah ne peut par ailleurs pas se déclarer compétent sur lui puisqu’il est domicilié au québec. toutefois, dans une telle « situation juridique com- plexe où plusieurs parties se trouvent dans des fors différents » (lépine, par. 36), et où un rattachement important existe entre leur litige et l’utah, j’estime qu’il est non seulement souhaitable, mais également nécessaire, dans l’intérêt de la justice et à la lumière [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc le juge brown 683 dispute” and of all co- defendants. conversely, to impose upon knight the additional burden of proving its allegations of alter ego or fraud before a quebec court seems unnecessary and, quite frankly, exces- sive, since it is apparent that only utah had an interest in asserting jurisdiction “over all aspects of the case”: van breda, at para 99. as the utah court said in response to mr. barer’s motion to dismiss:    [the] plaintiff has shown that david barer has suffi- cient minimum contacts with the state of utah to estab- lish personal jurisdiction over him. there was purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting business in utah in hiring a utah company in utah to perform work in utah. there is nexus between those forum- related contacts and plaintiff’s causes of action as they all arise out of the work performed. because the disputes regarding the other defendants will be determined in this forum, and there would appear to be little additional burden on david barer to have his personal liability, which is related to the alter ego claim against another defendant, also determined in this forum. the state of utah has an interest in providing a forum for resolution of the dispute arising from work contracted in and performed in the state, the plaintiff has an interest in receiving convenient and effective relief in the same forum where the rest of the dispute will be resolved. it furthers the interest of the interstate, and in this case the international justice system in having the entire dispute including the alter ego claims against two defendants resolved in one efficient action. therefore, the court finds that it is not unreasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction over david barer. [footnote omitted.] du « principe directeur » de la courtoisie interna- tionale qui sert d’assise aux différentes règles de droit international privé (spar, par. 15 et 17), de reconnaître la compétence du tribunal de l’utah à l’égard de « l’ensemble du litige » et de tous les codéfendeurs. à l’inverse, il semble inutile — et à vrai dire exagéré — d’imposer à knight le fardeau additionnel de prouver ses allégations d’alter ego ou de fraude devant le tribunal québécois, puisqu’il est évident que seules les autorités de l’utah avaient in- térêt à se déclarer compétentes « relativement à tous les aspects du recours » : van breda, par 99. ainsi que le tribunal de l’utah l’a souligné en réponse à la requête en irrecevabilité de m. barer : [traduction]    [la] demanderesse a démontré que david barer avait des liens minimaux suffisants avec l’utah pour être assujetti à sa compétence personnelle. il y a eu exercice délibéré du privilège de faire affaire dans l’utah lors de la rétention des services d’une société de cet état pour l’exécution de travaux dans l’utah. une connexité existe entre ces liens avec l’état du for et les causes d’action de la demanderesse, car ils découlent tous des travaux exécutés. puisque les litiges concernant les autres défendeurs seront tranchés dans cet état, il semble- rait que la détermination de la responsabilité personnelle de david barer, qui est liée à l’allégation d’alter ego for- mulée contre un autre défendeur, par les tribunaux de ce même état, n’ajouterait que minimalement à son fardeau. l’état de l’utah a intérêt à ce que le litige découlant de travaux qui ont été convenus et exécutés dans cet état y soit tranché, et il est dans l’intérêt de la demanderesse de pouvoir obtenir une réparation utile et efficace devant les tribunaux du même état où le reste du litige sera tranché. il est dans l’intérêt du système de justice inter- état, et en l’espèce du système de justice international, de faire juger dans une seule et même action efficace la totalité du différend, y compris les allégations ayant trait à l’al- ter ego contre les deux défendeurs. en conséquence, la cour conclut que l’exercice de la compétence personnelle à l’endroit de david barer n’est pas déraisonnable. [note en bas de page omise.] (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 102-3) (da, vol. ii, p.102-103) i acknowledge that art 3139 ccq has not [171] been fully argued in this appeal. article 3168(4) ccq has, however, and — as i have explained above — its scope cannot be determined in isolation. article 3164 ccq has also received considerable [171] je reconnais que l’art 3139 ccq n’a pas été plaidé de façon approfondie dans le présent pourvoi. toutefois, le par 3168(4) ccq l’a été et, comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, sa portée ne peut pas être cernée isolément. l’article 3164 ccq a aussi 684 barer v knight brothers llc brown j. [2019] 1 scr. attention from the parties and each of gascon and côté jj. in their reasons. in my view, it is a mis- take to ignore the significance of art 3164 ccq. to the utah court’s jurisdiction. further, and not- withstanding this court’s observation in grecon (at para. 32) that the text of art 3139 ccq reveals its “permissive nature”, this provision is not entirely discretionary. as explained by professor goldstein (at pp. 113-14): [translation] the provision itself states that the quebec court “has jurisdiction”, not that it “may assume jurisdic- tion”. it therefore does not seem to include a discretion not to exercise jurisdiction. however, this wording is not mandatory, unlike that of article 71 ccp, which uses the word “must”, as noted in [grecon] by the supreme court, which ultimately found this provision to be permissive in nature. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] [172] i also acknowledge, as this court noted in grecon (at para. 31), that art 3139 ccq “con- fers a discretion on the judge, who may decide to sever the principal action from the action in war- ranty”. but as this court also explained in lépine (at para. 34): “[e]nforcement by the quebec court depends on whether the foreign court had jurisdic- tion, not on how that jurisdiction was exercised”, and that proper regard must still be given to “the basic distinction between the establishment of jurisdiction as such and the exercise of jurisdiction” (emphasis added). it follows that a quebec court cannot ignore art 3139 ccq when deciding whether to recognize a foreign authority’s jurisdiction, even if that provi- sion confers a discretion upon the foreign authority to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction over the “incidental demand”. in this appeal, the utah court has chosen to assert its jurisdiction over all aspects of the case, including the alter ego claims. given art 3139 ccq, this choice was open to the utah court and should be respected by this court. fait l’objet d’une attention considérable, tant de la part des parties que de la part du juge gascon et de la juge côté dans leurs motifs. à mon avis, ignorer l’importance de l’art 3164 ccq à l’égard de la compétence du tribunal de l’utah est une erreur. de plus, et malgré l’observation de la cour dans grecon (par. 32) selon laquelle le libellé de l’art 3139 ccq. révèle son « caractère facultatif », cette disposition n’est pas entièrement discrétionnaire. comme l’ex- plique le professeur goldstein (p. 113-114) : la disposition elle- même énonce que le tribunal québécois « est compétent », et non « peut se saisir ». elle ne semble donc pas inclure un pouvoir discrétionnaire de ne pas l’exercer. toutefois, cette rédaction n’est pas impérative, à la différence de l’article 71 cpc, qui utilise le terme « doit », comme l’a relevé la cour suprême dans l’affaire [grecon], en attribuant finalement à cette disposition un caractère facultatif. [je souligne; notes en bas de page omises.] [172] je reconnais en outre, comme l’a fait la cour dans grecon (par. 31), que l’art 3139 ccq « laisse [  ] un pouvoir discrétionnaire au juge qui peut décider de dissocier le recours principal du recours en garantie ». toutefois, comme la cour l’a expliqué par ailleurs dans lépine (par. 34) : « [l]’exequatur du tribunal québécois dépend de l’existence de la com- pétence du tribunal étranger, et non des modalités de l’exercice de celle-ci » et il faut quand même prendre dûment en compte « la distinction de base entre la détermination de la compétence proprement dite et son exercice » (je souligne). il s’ensuit qu’un tribunal québécois ne peut pas faire abstraction de l’art 3139 ccq en décidant s’il y a lieu ou non de reconnaître la compétence d’un tribunal étranger, même si cette disposition confère à ce dernier un pouvoir discrétionnaire de ne pas exercer sa compé- tence à l’égard de la « demande incidente ». dans le présent pourvoi, le tribunal de l’utah a choisi de se déclarer compétent à l’égard de tous les aspects de l’affaire, y compris les allégations d’alter ego. compte tenu de l’art 3139 ccq, le tribunal de l’utah était autorisé à faire ce choix et la cour doit le respecter. [173] finally, my colleague gascon j. suggests that knight has not adduced evidence to establish “the [173] enfin, mon collègue le juge gascon suggère que knight n’a présenté aucune preuve pour étayer [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 685 required degree of ‘connexity’ between mr. barer and bec”: para. 91; see also côté j.’s reasons, at para 285. there are, of course, different aspects to “the required degree of ‘connexity’” to be considered here: the connection between mr. barer and bec; the connection between mr. barer or the claims made against him and the state of utah; and the connection between the contractual claims made against bec and the alter ego claims made against mr. barer per- sonally. so far as the connection between mr. barer and bec is concerned, i have already recounted evidence in the record showing that mr. barer was at the relevant time secretary and acting president of bec, and that he has had a “key role” in dealing with knight on behalf of bec. as for the connection be- tween mr. barer or the claims made against him and the state of utah, i agree with my colleague that the record shows a substantial connection (gascon j.’s reasons, at para. 88), and further say that this satisfies the requirements of art 3164 ccq. and, as for the connection between the contractual claims made against bec and the alter ego claims made against mr. barer personally, there can be no serious doubt that they are “connected” as required by grecon: para 31. in this regard, i take my colleague’s state- ment that “it is in the interests of justice that the ‘en- tire dispute including the alter ego claims’ be decided by one forum” (para. 88) as largely supportive, since it would not be “in the interests of justice” that un- connected claims be decided together by one forum. « le degré de “connexité” nécessaire entre bec et m. barer » : par. 91; voir aussi les motifs de la juge côté, par 285. bien entendu, divers aspects du « de- gré de “connexité” nécessaire » doivent être exa- minés en l’espèce : le rattachement entre m. barer et bec; le rattachement entre m. barer ou les allé- gations formulées contre lui et l’état de l’utah; et le rattachement entre les allégations contractuelles faites contre bec et les allégations d’alter ego for- mulées contre m. barer personnellement. en ce qui concerne le rattachement entre m. barer et bec, j’ai déjà relaté la preuve au dossier établissant que m. barer était, à l’époque pertinente, le secrétaire et président par intérim de bec et qu’il avait eu un « rôle clé » dans les négociations avec knight au nom de bec. quant au rattachement entre m. barer ou les allégations formulées contre lui et l’état de l’utah, je conviens avec mon collègue que le dossier montre un rattachement important (motifs du juge gascon, par. 88), et j’ajoute que cela satisfait aux exigences de l’art 3164 ccq. enfin, pour ce qui est des allégations contractuelles présentées contre bec et celles d’alter ego présentées contre m. barer per- sonnellement, il ne peut faire aucun doute qu’elles sont « connexes » comme l’exige grecon : par 31. à cet égard, je considère que l’affirmation de mon collègue selon laquelle « il est dans l’intérêt de la justice que [  ] “l’ensemble du litige, y compris les allégations d’alter ego”, soit tranché par un seul tribunal » (par. 88) appuie en grande partie cette proposition, puisqu’il ne serait pas « dans l’intérêt de la justice » que des allégations non connexes soient tranchées ensemble par un seul tribunal. iii conclusion iii conclusion [174] i would dismiss the appeal with costs. [174] je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi avec dé- pens. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par côté j. (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i. introduction i. introduction [175] knight brothers llc (hereinafter the “re- spondent” or “knight”) asked the superior court of quebec to recognize a judgment rendered by default [175] knight brothers llc (ci- après l’« intimée » ou « knight ») a demandé à la cour supérieure du québec de reconnaître un jugement rendu par défaut 686 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. (hereinafter the “amended final judgment”) by the united states district court, central division for the district of utah (hereinafter the “utah court”) and to declare it enforceable against david barer (hereinafter the “appellant” or “mr barer”). (ci- après le « jugement définitif modifié ») par la cour de district des états- unis, division centrale du district de l’utah (ci- après le « tribunal de l’utah »), et de déclarer cette décision opposable à david barer (ci- après l’« appelant » ou « m barer »). [176] the rules governing the recognition and en- forcement of foreign decisions are found in book ten, title four, of the civil code of québec (“ccq” or “civil code”). as a general principle, all foreign decisions will be recognized and, where applicable, declared enforceable unless an exception applies (art 3155 ccq;. canada post corp. v. lépine, 2009 scc 16, [2009] 1 scr 549, at para. 22; mutual trust co. v. st- cyr (1996), 144 dlr (4th) 338 (ca), at pp 347-48). quebec authorities must only ensure that the decision meets the requirements pre- scribed in the ccq, without considering its merits (art 3158 ccq). [176] les règles régissant la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions étrangères se trouvent au livre dixième, titre quatrième, du code civil du qué- bec (« ccq » ou « code civil »). en principe, toute décision étrangère sera reconnue et, le cas échéant, déclarée exécutoire, sauf exception (art 3155 ccq;. société canadienne des postes c. lépine, 2009 csc 16, [2009] 1 rcs 549, par. 22; mutual trust co. c. st- cyr, [1996] rdj 623 (ca), p 632-633). les autorités québécoises doivent uniquement vérifier si la décision remplit les conditions prévues par le ccq sans procéder à l’examen au fond de celle-ci (art 3158 ccq). [177] while these principles generally favour the recognition of foreign decisions, the quebec author- ities still have an important role to play: [177] bien que ces principes favorisent de façon générale la reconnaissance des décisions étrangères, les autorités québécoises ont quand même un rôle important à jouer : however favourable these principles may be to the recognition of foreign decisions, it must still be found that none of the exceptions provided for in art 3155 ccq. apply. in particular, as art. 3155(1) provides, the quebec court must find that the court of the country where the judgment was rendered had jurisdiction over the mat- ter. in this regard, title four also contains arts. 3164 to 3168, which set out rules the quebec court is to apply to determine whether the foreign authority had jurisdiction. [emphasis added.] si favorables que soient ces principes à la reconnais- sance des décisions étrangères, encore faut-il qu’aucune des exceptions prévues à l’art 3155 ccq ne trouve ap- plication. en particulier, comme le précise le par. 3155(1), le tribunal québécois doit constater que le tribunal de l’état dont provient le jugement avait compétence sur la ma- tière. le titre quatrième édicte alors aux art. 3164 à 3168 des règles destinées à permettre au tribunal québécois de déterminer si l’autorité étrangère avait compétence. [je souligne.] (lépine, at para. 24) (lépine, par. 24) [178] the main issue in this appeal is the applica- bility of the exception set out in art 3155(1) ccq: [178] la principale question en litige dans le pré- sent pourvoi concerne l’application de l’exception prévue au par 3155(1) ccq : 3155 a decision rendered outside québec is recognized and, where applicable, declared enforceable by the québec authority, except in the following cases: 3155 toute décision rendue hors du québec est reconnue et, le cas échéant, déclarée exécutoire par l’autorité du québec, sauf dans les cas suivants : (1) the authority of the state where the decision was rendered had no jurisdiction under the provisions of this title; 1o l’autorité de l’état dans lequel la décision a été rendue n’était pas compétente suivant les dispositions du présent titre; [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 687 [179] the superior court of quebec had to de- termine whether the utah court had jurisdiction to render its decision against the appellant. the pro- cess for ascertaining the jurisdiction of a foreign authority is based primarily on the rule enunciated in art 3164 ccq, that is, jurisdiction is established in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction applicable to quebec courts, to the extent that the dispute is substantially connected with the foreign state whose authority is seized of the matter. [179] la cour supérieure du québec était appelée à déterminer si le tribunal de l’utah avait compétence pour rendre sa décision contre l’appelant. la procé- dure pour établir la compétence de l’autorité étran- gère est principalement fondée sur la règle énoncée à l’art 3164 ccq, c’est-à-dire que la compétence est établie suivant les règles de compétence applicables aux tribunaux québécois dans la mesure où le litige se rattache d’une façon importante à l’état étranger dont l’autorité a été saisie. [180] more specifically, in a personal action of a patrimonial nature, like the action in this case, the jurisdiction of the foreign authority will be recog- nized only in the following cases (art 3168 ccq): [180] plus précisément, dans une action person- nelle à caractère patrimonial comme celle qui nous intéresse en l’espèce, la compétence des autorités étrangères ne sera reconnue que dans les cas suivants (art 3168 ccq) : (1) the defendant was domiciled in the state where the decision was rendered; 1o le défendeur était domicilié dans l’état où la décision a été rendue; (2) the defendant possessed an establishment in the state where the decision was rendered and the dispute relates to its activities in that state; 2o le défendeur avait un établissement dans l’état où la décision a été rendue et la contestation est relative à son activité dans cet état; (3) injury was suffered in the state where the decision was rendered and it resulted from a fault which was committed in that state or from an injurious act or omission which occurred there; 3o un préjudice a été subi dans l’état où la décision a été rendue et il résulte d’une faute qui y a été commise ou d’un fait dommageable qui s’y est produit; (4) the obligations arising from a contract were to be performed in that state; 4o les obligations découlant d’un contrat devaient y être exécutées; (5) the parties have submitted to the foreign authorities the present or future disputes between themselves arising out of a specific legal relationship; however, renunciation by a consumer or a worker of the jurisdiction of the authority of his place of domicile may not be set up against him; 5o les parties leur ont soumis les litiges nés ou à naître entre elles à l’occasion d’un rapport de droit déterminé; cependant, la renonciation du consommateur ou du tra- vailleur à la compétence de l’autorité de son domicile ne peut lui être opposée; (6) the defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign authorities. 6o le défendeur a reconnu leur compétence. [181] blanchard j. of the superior court found that art. 3168(3), (4) and (6) could all serve to es- tablish the utah court’s jurisdiction (2016 qccs 3471 (“sup. ct. reasons”), at paras. 10, 16 and 20 (canlii)). as a result, he recognized the foreign decision and declared it enforceable against the ap- pellant in quebec. [181] le juge blanchard de la cour supérieure a conclu que les par. 3168(3), (4) et (6) pouvaient tous servir à établir la compétence du tribunal de l’utah (2016 qccs 3471 (« motifs de la cs »), par. 10, 16 et 20 (canlii)). il a par conséquent reconnu la décision étrangère et l’a déclarée opposable à l’ap- pelant au québec. 688 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [182] the quebec court of appeal affirmed blanchard j.’s decision and dismissed the appeal. however, it stated the following: [182] la cour d’appel du québec a confirmé la décision du juge blanchard et a rejeté l’appel. elle a toutefois déclaré ce qui suit : without endorsing all the reasons of the judge of first instance, we are nevertheless all of the view that there were sufficient elements to allow to conclude as he did. [emphasis added.] [traduction] sans souscrire à tous les motifs du juge de première instance, nous sommes néanmoins tous d’avis qu’il y avait suffisamment d’éléments pour permettre de conclure comme il l’a fait. [je souligne.] (2017 qcca 597, at para. 1 (canlii)) (2017 qcca 597, par. 1 (canlii)) [183] the court of appeal did not specify whether it had identified errors in the superior court’s deci- sion or which aspects of the reasons it was not en- dorsing. its judgment is therefore of little assistance in resolving the issue before this court. [183] la cour d’appel n’a pas précisé si elle avait décelé des erreurs dans la décision de la cour supé- rieure ni à quels aspects des motifs elle ne souscrivait pas. le jugement qu’elle a rendu est donc de peu d’utilité pour trancher la question en l’espèce. in my opinion, there are several errors in the [184] superior court’s decision that warrant the interven- tion of this court. first, under the civil code, a court seized of an application for the recognition and en- forcement of a foreign decision must review the evi- dence submitted and ensure that the foreign authority had jurisdiction over the matter (iraq (state of) v. heerema zwijndrecht, bv, 2013 qcca 1112, at para 15). here, the superior court made a palpable and overriding error by concluding that art. 3168(3) and (4) were satisfied despite the absence of any evidence regarding a fault committed in utah or a contractual obligation of mr. barer to be performed in utah. second, the superior court erred in law in finding that the appellant had submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction pursuant to art. 3168(6) simply by raising substantive arguments in his motion to dis- miss. as a result, the utah court’s jurisdiction over the matter has not been established and the amended final judgment cannot be recognized and declared enforceable against the appellant. [184] à mon avis, la décision de la cour supérieure comporte plusieurs erreurs qui justifient l’interven- tion de notre cour. en premier lieu, sous le régime du code civil, le tribunal saisi d’une demande de reconnaissance et d’exécution d’une décision étran- gère doit examiner les éléments de preuve qui ont été soumis et s’assurer que l’autorité étrangère avait compétence sur l’affaire (iraq (state of) c. heerema zwijndrecht, bv, 2013 qcca 1112, par 15). dans le cas qui nous occupe, la cour supérieure a commis une erreur manifeste et dominante en concluant que les conditions prévues aux par. 3168(3) et (4) étaient remplies malgré l’absence de toute preuve concer- nant une faute commise en utah ou une obligation contractuelle de m. barer à exécuter en utah. en second lieu, la cour supérieure a fait erreur en ju- geant que l’appelant avait reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah conformément à l’art. 3168(6) du simple fait qu’il avait soulevé des arguments de fond dans sa requête en irrecevabilité. par conséquent, la compétence du tribunal de l’utah sur l’affaire n’a pas été établie et le jugement définitif modifié ne peut pas être reconnu et déclaré opposable à l’appelant. ii article 3168(3) and (4) ccq. ii paragraphes 3168(3) et (4) ccq. [185] i agree with my colleague gascon  j.’s conclusion that knight did not meet its burden of establishing the utah court’s jurisdiction over mr. barer pursuant to art. 3168(3) and (4) ccq. [185] je souscris à la conclusion de mon collègue le juge gascon suivant laquelle knight ne s’est pas déchargée du fardeau qui lui incombait d’établir la compétence du tribunal de l’utah à l’égard de [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 689 moreover, i would make the following additional comments. m. barer en vertu des par. 3168(3) et (4) ccq. par ailleurs, je tiens à ajouter les commentaires suivants. a evidence required for the recognition of a a la preuve requise pour la reconnaissance d’une foreign decision décision étrangère [186] when considering an application to recog- nize a foreign decision, a quebec court must review the evidence submitted and determine whether the authority of the state where the decision was ren- dered had jurisdiction over the matter: [186] lorsqu’il est saisi d’une demande de recon- naissance d’une décision étrangère, le tribunal qué- bécois doit examiner la preuve soumise et déterminer si l’autorité de l’état dans lequel la décision a été rendue avait compétence sur l’affaire : [translation] moreover, it is up to the court hearing the application for recognition to review the evidence adduced to ensure that the foreign court had jurisdiction over the matter   . il appartient, par ailleurs, au tribunal saisi de la de- mande de reconnaissance d’examiner la preuve soumise pour s’assurer que le tribunal étranger avait compétence sur la matière  . (heerema, at para. 15) (heerema, par. 15) [187] it is important to note that in cases where a quebec court is considering its own jurisdiction under art 3148 ccq, it will take the alleged facts as averred unless they are specifically contested by the parties (spar aerospace ltd. v. american mobile satellite corp., 2002 scc 78, [2002] 4 scr 205, at paras. 31-33), in which case the court will only require a prima facie showing of one of the factors set out in that article. this is a consequence of the procedural context under art. 167 of the new code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501 (“new ccp”):. first, it appears that the procedural context for chal- lenging jurisdiction at a preliminary stage supports the idea that art. 3148 establishes a broad basis for finding jurisdiction. in order to challenge jurisdiction in a pre- liminary motion, one must bring a declinatory motion to dismiss under art. 163 [now art 167] ccp. case law has established that a judge hearing such a motion is not to consider the merits of the case, but rather, is to take as averred the facts that are alleged by the plaintiff to bring it within the jurisdictional competence of the quebec courts     [references omitted.] [187] il importe de signaler que, lorsqu’un tribunal québécois examine sa propre compétence en vertu de l’art 3148 ccq, il tiendra pour avérés les faits allégués, à moins que ceux-ci ne soient expressé- ment contestés par les parties (spar aerospace ltée c. american mobile satellite corp., 2002 csc 78, [2002] 4 rcs 205, par. 31-33), auquel cas il exigera simplement une preuve prima facie établissant l’un des facteurs énoncés à cet article. c’est ce qu’im- plique le contexte procédural de l’art. 167 du nou- veau code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501 (« nouveau cpc ») :. en premier lieu, il appert que le contexte procédural permettant de contester la compétence au stade préli- minaire confirme l’idée que l’art. 3148 établit un large fondement permettant de conclure à la compétence d’un tribunal. pour contester la compétence dans le cadre d’une requête préliminaire, il faut demander le rejet de la de- mande en présentant une requête en exception déclinatoire conformément à l’art. 163 [maintenant l’art. 167] cpc. selon la jurisprudence, le juge saisi de ce genre de requête n’a pas à se prononcer sur le fond du litige, mais doit plutôt tenir pour avérés les faits que le demandeur allègue pour que la compétence des tribunaux du québec soit recon- nue    [renvois omis.] (spar, at para. 31) (spar, par. 31) 690 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [188] however, the procedural context is not the same for an application to recognize a foreign deci- sion. in such a context, the general rules of evidence apply, the allegations will not be accepted as averred and a prima facie showing will not be sufficient. the court will therefore analyze the evidence adduced to establish whether the foreign authority had juris- diction over the matter. for example, if the basis for recognizing the foreign authority’s jurisdiction is the defendant’s domicile (see art 3168(1) ccq), the quebec authority will require proof of that domicile and will not be satisfied by a mere allegation or a prima facie showing. the same is true of all the grounds for jurisdiction under art 3168 ccq. [189] therefore, under art. 3168(3) and (4) ccq, the utah court’s jurisdiction should be recognized only if the quebec authority finds, based on the ev- idence filed, that: [188] cependant, le contexte procédural n’est pas le même pour une demande de reconnaissance d’une décision étrangère. en pareil cas, ce sont les règles générales de la preuve qui s’appliquent, les alléga- tions ne seront pas tenues pour avérées et une preuve prima facie ne suffira pas. le tribunal analysera alors les éléments de preuve produits afin de déterminer si l’autorité étrangère avait compétence sur l’affaire. par exemple, si la reconnaissance de la compétence de l’autorité étrangère est fondée sur le domicile du défendeur (voir le par 3168(1) ccq), l’auto- rité québécoise exigera une preuve de ce domicile et ne se contentera pas d’une simple allégation ou d’une preuve prima facie. il en va de même pour tous les motifs d’attribution de compétence énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq. [189] en conséquence, suivant les par. 3168(3) et (4) ccq, la compétence du tribunal de l’utah ne devrait être reconnue que si l’autorité québécoise conclut, eu égard à la preuve produite, que l’une ou l’autre des conditions suivantes est remplie : (3) [an] injury was suffered in [utah] and it resulted from a fault which was committed in that state or from an injurious act or omission which occurred there; [or] 3o [u]n préjudice a été subi [en utah] et il résulte d’une faute qui y a été commise ou d’un fait dommageable qui s’y est produit; [ou] (4) the obligations arising from a contract were to be performed in [utah.] 4o les obligations découlant d’un contrat devaient [  ] être exécutées [en utah.] [190] according to blanchard j., art. 3168(3) and (4) ccq could provide a basis for recognizing the utah court’s jurisdiction “in as much as the accept- ance of the alleged promise to pay by [mr.] barer was received in utah and that same was to be per- formed in that state” (sup. ct. reasons, at para. 20 (emphasis added)). the alleged promise to pay to which blanchard j. referred was described in the respondent’s second amended complaint in utah in the following terms: [190] selon le juge blanchard, les par. 3168(3) et (4) ccq pouvaient servir à reconnaître la compé- tence du tribunal de l’utah dans la mesure où [tra- duction] « l’acceptation de la prétendue promesse de [m.] barer de payer avait été reçue en utah et où celle-ci devait être exécutée dans cet état » (motifs de la cs, par. 20 (je souligne)). la prétendue promesse de payer à laquelle le juge blanchard a fait référence a été décrite comme suit dans la deuxième poursuite modifiée déposée par l’intimée en utah : in a telephone conversation, david barer represented to mike mcknight, the president of intermountain rigging, that the defendants would pay the increased price for the foundation work provided by intermountain rigging on the project. [traduction] au cours d’une conversation télépho- nique, david barer a affirmé à mike mcknight, président d’intermountain rigging, que les défendeurs paieraient le prix majoré des travaux de fondations effectués par intermountain rigging dans le cadre du projet. at the time david barer made this representation to intermountain rigging, he knew the statement was false. au moment où david barer a fait cette déclaration à intermountain rigging, il savait qu’elle était fausse. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 691 david barer made the representation to intermountain rigging that the defendants would pay for the increased foundation work for the express purpose of inducing intermountain rigging to continue and complete the re- maining work on the project without payment. david barer a déclaré à intermountain rigging que les défendeurs paieraient le prix majoré des travaux de fonda- tions dans le but exprès d’inciter intermountain rigging à poursuivre et à terminer les travaux prévus par le projet sans la payer. intermountain rigging, acting reasonably and in ig- norance of the falsity of david barer’s representation, relied upon the representation and was induced to continue providing additional work and services for the defendants to complete the project. intermountain rigging, agissant de façon raisonnable et sans savoir que les déclarations de david barer étaient fausses, s’est fiée à celles-ci et a été incitée à poursuivre les travaux et à fournir les services additionnels néces- saires pour permettre aux défendeurs de mener à bien le projet. as a direct result of david barer’s fraudulent rep- resentation, intermountain rigging has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. en conséquence directe des déclarations frauduleuses de david barer, intermountain rigging a subi un préjudice dont le montant devra être déterminé au procès. wherefore, intermountain rigging demands an award of damages and judgment against defendant david barer as hereinafter set forth. par conséquent, intermountain rigging réclame des dommages- intérêts ainsi que le prononcé d’un juge- ment contre le défendeur david barer, tel qu’il est prévu ci- après. (paras. 64-68; see also paras. 4 and 30-31.) (par. 64-68; voir aussi par. 4 et 30-31.) [191] in the superior court, the appellant argued that the utah court had no jurisdiction to render its judgment against him. along with its application, the respondent filed documentary evidence that essen- tially consisted of the pleadings and decisions from the proceedings before the utah court. in particular, it filed the amended final judgment, the second amended complaint, the motion to dismiss, the memorandum of david barer in support of the mo- tion to dismiss, and the memorandum of decision and order denying mr. barer’s motion to dismiss. [192] the respondent argued that these documents afforded sufficient evidence to establish the utah court’s jurisdiction. i disagree. the respondent did adduce evidence that the appellant had received ser- vice of the complaint (sup. ct. reasons, at para. 4) and that the foreign decision was final. however, none of the documents submitted offered any evi- dence with regard to a fault committed by the ap- pellant in utah or a contractual obligation to be performed by him in that state. [191] devant la cour supérieure, l’appelant a sou- tenu que le tribunal de l’utah n’avait pas compétence pour rendre un jugement contre lui. l’intimée a joint à sa demande des éléments de preuve documentaire consistant essentiellement en des actes de procédure et des décisions tirées de l’instance en utah. plus particulièrement, elle a déposé le jugement définitif modifié, la deuxième poursuite modifiée, la requête en irrecevabilité, le mémoire soumis par david barer à l’appui de la requête en irrecevabilité, et la décision et l’ordonnance rejetant la requête en irrecevabilité de m barer. [192] l’intimée a prétendu que ces documents contenaient suffisamment d’éléments de preuve pour établir la compétence du tribunal de l’utah. je ne suis pas de cet avis. l’intimée a effectivement produit des éléments de preuve tendant à démontrer que l’appe- lant avait reçu signification de la poursuite (motifs de la cs, par. 4) et que la décision étrangère était définitive. toutefois, aucun des documents présen- tés n’offrait le moindre élément de preuve tendant à démontrer l’existence d’une faute commise par l’appelant en utah ou d’une obligation contractuelle que l’appelant devait exécuter dans cet état. 692 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [193] professor emanuelli describes the probative force of a foreign decision before the quebec courts as follows: [193] le professeur emanuelli décrit de la façon suivante la force probante d’une décision étrangère devant les tribunaux québécois : [translation] 1) the foreign decision is a means of proof. it serves to prove, for example, that a divorce judgment was in fact rendered abroad, ending the parties’ union, although it is possible to challenge the validity of the divorce. the judgment was rendered on the basis of certain grounds (adultery, mental cruelty, etc.) found by the foreign judge. the quebec judge must take account of the foreign judge’s findings of fact and may glean some information from them. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] 1) la décision étrangère est un moyen de preuve. il permet, par exemple, de prouver qu’un jugement de divorce a bien été prononcé à l’étranger, mettant fin à l’union entre les parties, même s’il est possible de contester la validité de ce divorce. ce jugement a été prononcé sur la base de certains motifs (adultère, cruauté mentale, etc.) constatés par le juge étranger. le juge québécois doit tenir compte des constatations de fait du juge étranger. il peut en tirer des informations. [je souligne; notes en bas de page omises.] (c. emanuelli, droit international privé québécois (3rd ed. 2011), at no. 327) (c. emanuelli, droit international privé québécois (3e éd. 2011), no 327) [194] with respect, and unlike blanchard  j., i do not find that the second amended complaint, the memorandum of decision and order denying mr. barer’s motion to dismiss, the amended final judgment, or any other exhibit filed in quebec of- fers any evidence that would allow recognition of the utah court’s jurisdiction. the alleged promise to pay and the alter ego allegations set out in the second amended complaint have yet to be proven in court. in fact, the appellant expressly denied those allegations, and no evidence of the alleged promise to pay, its content or its acceptance was adduced at any other time in the utah proceedings. while the decisions of the utah court filed as evidence are semi- authentic acts and make proof of their content under art 2822 ccq, they are default judgments and contain no findings of fact that may be relied on in the quebec proceedings to conclude that the foreign authority had jurisdiction. [194] en toute déférence, et contrairement au juge blanchard, je ne crois pas que la deuxième poursuite modifiée, la décision et l’ordonnance rejetant la re- quête en irrecevabilité de m. barer, le jugement défi- nitif modifié, et les autres pièces qui ont été déposées au québec renferment des éléments de preuve qui permettraient de reconnaître la compétence du tribunal de l’utah. les allégations relatives à la promesse de payer et à l’existence d’un alter ego que l’on trouve dans la deuxième poursuite modifiée n’ont pas encore été prouvées devant un tribunal. en fait, l’appelant a expressément nié ces allégations et aucune preuve de la prétendue promesse de payer, de sa teneur ou de son acceptation n’a été présentée à quelque autre moment au cours de l’instance en utah. bien que les décisions du tribunal de l’utah qui ont été produites en preuve constituent des actes semi- authentiques qui font preuve de leur contenu en vertu de l’art 2822 ccq, il s’agit de jugements rendus par défaut qui ne contiennent aucune conclusion de fait sur laquelle se fonder, dans le cadre de l’instance québécoise, pour conclure que l’autorité étrangère avait compétence. [195] according to blanchard j., the proof made before the utah court in the context of the motion to dismiss constituted “sufficient proof under quebec law that the requirements to grant jurisdiction to the utah court over barer [were] valid” (sup ct. reasons, at para 17). however, in the context of [195] suivant le juge blanchard, la preuve soumise au tribunal de l’utah dans le contexte de la requête en irrecevabilité constituait [traduction] « une preuve suffisante en droit québécois que les conditions d’at- tribution de la compétence au tribunal de l’utah à l’égard de m. barer étaient remplies » (motifs de la [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 693 the motion to dismiss, the allegations were simply accepted as true. once again, the decision on that motion does not contain any finding of fact that could support the allegations. [196] in its factum, the respondent identified the quebec court of appeal’s decision in aboud v. eplus technology inc., 2005 qcca 2, as [translation] “a good example of applying the connecting factors for a dispute to establish the jurisdiction of a for- eign court”. in that case, the court of appeal found that the evidence filed in quebec, which included foreign decisions, was sufficient to recognize the jurisdiction of the united states district court for the eastern district of virginia under art 3168(3) ccq. (aboud, at para 10). however, the quebec authori- ties were not asked to recognize a default judgment but a judgment on the merits, which had also been affirmed on appeal. in such a context, the quebec authorities could very well look at the findings of fact in those two decisions in order to recognize jurisdic- tion based on one of the factors in art 3168 ccq. furthermore, the petitioner in aboud did not simply file the foreign decisions but also adduced additional evidence, including the testimony of a witness that the contract in issue had been formed in the state of virginia (eplus technology inc. v. aboud, [2003] az- 50402261 (que. sup. ct.), at paras 13-15). [197] in the instant case, by contrast, there was no evidence that could allow the superior court to recognize the utah court’s jurisdiction under art. 3168(3) or (4) ccq. for this reason, i would find that blanchard j. committed a palpable and over- riding error (sup. ct. reasons, at para 20). this is not to say that decisions rendered by default will never be recognized in quebec or that the quebec courts should conduct a new trial. however, for a judgment rendered in a personal action of a patrimonial nature to be recognized, the applicant will need to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that one of the factors listed in art 3168 ccq existed. cs, par 17). toutefois, comme il s’agissait d’une requête en irrecevabilité, les allégations ont simple- ment été tenues pour avérées. là encore, la décision sur cette requête ne renferme aucune conclusion de fait susceptible d’étayer les allégations. [196] dans son mémoire, l’intimée cite l’arrêt rendu par la cour d’appel du québec dans l’affaire aboud c eplus technology inc., 2005  qcca  2, comme « un bel exemple d’application des facteurs de rattachement d’un litige pour établir la compé- tence d’un tribunal étranger ». dans cet arrêt, la cour d’appel a estimé que les pièces produites au québec, notamment les jugements étrangers, étaient suffi- santes pour permettre de reconnaître la compétence de la cour de district des états- unis du district est de la virginie en vertu du par 3168(3) ccq (aboud, par 10). les autorités québécoises étaient toutefois appelées à reconnaître non pas un jugement par dé- faut, mais bien un jugement sur le fond, qui avait par ailleurs été confirmé en appel. en pareil cas, les autorités québécoises pouvaient fort bien examiner les conclusions de fait de ces deux décisions afin de reconnaître la compétence du tribunal étranger en vertu d’un des facteurs énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq. de plus, dans l’affaire aboud, la requérante ne s’était pas contentée de produire les décisions étrangères, mais elle avait aussi présenté d’autres éléments de preuve, en faisant notamment entendre un témoin qui avait expliqué que le contrat avait été formé dans l’état de virginie (eplus technology inc. c. aboud, [2003] az- 50402261 (cs. qc), par 13-15). [197] en l’espèce, par contre, il n’y avait aucune preuve qui pouvait permettre à la cour supérieure de reconnaître la compétence du tribunal de l’utah en vertu des par. 3168(3) ou (4) ccq. pour cette raison, je suis d’avis de conclure que le juge blanchard a commis une erreur manifeste et dominante (motifs de la cs, par 20). il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant que les décisions rendues par défaut ne seront jamais reconnues au québec ou que les tribunaux québécois devraient tenir un nouveau procès. toutefois, pour que soit reconnu un jugement rendu dans une action personnelle à caractère patrimonial, il faut que le demandeur produise suffisamment d’éléments de preuve pour prouver l’existence d’un des facteurs énumérés à l’art 3168 ccq. 694 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. b the corporate veil under article 3168(4) ccq. b le voile corporatif sous le régime du par. 3168(4) [198] i would add that the respondent could not rely on art 3168(4) ccq — which applies in cases where “the obligations arising from a contract were to be performed in [the state where the decision was rendered]” — absent evidence that would have al- lowed the corporate veil to be pierced under quebec law (see zimmermann inc. v. barer, 2016 qcca 260, at para. 22 (canlii)). this conclusion seems to me inescapable given that mr. barer is not himself a party to the contract at issue. [199] article 3168(4) ccq cannot be relied on to establish jurisdiction against anyone remotely associ- ated with a contract. the action must be based on “the obligations arising from a contract”, which implies that the plaintiff is suing a contracting party who failed to honour contractual obligations. accordingly, and contrary to what my colleague brown j. suggests (at para. 99), art 3168(4) ccq requires a connec- tion not only with the object of the dispute (ie the contract), but also with the defendant (ie the person liable for the contractual obligations). holding other- wise would render this connecting factor indetermi- nate and diffuse, such that it would become difficult for certain litigants — for instance, the shareholders, directors and employees of a corporation that per- forms contractual obligations in a foreign state — to predict with reasonable certainty whether a foreign decision rendered against them may be recognized in quebec. this would undermine the very purpose of having clear connecting factors. ccq. [198] j’ajouterais que l’intimée ne pouvait invo- quer le par 3168(4) ccq — qui s’applique dans les cas où « les obligations découlant d’un contrat de- vaient [  ] être exécutées [dans l’état où la décision a été rendue] » — en l’absence d’éléments de preuve qui auraient permis de percer le voile corporatif sous le régime du droit québécois (voir zimmermann inc. c. barer, 2016 qcca 260, par. 22 (canlii)). cette conclusion me semble inévitable étant donné que m. barer n’est pas lui- même partie au contrat en cause. [199] le paragraphe 3168(4) ccq ne peut être invoqué pour établir la compétence à l’égard de toute personne liée de près ou de loin à un contrat. l’action doit être fondée sur « les obligations découlant d’un contrat », ce qui signifie que le demandeur poursuit une partie contractante qui n’a pas respecté ses obli- gations contractuelles. en conséquence, et contraire- ment à ce que suggère mon collègue le juge brown (par. 99), le par 3168(4) ccq exige la présence d’un lien non seulement avec l’objet du litige (c-à-d. le contrat), mais aussi avec le défendeur (c-à-d la personne responsable des obligations contractuelles). conclure autrement rendrait ce facteur de rattache- ment indéterminé et vague, de sorte qu’il devien- drait difficile pour certaines parties au litige — par exemple, les actionnaires, les administrateurs et les employés d’une société qui exécute des obligations contractuelles dans un état étranger — de prédire avec une certitude raisonnable si une décision étrangère rendue contre eux pourra être reconnue au québec, ce qui irait à l’encontre de l’objet même de l’adoption de facteurs de rattachement clairs. in this regard, i disagree with my colleague [200] brown j. (at paras. 105-6) that the common law de- cision in lapointe rosenstein marchand melançon llp v. cassels brock & blackwell llp, 2016 scc 30, [2016] 1 scr 851, is relevant to the interpreta- tion of art 3168(4) ccq. in that case, the majority took the view that, in tort claims, a court can assume jurisdiction over a dispute where a “contract con- nected with the dispute was made in the province” even if the defendant was not a party to the contract [200] à cet égard, je ne suis pas d’accord avec mon collègue le juge brown (par. 105-106) pour dire que l’arrêt de common law lapointe rosenstein mar- chand melançon sencrl c. cassels brock & blackwell llp, 2016 csc 30, [2016] 1 rcs 851, est pertinent pour l’interprétation du par 3168(4) ccq. dans cet arrêt, les juges majoritaires ont estimé que, dans les actions en responsabilité délictuelle, le tribu- nal peut se déclarer compétent à l’égard d’un litige « si un contrat lié au litige a été conclu dans la province », [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 695 (para 44). the wording of the ccq is narrower and does not lend itself to such an interpretation. if an action is of an extracontractual nature — the civil law equivalent to a tort claim — the plaintiff must rely on art 3168(3) ccq, which deals with cases involving an injury resulting from a fault. any other interpretation would blur the distinction between the two connecting factors. [201] by way of clarification, where the defend- ant is not a party to the contract at issue, the plain- tiff cannot rely on art 3168(4) ccq unless it is shown that the defendant is otherwise personally responsible for the contractual obligations under quebec law. in practice, it would therefore be in- sufficient to show that barer engineering company of america (“bec”) was the alter ego of mr barer. the respondent would also have to present evidence establishing that mr. barer invoked bec’s juridical personality “so as to dissemble fraud, abuse of right or contravention of a rule of public order” within the meaning of art 317 ccq (see, eg,. domaine de l’orée des bois la plaine inc. v. garon, 2012 qcca 269, at para. 9 (canlii); lanoue v. brasse- rie labatt ltée, 1999 canlii 13784 (que. ca), at pp. 9-12; coutu v. québec (commission des droits de la personne), 1998 canlii 13100 (que. ca), at pp. 14-18; p. martel, business corporations in canada: legal and pratical aspects (loose- leaf), at pp. 1-94 to 1-100). même si le défendeur n’était pas partie au contrat (par 44). le texte du ccq est plus restrictif et ne conduit pas à une telle interprétation. si l’action est de nature extracontractuelle — l’équivalent en droit civil de l’action en responsabilité délictuelle —, le demandeur doit invoquer le par 3168(3) ccq, qui vise les cas où il est question d’un préjudice résultant d’une faute. toute autre interprétation estomperait la distinction entre les deux facteurs de rattachement. [201] par souci de précision, j’ajouterais que, lorsque le défendeur n’est pas partie au contrat en cause, le demandeur ne peut invoquer le par 3168(4) ccq, à moins qu’il ne soit démontré que le défendeur est par ailleurs responsable personnellement des obligations contractuelles en vertu du droit québécois. en pra- tique, il ne suffirait donc pas de démontrer que barer engineering company of america (« bec ») était l’al- ter ego de m barer. l’intimée devrait également pré- senter une preuve établissant que m. barer a invoqué la personnalité juridique de bec « pour masquer la fraude, l’abus de droit ou une contravention à une règle intéressant l’ordre public » au sens de l’art 317 ccq. (voir, p ex, domaine de l’orée des bois la plaine inc. c. garon, 2012 qcca 269, par. 9 (canlii); lanoue c. brasserie labatt ltée, 1999 canlii 13784 (ca. qc), p. 9-12; coutu c. québec (commission des droits de la personne), 1998 canlii 13100 (ca. qc), p. 14-18; p. martel, la société par actions au québec, vol. i, les aspects juridiques (feuilles mobiles), par. 1-289 à 1-2901). [202] requiring such evidence does not amount to an “impermissible” review of the merits of the case (brown j.’s reasons, at para 101). the purpose of the inquiry is not to retry the case, but rather to verify whether the requirements for recognition are met (art 3158 ccq). the quebec court of appeal aptly explained the distinction in zimmermann, at paras. 15 and 18-20: [202] exiger une telle preuve n’équivaut pas à ré- examiner d’une manière « inacceptable » le fond de l’affaire (motifs du juge brown, par 101). l’analyse ne vise pas à juger à nouveau l’affaire, mais bien à vérifier si les conditions de la reconnaissance sont remplies (art 3158 ccq). la cour d’appel du qué- bec a bien expliqué la distinction dans zimmermann, par. 15 et 18-20 : the appellants argue that the trial judge erred by re- examining the merits of the case decided in vermont con- trary to art 3158 ccq. they further argue that she erred in concluding that additional evidence needed to be ad- duced before her so as to enable her to recognize the juris- diction of the district court with regard to the respondent. finally, they state that she should have concluded that the [traduction] les appelantes affirment que la juge de première instance a commis une erreur en réexaminant le fond de l’affaire qui avait été tranchée au vermont, contrairement à l’art 3158 ccq. elles soutiennent éga- lement qu’elle a commis une erreur en concluant qu’il était nécessaire que d’autres éléments de preuve lui soient présentés pour qu’elle puisse reconnaître la compétence 696 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. district court had jurisdiction over the respondent since it applied the doctrine of alter ego to lift the corporate veil in order to find him personally liable. therefore, under the mirror principle set out in art 3164 ccq, they alleged that “[  ] if quebec tribunals can apply the doctrine of alter ego to affirm their jurisdiction over the foreign alter ego of a quebec corporation, the quebec courts must equally respect a foreign tribunal’s determination that it holds jurisdiction over the quebec alter ego of a corpora- tion registered in their jurisdiction”. de la cour de district à l’égard de l’intimé. enfin, elles affirment qu’elle aurait dû conclure que la cour de dis- trict avait compétence à l’égard de l’intimé, étant donné qu’elle a appliqué la doctrine de l’alter ego afin de soule- ver le voile corporatif et de pouvoir ainsi déclarer celui-ci personnellement responsable. par conséquent, suivant le principe du miroir énoncé à l’art. 3164  ccq, les ap- pelantes soutiennent que « [  ] s’ils peuvent appliquer la doctrine de l’alter ego pour se déclarer compétents à l’égard de l’alter ego étranger d’une société québécoise, les tribunaux québécois doivent aussi respecter la décision rendue par le tribunal étranger qui se déclare compétent sur l’alter ego québécois d’une société immatriculée sous le régime de leurs lois ».   .   . when commenting on art. 3520 of the draft legislation leading to the revision of the civil code of quebec (ie the present art 3158 ccq),. professors talpis and goldstein circumscribed the role of a quebec authority with regard to its review of a foreign judgment as follows: alors qu’ils formulaient leurs commentaires au sujet de l’art. 3520 du projet de loi ayant mené à la révision du code civil du québec (c-à-d l’art 3158 ccq actuel), les professeurs talpis et goldstein ont circonscrit de la façon suivante le rôle que joue l’autorité québécoise lorsqu’elle révise un jugement étranger : [translation] article 3520 states that, in principle, the merits of the foreign judgment are not to be re- viewed. however, it should be noted that the quebec judge reconsiders the merits of the assessments made by the foreign judge when applying certain require- ments for recognition or enforcement. l’article 3520 précise que la révision au fond du juge- ment étranger est exclue en principe. cependant, on doit faire remarquer que le juge québécois réexamine au fond les appréciations du juge étranger, en mettant en œuvre certaines conditions de reconnaissance ou d’exécution. in fact, it is impossible to eliminate all consideration of the merits of the decision, since certain requirements for recognition cannot be reviewed effectively unless the quebec judge reconsiders the characterization of the facts by his or her foreign colleague   . if a party to the enforcement action in quebec challenges the ontario judge’s jurisdiction, the quebec court cannot rely on the ontario assessment of domicile but must look at the facts again to determine whether, in its view — according to the rules on quebec’s indirect jurisdiction — the defendant was indeed domiciled in ontario. this reassessment of the facts by the quebec judge is normal, because the ontario judge was not concerned with the rules on the indirect international jurisdiction of quebec. en effet, il est impossible de supprimer tout examen au fond de la décision car le contrôle de certaines conditions de la reconnaissance ne peut s’exercer effectivement que si le juge québécois réexamine la qualification des faits par son collègue étranger. [  ]. si l’une des parties à l’action en exécution au québec conteste la compétence du juge ontarien, le tribunal québécois ne pourra pas se fier à l’apprécia- tion ontarienne du domicile, mais devra examiner à nouveau les faits pour savoir si à ses yeux — selon les règles de compétence indirecte québécoise — le défendeur était bien domicilié en ontario. cette nou- velle appréciation des faits par le juge québécois est normale parce que le juge ontarien ne se préoccupait pas des règles de compétence internationale indirecte québécoise. the quebec court cannot be bound in this regard by the foreign application of the facts, for if it were, any review of indirect jurisdiction would become formal. le tribunal québécois ne peut être lié à ce sujet par l’application étrangère des faits, sinon tout contrôle de la compétence indirecte deviendrait formel. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 697 therefore, the fact that there is no review of the merits must not be taken to mean that the merits of the foreign judgment are not assessed. the quebec court also retains a right to critically examine its foreign coun- terpart’s work with respect to public order, whether procedural or otherwise, as we will see shortly. donc, on ne doit pas assimiler absence de révision au fond et absence d’appréciation du jugement étranger au fond. le tribunal québécois conserve également un droit critique sur le travail de son collègue étranger en matière d’ordre public, procédural ou autre, comme nous allons nous en rendre compte un peu plus loin. authors serge gaudet and patrick ferland share the les auteurs serge gaudet et patrick ferland abondent same view: dans le même sens : [translation] essentially, a court hearing an applica- tion for enforcement must therefore take the judgment as it stands and determine, based only on the require- ments set out in title four, whether it is appropriate to recognize the disposition of the judgment against the defendant. however, the principle of not reviewing the merits of the decision does not have the effect of depriving the quebec court of the right to verify that the requirements underlying the jurisdiction of the foreign authority that rendered the decision are met (defendant’s domicile or occurrence of fault or injury in the jurisdiction, for example). essentiellement, le tribunal saisi d’une demande d’exe- quatur doit donc prendre le jugement tel quel et déter- miner, sur la simple base des conditions énoncées par le titre quatrième, s’il convient d’en reconnaître ou non le dispositif à l’encontre du défendeur. le principe de non- intervention à l’égard du bien- fondé de la décision n’a toutefois pas pour effet de priver le tribunal qué- bécois du droit de vérifier l’existence des conditions requises pour fonder la compétence de l’autorité étran- gère ayant rendu la décision (domicile du défendeur ou survenance d’une faute ou d’u[n] préjudice dans la juridiction, par exemple). the trial judge examined all the situations contem- plated by art 3168 ccq, except par 3168(3) ccq. since both parties agreed that this provision was not ap- plicable. she determined that there was no evidence in the record that would allow her to conclude that the dis- trict court had jurisdiction over the respondent under art 3168 ccq based on the doctrine of alter ego and the piercing of the corporate veil. taking into account the particular circumstances of this case, the appellants have not convinced us that this conclusion is wrong in law or vitiated by a palpable and overriding error. [underlining in original; italics added; foornotes omitted.] la juge de première instance a examiné toutes les situations envisagées par l’art 3168 ccq, à l’exception de celles prévues à l’art. 3168(3), puisque les deux parties avaient convenu que cette disposition ne s’appliquait pas. elle a estimé qu’il n’y avait aucun élément de preuve au dossier qui lui permettait de conclure que la cour de dis- trict, en appliquant la doctrine de l’alter ego et en perçant le voile corporatif, avait compétence sur l’intimé en vertu de l’art 3168 ccq. eu égard aux circonstances particu- lières de l’espèce, les appelantes ne nous ont pas convain- cus que cette conclusion est erronée en droit ou entachée d’une erreur manifeste et dominante. [soulignement dans l’original; italiques ajoutés; notes en bas de page omises.] (quoting j. a. talpis and g. goldstein, “analyse critique de l’avant- projet de loi du québec en droit in- ternational privé” (1988), 91 r du n 606, at pp. 627- 28; s. gaudet and p. ferland, “le droit international privé”, in collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2015-2016, vol. 6, contrats, sûretés, pu- blicité des droits et droit international privé (2015); see also mutual trust, at p 633) (citant j a. talpis et g. goldstein, « analyse cri- tique de l’avant- projet de loi du québec en droit international privé » (1988), 91 r du n. 606, p. 627- 628; s. gaudet et p. ferland, « le droit internatio- nal privé », dans collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2015-2016, vol. 6, contrats, sûretés, publicité des droits et droit international privé (2015); voir aussi mutual trust, p 633) [203] likewise, in the instant case, the respond- ent was required to adduce evidence sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. otherwise, mr. barer had no “obligations arising from a contract” to perform [203] de la même façon, en l’espèce, l’intimée devait présenter suffisamment d’éléments de preuve pour permettre de percer le voile corporatif. autre- ment, m. barer n’avait pas d’« obligations découlant 698 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. in utah, and jurisdiction could not be asserted over him on the basis of art 3168(4) ccq. in the pres- ent circumstances, this is a jurisdictional issue, not a substantive one. i reiterate that, for jurisdictional purposes, [204] the law applicable to the piercing of the corporate veil is that of quebec, not utah. contrary to what my colleague brown j. asserts (at para. 101), it is of no import that the alter ego claim might have been governed by utah law had mr. barer been sued in quebec. the issue here is not what law is applica- ble on the merits, but whether the foreign judgment rendered against mr. barer can be recognized on the basis of art 3168(4) ccq. d’un contrat » à exécuter en utah et il ne pouvait y avoir de déclaration de compétence à son égard au titre du par 3168(4) ccq. dans les circonstances de l’espèce, il s’agit d’une question de compétence, et non d’une question de fond. [204] je rappelle qu’en ce qui concerne la com- pétence, le droit applicable pour déterminer s’il convient de percer le voile corporatif est celui du québec, et non celui de l’utah. contrairement à ce qu’affirme mon collègue le juge brown (par. 101), il importe peu de savoir que l’allégation d’alter ego aurait pu être régie par le droit de l’utah si m. barer avait été poursuivi au québec. la question qui se pose en l’espèce est de savoir non pas quel droit il convient d’appliquer au fond, mais plutôt si le jugement étranger rendu contre m. barer peut être reconnu sur le fondement du par 3168(4) ccq. [205] the nature and scope of a connecting fac- tor codified in the civil code must be determined according to the law of quebec. they do not vary depending on the foreign authority concerned. as p. ferland and g. laganière explain in the context of conflict rules: [205] la nature et la portée d’un facteur de rat- tachement codifié dans le code civil doivent être déterminées selon le droit québécois. elles ne varient pas en fonction de l’autorité étrangère en cause. comme l’expliquent p. ferland et g. laganière dans le contexte des règles de conflit : [translation] but there is no reason why the interpre- tation of foreign conflict rules should influence the inter- pretation of quebec conflict rules: if a quebec court is considering a private international law issue, it is for that court to delineate the scope of the relevant quebec conflict rules (and therefore to interpret those rules) using concepts from quebec law. or, on ne voit pas pourquoi l’interprétation des règles de conflit étrangères devrait influencer l’interprétation des règles de conflits québécoises : si un tribunal québécois est saisi d’une question de droit international privé, c’est à ce tribunal de délimiter le champ d’application des règles de conflit québécoises pertinentes (donc à interpréter ces règles), et ce, à l’aide des concepts du droit québécois. (“le droit international privé”, in collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2017-2018, vol. 7, contrats, sûretés, publicité des droits et droit inter- national privé (2017), 253, at p. 257) (« le droit international privé », dans collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2017-2018, vol. 7, contrats, sûretés, publicité des droits et droit international privé (2017), 253, p. 257) [206] for instance, there is little doubt that the notion of “domicile” under art 3168(1) ccq must be understood in light of quebec civil law (arts. 75 and 307 ccq). as professor goldstein puts it, [translation] “the actual definition of domicile un- der article 3168 ccq can only come from quebec law, since it is a matter of interpreting quebec provi- sions” (droit international privé, vol. 2, compétence internationale des autorités québécoises et effets [206] par exemple, il fait peu de doute que la notion de « domicile » au sens du par 3168(1) ccq doit être interprétée à la lumière du droit civil québécois (art. 75 et 307 ccq). comme l’affirme le profes- seur goldstein, « la définition même du domicile de l’article 3168 ccq ne peut provenir que du droit québécois puisqu’il s’agit d’interpréter des disposi- tions québécoises » (droit international privé, vol. 2, compétence internationale des autorités québécoises [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 699 des décisions étrangères (art. 3134 à 3168 ccq) (2012), at p. 441; see also ferland and laganière, at p. 304; g. goldstein and e. groffier, droit in- ternational privé, vol. 1, théorie générale (1998), at p.  428; emanuelli, at p.  166) similarly, what constitutes submission under art. 3168(6)  ccq. is determined according to quebec law (j. walker, castel & walker: canadian conflict of laws (6th ed. (loose- leaf)), at p.  14-24), as is the definition of an incidental demand under art 3139 ccq (g. goldstein, “compétence internationale indirecte du tribunal étranger”, in jurisclasseur québec — droit international privé (loose- leaf), by p-c lafond, ed., fasc. 11, at para 41). in my view, the same goes for the other connecting factors, including the obligations arising from a contract under art 3168(4) ccq. if, for example, the very existence of the contract were at issue, we would rely, for jurisdictional purposes, on quebec contractual rules. the present situation is no different. [207] in any event, even if we were to assume that a court must look at the law applicable on the merits to determine whether jurisdiction may be asserted over an alter ego claim under art 3168(4) ccq, the present case would nonetheless be governed by quebec law. under quebec rules of evidence, where the foreign law has not been pleaded or its content has not been established, the court applies the law in force in quebec (art 2809 ccq). as the law of utah pertaining to alter ego claims has been neither pleaded nor proven, art 317 ccq would apply by default — irrespective of conflict of laws rules. et effets des décisions étrangères (art. 3134 à 3168 ccq) (2012), p. 441; voir également ferland et laganière, p. 304; g. goldstein et e. groffier, droit international privé, t. 1, théorie générale (1998) p.  428; emanuelli, p.  166). ce qui constitue une reconnaissance au sens du par. 3168(6) ccq est aussi établi en fonction du droit québécois (j. walker, castel & walker : canadian conflict of laws (6e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), p. 14-24), tout comme la défini- tion d’une demande incidente au sens de l’art. 3139 ccq (g. goldstein, « compé tence internationale indirecte du tribunal étranger », dans jurisclasseur québec — droit international privé (feuilles mo- biles), par p-c. lafond, dir., fasc. 11, par 41). à mon avis, il en est de même pour les autres facteurs de rattachement, notamment les obligations découlant d’un contrat visées par le par. 3168(4) ccq. si, par exemple, l’existence même du contrat était en cause, nous nous appuierions, en ce qui concerne la com- pétence, sur les règles contractuelles du québec. la présente situation n’est pas différente. [207] de toute façon, même dans l’hypothèse où le tribunal devrait examiner le droit applicable au fond pour déterminer s’il peut se déclarer compétent à l’égard d’une allégation d’alter ego en vertu du par 3168(4) ccq, la présente affaire serait quand même régie par le droit québécois. selon les règles de preuve québécoises, lorsque le droit étranger n’a pas été allégué ou que sa teneur n’a pas été établie, le tribunal applique le droit en vigueur au québec (art 2809 ccq). comme le droit de l’utah se rap- portant aux allégations d’alter ego n’a été ni allé- gué ni établi, l’art 317 ccq s’appliquerait par défaut — indépendamment des règles en matière de conflits de lois. [208] in practice, if the decision had been ren- dered on the merits and not by default, a quebec court would apply quebec law to the foreign au- thority’s factual findings to determine whether it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil for the purpose of recognizing the decision on the basis of art 3168(4) ccq. in the case of a default judgment, however, no factual findings are made, and a quebec court will inevitably require actual evidence that would justify piercing the corporate veil for juris- dictional purposes. [208] en pratique, si la décision avait été rendue au fond, et non par défaut, le tribunal québécois ap- pliquerait le droit québécois aux conclusions de fait de l’autorité étrangère pour déterminer s’il convient de percer le voile corporatif afin de reconnaître la décision au titre du par 3168(4) ccq. dans le cas d’un jugement par défaut, cependant, aucune conclu- sion de fait n’a été tirée et le tribunal québécois doit forcément exiger des éléments de preuve concrets qui justifieraient de percer le voile corporatif aux fins de la compétence. 700 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [209] as i have already noted, in the present case, the alter ego allegations are just that, allegations that have not been proven in court. most saliently, there is simply no allegation, let alone evidence, that mr. barer used bec’s juridical personality “so as to dissemble fraud, abuse of right or contraven- tion of a rule of public order” within the meaning of art 317 ccq. therefore, it has not been proven that mr. barer was responsible for “the obligations arising from a contract”, and the foreign judgment cannot be recognized on the basis of art 3168(4) ccq. though my colleague brown j. criticizes the interpretation i adopt, i would point out that he acknowledges that art 3168(4) ccq is insufficient on its own to es- tablish jurisdiction against mr. barer, given that he would ultimately rely on art 3139 ccq — which applies to incidental demands — to recognize the utah judgment. i will comment on his approach at the end of my reasons. [209] comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, en l’espèce, les allégations d’alter ego ne sont que cela, des allé- gations qui n’ont pas été prouvées devant un tribu- nal. fait plus important, il n’existe tout simplement pas d’allégations, et encore moins d’éléments de preuve, voulant que m. barer se soit servi de la per- sonnalité juridique de bec « pour masquer la fraude, l’abus de droit ou une contravention à une règle inté- ressant l’ordre public » au sens de l’art 317 ccq. en conséquence, il n’a pas été établi que m. barer était responsable des « obligations découlant d[u] contrat » et le jugement étranger ne peut être re- connu en vertu du par 3168(4) ccq. bien que mon collègue le juge brown critique l’interprétation que j’adopte, je tiens à souligner qu’il reconnaît que le par 3168(4) ccq ne permet pas en soi d’établir la compétence à l’égard de m. barer puisqu’il s’appuie- rait en définitive sur l’art 3139 ccq — qui s’ap- plique aux demandes incidentes — pour reconnaître le jugement de l’utah. je commenterai son approche à la fin de mes motifs. iii article 3168(6) ccq. iii paragraphe 3168(6) ccq. [210] on the question of submission to a foreign authority pursuant to art. 3168(6)  ccq,. i disa- gree with the test set out by gascon j. and would find in this case that mr. barer did not submit to the jurisdiction of the utah court. the application judge erred in law in finding that an individual who raises a substantive issue necessarily submits to a foreign authority’s jurisdiction (sup. ct. reasons, at para. 16) and in reversing the burden of proof such that mr. barer had to disprove submission (sup. ct. reasons, at para 15). [210] sur la question de la reconnaissance de l’au- torité étrangère en vertu du par 3168(6) ccq, je ne puis souscrire au test énoncé par le juge gascon et je conclurais en l’espèce que m. barer n’a pas reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah. le juge saisi de la demande a commis des erreurs de droit en concluant que la personne qui soulève une question de fond reconnaît nécessairement la compétence de l’autorité étrangère (motifs de la cs, par. 16) et en renversant le fardeau de la preuve de manière à ce que m. barer ait à réfuter cette reconnaissance (motifs de la cs, par 15). [211] my colleague gascon j. finds that a defend- ant submits to the jurisdiction of a foreign authority “when the defendant presents substantive arguments which, if accepted, would resolve the dispute — or part of the dispute — on its merits” (para 69). this rigid approach is intended to prevent a defendant from making full submissions on the evidence and law before a court only to contest the court’s juris- diction later and require the plaintiff to retry the matter, thus imposing a burden on judicial resources (para 67). [211] mon collègue le juge gascon estime que le défendeur reconnaît la compétence d’une autorité étrangère « lorsqu’il présente des arguments de fond qui, s’ils étaient retenus, permettraient de trancher le litige sur le fond, en tout ou en partie » (par 69). cette approche rigide vise à empêcher le défendeur de présenter devant un tribunal des arguments com- plets sur la preuve et le droit pour ensuite contester la compétence de ce tribunal et obliger le demandeur à reprendre l’affaire au complet, ce qui imposerait un fardeau sur le plan des ressources judiciaires (par 67). [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 701 [212] respectfully, i find this test to be too strict. it ignores the fact that “the test of whether there is sufficient participation to constitute submission is subjective”, meaning that it must take into account the defendant’s subjective intent (j a talpis, with the collaboration of s. l. kath, “if i am from grand- mère, why am i being sued in texas?” responding to inappropriate foreign jurisdiction in quebec- united states crossborder litigation (2001), at p 114). [213] i would adopt a more flexible approach in determining whether a defendant has submitted to a foreign authority’s jurisdiction. a defendant that wishes to contest the jurisdiction of a foreign au- thority should be able to argue why the authority lacks jurisdiction without risking being found to have submitted to that jurisdiction. further, in jurisdic- tions where procedure requires that arguments on the merits be made simultaneously with objections based on jurisdiction, a defendant should not be prejudiced by raising substantive arguments at that stage. [214] the justifications for such an approach were summarized in cortas canning and refrigerating co. v. suidan bros. inc./suidan frères inc., [1999] rjq 1227 (sup. ct.), at p. 1244: the authors appear to favour the possibility that a de- fendant be allowed the possibility to “save his skin” in a foreign jurisdiction without submitting to this foreign jurisdiction. it could also permit a defendant to defend himself in cases of foreign shopping where a plaintiff could be seeking a more favourable environment in terms of quantum or of substantive law but with no substantial connection to the foreign jurisdiction. this line of reason- ing is, in the opinion of the court, legally sound. [i]t allows a defendant to raise at the begin[n]ing of a trial the ques- tion of jurisdiction; it gives a defendant time to evaluate the risk- reward equation that must be made before accepting to submit to a foreign jurisdiction. [emphasis added.] [212] en toute déférence, j’estime que ce test est trop strict. il ne tient pas compte du fait que [traduc- tion] « le critère servant à déterminer si la participa- tion est suffisante pour constituer une reconnaissance de compétence est subjectif », en ce sens qu’il doit tenir compte de l’intention subjective du défendeur (j a talpis, avec la collaboration de s l kath, « if i am from grand- mère, why am i being sued in texas? » responding to inappropriate foreign jurisdiction in quebec- united states crossborder litigation (2001), p 114). [213] j’adopterais une approche plus souple pour déterminer si le défendeur a reconnu la compétence de l’autorité étrangère. le défendeur qui souhaite contester la compétence d’une autorité étrangère devrait être en mesure d’expliquer pourquoi cette autorité n’est pas compétente sans courir le risque qu’un tribunal en arrive à la conclusion qu’il a re- connu cette compétence. de plus, dans les ressorts où la procédure exige que des arguments de fond soient présentés en même temps que les moyens déclinatoires, le défendeur ne devrait pas subir un préjudice parce qu’il a soulevé des arguments de fond à cette étape. [214] les raisons qui militent en faveur d’une telle approche ont été résumées dans la décision cortas canning and refrigerating co c suidan bros. inc./suidan frères inc., [1999] rjq 1227 (cs), p. 1244 : [traduction] les auteurs semblent être favorables à l’idée de permettre au défendeur de « sauver les meubles » devant le tribunal étranger sans reconnaître la compétence de ce dernier. cela pourrait également permettre au défen- deur de se défendre dans les situations où le demandeur recherche le tribunal et le ressort qui lui est le plus favo- rable tant pour ce qui est du montant auquel il pourrait être condamné qu’en ce qui concerne le droit substantiel applicable, mais où il n’existe pas de lien de rattachement important entre lui et le tribunal étranger. de l’avis de la cour, ce raisonnement est bien fondé en droit. il permet au défendeur de soulever la question de la compétence au début de l’instruction; il lui donne le temps de soupeser comme il se doit les risques et les avantages de chaque avenue avant d’accepter de reconnaître la compétence du tribunal étranger. [je souligne.] 702 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [215] ultimately, submission is concerned with the defendant’s intent (goldstein and groffier, at p. 430), and the intent to submit must be clear (171486 can- ada inc. v. rogers cantel inc., [1995] rdj 91, at p. 98; forest fibers inc. v. csav norasia container lines ltd., 2007 qccs 4794, at para. 44 (canlii); conserviera spa v. paesana import- export inc., 2001 canlii 24802 (que. sup. ct.), at paras 63-64). in determining whether a defendant has submitted to a foreign authority’s jurisdiction, quebec courts should ask whether such an intention is proven by the defendant’s actions. [216] a defendant must be permitted to raise ar- guments and considerations capable of convincing a foreign authority that it should not assume jurisdic- tion. it is unreasonable to suggest that any defend- ant who does so necessarily submits to the foreign authority’s jurisdiction. this would leave defendants in a “catch-22” situation. if they attempt to challenge the jurisdiction of a foreign authority, they risk being found by a quebec court to have submitted to that jurisdiction, thus exposing their personal assets in quebec. if they do not, they will likely be faced with a foreign default judgment which could seriously limit their ability to conduct business (or any other activities) in the foreign jurisdiction. the practical implications are real and serious. [217] i turn now to the facts of this case. blan- chard j. found that the appellant had submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction by raising the following issues in his motion to dismiss: [215] en fin de compte, la reconnaissance de compétence dépend de l’intention du défendeur (goldstein et groffier, p. 430) et cette intention doit être claire (171486 canada inc. c. rogers cantel inc., [1995] rdj 91, p. 98; forest fibers inc. c. csav norasia container lines ltd., 2007 qccs 4794, par. 44 (canlii); conserviera spa c. pae- sana import- export inc., 2001 canlii 24802 (cs. qc), par 63-64). pour déterminer si un défendeur a reconnu la compétence d’une autorité étrangère, les tribunaux québécois devraient se demander si les actes du défendeur démontrent qu’il avait une telle intention. [216] il faut permettre au défendeur de faire valoir des arguments et des considérations susceptibles de convaincre une autorité étrangère qu’elle ne devrait pas se déclarer compétente. il est déraisonnable de soutenir que le défendeur qui le fait reconnaît né- cessairement la compétence de l’autorité étrangère. cela placerait celui-ci dans une situation sans issue. s’il essaie de contester la compétence d’une autorité étrangère, il risque d’être considéré comme ayant reconnu la compétence de cette autorité aux yeux d’un tribunal québécois, exposant ainsi ses actifs per- sonnels au québec. s’il ne le fait pas, il se trouvera vraisemblablement aux prises avec un jugement par défaut étranger qui pourrait sérieusement restreindre sa capacité de faire des affaires (ou d’exercer toute autre activité) dans le ressort étranger. les consé- quences pratiques sont réelles et graves. [217] j’examine maintenant les faits en l’espèce. le juge blanchard a conclu que l’appelant avait re- connu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah en sou- levant les questions suivantes dans sa requête en irrecevabilité : [traduction] 1 plaintiff has failed to state a claim for fraud, as the claim as asserted is barred by the economic- loss rule; 1 la demanderesse n’a pas allégué la fraude, car cette allégation, telle que formulée, est irrecevable en raison de la règle des pertes financières; 2 plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state an alter ego claim against mr. barer; and 2 la demanderesse n’a pas allégué suffisamment de faits pour pouvoir faire valoir une allégation d’alter ego contre m. barer; et [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 703 3 plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to assert personal jurisdiction against mr barer. 3 la demanderesse n’a pas allégué suffisamment de faits pour justifier une déclaration de compétence person- nelle à l’égard de m barer. (see also sup. ct. reasons, at para 6) (voir aussi motifs de la cs, par 6) [218] my colleague gascon  j concedes that mr. barer did not present a defence on the merits. rather, he focuses on the first of the arguments raised by mr. barer in the motion to dismiss, finding that because mr. barer argued that knight’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim was barred at law by the pure economic loss rule, he necessarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the utah court (para 71). i would disagree with this conclusion for the following rea- sons. [219] the decision on the motion to dismiss pre- sented in utah establishes that “‘[t]o defeat a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the defendant must demonstrate that the presence of some other consid- erations would render jurisdiction unreasonable’” and that “the ‘jurisdictional inquiry in utah diver- sity cases is reduced to a single question: did the defendants have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state of utah to establish personal jurisdiction over them?’”. in light of this statement of the law, a broad range of arguments may convince a utah court that it lacks jurisdiction over a matter. a defendant must be allowed to present these arguments. thus, submitting an argument that can convince the court that assuming jurisdiction would be unreasonable cannot be considered to be recognition of the court’s jurisdiction. [218] mon collègue le juge gascon concède que m. barer n’a pas présenté de défense sur le fond. il insiste plutôt sur le premier des arguments soulevés par m. barer dans sa requête en irrecevabilité et conclut que, comme il a soutenu que l’allégation de déclarations inexactes frauduleuses faites par knight était irrecevable en droit en raison de la règle rela- tive aux pertes strictement financières, m. barer a nécessairement reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah (par 71). pour les motifs qui suivent, je ne puis souscrire à cette conclusion. [219] la décision sur la requête en irrecevabilité présentée en utah établit, d’une part, que [traduc- tion] « “[p]our faire échec à une preuve prima facie de compétence, le défendeur doit démontrer que la présence de certaines autres considérations rendrait déraisonnable une déclaration de compétence” » et, d’autre part, que « “l’analyse de la compétence dans les affaires de l’utah mettant en cause des parties de diverses citoyennetés se résume à une seule ques- tion : les défendeurs avaient- ils des ‘liens minimaux’ avec l’état de l’utah de manière à établir une com- pétence personnelle à leur égard?” ». à la lumière de cet énoncé du droit, un vaste éventail d’arguments peut convaincre un tribunal de l’utah qu’il n’a pas compétence sur une affaire. le défendeur doit avoir la possibilité de présenter ces arguments. en consé- quence, le fait de soulever un argument susceptible de convaincre le tribunal qu’il serait déraisonnable de se déclarer compétent ne peut être considéré comme une reconnaissance de la compétence de ce tribunal. [220] as my colleague gascon  j points out at para. 49, the question of whether an individual has submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign authority is “a question of mixed fact and law”. on the facts of this case, i find little support for the inference that the appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the utah court. while mr. barer did make some substantive arguments relating to the economic loss rule and the alter ego claim, they were presented alongside [220] comme mon collègue le juge gascon le sou- ligne au par. 49, la question de savoir si une personne a reconnu la compétence d’une autorité étrangère est « une question mixte de fait et de droit ». les faits en l’espèce me donnent peu de raisons d’inférer que l’appelant a reconnu la compétence du tribu- nal de l’utah. bien que m. barer ait effectivement présenté des arguments de fond quant à la règle des pertes financières et à l’allégation d’alter ego, il les a 704 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. jurisdictional arguments to support his position that the utah court lacked jurisdiction. while submission to jurisdiction can be either explicit or implicit, it must, as my colleague states, be clear (gascon j.’s reasons, at para. 52; rogers cantel, at p 98). [221] my colleague rejects the appellant’s argu- ment that he had no choice but to present all of his preliminary exceptions together in the utah proceed- ings, finding that the appellant bore the burden of proof in this regard (gascon j.’s reasons, at paras. 73 and 78). respectfully, this passage seems to contra- dict my colleague’s earlier conclusion that “[t]he party seeking recognition of a foreign decision thus bears the burden of proving the facts upon which the foreign authority’s indirect international jurisdiction is based” (para 33). it is my position that the respondent, in al- [222] leging that the utah court had jurisdiction over the appellant, bore the burden of proving that the appel- lant did in fact have a choice under utah procedural law not to proceed as he did when he presented his arguments in his motion to dismiss. this is con- sistent with the well- established principle that in quebec, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the facts upon which the court’s jurisdiction is based (transax technologies inc. v. red baron corp. ltd., 2017 qcca 626, at para. 13 (canlii); shamji v. tajdin, 2006 qcca 314, at para. 16 (canlii); bank of montreal v. hydro aluminum wells inc., 2002 canlii 3111 (que. sup. ct.), at para 12). [223] the question, therefore, is whether the re- spondent has demonstrated that under utah pro- cedural law, mr.  barer was required to raise his substantive arguments alongside his jurisdictional objections. the following passage from professor talpis is instructive: présentés en même temps que ses arguments relatifs à la compétence en vue d’étayer sa thèse suivant la- quelle le tribunal de l’utah n’avait pas compétence. si la reconnaissance de compétence peut être ex- plicite ou implicite, elle doit, comme l’affirme mon collègue, être claire (motifs du juge gascon, par. 52; rogers cantel, p 98). [221] mon collègue rejette l’argument de l’appe- lant suivant lequel il n’avait d’autre choix que de présenter tous ses moyens préliminaires ensemble dans le cadre de l’instance en utah, concluant que le fardeau de la preuve incombait à l’appelant à cet égard (motifs du juge gascon, par. 73 et 78). avec respect, ce passage semble contredire la conclusion précédente de mon collègue suivant laquelle « [i]l in- combe donc à la personne qui demande la reconnais- sance d’une décision étrangère de prouver les faits sur lesquels se fonde la compétence internationale indirecte de l’autorité étrangère » (par 33). [222] j’estime qu’en alléguant que le tribunal de l’utah avait compétence à l’égard de l’appelant, l’intimée avait la charge de démontrer que l’appe- lant avait effectivement le choix, en vertu des règles de procédure de l’utah, de ne pas procéder comme il l’a fait lorsqu’il a présenté ses arguments dans sa requête en irrecevabilité. cette conclusion s’ac- corde avec le principe bien établi suivant lequel, au québec, il incombe au demandeur de prouver les faits sur lesquels repose la compétence du tribunal (transax technologies inc. c. red baron corp. ltd., 2017 qcca 626, par. 13 (canlii); shamji c. tajdin, 2006 qcca 314, par. 16 (canlii); bank of montreal c. hydro aluminum wells inc., 2002 canlii 3111 (cs. qc), par 12). [223] il s’agit donc de savoir si l’intimée a démon- tré que, selon le droit procédural de l’utah, m. barer était tenu de soulever ses arguments de fond en même temps que ses moyens déclinatoires. les propos sui- vants du professeur talpis sont instructifs :    there is some merit to [the save your skin] approach in cases where the defendant’s acts were done out of ne- cessity — for example, where he could not contest ju- risdiction without filing a plea to the merits at the same [traduction]    l’approche [« sauver les meubles »] est bien fondée dans une certaine mesure lorsque le défendeur a agi par nécessité, par exemple, lorsqu’il n’aurait pas pu contester la compétence sans plaider en même temps sur [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 705 time (as in quebec’s simplified procedure) or where his acts stemmed from some urgency to avoid severe conse- quences   . le fond (comme dans le cas de la procédure simplifiée du québec) ou lorsqu’il était urgent pour lui d’agir pour éviter de graves conséquences   . (talpis, at p. 115) (talpis, p. 115) [224] in my view, the respondent has not met its burden in this regard. there is no evidence in the record to indicate that mr. barer had the procedural choice not to raise arguments relating to the eco- nomic loss rule and the alter ego cause of action at the stage of objecting to jurisdiction. i would there- fore find that mr. barer did not submit to the juris- diction of the utah court on this basis. [225] as my colleague gascon j. finds that the appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the utah court based on the first of the three arguments raised in the motion to dismiss, he does not address the other two arguments made by mr. barer in his mo- tion. for the following reasons, i would conclude that these arguments pertain directly to the utah court’s jurisdiction and that raising them therefore cannot amount to submission. [224] à mon avis, l’intimée ne s’est pas déchargée du fardeau qui lui incombait à cet égard. le dossier ne renferme aucun élément de preuve indiquant que m. barer avait la possibilité, sur le plan de la pro- cédure, de ne pas soulever, à l’étape des moyens déclinatoires, d’argument concernant la règle des pertes financières et la cause d’action fondée sur l’existence d’un alter ego. je suis par conséquent d’avis que m. barer n’a pas reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah en raison de ces arguments. [225] étant donné qu’eu égard au premier des trois arguments soulevés dans la requête en irrecevabilité, il conclut que l’appelant a reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah, mon collègue le juge gascon ne traite pas des deux autres arguments invoqués par m. barer dans sa requête. pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclurais que ces arguments se rapportent direc- tement à la compétence du tribunal de l’utah et que le fait de les soulever ne saurait donc équivaloir à une reconnaissance de compétence. [226] in its second amended complaint, the re- spondent alleged that the corporations based in the united states acted as the alter egos of the appellant. according to the respondent, this made the appellant personally liable for the obligations of those corpo- rations, and he should therefore be held responsible for the damages they had caused.9 this was one of [226] dans sa deuxième poursuite modifiée, l’in- timée a allégué que les sociétés établies aux états- unis agissaient à titre d’alter ego de l’appelant, ce qui, à son avis, rendait l’appelant personnellement responsable des obligations des sociétés en question et faisait en sorte qu’il devait être tenu responsable des dommages causés par celles-ci9. il s’agissait 9 talpis, at pp. 82-83: 9 talpis, p. 82-83 : one way for a plaintiff to avoid the constitutional require- ments of minimum contacts is to assert that the presence of a subsidiary in the forum provides personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. although jurisdiction over the subsidiary does not, of itself, give a state jurisdiction over a foreign par- ent, an alter ego or agency status of the subsidiary might do so. the fact is, in spite of a presumption of corporate separateness federal courts in the united states have sometimes pierced the corporate veil of a us subsidiary and asserted personal jurisdiction over the foreign parent based on an alter ego or agency relationship between the parent and the subsidiary. [footnote omitted.] [traduction] une des façons pour le demandeur de se soustraire aux exigences constitutionnelles relatives aux liens minimaux est d’affirmer que la présence d’une filiale dans l’état du for confère une compétence personnelle sur le défendeur étranger. bien que la compétence sur la filiale ne confère pas en soi à un état la compétence sur la société mère étrangère, le statut d’alter ego ou de mandataire de la filiale pourrait la lui conférer. le fait est qu’en dépit de la présomption de la personnalité morale distincte des sociétés, les tribunaux fédéraux des états- unis ont parfois levé le voile corporatif d’une filiale américaine et déclaré avoir compétence personnelle sur la société mère étrangère en se fondant sur une relation d’alter ego ou de mandant- mandataire entre la société mère et la filiale. [note en bas de page omise.] 706 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. the bases for personal jurisdiction against mr. barer, and it was therefore natural that an argument on jurisdiction would include arguments on this point. this is evidenced by the fact that the utah court itself expressly considered the alter ego arguments when deciding whether it had jurisdiction over the appellant personally. the fact that the appellant si- multaneously used the same arguments against the alter ego theory to challenge the claim on the merits was to be expected. his attempt to kill two birds with one stone does not reveal a clear intent to submit to the utah court’s jurisdiction. d’un des motifs justifiant une déclaration de com- pétence personnelle à l’égard de m. barer et il était donc naturel que des arguments sur cette question soient soulevés dans le cadre d’une contestation de la compétence, comme en témoigne le fait que le tribunal de l’utah s’est lui- même expressément penché sur les arguments relatifs à l’alter ego pour décider s’il avait compétence personnelle à l’égard de l’appelant. il fallait s’attendre à ce que l’appe- lant invoque simultanément les mêmes arguments à l’encontre de la théorie de l’alter ego pour contester la demande sur le fond. qu’il ait cherché à faire d’une pierre deux coups n’indique pas qu’il avait clairement l’intention de reconnaître la compétence du tribunal de l’utah. [227] the only other basis for jurisdiction against mr. barer personally was the alleged fraudulent mis- representation. in mr. barer’s motion to dismiss, he argued that the respondent had failed to allege that he had personally promised to pay and that in fact the respondent’s claim was that bec was responsible for paying the increased price. [227] le seul autre motif justifiant une déclaration de compétence personnelle à l’égard de m. barer était les prétendues déclarations inexactes fraudu- leuses. dans sa requête en irrecevabilité, m. barer a soutenu que l’intimée n’avait pas allégué qu’il s’était personnellement engagé à payer et qu’elle prétendait en fait que bec était tenue de payer le prix majoré. [228] if mr. barer’s arguments relating to alter ego and misrepresentation had been accepted, there would have been no basis to assert jurisdiction over him personally. these arguments both served to meet the burden enunciated by the utah court: “the de- fendant must demonstrate that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unrea- sonable”. as such, even if they were not exclusively jurisdictional, these arguments were connected to the claim that the utah court did not have jurisdiction. the appellant’s lawyer could not simply claim that the court lacked jurisdiction. he had to explain why and present convincing arguments to support that claim, arguments that were inevitably intertwined with arguments on the merits. [228] si les arguments de m. barer relatifs à l’alter ego et aux déclarations inexactes avaient été ac- ceptés, il n’y aurait eu aucun motif justifiant une déclaration de compétence personnelle à l’égard de celui-ci. ces arguments visaient tous deux à se dé- charger du fardeau énoncé par le tribunal de l’utah : [traduction] « le défendeur doit démontrer que la présence de certaines autres considérations rendrait déraisonnable une déclaration de compétence  ». ainsi, même s’ils ne concernaient pas exclusivement la compétence, ces arguments étaient liés à l’allé- gation suivant laquelle le tribunal de l’utah n’avait pas compétence. l’avocat de l’appelant ne pouvait simplement affirmer que ce tribunal n’était pas com- pétent. il devait expliquer pourquoi il ne l’était pas et présenter des arguments convaincants à l’appui de cette prétention, des arguments inévitablement liés aux arguments sur le fond. [229] in my opinion, one of the objectives under- lying art. 3168(6) is to ensure that jurisdiction is determined early in the process. a defendant should not be allowed to take part in the trial and plead on the merits in a foreign jurisdiction only to contest [229] à mon avis, un des objectifs qui sous- tend le par. 3168(6) est de faire en sorte que la compé- tence soit établie tôt dans le processus judiciaire. le défendeur ne devrait pas être autorisé à prendre part au procès et à plaider sur le fond dans un ressort [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 707 jurisdiction later in quebec and ask that another trial take place. however, this is not what happened here. [230] my colleague gascon j. also relies on the appellant’s conduct after his motion to dismiss was denied as further justification for the conclusion that he had submitted to the utah court’s jurisdic- tion (para 82). however, acts like those undertaken by the appellant are generally not understood as amounting to submission to jurisdiction, as my col- league observes at para 63. the appellant sought an extension of time and attended a settlement con- ference that he and the corporate defendants had been ordered by the utah court to attend (af, at para. 47; gascon j.’s reasons, at para 15). these actions do not, in my view, indicate an intent on the part of the appellant to have the dispute resolved by the utah court (gascon j.’s reasons, at para. 61; see also cortas canning, at pp. 1241 and 1243-44). [231] in fact, i would draw the opposite inference from the appellant’s conduct. the fact that he did not further engage in the action beyond requesting an extension of time and participating in a court- ordered settlement conference communicated a clear inten- tion not to submit to the utah court’s jurisdiction. [232] as a result, i find that blanchard j. erred in concluding that the appellant had submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction in accordance with art 3168(6) ccq (sup. ct. reasons, at para 16). étranger pour ensuite contester la compétence de ce tribunal au québec et réclamer la tenue d’un autre procès. ce n’est toutefois pas ce qui s’est passé en l’espèce. [230] mon collègue le juge gascon invoque égale- ment la conduite qu’a eue l’appelant après avoir été débouté de sa requête en irrecevabilité pour étoffer sa conclusion que l’appelant a reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah (par 82). toutefois, comme il le fait observer au par. 63, des mesures comme celles prises par l’appelant ne sont en règle générale pas interprétées comme équivalant à une reconnaissance de compétence. l’appelant a demandé une proroga- tion de délai et a participé à une conférence en vue d’un règlement à l’amiable à laquelle les sociétés défenderesses et lui avaient reçu l’ordre de participer par le tribunal de l’utah (ma, par. 47; motifs du juge gascon, par 15). à mon avis, ces mesures n’in- diquent pas que l’appelant avait l’intention de faire trancher le litige par le tribunal de l’utah (motifs du juge gascon, par. 61; voir aussi cortas canning, p. 1241 et 1243-1244). [231] en fait, je tirerais une inférence contraire de la conduite de l’appelant. le fait qu’il n’a pas pris part à l’action autrement qu’en demandant une pro- rogation de délai et en participant à une conférence en vue d’un règlement à l’amiable ordonnée par le tribunal de l’utah indiquait qu’il avait clairement l’intention de ne pas reconnaître la compétence de ce tribunal. [232] j’estime donc que le juge blanchard a com- mis une erreur en concluant que l’appelant avait reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah confor- mément au par 3168(6) ccq (motifs de la cs, par 16). iv article 3164 ccq. iv article 3164 ccq. [233] as none of the connecting factors under art.  3168  ccq is present, there is no need to consider whether the dispute is “substantially con- nected” with the foreign state under art 3164 ccq. as the wording of art 3168 ccq makes clear, in personal actions of a patrimonial nature, the juris- diction of foreign authorities is recognized only [233] étant donné qu’aucun des facteurs de rat- tachement énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq n’est pré- sent, il n’est pas nécessaire de se demander si le litige « se rattache d’une façon importante » à l’état étranger au sens de l’art 3164 ccq. comme le li- bellé de l’art 3168 ccq l’indique clairement, dans les actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial, la 708 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. where one of the listed factors is present. this is not the case here. [234] however, even if i were to agree with my col- league gascon j. that mr. barer submitted to the utah court’s jurisdiction, i would take the view that there is no substantial connection between the dispute and utah under art 3164 ccq and that recognition should therefore be denied. [235] though not essential to resolve the dispute before us, it is nevertheless desirable to confirm that a substantial connection may need to be demonstrated under art 3164 ccq even where one of the con- necting factors in art 3168 ccq has already been met. this is the prevailing approach of the court of appeal, and affirming its jurisprudence on this point would enhance the clarity and certainty of the law. it is all the more appropriate to do so given that the application judge addressed the issue (without con- sidering, it should be noted, the court of appeal’s relevant jurisprudence) and that both parties made quite extensive submissions on the matter. compétence des autorités étrangères n’est reconnue que lorsque l’un des facteurs énumérés est présent. ce n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. [234] cependant, même si j’étais d’accord avec mon collègue le juge gascon pour dire que m. barer a reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah, je serais d’avis qu’il n’existe pas de lien de rattache- ment important entre le litige et l’utah au sens de l’art 3164 ccq, de sorte que la reconnaissance devrait être refusée. [235] bien que cela ne soit pas essentiel à la solu- tion du présent litige, il est néanmoins souhaitable de confirmer qu’un rattachement important au sens de l’art 3164 ccq doit parfois être démontré même dans les cas où l’un des facteurs de rattachement énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq existe déjà. il s’agit de l’approche qui prévaut à la cour d’appel, et confir- mer sa jurisprudence sur ce point renforcerait la clarté et la certitude du droit. il convient d’autant plus de nous prononcer sur la question que le juge saisi de la demande en a traité (sans tenir compte, faut-il le souligner, de la jurisprudence pertinente de la cour d’appel) et que les deux parties ont présenté des arguments assez détaillés à ce sujet. a the substantial connection requirement a l’exigence du rattachement important in my view, there will be exceptional circum- [236] stances in which, despite the presence of one of the connecting factors under art 3168 ccq, further analysis will be required under art 3164 ccq to determine whether there is a substantial connection between the foreign state and the dispute. a connec- tion to the dispute means a connection to both the ob- ject of the litigation and the parties (j a talpis and j-g. castel, “interpreting the rules of private inter- national law”, in reform of the civil code, vol. 5b, private international law (1993), at para. 486; see also club resorts ltd. v. van breda, 2012 scc 17, [2012] 1 scr 572, at paras. 79 and 99; morguard investments ltd. v. de savoye, [1990] 3 scr 1077, at p 1108). [236] à mon avis, il y aura des circonstances ex- ceptionnelles où, malgré la présence de l’un des fac- teurs de rattachement énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq, il faudra procéder à une analyse plus poussée, fondée sur l’art 3164 ccq, afin de déterminer s’il existe un rattachement important entre l’état étranger et le litige. un rattachement avec le litige signifie un rattachement à la fois avec l’objet du litige et les parties (j a talpis et j-g. castel, « interprétation des règles du droit international privé », dans la réforme du code civil, t. 3, priorités et hypothèques, preuve et prescription, publicité des droits, droit international privé, dispositions transitoires (1993), par. 486; voir également club resorts ltd. c. van breda, 2012 csc 17, [2012] 1 rcs 572, par. 79 et 99; morguard investments ltd. c. de savoye, [1990] 3 rcs 1077, p 1108). [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 709 [237] evidence that one of the factors in art. 3168 ccq is present will generally be sufficient to demon- strate a substantial connection and thus to establish ju- risdiction, but this will not always be the case. i would add that, in practice, where one such factor is proven, a quebec court should refrain from assessing the suffi- ciency of the connection under art 3164 ccq unless it is specifically contested (see by analogy spar, at para 32). [238] this approach accords with the prevailing jurisprudence of the court of appeal, and i believe it to be the correct one (see zimmermann, at para. 12; heerema, at paras. 23 and 26; hocking v. haziza, 2008 qcca 800, at paras. 181-87 and 199 (canlii); see also jules jordan video inc. v. 144942 canada inc., 2014 qccs 3343, at paras. 54-55 (canlii); cortas can ning, at pp. 1233-34 and 1236-37; ema- nuelli, at no 290). [239] requiring that a substantial connection be- tween the dispute and the foreign state be demon- strated even where art 3168 ccq is engaged is consistent with the language, context and purpose of art 3164 ccq, as well as with the principle of comity and the values of order and fairness underly- ing the rules of private international law (see spar, at paras. 20-23; grecon dimter inc. v. jr. normand inc., 2005 scc 46, [2005] 2 scr 401, at para 19). it also builds on this court’s decisions in spar and lépine. further, and contrary to what my colleague brown j. seems to suggest (at para. 152), the ap- proach i would follow is not a recent jurisprudential creation but an interpretation stated at the time the new ccq was enacted (see talpis and castel, at para 485). il suffira généralement de prouver la présence [237] de l’un des facteurs énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq pour démontrer l’existence d’un rattachement important et ainsi établir la compétence, mais ce ne sera pas toujours le cas. j’ajouterais qu’en pratique, lorsqu’un tel facteur est établi, le tribunal québécois devrait s’abstenir d’apprécier le caractère suffisant du lien de rattachement au regard de l’art 3164 ccq, à moins que les parties ne le contestent expressément (voir, par analogie, spar, par 32). [238] cette approche est conforme à la jurispru- dence dominante à la cour d’appel et celle-ci me paraît correcte (voir zimmermann, par. 12; heerema, par. 23 et 26; hocking c. haziza, 2008 qcca 800, par. 181-187 et 199 (canlii); voir également jules jordan video inc. c. 144942 canada inc., 2014 qccs 3343, par. 54-55 (canlii); cortas canning, p. 1233- 1234 et 1236-1237; emanuelli, no 290). [239] le fait d’exiger que l’existence d’un ratta- chement important entre le litige et l’état étranger soit démontrée même lorsque l’art 3168 ccq s’ap- plique est compatible avec le libellé, le contexte et l’objet de l’art 3164 ccq, ainsi qu’avec le principe de courtoisie et les valeurs d’ordre et d’équité qui sous- tendent les règles de droit international privé (voir spar, par. 20-23; grecon dimter inc. c. jr. normand inc., 2005 csc 46, [2005] 2 rcs 401, par 19). cette exigence trouve également appui dans les arrêts spar et lépine de notre cour. de plus, et contrairement à ce que semble suggérer mon col- lègue le juge brown (au par. 152), l’approche que j’adopte ne repose pas sur une invention jurispru- dentielle récente, mais bien sur une interprétation exprimée dès l’adoption du nouveau ccq (voir talpis et castel, par 485). (1) language, context and purpose of arti- (1) le libellé, le contexte et l’objet de l’art. 3164 cle 3164 ccq. ccq. [240] at the outset, it is worth recalling that art. 3164 ccq is the first article, and the key provision, of the chapter of the ccq that sets out the rules ap- plicable to the jurisdiction of foreign authorities. it establishes the general principle of reciprocity, or “mirror” principle, whereby the jurisdiction of [240] tout d’abord, il convient de rappeler que l’art 3164 ccq est le premier article, et la dispo- sition clé, du chapitre du ccq qui énonce les règles applicables à la compétence des autorités étrangères. il établit le principe général de la réciprocité, ou du « miroir », selon lequel la compétence des autorités 710 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. foreign authorities is established in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction applicable to quebec author- ities under title three (lépine, at para 25). étrangères est établie suivant les règles de compé- tence applicables aux autorités québécoises en vertu du titre troisième (lépine, par 25). [241] to that general principle of reciprocity, art 3164 ccq adds a further requirement (lépine, at para. 25; spar, at para 62). the dispute must be “substantially connected” with the foreign state whose authority is seized of the matter: [241] à ce principe général de la réciprocité, l’art 3164 ccq ajoute une exigence supplémen- taire (lépine, par. 25; spar, par 62). le litige doit « se rattache[r] d’une façon importante » à l’état étranger dont l’autorité a été saisie : the jurisdiction of foreign authorities is established in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction applicable to québec authorities under title three of this book, to the extent that the dispute is substantially connected with the state whose authority is seized of the matter. la compétence des autorités étrangères est établie suivant les règles de compétence applicables aux autorités québé- coises en vertu du titre troisième du présent livre dans la mesure où le litige se rattache d’une façon importante à l’état dont l’autorité a été saisie. (art 3164 ccq) (art 3164 ccq) [242] the next few articles of the chapter, arts. 3165 to 3168 ccq, then supplement or qualify the gen- eral principle of reciprocity, either by broadening or limiting the grounds for recognizing foreign de- cisions. as professor h. p. glenn explains, [trans- lation] “the mirror principle is adjusted, but not necessarily discarded” (“droit international privé”, in la réforme du code civil (1993), vol. 3, 669, at p 770). with respect to personal actions of a patri- monial nature, for instance, art 3168 ccq largely reproduces the rules applicable to quebec courts under art 3148 ccq, while narrowing the scope of certain connecting factors. [243] i disagree with my colleague brown j. that the language of art 3164 ccq makes clear that a substantial connection must be established only where jurisdiction is based upon the provisions of title three (and possibly only upon the “general provisions” of that title). in my view, the reference to title three is not meant to limit the application of that fundamental requirement, but simply to ex- press the reciprocity principle which serves as the foundation for title four. as such, the subsequent provisions of title four do not displace, or entirely subsume, the requirement of a substantial connec- tion. [242] les dispositions suivantes de ce chapitre, les art. 3165 à 3168 ccq, complètent ou précisent en- suite le principe général de la réciprocité en élargis- sant ou en limitant les motifs de reconnaissance des décisions étrangères. comme l’explique le professeur h p. glenn, « le principe du miroir est ajusté, mais non écarté nécessairement » (« droit international privé », dans la réforme du code civil (1993), t. 3, 669, p 770). en ce qui concerne les actions personnelles à caractère patrimonial, par exemple, l’art 3168 ccq. reproduit en grande partie les règles applicables aux tribunaux québécois en vertu de l’art 3148 ccq. tout en restreignant la portée de certains facteurs de rattachement. [243] je ne suis pas d’accord avec mon collègue le juge brown pour dire que le libellé de l’art 3164 ccq. indique clairement que l’existence d’un rattachement important doit être établie uniquement lorsque la com- pétence est fondée sur les dispositions du titre troi- sième (et peut- être uniquement sur les « dispositions générales » de ce titre). à mon avis, la mention du titre troisième ne vise pas à limiter l’application de cette exigence fondamentale, mais simplement à exprimer le principe de la réciprocité qui sert de fondement au titre quatrième. par conséquent, les dispositions subséquentes du titre quatrième ne remplacent pas, ni n’englobent complètement, l’exigence du rattache- ment important. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 711 [244] further, and contrary to what my colleague suggests (at para.  141), reading the wording of art 3164 ccq in context is not akin to “rewriting” the provision. in hocking, bich ja aptly explained the rationale for the foregoing interpretation: [translation] article 3164 ccq is presented as a general principle with a double aspect: the jurisdiction of foreign courts is, first, determined according to the rules in title three but, second, only “to the extent that the dispute is substantially connected with the country whose authority is seized of the case”. the second aspect reflects the requirements — now constitutional and, as it were, categorical — recognized in morguard, supra. as for the first aspect, it may be supplemented or replaced excep- tionally or for clarification or restriction by arts. 3165 to 3168 ccq, but without affecting the application of the second aspect. thus, the fact that the first aspect is changed does not prevent or affect the application of the second. that means that the substantial connection test, an invar- iable component of the structuring principle expressed in art 3164 ccq, applies equally when the provisions of title three are applied as when the provisions clarifying, limiting, or standing in the stead of the rules of title three (such as arts. 3166 or 3168 ccq) are applied. [emphasis added; para 182] [244] de plus, et contrairement à ce qu’affirme mon collègue (au par.  141), cette interprétation contextuelle du libellé de l’art 3164 ccq ne re- vient pas à « récrire » la disposition. dans l’arrêt hocking, la juge bich a bien expliqué le raisonne- ment qui sous- tend l’interprétation qui précède : l’article 3164 ccq se présente comme un principe général à double volet : la compétence des autorités étran- gères est, d’une part, déterminée en fonction des règles du titre troisième mais, d’autre part, seulement « dans la mesure où le litige se rattache d’une façon importante à l’état dont l’autorité a été saisie ». ce second volet reflète les impératifs — désormais constitutionnels et, si l’on veut, catégoriques — reconnus dans l’arrêt morguard, précité. quant au premier volet, il arrivera que, par excep- tion, précision ou restriction, il soit complété ou remplacé, cédant alors le pas aux articles 3165 à 3168 ccq, mais sans affecter l’application du second volet. ainsi, le fait que soit changé le premier volet n’empêche ni n’affecte l’application du second. c’est donc dire que l’exigence du rattachement important, composante invariable du principe structurant qu’exprime l’article  3164 ccq, s’applique aussi bien lorsqu’on recourt aux dispositions du titre troisième que lorsqu’on recourt aux dispositions précisant ou restreignant les règles du titre troisième ou s’y substituant, comme par exemple les articles 3166 ou 3168 ccq [je souligne; par 182] [245] this interpretation is supported by the pur- pose of art 3164 ccq. the substantial connection requirement is meant to prevent quebec courts from recognizing a foreign decision where the connection is so weak, in the specific circumstances of the case, that recognition would be inappropriate (see, eg,. goldstein, fasc. 11, at para. 12; see also, by analogy, van breda, at paras. 81 and 95). this would be the case, for instance, in blatant cases of forum shopping (goldstein (2012), at para. 3164 575; emanuelli, at no 282). put another way, a separate requirement of a substantial connection ensures that fairness is not sacrificed on the altar of order and predicta- bility — the values that justify relying on specific, well- defined connecting factors (see van breda, at para 66). [245] l’objet de l’art 3164 ccq étaye cette inter- prétation. l’exigence du rattachement important vise à empêcher les tribunaux québécois de reconnaître une décision étrangère lorsque le lien de rattachement est si ténu, dans les circonstances particulières de l’affaire, que la reconnaissance ne serait pas indiquée (voir, p ex, goldstein, fasc. 11, par. 12; voir égale- ment, par analogie, van breda, par. 81 et 95). il en serait ainsi, par exemple, dans un cas flagrant de ma- gasinage de ressort (goldstein (2012), par. 3164 575; emanuelli, no 282). autrement dit, une exigence dis- tincte de rattachement important permet d’éviter que l’équité soit sacrifiée sur l’autel de l’ordre et de la prévisibilité — les valeurs qui justifient le recours à des facteurs de rattachement précis et bien définis (voir van breda, par 66). [246] in my view, this requirement serves as a safeguard in the exceptional cases where the codi- fied connecting factors fail to establish a substantial [246] à mon avis, cette exigence sert de méca- nisme de protection dans les cas exceptionnels où les facteurs de rattachement codifiés n’établissent pas un 712 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. connection. this very purpose is reflected in the commentaries on art 3164 ccq published by the minister of justice at the time of the reform of the ccq: rattachement important. cet objet même se dégage des commentaires sur l’art 3164 ccq qu’a publiés le ministre de la justice lors de la réforme du ccq : [translation] this article, which is new law, sets out the general rule concerning the jurisdiction of foreign authorities. in the absence of specific legislative provi- sions dealing with this matter, the jurisdiction of foreign authorities is established in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction applicable to quebec authorities under title three. indeed, these rules, which were devised to govern situations with a foreign element, appeared conversely to be valid for determining the jurisdiction of foreign au- thorities. the article also leaves quebec authorities some latitude to assess the jurisdiction of foreign authorities. cet article, de droit nouveau, énonce la règle générale tou- chant la compétence des autorités étrangères. en l’absence de dispositions législatives spécifiques sur cette question, la compétence des autorités étrangères est établie suivant les règles de compétence applicables aux autorités du québec en vertu du titre troisième. en effet, ces règles, conçues pour régir les situations comportant un élément d’extranéité, sont apparues à l’inverse, valables pour juger de la compétence des autorités étrangères. l’article laisse par ailleurs une certaine latitude aux autorités du québec pour apprécier la compétence des autorités étrangères.   .   .    the jurisdiction of foreign authorities could be based on the same criteria as the jurisdiction of quebec authorities and the dispute might nevertheless not be substantially connected with the state whose authority was seized of the matter. in such cases, the foreign authority’s jurisdiction might not be recognized. [emphasis added.]    la compétence des autorités étrangères pourrait se fonder sur les mêmes critères que ceux qui fondent la compétence des autorités québécoises et néanmoins le litige pourrait ne pas se rattacher d’une manière impor- tante à l’état dont l’autorité a été saisie. dans ce cas, la compétence de l’autorité étrangère pourrait n’être pas reconnue. [je souligne.] (ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), at p. 2022) (ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, t. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), p. 2022) [247] this safeguard remains relevant where the specific rules set out under title four are applicable. i acknowledge that the risk of inappropriately recog- nizing a foreign decision is diminished by the fact that art 3168 ccq is more restrictive than the cor- responding provision of title three, art 3148 ccq. but it does not follow that the substantial connec- tion requirement is “excessive” or “redundant” (see brown j.’s reasons, at para. 143): [247] ce mécanisme de protection demeure per- tinent lorsque les règles particulières énoncées au titre quatrième s’appliquent je reconnais que le fait que l’art 3168 ccq soit plus restrictif que l’art 3148 ccq — la disposition correspondante du titre troisième — diminue le risque qu’une dé- cision étrangère soit indûment reconnue, mais il ne s’ensuit pas que l’exigence du rattachement impor- tant est « excessi[ve] » ou « redondant[e] » (voir les motifs du juge brown, par. 143) : [translation] in quebec law, doubt about the appropri- ateness of the foreign court’s jurisdiction arises from the rigid civilian formulation of the rule on indirect jurisdic- tion, which selects one or more factors considered to be significant, such as a child’s domicile (art 3143 ccq, made bilateral by art 3164 ccq), the place where the obligations arising from a contract were to be performed (art 3168(4) ccq) or the occurrence of an injurious en droit québécois, le doute sur l’opportunité de la com- pétence du tribunal étranger provient de la formulation de type civiliste, rigide, de la règle de compétence indirecte qui sélectionne un ou plusieurs éléments jugés significatifs, comme le domicile d’un enfant (art 3143 ccq, bilatéra- lisé par l’article 3164 ccq), le lieu d’exécution des obli- gations d’un contrat (art 3168(4) ccq) ou la survenance du fait dommageable et le fait de subir un préjudice dans la [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 713 act or omission and the suffering of injury in the jurisdic- tion of the foreign court (art 3168(3) ccq), to trigger indirect jurisdiction. despite the presence of the trigger- ing factor, the head of jurisdiction, the situation may not actually have much connection with the court seized of the matter. in the interests of the proper administration of justice and procedural fairness, as la forest j. explained in morguard, it seems necessary to have a tool for reviewing this determination in certain cases. [emphasis added.] juridiction du tribunal étranger (art 3168(3) ccq), pour déclencher la compétence indirecte. malgré l’existence de l’élément déclencheur, du chef de compétence, il se peut que la situation n’ait en réalité pas beaucoup de rapport avec le tribunal saisi. par souci de bonne administration de la justice, d’équité procédurale, comme l’expliquait le juge la forest dans l’affaire morguard, il paraît nécessaire de disposer d’un outil permettant le cas échéant de revenir sur cette détermination. [je souligne.] (goldstein, fasc. 11, at para. 11) (goldstein, fasc. 11, par. 11) [248] accordingly, i cannot accept that the substan- tial connection requirement is merely “encapsulate[d]” within the specific rules set out in art 3168 ccq. (see brown j.’s reasons, at para. 135), thereby serving little or no independent purpose in that context. this would render the express words used by the quebec legislature largely without effect, at least in the con- text of personal actions of a patrimonial nature. most saliently, it might force quebec courts to recognize a foreign decision even where the dispute has only a weak connection with the jurisdiction. such an in- terpretation would ignore legitimate concerns about fairness to quebec residents engaged in litigation abroad. [249] the relevance of a distinct substantial con- nection requirement is illustrated by the case law. for instance, in cortas canning, a $9 million judg- ment based on unfair competition had been rendered by default in texas. in a nutshell, the plaintiffs al- leged that the defendants had packaged and labelled foods in a confusing manner. the quebec superior court was asked to recognize the judgment under art 3168(3) ccq (fault and damage) — among other grounds — on the basis that $96 worth of the defendants’ products had been sold in texas. the court rejected the application. it was certainly ar- guable, in such a case, that the sale did not in itself establish a substantial connection. [248] je ne puis par conséquent souscrire à l’idée que l’exigence du rattachement important est sim- plement « englob[ée] » dans les règles particulières énoncées à l’art 3168 ccq (voir les motifs du juge brown, par. 135) et qu’elle a ainsi peu ou point d’utilité propre dans ce contexte. cette interprétation ferait perdre presque tout effet aux termes exprès employés par le législateur québécois, du moins dans le contexte des actions personnelles à caractère pa- trimonial. fait plus important, elle pourrait obliger les tribunaux québécois à reconnaître une décision étrangère même lorsque le litige ne se rattache que de façon tenue au ressort étranger. une telle interpré- tation ferait abstraction de préoccupations légitimes quant à l’équité envers les résidents du québec qui sont parties à un litige à l’étranger. [249] la jurisprudence illustre la pertinence d’une exigence distincte de rattachement important. par exemple, dans cortas canning, un jugement de neuf millions de dollars fondé sur la concurrence déloyale avait été rendu par défaut au texas. en résumé, les demanderesses dans cette affaire alléguaient que les défendeurs avaient emballé et étiqueté des produits alimentaires d’une manière qui créait de la confusion. la cour supérieure du québec a été saisie d’une de- mande de reconnaissance de ce jugement au titre du par 3168(3) ccq (la faute et le préjudice) notam- ment au motif que des produits des défendeurs d’une valeur de 96 $ avaient été vendus au texas. la cour a rejeté la demande. il était certes possible de soutenir, dans un tel cas, que la vente n’établissait pas en soi l’existence d’un rattachement important. [250] likewise, in hocking, the quebec court of appeal upheld a superior court judgment denying [250] de la même façon, dans hocking, la cour d’appel du québec a confirmé un jugement de la 714 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. recognition of an ontario decision that had approved a settlement agreement in the context of a national class action. writing for the majority, bich ja took the view that none of the connecting factors in art 3168 ccq. existed for the quebec class members. she added that, in any event, the defendant’s submission to the jurisdic- tion of the ontario court could not make up, in itself, for the lack of a substantial connection between the quebec class members and the ontario forum: cour supérieure refusant de reconnaître une déci- sion ontarienne ayant approuvé une convention de règlement dans le contexte d’un recours collectif na- tional. s’exprimant au nom des juges majoritaires, la juge bich a estimé qu’aucun des facteurs de rattache- ment de l’art 3168 ccq n’existait relativement aux membres québécois du groupe. elle a ajouté que, de toute façon, la reconnaissance par la défenderesse de la compétence du tribunal ontarien ne pouvait à elle seule pallier l’absence de rattachement important entre les membres québécois du groupe et le for ontarien : [translation] that said, even supposing that art. 3168(6) ccq justified a priori the jurisdiction of the ontario court, i conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, that justification does not make up for the absence of a sub- stantial connection, ie, a real and significant link, between the dispute from the standpoint of the quebec plaintiffs and the ontario forum. at the risk of repeating myself, i will point out again that the quebec plaintiffs covered by the class action of the appellant hocking contracted, in quebec with quebec branches of hsbc with regard to hsbc’s activities on quebec territory, hypothec loans for properties located in quebec, with the obligations of the loans to be met in that province. none of those elements connect the dispute to the ontario forum as far as the quebec plaintiffs are concerned. cela dit, à supposer même que le paragraphe 3168(6) ccq justifie ici, a priori, la compétence du tribunal on- tarien, je conclus que dans les circonstances de l’espèce, cette justification ne pallie pas l’absence d’un rattachement important, c’est-à-dire d’un lien réel et substantiel, entre le litige, dans la perspective des justiciables québécois, et le for ontarien. au risque de me répéter, je rappellerai de nouveau que les justiciables québécois visés par le recours collectif de l’appelant hocking ont contracté au québec, auprès des succursales québécoises de hsbc et dans le cadre des activités de celle-ci sur le territoire québécois, des prêts hypothécaires visant des propriétés situées au québec, prêts dont les obligations devaient être exécutées dans cette même province. rien dans cela qui rattache le litige, quant à eux, au for ontarien. in summary, in the circumstances, the consent of the defendant alone cannot make up for the court’s lack of jurisdiction over people who themselves did not express (even implicitly) their wish to participate in the class ac- tion instituted before a foreign forum in a dispute that, from their perspective, has no real and substantial con- nection with the forum in question. [emphasis added; paras 220-21]. en résumé, dans les circonstances, le seul consentement du défendeur ne peut pallier l’absence de compétence du tribunal sur des personnes qui n’ont pas elles- mêmes ma- nifesté (et pas même implicitement) leur volonté de par- ticiper au recours collectif institué devant un for étranger, en rapport avec un litige qui, quant à elles, n’a aucun lien réel et substantiel avec le for en question. [je souligne; par 220-221] [251] the above cases show that there may be exceptional circumstances where there will be no substantial connection between the dispute and the foreign state even though one of the factors in art 3168 ccq is technically present, and where it would thus offend basic fairness to quebec litigants to recognize the foreign decision. [251] ces affaires montrent qu’il peut y avoir des circonstances exceptionnelles où il n’existe pas de rattachement important entre le litige et l’état étran- ger — même lorsque l’un des facteurs énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq est, strictement parlant, présent —, et où il serait contraire à l’obligation d’équité fonda- mentale envers les parties québécoises à un litige de reconnaître la décision étrangère. (2) spar and lépine (2) les arrêts spar et lépine [252] nothing in the approach i would follow is inconsistent with spar and lépine — quite the [252] l’approche que j’adopte n’est pas incompa- tible avec les arrêts spar et lépine, bien au contraire. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 715 contrary. in spar, the court found that the principle articulated in morguard that there must be a “real and substantial connection”, which is a constitutional requirement for the assumption of jurisdiction, does not introduce an additional criterion where a quebec court is determining whether it has jurisdiction to hear a dispute. rather, the constitutional requirement is “reflected in the overall scheme established by book ten” (spar, at para 63). however, the court was careful to note that its decision did not con- cern the recognition of foreign decisions and, more specifically, the substantial connection requirement under art 3164 ccq (para 64). indeed, while the criterion set out in art 3164 ccq should certainly be interpreted in harmony with the constitutional notion of a “real and substantial connection”, the two concepts nevertheless remain distinct. dans spar, la cour a conclu que le principe du « lien réel et substantiel » énoncé dans morguard, prin- cipe qui constitue une exigence constitutionnelle pour qu’il puisse y avoir déclaration de compétence, n’introduit pas un critère additionnel dans les cas où un tribunal québécois est appelé à décider s’il a compétence pour connaître d’un litige. l’exigence constitutionnelle « se dégage [plutôt] de l’économie générale du livre dixième » (spar, par 63). la cour a toutefois pris soin de souligner que la décision ne concernait pas la reconnaissance des décisions étran- gères et, plus précisément, l’exigence du rattache- ment important prévue à l’art 3164 ccq (par 64). en fait, bien que le critère énoncé à l’art 3164 ccq. doive être interprété en harmonie avec la notion constitutionnelle de « lien réel et substantiel », les deux concepts demeurent distincts. in any event, insofar as spar is relevant to [253] the present debate, i would take the view that the excerpts on which my colleague brown j. relies tend to support the approach i would follow: [253] quoiqu’il en soit, dans la mesure où l’arrêt spar est pertinent en l’espèce, j’estime que les extraits sur lesquels s’appuie mon collègue le juge brown tendent à étayer l’approche que j’adopte : looking at the wording of art. 3148 itself, it is arguable that the notion of a “real and substantial connection” is already subsumed under the provisions of art. 3148(3), given that each of the grounds listed (fault, injurious act, damage, contract) seems to be an example of a “real and substantial connection” between the province of quebec and the action. indeed, i am doubtful that a plaintiff who succeeds in proving one of the four grounds for jurisdic- tion would not be considered to have satisfied the “real and substantial connection” criterion, at least for the purposes of jurisdiction simpliciter. next, from my examination of the system of rules found in book ten, it seems that the “real and substantial connection” criterion is captured in other provisions, to safeguard against the improper assumption of jurisdiction. in particular, it is my opinion that the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as codified at art. 3135, serves as an im- portant counterweight to the broad basis for jurisdiction set out in art 3148. in this way, it is open to the appellants to demonstrate, pursuant to art. 3135, that although there is a link to the quebec authorities, another forum is, in the interests of justice, better suited to take jurisdiction. [emphasis added; paras 56-57]. à l’examen du libellé même de l’art. 3148, on peut sou- tenir que la notion de « lien réel et substantiel » se trouve déjà subsumée sous les dispositions du par 3148(3). en effet, chacun des motifs énumérés (la faute, le fait dom- mageable, le préjudice, le contrat) semble être un exemple de situations qui constituent un « lien réel et substantiel » entre la province de québec et l’action. en fait, je doute que le demandeur qui réussit à prouver l’un des quatre motifs d’attribution de compétence, ne soit pas considéré comme ayant satisfait au critère du « lien réel et substan- tiel », du moins aux fins de la simple reconnaissance de compétence. ensuite, après examen du système de règles contenues dans le livre dixième, il me semble que le critère du « lien réel et substantiel » s’incarne dans d’autres dispositions afin d’offrir une protection contre l’exercice injustifié de compétence de la part d’un tribunal. plus particulièrement, à mon avis, la doctrine du forum non conveniens, telle que codifiée à l’art. 3135, constitue un contrepoids important à la large assise juridictionnelle prévue à l’art 3148. ainsi, les appelantes peuvent démontrer, en conformité avec l’art. 3135, que malgré l’existence d’un lien avec les auto- rités du québec, il y a un autre tribunal qui, dans l’intérêt de la justice, est mieux à même d’exercer sa compétence. [je souligne; par 56-57] 716 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. [254] first, i note that the court did not entirely reject the possibility that the listed connecting factors (fault, injurious act, damage and contract) might, in exceptional circumstances, be insufficient to estab- lish a substantial connection. it merely stated that it was “doubtful”. again, i acknowledge that, in most situations, evidence of such factors will be sufficient. this is especially so where art 3168(3) ccq is satisfied given that, in such cases, fault and damage must be combined. however, assuming that it will always be sufficient strikes me as imprudent, as il- lustrated by the cortas canning decision, which i discussed above. [255] second, when the court referred to the grounds under which the real and substantial con- nection might be subsumed, it referred only to those listed in art. 3148 para 1(3) ccq (fault, injurious act, damage and contract). the court refrained from mentioning any other connecting factors, including submission. in my view, this omission is telling. in this regard, it should be recalled that, at common law, submission does not establish a real and substantial connection but rather constitutes a distinct ground for assuming jurisdiction (see morguard, at pp. 1103-4; van breda, at para. 79; beals v. saldanha, 2003 scc 72, [2003] 3 scr 416, at paras. 34 and 37; walker, at p 14-204). submission, in itself, does not connect the underlying dispute with the foreign state. where the defendant submits to a foreign forum, jurisdiction is instead based on the implicit consent of the parties (hocking, at paras 214-15). [254] premièrement, je constate que la cour n’a pas totalement écarté la possibilité que, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, les facteurs de ratta- chement énumérés (la faute, le fait dommageable, le préjudice et le contrat) ne suffisent pas à établir l’existence d’un lien substantiel. la cour entrete- nait simplement un « doute » à cet égard. encore une fois, je reconnais qu’en règle générale, il est suffisant de prouver l’un de ces facteurs. cela est d’autant plus vrai lorsque la condition énoncée au par 3168(3) ccq est remplie puisque, dans de tels cas, les éléments de faute et de préjudice doivent être réunis. cependant, il m’apparaît imprudent de tenir pour acquis que cela est toujours suffisant, comme l’illustre la décision cortas canning dont j’ai traité précédemment. [255] deuxièmement, lorsque la cour a fait état des motifs sous lesquels la notion de lien réel et substantiel peut se trouver englobée, elle a men- tionné uniquement ceux énumérés à l’art.  3148 al 1(3) ccq (la faute, le fait dommageable, le préjudice et le contrat). la cour a omis de men- tionner d’autres facteurs de rattachement, dont la reconnaissance de compétence. à mon avis, cette omission est révélatrice. à cet égard, il convient de rappeler qu’en common law, la reconnaissance de compétence n’établit pas l’existence d’un lien réel et substantiel, mais constitue plutôt un motif distinct de déclaration de compétence (voir mor- guard, p. 1103-1104; van breda, par. 79; beals c. saldanha, 2003 csc 72, [2003] 3 rcs 416, par. 34 et 37; walker, p 14-204). la reconnaissance de compétence ne rattache pas en elle- même le litige sous- jacent à l’état étranger. lorsque le défendeur reconnaît la compétence d’un tribunal étranger, la compétence repose plutôt sur le consentement im- plicite des parties (hocking, par 214-215). [256] third, the above excerpts from spar make clear that the court was alive to the risk of an “im- proper assumption of jurisdiction”. this is why it emphasized that the doctrine of forum non conveni- ens is an “important counterweight” to the inflexible, codified connecting factors. yet as the court later found in lépine, the application of that doctrine does not extend to the recognition of foreign de- cisions. in my opinion, this makes the substantial [256] troisièmement, les extraits ci- dessus de l’arrêt spar indiquent clairement que la cour était consciente du risque d’un « exercice injustifié de compétence de la part d’un tribunal ». c’est pourquoi elle a tenu à souligner que la doctrine du forum non conveniens constitue un « contrepoids important » à la rigidité des facteurs de rattachement codifiés. cependant, comme l’a par la suite conclu la cour dans l’arrêt lépine, cette doctrine ne s’applique pas [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 717 connection requirement in art 3164 ccq all the more necessary as a safeguard against inappropriate assumptions of jurisdiction (see goldstein, fasc. 11, at paras. 11 and 18). [257] overall, spar does not support the prop- osition that each of the codified connecting fac- tors — including submission — is always sufficient, in any circumstances, to meet the substantial connec- tion requirement in art 3164 ccq. on the contrary, it clearly recognizes the need for mechanisms to safeguard against an “improper assumption of ju- risdiction”: in addition, it is important to bear in mind that other private international law rules set out under book ten of the ccq also appear to ensure that the “real and sub- stantial connection” criterion is respected. for example, a substantial connection requirement is also a prerequisite for the recognition of the jurisdiction of foreign courts under art 3164 ccq. also, in matters of choice of law, art 3126 ccq calls for an application of the princi- ple of lex loci delicti, the law of the jurisdiction where the tort or wrong is considered to have occurred; see: h. reid, dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien (2nd ed. 2001), at p 333. article 3082  ccq serves as an exception to this rule in circumstances where it is clear that the matter is only remotely connected with the legal system prescribed by art. 3126 and is much more closely connected with the law of another country. therefore, by giving effect to the proximity principle, it seems that art. 3082 operates in the context of choice of law in a manner similar to which art. 3135 (forum non conven- iens) functions in the context of choice of jurisdiction. [emphasis added; para 62] à la reconnaissance des décisions étrangères. à mon avis, cela rend l’exigence du rattachement important énoncée à l’art 3164 ccq d’autant plus néces- saire comme protection contre les déclarations inap- propriées de compétence (voir goldstein, fasc. 11, par. 11 et 18). [257] dans l’ensemble, l’arrêt spar ne permet pas d’affirmer que chaque facteur de rattachement codi- fié — y compris la reconnaissance de compétence — est toujours suffisant, en toutes circonstances, pour satisfaire à l’exigence du rattachement important prévue à l’art 3164 ccq. au contraire, la cour y reconnaît clairement la nécessité de mécanismes offrant une protection contre un « exercice injustifié de compétence » : il est également important de se rappeler que d’autres règles de droit international privé énoncées au livre dixième du ccq contribuent à assurer le respect du cri- tère du « lien réel et substantiel ». par exemple, l’exigence d’un lien substantiel représente une condition préalable pour reconnaître la compétence des tribunaux étrangers suivant l’art 3164 ccq. aussi, dans les questions rela- tives au choix de la loi applicable, l’art 3126 ccq com- mande qu’on applique le principe de la lex loci delicti, la loi du lieu où le délit ou quasi- délit est considéré avoir été commis; voir : h. reid, dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien (2e éd. 2001), p 333. l’article 3082 ccq. constitue l’exception à cette règle dans des circonstances où il est manifeste que l’affaire n’a qu’un lien éloigné avec le système juridique prescrit par l’art. 3126 et beaucoup plus étroit avec la loi d’un autre état. par conséquent, en donnant effet au principe de proximité, il semble que l’art. 3082 s’applique dans le contexte du choix de la loi applicable d’une manière similaire à l’art. 3135 (forum non conveniens), lequel s’applique dans le contexte du choix d’un ressort. [je souligne; par 62] [258] the approach i favour is also consistent with lépine. to be clear, i am not suggesting that the court made any definitive statement in that decision as to the scope and effect of art 3164 ccq. on this point, the decision was essentially concerned with the applicability of the forum non conveni- ens doctrine where a quebec court is determining whether to recognize a foreign decision. moreover, i acknowledge that the court found in lépine that the foreign authority had jurisdiction on the basis [258] l’approche que je préconise est également compatible avec l’arrêt lépine. certes, dans cet arrêt, la cour ne s’est pas prononcée de façon définitive sur la portée et l’effet de l’art 3164 ccq. sur ce point, la décision portait essentiellement sur l’applicabilité de la doctrine du forum non conveniens dans le cas où un tribunal québécois est appelé à décider s’il y a lieu de reconnaître une décision étrangère. je re- connais en outre que la cour, dans lépine, a conclu que l’autorité étrangère avait compétence au titre de 718 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. of art 3168 ccq, without conducting a separate analysis under 3164 ccq. it was unnecessary to do so given that, in the circumstances of the case, the presence of the defendant’s head office in ontario undoubtedly established a substantial connection (para 38). l’art 3168 ccq sans avoir procédé à une analyse distincte fondée sur l’art 3164 ccq. il n’était pas nécessaire de le faire puisque, dans les circonstances de l’affaire, la présence du siège social de la dé- fenderesse en ontario établissait indubitablement l’existence d’un rattachement important (par 38). [259] lépine nevertheless lends support to the view that the substantial connection requirement may, in exceptional circumstances, constitute a bar to rec- ognition even where one of the connecting factors in art 3168 ccq is present. at the very least, the following passage leaves that door open: article 3164 ccq provides that a substantial con- nection between the dispute and the originating court is a fundamental condition for the recognition of a judgment in quebec. articles 3165 to 3168 then set out, in more specific terms, connecting factors to be used to determine whether, in certain situations, a sufficient connection ex- ists between the dispute and the foreign authority. the application of specific rules, such as those in art. 3168 respecting personal actions of a patrimonial nature, will generally suffice to determine whether the foreign court had jurisdiction. however, it may be necessary in consider- ing a complex legal situation involving two or more parties located in different parts of the world to apply the general principle in art. 3164 in order to establish jurisdiction and have recourse to, for example, the forum of necessity. the court of appeal added an irrelevant factor to the analysis of the foreign court’s jurisdiction: the doctrine of forum non conveniens. this approach introduces a degree of in- stability and unpredictability that is inconsistent with the standpoint generally favourable to the recognition of for- eign or external judgments that is evident in the provisions of the civil code. it is hardly consistent with the principles of international comity and the objectives of facilitating international and interprovincial relations that underlie the civil code’s provisions on the recognition of foreign judgments. in sum, even when it is applying the general rule in art. 3164, the court hearing the application for rec- ognition cannot rely on a doctrine that is incompatible with the recognition procedure. [emphasis added; para 36] [259] l’arrêt lépine étaye néanmoins la thèse sui- vant laquelle l’exigence du rattachement important peut, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, faire obstacle à la reconnaissance d’un jugement même lorsque l’un des facteurs de rattachement énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq est présent. le passage suivant ouvre à tout le moins la porte à cette possibilité : l’article 3164 ccq établit comme condition fonda- mentale de la reconnaissance d’un jugement au québec l’existence d’un lien important entre le litige et le tribunal d’origine. les articles 3165 à 3168 énoncent ensuite de manière plus spécifique des facteurs de rattachement per- mettant de conclure à la présence d’un lien suffisant entre le litige et l’autorité étrangère dans certaines situations. en général, le recours à des règles spécifiques, comme celles de l’art. 3168 applicables aux actions personnelles à carac- tère patrimonial, permettra de statuer sur la compétence du tribunal étranger. cependant, il se peut qu’une situation juridique complexe où plusieurs parties se trouvent dans des fors différents impose le recours au principe général de l’art. 3164 pour déterminer la compétence et recourir par exemple au for de nécessité. l’arrêt de la cour d’appel ajoute un élément non pertinent à l’analyse de la com- pétence du tribunal étranger : la doctrine du forum non conveniens. cette approche introduit ainsi un élément d’ins- tabilité et d’imprévisibilité qui s’accorde mal avec l’attitude en principe favorable à la reconnaissance des jugements étrangers ou externes qu’expriment les dispositions du code civil. elle ne respecte guère les principes de courtoisie internationale et les objectifs de facilitation des échanges internationaux et interprovinciaux qui sous- tendent les dis- positions du code civil sur la reconnaissance des jugements étrangers. en somme, même dans le cas où il a recours à la règle générale prévue à l’art. 3164, le tribunal de l’exequatur ne peut s’appuyer sur une doctrine incompatible avec la procédure de reconnaissance. [je souligne; par 36] [260] i agree with my colleague gascon j. that the above paragraph can be read in two ways (para 86). on one reading, it suggests that there will be ex- ceptional circumstances where the fundamental re- quirement of a substantial connection will not be met [260] je conviens avec mon collègue le juge gascon que le paragraphe ci- dessus peut s’interpréter de deux façons (par 86). selon la première interpréta- tion, il indique qu’il peut y avoir des circonstances exceptionnelles où l’exigence fondamentale du [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 719 despite art 3168 ccq being satisfied. on the other, it stands for the proposition that the reciprocity prin- ciple in art 3164 ccq authorizes a quebec court to rely on the general provisions of title three, such as the forum of necessity principle (art 3136 ccq), to recognize a foreign decision even where none of the factors in art 3168 ccq has been proven. [261] in my view, we do not have to choose be- tween those two readings. indeed, they are not in any way contradictory. in this regard, it should be recalled that the forum of necessity principle al- lows jurisdiction to be assumed on an exceptional basis where proceedings in any competent forum abroad prove impossible or cannot reasonably be required — so that there is no alternative that can pre- vent a miscarriage of justice (see goldstein (2012), at para. 3168 550; lamborghini (canada) inc. v. automobili lamborghini spa, [1997] rjq 58 (ca), at p 68). while the court’s reference to the forum of necessity principle illustrates the fact that art 3164 ccq can be used to expand the grounds for recognizing foreign decisions, this does not imply that the same provision cannot be relied upon to deny recognition on the basis of the absence of a substan- tial connection. indeed, the scenario mentioned by the court, namely “a complex legal situation involv- ing two or more parties located in different parts of the world”, strongly suggests that multiple potential forums would technically satisfy at least one of the connecting factors set out in art 3168 ccq but would nonetheless fail to satisfy the requirement of a substantial connection under art 3164 ccq. rattachement important ne sera pas remplie même s’il est satisfait à l’art 3168 ccq. selon la deuxième interprétation, il permet d’affirmer que le principe de la réciprocité énoncé à l’art 3164 ccq autorise les tribunaux québécois à s’appuyer sur les dispositions générales du titre troisième, comme le principe du for de nécessité (art 3136 ccq), pour reconnaître une décision étrangère même lorsqu’aucun des facteurs de l’art 3168 ccq n’a été établi. [261] à mon avis, nous n’avons pas à choisir entre ces deux interprétations. en effet, elles ne sont aucu- nement contradictoires. à cet égard, il faut se rappeler que le principe du for de nécessité permet exception- nellement à un tribunal de se déclarer compétent si l’introduction d’une action devant n’importe quel tribunal étranger compétent se révèle impossible ou ne saurait raisonnablement être exigée — de sorte qu’il n’existe aucune autre solution pour éviter une er- reur judiciaire (voir goldstein (2012), par. 3168 550; lamborghini (canada) inc. c. automobili lambor- ghini spa, [1997] rjq 58 (ca), p 68). bien que la mention par la cour du principe du for de né- cessité montre que l’art 3164 ccq peut être utilisé pour élargir les motifs de reconnaissance des déci- sions étrangères, cela ne veut pas dire que la même disposition ne peut être invoquée pour refuser de re- connaître une décision en raison de l’absence de rat- tachement important. en effet, le scénario mentionné par la cour, soit celui d’« une situation juridique complexe où plusieurs parties se trouvent dans des fors différents », tend fortement à indiquer que bon nombre de tribunaux pourraient en principe satisfaire à au moins un des facteurs de rattachement énoncés à l’art 3168 ccq, sans toutefois répondre à l’exigence du rattachement important prévue à l’art 3164 ccq. in any event, lépine is also noteworthy [262] for what it does not say. while the court explic- itly stated that the forum non conveniens doctrine is an “irrelevant factor” in the analysis of a foreign authority’s jurisdiction, it refrained from making any such assertion as regards the substantial con- nection requirement. indeed, one might argue that the forum non conveniens doctrine is irrelevant precisely because the “fundamental condition” of a substantial connection already offers a counter- weight to rigid connecting factors. this would be [262] quoi qu’il en soit, l’arrêt lépine est éga- lement digne de mention pour ce qu’il ne dit pas. bien qu’elle ait expressément affirmé que la doctrine du forum non conveniens constitue un « élément non pertinent » dans l’analyse de la compétence de l’autorité étrangère, la cour s’est abstenue de faire une telle affirmation à l’égard de l’exigence du rattachement important. d’ailleurs, on pourrait sou- tenir que la doctrine du forum non conveniens n’est pas pertinente précisément parce que la « condition fondamentale » de l’existence d’un rattachement 720 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. consistent with the concerns expressed in spar re- garding the risk of inappropriate assumptions of jurisdiction. [263] in concluding on this point, i would add that requiring a substantial connection in the con- text of the recognition of foreign decisions does not run counter to the principle of international comity. unlike the forum non conveniens doctrine, which pertains to the exercise of jurisdiction by the foreign authority (lépine, at para. 34), the substantial con- nection requirement is concerned with the establish- ment of jurisdiction in the strict sense. further, while it does introduce a certain degree of discretion, such a requirement does not translate into the highly sub- jective exercise of “choosing between two otherwise appropriate jurisdictions” (see g. saumier, “the recognition of foreign judgments in quebec — the mirror crack’d?” (2002), 81 can. bar rev. 677, at p. 694 (emphasis in original); quoted in hocking, at para 180). finally, requiring a substantial connec- tion can hardly offend comity given that it largely accords with the approach adopted in common law jurisdictions. important sert déjà de contrepoids à la rigidité des facteurs de rattachement, ce qui refléterait les pré- occupations exprimées dans l’arrêt spar quant au risque de déclarations inappropriées de compétence. [263] pour conclure sur ce point, j’ajouterai que le fait d’exiger un rattachement important dans le contexte de la reconnaissance des décisions étran- gères ne va pas à l’encontre du principe de la cour- toisie internationale. contrairement à la doctrine du forum non conveniens, qui concerne l’exercice de compétence par l’autorité étrangère (lépine, par. 34), l’exigence du rattachement important concerne l’éta- blissement de la compétence au sens strict. de plus, s’il est vrai qu’elle introduit un certain pouvoir discré- tionnaire, cette exigence ne se traduit pas par l’exer- cice hautement subjectif consistant à [traduction] « choisir entre deux ressorts par ailleurs appropriés » (voir g. saumier, « the recognition of foreign judg- ments in quebec — the mirror crack’d? » (2002), 81 r du b can. 677, p. 694 (en italique dans l’original); cité dans l’arrêt hocking, par 180). enfin, l’exigence du rattachement important peut difficilement contre- venir au principe de courtoisie puisqu’elle est dans une large mesure compatible avec l’approche adop- tée dans les ressorts de common law. [264] all in all, i would emphatically endorse the following comments by professor talpis: [264] somme toute, je souscris avec vigueur aux commentaires suivants du professeur talpis : the substantial connection test serves perfectly well the desired purpose of preventing parties from being haled into the court of an inappropriate foreign jurisdiction with- out further restricting recognition of foreign judgments. [p. 110] [traduction] le critère du rattachement important sert très bien l’objectif d’empêcher que des parties soient traî- nées devant le tribunal d’un ressort étranger inapproprié sans restreindre davantage la reconnaissance des juge- ments étrangers. [p. 110] put another way, the combination of clear, well- defined connecting factors and a distinct substantial connection requirement allows quebec courts to strike a proper balance between order and predicta- bility, on the one hand, and fairness and flexibility, on the other. autrement dit, la combinaison de facteurs de rat- tachement clairs et bien définis et d’une exigence distincte de rattachement important permet aux tri- bunaux québécois d’établir un juste équilibre entre, d’une part, l’ordre et la prévisibilité et, d’autre part, l’équité et la souplesse. b application to the present case b application à la présente affaire [265] turning to the facts of the case, i would re- iterate that, in most cases where art 3168 ccq is satisfied, it will be unnecessary to conduct a separate [265] examinant les faits de la présente affaire, je rappelle que, dans la plupart des cas où il est satisfait à l’art 3168 ccq, il ne sera pas nécessaire de procéder [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 721 analysis under art 3164 ccq. for example, had knight been successful in establishing jurisdiction under art. 3168(3) or (4) ccq, this would in all likelihood have demonstrated a substantial connec- tion pursuant to art 3164 ccq. such would be the case if it had been found that the fault and resulting injury occurred in utah (art.  3168(3)  ccq) or that the utah court’s decision concerned contractual obligations of mr. barer that were to be performed in utah (art 3168(4) ccq). but my colleague gascon j. has found that neither of these situations is present here, and i would reach the same conclu- sion. if mere allegations are insufficient to prove jurisdiction pursuant to one or more of the factors under art 3168 ccq, they are also insufficient to establish a substantial connection. it is in the application of art 3168(6) ccq. [266] that my colleague gascon j. attempts to find a sub- stantial connection. however, even if i were to ac- cept his finding that the appellant did submit to the utah court’s jurisdiction, i disagree that this would in itself satisfy art 3164 ccq. this is one of the exceptional cases in which a separate analysis is warranted. [267] more specifically, where a defendant is found to have submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign authority pursuant to art 3168(6) ccq, further evidence may be required to establish a substantial connection between the dispute and the forum (see hocking, at para. 220; talpis and castel, at para 501). this is certainly the case where “submission” has been, at best, reluctant and largely involuntary, and where the defendant has not presented a defence on the merits but has merely challenged the foreign au- thority’s jurisdiction. in this regard, and as i explained above, submission does not in itself establish an ac- tual connection between the underlying dispute and the foreign state. it is more properly understood as a distinct ground for jurisdiction. it follows that, unless there is extensive participation in the proceedings, such as presenting a defence on the merits — in which case, i would agree that submission is sufficient to satisfy art 3164 ccq — other factors should be à une analyse distincte fondée sur l’art 3164 ccq. par exemple, si knight avait réussi à établir la com- pétence en vertu des par.  3168(3) ou (4)  ccq, le rattachement important dont il est question à l’art 3164 ccq aurait selon toute vraisemblance été, par le fait même, démontré. tel serait le cas s’il avait été conclu que la faute et le préjudice en ayant ré- sulté s’étaient produits en utah (par 3168(3) ccq) ou encore que la décision du tribunal de l’utah portait sur des obligations contractuelles que m. barer devait exécuter en utah (par 3168(4) ccq). cependant, mon collègue le juge gascon a estimé qu’aucune de ces situations n’était présente en l’espèce et j’en ar- rive à la même conclusion. si de simples allégations ne suffisent pas à établir la compétence selon un ou plusieurs des facteurs prévus à l’art 3168 ccq, elles ne suffisent pas non plus à établir l’existence d’un rat- tachement important. [266] c’est dans l’application du par 3168(6) ccq. que mon collègue le juge gascon tente de trouver un rattachement important. toutefois, même si j’accep- tais sa conclusion suivant laquelle l’appelant a effecti- vement reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah, je ne suis pas d’accord avec lui pour dire que cette reconnaissance satisferait à elle seule aux exigences de l’art 3164 ccq. il s’agit en l’espèce de l’un des cas exceptionnels où une analyse distincte s’impose. [267] plus précisément, s’il est jugé que le défen- deur a reconnu la compétence de l’autorité étrangère au sens du par 3168(6) ccq, d’autres éléments de preuve peuvent être nécessaires pour établir l’exis- tence d’un lien de rattachement important entre le li- tige et le for (voir hocking, par. 220; talpis et castel, par 501). c’est assurément le cas lorsque la « recon- naissance de compétence » est tout au plus faite avec réticence et en grande partie d’une manière involon- taire, et que le défendeur n’a pas présenté de défense au fond, mais a simplement contesté la compétence de l’autorité étrangère. à cet égard, et comme je l’ai expliqué plus haut, la reconnaissance de compétence n’établit pas en soi un lien de rattachement réel entre le litige sous- jacent et l’état étranger. il est plus juste de la considérer comme un motif distinct d’attribu- tion de compétence. il s’ensuit qu’à moins d’une participation importante à l’instance, comme la pré- sentation d’une défense au fond — auquel cas je 722 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. considered to determine whether a substantial con- nection exists. [268] in the present case, the mere fact that the appellant made substantive arguments relating to the economic loss rule and the alter ego cause of action in his motion to dismiss, for the primary purpose of challenging the foreign authority’s jurisdiction, does not establish a sufficient substantial connection between the dispute and utah. [269] although my colleague brown j. agrees that mr. barer did not submit to the jurisdiction of the utah court (at paras. 94 and 146), he would rely on mr. barer’s “key role” in the negotiations between bec and knight to establish a substantial connec- tion between him personally and utah (para 164). yet mr. barer’s involvement as president of bec does not demonstrate such a connection, as he was not acting in his personal capacity. holding other- wise would amount to piercing the corporate veil for jurisdictional purposes whenever a director or executive (and perhaps any employee or mandatary) negotiates a contract on behalf of a corporation in a foreign jurisdiction. with respect, this cannot be the case. it is not enough to show a connection with the object of the dispute (ie the contract). a sufficient connection with the parties themselves, including with mr. barer in the instant case, must also be es- tablished (talpis and castel, at para. 486; see also van breda, at paras. 79 and 99). no such personal connection has been proven here. serais d’accord pour dire qu’une telle reconnaissance est suffisante pour satisfaire à l’art 3164 ccq —, d’autres facteurs devraient être examinés pour déter- miner s’il existe un rattachement important. [268] en l’espèce, le simple fait que, dans sa re- quête en irrecevabilité, l’appelant a présenté des arguments de fond quant à la règle des pertes finan- cières et à la cause d’action fondée sur l’existence d’un alter ego, et ce, dans le principal but de contester la compétence de l’autorité étrangère, n’établit pas l’existence d’un rattachement important suffisant entre le litige et l’utah. [269] bien que mon collègue le juge brown con- vienne que m. barer n’a pas reconnu la compétence du tribunal de l’utah (par. 94 et 146), il s’appuie sur le « rôle clé » qu’a joué m. barer dans les négocia- tions entre bec et knight pour établir l’existence d’un lien de rattachement important entre m. barer lui- même et l’utah (par 164). or, la participation de m. barer à titre de président de bec ne démontre pas l’existence d’un tel lien, car il n’agissait pas à titre personnel. conclure différemment reviendrait à percer le voile corporatif pour ce qui concerne la compétence chaque fois qu’un administrateur ou un cadre dirigeant (et peut- être même un employé ou un mandataire) négocie un contrat au nom d’une société dans un ressort étranger. avec égards, il ne peut en être ainsi. il ne suffit pas d’établir un lien de rattachement avec l’objet du litige (c.-à-d le contrat) l’existence d’un lien suffisant avec les parties elles- mêmes, notamment, en l’occurrence, avec m.  barer, doit aussi être établie (talpis et castel, par. 486; voir aussi van breda, par. 79 et 99). la preuve d’un tel lien personnel n’a pas été faite en l’espèce. [270] my colleague brown j. also relies on the law applicable under the conflict of laws rules in the ccq. in his opinion, a finding of substantial connection is buttressed by the fact that utah law would have applied to the alter ego claim against mr. barer under art 3083 ccq, which provides that the status and capacity of a legal person are gov- erned, with respect to its activities, by the law of the place where they are carried on (para 166). this is not a persuasive indicator of a substantial connection. [270] mon collègue le juge brown s’appuie éga- lement sur le droit applicable en vertu des règles de conflit de lois énoncées dans le ccq. selon lui, la conclusion voulant qu’il existe un rattachement important est étayée par le fait que le droit de l’utah se serait appliqué à l’allégation d’alter ego contre m. barer en vertu de l’art 3083 ccq, qui pré- voit que l’état et la capacité d’une personne morale sont régis, quant à son activité, par la loi du lieu où elle s’exerce (par 166). il ne s’agit pas d’un indice [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 723 first, i would note that the parties have not made submissions as to the law that would have applied before the quebec courts. as such, i would not take for granted that utah law would have governed this matter. but more fundamentally, my colleague’s ap- proach conflates conflict rules with the requirements for recognizing a foreign decision, which the quebec legislature has clearly distinguished. while there may be some overlap between the two, it cannot be assumed that any conflict rule whose purpose is to determine the law applicable on the merits will also indicate a substantial connection between the foreign state and both the parties and the object of the dispute. if we were to follow my colleague’s logic and rely on art 3083 ccq as he does, any shareholder of a corporation might have a substantial connection with the foreign jurisdictions in which the corporation’s activities happen to be carried on. this threshold for finding a substantial connection is plainly too low. [271] indeed, my colleague recognizes that the conflict rule in art 3083 ccq does not point to- wards an actual connection with mr. barer person- ally, but represents, at most, “a further indicator of a substantial connection between utah and the subject- matter of the whole dispute, including the alter ego claim” (para. 166 (underlining added)). in my view, this confirms that art.  3083  ccq. adds little to the discussion. in the present case, it is largely redundant in light of the connecting factor in art 3168(4) ccq given that bec’s activities in utah overlap with the contractual obligations at issue. it should thus be afforded little weight, if any. in short, article 3168(4) is insufficient to establish jurisdiction against mr. barer, and art. 3083 cannot make up for this insufficiency. convaincant de l’existence d’un rattachement im- portant. premièrement, je souligne que les parties n’ont pas présenté d’observations sur le droit qui se serait appliqué devant les tribunaux québécois. je ne tiendrais donc pas pour acquis que le droit de l’utah aurait régi la présente affaire. mais plus fondamen- talement, l’approche de mon collègue confond les règles de conflit avec les conditions de reconnais- sance des décisions étrangères, que le législateur québécois a clairement distinguées. bien qu’il puisse y avoir un certain chevauchement entre les deux, on ne saurait présumer qu’une règle de conflit servant à déterminer le droit applicable au fond indique aussi l’existence d’un rattachement important entre l’état étranger et les deux parties et l’objet du litige. si nous devions suivre la logique de mon collègue et nous appuyer sur l’art.  3083 ccq comme il le fait, tout actionnaire d’une société pourrait avoir un rattachement important avec les ressorts étrangers où s’exerce l’activité de la société. ce seuil pour conclure à l’existence d’un rattachement important est manifestement trop bas. [271] d’ailleurs, mon collègue reconnaît que la règle de conflit énoncée à l’art 3083 ccq n’in- dique pas un réel rattachement avec m. barer lui- même, mais représente tout au plus « un autre indice de l’existence d’un rattachement important entre cet état et l’objet de l’ensemble du litige, dont l’allé- gation d’alter ego » (par. 166 (je souligne)). à mon avis, cela confirme que l’art.  3083  ccq ajoute peu à l’analyse. en l’espèce, cette règle fait dans une large mesure double emploi avec le facteur de rattachement prévu au par 3168(4) ccq, car il y a chevauchement entre l’activité de bec en utah et les obligations contractuelles en cause. il faudrait donc lui accorder peu de poids, si tant qu’il lui en soit accordé. en somme, le par. 3168(4) ne suffit pas à établir la compétence à l’égard de m. barer et l’art. 3083 ne peut pallier cette insuffisance. [272] beyond the conflict rule invoked by my col- league, i would add that, in itself, the law that might have applied had the action been brought in quebec appears irrelevant to the assessment of a foreign authority’s assumption of jurisdiction. it is true, as my colleague notes (at para. 168), that a quebec court seized of the same dispute might consider the [272] outre la règle de conflit invoquée par mon col- lègue, j’ajouterai que le droit qui aurait pu être appliqué si l’action avait été intentée au québec semble en soi non pertinent pour l’appréciation d’une déclaration de compétence par une autorité étrangère. comme le fait remarquer mon collègue (par. 168), il est vrai qu’un tribunal québécois saisi du même litige pourrait tenir 724 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. applicable law in deciding whether to decline ju- risdiction under the forum non conveniens doctrine (art 3135 ccq;. spar, at paras 67-71). however, that doctrine is concerned with the exercise, not the establishment, of jurisdiction (lépine, at para. 34), and it therefore relies on different factors (haaretz. com v. goldhar, 2018 scc 28, [2018] 2 scr 3, at para 43). in a forum non conveniens analysis, for instance, the fact that a quebec court would be applying foreign law might militate — for reasons of efficiency — in favour of declining jurisdiction. the issue here, however, is not one of convenience; it is whether utah had a sufficient connection with mr. barer to establish jurisdiction against him. the law that a quebec court might apply to the alter ego claim does not tell us anything, in itself, about that connection. [273] in any event, insofar as the law applicable on the merits has any relevance, i would point out that the law that actually governed the action does not support a finding of a substantial connection between the dispute and utah. in the present case, we know from the memorandum decision and order denying mr. barer’s motion to dismiss that the utah court applied vermont law to the alter ego claim, not utah law. accordingly, i fail to see how this factor favours recognition. [274] finally, i would add that a substantial con- nection cannot be presumed on the mere basis that it appears more convenient to recognize a foreign decision in a given situation. both my colleagues insist that it is preferable that the actions against bec and mr. barer be heard together in a single forum (gascon j.’s reasons, at para. 88; brown j.’s reasons, at para 170). this may be so, but conven- ience is not an independent ground for jurisdiction, nor does it allow quebec courts to disregard the rights of quebec residents involved in litigation abroad. in the instant case, there is simply no way to circumvent the absence of actual evidence that would justify recognizing the utah court’s judg- ment. compte du droit applicable à celui-ci pour décider s’il y a lieu de décliner compétence selon la doctrine du forum non conveniens (art 3135 ccq;. spar, par. 67- 71). cependant, cette doctrine concerne l’exercice, et non la détermination, de la compétence (lépine, par. 34), et repose par conséquent sur des facteurs différents (haaretz.com c. goldhar, 2018 csc 28, [2018] 2 rcs 3, par 43). dans l’analyse relative au forum non conveniens, par exemple, le fait que le tribunal québécois applique un droit étranger pourrait inciter celui-ci — pour des raisons d’efficacité — à décliner compétence. en l’espèce, cependant, il s’agit de savoir non pas ce qui est commode, mais plutôt si l’utah présentait un rattachement suffisant avec m. barer pour établir sa compétence à l’égard de celui-ci. le droit que le tribunal québécois pourrait appliquer à l’allégation d’alter ego ne nous apprend rien en soi quant à ce rattachement. [273] quoi qu’il en soit, dans la mesure où le droit applicable au fond est pertinent, je souligne que le droit qui a de fait régi l’action n’étaye pas l’existence d’un rattachement important entre le litige et l’utah. dans la présente affaire, la décision et l’ordonnance rejetant la requête en irrecevabilité de barer révèlent que le tribunal de l’utah a appli- qué le droit du ver mont à l’allégation d’alter ego, et non le droit de l’utah. par conséquent, je ne vois pas comment ce facteur peut jouer en faveur de la reconnaissance. [274] enfin, j’ajouterai que l’existence d’un rattachement important ne saurait être présumée simplement parce qu’il semble plus commode de reconnaître la décision étrangère dans une situation donnée. mes deux collègues insistent sur le fait qu’il est préférable que les actions intentées contre bec et m. barer soient entendues ensemble par un seul tribunal (motifs du juge gascon, par. 88; motifs du juge brown, par 170). c’est peut- être le cas, mais la commodité ne constitue pas en soi un motif d’attri- bution de compétence et elle ne permet pas aux tri- bunaux québécois de faire fi des droits des résidants du québec qui sont parties à un litige à l’étranger. en l’espèce, on ne peut tout simplement pas faire abstraction de l’absence de preuve concrète permet- tant de reconnaître le jugement du tribunal de l’utah. [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 725 v article 3139 ccq. v article 3139 ccq. [275] some final comments must be made regard- ing the approach adopted by brown j. in short, my colleague would invoke art 3139 ccq, through the mirror effect of art 3164 ccq, to extend the application of art 3168(4) ccq — which concerns obligations arising from a contract — to mr. barer, who is not a party to the contract with knight. with respect, i cannot accept that proposition. [275] un dernier commentaire s’impose au sujet de l’approche adoptée par le juge brown. en résumé, mon collègue invoque l’art 3139 ccq, par le biais de l’effet miroir de l’art 3164 ccq, pour étendre l’application du par 3168(4) ccq — qui concerne les obligations découlant d’un contrat — à m. barer, qui n’est pas partie au contrat avec knight. avec égards, je ne puis accepter cette proposition. [276] even if i were to assume that art 3139 ccq. may be relied upon to recognize a foreign decision, it could not be applied in the instant case. article 3139 states that “[w]here a québec authority has jurisdiction to rule on the principal demand, it also has jurisdiction to rule on an incidental demand or a cross demand”. as the utah court had jurisdiction over the principal de- mand against bec on the basis of art 3168(4) ccq, so the argument goes, it would also have jurisdiction against mr barer. yet in the instant case, there is no way around the fact that the action against mr. barer is plainly a principal demand, not an incidental de- mand. on this point, i am in complete agreement with my colleague gascon j. (para 90). [276] même en présumant que l’art 3139 ccq peut être invoqué pour reconnaître une décision étrangère, il ne pourrait pas s’appliquer en l’espèce. cette dispo- sition précise que « [l]’autorité québécoise, compé- tente pour la demande principale, est aussi compétente pour la demande incidente ou reconventionnelle ». l’argument est le suivant : comme le tribunal de l’utah était compétent pour la demande principale contre bec en vertu du par 3168(4) ccq, il serait aussi compétent à l’égard de m barer. or, en l’espèce, on ne peut faire fi du fait que l’action contre m. barer consti- tue manifestement une demande principale, et non une demande incidente. sur ce point, je partage entièrement l’opinion de mon collègue le juge gascon (par 90). [277] before going any further, i would note that knight has never relied upon art 3139 ccq as a ground for recognizing the utah judgment. this, in itself, should give us pause. the onus of demonstrat- ing that the utah court had jurisdiction is on knight and no one else. with respect, international comity does not require quebec courts — or this court for that matter — to volunteer a legal rationale for rec- ognizing the jurisdiction of a foreign authority, to the potential detriment of quebec residents. [277] avant d’aller plus loin, je souligne que knight n’a jamais invoqué l’art 3139 ccq comme motif de reconnaissance du jugement de l’utah, ce qui devrait en soi nous donner matière à réflexion. il incombe à knight, et à personne d’autre, de démontrer que le tribunal de l’utah avait compétence. avec respect, la courtoisie internationale n’oblige pas les tribunaux québécois — ou d’ailleurs la cour — à fournir de leur propre chef un fondement juridique permettant de reconnaître la compétence d’une autorité étrangère au détriment possible des résidants du québec. [278] the fact that knight did not invoke this pro- vision also means that the parties have made no submissions on this point. in this context, i would refrain from making any definitive statement on the scope of art 3139 ccq, including whether it can be relied upon as an independent basis for recogniz- ing a foreign decision. [278] le fait que knight n’ait pas invoqué cette dis- position signifie aussi que les parties n’ont pas pré- senté d’observations sur ce point. dans ce contexte, je m’abstiendrai de me prononcer de manière défini- tive sur la portée de l’art 3139 ccq, y compris sur la question de savoir s’il peut servir de fondement distinct à la reconnaissance d’une décision étrangère. [279] however, i would note that, in grecon, the court cautioned that art 3139 ccq must be [279] cependant, je soulignerai que, dans l’arrêt grecon, la cour a fait une mise en garde selon laquelle 726 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. “interpreted narrowly so as not to indirectly enlarge the international jurisdiction of the quebec authority contrary to the specific provisions relating to the definition of its jurisdiction and the general princi- ples that underlie that jurisdiction” (para 29). the court also added that art 3139 ccq is merely a “permissive provision that is procedural in nature” (para 37). although my colleague brown j. quotes grecon, his proposed interpretation is anything but narrow. il faut donner à l’art 3139 ccq « une interprétation restrictive [  ] afin de ne pas étendre indirectement la compétence internationale des autorités québécoises au mépris des dispositions spécifiques portant sur la dé- finition des compétences de ces dernières et des prin- cipes généraux qui les sous- tendent » (par 29). la cour a ajouté que l’art 3139 ccq n’est qu’une « disposi- tion facultative à caractère procédural » (par 37). bien que mon collègue le juge brown cite l’arrêt grecon, l’interprétation qu’il propose est loin d’être restrictive. [280] yet as he acknowledges (at para. 159), there is ample academic authority to the effect that, where there are multiple co- defendants, jurisdiction over any one of them does not in itself confer jurisdiction over all the others (talpis, at pp. 36-39; talpis and castel, at para. 437; glenn, at para. 77; ferland and laganière, at p. 298; see also sorel tracy terminal maritime v. fsl limited, 2001 canlii 24746 (que. sup. ct.), at para 15). [280] pourtant, comme le reconnaît le juge brown (par. 159), il existe une doctrine abondante vou- lant que, lorsqu’il y a de multiples codéfendeurs, la compétence à l’égard de l’un d’eux ne confère pas en soi compétence à l’égard de tous les autres (talpis, p. 36-39; talpis et castel, par. 437; glenn, par. 77; ferland et laganière, p. 298; voir égale- ment sorel tracy terminal maritime c. fsl limited, 2001 canlii 24746 (cs qc), par 15). in this respect, i would point out that the [281] quebec legislature has chosen not to include a pro- vision stating that an “action against several de- fendants    may be instituted in the court before which any of them may be summoned” (to borrow, by analogy, the language of art. 75 of the former code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-25). other civil law jurisdictions have enacted broad provisions of this type which apply insofar as the claims have a certain degree of connexity (see, eg, art. 8a of switzerland’s loi fédérale sur le droit international privé; see also art. 9 of belgium’s loi portant le code de droit international privé). but this is not the case of quebec, and it seems to me that this legislative choice must be respected. the scope of art 3139 ccq should not be distorted so as to read in such a provision. [282] accordingly, i cannot accept that art. 3139 ccq may be relied on to extend jurisdiction over any “related” claim irrespective of whether the ac- tion can properly be characterized as an “incidental demand” (see brown j.’s reasons, at para 155). such a broad interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the wording of the provision, which distinguishes be- tween “principal” and “incidental” demands. [281] à cet égard, je signale que le législateur qué- bécois a décidé de ne pas inclure une disposition pré- voyant que l’« action [  ] formée contre plusieurs défendeurs [  ] peut être portée au tribunal devant lequel l’un ou l’autre pourrait être assigné » (pour reprendre, par analogie, les termes de l’art. 75 de l’ancien code de procédure civile, rlrq, c. c-25). d’autres ressorts de droit civil ont édicté ce type de dispositions générales qui s’appliquent dans la me- sure où les demandes présentent un certain degré de connexité (voir, p ex, l’art 8a de la loi fédérale sur le droit international privé de la suisse; voir également l’art. 9 de la loi portant le code de droit internatio- nal privé de la belgique). mais ce n’est pas le cas du québec et il me semble que ce choix législatif doit être respecté. la portée de l’art 3139 ccq ne devrait pas être dénaturée de manière à y lire une telle disposition. [282] par conséquent, je ne saurais accepter que l’art 3139 ccq puisse être invoqué pour conférer compétence sur toute demande « connexe » indépen- damment de la question de savoir si l’action peut à juste titre être qualifiée de « demande incidente » (voir les motifs du juge brown, par 155). une interprétation aussi large est clairement incompatible avec le libellé de la disposition, qui fait une distinction entre une de- mande « principale » et une demande « incidente ». [2019] 1 rcs. barer c knight brothers llc la juge côté 727 [283] while i take no position on the precise mean- ing of “incidental demand” under art 3139 ccq, there is no doubt that it must be defined on the basis of quebec procedural law (see, eg,. goldstein, fasc. 11, at para. 41; goldstein (2012), at para 3139 555). in quebec, the rules pertaining to “incidental pro- ceedings” are set out under title ii of book ii of the new ccp. for instance, “incidental proceedings” may refer to the voluntary or forced intervention of third persons, including recourses in warranty (arts. 184-90 of the new ccp). as my colleagues note, title ii also deals with the “consolidation of proceedings” (art. 210 of the new ccp), where two or more distinct proceedings are brought together to be tried at the same time. however, it is doubtful that the “proceedings” referred to in this provision may properly be characterized as a “principal demand” and an “incidental demand”. rather, it seems to me that consolidation involves two or more principal demands. [284] in the present case, my colleague brown j. seems to concede the obvious, namely that mr. barer was sued directly as a co- defendant in a principal demand directed against him, bec and central bearing corporation, ltd. (“cbc”) (para 158). as i understand it, his proposition is that the demand against mr. barer was nonetheless “incidental” for the purposes of art 3139 ccq because he could instead have been added as a co- defendant after the institution of a “principal demand” against bec or cbc through the forced intervention of a third per- son (under arts. 184 and 188-89 of the new ccp). whether this is true or not is of no import. this is simply not what happened. in effect, my colleague’s interpretation would erase the distinction between “principal demand” and “incidental demand” which is central to art 3139 ccq. yet the legislature did not use those words for no reason. [283] bien que je ne me prononce pas sur le sens précis à donner à l’expression «  demande inci- dente » employée à l’art 3139 ccq, il ne fait au- cun doute qu’elle doit être définie en fonction du droit procédural québécois (voir, p ex, goldstein, fasc. 11, par. 41; goldstein (2012), par 3139 555). au québec, les règles relatives aux « incidents de l’instance  » sont énoncées au titre  ii du livre  ii du nouveau cpc. par exemple, les «  incidents de l’instance » peuvent désigner les interventions volontaires ou forcées de tiers, notamment les demandes en garantie (art.  184-190 du nouveau cpc). comme le font remarquer mes collègues, le titre ii traite également de la « jonction d’ins- tances » (art. 210 du nouveau cpc), où plusieurs instances distinctes sont jointes pour être instruites en même temps. cependant, il est peu probable que les « instances » dont il est question dans ces dispo- sitions puissent à bon droit être qualifiées comme visant une «  demande principale  » et une «  de- mande incidente ». la jonction me semble plutôt viser plusieurs demandes principales. [284] en l’espèce, mon collègue le juge brown semble reconnaître l’évidence, à savoir que m. barer a été poursuivi directement à titre de codéfendeur dans une demande principale dirigée contre lui, bec et cen tral bearing corporation, ltd. (« cbc ») (par 158). si je comprends bien, il affirme que la de- mande contre m. barer était néanmoins une demande « incidente » au sens de l’art 3139 ccq parce que celui-ci aurait pu être plutôt ajouté comme codéfen- deur, après l’introduction de la « demande principale » contre bec ou cbc, par le recours à l’intervention forcée d’un tiers (en vertu des art. 184 et 188-189 du nouveau cpc). que cela soit vrai ou non importe peu. ce n’est tout simplement pas ce qui est arrivé. de fait, l’interprétation de mon collègue ferait disparaître la distinction entre « demande principale » et « demande incidente » qui est au cœur de l’art 3139 ccq. or, le législateur n’a pas employé ces mots pour rien. [285] finally, even if i were to accept brown j.’s broad interpretation of art 3139 ccq,. i would reject this basis for recognizing the foreign decision, as it would require that a substantial connection be proven under art 3164 ccq (brown j’s reasons, at para 149). no such connection exists in the present [285] enfin, même si je devais souscrire à l’in- terprétation large que le juge brown donne à l’art 3139 ccq, je serais d’avis de rejeter ce mo- tif de reconnaissance de la décision étrangère parce qu’il faudrait que l’existence d’un rattachement important soit établie en vertu de l’art 3164 ccq. 728 barer v knight brothers llc côté j. [2019] 1 scr. case. further, my colleague recognizes that, to the extent that art 3139 ccq could be relied upon, a certain degree of connexity would be required be- tween mr. barer and the contract between knight and bec (see grecon, at para 31). in the present case, the mere fact that mr. barer negotiated on be- half of bec — a distinct legal person — does not “connect” him sufficiently to the contract and should not be enough to justify an assumption of jurisdiction against him. (motifs du juge brown, par 149). un tel rattache- ment n’existe pas en l’espèce. de plus, mon collègue reconnaît que, dans la mesure où l’art 3139 ccq. peut être invoqué, un certain niveau de connexité serait nécessaire entre m. barer et le contrat entre knight et bec (voir grecon, par.  31) en l’es- pèce, le simple fait que m. barer a négocié au nom de bec  — une personne morale distincte  — ne le « rattache » pas suffisamment au contrat et ne devrait pas suffire à justifier une déclaration de compétence à son égard. [286] the contrary view amounts to doing in- directly what cannot be done directly. as i have explained above, mr. barer cannot fall within the ambit of art.  3168(4) ccq unless he is shown to be responsible for the “obligations arising from [the] contract”. because he is not himself a party to the contract, it would be necessary to adduce ev- idence to justify piercing the corporate veil under art 317 ccq. i highly doubt that art 3139 ccq. can be used to circumvent that specific requirement (see grecon, at para. 29), as this would undermine the certainty and predictability which the specific connecting factors in the ccq are intended to promote (see spar, at para 81). [286] l’opinion contraire équivaut à faire indirec- tement ce qu’on ne peut faire directement. comme je l’ai expliqué précédemment, m. barer ne peut être visé par le par 3168(4) ccq à moins qu’il ne soit démontré qu’il est responsable des « obliga- tions découlant [du] contrat ». comme il n’est pas lui- même partie au contrat, il faudrait présenter des éléments de preuve permettant de percer le voile cor- poratif en vertu de l’art 317 ccq. je doute fort que l’art 3139 ccq puisse être utilisé pour contourner cette exigence précise (voir grecon, par. 29), car la certitude et la prévisibilité que visent à promouvoir les facteurs de rattachement précis énoncés dans le ccq s’en trouveraient minés (voir spar, par 81). vi conclusion vi conclusion i conclude that the utah court’s jurisdiction [287] cannot be established under art 3168 ccq and that the dispute is not substantially connected with utah as required by art 3164 ccq. as a result, the decision cannot be recognized against the appellant. i would allow the appeal. [287] je conclus que la compétence du tribunal de l’utah ne peut être établie en vertu de l’art 3168 ccq. et que le litige ne présente pas de rattachement impor- tant avec l’utah comme l’exige l’art 3164 ccq. par conséquent, la décision ne peut être reconnue contre l’appelant. j’accueillerais le pourvoi. appeal dismissed with costs, côté j. dissenting. appel rejeté avec dépens, la juge côté est dis- sidente. procureurs de l’appelant : sternthal, katznelson, montigny, montréal. montigny, montréal. procureurs de l’intimée : franklin & franklin, montréal. montréal.
i. overview [1] in this appeal the court addresses the standard to be applied in criminal cases when judges are asked to summarily dismiss an application without hearing it on its merits. specifically, when is it appropriate to summarily dismiss an application for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process? [2] there is a clear consensus in courts across canada that trial judges have the power to summarily dismiss applications made in the criminal law context in certain circumstances. however, the national case law is divided about the proper threshold to be applied. it is time for this court to provide guidance on this important issue, which is linked to concepts as fundamental to our criminal justice system as trial fairness and trial efficiency. the chosen standard must protect the accused’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and full answer and defence while avoiding undue delay and the disproportionate or wasteful use of court resources. it should also discourage decision makers from determining the merits of the underlying application without all the evidence, as this risks unfairness for an efficiency which may be more apparent than real. [3] as a result, an application in a criminal proceeding, including for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, should only be summarily dismissed if the application is “manifestly frivolous”. this threshold best preserves fair trials, protects the accused’s right to full answer and defence, and ensures efficient court proceedings. it is a rigorous standard that allows trial judges to weed out the sort of applications that the summary dismissal power is designed to exclude, but permits most applications to be decided on their merits in proportionate proceedings. [4] in the case at bar, mr. johnston and mr. haevischer applied for stays of proceedings based on abuse of process; the crown, in turn, asked for and was granted summary dismissal of the stay applications. based on the trial judge’s own findings, mr. johnston’s and mr. haevischer’s applications for a stay of proceedings were not manifestly frivolous. i agree with the court of appeal for british columbia that it was an error to summarily dismiss them accordingly, i dismiss the appeal. mr. haevischer’s stay application will be remitted to the trial court for a voir dire. as requested by mr. johnston’s counsel, i make no order in relation to mr. johnston, who passed away in prison after this appeal was argued before this court. ii background a. the surrey six murders [5] mr. johnston and mr. haevischer were tried and found guilty of six counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. committed on october 19, 2007, what became known as the “surrey six murders” were precipitated by a dispute over the drug trade in surrey, british columbia, between corey lal, the intended victim, and james (jamie) bacon, one of the leaders of a criminal organization called the “red scorpions”. pursuant to a conspiracy to kill mr. lal, three members of the red scorpions — mr. johnston, mr. haevischer and “person x” — went to mr. lal’s drug “stash house”, a suite in a residential apartment building in surrey, to murder him. [6] when mr. johnston, mr. haevischer and person x arrived at the apartment, they came into contact with mr. lal, three of his associates, a gas fitter who was servicing fireplaces in the complex, and a young man who lived across the hall. the latter two victims had no connection to mr. lal. though mr. lal was the intended target, the five other victims were also killed to avoid detection the murders were committed execution-style. the forensic evidence discloses that all six men were shot multiple times at close range while lying on the floor of the apartment and that two different guns were used to kill them. b. the e-peseta investigation and the charges [7] these horrific high-profile murders led to a multi-year, large-scale royal canadian mounted police (“rcmp”) investigation, known as “project e-peseta”, which eventually resulted in multiple charges against numerous individuals. [8] some five years later, mr. johnston and mr. haevischer were each charged with six counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to murder mr. lal. they were ultimately tried together. [9] person x, the third participant in the murders, was unindicted, but pleaded guilty to second degree murder of three of the victims and conspiracy to murder mr. lal. the crown had intended to call person x as a witness at mr. johnston and mr. haevischer’s trial, but person x was ultimately precluded from testifying after an in camera proceeding conducted in the absence of mr. johnston and mr. haevischer. [10] quang vinh thang (michael) le and mr. bacon, leaders of the red scorpions, were charged with the murder of mr. lal and with conspiracy to murder mr. lal. mr. le pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge in december 2013 and testified in the trial against mr. johnston and mr. haevischer. mr. bacon pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge after the court of appeal overturned a stay of proceedings that had been entered in his case (r v. bacon, 2020 bcca 140, 386 ccc (3d) 256). [11] person y, a red scorpions member, was another co-conspirator. he acted as a police agent during the investigation in exchange for immunity from prosecution for the surrey six murders. however, he subsequently pleaded guilty to two unrelated first degree murders. [12] the e-peseta investigation was complex and plagued by difficulties. while the rcmp believed that the red scorpions were responsible for the surrey six murders, they were of the view that the only persons who could provide reliable evidence about what happened would be the participants themselves or their close associates, all of whom were “hostile” to police. the investigators decided that they needed to cultivate informers who would be willing to testify against those who committed this crime. [13] according to the material filed in the record, the investigators developed the “moving witnesses” strategy to “move criminals and their associates from loyalty to their group to loyalty to the rcmp” (ar, vol. xiv, at p 36) focusing on vulnerable members of the red scorpions and girlfriends of red scorpions members, the rcmp attempted to “dismantle the inner relationships within the red scorpions” and “replace those relationships by building ties between the potential witnesses and themselves” (p 37). the strategy called for “maximizing” or “creating” events in the targeted individual’s world, “[w]ith the goal of putting them in a position where they need to or want to turn to the ‘decent cop’ for help” (p 32) by gaining witnesses’ loyalty, the rcmp hoped to obtain their cooperation to solve the murders. c. the trial [14] mr. johnston and mr. haevischer’s trial, held before wedge j., was complex and lengthy, due in part to dozens of pre-trial and mid-trial applications and the high number of witnesses. both were found guilty of all counts. [15] one pre-trial application — application no. 65 (2013 bcsc 1526) — bears specific mention application no. 65 challenged the crown’s assertion of informer privilege over certain information. to respect the sensitive nature of informer privilege issues, the hearing in application no. 65 was held in the absence of both the accused and the public, and amici curiae were appointed to represent the interests of the accused and to provide an adversarial context for the court. the same amici were also appointed for the stay of proceedings applications. the information disclosed to them on application no. 65 formed the basis of the amici’s sealed submissions on the stay applications. d applications for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process [16] before convictions were entered, both defence counsel applied for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process based on the test set out by this court in r v. babos, 2014 scc 16, [2014] 1 scr 309, at para. 32. [17] a stay is an extraordinary remedy reserved for the “clearest of cases” (babos, at para. 31) the defence claimed that egregious police conduct caused prejudice to mr. johnston’s and mr. haevischer’s rights to a fair trial and undermined the integrity of the justice system. the allegations fall into three basic categories. the first two, which were raised by defence counsel, are (1) systemic police misconduct; and (2) the inhumane conditions of confinement mr. johnston and mr. haevischer experienced while on remand. the third category contains the sealed arguments made by the amici. [18] the first category contained multifaceted allegations of police misconduct. mr. johnston and mr. haevischer challenged the investigation’s use of the “moving witnesses” strategy, characterizing it as “extremely aggressive” (2014 bcsc 2172, 321 crr (2d) 192, at para. 29). additionally, they alleged criminal and other misconduct by officers involved in the e-peseta investigation in particular, sgt. brassington, s/sgt. attew, and two other officers engaged in exploitative sexual relationships with two female protected witnesses. notably, sgt. brassington and s/sgt. attew were lead e-peseta investigators who were “lynchpins” in the efforts to develop and handle witnesses as part of the “moving witnesses” strategy finally, they alleged that the police mishandled funds, evidence, witnesses, agents and informants. among the most egregious allegations were that the four officers who committed misconduct lost evidence and that s/sgt. attew and sgt. brassington endangered the safety of two female witnesses by improperly revealing their whereabouts. [19] the second category of allegations related to mr. johnston’s and mr. haevischer’s post-arrest conditions of confinement defence counsel submitted that mr. johnston and mr. haevischer were deliberately and punitively kept in solitary confinement for 14 months, in harsh and inhumane conditions, contrary to ss. 7 and 12 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms and to international human rights obligations. mr. haevischer’s cell was cold and filthy, smeared with mucus, feces and blood. mr. johnston’s cell, for months, had no natural light. both were confined to their cells, alone, for 22 or 23 hours per day, with extremely limited opportunities for visits or contact in effect, they were cut off from all contact these conditions caused physical deterioration and significant adverse mental health effects — both feared for their sanity defence counsel alleged this illegal treatment was part of the “moving witnesses” strategy and was designed to create the need for the inmates to seek out police help to change their desperate circumstances. [20] mr. johnston and mr. haevischer were only released from solitary confinement after mr. bacon, who was kept in similarly horrendous conditions pending trial for the surrey six murders, successfully brought an application for habeas corpus seeking release into the general prison population (see bacon v surrey pretrial services centre, 2010 bcsc 805, 11 admin. lr (5th) 1, at para. 292). mcewan j., who granted mr. bacon’s application, strongly condemned these conditions and found the treatment of mr. bacon contrary to both ss. 7 and 12 of the charter. [21] the third category of allegations was put forward by the amici, who argued an additional ground of police misconduct based on confidential information disclosed during application no. 65. their submissions were made in camera and ex parte. e. the crown’s request for a vukelich hearing [22] in the normal course, these stay applications would be heard in a separate hearing within the trial called a “voir dire” (r v. sadikov, 2014 onca 72, 305 ccc. (3d) 421, at paras. 30-31; erven v. the queen, [1979] 1 scr 926, at pp. 931-32).1 at the end of the voir dire, the judge would decide whether the applications succeed or fail on their merits, answering the ultimate question, which is “have the applicants met the applicable burden of proof by establishing facts that fulfill each of the legal requirements of the requested remedy?” in the case at bar, the judge would need to 1 to avoid confusion in these reasons i refer to an underlying application as an “application” or as an “underlying application” and to a request for summary dismissal as a “motion”. as well, while the terms “voir dire” and “evidentiary hearing” are often used interchangeably in the jurisprudence, here i use “voir dire” to refer to a separate hearing that occurs within a trial to decide a particular application. i use “evidentiary hearing” to refer to the calling of viva voce evidence during a voir dire. a voir dire may include an evidentiary hearing, but may also proceed only on a written record, or only on counsel’s submissions (r v. kematch, 2010 mbca 18, 251 man. r (2d) 191, at para. 43; see also r v. garnier, 2017 nssc 239, at para. 13 (canlii)). how the voir dire proceeds is a matter within the trial judge’s discretion. decide whether the applicants have met all three parts of the babos test such that stays of proceedings are warranted in the circumstances. [23] this ultimate question was never answered because the crown requested that the judge instead first hold the type of hearing described in the british columbia jurisprudence in r v. vukelich (1996), 78 bcac 113. other provinces have similar procedures under different names. a vukelich hearing occurs before the court hears the merits of the underlying application and is directed to a very different question: should the underlying application be summarily dismissed or should it be allowed to proceed to a voir dire? the appropriate standard to be applied for this preliminary question about summary dismissal lies at the heart of this appeal. [24] in this case, the crown’s basis for requesting summary dismissal at a vukelich hearing was that neither defence application disclosed “a sufficient foundation to establish that an evidentiary hearing is necessary or will assist the court in determining the merits of the application” (ar, vol. xiv, at p 22) even if the allegations were true, the crown contended that either they would not meet the standard for an abuse of process or they would not amount to the clearest of cases justifying the imposition of a stay. f. the vukelich hearing procedure [25] wedge j agreed to conduct the vukelich hearing requested by the crown. the summary dismissal motion was heard over six days and was divided into an open portion and an in camera portion defence counsel made submissions and tendered exhibits for the open portion. only the amici made sealed submissions and filed sealed exhibits during the in camera portion (mr. johnston, mr. haevischer and defence counsel did not, and still do not, have access to the sealed material.) in neither the open nor the in camera portion of the hearing was there the opportunity to adduce viva voce evidence or to cross-examine key witnesses. [26] the written record on the summary dismissal motion was extensive. multiple exhibits were filed for the open portion of the hearing, including various police documents outlining the rcmp investigative strategy for the e-peseta investigation and numerous documents regarding mr. johnston’s and mr. haevischer’s confinement. the sealed exhibits filed for the in camera portion of the hearing were significant and augmented the overall record. [27] while the open record was large, it did not represent the full range of evidence the defence wanted to place before wedge j. defence counsel indicated they wished to elicit additional evidence, should the judge decide to hold a voir dire. they intended to call certain rcmp officers for cross-examination, including those involved in the police misconduct, those who had helped develop the “moving witnesses” strategy, and those involved in decisions to place mr. johnston and mr. haevischer in solitary confinement they also intended to call correctional officers for cross- examination regarding the use of solitary confinement and experts to testify as to the impact of solitary confinement on mr. johnston’s and mr. haevischer’s mental health and physical well-being finally, they intended to tender other documents that they thought would materialize once they received full disclosure. g. the vukelich hearing decision: british columbia supreme court, 2014 bcsc 2172, 321 crr (2d) 192 (open reasons); 2014 bcsc 2194 (sealed reasons) [28] based on this lengthy yet limited written record, wedge j summarily dismissed the underlying stay applications. [29] wedge j stated the test for summary dismissal was whether an evidentiary hearing (ie, a voir dire) would assist in deciding if the alleged abuses could entitle mr. johnston and mr. haevischer to a stay. she referred to r v. wilder, 2004 bcsc 304, and r v. hamill (1984), 14 ccc (3d) 338 (bcca), and concluded that the applications could be summarily dismissed “if . . the grounds advanced by the applicants could not support a stay of proceedings” (para. 9). [30] wedge j considered whether the defence could satisfy the babos test for a stay of proceedings based on an abuse of process. this test requires an applicant to demonstrate (1) that there is “prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that ‘will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome’”; (2) that there is “no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice”; and (3) that, “[w]here there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted after [stages] (1) and (2) . . . the interests in favour of granting a stay [outweigh] ‘the interest that society has in having a final decision on the merits’” (babos, at para. 32, quoting r v. regan, 2002 scc 12, [2002] 1 scr 297, at paras. 54 and 57). [31] at stage one of the babos analysis, wedge j accepted, for the purposes of the vukelich hearing, that certain conduct could amount to an abuse of process and that entering convictions in light of that conduct would be harmful to the integrity of the justice system certain misconduct of the four officers — engaging in exploitative sexual relationships, endangering the safety of protected witnesses, lying to superiors, and manipulating overtime and expense claims — could constitute an abuse of process. however, she rejected the allegation that the “moving witnesses” strategy and the other impugned investigative practices amounted to an abuse of process wedge j also accepted that mr. johnston’s and mr. haevischer’s conditions of confinement violated their ss. 7 and 12 charter rights and could amount to an abuse of process finally, wedge j accepted certain allegations of abuse raised by the amici, but rejected certain inferences they put forward that were favourable to mr. johnston and mr. haevischer. instead, she preferred inferences favourable to the crown’s position. she determined that the materials available on the vukelich hearing did not support the amici’s theory. [32] at stage two of the babos analysis, wedge j accepted, for the purposes of the vukelich hearing, that there were no alternate remedies for the breaches she identified. [33] at stage three of the babos analysis, wedge j determined that this was not one of the “clearest of cases” where a stay was warranted (para. 153). on one side of the scale, the misconduct by the four officers was extremely serious however, the misconduct was not ongoing: the officers were suspended and removed from the investigation. further, the affected female witnesses were not called at trial, tempering the seriousness of the misconduct. though the conditions of confinement amounted to serious, prolonged and systemic misconduct that had an immediate and significant impact on mr. johnston’s and mr. haevischer’s mental and physical health, wedge j. noted that the conditions were not ongoing, and the state conduct had been judicially criticized by mcewan j. she also accorded weight to the misconduct alleged by the amici (though not the inferences that she had rejected). on the other side of the scale, the crimes were incredibly serious: the circumstances of the offences were shocking, there were six victims, and the motivation behind the murders was a desire to demonstrate the red scorpions’ strength, instill fear in rival gangs, and expand the red scorpions’ drug business. both society and the family members of the deceased had an interest in seeing convictions entered for wedge j., these considerations weighed more heavily in the balance. [34] wedge j concluded that, even if the applications were taken at their highest, the grounds advanced could not support a stay of proceedings. as such, an evidentiary hearing (ie, a voir dire) on the merits would not assist the court. for these reasons, she summarily dismissed the applications and ordered the convictions entered. h appeal of the vukelich ruling: british columbia court of appeal, 2021 bcca 34, 487 crr (2d) 48 (tysoe, mackenzie and willcock jja) [35] the court of appeal for british columbia concluded that wedge j should not have summarily dismissed the stay applications at the vukelich hearing. they ought to have been fully addressed and decided at a voir dire on their merits the court allowed the appeals, quashed the convictions, affirmed the verdicts of guilt, and remitted the stay applications to the trial court for a voir dire. [36] the court acknowledged that a judge’s decision on whether to hold a voir dire or evidentiary hearing is discretionary and owed deference nevertheless, wedge j had erred respecting the amici’s sealed submissions by weighing the evidence, drawing inferences and finding facts on an incomplete record. she failed to take the amici’s submissions at their highest and did not assume the truth of the facts alleged. the amici had identified sufficiently reasonable interpretations and plausible inferences such that a full evidentiary hearing was warranted. [37] in addition, wedge j imposed too high a standard to permit an evidentiary hearing. the threshold is meant to be low, and it was met in this case. when the judge found that stages one and two of babos were satisfied, it was clear that the applications were not frivolous however, the judge’s balancing at stage three purported to determine the ultimate issue without all the evidence. [38] in addition, the court admitted some of the fresh evidence that the amici tendered. the court determined that it showed there was conflicting evidence on the facts relevant to the amici’s argument and that it could be open to a judge to make different findings about the extent of the misconduct. [39] as well, the court remarked that, as a matter of law, no category of offence — no matter how serious — can be beyond the ambit of the abuse of process doctrine the court always retains the ability to dissociate itself from misconduct through a stay. iii analysis [40] the key question on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in summarily dismissing the stay applications for abuse of process. answering this question requires this court to determine the appropriate threshold for the summary dismissal of an application in the criminal law context. [41] i begin with a review of the genesis of the vukelich hearing and the values of trial efficiency and trial fairness. i then identify and explain the proper threshold: an application can only be summarily dismissed without a hearing where the application is manifestly frivolous. i also remark on the framework for summary dismissal motions, including who bears the burden of proof and what should be included in the record. [42] in the final section, i apply the “manifestly frivolous” standard to the case at bar like the court of appeal, i find that the applications were not manifestly frivolous and should have been heard and decided on their merits. a. summary dismissal in the criminal law context (1) the genesis of the vukelich hearing [43] the vukelich hearing has its genesis in a 1996 decision which upheld the trial judge’s refusal to hold a voir dire on the constitutionality of a search warrant (vukelich, at para. 8) mceachern cj, writing for the court of appeal for british columbia, relied heavily on the earlier ontario case of r v. kutynec (1992), 70 ccc. (3d) 289 (ca), which acknowledged that a “trial judge can weed out the applications which have no basis in fact or law, and can decide how and when those with potential merit should be resolved” (p 302). mceachern cj also noted that trial judges must “control the course of the proceedings” (para. 26). procedurally, he endorsed a “flexible approach . . . rather than [a] formal procedure” to determine whether or not to embark on a voir dire and how a voir dire should be conducted (para. 23). the same approach had been taken in kutynec. mceachern cj felt that both questions could be answered based on the statements of counsel, possibly supported by an affidavit. [44] because of the nature of the underlying application, mceachern cj did not need to articulate a general standard for when an application in a criminal trial should be summarily dismissed the defence application advanced in vukelich challenged a search warrant and relied upon r v. garofoli, [1990] 2 scr 1421. in garofoli, the court held that successfully challenged portions of an information to obtain (“ito”) are to be excised, after which the trial judge must determine if the remainder of the ito supports the issuance of the warrant. in vukelich, the trial judge applied the garofoli framework to conclude on the face of the record, accepting all of the defence’s allegations as true and excising the impugned information, that there was still sufficient information to issue the warrant given the nature of the defence application and the principles from garofoli, mceachern cj found that holding a voir dire would “not assist the proper trial of the real issues” (para. 26). [45] since 1996, vukelich hearings have been extended well beyond search warrant cases and are frequently used in criminal trials in british columbia. while it is more common for the crown to request a vukelich hearing to summarily dismiss a defence application, the trial judge’s screening function applies equally to crown applications, and defence counsel do sometimes request vukelich hearings (see r v. cody, 2017 scc 31, [2017] 1 scr 659, at para. 38; r v. biring, 2021 bcsc 2678, at para. 5 (canlii); r v. kuntz-angel, 2020 bcsc 1777, at para. 71 (canlii)). (2) underlying values: trial efficiency and trial fairness [46] the standard selected for summary dismissal on a vukelich-type hearing will be based on the two sets of underlying values at play in such proceedings: trial efficiency and trial fairness. these values coexist and “both must be pursued in order for each to be realised: they are, in practice, interdependent” (r v. jordan, 2016 scc 27, [2016] 1 scr 631, at para. 27, quoting bc. justice reform initiative, a criminal justice system for the 21st century (2012), at p 75). (a) trial efficiency [47] in both the civil and criminal contexts, trial judges play a gatekeeping role and can summarily dismiss certain applications without a hearing on the merits. [48] a civil claim will be struck “if it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action” or, alternatively phrased, if the claim has no reasonable prospect of success (r v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2011 scc 42, [2011] 3 scr 45, at para. 17). striking such claims “unclutters the proceedings”, “promotes litigation efficiency, reducing time and cost”, and allows litigants to focus on serious claims (paras. 19-20). relatedly, the civil rules for summary judgment, which is generally available when there is no genuine issue for trial, are “interpreted broadly, favouring proportionality and fair access to the affordable, timely and just adjudication of claims” (hryniak v. mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 scr 87, at para. 5; see also para. 34). [49] the same purposes are important in the criminal context, where the need for efficient trials to reduce undue delay is manifest (see r v. glegg, 2021 onca 100, 400 ccc (3d) 276, at para. 36; jordan, at paras. 114 and 139; cody, at paras. 36-39). dismissing unmeritorious applications made in the criminal law context helps ensure that trials occur within a reasonable time, which is an “essential part of our criminal justice system’s commitment to treating presumptively innocent accused persons in a manner that protects their interests in liberty, security of the person, and a fair trial” (jordan, at para. 20) “timely trials impact other people who play a role in and are affected by criminal trials, as well as the public’s confidence in the administration of justice” (para. 22). [50] indeed, the time limits set in jordan for the completion of most criminal trials should encourage those bringing underlying applications or seeking their summary dismissal to carefully consider whether such steps are necessary and to assess their impact on the trial timelines. all participants in the criminal justice system share a responsibility to take a “proactive approach . . . that prevents unnecessary delay by targeting its root causes” (cody, at para. 36, citing jordan, at para. 137). according a high degree of deference to summary dismissal decisions encourages trial judges to take on that responsibility and to exercise this discretionary power where appropriate (see r v. samaniego, 2022 scc 9, at para. 25; r v. edwardsen, 2019 bcca 259, at para. 75 (canlii); r v. orr, 2021 bcca 42, 399 ccc (3d) 441, at paras. 53-54). [51] the allure of efficiency is not, however, to advance simplicity or speed as ends in themselves. complexity in criminal trials is sometimes unavoidable, and the goal is to avoid disproportionate or undue delay, which impairs the interests of justice (see jordan, at para. 43). trials, and the applications taken in respect of them, should take a proportionate amount of time. what is required to fairly and justly address any particular application will depend on the nature of the application and the context of the broader trial. trial judges should guard against any “procedural step or motion that is improperly taken, or takes longer than it should” as they would “depriv[e] other worthy litigants of timely access to the courts” (para. 43). those steps do not increase the quality of justice in that particular trial similarly, trial judges should scrutinize decisions taken in the name of efficiency to ensure they actually save court time and judicial resources anticipated savings should be both real and required this is an important factor when considering protracted and merits-oriented summary dismissal motions, which often create other forms of costs and delays (in the civil context, see hryniak, at para. 6). [52] unfortunately, a review of the jurisprudence reveals that, as vukelich hearings proliferated, becoming almost routine, their animating goal of increasing trial efficiency has not been realized in practice in many cases, they are unnecessarily lengthy and veer towards the merits of the underlying application. a vukelich hearing “insisted upon by the crown” may devolve into a “protracted pre-hearing examination of the minutiae of the accused’s application” and result in the repetition of arguments on the ultimate voir dire (r v. tse, 2008 bcsc 867, at para. 21 (canlii); see also para. 23). in the result, the hearing “consumes, unnecessarily, the very scarce resources that the hearing itself was designed to avoid wasting” (r v. ali-kashani, 2017 bcpc 358, at para. 52 (canlii)). [53] that vukelich’s initial goal has not always materialized is exemplified by the case at bar. here, the six-day vukelich hearing involved extensive submissions by counsel, substantial evidence, and a deep dive into the merits of the stay applications. it led to a lengthy appeal which will result in repetition of the very same arguments when the applications are ultimately heard on their merits. [54] clearly, it cannot simply be assumed that summary dismissal is a surefire way to increase efficiency. to be practical and take proportionality into account, judges should identify and weigh the full impact of the various procedural options the resources that may be notionally saved by not hearing the main underlying application are simply a part of the picture judges must also factor in their extensive case management powers, which allow them to control the trial and the process and procedure of the underlying application these powers go a long way towards tempering legitimate concerns over prolix trials, fishing expeditions, disproportionate processes and undue delay. they are not a full answer, but they play an important role because they encourage the tailoring of proportionate proceedings. (b) trial fairness [55] however pressing the goal of trial efficiency, summary dismissal also raises concerns about fairness because it runs counter to the notion that parties should have the opportunity to present their cases and to have their evidence, claims and allegations adjudicated on their merits. in civil cases, there is a reluctance to drive the plaintiff from the judgment seat at an early stage of the proceedings because of the potential prejudice which may result from the premature dismissal of the claim — especially when the claim is novel or close to the line. [56] in criminal cases, trial fairness is more than a policy goal: it is a constitutional imperative. a criminal trial involves allegations made by the state against an accused whose liberty is often at stake the summary dismissal of criminal applications can curtail the accused’s right to full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial protected by ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter by stopping the accused from fully making arguments and eliciting evidence on their application (see dersch v. canada (attorney general), [1990] 2 scr 1505; r v. rose, [1998] 3 scr 262). there are, of course, limits to these rights for example, accused persons are not entitled to a voir dire and, if a voir dire is granted, are not entitled to whatever style of voir dire they would prefer (vukelich, at para. 26). the trial judge decides if and how the voir dire proceeds and whether it should include an evidentiary hearing. nevertheless, summary dismissal of applications made in the criminal law context implicates and, in certain circumstances, can curtail the accused’s rights. [57] due to this constitutional dimension, the civil rules and thresholds may provide limited guidance, but they cannot simply be adopted or transposed into the criminal domain in this area of public law, the accused’s charter rights must be accounted for, particularly when the underlying application is brought by the defence in pursuit of fair trial rights. additionally, the discrete realities of criminal trials must be respected this includes an appreciation of the vast nature, breadth, scope and variety of possible applications made in the criminal law context — issues which go well beyond those raised by civil statements of claim. in the criminal context, certain applications are governed by a separate body of criminal procedure, legislated processes and statutory standards, and others are governed by long-standing case law. the distinctive features of the criminal context bear both upon the appropriate standard for summary dismissal and how it ought to be applied in individual cases. [58] concerns about trial fairness can arise in numerous ways. setting too lax a standard for summary dismissal risks the dismissal, based on a limited or incomplete record, of applications that might have proved successful after a full hearing on the merits this risk becomes particularly salient where a party puts forward novel arguments which may carry significant precedential value and allow the law to develop. as recognized in the civil context, “[t]he approach must be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to proceed” (imperial tobacco, at para. 21). this concern applies with equal force in criminal cases: courts have acknowledged the risk of stifling novel claims, given that “the contours of constitutional rights are settled through the litigation of emerging, unresolved and contentious issues” (r v. mcdonald, 2013 bcsc 314, at para. 44 (canlii); teal cedar products ltd v. rainforest flying squad, 2022 bcsc 429, at paras. 14-15 (canlii)) certain interveners pointed out that a novel application might require full evidentiary exploration for the issues to properly emerge. i agree. [59] these concerns inform and align with existing jurisprudence, which recognizes that trial fairness requires a low threshold for holding a voir dire, such that most applications are heard on their merits (see r v. frederickson, 2018 bcca 2, at para. 33 (canlii)) indeed, the parties before this court generally all agree that it should not be difficult for an accused’s application to proceed to a voir dire, though they disagree on the exact standard to be applied. (c) the values of trial efficiency and trial fairness support a rigorous threshold for summary dismissal in the criminal context [60] the underlying values of trial fairness and trial efficiency mandate the conclusion that a rigorous threshold should be applied to summary dismissal motions in criminal trials a summary procedure is, as its name suggests, intended to be summary: preliminary, brief, and more in the nature of an overview than a deep dive. summary dismissal is built upon allegations and supported by the artifice of assuming that the facts asserted are true. by contrast, a hearing on the merits involves a final determination of the facts, and of whether, after a full review, the proven facts support the allegations and ground the requested remedy. [61] a rigorous threshold is also supported by the particular characteristics of criminal trials, including how the trial judge’s broad case management powers can help ensure the efficient, effective and proportionate use of court resources as well as the accused’s fair trial rights. judges perform a gatekeeping function, and the goal is that only those applications that should be caught by the summary dismissal power are in fact summarily dismissed. trial judges should therefore err on the side of caution when asked to summarily dismiss an application made in the criminal law context. this is especially so in light of the deferential standard of review applied on appeal to a judge’s case management decisions (samaniego, at para. 25; edwardsen, at para. 75) the threshold and standard selected for summary dismissal must respect this court’s observation (in the context of jury selection) that “occasional injustice cannot be accepted as the price of efficiency” (r v. find, 2001 scc 32, [2001] 1 scr 863, at para. 28). b. the “manifestly frivolous” threshold for summary dismissal [62] i turn now to the question at the heart of this appeal: what is the threshold for the summary dismissal of applications made in the criminal law context? i briefly review the uncertainty in the existing jurisprudence i then identify the correct threshold, which is whether the underlying application is manifestly frivolous, and explain why this threshold promotes both trial efficiency and trial fairness i also outline why other proposed thresholds are less suited to summary dismissal motions and provide some guidance about how the “manifestly frivolous” standard is to be applied, who bears the burden on the summary dismissal motion, and what type of record should be filed i conclude with a summary of the applicable framework for summary dismissal motions. (1) review of the jurisprudence [63] the threshold test “has been expressed in different ways at different times” (mcdonald, at para. 18) it has been variably described as having no reasonable prospect of success (cody, at para. 38); being frivolous or manifestly frivolous (jordan, at para. 63; cody, at para. 38; accurso v. r., 2022 qcca 752, at paras. 323 and 329 (canlii); brûlé v. r., 2021 qcca 1334, at para. 31 (canlii)); having no basis upon which it could succeed (cody, at para. 38); having no reasonable likelihood that the voir dire will assist (r v. pires, 2005 scc 66, [2005] 3 scr 343, at para. 35); being doomed to failure (r v. armstrong, 2012 bcca 242, 350 dlr (4th) 457, at para. 38; r v. omar, 2007 onca 117, 84 or (3d) 493, at para. 31; r v. cobb, 2021 qccq 546, at paras. 7 and 157 (canlii); r v gill, 2018 bcsc 661 (“gill (bcsc)”), at para. 36 (canlii)); being unmeritorious on its face (cobb, at para. 7); not being grounded in any facts that have a reasonable likelihood of ultimately supporting a remedy (gill (bcsc), at para. 36); having no basis in fact or law (kutynec, at p 302); having no foundation in the evidence (omar, at para. 31); being completely devoid of merit (r v. sandhu, 2021 mbqb 22, at para. 23 (canlii)); or being [translation] “manifestly unfounded and frivolous” (valcourt v r., 2019 qcca 903, at para. 6 (canlii)). indeed, some cases refer to multiple combinations of these words or phrases (see, eg,. cobb, at para. 7; gill (bcsc), at para. 36; omar, at para. 31). [64] as is apparent from the citations above, this uncertainty is not limited to british columbia provinces and territories across the country have relied on a combination of cases, including vukelich, kutynec and cody, as authority for the trial judge’s power to summarily dismiss applications (see, eg,. r v. rv, 2022 abca 218, at paras. 63-64 (canlii); r v. wesaquate, 2022 skca 101, 418 ccc (3d) 225, at para. 93; r v. giesbrecht, 2019 mbca 35, [2019] 7 wwr 280, at paras. 134-36; r. v. greer, 2020 onca 795, 397 ccc (3d) 40 (“greer (onca)”), at paras. 108, 111 and 113; accurso, at paras. 311-12; r v. emery martin, 2021 nbqb 67, at para. 14 (canlii); carver v. r., 2021 pesc 40, at para. 16 (canlii); r v. greenwood, 2022 nsca 53, 415 ccc (3d) 89, at paras. 147-48; r v lehr, 2018 nlsc 249, 426 crr (2d) 1, at paras. 14-18; r v. smith, 2021 yktc 60, at paras. 5 and 13 (canlii); r v. denechezhe, 2021 yktc 18, at para. 82 (canlii)). [65] while the various formulations all seek to avoid unnecessary and wasteful voir dires, mr. johnston was correct when he argued that rearticulating a standard using different words and phrases creates confusion and generates uncertainty. the existing jurisprudence is thus unsettled and demonstrates that this court needs to provide clarity on the proper threshold to be applied to the summary dismissal of applications made in the criminal law context. this is a question of first instance, and the court is now called upon to establish the correct threshold based on first principles. (2) the “manifestly frivolous” threshold [66] i conclude that the appropriate standard for summary dismissal is whether the underlying application is manifestly frivolous. this standard draws on the case law concerning frivolous applications, as advanced by some parties and interveners, including mr. johnston, mr. haevischer, the independent criminal defence advocacy society, the canadian civil liberties association, and the trial lawyers association of british columbia however, it also requires that the flaws in the application are manifestly apparent. [67] the “frivolous” part of the standard weeds out those applications that will necessarily fail. this court has previously stated that the “‘not frivolous’ test is widely recognized as being a very low bar” (r v. oland, 2017 scc 17, [2017] 1 scr 250, at para. 20) having reviewed the case law on the “not frivolous” threshold, inevitability or necessity of failure is the key characteristic of a “frivolous” application. in relation to the case law on applications for bail pending appeal of a conviction under s 679(3) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, see r v. passey (1997), 56 alta. lr (3d) 317 (ca), at paras. 6-8; r v. effert, 2006 abca 352, at paras. 5-6 (canlii); r v. greer, 2021 bcca 148, at para. 36 (canlii); r v. mian (1996), 148 nsr (2d) 155 (ca), at para. 9; r v manasseri, 2013 onca 647, 312 ccc (3d) 132, at para. 38; r v gill, 2016 bcca 355, 1 mvr (7th) 245, at para. 17; r v hanna (1991), 3 bcac 57, at para. 6; r v. drouin, 1994 canlii 4621 (sask. ca), at p 2; cf. r v. perrier, 2009 nlca 61, 293 nfld. & peir 92, at para. 24. in relation to s 685(1) applications for summary dismissal of appeals where the court of appeal determines that the legal grounds for the appeal are frivolous or vexatious, see r v. beseiso, 2020 onca 686, at para. 7 (canlii); r v mehedi, 2019 onca 387, at para. 6 (canlii). finally, in relation to s 320.25 applications for a stay of a driving prohibition pending appeal, see r v. mcpherson, 1999 bcca 638, 140 ccc (3d) 316, at para. 5. [68] aside from the inevitability or necessity of failure, the “frivolous” standard has captured a compendium of other phrases. it is because it will necessarily fail that a frivolous application has also been described as “not arguable” and as “having no basis upon which it could succeed”. similarly, saying an application is “doomed to failure” connotes inevitability and is just another way of saying an application is “frivolous” (see, eg,. armstrong, at para. 38; omar, at para. 31; cobb, at para. 7). [69] however, i add the word “manifestly” to capture the idea that the frivolous nature of the application should be obvious. “manifestly” is defined as “as is manifest; evidently, unmistakably, openly”, and “manifest” is defined as “[c]learly revealed to the eye, mind, or judgement; open to view or comprehension; obvious” (oxford english dictionary (online)). just like the civil standard for striking a claim requires that it be “plain and obvious” that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action (or, in french, “évident et manifeste”), the addition of the word “manifestly” adds another layer to the “frivolous” standard and helpfully indicates that a summary dismissal motion should be based on that which is clearly revealed. [70] the “manifestly frivolous” standard has been used recently by the quebec court of appeal, including in the context of the proposed summary dismissal of a stay application (accurso, at paras. 323 and 329; brûlé, at para. 31; see also ouellet v. r., 2021 qcca 386, 70 cr (7th) 279, at para. 12, fn. 3, referring to an application being [translation] “frivolous on its face”). in applying this standard, the court of appeal has called for judges to exercise caution before summarily dismissing an application because such dismissal deprives the applicant (often the accused) of a hearing on the merits (accurso, at paras. 314-15, citing brûlé, at para. 31) in summary dismissal motions, rather than requiring that the accused prove the existence of the charter violation on an underlying charter application, the court of appeal has required only that the accused demonstrate that it is conceivable that the claim could be allowed (accurso, at para. 323). [71] thus, the “manifestly frivolous” standard, which connotes the obvious necessity of failure, is the appropriate threshold for the summary dismissal of applications made in the criminal law context. if the frivolous nature of the application is not manifest or obvious on the face of the record, then the application should not be summarily dismissed and should instead be addressed on its merits. [72] this standard best serves both the values of trial efficiency and trial fairness. it is a rigorous standard that will allow judges to weed out those applications that would never succeed and which would, by definition, waste court time. the blunt tool of summary dismissal, which precludes the applicant from proceeding, is not the only way judges can protect efficiency the judge’s panoply of case management powers allows for tailored proceedings and mitigates concerns that “fishing expeditions” may derail a trial’s progress, generate undue delay, or result in the disproportionate use of court time. [73] the “manifestly frivolous” threshold also protects fair trial rights by ensuring that those applications which might succeed, including novel claims, are decided on their merits protecting fair trial rights is always important, but takes on added significance when the application in question carries great consequences. generally speaking, the greater the consequences associated with a given application, the greater the possible impact on an accused’s rights if the application is summarily dismissed. certain applications carry more significant consequences simply because of their nature and the issues they raise for example, applications for a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process are of enormous import for an accused and the public. they often involve serious allegations of egregious state misconduct and always call for serious consequences, namely, a permanent halting of the prosecution (babos, at paras. 30, 35 and 37; canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. tobiass, [1997] 3 scr 391, at para. 91) similarly, an underlying application might allege breaches of an accused’s charter rights, such that its summary dismissal prevents the accused from litigating those rights in the course of trial. (3) other standards proposed by the parties [74] the alternative standards proposed by some of the parties and interveners are not as well suited to the task as the “manifestly frivolous” threshold. [75] the crown and others proposed the “no reasonable prospect of success” threshold based on their reading of cody in cody, this court used the phrases “reasonable prospect of success”, “no basis upon which the application could succeed”, and “frivolous” in connection with summary dismissal motions (para. 38). in this case, the court of appeal for british columbia stated that this court “has articulated this standard as requiring an application to have a ‘reasonable prospect’ of success or of assisting in determining the issues before the court” (para. 373). other courts have also relied on cody as authority for the threshold for summary dismissal, citing to one or more of the three phrases used (see, eg,. lehr, at para. 17; hu v. r., 2022 qccs 2871, at para. 13 (canlii); greer (onca), at para. 108; r v. morin, 2022 skca 46, [2022] 7 wwr 443, at para. 23; r v. walton, 2019 onsc 928, at para. 47 (canlii)). [76] however, cody did not decide the threshold to be applied generally to the summary dismissal of applications made in the criminal law context. cody was not a case on summary dismissal, but rather a case on unreasonable delay violating s 11(b) of the charter. cody affirmed the framework set out in jordan and echoed jordan’s call for trial judges to use their case management powers to minimize delay in this latter respect, cody remarked, as an example, that trial judges should exercise these powers to summarily dismiss applications. cody did not closely examine and establish the proper standard under which that power should be exercised and should not be read to establish any authoritative statements in this regard. [77] further, the “no reasonable prospect of success” standard is ill suited to summary dismissal in the criminal context as it may invite an assessment of the merits of the underlying application a detailed assessment goes beyond the scope of a summary dismissal motion and invites the sort of protracted proceedings that currently plague vukelich hearings. it risks drawing the summary dismissal judge in too deeply on a limited record. while it is a useful standard in other areas of law, it tends to work against efficiency when used for summary dismissal in the criminal context the assessment of the merits of the underlying application ought to be reserved for the final part of the decision-making process: that is, when answering the ultimate question on the voir dire itself. [78] alternatively, others before this court invoked pires to argue that trial judges should decline to embark on an evidentiary hearing if the petitioning party “is unable to show a reasonable likelihood that the hearing can assist in determining the issues before the court” (para. 35); this is sometimes referred to as the “no reasonable likelihood of assistance” standard however, by commenting on the need for trial judges to control prolix proceedings, the court in that case also did not purport to decide the threshold for summary dismissal motions. rather, pires dealt with a challenge to a search warrant and affirmed the requirement from garofoli that the defence must show a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination of the affiant will assist in determining the relevant issues (paras. 3 and 40). [79] the “no reasonable likelihood of assistance” standard suffers from the same flaw of being merits-based. in addition, its focus is on procedure (how to decide the underlying application) rather than substance (namely, whether the application is somehow flawed and ought to be summarily dismissed) thus, while this may be a helpful consideration when deciding how a voir dire should be conducted, it should not be used in summary dismissal motions to determine whether an underlying application should proceed to a voir dire. [80] the “manifestly frivolous” standard is intended to be a clear standard to be applied to summary dismissal motions brought in the criminal law context that are not otherwise subject to a legislated or judicial threshold. it does not, for example, have an impact on applications brought under criminal code provisions such as s 685(1) applications concerning frivolous appeals or s 679 applications for bail pending an appeal (including oland). nor does this standard eclipse the bodies of law that have developed around particular types of applications, such as garofoli and pires applications to challenge the lawfulness of a search warrant. (4) applying the “manifestly frivolous” standard [81] having established what the threshold should be, i now provide guidance on how the “manifestly frivolous” threshold should be applied. i explain how judges should treat the facts and inferences alleged in the underlying application and how to identify when the application is manifestly frivolous. [82] the crown argued that trial judges should be allowed to engage in a limited assessment or weighing of the proposed evidence and should be permitted to reject facts or inferences for which there is no reasonable basis in the facts alleged by the applicant. the crown’s approach invites an assessment of the merits and is thus out of step with the “manifestly frivolous” threshold it runs contrary to the established proposition that the facts must generally be assumed true, not accepted as true after a limited weighing. the judge should not engage in a limited weighing of the evidence to ascertain if it is reasonably capable of supporting an inference, nor should the judge decide which among competing inferences they prefer. any such weighing should be left to the voir dire proper. [83] on the summary dismissal motion, the judge must assume the facts alleged by the applicant to be true and must take the applicant’s arguments at their highest (vukelich, at para. 26; armstrong, at para. 8; gill (bcsc), at para. 24). while there is no need to weigh the evidence or decide any facts on the summary dismissal motion, the applicant’s underlying application should explain its factual foundation and point towards anticipated evidence that could establish their alleged facts where the applicant cannot point towards any anticipated evidence that could establish a necessary fact, the judge can reject the factual allegation as manifestly frivolous. [84] likewise, the judge ought to generally assume the inferences suggested by the applicant are true, even if competing inferences are proffered. the judge should only reject an inference if it is manifestly frivolous, meaning that there is no reasoning path to the proposed inference this might be the case where a necessary fact underpinning the inference is not alleged or if the inference cannot be drawn as a matter of law (eg, if the proposed inference is based on impermissible reasoning). [85] a similar approach is taken to the overall application. because the truth of the facts alleged is assumed, an application will only be manifestly frivolous where there is a fundamental flaw in the application’s legal pathway: the remedy cannot be reached. for example, an application may be manifestly frivolous because the judge has no jurisdiction to grant the requested remedy (see, eg,. lehr, at paras. 27-32). alternatively, the application could put forward a legal argument that has already been rejected: applications that depend on legal propositions that are clearly at odds with settled and unchallenged law are manifestly frivolous (see, eg,. lehr, at paras. 22-23). [86] an application may also be manifestly frivolous where the remedy sought could never issue on the facts of the particular application. the nature of the application will be relevant to this analysis. on certain applications, the trial judge may be able to assume the facts put forward by the applicant and, assuming those facts, determine whether the remedy sought could issue. garofoli applications, where trial judges ask if the ito could still support the issuance of the search warrant even if the challenged portions of the ito are excised, make the point where the ito still supports the issuance of the warrant, then the application can be summarily dismissed because, even if the defence could prove that the impugned portions of the ito ought to be struck, the sought-after remedy (the exclusion of evidence obtained under the warrant) would not follow. [87] alternatively, key portions of the application could be missing for example, the application may fail to set out a conclusion that is necessary to satisfy the relevant legal test. specifically, an application for a stay for abuse of process must fail if the applicant accepts that an alternative remedy is capable of redressing the prejudice. key factual allegations might also be missing. for instance, an application for a stay for abuse of process must fail if the applicant has not alleged any abusive conduct. [88] these fundamental flaws ought to be manifest. if the error is not apparent on the face of the record, the application should proceed. [89] finally, the trial judge’s power to summarily dismiss an application is ongoing. even if the judge permits the application to proceed to a voir dire, the judge retains the ability to summarily dismiss the application during the voir dire if and when it becomes apparent that the application is manifestly frivolous (cody, at para. 38, citing jordan, at para. 63) this may occur if the applicant is unable to elicit any evidence, contested or otherwise, to prove a necessary fact. (5) the burden rests on the party seeking summary dismissal [90] on a motion for summary dismissal, the party moving for summary dismissal bears the burden of convincing the judge that the underlying application is manifestly frivolous. [91] some argued that the burden should be placed on the party bringing the underlying application because there is no automatic entitlement to a voir dire (vukelich, at para. 26) however, placing the onus on the party who moves for summary dismissal is logical, practical and preferable. logically, the party who seeks summary dismissal should bear the onus of demonstrating that this remedy ought to be granted practically, the burden may discourage the moving party from applying to summarily dismiss every single application brought in a case, whether manifestly frivolous or not. such tactical behaviour is highly inefficient and wastes court time. [92] if, without a motion from a party, a trial judge exercises the case management power to hold a summary dismissal hearing, the burden still rests on the party opposing the underlying application (ie, the party who would benefit from the application’s summary dismissal) if the party demonstrates that the application is manifestly frivolous, the judge can summarily dismiss the application. (6) minimal record on summary dismissal motions [93] the record on a summary dismissal motion should normally be minimal and of a summary nature because extensive evidence often demands the type of time, effort and delay which works to defeat the very purpose of the motion while both parties are expected to put their best foot forward, there is no need to set firm rules about what type of record ought to be filed (see glegg, at para. 37; giesbrecht, at para. 158). given the different rules of procedure that apply across the provinces and territories, and given that a trial judge has discretion to determine how an application should unfold, the approach to a summary dismissal hearing should involve “a flexible rather than a fixed process” (vukelich, at para. 19; see also kutynec, at pp. 293-94 and 299). [94] as a preliminary matter, the party filing the underlying application must ensure that their application complies with the local court rules and the applicable practices, directives and procedures. some jurisdictions have developed particular rules and approaches to control which applications should be heard in a voir dire. ontario incorporated the power to summarily dismiss an application into its rules of criminal procedure (see glegg, at para. 34; criminal proceedings rules for the superior court of justice (ontario), si/2012-7, r 3402). alberta requires all charter applications to be accompanied by sufficient particulars (see r v. dwernychuk (1992), 135 ar 31 (ca), at paras. 12 and 21; r v. baker, 2004 abpc 218, 47 alta. lr (4th) 152, at para. 11; court of king’s bench of alberta criminal procedure rules, si/2017-76, r 14). the crown in alberta would often seek further particulars to better understand the defence’s application before motioning for its summary dismissal. [95] material filed on the underlying application, as well as the motion for summary dismissal, will of course form part of the record. the moving party should clearly explain how the underlying application is manifestly frivolous it is not sufficient to simply advance conclusory statements that the underlying application will not, on the ultimate analysis, result in the remedy — that line of argument inappropriately focuses on the final merits of the underlying application and not on whether it is manifestly frivolous. [96] in accordance with the principle that an application should only be dismissed if it is manifestly frivolous, any additional material that is filed as part of the record on a summary dismissal motion should be minimal and necessary. this will help avoid the issue of delay and inefficiency that has, to date, plagued vukelich hearings. it should not take extensive and detailed contested evidence to ascertain whether the application will necessarily fail. counsel should, at minimum, offer particulars as to (1) what legal principles, charter provisions, or statutory provisions are being relied on and how those principles or provisions have been infringed; (2) the (anticipated) evidence to be relied on and how it may be adduced; (3) the proposed argument; and (4) the remedy requested (baker, at para. 11; dwernychuk, at paras. 21-22). [97] on a summary dismissal motion, the party who has brought the underlying application bears the minimal burden of providing the judge with the specifics outlined above through oral or written submissions. while the overall burden rests on the party seeking summary dismissal, the applicant is the one with knowledge of what remedy they seek, so they should set out, with sufficient detail, what they hope to prove on the application in order to obtain that remedy depending on local filing requirements, much of this information may already be set out in a notice of application and supporting materials. counsel’s submissions will be a “useful first step” to supplement that information (vukelich, at para. 23) additionally, it is worth recalling that it is within the trial judge’s case management powers to make inquiries of the applicant to draw out these particulars before proceeding to a voir dire (r v. felderhof (2003), 68 or (3d) 481 (ca), at para. 57). [98] while counsel’s statements will often be sufficient, sometimes more might be required. i leave it to the discretion of the judge deciding the summary dismissal motion to determine whether something more is required and, if so, what that something more should be. deciding how the summary dismissal motion proceeds is within the judge’s case management powers. however, the judge should bear in mind that the more material filed, the greater the risk of delay, the greater the risk that the summary dismissal hearing devolves into a scrum over the merits of the underlying application and the greater the risk that the judge inadvertently decides the merits of the application itself (gill (bcsc), at para. 24). c. summary and framework for summary dismissal [99] while the “manifestly frivolous” standard sits at the core, the overall framework for summary dismissal requires a flexible approach to permit jurisdictional variance around the rules of criminal procedure and to foster a principled and practical approach. [100] in the normal course of a criminal trial one party files an underlying application — which can take many forms and cover myriad topics — and the party opposite may counter with a motion to dismiss that underlying application. this creates a two-part framework under which judges are asked to (1) address the summary dismissal motion; and, if refused, (2) decide the underlying application on its merits. [101] the two parts involve different questions, with distinct considerations and their own legal standards. during the first part, when deciding the summary dismissal motion, the question is whether, taking the facts and inferences alleged to be true, the party seeking summary dismissal has demonstrated that the underlying application is manifestly frivolous. if the matter proceeds to a voir dire, then, during the second part, at the conclusion of the voir dire, judges must decide the ultimate question of whether the underlying application succeeds or fails on its merits: has the applicant met the applicable burden of proof and established the facts necessary to fulfill the legal requirements underlying the requested remedy for the particular application at issue? [102] these parts are, however, related by more than sequence because, throughout, judges will need to consider how to exercise their discretion and case management powers to ensure justice is done in the circumstances. judges control their courtrooms and are not required to hear all motions or hold particular types of hearings. judges may, for example, direct how motions or the voir dire will be heard, especially whether to do so on the basis of testimony or some other form; direct the order in which evidence is called; restrict cross-examination that is unduly repetitive, rambling, argumentative, misleading or irrelevant; place reasonable limits on oral submissions; direct written submissions; and defer rulings (samaniego, at para. 22; felderhof, at para. 57). case management powers also include the ability to revisit prior evidentiary determinations or to allow new applications mid-trial if doing so would be in the interests of justice (r v jj, 2022 scc 28, at para. 86) a motion by counsel for directions also calls for an exercise of case management powers (jj, at paras. 103-5). [103] quite apart from the separate legal standards applied at the two parts of this process, judges will need to turn their minds to whether they will entertain a summary dismissal motion at all; how that summary dismissal motion should be heard; and how any eventual voir dire will be conducted. these are discretionary decisions taken under judges’ case management powers. [104] in exercising their discretion concerning whether to hear the summary dismissal motion, judges must consider the context and consequences associated with the underlying application, including whether it is amenable to summary disposition and how the applicant’s fair trial rights will be affected by a summary dismissal hearing additionally, judges must consider whether holding a summary dismissal hearing will be an effective use of court time or if it will actually create delay. where, for example, the summary hearing would take almost as long as a voir dire on the underlying application, consideration needs to be given to whether fairness, efficiency and respect for the administration of justice more strongly support using the time to deal with the merits of the underlying application rather than devoting resources to matters preliminary to it. in terms of pure efficiency, judges could not be faulted for proceeding directly to a voir dire when it would take the same time to hear the application on its merits as to conduct a summary dismissal hearing judges should only conduct a vukelich-type hearing where doing so best ensures a proportionate process: one which respects the applicant’s right to be heard, serves the goal of trial fairness, actually saves resources, and avoids undue delay. [105] if judges decide to hear the summary dismissal motion, they must also decide how to hear it. judges must ensure the summary dismissal motion proceeds in a fair and proportionate manner. [106] if summary dismissal is refused, judges will also be called upon to determine how the voir dire on the underlying application should be conducted, including whether there should be an evidentiary hearing or whether the matter can proceed solely on the basis of argument, an agreed statement of facts or some combination of methods. allowing an application to proceed to a voir dire is not a free licence to counsel to argue an application however they choose. the time and leeway given to counsel to present and argue the application should be proportionate: just enough to ensure that the application is fairly treated beyond that point, additional time and leeway can cause undue delay. [107] exercising these case management powers not only calls for proportionate proceedings which balance trial efficiency and trial fairness, but may require a comparative assessment of what approach best meets the exigencies and equities of a particular case. judges should bear in mind that the summary dismissal power is not their only tool to manage the underlying application and consider whether their other case management powers are better suited to managing the underlying application (samaniego; cody, at para. 38). the values of trial efficiency and trial fairness may be better served by holding a voir dire on the underlying application that is tailored through the use of judicial discretion to only what is necessary for a fair consideration of the substance of the allegations when judges exercise their case management powers in this way, they fulfill the underlying purposes of case management powers: ensuring that trials proceed in a fair, effective and efficient manner (samaniego, at para. 21). iv application to this case [108] bearing this framework in mind, the judge erred in summarily dismissing mr. johnston’s and mr. haevischer’s applications for a stay based on abuse of process. first, the judge failed to assume the truth of the facts and inferences alleged by defence counsel and the amici. second, the judge applied an insufficiently rigorous threshold for summary dismissal, which led her to engage in the balancing stage of babos without the benefit of all the evidence on the scope of the state misconduct and to decide the merits of the stay applications on a partial record. a failure to assume the truth of the alleged facts [109] the judge correctly identified that she had to accept the facts alleged by the applicants as true. however, in practice, she failed to assume the truth of the alleged facts and inferences, and in doing so, failed to take the allegations at their highest. [110] most notably, and as found by the court of appeal, the judge erred in her sealed reasons by weighing the evidence, drawing inferences and finding facts the judge erred by accepting the crown’s argument that the filed materials did not support the amici’s theory and, thus, she failed to take the amici’s argument at its highest. the judge should have assumed that the facts alleged by the amici were true and should not have rejected the amici’s inferences at this stage, given that the inferences were not manifestly frivolous. [111] i also find that the judge erred in the open ruling by failing to take the alleged facts and inferences as true in three instances. [112] first, the judge failed to accept the allegation that the “moving witnesses” strategy encompassed the abusive conditions of confinement. she acknowledged the defence allegation that the “moving witnesses” strategy “included isolating the accused by directing their conditions of confinement so as to make them particularly vulnerable” (trial judgment, at para. 35; see also paras. 58 and 113). while the judge accepted the factual allegations respecting the custodial conditions and the allegation that the conditions were directed by the rcmp, it does not appear that she accepted the connection alleged between the “moving witnesses” strategy and the conditions of confinement this is evident insofar as the judge rejected the allegation that the “moving witnesses” strategy was itself abusive. if the judge had accepted the alleged connection between the abusive conditions of confinement and the “moving witnesses” strategy, then she would have accepted the inference that the “moving witnesses” strategy was itself abusive. on the face of the record, this inference was not manifestly frivolous. the judge erred by not accepting these allegations and inferences and failed to take mr. johnston’s and mr. haevischer’s cases at their highest. [113] second, the judge did not accept the allegation that there was an intentional connection between the “moving witnesses” strategy and the misconduct of the four officers. she accepted that the effect of the strategy “was to encourage an ‘anything goes’ attitude on [the four officers’] part” (para. 124). defence counsel’s arguments went beyond that during submissions, mr. johnston’s counsel clarified that they wished to cross-examine s/sgt. attew and the supervising superintendent to help the court understand “how that strategy came to be, how it was formulated, and by whom, and to what degree it influenced the conduct of these officers” (ar, vol. xv, at p 263) the allegation was that the strategy explicitly or implicitly permitted the misconduct; the corresponding inference is that the strategy was itself abusive for example, the applications raised the possibility that the strategy was created with the intention that the officers move loyalties by engaging in sexual conduct with protected witnesses as pointed out by mr. johnston’s counsel in his notice of application, a document summarizing the strategy makes note of the fact that “girlfriends” might be vulnerable and discusses “creating events” in the targeted witnesses’ worlds, including “infidelity” (ar, vol. xiv, at pp. 14 and 31-32) the judge failed to take the applications at their highest by finding that the “moving witnesses” strategy merely encouraged the officer misconduct. [114] third, and finally, the judge found that other instances of police misconduct alleged by mr. johnston and mr. haevischer did not amount to an abuse of process under stage one of the babos test. while the judge may have assumed as a fact that these investigative practices occurred, she went on to make a finding that police handling of certain funds, witnesses, agents, informers and evidence could not amount to an abuse of process at stage one of babos. taking the arguments at their highest, i conclude that the allegation that these practices amounted to an abuse of process was not manifestly frivolous: there was no fundamental flaw in the allegation. b application of an insufficiently rigorous threshold [115] the judge erred in law by applying an incorrect threshold for summary dismissal. though the judge did not have the benefit of these reasons setting out the “manifestly frivolous” threshold, she correctly noted that the overarching question was whether the stay applications should proceed to a hearing on their merits. however, in her analysis, she applied a more merits-based threshold for summary dismissal which was not sufficiently rigorous. [116] an application might be manifestly frivolous at stage one or stage two of babos. however, that was not the case here in light of the strong allegations of abuse put forward by the applicants accordingly, once the judge found (1) that the applications put forward allegations of police misconduct that would shock the community’s conscience and/or were offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency; (2) that the integrity of the justice system would be prejudiced by continuing the proceedings; and (3) that no remedy short of a stay was capable of redressing the prejudice, it should have been clear that the applications were not frivolous, let alone manifestly frivolous. the findings that there were serious abuses at issue in this case and that a stay was the only possible remedy were enough to establish that the applications were not manifestly frivolous. [117] accordingly, in this case, there was no need for the judge to engage in the balancing exercise at stage three of babos. by engaging in that balancing exercise, the judge committed a further error as she purported to decide the ultimate issue on an incomplete record. she conducted the balancing exercise after inappropriately rejecting that certain of the allegations amounted to an abuse of process at stage one of babos, thus skewing the balancing process. additionally, i would note that, at the balancing stage, caution must be taken when considering the extent to which a judicial rebuke made in someone else’s case (here, in mr. bacon’s habeas corpus application before mcewan j.) can help redress the personal abuses alleged by others before a different court. [118] moreover, the judge conducted the balancing exercise when she could not be sure that she had access to all the necessary evidence in cases like this, which involve state misconduct, there is a distinct possibility that the extent of the misconduct will be unknown at the summary dismissal stage, and it may well be more serious than alleged where the trial disclosure is not relevant to the issues on an application, separate disclosure will likely be necessary to ensure that all material relevant to the application is produced. in addition, the misconduct may only come to light through cross-examination as acknowledged by the court of appeal, certain defence allegations — such as the ones made here — “are such that they can likely only be established through cross-examination” (para. 404; see also r v rice, 2018 qcca 198, at para. 64 (canlii)). this court has further recognized that cross-examination is a critically important tool and an essential component of the accused’s right to full answer and defence (see, eg,. r v. lyttle, 2004 scc 5, [2004] 1 scr 193, at para. 41; r v. osolin, [1993] 4 scr 595, at p 663; r v. shearing, 2002 scc 58, [2002] 3 scr 33, at para. 76; r v. ns, 2012 scc 72, [2012] 3 scr 726, at para. 64). [119] the crown describes this outcome as troubling and submits that requiring a voir dire once the first two stages of babos show that the application is not manifestly frivolous unduly curtails a judge’s discretion to summarily dismiss an application, such that judicial resources will be wasted. the concern about wasting judicial resources is misplaced, in light of the possible consequences summarily dismissing a stay application without all the evidence impairs the accused’s right to a fair trial and may undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. stay applications may allege abuse of the highest order: summarily dismissing them without any opportunity for the applicant to further elicit evidence to substantiate their claims risks compounding any wrongs done by the state to the applicant. additionally, this result does not unduly curtail a judge’s discretion in the rare case in which balancing at stage three of babos might be appropriate on the summary dismissal motion; it merely recognizes that, in this case, the application was not shown to be manifestly frivolous at stages one and two of babos and, in the circumstances, should not have been summarily dismissed. [120] finally, i agree with the court of appeal that the judge slid towards deciding the ultimate merits of the applications. in finding that she would not grant a stay, the judge focused on the merits and on the ultimate outcome rather than on whether the applications were manifestly frivolous. in doing so, she applied too lax a threshold for summary dismissal and conflated the analysis required for the summary dismissal hearing with the analysis she was required to undertake on the voir dire itself. [121] as a final matter, the crown stresses that its submission is not that a stay could never issue for such serious offences, but rather that, in these particular circumstances, on balance, a stay should not issue. while it remains to be determined whether a stay of proceedings should or should not issue in this particular case, in light of both the seriousness of the offences and the seriousness of the abuse, i agree with the general proposition set out by the court of appeal that no category of offence is beyond the ambit of the abuse of process doctrine. v conclusion [122] when the above framework is applied, it is apparent that the stay applications were not manifestly frivolous and should not have been summarily dismissed. accordingly, i dismiss the appeal. in light of mr. johnston’s passing, only mr. haevischer’s stay application will be remitted to the supreme court of british columbia for hearing at a voir dire. mr. haevischer will have the opportunity to argue all the allegations. that mr. haevischer should have “a full chance to re-litigate all the issues” if the matter was remitted was agreed to by the crown in submissions (transcript, at p 20). that said, i leave how the voir dire ought to be conducted to the hearing judge’s discretion. [123] in the course of my reasons, i have not relied on the fresh evidence admitted by the court of appeal and, as such, do not decide whether the court of appeal erred in admitting that evidence. the admissibility of the fresh evidence and, if admitted, what weight to give it will be considered and dealt with by the judge hearing mr. haevischer’s stay application. appeal dismissed.
[1] abella j — mitra javanmardi opened a naturopathic clinic in quebec in 1985. she has a degree in science from mcgill university, a doctorate in naturopathic medicine from the national college of naturopathic medicine in portland, oregon, and a related diploma which involved 500 hours of further courses ms. javanmardi’s education included classes and clinical training about intravenous injection techniques. she has treated between 4,000 and 5,000 patients at her clinic since it opened and, starting in 1992, has administered nutrients to approximately ten patients per week by way of intravenous injection. intravenous administration of nutrients by naturopaths is not legal in quebec but is lawful in most provinces. [2] on june 12, 2008, roger matern and his wife visited ms. javanmardi’s clinic. mr. matern was 84 years old and had heart disease. he was frustrated with the treatment he had received at conventional medical clinics and hoped that naturopathy would improve his quality of life after an hour-long consultation, ms. javanmardi recommended intravenously administered nutrients. despite ms. javanmardi’s telling him that she did not normally administer intravenous injections on a first visit, mr. matern insisted on having an intravenous treatment that day. [3] ms. javanmardi prepared the nutrient solution for mr. matern’s intravenous injection it contained magnesium chloride, manganese chloride, potassium chloride, l-taurine, l-carnitine, and sterile water. to create the solution, ms. javanmardi combined nutrients from separate vials one vial contained l- carnitine. mr. matern was the third patient to whom l-carnitine from the same vial had been administered that day. the other two patients did not have adverse reactions to their injections. the vial turned out to be contaminated. [4] mr. matern reacted negatively to the injection almost immediately he complained of being hot and nauseous ms. javanmardi stopped the intravenous injection and checked mr. matern’s vital signs, which were stable. mr. matern had no fever, was not experiencing confusion, and there was no sign of infection on the site of the injection. [5] throughout ms. javanmardi’s career, no patient had ever been infected during an intravenous injection she thought that mr. matern could be having a hypoglycaemic reaction and suggested he eat some sugar mr. matern consumed a spoonful of honey and orange juice. [6] despite his symptoms, mr. matern said that he did not want to go to the hospital his wife and daughter took him home in a call later that day with mr. matern’s daughter, ms. javanmardi explained that mr. matern needed to stay hydrated and advised his daughter to take him to the hospital if she was unable to keep him hydrated. [7] that night, mr. matern’s daughter called an ambulance because she was concerned that her father’s condition was worsening. doctors at the hospital noted signs of endotoxic shock mr. matern’s symptoms continued to worsen and he died of endotoxic shock some hours later. [8] ms. javanmardi was charged with criminal negligence causing death contrary to s 220(b) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, and manslaughter, contrary to ss. 234 and 236(b) of the criminal code. [9] at trial, the crown identified several of ms. javanmardi’s acts or omissions as the bases for criminal negligence causing death and as predicate offences for unlawful act manslaughter of these, only one act, the intravenous injection administered contrary to s 31 of quebec’s medical act, cqlr, c. m-9, was argued before this court as the basis for both charges.1 [10] the trial lasted for 39 days. in a 50-page, 453-paragraph judgment which thoroughly and carefully canvassed the evidence, villemure j made the following findings of fact:  according to the expert evidence, the nutrients ms. javanmardi selected for mr. matern’s intravenous injection were “benign” and “potentially helpful”;  ms. javanmardi had the required skills to administer intravenous injections. she has a degree in science from mcgill university and a 1 section 31 states: 31 the practice of medicine consists in assessing and diagnosing any health deficiency in a person in interaction with their environment, in preventing and treating illness to maintain or restore health or to provide appropriate symptom relief. the following activities in the practice of medicine are reserved to physicians: (1) diagnosing illnesses; (2) prescribing diagnostic examinations; (3) using diagnostic techniques that are invasive or entail risks of injury; (4) determining medical treatment; (5) prescribing medications and other substances; (6) prescribing treatment; (7) using techniques or applying treatments that are invasive or entail risks of injury, including aesthetic procedures. . doctorate in naturopathic medicine from the national college of naturopathic medicine this university is recognized in its field her four-year education there included one year of courses based on traditional medicine she was also trained in the administration of intravenous injections, pharmacology, and the interaction of nutrients with other medications in addition, she got a diploma from the homeopathic academy of naturopathic physicians, which involved 500 hours of courses ms. javanmardi acquired further skills by practicing naturopathy at her clinic since 1985, and she had almost two decades of experience in administering intravenous injections to patients;  while quebec does not regulate naturopathy, ms. javanmardi aligned her professional standards with the regulations in other provinces;  ms. javanmardi purchased her nutrients from a reputable ontario pharmacy that complied with provincial health and safety regulations. as a naturopath, ms. javanmardi was authorized to purchase those nutrients in ontario;  ms. javanmardi was knowledgeable about nutrients. this enabled her to identify which ones correspond to the specific needs of different patients. the information mr. matern gave to ms. javanmardi about his medical condition was sufficient for ms. javanmardi to determine which nutrients could ameliorate his condition;  ms. javanmardi was alive to the need to observe sterilization protocols for administering intravenous injections and had taken sufficient precautionary measures to prevent contamination. the way she stored and preserved the vials used for intravenous injections, including in this case, aligned with the specific properties of each vial and with the instructions of the pharmacist who supplied them;  mr. matern knew that ms. javanmardi was not a physician. mr. matern immediately wanted an intravenous injection of nutrients and validly consented to the procedure; and  mr. matern died of endotoxic shock attributable to the presence of bacteria in the l-carnitine vial from which ms. javanmardi drew nutrients for his injection. due to the high concentration of bacteria in the injected solution, mr. matern’s death was inevitable from the moment he was given the intravenous injection. [11] villemure j was satisfied that ms. javanmardi had the necessary skills to administer intravenous injections, had observed the required protocols and had taken sufficient precautions at every stage of the process. [12] based on these findings, villemure j acquitted ms. javanmardi of both charges. as to the charge of criminal negligence causing death, villemure j concluded that ms. javanmardi’s conduct did not show a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person in her circumstances would have exercised. villemure j. was not satisfied that a reasonable person would have been aware of any risk inherent in ms. javanmardi’s conduct and therefore concluded that the crown had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that ms. javanmardi’s conduct showed wanton or reckless disregard for mr. matern’s life or safety. [13] in dealing with the unlawful act manslaughter charge, and focusing on the “unlawful act” of administering an intravenous injection contrary to quebec’s medical act, villemure j concluded that the intravenous injection was not objectively dangerous a reasonable person in ms. javanmardi’s circumstances would not have foreseen that intravenously administering a benign solution, in accordance with proper procedures, would create a risk of harm. [14] having acquitted ms. javanmardi, villemure j declined to consider supplementary arguments made by ms. javanmardi’s counsel about the constitutionality of the offences under which she had been charged. [15] the court of appeal set aside both acquittals it concluded that villemure j misstated the elements of unlawful act manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death, and further erred by considering the training that ms. javanmardi had received in the course of her education to become a naturopath. in the court of appeal’s view, the intravenous injection was objectively dangerous and ms. javanmardi’s conduct constituted a marked departure from the reasonable person standard. the court of appeal substituted a conviction on the charge of unlawful act manslaughter and ordered a new trial on the criminal negligence charge.2 the court of appeal briefly considered — and rejected — ms. javanmardi’s arguments that the provisions under which she was charged were unconstitutional. [16] for the following reasons, i would allow ms. javanmardi’s appeal on both charges and restore the acquittals. analysis [17] the charges for both criminal negligence causing death and unlawful act manslaughter were based on the same conduct: administering an intravenous injection contrary to quebec’s medical act. as the facts of this case demonstrate, there is a great 2 the court of appeal declined to substitute a conviction on the criminal negligence charge because, in its view, without [translation] “an overall assessment of the evidence” (para. 124), it was not possible to determine whether ms. javanmardi’s conduct amounted to a marked and substantial departure from the reasonable person standard. deal of overlap between unlawful act manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death. nonetheless, to begin the analysis, the offences must be approached separately. the relevant criminal code provisions dealing with criminal negligence [18] are: 219 (1) every one is criminally negligent who (a) in doing anything, or (b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do, shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. (2) for the purposes of this section, duty means a duty imposed by law. 220 every person who by criminal negligence causes death to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable (a) where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and (b) in any other case, to imprisonment for life. [19] the actus reus of criminal negligence causing death requires that the accused undertook an act — or omitted to do anything that it was his or her legal duty to do — and that the act or omission caused someone’s death. [20] the fault element is that the accused’s act or omission “shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons” neither “wanton” nor “reckless” is defined in the criminal code, but in r v. jf, [2008] 3 scr 215, this court confirmed that the offence of criminal negligence causing death imposes a modified objective standard of fault — the objective “reasonable person” standard (paras. 7-9; see also r v. tutton, [1989] 1 scr 1392, at pp. 1429-31; r v. morrisey, [2000] 2 scr 90, at para. 19; r v. beatty, [2008] 1 scr 49, at para. 7). [21] as with other negligence-based criminal offences, the fault element of criminal negligence causing death is assessed by measuring the degree to which the accused’s conduct departed from that of a reasonable person in the circumstances.3 for some negligence-based offences, such as dangerous driving, a “marked” departure satisfies the fault element (jf, at para. 10; see also: beatty, at para. 33; r v. roy, [2012] 2 scr 60, at para. 30; r v. l (j.) (2006), 204 ccc (3d) 324 (ont. ca), at para. 15; r v. al-kassem, 2015 onca 320, 78 mvr (6th) 183, at para. 6). in the context of criminal negligence causing death, however, the requisite degree of departure has been described as an elevated one — marked and substantial (jf, at para. 9, applying tutton, at pp. 1430-31, and r v. sharp (1984), 12 ccc (3d) 428 (ont. ca)). [22] these standards have much in common they both ask whether the accused’s actions created a risk to others, and whether “a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible” (see roy, at para. 36; stewart, 3 in jf, this court held that the determination of whether the accused’s conduct departed to the requisite degree is properly viewed as an assessment of fault, not actus reus (see hamish stewart, “f (j.): the continued evolution of the law of penal negligence” (2008), 60 cr (6th) 243, at p 246). at p 248). the distinction between them has been described as a matter of degree (see r v. fontaine (2017), 41 cr (7th) 330, at para. 27; r v. blostein (2014), 306 man. r. (2d) 15, at para. 14). as healy ja explained in fontaine: these differences of degree cannot be measured by a ruler, a thermometer or any other instrument of calibrated scale the words “marked and substantial” departure are adjectives used to paraphrase or interpret “wanton or reckless disregard” in section 219 of the code but they do not, and cannot, indicate any objective and fixed order of magnitude that would have prescriptive value from one case to another. as with the assessment of conduct in cases of criminal negligence, the assessment of fault by the trier of fact is entirely contextual. [para. 27] [23] in jf,. fish j did not fully explain how to distinguish between a “marked” and a “marked and substantial” departure, as the case did not “turn on the nature or extent of the difference between the two standards” (paras. 10-11). in this appeal, as well, the differences in etymology are not dispositive and need not be resolved. in any event, the parties argued on the basis that the proper threshold for criminal negligence causing death is a “marked and substantial” departure, and that is the basis on which these reasons approach the issue. a conviction for criminal negligence causing death therefore requires the crown to prove that the accused undertook an act, or omitted to do anything that it was her legal duty to do, and that the act or omission caused the death of another person (the actus reus). based on jf, the crown must also establish that the accused’s conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances (the fault element). [24] turning to unlawful act manslaughter, the following criminal code provisions apply: 222 (1) a person commits homicide when, directly or indirectly, by any means, he causes the death of a human being. (4) culpable homicide is murder or manslaughter or infanticide. (5) a person commits culpable homicide when he causes the death of a human being, (a) by means of an unlawful act; (b) by criminal negligence; (c) by causing that human being, by threats or fear of violence or by deception, to do anything that causes his death; or (d) by wilfully frightening that human being, in the case of a child or sick person. 234 culpable homicide that is not murder or infanticide is manslaughter. [25] the actus reus of unlawful act manslaughter under s 222(5)(a) requires the crown to prove that the accused committed an unlawful act and that the unlawful act caused death (r v. creighton, [1993] 3 scr 3, at pp. 42-43; r v. desousa, [1992] 2 scr 944, at pp. 959 and 961-62). the underlying unlawful act is described as the “predicate” offence (desousa, at p 956; creighton, at p 42). the predicate offence in ms. javanmardi’s case is administering the intravenous injection contrary to s 31 of quebec’s medical act, a strict liability offence. [26] there has been some uncertainty around whether the crown must prove that the predicate offence was “objectively dangerous” (see larry c wilson, “too many manslaughters” (2007), 52 crim l.q 433, at p 459, citing isabel grant, dorothy chunn and christine boyle, the law of homicide (loose-leaf), at pp. 4-15, 4- 16 and 4-20; stanley yeo, “the fault elements for involuntary manslaughter: some lessons from downunder” (2000), 43 crim l.q 291, at p 293) in my view, the “objective dangerousness” requirement adds nothing to the analysis that is not captured within the fault element of unlawful act manslaughter — objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm that is neither trivial nor transitory (creighton, at pp. 44-45). an unlawful act, accompanied by objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm that is neither trivial nor transitory, is an objectively dangerous act. [27] support for this position is found in desousa, which has been cited as the definitive statement of the fault element of unlawful act manslaughter (creighton, at pp. 44-45). in desousa, sopinka j considered the meaning of “unlawful act” for the purposes of the offence of unlawfully causing bodily harm, concluding that the unlawful act must be objectively dangerous in the sense that there is objective foreseeability of bodily harm: english authority has consistently held that the underlying unlawful act required by its manslaughter offence requires proof that the unlawful act was “likely to injure another person” or in other words put the bodily integrity of others at risk (see also r v. hall (1961), 45 cr. app. r 366 (cca);. r v. church (1965), 49 cr. app. r 206 (cca);. director of public prosecutions v. newbury (1976), 62 cr. app. r 291 (hl), and director of public prosecutions v. daley (1978), 69 cr. app. r 39 (pc)). this position has also been adopted by most canadian courts. [p 959] [28] subsequent cases and academic writing confirm that there is no independent actus reus requirement of objective dangerousness as patrick healy observed, this court in creighton agreed that the element of dangerousness connotes an element of fault (“the creighton quartet: enigma variations in a lower key” (1993), 23 c.r (4th) 265, at pp 271-73) others too have suggested that “dangerousness can be seen as entirely subsumed within the concept of foreseeability of harm, and should be discarded as unnecessarily complicated” (grant et al., at pp. 4- 15 to 4-16; see also r v. plein (2018), 50 cr (7th) 41, at para. 30; r v. kahnapace (2010), 76 cr (6th) 38, at para. 28; r v. lm, 2018 nwttc 6, at para. 31 (canlii); r v. ps, 2018 oncj 274, at paras. 205-6 (canlii)). [29] there is little benefit, in my view, to inviting judges or juries to first consider the objective “dangerousness” of the accused’s actions in a vacuum, and then duplicate that exercise with the benefit of context when they reach the fault element of the offence model jury instructions already avoid this repetition, which introduces unnecessary complexity into the offence of unlawful act manslaughter, increasing the risk of confusion and legal error (the hon justice david watt, watt’s manual of criminal jury instructions (2nd ed. 2015), at p 739; gerry a. ferguson and the hon. justice michael r. dambrot, crimji: canadian criminal jury instructions (4th ed. (loose-leaf)), vol. 2, at p 6.39-6; national judicial institute, model jury instructions (online, at d6)). [30] as a result, the actus reus of unlawful act manslaughter is satisfied by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed an unlawful act that caused death. there is no independent requirement of objective dangerousness. [31] the fault element of unlawful act manslaughter is, as noted, objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm that is neither trivial nor transitory, coupled with the fault element for the predicate offence (creighton, at pp. 42-43; desousa, at pp. 961-62). i agree with the court of appeal that where the predicate offence is one of strict liability, as in this case, the fault element for that offence must be read as a marked departure from the standard expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances (see also grant et al., at pp. 4-14 to 4-15; larry c. wilson, “beatty, jf, and the law of manslaughter” (2010), 47 alta. l. rev. 651, at pp. 663-64; kent roach, criminal law (7th ed. 2018), at p 466; r v. curragh inc. (1993), 125 nsr (2d) 185 (prov. ct.); r v. fournier, 2016 qccs 5456, at paras. 62-70 (canlii); and lm, at paras. 44-49). this approach aligns with creighton, where mclachlin j clarified that predicate offences involving carelessness or negligence must be read as requiring a marked departure from the standard of the reasonable person (p 59). [32] both charges against ms. javanmardi, therefore, required her conduct to be measured against the standard of a reasonable person in her circumstances — as part of the fault element of both criminal negligence and the predicate offence for unlawful act manslaughter. [33] this leads me to the court of appeal’s reasons for overturning ms. javanmardi’s acquittals. [34] the court of appeal held that in acquitting ms. javanmardi of both charges, villemure j misapplied the “reasonable person” standard. according to the court of appeal, villemure j erred by referring to ms. javanmardi’s training and experience in intravenous injections when deciding whether her conduct constituted a marked departure from that of a reasonable person in the court of appeal’s view, evidence of ms. javanmardi’s academic training was not relevant to the nature and circumstances of the activity. [35] with respect, i see no error in how villemure j assessed the reasonableness of ms. javanmardi’s conduct. [36] this court most comprehensively considered how to assess and apply the reasonable person standard in creighton. in that case, a woman died as a result of a cocaine injection given to her by marc creighton, a drug dealer. mclachlin j clarified that the modified objective standard is “that of the reasonable person in all the circumstances of the case” (p 41). she endorsed the “reasonable person” standard in order to maintain “a uniform standard for all persons . . . regardless of their background, education or psychological disposition” (p 60) in her view, “[w]ithout a constant minimum standard, the duty imposed by the law would be eroded and the criminal sanction trivialized” (p 70). she concluded that mr. creighton’s habitual drug use was not to be considered in setting the “reasonable person” standard. [37] mclachlin j explained, however, that greater care may be expected of the “reasonable person” on the basis of the nature and circumstances of the activity (p 72). certain activities, for example, require special attention and skill an accused undertaking such an activity may be found to have breached the reasonable person standard if he or she is not qualified to provide the special care that the activity requires, or negligently failed to exercise such care while engaged in the activity. in this way, the law maintains a “constant minimum standard” for every person who engages in an activity requiring special care and skill: they must be both qualified and exercise the special care that the activity requires. [38] creighton’s activity-sensitive approach to the modified objective standard has been applied in a variety of contexts, including in cases involving driving, hunting and parenting (beatty, at para 40; r v gendreau, 2015 qcca 1910, at para 30 (canlii); jf, at paras. 8-9). these decisions confirm that while the standard is not determined by the accused’s personal characteristics, it is informed by the activity. in this case, the activity is administering an intravenous injection, and the standard to be applied is that of the reasonably prudent naturopath in the circumstances. [39] in measuring ms. javanmardi’s conduct against this standard, villemure j. was not only entitled, she was obliged to consider her prior training, experience and qualifications as a naturopath. where the crown’s theory is, as it is in this case, that the accused engaged in an activity without the requisite training and knowledge, the accused’s activity-specific knowledge and experience are clearly relevant to determining whether the applicable standard of care was met. an accused’s training and experience may, for example, be used to rebut an allegation of being unqualified to engage in an activity. evidence of training and experience may also be used to show how a reasonable person would have performed the activity in the circumstances. [40] in this case, ms. javanmardi’s professional experience and her education were relevant in determining whether she was qualified for the activity in which she was engaged and were, as a result, relevant in determining whether she met the applicable standard of care. i see no error in villemure j.’s treatment of this evidence, which the defence adduced to rebut the allegation that ms. javanmardi was not qualified to administer an intravenous injection the court of appeal, with respect, erred in overturning ms. javanmardi’s acquittals on this basis. [41] the court of appeal also erred in disturbing ms. javanmardi’s acquittals based on its conclusion that her conduct markedly departed from that of a reasonable person. this conclusion, with respect, cannot be squared with villemure j.’s findings of fact. based on these findings, which the court of appeal inexplicably replaced with its own, villemure j concluded that ms. javanmardi’s conduct did not constitute a marked departure from that of a reasonable person in her circumstances. as explained above, villemure j found that ms. javanmardi was properly qualified to administer intravenous injections; aligned her practice with established professional standards in other jurisdictions; purchased nutrients from a reputable ontario pharmacy; chose nutrients that were appropriate for mr. matern’s condition; stored and preserved the vial used for the intravenous injection in a manner consistent with the properties of the vial and the instructions of the supplying pharmacist; and took the necessary precautions at every stage of administering the intravenous injection, including observing sufficient protocols to prevent sepsis. [42] this court has frequently cautioned against appellate courts transforming their opposition to a trial judge’s factual findings and inferences into attributed legal errors (r v george, [2017] 1 scr 1021, at para 17) there is no basis for overturning villemure j.’s findings or her conclusion that the marked departure threshold was not met. it was not open to the court of appeal, with respect, to reweigh the evidence or substitute its own factual findings on this critical issue. [43] nor was the court of appeal justified in interfering with the acquittal for criminal negligence causing death because villemure j had misstated the applicable legal standard. the court of appeal concluded that by applying the marked departure instead of the marked and substantial departure standard, villemure j erred. she did, but since villemure j found that ms. javanmardi’s conduct did not meet the lower threshold of a marked departure from the reasonable person standard, she would not have found that the conduct satisfied the higher standard of a marked and substantial departure the erroneous articulation of the fault element for criminal negligence causing death was therefore irrelevant to the outcome. [44] with respect to the acquittal for unlawful act manslaughter, the court of appeal held that villemure j erred in law by failing to recognize that intravenous injections are objectively dangerous. as i have explained, objective dangerousness is no longer an independent requirement of unlawful act manslaughter — it has been subsumed in the fault element of whether there was an objectively foreseeable risk of bodily harm. all of villemure j.’s factual findings, which were based on the evidence, amply support the conclusion that an intravenous injection, performed properly by a naturopath qualified to administer such injections, did not pose an objectively foreseeable risk of bodily harm in the circumstances. villemure j considered both the act being performed and the person performing it, as she was required to do when assessing whether a risk of bodily harm is objectively foreseeable in the context of an activity requiring special care. the court of appeal erred in substituting its view that an intravenous injection is objectively dangerous regardless of the circumstances in which it is administered. [45] i do, however, agree with the court of appeal that villemure j erred in her articulation of the fault element for unlawful act manslaughter by stating that it required objective foreseeability of a risk of death the proper test is objective foreseeability of a risk of bodily harm that is neither trivial nor transitory. but this error was immaterial, because even had villemure j applied the proper test, she would still have acquitted ms. javanmardi based on her conclusion that the intravenous injection was not objectively dangerous, because a reasonable person in these circumstances would not have foreseen a risk of harm. [46] i would therefore allow the appeal and restore the acquittals for both criminal negligence causing death and unlawful act manslaughter in view of these conclusions, it is unnecessary to consider the constitutional issues. english version of the reasons of wagner cj and rowe j delivered by the chief justice (dissenting) — i. introduction [47] is administering an injection to another person an objectively dangerous act? does the answer to this question depend on the training or experience of the person performing the act? these are the questions raised by this appeal like the court of appeal, i would answer the first in the affirmative and the second in the negative. i would order a new trial on both charges. [48] ms. javanmardi, who practiced naturopathy in quebec, administered injections to her clients without being legally authorized to do so. it is admitted that she did so knowingly and regularly for several years, thereby committing the offence of practising medicine illegally, a provincial penal offence of strict liability. [49] in 2008, a vial in ms. javanmardi’s clinic was, unbeknownst to her, contaminated by a bacterium ms. javanmardi drew a substance from that vial to administer an injection to mr. roger matern, which caused him to develop septic shock that proved to be fatal. she was charged with criminal negligence causing death and unlawful act manslaughter. ms. javanmardi was initially acquitted of both charges by the trial court (cq,. no. 500-01-013474-082, april 8, 2015). the crown then appealed to the court of appeal, which convicted ms. javanmardi of the latter charge and ordered a new trial on the former (2018 qcca 856, 47 cr (7th) 296). ms. javanmardi is asking this court to restore the initial acquittals. [50] the two charges in question are based on the unlawful injection given by ms. javanmardi to mr. matern on june 12, 2008. the uncontested evidence shows that such an act is objectively dangerous because the injection of a substance across physiological barriers poses inherent risks. in addition, the contaminated vial used by ms. javanmardi was a “single-dose” vial and contained no preservative. in spite of this, she had previously used it for two other clients the morning of june 12, contrary to the recommended practice. [51] the trial court nonetheless acquitted ms. javanmardi, stating that it had a reasonable doubt as to whether the unlawful injection was objectively dangerous and as to whether her conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care that applied in the circumstances. [52] with respect, by refusing to find that the unlawful injection was objectively dangerous, the trial court failed to arrive at the legal conclusion that was necessary in light of the facts as found. this was an error of law (r v. jmh, 2011 scc 45, [2011] 3 scr 197), whose impact is such that it requires a new trial (vézeau v. the queen, [1977] 2 scr 277; r v. morin, [1988] 2 scr 345; r v. graveline, 2006 scc 16, [2006] 1 scr 609; r v. george, 2017 scc 38, [2017] 1 scr 1021). although the court made other errors, this one was the most important because it was made earlier in the decision and therefore magnified the impact of the errors that followed it. [53] i will begin by discussing the essential elements of the offence of manslaughter in order to expand slightly on my colleague’s review of this subject. i will then consider the two main errors made by the trial court, focusing particularly on the objective dangerousness of the act in question. ii unlawful act manslaughter [54] the offence of unlawful act manslaughter is quite particular because it requires proof of an underlying unlawful act, the offence has two cumulative fault elements: the mens rea of the underlying act and the mens rea specific to manslaughter. this two-tiered structure also makes the offence more complicated in nature it is therefore important, first and foremost, to identify each of its elements with precision. a actus reus [55] the actus reus of unlawful act manslaughter has three elements: (1) an underlying unlawful act; (2) the objective dangerousness of that act; and (3) a causal connection between the act and the death. (1) unlawful act [56] in my view, a verdict of manslaughter can validly be based on either a federal underlying offence or a provincial underlying offence. this is in fact implicit in my colleague’s reasons as she notes, absolute liability offences are clearly excluded, whether they were enacted by parliament or by a legislature (r v. desousa, [1992] 2 scr 944, at p 957). [57] once an unlawful act is proved, the first element of the actus reus (the underlying unlawful act) is therefore satisfied. the court must then consider the second element, that is, the requirement that the unlawful act be objectively dangerous. it is this element that is central to these proceedings. (2) objectively dangerous conduct [58] in addition to being unlawful, the impugned act must be objectively dangerous; in other words, it must be an act that a reasonable person would know is likely to subject another person to a risk of bodily harm (desousa, at p 961) my colleague is of the view that this element is superfluous in the case of manslaughter because it duplicates the fault element, that is, foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm (r v. creighton, [1993] 3 scr 3, at p 24). [59] while the objectively dangerous conduct is relevant to the actus reus and to the fault element, it cannot be said that it is assessed from the same perspective at both stages of the analysis. the actus reus will be proved if the court is satisfied that the accused did something that a reasonable person would have known was likely to subject another person to a risk of harm. in considering the actus reus, the court is not to assess the extent to which the accused’s conduct departed from this standard of care or the accused’s state of mind. rather, the actus reus of penal negligence, like that of civil negligence, will be established where the court is satisfied that the impugned conduct deviated from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person this evidentiary threshold reflects the fact that, at this stage of the analysis, the court is considering whether the accused committed the physical element of the offence, not whether the accused had the state of mind required for a conviction. [60] the second element of the actus reus, the objective dangerousness of the unlawful act, is therefore assessed without reference to the accused’s personal characteristics this does not involve the application of the modified objective test, which allows the court to consider limited contextual factors that test is instead applied in analyzing mens rea and, where it is met, has the effect of exculpating an accused who has not breached the standard of care sufficiently for criminal liability to be imposed. it is important to note that the relevance of certain contextual factors that is described in creighton, which i will discuss shortly, concerns the analysis of mens rea the guidance provided by mclachlin j (as she then was) on the consideration of such factors was in the context of the “debate about the degree to which personal characteristics should be reflected in the objective test for fault in offences of penal negligence” (creighton, at p 60 (emphasis added)). (3) causal connection [61] in addition to an underlying unlawful act that is objectively dangerous, one last element is required to establish the actus reus: a causal connection. ms. javanmardi argues for a strict interpretation of this concept. in her submission, this requirement will not be met unless the death results from the unlawful nature of the impugned conduct. she therefore argues that it was not sufficient in the case at bar to connect the death to the injection. rather, the death had to have been caused by the illegal practice of medicine. i disagree. [62] to begin with, ms. javanmardi’s arguments here are contradictory. at the stage where the causal connection is considered, she defines the act as being the illegal practice of medicine, but in her argument for uniform rules on the matter across provinces and territories, she focuses instead on the act of administering the injection (because, of course, the illegal practice of medicine is prohibited throughout the country). furthermore, the emphasis she wishes to place on the connection between the unlawful nature of the act and the death is inconsistent with the detailed analytical approach used for negligence the trial judge’s finding that the injection given by ms. javanmardi caused the victim’s death is therefore perfectly valid. b mens rea [63] unlawful act manslaughter has two cumulative fault elements: the mens rea of the underlying act and the fault element specific to manslaughter. [64] with regard to the underlying act, it is important to note that a verdict of manslaughter can be based on a violation of a statute or of regulations. a number of such violations, whether under a federal or a provincial enactment, involve “strict liability” and therefore lie midway between absolute liability offences, for which there is no fault element, and “mens rea” offences, for which the crown must prove fault. therefore, as doyon ja wrote for the quebec court of appeal with regard to strict liability: [translation] . . proving actus reus (the material elements of the offence) has the effect of compelling the defendant to deny the presumed intent (or the moral aspect), either by demonstrating his reasonable diligence or by establishing the existence of an error of fact based on reasonable grounds that explains his conduct. (autorité des marchés financiers v. patry, 2015 qcca 1933, at para. 59 (canlii)) [65] here, the court of appeal and the parties are agreed that, where such an offence forms the basis for a manslaughter charge, the reverse onus used in the case of strict liability offences is not appropriate to ensure a minimum degree of moral blameworthiness, the crown must therefore establish a negligent state of mind corresponding to a “marked departure”. the purpose is unquestionably a laudable one: to ensure that the accused had a culpable state of mind reflecting the seriousness of the crime. the fact that strict liability is a form of penal negligence explains the reliance on an objective fault element, that is, marked departure. [66] i wish to be clear that, as this court has repeatedly stated, “[s]hort of incapacity to appreciate the risk or incapacity to avoid creating it, personal attributes such as age, experience and education are not relevant. the standard against which the conduct must be measured is always the same” (r v. beatty, 2008 scc 5, [2008] 1 scr 49, at para. 40). every person, regardless of his or her professional training, is required to act in accordance with the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances. [67] the fault element for manslaughter is objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm, regardless of how the death is caused (through an unlawful act or through criminal negligence) (creighton, at p 24). it is acknowledged that the trial judge erred in law in this regard, since she found that the fault element required foreseeability of the risk of death. she thus applied the more stringent test proposed by the dissent in creighton, which has never been recognized according to the current state of the law on the matter. [68] that error on its own might not be sufficient to warrant an order for a new trial, since it was made after the trial judge raised a doubt about the commission of the actus reus and can therefore be considered to have been made in obiter. however, as i will point out, because the analysis of the actus reus (dangerous act) is itself vitiated, the sum of the errors made by the judge warrants an order for a new trial. iii first error of law: objective dangerousness of the unlawful act [69] the court of appeal expressed the view that the trial judge’s findings of fact led inevitably to the conclusion that the unlawful injection was objectively dangerous: [translation] the findings of fact on which this argument is based are not in dispute: (1) the respondent is not authorized by the laws of quebec to administer nutrients intravenously to a human being, (2) the respondent administered contaminated substances to roger matern intravenously, (3) the contaminated substances were not filtered out by mr. matern’s digestive system . intravenous injections pose inherent dangers to humans, including with respect to infection caused by the sudden introduction of microbes and bacteria into the body. this reasonably foreseeable danger of causing another person bodily harm that is neither transitory nor trivial is not unrelated to the fact that this therapeutic procedure is an act reserved by the provincial legislature to a limited group of health professionals . . . . [paras. 92-94] [70] i am in complete agreement with these remarks, and i would add that it is also not in dispute that ms. javanmardi administered the injection that day by drawing, for the third time, from a single-dose vial that had already been used for two other patients, a practice that is contraindicated according to the expert evidence. moreover, in analyzing the validity of mr. matern’s consent, the trial judge stated that it could be inferred from the evidence that, before the injection, he and his family [translation] “accepted the inherent risks” of the treatment proposed by ms. javanmardi knowing that she was not a physician in the traditional sense of the term and that she administered nutrients intravenously (para. 409). it therefore follows that there were indeed risks. all of this should have led the trial court to find that the act was objectively dangerous. the court of appeal’s intervention was thus warranted. [71] my colleague maintains that the requirement that the impugned act be objectively dangerous is superfluous and should not be considered when assessing the actus reus in my view, a two-stage analysis is helpful if the prosecution cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the act committed — considered without regard to the context — was objectively dangerous, then the court does not have to conduct the more thorough analysis required for mens rea, which could make it necessary for the accused to advance and prove a defence in order to exculpate himself or herself. however, the analytical framework proposed by my colleague also leads to the conclusion that the trial judge made an error earlier in her decision that magnified the impact of the errors that followed it. were the actus reus of the offence to require only the commission of an unlawful act causing death, the physical element of the offence would clearly be established in the instant case it is not in dispute that ms. javanmardi was not legally authorized to administer an injection to mr. matern and that that unlawful act caused his death. the trial judge therefore erred in finding that the actus reus had not been established in this case. iv second error of law: consideration of personal characteristics [72] my colleague maintains that the trial judge, in her analysis, relied on ms. javanmardi’s experience and training to find that a reasonable naturopath in the same circumstances would not have foreseen the risk of bodily harm and that her conduct was therefore not a marked departure. my colleague adds that, according to this court’s precedents, the standard of care against which an accused’s conduct must be measured may vary depending on the activity performed. [73] on this point, i agree. it is in fact clear from the reasons of mclachlin j in creighton that an ordinary day-to-day activity does not, a priori, require the same care as brain surgery. [74] in creighton, the majority stated that a person who engages in an activity that requires special care to be exercised may fail to meet the standard of care either (i) because the person is not qualified to exercise the required care, or (ii) because the person fails to exercise that care (pp. 72-73). at this stage in the analysis, the accused’s training may become relevant, depending on what charges have been laid. where the crown argues that a person breached the standard of care by engaging in an activity without being qualified to exercise the required care, it is then for the court to consider any evidence adduced to show that the person was in fact qualified however, the person’s experience is not relevant in determining what is required by the standard of care or what special care is required by the activity in question as mclachlin j. explained, “[a] brain surgeon performing surgery in a grossly negligent way might violate the standard in this second way” (creighton, at p 73). [75] the guidance provided by the majority in creighton concerning the ways in which a person may fail to meet an elevated standard of care — either by not being qualified to exercise the care required by the specialized activity or by failing to exercise that care — is relevant in the instant case according to the evidence, the activity in issue poses inherent risks to health and therefore logically entails an elevated standard of care, including the holding of a permit and the use of multi-dose vials where such a measure is required consideration of ms. javanmardi’s qualifications at the mens rea stage was therefore not an error as such. however, i am of the view that the trial judge erred in confining herself to the argument that because ms. javanmardi had the training required to administer injections and was accustomed to doing so without any complications occurring, a reasonable person in her position could not have anticipated the risk of bodily harm. in making that finding, the trial judge improperly combined the analyses of the two ways in which a person may fail to meet an elevated standard of care. i will explain. [76] a review of ms. javanmardi’s qualifications was necessary because the prosecution alleged that she had failed to meet the standard of care by engaging in a specialized activity without being qualified to do so. this did not obviate the need to analyze the second possibility for breaching the standard of care, that is, failure to exercise the required care although it was established that ms. javanmardi was qualified to exercise the care required to administer an intravenous injection, that training could not affect the level of care she had to meet. [77] the act performed in the instant case was objectively dangerous, and ms. javanmardi’s experience does not alter this. the dangerousness of the act would have been established even if it had been performed by a health professional who was authorized to do so: the difference lies rather in ms. javanmardi’s qualifications to perform the act in question and in the care exercised in performing it injecting a substance across physiological barriers is an “inherently dangerous activity”, like driving (beatty, at para. 31). on this point, the trial judge erred. [78] because it was of the view that conduct amounting to a marked departure relative to that of a reasonable person had been proved, the court of appeal convicted ms. javanmardi of the offence of manslaughter. it found only that there was a marked departure, because it did not think that the evidence led inevitably to a finding of marked and substantial departure it therefore ordered a new trial on the offence of criminal negligence causing death. [79] by making ms. javanmardi’s training the main point of her analysis, the trial judge failed to consider certain undisputed facts that might establish a marked departure regardless of the experience of the person performing the act in question. i note, for example, the conduct set out below, on which the court of appeal relied in finding a marked departure i agree with the court of appeal that, in the same circumstances, a reasonable person would not have: [translation]        injected a product intravenously into a client without the required medical prescription, but would instead have administered authorized substances orally, in accordance with the provisions of quebec’s medical act; drawn a product from a single-dose vial three times and then injected it into three different clients; violated his or her normal treatment protocol, rather than deviating from it at the insistence of a patient being seen for the first time; left it to an untrained member of his or her administrative staff to monitor the client during such a treatment; recommended to a patient who was having alarming reactions within minutes of starting treatment (sudden hot flashes followed by shivering, confusion, erratic behaviour, vomiting and generalized weakness) that the patient ingest tea, honey or sweetened juice or be given a massage; failed, when faced with symptoms unknown to the person, to refer the client to a physician’s care; failed, when advised a few hours later that the patient’s condition was worsening, to recommend that the patient be taken to a hospital. [para. 120] it should also be noted that the vial used had no date of manufacture or expiration date on it, that the label showed a concentration that was not the actual concentration and that ms. javanmardi did not wear a smock or other proper clothing when she administered the injection (ca, at para. 87). [80] entering a conviction on an appeal from an acquittal is an exceptional measure, and the error of law at issue here is also a rare occurrence while it is a palpable error as regards the dangerous act, it is not as palpable as regards the marked departure standard i am of the view that ms. javanmardi’s conduct constitutes a marked departure, particularly because she used a single-dose vial three times, although i acknowledge that the trial judge reached the opposite conclusion and that she had evidence tending to support that conclusion, namely testimony to the effect that public institutions sometimes use single-dose vials more than once despite official recommendations to the contrary (af, at para. 17). [81] moreover, presumably because she considered the post-offence conduct irrelevant given her key finding of fact on the causal connection, the trial judge failed to consider whether ms. javanmardi was qualified to deal with any complications, a point that had been vigorously argued before her. as a result, the court of appeal could not assume that ms. javanmardi was unqualified in this respect, especially since the trial judge described ms. javanmardi’s entire testimony — in which she defended her post-injection qualifications — as credible (cq, at paras. 425-29) in other words, while a conviction for manslaughter was undoubtedly reasonable in this case, it was not so inevitable as to justify the measure ordered by the court of appeal. [82] the fact remains that the trial judge erred in failing to find that the unlawful injection given by ms. javanmardi was objectively dangerous she also applied the wrong standard of proof concerning the mens rea of manslaughter, since she required objective foreseeability of the risk of death rather than of the risk of bodily harm. finally, the judge erred in considering ms. javanmardi’s professional training when assessing the objective nature of the risk posed by the injection. those errors, whose effect is to invalidate most of the legal conclusions reached on the essential elements of the offence of manslaughter, had a sufficient impact. in light of their number and scope, i am of the view that the analysis must be carried out again for both charges. v disposition [83] if ms. javanmardi were convicted of both charges, the sentencing judge would, of course, stay one of the charges (kienapple v. the queen, [1975] 1 scr. 729). but this does not mean that one of them must be dropped at this stage, especially since criminal negligence causing death, as the more serious offence, is usually the charge that will stand (r v. jf, 2008 scc 60, [2008] 3 scr 215, at para. 13). the order for a new trial therefore applies to both. [84] finally, i will not deal with the constitutional questions raised in the alternative by ms. javanmardi, which were not considered at trial. i would allow the appeal in part solely to set aside the conviction for manslaughter entered by the court of appeal and to order a new trial on this charge. appeal allowed, wagner cj and rowe j dissenting. montréal; drivod services juridiques, montréal. and penal prosecutions, montréal. solicitor for the respondent the attorney general of quebec: attorney general of quebec, montréal. solicitors for the intervener association des avocats de la défense de montréal: desrosiers, joncas, nouraie, massicotte, montréal. solicitors for the interveners the québec association of naturopathic medicine and association des naturopathes agréés du québec: battista turcot israel corbo, montréal. solicitors for the intervener the canadian association of naturopathic doctors: conway baxter wilson, ottawa. barristers, toronto.
i. introduction [1] this appeal concerns a clause in a commercial winter maintenance agreement that permitted the clients to terminate the contract unilaterally, without cause, upon giving the contractor 10 days’ notice. the dispute does not turn on whether the clause represented a fair bargain between the parties. there is also no issue about the meaning of the termination clause. the dispute turns rather on the manner in which the respondents (collectively “baycrest”) exercised the termination clause. acknowledging that 10 days’ notice was given the appellant, cm. callow inc. (“callow”), argues that baycrest exercised the termination clause contrary to the requirements of good faith set forth by this court in bhasin v. hrynew, 2014 scc 71, [2014] 3 scr 494, in particular the duty to perform the contract honestly. [2] in bhasin, cromwell j recognized a general organizing principle of good faith, which means that “parties generally must perform their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily” (para. 63). this organizing principle, he explained, “is not a free-standing rule, but rather a standard that underpins and is manifested in more specific legal doctrines and may be given different weight in different situations” (para. 64). the organizing principle of good faith manifests itself through “existing doctrines” addressing “the types of situations and relationships in which the law requires, in certain respects, honest, candid, forthright or reasonable contractual performance” (para. 66). [3] in this appeal, the applicable good faith doctrine is the duty of honesty in contractual performance. as cromwell j explained in bhasin, at para. 73, the duty of honesty applies to all contracts as a matter of contractual doctrine, and means “simply that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract”. callow says baycrest’s failure to exercise its right to terminate in keeping with the mandatory duty of honest performance amounted to a breach of contract. it points to the trial judge’s findings that baycrest withheld the information that the contract was in danger of termination. baycrest then continued to represent that the contract was not in danger and knowingly declined to correct the false impression it had created and under which callow was operating. this dishonesty continued for several months, “in anticipation of the notice period” wrote the trial judge and, claims callow, resulted in it foregoing the opportunity to bid on other winter contracts and thereby justifies an award of damages (2017 onsc 7095, at para. 67 (canlii)). [4] baycrest, for its part, recalling that cromwell j explicitly stated in bhasin that the duty of honest performance does not amount to a duty to disclose, argues that its silence did not constitute dishonesty it also says the alleged dishonesty was not connected to the contract in place at the time because, in its submission, the impugned communications related to the possibility of a future contract not yet executed the court of appeal agreed and overturned the trial judge’s decision (2018 onca 896, 429 dlr (4th) 704). [5] i respectfully disagree with the court of appeal on whether the manner in which the termination clause was exercised ran afoul of the minimum standard of honesty. the duty to act honestly in the performance of the contract precludes active deception. baycrest breached its duty by knowingly misleading callow into believing the winter maintenance agreement would not be terminated by exercising the termination clause dishonestly, it breached the duty of honesty on a matter directly linked to the performance of the contract, even if the 10-day notice period was satisfied and irrespective of their motive for termination. for the reasons that follow, i would allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the ontario superior court of justice. ii background [6] baycrest includes 10 condominium corporations managed by condominium management group and a designated property manager each corporation has its own board of directors to manage its affairs and, collectively, they established a joint use committee (“juc”). the juc makes decisions regarding the joint and shared assets of the condominiums. in 2010, the condominium corporations entered into a two-year winter maintenance agreement with callow, a corporation owned and operated by christopher callow. pursuant to the terms of the agreement, callow provided winter services, including snow removal, to the condominium corporations. [7] at the conclusion of the two-year term in 2012, the corporations entered into two new agreements with callow joseph peixoto — president of one of the condominium corporations, and representative on the juc — negotiated the main pricing terms with mr. callow for the renewal of the winter maintenance contract, which also added a separate summer maintenance services contract. [8] at issue in this appeal is the winter maintenance agreement, which had a new two-winter term from november 1, 2012 to april 30, 2014. pursuant to clause 9, the corporations were entitled to terminate the winter maintenance agreement if callow failed to give satisfactory service in accordance with the terms of this agreement. moreover, clause 9 provided that “if for any other reason [callow’s] services are no longer required for the whole or part of the property covered by this agreement, then the [condominium corporations] may terminate this contract upon giving ten (10) days’ notice in writing to [callow]” (ar, vol. iii, at p 10). [9] during the first winter of the two-winter term, there were complaints from occupants of various condominiums, many of which related to snow removal from individual parking stalls in january 2013, mr. callow attended a juc meeting to address the concerns the minutes reflected the positive nature of this meeting, recording that “[t]he committee confirmed that [callow] has been diligent in addressing this issue as best as could be expected considering the nature of the storms recently experienced” (ar, vol. iii, at p 35). after the meeting, the property manager at the time also sent a follow-up email to the juc members: “i know that your board has been generally satisfied with the snow removal — so there is nothing outstanding to report here” (p 39). [10] a few months later — still in the first year of the agreement — respondent tammy zollinger became the property manager about three weeks after ms. zollinger’s arrival, another juc meeting was held, this time without mr. callow present during the meeting, ms. zollinger advised the juc to terminate the winter maintenance agreement with callow “due to poor workmanship in the 2012-13 winter” (ar, vol. iii, at p 43) the minutes went on to indicate that ms. zollinger had reviewed the contract and advised the juc members that they could terminate the contract with callow with no financial penalty. ms. zollinger further advised that she would get quotes from other snow removal contractors. the juc voted to terminate the winter maintenance agreement shortly thereafter, “in either march or april” of 2013 (trial reasons, at para. 51). baycrest chose not to inform mr. callow of its decision to terminate the winter maintenance agreement at that time. [11] although only one winter of the two-winter term had been completed, callow began discussions throughout the spring and summer of 2013 with baycrest regarding a renewal of the winter maintenance agreement. specifically, mr. callow had various exchanges with two condominium corporations’ board members, one of whom was mr. peixoto following these conversations, wrote the trial judge, “mr. callow thought that he was likely to get a two-year renewal of his winter maintenance services contract and they were satisfied with his services” (para. 41). [12] meanwhile, callow continued to fulfill its obligations under the winter and summer maintenance agreements including, pursuant to the latter arrangement, finishing “spring cleanup”, cutting grass on a weekly basis and conducting garbage pick-up. furthermore, during the summer of 2013, callow “performed work above and beyond [its] summer maintenance services contract” (para 42), even doing what mr. callow described as some “freebie” work, which he hoped would act as an incentive for baycrest to renew the winter maintenance agreement at the end of the upcoming winter. [13] conversations between callow and mr. peixoto continued into july 2013, at which time callow decided to improve the appearance of two gardens. in an email dated july 17, 2013, mr. peixoto wrote to another condominium corporation board member regarding this “freebie” work, writing in part: “it’s nice he’s doing it but i am sure it’s an attempt at us keeping him. btw, i was talking to him last week as well and he is under the impression we’re keeping him for winter again. i didn’t say a word to him cuz i don’t wanna get involved but i did tell [ms. zollinger] that [mr. callow] thinks we’re keeping him for winter” (ar, vol. iii, at p 73). [14] baycrest did not inform callow about the decision to terminate the winter maintenance agreement until september 12, 2013. at that point, ms. zollinger advised callow by way of email “that baycrest will not be requiring your services for the winter contract for the 2013/2014 season, as per section 9 of the contract, baycrest needs to provide the contractor with 10 days’ notice” (ar, vol. iii, at p 49). [15] callow consequently filed a statement of claim for breach of contract, alleging that baycrest acted in bad faith by accepting free services while knowing callow was offering them in order to maintain their future contractual relationship. moreover, callow alleged that baycrest knew or ought to have known that callow would not seek other winter maintenance contracts in reliance on the representations that callow was providing satisfactory service and the contract would not be prematurely terminated. accordingly, “[a]s a result of these misrepresentations and/or bad faith conduct, [mr. callow on behalf of callow] did not bid on other tenders for winter maintenance contracts. [baycrest is] now liable for callow’s damages for loss of opportunity” (ar, vol. i, p 45, at para. 30). finally, callow alleged that baycrest was unjustly enriched by the free services it provided in the summer of 2013. [16] callow sought damages in the amount of $81,383.68 for breach of contract, an amount equivalent to the one year remaining on the winter maintenance agreement, damages for intentional interference with contractual relations, inducing breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation. it also asked for damages in the amount of $5,000.00 for unjust enrichment, an amount equivalent to the “freebie” work, and pre- and post-judgment interest and costs on a substantial indemnity basis. iii prior decisions a ontario superior court of justice (o’bonsawin j.) [17] in her review of the circumstances of the dispute, the trial judge commented on the testimony of several key witnesses, concluding that mr. callow was a credible witness in contrast, she found that baycrest’s witnesses — including a former property manager, as well as ms. zollinger and mr. peixoto — had “provided many exaggerations, over-statements and constantly provided comments contrary to the written evidence” (para. 11). the trial judge thus preferred mr. callow’s version of events to that of baycrest. [18] at trial, baycrest advanced two main submissions. first, it argued that, as a matter of simple contractual interpretation, clause 9 clearly and unambiguously states that it could terminate the contract for any reason by providing callow with 10 days’ notice in writing. second, even though no cause had to be shown to invoke clause 9, baycrest nonetheless argued that the evidence before the trial judge demonstrated that callow’s level of service did not comply with the contractual specifications and was not to its complete satisfaction. [19] the trial judge dismissed both arguments. first, she found that callow’s work met the requisite standard. while there were complaints about callow’s work, she observed that “a significant portion related to the clearing of parking stalls, which was the fault of owners/tenants who did not move their vehicles”. “was the quality of callow’s work below standard?” asked the trial judge, “the evidence leads me”, she wrote, “to answer no” (para. 55). [20] second, the trial judge held that this was not a simple contractual interpretation case. in her view, the organizing principle of good faith performance and the duty of honest performance were engaged the trial judge explained that, as cromwell j noted in bhasin, the duty of honest performance should not be confused with a duty of disclosure. “however,” she wrote, “contracting parties must be able to rely on a minimum standard of honesty” to ensure “that parties will have a fair opportunity to protect their interests if the contract does not work out” (para. 60, citing bhasin, at para. 86). for the purposes of drawing a distinction between the failure to disclose a material fact and active dishonesty, the trial judge observed that “[u]nless there is active deception, there is no unilateral duty to disclose information before the notice period” (para. 61). [21] the trial judge was satisfied that baycrest “actively deceived” callow from the time the termination decision was made in march or april 2013 to the time when notice was given on september 12, 2013. specifically, she found that baycrest “acted in bad faith by (1) withholding the information to ensure callow performed the summer maintenance services contract; and (2) continuing to represent that the contract was not in danger despite [baycrest’s] knowledge that callow was taking on extra tasks to bolster the chances of renewing the winter maintenance services contract” (para. 65). given the active communications between the parties during the summer of 2013, “which deceived callow”, the trial judge “[did] not accept [baycrest’s] argument that no duty was owed to disclose the decision to terminate the contract before the notice” (para. 66). “the minimum standard of honesty”, she concluded, “would have been to address the alleged performance issues, to provide prompt notice, or to refrain from any representations in anticipation of the notice period” (para. 67). [22] the trial judge tied baycrest’s dishonesty to the way in which it delayed invocation of the 10-day notice period set out in clause 9, while it actively deceived callow that the contract was not in jeopardy. her reasons relied upon, by analogy, the law recognizing a duty to exercise good faith in the manner of dismissal when terminating an employee she noted that baycrest “intentionally withheld the information in bad faith” (para. 69) she expressly acknowledged that exercising a termination clause is not, in itself, evidence of a breach of good faith. however, in this case, baycrest deliberately deceived callow about termination, which was a breach of the duty of honest performance. [23] by reason of this contractual breach, the trial judge awarded damages to callow, in order to place it in the same position as if the breach had not occurred. these damages amounted to $64,306.96, a sum equivalent to the value of the winter maintenance agreement for one year, minus expenses that callow would typically incur; a further amount of $14,835.14, representing the value of one year of a lease of equipment that callow would not have leased if it had known the winter maintenance was to be terminated; and $1,600.00 for the final invoice for the summer work, which baycrest had failed to pay to callow. costs were awarded to callow. [24] the trial judge was also satisfied that baycrest was unjustly enriched due to the “freebie” work performed by callow during the summer of 2013. she declined, however, to award damages for the unjust enrichment since callow failed to provide evidence of its expenses. b court of appeal for ontario (lauwers, huscroft and trotter jja) [25] baycrest appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in two respects. first, it alleged she erred by improperly expanding the duty of honest performance beyond the terms of the winter maintenance agreement. second, it argued the trial judge erred in assessing damages. [26] the court of appeal unanimously agreed with baycrest on the first point, and set aside the judgment at first instance. the court of appeal recognized, as the trial judge had found, that the “[d]irectors of two of the condominium corporations and members of the juc were aware that mr. callow was performing ‘freebie’ work, and knew he was under the impression that the contracts were likely to be renewed” (para. 5). nonetheless, the court stressed that bhasin was a modest, incremental step, and good faith is to be applied in a manner so as to avoid commercial uncertainty. as such, the duty of honesty “does not impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or to require a party to forego advantages flowing from the contract” (para. 12, citing bhasin, at para. 73). [27] the court of appeal further emphasized that callow had made two concessions in its factum first, callow acknowledged that baycrest was not contractually required to disclose its decision to terminate the winter maintenance agreement prior to the 10-day notice period. second, callow acknowledged that the failure to provide notice on a more timely basis was not, in and of itself, evidence of bad faith because there is “no unilateral duty to disclose information relevant to termination”, the court reasoned baycrest “[was] free to terminate the winter contract with [callow] provided only that [it] informed him of [its] intention to do so and gave the required notice. that is all that [callow] bargained for, and all that he was entitled to” (para. 17) while the trial judge’s findings “may well suggest a failure to act honourably,” the court of appeal expressed its view that the findings “do not rise to the high level required to establish a breach of the duty of honest performance” (para. 16). [28] in any event, the court of appeal said that any deception in the communications during the summer of 2013 related to a new contract not yet in existence, namely the renewal that callow hoped to negotiate. accordingly, in its view, any deception could not be said to be directly linked to the performance of the winter contract (para. 18). [29] given the court of appeal’s conclusion, it did not address damages. iv analysis a overview of the appeal [30] this appeal presents this court with an opportunity to clarify what constitutes a breach of the duty of honest performance where it manifests itself in connection with the exercise of a seemingly unfettered, unilateral termination clause. pointing to what it calls baycrest’s active deception in the exercise of the clause, callow says this conduct was a breach of the duty of honest performance recognized in bhasin. [31] before this court, callow does not dispute the meaning of clause 9. nor does callow’s argument on appeal concern the adequacy of the bargain struck with baycrest or whether the termination was unjustified. callow is not saying, for instance, that it should have been afforded more notice because the 10-day period was unfair in the circumstances. i recognize that, at trial, there was some question as to whether the termination was fitting given callow’s work record. indeed, the trial judge found in callow’s favour on this point, concluding that it had provided satisfactory services. but the suggestions that callow was terminated for some improper purpose or motive, or even that the termination was unreasonable, need not be determined on this appeal. the narrow question addressed here is whether baycrest failed to satisfy its duty not to lie or knowingly deceive callow about matters directly linked to the performance of the winter maintenance agreement, specifically by exercising the termination clause as it did. [32] in the present circumstances, callow says baycrest misled mr. callow about the possible renewal of the winter maintenance agreement and, as a result, it knowingly deceived him into thinking it was satisfied with callow’s performance of the agreement then in force for the upcoming winter season. callow says it mistakenly inferred, as a consequence of this dishonesty, that there was no danger of the existing winter contract being terminated pursuant to clause 9 of the contract this, callow submits, was to the full knowledge of baycrest, who failed to correct its false impression which amounted to a breach of the duty of honest performance. in short, callow says this deceitful conduct meant the exercise of the termination clause was wrongful in that it was breached even if, strictly speaking, the required notice was given. this should give rise, claims callow, to compensatory damages on the ordinary measure as the trial judge had ordered: damages for lost profits, wasted expenditures and an unpaid invoice. [33] in addition to the duty of honest performance, callow invokes a free-standing duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith, which, it argues, cromwell j also recognized in bhasin and which would justify the same award in damages. furthermore, in the event the court disagrees that there has been a breach of one or another of those existing duties, callow submits, alternatively, that this court should recognize a new duty of good faith, which would prohibit “active non-disclosure”. [34] in answer, baycrest notes the concessions made by callow before the court of appeal, specifically that clause 9 on its face did not require it to give more notice. baycrest agrees with the court of appeal that whatever communications took place between the parties, those communications concerned a future contract and were not directly related to the performance of the winter contract then in force. the agreement granted baycrest an unqualified right to terminate the contract on notice for any reason, which is precisely what occurred. recalling that the duty to act honestly in performance is not a duty of disclosure and does not impose a duty of loyalty akin to that of a fiduciary, baycrest says that callow seeks to have it subvert its own interest by requiring it to inform callow of its intention to end the winter maintenance agreement before the stipulated 10 days’ notice the court of appeal was thus correct in concluding that the bargain struck by the parties entitled baycrest to end the contract as it did. in a similar vein, with respect to the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith, baycrest says that because it respected the terms of the contract, the issue of abuse of contractual discretion does not arise on the facts of this case. [35] in any event, baycrest emphasizes the conclusion reached by the court of appeal that any discussions in the spring and summer of 2013 that may have misled callow were connected to pre-contractual negotiations. thus, any dishonesty cannot be said to be directly linked to the performance of the winter maintenance agreement. [36] the appeal should be allowed i respectfully disagree with the court of appeal on two main points. [37] first, bhasin is clear that even though baycrest had what was, on its face, an unfettered right to terminate the winter maintenance agreement on 10 days’ notice, the right had to be exercised in keeping with the duty to act honestly, ie. baycrest could not “lie or otherwise knowingly mislead” callow “about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract”. according to the court of appeal, any dishonesty was about a renewal, which was in turn connected to pre-contractual negotiations to which the duty as stated in bhasin does not apply. i respectfully disagree. in my view, the court of appeal may have erroneously framed the trial judge’s findings at paragraph 6, writing that she found that baycrest had represented “that the winter contract was not in danger of non-renewal” (emphasis added). referring instead to the ongoing winter services agreement, the trial judge had found baycrest misrepresented “that the contract was not in danger despite [baycrest’s] knowledge that callow was taking on extra tasks to bolster the chances of renewing the winter maintenance services contract” (para. 65). in determining whether dishonesty is connected to a given contract, the relevant question is generally whether a right under that contract was exercised, or an obligation under that contract was performed, dishonestly as i understand it, the trial judge’s finding was that the dishonesty in this case was related not to a future contract but to the termination of the winter maintenance agreement. if someone is led to believe that their counterparty is content with their work and their ongoing contract is likely to be renewed, it is reasonable for that person to infer that the ongoing contract is in good standing and will not be terminated early. this is what the trial judge found. simply said, baycrest’s alleged deception was directly linked to this contract because its exercise of the termination clause in this contract was dishonest. [38] second, the court of appeal erred when it concluded that the trial judge’s findings did not amount to a breach of the duty of honest performance. while the duty of honest performance is not to be equated with a positive obligation of disclosure, this too does not exhaust the question as to whether baycrest’s conduct constituted, as a breach of the duty of honesty, a wrongful exercise of the termination clause. baycrest may not have had a free-standing obligation to disclose its intention to terminate the contract before the mandated 10 days’ notice, but it nonetheless had an obligation to refrain from misleading callow in the exercise of that clause. in circumstances where a party lies to or knowingly misleads another, a lack of a positive obligation of disclosure does not preclude an obligation to correct the false impression created through its own actions. [39] in light of these points, it is my view that this is not a simple contractual interpretation case bearing on the meaning to be given to clause 9. nor is this a case involving passive failure to disclose a material fact. instead, as recognized by the court of appeal, “[n]ot only did [baycrest] fail to inform [callow] of [its] decision to terminate, . . [it] actively deceived callow as to [its] intentions and accepted the ‘freebie’ work [it] performed, in the knowledge that this extra work was performed with the intention/hope of persuading [baycrest] to award [callow] additional contracts once the present contracts expired” (para. 15 (emphasis added)). while baycrest was not required to subvert its legitimate contractual interests to those of callow in respect of the existing winter services agreement, it could not, as it did, “undermine those interests in bad faith” (bhasin, at para. 65). [40] for the reasons that follow, this dispute can be resolved on the basis of the first ground of appeal relating to the duty of honest performance. baycrest knowingly misled callow in the manner in which it exercised clause 9 of the agreement and this wrongful exercise of the termination clause amounts to a breach of contract under bhasin. in the circumstances, i find it unnecessary to answer callow’s argument that, irrespective of the question of honesty, baycrest breached a duty to exercise a discretionary power in good faith. nor is it necessary to extend bhasin to recognize a new duty of good faith relating to what callow has described as “active non-disclosure” of information germane to performance. b. the duty of honest performance (1) the dishonesty is directly linked to the performance of the contract [41] i turn first to callow’s submission that the court of appeal erred in concluding that the dishonesty was not connected to the contract “then in effect” (ca reasons, at para. 18). as i will endeavour to explain, while baycrest had the right to terminate, it breached the duty of honest performance in exercising the right as it did. [42] callow relies on the duty of honest performance in contract formulated in bhasin. this duty, which applies to all contracts, “requires the parties to be honest with each other in relation to the performance of their contractual obligations” (para. 93). while this formulation of the duty refers explicitly to the performance of contractual obligations, it applies, of course, both to the performance of one’s obligations and to the exercise of one’s rights under the contract. cromwell j concluded, at paragraphs 94 and 103, that the finding that the non-renewal clause had been exercised dishonestly made out a breach of the duty: the trial judge made a clear finding of fact that can-am “acted dishonestly toward bhasin in exercising the non-renewal clause”: para. 261; see also para. 271. there is no basis to interfere with that finding on appeal it follows that can-am breached its duty to perform the agreement honestly. as the trial judge found, this dishonesty on the part of can-am was directly and intimately connected to can-am’s performance of the agreement with mr. bhasin and its exercise of the non-renewal provision. i conclude that can-am breached the 1998 agreement when it failed to act honestly with mr. bhasin the non-renewal clause. in exercising [emphasis added.] this same framework for analysis applies to this appeal. the trial judge here made a clear finding of fact that baycrest acted dishonestly toward callow by representing that the contract was not in danger even though a decision to terminate the contract had already been made (paras. 65 and 67). there is no basis to interfere with that finding on appeal as i will explain, it follows that baycrest deceived callow and thereby breached its duty of honest performance. [43] i begin by recognizing the debate as to the extent to which good faith, beyond the duty of honesty, should substantively constrain a right to terminate, in particular one found in a contract (see, eg,. w. courtney, “good faith and termination: the english and australian experience” (2019), 1 journal of commonwealth law 185, at p 189; m. bridge, “the exercise of contractual discretion” (2019), 135 lqr 227, at p 247). for some, the right to terminate is in the nature of an “absolute right” insulated from judicial oversight, unlike the exercise of contractual discretion (see e. peel, the law of contract (15th ed. 2020), at para. 18-088). to this end, i recall that cromwell j observed that “[c]lassifying the decision not to renew the contract as a contractual discretion would constitute a significant expansion of the decided cases under that type of situation” (bhasin, at para. 72). i need not and do not seek to resolve this debate in this case. i emphasize that cromwell j himself recognized that, regardless of this debate, the non-renewal clause could not be exercised dishonestly (para. 94). whatever the full range of circumstances to which good faith is relevant to contract law in common law canada, it is beyond question that the duty of honesty is germane to the performance of this contract, in particular to the way in which the unilateral right to terminate for convenience set forth in clause 9 was exercised. [44] as a further preliminary matter, i recall that the organizing principle of good faith recognized by cromwell j is not a free-standing rule, but instead manifests itself through existing good faith doctrines, and that this list may be incrementally expanded where appropriate. in this case, callow invokes two existing doctrines: the duty of honest performance and the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith. in my view, properly understood, the duty to act honestly about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract — the exercise of the termination clause — is sufficient to dispose of this appeal no expansion of the law set forth in bhasin is necessary to find in favour of callow. rather, this appeal provides an opportunity to illustrate this existing doctrine that, i say respectfully, was misconstrued by the court of appeal. [45] while these two existing doctrines are indeed distinct, like each of the different manifestations of the organizing principle, they should not be thought of as disconnected from one another cromwell j explained that good faith contractual performance is a shared “requirement of justice” that underpins and informs the various rules recognized by the common law on obligations of good faith contractual performance (bhasin, at para. 64). the organizing principle of good faith was intended to correct the “piecemeal” approach to good faith in the common law, which too often failed to take a consistent or principled approach to similar problems and, instead, develop the law in this area in a “coherent and principled way” (paras. 59 and 64). [46] by insisting upon the thread that ties the good faith doctrines together — expressed through the organizing principle — courts will put an end to the very piecemeal and incoherent development of good faith doctrine in the common law against which cromwell j sought to guard while the duty of honest performance might bear some resemblance to the law of misrepresentation, for example, in a way that good faith in other settings may not, bhasin encourages us to examine how other existing good faith doctrines, distinct but nonetheless connected, can be used as helpful analytical tools in understanding how the relatively new duty of honest performance operates in practice. [47] the specific legal doctrines derived from the organizing principle rest on a “requirement of justice” that a contracting party, like baycrest here in respect of the contractual duty of honest performance, have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of their counterparty (bhasin, at paras. 63-64) it need not, according to bhasin, subvert its own interests to those of callow by acting as a fiduciary or in a selfless manner that would confer a benefit on callow to be sure, this requirement of justice reflects the notion that the bargain, the rights and obligations agreed to, is the first source of fairness between parties to a contract. but by the same token, those rights and obligations must be exercised and performed, as stated by the organizing principle, honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily where recognized by law this requirement of justice, rooted in a contractual ideal of corrective justice, ties the existing doctrines of good faith, including the duty to act honestly, together. the duty of honest performance is but an exemplification of this ideal here, based on its failure to perform clause 9 honestly, baycrest committed a breach of contract, a civil wrong, for which it has to answer. [48] when, in bhasin, cromwell j recognized a duty to act honestly in the performance of contracts, he explained that this duty “should not be thought of as an implied term, but a general doctrine of contract law that imposes as a contractual duty a minimum standard of honest contractual performance” (para. 74). characterizing this new duty as a matter of contractual doctrine was appropriate, cromwell j wrote, “since parties will rarely expect that their contracts permit dishonest performance of their obligations” (para. 76). the duty therefore applies even where — as in our case — the parties have expressly provided for the modalities of termination given that the duty of good faith “operates irrespective of the intentions of the parties” (para. 74) no contractual right, including a termination right, can be exercised dishonestly and, as such, contrary to the requirements of good faith. [49] cromwell j.’s choice of language is telling it is not enough to say that, temporally speaking, dishonesty occurred while both parties were performing their obligations under the contract; rather, the dishonest or misleading conduct must be directly linked to performance. otherwise, there would simply be a duty not to tell a lie, with little to limit the potentially wide scope of liability. [50] the duty of honest performance is a contract law doctrine, setting it apart from other areas of the law that address the legal consequences of deceit with which it may share certain similarities. one could imagine analyzing the facts giving rise to a duty of honest performance claim through the lens of other existing legal doctrines, such as fraudulent misrepresentation giving rise to rescission of the contract or the tort of civil fraud (see, eg,. b. macdougall, misrepresentation (2016), at §1144-1145). however, in bhasin, cromwell j wrote explicitly that while the duty of honest performance has similarities with civil fraud and estoppel “it is not subsumed by them” (para. 88). for instance, unlike estoppel and civil fraud, the duty of honest performance does not require a defendant to intend that the plaintiff rely on their representation or false statement. cromwell j explicitly defined the duty as a new and distinct doctrine of contract law, not giving rise to tort liability or tort damages but rather resulting in a breach of contract when violated (paras. 72-74, 90, 93 and 103). we are not asked by the parties to depart from this approach. [51] in light of bhasin, then, how is the duty of honest performance appropriately limited? the breach must be directly linked to the performance of the contract cromwell j observed a contractual breach because can-am “acted dishonestly toward bhasin in exercising the non-renewal clause” (para. 94) he pointed, in particular, to the trial judge’s conclusion that can-am “acted dishonestly with mr. bhasin throughout the period leading up to its exercise of the non-renewal clause” (para. 98; see also para. 103). accordingly, it is a link to the performance of obligations under a contract, or to the exercise of rights set forth therein, that controls the scope of the duty. in a comment on bhasin, professor mccamus underscored this connection: “cromwell j was of the view that the new duty of honesty could be breached in the context of the exercise of a right of non-renewal. that was the holding in bhasin” (“the new general ‘principle’ of good faith performance and the new ‘rule’ of honesty in performance in canadian contract law” (2015), 32 jcl 103, at p 115). while the abuse of discretion was not the basis of the damages awarded in bhasin, the duty of honest performance shares a common methodology with the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith by fixing, at least in circumstances like ours, on the wrongful exercise of a contractual prerogative. [52] importantly, callow does not seek to bar baycrest from exercising the termination clause here; like in bhasin, it only seeks damages flowing from the fact that the clause was exercised dishonestly. in other words, callow’s argument, properly framed, is that baycrest could not exercise clause 9 in a manner that breached the duty of honesty, however absolute that right appeared on its face. [53] good faith is thus not relied upon here to provide, by implication, a new contractual term or a guide to interpretation of language that was somehow an unclear statement of parties’ intent. instead, the duty of honesty as contractual doctrine has a limiting function on the exercise of an otherwise complete and clear right because the duty, irrespective of the intention of the parties, applies to the performance of all contracts and, by extension, to all contractual obligations and rights this means, simply, that instead of constraining the decision to terminate in and of itself, the duty of honest performance attracts damages where the manner in which the right was exercised was dishonest. [54] the issue, then, is not whether the clause was properly interpreted, or whether the bargain itself is inadequate. moreover, what is important is not the failure to act honestly in the abstract but whether baycrest failed to act honestly in exercising clause 9. stated simply, no contractual right can be exercised in a dishonest manner because, pursuant to bhasin, that would be contrary to an imperative requirement of good faith, ie not to lie or knowingly deceive one’s counterparty in a matter directly linked to the performance of the contract. [55] this argument invites this court to explain if and how baycrest wrongfully exercised the termination clause, quite apart from any notice requirement. i would add that this focus on the manner in which the termination right was exercised should not be confused with whether the right could be exercised callow does not allege that baycrest did not have the right to terminate the agreement — this entitlement to do so on 10 days’ notice, pursuant to clause 9, is not at issue here. however, according to callow, that right was exercised dishonestly, in breach of the duty in bhasin, obliging baycrest to pay damages as a consequence of its behaviour. accordingly, i would draw the same distinction made by cromwell j in bhasin regarding the exercise of the non-renewal clause at issue in that case: can-am acted dishonestly towards mr. bhasin in exercising the non-renewal clause as it did, and was liable for damages as a result, but it was not precluded from exercising its prerogative not to renew the contract. [56] in service of its argument that baycrest breached the duty of honest performance in its exercise of clause 9 of the contract, callow points to references in bhasin to quebec law (at paras. 32, 35, 41, 44, 82 and 85) and in particular to cromwell j.’s reference to the theory of the abuse of contractual rights set forth in arts. 6, 7 and 1375 of the civil code of québec (“ccq” or “civil code”) (para. 83). callow observes that the requirement not to abuse contractual rights is recognized as a feature of good faith performance in quebec. it submits that the allusion to the doctrine of abuse of rights was an indication of the requirements of good faith in bhasin and argues that the same framework can usefully illustrate how the common law duty of honesty constrains the termination clause in this case. [57] i agree that looking to quebec law is useful here. the direct link between the dishonest conduct and the exercise of clause 9 was not properly identified by the court of appeal in this case and quebec law helps illustrate the requirement that there be such a link from bhasin. in my view, baycrest’s dishonest conduct is not a wrong independent of the termination clause but a breach of contract that, properly understood, manifested itself upon the exercise of clause 9. through that direct link between the dishonesty and the exercise of the clause, the conduct is understood as contrary to the requirements of good faith. this emerges more plainly when considered in light of the civilian doctrine of contractual good faith alluded to in bhasin, specifically the fact that, in quebec “[t]he notion of good faith includes (but is not limited to) the requirement of honesty in performing the contract” (para. 83). thus, like in quebec civil law, no contractual right may be exercised dishonestly and therefore contrary to the requirements of good faith properly raised by cromwell j., this framework for connecting the exercise of a contractual clause and the requirements of good faith is helpful to illustrate, for the common law, the link made in bhasin that the court of appeal failed to identify here. [58] mindful no doubt of its unique vantage point which offers an occasion to observe developments in both the common law and the civil law in its work, this court has often drawn on this country’s bijural environment to inform its decisions, principally in private law appeals. while this practice has varied over time and has been most prevalent in civil law cases in which common law authorities are considered, the influence of bijuralism is not and need not be confined to appeals from quebec or to matters relating to federal legislation (see j-f. gaudreault-desbiens, les solitudes du bijuridisme au canada (2007), at pp. 7-22). in its modern jurisprudence, this court has recognized the value of looking to legal sources from quebec in common law appeals, and has often observed how these sources resolve similar legal issues to those faced by the common law (see, eg,. canadian national railway co. v. norsk pacific steamship co., [1992] 1 scr 1021, at pp. 1143-44; deloitte & touche v. livent inc. (receiver of), 2017 scc 63, [2017] 2 scr 855, at para. 138; see also kingstreet investments ltd. v. new brunswick (finance), 2007 scc 1, [2007] 1 scr 3, at para. 41). used in this way, authorities from quebec do not, of course, bind this court in its disposition of a private law appeal from a common law province, but rather serve as persuasive authority, in particular, by shedding light on how the jurisdictionally applicable rules work. in my respectful view, it is uncontroversial that, when done carefully, sources of law may be used in this way (farber v royal trust co., [1997] 1 scr 846, at para. 32, citing j-l. baudouin, “l’interprétation du code civil québécois par la cour suprême du canada” (1975), 53 can. bar rev. 715, at p 726). as robert j. sharpe put it, writing extra-judicially, judges “should strive to maintain the coherence and integrity of the law as defined by the binding authorities, using persuasive authority to elaborate and flesh out its basic structure” (good judgment: making judicial decisions (2018), at pp. 171-72). [59] this does not mean the appropriate use of these sources is limited to cases where there is a gap in the law of the jurisdiction in which the appeal originates, in the sense that there is no answer to the legal problem in that law, or where a court contemplates modifying an existing rule. respectfully said, i am aware of no authority of this court supporting so restrictive an approach and note that, while unresolved, there are serious debates in both the common law and the civil law as to what exactly a “gap” in the law might be (see, eg,. j. gardner, “concerning permissive sources and gaps” (1988), 8 oxford j leg stud 457; j. e. c. brierley, “quebec’s ‘common laws’ (droits communs): how many are there?”, in e. caparros et al., eds., mélanges louis-philippe pigeon (1989), 109) taking this approach would unduly inhibit the ability of this court to understand the law better in reference to how comparable problems are addressed elsewhere in canada it would be wrong to disregard potentially helpful material in this way merely because of its origin. [60] in private law, comparison between the common law and civil law as they evolve in canada is a particularly useful and familiar exercise for this court this exercise of comparison between legal traditions for the purposes of “explanation” and “illustration” has been described as “worthwhile”, “useful” and “helpful” (farber, at para. 32 and 35; st. lawrence cement inc. v. barrette, 2008 scc 64, [2008] 3 scr. 392, at para. 76; norsk, at p 1174, per stevenson j (concurring)). principles from the common law or the civil law may serve as a “source of inspiration” for the other, precisely because these “two legal communities have the same broad social values” (bou malhab v. diffusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 scc 9, [2011] 1 scr 214, at para. 38). the common law and the civil law are not the only legal traditions relevant to the work of the court; yet, the opportunity for dialogue between these legal traditions is arguably a special mandate for this court given the breadth and responsibilities of its bijural jurisdiction. this opportunity has been underscored in scholarly commentary, including in the field of good faith performance of contracts (eg,. l. lebel and p-l. le saunier, “l’interaction du droit civil et de la common law à la cour suprême du canada” (2006), 47 c de d 179, at p 206; r. jukier, “good faith in contract: a judicial dialogue between common law canada and québec” (2019), 1 journal of commonwealth law 83). [61] writing extra-judicially, lebel j has observed that this exercise is part of the function of this court, as a national appellate court, adding that [translation] “because it has the ability to do so today, thanks to its institutional resources, the supreme court now assumes the symbolic responsibility of embracing a culture of dialogue between the two major legal traditions” (“les cultures de la cour suprême du canada : vers l’émergence d’une culture dialogique?”, in j-f. gaudreault-desbiens et al., eds., convergence, concurrence et harmonisation des systèmes juridiques (2009), 1, at p 7). this court’s unique institutional capacity as the apex court of common law and civil law appeals in canada allows it to engage in dialogue that makes it “more than a court of appeal for each of the provinces” (f. allard, the supreme court of canada and its impact on the expression of bijuralism (2001), at p 21) the opportunity for dialogue presents itself specifically in the context of the common law good faith doctrines. pointing to the writing of lebel j and to how quebec sources were deployed in bhasin, one comparative law scholar wrote recently that while the distinctiveness of canada’s legal traditions must be “maintained and jealously protected, [this] need not prevent [them] from learning from [one another]” (r. jukier, “the legacy of justice louis lebel: the civilian tradition and procedural law” (2015), 70 sclr (2d) 27, at p 45) professor waddams has remarked that the reference to quebec law in bhasin is an “invitation” to consider civil law concepts, including abuse of rights, in the development of the common law relating to good faith (see “unfairness and good faith in contract law: a new approach” (2017), 80 sclr (2d) 309, at pp. 330-31). this would be consistent with a broader pattern of “more pronounced reciprocal influence between traditions as comparative analysis becomes increasingly prominent in [this court’s] judgments” (allard, at p 22). [62] indeed, this court has undertaken this exercise in some common law and civil law appeals in which good faith principles are engaged, including bhasin itself (see also potter v new brunswick legal aid services commission, 2015 scc 10, [2015] 1 scr 500, at para. 30; wallace v united grain growers ltd., [1997] 3 scr 701, at paras. 75 and 96, citing farber). cromwell j pointed to the comfort that can be drawn from the experience of the civil law of quebec, for example, by those common lawyers who fear that a new duty of honest performance would “create uncertainty or impede freedom of contract” (bhasin, at para. 82) cromwell j also pointed to substantive points of comparison in support of his analysis on the similarity between implied terms in the common law and good faith in quebec as well as on the fact that good faith in quebec law also includes a requirement of honesty in performing contracts (paras. 44 and 83). strikingly, in one recent quebec example that is especially relevant here, gascon j., writing for a majority of this court, quoted bhasin on the degree to which the organizing principle of good faith exemplifies the notion that a contracting party should have “appropriate regard” to the legitimate contractual interests of their counterparty. he noted that “[t]his statement applies equally to the duty of good faith in quebec civil law” (churchill falls (labrador) corp v. hydro-québec, 2018 scc 46, [2018] 3 scr 101, at para. 117). i note this only as an instance of accepted judicial reasoning in this field, where comparisons are rightly said to be difficult. a majority of the court nevertheless invoked a leading common law authority on good faith to illuminate the civil law’s distinct treatment as both helpful and persuasive. [63] in the same way, i draw on quebec civil law in this appeal to illustrate what it means for dishonesty to be directly linked to contractual performance as i will explain, the civil law framework of abuse of rights helps to focus the analysis of whether the common law duty of honest performance has been breached on what might be called the wrongful exercise of a contractual right. [64] this appeal makes plain a need for clarification on the question of when dishonesty is directly linked to the performance of a contract the court of appeal recognized the duty of honest performance, but concluded that the communications at issue were not directly linked to performance of the existing contract: “communications between the parties may have led mr. callow to believe that there would be a new contract, but those communications did not preclude [baycrest] from exercising their right to terminate the winter contract then in effect” (para. 18). the court’s reasons also conclude that baycrest could exercise the termination clause “provided only that [it] informed him of [its] intention to do so and gave the required notice. that is all [callow] bargained for, and all that [it] was entitled to” (para. 17). the court of appeal apparently did not consider that the manner in which the termination right was exercised amounted to a breach of the duty to act honestly. this was, for the trial judge in the present appeal, the matter directly linked to the performance of the contract in the dispute with callow. [65] these diverging conclusions in this case are unsurprising given that this court recognized the duty of honest performance as a “new” good faith doctrine relatively recently (bhasin, at para. 93). nevertheless, the reasons in bhasin indicate how the required connection between the dishonesty and performance is made manifest. when cromwell j summarized the new duty, he suggested that it required honesty “about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract” and, later, “in relation to the performance of their contractual obligations” (paras. 73 and 92). but this latter formulation does not of course comprehensively describe the required link, not least of all because it speaks of honesty in the performance of an obligation, and says nothing about the exercise of a right yet, in applying the duty to the facts in bhasin, this court concluded that there was a breach of the duty on the basis of the trial judge’s finding that can-am acted dishonestly in the exercise of the non-renewal clause (paras. 94 and 103). [66] further, i note that while the duty of honest performance has similarities with the pre-existing common law doctrines of civil fraud and estoppel, these doctrines do not assist in our analysis of the required link to the performance of the contract. the duty of honest performance is a contract law doctrine (bhasin, at para. 74). it is not a tort. it is its nature as a contract law doctrine that gives rise to the requirement of a nexus with the contractual relationship while other areas of the law involving dishonesty may be useful to understand what it means to be dishonest, they provide no obvious assistance in determining what is and is not directly linked to the performance of a contract. [67] in my view, the required direct link between dishonesty and performance from bhasin is made plain, by way of simple comparison, when one considers how the framework for abuse of rights in quebec connects the manner in which a contractual right is exercised to the requirements of good faith. specifically, the direct link exists when the party performs their obligation or exercises their right under the contract dishonestly. when read together, arts. 6, 7 and 1375 ccq point to this connection by providing that no contractual right may be exercised abusively without violating the requirements of good faith. article 7 in particular provides “[n]o right may be exercised with the intent of injuring another or in an excessive and unreasonable manner, and therefore contrary to the requirements of good faith.” while the substantive content of this article is not relevant to the common law analysis, the framework is illustrative. this article shows how the requirements of good faith can be tied to the exercise of a right, including a right under a contract. it is the exercise of the right that is scrutinized to assess whether the action has been contrary to good faith. [68] under the civil law framework of abuse of rights, it is no answer to say that, because a right is unfettered on its face, it is insulated from review as to the manner in which it was exercised. moreover, the doctrine of abuse of right does not preclude the holder from exercising the contractual right in question. as professors jobin and vézina have written on abuse of contractual rights in quebec, [translation] “[t]he doctrine of abuse of right does not lead to the negation of the right as such; rather, it addresses the use made of the right by its holder” (j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obligations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at no. 156). it has been said that good faith in the civil law has a [translation] “limiting function” in directing standards of ethical conduct to which parties must conform, as a matter of imperative law, when performing the contract: [translation] “it [ie the limiting function of good faith] thus seeks to sanction a party’s improper conduct in the exercise of the party’s contractual prerogatives.” (m. a. grégoire, liberté, responsabilité et utilité : la bonne foi comme instrument de justice (2010), at p 225). that is what is at stake here: whether the ethical standard expressed in the common law duty to act honestly in performance, as a manifestation of the organizing principle of good faith recognized in bhasin, limits the manner in which baycrest can exercise its right to terminate the winter maintenance agreement. by focusing attention on the exercise of a particular right under a particular contract, a direct link to the performance of that contract is helpfully drawn. [69] thus, in houle v canadian national bank, [1990] 3 scr 122 — a quebec case cited in bhasin, at para. 85 — the contracting party’s right to demand repayment of the loan, as stipulated in the contract, was upheld (p 169). the “abuse of right” identified by the court was the manner in which the right was exercised. this is, as i have noted, broadly similar to bhasin. there, can-am had a contractual right of non-renewal, but can-am nonetheless exercised that right in a dishonest manner, and thus breached the duty of honest performance (para. 94). this was a wrongful exercise of the right in that it was exercised contrary to the mandatory requirement of good faith performance. [70] there are special reasons, of course, to be cautious in undertaking the comparative exercise to which callow invites us here. one is that there are important differences between the civilian treatment of abuse of contractual rights and the current state of the common law. the civil code provides that no right may be exercised with the intent to injure another or in an excessive and unreasonable manner and therefore contrary to the requirements of good faith requiring that parties conduct themselves in good faith, in particular at the time an obligation is performed. insofar as the organizing principle in bhasin speaks to a related idea that parties generally must perform their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily, this principle, unlike quebec law, is not a free-standing rule but rather a standard that underpins and manifests itself in more specific doctrines. further, in bhasin, positive law was only formally extended by recognizing a general duty of honesty in contractual performance. [71] an additional reason is the common law’s fabled reluctance to embrace the standard associated with the civilian idea of “abuse of rights”, including abuse of contractual rights, a doctrine to which bhasin alluded in para. 83 (see, eg, the survey in h. c gutteridge, “abuse of rights” (1933), 5 cambridge l.j 22, at pp. 22 and 30-31).1 mindful of this, cromwell j recalled the “fundamental commitments of the common law of contract” to the “freedom of contracting parties to pursue their individual self-interest” and — importantly to the theory of abuse of rights — that the organizing principle he recognized “should not be used as a pretext for scrutinizing the motives of contracting parties” (para. 70) others have observed that the civilian conception of legal rights — droits subjectifs in the french tradition — are conceptually different from “rights” in the common law, or even that the preoccupation with the “social” dimension of limits to rights, as opposed to a purely “economic” aspect of a freely-negotiated bargain, is peculiar to the civil law (see, eg,. f. h lawson, negligence in the civil law (1950), at pp. 15-20) still others have observed the differing techniques for the genesis of new rules of law according to the common law and civil law methods (see, eg,. p. daly, “la bonne foi et la common law: l’arrêt bhasin c. hrynew”, in j. torres-ceyte, g-a. berthold and c-a. m. péladeau, eds., le dialogue en droit civil (2018), 89, at pp. 101-2). one should not lose sight of the fact 1 professor gutteridge pointed in particular to the influence of mayor of bradford v. pickles, [1895] ac 587 (hl) and, in the contractual setting, allen v. flood, [1898] ac 1 (hl), quoting from p 46 of the latter judgment: “. . . any right given by contract may be exercised as against the giver by the person to whom it is granted, no matter how wicked, cruel, or mean the motive may be which determines the enforcement of the right”. that, as intellectual and historical traditions, the common law and the civil law represent, in many respects, distinctive ways of knowing the law. [72] it is true that lebel j., writing extra-judicially prior to this court’s decision in bhasin, in which he concurred, noted that in the dialogue between the common law and the civil law in this court’s jurisprudence, good faith offered an example of [translation] “coexistence” rather than “convergence” or “divergence” (lebel, at pp. 12-15) yet as he noted, comparison in this field that respects the “intellectual integrity” of distinctive traditions remains a viable part of the dialogue between common law and the civil law at this court (p 15). while the requirements of honest contractual performance in the two legal traditions may be rooted in distinct histories, they have come together to address similar issues, at least in the context of dishonest performance (bhasin, at para. 83). the civil law provides a useful analytical guide to illustrating the relatively recent common law duty. two reasons in particular underlie the usefulness of the comparative exercise here. [73] first, i stress that i do not rely on the civil law here for the specific rules that would govern a similar claim in quebec. rather, within the constraints imposed on this court by the precedent in bhasin and the wider common law context, i draw on abuse of rights as a framework to understand the common law duty of honest performance. second, there is no serious concern here that looking to quebec law will throw the common law into a state of uncertainty. as cromwell j did in bhasin, this court can take comfort from the experience of quebec to allay fears that applying this general framework of wrongful exercise of rights will result in commercial uncertainty or inappropriately constrain freedom of contract. notwithstanding their differences, the common law and the civil law in quebec share, in respect of good faith, some of the “same broad social values” that justify comparison generally (bou malhab, at para. 38). as noted, this court pointed to a shared concern for the proper compass of good faith in that it “does not require acting to serve [the other contracting party’s] interests in all cases” and both anchor remedies in corrective, not distributive justice (churchill falls, at para. 117, citing bhasin, at para. 65) as professor moore wrote, prior to his appointment as a judge [translation] “the value of individual autonomy, and the fear that good faith is an imprecise concept, are not exclusive to the common law. they are discussed at length in civil law commentary and jurisprudence” (“brèves remarques spontanées sur l’arrêt bhasin c hrynew”, in j. torres-ceyte, g-a. berthold and c-a. m. péladeau, eds., le dialogue en droit civil (2018), 81, at p 84) for these reasons, it is not inappropriate to illustrate the duty of honest performance using the framework of the wrongful exercise of a right dishonesty is directly linked to the performance of a given contract where it can be said that the exercise of a right or the performance of an obligation under that contract has been dishonest. [74] applying bhasin to this case, and drawing on the illustration provided by the quebec civil law sources cromwell j himself cites, i am of the respectful view that the court of appeal erred when it concluded that the dishonesty here was only about a future contract. properly understood, the alleged dishonesty in this case was directly linked to the performance of the contract because baycrest’s exercise of the termination right provided to it under the contract was dishonest. [75] the termination right was exercised dishonestly according to the trial judge in our case, notwithstanding the fact that its terms — the 10-day notice — were otherwise respected. pointing to the dishonest representations, regarding the danger to the contract and made in anticipation of the notice period, she held that the duty to act honestly was linked to the termination of the contract and the exercise of that right in the circumstances was a breach of contract. the trial judge did not deny the right of baycrest to terminate the contract, but the manner in which it did so was wrongful — in breach of the duty of honesty — and for that it owed callow damages. importantly, this does not deny the existence of the termination right but fixes on the wrongful manner in which it was exercised. (2) baycrest’s conduct constitutes dishonesty [76] the second issue to be resolved is whether baycrest’s conduct amounts to dishonesty within the meaning of the duty of honest performance in bhasin. callow takes issue with the court of appeal’s conclusion that while the facts may have suggested a failure to act honourably, they did not rise to the level of a breach of this duty. to dispose of this appeal, then, we must determine what standard of honesty was expected of baycrest in its exercise of clause 9. [77] there is common ground that parties to a contract cannot outright lie or tell half-truths in a manner that knowingly misleads a counterparty. it is also agreed here that the failure to disclose a material fact, without more, would not be contrary to the standard beyond this, however, the parties continue to disagree about what might constitute knowingly misleading conduct as that idea was alluded to in bhasin. [78] callow argues that while this court in bhasin held that the duty of honest performance does not impose a duty of disclosure, it left open the possibility that an omission to inform can nonetheless be knowingly misleading in certain circumstances. callow acknowledges that the line between a misrepresentation and the innocent failure to disclose is not always easy to draw. but by “positively misleading” mr. callow that the winter maintenance agreement was likely to be renewed in 2014, he was led to infer, mistakenly and to the knowledge of baycrest, that a decision had not been made to terminate the existing contract in 2013. failing to correct this false impression, in callow’s view, was a breach of its obligation to act honestly in the performance of the winter maintenance agreement. it meant that clause 9 was not exercised in keeping with the obligatory duty to perform the contract honestly imposed in bhasin. [79] baycrest submits that “active deception” — a term invoked by the trial judge, as well as both parties — requires actual dishonesty, in the sense that an outright lie is necessary “silence”, said its counsel at the hearing, “can only constitute misrepresentation when there is a duty to speak”. since the duty of honest performance does not bring with it a duty of disclosure, “silence cannot constitute dishonesty or an act of misrepresentation, whether done intentionally or, i suppose, accidentally” (transcript, at p 37). [80] baycrest is right to say that the duty to act honestly “does not impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or require a party to forego advantages flowing from the contract” (bhasin, at para. 73; see also a. swan, j. adamski and a. y. na, canadian contract law (4th ed 2018), at p 347) cromwell j referred to united roasters, inc. v. colgate-palmolive co., 649 f.2d 985 (4th cir. 1981), in support of his conclusion that the duty of honest performance is distinct from a free-standing duty to disclose information (para. 87). in united roasters, the terminating party had decided in advance of the required notice period to terminate the contract. the court held that no disclosure of that intention was required other than what was stipulated in the contract. in cromwell j.’s view, this made “it clear that there is no unilateral duty to disclose information relevant to termination” (para. 87). [81] one might well understand that courts would shy away from imposing a free-standing positive duty to disclose information to a counterparty where it would serve to upset the corrective justice orientation of contract law whether or not a positive duty to cooperate of this character should be associated with the principle of good faith performance in the common law, a party to a contract has no general duty to subordinate their interests to that of the other party in the law as it now stands (see bhasin, at para. 86). requiring a party to speak up in service of the requirements of good faith where nothing in the parties’ contractual relationship brings a duty to do so could be understood to confer an unbargained-for benefit on the other that would stand outside the usual compass of contractual justice yet where the failure to speak out amounts to active dishonesty in a manner directly related to the performance of the contract, a wrong has been committed and correcting it does not serve to confer a benefit on the party who has been wronged. to this end, cromwell j clarified that the “situation is quite different . . . when it comes to actively misleading or deceiving the other contracting party in relation to performance of the contract” (para. 87). in such circumstances, contractual parties should be mindful to correct misapprehensions, lest a contractual breach of the bhasin duty be found. [82] by noting that liability flowed from active dishonesty and not a unilateral duty to disclose, cromwell j indicated that the duty of honesty is consonant with the ordinary principles of contractual justice: that bhasin does not impose a duty to disclose or a fiduciary-type obligation means that performing a contract honestly is not a selfless or altruistic act one might well say that performing one’s own end of a bargain honestly is in keeping with the pursuit of self-interest as long as the law can be counted on to require the same honest conduct from one’s counterparty. whatever constraints it justifies on baycrest’s ability to terminate the contract based on values of honesty associated with good faith, it does not require it to confer a benefit on callow in exercising that right as cromwell j explained, having appropriate regard for the legitimate contractual interests of the contracting parties “does not require acting to serve those interests in all cases” (para. 65) this explains, to my mind, the limited character of the duty of honesty: it is not a device that allows a court, in the name of a conception of good faith resting on distributive justice, to require the party that has to exercise a contractual right or power “to serve” the other party’s interest at the expense of their own. [83] this emphasis on the corrective justice foundation of the duty to act honestly in performance is, in my view, helpful to understanding why a facially unfettered right is nonetheless constrained by the imperative requirement of good faith explained in bhasin i recall that cromwell j sought to reassure those who feared commercial uncertainty resulting from the recognition of this new duty by explaining that the requirement of honest performance “interferes very little with freedom of contract” (para. 76) after all, the expectation that a contract would be performed without lies or deception can already be thought of as a minimum standard that is part of the bargain. i agree with the sentiment expressed by the chief justice of alberta in a case that relied on bhasin and potter: “companies are entitled to expect that the parties with whom they contract will be honest” in their contractual dealings (ifp technologies (canada) inc. v. encana midstream and marketing, 2017 abca 157, 53 alta. lr (6th) 96, at para. 4). in that sense, while the duty is one of mandatory law, in most cases it can be thought of as leaving the agreement and both parties’ expectations — the first source of justice between the parties — in place. by extension, requiring that a party exercise a right under the contract in keeping with this minimum standard only precludes the commission of a wrong and thus repairing that breach, where damage resulted, may be thought of as consonant with the principles of corrective justice where a party has lied or otherwise knowingly misled the other contracting party in respect of a matter that is directly linked to the performance of the contract, it amounts to breach of contract that must be set right, but the benefits of the bargain need not be otherwise reallocated between the parties involved. [84] that said, i emphasize once again that it is unquestionable that the duty is imposed as a matter of contractual doctrine rather than by implication or interpretation, and, by virtue of its status as contractual doctrine, parties are “not free to exclude” the duty altogether (bhasin, at para. 75). even if the parties, as here, have agreed to a term that provides for an apparently unfettered right to terminate the contract for convenience, that right cannot be exercised in a manner that transgresses the core expectations of honesty required by good faith in the performance of contracts. [85] this framework for measuring the wrongful exercise of the termination right does not turn on baycrest’s motive in exercising clause 9 beyond the observation that it did so dishonestly. the right of termination was, on its face, one without cause: baycrest may have had legitimate grievances against callow or some ulterior motive for its knowing deception — it is of no moment. the negative view that the property manager may have had of callow, alluded to by the trial judge (at para. 14), is not the source of the breach of the duty of honest performance. [86] moreover, i note that cromwell j described the requirements of the duty of honesty negatively: while the duty of honest performance does not require parties to act angelically by subordinating their own interests to that of their counterparty (bhasin, at para. 86), they must refrain from lying or knowingly misleading their counterparty (para. 73) as a “negative” obligation — that is, in the absence of a recognized duty to act, the injunction it imposes is one not to act dishonestly — it sits more plainly with the ordinary objectives of corrective justice and what one scholar sees as the traditional posture of the common law in favour of contractual autonomy and individual freedom in private law [translation] “it is clear”, wrote professor daly in a comment on the common law method consecrated in bhasin, “that the duty of honesty recognized in bhasin is a negative obligation — not to lie — rather than a positive obligation — to act in good faith” (pp. 101-2). this same orientation has been observed as animating the analogous contractual duty of good faith in the civil law. while positive obligations to cooperate in performance may be otherwise required by the law of good faith, scholars have observed that the notional equivalent of the duty of honest performance in quebec civil law most typically imposes negative obligations — to refrain from lying, for example — in the measure of the abuse of a contractual right (baudouin and jobin, at no. 161) care must be taken, i hasten to say, not to confuse the [translation] “duty to act faithfully” recognized in this regard, with the fiduciary duty of loyalty that stands outside of good faith in both legal traditions. [87] i would add that, as cromwell j made plain, the recognition of the duty to act honestly in performance does not necessarily mean that the ideal spoken to in the organizing principle of good faith set forth in bhasin might not manifest itself otherwise. even within the limited compass of corrective justice, circumstances may arise in which the organizing principle would encourage the view that contractual rights must be exercised in a manner that was neither capricious nor arbitrary, for example, or that some duty to cooperate between the parties be imposed, though recognizing that, contrary to fiduciary duties, “good faith performance does not engage duties of loyalty to the other contracting party or a duty to put the interests of the other contracting party first” (bhasin, at para. 65). but for present purposes, it is not necessary to go that further step: i am of the view that where the exercise of a contractual right is undertaken dishonestly, the exercise is in breach of contract and this wrong must be corrected. that is what happened here. [88] the question that remains is whether baycrest lied to or knowingly misled callow and thus breached the duty to act honestly. [89] i recognize that in cases where there is no outright lie present, like the case before us, it is not always obvious whether a party “knowingly misled” its counterparty. yet, baycrest is wrong to suggest that nothing stands between the outright lie and silence elsewhere, as in the law of misrepresentation, for instance, one encounters examples of courts determining whether a misrepresentation was present, regardless of whether there was some direct lie (see a. swan, “the obligation to perform in good faith: comment on bhasin v. hrynew” (2015), 56 can. bus. lj 395, at p 402). as professor waddams has written, “[a]n incomplete statement may be as misleading as a false one, and such half-truths have frequently been treated as legally significant misrepresentations.” ultimately, he wrote, “it is open to the court to hold that the concealment of the material facts can, when taken with general statements, true in themselves but incomplete, turn those statements into misrepresentations” (the law of contracts (7th ed. 2017), at no. 441). similarly, where a party makes a statement it believes to be true, but later circumstances affect the truth of that earlier statement, courts have found, in various contexts, that the party has an obligation to correct the misrepresentation (see xerex exploration ltd. v. petro-canada, 2005 abca 224, 47 alta. lr (4th) 6, at para. 58; see also c. mummé, “bhasin v. hrynew: a new era for good faith in canadian employment law, or just tinkering at the margins?” (2016), 32 intl j. comp. lab. l & ind. rel. 117, at p 123). [90] these examples encourage the view that the requirements of honesty in performance can, and often do, go further than prohibiting outright lies indeed, the concept of “misleading” one’s counterparty — the term invoked separately by cromwell j — will in some circumstances capture forms of silence or omissions. one can mislead through action, for example, by saying something directly to its counterparty, or through inaction, by failing to correct a misapprehension caused by one’s own misleading conduct to me these are close cousins in the catalogue of deceptive contractual practices (see, eg,. yam seng pte ltd v international trade corp ltd., [2013] ewhc 111, [2013] 1 all e.r (comm.) 1321 (qb), at para. 141). [91] at the end of the day, whether or not a party has “knowingly misled” its counterparty is a highly fact-specific determination, and can include lies, half-truths, omissions, and even silence, depending on the circumstances. i stress that this list is not closed; it merely exemplifies that dishonesty or misleading conduct is not confined to direct lies. no reviewable error has been shown in the finding of dishonesty that took place in anticipation of the exercise of clause 9 here. i would not interfere with the trial judge’s view here on a matter that is owed deference. deference should be shown to the trial judge in reviewing her discretionary exercise of weighing the evidence, especially given credibility played a part in her analysis, as she explained. [92] reading the whole of the first instance judgment, i see no consequential error in the account given by the trial judge of the law on the duty of honest performance. she did not base her conclusions on some free-standing duty to disclose information. instead, she examined whether baycrest knowingly misled callow as to the standing of the winter maintenance agreement, and thus wrongfully exercised its right of termination. despite this, however, baycrest argues that the trial judge erred in failing to recognize that its conduct did not reach the “much higher standard” spoken to in bhasin. i disagree. no such error has been shown. [93] it is helpful for our purposes to recall that on the facts in bhasin, part of the dishonest conduct concerned the respondent can-am’s plans to reorganize its activities in alberta. its plan contemplated invoking its contractual right of non-renewal to force a merger between mr. bhasin and his competitor, mr. hrynew in effect, this reorganization would have given mr. bhasin’s business to mr. hrynew can-am, however, had said nothing of its plan to mr. bhasin. when mr. bhasin first heard of the merger plans he questioned an official of can-am about its intentions “[t]he official ‘equivocated’”, cromwell j explained, “and did not tell him the truth that from can-am’s perspective this was a ‘done deal’” (para. 100). cromwell j later concluded that “can-am’s breach of contract consisted of its failure to be honest with mr. bhasin about its contractual performance and, in particular, with respect to its settled intentions with respect to renewal” (para. 108). cromwell j wrote: “the trial judge made a clear finding of fact that can-am ‘acted dishonestly toward bhasin in exercising the non- renewal clause’. there is no basis to interfere with that finding on appeal. it follows that can-am breached its duty to perform the agreement honestly” (para. 94 (references omitted)). [94] it is true that baycrest remained silent about its decision to terminate callow’s contract and that clause 9, on its face, did not impose on it a duty to disclose its intention except for on the 10-day notice requirement. that said, it had to refrain, as the trial judge said, from “deceiv[ing] callow” through a series of “active communications” (para. 66). when it failed to refrain from doing so in anticipation of exercising its termination right, it deceived callow into thinking it would leave the existing winter services agreement intact. [95] these “active communications”, as i understand the trial judge’s findings of fact, came in two forms first, mr. peixoto made statements to mr. callow suggesting that a renewal of the winter maintenance agreement was likely. as the trial judge found, “[a]fter his discussions with mr. peixoto and mr. campbell, mr. callow thought that he was likely to get a two-year renewal of his winter maintenance services contract and [it was] satisfied with his services [under the existing agreement which had one winter to run]. this assumption is also supported by the documentary evidence, especially by the private e-mails between mr. peixoto and mr. campbell” (para. 41). [96] baycrest attempts to recast the significance of this finding, arguing that mr. callow only had casual discussions with two of the juc members — mr. peixoto and mr. campbell — about the possibility of a contract renewal such casual discussions, it says, cannot rise to the level of a lie. this position ignores the key finding in the trial judge’s reasons that it was mr. peixoto — the juc member who negotiated the main pricing terms with callow for the winter maintenance agreement — who made statements to mr. callow suggesting that a renewal was likely (paras. 23 and 40-43). after making credibility findings against mr. peixoto, the trial judge found that he had “led mr. callow to believe that all was fine with the winter [contract]” and that baycrest was “interested in a future extension of callow’s contracts” (para. 47). this dishonesty did not take place in the abstract: the trial judge found it to be relevant to the exercise of clause 9. [97] the second form of “active communications” that deceived callow was related to the “freebies” callow had offered baycrest in the summer of 2013. as the trial judge found, callow performed this free work because mr. callow wanted to provide an incentive for baycrest to renew the winter maintenance agreement. baycrest, for its part, gladly accepted the services offered by callow. [98] again, baycrest attempts to recast the significance of these findings, arguing that “there is nothing inherently unlawful or unfair about accepting a contractor’s incentives offered in the hopes of securing a new contract or the renewal of an existing contract” (rf, at para. 112). whether or not that is the case, i again stress that mr. peixoto “understood that the work performed by callow was a ‘freebie’ to add an incentive for the boards to renew his winter maintenance services contract” and “advised mr. callow that he would tell the other board members about this work” (trial reasons, at para. 43) these active communications by baycrest suggested, deceptively, that there was hope for renewal and, perforce, the current contract would not be terminated. [99] considering baycrest’s conduct as a whole over those few months, it was certainly reasonable for mr. callow, who was led to believe that a renewal was likely, to infer that baycrest had not decided to terminate the ongoing contract moreover, baycrest knew mr. callow was under this false impression, as shown by the email sent by mr. peixoto on july 17, 2013 and, nonetheless, continued to give him the impression that a renewal was likely even though the decision to terminate him was made (see trial reasons, at para. 48). upon realizing that mr. callow was under this false impression, baycrest should have corrected the misapprehension; in the circumstances, its conduct misled callow. [100] i respectfully disagree with the idea that the deception in this case only concerned termination for unsatisfactory services and did not extend to termination for any other reason the trial judge found that the dishonest conduct involved representations that the contract was not in danger at all when baycrest knew it would be terminated (para. 65). [101] the court of appeal did not interfere with these findings, nor has baycrest argued that the trial judge made any palpable and overriding errors. accordingly, in light of the trial judge’s findings of fact, i agree that baycrest intentionally withheld information in anticipation of exercising clause 9, knowing that such silence, when combined with its active communications, had deceived callow. by failing to correct mr. callow’s misapprehension thereafter, baycrest breached its contractual duty of honest performance. this is in stark contrast to united roasters, where the defendant merely withheld its decision to terminate the agreement unlike in this case, the defendant there did not engage in a series of acts that it knew would cause the plaintiff to draw an incorrect inference and then fail to correct the plaintiff’s misapprehension. [102] in this sense, this case is broadly similar to dunning v. royal bank (1996), 23 ccel (2d) 71 (ont. cj (gen. div.)), one of the examples of breaches of the duty to exercise good faith in the manner of dismissal provided by iacobucci j in support of his conclusions in wallace. while it was decided in the distinctive good faith setting of the employment context, dunning is an appropriate analogy to the present case because in bhasin cromwell j explicitly recognized that “the duty of honesty was a key component of the good faith requirements which have been recognized in relation to termination of employment contracts” (bhasin, at para. 73, citing wallace, at para. 98; honda canada inc. v. keays, 2008 scc 39, [2008] 2 scr 362, at para. 58). it seems to me that if the duty of honest performance was a key component of the good faith requirements spoken to in wallace and keays, a similar framework applies, again bound together through the organizing principle as iacobucci j explained, the employee’s job in dunning had been eliminated, but the employer told him another position would probably be found for him and the new assignment would necessitate a transfer. while the employee was being reassured about his future, the employer was contemplating his termination eventually, the employer chose to terminate the employee but withheld that information from the employee for some time, despite knowing the employee was in the process of selling his home in anticipation of the transfer news of the termination only came after the employee had sold his home. such conduct, iacobucci j observed, clearly violated the expected standard of good faith in the manner of dismissal. [103] as dunning, wallace and keays make plain, an employer has the right to terminate an employment contract without cause, subject to the duty to provide reasonable notice. however broad that right may be, however, an unhappy employee can allege a distinct contractual breach when the employer has mistreated them in the manner of dismissal. in the end, as cromwell j noted, “contracting parties must be able to rely on a minimum standard of honesty from their contracting partner in relation to performing the contract as a reassurance that if the contract does not work out, they will have a fair opportunity to protect their interests” (bhasin, at para. 86) when baycrest deliberately remained silent, while knowing that mr. callow had drawn the mistaken inference the contract was in good standing because it was likely to be renewed, it breached the duty to act honestly. in my view, the trial judge did not create a new duty of disclosure in correcting that wrong but rather sought to denounce the baycrest’s conduct remedying that with an order for damages to repair baycrest’s failure to exercise clause 9 in accordance with the requirements of the duty of honest performance did not confer a benefit on callow; it merely set matters right on the usual measure of corrective justice following this breach of contract. respectfully stated, it is therefore my view that the court of appeal erred in concluding that baycrest’s conduct was dishonourable but not dishonest. [104] i would note, however, that i do agree in part with the court of appeal’s observation that the trial judge went too far in concluding that “[t]he minimum standard of honesty would have been to address the alleged performance issues, to provide prompt notice, or to refrain from any representations in anticipation of the notice period” (trial reasons, at para. 67) in my respectful view, to impute these first two requirements would amount to altering the bargain struck between the parties substantively, a conclusion not sought by callow before this court. that said, i agree with the trial judge that, at a minimum, baycrest had to refrain from false representations in anticipation of the notice period having failed to correct mr. callow’s misapprehension that arose due to these false representations, i too would recognize a contractual breach on the part of baycrest in the exercise of its right of termination in clause 9. damages thus flow for the consequential loss of opportunity, a matter to which i now turn. c damages [105] baycrest submits that callow is not entitled to any damages for the breach. baycrest argues that the trial judge erred in fixing the quantum of damages, first, by awarding callow its expected profits over the full balance of the contract; second, by misapprehending the evidence relating to callow’s expenses; and, finally, by awarding both the loss of profit and the expenses incurred. [106] on the first point, i note that the trial judge correctly proceeded on the premise that, “[d]ue to the breach of contract, [callow] is entitled to be placed in the same position as if the breach had not occurred” (para. 79) indeed, as cromwell j. explained in bhasin, breach of the duty of honest contractual performance supports a claim for damages according to the ordinary contractual measure (para. 88). [107] the ordinary approach is to award contractual damages corresponding to the expectation interest (atlantic lottery corp inc v babstock, 2020 scc 19, at para. 108). that is, damages should put callow in the position that it would have been in had the duty been performed. [108] while it has rightly been observed that reliance damages and expectation damages will be the same in many if not most cases, they are nevertheless conceptually distinct. as professor stephen smith wrote: “defendants are ordered to do what they promised to do, not to do whatever is necessary to ensure the claimant is not harmed by relying on the promise” (atiyah’s introduction to the law of contract (6th ed. 2006), at p 405) damages corresponding to the reliance interest are the ordinary measure of damages in tort (premd inc. v. ogilvy renault llp, 2013 onca 412, 309 oac 139, at para. 65). this measure may be appropriate where it would be difficult for the plaintiff to prove the position they would have been in had the contract been performed. reliance damages in contract mean putting the injured party in the position it would have been in had it not entered into the contract at all (para. 66). [109] i see no basis to hold that a breach of the duty of honest performance should in general be compensated by way of reliance damages. i recall that the duty of honest performance is a doctrine of contract law. its breach is not a tort. not only would basing damages in this case on the reliance interest set this contractual breach apart from the ordinary measure of contractual damages, but it would depart from the measure as it was applied in bhasin (para. 108; see also macdougall, at §1130). in my respectful view, there is no basis to depart from bhasin on this point which, in any event, was not argued by the parties further, i note that this view is shared by authors who have written that the duty of honest performance protects a party’s expectation interest, rather than reliance interest (see, eg,. mccamus (2015), at pp. 112-13). finally, while reliance damages and expectation damages coincide on the facts here, there is good reason to retain, in my view, the ordinarily applicable measure of contractual damages that seeks to provide the plaintiff with what they had expected. professor waddams has written that this can have a positive deterrent effect: “one of the legitimate arguments in favour of the current rule and against a rule measuring damages only by the plaintiff’s reliance is that a rule protecting only reliance would fail to deter breach in a large number of cases where the defendant calculated that the plaintiff’s provable losses were less tha[n] the cost of performance” (“breach of contract and the concept of wrongdoing” (2000), 12 sclr (2d) 1, at pp. 18-19). [110] baycrest nevertheless argues that the trial judge did not actually consider what position callow would be in if it had fulfilled the duty and instead awarded the value of the balance of the winter maintenance agreement. in so doing, it argues, she fell into the same error as the trial judge in bhasin, who simply awarded damages as though the contract had been renewed. baycrest says that this court has appropriately condemned this approach because the parties did not intend or presume a perpetual contract. [111] moreover, baycrest points to hamilton v. open window bakery ltd., 2004 scc 9, [2004] 1 scr 303, for the proposition that damages are assessed by that mode of performance which is least burdensome to the defendant. callow, it is said, is entitled to no more than the minimum that baycrest was obligated to do pursuant to the contract. since clause 9 allowed it to terminate the winter maintenance agreement at any point on 10 days’ notice, no damages should flow. [112] in my view, hamilton is of no assistance to baycrest in this case. while cromwell j referenced this principle in bhasin, he did so in the context of whether the court should recognize a broad, free-standing duty of good faith, for which the appellant there had argued briefly stated, the appellant’s position was that the respondent, can-am, would have been in breach of such a duty since it had attempted to use the non-renewal clause to force mr. bhasin into a merger. cromwell j declined to recognize such a broad duty, reasoning that “can-am’s contractual liability would still have to be measured by reference to the least onerous means of performance, which in this case would have meant simply not renewing the contract” (bhasin, at para. 90; see also j. d. mccamus, the law of contracts (3rd ed. 2020), at pp. 23-25). because no damages would have flowed from this breach, it was unnecessary for the court to decide whether a broad, free-standing duty of good faith should be recognized. [113] it bears emphasizing that, despite cromwell j.’s comments related to hamilton, he nonetheless awarded damages to the appellant flowing from the breach of the respondents’ obligation to perform the contract honestly. damages were awarded using the ordinary measure of contractual expectation damages, namely to put mr. bhasin in the position he would have been in had can-am not breached its obligation to behave honestly in the exercise of the non-renewal clause (bhasin, at paras. 88 and 108). this resulted in mr. bhasin being compensated for the value of his business that eroded (paras. 108-10) as professors o’byrne and cohen helpfully explain, “if can-am had dealt with bhasin honestly on all fronts (though without requiring it to disclose its intention not to renew), bhasin would have realized much sooner that his relationship with can-am was in tremendous jeopardy and reaching a breaking point. he could have taken proactive steps to protect his business, instead of seeing it ‘in effect, expropriated and turned over to mr. hrynew’” (“the contractual principle of good faith and the duty of honesty in bhasin v. hrynew” (2015), 53 alta. lr 1, at p 8 (footnotes omitted)). [114] how is it that damages were awarded for a breach of the duty of honest performance despite the principle outlined in hamilton? while damages are to be measured against a defendant’s least onerous means of performance, the least onerous means of performance in this case would have been to correct the misrepresentation once baycrest knew callow had drawn a false inference. had it done so, callow would have had the opportunity to secure another contract for the upcoming winter. as callow explained at the hearing, “since this dishonesty caused callow a loss by inducing it not to bid on other contracts during the summer of 2013 for the winter of 2013 to 2014, the condos are liable to it for damages” (transcript, at p 5), which reflect its lost opportunity arising out of its abuse of clause 9. [115] it may be true that the trial judge could have explained her rationale for awarding damages more plainly. but even if the trial judge fell into the same error that the trial judge in bhasin committed, so as to award damages as though the contract had carried on, it was one of no consequence. [116] as the trial judge found, baycrest “failed to provide a fair opportunity for [callow] to protect its interests” (para. 67). had baycrest acted honestly in exercising its right of termination, and thus corrected mr. callow’s false impression, callow would have taken proactive steps to bid on other contracts for the upcoming winter (af, at paras. 91-95) indeed, there was ample evidence before the trial judge that callow had opportunities to bid on other winter maintenance contracts in the summer of 2013, but chose to forego those opportunities due to mr. callow’s misapprehension as to the status of the contract with baycrest. in any event, even if i were to conclude that the trial judge did not make an explicit finding as to whether callow lost an opportunity, it may be presumed as a matter of law that it did, since it was baycrest’s own dishonesty that now precludes callow from conclusively proving what would have happened if baycrest had been honest (see lamb v. kincaid (1907), 38 scr 516, at pp. 539-40). [117] in the result, i see no palpable and overriding error. i am satisfied that, if baycrest’s dishonesty had not deprived callow of the opportunity to bid on other contracts, then callow would have made an amount that was at least equal to the profit it lost under the winter maintenance agreement the trial judge found that, once expenses are deducted, that award amounts to $64,30696. i see no reason to interfere with her fact finding as to the estimation of expenses. consequently, i see no basis for overturning this portion of the trial judge’s award of damages. [118] the trial judge also awarded callow $14,835.14, representing the cost of leasing a piece of machinery for one year. mr. callow testified that he had leased the machinery specifically for the winter maintenance agreement, but would not have had he known the contract would be terminated (para. 81). baycrest submits that the trial judge erred by awarding these expenses because it amounts to double recovery. [119] i see no issue of double recovery in this case. the trial judge awarded the $64,306.96 as lost profit, not lost revenue. this is appropriate because callow was not actually hired for the other contract on which it did not bid and therefore did not necessarily have to undertake all the expenses that would have been required to fulfill that contract. however, as callow had already committed to this expense, the lease of the machinery, it too should be compensated for along with the lost profit. the trial judge was entitled to decide this point as she did, having the advantage of measuring losses first hand. i see no reviewable error in the trial judge’s approach on this issue. v disposition [120] i would allow the appeal, set aside the order of the court of appeal and reinstate the judgment of the trial judge, with costs throughout. the reasons of moldaver, brown and rowe jj. were delivered by brown j — i. introduction [121] this appeal invites us to affirm the scope and operation of the duty of honest performance, recognized in bhasin v. hrynew, 2014 scc 71, [2014] 3 scr. 494, by clarifying the distinction between actively misleading conduct and innocent non-disclosure. applying that distinction to the facts of this appeal, is a straightforward matter. as the trial judge found, the respondents (collectively, “baycrest”) represented to callow (referring interchangeably in these reasons to the appellant and its principal) that its contract would not be terminated (2017 onsc 7095). by relying on baycrest’s representations, callow lost the opportunity to secure other work for the contract’s term. callow’s complaint therefore does not relate to baycrest’s silence but rather to its positive representations, which can clearly ground a claim based on the duty of honest performance. [122] given that baycrest did not identify any palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge’s findings, i agree with the majority that the appeal should be allowed and the trial judge’s award restored. regrettably, however, i am compelled to express my respectful objection to the majority’s view that the doctrine of abuse of right in the civil law of quebec is “useful” and “helpful” in understanding the application of bhasin to this appeal (para. 57). again respectfully, i see this digression as neither “useful” nor “helpful” to the judges and lawyers who must try to understand the common law principles of good faith as developed in this judgment indeed, it will only inject uncertainty and confusion into the law. [123] this is not to suggest that comparative legal analysis is not an important tool or that its use should somehow be unduly limited at this court. as the majority’s reasons amply document, the court has a longstanding tradition of looking to quebec’s civil law in developing the common law ⸺ whether to answer a question that the common law does not answer (that is, to fill a “gap”) or where it is necessary to modify or otherwise develop existing rules. in addition, where concerns are raised about the effects of moving the common law in one direction or another, this court has considered the experience in quebec and elsewhere, often for reassurance that the posited concerns are unfounded or overstated what this court has refrained from doing, however, is deploying comparative legal analysis that serves none of these purposes or, even worse, renders the law obscure to those who must know and apply it. but by invoking the civilian abuse of right framework to clarify when “[d]ishonesty is directly linked to the performance of a given contract” (para. 73) — a question requiring no “clarification” — the majority does exactly that. [124] while, therefore, my objection is fundamentally methodological, it also speaks to the substantive consequences that follow. as the majority acknowledges, this appeal concerns the duty of honest performance, not the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith. and yet, its digression into the notion of “wrongful exercise of a right”, in substance, pulls it into that very territory, since it ties dishonesty to the manner in which contractual discretion is exercised. effectively, then, the majority’s reliance on a civil law concept leads it to conflate, or at least obscure the distinction between what are distinct common law concepts this is both unnecessary and undesirable, since the exercise of discretion ⸺ apart from being a matter of performance that may be misrepresented ⸺ has little to do with the duty of honest performance. rather, the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith ⸺ or, expressed with the civilian terminology the majority adds, in a manner that is not “abusive” or “wrongful” ⸺ is a distinct concept that has no application to this appeal. [125] our aim in deciding this appeal should be to develop the common law’s organizing principle of good faith carefully, and in a coherent manner, and more particularly in a manner that gives clear guidance by taking care to distinguish among the distinct doctrines identified by this court in bhasin respectfully, i say that the majority has not done so here. ii background [126] baycrest comprises ten condominium corporations with shared assets, for which decisions are made by a joint use committee. in april 2012, baycrest entered into two separate two-year agreements with callow to provide summer landscaping and winter snow removal services. the terms of the winter service agreement stipulated that baycrest could terminate the agreement, without cause, upon giving 10 days’ notice. [127] in march or april 2013, the joint use committee voted to terminate the winter service agreement earlier than its scheduled expiry in april 2014. baycrest opted not to tell callow about its decision until september 2013, however, so as not to jeopardize his performance under the summer service agreement unaware of baycrest’s decision, callow performed free work for baycrest in the spring and summer of 2013 in the hope that baycrest would renew both agreements. callow also discussed the prospect of renewal with two baycrest representatives, one of whom had negotiated callow’s existing agreements in 2012. these discussions led him to believe that he was likely to receive a two-year contract renewal in 2014 and, therefore, that the winter service agreement was not in danger. knowing that callow was operating under this misapprehension, baycrest nevertheless continued to withhold information about its termination decision. [128] on september 12, 2013, baycrest gave callow notice that it was terminating the winter service agreement. callow sued, claiming that baycrest failed to perform the winter service agreement in good faith and was therefore liable for breach of contract the trial judge held that baycrest breached the duty of honest performance she found that baycrest’s statements and conduct actively deceived callow and led him to believe that the winter service contract would not be terminated. as a result, she awarded damages to place callow in the position that it would have been in had the contract not been terminated. the court of appeal for ontario reversed, stating that the duty of honest performance does not impose a requirement of disclosure (2018 onca 896, 429 dlr (4th) 704) in its view, even if baycrest had misled callow, callow bargained only for 10 days’ notice of termination and that was the extent of its entitlement. iii analysis a. this case can be readily decided by applying the common law principle of good faith [129] disposing of this case is really a simple matter of applying this court’s decision in bhasin the first step in deciding a common law good faith claim is to consider whether any established good faith doctrines apply. callow bases its claim on two established doctrines: the duty of honest performance and the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith. as i will explain, however, callow’s claim should be resolved by applying only the duty of honest performance. (1) the duty of honest performance [130] as a universally applicable minimum standard, all contracts must be performed honestly contracting parties may therefore not lie to, or otherwise knowingly mislead, each other about matters directly linked to performance (bhasin, at paras. 73-74). if a plaintiff suffers loss in reliance on its counterparty’s misleading conduct, the duty of honest performance serves to make the plaintiff whole. the duty of honest performance does not, however, “impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or require a party to forego advantages flowing from the contract” (bhasin, at para. 73). [131] the dividing line between (1) actively misleading conduct, and (2) permissible non-disclosure, is the central issue in this appeal. as that line has been clearly demarcated by cases addressing misrepresentation in other contexts, it is in my view worth affirming here that the same settled principles apply to the duty of honest performance. the duty of honest performance is, after all, broadly comparable to the doctrine of fraudulent misrepresentation, although it applies (unlike misrepresentation) to representations made after contract formation (b. macdougall, misrepresentation (2016), at pp. 63-64). it follows that those representations sufficient to ground a claim for misrepresentation are analogous to the representations that will support a claim based on the duty of honest performance. [132] the general rule, applicable to contracts other than those requiring utmost good faith, is that contracting parties have no duty to disclose material information (bhasin, at paras. 73 and 86) mere silence therefore cannot be considered actively misleading conduct (alevizos v. nirula, 2003 mbca 148, 180 man. r (2d) 186, at para. 19). in some cases, however, silence on a particular topic is misleading in light of what has been said (xerex exploration ltd. v. petro-canada, 2005 abca 224, 47 alta. lr (4th) 6, at para. 56, citing opron construction co. v. alberta (1994), 151 ar. 241 (qb)). again, no wheels need re-inventing here there is, in the context of misrepresentation, “a rich law accepting that sometimes silence or half-truths amount to a statement” (macdougall, at p 67; see also a. swan, “the obligation to perform in good faith: comment on bhasin v hrynew” (2015), 56 can bus l.j 395, at p 402) a contracting party therefore may not create a misleading picture about its contractual performance by relying on half-truths or partial disclosure (peek v. gurney (1873), l.r 6 h.l 377; alevizos, at paras. 24-25; xerex, at paras. 56-57) and contracting parties are required to correct representations that are subsequently rendered false, or which the representor later discovers were erroneous (xerex, at para. 58; macdougall, at pp. 118-19). [133] further, the representation need not take the form of an express statement. so long as it is clearly communicated, it may comprise other acts or conduct on the part of the defendant (macdougall, at p 87). the question is whether the defendant’s active conduct contributed to a misapprehension that could be corrected only by disclosing additional information. if so, the defendant must make that disclosure. conversely, a contracting party is not required to correct a misapprehension to which it has not contributed (t. buckwold, “the enforceability of agreements to negotiate in good faith: the impact of bhasin v. hrynew and the organizing principle of good faith in common law canada” (2016), 58 can. bus. lj 1, at p 13). the entire context, which includes the nature of the parties’ relationship, is to be considered in determining, objectively, whether the defendant made a misrepresentation to the plaintiff (macdougall, at p 102; see, eg,. outaouais synergest inc v lang michener llp, 2013 onca 526, 116 or (3d) 742, at paras. 84-87; crf. holdings ltd. v. fundy chemical international ltd. (1981), 33 bclr 291 (ca), at p 296). it follows that the question of whether a misrepresentation has been made is a question of mixed fact and law, subject to appellate review only for palpable and overriding error. [134] in light of these principles ⸺ which, again, are well established and require nothing more than a statement by this court of their application to the duty of honest performance ⸺ i cannot accept baycrest’s argument that its conduct fell on the side of innocent non-disclosure indeed, the trial judge found that “active communications between the parties between march/april and september 12, 2013 . . deceived callow” (para. 66 (canlii)). based on baycrest’s conduct and express statements, the trial judge found that baycrest had represented that the winter service agreement was not in danger of termination (paras. 65 and 76) further, the trial judge found that baycrest knew that its representations were misleading and nonetheless expressed its intention of keeping callow in the dark (paras. 48 and 69). these findings are sufficient to support the conclusion that baycrest breached the duty of honest performance. and baycrest identifies no palpable and overriding error to justify overturning them. [135] nor do i accept baycrest’s argument that its representations related only to the renewal of a new winter agreement and not to the termination of callow’s existing agreement. as i have explained, whether baycrest made an actionable representation about its performance must be determined in context, which included its conduct as i have described it. and it was open to the trial judge to conclude from that conduct that callow reasonably inferred that the winter service agreement would not be terminated (see, eg,. queen v. cognos inc., [1993] 1 scr 87, at pp. 128-32). again, i see no basis for disturbing the trial judge’s conclusion. (2) the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith [136] callow also argues that baycrest’s decision to terminate the winter service agreement was a discretionary decision that it was required to make in good faith. he relies on the good faith duty that arises “where one party exercises a discretionary power under the contract”, and which was affirmed by this court in bhasin (para. 47). as a preliminary matter, i note that not every decision that involves a degree of discretion is subject to this duty (bhasin, at para. 72; j. t. robertson, “good faith as an organizing principle in contract law: bhasin v hrynew ⸺ two steps forward and one look back” (2015), 93 can. bar rev. 809, at p 859). the extent to which it applies to unfettered termination rights remains unsettled, and i do not purport to resolve that controversy here (styles v alberta investment management corp., 2017 abca 1, 44 alta. lr (6th) 214, at para. 41; mohamed v. information systems architects inc., 2018 onca 428, 423 dlr (4th) 174, at para. 19). [137] this duty limits the exercise of certain contractual powers that may appear to grant one party unfettered discretion for the purposes of this appeal, it is unnecessary to express a firm view on the standard that applies to a breach of this duty. it is sufficient to note that where a plaintiff relies on this duty, its complaint is not about dishonesty; rather, it is that the defendant was not entitled to make the decision that it made the wrongful behavior is the very exercise of discretion, and the plaintiff therefore bases its claim on the effect of that decision (see, eg,. greenberg v. meffert (1985), 50 or (2d) 755 (ca);. mesa operating ltd. partnership v. amoco canada resources ltd. (1994), 19 alta. lr (3d) 38 (ca)). damages are awarded based on the difference between the outcome that occurred and the outcome that would have occurred if the defendant had exercised its discretion in the least onerous, yet lawfully acceptable, manner. [138] callow, however, does not dispute that baycrest was entitled to terminate the winter service agreement, as it did, without cause and by providing only 10 days’ notice rather, callow impugns the dishonesty that preceded baycrest’s exercise of discretion. callow therefore seeks damages measured by considering what would have happened had baycrest made the same decision, albeit without misrepresenting its intentions. the applicable duty is therefore the duty of honest performance. in sum, the appeal at bar presents a case about dishonesty in the performance of a contract, and nothing more indeed, it represents precisely the sort of instance contemplated by cromwell j.’s reference for this court in bhasin, at para. 73, to circumstances where a party “lie[s] or mislead[s] the other party about one’s contractual performance”. conversely, it is not a case about the exercise of a discretionary power. (3) damages [139] having concluded that baycrest breached the duty of honest performance, the remaining issue is whether the trial judge awarded the appropriate quantum of damages while i reach the same result as the majority, i approach this question somewhat differently than it does. the majority would retain the expectation measure of damages for breach of the duty of honest performance. i say, however, that it follows from recognizing baycrest’s misleading conduct as a wrong independent of the termination provision that the proper measure of damages represents the loss callow suffered in reliance on baycrest’s misleading representations (which i accept will often coincide with the expectation measure). [140] the majority relies on cromwell j.’s statement in bhasin that a breach of the duty of honest contractual performance “supports a claim for damages according to the contractual rather than the tortious measure” (para. 88). but when the purpose of the expectation measure of damages for breach of contract is examined and contrasted with the legal framework developed in bhasin, the actual claim in bhasin and the damages actually received, it becomes readily apparent that the reliance measure is precisely the measure that the bhasin framework contemplates should be awarded. on this point, the majority’s reasons represent not fidelity to bhasin, but a regrettable departure that undermines the coherence between the interests sought to be protected in bhasin and the remedy to be awarded. [141] it has “long been settled and [is] indeed axiomatic” that the legal aim in remedying a breach of contract is to give the innocent party the full benefit of the bargain by placing it in the position it would have occupied had the contract been performed (p. benson, justice in transactions (2019), at p 5; see also fidler v. sun life assurance co. of canada, 2006 scc 30, [2006] 2 scr 3, at para. 27). awarding a reliance measure ⸺ that is, compensating for losses sustained by the innocent party in reliance on the contract ⸺ would ignore the innocent party’s right to performance that flows from its having pledged consideration therefor, thereby potentially depriving it of the benefit of the contract indeed, confining recovery to losses sustained in reliance on the agreement would create an incentive to breach agreements where the cost of performance outweighs the reliance measure of damage (s. m. waddams, the law of contracts (7th ed. 2017), at para. 704; see also l. l. fuller and w. r. perdue jr., “the reliance interest in contract damages” (1936), 46 yale lj 52, at pp. 57-66). [142] but the justification for awarding expectation damages does not apply to breach of the duty of honest performance in such cases, the issue is not that the defendant has failed to perform the contract, thereby defeating the plaintiff’s expectations. it is, rather, that the defendant has performed the contract, but has also caused the plaintiff loss by making dishonest extra-contractual misrepresentations concerning that performance, upon which the plaintiff relied to its detriment. in short, the plaintiff’s complaint is not lost value of performance, but detrimental reliance on dishonest misrepresentations the interest being protected is not an expectation interest, but a reliance interest. and just as these are unrelated interests, an expectation measure of damage is unrelated to the breach of the duty of honest performance. [143] the claim in bhasin itself is illustrative. bhasin contracted to sell financial products for can-am. the contract would renew automatically at the end of the initial term unless one of the parties gave six months’ notice of non-renewal. can-am intended to force a takeover of bhasin’s business by his competitor, hrynew, but misled him about its intention to do so can-am also appointed hrynew to audit bhasin’s business. when bhasin protested this conflict of interest, can-am lied to him about the reason for hrynew’s appointment as auditor and the terms that would govern his access to bhasin’s confidential information ultimately, when can-am gave notice of non-renewal, bhasin lost the value of his business this court found that, but for can-am’s dishonesty in the period leading up to the non-renewal, he “would have been able to retain the value of his business rather than see it, in effect, expropriated and turned over to mr. hrynew” (para. 109). it awarded damages to compensate for the lost value of the business. [144] neither the claim, then, nor the damage award, related to can-am’s failure to perform the contract with bhasin. the theory of the judgment was that bhasin lost the value of his business by relying on can-am’s dishonest representations. the relief actually awarded was therefore measured by the difference between bhasin’s position and the position he would have occupied had can-am not been dishonest about its intention to force a takeover by way of cancelling his contract. had bhasin not relied on can-am’s dishonesty, no damages could have been awarded on this basis, because the dishonesty would not have altered his position. [145] the measure applied in bhasin was, therefore, clearly not based on expected performance, and indeed it appears to have had nothing to do with placing bhasin in the position he would have occupied had the contract been performed (k. maharaj, “an action on the equities: re-characterizing bhasin as equitable estoppel” (2017), 55 alta. l. rev. 199, at p 215). rather, it was directed solely towards making good the detriment that flowed from bhasin’s reliance on a dishonest misrepresentation — a measure characterized by one scholar as “very tort-like” (macdougall, at p 65). much like estoppel and civil fraud, therefore, the duty of honest performance vindicates the plaintiff’s reliance interest (robertson, at p 861; maharaj, at pp. 215-18). a contracting party that breaches this duty will be liable to compensate its counterparty for any foreseeable losses suffered in reliance on the misleading representations. [146] this is not to suggest that the duty of honest performance is “subsumed” by estoppel and civil fraud (kasirer j.’s reasons, at para. 50). rather, it is merely to observe that each of these legal devices protects the same interest indeed, far from being “subsumed” into estoppel and civil fraud, the duty of honest performance protects the reliance interest in a distinct and broader manner since, as this court observed in bhasin, the defendant may be held liable even where it does not intend for the plaintiff to rely on the misleading representation (para. 88) irrespective of the defendant’s intention, all a plaintiff need show is that, but for its reliance on the misleading representation, it would not have sustained the loss. [147] baycrest advances three arguments for reducing the trial award first, it says that the ten day notice period defines its maximum exposure for damages because, irrespective of its dishonesty, its least onerous means of performance was to terminate the agreement. the trial judge therefore incorrectly awarded damages as if the winter contract had not been terminated. [148] while baycrest is correct to say that damages for breach of contract are measured against the defendant’s least onerous means of performance (hamilton v. open window bakery ltd., 2004 scc 9, [2004] 1 scr 303, at para. 20), that principle does not assist baycrest here to perform the contract honestly (that is, without breaching the duty of honest performance), baycrest was required not to mislead callow about whether the contract would be terminated it could have accomplished this by keeping silent about termination or, having misled callow as to the true state of affairs, by correcting callow’s misapprehension before he relied on the misleading conduct to his detriment. had either of these possibilities occurred, callow would have been able to seek other work for the 2013-14 winter season. [149] of course, we cannot say with certainty that callow would have secured other work he might have sat idle in any event, assuming that the winter service contract was in good standing but this evidentiary difficulty is the product of baycrest’s dishonesty, and baycrest should not be relieved from liability simply because callow cannot definitively prove what would have occurred had it not been misled (wood v. grand valley rway. co. (1915), 51 scr 283, at pp. 288-91; see also lamb v. kincaid (1907), 38 scr 516, at pp. 539-40). callow gave evidence that it typically bid on winter contracts during the summer months and that it was too late to find replacement work by the time it was notified of termination i agree with the majority that, based on the record, we can reasonably presume that callow would have been able to replace the winter service agreement with a contract of similar value. while the trial judge erred by awarding damages as if the winter service agreement had not been terminated, i would, based on this presumption, award the same quantum of damages. [150] secondly, baycrest says that the trial judge’s award led to double recovery for callow’s expenses. but this is simply incorrect. the trial judge awarded callow the net value of the winter service agreement ($64,306.96) ⸺ representing the gross contract value ($80,383.70) less callow’s expenses, which the trial judge approximated at 20 percent ($16,07674). she then added back the cost of an equipment lease, which callow had already entered into in reliance on baycrest’s misleading representations. though the trial judge did not say so expressly, the record shows that callow’s approximated expenses included the cost of leasing equipment if callow is not reimbursed for the leasing expenses that he incurred in reliance on baycrest’s misleading representations, those expenses would therefore be counted against him twice. absent baycrest’s breach of contract, callow would have obtained a similarly valued contract and ended the 2013-14 winter season with $64,306.96 in profit. the trial judge’s approach ensured that callow was restored to this position, and, accordingly, i see no basis for overturning this aspect of her award. [151] finally, baycrest argues that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to callow’s expenses i am not convinced, however, that the trial judge did anything other than estimate callow’s expenses at 20 percent of the winter service contract’s value, based on evidence that callow gave regarding its expenses in previous years. estimating the expenses was a decision that fell within the trial judge’s remit as a fact-finder and should not be disturbed on appeal. indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the trial judge could have proceeded differently, given that the winter services agreement was never performed and that we therefore cannot say with certainty what callow’s expenses would have been. b. “abuse of right”, “wrongful exercise of a right”, and comparative analysis of good faith in the law of contract [152] with the exception of my discussion regarding damages, most of the foregoing is consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with the majority’s reasons, and is sufficient to dispose of this appeal. but while acknowledging this (at para. 44: “the duty to act honestly about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract . . . is sufficient to dispose of this appeal”; “[n]o expansion of the law set forth in bhasin is necessary to find in favour of callow”), the majority nonetheless proceeds to delve into matters beyond the duty to act honestly. and in so doing, it does indeed expand upon (and, i say, confuse) the law set forth in bhasin. [153] more particularly, the majority says that this appeal presents an opportunity to resolve two issues: first, “what constitutes a breach of the duty of honest performance where it manifests itself in connection with the exercise of a seemingly unfettered, unilateral termination clause” (para. 30); and secondly, “when dishonesty is directly linked to the performance of a contract” (para. 64). these questions lead the majority to focus on whether the exercise of the termination provision was itself dishonest. it explains: . . . the duty of honesty as contractual doctrine has a limiting function on the exercise of an otherwise complete and clear right . . this means, simply, that instead of constraining the decision to terminate in and of itself, the duty of honest performance attracts damages where the manner in which the right was exercised was dishonest. [para. 53] the majority finds support for this approach in quebec civil law specifically, it contends that the “required direct link between dishonesty and performance” is “made plain” by considering “how the framework for abuse of rights in quebec connects the manner in which a contractual right is exercised to the requirements of good faith” (para. 67). it states that arts. 6, 7 and 1375 of the civil code of québec “point to this connection by providing that no contractual right may be exercised abusively without violating the requirements of good faith” (para. 67). [154] both as a substantive and methodological matter, i cannot endorse this. first, in the circumstances of this particular appeal, the majority’s resort to the civil law as a “source of inspiration” (para. 60) is inappropriate. as the majority acknowledges, the issues to which its analysis responds are fully addressed by bhasin itself, and there is no indication that the principles outlined therein require further elaboration. secondly, and relatedly, the majority’s focus on the wrongful exercise of a right distorts the analysis mandated by bhasin and undermines the independent character of the various common law good faith duties identified therein. (1) comparative analysis [155] the majority draws on the civilian concept of abuse of rights “as a framework to understand the common law duty of honest performance” (para. 73). specifically, it finds that this framework “helps to focus the analysis of whether the common law duty of honest performance has been breached on what might be called the wrongful exercise of a contractual right” (para. 63). [156] in considering the utility of the comparative exercise that the majority proposes, it must be borne in mind that the common law principles applicable to this appeal are both determinative and settled drawing from civil law in these circumstances departs from this court’s accepted practice in respect of comparative legal analysis. rather than permissibly drawing inspiration or comfort from the civil law in filling a gap in the common law or in modifying it, the majority’s approach, i say respectfully, risks subsuming the common law’s already-established and distinct conception of good faith into the civil law’s conception. and to the extent it does so, it confuses matters significantly, the majority’s assurances to the contrary notwithstanding. [157] as moldaver j observed (in dissent, but not on this point) in reference re supreme court act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 scc 21, [2014] 1 scr 433, at para. 113 (emphasis added), “[t]he coexistence of two distinct legal systems in canada — the civil law system in quebec and the common law system elsewhere — is a unique and defining characteristic of our country.” the distinct common law and civil law traditions represent an integral component of canadian legal heritage and identity (hon m bastarache, “bijuralism in canada”, in bijuralism and harmonization: genesis (2001), at p 26; see also m. samson, “le droit civil québécois: exemple d’un droit à porosité variable” (2018-19), 50 ottawa l. rev. 257, at p 257). [158] preserving this unique aspect of canada’s identity requires maintaining the distinct features of both the common law and civil law traditions. indeed, this court has gone so far as to describe its own composition as having been designed to ensure “that the common law and the civil law would evolve side by side, while each maintained its distinctive character” (reference re supreme court act, at para. 85 (emphasis added)). it follows that, just as this court decided in reference re supreme court act that the presence on this court of at least three judges from quebec “ensur[es] civil law expertise and the representation of quebec’s legal traditions”, the integrity and distinct character of the common law is also ensured by the presence of judges from canada’s common law jurisdictions. [159] it also follows from the distinct nature of canada’s two legal traditions that drawing from one tradition to influence the other is simply an exercise in comparative legal analysis (caisse populaire des deux rives v. société mutuelle d’assurance contre l’incendie de la vallée du richelieu, [1990] 2 scr 995, at p 1016). as i have already recounted, this is what the majority claims it is doing here. but while comparison is an important tool, its uses are not unlimited in particular, comparative analysis, in the sense of using law from another legal system to elucidate or develop the domestic legal system, is generally appropriate only where domestic law does not provide an answer to the problem facing the court, or where it is necessary to otherwise develop that law. using law from other systems in other circumstances would either be superfluous, or would (to the extent of its use) have the undesirable effect of displacing established domestic jurisprudence (j-l. baudouin, “l’interprétation du code civil québécois par la cour suprême du canada” (1975), 53 can. bar rev. 715, at pp. 725-27; see also k. zweigert and h kötz, introduction to comparative law (3rd rev ed 1998), at pp. 17-18; t. lundmark, charting the divide between common and civil law (2012), at pp. 8-10) as justice sharpe writes extra-judicially about the use of authority generally, which applies equally to comparative legal analysis, “[i]t is only where the case cannot readily be decided on the basis of binding authority that non-binding sources will have a material effect on the decision” (good judgment: making judicial decisions (2018), at p 171). [160] these sources are not expressions of jurisdictional chauvinism rather, they express a posture of prudence and disciplined restraint in the deployment of comparative analysis in judgments and for good reason seeking inspiration from external sources when it is unnecessary to do so may simply complicate a straightforward subject, thereby introducing uncertainty to a previously settled area of law (gilles e néron communication marketing inc v chambre des notaires du québec, 2004 scc 53, [2004] 3 scr 95, at para. 56, citing j-l. baudouin and p. deslauriers, la responsabilité civile (6th ed. 2003), at p 193). even something as seemingly innocuous as changing the terminology used to describe a concept ⸺ for example, the majority’s reliance on the civil law device of abuse of right and references to the wrongful exercise of a right ⸺ can have substantive legal implications, affecting the coherence and stability of the resulting modified legal system. language itself, after all, plays “a crucial role in the evolution of the law” (bastarache, at p 20; see also lundmark, at pp. 74-86). [161] this is not mere conjecture. the seemingly benign injection of civil law terminology into common law judgments has previously generated precisely that kind of instability. substantial confusion in the common law of unjust enrichment arose in canada in the 1970s from the introduction of civil law terminology of “absence of juristic reasons for an enrichment” as if it were synonymous with the traditional requirement of “unjust factors” that had been “deeply ingrained” since lord mansfield’s judgment in moses v. macferlan (1760), 2 burr. 1005, 97 er 676 (kb) (m. mcinnes, “the reason to reverse: unjust factors and juristic reasons” (2012), 92 bul. rev. 1049, at pp. 1052 and 1054). as professor mcinnes explains: . . without discussion or explanation, the supreme court of canada began to use the civilian terminology (ie, “absence of juristic reason for the enrichment”) while continuing to apply the traditional unjust factors. predictably, the canadian law of unjust enrichment grew ever more confused as the court said one thing and did another. [footnotes omitted; p 1056.] [162] the result was, to put it mildly, destabilizing. and predictably so. while western legal systems are called upon to address the same kinds of disputes, each has developed different ways over the centuries to resolve them the result is like two massive jigsaw puzzles that cover the same amount of ground. from a distance, each looks much the same as the other, but up close, it becomes apparent that the pieces are cut differently so that pieces from one cannot fit (or at least fit easily) into the other. and so it was when “juristic reasons” began to be spoken of in the canadian common law of unjust enrichment conflicting lines of authorities continued to apply the common law requirement of unjust factors, while in other decisions courts ascribed legal significance to the introduction of civilian language ⸺ that is, they “took the civilian language at face value and ordered restoration when defendants could not justify the retention of their enrichments” (mcinnes, at p 1056 (footnote omitted)). in the end, this court had to settle the question in garland v. consumers’ gas co., 2004 scc 25, [2004] 1 scr 629, which it did by clarifying that the civilian terminology of “juristic reasons” applies but coming even several decades after the uncertainty arose, we must acknowledge that this confirmation of the civil law terminological shift itself also effected substantive instability in the administration of the common law: in a stroke, lawyers and judges were required to alter fundamentally their conception of injustice liability now responds to the absence of any reason for the defendant’s retention, rather than to the presence of some reason for the plaintiff’s recovery. the transition has not been seamless, and it will be many years before practice settles into the level of consistency and certainty that litigants have the right to expect from a mature system of law. [emphasis in original.] (mcinnes, at p 1057) [163] this is not to suggest that garland is wrongly decided, or that its authority in the common law of unjust enrichment is somehow undermined by its civilian inclination. rather, it is simply to point out that there can be a heavy price to pay ⸺ typically, by unijural lawyers and their clients ⸺ when external legal concepts are introduced via a judgment on a purely domestic legal issue. hence the restraint which this court has (until now) shown, by introducing external legal concepts to a judgment only where it is necessary to do so ⸺ that is, to fill a gap where domestic law does not provide an answer, or where it is necessary to modify or otherwise develop an existing legal rule in such circumstances, other legal systems may well reveal potential solutions that would not have been apparent from a narrow domestic focus (zweigert and kötz, at pp. 17-20; see also canadian national railway co v norsk pacific steamship co., [1992] 1 scr 1021, at pp. 1140-47 (per mclachlin j., as she then was)). this is what we mean when we say that canada’s two legal systems can serve as sources of “inspiration” (bou malhab v. diffusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 scc 9, [2011] 1 scr 214, at para. 38). [164] we can also draw on the experience of other legal systems to assist our deliberations about whether an identified potential solution to a legal problem will result in negative consequences. indeed, that was the limited use this court made of quebec law (and, for that matter, u.s law) in bhasin, at paras. 83-85, saadati v. moorhead, 2017 scc 28, [2017] 1 scr 543, at para. 34, and norsk, at pp. 1174-75 (per stevenson j., concurring). similarly, this court will sometimes observe that a legal concept developed within one system, using domestic sources, mirrors a concept found in another system (deloitte & touche v. livent inc. (receiver of), 2017 scc 63, [2017] 2 scr 855, at para. 138 (per mclachlin cj, dissenting in part); kingstreet investments ltd v new brunswick (finance), 2007 scc 1, [2007] 1 scr 3, at para. 41; st. lawrence cement inc. v. barrette, 2008 scc 64, [2008] 3 scr 392, at paras. 76-79; see also sport maska inc. v. zittrer, [1988] 1 scr 564, at p 570 (per beetz j., concurring)). when used in these ways, comparative sources are relied on to provide comfort that other legal systems have arrived at similar conclusions. [165] but that is not this case. here, no gaps are to be filled, and no domestic common law requires development (or even “clarification”). rather, in service of what the majority describes as a “dialogue” between the civil law and common law, it uses the civil law device of abuse of right to drive an analysis which, i repeat, is neither necessary to decide this appeal, nor helpful in its obscuring of the law further, this case engages an issue ⸺ the place of good faith in contract law ⸺ on which the canadian common law and civil law systems have adopted very different approaches ⸺ each autonomous, and neither inherently superior to the other (see, generally, r. jukier, “good faith in contract: a judicial dialogue between common law canada and québec” (2019), 1 journal of commonwealth law 83). as the hon. louis lebel observed: [translation] the fact that the court has maintained the specificity of the two legal traditions with respect to good faith shows the importance it attaches to respect for their conceptual autonomy. the dialogue between the two systems remains circumscribed by a judicial stance that, in general today, understands the importance and characteristics of the major legal traditions that make up canadian bijuralism. (“les cultures de la cour suprême du canada: vers l’émergence d’une culture dialogique?”, in j.-f gaudreault-desbiens et al., eds., convergence, concurrence et harmonisation des systèmes juridiques (2009), 1, at p 15) [166] indeed, there are principled reasons for the distinct treatment of good faith as between the common law and civil law systems. as professor valcke observes, the common law also relies on other concepts, including the equitable doctrine of estoppel, to achieve similar outcomes as the doctrine of good faith (“bhasin v hrynew: why a general duty of good faith would be out of place in english canadian contract law” (2019), 1 journal of commonwealth law 65, at p 77). at a more general level, the common law and civil law are premised on different understandings of legal rights (h. dedek, “from norms to facts: the realization of rights in common and civil private law” (2010), 56 mcgill lj 77, at pp. 79-81) and of the role of the state in mitigating the effects of harsh bargains (m pargendler, “the role of the state in contract law: the common-civil law divide” (2018), 43 yale j intl l 143, at p 179). [167] i acknowledge that the majority refers to “special reasons” to be “cautious in undertaking the comparative exercise to which callow invites us here” (para. 70). but ⸺ and, again i stress, in an area of common law that admits of no lacuna or gap that needs filling, or that is in need of development ⸺ by applying the civilian doctrine of “abuse of right” as it does, caution is thrown to the wind, the independent character of the existing good faith doctrine, which bhasin carefully preserved, is undermined, and the generally applicable rule that this court rejected in bhasin is at least implicitly embraced. [168] to be clear, the majority’s comparative methodology is not mere surplusage. rather, its application is the only point of the exercise. as i have already recounted, the doctrine of abuse of rights is applied “to focus the analysis of whether the common law duty of honest performance has been breached on what might be called the wrongful exercise of a contractual right” (para. 63). quebec civil law is cited as authority for the proposition that “no contractual right may be exercised abusively” (para. 67). this leads to another reason why comparative methodology is undesirable in this case, which requires me to speak plainly. the passages i have just cited from the majority’s reasons, and indeed the very notion of “abuse of right”, would not be familiar, meaningful or even comprehensible to the vast majority of common law lawyers and judges. and yet, many of them would reasonably assume ⸺ as many did when the language of “juristic reasons” entered the common law lexicon of unjust enrichment ⸺ that there is legal significance in their use here, and that they must therefore familiarize themselves with these concepts or retain bijural assistance in order to competently represent their clients or adjudicate their cases at the very least, common law lawyers applying the common law concepts under discussion here will presumably need to have an eye, as the majority does, to the civil code of québec. how they would acquire the necessary familiarity, and the extent to which they must acquire it, is left unexplained. [169] these are not idle concerns, and on this point there is a certain reality that we must bear in mind. few common law lawyers and judges in most provinces are sufficiently versed in french to read the sources of civil law concerning the abuse of right and of those who are, fewer still will be trained in the civil law so as to understand their substance. [170] i confess that i am in no position to express a view on the correctness of the majority’s proclamation that it, or this court, is pursuing a “dialogue” between the civil and common legal systems. indeed, it is not obvious to me what having such a “dialogue” means in the context of discharging our adjudicative responsibilities. but accepting that my colleagues understand themselves to be so engaged, i suggest with utmost respect that their dialogical pursuit should not occur at the expense of those who must know, understand and apply an aspect of one of those legal systems that the majority now renders opaque. it really comes down to this: the majority’s unnecessary digression into external legal concepts will create practical difficulties on the ground by making the common law governing contractual relationships less comprehensible and therefore less accessible to those who need to know it, thereby increasing costs for all concerned. at a time when many are striving to remove old barriers that impede access to justice, i would not erect new barriers in the form of legal expression that bears little to no resemblance to the training and experience of those who help citizens navigate the legal system. [171] even where a comparative analysis is appropriate, the analogy of the jigsaw puzzles must be borne in mind. it is simply not the case that “the common law and the civil law represent . . . distinctive ways of knowing the law” (kasirer j.’s reasons, at para. 71 (emphasis added)). they are not different theories of law. they are different systems of law. and because legal rules must originate from the system within which that rule will operate, comparative analysis must be undertaken with care and circumspection. this court’s statement in caisse populaire des deux rives, at p 1004, is apposite: . . . apparent similarity of the fundamental rules should not cause us to forget that the courts have a duty to ensure that insurance law develops in a manner consistent with the rest of quebec civil law, of which it forms a part. accordingly, while the judgments of foreign jurisdictions, in particular britain, the united states and france, may be of interest when the law there is based on similar principles, the fact remains that quebec civil law is rooted in concepts peculiar to it, and while it may be necessary to refer to foreign law in some cases, the courts should only adopt what is consistent with the general scheme of quebec law. [emphasis added.] [172] the direction that civil law developments must be consistent with the overall civil law of quebec applies with equal force when considering potential modifications to the common law maintaining the distinct character of each of canada’s legal traditions requires administering each system according to its own scheme of rules, and by reference to its own authorities (colonial real estate co. v. la communauté des soeurs de la charité de l’hôpital général de montréal (1918), 57 scr 585, at p 603; see also j. dainow, “the civil law and the common law: some points of comparison” (1967), 15 am. j. comp. l 419, at pp. 434-35). it follows that any enrichment from another legal system must be incorporated only insofar as it conforms to the internal structure and organizing principles of the adopting legal system (f. allard, the supreme court of canada and its impact on the expression of bijuralism (2001), at p 9). ultimately, the golden rule in using concepts from one of canada’s legal systems to modify the other is that the proposed solution must be able to completely and coherently integrate into the adopting system’s structure (j-l. baudouin, “mixed jurisdictions: a model for the xxist century?” (2003), 63 la. l. rev. 983, at pp. 990-91). [173] this is of practical concern here. analytically jamming the civilian concept of abuse of right regarding the termination of a contract into the common law is not the tidy and discrete affair that the majority appears to suppose this is because the obligation of good faith in civil law imposes more onerous duties on the party terminating the contract than it does at common law. the quebec court of appeal has explained the notion of abuse of right in the context of termination of a contract in the following way: [translation] up until now, the courts have sometimes sanctioned abuse of right in cases of malice. however, they have also sanctioned unilateral resiliation by a distributor for reasons found not to be within the spirit of the discretionary resiliation clause, or where the resiliation was improper, that is, without any valid reason, or without prior notice or without any sign of what was to come. these cases clearly illustrate the “moralization” of contractual relations by the doctrine of abuse of right: for it is not enough to resiliate a contract in a strictly lawful manner (in accordance with the language of a resiliation clause), it is also necessary to do so in a legitimate way. [emphasis added.] (birdair inc. v. danny’s construction co., 2013 qcca 580, at para. 131 (canlii), citing j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obligations (6th ed. 2005), by p-g. jobin with the collaboration of n. vézina, at para. 125) [174] even if we were to imagine that it was the exercise of the termination clause that led in this case to the breach of duty of honest contractual performance ⸺ which, as i shall explain below, it was not ⸺ bhasin stipulates clearly that there is no duty to disclose information or intentions relevant to termination that flows from the common law duty of good faith but under the civilian doctrine invoked by the majority, terminating a contract without disclosing intentions can constitute an abuse of right. while the majority acknowledges that it “do[es] not rely on the civil law here for the specific rules that would govern a similar claim in quebec” (para. 73), this tends to affirm how inappropriate its comparative analysis is here. the majority either relies on a truncated and therefore distorted version of the civilian framework of abuse of right, or else opens the door to future “clarifications” (which would further undermine the integrity of the common law duty of honest performance as stated in bhasin). even on its own terms, then, the majority’s invocation of abuse of right raises more questions than it claims to answer. [175] for all these reasons, i am of the respectful view that it is not appropriate to refer to, and rely upon, the doctrine of abuse of right in this case. this appeal calls upon this court to straightforwardly apply the duty of honest performance, and nothing more. transplanting the doctrine of abuse of right into the common law context is not only unnecessary here, doing so without reference to the broader context in which good faith operates in the common law will cause significant uncertainty. (2) the wrongful exercise of a right [176] the majority’s reliance on the civilian doctrine of abuse of a right leads me to a final, substantive criticism: in focusing on the wrongful exercise of a right, it distorts the analysis described in bhasin and elides the distinction between honest performance and good faith in the exercise of a contractual discretion. [177] the gravamen of a claim in honest performance is that a party made dishonest representations concerning contractual performance that caused its counterparty to suffer loss it is not that a right was exercised in a way that was wrongful, abusive, or even dishonest here, for example, the complaint hinges on baycrest’s deceptive conduct preceding the exercise of the termination clause by relying on baycrest’s misleading representations, callow missed the opportunity to bid on other contracts. the exercise of the termination clause is relevant only in the sense that it was the subject of the misrepresentation. [178] i recognize that, in bhasin, cromwell j stated that the defendant breached the duty of honest performance when it “failed to act honestly with [the plaintiff] in exercising the non-renewal clause” (para. 103). this phrasing, however, mirrored the trial judge’s finding that the defendant “acted dishonestly toward bhasin in exercising the non-renewal clause” (bhasin v. hrynew, 2011 abqb 637, 526 ar 1, at para. 261, quoted in bhasin, at para 94) elsewhere, cromwell j is clear that the breach “consisted of [the defendant’s] failure to be honest with [the plaintiff] about its contractual performance and, in particular, with respect to its settled intentions with respect to renewal” (para. 108). this reflects the general framework that he describes, ie, that the duty of honest performance “is a simple requirement not to lie or mislead the other party about one’s contractual performance” (para. 73). [179] maintaining analytical clarity about the source of the breach ⸺ the dishonesty that preceded the termination, and not the termination itself ⸺ is important for two reasons. first, a breach of the duty of honest performance may arise from many aspects of performance. the general rule enunciated in bhasin provides a clear standard that can be applied across different contexts, including to the facts of this appeal. there is no benefit in developing a separate analysis that responds narrowly to dishonesty concerning the exercise of a contractual right. doing so will only make the law more confused and difficult to apply. [180] secondly, the source of the breach distinguishes the duty of honest performance from the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith. as discussed above, where a breach of the latter duty is alleged, the focus of the analysis is whether the defendant was entitled to exercise its discretion in the way that it did. by shifting the focus of the honest performance analysis to the manner in which a right was exercised, the majority blurs the boundaries between these two distinct duties. indeed, it contends that “the duty of honest performance shares a common methodology with the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith by fixing, at least in circumstances like ours, on the wrongful exercise of a contractual prerogative” (para. 51). [181] we are bound by bhasin to treat the duty of honest performance as conceptually distinct from the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith (atlantic lottery corp. inc. v. babstock, 2020 scc 19, at para. 65). this is not simply a matter of stare decisis and incremental legal development (although it is at least those things); there is also the practical concern that blurred and ambiguous treatment of these two duties has a meaningful impact on the outcome for contracting parties. contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the wrong at issue in each category of cases is distinct, and the damages available differ accordingly. the award for a breach of the duty of honest performance addresses the effect of the dishonesty. in contrast, the award for a breach of the duty to exercise discretion in good faith addresses the effect of the exercise of discretion itself. placing both duties under the umbrella of the “wrongful exercise of a contractual right” obscures these distinctions and thus represents an unfortunate departure from bhasin. iv conclusion [182] i would allow the appeal, set aside the court of appeal decision, and reinstate the judgment of the trial judge with costs in this court and the courts below. the following are the reasons delivered by côté j — [183] what constitutes actively misleading conduct in the context of a contractual right to terminate without cause? where should the line be drawn between active dishonesty and permissible non-disclosure of information relevant to termination? does a party to a contract have an obligation to dissuade his counterparty from entertaining hopes regarding the duration of their business relationship? these are the questions raised by this appeal. [184] in this case, the respondents (“baycrest”) bargained for a right to terminate at any time and for any other reason than unsatisfactory services upon giving 10 days’ notice. baycrest made the decision to terminate, but it chose to wait before sending the notice, as it did not want to jeopardize the performance of other work that was being done by the appellant (“callow”, referring interchangeably to cm. callow inc. and to its principal, mr. christopher callow). in the meantime, baycrest became aware that its counterparty was entertaining hopes of a renewal, although it did not say or do anything that materially contributed to those hopes. baycrest did nothing to discourage them; such conduct may not be laudable, but it does not fall within the category of “active dishonesty” prohibited by the contractual duty of honest performance. i. issue on appeal [185] both of my colleagues seem to agree on the following propositions. [186] first, this case concerns solely the duty of honest performance and not the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith (these two duties were distinguished in bhasin v. hrynew, 2014 scc 71, [2014] 3 scr 494, at paras. 47, 50 and 72-73). [187] second, the duty of honest performance “means simply that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract” (bhasin, at para. 73). [188] third, there is no duty to disclose information or one’s intentions with respect to termination (bhasin, at paras. 73 and 87). [189] fourth, there is no need to extend the law by recognizing a new duty of good faith relating to “active non-disclosure”. [190] i take it we all agree with these premises therefore, the issue, when properly framed, bears on the distinction referred to in bhasin (at paras. 73 and 86-87) between actively misleading conduct and permissible non-disclosure. in the context of this case it comes down to this: did baycrest lie or otherwise knowingly mislead callow into thinking that there was no risk it would exercise its right to terminate the winter agreement for any other reason than unsatisfactory services? the answer to this question is no. [191] before turning to my analysis, i wish to express my substantial agreement with justice brown’s observations insofar as they pertain to the role of external legal concepts. justice kasirer states at paragraph 44 of his reasons that “[n]o expansion of the law set forth in bhasin is necessary” to dispose of this appeal. however, he then embarks on, and i say this respectfully, an unnecessary comparative exercise between the civil law and the common law under the pretext of “dialogue”. i am perplexed by the virtues of “dialogue” in a case like this one where no gaps in the common law need to be filled and no rules need to be modified. i do not see why we should adopt such an approach, one that provides no palpable benefits and that is also arbitrary and unpredictable. [192] that being said, i believe that the common law as it now stands does not support the result my colleagues arrive at. i am afraid that the unnecessary debate about comparative legal exercises may have diverted attention from the facts of this case as they are. ii ambit of the duty of honest performance a context in which the duty was created [193] in bhasin, the court unanimously introduced the contractual duty of honest performance as a “new common law duty under the broad umbrella of the organizing principle of good faith performance of contracts” (para. 72). cromwell j stressed that this was no more than a “modest, incremental step” (para. 73; see also paras. 82 and 89), with the duty of honest performance being a “minimum standard” (para. 74). [194] in cromwell j.’ opinion, the new duty would “interfer[e] very little with freedom of contract” (para. 76); so little that he thought such interference would be “more theoretical than real” (para. 81). on the subject of the organizing principle of good faith from which it grew, cromwell j stated: the principle of good faith must be applied in a manner that is consistent with the fundamental commitments of the common law of contract which generally places great weight on the freedom of contracting parties to pursue their individual self-interest. in commerce, a party may sometimes cause loss to another — even intentionally — in the legitimate pursuit of economic self-interest . . . . the development of the principle of good faith must be clear not to veer into a form of ad hoc judicial moralism or “palm treeˮ justice. in particular, the organizing principle of good faith should not be used as a pretext for scrutinizing the motives of contracting parties. [para. 70] [195] cromwell j also expressed specific concerns relating to the clarity of the duty, its effect on commercial certainty and other practical implications (at paras. 59, 66, 70-71, 73, 79-80 and 86-87). he endeavoured to explain what the new duty was not: the duty of honest performance that i propose should not be confused with a duty of disclosure or of fiduciary loyalty. a party to a contract has no general duty to subordinate his or her interest to that of the other party. [emphasis added; para. 86.] [196] turning to a positive description, he stressed that the duty of honest performance was a “simple requirement” not to lie or knowingly mislead about matters directly linked to performance of the contract (para. 73). [197] the requirement that parties not lie is straightforward. but what kind of conduct is covered by the requirement that they not otherwise knowingly mislead each other? absent a duty to disclose, it is far from obvious when exactly one’s silence will “knowingly mislead” the other contracting party are we to draw sophisticated distinctions between “mere silence” and other types of silence, as brown j suggests? if that be so, i wonder how a contracting party — on whom, i note, the law imposes neither “a duty of loyalty or of disclosure” nor a requirement “to forego advantages flowing from the contract” (bhasin, at para. 73) — is supposed to know at what point a permissible silence turns into a non-permissible silence that may constitute a breach of contract. with the greatest respect, i do not believe such casuistry is compatible with the “simple requirement” cromwell j meant to set out in bhasin. [198] as cromwell j put it, “a clear distinction can be drawn between a failure to disclose a material fact, even a firm intention to end the contractual arrangement, and active dishonesty” (para. 86 (emphasis added)). he added that “united roasters makes it clear that there is no unilateral duty to disclose information relevant to termination. but the situation is quite different, as i see it, when it comes to actively misleading or deceiving the other contracting party in relation to performance of the contract” (para. 87 (emphasis added)). these words should be taken at face value. the duty of honest performance should remain “clear and easy to apply” (para. 80). b permissible non-disclosure [199] it must be borne in mind that all obligations flowing from the duty of honest performance are “negative” obligations (p. daly, “la bonne foi et la common law: l’arrêt bhasin c. hrynew”, in j. torres-ceyte, g-a. berthold and c-a. m. péladeau, eds., le dialogue en droit civil (2018), 89, at pp. 101-2; see also kasirer j.’s reasons, at para. 86). extending the duty beyond that scope would “detract from . . . certainty in commercial dealings” (bhasin, at para. 80). [200] therefore, silence cannot be considered dishonest within the meaning of bhasin unless there is a positive obligation to speak. such an obligation does not arise simply because a party to a contract realizes that his counterparty is operating under a mistaken belief. [201] absent a duty of disclosure, that is, absent any kind of free-standing positive obligation flowing from the duty of honest performance, a party to a contract has no obligation to correct his counterparty’s mistaken belief unless the party’s active conduct has materially contributed to it (see, in a different context, t. buckwold, “the enforceability of agreements to negotiate in good faith: the impact of bhasin v. hrynew and the organizing principle of good faith in common law canada” (2016), 58 can. bus. lj 1, at pp. 12-13). [202] what constitutes a material contribution will obviously depend upon the context, which includes the nature of the parties’ relationship (see brown j.’s reasons, at para. 133) as well as the relevant provisions of the contract but the reason underlying this requirement is a practical one that is consistent with bhasin’s emphasis on commercial expectations (at paras. 1, 34, 41, 60 and 62): parties that prefer not to disclose certain information — which they are entitled not to do — are not required to adopt a new line of conduct in their contractual relationship simply because they chose silence over speech. [203] it cannot be that the law, on the one hand, allows contracting parties not to disclose information but, on the other hand, negates that possibility by imposing a standard of conduct that is at odds with the spontaneous attitudes — such as evasiveness and equivocation — parties might have when their conversations bear precisely on what they wish not to disclose. [204] even though parties who make that choice must be careful with what they say or do, especially if they become aware that their counterparties are operating under a mistaken belief, they should not be asked to behave as if their actions were being scrutinized under a microscope to determine whether they have contributed to that mistaken belief. such a requirement would be unacceptable. [205] in the context of a right to terminate a contract without cause, a party that intends to end an agreement does not have to convey hints in order to alert his counterparty that their business relationship is in danger. no duty of disclosure should mean no duty of disclosure. [206] a party’s awareness of his counterparty’s mistaken belief will therefore not, in itself, trigger an obligation to speak unless the party has taken positive action that materially contributed to that belief. the active conduct and the mistaken belief must both pertain to contractual performance; otherwise, it could hardly be said that one has “knowingly misle[d] [the] other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract” (bhasin, at para. 73). [207] in sum, the “minimum standard” of honesty imposed by the duty of honest performance has to be consistent with the other principles set out in bhasin. it also has to be realistic and not overly formalistic. absent a duty of disclosure, a party has no obligation to dissuade his counterparty from persisting in a mistaken belief. this does not mean that the party may induce or reinforce such a belief by significant positive actions or representations. there is an obligation to correct this mistaken belief if the party’s active conduct has materially contributed to it. iii analysis [208] callow and baycrest entered into two two-year contracts: a winter agreement covering mostly snow removal services for the period from november 1, 2012 to april 30, 2014 and a summer maintenance services agreement for the period from may 1, 2012 to october 31, 2013. the winter agreement, which is at issue here, contained the following provision: 9 if the contractor [i.e callow] fails to give satisfactory service to the corporation [ie. baycrest] in accordance with the terms of this agreement and the specifications and general conditions attached hereto or if for any other reason the contractor’s services are no longer required for the whole or part of the property covered by this agreement, then the corporation may terminate this contract upon giving ten (10) days’ notice in writing to the contractor, and upon such termination, all obligations of the contractor shall cease and the corporation shall pay to the contractor any monies due to it up to the date of such terminations. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. iii, at p 10) [209] in march or april 2013, baycrest decided to terminate the winter agreement on september 12, 2013, it gave callow 10 days’ notice that it was terminating the contract in the meantime, baycrest had learned that callow was performing free extra landscaping work and that he was under the impression the winter agreement would not be terminated (trial reasons, 2017 onsc 7095, at para. 48 (canlii)). [210] it can easily be understood from these circumstances that callow was “shocked” by the termination. callow believed that, “if there was a problem, he would have expected [baycrest] to bring it to his attention like [it] had done in the past” (trial reasons, at para. 49) baycrest’s behaviour was certainly discourteous and cavalier. yet, that is not the question here the question is whether baycrest materially contributed to callow’s mistaken belief that the contract would not be terminated. if baycrest did, then it had an obligation to correct that mistaken belief in accordance with its duty of honest performance otherwise, it had no obligation to disclose anything. [211] before our court, callow acknowledged that by entering into the winter agreement, he had taken the risk that baycrest “may terminate [the contract], but only disclose the termination decision on 10 days’ written notice” (transcript, at p 11; see also ca reasons, 2018 onca 896, 429 dlr (4th) 704, at para. 14). i am of the view that according to the terms of the winter agreement, callow could have found himself in the exact same situation regardless of baycrest’s behaviour during the spring and summer of 2013 such a possibility was in fact inherent in the contract he had bargained for. [212] callow essentially submits that baycrest’s active conduct led him to believe that the winter agreement was no longer at risk of being terminated despite the clear wording of the termination provision. he stresses the following points: (1) baycrest deliberately kept its decision secret because it did not want to jeopardize the performance of the summer agreement; (2) baycrest showed satisfaction with callow’s services; (3) callow had discussions with mr. peixoto and mr. campbell regarding the renewal of the winter agreement; (4) baycrest accepted callow’s “freebie” work; and (5) baycrest was aware of callow’s mistaken belief. [213] in my view, the appeal should be dismissed. [214] the trial judge’s understanding of “active dishonesty” is tainted by an error of law. she did not consider the principle that, in order to amount to a breach of the duty of honest performance, any active dishonesty had to be “directly linked to the performance of the contract” (bhasin, at para. 73). in assessing baycrest’s conduct, she did not inquire into whether baycrest had “lie[d] or otherwise knowingly misle[d]” callow about the exercise of its right to terminate the winter agreement for any other reason than unsatisfactory services this explains why she wrongly insisted on, amongst other things, the need to “address the alleged performance issues” (para. 67) despite the fact that the winter agreement could be terminated even if callow’s services were satisfactory. [215] furthermore, although the trial judge seems to have been aware that there was no duty of disclosure (para. 60), she nonetheless found that baycrest had acted in bad faith by “withholding the information to ensure callow performed the summer maintenance services contract” (para. 65; see also para. 76). she never asked herself whether baycrest had explicitly or implicitly said or done anything that could have misled callow into thinking that the contract was at no risk of being terminated for any other reason than unsatisfactory services it is clear from reading the trial judge’s reasons as a whole that the “representations” she found had been made by baycrest (at paras. 65, 67 and 76) were not directly linked to the performance of the winter agreement. in sum, the trial judge’s misunderstanding of the applicable legal principles vitiated the fact-finding process. [216] baycrest had bargained for a right to terminate its winter agreement for any reason and at any time upon giving 10 days’ notice. its duty of honest performance did not require it to “forego” this undeniable “advantag[e] flowing from the contract” (bhasin, at para. 73). it had no obligation to tell callow about its decision to terminate the winter agreement until 10 days before the termination was to take effect, as the contract stipulated. even after baycrest became aware of callow’s mistaken belief, it had no obligation to refuse the “freebie” work callow was performing on his own initiative or to correct this mistaken belief he was operating under. such an obligation would have arisen only if baycrest had contributed materially to that mistaken belief by inducing it or reinforcing it. in light of the evidence and the trial judge’s findings, i am not convinced that baycrest had done so. [217] i do not have the same reading as my colleague kasirer j about certain of the trial judge’s findings of fact (para. 100). these findings expressed in very broad terms should not be insulated from the reasons as a whole and from the evidence that was before the trial judge. for instance, my colleague writes that “mr. peixoto made statements to mr. callow suggesting that a renewal of the winter maintenance agreement was likely” (para. 95), and he considers that to be a “key finding” (para. 96). however, the trial judge’s finding pertained to what callow had thought, not to what baycrest had said (trial reasons, at para. 41), which is something quite different. indeed, as i demonstrate below, the evidence supporting this “key finding” shows that callow’s thoughts regarding a renewal of the winter agreement had nothing to do with what baycrest said to him. [218] i now turn to the application of the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case. a discussions about renewal [219] callow argues that baycrest materially contributed to his mistaken belief by discussing a possible renewal. indeed, the renewal issue is central in this appeal. it is not disputed that unlike the contract at issue in bhasin, the winter agreement did not contemplate any automatic renewal; it only contemplated termination. since renewal was not a term of the winter agreement, it cannot be considered “performance of the contract” within the meaning of bhasin. for callow’s claim to succeed, any breach of the duty of honest performance must pertain to termination. [220] both of my colleagues accept callow’s submission that it can be inferred from the discussions about renewal that the winter agreement was not in danger of termination. i would agree with such a proposition in the following circumstances: if one party leads another to believe that their contract will be renewed, it follows that the other party can reasonably expect their business relationship to be extended rather than terminated. but an inference to that effect cannot be drawn in the abstract. in order to infer that one party, through discussions about renewal, led the other party to think that there was no risk their existing agreement would be terminated, the inference-drawing process must obviously take into account the nature of the risk at stake and what was actually communicated during those discussions. otherwise, the inference would entail a palpable and overriding error that would be subject to appellate review (housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at paras. 22-23). [221] here, s 9 of the winter agreement contemplated that the agreement might be terminated (1) for unsatisfactory services, or (2) for any other reason than unsatisfactory services. did baycrest, by discussing renewal, communicate anything that might have led callow to believe there was no risk the winter agreement would be terminated for any other reason than unsatisfactory services? the trial judge described the discussions between the parties as follows: during the spring and summer of 2013, callow performed regular weekly grass cutting, garbage pick-up and was in discussions with the condominium corporations’ board members to renew the contract for the following summer and also the winter maintenance services contract for a further two years. at this time, callow had only completed year one of a two-year contract. the contract was supposed to remain in place for the winter of 2013-2014. after his discussions with mr. peixoto and mr. campbell, mr. callow thought that he was likely to get a two-year renewal of his winter maintenance services contract and they were satisfied with his services. [emphasis added; paras. 40-41.] [222] the trial judge, who found callow to be credible, relied on the following part of his testimony: q. now is probably a good time to — well tell me about these discussions. let’s hear what discussions were you having. a. mostly with joe [peixoto], we discussed it, and he said “yeah, it looks good, i’m sure they’ll be up for it, let me talk to them”. q. up for what? a. a two-year renewal. q. all right. anyone else? a. kyle campbell i ran into once or twice on site and we had discussions as well too. q. okay, and what was your impression of —of — i mean i suppose you already answered. a. that i was likely going to be getting a two-year renewal, there was no reason not to, they were satisfied with the service, they were happy with it. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 67-68) [223] apparently not much importance was attached to the renewal issue at trial. the amended statement of claim did not even address this issue; it instead focused on baycrest’s knowledge, callow’s “freebie” work and the provision of satisfactory services. even though the trial judge did consider renewal, i note that her findings in this regard bore on callow’s mistaken belief that the winter agreement was likely to be renewed (at para. 41); they did not bear on anything baycrest actually did or said that would have misled callow into that belief. [224] what callow thought is one thing; what baycrest said or did is another. according to callow himself, mr. peixoto did not propose anything on behalf of baycrest. mr. peixoto’s statement that “i’m sure they’ll be up for it, let me talk to them” (ar, vol. ii, at p 67) clearly meant that despite his favorable opinion, he was not the one making the decision and that baycrest had not even considered the mere possibility of a renewal at the time. it certainly could not be inferred from this statement that a renewal was likely callow’s testimony does not suggest that he was misled into believing that baycrest was actually contemplating a renewal — mr. peixoto’s response instead presupposes the contrary — nor does it suggest that baycrest did or said anything to negate the risk callow took that his contract might be terminated for any other reason than unsatisfactory services indeed, callow insisted that he had believed a renewal was likely because “there was no reason not to, they were satisfied with the service, they were happy with it” (ar, vol. ii, at p 68). [225] in his examination for discovery, callow had given the same reason for thinking his winter agreement would be renewed, that is, because “there was no reason not to” (ar, vol. ii, at p 49). he did not refer to his discussions with mr. peixoto or mr. campbell. when asked if anyone had told him that his contract would be renewed, he said he could not recall the evidence does not establish that mr. peixoto or mr. campbell initiated the discussions about renewal. on the contrary, it suggests that callow did when cross-examined about his “freebie” work, callow admitted that, although he was under the mistaken belief that his contract was likely to be renewed, he was in fact only “hopeful” that it would be. nowhere in his testimony did he suggest that he had been given any information that could mislead him into believing that baycrest was seriously contemplating a two-year renewal instead of termination. [226] the trial judge referred to “active communications . . . between march/april and september 12, 2013, which deceived callow” (para. 66), and to “representations in anticipation of the notice period” (para. 67; see also paras. 65 and 76). but those references must be read in light of the evidence and the reasons as a whole. even though the trial judge made credibility findings against mr. peixoto and mr. campbell and credibility findings in favour of callow, the evidence pertaining to renewal supports only a very limited number of inferences regarding termination. [227] at most, it can be said that mr. peixoto and mr. campbell did not dissuade callow from entertaining hopes when they had a chance to do so but, and most importantly, they did not suggest that baycrest was actually contemplating a continuation of their business relationship. if that had been the case, then i would agree that it might have been justifiable to infer that callow had been led to believe there was no risk that his existing contract would be terminated before its term but that was simply not the case here. in my view, the trial judge did not infer from the discussions about renewal that baycrest had done or said anything to negate the risk that the winter agreement would be terminated for any other reason than unsatisfactory services. had she made such an inference, it would be subject to appellate review, as it would not be supported by the evidence given the context discussed above, mr. peixoto’s and mr. campbell’s vague and evasive declarations did not materially contribute to callow’s mistaken belief that would have required baycrest to disclose additional information. b baycrest’s satisfaction with callow’s services [228] the trial judge placed great importance on the fact that callow’s services had been satisfactory and that baycrest’s conduct had given him no reason to think otherwise (paras. 22, 27, 29-30, 34-36, 39, 41, 46-47 and 55). i note there is no finding that baycrest communicated any particular sign of satisfaction pertaining to the performance of the winter agreement past march 19, 2013. that being said, there is nothing dishonest about baycrest terminating the winter agreement after showing its satisfaction with the quality of callow’s work. [229] further, the parties had explicitly contemplated that baycrest could terminate the winter agreement even if it was satisfied with callow’s performance, as the contract provided that baycrest could exercise its termination right for any other reason than unsatisfactory services. thus, positive feedback about callow’s services cannot justify callow’s mistaken belief that the contract would not be terminated. c callow’s mistaken belief that the winter agreement would remain in effect [230] the trial judge found that baycrest had “continu[ed] to represent that the contract was not in danger” (paras. 65 and 76; see also para. 13) this finding was essentially grounded on the overall signs of satisfaction communicated by baycrest, on its acceptance of the “freebie” work and on callow’s mistaken belief following the discussions pertaining to renewal. as i have already explained, nothing here required baycrest to disclose its intent to terminate the winter agreement. [231] what the trial judge did not find is also relevant she did not find that baycrest had decided to forego its right to terminate the winter agreement. she did not find that baycrest had lied to callow. she did not find that baycrest had negated the risk taken by callow that his contract would be terminated for any other reason than unsatisfactory services lastly, she did not clearly indicate why callow so firmly believed “that his winter maintenance services contract would remain in place during the following winter” (para. 13). [232] callow’s belief that there was no risk baycrest would exercise its termination right was based on two things first, on the positive feedback he had received regarding his services. in his words, baycrest was “happy with it”. however, this is not very relevant in a context in which baycrest could terminate the winter agreement for any other reason than unsatisfactory services second, and most importantly, callow’s mistaken belief was based on an erroneous interpretation of the winter agreement. [233] at trial, callow testified that he was aware of the termination clause, but that he thought the two-year term made it unenforceable: q . . . so, in that letter, there is a — a statement that the termination was in breach of the agreement. so, my question for you is, at that point in time what was your understanding, why was the termination in breach of the agreement? a. because they asked me, and we entered into a two year agreement, to provide services both summer and winter; and i did so at a reduced rate. i upheld my end of the bargain which was to perform that work at that reduced rate they — and which i might add, i was not paid for, the landscaping and the final aspect of it, they were supposed to pay me. they didn’t do it and i continued to fulfill my contractual obligations i expected nothing less than the same from them. q so — so, when you — because you talk — but you knew that in the winter contract, there was that termination clause. a they had a clause written in there i didn’t believe it be enforceable because we had a two year contract. that’s the whole idea to a two year contract. you have contract for two years. i provide services for two years and they pay me for those services. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. ii, at p 120; see also pp. 106-7.) [234] even though that was not the position he took in this court, callow’s uninformed interpretation of the termination provision casts an important light on the reason why he did not believe there was a risk the winter agreement would be terminated for any other reason than unsatisfactory services the evidence does not suggest that baycrest said or did anything that could have negated that risk, nor does it suggest that baycrest had anything to do with callow’s erroneous interpretation of the termination provision i am therefore of the view that baycrest was not required to correct callow’s mistaken belief by disclosing information it decided not to disclose. iv conclusion [235] the trial judge erred in concluding that baycrest had to address performance issues or provide prompt notice prior to termination (para. 67). she did not inquire into whether baycrest had made any representations that had misled callow into thinking baycrest would not terminate the winter agreement for any other reason than unsatisfactory services. in my view, the trial judge extended the ambit of the duty of honest performance in a way that was not consistent with the other principles set out in bhasin. [236] in sum, the narrow issue in this appeal comes down to this: did baycrest lie or otherwise knowingly mislead callow into thinking that there was no risk it would exercise its right to terminate the winter agreement for any other reason than unsatisfactory services? there were no outright lies. baycrest was aware of callow’s mistaken belief that his services would be required for the upcoming winter but baycrest never forewent the contractual advantage it had of being able to end the winter agreement at any time upon 10 days’ notice. nor did baycrest say or do anything that materially contributed to callow’s mistaken belief that the winter agreement would not be terminated for any other reason than unsatisfactory services. regardless of how its conduct is characterized, baycrest had no obligation to correct callow’s mistaken belief. [237] to be clear, the result i arrive at should not be interpreted as meaning that baycrest’s behaviour was appropriate or that callow has no recourse it means that callow’s recourse cannot be based on a breach of the duty of honest performance. the trial judge did in fact find that baycrest had been unjustly enriched by the “freebie” work (at para. 77), but she stated that callow had not provided evidence of his expenses. that question exceeds the scope of this appeal, however. [238] i would therefore dismiss the appeal. appeal allowed with costs throughout, côté j dissenting. ottawa. solicitors for the intervener the canadian federation of independent business: blake, cassels & graydon, toronto. toronto.
[1] with the greatest respect for the contrary view, i agree with the court of appeal’s decision to authorize the class action proposed by the respondent, both against desjardins financial services firm inc. (“firm”) and against desjardins global asset management inc. (“management”). in my respectful opinion, the superior court judge erred in dismissing the re-amended and particularized motion (2) for authorization to institute a class action and to obtain the status of representative, reproduced in ar, vol. ii, at pp. 104-62 (“motion”), against the appellants. except for one matter, i agree with the better part of the court of appeal’s analysis. [2] it is true, as the jurisprudence of this court has made plain, that a judgment dismissing a class action is entitled to deference on appeal, particularly because of the discretionary nature of the decisions of authorization judges. in this case, however — and this is conceded by the appellants in several respects — the superior court judge erred in analyzing certain aspects of the conditions set out in subparas. (a) and (b) of art. 1003 of the former code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25 (“former ccp”) (which correspond to subparas (1) and (2) of art. 575 of the new code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“new ccp”)). like the court of appeal, i am respectfully of the view that these errors in many respects undermine the deference that must ordinarily be shown by an appellate court. [3] i am also of the opinion that some of these errors, including that of disregarding the contractual relationship between firm and the group’s members, are overriding because they strike at the very heart of the judge’s decision not to authorize the class action. as the court of appeal stated, the respondent’s position was not well circumscribed before the superior court. in fact, the action against firm is based on allegations that a common omission, made by all of its representatives, gave rise to liability for this appellant because of the duty to inform that was inherent in its contractual relationship with the respondent and the other members of the group. the alleged fault is therefore a systematic breach of the duty owed by firm, acting through its employees or mandataries, to inform the group’s members of the risks associated with the investments at issue — an omission that was identical and generalized across the group. having declined to find that there was a contract, the judge did not identify this omission by firm, which, according to the motion, is a source of contractual liability for firm under art. 1458 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”). [4] first of all, the “direct” contractual liability alleged against firm is based on its own fault. it is argued that firm is at fault for giving insufficient instructions to all of its representatives. it is also alleged that firm’s representatives, having received false, misleading or incomplete information, failed in turn to provide adequate information to the respondent and the other members of the group, thereby causing them loss. according to the position the respondent wishes to argue on the merits, this generalized omission gave rise to “indirect” contractual liability for firm as a mandator or employer. [5] despite various concessions made at the hearing in this court, the appellants argue — incorrectly, in my view — that the action against firm must be characterized as a [translation] “class action based on the representations made individually by hundreds of financial advisers” (af, at para. 17) i disagree: the motion alleges that all of the representatives failed in the same way to discharge their contractual duty to inform each member of the group of the risks associated with the proposed investment, thereby making the appellant firm indirectly liable for an identical fault committed systematically by all its representatives. [6] contrary to what the motion judge held, i am therefore of the view that the respondent has met the conditions relating to each of the legal bases for the proposed class action against firm. [7] moreover, because of errors made by the superior court in assessing the allegations against the appellant management — again largely conceded — this aspect of the class action must also be authorized, as the court of appeal held. however, i would acknowledge the respondent’s concession that he is not seeking, on his own behalf or on behalf of the group, punitive damages in relation to the “affected abcp” (asset-backed commercial paper) — a definition not disputed by the parties — that is subject to a restructuring process and a related sanction order made by an ontario court under the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36 (“ccaa”). [8] finally, i am of the opinion that, in performing her screening function, the motion judge trenched upon the work of the trial judge, both with regard to firm and with regard to management. as the court of appeal correctly pointed out, this too is an error that, under the established standards, provides a basis for appellate review of the judge’s decision. [9] in fairness to the motion judge, i note that the parties did not make life easy for her. the respondent’s motion — amended thoroughly along the way, including with respect to the initial position put forward — is not the most elegant of its kind. the judge’s task was also complicated by the procedural initiatives of all kinds undertaken by the appellants — examinations, production of documents, motions for particulars. the court of appeal rightly noted that the steps taken by the appellants seemed [translation] “at first glance to be inconsistent with the idea of a summary proceeding” (2017 qcca 1673, at para. 36 (canlii)). the increasing complexity of the proceedings and the excessive volume of evidence may have prompted the authorization judge to take on, perhaps reluctantly, but no less inappropriately, the role of ultimate arbiter of the facts rather than limiting herself to analyzing the proposed legal syllogism. i. preliminary remarks [10] once it found that there were grounds to intervene, the court of appeal thought it appropriate to review — and it was right to do so — the procedural and factual background of the case i adopt its account as my own, subject to a few additional points raised by the parties’ arguments. before going any further, i also wish to make a few remarks concerning the debate between the parties. [11] first preliminary remark: the standard for authorizing a class action is not in dispute in this appeal. this is so despite the fact that, in the factum they filed with this court, the appellants criticize the court of appeal’s judgment harshly as being [translation] “a new milestone in calling into question the work of the superior court’s authorization judges” (af, at para. 11), and despite the fact that, in their application for leave to appeal, they asked in part that this court [translation] “clarify the application of the test developed in [vivendi canada inc. v. dell’aniello, 2014 scc 1, [2014] 1 scr 3] in the context of market intermediaries’ liability for the actions of financial advis[e]rs” (para. 16) focusing more specifically on the expression [translation] “read between the lines” used by the court of appeal (at para. 33), the appellants state the following in their factum: [translation] by establishing that authorization judges must now “read between the lines” to identify arguable cases in allegations that are “not perfect”, the court of appeal is giving perilous guidance that is contrary to the principles laid down by this court with respect to the burden on applicants to articulate their syllogism in a clear and sufficient manner. that guidance alone warrants the intervention of this court . . . . [footnote omitted; para. 34.] in support of this assertion, the appellants cite the reasons of the judges who dissented or dissented in part in l’oratoire saint-joseph du mont-royal v. jj, 2019 scc 35, thus inviting the court to reconsider a decision it rendered in 2019. [12] this position is surprising and contrasts with the grounds raised by the appellants at the hearing, during which they did not even mention the expression “read between the lines”. in answer to questions from the members of the panel, counsel for the appellants conceded that the purpose of their appeal was not to challenge the principles established by this court in infineon technologies ag v option consommateurs, 2013 scc 59, [2013] 3 scr 600, and vivendi or — despite what is stated in the appellants’ factum — to move away from the majority opinion in oratoire. [13] because my colleague deals at length with the expression “read between the lines”, which she believes reflects a methodological error made by the court of appeal, i think it will be helpful to explain why, in my view, this expression should not be understood as a departure from the applicable law. [14] to dispel any confusion on this point, i will quote the court of appeal’s words in their context: [translation] stated otherwise, on the basis of the facts alleged in the application for authorization — facts that, in addition, must in principle be assumed to be true — “[t]he applicant’s burden at this stage is to establish an arguable case”, according to the supreme court in infineon, and nothing more of course, the supreme court added immediately, referring to harmegnies v toyota canada inc., these factual allegations must, however, not be vague, general or imprecise and must “be accompanied by some evidence to form an arguable case”. what does this mean? on the one hand, while it is true that one must not be satisfied with vagueness, generalities and imprecision, it would be wrong to close one’s eyes to allegations that are perhaps not perfect, but whose true meaning is nonetheless clear. one must therefore be able to read between the lines. to do otherwise would be to adopt an unduly literal or rigid approach and to give what the supreme court stated in this regard a meaning that it does not have. on the other hand, it must be understood that generic allegations will not suffice, as the facts raised must, in light of the applicable law, be specific enough to make it possible to comprehend the gist of the proposed narrative and to verify on that basis that the conditions of art. 575 ccp. are met, that is, that the legal syllogism is arguable and that the issues of fact and law underlying it are sufficiently common that their resolution will advance the case for the benefit of each of the members of an otherwise appropriate class, whose interests will be assured by a person capable of properly representing them; these conditions must be interpreted and applied in a manner that “favours easier access to the class action”. there is therefore no requirement that the person seeking authorization to institute a class action specify in minute detail all the allegations being made or the evidence that the person intends to adduce in support of those allegations at the trial on the merits, an approach rejected in infineon by the supreme court, which noted that “the applicable standard is that of showing an arguable case, not the more onerous one of proof on a balance of probabilities”. [footnotes omitted; paras. 32-34.] [15] contrary to what the appellants argue in their factum, i do not think that the expression “read between the lines” reflects any error by the court of appeal. a careful reading of the passage shows that this figurative expression was used simply to caution against being overly literal in analyzing a motion for authorization to institute a class action, and not to signal a change in the law. when the court of appeal’s reasons are read as a whole and the justifications it gave for intervening are considered in context, one plainly understands that “read between the lines” is not an invitation to search in a vacuum — on the blank page — for allegations that are missing from the motion. [16] a few paragraphs earlier, the court of appeal explained that an overly strict approach at the authorization stage, however laudable the intention behind it may be, is not consistent with the approach proposed by this court in infineon, vivendi, bank of montreal v marcotte, 2014 scc 55, [2014] 2 scr 725, and theratechnologies inc v 121851 canada inc., 2015 scc 18, [2015] 2 scr 106, ie a flexible, liberal and generous approach to the authorization conditions that “favours easier access to the class action as a vehicle for achieving the twin goals of deterrence and victim compensation” (infineon, at para. 60, quoted in ca reasons, at para. 29). i would add that the court of appeal properly relied on infineon, in which, as we know, this court explained that inferences can be drawn, not from an absence of words, but from the allegations themselves (see infineon, at para. 89). it is true, as my colleague states, that inferences may not be drawn in the complete absence of allegations in my view, however, the court of appeal adhered perfectly to the principles laid down in infineon: through its approach, those principles were implemented. the court of appeal relied precisely on the allegations at paras. 107 et seq. of the motion to identify the breach committed by ms. blanchette, the financial adviser, that is, failing to inform the respondent of the risks associated with the investment (see, eg, para. 77) the court of appeal’s approach also allowed it to overlook the fact that the motion was poorly worded in some respects, for example, by not dwelling on an ill-chosen word in the motion but instead reading the entire paragraph, even the entire motion, in order to understand the [translation] “true meaning” of the allegations (see, eg, para. 95). [17] the same approach has been adopted in this court’s decisions — including oratoire, rendered after the court of appeal’s judgment my colleague brown j., writing for the majority in that case, accepted jj’s argument, which was not explained in detail in the allegations, that the combination of several pieces of evidence “supports an argument, at the authorization stage, that it might be possible at the trial on the merits to draw from them an inference that the congregation knew or could not have been unaware that some of its members were assaulting children” (para. 24 (emphasis in original); see also para. 69) brown j added that authorization judges must “pay particular attention not only to the alleged facts but also to any inferences or presumptions of fact or law that may stem from them and can serve to establish the existence of an ‘arguable case’” (para. 24; see also para. 60). it can be seen from the majority’s reasons in oratoire that the applicant must present facts that are specific enough to allow the legal syllogism to be considered but that it is not necessary to provide step-by-step details of the legal argument to be made in the submissions on the merits of the case. in this regard, the court of appeal was not changing or reshaping the law by not requiring that the entire legal argument be laid out in minute detail. [18] in using the expression “read between the lines”, the court of appeal also intended to denounce the rigidity and literalism that, in its view, were reflected in the motion judge’s decision it found that this ill-advised rigidity was the source of the judge’s reviewable error in [translation] “stepping into the realm of the evidence and the merits and imposing on the applicant a burden going well beyond the requirements set by art. 575 ccp (art. 1003 of the former ccp)” (para. 35). i agree with my colleague that the judge made this error, including by concluding that the 2008 financial crisis, not management’s fault, was the cause of the loss suffered. [19] there is therefore no question of inventing wording that is not in the motion or of relieving the applicant of its burden of demonstration. as the court of appeal explained, [translation] “[f]orm is, of course, important, but it must not prevail over substance, even in a class action” (para. 95). rigour is called for in reading the motion as a whole, but, as the court of appeal stated, a rigid or literal approach is risky. in 2006, in a book published prior to the decisions in infineon, vivendi and oratoire, professor pierre-claude lafond pointed out the flaws in an overly rigid approach, noting that [translation] “[t]he liberal judicial interpretation, which is now the prevailing one, ensures that the class action does not become inaccessible for essentially technical reasons, depriving litigants of a powerful instrument of access to justice” (le recours collectif, le rôle du juge et sa conception de la justice: impact et évolution (2006), at p 272; see also pp. 7, 81-88 and 280). this court took note, relying on the writings of professor lafond and other sources to endorse this liberal approach in oratoire (see paras. 42, 56 and 79). [20] in short, contrary to what the appellants suggest, the court of appeal did not invent wording or a cause of action by using this expression. to “read between the lines” is to take the wording as a starting point from which to discover the full message it conveys, including the necessarily implied message paradoxically, the appellants take the expression literally by insisting that “read between the lines” means to read into the blank spaces something not written there. they seem to forget the meaning of the metaphor chosen by the court of appeal, lapsing into precisely the same literalism that the expression is intended to denounce. [21] indeed, the appellants have not cited any decision in which the expression “read between the lines” has caused confusion or has been interpreted as an invitation to rewrite a cause of action on the contrary, it seems to me that the judges of the superior court have no particular difficulty understanding these words, as they have found, for example, that [translation] “the allegations in an application for authorization need not specify in minute detail the evidence that an applicant intends to adduce on the merits, and that the allegations may be imperfect but their true meaning may nonetheless be clear” (transport tfi 6 v. espar inc., 2017 qccs 6311, at para. 23 (canlii), citing asselin (ca) and infineon; see also: beauchamp v procureure générale du québec, 2017 qccs 5184, at paras. 18 and 73 (canlii); bramante v. restaurants mcdonald’s du canada limitée, 2018 qccs 4852, at para. 10 (canlii)). the concerns about a slippery slope that will transform the state of the law in quebec if the court of appeal’s decision is upheld are therefore, in my view, unfounded. [22] second preliminary remark: the appellants’ categorical assertion that it is impossible to bring a class action against a brokerage firm based on wrongdoing by investment advisers must be rejected. in urging the dismissal of the action against firm, counsel for the appellants argued at the hearing that any action based on faults committed by representatives, like the one proposed in this case, is necessarily an individual action because the relationship between an adviser and a client is inevitably personalized around the client’s risk tolerance and the advice relating to it this statement is lacking in nuance, as my colleague acknowledges. as we will see, not only do the appellants paint an inaccurate picture of the case law, but the categorical position they put forward to defeat the class action against firm is also inconsistent with the quebec authorization judge’s task of verifying whether there is an identical, similar or related question that will advance the case, a condition more flexible than the one that exists in the rest of the country. although my colleague states that she would not close the door to the possibility of a class action in similar circumstances, her reasons, if accepted by this court, would in my respectful view reflect, in their practical effects, the appellants’ assertion. [23] third preliminary remark: the case is shaped to a large extent by the appellants’ concessions that the motion judge made several errors. as i have already noted, they concede that the judge erred in denying the existence of a contractual relationship between firm and the group’s members, a relationship on which mr. asselin relies to argue that this appellant is contractually liable. the appellants also concede that the motion judge erred in excluding the possibility of a cause of action against management as the designer of the investments at issue. moreover, they admit that she rejected a class action against management pursuant to art. 1003(a) of the former ccp without having analyzed this appellant’s situation, as she confined herself to examining firm’s situation alone. in this court, the appellants do not dispute the fact that there are what are called “common” questions relating to management. they also concede that their argument concerning the release related to abcp would prevent only the claim for punitive damages from being authorized, not the aspect of the proposed action that deals with compensatory damages. [24] not only do all of these concessions clarify the debate that remains to be resolved by this court, but they also confirm that the court of appeal was correct to intervene despite the deference generally owed to authorization judges. with respect, in light of these conceded errors — most of which were relevant to the motion judge’s decision to deny authorization — i think that it is particularly difficult to argue that the court of appeal intervened in this case without any grounds or by “rewriting” mr. asselin’s cause of action. [25] fourth preliminary remark: although my colleague côté j writes that “[t]he flexible and liberal approach to authorization established by this court’s decisions in infineon, vivendi and subsequent cases is not being called into question here” (para. 199), i am, with respect, of the view that this would in fact be the unavoidable consequence of what she proposes in her reasons. her analysis might be thought to deviate from what this court has said about the approach to be taken at the authorization stage on at least two points. first, she suggests that a court’s role is not simply to screen out frivolous applications, thereby contradicting the principles laid down by this court in infineon and oratoire second, by disregarding the common question raised by this case and emphasizing that “[t]he individualized analysis required by the action precludes the possibility of proceeding on a collective basis” (reasons of côté j., at para. 247), she seems to add a requirement, in the analysis of the condition set out in art. 1003(a) of the former ccp, that the common questions predominate over the individual ones. however, quebec law requires only that there be a common question that can advance the action in a not insignificant manner. in my respectful view, these assertions seem to have the effect of undermining the generous and flexible approach adopted by this court in infineon, vivendi and oratoire. [26] i note that the parties have not asked the court to reconsider its decisions. indeed, the appellants conceded at the hearing that the appeal to this court is not meant to change the law; it is an appeal in which this court’s role is simply to “correct errors” allegedly made by the court of appeal. i agree with the appellants on this point, and i would even go further: not only does this case provide no basis for changing the law, but the court of appeal adhered perfectly to the analytical framework established in infineon and vivendi, and even though oratoire was decided after the court of appeal rendered its judgment, its reasoning was also consistent with the main principles enunciated by this court in that case, which, until further notice, states the law. [27] i therefore propose to confine myself to the law as it stands following infineon, vivendi and oratoire as we know, the threshold for authorizing a class action in quebec is a low one. once the four conditions set out in art. 1003 of the former ccp (now art. 575 of the new ccp) are met, the authorization judge must authorize the class action; the judge has no residual discretion to deny authorization on the pretext that, despite the fact that the four conditions are met, a class action is not “the most appropriate” vehicle (see vivendi, at para. 67). questions of law may be resolved by an authorization judge if the outcome of the proposed action depends on the judge’s doing so, but this choice is generally a discretionary one (see oratoire, at para. 55) this reflects the purpose of the authorization stage of the class action: the judge’s role is to filter out frivolous claims, and nothing more (see oratoire, at para. 56, citing, among other things, infineon, at paras. 61, 125 and 150). finally, there is no requirement in quebec that the common questions predominate over the individual ones (see vivendi, at paras. 56-57). on the contrary, a single common question is enough if it advances the litigation in a not insignificant manner. it is not necessary that the common question be determinative of the outcome of the case (see vivendi, at para. 58; oratoire, at para. 15). [28] with respect, i am therefore of the view that my colleague and i do not disagree on mere questions “of application” of well-established principles (reasons of côté j., at para. 200). ii background and parties’ arguments [29] the respondent submits that the appellant firm incurred contractual liability to him and the other members of the group by reason of its own conduct as well as through its representatives. this liability is based on what the court of appeal referred to as a [translation] “dual fault”: (i) firm’s own systematic failure to give all of its representatives sufficient instructions concerning the fact that there were risks associated with the investments issued by the desjardins caisses populaires (firm’s “direct” fault), and (ii) a systematic failure by all of firm’s representatives to disclose those risks to the group’s members (firm’s “indirect” fault). the parties agree that firm can be liable for the faults of its financial advisers (including mr. asselin’s adviser, ms. blanchette) because they were acting as its employees or mandataries. [30] the respondent also argues in his motion that the appellant management is extracontractually liable to him and the other members of the group. this liability is twofold as well: (i) management allegedly committed an extracontractual fault in the design of the capital-guaranteed deposits and is therefore liable as the [translation] “designer” of the investments; and (ii) management allegedly managed the invested funds incompetently, thereby incurring extracontractual liability as the “manager” of the investments. [31] according to the main allegations in the motion, the basis for the appellants’ liability is that firm [translation] “breached its informational obligations and duties and is liable for the damage sustained by the group’s members” (ar, vol. ii, at p 44, para. 105), while management “breached its obligations and duties of competence with regard to design and management and is liable for the damage sustained by the group’s members” (p 44, para. 106 (emphasis deleted)). [32] the appellants dispute the existence of common questions in the proposed action against firm pursuant to art. 1003(a) of the former ccp. they also challenge the sufficiency of the allegations in the proposed action against firm and management in light of the conditions established under art. 1003(b) of the former ccp. furthermore, they take issue with the court of appeal for not applying the judicial release with respect to abcp, which would have led that court to deny the claim for punitive damages against management at this preliminary stage. [33] i propose to discuss the grounds of appeal in detail, in relation to each appellant, in the same order as the motion judge: first from the perspective of art. 1003(b) of the former ccp and then by reference to the “common” questions under art. 1003(a) of the former ccp. iii firm a article 1003(b) of the former ccp: “arguable case” against firm [34] the appellants allege that there is no arguable case against firm. on this point, the motion judge found that there was no good colour of right for a potential contractual claim against firm because of the lack of a contractual relationship between firm and mr. asselin the judge noted the absence of any wrongful breach of the deposit agreements, which were contracts that were not binding on firm, and also found that firm could not be alleged to have committed a particularized contractual fault (2016 qccs 839, at paras. 70 and 82 (canlii)). absent a signed contract or a mandate, firm was not contractually liable to the respondent or the other members of the group, which, in the judge’s view, defeated the position advanced by the respondent in his motion (para. 136). [35] we know that the court of appeal viewed this as an error. in its opinion, the contractual claim against firm was not based on the deposit agreements the motion and the evidence adduced in support of the allegations confirmed that ms. blanchette, firm’s planner who had advised the respondent, mr. asselin, was an employee or mandatary of firm, just like the individuals who had advised the other members of the group (para. 51, note 63, and para. 52, note 66). those representatives linked firm to the group’s members through a contract for investment advice, a contract that existed independently of the deposit agreements entered into with the caisses populaires (paras. 49-82). [36] at the hearing in this court, the appellants rightly conceded that the motion judge had erred on this point and that there was a contract between firm and the group’s members. counsel thus admitted that ms. blanchette and the other financial advisers were representatives of firm — its employees or mandataries — and that, as such, their faults could give rise to contractual liability for firm (transcript, at pp. 10 and 19). the contractual basis for firm’s liability is therefore no longer in issue. [37] the existence of this contractual relationship between firm and the group’s members is a fundamental element of the proposed legal syllogism, which makes it possible to argue that firm is contractually liable. this being the case, i cannot agree with the view that the court of appeal intervened with respect to this conclusion in the absence of a palpable and overriding error or an error of law by the motion judge. with respect, it seems equally difficult to argue that the court of appeal rewrote or “reorient[ed]” the respondent’s cause of action (af, at para. 28; reasons of côté j., at para. 236). to my mind, the appellants’ concession that the judge erred in refusing to recognize the contractual relationship between firm and the group’s members is fundamental this error shows that the motion judge simply did not understand the proposed legal syllogism, and the error is more than sufficient to justify the court of appeal’s intervention with respect to this condition in the proposed action against firm. [38] despite their concession, the appellants submit that the allegations of the motion are, for the purposes of the assessment required by art. 1003(b) of the former ccp, insufficient for the class action to be authorized. they argue that the respondent makes only [translation] “vague, general and imprecise allegations” with respect to firm’s faults. in the circumstances, they say, such allegations should be supported by some evidence, but that evidence is absent in this case. [39] specifically, the appellants argue that all of the documents filed by the respondent that allegedly contain misrepresentations came not from firm, but from the caisses populaires that were the issuers of the capital-guaranteed deposits those documents cannot make up for the insufficiency of the allegations of fault against firm, nor can they ground firm’s liability. the appellants argue that the motion judge was right about this: the few exhibits that came from firm, such as the respondent’s planning forms, contain no specific representations concerning the capital-guaranteed deposits. [40] these arguments must be rejected in my view, there is no absence of allegations in the case at bar. on the contrary, the allegations are sufficiently precise, in accordance with the applicable standard, and are also supported by “some evidence” within the meaning of infineon and oratoire. (1) allegations of the motion [41] once it is established — contrary to what the motion judge concluded from the record — that there was a contract, the factual allegations relating to the dual fault can be identified easily, and they must therefore be assumed to be true at the authorization stage. [42] the proposed legal syllogism, which is based on a breach by firm of its duty to inform, bears closer examination. in his motion, mr. asselin explains right in the summary that he is alleging that the appellants [translation] “breached and violated the obligations and duties of information, competence and management . . .” (ar, vol. ii, at p 105, para. 2 (emphasis added)) according to the motion, the appellants failed to “adequately infor[m] the group’s members” (p 105, para. 5 (emphasis added)) of the risky transactions conducted using the amounts the members had entrusted to them. with regard to injury, mr. asselin explains the loss of a return resulting from risky investment strategies (para. 8); with regard to causation, he states that he “would never have agreed to invest in the pp and alt investments if the respondents [here, the appellants] had adequately informed him of the risks associated with these investments” (p 106, para. 10 (emphasis added)). this is the legal syllogism advanced by mr. asselin for the proposed action against firm. [43] the faults are described with sufficient precision, and the information missing for the entire group relates, among other things, to the level of risk involved in the investments, their volatility and the way they worked, including the leverage used. first, there are paras. 107 and 107.1 of the motion: firm described the investments as being [translation] “safe and intended for a risk-averse investor”, and firm failed to give its representatives sufficient instructions “regarding the characteristics and risks of the . . . investments” (ar, vol. ii, at p 147) in both cases, mr. asselin makes direct allegations against firm. because it had a monopoly on information about the structure and characteristics of the investments, firm had a duty to inform its representatives so that they in turn could inform their clients. in the absence of adequate instruction concerning the investments, the representatives “were not therefore in a position to evaluate their advantages and disadvantages” (p 147, para. 1071). [44] a specific allegation of fault made against the representatives can be found at para. 107.2 of the motion: [translation] “the information provided by the representatives of desjardins financial services to the group’s members was therefore necessarily wrong or insufficient, if not false, deceptive or misleading” (ar, vol. ii, at p 147). firm’s liability for those faults is also alleged, since the respondent explains that firm was “responsible for the mutual fund representatives and financial planners working in the network of caisses populaires” (p 110, para. 30) and, more specifically, that firm was, “[i]n the context of this case . . . responsible for the representatives who offered pp and alt investments and solicited deposits from the group’s members in the network of caisses populaires of the desjardins group” (p 110, para. 32). [45] it can therefore be understood that the proposed action is based not on a breach of the deposit agreements, but rather on a generalized and systematic breach of the duty to inform. mr. asselin alleges that firm systematically breached its duty to inform by not adequately informing all of its representatives of the risks and characteristics of the investments (the “direct” fault). according to the facts alleged in the motion, the representatives, having received false, misleading or incomplete information, then failed to provide adequate information to the group’s members (the “indirect” fault) firm’s alleged “dual fault”, and the basis for the action, is a generalized and systematic breach of its general duty to inform. given that firm dealt with the group’s members only through its representatives, this “dual fault” identified by the court of appeal refers, in other words, to two sides of the same coin: firm’s breach of its duty to inform the group’s members directly itself, and to inform them indirectly through its representatives. [46] the motion states, at paras. 73.7 and 73.8, that the promotional documents used by the representatives with their clients emphasized that the investments at issue had potential returns that were higher, regular and not very volatile. [translation] “however”, the motion reads, “these documents said nothing at all about the risks associated with these investments, apart from sometimes stating in a footnote that the returns might be nil” (ar, vol. ii, at p 124 (emphasis deleted)). [47] this is an allegation that there was a failure to disclose the risks, a failure that, according to the respondent, was generalized across the group and constituted an identical breach by firm of its contractual duty to inform that was repeated systematically for each member of the group the allegation against firm must be analyzed in light of the very nature of the fault committed — an omission is, by definition, characterized by an absence of information firm’s liability allegedly [translation] “arises from [its] denial or failure to disclose”, to borrow a useful expression from another context (see imperial tobacco canada ltée v conseil québécois sur le tabac et la santé, 2019 qcca 358, 55 cclt (4th) 1, at para. 813). in my view, it is therefore not a matter of seeking some particularized fault committed by the representative, ms. blanchette: the motion alleges faults of omission that were committed systematically by both firm and its representatives. [48] at paras. 73.9 and 73.10, as well as paras. 73.26 to 73.30, the motion provides additional information concerning breaches of a similar nature and elsewhere, the emphasis is on the faults of omission committed as they relate to firm’s direct and indirect liability. after explaining the leveraging of the financial products, the respondent alleges [translation] “that at no time did the [appellants] explain to the group’s members how the investments worked” (ar, vol. ii, at p 114, para. 52); at para. 10711, the respondent refers to the documents entered in evidence, alleging that they “gave no explanation, or a very incomplete explanation, of the leverage used to obtain the return on the pp and alt investments”; at para. 10712, the respondent adds that “[t]hose documents merely provided an incomplete description of the pp and alt investments and presented the advantages of these investments without describing the risks associated with the pp and alt investments” (p 147 (emphasis deleted)). [49] in one form or another, mr. asselin alleges that at no time did firm [translation] “disclose to the group’s members the risks associated with the liquidity issues and the financial leverage” for the investments (ar, vol. ii, at p 148, para. 110) mr. asselin explains that the group’s members “could not have known, even with all due diligence” (p 148, para. 115), that management was using risky investment strategies that had not been disclosed. furthermore, firm “made false and misleading representations to the group’s members . . . regarding the correlation with the stock markets” (p 148, para. 116). [50] on the basis of these facts, the motion alleges that firm [translation] “breached the informational obligations and duties it owes by law” (ar, vol. ii, at p 149, para. 118) and that it is therefore contractually liable (p 154, para. 145). (2) sufficiency of the allegations [51] are these allegations sufficient to meet the condition set out in art. 1003(b) of the former ccp? [52] in oratoire, brown j., writing for the majority, explained that “[t]he applicant’s burden at the authorization stage is simply to establish an ‘arguable case’ in light of the facts and the applicable law”, a threshold he described as “low” (para. 58; see also infineon, at paras. 65 and 67). [53] with respect, the proposition that the role of authorization judges at this stage is not limited to screening applications for authorization is a change to the applicable law (reasons of côté j., at paras. 218 and 220-21). none of the decisions cited to this effect (infineon, at para. 59, vivendi, at para. 37, and oratoire, at para. 7, cited in the reasons of côté j., at para. 220) describes the role of screening out frivolous actions as being separate from that of verifying compliance with the conditions set out in art. 1003 of the former ccp (in this regard, see also lafond, at p 116, quoted with approval in oratoire, at para. 56: [translation] “the authorization stage exists solely to screen out applications that are frivolous or clearly unfounded in fact or in law, as the legislature originally intended”). [54] with respect, i do not think it is appropriate to revive a debate that was in fact settled by this court as recently as last year. in oratoire, the dissenting judge also suggested that “while a court must of course screen out frivolous or clearly unfounded applications from the outset, the criterion applicable to the condition set out in art. 575(2) ccp is separate and, above all, more stringent” (para. 207) however, eight judges expressed a contrary view. [55] brown j., for the majority, explained that “it is in principle not appropriate at the authorization stage for the court to make any determination as to the merits in law of the conclusions in light of the facts being alleged it is enough that the application not be ‘frivolous’ or ‘clearly wrong’ in law” (para. 58) he specifically noted that, “[a]s this court explained in infineon, ‘the court’s role is merely to filter out frivolous motions’, which it does ‘to ensure that parties are not being subjected unnecessarily to litigation in which they must defend against untenable claims’” (para. 56 (emphasis in original)). he then referred to two other paragraphs of infineon in which lebel j and wagner j (as he then was) stated unequivocally that “the purpose of the authorization stage is merely to screen out frivolous claims” (para. 56, citing infineon, at para. 150; see also para. 125). the majority in oratoire, relying in part on infineon and theratechnologies, also noted that its approach was already well established in the case law and academic literature (see paras. 56 and 58). [56] moreover, as brown j noted in response to the comments made by côté j. in oratoire, gascon j agreed with his position, and it would be wrong to say “that screening out frivolous or clearly unfounded applications is not the ‘criterion adopted by the legislature’, but only ‘one of the purposes of the authorization process’” (para. 61 (emphasis in original)). conscious of the fact that some would like this court to strengthen the authorization process, brown j observed, however, that the “decisions in infineon and vivendi . . . can be said to have been endorsed by the quebec legislature when the new ccp came into force” (para. 62). [57] in the case at bar, the burden of establishing “an ‘arguable case’ in light of the facts and the applicable law” is met (oratoire, at para. 58). mr. asselin’s proposed cause of action is neither frivolous nor clearly unfounded. [58] on the contrary, the proposed legal syllogism is perfectly arguable: a person who provides financial services is indeed subject to a duty to inform, and failure to comply with that duty may give rise to civil liability, for which the principal or mandator of the financial adviser at fault must answer (see laflamme v. prudentiel-bache commodities canada ltd., 2000 scc 26, [2000] 1 scr 638, at paras. 30-31; r. crête and c. duclos, “les sanctions civiles en cas de manquements professionnels dans les services de placement”, in crête, ed., et al., courtiers et conseillers financiers. encadrement des services de placement (2011), 361, at p 394; souscripteurs du lloyd’s v alimentations denis & mario guillemette inc., 2012 qcca 1376, at paras. 16-17 (canlii)). [59] as the court of appeal explained, the group’s members were in fact linked to firm by [translation] “a contract for services within the meaning of art. 2098 ccq or, if the services are not paid for directly, a similar sui generis contract” (para. 54). under a contract whose object is the giving of advice, the obligation to give advice is the core prestation, while the obligation to inform is an accessory one (see d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (3rd ed. 2018), at no. 2004). [60] it is important to understand the distinction between the duty to provide advice and the duty to inform, which are [translation] “in theory distinct from one another” (lluelles and moore, at no. 2002 (footnote omitted)). this distinction will also be relevant in analyzing the common questions. [61] grounded in the general obligation of good faith (arts. 6, 7 and 1375 ccq), the duty to inform relates to all contracts and, in principle, applies to all contracting parties (lluelles and moore, at nos 2001 and 2003) the private law dictionary and bilingual lexicons: obligations (2003) defines “obligation to inform” as an “[o]bligation to reveal to another facts that the latter, in order to adjust his or her conduct, may legitimately expect to receive” (p 215) in contrast, “obligation to advise” is defined as an “[o]bligation to provide counsel to another in the furtherance of the latter’s interest” (p 214) the duty to inform is less onerous and less individualized than the obligation to provide advice (m. fabre-magnan, de l’obligation d’information dans les contrats: essai d’une théorie (1992), at nos. 471-72; f. terré, p. simler and y. lequette, droit civil: les obligations (11th ed. 2013), at no. 455; j-l. baudouin and p. g. jobin, les obligations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at no. 306). as this court explained in laflamme: the duty to provide advice requires that the manager make his knowledge and expertise available to the client, and that he use them better to serve the client’s interests in light of the client’s objectives. however, the duty to provide advice is not the same as the obligation to inform, the substance of the latter being more objectively quantifiable [emphasis added; para. 33.] [62] the main obligation of a financial adviser, and of the adviser’s firm, is therefore to provide advice tailored to the client. mr. asselin, however, is relying on the accessory obligation that firm and all of the representatives had to present the characteristics and risks associated with the investments, that is, to provide each client with objective information, such as information about the leverage being used. this is the basis for the proposed legal syllogism, which the motion judge misunderstood when she conflated the duty to provide advice and the duty to inform. [63] in bank of montreal v. bail ltée, [1992] 2 scr 554, this court observed that the scope of the obligation to inform is assessed on the basis of the following criteria: “[1] knowledge of the information, whether actual or presumed, by the party which owes the obligation to inform; [2] the fact that the information in question is of decisive importance; [3] the fact that it is impossible for the party to whom the duty to inform is owed to inform itself, or that the creditor is legitimately relying on the debtor of the obligation” (pp. 586-87). [64] the first point is not in any doubt, since firm knows or is presumed to know the characteristics of the investments it recommends. the motion also alleges that the appellants [translation] “knew as early as 2007 that a liquidity crisis affecting hedge funds would occur” (ar, vol. ii, at p 148, para. 114), making the investments even more unstable. on the second point, mr. asselin alleges that he made the investments in question “on the strength of all [the] information” provided and passed on by ms. blanchette (p 144, paras. 89-91) and that he “would never have agreed to invest in the pp and alt investments if the [appellants] had adequately informed him of the risks associated with these investments” (p 106, para. 11). this means that, according to the motion, the information was of decisive importance. on the third point, the motion alleges that “[t]he group’s members were not in a position and could not have known, even with all due diligence, that [management] was using significant leverage that might eliminate any possibility of obtaining a return at maturity” (p 148, para. 115). the motion thus alleges that it was impossible for the members to inform themselves. [65] in short, on my reading, and with respect for those who disagree, the wording of the motion makes it possible to understand the proposed syllogism without any need to reorient the cause of action or to guess what it is. not only did the court of appeal fully understand that there was a contractual relationship between firm and the respondent, but it also correctly observed that the class action against firm was based in part on a breach of the duty to inform imposed by the contract the relevant allegations refer to faults of omission that are said to be attributable to firm. [66] i therefore conclude that, contrary to what the appellants argue, the allegations are sufficient to establish an arguable case against firm the proposed syllogism is neither frivolous nor clearly unfounded in law. the allegations are precise enough to be assumed to be true. but even if it were to be found that the allegations lack precision, there is, in my view, a sufficient basis for them in the evidence adduced. (3) the evidence [67] the appellants submit that the respondent’s assertions are not supported by “concrete”, “specific” or “tangible” facts (oratoire, at para. 25, per brown j., for the majority). in oratoire, they say, the majority justified its conclusion by referring to a “table of victims” that had been entered in evidence that table, which listed approximately 40 victims and close to 30 assailants, set out “‘specific, tangible’ facts that in themselves support[ed] jj’s claim that the congregation knew about the alleged assaults on children by its members” (para. 23), a fact that could be proved by presumption. according to the appellants, there is nothing comparable in the evidence adduced by the respondent that could compensate for his insufficient allegations. [68] i disagree, for three reasons. [69] first, the motion does not allege a positive misrepresentation; it alleges an omission. in oratoire, on the other hand, what was sought was evidence of positive wrongful acts — assaults on minors — and the applicant bore the ultimate burden of proving those acts. [70] in contractual matters, the burden of proof depends on the intensity of the obligation. here, the alleged omission corresponds to a breach of the duty to inform, which, unlike the duty to provide advice, is an obligation of result (lluelles and moore, at no. 2002). in the case of an obligation of result, [translation] “mere proof by the creditor that the result was not achieved is sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the debtor is liable” (jobin and vézina, at no. 40; see also lluelles and moore, at no. 108) thus, according to scholarly opinion, the burden of proving that the information was provided lies on the debtor, in this case the appellants. in other words, evidence that mr. asselin did not receive the information owed to him would shift the burden of showing that the information was provided — that is, that there was no omission — to the appellants otherwise, as professor fabre-magnan explains, if a creditor of the obligation to inform, in order to succeed, had to adduce evidence that the other contracting party had failed to provide information, the creditor [translation] “would be required to demonstrate an indefinite negative proposition, which is by no means easy, and perhaps even impossible” (no. 545 (footnote)). [71] why does this matter here? at the authorization stage, the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that the proposed legal syllogism is arguable, not the burden of proving each element of the syllogism on the usual civil balance of probabilities standard (oratoire, at para. 58) the superior court judge applied the wrong standard to test the conditions set out in art. 1003(a) and (b) when she wrote that the applicant [translation] “has not demonstrated that a representative actually provided the alleged documents or information” (para. 212 (emphasis added)) to assess the sufficiency of the evidence and the allegations, the judge instead had to consider the particular features of the context and what would or would not have to be proved at trial. here, we are dealing with allegations of omissions and with a burden of proof on the merits that is lower in some respects. in this context, the evidence adduced by mr. asselin in support of allegations that must, in any event, be assumed to be true is more than sufficient. [72] it is therefore not surprising that the action could be authorized without proof on a balance of probabilities that the information had not been provided. if the appellants had evidence that the information had in fact been given to the members and the representatives, they could have sought the superior court’s permission to adduce that evidence. we know that the sufficiency of the evidence of a possible breach is an issue for the trial on the merits. a finding that the allegations are supported by some evidence at this stage is not binding on the court that will decide the merits of the case and does not entail any loss of rights for the appellants, who will have ample opportunity at trial to present evidence and to make the argument that the promotional documents cannot ground a breach of firm’s duty to inform. i reiterate that the purpose of this stage of the proceedings is only to authorize the filing of the motion to institute proceedings; the judgment on the motion for authorization of the action is [translation] “merely a preliminary decision that could be varied at the trial, or even before, and does not prejudge the final outcome of the litigation” (lafond, at pp. 116-17 (footnotes omitted)). [73] second, mr. asselin has filed many documents to support allegations concerning firm’s failure to disclose, to all clients, the risks associated with the methods used to manage the investments. the filing of these exhibits serves to illustrate the absence of any adequate warning regarding those risks, thereby bolstering the plausibility of the allegations. the omissions show that the documents in question were deficient, and they therefore confirm the possibility that an omission was made systematically by all of firm’s representatives. [74] the appellants maintain that these documents contain no evidence of any misrepresentation, such that they cannot be viewed as “some evidence” needed to clarify and explain the vague and imprecise allegations made in the motion. however, the documents were filed not as evidence of what was said, but rather — in the context of allegations concerning the faults attributable to firm — as evidence of what was not said. here again, the court of appeal was correct, as it explained at para. 149 of its reasons that the respondent [translation] “is basing his application . . . and his potential action against [firm] not on these documents, but on the (alleged) fact that [firm] and its representatives did not warn him or the other members of the group of the true risks associated with the pp and alt investments”. the documents are a means to this end, not an end in themselves. requiring a fuller demonstration of breaches at the authorization stage — for example, by emphasizing the need for evidence that the documents were in fact provided to all the members — would risk transforming this preliminary stage into an actual trial. it is true that the authorization stage is more than a mere formality, but it is also much less than an actual trial as professor lafond explains, [translation] “a motion for authorization must be treated as what it is: a simple screening mechanism, a preliminary proceeding that must in no way encroach on the merits of the case” (p 134). this is the main risk we run in the case at bar, and, with respect, it is a risk about which the motion judge was less than vigilant. [75] what significance should be given to the fact that some of these documents “did not come” from firm but were, as the appellants note, prepared by the caisses populaires? [76] none at all. firm, through its representatives, chose to use these documents in the performance of its contract with the respondent and some other members of the group the motion is clear in this respect (paras. 73.20, 73.23, 73.34, 73.42, 73.48, 73.69, 89.3 and 894). regardless of their origin, when ms. blanchette gave documents to mr. asselin in order to provide him with information, she spoke to him and was thereby able to bind firm. [77] thus, it is not so much the origin of the documents that is relevant to whether the case the respondent is trying to make against firm is an arguable one, but rather the fact that firm used the documents and provided them to others. it is alleged that this fact, and the choice made by firm and its representatives to rely on the documents, are evidence of the breach of the contractual duty to inform alleged in support of firm’s indirect contractual liability. as a result of the failure to disclose the risks associated with the investments at issue, the same documents are also alleged to be evidence that the instruction given by firm to the representatives was inadequate, which supports the allegation of direct contractual liability this evidence will, of course, have to be tested at the trial on the merits, but it is sufficient for the action to be authorized. [78] i would add that the prospectus exemption granted by securities legislation is equally irrelevant to the alleged breaches of the contractual duty to inform and to the failure to train the representatives properly. a document provided by a financial adviser that looks official, whether that document is required or not, may mislead an investor if it contains false or incomplete information. the appellants are therefore wrong to argue, as they did at the hearing, that the documents cannot form the basis for a direct fault by firm where the issuer — the caisses populaires — was not required by the applicable legislation to provide investors with information. whether the documents were or were not necessary to comply with legislative requirements is not a deciding factor; what matters is that they were used by the representatives and that they were, according to the motion, deficient the respondent alleges that firm breached its obligations. firm’s use of the documents is “some evidence” that, if need be, clarifies even further the allegations relating to the breaches that constitute, as the court of appeal put it, firm’s “dual fault”. [79] third, mr. asselin’s pre-hearing examination is also relevant evidence. lluelles and moore note that in the case of [translation] “non-performance of an obligation to do something, such as an absence of advice or information, the question of the burden of proof is more difficult, as the breach amounts to a negative, which is inherently difficult to establish persuasively” (no. 2014, note 259). they add, however, that it can be proved simply by testimony: “the creditor of the obligation to inform or to provide advice would have to state under oath that he or she did not receive such information or advice, which would make it possible to establish that the debtor did not give the information or advice” (no. 2014, note 259 (emphasis in original)). mr. asselin’s credibility and the probative value of his assertions are matters to be assessed at the trial on the merits. [80] contrary to what the appellants argue, the fact that mr. asselin was “happy” with his dealings with his adviser, ms. blanchette, is of no importance here; what is important is that he trusted her and that, during their discussions, he was not properly informed of the risk affecting this kind of investment. this is confirmed by his examination. the respondent’s position is that all of the investors were in the same situation. [81] in conclusion, the allegations not only exist and are sufficiently precise, but they are also supported by the evidence in the record. it should be noted that in quebec, unlike in the rest of the country, an applicant is not required to “show that the claim has a ‘sufficient basis in fact’” (oratoire, at para. 58, citing infineon, at para. 128). in this case, requiring conclusive documentary evidence of a failure to provide information would not only ask too much at the authorization stage, but would also impose on mr. asselin a burden more onerous than the one he will have to face during the trial on the merits, since an omission can be proved by any means, including testimony and inference. [82] far from reading the motion in a cursory manner or treating the authorization stage as a mere formality, the court of appeal analyzed the motion closely and rigorously the appellants have not shown that it made any error with regard to the arguable case against firm. b article 1003(a) of the former ccp:. identical, similar or related question of law or fact that can advance the cause of action against firm in a not insignificant manner [83] unlike the motion judge, the court of appeal correctly held that a generalized and systematic breach of the duty to inform raised common questions. [84] it should be borne in mind that, at the authorization stage, the decisions of the quebec courts and of this court require “a flexible approach to the common interest that must exist among the group’s members” (vivendi, at para. 54). as a result, “even where circumstances vary from one group member to another, a class action can be authorized if some of the questions are common” (vivendi, at para. 58). it is clear from the decided cases that [translation] “[t]he fact that the situations of all members of the group are not perfectly identical does not mean that the group does not exist or is not uniform” (infineon, at para. 73, citing guilbert v. vacances sans frontière ltée, [1991] rdj 513, at p 517) and that, “[a]t the authorization stage, the threshold requirement for common questions is low” (para. 72). [85] although some jurisdictions require that the common questions predominate, in quebec, a single common question is sufficient as long as it advances the litigation in a not insignificant manner. lebel j and wagner j (as he then was), writing for a unanimous court, explained this clearly in vivendi (see para. 58; see also oratoire, at paras. 15, 18 and 20) i would also note that the ccp requires not a common answer, but rather a common question (vivendi, at para. 51). [86] the question of whether firm misinformed its representatives, with the result that there was a generalized and systematic failure to inform the investor clients, is, by definition, a question common to all members of the group answering this question would advance the litigation in a not insignificant manner. given the nature of the allegations, there is even a strong possibility that the answer to the question will be the same for all members, although it is not necessary to demonstrate this at this stage. nor is it necessary at the authorization stage to demonstrate the systematic nature of firm’s breach. this question requires the same analysis and “is significant enough to affect the outcome of the class action” (infineon, at para. 72). [87] according to the decided cases, attempting to determine whether the common question predominates distracts us from the central issue at the authorization stage, which is whether the common question plays a not insignificant role in the outcome of the case (see vivendi, at para. 60; oratoire, at para. 20) a common question may advance the litigation even if many individual questions remain. [88] i must therefore respectfully disagree with my colleague’s statement that “[t]he individualized analysis required by the action precludes the possibility of proceeding on a collective basis” (para. 247). in my respectful view, this position could distort the law on class actions in quebec. i reiterate that the conditions set out in the ccp do not require that the common questions predominate. the fact that a number of individual questions remain does not mean that the common question plays an insignificant role in the action. care must be taken not to make the same error that was made by the authorization judge in vivendi, who was “mistaken in emphasizing the possibility that numerous individual questions would ultimately have to be analyzed” (para. 60). the fact that there are common questions in the proposed action becomes even clearer from the allegations once the following is understood: a) the action is based on a breach of the duty to inform; b) the duty to inform may be general in scope; and c) a class action for such a breach based on the adviser-client relationship is not impossible. i propose to consider each of these three points in turn. (1) the action is based on a breach of the duty to inform [89] the appellants’ arguments in this court are focused on the following proposition: unless a direct fault by firm or the systematic nature of the misrepresentations conveyed by its advisers is [translation] “supported or demonstrated”, as their counsel put it at the hearing, a class action cannot be authorized on the basis of the investor-adviser relationship, because that relationship involves too many individual issues. the appellants submit that the court of appeal, in authorizing the class action, disregarded unanimous case law to the effect that the claims made by the respondent and the other members necessarily vary with each investor’s specific context and individual risk tolerance (in accordance with the “know your client” concept). they argue that a class action against a brokerage firm for a breach of the duty to provide advice is impossible in such circumstances. [90] once it is understood that the basis for the proposed action against firm is a breach of the general duty to inform (and not the duty to provide advice), it becomes clear that there are common questions that meet the condition of art. 1003(a) of the former ccp. what is common to all the members is the generalized and systematic failure to disclose information concerning the risk associated with the investments. the appellants’ arguments regarding the individualized duty to provide advice are therefore not relevant like the motion judge, the appellants are basing their reasoning on an incorrect understanding of the position taken in the motion. [91] i come to this view for the following reasons. [92] as discussed above, mr. asselin’s proposed action is based on an alleged breach by firm of its duty to inform. the motion is clear in this regard: [translation] faults breaches of the duty to inform 107. the pp and alt investments were represented and described to the group’s members as being safe and intended for a risk-averse investor, as will be shown more fully at the hearing; 107.1 moreover, the representatives of desjardins financial services were not given sufficient instructions regarding the characteristics and risks of the pp and alt investments and were not therefore in a position to evaluate their advantages and disadvantages; 10711. in this regard, the documents describing the pp and alt investments . . . gave no explanation, or a very incomplete explanation, of the leverage used to obtain the return on the pp and alt investments; 10712. those documents merely provided an incomplete description of the pp and alt investments and presented the advantages of these investments without describing the risks associated with the pp and alt investments; the information provided by the representatives of desjardins 107.2 financial services to the group’s members was therefore necessarily wrong or insufficient, if not false, deceptive or misleading; in reality, the amounts allocated to the return on the pp 108. investment and the alt investment were invested in hedge funds with a leverage ratio of five (5) to one (1), as can be seen from the article by jean gagnon entitled “pourquoi certains produits à capital garanti de desjardins ne rapporteront rien”, exhibit r-14; 108.1 what is more, the hedge funds in which those amounts were invested were themselves leveraged, which multiplied the risk of the pp and alt investments; 109. the use of these strategies resulted in a loss of one hundred percent (100%) of the assets of the pp and alt investments allocated to the return, whereas the hedge fund market had losses of only thirteen percent (13%) as of september 30, 2008; at no time, however, did the respondent . . . desjardins 110. financial services disclose to the group’s members the risks associated with the liquidity issues and the financial leverage, despite the fact that it was aware or could not have been unaware of those risks; . the group’s members were not in a position and could not have 115. known, even with all due diligence, that the respondent . . desjardins asset management was using significant leverage that might eliminate any possibility of obtaining a return at maturity and that in fact caused the loss, in the fall of 2008, of the portion of the original deposit allocated to the return; 116. furthermore, the respondent . . . desjardins financial services made false and misleading representations to the group’s members . regarding the correlation with the stock markets; contrary to what the respondent . . . desjardins financial 117. services claimed, the pp and alt investments were profoundly affected by stock market fluctuations; 118. the respondent . . . desjardins financial services failed to provide adequate information to the group’s members and breached the informational obligations and duties it owes by law; 119. the faults of the respondent . . . desjardins financial services concerning the obligations related to the disclosure of information occurred in a context in which the pp and alt investments were intended for a varied clientele including individuals with little knowledge of financial concepts; [emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted.] (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 147-49) [93] the motion indicates that the group’s members were systematically misinformed by giving its representatives documents that were misleading and incomplete, firm misinformed them and did not give them the means to adequately inform the group’s members. the motion alleges that the information provided to the members was therefore necessarily wrong or insufficient, if not false, deceptive or misleading. [94] the systematic nature of firm’s breach is therefore clearly alleged. there is no question of reading something into the motion that is not there or of “reorienting” the respondent’s cause of action; it is enough to note, and to assume the truth of, mr. asselin’s allegation that firm’s representatives were not given sufficient instructions regarding the products’ characteristics and, as a result, were unable in turn to inform the group’s members. [95] it is also important to note that the information in question here was objective information that firm never gave the representatives or the members concerning, among other things, the leverage used to obtain the return and the risky nature of the investments (paras. 10711 and 1072). mr. asselin is not alleging that certain representatives gave the members personalized and subjective advice that was not in keeping with their individual risk tolerance. he is alleging that information that was essential to all the members was never given to the representatives and therefore could not be passed on to the members. [96] that being the case, mr. asselin identifies common questions relating, again, to firm’s duty to inform. the common questions are specifically formulated by reference to the duty to inform, not the duty to provide advice: [translation] a. identical, similar or related questions of fact and law that link each member of the group to the respondents and that the applicant intends to have decided through the class action 138 conformity of the financial product did the pp and alt investments conform with the financial products that desjardins trust, desjardins financial services and desjardins asset management designed and/or offered to the group’s members? 139 duty to inform did desjardins trust and desjardins financial services owe the members of the registered group, in the case of desjardins trust, and the members of the principal group, in the case of desjardins financial services, a duty under the deposit insurance act, the act respecting the distribution of financial products and services, the civil code of québec and/or the applicable rules and/or practices to provide them with information with respect to the offering, design and management of the pp and alt investments? 140 if so, did desjardins trust and desjardins financial services breach this duty by failing to clearly inform the members of the registered group, in the case of desjardins trust, and the members of the principal group, in the case of desjardins financial services, that the pp and alt investments would include investment strategies that might eliminate, before maturity, any possibility of a return? [emphasis deleted.] (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 152-53) [97] despite being poorly worded at times, as the court of appeal noted, the motion is clear in identifying the breach of a duty to inform as the basis for firm’s contractual liability nowhere in the motion is there any mention of a breach of an individualized duty to provide advice. [98] it is therefore surprising that the appellants’ primary argument is that the duty to provide advice is too individualized to form the basis for a class action. it is true that a case based on the duty to provide advice and the responsibility to “be well informed” as to one’s client may be ill suited to a class action — but that is not the question. the position taken in the motion is not based on the individual liability of a financial adviser to a particular client, which would depend, on a case-by-case basis, on evidence of the client’s profile to establish whether the investment was in fact appropriate as counsel for the respondent clearly explained before the court of appeal, [translation] “[t]hat is not the basis for the action at all”: the judge, in closing, the motion judge also said that a class action should not be authorized because, basically, what the applicants were asserting was the liability of an adviser to a client it would be necessary to establish — as in the case of a management mandate between a client and a manager — it would be necessary to establish each client’s profile in order to determine whether in fact the product was appropriate for the client. it is absolutely not the case, it was never argued, we even told the court — it mentions this in its judgment — that we were not pursuing a relationship based on the professional liability of a dealer or financial adviser to a client. that is not the basis for the action at all; the basis for the action, the principal and essential legal syllogism put forward for this action, is that a product was represented as having particular characteristics even though it did not have those characteristics and, as a result, a product was sold, misrepresentations were made, a product was sold as being safe, including the return portion, even though it was being managed in a highly speculative manner through leverage, the use of leverage, in this case a ratio of one to five (1:5), five (5) to one (1), and even in the case of the hedge funds, twenty (20) to one (1). [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. xiii, at pp. 29-30) [99] the basis for the action is the duty to inform: it is alleged that the information provided by firm was systematically truncated, incomplete or misleading. (2) the duty to inform may be general in scope [100] i emphasize the appellants’ misunderstanding of the basis for the proposed action because the scope of the duty to inform and the scope of the duty to provide advice do not vary in the same way with each client’s specific context. [101] the duty to provide advice owed by firm’s representatives was indeed an individualized one, as the appellants contend and as my colleague notes as well. they rely on cases dealing with the individualization of the duty to provide advice, which i see no need to discuss, as that is not the basis for the action. suffice it to say that the duty of financial advisers to provide advice requires [translation] “consideration of the client’s particular situation, goals and expectations” and that it “therefore requires a subjective assessment in order to tailor the advice to the client’s specific situation” (crête and duclos, at pp. 394-95 (footnotes omitted)). [102] it was to this duty to provide advice that counsel for the appellants referred at the hearing in his recurring argument about the “know your client” concept, that is, the responsibility of a financial adviser to be well informed as to his or her client and to tailor advice to the client’s situation the advice given to each client takes into account the client’s level of risk tolerance and particular financial situation. that is not the action before this court, however as my colleague notes, “one of the most important obligations of securities dealers and financial advisers is to know their clients” (para. 243). but this does not mean that such advisers are not also subject to other obligations, which could be more general, a proposition with which my colleague agrees (para. 242). [103] in this case, as we have seen, firm and its representatives also had a duty to inform that coexisted with the duty to provide advice (r. crête and c. duclos, “le portrait des prestataires de services de placement”, in r. crête, ed., et al., courtiers et conseillers financiers. encadrement des services de placement (2011), 45, at p 65). [104] this duty to inform is, in many respects, less individualized and therefore more likely to give rise to common questions than the duty to provide advice. the duty to provide advice [translation] “is subjective in nature and requires a great deal of skill as well as knowledge of the other contracting party’s needs” (lluelles and moore, at no. 2002). the duty to inform, on the other hand, “is quite easy to fulfil, as it simply involves transferring, during the course of the contract, information that is important to the other contracting party” (no. 2002) unlike the duty to provide advice, which depends on each client’s idiosyncrasies, the duty to inform is therefore “above all largely dependent on the status of the parties” (no. 2006 (footnote omitted)). [105] here, the alleged fault is a breach of a general obligation to inform that affected each member, not a breach of an individualized obligation to properly advise a client. what mr. asselin alleges is that firm and its representatives systematically failed to provide essential and objective information regarding the characteristics of the investments it is therefore clear that the alleged breach of firm’s duty to inform is necessarily a common question, regardless of each client’s specific characteristics. [106] but what about the fact that the scope of the duty to inform varies with the context? as we have seen, the scope of the duty depends on “[1] knowledge of the information, whether actual or presumed, by the party which owes the obligation to inform; [2] the fact that the information in question is of decisive importance; [3] the fact that it is impossible for the party to whom the duty to inform is owed to inform itself, or that the creditor is legitimately relying on the debtor of the obligation”. the scope of the duty to inform is therefore assessed in light of the needs and knowledge of the creditor of the duty. this does not mean that there cannot be circumstances in which all of the creditors were deprived of information as a result of a systematic omission. mr. asselin is specifically alleging the existence of such circumstances, in which an [translation] “informational imbalance” (jobin and vézina, at no. 313) and firm’s control of the information are common to all the members. [107] in scholarly commentary, it is noted that the scope of the creditor’s duty to inform itself depends on whether it is possible for the creditor [translation] “to know or have access to the information” (jobin and vézina, at no. 314; see also, eg,. s. grammond, a-f. debruche and y. campagnolo, quebec contract law (2nd ed. 2016), at para. 327). as professor fabre-magnan observes, the same limit is found in french law where [translation] “the creditor legitimately has no knowledge of the information” (fabre-magnan (1992), at nos. 254 et seq.; see also j. carbonnier, droit civil (2004), vol. ii, at no. 998). it is true that this lack of knowledge or impossibility, even in the context of the obligation to inform, can be assessed concretely in light of the individual capabilities of the person who claims to be owed the information. however, the case for a class action here is based on the idea that all of the investors were in this situation of impossibility because of the breaches committed by firm in disseminating information about the risks to its own mandataries and employees. [108] indeed, as alleged in the motion, the group’s members could not have known the information that firm had about how the investments worked, “even with all due diligence”. accordingly, the fact that the duty to inform does not extend to what the creditor already knows or is presumed to know has no impact on mr. asselin’s position in any event, if firm wishes to show that, despite its silence, some clients already knew or should have known the characteristics of the investments, this goes to the defence that this appellant can raise at the trial on the merits. at this stage of the proceedings, the alleged facts must be assumed to be true, and mr. asselin is clearly alleging that it was impossible for clients to find out the relevant information so that they could know the characteristics of the investments the questions raised with respect to firm’s alleged breach are therefore common to all the clients, regardless of their level of financial education. [109] moreover, the appellants’ argument that expertise and risk tolerance are specific to each client is immaterial given that mr. asselin is alleging a general failure to disclose information that was owed to all members and was of decisive importance to all members. this was what counsel for mr. asselin explained before the court of appeal: [translation] so it is simply the equivalent of saying, here are a hundred (100) people or a thousand (1,000) people who ordered a car, i don’t know, a buick, and received a scooter. so there is no need to look at why the people wanted, the applicants or the members wanted a car, what they were going to do with the car, whether it was really a car that was suitable for them; there’s no need to do that. (ar, vol. xiii, at pp. 30-31) [110] i note that my colleague is critical of the motion for not alleging “that a systematic fault was committed by firm’s representatives, which, in [her] opinion, is essential for a common question to be found to exist” (para. 256). as we have seen, however, para. 107.2 of the motion states that “[t]he information provided by the representatives of desjardins financial services to the group’s members was . necessarily wrong or insufficient, if not false, deceptive or misleading”. this, in my respectful view, is an adequate allegation of fault on the part of the representatives. [111] i will also say, since the appellants reproach mr. asselin for not offering any concrete criticisms of his financial adviser at the time, that it is not a question of pointing the finger at a financial adviser who is alleged to have been particularly incompetent on the contrary, the argument is that by failing to properly train its representatives, firm doomed all of them to commit the same fault. [112] it is therefore not the court of appeal that rewrote the respondent’s motion by divining a fault committed by the financial advisers, including ms. blanchette. in my view, it is rather the appellants that are reorienting the cause of action by regarding the action as being based on the poor individualized advice allegedly given by ms. blanchette. indeed, this misreading of the motion is what grounds their argument that the respondent has not made any specific allegations or raised any common questions. in my opinion, the respondent’s action is based, as i have already said, on a generalized and systematic failure by firm to provide information. firm is alleged to have breached its duty to all members of the group by failing to provide representatives and clients with essential and objective information about the products being recommended. [113] with respect, i therefore cannot agree with my colleague that firm’s alleged breach here requires too individualized an analysis to be the subject of a class action the alleged faults do not depend on the identity of either the client or the adviser. (3) a class action for a breach of the duty to inform based on the adviser-client relationship is not impossible [114] at the hearing, in answer to a question by one of my colleagues, the appellants tried to persuade this court that a class action against a brokerage firm for breaches by its representatives is impossible. [115] i disagree with the appellants’ argument that this type of case is never well suited to a class action. in light of the social function of the class action, it would be highly imprudent for this court to declare, as the appellants would like, that any class action of this kind against a brokerage firm is impossible or that an action based on a representative’s alleged fault is necessarily an individual action. [116] this court has clearly explained, in decisions that are consistent on this point, that the twin goals of access to justice and victim compensation will be achieved by interpreting the authorization conditions broadly (see oratoire, at para. 8; marcotte, at para. 43; infineon, at para. 60) the categorical interpretation proposed by the appellants would, in a context like the one here, deprive the class action of part of its role of helping people who, for economic and other reasons, face barriers in asserting their rights (oratoire, at para. 8; aic limited v fischer, 2013 scc 69, [2013] 3 scr 949, at paras. 24 and 27; bisaillon v concordia university, 2006 scc 19, [2006] 1 scr 666, at para. 16). this concern is particularly relevant in actions based on financial investments, since the fact that the amounts in issue are modest when considered individually often means that “traditional litigation provides no economically feasible way to recover the investors’ claimed losses” (fischer, at para. 57; see hollick v. toronto (city), 2001 scc 68, [2001] 3 scr 158, at para. 15; western canadian shopping centres inc v dutton, 2001 scc 46, [2001] 2 scr 534, at para. 28). [117] furthermore, the appellants’ description of the case law — they contend that the need for such an action to proceed on an individual basis has been accepted unanimously by the courts, [translation] “not just in quebec, [but] throughout canada” (transcript, at pp. 7 and 22) — does not support the conclusion they suggest to us. [118] the appellants cite cases on class actions that, with a few exceptions, are common law cases or were decided before vivendi and infineon. the appellants refer, for example, to fisher v. richardson gmp ltd., 2019 abqb 450, 95 alta. lr (6th) 172, in which the application judge held in part that the proposed class proceeding was not the “preferable procedure” based on one of the criteria in the alberta statute, a criterion that differs from the ones applicable in quebec (para. 132). it should be borne in mind that, in vivendi, this court noted that common law decisions cannot “necessarily be imported without adaptation into quebec civil procedure” (para. 48). [119] the appellants cite only one quebec judgment rendered after vivendi in which the judge declined to authorize a class action, namely louisméus v. compagnie d’assurance-vie manufacturers (financière manuvie), 2017 qccs 3614. it certainly was not held in that case that a class action is never possible in circumstances such as these, since hamilton j., as he then was, made a point of stating that the application before him was not based on [translation] “failure to provide information” (para. 38 (canlii)) his comments on this subject were therefore, at best, obiter in fact, he remained cautious, writing that the sufficiency of the information provided by a brokerage firm pursuant to its obligation to inform its clientele as a whole might be a common issue in a potential class action, but that this was not the specific position taken by the applicant in the case before him in other words, hamilton j., far from closing the door to any class action, stated instead that common issues may exist in the case of a failure to provide information: [translation] the claim based on failure to provide information or a defect of consent is more problematic as a class action. it is based on the understanding that ms. louisméus and mr. gauthier had when she purchased the policy in 1993 and additional capital in 2000. it is difficult to see any common issues shared with the other members of the class. what understanding an insured person or an adviser has is an individual issue, not a common one whether aetna provided sufficient information might be a common issue, but in this case mr. gauthier appears to concede that the information in aetna’s bulletins was sufficient, and the question is rather whether the representatives received that information. it is necessary to consider the information that each adviser received, what each adviser understood and told his or her clients, what the client understood and what was important to the client in making a decision. the court does not think that a claim of this kind (if it had been pleaded, which is not the case) involves a common issue that is sufficiently important to justify a class action [emphasis added; footnote omitted; paras. 91-94.] [120] the judgment cited by the appellants therefore supports the proposition that is the opposite of theirs: a class action based on a brokerage firm’s liability for the conduct of its representatives is possible, though such actions would be quite rare, as long as the issue is whether the information provided by the brokerage firm (here, firm) to its representatives and to the group’s members was insufficient, with the result that a general duty to inform was breached. [121] with respect, it seems to me that the other judgments cited by the appellants and by my colleague also miss the mark. my colleague relies in part on brunelle v. banque toronto dominion, 2009 qccs 4605 in that case, the court noted that the legal syllogism was untenable as regards the duty to provide advice because the bank did not owe its customers such a duty, which arose [translation] “only in exceptional circumstances” (para. 82 (canlii)) in the case at bar, however, it is clear — and undisputed — that each financial adviser had a duty to provide advice and a duty to inform. in the judgment cited, the duty to provide advice, which existed in exceptional circumstances, could not be dealt with collectively. here, the duty to provide advice and the duty to inform existed for all members. while i agree with my colleague that mr. asselin’s action concerns the duty to inform, i am, however, of the view that the analogy with a judgment concerning the exceptional nature of the duty to provide advice is of no assistance to the appellants. [122] i also see three important reasons to distinguish paré v. desjardins sécurité financière, 2007 qccs 4566, from the instant case first, in paré, the information provided to the members was sufficient [translation] “for the borrower to clearly understand the process” involved (para. 56 (canlii)), which is not the case here. second, that decision was based on dutton, which established that “with regard to the common issues, success for one class member must mean success for all” (dutton, at para. 40, cited in paré, at para. 35). but in vivendi, this court noted that “the common success requirement identified in dutton must not be applied inflexibly” (para. 45) and that “[c]aution must be exercised when applying the principles from dutton and rumley to the rules of quebec civil procedure relating to class actions” (para. 48). third, the applicant in paré had “not alleged or made out a prima facie case that a majority or at least a significant number of participants did not understand the explanations in the participant’s guide or did not receive the necessary information from their adviser” (paré, at para. 64). as we know, mr. asselin is alleging here that all the members were deprived of relevant information and that firm committed a systematic fault. paré is therefore of no assistance to firm in trying to persuade this court that the proposed class action is impossible. [123] farber v. nn. life insurance co. of canada, [2002] az-50123096 (sup. ct.), which is also cited by the appellants and by my colleague, raises similar concerns. it is a 10-paragraph decision in which the applicant made two contradictory arguments (para. 3) and the court did not believe his assertion that he had misunderstood the documents provided by the insurance company (para. 4) moreover, the decision predates this court’s decisions in vivendi and infineon, and states that the common questions condition requires “that the recourses be identical, similar or related” (para. 3). [124] in short, it is true that some authorization judges have occasionally expressed reservations about class actions based on representations made by a large number of employees. to conclude from this that a class action is impossible in the circumstances, or that the decided cases are consistent and unanimous, is a step that i am not prepared to take. this would disregard not only the flexibility mandated by the role of class actions in fostering social justice, but also any decisions to the contrary rendered by courts in quebec and canada, including decisions stating that causation can be proven by presumption despite differences among the members (comité syndical national de retraite bâtirente inc v société financière manuvie, 2011 qccs 3446, at para. 98 (canlii); chandler v volkswagen aktiengesellschaft, 2018 qccs 2270, at paras. 66 and 98 (canlii)). for example, in manuvie, in which one of the allegations was that there had been a failure to disclose the risks associated with variable annuity portfolios, the authorization judge stated the following: [translation] . . . it may be presumed as well that the impact of each of these misrepresentations on manulife’s security prices may not have been identical and that, depending on the economic context and on their own skill and expertise, the investors may have assessed the available information in different ways. this does not mean the court can say that there are no common or related questions of law or fact here that can advance the litigation. [emphasis added; para. 103.] [125] in addition, the case before this court is very similar to dupuis v. desjardins sécurité financière, compagnie d’assurance-vie, 2015 qccs 5828 (in which authorization to institute a class action was granted). as in the instant case, when the action was considered from the perspective of the failure by the company selling the investments to disclose relevant information, common questions were identified despite the specific characteristics of each member of the group (see paras. 47-53 (canlii)) in fact, the authorization judge, in his decision (at para. 91), identified commons questions that are virtually identical to the ones proposed by mr. asselin in this case. [126] i therefore see no reason to accede to the appellants’ request that any class action against a brokerage firm for the conduct of its representatives be declared impossible despite the fact that it was firm’s systematic failure to provide information to its representatives that gave rise to their faults. with respect, it also seems to me that, although my colleague states that she is not “concluding that a claim for a financial adviser’s breach of the duty to inform can never be the subject of a class action” (para. 256), this would indeed be the consequence of her reasons. it is alleged here that all of the representatives systematically failed to provide information to the group’s members because they did not have that information themselves. if this argument is not sufficient to find that the appeal raises a common question, i have difficulty imagining what allegation could be sufficient. [127] to close the door to the proposed class action in such a categorical fashion would undermine the role of the class action as a procedural mechanism for fostering social justice in this setting. (4) conclusion concerning the condition of article 1003(a) of the former ccp. [128] the proposed class action against firm concerns, as we have seen, a contractual breach of its duty to inform that grounds both its direct liability, for its failure to provide information to its representatives, and its indirect liability, for the incomplete information provided by the representatives to the group’s members in both cases, the alleged omissions are systematic in nature. they do not depend on each client’s individual characteristics. [129] the systematic nature of these omissions in both cases makes it possible to identify common questions in the proposed action against firm under art. 1003(a) of the former ccp. the following common questions were correctly identified by the court of appeal (para. 8): [translation] 1 conformity of the financial product did the pp and alt investments conform with the financial products that [firm] and [management] designed and/or offered to the group’s members? 2 duty to inform. did [firm] owe the group’s members a duty under the deposit insurance act, the act respecting the distribution of financial products and services, the civil code of québec, any other statute and/or the applicable rules and/or practices to provide them with information with respect to the nature, characteristics, offering and management of the pp and alt investments? 3. if so, did [firm] breach this duty by failing to clearly inform the group’s members that the pp and alt investments would include investment strategies that might eliminate, before maturity, any possibility of a return? [130] in my respectful view, the motion judge’s reasons show that she considered the common questions condition from the perspective of an action based on the duty to provide individualized advice tailored to each client’s risk tolerance, even though that was not the basis for mr. asselin’s action (paras. 208-9). [131] in addition to this error of reading the motion from the perspective of an individualized duty to provide advice, the manner in which the motion judge noted the absence of a common question suggests that she also went beyond the standard that applies at this stage of the proceedings: [translation] this is because, unless there is valid evidence demonstrating the systematic distribution of a document containing representations that all of the clients necessarily read before purchasing various investments and that inevitably influenced their choice of investment, the essence of such a relationship is based more on a very personal assessment of each client’s investor profile and goals, which involves discussions that vary from one client to the next, even if the same representative serves multiple clients and may do so in a similar manner. [emphasis added; para. 210.] [132] with great respect, it seems to me that the respondent is correct to say that the authorization judge — by looking at whether the documents contained representations, and not omissions, that were necessarily known and that inevitably had an impact on everyone — imposed a burden of demonstration that went beyond showing an arguable case the systematic conduct that the judge reproached mr. asselin for not having “demonstrated” is alleged throughout the motion, which is more than sufficient in my respectful opinion, my colleague makes the same error when she states that firm’s alleged fault requires an analysis that is too individual “unless it is shown that the breach occurred systematically” (para. 247). [133] the motion may be unwieldy at times, and its coherence no doubt suffered by reason of the multiples amendments made to it. in my view, however, the basis for this liability giving rise to common questions is adequately alleged in these circumstances, the court of appeal was justified in intervening, and the common questions condition is met for the proposed action against firm. iv management [134] in this court, the appellants make several concessions with regard to management’s situation. they reiterate that the authorization judge erred with respect to the condition set out in art. 1003(a) of the former ccp. as the court of appeal noted, [translation] “the judgment completely overlooks the portion of the action that concerns [management]” (para. 147). yet this portion of the action undoubtedly raises common questions, as the appellants acknowledge. they also concede, as they did before the court of appeal, that it can be argued that management is liable as the designer of the investments, contrary to what the motion judge found. [135] the appellants raise two main grounds of appeal in order to prevent, in whole or in part, the authorization of the class action against management. a circularity of the reasoning [136] the first ground of appeal has to do with whether the case against management is an arguable one. according to the appellants, the syllogism proposed by the respondent is circular in nature and untenable. they submit that there is nothing to suggest that the absence of a return was due to the risky strategies used by management; this allegation, in the context of the 2008 financial crisis, is mere speculation and cannot suffice for the purposes of art. 1003 of the former ccp. [137] this argument is without merit. [138] contrary to what the appellants contend, mr. asselin is not merely saying that management’s practices were risky because the investments did not generate a return; he is making concrete allegations against management. the motion speaks for itself in this regard: [translation] 108 in reality, the amounts allocated to the return on the pp investment and the alt investment were invested in hedge funds with a leverage ratio of five (5) to one (1), as can be seen from the article by jean gagnon entitled “pourquoi certains produits à capital garanti de desjardins ne rapporteront rien”, exhibit r-14; 108.1 what is more, the hedge funds in which those amounts were invested were themselves leveraged, which multiplied the risk of the pp and alt investments; . 123 furthermore, a significant portion of the money market investments in the pp investment and the alt investment consisted of asset-backed commercial paper (“abcp”); 124 as of august 2007, however, abcp became a risky and illiquid asset that could no longer play the role ascribed to it in the pp and alt investments, as can be seen from, among other things, the desjardins group’s annual reports for 2007 (pp. 25-27 and 113-15), 2008 (pp. 34-40 and 133-37), 2009 (pp. 170-74) and 2010 (pp. 142-46), exhibit r-17, jointly, as well as the desjardins group’s quarterly reports from september 2007 to september 2008, exhibit r-13, jointly; 125 despite the foregoing, the respondents not only retained abcp in the pp investment and the alt investment after august 2007, but also made new issues of those investments until september 2008, as can be seen from, among other things, reports r-17 and r-13; 126 this management decision, which was injurious to the group’s members, stands in contrast to the fact that, during the same period, the respondents replaced the abcp held by their institutional clients with secure, liquid deposit notes, as can be seen from, among other things, reports r-17 and r-13; . 128 the respondents desjardins trust and desjardins asset management ceased in the fall of 2008 to manage the amounts that had been entrusted to them for the purpose of obtaining a return at maturity for the group’s members; [emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted.] like the court of appeal and my colleague, i am of the opinion that these allegations are sufficiently precise. [139] it seems to me that, through their argument that the allegations are circular, the appellants are attempting to revive the defence, which was accepted by the motion judge but rejected on appeal, that the real cause of the respondent’s loss was the 2008 financial crisis, not management’s incompetence. [140] the issue of what impact the financial crisis had on the causal link between management’s alleged extracontractual faults and the loss for which the respondent is seeking compensation is one that goes to the merits of the case. the court of appeal, properly relying on london life insurance company v long, 2016 qcca 1434, at paras. 104 and 108 (canlii), emphasized that the difficult issue — disputed in this case — of how the crisis may have affected the return on an investment could not be decided at the authorization stage without encroaching on the role of the trial judge (see, eg,. oratoire, at para. 41). there is no reviewable error in that conclusion. b release with respect to abcp [141] the second ground of appeal concerns management’s alleged faults in relation to abcp, for which mr. asselin is claiming punitive damages. [142] the respondent argues that the appellant management interfered unlawfully and intentionally with his right to the peaceful possession of his property, thereby justifying a claim for punitive damages pursuant to ss. 6 and 49 of the charter of human rights and freedoms, cqlr, c. c-12. the motion for authorization alleges, at para. 123, that “a significant portion of the money market investments in the pp investment and the alt investment consisted of asset-backed commercial paper (‘abcp’)”. the following is stated at para. 126.1: [translation] since the respondents knew that the abcp market was precarious and illiquid, their decision to continue issuing the pp investment and the alt investment after august 2007 and to retain abcp in the pp and alt investments issued before august 2007 had the effect of imposing on the group’s members a loss that the respondents desjardins trust (with regard to the members of the registered group only) and desjardin asset management would otherwise have had to assume personally, which amounts to unlawful and intentional interference with the right of the group’s members to the peaceful enjoyment and free disposition of their property, and which justifies an award of punitive damages; (ar, vol. ii, at p 150) [143] the appellants submit that this aspect of the claim is not arguable and that the court of appeal made an overriding error in setting aside the motion judge’s decision on this point. according to the appellants, any claim relating to abcp has been extinguished as a result of the sanction order made as part of the restructuring of the abcp market carried out under the ccaa (see atb financial inc. v. metcalfe & mansfield alternative investments ii corp (2008), 43 cbr (5th) 269 (ont sc), decision accompanying the sanction order, june 5, 2008, and the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement, january 12, 2009, aff’d 2008 onca 587, 92 or. (3d) 513) in light of the release and injunction included in the sanction order, the aspect of the respondent’s cause of action that is based on abcp is not arguable under art. 1003(b) of the former ccp. [144] the appellants allege that the court of appeal made a number of errors in allowing the respondent’s claim for punitive damages to proceed on the merits. first, they argue that it erred in insisting that the sanction order be formally introduced in evidence, disregarding the rule that, under the ccaa, such an order is automatically enforceable. in addition, the court of appeal allegedly erred in declining to find that the cause of action relating to abcp had been extinguished because the release sanctioned by the order in favour of all participants in the canadian abcp market was a full release. if there was any doubt as to the interpretation of the order, the matter had to be referred to the ontario superior court of justice, which, according to the appellants, has exclusive jurisdiction over any question concerning the interpretation of the release and injunction reproduced in the order. finally, the appellants argue, the court of appeal erred in refusing to segment the claim in order to separate the elements relating to abcp from those relating to the other aspects of the cause of action. [145] the respondent defends the court of appeal’s decision to leave the issues relating to the application of the release for the trial on the merits. first, he notes that the claim for compensatory damages is not based on the members’ holding of abcp and that the only claim possibly based on abcp is the one for punitive damages. moreover, at this stage of the proceedings and given the state of the record, it would be premature to conclude, without evidence concerning the exact nature of the investments at issue, that the claim for punitive damages should be denied on the basis of the release and injunction included in the sanction order the respondent points out that the appellants adduced no evidence from which the authorization judge could determine whether the abcp to which the investments at issue may have been exposed was affected abcp covered by the order or was subject to “unaffected claims” excluded from the order clearly, he says, evidence is necessary in order to understand this, which means that there is no pure question of law that can be decided at the authorization stage he relies on desjardins sécurité financière, compagnie d’assurance-vie v. dupuis, 2018 qcca 1136, particularly paras. 16 and 18 (canlii), where the court of appeal, faced with a similar problem, held that it would be premature to deny a claim for punitive damages in dupuis (ca), as here, no connection could be established between the proposed class action and the abcp market because, without evidence, it was unclear whether the abcp was of the type covered by the sanction order. [146] how is this matter to be decided? [147] to begin with, it should be noted that both parties have qualified the arguments they made in the courts below, which, in my view, helps to clarify the debate. [148] first, the parties agree that this aspect of the litigation relates only to the claim for punitive damages; the motion for authorization brought against management with respect to compensatory damages can therefore proceed, subject, of course, to the other conditions set out in art. 1003 of the former ccp. [149] in addition, the respondent acknowledges that the release on which the appellants rely is in effect and enforceable in quebec (transcript, at p 76). his counsel stated at the hearing that [translation] “. . . there is no dispute that the release is fully applicable, but it is impossible at this time to know what its scope might be” (p 81). counsel conceded that his client’s claim pertains only to unaffected claims as defined in the release (pp. 78-82). [150] it can be understood from his position that the respondent is waiving any claim for punitive damages for affected abcp and limiting himself to the abcp not covered by the release. in light of this clarification of what is being claimed for the purposes of the class action, the affected abcp can, it seems to me, be excluded at once, even though a defence that involves the weighing of evidence should ordinarily be dealt with at trial: oratoire, at paras. 41-42. it is therefore unnecessary to discuss the conditions for pursuing an “excepted claim”, which, according to the plan of arrangement, is a claim for the prejudice suffered “as a direct result of purchasing specific affected abcp” (third amended plan of compromise and arrangement, art. 10.4(c); sanction order, art. 20(c) (emphasis added)). [151] technically speaking, the exclusion of affected abcp is not a segmentation of the cause of action but rather a clarification of its contours based on the statements made by the respondent himself. this appears to me to be an appropriate solution to which the appellants do not formally object, given the position taken by their counsel at the hearing: [translation] if my friends are arguing that their action is not based on abcp or that the claim . . . has to do with management as such and not with abcp, let this be confirmed in a judgment, let it be stated that the claim cannot include damages sought in relation to abcp, because, in every respect, when you read the release, there is nothing that could have been done with regard to abcp that would allow an action to continue. (transcript, at p 52) [152] the motion judge found that [translation] “the claim based on abcp is, on its face, barred” (para. 187). to make that finding, she relied in particular on the sanction order made by campbell j and cited certain provisions of the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement. however, she did not refer to the distinction between affected abcp and unaffected claims as dealt with in the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement. [153] the court of appeal intervened after taking note of the respondent’s argument that this issue went to the merits of the case, and also because of its own view that the argument made by the appellants required evidence (para. 138). i agree on these two points and, with respect, i am of the opinion that the motion judge could not decide whether the claim was barred at the authorization stage. [154] it is true, as i have noted, that a court “may . . . decide a pure question of law at the authorization stage if the outcome of the proposed class action depends on its doing so” (oratoire, at para. 55 (emphasis in original)). but the question of whether the abcp concerned is part of the affected abcp covered by the release and listed in its schedule “a” is not a pure question of law. deciding it would require, at a minimum, a list of the abcp included in the investments at issue. i therefore disagree with my colleague’s interpretation, which is that the admission made by counsel for mr. asselin at the motion hearing that “the release with respect to abcp covers the investments made prior to august 2007” implies that there is no remaining factual question to be dealt with on the merits (para. 268). [155] in this case, it is not the application of the order that is being contested but rather its scope, which can be argued later, just like the scope of the judicial admission made at the motion hearing. the scope of the affected abcp and the unaffected abcp is an issue that could, if necessary, be referred to the ontario superior court of justice (see art. 11.12 of the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement). as in hy bloom inc. v. banque nationale du canada, 2010 qccs 737, [2010] rjq 912, at para. 102, and dupuis (ca), at paras. 18-20, potential claims relating to abcp that are not extinguished by the release can be heard that being the case, the parties’ dispute formally concerns, at this point in time, not the interpretation of the order, but simply its implementation. the scope of the affected abcp or the unaffected abcp is not being decided. [156] caution must therefore be exercised at this stage, and any doubt should weigh in favour of the continuation of the proceedings, especially since deferring this matter will not result in the appellants losing any rights given that the action against management must proceed on the merits on the claim for compensatory damages. that being said, counsel for the respondent acknowledges that the claim for punitive damages is by no means certain to be successful, although it must be recognized that, though difficult, a claim based on unlawful and intentional interference under s 6 of the charter in relation to the abcp not covered by the release remains arguable in this context. [157] this is the explanation for the qualifying words that, in my respectful view, should be added to paras. 8 and 9 of the court of appeal’s judgment in this appeal: for common question 8(c) and for the conclusion dealing with punitive damages, i would specify that the payment to each member of the group of an amount [translation] “in punitive damages” may be sought “solely in relation to unaffected claims within the meaning of article 1 of the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement sanctioned by order of the ontario superior court of justice dated january 12, 2009”. v conclusion [158] i would allow the appeal in part, but solely for the purpose of varying paras. 8 and 9 of the court of appeal’s judgment so that they read as follows: [translation] [8] identifies as follows the principal questions of fact and of law to be dealt with collectively: . 8 damages based on the answers to the previous questions, are desjardins financial services firm inc and desjardins global asset management inc. liable: . (c) to pay each member of the group one thousand dollars ($1,000) in punitive damages solely in relation to unaffected claims within the meaning of article 1 of the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement sanctioned by order of the ontario superior court of justice dated january 12, 2009, subject to adjustment, with interest at the legal rate and the additional indemnity from the date of the judgment to be rendered? [9] identifies as follows the principal conclusions sought on the merits in the class action, it being understood that whether the awards set out below are in solidum depends on the answer, if any, given by the superior court to the final portion of question 6, as defined at paragraph [8] above: . order each of the respondents to pay each member of the group one thousand dollars ($1,000) in punitive damages solely in relation to unaffected claims within the meaning of article 1 of the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement sanctioned by order of the ontario superior court of justice dated january 12, 2009, subject to adjustment, with interest at the legal rate and the additional indemnity from the date of the judgment to be rendered, and order the collective recovery of these amounts. [159] i would award costs to mr. asselin throughout. overview [160] this appeal raises issues related to the authorization of class actions in quebec much continues to be written on this subject by both judges and authors. although the principles that are to guide a court at the authorization stage are well known, applying them remains difficult and at times unpredictable. [161] the case concerns capital-guaranteed investments that, it is alleged, though represented to be safe, were in reality risky investments that were also managed in a risky manner the investments in question ultimately yielded no return at maturity, although the investors did recover their capital. the respondent, disappointed at having obtained no return on his investment, filed a re-amended and particularized motion (2) for authorization to institute a class action and to obtain the status of representative, reproduced in ar, vol. ii, at pp. 104-62 (“motion”).1 the superior court declined to authorize the action (2016 qccs 839). the court of appeal set aside that decision and authorized the action (2017 qcca 1673). ii the parties [162] the respondent, ronald asselin, is a long-time member of a caisse populaire that is part of the desjardins group and that offers various financial services. the appellants in this case — desjardins financial services firm inc. (“firm”) and desjardins global asset management inc (“management”) — are part of the desjardins group. at first, desjardins trust inc. was also a party in the proceeding, but the respondent discontinued his suit against it in the superior court. [163] the appellant firm is a financial services firm that works in the areas of mutual fund brokerage and financial planning. in his motion, the respondent alleges 1 since the enactment of the new code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-25.01 (“new ccp”), the expression used is now instead an “application for authorization to institute a class action”. because the proceedings in this case were filed under the former code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25 (“ccp”),. i will refer throughout these reasons to the “motion for authorization to institute a class action”. that firm is responsible for the mutual fund representatives and financial planners working in the caisses populaires of the desjardins group, including the representatives who offered the investments at issue to the members of the group covered by the proposed class action. [164] the appellant management is a portfolio company that works in asset management. it offers various services relating to investments, portfolio management, and financial and asset allocation strategies. the respondent alleges that management designed the investments at issue in this proceeding and was responsible for managing them. iii the investments [165] this case concerns two types of investments: perspectives plus term savings (“pp”) and alternative term savings (“alt”). mutual fund representatives and financial planners offered these savings vehicles in the network of caisses populaires of the desjardins group what was appealing about the pp and alt investments can be described briefly: their capital was guaranteed at maturity, and they offered a potential return that was variable, although it could be nil. clients purchased these investments by entering into deposit agreements with the caisse populaire where they did business. each deposit agreement therefore created a contractual relationship between the client and his or her caisse populaire, which was the issuer of the investment, but did not create a contractual relationship between the client and either firm or management. [166] in his motion, the respondent describes as follows how the investments worked. a portion of the invested capital was guaranteed by a zero-coupon bond whose value at maturity was equal to the value of the original deposit, such that the capital was guaranteed. the amounts allocated to the return were equal to the residual value of the original deposit following the purchase of the zero-coupon bond, and that value was invested in money market funds and used to guarantee trades in financial derivatives selected on a monthly basis. at maturity, the value of the investment was thus equal to the original deposit (which was guaranteed) plus any return obtained. iv facts of the case [167] the respondent alleges that on march 4, 2005, denise blanchette, a financial planner and mutual fund representative, recommended that he purchase pp and alt investments on june 14, 2005, allegedly on the basis of those recommendations, the respondent entered into a deposit agreement with the caisse populaire de sherbrooke-est and deposited amounts in a first pp investment with a term of seven years. in january 2006, the respondent received his annual investment statement issued by the caisse populaire de sherbrooke-est, which indicated that his investment had yielded a return of 2.3 percent for 2005. in january 2007, he received a second annual investment statement, again issued by the caisse populaire de sherbrooke-est, which showed a return of 6.9 percent for 2006. [168] the 2006 statement was accompanied by a letter from the caisse populaire de sherbrooke-est signed by ms. blanchette the letter stated that the guaranteed investments were [translation] “an excellent investment vehicle, both for the protection of your capital and for the attractive returns you can obtain from them” (ar, vol. xi, at p 14 (emphasis deleted)). the respondent alleges that, later in 2007, he received a document from the desjardins group that promoted the pp and alt investments. it should be noted that the document expressly stated that [translation] “[t]he returns presented are not a guarantee of future performance” (ar, vol. x, at p 101). [169] on june 19 and 26, 2007, allegedly [translation] “on the strength of all this information” (sup. ct. reasons, at para. 101 (canlii)), the respondent signed two new deposit agreements for a second pp investment with a term of three and a half years and a first alt investment with a term of five years. these agreements were again entered into with the caisse populaire de sherbrooke-est. [170] in february 2008, the respondent received his investment statements for 2007, once again issued by the caisse populaire de sherbrooke-est, which indicated returns ranging from 1.7 to 9.0 percent for his pp and alt investments. never, while his investments were yielding a positive return, did the respondent complain about how they were being managed or about the makeup of the financial products in which the amounts allocated to the return were being invested. [171] on march 26, 2009, the respondent received a letter dated march 2, 2009 from the fédération des caisses desjardins informing him that his three investments would yield no return, even though the terms had not yet expired. this was confirmed in february 2010 when the respondent received his investment statement for 2009, issued by the caisse de l’est de sherbrooke, which indicated a return of 0 percent. v the respondent’s motion for authorization to institute a class action [172] on september 16, 2011, the respondent filed his motion for authorization to institute a class action the route taken by the motion prior to the decision on authorization was a long one. it was the subject of several interlocutory and preliminary motions and of numerous amendments over a period of four years before the authorization hearing. [173] of course, it is the final version of the motion that must be considered for the purposes of authorization as i will explain below, the motion alleges that the appellants are liable both contractually and extracontractually the group the respondent intends to represent comprises all persons who held pp and alt investments as of october 1, 2008. [174] the respondent essentially alleges that firm breached its duty to inform by not adequately informing him and the group’s members of the specific nature of the investment strategies being used, which he describes as risky the motion describes firm’s alleged faults as follows: [translation] 107. the pp and alt investments were represented and described to the group’s members as being safe and intended for a risk-averse investor . . . ; 107.1 moreover, the representatives of [firm] were not given sufficient instructions regarding the characteristics and risks of the pp and alt investments and were not therefore in a position to evaluate their advantages and disadvantages; 10711. in this regard, the documents describing the pp and alt investments . . . gave no explanation, or a very incomplete explanation, of the leverage used to obtain the return on the pp and alt investments; 10712. those documents merely provided an incomplete description of the pp and alt investments and presented the advantages of these investments without describing the risks associated with the pp and alt investments; 107.2 the information provided by the representatives of [firm] was therefore necessarily wrong or insufficient, if not false, deceptive or misleading; 108. in reality, the amounts allocated to the return on the pp investment and the alt investment were invested in hedge funds with a leverage ratio of five (5) to one (1) . . .  ; . 110 at no time, however, did [firm] disclose to the group’s members the risks associated with the liquidity issues and the financial leverage, despite the fact that it was aware or could not have been unaware of those risks; . 116. 117. 118. furthermore, [firm] made false and misleading representations to the group’s members . . . regarding the correlation with the stock markets; contrary to what [firm] claimed, the pp and alt investments were profoundly affected by stock market fluctuations; [firm] failed to provide adequate information to the group’s members and breached the informational obligations and duties it owes by law; 119. the faults of [firm] concerning the obligations related to the disclosure of information occurred in a context in which the pp and alt investments were intended for a varied clientele including individuals with little knowledge of financial concepts. [emphasis deleted.] (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 147-49) [175] as for management, the respondent essentially alleges that it breached its duty of competence and management by using the amounts deposited by the group’s members, or allowing those amounts to be used, to conduct risky transactions that exposed the investments to market fluctuations. the motion describes management’s alleged faults as follows: [translation] 120. 122. 122.1 [management] took risks that were contrary to its legal and contractual obligations and duties in designing and implementing their investment strategies; . [t]he amounts allocated to the return had to be liquidated to honour the capital guarantee for the pp investment and the alt investment, which shows the scale of the risk associated with the chosen investment strategies; the investment strategies, particularly the use of a leverage ratio of five (5) to one (1), had the effect of putting the capital guarantee at risk and of forcing a liquidation, which, moreover, was premature, of the amounts allocated to the return on the pp investment and the alt investment; 123. furthermore, a significant portion of the money market investments in the pp investment and the alt investment consisted of asset-backed commercial paper (“abcp”); 124. 125. 127. as of august 2007, however, abcp became a risky and illiquid asset that could no longer play the role ascribed to it in the pp and alt investments . . . ; despite the foregoing, [the appellants] not only retained abcp in the pp investment and the alt investment after august 2007, but also made new issues of those investments until september 2008 . . . ; . this flawed design and management by [management], contrary to its obligations and duties to act prudently and diligently and to adhere to sound and prudent management practices, resulted in a loss of one hundred percent (100%) of the assets allocated to the return, whereas none of the underlying assets sustained a loss on such a scale. [emphasis added.] (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 149-51) [176] regarding causation, the respondent alleges that the appellants’ actions, and in particular the investment strategies they used, caused the collapse of the investments in 2008 and resulted in the loss of all the assets allocated to the return. in addition to being deprived of a return, the group’s members were allegedly deprived of access to the invested capital until the investments matured. the respondent claims, among other things, the difference between the return that was obtained or to be obtained and the return that should normally have been obtained from investments designed and managed in accordance with the duties of management and competence, damages for being deprived of the deposited capital for the term until maturity, damages for the troubles, worries and inconveniences suffered by the members and, lastly, punitive damages in relation to management’s decision to continue to issue the pp and alt investments after august 2007. vi. judicial history a quebec superior court, 2016 qccs 839 (the honourable justice claude dallaire) [177] the superior court refused to authorize the class action. it held that the colour of right requirement set out in art. 1003(b) ccp (art. 575(2) of the new ccp) was not met with respect to either the action against firm or the action against management. it also held that the common questions requirement set out in art. 1003(a) ccp (art. 575(1) of the new ccp) was not met with respect to the action against firm. [178] the judge rigorously reviewed the general principles applicable to the authorization of a class action before discussing the motion for authorization. first, she considered firm’s alleged contractual liability in order to determine whether the alleged facts seemed to justify the conclusions being sought (art. 1003(b) ccp). she found that the only possible contractual basis for the action against firm lay in the term deposit agreements, but that the parties to those agreements were the caisses populaires and their clients. the principle of relativity of contracts therefore meant that there was no contractual relationship between the group’s members and firm. [179] the judge was also of the opinion that the allegations of the motion contained no specific fact that would support a finding that one of firm’s representatives had committed a particularized fault related to inadequate representations; the contract of mandate raised by counsel for the respondent at the hearing as a last gasp was of no assistance to them in the absence of specific allegations concerning the representatives’ fault. [180] finally, the judge reviewed the documents filed by the respondent to ensure that [translation] “nothing in the motion [could] link the members to firm on a contractual basis” (para. 86). she found that almost all of the documents came not from firm, but from the caisses populaires or from unknown sources, which made it impossible to infer that firm might have played any role in drafting their content. [181] the judge considered the respondent’s individual claim against firm. she noted that the respondent had never signed a contract with firm and that he was neither alleging the existence of a mandate nor making any specific allegation against the representatives of firm with whom he had dealt in her view, the allegations were instead general in nature. moreover, she found that the respondent’s allegation that he had purchased the investments “on the strength of all this information” provided by ms. blanchette was too vague and that the evidence suggested that the documents the respondent alleged he had consulted before making his investments could not have influenced his decision she noted that all that remained was ms. blanchette’s recommendation, the substance of which was unknown because the respondent said that he had no recollection of it. she also noted that the respondent did not criticize the recommendation made by ms. blanchette in any way. the judge therefore concluded that the allegations with respect to firm were speculative and did not satisfy the condition of art. 1003(b) ccp. [182] regarding the common questions requirement of art. 1003(a) ccp, the judge expressed the view that the mandator-mandatary relationship between a mutual fund representative and his or her client is ill suited to a class action (paras. 208-9). unless there was evidence of the systematic nature of the representations, of which all the members would have had knowledge, it would be more difficult to establish that there were common questions this condition was therefore also an impediment to authorizing the action against firm. [183] second, the judge dealt with the action against management. she began by considering the allegations against management as the designer of the investments. in light of the evidence in the record, she was not convinced by the allegation that management was responsible for designing the investments. she found that the faulty design of the investments had not been established and was merely speculation. [184] the judge then discussed the alleged fault related to the duty of competence and management in her view, the allegations to the effect that management’s investment strategies, including the use of significant leverage, were so risky that they amounted to a breach of its duty of competence and management were general and vague she added that the legislative provisions being relied on with respect to the obligations resting on managers to act prudently, diligently, competently, loyally and in good faith were not applicable to the appellants because the investments in question were neither mutual funds nor investment funds within the meaning of the securities act, cqlr, c. v-11. [185] the judge also considered the allegation that management had committed a fault by investing the amounts allocated to the return in asset-backed commercial paper (“abcp”) she found that if the action were able to proceed, the claim for punitive damages would be barred because of the release with respect to abcp arising from the sanction order made by the ontario superior court of justice as part of the restructuring of the abcp market under the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36 (“ccaa”) (para. 187; see atb financial v. metcalfe & mansfield alternative investments ii corp (2008), 43 cbr (5th) 269 (ont sc), decision accompanying the sanction order, june 5, 2008, and the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement, january 12, 2009, aff’d 2008 onca 587, 92 or (3d) 513). [186] the judge noted that, even though she did not have to decide the merits of the action, she was required to determine whether it was plausible; in this regard, she observed that the evidence suggested that the economic crisis of 2008 was the reason why there had been no return on the investments she therefore found that the allegations against management did not satisfy the condition set out in art. 1003(b) ccp (para. 201). [187] as for the other conditions, the judge noted that art. 1003(c) ccp was not in issue and that the respondent satisfied the requirement of art. 1003(d) even though he might not be the ideal representative. b quebec court of appeal, 2017 qcca 1673 (the honourable justice marie-france bich, justices marie st-pierre and claude c. gagnon concurring) [188] the court of appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the superior court’s judgment and authorized the class action in its entirety it concluded that the legal syllogism proposed by the respondent was tenable in relation to both firm and management. [189] the court of appeal discussed the authorization process itself, expressing the opinion that introducing greater stringency into this process would not reflect the state of the law as established by this court in infineon technologies ag v. option consommateurs, 2013 scc 59, [2013] 3 scr 600, vivendi canada inc v. dell’aniello, 2014 scc 1, [2014] 1 scr 3, and theratechnologies inc v 121851 canada inc., 2015 scc 18, [2015] 2 scr 106 in its view, the applicant, mr. asselin, was only required to establish an [translation] “arguable case, that is, one with a chance of success” (para. 29 (canlii)) it noted the importance of not considering the merits of the action at the authorization stage. [190] although the court of appeal conceded that the motion for authorization in this case was not [translation] “perfectly clear”, it found that it was “quite possible to discern in this labyrinth the essential elements” of the respondent’s legal syllogism (para. 47). more specifically, the court opined that “while it is true that one must not be satisfied with vagueness, generalities and imprecision, it would be wrong to close one’s eyes to allegations that are perhaps not perfect, but whose true meaning is nonetheless clear one must therefore be able to read between the lines” (para. 33) (emphasis added). [191] the court of appeal dealt first with the contractual aspect of the case — the action against firm in its view, ms. blanchette, as an employee or mandatary acting in the performance of her duties, had contractually bound firm. relying on an academic article, the court of appeal determined that a contractual relationship exists between a client who consults a firm for financial advice and the said firm (para. 57). this relationship existed for all other members of the group who were in a situation similar to that of mr. asselin there was thus, prima facie, a contract between the respondent and firm whose object was the giving of financial advice. [192] regarding the contractual fault alleged against firm, the court of appeal explained that it involved a breach of the duty to honour its contractual undertakings. the court of appeal held that the respondent’s argument was that firm should not have recommended the products in question to its clients without advising them of a known uncertainty and warning them of the consequent risk (para. 68). [193] next, the court of appeal considered the extracontractual aspect of the case — the action against management. the court of appeal noted that the appellants were now conceding that it could be argued that management might be liable as the designer of the investments at issue the court of appeal also rejected the motion judge’s findings to the effect that the fault ascribed to management was based on hypothetical, vague and speculative allegations containing opinions in its view, alleging that management’s investment strategies had undermined the products was not at all hypothetical or speculative, but was a question of fact. although some of the allegations were poorly worded, the court of appeal expressed the opinion that form must not prevail over substance and concluded that the alleged fault was sufficiently well defined. [194] on the issue of injury, the court of appeal found that the loss of a return could be a real injury, as could the fact that the respondent and the members had been deprived of their capital until maturity and had therefore been unable to reinvest it elsewhere in the meantime. as for causation, the court of appeal expressed the opinion that the respondent had adequately established a failure by firm to disclose crucial information as well as his reliance on that incomplete and erroneous information when making his decision to purchase the investments in its view, therefore, the legal syllogism for firm’s breach of its duty to provide advice and its duty to inform, and for management’s breach of its duty of competence, was tenable. [195] regarding the release from which management was alleged to have benefited, the court of appeal was of the view that the motion judge should have rejected this argument. the court of appeal concluded that this ground required the production of evidence, namely evidence of the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement and the release it contained, because in this case they constituted facts to be proved in accordance with art. 2803 of the civil code of québec. in spite of that, the court of appeal considered the release and held that it did not make it possible to determine with certainty whether management was one of the “released parties” as defined in the release or to determine whether the claim in this case was covered by the release (para. 138). [196] finally, the court of appeal held that the motion judge’s conclusion concerning the common questions requirement of art. 1003(a) ccp was wrong because, in its view, it was not enough to assert that the type of relationship between firm and the group’s members was ill suited to a class action (para. 150). vii issues [197] this appeal requires that we answer the following questions: (1) did the court of appeal err in authorizing the respondent’s action against firm? (a) does the respondent’s action raise identical, similar or related questions of law or fact in accordance with art. 1003(a) ccp. (common questions)? (b) do the facts alleged in the respondent’s motion seem to justify the conclusions being sought in accordance with art. 1003(b) ccp. (colour of right)? (2) did the court of appeal err in authorizing the respondent’s action against management? (a) does the release relied on by management bar the respondent’s claim for punitive damages in relation to abcp (colour of right)? (b) do the facts alleged in the respondent’s motion seem to justify the conclusions being sought with respect to compensatory damages (colour of right)? [198] before turning to the analysis, i note that although this appeal was decided under the ccp, the legislature did not alter the substance of the authorization conditions in enacting the new ccp, which came into force in 2016 (see ministère de la justice, commentaires de la ministre de la justice: code de procédure civile, chapitre c-25.01 (2015), art. 575). while certain aspects of the authorization procedure were changed with the enactment of the new ccp — one example is the possibility of a decision authorizing a class action being appealed with leave under art. 578 of the new ccp (see also art. 577 of the new ccp) — these changes did not affect how a court is to deal with a motion (or application) for authorization to institute a class action. thus, my comments apply both to the former and to the new ccp. viii analysis [199] in my opinion, this appeal raises questions of application rather than of principle. the flexible and liberal approach to authorization established by this court’s decisions in infineon, vivendi and subsequent cases is not being called into question here. however, it must be determined whether, and to what extent, this flexible and liberal approach allows a court of first instance or an appellate court considering a motion for authorization to institute a class action to read “between the lines” of the motion in order to find that the conditions set out in art. 1003 ccp (now art. 575) are met. [200] my colleague kasirer j disagrees. i agree with him that an unduly strict reading of the authorization conditions is incompatible with quebec law as it now stands. our differences of opinion seem instead to relate to what amounts to a “strict” treatment of a motion for authorization. the courts have accepted that a motion for authorization to institute a class action must be dealt with in a flexible manner, but the current case law does not allow an authorization judge to “guess” what the basis is for the cause of action. this position does not amount to an unduly strict reading of the motion, but, rather, is consistent with the intention clearly expressed by the legislature that each of the conditions set out in art. 1003 ccp be met. a objectives of the class action [201] this court has already discussed the objectives of the class action in detail. they include facilitating access to justice, modifying harmful behaviour and conserving judicial resources (l’oratoire saint-joseph du mont-royal v jj, 2019 scc 35, at para. 6; hollick v. toronto (city), 2001 scc 68, [2001] 3 scr 158, at para. 15; western canadian shopping centres inc. v. dutton, 2001 scc 46, [2001] 2 scr 534, at paras. 27-29; vivendi, at para. 1). these objectives have led to case law that facilitates bringing such an action (bank of montreal v marcotte, 2014 scc 55, [2014] 2 scr 725, at para. 43, quoting infineon, at para. 60). this case law is well established, and my intention is not to raise any doubts about it. [202] as commendable as the objectives of the class action may be, they can be attained, however, only if a rigorous procedure is followed for the authorization of such an action the fact that the class action is a cumbersome procedural vehicle that represents a huge undertaking for all of the participants, including the courts, cannot be disregarded. the class action will not be able to attain its objectives unless the courts give meaning and substance to the legislature’s provisions in a manner consistent with their institutional role. b authorization stage of the class action [203] four conditions must be met in order for a class action to be authorized: 1003 the court authorizes the bringing of the class action and ascribes the status of representative to the member it designates if of opinion that: (a) the recourses of the members raise identical, similar or related questions of law or fact; (b) the facts alleged seem to justify the conclusions sought; (c) the composition of the group makes the application of article 59 or 67 difficult or impracticable; and (d) the member to whom the court intends to ascribe the status of representative is in a position to represent the members adequately. [204] the authorization stage — known as the certification stage in the common law provinces — regulates the unique procedural vehicle that is the class action. indeed, the class action enables a single representative to advance the interests of dozens or even hundreds of people (art. 999(d) ccp). the mechanisms of authorization and notice to the members make up for the absence of a power of attorney that is inherent in the class action because of the exception made to the rules for mandates to take part in judicial proceedings (c. piché, l’action collective: ses succès et ses défis (2019), at p 71). seen in this light, the authorization stage is what confers full legitimacy on the class action. [205] the authorization stage thus helps to protect the interests of all those involved in the class action — not only the interests of the representative and the absent members, but also those of the defendants and even of the administration of justice: [translation] [t]he authorization procedure is also intrinsically intended to protect the rights and interests of defendants because the court is required to rule on the preconditions for authorizing the action, it ensures, in so doing, that defendants do not face groundless suits. this exercise is fundamental in a context in which abuse of process and actions with little basis can be common. aside from that risk, the bringing of a class action generally has significant consequences for defendants. in that sense, it is now recognized that there is a considerable media and business impact on them [when a motion for authorization is filed]. the multiplier effect from the aggregation of a large number of claims produces a significant risk of nuisance. [citations omitted.] (c. piché (2019), at pp. 71-72) [206] authorization is therefore meant to be more than a mere formality. it would be regrettable if this stage were reduced to simply rubber stamping the proposed action. indeed, a lack of rigour at the authorization stage represents a threat to the objectives of the class action itself, and in particular to its role as a vehicle for access to justice (see p-c. lafond, le recours collectif, le rôle du juge et sa conception de la justice: impact et évolution (2006), at p 349). i therefore agree completely with this eloquent statement by my colleague kasirer ja, as he then was: a lack of rigour at authorization can indeed weigh down the courts with ill-conceived claims, creating the perverse outcome that the rules on class actions serve to defeat the very values of access to justice they were designed to champion. (sibiga v. fido solutions inc., 2016 qcca 1299, at para. 14 (canlii)) [207] despite its fundamental role, the authorization stage is nevertheless not uncontroversial. it is not accepted unanimously in the legal community, and differing views have in fact frequently been expressed by judges in this regard (see, eg,. charles v boiron canada inc., 2016 qcca 1716, at paras. 69-74, per bich j.a (canlii); société québécoise de gestion collective des droits de reproduction (copibec) v. université laval, 2017 qcca 199, at para. 136 (canlii); see, a contrario, whirlpool canada v. gaudette, 2018 qcca 1206, at para. 29, per savard ja, as she then was (canlii)) these disagreements are not merely theoretical; they have very practical stakes that relate to the core of the legitimacy of the class action, that is, access to justice. [208] the usefulness of the authorization stage is questioned because of the delays it can cause. however, even though some might consider that the time required for an authorization proceeding is excessive, this can in no way be compared to the length of the hearing on the merits (c. piché, “tout ce qu’on ne vous a jamais dit sur l’étape d’autorisation dans l’action collective” (2018), 77 r du b 525, at p 540). [209] what can be said in the face of this controversy? the fact is that, although the legislature has had several opportunities to eliminate the authorization stage, it has not seen fit to do so. refashioning this stage — or, if necessary, abolishing it — is a matter for politicians. the authorization stage remains, and it must be given meaning. c role of the judge at the authorization stage [210] the judge has a very specific role at the authorization stage that must be considered in order to properly fix the guideposts for this stage and ensure that motions for authorization to institute class actions are dealt with more uniformly. before turning to this, i wish to briefly discuss certain well-established principles that apply at the authorization stage of a class action in quebec. [211] to begin, it should be borne in mind that the burden of showing that all the conditions of art. 1003 ccp are met is always, and only, on the applicant. this is not a heavy burden: it is a burden of demonstration that the proposed legal syllogism is tenable rather than a burden of proof on a balance of probabilities (infineon, at paras. 61, 65, 84, 89 and 127; oratoire, at para. 58; martin v société telus communications, 2010 qcca 2376, at para. 32 (canlii); pharmascience inc. v. option consommateurs, 2005 qcca 437, [2005] rjq 1367, at para. 25). it has, in particular, been described as a burden of logic (court of appeal reasons, at paras. 38 and 45; union des consommateurs v. bell canada, 2012 qcca 1287, [2012] rjq. 1243, at para. 88). [212] next, the allegations of fact in the motion must be assumed to be true, provided that they are sufficiently precise to ensure that they effectively support the existence of the right being claimed (infineon, at paras. 67 and 134; oratoire, at para. 59, per brown j., and para. 171, per gascon j.; labelle v agence de développement des réseaux locaux de services de santé et de services sociaux — région de montréal, 2011 qcca 334, at paras. 59-60 (canlii); toure v. brault & martineau inc., 2014 qcca 1577, at para. 38 (canlii); sibiga, at para. 52; harmegnies v. toyota canada inc., 2008 qcca 380, at para. 44 (canlii); regroupement des citoyens contre la pollution v alex couture inc., 2007 qcca 565, [2007] rjq 859, at para. 32; boiron canada inc., at para. 4) vague, general or imprecise allegations cannot be assumed to be true, as they are more akin to personal opinion, speculation or conjecture (oratoire, at para. 59, per brown j.; fortier v. meubles léon ltée, 2014 qcca 195, at para. 69 (canlii); toure, at para. 39) allegations that are vague, general or imprecise cannot be taken into consideration unless they are supported by “some evidence” (infineon, at paras. 67 and 134; oratoire, at para. 59). furthermore, the court hearing the motion for authorization is not required to assume allegations amounting to legal argument to be true (option consommateurs v bell mobilité, 2008 qcca 2201, at paras. 37-38 (canlii); lafond, at p 132). [213] i would also reiterate that the court’s role is not to guess the basis for the action whose authorization is being sought, or for the legal syllogism, where no specific allegations are made in relation to a key element of the cause of action the court hearing the motion for authorization can supplement the allegations using the evidence in the record and can draw inferences and presumptions from them (oratoire, at para. 24, per brown j). [214] because the court is not required to assume the applicant’s legal allegations to be true, it “may . . . decide a pure question of law at the authorization stage if the outcome of the proposed class action depends on its doing so, and to some extent the court must also interpret the legislation to determine whether the proposed class action is ‘frivolous’ or ‘clearly wrong’ in law” (oratoire, at para. 55, per brown j (emphasis in original); see also trudel v banque toronto-dominion, 2007 qcca 413, at paras. 2-3 (canlii); groupe d’action d’investisseurs dans biosyntech v tsang, 2016 qcca 1923, at para. 33 (canlii); lambert v whirlpool canada, lp, 2015 qcca 433, at para. 12 (canlii); fortier, at paras. 89-91; toure, at para. 42; benabu v vidéotron, 2018 qccs 2207, at paras. 19-22 (canlii), aff’d 2019 qcca 2174; seigneur v netflix international, 2018 qccs 4629, at paras. 39 and 51-52 (canlii), aff’d 2019 qcca 1671). i wish to emphasize that when a judge decides a question of law on which the outcome of a class action depends at the authorization stage, this furthers the objectives of predictability of the law and judicial economy that underlie the system of administration of justice. it is also consistent with the objective at the authorization stage of “ensur[ing] that defendants do not have to defend against untenable claims on the merits” (vivendi, at para. 37; see also infineon, at para. 61; oratoire, at para. 56) questions of fact, which require the filing of evidence, must be left to the trial judge. [215] a judge has a more active role in deciding a motion for authorization than in an ordinary proceeding. the authorization judge must play the role of protector of the absent members’ interests while remaining impartial and striving not to usurp the functions of counsel by managing the proceeding in an overly inquisitorial manner (lafond, at pp. 14-16 and 48). [216] the fundamental principle of our adversarial system is that it is the parties who conduct the case. courts must decide cases on the basis of the record before them and may not reframe the litigation on their own initiative. thus, although a judge does have the power to propose certain amendments — such as limiting the definition of the group — in order to promote the efficiency of the proceeding, he or she cannot reorient the debate (lafond, at p 20; see also raleigh v maibec inc., 2016 qccs 2533, at para. 65 (canlii); see also, in the common law context, mccracken v canadian national railway company, 2012 onca 445, 111 or (3d) 745, at paras. 132 and 134). even though the court is required to play a more active role in the context of a class action, this does not mean it can take on the role of party or counsel and change the purpose of the action as presented by the applicant. [217] in infineon, and in the subsequent cases, this court stated that the court plays a “filtering” or screening role at the authorization stage (paras. 59 and 65). however, this court has explained as well that the court hearing the motion for authorization must also verify that the action meets each of the conditions of art. 1003 ccp (vivendi, at para. 37; infineon, at para. 59). nonetheless, there sometimes seem to be differences of opinion between seeing authorization as simply a screening stage whose purpose is only to prevent frivolous or vexatious cases and seeing it as a verification stage that ensures that the action meets all the conditions of art. 1003 ccp. yet this court clearly stated in infineon that “the court’s role is merely to filter out frivolous motions and grant those that meet the evidentiary and legal threshold requirements of art. 1003”, that is, those that disclose an “arguable case” or a “good colour of right” (paras. 61 and 65 (emphasis added); see also vivendi, at para. 37). similarly, this court has on several occasions reiterated that it is not only frivolous applications that must be screened out, but also those that are “untenable” (oratoire, at paras. 56 and 61; see also infineon, at paras. 61-62; vivendi, at para. 37). [218] courts that decide whether to authorize class actions must take a consistent approach. verifying that the relevant conditions are met at the authorization stage must not be mistaken for making an incursion into the merits or adding to the applicant’s burden at this stage. even though the analysis required at the authorization stage may be laborious because, for example, the case is complex, this does not mean that it is illegitimate. quite the contrary, the analysis is necessary to ensure that all the elements of the applicant’s cause of action are present and that each of the conditions set out in art. 1003 ccp is met. the fact that the analysis may be difficult does not mean that the action must be authorized. determining whether there is a “good colour of right” necessarily requires that the motion be read carefully to ascertain whether the proposed syllogism is tenable. [219] the authorization judge is thus in the delicate position of having to adopt an approach to the authorization conditions that, on the one hand, helps preserve the integrity of the authorization stage and, on the other, does not place undue restrictions on the action being proposed. defects of form can be excused, but substantive defects cannot be. because the court must assume that the alleged facts are true, the allegations must be clear and complete, not vague, general or imprecise. in short, the judge’s role at the authorization stage is to screen out frivolous or untenable actions, but also to verify that the applicant meets all the conditions of art. 1003 ccp. professor lafond clearly summarizes the task of the court hearing the motion for authorization: [translation] the class action does not have to be put through the ultimate test at the authorization stage. as the supreme court has stated, the court need not be convinced of the merits of the claim. its role comes down to verifying, without making any assumption about the merits of the case, whether the legal syllogism underlying the action is correct, which involves a brief review of the legal arguments made by the applicant. [emphasis added; citations omitted; pp. 110-11.] [220] that being said, my articulation of the screening role is not an attempt to “revive a debate that was in fact settled by this court as recently as last year”, as my colleague suggests (para. 54) in kasirer j.’s view, oratoire confirmed that authorization can be denied only if a motion is frivolous or clearly unfounded in law or in fact (paras. 55-58). however, saying that authorization is a verification stage and not simply a stage for screening out abusive and frivolous actions is consistent with the decisions of this court (see infineon, at para. 61; vivendi, at para. 37). the case law is perfectly clear and unanimous in this regard: at the authorization stage, the court must ensure that all the conditions of art. 1003 ccp are met and must decline to authorize the action if even one of them is not met. the court certainly plays a screening role at the authorization stage, but also a verification role (infineon, at para. 59; vivendi, at para. 37; oratoire, at para. 7, per brown j). [221] i wish to clarify my understanding of the expression “frivolous on its face”, as this seems to be at the root of the difference of opinion with my colleague. in this regard, i am of the opinion that my colleague departs from this court’s precedents in infineon, vivendi and oratoire in stating that the purpose of screening is merely “to filter out frivolous claims, and nothing more” (paras. 25 and 27) i agree that the screening threshold is not a very high one. nevertheless, there is a distinction between an “untenable” motion and one that is “frivolous” in my view, a motion for authorization that does not meet all the authorization conditions is not for that reason alone “frivolous”, a label that applies instead to a motion that is futile, vexatious or meaningless on its face. it is therefore not a question of screening out only the most extreme motions. the motion must be read carefully and the evidence in the record analyzed. when i speak of a verification stage, i am reiterating the well-established principle that the authorization judge must carefully read the allegations of the motion that are assumed to be true in order to determine whether the legal syllogism proposed in the motion is an arguable one. [222] having clarified this, i will now discuss the standard for appellate intervention in a decision made at the authorization stage. d. standard for appellate intervention [223] judges have broad powers at the authorization stage; they have considerable leeway in assessing whether the four authorization conditions set out in art. 1003 ccp are met (harmegnies v toyota canada inc., 2008 qcca 380, at paras. 20-24 (canlii); see also lafond, at pp. 153-54). if a judge is of the opinion that each condition is met, he or she must authorize the action, as provided for in art. 1003 ccp, and has no discretion to decline to do so (see also vivendi, at para. 67). [224] this broad power to assess is reflected in the applicable standard for appellate intervention: palpable and overriding error. as this court recently observed, an appellate court’s power to intervene is limited when it hears an appeal from a decision on a motion for authorization to institute a class action (oratoire, at para. 10, per brown j.) intervention by the court of appeal will be justified only if the authorization judge’s assessment of the conditions of art. 1003 ccp is clearly wrong (see also vivendi, at para. 34; federal express canada corporation v farias, 2019 qcca 1954, at para. 2 (canlii); benabu (ca), at para. 3 (canlii)). if the court of appeal chooses to intervene on the basis that, in its view, the assessment of one of the authorization conditions is clearly wrong, it can substitute its own opinion only with respect to that condition (vivendi, at para. 35; sofio v organisme canadien de réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobilières (ocrcvm), 2015 qcca 1820, at para. 17 (canlii); sibiga, at paras. 32-35; boiron canada inc., at para. 37; belmamoun v. brossard (ville), 2017 qcca 102, 68 mplr (5th) 46, at para. 70). of course, the court of appeal can intervene if there is an error of law, because the standard applicable to questions of law is correctness. the fact remains, however, that an appellate court’s power of intervention is limited and that it must defer to the authorization judge’s assessment of the conditions of art. 1003 ccp. ix application [225] how do these principles apply in this case? i begin by noting that this is not an action in which the inadequacies of the legal syllogism are obvious on the face of the motion for authorization (see, eg,. durand v attorney general of quebec, 2018 qccs 2817) however, infineon and vivendi did not make the authorization conditions so generous that only motions that are frivolous on their face can be screened out. [226] this appeal requires a careful analysis of the motion, including the allegations and the documents that were before the authorization judge so that she could determine whether the action should be authorized. this is precisely the exercise that an authorization judge must undertake, and prior to this analysis, it cannot be said on what basis the cause of action is arguable and can be authorized. authorization remains an intellectual exercise that cannot be sidestepped on the ground that a cursory reading of the motion does not show the legal syllogism to be fundamentally flawed. a. the proposed action against firm [227] the main issue that must be considered in relation to the action against firm concerns the court of appeal’s intervention in the superior court’s decision. this issue raises two sub-issues relating to the authorization conditions set out in art. 1003 ccp: whether there are any common questions with regard to firm (art. 1003(a) ccp) and whether there is an arguable case against firm (art. 1003(b) ccp). [228] before dealing with these issues, i believe it is essential to discuss the basis for the respondent’s action against firm, as there is some disagreement about it. [229] i agree with my colleague that the existence of a contractual relationship between firm and the respondent is no longer in any doubt (paras. 23 and 37). firm’s representatives, including ms. blanchette, could therefore engage its contractual liability, which the appellants in fact conceded at the hearing in this court. however, i note that the motion judge considered several possible contractual bases for the action against firm. the fact that she ruled out the possibility of a contractual basis arising from the deposit agreements does not invalidate her decision given the fact that she considered other contractual bases, including the one arising from the mandator-mandatary relationship between firm’s representatives and their clients. [230] the respondent’s action is based on a breach of firm’s duty to inform. the respondent asserts that if he had been informed that the investments involved certain risks relating to the return, he would not have purchased them. [231] my colleague outlines the nature of the duty to inform (para. 61) i therefore propose to make only a few additional points. first, the duty to inform arises both at the pre-contractual stage, where it requires the disclosure of the information needed to obtain informed consent, and during the performance of the contract (j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers and b. moore, la responsabilité civile, vol. 2, responsabilité professionnelle (8th ed 2014), at nos. 2-452 and 307) the duty to inform to which my colleague refers would appear to be an ongoing duty that arose during the performance of the contract for services, as it cannot, in this case, be a duty to inform that arose at the pre-contractual stage in relation to the deposit agreements. [232] finally, before embarking on the subject of the respondent’s action against firm, i would like to clarify which contracts are at issue in this case given that the respondent is alleging that firm is contractually liable. the motion judge did not err in stating that firm could not be contractually liable on the basis of the deposit agreements for the pp and alt investments because the parties to those agreements were the clients and their respective caisses populaires this does not seem to have been questioned either by the court of appeal or by my colleague. the contract that could give rise to firm’s contractual liability is instead the one that it entered into with clients through its representatives, in this case ms. blanchette. i agree with the court of appeal that the contract in question was a contract for services whose sole object was the giving of advice (paras. 54 and 63). my position on this point is therefore the same as that of my colleague (para. 59). while the giving of advice was the core prestation under the contract, i also agree that this did not preclude a duty to inform from existing as well (j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obligations (7th ed 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at no. 306). (1) intervention of the court of appeal [233] the appellants submit that the court of appeal rewrote the respondent’s cause of action against firm. this argument is based in part on the comments the court made at para. 33 of its reasons: [translation] first, while it is true that one must not be satisfied with vagueness, generalities and imprecision, it would be wrong to close one’s eyes to allegations that are perhaps not perfect, but whose true meaning is nonetheless clear. one must therefore be able to read between the lines. to do otherwise would be to adopt an unduly literal or rigid approach and to give what the supreme court stated in this regard a meaning that it does not have. [emphasis added.] [234] it is true that strict formalism is not compatible with the flexible approach that must be taken at the authorization stage. but even if it is assumed for the purposes of discussion that it is sometimes necessary to “read between the lines”, lines must still exist; the court cannot write them itself. [235] i would adopt the interesting metaphor made by rennie j., as he then was, in speaking of administrative law: newfoundland nurses is not an open invitation to the court to provide reasons that were not given, nor is it licence to guess what findings might have been made or to speculate as to what the tribunal might have been thinking. this is particularly so where the reasons are silent on a critical issue. . . . newfoundland nurses allows reviewing courts to connect the dots on the page where the lines, and the direction they are headed, may be readily drawn. here, there were no dots on the page. [emphasis added.] (komolafe v canada (citizenship and immigration), 2013 fc 431, 16 imm. lr (4th) 267, at para. 11) [236] in the same way, “reading between the lines” does not allow an appellate court to reorient an action however it likes, particularly in the absence of allegations. while a motion may lack clarity, as the court of appeal acknowledged with respect to the record in this case (at para. 47), there must still be a common thread that makes it possible to connect the dots so that the court hearing the motion can infer the cause of action on the basis of deductions from the alleged facts (a v. frères du sacré-coeur, 2017 qccs 5394, at para. 31 (canlii)). however, this cannot be done in the absence of allegations, and it certainly cannot be done where there are conflicting allegations. that would go beyond facilitating the authorization of class actions as favoured by the courts. and in my opinion, with respect, that is what happened in the court of appeal. [237] the authorization judge analyzed the action against firm as it had been presented by the respondent in his motion for authorization, that is, from the standpoint of firm’s contractual liability for a breach of the duty to inform. this alleged breach of the duty to inform was analyzed in relation to, among other things, a contractual basis for the action arising from the mandator-mandatary relationship between firm’s representatives and the clients (para. 208). i reiterate here that the judge’s assessment of the authorization conditions is entitled to deference on appeal absent a palpable and overriding error. (2) common questions requirement (article 1003(a) ccp) [238] firm essentially argues that unless the representations or omissions alleged against all of its financial advisers are shown to have been systematic in nature, the class action cannot be authorized, since the condition of identical, similar or related questions of law or fact is not met. [239] i agree with the authorization judge that this condition is not met in this case. the liability of financial advisers for a breach of the duty to inform and the duty to provide advice is not well suited to a class action because of the highly individual nature of the relationship between a client and an adviser in the context of a contract for investment services. in such a case, the liability analysis would have to be repeated for each individual claim the case law is consistent in this regard: there can be no common questions in such circumstances. this does not mean, however, that financial advisers are shielded from any class action for a breach of the duty to inform if an applicant can show that the breach was systematic in nature, the common questions condition will not be an impediment to authorizing the action this was what the applicant in oratoire did by preparing a table of victims that, he argued, showed what appeared to be systematic fault on the part of the defendant institutions. the respondent here, on the other hand, has neither alleged nor shown any kind of systematic breach of the advisers’ duty to inform that might be imputed to firm. by the respondent’s own admission, he has no idea whether other clients were in the same situation as him. in short, it is the absence of a systematic breach that is fatal to the respondent’s action, not the fact that the action concerns financial advisers. [240] the question to be dealt with collectively as regards firm’s duty to inform is described as follows by the respondent: [translation] [d]id [firm] breach this duty [to inform] by failing to clearly inform the members of the . . . group . . . that the pp and alt investments would include investment strategies that might eliminate, before maturity, any possibility of a return? (ar, vol. ii, at p 158) [241] even if it is assumed for the purposes of discussing the condition of art. 1003(a) ccp that the respondent has an arguable case against firm, i am of the view that the action cannot be authorized because of the absence of common questions. determining whether firm committed the fault it is alleged to have committed, namely a breach of its duty to provide information concerning the safety of the pp and alt investments, requires a contextual analysis involving a number of factors, including the nature of the relationship between the financial adviser and the client, the information provided by the financial adviser, each individual’s investor profile, age and experience, each investor’s understanding of the risks associated with the investments, and each investor’s level of sophistication and risk tolerance — all factors that essentially highlight the fact that the duty to inform is an individual and not a common one unless it is shown that the duty was systematically breached. [242] i agree with my colleague that the duty to inform is more general than the duty to provide advice owed by firm’s representatives. the duty to inform is, however, a variable obligation shaped by the circumstances of each case, such as the client’s characteristics and the nature of the client’s relationship with his or her adviser (d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (3rd ed 2018), at no. 2006; n. l’heureux and m. lacoursière, droit bancaire (5th ed 2017), at no. 644) this court affirmed the variable nature of the duty to inform in bank of montreal v. bail ltée, [1992] 2 scr 554, at pp. 586-87. the variable nature of the duty is especially true in cases where it is an accessory to a main prestation whose object is the giving of advice (reasons of kasirer j., at para. 59). in the case at bar, the duty to inform did not arise as an accessory to the deposit agreements for the pp and alt investments, since the parties to those agreements were the clients and their caisses populaires the obligation to inform in this case clearly arose in a broader context, namely the provision of a financial adviser’s services, which varies in accordance with several factors, including the length of the relationship, the client’s goals and the client’s level of expertise, to name a few. it is therefore not surprising that the respondent does not know whether there are other members in the same situation as him. [243] the duty to inform owed by a professional who provides services to a lay client therefore includes a duty to become informed of facts that may be of interest to the client (lluelles and moore, at no. 20091). in this regard, one of the most important obligations of securities dealers and financial advisers is to know their clients this obligation of means is necessarily an individual one whose content and extent vary (s. rousseau, “l’obligation du courtier de connaître son client en droit canadien des valeurs mobilières” (2008), 2 rdbf 11) the obligation of advisers or dealers to know their clients shapes their relationship with them; it is clear that the clients’ specific circumstances are of significant importance. [244] this court in fact recognized the variable content of the obligations resting on market intermediaries in laflamme v. prudential-bache commodities canada ltd., 2000 scc 26, [2000] 1 scr 638: the content of the obligations that rest on the manager will vary with the object of the mandate and the circumstances one of the most fundamental of these obligations is that the manager exercise reasonable skill and all the care of a prudent administrator (art. 1710 cclc). the conduct expected is not that of the best of managers, nor the worst. rather, it is the conduct of a reasonably prudent and diligent manager performing similar functions in an analogous situation. thus the portfolio manager’s conduct must [translation] “be analysed having regard to his role as a specialist in this kind of transaction, and to the practices of each profession” ([n. l’heureux, “la révocation d’un agent et le statut d’intermédiaire de commerce” (1977), 18 c de d 397], at p 425). the regulation respecting securities, (1983) 115 go. ii, 1269, further defines this obligation by requiring that in his relations with his client the manager use “the care that one might expect of an informed professional placed in the same circumstances” (s 235). he must also deal in good faith, honestly and fairly with his clients (s 2341) [emphasis added; para. 29.] the court also stated the following: the scope and nature of this duty will vary with the circumstances. specifically, we note the importance of the client’s personality. . . . the substantive content of the duty to provide advice will vary inversely with the client’s knowledge of investments (mines v. calumet investments ltd., [1959] cs 455; proulx v. société de placements & co., [1976] ca 121). a dealer who is a manager is also required to be well informed as to his client (securities act, s 161; regulation respecting securities, s 232; commission des valeurs mobilières du québec, instructions générales québécoises q-9, s 57). [emphasis added; para. 34.] although these comments were made in the context of an action against a securities dealer acting as a portfolio manager, i consider them to be equally relevant in the context of this case. [245] in richter & associés inc. v. merrill lynch canada inc., 2007 qcca 124, [2007] rjq 238, at para. 73, the quebec court of appeal also recognized that a dealer’s obligations vary with the circumstances, which may include [translation] “the specific object of the mandate, the client’s goals, the client’s knowledge in the field of the contemplated investment, the risks associated with the transaction, and the client’s financial situation and personality”. [246] more recently, the quebec superior court also affirmed that a class action is not the appropriate vehicle for an action based on a breach of the duty to inform because of the variability in each member’s circumstances. in louisméus v. compagnie d’assurance-vie manufacturers (financière manuvie), 2017 qccs 3614, which also concerned the sale of financial products, the honourable hamilton j (as he then was) found that there were no common issues because analyzing the breach of an adviser’s duty to inform required consideration of the specifics of each individual relationship, including what information each adviser had received, how the instructions received from each client had been understood, what each adviser had communicated to each of his or her clients, and what had led each client to purchase the products (paras. 91-94 (canlii); see also brunelle v. banque toronto dominion, 2009 qccs 4605). i do not see the same limitations that my colleague kasirer j sees in these comments even though they were obiter, louisméus still has persuasive force. [247] while i agree that the court should not focus on each member’s specific characteristics at the authorization stage of the class action (lafond, at p 63), the fact remains that here the elements of fault, causation and injury raised by the respondent on behalf of the group are highly variable given the need for such a contextual analysis, there can therefore be no commonality to the question of whether the duty to inform was breached unless it is shown that the breach occurred systematically. the individualized analysis required by the action precludes the possibility of proceeding on a collective basis. [248] in quebec, it was so held prior to vivendi and infineon. an action should not proceed on a collective basis where the analysis on which it hinges is specific to each individual for example, in rosso v autorité des marchés financiers, 2006 qccs 5271, [2007] rjq 61, per lalonde j., the superior court found that there can be no common questions where the causation analysis has to be repeated for each member, resulting in a multitude of individual proceedings (para. 45; see also paré v. desjardins sécurité financière, 2007 qccs 4566, at paras. 59-61, per jasmin j. (canlii)) relying on louisméus, the superior court also stated the following in farber v. nn. life insurance co. of canada, [2002] az-50123096: if, on the other hand, as mr. farber claims, he was a victim of misrepresentation, such a claim would be dependent upon his subjective understanding either of the contract documents or of the illustration used by the broker who sold him the policy. he could not on that account extend his state of error to all the members of the group because each situation would vary, according to the individual purchaser's understanding of what it was he or she was purchasing, and the particular goals of insurance or savings that he or she was setting. the possibilities are simply too varied and too complex factually to permit the efficiencies in time and money which the class action is intended to achieve. [para. 2] [249] this interpretation of the requirement of art. 1003(a) ccp continued to prevail following vivendi and infineon, as shown by louisméus, described above. [250] my colleague argues that i have added a requirement that the common questions predominate over the individual ones (para. 25). i agree completely with him that there is no requirement in quebec law that the common questions predominate, provided, of course, that one or more common questions exist. however, the meaning of the condition set out in art. 1003(a) ccp as discussed in infineon and vivendi must not be forgotten. this condition is designed to ensure that the collective nature of the proposed action is preserved by verifying that the case raises, at a minimum, one question that allows for a collective analysis that will advance the litigation in a “not insignificant” manner (vivendi, at para. 58; see rozon v. les courageuses, 2020 qcca 5, at para. 68, per hamilton ja (canlii)). in other words, the common question must be significant enough “to affect the outcome of the class action” (infineon, at para. 72). the analysis of the common question must therefore be made by reference to the action being proposed. fundamentally, the purpose of this condition is to “avoid duplication of fact-finding or legal analysis” (dutton, at para. 39; rumley v british columbia, 2001 scc 69, [2001] 3 scr 184, at para. 29; vivendi, at para. 44; see lafond, at p 92). [251] it is clear that where an action requires the duplication of fact-finding in relation to the provision of services by each of the financial advisers as well as the duplication of legal analysis in relation to each of their breaches in the circumstances of each case, it must be concluded that the resolution of the proposed common question will not advance the action in a not insignificant manner. such an approach recognizes the role of proportionality — a cardinal principle of civil procedure — in an action that raises mainly questions of a highly individual nature by preventing the costly and enormous vessel of the class action from being put in motion where there are no efficiency gains to be made and where individual actions would not unduly encumber the resolution of the case (art. 4.2 ccp; art. 18 of the new ccp). [252] in this case, i am therefore of the view that no common question can arise given the manner in which the respondent has presented the action there is no allegation that other members are in a situation sufficiently similar to his; on the contrary, as i discuss below, it is unknown whether there are other members in the same situation as the respondent. [253] i therefore agree with firm that it was an error for the court of appeal, in light of the motion as presented, to treat the respondent’s situation as a systematic one involving a similar fault committed by each financial adviser in relation to each member of the group with respect, this was merely speculation, and the court of appeal took reading “between the lines” too far on this point. [254] to identify the systematic nature of the alleged fault, kasirer j relies heavily on the respondent’s allegation that firm did not give its representatives sufficient instructions regarding the pp and alt investments. this allegation reads as follows: 107.1 moreover, the representatives of [firm] were not given sufficient instructions regarding the characteristics and risks of the pp and alt investments and were not therefore in a position to evaluate their advantages and disadvantages; however, this allegation does not suffice to make any fault committed by the representatives a systematic one. because it is based only on generalities, it cannot be assumed to be true. as is required by the authorities, a general allegation such as this must therefore be supported by some evidence before it can be taken into account (infineon, at paras. 67 and 134; oratoire, at para. 59). but the respondent has produced no evidence that specifically supports this allegation. in fact, he has instead presented evidence contradicting the systematic nature of the alleged fault. [255] the respondent admitted that he did not know whether there were other investors in a situation similar to his: [translation] [counsel for the appellants]: . . . and so, you also don’t know, because these are exhibits that do not concern you personally, you don’t know the circumstances in which the other members, if this is the case, how they received them, in what circumstances they received them? [counsel for the respondent]: it has been admitted that the witness does not know those circumstances. do you want another admission? [counsel for the appellants]: and you also don’t know which representations may or may not have been made to a member when the member received any of those documents? ronald asselin: i know nothing. [counsel for the appellants]: he does not know the circumstances in which the members concerned happened to receive those exhibits [exhibits disclosed by members of group or by third parties]? [counsel for the respondent]: i have already admitted it to you. he does not know the circumstances. (ar, vol. xii, at pp. 125-26) it has therefore not been alleged or shown that the fault said to have been committed by firm and its representatives in relation to their clients was systematic in nature. in my opinion, the court of appeal erred in extrapolating the respondent’s situation to the other members of the proposed group (paras. 51-52, 76-79 and 149). [256] without concluding that a claim for a financial adviser’s breach of the duty to inform can never be the subject of a class action, i am of the view that it cannot be in this case it is not alleged that a systematic fault was committed by firm’s representatives, which, in my opinion, is essential for a common question to be found to exist. any common question that might be identified would not advance the action in a not insignificant manner, particularly in light of the host of individual questions to be resolved. [257] the question of what fault may be committed by such an adviser, which, as i explained above, involves a variety of issues for each individual who purchased a pp investment, an alt investment or both, and the question of causation in particular are highly variable, because individual trials will be needed to establish the context that led to each investment. this is true regardless of whether the obligation to inform or the obligation to provide advice is in issue this evidence will have to be adduced individually for each relationship between a financial adviser and a client, and it is likely to be highly personalized and subjective given the nature of the action a systematic duplication of fact-finding and legal analysis will be required, which means that the proposed question cannot advance the litigation in a not insignificant manner. as a result, that question cannot be characterized as a common question in this case (see lallier v volkswagen canada inc., 2007 qcca 920, [2007] rjq 1490, at para. 21). in short, the instant case would not lead to a collective analysis (vivendi, at para. 58), and the contemplated class action would not avert the duplication of proceedings. [258] i therefore agree with the authorization judge that the condition of art. 1003(a) ccp is not met in this case. [259] in my view, the absence of systematic fault is, on its own, a persuasive enough ground for declining to authorize the action. this conclusion concerning the condition of art. 1003(a) ccp is sufficient to dispose of firm’s appeal and to dismiss the action against it it is therefore unnecessary to deal with the second sub-issue submitted by firm, namely whether there is no arguable case under art. 1003(b) ccp. b. the proposed action against management (1) intervention of the court of appeal [260] i reiterate here that an appellate court’s power to intervene at the authorization stage is limited. it can intervene only if the authorization judge made a palpable and overriding error in considering the conditions of art. 1003 ccp or an error of law. if an appellate court intervenes with regard to the assessment of one of the conditions of art. 1003 ccp, it can substitute its own opinion only with respect to that condition. [261] for the reasons that follow, i am of the view that in the case of the respondent’s action against management, the court of appeal’s intervention was warranted only in part. (2) punitive damages [262] the respondent seeks an award of $1,000 in punitive damages for each member of the group against management. he argues that management owes punitive damages to the group’s members because a significant portion of the investments making up the pp and alt investments consisted of abcp he submits that the appellants therefore interfered unlawfully and intentionally with the right of the group’s members to the peaceful enjoyment and free disposition of their property by retaining abcp in the investments after it became a risky and illiquid asset and by issuing new investments consisting of abcp. [263] the authorization judge found that if the action were to be authorized, this claim would be barred because of the release with respect to abcp found in the sanction order made by the ontario superior court of justice under the ccaa. that release would have the effect of barring or terminating any claim based on the use of abcp. [264] the court of appeal was of the view that the motion judge should have rejected this argument outright. the court of appeal found that it was not possible to determine with certainty from the terms of the release which of its provisions might apply in this case. [265] two questions must be decided in order to ascertain whether the respondent’s claim is barred by the release. [266] the first question is whether an authorization judge can consider a release at the authorization stage and, if so, to what extent the judge can interpret the release and apply it to the facts. [267] the second question relates to the circumstances of this appeal. it requires a determination of whether the release bars the respondent from claiming punitive damages based on management’s actions relating to abcp as an investment in the pp and alt investments. [268] for the reasons that follow, i am of the opinion that the authorization judge correctly decided to consider the release and its scope in order to determine whether the proposed action against management claiming punitive damages in relation to abcp established an arguable case (oratoire, at para. 55). in this case, the terms of the release, and the respondent’s admission that the release with respect to abcp covers the investments made prior to august 2007, show that the proposed action against management cannot be authorized insofar as its purpose is to obtain punitive damages. (a) the application of a release may be considered at the authorization stage [269] the defences available to a defendant are generally considered at the trial on the merits (oratoire, at para. 41). as i explained, however, a court may decide a pure question of law at the authorization stage if the outcome of the proposed class action depends on its doing so. this principle, which applies to the interpretation of legislation, also extends to the interpretation of a release included in the sanction order made by the ontario superior court of justice, which has “full force and effect” in quebec under s 16 of the ccaa. the question is whether, if the facts are assumed to be true, the conclusions sought by the respondent are tenable in light of that release. [270] in the case at bar, the outcome of the part of the proposed action that concerns punitive damages in relation to abcp depends on how the terms of the release are interpreted, and the authorization judge was right to interpret the release in considering whether this part of the proposed action was tenable. [271] where evidence is necessary to determine the applicability of a release found in a sanction order, this question should be decided at the trial on the merits. conversely, where such evidence is not necessary, it would be neither logical nor desirable, from the standpoint of judicial economy and of proportionality of proceedings, to defer making a decision on this question of law when the court has an opportunity to decide it at the authorization stage. therefore, the fact that a question of interpretation presents some difficulty at the authorization stage does not make it an improper question if it does not require evidence to be adduced (see, for example, telus communications inc v wellman, 2019 scc 19, [2019] 2 scr 144, at paras. 86-87). in law as in life, it is preferable not to put off until tomorrow that which should be done today. once it is plain and obvious in law that a release has the effect of barring an action, the resources of the parties and the courts should not be wasted by postponing a decision that can be rendered by an authorization judge on the basis of the record before him or her. [272] this is especially true for releases resulting from a compromise or arrangement sanctioned by a court under the ccaa. these releases benefit creditors, as they reduce the risk of litigation against parties protected under the ccaa, the risk of delay caused by complex litigation and the depletion of assets to fund such litigation (nortel networks corp., re, 2010 onsc 1708, 63 cbr (6th) 162, at para. 81, per morawetz j.) they advance one of the ccaa’s important objectives, which is to favour restructuring by preventing the risk of litigation (l. pearce, “catch and release: class actions and solvent third parties under the ccaa” (2016), 11 can class action rev. 171). [273] these principles are well illustrated by holley v northern trust co. canada, 2014 onsc 889, 10 cbr. (6th) 162, aff’d on other grounds, 2014 onca 719, 18 cbr (6th) 162 in that case, perell j., accepting the facts as proven, struck out a class action because it was plain from reading the release included in the sanction order made under the ccaa that the release applied to the causes of action alleged by the claimants. [274] the unique nature of a judicial release under the ccaa militates in favour of considering it at a preliminary stage of an action, such as the authorization stage. like the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3, the ccaa creates a nationwide system dealing with the insolvency and restructuring of companies as defined in the act: “[t]he national implementation of bankruptcy decisions rendered by a court within a particular province is achieved through the cooperative network of superior courts of the provinces and territories” (sam lévy & associés inc v azco mining inc., 2001 scc 92, [2001] 3 scr 978, at para. 25, citing in re mount royal lumber & flooring co. (1926), 8 cbr 240 (ca), at p 246, per rivard ja). [275] in this regard, ss. 16 and 17 of the ccaa provide that orders made under the ccaa are binding on the other courts that have jurisdiction under the ccaa and must be enforced by those courts in the same manner as if they had made the orders themselves (canadian red cross society (re) (1998), 165 dlr (4th) 365 (bcsc), at para. 31; b. boucher, faillite et insolvabilité: une perspective québécoise de la jurisprudence canadienne (loose-leaf), vol. ii, at p 6-134) accordingly, it is imperative that quebec courts give effect to ccaa orders regardless of the jurisdiction where the proceedings took place the release included in the sanction order is therefore directly applicable in quebec. [276] this principle is clearly illustrated by hy bloom inc. v. banque nationale du canada, 2010 qccs 737, [2010] rjq 912, in which wagner j (as he then was) considered the application of the same release being relied on in the case at bar to another claim made in quebec. the plaintiffs, who had invested in abcp, had brought an action against the bank on the ground that abcp had been represented to them as being a guaranteed, risk-free investment. in dismissing the claim, wagner j held the following: [translation] . . . under sections 16 and 17 of the ccaa, [the superior court] need only be satisfied that the order emanates from the court designated under the ccaa, and it cannot reopen the debate already finished before another court that was lawfully seized of all the issues in dispute. without deciding on the veracity or merits of the allegations in the amended motion to institute proceedings, the court is of the opinion that the plan as approved will allow the plaintiffs to continue their actions insofar as they can establish fraud . . . as defined in the plan. however, they may no longer sue national bank for any other claim arising from the sale of abcp. [paras. 101-2] [277] releases are therefore relevant not only for the purposes of art. 1003(b) ccp, which relates to colour of right, but also for the purposes of art. 1003(a) ccp, which relates to the existence of common questions. this is a matter falling within the role of the court that hears the motion for authorization. [278] in order to implement the ccaa framework, an authorization judge should be able to consider the terms of a release in order to determine whether it bars a claim in whole or in part. if, when the alleged facts are assumed to be true, the terms of the release make it clear that part of the action cannot proceed, that aspect should not be authorized, because it no longer meets the colour of right condition. (b) the release with respect to abcp bars the claim for punitive damages [279] before i turn to the application of the release to mr. asselin’s motion, some additional facts are necessary. [280] in august 2007, a liquidity crisis threatened the canadian abcp market. the crisis was triggered by a loss of confidence among investors stemming from the news of widespread defaults on subprime mortgages in the united states on august 13, 2007, the canadian abcp market was frozen with a view to resolving the crisis by restructuring that market. [281] the major participants in the canadian abcp market met in montréal in august 2007. the purpose of the meetings was to come up with a common solution to prepare for the possible restructuring of the canadian abcp market, which was worth nearly $32 billion at the time. the meetings resulted in what is known as the montreal accord. [282] the desjardins group, as a participant in the abcp market, was involved in the discussions that led to the montreal accord, which it signed on august 16, 2007. the accord included an agreement in principle concerning a proposal for restructuring the market following the conclusion of the accord, the pan-canadian investors committee for third-party structured asset-backed commercial paper, which was made up of abcp investors, was incorporated to negotiate the terms of the market restructuring on behalf of investors the committee later put forward a creditor-initiated plan of arrangement that formed the subject matter of the proceedings in metcalfe & mansfield (ca). [283] an agreement in principle was reached on december 23, 2007, and an application was filed in march 2008 under the ccaa for the restructuring of the abcp market. the agreement in principle served as the basis for the plan of compromise and arrangement in the ccaa process. that plan was sanctioned by campbell j (see third amended plan of compromise and arrangement). [284] under the plan, the creditors released their claims against the dealers that had sold them investments containing abcp the plan called for the release of canadian banks, dealers, noteholders, asset providers, issuer trustees, liquidity providers and other market participants, or virtually all participants in the canadian abcp market, from any liability associated with the sale or use of abcp, with the exception of certain narrow claims relating to fraud. [285] the terms of the release in that case, as set out in art. 10.1 of the third amended plan of compromise and arrangement (art. 17 of the sanction order), were as follows: [e]very person (regardless of whether or not such person is a noteholder) . . . hereby fully, finally, irrevocably and unconditionally releases and forever discharges each of the released parties of and from any and all past, present and future claims, rights, interests, actions, rights of indemnity, liabilities, demands, duties, injuries, damages, expenses, fees . . . costs, compensation, or causes of action of whatsoever kind or nature whether foreseen or unforeseen, known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, contingent or actual, liquidated or unliquidated, whether in tort or contract, whether statutory, at common law or in equity, based on, in connection with, arising out of, or in any way related to, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly: any act or omission existing or taking place on or prior to the plan implementation date relating to or otherwise in connection with the third-party abcp market in canada, the abcp conduits, the affected abcp, the business and affairs of any of the released parties relating to or otherwise in connection with the affected abcp . . . . [emphasis added.] [286] the sanctioned plan contained a limited exclusion for an “excepted claim” as defined in the release. an excepted claim was primarily one based on fraudulent misrepresentations (art. 20(d)(i) sanction order; art. 10.4(c) third amended plan of compromise and arrangement). the release required that the pleadings for such claims provide specific information concerning: the authorized representative who made the misrepresentation, the person to whom the misrepresentation was made, the dates on which abcp was purchased, the text of the representation said to be untrue, and the action taken by the potential plaintiff in reliance on the representation (art. 20(d)(ii) sanction order; art. 10.4(d)(ii) third amended plan of compromise and arrangement) a potential plaintiff had the right to bring an excepted claim only within nine weeks of the date of delivery of notice by the monitor in the proceeding under the ccaa (art. 20(f)(ii) sanction order; art. 10.4(f)(ii) third amended plan of compromise and arrangement). [287] on appeal from campbell j.’s sanction order, the ontario court of appeal upheld the plan of arrangement and noted that the release exempted virtually all participants in the canadian abcp market from any liability associated with abcp (metcalfe & mansfield (ca), at para. 29). [288] in subsequent decisions, it was affirmed that the release was a necessary component of the plan and that it had been drafted very broadly in order to bar all claims relating to abcp, except the claims for misrepresentations that had been specifically carved out (mull v. national bank of canada, 2011 onca 488, at para. 9 (canlii)). [289] the respondent takes the position that the issue of whether the release applies to the appellants could not be argued at the authorization stage because the appellants adduced no evidence from which the authorization judge could determine whether management was a released party within the meaning of the release or whether the abcp to which the pp and alt investments may have been exposed was “affected abcp” this argument is untenable in view of the respondent’s judicial admission at the hearing on may 7, 2015: [translation] [counsel for the appellants] stated that [counsel for the respondent] had admitted on monday that he was withdrawing the claim on the first component, acknowledging that the release does in fact release [management] in this respect and that he therefore has no action or claim for punitive damages against [management] based on the first component. [counsel for the respondent] confirmed that this was correct, that this was what he had pleaded before justice godbout. the court summarized the judicial admission as follows: [counsel for the respondent] acknowledged that the release with respect to abcp covers the investments made before august 2007. (ar, vol. ii, at p 194) [290] while an authorization judge must assume the facts alleged by an applicant to be true, the judge cannot then disregard the admissions made by that applicant. the respondent is not alleging that management was no longer a released party after august 2007. nor is he arguing that the abcp sold by management was no longer affected abcp after august 2007. it can therefore be assumed that the release must apply to management and its investments before, during and after august 2007. [291] what i understand, rather, is that according to the respondent, the only important change that occurred in august 2007 was that management became aware of the risk associated with the continued use of abcp in its investments and that it nevertheless retained this type of investment in the pp and alt investments (ar, vol. ii, at p 150). [292] management’s alleged awareness of the risk has no effect on the continued application of the release to the parties or to the investments ultimately, it only changes the basis for the respondent’s claim the question is therefore whether the claim can survive the terms of the release, which allows only claims falling within the definition of an excepted claim however, the respondent’s claim cannot be an excepted claim. [293] the release thus presents two impediments that are fatal to the claim for punitive damages based on abcp. [294] the first impediment arises from the limited cause of action authorized for an excepted claim: the claim must be based on express fraudulent misrepresentations made to the potential plaintiff by an “authorized representative” of the potential defendant. the exception for misrepresentations must be interpreted narrowly to avoid the “potential cascade of litigation” that would result from a broad interpretation (metcalfe & mansfield (sc), at para. 113) the misrepresentation requirement is applicable in both the civil and the common law jurisdictions (para. 118). [295] however, mr. asselin’s claim for punitive damages is not based on a misrepresentation. rather, he submits that management’s fault in relation to abcp lies in [translation] “flawed design and management . . . contrary to its obligations and duties to act prudently and diligently and to adhere to sound and prudent management practices” (ar, vol. ii, at p 150) moreover, the allegations are not sufficiently detailed, because the release requires details concerning the date, content and source of the misrepresentation. the motion therefore does not allege a cause of action covered by the definition of an excepted claim. [296] even if other parts of the motion are considered, the respondent is not arguing that any “authorized representative” of management acted with fraudulent intent this fact alone means that there is no legal syllogism in respect of which authorization could be granted, as it is the representative who must have the fraudulent intent campbell j himself was aware of the possibility that the release would “preclude recovery in circumstances where senior bank officers who had the requisite fraudulent intent directed sales persons to make statements that the sales persons reasonably believed but that the senior officers knew to be false” (metcalfe & mansfield (sc), at para. 119). [297] the second impediment to the claim for punitive damages relates to the strict time limit for asserting a claim. the nine-week time limit began to run on the date of delivery of notice by the monitor, which was essentially the date on which the sanction order was made, namely june 5, 2008 (j. carhart and j. hoffman, “canada’s asset backed commercial paper restructuring: 2007-2009” (2010), 25 bflr 35, at p 56). mr. asselin’s motion for authorization to institute a class action was served on september 16, 2011. his claim for punitive damages based on management’s use of an investment strategy that included abcp was therefore filed out of time. [298] courts with jurisdiction under the ccaa have “[t]he ability to conclusively cap liability and close the door on future litigation” (pearce, at p 193). this is the case here. to permit claims to be considered regardless of the previous decisions and the release would operate as a manifest unfairness to all the other participants that incurred losses (mull, at para. 2). allowing the claim relating to abcp to proceed would amount to reopening a debate on the release in the quebec superior court, which [translation] “would short-circuit the economy of the judicial system” (hy bloom inc., at para. 84). [299] in conclusion, the release stands in the way of the respondent’s legal syllogism with regard to management’s fault, and the claim based on abcp must be dismissed. it is clear from the allegations, the terms of the release and the respondent’s admission that the claim for punitive damages based on abcp does not have the colour of right required by art. 1003(b) ccp. (3) compensatory damages [300] insofar as it is argued that management is liable as the designer and manager of the products, i agree with the court of appeal that the action can be authorized in relation to the compensatory damages sought by the respondent against management. [301] the respondent alleges that management breached its duty of competence and management by taking risks that were contrary to its legal and contractual obligations (ar, vol. ii, at p 63, para. 120) among other things, he alleges that management liquidated the amounts allocated to the return on the pp and alt investments in order to honour the capital guarantee, which, he says, shows the scale of the risk associated with the investments. thus, in addition to the use of abcp, the investment strategies included the use of a leverage ratio of five to one, which, according to the respondent, was in violation of management’s obligations because it put the capital at risk and forced the liquidation of the amounts allocated to the return (para. 1221). the respondent submits that all of this was contrary to management’s obligation to act prudently and diligently and that it resulted in a loss of 100 percent of the assets allocated to the return (para. 127). [302] the authorization judge declined to authorize this part of the action, in particular because she found that the losses in question were attributable to the market collapse during the crisis of 2008 and that, as a result, the action did not have the colour of right required by art. 1003(b) ccp. i agree with the court of appeal that this was an error that warranted its intervention. by referring to the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, the authorization judge decided the merits of the action. thus, even though one may find tenuous this aspect of the action, it is not devoid of foundation. the allegations are sufficiently precise for this aspect of the action against management to be authorized. [303] i would therefore answer the second question at issue partly in the negative, as i am of the view that the court of appeal properly authorized the action against management except in relation to the claim for punitive damages. x disposition [304] i would allow the appeal in part. i would decline to authorize the action against firm, and i would authorize the action against management, but only in relation to the claim for compensatory damages.
i. introduction la juge martin — i. introduction [1] mr. chung was acquitted of dangerous driv- ing causing death under s. 249(4)1 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“code”). at trial and on appeal, there was no question that mr. chung drove in an objectively dangerous manner and committed the actus reus of the charged offence. however, the trial judge had a reasonable doubt about whether mr. chung had the requisite guilty mind or mens rea (2018 bcpc 133, 29 mvr (7th) 122). on appeal, [1] monsieur chung a été acquitté relativement à une accusation de conduite dangereuse ayant causé la mort, portée en vertu du par. 249(4)1 du code cri- minel, lrc 1985, c. c-46 (« code »). au procès et en appel, il ne faisait aucun doute que celui-ci avait conduit d’une manière objectivement dangereuse et qu’il avait commis l’actus reus de l’infraction dont il était accusé. toutefois, le juge de première instance avait un doute raisonnable quant à savoir 1 this is the offence under which mr. chung was charged in 2015. subsection 4 of s. 249 was repealed and replaced by s 32013(3) of the code as of december 18, 2018. 1 il s’agit de l’infraction dont m. chung a été accusé en 2015. le para graphe 249(4) a été abrogé et remplacé par le par 32013(3) du code en date du 18 décembre 2018. [2020] 1 rcs. r c chung la juge martin 409 the sole issue was whether the trial judge committed an error of law in fi nding that mr. chung lacked the requisite mens rea (2019 bcca 206, 55 cr (7th) 459). the british columbia court of appeal found such an error of law. reading the trial judgment fully and fairly, i conclude that there was an error of law and that this appeal must be dismissed. s’il avait l’intention coupable ou mens rea nécessaire (2018 bcpc 133, 29 mvr (7th) 122). en appel, la seule question était de savoir si le juge avait com- mis une erreur de droit en concluant que m. chung n’avait pas la mens rea requise (2019 bcca 206, 55 cr (7th) 459). la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a jugé qu’il y avait eu une telle erreur de droit. après avoir lu le jugement de première instance dans son ensemble et de manière juste, je conclus qu’il y a eu erreur de droit et que le présent pourvoi doit être rejeté. ii factual background and judicial history ii les faits et l’historique des procédures judiciaires [2] on the morning of saturday, november 14, 2015, mr. chung drove his vehicle at almost three times the speed limit towards a major intersection in vancouver and crashed into a left- turning vehicle. the driver of the left- turning vehicle died at the scene. [3] the collision occurred at the intersection of two arterial roads in vancouver: oak street and west 41st avenue. this was a mixed residential- commercial area with two gas stations, a community centre, a nursing home, small retail businesses, and multiple bus stops around and near the intersection. four pedestrians were in the vicinity of the intersec- tion at the time of the collision. it was not raining, but the road was damp or wet. traffi c was light around the intersection, but other cars were present and fi ve civilian witnesses were called at trial who were all driving cars near the intersection at the time of the collision. the speed limit for both streets is 50 km/h, but drivers generally go above that speed limit. both roads are wide and straight and have dedicated left turning lanes. [2] le samedi 14 novembre 2015, en avant- midi, m.  chung a conduit son véhicule à une vitesse presque trois fois supérieure à la limite autorisée en direction d’une intersection importante à vancouver et il est entré en collision avec un véhicule qui effec- tuait un virage à gauche. la personne conduisant ce dernier véhicule est décédée sur les lieux de l’ac- cident. [3] la collision s’est produite à l’intersection de deux artères de vancouver, la rue oak et la 41e ave- nue ouest. il s’agissait d’une zone mixte résidentielle et commerciale où il y avait deux postes d’essence, un centre communautaire, un foyer de soins de longue durée, de petits commerces de détail et de multiples arrêts d’autobus autour de l’intersection et à proximité de celle-ci. quatre piétons se trouvaient près de l’intersection au moment de la collision. il ne pleuvait pas, mais la chaussée était humide ou mouillée. la circulation était faible autour de l’inter- section, mais d’autres voitures étaient présentes et cinq témoins civils, qui conduisaient tous des voi- tures près de l’intersection au moment de la collision, ont été assignés au procès. la limite de vitesse dans les deux rues est de 50 km/h, mais les conducteurs dépassent généralement cette limite. les deux rues sont larges et droites et ont des voies réservées aux virages à gauche. [4] a dashboard camera video from another vehicle at the intersection captured 4.9 seconds of the event. over the span of a block, mr. chung had moved into the curbside lane, passed at least one car on the right, and accelerated from 50 km/h to 140 km/h before [4] une caméra- témoin d’un autre véhicule à l’intersection a capté 4,9 secondes de l’événement. sur une distance équivalente à un segment de rue, c’est-à-dire la portion de rue comprise entre deux intersections, m. chung s’est inséré dans la voie en 410 r v chung martin j. [2020] 1 scr. entering the intersection. the trial judge found that mr. chung was not inattentive nor was he engaged in any dangerous conduct prior to this one block span. mr. chung was driving a powerful vehicle that could accelerate quickly; the trial judge heard expert evidence that the vehicle could accelerate from 0 to 100 km/h in 4.5 seconds in dry conditions, although the trial judge made no fi ndings regarding exactly how quickly mr. chung reached his top speed in damp or wet conditions. as mr. chung approached the intersection going north along oak street, there was a toyota in front of him making a right turn. as the toyota was turning right, the victim started to make his left turn from going southbound on oak street to eastbound on west 41st avenue. at this point, mr. chung started braking, narrowly missed hitting the toyota, and collided with the victim’s car at a speed of 119 km/h. [5] taking into account all of the above circum- stances, the trial judge found that mr. chung’s ex- cessive speeding over a short distance towards this major intersection was objectively dangerous to the public and that the actus reus of dangerous driving was established. [6] however, the trial judge acquitted mr. chung because he had reasonable doubt that mr. chung’s conduct met the mens rea requirement for dangerous driving. the trial judge distinguished the facts of this case from circumstances where excessive speed met the mens rea requirement and emphasized that the momentariness of mr. chung’s speeding was criti- cal in fi nding that his conduct did not show criminal fault. bordure du trottoir, a doublé au moins une voiture par la droite et a accéléré, passant de 50 km/h à 140 km/h, avant de s’engager dans l’intersection. le juge de première instance a conclu que m. chung n’avait pas été inattentif et qu’il n’avait pas conduit de façon dangereuse avant de parcourir cette distance. monsieur chung conduisait un véhicule puissant qui pouvait accélérer rapidement; le juge a entendu une preuve d’expert selon laquelle le véhicule pouvait accélérer de 0 à 100 km/h en 4,5 secondes dans des conditions sèches, bien qu’il n’ait pas tiré de conclu- sion sur le temps exact qu’il a fallu à m. chung pour atteindre sa vitesse maximale dans des conditions humides ou mouillées. alors que m. chung s’appro- chait de l’intersection en direction nord sur la rue oak, il y avait une toyota devant lui qui effectuait un virage à droite. pendant que la toyota tournait à droite, la victime a commencé à faire son virage à gauche pour passer de la rue oak, direction sud, à la 41e avenue ouest, direction est. à ce moment, m. chung a commencé à freiner, a évité de justesse la toyota et est entré en collision avec la voiture de la victime à une vitesse de 119 km/h. [5] prenant en considération toutes les circons- tances susmentionnées, le juge du procès a conclu que l’excès de vitesse de m. chung sur une courte distance en direction de cette intersection impor- tante était objectivement dangereux pour le public et que l’actus reus de la conduite dangereuse avait été établi. [6] toutefois, le juge du procès a acquitté m. chung parce qu’il avait un doute raisonnable quant à savoir si son comportement satisfaisait à l’exigence de la mens rea requise pour conclure à la conduite dan- gereuse. le juge a établi une distinction entre les faits de l’espèce et les circonstances dans lesquelles la vitesse excessive avait satisfait à l’exigence de la mens rea, et il a souligné que le caractère momentané de l’excès de vitesse de m. chung était crucial dans la conclusion selon laquelle son comportement ne révélait aucune faute criminelle. [7] the british columbia court of appeal found that the trial judge had erred in law by “conceiv[ing] that a principle exists that a brief period of speeding (no matter how excessive the speed) cannot satisfy [7] la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a conclu que le juge de première instance avait commis une erreur de droit en [traduction] « considér[ant] qu’il existe un principe selon lequel un bref excès [2020] 1 rcs. r c chung la juge martin 411 the mens rea requirement” (para 42). the court of appeal therefore overturned the acquittal and entered a conviction, ruling that mr. chung would have been found guilty but for the trial judge’s error. [8] the sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge made an error of law, which would allow the crown to appeal mr. chung’s acquittal under s. 676(1)(a) of the code. in these reasons, i fi rst describe the types of [9] errors that are reviewable by appellate courts for crown appeals of acquittals. second, i interpret the trial judge’s reasons and explain how they demon- strate two inter- related errors of law concerning the interpretation and application of the test for mens rea for dangerous driving. lastly, i address why i would dismiss the appeal and uphold the conviction entered by the court of appeal. de vitesse (sans égard à l’ampleur de l’excès de vitesse) ne peut satisfaire à l’exigence de la mens rea » (par 42). la cour d’appel a donc annulé l’ac- quittement et a inscrit une déclaration de culpabilité, statuant que m. chung aurait été déclaré coupable n’eût été l’erreur du juge. [8] la seule question en litige en l’espèce est de savoir si le juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit, laquelle permettrait à la couronne d’interjeter appel de l’acquittement de m. chung en application de l’al. 676(1)a) du code. [9] dans les présents motifs, je décris première- ment les types d’erreurs que peuvent contrôler les juridictions d’appel saisies d’appels d’acquittements interjetés par la couronne. deuxièmement, j’inter- prète les motifs du juge du procès et j’explique com- ment ceux-ci révèlent l’existence de deux erreurs de droit étroitement liées en ce qui concerne l’interpré- tation et l’application du critère de la mens rea de la conduite dangereuse. enfi n, je traite des raisons pour lesquelles je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi et de confi rmer la déclaration de culpabilité inscrite par la cour d’appel. iii reviewable errors in crown appeals iii erreurs susceptibles de contrôle dans les appels [10] under s. 676(1)(a), the crown can only ap- peal an acquittal on a “question of law alone”. an appealable error must be traced to a question of law, rather than a question about how to weigh evidence and assess whether it meets the standard of proof (r v. jmh, 2011 scc 45, [2011] 3 scr 197, at paras. 25-27; r v. george, 2017 scc 38, [2017] 1 scr 1021, at paras 15-17). therefore, the crown cannot appeal merely because an acquittal is un- reasonable (r v. biniaris, 2000 scc 15, [2000] 1 scr 381, at para 33). de la couronne [10] selon l’al.  676(1)a), la couronne ne peut interjeter appel d’un acquittement que pour une « question de droit seulement ». un lien doit pou- voir être établi entre l’erreur susceptible d’appel et une question de droit, plutôt qu’une question sur la manière d’apprécier la preuve et de vérifi er si celle-ci satisfait à la norme de preuve (r c. jmh, 2011 csc 45, [2011] 3 rcs 197, par. 25-27; r. c george, 2017 csc 38, [2017] 1 rcs 1021, par 15-17). la couronne ne peut donc pas inter- jeter appel simplement parce qu’un acquittement est déraisonnable (r c. biniaris, 2000 csc 15, [2000] 1 rcs 381, par 33). [11] errors of law arise, for example, where “the legal effect of fi ndings of fact or of undisputed facts raises a question of law” and where there is “an assessment of the evidence based on a wrong legal principle” (jmh, at paras 28-30). these two types [11] les erreurs de droit sont commises, par exemple, lorsque « [l]’effet juridique des conclusions de fait ou des faits incontestés soulève une question de droit » et lorsqu’il y a « [u]ne appréciation de la preuve fondée sur un mauvais principe juridique » 412 r v chung martin j. [2020] 1 scr. of errors are somewhat similar; they both address errors where the trial judge’s application of the legal principles to the evidence demonstrates an errone- ous understanding of the law, either because the trial judge fi nds all the facts necessary to meet the test but errs in law in its application, or assesses the evidence in a way that otherwise indicates a misapprehension of the law. (jmh, par 28-30). ces deux types d’erreurs sont quelque peu semblables; dans les deux cas, il s’agit de situations où l’application des principes juridiques à la preuve, par les juges de première instance, révèle une compréhension erronée du droit, soit parce que les juges concluent à l’existence de tous les faits né- cessaires pour satisfaire au critère mais commettent une erreur de droit dans son application, soit parce que les juges apprécient la preuve d’une manière qui indique autrement une mauvaise compréhension du droit. iv the errors of law in the trial judge’s reasons iv les erreurs de droit dans les motifs du juge de [12] mr. chung argues that there is no such error of law in the trial judge’s reasons. i disagree. [13] when interpreting a trial judge’s reasons, ap- pellate courts should not parse the reasons of the trial judge in a line by line search for errors. instead, the reasons are to be “read as a whole, in the con- text of the evidence, the issues and the arguments at trial, together with ‘an appreciation of the purposes or functions for which they are delivered’” (r v. laboucan, 2010 scc 12, [2010] 1 scr 397, at para. 16, quoting r v. rem, 2008 scc 51, [2008] 3 scr 3, at para 16). appellate courts must at- tempt to understand the reasoning of the trial judge. however, even if the trial judge articulates the right test, appellate courts may fi nd an error of law if the judge’s reasoning and application demonstrate a failure to properly apprehend the law (george, at para 16). [14] in this case, the trial judge thoroughly re- viewed the evidence before him and made clear factual fi ndings. he cited, at para. 63, the correct test for the mens rea of dangerous driving causing death, articulated in r v. roy, 2012 scc 26, [2012] 2 scr 60, at para. 36: première instance [12] selon m. chung, les motifs du juge du procès ne sont pas entachés d’une telle erreur de droit. je ne suis pas d’accord. [13] lorsqu’elles interprètent les motifs des juges de première instance, les juridictions d’appel ne devraient pas décortiquer ces motifs ligne par ligne à la recherche d’erreurs. les motifs doivent plu- tôt « être lus comme un tout, dans le contexte de la preuve, des questions en litige et des arguments présentés lors du procès, et “en tenant compte des buts ou des fonctions de l’expression des motifs” » (r c. laboucan, 2010 csc 12, [2010] 1 rcs 397, par. 16, citant r c. rem, 2008 csc 51, [2008] 3 rcs 3, par 16). les juridictions d’appel doivent tenter de comprendre le raisonnement des juges de première instance. toutefois, même si ces juges ont énoncé le bon critère, les juridictions d’appel peuvent conclure à une erreur de droit si le raisonnement exposé et l’application faite de ce critère révèlent une mauvaise compréhension du droit (george, par 16). [14] en l’espèce, le juge de première instance s’est livré à un examen approfondi de la preuve lui ayant été présentée et il a formulé des conclusions de fait claires. il a cité, au par. 63, le bon critère de la mens rea de la conduite dangereuse causant la mort, critère énoncé dans r c. roy, 2012 csc 26, [2012] 2 rcs. 60, au par. 36 : the focus of the mens rea analysis is on whether the dangerous manner of driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable l’analyse relative à la mens rea doit être centrée sur la question de savoir si la façon dangereuse de conduire résultait d’un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de [2020] 1 rcs. r c chung la juge martin 413 person would have exercised in the same circumstances (beatty, at para 48). it is helpful to approach the issue by asking two questions. the fi rst is whether, in light of all the relevant evidence, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible. if so, the second question is whether the accused’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it, if possible, was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances. [emphasis in original.] [15] the trial judge found that mr. chung’s danger- ous conduct was only limited to the one block span where he accelerated to almost three times the speed limit, passing at least one car on the right, nearly hit the toyota turning right in front of him, and then col- lided with the victim’s vehicle. the trial judge con- cluded that mr. chung had not been inattentive while driving. the trial judge then canvassed a line of cases which he believed supported the principle that speed- ing alone is rarely suffi cient to establish the mens rea for dangerous driving. he distinguished these cases, fi nding that in these cases speeding was more than momentary or there was some other additional dangerous conduct that was not present in the case at bar. the trial judge emphasized that mr. chung’s speed was momentary, noting that although mo- mentary conduct can be a marked departure, it will more usually be only a mere departure where driving is otherwise proper (para. 117, citing r v. willock (2006), 212 oac 82, per doherty ja). therefore, he had reasonable doubt that mr. chung’s conduct represented a marked departure because the “mo- mentariness of the accused’s conduct in excessively speeding [was] insuffi cient to meet the criminal fault component” (paras 119-120). diligence que respecterait une personne raisonnable dans la même situation (beatty, par 48). il est utile d’aborder le sujet en posant deux questions. la première est de savoir si, compte tenu de tous les éléments de preuve pertinents, une personne raisonnable aurait prévu le risque et pris les mesures pour l’éviter si possible. le cas échéant, la deuxième question est de savoir si l’omission de l’accusé de prévoir le risque et de prendre les mesures pour l’évi- ter si possible constitue un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence que respecterait une personne raison- nable dans la même situation que l’accusé. [en italique dans l’original.] [15] le juge du procès a conclu que le comporte- ment dangereux de m. chung s’était limité exclu- sivement à la distance équivalente à un segment de rue où il a accéléré pour atteindre presque trois fois la limite permise, doublant au moins une voiture par la droite, a presque frappé la toyota qui effectuait un virage à droite devant lui, puis est entré en collision avec le véhicule de la victime. le juge a estimé que m. chung n’avait pas été inattentif pendant qu’il conduisait. il a ensuite examiné à fond une série de décisions qui, à son avis, appuyaient le principe selon lequel un excès de vitesse à lui seul est rare- ment suffi sant pour établir la mens rea de la conduite dangereuse. il a établi une distinction entre le présent cas et ces affaires, concluant que, dans celles-ci, l’excès de vitesse était plus que momentané ou il y avait un comportement dangereux additionnel qui était absent en l’espèce. il a souligné que l’excès de vitesse de m. chung avait été momentané, faisant observer que, bien qu’un comportement momentané puisse représenter un écart marqué, il s’agira plus habituellement d’un simple écart lorsque la façon de conduire est bonne par ailleurs (par. 117, citant r c. willock (2006), 212 oac 82, le juge d’appel doherty). il avait donc un doute raisonnable pour ce qui est de savoir si le comportement de m. chung représentait un écart marqué, parce que [traduc- tion] « le caractère momentané du comportement de l’accusé en faisant de l’excès de vitesse ne suffi [sait] pas à satisfaire à l’élément de la faute criminelle » (par 119-120). [16] it would not be an error of law if the trial judge simply applied the test in roy, considered all the cir- cumstances, and came to an unreasonable conclusion regarding whether the accused’s conduct displayed a [16] il n’y a pas erreur de droit si le juge de pre- mière instance a simplement appliqué le critère énoncé dans roy, pris en compte toutes les circons- tances et tiré une conclusion déraisonnable quant à 414 r v chung martin j. [2020] 1 scr. marked departure from the norm. however, it would be an error of law if the trial judge failed to compare the accused’s actions to what a reasonable person would have foreseen and done in all of the circum- stances. this type of error is not a factual matter of weighing evidence, but rather it goes to the legal defi - nition of the mens rea analysis for dangerous driving. [17] although the trial judge correctly cited pas- sages from cases which express the applicable legal standards, i fi nd two inter- related errors of law. first, i agree with the court of appeal that the trial judge erred by applying a wrong legal principle. second, and most importantly, i fi nd that the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal test in roy by not assessing what a reasonable person would have foreseen and done in mr. chung’s circumstances. [18] applying a wrong legal principle and failing to apply the correct legal test are two sides of the same coin. both characterizations go to the same essential error of law in this case, which was a failure of the trial judge to properly consider the conduct of the reasonable person in all of the circumstances in determining whether there was a marked departure. [19] first, i agree with the court of appeal that the trial judge’s fi xation on the momentariness of the speeding demonstrates an error of law. clearly, momentary excessive speeding on its own can es- tablish the mens rea for dangerous driving where, having regard to all the circumstances, it supports an inference that the driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reason- able person in the same circumstances would have exhibited (roy, at para 41). la question de savoir si le comportement de l’accusé représentait un écart marqué par rapport à la norme. toutefois, il y a erreur de droit s’il n’a pas comparé les gestes de l’accusé à ce qu’une personne raison- nable aurait prévu et fait eu égard à toutes les cir- constances. ce type d’erreur n’est pas une question factuelle d’appréciation de la preuve, mais touche plutôt à la défi nition juridique de l’analyse relative à la mens rea de la conduite dangereuse. [17] bien que le juge de première instance ait cor- rectement cité les passages de décisions qui énoncent les normes juridiques applicables, je conclus qu’il a commis deux erreurs de droit étroitement liées. en premier lieu, je suis d’accord avec la cour d’appel pour dire que le juge a commis une erreur en appli- quant un principe juridique erroné. en deuxième lieu, élément le plus important, j’estime que celui-ci n’a pas appliqué le bon critère juridique énoncé dans roy en n’évaluant pas ce qu’une personne rai son- nable aurait prévu et fait dans la même situation que m chung. [18] appliquer un principe juridique erroné et ne pas appliquer le bon critère juridique sont deux fa- cettes d’un même problème. les deux qualifi cations se rapportent à la même erreur de droit essentielle en l’espèce, à savoir l’omission du juge du procès d’avoir examiné convenablement le comportement de la personne raisonnable eu égard à toutes les cir- constances pour trancher la question de savoir s’il y a eu un écart marqué. [19] premièrement, je conviens avec la cour d’ap- pel que l’importance indue qu’a accordée le juge de première instance au caractère momentané de l’excès de vitesse révèle qu’une erreur de droit a été com- mise. un excès de vitesse momentané à lui seul peut clairement établir la mens rea de la conduite dange- reuse lorsque, eu égard à toutes les circonstances, il permet de conclure que la façon de conduire résultait d’un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence qu’aurait respectée une personne raisonnable dans la même situation (roy, par 41). [20] although the trial judge recognized that mo- mentary conduct could be a marked departure, the trial judge stated that his analysis turned “[c]ritically” [20] bien qu’il ait reconnu qu’un comportement momentané puisse constituer un écart marqué, le juge du procès a affi rmé que son analyse reposait [2020] 1 rcs. r c chung la juge martin 415 on the fact that mr. chung’s speed was categorically momentary (para.  117). that the trial judge was relying on a legal principle, rather than making a determination of fact, is supported by his citation to willock and the fact that he distinguished other cases where excessive speeding and acceleration oc- curred over a longer period of time or in conjunction with additional dangerous conduct (paras. 103-7 and 118). read as a whole, his reasons indicate that he believed that, when excessive speed was momentary, it was unable on its own to establish the mens rea for dangerous driving. [21] the trial judge erred in focussing on the mo- mentary nature of mr. chung’s conduct, rather than analyzing whether the reasonable person would fore- see the dangers to the public from the momentary conduct. a brief period of rapidly changing lanes and accelerating towards an intersection is not com- parable to momentary mistakes that may be made by any reasonable driver, like the mistimed turn on to a highway in roy, the momentary loss of awareness in r v. beatty, 2008 scc 5, [2008] 1 scr 49, or the sudden loss of control in willock. [22] although this court in roy and beatty de- termined that momentary lapses in attention and judgment would usually not raise criminal liabil- ity, this was because momentary lapses often result from the “automatic and refl exive nature of driving” (beatty, at para. 34) or “[s]imple carelessness, to which even the most prudent drivers may occasion- ally succumb” (roy, at para 37). these are examples of conduct that, when assessed in totality against the reasonable person standard, only represent a mere departure from the norm. momentary conduct is not assessed differently from other dangerous conduct. conduct that occurs over a brief period of time that creates foreseeable and immediate risks of serious consequences can still be a marked departure from the norm (beatty, at para 48). a reasonable person would have foreseen that rapidly accelerating to- wards a major intersection at a high speed creates a de façon [traduction] « crucial[e] » sur le fait que la vitesse de m. chung était indiscutablement momentanée (par 117). le fait que le juge se fon- dait sur un principe juridique, plutôt que de tirer une conclusion de fait, est étayé par son renvoi à l’arrêt willock et par le fait qu’il a établi une distinction avec d’autres affaires où la vitesse et l’accélération excessives s’étaient produites sur de plus longues périodes ou en combinaison avec un comportement dangereux additionnel (par. 103-107 et 118). lus dans leur ensemble, ses motifs indiquent que, selon lui, lorsqu’elle était momentanée, la vitesse exces- sive ne pouvait à elle seule établir la mens rea de la conduite dangereuse. [21] le juge de première instance a commis une erreur en se concentrant sur le caractère momentané du comportement de m. chung, plutôt que de se demander si la personne raisonnable aurait prévu les dangers que le comportement momentané présentait pour le public. une brève période de changements rapides de voie et d’accélération vers une intersec- tion n’est pas comparable aux erreurs momentanées que peut commettre tout conducteur raisonnable, par exemple le virage au mauvais moment sur une auto- route dans roy, la perte de conscience momentanée dans r c. beatty, 2008 csc 5, [2008] 1 rcs 49, ou la perte de contrôle soudaine dans willock. [22] bien que notre cour dans les arrêts roy et beatty ait statué que les inattentions et erreurs de jugement momentanées n’engagent pas habituel- lement la responsabilité criminelle, c’est parce ces manquements momentanés résultent souvent de la « nature automatique et réactive de la conduite d’un véhicule automobile » (beatty, par. 34) ou de « [l]a simple imprudence que même les conducteurs les plus prudents peuvent à l’occasion commettre » (roy, par 37). il s’agit là d’exemples de compor- tements qui, lorsqu’ils sont appréciés en totalité au regard de la norme de la personne raisonnable, ne représentent qu’un simple écart par rapport à la norme. un comportement momentané ne s’appré- cie pas différemment d’autres comportements dan- gereux. un comportement qui se produit sur une brève période et qui crée des risques prévisibles et immédiats de conséquences graves peut néanmoins 416 r v chung martin j. [2020] 1 scr. very real risk of a collision occurring within seconds. this is what actually occurred in mr. chung’s case. risky conduct at excessive speeds foreseeably can result in immediate consequences. therefore, the fact that foreseeable consequences occur within a short period of time after someone engages in highly dangerous behaviour cannot preclude a fi nding of mens rea for dangerous driving. [23] second, i fi nd that the trial judge did not ap- ply the correct legal test in roy. in his reasons, he failed to determine whether a reasonable person in mr. chung’s circumstances would have foreseen the risk from accelerating rapidly and speeding into that major intersection and taken actions to avoid it. this is not merely a matter of the trial judge failing to write out his thought process, but rather a matter of the trial judge not turning to the core question at issue: “whether the dangerous manner of driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the same circumstances” (roy, at para. 36 (empha- sis added)). the trial judge’s reasons, interpreted as a whole, reveal that he failed to undertake this analysis. constituer un écart marqué par rapport à la norme (beatty, par 48). une personne raisonnable aurait prévu que l’accélération rapide en direction d’une intersection importante à une vitesse élevée crée un risque bien réel de collision dans les secondes qui suivent. c’est ce qui s’est effectivement produit dans le cas de m chung. un comportement risqué à une vitesse excessive peut, de manière prévisible, entraîner des conséquences immédiates. en consé- quence, le fait que les conséquences prévisibles se produisent peu de temps après qu’une personne se soit livrée à un comportement hautement dangereux ne saurait empêcher une conclusion de mens rea de conduite dangereuse. [23] deuxièmement, je conclus que le juge de pre- mière instance n’a pas appliqué le bon critère juri- dique énoncé dans roy. dans ses motifs, le juge n’a pas déterminé si une personne raisonnable dans la même situation que m. chung aurait prévu le risque qu’il y avait à accélérer rapidement et à s’engager à toute vitesse dans cette intersection importante et aurait pris les mesures pour l’éviter. il ne s’agit pas simplement d’une omission du juge de consigner son processus de réfl exion par écrit, mais plutôt du fait qu’il ne s’est pas penché sur la question fonda- mentale en cause, à savoir « si la façon dangereuse de conduire résultait d’un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence que respecterait une personne raisonnable dans la même situation » (roy, par. 36 (je souligne)). il ressort des motifs du juge, inter- prétés dans leur ensemble, qu’il n’a pas procédé à cette analyse. [24] although trial judges are not required to set out their analysis in any particular way, the two ques- tions in roy, at para. 36, are helpful and emphasize the need to compare the accused’s conduct to the con- duct of a reasonable person in their circumstances, and by reference to all relevant evidence. this is es- sential for determining objective mens rea. at some point in the mens rea analysis, the trial judge must work with the facts as found and consider whether, in the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken the same actions as the accused. only when there has [24] bien que les juges de première instance n’aient pas l’obligation d’exposer leur analyse d’une façon en particulier, les deux questions posées dans roy, au par. 36, sont utiles et mettent en évidence la nécessité de comparer le comportement de la personne accu- sée au comportement d’une personne raisonnable dans la même situation qu’elle, eu égard à tous les éléments de preuve pertinents. cela est essentiel pour déterminer la mens rea objective. à un moment donné dans l’analyse relative à la mens rea, les juges doivent travailler avec les faits tels que constatés et se demander si, eu égard à toutes les circonstances, [2020] 1 rcs. r c chung la juge martin 417 been an active engagement with the full picture of what occurred can the trial judge determine whether the accused’s conduct was a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable and prudent driver. instead of focussing on what a reasonable [25] person would have foreseen and done in the circum- stances, the trial judge engaged in reasoning focussed on the type (speeding) and duration (momentariness) of mr. chung’s conduct, to the exclusion of the full picture his analysis focussed on distinguishing cases where excessive speeding had been found to be a marked departure from the circumstances of this case, rather than examining the risks created by mr. chung’s speeding. in other words, he focussed on what mr. chung did not do in comparison to these other cases, rather than asking the correct legal ques- tion and assessing what risks a reasonable person would foresee arising from mr. chung’s momentary speeding in the circumstances. [26] had the trial judge turned to consider the circumstances of this case fully and specifi cally, he would have addressed the fact that mr. chung’s conduct did not only include momentary excessive speeding, but also narrowly missing another vehicle turning right in front of him, passing in the curb lane, and accelerating towards a major intersection while aware of at least two vehicles in the intersection. the trial judge found that mr. chung was not inattentive while driving, but did not consider how mr. chung’s awareness of his surroundings contributed to his con- duct being a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable person. a full analysis in this case would have considered the duration of the speeding, as well as the accused’s control of the car (he switched lanes and then accelerated), the magnitude of speeding (almost three times the speed limit), the location of speeding (approaching a major intersection), and the accused’s awareness of at least two vehicles at the intersection as he approached it. the trial judge then une personne raisonnable aurait prévu le risque et agi de la même façon que la personne accusée. ce n’est qu’une fois avoir activement pris en compte le tableau complet de ce qui s’est produit que les juges peuvent trancher la question de savoir si le comportement de la personne accusée représentait un écart marqué par rapport au comportement d’un conducteur raisonnable et prudent. [25] plutôt que de se concentrer sur ce qu’une personne raisonnable aurait prévu et fait dans les circonstances, le juge du procès s’est livré à un rai- sonnement axé sur le type (l’excès de vitesse) et la durée (le caractère momentané) du comportement de m. chung, à l’exclusion du tableau global. son analyse a porté principalement sur l’établissement de distinctions entre des affaires où il a été jugé que l’excès de vitesse représentait un écart mar- qué et les circonstances en l’espèce, plutôt que sur l’examen des risques créés par l’excès de vitesse de m chung. autrement dit, le juge s’est concentré sur ce que m. chung n’avait pas fait par rapport à ce qui avait été fait dans ces autres affaires, au lieu de se poser la bonne question juridique et d’apprécier les risques qu’une personne raisonnable aurait prévus en conséquence de l’excès de vitesse momentané de m. chung dans les circonstances. [26] si le juge de première instance avait examiné pleinement et en particulier les circonstances de la présente affaire, il aurait pris en compte le fait que m. chung avait non seulement commis un excès de vitesse momentané, mais avait en outre évité de justesse un autre véhicule qui tournait à droite devant lui, doublé dans la voie en bordure du trottoir et accéléré en direction d’une intersection importante alors qu’il avait conscience de la présence d’au moins deux véhicules dans l’intersection. le juge a conclu que m. chung n’était pas inattentif pendant qu’il conduisait, mais il n’a pas pris en considé- ration comment la conscience qu’avait celui-ci de son environnement contribuait à faire en sorte que son comportement constituait un écart marqué par rapport au comportement d’une personne raison- nable. une analyse complète en l’espèce aurait porté sur la durée de l’excès de vitesse, ainsi que sur la maîtrise qu’avait l’accusé de la voiture (il a changé de voie, puis accéléré), sur l’ampleur de l’excès de 418 r v chung martin j. [2020] 1 scr. had to consider whether, on these facts as found, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of endangering the public by engaging in this conduct and taken steps to avoid it, presumably by not driv- ing so fast. [27] the duration and nature of the accused’s con- duct are only some of the factors to be considered with all of the circumstances in the mens rea analy- sis. they are not factors that can be taken out of context. it is conceivable that in some contexts, even grossly excessive speed may not establish a marked departure from the standard of care, while in other circumstances speed may not need to be grossly ex- cessive in order to still be a marked departure. courts must be careful to avoid fettering the analysis in roy by adopting hard- and- fast rules regarding when iso- lated factors will or will not be marked departures. although case law may be helpful in providing ex- amples of what has previously been determined to be a marked departure, courts must still analyze the accused’s actions relative to the reasonable person in the specifi c circumstances at issue. vitesse (presque trois fois la limite de vitesse), sur l’endroit de l’excès de vitesse (à l’approche d’une intersection importante) et sur le fait que l’accusé avait conscience de la présence d’au moins deux véhicules à l’intersection en s’approchant de celle-ci. le juge devait ensuite se demander si, eu égard à ces faits tels que constatés, une personne raisonnable aurait prévu le risque de mettre en danger le public en se livrant à ce comportement et pris les mesures pour l’éviter, vraisemblablement en ne conduisant pas aussi vite. [27] la durée et la nature du comportement de l’accusé ne sont que quelques- uns des facteurs à examiner avec l’ensemble des circonstances dans l’analyse relative à la mens rea. ce ne sont pas des facteurs qui peuvent être pris hors contexte. il est concevable que, dans certains contextes, même une vitesse nettement excessive ne puisse établir un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence, alors que dans d’autres circonstances, la vitesse n’a peut- être pas besoin d’être nettement excessive pour repré- senter quand même un écart marqué. les tribunaux doivent prendre soin de ne pas restreindre l’analyse énoncée dans roy en adoptant des règles absolues sur la question de savoir quand des facteurs isolés représenteront ou non des écarts marqués. bien que la jurisprudence puisse être utile en fournissant des exemples de ce qui a déjà été jugé être un écart mar- qué, les tribunaux doivent quand même analyser les gestes de la personne accusée par rapport à ceux de la personne raisonnable dans les circonstances particulières en cause. v conclusion v conclusion [28] a reasonable person understands that driv- ing is an inherently risky activity. it is made all the more risky the faster we drive, the harder we acceler- ate, and the more aggressively we navigate traffi c. although even careful driving can result in tragic consequences, some conduct is so dangerous that it deserves criminal sanctions. [28] une personne raisonnable comprend que le fait de conduire constitue une activité qui comporte des risques inhérents. cette activité devient d’autant plus risquée plus nous conduisons vite, plus nous accélérons brusquement et plus nous manœuvrons dans la circulation de manière agressive. bien que même une façon de conduire prudente puisse entraî- ner des conséquences tragiques, certains comporte- ments sont si dangereux qu’ils méritent des sanctions pénales. [2020] 1 rcs. r c chung la juge karakatsanis 419 [29] on the facts as found by the trial judge, over a one block span, mr. chung moved into the curb lane, passed at least one car on the right, and accelerated to 140 km/h in a 50 km/h zone while approaching a major urban intersection and being aware of at least two other cars in the intersection. there is no evidence that the accused lost control of his vehicle. concerning the required mental element, it is not necessary to fi nd that mr. chung was subjectively aware of the risk of his conduct and intentionally created this risk. the test for mens rea is based on the reasonable person. a reasonable person would have foreseen the immediate risk of reaching a speed of almost three times the speed limit while accelerat- ing towards a major city intersection. mr. chung’s conduct in these circumstances is a marked departure from the norm. [30] the trial judge made all the fi ndings of fact necessary to determine that there was a marked de- parture from the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent driver, and therefore to support a verdict of guilty under s. 686(4)(b)(ii) of the code (r v. cassidy, [1989] 2 scr 345, at p 355). in other words, but for the error of law, the accused would have been convicted (r v. lutoslawski, 2010 scc 49, [2010] 3 scr 60). i would therefore dismiss the appeal. [29] vu les faits constatés par le juge de première instance, sur une distance équivalente à un segment de rue, m. chung s’est inséré dans la voie en bor- dure du trottoir, a doublé au moins une voiture par la droite et a accéléré pour atteindre une vitesse de 140 km/h dans une zone où la limite est de 50 km/h à l’approche d’une intersection urbaine importante, tout en ayant conscience de la présence d’au moins deux autres voitures dans l’intersection. rien dans la preuve n’établit que l’accusé a perdu la maîtrise de son véhicule. pour ce qui est de l’élément mo- ral requis, il n’est pas nécessaire de conclure que m. chung était subjectivement conscient du risque que posait son comportement et qu’il a intention- nellement créé ce risque. le critère de la mens rea s’appuie sur la personne raisonnable. une telle per- sonne aurait prévu le risque immédiat qu’il y avait à atteindre une vitesse de presque trois fois supérieure à la limite autorisée tout en accélérant en direction d’une intersection urbaine importante. le comporte- ment de m. chung dans ces circonstances constitue un écart marqué par rapport à la norme. [30] le juge de première instance a tiré toutes les conclusions de fait nécessaires pour conclure qu’il y a eu un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence qu’aurait respectée un conducteur raison- nable et prudent, et donc pour justifi er un verdict de culpabilité en application du sous-al. 686(4)b)(ii) du code (r c. cassidy, [1989] 2 rcs 345, p 355). autrement dit, n’eût été l’erreur de droit, l’accusé aurait été déclaré coupable (r c. lutoslawski, 2010 csc 49, [2010] 3 rcs 60). je suis donc d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [31] karakatsanis j (dissenting) — crown rights of appeal from acquittals are limited to questions of law alone: criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, s 676(1)(a). in particular, this court has emphasized that there is no ground of “unreasonable acquittal” open to the crown on appeal: see r v. jmh, 2011 scc 45, [2011] 3 scr 197, at paras 32-33. not only is no such crown right of appeal provided for in the code, but “as a matter of law, the concept of ‘unreasonable acquittal’ is incompatible with the presumption of innocence and the burden which [31] la juge karakatsanis (dissidente) — le droit de la couronne d’interjeter appel d’un acquit- tement se limite aux questions de droit seulement : code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, al 676(1)a). plus particulièrement, notre cour a souligné que la couronne ne peut pas se pourvoir en appel pour cause d’« acquittement déraisonnable » : voir r c. jmh, 2011 csc 45, [2011] 3 rcs 197, par. 32- 33. non seulement le code n’accorde pas pareil droit d’appel à la couronne, mais « la notion d’“acquitte- ment déraisonnable” est incompatible, en droit, avec 420 r v chung karakatsanis j. [2020] 1 scr. rests on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt”: jmh, at para. 27, citing r. v. biniaris, 2000 scc 15, [2000] 1 scr 381, at para 33. the fact that an acquittal may be on its face unreasonable, or even “manifestly” unreasonable, does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that a legal error was committed in coming to the decision to acquit. appellate intervention in an acquittal is only available when the crown establishes that the trial judge’s reasonable doubt is tainted by an identifi able legal error: jmh, at para 39. appellate jurisdiction does not extend to questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law. parliament’s clear policy choice to tightly circumscribe the scope of crown appeals from acquittal must be respected. la présomption d’innocence et l’obligation qu’a la poursuite de présenter une preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable » : jmh, par. 27, citant r c. biniaris, 2000 csc 15, [2000] 1 rcs 381, par 33. le fait qu’un acquittement puisse être déraisonnable ou même « manifestement » déraisonnable à première vue ne mène pas inexorablement à la conclusion qu’une erreur de droit a été commise dans l’analyse qui a mené à la décision d’acquitter. la juridiction d’appel ne peut intervenir dans un acquittement que si la couronne établit que le doute raisonnable du juge du procès est entaché d’une erreur de droit dis- cernable : jmh, par 39. la compétence en matière d’appel ne s’étend pas aux questions de fait et aux questions mixtes de fait et de droit. il faut respec- ter la décision de politique claire du parlement de bien circonscrire la portée des appels formés par la couronne contre les acquittements. [32] in this case, i conclude that the trial judge’s decision to acquit the appellant is not tainted by an identifi able legal error. the appellant’s acquittal should therefore be restored. [32] en l’espèce, je conclus que la décision du juge du procès d’acquitter l’appelant n’est pas entachée d’une erreur de droit discernable. il y a donc lieu de rétablir l’acquittement de l’appelant. [33] busy trial judges cannot be expected to write perfect reasons. appellate courts approach a trial judge’s reasons by reading them as a whole rather than fi nely parsing them, presuming that the trial judge knows the basic principles of criminal law: see for example r v. rem, 2008 scc 51, [2008] 3 scr 3, at paras. 16, 35, 45 and 54. on a crown appeal from an acquittal, this court has further em- phasized that the adequacy of a trial judge’s reasons is informed by the limited nature of the crown’s ap- peal rights: jmh, at para. 32, citing r v. walker, 2008 scc 34, [2008] 2 scr 245, at paras. 2 and 22. this context calls for restraint: r v. george, 2017 scc 38, [2017] 1 scr 1021, at para 17. [34] the court of appeal found that the trial judge applied a wrong legal standard to the facts, in that he “conceived that a principle exists that a brief period of speeding (no matter how excessive the speed) can- not satisfy the mens rea requirement”: 2019 bcca 206, 55 cr (7th) 459, at para 42. [33] on ne peut s’attendre à ce que des juges de première instance occupés rédigent des motifs par- faits. les juridictions d’appel abordent les motifs du juge du procès en les considérant globalement plutôt qu’en les décortiquant avec fi nesse, en présumant que le juge connaît les principes fondamentaux du droit criminel : voir par exemple r c. rem, 2008 csc 51, [2008] 3 rcs 3, par. 16, 35, 45 et 54. dans le cas d’un appel formé par la couronne contre un acquittement, notre cour a souligné en outre que le caractère suffi sant des motifs du juge du procès repose sur la nature limitée des droits d’appel de la couronne : jmh, par. 32, citant r c. walker, 2008 csc 34, [2008] 2 rcs 245, par. 2 et 22. la retenue est de mise dans ce contexte : r c. george, 2017 csc 38, [2017] 1 rcs 1021, par 17. [34] la cour d’appel a conclu que le juge du pro- cès avait appliqué une mauvaise norme juridique aux faits, en ce qu’il [traduction] « a considéré qu’il existe un principe selon lequel un bref excès de vitesse (sans égard à l’ampleur de l’excès de vitesse) ne peut satisfaire à l’exigence de la mens rea » : 2019 bcca 206, 55 cr (7th) 459, par 42. [2020] 1 rcs. r c chung la juge karakatsanis 421 [35] reading the reasons as a whole, i am not satisfi ed that the trial judge relied on the erroneous principle that, as a matter of law, a brief period of excessive speed alone is insuffi cient to establish the mens rea for dangerous driving. of course, there is no such legal principle. momentary excessive speed can establish the mens rea for dangerous driving where, having regard to all the circumstances, the manner of driving supports an inference that the driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have exhibited: r v. roy, 2012 scc 26, [2012] 2 scr 60, at para 41. [35] lisant les motifs dans leur ensemble, je ne suis pas convaincue que le juge du procès s’est appuyé sur le principe erroné selon lequel, en droit, un bref excès de vitesse à lui seul ne suffi t pas pour établir la mens rea de la conduite dangereuse. bien entendu, il n’existe aucun principe juridique de ce genre. un excès de vitesse momentané peut établir la mens rea de la conduite dangereuse lorsque, eu égard à toutes les circonstances, la façon de conduire permet de conclure que celle-ci résultait d’un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence qu’aurait respectée une personne raisonnable dans la même situation : r c. roy, 2012 csc 26, [2012] 2 rcs 60, par 41. [36] the trial judge correctly stated the relevant legal principles applicable to dangerous driving, at paras. 60-66, and restated the mens rea test in the course of his mens rea analysis and conclusion, at paras. 112 and 119. the trial judge’s treatment of case law does not provide a basis to infer that he failed to apply the proper principles or constrained his assessment of all of the circumstances by relying on an erroneous legal principle. the trial judge un- dertook a context- based assessment of the case law that was presented to him involving excessive speed and made observations about tendencies in that case law. he noted facts that in his view distinguished those cases from the present case. in other words, the trial judge engaged in a completely ordinary method of reasoning. [37] read fairly and as a whole, the reasons dis- close that the trial judge was aware that both ex- cessive speed and momentary conduct could meet the marked departure standard, depending on the circumstances. for instance, he explicitly referred to the statement of doherty ja in r v. willock (2006), 212 oac 82, at para. 31, that “[t]here can be no doubt that conduct occurring in a two to three second interval can amount to a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable person”: para 117. [36] le juge de première instance a, aux par. 60- 66, correctement énoncé les principes juridiques pertinents applicables à la conduite dangereuse et il a, aux par. 112 et 119, énoncé de nouveau le critère de la mens rea dans son analyse et sa conclusion sur la mens rea. la manière dont le juge a traité de la jurisprudence ne permet pas de conclure qu’il n’a pas appliqué les bons principes ou qu’il a restreint son appréciation de toutes les circonstances en se fondant sur un principe juridique erroné. le juge s’est livré à un examen contextuel de la jurisprudence relative à l’excès de vitesse qui lui a été présentée et a fait des observations sur les tendances de cette jurisprudence. il a relevé des faits qui, à son avis, permettaient d’éta- blir une distinction entre ces affaires et la présente espèce. autrement dit, le juge a tenu un raisonnement tout à fait ordinaire. [37] lus de manière juste et dans leur en semble, les motifs révèlent que le juge du procès était conscient qu’un excès de vitesse et un comportement momentané pouvaient satisfaire à la norme de l’écart marqué, selon les circonstances. par exemple, il a mentionné explicitement l’affi rmation du juge d’ap- pel doherty dans r c. willock (2006), 212 oac. 82, par. 31, selon laquelle [traduction] « [i]l ne fait aucun doute qu’un comportement durant deux ou trois secondes peut constituer un écart marqué par rapport à la norme que respecterait une personne raisonnable » : par 117. [38] that the trial judge considered it “critical” that the appellant’s excessive speed was momentary does not mean that he understood that the appellant’s [38] ce n’est pas parce que le juge de première instance a estimé « crucial » le caractère momentané de l’excès de vitesse de l’appelant qu’il a compris 422 r v chung karakatsanis j. [2020] 1 scr. conduct could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the mens rea requirement. it suggests that he considered the momentariness of the appellant’s excessive speed to be an important factor in the circumstances. the trial judge was not required to touch on every cir- cumstantial factor in the course of his analysis, but on those he considered important, so as to explain why he reached his conclusion: rem, at para 17. questions about whether the trial judge should have placed less weight on the short duration of speeding, and more weight on the degree to which speeding exceeded the limit, where the speeding occurred, or on other factors relating to the appellant’s control of the car and awareness, are not questions of law alone: jmh, at para 28. que le comportement de celui-ci ne pouvait pas, en droit, satisfaire à l’exigence de la mens rea. cela tend à indiquer qu’il a considéré que le caractère momen- tané de l’excès de vitesse de l’appelant constituait un facteur important dans les circonstances. dans son analyse, le juge était tenu, non pas d’aborder chaque facteur circonstanciel, mais bien ceux qu’il a estimé importants, afi n de motiver sa conclusion : rem, par 17. les questions de savoir s’il aurait dû accorder moins de poids à la courte durée de l’excès de vitesse, et plus de poids au degré de celui-ci, à l’endroit où il a eu lieu ou à d’autres facteurs ayant trait à la maîtrise par l’appelant de la voiture et à sa conscience, ne constituent pas des questions de droit seulement : jmh, par 28. [39] there is also no basis for inferring that the trial judge did not compare the appellant’s conduct to what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances in coming to the conclusion that there was “at least a reasonable doubt that [the ap- pellant’s] conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver”: para. 119 (emphasis added). he understood that what represents a marked departure in the circumstances is a matter of degree, and that the mens rea test is fundamentally comparative: paras. 60, 65 and 116. inferring that the trial judge failed to compare the appellant’s conduct to that of a reasonable person because he did not explicitly describe what a reason- able person would have done in the circumstances is tantamount to presuming that he misunderstood the applicable legal principles. [39] rien ne permet non plus de conclure que le juge du procès n’a pas comparé le comportement de l’appelant à ce qu’aurait fait une personne rai son- nable dans les circonstances pour arriver à la conclu- sion qu’il existait [traduction] « à tout le moins un doute raisonnable quant au fait que le comportement de [l’appelant] représentait un écart marqué par rap- port à la norme qu’aurait respectée un conducteur raisonnablement prudent » : par. 119 (je souligne). il a compris que ce qui constitue un écart marqué dans les circonstances est une question de degré, et que le critère de la mens rea est fondamentalement de nature comparative : par. 60, 65 et 116. conclure que le juge de première instance n’a pas comparé le comportement de l’appelant à celui d’une personne raisonnable parce qu’il n’a pas décrit explicitement ce qu’une personne raisonnable aurait fait dans les circonstances équivaut à présumer qu’il a mal com- pris les principes juridiques applicables. [40] the two questions this court identifi ed in roy, at para. 36, were set out to assist trial judges in determining whether the mens rea test is met in the circumstances. they do not change the nature of the mens rea test. [40] les deux questions que notre cour a déga- gées au par. 36 de l’arrêt roy visent à aider les juges de première instance à décider si le critère de la mens rea est respecté dans les circonstances. elles ne modifi ent pas la nature de ce critère. [41] the core issue in this case was the second question in roy, whether the accused’s failure to fore- see the risk and take steps to avoid it was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances. the fi rst question in roy, whether a reasonable [41] le point fondamental en l’espèce était la deuxième question dans roy, à savoir si l’omission de l’accusé de prévoir le risque et de prendre les mesures pour l’éviter constituait un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence qu’aurait respectée une personne raisonnable dans la même situation que [2020] 1 rcs. r c chung la juge karakatsanis 423 person in the accused’s circumstances would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it, was not the “substance of what was in issue”: jmh, at para. 32, citing walker, at para 20. at trial, the ap- pellant appeared to concede that it could be answered affi rmatively: see para 57. the trial judge was not required to spend his time resolving issues that were effectively uncontested. in any event, the trial judge implicitly answered the fi rst question by fi nding that the appellant’s failure to foresee the risk was aptly described as “a departure or a mere departure from the normal manner of driving”: para. 116, citing r. v. adams, 2012 peca 15, 325 nfl d & peir 93, at para 65. [42] the trial judge was ultimately left with a rea- sonable doubt as to whether the manner of driving met the mens rea standard, that is, whether it sup- ported an inference that the driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care. as stated above, whether his decision to acquit on that basis was “reasonable” under the circumstances is not at issue in a crown appeal such as this one: jmh, at para. 25; biniaris, at para 33. because i do not fi nd that the trial judge’s decision to acquit is tainted by legal error, i would allow the appeal and restore the acquittal. l’accusé. la première question dans roy, à savoir si une personne raisonnable dans la même situation que l’accusé aurait prévu le risque et pris les me- sures pour l’éviter, ne représentait pas les « éléments essentiels du litige » : jmh, par. 32, citant walker, par 20. l’appelant semble avoir concédé au pro- cès que cette question pouvait recevoir une réponse affi rmative : voir par 57. le juge du procès n’était pas obligé de consacrer son temps au règlement de questions qui n’étaient en fait pas contestées. quoi qu’il en soit, il a répondu implicitement à la première question en concluant que l’omission de l’appelant de prévoir le risque était décrite avec justesse comme [traduction] « un écart ou un simple écart par rapport à la façon normale de conduire » : par. 116, citant r c. adams, 2012 peca 15, 325 nfl d & peir 93, par 65. [42] il subsistait en fi n de compte dans l’esprit du juge du procès un doute raisonnable quant à savoir si la façon de conduire satisfaisait au critère de la mens rea, c’est-à-dire si elle permettait de conclure qu’elle résultait d’un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence. comme nous l’avons vu, la question de sa- voir si sa décision de prononcer un acquittement pour ce motif était « raisonnable » dans les circonstances ne se pose pas dans un appel de la couronne tel que celui en l’espèce : jmh, par. 25; biniaris, par 33. comme cette décision n’est pas, à mon avis, entachée d’une erreur de droit, j’accueillerais le pourvoi et je rétablirais l’acquittement. appeal dismissed, karakatsanis j dissenting. pourvoi rejeté, la juge karakatsanis est dissi- dente. procureurs de l’appelant  : fowler and blok, vancouver. vancouver. procureur de l’intimée : procureur général de la british columbia, vancouver. colombie- britannique, vancouver.
[1] this is an appeal by a young person from a finding of guilt of sexual assault on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable it is also a challenge to the constitutionality of s 37(10) of the youth criminal justice act, sc 2002, c 1, which denies young persons rights of appeal available to all adults convicted of indictable offences, namely an automatic right to appeal to the supreme court of canada when there is a dissent in the court of appeal on a question of law or when the court of appeal enters a finding of guilt on a crown appeal from an acquittal at trial. these rights of appeal serve as a substantial safeguard against miscarriages of justice. under the ycja, they are not available to young persons in the criminal justice system. [2] the constitutional issue turns on whether this deprivation violates the rights of young people under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, and, if so, whether it can be justified. the argument was based both on ss. 15 and 7 of the charter, but in view of my conclusion under s 15, it is unnecessary to address the s 7 issue. the essence of the s 15 argument is that the deprivation perpetuates and reinforces young people’s disadvantage in criminal proceedings and there is therefore a breach of s 15(1) of the charter. [3] the crown’s position can be distilled into two main propositions:  the ycja is ameliorative legislation that provides young people other protections, making this particular safeguard against wrongful convictions for indictable offences unnecessary.  appeals prolong the process, and young people need a speedy resolution to criminal proceedings. under the ycja, timeliness is a key objective so that young persons found guilty can be quickly rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. [4] the answer to these propositions can be summarized as follows and leads me to conclude, respectfully, that the limitation in s 37(10) constitutes a prima facie breach of s 15 that cannot be justified under s 1:  the fact that the overall purpose of the legislation is ameliorative is of no relevance in determining whether a particular limitation represents a prima facie breach of s 15 it may factor contextually into the justificatory analysis in s 1, but what is at issue at the breach stage is the impact of the limitation on the claimant group, not the purpose of the legislation as a whole. the crucial fact remains that the ycja does not provide any analogous procedural substitute for a guaranteed right to appeal to this court.  the objective of timeliness is not a justification for denying access to a procedural protection that has historically served to guard against miscarriages of justice. there is no justification for a speedy resolution if the resolution is based on an unfair trial. [5] as to the appeal from the finding of guilt, i agree with the majority in the court of appeal that the verdict was reasonable and would dismiss the appeal. prior proceedings [6] when cp was 15, he went to a party at a beach to celebrate a friend’s birthday with a group of young people. the complainant, rd, was 14. they had both been drinking. sexual intercourse took place. [7] c.p was charged with sexually assaulting r.d he was tried before crosbie j sitting as a youth justice court judge under the ycja. [8] the crown’s position at trial was that c.p had sex with r.d when he knew she was too drunk to be capable of consenting cp’s defence was that rd. consented to having sex with him before there were any signs that she was too drunk to consent. he said he thought she was “fine” when they had intercourse. [9] crosbie j., in thorough and thoughtful reasons, addressed whether rd. was too intoxicated to consent and whether cp had an honest but mistaken belief in rd’s consent (2017 oncj 277). [10] rd did not testify. her videotaped statement to the police was admitted at trial. she did not remember the sexual activity. [11] one of rd’s friends, eg, gave a videotaped statement to the police that was admitted at trial. she said that she came to the party with a friend later than the rest of the group. the very first thing she saw was rd lying on the ground. she went to her right away. she found rd extremely intoxicated. she had been vomiting, could not get up, and was incapable of communicating. in her oral evidence, eg reiterated that she immediately went to rd when she arrived at the party. eg’s evidence on this point was not challenged. [12] the trial judge found that eg was a “credible and reliable witness” with “no animus towards cp” [13] cp’s evidence was that rd consented to sexual intercourse. he testified that he and rd arrived at the party with a group of friends. they sat on a mattress by a bonfire, where they talked and kissed. rd walked away from the bonfire by herself and sat by some rocks away from the group. cp talked to another friend for about five minutes, then returned to rd. cp testified that he and rd started kissing, and that at one point she said “fuck me”. he said he was surprised at first, but he believed her and thought she was able to give consent. he did not use protection. [14] c.p said that after ejaculating, he stood up and heard e.g and another young person arrive he said he went to talk to them for 10 or 15 minutes before returning to r.d on cross-examination, however, c.p admitted that e.g went “directly to [rd]” when she arrived. [15] the trial judge did not believe certain critical aspects of cp’s evidence, including that rd was “fine” during intercourse and that she asked him for sex. on these points, she found that cp was “evasive and rattled” and “trying to downplay the impact of his drunken state on his ability to remember what happened and on his actions that evening”. cp’s demeanour, based on his tone, manner and language, suggested to her that he was guessing about certain answers, and that at other times, he “desperately wanted it to be the case that something had happened, but in fact, it had not”. she was aware, however, that cp was remembering an event from a year ago. cp is also only 16 years old and i suspect, was nervous when testifying, especially under the skilled cross- examination of counsel. i am, by no means, criticizing his evidence in its entirety what i have set out above are the many reasons upon which i rejected his evidence on certain, key points. [para. 114] [16] crosbie j rejected cp’s evidence in chief that he spoke with eg for 10 to 15 minutes before eg attended to rd, but she accepted his evidence that he heard eg arrive at the party right after he finished having sex with rd, and his admission in cross-examination that eg went directly to rd when she arrived, which aligned with eg’s evidence. [17] there is no dispute that r.d was intoxicated to the point of incapacity when eg found her. the question, therefore, was how soon after the sexual activity took place did eg see rd. based on cp’s evidence that he heard eg arrive right after the intercourse and the evidence from eg and cp that eg went directly to rd when she arrived, the trial judge concluded that rd was in an incapacitated state at the time of intercourse: this evidence . . . leads me to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that rd was extremely intoxicated at the time cp admitted to being with her and admitted to having sex with her e.g found r.d having already vomited she was found unconscious and generally unresponsive — all within a very, very short period of time from when cp, on his own evidence, had just ejaculated inside her. [para. 95] [18] this led crosbie j to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that rd was incapable of consenting at the time of intercourse. [19] having found that rd was too intoxicated to consent at the time of sexual activity, crosbie j turned to whether c.p had an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent. she made three key findings. first, she expressly found that “[rd] did not ask cp to ‘fuck me’”. second, she concluded that there was “no room to doubt [cp’s] knowledge of how drunk” rd was when sexual intercourse took place: . . . within a very short period of time of the sexual activity, rd was falling asleep, had vomit on her, did not appear to be comprehending what eg [her friend] was saying and was unable to meaningfully respond. in his testimony, cp put himself with rd during this time period. there is simply no room to doubt his knowledge of how drunk rd really was at the relevant time. [para. 120] [20] finally, she found that, despite his knowledge of her intoxicated state, cp. failed to take steps to ascertain whether r.d was consenting, instead choosing to “forg[e] ahead, knowing there existed a danger or risk that [rd] was too drunk”. while he knew there was “a need for some inquiry”, he “did not wish to pursue the truth — he preferred to remain ignorant”. [21] as a result, the trial judge was satisfied, “beyond a reasonable doubt that cp knew or was reckless or wilfully blind to the fact that rd was so intoxicated that she could not have consented to sexual activity”. [22] she found cp guilty of sexual assault. [23] cp appealed to the court of appeal for ontario, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable. macpherson ja, writing for the majority, dismissed cp’s appeal (2019 onca 85, 373 ccc (3d) 244). he found that “the trial judge’s careful and comprehensive reasons led to an entirely reasonable verdict”. in his view, the trial judge did not commit any errors in her treatment of cp’s evidence or of the applicable law. her finding, based on the evidence, that eg went directly to rd when she arrived at the party and that c.p had heard her arrive as soon as he ejaculated and stood up, reasonably led to the conclusion both that rd was incapable of consenting and that c.p knew she was unable to consent the trial judge explained the bases for her negative assessment of cp’s credibility clearly, and why she expressly rejected key aspects of his evidence, such as his evidence that rd was “fine” during intercourse and that she had asked him for sex. [24] writing in dissent, nordheimer j.a would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal on the basis that “proof of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt was not an available verdict” on a “fair and balanced review of the evidence as a whole” in his view, the trial judge erred in relying on cp’s evidence that he heard eg arrive at the beach after he ejaculated, while rejecting all other aspects of his evidence. as cp’s evidence regarding the relative timing of his ejaculation and eg’s arrival was the “missing link” that tied the sexual activity to rd’s incapacitated state, it was incumbent on the trial judge to explain her rationale for relying on this single piece of evidence. he also found that there were significant problems with eg’s evidence about the time of her arrival. [25] cp filed a notice of appeal pursuant to s 691(1)(a) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, which provides an automatic appeal as of right to an accused who is convicted of an indictable offence and whose conviction is affirmed by the court of appeal with a dissent on a question of law. the crown filed a motion to quash, based on the fact that under s 37(10) of the ycja young persons have no automatic right of appeal. leave is therefore required even when there is a dissent on a question of law at the court of appeal (r v. c (tl), [1994] 2 scr 1012; r v. kjm, 2019 scc 55, at para. 35). [26] cp filed a notice of constitutional question and argued that s 37(10) of the ycja was contrary to ss. 7 and 15 of the charter. [27] this court adjourned the crown’s motion to quash without prejudice to cp’s right to seek leave to appeal, including on the question of the constitutionality of s 37(10) of the ycja. the court granted leave to appeal both the verdict and the constitutional issue. analysis on finding of guilt [28] when a verdict is reached by a judge sitting alone and explained in reasons for judgment, there are two bases on which a court of appeal may find the verdict unreasonable. first, a verdict is unreasonable if it is not one that a “properly instructed jury acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered” (r v. biniaris, [2000] 1 scr. 381, at para 36, quoting r v. yebes, [1987] 2 scr 168, at p 185) in biniaris, arbour j clarified that this standard, despite being expressed in terms of a verdict reached by a jury, also applies to the decisions of a judge sitting without a jury. she explained, however, that review for unreasonableness on appeal is “somewhat easier when the judgment under attack is that of a single judge”, since judges give reasons whereby the reviewing appellate court may be able to identify a flaw in the evaluation of the evidence, or in the analysis, that will serve to explain the unreasonable conclusion reached, and justify the reversal. [para. 37] [29] arbour j.’s comments in biniaris led to the adoption, in r v beaudry, [2007] 1 scr 190, and r v. sinclair, [2011] 3 scr 3, of a narrowly expanded, second avenue of review for unreasonableness. a verdict reached by a judge may be unreasonable, even if supported by the evidence, if it is reached “illogically or irrationally” (beaudry, at paras. 96-97, per fish j (dissenting in the result); sinclair, at paras. 4 and 15-17, per fish j (dissenting in the result), and at para. 44, per lebel j). this may occur if the trial judge draws an inference or makes a finding of fact essential to the verdict that is plainly contradicted by the evidence relied on by the judge in support of that inference or finding, or shown to be incompatible with evidence that has neither been contradicted by other evidence nor rejected by the trial judge (sinclair, at paras. 4, 16 and 19-21; r v. rp, [2012] 1 scr 746, at para. 9). [30] the beaudry and sinclair inquiry into illogical or irrational findings or inferences is not an invitation for reviewing judges to substitute their preferred findings of fact for those made by the trial judge (beaudry, at para. 98). as macpherson ja. noted in the court of appeal, the “fact that an appeal court judge would have had a doubt when the trial judge did not is insufficient to justify the conclusion that the trial judgment was unreasonable” (para 67, quoting r v ag, [2000] 1 scr 439, at para. 29). nor is it an invitation to unjustifiably interfere with a trial judge’s credibility assessments. a court of appeal reviewing credibility assessments in order to determine whether the verdict is reasonable cannot interfere with those assessments unless they cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence (rp, at para. 10; r v. burke, [1996] 1 scr 474, at para. 7). the inquiry into the logic or rationality of a judge’s essential findings under beaudry and sinclair is narrowly targeted at “fundamental flaws in the reasoning process” which means that the verdict was not reached judicially or in accordance with the rule of law (sinclair, at paras. 4, 26 and 77). [31] relying on beaudry and sinclair, cp argued that it was illogical for the trial judge to find that eg discovered rd in a state of incapacity very shortly after the intercourse. building on the reasons of nordheimer ja in dissent, cp submitted that the fundamental flaw in the trial judge’s reasoning was that she accepted his evidence that eg arrived right after the intercourse, but rejected his evidence on all other material points. relying on the traditional biniaris standard, cp also argued that the verdict was not one that a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably have rendered based on the available evidence, because the evidence could not establish the timing of the intercourse with any precision. [32] in my respectful view, the reasoning that led the trial judge to conclude that e.g discovered r.d in her incapacitated state right after the intercourse was both logical and rational. [33] c.p argued that the trial judge’s “selective reliance” on his evidence regarding eg’s arrival was illogical because her reason for rejecting other parts of his evidence was that he was too drunk to be relied upon. in particular, cp argued that the judge could not logically reject his evidence, based on his drunkenness, that he spoke with e.g for 10 or 15 minutes before she went to rd, while accepting his evidence, in the same sequence of events, that eg arrived right after the intercourse. [34] this argument misapprehends the trial judge’s reasons. she rejected cp’s evidence that he spoke with eg before she attended to rd because it was internally inconsistent with his own evidence on cross-examination, externally contradicted by the evidence of eg, and because cp was intoxicated, particularly in comparison to eg, whose memory was “not suspect” more broadly, cp’s intoxication and his dishonesty about his intoxication were among numerous factors relevant to the trial judge’s assessment of cp’s credibility. at no point did the judge find that cp was so drunk that his memory was categorically unreliable the effect of intoxication on a witness’s testimony is not all or nothing. [35] it is a well-established principle that a judge or jury may “believe some, none, or all of the testimony of any witness, including that of an accused” (r v. jhs, [2008] 2 scr 152, at para. 10). here, the trial judge rejected certain key points in cp’s evidence but believed his evidence that he heard e.g arrive right after intercourse. she provided sound reasons for what she believed and what she did not, explaining why she found that some of his evidence did not suffer from the same flaws that led her to reject other aspects of his testimony. [36] the verdict was also clearly one that “a properly instructed [judge or] jury acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered” (biniaris, at para. 36, quoting yebes, at p 185). there was evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that eg discovered rd in an incapacitated state shortly after the intercourse occurred. crosbie j was well aware that the time of intercourse could not be ascertained in absolute terms she understood that “there was a lack of clarity with respect to the timing of the sexual activity”. the crown witnesses were only able to “make a guess” about when the group arrived at the beach, and none of the crown witnesses could “pinpoint the time” the intercourse happened. but what mattered, as the court of appeal majority explained, was not the precise time, but the “relative time of [eg’s] arrival in relation to the sexual activity” (para. 56 (emphasis added)). [37] the combination of eg’s evidence and cp’s evidence satisfied the trial judge that eg went to rd as soon as she arrived, and that, on cp’s own evidence, her arrival at the party was right after intercourse had taken place. this entitled the trial judge logically to conclude that the totally incapacitated condition e.g found the victim in when she arrived was the condition she was in during the sexual activity. [38] for these reasons, i agree with the majority in the court of appeal that there is no basis for finding the verdict to be unreasonable. crosbie j.’s reasons for finding cp guilty of sexual assault are model trial reasons: rigorous and thoughtfully explained. [39] i would therefore dismiss the appeal. the constitutionality of section 37(10) of the ycja [40] there remains the issue of the constitutionality of s 37(10) of the ycja, which deprives young persons of the automatic rights of appeal to this court in s 691 of the criminal code. [41] on march 11, 2019, cp filed a notice of appeal pursuant to s 691(1)(a) of the criminal code, which grants an automatic right of appeal to persons convicted of an indictable offence when there is a dissent on a question of law in the court of appeal. [42] in response, the crown filed a motion to quash pursuant to s 44 of the supreme court act, rsc 1985, c. s-26, which says: 44 the court may quash proceedings in cases brought before it in which an appeal does not lie, or whenever such proceedings are taken against good faith. [43] it based its motion on the requirement, under s 37(10) of the ycja, that a young person obtain leave before they can appeal to this court in response to the crown’s motion to quash, c.p filed a notice of constitutional question pursuant to r 33(2) of the rules of the supreme court of canada, sor/2002-156. after receiving written submissions, the court adjourned the crown’s motion to quash “without prejudice to cp’s right to serve and file an application for leave to appeal” (bulletin of proceedings, november 15, 2019, at p 36). the court’s order stated that cp could “raise as a ground for leave to appeal any constitutional issue in respect of s 37(10) of the youth criminal justice act” (p 36). [44] cp filed an application for leave to appeal in which he raised two grounds: the reasonableness of his verdict and the constitutionality of s 37(10) of the ycja. [45] the crown filed a response to the leave application, submitting that this court did not have jurisdiction to hear the constitutional issue because there was no final order or judgment with respect to the constitutionality of s 37(10) for c.p to appeal from. secondly, while acknowledging that this court has discretion to consider new constitutional issues raised for the first time before it, the crown submitted that this discretion should only be exercised when there is a meaningful nexus between the constitutional issue and the judgment or order under appeal. [46] this court granted leave to appeal the attorney general of canada intervened on the constitutional question. [47] at the hearing, the crown again asserted its position that the court had no jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue, but it did not press the point since all parties were present and prepared to argue the constitutional question. [48] this court’s decision in guindon v. canada, [2015] 3 scr 3, governs. in guindon, the majority held that once an appeal is before the court, the decision about [w]hether to hear and decide a constitutional issue when it has not been properly raised in the courts below is a matter for the court’s discretion, taking into account all of the circumstances, including the state of the record, fairness to all parties, the importance of having the issue resolved by this court, its suitability for decision and the broader interests of the administration of justice. . . . the court’s discretion to hear and decide new issues should only be exercised exceptionally and never unless the challenger shows that doing so causes no prejudice to the parties. [paras. 20 and 23] [49] in this case, there is no prejudice to the parties. all attorneys general were given notice of the constitutional question and the attorney general of canada exercised its right to intervene. as in guindon, no party “suggested that any additional evidence is required, let alone requested permission to supplement the record” (para. 35). [50] but of particular relevance is the fact that it is clearly in the interests of the administration of justice for this court to exercise its discretion to hear and decide the issue, since it is one which could only come before this court for the first time on an appeal from a court of appeal. declining to hear cp’s constitutional argument would mean leaving an access-to-justice issue of fundamental importance to young persons in jurisdictional limbo. [51] the procedural history in this matter provides further support for the court’s jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue. it is beyond dispute that it would have been necessary for the court to determine the validity of s 37(10) in order to properly dispose of the crown’s motion to quash cp’s initial notice of appeal as of right. by adjourning that motion and permitting cp to raise the constitutional question in his application for leave to appeal, the court retained the jurisdiction to decide the question, which it had acquired as a result of the motion to quash, on the appeal proper. [52] turning then to the merits of the constitutional question, namely, whether s 37(10) of the ycja is a breach of ss. 15 or 7 of the charter. [53] section 691 of the criminal code sets out the appeal routes to this court for indictable offences. it gives an accused the benefit of automatic rights to appeal to this court in specific circumstances section 691(1)(a)1 gives a person whose conviction for an indictable offence is upheld at the court of appeal an automatic right to appeal to this court on any question of law on which a judge at the court of appeal dissents. additionally, s 691(2)2 gives a person whose acquittal is overturned at the court of appeal an automatic right to appeal to this court on any question of law on which a judge of the court of appeal dissents, or on any question of law if the court of appeal enters a verdict of guilty against that person. [54] section 37(1)3 of the ycja incorporates the appeal routes for indictable offences under the criminal code into the youth justice system. but s 37(10) of the ycja denies young persons the automatic rights to appeal to this court set out in ss. 691(1)(a) and 691(2) of the criminal code, and instead requires them to seek leave before they can appeal. section 37(10) states: 1 691 (1) a person who is convicted of an indictable offence and whose conviction is affirmed by the court of appeal may appeal to the supreme court of canada: (a) on any question of law on which a judge of the court of appeal dissents 2(2) a person who is acquitted of an indictable offence other than by reason of a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and whose acquittal is set aside by the court of appeal may appeal to the supreme court of canada (a) on any question of law on which a judge of the court of appeal dissents; (b) on any question of law, if the court of appeal enters a verdict of guilty against the person . 3 37 (1) an appeal in respect of an indictable offence or an offence that the attorney general elects to proceed with as an indictable offence lies under this act in accordance with part xxi (appeals — indictable offences) of the criminal code, which part applies with any modifications that the circumstances require. (10) no appeal lies under subsection (1) from a judgment of the court of appeal in respect of a finding of guilt or an order dismissing an information or indictment to the supreme court of canada unless leave to appeal is granted by the supreme court of canada. [55] that brings us to whether this provision violates s 15 of the charter. section 15(1) states: 15. (1) every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. [56] this court recently reaffirmed the test for identifying breaches of s 15(1) in fraser v. canada (attorney general), 2020 scc 28. to prove a prima facie violation of s 15(1), a claimant must demonstrate that the impugned law:  on its face or in its impact, creates a distinction based on enumerated or analogous grounds; and  imposes burdens or denies a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage. [para. 27] [57] substantive equality requires attention to the full context of the claimant group’s situation and to the impact of the limitation on that situation (fraser, at para. 42). but context must not be confused with justification. neither stage of the test for determining whether there is a breach of s 15 under our jurisprudence permits the objectives of the legislation to infuse the analysis into whether the limitation itself is a distinction that has the effect of perpetuating, reinforcing, or exacerbating the disadvantage of the claimant group. only at the s 1 justificatory stage are the statutory objectives relevant, and then only to the extent that they justify the limitation (fraser, at para. 79). [58] the parties acknowledge that the first step of the s 15(1) test is satisfied because there is a distinction between the appeal rights to this court available to adults and young people on the basis of age. as a result, the dispute in this appeal revolves around whether the second step of the test has been met. does depriving young people of the automatic rights to appeal that adults have reinforce, perpetuate or exacerbate their disadvantage? if it does, a prima facie breach of s 15 is made out. [59] determining this constitutional issue requires us to first consider what benefit an automatic right to appeal to this court provides. an appeal as of right to this court when a judge of the court of appeal dissents on a question of law in a criminal case has existed since this court was established in 1875 (supreme and exchequer court act, sc 1875, c 11, s 49). the right was transferred to the criminal code in 1892 (see criminal code, 1892, sc 1892, c 29, s 750). professor peter h. russell explains that the “principal object” of an appeal as of right to this court in a criminal case is to rectify legal errors in the trial of serious offences disagreement between members of the provincial court of appeal is considered sufficient evidence of the possibility of such an error, providing grounds for this court’s review (“the jurisdiction of the supreme court of canada: present policies and a programme for reform” (1968), 6 osgoode hall lj 1, at pp. 13-14). [60] in biniaris, arbour j echoed this view in her discussion of why a dissent on a question of law, including an unreasonable conviction, or one that cannot be supported by the evidence, automatically triggers a right of appeal to this court: criminal appeals on questions of law are based in part on the desire to ensure that criminal convictions are the product of error-free trials. error- free trials are desirable as such, but even more so as a safeguard against wrongful convictions. [para. 26] no one before us challenged the merits of this proposition, namely, that the purpose of these automatic appeal rights is to guard against miscarriages of justice. the criminal code provisions themselves reflect parliament’s acknowledgment that a dissent on a question of law in a court of appeal, or a conviction entered for the first time on appeal, demands automatic review. [61] the importance of preventing wrongful convictions cannot be overstated. as this court held in united states v. burns, [2001] 1 scr 283, “[t]he avoidance of conviction and punishment of the innocent has long been in the forefront of ‘the basic tenets of our legal system’. it is reflected in the presumption of innocence under s 11(d) of the charter and in the elaborate rules governing the collection and presentation of evidence, fair trial procedures, and the availability of appeals” (para 95) robust procedural protections against wrongful convictions are crucial the history of wrongful convictions such as those of steven truscott, david milgaard and donald marshall jr. are evidence of the unconscionable consequences of their absence. the very existence of wrongful convictions shows that the risk of miscarriages of justice is far from theoretical. [62] the automatic appeal right under s 691(1)(a) — available to any adult convicted of an indictable offence if a judge on a court of appeal has doubts about the validity of the conviction — is a significant safeguard against wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice. it is premised on the common sense understanding that a dissent on a question of law at the court of appeal raises a legitimate question as to the validity of the conviction, necessitating final review by this court regardless of whether or not the case would otherwise meet the court’s standard for leave to appeal. [63] where a court of appeal sets aside an acquittal and enters a guilty verdict for the first time on appeal, s 691(2)(b) likewise provides a critical check on the safety of the verdict. when s 691(2)(b) is triggered, the right of appeal to this court is the accused person’s first right of appeal. without it, an offender acquitted at trial and then convicted by the court of appeal is left without a guarantee that his conviction will be reviewed by any court. [64] section 691(2)(b) operates when a court of appeal substitutes a finding of guilt for an acquittal entered at trial. when s 691(2)(b) is triggered and a judge on the court of appeal dissents, the premise underlying s 691(1)(a) continues to hold true. the dissent against the court of appeal’s decision to substitute a finding of guilt raises doubt as to the validity of that decision. [65] even when the decision to substitute a guilty finding is unanimous, however, s 691(2)(b) serves, for adults, as an important check against miscarriages of justice. the purpose of the provision is plain. the reviewability of criminal convictions has “been an integral part of our criminal law system at least since the enactment of the criminal code” in 1892 (r v farinacci (1993), 86 ccc (3d) 32 (ont ca), at p 42). appeals are an “integral part of the criminal justice system in canada”, which “protect against wrongful convictions and enhance the fairness of the process” (r v. r (r.), 2008 onca 497, 90 or (3d) 641, at para. 16). accordingly, the criminal code provides for “virtually unfettered” first level appeals from findings of guilt (r (r.), at para. 19). section 691(2)(b) is an expression of the basic concept that it is essential to a fair criminal justice system that anyone convicted of an indictable offence is entitled to at least one appeal from the initial finding of guilt, whether that finding is first entered at trial or on appeal. in this section, parliament has determined that the availability of an appeal with leave does not provide a sufficient guarantee of first level review for adult offenders. [66] these automatic appeal rights, are, of course, no guarantee against miscarriages of justice, but at the very least, in providing an automatic additional layer of judicial scrutiny, they offer a significant procedural safeguard. the question then is whether denying this procedural safeguard to young people violates s 15 of the charter. [67] having considered the substance of the benefit provided by an automatic appeal to this court, some historical context about the youth justice system is now required. [68] young people have been subject to a separate criminal justice system since 1908. the philosophy of this system has evolved over time. a review of the system’s history shows a shift from a paternalistic model that limited young people’s procedural rights, towards a due process model that recognizes young people as rights-bearing individuals who require enhanced procedural protections to accommodate their vulnerability the evolution of rights of appeal within the youth justice system has followed a similar trajectory. crucially, however, young people’s access to this court has lagged behind. [69] canada’s first separate youth justice system was established under the juvenile delinquents act, 1908, sc 1908, c 40. the juvenile delinquents act was animated by a welfare-oriented philosophy, with the court acting as parens patriae. its purpose was expressed as follows: 31. . . . that the care and custody and discipline of a juvenile delinquent shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents, and that as far as practicable every juvenile delinquent shall be treated, not as a criminal, but as a misdirected and misguided child, and one needing aid, encouragement, help and assistance. [70] in furtherance of the juvenile delinquents act’s underlying philosophy, young people’s legal rights were deliberately limited. the “treatment-based philosophy underlying the legislation necessitated a system based on both procedural and dispositional paternalism because the emphasis in the [juvenile delinquents act] was on helping the juvenile delinquent as quickly as possible” (janet bolton, et al., “the young offenders act: principles and policy — the first decade in review” (1993), 38 mcgill lj 939, at p 947). [71] consequently, under the juvenile delinquents act, young people were afforded few procedural protections a first level of appeal was only available by special leave, if a judge of the superior court was of the view that “in the particular circumstances of the case it is essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice that such leave be granted” (juvenile delinquents act, 1929, sc 1929, c 46, s 37(1) and (2)). the restriction on appeals was justified by the view that the expeditious resolution of young people’s criminal cases should be prioritized over due process rights (see nicholas bala and sanjeev anand, youth criminal justice law (3rd ed. 2012), at p 466; see also department of justice, committee on juvenile delinquency, juvenile delinquency in canada: the report of the department of justice committee on juvenile delinquency (1965), at pp. 154-55 (“juvenile delinquency in canada”)). [72] by the 1960s, the juvenile delinquents act had attracted attention for failing to provide adequate legal rights to young people. the limitation on appeals was subject to specific criticism the department of justice report entitled juvenile delinquency in canada argued that the existing system for accessing appeals was “unduly restrictive” and recommended that the young person and the crown be given direct access to the court of appeal on questions of law (pp. 154-55). [73] the juvenile delinquents act was replaced in 1984 by the young offenders act, rsc 1985, c y-1, marking a significant shift in canada’s philosophical approach to youth justice. the enactment of the charter in 1982 provided the impetus for parliament to expand the legal protections given to young people facing criminal charges (see nicholas bala, “changing professional culture and reducing use of courts and custody for youth: the youth criminal justice act and bill c-10” (2015), 78 sask. l. rev. 127, at p 131). [74] one of the young offenders act’s guiding themes was that young people should be afforded the same rights to due process and fair and equal treatment as adults (see r v. j (jt), [1990] 2 scr 755, at p 779, per l’heureux-dubé j (dissenting), citing the solicitor general’s office report, the young offenders act: highlights (1981), at p 4). its declaration of principle, articulated in s 3, announced that “young persons have rights and freedoms in their own right, including those stated in the canadian charter of rights and freedoms” (see s 3(1)(e)), giving young people a substantial suite of procedural protections for the first time. these rights included rights of appeal, which acknowledged that unless there is a valid conviction in accordance with correct legal principles, there is no “offender” to hold accountable (bala and anand, at p 466). [75] section 27(1)4 of the young offenders act incorporated the provisions respecting appeals for indictable offences in the criminal code into the youth justice system. this would have included automatic rights to appeal to this court, but s 27(5)5 stipulated that a young person was required to obtain leave before an appeal to this court could be heard: (5) no appeal lies pursuant to subsection (1) from a judgment of the court of appeal in respect of a finding of guilt or an order dismissing an information to the supreme court of canada unless leave to appeal is granted by the supreme court of canada within twenty-one days after the judgment of the court of appeal is pronounced or within such extended time as the supreme court of canada or a judge thereof may, for special reasons, allow. [76] in a case involving statutory interpretation, this court said in obiter that this limitation reflected “[t]he policy favouring the early resolution of the adjudicative stage in order to facilitate commencement of rehabilitation” (c (tl), at p 1016). in this way, it aligned with the parens patriae approach to youth justice that prevailed under the predecessor legislation, the juvenile delinquents act. [77] the young offenders act was replaced in 2003 by the current legislation, the youth criminal justice act. like the young offenders act, the ycja’s declaration of principle recognizes that “young persons have rights and freedoms in their own right” (s 3(1)(d)(i)). but the ycja’s declaration of principle goes further. it states that the criminal justice system for young persons must emphasize “enhanced procedural 4 rep. & sub. c 24 (2nd supp.), s 20. 5 rep. & sub. c 24 (2nd supp.), s 20. protection to ensure that young persons are treated fairly and that their rights . . . are protected” (s 3(1)(b)(iii)). in accordance with this principle, the ycja affords young people a wide range of supplementary rights and procedural protections (see kjm, at para. 142, per abella and brown jj). [78] subsections 27(1) and (5) of the young offenders act were replaced without substantive changes by subsections 37(1) and (10) of the ycja. in other words, despite its emphasis on providing young people with procedural protection, access to this court by way of appeal remained limited under the ycja as it had been under the young offenders act c.p argues that the deprivation of this procedural benefit perpetuates young people’s unique disadvantage within the criminal justice system. [79] this court has repeatedly recognized that young people are distinctively vulnerable in the criminal justice context. in r v. db, [2008] 2 scr 3, this court held that the ycja’s presumptive offence regime, which listed a set of offences to which an adult sentence presumptively applied, violated s 7 of the charter. the court explained that canada has a separate youth justice system for a reason, namely, that “because of their age, young people have heightened vulnerability” (para. 41). further, the court held that: a young person should receive, at the very least, the same procedural benefit afforded to a convicted adult on sentencing, namely, that the burden is on the crown to demonstrate why a more severe sentence is necessary and appropriate in any given case the onus on the young person reverses this traditional onus on the crown and is, consequently, a breach of s 7. [emphasis added; para. 82.] [80] db constitutionalized the special status of young people in the criminal justice system in light of their distinctive vulnerability. it also recognized, in the context of sentencing, that procedural rules that benefit adults must apply equally in youth proceedings. [81] that same year, in r v. lth, [2008] 2 scr 739, fish j emphasized the importance of the enhanced procedural protections that govern the admissibility of statements made by young people to authority figures he explained that these protections are justified on the basis that the “procedural and evidentiary safeguards available to adults do not adequately protect young persons, who are presumed on account of their age and relative unsophistication to be more vulnerable than adults” (para. 3) in particular, fish j found that young people are vulnerable because they “generally do not understand their legal rights as well as adults, are less likely to assert those rights in the face of a confrontation with a person in authority and are more susceptible to the pressures of interrogation” (para. 24). [82] one year later, in r v. sjl, [2009] 1 scr 426, this court held that if a young person and an adult are alleged to have committed an offence in tandem, they must be tried separately. deschamps j held that the creation of the youth justice system “was based on recognition of the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness of young persons and on their heightened vulnerability in dealing with the justice system” (para. 64) a joint trial would “be inconsistent with the governing principle of the ycja, which maintains a justice system for young people that is separate from the system for adults” (para. 56 (emphasis in original)). [83] in response to these cases, parliament amended the ycja in 20126 and updated its declaration of principle at s 3(1)(b). the emphasis on enhanced procedural protection for young people was preserved at s 3(1)(b)(iii). [84] professors nicholas bala and sanjeev anand explain the relationship between young people’s vulnerability and their concomitant need for enhanced procedural protection compellingly: the underlying rationale for giving greater legal protections to young persons than to adults — like the rationale for the limited accountability of adolescents — is their intellectual, social, and psychological immaturity. adolescents are less likely to appreciate the significance of the legal process and the legal consequences of the decisions they are required to make. they generally do not fully understand and appreciate their rights and are likely unable to exercise them fully without assistance. adolescents are also likely to have greater difficulty in formulating realistic plans and advocating for their views in the youth justice system. they may also be more vulnerable to pressure from the police and other agents of the state. [p 164] [85] in short, the enhanced procedural protections afforded to young people in the youth justice system are not gratuitous benefits. they are directly responsive to the vulnerability and concomitant disadvantage that inheres in young people because of their age. sometimes young people will be entitled to the same procedural protections 6 see 2012, c 1, s 168(2). as adults, and sometimes different protections will be required. the ycja does not and need not strive for line by line parity with the criminal code and none of our ycja jurisprudence advances this hyperbolic proposition the question before us is not whether young people should be entitled to all procedural rights afforded to adults; it is about s 37(10) of the ycja, and whether s 15(1) of the charter entitles young people to the automatic rights of appeal available to adults. the answer to this question depends on whether the deprivation of the rights to appeal to this court reinforces, perpetuates or exacerbates young people’s disadvantage within the criminal justice system. [86] clearly it does. it deprives young people of what is acknowledged to be a significant safeguard against wrongful convictions for adults, despite the evidence that young people are more vulnerable to them than adults a recent report of the federal/provincial/territorial heads of prosecutions subcommittee on the prevention of wrongful convictions identifies young people as a population that is at risk of wrongful convictions, explaining: ample research now suggests that young persons are also more vulnerable to wrongful convictions, as compared to adults, for a variety of age-related reasons the nature of the young developing brain is considered a key factor. in essence, youthful brains are wired differently, and those underdeveloped brains result in young persons being poor decision-makers, in contrast to adults. experts across disciplines point to a trilogy of judgments by the united states supreme court, including roper v simmons where the court acknowledged the scientific evidence that young persons are less mature, less able to assess risks and long-term consequences of their conduct, more vulnerable to external pressures and more compliant to authority. as a result, the traits that make young persons different from adults cognitively, socially and emotionally, may also make them particularly susceptible to the recognized systemic factors that contribute to wrongful convictions. (innocence at stake: the need for continued vigilance to prevent wrongful convictions in canada, 2018 (online), at p 243.) [87] research from the united states also develops the contours of the unique vulnerability of young people, including that they are more suggestible and compliant than adults during police questioning and are less likely to understand their legal rights. these traits are significant risk factors for wrongful findings of guilt (emily west and vanessa meterko, “innocence project: dna exonerations, 1989-2014: review of data and findings from the first 25 years” (2016), 79 alb. l. rev. 717, at pp. 728, 759-60, 763 and 783; saul m. kassin, et al., “police-induced confessions: risk factors and recommendations” (2010), 34 law & hum. behav. 3). the research also demonstrates that the risk of wrongful findings of guilt is increased when young people are denied the due process protections afforded to adults (steven a. drizin and greg luloff, “are juvenile courts a breeding ground for wrongful convictions?” (2007), 34 n. ky. l. rev 257, at p 260; joshua a tepfer, laura h nirider and lynda m tricarico, “arresting development: convictions of innocent youth” (2010), 62 rutgers l. rev. 887). [88] db explained the unique disadvantages of young people in the criminal justice system: their “heightened vulnerability, less maturity and a reduced capacity for moral judgment” (para. 41). moreover, it is important to stress that the vulnerability experienced by young people in general is amplified for those young people who are indigenous or members of racial minorities the unfortunate reality, as this court recently pointed out in r v le, 2019 scc 34, is that “being frequently targeted, stopped, and subjected to pointed and familiar questions” by police is a “common and shared experience” for racialized youth (para. 97) these young people disproportionately interact with the criminal justice system for a complex variety of reasons, which include both direct and systemic racial discrimination within the system (bala and anand, at pp. 58-59; robin t fitzgerald and peter j carrington, “disproportionate minority contact in canada: police and visible minority youth” (2011), 53 cjccj 449, at pp. 450-54 and 473; carla cesaroni, chris grol and kaitlin fredericks, “overrepresentation of indigenous youth in canada’s criminal justice system: perspectives of indigenous young people” (2019), 52 austl. & nz. j. crim. 111, at p 112; nate jackson, “aboriginal youth overrepresentation in canadian correctional services: judicial and non-judicial actors and influence” (2015), 52 alta. l. rev. 927, at pp. 929-32). [89] this is not a new phenomenon, either in the public’s or in the judiciary’s consciousness since r v parks (1993), 15 o.r (3d) 324 (ca), courts have acknowledged the wide range of ways the criminal justice system can disproportionately affect accused persons in these groups (r v gladue, [1999] 1 scr 688; r v. ipeelee, [2012] 1 scr 433). if being indigenous or a racial minority can have a disparately negative impact on adult accused persons, the double jeopardy vulnerability of being both a young accused and a member of a racial minority follows regrettably and inexorably (see robert mason, library of parliament, wrongful convictions in canada, background paper 77-e, september 23, 2020, at p 10). [90] all this confirms that young people are particularly vulnerable to wrongful convictions in the criminal justice system, and are in any event no less vulnerable to them than are adults. yet s 37(10) of the ycja deprives young people of the benefit of an automatic right to appeal to this court when a judge on the court of appeal has identified a risk of legal error, a benefit that has long been available to adult accused people. moreover, by virtue of its effect on s 691(2) of the criminal code, s 37(10) of the ycja deprives young people who are found guilty for the first time by a court of appeal of the right to have their case reviewed at all. this deprivation demonstrably perpetuates young people’s disadvantage within the criminal justice system it is a holdover from an antiquated and paternalistic model of youth justice and deprives young people of a procedural safeguard designed to reduce the risk of miscarriages of justice. [91] it would be untenable to suggest that young persons are less worthy of protection from miscarriages of justice than adults as d.b pointed out, the very philosophy and purpose of the ycja, with its emphasis on providing substantial procedural protections for young persons, argues for procedures to prevent the ultimate disadvantage, namely, a wrongful conviction. [92] the crown argues that the leave to appeal process is an adequate substitute for an automatic right of appeal. but the process in the regular application for leave to appeal stage is by its very nature less intensive than the scrupulous search for legal error conducted during a hearing on the merits as the crown acknowledges in its factum, “[t]he leave process is designed to be more streamlined than the appeal process” (para. 56). while this court strives to detect any sign that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred at the leave to appeal stage, the fact remains that an application for leave to appeal does not involve a screening for error in the level of depth that characterizes an appeal on the merits. leave to appeal decisions are made without an oral hearing or the benefit of the full record on which to assess any legal infirmities. [93] the crown also argues that this court could alleviate the disadvantageous impact of s 37(10) by applying a lower standard to leave to appeal decisions involving youth justice it is worth noting that the crown’s argument on discretion was used, unsuccessfully, to justify the sentencing provisions that were deemed unconstitutional in db. those provisions left the ultimate issue of whether to impose an adult sentence on a young person in the discretion of the sentencing judge. the court found, however, that the existence of discretion did not make them any less infringing of young people’s s 7 right to liberty. the same reasoning applies here. even though this court could theoretically exercise its discretion in a way that reduces the unconstitutional effects of s 37(10), this does not render an unconstitutional provision constitutional. [94] nor am i persuaded by the crown’s argument that there is no disadvantage because there are many other procedural benefits available to young people in the ycja. this evokes sopinka j.’s obiter statement in 1994 in c (tl) that it is “difficult to accept that a young offender can select one aspect of the [adult] scheme and claim entitlement to the equal benefit of it with adults without taking into account the many related benefits accorded to young persons which are denied to adults” (pp. 1017-18). it is important to remember not only that these comments were made in obiter, but that the issue in that case was one of statutory interpretation, not constitutional validity. [95] moreover, the case was about the rule against multiple convictions for a single criminal act, not an unsafe verdict. there is no basis for assuming that in those circumstances, sopinka j would have turned his mind to the role of appeal rights in preventing miscarriages of justice. most significantly, his comments were made well before this court’s decisions in db,. lth and sjl, all of which underscore the importance of providing procedural protection to young people in recognition of their vulnerability. despite the range of procedural protections afforded to young people by the ycja, the fact remains that s 37(10) of the ycja provides young people with less robust rights of appellate review than adults on the basis of their age, in a context where they are already uniquely vulnerable the existence of other procedural safeguards provides no legal comfort to a young person subjected to a dubious finding of guilt. [96] and my colleague’s assertion that the objective of timeliness in the ycja should form part of the context at the s 15 stage, confuses context with justification. timeliness was in fact advanced by the crown as a justification for the limitation under s 1. this is where it belongs (andrews v. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143, at p 178; quebec (attorney general) v. a, [2013] 1 scr 61, at para. 331; kahkewistahaw first nation v. taypotat, [2015] 2 scr 548, at para. 16; fraser, at para. 42) it has no place in determining whether there is a prima facie breach of s 15(1). fraser emphasized this point: the perpetuation of disadvantage . . does not become less serious under s 15(1) simply because it was relevant to a legitimate state objective. . the test for a prima facie breach of s 15(1) is concerned with the discriminatory impact of legislation on disadvantaged groups, not with whether the distinction is justified, an inquiry properly left to s 1 . . . . [emphasis in original; para. 79.] [97] the fact that timeliness is one of the objectives of the limitation or of the ycja is irrelevant to whether depriving young people of a significant safeguard against miscarriages of justice perpetuates their disadvantage. it amounts to telling them that as long as they are processed through the system quickly, they should be grateful for not having to go through an added layer of protection from miscarriages of justice. [98] my colleague’s reliance on withler v. canada (attorney general), [2011] 1 scr 396, to suggest that young accused people’s interest in timeliness must be balanced against their interest in procedural protection as a part of a “contextual” s 15(1) analysis is misplaced withler was specifically concerned with “how an analysis under s 15(1) is to proceed where the impugned law is part of a wide-reaching legislative scheme of government benefits” (para. 25). against that background, we held that the “multiplicity of interests” balanced by the impugned law will “colour the discrimination analysis”, as it is necessary to take “into account the universe of potential beneficiaries” (paras. 3 and 38). withler does not support the proposition that a legislative provision that perpetuates a claimant group’s disadvantage will pass s 15(1) scrutiny as long as a “contextual” inquiry shows that the broader legislative scheme is intended to promote that group’s other interests in different ways. [99] parliament has determined that where the judges of a court of appeal are divided on whether an adult’s conviction for an indictable offence is legally sustainable, or where they overturn an acquittal in favour of a guilty verdict, the accused person should have an automatic right to appeal to this court to ensure that the trial was a fair one and that no miscarriage of justice occurred the absence of that protection for young persons is the denial of a procedural benefit that perpetuates and reinforces their inherent vulnerability in the criminal justice system. there is therefore a prima facie breach of s 15. [100] turning to s 1, the crown submits that the pressing and substantial objective for s 37(10)’s deprivation of an automatic right of appeal is to grant the supreme court of canada the discretion to decide when criminal cases involving young persons merit a second level of appellate review. there is a societal interest in vesting with the supreme court the decision-making power to decide when a young person’s criminal case merits further review and when there would be minimal or no utility to further prolonging the appellate process in the light of the primacy of the ycja principles of timeliness, rehabilitation and reintegration [rf, at para. 55] [101] even accepting that quick decision-making by this court is an important goal for limiting appeal rights for young people, it fails at the final stage of the proportionality analysis because any benefits of the denial are far outweighed by the deleterious effects this is an access to justice issue of fundamental importance to young people seeking to prevent wrongful convictions. [102] i accept that promoting timeliness, early rehabilitation and reintegration are salutary goals, but s 37(10)’s actual contribution to achieving them is minimal. the most that will be saved is a few months in those cases where leave is denied. on the other hand, requiring a young accused person to go through the leave to appeal process before they are entitled to a hearing has the effect of prolonging the process, not abbreviating it in cases when leave is granted, since if leave is granted, the appeal will not be heard for several more months. if, however, an appeal is immediately scheduled because there is an automatic right of appeal, the process of fulsome scrutiny for error will get underway months earlier. that means that s 37(10) exposes young people to a greater risk of miscarriages of justice in aid of the possibility of saving a few months of time. [103] it is also important to point out the critical difference between the capacity for scrutiny in an application for leave to appeal and in an actual appeal leave decisions are made by this court without the benefit of a full hearing. without these assessment tools, the court is screening for miscarriages of justice with one hand tied behind its back that is why parliament decided that heightened scrutiny is automatically required for adults when the criteria under s 691 of the criminal code are satisfied. [104] denying young people the automatic full scrutiny of an appeal and accepting a less rigorous appeal process makes justice the servant of expedition for young people, rather than the other way around. there is no doubt that expedition is important for young people, but not at the expense of procedural protections designed to minimize the risk of miscarriages of justice. [105] preventing miscarriages of justice is at the core of every layer of scrutiny in the criminal justice system for every accused person. a wrongful finding of guilt under the ycja is no less a miscarriage of justice than a wrongful conviction for adults under the criminal code. [106] yet s 37(10) not only denies access to an automatic appeal for young people when there is a dissent, it even denies it when the attorney general has filed a notice of intention to seek an adult sentence thereby depriving them of a right guaranteed to an adult even when the state wants to treat them like one. [107] the counter argument, that the benefit of the denial of an automatic right of appeal facilitates the prioritization of immediate rehabilitation and reintegration, reflects the paternalism that prevailed under the previous juvenile delinquents act. it suggests that young people do not need the procedural protection of an automatic appeal available to adults because starting on their rehabilitative journey is more important than ensuring that the convictions that launched them into that journey are the result of fair trials. [108] this is an argument that justifies an increased risk of wrongful findings of guilt as an acceptable cost of doing business within the youth justice system, based on timeliness and early rehabilitation and reintegration. but timeliness, rehabilitation and reintegration are not legitimate objectives if the underlying finding of guilt resulted from an unfair trial. the objectives of timeliness, rehabilitation and reintegration are based on an assumption that the finding of guilt is not based on a miscarriage of justice. they are meaningless if wrongful findings of guilt are tolerated in the service of speed. the ycja is not intended to promote swift injustice. there is no need for rehabilitation or reintegration if the young person should not have been found guilty in the first place. [109] the profoundly harmful impact of fast-tracking rehabilitation and reintegration over the right to have the basic procedural appeal protection from miscarriages of justice as adults far outweighs the benefit of the potential shaving of a few months off the appeal process. [110] finally, an argument raised at the hearing that this court should not find a breach of s 15 because it could provide the precedential basis for findings of other s 15 breaches in the ycja calls for a response. the proposition is, with respect, problematic not only jurisprudentially, but conceptually. [111] the underlying jurisprudential problem with the suggestion is that it relies on an approach to s 15 that this court has never applied — equality as sameness — in order to warn that finding a breach in this case could lead, by logical extension, to increased access to procedural protections like jury trials and preliminary inquiries for young people. in this court’s very first equality case, andrews, the court rejected a “sameness”, or formal theory of equality, adopting substantive equality instead, an approach that recognizes, respects, and accommodates difference (pp. 164-65, 168 and 171) the rejection of “identical treatment” under s 15 was confirmed in, among others, r v. kapp, [2008] 2 scr 483, at paras. 14-16 and 27-28, withler, at paras. 2 and 39-66, and most recently in fraser, at paras. 40-41 and 47. instead, this court looks to whether the specific limitation before the court is a distinction that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating the claimant’s disadvantage. [112] there is also a conceptual problem with what amounts to an argument that there should be no finding of a prima facie breach of s 15 in this case because it could potentially lead to finding other s 15 breaches this adds a troubling factor to our charter analysis the idea that the court should decline to find that a limiting distinction has the effect of perpetuating disadvantage for the claimant group if it would encourage other rights claimants to come forward, undermines the whole of the s 15 analysis. the burden at the breach stage is on the claimant to satisfy this court’s two- part test. we do not ask claimants to anticipate what other claims their success may inspire, the potential consequences of those claims, or to justify why they should succeed anyway. [113] nor, in fact, has this kind of “slippery slope” argument ever played an analytical role in determining whether or not a charter right has been breached. to inject it now, as a potential barrier to s 15 claims, or any other charter claim, would hold the court hostage to the fear of unknown consequences. by engaging in this type of argument, judges risk giving “short shrift” to the case before the court and deciding future claims without the factual foundation and legal arguments necessary for a proper assessment (lorraine eisenstat weinrib, “the body and the body politic: assisted suicide under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms” (1994), 39 mcgill lj. 618, at pp. 636-37; see also frederick schauer, “slippery slopes” (1985), 99 harv. l. rev. 361). [114] the purpose of the as-of-right appeal denied by s 37(10) is straightforward — to ensure the safety of a verdict in circumstances where that verdict is called into question by a judge on the court of appeal, or when a guilty verdict is entered for the first time on appeal the concern that a claim could be advanced for jury trials and preliminary inquiries if a young person wins an automatic appeal right in this case, ignores the significant differences between the procedures, differences best explored in a case where the issue is before the court and the parties have had the chance to argue the merits. [115] in this case, there is a direct link between the denial of a procedural protection available to adults, and youth vulnerability to miscarriages of justice. the denial has the effect of perpetuating that vulnerability in examining whether a provision perpetuates a disadvantage under s 15, it is far from obvious that there is anything like the same link with jury trials and preliminary inquiries that engages the risk of a miscarriage of justice. there is only one purpose of the procedural benefit denied here, namely to ensure the safety of a verdict in circumstances where that verdict is called into question by a judge on the court of appeal. this is simply not comparable to the multi-faceted complexity of jury trials. the attempt to speculatively analogize them emblemizes the fallacy of the slippery slope. [116] ultimately, in my respectful view, this type of argument seems to me to be fundamentally incompatible with the purpose of the charter. the charter was intended to impose a set of justiciable constraints and obligations on government that are enforceable by individuals and groups (see jacob weinrib, “the modern constitutional state: a defence” (2014), 40 queen’s lj 165). as this court explained in vriend v. alberta, [1998] 1 scr 493, “[c]itizens must have the right to challenge laws which they consider to be beyond the powers of the legislatures. when such a challenge is properly made, the courts must, pursuant to their constitutional duty, rule on the challenge” (para. 56). implicit in this statement is the proposition that the court must rule on the case that is actually before it, not a hypothetical future claim. [117] the only question before us is whether s 37(10) of the ycja violates the charter. in my respectful view, it does. [118] for all the foregoing reasons, the prima facie breach of s 15 cannot be justified, making s 37(10) of the ycja unconstitutional. [119] given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to address cp’s submission that s 37(10) of the ycja also breaches his s 7 charter right as a violation of the suggested principle of fundamental justice that young persons are entitled to enhanced procedural protections in the criminal justice system. [120] this constitutional issue does not affect cp’s appeal from the finding of guilt. i would dismiss the appeal. the reasons of wagner cj and moldaver, brown and rowe jj. were delivered by the chief justice — introduction [121] this appeal raises two distinct issues. the first concerns the reasonableness of a finding of guilt on a charge of sexual assault. the appellant, cp, maintains that the verdict was reached illogically and was not reasonably available on the evidence. for the same reasons as my colleague abella j., i would dismiss the appeal from the finding of guilt the trial judge’s reasons were rigorous and cogent, and there is no basis for finding that the verdict was unreasonable. [122] the second issue is the constitutionality of s 37(10) of the youth criminal justice act, sc 2002, c 1 (“ycja”), which requires young offenders to seek leave before they can appeal to this court. in the appellant’s view, this provision infringes ss 7 and 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, because it deprives young persons of a procedural benefit that is available to adults under s 691(1)(a) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, namely an automatic right of appeal where an appellate court affirms a conviction for an indictable offence, but one judge of that court dissents on a question of law. [123] i agree with the conclusion of my colleague abella j on the preliminary matter of jurisdiction however, for the reasons that follow, i would dismiss the constitutional challenge. constitutionality of section 37(10) of the ycja a analysis with respect to section 7 [124] section 7 of the charter guarantees that: everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. [125] two elements must be established in order to show a violation of s 7: (1) that the impugned law or government action deprives the claimant of the right to life, liberty or security of the person; and (2) that the deprivation in question does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice (carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para. 55; r v. db, 2008 scc 25, [2008] 2 scr 3, at para. 37). [126] in this appeal, the requirements of the first step are readily satisfied, as a limit on young persons’ right to appeal to this court engages residual liberty interests that are cognizable under s 7 (r v gamble, [1988] 2 scr 595, at p 645; r v. farinacci (1993), 86 ccc (3d) 32 (ont. ca), at p 40). both parties acknowledge this. the outcome thus hinges on whether this deprivation is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. [127] the appellant asks this court to recognize a new principle of fundamental justice — that young persons are entitled to “enhanced procedural protections” in the criminal justice system. a cornerstone of his argument is this court’s decision in db. in which abella j., writing for the majority, recognized “a presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability” for young persons as a principle of fundamental justice and held that, accordingly, “[a] young person should receive, at the very least, the same procedural benefit afforded to a convicted adult on sentencing” (paras. 41 and 82 (emphasis in original)). the appellant argues that db constitutionalized the special status of young persons in the criminal justice system and established enhanced procedural protection as a guiding principle in the youth justice jurisprudence. in his opinion, the time has come for the court to constitutionalize the latter principle under s 7. [128] the appellant submits that the principle of enhanced procedural protection satisfies the three criteria reiterated by abella j in db, namely that for a principle of justice to be “fundamental” within the meaning of s 7: (i) it must be a legal principle; (ii) there must be a consensus that the rule or principle is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate; and (iii) it must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person (para. 46). [129] but it is somewhat unclear from the appellant’s submissions if this principle of enhanced procedural protection entails a comparative assessment of procedural rights of young persons and those of adults, or if it is a freestanding standard that applies independently to young persons in light of their unique circumstances irrespective of what is available to adults. at times, the appellant seems to interpret the principle as requiring that procedural protections afforded to young persons be greater than, or at least equal to, those that are provided to adults throughout the criminal justice system according to this approach, s 7 guarantees that young persons will not be deprived of any significant procedure available to adults without good reason. [130] if the content of the principle is indeed strictly contingent on a comparative assessment, one that fluctuates depending on the procedural benefits parliament sees fit to extend to or withhold from adults at a given time, then it yields neither a meaningful standard nor one upon which any consensus is conceivable. to the extent that the concern is solely how young persons are treated in comparison to adults, the argument appears better suited to a s 15 charter analysis, not to one that engages principles of fundamental justice under s 7. [131] but the appellant, who is aware of these difficulties, also suggests that enhanced procedural protection can be a freestanding principle, which means that any procedural safeguard for young persons must account for their unique status in the criminal justice system. he submits that, rather than requiring procedures identical to those accorded to adults, the principle of “enhanced procedural protection” allows for a reasoned evaluation of legislative choices against the assumption that young people must enjoy special consideration in the justice system. it does not mean that for every procedure “x” adopted for adults, parliament must accord “x + 1” or even “x” to young people. differences in procedure — even ones that appear to confer less elaborate rights on young people — can be fully consistent with this principle provided that, when viewed in context, the procedure in question vindicates rather than derogates from the interests of the young accused. [emphasis in original.] (af, at para. 71.) [132] the difficulty with this freestanding interpretation of the principle, then, is that it quite simply offers nothing new. there is already a well-established principle of fundamental justice that all accused must be accorded adequate procedural safeguards against wrongful convictions or other miscarriages of justice in the criminal process (canadian foundation for children, youth and the law v. canada (attorney general), 2004 scc 4, [2004] 1 scr 76, at para 5) as for the requirements that afford adequate procedural protection, they “are not immutable”, but “vary according to the context in which they are invoked”, which means that “certain procedural protections might be constitutionally mandated in one context but not in another” (r v lyons, [1987] 2 scr 309, at p 361; see also united states of america v. cobb, 2001 scc 19, [2001] 1 scr 587, at para. 32; idziak v. canada (minister of justice), [1992] 3 scr 631, at pp. 656-57). in other words, the adequacy of procedural protections will necessarily be sensitive to the unique circumstances of young persons that have been identified by this court, including their diminished moral culpability and their need for enhanced procedural protection in the criminal justice system (db, at para 41) if enhanced procedural protection is construed as a freestanding principle, the appellant’s s 7 argument, worded differently, depends on whether s 37(10) deprives young persons of a liberty interest without adequate procedural safeguards. [133] in my view, denying young persons an automatic right to a hearing in this court where a court of appeal judge has dissented on a question of law cannot in itself contravene their constitutional entitlement to adequate procedural protection in the youth criminal justice system. this court has steadfastly affirmed in various contexts that “there is no constitutional right to an appeal”, let alone an automatic one at the apex of the judicial system, including in circumstances that unequivocally engaged liberty interests and principles of fundamental justice that are cognizable under s 7 (charkaoui v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2007 scc 9, [2007] 1 scr. 350, at para. 136, citing kourtessis v. mnr, [1993] 2 scr 53; see also chiarelli v. canada (minister of employment and immigration), [1992] 1 scr 711, at p 739). fundamental justice does not entail “the most favourable procedures that could possibly be imagined” (lyons, at p 362). although i do not foreclose the theoretical possibility that s 7 would ever provide a right of appeal in some other context — an issue which need not be decided here — i cannot see how the principles of fundamental justice could require something as specific as an automatic hearing in this court in the narrow circumstances in which a court of appeal affirms a conviction for an indictable offence, but a judge of that court dissents on a question of law. [134] such a requirement would have the effect of constitutionalizing the application of s 691(1)(a) of the criminal code to young persons, thereby implying that parliament would be under a positive obligation to enact such a provision if one did not already exist. this conclusion would appear all the more anomalous in light of the fact that a leave requirement for criminal cases in this court is the rule, not an exception. there is of course no automatic statutory right to appeal to this court in a summary conviction case even when an appellate court has set aside an acquittal and entered a conviction for the first time, just as there is no right to appeal on a question of fact even when a judge of the court of appeal has dissented what is more, the summary conviction procedure, which is the default procedure for young persons (s 142 of the ycja) and in which the avenues of appeal available to an accused are generally more limited, has consistently been held to be constitutional (r v. rl (1986), 26 ccc (3d) 417 (ont. ca);. r v. kg (1986), 31 ccc (3d) 81 (alta. ca);. r v. b (s.) (1989), 50 ccc (3d) 34 (sask. ca)). in other words, automatic appeals for young persons are not — in the words this court used in rejecting a similar request to entrench the “best interests of the child” as a principle of fundamental justice — a “foundational requirement for the dispensation of justice” (canadian foundation for children, at paras. 10-12). [135] a contextual assessment of the adequacy of procedural protections should also be sensitive to the unique costs of a prolonged appellate process in the youth justice system — for the young accused, but also for victims, who themselves are often young persons (n. bala and s. anand, youth criminal justice law (3rd ed. 2012), at p 154, citing national council of welfare, justice and the poor (2000)) the governing principles of timely intervention and prompt action stated in s 3(1)(b)(iv) and s 3(1)(b)(v) of the ycja, which i will discuss in greater detail in my analysis with respect to s 15, also colour the s 7 analysis the principles of fundamental justice “reflect a spectrum of interests, from the rights of the accused to broader societal concerns”, and while the fairness of a procedure will be assessed primarily from the point of view of the accused, “it must as well be looked at from the point of view of fairness in the eyes of the community and the complainant” (r v. seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577, at p 603; r v. e (aw), [1993] 3 scr 155, at p 198). [136] it also bears emphasizing at this juncture that the threat of wrongful conviction which my colleague abella j seeks to address is, on the record before us, entirely theoretical the appellant has provided no evidence that the absence of an automatic appeal in any way increases the likelihood of wrongful convictions or other miscarriages of justice for young persons tried for indictable offences. nor is there any evidence before us suggesting that the court’s leave process affords inadequate procedural protection in other words, it has not been shown that there is an actual problem with the way the court has been exercising its discretion to grant leave, let alone one that warrants a finding of a constitutional violation. [137] on the contrary, the leave process in this court is rigorous. while it is true that leave applications are not subject to the same in-depth screening for errors as is the case in an appeal on the merits, the court has a wide discretion to consider factors that might suggest a possibility of error, including the fact that a judge dissented on a question of law or a conviction entered for the first time on appeal. there is no basis to believe that a serious argument pointing to a miscarriage of justice would not meet the public interest standard for leave to appeal to the court. as former justice iacobucci observed, “even where there has been no dissent or reversal of an acquittal at the court of appeal, leave to appeal in criminal cases often is granted given that criminal cases are frequently considered to raise issues of public importance because they involve the liberty of the subject” (f iacobucci, “the supreme court of canada: its history, powers and responsibilities” (2002), 4 j. app. prac. & process 27, at pp. 34-35). the supreme court would and does exercise its leave requirement in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. [138] in my view, the dearth of evidence of a problem in this regard belies the conclusion that s 37(10) denies young persons adequate procedural safeguards as was the case under past youth justice legislation, which did indeed provide for paternalistic practices and left young persons vulnerable to miscarriages of justice. on the contrary, our modern youth justice system has long left those problematic practices behind, providing young persons with enhanced procedural protections commensurate with their unique circumstances and inherent vulnerability in the justice system. [139] for these reasons, i conclude that s 37(10) of the ycja is consistent with s 7 of the charter even in a case in which a court of appeal judge has dissented on a question of law. nonetheless, i would not foreclose the theoretical possibility that s 7 may guarantee an appeal as of right where a court of appeal has entered a conviction for the first time, but this is an issue which need not be decided on the facts of this case. b analysis with respect to section 15 [140] the appellant also maintains that s 37(10) of the ycja discriminates against young persons on the basis of age by denying them an important procedural benefit that is granted to adults in similar circumstances. section 15(1) of the charter sets out the following guarantee: every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. [141] a law or a government action will contravene this guarantee: (1) if, on its face or in its impact, it creates a distinction based on enumerated or analogous grounds; and (2) if it imposes burdens or denies a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating a disadvantage (fraser v. canada (attorney general), 2020 scc 28, at para. 27; kahkewistahaw first nation v. taypotat, 2015 scc 30, [2015] 2 scr 548, at paras. 19‑20). [142] the parties agree that s 37(10) of the ycja creates a distinction based on age. the issue is whether it draws a discriminatory distinction by denying a benefit in a manner that reinforces, perpetuates or exacerbates young persons’ disadvantage. in this respect, it should also be borne in mind that age-based distinctions are generally a “common and necessary way of ordering our society” and are “not strongly associated with discrimination and arbitrary denial of privilege” (gosselin v. quebec (attorney general), 2002 scc 84, [2002] 4 scr 429, at para. 31). [143] this is not the first time that an equality argument has been raised in this court with respect to the relatively limited avenues of appeal that are available to young persons in the criminal justice system in r v c (tl), [1994] 2 scr 1012, the court considered the statutory interpretation of s 27(5) of the young offenders act, rsc 1985, c. y‑1, a functionally equivalent provision of the precursor to the ycja. in that case, sopinka j noted that, in light of “[t]he policy favouring the early resolution of the adjudicative stage”, “there is no anomaly” in the fact “that a young person found guilty of an offence should enjoy more restricted rights of appeal than an adult who is convicted of an offence” (pp. 1015-16). although he did not definitively rule out an equality challenge, sopinka j found it “difficult to accept that a young offender can select one aspect of the scheme and claim entitlement to the equal benefit of it with adults without taking into account the many related benefits accorded to young persons which are denied to adults” (p 1017). [144] while c (tl) was not formally dispositive of the issue, part of its underlying rationale remains relevant to the instant case. sopinka j.’s obiter remarks caution against artificially cherry-picking individual features from a multifaceted legislative scheme in order to reveal inequities between fundamentally distinct systems. the court of appeal for british columbia has made similar comments warning “against artificially isolating a single provision from a comprehensive criminal justice regime intended to benefit youth and thereby finding a constitutional violation” and stating that “it is improper to single out a particular subsection”, because each subsection “is so much a detail of the over-all comprehensive scheme that it cannot be, and should not be, considered separately” (r v. m (js), 2005 bcca 417, 200 ccc. (3d) 400, at para. 31; r v. dfg (1986), 29 ccc (3d) 451, at pp. 453-54). [145] in other words, it is the actual impact of the provision in its full context that should govern the analysis, and s 37(10) should not be divorced from its entire legislative context. an approach requiring line-by-line parity with the criminal code without reference to the distinct nature of the underlying scheme of the ycja would indeed be contrary to the contextual approach mandated in withler v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 12, [2011] 1 scr 396, at paras. 73, 76 and 79. the analysis instead requires a “contextual understanding of a claimant’s place within a legislative scheme and society at large”; the court must ask “whether the lines drawn are generally appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the persons impacted and the objects of the scheme” (paras 65 and 67) understanding the distinct legislative scheme underlying s 37(10) is crucial to the assessment of the actual impact of the law on young persons (see p. j. monahan, b. shaw and p. ryan, constitutional law (5th ed. 2017), at p 469). [146] in this case, the appeal options set out in s 37 of the ycja form part of a comprehensive scheme designed to implement the declaration of principle made in s 3 together with the restorative and rehabilitative concepts outlined in the preamble to the ycja. section 3(1)(b) in particular provides: (b) the criminal justice system for young persons must be separate from that of adults, must be based on the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability and must emphasize the following: (i) rehabilitation and reintegration, (ii) fair and proportionate accountability that is consistent with the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity, (iii) enhanced procedural protection to ensure that young persons are treated fairly and that their rights, including their right to privacy, are protected, (iv) timely intervention that reinforces the link between the offending behaviour and its consequences, and (v) the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for enforcing this act must act, given young persons’ perception of time; [147] it is evident that the ycja is designed to balance multiple interests. first, as fish j noted in r v. rc, 2005 scc 61, [2005] 3 scr 99, “[i]n keeping with its international obligations, parliament has sought as well to extend to young offenders enhanced procedural protections” which they alone enjoy (para 41) these wide- ranging procedural safeguards were aptly summarized by abella and brown jj. in r. v. kjm, 2019 scc 55, at para. 142 (dissenting, though not on this point): such enhanced procedural rights in the ycja include: extrajudicial measures (ss. 4 to 12); notice to parents (s 26); the possibility of compelling parents to attend court (s 27); an enhanced right to counsel (ss. 10(2)(d), 25 and 32); specific obligations for youth justice court judges to ensure that young persons are treated fairly (s 32); reducing the possibility of bail (s 29); creating the option of releasing young persons who would otherwise be denied bail (s 31); de novo bail reviews (s 33); the right of young persons to be separated from adults in temporary detention (s 30); enhanced procedural safeguards surrounding the admissibility of statements made by young persons to authorities (s 146); and a distinct sentencing regime (ss. 38 to 82). [148] second, the long-recognized need for enhanced timeliness and promptness in the resolution of youth cases, a principle that has been a leitmotif of this court’s jurisprudence as well as of canada’s international obligations, is codified in s 3(1)(b)(iv) and s 3(1)(b)(v) of the ycja internationally, the united nations convention on the rights of the child, can. ts 1992 no. 3, which is named in the ycja’s preamble, guarantees the right of young persons to have criminal proceedings against them determined without delay (art. 40(2)(b)(iii)). likewise, rule 20.1 of the united nations standard minimum rules for the administration of juvenile justice, a/res/40/33 (november 29, 1985), provides that cases involving young persons “shall from the outset be handled expeditiously, without any unnecessary delay” it is significant that s 3(1)(b)(iv) and s 3(1)(b)(v) had no equivalent in the former young offenders act (bala and anand, at p 441). [149] in a similar vein, the court, in determining how presumptive ceilings with respect to unreasonable delays apply in youth cases, recognized in kjm that the interest in timeliness in such cases requires a more holistic approach, one that is multifaceted rather than being focused only on rehabilitation. it identified five main reasons why timeliness has special significance for young persons: reinforcing the connection between actions and consequences. first, because young persons have “a different perception of time and less well- developed memories than adults”, their ability to appreciate the connection between actions and consequences is impaired. . reducing psychological impact. second, bearing in mind that any time spent awaiting trial occupies a greater proportion of a young person’s life than an adult’s, and that young persons perceive time differently than adults do, delay may have a greater psychological impact on a young person. . preserving the right to make full answer and defence. third, memories tend to fade faster for young persons than for adults. the increased rapidity with which a young person’s memory fades may make it more difficult for him or her to recall past events, which may in turn impair his or her ability to make full answer and defence, a right which is protected by s 7 of the charter . avoiding potential unfairness. fourth, . . [w]here a prolonged delay separates the offending conduct from the corresponding punishment, the young person may experience a sense of unfairness, as his or her thoughts and behaviours may well have changed considerably since the offending conduct took place. therefore, to avoid punishing young persons for “who they used to be”, delay should be minimized. advancing societal interests. fifth, trying young persons in a timely manner advances societal interests. society has an interest in seeing young persons rehabilitated and reintegrated into society as swiftly as possible. [citations omitted; paras. 51-55.] [150] also of significance is the role of timeliness in relation to the psychological state of victims, themselves often children, as illustrated in the instant case. this flows from the rule regarding “special considerations” in s 3(1)(d)(ii) of the ycja to the effect that “victims . . . should suffer the minimum degree of inconvenience as a result of their involvement with the youth criminal justice system”. [151] thus, promptness and enhanced procedural protection are both core tenets of the youth criminal justice system (see s davis-barron, youth and the law in canada (2nd ed. 2015), at p 177). in creating a separate youth system with distinct procedures, parliament has acknowledged that, while young persons are uniquely vulnerable to miscarriages of justice, they are also uniquely vulnerable to harms resulting from protracted legal proceedings. these unique vulnerabilities are two sides of the same coin, and will at times even overlap. as abella and brown jj. noted in kjm, “timeliness as a procedural safeguard takes on heightened significance for young persons” in the context of a trial, not least because delays could also affect their ability to make full answer and defence (para. 151 (underlining added)). [152] i am of the opinion that a contextual understanding of the place of young persons in the procedural scheme of the ycja must also account both for their interest in prompt resolution and for the general prejudice of interacting with the criminal justice system, given that “the ameliorative effect of the law on others and the multiplicity of interests it attempts to balance will also colour the discrimination analysis” (withler, at para. 38). [153] i hasten to emphasize, however, that in considering the relevance of timeliness to the question whether s 37(10) perpetuates a disadvantage faced by young persons, i am not seeking to justify any such disadvantage on the basis that it is relevant to a legitimate state objective or on the basis of the ameliorative effect of the ycja as a whole — such concerns are properly left to the inquiry under s 1 of the charter, and then only to the extent that they can specifically justify the impugned limitation (fraser, at para. 69). rather, i am simply giving full effect to the contextual analysis mandated by this court’s approach to substantive equality (fraser, at para. 42). the inquiry under s 15(1) of the charter into the perpetuation of a disadvantage requires attention to “the full context of the claimant group’s situation” and to “the actual impact of the law on that situation” (withler, at para. 43; see also taypotat, at para. 17). the result of this contextual inquiry may in turn be to reveal that differential treatment is discriminatory because it perpetuates disadvantage, that it is neutral, or “that differential treatment is required in order to ameliorate the actual situation of the claimant group” (withler, at para. 39) this court must, therefore, in assessing the actual impact of a leave requirement, have regard to the full context of the situation of young persons, which, i find, includes the fact that a structurally prolonged appellate review can be more prejudicial to them. [154] with respect, abella j.’s analysis on s 37(10) does the opposite, as it deviates from the contextual approach mandated by substantive equality. in my view, considered in context, s 37(10) does not perpetuate any disadvantage but, rather, appropriately balances the overlapping interests of young persons in prompt resolution and in appellate review, given the common sense understanding that there will be an inherent and inevitable trade-off between these interests. [155] above all, it should be borne in mind that s 37(10) applies equally to the crown. viewed in context, a leave requirement confers the corollary procedural benefit for young persons of being protected from an as of right appeal by the crown pursuant to s 693(1)(a) of the criminal code, a safeguard that is not afforded to adults. where a young person is acquitted by the court of appeal but one judge of that court dissents on a question of law, s 37(10) acts as a bulwark against protracted delays, and the benefit of finality and closure conferred by the provision is far from trivial, not just for the accused, but also for the complainants, who may themselves be young persons. the claim that this provision offers only “the possibility of saving a few months” loses sight of this crucial contextual aspect (abella j.’s reasons, at para. 102). in other words, this claim disregards the fact that invalidating s 37(10) would also equip the crown with an automatic appeal against a young person who has been acquitted. in my view, to dismiss the young person’s interest in timeliness as an argument that is relevant only to the justification inquiry under s 1 would be to bypass the contextual assessment that is needed in order to grasp the actual impact of the provision. [156] it is true that, in a case in which leave is ultimately granted, s 37(10) will have prolonged the process slightly for a young person whose conviction led to a dissent in the court of appeal. but this negates neither the promptness achieved where leave is denied nor the structural disincentive flowing from a leave requirement and its impact on timeliness in the youth criminal justice system as a whole. as well, leave applications can be heard more quickly than appeals and are likely to be expedited where young offenders are involved. considered in the context of the ycja as a whole, s 37(10) legitimately fosters promptness and timeliness. [157] these benefits of the provision must also be considered in conjunction with the absence of evidence that this court’s leave process perpetuates a tangible disadvantage for young persons put plainly, abella j.’s contention that “young people’s access to this court has lagged behind” is not borne out by any evidence in the record before us (para. 68). neither the appellant nor my colleague could point to a single case in which this court denied leave to a young person where a judge of a court of appeal had dissented. i would add that young persons are not denied access to this court, given that “[t]he right to apply for leave is itself a right of access to the [c]ourt” (krishnapillai v. canada (ca), 2001 fca 378, [2002] 3 fc 74, at para. 24, quoting bains v. canada (minister of employment and immigration) (1990), 47 admin. lr. 317 (fca), at p 318). the final bulwark against a miscarriage of justice is not, strictly speaking, a right to an automatic appeal, but the right of appeal itself, whether by leave or as of right; moreover, “continuous re‑litigation is not a guarantee of factual accuracy” (toronto (city) v. cupe,. local 79, 2003 scc 63, [2003] 3 scr 77, at para. 41). where a young person brings an application for leave to appeal against an affirmed conviction after a judge of the court of appeal dissents on a question of law, this court is uniquely suited in such circumstances to consider all relevant factors, including arguments pointing to a miscarriage of justice. given the particular costs for young persons of an automatic oral hearing and an in-depth review of the record by a full panel, such a proceeding will not serve their interests in every case this is especially true in light of the dictum that “[s]ometimes the opportunity for more opinions does not serve the ends of justice” (kourtessis, at p 70). [158] needless to say, no member of this court would tolerate having a dubious conviction rest undisturbed simply to ensure a prompt resolution and i am of the opinion that nothing in a leave requirement implies that wrongful convictions are somehow more tolerable in the youth justice system this court is not to rely on a dissent as a blanket proxy for merit in all cases, although that might be a convenient metric in the adult system rather, s 37(10) allows it to take an individualized and sensitive approach which can also account for the harm of protracted appellate review in the youth justice system. [159] a decontextualized analysis fails to capture these essential features, and effectively equates equal treatment with identical treatment, which is an approach this court has consistently rejected (canadian foundation for children, at para. 51). the vulnerability of young persons in the criminal justice system is not exacerbated simply because a provision of the ycja fails to offer the maximum imaginable procedural benefit available to adults. this is all the more true of a benefit that is unrelated, or has at best a dubious link, to their actual vulnerability and their unique needs. [160] in my view, the leave requirement under s 37(10) is one of several legitimate ways in which the youth justice system can provide different procedural avenues than the ones available to adults without degrading young persons’ equal worth or reinforcing their disadvantage. another is that young offenders are not entitled to a jury trial in every case in which an adult can elect trial by jury. nor do they enjoy the same right to a preliminary hearing, which has historically been narrower for young persons than for adults. and yet, in deciding whether direct indictments were available to the crown under the ycja, the court has previously acknowledged that parliament’s decision to restrict preliminary hearings for youth can actually be construed as a benefit: indictment will advance furthermore, it could even be said that there will be cases in which a direct the objectives and principles of the ycja. to preclude prosecutors from ever using it might place those objectives and principles in jeopardy. for example, the reason related to the psychological state of witnesses is especially significant in light of the special rule set out in s 3(1)(d)(ii) of the ycja that “victims should be treated with courtesy, compassion and respect for their dignity and privacy and should suffer the minimum degree of inconvenience as a result of their involvement with the youth criminal justice system”. similarly, it is recognized that the preliminary inquiry lengthens the judicial process, which has a greater impact on accused young persons, “given [their] perception of time”, and given that holding a preliminary inquiry could conflict with the objectives of promptness and speed provided for in s 3(1)(b)(v) of the ycja [emphasis in original; text in brackets in original.] (r v. sjl, 2009 scc 14, [2009] 1 scr 426, at para. 40; it should be noted that the case preceded amendments to the criminal code which restricted preliminary inquiries to offences punishable by 14 years or more.) [161] my colleague abella j and i agree that it is trite to say that the charter’s guarantee of equality requires neither a sameness or formal equality nor line-by-line parity with the criminal code, but rather a search for substantive equality young persons have different needs and vulnerabilities than adults, which is precisely why canada’s youth justice system “stands separate” from that of adults (kjm, at para. 49; rc, at para. 41). in my view, a leave requirement corresponds to that reality. [162] in choosing to deny young persons an automatic right to appeal to this court, parliament did not discriminate against them, but responded to the reality of their lives by balancing the benefits of appellate review against the harms inherent in that process, in keeping with the dictum that “there should not be unnecessary delay in the final disposition of proceedings, particularly proceedings of a criminal character” (kourtessis, at p 70). the fact that one specific feature of the youth system does not mirror a feature of the adult system is not a basis for a finding of discrimination. conclusion [163] accordingly, s 37(10) of the ycja is consistent with ss. 7 and 15 of the charter, and there is no need to proceed to an analysis under s 1. [164] i would dismiss the appeal. the following are the reasons delivered by kasirer j — overview [165] i have had the advantage of reading the reasons prepared by my colleagues the chief justice and abella and côté jj. with respect for other views, i have come to the conclusion, like the chief justice, that s 37(10) of the youth criminal justice act, sc 2002, c 1 (“ycja”), is constitutionally valid. i also conclude the guilty verdict rendered against the appellant, cp, was not unreasonable and the appeal should be dismissed on this basis. [166] to be most plain on the various matters before the court, i agree with abella j.’s reasons, and with those of the majority of the court of appeal, that the guilty verdict rendered against the appellant, cp, was not unreasonable. in respect of the second issue bearing on the constitutionality of s 37(10) of the ycja, i agree with abella j that this court has jurisdiction to decide the constitutional questions. i also share the chief justice’s view that s 37(10) is consistent with s 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. like him, i would leave the matter of whether s 7 requires a first right to appeal from a conviction entered by a court of appeal — a question not before this court — to another day. [167] my reasons differ from those of my colleagues on whether s 37(10) of the ycja infringes the equality guarantee in s 15(1) of the charter. our differences bear, in particular, on the application of s 1 of the charter to the requirement that a young person seek leave to appeal to this court where a court of appeal affirms a conviction on an indictable offence but there is a dissent on a question of law. like abella j., and based in particular on the judgments of this court in fraser v canada (attorney general), 2020 scc 28, and ontario (attorney general) v. g, 2020 scc 38, i conclude that s 37(10) of the ycja does constitute a limit on s 15(1) charter rights. but in my respectful opinion the crown has shown here that the limit to the equality right of young persons prescribed by s 37(10) of the ycja, when read in conjunction with s 691(1)(a) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, is justified in a free and democratic society. in the result, i would conclude that s 37(10) is constitutionally valid. [168] i hasten to say that i agree with many of the observations made by the chief justice in respect of the importance of timeliness to the rule in s 37(10) of the ycja and many of his remarks regarding the safeguards against a miscarriage of justice that are afforded to young persons who seek leave to appeal to this court in a criminal matter. i agree too with his view that the court’s leave process is sufficiently flexible to guard against the injustice brought by the leave requirement alleged by cp. the chief justice sees these considerations of timeliness and the safeguards as relevant features of the context for the determination of whether s 15(1) has been limited; instead, as i shall endeavour to explain, i understand them as pertinent to the demonstration that the limit on s 15(1) rights is justified under s 1 of the charter, which is a task that falls to the state i conclude that s 37(10) of the ycja is constitutionally compliant, but i propose to come to that conclusion using some of the chief justice’s arguments on this different path. [169] it is best to acknowledge, from the outset, that the burden of showing the limit on s 15(1) rights is justified that falls to the crown under s 1 is a heavy one. it is best to recognize, too, that the benefit of timeliness to youth rehabilitation and reintegration into society afforded by s 37(10) represents, at least in terms of time saved in the justice system, a relatively modest advantage over an appeal as of right. furthermore, it is plain that if the risk of a miscarriage of justice brought by the leave requirement in s 37(10) were a real one, that risk would likely outweigh the modest advantage of timeliness under the s 1 analysis. i share abella j.’s view — i am inclined to think that all members of this court would share her view — that swift injustice for a young person would be no justice at all. there is no virtue in timely rehabilitation of an innocent young person. section 37(10) would be a failed project if it championed rehabilitation over unsafe verdicts. [170] but in my respectful view, s 37(10) does not, practically speaking, expose a young person to a real risk of swift injustice and, notwithstanding the prima facie s 15(1) breach for age discrimination, it is nevertheless constitutionally valid. however modest, the timeliness advantage outweighs any true risk of a miscarriage of justice for young persons associated with the added leave requirement. there is no trivializing the risks of miscarriages of justice in the criminal law but, to my mind, the crown has demonstrated that any additional risk of a juridical error pointed to by cp is more theoretical than real. where a young person seeks leave to appeal against a conviction on a question of law on which there was a dissent below, and the proposed appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, there is every reason to believe that leave would be granted. avoiding the risk of a miscarriage of justice — even if the question of law was a matter of interest only to the parties — would in my view be a matter of public importance warranting leave to appeal under the applicable provisions in the supreme court act, rsc 1985, c. s-26, and the criminal code. [171] it was argued here, in particular, that the danger of miscarriage of justice is heightened when a young person must seek leave to appeal where, in the court of appeal, the dissent bears on an unreasonable verdict as the relevant question of law. i disagree when the leave process discloses an arguable case pointing to a possible miscarriage of justice on this basis, the matter would be elevated to one meeting the requisite standard of public importance. this is because all of society has a stake in the particular young person’s liberty interest even if the question of law in issue is not jurisprudentially significant. where the proposed appeal has a reasonable prospect of success — disclosed by the reasons of the dissenting judge, the application for leave, or the record filed in support thereof — leave would be granted because the public importance criterion will have been met. the notion that leave would be denied in such circumstances — that, for reasons of dispatch, leave would be denied to a reasonably arguable appeal from a young person’s conviction supported by a dissent below — is to suggest that this court would act in a manner contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, which is untenable. importantly, given the generous interpretation of leave criteria relevant in these circumstances, this court is able to identify such cases on a leave application and distinguish them from those which should not go forward to the merits. [172] imposing a leave requirement for young persons in the limited circumstances in which an appeal as of right to this court is available to adults under the criminal code is thus a proportionate measure open to parliament in pursuit of the objective of timeliness, early rehabilitation, and reintegration of young people in criminal matters this court is institutionally equipped to identify and grant leave, based on the leave application including the evidence filed, which allows it to guard against potential miscarriages of justice in circumstances where young persons would otherwise have had an appeal as of right pursuant to s 691(1)(a) of the criminal code. where there is no reasonable prospect of success for the proposed appeal, the leave requirement can bring an end to cases that manifestly do not raise this potential injustice in a timely manner, before proceeding to a full hearing. in that light, it was open to parliament, as the crown argues, to enact s 37(10) of the ycja, as a rule that brings an advantage of timeliness to young persons in a manner that outweighs any negative effects brought by the requirement of leave. for the reasons that follow, i conclude the limit on the guarantee against age discrimination is justified. the applicable legal principles [173] the burden is on the party seeking to rely on the impugned provision to establish that the limit on s 15(1) is justified under s 1 of the charter (r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at pp. 136-37) the law is well settled here: that party must demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective for the limit and that the means chosen to advance this objective do not disproportionately limit the s 15(1) right. proportionality demands that the limit be rationally connected to the stated pressing and substantial objective, that it be minimally impairing, and that its benefits outweigh its negative effects (ontario v. g, at para. 71). [174] the right to equality, like all charter rights, must sometimes give way to legitimate societal objectives i am mindful, however, that the relationship between s 15(1) and s 1 requires careful attention as one scholar has observed, there is something of a “normative mismatch” between these two provisions of the charter, in that “section 15 could be seen as an attempt to protect from the ‘tyranny of the majority’, . . . and section 1 brings back the idea that the needs of the whole might, on balance, justify discrimination” (s. lawrence, “equality and anti-discrimination: the relationship between government goals and finding discrimination in section 15”, in p. oliver, p. macklem and n. des rosiers, eds., the oxford handbook of the canadian constitution (2017), 815, at p 829). [175] wilson j explained in andrews v. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143, that the burden resting on the state to justify a limit on s 15(1) rights is rightly an onerous one (p 154). i agree with professor s. martin, writing before she was a judge, that “a strong understanding of the interrelationship of equality, freedom and democracy under the charter will provide the basis to distinguish between infringements which are reasonable and demonstrably justified” and those which are not (“balancing individual rights to equality and social goals” (2001), 80 can. bar rev 299, at p 364) the focus of the inquiry must be “on the seriousness of the discrimination and its relationship with the underlying values in a free and democratic society” (pp. 366-67; see also p 365). [176] on this latter point, i note that a limit on s 15(1) rights based on a person’s age has been viewed in some contexts as less serious and thus more easily justified. as professor p. w. hogg wrote, a “minority defined by age is much less likely to suffer from the prejudice of the majority than is a minority defined by race or religion or any other characteristic that the majority has never possessed and will never possess” (constitutional law of canada (5th ed supp (loose-leaf)), vol. 2, at p 55-66). moreover, it is notable that this court has found limits on s 15(1) rights on the basis of age to be more susceptible to justification based on legitimate state objectives (see, eg,. mckinney v. university of guelph, [1990] 3 scr 229, at pp. 297 and following; stoffman v. vancouver general hospital, [1990] 3 scr 483, at pp. 520-31; harrison v university of british columbia, [1990] 3 scr 451, at pp. 463-64; see also, relatedly, a.c v. manitoba (director of child and family services), 2009 scc 30, [2009] 2 scr 181, at para. 110). [177] the justification analysis must be attentive to the context of the legislative objectives at issue (see, eg,. c. d. bredt, “the right to equality and oakes: time for change” (2009), 27 njcl 59, at p 73). the state must not only identify a pressing and substantial objective (fraser, at paras. 125-29), but that objective must also be scrutinized so that state conduct resulting in the most odious forms of discrimination is not excused. as iacobucci j., dissenting, put it in egan v. canada, [1995] 2 scr 513, “a constitutionally impermissible purpose will not save a law under s 1” (para. 210; see also vriend v. alberta, [1998] 1 scr 493, at paras. 115-16). when considering whether the objective is pressing and substantial, for example, an avowed purpose of “injuring or degrading” a group would be plainly illegitimate (v. c. jackson, “proportionality and equality”, in v. c. jackson and m. tushnet, eds., proportionality: new frontiers, new challenges (2017), 171, at p 175). [178] this does not, however, preclude limits that “promote other values and principles” (m v. h., [1999] 2 scr 3, at para. 107 (emphasis in original); d. proulx, “droit à l’égalité”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit public — droit constitutionnel (loose-leaf), vol. 2, by s. beaulac and j-f. gaudreault-desbiens, eds., fasc. 9, at nos. 6 and 47). at the rational connection stage, the key question is whether the prima facie discrimination at issue furthers the legitimate legislative objectives (see egan, at paras. 191-98, per iacobucci j., dissenting; m v. h., at paras. 109-16; centrale des syndicats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2018 scc 18, [2018] 1 scr. 522, at para. 44; ontario v. g, at para. 73). [179] if these hurdles can be overcome, a margin of appreciation is afforded to legislatures in selecting the means to achieve their objectives (quebec (attorney general) v. a, 2013 scc 5, [2013] 1 scr 61, at paras. 439-40, per mclachlin cj, concurring, and at paras. 401-5, per deschamps j., dissenting in part; centrale, at paras. 45-50). the means must fall within a range of reasonable alternatives open to a legislature to achieve its objectives so as to be minimally impairing (rjr‑macdonald inc v canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at para. 160; eldridge v. british columbia (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr 624, at paras. 93-94). finally, the benefits of the legislative objectives must, of course, outweigh their negative effects (centrale, at paras. 51-54). the limit on section 15(1) is justified under section 1 [180] mindful of these principles, i turn to the constitutional question at issue. the notice of constitutional question summarizes cp’s specific concern with s 37(10) of the ycja as it relates to s 15(1) of the charter, and connects it to s 691(1)(a) of the criminal code: does s 37(10) of the youth criminal justice act, s.c 2002, c 1, infringe s 15(1) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms by impermissibly discriminating against young people to the extent that it purports to deny a young person whose conviction was upheld by a majority of the court of appeal the procedural benefit of an appeal as of right to the supreme court of canada pursuant to s 691(1)(a) of the criminal code, where such benefit is granted to an identically situated adult offender? [181] for indictable appeals in youth matters, the ycja incorporates the criminal code appeal provisions (ycja, s 37(1)) like an adult, a young person convicted of an indictable offence and whose conviction is unanimously affirmed by the court of appeal has an appeal to this court with leave on any question of law (criminal code, s 691(1)(b)). however, because s 37(10) of the ycja provides that the judgment of a court of appeal in a youth criminal matter cannot be appealed to this court except with leave, young persons, unlike adults, do not have an automatic right to appeal to this court where a conviction on an indictable offence is affirmed at the court of appeal and there is a dissent on a question of law (criminal code, s 691(1)(a)). the constitutional question before this court is particularized to this s 691(1)(a) appeal route. it is this narrow instance of prima facie age discrimination that the crown must therefore justify. [182] while the constitutional issue is being argued for the first time before this court, it bears noting that the question pertains to proceedings unique to this forum and, as the crown noted in its argument in support of the constitutionality of s 37(10), engages its particular institutional knowledge of the leave process (rf, at para. 38). indeed, when, as in this case, an enactment that limits the right to equality relating to the criminal justice system is scrutinized under s 1, judges’ “knowledge and understanding” of the workings of the courts may provide them with a “higher degree of certainty” than in some other settings when measuring whether the limit is justified in a free and democratic society (mckinney, at p 305). i also note the attorney general of canada intervened in this case and made submissions on s 1 of the charter with a view to justifying a provision enacted by parliament. a pressing and substantial objective [183] c.p does not accept that s 37(10) of the ycja has a pressing and substantial objective (af, at para. 92; transcript, at p 41). i must respectfully disagree. [184] according to the statutory declaration of principle in s 3 of the ycja, the youth criminal justice system is designed, in part, to promote timeliness, early rehabilitation, and reintegration in youth criminal matters. section 3(1)(b) of the ycja provides that the criminal justice system for young persons must emphasize “(i) rehabilitation and reintegration, . . (iv) timely intervention that reinforces the link between the offending behaviour and its consequences, and (v) the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for enforcing this act must act, given young persons’ perception of time”. [185] while the case did not concern issues of constitutionality, in r v. c (tl), [1994] 2 scr 1012, sopinka j recognized that the policy favouring early resolution and rehabilitation was served by an analogous appeal provision under the young offenders act, rsc 1985, c. y-1 (p 1016; rf, at paras. 16 and 27; if,. agc, at para. 12) likewise, in the case of s 37(10) of the ycja, i agree with the attorney general of canada that “providing for appeals by leave instead of by right favours early resolution of matters involving youth to allow for commencement of the rehabilitation stage” (para. 54). [186] timeliness has special significance for young persons youth justice scholars have observed in this context that young people perceive time differently and have less well developed memories than adults (n. bala and s. anand, youth criminal justice law (3rd ed. 2012), at p 144). timeliness reinforces the connection between the actions and consequences, reduces psychological impact, avoids a sense of potential unfairness, and advances societal interest in seeing young persons rehabilitated and reintegrated into society as swiftly as possible (r v kjm, 2019 scc 55, at paras. 51-52 and 54-55). it has consequently been said that “[t]he effectiveness of the juvenile justice process depends at least in part on its timeliness” (j. a. butts, g. r. cusick and b. adam, delays in youth justice (2009), at p 8; see also department of justice, committee on juvenile delinquency, juvenile delinquency in canada: the report of the department of justice committee on juvenile delinquency (1965), at p 154). [187] in light of the above, i have no difficulty concluding that promoting timeliness, early rehabilitation, and reintegration in youth criminal matters is a pressing and substantial objective. b rational connection [188] a reasonable inference that s 37(10) of the ycja will help to bring about the pressing and substantial objective is sufficient to establish a rational connection (canada (attorney general) v. jti-macdonald corp., 2007 scc 30, [2007] 2 scr. 610, at para. 40; mounted police association of ontario v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 1, [2015] 1 scr 3, at para. 143). [189] c.p says s 37(10) of the ycja is not connected to the pressing and substantial objective of timeliness, early rehabilitation, and reintegration. the total time to process and decide a leave application, he says, is not materially shorter than the time to hear and decide an as of right appeal and, if leave is granted, the total time is longer than an as of right appeal. [190] i disagree section 37(10) of the ycja is rationally connected to the relevant objective by requiring leave in those circumstances where there would otherwise be appeals as of right, this provision serves the goal of timeliness. the leave requirement may well serve as a disincentive to bringing an unmeritorious appeal. moreover, leave applications are generally decided more quickly than appeals on average, this court renders leave decisions in approximately four months (supreme court of canada, 2020 year in review (2021), at p 34). conversely, it takes cases at this court an average of eight months to be heard after leave is granted or a notice of appeal as of right is filed. should the appeal be taken on reserve, further time will elapse prior to the time judgment is rendered. as the attorney general of canada argues, the leave to appeal process can bring an early end to the proceedings of applicants whose potential appeals are without merit (para. 55) such applications for leave will be dismissed, rather than proceeding to a full appeal. in this way, and while it should be acknowledged the time saved is not always substantial, s 37(10) of the ycja is rationally connected to the goal of promoting timeliness, early rehabilitation, and reintegration when c.p argues that s 37(10) “does vanishingly little” (af, at para. 90) to advance the objective of early resolution of the adjudicative process for young people in order to facilitate rehabilitation, he is not denying a rational connection but proposing an argument that is best left to the final step of the proportionality analysis. [191] i do recognize the appeal process may be longer on average for those young persons who are successful in their leave applications to this court, as compared to a scenario in which there was no leave requirement. [192] the comparison proposed by c.p is, however, a difficult one to make. when the court grants leave, it does so on the unstated presumption that the proposed appeal is an arguable one or the question of law requires the guidance of the court. no such presumption obtains in respect of an appeal as of right. i note further that when leave is granted, an appellant is not necessarily confined to arguing the narrow question of law identified by the dissent in the court below as in an appeal as of right. unless this court restricts the issues that will be heard, leave to appeal is generally understood to be granted at large (r v. keegstra, [1995] 2 scr 381, at para. 28). this makes the comparison difficult. [193] but, in any event, cp’s observation, as it relates to appeals in which the court sees some prima facie merit at the leave stage, does not preclude a finding that s 37(10) of the ycja is rationally connected to the legislative objective. section 37(10) of the ycja is designed to bring a rapid conclusion to those cases where there is no reason to hear the appeal which raises a question of law that is without merit. this is broadly analogous to the power courts of appeal have to dismiss summarily an appeal as of right on a question of law that is frivolous without a full hearing on the merits (criminal code, s 685(1)) section 37(10) of the ycja therefore furthers the legislative goal of timeliness, early rehabilitation, and reintegration in youth criminal matters. c minimal impairment [194] the question at this step of the analysis is whether s 37(10) of the ycja falls within a range of reasonable alternatives open to parliament to achieve its objective this margin of appreciation afforded to legislatures, as mclachlin cj. explained in quebec v. a, is particularly important where the measure seeks to balance legitimate competing social values (para. 439). in that case, the provincial legislature sought to balance equal treatment of property rights and support obligations in conjugal relationships against individual freedom to choose whether or not to marry or enter into a civil union. mclachlin cj explained that the question the court must ask is whether “the law goes too far in relation to the goal the legislature seeks to achieve” (para. 442 (emphasis in original)). likewise, in this case, parliament set out to balance the various social objectives identified in the declaration of principle in designing a system of youth criminal justice (ycja, s 3). the question is whether parliament’s imposition of a leave requirement in s 37(10) goes too far to achieve its objective of timeliness, early rehabilitation, and reintegration in youth criminal matters. [195] c.p says s 37(10) of the ycja is not minimally impairing because the leave to appeal process is no substitute for an appeal as of right. i acknowledge that imposing a leave requirement on an otherwise meritorious appeal could raise a potential for miscarriage of justice that is not present in the case of adults who have an appeal as of right. youth must first convince this court to grant leave before their appeal is heard on the merits, even though they are at least as susceptible to wrongful conviction. however, in my view, the leave to appeal process serves as an effective bulwark against miscarriages of justice and is sufficient to fulfill the requirement of minimal impairment. [196] this court exercises its leave power in a manner that allows it to hear appeals in cases raising a potential miscarriage of justice i acknowledge the observations that, as a general matter, leave to appeal is granted exceptionally (m. vauclair and t. desjardins, traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales (27th ed. 2020), at para. 341), and that “[t]he single most important criterion determining the success or failure of a leave application is the public importance of the issues it raises” (e. meehan, et al., supreme court of canada manual: practice and advocacy (loose-leaf), at p 3-3). but commentators have also long recognized that the concept of “public importance” does not necessarily mean that the issue raised in the application has a far-reaching impact on the law in criminal matters, as the crown observes (rf, at para. 39). sopinka j., speaking extra-judicially, noted that in criminal matters the public importance criterion is “not applied as strictly. if an applicant has not had a fair trial or was possibly wrongfully convicted, we may grant leave even in the absence of an ‘earth-shaking’ issue of law” (meehan, at pp. 3-4 to 3-4.1, quoting an address by sopinka j given on april 10, 1997). this principle was corroborated by iacobucci j., writing extra-judicially, who stated that “even where there has been no dissent or reversal of an acquittal at the court of appeal, leave to appeal in criminal cases often is granted given that criminal cases are frequently considered to raise issues of public importance because they involve the liberty of the subject” (f. iacobucci, “the supreme court of canada: its history, powers and responsibilities” (2002), 4 j. app. prac. & process 27, at pp. 34-35). [197] there is only one circumstance we are called upon to consider by the constitutional question in this appeal: when a young person who is convicted of an indictable offence, and whose conviction is affirmed by the court of appeal, seeks to appeal to this court like an adult, the young person has a right of appeal on any question of law on which a judge of the court of appeal dissents. unlike an adult, by reason of s 37(10), the young person’s right of appeal requires leave. [198] cp says this constitutes a limit on his s 15(1) right to equality that cannot be justified under s 1. he argues — and in this he is joined by the intervener criminal lawyers’ association (ontario) (“cla”) — that when that question of law upon which the dissent rests is an unreasonable verdict, the added requirement of leave creates a serious risk that leave will be denied because the question of law will not be seen as one of “public importance”. [199] the cla says that “a test of ‘public importance’ implies that the legal issues at stake in the case must transcend the particular dispute between the two parties” (if, at para. 12). the cla submits that an unreasonable verdict, while a question of law, does not typically raise a question that transcends the parties’ particular dispute. generally speaking, an appeal based on a dissent that has identified a verdict as unreasonable does not raise a novel or unsettled point of law that requires direction from this court. as a result, submits the intervener, “an unreasonable conviction, will, largely, not be reviewed by this court and errors upon which provincial courts of appeal cannot agree will not be corrected. wrongful convictions will result” (para. 2). [200] i disagree. this risk of wrongful convictions decried by cp and the cla rests on a flawed understanding of the leave process. [201] in my view, the public importance criterion is best understood in this context as one that is engaged not only by jurisprudentially important legal issues that qualify as issues of public importance on that basis, but also by those that raise serious questions of law about the safety of the verdict in criminal matters the issue of a wrongful conviction transcends the particular defendant and engages the integrity of our system of justice as a whole, thereby raising issues of public importance for the purposes of granting leave to appeal. [202] by way of example, i note that in r v. hay, 2010 scc 54, [2010] 3 scr. 206, the defendant sought leave to this court on the ground that the guilty verdict was unreasonable (para. 1). cromwell j., writing for the panel of three judges, found it was in the interests of justice to order the release of certain exhibits for the purpose of this leave application, due to the possible significance of this evidence to the unreasonable verdict issue (para. 9). ultimately, leave to appeal was granted, fresh evidence related to the released exhibits was admitted and the appeal was allowed on that basis (r v. hay, 2013 scc 61, [2013] 3 scr 694, at paras. 74-75 and 78) these proceedings suggest strongly that this court is alive to issues of unreasonable verdicts at the leave to appeal stage even if those issues do not necessarily demonstrate a broad legal importance that transcends the interests of the parties beyond the possibility of a wrongful conviction. this court is unquestionably concerned with the possibility of miscarriages of justice (see, eg,. r v. biniaris, 2000 scc 15, [2000] 1 scr 381, at para. 26) and can be expected to exercise its power to grant leave accordingly. [203] i note as well that in r v r (r.), 2008 onca 497, 90 o.r (3d) 641, doherty ja discussed leave to appeal to a provincial court of appeal from a decision upholding a conviction on a summary offence and, in doing so, analogized to this court’s ability to grant leave to appeal for indictable offences (para. 20). notably, he explained that the interests of justice require granting leave where there is a “strong likelihood” an error of law by the lower court caused the conviction to be sustained (para. 34). in the same way, i am of the view that this court has the power to grant leave in youth criminal matters when the application for leave to appeal raises the risk that a miscarriage of justice will occur if the appeal is not heard and where the proposed appeal has a reasonable prospect of success. [204] indeed, as a guardian of rights under the charter (hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at p 169), this court has not only an ability to exercise its power to grant leave mindful of those rights and the fundamental principles of justice, but, in my view, has a responsibility to do so. [205] i also note that this court has the institutional capacity to identify possible miscarriages of justice through the leave to appeal process. in an application for leave, the applicant must file not only the lower court decisions and argument, but also any relevant excerpts of the transcripts or evidence, including exhibits, on which it intends to rely (rules of the supreme court of canada, sor/2002-156, r 25(1)) these materials must be filed with the court electronically, in addition to printed versions (r 26(1)), and, pursuant to the guidelines for preparing documents to be filed with the supreme court of canada (print and electronic), january 27, 2021 (online), electronically filed material must be searchable the overall result is that the evidentiary record relevant, for example, to advancing an argument based on an unreasonable verdict may be filed at the leave stage. [206] further, i recall that the as of right appeal from which cp would have benefited had he been an adult is restricted to instances where there is a dissent in the court of appeal on a question of law. the grounds for such dissent will be explicitly recorded in the formal judgment pursuant to s 677 of the criminal code in these circumstances, this court’s attention is not only drawn to the dissent, but to the question of law that meant the dissenting judge would have arrived at a different outcome. in deciding whether a proposed appeal meets the criteria for granting leave, this court will naturally consider, as a practical matter, the presence of a dissent in the court below as one sign that the appeal may well have a reasonable prospect of success. in some measure, one might be inclined to say that the very fact of the dissent is something of a red flag; it serves as a signal to the possible seriousness of the appeal for which leave is sought in fact, a study of leave decisions between 1993 and 1995 noted that a “dissenting vote in the lower appellate court also catches the eye of the court; dissents are significantly and positively related to leave decisions” (r. b. flemming, tournament of appeals: granting judicial review in canada (2004), at p 70; see also p 10) it follows that the leave process provides an effective safeguard for young persons in those cases where a similarly situated adult would have an appeal as of right under s 691(1)(a). [207] for these reasons, i conclude that parliament’s decision to impose a leave requirement in these circumstances in pursuit of the goal of timeliness, early rehabilitation, and reintegration in youth criminal justice matters is one that minimally impairs the s 15(1) right. d overall proportionality [208] the final question is whether the crown has met its burden to show that the benefits of s 37(10) of the ycja outweigh its negative effects. this case requires the court to balance the benefits of the timely conclusion of youth criminal matters against the discriminatory impact of imposing a leave requirement in circumstances where adults can appeal as of right. [209] section 37(10) of the ycja addresses the heightened degree of prejudice associated with structurally drawn-out appellate review as doherty j.a noted in r (r.), “[p]rolonged appellate proceedings detract from the timeliness and finality of criminal verdicts dispositions in criminal matters made in the detached, rarefied climate of the appeal court, years after the relevant events, by a court with virtually no connection to the place or people affected by the allegation are not the ideal way to resolve criminal cases” (para. 16). timeliness is an especially important goal in youth criminal justice with demonstrable and long-recognized benefits (kjm, at paras. 51-52 and 54-55) and s 37(10) of the ycja confers those benefits by allowing this court to filter out appeals that are without merit at the leave stage as i noted above, the leave process is, on average, completed sooner than the hearing of an appeal as of right. [210] this benefit must be weighed against the negative effects caused by the prima facie discrimination in this case, this is the fact that young persons whose conviction for an indictable offence is affirmed by a court of appeal, but with a dissent on a question of law, must seek leave to appeal to this court. [211] i acknowledge that the appeal as of right to this court has been described as “very meaningful” (house of commons, minutes of proceedings and evidence of the legislative committee on bill c-53, no. 1, 2nd sess., 33rd parl., october 5, 1987, at p 17 (robert kaplan)). it is no doubt true that this court retains jurisdiction as a so- called “court of error” on some questions of law in criminal matters but, when compared carefully to the right of appeal with leave, the different role of the appeal as of right should not be overstated. as the crown underscores, s 37(10) of the ycja does not deny a young person the possibility of an appeal to this court (rf, at para. 38). it affords young persons the ability to seek leave to appeal on the basis of the process i have described above. even where leave is required, this court is alerted to the fact that a dissent by a court of appeal judge raises doubt, in the mind of that judge, about the safety of the verdict and is able to measure the seriousness of the argument that there has been a miscarriage of justice the leave process allows this court to identify and grant leave in those cases where there is a reasonable prospect that an appeal may correct a miscarriage of justice. [212] to summarize on this point, i recall that parliament, in enacting s 37(10) of the ycja, did not choose to take away a young person’s access to this court, it only added a leave requirement. when deciding the leave application, this court will have the benefit of the reasons offered in the dissent below on the question of law on appeal, as isolated by s 677 of the criminal code. the court will have the argument in support of leave and the required supporting materials, including evidence at trial, that will allow the court to measure whether the question of law raises a meritorious appeal. most importantly, and contrary to what cp and some of the interveners have argued before us, the criteria for granting leave as relevant to youth criminal matters means that when the liberty of the young person is at stake, a prima facie meritorious appeal on the question of law — including an unreasonable verdict argument — would meet the public importance standard even if the matter does not, on its face, transcend in jurisprudential importance the interest of the parties. where, in such cases, the leave application discloses a reasonable prospect of success, this court can grant leave. [213] for the reasons outlined above, i am confident that the leave process provides a safeguard for youth in circumstances where an adult would have an appeal as of right. it was open to parliament to seek a legislative path that places greater weight on the negative effect of longer appellate proceedings that have no utility while simultaneously maintaining access for meritorious appeals through the leave process. [214] for these reasons, i conclude that the benefits in terms of timeliness outweigh the negative effects of the prima facie discrimination at issue. any enhanced risk of miscarriage of justice as a result of having to seek leave to appeal in the circumstances raised in the notice of constitutional question is minimized by the leave to appeal process. imposing a leave requirement in service of the broader goals of youth criminal justice is consistent with the place of equality in a free and democratic society. conclusion [215] i would dismiss the appeal. [216] in answer to the constitutional questions raised here, i conclude that s 37(10) of the ycja does not infringe s 7 of the charter it amounts to a limit of s 15(1) of the charter, but one that is justified by s 1. accordingly, i would conclude that s 37(10) of the ycja is constitutionally valid. the following are the reasons delivered by côté j — overview [217] this is an appeal from a verdict of guilty of sexual assault entered by crosbie j of the ontario court of justice. the appellant, cp, was 15 years old at the time of the events and was therefore tried pursuant to the youth criminal justice act, sc 2002, c 1. [218] it was not in dispute that c.p had had sexual intercourse with the complainant, rd, who was 14 years old at the time, at a beach party where both had been drinking alcohol. because rd had no memory of the intercourse, she was unable to provide direct evidence that she had not consented. the central question in this case was thus whether rd had been too intoxicated to consent when the intercourse took place, and not whether she did or did not in fact consent. pinpointing the time of the sexual activity was key to answering this question if it had occurred early in the evening when rd was only beginning to experience some of the effects of the alcohol she was drinking, a capacity to consent could be inferred. however, if the intercourse had occurred later in the evening when rd was severely intoxicated, it would be open to the trial judge to infer that rd was incapable of consenting. [219] the trial judge (2017 oncj 277) found that the intercourse had occurred later in the evening. she therefore concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that rd had been too intoxicated to be capable of consenting at the time of the intercourse and that cp had had knowledge of her incapacity. [220] a majority of the court of appeal for ontario (2019 onca 85, 373 ccc. (3d) 244) upheld cp’s conviction. nordheimer ja, dissenting, would have entered an acquittal. cp is asking this court to set aside his conviction and to enter a verdict of acquittal. in the alternative, he asks us to order a new trial. i agree with cp that the verdict is unreasonable. [221] cp also submits that s 37(10) of the ycja, which deprives young persons of the automatic right of appeal that is available to adults where there is a dissent on a question of law in a court of appeal, violates ss. 7 and 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms and that the violations are not justified under s 1 of the charter. given that leave has been granted in this case, and given the conclusion i reach on the merits of the appeal, i decline to take a position on the charter arguments. however, i feel a need to reiterate the importance of a dissent on a question of law more particularly, in matters involving young persons, i am of the view that such a dissent, especially a powerful one like that of nordheimer ja in this case, clearly indicates that an appeal has some merit and that the conviction must be reviewed. [222] for the following reasons, i would allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and enter an acquittal. context [223] on april 23, 2016, a number of teenagers met outside a liquor store (“lcbo”) in toronto to “shoulder tap”, that is, to ask adults to go into the store and buy alcohol for them. the group of teenagers had planned to take alcohol to a nearby beach to celebrate the birthday of a certain t. among them were rd and cp. [224] rd and cp had known each other for about two months. they became friends by frequently spending time together with other teenagers after school and on weekends at a coffee shop. [225] it is not clear exactly when the group was at the lcbo. cp testified that he had arrived around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m and was there for about 30 to 45 minutes, whereas rd said they had been at the lcbo at about 9:00 or 10:00 pm. in any event, it is not in dispute that the lcbo closed at 10:00 pm and that the group would thus not have left later than that. [226] after obtaining bottles of vodka for their party, the group of teenagers made their way to the beach. cp and rd walked together to a streetcar that went in that direction. they sat close to each other in the streetcar and talked. on the way to the beach, the teenagers were drinking straight from the bottles and passing them around. [227] to get to the beach, they had to walk through a parking lot and then down a steep hill. when they arrived at the beach, a group of older youths, who were already there, had started a bonfire. the older group agreed to let the new arrivals join them. according to her friend gg,. rd was not drunk when they arrived at the beach. [228] once again, it is not clear exactly when the group got to the beach, although the evidence places the time of arrival somewhere between 10:00 and 11:00 pm. rd. told the police that the group had arrived during that period, and gg testified that they had arrived around 10:30 pm. cp’s account of the duration of the trip from the lcbo to the beach, which the trial judge did not reject, points to the same period. [229] cp and rd sat down together on a mattress by the fire. they talked and drank together after 15 to 20 minutes, they started french kissing on the mattress. their kissing was interrupted, however, when some people from the older group decided to throw the mattress into the fire. [230] having been forced to move, rd went to sit by some rocks about 5 to 10 feet away from the fire and cp went to talk with one of his friends for 5 minutes. [231] r.d did not testify at trial and was never cross-examined instead, the crown filed a videotaped statement rd had made to the police and a transcript of that statement. in her statement, rd had told the police that her memory was blurry, but that she remembered kissing cp on the mattress until it was thrown into the fire and sitting by the rocks. [232] cp testified that he had decided to leave his friend and join rd by the rocks because he wanted to continue kissing her. according to cp, they began again where they had left off. despite her allegedly blurry memory, rd did remember lying on the sand by the rocks covered with a blanket and kissing cp. [233] cp added that while they were kissing by the rocks, he started touching her crotch through her clothes. he testified that rd had then asked him to “fuck me, [c]”. cp admitted that this had taken him by surprise, but that he had no reason to doubt that she wanted to have intercourse with him. given the earlier kissing, this may have appeared as the natural culmination of what was happening between them. [234] cp testified that after rd had said “fuck me, [c.]”, he helped her pull down her pants and they had sexual intercourse. he did not use a condom, because he did not have any. he stated that rd had been conscious throughout the intercourse and that she did not appear to be too intoxicated to consent. rd told the police that she did not remember having had intercourse, but recalled pulling up her pants afterwards. [235] significantly, although there were about a dozen people around the fire, that is, within 5 to 10 feet of the place where the intercourse occurred, the crown did not call a single witness who had witnessed it and could tell the court whether rd had been passed out or had simply been tipsy. this is surprising, given that it took place only 5 to 10 feet away and thus must not have occurred unnoticed. in fact, there were a number of people who discussed that “event” among themselves that evening, and on social media the next morning. [236] cp testified that after they had finished, he stood up while rd pulled up her pants. as i mentioned above, although rd said that she did not remember having had intercourse with cp, she did recall pulling up her pants. [237] it is not in dispute that eg arrived at the party after the intercourse and found rd asleep with vomit on her, and that, on being awakened, rd had trouble talking and kept saying that she was cold. what is in dispute, however, is the timing of eg’s arrival in relation to the intercourse. [238] on the one hand, c.p testified that when he had stood up after having intercourse, he heard that his friends j and eg were arriving at the beach and decided to go talk to them, which he did for 10 to 15 minutes. cp,. j and eg then walked over to see rd and found her vomiting. in response to a leading question asked by the crown in cross-examination, cp agreed, however, that eg had gone “directly” over to rd. [239] on the other hand, eg, who had had little to drink that evening, testified at trial that she had arrived at the beach after the rest of the group and went directly over to rd upon arriving. but this testimony is inconsistent with eg’s statement to the police that she drank some of the vodka that had been left and then stayed with rd. for the rest of the evening. if she stayed with rd throughout the evening, there is no time when she could have drunk vodka other than between her arrival at the beach and her observation of rd lying asleep, which has the effect of widening the gap between the time of the intercourse and the time when she went to see rd. [240] eg also said that cp was very drunk when she arrived. according to her testimony, cp was having difficulty walking, and kept repeating himself and making random comments. [241] gg who was also at the beach that evening, confirmed that cp was quite intoxicated that evening she also testified that when she left the party around 12:30 am,. eg had not yet arrived. gg added that rd had started throwing up just before she left. [242] at either 1:24 or 1:49 am,. rd had a telephone conversation with ll, another teenager who was not at the party l.l testified that r.d was slurring her words over the phone. she also kept apologizing, but he did not know the reason why. at the time, ll and rd had been seeing each other romantically, but they were not in a formal relationship. [243] later on, the mothers of three of the girls arrived at the beach to take them home r.d was helped up the hill to the parking lot while the mothers were assembling the teenagers in the parking lot, r.d and c.p were seen hugging each other: rd had her hands around cp’s waist and her head was resting on his shoulder. rd then got into the vehicle of eg’s mother. [244] eg’s mother did not take rd home. it had instead been decided that she would be taken to gg’s house. gg’s mother gave rd toast and water and offered her a bed. rd’s mother was then informed that her daughter was staying at gg’s house. [245] the next morning, rd’s mother picked her up at gg’s house and took her home. rd went back to sleep. after waking up, she read a text message from one of her friends, who told her that a picture of her sleeping under a blanket on the beach, with the caption “[s]he fucked [c.] then passed out”, was being sent around. humiliated, rd said to her friend, “i wanna die [sic]”. ll, the boy rd was seeing at the time, also got the message. clearly upset, he forwarded the picture to rd and said “u fucked [c]. thats why im done [sic]”. rd answered “i don’t remember that tho [sic]”. [246] alarmed by the situation, rd called her mother to her bed and told her about the rumour. rd’s mother provided double hearsay evidence7 to the effect that her daughter rd had told her that some of her friends were saying that cp had had sex with her while she was passed out on the beach; at least, that is how rd’s mother interpreted the situation. it is noteworthy, however, that none of the text messages rd. received that morning mentioned that cp had had sex with her while she was passed out. rather, the message indicated that she had had sex with cp and then passed out. 7 although the hearsay evidence was admissible because the defence did not object to it, it should nonetheless be of lower probative value. [247] rd’s mother decided to take her daughter to the hospital to be examined. the medical staff swabbed rd and found dna that was later confirmed to match that of cp. rd initially refused to report the incident to the police. however, her mother managed to convince her to do so by saying, among other things, that not to report it would amount to condoning the fact that cp had had sex with her while she was passed out, although rd could not confirm that it had in fact occurred while she was passed out and the text messages were actually to the opposite effect when making her statement to the police later in the day after she went to the hospital, she was asked whether she had wanted to have sex with cp, and her answer was “i don’t remember it so, i don’t, i don’t think so”. decisions of the courts below a ontario court of justice, 2017 oncj 277 (crosbie j.) [248] the trial judge noted that it was not in dispute that cp had had sexual intercourse with rd. because rd’s lack of memory meant that she could not testify that she had not communicated consent, the crown’s case rested on the theory that her intoxication had made her incapable of consenting in any event. the crown therefore had to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) r.d was too intoxicated to consent; (2) cp knew that rd could not have consented; and (3) cp. did not have an honest but mistaken belief in consent. the trial judge concluded that all these elements were established beyond a reasonable doubt, and convicted cp of sexual assault. (1) actus reus — rd’s. incapacity to consent [249] the trial judge properly recognized that the timing of the sexual intercourse during the evening was crucial to the determination of whether r.d had been too intoxicated to consent: had the sexual activity occurred closer in time to when the group first arrived — when rd was drinking but not yet feeling significant effects of her alcohol consumption — the crown may well have had more difficulty establishing that rd lacked the capacity to consent. the further in time, however, to the point when r.d was asleep, motionless, incomprehensible, and vomiting, the more likely it is that the crown would be able to establish that r.d lacked the minimal capacity to consent. [emphasis added; para. 90 (canlii).] in other words, the question was how long after the intercourse rd was discovered by her friends in a state of extreme intoxication. if the crown was unable to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that it had taken place shortly before e.g saw rd, a finding of guilt would be unavailable. [250] although the trial judge fully understood the importance of the timing, she acknowledged that the evidence was insufficient for her to determine approximately when the intercourse had occurred during the evening: as the trial unfolded, it seemed there was a lack of clarity with respect to the timing of the sexual activity. as noted in the review of the evidence, the crown witnesses were only able to make a guess about when the group arrived at the beach. eg and gg did not witness any sexual activity and therefore could not help pinpoint the time it happened. rd had fragments of memory but certainly was not able to specify the timing of the incident. [emphasis added; para. 90.] [251] ultimately, the trial judge found that the intercourse had occurred shortly before eg arrived at the beach. she based this finding on “[t]he combination of eg’s and cp’s evidence” (para. 90). [252] first, the trial judge noted that eg had testified that she went over to rd. “instantly” upon arriving. [253] second, the trial judge opined that eg’s testimony was corroborated by that of cp. in his examination-in-chief, cp said that after the intercourse, he stood up and heard “that [j.] and eg . . . had arrived” (para. 92). he added that he then went to where they were and had a 10- to 15-minute conversation with them before they went to see rd. but the trial judge was of the view that cp had then confirmed, during his cross-examination, “that e.g went right over to r.d when she arrived” (para. 92 (emphasis added)). [254] to be able to rely on cp’s testimony as corroboration of eg’s evidence, the trial judge had to reject cp’s evidence that he had had a 10- to 15-minute conversation with eg before she went over to rd. the trial judge did so, and she based this conclusion on, among other things, her view (1) that cp had contradicted himself under cross-examination, (2) that eg’s evidence was more believable and (3) that cp’s testimony was unreliable because he had been too intoxicated at that point in the evening. this enabled the trial judge to isolate the answer cp had given in cross- examination and to use it to bolster eg’s testimony. [255] having found that the intercourse occurred shortly before eg’s arrival, the trial judge concluded that rd must have been incapacitated when it took place owing to her level of intoxication. indeed, the trial judge had noted that eg had found r.d “unconscious, vomit-laden and generally unresponsive” upon her arrival (para. 100). (2) mens rea — cp’s. knowledge that rd. was too intoxicated to consent [256] the trial judge “concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that cp knew or was reckless or wilfully blind to the fact that rd was so intoxicated that she could not have consented to sexual activity” (para. 117) in her view, rd’s impairment was evident to gg,. eg and cp. [257] the trial judge also found as a fact that rd did not say “fuck me, [c.]” first, she viewed cp’s evidence as neither credible nor reliable second, she had doubts about the plausibility of that communicated consent. because their relationship was a “platonic” one, it was unlikely that their kissing would naturally have led to rd. asking cp to have sex with her on a beach where there were people nearby (para. 126). in any event, the trial judge was of the opinion that even if rd had done so, “she was too intoxicated to have given voluntary consent to sexual activity” (para. 121). (3) defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent [258] lastly, the trial judge rejected cp’s defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent. she concluded that even if rd had said “fuck me, [c.]”, cp would not have been entitled to rely on that communicated consent without deciding conclusively, the trial judge stated that c.p was legally barred from relying on the defence either because of his intoxication or because his mind was clear enough for him to be well aware of rd’s incapacity and of the need to take reasonable steps to ascertain the voluntariness of her consent. b court of appeal for ontario, 2019 onca 85, 373 ccc (3d) 244 (1) dissent (nordheimer ja) [259] nordheimer ja, dissenting, found that the trial judge’s verdict was unreasonable. in his view, her finding that rd had been incapable of consenting was “incompatible with the whole of the evidence, especially the uncontradicted evidence” (ca reasons, at para. 15). nordheimer ja disagreed with the trial judge’s finding that the intercourse had occurred later in time during the evening. [260] first, nordheimer ja concluded that the trial judge had erred in law by failing to explain why she was isolating a single piece of cp’s evidence and rejecting all the rest. he noted that there was only one piece of evidence that could place the intercourse close in time to eg’s arrival. it consisted in a single answer given by cp. in cross-examination in response to an ambiguous suggestion made by the crown that eg had gone “directly” to rd upon her arrival. this single piece of evidence was crucial to the trial judge’s chain of reasoning. without it, there was no other evidence that could connect the time of the intercourse with that of eg’s arrival the only evidence eg could provide was that rd had been asleep when she arrived, but she could not say whether she had arrived shortly after or long after the intercourse, because she had not been there when it happened. nordheimer ja stated that, although it is open to a trier of fact to accept only some of a witness’s evidence, the trial judge had to provide an explanation for her crucial decision to reject all of cp’s evidence but this single answer. her not doing so constituted an error of law. [261] second, nordheimer j.a was of the opinion that the totality of the evidence demonstrated that “there was a larger gap in time between the sexual activity and eg’s arrival than the trial judge allowed for” (para. 31 (emphasis added)). eg’s statement that she had upon arriving found rd asleep could not therefore be relied on to establish that rd was incapacitated during the intercourse. it is quite possible that rd’s state changed from being capable to being incapable during that gap between the intercourse and eg’s arrival. [262] having found that the trial judge’s finding on the actus reus was unreasonable, nordheimer ja did not address the reasonableness of the decision to reject cp’s defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent. he would have set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal. (2) majority (macpherson ja. with feldman ja. concurring) [263] macpherson ja, writing for the majority, concluded that the verdict was reasonable. he disagreed with nordheimer ja’s reasoning. [264] first, macpherson ja was of the view that the trial judge had not erred in law by failing to explain her reasons for accepting only part of cp’s evidence and rejecting the rest. he stated that the trial judge had explained why she found that cp. was not credible and why she rejected his evidence on certain key points, such as its veracity on the question of the 10- to 15-minute conversation. it was therefore open to the trial judge to accept only some of cp’s evidence. [265] second, macpherson ja disagreed that the trial judge’s finding that the sexual activity had occurred immediately before e.g arrived at the beach was incompatible with the rest of the evidence in his view, what mattered was not “the exact time of eg’s arrival and observation of the complainant” (para. 56) rather, what was critical to the trial judge’s finding of incapacity was the relative time of eg’s arrival in relation to the intercourse. cp had testified that the gap in time between the intercourse and eg’s arrival was relatively narrow. ten or fifteen minutes would not have made a difference. issue [266] on the merits of cp’s appeal, the only question is whether the conviction of cp for sexual assault is reasonable. analysis [267] cp asks this court to set aside his conviction and to enter a verdict of acquittal. in the alternative, he asks us to order a new trial. cp raises three grounds of appeal. in my view, the verdict of guilty is unreasonable for two reasons. [268] first, there is a logical flaw in the trial judge’s reasoning that corrupts an evidentiary finding that is crucial to the outcome of the case. the trial judge made two irreconcilable findings on the one hand, she relied on cp’s recollection of events contemporaneous with the intercourse in order to convict him. but, on the other hand, she found that c.p had been too intoxicated at that point in the evening to be subsequently capable of testifying reliably about what had happened. this first reason alone would suffice for this court to order a new trial. [269] second, i am also of the view that the evidence is not capable of supporting the finding of incapacity to consent and that the court should therefore enter a verdict of acquittal instead of ordering a new trial an approach to the reliability of cp’s testimony that is consistent with the trial judge’s repeated findings to the effect that cp was quite intoxicated and that his memory of the crucial events was unreliable leads to the conclusion that the balance of the circumstantial evidence simply does not make it possible to pinpoint the time when the intercourse occurred. this means that the intercourse may have occurred at any time within an approximately two-hour window during which rd’s state changed from not being drunk to being unconscious. a whether the finding of incapacity was reached illogically [270] cp’s first ground of appeal is that the trial judge’s reasoning is illogical within the meaning of r v. beaudry, 2007 scc 5, [2007] 1 scr 190, and r v. sinclair, 2011 scc 40, [2011] 3 scr 3 illogicality may occur in “various ways” (sinclair, at para. 19). in the case at bar, cp argues that the trial judge made two irreconcilable findings of fact. on the one hand, she rejected cp’s evidence that he had had a 10- to 15-minute conversation with eg when she arrived at the beach and before eg went over to rd, because he had been quite intoxicated at that point in the evening but, on the other hand, the trial judge accepted another part of his evidence about what had happened at that point in the evening, that is, his testimony that he had heard “that [j.] and eg . . . had arrived” shortly after the intercourse. cp. submits that if he had been too inebriated at that time to be subsequently able to testify reliably about the conversation, he would logically also be unable to testify reliably that eg had arrived shortly after the intercourse. those two things would have occurred at the same time, a time when he was, in the trial judge’s view, too drunk to subsequently remember what had happened. cp points out that the trial judge failed to provide an explanation for this “selective reliance” (af, para. 120). i agree that the trial judge’s finding of incapacity was reached illogically. [271] as i mentioned above, the trial judge was well aware that the timing of the intercourse was the central issue of this case the defence did not dispute eg’s testimony that she had found r.d virtually passed out with vomit on her if the intercourse had occurred very shortly before eg’s arrival, an inference of incapacity would be more plausible than it would if the intercourse had occurred long before that time. according to gg,. rd was not drunk when the group arrived at the beach, but she became more and more drunk as time passed until she began throwing up around 12:30 am. if the intercourse had occurred early in the evening, at a time when rd. was either sober or, if drunk, not incapacitated, an inference of incapacity would therefore be too tenuous for cp to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. it is important to note that rd being intoxicated early in the evening would not mean that she was necessarily incapable of consenting. it was only when she reached the stage at which she became impaired to the point that she no longer had an operating mind — if that did in fact happen — that her consent would have become vitiated at law (see r. v. al-rawi, 2018 nsca 10, 359 ccc (3d) 237, at para. 66; r v. hutchinson, 2014 scc 19, [2014] 1 scr 346, at paras. 55-57; r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, at para. 88). [272] the trial judge was of the view that the question of the timing of the intercourse was answered by the “combination of eg’s and cp’s evidence” (para. 90) the combination of their evidence was indeed crucial to her finding of incapacity. eg testified that she had gone over to rd instantly and found her to be extremely intoxicated (para. 91). however, because eg was not at the beach when the intercourse occurred, her evidence alone could not serve to pinpoint the time of the intercourse in relation to the time when she saw that r.d was asleep even if it is assumed that eg went over to rd instantly upon her arrival, that does not establish whether she observed rd within minutes after the intercourse or an hour later. put simply, eg’s evidence alone was insufficient to support a finding of incapacity at the time of the intercourse. whatever the case may be, additional evidence was necessary in order to narrow the gap between the time of the intercourse and the time when she went to see rd. in this instance, only cp’s evidence could address the timing of the intercourse in relation to eg’s arrival and her observation of rd. [273] cp testified that after the intercourse, he had stood up and heard at the same time “that [j.] and eg . . . had arrived”. this statement by cp helped narrow the gap between the time of the intercourse and the time when eg went to see rd. the combination of this statement with eg’s testimony that she had gone over to rd. instantly made the two events contemporaneous, if not almost concomitant. however, cp added that he had had a 10- to 15-minute conversation with eg before she tended to rd, which meant that there was a gap of 10 to 15 minutes between the events in question according to cp,. rd’s state changed from being capable to being incapable during that time. [274] the trial judge bridged that 10- to 15-minute gap by rejecting the evidence that “[cp] spoke with eg before she tended to rd” for three reasons (para. 93). so far, there is nothing illogical in the trial judge’s reasoning. it is well established that it is open to a trier of fact to accept only some of a witness’s testimony (r v. jhs, 2008 scc 30, [2008] 2 scr 152, at para. 10; r v. mathieu (1994), 90 ccc (3d) 415 (que. ca), at p 430, per fish ja, aff’d [1995] 4 scr 46). it was therefore open to the trial judge to reject cp’s evidence about the conversation and accept only his evidence that he had heard eg arriving shortly after the intercourse, provided that she had a logical and reasonable basis for doing so. [275] where the trial judge’s reasoning becomes illogical, however, is in the three reasons she gave for rejecting cp’s evidence about the conversation: a) internal contradiction: c.p contradicted himself when he said, in his examination-in-chief, that he had had a conversation with eg before she went to see rd, but then indicated, in a single answer to a leading question asked by the crown in cross-examination, that eg had gone directly over to rd. upon arriving. b) external contradiction: the trial judge preferred eg’s version that she had not had a conversation with c.p upon arriving, because she found e.g more reliable and credible than cp. c) unreliability caused by intoxication: cp’s evidence was unreliable because “he was [too] intoxicated at this point” in the evening (paras. 91-94). the source of the illogicality stems from this third reason. [276] what is illogical is not the trial judge’s treatment of the existence or inexistence of the conversation, that is, her acceptance of a single answer from cp’s cross-examination that eg went directly over to rd and her rejection of the rest of his evidence relating to the issue of the conversation. nordheimer ja concluded that the trial judge’s relying on this single answer without giving any explanation constituted an error of law (ca reasons, at paras. 23-26). however, i am of the view that the trial judge did in fact give reasons for relying on this single answer and rejecting the evidence that the conversation took place. she rejected cp’s testimony about the conversation because alcohol had impacted his reliability, because he had contradicted himself and because she believed another witness instead of him. [277] rather, what was illogical was for the trial judge to find, on the one hand, that c.p could not testify reliably about what had happened after the intercourse because he had been too intoxicated at that point in the night, while also finding, on the other hand, that cp could nevertheless testify reliably about the fact that he had heard “that [j.] and eg . . . had arrived”. these findings are irreconcilable. if cp was too intoxicated at that time to be subsequently able to testify reliably about the conversation, his testimony about having heard e.g arriving was also necessarily unreliable. these two events would have occurred at the same point in time, that is, at a time when, in the trial judge’s view, c.p had been too drunk for his subsequent testimony to be reliable. [278] the crown counter-argues that the trial judge’s findings are in fact compatible. in the crown’s view, it was open to the trial judge to rely on her credibility findings in order to reject most of cp’s testimony and accept only some of his evidence. she made detailed adverse credibility findings at paras. 107-14. the crown adds that the other two reasons the trial judge gave — the internal and external contradictions — were sufficient to justify her rejection of cp’s evidence about the conversation and her acceptance of his evidence that eg’s arrival was contemporaneous with the intercourse. [279] i agree with the crown that those are two valid reasons for doing so. but that is beside the point. again, the problem is not that the trial judge irrationally rejected the evidence about the conversation. rejecting an internally contradictory testimony or believing another more credible and reliable witness is logical. rather, the problem is that she made two irreconcilable findings. she found that cp had been too drunk at that time to subsequently remember some things yet not too drunk to subsequently remember other things that would have happened at the same time. [280] in other words, if the trial judge had said that she was rejecting cp’s testimony about the conversation for only two reasons — the internal and external contradictions — and had not mentioned cp’s being intoxicated as an additional reason, her reasons would have been logical but by adding this third reason, she introduced illogicality into her reasoning. [281] the trial judge gave no reasons to explain this inconsistency on a crucial piece of evidence. without cp’s evidence that he had heard eg arriving after the intercourse, it was impossible to convict him the trial judge explained why she rejected the evidence about the conversation, not why she cherry-picked “a sort of island of acuity” from “a sea of oblivion” (r v. cedeno, 2005 oncj 91, 27 cr (6th) 251, at para. 20). [282] if i may borrow stratas ja’s words from south yukon forest corp v. canada, 2012 fca 165, 431 nr 286, at para. 46, and adapt them to the context of the case at bar, a logical flaw that corrupts an evidentiary finding that is crucial to the outcome of the case — the finding of incapacity here — does not merely pull at leaves and branches and leave the tree standing, but causes the entire tree to fall. because the finding of incapacity has fallen to the ground, the verdict of guilty is unreasonable and the conviction cannot stand. [283] where a logical flaw in a trial judge’s reasoning renders a verdict unreasonable within the meaning of beaudry and sinclair, a new trial must be ordered (sinclair, at para. 23). if, however, the verdict is at the same time unavailable on the record, an appellate court must enter a verdict of acquittal instead of ordering a new trial (para. 23). whether a verdict of acquittal should be entered or a new trial ordered in this case will therefore depend on my answer on cp’s second ground of appeal. b whether the finding of incapacity was reasonably available on the evidence [284] cp’s second ground of appeal is that the evidence available to the trial judge was capable of supporting neither her finding of incapacity nor, as a result, the verdict of guilty (r v. yebes, [1987] 2 scr 168; r v. biniaris, 2000 scc 15, [2000] 1 scr 381). as i mentioned above, if this second ground should succeed, the result will be an acquittal instead of a new trial. where, as in the instant case, the crown’s case is based on circumstantial evidence, the appeal court must determine “whether the trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accused’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence” (r v. villaroman, 2016 scc 33, [2016] 1 scr 1000, at para. 55). in contrast with the ground of unreasonableness under beaudry and sinclair, which is concerned with “fundamental flaws in the reasoning process that led to [the trial judge’s verdict]” (sinclair, at para. 4, quoting para. 77 (text in brackets in original); see also beaudry), this second ground of appeal is concerned with the weight of the evidence in the record. it “requires the appellate court to re-examine and to some extent reweigh and consider the effect of the evidence” (villaroman, at para. 55; see also biniaris, at para. 36). [285] in this case, i am of the view that the trial judge could not reasonably conclude that rd’s being incapable of consenting at the time of the intercourse was the only reasonable finding available on the evidence without the finding of incapacity, there was no case against cp, because neither rd nor any other witness had testified that rd had not consented as a matter of fact. consequently, the evidence is not capable of supporting the verdict of guilty, and a verdict of acquittal should be entered in its place. [286] the starting point of the re-examination of the evidence is the weight attached to cp’s testimony. in my opinion, the trial judge should have accorded far less weight to cp’s evidence about the timing of the intercourse in relation to eg’s arrival than she did in her reasons. the trial judge attached significant weight to cp’s evidence that he had heard eg arriving shortly after the intercourse. it constituted the centrepiece of her reasons. this was, however, incompatible with her repeated findings to the effect that cp had been quite intoxicated and was thus an unreliable witness. [287] after getting vodka from the lcbo, cp began drinking early in the night while the group was walking to the streetcar on the way to the beach. he continued drinking on the streetcar. once they arrived at the beach, he drank even more vodka around the bonfire. according to eg and gg, all this alcohol made cp very drunk. eg said that cp could not speak coherently or walk properly. gg added that cp. was stumbling. cp himself confirmed that he had drunk so much that his friend j told him to sit down because he could barely walk. [288] the trial judge made several adverse findings against c.p based on the evidence of his level of intoxication. first, she rejected his evidence that he had had a conversation with eg upon her arrival, because he had been too intoxicated at that point in the night for his testimony to be reliable. second, the trial judge noted that cp’s level of intoxication could explain “his lack of recollection about certain details” (para. 110). she added that, “if [cp] was as drunk as witnesses suggest, it would be understandable for him to have gaps in his memory” (para. 114). third, the trial judge concluded that, because of s 273.2(a)(ii) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, cp’s level of intoxication barred him legally from relying on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent. [289] in addition to cp’s unreliability based on his level of intoxication, the rest of the evidence relating to the timeline of the evening’s events further undermined the probative value of his evidence. the evidence did not permit the time of the intercourse to be determined beyond a reasonable doubt. a reconstruction of the timeline indicates that the intercourse may have occurred at any time during a window of roughly two hours. [290] first, rd and gg stated that the group had arrived at the beach sometime between 10:00 and 11:00 pm. this approximate time of arrival is consistent with the balance of the evidence. the group must have left the lcbo sometime before it closed at 10:00 pm. according to cp’s uncontradicted testimony, they then walked for 15 to 30 minutes, rode the streetcar for about 15 minutes, walked to the beach for 10 minutes and then discussed whether they would join the older group or start their own bonfire — these were all narrative details the trial judge did not reject. [291] second, 15 or 20 minutes after c.p and r.d sat down together on the mattress, they started kissing until it was thrown into the fire. shortly thereafter, cp. joined rd by the rocks and had intercourse with her. i agree with nordheimer ja. that, on the strength of judicial experience, the sexual activity occurred in all likelihood before rd had gotten vomit on her (ca reasons, at para. 31). in any event, the crown did not argue the contrary. [292] third, according to gg’s testimony, rd started throwing up sometime around 12:30 am. no witness other than gg saw when rd started throwing up. cp. testified that he had not been there, and eg arrived after that. gg left the party very shortly afterwards, at 12:30 a.m she was certain that she had left around that time, because she had looked at her phone before leaving. contrary to other witnesses who were only guessing about the timing of certain events, gg’s evidence in this respect was unambiguous. [293] fourth, e.g arrived at the beach sometime after 12:30 a.m gg’s testimony makes this timing limpid. indeed, gg was adamant that when she left at 12:30 am, she had not yet seen eg. in contrast, eg admitted that she was unable to affirm with certainty when she arrived it follows that e.g necessarily arrived sometime after 12:30 am. [294] fifth, following an undetermined period of time after her arrival, eg went over to rd and found her asleep with vomit on her. whether eg went directly over to r.d upon arriving or had a 10- to 15-minute conversation with c.p first, as he testified, should not have been given the weight the trial judge gave it. there was in fact ample evidence arising from eg’s testimony to support a conclusion that going over to r.d was not the very first thing she did upon arriving the first piece of evidence was the fact that eg told the police that, when she arrived, she had drunk some vodka that was left. as nordheimer ja noted, eg going over to rd instantly is inconsistent with her statement that she drank some vodka, because she also said that she had stayed with rd for her entire time at the beach until they all left. if she stayed with rd constantly after going to see her, she must have drunk the vodka before doing so. the second piece of evidence was eg’s statement that she had heard a rumour that cp and rd had had intercourse earlier in the evening. her statement implies that when she arrived, she had a conversation with some of the young people around the fire about the intercourse before going over to rd. this is what she said: . . . i’m not really too sure who was saying it but a few people were like, oh like, [rd] and [cp] like, had sex earlier today, tonight and i was like when? and they were like oh like, before you and [g.] showed up. . (ar, vol. ii, at p 30) [295] this timeline shows that there was roughly a two-hour window between (1) the group’s arrival at the beach between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m and (2) eg’s observation of r.d sometime after 12:30 a.m the evidence as a whole cannot reasonably be interpreted in such a way that rd’s being incapable of consenting is the only reasonable conclusion. the trial judge should have acquitted cp. once the reliability of cp’s testimony is approached coherently with the trial judge’s repeated findings to the effect that he had been quite intoxicated and that his memory of the crucial events was unreliable, it is simply impossible to pinpoint, even roughly, the time when the intercourse occurred on the basis of the rest of the circumstantial evidence. in fact, the available circumstantial evidence indicates that the intercourse may have occurred at any time in the two-hour window. rd’s level of intoxication changed considerably during that time from not being drunk, according to gg, upon arriving at the beach to being passed out later on. the trial judge herself acknowledged that, without cp’s evidence, the rest of the circumstantial evidence could not on its own pinpoint the time of the intercourse in that window: as the trial unfolded, it seemed there was a lack of clarity with respect to the timing of the sexual activity. as noted in the review of the evidence, the crown witnesses were only able to make a guess about when the group arrived at the beach. eg and gg did not witness any sexual activity and therefore could not help pinpoint the time it happened. rd had fragments of memory but certainly was not able to specify the timing of the incident. . . . the combination of eg’s and cp’s evidence, however, has answered the question of when during the evening the sexual activity took place. [emphasis added; para. 90.] [296] furthermore, there is other evidence that, although not necessary to a finding that the verdict was unreasonable, should have reinforced the existence of a reasonable doubt in the trial judge’s mind. [297] although the intercourse occurred at a distance of only 5 to 10 feet from the fire pit where a dozen or so young people were assembled, the crown did not call a single witness who had seen it happen. the crown called eg, who had arrived after it occurred, and gg, who also had not seen it happen. yet there were obviously some people who had witnessed the intercourse, as can be seen from the messages exchanged on social media the next morning in which teenagers shared the information that rd. and cp had had sex together. also, there were some who told eg, after her arrival, that rd and cp had had intercourse earlier in the night, which makes clear that their sexual activity had not gone unnoticed. [298] the phone conversation between r.d and l.l that occurred after 1:00 am should also have reinforced the existence of a reasonable doubt. during that conversation, rd kept apologizing to ll, whom she was seeing romantically. when considered together with the rest of the evidence, it tends to indicate that r.d was aware of and sorry for what had happened in the same vein, the fact that rd. remembered kissing cp by the rocks and pulling up her pants after the intercourse were further signs that she had been aware of what was happening, which constitutes fertile ground for a reasonable doubt. [299] finally, the crown’s case appears to have been constructed on a narrative informed by rumours and double hearsay. as i noted above, rd’s mother may not have forced her daughter to report to the police, but she convinced her to do so on the premise that rd had been assaulted while being passed out. it is this narrative based on the rumour rd heard from her friends that appears to have informed the case built by the police and the prosecution. obviously, this alone does not mean that the crown’s case could not stand, but a trial judge drawing on his or her judicial experience should have approached the theory of the case with an extra layer of caution. [300] in conclusion, without the crucial finding of incapacity, the crown could not prove its case, because there was no evidence of absence of consent. the verdict is unreasonable, and the trial judge should have acquitted cp. c whether the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent [301] cp’s third ground of appeal is that the trial judge erred in law by rejecting his defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent. he argues that she should have considered his youth in assessing the circumstances known to him for purposes of the quasi-objective standard for determining whether an accused can rely on that defence in cp’s view, the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness imposes the application of a lower standard. although everyone is presumed to know the law, it is absurd to propose that an intoxicated teenager is presumed to know the intricacies of the jurisprudence pertaining to what constitutes valid consent. therefore, the trial judge should have considered cp’s limited understanding of criminal law principles in analyzing his defence. [302] despite the question being a matter of doctrinal interest, i do not believe that it should be answered in this case. doing so would have no impact on the outcome of this appeal. cp asks us to rule on this legal issue in order to provide guidance to the court below should a new trial be ordered. because i have concluded that a verdict of acquittal should be entered, such guidance is not necessary. in any event, even if i had concluded that a new trial should be ordered, the answer to this question would have had no impact on the outcome of the appeal the question would be purely theoretical. cp does not challenge the trial judge’s finding that rd did not say “fuck me, [c.]” — this alleged communicated consent constituted the condition precedent to his defence. nor does he challenge the trial judge’s finding that his level of intoxication barred him legally from relying on the defence — this is another hurdle that made this defence unavailable to him in brief, the error of law, if any, would be of no consequence. lastly, it seems that cp is raising this issue for the first time in his appeal to this court. conclusion [303] as mentioned above, i am of the opinion that it is not necessary to answer the constitutional questions pertaining to the validity of s 37(10) of the ycja, because they are now moot. given that this court has granted leave to appeal, the constitutional analysis of the denial of an automatic right of appeal to this court would have no impact on the underlying criminal appeal in this case. therefore, i decline to take a position on those questions. [304] for the foregoing reasons, i would allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and enter an acquittal.
i. introduction le juge rowe — i. introduction [1] this appeal raises two issues that call upon the court to reaffirm fundamental principles of proce- dural and corporate law. the first relates to the rules of standing under the quebec code of civil proce- dure, cqlr, c. c-25 (“former ccp”), now code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501 (“new ccp”), and requires the court to clarify what it takes to dismiss an action for lack of “sufficient interest” under art. 165(3) of the former ccp (art. 168(3) of the new ccp). the second relates to the distinct legal personality of corporations and requires the court to reaffirm why shareholders do not possess a right of action under the civil code of québec (“ccq”) in relation to faults committed against the corporation in which they hold shares. in my view, [1] le présent pourvoi soulève deux questions où la cour est appelée à réaffirmer les principes fondamentaux du droit procédural et du droit des sociétés. la première est liée aux règles relatives à la qualité pour agir prévues dans le code de pro- cédure civile du québec, rlrq, c. c-25 (« ancien cpc »), devenu le code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501 (« nouveau cpc »), et exige que la cour précise les éléments nécessaires pour rejeter, en vertu de l’art. 165(3) de l’ancien cpc (l’art. 168(3) du nouveau cpc), une action pour cause d’absence d’« intérêt suffisant ». la deuxième porte sur la per- sonnalité juridique distincte des sociétés et requiert que la cour réaffirme les raisons pour lesquelles les actionnaires ne disposent pas de droit d’action en 490 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. the application of fundamental principles leads to the conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed. vertu du code civil du québec (« ccq ») relative- ment aux fautes commises à l’endroit de la société dans laquelle ils détiennent des actions. à mon avis, l’application des principes fondamentaux mène à la conclusion que le pourvoi devrait être rejeté. ii facts ii faits [2] the appellants are mr.  yves brunette and mr. jean m. maynard, acting in their capacity as trus- tees of fiducie maynard 2004 (“fiducie”). fiducie was the sole shareholder of 9143- 1304 québec inc., a holding company which controlled — in whole or in part — the corporations that comprised groupe melior. prior to 2010, groupe melior owned, reno- vated, and operated seniors’ residences and, by all accounts, was successful. [2] les appelants sont mm. yves brunette et jean m. maynard, qui agissent en qualité de fiduciaires de fiducie maynard 2004 (« fiducie »). la fiducie était la seule actionnaire de 9143- 1304 québec inc., une société de portefeuille qui contrôlait — en totalité ou en partie — les sociétés qui formaient le groupe melior. avant 2010, ce dernier possédait, rénovait et exploitait des résidences pour personnes âgées et, de l’avis général, était prospère. [3] the success of groupe melior was cut short by two events that strained the finances of its member corporations. first came the discovery that groupe melior’s vice- president had committed fraud worth $1.8 million against the corporations. second, re- venu québec issued unexpected notices of assess- ment against several corporations of groupe melior in 2009. these notices — and the collection action that accompanied them — resulted in the bankruptcy of most of the groupe melior corporations, of 9143- 1304 québec inc. and of mr maynard. this in turn caused the total loss of value of the patrimony of fiducie, which was comprised exclusively of shares in 9143- 1304 québec inc. [3] deux événements ont coupé court au succès du groupe melior, événements ayant pesé lourdement sur les finances de ses sociétés membres. première- ment, il y a eu la découverte que la vice- présidente du groupe melior avait commis une fraude de 1,8 mil- lions de dollars envers les sociétés. deuxièmement, revenu québec a établi des avis de cotisation im- prévus à l’égard de plusieurs sociétés du groupe melior en 2009. ces avis — ainsi que les mesures de recouvrement qui les accompagnaient — ont causé la faillite de la plupart des sociétés du groupe melior, de 9143- 1304 québec inc. et de m. maynard, ce qui a causé la perte totale de la valeur du patrimoine de la fiducie, lequel était composé exclusivement des actions dans 9143- 1304 québec inc. [4] the appellants instituted proceedings to re- cover the lost value of fiducie’s patrimony from the respondents, a group of lawyers and accountants comprised of legault joly thiffault, sencrl;. ljt fiscalité inc.; ljt corporatif inc.; ljt conseil inc.; ljt litige inc.; ljt immobilier inc.; lehoux boivin comptables agréés, senc;. marcel chaput and fiscaliste mc. inc. the appellants claimed that the respondents committed a number of professional faults in setting up the tax structure of groupe melior and, in doing so, breached their duty to advise fi- ducie. the appellants alleged, inter alia, that the tax structure set up by the respondents was not compliant with legislation and that it exposed the corporations [4] les appelants ont introduit la présente instance pour recouvrer la perte de valeur du patrimoine de la fiducie auprès des intimés, un groupe d’avocats et de comptables composé de legault joly thiffault, sencrl,. ljt fiscalité inc., ljt corporatif inc., ljt conseil inc., ljt litige inc., ljt immobilier inc., lehoux boivin comptables agréés, senc,. marcel chaput et fiscaliste mc. inc. ils ont soutenu que les intimés avaient commis un certain nombre de fautes professionnelles dans l’établissement de la structure fiscale du groupe melior et que, ce faisant, ceux-ci avaient manqué à leur obligation de conseil envers la fiducie. ils ont fait valoir, notamment, que la structure fiscale établie par les intimés n’était pas conforme à la [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault le juge rowe 491 to unexpected tax liability. according to the appel- lants, these faults led to the bankruptcy of most of the groupe melior corporations, the bankruptcy of 9143- 1304 québec inc., and the total loss of value of fiducie’s patrimony. the appellants sought damages totalling $55,000,000 — calculated in essence based on the net value of seniors’ residences owned by groupe melior by the end of summer 2008 — and a reimbursement of extrajudicial fees worth $405,000. mr. maynard, who was the director of several cor- porations of groupe melior as well as the trustee and beneficiary of fiducie, also claimed $100,000 in damages for moral injury from the respondents. loi et qu’elle exposait les sociétés à une obligation fis- cale imprévue. selon les appelants, ces fautes ont mené à la faillite de la plupart des sociétés du groupe melior, à la faillite de 9143- 1304 québec inc. et à la perte totale de la valeur du patrimoine de la fiducie. les appelants ont réclamé des dommages- intérêts s’élevant au total à 55 000 000 $ — montant calculé essentiellement en fonction de la valeur nette des résidences pour per- sonnes âgées que détenait le groupe melior à la fin de l’été 2008 — et le remboursement d’honoraires extra- judiciaires de 405 000 $. m. maynard, qui était l’ad- ministrateur de plusieurs sociétés du groupe melior ainsi que le fiduciaire et le bénéficiaire de la fiducie, a également réclamé aux intimés des dommages- intérêts de 100 000 $ en réparation du préjudice moral subi. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire a superior court, 2015 qccs 3482 a cour supérieure, 2015 qccs 3482 [5] the respondents moved to dismiss the action for lack of sufficient interest under art. 165(3) of the former ccp. they argued that fiducie did not have a sufficient interest to bring a claim in relation to faults committed against the groupe melior cor- porations. they further argued that, as fiducie was the sole shareholder of a holding company that was itself a shareholder of groupe melior, it could not assert a right of action that belonged solely to the corporations of groupe melior. [5] se fondant sur l’art. 165(3) de l’ancien cpc, les intimés ont présenté une requête en irrecevabi- lité pour cause d’absence d’intérêt suffisant. ils ont soutenu que la fiducie n’avait pas un intérêt suffisant pour présenter une demande relativement aux fautes commises à l’endroit des sociétés du groupe melior. ils ont de plus prétendu que, comme elle était la seule actionnaire d’une société de portefeuille qui était elle- même actionnaire du groupe melior, la fiducie ne pouvait pas faire valoir un droit d’action qui ap- partenait uniquement aux sociétés du groupe melior. [6] justice mayrand of the superior court agreed with the respondents. she dismissed the action on the basis that the appellants did not have a sufficient interest to claim damages from the respondents based on the lost value of real estate assets belonging to the groupe melior corporations. in her view, fidu- cie could not claim damages for faults committed against the groupe melior corporations. citing foss v. harbottle (1843), 2 hare 461, 67 er 189 (hl);. houle v. canadian national bank, [1990] 3 scr. 122; and hercules managements ltd. v. ernst & young, [1997] 2  scr  165, she explained that shareholders do not have a cause of action in rela- tion to faults committed against the corporation by third- party defendants: para 42. rather, shareholders only have a sufficient interest to bring a claim if the [6] la juge mayrand de la cour supérieure a donné raison aux intimés. elle a rejeté l’action au motif que les appelants n’avaient pas d’intérêt suffisant pour ré- clamer aux intimés des dommages- intérêts fondés sur la perte de la valeur des actifs immobiliers appartenant aux sociétés du groupe melior. à son avis, la fidu- cie ne pouvait pas réclamer des dommages- intérêts pour des fautes commises à l’endroit des sociétés du groupe melior. citant foss c. harbottle (1843), 2 hare 461, 67 er 189 (hl),. houle c. banque ca- nadienne natio nale, [1990] 3 rcs 122, et hercules managements ltd. c. ernst & young, [1997] 2 rcs. 165, elle a expliqué que les actionnaires n’ont pas de cause d’action relativement aux fautes commises par un tiers défendeur à l’endroit de la société (par 42). les actionnaires n’ont plutôt un intérêt suffisant pour 492 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. third- party defendant breached a distinct legal obli- gation owed to the shareholders and if the sharehold- ers suffered an injury distinct from those suffered by the corporation: para 43. présenter une demande que si le tiers défendeur a manqué à une obligation légale distincte envers les actionnaires et si ces derniers ont subi un préjudice distinct de celui subi par la société (par 43). [7] in this case, justice mayrand found that the appellants’ re-re- amended and particularized mo- tion to institute proceedings (“motion to institute proceedings”) failed on both counts. first, it did not disclose the breach by the respondents of a dis- tinct obligation owed to fiducie in its capacity as shareholder: paras 63-64. rather, the alleged faults pertained solely to the tax structure of the groupe melior corporations and failed to reflect a distinct legal obligation owed to fiducie. second, even if it had disclosed the breach of a distinct legal obliga- tion, the motion to institute proceedings failed to raise a distinct injury suffered by fiducie: para 66. as the damages being claimed were based on the net value of real estate assets belonging to groupe melior (and not fiducie), fiducie had failed to allege an injury distinct from that suffered by the groupe melior corporations. in justice mayrand’s view, this was fatal to fiducie’s claim. [7] en l’espèce, la juge mayrand a conclu que la requête introductive d’instance ré-ré- amendée et pré- cisée (« requête introductive d’instance ») des appe- lants ne satisfaisait à aucune de ces deux conditions. premièrement, la requête n’indiquait pas que les inti- més avaient manqué à une obligation distincte envers la fiducie en sa qualité d’actionnaire (par 63-64). les fautes reprochées portaient plutôt seulement sur la structure fiscale des sociétés du groupe melior et ne reflétaient aucune obligation légale distincte envers la fiducie. deuxièmement, même si elle avait révélé un manquement à une obligation légale distincte, la requête ne faisait pas état d’un préjudice distinct subi par la fiducie (par 66). comme les dommages- intérêts réclamés étaient fondés sur la valeur nette des actifs immobiliers appartenant au groupe melior (et non à la fiducie), la fiducie n’avait pas invoqué un préjudice distinct de celui subi par les sociétés du groupe melior. de l’avis de la juge mayrand, cela portait un coup fatal à la demande de la fiducie. b quebec court of appeal, 2017 qcca 391 b cour d’appel du québec, 2017 qcca 391 [8] the quebec court of appeal unanimously agreed with justice mayrand and upheld the dis- missal of the claim for lack of sufficient interest: para.  19 (canlii) justices morissette, bich and hogue reaffirmed that, as a general rule, the share- holders of a corporation have no cause of action for an injury caused to the corporation: para 20. this rule is equally applicable under the common law as it is under the civil law of quebec: para 22. citing houle, the court of appeal nevertheless acknowl- edged an exception to this rule where shareholders can show that they have suffered direct injury that is distinct from that suffered by the corporation and that this injury flowed from the breach of a distinct legal obligation owed to the shareholders: para 23. [8] la cour d’appel du québec a souscrit à l’unani- mité à l’opinion de la juge mayrand et a confirmé le rejet de la demande en raison de l’absence d’intérêt suffisant (par. 19 (canlii)). les juges morissette, bich et hogue ont confirmé qu’en règle générale, les actionnaires d’une société n’ont pas de cause d’ac- tion pour un préjudice causé à la société (par 20). cette règle s’applique tant en common law qu’en droit civil québécois (par 22). citant l’arrêt houle, la cour d’appel a néanmoins reconnu une exception à cette règle lorsque les actionnaires peuvent établir qu’ils ont subi un préjudice direct distinct de celui subi par la société et que ce préjudice découle du manquement à une obligation légale distincte envers les actionnaires (par 23). [9] in this case, the court of appeal found that fiducie was effectively seeking damages for the value lost from its patrimony, which equalled the net value of the seniors’ residences owned by the groupe [9] en l’espèce, la cour d’appel a conclu que la fiducie réclamait en fait des dommages- intérêts pour la perte de valeur de son patrimoine, laquelle équiva- lait à la valeur nette des résidences pour personnes [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault le juge rowe 493 melior corporations: para 25. the court held that, while the groupe melior corporations (or their trus- tees in bankruptcy) could have instituted proceedings against the respondents for these damages, the fact that they did not was insufficient to give fiducie the right to bring its own claim against the respondents: para 26. as the damages claimed by fiducie were the result of injuries that were neither direct nor distinct from those suffered by the groupe melior corporations, the court concluded that fiducie had no legal interest sufficient to ground its claim against the respondents: para 28. the court also rejected the appellants’ subsidiary argument for investment losses on the basis that the appellants failed to allege these losses as part of a specific claim: paras 30-31. âgées dont les sociétés du groupe melior étaient propriétaires (par 25). elle a jugé que les sociétés du groupe melior (ou leurs syndics de faillite) auraient pu intenter une action contre les intimés pour obtenir ces dommages- intérêts, mais que leur omission de le faire était insuffisante pour donner à la fiducie le droit de présenter sa propre demande contre les intimés (par 26). puisque les dommages- intérêts réclamés par la fiducie résultaient d’un préjudice qui n’était ni direct ni distinct de celui subi par les sociétés du groupe melior, la cour a conclu que la fiducie n’avait pas d’intérêt juridique suffisant pour fonder sa demande contre les intimés (par 28). elle a également rejeté l’argument subsidiaire des appelants portant sur les pertes d’investissements au motif qu’ils n’avaient pas fait valoir ces pertes dans le cadre d’une réclamation particulière (par 30-31). iv issues iv questions en litige [10] the appeal raises a single question: did the courts below err in dismissing fiducie’s claim for lack of sufficient interest under art. 165(3) of the former ccp?. to answer this question, this court must consider both the principles of standing under the ccp and the rules that limit the right of share- holders to seek compensation for faults committed against a corporation in which they hold shares. i turn first to the procedural issue under the ccp. before addressing the substantive question of corpo- rate law under the ccq. [10] le pourvoi soulève une seule question : les tri- bunaux inférieurs ont- ils commis une erreur en rejetant la demande de la fiducie en raison de l’absence d’inté- rêt suffisant sur le fondement de l’art. 165(3) de l’an- cien cpc?. pour répondre à cette question, la cour doit prendre en considération les principes relatifs à la qualité pour agir prévus dans le cpc et les règles qui limitent le droit des actionnaires de demander à être indemnisés pour des fautes commises à l’endroit d’une société dans laquelle ils détiennent des actions. avant d’analyser la question de fond touchant le droit des sociétés au regard du ccq, je vais d’abord examiner la question de procédure au regard du cpc. v analysis v analyse a standing under the code of civil procedure a qualité pour agir sous le régime du code de procédure civile (1) “sufficient interest” (1) « intérêt suffisant » [11] article 55 of the former ccp — which cor- responds to art. 85 of the new ccp — defines the basic rule of standing in quebec. it states that: [11] l’article 55 de l’ancien cpc — qui corres- pond à l’art. 85 du nouveau cpc — définit la règle de base quant à la qualité pour agir au québec. il est rédigé en ces termes : 55 whoever brings an action at law, whether for the enforcement of a right which is not recognized or is 55 celui qui forme une demande en justice, soit pour obtenir la sanction d’un droit méconnu, menacé ou dénié, 494 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. jeopardized or denied, or otherwise to obtain a pronounce- ment upon the existence of a legal situation, must have a sufficient interest therein. soit pour faire autrement prononcer sur l’existence d’une situation juridique, doit y avoir un intérêt suffisant. i note at the outset that the ccp does not elab- [12] orate on the meaning of “sufficient interest”: c. piché, droit judiciaire privé (2nd ed. 2014), at p 228. its meaning must therefore be drawn from the jurispru- dence. in quebec, the leading case remains jeunes canadiens pour une civilisation chrétienne v. fon da- tion du théâtre du nouveau- monde, [1979] ca 491, in which the court of appeal stated, at p. 493: [12] je constate, d’entrée de jeu, que le cpc ne pré- cise pas le sens d’« intérêt suffisant » (c. piché, droit judiciaire privé (2e éd. 2014), p 228). il faut donc se tourner vers la jurisprudence pour en dégager le sens. au québec, l’arrêt de principe est toujours jeunes ca- nadiens pour une civilisation chrétienne c. fondation du théâtre du nouveau- monde, [1979] ca 491, où la cour d’appel a affirmé à la p. 493 : [translation] interest is the benefit the plaintiff will derive from the proceeding he or she brings, assuming that it is well founded. except in the exceptional cases specif- ically provided for by law, the general legal rule is that, to be sufficient, the interest must be direct and personal, among other things. [emphasis added.] l’intérêt, c’est l’avantage que retirera la partie deman- deresse du recours qu’elle exerce, le supposant fondé. à part les cas d’exception spécifiquement prévus par la loi, la règle en droit commun est que pour être suffisant l’intérêt doit, entre autres, être direct et personnel. [je souligne.] [13] drawing on this definition, this court has stated that the interest required by art. 55 must be a “le- gal, direct, personal, acquired and existing interest”: noël v. société d’énergie de la baie james, 2001 scc 39, [2001] 2 scr 207, at paras. 37-38, citing d. ferland and b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (3rd ed. 1997), vol. 1, at pp. 89 et seq.; jeunes canadiens, at p. 493; see also bou malhab v. diffusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 scc 9, [2011] 1 scr 214, at para. 44; kingsway, compagnie d’as- surances générales v. bombardier produits récréa- tifs inc., 2010 qcca 1518, [2010] rjq 1894, at para. 21; société d’habitation du québec v. leduc, 2008 qcca 2065, at para. 14 (canlii). [13] se fondant sur cette définition, la cour a dé- claré que l’intérêt requis par l’art. 55 doit être « un intérêt juridique, direct et personnel, et né et ac- tuel » (noël c. société d’énergie de la baie james, 2001 csc 39, [2001] 2 rcs 207, par. 37-38, ci- tant d. ferland et b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (3e éd. 1997), vol. 1, p. 89 et suiv.; jeunes canadiens, p. 493; voir aussi bou malhab c. diffusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 csc 9, [2011] 1 rcs 214, par. 44; kingsway, compagnie d’assurances générales c. bombardier produits ré- créatifs inc., 2010 qcca 1518, [2010] rjq 1894, par. 21; société d’habitation du québec c. leduc, 2008 qcca 2065, par. 14 (canlii)). [14] in the context of an action in civil liability, this typically means that, “to have the necessary interest to bring an action, a person must have sustained personal injury”: bou malhab, at para 44. this re- quirement is confirmed by the rules respecting dam- ages in quebec. as this court noted in bou malhab, “the rules of civil liability in the ccq provide that injury is compensable if it is personal to the plain- tiff. the purpose of compensation is to put the victim back in the situation he or she was in prior to the injury. the wording of arts. 1607 and 1611 ccq. confirms that the compensated injury must be per- sonal to the creditor of the right to compensation”: [14] dans le contexte d’une action en responsa- bilité civile, cela signifie habituellement que « seul un préjudice personnel confère à l’auteur d’une demande en justice l’intérêt requis pour la présen- ter » (bou malhab, par 44). les règles applicables aux dommages- intérêts au québec confirment cette exigence. comme l’a souligné la cour dans bou malhab, « les règles de la responsabilité civile prévue par le ccq requièrent que, pour être réparable, le préjudice soit personnel au demandeur. la réparation de nature compensatoire a pour but de remettre la vic- time dans la situation qui était la sienne avant le préju- dice. les termes mêmes des art. 1607 et 1611 ccq. [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault le juge rowe 495 para 47. this coherence with the ccq reinforces the conclusion that the “sufficient interest” at issue under art. 55 of the former ccp must be direct and personal and cannot, barring an exception at law, be premised on another party’s right of action. confirment que le préjudice réparé doit être personnel au créancier du droit à la réparation » (par 47). cette cohérence avec le ccq renforce la conclusion selon laquelle l’« intérêt suffisant » en cause visé à l’art. 55 de l’ancien cpc doit être direct et personnel et ne peut, à moins d’une exception en droit, être fondé sur le droit d’action d’une autre partie. (2) lack of “sufficient interest” (2) absence d’« intérêt suffisant » [15] the existence of a sufficient interest is one of the conditions that define whether or not an action is admissible at law: jeunes canadiens, at p. 493; see also piché, at p 228. along with the question of legal capacity to act, it completes a set of prelimi- nary conditions that individuals must generally fulfill before a court will consider their claim. an absence of sufficient interest can therefore be raised proprio motu by the court, which can lead to the claim being dismissed under art. 462 of the former ccp:. jeunes canadiens, at p 493. [15] l’existence d’un intérêt suffisant est une des conditions qui déterminent si l’action est recevable ou non en droit (jeunes canadiens, p. 493; voir aussi piché, p 228). avec la question de la capacité juridique d’agir, elle complète un ensemble de conditions préli- minaires auxquelles une personne doit généralement satisfaire pour que le tribunal examine sa demande. l’absence d’intérêt suffisant peut donc être soulevée par le tribunal de son propre chef, ce qui peut donner lieu au rejet de la demande en vertu de l’art. 462 de l’ancien cpc (jeunes canadiens, p 493). [16] as one of the necessary conditions of admis- sibility, the existence of a sufficient interest is not presumed by the court; it must be established by the claimant, who must allege the necessary facts to underpin the sufficiency of his or her interest in the motion to institute proceedings: ibid., at p 494. to this end, vague and general allegations of fact are insufficient. the claimant must rather provide a precise statement of facts, as required by the general rules concerning written pleadings under art. 76 of the former ccp (art. 99 of the new ccp). [17] for this reason, the sufficiency of the interest alleged by the claimant is open to being challenged for failing to meet the requirements of the ccp. to this effect, art. 165(3) of the former ccp — art. 168(3) of the new ccp — provides the proce- dural basis for the defendant to bring this challenge at the stage of preliminary motions. it states: [16] puisqu’il s’agit de l’une des conditions né- cessaires à la recevabilité d’une action, le tribunal ne suppose pas l’existence d’un intérêt suffisant; celle-ci doit être établie par le demandeur, qui doit dans la requête introductive d’instance invoquer les faits nécessaires pour étayer le caractère suffisant de son intérêt (ibid., p 494). à cette fin, les alléga- tions de fait vagues et générales ne suffisent pas. le demandeur doit plutôt fournir un exposé précis des faits, comme l’exigent les règles générales relatives à la procédure écrite énoncées à l’art. 76 de l’ancien cpc (l’art. 99 du nouveau cpc). [17] pour cette raison, le caractère suffisant de l’in- térêt que fait valoir le demandeur peut être contesté s’il ne respecte pas les exigences du cpc. à cette fin, l’art. 165(3) de l’ancien cpc — l’art. 168(3) du nouveau cpc — prévoit le fondement procédu- ral pour que le défendeur puisse présenter une telle contestation à l’étape des requêtes préliminaires. il est rédigé en ces termes : 165 the defendant may ask for the dismissal of the ac- tion if: 165 le défendeur peut opposer l’irrecevabilité de la de- mande et conclure à son rejet : (1) there is lis pendens or res judicata; 1 s’il y a litispendance ou chose jugée; 496 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. (2) one of the parties is incapable or has not the necessary capacity; 2 si l’une ou l’autre des parties est incapable ou n’a pas qualité; (3) the plaintiff has clearly no interest in the suit; 3 si le demandeur n’a manifestement pas d’intérêt; (4) the suit is unfounded in law, even if the facts alleged are true. 4 si la demande n’est pas fondée en droit, supposé même que les faits allégués soient vrais. [18] i note that the exception to dismiss under art.  165(3) will only succeed where the plaintiff clearly has no interest. courts are therefore called upon to act with prudence before preliminarily dis- missing a claim on this basis: leduc, at para. 15; paradis v. association des propriétaires vda, 2007 qcca 1736, at para. 5 (canlii). this court issued a similar call for caution in the context of preliminary motions to dismiss in canada (attorney general) v. confédération des syndicats nationaux, 2014 scc 49, [2014] 2 scr 477, by stating that “[d]ismissing an action at a preliminary stage can have very seri- ous consequences   . the courts must therefore be cautious in exercising this power”: para 17. [19] nevertheless, a sufficient interest being a con- dition of admissibility for all claims, it follows that courts must be capable of determining its existence and, where appropriate, dismiss claims where the alleged interest is insufficient. this implies that the sufficient interest of the claimant must be capable of determination at the stage of preliminary motions, without the court needing to determine whether the claim is founded in law. rather, the court is required to make inferences and draw conclusions about whether or not the claimant has a sufficient interest. in all actions for civil liability, this requires that the sufficient interest of the claimant be established be- fore the court considers the claim on its merits — that is, before the court makes any final determination regarding the essential elements of fault, injury, and causation. as a matter of logic, this analysis on the merits will be necessary only where the preliminary condition of sufficient interest is met. [18] je signale que le moyen d’irrecevabilité prévu à l’art. 165(3) ne sera accueilli que si le demandeur n’a manifestement pas d’intérêt. les tribunaux sont donc appelés à faire preuve de prudence avant de rejeter une demande sur ce fondement au stade pré- liminaire (leduc, par. 15; paradis c. association des propriétaires vda, 2007 qcca 1736, par. 5 (canlii)). la cour a formulé une mise en garde semblable dans le contexte des requêtes prélimi- naires en irrecevabilité dans canada (procureur général) c. confédération des syndicats nationaux, 2014 csc 49, [2014] 2 rcs 477, en affirmant ce qui suit : « le rejet d’une action au stade préliminaire peut [  ] entraîner de très sérieuses conséquences. les tribunaux doivent pour cette raison faire preuve de circonspection dans l’exercice de ce pouvoir » (par 17). [19] néanmoins, l’intérêt suffisant étant une condi- tion de recevabilité applicable à toutes les demandes, il s’ensuit que les tribunaux doivent être en mesure d’établir son existence et, s’il y a lieu, de rejeter les demandes lorsque l’intérêt allégué est insuffisant. cela suppose que la question de l’intérêt suffisant du demandeur doit pouvoir être tranchée au stade des requêtes préliminaires, sans que le tribunal ait besoin de décider si la demande est fondée en droit. le tribunal est plutôt tenu de faire des inférences et de tirer des conclusions quant à savoir si le demandeur a ou non un intérêt suffisant. dans toutes les actions en responsabilité civile, il faut donc que l’intérêt suf- fisant du demandeur soit établi avant que le tribunal examine la demande sur le fond — c’est-à-dire avant que le tribunal rende une décision définitive concer- nant les éléments essentiels que constituent la faute, le préjudice et le lien de causalité. d’un point de vue logique, cette analyse sur le fond ne sera nécessaire que lorsque la condition préliminaire de l’intérêt suffisant est respectée. [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault le juge rowe 497 if the sufficiency of his or her interest is chal- [20] lenged by the defendant under art. 165(3) of the former ccp, the claimant has the opportunity to respond by providing additional facts to demonstrate that interest. unlike motions under art. 165(4) of the former ccp, however, the court is not required to treat the facts alleged by the claimant as true for the purposes of the motion: leduc, at para 16. nor is the court bound to accept the characterization of the facts alleged by the claimant. for this reason, the claimant may place before the court evidence to support al- leged facts if the defendant raises art. 165(3) of the former ccp and claims that the allegations alone are insufficient to establish the sufficient interest required by art. 55: ibid. [21] for the court to determine the existence of a sufficient interest under art. 55 of the former ccp, the facts alleged by the claimant must relate to the substantive right at issue. this is so because the exist- ence of a sufficient interest cannot be determined in the abstract. as this court noted in noël, at para. 38: [20] si le défendeur conteste le caractère suffisant de l’intérêt du demandeur en vertu de l’art. 165(3) de l’ancien cpc, ce dernier a la possibilité de ré- pondre en présentant des faits additionnels pour dé- montrer cet intérêt. cependant, contrairement à ce qui se passe dans le cas des requêtes fondées sur l’art. 165(4) de l’ancien cpc, le tribunal n’a pas, pour les besoins de la requête, à tenir pour avérés les faits allégués par le demandeur (leduc, par 16). il n’est pas non plus tenu d’accepter la qualification de ces faits. pour cette raison, le demandeur peut sou- mettre au tribunal des éléments de preuve qui étayent les faits allégués si le défendeur soulève l’art. 165(3) de l’ancien cpc et fait valoir que les allégations sont insuffisantes à elles seules pour établir l’intérêt suffisant requis par l’art. 55 (ibid). [21] pour que le tribunal établisse l’existence d’un intérêt suffisant au sens de l’art. 55 de l’ancien cpc, les faits allégués par le demandeur doivent se rap- porter au droit substantiel en cause. il en est ainsi parce que l’existence d’un tel intérêt ne peut être établie dans l’abstrait. comme l’a souligné la cour dans noël, par. 38 : however, the concept of procedural interest [under art. 55] refers to the substantive right   . the existence of an interest in bringing a judicial proceeding depends on the existence of a substantive right. it is not enough to assert that a procedure exists. a right enforceable by the courts must be asserted. this understanding of the concept of interest thus calls for consideration of the substantive law on which the cause of action is based. this is the nub of the case at bar. le concept d’intérêt procédural [visé à l’art. 55] réfère toutefois au droit substantiel. [  ]. l’existence d’un inté- rêt à intenter un recours judiciaire dépend de l’existence d’un droit substantiel. il ne suffit pas d’alléguer qu’une procédure existe. l’on doit invoquer un droit susceptible d’être reconnu par les tribunaux. ce caractère de la notion d’intérêt incite ainsi à l’examen du droit substantiel d’où provient le droit d’action exercé. c’est ici que se situe le nœud de cette affaire. [22] in this case, it was incumbent upon fiducie to allege facts necessary to demonstrate the sufficiency of its interest in claiming damages for civil liability against the respondents. the respondents moved to dismiss fiducie’s claim for lack of sufficient in- terest under art. 165(3) of the former ccp on the basis that, as an indirect shareholder of the groupe melior corporations, fiducie had no right to claim losses equivalent to the value of the real estate as- sets that had belonged to groupe melior. to assess the merits of this argument, we must turn to the substantive rules of corporate law under the ccq. to assess whether fiducie alleged facts necessary to [22] en l’espèce, il incombait à la fiducie d’allé- guer les faits nécessaires pour démontrer le caractère suffisant de son intérêt à réclamer des dommages- intérêts en responsabilité civile aux intimés. se fon- dant sur l’art. 165(3) de l’ancien cpc, ces derniers ont présenté une requête en irrecevabilité de la de- mande de la fiducie pour cause d’absence d’intérêt suffisant, au motif qu’en tant qu’actionnaire indirecte des sociétés du groupe melior, la fiducie n’avait pas le droit de réclamer des pertes équivalentes à la valeur des actifs immobiliers qui appartenaient au groupe melior. pour évaluer le bien- fondé de cet argument, nous devons examiner les règles de fond 498 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. demonstrate the sufficiency of its interest in claiming damages from the respondents. du droit des sociétés prévues dans le ccq en vue d’évaluer si la fiducie a allégué les faits nécessaires pour démontrer le caractère suffisant de son intérêt à réclamer des dommages- intérêts aux intimés. b principles of corporate law under the civil b principes du droit des sociétés prévus dans le code of québec code civil du québec [23] the courts below dismissed fiducie’s claim on the basis that it could not seek damages against the respondents based on a right of action belonging to the groupe melior corporations. this conclusion follows from fundamental principles of corporate law. in what follows, i first address why sharehold- ers, under the civil law of quebec, do not possess a right of action in relation to faults committed against a corporation in which they hold shares. i then ad- dress what has been stated, mistakenly, to be an exception to this rule in houle. [24] i note that the appellants placed significant emphasis on the specificity of the civil law. they urged the court against the wholesale adoption of the common law rule set out in foss v. harbottle, which categorically bars shareholder recovery for faults committed against a corporation. despite the fact that the principles established in that decision have been recognized to be applicable in quebec since dominion cotton mills co. v. amyot, [1912] ac 546 (pc), at p. 552, the appellants submitted that the rule set in foss v. harbottle is incompati- ble with basic principles of the ccq:. af, at pa- ras. 34-40 and 50-59. with respect, this argument misses the mark. the decisions of the superior court and the court of appeal dismissing the claim for lack of interest are firmly grounded in civil law principles. in certain cases, the civil law produces a conclusion similar to that which would arise under the common law. this is one such case. as this court has noted, there is often “a striking similarity between the civil law and the common law approaches”: bou malhab, at para 38. this similarity, where it is premised on principles proper to each legal system, in no way detracts from the coherence and integrity of either. [23] les tribunaux inférieurs ont rejeté la demande de la fiducie au motif qu’elle ne pouvait pas ré- clamer des dommages- intérêts aux intimés sur le fondement d’un droit d’action appartenant aux so- ciétés du groupe melior. cette conclusion découle de principes fondamentaux du droit des sociétés. dans les paragraphes qui suivent, je traiterai d’abord des raisons pour lesquelles les actionnaires, en droit civil québécois, ne possèdent pas de droit d’action relativement aux fautes commises à l’endroit d’une société dans laquelle ils détiennent des actions. j’examinerai ensuite ce que l’on a appelé, à tort, une exception à cette règle de l’arrêt houle. [24] je constate que les appelants ont fortement insisté sur la spécificité du droit civil. ils ont exhorté la cour à ne pas adopter en bloc la règle de common law énoncée dans foss c. harbottle, laquelle em- pêche catégoriquement les actionnaires d’obtenir une indemnisation pour des fautes commises à l’endroit d’une société. malgré le fait que les principes établis dans cette décision sont reconnus comme étant ap- plicables au québec depuis l’arrêt dominion cotton mills co. c. amyot, [1912] ac 546 (cp), p. 552, les appelants ont soutenu que la règle établie dans foss c. harbottle est incompatible avec les principes de base du ccq (ma, par. 34-40 et 50-59). soit dit en tout respect, cet argument rate sa cible. les décisions de la cour supérieure et de la cour d’appel de rejeter la demande en raison de l’absence d’intérêt reposent fer- mement sur les principes de droit civil. dans certains cas, le droit civil mène à une conclusion semblable à celle à laquelle donnerait lieu la common law. tel est le cas en l’espèce. comme l’a souligné la cour, « la convergence de l’approche civiliste et de l’approche de common law » est souvent « remarquable » (bou malhab, par 38). cette convergence, lorsqu’elle re- pose sur des principes propres à chaque système ju- ridique, ne porte aucunement atteinte à la cohérence et à l’intégrité de l’un ou l’autre. [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault le juge rowe 499 (1) the general principle of distinct legal (1) le principe général de la personnalité juri- personality dique distincte [25] the ccq recognizes that legal persons such as corporations have a distinct legal personality (art. 298) and a distinct patrimony (art 302). as with all legal persons, corporations “have full enjoyment of civil rights” (art. 301) and the “capacity to exercise all their rights” (art 303). read together, these pro- visions lead to the conclusion that the right of action of a corporation belongs to the corporation itself. like other claimants with the capacity to act, the corporation itself must exercise its rights of action in its own name. the corollary is that shareholders may not personally exercise a right of action that belongs to the corporation: p. martel, la société par actions au québec (loose- leaf), vol. 1, at para 1-28. [26] courts in quebec have applied these principles consistently. as a consequence, the jurisprudence has barred shareholders from personally instituting proceedings against third parties based on rights of action belonging to the corporation in which they hold shares: see, eg,. houle, at p. 182; groupe d’ac- tion d’investisseurs dans biosyntech v. tsang, 2016 qcca 1923, at paras. 23-27 (canlii); backman v. canadian imperial bank of commerce, [2004] rra 776 (ca), at pp. 797-98; abattoirs lauren- tides (1987) inc. v. olymel, 2003 canlii 8729 (que. sup. ct.), at paras. 129-34; tardif v. huot, [2001] az- 50082813 (que. sup. ct.); harpin v. lessard, 2000 canlii 18991 (que. sup. ct.); cartier v. tes- sier, 1999 canlii 11919 (que. sup. ct.); moulin v. aconvenbec ltée, [1990] rra 577 (que. sup. ct.), at p. 580; crevier v. paquin, [1975] cs 260 (que.), at p.  264; silverman v heaps, [1967] cs  536 (que.), at p 539. [25] le ccq reconnaît que les personnes mo- rales comme les sociétés ont une personnalité juri- dique distincte (art. 298) et un patrimoine distinct (art 302). comme toutes les personnes morales, les sociétés « ont la pleine jouissance des droits civils » (art. 301) et la « capacité requise pour exercer tous leurs droits » (art 303). la lecture conjointe de ces dispositions mène à la conclusion que le droit d’ac- tion d’une société appartient à la société elle- même. comme d’autres demandeurs ayant la capacité d’agir, la société elle- même doit exercer ses droits d’action en son propre nom, ce qui a pour corollaire que les actionnaires ne peuvent pas exercer person- nellement un droit d’action qui appartient à celle-ci (p. martel, la société par actions au québec (feuilles mobiles), vol. 1, par 1-28). [26] les tribunaux au québec ont appliqué ces principes de manière uniforme. en conséquence, la jurisprudence a empêché les actionnaires d’in- tenter personnellement un recours contre des tiers sur le fondement de droits d’action appartenant à la société dans laquelle ils détiennent des actions (voir, p ex, houle, p. 182; groupe d’action d’in- vestisseurs dans biosyntech c. tsang, 2016 qcca 1923, par. 23-27 (canlii); backman c. canadian imperial bank of commerce, [2004] rra 776 (ca), p. 797- 798; abattoirs laurentides (1987) inc. c. olymel, 2003 canlii 8729 (cs. qc), par. 129- 134; tardif c. huot, [2001] az- 50082813 (cs. qc); harpin c. lessard, 2000 canlii 18991 (cs. qc); cartier c. tessier, 1999 canlii 11919 (cs. qc); moulin c. aconvenbec ltée, [1990] rra 577 (cs. qc), p. 580; crevier c. paquin, [1975] cs 260 (qc), p. 264; silverman c. heaps, [1967] cs 536 (qc), p 539). [27] the benefits of incorporation come with a corresponding limit on the rights of shareholders: houle, at p 178. it would be incoherent — and in- deed, unjust — for shareholders to benefit from lim- ited liability while at the same time gaining a right of action in relation to faults committed against the corporation in which they hold shares: martel, at para. 1-28; see also silverman v. heaps, at p 539. [27] les avantages de la constitution en société s’accompagnent d’une limite corrélative aux droits des actionnaires (houle, p 178). il serait incohérent — et en fait injuste — que les actionnaires bénéfi- cient d’une responsabilité limitée tout en obtenant un droit d’action relativement aux fautes commises à l’endroit de la société dans laquelle ils détiennent des actions (martel, par. 1-28; voir aussi silverman 500 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. the corporate veil is impermeable on both sides; just as shareholders cannot be liable for faults committed by the corporation, so too are they barred from seek- ing damages for faults committed against it: houle, at pp. 177-80; see also f. pérodeau, “le sort réservé à la réclamation d’un actionnaire pour la perte de valeur de ses actions: une revue de la jurisprudence québécoise” in barreau du québec, vol. 255, les dommages en matière civile et commerciale (2006), at pp 5-6. [28] the application of this rule under the civil law of quebec does not result from the undue incor- poration of common law principles. as discussed, corporations have a distinct legal personality under the ccq. like all claimants, they must have a direct and personal interest in a matter before instituting proceedings under art. 55 of the former ccp. in the context of civil liability, this means the corporation itself must have suffered an injury. in such cases, the cause of action belongs to the corporation itself and not to its shareholders, who are distinct legal persons under the ccq. c. heaps, p 539). le voile de la personnalité mo- rale est étanche de part et d’autre; tout comme les actionnaires ne peuvent être tenus responsables des fautes commises par la société, ils ne peuvent pas non plus réclamer des dommages- intérêts pour des fautes commises à l’endroit de celle-ci (houle, p. 177- 180; voir aussi f. pérodeau, « le sort réservé à la réclama- tion d’un actionnaire pour la perte de valeur de ses actions : une revue de la jurisprudence québécoise », dans barreau du québec, vol. 255, les dommages en matière civile et commerciale (2006), p 5-6). [28] l’application de cette règle en droit civil qué- bécois ne découle pas de l’incorporation injustifiée de principes de common law. je le rappelle, les so- ciétés ont une personnalité juridique distincte sous le régime du ccq. comme tous les demandeurs, elles doivent, suivant l’art. 55 de l’ancien cpc, avoir un intérêt direct et personnel pour agir avant d’intenter une poursuite. dans le contexte de la responsabi- lité civile, cela signifie que la société elle- même doit avoir subi un préjudice. en pareils cas, la cause d’action appartient à la société elle- même et non à ses actionnaires, qui sont des personnes juridiques distinctes sous le régime du ccq. (2) the “exception” in houle (2) l’« exception » établie dans houle in houle, this court reaffirmed that share- [29] holders cannot institute proceedings in relation to faults committed by a third- party defendant against a corporation as the right to do so belongs to the corporation itself: pp 177-80. the court recognized, however, that in certain circumstances sharehold- ers may possess their own right of action against the same defendant: pp 180-87. in such cases, the shareholders must establish (1) that the defendant breached a distinct obligation owed to the sharehold- ers, and (2) that this breach resulted in a direct injury suffered by the shareholders, independent from that suffered by the corporation: ibid., at pp. 182 and 186; see biosyntech, at para 30. [29] dans l’arrêt houle, la cour a réaffirmé que les actionnaires ne peuvent intenter une poursuite relati- vement aux fautes commises par un tiers défendeur à l’endroit d’une société parce que le droit de le faire appartient à la société elle- même (p. 177- 180). elle a toutefois reconnu que, dans certaines circonstances, les actionnaires peuvent avoir leur propre droit d’ac- tion contre le même défendeur (p. 180- 187). dans de tels cas, les actionnaires doivent établir (1) que le défendeur a manqué à une obligation distincte envers les actionnaires et (2) que ce manquement leur a occasionné un préjudice direct, indépendant de celui subi par la société (ibid., p. 182 et 186; voir biosyntech, par 30). [30] the court in houle did not create an exception to the general rule barring shareholders from recov- ering damages in relation to faults committed against the corporation. rather, the court simply reiterated the essential elements of civil liability in quebec [30] dans l’arrêt houle, la cour n’a pas créé d’exception à la règle générale empêchant les ac- tionnaires d’obtenir des dommages- intérêts relative- ment aux fautes commises à l’endroit de la société. elle a plutôt simplement réaffirmé les éléments [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault le juge rowe 501 civil law — fault, injury, and causation — and held that shareholders can have an independent right of action where they establish the existence of each element in a way that is distinct from the fault and injury caused to the corporation: houle, at p. 182; see also pérodeau, at p 44. [31] with regard to the element of injury, the dis- cussion in houle highlights that, in most cases where faults are committed against the corporation, share- holders suffer only an indirect injury: pp 185-86. as the ccq allows the recovery of damages for direct injuries only (art. 1607), it follows that claims to recover from such an injury will fail. hence the ne- cessity for shareholders to demonstrate the existence of an independent fault and a direct injury, both of which are distinct from that suffered by the corpora- tion. while it is true that justice l’heureux- dubé did not use the word “distinct” to qualify the injury of the shareholders, she highlighted the need for direct damage, “   besides or beyond and independently of any damage the company itself may have incurred”: houle, at p 186. in my view, direct damage that is independent of the damage suffered by the corpora- tion should, for the sake of clarity, be characterized as distinct. as such, the necessity for the injury to be “distinct” reiterates rather than departs from the principles established in houle. [32] contrary to the argument put forward by the appellants, neither the superior court nor the court of appeal dismissed the claim through an im- proper application of the common law rule in foss v. harbottle. both decisions below are grounded in the civil law and apply the requirements of civil liability set out in houle. as discussed below, the appellants’ failure to meet these requirements fully justified the dismissal of fiducie’s claim. essentiels de la responsabilité civile en droit civil québécois — la faute, le préjudice et le lien de causa- lité — et a conclu que les actionnaires peuvent avoir un droit d’action indépendant lorsqu’ils établissent l’existence de chaque élément de manière distincte de la faute commise à l’endroit de la société et du préjudice causé à celle-ci (houle, p. 182; voir aussi pérodeau, p 44). [31] en ce qui a trait à l’élément de préjudice, l’analyse dans houle fait ressortir que, dans la plu- part des cas où des fautes sont commises à l’endroit de la société, les actionnaires ne subissent qu’un préjudice indirect (p. 185- 186). comme le ccq. permet l’obtention de dommages- intérêts en répara- tion d’un préjudice direct uniquement (art. 1607), il s’ensuit que les demandes d’indemnisation pour un préjudice indirect seront rejetées, d’où la nécessité pour les actionnaires de démontrer l’existence d’une faute indépendante et d’un préjudice direct, distincts de ceux subis par la société. bien qu’elle n’ait certes pas utilisé le terme « distinct » pour qualifier le pré- judice subi par les actionnaires, la juge l’heureux- dubé a insisté sur la nécessité d’un dommage direct, «    en plus ou au- delà et indépendamment de tout dommage qu’a pu subir la compagnie elle- même » (houle, p 186). à mon avis, un dommage direct qui est indépendant de celui subi par la société devrait, par souci de clarté, être qualifié de distinct. la né- cessité d’un préjudice « distinct » a donc pour effet de réaffirmer les principes établis dans houle plutôt que d’y déroger. [32] contrairement à ce que soutiennent les appe- lants, ni la cour supérieure ni la cour d’appel n’ont rejeté la demande en raison d’une mauvaise appli- cation de la règle de common law établie dans foss c. harbottle. les deux décisions des juridictions in- férieures sont fondées sur le droit civil et appliquent les exigences de la responsabilité civile énoncées dans houle. comme nous le verrons plus loin, le non- respect de ces exigences par les appelants justi- fiait pleinement le rejet de la demande de la fiducie. c application c application [33] the appellants were bound to allege facts that correspond to the elements set out in houle [33] pour établir le caractère suffisant de l’intérêt de la fiducie à réclamer des dommages- intérêts aux 502 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. to establish fiducie’s sufficient interest in seek- ing damages against the respondents. they had to demonstrate that, despite being an indirect share- holder of the groupe melior corporations, fiducie had an independent cause of action in civil liability against the respondents. this required the appellants to show that (1) the respondents breached a distinct legal obligation owed to fiducie, and (2) this breach caused fiducie to suffer a direct injury distinct from that suffered by the groupe melior corporations. in my view, the appellants failed on both counts. intimés, les appelants étaient tenus d’alléguer des faits qui correspondaient aux éléments énoncés dans houle. il leur fallait démontrer que, malgré le fait qu’elle était actionnaire indirecte des sociétés du groupe melior, la fiducie disposait d’une cause d’action indépendante en responsabilité civile contre les intimés. les appe- lants devaient donc établir que (1) les intimés avaient manqué à une obligation légale distincte envers la fiducie et que (2) ce manquement avait causé un pré- judice direct à la fiducie, distinct de celui subi par les sociétés du groupe melior. à mon avis, les appelants n’ont réussi à établir aucun de ces deux éléments. (1) breach of a distinct legal obligation (1) manquement à une obligation légale distincte [34] the appellants had to allege facts to support a finding that the respondents breached a distinct legal obligation owed to fiducie. to this effect, they argued that the respondent lawyers and account- ants maintained contractual relationships with both fiducie and the corporations of groupe melior: af, at para 8. they also alleged that the respondents committed both contractual and extra- contractual faults against fiducie. these faults related largely to the flawed tax structure the respondents established for groupe melior: motion to institute proceedings, at paras 278-92. [35] the alleged facts that relate to this first re- quirement of houle refer primarily to legal obliga- tions owed to the groupe melior corporations and not to fiducie. they do not suffice to give fiducie an independent right of action against the respondents as they do not disclose the breach of an independent legal obligation owed to fiducie. i add that, even where the motion to institute proceedings alleges distinct legal obligations owed by the respondents to fiducie, it fails to allege how these obligations relate to the injury at issue in this appeal. [34] les appelants devaient alléguer des faits pour étayer la conclusion selon laquelle les intimés avaient manqué à une obligation légale distincte envers la fiducie. pour ce faire, ils ont soutenu que les avo- cats et les comptables intimés avaient entretenu des relations contractuelles avec la fiducie et les sociétés du groupe melior (ma, par 8). ils ont aussi fait valoir que les intimés avaient commis des fautes contractuelles et extracontractuelles à l’endroit de la fiducie. ces fautes étaient en grande partie liées à la structure fiscale déficiente qu’avaient établie les intimés pour le groupe melior (requête introductive d’instance, par. 278- 292). [35] les faits allégués qui portent sur la première exigence établie dans houle renvoient principale- ment aux obligations légales envers les sociétés du groupe melior et non envers la fiducie. ils ne suf- fisent pas pour donner à la fiducie un droit d’action indépendant contre les intimés, car ils ne révèlent aucun manquement à une obligation légale indépen- dante envers la fiducie. j’ajoute que, bien qu’elle fasse état d’obligations légales distinctes des intimés envers la fiducie, la requête introductive d’instance n’indique pas de quelle façon ces obligations se rap- portent au préjudice en cause dans le présent pourvoi. [36] take, for instance, the general allegations put forward by the appellants in the opening paragraphs of their statement of facts: [36] prenons, par exemple, les allégations géné- rales présentées par les appelants dans les premiers paragraphes de leur exposé des faits : [translation] as will be shown below, the defend- ants, who are all lawyers, accountants and/or auditors, les défendeurs, qui sont tous avocats, experts- comptables et/ou vérificateurs, ont adopté, tel qu’il sera démontré [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault le juge rowe 503 behaved in a clearly unreasonable manner in the perfor- mance of mandates relating to management of the affairs of groupe melior (as defined below) and in their dealings with mr. maynard, both in his personal capacity and in his capacity as trustee of fiducie, and repeatedly acted with gross negligence and breached their duties to be competent and to provide advice in their role as advisors of groupe melior, mr. maynard and fiducie, thereby causing signif- icant injury to fiducie and mr. maynard; ci- après, une conduite manifestement déraisonnable dans l’exécution de mandats en regard de la gestion des affaires du groupe melior (tel qu’il sera défini ci- après), et dans leurs relations avec maynard tant en sa qualité personnelle qu’en sa qualité de fiduciaire de la fiducie, et ont, de façon répétée, fait preuve de négligence grossière et de manque- ments à leurs devoirs de compétence et de conseil dans leur rôle de conseillers de groupe melior, de maynard et de la fiducie, causant ainsi un préjudice important à la fiducie et à maynard; since the defendants were acting as professionals on behalf of groupe melior, fiducie and mr. maynard, they were, at all times relevant to these proceedings, fully aware, or they could not reasonably have been unaware, that their actions would cause injury to the fiducie and mr. maynard; [emphasis added.] les défendeurs agissant comme professionnels pour le compte de groupe melior, de la fiducie et de maynard avaient, en tout temps pertinent pour les fins des présentes, pleinement connaissance ou ne pouvaient raisonnablement ignorer que leurs agissements causeraient un préjudice à la fiducie et à maynard; [je souligne.] (motion to institute proceedings, at paras. 3-4) (requête introductive d’instance, par. 3-4) [37] it is clear from the foregoing that the appel- lants confuse the obligations owed by the respond- ents to the groupe melior corporations with those allegedly owed to fiducie and to mr maynard. de- spite the promise of further specificity, this confusion of obligations continues throughout the statement of facts: see, eg, at paras. 35, 46 and 256. the prob- lem is that an obligation owed by the respondents to groupe melior does not necessarily give rise to an independent obligation owed to fiducie. [38] for example, while the appellants claim that the respondents acted negligently in establishing the tax structure of groupe melior, they allege only facts that relate to obligations owed to groupe melior itself: see, eg,. motion to institute proceedings, at paras. 181, 198 and 273. in other words, they fail to show how the respondents owed an independent ob- ligation to inform and advise fiducie itself on the tax structure. similarly, the fact that information about this tax structure might have been communicated to mr. maynard in his capacity as director of several corporations of groupe melior does not mean that the respondents had a distinct obligation to inform fiducie in its capacity as the ultimate shareholder of the corporations. [37] il ressort clairement de ces paragraphes que les appelants confondent les obligations des intimés envers les sociétés du groupe melior et celles que ceux-ci auraient envers la fiducie et m maynard. malgré la promesse d’une plus grande précision, cette confusion entre les obligations se poursuit tout au long de l’exposé des faits (voir, p ex, par 35, 46 et 256). le problème est qu’une obligation des intimés envers le groupe melior ne donne pas néces- sairement lieu à une obligation indépendante envers la fiducie. [38] par exemple, bien qu’ils soutiennent que les intimés ont fait preuve de négligence lorsqu’ils ont établi la structure fiscale du groupe melior, les appe- lants allèguent seulement des faits qui sont liés aux obligations envers le groupe melior lui- même (voir, p ex, la requête introductive d’instance, par. 181, 198 et 273). autrement dit, ils n’ont pas su démontrer que les intimés avaient, envers la fiducie elle- même, une obligation indépendante d’information et de conseil au sujet de la structure fiscale. de même, le fait que des renseignements relatifs à cette structure fiscale auraient pu être communiqués à m. maynard en sa qualité d’administrateur de plusieurs sociétés du groupe melior ne signifie pas que les intimés avaient une obligation distincte d’informer la fiducie en sa qualité d’actionnaire ultime des sociétés. 504 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. it is, of course, true that injury to the corpo- [39] rations in groupe melior may have consequences for those holding their shares. fiducie is the sole shareholder of 9143- 1304 québec inc.; this corpo- ration controlled in whole or in part the corporations of groupe melior. for this reason, any breach of an obligation owed to groupe melior would tend to have an indirect impact on the interests of both 9143- 1304 québec inc. and fiducie. mr. maynard, acting as a trustee and the primary beneficiary of fiducie, could also be affected by faults committed against groupe melior and the resulting injuries. but having chosen to structure his business by means of various incorporations, he cannot now seek to avoid the consequences of those choices. as justice wilson put it in kosmopoulos v. constitution insurance co., [1987] 1 scr 2, “[h]aving chosen to receive the benefits of incorporation, he should not be allowed to escape its burdens. he should not be permitted to ‘blow hot and cold’ at the same time”: p 11. [40] fiducie is, of course, content to avoid the debts owed by the corporations of groupe melior. this limited liability, however, comes at a cost: as shareholder, fiducie has no right of action in rela- tion to faults committed by the respondents against groupe melior. given the exceptional nature of fi- ducie’s claim, it was incumbent upon the appellants to allege sufficient facts to show how the respondents breached a legal obligation owed to fiducie distinct from those owed to groupe melior. their failure to do so is fatal to fiducie’s claim. [39] le préjudice subi par les sociétés du groupe melior peut certes avoir des conséquences sur ceux qui y détiennent des actions. la fiducie était la seule actionnaire de la société 9143- 1304 québec inc.; cette dernière contrôlait en totalité ou en partie les so- ciétés du groupe melior. pour cette raison, tout man- quement à une obligation envers le groupe melior était susceptible d’avoir une incidence indirecte sur les intérêts à la fois de 9143- 1304 québec inc. et de la fiducie. m. maynard, en sa qualité de fiduciaire et de principal bénéficiaire de la fiducie, pouvait également être touché par les fautes commises à l’en- droit du groupe melior et le préjudice en résultant. cependant, ayant choisi de structurer son entreprise au moyen de diverses constitutions en sociétés, il ne peut maintenant chercher à échapper aux consé- quences de ces choix. comme l’a affirmé la juge wilson dans kosmopoulos c. constitution insurance co., [1987] 1 rcs 2, « [a]yant opté pour les avan- tages de la constitution en société, il ne devrait pas lui être permis de se soustraire à ses désavantages. il ne devrait pas lui être loisible de “jouer sur les deux tableaux” en même temps » (p 11). [40] la fiducie ne demande évidemment pas mieux que d’échapper aux dettes des sociétés du groupe melior. cette responsabilité limitée a toute- fois un prix : en tant qu’actionnaire, la fiducie n’a pas de droit d’action relativement aux fautes com- mises par les intimés à l’endroit du groupe melior. vu la nature exceptionnelle de la demande de la fiducie, il incombait aux appelants d’alléguer suffi- samment de faits pour établir de quelle façon les in- timés avaient manqué à une obligation légale envers la fiducie, obligation étant distincte de celles qu’ils avaient envers le groupe melior. leur omission de le faire porte un coup fatal à la demande de la fiducie. (2) distinct injury (2) préjudice distinct [41] the appellants were also obliged to allege facts showing a direct injury suffered by fiducie as distinct from that suffered by groupe melior. they describe the injury suffered by fiducie as [transla- tion] “the total loss of value of the trust patrimony”: motion to institute proceedings, at para 293. fiducie claims $55,000,000 worth of damages for this in- jury, calculated primarily to reflect the net value [41] les appelants étaient aussi tenus d’alléguer des faits montrant que le préjudice direct subi par la fiducie était distinct de celui subi par le groupe melior. ils ont décrit le préjudice subi par la fiducie comme « l’anéantissement de la valeur du patrimoine fiduciaire » (requête introductive d’instance, par 293). la fiducie réclame des dommages- intérêts évalués à 55 000 000 $ pour ce préjudice, montant calculé [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault le juge rowe 505 of the seniors’ residences owned and operated by groupe melior by the end of summer 2008: ibid., at para 300. the problem, however, is that these residences belonged to the groupe melior corpora- tions and not to fiducie. as the ultimate shareholder, fiducie inevitably suffered from the bankruptcy of the groupe melior corporations. as alleged in the motion to institute proceedings, however, the injury caused by the respondents — the bankruptcy and ensuing loss of the seniors’ residence — was suffered by the corporations of groupe melior. it was not directly suffered by fiducie. [42] this conclusion is reinforced by the evidence adduced by the appellants before the superior court. for instance, the expert report used to calculate fiducie’s damages reveals that the loss of value from the trust patrimony that was suffered by fiducie cor- responds to the net value of the seniors’ residences once owned by groupe melior: paras. 69-72, citing exhibit p-8. this confirms that the injury alleged by fiducie is indistinguishable from the losses suffered by groupe melior. [43] this court has often affirmed that the state- ment of claim (called and originating application in quebec (in the new ccp)) defines the issues and informs the opposing parties of the case they have to meet: haaretz.com v. goldhar, 2018 scc 28, [2018] 2 scr 3, at para. 21; see also lax kw’alaams indian band v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 56, [2011] 3 scr 535, at para 41. for this reason, neither the parties nor the courts may redefine a cause of action on appeal nor read into a statement of claim what is not there. as the alleged injury in this case was suffered by the groupe melior corpo- rations, the facts pleaded by the appellants point only to an indirect injury suffered by fiducie. principalement pour tenir compte de la valeur nette des résidences pour personnes âgées que détenait et exploitait le groupe melior à la fin de l’été 2008 (ibid., par 300). le problème, toutefois, tient à ce que ces ré- sidences appartenaient aux sociétés du groupe melior et non à la fiducie. en tant qu’actionnaire ultime, la fiducie a inévitablement subi un préjudice du fait de la faillite des sociétés du groupe melior. cependant, comme il est allégué dans la requête introductive d’ins- tance, le préjudice causé par les intimés — la faillite et la perte des résidences pour personnes âgées qui en a découlé — a été subi par les sociétés du groupe melior. il n’a pas été directement subi par la fiducie. [42] la preuve présentée par les appelants devant la cour supérieure renforce cette conclusion. par exemple, le rapport d’expert utilisé pour calculer les dommages- intérêts de la fiducie révèle que la perte de la valeur du patrimoine fiduciaire subie par la fiducie correspond à la valeur nette des rési- dences pour personnes âgées ayant déjà appartenu au groupe melior (par. 69-72, citant la pièce p-8). cet élément de preuve confirme que le préjudice allégué par la fiducie ne peut être distingué des pertes subies par le groupe melior. [43] la cour a souvent affirmé que la déclaration (appelée demande introductive d’instance au québec (dans le nouveau cpc)) définit ce qui est en litige et informe les parties adverses de la cause qu’elles auront à contrer (haaretz.com c. goldhar, 2018 csc 28, [2018] 2 rcs 3, par. 21; voir aussi bande indienne des lax kw’alaams c. canada (procureur général), 2011 csc 56, [2011] 3 rcs 535, par 41). pour cette raison, ni les parties ni les tribunaux ne peuvent redéfinir une cause d’action en appel ou inclure dans la déclaration, par voie d’interprétation extensive, des éléments qui n’y figurent pas. comme le préjudice al- légué en l’espèce a été subi par les sociétés du groupe melior, les faits invoqués par les appelants indiquent seulement que la fiducie a subi un préjudice indirect. indirect injuries are not compensable under [44] art.  1607  ccq. as beaudoin, deslauriers and moore have stated: [44] un préjudice indirect n’est pas indemnisable en vertu de l’art 1607 ccq. comme l’ont affirmé beaudoin, deslauriers et moore : [translation] the courts will not recognize loss the immediate source of which is not the fault itself but some les tribunaux ne reconnaissent pas le préjudice qui puise sa source immédiate non dans la faute elle- même, 506 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. other injury already caused by the fault. in other words, damage resulting from damage, repercussive damage, “second degree” damage, is indirect. mais dans un autre préjudice déjà causé par la faute. en d’autres termes, est indirect le dommage issu du dom- mage, le dommage par ricochet, le dommage au « second degré ». (j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers and b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at no. 1-684) (j-l baudouin,. p. deslauriers et b. moore, la res- ponsabilité civile (8e éd. 2014), nº 1-684) [45] several decisions in quebec have affirmed this principle and held that a direct injury suffered by a corporation amounts to an indirect injury suffered by the shareholder: houle, at p. 186; biosyntech, at para. 23; silverman, at p. 539; michaud v. groupe vi- déotron ltée, [2003] rjq 3087 (ca), at para. 66; st- paul fire & marine insurance co. v. parsons & misiurak construction ltd., [1996] rjq 2925 (que. sup. ct.) at pp. 2971-72; pellin v. bedco, divi- sion de gérodon inc., 2002 canlii 20301 (que. sup. ct.), at para 44. this case is no exception. [45] ce principe a été confirmé dans plusieurs décisions au québec, où il a été conclu que le pré- judice direct subi par une société équivaut à un pré- judice indirect subi par l’actionnaire (houle, p. 186; biosyntech, par. 23; silverman, p. 539; michaud c. groupe vidéotron ltée, [2003] rjq 3087 (ca), par. 66; st- paul fire & marine insurance co. c. parsons & misiurak construction ltd., [1996] rjq. 2925 (cs. qc), p. 2971- 2972; pellin c. bedco, divi- sion de gérodon inc., 2002 canlii 20301 (cs. qc), par 44). la présente affaire ne fait pas exception. [46] i acknowledge that the characterization of an injury, as direct or indirect, requires an assess- ment of causation and that questions of causation are typically left to the trial judge. some decisions in quebec have declined to dismiss claims on this basis on a preliminary motion: 3952851 canada inc. v. groupe montoni (1995) division construction inc., 2017 qcca 620, at para. 47 (canlii); bruneau v. gespro technologies inc., 2001 canlii 20199 (que. sup. ct.), at paras 11-13. there is an important dif- ference, however, between these cases and the case at hand. in the former, the courts considered that the al- leged facts were sufficient to establish the legal basis of the claims or the required interest of the claimants: montoni, at para. 56; gespro, at paras 20-21. such is not the case here. while courts must be careful in exercising their power to dismiss claims for lack of sufficient interest, courts have an obligation to end proceedings when that interest is manifestly absent: mont réal (ville de) v. mont réal- ouest (ville de), 2009 qcca 2172, [2009] rjq 2729, at para 31. [46] je reconnais que la qualification d’un pré- judice comme étant direct ou indirect requiert une analyse de la causalité et qu’il revient généralement au juge de première instance de se prononcer sur les questions relatives à la causalité. dans certaines décisions, les tribunaux québécois ont refusé de reje- ter des demandes sur ce fondement dans le contexte d’une requête préliminaire (3952851 canada inc. c groupe montoni (1995) division construction inc., 2017 qcca 620, par. 47 (canlii); bruneau c. gespro technologies inc., 2001 canlii 20199 (cs. qc), par 11-13). il existe toutefois une importante différence entre ces affaires et le cas qui nous occupe. dans ces affaires, les tribunaux ont jugé que les faits allégués suffisaient pour établir le fondement juridique des demandes ou l’intérêt requis des de- mandeurs (montoni, par. 56; gespro, par 20-21). tel n’est toutefois pas le cas en l’espèce. bien qu’ils doivent faire preuve de prudence lorsqu’ils exercent leur pouvoir de rejeter des demandes pour cause d’absence d’intérêt suffisant, les tribunaux ont l’obli- gation de mettre fin à l’instance lorsque cet intérêt est manifestement absent (mont réal (ville de) c. mont réal- ouest (ville de), 2009 qcca 2172, [2009] rjq 2729, par 31). [47] furthermore, if we accept that the character- ization of injury is so closely related to causation [47] de plus, si nous acceptons que la question de la qualification du préjudice est si intimement liée à [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault le juge rowe 507 that it must in all cases be decided at a trial on the merits, then preliminary motions under art. 165(3) would invariably fail in the context of civil liability. this is because one of the essential elements of the claim — injury — could never be challenged prior to a trial on the merits. at the preliminary stage, quebec courts would effectively be stripped of any means to weed out unfounded claims in civil liability for lack of sufficient interest under art 165(3). [48] the potential for wasted judicial resources here is considerable. as this court set out in hryniak v. mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 scr 87, “un- due process and protracted trials, with unnecessary expense and delay, can prevent the fair and just res- olution of disputes”: para 24. the fair and just res- olution of disputes requires an efficient allocation of judicial resources. the scarcity of judicial resources requires that courts be able to dismiss claims that are manifestly unfounded at a preliminary stage. [49] to borrow from chief justice mclachlin in r v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2011 scc 42, [2011] 3 scr 45, “[t]he power to strike out claims that have no reasonable prospect of success is a valu- able housekeeping measure essential to effective and fair litigation. it unclutters the proceedings, weeding out the hopeless claims and ensuring that those that have some chance of success go on to trial”: para 19. the same is true for the power to dismiss claims for lack of sufficient interest under the ccp. celle de la causalité qu’elle doit, dans tous les cas, être tranchée au procès sur le fond, les requêtes préli- minaires fondées sur l’art. 165(3) seront immanqua- blement rejetées dans le contexte de la responsabilité civile. il en est ainsi parce que l’un des éléments essentiels de la demande — le préjudice — ne peut jamais être contesté avant le procès sur le fond. au stade préliminaire, les tribunaux québécois seront effectivement dépouillés de tout moyen d’écarter, en vertu de l’art. 165(3), les demandes non fondées en responsabilité civile en raison de l’absence d’intérêt suffisant. [48] le risque de gaspillage des ressources ju- diciaires est considérable en l’espèce. comme l’a affirmé la cour dans hryniak c. mauldin, 2014 csc 7, [2014] 1 rcs 87, « les formalités excessives et les procès interminables occasionnant des dépenses et des délais inutiles peuvent faire obstacle au rè- glement juste et équitable des litiges » (par 24). le règlement juste et équitable des litiges exige une affectation efficiente des ressources judiciaires. vu la rareté de telles ressources, les tribunaux doivent être capables de rejeter au stade préliminaire les de- mandes qui sont manifestement non fondées. [49] pour reprendre les propos de la juge en chef mclachlin dans r c imperial tobacco canada ltée, 2011 csc 42, [2011] 3 rcs 45, « [l]e pou- voir de radier les demandes ne présentant aucune possibilité raisonnable de succès constitue une im- portante mesure de gouverne judiciaire essentielle à l’efficacité et à l’équité des procès. il permet d’éla- guer les litiges en écartant les demandes vaines et en assurant l’instruction des demandes susceptibles d’être accueillies » (par 19). il en va de même du pouvoir en vertu du cpc de rejeter des demandes pour cause d’absence d’intérêt suffisant. [50] having failed to show a direct injury suffered by fiducie distinct from the one suffered by the groupe melior corporations, fiducie falls short of the requirement set out in houle. consequently, it cannot establish a sufficient interest in seeking dam- ages against the respondents. [50] n’ayant pas réussi à établir qu’elle a subi un préjudice direct distinct de celui subi par les socié- tés du groupe melior, la fiducie ne répond pas aux exigences établies dans houle. elle ne peut donc pas établir le caractère suffisant de son intérêt à réclamer des dommages- intérêts aux intimés. 508 brunette v legault joly thiffault rowe j. [2018] 3 scr. vi conclusion vi conclusion [51] the principles of procedural and corporate law in quebec bar shareholders from exercising rights of action that belong to the corporations in which they hold shares. shareholders may institute proceedings, however, if they can demonstrate (1) a breach of a distinct obligation, and (2) a direct injury that is distinct from that suffered by the corporation in question. these requirements reflect the essential principles of civil liability under the ccq and provide shareholders having a direct and personal interest with a means to seek damages against third- party defendants. [51] les principes du droit procédural et du droit des sociétés au québec empêchent les actionnaires d’exercer des droits d’action qui appartiennent aux sociétés dans lesquelles ils détiennent des actions. les actionnaires peuvent toutefois intenter une pour- suite s’ils peuvent démontrer (1) un manquement à une obligation distincte et (2) un préjudice direct qui est distinct de celui subi par les sociétés en question. ces exigences reflètent les principes essentiels de la responsabilité civile sous le régime du ccq et permettent aux actionnaires ayant un intérêt direct et personnel de réclamer des dommages- intérêts à des tiers défendeurs. [52] in this case, the appellants’ motion to institute proceedings does not disclose the breach of a distinct legal obligation, nor does it disclose a distinct injury from that suffered by the groupe melior corpora- tions. they have consequently not demonstrated a direct and personal interest that would allow fiducie to claim damages from the respondents. [52] en l’espèce, la requête introductive d’instance des appelants ne fait pas état d’un manquement à une obligation légale distincte, ni d’un préjudice distinct de celui subi par les sociétés du groupe melior. ils n’ont donc pas démontré l’existence d’un intérêt direct et personnel qui permettrait à la fiducie de réclamer des dommages- intérêts aux intimés. [53] i add this if shareholders wish to ensure that a corporation exercises its rights, they may do so by means of a derivative action in the corpora- tion’s name: canada business corporations act, rsc 1985, c. c-44, s. 239; business corporations act, cqlr, c s-311, s 445. these rules change upon bankruptcy as all rights of action belonging to the corporation pass to the trustee. if the trus- tee declines to pursue an action on behalf of the corporation, the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3, provides that a creditor may obtain from the court an authorization to institute proceedings based on a right of action belonging to the corporation: s 38(1). as a result, other creditors are then afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. shareholders have no such right. any surplus recovered by the creditors belongs to the estate of the corporation for the benefit of all creditors and, if anything remains, for the benefit of its shareholders. to allow shareholders to gain an in- dependent right of action prior to this distribution for injuries suffered by the bankrupt corporation would be to upend the usual priorities of the bankruptcy and insolvency act. [53] j’ajouterai ceci. si les actionnaires veulent veiller à ce qu’une société exerce ses droits, ils peuvent le faire en intentant un recours similaire à l’action oblique au nom de la société (loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions, lrc 1985, c. c-44, art. 239; loi sur les sociétés par actions, rlrq, c s-311, art 445). ces règles changent s’il y a fail- lite puisque tous les droits d’action appartenant à la société passent alors au syndic. si ce dernier refuse d’intenter une action pour le compte de la société, la loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité, lrc 1985, c. b-3, prévoit qu’un créancier peut obtenir du tribu- nal l’autorisation d’engager une poursuite fondée sur le droit d’action appartenant à la société (par 38(1)). d’autres créanciers ont donc alors la possibilité de prendre part à l’instance. les actionnaires n’ont pas un tel droit. tout excédent recouvré par les créanciers appartient au patrimoine de la société et est destiné à l’ensemble de ses créanciers et, s’il reste quelque chose, à ses actionnaires. permettre aux actionnaires d’obtenir avant cette distribution un droit d’action indépendant pour le préjudice subi par la société faillie bouleverserait les priorités habituelles de la loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité. [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 509 in this case, the trustee in bankruptcy of [54] groupe melior could have instituted proceedings against the respondents but did not. the creditors of groupe melior, with the bankruptcy court authoriza- tion, could also have instituted proceedings against the respondents but did not either. their failure to in- stitute proceedings does not provide fiducie with an independent cause of action against the respondents. as fiducie lacks the sufficient interest required by art. 55 of the former ccp,. i would dismiss the ap- peal with costs to legault joly thiffault, sencrl;. ljt fiscalité inc.; ljt corporatif inc.; ljt conseil inc.; ljt litige inc.; ljt immobilier inc.; and lehoux boivin comptables agréés, senc; and uphold the dismissal of their claim under art. 165(3) of the former ccp. [54] dans le cas qui nous occupe, le syndic de faillite du groupe melior aurait pu intenter une pour- suite contre les intimés, mais il ne l’a pas fait. les créanciers du groupe melior auraient pu également, avec l’autorisation du tribunal de faillite, intenter une poursuite contre eux, mais ils ne l’ont pas fait non plus. leur omission de poursuivre les intimés ne donne pas à la fiducie une cause d’action indépen- dante contre les intimés. comme la fiducie n’a pas l’intérêt suffisant exigé à l’art. 55 de l’ancien cpc, je rejetterais le pourvoi avec dépens en faveur de legault joly thiffault, sencrl, de ljt fiscalité inc., de ljt corporatif inc., de ljt conseil inc., de ljt litige inc., de ljt immobilier inc. et de lehoux boivin comptables agréés, senc, et je confirmerais le rejet de sa demande conformément à l’art. 165(3) de l’ancien cpc. english version of the reasons delivered by les motifs suivants ont été rendus par côté j. (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i. introduction i. introduction [55] there is nothing trivial about dismissing an action before the plaintiff has even had an opportu- nity to be heard on the merits. as this court noted in canada (attorney general) v. confédération des syndicats nationaux, 2014 scc 49, [2014] 2 scr. 477, at para. 1, “[a]lthough the proper administra- tion of justice requires that the courts’ resources not be expended on actions that are bound to fail, the cardinal principle of access to justice requires that the power be used sparingly, where it is clear that an action has no reasonable chance of success.” caution must be exercised, particularly where the basis for the exception to dismiss is that the plaintiff has no interest. whether an interest exists is often dependent on the facts, and can rarely be assessed fully before trial. [55] il n’y a rien de banal à rejeter une action avant même que le demandeur ait pu se faire entendre sur le fond. comme le rappelait la cour dans canada (procureur général) c. confédération des syndicats nationaux, 2014 csc 49, [2014] 2 rcs 477, par. 1, « si la saine administration de la justice commande que les recours voués à l’échec n’accaparent pas les ressources des tribunaux, le principe cardinal de l’accès à la justice exige en revanche que ce pouvoir soit utilisé avec parcimonie, lorsqu’il est manifeste qu’une demande n’a aucune chance raisonnable de succès ». la prudence s’impose d’autant plus lorsque le moyen d’irrecevabilité repose sur l’absence d’in- térêt. en effet, l’intérêt est souvent tributaire des faits — et peut rarement être apprécié pleinement avant l’instruction de l’affaire. [56] in the instant case, the courts below found that fiducie maynard 20041 (“fiducie”) clearly did not have a sufficient interest or the necessary capacity [56] dans le présent dossier, les tribunaux de juri- diction inférieure ont conclu que fiducie maynard 20041 (« fiducie ») ne possédait manifestement pas 1 in these proceedings, fiducie maynard 2004 is represented by its trustees, yves brunette and jean m maynard. for the sake of readability, i will simply use the word “fiducie” to refer to the appellants. 1 fiducie maynard 2004 est représentée à l’instance par ses fidu- ciaires messieurs yves brunette et jean m maynard. pour alléger le texte, j’emploierai simplement le terme « fiducie » pour référer aux appelants. 510 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. to bring an action against the respondents. they accordingly declared that the re-re- amended and par- ticularized motion to institute proceedings (“mip”) was inadmissible and dismissed it at the preliminary stage. my colleague rowe j. agrees with them and would therefore dismiss the appeal. l’intérêt suffisant ni la qualité pour former une de- mande en justice à l’encontre des intimés. ils ont donc déclaré la requête introductive d’instance ré-ré- amendée et précisée (« rii ») irrecevable et l’ont rejetée au stade préliminaire. mon collègue le juge rowe partage leur avis et rejetterait donc l’appel. [57] mayrand j. of the superior court was of the view that the mip did not identify any fault allegedly committed against fiducie that was distinct from the fault allegedly committed against the corporations making up groupe melior, of which fiducie was an indirect shareholder (2015 qccs 3482, at paras. 58 and 63). she also expressed the view that the mip did not refer to any damage suffered by fiducie that was distinct from the damage suffered by those corpora- tions (para 66). as a result, she found that fiducie clearly did not have the necessary interest to bring this action, given that the corporations in question were the [translation] “holders of the rights being claimed” (para 79). [57] selon la juge mayrand de la cour supérieure, la rii ne soulèverait aucune faute qui aurait été com- mise à l’endroit de la fiducie, et qui serait distincte de celle qui aurait été commise à l’égard des sociétés qui composent le groupe melior et dont la fiducie est indirectement actionnaire (2015 qccs 3482, par. 58 et 63). de plus, la rii ne ferait état d’aucun préjudice subi par la fiducie qui serait distinct de celui subi par ces sociétés (par 66). par conséquent, la fiducie n’aurait manifestement pas l’intérêt né- cessaire pour intenter la présente action, puisque ce sont les sociétés en question qui seraient « titulaires des droits réclamés » (par 79). [58] the court of appeal affirmed that decision and dismissed fiducie’s appeal. in its opinion, the mip did not allege any direct damage that was dis- tinct from and independent of the damage caused to the corporations (2017 qcca 391, at para 30). in light of that finding, the court of appeal saw no need to determine whether the mip alleged a breach of an obligation owed to fiducie (para 35). [58] la cour d’appel a confirmé cette décision et rejeté l’appel formé par la fiducie. de l’avis de la cour, aucun préjudice direct, distinct et indépendant de celui occasionné aux sociétés ne serait allégué dans la rii (2017 qcca 391, par 30). compte tenu de cette conclusion, la cour d’appel n’a pas jugé né- cessaire de décider si la rii alléguait un manquement à une obligation à l’endroit de la fiducie (par 35). [59] in my view, the courts below made an er- ror in respect of which this court must intervene. according to the uncontradicted allegations in the mip, there were separate contracts of mandate be- tween, on the one hand, fiducie and the respondent lawyers, accountants and tax experts and, on the other hand, the groupe melior corporations and the respondents. it is also alleged in the mip that the respondents breached their obligations under their mandates with fiducie, thereby causing direct per- sonal damage to it (see art. 1458 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”)). at the preliminary stage, these allegations are sufficient to establish that fiducie has the necessary interest to bring an action. questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law, such as the directness of the damage and the fault, must be left to the trial judge and decided after the relevant [59] à mon avis, les tribunaux de juridiction in- férieure ont commis une erreur qui nécessite l’in- tervention de cette cour. selon les allégations non contredites de la rii, il existait des contrats de man- dat distincts intervenus, d’une part, entre la fiducie et les avocats, comptables et fiscalistes intimés et, d’autre part, entre les sociétés du groupe melior et les intimés. toujours selon la rii, les intimés au- raient manqué aux obligations qui leur incombaient en vertu de leurs contrats de mandat avec la fiducie, causant ainsi un préjudice direct et personnel à cette dernière (voir art. 1458 du code civil du québec (« ccq »)). au stade préliminaire, ces allégations suffisent à établir que la fiducie possède l’intérêt requis pour former une demande en justice. les ques- tions de fait et les questions mixtes de fait et de droit, comme c’est le cas du caractère direct du préjudice et [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 511 evidence has been considered. without expressing an opinion on fiducie’s chances of proving its interest at trial, i believe that it is premature to dismiss the action. i would therefore allow the appeal. de la faute, doivent être laissées à l’appréciation du juge du fond et tranchées après analyse de la preuve pertinente. sans me prononcer sur les chances que la fiducie parvienne à prouver son intérêt lors de l’instruction, je suis d’avis qu’il est prématuré de rejeter l’action. j’accueillerais donc l’appel. ii dismissal on the basis that the plaintiff clearly ii l’irrecevabilité fondée sur l’absence manifeste has no interest d’intérêt [60] the sufficient interest required by art. 55 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25 (“for- mer ccp”) — now art. 85 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501 (“new ccp”) — is the monetary or moral benefit the plaintiff will derive if the action is well- founded (jeunes canadiens pour une civilisation chrétienne v. fondation du théâtre du nouveau- monde, [1979] ca 491, at pp. 493-94; consoltex inc v 155891. canada inc., 2006 qcca 1347, at para. 28 (canlii); kingsway, compagnie d’assurances générales v. bombardier produits ré- créatifs inc., 2010 qcca 1518, [2010] rjq 1894, at para 21). this interest must be legal in nature, such that it depends on the existence of a substan- tive right that is enforceable by the courts (noël v. société d’énergie de la baie james, 2001 scc 39, [2001] 2 scr 207, at paras 37-38). it must also be direct and personal in the sense that a right specific to the plaintiff must have been infringed (bou malhab v. diffusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 scc 9, [2011] 1 scr 214, at paras. 44 and 47). [60] l’intérêt suffisant requis par l’art.  55 du code de procédure civile, rlrq, c. c-25 (« an- cien cpc  »), maintenant l’art.  85 du code de procédure civile, rlrq, c.  c-25.01 («  nouveau cpc  »), correspond à l’avantage pécuniaire ou moral que retirera le demandeur si l’action s’avère fondée (jeunes canadiens pour une civilisation chrétienne c. fondation du théâtre du nouveau- monde, [1979] ca  491, p.  493- 494; consoltex inc c 155891 canada inc., 2006 qcca 1347, par.  28 (canlii); kingsway, compagnie d’assu- rances générales c. bombardier produits récréa- tifs inc., 2010 qcca 1518, [2010] rjq 1894, par 21). cet intérêt doit être de nature juridique, de sorte qu’il dépend de l’existence d’un droit subs- tantiel susceptible d’être reconnu par les tribunaux (noël c. société d’énergie de la baie james, 2001 csc 39, [2001] 2 rcs 207, par 37-38). l’intérêt doit en outre être direct et personnel, en ce sens que le demandeur doit avoir été lésé dans un droit qui lui est propre (bou malhab c. diffusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 csc 9, [2011] 1 rcs 214, par. 44 et 47). [61] having an interest is, first of all, a substan- tive condition. if the evidence at trial shows that the plaintiff does not have a sufficient interest, the action will be dismissed by way of a final judgment (d. ferland and b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (5th ed. 2015), vol. 1, at para 1-888). [61] l’intérêt est d’abord une condition de fond. si la preuve révèle, au terme de l’instruction, l’absence d’intérêt suffisant du demandeur, l’action sera rejetée par voie de jugement final (d. ferland et b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (5e éd. 2015), vol. 1, par 1-888). [62] having an interest is also an essential criterion for the admissibility of any action (jeunes cana- diens pour une civilisation chrétienne, at p. 493; c. belleau, collection de droit 2017- 2018, vol. 2, preuve et procédure, at pp 59-60). an action may be dismissed at the preliminary stage, but only if it [62] l’intérêt est également un critère essentiel à la recevabilité de toute demande en justice (jeunes canadiens pour une civilisation chrétienne, p. 493; c. belleau, collection de droit 2017- 2018, vol. 2, preuve et procédure, p 59-60). une demande peut être rejetée dès le stade préliminaire, à condition 512 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. is clear that the plaintiff has no interest. this rule is expressly set out in the code of civil procedure: toutefois que l’absence d’intérêt soit manifeste. cette règle est expressément prévue par le code de pro- cédure civile : 165 the defendant may ask for the dismissal of the ac- tion if: 165 le défendeur peut opposer l’irrecevabilité de la de- mande et conclure à son rejet :   .   . (3) the plaintiff has clearly no interest in the suit; 3 si le demandeur n’a manifestement pas d’intérêt; (former ccp, art. 165) (ancien cpc, art. 165) 168 a party may ask that an application or a defence be dismissed if 168 une partie peut opposer l’irrecevabilité de la de- mande ou de la défense et conclure à son rejet dans l’une ou l’autre des circonstances suivantes :   .   . (3) one of the parties clearly has no interest. 3° l’une ou l’autre des parties n’a manifestement pas d’intérêt. (new ccp, art. 168) (nouveau cpc, art. 168) [63] thus, the dismissal of an action before trial re- quires that it be clear that the plaintiff has no interest. the french word “manifeste” (“manifestement” is the equivalent of the word “clearly” in the french ver- sion of both art. 165(3) and art. 168(3)) is defined as follows in the dictionnaire de droit québécois et ca- nadien: [translation] “very apparent, discernible simply from seeing or reading a document, record or judgment” (h. reid, dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien (5th ed. 2015), at p 405). in housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at pa- ras. 5-6, the court noted that “manifeste” (“palpable” in the english version of that case) means [transla- tion] “plainly seen” or “not open to dispute”. [64] the reason the legislature has made a point of requiring that it be “clear” that the plaintiff has no interest — which, moreover, it has not expressly done in respect of any of the other exceptions to dismiss — is no doubt that the concept of interest is closely related to the substantive right itself, and in most cases that right cannot be established without a full assessment of the facts and without reviewing the evidence. [63] l’absence d’intérêt doit donc être manifeste pour justifier le rejet d’une demande en justice avant l’instruction. le terme « manifeste » est défini comme suit dans le dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien : « qui est très apparent, que l’on peut déceler à la seule vue ou lecture d’un document, d’un dossier, d’un jugement » (h. reid, dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien (5e éd. 2015), p 405). ainsi, dans l’arrêt housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, par. 5-6, la cour a souligné que ce mot signifie quelque chose de « tout à fait évident » ou « qui ne peut être contesté ». [64] si le législateur prend soin de préciser que l’absence d’intérêt doit être « manifeste » — ce qu’il ne fait d’ailleurs expressément pour aucun autre moyen d’irrecevabilité —, c’est sans doute parce que la notion d’intérêt est étroitement liée au droit substantiel lui- même, lequel ne peut, la plupart du temps, être établi sans une appréciation complète des faits et un examen de la preuve. [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 513 [65] to establish an interest at the admissibility stage, the plaintiff must allege the necessary elements of the substantive right being claimed, but he or she is not required to prove these elements before trial. as a result, the interest must be inferred simply by reading the originating application (ferland and emery, at para. 1-1221; l. chamberland, ed., le grand col- lectif: code de procédure civile — commentaires et annotations (3rd ed. 2018), at p 588). this was confirmed in jeunes canadiens pour une civilisation chrétienne: [65] afin de démontrer son intérêt au stade de la recevabilité, le demandeur doit alléguer les éléments nécessaires du droit substantiel qu’il réclame, mais il n’a pas à en faire la preuve avant le procès. ainsi, l’intérêt doit s’inférer d’une simple lecture de la demande introductive d’instance (ferland et emery, par. 1-1221; l. chamberland, dir., le grand col- lectif : code de procédure civile — commentaires et annotations (3e éd. 2018), p 588). c’est ce que confirme l’arrêt jeunes canadiens pour une civili- sation chrétienne : [translation] the necessary interest, like the other subjective conditions, cannot be presumed; if not specifi- cally raised, it must necessarily be inferred from the words of the pleading; a vague, general allegation of personal damage is not enough. [emphasis added; p 494]. l’intérêt requis, comme il en est des autres conditions subjectives, ne se présume pas; s’il n’est pas spécifique- ment plaidé, il doit s’inférer nécessairement du libellé de la procédure; une allégation vague et générale de préjudice personnel ne suffit pas. [je souligne; p 494] [66] to be sufficient to show that an interest ex- ists at the admissibility stage, allegations must, at a minimum, be clear and precise (art. 99 of the new ccp; art. 76 of the former ccp). however, in the specific case of causation, an “allusion” is generally sufficient (see 3952851 canada inc v. groupe mon- toni (1995) division construction inc., 2017 qcca 620, at para. 49 (canlii), citing acadia subaru v. michaud, 2011 qcca 1037, [2011] rjq 1185, at para 55). [66] pour démontrer de manière suffisante l’exis- tence d’un intérêt au stade de la recevabilité, les allé- gations doivent être minimalement claires et précises (art. 99 du nouveau cpc; art. 76 de l’ancien cpc). cependant, en ce qui concerne plus particulièrement la causalité, une « allusion » suffit généralement (voir 3952851 canada inc. c. groupe montoni (1995) division construction inc., 2017 qcca 620, par. 49 (canlii); citant acadia subaru c. michaud, 2011 qcca 1037, [2011] rjq 1185, par 55). [67] in my opinion, professor charles belleau pro- vides a good description of the plaintiff’s burden at this preliminary stage: [67] à mon avis, le professeur charles belleau décrit bien le fardeau du demandeur à cette étape préliminaire : [translation] all in all, the question of admissibility involves inquiring into whether, independently of the sub- stantive issues, the right of action a litigant claims to have meets fundamental criteria that give the court the authority to consider it. it should be clear from the application itself that the person making it has an interest in the suit and the necessary capacity to bring an action and is not incapable, and that his or her right of action has not been extinguished by the expiry of a prescription period. the first three con- ditions are set out in the code of civil procedure, while the last can be inferred from substantive law provisions, including those of the civil code. they are normally ver- ified simply by reading the originating application. if the opposing party notes that one of them is not met, he or she can raise a preliminary exception called an exception to en somme, la recevabilité consiste à se demander si, in- dépendamment des questions de fond, le droit d’action qu’un justiciable prétend avoir répond à des critères fon- damentaux qui permettront au tribunal de s’en saisir. la lecture de la demande devrait en effet démontrer que son auteur jouit de l’intérêt, de la qualité et de la capacité pour agir en justice et que son droit d’action n’est pas éteint par la survenance d’un délai de prescription. les trois pre- mières conditions sont prévues par le code de procédure civile, tandis que la dernière s’infère des dispositions du droit substantiel, notamment celles du code civil. elles se vérifient normalement à la seule lecture de la demande introductive d’instance. si la partie adverse constate qu’il en manque une, elle peut alors lui opposer un moyen préliminaire qualifié d’irrecevabilité et donc tenter de la 514 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. dismiss, thereby trying to have the application dismissed before it can be heard on the merits (art 168). faire rejeter avant même qu’elle puisse faire l’objet d’une audition sur le fond (art 168).   .   .    [w]here a creditor sues a debtor for payment of what he or she is owed, it is clear simply from reading the al- legations in the originating application to the effect that the claim exists and is exigible, as well as the conclusion in the application asking the court to order the defendant to pay the creditor the amount claimed in that regard, that the creditor has the interest required to sue because his or her patrimony would otherwise suffer a loss of income. if that is the case, the defendant will not be able to raise an exception to dismiss in respect of the application. but as for the issue of whether the claim actually exists and is exigible, it goes to the “merits” of the application. a defendant wishing to argue this point will then have to proceed with his or her defence (art. 170), and the case might continue to trial and to a judgment on the merits by the court. [emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted.]    lorsqu’un créancier poursuit son débiteur en justice pour se faire payer son dû, une simple lecture des alléga- tions de sa demande introductive d’instance au sujet de l’existence de la créance et de son exigibilité, ainsi que de sa conclusion demandant au tribunal de condamner le défendeur à lui payer le montant réclamé à ce titre, fait ressortir son intérêt pour ester en justice, puisqu’autrement son patrimoine subirait un manque à gagner. le défendeur ne pourra donc pas alors soulever l’irrecevabilité de la de- mande. par contre, quant à la question de savoir si dans les faits cette créance existe et si elle est exigible, elle relève du « bien- fondé » de la demande. si le défendeur veut en débattre, il devra alors utiliser à cette fin la procédure de la défense (art. 170) et le litige se poursuivra, le cas échéant, jusqu’à son instruction et à un jugement sur le fond par le tribunal. [je souligne; italique dans l’original omis.] (belleau, at p. 59) (belleau, p. 59) [68] that being said, it is true that the alleged facts are not automatically assumed to be true in the context of an exception to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s clearly having no interest. the court can therefore allow the parties to adduce any evidence that is considered necessary (société d’habitation du québec v. leduc, 2008 qcca 2065, at para. 16 (canlii)) so as, among other things, to give the de- fendant an opportunity to contradict the allegations. [68] cela dit, il est vrai que les faits allégués ne sont pas d’emblée tenus pour avérés dans le contexte d’un moyen d’irrecevabilité fondé sur l’absence ma- nifeste d’intérêt. le tribunal peut donc permettre aux parties de présenter une preuve jugée néces- saire (société d’habitation du québec c. leduc, 2008 qcca 2065, par. 16 (canlii)), notamment pour donner au défendeur la possibilité de contredire les allégations. [69] where the allegations are not contradicted, however, the court must assume them to be true. otherwise, the hearing on the exception to dismiss could well become a trial before a trial, which is certainly contrary to the principle of proportionality and to the interests of the proper administration of justice. the principles laid down by this court in the context of an application raising the declinatory exception therefore apply with equal force to an exception to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s clearly having no interest: [69] cependant, lorsque les allégations ne sont pas contredites, le tribunal doit les tenir pour avé- rées. autrement, l’audition du moyen d’irrecevabilité risque de devenir un procès avant le procès, ce qui n’est certainement pas conforme au principe de pro- portionnalité ni dans l’intérêt d’une saine administra- tion de la justice. en ce sens, les enseignements de notre cour dans le contexte d’une demande soulevant le moyen déclinatoire s’appliquent de la même ma- nière au moyen d’irrecevabilité fondé sur l’absence manifeste d’intérêt : the declinatory motion allows the defendants to challenge the facts alleged by the plaintiff. indeed, in the case at bar, the appellants adduced evidence to demonstrate that the incentive payments were made to the respondent’s head la requête en exception déclinatoire permet toutefois au défendeur de contester les faits allégués par le demandeur. en l’espèce, les appelantes ont effectivement présenté des éléments de preuve pour démontrer que les versements de [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 515 office in toronto and not to the respondent’s establishment in ste- anne-de- bellevue. nevertheless, the fact remains that the role of the motions judge is to refrain from eval- uating the evidence of parties unless the facts are specif- ically contested by the parties. in my opinion, reading in limitations with respect to the amount and nature of the damage that must be suffered in the jurisdiction before the court can assert its competence may improperly require the motions judge to prematurely decide the merits of the case. [emphasis added.] primes avaient été effectués au siège social de l’intimée à toronto et non à son établissement de ste- anne-de- bellevue. il n’en demeure pas moins que le rôle du juge des requêtes lui commande de s’abstenir d’apprécier la preuve des parties à moins que celles-ci ne contestent spécifiquement les faits. à mon avis, l’introduction de restrictions quant au montant et à la nature du préjudice subi dans le ressort avant que le tribunal puisse se décla- rer compétent risquerait d’obliger indûment le juge des requêtes à se prononcer prématurément sur le fond du litige. [je souligne.] (spar aerospace ltd. v. american mobile satellite corp., 2002 scc 78, [2002] 4 scr 205, at para. 32) (spar aerospace ltée c. american mobile satellite corp., 2002 csc 78, [2002] 4 rcs 205, par. 32) [70] to adopt any other approach would be to disregard the need to exercise caution in ruling on an exception to dismiss (confédération des syn- dicats nationaux, at paras. 1 and 17-19; leduc, at paras. 14-18; ferland and emery, at para 1-1221). given the serious consequences of dismissing an action prematurely, the plaintiff must be given an opportunity to be heard on the merits if there is any doubt (st- eustache (ville de) v. régie intermunici- pale argenteuil deux- montagnes, 2011 qcca 227, at paras. 24-25 and 31 (canlii); bohémier v. bar reau du québec, 2012 qcca 308, at para. 17 (canlii); entrepôt international québec, sec v. protection incendie de la capitale inc., 2014 qcca 617, at para. 2 (canlii)). this is especially true where his or her interest is in issue, given that the legislature has specified that a court must not dismiss an action unless it is clear that the plaintiff has no interest. [70] adopter toute autre approche serait faire fi de la prudence requise avant de se prononcer sur un moyen d’irrecevabilité (confédération des syndi- cats nationaux, par. 1 et 17-19; leduc, par. 14-18; ferland et emery, par.  1-1221) en effet, vu les graves conséquences qu’entraîne le rejet prématuré d’une action, il faut laisser au demandeur la chance de se faire entendre sur le fond en cas de doute (st- eustache (ville de) c. régie intermunicipale argen- teuil deux- montagnes, 2011 qcca 227, par. 24-25 et 31 (canlii); bohémier c. barreau du québec, 2012 qcca 308, par. 17 (canlii); entrepôt inter- national québec, sec c. protection incendie de la capitale inc., 2014 qcca 617, par. 2 (canlii)). cela est d’autant plus vrai lorsque la question de l’intérêt pour agir est en cause, puisque le législa- teur précise expressément que le tribunal ne doit conclure au rejet qu’en cas d’absence manifeste. in the instant case, the respondents adduced [71] no evidence that contradicted the allegations set out in the mip. they merely [translation] “referred to excerpts from maynard’s examination on dis- covery that confirm certain statements alleged in the mip, and they filed a summary table of exhibits that had already been filed by fiducie” (sup ct, at para 34). in circumstances such as these, there is no need to look beyond the allegations in the mip (see racine v. langelier, 2013 qccs 5657, at paras. 17-19 (canlii)). as i will explain in the next section, those allegations were sufficient — at the admissibility stage — to establish fiducie’s interest. the exception to dismiss therefore had to [71] en l’espèce, les intimés n’ont présenté aucune preuve contredisant les allégations se trouvant dans la rii. en effet, ils n’ont fait que se « référ[er] à des extraits de l’interrogatoire au préalable de maynard qui confirment certains énoncés allégués de la rii et ils ont produit un tableau récapitulatif de pièces déjà produites par fiducie » (cs, par 34). dans un tel contexte, il suffit de s’en remettre aux allé- gations de la rii (voir racine c. langelier, 2013 qccs 5657, par. 17-19 (canlii)). or, comme j’en traiterai à la prochaine section, ces allégations étaient suffisantes — au stade de la recevabilité — pour établir l’intérêt de la fiducie. le moyen d’irreceva- bilité devait par conséquent être rejeté. toute autre 516 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. be dismissed. in my opinion, any other conclusion would be imprudent at this stage of the proceedings. conclusion m’apparaît comme une imprudence à cette étape de l’instance. [72] before going any further, i will simply add that the applicable standard of review in the case at bar is correctness. given that the court hearing a preliminary exception does not assess the evidence, there is no justification for showing deference on an appeal from its decision (montoni, at para. 32; entrepôt international québec, at para 1). [72] avant d’aller plus loin, j’ajouterai simplement que la norme de contrôle applicable en l’espèce est celle de la décision correcte. en l’absence de toute appréciation de la preuve par le tribunal de première instance, rien ne justifie de faire montre de déférence lorsqu’il s’agit d’un appel d’un moyen préliminaire (montoni, par. 32; entrepôt international québec, par 1). iii fiducie’s interest at the preliminary stage iii l’intérêt de la fiducie au stade préliminaire [73] at the admissibility stage, fiducie bears the burden of alleging the necessary elements to es- tablish that it has the interest required to bring a civil liability action against the respondents. thus, the mip had to point to an extracontractual fault or breach of contract, compensable damage, and a causal connection between the two. in my opinion, all of these elements are present. [73] au stade de la recevabilité, la fiducie a le fardeau d’alléguer les éléments nécessaires pour démontrer l’intérêt requis pour former une action en responsabilité civile à l’encontre des intimés. la rii devait donc faire état d’une faute extracontractuelle ou d’un manquement contractuel, d’un préjudice in- demnisable, ainsi que d’un lien de causalité entre les deux. à mon avis, tous ces éléments sont présents. [74] i note that establishing an interest at the pre- liminary stage does not require the plaintiff to prove that his or her suit is founded in law. if, although the alleged facts are assumed to be true, the defendant disputes the substantive law on which the action is based, the defendant must raise the exception to dismiss that applies specifically to suits that are un- founded in law (art. 168 para. 1(2) of the new ccp; art. 165(4) of the former ccp). in the case at bar, it seems to me that these two exceptions to dismiss have to a large extent been confused with one an- other. be that as it may, i will also discuss the prin- ciples of civil liability and corporate law that apply to the action, because that is how the case has been dealt with in all the courts. [74] je précise que la démonstration de l’existence d’un intérêt au stade préliminaire ne requiert pas du demandeur qu’il établisse le bien- fondé en droit de sa demande. si le défendeur conteste le droit subs- tantiel qui sous- tend la demande, bien que les faits allégués soient tenus pour avérés, il doit recourir au moyen d’irrecevabilité qui vise spécifiquement les demandes non fondées en droit (art. 168 al. 1(2) du nouveau cpc; art. 165(4) de l’ancien cpc). dans la présente affaire, il me semble que ces deux moyens d’irrecevabilité ont été dans une large mesure confon- dus. néanmoins, je m’attarderai également aux prin- cipes de responsabilité civile et de droit corporatif applicables à la demande, puisque c’est ainsi que le dossier a été examiné devant toutes les juridictions. a in some circumstances, shareholders have their own right of action for a loss in the value of their shares a dans certaines circonstances, un actionnaire possède un droit d’agir en justice qui lui est propre pour la perte de valeur de ses actions [75] fiducie alleges that the respondents — pro- fessionals whose services it retained — breached a number of contractual obligations they owed to it, thereby directly causing the destruction of its trust patrimony, that is, the value of the shares it held in [75] la fiducie allègue que les intimés  —  des professionnels dont elle a retenu les services — ont manqué à plusieurs obligations contractuelles à son égard, ce qui aurait causé directement la destruction de son patrimoine fiduciaire, c’est-à-dire la valeur de [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 517 9143- 1304 québec inc. and, indirectly, in the various corporations of groupe melior (see, for example: mip, at paras. 26, 34-35, 45-46, 102, 256 and 300). [76] the nature of this claim leads my colleague — like the courts below before him — to review the principles of corporate law that apply in quebec (paras. 22 et seq). on this subject, i agree with the substance of his comments on the distinct legal personalities of corporations and their sharehold- ers. shareholders have no right of action for a fault committed against a corporation in which they hold shares (paras. 23 and 27, where my colleague re- fers, inter alia, to houle v. canadian national bank, [1990] 3 scr 122, at pp 177-80). that right be- longs solely to the corporation, and it is the corpora- tion that must exercise it (paras 25-26). i agree that the result reached in this regard in quebec civil law is much the same as the one reached in the common law elsewhere in the country (paras. 24 and 28). [77] as a shareholder, fiducie therefore has no right of action for breach of a contractual obligation owed to the groupe melior corporations that caused damage to the latter. indeed, fiducie does not dispute this conclusion. rather, it argues that it has a right of action of its own against the respondents that is based on a distinct contractual obligation owed to it and on direct damage specific to it, as was the case in houle. [78] what houle shows is that, in certain excep- tional circumstances, shareholders may have a right of action distinct from that of the corporation for a loss in the value of their shares, and may there- fore have a sufficient interest to bring an action in their own names. for this purpose, the shareholders must allege (i) that there was a breach of a distinct obligation owed to them and (ii)  that the breach caused direct personal damage to them (houle, at pp 180-87). as my colleague explains, this is not strictly speaking an “exception” to the corporate veil, but instead represents a simple application of the general principles of civil liability (para 30). ses actions dans 9143- 1304 québec inc. et, indirec- tement, dans les diverses sociétés du groupe melior (voir, par exemple : rii, par. 26, 34-35, 45-46, 102, 256 et 300). [76] la nature de cette réclamation amène mon collègue — à l’instar des tribunaux de juridiction infé- rieure avant lui — à considérer les règles applicables au québec en matière de droit corporatif (par. 22 et suiv). à ce sujet, je suis en accord avec l’essentiel de ses commentaires sur la personnalité juridique dis- tincte des sociétés par actions et de leurs actionnaires. en effet, un actionnaire ne possède aucun droit d’ac- tion pour une faute commise à l’endroit d’une société dont il détient des actions (par. 23 et 27, où mon col- lègue se réfère notamment à l’arrêt houle c. banque canadienne nationale, [1990] 3 rcs 122, p. 177- 180). ce droit appartient en propre à la société, et c’est elle qui doit l’exercer (par 25-26). à cet égard, je conviens que le droit civil québécois parvient sen- siblement aux mêmes résultats que la common law ailleurs au pays (par. 24 et 28). [77] en tant qu’actionnaire, la fiducie ne dispose donc d’aucun droit d’action pour un manquement à une obligation contractuelle envers les sociétés du groupe melior leur ayant causé un préjudice. cette conclusion n’est d’ailleurs pas contestée par la fiducie. cette dernière prétend plutôt posséder son propre droit d’action contre les intimés, droit qui serait fondé sur une obligation contractuelle distincte à son endroit et sur un préjudice direct qui lui est propre, comme c’était le cas dans l’arrêt houle. [78] en effet, l’arrêt houle confirme qu’un ac- tionnaire dispose parfois, dans certaines circons- tances exceptionnelles, d’un droit d’action distinct de celui de la société pour la perte de valeur de ses actions, et possède donc un intérêt suffisant pour former une demande en justice en son propre nom. pour ce faire, l’actionnaire doit alléguer (i) qu’il y a eu un manquement à une obligation distincte envers lui- même et (ii) que le manquement lui a causé un préjudice direct et personnel (houle, p. 180- 187). comme l’explique mon collègue, il ne s’agit pas à proprement parler d’une « exception » au voile corporatif, mais plutôt de la simple application des règles générales de la responsabilité civile (par 30). 518 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [79] however, i respectfully believe that my col- league departs from those very principles by em- phasizing the “distinct” nature of the damage and by reading houle too narrowly (paras. 29-31, 33 and 41). his reasons, like those of the courts below, sug- gest that the shareholder’s damage must be unrelated to that of the corporation. but that is not the case. in houle, the plaintiffs’ damage — a drop in the value of their shares — resulted from the liquidation of the corporation’s assets. it was not entirely “distinct” damage. what is more, l’heureux- dubé j. at no time used the word “distinct” to describe the damage in question, as she did to describe the obligation owed to the shareholder. [79] cependant, avec égards, j’estime que mon collègue s’écarte de ces mêmes règles en insistant sur le caractère « distinct » du préjudice et en faisant, se- lon moi, une lecture trop restrictive de l’arrêt houle (par. 29-31, 33 et 41). ses motifs, comme ceux des tribunaux de juridiction inférieure, suggèrent que le préjudice de l’actionnaire doit être étranger à celui subi par la société. or, il n’en est rien. dans l’affaire houle, le préjudice subi par les demandeurs — la baisse de valeur de leurs actions — découlait de la liquidation des actifs de la société. il ne s’agissait pas d’un préjudice entièrement « distinct ». d’ailleurs, la juge l’heureux- dubé n’emploie jamais le terme « distinct » pour décrire le préjudice en cause, comme elle le fait pour l’obligation envers l’actionnaire. in my opinion, houle requires no more [80] than does the civil code of québec, namely that the damage be direct and personal (arts. 1607 and 1611 ccq): [80] à mon avis, l’arrêt houle ne requiert rien de plus que ce qui est énoncé au code civil du québec, c’est-à-dire que le préjudice soit direct et personnel (art. 1607 et 1611 ccq) :. in order for the prejudice to be compensated, it must be direct and certain (art. 1075 [of the civil code of lower canada]). the above facts were dealt with by the trial judge and the court of appeal. both concluded that the respondents suffered a loss of $250 000, representing the difference between the value of the shares before and af- ter the acts of the appellant bank. this value is no longer contested and constitutes actual damage. thus, the damage is certain. pour qu’il puisse y avoir indemnisation du préjudice, celui-ci doit être direct et certain (art. 1075 [du code civil du bas- canada]). les faits précités ont été abordés par le juge de première instance et par la cour d’appel. tous les deux ont conclu que les intimés avaient subi une perte de 250 000 $, représentant la différence entre la valeur des actions avant et après les mesures prises par la banque appelante. cette valeur n’est plus contestée et représente le préjudice réellement subi. le dommage est donc certain. it may be questioned whether the damage is direct. the argument would be that the company suffered the damage, and only indirectly would the shareholders be prejudiced, on account of the value of their shares being affected. on peut toutefois se demander si le dommage est direct. on pourrait ainsi prétendre que c’est la compagnie qui a subi le dommage et que ce n’est qu’indirectement que les actionnaires ont subi un préjudice en raison des répercus- sions sur la valeur de leurs actions. in most circumstances, this argument would prevail. even if fault can be found, the damage is done to the company, and it is for the company to claim compensation for the damage. however, in this case, there was more than just damage to the company, since, to the knowledge of the bank, the respondents were in the process of negotiat- ing the sale of their shares. the respondents had a direct, personal, financial interest at stake and the bank knew this. furthermore, the respondents sold their shares, very soon after the liquidation of the company’s assets, to the same company with whom they were previously negotiating. in these circumstances, it was the potential sale value of their shares that was damaged, a value that the respondents dans la plupart des cas, cet argument serait retenu. en effet, même si l’on conclut à l’existence d’une faute, c’est à la compagnie que le dommage est causé et c’est à elle d’en réclamer réparation. en l’espèce, cependant, il y a eu davantage qu’un simple dommage causé à la compagnie étant donné que les intimés étaient, à la connaissance de la banque, en train de négocier la vente de leurs actions et qu’ils avaient donc un intérêt financier direct et personnel en jeu et la banque savait cela. de plus, les intimés ont, très peu de temps après la liquidation des actifs de la compagnie, vendu leurs actions à la compagnie même avec laquelle ils avaient auparavant négocié. dans les circonstances, c’est à la valeur potentielle de leurs actions [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 519 were at the point of enjoying personally. the acts of the bank resulted in the respondents’ losing something that was inches away from their grasp. à la revente qu’on a porté atteinte, valeur dont les intimés étaient sur le point de jouir personnellement. en raison des agissements de la banque, les intimés ont donc perdu quelque chose qui était à portée de la main.   .   .   . on the facts of this case, the harm flowing from the imminent sale of the respondents’ shares in the company resulted in direct damage to the shareholders, besides or beyond and independently of any damage the company itself may have incurred as a result of its contractual rela- tionship with the bank. [emphasis added.]    vu les faits de l’espèce, le tort résultant de la vente imminente des actions que les intimés détenaient dans la compagnie a résulté en un dommage direct aux ac- tionnaires, en plus ou au- delà et indépendamment de tout dommage qu’a pu subir la compagnie elle- même en raison des liens contractuels qui l’unissaient à la banque. [je souligne.] (houle, at pp. 185-86) (houle, p. 185- 186) [81] this passage shows that houle did not intro- duce a new criterion in addition to the existing ones under the civil code of québec. l’heureux- dubé j. did state that, on the facts of the case, there was “di- rect damage to the shareholders, besides or beyond and independently” of the damage sustained by the corporation. but the fact remains that the damage in question corresponded to the drop in the value of the shares that had resulted from the quick liquidation of the corporation’s assets. in other words, the damage for which a claim was being made coincided with the corporation’s losses. if that damage became “in- dependent” or “distinct”, it was simply because of the particular circumstances of the case. the bank’s wrongful conduct in relation to the shareholders had directly affected the value of their shares. the concept of “independent” damage was used only to illustrate the fact that, in exceptional cases, damage sustained by a shareholder may be direct and per- sonal. therefore, contrary to what is suggested in my colleague’s reasons and those of the courts below, this concept is not in itself a condition to be met. moreover, i note that my colleague does not explain the precise nature of this supposed criterion or its relationship to the general principles of civil liability. nor does he explain what made the damage of the shareholders in houle “independent” or “distinct”, if not the extracontractual fault committed against them by the bank. [81] il ressort de la lecture de cet extrait que l’ar- rêt houle n’introduit pas un critère additionnel, au- delà de ce que prévoit déjà le code civil du québec. certes, la juge l’heureux- dubé mentionne que, dans les faits, il s’agit d’un « dommage direct aux ac- tionnaires, en plus ou au- delà et indépendamment » du préjudice subi par la société. mais il n’en demeure pas moins que le préjudice en cause correspond à la chute de la valeur des actions liée à la liquidation précipitée des actifs de la société. autrement dit, le préjudice réclamé se confond avec les pertes subies par la société. si ce préjudice prend un caractère « indépendant » ou « distinct », c’est simplement en raison des circonstances particulières de l’affaire. en effet, par sa conduite fautive à l’égard des ac- tionnaires, la banque a directement affecté la valeur de leurs actions. la notion de préjudice « indépen- dant » ne sert qu’à illustrer que le préjudice subi par l’actionnaire peut, exceptionnellement, être direct et personnel. ainsi, contrairement à ce que suggèrent les motifs de mon collègue et ceux des juridictions inférieures, cette notion ne constitue pas, en elle- même, une condition à remplir. d’ailleurs, je note que mon collègue n’explique pas la nature exacte de ce prétendu critère ni son rattachement aux règles générales de la responsabilité civile. de même, ses motifs ne précisent pas ce qui conférait un caractère « indépendant » ou « distinct » au préjudice subi par les actionnaires dans houle, sinon la faute extra- contractuelle de la banque à leur endroit. 520 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [82] this emphasis on the “distinctness” of the damage is confusing and distorts the analysis. once there is a drop in the value of shares, as there was in houle, a shareholder’s damage cannot be com- pletely dissociated from that of the corporation. what must instead be determined is whether there are exceptional circumstances that make the share- holder’s damage direct damage, as is required by art 1607 ccq. in bruneau v. gespro technologies inc., 2001 canlii 20199 (que. sup ct), a case in which shareholders were suing third parties who had appropriated software owned by a corporation, bouchard j. (as he then was) provided a good sum- mary of the approach to be taken as a result of houle: insister sur ce caractère « distinct » porte à [82] confusion et vient fausser l’analyse du préjudice. dès lors qu’une chute de la valeur des actions est en cause, comme c’était le cas dans l’affaire houle, le préjudice de l’actionnaire ne peut être entièrement dissocié de celui de la société. ce qu’il faut plutôt chercher à déterminer, c’est si des circonstances exceptionnelles permettent de donner un caractère direct au préjudice subi par l’actionnaire, comme le requiert l’art 1607 ccq. dans l’affaire bruneau c. gespro technologies inc., 2001 canlii 20199 (c.s qc), où des actionnaires poursuivaient des tiers s’étant approprié le logiciel appartenant à une société, le juge bouchard (maintenant juge de la cour d’appel) a bien résumé l’approche à adopter suivant l’arrêt houle : [translation] it follows from this decision of the supreme court that a loss in the value of a company’s shares can be regarded as damage specific to a shareholder if the shareholder can show that, in the circumstances, the third party who committed a fault had a distinct legal obligation to act reasonably toward him or her. il découle de cette décision de la cour suprême que la perte de valeur des actions d’une compagnie peut être considérée comme un dommage qui est propre à l’ac- tionnaire si ce dernier parvient à démontrer, compte tenu des circonstances, que le tiers fautif avait l’obligation légale distincte d’agir raisonnablement à son endroit. in the instant case, the court cannot rule out the possi- bility that the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ declarations, though different from the facts of houle, will lead the judge who hears the case on its merits to consider whether the defendants, because of their specific relationship with the plaintiffs and of the alleged business transactions, were required, independently of their contractual obligations to 9008 and sit, to act reasonably in their dealings with the plaintiffs. [paras. 19-20] en l’espèce, le tribunal ne peut écarter la possibilité que les faits allégués dans les déclarations des deman- deurs, bien que différents de ceux présents dans l’arrêt houle, amènent le juge chargé d’entendre l’affaire à son mérite à examiner si les défendeurs, en raison des rela- tions particulières qu’ils avaient avec les demandeurs et des transactions commerciales alléguées, devaient agir raisonnablement envers eux et ce, indépendamment des obligations contractuelles des défendeurs envers 9008 et sit. [par. 19-20] this reasoning has been followed many times, in- cluding by the court of appeal in a decision sub- sequent to its judgment in the case at bar (montoni, at paras. 47-48; see also agri- capital drummond inc v. mallette, sencrl, 2009 qcca 1589, [2009] rra 935, at paras. 53-57; 9227- 1899 québec inc. v. gosselin, 2013 qccs 5036, at paras. 23-28 (canlii); conporec inc v. sorel- tracy (ville de), 2013 qccs 2789, at paras. 31-32 (canlii); industries portes mackie inc v. garaga inc., 2007 qccs 3304, at para. 31 (canlii); desrochers v. edc- exportation et développement canada, 2007 qccs 3032, at pa- ras. 25-26 (canlii); besner v. friedman & friedman, 2004 canlii 14237 (que. sup ct), at paras. 87-97; ce raisonnement a été suivi à maintes reprises, y com- pris par la cour d’appel après qu’elle ait rendu le ju- gement visé par le présent appel (montoni, par. 47-48; voir aussi agri- capital drummond inc. c. mallette, sencrl, 2009 qcca 1589, [2009] rra 935, par. 53-57; 9227- 1899 québec inc. c. gosselin, 2013 qccs 5036, par. 23-28 (canlii); conporec inc. c. sorel- tracy (ville de), 2013 qccs 2789, par. 31-32 (canlii); industries portes mackie inc. c. garaga inc., 2007 qccs 3304, par. 31 (canlii); desrochers c. edc- exportation et développement canada, 2007 qccs 3032, par. 25-26 (canlii); besner c. friedman & friedman, 2004 canlii 14237 (cs. qc), par. 87-97; voir également, dans la doctrine, les commentaires sur [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 521 see also, in the academic literature, the comments on houle in p. martel, la société par actions au québec (2011), vol. 1, at paras. 1-257 to 1-260). in my view, the court of appeal therefore [83] erred in the instant case by seeking to identify dam- age that was entirely [translation] “distinct and independent” (paras. 25-31), whereas in houle, this court had insisted only on damage that was direct and personal — as required by the civil code of lower canada and, now, the civil code of québec — and had explicitly recognized that a loss in the value of shares may, in exceptional circumstances, constitute such damage. i cannot, therefore, agree with the court of appeal or with my colleague on this point. [84] the court of appeal also erred in ruling that there was no direct damage without taking all the circumstances into account and without even consid- ering the distinct obligations owed to fiducie by the respondents (para 35). viewed in that light, the loss of the trust patrimony could only have seemed indi- rect. determining whether damage is direct or indi- rect comes down to determining whether it is a direct consequence of the alleged default (art 1607 ccq). the damage issue therefore cannot be considered in isolation, without reference to fault or breach of contract. in houle, for example, it was presumably only because of the bank’s wrongful conduct toward the shareholders that the loss in the value of their shares could be characterized as damage that was “direct”, and therefore “independent”. in this sense, fiducie is not wrong to say that the court of appeal has departed from the principles from houle. l’arrêt houle dans p. martel, la société par actions au québec (2011), vol. 1, par. 1-257 à 1-260). [83] dans la présente cause, la cour d’appel a donc fait erreur, à mon avis, en cherchant un préjudice entièrement « distinct et indépendant » (par. 25-31), alors que l’arrêt houle n’insiste que sur un préju- dice direct et personnel — conformément au code civil du bas- canada et, maintenant, au code civil du québec —, et reconnaît explicitement qu’une perte de valeur des actions peut constituer, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, un tel préjudice. je ne peux, par conséquent, partager l’opinion de la cour d’appel ni celle de mon collègue à ce sujet. [84] de même, la cour d’appel a commis une erreur en se prononçant sur l’absence de préjudice direct sans tenir compte de l’ensemble des circonstances et sans même examiner les obligations distinctes des intimés envers la fiducie (par 35). considérée sous cet angle, la perte du patrimoine fiduciaire ne pouvait que paraître indirecte. en effet, examiner le caractère direct ou indirect du préjudice revient à déterminer si le préjudice constitue une suite directe du défaut reproché (art 1607 ccq). la question du préjudice ne peut donc être analysée de façon compartimentée, sans égard à la faute ou au manquement contractuel. dans houle, par exemple, c’est seulement à la lu- mière de la conduite fautive de la banque à l’encontre des actionnaires que la perte de valeur des actions a vraisemblablement pu être qualifiée de dommage « direct » et, par le fait même, « indépendant ». en ce sens, la fiducie n’a pas tort lorsqu’elle affirme que la cour d’appel s’est écartée des principes élaborés dans houle. b questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law must be decided after the relevant evidence is considered b les questions de fait et les questions mixtes de fait et de droit doivent être tranchées au terme d’un examen de la preuve pertinente [85] the court of appeal also erred in making findings in relation to the “indirect” nature of the damage at the preliminary stage. this question of fact must instead be left to the trial judge, since it requires that all the circumstances of the case be ana- lyzed in light of the evidence. unlike my colleague, [85] en outre, la cour d’appel a commis une erreur en tirant, dès le stade préliminaire, des conclusions quant au caractère « indirect » du préjudice. cette question de fait doit plutôt être laissée au juge du fond, puisqu’elle requiert l’appréciation de l’en- semble des circonstances de l’affaire à la lumière 522 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. i am of the view that there is no justification for making an exception to this rule and that this court should therefore intervene to dismiss the preliminary exception. de la preuve. contrairement à mon collègue, je suis d’avis que rien ne justifie de faire exception à cette règle, et qu’il y a donc lieu d’intervenir pour rejeter le moyen préliminaire. [86] the question whether damage is direct can- not be considered separately from the causal con- nection between the fault and the damage (j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers and b. moore, la respon- sabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at no 1-333). because causation, “without a doubt, is a question of fact” (benhaim v. st- germain, 2016 scc 48, [2016] 2 scr 352, at paras. 36 and 92; mont réal (ville) v. lonardi, 2018 scc 29, [2018] 2 scr 103, at para. 41), the same holds true for the directness of the damage (bruneau, at paras 11-13). [87] there is no ready- made formula for deter- mining whether damage is direct. no damage — or victim — is automatically excluded. the commen- tators agree unanimously that this determination is essentially based on an assessment of the facts: [86] en effet, la question du caractère direct d’un préjudice est indissociable du lien de causalité entre la faute et ce préjudice (j-l baudouin,. p. deslauriers et b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8e éd. 2014), no 1-333). puisque la causalité est « indubitablement une question de fait » (benhaim c. st- germain, 2016 csc 48, [2016] 2 rcs 352, par. 36 et 92; mont réal (ville) c. lonardi, 2018 csc 29, [2018] 2 rcs. 103, par. 41), il en va de même du caractère direct du préjudice (bruneau, par 11-13). il n’existe pas de formule toute faite pour [87] statuer sur le caractère direct ou non du préjudice. aucun dommage — ni aucune victime — n’est ex- clu péremptoirement. selon l’opinion unanime de la doctrine sur cette question, cette détermination repose essentiellement sur l’appréciation des faits : [translation] the courts must therefore determine in each specific case, independently of the identity of the per- son making the claim, whether the damage being claimed is a direct consequence of the fault, and are not to try to decide whether the plaintiff is in fact the immediate victim. les tribunaux doivent donc évaluer, dans chaque cas par- ticulier, si le dommage réclamé est une conséquence di- recte de la faute, indépendamment de la personnalité du réclamant, et non pas chercher à décider si le demandeur est bien la victime immédiate. (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no. 1-337) (baudouin, deslauriers et moore, no 1-337) [translation] the determination of the line between direct damage and indirect damage, which is based largely on the circumstances of each case and is made on a balance of probabilities, is not an exact science and does not really lend itself to theorizing. la détermination de la frontière entre les dommages di- rects et les dommages indirects, largement tributaire des circonstances propres à chaque espèce, fonction de la « balance des probabilités », n’est pas une science exacte et se prête difficilement à la théorisation. (d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (2nd ed. 2012), at para. 2963; see also v. karim, les obligations (4th ed. 2015), vol. 2, at para. 1996) (d.  lluelles et b.  moore, droit des obligations (2e éd. 2012), par. 2963; voir aussi v. karim, les obligations (4e éd. 2015), vol. 2, par. 1996) [88] but it is well established that a judge must refrain from deciding a question of fact, or even a question of mixed fact and law, at the preliminary stage unless, in the case of an exception to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s clearly having no interest, sufficient evidence is adduced at that stage. in the [88] or, il est bien établi qu’un juge doit s’abstenir de trancher une question de fait, ou même une ques- tion mixte de fait et de droit, au stade préliminaire, à moins qu’une preuve suffisante soit présentée dès cette étape dans le cas d’un moyen d’irrecevabilité fondé sur l’absence manifeste d’intérêt. en l’espèce, [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 523 instant case, the court of appeal itself recognized that such questions must in principle be decided by the trial judge, but it reserved the right to depart from the rule: la cour d’appel a elle- même reconnu que ces ques- tions doivent en principe être tranchées par le juge du fond, tout en se réservant la faculté de déroger à la règle : [translation] while it is fair to say that it is often prefer- able to let the trial judge decide such questions, the court is of the opinion that it is not appropriate to do so where, as in this case, the conclusion is clear. allowing the action to continue would serve no useful purpose. [para. 34] quoiqu’il soit juste de dire qu’il est souvent préférable de laisser le juge du fond décider de telles questions, la cour est d’avis qu’il n’est pas opportun de le faire lorsque, comme ici, la conclusion est claire. permettre à l’action de se poursuivre ne servirait aucune fin utile. [par. 34] [89] it is not simply a matter of “appropriateness”, however. indeed, the court of appeal reaffirmed this rule in montoni, a decision rendered barely a month after the judgment being appealed from in the case at bar. in montoni, the court of appeal stressed that it is important for a judge hearing an exception to dismiss not to rule on questions of causation: [89] il ne s’agit pourtant pas d’une simple question d’« opportunité ». la cour d’appel a d’ailleurs réaf- firmé cette règle dans l’arrêt montoni rendu à peine un mois après le jugement faisant l’objet du présent pourvoi. dans cette affaire, la cour d’appel a insisté sur le fait qu’il est important que le juge saisi d’un moyen d’irrecevabilité ne se prononce pas sur les questions de causalité : [translation] that being said, the courts recognize that in extracontractual liability cases, it is for the trial judge to determine whether damage is direct or indirect. in bruneau v. gespro technologies inc., justice jean bou- chard of the superior court (as he then was) stated the following in dismissing the first exception to dismiss based on the claimed damage being indirect: cela étant, la jurisprudence reconnaît qu’en matière de responsabilité extracontractuelle, la détermination du caractère direct ou indirect du dommage relève du juge du fond. d’ailleurs, dans bruneau c. gespro technologies inc., le juge jean bouchard, alors à la cour supérieure, rejetait le premier moyen d’irrecevabilité fondé sur le caractère indirect des dommages réclamés en ces termes : [12] the basis for the proceedings brought by the plain- tiffs is extracontractual. to succeed in their actions, they will have to prove fault, damage and a causal connection between the two. because the court must assume the facts to be true when hearing a motion under article 165(4), it would certainly be usurping the role of the judge who hears the case on its merits if it were to determine at this stage whether the damage alleged by the plaintiffs is indirect. [12] le fondement du recours entrepris par les deman- deurs est de nature extracontractuelle. pour réussir dans leurs actions, ces derniers devront prouver une faute, un dommage et un lien de causalité entre cette faute et le dommage. comme le tribunal saisi d’une requête en vertu de l’article 165 (4) doit tenir les faits pour avérés, il usurperait sans contredit le rôle du juge chargé d’entendre l’affaire à son mérite s’il devait, dès ce stade-ci, déterminer si les dommages allégués par les demandeurs sont indirects.   .   . in acadia subaru v. michaud, this court also noted that the determination of whether there is a causal connection between the damage and the alleged faults must be made at trial. in that case, the court held that an allusion to causa- tion in the motion (coupled with allegations of damage and fault) was sufficient for it to find that the suit was not unfounded in law. [emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted; paras 47-49]. dans l’affaire acadia subaru c. michaud, notre cour rappelait aussi que la détermination de l’existence de causalité entre le préjudice subi et les fautes alléguées doit avoir lieu lors du procès. dans ce cas, la cour jugeait qu’une allusion à la causalité dans la requête (jumelée à des allégations de préjudice et de faute) suffisait à conclure que la poursuite n’était pas mal fondée en droit. [je sou- ligne; soulignement dans l’original omis; par 47-49] 524 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [90] the court of appeal reconfirmed these princi- ples in fanous v. gauthier, 2018 qcca 293: [translation] questions of fact must be left to the trial judge, who must assess the evidence as a whole. indeed, questions of fact and mixed questions cannot be decided at this stage of the case, given that they necessar- ily entail a factual inquiry. where a question cannot be resolved on the face of the record, therefore, the motion to dismiss must be dismissed. such is the case here. [90] la cour d’appel a confirmé à nouveau ces principes dans l’arrêt fanous c gauthier, 2018 qcca 293 : les questions de fait doivent être laissées à l’appré- ciation du juge du fond appelé à apprécier l’ensemble de la preuve. d’ailleurs, les questions de fait et les questions mixtes ne peuvent être tranchées à cette étape du litige puisqu’elles impliquent nécessairement un examen fac- tuel. ainsi, lorsqu’une question ne peut être résolue à la simple lecture du dossier, la demande en irrecevabilité doit être rejetée. c’est le cas, en l’espèce.   .   . in this case, many allegations of fact are sufficient to allow the appellant’s action in damages to go to trial. en l’espèce, maintes allégations de fait suffisent à lais- ser porter au fond le recours en dommages de l’appelant.   .   . care must be taken to avoid ending litigation at an early stage without considering the case on its merits. such a motion can be granted only if the legal situation is plain and unambiguous, which it is not here. [emphasis added; paras. 16, 19 and 21 (canlii).] la prudence est de mise afin d’éviter de mettre fin prématurément à un procès sans examen au fond. pour faire droit à pareille requête, la situation juridique doit être claire et sans ambiguïté, ce qui n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. [je souligne; par. 16, 19 et 21 (canlii).] [91] regarding fault, a question of mixed fact and law, the rule remains the same as for the directness of the damage. for example, in weinberg v. ernst & young llp, 2003 canlii 33911 (que. sup ct), certain shareholders of cinar corporation brought an action against ernst & young, which had acted, inter alia, as cinar’s auditor, alleging that it had breached not only its obligations to the corporation, but also distinct contractual obligations it owed the shareholders themselves. as in this appeal, the plain- tiffs were claiming damages for a loss in the value of their shares, an amount of more than $170 million. in weinberg, the superior court found that an exception to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs clearly had no interest in the suit and that the suit was un- founded in law could not be granted, because issues relating to fault had to be decided on the merits: [91] en ce qui a trait à la faute, une question mixte de fait et de droit, la règle demeure la même que pour le caractère direct du préjudice. en guise d’exemple, dans l’affaire weinberg c. ernst & young llp, 2003 canlii 33911 (cs. qc), des actionnaires de la so- ciété cinar ont intenté une action reprochant à la défenderesse ernst & young, qui agissait notamment à titre de vérificatrice, d’avoir manqué non seulement à ses obligations envers la société, mais également à des obligations contractuelles distinctes envers les actionnaires eux- mêmes. tout comme dans le présent pourvoi, les demandeurs réclamaient des dommages- intérêts correspondant à la perte de valeur de leurs actions, soit une somme de plus de 170 millions de dollars. la cour supérieure a estimé dans cette af- faire qu’un moyen d’irrecevabilité reposant à la fois sur l’absence manifeste d’intérêt et sur le caractère non fondé en droit de la demande ne pouvait être accueilli, les questions portant sur la faute devant être tranchées au fond : [translation] as for the other conclusions based on allegations that faults were committed by ernst & young, quant aux autres conclusions fondées sur des alléga- tions de fautes de ernst & young, il est vrai qu’en principe [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 525 it is true that, in principle, these faults can be alleged only by cinar and its subsidiaries given that ernst & young is being sued in its capacity as auditor — unless a derivative action is brought (which is not the case here) — but every principle has exceptions, which it is not open to this court to decide in the context of a preliminary exception. ces fautes ne peuvent être reprochées que par cinar et ses filiales autant que ernst & young soit poursuivie à titre de vérificateur, à moins d’une action dérivative (ce qui n’est pas ici le cas), mais tout principe souffre des exceptions qu’il n’appartient pas à cette cour de décider sur exception préliminaire. in addition, the alleged faults also involve breaches by or advice given by ernst & young in a capacity other than that of auditor of the books of cinar and its subsidiaries. [emphasis added.] davantage, les fautes reprochées visent aussi bien des manquements ou des conseils prodigués par ernst & young en qualité autre qu’à titre de vérificateur des livres de cinar et de ses filiales. [je souligne.] (weinberg, at paras. 8-9; motion to dismiss appeal granted in weinberg v. ernst & young llp, [2003] jq no 14375 (ql) (ca)) (weinberg, par. 8-9; requête en rejet d’appel accueil- lie dans weinberg c. ernst & young llp, [2003] jq no 14375 (ql) (ca)) [92] there is no justification here for us to depart from these well- established principles, which the court of appeal has reiterated on two occasions since its judgment in the instant case. where suffi- cient uncontradicted allegations are made with re- spect to the necessary elements of the substantive right being claimed, only an individualized analysis based on the relevant evidence can establish whether the damage in question is a direct consequence of the alleged fault. a loss in the value of a corporation’s shares may be regarded as direct damage specific to a shareholder if the shareholder can show that, in the circumstances, the defendant breached a distinct obligation owed to him or her — as was the case in houle. [92] en l’espèce, rien ne justifie de déroger à ces principes bien établis et réitérés à deux occasions par la cour d’appel depuis son jugement dans la présente affaire. en présence d’allégations non contredites et suffisantes quant aux éléments nécessaires du droit substantiel réclamé, seule une analyse individualisée et fondée sur la preuve pertinente permet de déter- miner si le préjudice subi est une suite directe de la faute reprochée. en effet, il est possible que la perte de valeur des actions d’une société soit considérée comme un préjudice direct propre à l’actionnaire si ce dernier parvient à démontrer que, dans les circons- tances, le défendeur a manqué à une obligation dis- tincte envers lui — comme ce fut le cas dans houle. [93] contrary to what my colleague argues (para. 47), leaving it to the trial judge to determine whether the damage is direct is not tantamount to doing away, in the civil liability context, with the exception to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s clearly having no interest. an action can still be dismissed at the preliminary stage if there are in- sufficient allegations regarding fault, direct and personal damage and a causal connection. as well, it can be dismissed if the evidence adduced at this stage shows that the plaintiff clearly has no interest. it is true that the plaintiff’s burden is generally not a very difficult one to meet, but this is precisely what the legislature contemplated by insisting that an action not be dismissed unless it is clear that the plaintiff has no interest. [93] contrairement à ce que prétend mon collègue (par. 47), laisser au juge du fond le soin de statuer sur le caractère direct ou non du préjudice ne revient pas à éliminer le moyen d’irrecevabilité fondé sur l’absence manifeste d’intérêt en matière de respon- sabilité civile. en l’absence d’allégations suffisantes quant à la faute, au préjudice direct et personnel et au lien causal, une demande en justice pourra tou- jours être rejetée au stade préliminaire. de même, la demande pourra être rejetée lorsque la preuve produite à cette étape permet de conclure à l’absence manifeste d’intérêt. certes, il n’est généralement pas très difficile de satisfaire au fardeau du demandeur. mais c’est précisément ce que le législateur a prévu en insistant pour que la demande ne soit rejetée qu’en cas d’absence manifeste d’intérêt. 526 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. c fiducie has established the interest required c la fiducie démontre l’intérêt requis au stade at the preliminary stage préliminaire [94] although the question of fault is one of mixed fact and law and the directness of damage and causa- tion are questions of fact, these elements must be supported by allegations of fact that are sufficient to show at the admissibility stage that an interest exists. in my view, this has been shown in this case. the allegations in the mip are sufficient to support an argument that a breach of a distinct obligation owed to fiducie caused it damage that was direct and personal. [94] bien que la faute soit une question mixte de fait et de droit, et que le caractère direct du préju- dice et la causalité soient des questions de fait, ces éléments doivent faire l’objet d’allégations de fait suffisantes pour démontrer au stade de la recevabilité l’existence d’un intérêt. à mon avis, cette démons- tration a été faite en l’espèce. les allégations de la rii suffisent pour soutenir qu’un manquement à une obligation distincte envers la fiducie a causé à cette dernière un préjudice direct et personnel. [95] fiducie alleges that the respondents acted for it as lawyers, accountants and tax experts, thereby establishing a distinct contractual relationship be- tween the parties (mip, at paras 3-4). in particular, the uncontradicted allegations in the mip indicate that legault joly thiffault acted as fiducie’s prin- cipal law firm from 2004 to 2010 (paras. 28 and 34-35). lehoux boivin acted as fiducie’s principal accounting firm from the time fiducie was consti- tuted (paras 44-47). finally, lawyer marcel chaput represented fiducie in the course of tax audits (pa- ras. 37 and 41(f)). the mandates given to the re- spondents allegedly gave rise to general duties to provide fiducie with information and advice (mip, at paras. 278, 280 and 282). [95] la fiducie allègue que les intimés agissaient pour son compte à titre d’avocats, de comptables et de fiscalistes, établissant ainsi l’existence d’un lien contractuel distinct entre les parties (rii, par 3-4). notamment, selon les allégations non contredites de la rii, legault joly thiffault aurait agi comme prin- cipal cabinet d’avocats de la fiducie entre 2004 et 2010 (par. 28 et 34-35). lehoux boivin aurait été le principal cabinet d’experts- comptables de la fiducie depuis la constitution de celle-ci (par 44-47). enfin, l’avocat marcel chaput l’aurait représentée dans le cadre de vérifications fiscales (par. 37 et 41(f)). les mandats confiés aux intimés auraient donné nais- sance à des devoirs généraux d’information et de conseil envers la fiducie (rii, par. 278, 280 et 282). [96] the uncontradicted allegations in the mip also indicate that the respondents committed several breaches of the professional obligations they owed to fiducie. they are alleged to have been fully aware that the tax structure they were putting in place would not be accepted by revenu québec and was unnec- essarily risky for fiducie (paras. 5 and 176). but they allegedly failed to inform fiducie in a timely manner of the risks being incurred and the disputes with revenu québec, thereby preventing it from rectifying the situation and avoiding the destruction of its trust patrimony (paras. 181-85, 229-31 and 256). it is alleged that in so doing, the respondents breached the duties they owed to fiducie itself to provide information and advice. those breaches are alleged to have been the direct cause of fiducie’s damage, that is, the destruction of its trust patrimony (paras. 26, 229, 244 and 293- 300). [96] toujours selon les allégations non contredites de la rii, les intimés auraient commis plusieurs man- quements à leurs obligations professionnelles envers la fiducie. ils auraient été pleinement conscients du fait que la structure fiscale mise en place ne serait pas acceptée par revenu québec et était inutilement risquée pour la fiducie (par. 5 et 176). or, les inti- més auraient omis d’aviser la fiducie en temps utile des risques encourus et des différends avec revenu québec, l’empêchant ainsi de remédier à la situation et d’éviter l’anéantissement de son patrimoine fidu- ciaire (par. 181- 185, 229- 231 et 256). les intimés auraient de ce fait manqué à leurs devoirs d’infor- mation et de conseil envers la fiducie elle- même. ces manquements auraient causé directement le pré- judice subi par la fiducie, soit la destruction de son patrimoine fiduciaire (par. 26, 229, 244 et 293- 300). [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 527 it should also be mentioned that the mip re- [97] fers to invoices for fees that had been sent directly to mr. maynard by the respondents legault joly thiffault and lehoux boivin (paras 312-14). the fees in question were allegedly claimed in 2011 for professional services that had been provided spe- cifically to rectify the situation caused by these re- spondents’ alleged breaches of the obligations they owed to fiducie. [98] unlike my colleague (paras.  35-40), i am of the view that it would be possible for the trial judge to find on the basis of the alleged facts — after considering the evidence — that the respondents breached obligations that were distinct from the ones they owed to the groupe melior corporations. it is true that the mip contains few specific allegations concerning the mandates given by fiducie and their connection with the alleged breaches. however, the respondents’ duties to provide information and ad- vice were not strictly circumscribed by the object of those mandates (see côté v. rancourt, 2004 scc 58, [2004] 3 scr 248, at para 6). for example, the circumstances could in themselves have required the respondents to inform fiducie directly and in a timely manner. it was clearly in fiducie’s interest to be aware of the situation, since it might have been in the best position to ensure that the necessary ac- tion was taken by the various entities of groupe melior and by their partners (see, inter alia, mip, at paras. 181, 229 and 256). in my opinion, these are questions of mixed fact and law that cannot be decided at this stage of the proceedings without con- sidering the relevant evidence. [97] par ailleurs, il convient de signaler que la rii fait état de factures d’honoraires des intimés legault joly thiffault et lehoux boivin adressées directe- ment à m. maynard (par. 312- 314). ces honoraires auraient été réclamés en 2011 pour des services pro- fessionnels visant justement à redresser la situation causée par les manquements reprochés à ces intimés à l’égard de leurs obligations envers la fiducie. [98] contrairement à mon collègue (par. 35-40), j’estime que les faits allégués pourraient permettre au juge du procès de conclure — après étude de la preuve — que les intimés ont manqué à des obliga- tions distinctes de celles envers les sociétés du groupe melior. je reconnais que la rii comporte peu d’allé- gations spécifiques concernant les mandats confiés par la fiducie et leur lien avec les manquements al- légués. cependant, les devoirs d’information et de conseil qui incombaient aux intimés n’étaient pas strictement limités par l’objet de ces mandats (voir côté c. rancourt, 2004 csc 58, [2004] 3 rcs 248, par 6). ainsi, les circonstances pouvaient, en elles- mêmes, exiger que les intimés préviennent direc- tement la fiducie, et ce, en temps utile. en effet, il était clairement dans l’intérêt de cette dernière de connaître la situation, car elle se trouvait possiblement dans une position privilégiée pour voir à ce que les mesures nécessaires soient prises par les différentes entités du groupe melior et par leurs partenaires (voir notamment rii, par. 181, 229 et 256). à mon sens, il s’agit là de questions mixtes de fait et de droit qui ne peuvent être tranchées à cette étape des procédures, sans un examen de la preuve pertinente. [99] i want to be clear that, contrary to what the motion judge’s reasons suggest (sup.  ct., at pa- ras. 58-63), fiducie does not have to allege facts that are actually “independent” or “distinct” in order to establish a breach of a distinct obligation. it would be possible for the same facts — for example, in the instant case, the failure to inform fiducie, groupe melior and the various entities in that group in a timely manner — to represent breaches of all the distinct obligations owed to them by the respondents (see montoni, at para 37). [99] je tiens à préciser que, contrairement à ce que suggère le jugement de première instance (cs, par. 58-63), la fiducie n’a pas à alléguer des faits à proprement parler « indépendants » ou « distincts » pour démontrer un manquement à une obligation distincte. en effet, les mêmes faits — par exemple, dans ce cas-ci, l’omission d’informer en temps utile la fiducie, le groupe melior et ses différentes enti- tés — pourraient constituer autant de manquements à autant d’obligations distinctes des intimés à leur égard (voir montoni, par 37). 528 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [100] as for the assessment of fiducie’s damage, it must also be left to the trial judge. it is possible that the judge will conclude that the respondents’ breaches were the direct cause of that damage in light, among other things, of their alleged failure, in breach of their obligations under the contracts of mandate with fiducie, to inform fiducie in a timely manner. as in houle, the alleged damage — the destruction of the trust patrimony — corresponds to the drop in the value of the shares resulting from the loss of the underlying assets (mip, at paras. 26 and 300). my colleague agrees with the court of appeal that fiducie is instead essentially claiming the value of the seniors’ residences owned by the groupe melior corporations (reasons of rowe j., at paras. 41-42; ca, at para 27). however, although some might consider the wording of the mip on this point to be clumsy, it is clear that fiducie is simply using the value of the properties to estimate the value of its shares before groupe melior collapsed. this method of valuation is of course open to question, but this issue relates solely to the quantum of damages, and not to the very existence of damage. moreover, to the extent that there is ambiguity in the allegations with regard to the amount of the damages being claimed, it seems to me that the solution lies in an amendment of the mip and in the expert evidence that will be presented at trial, not in the death sen- tence represented by outright dismissal of the action at the preliminary stage. [100] quant à l’appréciation du préjudice subi par la fiducie, cette question doit également être laissée au juge du fond. il est possible que ce dernier en vienne à la conclusion que les manquements des intimés ont directement causé ce préjudice, compte tenu notam- ment de l’allégation leur reprochant d’avoir omis de prévenir la fiducie en temps utile, et ce, en violation de leurs obligations découlant des contrats de man- dat conclus avec la fiducie. d’ailleurs, tout comme dans l’affaire houle, le préjudice allégué — soit la destruction du patrimoine fiduciaire — correspond à la chute de valeur des actions à la suite de la perte des actifs sous- jacents (rii, par. 26 et 300). à l’instar de la cour d’appel, mon collègue est plutôt d’avis que la fiducie réclame essentiellement la valeur des résidences pour aînés qui appartenaient aux sociétés du groupe melior (motifs du juge rowe, par. 41-42; ca, par 27). or, bien que, selon certains, la rédac- tion de la rii pourrait à cet égard être qualifiée de ma- ladroite, il est clair que la fiducie utilise simplement la valeur des propriétés afin d’estimer la valeur de ses actions avant l’effondrement du groupe melior. cette méthode d’évaluation est sans doute discutable, mais il s’agit d’une question qui concerne uniquement le quantum des dommages- intérêts, et non l’existence même du préjudice. de plus, dans la mesure où les allégations comportent certaines ambiguïtés quant à l’étendue des dommages- intérêts réclamés, la solu- tion réside, il me semble, dans une modification de la rii et dans la preuve d’expertise qui sera présentée au procès, plutôt que dans l’infliction de la peine capitale que représente le rejet pur et simple de la demande au stade préliminaire. i also note that the “personal” nature of the [101] damage for the purposes of art 1611 ccq is not in issue in this case. the loss in the value of the shares was incurred by fiducie and no one else. of course, to the extent that this damage and the losses of the corporations themselves overlap, there could be a risk of double recovery. but such a risk must be assessed on a case-by- case basis, in light of the circumstances and the evidence, at the time the quan- tum of damages is determined (infineon tech no lo gies ag v. option consommateurs, 2013 scc 59, [2013] 3 scr 600, at paras 114-15). this cannot be a sufficient basis for finding that a plaintiff clearly has no interest. in any event, the problem does not arise [101] je note également que le caractère « person- nel » du préjudice, au sens de l’art 1611 ccq, n’est pas en cause ici. la perte de valeur des actions a été subie par la fiducie, et par personne d’autre. certes, dans la mesure où ce préjudice recoupe les pertes subies par les sociétés elles- mêmes, il pourrait y avoir risque de double indemnisation. mais ce risque doit être évalué au cas par cas, selon les circons- tances et en fonction de la preuve, au moment d’éta- blir le quantum des dommages- intérêts (infineon technologies ag c. option consommateurs, 2013 csc 59, [2013] 3 rcs 600, par. 114- 115). ce ne saurait être un motif suffisant pour conclure à l’ab- sence manifeste d’intérêt. quoi qu’il en soit, dans le [2018] 3 rcs. brunette c legault joly thiffault la juge côté 529 in the instant case, because no other claims have been made either by the corporations (or their trustee in bankruptcy) or by creditors. présent dossier, le problème ne se pose pas puisqu’il n’y a aucune autre réclamation de la part des sociétés (ou de leur syndic) ni des créanciers. in summary, it can be seen from the mip that [102] fiducie is alleging breaches of distinct obligations that caused it direct personal damage. these uncon- tradicted allegations must be assumed to be true and are sufficient to establish fiducie’s interest at this preliminary stage. it will be for the trial judge to determine, after reviewing the evidence, whether the alleged breaches, damage and causal connection are sufficient to establish fiducie’s interest on the merits. [103] one final comment must be made. in my view, it is irrelevant that the corporations (or their trustee in bankruptcy) could themselves have sued the respondents but did not do so (reasons of rowe j., at para. 53; ca, at para 28). this argument disre- gards the fact that fiducie claims to have a right of action distinct from that of the corporations. it is true that fiducie, as a shareholder, might have been able to avail itself of the procedures similar to the oblique action that are provided for in business corporations legislation and thus bring an action in the name of the corporations. but that does not negate the right of action it claims to have in its own name in accord- ance with the general principles of civil liability. in houle, at p. 176, l’heureux- dubé j. noted that the company could have brought an action against the bank but had decided not to do so. but that decision did not affect the former shareholders’ right to take legal action for the fault committed against them. [104] i also disagree with my colleague’s sugges- tion that fiducie’s action is barred by the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c b-3. fiducie is not purporting to act as a creditor of the corporations, nor is it seeking a balance due from them; rather, it is arguing that it has a direct right of action against the respondents for breaches of contract they committed against it. once again, this theoretically gives rise to a risk of double recovery, but there is no such risk in this case. [102] en somme, à la lecture de la rii, on constate que la fiducie allègue des manquements à des obli- gations distinctes qui lui auraient causé un préjudice direct et personnel. ces allégations non contredites doivent être tenues pour avérées et suffisent pour démontrer l’intérêt de la fiducie à ce stade prélimi- naire. il appartiendra au juge du procès de détermi- ner, après examen de la preuve, si les manquements, le préjudice et le lien de causalité allégués sont suffi- sants pour établir, sur le fond, l’intérêt de la fiducie. [103] un dernier commentaire s’impose. le fait que les sociétés (ou leur syndic) auraient pu elles- mêmes poursuivre les intimés, mais ne l’ont pas fait, est selon moi sans pertinence (motifs du juge rowe, par. 53; ca, par 28). cet argument ne tient pas compte du fait que la fiducie prétend avoir un droit d’action distinct de celui des sociétés. certes, la fiducie aurait peut- être pu, à titre d’actionnaire, se prévaloir des recours similaires à l’action oblique prévus par les lois sur les sociétés par actions et ainsi former une demande en justice au nom des sociétés. mais cela n’écarte pas le droit d’action dont elle prétend disposer, en son nom personnel, en vertu des règles générales de la responsabilité civile. d’ailleurs, dans l’arrêt houle, p. 176, la juge l’heureux- dubé a souligné que la compagnie aurait pu poursuivre la banque, mais a décidé de ne pas le faire. cette décision n’affectait pas pour autant le droit des anciens actionnaires de s’adresser aux tri- bunaux à l’égard de la faute commise à leur endroit. [104] de même, je suis en désaccord avec mon collègue lorsqu’il suggère que la loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité, lrc 1985, c. b-3, fait obstacle à l’action de la fiducie. cette dernière ne prétend pas agir à titre de créancière des sociétés et ne cherche pas non plus à en obtenir le reliquat, elle affirme plutôt disposer d’un droit d’action direct contre les intimés pour leurs manquements contractuels à son endroit. encore une fois, cet enjeu soulève théori- quement un risque de double indemnisation, mais ce risque ne se pose pas en l’espèce. 530 brunette v legault joly thiffault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. iv conclusion iv conclusion [105] in my opinion, the courts below erred in dis- missing fiducie’s mip at the preliminary stage. the facts alleged in the mip are sufficient to establish an interest at this stage. at any rate, in my view, it is not clear that fiducie does not have an interest. it is true that the proper administration of justice some- times requires that actions that are clearly bound to fail be dismissed at the preliminary stage, including where it is clear that the plaintiff has no interest. but this drastic remedy must be administered with the greatest caution. the scarcity of judicial resources to which my colleague refers must not become a pretext for limiting access to the courts to cases in which there is a clear chance of success or to plain- tiffs whose interest is not in any doubt. in the instant case, fiducie may well have difficulty proving a sufficient interest at trial, but it should nonetheless be given the opportunity to do so. i would therefore allow the appeal with costs. [105] à mon avis, les juridictions inférieures ont eu tort de rejeter, au stade préliminaire, la rii de la fiducie. en effet, les faits allégués dans la rii sont suffisants pour démontrer l’existence d’un intérêt à ce stade. du moins, l’absence d’intérêt n’est pas manifeste à mes yeux. il est vrai qu’une saine ad- ministration de la justice requiert parfois le rejet, au stade préliminaire, d’actions qui sont clairement vouées à l’échec, y compris pour absence manifeste d’intérêt. mais ce remède draconien doit être admi- nistré avec la plus grande prudence. le manque de ressources judiciaires invoqué par mon collègue ne doit pas devenir un prétexte pour réserver l’accès aux tribunaux aux seules causes qui présentent des chances évidentes de succès, ou encore aux seuls demandeurs dont l’intérêt ne fait aucun doute. en l’espèce, la fiducie aura peut- être de la difficulté à prouver un intérêt suffisant lors du procès, mais il convient néanmoins de lui en laisser la chance. j’accueillerais donc l’appel avec dépens. appeal dismissed with costs, côté j. dissenting. pourvoi rejeté avec dépens, la juge côté est dis- sidente. procureurs des appelants : imk, mont réal. fault, sencrl,. ljt fiscalité inc., ljt corpo ratif inc., ljt conseil inc., ljt litige inc. and ljt immo- bilier inc.: robinson sheppard shapiro, mont réal. procureurs des intimés legault joly thiffault, sencrl,. ljt fiscalité inc., ljt corporatif inc., ljt conseil inc., ljt litige inc. et ljt immobilier inc. : robinson sheppard shapiro, mont réal. procureurs de l’intimé lehoux boivin comptables tables agréés: woods, mont réal. agréés : woods, mont réal.
i. introduction gascon et brown rendu par le juge brown — i. introduction [1] this appeal presents two issues: (1) whether the investigative technique employed by an undercover police officer amounted to a search or seizure of the appellant sean patrick mills’ online communica- tions under s. 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms; and, (2) whether police intercepted a private communication pursuant to s 1842 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, absent prior judicial authorization. [1] le présent pourvoi soulève deux questions : (1) la technique d’enquête utilisée par un agent d’in- filtration équivalait- elle à une fouille ou à une saisie des communications en ligne de l’appelant sean patrick mills au sens de l’art. 8 de la charte cana- dienne des droits et libertés, et (2) la police a-t-elle intercepté une communication privée conformément à l’art 1842 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, en l’absence d’une autorisation judiciaire préalable? [2] these issues arise from a sting conducted by a police officer, who posed online as a 14- year-old girl, with the intent of catching internet child lurers. over two months, mills sent several messages, using facebook and hotmail. eventually, he was arrested in a public park where he had arranged a meeting with the “child”, and was charged under s 1721 of the criminal code with luring a child via the internet. the entire operation occurred without prior judicial authorization. [2] ces questions découlent d’une opération d’in- filtration menée par un policier qui s’est fait pas- ser en ligne pour une adolescente de 14 ans, avec l’intention d’attraper des cyberprédateurs. pendant deux mois, m. mills a envoyé plusieurs messages par facebook et hotmail. il a finalement été arrêté dans un parc public où il avait organisé une rencontre avec l’« enfant » en question, et il a été accusé de leurre par internet en vertu de l’art 1721 du code criminel. l’ensemble de l’opération s’est déroulée sans autorisation judiciaire préalable. [3] using a screen capture software, the police introduced a record of the emails and messages as evidence at trial. mills, arguing that his s. 8 charter [3] utilisant un logiciel de capture d’écran, la po- lice a produit en preuve au procès un relevé contenant les courriels et les messages envoyés. soutenant qu’il 332 r v mills brown j. [2019] 2 scr. right to be free from unreasonable search and sei- zure was infringed, applied for the exclusion of the evidence. the trial judge, while finding that judicial authorization was required from the point at which the police had determined that mills had a “poten- tially inappropriate interest” in a minor, nonethe- less admitted the evidence and convicted mills on one of the counts. the newfoundland and labrador court of appeal upheld his conviction, but found that mills’ expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable. [4] while i agree with the court of appeal that mills had no reasonable expectation of privacy, i adopt slightly different reasons. specifically, he could not claim an expectation of privacy that was objec- tively reasonable in these circumstances. he was communicating with someone he believed to be a child, who was a stranger to him, and the undercover officer knew this when he created her. therefore, since s. 8 of the charter is not engaged, it follows that the sting did not require prior judicial authorization. i would therefore dismiss the appeal. avait été porté atteinte à son droit à la protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions et les saisies abusives garanti par l’art. 8 de la charte, m. mills a demandé l’exclusion de la preuve. bien qu’il ait conclu qu’une autorisation judiciaire était requise à partir du moment où les policiers déterminaient que m. mills avait un [traduction] « intérêt potentiel- lement inapproprié » à l’égard d’un mineur, le juge du procès a néanmoins admis la preuve et a déclaré m. mills coupable d’un des chefs d’accusation. la cour d’appel de terre- neuve-et- labrador a confirmé sa déclaration de culpabilité, mais a conclu que l’at- tente de m. mills au respect de sa vie privée n’était pas objectivement raisonnable. [4] bien que je sois d’accord avec la cour d’appel pour dire que m. mills ne pouvait raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de sa vie privée, ma conclusion s’appuie sur des raisons légèrement différentes. plus précisément, il ne pouvait pas prétendre qu’il avait une attente au respect de sa vie privée qui était ob- jectivement raisonnable dans les circonstances de l’espèce. il s’entretenait avec une personne qu’il croyait être une enfant, et qui était une inconnue pour lui, et l’agent d’infiltration savait qu’un tel entretien aurait lieu au moment où il a créé cette personne. en conséquence, comme l’art. 8 de la charte n’est pas en cause, il s’ensuit que l’opération d’infiltration ne nécessitait pas d’autorisation judiciaire préalable. je rejetterais donc le pourvoi. ii overview of facts and proceedings ii aperçu des faits et des procédures a background a contexte [5] in february 2012, constable greg hobbs of the royal newfoundland constabulary created a hotmail email account in order to pose as a 14- year-old girl, “leann power”. shortly thereafter, he created a facebook profile under the same name, listing leann’s hometown as st. john’s and identifying her high school. one month later, mills (then 32 years old) contacted “leann” through facebook, pretend- ing to be 23 years old. over the next two months, he sent her several messages and emails, including a photo of his penis. [5] en février 2012, l’agent greg hobbs du royal newfoundland constabulary a créé un compte de courriel hotmail afin de se faire passer pour une ado- lescente de 14 ans du nom de « leann power ». peu après, il a créé un profil facebook sous le même nom, indiquant que leann vivait à st. john’s et nommant l’école secondaire qu’elle fréquentait. un mois plus tard, m. mills (alors âgé de 32 ans) a communiqué avec « leann » au moyen de facebook, prétendant être âgé de 23 ans. dans les deux mois qui ont suivi, il lui a envoyé plusieurs messages et courriels, dont une photo de son pénis. [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills le juge brown 333 [6] the police maintained a record of the online communications and emails, through a screen cap- ture software called “snagit”. [7] on may 22, 2012, mills was arrested in a park where he had arranged a meeting with leann. he was charged with child luring under s 1721 of the criminal code. at trial, he argued that the police, which operated the sting entirely without judicial authorization, ought to have obtained authorization under s 1842 of the criminal code, and that the search and seizure (by snagit) of the communica- tions obtained via the fake online profile breached his s. 8 charter right. he therefore applied to exclude the evidence. [6] les policiers ont conservé un relevé des com- munications en ligne et des courriels en question au moyen d’un logiciel de capture d’écran appelé « snagit ». [7] le 22 mai 2012, m. mills a été arrêté dans un parc où il avait organisé une rencontre avec leann. il a été accusé de leurre, infraction prévue à l’art 1721 du code criminel. au procès, il a fait valoir que la police — qui avait mené toute l’opération d’infiltra- tion sans autorisation judiciaire — aurait dû obtenir une telle autorisation en application de l’art 1842 du code criminel, et que la fouille et la saisie (par snagit) des communications au moyen du faux profil en ligne portaient atteinte aux droits que lui garan- tissait l’art. 8 de la charte. il a donc demandé l’ex- clusion de la preuve. b judicial history b historique judiciaire (1) newfoundland and labrador provincial court — orr prov. ct. j ((2013), 7 cr (7th) 268) (1) cour provinciale de terre- neuve-et- labrador — le juge orr ((2013), 7 cr (7th) 268) [8] the trial judge found that the messages were “private communications”, as defined in s. 183 of the criminal code. because the police were party to those communications, their interception was subject to the requirements of s 1842 (“interception with consent”). while facebook and hotmail automat- ically generated a record of the communications, the use of snagit generated an additional seizure. and, because mills was using a username and a password, he had an expectation of privacy in his communications — which, while perhaps limited by the recipient’s use of an alias or false identity, was not eliminated. [9] the judge therefore found that s. 8 of the char- ter was breached. judicial authorization was required from the point that cst. hobbs became aware of mills’ “potentially inappropriate interest” in leann. [8] le juge du procès a conclu que les messages étaient des « communications privées » au sens de l’art. 183 du code criminel. comme la police par- ticipait à celles-ci, leur interception était assujettie aux exigences de l’art 1842 (« interception avec consentement  »). bien que facebook et hotmail aient généré automatiquement un relevé des commu- nications, l’utilisation de snagit a entraîné une saisie additionnelle. de plus, comme m. mills se servait d’un nom d’utilisateur et d’un mot de passe, il avait une attente au respect de sa vie privée dans ses com- munications — attente qui, bien que peut- être limitée du fait que la destinataire utilisait un pseudonyme ou une fausse identité, n’a pas été éliminée. [9] le juge a donc conclu qu’il y avait eu violation de l’art. 8 de la charte. selon lui, une autorisation judiciaire était requise à partir du moment où l’agent hobbs s’est rendu compte que m. mills avait un [traduction] « intérêt potentiellement inappro- prié » à l’égard de leann. in separate reasons on the admissibility under [10] s. 24(2) of the charter of the communications, the [10] dans des motifs distincts sur la possibilité d’utiliser les communications au regard du par. 24(2) 334 r v mills brown j. [2019] 2 scr. trial judge found that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute (r v. mills (2014), 346 nfld. & peir 102), and convicted mills. de la charte, le juge du procès a conclu que l’uti- lisation de cette preuve n’était pas susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice (r c. mills (2014), 346 nfld. & peir 102) et a déclaré m. mills coupable. (2) newfoundland and labrador court of ap- peal — welsh, harrington and hoegg jja. (2017 nlca 12) (2) cour d’appel de terre- neuve-et- labrador — les juges welsh, harrington et hoegg (2017 nlca 12) [11] while the court of appeal upheld mills’ con- viction, it reasoned that there was no “interception” and that the trial judge had therefore erred in con- cluding that authorizations under s 1842 were re- quired. relying on the factors set out in r v. spencer, 2014 scc 43, [2014] 2 scr 212 (at para. 18) by which to assess the reasonable expectation of privacy of an individual, the court found (at para. 23) that mills must have known that “he lost control over any expectation of confidentiality [and] took a risk when he voluntarily communicated with someone he did not know”. in the result, his expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable and his s. 8 rights were not infringed. [11] bien qu’elle ait confirmé la déclaration de culpabilité de m. mills, la cour d’appel a estimé qu’il n’y avait eu aucune « interception » et que le juge de première instance avait donc commis une erreur en concluant que des autorisations obtenues conformément à l’art 1842 étaient requises. se fon- dant sur les facteurs énoncés dans r c. spencer, 2014 csc 43, [2014] 2 rcs 212 (par. 18) — fac- teurs au regard desquels l’attente raisonnable en matière de vie privée d’une personne est appréciée, elle a conclu (au par. 23) que m. mills devait savoir qu’[traduction] « il a[vait] perdu le contrôle à l’égard de toute attente en matière de confidentialité [et] [qu’]il a[vait] pris un risque en communiquant volontairement avec une personne qu’il ne connais- sait pas ». en conséquence, l’attente de m. mills au respect de sa vie privée n’était pas objectivement raisonnable et il n’a pas été porté atteinte aux droits que lui garantit l’art 8. iii analysis iii analyse a section 8 charter analysis: mills has no rea- sonable expectation of privacy a analyse fondée sur l’art.  8 de la charte  : m. mills ne pouvait raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de sa vie privée in r v. marakah, 2017 scc 59, [2017] 2 [12] scr 608, this court reiterated that, to claim s. 8’s protection, an accused must show a subjectively held, and objectively reasonable, expectation of privacy in the subject matter of the putative search: para. 10; see also r v. cole, 2012 scc 53, [2012] 3 scr 34, at para. 34; spencer, at para. 16; r v. tessling, 2004 scc 67, [2004] 3 scr 432, at para. 18; r v. ed- wards, [1996] 1 scr 128, at para. 45; hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at pp 159-60. i say “putative search”, since there is no “search and seizure” within the meaning of s. 8 if the claimant [12] dans l’arrêt r c. marakah, 2017 csc 59, [2017] 2 rcs 608, notre cour a réaffirmé que, pour se réclamer de la protection de l’art. 8, l’accusé doit démontrer qu’il pouvait subjectivement, et de façon objectivement raisonnable, s’attendre au respect de sa vie privée à l’égard de l’objet de la prétendue fouille : par. 10; voir aussi r c. cole, 2012 csc 53, [2012] 3 rcs 34, par. 34; spencer, par. 16; r c. tessling, 2004 csc 67, [2004] 3 rcs 432, par. 18; r c. edwards, [1996] 1 rcs 128, par. 45; hunter c. southam inc., [1984] 2 rcs 145, p. 159- 160. je dis « prétendue fouille », car il n’y a pas [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills le juge brown 335 cannot demonstrate a reasonable expectation of pri- vacy: r v. dyment, [1988] 2 scr 417, at p. 426; see also s. penney, v. rondinelli and j. stribopoulos, criminal procedure in canada (2nd ed. 2018), at pp. 151-52; h. stewart, “normative foundations for reasonable expectations of privacy” (2011), 54 sclr (2d) 335, at p 335. [13] objective reasonableness is assessed in the “totality of the circumstances”: edwards, at pa- ras. 31 and 45; marakah, para. 10; spencer, at pa- ras.  16-18; cole, at para.  39; r v. patrick, 2009 scc 17, [2009] 1 scr 579, at para. 26; tessling, at para 19. and, this court has also consistently maintained that examining the totality of the cir- cumstances entails an evaluation of all aspects of privacy: edwards, at para. 45; patrick, at para 26. four lines of inquiry guide the application of the test: (1) an examination of the subject matter of the alleged search; (2) a determination as to whether the claimant had a direct interest in the subject matter; (3)  an inquiry into whether the claimant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the sub- ject matter; and (4) an assessment as to whether this subjective expectation of privacy was objec- tively reasonable, having regard to the totality of the circumstances: cole, at para. 40; marakah, at para. 11; spencer, at para. 18; patrick, at para. 27; tessling, at para 32. de « fouille » et « saisie » au sens de l’art. 8 si le demandeur ne peut démontrer l’existence d’une at- tente raisonnable au respect de sa vie privée : r. c. dyment, [1988] 2 rcs 417, p. 426; voir aussi s. penney, v. rondinelli et j. stribopoulos, crimi- nal procedure in canada (2e éd. 2018), p. 151- 152; h. stewart, « normative foundations for reasonable expectations of privacy » (2011), 54 sclr (2d) 335, p 335. [13] le caractère objectivement raisonnable est ap- précié au regard de l’« ensemble des circonstances » : edwards, par. 31 et 45; marakah, par. 10; spencer, par. 16-18; cole, par. 39; r c. patrick, 2009 csc 17, [2009] 1 rcs 579, par. 26; tessling, par 19. de plus, la cour a également toujours maintenu que l’examen de l’ensemble des circonstances suppose l’évaluation de tous les aspects de la vie privée : edwards, par. 45; patrick, par 26. quatre considéra- tions guident l’application du critère : (1) l’examen de l’objet de la prétendue fouille; (2) la question de savoir si le demandeur possédait un droit direct à l’égard de l’objet; (3) la question de savoir si le demandeur avait une attente subjective au respect de sa vie privée relativement à l’objet; (4) la ques- tion de savoir si cette attente subjective au respect de sa vie privée était objectivement raisonnable, eu égard à l’ensemble des circonstances : cole, par. 40; marakah, par. 11; spencer, par. 18; patrick, par. 27; tessling, par 32. (1) what was the subject matter of the alleged (1) quel était l’objet de la prétendue fouille? search? [14] the subject matter of the alleged search is the electronic communications that took place on facebook “chat” and over email. i see no legally significant distinction between these media of com- munication and the text message exchanges on cell- phones which this court considered in marakah. each can be accessed via many electronic devices connected to the internet. and, in marakah, this court refused to distinguish among different messag- ing applications, since they are functionally equiv- alent as an “interconnected system    [which]   . functions to permit rapid communication of short messages between individuals” — which exchanges, [14] la prétendue fouille visait les communica- tions électroniques ayant eu lieu lors de séances de « clavardage » sur facebook, ainsi que par courriel. je ne vois aucune distinction importante sur le plan juridique entre ces moyens de communication et celui qui consiste à échanger des messages textes sur téléphones cellulaires sur lequel la cour s’est pen- chée dans marakah. de nombreux appareils électro- niques connectés à internet donnent accès à chacun d’eux. de plus, dans marakah, la cour a refusé de faire une distinction entre les différentes applications de messagerie, puisqu’elles sont fonctionnellement équivalentes à un « réseau interconnecté [  ] [qui] 336 r v mills brown j. [2019] 2 scr. the court added, is the very thing that law enforce- ment seeks to access: marakah, at paras 18-19. [15] while in this case police were the direct recip- ients of mills’ messages, it remains that he intended to have a one-on- one online conversation. this tends to support recognizing an expectation of privacy in those communications. [  ] permet la transmission rapide de courts mes- sages entre des personnes » — lesquels échanges, a ajouté la cour, sont précisément ce que les policiers recherchent : marakah, par 18-19. [15] bien qu’en l’espèce, les policiers aient été les destinataires directs des messages de m. mills, il n’en demeure pas moins que ce dernier voulait avoir une conversation seul à seul en ligne. cela tend à étayer la reconnaissance d’une attente au respect de la vie privée à l’égard de ces communications. (2) did mills have a direct interest in the sub- (2) m. mills possédait-il un droit direct à l’égard ject matter? de l’objet? [16] i accept that, as a participant to (and indeed a co- author of) the communications, mills had a direct interest in the subject matter of the alleged search: see marakah, at para. 21; spencer, at para. 50; pat- rick, at para 31. [16] je conviens qu’en tant que personne ayant par- ticipé aux communications (et, bien entendu, en tant que coauteur de celles-ci), m. mills possédait un droit direct à l’égard de l’objet de la prétendue fouille : voir marakah, par. 21; spencer, par. 50; patrick, par 31. (3) did mills have a subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter? (3) m. mills avait-il une attente subjective au res- pect de sa vie privée relativement à l’objet? [17] in cases of alleged online child luring, it is not difficult for an accused to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in online communications, since avoiding detection will be a priority. users expect that their text messages or (as here) their functional equivalent will remain private: r v. jones, 2017 scc 60, [2017] 2 scr 696, at para 34. and so it is unsurprising that, here, the crown does not dispute that mills expected the communications to be private. [17] dans les cas d’allégations de leurre en ligne, il n’est pas difficile pour l’accusé de démontrer une attente subjective au respect de sa vie privée à l’égard des communications en ligne, car éviter d’être repéré constituera dans un tel cas une priorité. les utilisa- teurs s’attendent à ce que leurs messages textes ou (comme en l’espèce) leur équivalent fonctionnel demeurent privés : r c. jones, 2017 csc 60, [2017] 2 rcs 696, par 34. il n’est donc pas étonnant qu’en l’espèce, la couronne ne conteste pas le fait que m. mills s’attendait à ce que les communications en cause soient privées. [18] the evidence amply demonstrates this, since mills instructed leann to delete their messages regu- larly and to empty her deleted messages folder. when leann commented on a publication he had posted on facebook, he deleted it immediately then privately messaged her to explain that his mother was also a facebook user and that he would “just rather not hear what she has to say about our age difference”: ar, vol. 2, at p 86. replying to an email in which cst. hobbs had sent mills pictures supposedly portraying leann, mills promised to keep their relationship [18] la preuve le démontre amplement, car m. mills a demandé à leann de supprimer leurs messages régu- lièrement et de vider son dossier d’éléments supprimés. quand leann a fait un commentaire sur une publica- tion qu’il avait affiché sur facebook, il a supprimé celui-ci immédiatement et lui a envoyé un message privé pour lui expliquer que sa mère utilisait également facebook et qu’il [traduction] « préférerait ne pas entendre ce qu’elle a à dire à propos de notre différence d’âge » : da, vol. 2, p 86. répondant à un courriel dans lequel l’agent hobbs avait envoyé à m. mills des [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills le juge brown 337 secret. he added that he expected the same from her: ar, vol. 2, at p 122. similarly, when mills sent a picture of his erect penis to leann, he instructed her to delete all of their conversations. he wrote: “can’t be too careful and i’d say you would get in trouble with pics like this”. the title of the email, “delete this after you look at it!!”, also shows his wish that their relationship remain hidden: ar, vol. 2, at p 135. photos prétendument de leann, m. mills a promis de garder leur relation secrète. il a ajouté qu’il s’attendait à la même chose d’elle : da, vol. 2, p 122. de même, lorsqu’il a envoyé à leann une photo de son pénis en érection, il l’a invitée à effacer toutes leurs conversa- tions. il lui a écrit ce qui suit : « on n’est jamais trop prudent et tu pourrais, à mon avis, t’attirer des ennuis avec des photos comme celle-ci ». le titre du courriel, « regarde puis supprime ça!! », montre également qu’il souhaitait que leur relation demeure secrète : da, vol. 2, p 135. [19] this consideration therefore also weighs in favour of mills’ claim to a reasonable expectation of privacy. it remains to consider, however, whether his subjective expectation of privacy was objec- tively reasonable: b a macfarlane,. r j frater and c. michaelson, drug offences in canada (4th ed. (loose- leaf)), vol. 2, at p 24-15. [19] cette considération milite donc également en fa- veur de l’allégation de m. mills selon laquelle il pouvait raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de sa vie privée. il reste toutefois à se demander si cette attente subjec- tive était objectivement raisonnable : b a macfarlane,. r j frater et c. michaelson, drug offences in canada (4e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), vol. 2, p 24-15. (4) is mills’ subjective expectation of privacy objectively reasonable? [20] in order to challenge an alleged search under s. 8, mills must demonstrate the objective reasona- bleness of his claim to privacy — the assessment of which must have regard to the totality of the circum- stances. this is not purely a descriptive question, but rather a normative question about when canadians ought to expect privacy, given the applicable con- siderations. this appeal involves a particular set of circumstances — the police created one of the com- municants and controlled her every move — and two considerations become decisive: the nature of the investigative technique used by police, and the na- ture of the relationship between the communicants. specifically, here, the investigative technique did not significantly reduce the sphere of privacy enjoyed by canadians because the technique permitted the state to know from the outset that the adult accused would be communicating with a child he did not know. as i will explain, in these circumstances, any subjective expectation of privacy the adult accused might have held would not be objectively reasonable. (4) l’attente subjective de m. mills au respect de sa vie privée était- elle objectivement raison- nable? [20] pour pouvoir contester une prétendue fouille en vertu de l’art. 8, m. mills doit démontrer le caractère objectivement raisonnable de son allégation relative au respect de sa vie privée — l’appréciation à cet égard doit tenir compte de l’ensemble des circonstances. il s’agit non pas d’une question purement descriptive, mais plutôt d’une question normative du moment où les canadiens devraient s’attendre au respect de leur vie privée, eu égard aux considérations applicables. le présent pourvoi porte sur un ensemble particulier de circonstances — les policiers ont créé l’un des in- terlocuteurs et ont contrôlé chacun de ses gestes — et deux considérations deviennent décisives : la nature de la technique d’enquête utilisée par la police et la nature de la relation entre les interlocuteurs. de façon plus particulière, en l’espèce, la technique d’enquête utilisée n’a pas réduit de façon importante la sphère d’intimité dont jouissent les canadiens, parce qu’elle a permis à l’état de savoir dès le départ que l’ac- cusé adulte communiquerait avec une enfant qu’il ne connaissait pas. comme je vais l’expliquer, en pareilles circonstances, toute attente subjective au respect de la vie privée qu’a pu avoir l’accusé adulte ne serait pas objectivement raisonnable. 338 r v mills brown j. [2019] 2 scr. [21] before turning to the normative question, as a preliminary matter, the nature of the privacy in- terest must be determined. here, mills asserts an informational privacy interest. as this court held in spencer, informational privacy includes at least three conceptually distinct although overlapping un- derstandings of privacy: as secrecy, as control, and as anonymity: para 38. mills is asserting a “privacy as control” interest in the content of his commu- nications, which represents the “assumption that all information about a person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit”: spencer, at para 40. while this privacy interest protects what information we share with others, it in turn relies on the control that a person exercises by choosing, selectively, those particular persons who will receive this information. in effect, mills argues that he chose his recipient (here, someone he believed to be a child who was a stranger to him), and the police’s creation of a fake online profile prevented him being able to converse in secret with the person he chose. [22] but crucial here is that mills was communicat- ing with someone he believed to be a child, who was a stranger to him. mills’ claim is, therefore, that even when conversing with a child who was a stranger to him, he retained the ability to choose, selectively, with whom he would share certain communications. this presupposes that there is nothing inherently dif- ferent between a relationship involving an adult and a child unknown to them, and other relationships, for the purposes of the s. 8 privacy analysis. i disagree and, on this point, find the statements of nielsen j. in r v. graff, 2015 abqb 415, 337 crr (2d) 77, at paras. 63 and 65, where the accused was charged with internet luring of a recipient who identified as being 14 years old, to be apposite: [21] avant de se pencher sur la question norma- tive, il faut, à titre préliminaire, déterminer la na- ture du droit à la vie privée en cause. en l’espèce, m. mills fait valoir un droit à la vie privée d’ordre informationnel. comme l’a conclu la cour dans l’ar- rêt spencer, un tel droit englobe au moins trois fa- cettes qui se chevauchent, mais qui se distinguent sur le plan conceptuel : la confidentialité, le contrôle et l’anonymat : par 38. m. mills allègue un droit à la vie privée portant sur le « contrôle » dans le contenu de ses communications, droit représentant le « postu- lat selon lequel l’information de caractère personnel est propre à l’intéressé, qui est libre de la commu- niquer ou de la taire comme il l’entend » : spencer, par 40. bien qu’il protège les renseignements que nous communiquons à d’autres personnes, ce droit à la vie privée repose sur le contrôle qu’une personne exerce en choisissant, de façon sélective, quelles personnes recevront ces renseignements. en fait, m. mills soutient qu’il a choisi sa destinataire (en l’espèce une personne qu’il croyait être une enfant et qui était une inconnue pour lui) et que la création par les policiers d’un faux profil en ligne l’a empê- ché de pouvoir s’entretenir en secret avec celle-ci. [22] cependant, élément crucial en l’espèce, m. mills communiquait avec une personne qu’il croyait être une enfant et qui était une inconnue pour lui. celui-ci fait donc valoir que, même lorsqu’il s’entretenait avec une enfant qui était une inconnue pour lui, il avait conservé la possibilité de choisir, de façon sé- lective, à qui il communiquerait certains échanges. pour les besoins de l’analyse du droit à la vie privée au regard de l’art. 8, cela présuppose qu’il n’y a rien de différent en soi entre une relation mettant en cause un adulte et un enfant qu’il ne connaît pas, et d’autres relations. je ne suis pas d’accord et, sur ce point, les déclarations faites par le juge nielsen dans r c. graff, 2015 abqb 415, 337 crr (2d) 77, par. 63 et 65, où l’accusé a été inculpé de leurre sur internet à l’égard d’un destinataire qui s’est présenté comme étant une personne âgée de 14 ans, sont, à mon avis, pertinentes : in sum, the applicant sent highly personal information over the internet to a complete stranger, in the absence of any invitation to send such information, and without taking any reasonable steps to ascertain the identity of [traduction] en bref, le demandeur a envoyé à une personne qu’il ne connaissait pas du tout des renseigne- ments de nature très personnelle sur internet, et ce, sans avoir été invité à le faire et sans prendre des mesures [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills le juge brown 339 the recipient, to ensure his own anonymity, or to ensure any confidentiality with respect to the information he sent. raisonnables pour vérifier l’identité du destinataire, pour garantir son propre anonymat ou pour assurer une quel- conque confidentialité en ce qui a trait aux renseignements qu’il transmettait.   .   . i conclude in all of the circumstances that while the applicant gambled or hoped that the chat and other ma- terial and information he sent would remain private, he had no basis upon which to form a[n]    objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances. compte tenu de l’ensemble des circonstances, je conclus que, bien que le demandeur ait pris des risques ou ait espéré que les messages qu’il envoyait lors de séances de clavardage, ainsi que les autres éléments et renseigne- ments qu’il transmettait en ligne, demeureraient privés, rien ne lui permettait de s’attendre de façon [  ] objec- tivement raisonnable au respect de sa vie privée dans les circonstances. see also r v. ghotra, [2015] oj. no. 7253 (ql) (scj), at para 128. voir également r c. ghotra, [2015] oj. no. 7253 (ql) (csj), par 128. [23] this court has recognized that children are especially vulnerable to sexual crimes (r v. george, 2017 scc 38, [2017] 1 scr 1021, at para. 2); that the internet allows for greater opportunities to sexually exploit children (r v. morrison, 2019 scc 15, [2019] 2 scr 3, at para. 2); and that enhancing protection to children from becoming victims of sex- ual offences is vital in a free and democratic society (r v. krj, 2016 scc 31, [2016] 1 scr 906, at para. 66, citing laskin ja in r v. budreo (2000), 46 or (3d) 481 (ca)). this leads me to conclude that, on the normative standard of expectations of pri- vacy described by this court (tessling, at para. 42), adults cannot reasonably expect privacy online with children they do not know. that the communication occurs online does not add a layer of privacy, but rather a layer of unpredictability. [23] la cour a reconnu que les enfants sont par- ticulièrement vulnérables aux crimes sexuels (r. c george, 2017 csc 38, [2017] 1  rcs  1021, par. 2), qu’internet fournit plus d’occasions d’ex- ploiter sexuellement des enfants (r c. morrison, 2019 csc 15, [2019] 2 rcs 3, par. 2) et que le fait d’offrir à ceux-ci une protection accrue afin qu’ils ne soient pas victimes d’infractions sexuelles est vital dans une société libre et démocratique (r c. krj, 2016 csc 31, [2016] 1 rcs 906, par. 66, citant le juge laskin dans r c. budreo (2000), 46 or (3d) 481 (ca)). cela m’amène à conclure qu’eu égard au critère normatif de l’attente en matière de vie privée énoncé par notre cour (tessling, par. 42), les adultes ne peuvent pas raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de leur vie privée dans leurs communications en ligne avec des enfants qu’ils ne connaissent pas. le fait que celles-ci aient lieu en ligne ajoute non pas une couche de protection de la vie privée, mais plutôt un élément d’imprévisibilité. [24] the difficulty, of course, is that, in most sit- uations, police are unlikely to know in advance of any potential privacy breach the nature of the rela- tionship between the conversants — for example, whether the child truly is a stranger to the adult. we must also bear in mind that most relationships be- tween adults and children are worthy of s. 8’s protec- tion, including, but in no way limited to, those with family, friends, professionals, or religious advisors. [24] la difficulté, bien entendu, tient à ce que, dans la plupart des cas, il est peu probable que la police connaisse, avant qu’il puisse y avoir atteinte à la vie privée, la nature de la relation entre les in- terlocuteurs — et sache, par exemple, si l’enfant est véritablement un inconnu pour l’adulte. il nous faut également garder à l’esprit que la plupart des relations entre adultes et enfants sont dignes de jouir de la pro- tection conférée par l’art. 8, notamment celles avec 340 r v mills brown j. [2019] 2 scr. significantly, and most importantly for the dispo- sition of this appeal, this difficulty does not arise here. here, the police were using an investigative technique allowing it to know from the outset that the adult was conversing with a child who was a stranger. different normative considerations arise here, both as to the nature of the relationship and how that informs the s. 8 analysis, and as to the degree by which the investigative technique reduces the sphere of privacy enjoyed by canadians. [25] while this court has not traditionally ap- proached s. 8 from the perspective of the particular relationship between the parties subject to state sur- veillance, this is because of its view of s. 8’s pro- tection as content- neutral. in this case, the police technique permitted them to know that relationship in advance of any potential privacy breach. for ex- ample, in dyment, the majority of the court held that, while a person may consent to give a sample of blood requested by his or her physician, it does not follow that all privacy interests in the sample have been relinquished once the blood has left the person’s body. the s. 8 interest was not viewed by the court as being concerned solely with the blood, but principally with the relationship between the patient and the physician. the court wrote, at p. 432: “the charter extends to prevent a police officer   . from taking    blood from a person who holds it subject to a duty to respect the dignity and privacy of that person” (emphasis added). while, therefore, the patient had relinquished physical control over the sample, he was able — by reason of the privacy interest imbued in the relationship — to retain legal control over it. des membres de la famille, des amis, des profession- nels ou des conseillers religieux. fait important, et le plus important pour trancher le présent pourvoi, cette difficulté ne se pose pas en l’espèce. dans la présente affaire, la police utilisait une technique d’enquête lui permettant de savoir dès le départ que l’adulte s’entretenait avec une enfant qu’il ne connaissait pas. différentes considérations normatives entrent en jeu en l’espèce, tant en ce qui concerne la nature de la relation et la façon dont cela éclaire l’analyse fondée sur l’art. 8, qu’en ce qui concerne la mesure dans laquelle la technique d’enquête réduit la sphère d’intimité dont jouissent les canadiens. [25] si la cour n’a pas traditionnellement abordé l’art. 8 sous l’angle de la relation particulière entre les parties soumises à la surveillance de l’état, c’est parce qu’elle considère que la protection offerte par cette disposition est neutre sur le plan du contenu. en l’espèce, la technique utilisée a permis aux poli- ciers de connaître cette relation avant qu’il puisse y avoir atteinte à la vie privée. à titre d’exemple, dans dyment, les juges majoritaires de la cour ont jugé que le fait qu’une personne puisse consentir à donner un échantillon de sang demandé par son médecin ne signifie pas nécessairement qu’il y a eu renonciation à tous les droits à la protection de la vie privée à l’égard de l’échantillon en question une fois que le sang a quitté le corps de cette personne. la cour a considéré que le droit garanti par l’art. 8 portait non pas uniquement sur le sang, mais plutôt principale- ment sur la relation entre le patient et le médecin. elle a écrit ce qui suit à la p. 432 : « la protection accordée par la charte va jusqu’à interdire à un agent de police [  ] de se faire remettre [  ] le sang d’une personne par celui qui l[e] détient avec l’obligation de respecter la dignité et la vie privée de cette per- sonne » (je souligne). en conséquence, bien qu’il ait renoncé au contrôle matériel de l’échantillon, le patient a pu — en raison du droit à la protection de la vie privée imprégnant la relation — conserver le contrôle juridique de celui-ci. [26] in short, the sample was a proxy for s. 8’s purpose in dyment, being to protect a particular re- lationship — which society values as worthy of s. 8’s protection — from state intrusion. applied to this appeal, and while i have said that many adult- child [26] en bref, dans l’arrêt dyment, l’analyse rela- tive à l’échantillon a tenu lieu d’analyse relative à l’objectif visé par l’art. 8, lequel consiste à protéger une relation donnée — que la société juge digne de jouir de la protection de l’art. 8 — contre l’intrusion [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills le juge brown 341 relationships are also worthy of s. 8’s protection — the relationship between mills and “leann” is not one of them, if expectations of privacy are to reflect a normative (rather than a purely descriptive) stand- ard. the conclusion may or may not apply to other types of relationships, depending on the nature of the relationship in question and the circumstances surrounding it at the time of the alleged search. [27] as to the second consideration — the nature of the investigative technique used — what renders mills’ expectation of privacy objectively unreason- able is that, in creating the fictitious child, police knew from the outset that the relationship between mills and his interlocutor was similarly fictitious, and that “leann” was truly a stranger to him. the police could, therefore, confidently and accurately conclude that no s. 8 concern would arise from their reviewing these particular communications, because the necessary information about the nature of the relationship between the accused and the “child” was already known from the outset. [28] our s. 8 jurisprudence is predicated on police obtaining prior authorization before a potential pri- vacy breach. but no such potential exists here. the police created the fictitious child and waited for adult strangers to message them. this is what distinguishes this case from r v. wong, [1990] 3 scr 36, and marakah, where the state was intruding upon an unknown (to them) relationship. at most, police had a mere theory about the relationship between the conversants: in wong, for example, they were thought to be illegal gamblers it would only be through an examination of the conversation that the true nature of the relationship could have been de- finitively known. in contrast, police knew from the outset the nature of the relationship between these conversants. this also distinguishes this case from the impersonation- through- informer technique em- ployed in r v. duarte, [1990] 1 scr 30. de l’état. en appliquant cet arrêt en l’espèce, et bien que j’aie affirmé que de nombreuses relations adulte- enfant sont également dignes de bénéficier de la protection conférée par l’art. 8, je conclus que, si l’attente en matière de vie privée doit refléter un cri- tère normatif (et non purement descriptif), m. mills et « leann » n’avaient pas une relation de ce type. cette conclusion peut s’appliquer ou non à d’autres types de relations, selon la nature de la relation en question et les circonstances entourant celle-ci au moment de la prétendue fouille. [27] pour ce qui est de la deuxième considéra- tion — la nature de la technique d’enquête utili- sée  —, ce qui rend objectivement déraisonnable l’attente de m. mills au respect de sa vie privée est le fait qu’en créant l’enfant fictive, les policiers savaient dès le départ que la relation entre m. mills et son interlocutrice était elle aussi fictive, et que « leann » était véritablement une inconnue pour lui. ils pou- vaient donc conclure en toute confiance et à juste titre qu’aucune préoccupation fondée sur l’art. 8 ne découlerait de leur examen de ces communications, parce que les renseignements nécessaires quant à la nature de la relation entre l’accusé et l’« enfant » était connus depuis le départ. [28] notre jurisprudence relative à l’art. 8 suppose l’obtention par la police d’une autorisation préalable avant qu’il puisse y avoir atteinte à la vie privée. il n’y a toutefois aucune possibilité de cette nature en l’espèce. les policiers ont créé l’enfant fictive et ont attendu que des inconnus d’âge adulte leur envoient des messages c’est ce qui distingue la présente espèce des affaires r c. wong, [1990] 3 rcs 36, et marakah, où l’état s’immisçait dans une relation qui (lui) était inconnue. la police avait tout au plus une simple théorie quant à la relation entre les inter- locuteurs : dans wong, par exemple, ceux-ci étaient considérés comme des joueurs illégaux. la nature véritable de la relation ne pouvait être connue de façon certaine que par un examen de la conversation. par contraste, en l’espèce, les policiers connaissaient dès le départ la nature de la relation entre les interlo- cuteurs. c’est ce qui distingue également le présent cas de l’affaire r c. duarte, [1990] 1 rcs 30, où la technique employée était celle de l’usurpation d’identité par un indicateur de police. 342 r v mills brown j. [2019] 2 scr. [29] this investigative technique allowed the police to know from the outset the nature of the relationship between mills and “leann”. as my col- league karakatsanis j. notes, this technique involved police simply responding to messages sent directly to them as “leann”. no risk of potential privacy breach — for example, police sifting various com- munications before being able to ascertain the rela- tionship — arose here. [30] my colleague martin j. says that these rea- sons “put courts in the business of evaluating the canadian public’s personal relationships with a view to deciding which among them deserve charter pro- tection under s. 8, and which do not” (para. 110) and “effectively sanctio[n] the unjustified state intrusion into swaths of all individuals’ private lives in the hopes of capturing some illegal communications” (para 131). with respect, the alias- based sting op- eration employed here is not some first step to a dystopian world of mass unregulated surveillance. nothing in these reasons suggests or should be taken as suggesting that police can simply monitor com- munications in the hope of stumbling upon a conver- sation that reveals criminality. the proposition that i advance is a modest one: to repeat, it is that mills cannot establish an objectively reasonable expec- tation of privacy in these particular circumstances, where he conversed with a child online who was a stranger to him and, most importantly, where the police knew this when they created her. [29] la technique d’enquête utilisée en l’espèce a permis aux policiers de connaître dès le départ la nature de la relation entre m. mills et « leann ». comme le souligne ma collègue la juge karakatsanis, cette technique consistait pour les policiers à simple- ment répondre aux messages qui leur étaient direc- tement envoyés sous le pseudonyme de « leann ». il n’y avait aucun risque d’atteinte à la vie privée en l’espèce — ce qui arrive, par exemple, lorsque les policiers passent en revue diverses communications avant d’être en mesure d’établir la relation. [30] ma collègue la juge martin affirme que les présents motifs « impose[nt] aux tribunaux la tâche d’évaluer les relations personnelles des canadiens afin de décider lesquelles sont dignes de jouir de la protection conférée par l’art. 8 de la charte, et les- quelles ne le sont pas » (par. 110), et « sanctionn[ent] dans les faits l’intrusion injustifiée de l’état dans de grands pans de la vie privée de toute personne en vue d’obtenir quelques communications illégales » (par 131). soit dit en tout respect, l’opération d’in- filtration fondée sur un pseudonyme utilisée en l’es- pèce ne constitue pas une première étape vers la mise en place d’une société dystopique caractérisée par une surveillance de masse non réglementée. rien dans les présents motifs ne suggère ou ne devrait être considéré comme suggérant que les policiers peuvent simplement surveiller des communications dans l’espoir de tomber sur une conversation qui révèle une activité criminelle. la proposition que j’avance est modeste : je le répète, m. mills ne peut pas établir une attente objectivement raisonnable au respect de sa vie privée dans les circonstances de l’espèce, où il s’est entretenu en ligne avec une enfant qui était une inconnue pour lui et où, élément le plus important, les policiers savaient qu’un tel en- tretien aurait lieu au moment où ils ont créé l’enfant en question. [31] with respect for those who view the matter differently, i simply cannot accept that, on the facts of this case, “giving [judicial] sanction to the particular form of unauthorized surveillance in question would see the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society”: wong, at p 46. i agree with the court of appeal’s conclusion [31] soit dit en tout respect pour les tenants de l’avis contraire, je ne puis tout simplement pas ac- cepter qu’eu égard aux faits de l’espèce, la « sanction [judiciaire] de la forme particulière de surveillance non autorisée en cause empiéterait sur l’intimité dont disposent encore les particuliers dans une mesure incompatible avec les objectifs d’une société libre et ouverte » : wong, p 46. je souscris à la conclusion [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills le juge brown 343 that mills did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in these circumstances. de la cour d’appel selon laquelle m. mills ne pou- vait raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de sa vie privée dans les circonstances de l’espèce. b additional consideration b considération additionnelle [32] my conclusion on the unreasonableness of mills’ expectation of privacy is determinative. that said, i offer this further observation on whether part vi of the criminal code captured these com- munications because they consisted of “private com- munication”. [32] ma conclusion quant au caractère déraison- nable de l’attente de m. mills au respect de sa vie pri- vée est déterminante. cela dit, je ferai l’observation suivante sur la question de savoir si la partie vi du code criminel visait les communications en question du fait qu’il s’agissait de « communications privées ». in my view, s 1842 of the criminal code was [33] not applicable here because there was no “private communication”. section 184.2(1) states that “[a] person may intercept,    a private communication where either the originator of the private commu- nication or the person intended by the originator to receive it has consented to the interception and an au- thorization has been obtained pursuant to subsection (3)”. section 183 defines “private communication” and “intercept” for the purpose of part vi: 183 in this part, [33] à mon avis, l’art 1842 du code criminel ne s’appliquait pas en l’espèce parce qu’il n’y a eu aucune «  communication privée  » le para- graphe  184.2(1) prévoit que «  [t]oute personne peut [  ] intercepter une communication privée si l’auteur de la communication ou la personne à laquelle il la destine a consenti à l’interception et si une autorisation a été obtenue conformément au paragraphe (3). » l’article 183 définit « communi- cation privée » et « intercepter » pour l’application de la partie vi : 183 les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente partie.   .   . intercept includes listen to, record or acquire a commu- nication or acquire the substance, meaning or purport thereof;   . private communication means any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator who is in canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is in canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the origi- nator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio- based telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it; communication privée communication orale ou télécom- munication dont l’auteur se trouve au canada, ou destinée par celui-ci à une personne qui s’y trouve, et qui est faite dans des circonstances telles que son auteur peut raison- nablement s’attendre à ce qu’elle ne soit pas interceptée par un tiers. la présente définition vise également la com- munication radiotéléphonique traitée électroniquement ou autrement en vue d’empêcher sa réception en clair par une personne autre que celle à laquelle son auteur la destine.   . intercepter s’entend notamment du fait d’écouter, d’en- registrer ou de prendre volontairement connaissance d’une communication ou de sa substance, son sens ou son objet.   .   . 344 r v mills karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. [34] reading this definition together with this court’s elaboration of s. 8 of the charter, a com- munication made under circumstances in which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy cannot con- stitute a “private communication” for the purposes of s. 183: r v. telus communications co., 2013 scc 16, [2013] 2 scr 3, at para. 32; s. penney, “consent searches for electronic text communica- tions: escaping the zero- sum trap”, (2018) 56 alta. l. rev. 1, at p 18. [34] si l’on interprète cette définition conjointe- ment avec les précisions apportées par la cour à l’égard de l’art. 8 de la charte, une communica- tion faite dans des circonstances où il n’y a aucune attente raisonnable au respect de sa vie privée ne saurait constituer une « communication privée » pour l’application de l’art.  183  : r c société telus communications, 2013 csc 16, [2013] 2 rcs 3, par. 32; s. penney, « consent searches for electronic text communications  : escaping the zero- sum trap » (2018), 56 alta. l. rev. 1, p 18. iv conclusion iv conclusion [35] in the result, mills has failed to establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversations with “leann”. i would, therefore, dis- miss the appeal. [35] par conséquent, m.  mills n’a pas réussi à établir qu’il pouvait raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de sa vie privée dans ses conversations avec « leann ». je rejetterais donc le pourvoi. the reasons of wagner cj and karakatsanis j. version française des motifs du juge en chef were delivered by wagner et de la juge karakatsanis rendus par [36] karakatsanis j. — i agree with my colleague brown j. on the outcome of this appeal. however, i reach this conclusion for different reasons. in my view, when undercover police officers communicate in writing with individuals, there is no “search or seizure” within the meaning of s. 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. this is because it is not reasonable to expect that your messages will be kept private from the intended recipient (even if the intended recipient is an undercover officer). further, the police conduct does not amount to a search or seizure — the police did not take anything from the accused or intrude on a private conversation; the undercover officers simply received messages sent directly to them. [36] la juge karakatsanis — je partage l’avis de mon collègue le juge brown sur l’issue du pré- sent pourvoi. j’arrive toutefois à cette conclusion pour des raisons différentes. à mon avis, lorsque des agents d’infiltration de la police communiquent par écrit avec des individus, il n’y a aucune « fouill[e] » ou « saisi[e] » au sens de l’art. 8 de la charte cana- dienne des droits et libertés, et ce, parce qu’il n’est pas raisonnable de s’attendre à ce que le destinataire visé d’un message n’en prenne pas connaissance (même si le destinataire en question est un agent d’infiltration) de plus, la conduite des policiers n’équivaut pas à une fouille ou à une saisie : les poli- ciers n’ont rien pris à l’accusé ni ne se sont immiscés dans une conversation privée; les agents d’infiltration ont simplement reçu les messages qui leur avaient été directement envoyés. [37] here, the police did not interfere with a private conversation between other individuals; they directly participated in it. because the conversation occurred via email and facebook messenger, it necessarily took place in a written form. the screenshots from the computer program “snagit” are simply a copy of the pre- existing written record and not a separate surreptitious permanent record created by the state. [37] en l’espèce, les policiers ne se sont pas ingé- rés dans la conversation privée d’autres personnes; ils y ont directement participé. comme cette conver- sation a eu lieu au moyen de courriels et de facebook messenger, elle a nécessairement pris une forme écrite. les captures d’écran tirées du programme informatique « snagit » sont tout simplement une copie d’un relevé écrit déjà existant, et non un relevé [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge karakatsanis 345 thus, the police did not violate s. 8 when they com- municated with mr. mills and retained screenshots of those conversations. i would dismiss the appeal. permanent distinct créé clandestinement par l’état. en conséquence, les policiers n’ont pas contrevenu à l’art. 8 lorsqu’ils ont communiqué avec m. mills et conservé des captures d’écran de ces conversations. je rejetterais le pourvoi. i analysis i analyse [38] section 8 protects the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. in interpreting s. 8, courts seek to strike an acceptable balance, in a free and democratic society, between sometimes conflicting interests in the privacy necessary for per- sonal dignity and autonomy and the need for a secure and safe society: see hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr 145, at pp 159-60. [39] the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures must keep pace with techno- logical developments to ensure that citizens remain protected against unauthorized intrusions upon their privacy by the state: r v. fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621, at para. 102; see also r v. wong, [1990] 3 scr 36, at p 44. however, as technology evolves, the ways in which crimes are committed — and investigated — also evolve. this case implicates both of these consequences. it requires us to consider what, if any, judicial pre- authorization is necessary when a common police investigative technique — an undercover operation — is conducted electron- ically to “identify and apprehend predatory adults who, generally for illicit sexual purposes, troll the internet to attract and entice vulnerable children and adolescents”: r v. levigne, 2010 scc 25, [2010] 2 scr 3, at para 24. [38] l’article 8 garantit le droit à la protection contre les fouilles, perquisitions et saisies abusives. lorsqu’ils interprètent cette disposition, les tribu- naux tentent d’établir un équilibre acceptable dans une société libre et démocratique entre les intérêts parfois contradictoires que constituent, d’une part, les intérêts en matière de respect de la vie privée nécessaires à la dignité et à l’autonomie de la per- sonne, et, d’autre part, le besoin de vivre dans une société sûre et sécuritaire : voir hunter c. southam inc., [1984] 2 rcs 145, p. 159- 160. [39] le droit à la protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions et les saisies abusives doit évo- luer au même rythme que la technologie afin que les citoyens demeurent à l’abri des atteintes non autorisées de l’état à leur vie privée : r c. fearon, 2014 csc 77, [2014] 3 rcs 621, par. 102; voir aussi r c. wong, [1990] 3 rcs 36, p 44. cepen- dant, au fur et à mesure qu’évolue la technologie, les moyens de commettre des crimes — et d’enquêter sur ceux-ci — évoluent également. la présente af- faire met en jeu ces deux conséquences. elle nous oblige à déterminer quelle autorisation judiciaire, s’il en faut une, doit être obtenue au préalable lorsqu’une technique d’enquête policière courante — une opé- ration d’infiltration — se déroule électroniquement en vue « de démasquer et d’arrêter les prédateurs adultes qui rôdent dans l’internet pour appâter des enfants et des adolescents vulnérables, généralement à des fins sexuelles illicites » : r c. levigne, 2010 csc 25, [2010] 2 rcs 3, par 24. a electronic conversations in undercover police a conversations électroniques lors d’opérations investigations policières d’infiltration [40] in my opinion, no “search or seizure” oc- curred when constable hobbs, posing as a young girl, conversed with mr. mills through facebook messenger and email. [40] à mon avis, il n’y a eu aucune « fouill[e] » ou « saisi[e] » quand l’agent hobbs, se faisant passer pour une jeune fille, s’est entretenu avec m. mills par facebook messenger et par courriel. 346 r v mills karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. [41] not every investigatory technique used by the police constitutes a search or seizure for con- stitutional purposes — s. 8 may be engaged only where the investigatory conduct intrudes upon a per- son’s reasonable expectation of privacy: r v. evans, [1996] 1 scr 8, at para. 11; r v. tessling, 2004 scc 67, [2004] 3 scr 432, at para. 18; r v. cole, 2012 scc 53, [2012] 3 scr 34, at para 34. as doherty ja recognized, “[w]hen deciding whether state conduct amounts to a search or seizure, the focus is not so much on the nature of the state con- duct as it is on the impact of the state conduct on the privacy interests of the s. 8 claimant”: r v. orlandis- habsburgo, 2017 onca 649, 40 cr (7th) 379, at para 39. [42] this court has long recognized that s. 8 does not prevent police from communicating with indi- viduals in the course of an undercover investigation. this is because an individual cannot reasonably ex- pect their words to be kept private from the person with whom they are communicating. section 8 does not apply because the investigatory technique of engaging in conversation, even where the officer is undercover, does not diminish an individual’s rea- sonable expectation of privacy. both r v. duarte, [1990] 1 scr 30, and r v. fliss, 2002 scc 16, [2002] 1 scr 535, involved conversations between undercover police officers and the accused. in neither case did the conversation itself engage s 8. as la forest j. wrote in duarte, at p. 57, “[a] conversation with an informer does not amount to a search and seizure within the meaning of the charter. surrep- titious electronic interception and recording of a private communication does” (emphasis added). in her concurring reasons in fliss, at para. 12, arbour j. echoed this point, holding that “a conversation with an informer, or a police officer, is not a search and seizure. only the recording of such conversation is.” [41] toute technique d’enquête utilisée par les po- liciers ne constitue pas une fouille, une perquisition ou une saisie sur le plan constitutionnel : l’art. 8 n’entre en jeu que dans le cas où la conduite en matière d’enquête empiète sur l’attente raisonnable d’une personne au respect de sa vie privée : r c. evans, [1996] 1 rcs 8, par. 11; r c. tessling, 2004 csc 67, [2004] 3 rcs 432, par. 18; r c. cole, 2012 csc 53, [2012] 3 rcs 34, par 34. comme l’a reconnu le juge doherty, [traduction] « [l]orsqu’il s’agit de décider si la conduite de l’état équivaut à une fouille, à une perquisition ou à une saisie, l’attention ne doit pas tant porter sur la nature de la conduite étatique que sur l’incidence de cette conduite sur les intérêts en matière de vie privée du demandeur qui invoque l’art. 8 » : r c. orlandis- habsburgo, 2017 onca 649, 40 cr (7th) 379, par 39. [42] notre cour reconnaît depuis longtemps que l’art. 8 n’empêche pas les policiers de communiquer avec des individus au cours d’une opération d’infil- tration. il en est ainsi parce qu’un individu ne peut raisonnablement s’attendre à ce que la personne avec laquelle il communique ne prenne pas connaissance de ses propos. l’article 8 ne s’applique pas parce que la technique d’enquête qui consiste pour un policier à participer à une conversation — même si celui-ci est un agent d’infiltration — ne diminue pas l’attente raisonnable d’une personne au respect de sa vie pri- vée. les affaires r c. duarte, [1990] 1 rcs 30, et r c. fliss, 2002 csc 16, [2002] 1 rcs 535, portaient toutes deux sur des conversations entre des agents d’infiltration et l’accusé. dans les deux cas, la conversation en soi n’a pas fait intervenir l’art 8. comme l’a écrit le juge la forest dans duarte, à la p. 57, « [u]ne conversation avec un indicateur n’est pas une fouille, une perquisition ou une sai- sie au sens de la charte. toutefois l’interception et l’enregistrement électroniques clandestins d’une communication privée en sont » (je souligne). dans les motifs concordants qu’elle a rédigés dans fliss, la juge arbour a repris ce point de vue au par. 12, statuant qu’« une conversation avec un indicateur, ou un policier, n’est pas une fouille, une perquisition ou une saisie. seul l’enregistrement de cette conver- sation l’est. » [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge karakatsanis 347 [43] similarly, undercover police investigations have long been recognized as legitimate and im- portant law enforcement tools. police do not need to obtain judicial pre- authorization before begin- ning an undercover investigation. this court has acknowledged that police may employ creativity and subterfuge in their work of preventing and investi- gating crime, although the police conduct must not threaten the integrity of the criminal justice system: see r v. oickle, 2000 scc 38, [2000] 2 scr 3, at paras. 65-67, citing rothman v. the queen, [1981] 1 scr 640, at p. 697 (per lamer j. (as he then was), concurring); r v. mack, [1988] 2 scr 903, at pp. 916-17; r v. hart, 2014 scc 52, [2014] 2 scr. 544, at para 83. [44] here, an undercover police officer conversed with mr. mills using facebook messenger and email. obviously, mills did not realize he was talking to someone who was an undercover officer. however, this is no different from someone who unwittingly speaks to an undercover officer in person. fliss makes clear that individuals conversing orally with an undercover officer are not thereby subject to a search or seizure within the meaning of the charter, even if they have no reason to believe they are speak- ing to the police. in this case, mr. mills clearly in- tended for the recipient (who happened to be a police officer) to receive his messages. it would not be reasonable for him to expect otherwise. because he had no reasonable expectation that his messages would be kept private from the intended recipient, s. 8 is not engaged. [45] the fact that the conversation took place in a written form, rather than orally as in duarte and fliss, does not transform it into a search or seizure. for example, if mills had sent a letter or passed a note to an undercover officer, s. 8 would not require the officer to get a warrant prior to reading it. [43] de même, les opérations policières d’infiltra- tion sont reconnues depuis longtemps comme des outils d’application de la loi légitimes et importants. les policiers n’ont pas besoin d’obtenir une autori- sation judiciaire avant d’entreprendre une opération d’infiltration. la cour a reconnu que ceux-ci peuvent faire appel à la créativité et au subterfuge dans leur travail de prévention du crime et d’enquête en ma- tière criminelle, mais que leur conduite ne doit pas menacer l’intégrité du système de justice pénale : voir r c. oickle, 2000 csc 38, [2000] 2 rcs 3, par. 65-67, citant rothman c. la reine, [1981] 1 rcs 640, p. 697 (opinion concordante du juge lamer (plus tard juge en chef)); r c. mack, [1988] 2 rcs 903, p. 916- 917; r c. hart, 2014 csc 52, [2014] 2 rcs 544, par 83. [44] en l’espèce, un agent d’infiltration s’est entre- tenu avec m. mills par facebook messenger et par courriel. de toute évidence, m. mills ne s’est pas rendu compte que la personne à laquelle il parlait était un agent d’infiltration. cependant, cette situa- tion n’est pas différente de celle où un individu parle, sans le savoir, à un agent d’infiltration en personne. l’arrêt fliss établit clairement que les individus qui s’entretiennent de vive voix avec un agent d’infiltra- tion ne font pas par le fait même l’objet d’une fouille ou d’une saisie au sens de la charte, et ce, même si ils n’ont aucune raison de croire qu’ils parlent à la police. dans la présente affaire, m. mills a claire- ment voulu que le destinataire (qui était en l’occur- rence un policier) reçoive ses messages. il ne serait pas raisonnable pour lui de s’attendre à autre chose. comme il ne pouvait raisonnablement s’attendre à ce que le destinataire visé de ses messages n’en prenne pas connaissance, l’art. 8 n’entre pas en jeu. [45] le fait que la conversation ait pris une forme écrite, plutôt qu’orale comme dans les affaires duarte et fliss, ne transforme pas celle-ci en une fouille ou une saisie. à titre d’exemple, si m. mills avait envoyé une lettre ou remis une note à un agent d’infiltration, l’art. 8 n’exigerait pas que ce dernier obtienne un mandat avant d’en prendre connaissance. [46] the appellant submits that the combined ef- fect of duarte and wong requires the police to always obtain prior judicial authorization before engaging [46] l’appelant soutient que les arrêts duarte et wong ont pour effet combiné d’exiger des policiers qu’ils obtiennent toujours une autorisation judiciaire 348 r v mills karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. in individual undercover conversations online. in his view, the police conduct in this case is “indis- tinguishable” from the surreptitious recording in duarte. [47] however, the common thread between duarte and wong was not the use of undercover officers, but the state’s unilateral decision to make surreptitious audio and video recordings of oral conversations. this prospect was troubling because the police trans- formed an ephemeral oral conversation into a per- manent record without the knowledge of the person who was speaking. the issue was whether the state’s newfound technological ability to “listen in” on con- versations should require judicial pre- authorization. and with respect to the prospect of surreptitious audio and video recordings of our everyday lives, the court concluded that the threat to individual freedom and autonomy outweighed the state’s valid law enforcement objectives. [48] but in this case, mr. mills chose to use a writ- ten medium to communicate with constable hobbs. email and facebook messenger users are not only aware that a permanent written record of their com- munication exists, they actually create the record themselves. the analogy with duarte is to the oral conversation, not the surreptitious recording of that conversation. duarte did not deal with a written re- cord created by an individual communicating with an undercover officer. as such, it does not require the police to obtain a warrant before using modern communication methods such as text messages or emails during undercover investigations. avant de participer à des entretiens particuliers en ligne dans le cadre d’une opération d’infiltration. à son avis, la conduite des policiers en l’espèce [traduction] « est impossible à distinguer de » l’enregistrement clandestin dans duarte. [47] cependant, le trait commun des affaires duarte et wong était non pas le recours à des agents d’infiltration, mais plutôt la décision unilatérale de l’état d’effectuer clandestinement des enregistre- ments audio et vidéo de conversations de vive voix, ce qui était troublant, car les policiers avaient trans- formé une conversation éphémère de vive voix en un relevé permanent à l’insu de la personne qui parlait. la question était de savoir si la capacité technolo- gique nouvelle de « faire l’écoute » de conversations devrait exiger une autorisation judiciaire préalable. et, en ce qui a trait à la perspective d’enregistrements audio et vidéo de la vie quotidienne, la cour a conclu que la menace pour la liberté et l’autonomie de la personne l’emportait sur les objectifs valables de l’état en matière d’application de la loi. [48] cependant, dans la présente affaire, m. mills a choisi l’écrit comme moyen de communication avec l’agent hobbs. non seulement les utilisateurs du courriel et de facebook messenger sont au fait de l’existence d’un relevé écrit permanent de leurs communications, mais ils créent en fait eux- mêmes ce relevé. l’analogie avec l’arrêt duarte a trait à la conversation de vive voix, et non à l’enregistrement clandestin de cette conversation. cet arrêt ne portait pas sur un relevé écrit créé par une personne commu- niquant avec un agent d’infiltration. il n’exige donc pas que les policiers obtiennent un mandat avant d’utiliser des moyens de communication modernes, tels les messages textes ou les courriels, au cours d’opérations d’infiltration. [49] my colleague martin  j raises the spectre of “surreptitious electronic surveillance on a mass scale”: para 103. however, the investigatory tech- nique in this case involved a one-on- one conversa- tion between an undercover officer and the accused. this court has held that generally, police attempts to obtain written, electronic conversations are sub- ject to s 8. police are required to obtain a warrant before accessing text message conversations stored [49] ma collègue la juge martin évoque le risque d’une «  surveillance électronique clandestine à grande échelle » : par 103. cependant, la technique d’enquête utilisée en l’espèce consistait en une conversation seul à seul entre un agent d’infiltration et l’accusé. la cour a conclu qu’en règle générale, les tentatives des policiers d’obtenir des conversa- tions électroniques écrites sont assujetties à l’art 8. ceux-ci sont tenus d’obtenir un mandat avant de [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge karakatsanis 349 by telecommunications providers: r v. jones, 2017 scc 60, [2017] 2 scr 696, at paras. 77-81; r v. telus communications co., 2013 scc 16, [2013] 2 scr 3, at paras. 12-13 and 48-49. similarly, viewing a text message conversation between two other parties, without their consent, also engages s. 8 of the charter: r v. marakah, 2017 scc 59, [2017] 2 scr 608, at paras 54-57. [50] this approach does not re- introduce the “risk analysis” rejected in duarte. section 8 protects “the expectation that our words will only be heard by the person or persons to whom we direct our remarks”: duarte, at p 47. in this case, that is precisely what occurred — mills’ communications were received by their intended recipient, who happened to be a police officer. by communicating online with a person he had never met before, mills opened himself up to the possibility that the other person was a police officer. the charter cannot be invoked “to protect us against a poor choice of friends”: duarte, at p 57. [51] thus, s. 8 of the charter is not engaged merely because an undercover officer converses electroni- cally with an individual. this is because (1) it is not reasonable for the sender to expect that the messages will be kept private from the intended recipient (even if the recipient is an undercover officer); and (2) the police conduct of communicating with an individual does not amount to a search or seizure. either way, the outcome is the same — s. 8 is not violated when police simply communicate with an individual. pouvoir avoir accès à des conversations par message texte conservées par les fournisseurs de services de télécommunications : r c. jones, 2017 csc 60, [2017] 2 rcs 696, par. 77-81; r c. société telus communications, 2013 csc 16, [2013] 2 rcs 3, par. 12-13 et 48-49. de même, le fait d’examiner une conversation par message texte entre deux autres parties, sans leur consentement, fait également inter- venir l’art. 8 de la charte : r c. marakah, 2017 csc 59, [2017] 2 rcs 608, par 54-57. [50] cette approche ne réintroduit pas l’« analyse fondée sur le risque » rejetée dans l’arrêt duarte. l’article 8 protège les cas où « nous nous attendons à ce que nos propos ne soient entendus que par la personne ou les personnes auxquelles nous les desti- nons » : duarte, p 47. c’est précisément ce qui s’est passé en l’espèce — les communications de m. mills ont été reçues par le destinataire visé, qui était en l’occurrence un policier. en communiquant en ligne avec une personne qu’il n’avait jamais rencontrée auparavant, m. mills s’est exposé au risque que cet interlocuteur soit un policier. la charte ne peut être invoquée pour « nous protéger si nous choisissons mal nos amis » : duarte, p 57. [51] en conséquence, l’art. 8 de la charte n’entre pas en jeu du simple fait qu’un agent d’infiltration discute par voie électronique avec un individu, et ce, pour les motifs suivants : (1) il n’est pas raisonnable de la part de l’expéditeur de s’attendre à ce que le destinataire visé de ses messages n’en prenne pas connaissance (même s’il s’agit d’un agent d’infiltra- tion), et (2) le fait que les policiers communiquent avec un individu n’équivaut pas à une fouille ou à une saisie. d’une manière ou d’une autre, le résultat est le même : il n’y a aucune violation de l’art. 8 quand les policiers ne font que communiquer avec un individu. [52] the alternative conclusion would signifi- cantly and negatively impact police undercover op- erations, including those conducted electronically: see s c hutchison et al., search and seizure law in canada (loose- leaf), at s. 4(c)(v)(b) (discussing whether a communication obtained by impersona- tion or mistake has been intercepted). i agree with the intervener canadian association of chiefs of police that requiring police officers to obtain judicial [52] l’autre conclusion aurait une incidence impor- tante et négative sur les opérations policières d’infil- tration, y compris celles menées électroniquement : voir s c hutchison et autres, search and seizure law in canada (feuilles mobiles), section 4(c)(v)(b) (portant sur la question de savoir si une communica- tion obtenue par usurpation d’identité ou par erreur a été interceptée). je conviens avec l’intervenante l’association canadienne des chefs de police que 350 r v mills karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. authorization, especially part vi authorization, prior to engaging in this type of undercover operation would “effectively hamstring the ability of the police to proactively enforce [child luring offences]”: i f, at para 5. particularly in a case like this, where there is no suspect before the investigation commences, police would not have grounds to obtain a warrant or part vi authorization. as courts have recognized, undercover police operations are an important tool in enforcing the child luring offences and protect- ing vulnerable children: levigne, at para. 25; r v. alicandro, 2009 onca 133, 95 or (3d) 173, at para 38. requiring police to obtain judicial pre- authorization before even launching an electronic undercover investigation simply does not strike an appropriate balance between individual privacy and the safety and security of our children. le fait d’exiger des policiers qu’ils obtiennent une autorisation judiciaire, surtout une autorisation visée à la partie vi, avant de se livrer à une opération d’in- filtration de ce genre [traduction] « empêchera[it] dans les faits les policiers de [réprimer] de façon proactive [les infractions de leurre] » : mi, par 5. plus particulièrement dans une affaire comme celle qui nous occupe, où il n’y pas de suspect avant l’ou- verture de l’enquête, les policiers n’auraient pas de motifs d’obtenir un mandat ou une autorisation visée à la partie vi. comme l’ont reconnu les tribunaux, les opérations policières d’infiltration sont un moyen important de réprimer les infractions de leurre et de protéger les enfants vulnérables : levigne, par. 25; r c. alicandro, 2009 onca 133, 95 or (3d) 173, par 38. exiger que la police obtienne une autorisa- tion judiciaire avant même qu’une opération d’infil- tration par voie électronique ne soit lancée ne permet tout simplement pas d’établir un équilibre approprié entre la vie privée des individus et la sécurité de nos enfants. b using “snagit” to take screenshots of an elec- b utilisation de « snagit » pour faire des captures tronic conversation d’écran d’une conversation électronique [53] mills submits that by using “snagit” to take screenshots of the electronic messages he exchanged with the undercover officer, the police further vio- lated his s. 8 charter rights. [54] the question remains then as to whether the use of “snagit” otherwise amounts to a search or sei- zure, requiring some form of judicial authorization. of course, even if the crown were not permitted to tender the printed screenshots as evidence, the crown could still call the officer to testify about what the accused said and the written record could be used to refresh the officer’s memory: duarte, at pp. 58 and 60; fliss, at paras. 7, 12 and 43-45. however, permanently preserving the accused’s own words, in a complete and accurate format, gives the state compelling evidence against the accused. does the state’s use of screenshot technology intrude upon the accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy such that it constitutes a search or seizure? [53] m. mills soutient qu’en utilisant « snagit » pour prendre des captures d’écran des messages élec- troniques qu’il échangeait avec l’agent d’infiltration, les policiers ont violé de nouveau les droits que lui garantit l’art. 8 de la charte. [54] il reste alors à décider si l’utilisation de « snagit » équivaut par ailleurs à une fouille ou à une saisie qui requiert une certaine forme d’autorisation judiciaire. bien entendu, même si elle n’était pas autorisée à produire en preuve les captures d’écran imprimées, la couronne pourrait toujours faire té- moigner l’agent au sujet de ce qu’a dit l’accusé et le relevé écrit pourrait servir à rafraîchir la mémoire de ce témoin : duarte, p. 58 et 60; fliss, par. 7, 12 et 43-45. cependant, la conservation permanente des propos complets et exacts de l’accusé fournit à l’état une preuve convaincante contre l’accusé. l’utilisation par l’état de la technologie de capture d’écran empiète-t-elle sur l’attente raisonnable de l’accusé au respect de sa vie privée de sorte qu’elle constitue une fouille ou une saisie? [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge karakatsanis 351 in my opinion, it does not. as discussed [55] above, the permanent record of the conversation resulted from the medium through which mr. mills chose to communicate. he cannot reasonably expect that the recipient would not have a written record of his words. [55] à mon avis, la réponse est non. comme nous l’avons vu, le relevé permanent de la conversation résulte du moyen choisi par m. mills pour communi- quer. ce dernier ne peut raisonnablement s’attendre à ce que le destinataire ne dispose pas d’un relevé écrit de ses propos. [56] for this reason, the police officer’s use of “snagit” is also not a search or seizure. i cannot see any relevant difference in the state preserving the conversations by using “snagit” to take screen- shots of them, by using a computer to print them, or by tendering into evidence a phone or laptop with the conversations open and visible. ultimately, the “snagit” screenshots are just a copy of the written messages. this use of technology is not intrusive or surreptitious state conduct. [57] my conclusion that s. 8 is not engaged in this case does not mean that undercover online police operations will never intrude on a reasonable ex- pectation of privacy. as technology and the ways we communicate change, courts play an important role in ensuring that undercover police techniques do not unacceptably intrude on the privacy of canadians. particularly in the context of the digital world, it is important for courts to consider both the nature and the scale of an investigative technique in determining whether s. 8 is engaged. with respect to the concern about the prospect of broader surveillance made possible by technological advances, as binnie j. ob- served in tessling, “[w]hatever evolution occurs in future will have to be dealt with by the courts step by step. concerns should be addressed as they truly arise”: para 55. [56] c’est pour cette raison que l’utilisation de « snagit » par les policiers ne constitue pas non plus une fouille ou une saisie. pour ce qui est de la conser- vation des conversations par l’état, je ne vois aucune différence pertinente entre le fait d’utiliser « snagit » pour faire des captures d’écran de celles-ci, l’utili- sation d’un ordinateur pour les imprimer, et le dépôt en preuve d’un téléphone ou d’un ordinateur porta- tif où les conversations en question sont ouvertes et visibles. en fin de compte, les captures d’écran obtenues au moyen de « snagit » ne sont qu’une copie des messages écrits. cette utilisation de la technologie ne constitue pas une conduite intrusive ou clandestine de l’état. [57] ma conclusion selon laquelle l’art. 8 n’entre pas en jeu en l’espèce ne signifie pas que les opé- rations policières d’infiltration menées en ligne n’empièteront jamais sur une attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée. les changements que connaissent la technologie et nos façons de commu- niquer amènent les tribunaux à jouer un rôle impor- tant lorsqu’il s’agit de garantir que les techniques d’infiltration policière n’empiètent pas de façon inacceptable sur la vie privée des canadiens. en particulier dans le contexte de l’ère numérique, il est important que les tribunaux se penchent tant sur la nature que sur l’étendue de la technique d’enquête utilisée lorsqu’il s’agit de décider si l’art. 8 entre en jeu. quant à la crainte que les avancées technolo- giques rendent possible une surveillance plus large, le juge binnie a fait remarquer dans l’arrêt tessling que « [t]out développement qui pourra survenir de- vra être examiné par les tribunaux. les problèmes devraient être analysés au moment où ils se posent véritablement » : par 55. [58] because the police techniques used here did not engage the protections of s. 8, judicial pre- authorization was not required therefore, it is unnecessary to consider whether any of the police [58] comme les techniques policières utilisées en l’espèce ne faisaient pas intervenir les protections prévues à l’art. 8, une autorisation judiciaire préa- lable n’était pas requise. il n’est donc pas nécessaire 352 r v mills karakatsanis j. [2019] 2 scr. techniques constituted an “intercept” as defined in part vi of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. de se demander si l’une ou l’autre de ces techniques constituait une « interception » au sens de la par- tie vi du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46. ii conclusion ii conclusion [59] the ultimate normative issue under s. 8 is “whether, in light of the impact of an investigative technique on privacy interests, it is right that the state should be able to use that technique without any legal authorization or judicial supervision”: h. stewart, “normative foundations for reasonable expecta- tions of privacy” (2011), 54 sclr (2d) 335, at p 342. i acknowledge that the court in duarte did not anticipate the widespread use of electronic com- munication. i also recognize that many individuals engage in extensive, private online conversations with people they have not previously met in person. but, while the internet empowers individuals to ex- change much socially valuable information, it also creates more opportunities to commit crimes. the anonymity of the online world enables some preda- tory adults to gain the trust of vulnerable children and entice them into sexual activity: r v. legare, 2009 scc 56, [2009] 3 scr 551, at para. 2; levigne, at para 25. [60] undercover police operations, using the an- onymity of the internet, allow police officers to proactively prevent sexual predators from preying on children. for decades, police officers have used undercover operations to investigate and prevent crimes. the fact that conversations with undercover officers now occur in written form on the internet does not, in itself, violate s. 8 of the charter. how- ever, this conclusion in no way gives the police a broad license to engage in general online surveillance of private conversations. both s. 8 of the charter, as outlined in telus, marakah and jones, as well as the common law doctrines of abuse of process and entrapment place limits on the ways police can use electronic communications in the course of an investigation. [59] la question normative qu’il faut finalement se poser au regard de l’art. 8 est de savoir [traduc- tion] « si, compte tenu de l’incidence d’une tech- nique d’enquête donnée sur des intérêts en matière de vie privée, il est souhaitable que l’état puisse utiliser cette technique sans aucune autorisation légale ou surveillance judiciaire » : h. stewart, « normative foundations for reasonable expectations of pri- vacy » (2011), 54 sclr (2d) 335, p 342. je re- connais que, dans l’arrêt duarte, la cour n’avait pas prévu l’utilisation généralisée de la communication électronique. je concède également que beaucoup de gens se livrent à de longues conversations privées en ligne avec des individus qu’ils n’ont jamais ren- contrés en personne. or, bien qu’internet permette aux individus d’échanger entre eux des renseigne- ments très précieux pour la société, il crée aussi davantage d’occasions de commettre des crimes. l’anonymat de l’univers virtuel permet à certains prédateurs adultes de gagner la confiance d’enfants vulnérables et de les amener par la ruse à se livrer à des activités sexuelles : r c. legare, 2009 csc 56, [2009] 3 rcs 551, par. 2; levigne, par 25. [60] les opérations policières d’infiltration réali- sées à la faveur de l’anonymat d’internet permettent à la police d’empêcher de façon proactive les préda- teurs sexuels de s’en prendre à des enfants. les po- liciers recourent aux opérations d’infiltration depuis des décennies pour enquêter sur des crimes et les prévenir. le fait que les conversations avec des agents d’infiltration se fassent aujourd’hui sous forme écrite sur internet ne contrevient pas, en soi, à l’art. 8 de la charte. toutefois, cette conclusion ne confère aucu- nement à la police une grande latitude lui permettant de se livrer à une surveillance générale en ligne des conversations privées. tant l’art. 8 de la charte — tel que décrit dans les arrêts telus, marakah et jones — que les doctrines de common law de l’abus de procédure et de la provocation policière limitent les façons dont les policiers peuvent utiliser les com- munications électroniques au cours d’une enquête. [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge karakatsanis 353 interveners in this case raised the concern [61] about the extent to which the police are permitted to impersonate other individuals to further their under- cover objectives. the intervener criminal lawyers’ association submits that not applying s. 8 in the present case opens the door to the police posing as internet therapy providers or even creating their own dating service in an effort to monitor the ad- dictions or sexual preferences of canadians: i f, at paras 4-5. [62] these scenarios are far removed from the facts of this particular case, where the officer cre- ated a single facebook profile and did not initiate contact with anyone. more importantly, i am not persuaded that either s. 8 of the charter or part vi of the criminal code would be the proper vehicles to address these concerns. the threat of rogue police undercover investigations is better characterized as a broader threat to the integrity of the justice system. as lamer j. recognized in rothman, certain under- cover techniques, such as posing as a prison chaplain or a legal aid lawyer to elicit incriminating evidence, go too far and must be condemned by courts because they threaten the integrity of the justice system itself: pp 696-97. [61] les intervenants en l’espèce ont soulevé la préoccupation relative à la mesure dans laquelle les policiers sont autorisés à usurper l’identité d’autres personnes pour favoriser l’atteinte de leurs objectifs d’infiltration. la criminal lawyers’ association in- tervenante soutient que le fait de ne pas appliquer l’art. 8 en l’espèce ouvre la porte à la possibilité que les policiers se fassent passer pour des fournisseurs de thérapie sur internet, ou encore créent leur propre service de rencontre, en vue de surveiller les dépen- dances ou les préférences sexuelles des canadiens : mi, par 4-5. [62] ces scénarios ont très peu à voir avec les faits de la présente affaire, où l’agent a créé un seul profil facebook et n’a pris contact avec personne. plus important encore, je ne suis pas convaincue que l’art. 8 de la charte ou la partie vi du code criminel constituent les moyens appropriés pour répondre à ces préoccupations. la menace d’opé- rations d’infiltration menées par des policiers sans scrupules s’apparente davantage à une menace plus large à l’intégrité du système de justice. comme l’a reconnu le juge lamer dans rothman, certaines techniques d’infiltration, comme le fait de se faire passer pour un aumônier de prison ou un avocat de l’aide juridique pour soutirer des éléments de preuve incriminants, vont trop loin et doivent être condamnées par les tribunaux parce qu’elles me- nacent l’intégrité du système de justice lui- même : p. 696- 697. [63] if such cases arise, where police impersona- tion tactics offend society’s notions of decency and fair play, courts should invoke existing common law mechanisms to regulate undercover police in- vestigations, including those conducted online. the abuse of process doctrine guards against coercive police conduct, such as preying on an accused’s vul- nerabilities, which threatens trial fairness and the integrity of the justice system: hart, at paras 111-18. in addition, if police go beyond providing an op- portunity to commit an offence and actually induce its commission, the entrapment doctrine applies: mack, at pp 964-66. indeed, courts have used the entrapment doctrine to scrutinize sting operations similar to the one used here: see r v. chiang, 2012 bcca 85, 286 ccc (3d) 564, at paras. 14-21; [63] en pareilles situations, soit dans le cas où les tactiques policières d’usurpation d’identité vont à l’encontre de la conception de la décence et du franc- jeu au sein de notre société, les tribunaux devraient invoquer les mécanismes de common law existants pour régir les opérations policières d’infiltration, y compris celles menées en ligne. ainsi, la doctrine de l’abus de procédure offre une protection contre la conduite coercitive de la police, par exemple dans un cas où l’on miserait sur les points vulnérables de l’accusé, ce qui aurait pour effet de compromettre l’équité du procès et l’intégrité du système de jus- tice : hart, par. 111- 118. en outre, si la police fait plus que fournir une occasion de commettre une infraction et qu’elle incite véritablement à sa per- pétration, la doctrine de la provocation policière 354 r v mills moldaver j. [2019] 2 scr. r v. bayat, 2011 onca 778, 108 or (3d) 420, at paras 15-23. in such circumstances, trial judges have “wide discretion to issue a remedy — including the exclusion of evidence or a stay of proceedings”: hart, at para. 113; see also r v. babos, 2014 scc 16, [2014] 1 scr 309, at paras. 30-47 and 53-57. [64] my conclusion that the charter does not re- quire judicial authorization before police participate in undercover online conversations of this kind also does not prevent parliament from enacting legislation to regulate these operations. indeed, given the preva- lence of electronic communication and the prospect of increased police surveillance online, a legislative scheme could provide helpful guidance about the appropriate use and reporting of undercover police techniques to prevent and investigate online crime. s’applique : mack, p. 964- 966. en effet, les tribunaux ont eu recours à cette doctrine pour examiner en profondeur des opérations d’infiltration semblables à celle utilisée en l’espèce  : voir r c chiang, 2012 bcca 85, 286 ccc (3d) 564, par. 14-21; r c. bayat, 2011 onca 778, 108 or (3d) 420, par 15-23. dans de tels cas, les juges du procès jouissent d’« un grand pouvoir discrétionnaire pour accorder réparation, y compris l’exclusion de la preuve et l’arrêt des procédures » : hart, par. 113; voir également r c. babos, 2014 csc 16, [2014] 1 rcs 309, par. 30-47 et 53-57. [64] par ailleurs, ma conclusion suivant laquelle la charte ne commande pas d’autorisation judiciaire préalable à la participation d’agents d’infiltration à des conversations en ligne de ce type n’empêche pas le parlement d’adopter des dispositions législatives pour régir ces opérations. de fait, compte tenu de l’omniprésence des communications électroniques et de la perspective d’une surveillance policière accrue en ligne, un régime législatif pourrait fournir des indications utiles sur la façon appropriée d’utiliser — et de faire rapport sur — les techniques policières d’infiltration visant à prévenir les cybercrimes et à enquêter sur ceux-ci. [65] in conclusion, there was no violation of s. 8 when the police communicated with mills and used “snagit” to preserve the written record of those conversations. the screenshots of the conversations were therefore admissible evidence. i would dismiss the appeal. [65] en conclusion, il n’y a eu aucune violation de l’art. 8 lorsque les policiers ont communiqué avec m. mills et ont utilisé « snagit » pour conserver le re- levé écrit des conversations. les captures d’écran de celles-ci constituaient donc des éléments de preuve admissibles. je rejetterais le pourvoi. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [66] moldaver  j.  — although my colleagues karakatsanis j. and brown j. provide separate rea- sons for dismissing the appeal, in my view, each set of reasons is sound in law and each forms a proper basis for upholding the order of the newfoundland and labrador court of appeal dismissing mr. mills’ appeal. [66] le juge moldaver — bien que mes collè- gues les juges karakatsanis et brown exposent des motifs distincts pour rejeter le pourvoi, chaque série de motifs est, à mon avis, bien fondée en droit et sert de fondement valable pour confirmer l’ordonnance de la cour d’appel de terre- neuve-et- labrador ayant rejeté l’appel de m mills. [67] accordingly, i concur in the result and would likewise dismiss the appeal. [67] en conséquence, je souscris au résultat au- quel ils arrivent et je rejetterais également le pour- voi. [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 355 the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par martin j. — i. introduction la juge martin — i. introduction [68] the regulation of an ever- changing internet presents many challenges for lawmakers and courts and requires the careful balancing of rights and in- terests. [68] la réglementation de l’internet, lequel est en constante évolution, présente de nombreux défis pour les législateurs et les tribunaux, et exige un juste équilibre entre les droits et les intérêts. [69] the sexual exploitation of a minor is an ab- horrent act that canadian society, including this court, strongly denounces in an online context, adults who prey on children and youth for a sexual purpose can gain the trust of these young people through anonymous or falsified identities, and can reach into their homes more easily than ever before, from anywhere in the world. children and youth are therefore particularly vulnerable on the internet and require protection. [70] parliament has addressed the unique risks posed by online sexual predation through, inter alia, s 1721 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“code”). as tools of crime grow more sophisticated, so must law enforcement techniques. state actors must be equipped with investigative powers that will allow them to effectively and proactively root out the sexual exploitation of children online. [71] such investigative powers, however, need to be counter- balanced with the state’s obligation to respect the privacy rights of its citizens. parliament has taken steps in this regard by legislating when the state must seek judicial authorization for accessing certain types of private communications: see part vi of the code, “invasion of privacy”. however, the relevant provisions in part vi were enacted before the widespread use of modern means of electronic communications, which have the capacity to gener- ate a written record of conversations. [69] l’exploitation sexuelle d’un mineur est un acte odieux que dénonce fortement la société ca- nadienne, y compris notre cour. dans un contexte numérique, les adultes qui exploitent des enfants et des jeunes dans un but sexuel peuvent gagner leur confiance grâce à des identités anonymes ou fausses et peuvent s’immiscer dans leur domicile plus faci- lement que jamais, à partir de n’importe où dans le monde. les enfants et les jeunes sont donc particu- lièrement vulnérables sur internet et ont besoin de protection. [70] le législateur a pris des mesures pour contrer les risques particuliers que pose la prédation sexuelle en ligne, notamment au moyen de l’art 1721 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c c-46. les outils de la criminalité deviennent de plus en plus perfection- nés, et il doit en être de même pour les techniques des forces de l’ordre. les acteurs de l’état doivent disposer de pouvoirs d’enquête qui leur permettront d’enrayer efficacement et en amont l’exploitation sexuelle en ligne des enfants. [71] cependant, de tels pouvoirs d’enquête doivent être contrebalancés par l’obligation de l’état de res- pecter les droits au respect de la vie privée de ses citoyens. le parlement a pris des mesures à cet égard en adoptant une loi qui prévoit les situations où l’état doit obtenir une autorisation judiciaire pour avoir accès à certains types de communications privées (voir la partie vi du code criminel, « atteintes à la vie privée »). cependant, les dispositions pertinentes de la partie vi ont été adoptées avant l’utilisation massive des moyens modernes de communication électronique, qui peuvent produire un relevé écrit des conversations. 356 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. [72] this appeal asks whether the state should be permitted to conduct warrantless surveillance of private, electronic communications, or whether that state surveillance should be regulated. in my respectful view, protecting children from online sex- ual exploitation, while essential, does not require the unregulated state surveillance of the public’s private electronic communications. for the reasons that follow, i conclude that members of society have a reasonable expectation that their private, electronic communications will not be acquired by the state at its sole discretion. if the police wish to acquire a record of those communications, for the legitimate and vitally important purpose of preventing sexual crimes against young people, such investigative ac- tivities must be regulated. the precise nature of such regulation is best left to parliament. [73] thus, while the state should be empowered to prevent sexual predators from targeting children and youth online, members of society must not, and need not, be subjected to the unregulated state surveillance of their private electronic communications in order for the state to achieve these aims. il s’agit en l’espèce de décider si l’état devrait [72] pouvoir exercer, sans mandat, une surveillance des communications électroniques privées, ou si une telle surveillance par l’état devrait être réglemen- tée. à mon humble avis, la protection des enfants contre l’exploitation sexuelle en ligne, bien qu’elle soit essentielle, n’exige pas que l’état assure une surveillance non réglementée des communications électroniques privées des membres du public. pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclus que les membres de la société s’attendent raisonnablement à ce que l’état ne prenne pas connaissance, à son entière discrétion, de leurs communications électroniques privées. si la police veut prendre connaissance d’un relevé de ces communications, dans le but légitime et d’une importance capitale d’empêcher la commission de crimes sexuels contre les jeunes, de telles activités d’enquête doivent être réglementées. c’est au lé- gislateur de décider de la nature précise d’une telle réglementation. [73] par conséquent, même si l’état devrait avoir pleins pouvoirs pour empêcher les prédateurs sexuels de s’en prendre à des enfants et à des jeunes en ligne, les communications électroniques privées des membres de la société ne doivent pas faire l’objet d’une surveillance non réglementée, par l’état, afin que celui-ci puisse parvenir à ces fins. ii relevant facts ii faits pertinents [74] in 2012, members of the royal newfound- land constabulary’s child exploitation unit, one of whom was constable hobbs, conducted a sting operation with the intent of catching internet child lurers. on february 28 and march 12, 2012, cst. hobbs created an email and a facebook account for a fictitious 14-year-old individual whom he called “leann power”. cst. hobbs testified that he knew of no policy manuals to guide this type of investigation, and that his investigatory tactics were left to his dis- cretion. on “leann’s” facebook profile, cst. hobbs pretended that “leann” resided in st. john’s and was a student at a local high school. he obtained a pho- tograph from the internet to use as “leann’s” profile picture. while cst. hobbs did not make any “friend” requests, he received and accepted “friend” requests that resulted from “leann’s” affiliation with the local [74] en 2012, des membres du groupe de lutte contre l’exploitation des enfants de la royal new- foundland constabulary, dont faisait partie l’agent hobbs, ont mené une opération d’infiltration avec l’intention de mettre la main sur des cyberprédateurs. le 28 février 2012 et le 12 mars 2012, l’agent hobbs a créé un compte courriel et un profil facebook afin de se faire passer pour une adolescente de 14 ans à qui il a donné le nom de « leann power ». l’agent hobbs a déclaré qu’il ne connaissait aucun manuel de po- litique concernant ce type d’enquête et que le choix de ses tactiques d’enquête était laissé à sa discré- tion. dans le profil facebook qu’il a créé au nom de « leann », l’agent hobbs a indiqué que « leann » habitait à st. john’s et qu’elle fréquentait une école secondaire locale. il y a ajouté une photo obtenue sur internet comme photo de profil de « leann ». bien [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 357 high school: see (2013), 343 nfld. & peir 128, at paras. 3-4 and 40 (“decision re s 8”). [75] on march 20, 2012, cst. hobbs received a facebook message from mr mills. over the next two months, mr. mills exchanged several facebook mes- sages and emails with “leann”. ultimately, mr. mills was arrested in a public park where he had arranged to meet “leann”. he was charged with four counts of luring a child under s 1721 of the code: decision re s. 8, at paras. 1 and 5-10. que l’agent hobbs n’ait envoyé aucune « demande d’amitié », il a reçu et accepté de telles demandes, qui lui ont été faites en raison du lien que « leann » avait avec l’école secondaire locale (voir (2013), 343 nfld. & peir 128, par. 3-4 et 40 (« décision relative à l’art 8 »)). [75] le 20 mars 2012, l’agent hobbs a reçu un message facebook de m mills. au cours des deux mois suivants, m. mills a échangé plusieurs mes- sages facebook et courriels avec « leann ». finale- ment, m. mills a été arrêté dans un parc public où il avait organisé une rencontre avec « leann ». il a été accusé de quatre chefs d’accusation de leurre en vertu de l’art 1721 du code criminel (décision relative à l’art. 8, par. 1 et 5-10). iii admissibility of the electronic communications iii admissibilité des communications électroniques between mr. mills and “leann” entre m. mills et « leann » [76] mr. mills challenged the admissibility of the electronic communications exchanged between him- self and “leann” on two grounds: first, that the police failed to comply with s 1842 of the code by not obtaining authorization prior to intercepting private communications; and second, that the state action constituted an unreasonable search and seizure con- trary to s. 8 of the charter. [77] my colleagues have found that mr. mills had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his com- munications with “leann”. without a reasonable expectation of privacy, there was no search. further, brown j. concludes that s 1842 of the code does not apply to the case at bar, while karakatsanis j. finds it unnecessary to consider the question. [76] m. mills a contesté l’admissibilité des com- munications électroniques échangées entre lui et « leann » pour deux motifs : d’une part, il a soutenu que la police n’avait pas respecté l’art 1842 du code criminel car elle n’avait pas obtenu l’autorisa- tion pour intercepter des communications privées, et d’autre part, que l’action de l’état constituait une fouille et une saisie abusives en contravention de l’art. 8 de la charte. [77] mes collègues ont conclu que m. mills n’avait aucune attente raisonnable au respect de sa vie privée à l’égard de ses communications avec « leann ». sans une telle attente, il n’y avait pas de fouille. de plus, le juge brown conclut que l’art 1842 du code criminel ne s’applique pas à l’affaire qui nous occupe, alors que la juge karakatsanis estime qu’il est inutile d’examiner la question. [78] respectfully, i depart from these conclusions. mr. mills had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the impugned communications, and the state’s surveillance of those private communications there- fore constituted a search. further, the police use of “snagit” screenshot software was regulated by s 1842 of the code: cst. hobbs intercepted private communications when he used “snagit” to record his communications with mr.  mills in real- time. [78] soit dit en tout respect, je ne souscris pas à ces conclusions. m. mills avait une attente rai- sonnable au respect de sa vie privée à l’égard des communications en cause, et la surveillance de ces communications privées par l’état constituait donc une fouille. qui plus est, l’utilisation du logiciel de capture d’écran « snagit » par la police était régie par l’art 1842 du code criminel : l’agent hobbs a intercepté des communications privées lorsqu’il 358 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. as such, he was required to obtain an authorization pursuant to s 1842. because cst. hobbs did not do so, he breached mr. mills’ s. 8 charter-protected privacy right. further, even if cst. hobbs had chosen not to employ extraneous screen recording software, his investigative technique may still have constituted an “interception” for the purposes of s 1842. [79] however, the admission into evidence of the impugned communications would not bring the ad- ministration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2) of the charter. i would therefore dismiss the appeal. iv reasonable expectation of privacy in private electronic communications a utilisé « snagit » pour enregistrer ses échanges avec m. mills en temps réel. il devait donc obtenir l’autorisation prévue à l’art 1842. comme il ne l’a pas fait, l’agent hobbs a porté atteinte au droit à la vie privée que l’art. 8 de la charte garantit à m mills. de plus, même si l’agent hobbs avait dé- cidé de ne pas utiliser un logiciel de saisie d’écran externe, sa technique d’enquête aurait quand même pu constituer une « interception » pour l’application de l’art 1842. [79] cependant, l’admission en preuve des com- munications en cause n’est pas susceptible de dé- considérer l’administration de la justice aux termes du par. 24(2) de la charte. je serais donc d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. iv attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée à l’égard des communications électroniques pri- vées [80] reasonable expectation of privacy is assessed on a normative, rather than descriptive, standard: hunter v southam inc., [1984] 2  scr  145, at pp. 159-60; r v. tessling, 2004 scc 67, [2004] 3 scr 432, at para. 42; r v. patrick, 2009 scc 17, [2009] 1 scr 579, at para. 14; r v. spencer, 2014 scc 43, [2014] 2 scr 212, at para. 18; r. v. reeves, 2018 scc 56, at para 28. this means that the question to be asked is whether the privacy claim must “be recognized as beyond state intrusion absent constitutional justification if canadian society is to remain a free, democratic and open society”: r v. ward, 2012 onca 660, 112 or (3d) 321, at para. 87. [80] l’attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée est de nature normative, et non descriptive (hunter c. southam inc., [1984] 2 rcs 145, p. 159- 160; r c. tessling, 2004 csc 67, [2004] 3 rcs 432, par. 42; r c. patrick, 2009 csc 17, [2009] 1 rcs 579, par. 14; r c. spencer, 2014 csc 43, [2014] 2 rcs. 212, par. 18; r c. reeves, 2018 csc 56, par 28). la question qu’il faut se poser consiste donc à savoir si le droit à la vie privée revendiqué doit [traduction] « être considéré comme à l’abri de toute intrusion par l’état — sauf justification constitutionnelle — pour que la société canadienne demeure libre, démocra- tique et ouverte » (r. c. ward, 2012 onca 660, 112 or (3d) 321, par 87). [81] when responding to this question in the con- text of this appeal, the starting point is this court’s decision in r v. duarte, [1990] 1 scr 30. [81] pour répondre à cette question dans le con- texte du présent pourvoi, il faut commencer par exa- miner la décision de notre cour dans r c. duarte, [1990] 1 rcs 30. a the case of duarte is the starting point a l’affaire duarte constitue le point de départ [82] as early as 30 years ago, this court held that surreptitious participant electronic surveillance by the state requires regulation: duarte, and its compan- ion case, r v. wong, [1990] 3 scr 36. in duarte, a group conversation about a cocaine transaction was [82] il y a de cela tout juste 30 ans, notre cour a conclu que la surveillance électronique participa- tive clandestine par l’état devait être réglementée (duarte et l’arrêt connexe, r c. wong, [1990] 3 rcs 36). dans duarte, une conversation de groupe [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 359 surreptitiously recorded with the consent of two of the parties to the conversation — an informer and an undercover police officer. when a participant in a conversation either surreptitiously records that conversation or consents to the conversation being surreptitiously recorded, it is called “participant sur- veillance”. at the time, s 17811(2)(a) of the code permitted parties to a conversation to conduct elec- tronic participant surveillance without a warrant. on the strength of a normative privacy analysis, la forest j. held that the risk of warrantless surveillance at the sole discretion of the police cannot be imposed on all members of society. he further held that this principle applies equally in the case of participant surveillance. as such, warrantless electronic partic- ipant surveillance by the state infringes s. 8 of the charter. [83] at its core, surreptitious electronic recording of private communications by the state attracted a privacy interest in duarte because recording a com- munication transforms the originator’s ephemeral words into documentary evidence. the act of re- cording, therefore, “annihilates the very important right    to choose the range of our auditors” (p 51). this concern was expressed by harlan j., dissenting in united states v. white, 401 us 745 (1971), at pp. 787-89 and referenced in duarte, at p. 54, as “having to contend with a documented record”. the risk of documentation and permanence is evoked in two of duarte’s foremost statements of principle: au sujet d’une affaire de cocaïne avait été enregistrée clandestinement avec le consentement de deux des parties à la conversation — un indicateur et un agent d’infiltration. lorsqu’un participant à une conversa- tion enregistre clandestinement cette conversation ou consent à ce que la conversation soit enregistrée clandestinement, il s’agit de « surveillance participa- tive ». à l’époque, l’al 17811(2)a) du code criminel permettait aux parties à une conversation d’exercer une surveillance électronique participative sans man- dat. se fondant sur une analyse normative du droit à la vie privée, le juge la forest a conclu que tous les membres de la société ne peuvent pas être exposés au risque que la police exerce une surveillance sans mandat, à sa seule discrétion. il a en outre conclu que ce principe s’applique tout autant dans le cas de la surveillance participative. par conséquent, la surveillance électronique participative sans mandat par l’état contrevient à l’art. 8 de la charte. [83] essentiellement, l’enregistrement électro- nique clandestin, par l’état, de communications privées a suscité un droit à la vie privée dans l’affaire duarte parce que l’enregistrement d’une commu- nication transforme les propos éphémères de son auteur en preuve documentaire par conséquent, l’enregistrement en tant que tel « annihile le droit extrêmement important [  ] de choisir nos audi- teurs » (p 51). le juge harlan, dissident dans united states c. white, 401 us 745 (1971), p. 787- 789, et cité dans l’arrêt duarte, p. 54, a exprimé cette inquiétude lorsqu’il a parlé du risque de devoir « se reporter à des notes écrites » de nos pensées privées. le risque que ces propos éphémères soient consi- gnés par écrit et de façon permanente est évoqué dans deux des plus importants énoncés de principe de l’arrêt duarte :    the regulation of electronic surveillance protects us from a risk of a different order, ie, not the risk that some- one will repeat our words but the much more insidious danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words.    la réglementation de la surveillance électronique nous protège plutôt contre un risque différent : non plus le risque que quelqu’un répète nos propos, mais le danger bien plus insidieux qu’il y a à permettre que l’état, à son entière discrétion, enregistre et transmette nos propos.   .   .    the law recognizes that we inherently have to bear the risk of the “tattletale” but draws the line at concluding    le droit reconnaît que nous devons par la force des choses assumer le risque posé par le « rapporteur », mais 360 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. that we must also bear, as the price of choosing to speak to another human being, the risk of having a permanent electronic recording made of our words. [emphasis added; pp. 44 and 48.] [84] duarte’s concern with the recording of private communications was rooted in the conviction that if members of the public believed that every time they spoke they were at risk of producing a documented record of their communications for the state to use at its sole discretion, privacy from state intrusion would no longer exist, and freedom of thought and expression would be effectively stripped of meaning: p 44. since 1990, it has therefore been accepted that to leave electronic state surveillance unchecked would be to relinquish our freedom: the “freedom not to be compelled to share our confidences with others is the very hallmark of a free society”: p 53. refuse d’aller jusqu’à conclure que nous devons en outre supporter, comme prix de l’exercice du choix d’adresser la parole à un autre être humain, le risque que soit fait un enregistrement électronique permanent de nos propos. [je souligne; p. 44 et 48.] [84] le problème relatif à l’enregistrement des communications privées soulevé dans duarte tirait son origine de la conviction que, si les membres du public croyaient qu’ils s’exposaient, chaque fois qu’ils ouvrent la bouche, au risque qu’un relevé écrit de leurs communications soit produit afin d’être uti- lisé par l’état à son entière discrétion, la protection de la vie privée contre l’intrusion de l’état n’exis- terait plus et la notion de liberté de pensée et d’ex- pression se trouverait en fait dénuée de sens (p 44). depuis 1990, il est donc accepté que le fait de laisser l’état libre de procéder à une telle surveillance élec- tronique sans qu’elle soit réglementée reviendrait à renoncer à notre liberté : « la liberté de ne pas être obligé de partager nos confidences avec autrui est la marque certaine d’une société libre » (p 53). in response to duarte, parliament regulated [85] participant electronic state surveillance: r v. pires, 2005 scc 66, [2005] 3 scr 343, at para 8. what is now s 1842 of the code provides that where the state seeks to “intercept” a “private communication”, the state must obtain prior judicial authorization, even when one party to that communication has consented to its interception. [85] en réponse à l’arrêt duarte, le législateur a réglementé la surveillance électronique participative menée par l’état (r. c. pires, 2005 csc 66, [2005] 3 rcs 343, par 8). selon l’article 184.2 actuel du code criminel, si l’état cherche à « intercepter une communication privée », il doit au préalable obtenir une autorisation judiciaire, même si l’une des parties à la communication a consenti à son interception. b duarte for the digital age b duarte à l’ère du numérique [86] this appeal “is duarte for the digital age”: af, at para 69. in duarte, state access to docu- mentation of our private communications occurred via state recording technology. now, however, indi- viduals often communicate using electronic media, such that their conversations are inherently recorded. where the intrusive technology used to be in the hands of the state, it is now in our back pockets. [86] le présent pourvoi, [traduction] « c’est l’af- faire duarte à l’ère du numérique » (ma, par 69). dans duarte, l’état avait pu obtenir accès à un re- levé écrit de communications privées au moyen de matériel d’enregistrement. or de nos jours, les gens communiquent souvent par le truchement de médias électroniques, de sorte que leurs conversations sont nécessairement enregistrées. si les technologies in- trusives se trouvaient autrefois entre les mains de l’état, elles se trouvent maintenant dans notre poche arrière. [87] as la forest j. clarified in wong, the princi- ples in duarte must not be restricted to the particular [87] comme l’a précisé le juge la forest dans wong, les principes établis dans duarte ne doivent [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 361 technology at issue in that decision. rather, duarte was concerned with “all existing means by which the agencies of the state can electronically intrude on the privacy of the individual, and any means which technology places at the disposal of law enforcement authorities in the future”: wong, at pp 43-44. the electronic intrusion that lay at the heart of duarte was the breach of the right to choose the range of our listeners, and the concomitant reality of having to contend with a documented record of our private thoughts in the hands of the state. duarte framed this danger as the state recording and transmitting our words, but this privacy breach can present itself in many forms. in this case, we have the opportunity to pull [88] the normative principles of duarte and wong through this court’s more recent charter s.  8 and code part vi jurisprudence — in particular, patrick; r v. telus communications co., 2013 scc 16, [2013] 2 scr 3; r v. cole, 2012 scc 53, [2012] 3 scr. 34; spencer; r v. marakah, 2017 scc 59, [2017] 2 scr 608; r v. jones, 2017 scc 60, [2017] 2 scr 696; reeves. the goal is to arrive at a judicial position that, while firmly grounded in the case law, “keep[s] pace with technological development, and, accordingly,    ensure[s] that we are ever protected against unauthorized intrusions upon our privacy by the agents of the state, whatever technical form the means of invasion may take”: wong, at p 44. pas viser seulement le moyen technologique en cause dans cette décision. au contraire, duarte portait sur « tous les moyens actuels permettant à des agents de l’état de s’introduire électroniquement dans la vie privée des personnes, et tous les moyens que la technologie pourra à l’avenir mettre à la dispo- sition des autorités chargées de l’application de la loi » (wong, p 43-44). l’atteinte commise à l’aide d’un moyen électronique qui était au cœur de l’arrêt duarte résidait dans la violation du droit de choisir ses auditeurs et, parallèlement, dans le fait que l’état ait entre ses mains des notes écrites de nos pensées privées. l’arrêt duarte a défini ce danger comme étant celui que l’état enregistre et transmette nos propos, mais cette violation de la vie privée peut se présenter sous plusieurs formes. [88] en l’espèce, nous avons l’occasion d’appli- quer les principes normatifs de duarte et de wong au regard de la jurisprudence récente de notre cour portant sur l’art. 8 de la charte et sur la partie vi du code criminel — plus particulièrement, patrick; r. c. société telus communications, 2013 csc 16, [2013] 2 rcs 3;. r c. cole, 2012 csc 53, [2012] 3 rcs 34;. spencer; r c. marakah, 2017 csc 59, [2017] 2 rcs 608;. r c. jones, 2017 csc 60, [2017] 2 rcs 696; et reeves. l’objectif est de parvenir à une position qui, tout en étant solidement ancrée dans la jurisprudence, « évolu[e] au rythme du progrès technologique et, par conséquent, nous assur[e] une protection constante contre les atteintes non autorisées à la vie privée par les agents de l’état, peu importe la forme technique que peuvent revêtir les divers moyens employés » (wong, p 44). [89] the risk contemplated in duarte was that the state could acquire a compelled record of citizens’ private thoughts with no judicial supervision. at the end of the cold war era, the way to obtain a real- time record of a conversation was to record it. today, the way to obtain a real- time record of a conversation is simply to engage in that conversation. this court must assess how and whether the primary concern of documentation in duarte still applies to cases in which (a) a communication method self- generates documentation of the communication, and (b) the originator of the communication knows that this oc- curs. should this shift in communication technology [89] le risque dont il était question dans duarte était que l’état puisse prendre connaissance, sans surveillance judiciaire, des relevés reproduisant les pensées privées de citoyens, que ceux-ci n’ont pas choisi de divulguer. à la fin de la guerre froide, pour obtenir un relevé en temps réel d’une conversation, il fallait enregistrer cette conversation. aujourd’hui, pour ce faire, il suffit de participer à cette conversa- tion. notre cour doit décider si le principal sujet de préoccupation dans l’arrêt duarte — la consignation des conversations — est toujours pertinent, et le cas échéant, de quelle façon il l’est, dans les affaires où a) le mode de communication génère lui- même 362 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. now allow the state to access people’s private on- line conversations at its sole discretion and thereby threaten our most cherished privacy principles? [90] in my view, the answer is no. this court must identify the privacy interest that duarte and sub- sequent cases sought to protect and ensure that it remains protected as the communication environ- ment evolves. this privacy interest is the right to be secure against surreptitious state access to records of our private thoughts with no judicial supervision. in order to safeguard this privacy interest, duarte concluded that state access to electronic recordings of private communications requires regulation. a shift in communication methods should not mean that the state should no longer be required to seek authorization prior to surreptitiously acquiring writ- ten records of our private communications. if it were otherwise, “there would be no meaningful residuum to our right to live our lives free from surveillance”: duarte, at p 44. c it is objectively reasonable to expect that the state will not acquire records of private con- versations at its sole discretion un relevé de la communication, et b) l’auteur de la communication sait que cela se produit. cette évo- lution des technologies de communication permet- elle maintenant à l’état d’avoir accès, à son entière discrétion, aux conversations en ligne privées des gens, ce qui menace nos principes les plus chers de protection de la vie privée? [90] à mon avis, il faut répondre à cette question par la négative. notre cour doit définir le droit à la vie privée que l’arrêt duarte et les décisions rendues dans sa foulée visaient à protéger et faire en sorte que ce droit demeure protégé au fil de l’évolution du monde de la communication. ce droit à la vie privée est le droit d’être protégé contre un accès clandestin de l’état aux relevés de nos pensées privées, sans au- cune supervision judiciaire. pour que ce droit à la vie privée soit protégé, il a été conclu dans duarte que l’accès de l’état aux enregistrements électroniques de communications privées doit être réglementé. une évolution des moyens de communication ne devrait pas avoir pour conséquence que l’état n’ait plus besoin d’autorisation pour prendre clandestinement connaissance des relevés écrits de nos communica- tions privées. s’il en était autrement, « il ne nous resterait rien qui vaille de notre droit de vivre libre de toute surveillance » (duarte, p 44). c il est objectivement raisonnable de s’attendre à ce que l’état ne prenne pas connaissance, à son entière discrétion, de relevés de conversations privées [91] unregulated state access to electronic private communications engages s. 8 of the charter because contemporary electronic communications are analo- gous to the surreptitious electronic recordings that at- tracted a reasonable expectation of privacy in duarte. while electronic communications possess the charac- teristics of informality and immediacy that define oral conversations, they also possess the characteristics of permanence, evidentiary reliability, and transmissibil- ity that define electronic recordings. they are a form of the “documented record” (duarte, at p. 54, refer- ring to white, at pp. 787-89) to which the state seeks access. thus for the “freedom not to be compelled to share our confidences” (duarte, at p. 53) to retain any meaning, state access to electronic recordings of [91] l’accès non réglementé de l’état aux communi- cations électroniques privées fait intervenir l’art. 8 de la charte parce que les communications électroniques modernes ressemblent aux enregistrements électro- niques clandestins qui ont suscité une attente raison- nable au respect de la vie privée dans duarte. bien que les communications électroniques présentent le même caractère informel et immédiat que les conversations de vive voix, elles ont également pour caractéristiques la permanence, la fiabilité probatoire et la transmis- sibilité qui définissent les enregistrements électro- niques. elles constituent une forme de « notes écrites » (duarte, p. 54, citant white, p. 787-789) auxquelles l’état cherche à avoir accès. ainsi, pour que la « liberté de ne pas être obligé de partager nos confidences avec [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 363 our private communications requires regulation. it was, therefore, objectively reasonable for mr. mills to expect not to be subjected to warrantless state acquisition of permanent electronic recordings of his private communications. the state action in this case constituted a search within the meaning of s. 8 of the charter. in duarte, la forest j. distinguished between [92] two different orders of state activity: “a conversation with an informer does not amount to a search and sei- zure within the meaning of the charter. surreptitious electronic interception and recording of a private communication does”: p. 57; see also r v. fliss, 2002 scc 16, [2002] 1 scr 535, at para 12. in her reasons, my colleague karakatsanis j. analo- gizes mr. mills’ messages with “leann” to duarte’s “conversation with an informer”: at paras. 42 and 48. in karakatsanis j.’s view, the messages exchanged between mr. mills and cst. hobbs were analogous to an oral conversation, and s. 8 of the charter was not engaged. [93] with respect, i am of the view that when one grounds the distinction between a “conversation” and a “recording” within a discussion of the privacy interest that duarte sought to protect, it becomes apparent that the electronic communications in the case at bar constituted both the conversation and the surreptitious electronic recording of that conversa- tion. this duality should support, not undermine the protection of privacy rights, because a recording exists and the state has unrestricted and unregulated access to it. autrui » (duarte, p. 53) conserve un sens, l’accès par l’état aux enregistrements électroniques de nos com- munications privées doit être réglementé. par consé- quent, il était objectivement raisonnable pour m. mills de s’attendre à ce que l’état ne prenne pas connais- sance sans mandat des enregistrements électroniques permanents de ses communications privées. l’action de l’état dont il est question en l’espèce constituait une fouille au sens de l’art. 8 de la charte. [92] dans l’arrêt duarte, le juge la forest a éta- bli une distinction entre deux différentes catégories d’activités de l’état : « une conversation avec un in- dicateur n’est pas une fouille, une perquisition ou une saisie au sens de la charte. toutefois, l’interception et l’enregistrement électroniques clandestins d’une communication privée en sont » (p. 57; voir aussi r. c. fliss, 2002 csc 16, [2002] 1 rcs 535, par 12). dans ses motifs, ma collègue la juge karakatsanis compare les messages échangés entre m. mills et « leann » aux « conversation[s] avec un indicateur » dont il était question dans duarte (par. 42 et 48). à son avis, les messages échangés entre m. mills et l’agent hobbs sont comparables à une conversation de vive voix, et l’art. 8 de la charte n’entre pas en jeu. [93] soit dit en tout respect, j’estime que lorsque l’on considère la distinction qui a été établie entre une « conversation » et un « enregistrement » à la lumière du droit à la vie privée que l’arrêt duarte visait à protéger, il devient évident que, dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, les communications électroniques en cause étaient à la fois la conversation et l’enre- gistrement électronique clandestin de cette conver- sation. cette dualité devrait étayer, et non miner, la protection des droits à la vie privée, puisqu’un enregistrement existe et que l’état dispose d’un accès non réglementé et sans restriction à celui-ci. [94] this court has already opined on the hybrid nature of text messaging. in telus, abella j. stated that “text messaging bears several hallmarks of tradi- tional voice communication: it is intended to be con- versational, transmission is generally instantaneous, and there is an expectation of privacy in the commu- nication”: para 1. later in her judgment, abella j. noted a distinction between text messaging and oral communication: “unlike voice communications, text [94] notre cour s’est déjà prononcée sur le carac- tère hybride de la messagerie texte. dans telus, la juge abella a déclaré que la messagerie texte « pré- sente plusieurs caractéristiques de la communication orale traditionnelle : elle se veut un moyen de conver- sation, la transmission du message est généralement instantanée et l’on s’attend à ce que la communi- cation demeure privée » (par 1). plus loin dans ses motifs, la juge abella a relevé une distinction entre 364 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. communications, by their nature, generate a record of the communication which may easily be copied and stored”: para 34. thus text messaging is “an electronic conversation”: para 5. while electronic communications can possess the immediacy and spontaneity of a “simple conversation”, they also inherently generate a permanent1 written record of the communication itself. in his concurring reasons in marakah, rowe j. reached a similar conclusion: digital communication both “creates a record that is beyond our control” and, at the same time, possesses a “conversational quality” that makes it “akin to a digital conversation”: paras 86-87. if duarte’s dichotomy was concerned with documentation, this means that electronic communications occupy both sides of the ledger. they are both the oral conversa- tion and the electronic recording of that conversation. la messagerie texte et les communications orales : « contrairement aux communications orales, les com- munications textuelles — qui sont, de par leur nature, des écrits — génèrent un document qui peut facile- ment être copié et conservé » (par 34). la message- rie texte est donc une « conversation électronique » (par 5). bien qu’elles puissent posséder le caractère immédiat et la spontanéité d’une « simple conversa- tion », les communications électroniques génèrent aussi de par leur nature un relevé écrit permanent1 de la communication elle- même. dans ses motifs concordants dans marakah, le juge rowe a tiré une conclusion similaire : les communications numériques « crée[nt] [  ] un historique qui échappe à notre contrôle » et, parallèlement, possèdent une « qualité de conversation » qui font en sorte qu’elles « s’appa- rentent à une conversation numérique » (par 86-87). si la dichotomie établie dans l’arrêt duarte reposait sur la consignation, il s’ensuit que les communications électroniques jouent sur les deux plans. elles s’en- tendent à la fois de la conversation de vive voix et de l’enregistrement électronique de cette conversation. (1) the significance of creating the recording (1) l’importance de créer l’enregistrement nous- ourselves mêmes [95] there is no doubt that, as karakatsanis j. states, “email and facebook messenger users are not only aware that a permanent written record of their commu- nication exists, they actually create the record them- selves”: para 48. that conversants are aware that their communications are being recorded, and that they knowingly create the record themselves, does not mean that modern electronic communications must be analogized to the “oral conversation” in duarte or destroy any reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications. [95] comme le dit la juge karakatsanis, il ne fait aucun doute que, « [n]on seulement les utilisateurs du courriel et de facebook messenger sont au fait de l’existence d’un relevé écrit permanent de leurs communications, mais ils créent en fait eux- mêmes ce relevé » (par 48). le fait que les interlocuteurs soient conscients que leurs communications sont enregistrées, et qu’ils créent eux- mêmes sciemment le relevé de celles-ci, ne signifie pas que les com- munications électroniques modernes doivent être comparées à la « conversation de vive voix » dont il était question dans duarte ou qu’elles réduisent à néant toute attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée à l’égard de ces communications. 1 while all electronic communications generate a written record of a conversation, not all electronic communications generate a permanent written record, eg, “snapchat”. nonetheless, the general nature of electronic communication remains and must be addressed: “technical differences inherent in new technology should not determine the scope of protection afforded to private communications”: telus, at para 5. 1 si toutes les communications électroniques génèrent un relevé écrit de la conversation, ce ne sont pas toutes les communi- cations électroniques qui génèrent un relevé écrit permanent, p ex, « snapchat ». néanmoins, la nature générale des commu- nications électroniques demeure et il faut en tenir compte : « les différences techniques intrinsèques des nouvelles technologies ne devraient pas déterminer l’étendue de la protection accordée aux communications privées » (telus, par 5). [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 365 in drawing a distinction between oral com- [96] munication and recording, la forest j. cited holmes v. burr, 486 f.2d 55 (1973), at p. 72: ‘“few of us would ever speak freely if we knew that all our words were being captured by machines for later release before an unknown and potentially hostile audience. no one talks to a recorder as he talks to a person”’: duarte, at p 50. adapting duarte to our digital age, it remains the case that no one speaks to a recorder as they would speak to a person. yet people now “speak to recorders” each time they send an electronic message. does this mean that it is no longer objec- tively reasonable to expect that our conversations will remain private, simply because they are now (much of the time) recorded? this court has held in the negative. creating written, electronic records of one’s private communications is a virtual prerequisite to participation in society, and yet “canadians are not required to become digital recluses in order to maintain some semblance of privacy in their lives”: jones, at para 45. despite the capacity of modern technology to record electronic communications, individuals still retain both subjective and objective expectations of privacy in those communications: telus, at para. 32; transcript, at p 59. [96] lorsqu’il a établi une distinction entre la communication orale et l’enregistrement, le juge la forest a cité l’arrêt holmes c. burr, 486 f.2d 55 (1973), p. 72 : [traduction] « peu d’entre nous parleraient franchement si nous savions que tous nos propos sont interceptés par des machines en vue de leur diffusion ultérieure devant un auditoire inconnu et peut- être hostile. personne ne parle à un magnétophone comme il parle à un être hu- main » (duarte, p 50). si j’adapte l’arrêt duarte à l’ère numérique, il demeure que personne ne parle à un magnétophone comme il parle à un être humain. pourtant, de nos jours, les gens « parlent à un ma- gnétophone » chaque fois qu’ils envoient un mes- sage électronique. cela signifie-t-il qu’il n’est plus objectivement raisonnable de s’attendre à ce que nos conversations demeurent privées simplement parce qu’elles sont maintenant (la plupart du temps) enregistrées? notre cour a conclu que la réponse est non. la création de relevés électroniques écrits de ses communications privées est pratiquement une condition à laquelle il faut consentir pour participer à la société, et pourtant, les « canadiens n’ont pas à vivre en reclus du monde numérique afin de pou- voir conserver un semblant de vie privée » (jones, par 45). en dépit du fait que les technologies mo- dernes peuvent enregistrer des communications électroniques, les gens ont encore des attentes, sub- jectives et objectives, au respect de leur vie privée à l’égard de ces communications (telus, par. 32; transcription, p 59). [97] further, awareness that one’s conversation is documented does not necessarily negate the objec- tive reasonableness of the expectation that the state will not access that documentation. the standard is normative, not descriptive. as the honourable renee m. pomerance wrote in “flirting with frankenstein: the battle between privacy and our technological monsters” (2016), 20 can. crim. l. rev. 149, at p. 159: [97] de plus, le fait d’avoir conscience que la con- versation est consignée n’invalide pas nécessairement le caractère objectivement raisonnable de l’attente selon laquelle l’état n’aura pas accès à ces relevés. cette attente est de nature normative, non descriptive. comme l’a écrit la juge renee m. pomerance dans son ouvrage « flirting with frankenstein : the battle between privacy and our technological monsters » (2016), 20 rev. can. dp 149, p. 159 : citizens may be willing to give up civil liberties if they be- lieve that it will make them safer. they may be resigned [to a lack of] privacy for the sake of convenience. they may be resigned to a lack of privacy, having been conditioned to believe that we are already living in a surveillance society. no one of those attitudes should singlehandedly shape our [traduction] les citoyens peuvent être prêts à renon- cer à leurs libertés civiles s’ils croient qu’ils seront ainsi plus en sécurité. peut- être sont- ils résignés [à l’absence] de vie privée pour des raisons de commodité. peut- être sont- ils résignés à l’absence de vie privée parce qu’ils sont conditionnés à croire que nous vivons déjà dans une 366 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. legal approach. rights and freedoms should not be shaped by fear or fatalism. in duarte, the danger inherent in the state’s [98] ability to create electronic recordings of our words at any moment and with no justification at all was that it would lead to a society in which we expected this to be the case. in la forest j.’s view, a soci- ety in which we risk unregulated electronic surveil- lance “every time we ope[n] our mouths” (duarte, at p. 44) is one that no longer has any sense of freedom: duarte; r v. wise, [1992] 1 scr 527, at p. 565, per la forest j. the intervener samuelson- glushko canadian internet policy and public interest clinic discussed “the damage to free expression that would flow from imputing an assumption that one’s inter- locutor may be an undercover state agent making records of the electronic conversation” (if, at p. 9) by referencing this passage by alan westin, who was writing about the early development of computers (privacy and freedom (1967), at p. 349): the danger to privacy and to    liberties in this devel- opment was that individuals who knew that all this in- formation was being collected and stored and lay readily available in machines would never be able to know when it would be used “against them” and for what purposes. this public awareness of potential use would lead to an “increase in behaviour ‘for the record’” and less freedom of action and expression. people will be concerned not only with the fact that they are going “on record,” but also with how that record will “look” to those in authority who examine it. the whole purpose of privacy    is to allow for unguarded, experimental “release” behavior of indi- viduals, and this outlet is just what our dossier- computer system is threatening. société de surveillance. aucune de ces attitudes ne devrait à elle seule dicter notre démarche juridique. les droits et libertés ne doivent pas être définis en fonction de la peur ou du fatalisme. [98] dans duarte, le danger inhérent à la capacité de l’état de créer des enregistrements électroniques de nos propos, n’importe quand et sans aucune justifica- tion, était que la société finisse par s’attendre à ce que l’état agisse ainsi. selon le juge la forest, une société où nous sommes exposés au risque d’une surveillance électronique non réglementée « chaque fois que nous ouvrons la bouche » (duarte, p. 44) est une société qui n’a plus aucun sens de la liberté (duarte; r c. wise, [1992] 1 rcs 527, p. 565, le juge la forest). l’intervenante, la clinique d’intérêt public et de po- litique d’internet du canada samuelson- glushko, a abordé la question de [traduction] « l’atteinte qui serait portée à la liberté d’expression s’il fallait présumer que l’interlocuteur est un agent d’infiltra- tion de l’état qui crée un relevé de la conversation électronique » (mi, p. 9), citant le passage suivant de l’ouvrage d’alan westin, qui porte sur les débuts de l’ordinateur (privacy and freedom (1967), p. 349) : [traduction] le danger que cet essor présentait pour la vie privée et pour les libertés [  ] était que ceux qui savaient que tous ces renseignements étaient recueillis, stockés dans des machines et faciles d’accès, ne pour- raient jamais savoir quand ils seraient utilisés « contre eux » et à quelles fins. cette conscience du public quant à l’utilisation potentielle des renseignements recueillis se traduirait par des « comportements davantage empreints de “retenue” » et par une moins grande liberté d’action et d’expression. les gens se soucieraient non seulement du fait qu’ils sont « enregistrés », mais aussi de la façon dont cet enregistrement serait « perçu » par les autorités qui en prendraient connaissance. l’objectif même de la protec- tion de la vie privée [  ] est de permettre aux gens d’avoir des comportements libérateurs sans contrainte et en toute liberté, et c’est précisément cet exutoire que menace notre système de dossiers informatiques. harlan j. expressed this same sentiment as follows: “authority is hardly required to support the proposition that words would be measured a good deal more care- fully and communication inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being transmitted and transcribed”: white, at pp. 787-89, referenced in duarte, at p 54. le juge harlan a exprimé la même idée comme suit : [traduction] « c’est l’évidence même que l’on pèse- rait bien davantage ses mots et que la communication en serait gênée si l’on soupçonnait que les conversa- tions étaient transmises et transcrites » (white, p. 787- 789, cité dans duarte, p 54). [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 367 [99] fifty years on from white, authority is begin- ning to emerge, and it is corroborating harlan j.’s views. a number of empirical studies have confirmed the “chilling effect” of government surveillance on online behaviour. these studies suggest that state electronic surveillance leads individuals to self- censor their online expression: j w penney, “in- ternet surveillance, regulation, and chilling effects online: a comparative case study” (2017), 6:2 inter- net policy review (online), at p. 22; a. marthews and c. tucker, “the impact of online surveillance on behavior” in d. gray and s e henderson, eds., the cambridge handbook of surveillance law (2017), 437. [100] the consequences of knowing that, at any point and with reference to any of our statements, we will have to contend with a documented record of those statements in the possession of the state, would be no less than the total “annihilat[ion]” (duarte, at p. 44) of our sense of privacy. for this reason, duarte decided that if the state wished to acquire documen- tation of the private thoughts of its citizens, it would require prior judicial authorization. [99] cinquante ans après l’arrêt white, de plus en plus d’auteurs publient des articles à ce sujet qui corroborent l’avis du juge harlan. de nombreuses études empiriques ont confirmé l’« effet paralysant » de la surveillance gouvernementale sur les com- portements en ligne. ces études indiquent que la surveillance électronique par l’état incite les gens à exercer l’autocensure sur leur expression en ligne (j w penney, « internet surveillance, regulation, and chilling effects online  : a comparative case study » (2017), 6:2 internet policy review (en ligne), p. 22; a. marthews et c. tucker, « the impact of online surveillance on behavior » dans d. gray et s e henderson, dir., the cambridge handbook of surveillance law (2017), 437. [100] de savoir qu’à tout moment et pour n’im- porte lequel de nos propos, il nous faudrait composer avec le fait que l’état ait en sa possession des notes écrites de ces propos n’aurait pour conséquence rien de moins que l’« anéantissement » (duarte, p. 44) total de notre sens de la vie privée. c’est pourquoi la cour a décidé, dans l’arrêt duarte, que si l’état voulait prendre connaissance des relevés des pensées privées de ses citoyens, il aurait besoin d’une autori- sation judiciaire préalable. (2) “intended recipient” (2) « destinataire visé » [101] karakatsanis j. states that “it is not reason- able to expect that your messages will be kept pri- vate from the intended recipient”: at para 36. that general proposition does not and cannot apply when the state has secretly set itself up as the intended recipient. it is clear from duarte that in the case of state participant surveillance, the notion of “in- tended recipient” — as well as the characterization of “the person or persons to whom we direct our re- marks” (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 50, citing duarte, p. 47) — is infused with the concept of the right to choose the range of one’s listeners. while in duarte the “intended recipients” of the conversation were the undercover police officer and the informer, mr. duarte retained a reasonable expectation of pri- vacy in the contents of that conversation because the police use of recording technology violated his right not to have to contend with a documented record in the hands of the state. analogously, an individual [101] la juge karakatsanis affirme qu’« il n’est pas raisonnable de s’attendre à ce que le destinataire visé d’un message n’en prenne pas connaissance » (par 36). cette proposition générale ne s’applique pas, et ne peut s’appliquer, lorsque l’état a secrè- tement fait en sorte d’être le destinataire visé. il ressort clairement de l’arrêt duarte que, dans le cas d’une surveillance participative de l’état, la notion de « destinataire visé » — ainsi que de la qualifica- tion de « la personne ou [d]es personnes auxquelles nous [  ] destinons [nos propos] » (motifs de la juge karakatsanis, par. 50, citant duarte, p. 47) — est in- timement liée au droit de choisir ses auditeurs. même si, dans duarte, les « destinataires de la conversa- tion » étaient l’agent d’infiltration et l’indicateur, m. duarte avait toujours une attente raisonnable au respect de sa vie privée à l’égard du contenu de cette conversation, parce que le recours par la police à du matériel d’enregistrement violait son droit de 368 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. engaged in a private, electronic conversation retains the reasonable expectation that the state will only have access to a permanent electronic recording of that private communication if the state agent has sought judicial authorization. normative expecta- tions have not changed. the difference, of course, is that we now use technology that makes the recording itself. [102] i note that this appeal concerns electronic communications and their conscriptive capacity to inherently generate a record of what will often be spontaneous, informal communication. it does not concern the privacy interests in a note, a letter, or other written forms of communication that will turn on their own qualities: karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 45; marakah, at para. 86, per rowe j.; r v. vu, 2013 scc 60, [2013] 3 scr 657, at para 24. ne pas avoir à composer avec le risque que des notes écrites soient entre les mains de l’état. par analogie, la personne qui participe à une conversation élec- tronique privée peut raisonnablement s’attendre à ce que l’état n’ait accès à un enregistrement élec- tronique permanent de cette communication privée que si l’agent de l’état a obtenu une autorisation judiciaire. les attentes normatives n’ont pas changé. la différence, évidemment, c’est que nous utilisons maintenant des technologies qui font elles- mêmes l’enregistrement. [102] je souligne que le présent pourvoi porte sur les communications électroniques et sur la capacité auto- incriminante inhérente à celles-ci de créer un relevé de communications qui seront bien souvent spontanées, informelles. il ne porte pas sur les in- térêts en matière de vie privée à l’égard d’une note, d’une lettre ou d’autres formes de communication, qui ont leurs propres caractéristiques (motifs de la juge karakatsanis, par. 45; marakah, par. 86, le juge rowe; r c. vu, 2013 csc 60, [2013] 3 rcs 657, par 24). (3) quantitative and qualitative distinctions be- tween in- person and electronic state surveil- lance (3) distinctions quantitatives et qualitatives entre la surveillance en personne et la surveillance électronique par l’état [103] two additional comments on the nature of electronic surveillance are in order. first, the “con- versations” contemplated by this court in duarte do not afford a direct comparison to electronic commu- nications today because the in- person conversations with undercover police officers at issue in duarte were not capable of subjecting the public to surrep- titious electronic surveillance on a mass scale. [103] je me dois de faire deux autres observations sur la nature de la surveillance électronique. d’abord, les « conversations » sur lesquelles notre cour s’est penchée dans duarte ne sauraient faire l’objet d’une comparaison directe avec les communications élec- troniques d’aujourd’hui, parce que les conversations de vive voix avec des agents d’infiltration dont il était question dans cette affaire n’étaient pas susceptibles d’exposer le public à une surveillance électronique clandestine à grande échelle. [104] in a free and democratic society, individuals do not expect a significant number of the people with whom they interact to be undercover police officers surveilling them at the officers’ “whim”: duarte, at pp. 44 and 49. while such a scenario is inconceiv- able in in- person undercover operations due to the practical resource constraints of undercover police work, it is perfectly conceivable when it comes to electronic surveillance technologies: “surveillance [104] dans une société libre et démocratique, les gens ne s’attendent pas à ce qu’un grand nombre de personnes avec lesquelles ils interagissent soient des agents d’infiltration de la police qui les sur- veillent « à leur guise » (duarte, p. 44 et 49). si un tel scénario paraît inconcevable dans un contexte d’opération d’infiltration en personne, en raison de contraintes pratiques liées aux ressources dans le cas des activités d’infiltration policière, il devient [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 369 has emerged as the dominant organizing practice of late modernity   , and is used in different technolog- ical guises to monitor and govern assorted categories of people (citizens, motorists, workers, students, consumers, international travelers, military adver- saries, welfare recipients, and various other group- ings)”: k d haggerty, “methodology as a knife fight: the process, politics and paradox of evalu- ating surveillance” (2009), 17 critical crim. 277, at pp. 277-78; see also d. lyon, surveillance after snowden (2015), at p. 47: “the cables and conduits of the internet    make possible mass surveillance as never before”. [105] in part, this is a question of resources. while an in- person undercover operation will usually occur at a 1:1 ratio (one police officer gaining the confi- dence of one target), online surveillance may cover much more ground. a single police officer can con- duct many electronic conversations at once. thus the number of electronic conversations that undercover police officers could be conducting with members of the public at any given time is likely to be greater than the number of conversations that the same po- lice officers could conduct in person. parfaitement concevable dans le cas des technolo- gies de surveillance électronique : [traduction] « la surveillance est devenue la principale activité directrice de la nouvelle modernité [  ], et dif- férents moyens technologiques sont utilisés pour surveiller et gouverner diverses catégories de gens (citoyens, automobilistes, travailleurs, étudiants, consommateurs, voyageurs internationaux, adver- saires militaires, prestataires d’aide sociale et autres groupes) » (k d haggerty, « methodology as a knife fight  : the process, politics and paradox of evaluating surveillance  » (2009), 17 critical crim.  277, p.  277- 278; voir aussi d.  lyon, sur- veillance after snowden (2015), p. 47 : [traduc- tion] « les câbles et les conduites de l’internet [  ] rendent la surveillance de masse possible comme jamais auparavant »). [105] il s’agit, en partie, d’une question de res- sources. alors qu’une opération d’infiltration en personne s’effectue normalement selon un rapport de 1 : 1 (un agent de police qui gagne la confiance d’une cible), la surveillance en ligne peut ratisser beaucoup plus large. un seul agent de police peut mener plusieurs conversations électroniques à la fois. par conséquent, le nombre de conversations électro- niques que pourraient avoir les agents d’infiltration avec des membres du public, à un moment donné, est susceptible d’être plus élevé que le nombre de conversations que ces mêmes agents pourraient avoir en personne. [106] the analogy between an oral conversation and an electronic communication is not only unten- able because of the quantitative increase in surveil- lance capacity when it moves online; there is also a qualitative distinction between electronic surrepti- tious surveillance and in- person surveillance. cst. hobbs could not have been conducting this police work in person. the ability to fabricate alternative identities has never been more possible than it is now. of course, this aspect of electronic commu- nication makes it all the more necessary to police online spaces for criminal activity that thrives on such anonymity. yet this same anonymity allows for a different order of state surveillance in which police officers can more easily create a richly tex- tured, and therefore more believable, false identity [106] l’analogie entre une conversation de vive voix et une communication électronique est inte- nable non seulement à cause de l’augmentation quantitative de la capacité de surveillance lorsqu’il est question de surveillance en ligne, mais aussi en raison de la distinction qualitative qu’il y a entre la surveillance électronique clandestine et la surveil- lance en personne. l’agent hobbs n’aurait pas pu faire ce travail policier en personne. se créer d’autres identités n’a jamais été aussi facile que maintenant. il va de soi qu’à cause de cet aspect de la communi- cation électronique, il est encore plus nécessaire de surveiller le cyberespace en vue de mettre au jour les activités criminelles qui se multiplient en raison de cet anonymat. or, ce même anonymat permet une surveillance par l’état d’un tout autre ordre, 370 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. through which to conduct surveillance left to conduct electronic surveillance at their sole discre- tion — because “when undercover police officers communicate in writing with individuals, there is no ‘search or seizure’” (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 36) — the police “could impersonate an inter- net therapy provider to learn of a person’s addictions or an online dating service to discover an individu- al’s sexual preferences — all for weeks or months on  end”:  if, . criminal lawyers’ association, at para 4. where, as here, the police can pose as a child and gain the trust of other children — or where, for instance, the police can impersonate an internet therapy provider or online dating service through intricately fabricated false identities — the nature of surveillance has changed. our privacy protections must keep pace. [107] in her reasons, karakatsanis j. states that “rogue police undercover investigations” should be appropriately characterized as a threat to the integ- rity of the justice system itself: para 62. she looks to mechanisms such as abuse of process and the entrapment doctrine to redress these types of police tactics: paras 62-63. i agree that police action that “offends our basic values” (rothman v. the queen, [1981] 1 scr 640, at p. 689, per lamer j.) can and should be addressed in a number of ways; this is for the good. however, when that state action also intrudes on a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is intended to be addressed, inter alia, via s. 8 of the charter. what is at issue in this appeal is not only the actions of one officer, but also the general rule that should govern how the state may gain access to private communications using current technolo- gies. in my view, placing communications outside s. 8 because the state recipient can now obtain a record of the conversation simply by engaging in it, undermines the purpose of privacy rights and upsets the careful balance between the ability of the state alors que les policiers peuvent créer plus facile- ment de fausses identités, très élaborées, donc plus crédibles, sous le couvert desquelles ils exercent leur surveillance. les policiers ont toute discrétion pour exercer une surveillance électronique — vu que « lorsque des agents d’infiltration de la police communiquent par écrit avec des individus, il n’y a aucune “fouill[e]” ou “saisi[e]” » (motifs de la juge karakatsanis, par. 36) — de sorte qu’ils [traduc- tion] « pourraient se faire passer pour un fournis- seur de services thérapeutiques en ligne en vue de connaître les dépendances d’une personne, ou en- core pour un fournisseur de services de rencontre en ligne en vue de découvrir les préférences sexuelles d’une personne — et ce, pendant des semaines ou des mois » (mi,. criminal lawyers’ association, par 4). lorsque, comme en l’espèce, un policier peut se faire passer pour un enfant et gagner la confiance d’autres enfants — ou lorsque, par exemple, un po- licier peut prétendre être un fournisseur de services thérapeutiques ou de services de rencontre en ligne sous le couvert d’une fausse identité très élaborée — c’est que la nature de la surveillance a changé. nos protections en matière de vie privée doivent évoluer au même rythme. [107] dans ses motifs, la juge karakatsanis affirme que « [l]a menace d’opérations d’infiltration menées par des policiers sans scrupules » s’apparente à une menace à l’intégrité du système de justice en tant que tel (par 62). elle s’intéresse à des mécanismes comme l’abus de procédure et la doctrine de la pro- vocation policière afin que les tactiques policières de ce type soient corrigées (par 62-63). je suis d’ac- cord pour dire que les mesures policières qui « en- frei[gnent] nos valeurs fondamentales » (rothman c. la reine, [1981] 1 rcs 640, p. 689, le juge lamer) peuvent et doivent être corrigées de diverses façons, pour le bien de tous. cependant, lorsque de telles actions de l’état vont aussi à l’encontre d’une attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée, elles doivent être examinées, notamment, au regard de l’art. 8 de la charte. en l’espèce, ce ne sont pas seulement les actions d’un policier qui sont en litige, mais aussi la règle générale qui devrait régir la façon dont l’état peut avoir accès aux communications privées à l’aide des technologies actuelles. à mon avis, exclure les communications de la portée de l’art. 8 parce que [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 371 to investigate crime and the rights of individuals to private areas of expression. [108] duarte was concerned about the privacy implications of the state acquiring permanent, elec- tronic recordings of private communications at its sole discretion. electronic communications are con- versations that occur on platforms that inherently have the capacity to generate permanent electronic recordings. if the state wishes to acquire the doc- umentation of those communications, it requires authorization. l’état destinataire peut maintenant obtenir un relevé de la conversation simplement en y prenant part nuit à l’objet des droits à la vie privée, et perturbe le juste équilibre entre la capacité de l’état d’enquêter sur des crimes et les droits des personnes de disposer d’espaces privés pour s’exprimer. [108] dans l’arrêt duarte, il était question des conséquences sur la vie privée du fait que l’état, à son entière discrétion, avait pris connaissance d’en- registrements électroniques permanents de commu- nications privées. les communications électroniques s’entendent des conversations qui ont lieu sur des plateformes pouvant, de par leur nature, créer des enregistrements électroniques permanents. si l’état souhaite prendre connaissance du relevé de ces com- munications, il doit obtenir une autorisation. d the question of relationship d la question de la relation [109] my colleague brown j. decides this appeal on the basis that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy where the state conducts a sting operation and knows from the outset that an adult accused is communicating with a child that he or she does not know: paras 22-3. while brown j. ties his conclu- sion to the sting context, his reasoning would apply whenever its “crucial” factors are present: that the accused “was communicating with someone he be- lieved to be a child, who was a stranger to him”: para. 22 (emphasis deleted). [109] mon collègue le juge brown fonde sa décision dans le présent pourvoi sur le fait qu’il n’y a pas d’at- tente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée lorsque l’état réalise une opération d’infiltration et qu’il sait dès le départ que l’adulte accusé communique avec un enfant qu’il ne connaît pas (par 22-23). alors que la conclusion du juge brown se rattache au contexte d’infiltration, son raisonnement s’appliquerait chaque fois que les facteurs « crucia[ux] » qu’il a établis sont présents, c’est-à-dire que l’accusé « communiquait avec une personne qu’il croyait être une enfant et qui était une inconnue pour lui » (par. 22 (italique omis)). [110] with respect, i do not accept that this new category of “relationship” is needed to limit when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. indeed, this concept of “relationship” is built upon two ideas that have already been rejected by this court. first, the concept of “relationship” is really a proxy for “control” and is based in risk analysis reasoning that this court has rejected. second, “relationship” is also used to target illegal activity, and is not therefore content neutral. over and above these conflicts with s. 8 jurisprudence, at the heart of this reasoning is the normative position that a relationship between an adult and a child who is a stranger is not a relation- ship worthy of s. 8’s protection: brown j.’s reasons, at para 26. this position seeks to put courts in the [110] soit dit en tout respect, je ne peux accepter que cette nouvelle catégorie de « relation » est né- cessaire pour limiter les situations où il y a attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée. de fait, ce concept de « relation » repose sur deux idées qui ont déjà été rejetées par notre cour d’abord, le concept de « relation » est en fait un indicateur de « contrôle » et est fondé sur le raisonnement relatif à l’analyse de risques que notre cour a rejeté. ensuite, la « relation » est aussi utilisée pour cibler les activi- tés illégales, et n’est donc pas neutre sur le plan du contenu. au- delà de ces conflits avec la jurisprudence portant sur l’art. 8, il y a, au cœur de ce raisonnement, la position normative selon laquelle une relation entre un adulte et un enfant qui lui est inconnu n’est pas 372 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. business of evaluating the canadian public’s personal relationships with a view to deciding which among them deserve charter protection under s.  8, and which do not. the concern here is not only that this has never been done before — it is that, as a matter of principle in the s. 8 context, it should not be done at all. judicial (dis)approbation of an accused’s lifestyle has no place in the s. 8 privacy analysis. [111] the court should not create charter-free zones in certain people’s private, electronic commu- nications on the basis that they might be criminals whose relationships are not socially valuable. the charter expressly grants s. 8 protections to “every- one”. members of society have a reasonable expec- tation that their private, electronic communications will not be acquired by the state at its sole discretion. [112] finally, a finding of reasonable expecta- tion of privacy in a particular thing or area does not mean that the state is forbidden from conducting a search — it simply means that the police action must be supported by a power or authorization that respects s. 8 of the charter. in my view, the sce- nario presented of a sting context in which the state pretends to be a child and communicates with those seeking to sexualize children is precisely the type of circumstance in which the state could and should obtain judicial authorization to surveil private, elec- tronic communications. digne de jouir de la protection conférée par l’art. 8 (voir le par. 26 des motifs du juge brown). cette position vise à imposer aux tribunaux la tâche d’éva- luer les relations personnelles des canadiens afin de décider lesquelles sont dignes de jouir de la protection conférée par l’art. 8 de la charte, et lesquelles ne le sont pas. le point qui est préoccupant ici est que non seulement cela ne s’est encore jamais fait, mais que par principe dans le contexte de l’art. 8, cela ne devrait pas se faire du tout. l’approbation (ou la dé- sapprobation) par les tribunaux du mode de vie d’un accusé n’a pas sa place dans le cadre d’une analyse du droit à la vie privée au regard de l’art 8. [111] la cour ne devrait pas créer de zones sous- traites à l’application de la charte à l’égard de cer- taines communications électroniques privées des gens au motif qu’ils sont peut- être des criminels dont les relations ne sont pas socialement valables. la charte confère expressément à « chacun » les protections garanties à l’art 8. les membres de la société s’attendent raisonnablement à ce que l’état ne prenne pas connaissance, à son entière discrétion, de leurs communications électroniques privées. [112] enfin, la conclusion qu’il y a attente raison- nable au respect de la vie privée à l’égard d’une chose ou d’un lieu précis ne signifie pas qu’il est interdit à l’état d’effectuer une fouille; cela signifie simplement que les actions des policiers doivent être validées par un pouvoir ou une autorisation qui respecte l’art. 8 de la charte. à mon avis, le scénario présenté, soit celui où l’état prétend, dans un contexte d’infiltration, être un enfant et communique avec des gens qui cherchent à sexualiser des enfants, est précisément le type de situation dans laquelle l’état pourrait et devrait ob- tenir une autorisation judiciaire pour surveiller des communications électroniques privées. (1) relationship as a proxy for control (1) la relation comme indicateur de contrôle [113] my colleague brown j. states that it is not reasonable for an adult to expect privacy when com- municating with a vulnerable child who is a stranger because hoping that a complete stranger will keep one’s communications private is a “gamble” that cannot ground an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy: see brown j.’s reasons, at paras 22-23. in [113] mon collègue le juge brown affirme qu’il n’est pas raisonnable qu’un adulte s’attende au res- pect de sa vie privée lorsqu’il communique avec un enfant vulnérable qui lui est inconnu parce qu’espérer qu’une personne qu’on ne connaît pas du tout gardera les communications secrètes est un « risque » qui ne peut être à l’origine d’une attente raisonnable au [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 373 other words, mr. mills did not have a reasonable ex- pectation of privacy from warrantless, surreptitious state electronic surveillance because he did not have sufficient control over what his co- conversant would do with his communications. [114] with respect, this position reintroduces the “loss of control due to risk of disclosure” analysis that this court recently rejected in marakah. a rea- sonable expectation of privacy analysis concerns state intrusion. the risk that one’s co- conversant may disclose a private communication does not affect the reasonableness of the expectation that the state, in the absence of such disclosure, will not intrude upon that private communication. for this reason, the theory of loss of control due to risk of disclosure is a type of risk analysis that this court has repeatedly said should not form part of the s. 8 analysis: duarte, at p. 44; wong, at pp. 45-46; wise, at pp. 563-64, per la forest j., dissenting but not on this point; r v. gomboc, 2010 scc 55, [2010] 3 scr 211, at para. 34, per deschamps j., concurring; cole, at para. 58; marakah, at para. 45; reeves, at para. 50; see also ward, at para. 77; r v. craig, 2016 bcca 154, 335 ccc (3d) 28, at para 108. [115] this court’s rejection of risk analysis has never hinged on the nature of the relationship between the parties. in marakah, for instance, the majority did not analyze the relationship between mr. winchester and mr marakah. this is because it was not relevant to the question of whether mr. marakah had a rea- sonable expectation that the state would not access his text messages from a recipient’s device without a warrant. thus marakah’s rejection of risk analy- sis, at para. 40, was a statement of general principle applicable to all reasonable expectation of privacy assessments of electronic communications, including the assessment to be undertaken in the case at bar: respect de la vie privée (voir les par. 22-23 des motifs du juge brown). autrement dit, m. mills ne pouvait raisonnablement s’attendre à ce que sa vie privée échappe à la surveillance électronique clandestine et sans mandat par l’état parce qu’il n’exerçait pas un contrôle suffisant sur ce que son interlocuteur ferait avec ces communications. [114] soit dit en tout respect, cette position réin- troduit l’analyse de la « perte de contrôle causée par un risque de divulgation » que notre cour a récem- ment rejetée dans marakah. l’analyse relative à une attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée porte sur l’intrusion de l’état. le risque qu’un interlocuteur divulgue une communication privée n’a pas d’inci- dence sur le caractère raisonnable de l’attente selon laquelle l’état, s’il n’y a pas eu de telle divulgation, ne s’immiscera pas dans cette communication privée. pour cette raison, la théorie de la perte de contrôle causée par un risque de divulgation constitue le genre d’analyse du risque qui, comme l’a maintes fois ré- pété notre cour, ne devrait pas faire partie de l’ana- lyse fondée sur l’art. 8 (duarte, p. 44; wong, p. 45-46; wise, p. 563- 564, le juge la forest, dissident, mais pas sur ce point; r c. gomboc, 2010 csc 55, [2010] 3 rcs 211, par. 34, la juge deschamps, dans ses motifs concordants; cole, par. 58; marakah, par. 45; reeves, par. 50; voir aussi ward, par. 77; r c. craig, 2016 bcca 154, 335 ccc (3d) 28, par 108). [115] le rejet de l’analyse du risque par notre cour n’a jamais été lié à la nature de la relation entre les parties. dans marakah, par exemple, les juges majoritaires n’ont pas analysé la relation entre mm. winchester et marakah, parce que cela n’était pas utile quant à la question de savoir si m. marakah pouvait raisonnablement s’attendre à ce que l’état n’ait pas accès, sans mandat, à ses messages textes à partir de l’appareil d’un destinataire. par consé- quent, le rejet dans marakah de l’analyse du risque, au par. 40, était un énoncé de principe général ap- plicable à tous les examens concernant les attentes raisonnables au respect de la vie privée à l’égard de communications électroniques, y compris l’examen devant être entrepris dans l’affaire qui nous occupe : the crown argues that mr. marakah lost all control over the electronic conversation with mr.  winchester la couronne prétend que m. marakah a perdu tout con- trôle sur la conversation électronique avec m. winchester 374 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. because mr. winchester could have disclosed it to third parties. however, the risk that recipients can disclose the text messages they receive does not change the analysis: duarte, at pp. 44 and 51; cole, at para 58. to accept the risk that a co- conversationalist could disclose an electronic conversation is not to accept the risk of a different order that the state will intrude upon an electronic conversation absent such disclosure. “[t]he regulation of electronic surveillance protects us from a risk of a different order, ie, not the risk that someone will repeat our words but the much more insidious danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words”: duarte, at p 44. therefore, the risk that a re- cipient could disclose an electronic conversation does not negate a reasonable expectation of privacy in an electronic conversation. [underlining added.] [116] the focus of a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis is not on whether the party to whom one has communicated is likely to go to the po- lice — “[n]o set of laws could immunize us from that risk”: duarte, at p 44 rather, the focus is on whether, absent such disclosure, it is reasonable to expect that the police will not intrude on those com- munications without a warrant or some other form of authorization. parce que ce dernier aurait pu la divulguer à des tiers. cependant, le risque que des destinataires divulguent les messages textes qu’ils reçoivent ne change rien à l’analyse (duarte, p. 44 et 51; cole, par 58). accepter le risque qu’un interlocuteur divulgue une conversation électronique ne revient pas à accepter le risque différent que l’état s’immisce dans une conversation électronique non divulguée. « la réglementation de la surveillance électronique nous protège contre un risque différent  : non plus le risque que quelqu’un répète nos propos, mais le danger bien plus insidieux qu’il y a à permettre que l’état, à son entière discrétion, enregistre et transmette nos propos » (duarte, p 44). en conséquence, le risque qu’un destinataire divulgue une conversation électro- nique n’exclut pas une attente raisonnable en matière de respect de la vie privée à l’égard de cette conversation. [je souligne.] [116] l’analyse relative à l’attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée est axée non pas sur la ques- tion de savoir si la partie avec laquelle une personne a communiqué est susceptible d’aller voir la police — « [a]ucune législation ne pourrait nous mettre à l’abri de ce risque » (duarte, p 44). elle est plutôt axée sur la question de savoir si, faute d’une telle divulgation, il est raisonnable de s’attendre à ce que la police ne s’immisce pas dans ces communications sans mandat ou autre forme d’autorisation. (2) relationship as a means of targeting illegal- (2) la relation comme moyen de cibler les actes ity illégaux [117] my colleague brown j. concludes that be- cause this court has pronounced on the vulnerability of children, the capacity of the internet to facilitate sexual crimes against children, and the need to pro- tect children from sexual exploitation, it follows that “adults cannot reasonably expect privacy online with children they do not know”: para 23. with the greatest of respect, i cannot read this conclusion as anything other than the targeting of illegal activity and the denial of privacy rights to individuals who, it may be believed, are most likely to engage in that type of illegal activity. the centrality of the sting context in my colleague’s analysis only highlights this further: a sting operation — by definition — targets illegal activity. as such, the conclusion that “adults cannot reasonably expect privacy online with children they do not know” is contrary to the core [117] mon collègue le juge brown conclut qu’étant donné que notre cour s’est prononcée sur la vul- nérabilité des enfants, sur le fait qu’internet puisse faciliter la commission de crimes sexuels contre les enfants et sur la nécessité de protéger les enfants contre l’exploitation sexuelle, il s’ensuit que « les adultes ne peuvent pas raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de leur vie privée dans leurs communica- tions en ligne avec des enfants qu’ils ne connaissent pas » (par 23). soit dit avec le plus grand respect, je ne peux interpréter cette conclusion autrement que comme visant les activités illégales et privant des droits à la vie privée les personnes qui, pour- rait-on croire, sont les plus susceptibles de prendre part à ce type d’activité illégale. le rôle central que joue le contexte de l’opération d’infiltration dans l’analyse de mon collègue ne fait qu’accentuer ce [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 375 principle of content neutrality at the heart of this court’s s. 8 jurisprudence. [118] under s. 8, the fact that an individual may be engaged in criminal behaviour online does not affect the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. this court has consistently said that “[t]he nature of the privacy interest does not depend on whether, in the particular case, privacy shelters legal or illegal activity. the analysis turns on the privacy of the area or the thing being searched and the impact of the search on its target, not the legal or illegal nature of the items sought”: spencer, at para. 36; hunter, at p. 160; wong, at pp. 49-50; r v. am, 2008 scc 19, [2008] 1 scr 569, at para. 72; patrick, at para. 32; marakah, at para 48. for this reason, a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis must be framed in “broad and neutral terms”: wong, at p 50. [119] before this court, the crown acknowledges that the majority in marakah held that a reasona- ble expectation of privacy analysis must be content neutral. however, the crown urges this court to de- part from its content neutral approach in all cases of electronic communications “that constitute a crime against the recipient”: rf, at para 56. constat : une opération d’infiltration — par défini- tion — vise des activités illégales. par conséquent, la conclusion selon laquelle « les adultes ne peuvent pas raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de leur vie privée dans leurs communications en ligne avec des enfants qu’ils ne connaissent pas » est contraire au principe fondamental de la neutralité de contenu qui est au cœur de la jurisprudence relative à l’art. 8 de notre cour. [118] pour l’application de l’art. 8, le fait qu’une personne puisse adopter un comportement crimi- nel en ligne ne change pas l’analyse de l’attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée. notre cour a affirmé de façon constante que « [l]a nature de l’intérêt en matière de vie privée ne dépend pas de la question de savoir si, dans un cas particulier, le droit à la vie privée masque une activité légale ou une activité illégale. en effet, l’analyse porte sur le ca- ractère privé du lieu ou de l’objet visé par la fouille ou la perquisition ainsi que sur les conséquences de cette dernière pour la personne qui en fait l’objet, et non sur la nature légale ou illégale de la chose recherchée  »  (spencer, par.  36; hunter, p.  160; wong, p. 49-50; r c. am, 2008 csc 19, [2008] 1 rcs 569, par. 72; patrick, par. 32; marakah, par 48). pour cette raison, l’analyse relative à l’at- tente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée doit se faire « en termes plus généraux et plus neutres » (wong, p 50). [119] devant notre cour, la couronne reconnaît que, dans l’arrêt marakah, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que l’analyse relative à l’attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée doit être neutre sur le plan du contenu. elle a cependant demandé à la cour d’écarter cette approche dans tous les cas où les com- munications électroniques [traduction] « consti- tuent un acte criminel visant le destinataire » (mi, par. 56) [120] by stating that “adults cannot reasonably ex- pect privacy online with children they do not know,” brown j. is effectively granting the crown’s request to find a “limited exception” (rf, at para. 50) to this court’s content neutral analysis. with respect, there is no reason to depart from well- established principle and recent precedent in this case. this is [120] en affirmant que « les adultes ne peuvent pas raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de leur vie privée dans leurs communications en ligne avec des enfants qu’ils ne connaissent pas », le juge brown accède dans les faits à la demande de la couronne de conclure qu’une « exception limitée » (mi, par. 50) s’applique à l’analyse neutre sur le plan du contenu 376 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. not the first time that the court has been called upon to develop privacy law in the context of digital and/or internet- based sexual crimes involving minors: see, eg,. cole, spencer, and reeves. this court did not see fit to displace its content neutral analysis in those cases, and it is no more appropriate to do so here. [121] the standard reasoning underpinning the importance of a content neutral analysis is that justi- fying a search based on the illegal content discovered during that search undermines the system of prior judicial authorization meant to prevent unjustified searches before they occur: see hunter, at p 160. brown j. seeks to allay that concern by targeting only those individuals who, according to my colleague, deserve to be searched because their relationships are not ones that our society would wish to shield from state scrutiny — in this case, adults who communi- cate online with children they do not know. [122] this approach assumes that communications between adults and children who do not know each other will be criminal in nature. in reality, this is not an inevitability. the broad category of “relation- ships between adults and children who are unknown to them” encompasses informal, vitally- important educational relationships that can arise in online spaces. this wide net is therefore overbroad and would capture an array of non- criminal communica- tions: for example, professionals who communicate with youth to provide career advice, or adults who may be able to offer support to youth struggling with addiction, sexual identity or bullying because they have had similar life experiences. an adult sharing their own experiences, in the course of a private, electronic communication between strangers could make all the difference in a young person’s life. if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such communications because an adult is in contact with qu’utilise notre cour. en toute déférence, rien ne justifie en l’espèce de déroger à un principe bien établi et à la jurisprudence récente. ce n’est pas la première fois que la cour est appelée à élaborer des règles de droit en matière de respect de la vie privée dans le contexte des crimes sexuels commis à l’endroit de mineurs sur internet ou à l’aide de la technologie numérique (voir, p ex, cole,. spencer et reeves). la cour n’a pas jugé bon d’écarter l’ana- lyse neutre sur le plan du contenu dans ces affaires, et il ne convient pas davantage qu’elle le fasse en l’espèce. [121] selon le raisonnement habituel qui sous- tend l’importance d’une analyse neutre sur le plan du contenu, la justification d’une fouille en fonction du contenu illégal découvert lors de cette fouille mine le système d’autorisation judiciaire préalable visant à empêcher les fouilles non justifiées avant qu’elles n’aient lieu (voir hunter, p 160). le juge brown cherche à dissiper cette préoccupation en ciblant seu- lement les personnes qui, selon lui, méritent d’être fouillées parce que leurs relations ne sont pas de celles que notre société souhaiterait protéger d’un examen par l’état — en l’espèce, les adultes qui communiquent en ligne avec des enfants qu’ils ne connaissent pas. [122] cette approche part du principe que les communications entre des adultes et des enfants qui ne se connaissent pas sont de nature crimi- nelle. en réalité, cela n’est pas inévitable. la ca- tégorie générale des « relations entre des adultes et des enfants qui leur sont inconnus  » englobe les relations pédagogiques informelles et d’une importance capitale qui peuvent se créer dans le cyberespace. cette large portée est donc excessive et comprendrait tout un éventail de communica- tions non criminelles  : par exemple, les profes- sionnels qui communiquent avec des jeunes pour leur donner des conseils en matière de carrière, ou les adultes qui, parce qu’ils ont vécu des expé- riences semblables, pourraient fournir du soutien aux jeunes qui sont aux prises avec une dépen- dance, qui ont des questionnements au sujet de leur identité sexuelle ou qui vivent de l’intimidation. un adulte qui fait part à un jeune de sa propre [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 377 an unknown child, then the state is permitted to listen in and record without the need for any regulation, authorization or limits. content neutrality was devel- oped to ensure that such unjustified state intrusions into privacy would not occur. in my view, and following binnie j. in am, [123] the position that “adults cannot reasonably expect privacy online with children they do not know” shifts the analysis from a “reasonable” expectation of pri- vacy to a “legitimate” expectation of privacy. the view that some relationships are a priori criminal and therefore do not legitimately attract an expectation of privacy both assumes criminality where there may be none, and assumes that there can be no reason- able privacy interests in illegal communications. both of these assumptions are incorrect: am, at paras 69-73. [124] finally, as i discuss in further detail later in these reasons, the police in the case at bar engaged in unregulated online surveillance of an unknown number of youth who believed they were speaking to someone their own age. the facts of this case, there- fore, do not illustrate the scenario that my colleague envisions — a scenario in which only criminals are denied privacy protection. expérience, lors de communications électroniques privées entre étrangers, pourrait faire toute une différence dans la vie de ce jeune. s’il n’y a pas d’attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée à l’égard de telles communications parce qu’un adulte communique avec un enfant qui lui est in- connu, l’état pourrait alors écouter et enregistrer les communications sans que cette surveillance soit réglementée ou limitée, et sans que l’état ait besoin d’une autorisation pour ce faire. le principe de la neutralité du contenu a été élaboré pour faire en sorte que de telles atteintes injustifiées de l’état à la vie privée ne se produisent pas. [123] à mon avis, et conformément au raisonne- ment du juge binnie dans am, la position voulant que « les adultes ne peuvent pas raisonnablement s’attendre au respect de leur vie privée dans leurs communications en ligne avec des enfants qu’ils ne connaissent pas » fait que l’analyse se détourne d’une attente « raisonnable » au respect de la vie privée au profit d’une attente « légitime » au res- pect de la vie privée. l’opinion selon laquelle cer- taines relations sont à première vue criminelles et ne suscitent donc pas légitimement d’attente au respect de la vie privée suppose à la fois qu’il y a criminalité alors qu’il n’y en a peut- être pas, et qu’il ne peut y avoir aucun droit raisonnable au res- pect de la vie privée à l’égard des communications illégales ces deux postulats sont erronés  (am, par 69-73). [124] enfin, comme je l’explique en détail plus loin dans les présents motifs, la police a procédé, dans le cas qui nous occupe, à une surveillance en ligne non réglementée d’un nombre inconnu de jeunes qui croyaient parler à une personne de leur âge par conséquent, les faits de l’espèce ne dé- peignent pas le scénario qu’évoque mon collègue — scénario où seuls les criminels sont privés de la protection de leur vie privée. [125] remember that the issue is not whether a child who has been victimized can go to the police with an online communication received by that child. rather, the issue is whether the state can pretend to be a child in private online communications at il faut garder à l’esprit que la question n’est [125] pas de savoir si un enfant qui a été victime peut aller voir la police pour lui montrer une commu- nication en ligne qu’il a reçue. il s’agit plutôt de savoir si l’état peut prétendre être un enfant dans 378 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. its sole discretion and absent any regulation. in my view, it should not be free to do so. des communications privées en ligne, à son entière discrétion et sans qu’une telle démarche soit régle- mentée. à mon avis, l’état ne devrait pas être libre de le faire. (3) courts should not be in the business of de- termining which personal relationships fall within section 8 (3) les tribunaux ne devraient pas avoir la tâche de décider quelles relations personnelles sont visées par l’art. 8 de la charte [126] beyond my concerns about content neutral- ity, i would also caution that the normative position that “adults cannot reasonably expect privacy online with children they do not know” asks courts to en- gage in an unnecessary and unprincipled valuation of personal relationships when this factor is irrelevant to the s. 8 inquiry. further, even if assessing personal relationships to determine which of them deserve to be protected from warrantless state scrutiny did accord with the s. 8 inquiry, courts are ill- equipped to conduct this assessment. casting suspicion on an entire category of human relationship not only stig- matizes that relationship — it exposes meaningful and socially valuable communication to unregulated state electronic surveillance. for all of these reasons, in my view, courts should not use s. 8 to allow the state into certain personal relationships which are seen as unworthy of charter protection. [126] au- delà de mes préoccupations concernant la neutralité du contenu, je signale aussi que la position normative voulant que « les adultes ne peuvent pas rai- sonnablement s’attendre au respect de leur vie privée dans leurs communications en ligne avec des enfants qu’ils ne connaissent pas » exige que les tribunaux procèdent à une évaluation inutile et non fondée sur des principes des relations personnelles alors que ce facteur n’est pas utile pour l’analyse fondée sur l’art 8. de plus, même si l’évaluation des relations personnelles par les tribunaux pour décider lesquelles sont dignes d’être protégées contre un examen sans mandat de l’état concorde avec l’analyse fondée sur l’art. 8, les tribunaux sont mal outillés pour réaliser une telle éva- luation. soulever des doutes au sujet d’une catégorie entière de relations humaines ne fait pas que stigmati- ser de telles relations; cela expose aussi des communi- cations utiles et socialement valables à une surveillance électronique par l’état, qui n’est pas réglementée. pour toutes ces raisons, je suis d’avis que les tribunaux ne devraient pas recourir à l’art. 8 pour permettre à l’état de s’immiscer dans certaines relations personnelles qui sont considérées comme n’étant pas dignes de jouir de la protection conférée par la charte. i say this understanding that as the majority [127] of this court stated in patrick, “[p]rivacy analysis is laden with value judgments which are made from the independent perspective of the reasonable and informed person who is concerned about the long- term consequences of government action for the protection of privacy”: para 14. yet the necessity of conducting “value judgments” does not permit courts to engage in a free- wheeling evaluation of accused persons and their relationships. rather, the charter has tasked courts with making value judgments that relate to the objects of the s. 8 inquiry itself. these objects are “the privacy of the area or thing being searched and the potential impact of the search on [127] je dis cela tout en reconnaissant que les juges majoritaires de notre cour ont affirmé dans patrick que « [l]’analyse du droit au respect de la vie privée abonde en jugements de valeur énoncés du point de vue indépendant de la personne raisonnable et bien informée, qui se soucie des conséquences à long terme des actions gouvernementales sur la protec- tion du droit au respect de la vie privée » (par 14). cependant, la nécessité d’effectuer des « jugements de valeur » ne permet pas aux tribunaux de procé- der à une évaluation libre de toute contrainte des personnes accusées et de leurs relations. la charte a plutôt eu pour effet d’obliger les tribunaux à faire des jugements de valeur se rapportant aux objets de [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 379 the person being searched”: patrick, at para 32. on this basis, this court has assessed whether members of society can expect privacy in their backpacks in school (am); in their text message communications, be that in a search incident to arrest (r v. fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621) or on a recipi- ent’s device (marakah); in computers in their own home (vu; reeves); in a car that they do not own (r. v. belnavis, [1997] 3 scr 341); and in the relative distribution of heat over the surface of their home (tessling). [128] the s. 8 inquiry is not, and never has been, focused on whether a relationship between two non- state actors is worthy of constitutional protection. for example, r v. dyment, [1988] 2 scr 417, did not concern relationships. the privacy invasion in dyment was “the use of a person’s body with- out his consent to obtain information about him”: pp 431-32. [129] nor is the value of a personal relationship an appropriate object or aspect of a s. 8 inquiry. parlia- ment has expressly extended s. 8 protection to “every- one”: “everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” respectfully, it is not the role of the courts to evaluate personal rela- tionships with a view to denying s. 8 charter protec- tion to certain classes of people. rather, as stewards of the charter, courts “provide what is often the only effective shelter for individuals and unpopular minorities from the shifting winds of public pas- sion”’: r v. collins, [1987] 1 scr 265, at p. 282, citing d. gibson, the law of the charter: general principles (1986), at p 246. l’analyse relative à l’art. 8 elle- même. ces objets sont « le caractère privé du lieu ou de l’objet visé par la fouille, ainsi que [  ] les conséquences potentielles de la fouille pour la personne qui en fait l’objet » (patrick, par 32). sur ce fondement, notre cour s’est demandé si les membres de la société peuvent s’at- tendre au respect de leur vie privée à l’égard de leurs sacs à dos à l’école (am); de leurs communications par message texte, que ce soit dans le cadre d’une fouille accessoire à une arrestation (r c. fearon, 2014 csc 77, [2014] 3 rcs 621) ou dans l’appareil du destinataire (marakah); de leur ordinateur dans leur propre maison (vu; reeves); d’une voiture dont ils ne sont pas propriétaires (r c. belnavis, [1997] 3 rcs 341); et de la distribution relative de la cha- leur sur la surface de leur résidence (tessling). [128] l’analyse relative à l’art. 8 n’est pas, et n’a jamais été, axée sur la question de savoir si une re- lation entre deux personnes qui n’agissent pas au nom de l’état est digne de jouir de la protection constitutionnelle. par exemple, l’arrêt r c. dyment, [1988] 2 rcs 417, ne portait pas sur les relations. dans cette affaire, l’atteinte à la vie privée consistait en « l’utilisation du corps d’une personne, sans son consentement, en vue d’obtenir des renseignements à son sujet » (p 431). [129] la valeur d’une relation personnelle n’est pas non plus un objet ou un aspect pertinent d’une analyse fondée sur l’art 8. le législateur a expres- sément prévu que la protection conférée par l’art. 8 s’applique à « chacun » : « chacun a droit à la protec- tion contre les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les saisies abusives. » soit dit en tout respect, ce n’est pas le rôle des tribunaux d’évaluer les relations personnelles en vue de priver certaines catégories de personnes de la protection que confère l’art. 8 de la charte. en fait, en tant que protecteurs de la charte, les tribunaux « constituent souvent la seule protection efficace des minorités impopulaires et des individus contre les revirements de la passion publique » (r c. collins, [1987] 1 rcs 265, p. 282, citant d. gibson, the law of the charter  : general principles (1986), p 246). [130] moreover, carving out privacy- free zones for particular relationships will expose socially [130] de plus, le fait de créer des zones soustraites au droit à la vie privée pour des relations précises 380 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. meaningful communications to unregulated state surveillance. as detailed above, there are many com- munications that would be captured in the category of “adults who communicate with children who are unknown to them” that are worthy of s. 8’s protection. [131] for all of these reasons, a new turn in our s. 8 jurisprudence that looks to the personal relationships between parties as a dispositive means of denying or granting privacy rights conflicts with the purpose of s 8. it effectively sanctions the unjustified state intrusion into swaths of all individuals’ private lives in the hopes of capturing some illegal communica- tions. this runs counter to this country’s decision that private communications are to remain private, unless the state has authorization to search them. exposera des communications socialement valables à la surveillance non réglementée de l’état. comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, de nombreuses communications dignes de jouir de la protection conférée par l’art. 8 seraient visées par la catégorie des « adultes qui com- muniquent avec des enfants qui leur sont inconnus ». [131] pour toutes ces raisons, un virage dans notre jurisprudence relative à l’art. 8 qui obligerait les tribunaux à se pencher sur les relations personnelles entre les parties afin qu’ils décident si les droits au respect de la vie privée doivent être respectés ou refusés est en conflit avec l’objet de l’art 8. un tel virage sanctionne dans les faits l’intrusion injustifiée de l’état dans de grands pans de la vie privée de toute personne en vue d’obtenir quelques communications illégales. cette approche est contraire à la décision qu’a prise notre pays, soit que les communications privées doivent demeurer privées, sauf si l’état a l’autorisation de procéder à une fouille. (4) conclusion on the question of relationship (4) conclusion sur la question de la relation [132] this court has consistently rejected the risk analysis approach, and instead conducts content neu- tral s. 8 analyses by examining the state conduct at issue. the question to be answered when conducting a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in the case at bar is not whether adults who communicate online with underage strangers during alias- based sting operations have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their private, electronic communications. rather, it is whether members of society have a rea- sonable expectation that their private, electronic com- munications will not be acquired by the state at its sole discretion: see patrick, at para 32. [132] notre cour a toujours rejeté d’adopter la mé- thode d’analyse fondée sur le risque, et effectue plu- tôt des analyses fondées sur l’art. 8 qui sont neutres sur le plan du contenu en examinant la conduite de l’état en question. dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, la question à laquelle il faut répondre lorsqu’on pro- cède à l’analyse de l’attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée n’est pas de savoir si les adultes qui communiquent en ligne avec des inconnus d’âge mineur au cours d’opérations d’infiltration poli- cières fondées sur un pseudonyme ont une attente raisonnable au respect de leur vie privée à l’égard de leurs communications électroniques privées. il s’agit plutôt de savoir si les membres de la société peuvent raisonnablement s’attendre à ce que l’état ne prenne pas connaissance, à son entière discrétion, des relevés de leurs communications électroniques privées (voir patrick, par 32). e conclusion on reasonable expectation of pri- e conclusion sur l’attente raisonnable au respect vacy de la vie privée [133] in a free and democratic society, it is reason- able for members of society to expect that the state will only access electronic recordings of their private [133] dans une société libre et démocratique, il est raisonnable pour les membres de la société de s’at- tendre à ce que l’état n’ait accès aux enregistrements [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 381 communications if it has sought authorization to do so. this includes participant surveillance of one’s private communications. it may be difficult for some to accept that this reasonable expectation of privacy extends to mr.  mills as well, but extend it does: “[t]he question is not which risks the claimant has taken, but which risks should be imposed on him in a free and democratic society”: reeves, at para. 41; duarte, at p. 52; spencer, at para. 36; patrick, at para. 32; wise, at p 567. the police surveillance in question constituted a search within the meaning of s. 8 of the charter. électroniques de leurs communications privées que s’il a obtenu l’autorisation de le faire. il en va de même pour la surveillance participative des commu- nications privées. d’aucuns peuvent trouver difficile d’accepter que cette attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée s’applique aussi à m. mills, mais elle s’applique bel et bien : « [i]l ne faut pas se demander quels risques ont été pris par la personne qui invoque la charte, mais plutôt quels risques devraient lui être imposés dans le cadre d’une société libre et démo- cratique » (reeves, par. 41; duarte, p. 52; spencer, par. 36; patrick, par. 32; wise, p 567). en l’espèce, la surveillance policière constituait une fouille au sens de l’art. 8 de la charte. v part vi authorization v autorisation visée à la partie vi i agree with the appellant that “the use of [134] ‘snagit’ to capture the messages fits within the defi- nition of ‘intercept’ in s. 183 of the code as this program recorded and acquired the substance of the texts”: af, at para. 48; see also decision re s. 8, at para 34. i further explore whether cst. hobbs’ ac- tions may also have constituted an interception even in the absence of “snagit”. this latter discussion raises the issue of whether our statutory scheme au- thorizing the interception of private communications requires reconsideration in light of shifts in commu- nication technology. i leave this reconsideration to parliament’s good judgment. a did mr. mills have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his communications? [134] je conviens avec l’appelant que [traduc- tion] « l’utilisation de “snagit” pour prendre des captures d’écran des messages répond à la défini- tion d’“interception” prévue à l’art. 183 du code criminel, en ce que ce programme a permis d’enre- gistrer et de prendre volontairement connaissance de la substance des textos » (ma, par. 48; voir aussi décision relative à l’art. 8, par 34). j’examinerai plus à fond la question de savoir si les actions de l’agent  hobbs auraient pu également constituer une interception même sans le recours à « snagit ». cette dernière analyse soulève la question de sa- voir si, compte tenu des nouvelles technologies de communication, il convient de revoir notre régime législatif qui permet l’interception de communica- tions privées. je laisse cet examen au bon jugement du législateur. a m. mills avait-il une attente raisonnable au res- pect de sa vie privée à l’égard de ses communi- cations? [135] for s 1842 to apply to a particular investiga- tive technique, the state must be seeking to intercept a “private communication”. a “private communica- tion” is “any oral communication, or any telecom- munication    that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to re- ceive it”: code, s 183. built into this definition is [135] pour que l’art 1842 s’applique à une tech- nique d’enquête donnée, il faut que l’état cherche à intercepter une « communication privée ». une « communication privée » est une « [c]ommunica- tion orale ou télécommunication [  ] qui est faite dans des circonstances telles que son auteur peut raisonnablement s’attendre à ce qu’elle ne soit pas interceptée par un tiers  »  (art.  183 du code criminel) cette définition prévoit que l’auteur 382 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. the requirement that the originator had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their communication. for the reasons outlined above, mr. mills had a reason- able expectation of privacy in his communications. the impugned communications therefore constitute “private communication” under s. 183 of the code. devait avoir une attente raisonnable au respect de sa vie privée à l’égard de ses communications. pour les motifs exposés ci- dessus, m. mills avait une attente raisonnable au respect de sa vie privée à l’égard de ses communications. les communi- cations en cause constituaient donc des « commu- nications privées » au sens de l’art. 183 du code criminel. b did the use of “snagit” constitute an intercep- b l’utilisation de « snagit » constituait- elle une tion? interception? [136] section 184.2 of the code applies to commu- nications that have been “intercepted” by means of any electro- magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device. to “intercept” means to “listen to, record or acquire a communication or acquire the substance, meaning or purport thereof”: code, s 183. with re- spect for the opposing view, i conclude that the use of “snagit” in this case constituted an interception. [137] cst. hobbs recorded the conversations that he had with mr. mills using a computer program “which allows the computer user to capture and copy the information on the screen”: decision re s. 8, at para 6. when asked why he used this com- puter program, cst. hobbs replied, “[f]or continu- ity purposes to keep them all together for the sake of reproduction for the courts if need be”: ar, vol.  ii, at p.  7 he stated that he did not at any point print the messages directly from their original programs, but rather “would always save them by doing a screen capture”: p 8. cst. hobbs further explained: “every person may have their own way of doing things. that’s just my personal preference which i found has always been more beneficial. i just find it keeps everything in the same location. i can store it all on my computer in the same file folder”: p.  8 on the plain meaning of “record”, cst hobbs recorded the informational content of the private communications when he “save[d] them by doing a screen capture” into a centralized location on his computer “for the sake of repro- duction for the courts” (pp 7-8). this constituted [136] l’article 184.2 du code criminel s’applique aux communications qui ont été « interceptées » au moyen d’un dispositif électromagnétique, acous- tique, mécanique ou autre. « intercepter » s’entend « du fait d’écouter, d’enregistrer ou de prendre vo- lontairement connaissance d’une communication ou de sa substance, son sens ou son objet » (art. 183 du code criminel). avec égards pour l’opinion con- traire, je conclus que l’utilisation de « snagit » dans l’affaire qui nous occupe constituait une intercep- tion. [137] l’agent hobbs a enregistré ses conversa- tions avec m. mills à l’aide d’un logiciel [traduc- tion] « qui permet à son utilisateur de faire des captures d’écran des renseignements apparaissant à l’écran et de les enregistrer » (décision relative à l’art. 8, par 6). interrogé quant aux raisons pour lesquelles il avait utilisé ce logiciel, l’agent hobbs a répondu : [traduction] « pour assurer une conti- nuité, pour conserver [les messages] ensemble aux fins de reproduction à l’intention des tribunaux, au besoin » (da, vol. ii, p 7). il a déclaré qu’il n’avait en aucun temps imprimé les messages di- rectement à partir des programmes originaux, mais qu’il «  les avait toujours sauvegardés au moyen d’une capture d’écran » (p 8). l’agent hobbs a en outre expliqué que : « chaque personne a sa propre façon de faire les choses. c’est simplement celle que je préfère et j’ai toujours trouvé qu’elle était la plus avantageuse elle permet de tout conser- ver au même endroit. je peux tout stocker dans un même dossier de mon ordinateur  »  (p.  8) selon le sens ordinaire du mot «  enregistrer  », l’agent hobbs a enregistré le contenu informationnel des [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 383 an interception: see also r v. kwok, [2008] oj. no. 2414 (ql) (cj). [138] the interception in this case occurred in “real- time”: jones, at para 69. this court’s analysis of the meaning of “intercept” in jones clarified that an “interception suggests a prospective concept of authorization relating to communications not yet in existence. the word ‘intercept’ denotes an interfer- ence between the sender and recipient in the course of the communication process”: jones, at para. 69; see also telus, at para 37. thus part vi is a reg- ulatory scheme intended to authorize the real- time interception of future communications. i agree with the appellant that, for this reason as well, part vi applies to the state action here: af, at para 59. cst. hobbs received the communications and contempo- raneously recorded them using screen capture soft- ware. this was far from the historical text messages at issue in jones. had cst. hobbs sought authori- zation to conduct these real- time interceptions, he would have been seeking authorization to intercept communications that were not yet in existence. the state action in this case thus conforms to this court’s interpretation of “interception” in jones. communications privées lorsqu’il les a « sauvegar- dées au moyen d’une capture d’écran » à un seul endroit de son ordinateur « aux fins de reproduction à l’intention des tribunaux » (p 7-8). il s’agissait là d’une interception (voir aussi r c. kwok, [2008] oj no 2414 (ql) (cj)). [138] dans la présente affaire, l’interception a eu lieu en « temps réel » (jones, par 69). il ressort de l’analyse du sens du mot « intercepter » à laquelle notre cour s’est livrée dans jones, que « la notion d’interception suggère l’idée d’une autorisation pros- pective visant des communications qui n’existent pas encore. le verbe “intercepter” évoque une interposi- tion entre l’expéditeur et le destinataire dans le cours du processus de communication » (jones, par. 69; voir aussi telus, par 37). ainsi, la partie vi établit un cadre réglementaire visant à ce que l’interception en temps réel de communications à venir soit auto- risée. je conviens avec l’appelant que, pour cette raison également, la partie vi s’applique à l’action de l’état en l’espèce (ma, par 59). l’agent hobbs a reçu les communications et les a simultanément en- registrées au moyen d’un logiciel de capture d’écran. on est loin des messages textes existants en cause dans l’arrêt jones. si l’agent hobbs avait demandé l’autorisation pour procéder à ces interceptions en temps réel, il aurait demandé l’autorisation pour in- tercepter des communications non encore existantes. l’action de l’état, en l’espèce, est donc conforme à l’interprétation que notre cour a donnée au terme « interception » dans jones. [139] i further note that, contrary to what the court of appeal held (at para. 13) and what some other appellate courts and commentators appear to have decided as well (2017 ncla 12; see also r v. blais, 2017 qcca 1774, at paras. 16-17 (canlii), r v. beairsto, 2018 abca 118, 359 ccc (3d) 376, at para. 25), an “interception” does not require a third party. this court’s reference to third- party involve- ment in jones (at para. 72) does not apply to cases of participant surveillance or to the parameters of s 1842 of the code. parliament enacted what is now s 1842 in response to duarte. duarte was a case of participant surveillance — the undercover officer and informer in that case were participants in the [139] j’ajouterai que, contrairement à ce que la cour d’appel a conclu (au par. 13) et à ce que certains autres tribunaux d’appel et auteurs ont conclu éga- lement (2017 nlca 12; voir aussi r. c. blais, 2017 qcca 1774, par. 16-17 (canlii), r c. beairsto, 2018 abca 118, 359 ccc (3d) 376, par. 25), une « interception » peut se faire sans tiers. ce que notre cour a dit au sujet des actes accomplis par un tiers dans l’arrêt jones (par. 72) ne s’applique pas aux cas de surveillance participative ou aux paramètres de l’art 1842 du code criminel. le législateur a adopté l’art 1842 actuel en réponse à l’arrêt duarte, qui portait sur une affaire de surveillance participa- tive — l’agent d’infiltration et l’indicateur étaient 384 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. conversation. the “interception” in duarte occurred not because a third party intercepted the communi- cation, but because state recording equipment did. the trial judge correctly conducted this analysis: decision re s. 8, at paras. 17 and 23. [140] finally, concluding that the state action in this case was an “interception” accords with the “un- dergirding purpose” of part vi: jones, at para. 59; rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para 21. part vi is aimed at the use of intrusive tech- nologies to surveil private communications: jones, at para. 73; duarte, at pp 43-44. in employing screen capture software, cst. hobbs used technology to sur- veil — record and acquire in real time — mr. mills’ private communication and, in so doing, violated mr. mills’ right to choose the range of his listeners: duarte, at p 51. c surreptitious electronic communication by the state with members of the public in a private setting may constitute an interception [141] in our current communications environment, we are wiretapping ourselves. we knowingly deliver documentary evidence of our private communica- tions into the hands of not only our intended recipi- ents, but also into the digital repositories of corporate third parties. yet this does not negate the right to be protected against state intrusion on our privacy. as the statutory scheme with which we regulate state privacy intrusion, part  vi must engage with and accommodate these complexities. this includes the constituent components of part vi, such as the defi- nition of “intercept”: “the issue then is how to define ‘intercept’ in part vi. the interpretation should be informed not only by the purposes of part vi, but also by the rights enshrined in s. 8 of the charter, which in turn must remain aligned with technological developments”: telus, at para 33. des participants à la conversation. il y a eu « inter- ception » dans cette affaire non pas parce qu’un tiers avait intercepté la communication, mais parce que le matériel d’enregistrement de l’état l’avait inter- ceptée. c’est l’analyse à laquelle s’est livré à juste titre le juge du procès (décision relative à l’art. 8, par. 17 et 23). [140] enfin, la conclusion selon laquelle l’action de l’état en l’espèce constituait une « interception » est compatible avec « l’objectif sous- jacent » de la partie vi (jones, par. 59; rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27, par 21). la partie vi vise l’utilisation de moyens technologiques intrusifs en vue de la surveillance des communications pri- vées (jones, par. 73; duarte, p 43-44). en employant un logiciel de capture d’écran, l’agent hobbs a utilisé un moyen technologique en vue de surveiller les communications privées de m. mills, de les enregis- trer et d’en prendre connaissance en temps réel et, ce faisant, il a violé le droit de m. mills de choisir ses auditeurs (duarte, p 51). c l’utilisation clandestine par l’état de moyens électroniques pour communiquer avec des membres du public dans un contexte privé peut constituer une interception [141] dans le monde actuel des communications, nous nous mettons nous- mêmes sous écoute élec- tronique. nous transmettons sciemment non seule- ment aux destinataires prévus, mais aussi aux dépôts de données numériques de sociétés tierces parties, une preuve documentaire de nos communications privées. pourtant, cela ne nous prive pas du droit d’être protégés contre l’intrusion de l’état dans notre vie privée. s’agissant du régime législatif qui régit les intrusions de l’état dans la vie privée, la partie vi doit tenir compte de ces complexités. cela comprend ses éléments constitutifs, tels que la dé- finition d’« intercepter » : « la question consiste donc à interpréter le mot “intercepter” à la partie vi. l’interprétation de ce mot doit se fonder non seu- lement sur les objectifs de la partie vi, mais aussi sur les droits garantis par l’art. 8 de la charte, les- quels doivent progresser au rythme de la technolo- gie » (telus, par 33). [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 385 [142] the statutory definition of “intercept” is to “listen to, record or acquire a communication or ac- quire the substance, meaning or purport thereof.” in communicating with mr. mills over a medium that inherently produces an electronic recording,2 cst. hobbs “acquired” a record of the communication. it is true that, leaving the issue of “snagit” aside, cst. hobbs simply availed himself of the technology that mr. mills was already using. yet just as duarte was not aimed solely at the recording of the conversation but also at the state’s acquisition of a record, s 1842 is not only aimed at intrusive technologies that inter- fere in private communications (jones, at para. 69); it is also aimed at the capacity of intrusive technolo- gies to access our private communications: “part vi recognizes the dangers inherent in permitting access to the future private communications of a poten- tially unlimited number of people over a lengthy period of time”: telus, at para 42. members of the public must be protected from unregulated, sur- reptitious state collection of their private electronic communications. it may therefore be the case that the surveillance of mr. mills’ online private commu- nication, with or without screen capture technology, constituted the type of clandestine state surveillance using intrusive technology that part vi was intended to proscribe. [142] la définition du mot «  intercepter  » que prévoit la loi est le « fait d’écouter, d’enregistrer ou de prendre volontairement connaissance d’une communication ou de sa substance, son sens ou son objet  ». en communiquant avec m.  mills sur un support qui produit par lui- même un enregistrement électronique2, l’agent hobbs « a pris connaissance » d’un relevé de la communication. il est vrai que, si l’on met de côté la question du logiciel « snagit », l’agent hobbs a seulement profité de la technologie dont se servait déjà m mills. or tout comme l’affaire duarte ne portait pas seulement sur l’enregistrement de la conversation, mais aussi sur l’acquisition par l’état d’un relevé d’une communication, l’art 1842 ne vise pas seulement les technologies intrusives qui permettent une interposition dans nos communica- tions privées (jones, par. 69); il vise aussi la fonction des technologies intrusives par laquelle elles peuvent avoir accès à nos communications privées : « la par- tie vi reconnaît les dangers inhérents au fait de per- mettre l’accès aux futures communications privées d’un nombre potentiellement illimité de personnes pendant une longue période » (telus, par 42). les membres du public doivent être protégés contre la collecte clandestine et non réglementée, par l’état, de leurs communications électroniques privées. il se peut donc que la surveillance des communications privées en ligne de m. mills, avec ou sans logiciel de capture d’écran, ait constitué le type de surveillance clandestine, par l’état, au moyen d’une technologie intrusive, que la partie vi vise à interdire. [143] if, in the alternative, surreptitious, electronic police surveillance of private communications is only regulated by part vi to the extent that extrane- ous recording software is employed, then our “com- prehensive scheme    for the interception of private [143] si, par ailleurs, la surveillance électronique clandestine par la police de communications privées n’est régie que par la partie vi, dans la mesure où un logiciel externe d’enregistrement est employé, alors notre « régime complet [  ] en vue de l’interception 2 it must be noted, however, that in this case the inherent documen- tary evidence produced by virtue of communicating over facebook and hotmail was not the evidence adduced at trial. cst. hobbs’ only copy of the messages were those that he had acquired via “snagit”. he had deactivated “leann’s” facebook account when mr. mills was charged with the offences now before this court. as for the record of conversations on mr. mills’ end, the search of mr. mills’ hard drive pulled up only fragments of the commu- nications, the evidentiary weight of which depended on checking the fragments against the integral copy captured by “snagit”. the only reproducible form of the communications came from the screen captures. 2 il convient de noter, cependant, que dans la présente affaire, la preuve documentaire inhérente produite grâce à la communication sur facebook et hotmail n’est pas celle qui a été présentée au procès. les seuls messages copiés par l’agent hobbs sont ceux qu’il a obtenus à l’aide de « snagit ». il avait désactivé le compte facebook de « leann » lorsque m. mills a été accusé des infrac- tions qui sont portées devant notre cour. quant aux relevés des conversations produits du côté de m. mills, la fouille effectuée sur le disque dur de ce dernier n’a permis d’obtenir que des fragments des communications, et la valeur probante de chacun d’eux reposait sur une comparaison avec la capture d’écran intégrale obtenue au moyen de « snagit ». les seules communications pouvant être reproduites étaient celles sous forme de capture d’écran. 386 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. communications” (telus, at para. 2) is no longer sufficiently comprehensive. to be constitutionally compliant, state acquisition in real- time of private electronic communications requires regulation. de communications privées » (telus, par. 2) n’est plus assez complet. pour être constitutionnelle, la prise de connaissance en temps réel, par l’état, de commu- nications électroniques privées doit être réglementée. d part vi strikes the right balance between law enforcement’s need to investigate crime and the right of an individual in a democratic so- ciety to be left alone [144] i agree with the intervenor the attorney general of ontario that the internet has created “an unprecedented platform for child exploitation” and that undercover proactive police investigations are necessary to combat the online exploitation of chil- dren: if, at pp. 7-9; see also g j fitch,. qc, “child luring”, in substantive criminal law, advocacy and the administration of justice, vol. 1, presented to the national criminal law program (2007), at pp. 1 and 3. part vi of the code was developed with these considerations in mind. in my view, its application to the use of “snagit” in the case at bar strikes the right balance between law enforcement’s need to investigate crime and the right of an individual in a democratic society to be left alone. where the police wish to conduct surreptitious electronic surveillance by means of intrusive technology, their investigative methods must be authorized by the judiciary or some other independent third party. i am not persuaded by the argument that [145] internet predators move so quickly from victim to victim that it would be “unconscionable” to pause an investigation for the amount of time that it would take to secure judicial authorization (if,. canadian association of chiefs of police, at pp 6-8). our ju- dicial system is equipped to issue authorizations in a timely fashion. police officers secure warrants on short timelines every day in this country. here, the words of la forest j. in duarte, at pp. 52-53, are apt: d la partie vi établit un juste équilibre entre la nécessité pour les forces de l’ordre d’enquêter sur les crimes et le droit des individus vivant dans une société démocratique de ne pas être importunés [144] je partage l’avis de l’intervenante, la procu- reure générale de l’ontario, pour dire que l’internet a créé [traduction] « une plateforme sans précédent pour l’exploitation d’enfants », et qu’il est néces- saire de mener des opérations d’infiltration poli- cières proactives pour lutter contre l’exploitation en ligne des enfants (mi, p. 7-9; voir aussi g j fitch, cr, « child luring », dans substantive criminal law, advocacy and the administration of justice, vol. 1, document présenté au national criminal law program (2007), p. 1 et 3). la partie vi du code criminel a été élaborée à la lumière de ces considéra- tions. à mon avis, son application à l’emploi du logi- ciel « snagit » dans l’affaire qui nous occupe établit un juste équilibre entre la nécessité pour les forces de l’ordre d’enquêter sur les crimes et le droit des individus vivant dans une société démocratique de ne pas être importunés. si la police souhaite exercer une surveillance électronique clandestine à l’aide d’un moyen technologique intrusif, elle doit faire autoriser sa méthode d’enquête par une cour de justice ou une autre tierce partie indépendante. [145] je ne juge pas convaincant l’argument selon lequel les cyberprédateurs passent si rapidement d’une victime à l’autre qu’il serait [traduction] «  inacceptable  » de suspendre une enquête le temps d’obtenir une autorisation judiciaire (mi,. association canadienne des chefs de police, p 6-8). notre système judiciaire est en mesure de délivrer les autorisations nécessaires en temps opportun. chaque jour au pays, des policiers obtiennent des mandats dans des délais serrés. les mots du juge la forest dans l’arrêt duarte, p. 52-53, sont ici pertinents :    the imposition of a warrant requirement would have the sole effect of ensuring that police restrict “participant    imposer l’exigence de l’obtention d’un mandat aurait pour seul effet d’obliger la police à limiter la [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 387 monitoring” to cases where they can show probable cause for a warrant. it is unclear to me how compelling the police to restrict this practice to instances where they have convinced a detached judicial officer of its necessity would hamper the police’s ability effectively to combat crime. but even if this were so, this restriction would be justified by the knowledge that the police would no longer have the right ‘to train these powerful eavesdrop- ping devices on you, me, and other law- abiding citizens as well as the criminal element’, to cite the observation of cirillo j. in commonwealth v. schaeffer, [536 a.2d 354 (penn. 1987)], at p 367. or, as karakatsanis j. succinctly states in reeves, at para. 54: “i recognize that rejecting the crown’s approach may interfere with criminal investigations. but charter rights often do.” [146] i acknowledge, however, that the implica- tions of concluding that the police “intercepted” the communication even absent the use of “snagit” are more complex. the question as to what standard of reasonableness would be required for prior judicial authorization of varied forms of proactive police investigations is one best left to parliament. on this point, i take care to restate that my position does not and should not inexorably lead to the police being unable to investigate child lurers. rather, it focuses on the authorization of those investigations by an independent third party. a less exacting regime than part vi may be appropriate in certain circumstances. « surveillance participative » aux cas où elle peut démon- trer l’existence de raisons plausibles d’obtenir un mandat. je vois mal en quoi la capacité de la police de combattre efficacement le crime serait diminuée si elle était tenue de limiter le recours à cette pratique aux situations dans lesquelles elle peut convaincre un officier de justice im- partial de sa nécessité. même à supposer que ce soit le cas, la restriction se justifierait par la certitude que la police n’aurait plus le droit [traduction] « de braquer ces puissants appareils d’écoute sur vous et moi et sur d’autres citoyens respectueux des lois en même temps que sur l’élément criminel », pour reprendre les propos du juge cirillo dans commonwealth v. schaeffer, [536 a.2d 354 (penn. 1987)], p 367. ou encore, comme l’a dit brièvement la juge karakatsanis au par. 54 de l’arrêt reeves : « je con viens que rejeter l’approche préconisée par la couronne pourrait nuire à des enquêtes criminelles, mais c’est souvent ce que font les droits garantis par la charte. » [146] je reconnais, cependant, que conclure que la police a « intercepté » les communications même sans l’aide de « snagit » a des répercussions plus complexes. il vaut mieux laisser le législateur dé- cider de la norme de raisonnabilité qui s’impose en ce qui a trait à l’autorisation judiciaire préalable requise pour procéder à diverses formes d’enquêtes policières proactives. à ce sujet, je tiens à répéter que ma position ne fait pas inexorablement en sorte que la police serait incapable de mener des enquêtes sur les cyberprédateurs, et ne devrait pas avoir cet effet. elle est plutôt axée sur l’autorisation de ces enquêtes par un tiers indépendant. un régime moins exigeant que celui de la partie vi peut être approprié dans certaines circonstances. [147] finally, on the subject of “proactive police investigations” such as occurred in the case at bar, i would suggest that these investigations would ben- efit from a standardized set of privacy protective guidelines. according to cst hobbs, there were no guidelines or policies available to assist him in setting up a minimally intrusive false identity. as a result, he created policy on his own, with undesirable consequences. to construct his online persona, cst. hobbs used photographs from the internet of a youth who was unknown to him. that youth was, therefore, unwittingly conscripted into a police investigation. [147] enfin, concernant les « enquêtes policières proactives » comme celle entreprise dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, je crois qu’une série de lignes directrices uniformisées sur la protection de la vie privée pourraient être utiles. selon l’agent hobbs, il n’existait aucune ligne directrice ou politique qui l’aurait aidé à créer une fausse identité la moins attentatoire possible. il a donc créé lui- même une politique, qui a entraîné des conséquences in- désirables pour fabriquer son identité virtuelle, l’agent hobbs s’est servi de photos d’une adoles- cente qu’il ne connaissait pas, trouvées sur internet. 388 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. further, “[t]here were a number of what has been described by various authors as ‘low visibility’ en- counters with [cst. hobbs] by innocent members of the public. the officer used their [online] presence on his facebook page to provide credibility to his profile while at the same time they shared information with him unaware that he was a police officer”: (2014), 346 nfld. & peir 102, at para. 10 (“decision re section 24(2)”). cst. hobbs did not seek or obtain the informed consent of the individuals that he added on facebook, individuals who were effectively used “as part of the ‘bait’ to trap an internet predator”: (2015), 364 nfld. & peir 237, at para. 18 (“sentencing decision”). there was also no evidence as to how or whether the police retained the personal information of any of these individuals: sentencing decision, at para 18. proactive online investigations can cast a wide net of electronic surveillance, resulting in innocent members of the public, many of whom may be youth, unwittingly sharing sensitive personal information with the police. to ensure that such in- vestigative techniques are minimally invasive, they must be subject to clear guidelines. cette adolescente a donc participé sans le vouloir à une enquête policière qui plus est, [traduc- tion] «  [i]l y a eu un certain nombre de ce que divers auteurs ont appelé des rencontres “discrètes” entre [l’agent hobbs] et des personnes innocentes. l’agent s’est servi de leur présence [en ligne] sur sa page facebook pour donner de la crédibilité à son profil alors que ces personnes lui transmettaient des renseignements, sans savoir qu’il était policier » ((2014), 346 nfld. & peir 102, par. 10 (« déci- sion relative au par 24(2) »)). l’agent hobbs n’a pas tenté d’obtenir ni obtenu le consentement éclairé des personnes qu’il a ajoutées sur sa page facebook, ces personnes ayant en fait été utilisées « comme “ap- pâts” en vue de piéger un cyberprédateur » ((2015), 364 nfld & peir  237, par.  18 («  décision re- lative à la peine »)). de plus, il n’y avait aucune preuve quant à savoir si, ou comment, la police a conservé les renseignements personnels de l’une ou l’autre de ces personnes (décision relative à la peine, par 18). les enquêtes en ligne proactives peuvent être à l’origine d’une surveillance électronique très vaste, de sorte que des personnes innocentes, dont de nombreux jeunes, transmettent sans le savoir des renseignements personnels sensibles à la police. pour que ces techniques d’enquête soient le moins attentatoires possible, elles doivent être régies par des lignes directrices claires. vi did the search breach section 8 of the charter? vi la fouille constituait- elle une violation de [148] a search or seizure is presumptively unrea- sonable in the absence of prior judicial authorization. however, the crown may establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the police conduct was reasonable in that it was authorized by law, the law was reasona- ble, and the manner in which the search was carried out was reasonable: collins, at p 278. here, there was no prior judicial authorization and as such, the search is presumptively unreasonable. the search or seizure was not authorized by any law. therefore, the search of the communications breached s. 8 of the charter. l’art. 8 de la charte? [148] les fouilles, les perquisitions et les sai- sies sont présumées abusives à moins qu’elles aient été autorisées préalablement par un tribunal. cependant, la couronne peut établir, selon la pré- pondérance des probabilités, que la police a agi de manière raisonnable, c’est-à-dire que la fouille était autorisée par la loi, que la loi elle- même n’avait rien d’abusif et que la fouille n’a pas été effectuée d’une manière abusive (collins, p 278). en l’espèce, il n’y a eu aucune autorisation judiciaire préalable, de sorte que la fouille est présumée abusive la fouille ou la saisie n’était pas autorisée par la loi. par conséquent, la fouille effectuée à l’égard des communications constituait une violation de l’art. 8 de la charte. [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 389 vii. should the evidence be excluded under sec- vii. la preuve doit- elle être écartée par application tion 24(2) of the charter? du par. 24(2) de la charte? [149] having found that mr. mills’ s. 8 charter rights were breached, the trial judge nevertheless denied mr. mills’ application to exclude the evi- dence of the electronic communications pursuant to s 24(2). though my reasoning differs in several important respects, i agree with the trial judge that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [150] mr. mills argues that the trial judge ought to have approached this matter from the viewpoint that this was a violation of the right against self- incrimination. if this was mr. mills’ position at the time that the application to exclude was heard, then i agree that the trial judge should have addressed it. however, even if this was an error, it had no effect on the outcome of the decision. in his sentencing decision, the judge found that this was not a case of entrapment: paras 3-8. thus, if he had canvassed this issue in his s. 24(2) analysis, the trial judge would have concluded that the evidence was not obtained contrary to the right against self- incrimination. [151] the remainder of mr. mills’ submissions concern the treatment and weighing of the factors for exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) as articulated in r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr 353, at para 71. these factors are: “(1) the seriousness of the charter-infringing state conduct    (2) the im- pact of the breach on the charter-protected interests of the accused    and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits”. [149] après avoir conclu que les droits de m. mills garantis par l’art. 8 de la charte avaient été violés, le juge du procès a néanmoins rejeté la demande de m. mills, qui sollicitait l’exclusion de la preuve des communications électroniques par application du par 24(2). bien que mon raisonnement diffère à plusieurs égards importants de celui du juge du procès, je conviens avec lui que l’admission de cette preuve n’aurait pas pour effet de déconsidérer l’ad- ministration de la justice. [150] m. mills soutient que le juge du procès aurait dû aborder la présente affaire comme étant une vio- lation du droit de ne pas s’incriminer. s’il s’agissait là de la position défendue par m. mills au moment de l’instruction de la demande d’exclusion, alors je conviens que le juge du procès aurait dû se pro- noncer sur cette question. or, même s’il s’agissait d’une erreur, celle-ci n’a eu aucun effet sur l’issue de la décision. dans sa décision relative à la peine, le juge a conclu qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’une affaire de provocation policière (par 3-8). ainsi, s’il avait examiné cette question dans son analyse relative au par. 24(2), le juge du procès aurait conclu que la preuve n’avait pas été obtenue en contravention du droit de ne pas s’incriminer. [151] les autres observations de m. mills con- cernent le traitement et l’appréciation des facteurs exposés dans l’arrêt r c grant, 2009 csc 32, [2009] 2 rcs 353, par. 71, qui permettent d’écarter des éléments de preuve en application du par 24(2). ces facteurs sont : « (1) la gravité de la conduite attentatoire de l’état [  ] (2) l’incidence de la vio- lation sur les droits de l’accusé garantis par la charte [  ] et (3) l’intérêt de la société à ce que l’affaire soit jugée au fond ». [152] mr. mills submits that the trial judge erred in finding that the undercover officer acted in good faith. however, this was a reasonable conclusion open to the trial judge, who found that the police officer was “following what he believed to be a le- gitimate investigative technique”: decision re sec- tion 24(2), at para 10. it is concerning that the officer [152] m. mills soutient que le juge du procès a eu tort de conclure que l’agent d’infiltration avait agi de bonne foi. il s’agit cependant là d’une conclusion raisonnable que pouvait tirer le juge du procès, après avoir conclu que l’agent [traduction] « appliquait ce qu’il croyait être une technique d’enquête légi- time » (décision relative au par. 24(2), par 10). il 390 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. did not enquire into whether the investigative tech- nique was constitutionally valid, or into whether he was required to obtain judicial authorization: “neg- ligence or wilful blindness cannot be equated with good faith”: grant, at para 75. it is also concerning that there were no written police guidelines for him to follow. yet in my view, cst. hobbs would be for- given for assuming the constitutional validity of this technique. this court’s decision in r v. levigne, 2010 scc 25, [2010] 2 scr 3, can be interpreted as validating the investigative technique used here.3 the parties in levigne did not raise the s. 8 charter issues inherent in the police investigative tactics employed in that case, and thus this court’s silence on the issue in levigne does not bind it now. never- theless, for this reason and for the reasons identified by the trial judge, the trial judge did not err in finding that the officer was acting in good faith. this first factor weighs in favour of admission. [153] with respect to the impact on the accused’s charter-protected interests, the trial judge found that there was a reduced expectation of privacy be- cause “the accused had been communicating with an unknown individual with the knowledge that his communications would be recorded on that person’s computer”: decision re section 24(2), at para 11. as such, the trial judge found that this branch of the in- quiry favoured admission of the evidence. mr. mills submits that the trial judge’s findings run counter to the jurisprudence. i agree. there was no “reduced expectation of privacy” in this case. this court has made clear that a person’s lack of control over their communications does not reduce their reasonable ex- pectation of privacy from state intrusion: see duarte, at p. 48; marakah, at para 68. the charter breach substantially impacted mr mills. it revealed private est préoccupant de constater que l’agent n’a pas cherché à savoir si la technique d’enquête était va- lide sur le plan constitutionnel, ou s’il devait obtenir une autorisation judiciaire : « il [est] impératif [  ] de ne pas assimiler la négligence ou l’aveuglement volontaire à la bonne foi » (grant, par 75). il est tout aussi préoccupant de constater qu’il ne dispo- sait d’aucune ligne directrice écrite qu’il aurait pu suivre. je suis cependant d’avis que l’on pardonnera à l’agent hobbs d’avoir présumé que cette technique était constitutionnelle. l’arrêt de notre cour r c. levigne, 2010 csc 25, [2010] 2 rcs 3, peut être interprété comme une reconnaissance valide de la technique d’enquête employée en l’espèce3. les par- ties dans levigne n’ont pas soulevé la question des droits protégés par l’art. 8 de la charte qui est inhé- rente aux tactiques d’enquête policière employées dans cette affaire, et le silence de notre cour sur la question dans levigne ne la lie pas maintenant. j’estime néanmoins que, pour cette raison et pour les motifs mentionnés par le juge du procès, ce dernier n’a pas commis d’erreur en concluant que l’agent avait agi de bonne foi. ce premier facteur milite en faveur de l’admission. [153] quant à l’incidence sur les droits de l’accusé garantis par la charte, le juge du procès a conclu que l’attente au respect de la vie privée était réduite parce que [traduction] « l’accusé communiquait avec un inconnu tout en sachant que ses communi- cations seraient enregistrées sur l’ordinateur de cette personne » (décision relative au par. 24(2), par 11). c’est pourquoi il a conclu que ce volet de l’ana- lyse militait en faveur de l’admission de la preuve. m. mills fait valoir que les conclusions du juge du procès vont à l’encontre de la jurisprudence. je suis de cet avis. il n’y avait aucune « attente réduite au respect de la vie privée » en l’espèce. notre cour a bien précisé que le fait qu’une personne n’ait pas de contrôle sur ses communications ne réduit pas son attente raisonnable en matière de protection contre l’intrusion de l’état dans sa vie privée (voir duarte, 3 in levigne, the investigating officer employed a recording software program called camtasia to record his private online chats with the accused. as the officer in that case testified, camtasia is “a software program that basically records whatever happens on your screen as a video”: levigne, a. r., at p 113. 3 dans levigne, l’enquêteur a utilisé un logiciel d’enregistrement appelé camtasia pour enregistrer ses séances de clavardage privées avec l’accusé. comme l’a déclaré l’agent, camtasia est [traduc- tion] « un logiciel qui enregistre essentiellement tout ce qui se passe sur votre écran, comme s’il s’agissait d’une vidéo » (levigne, da, p 113). [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills la juge martin 391 information that was central to his biographical core, and it exposed that information to police scrutiny: r. v. plant, [1993] 3 scr 281, at p. 293 (a biographi- cal core of information “would include information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual”); cole, at pa- ras 45-46. this factor weighs in favour of exclusion. [154] as for society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, the trial judge found that the exclusion of the evidence would be “fatal to the crown case”, and that the evidence was “real probative evidence of high reliability”: decision re section 24(2), at para 12. on appeal to this court, the appellant acknowledges that the offence in this case is serious. however, defence counsel urges this court not to place “undue emphasis” on the serious- ness of the offence: af, at paras 103-6. [155] in my view, the balance of the three factors favours admission of the evidence. in so concluding, i do not place “undue emphasis” on the seriousness of the offence. while the impact of the breach on mr. mills’ privacy interest was significant and not diminished, the seriousness of the charter breach was minimal. i am of the view that the exclusion of “relevant and reliable evidence” in a child- luring case, obtained using tactics that the police had good reason to believe were legal at the time of the inves- tigation, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: grant, at para 81. p. 48; marakah, par 68). la violation de la charte a eu une incidence importante sur m. mills : des renseignements biographiques d’ordre privé ont été révélés et soumis à l’examen de la police (r c. plant, [1993] 3 rcs 281, p. 293 (un ensemble de rensei- gnements biographiques d’ordre privé « pourrait no- tamment [comprendre des] renseignements tendant à révéler des détails intimes sur le mode de vie et les choix personnels de l’individu »); cole, par 45-46). ce facteur milite en faveur de l’exclusion. [154] quant à l’intérêt de la société à ce que l’af- faire soit jugée au fond, le juge du procès a conclu que l’exclusion de la preuve serait [traduction] «  fatale pour la couronne  » et que cette preuve d’« une valeur probante réelle était d’une grande fiabilité » (décision relative au par. 24(2), par 12). en appel devant notre cour, l’appelant a reconnu que l’infraction reprochée était grave. toutefois, son avocat demande à la cour de ne pas accorder [traduction] « une importance indue » à la gravité de l’infraction (ma, par. 103- 106). [155] j’estime que l’appréciation des trois facteurs milite en faveur de l’admission de la preuve. en concluant ainsi, je n’accorde pas une « importance indue » à la gravité de l’infraction. bien que l’at- teinte au droit à la vie privée de m. mills ait eu des répercussions importantes et non réduites, la gravité de l’atteinte à la charte était minime. je suis d’avis que l’exclusion d’« éléments de preuve pertinents et fiables » dans une affaire de leurre d’enfants, lesquels ont été obtenus au moyen de tactiques que la police avait de bonnes raisons de croire légales au moment de l’enquête, aurait pour effet de déconsidérer l’ad- ministration de la justice (grant, par 81). [156] the trial judge did not err by declining to ex- clude the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2), and i would uphold his determination that the appropriate remedy for the charter breach is a two- month reduction in sentence. [156] le juge du procès n’a pas commis d’erreur en refusant d’écarter la preuve sur le fondement du par. 24(2), et je confirmerais sa décision selon laquelle la réparation adéquate pour l’atteinte portée à la charte est une réduction de peine de deux mois. viii conclusion viii conclusion [157] it was objectively reasonable for mr. mills to expect that a permanent electronic recording of his private communications would not be surreptitiously [157] il était objectivement raisonnable pour m. mills de s’attendre à ce qu’un agent de l’état ne puisse prendre clandestinement connaissance d’un 392 r v mills martin j. [2019] 2 scr. acquired by an agent of the state absent prior judicial authorization. cst. hobbs’ use of “snagit” consti- tuted an “interception” within the meaning of part vi of the code. further, even in the absence of “snagit”, it may be that the state investigative technique em- ployed here constituted an “interception”. because cst. hobbs did not seek and obtain prior judicial authorization pursuant to s.  184.2 prior to using “snagit”, the search of the private communications was unreasonable. however, i would not exclude the communications under s. 24(2) of the charter. [158] this appeal raises serious questions as to whether and how police surveillance of electronic communications should be regulated. following this court’s rich line of case law developing the nor- mative principles of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, i conclude that unchecked state surveillance — in this case, unchecked state acquisition of permanent electronic recordings of private communications — contravenes s. 8 of the charter. to the extent that our legislative scheme au- thorizing the interception of private communications does not capture the modern methods by which the state obtains real- time recordings of private commu- nications, i believe that it requires reconsideration. enregistrement électronique permanent de ses com- munications privées sans autorisation judiciaire pré- alable. l’utilisation par l’agent hobbs de « snagit » constituait une « interception » au sens de la partie vi du code criminel. qui plus est, il se peut que, même sans « snagit », la technique d’enquête employée par l’état en l’espèce ait constitué une « interception ». comme l’agent hobbs n’a pas cherché à obtenir ni obtenu l’autorisation judiciaire préalable prévue à l’art 1842 avant d’utiliser « snagit », la fouille à l’égard des communications privées en cause était déraisonnable. toutefois, je n’écarterais pas ces communications sur le fondement du par. 24(2) de la charte. [158] le présent pourvoi soulève de sérieuses questions quant à savoir si la surveillance policière de communications électroniques devrait être régle- mentée et, le cas échéant, de quelle façon elle devrait l’être. suivant l’abondante série de décisions de notre cour établissant les principes normatifs de ce qui constitue une attente raisonnable au respect de la vie privée, je conclus que la surveillance non réglemen- tée, par l’état — en l’espèce, la prise de connaissance non réglementée, par l’état, d’enregistrements élec- troniques permanents de communications privées — contrevient à l’art. 8 de la charte. dans la mesure où notre régime législatif qui autorise l’interception de communications privées ne comprend pas les méthodes modernes par lesquelles l’état obtient des enregistrements en temps réel de communications privées, je crois qu’il doit être réexaminé. [159] for the foregoing reasons, i would dismiss the appeal. [159] pour les motifs qui précèdent, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. appeal dismissed. pourvoi rejeté. procureurs de l’appelant : sullivan breen king defence, st. john’s; spiteri & ursulak, ottawa. defence, st. john’s; spiteri & ursulak, ottawa. tice & public safety, special prosecutions office, st. john’s. procureur de l’intimée : department of justice & public safety, special prosecutions office, st. john’s. prosecutions: public prosecution service of canada, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la directrice des poursuites pénales : service des poursuites pénales du canada, toronto. [2019] 2 rcs. r c mills 393 ontario: crown law office, criminal, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure gé- nérale de l’ontario : crown law office, criminal, toronto. and penal prosecutions: director of criminal and penal prosecutions, quebec city. procureur de l’intervenant le directeur des pour- suites criminelles et pénales : directeur des pour- suites criminelles et pénales, québec. british columbia: ministry of attorney general, criminal appeals and special prosecutions, vic- toria. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de la colombie- britannique : ministry of attorney general, criminal appeals and special prosecu- tions, victoria. solicitor for the intervener attorney general of alberta: justice and solicitor general appeals, education & prosecution policy branch, calgary. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de l’alberta : justice and solicitor general appeals, education & prosecution policy branch, calgary. canadian internet policy and public interest clinic: presser barristers, toronto; markson law profes- sional corporation, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante la clinique d’in- térêt public et de politique d’internet du canada samuelson- glushko : presser barristers, toronto; markson law professional corporation, toronto. erties association: addario law group, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association ca- nadienne des libertés civiles : addario law group, toronto. association: stockwoods, toronto; ruby, shiller & enenajor, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association : stockwoods, toronto; ruby, shiller & enenajor, toronto. of chiefs of police: royal newfoundland constabu- lary legal services unit, st. john’s. procureur de l’intervenante l’association cana- dienne des chefs de police : royal newfoundland constabulary legal services unit, st. john’s.
i. overview [1] electricity is increasingly ubiquitous in our lives today . . . and in our land registers. [2] the appellant operates the largest electrical power system in north america, with more than 34,000 km of transmission lines. the benefits to quebecers are many, and the acts of servitude that form the legal framework for this system are just as numerous. there are reportedly 37,405 such servitudes in total, including many that were established a long time ago can the appellant develop and modernize its system on the basis of rights it holds under decades-old servitudes that were established for specific construction projects? that is the question raised by this appeal. [3] in a context in which quebecers’ energy needs are growing and the sources of electricity generation are changing, the appellant must adapt its system to ensure that its service remains reliable and safe. the 1998 ice storm was particularly revealing: major load centres can be especially vulnerable, hence the need for more and more lines and interconnections. [4] in recent years, the appellant designed a proposed electrical transmission line that would make it possible to reinforce the power supply to the metropolitan loop of greater montréal and address a significant increase in demand in terrebonne. this line was originally supposed to run from the chamouchouane transformer substation in the saguenay-lac-saint-jean region to the bout-de-l’île transformer substation in montréal but it was subsequently decided that the line would be routed to the judith-jasmin substation in terrebonne and that a link would be constructed between that substation and the bout-de-l’île substation. the estimated cost of the project is $1.34 billion. [5] in planning the route to be taken by the chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île line, the appellant realized that it would be easier to run the line through a corridor in the southern part of the province where it already had servitudes. these servitudes had been established in the 1970s for a transmission line between the jacques-cartier substation near québec and the duvernay substation in laval. the land making up this corridor included lots belonging to the respondents. [6] the appellant held public information sessions and notified the affected individuals in writing of what its project would entail its employees went to the respondents’ lots in order to conduct surveying and clearing work, but were denied access to them. the appellant then applied for an injunction, the merits of which the respondents have challenged, arguing, among other things, that the servitudes established in the 1970s are valid only for the jacques-cartier–duvernay line and do not permit the construction of a new line. ii the parties a. the appellant [7] the appellant operates a public enterprise constituted under the hydro-québec act, cqlr, c. h-5, that is engaged in the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. the transmission component of its undertaking consists in sending power produced in its hydroelectric power plants to transformer substations through high-voltage lines. at the substations, voltage is “stepped down” so that the electricity can be distributed to places where it will be consumed: this is the distribution component. [8] as a mandatary of the government, the appellant is required to supply power and to supply quebecers with heritage pool electricity:1 hydro-québec act, ss. 311 and 22. it has, besides the special rights and powers conferred upon it by law, all those pertaining to legal persons in general, such as the capacity to enter into 1 heritage pool electricity is defined as follows in the thésaurus de l’activité gouvernementale on the quebec government’s web portal: [translation] “heritage pool electricity is the power produced by plants that were in service in 1998, in the amount of 165 twh (terawatt-hours), for which a lower heritage rate is applied. hydro-québec’s ‘heritage’ plants include those of the la grande complex, the manicouagan river, the ottawa river and the st. lawrence river” (online). contracts and to possess property: hydro-québec act, ss. 3 and 312;. civil code of québec (“ccq”), arts. 298 to 303 it may construct, purchase or lease any immovables required in order to transmit or distribute power: hydro-québec act, s 29 paras. 1 and 2.2 it may also, with the authorization of the government, acquire by expropriation any immovable or servitude required for the generation, transmission or distribution of power, even before the execution of the proposed work is authorized: hydro-québec act, ss. 33(3)(b) and 35. b. the respondents [9] the respondents are the owners of lots on which the appellant claims to hold servitudes that authorize it to construct electrical transmission lines. iii background a construction of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line and establishment of the servitudes at issue [10] the servitudes at issue were established in the 1970s in connection with the construction of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line the sequence of events surrounding their establishment involved three documents — an order in council, notices of expropriation, and agreements — large excerpts of which are reproduced 2 at the time the jacques-cartier–duvernay line was constructed, however, the act required that the acquisition and construction of immovables first be authorized by the lieutenant-governor in council: hydro-quebec act, rsq 1964, c 86 (“hqa”), s 29 para. 6, as amended. below to elucidate the decisions of the courts below and the arguments raised by the parties. (1) order in council 3360-72 [11] on november 8, 1972, the government issued order in council 3360-72, which authorizes the appellant to obtain, by mutual agreement or by expropriation, any immovable property and real rights it needs in order to construct power transmission and distribution lines between the jacques-cartier and duvernay substations. the key portions of this order in council read as follows: [translation] in the matter of authorization for hydro-quebec to construct electrical transmission and distribution lines between the jacques-cartier transformer substation and the duvernay transformer substation and to acquire the immovable property and real rights required for this purpose. whereas section 33 of the “hydro-quebec act” (rsq 1964, chapter 86, as amended) provides that hydro-quebec may “acquire by expropriation any immoveable, servitude or construction required for the exploitation of waterpowers held by the commission or for the generation, transmission or distribution of power”; whereas hydro-quebec wishes to construct the electrical power transformer substations, high-voltage or other electrical power transmission and distribution lines, communications networks of any kind, access roads and buildings required for the construction and operation of the said lines between the jacques-cartier transformer substation and the duvernay transformer substation . whereas hydro-quebec asks that the lieutenant-governor in council authorize it to acquire, by mutual agreement or by expropriation and prior possession, the immoveables and real rights it needs for the above-mentioned purposes, it is therefore ordered, on a proposal of the minister of natural resources: that hydro-quebec be authorized to construct electrical power transformer substations, high-voltage or other electrical transmission and distribution lines, communications networks of any kind, access roads and buildings required for the construction and operation of the said lines between the jacques-cartier transformer substation and the duvernay transformer substation, and to acquire by mutual agreement, if it deems that appropriate, or by expropriation and prior possession with filing of plans at the registry office, if it deems that more appropriate, the immoveables or real rights it needs for the purposes set out above, on the land, farms or lots located in the parishes . (2) notices of expropriation and documents related to them [12] having obtained the authorizations it needed by way of order in council 3360-72, the appellant acquired, by expropriation, the servitudes required for the construction of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line following the procedure that applied at that time, it served on the owners — and published at the registry office — notices of expropriation and prior possession (“notices of expropriation”), plans, and overall assessment certificates for the expropriated real rights. the lots currently owned by the respondents were all affected by these expropriation procedures. [13] the notices of expropriation were all composed similarly they read as follows: [translation] the quebec hydro-electric commission, acting pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by the hydro-quebec act (rsq. 1964, chapter 86, as amended) and by the code of civil procedure and duly authorized by order in council number 3360-72 of november 8, 1972, hereby files general plan number . . . for the purpose of obtaining the perpetual real rights of servitude it needs for the construction, operation and maintenance of one (or more) 735-kv electrical transmission line(s), jacques-cartier–duvernay, together with an overall assessment certificate. the said perpetual real rights of servitude consist of: a) b) c) d) e) a right to place, replace, maintain and operate, on the said servient land, one or more high- or low-voltage electrical transmission line(s), and communication lines, including towers and/or poles with the necessary footings, wires, cables, counterweights, anchor rods, guy lines and any other necessary or useful accessories; a right to cut, prune, remove and destroy, in any manner whatsoever and at any time, on the said servient land, any trees, shrubs, branches and bushes, and to remove any objects that may be found there; a right to move about on the said servient land at any time, on foot or in a vehicle of any kind, in order to exercise any right granted to it hereunder; a right to cut, prune and remove any trees located outside the said servient land that could impede or interfere with the functioning, construction, replacement or maintenance of the said line(s), and, for these purposes, to move about on the land adjacent to the said servient land; and a prohibition against any person erecting any construction or structure on, above or under the said servient land, except for the erection of dividing fences and their gates, and against modifying the current elevation of this servient land. in accordance with section 19 of the watercourses act (rsq 1964, chapter 84, as amended), the said perpetual real rights of servitude are created in favour of the dominant land constituted by the electrical transmission line(s) to be erected on the servient land consisting of the immovables indicated in red on the above-mentioned general plan. (ar, at pp. 149-50) (3) agreements [14] after serving and publishing the notices of expropriation, the appellant signed notarial agreements (“agreements” or “agreements at issue”) with the respondents’ predecessors in title. among other things, these agreements describe the servitudes established in favour of the appellant, identify the servient land and the dominant land, and fix the amounts of the indemnities payable for the acquired servitudes and for any work that might be carried out on the servient land. [15] the agreements in question, which were also published at the registry office, differ from one another in only a few details relating, for example, to the amount of the indemnity or to dates. only one of them says nothing about the number of lines authorized on the servient land; all the other agreements limit this number to three. their wording conforms to the following template: [translation] before . . . notary for the province of quebec . appeared: mr. . and: hereinafter called the “owner”; the quebec commission the (hydro-quebec), a corporation duly constituted under “hydro-quebec act” (rsq 1964, chapter 86, as amended) . . . the said quebec hydro-electric commission being duly authorized for the hydro-electric purposes of this agreement by order of the lieutenant-governor in council number 3360-72, dated november 8, 1972. hereinafter called the “commission”; which parties, prior to the acquittance and the agreements which are the subject hereof, do declare as follows: 1. the commission, acting pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by the hydro-quebec act (rsq 1964, chapter 86, as amended) and by the code of civil procedure, has become the owner, by expropriation, of the perpetual real rights of servitude required for the construction, replacement, maintenance and operation, on, above and under the servient land hereinafter described belonging to the owner, of one (or more) electrical transmission line(s) and of communication lines, by the deposit of a plan and the other documents prescribed by the act, in the office of the registration division of . 2. the said perpetual real rights of servitude consist of: (a) a right to place, replace, maintain and operate, on the said servient land, three (3) high- or low-voltage electrical transmission line(s), and communication lines, including towers and/or poles with the necessary footings, wires, cables, counterweights, anchor rods, guy lines and any other necessary or useful accessories; (b) a right to cut, prune, remove and destroy, in any manner whatsoever and at any time, on the said servient land, any trees, shrubs, branches and bushes, and to remove any objects that may be found there; (c) a right to move about on the said servient land, on foot or in a vehicle of any kind, in order to exercise any right granted to it hereunder; (d) a right to cut, prune and remove any trees located outside the said servient land that could impede or interfere with the functioning, construction, replacement or maintenance of the said line(s), and, for these purposes, to move about on the land adjacent to the said servient land; and (e) a prohibition against any person erecting any construction or structure on, above or under the said servient land, except for the erection of dividing fences and their gates, and changing the current elevation of this servient land. 3. in accordance with section 19 of the watercourses act (rsq 1964, chapter 84, as amended), the dominant land in whose favour the above-mentioned rights have thus been established as a perpetual real servitude consists in the electrical transmission line(s) erected or to be erected on the said servient land. 4. the servient land on which the above-mentioned rights have thus been established as a perpetual real servitude consists in the following immovable, namely: . 7. the total indemnity owed to the owner as a result of the expropriation of the above-mentioned perpetual real rights of servitude has been fixed by mutual agreement between the parties in the amount of . in full and final settlement of any amounts owed for any reason whatsoever. these facts being declared, the parties hereto make the following declarations and agreements: acquittance the owner hereby acknowledges that the above-mentioned perpetual real rights of servitude affecting the servient land described above have been duly expropriated by the commission and that he has today received from the latter, to his entire satisfaction, the amount of . representing the indemnity mutually agreed upon between the owner and the commission, in full and final payment of any amount owed for any reason whatsoever, by the commission, further to the aforesaid expropriation, whereof full and final acquittance. as a consequence of the aforesaid payment, the parties hereto require the registrar to mention this agreement wherever doing so is necessary. this indemnity takes into account, among other things, the value of the above-mentioned perpetual real rights of servitude and of the depreciation of the residual part of the said immovable, and covers the value of any timber situated at any time on the said servient land, which timber may be retrieved by the owner, in whole or in part, at his or her own expense and risk, as and when it is cut down, provided that it has not otherwise been used by the commission or its agents for the purposes of its undertaking. furthermore, this indemnity takes into account zero (0) hole(s) dug and used for towers, poles, guy lines and anchor rods placed or to be placed on the said servient land, as well as the existence of such towers, poles, guy lines and anchor rods. should the commission place a larger number of towers, poles, guy lines and anchor rods on the said servient land, it shall pay, once the work has in each case been completed, to the person who is the owner of the said servient land at that time, the additional indemnity set out below, calculated as follows: . conveyance in consideration of the said indemnity, the owner also hereby conveys and transfers to the commission, accepting, for all legal purposes and insofar as they may be needed, the above-mentioned perpetual real rights of servitude in the servient land described above, in favour of the dominant land described above. condition the commission shall pay all costs related to this agreement, its registration and the necessary copies, including one copy for the owner. interpretive clauses . 2 all the clauses, conditions, obligations and agreements stipulated herein shall benefit and be binding on the owner’s representatives, successors and assigns by particular or general title. (ar, at pp. 179-84) [16] having acquired the servitudes, the appellant went ahead with the construction of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line. b reconfiguration of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line [17] in the early 1980s, the appellant reconfigured the jacques-cartier– duvernay line to carry electricity from dams in northwestern quebec southward. the electricity, which until then had come from hydroelectric power plants on the north shore through the jacques-cartier substation, would from then on come from james bay plants through the la vérendrye substation. [18] the quebec government authorized new expropriations by order in council 899-80 of march 26, 1980. these measures did not affect the respondents’ lots. no changes were made to the existing infrastructure. only the origin of the electrons changed. the transmission line passing through the respondents’ lots was no longer the jacques-cartier–duvernay line, but the la vérendrye–duvernay line. up until the time of the trial, the respondents were unaware that a reconfiguration had taken place. c construction of the chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île line [19] on march 13, 2015, the régie de l’énergie du québec authorized a proposed electrical transmission line between the chamouchouane and bout-de-l’île substations this time, the construction of the new line had obvious, tangible repercussions on the respondents’ lots it involved routing a second electrical transmission line through them. [20] by order in council 720-2016, (2016) 148 go 35, 4927, of august 9, 2016, the government authorized the appellant to go ahead with the required expropriations the respondents’ lots were excluded from the scope of the order in council. according to the appellant, the servitudes granted in the 1970s allowed it to route up to three lines through the respondents’ lots, which meant that the project did not require any new expropriations there the respondents disagreed with this interpretation, taking the view that the rights arising from the servitudes established when the jacques-cartier–duvernay line was constructed were limited to that one line only. [21] the appellant then applied for an injunction and obtained a safeguard order as well as interlocutory injunctions, to remain in force pending judgment in its application for a permanent injunction. in a cross-application, the respondents sought damages for unauthorized use of the servitudes following the reconfiguration of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line and for hardship and inconvenience caused by the existing infrastructure. on november 17, 2016, the parties had the proceeding split so as to have the hearing of the cross-application postponed to a later date, depending on the outcome on the issue of the scope of the servitudes: see 2018 qcca 838, at para. 5. iv. judicial history a quebec superior court (sansfaçon j.), 2017 qccs 2347 [22] at trial, sansfaçon j ruled in favour of the appellant he found that the servitudes at issue had originally been acquired by expropriation (para. 24), but that the subsequent agreements had clarified their purpose and scope while also recording the amounts of the indemnities that were paid and the fact that acquittances had been given: paras. 6-7 and 38. [23] in the trial judge’s opinion, the solution to the dispute could be found in the description of the servitudes set out in the notices of expropriation and the agreements, and there was nothing in that description that limited the appellant’s rights to the jacques-cartier–duvernay line (paras. 28-29 and 38). he found that the reference to the construction of that line in the preamble to the notices of expropriation had no impact on the scope of the servitudes: paras. 34 and 36. in his view, the agreements were clear and left no room for doubt in this regard: they authorized the appellant to erect three electrical transmission lines (or more, in some cases) and did not mention the origin or the destination of the electricity (para. 38). [24] sansfaçon j rejected the argument regarding unauthorized use of the servitudes following the reconfiguration of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line on the basis that the notices of expropriation and the agreements contained no restrictions in this regard: paras. 41-43. he noted in passing that this work had in no way affected the respondents’ lots or the servitudes at issue: paras. 41-42. [25] having concluded that the appellant benefited from servitudes authorizing it to place three electrical transmission lines on the respondents’ lots, and therefore to proceed with the construction of the chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île line, he granted the injunction and dismissed the cross-application. b quebec court of appeal (morissette, healy and roy jja), 2018 qcca 838 [26] the court of appeal allowed the respondents’ appeal. it remarked at the outset that sansfaçon j.’s decision to dismiss the cross-application had been ultra petita, as the splitting of the proceeding meant that that matter had no longer been before him: paras. 2, 5-6 and 38. [27] in the court of appeal’s view, the servitudes at issue had been acquired by expropriation and should therefore be characterized as servitudes established by operation of law: paras. 17-18. this led the court of appeal to find that the agreements should be analyzed in light of the limits imposed by order in council 3360-72 and that the scope of the servitudes did not extend beyond what had been authorized by that order in council: para. 18. noting that the existence of a notice of expropriation does not preclude the negotiation of conventional servitudes, the court stated that the agreements entered into in this case should not be characterized in that way, given that they referred to servitudes that had been acquired by expropriation: para. 21. [28] the court of appeal expressed the opinion that the appellant could not rely on the servitudes in its favour for the construction of the new chamouchouane– bout-de-l’île line, because [translation] “order in council 3360-72, the plan, the notices of expropriation and prior possession, the agreements and the acquittances all refer to servitudes for the construction of transmission lines between jacques-cartier and duvernay”: para. 22. having found that order in council 720-2016 of august 9, 2016 empowered the appellant to acquire servitudes by expropriation, the court invited the appellant to proceed by way of new expropriations or agreements: para. 24. [29] the court of appeal rejected the respondents’ argument that the reconfiguration of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line had resulted in a substitution for the dominant land: para. 29. it nonetheless determined that, since the reconfiguration, the appellant had been using the servitudes in its favour for a purpose other than the one provided for in the acts establishing them: para. 37. the court referred the matter of monetary compensation to the judge who would be hearing the cross-application. c quebec court of appeal (savard ja), 2018 qcca 1189 [30] the appellant announced that it intended to appeal to this court, and applied for a stay of the court of appeal’s judgment. the respondents pointed out that their proceedings were intended not to prevent the chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île line from being completed, but to obtain financial compensation. savard ja ordered a stay, noting that other owners in the same situation were relying on the court of appeal’s judgment to prevent the appellant from going ahead with its work. v. issues [31] this appeal raises the following issues: a did the quebec court of appeal err by reassessing the evidence? b. are the power line servitudes in favour of the appellant limited to the jacques-cartier–duvernay line? c. was the appellant’s reconfiguration of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line in the 1980s incompatible with the servitudes? d. are the appellant’s proceedings abusive? vi analysis a did the quebec court of appeal err by reassessing the evidence? [32] the appellant submits that the court of appeal reassessed the evidence in the absence of a palpable and overriding error in concluding at para. 22 that [translation] “the agreements and the acquittances . . refer to servitudes for the construction of transmission lines between jacques-cartier and duvernay” (emphasis added). the appellant also claims that the court conducted its own research regarding order in council 720-2016 of august 9, 2016 after the conclusion of oral argument. the respondents’ position on this point is not entirely clear. after acknowledging that the court of appeal [translation] “conducted a full, in-depth analysis of all the evidence” (rf, at para. 29), they submit that it did not reconsider any questions of fact and that its intervention in the trial judge’s findings presupposed the existence of a reviewable error. [33] absent a palpable and overriding error, an appellate court must refrain from interfering with findings of fact and findings of mixed fact and law made by the trial judge: housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at paras. 10-37; benhaim v. st-germain, 2016 scc 48, [2016] 2 scr 352. an error is palpable if it is plainly seen and if all the evidence need not be reconsidered in order to identify it, and is overriding if it has affected the result: h.l v canada (attorney general), 2005 scc 25, [2005] 1 scr 401, at paras. 55-56 and 69-70; salomon v. matte-thompson, 2019 scc 14, [2019] 1 scr 729, at para. 33. as morissette ja. so eloquently put it in jg v. nadeau, 2016 qcca 167, at para. 77, [translation] “a palpable and overriding error is in the nature not of a needle in a haystack, but of a beam in the eye and it is impossible to confuse these last two notions”: quoted in benhaim, at para. 39. the beam in the eye metaphor not only illustrates the obviousness of a reviewable error, but also connotes a misreading of the case whose impact on the decision is plain to see. [34] the respondents submit that in itself the intervention of a court of appeal with regard to findings of fact or of mixed fact and law presupposes, at least implicitly, that the court first identified a palpable and overriding error. i disagree. the appellate court must point to a palpable and overriding error before such an intervention; otherwise, this court, if it does not identify a reviewable error, must restore the trial judge’s decision: schwartz v canada, [1996] 1 scr 254, at para. 36; hl, at paras. 56 and 70; quebec (director of criminal and penal prosecutions) v jodoin, 2017 scc 26, [2017] 1 scr 478, at para. 51; salomon, at paras. 109-10, per côté j., dissenting, but not on this point; modern cleaning concept inc. v. comité paritaire de l’entretien d’édifices publics de la région de québec, 2019 scc 28, at para. 71, per côté, brown and rowe jj., dissenting, but not on this point. the role of this deferential standard of review would not be fulfilled if every intervention for which no justification was given had to be assumed to be implicitly consistent with it. it would be desirable for an appellate court to precisely identify the palpable and overriding errors in respect of which it is intervening; but in every case, it must be clear from the court’s reasons that it has applied the appropriate standard of review. [35] in the case at bar, the court of appeal made the two errors it is purported to have made. [36] first, it substituted its own opinion for that of the trial judge regarding a question of fact in reaching, i would add, a conclusion that was clearly contrary to the evidence. at para. 22 of its reasons, it wrote: [translation] because order in council 3360-72, the plan, the notices of expropriation and prior possession, the agreements and the acquittances all refer to servitudes for the construction of transmission lines between jacques-cartier and duvernay, hydro-québec cannot rely on these servitudes for the construction of the new chamouchouane– bout-de-l’île line. [emphasis added.] this statement is incorrect. one need only read the words of the agreements and the acquittances to realize that they do not contain even the most obscure allusion to a line between the jacques-cartier and duvernay substations the error is especially significant given that it is intimately linked to the findings on the main issue in the case: the scope of the servitudes established in favour of the appellant. [37] second, the court of appeal compromised the fairness of the proceeding by drawing conclusions regarding the application of order in council 720-2016, of which it took judicial notice after the hearing without notifying the parties. the court wrote: the necessary servitudes [translation] on august [9], 2016, after the proceedings began, the government issued another order in council to enable hydro-québec to the acquire chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île line hydro-québec therefore has the authority to acquire servitudes for the construction of the new line, but must follow the appropriate procedure, that is, either proceed by expropriation or obtain conventional servitudes [emphasis added; footnote omitted.] the construction of for [38] this order in council with respect to expropriation has never been raised by the parties. it was not formally filed in the trial record, nor did it appear in the appeal record. it was touched on in passing at trial, and counsel for the respondents confirmed that the 2016 order in council did not cover his clients’ lots. it did not come up at all in oral argument in the court of appeal. [39] in all likelihood, the court of appeal conducted its own research after the conclusion of oral argument. because the order in council had been published in the gazette officielle du québec, the court could take judicial notice of it: art. 2807 ccq. but the court did much more than that: it decided the case on the basis of the order in council without giving the parties the opportunity to be heard on this subject. however, the scope of order in council 720-2016 is not clear from its words it authorizes hydro-québec for [translation] to acquire, by expropriation, the immovables or servitudes the 735-kv the construction and operation of required chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île project, as well as the related infrastructure and equipment on the land hereinafter defined in accordance with the plans prepared by éric deschamps, land surveyor, on march 10, 2016, under number 10838 of his minutes, and by richard lamontagne, land surveyor, on march 15, 2016, under number 236 of his minutes . [40] it is therefore necessary to refer to the plans in question in order to determine whether the appellant’s expropriation powers under order in council 720-2016 extend to the respondents’ lots. those plans were not published in the gazette officielle du québec, nor were they filed in evidence or even alleged or argued by the parties. this could mean one of two things: either the court of appeal considered plans that were not in evidence and drew erroneous conclusions from them, or it assumed, without verifying, that the respondents’ lots appeared on the land surveyors’ plans whichever is the case, the approach taken raises serious concerns relating to procedural fairness, as the appellant never had the opportunity to make representations regarding this non-viable solution which has been imposed on it, and which could not have been foreseen given what was actually discussed in the course of the litigation. [41] on november 22, 2019, my colleague brown j granted the appellant leave to adduce new evidence for the purpose of establishing that order in council 720-2016 does not authorize the expropriation proceedings on the respondents’ lots it in fact appears that the section of the chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île line where those lots are located was excluded from the plans to which the order in council refers. the appellant explains that it did not ask the government for authorization to expropriate the lots in question, because it believed it already had the real rights it needed to carry out its project it cannot therefore be said that the appellant is authorized to acquire, by expropriation, new servitudes on the respondents’ lots for the construction of the chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île line: ca reasons, at para. 24. indeed, it has no such authorization. [42] the two errors discussed above are significant enough to persuade me to allow this appeal. however, given the circumstances of this case, i think it is necessary to reconsider the court of appeal’s conclusions regarding the scope and exercise of the servitudes established in favour of the appellant. b are the power line servitudes in favour of the appellant limited to the jacques-cartier–duvernay line? [43] in this court, the appellant submits that the servitudes should be characterized as conventional servitudes given that they were negotiated with the respondents’ predecessors in title after the notices of expropriation were published. the agreements, which alone define the object and scope of the servitudes, should therefore prevail over the notices of expropriation it would be inappropriate to interpret the servitudes having regard to an external document such as order in council 3360-72 which, moreover, does not appear in the land register under the agreements, the appellant can construct three electrical transmission lines regardless of the origin or destination of the electricity they carry. [44] the respondents counter that the servitudes were acquired by expropriation and that the agreements concern only the indemnity that was payable. in oral argument, their counsel essentially maintained that the agreements on which the appellant relies have two parts. the first part begins with the following words: [translation] which parties [ie, the parties to the act], prior to the acquittance and the agreements which are the subject hereof, do declare as follows . the second begins as follows: these facts being declared, the parties hereto make the following declarations and agreements . (ar, at pp. 180 and 182) in the respondents’ view, this structure suggests that the first part of the agreements, in which the real rights flowing from the servitudes are enumerated, plays the role of a mere declaratory preamble, while the content of the agreement proper is limited to the indemnities and the acquittance stipulated in the second part accordingly, the servitudes, having been established by operation of law, should be interpreted in light of order in council 3360-72 and the documents subsequent to it — namely the notices of expropriation and the plans — which prevail over the declaratory provisions in the first part of the notarial agreements. because the order, the notices of expropriation and the plans refer to the jacques-cartier–duvernay line, it follows, they submit, that the servitudes only permit the construction or operation of lines between those two substations. (1) characterization of the post-expropriation agreements [45] the disagreement between the courts below with regard to the characterization of the servitudes at issue essentially rests on the characterization of the post-expropriation agreements the court of appeal recognized that publishing a notice of expropriation does not bar the expropriating party and the expropriated party from subsequently negotiating conventional servitudes, but it concluded that the appellant and the respondents’ predecessors in title had negotiated nothing of the sort, given that their agreements referred to servitudes acquired by expropriation and that such references would preclude the servitudes being characterized as conventional servitudes: para. 21. [46] the characterization of the agreements at issue is so intimately linked to the assessment of the facts that i see this more as a question of mixed fact and law than as a pure question of law: uniprix inc. v. gestion gosselin et bérubé inc., 2017 scc 43, [2017] 2 scr 59, at paras. 38 and 42; churchill falls (labrador) corp v. hydro-québec, 2018 scc 46, [2018] 3 scr 101, at para. 49. with respect, i find that the court of appeal erred in interfering with the trial judge’s conclusions in the absence of a palpable and overriding error. there is no such error in sansfaçon j.’s conclusion, which is perfectly justifiable in light of the evidence. [47] first, the agreements contain a clause entitled “cession” (conveyance), by which: [translation] . . the owner . . conveys and transfers to the commission, accepting, for all legal purposes and insofar as they may be needed, the above-mentioned perpetual real rights of servitude in the servient land . . . in favour of the dominant land . this clause appears after the acquittance, that is, in the part of the agreement that opens with the phrase “these facts being declared, the parties hereto make the following declarations and agreements” it is thus, according to the respondents’ argument, at the core of the agreement proper. it explicitly states that the owner of the servient land grants the owner of the dominant land the servitudes described in para. 2 of the preceding part. this is confirmed by the use of the word “cession” in the heading of the clause in question at the time the agreements at issue were signed, leading french dictionaries defined this word as follows: [translation] [conveyance]. . . . the action of conveying, transferring to another that which one owns. (dictionnaire de l’académie française (8th ed. 1932), vol. 1, at p 212) [translation] [c]onveyance. . . . 1 the action of abandoning to another person a right which one holds or owns . . . 2 the action of conveying to another person property in one’s possession. (grand larousse de la langue française (1971), vol. 1, at p 652) [translation] [conveyance]. . . . law. the action of conveying (a right, property). see transfer; assignment, sale. convey. . . 2 law to transfer ownership of a thing to another person. see grant, divest, deliver, reconvey, transfer, sell . (p. robert, dictionnaire alphabétique & analogique de la langue française (1976), at p 250 and p 242) [48] second, sansfaçon j found that after the notices of expropriation were published, the parties’ predecessors in title had [translation] “sign[ed] an agreement . . . in which they detailed the object of the servitude”: para. 6 (emphasis added).3 after reproducing the substantive portions of the notices of expropriation, he pointed to the provisions of the notarial agreements, which vary as regards the number of electrical transmission lines that can be placed on the servient land: paras. 5-7 although the notices of expropriation are vague regarding the number of lines authorized by the servitudes, “in most of the contracts at issue, this number of lines is set at three”: para. 7 a discrepancy between the two instruments regarding such an important stipulation tends to confirm that negotiations with respect to the scope of the servitudes themselves were conducted after the notices of expropriation had been published. [49] third, i have difficulty seeing how the agreements at issue can be characterized without taking into account the real rights obtained by the appellant, focusing instead on the monetary consideration as if these were merely compensation agreements. i cannot agree with the respondents’ argument that their predecessors in title agreed to the amount of the indemnity but only recognized the expropriation itself. according to the very words of the agreements, the indemnity is simply the 3 the court of appeal repeated this finding at para. 15 of its reasons, but ascribed no legal consequences to it. consideration for the main prestation set out in the [translation] “conveyance” clause, which is reproduced above: it is “[i]n consideration of the said indemnity” that the owner of the servient land “conveys and transfers . . accepting, for all legal purposes and insofar as they may be needed, the . . . perpetual real rights of servitude” described at the beginning of the agreements. [50] i find that sansfaçon j was correct in concluding that the agreements at issue are servitude agreements what now remains to be done is to determine their effect having regard to order in council 3360-72 and the notices of expropriation. (2) distinction between the agreements, the notices of expropriation and the order in council [51] to determine the scope of the servitudes established in favour of the appellant, sansfaçon j considered the notices of expropriation and the agreements, relying on the latter to clear up any ambiguities: paras. 34-38. in the court of appeal’s view, the appropriate approach was instead to analyze all the documents —notices of expropriation, plans, agreements and acquittances — in the context of the limits imposed by order in council 3360-72: paras. 18 and 22. [52] the order in council, the notices of expropriation and the agreements are different types of documents, and it is important to distinguish them from one another. an order in council issued in accordance with s 33(3)(b) hqa, as amended,4 is an 4 today, the reference would instead be to the hydro-québec act. administrative act for the purpose of authorizing the exercise of the “power . . to deprive a property owner of the enjoyment of the attributes of his or her right of ownership”: lorraine (ville) v 2646-8926 québec inc., 2018 scc 35, [2018] 2 scr 577, at para. 1 this authorization is a form of administrative tutorship exercised by the lieutenant-governor in council (today one would say by the government) over the appellant’s discretion with respect to expropriation: p. issalys and d. lemieux, l’action gouvernementale: précis de droit des institutions administratives (4th ed. 2020), at pp. 173-74 and 353; p. garant, with p. garant and j. garant, droit administratif (7th ed 2017), at pp. 445-51 filing a notice of expropriation and the documents related to it is an administrative act that establishes and individualizes the servitude. as for the agreement, it relates to the ordinary exercise of civil rights and to the private law rules of contract. [53] a servitude acquired by expropriation is, according to the classification set out in art. 1181 ccq, a servitude established by “operation of law”: s. normand, introduction au droit des biens (3rd ed. 2020), at p 322; d-c. lamontagne, biens et propriété (8th ed. 2018), at no. 611; p-c. lafond, précis de droit des biens (2nd ed. 2007), at para. 2046 this being the case, neither the law nor public order bars the expropriating party and the expropriated party from clarifying or modifying such a servitude by mutual agreement agreements similar to the ones at issue have come before our courts on several occasions: michaud et simard inc v commission hydro-électrique de québec, [1982] c.a 169 (que.); domaine de la rivière inc v. aluminium du canada ltée, [1996] rdi 6 (ca);. sani sport inc. v. hydro-québec, 2008 qcca 2498, [2009] rjq 26; lafond, at paras. 2046-47. [54] michaud et simard inc. is of particular interest in this regard. it concerned the scope of power line servitudes for which notices of expropriation had been issued and agreements had subsequently been entered into. bisson ja wrote the following for a unanimous panel: [translation] . . . i conclude that the conventional servitudes must prevail in this case. it is true that there were notices of expropriation, but these notices were followed by negotiations and conventional servitudes. the expropriated party attempted to draw a distinction between servitudes of public utility, which were referred to as administrative servitudes, and conventional servitudes. i find that an entity such as hydro, which is empowered to obtain servitudes of public utility by expropriation, does not in so doing lose the capacity to acquire servitudes by agreement. hydro, which has all the general powers of a corporation, obviously has the power to negotiate the acquisition of a servitude. from this, i conclude that the agreements subsequently entered into with the owners of the servient land must prevail over notices of expropriation r-19 of 1953 as amended in 1953 for bersimis i and r-20 of 1957 for bersimis ii. what now remains to be seen is what rights and obligations were acquired by hydro, on the one hand, and conveyed by the owners of the servient land, on the other hand, in each of these agreements. [citations omitted; pp. 175-76.] i agree with this reasoning. it must be presumed that the servitude agreement, if entered into after the notice of expropriation, contains a more faithful definition of the scope and terms for exercise of the servitude of public utility than does the notice of expropriation. this is particularly true in the case at bar, given that the agreements at issue include a complete description of the servitudes, adding some details that do not appear in the notices of expropriation (such as the authorized number of lines). in these circumstances, the agreements are the titles to which the owners of the servient land and the dominant land must refer in exercising their respective rights. [55] the court of appeal agreed with the principle from michaud et simard inc. that notices of expropriation do not preclude parties from negotiating conventional servitudes, but it concluded that that principle did not apply, because the agreements at issue [translation] “refe[r] to the acquisition of servitudes by expropriation”: para. 21. to me, such a distinction seems excessively formalistic. first, it is based on a textual argument that does not take into account the real content of the agreements: see paras. 47-49 of these reasons second, the reference to the means by which the servitudes were established becomes irrelevant when one recognizes that a servitude acquired by expropriation may be amended by agreement third, if it were to be accepted that two different sets of rules applied depending on whether the post-expropriation agreements referred to the means of establishment of the servitudes, it would become practically impossible to draw a clear line between cases in which the servitude must be analyzed on the basis of the notice of expropriation and documents related to it, and cases in which it must be analyzed on the basis of the subsequent agreement. [56] in my view, the approach according to which the servitudes should be analyzed in light of the order in council is also wrong. an order in council issued in accordance with s 33 of the hqa is concerned with the public use relied on to justify the expropriation. it expresses an administrative authorization to intrude on the owner’s right to the free disposition of his or her property, but it does not in itself grant any real rights. it makes it possible to establish a servitude without the consent of the owner of the servient land, but does not establish a servitude on that land. what define the rights granted by the servitudes are the titles: domaine de la rivière inc.; normand, at p 320; lafond, at para. 2050. in the instant case, the titles are the servitude agreements. [57] servitude agreements are subject to the rules applicable to the interpretation of contracts: centre de distribution intégré (cdi) inc. v. développements olymbec inc., 2015 qcca 1463, 59 rpr (5th) 1, at para. 17; 151692 canada inc. v. centre de loisirs de pierrefonds enr., 2005 qcca 376, [2005] rdi 237, at para. 30; normand, at p 329; see also uniprix, at paras. 34-41. if their words are clear, effect must be given to the clearly expressed intention of the parties if, however, the agreements, read as a whole, are vague, ambiguous or incomplete, the common intention of the parties must be sought: art. 1425 ccq. [58] but there is no need to go to that second step in this case, as sansfaçon j. has already found that the agreements were clear: para. 38. whether a contract is clear or ambiguous is, in the context of an appeal, a question of mixed fact and law for which the applicable standard for intervention is palpable and overriding error: uniprix, at para. 41. because no such errors have been established, the scope of the servitudes must be determined in light of the words of the agreements at issue. (3) rights under the servitude agreements [59] in substance, the agreements grant the appellant:  servitudes allowing it to place, replace, operate and maintain up to three electrical transmission lines;5  servitudes for tree cutting and pruning;  servitudes of right of way; and  servitudes of non-construction. [60] they do not mention any restrictions regarding the origin or destination of the electricity the argument that the servitudes are limited to the line between the jacques-cartier and duvernay substations must therefore fail moreover, the respondents’ suggestion that a restrictive interpretation of the powers of expropriation 5 these “lines” should not be confused with the [translation] “electrical wires” (trial reasons, at paras. 45-50). is required cannot be accepted either. what we must rule on here is not the exercise of a public power, but the scope of contractual agreements. [61] the servitudes on the respondents’ lots authorize the appellant to construct the chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île line. as i mentioned above, there is no need to refer to the provisions of the notices of expropriation: the agreements must prevail. i wish to be clear, however, that had it been necessary to do so, my conclusion would have been the same. i agree with sansfaçon j that the reference in the preamble of the notices of expropriation to order in council 3360-72 and the jacques-cartier–duvernay line has no impact on the description of the scope of the servitudes: trial reasons, at paras. 34 and 36. c was the appellant’s reconfiguration of the jacques-cartier–duvernay line in the 1980s incompatible with the servitudes? [62] having unduly limited the appellant’s rights on the respondents’ land to the jacques-cartier–duvernay line, the court of appeal concluded that the redirection of that line to the la vérendrye substation in the early 1980s was incompatible with the servitudes. [63] the appellant submits that this conclusion seriously compromises the principle of stability of real rights on which the evolution of its system depends, especially given that redirecting an electrical transmission line to another substation has no effect on the situation of the servient land. as for the respondents, they see this change as a substitution for the dominant land. [64] to identify the dominant land, the agreements at issue refer to s 19 of the watercourses act, rsq 1964, c 84.6 contrary to what the respondents suggest, the dominant land is not the transmission line between the jacques-cartier and duvernay substations. rather, it is [translation] “the electrical transmission line(s) erected or to be erected on the said servient land”: art. 3 of the agreements. on this point, i agree with the court of appeal that there is no new dominant land, because the transmission line is still there: ca reasons, at para. 29. [65] however, i find that the court of appeal erred in concluding that the appellant [translation] “is using the line for a purpose other than the one provided for in the act of servitude” (para. 37). as i explained above, the servitudes at issue must be analyzed in light of the agreements subsequent to the notices of expropriation, and those agreements contain no restrictions as to the origin of the electricity. they grant the right to [translation] “place, replace, maintain and operate, on the said servient land, three (3) high- or low-voltage electrical transmission line(s), and communication lines”. the servitudes concern the lines crossing the servient land, not the substations located at either end of those lines. i see nothing in the words of the agreements that would explicitly or implicitly prevent the appellant from redirecting one of its lines toward another substation the right to operate electrical transmission lines clearly 6 now the watercourses act, cqlr, c. r-13. includes the right to make modifications such as the one that was made in the early 1980s. d are the appellant’s proceedings abusive? [66] the respondents submit that the appellant is abusing its rights and that the proceedings it has undertaken are themselves abusive they seek a substantial indemnity that, they claim, corresponds to the expenditures and costs they incurred. [67] no evidence has been adduced in this regard at first glance, however, there is nothing abusive about these proceedings the appellant sought to use the servitudes that had been granted to it by the respondents’ predecessors in title and had been published in the land register. the respondents were presumed to be aware of the rights granted by these servitudes: arts. 1182 and 2941 ccq. they nonetheless blocked construction of the new chamouchouane–bout-de-l’île line, which forced the appellant to seek injunction orders. unsuccessful at trial, the respondents appealed the case, and they now claim that the appellant must [translation] “be found liable to [them] for all the expenditures it caused them to incur in all three (3) courts”: rf, at para. 128. with respect, it is not up to the appellant to pay for the steps they took. vii conclusion [68] for these reasons, i would allow the appeal, set aside the court of appeal’s decision and restore all the conclusions of the trial judge’s decision, except the one stated in para. 66 i would remand the case to the superior court for hearing of the cross-application. the appellant is entitled to its costs throughout. appeal allowed with costs throughout.
i. introduction [1] at the heart of these appeals is the balance between the protection of the rights of the accused in the criminal process and society’s interest in the effective investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. the appeals raise three issues: (1) the voluntariness of one of the appellants’ confessions under the common law confessions rule; (2) whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder; and (3) whether the appellants’ confessions were “obtained in a manner” that breached the canadian charter of rights and freedoms because the police failed to make a “fresh start” from earlier charter breaches, and if their confessions were so obtained, whether they must be excluded under s 24(2). [2] the appellants, brian john lambert and james andrew beaver, shared a townhouse in calgary with the deceased, sutton bowers. one morning, lambert called 9-1-1 and alleged that he and beaver had arrived home to find bowers dead in a puddle of blood. lambert told the 9-1-1 operator that they did not know how bowers had died, but he admitted that there had been “altercations all week”, including the night before when bowers had told both lambert and beaver to “get the hell out” (rr, at pp. 17- 18). the operator told lambert that the townhouse would be treated as a crime scene for now. [3] it is not disputed that the police officers who attended the scene in response to the 9-1-1 call breached the appellants’ charter rights by detaining them and taking them to the police station without lawful authority. it is also not disputed that when homicide detectives realized that their colleagues had unlawfully detained the appellants, they promptly tried to make a “fresh start” by advising them of their charter rights and then arresting them for murder. when questioned separately, the appellants initially denied any knowledge of how bowers had died. eventually, however, they both confessed to killing bowers during a fight, mopping up his blood, and dragging his body to the bottom of the stairs to make his death look like an accident. at issue at trial was the admissibility of these confessions. [4] at trial, the appellants argued that their confessions were involuntary and thus inadmissible under the common law confessions rule. the appellants also asserted that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest them for murder. in the alternative, the appellants claimed that because the homicide detectives had failed to make a “fresh start” from the charter breaches that stemmed from the appellants’ unlawful detention, their confessions were obtained in a manner that breached the charter and must be excluded under s 24(2). [5] on voir dire, the court of queen’s bench of alberta disagreed with the appellants and admitted their confessions into evidence (2019 abqb 125, 88 alta. lr. (6th) 337). based on this decision, the appellants entered an agreed statement of facts in which they admitted their role in the killing and invited the trial judge to convict them as co-principals to manslaughter. the trial judge did so and sentenced each to four years’ imprisonment (2019 abqb 235). the court of appeal of alberta dismissed the appellants’ appeals from conviction (2020 abca 203, 4 alta. lr (7th) 301) and sentence (2021 abca 227). the appellants now appeal their convictions to this court with leave. only beaver appeals the voluntariness of his confession. both beaver and lambert claim that their confessions should be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter. [6] i would dismiss the appeals, but for somewhat different reasons than the decisions under appeal. as i will explain, i agree with the lower courts that beaver’s confession was voluntary and thus admissible under the common law confessions rule. i also agree that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder. however, i find that the homicide detectives made a “fresh start” from the charter breaches arising from the appellants’ unlawful detention for lambert but not for beaver. thus, only beaver’s confession was obtained in a manner that breached the charter. balancing the lines of inquiry under s 24(2) of the charter, i conclude that admitting beaver’s confession into evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute i would thus confirm the appellants’ convictions for manslaughter. ii background facts a. three roommates: bowers, lambert, and beaver [7] the appellants, lambert and beaver, and the deceased, bowers, were roommates in a townhouse in calgary. bowers was the landlord of the property, as his father owned the townhouse and allowed him to live there rent-free and earn income by renting out rooms. beaver and lambert were tenants. b. the suspicious 9-1-1 call [8] on october 9, 2016, at 9:59 am,. lambert called 9-1-1 to report that “there’s a guy in a puddle of blood . . . inside [his] house” (rr, at p 16). he told the 9-1-1 and calgary police service operators that there had been “altercations all week”, including when he came home the previous night and bowers “had people there” (p 17). lambert said that bowers “told [him and beaver] to get the hell out”, so he left with beaver because he “wasn’t about to get into a confrontation” (pp. 17-18) he claimed that when he returned the next morning, he found bowers lying “in a puddle of blood”, “face down front [on] the floor” (p 21). [9] the calgary police service operator told lambert that the situation would be treated with “just a little bit of a suspicion because [they] don’t know what’s goin’ on at this point” (pp. 24-25) lambert insisted he did not know what happened to bowers, repeating “[h]e was pretty angry at us, so we just left” (p 25). lambert then confirmed that bowers was not conscious or breathing, and advised that beaver said that “he looks like he fell and hit his head” (p 26). the calgary police service operator said that they would “treat [the townhouse] as a crime scene for now” (p 27). while awaiting emergency medical services, the 9-1-1 operator told lambert to perform cpr, but lambert advised that rigor mortis had set in, adding: “he’s dead” (p 36). c. the police find bowers dead [10] within minutes, police and emergency medical services arrived and found bowers at the foot of the staircase, where he lay dead the senior police officer, sgt. james lines, directed that this was a crime scene. he ordered two other officers, csts. trent taylor and alana husband, to detain lambert and beaver under the medical examiners act, legislation that he admitted on the voir dire does not exist; he had meant to refer to alberta’s fatality inquiries act, rsa 2000, c. f-9, but this act provides no detention powers. d. the police detain lambert [11] as directed, cst. taylor told lambert that he was being detained under the medical examiners act. he advised lambert that he had the right to retain and instruct a lawyer without delay and cautioned him, saying that he could be charged with an offence and that he did not have to say anything but anything he did say could be used in evidence lambert said that he understood the caution and wanted to speak to a lawyer “to cover [his] ass”, even though he was “not guilty of anything” (ar, vol. i, at p 95). [12] while cst. taylor drove lambert to police headquarters, he asked him what had happened. lambert repeated what he had told the 9-1-1 operator. on the voir dire, cst. taylor conceded that he had “messed up” and that he should not have questioned lambert during the drive because he had asked to speak to a lawyer (p 109). at no point did cst. taylor place lambert under arrest. e. the police detain beaver [13] cst. husband placed beaver in her police car. when beaver was alone in the car, the car video recorded him saying, “[t]hey’re gonna take my statement” (ar, vol. iii, at p 26). cst. husband then told him: “i just have to read you the legalities here. . . i am investigatively, detaining you for, uh, whatever’s going on in there, (laughing)” (p 28) she advised beaver of his right to retain and instruct a lawyer without delay and asked him if he wanted to contact a lawyer. he responded, “i don’t need one. . . no” (p 30) cst. husband repeated that beaver was being “investigatively detained” and cautioned him, saying that he did not have to say anything but anything he did say could be used in evidence (p 30) beaver said he understood. [14] when cst. husband asked beaver what had happened, he responded with a narrative consistent with lambert’s 9-1-1 call she then drove him to police headquarters, told him he was still under investigative detention, and asked him again if he wanted to speak to a lawyer once again, he declined at no point did cst. husband place beaver under arrest. f. the arrival of a seasoned homicide detective [15] soon afterwards, a medical investigator from the office of the chief medical examiner contacted the calgary homicide unit to communicate that bowers’ death appeared suspicious at 10:36 am,. s/sgt. colin chisholm telephoned det. christian vermette, a seasoned homicide detective, and told him to come to work. on the voir dire, det. vermette testified that he was “basically [being called out to work] on a suspicious death” because it was his “turn to be the primary investigator for the next homicide” (ar, vol. i, at p 207). he testified that s/sgt. chisholm, who had spoken to the medical investigator, “basically relayed . . that a male was found facedown in a pool of blood near the front entrance of a residence” and “that there was some sort of conflict or dispute that occurred between the victim and roommates” (p 205) det. vermette’s impression at this point was that the two roommates were under arrest and on their way to police headquarters. [16] at 10:46 am,. det. vermette received an email from s/sgt. chisholm with the subject line “looks like new homicide” and which confirmed what the staff sergeant had just told him by phone. [17] at 11:22 am,. det. vermette arrived at police headquarters, and at 11:39 am, he met with csts. taylor and husband, who told him that lambert and beaver had been “chartered and cautioned” (p 210). det. vermette then “review[ed] the file”, which included an event information document that summarized the 9-1-1 call and an event chronology document that detailed the events after the 9-1-1 call and included contemporaneous police comments (p 209) he also reviewed a police information management system report, which noted that three days earlier the police had attended at the townhouse because lambert had reported that bowers assaulted him but that he did not want charges laid and would not provide a statement. the police information management system report stated that lambert planned to move out within the next two weeks and that he did not want the police to speak to bowers. g. lambert and beaver arrive at police headquarters [18] at 11:15 am,. lambert and beaver arrived at police headquarters. lambert spoke to a lawyer by telephone. beaver declined the opportunity to do so. [19] two homicide investigators, dets. matthew demarino and reagan hossack, were tasked with interviewing lambert and beaver, respectively. [20] at 12:09 pm,. det. demarino, who believed that lambert and beaver were already under arrest, began interviewing lambert he confirmed that lambert had spoken to a lawyer and that he understood his lawyer’s advice. det. demarino advised lambert that, regardless of anything anyone had previously told him, he did not have to say anything unless he wished to do so, but anything he did say could be used in evidence he then repeated this caution once more and lambert indicated that he understood det. demarino also informed lambert that his interview was being recorded. [21] det. demarino asked lambert if he knew the deceased. at first, lambert responded that he “[d]on’t wanna talk about nothin’”, saying that the police “have ways to figure out who [the deceased] is without [him] having to talk to [them] about it” (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 7-8) later, he confirmed that the deceased was his roommate, bowers. [22] when det. demarino left the interview to give this information to the homicide team, he spoke with cst. husband. it was only at this time that det. demarino learned that neither lambert nor beaver had been arrested at this point, beaver’s interview had not yet begun. [23] at about 12:20 pm,. det. vermette was advised that neither beaver nor lambert had been arrested. at 12:22 pm,. det. vermette directed dets. demarino and hossack to arrest lambert and beaver for murder when making this direction, det. vermette believed that he had reasonable and probable grounds to do so. h. lambert is arrested for murder [24] at 12:29 pm,. det. demarino arrested lambert for murder and then continued to interview him, underscoring that “this is a very, very serious matter” (p 17). det. demarino tried to distance his interaction with lambert from the earlier unlawful conduct by (1) telling him they were going to “start from the very beginning” (p 17); (2) telling him four times he was under arrest for murder; (3) facilitating lambert’s second consultation with a lawyer and confirming that he understood his lawyer’s advice; (4) repeating that they “have to start everything all over again” (p 30) after lambert consulted a lawyer; and (5) providing him with a primary caution three times during the interview (ie, that he did not have to say anything unless he wished to do so but whatever he did say could be used in evidence) and a secondary caution (ie, that his decision on whether to speak to the police should not be influenced by anything he had already told the police or that the police had told him). i. beaver is arrested for murder [25] at roughly the same time, det. hossack arrested beaver for murder. unlike det. demarino, however, det. hossack did not caution beaver again instead, she referred to cst. husband’s earlier caution, saying, “it’s no different than what uh, constable husband read to you [a] little while ago” (ar, vol. iii, at p 51). she said that she was “just reading it ’cause [she’s] a new person that [he’s] gonna be talking to” (pp. 51-52). (at the voir dire, det. hossack acknowledged that her failure to caution beaver was “a mistake, an error, on [her] part” (ar, vol. i, at p 185).) det. hossack advised beaver of his right to retain and instruct counsel without delay, but beaver declined to speak to a lawyer, saying he did not think he needed one. he then added that he “probably should” speak with a lawyer and that he was “not understanding the severity of it” (ar, vol. iii, at p 53). det. hossack emphasized to beaver that it was up to him whether he spoke to a lawyer and reminded him that he was being questioned because “someone was found dead in the apartment” and that he had “been brought [to the police headquarters] because [he was] there” (p 53). det. hossack then repeated, “it’s just important that you know that you can call a lawyer right now” (p 54), and then said, once again, “it’s important that you know that if you wanna call a lawyer you can” (p 55). beaver insisted that he did not need a lawyer and formally waived his right to counsel. j. det. vermette confirms his earlier decision to arrest the appellants [26] at 12:35 pm, just a few minutes after det. vermette had directed that the appellants be arrested for murder, he learned that bowers had sent facebook messages to a friend the previous evening highlighting his conflicts with beaver and lambert: 6:36 pm im taking brian and jim down they fucked me 9:13 p.m i just destroyed brian and jim now i can get some worthy roommates any suggestions (rr, at p 45) [27] these messages confirmed det. vermette’s earlier decision to arrest the appellants. k after police questioning, lambert confesses [28] det. demarino questioned lambert for over 12 hours at first, lambert maintained that he had found bowers dead in the townhouse and that he had nothing to do with his death but at the tail end of the interview, det. demarino confronted lambert with inculpatory evidence that led him to confess that bowers had died during a fight with him and beaver. l. after seeing a video of lambert’s confession, beaver confesses [29] during the first 12 hours of his interview, beaver also maintained that he had nothing to do with bowers’ death. he insisted that he did not remember details of events that took place before his arrival at the police headquarters because he had been drinking the night before. he continued to cite his poor memory even when he was shown lambert’s videotaped confession det. hossack’s interviewing style then became more confrontational. she called beaver’s memory lapse “bullshit” and said “people . . . don’t forget stuff like this” (ar, vol. iii, at p 282). within another hour of questioning, beaver confessed, admitting that bowers had died during a fight with him and lambert. m beaver and lambert are charged with manslaughter and obstruction of justice [30] beaver and lambert were charged with manslaughter for their involvement in bowers’ death and obstruction of justice for misleading the police in the investigation into bowers’ death. iii. judgments below a court of queen’s bench of alberta (yamauchi j.) (1) the voir dire ruling, 2019 abqb 125, 88 alta. lr (6th) 337 [31] on a blended voir dire, the trial judge held that the crown had proved the voluntariness of the appellants’ confessions beyond a reasonable doubt and that neither of their confessions should be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter. [32] first, the trial judge held that beaver’s confession to det. hossack was voluntary applying r v oickle, 2000 scc 38, [2000] 2 scr 3, the trial judge concluded that beaver had an operating mind and that the police did not extract his confession through threats, promises, police trickery, or oppressive tactics (paras. 82 and 94-95) nothing det. hossack did during the interview broke beaver’s will; “[w]hat did break his will was the version of events that mr. lambert had provided to det. demarino” (para. 96) det. hossack’s failure to repeat the police caution that cst. husband previously provided did not deprive beaver of a meaningful choice as to whether to speak to the police, since “[t]here is no requirement that the police repeat the caution” if the accused “already indicates that he understands his right to refuse to answer questions” (para. 92). [33] second, the trial judge held that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest both appellants for murder. det. vermette subjectively believed he had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants (at para. 151), and his belief was objectively reasonable “based on the trauma that mr. bower[s] suffered, the motive that [the appellants] had, and the opportunity [they had] to carry out their objectives” (para. 159). [34] third, the trial judge held that the homicide detectives “cured” the charter breaches arising from the appellants’ unlawful detention by making a “fresh start” and arresting the appellants for murder at the police headquarters (paras. 191 and 209). the crown conceded and the trial judge found that the police breached ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the charter in their initial interactions with the appellants. the appellants were unlawfully detained contrary to s 9 of the charter because there was no statutory basis to detain them or any basis to place them under investigative detention at common law (paras. 149 and 229) their ss. 10(a) and 10(b) charter rights were also breached because they did not know the jeopardy they faced after being detained under non- existent legislation (paras. 183 and 188). finally, lambert’s s 10(b) charter right was further infringed when cst. taylor asked him what had happened after lambert said he wanted to speak to a lawyer (para. 185). nevertheless, the “fresh start” made by the homicide detectives meant that the appellants’ confessions were not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter there was thus no need to consider s 24(2) (paras. 209 and 215). [35] fourth, in the alternative, the trial judge held that admitting the appellants’ confessions would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute (para. 254). although the seriousness of the charter-infringing state conduct in the initial police interactions favoured excluding the confessions, the minimal impact of the breaches on the appellants’ charter-protected interests and society’s interest in adjudicating the case on the merits “tip[ped] the balance in favour of admission” under s 24(2) (para. 259). (2) the trial decision [36] with the confessions admitted into evidence, the parties submitted an agreed statement of facts inviting the trial judge to convict lambert and beaver for manslaughter and to make the following factual findings and inferences: (1) lambert and beaver verbally argued with bowers about the rent for the townhouse; (2) the argument turned into a violent scuffle involving all three men, resulting in bowers’ death from “blunt force trauma to the neck”; (3) “[t]he force used by lambert and beaver caused the death of bowers”; (4) lambert and beaver placed bowers’ body at the bottom of the stairs and mopped up the blood to mislead the authorities about how he died; and (5) lambert and beaver “had an agreement as to what to falsely tell the authorities, and did so starting with lambert’s 911 call” (rr, at p 48). [37] the trial judge accepted the agreed statement of facts, made the invited factual findings and inferences, and convicted the appellants of manslaughter the crown then stayed the obstruction of justice charges. [38] the trial judge sentenced the appellants to four years’ imprisonment, less credit for pretrial custody, and imposed various ancillary orders (2019 abqb 235, paras. 78-81 (canlii)). he found that the appellants killed bowers in a “two on one” attack involving “gratuitous violence” (para. 31) and noted that they made a failed attempt to feign an accident by moving bowers’ body to the bottom of the stairs. the trial judge concluded that the gravity of the offence and moral culpability of both appellants was “very high” (paras. 31 and 48-49). b court of appeal of alberta, 2020 abca 203, 4 alta. lr (7th) 301 (o’ferrall, wakeling and feehan jja) [39] the court of appeal dismissed the conviction appeals there was no reviewable error in the trial judge’s assessment of voluntariness (paras. 30-31) the police also had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder and “made a practical and common-sense decision” to arrest them “based on the information [det. vermette] had received by the time of the arrests” (para. 9). [40] the court of appeal agreed that the homicide detectives made a “fresh start” in arresting the appellants, such that their confessions were not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter (paras. 15 and 18) the police gathered little evidence of significance when the appellants were unlawfully detained, and the homicide detectives tried to insulate any subsequent evidence they might gather from the earlier charter breaches (para. 17). there was “no causal connection” between any charter breach and the confessions, “arguably no temporal connection”, and “the context in which the confessions were given was completely different from the initial detention and early general questions” (para. 26). there was thus no need to consider whether the trial judge erred in his alternative s 24(2) analysis (para. 27). [41] the court of appeal later dismissed the sentence appeals (2021 abca 227). iv. issues [42] these appeals raise three issues: a was beaver’s confession voluntary? b did the police have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder? c. should the appellants’ confessions be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter? v analysis a was beaver’s confession voluntary? [43] before this court, only beaver challenges the voluntariness of his confession. he argues that his confession was involuntary and therefore inadmissible under the common law confessions rule. beaver notes that the trial judge was the same trial judge as in r v. tessier, 2018 abqb 387, a decision that the court of appeal of alberta overturned as reflecting “an impoverished understanding of the modern confessions rule” (2020 abca 289, 12 alta. lr (7th) 55, at para. 46). since then, however, a majority of this court, per kasirer j., has overturned the court of appeal’s decision (2022 scc 35 (“tessier (scc)”)). [44] as i will elaborate, i do not accept that beaver’s confession was involuntary. it therefore need not be excluded under the common law confessions rule. (1) the common law confessions rule (a) general principles [45] the common law confessions rule provides that a confession to a person in authority is presumptively inadmissible, unless the crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary (oickle, at paras. 30 and 68; r v. spencer, 2007 scc 11, [2007] 1 scr 500, at para. 11; tessier (scc), at paras. 39, 68 and 89). under the confessions rule, an involuntary confession “always warrants exclusion” (oickle, at para. 30; see also r v singh, 2007 scc 48, [2007] 3 scr 405, at para. 38). but a voluntary confession need not always be admitted into evidence. if a voluntary confession was obtained in a manner that breached the charter, it can still potentially be excluded under s 24(2) (oickle, at para. 30; singh, at para. 38). [46] at the heart of the confessions rule is the delicate balance between individual rights and collective interests in the criminal justice system (singh, at paras. 1, 21, 27-28, 31 and 34; tessier (scc), at paras. 4 and 69; oickle, at para. 33). the “twin goals” of the rule involve “protecting the rights of the accused without unduly limiting society’s need to investigate and solve crimes” (oickle, at para. 33). on the one hand, the common law recognizes an individual’s right against self-incrimination and right to remain silent, such that an individual need not give information to the police or answer their questions absent statutory or other legal compulsion; on the other hand, the police often need to speak to people when discharging their important public responsibility to investigate and solve crime. [47] voluntariness, broadly defined, is the “touchstone” of the confessions rule (oickle, at paras. 27, 32 and 69; spencer, at para. 11; singh, at para. 31). voluntariness is a shorthand for a complex of values engaging policy concerns related to not only the reliability of confessions, but also to respect for individual free will, the need for the police to obey the law, and the fairness and repute of the criminal justice system. involuntary confessions can be unreliable, unfair, and harmful to the reputation of the criminal justice system (oickle, at paras. 32 and 70; singh, at paras. 30 and 34; tessier (scc), at paras. 70 and 72). a statement may be involuntary “because it is unreliable and raises the possibility of a false confession, or because it was unfairly obtained and ran afoul of the principle against self-incrimination and the right to silence” (tessier (scc), at para. 70). [48] the application of the confessions rule is necessarily flexible and contextual when assessing the voluntariness of a confession, the “trial judge must determine, based on the whole context of the case, whether the statements made by an accused were reliable and whether the conduct of the state served in any way to unfairly deprive the accused of their free choice to speak to a person in authority” (tessier (scc), at para. 68) the trial judge must consider all relevant factors, including the presence of threats or promises, the existence of oppressive conditions, whether the accused had an operating mind, any police trickery that would “shock the community”, and the presence or absence of a police caution. these factors are not a checklist that supplants a contextual inquiry (see oickle, at paras. 47, 66-67 and 71; spencer, at paras. 11-12; singh, at para. 35; tessier (scc), at paras. 5, 68, 76 and 87). (b) oppression [49] oppression focusses on the atmosphere of a police interview. this court has accepted that “[o]ppression clearly has the potential to produce false confessions” because a suspect may “confes[s] purely out of a desire to escape [inhumane] conditions” (oickle, at paras. 58 and 60). the non-exhaustive factors that can create oppressive conditions include depriving the suspect of food, clothing, water, sleep, or medical attention; denying access to counsel; or excessively aggressive, intimidating police questioning for a long time (oickle, at paras. 58-60; tessier (scc), at para. 99). (c) the role of a police caution [50] the role of a police caution in the voluntariness analysis was recently clarified in tessier (scc), where kasirer j affirmed, at para. 5, that “the presence or absence of a police caution is an ‘important’ factor in answering the question of voluntariness”, based on charron j.’s guidance in singh, at para. 33 (see also singh, at para. 31; boudreau v. the king, [1949] scr 262, at p 267). [51] in tessier (scc), kasirer j explained that if the accused was a suspect, the absence of a caution is prima facie evidence of — but does not itself establish — involuntariness (paras. 11 and 89). neither a caution nor proof of actual knowledge of the right to silence is a necessary condition of voluntariness (tessier (scc), at paras. 12 and 74; see also singh, at paras. 31 and 33; boudreau, at p 267) nevertheless, the absence of a caution “weighs heavily” in the voluntariness analysis because it is “prima facie evidence that the suspect has been unfairly denied their choice to speak to the police and that, as a consequence, the statement cannot be considered voluntary” (tessier (scc), at para. 11). [52] when the police have not given a caution, the crown must “show that the absence of a caution did not undermine the suspect’s free choice to speak to the police as part of the contextual examination of voluntariness” (tessier (scc), at para. 8). the absence of a caution may be afforded less weight when the suspect subjectively understood the right to silence or the consequences of speaking to the police. kasirer j. provided the following guidance in tessier (scc), at para. 88: while not necessary for the crown to demonstrate, proof that the accused was in fact subjectively aware of their right to silence or aware of the consequences of speaking will be powerful evidence that the absence of a caution did not undermine voluntariness. in such an instance, doubts as to fairness that could result from the absence of a caution plainly do not arise because the suspect has the information necessary to choose whether to speak or remain silent. [53] some of the non-exhaustive factors that can help show the suspect was subjectively aware of their right to silence or of the consequences of speaking to the police include (1) the suspect’s awareness of being recorded; (2) indications that the suspect is directing the conversation; (3) the suspect’s awareness of what is being investigated and their alleged role in the investigation; (4) the suspect’s exercise of the right to silence by declining to answer police questions; and (5) the suspect’s eagerness to talk, although this factor can weigh for and against such a finding, depending on the circumstances (tessier (scc), at para. 88). [54] absent an error of law in relation to the applicable legal principles, a trial judge’s application of the voluntariness framework is a question of fact or of mixed fact and law attracting appellate deference (oickle, at para. 22; spencer, at paras. 16- 18; tessier (scc), at para. 46). mere disagreement with the weight given to various items of evidence is not a basis to reverse a trial judge’s finding of voluntariness (oickle, at para. 22). (2) application [55] beaver claims that the trial judge and the court of appeal erred by taking a narrow approach to voluntariness that merely glossed over whether he had been denied his right to silence or had made a meaningful choice to speak with the police. he claims that the trial judge mechanically reviewed a checklist of voluntariness factors without considering the more fundamental question of whether he could make a meaningful choice to speak to the police when he was not informed of his jeopardy or properly advised that he had a choice about whether to give a statement. he also says that the duration of his interview and det. hossack’s “interview strategy” created an oppressive atmosphere. lastly, he contends that the court of appeal improperly deferred to the trial judge’s finding of voluntariness without independent scrutiny. [56] as i will explain, i disagree with beaver’s submission that his confession was involuntary. (a) the trial judge correctly stated the law and concluded that beaver’s confession was voluntary based on three findings of fact [57] as the court of appeal held (at paras. 28-29), the trial judge correctly cited the general legal principles of voluntariness from oickle and singh (paras. 43-46). he properly noted that voluntariness is the touchstone of the confessions rule and must be examined contextually (para. 44). he also correctly stated that although an individual has the right to remain silent, this does not mean that they have a right not to be spoken to by the police (para. 45) absent any identifiable legal error in the trial judge’s statement of the relevant legal principles, beaver’s real quarrel is with how the trial judge applied these principles when concluding that his confession was voluntary. [58] in my view, the trial judge made three findings of fact that justified his conclusion that beaver’s confession was voluntary: (1) beaver was given a police caution and understood that he did not have to speak to the police and that anything he said could be used in evidence; (2) beaver knew exactly why the police were interviewing him after he was arrested for murder, which undermines his argument that he did not know the jeopardy he faced when he was arrested; and (3) beaver confessed because he was confronted with lambert’s videotaped confession. i will address each finding in turn. (i) beaver was given a police caution and understood it [59] first, the trial judge found as fact that beaver was given a police caution and understood it (paras. 90-91). he was given a police caution at the scene, even if only when he was unlawfully detained. cst. husband used standard wording, telling him: “you’re not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say may be given in evidence” (ar, vol. iii, at p 30; see also singh, at para. 31; r v. manninen, [1987] 1 scr 1233, at p 1237). this caution informed beaver of his right to remain silent “in plain language” (singh, at para. 31). [60] the trial judge appreciated that the question before him was whether beaver’s confession was voluntary, even though det. hossack did not caution beaver during her interview at the station but referred back to cst. husband’s caution at the scene (paras. 90-91) the trial judge stated that “[t]here is no requirement that the police repeat the caution more than once if the accused person already indicates that he understands his right to refuse to answer questions” (para. 92). [61] here, the fact that det. hossack did not caution beaver again upon his arrest is not “prima facie evidence that the suspect has been unfairly denied their choice to speak to the police” (tessier (scc), at para. 11) unlike the accused in tessier, beaver had been cautioned and understood the caution even if it would have been preferable for det. hossack to have repeated the caution when beaver was arrested for murder, a caution is not a condition of voluntariness (tessier (scc), at para. 89). put otherwise, the absence of a caution in itself does not “bind the hands of the court” by automatically rendering a subsequent confession involuntary (boudreau, at p 267, quoted by charron j in singh, at para. 31). (ii) beaver knew the police were interviewing him in a murder investigation and subjectively understood the consequences of speaking with the police [62] second, and relatedly, the trial judge found as fact that beaver knew why det. hossack was interviewing him after he had been arrested for murder and what he would be questioned about (paras. 83, 93 and 246) before proceeding with the interview, det. hossack told beaver “right now you’re under arrest for murder” (ar, vol. iii, at p 51; abqb voir dire reasons, at para. 93). thus, even though beaver did not know his jeopardy when he was unlawfully detained, he did know his jeopardy when he was arrested. [63] beaver subjectively knew the consequences of speaking with the police upon his arrest (tessier (scc), at para. 88). for example, in formally waiving his right to counsel, beaver confirmed that he understood that det. hossack could only take a statement from him if det. hossack was sure that beaver did not want to exercise his right to contact a lawyer and that any statement he gave could be used in evidence against him. det. hossack also told beaver four times that everything he said was being recorded, which beaver acknowledged beaver then initiated the conversation by asking det. hossack, “[o]kay, where should i start? how ‘bout yesterday?” (ar, vol. iii, at p 58). [64] because the trial judge found as fact that beaver “knew exactly why det. hossack was interviewing him” (para. 93), this is a case in which “doubts as to fairness . . from the absence of a caution plainly do not arise” (tessier (scc), at para. 88). [65] even so, beaver argues that det. hossack unfairly deprived him of a meaningful choice about whether to speak to the police. he says that det. hossack was “deliberately casual” when arresting him for murder, including by telling him the caution was “no different than what uh, constable husband read to [him]” and that being arrested “doesn’t mean [he’s] gonna be charged with anything. all that means is right now . . . that [he] can’t leave, ‘kay?” (beaver factum, at para. 37; ar, vol. iii, at p 51) it is this “pernicious” language that beaver impugns (beaver factum, at para. 37). [66] i do not agree. it was legally and factually accurate for det. hossack to tell beaver that being arrested for murder did not necessarily mean he would be charged with murder (see r v. brown, 2015 onsc 3305, at para. 124 (canlii)). beaver also says that det. hossack sent a mixed signal about the jeopardy he faced after he had been arrested for murder by saying “in a cautionary way [they] have to charter everyone” (beaver factum, at para. 37; ar, vol. iii, at p 54) but the trial judge referred to and weighed all these statements in finding that beaver “knew exactly why det. hossack was interviewing him”. this court must defer to that finding (housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at paras. 15-18). in effect, beaver is asking this court to reweigh the evidence to reverse the trial judge’s finding of voluntariness. i would decline to do so. (iii) beaver’s interview was not oppressive [67] lastly, the trial judge found as fact that the circumstances of beaver’s interview were not oppressive (paras. 95-96) i disagree with beaver’s claim that det. hossack created an oppressive atmosphere by asking increasingly confrontational questions during an interview that spanned 13 hours. although beaver’s interview was long, it was not the type of “excessively aggressive and intimidating” interview contemplated as oppressive in oickle (tessier (scc), at para. 99) the trial judge described the interview as “conversation[al]” in nature and highlighted that det. hossack was “respectful” when interviewing beaver, before becoming only “somewhat more confrontational” when presenting him with lambert’s videotaped confession (para. 95). although the trial judge accepted that, in principle, “subjecting the accused person to aggressive and prolonged questioning” can be an oppressive tactic affecting voluntariness (at para. 94), he found as fact that the atmosphere of the interview did not “break [mr. beaver’s] will” (para. 96). instead, the trial judge found that what broke beaver’s will was having to face “the version of events that mr. lambert had provided to det. demarino” in the videotaped confession (para. 96). (b) conclusion: beaver’s confession was voluntary [68] the trial judge properly applied the relevant legal principles in deciding that det. hossack’s interview of beaver raised no concern as to the voluntariness of his confession. because beaver has not established that any palpable and overriding error infected the trial judge’s findings of fact, i must defer to his conclusion that beaver’s confession was voluntary. b did the police have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder? [69] the second issue is whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder it is uncontested that det. vermette instructed the homicide detectives to arrest the appellants after they had been arbitrarily detained for just over two hours. the appellants claim that courts should be vigilant when considering whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds to make an arrest following an unlawful detention in order to “protect against abuses of power inherent when police are actively violating an arrestee’s charter rights” (lambert factum, at para. 36). [70] as i will elaborate, even with this vigilance in mind, i do not accept that the appellants’ arrest for murder was unlawful. (1) legal principles governing a warrantless arrest [71] the police have statutory authority to arrest a person without a warrant under s 495 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. the applicable part of s 495 in this appeal, s 495(1)(a), allows a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant if, on reasonable grounds, they believe the person has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence. [72] the essential legal principles governing a warrantless arrest are settled: 1. a warrantless arrest requires subjective and objective grounds to arrest. the arresting officer must subjectively have reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, and those grounds must be justifiable from an objective viewpoint (r v storrey, [1990] 1 scr 241, at pp. 250-51; r v. latimer, [1997] 1 scr 217, at para. 26; r v. tim, 2022 scc 12, at para. 24). 2. in assessing the subjective grounds for arrest, the question is whether the arresting officer honestly believed that the suspect committed the offence (r v. shepherd, 2009 scc 35, [2009] 2 scr 527, at para. 17) subjective grounds for arrest are often established through the police officer’s testimony (see, for example, storrey, at p 251; latimer, at para. 27; tim, at para. 38). this requires the trial judge to evaluate the officer’s credibility, a finding that attracts particular deference on appeal (r v gf, 2021 scc 20, at para. 81; r v. beaudry, 2007 scc 5, [2007] 1 scr 190, at para. 4). 3. the arresting officer’s subjective grounds for arrest must be justifiable from an objective viewpoint. this objective assessment is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest, including the dynamics of the situation, as seen from the perspective of a reasonable person with comparable knowledge, training, and experience as the arresting officer (storrey, at pp. 250-51; latimer, at para. 26; tim, at para. 24). 4. evidence based on the arresting officer’s training and experience should not be uncritically accepted, but neither should it be approached with “undue scepticism” (r v. mackenzie, 2013 scc 50, [2013] 3 scr 250, at paras. 64-65). although the analysis is conducted from the perspective of a reasonable person “standing in the shoes of the [arresting] officer”, deference is not necessarily owed to their view of the circumstances because of their training or experience (r v. chehil, 2013 scc 49, [2013] 3 scr 220, at paras. 45 and 47; mackenzie, at para. 63). the arresting officer’s grounds for arrest must be more than a “hunc[h] or intuition” (chehil, at para. 47). 5. in evaluating the objective grounds to arrest, courts must recognize that, “[o]ften, the officer’s decision to arrest must be made quickly in volatile and rapidly changing situations. judicial reflection is not a luxury the officer can afford. the officer must make his or her decision based on available information which is often less than exact or complete” (r v. golub (1997), 34 or. (3d) 743 (ca), at p 750, per doherty ja). courts must also remember that “[d]etermining whether sufficient grounds exist to justify an exercise of police powers is not a ‘scientific or metaphysical exercise’, but one that calls for the application of ‘[c]ommon sense, flexibility, and practical everyday experience’” (r v. canary, 2018 onca 304, 361 ccc (3d) 63, at para. 22, per fairburn ja (as she then was), citing mackenzie, at para. 73). 6. “reasonable and probable grounds” is a higher standard than “reasonable suspicion” reasonable suspicion requires a reasonable possibility of crime, while reasonable and probable grounds requires a reasonable probability of crime (chehil, at para. 27; r v debot, [1989] 2 scr 1140, at p 1166) at the same time, police do not require a prima facie case for conviction before making an arrest (storrey, at p 251; shepherd, at para. 23; tim, at para. 24) nor do the police need to establish that the offence was committed on a balance of probabilities (mugesera v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), 2005 scc 40, [2005] 2 scr 100, at para. 114; see also r v. henareh, 2017 bcca 7, at para. 39 (canlii); r v loewen, 2010 abca 255, 490 a.r 72, at para. 18) instead, the reasonable and probable grounds standard requires “a reasonable belief that an individual is connected to the offence” (mackenzie, at para. 74 (emphasis deleted); debot, at p 1166) a reasonable belief exists when “there is an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information” (mugesera, at para. 114; see also r v. al askari, 2021 abca 204, 28 alta. lr (7th) 129, at para. 25; r v. omeasoo, 2019 mbca 43, [2019] 6 wwr 280, at para. 30; r v. summers, 2019 nlca 11, 4 canlr 156, at para. 21) the police are also not required to undertake further investigation to seek exculpatory facts or to rule out possible innocent explanations for the events before making an arrest (chehil, at para. 34; shepherd, at para. 23; r v. ha, 2018 abca 233, 71 alta. lr (6th) 46, at para. 34; r v. maccannell, 2014 bcca 254, 359 bcac 1, at paras. 44-45; r v. rezansoff, 2014 skca 80, 442 sask. r 1, at para. 28; e. g. ewaschuk, criminal pleadings & practice in canada (3rd ed. (loose-leaf)), at § 5:40). 7. the police cannot rely on evidence discovered after the arrest to justify the subjective or objective grounds for arrest (r v. biron, [1976] 2 scr 56, at p 72; r v. brayton, 2021 abca 316, 33 alta. l.r (7th) 241, at para. 43; ha, at paras. 20-23; r v. montgomery, 2009 bcca 41, 265 bcac 284, at para. 27; ewaschuk, at § 5:40). 8. when a police officer orders another officer to make an arrest, the police officer who directed the arrest must have had reasonable and probable grounds it is immaterial whether the officer who makes the arrest personally had reasonable and probable grounds (debot, at pp. 1166-67). [73] the existence of reasonable and probable grounds for a warrantless arrest is based on the trial judge’s factual findings reviewable only for palpable and overriding error. whether the facts as found by the trial judge amount to reasonable and probable grounds is a question of law reviewable for correctness (shepherd, at para. 20; tim, at para. 25). (2) contemporaneous police notes are desirable but not mandatory in a warrantless arrest [74] the appellants do not question the legal principles above instead, they contend that a warrantless arrest is unlawful where the police fail to take detailed contemporaneous notes of their grounds for arrest and the material relied on in forming those grounds. they claim that the lack of contemporaneous notes frustrates a court’s ability to review the existence of subjective grounds for arrest, the information known to the officer at the time of arrest, and whether this information justifies the subjective grounds from an objective viewpoint. [75] i agree that contemporaneous notes are generally desirable when determining whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds for a warrantless arrest, but i disagree that such notes should be mandatory in all cases. this court has insisted on detailed notes to justify the police conducting warrantless cell phone searches (r v fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621, at para. 82), and has encouraged them in several contexts, including for strip searches (r v. golden, 2001 scc 83, [2001] 3 scr 679, at para. 101), for warranted searches of a computer (r. v vu, 2013 scc 60, [2013] 3 scr 657, at para. 70), and after searching a home incident to arrest (r v. stairs, 2022 scc 11, at para. 81). however, our law has never insisted on contemporaneous notes for all warrantless arrests, nor would i impose such a requirement. insisting on contemporaneous notes in all cases could undermine the ability of the police to respond appropriately to the dynamic situations they face each day. [76] the lack of contemporaneous notes does not necessarily frustrate judicial review of warrantless arrests. courts routinely evaluate the existence of reasonable and probable grounds based on the arresting officer’s testimony and other evidence (see, eg,. r v. nguyen, 2017 bcpc 131; r v. kroeker, 2019 bcpc 127; r v. rauch, 2022 bcpc 117; r v. daley, 2015 onsc 7367). [77] i therefore conclude that contemporaneous notes are not legally required for a warrantless arrest in all cases. nor, as i will explain, does the absence of such notes frustrate judicial review here. (3) application (a) det. vermette had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants [78] here, the trial judge accepted det. vermette’s testimony that he had subjective reasonable and probable grounds to direct the appellants’ arrests for murder (paras. 151, 153, 157, 232 and 240). that finding is uncontested. the contested issue is whether those grounds were objectively reasonable the appellants say that det. vermette had no more than an “impression” that bowers’ death was suspicious, which fails to meet the threshold of credibly based probability that the appellants murdered bowers. [79] i do not agree. i readily accept that some of the evidence det. vermette had when he formed his reasonable and probable grounds may have pointed towards bowers’ death being an accident rather than murder this includes, for example, lambert’s statement to the 9-1-1 operator that “[beaver] says he looks like he fell and hit his head” (rr, at p 26) but det. vermette did not have to rule out possible innocent explanations of bowers’ death before arresting the appellants nor did he require a prima facie case for conviction. [80] i also readily accept that the police relied on circumstantial evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants, but this is not unusual. when the police learn of a suspicious death and there is no direct evidence of who may be responsible, they routinely look to motive and opportunity to further their investigation. for example, in latimer, at para. 27, this court held that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest a father for the murder of his severely disabled daughter based on the circumstantial evidence that carbon monoxide was found in the daughter’s blood, strongly suggesting that she had been poisoned; that it was unlikely that her death was accidental; that given her physical condition, her death could not have been suicide; and that the father had both motive and opportunity. this is not to say that motive, opportunity, and a suspicious death will establish reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for murder in every case whether circumstantial evidence of this nature establishes grounds to arrest will depend on the facts and the strength of the evidence. [81] here, the trial judge’s factual findings confirm that det. vermette’s belief that the appellants were connected to bowers’ death was objectively reasonable when he directed their arrest far from having a mere suspicion, det. vermette had compelling and credible information that the appellants had motive to kill bowers, that they had the opportunity to act on this motive, and that bowers’ death was suspicious. (i) the appellants had motive and opportunity to kill bowers [82] the trial judge found that both appellants had the motive and opportunity to kill bowers (para. 159) these factual findings were amply supported by the information before det. vermette when he formed his subjective reasonable and probable grounds. the appellants had motive to kill bowers based on the recent history of conflict and violence in the townhouse that had led to “altercations all week”, including the night before when bowers had angrily told the appellants to “get the hell out”, and a few days earlier when the police had attended the townhouse after lambert claimed that bowers had assaulted him. the appellants also had the opportunity to kill bowers because they lived with him, they were the last known persons to see him alive, and they claimed to have discovered his body at the townhouse before placing the 9-1-1 call (para. 143). (ii) bowers’ death was suspicious [83] the totality of the circumstances also showed that bowers’ death was suspicious. [84] first, det. vermette, a seasoned homicide detective, viewed the death as suspicious. his view was supported by the call he had received from s/sgt. chisholm calling him into work. s/sgt. chisholm had advised him that he had spoken with the medical investigator’s office, which had “vast experience” and which had advised that the homicide team needed to be called out to investigate because the “death investigator” had identified “issues” or “problems” (ar, vol. i, at pp. 238-39) as det. vermette put it, the medical investigator’s office effectively said, “[h]ey, this is suspicious” (p 239). det. vermette viewed this as “important” because he knew from experience how the medical investigator’s office triaged calls in cases of suspicious deaths (p 227) s/sgt. chisholm’s follow-up email to him also had the subject line “looks like new homicide”. none of this information had been available to the police when the appellants were unlawfully detained, but all of it was available to them when they arrested the appellants for murder. [85] second, the evidence of the appellants’ motive and opportunity reinforced the suspicious nature of the death. bowers was found dead in the townhouse he lived in with the appellants, the morning after he had argued with them and had angrily told them to “get the hell out”. this atmosphere of violence was not an isolated incident: lambert told the 9-1-1 operator that there had been “altercations all week” and alleged that bowers assaulted him just three days earlier. [86] finally, police found bowers lying face down in a pool of blood with apparent trauma to his body, and the townhouse was being treated as a crime scene (abqb voir dire reasons, at para. 158). (b) det. vermette did not form his grounds to arrest in two minutes [87] i also do not accept the appellants’ argument that det. vermette’s decision to arrest the appellants for murder was a “hurried decision” made “two minutes after being advised the appellants were unlawfully detained” (lambert factum, at para. 48; beaver factum, at para. 44) det. vermette was confronted with this theory on cross-examination and rejected it as “not accurate” (ar, vol. i, at p 256) his unchallenged evidence was that when he directed the appellants’ arrests, he was “already satisfied” of the grounds for arrest because he had reviewed all the relevant material over the course of the morning (p 256). (c) conclusion: the appellants were lawfully arrested [88] examining all the information before det. vermette — including the appellants’ motive to kill bowers, the opportunity they had to act on this motive, and the evidence that bowers’ death was suspicious — through the eyes of a reasonable person with the knowledge, training, and experience comparable to such a seasoned homicide detective, i conclude that det. vermette had objectively reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder det. vermette’s grounds went well beyond a hunch or intuition and objectively justified his reasonable belief that the appellants were involved in bowers’ killing. c. should the appellants’ confessions be excluded under section 24(2) of the charter? [89] the final issue is whether the appellants’ confessions should be excluded from evidence under s 24(2) of the charter. the appellants say that because the police failed to effect a “fresh start” from the earlier charter violations arising from their unlawful detention, their confessions were “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter and must be excluded under s 24(2). (1) the charter rights infringed [90] the s 24(2) analysis requires identifying the charter rights infringed. the crown conceded, and the trial judge found, that the police breached the appellants’ ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) charter rights from when they were unlawfully detained until they were arrested for murder about two hours later the police breached s 9 by unlawfully detaining the appellants at the scene and by transporting them to the police station while they were being “investigatively detained” under the non-existent medical examiners act. there was no basis to place the appellants under investigative detention at common law because, at the time of their detention, there was no “clear nexus” between them and bowers’ death, and it had not been established that bowers’ death resulted from a recent criminal offence (abqb voir dire reasons, at para. 149). nor, at the time, was there statutory authority to arrest the appellants under the more onerous reasonable and probable grounds standard in s 495(1)(a) of the criminal code. the police also breached s 10(a) of the charter by failing to give the appellants a legally valid reason for their detention and breached s 10(b) because the appellants did not know the jeopardy they faced while they were unlawfully detained (paras. 183 and 188) finally, the police breached lambert’s s 10(b) rights by asking him questions in the police car after he had said that he wanted to speak to a lawyer (para. 185). [91] i do not accept the appellants’ suggestion that the trial judge found that the police breached their s 8 charter rights. the trial judge considered only lambert’s s 8 charter rights and found that both his arrest for murder and the search of his person incident to arrest were lawful (para. 210). [92] i also reject the appellants’ suggestion that the trial judge found that the police breached their rights to silence under s 7 of the charter. the trial judge noted that because the appellants’ confessions were voluntary, the argument that their confessions were obtained in a manner that breached their s 7 right to silence could not succeed: it is established that a voluntary confession cannot have been obtained in a manner that breached s 7 of the charter (paras. 127-30, citing singh, at para. 8, and r v. broyles, [1991] 3 scr 595, at p 609; see also d. m. paciocco, p. paciocco and l. stuesser, the law of evidence (8th ed 2020), at p 453) i see no error in these conclusions. [93] as a result, i will consider whether the confessions should be excluded under s 24(2) based solely on the ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) charter violations. as i detail below, i have concluded that lambert’s confession was not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter, but that beaver’s confession was the police severed any contextual connection between lambert’s confession and the earlier charter breaches arising from his unlawful detention and rendered any temporal connection to those breaches remote or tenuous in doing so, the police made a “fresh start” from the charter breaches for lambert. however, the police failed to do so for beaver. this court must therefore consider whether exclusion of beaver’s confession is required under s 24(2). on a proper weighing of the relevant considerations, i conclude that it is not. (2) the “obtained in a manner” threshold requirement [94] there are two components to determining whether evidence must be excluded under s 24(2) the first component — the threshold requirement — asks whether the evidence was “obtained in a manner” that infringed or denied a charter right or freedom if the threshold requirement is met, the second component — the evaluative component — asks whether, having regard to all the circumstances, admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute (see r v plaha (2004), 189 oac 376, at para. 44, per doherty ja, who coined this terminology; see also r v. strachan, [1988] 2 scr 980, at p 1000; tim, at para. 74; r v. mcsweeney, 2020 onca 2, 451 crr (2d) 357, at para. 57; r v. lauriente, 2010 bcca 72, 283 bcac 215, at para. 35; s. c. hill, d. m. tanovich and l. p. strezos, mcwilliams’ canadian criminal evidence (5th ed (loose-leaf)), at § 19:22). (a) “fresh start” and the threshold requirement [95] section 24(2) of the charter is engaged only when the accused first establishes that evidence was “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter. the threshold requirement “insists that there be a nexus” between the charter breach and the evidence, absent which “s 24(2) has no application” (r v manchulenko, 2013 onca 543, 116 o.r (3d) 721, at para. 71, per watt ja). determining whether evidence was “obtained in a manner” that infringed the charter involves a case-specific factual inquiry into the existence and sufficiency of the connection between the charter breach and the evidence obtained there is “no hard and fast rule” (strachan, at p 1006; tim, at para. 78). [96] the general principles governing the application of the threshold requirement were helpfully summarized by moldaver j in r v. mack, 2014 scc 58, [2014] 3 scr 3, at para. 38: whether evidence was “obtained in a manner” that infringed an accused’s rights under the charter depends on the nature of the connection between the charter violation and the evidence that was ultimately obtained. the courts have adopted a purposive approach to this inquiry. establishing a strict causal relationship between the breach and the subsequent discovery of evidence is unnecessary. evidence will be tainted if the breach and the discovery of the impugned evidence are part of the same transaction or course of conduct. the required connection between the breach and the subsequent statement may be temporal, contextual, causal, or a combination of the three. a “remote” or “tenuous” connection between the breach and the impugned evidence will not suffice (wittwer, at para. 21). see also r v. pino, 2016 onca 389, 130 or (3d) 561, at para. 72, per laskin ja;. tim, at para. 78. [97] a large body of appellate jurisprudence and academic commentary has recognized that evidence will not be “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter when the police made a “fresh start” from an earlier charter breach by severing any temporal, contextual, or causal connection between the charter breach and the evidence obtained or by rendering any such connection remote or tenuous in some cases, the police may make a “fresh start” by later complying with the charter, although subsequent compliance does not result in a “fresh start” in every case. the inquiry must be sensitive to the facts of each case (see r v. wittwer, 2008 scc 33, [2008] 2 scr 235, at paras. 3 and 21-22; plaha, at paras. 47 and 53; r v. lewis, 2007 onca 349, 86 or (3d) 46, at para. 31; r v. simon, 2008 onca 578, 269 oac. 259, at para. 69; r v woods, 2008 onca 713, at paras. 10-11 (canlii); manchulenko, at paras. 68-70; r v. hamilton, 2017 onca 179, 347 ccc (3d) 19, at para. 54; mcsweeney, at para. 59; paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 485; p. j. sankoff, the law of witnesses and evidence in canada (loose-leaf), at § 20:10; s. penney, v. rondinelli and j. stribopoulos, criminal procedure in canada (3rd ed. 2022), at ¶¶10122-10124;. r. j. marin, admissibility of statements (9th ed (loose- leaf)), at §§ 2:36 and 5:68; d. watt, watt’s manual of criminal evidence (2021), at §41.01; ewaschuk, at § 31:1565). [98] the concept of a “fresh start” under s 24(2) of the charter was adopted from the common law “derived confessions rule”, under which a court examines whether an otherwise voluntary confession is sufficiently connected to a prior involuntary confession to be tainted (penney, rondinelli and stribopoulos, at ¶¶4.50- 4.52 and 10122-10123;. paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 426, fn. 179, and p 485, fn. 72) under this rule, courts evaluate whether a voluntary confession is admissible, despite the prior involuntary confession, by making a “factual determination based on factors designed to ascertain the degree of connection between the two statements”, such as “the time span between the statements, advertence to the previous statement during questioning, the discovery of additional incriminating evidence subsequent to the first statement, the presence of the same police officers at both interrogations and other similarities between the two circumstances” (r v. i (lr) and t (e.), [1993] 4 scr 504, at p 526; see also r v r (d.), [1994] 1 scr 881, at p 882; r v. sgt, 2010 scc 20, [2010] 1 scr 688, at paras. 28-30; manchulenko, at paras. 67 and 69). [99] in some cases, evidence will remain tainted by a charter breach despite subsequent charter compliance. for this reason, “[c]are should be taken in using the ‘fresh start’ label to resolve ‘obtained in a manner’ inquiries” (paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 485). whether evidence was “obtained in a manner” is not determined by whether the state eventually complied with its charter obligations, but instead is based on whether there remains a sufficient causal, temporal, or contextual connection between the charter breach and the impugned evidence. in this way, the “fresh start” analysis fits comfortably within this court’s holistic approach to whether evidence was “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter. (b) cases illustrating the “fresh start” concept [100] in wittwer, fish j for this court accepted that, in principle, the police can make a “fresh start” after a charter violation, even though he found no “fresh start” on the facts. the accused had made two incriminating statements to the police that were inadmissible because they were made contrary to the accused’s right to counsel under s 10(b) of the charter. five months later, while the accused was in custody on another charge, a different officer informed him of his right to counsel and questioned him again, claiming that he did not know the content of the earlier statements. the accused provided no incriminating information until he was confronted with one of his earlier incriminating statements, at which point he made a third incriminating statement. fish j ruled that by referring to the earlier incriminating statement, the police “intentionally and explicitly bridged” the gap between the inadmissible statement and the third statement, thus preserving the temporal, causal, and contextual connections between them (para. 22). he explained that “[w]hat began as a permissible fresh start thus ended as an impermissible interrogation inseparably linked to its tainted past” (para. 3 (emphasis in original)). the third statement was thus “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter and was then excluded under s 24(2). [101] by contrast, in simon the ontario court of appeal found that the police did make a “fresh start”. in that case, the police had placed the accused under surveillance while investigating sexual assaults and arrested him for being in possession of a stolen van they advised him of his right to counsel under s 10(b) of the charter in connection with the stolen van, but they did not advise him of his s 10(b) right in connection with the sexual assaults before they questioned him about them during questioning, the accused gave his written consent to provide the police with a saliva sample for dna analysis for the sexual assault investigation. when giving this consent, the accused acknowledged that he did not have to provide the sample, that it could be used against him in criminal proceedings, and that he had the right to discuss with a lawyer whether to provide it the dna analysis of the saliva sample ultimately incriminated the accused in the sexual assaults. in ruling that the saliva sample was admissible, doherty ja acknowledged that the police breached s 10(b) of the charter by failing to advise the accused of his right to counsel in relation to the sexual assault investigation, but ruled that the police made a “fresh start” by severing this earlier charter breach from their later conduct in doherty ja’s view, by obtaining the accused’s written consent for the saliva sample, “the officers administered a focussed and powerful antidote to their earlier s 10(b) breach” (para. 70), and drove “a wedge between the giving of the sample and the earlier breach of s 10(b)” (para. 74). doherty j.a concluded that because the police had “effectively disconnected the decision to give the sample from any potential effect of the prior s 10(b) breach” (para. 74), the saliva sample was not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter. [102] these principles apply to any form of evidence that the police obtain following a charter violation; they are not limited either to successive statements or to s 10(b) charter violations although many “fresh start” cases have involved successive statements to persons in authority (see, for example, plaha; lewis; woods; hamilton; mcsweeney), i agree with the observation of watt ja in manchulenko, at para. 70, that “[n]o principled reason exists to confine the ‘fresh start’ jurisprudence” to such cases and that “[t]he rationale that underpins the ‘fresh start’ principle is the same irrespective of the specific form the evidence proposed for admission takes”. (c) potential indicators of a “fresh start” [103] when undertaking the case-specific factual inquiry into whether the police effected a “fresh start”, some potentially illustrative indicators include:  whether the police informed the accused of the charter breach and dispelled its effect with appropriate language (r (d.), at p 882). what constitutes appropriate language will vary with the circumstances of the case. in some cases, it may be sufficient to say, “we’re going to start over”; in other cases, more detailed or specific language may be needed to remove the taint from the earlier charter breach;  whether the police cautioned the accused after the charter breach but before the impugned evidence was obtained (plaha, at para. 53; hamilton, at paras. 58-59; woods, at para. 9) ideally, this would involve both a primary caution (“you are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say may be given in evidence” (singh, at para. 31; manninen, at p 1237)), and a secondary caution (“your decision to speak to the police should not be influenced by anything you have already said to the police or the police have already said to you” (manninen, at p 1238));  whether the accused had the chance to consult counsel after the charter breach but before the impugned evidence was obtained (manchulenko, at para. 69; woods, at paras. 5 and 9; r v. dawkins, 2018 onsc 6394, at para. 62 (canlii));  whether the accused gave informed consent to the taking of the impugned evidence after the charter breach (simon, at para. 74);  whether and how different police officers interacted with the accused after the charter breach but before the impugned evidence was obtained (see lewis, at para. 32; woods, at para. 9; mcsweeney, at para. 62; i (lr) and t (e.), at p 526; dawkins, at para. 62); and  whether the accused was released from detention after the charter breach but before the impugned evidence was obtained. (3) application (a) the trial judge’s “fresh start” analysis contained errors of law [104] although the trial judge reviewed the case law on “fresh start” principles, i have concluded that he erred in law by failing to apply the correct legal test and by applying an incorrect legal principle (r v. chung, 2020 scc 8, at paras. 13 and 18). [105] first, the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal test by focussing solely on the conduct of the police that was charter-compliant, without expressly analyzing whether or how that conduct severed the temporal, causal, or contextual connection between the earlier charter breaches and the appellants’ confessions or rendered those connections remote or tenuous. the trial judge appeared to proceed on the basis that the appellants’ arrest for murder was sufficient to constitute a “fresh start”. he framed the issue as “whether [the appellants’] arrests following det. vermette’s direction [to arrest the appellants for murder] resulted in a ‘fresh start’ such that the charter breaches are ‘cured’” (para. 206) he concluded that the arrests resulted in a “fresh start” and compliance with the charter, without considering the connection between the earlier charter violations and the confessions (para. 209). [106] second, and relatedly, the trial judge applied the wrong legal principle by repeatedly referring to the police as having “cured” the earlier charter breaches (paras. 191, 206, 215, 239 and 253). it is unhelpful and inaccurate to describe the police as having “cured” the earlier charter breaches. it is unhelpful because it obscures the real issue: whether there is a sufficient connection between the charter breaches and the impugned evidence, and not simply whether there was subsequent charter compliance it is inaccurate because subsequent charter-compliant conduct by the police does not “cure” earlier charter breaches; the charter breaches still occurred and merit proper consideration under the threshold requirement. instead, charter-compliant conduct may dissociate the charter breaches from the impugned evidence by severing any connection between them or by rendering any connection remote or tenuous. only then is the evidence not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter. [107] because the trial judge erred in law in his analysis of the threshold requirement, no deference is owed to his conclusion that the evidence was not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter (mack, at para. 39; r v. keror, 2017 abca 273, 57 alta. lr (6th) 268, at para. 35). that issue must be analyzed afresh. (b) lambert’s confession was not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter [108] in my view, the police took several steps that collectively severed any contextual connection between the breach of lambert’s charter rights arising from his unlawful detention and his confession these steps also rendered any temporal connection with the charter breaches remote finally, there was also no causal relationship between the charter breaches and lambert’s confession lambert’s confession was thus not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter. [109] specifically, det. demarino severed any contextual connection with lambert’s earlier unlawful detention under the supposed medical examiners act. he did so by telling lambert that they were going to “start from the very beginning”, by advising him that this is a “very, very serious matter”, and by informing him four times that he was under arrest for murder. by taking these steps, det. demarino addressed the previous failure to advise lambert of the extent of his jeopardy when he had been unlawfully detained det. demarino then facilitated lambert’s second consultation with counsel, confirmed that he understood the advice he had been given, repeated to him that they “have to start everything all over again”, and provided him with a primary caution three times and a secondary caution once. collectively, these steps created a new context for the interaction with the police and “dispelled” the effect of the charter breaches on lambert’s confession (r (d.), at p 882). [110] in addition, any temporal connection between the charter breaches arising from lambert’s unlawful detention and his confession after he had been arrested for murder was at best tenuous. lambert’s confession was provided about 12 hours after the charter breaches, which the court of appeal found left “arguably no temporal connection” (para. 26) in plaha, at para. 49, doherty ja cautioned that evaluating whether a temporal connection persists “requires more than simply counting the minutes or hours” between the breach and the subsequent statement. as he explained, “[e]vents that occur during the time interval can colour the significance of the passage of time” (para. 49; see also manchulenko, at para. 73). here, the intervening steps taken by det. demarino and lambert’s decision to confess even after he was fully aware of his rights rendered any temporal link between the charter breaches and the confession extremely tenuous (r v. goldhart, [1996] 2 scr 463, at para. 45). such “remote or tenuous connections are no connections at all” (r v. keshavarz, 2022 onca 312, 413 ccc (3d) 263, at para. 53, per fairburn acjo). [111] there was also no causal connection between the charter breaches arising from lambert’s unlawful detention and his confession after he was arrested for murder. lambert provided no incriminating information because of the charter breaches and he continued to protest his innocence lambert confessed only after he consulted counsel, after he understood his rights, and after he appreciated that he had been arrested for murder. [112] by taking the steps described above, the police ensured that lambert’s confession was not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter. it is therefore unnecessary to consider the evaluative component of s 24(2) for lambert since lambert’s confession was admissible, i would dismiss his appeal and confirm his conviction for manslaughter. (c) beaver’s confession was “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter [113] the same cannot be said of beaver’s confession. although, like lambert, beaver was at first unlawfully detained and then arrested for murder, unlike lambert, beaver declined the several opportunities he was given to consult counsel. as a result, in beaver’s case it cannot be said that an intervening consultation with counsel severed any connection between the charter breaches arising from his unlawful detention and his eventual confession (see manchulenko, at para. 69). [114] most importantly, however, det. hossack referred back to cst. husband’s earlier caution during beaver’s unlawful detention, when beaver had been told that he was being “investigatively detained” for “whatever’s going on” in the townhouse where bowers had been found dead. by telling beaver that “it’s no different than what uh, constable husband read to [him]”, det. hossack invoked a caution given when beaver was unlawfully detained under non-existent legislation and when he had not been advised of the jeopardy he faced for any offence, let alone for murder. by recalling this caution, det. hossack failed to dissociate her interaction with beaver from the earlier charter breaches and actively maintained a contextual connection between beaver’s initial unlawful detention and his confession. thus, even after beaver had been lawfully arrested and made aware of the jeopardy he faced, his confession was contextually linked to the earlier charter breaches. [115] beaver’s confession was thus “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter it is therefore necessary to consider whether it should be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter. (4) beaver’s confession should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the charter [116] whether the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by admitting beaver’s confession involves examining the impact its admission would have on public confidence in the administration of justice over the long term, based on a balancing of the three lines of inquiry described by this court in r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr 353: (1) the seriousness of the charter-infringing state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the accused’s charter-protected interests; and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits (see grant, at para. 71; see also r v. le, 2019 scc 34, [2019] 2 scr 692, at paras. 139-42; tim, at para. 74; r v. lafrance, 2022 scc 32, at para. 90). [117] section 24(2) of the charter is not an automatic exclusionary rule precluding the admission of all unconstitutionally obtained evidence. such evidence will only be excluded when the accused establishes that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute (see r v collins, [1987] 1 scr 265, at p 280; tim, at para. 75). balancing the relevant considerations under s 24(2) is a qualitative determination that is not capable of mathematical precision (grant, at paras. 86 and 140; r v. harrison, 2009 scc 34, [2009] 2 scr 494, at para. 36; tim, at para. 98). [118] on appeal, a trial judge’s findings of fact in applying s 24(2) attract deference, but no deference is owed to the application of the law to the facts (grant, at paras. 43 and 86; lafrance, at para. 91). deference is also not owed when the appellate court disagrees with the trial judge’s conclusions on the charter breaches (grant, at para. 129; lafrance, at para. 91) nor is deference owed to a trial judge’s s 24(2) analysis conducted in the alternative, because such an analysis involves an artificial evaluation of the seriousness of a charter breach and the impact on charter-protected interests that the trial judge did not find (grant, at para. 129; r v. paterson, 2017 scc 15, [2017] 1 scr 202, at para. 42; le, at para. 138; tim, at para. 72; lafrance, at para. 91; r v gtd, 2017 abca 274, 57 alta l.r (6th) 213, at para. 51, per veldhuis ja, dissenting, appeal allowed substantially for the reasons of veldhuis ja, 2018 scc 7, [2018] 1 scr 220, at para. 3). similarly, no deference is owed to a trial judge’s s 24(2) analysis conducted in the alternative when the trial judge found that the impugned evidence was not “obtained in a manner” that breached the charter. such an alternative analysis likewise involves an artificial evaluation of the seriousness of a charter breach and its impact on charter-protected interests that the trial judge found were unconnected to the impugned evidence. [119] as a result, no deference is owed to the trial judge’s alternative analysis of the threshold requirement under s 24(2). this court must conduct the s 24(2) analysis afresh, while respecting the trial judge’s factual findings. (a) the seriousness of the charter-infringing state conduct [120] the first line of inquiry under s 24(2) considers whether the charter-infringing state conduct is so serious that the court needs to dissociate itself from it. this inquiry requires the court to situate the charter-infringing conduct on a scale of culpability at one end of the scale is conduct that constitutes a wilful or reckless disregard of charter rights, a systemic pattern of charter-infringing conduct, or a major departure from charter standards at the other end of the scale are less serious charter breaches, including breaches that are inadvertent, technical, or minor or those that reflect an understandable mistake the more severe the state’s charter-infringing conduct, the greater the need for courts to disassociate themselves from it (see grant, at paras. 72-74; le, at para. 143; harrison, at para. 22; r v. côté, 2011 scc 46, [2011] 3 scr 215, at para. 47; tim, at para. 82; lafrance, at para. 93). [121] the breaches of beaver’s ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) charter rights arising from his unlawful detention were serious sgt. lines directed beaver’s detention under non-existent legislation, the medical examiners act. this involved a reckless disregard for beaver’s charter rights and a significant departure from charter standards. as a member of the calgary police service with 17 years’ experience, sgt. lines should have known that the medical examiners act did not exist and that he did not have the authority to detain beaver at that point sgt. lines’ direction was not an “understandable mistake”, nor was it a mistake made in “good faith”. instead, as the trial judge found, sgt. lines made the direction because “he was looking for a way to maintain control over mr. beaver . . ., but was not sure exactly how to do it” (abqb voir dire reasons, at para. 230) this was a serious charter violation involving an inappropriate and unjustified overreach of police powers. [122] the first line of inquiry strongly favours exclusion of beaver’s confession. (b) the impact of the breach on the accused’s charter-protected interests [123] the second line of inquiry under s 24(2) considers the impact of the charter breach on the accused’s charter-protected interests this inquiry involves identifying the interests protected by the relevant charter right and evaluating the extent to which the charter breach “actually undermined the interests protected by the right” (grant, at para. 76). as with the first line of inquiry, the court must situate this impact on a spectrum the greater the impact on the accused’s charter-protected interests, the greater the risk that admission of the evidence would suggest that charter rights are of little actual avail to citizens, thus breeding public cynicism and bringing the administration of justice into disrepute (see grant, at paras. 76-77; le, at para. 151; tim, at para. 90; lafrance, at para. 96). [124] three factors indicate that the charter breaches arising from beaver’s unlawful detention had only minimal impact on his charter-protected interests. [125] first, and most importantly, beaver’s decision to confess was not caused by the charter breaches arising from his unlawful detention. in appropriate cases, the lack of a causal connection between the breaches and the obtaining of the impugned evidence may mitigate the impact of the breach on the accused’s charter-protected interests (grant, at para. 122; r v mian, 2014 scc 54, [2014] 2 scr 689, at para. 87; r v. rover, 2018 onca 745, 143 or (3d) 135, at para. 43; r v. pileggi, 2021 onca 4, 153 or (3d) 561, at para. 120). as this court explained in grant, the strength of the causal connection between the charter infringement and the impugned evidence plays “a useful role . . . in assessing the actual impact of the breach on the protected interests of the accused” (para. 122). here, no such causal connection exists. the trial judge found that the charter breaches arising from the unlawful detention “had little effect” on either appellant’s decision to confess (para. 247). as the trial judge explained, beaver’s confession had nothing to do with the charter breaches arising from the unlawful detention and everything to do with “the evidence that was beginning to unfold”, including, most importantly, lambert’s videotaped confession (paras. 95 and 247). the lack of a causal connection between the charter breaches and beaver’s confession mitigates the actual impact of the breaches on his charter-protected interests. [126] second, beaver understood the basis for his interaction with the police. this diminished the impact the breach had on his s 10(a) charter right to be informed promptly of the reasons for his detention and his s 10(b) charter right to counsel. the trial judge found as fact that, during the two hours when beaver was arbitrarily detained, he “knew why [he was] being detained” (para. 244) because beaver and lambert placed the 9-1-1 call themselves, “[they both] knew, or had to have known, that they were going to be questioned concerning . . . bowers’ death” (para. 246). and before beaver was even questioned, he was recorded saying to himself “[t]hey’re gonna take my statement”. because beaver understood the “substance” of the reasons for his detention, this attenuated the impact of the ss. 10(a) and 10(b) breaches on his charter-protected interests (para. 246). [127] finally, the impact of the breach on beaver’s “liberty from unjustified state interference” and “right to be left alone” protected under s 9 of the charter (le, at paras. 152 and 155 (emphasis deleted)) was also attenuated because beaver could not reasonably have expected to be left alone this is not a case where there was an “absence of justification to investigate the [accused] at all” (le, at para. 155 (emphasis in original)); beaver and lambert invited the police to the scene of bowers’ death, and the police had a common law duty to respond to their call of distress (r v. godoy, [1999] 1 scr 311, at paras. 17 and 23). without diminishing the seriousness of the charter breaches or disregarding the duty of the police to act in accordance with the law, it must be emphasized that beaver could not reasonably have expected to be left alone. indeed, beaver expected to interact with the police as part of his plan to fabricate a false account of bowers’ death. [128] in my view, because the charter breaches arising from beaver’s unlawful detention had only minimal impact on his charter-protected interests, the second line of inquiry favours neither exclusion nor inclusion of beaver’s confession. (c) society’s interest in an adjudication of the case on its merits [129] the third line of inquiry under s 24(2) considers societal concerns and asks whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by the admission or the exclusion of the evidence (grant, at para. 79). relevant factors under this inquiry include the reliability of the evidence, the importance of the evidence to the prosecution’s case, and the seriousness of the offence at issue (grant, at paras. 79-84; harrison, at para. 33; côté, at para. 47; paterson, at paras. 51-52). [130] here, the charter breaches arising from beaver’s unlawful detention did not undermine the legality of beaver’s arrest for murder or the reliability of his confession. nor is this a case where the charter breaches effectively compelled beaver to talk to the state after he had been arrested for murder (grant, at para. 81). rather, beaver spoke voluntarily with det. hossack for hours in an effort to deceive her and to obstruct justice beaver’s confession was also essential to the crown’s case against him, as reflected in the agreed statement of facts at trial. and while the seriousness of the offence has the potential to “cut both ways” (grant, at para. 84), the public has a heightened interest in seeing serious offences such as manslaughter and obstruction of justice adjudicated on the merits. [131] excluding reliable evidence critical to the crown’s case, such as beaver’s confession, can also undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice system and render the trial unfair from the public’s perspective, thus bringing the administration of justice into disrepute (see grant, at paras. 80-81; harrison, at paras. 33-34; tim, at para. 96). these considerations apply forcefully here. [132] the third line of inquiry therefore strongly supports admission of beaver’s confession. (d) final balancing [133] the final step in the s 24(2) analysis involves weighing each line of inquiry to determine whether admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. this balancing has a prospective function: it aims to ensure that evidence obtained through a charter breach does not cause further damage to the justice system. it is also societal in scope: its goal is not to punish the police but to address systemic concerns involving the broad impact of admitting the evidence on the long-term repute of the justice system (see grant, at paras. 69-70 and 85-86; le, at para. 139; tim, at para. 98). [134] when undertaking this weighing exercise, “it is the cumulative weight of the first two lines of inquiry that trial judges must consider and balance against the third line of inquiry” (lafrance, at para. 90 (emphasis in original)). “[w]hen the two first lines, taken together, make a strong case for exclusion”, the third line of inquiry “will seldom tip the scale in favour of admissibility” (lafrance, at para. 90). the third line of inquiry “becomes important when one, but not both, of the first two inquiries pushes strongly toward the exclusion of the evidence” (r v. mcguffie, 2016 onca 365, 131 or (3d) 643, at para. 63, per doherty ja; see also r v. chapman, 2020 skca 11, 386 ccc (3d) 24, at paras. 125-26 and 130). it is possible that admitting evidence obtained by particularly serious charter-infringing conduct will bring the administration of justice into disrepute, even if the conduct did not have a serious impact on the accused’s charter-protected interests (le, at para. 141). but where the cumulative weight of the first two lines of inquiry is overwhelmed by a compelling public interest in admitting the evidence, the administration of justice will not be brought into disrepute by its admission. [135] in my view, the third line of inquiry is central to the s 24(2) weighing exercise in this case. the first two lines of inquiry, taken together, do not make a strong case for excluding beaver’s confession. only the seriousness of the charter breaches strongly favours exclusion. the second line of inquiry pulls neither towards nor against exclusion because the breaches had minimal impact on beaver’s charter-protected interests. the cumulative weight of the first two lines of inquiry is overwhelmed by a compelling public interest in admitting beaver’s confession. this evidence is crucial to the prosecution’s case against an offender who allegedly killed another person and then tried to obstruct the police investigation. on a proper balancing of the lines of inquiry under s 24(2), i conclude that admitting beaver’s confession would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [136] i would therefore admit beaver’s confession and confirm his conviction for manslaughter. vi disposition [137] i would dismiss both appeals. the reasons of karakatsanis, côté, brown and martin jj. were delivered by martin j — i. overview [138] on the morning of october 9, 2016, the appellants, brian john lambert and james andrew beaver, called 9-1-1 and reported arriving home from a night away to find their roommate’s dead body shortly after arriving at the scene, police unlawfully detained the appellants pursuant to non-existent legislation, transported them to police headquarters for questioning, and searched them upon arrival. during mr. lambert’s transport, police questioned him before facilitating his request to exercise his right to counsel. this conduct resulted in multiple serious breaches of the appellants’ rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. [139] i part ways with the majority on two points. first, on whether it was lawful for the lead investigator, after learning of the circumstances of the appellants’ unlawful detention, to immediately arrest them for murder and direct their continued questioning. i conclude that the information relied on to direct the appellants’ arrests does not come close to the particularized probability required to meet the reasonable grounds standard. the arrests were a blatant attempt to salvage the investigation in the face of what officers knew were multiple serious violations of the appellants’ charter rights. the accumulation of breaches of well-established charter standards in this case requires that the evidence be excluded as a remedy under s 24(2) of the charter to avoid bringing further disrepute to the administration of justice. [140] second, the test for inclusion under s 24(2) is long established and well known. the focus is on the connection between the breach and the evidence obtained, with reference to temporal, contextual, and causal elements (r v. strachan, [1988] 2 scr 980; r v. goldhart, [1996] 2 scr 463; r v. wittwer, 2008 scc 33, [2008] 2 scr 235). there is simply no need to speak in terms of whether or not there was somehow a “fresh start” for those who have breached charter rights. indeed, the notion of a “fresh start” is an unhelpful and potentially misleading concept that has no place in the s 24(2) analysis. it divides what is to be a holistic analysis into before and after segments and operates to cure and/or remove charter breaches from the analysis, thus placing a heavy finger on the scale of s 24(2). [141] the combination of these two conclusions is more than enough to allow the appeals, exclude all the evidence obtained in a manner that infringed the appellants’ charter rights, set aside the convictions, and order new trials. thus, while i should not be taken as accepting the majority’s voluntariness analysis, i find it unnecessary to address the voluntariness issue raised by mr. beaver. ii background a facts [142] shortly before 10:00 am on october 9, 2016, mr. lambert called 9-1-1 and reported finding his roommate and landlord, sutton raymond bowers, lying face down in a puddle of blood inside their home. he told the 9-1-1 operator that he and mr. bowers had been having “altercations” all week. when he came home the previous evening, mr. bowers told him and his other roommate, mr. beaver, to “get the hell out” (rr, at p 18) they left mr. bowers at home with guests and returned that morning to find his body in the townhouse. [143] police officers arrived at the scene within minutes they observed the deceased lying at the base of “a fairly steep set of polished hardwood stairs” (2019 abqb 125, 88 alta. lr (6th) 337, at para. 7). an empty bottle of rum was left out on a table (para. 10). mr. lambert informed one of the officers, cst. taylor, that it was not unusual for the deceased to be passed out from intoxication none of the officers observed either of the appellants acting suspiciously. there were no signs of a struggle at the scene. [144] none of the officers at the scene believed they had grounds to arrest the appellants. [145] sgt. lines was in charge at the scene he directed two officers, cst. husband and cst. taylor, to detain the appellants under the medical examiners act. he testified that he meant to refer to the fatality inquiries act, rsa 2000, c. f-9, as he believed this legislation authorized police to detain people at the scene of a potential homicide. he acknowledged that he erred in two respects: there is no such legislation as the medical examiners act in alberta, and the fatality inquiries act provides no detention power to police. [146] cst. husband took mr. beaver into custody. she told him that she had to “read [him] the legalities” and that she was “investigatively detaining [him] for, uh, whatever’s going on in there, (laughing)” (ar, vol. iii, at p 28). she testified that she did not know what mr. beaver was under investigative detention for; he was taken into custody because police did not know whether he was a witness or an offender and they needed to find out his involvement. [147] cst. taylor was in charge of mr. lambert’s detention he read mr. lambert his charter warning and caution, informing him that he was detained under the medical examiners act. mr. lambert replied that he understood and wished to speak to a lawyer. [148] cst. taylor then transported mr. lambert to the station in his police vehicle during the car ride, he asked mr. lambert about what had happened. mr. lambert described his version of what had occurred the previous night between himself, mr. beaver, and the deceased. he noted that a male he did not recognize had been at the residence with mr. bowers the previous evening. [149] det. vermette was assigned as the primary investigator on the file at 10:36 am, he received a phone call from s/sgt chisholm calling out the homicide unit to investigate a death during this call, s/sgt. chisholm indicated that he had spoken to the medical investigator and a man had been found face down in a pool of blood at the bottom of the stairs near the front entrance of a residence. he informed det. vermette that there had been some conflict or dispute between the victim and his roommates, who were being transported to the police detachment. s/sgt. chisholm also sent det. vermette an email relating this information. [150] csts. husband and taylor and the appellants arrived at police headquarters at about 11:15 am. the appellants were both searched and mr. lambert was given an opportunity to speak with a lawyer. they were placed in separate holding rooms. [151] at 11:39 am,. det. vermette spoke with csts. husband and taylor. they informed him that the appellants had been “chartered and cautioned” and provided with an opportunity to speak with legal counsel (ar, vol. i, at p 210). det. vermette was “assuming” that they had been arrested for murder (p 251) he assigned det. hossack and det. demarino to interview mr. lambert and mr. beaver, respectively. [152] det. vermette testified that when he met with csts. husband and taylor, he did not have reasonable grounds to arrest the appellants. [153] det. vermette then reviewed the material in the police file. the material included an “event information”, which provided a summary of the case based on the 9-1-1 call and some remarks inputted from officers, and an “event chronology”, which essentially repeated the content of the event information. [154] the event information indicated that the 9-1-1 call was categorized as “medical – sudden death” (ar, vol. iii, at p 321). it identified the townhouse as a location of interest, or “loi”, because mr. lambert had previously made a complaint about his landlord, mr. bowers. it also indicated that police and emergency medical services had been called to the townhouse in august of that year, about three months prior to the 9-1-1 call, to perform a mental health check on mr. bowers after he had drank floor cleaner in what det. vermette described as an “attempted suicide kind of situation” (ar, vol. i, at p 217). the event information showed that mr. bowers had a criminal history for violence, but showed no criminal history for either of the appellants det. vermette testified he believed the event information was important because it showed there was an “environment of violence” at the townhouse (p 219). [155] mr. lambert’s complaint about mr. bowers was further detailed in a police information management system (“pims”) report, which also formed part of the file. the pims report indicated that three days before the 9-1-1 call, mr. lambert had reported to police that mr. bowers had been drinking and punched him in the groin. mr. lambert called police to inquire about the process if charges were pursued, but the report noted that he did not wish to lay charges, provide a statement, or further involve police. he planned to move out within the next two weeks. det. vermette explained that he viewed the pims report as important because it corroborated the “environment of violence” from the event information. [156] shortly after beginning mr. lambert’s interview, det. demarino learned of the circumstances of the appellants’ detention from cst. husband. recognizing the serious legal issues engaged, he brought his concerns to det. vermette. det. vermette then instructed the interviewing detectives to arrest the appellants for murder, re-do their cautions, and proceed with the interviews. he testified that he took at most two minutes to make the decision to arrest the appellants after he learned of the circumstances of their detention. he said he needed to act quickly because he knew the appellants were at the police headquarters “illegally” (ar, vol. i, at p 256). [157] det. vermette took no notes of this interaction with det. demarino, or others, and did not record the grounds on which he based his decision to direct the appellants’ arrests. [158] det. demarino returned to mr. lambert’s interview room and arrested him for murder. he provided mr. lambert with another opportunity to consult counsel and cautioned him on his right to silence cst. arns photographed and swabbed mr. lambert. she told him, “right now it’s just you’re one of our witnesses and it’s a normal procedure that we usually do” (ar, vol ii, at pp. 132-33; see also abqb reasons, at para. 37) mr. lambert maintained for several hours that he wished to exercise his right to silence, but eventually began to speak. [159] in a separate room, det. hossack arrested mr. beaver for murder and informed him of his right to counsel. she emphasized that nothing had changed from when he was previously cautioned — she was simply reading the caution to “start off fresh” (ar, vol. iii, at p 50). when mr. beaver expressed surprise that he was under arrest, det. hossack reassured him all this meant was that he could not leave. det. hossack told mr. beaver she was only reading the caution again because she was a new person he was speaking to. mr. beaver told det. hossack that he did not think he needed counsel, but he was “not understanding the severity of it” (ar, vol. iii, at p 53). in response, det. hossack explained to mr. beaver that he was brought to police headquarters because he was at the scene where the body was found and told him, “we need to figure out what’s going on and because . . . you were there um, just kind of in a, in a cautionary way we have to charter everyone” (p 54). [160] mr. beaver waived his right to counsel for the first 12 hours of the interview, he maintained that he could not remember what had happened as he had been drinking the previous night. at around 1:00 am, after det. hossack started taking a more aggressive approach, he began adopting the inculpatory statements she put to him. b. lower court decisions [161] the trial judge denied the appellants’ application to exclude the evidence as a remedy for the charter breaches. he concluded that the appellants’ detention at the scene was unlawful because there was no “clear nexus” between the appellants and mr. bowers’ death; nor was it clear that mr. bowers had died as a result of a criminal offence (para. 149) nevertheless, he found that det. vermette had subjective and objectively reasonable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder based on the trauma mr. bowers suffered and the appellants’ motive and opportunity to commit the offence (para. 159) unlike the officers at the scene who did not form reasonable grounds, det. vermette had access to the pims report, which demonstrated animosity between mr. bowers and mr. lambert (para. 158). [162] although he found it unnecessary to analyze whether to exclude the evidence under s 24(2) of the charter because the arrests constituted a “fresh start” that “cured” the breaches (at para. 215), the judge conducted an alternative analysis of the factors as outlined in r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr 353. he concluded the breaches would not have warranted exclusion because the state conduct was not deliberate, severe, or a blatant disregard for charter rights; the breaches had little impact on the appellants; and there were no reliability concerns with the evidence, despite their importance to the crown’s case being unclear. [163] the court of appeal of alberta unanimously dismissed the appeal (2020 abca 203, 4 alta l.r (7th) 301) the court agreed that there were reasonable grounds for the arrests, opining that det. vermette “made a practical and common- sense decision to arrest the appellants based on the information he had received by the time of the arrests” (para. 9). it found no error in the trial judge’s “fresh start” analysis, and did not consider his alternative analysis under s 24(2). iii analysis [164] my analysis will address three issues first, were the appellants’ arrests unlawful? second, was the evidence provided in their statements “obtained in a manner” that infringed their charter rights? finally, would admission of the evidence bring the administration of justice into disrepute? [165] i have no hesitation in answering each of these questions in the affirmative. a. the appellants’ arrests were unlawful [166] it is well established that police must have reasonable grounds to believe an individual committed or was about to commit an indictable offence in order to lawfully arrest them without prior judicial authorization (criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, s 495(1)(a)). the reasonable belief must relate to two elements: whether an offence has been committed, and whether the person under arrest committed the offence. the test must be met on both a subjective and an objective basis. this means that it is necessary, but not sufficient, for the police to have a personal, honestly held belief in the presence of reasonable grounds. the crown must also establish that the asserted grounds were objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable person standing in the position of the officer (r v. storrey, [1990] 1 scr 241, at pp. 250-51). [167] reasonable grounds is a high threshold that is met at the point where a credibly based probability replaces suspicion (hunter v. southam inc., [1984] 2 scr. 145, at pp. 166-67; baron v. canada, [1993] 1 scr 416, pp. 446-47). it requires the police to point to particularized evidence to support “an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information” (mugesera v canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), 2005 scc 40, [2005] 2 scr 100, at para. 114). whether the legal standard of reasonable grounds was met on the particular facts of a given case is a question of law to be assessed on a correctness standard (r v. shepherd, 2009 scc 35, [2009] 2 scr 527, at para. 20; r v. mackenzie, 2013 scc 50, [2013] 3 scr 250, at para. 54). [168] the need to establish reasonable grounds before effecting an arrest is not a mere procedural requirement — it is a constitutional imperative an arrest is a key investigative step on which much hinges, both for the police and for the arrestee it triggers intrusive police powers relating to detention, interrogation, search, and the use of force an arrest empowers police to search the individual and their immediate surroundings without requiring them to obtain a warrant or show independent reasonable and probable grounds. police can detain arrested individuals without any review for up to 24 hours — potentially longer if a justice is unavailable (criminal code, s 503(1)). during this prolonged detention, the police may subject the arrestee to hours on end of questioning involving forms of manipulation, including lying to the arrestee in order to extract information. this is why, in the foundational decision of storrey, cory j described the reasonable grounds requirement as a vital protection necessary to safeguard citizens’ liberty and without which “even the most democratic society could all too easily fall prey to the abuses and excesses of a police state” (p 249). the powers an arrest affords to the police is only justifiable on the basis of demonstrating reasonable grounds to believe an offence has been committed. absent this information, the intrusion on liberty interests tolerated in the name of the investigation of crime cannot be justified. the reasonable grounds standard is a key constitutional safeguard and it must not be watered down because of mere investigative expediency or to salvage an investigation in the face of charter-infringing conduct. [169] it is worth setting out at some length det. vermette’s testimony describing the basis on which he asserted that there were reasonable grounds to direct the appellants’ arrests. he explained his grounds for arrest in this way: . . . when i get called out, it’s called out on a suspicious death. the -- the - - there is -- it is clear that there’s a conversation between staff sergeant chisholm and the medical examiner. that is important to me. i know the process that we go through and how the medical examiner or the medical examiner’s office triage those type of calls so that call coming in as suspicious is important to me. i know that someone is deceased at the scene, and i start getting relationships based on that. i can tell you that brian lambert is the caller. he identifies himself as the roommate. and without getting into too much detail, i believed that jim beaver is the other roommate that is present as well. . . . we talk about a prior altercation with roommates so what i am looking at here, if i look at the totality, i look at the environment, i look at the violence, i look at the anger, i look at some of the vernacular that was used, i can see that both roommates were there at the time of this 911 call. i look -- i start looking at opportunity. is there possible opportunity that mr. beaver or mr. lambert could have committed this offence? why do i say “this offence”? i believe it to be suspicious in nature. there’s red flags all over the document. now, when i look at the pims report and then i look at that as corroborating some of the information that i saw, i start looking at motive. i start looking at motivation and, again, in culmination with all of the information that i am getting -- and to review, phone call from staff sergeant chisholm, email from staff sergeant chisholm, review of the i/net event information, review of the i/net event chronology, review of the pims report, the belief that investigatively that the victim is going to be sutton bowers, i believe there are subjective and objective grounds to arrest both mr. lambert and mr. beaver for murder. (ar, vol. i, at pp. 226-27) [170] the grounds relied on by det. vermette to direct the appellants’ arrests do not come close to providing the particularized evidence required to ground a reasonable belief based on credible and compelling information that the reasonable grounds standard demands. i explain this conclusion in the following manner. i begin by briefly commenting on the relevance of the absence of notes taken by det. vermette to the assessment of reasonable grounds. then, i explain why the above information fails to meet the objective reasonable grounds standard first, all of the information, in its totality, is not sufficient to meet the particularized probability required to form reasonable grounds second, the timeline of events in det. vermette’s testimony undermines the reasonableness of his stated belief that there was reason to believe the appellants killed mr. bowers at the time of their arrest. third, the individual pillars of evidence relied on for the asserted grounds do not support the officer’s reasoning. (1) there were no notes to review on the claimed grounds for arrest [171] det. vermette did not take notes detailing the actual and individual information he claimed to rely on to support his decision-making at the time of the arrest. there is therefore no contemporaneous record of the particular grounds asserted to justify why the arrest power was believed to be a legally available option for each accused at the relevant point in time. [172] it is well recognized that police notes are crucial to the court’s ability to meaningfully review the exercise of police power without prior judicial authorization, including the arrest power (r v fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621, at para. 82; r v. vu, 2013 scc 60, [2013] 3 scr 657, at para. 70; see also wood v. schaeffer, 2013 scc 71, [2013] 3 scr 1053, at paras. 63-66). [173] the absence of notes is a factor to be considered in deciding whether to accept the witness’s testimony (r v. lotfy, 2017 bcca 418, 357 ccc (3d) 516, at para. 54; see r v. faulkner, 2020 abqb 231, at para. 37 (canlii); r v. abdulatif, 2017 onsc 2089, at paras. 39-42 (canlii); r v mascoe, 2017 onsc 4208, 350 ccc (3d) 208, at paras. 114-15; united states of america v. sheppard, 2013 qccs 5260, 295 crr (2d) 113, at para. 20; r v. davidoff, 2013 abqb 244, 560 ar 252, at para. 25; r v odgers, 2009 oncj 287, at para. 16 (canlii); r v fisher, 2005 canlii 16070 (ont. ca), at para. 1). [174] in reviewing reasonable grounds, the absence of notes may inform the court’s assessment of the officer’s credibility, which is relevant to both the subjective and the objective elements of the test. without notes, it is difficult to cross-examine or question what is often a bare assertion by the officers that they had grounds to arrest the individual. notes are therefore critical to checking the exercise of police power by ensuring that statements of personal belief do not go routinely or effectively unchallenged with respect to the objective element of the test, notes provide contemporaneous documentary evidence of what information the officer actually considered at the time the decision to arrest was made. the question at this stage is whether there were objectively reasonable grounds based on the information the police did rely on, not what they could have relied on. this is to prevent charter breaches to the extent possible by ensuring a thorough assessment is conducted before the decision to arrest is made. to do otherwise would incentivize police to make snap decisions and piece together information in an attempt to justify those decisions after-the-fact. the absence of notes detailing the information used to form the decision at the time it was made may therefore hinder the arrestee’s ability to challenge the decision to arrest, and the court’s ability to get to the truth of the basis for that decision. [175] it is unnecessary to decide whether the judge’s acceptance of the officer’s subjective belief was tainted by palpable and overriding error because it is clear that the asserted grounds, even if believed, do not come close to meeting the test on an objective standard. (2) the totality of the information relied on is insufficient to meet the reasonable grounds standard [176] the grounds forming the basis on which det. vermette directed the appellants’ arrests in their totality do not rise to the level of a credibly based probability required to meet the reasonable grounds standard det. vermette’s testimony continuously restated the same information in various verbal formulations. the reasons proffered were embellished, long-winded, abstract and repetitive. they exaggerated the extent and utility of the information relied upon and obscured the lack of particularized evidence grounding the stated belief. when the inflated explanations are stripped back, the reasoning is essentially that the police were called on the scene to investigate a suspicious death and the individuals who found the body had an acrimonious relationship with the deceased, in which the deceased appeared to be the aggressor. i cannot accept that the police, whenever they are called upon to investigate a traumatic death, are entitled to arrest the individuals who reported the body for murder simply because they had a tumultuous history with the deceased. [177] det. vermette admitted that when he spoke to csts. taylor and husband at 11:39 a.m — after his conversation with s/sgt. chisholm but before reviewing the materials in the police file — he did not have grounds to arrest the appellants the implication from his testimony was, however, that the material he subsequently reviewed in the file provided the additional information necessary to meet the threshold of reasonable grounds. [178] all of the information taken together does not amount to reasonable grounds. in addition, the information in the police reports could not have made up the difference needed to ground a credibly based probability. det. vermette’s testimony indicates that most of the circumstances he relied on to form reasonable grounds were known to him before he reviewed these documents. in particular, he already knew: the homicide unit had been called out to investigate a death; the body was found face down in a pool of blood near the bottom of the stairs at the front entrance of a residence; there was a prior conflict or dispute between the deceased and his roommates; and the roommates had been brought into custody by the officers who attended at the scene. while slightly more detailed, the additional information in the police file did not significantly alter the factual matrix. corroborating the undisputed information that the appellants and the deceased were roommates and that they had been arguing that week could not raise the level of suspicion to that of reasonable grounds to believe that the appellants had killed mr. bowers. [179] further, the grounds asserted by det. vermette and accepted by the lower courts fail to engage with the exculpatory evidence pointing away from mr. bowers’ death being a homicide, and from the appellants being involved. in assessing whether the reasonable grounds standard is met, the police must take into account the totality of the circumstances this means that they are not entitled to disregard exculpatory, neutral, or equivocal information unless they have good reason to believe it is unreliable (r v. chehil, 2013 scc 49, [2013] 3 scr 220, at paras. 26, 29 and 33). here, there were serious questions relating to both the offence and the individuals. [180] with respect to the offence, information at the scene suggested that mr. bowers may have died in an intoxicated fall. this is reflected in the trial judge’s finding that, at the time of the appellants’ detention, it was unclear whether the death was the result of a criminal offence. no further information suggesting the death was the result of a homicide was uncovered between the initial detention and the appellants’ arrests. det. vermette’s assertion that the death was “suspicious” because there were “red flags all over the document” is not the type of credible, compelling, particularized information that police can rely upon to support a reasonable belief that an offence has been committed for the purpose of justifying an arrest for murder. [181] with respect to the individuals, the appellants’ connection to the death was tenuous there was no information about the time of death suggesting that it had occurred when the appellants would have had the “opportunity” to commit the offence. it will be true in every case that a particular individual or individuals report finding the body this fact alone does not provide evidence of an “opportunity” to commit the offence the information known to police at the time of the arrests was that the deceased was last seen alive with an unknown man. [182] further, in all of the history in the police file, the deceased was the aggressor in the altercations. he was the only one with a history of violence. neither of the accused had a criminal record. the information in the pims report relied on to support the “motive” suggested that mr. lambert didn’t think much of the assault and did not want to involve the police, have charges laid or provide a statement any indication that the assault provided mr. lambert with a motive to kill was minimal. [183] moreover, there was nothing at all to suggest mr. beaver was involved in any of the prior incidents other than the argument the evening before the 9-1-1 call, which was already known to officers at the scene. it is untenable to conclude, as the trial judge did, that the information in the pims report could make up the difference between the absence of reasonable suspicion to detain the appellants at the scene, and the presence of reasonable grounds to arrest them at police headquarters. (3) the timing of the arrests suggests the decision was made for expediency [184] the timing of det. vermette’s direction to arrest the appellants also calls into question the reasonableness of the decision. on det. vermette’s own evidence, he made the decision to arrest the appellants within two minutes of learning that the appellants had been illegally detained and transported to the station. up to this point, he had been under the mistaken impression that officers at the scene had already arrested the appellants for murder. det. vermette testified that he made the decision to arrest quickly in order to “rectify” the situation (ar, vol. i, at p 225). [185] the circumstances of the appellants’ unlawful detention and transport should have been a cause for concern not only because of the charter breaches that resulted, but to prompt questioning into why the other officers did not believe they had grounds to arrest the appellants under their authority in s 495 of the criminal code. det. vermette’s failure to make any such inquiries in this case is indicative of the arrests being a means to salvage the investigation, rather than the result of asking himself whether he in fact had lawful grounds to keep the appellants in custody, even if not done in bad faith. (4) the evidence relied on for the asserted grounds did not support a reasonable belief [186] finally, the individual pillars of evidence relied on for the asserted grounds do not support the officer’s reasoning, either standing alone or in combination. [187] i have already explained why the information relied on to support the appellants’ “motive” and “opportunity” is not compelling. in addition, much was made in det. vermette’s testimony of the fact that the medical examiner had called the homicide unit to investigate the death, which in his view meant that the death was suspicious the word “suspicious” was det. vermette’s own — the police reports described the death as a “sudden death”, not a suspicious one. [188] for an investigator to rely on the “suspicious” nature of a death in support of reasonable grounds, this label must hold up to scrutiny on the basis of particularized, objectively verifiable information. the police, not the medical examiner, are legally trained on what the constitutional standard of reasonable grounds entails the possibility of foul play will be true any time the homicide unit is called in to investigate a death. it is not the fact of the medical investigator calling for further investigation, but the basis on which she made that decision, that could reasonably support the belief that an offence had been committed. the medical examiner can explain to the police the information on which they believe foul play may or may not have been involved, and the police can and should use that information to inform their view of whether or not there are reasonable grounds this appears to have happened in a phone call between the medical examiner and det. vermette at 12:35 pm in which she provided the details of her scene assessment. however, this occurred approximately 20 minutes after he had directed dets. hossack and demarino to arrest the appellants for murder. at the time of the arrests, there was no information about why the medical examiner had engaged the homicide unit and what facts or factors grounded her assessment. it could be that the medical examiner calls out the police to every “sudden death”, or it could be that there were particular facts about the scene that supported a belief that the death was not the result of an accident. we simply do not know. [189] the information that det. vermette explained formed the basis of his decision to arrest the appellants may have given rise to a reasonable suspicion, but to accept that it formed the basis of reasonable grounds to believe that the appellants killed mr. bowers would erode the reasonable grounds standard to a level inconsistent with what is required to provide a meaningful check on the state’s investigatory powers in accordance with the charter’s requirements. while the assessment is global and does not require an isolated parsing of each particular component or a prima facie case to answer on each element of the offence, there must be something of substance proffered in order to meet the objective reasonable grounds standard. the police have failed to offer a substantively reasonable basis to support the asserted belief that at the time of the appellants’ arrests, there were reasonable grounds to believe they had killed mr. bowers. b. the evidence was “obtained in a manner” that infringed the appellants’ charter rights [190] the crown conceded, and the trial judge found, that the police breached the appellants’ ss. 9, 10(a) and 10(b) charter rights. the trial judge also held that the arrests and the searches subsequent to those arrests were lawful and that the right to silence was not breached because the statements were voluntary. i conclude that the arrests were not supported by reasonable and probable grounds and that as a result, the searches conducted pursuant to those arrests were also constitutionally infirm under s 8 of the charter (r v. feeney, [1997] 2 scr 13, at para. 60; r v. tim, 2022 scc 12, at para. 48). further, the s 9 guarantee against arbitrary detention is a manifestation of a person’s s 7 charter right to liberty (grant, at para. 54; re bc. motor vehicle act, [1985] 2 scr 486, at pp. 502-3). as i explain, these additional breaches of a person’s ss. 7 and 8 rights combine to be sufficient to exclude the impugned evidence and i need not address the majority’s views on the voluntariness of the statements given. [191] in determining whether evidence was “obtained in a manner” that breaches the charter, i agree with my colleague that courts should examine the entire relationship between the evidence and the breach to determine the strength of the connection and assess whether the breach and the evidence are part of the same transaction or course of conduct. the connection may be temporal, contextual, causal, or a combination of the three (strachan; goldhart; wittwer). a strict causal connection is not required (r v. therens, [1985] 1 scr 613, at p 649; strachan, at pp. 1005-6). instead, a global assessment is necessary “to determine whether a charter violation occurred in the course of obtaining the evidence” (strachan, at p 1005) indeed, a charter breach following the discovery of evidence may still meet the “obtained in a manner” requirement of s 24(2) (r v. pino, 2016 onca 389, 130 or (3d) 561). the “obtained in a manner” analysis necessitates the full contextual analysis each time it is performed, regardless of whether subsequent charter-compliant actions exist. [192] the trial judge and court of appeal departed from this holistic assessment. they defined a “fresh start” as an attempt by police to “cure” an earlier breach so that any subsequently discovered evidence would not be “obtained in a manner” that infringed a person’s charter rights (ca reasons, at para. 12; see also if,. canadian civil liberties association (“ccla factum”), at para. 13). instead of examining the connection between the breach and the evidence holistically, the “fresh start” principle focuses on whether the police, after the breach, corrected their behaviour this definition of “fresh start” reduces the broad “obtained in a manner” analysis and asks only two questions: (1) whether there was subsequent charter-compliant state conduct following the breach but before the discovery of the evidence; and (2) whether that subsequent charter-compliant conduct severed the relationship between the breach and the discovery of the evidence (ccla factum, at para. 13). [193] the arrests, even if they were lawful, do not constitute a “fresh start” that shields subsequent actions by the police from charter scrutiny. [194] i do not think this vague notion of a “fresh start” is already part of our law and i am convinced it should not be so recognized the idea of a “fresh start” is unnecessary because the established holistic approach is more than adequate to the task and this new flourish creates many deep pitfalls with no countervailing purpose. [195] i disagree with my colleague’s contention that this court has accepted that, in principle, the police can make a “fresh start” after a charter violation (para. 100). i would not read wittwer as endorsing the “fresh start” concept as one that can shield evidence from the application of s 24(2) of the charter. no such conclusion was ever made in that case. [196] wittwer concerned the admissibility of an incriminating statement that the police obtained from the accused in a manner that violated his right to counsel. another officer made a new attempt to get a statement from the accused without referring to the information gathered from the unconstitutionally obtained statement, but eventually referred to it after the officer determined there was no other way to convince the accused to talk fish j concluded that the evidence was obtained in a manner that violated the charter because “[w]hat began as a permissible fresh start thus ended as an impermissible interrogation inseparably linked to its tainted past” (para. 3 (emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted)). [197] some have sought to elevate this ambiguous wording as endorsing the view that “fresh starts” may be permissible in appropriate cases, even if the one in wittwer was found not to be (see r v simon, 2008 onca 578, 269 oac 259; r v. manchulenko, 2013 onca 543, 116 or (3d) 721; r v. hamilton, 2017 onca 179, 347 ccc (3d) 19; r v. mcsweeney, 2020 onca 2, 451 crr (2d) 357). in my view, the above statement does not establish the notion of a “fresh start” as an accepted doctrine or binding principle of our law. the court in wittwer found that there was no break between the manner in which the charter was breached in these two offending interrogations. fish j used a colloquial description of what police were trying to do by their conduct and by doing so he did not create a new doctrine which operates outside of the holistic analysis done under s 24 the “fresh start” described related to the police’s conduct, and not the admissibility of the second statement under s 24. indeed, on the contrary, fish j determined that the taking of the second statement was tainted by reference to the “inadmissible statement” taken some five months prior (para. 22). [198] the concept of a “permissible fresh start” detracts from the broad and generous approach that this court has adopted for the “obtained in a manner” requirement of s 24 of the charter. regardless of the presence of charter-compliant conduct following a breach, the test must remain the same in every case: the evidence is “obtained in a manner” that infringes a charter right if upon review of the entire course of events, the breach and the obtaining of the evidence can be said to be part of the same transaction or course of conduct. the connection between the breach and the obtaining of the evidence may be temporal, contextual, causal or a combination of the three, and the connection must be more than tenuous (r v. plaha (2004), 189 oac. 376, at para. 45, citing goldhart, at paras. 32-49). i see no reason why this test should not govern in all cases even if, or maybe especially when, police have recognized a breach and have taken steps to stop it. [199] this is precisely the approach adopted by fish j in wittwer (at para. 21) and is the only legal test endorsed by this court. although arguably, fish j refers to a “fresh start”, he then unequivocally applies the generous and broad approach to the “obtained in a manner” requirement developed in strachan and goldhart to conduct his analysis. the text of s 24(2) is not worded so narrowly as to preclude evidence from consideration even when the police take steps to cease an ongoing charter violation. substituting a “fresh start” analysis for a complete and contextual “obtained in a manner” analysis creates an inflexible test that makes charter remedies less accessible to those whose rights were violated. no single rule should disrupt the courts’ remedial inquiry (ccla factum, at para. 22). [200] as with all remedial provisions, s 24 of the charter must be given a large and liberal interpretation consistent with its purpose taking a broad and generous approach to the “obtained in a manner” threshold requirement is important, as it is the gateway to the focus of s 24(2): whether the admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute (pino, at para. 56). an overly narrow interpretation of s 24(2) would prevent courts from even considering the seriousness of the charter-infringing conduct, an unwelcome result which would automatically immunize prior charter breaches. there is simply no need or utility in speaking about a “fresh start” because the current s 24 jurisprudence contemplates that there may be circumstances in which the requisite connection is not established and the evidence was outside its “obtained in a manner” requirement. in my view, it is an unhelpful label that creates and supports an improper path of reasoning, serving to divide a holistic analysis into two parts. the trial decision in this case demonstrates the dangers that accompany the “fresh start” doctrine. in finding that there was a “fresh start” such that the charter breaches were “cured”, the trial judge characterized the police conduct following the arrest as a second transaction, unrelated to the prior events (paras. 207-11). this allowed him to ignore the unlawful conduct that preceded the arrests while relying only on the charter- compliant conduct following the arrests to justify a lack of connection between the charter violations and the statements. [201] respectfully, the approach my colleague has taken to the “fresh start” doctrine leads to a replication of the trial judge’s error though he rejects the trial judge’s conclusion that police can “cure” an earlier charter breach with charter- compliant conduct (para. 106, citing abqb reasons, at paras. 191, 206, 215, 239 and 253), he similarly enumerates police conduct that would allow just that; indicators that the police have rectified their breaches with new, charter-compliant conduct (factors enumerated at para. 103). there is no “focussed and powerful antidote” that can erase conduct violating the charter (para. 101, citing simon, at para. 70); this conduct must always form part of the “obtained in a manner” analysis. [202] by shifting the focus to the eventual charter-compliant conduct, the “fresh start” doctrine distracts from the remedial nature of s 24(2) and allows police to insulate their conduct from review, regardless of the severity of that conduct this approach clashes with the principle under the grant inquiry that charter-compliant conduct by some police officers does not negate or reduce the severity of the charter- infringing conduct of other police officers (r v. reilly, 2020 bcca 369, 397 ccc. (3d) 219, at paras. 93-102, aff’d 2021 scc 38; see also ccla factum, at para. 20). [203] after reviewing the entire course of events, i conclude that the evidence was “obtained in a manner” that infringed the appellants’ charter rights. because the trial judge erred in (1) concluding that there were reasonable grounds to arrest the appellants and in (2) relying on the concept of a “fresh start” to sever the connection between the initial charter breaches and subsequent statements provided, his conclusion that the evidence was not “obtained in a manner” within the meaning of s 24(2) of the charter is not owed deference here, there is a strong temporal, contextual, and causal connection between the breaches of the appellants’ charter rights and the collection of their statements. the appellants were under the continuous control and supervision of the police from the time of their unlawful detention and transportation from the scene, to the time det. vermette unlawfully directed their arrests, to the time they ultimately admitted their involvement some 12 hours later. the police facilitating a second consultation with counsel for mr. lambert and advising him that they are “start[ing] everything all over again” does nothing to relinquish the firm grasp they continued to hold on him (ar, vol. ii, at p 30) although a causal connection is not required, the fact that the police would not have obtained the evidence but for the detention, transport, and arrests that were conducted in a manner that violated their charter rights supports the conclusion that the charter breaches and the evidence the appellants provided in their statements were “inextricably linked” (r v. black, [1989] 2 scr 138, at p 163). c admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute [204] the final question to be addressed is whether, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of that evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. i have no doubt that it would. [205] given my conclusion that the trial judge erred in his analysis on whether there were reasonable grounds for arrest, his alternative analysis under s 24(2) is not owed deference (r v le, 2019 scc 34, [2019] 2 scr 692, at para. 138; r v. paterson, 2017 scc 15, [2017] 1 scr 202, at para. 42; grant, at para. 129). even if this were not the case, there are legal errors in the trial judge’s alternative analysis, which i discuss below, that would justify revisiting his conclusions. further, the judge’s finding that the arrests “cured” the previous charter breaches undermined his ability to appreciate the impact of those breaches on the appellants. i will therefore conduct my own analysis of the grant factors. (1) seriousness of the charter-infringing state conduct [206] the charter-infringing state conduct for which the appellants seek a remedy includes: (i) their unlawful detention, transport, and search pursuant to a non-existent police power in non-existent legislation, resulting in breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a) and 10(b); (ii) cst. taylor’s failure to hold off on questioning mr. lambert, violating his rights under ss. 7 and 10(b); and (iii) their arrest for murder absent reasonable grounds, resulting in further arbitrary detention contrary to s 9. [207] the police conduct in this case can only be described as a string of extremely serious violations of well-established charter principles in no circumstances were the officers acting in areas of urgency or legal uncertainty. each of the principles that were breached in this case have been foundational legal requirements since the early years of the charter. that these charter requirements took a back seat to investigative convenience and expediency is unacceptable and brings the administration of justice into disrepute. the trial judge’s conclusion that the breaches were not serious, and even the product of “good faith” errors, is untenable when applying the correct legal principles to the facts as he found them. [208] the absence of bad faith conduct in breaching charter rights does not mean that the breaches are not “severe” or at the serious end of the spectrum in the analysis under s 24(2). circumstances where police are found to have deliberately breached the charter are exceedingly rare however, we expect a great deal more of police than simply refraining from purposely abusing their powers as state actors who are empowered with extraordinary authority to detain, interrogate, and use force against members of the public in the execution of their duties, it is imperative that police conduct remains scrupulously in line with the boundaries circumscribed by constitutional standards for this reason, a failure to abide by established principles governing police conduct is considered extremely serious conduct that would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute (r v. kokesch, [1990] 3 scr 3, at pp. 32-33; r v. genest, [1989] 1 scr 59, at p 87). indeed, conduct that is “reckless”, “negligent”, or “ignorant” should support exclusion of the evidence (grant, at paras. 74-75). conduct does not need to be deliberate, motivated by an ulterior purpose, or involve systemic or institutional abuse in order to favour a remedy (grant, at para. 75; r v. harrison, 2009 scc 34, [2009] 2 scr 494, at paras. 24-25; paterson, at para. 47; le, at para. 143). [209] the concept of “good faith” has a particular legal meaning in the context of the s 24(2) analysis. for conduct to be described as “good faith”, the police must have conducted themselves in a manner consistent with what they “subjectively, reasonably, and non-negligently believe[d] to be the law” (le, at para. 147, quoting r. v. washington, 2007 bcca 540, 248 bcac 65, at para. 78 (emphasis added); see also paterson, at para. 44). the conduct cannot be considered “good faith” if it was based on an unreasonable error or ignorance as to the scope of police authority (r v. buhay, 2003 scc 30, [2003] 1 scr 631, at para. 59; tim, at para. 85). failing to act in bad faith — for example, by knowingly or deliberately breaching the accused’s charter rights — does not mean that there was good faith police conduct, unless the conduct was also reasonable and showed a genuine attempt to respect and even promote the rights guaranteed under the charter (le, at para. 147). [210] the trial judge erred in failing to apply these principles to the actions of the officers in this case in the alternative analysis he conducted under s 24(2). [211] the trial judge found that in directing the appellants’ arrests under the medical examiners act, sgt. lines “was looking for a way to maintain control over mr. beaver and mr. lambert, but was not sure exactly how to do it” (para. 230). he characterized this conduct as “reckless”, but not “deliberate”, “severe”, or indicative of a “blatant disregard” for the appellants’ charter rights (para. 230) while the judge correctly found that this conduct could not be characterized as good faith and favoured exclusion, i cannot accept his conclusion that the conduct was not severe and did not show a disregard for the appellants’ charter rights. detaining the appellants under a non-existent police power simply because the officer was searching for a way to maintain control over them does exactly that. the import of his finding was that the officer was operating with an end goal other than ensuring that the necessary legal standards governing police conduct were met. this shows a disregard for the bounds of police authority to limit individual liberty through arrest and detention it is decidedly very serious conduct. [212] as for cst. taylor’s decision to start questioning mr. lambert in the car before having provided him with an opportunity to speak to counsel, the judge found that the questioning was not serious or a blatant disregard for mr. lambert’s charter rights he noted that it was not an interrogation or a deliberate attempt to elicit incriminating information; cst. taylor simply asked what had happened. he described the seriousness of this conduct in the following terms (at para. 234): this court cannot find cst. taylor’s question completely blameless. although innocent on its face, and likely intended not to illicit incriminating information, cst. taylor took the risk that mr. lambert would provide incriminating evidence. in posing this question, therefore, he was negligent. but does this negligent behaviour move the breach to the more serious side of the breach spectrum? in grant, mclachlin cjc and charron j said, “‘[g]ood faith’ on the part of the police will also reduce the need for the court to disassociate itself from the police conduct”: grant at para 75. this court finds that cst. taylor was posing the question in good faith. he was not attempting to elicit evidence from mr. lambert. rather, he was simply posing a question that might further the investigation as to how mr. bowers died. in so doing, he was negligent, but not grossly so. his behaviour would fall more to the less serious side of the spectrum. [213] respectfully, it is not possible to conclude that the failure to hold off on questioning mr. lambert was a “good faith” or non-serious error. in citing para. 75 of grant for authority that good faith on the part of police will reduce the need to dissociate from police conduct, the judge unfortunately overlooked the very next sentence of that paragraph, which affirms that “negligence or wilful blindness cannot be equated with good faith” the judge made the express finding, which is well grounded in the facts, that cst. taylor’s failure to hold off questioning demonstrated negligence in meeting the conduct required of police officers. [214] the legal implication of the trial judge’s factual findings is that the s 10(b) breach during the transportation of mr. lambert was serious and favoured exclusion of the evidence section 10(b) of the charter is concerned with self-incrimination and these concerns are present at the outset of detention (r v. suberu, 2009 scc 33, [2009] 2 scr 460, at para. 2). the duty to hold off has long been a crucial aspect of the implementational duties required of police; once a detainee asserts their right to counsel, the police cannot compel them to partake in a process which could adversely affect the conduct of an eventual trial until that right has been exercised (r v. prosper, [1994] 3 scr 236, at p 269, citing r v. ross, [1989] 1 scr 3, at p 12). [215] there was no uncertainty in the law, nor was there any sense of urgency that might have required the police to begin questioning mr. lambert before they could facilitate a call with counsel. the fact that the questioning was done in a casual manner rather than an interrogation-style in no way diminishes the seriousness of this conduct, which by the trial judge’s finding was designed to “further the investigation as to how mr. bowers died” the question asked was designed to get a response about what happened. whether the officer said he did not expect to receive incriminating evidence does not negate the seriousness of failing to ensure that mr. lambert obtained the legal advice he requested and had a right to receive before he was subject to police questioning mr. lambert could have made incriminating statements in the police cruiser, and the seriousness of the police’s charter-infringing conduct is not mitigated by the fact that he did not. [216] finally, the judge concluded that if he was wrong in finding there were reasonable grounds to arrest the appellants, det. vermette’s conduct would not be serious. he relied on the fact that det. vermette was acting in a “fluid situation”, did not “have the luxury of time and thorough consideration”, and could not be expected to undertake a complete analysis of the bases supporting his grounds like a court could do in hindsight (paras. 232 and 240). i disagree in principle with these conclusions. [217] the decision to arrest the appellants constituted a serious violation of their charter rights. a subjective belief in reasonable grounds does not excuse the decision to arrest in order to justify continued detention in the absence of objective reasonable grounds. undertaking a thorough analysis of whether the information known to officers at the time was enough to support a credibly based probability that the appellants had killed mr. bowers was thus required. [218] contrary to the trial judge’s conclusion, the officers were not acting in the type of “fluid situation” that might support a finding that there was insufficient time to undertake a complete analysis of the bases supporting, and pointing away from, the grounds for arrest. there was no need to act quickly to preserve officer safety, take control of a dynamic situation, or prevent the destruction of evidence. an investigation is always “fluid” in the sense that officers continuously gather information and make decisions on the basis of that information this does not licence them to breach the charter, nor does it make any breaches less serious or excusable fluidity is not a reason to fail to approach the applicable legal standard with rigour. there is no reason that the police did not have the luxury of time and consideration before making a determination about whether there were reasonable grounds to arrest the appellants. [219] while the officer was right to be concerned with protecting the appellants’ charter rights when he was presented with the circumstances of their unlawful detention, there was an equally viable alternative that would better achieve that objective in this case: releasing the appellants from custody and arresting them once there were reasonable grounds to do so no attempts were made to inquire into the reasons why the appellants were not arrested and were instead detained under a statute that det. vermette knew did not exist and did not grant the police any detention powers. any perceived urgency by the officers at this time was of their own making. it is not a basis for lowering the standards we expect them to uphold under the charter. [220] while i find it unnecessary to determine whether it impacted the voluntariness of the statements, the post-arrest conduct of the police also indicates a lack of attention to ensuring the appellants understood the seriousness of the circumstances they faced at best, informing the appellants that they were arrested simply because they were witnesses and the police needed to determine what happened showed a lack of care towards ensuring the appellants understood the extent of the jeopardy that accompanies being arrested for murder. [221] in sum, the state conduct in this case involved decisions by three separate officers to undertake actions in violation of well-established charter standards, placing investigative expediency above the rights of the appellants in the face of no urgency and no legal uncertainty. not only were these breaches serious on their own, but the pattern of disregard shown by these officers over the course of the investigation further supports the conclusion that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute (grant, at para. 75). this factor weighs heavily in favour of exclusion. (2) impact on the appellants’ charter-protected interests [222] because of the charter breaches, the appellants were deprived of their liberty for several hours without a lawful basis and without being informed of the reason, preventing them from being able to make an informed decision about whether to cooperate with police. during this time, the police kept the appellants in custody, searched them, and continued their investigation to the point where they purportedly obtained sufficient grounds to arrest them for murder. they then continued to detain and interrogate them on the basis of those purported grounds until they admitted their involvement in mr. bowers’ death there is no doubt that the intrusion on their charter-protected interests was serious. [223] in the alternative analysis the trial judge conducted under s 24(2), he failed to consider the impact of the appellants’ inability to receive legal advice based on an informed understanding of their jeopardy during their unlawful detention and transport — a time at which they were highly vulnerable to the exercise of state power. he instead focused on his findings that the appellants knew they had staged the scene of the death, from which he surmised that they knew the reasons for their detention. he also gave significant weight to his findings that the appellants would have spoken to the police no matter what because they were intent on providing their exculpatory narrative. for these reasons, he concluded that the breaches “had little effect” on the appellants (para. 247). [224] i have significant concerns with these aspects of the trial judge’s analysis. it does not follow from knowledge that the police are investigating a death that the appellants should have understood the extent of their legal jeopardy. even the officers at the scene testified that they did not understand the basis for the appellants’ detention. in the case of mr. beaver, the officer laughed while detaining him and providing his caution, signaling that she was not taking the situation seriously and that he need not either. [225] it is speculative to conclude that the appellants would have chosen to speak to police and provide the exculpatory narrative had they been properly notified of the circumstances of their jeopardy and given the right to speak to counsel on the basis of that information it could equally have been the case that the appellants gave their exculpatory narrative because they did not appreciate the seriousness of the jeopardy they faced or the implications of providing that information, or felt they had to continue with the narrative they had committed themselves to without being properly informed (see, eg,. plaha, at paras. 59-61; r v. noel, 2019 onca 860, at para. 27 (canlii)). [226] the trial judge also commented on the impact of cst. taylor’s breach of the duty to hold off on mr. lambert, determining that he “provided his explanation to cst. taylor spontaneously following cst. taylor’s charter breach” and would have done so in any event because he wanted to profess his innocence (para. 238) it is unclear what was spontaneous about this explanation given that it was provided in direct response to cst. taylor’s questioning. the basis on which the judge concluded that mr. lambert would have provided his explanation to cst. taylor without prompting is also unclear again, the fact that the explanation provided was exculpatory does not lessen the impact of his uninformed choice to speak to police. [227] the crown argues that the impact of the unlawful arrests is lessened by the fact that the police found out shortly after the arrests, at about 12:35 pm, that mr. bowers had sent incriminating messages on his computer to a friend on the evening of october 8, 2016. the messages stated that mr. bowers was “taking brian and jim down” because “they fucked [him]” (rr, at p 45). another message was sent some three hours later, stating: “i just destroyed brian and jim now i can get some worthy roommates any suggestions” (p 45) in the crown’s submission, these messages further confirmed the animus between the deceased and the appellants and would have resolved any doubt about the grounds for the arrests shortly after they were originally carried out. [228] i am doubtful that this information, which again corroborated an uncontroversial point and which pointed to the deceased — not the appellants — as the aggressor, would have made up the difference needed to reach the reasonable grounds threshold further, the additional information from the pims report establishes mr. bowers as having assaulted mr. lambert, and the report makes no mention at all of mr. beaver in any event, even if this information were sufficient to provide objectively reasonable grounds, it would not significantly lessen the cumulative impact of the breaches on the appellants’ charter-protected interests that led to that point. [229] the comments by police after the appellants’ arrests telling them that they were mere witnesses and the arrests were merely procedural further exacerbated the impact of the breaches on the appellants by downplaying the extent of their jeopardy. for mr. beaver, det. hossack’s reassurance that his arrest changed nothing about his circumstances — which was clearly false — heightened the impact on his charter- protected interests. [230] this factor also weighs in favour of exclusion. (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits [231] society’s interests in the adjudication of the case on its merits favours admission of the evidence, but not overwhelmingly so. it is not clear that the crown’s case would be “gutted” if the statements were excluded (grant, at para. 83). and while the offence is undoubtedly serious, this factor “cut[s] both ways” as the public has a heightened interest in ensuring the justice system is above reproach when the penal stakes for the accused are high (grant, at para. 84) on this point, iacobucci j.’s comments in r v. burlingham, [1995] 2 scr 206, at para. 50, are apposite: . . . i underscore that we should never lose sight of the fact that even a person accused of the most heinous crimes, and no matter the likelihood that he or she actually committed those crimes, is entitled to the full protection of the charter short-cutting or short-circuiting those rights affects not only the accused, but also the entire reputation of the criminal justice system it must be emphasized that the goals of preserving the integrity of the criminal justice system as well as promoting the decency in investigatory of applying s 24(2). techniques are of fundamental importance (4) balancing [232] on balance, i conclude that admission of the evidence in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and therefore the evidence must be excluded under s 24(2) of the charter the circumstances of the appellants’ detention and questioning led to multiple officers breaching multiple charter rights. the police conduct was extremely serious, violating foundational charter principles that officers have been bound for decades to follow during the course of an investigation there were no circumstances of uncertainty in the law or urgency in handling a dynamic situation that might explain these basic errors, which fundamentally undermined the appellants’ charter-protected interests given the strength of the first two grant factors, society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits is insufficient to tip the balance in favour of admission (le, at para. 142; paterson, at para. 56). iv conclusion [233] i would therefore allow the appeals, exclude all the evidence obtained in a manner that infringed the appellants’ charter rights, set aside the appellants’ convictions, and order new trials while the appellants sought an order substituting acquittals, the trial judge’s reasons indicated that the crown may have evidence to make a case even having excluded this evidence (see abqb reasons, at paras. 251-52), and there is insufficient information in the record available at this court to determine otherwise. appeals dismissed, karakatsanis, côté, brown and martin jj. dissenting. sitar & milczarek, calgary.
i. introduction [1] in british columbia (minister of forests) v. okanagan indian band, 2003 scc 71, [2003] 3 scr 371, this court established a framework for assessing claims for advance costs to offset the anticipated litigation expenses of public interest litigants. among its requirements was that an applicant demonstrate impecuniosity — meaning, that it “genuinely cannot afford to pay for the litigation” (para. 40). [2] this appeal concerns an application for advance costs by beaver lake cree nation to fund its litigation under s 35 of the constitution act, 1982. a band within the meaning of the indian act, rsc 1985, c i-5, beaver lake has about 1,200 members, approximately 450 of whom live on a reserve located near lac la biche, alberta in 2008, band chief germaine anderson sued on her own behalf and as a representative of all beaver lake cree nation beneficiaries of treaty no. 6 and of beaver lake cree nation (collectively, beaver lake). [3] while contending that it is “impecunious”, beaver lake has access to resources — both assets and income — that could potentially be applied to fund this litigation. beaver lake says, however, that these resources must be applied to address other priorities the issue to be decided here, then, is how the requirement of impecuniosity applies in this circumstance that is, we must consider how a first nation government applicant may demonstrate impecuniosity where it has access to resources that could fund litigation, but says it must devote those resources to other priorities. [4] we conclude that a first nation government that has access to resources may meet the impecuniosity requirement if it demonstrates that it requires such resources to meet its pressing needs. while the impecuniosity requirement is guided by the condition of necessity, pressing needs are not defined by the bare necessities of life. rather, and in keeping with the imperative of reconciliation, they ought to be understood from the perspective of that first nation government. a court may therefore consider the broader context in which a first nation government sets priorities and makes financial decisions, accounting for competing spending commitments, restrictions on the uses of its resources, and fiduciary and good governance obligations. it follows that, in appropriate cases, a first nation government may succeed in demonstrating impecuniosity despite having access to resources whose value equals or exceeds its litigation costs. [5] all this said, the threshold of impecuniosity remains high and is not easily met. bearing in mind the constraints on the judicial role imposed by the separation of powers, the extraordinary nature of the remedy and the importance of accountability for the expenditure of public funds it entails, the court’s analysis must be firmly grounded in the evidence. the court must be able to (1) identify the applicant’s pressing needs; (2) determine what resources are required to meet those needs; (3) assess the applicant’s financial resources; and (4) identify the estimated costs of funding the litigation. this approach is sufficiently flexible to account for the realities facing first nations governments and the importance of furthering the goal of reconciliation while adhering to the appropriate judicial role. [6] despite finding that beaver lake had, at the time of its application, more than $3 million in unrestricted funds and additional ongoing revenue that could be used to pay for its legal fees, the case management judge held that it was — given the impoverished state of the community and the other needs it was required to meet — impecunious and awarded beaver lake advance costs (2019 abqb 746). the court of appeal of alberta reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support that conclusion (2020 abca 238, 448 dlr (4th) 555). [7] in our respectful view, the case management judge erred in her impecuniosity analysis while her finding that beaver lake is an impoverished community with pressing needs is unassailable, her findings were insufficient to conclude that beaver lake had satisfied the legal test for impecuniosity. [8] the matter of beaver lake’s impecuniosity, however, should be reconsidered in light of the reasons that follow, and to account for the passage of time which will likely have altered beaver lake’s current financial state we would therefore allow the appeal and remit the matter to the court of queen’s bench of alberta. ii background [9] beaver lake’s underlying claim, in essence, is that the crown “improperly allowed lands traditionally used by beaver lake cree nation to be ‘taken up’ for industrial and resource development” thereby “compromis[ing] [its] ability . . to pursue its traditional way of life” (ca reasons, at para. 2). it seeks various declarations of right, injunctions, and damages or equitable compensation. [10] in support of its application, beaver lake says that the cost of litigation — which it estimated as $5 million — is well beyond its reach. by the time beaver lake’s application was heard, it had already spent approximately $3 million on legal fees, paid from its own funds and from third party fundraising a 120-day trial is presently scheduled to begin in january 2024. [11] citing okanagan and little sisters book and art emporium v canada (commissioner of customs and revenue), 2007 scc 2, [2007] 1 scr 38, the case management judge correctly stated the test for awarding advance costs — that an applicant must demonstrate impecuniosity, present a prima facie meritorious case and raise issues of public importance — and recognized that her decision is ultimately discretionary. canada and alberta conceded for the purposes of this application that beaver lake’s case was prima facie meritorious and, the case management judge found that the public importance requirement was satisfied, since beaver lake’s case raised a novel issue regarding the interpretation of aboriginal and treaty rights. [12] as to impecuniosity, the case management judge found that beaver lake’s financial situation had improved in recent years. it was not under any imminent threat of insolvency or third party or co-management, its recent financial statements showed a surplus, and it had been able to spend $3 million in legal fees for the litigation (averaging $300,000 each year). after reviewing beaver lake’s resources — including government funding for a variety of programs, impact benefit agreements negotiated with industry and miscellaneous revenue streams such as third party fundraising — she determined that beaver lake had access to “more than $3 million” in unrestricted funds that could potentially finance its litigation (para. 60 (canlii)). [13] the case management judge also observed, however, that beaver lake has “substantial deficits in housing and infrastructure and . . . high levels of unemployment and social assistance” (para. 30) relying on the evidence of band council and community members, she held that beaver lake was an impoverished community with many pressing needs and concluded that it was impecunious because it “cannot fund the litigation at the rate required to bring it to trial” (para. 63). in the result, she found it appropriate to award advance costs beaver lake, she said, should not have “to choose between pursuing this litigation and attempting to provide for the basic necessities of life” (para. 66) each of beaver lake, canada and alberta would therefore contribute $300,000 annually to the credit of beaver lake’s legal fees until the trial was concluded or litigation was otherwise resolved. [14] the court of appeal allowed canada’s and alberta’s appeals and set aside the case management judge’s order the case management judge erred, it held, in concluding that beaver lake was impecunious. her finding that beaver lake had more than $3 million in unrestricted funds alone signified that beaver lake “prima facie did not meet the legal test” (c.a reasons, at para. 17) it was an error in principle to conclude that beaver lake was impecunious when it had financial resources, but chose to spend them on other priorities. distinguishing “discretionary spending on desirable improvements to community infrastructure and standards of living” from “spending on basic necessities”, it held that an applicant is impecunious only where its expenditures on matters in the latter category render it genuinely unable to pay for the litigation (para. 28) here, no evidence supported the case management judge’s finding that beaver lake would have to choose between spending on basic necessities and pursuing the litigation. [15] before the court of appeal, canada tendered fresh evidence that beaver lake had received $2.97 million in settlement of a specific claim. the court of appeal therefore held that, in light of this evidence and of the case management judge’s findings, and accounting for her errors in principle in disregarding certain assets that were available to beaver lake, beaver lake had at least $6 to 7 million to fund the litigation further, it said that the advance costs order was “unreasonable”, since it failed to adequately balance the parties’ interests, the quantum of the award was not justified on the record, and the order did not include adequate procedural controls. iii analysis [16] our analysis proceeds as follows. first, we review the test and underlying principles governing awards for advance costs in public interest litigation. secondly, we consider the impecuniosity requirement of that test, and how it applies to a first nation government that has access to financial resources that could potentially pay for its litigation. finally, we apply the framework to illustrate how, we say respectfully, the case management judge erred in her assessment of impecuniosity in this case. [17] beaver lake submits that whether a first nation government is impecunious must be informed by broad contextual factors and the unique realities of first nations, including the government’s obligations to its community and the reasonable financial decisions it makes on matters besides litigation. an approach to impecuniosity that focuses exclusively on an applicant’s available financial resources is contrary to the objective of reconciliation inherent in s 35 litigation. in any event, spending on beaver lake’s housing and infrastructure deficits is not just a reasonable financial decision, but a basic need that should take priority over funding the litigation. [18] alberta and canada each submit that, given beaver lake’s access to significant assets and revenues, it was not impecunious. while alberta agrees that the test for impecuniosity is not one of “unqualified impecuniosity” (c.a reasons, at para. 25), beaver lake did not provide sufficient contextual evidence identifying or costing its basic needs or demonstrating that it was using its unrestricted financial resources to address those needs. alberta acknowledges that the goal of reconciliation is relevant under certain branches of the advance costs test, but argues that it has no role to play in the impecuniosity analysis. canada says that the exceptional nature of an advance costs award means that merely having legitimate and reasonable infrastructure or social needs sets the bar too low. beaver lake did not satisfy the onus of proving that its proposed alternate uses for its financial resources meet a high threshold of necessity. a advance costs (1) guiding judicial discretion [19] we begin with first principles. a court’s equitable jurisdiction over costs confers discretion to decide when, and by whom, costs are to be paid (okanagan, at para. 35). this includes the power to award advance costs (also referred to as “interim costs”) prior to the final disposition of public interest litigation and in any event of the cause (okanagan, at para. 1) such awards are “meant to provide a basic level of assistance necessary for the case to proceed” (little sisters, at para. 43). [20] in okanagan, this court held that advance costs could be awarded based on the strong public interest in obtaining a ruling on a legal issue of exceptional importance, that not only transcended the interests of the parties but also would, in the absence of public funding, have failed to proceed to a resolution, creating an injustice (para. 34; r v. caron, 2011 scc 5, [2011] 1 scr 78, at para. 6). access to justice is an important policy consideration underlying advance costs awards where a litigant seeks a determination of their constitutional rights and other issues of broad public significance, but lacks the financial resources to proceed. it has also been recognized by this court as “fundamental to the rule of law” (trial lawyers association of british columbia v. british columbia (attorney general), 2014 scc 59, [2014] 3 scr 31, at para. 39; see also bcgeu v british columbia (attorney general), [1988] 2 scr 214, at p 230) further, costs awards can permit litigants of limited means, including vulnerable and historically disadvantaged groups, to have access to the courts in cases of public importance. [21] but this court has also emphasized that “okanagan did not establish the access to justice rationale as the paramount consideration in awarding costs” and that “[c]oncerns about access to justice must be considered with and weighed against other important factors” (little sisters, at para. 35). indeed, as this court explained in little sisters, at para. 5, notwithstanding obstacles to access to justice such as underfunded and overwhelmed legal aid programs and growing instances of self-representation, the court in okanagan “did not seek to create a parallel system of legal aid or a court-managed comprehensive program” rather, okanagan applies to those rare instances where a court would be “participating in an injustice — against the litigant personally and against the public generally” — by declining to exercise its discretion to order advance costs (little sisters, at para. 5). to award advance costs outside those instances would amount to “imprudent and inappropriate judicial overreach” (little sisters, at para. 44). [22] the root of the concern underlying this narrow scope for an advance costs order is the separation of powers in ontario v criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr 3, this court affirmed that “our constitutional framework prescribes different roles for the executive, legislative and judicial branches” (para. 27) and that it is “fundamental that no one of them overstep its bounds, that each show proper deference for the legitimate sphere of activity of the other” (para. 29, quoting new brunswick broadcasting co v nova scotia (speaker of the house of assembly), [1993] 1 scr 319, at p 389). and so, in caron, at para. 6, the court observed that “[a]s a general rule, of course, it is for parliament and the provincial legislatures to determine if and how public monies will be used to fund litigation against the crown” (see also st-arnaud v. cl, 2009 qcca 97, at para. 29 (canlii): “. . . the long-lasting solution, if there is one, is to be found in distributive justice and falls within the purview of the legislator, rather than in corrective justice, which involves the intervention of the courts”). allocating public resources among competing priorities is “a policy and economic question; it is a political decision” (criminal lawyers’ association, at para. 43). [23] where, therefore, an applicant seeks to have its litigation funded by the public purse, courts must be mindful of the constraints of their institutional role. those constraints necessarily confine a court’s discretion to grant such an award to narrow circumstances (okanagan, at para. 41) it must be a “last resort” (little sisters, at paras. 36, 41, 71 and 73), reserved for the “rare and exceptional” case (okanagan, at para. 1) and where, again, to refrain from awarding advance costs would be to participate in an injustice. [24] in further keeping with these concerns, the test for advance costs is rigorous. okanagan states three “absolute requirements” (little sisters, at para. 37) that must be satisfied: impecuniosity, a prima facie meritorious case, and issues of public importance. further, while meeting these requirements is necessary, doing so does not automatically entitle an applicant to an advance costs award (caron, at para. 39). where the requirements are satisfied, a court — having considered all relevant individual circumstances of the case — retains residual discretion to decide whether to award advance costs, or to consider other ways of facilitating the hearing of the case (little sisters, at para. 37). (2) reconciliation [25] since okanagan, this court has decided haida nation v. british columbia (minister of forests), 2004 scc 73, [2004] 3 scr 511, taku river tlingit first nation v british columbia (project assessment director), 2004 scc 74, [2004] 3 scr 550, and mikisew cree first nation v. canada (minister of canadian heritage), 2005 scc 69, [2005] 3 scr 388. these judgments and others affirmed the crown’s obligation to consult and accommodate indigenous groups, and emphasized that the “fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty rights is the reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and their respective claims, interests and ambitions” (mikisew cree, at para. 1; see also haida nation, at para. 32; taku river, at para. 42; newfoundland and labrador (attorney general) v. uashaunnuat (innu of uashat and of mani-utenam), 2020 scc 4, at para. 22). in r v. desautel, 2021 scc 17, at para. 22, this court reiterated that “the two purposes of s 35(1) are to recognize the prior occupation of canada by organized, autonomous societies and to reconcile their modern-day existence with the crown’s assertion of sovereignty” and that “[t]he same purposes are reflected in the principle of the honour of the crown, under which the crown’s historic assertion of sovereignty over aboriginal societies gives rise to continuing obligations to their successors as part of an ongoing process of reconciliation.” as the parties and several interveners have invoked reconciliation here, it is worth explaining its significance in the advance costs test, with respect to a first nation government applicant involved in s 35 litigation. [26] where litigation raises novel issues concerning the interpretation of aboriginal and treaty rights and the infringement of those rights, this may have significant weight in a court’s analysis of the public importance branch of the advance costs test and the exercise of its residual discretion other aspects of the crown-aboriginal relationship may be relevant to a court’s exercise of its residual discretion since, at this stage, “the court must remain sensitive to any concerns that did not arise in its analysis of the test” (little sisters, at para. 72). for example, a court may be more inclined to exercise its discretion to award advance costs where the crown has employed tactics to delay the resolution of the applicant’s claim (see hagwilget indian band v. canada (minister of indian affairs and northern development), 2008 fc 574, [2008] 3 cnlr 136, at paras. 20-24). [27] in assessing impecuniosity, a court must respectfully account for the broader context in which first nations governments such as beaver lake make financial decisions promoting institutions and processes of indigenous self-governance fosters a positive, mutually respectful long-term relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous communities, thereby furthering the objective of reconciliation (first nation of nacho nyak dun v yukon, 2017 scc 58, [2017] 2 scr 576, at para. 10; beckman v. little salmon/carmacks first nation, 2010 scc 53, [2010] 3 scr 103, at paras. 9-10). in the context of the impecuniosity analysis, this means that the pressing needs of a first nation should be considered from the perspective of its government that sets its priorities and is best situated to identify its needs. we return below to what doing so specifically entails in this case. (3) the terms of an advance costs award [28] where a court decides that an award of advance costs is justified, the terms of the order must be carefully crafted. they must balance the interests of the parties, and should not impose an unfair burden (okanagan, at para. 41). accordingly, the order must provide for, or allow for the later provision of, oversight in the form of a “definite structure . . . imposed or approved by the court itself” that sets limits on the rates and hours of legal services and caps the award at an appropriate global amount (little sisters, at para. 42). the order should also build in judicial oversight to allow the court to “closely monitor the parties’ adherence to its dictates” (para. 43) in short, an advance costs order is not free rein. because the public purse is burdened, there must be “scrutiny” of how a litigant spends the opposing party’s money (para. 42). [29] other terms of the order will, of course, be informed by a court’s findings in deciding impecuniosity as outlined below, an applicant pleading impecuniosity must provide a litigation plan and sufficient evidence of its financial resources. while this will obviously be relevant to the quantum of the award, which should represent “a basic level of assistance necessary for the case to proceed” (little sisters, at para. 43), it will also assist in determining whether, for example, the terms of an advance cost order should include a requirement that the applicant commit to making some contribution to the litigation. it is, therefore, to that requirement of impecuniosity that we now turn. b. the impecuniosity requirement (1) impecuniosity and first nations governments: the threshold [30] this court has stated the requirement of impecuniosity in varying, but strict, terms in okanagan, it held that an applicant is impecunious if it “genuinely cannot afford to pay for the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the issues to trial — in short, the litigation would be unable to proceed if the order were not made” (para. 40). likewise, in little sisters, this court stated that the impecuniosity requirement “means that it must be proven to be impossible to proceed otherwise before advance costs will be ordered” (para. 71). and these general formulations have proven sufficient to decide the cases which have to date called upon the court to apply the advance costs test. in okanagan, the applicant bands faced extreme financial difficulty, as they ran deficits to finance day-to-day operations and were close to having outside management of their finances imposed upon them. it was impossible for them to fund the estimated litigation costs (paras. 4-5) in caron, the applicant had exhausted his limited personal funds, incurred debts, sought and received donations, and faced costly lawyer and expert fees (paras. 11-13 and 21). finally, in little sisters, this court did not need to apply the impecuniosity requirement, as the other branches of the advance costs test were not satisfied (para. 67). [31] what makes this a case of first impression is whether and how, in the context of a claim brought by a first nation government, it can be said that it “genuinely cannot afford to pay” for, or that it is “impossible to proceed” with, public interest litigation, while having access to financial resources that it says must be otherwise allocated. [32] the parties agree that, in such circumstances, the assessment of impecuniosity must look beyond the first nation government’s financial resources in the abstract. a snapshot in time of its resources will be an important part of the analysis. but to assess whether a first nation government genuinely cannot afford to pay for litigation, a court must also consider the broader context in which that government makes financial decisions, including its competing spending commitments, restrictions on the uses of its resources, and fiduciary and good governance obligations. a first nation government may genuinely need to allocate some or all of its resources to priorities other than litigation. [33] the parties and interveners in this appeal presented us with several proposals for modifying or elaborating on the meaning of the impecuniosity requirement to suit the circumstances before us. the intervener the chiefs of ontario, submits that where a first nation government applicant is involved in s 35 litigation, it should be presumed to be impecunious beaver lake, in its factum, and several interveners argue that an applicant is impecunious where it is unable to finance the litigation because it has expended its resources on other “reasonable financial choices” (see, eg,. af, at paras. 4, 55, 58 and 61). another intervener, the advocates’ society, proposes that the impecuniosity requirement should ask whether it would be “unduly onerous” for the applicant to be expected to fund the litigation (if, at paras. 3, 24-26 and 28). [34] we would not modify the impecuniosity requirement in these ways. [35] we recognize that access to justice is of particular importance in the context of s 35 litigation, and further acknowledge that, in some cases, the dire financial circumstances of a first nation government applicant may be the very result of the alleged interference with its constitutional rights at issue in the litigation. none of this, however, warrants a presumption that all first nations government applicants are impecunious. first, this presumption is inappropriate, as the financial situation of first nations governments varies throughout canada. secondly, the parameters for an award of advance costs and the impecuniosity branch of the test were developed in okanagan, which was itself a s 35 claim by a first nation government applicant, and which held that impecuniosity “must be established on the evidence” (para. 36 (emphasis added)) finally, a class-based presumption of impecuniosity would risk turning the advance costs test into a parallel system of legal aid which, as noted above, would signify imprudent and inappropriate judicial overreach. [36] that said, judicial notice may be taken of the systemic and background factors affecting indigenous peoples in canadian society. as this court reiterated in r. v. ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1 scr 433, at para. 60, in the context of criminal sentencing, “courts must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential schools and how that history continues to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for aboriginal peoples”. in the context of the advance costs test, courts may also take notice of such matters insofar as they may be relevant to understanding a first nation government’s financial situation and spending priorities. [37] nor can we accept thresholds based on a standard of “reasonableness” or on whether it would be “unduly onerous” for the applicant to fund the litigation. while assessing impecuniosity entails reviewing the evidence of a first nation government’s expenditures on matters besides litigation, the ultimate determination cannot be reached by applying broad and open-ended standards of reasonableness or undue burdens. these standards would dilute the requirement, repeatedly emphasized in little sisters, that advance costs awards “must be granted . . in circumstances where the need for them is clearly established”, as a “last resort” (para. 36; see also paras. 41, 71, 73 and 78), and that “[a] court awarding advance costs must be guided by the condition of necessity” (para. 44 (emphasis added)). [38] the concept of necessity is captured by this court’s direction that advance costs are to be ordered as a “last resort”, where the first nation government “genuinely cannot afford” the litigation and where it is “impossible to proceed”. it follows from this, in our view, that it is open to a court to decide that a first nation government is impecunious when its prioritization of “pressing needs”, properly understood, has left it unable to fund public interest litigation doing so — as opposed, for example, to considering merely whether the first nation government made a “reasonable” financial choice — is consistent with this court’s strictures confining grants of advance costs, inasmuch as meeting a pressing need connotes necessity. [39] an approach to impecuniosity that allows a first nation government’s pressing needs to take priority over the litigation has been usefully applied in lower court decisions for example, the concept of a first nation government applicant’s “pressing needs” has been applied to determine if it is genuinely unable to pay for the litigation. in keewatin v. ontario (minister of natural resources) (2006), 32 cpc. (6th) 258 (ont. scj),. spies j found that the applicant had access to $500,000 to $600,000 annually in trust fund income that could be used to finance the litigation, but concluded that it was nevertheless impecunious because it should use those funds to address “more pressing needs that would take priority over funding this litigation” (para. 83; see also paras. 80-82 and 96). significantly, this approach also appears to reflect a broadly acceptable threshold for impecuniosity, as it was applied both by the case management judge and the court of appeal in this case, the latter identifying the central issue before it as “the extent to which the funding of this litigation can be ‘weighed against the community’s other pressing needs’” (para. 24, quoting the case management judge’s reasons, at para. 60). [40] we are therefore content to affirm that an applicant genuinely cannot afford to pay for the litigation where, and only where, it cannot meet its pressing needs while also funding the litigation. and, as we explain further below, where the applicant is a first nation government, pressing needs must be understood from the perspective of the first nation government. (2) assessing pressing needs [41] bearing in mind the extraordinary nature of the remedy, and the constraints of the judicial role in ordering the expenditure of public funds, assessing whether a first nation government has sufficient resources to pay for the litigation after meeting its pressing needs requires that a court have a sufficient record to (1) identify the applicant’s pressing needs; (2) determine what resources are required to meet those needs; (3) assess the applicant’s resources (both assets and income); and (4) identify the estimated cost of funding the litigation. the level of evidential granularity required for a trier of fact to apply the legal test will vary, depending on the circumstances of the applicant. detailed proof of an applicant’s pressing needs and the extent to which they are unfunded, and estimated litigation costs, may be required to ensure accountability over the expenditure of public funds. at the same time, it must not be prohibitively expensive to establish impecuniosity. (a) identifying the pressing needs of a first nation government [42] where an applicant has access to financial resources that could potentially be used to pay for the litigation, it bears the onus of proving that it genuinely cannot afford to pay for the litigation because it must commit those resources to address other pressing needs. identifying the pressing needs of a first nation government will always be a fact-specific determination; different communities may have different governance structures, funding arrangements and priorities, and so the evidence to establish pressing needs will vary from community to community. [43] there can be no question that expenditures on basic necessities of life, including adequate housing, a safe water supply, and basic health and education services, rise to the level of addressing a pressing need. spending to improve standards of living, for example, to provide enhanced health and education services or to promote cultural survival, may also qualify. [44] further, and as we have already observed (at para. 25), the goal of reconciling aboriginal interests with the broader interests of society will inform how a court identifies the pressing needs of a first nation government reconciliation requires a court to consider the pressing needs of a first nation government applicant from its perspective as a government that sets its own priorities and is best situated to identify its needs. accordingly, a court identifying the pressing needs of a first nation government may have regard to what that government has prioritized in the past as indicated, for example, by records of crown consultation, of negotiations with the crown for funding, by band council resolutions requesting access to capital and revenue moneys, and in records of internal departmental or other meetings dealing with its budgeting and priorities. certain prioritized expenditures, such as allocating funds to construct a skating rink or to promote the first nation’s culture, may not appear to a court to address a pressing need on their face and yet, a community may adduce evidence of how it has prioritized this project because it promotes its indigenous identity or, for example, an urgent problem of youth in crisis has led it to promote physical health, outdoor activities or traditional cultural practices (keewatin, at para. 59). (b) the extent of unfunded pressing needs [45] identification by a court of needs as truly pressing will not establish impecuniosity. an applicant should also adduce evidence of the costs of meeting those needs and the extent to which it cannot cover those costs. the amount of detail required will depend on the circumstances, including the nature of the unmet needs and any difficulties in estimating the cost of those needs. [46] additionally, where the applicant has access to resources that could potentially pay for the litigation but which it says must be devoted to its pressing needs, it must demonstrate that those resources are in fact being devoted to addressing those pressing needs we concur with the court of appeal of alberta’s statement in the present case that “[f]unds that are available to meet infrastructure and services deficits must be used for that purpose before a claim can be made for advance [costs], based on an argument that available funds are needed for those other priorities” (para. 31). in this regard, evidence of an applicant’s plan for the use of its financial resources would be relevant. (c) assessing the applicant’s financial resources [47] it follows from our jurisprudence that in some cases, a finding of impecuniosity can be made even where the applicant does not adduce detailed evidence, either because the applicant does not have any available financial resources, as in okanagan, or because it is obvious that its financial resources would be outstripped by the nature and extent of its pressing needs as compared with its estimated litigation costs. [48] lower court cases illustrate how a finding of impecuniosity can find support in the evidence adduced by a first nation government applicant. in missanabic cree first nation v. ontario, 2011 onsc 5196, 38 cpc (7th) 385, the first nation government satisfied the impecuniosity requirement where it adduced years of financial statements disclosing that its liabilities exceeded its assets, that it had significant long-term debt, and that it did not have any unrestricted revenue sources that could be used towards the litigation (paras. 41-47). in hagwilget indian band, litigation between the applicant band and canada had persisted for 20 years, leaving the band “with virtually no resources” (para. 12). it was manifest to the court that the band could not pursue the litigation without advance costs, since its funding was closely controlled by the government, it had been unsuccessful in obtaining other sources of funding, it owed counsel over $140,000, ran deficits, had no available credit, and had to close its band council offices for over three weeks due to lack of funding (paras. 12-14). in keewatin, the record established that securing funding from individual members was impractical, virtually all funding came from the federal and provincial governments and was earmarked for specific priorities, the band ran deficits in successive years, the majority of its members were unemployed, lacked adequate housing and an adequate water supply, and other sources of funding had been explored but were inadequate to fund the litigation. on this basis, the band was found to be impecunious (para. 108). [49] where a first nation government applicant has extensive assets and ongoing revenue, however, more detailed evidence of its financial resources is required to demonstrate impecuniosity this may include an account of its assets, liabilities, income and expenses, information about restrictions on revenue, number of employees and salaries, and evidence of its ability and efforts to obtain funding from alternative sources. and where a responding party challenges an applicant’s contention that certain financial resources are unavailable because they have been or are being spent to address pressing needs, the applicant may be required to justify the challenged expenditures. [50] in all cases, because advance costs are a measure of last resort, an applicant must demonstrate that it made sufficient efforts to obtain funding from alternate sources depending on the circumstances, if an applicant requires ministerial permission to access certain funds, it should demonstrate that it sought this permission (and been declined), or justify its choice to refrain from doing so (little sisters, at para. 68). similarly, a court should generally consider whether the applicant attempted to obtain private funding through fundraising campaigns or tried to obtain a loan (paras. 40 and 70). what is required in each case will vary depending on the evidence of what funding is realistically available. for example, in caron, this court deferred to the application judge’s finding that it was not “realistically possible” for the applicant to launch a formal fundraising campaign as the litigation unfolded, given the trial schedule and its demands (para. 41, quoting r v. caron, 2007 abqb 632, 424 ar. 377, at para. 30). (d) comparing estimated litigation costs and the applicant’s surplus resources [51] little sisters instructs that “cost estimates [for the litigation] form an integral part of the evidence; the court should subject them to scrutiny, and then use them to consider whether the litigant is impecunious” (para. 69). consistent with this direction, an applicant must submit an up-to-date litigation plan so that a court can know, at least approximately, the cost of pursuing the litigation. [52] ultimately, after assessing the financial resources available to a first nation government applicant, the extent to which it must commit those resources to pressing needs in priority to the litigation and the estimated cost of the litigation, a determination can be made regarding whether the applicant has surplus resources with which it may finance the litigation in whole or in part. c application of the framework to this appeal [53] disturbing the case management judge’s discretionary decision to award advance costs cannot be undertaken lightly (little sisters, at para. 49) at the same time, in making an exceptional award of advance costs, “trial judges must . . . be careful to stay within recognized boundaries” (para. 49). even discretionary decisions are not completely insulated from review, and appellate intervention is warranted where a trial judge has misdirected himself or herself as to the applicable law, including the identification of the requisite legal criteria, their definition and their application (okanagan, at paras. 36 and 43). [54] here, the case management judge, acting without the benefit of these reasons, made general observations about beaver lake’s financial resources and pressing needs to find that it was an impoverished community. on the record before her, that finding is unassailable. but with great respect, it is, without more, insufficient. she did not make the particular findings necessary in these circumstances to decide impecuniosity or to determine the amount of advance costs required to enable beaver lake to pursue the litigation indeed, the record before her was itself insufficient to support such findings for these reasons, and because beaver lake’s financial circumstances have changed since its initial application (indeed, the fresh evidence before the court of appeal demonstrates that those circumstances are dynamic), this matter must be remitted for a new hearing so that impecuniosity can be decided in accordance with these reasons. (1) beaver lake’s pressing needs [55] as we have already recounted, the case management judge found that beaver lake has “substantial deficits in housing and infrastructure and . . . high levels of unemployment and social assistance” (para. 30) these findings, too, were fully available on the record before her. beaver lake adduced and was cross-examined on extensive affidavit evidence regarding the community’s living conditions that spoke of food insecurity and lack of access to lands, social assistance, unemployment, inadequate housing, inadequate infrastructure, insufficient resources for health and education programs, poor water quality and access, health needs, and overall poverty. further, the record showed that ameliorating these conditions had been identified as significant priorities by the band. [56] in light of this evidence, we agree that the case management judge appropriately identified beaver lake’s pressing needs such matters fall within the basic necessities of life which, as such, clearly rise to the level of pressing needs within the circumstances of this applicant in particular, allocating resources to improve deficits in housing, infrastructure, and basic social programming would, from the perspective of this first nation government, constitute the addressing of pressing needs. we therefore disagree with the court of appeal inasmuch as it suggests that expenditures thereon represent “spending on desirable improvements” rather than spending on pressing needs (para. 28). (2) the extent of beaver lake’s unfunded pressing needs [57] the case management judge did not make findings regarding the estimated costs of beaver lake’s pressing needs, or the extent to which those costs are not covered by the financial resources available to beaver lake. nor were the necessary specific findings made to show how those resources were being applied to meet those needs. [58] indeed, the case management judge could not have made those findings on the record before her a constant refrain in the evidence and submissions was that beaver lake could not meet its pressing needs because it lacked sufficient funds. yet, there was no specific account of how much it would cost to address beaver lake’s pressing needs, or why no other resources were available to meet those needs. the case management judge should have been told, for example, why federal funding allocated to beaver lake’s pressing needs falls short of adequately addressing them. [59] the evidence concerning beaver lake’s financial resources did not fully answer whether those resources were required to address its pressing needs, and whether any funds would remain that could potentially pay for the litigation for example, evidence of financial statements, while helpful, were insufficient since they do not identify beaver lake’s current or future needs, or the extent to which funding has or has not been allocated to meeting them (ar, vol. xii, at pp. 180-83). [60] beaver lake’s band administrator, john geoffrey rankin, deposed that, in discharging his responsibility to develop business strategies that align with the community’s short- and long-term objectives, he meets weekly with band departmental managers to review progress on priorities, develop and assess departmental budgets, and assist with additional funding requests (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 12-13). however, the content and outcome of those meetings were not before case management judge. placing this evidence before the court could help it understand not only the community’s pressing needs (although, as we have discussed, they were adequately demonstrated in this case), but also how existing and future resources are to be allocated to meet those needs, whether those resources will be sufficient, and whether there are pressing needs that will nonetheless go unmet. [61] it follows that the court will require evidence that quantifies the financial resources required to meet the first nation government’s pressing needs here, for example, it was unclear just how much it would cost to provide adequate housing. mr. rankin’s affidavit indicated that 50 members are on the waitlist for housing, 20 houses are in need of immediate major repairs, and 8 houses need to be replaced due to health and safety concerns (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 24-25). but it would be difficult for a court to know what resources must be allocated to these needs without estimates of how much that work would cost, coupled with an explanation of why other sources of funds could not cover these costs. while some of these costs may be unpredictable, more information should be provided where possible; if further information is not available at the time of application, beaver lake should explain why it is not. similarly, beaver lake’s evidence was that repairs were needed for its sewer system and treatment lagoon, but whether its resources, present or future, could be allocated to that expense was not explained. we were told at the hearing that canada has agreed “to provide the funds and that [it] is costing up to $8 million” (transcript, at p 26; see also p 90) however, a court would need to know whether the funding is conditional, whether those conditions are practically achievable, whether this government funding is sufficient and, if not, whether beaver lake proposes to allocate resources to address this need. (3) beaver lake’s financial resources [62] the case management judge considered beaver lake’s resources to arrive at the conclusion that it had more than $3 million in unrestricted assets potentially available for the litigation. she was entitled to make this finding based on the evidence provided by beaver lake, which consisted of financial statements, affidavits from band council and community members, government reports and correspondence, and expert evidence concerning beaver lake’s assets and sources of revenue. [63] additional evidence regarding beaver lake’s assets and income, including any restrictions on those resources, and its liabilities and expenses could help the court more accurately determine what resources beaver lake could access. it would also be helpful if beaver lake were to provide a more detailed account of its efforts to obtain funding from alternate sources. the following examples illustrate how the analysis of beaver lake’s financial resources would have benefitted from further elaboration. [64] first, beaver lake created the heritage trust as a vehicle to manage income received from projects carried out on its traditional lands, which beaver lake allocates towards community development programs and services according to the terms of the trust agreement. under the trust’s terms, beaver lake can draw up to 10 percent once every four years for these community activities, some of which at least, on their face, may correspond to some of beaver lake’s pressing needs. beaver lake explained that the purpose of the restriction on withdrawals from the trust is to enable it to build capital to start to address its deep deficits; however, more clarity regarding the purposes of the funding and how it is allocated would be helpful. it is unclear on the current record why the trust funds are insufficient to meet at least some of beaver lake’s pressing needs. [65] secondly, beaver lake has access, under certain conditions, to the indian oil and gas canada trust, which consists of funds derived from ongoing revenue from oil and gas extraction on the beaver lake reserve. there are no restrictions on the purposes for which the funds could be used, although accessing funds from the trust requires ministerial approval. while we note beaver lake’s explanation that the trust is an “emergency fund” used for immediate needs such as urgent infrastructure repairs (af, at para. 36), knowing more about the binding quality of those restrictions or of beaver lake’s past use of these funds for emergency purposes, and whether beaver lake sought approval to finance the litigation (or if not, why not) would assist the court. [66] finally, while beaver lake received approval to become a borrowing member of the first nations finance authority (rr,. alberta, vol. i, at pp. 141 and 143; case management judge’s reasons, at para. 58), the evidence does not show that it has sought to obtain a loan to pursue litigation. it would assist the court to know why this is so or, alternatively, if indeed it has applied for a loan, the authority’s response. [67] in short, the case management judge required a more particularized and comprehensive record in order to consider whether beaver lake had made sufficient efforts to obtain funding from alternate sources, and whether other sources of funds are available to be used for the litigation. this is no small consideration: a court must be satisfied that an applicant has explained with sufficient detail whether its financial resources can be used to finance the litigation, and if not, why not. (4) comparing beaver lake’s estimated litigation costs and surplus resources [68] consistent with this court’s direction in little sisters, the case management judge reviewed beaver lake’s litigation plan and determined the quantum of funds required to pursue the litigation she accepted beaver lake’s estimate of $5 million for the litigation. as part of this exercise, the case management judge was required to determine whether beaver lake had any surplus resources to finance the litigation in whole or in part and to assess the funds necessary to advance the litigation. as the matter is being remitted for a new hearing, and given the amount of time that has elapsed from the initial application, and further given that beaver lake’s litigation plan was dated 2014 and marked “without prejudice”, beaver lake should submit a current litigation plan to assist the court with this determination this information, combined with a more detailed record that addresses the questions raised above, would help the court understand the extent to which beaver lake must commit its present and future resources to pressing needs instead of the litigation, quantify the estimated cost of the litigation, and determine whether beaver lake has any surplus resources to finance the litigation in whole or in part. (5) the fresh evidence [69] in our view, the evidence of the amount received by beaver lake from the resolved specific claim ($2.97 million) is not conclusive; indeed, it raises more questions. nor does it speak to beaver lake’s current financial resources or pressing needs chief anderson deposes that the settlement funds will be applied to various priorities, including another lawsuit, infrastructure and housing, upgrading beaver lake’s water treatment system, gas lines installation, electricity and sewage, and covid-19 support payments (ar, vol. viii, at pp. 85-86) however, it is unclear whether the funding for “sewage” overlaps with the sewage lagoon and, if so, whether canada has already covered the cost of meeting that pressing need. further yet, the amounts to be paid in covid-19 supports is unspecified, as are the sources from which those payments are to be made. finally, while chief anderson identifies those needs, and while those needs may well qualify as pressing, it is unclear how much those needs cost and what other sources may be applied to cover them. [70] in any event, the fact of the specific claim settlement should, in our view, have led the court of appeal to return the matter to the court of queen’s bench for consideration. indeed, the case management judge’s order contemplated precisely that procedure, directing that “if beaver lake receives compensation from its outstanding claims or otherwise receives a windfall, then this order shall be revisited” (para. 67). (6) the terms of the advance costs order [71] in the absence of a sufficient record on which the case management judge could make findings regarding the cost of meeting beaver lake’s pressing needs, the resources available to fund those needs, and any resources left over for the litigation, it is unclear how the case management judge arrived at the amount of $300,000 to be paid by each party. nor is it clear whether this amount was to be paid proportionally or in priority order as expenses were incurred (ie,. beaver lake, then alberta, then canada). further, the terms of the order did not provide the “definite structure” which this court in little sisters stated was necessary to provide oversight and direction to the award’s administration, or a global cap or limits on legal fees (paras. 42-43). iv disposition [72] we would allow the appeal and remit the application to the court of queen’s bench of alberta. we are mindful of the time and resources expended by the parties in the nearly 14 years since this litigation began. this is, however, a case of first impression moreover, the matter now requires reconsideration, both in accordance with these reasons and in light of the passage of time since the original hearing. [73] we would also award solicitor-client costs to beaver lake in this court and in the courts below. solicitor-client costs, being a form of special costs (sa v. metro vancouver housing corp., 2019 scc 4, [2019] 1 scr 99, at paras. 67-71), are awardable where the case involves matters of public interest that are truly exceptional, where the applicant shows it has no personal, proprietary or pecuniary interest in the litigation that would justify the proceedings on economic grounds, and where it would not have been possible for the litigation to be pursued with private funding (carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para. 140). the case management judge in the present case found that beaver lake’s underlying litigation satisfied the public importance branch of the advance costs test. additionally, in our view, the question of advance costs for a first nation government claimant possessing resources of its own represents a truly exceptional matter of public interest. as we have explained, this is not only a case of first impression, but one that goes to the heart of the separation of powers. [74] while beaver lake has some personal, proprietary or pecuniary interest in the underlying litigation, it did not initiate proceedings on primarily private or economic grounds. the case management judge found, at para. 26, that a contingency fee arrangement was not practical in this case, in part, because beaver lake’s “primary claim . . . is for a declaration and the claim for monetary relief is secondary”. finally, in the specific context of an interlocutory application for advance costs, while we cannot say that beaver lake has shown that it would not have been possible to pursue this matter with private funding, the entire point of this appeal was to explain what it must show in order to meet that threshold. these are unique circumstances. appeal allowed. solicitors for the respondent her majesty the queen in right of the province of alberta: norton rose fulbright canada, calgary.
[1] where an accused is charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood, once the crown has established certain conditions, the burden shifts to the accused to raise a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the breathalyzer test results. if there is no evidence raising such a doubt, the results are presumed to be accurate, which is to say that the alcohol level in the breath sample is presumed to reflect the alcohol level in the accused’s blood at [1] dans les cas d’accusation de conduite d’un véhicule à moteur alors que l’alcoolémie dépasse 80 mg d’alcool par 100 ml de sang, une fois que certaines conditions sont établies par le ministère public, il appartient à l’accusé de soulever un doute raisonnable sur la fiabilité des résultats de l’alcootest. en l’absence d’une preuve soulevant un tel doute, les résultats sont présumés exacts, c’est-à-dire que le taux d’alcool dans l’échantillon d’haleine est pré- sumé refléter le taux d’alcool dans le sang de l’accusé [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois le juge en chef 461 the time of testing, and that level is presumed to be identical to the alcohol level in the accused’s blood at the material time. au moment du test, et ce taux est présumé identique au taux d’alcool dans le sang de ce dernier au mo- ment des faits reprochés. [2] this appeal concerns the scope of the evidence that must be adduced to rebut the presumptions of accuracy and identity that are applicable to breatha- lyzer test results under s. 258(1)(c) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“cr c”). from the bench, the court allowed the crown’s appeal from the judgment of the court of appeal, set aside the verdict of acquittal restored by the court of appeal, and ordered a new trial, with reasons to follow. these are those reasons. [2] le pourvoi porte sur l’étendue de la preuve à présenter pour réfuter les présomptions d’exactitude et d’identité que l’al. 258(1)c) du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46 (« c cr. »), confère aux ré- sultats de l’alcootest. la cour a accueilli séance tenante l’appel interjeté par le ministère public à l’encontre de l’arrêt de la cour d’appel, mis de côté le verdict d’acquittement rétabli par la cour d’appel, ordonné un nouveau procès et précisé que les motifs suivraient. les voici. [3] the extent of the burden resting on an accused in such circumstances has been the subject of much debate. in r v. st‑ onge lamoureux, 2012 scc 57, [2012] 3 scr 187, this court put an end to that debate. since that decision, it has been settled that to rebut the presumptions in s. 258(1)(c) cr c, an accused must adduce evidence tending to show that the malfunctioning or improper operation of the ap- proved instrument casts doubt on the reliability of the results (st‑ onge lamoureux, at para 52). thus, [3] l’étendue du fardeau incombant à l’accusé en pareilles circonstances a fait l’objet de plusieurs débats auxquels notre cour a mis un terme dans r c.  st‑ onge lamoureux, 2012 csc 57, [2012] 3 rcs 187. depuis cet arrêt, il est acquis que, pour réfuter les présomptions de l’al. 258(1)c) c cr, l’accusé doit offrir une preuve qui tend à démontrer que le mauvais fonctionnement ou l’utilisation in- correcte de l’appareil approuvé permet de douter de la fiabilité des résultats (st‑ onge lamoureux, par 52). ainsi, the new provisions [of the cr c] do not make it impos- sible to disprove the test results. rather, parliament has recognized that the results will be reliable only if the instruments are operated and maintained properly, and that there might be deficiencies in the maintenance of the instruments or in the test process. what the new provisions require is that evidence tending to cast doubt on the reli- ability of the results relate directly to such deficiencies. [para. 41] les nouvelles dispositions [du c cr.] n’ont pas pour effet de rendre irréfutables les résultats des analyses. elles re- connaissent plutôt que les résultats ne seront fiables que dans la mesure où les appareils sont bien utilisés et bien entretenus, et que des défaillances peuvent survenir dans l’entretien ou le processus d’analyse. ce que les nouvelles dispositions exigent, c’est que la preuve tendant à remettre en question la fiabilité des résultats porte directement sur de telles défaillances. [par. 41] this requirement has two purposes. first, it aims to ensure continued scientific recognition of breatha- lyzer test results, and second, it promotes the proper functioning and proper operation of instruments in order to prevent the reliability of the results from being compromised (st‑ onge lamoureux, at pa- ras 33-36). cette exigence poursuit deux objectifs. d’une part, elle vise à garantir que les résultats d’alcootest conti- nuent de jouir de la reconnaissance scientifique et, d’autre part, elle veille à encourager le bon fonc- tionnement et l’utilisation correcte des appareils afin d’éviter que la fiabilité des résultats ne soit compro- mise (st‑ onge lamoureux, par 33-36). [4] the accused’s burden is discharged if the fol- lowing conditions are met: (i) the accused adduces evidence relating directly to the malfunctioning or [4] l’accusé se décharge de son fardeau si les condi- tions suivantes sont réunies : (i) il offre une preuve portant directement sur le mauvais fonctionnement 462 r v cyr- langlois the chief justice [2018] 3 scr. improper operation of the instrument, and (ii) the accused establishes  that this defect tends to cast doubt on the reliability of the results. each of these conditions has a theoretical element and a practi- cal element. therefore, for the improper operation of the instrument to be established, it must first be found that a specific procedure is generally required (theoretical element), and it must then be shown that the procedure was not in fact followed (practical el- ement). the evidence from which it can be inferred that the defect tends to cast doubt on the reliability of the results must be looked at in the same manner. the theoretical element is satisfied where it is proved that the purpose of the procedure in question is to ensure the reliability of the results. on the practical element, the evidence must establish that, in the particular case, the defect could have affected the reliability of the results. ou l’utilisation incorrecte de l’appareil et (ii) il établit que ce vice tend à mettre en doute la fiabilité des résultats. chacune de ces conditions comporte un volet théorique et un volet pratique. en conséquence, pour établir l’utilisation incorrecte de l’appareil, il faut d’abord conclure qu’une procédure précise est généralement requise (volet théorique), puis établir que celle-ci n’a pas été respectée dans les faits (vo- let pratique). la preuve qui permet d’inférer que ce vice tend à mettre en doute la fiabilité des résultats doit également être envisagée de la même manière. il est satisfait au volet théorique s’il est prouvé que la procédure en question a pour objectif d’assurer la fiabilité des résultats. pour le volet pratique, la preuve doit établir que ce vice est susceptible ici d’avoir influé sur la fiabilité des résultats. [5] in the instant case, there is no need to deal with the first condition. even if we assume, without decid- ing, that improper operation of the instrument was established here based on failure to complete the 15- or 20- minute observation period, there was clearly no evidence that this improper operation tended to cast doubt on the reliability of the results. the court of appeal’s judgment must be reversed. the superior court’s judgment setting aside the verdict of acquit- tal by the court of québec and ordering a new trial must be restored. [5] en l’espèce, il n’est pas nécessaire de se pen- cher sur la première condition. même à supposer, sans en décider, que l’utilisation incorrecte de l’ap- pareil a été ici établie par le non- respect de la période d’observation de 15 ou 20 minutes, la preuve que cette utilisation incorrecte tendait à mettre en doute la fiabilité des résultats était manifestement absente. l’arrêt de la cour d’appel doit être infirmé. le ju- gement de la cour supérieure qui a cassé le verdict d’acquittement de la cour du québec et ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès doit être rétabli. a facts a faits [6] on july 12, 2012, the respondent marc cyr- langlois was stopped by constables boissonneault and cousineau while he was driving his vehicle. con- stable cousineau arrested him at around 12:35 am. the respondent was frisk searched and then taken to the police station. when they arrived at the station at around 12:54 am, the three men went into two adjacent rooms separated by a window. constable boissonneault, a qualified technician, went into the breathalyzer room to prepare the instrument and run a control test. constable cousineau accompa- nied the respondent to the interrogation room and then joined constable boissonneault in the adjacent breathalyzer room while the respondent exercised his right to counsel confidentially. constable cousineau [6] le 12  juillet  2012, l’intimé, m marc cyr- langlois, est intercepté au volant de son véhicule par les agents boissonneault et cousineau. vers 0 h 35, l’agent cousineau procède à son arresta- tion. l’intimé est soumis à une fouille sommaire avant d’être conduit au poste de police. à leur ar- rivée vers 0 h 54, tous trois se rendent dans deux salles adjacentes séparées par une fenêtre. l’agent boissonneault, technicien qualifié, entre à l’intérieur de la salle d’alcootest pour préparer l’appareil et procéder à un test de contrôle. l’agent cousineau accompagne quant à lui l’intimé dans la salle d’in- terrogatoire, puis rejoint l’agent boissonneault dans la salle d’alcootest adjacente pendant que l’intimé exerce confidentiellement son droit à l’assistance [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois le juge en chef 463 observed the respondent through the window while he placed a call to his counsel, which ended at around 1:05 am. d’un avocat. l’agent cousineau observe l’intimé par la fenêtre durant l’appel à son avocat, qui se termine vers 1 h 05. [7] at 1:08 am,. constable boissonneault gave the respondent a first breathalyzer test, which showed 157 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. during the statutory waiting period prior to the second test, the respondent was alone with constable cousineau in the interrogation room. at 1:30 am,. constable boissonneault administered the second breathalyzer test, which showed 148 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. both results were therefore over the legal limit, with a difference of less than 10 mg. the re- spondent was then charged with operating a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. only the second charge is in issue here. [7] l’agent boissonneault fait passer à l’intimé un premier test d’alcoolémie à 1 h 08, lequel indique un taux de 157 mg d’alcool par 100 ml de sang. durant la période d’attente légale précédant le second test, l’intimé attend dans la salle d’interrogatoire seul avec l’agent cousineau. l’agent boissonneault ef- fectue le second test d’alcoolémie à 1 h 30, lequel indique un taux de 148 mg d’alcool par 100 ml de sang. les deux résultats obtenus se situent donc au- dessus de la limite légale, avec un écart de moins de 10 mg. l’intimé est alors accusé d’avoir conduit un véhicule à moteur alors que sa capacité de conduire ce véhicule était affaiblie par l’alcool, ainsi que de conduite d’un véhicule à moteur alors que son alcoolémie dépassait 80 mg d’alcool par 100  ml de sang. seul le deuxième chef d’accusation est en cause ici. b procedural history b historique procédural (1) court of québec (1) cour du québec [8] at trial in the court of québec, the parties agreed that the court should begin by determining whether constable boissonneault had breached the duty to operate the breathalyzer properly by failing to observe the accused himself for a period of 15 or 20 minutes before administering each test. the ac- cused argued that, in such a case, the presumptions were rebutted, which had to lead to his acquittal in the absence of additional evidence from the crown. [8] au procès devant la cour du québec, les par- ties conviennent de trancher d’abord la question de savoir si l’agent boissonneault a manqué à l’obliga- tion d’utiliser correctement l’alcootest en omettant d’observer lui- même l’accusé durant une période de 15 ou 20 minutes avant de procéder à chaque test. selon l’accusé, les présomptions sont réfutées dans un tel cas, ce qui doit, en l’absence de preuve à charge supplémentaire, entraîner son acquittement. [9] only constable boissonneault testified for the crown, and the trial judge rendered his decision from the bench. the trial judge found that, while the tech- nician was not required to observe the accused him- self, the period during which constable cousineau had done so was not continuous. he then stated that, since the general purpose of the observation pro- cedure is to ensure the reliability of the results, his finding that the procedure had not been followed in this case was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt. he did not refer to any additional evidence in this regard. he therefore acquitted the respondent of the [9] seul l’agent boissonneault témoigne pour le ministère public et le juge du procès rend sa décision séance tenante. ce dernier conclut que, bien que le technicien ne soit pas tenu d’observer lui- même l’ac- cusé, la période pendant laquelle l’agent cousineau s’est acquitté de cette tâche n’était pas continue. il affirme ensuite que, comme la procédure d’observa- tion a pour objectif général d’assurer la fiabilité des résultats, sa conclusion selon laquelle celle-ci n’a pas été respectée en l’espèce suffit pour soulever un doute raisonnable. il ne mentionne aucun élément additionnel à ce chapitre. il acquitte donc l’intimé 464 r v cyr- langlois the chief justice [2018] 3 scr. second charge, and the crown stated that it had no evidence to adduce on the first charge. du second chef d’accusation et le ministère public déclare n’avoir aucune preuve à offrir sur le premier. (2) quebec superior court, 2015 qccs 4369 (2) cour supérieure du québec, 2015 qccs 4369 [10] since it was of the view that the evidence required to rebut the presumptions had not been ad- duced, the crown appealed as of right to the superior court, which allowed the appeal, set aside the judg- ment of acquittal and ordered a new trial. zigman j. relied on the principles enunciated in r v. so, 2014 abca 451, 9 alta. lr (6th) 382, and concluded as follows: [10] d’avis que la preuve nécessaire pour réfuter les présomptions n’a pas été présentée, le ministère public interjette appel de plein droit devant la cour supérieure, qui accueille l’appel, casse le jugement d’acquittement et ordonne la tenue d’un nouveau procès. le juge zigman s’appuie sur les enseigne- ments de l’arrêt r c. so, 2014 abca 451, 9 alta. lr (6th) 382, et conclut ceci : [translation] the court agrees with the principles stated by the alberta court of appeal at paragraph 47 of so, and it therefore concludes that in this case, the trial judge did not properly apply the law and made a fatal error of law in acquitting the [respondent]. [para. 10 (canlii)] le tribunal est d’accord avec les principes énoncés par la cour d’appel de l’alberta au paragraphe 47 de so et, en conséquence, conclut que dans la présente affaire, le juge de première instance n’a pas appliqué correctement la loi, et a commis une erreur de droit qui est déterminante, quand il a acquitté l’[intimé]. [par. 10 (canlii)] in so, the alberta court of appeal had sum- [11] marized the burden of proof that rests on an accused in such circumstances as follows: [11] dans l’arrêt so, la cour d’appel de l’alberta avait résumé ainsi le fardeau de preuve incombant à l’accusé en pareilles circonstances : to rebut the statutory presumptions an accused must establish to the reasonable doubt standard: (a) a deficiency in the functioning or operation of the instrument; and (b) that the deficiency directly related to the reliability of the breath test results. [para. 47] [traduction] pour réfuter les présomptions établies par la loi, l’accusé doit établir selon la norme du doute raisonnable l’existence a) d’une défaillance dans le fonc- tionnement ou l’utilisation de l’appareil, et b) d’un lien direct entre cette défaillance et la fiabilité des résultats de l’alcootest. [par. 47] (3) quebec court of appeal, 2017 qcca 1033 (3) cour d’appel du québec, 2017 qcca 1033, 39 cr (7th) 123 [12] the respondent subsequently sought leave to appeal to the court of appeal on a question of law, which was granted. a majority of the court of appeal set aside the superior court’s judgment and restored the verdict of acquittal. all of the judges agreed that an accused must not only establish that the breathalyzer was operated improperly, but must also adduce evidence tending to show that its im- proper operation [translation] “[could] influence the result” (paras. 38 and 69 (canlii)). in short, the deficiency alleged must be serious enough to raise a reasonable doubt (st‑ onge lamoureux, at para 59). in the instant case, the majority found that [12] l’intimé sollicite par la suite l’autorisation d’en appeler devant la cour d’appel sur une question de droit, laquelle est accordée. la cour d’appel, à la majorité, infirme le jugement de la cour supérieure et rétablit le verdict d’acquittement. tous les juges sont d’accord pour dire qu’un accusé doit non seulement établir l’utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest, mais également offrir une preuve tendant à démontrer que celle-ci est « susceptible [d’]influencer le résultat » (par. 38 et 69). en somme, la défaillance soulevée doit être suffisamment sérieuse pour susciter un doute raisonnable (st‑ onge lamoureux, par 59). les juges majoritaires estiment qu’en l’espèce, cette [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois le juge en chef 465 this determination essentially concerned a question of fact and that the superior court had erred in in- tervening absent an unreasonable assessment of the evidence by the trial judge. the dissenting judge would have upheld the superior court’s decision on the ground that “[t]he [court of québec] judge was not faced with evidence showing a deficiency [that could] affect the result” (para 71). conclusion portait essentiellement sur une question de fait et que la cour supérieure a commis une erreur en intervenant en l’absence d’une appréciation dé- raisonnable de la preuve par le premier juge. la juge dissidente aurait quant à elle maintenu la décision de la cour supérieure au motif que « [l]e juge [de la cour du québec] ne disposait pas d’une preuve démontrant une défaillance susceptible d’affecter le résultat » (par 71). ii analysis ii analyse [13] the only real issue is how, in cases where there is evidence that an instrument was operated im- properly (the respondent not having challenged the functioning of the instrument), the accused can show that this defect tends to cast doubt on the reliability of the results. the heart of the dispute comes down to the following: is evidence that is purely theoretical sufficient for this purpose? [13] la seule question véritablement en litige est celle de savoir comment, dans l’hypothèse d’une preuve d’utilisation incorrecte d’un appareil (le fonc- tionnement de l’appareil n’ayant pas été remis en cause par l’intimé), un accusé peut démontrer que ce vice tend à mettre en doute la fiabilité des résultats. le cœur du désaccord se résume à ceci : une preuve purement théorique est- elle suffisante à ce chapitre? [14] while it is not impossible that abstract evi- dence alone may sometimes meet the requirement of raising a reasonable doubt about the reliability of results, it is more likely that evidence that relates more concretely to the facts in issue will be required. this was the case here: without such evidence, the accused’s argument was in the realm of speculation and could not satisfy the reasonable doubt test (st‑ onge lamoureux, at paras 52-53). [14] bien qu’il ne soit pas exclu qu’une démons- tration abstraite puisse parfois satisfaire, à elle seule, à l’obligation de soulever un doute raisonnable sur la fiabilité des résultats, il est plus probable qu’une preuve qui se rattache plus concrètement aux faits en cause soit requise. c’était le cas ici : sans une telle preuve, l’argument de l’accusé s’inscrit dans le domaine de la conjecture et ne peut respecter le critère du doute raisonnable (st‑ onge lamoureux, par 52-53). [15] as a result, i do not agree with the respond- ent’s argument that it was enough in this case to show that the procedural defect in issue could, in theory, compromise reliability. relying on such evidence amounts to accepting a [translation] “mere hypo- thetical possibility”, which is clearly not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt (r v. lifchus, [1997] 3 scr 320, at para 30). moreover, it is important to remember that the respondent was searched twice, that he was monitored by the police officers and that the two test results were consistent, which means that if there was a digestive issue that had a distorting effect, it must have occurred before each test and affected each result in the same way. in this context, the mere improper operation alleged by the respond- ent did not in itself tend to show that the reliability [15] en conséquence, je ne souscris pas à l’ar- gument de l’intimé selon lequel démontrer que le vice de procédure en cause peut théoriquement com promettre la fiabilité suffisait en l’espèce. se contenter d’une telle preuve équivaut à avaliser une « simple possibilité théorique », ce qui est nettement insuffisant pour soulever un doute raisonnable (r. c. lifchus, [1997] 3 rcs 320, par 30). du reste, il est important de rappeler à ce sujet que l’intimé a été fouillé à deux reprises, qu’il a été soumis à la surveillance des policiers et que les tests révèlent deux résultats cohérents entre eux, de sorte que s’il y a eu un phénomène digestif perturbateur, celui-ci doit s’être produit avant chacun des tests et en avoir in- fluencé de la même façon chacun des résultats. dans ce contexte, la simple utilisation incorrecte invoquée 466 r v cyr- langlois the chief justice [2018] 3 scr. of the results was in doubt. the minimum evidence required for this purpose was simply not adduced. par l’intimé ne tend pas à elle seule à démontrer que la fiabilité des résultats est mise en doute. la preuve minimale requise à cet égard n’a tout simplement pas été présentée. [16] i do not rule out the possibility that improper operation may be so serious or so closely connected with reliability that it will be sufficient in itself to raise a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results obtained. in short, it does not matter whether the possible impact on reliability is inferred from the actual nature of the defect, from the extent of the defect or from other external circumstances. what is essential is that the possibility that the defect affected the reliability of the results is serious enough to raise a reasonable doubt. bélanger ja, dissenting in the court of appeal, noted the following on this point: [16] je n’exclus pas la possibilité qu’une utilisation incorrecte soit si grave ou si intimement liée à la fia- bilité qu’elle suffise à elle seule à soulever un doute raisonnable sur la fiabilité des résultats obtenus. en somme, que l’incidence possible sur la fiabilité se déduise de la nature même du vice, de son ampleur ou d’autres circonstances externes importe peu. ce qui est essentiel, c’est que la possibilité que le vice ait influé sur la fiabilité des résultats soit suffisam- ment sérieuse pour soulever un doute raisonnable. la juge bélanger, dissidente en cour d’appel, souligne à ce propos : [translation] although expert evidence is not essen- tial, concrete evidence must be tendered to show that the improper operation or malfunctioning of the instrument may be linked to the results (as opposed to the necessity to show that improper operation did in fact lead to unre- liable results). in sum, the evidence should not be mere hypothesis or conjecture. [para. 75] quoiqu’une preuve d’expert ne soit pas essentielle, il doit y avoir une preuve concrète que la mauvaise utilisa- tion ou le fonctionnement défaillant ait pu avoir un lien possible avec les résultats (par opposition à la nécessité de démontrer que dans les faits, l’utilisation incorrecte a engendré des résultats non fiables). bref, la preuve ne doit pas tendre à démontrer une simple supputation ou hypothèse [par 75]. i agree entirely with her analysis. the court of qué- bec judge did not point to any concrete evidence in this regard, and for good reason: beyond conjec- ture and speculation, the evidence showed nothing. zigman j. of the superior court correctly found that there was no evidence tending to cast doubt on the reliability of the results, and the majority of the court of appeal erred in reversing his decision. je souscris entièrement à son analyse. le juge de la cour du québec n’a relevé aucun élément concret à ce sujet, et pour cause : au- delà des suppositions ou des hypothèses, la preuve ne révèle rien. le juge zigman de la cour supérieure a eu raison de conclure à l’absence d’une preuve tendant à mettre en doute la fiabilité des résultats et les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont fait erreur en infirmant sa décision. [17] an intervener, the criminal lawyers’ asso- ciation, argues that it would be impossible for an accused to testify about his or her alcohol consump- tion or digestive problems without contravening s 258(1)(d01). cr c. the intervener is mistaken. it is well established that challenges to the presump- tions in s. 258(1)(c) cr c can be based only on issues relating to the proper functioning and proper operation of an instrument. however, an accused who testifies to establish that he or she had a di- gestive problem is not seeking thereby to show that the instrument was operated improperly. rather, the [17] l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association prétend qu’il serait impossible pour l’accusé de té- moigner sur sa consommation d’alcool ou ses ma- laises digestifs sans contrevenir à l’al 258(1)d01). c.  cr elle a tort il est acquis que les contesta- tions mettant en cause les présomptions prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c cr sont limitées aux questions rela- tives au bon fonctionnement et à l’utilisation correcte de l’appareil. cependant, l’accusé qui établit par son témoignage l’existence d’un problème digestif ne cherche pas par le fait même à démontrer l’utilisation incorrecte de l’appareil. il offre plutôt une preuve [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois la juge côté 467 accused is providing concrete, rational evidence that the reliability of the results may have been affected, after first identifying a deficiency in the operation of the instrument. this distinction is crucial. of course, the fact that such testimonial evidence is admissible does not make it compulsory. concrète et rationnelle d’une possible incidence sur la fiabilité des résultats, et ce, après avoir préala- blement constaté une défaillance dans l’utilisation de celui-ci. cette distinction est cruciale. il va sans dire que le fait qu’une telle preuve testimoniale soit admissible ne la rend pas pour autant obligatoire. [18] moreover, i do not agree with the respond- ent, who maintains that he did not present a “burp- ing defence” because that defence relates solely to s 258(1)(d1). cr c. the burping defence was an essential part of his arguments. he argued that the improper operation of the instrument cast doubt on the reliability of the results precisely because, in such a case, the police might not notice certain digestive issues that can have a distorting effect: the discus- sion during the hearing before the court of québec judge confirms that this question was central to the respondent’s submissions. [19] ultimately, in light of the material in the re- cord, and particularly the consistency of the results, there was absolutely no evidence tending to show that the alleged defect cast doubt on the reliability of the results. that defect therefore could not form the basis for a reasonable doubt. in addition, acceptance of theoretical evidence based on speculation reflects a misinterpretation of the accused’s burden of proof, which is an error of law. the superior court did not err in setting aside the respondent’s acquittal and ordering a new trial. [18] en outre, je ne suis pas d’accord avec l’in- timé, qui soutient ne pas avoir présenté de « dé- fense d’éructation », puisque cette dernière relèverait uniquement de l’al 258(1)d1) c cr. cette défense constituait un élément essentiel de son argumenta- tion. en effet, l’intimé a plaidé que, si l’utilisation incorrecte de l’appareil permettait de mettre en doute la fiabilité des résultats, c’était précisément parce que certains phénomènes digestifs perturbateurs pouvaient dans un tel cas échapper aux policiers : les échanges lors de l’audience devant le juge de la cour du québec confirment que cette question était au cœur des représentations de l’intimé. [19] au bout du compte, eu égard aux éléments au dossier et notamment à la cohérence des résultats, il y avait absence totale de preuve tendant à démontrer que le vice invoqué permettait de mettre en doute la fiabilité des résultats et celui-ci ne pouvait donc fon- der de doute raisonnable. de plus, se satisfaire d’une preuve théorique qui relève de la conjecture traduit une interprétation erronée du fardeau de preuve in- combant à l’accusé, ce qui constitue une erreur de droit. la cour supérieure n’a pas commis d’erreur en annulant l’acquittement de l’intimé et en ordonnant un nouveau procès. english version of the reasons delivered by les motifs suivants ont été rendus par côté j. (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i overview i aperçu it was held in r v. st‑ onge lamoureux, 2012 [20] scc 57, [2012] 3 scr 187, at para. 27, that the evidentiary scheme applicable to offences involving driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit infringes the right to be presumed innocent guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. one reason why this infringe- ment is justified in part is because of the recognized [20] l’arrêt r c. st‑ onge lamoureux, 2012 csc 57, [2012] 3 rcs 187, par. 27, établit que le ré- gime de preuve applicable aux infractions liées à la conduite avec une alcoolémie supérieure à la limite permise porte atteinte à la présomption d’innocence garantie par l’al.  11d) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. si cette atteinte est en partie justifiée, c’est notamment en raison de la fiabilité 468 r v cyr- langlois côté j. [2018] 3 scr. reliability of breathalyzer test results however, the reliability of the results is itself contingent on the proper functioning and proper operation of the instrument. where an accused raises a reasonable doubt in this regard, there is no longer any basis for the presumptions of accuracy and identity created by s. 258(1)(c) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“cr c”),1 and those presumptions must be discarded. reconnue des résultats d’alcootest. cependant, cette fiabilité est elle- même tributaire du bon fonctionne- ment et de l’utilisation correcte de l’appareil. lorsque l’accusé soulève un doute raisonnable à cet égard, les présomptions d’exactitude et d’identité prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46 (« c cr »)1, n’ont plus lieu d’être et doivent être écartées. [21] in the instant case, the trial judge found that the qualified technician’s testimony tended to show that the observation period required prior to the ad- ministration of the breathalyzer test had not been complied with and that this was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results and thus to deprive the prosecution of the benefit of the statutory presumptions. in my view, the trial judge made no error of law that would warrant ap- pellate intervention. the issue is ultimately one of weighing of evidence, and the acquittal must there- fore be upheld. [21] dans la présente affaire, le juge du procès a conclu que le témoignage du technicien qualifié tendait à démontrer que la période d’observation requise avant l’administration de l’alcootest n’avait pas été respectée, ce qui suffisait à soulever un doute raisonnable quant à la fiabilité des résultats et, par conséquent, à faire perdre à la poursuite le bénéfice des présomptions légales. je suis d’avis que le juge du procès n’a commis aucune erreur de droit qui jus- tifierait l’intervention d’une cour d’appel. il s’agit en définitive d’une question d’appréciation de la preuve et l’acquittement doit par le fait même être confirmé. [22] to require, as the majority does in practice, evidence tending to show that the improper operation of the breathalyzer in fact led to inaccurate results — for example, in this case, by imposing an obligation on the accused to testify about his physiological re- actions (such as burping) — would upset the delicate balance between the constitutional rights of accused persons and parliament’s objectives. coupled with the recent majority judgment in r v. gubbins, 2018 scc 44, [2018] 3 scr 35, which held that breath- alyzer maintenance records are not available under first party disclosure, such a requirement would ren- der even more illusory the defences on which the constitutionality of the evidentiary scheme at issue in st‑ onge lamoureux depends. [22] exiger, comme le fait en pratique la majorité, une preuve tendant à démontrer que l’utilisation in- correcte de l’alcootest a entraîné dans les faits des résultats inexacts — par exemple, dans ce cas-ci, en imposant à l’accusé l’obligation de témoigner de ses réactions physiologiques (une éructation par exemple) — viendrait rompre l’équilibre fragile entre les droits constitutionnels de l’accusé et les objectifs du législateur. jumelée au récent jugement majoritaire dans r c. gubbins, 2018 csc 44, [2018] 3 rcs 35, selon lequel les registres d’entretien des alcootests échappent à l’obligation de communication de la preuve incombant à la partie poursuivante, cette exi- gence rendrait encore plus illusoires les moyens de défense dont dépend la constitutionnalité du régime de preuve en cause dans st‑ onge lamoureux. [23] therefore, i will briefly discuss this court’s reasoning in st‑ onge lamoureux. then, i will provide [23] je reviendrai donc brièvement sur le rai- sonnement de notre cour dans st‑ onge lamoureux. 1 the act to amend the criminal code (offences relating to con‑ veyances) and to make consequential amendments to other acts, sc 2018, c. 21, which received royal assent on june 21, 2018, repeals s. 258(1)(c) cr c and replaces it with s 32031(1). the amendment will come into force on december 18, 2018. 1 la loi modifiant le code criminel (infractions relatives aux moyens de transport) et apportant des modifications corrélatives à d’autres lois, lc 2018, c. 21, qui a reçu la sanction royale le 21 juin 2018, abroge l’al. 258(1)c) c cr. et le remplace par le par 32031(1). la modification entrera en vigueur le 18 dé- cembre 2018. [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois la juge côté 469 some clarification concerning the respective burdens of the defence and the crown with regard to the func- tioning and operation of the breathalyzer. i will then consider the facts of this case in order to demonstrate that the original verdict of acquittal is, in my view, un- impeachable. lastly, i will conclude by emphasizing that it would be unfair to order a new trial given the fact that the crown is relying on arguments made for the first time on appeal. j’apporterai ensuite certaines précisions sur les far- deaux respectifs de la défense et du ministère public en ce qui a trait au fonctionnement et à l’utilisation de l’alcootest. je poursuivrai en examinant les faits de la présente affaire afin de démontrer que le verdict initial d’acquittement est, selon moi, inattaquable. enfin, je conclurai en soulignant qu’il serait injuste d’ordonner un nouveau procès, compte tenu du fait que le ministère public s’appuie sur des arguments présentés pour la première fois en appel. ii analytical framework ii cadre d’analyse a compliance with the relevant procedures un‑ derpins the constitutionality of the presump‑ tions in section 258(1)(c) cr c. a le respect des procédures pertinentes sous‑ tend la constitutionnalité des présomptions prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c cr. [24] essentially, this appeal requires the court to consider the burden resting on an accused who seeks to counter the presumptions of accuracy and identity in s. 258(1)(c) cr c as well as the type of evidence that the accused must adduce to discharge that burden. [24] pour l’essentiel, la cour est appelée en l’es- pèce à examiner le fardeau imposé à l’accusé qui entend repousser les présomptions d’exactitude et d’identité prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c cr, ainsi que le type de preuve que celui-ci doit présenter pour satisfaire à ce fardeau. [25] my position is based, as it was in the recent de- cision in gubbins, on the majority reasons in st‑ onge lamoureux. in the instant case, the majority also acknowledges the relevance of st‑ onge lamoureux, but in my view, and with respect, it departs from that decision. the reason why the validity of the eviden- tiary scheme applicable to offences involving driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit was upheld in part in st‑ onge lamoureux, despite the infringement of the right to be presumed innocent (paras. 24 and 27-28), was notably because there was still a real possibility that the accused could counter the statutory presumptions by raising a reasonable doubt about the proper operation of the breathalyzer. [25] tout comme dans le récent arrêt gubbins, ma position repose sur les motifs des juges majoritaires dans st‑ onge lamoureux. dans la présente affaire, la majorité reconnaît elle aussi la pertinence de cet arrêt, mais, à mon avis, et avec égards, elle s’en écarte. si la validité du régime de preuve applicable aux infractions liées à la conduite avec une alcoo- lémie supérieure à la limite permise a été partielle- ment confirmée dans st‑ onge lamoureux, malgré l’atteinte à la présomption d’innocence (par. 24 et 27-28), c’est notamment parce que l’accusé conserve la possibilité réelle de repousser les présomptions légales en soulevant un doute raisonnable quant à l’utilisation correcte de l’alcootest. [26] although the scientific evidence adduced in st‑ onge lamoureux demonstrated the reliability of breathalyzers, it also highlighted the importance of following the relevant procedures faithfully in order to obtain accurate results: [26] bien que la preuve scientifique produite dans l’affaire st‑ onge lamoureux ait démontré la fiabilité des alcootests, cette même preuve a également fait ressortir l’importance de respecter fidèlement les procédures pertinentes afin d’obtenir des résultats exacts : the expert evidence filed in the instant case reveals that the possibility of an instrument malfunctioning or being used la preuve d’expertise produite dans la présente instance révèle que la possibilité de mauvais fonctionnement ou de 470 r v cyr- langlois côté j. [2018] 3 scr. improperly when breath samples are taken is not merely speculative, but is very real   . mauvaise utilisation de l’appareil lors de la prise d’échan- tillons d’haleine n’est pas fondée sur de simples conjec- tures, mais est bien réelle  .   . thus, human error can occur when samples are taken and at various steps in the maintenance of the instruments, which, it should be mentioned, are used canada- wide. hodgson’s report, which the prosecution itself relied on as a source of the statutory amendments, refers to the importance of proper operation and maintenance:    il peut donc se produire des erreurs humaines au cours du processus de prélèvement et aux diverses étapes d’en- tretien de ces appareils qui, il faut le noter, sont utilisés à travers tout le canada. le rapport hodgson — que la poursuite elle- même a invoqué comme source des mo- difications législatives — fait état de l’importance d’une bonne manipulation et d’un bon entretien :    to achieve scientifically sound results in opera- tional use, user agencies must ensure that approved instruments are operated by qualified personnel using procedures based on good laboratory practice. [p. 83] [emphasis added; paras 25-26]. pour parvenir à des résultats rigoureusement scien- tifiques lors de leur utilisation sur le terrain, les al- cootests approuvés doivent être manipulés par du personnel qualifié suivant des procédures fondées sur de bonnes pratiques de laboratoire. [p. 97] [je souligne; par 25-26] (see also paras. 26, 38, 41 and 72.) (voir aussi par. 26, 38, 41 et 72.) [27] in discussing the relevant procedures for en- suring the reliability of results, the court gave the specific example of the period during which the ac- cused must be observed prior to the test: [27] parmi les procédures pertinentes pour assurer la fiabilité des résultats, la cour donne l’exemple pré- cis de la période d’observation préalable du prévenu : the alcohol test committee (“committee”) of the ca- nadian society of forensic science (“csfs”) has made a series of recommendations concerning the procedures to be followed by the professionals who operate the instru- ments    . the committee states that before collecting a breath sample, the qualified technician must, among other things, observe the test subject for 15 minutes    . [emphasis added; para 25]. le comité des analyses d’alcool (« comité ») constitué sous l’égide de la société canadienne des sciences judi- ciaires (« scsj ») a formulé un ensemble de recomman- dations relatives aux procédures que doivent suivre les professionnels qui opèrent les appareils [  ]. avant de prélever un échantillon d’haleine, le comité prévoit que le technicien qualifié doit notamment observer le sujet de l’analyse pendant 15 minutes    [je souligne; par 25] (see also r v drolet, 2010 qccq 7719, at pa- ras. 92-94 (canlii), cited at para. 35 of st‑ onge lamoureux.) (voir aussi r c. drolet, 2010 qccq 7719, [2010] rjq 2610, par. 92-94, citée au par. 35 de st‑ onge lamoureux.) [28] in determining whether the infringement was justified under s. 1 of the charter, the court ex- pressly emphasized the fact that the constitutionality of the provisions at issue depended, among other things, on “whether it is possible, and how easy it is, for the accused to rebut the presumption” (pa- ras. 30-31 (emphasis added)). [28] à l’étape de la justification au regard de l’article premier de la charte, la cour a insisté ex- pressément sur le fait que la constitutionnalité des dispositions en cause dépendrait notamment de la « possibilité pour la personne accusée de repousser la présomption et la facilité avec laquelle elle peut le faire » (par. 30-31 (je souligne)). [29] in this regard, the court found that only the first of the three requirements imposed on the ac- cused by s. 258(1)(c) cr c — that of adducing [29] à cet égard, la cour a conclu que seule la première des trois exigences imposées à l’accusé par l’al. 258(1)c) c cr — celle de produire une preuve [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois la juge côté 471 evidence tending to show that the instrument was malfunctioning or was operated improperly — con- stituted a reasonable limit on the right to be presumed innocent (para 3). this burden was justified because it reflected the fact that “the results will be reliable only if the instruments are operated and maintained properly” (para 41). tendant à démontrer le mauvais fonctionnement ou l’utilisation incorrecte de l’appareil — constitue une limite raisonnable à la présomption d’innocence (par 3). en effet, ce fardeau se justifie puisqu’il res- pecte le fait que « les résultats ne seront fiables que dans la mesure où les appareils sont bien utilisés » (par 41). [30] the court declined to specifically determine the nature and scope of the evidence required to show that the instrument was operated improperly (para 42). however, deschamps j. made a point of noting the relevance of the recommendations made by the alcohol test committee of the canadian society of forensic science: [30] la cour s’est abstenue de circonscrire avec précision la nature et l’étendue de la preuve requise pour démontrer une utilisation incorrecte de l’ap- pareil (par 42). la juge deschamps a cependant pris soin de signaler la pertinence des recomman- dations du comité des analyses d’alcool constitué sous l’autorité de la société canadienne des sciences judiciaires : in its recommendations, the csfs committee also suggested mechanisms for ensuring that the instruments function properly and for assuring the quality of breath alcohol analyses. it can be inferred from these recommen- dations that the instruments may not function optimally if the suggested procedures are not followed. [emphasis added; para 43]. dans ses recommandations, le comité de la scsj suggère également des mécanismes pour assurer le bon fonctionnement des appareils et la qualité des analyses d’alcoolémie. il est possible d’inférer de ces recomman- dations que, si les procédures suggérées ne sont pas sui- vies, le fonctionnement des appareils pourrait ne pas être optimal. [je souligne; par 43] [31] it was therefore in light of the fact that it was possible for the accused to show that the relevant pro- cedures had not been followed — in which case the reliability of the results could not be assumed — that the court ultimately concluded that the first require- ment imposed by s. 258(1)(c) cr c was justified under s. 1 of the charter. in my view, that conclusion sheds light on the burden resting on an accused who seeks to counter the statutory presumptions. [31] c’est donc en tenant compte de la possibilité pour l’accusé de démontrer que les procédures perti- nentes n’ont pas été suivies — auquel cas la fiabilité des résultats ne peut être tenue pour acquise — que la cour a finalement conclu que la première exigence de l’al. 258(1)c) c cr était justifiée au regard de l’article premier de la charte. à mon avis, ce constat nous éclaire sur le fardeau imposé à l’accusé qui entend repousser les présomptions légales. b an accused who seeks to counter the presump‑ tions in section 258(1)(c) cr c. bears only the burden of raising a reasonable doubt about improper operation of the breathalyzer that could affect the reliability of the results b le fardeau imposé à l’accusé qui entend repous‑ ser les présomptions prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c cr se limite à soulever un doute raisonnable quant à une utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest susceptible d’affecter la fiabilité des résultats i am not suggesting that st‑ onge lamoureux [32] elevated the various recommendations concerning the operation of breathalyzers — including that there be a period of observation of the accused — to the level of statutory conditions that the crown must meet to benefit from the presumptions of accuracy and identity in s. 258(1)(c) cr c. the only applicable je ne prétends point que l’arrêt st‑ onge [32] lamoureux a élevé les diverses recommandations relatives à l’utilisation des alcootests  —  y com- pris le respect d’une période d’observation du pré- venu — au rang de conditions législatives auxquelles le ministère public devrait satisfaire pour bénéficier des présomptions d’exactitude et d’identité prévues à 472 r v cyr- langlois côté j. [2018] 3 scr. statutory conditions are those imposed by parliament in s. 258(1)(c)(ii) to (iv). [33] as noted by the majority of the quebec court of appeal, an accused who seeks to counter the statu- tory presumptions bears only the burden of adducing evidence tending to show a malfunction or improper operation of the breathalyzer that could affect the reliability of the results; the accused is not required to show that the results are in fact inaccurate (2017 qcca 1033, at paras. 38, 41, 56 and 60 (canlii)). it is also clear that the evidence in question need only raise a reasonable doubt in this regard (st‑ onge lamoureux, at para. 16; r v. gibson, 2008 scc 16, [2008] 1 scr 397, at para 17). l’al. 258(1)c) c cr. les seules conditions législatives applicables sont celles imposées par le législateur aux sous-al. 258(1)c)(ii) à (iv). [33] comme l’ont affirmé les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel du québec, le fardeau imposé à l’ac- cusé qui entend repousser les présomptions légales se limite à produire une preuve tendant à démontrer un mauvais fonctionnement ou une utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest susceptible d’affecter la fiabilité des résultats, sans toutefois requérir de démontrer dans les faits l’inexactitude des résultats (2017 qcca 1033, 39 cr (7th) 123, par. 38, 41, 56 et 60). il va de soi, par ailleurs, que la preuve en question n’a qu’à soulever un doute raisonnable à cet égard (st‑ onge lamoureux, par. 16; r c. gibson, 2008 csc 16, [2008] 1 rcs 397, par 17). [34] this formulation of the burden is consistent with st‑ onge lamoureux, which simply requires evidence of a “defect that could cast doubt on the reliability of the results” (para. 63; see also paras. 41 and 48), and with the principles enunciated in r v. so, 2014 abca 451, 9 alta. lr (6th) 382, at pa- ras. 44 and 47. [34] cette formulation est conforme à l’arrêt st‑ onge lamoureux, qui insiste simplement sur la preuve d’un « vice de nature à mettre en doute la fiabilité des résultats » (par. 63; voir aussi par. 41 et 48), de même qu’aux enseignements de l’arrêt r c. so, 2014 abca 451, 9 alta. lr (6th) 382, par. 44 et 47. [35] like the crown, the majority purports to ac- cept that the burden on the accused is simply to raise a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results by means of evidence tending to show that the breathalyzer was malfunctioning or was operated improperly (majority reasons, at para 4). yet by requiring “evidence that relates more concretely to the facts in issue” (para. 14) — what it refers to as the “practical element” — the majority is effectively imposing an obligation on the accused to cast doubt on the accuracy of the results on the facts of the case. with respect, i consider it contrary to this court’s reasoning in st‑ onge lamoureux to impose such a burden, since it amounts to resurrecting, in attenuated form, the second requirement in s. 258(1)(c) cr c. it will be recalled that this court held in st‑ onge lamoureux that this second requirement — that of demonstrating a connection between the deficiency and the results indicating a blood alcohol level ex- ceeding the legal limit — constituted a serious in- fringement of the right to be presumed innocent that could not be justified (para 59). [35] tout comme le ministère public, la majorité dit accepter que le fardeau de l’accusé se résume à soulever un doute raisonnable quant à la fiabilité des résultats en s’appuyant sur une preuve tendant à démontrer le mauvais fonctionnement ou l’utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest (motifs majoritaires, par 4). pourtant, en exigeant une « preuve qui se rattache plus concrètement aux faits en cause » (par. 14), ce qu’elle appelle le « volet pratique », la majorité impose en réalité à l’accusé l’obligation de mettre en doute l’exactitude des résultats dans les faits de l’affaire. avec égards, j’estime que ce fardeau va à l’encontre du raisonnement de notre cour dans st‑ onge lamoureux. en effet, un tel fardeau revient à faire renaître sous une forme atténuée la seconde exigence de l’al. 258(1)c) c cr. rappelons que l’ar- rêt st‑ onge lamoureux établit que cette deuxième exigence — soit celle de démontrer un lien entre la défaillance et les résultats indiquant une alcoolémie supérieure à la limite permise — constitue une at- teinte sérieuse à la présomption d’innocence qui ne peut être justifiée (par 59). [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois la juge côté 473 it is no accident that st‑ onge lamoureux re- [36] quires evidence that raises a reasonable doubt about the reliability rather than the accuracy of the re- sults. these two terms, though related, do not have the same meaning. the former refers, in its tech- nical sense, to the [translation] “[a]bility of a system    to function without incident for a pe- riod of time” and, by extension, to the “[n]ature of [something that can be relied on]” (le petit robert (new ed. 2012), at p. 1036, definition of “fiabilité” (reliability)). the latter refers to “[c]onformity to the truth” (p. 964, definition of “exactitude” (accu- racy)). in st‑ onge lamoureux, the court could have required the accused to rebut the presumption of ac‑ curacy by adducing evidence that raised a reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the results. instead, the court asked the accused to raise a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results. in my opinion, this distinction is significant. [37] simply put, where the evidence tends to show — on the reasonable doubt standard — that the malfunctioning or improper operation of the breathalyzer increased the possibility of an inaccu- rate result, then reliability is affected and the accused has met his or her burden. the accused does not have to tender additional evidence in order to directly raise a reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the results on the facts of the case. in practice, it will be sufficient to adduce evidence tending to show that a recommended procedure was not faithfully followed and that the purpose of the procedure is to ensure the reliability of the results. in my view, this is a “defect that could cast doubt on the reliability of the results” within the meaning of st‑ onge lamoureux (empha- sis added). the accused’s burden ends there, because the application of the presumptions in s. 258(1)(c) cr c is justified only insofar as the relevant proce- dures are complied with (see st‑ onge lamoureux, at paras. 27, 38, 41, 43 and 63). [36] ce n’est pas par hasard que l’arrêt st‑ onge lamoureux requiert une preuve de nature à soulever un doute raisonnable quant à la fiabilité plutôt que quant à l’exactitude des résultats. bien qu’ils soient liés, ces deux termes n’ont pas le même sens. le pre- mier désigne, dans son sens technique, l’« [a]ptitude d’un système [  ] à fonctionner sans incidents pen- dant un temps donné », et, par extension, le « [c]arac- tère d’une chose [à laquelle on peut se fier] » (le petit robert (nouv. éd. 2012), p 1036). le second renvoie à la « [c]onformité avec la réalité » (p 964). dans st‑ onge lamoureux, la cour aurait pu exiger que l’accusé réfute la présomption d’exactitude en présentant une preuve soulevant un doute raison- nable quant à l’exactitude des résultats. or, la cour a plutôt invité l’accusé à soulever un doute raisonnable à l’égard de la fiabilité des résultats. selon moi, cette nuance est significative. [37] en clair, lorsque la preuve tend à démon- trer — selon la norme du doute raisonnable — que le mauvais fonctionnement ou l’utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest a augmenté la possibilité d’un résultat inexact, la fiabilité s’en trouve affectée, et l’accusé a satisfait à son fardeau. ce dernier n’a pas à produire une preuve additionnelle afin de soulever directe- ment un doute raisonnable quant à l’exactitude des résultats dans les faits de l’affaire. en pratique, il suffira de présenter une preuve tendant à démontrer qu’une procédure recommandée n’a pas été suivie fi- dèlement, et que cette procédure vise à assurer la fia- bilité des résultats. il s’agit, selon moi, d’un « vice de nature à mettre en doute la fiabilité des résultats » au sens de l’arrêt st‑ onge lamoureux (je souligne). le fardeau de l’accusé s’arrête là, puisque l’application des présomptions prévues à l’al 258(1)c) c cr n’est justifiée que dans la mesure où les procédures per- tinentes sont respectées (voir st‑ onge lamoureux, par. 27, 38, 41, 43 et 63). [38] the burden then shifts to the crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the deficiency in question had no impact on the accuracy of the re- sults on the facts of the case. in st‑ onge lamoureux, deschamps j. noted that there is nothing excessive about this reverse onus: “[b]eing the party that has to prove that there is no connection after the accused [38] il revient alors au ministère public de prouver, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que la défaillance en cause n’a eu aucune incidence sur l’exactitude des ré- sultats dans les faits de l’affaire. la juge deschamps a d’ailleurs fait remarquer dans st‑ onge lamoureux que ce renversement du fardeau n’a rien d’excessif : « [l]e fait que la poursuite soit la partie tenue de 474 r v cyr- langlois côté j. [2018] 3 scr. has adduced evidence to show that the instrument malfunctioned or was operated improperly does not impose a significant additional burden on the prose- cution” (para. 57 (emphasis added)). however, if the crown fails to discharge this burden, it completely loses the benefit of the statutory presumptions in s. 258(1)(c) cr c. as mr. cyr- langlois aptly ob- serves in his factum, [translation] “[t]he crown should not be able to rely on the rigour of the tech- nicians to persuade this court that the results are reliable and then trivialize the importance of that rigour when the reliability of the results is chal- lenged” (para 192). présenter à son tour une preuve d’absence de lien après que la défense aura soumis une preuve met- tant en doute le bon fonctionnement ou l’utilisation correcte de l’appareil ne lui impose pas un fardeau additionnel important » (par. 57 (je souligne)). si toutefois le ministère public ne parvient pas à satis- faire à ce fardeau, il perd définitivement le bénéfice des présomptions légales prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c.  cr comme le souligne avec justesse m cyr- langlois dans son mémoire, « [l]e ministère public ne doit pas pouvoir utiliser la rigueur des techniciens pour convaincre cette cour de la fiabilité des résul- tats, pour ensuite banaliser l’importance de cette même rigueur lorsque la fiabilité des résultats est attaquée » (par 192). c a qualified technician’s testimony may be sufficient to counter the presumptions in sec‑ tion 258(1)(c) cr c. c le témoignage d’un technicien qualifié peut suffire à repousser les présomptions prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c cr. [39] there is nothing to prevent the accused from relying solely on the qualified technician’s testimony to raise a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results. as the court stated in r v. crosthwait, [1980] 1 scr 1089, at p. 1100, evidence to counter the statutory presumptions may be “sought in dep- ositions given by witnesses of the crown as well as in depositions of defence witnesses”. [40] under the criminal code, the qualified tech- nician is responsible for the proper operation of the breathalyzer (see, for example, ss. 254(3)(a)(i) and 258(1)(c)(iv)). where the technician testifies about a recommended procedure, states that its purpose is to ensure the reliability of the results and, finally, admits that he or she did not follow the procedure faithfully or does not know whether it was followed faithfully, the accused is not obliged to tender ad- ditional evidence — such as a copy of the training manual in issue — to corroborate the technician’s testimony. that testimony is in itself evidence that can raise a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results. to take the opposite position would be to disregard the unique role conferred by parliament on qualified technicians in the context of blood alcohol analysis. [39] rien n’empêche l’accusé de s’appuyer uni- quement sur le témoignage du technicien qualifié pour soulever un doute raisonnable quant à la fiabilité des résultats. comme l’a précisé la cour dans l’arrêt r c. crosthwait, [1980] 1 rcs 1089, p. 1100, une preuve visant à repousser les présomptions légales peut être « puisée autant dans les dépositions des témoins du ministère public que dans celles des té- moins de la défense ». [40] suivant le code criminel, le technicien qua- lifié est responsable de l’utilisation correcte de l’al- cootest (voir, par exemple, sous-al. 254(3)a)(i) et 258(1)c)(iv)). lorsque ce technicien témoigne au sujet d’une procédure recommandée, qu’il précise que la procédure en question vise à assurer la fiabilité des résultats, et qu’il admet enfin ne pas avoir suivi celle-ci fidèlement ou ignorer si elle l’a été, l’accusé n’a pas l’obligation de produire une preuve addition- nelle — telle une copie du manuel de formation en cause — pour corroborer le témoignage. il s’agit, en soi, d’une preuve susceptible de soulever un doute raisonnable quant à la fiabilité des résultats. adopter la position contraire serait faire fi du rôle unique que le législateur accorde au technicien qualifié en matière d’analyse de l’alcoolémie. [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois la juge côté 475 it is for the trier of fact to assess the evidence [41] adduced in order to determine whether it is sufficient to counter the statutory presumptions. of course, the trier of fact may well find that, in the circumstances, the qualified technician’s testimony does not in itself raise a reasonable doubt, for example because the problems identified are “frivolous or trivial” (st‑ onge lamoureux, at paras. 52 and 59). il revient au juge des faits d’apprécier la preuve [41] administrée afin de déterminer si celle-ci est suffisante pour repousser les présomptions légales. il va sans dire que le juge pourrait très bien considérer que, dans les circonstances, le témoignage du technicien qualifié ne soulève pas en soi un doute raisonnable, par exemple parce que les problèmes constatés sont « futiles ou anodins » (st‑ onge lamoureux, par. 52 et 59). iii application to the facts iii application aux faits a the trial judge made no error of law a le juge du procès n’a commis aucune erreur de droit [42] the trial judge correctly stated the law. he properly noted that the accused must adduce ev- idence tending to show that the breathalyzer was malfunctioning or was operated improperly and that the deficiency in question must raise a reasonable doubt about the [translation] “reliability of the test taken” (ar, vol. 1, at pp. 3 and 6). his findings of fact on this point are supported by the evidence adduced by the parties. in my opinion, the verdict of acquittal is therefore unimpeachable. [42] le juge du procès s’est bien dirigé en droit. il affirme avec raison que l’accusé doit produire une preuve tendant à démontrer le mauvais fonction- nement ou l’utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest, et que la défaillance en question doit soulever un doute raisonnable quant à la « fiabilité du test qui a été prélevé » (da, vol. 1, p. 3 et 6). ses conclusions de fait à cet égard trouvent appui dans la preuve produite par les parties. à mon avis, le verdict d’acquittement est par conséquent inattaquable. [43] the crown has not identified any error of law that would warrant this court’s intervention. contrary to what it argues, it was deprived of the benefit of the presumptions in s. 258(1)(c) cr c not because of a [translation] “mere speculative pos- sibility”, but rather because of concrete and specific evidence showing that a relevant procedure — obser- vation of the accused for a period of time — had not been followed and that this deficiency could affect the reliability of the results. [43] le ministère public n’a décelé aucune erreur de droit qui justifierait l’intervention de la cour. contrairement à ce qu’il prétend, ce n’est pas une « simple possibilité conjecturale » qui lui a fait perdre le bénéfice des présomptions prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c cr, mais une preuve concrète et précise démon- trant qu’une procédure pertinente  —  la période d’observation du prévenu — n’a pas été suivie, et que cette défaillance était susceptible d’affecter la fiabilité des résultats. [44] in this regard, i cannot agree with the major- ity that the trial judge misinterpreted the reasonable doubt standard and that his findings were based on “speculation” (majority reasons, at paras. 14, 15 and 19). this loses sight of the fact that the accused was not required to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, or even about the accuracy of the results on the facts of the case. the reasonable doubt simply had to relate to improper operation of the breathalyzer that could affect the reliability of the results. on this [44] à cet égard, je ne peux souscrire à l’opinion de la majorité voulant que le juge du procès ait mal interprété la norme du doute raisonnable et que ses conclusions relèvent de la « conjecture » (motifs majoritaires, par. 14, 15 et 19). c’est perdre de vue que l’accusé n’a pas à soulever un doute raisonnable quant au fait que l’alcoolémie dépassait la limite permise, ni même quant à l’exactitude des résultats dans les faits de l’affaire. le doute raisonnable de- vait simplement porter sur une utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest susceptible d’affecter la fiabilité des 476 r v cyr- langlois côté j. [2018] 3 scr. point, the evidence adduced in the instant case was not “theoretical”. résultats. à ce chapitre, la preuve offerte en l’espèce n’était pas « théorique ». [45] moreover, the majority concedes that, in cer- tain circumstances, evidence of improper operation may in itself raise a reasonable doubt about the re- liability of the results (para 16). in my view, this is a matter for the trier of fact to decide, since it involves assessing the sufficiency of the evidence (see sunbeam corporation (canada) ltd v. the queen, [1969] scr 221, at p. 231; lampard v. the queen, [1969] scr 373, at pp. 380-81; schuldt v. the queen, [1985] 2 scr 592, at p 608). [45] qui plus est, la majorité concède qu’il est possible, dans certaines circonstances, que la preuve d’une utilisation incorrecte soulève en elle- même un doute raisonnable quant à la fiabilité des résul- tats (par 16). à mon sens, il appartient au juge des faits de se prononcer sur cette question, car il s’agit d’apprécier le caractère suffisant de la preuve (voir sunbeam corporation (canada) ltd. c. the queen, [1969] rcs 221, p. 231; lampard c. the queen, [1969] rcs 373, p. 380- 381; schuldt c. la reine, [1985] 2 rcs 592, p 608). b the evidence adduced at the hearing was sufficient to counter the presumptions in sec‑ tion 258(1)(c) cr c. b la preuve présentée à l’audience suffisait à re‑ pousser les présomptions prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c cr. [46] in the present case, mr. cyr- langlois adduced relevant evidence concerning the improper operation of the breathalyzer and the trial judge found that that evidence was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results. this court should therefore not intervene. [46] en l’espèce, m. cyr- langlois a présenté une preuve pertinente quant à l’utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest, et le juge du procès a conclu que cette preuve suffisait à soulever un doute raisonnable quant à la fiabilité des résultats. notre cour ne de- vrait donc pas intervenir. [47] first, constable boissonneault, the qualified technician, himself stated that the procedures pre- scribed by the école nationale de police du québec include a 20- minute observation period he said that this period is meant to ensure that the accused has not consumed alcohol, vomited, regurgitated or burped before the breath samples are taken, since any of these may leave residual alcohol in the ac- cused’s mouth, which could distort the results. this testimony was more than sufficient to show that a procedure exists for ensuring the reliability of the test results. there was no need to file the training manual of the école nationale de police du québec, to which the witness referred, or to have an expert testify to corroborate what the witness had said. [47] d’abord, l’agent boissonneault, le techni- cien qualifié, a lui- même affirmé que les procédures prescrites par l’école nationale de police du québec prévoient une période d’observation de 20 minutes. selon lui, cette période vise à s’assurer que le pré- venu n’a pas consommé, vomi, régurgité ou éructé avant le prélèvement des échantillons d’haleine, ce qui risque d’entraîner la présence d’alcool résiduel dans sa bouche et ainsi de fausser les résultats. ce témoignage était largement suffisant pour démon- trer l’existence d’une procédure visant à assurer la fiabilité des résultats d’analyses. il n’était pas néces- saire de produire le manuel de formation de l’école nationale de police du québec auquel le témoin a fait référence, ni de faire témoigner un expert pour corroborer ses observations. [48] constable boissonneault’s cross- examination also tends to show that mr. cyr- langlois was not observed during the prescribed period to ensure that no physiological reaction affected the reliability of the results. the qualified technician stated that he [48] ensuite, le contre- interrogatoire de l’agent boissonneault tend également à démontrer que m. cyr- langlois n’a pas été observé pendant la pé- riode prescrite de manière à s’assurer qu’aucune réaction physiologique n’affecte la fiabilité des [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois la juge côté 477 had not observed the accused himself because he had been busy preparing the breathalyzer. another police officer, constable cousineau, did so instead. however, constable boissonneault could not con- firm that his colleague had observed the accused continuously during the 20- minute period preceding the breathalyzer test. in addition, there was a certain amount of time during which constable cousineau was unable to determine whether mr. cyr- langlois burped, since mr. cyr- langlois was alone in a sound- proof room exercising his right to counsel. constable boissonneault does not appear to have been con- cerned about this, even though he acknowledged that, as the qualified technician, he was responsible for ensuring that no physiological reactions occurred before he took the breath samples. as a result, the trial judge could certainly find that the qualified tech- nician’s testimony was sufficient to raise a reason- able doubt about compliance with the prescribed observation period. résultats. le technicien qualifié a affirmé qu’il n’avait pas lui- même observé le prévenu parce qu’il était occupé à préparer l’alcootest. c’est plutôt un autre policier, l’agent cousineau, qui s’en serait chargé. cependant, l’agent boissonneault n’a pu confirmer que son collègue avait observé le prévenu de manière constante pendant la période de 20 minutes ayant précédé l’alcootest. de plus, pendant un certain laps de temps, l’agent cousineau ne pouvait déterminer si m. cyr- langlois éructait puisque ce dernier se trouvait seul dans une salle insonorisée pour exercer son droit à l’avocat. l’agent boissonneault ne semble pas s’en être préoccupé même s’il a reconnu avoir la responsabilité, à titre de technicien qualifié, de s’as- surer de l’absence de réactions physiologiques avant de procéder aux prélèvements d’haleine. de ce fait, le juge du procès pouvait certainement estimer que le témoignage du technicien qualifié était suffisant pour soulever un doute raisonnable quant au respect de la période d’observation prescrite. [49] ultimately, it was open to the trial judge to find that mr. cyr- langlois had adduced evidence tending to show improper operation of the breatha- lyzer that could affect the reliability of the results, and not “simply to show that a deficiency is possi- ble”. in my opinion, this is neither “conjecture” nor “speculation” (majority reasons, at para. 16), since, according to the evidence adduced, the qualified technician administered the tests without faithfully following the prescribed procedure and without en- suring, as he was required to do, that the accused did not have any physiological reaction that could distort the results. the trial judge could therefore have a reasonable doubt about their reliability. [49] en définitive, il était loisible au juge du procès de conclure que m. cyr- langlois avait présenté une preuve tendant à démontrer une utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest susceptible d’affecter la fiabilité des résultats, et non une « simple possibilité de défail- lance ». à mon avis, il ne s’agit ni de « supposi- tions » ni d’« hypothèses » (motifs majoritaires, par. 16), puisque, selon la preuve présentée, le tech- nicien qualifié a procédé aux analyses sans avoir suivi fidèlement la procédure prescrite et sans s’être assuré, comme il le devait, que le prévenu n’avait eu aucune réaction physiologique susceptible de fausser les résultats. le juge du procès pouvait donc entrete- nir un doute raisonnable sur leur fiabilité. [50] at that point, the accused had discharged his burden under s. 258(1)(c) cr c and did not have to adduce any other evidence. as hogue ja of the quebec court of appeal aptly wrote: [50] à ce moment, l’accusé avait satisfait au far- deau qui lui incombe en vertu de l’al. 258(1)c) c cr. et n’avait aucune autre preuve à présenter. comme l’a écrit avec justesse la juge hogue de la cour d’ap- pel du québec : [translation] in the absence of additional evidence al- lowing him to conclude that the possibility of the invalid re- sult to which officer boissonneault referred could be ruled out, the first instance judge was entitled not to extend the benefit of the presumptions to the prosecution. he did not have to require anything further from the accused. [para. 50] à défaut d’une preuve supplémentaire permettant de conclure que la possibilité d’un résultat inexact auquel réfère l’agent boissonneault doit être écartée, le juge d’ins- tance pouvait priver le ministère public du bénéfice des présomptions. il n’avait pas à exiger plus de la part de l’accusé. [par. 50] 478 r v cyr- langlois côté j. [2018] 3 scr. in fact, it would be contrary to the right to [51] remain silent and the right to be presumed innocent to require an accused to testify about his or her alco- hol consumption and physiological reactions when the accused has already adduced evidence tending to show improper operation of the breathalyzer that could affect the reliability of the results. with re- spect, the majority’s approach shifts the obligation to the accused to observe himself or herself, make note of every physiological reaction and then testify about this, failing which the improper operation of the breathalyzer will be presumed to be of no conse- quence. i highly doubt that this could be a justified infringement of the accused’s rights. it is the state’s responsibility, not that of the accused, to ensure com- pliance with the requisite conditions for obtaining accurate results. [52] the majority suggests that the relative con- sistency of the two test results — among other evi- dence — tends to show that failure to comply with the observation period had no impact in this case, and thus tends to confirm the reliability of the re- sults (majority reasons, at para 15). even on the assumption that this is true, the onus was on the crown to prove it, for example by having the quali- fied technician or an expert testify on this point. the crown did not do so, however, and it must accept the consequences. the application of the presumptions of accuracy and identity in s. 258(1)(c) cr c was no longer justified, and the presumptions therefore had to be discarded. in the absence of any other evidence showing that mr. cyr- langlois was guilty, the trial judge had no choice but to acquit him. c the court should not order a new trial based on arguments made for the first time on appeal [51] de fait, il serait contraire au droit de garder le silence et à la présomption d’innocence d’exiger que l’accusé témoigne au sujet de sa consommation d’alcool et de ses réactions physiologiques, alors qu’il a déjà présenté une preuve tendant à démontrer une utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest susceptible d’affecter la fiabilité des résultats. avec égards, l’ap- proche de la majorité transfère au prévenu l’obliga- tion de s’observer lui- même et de noter ses moindres réactions physiologiques, puis de témoigner à ce sujet, à défaut de quoi l’utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest est présumée sans conséquence. je doute fortement qu’il puisse s’agir d’une atteinte justifiée aux droits de l’accusé. c’est la responsabilité de l’état, et non celle du prévenu, de s’assurer que les conditions requises pour obtenir des résultats exacts sont respectées. [52] la majorité suggère que la relative cohérence entre les résultats des deux tests — entre autres élé- ments au dossier — tend à démontrer que le non- respect de la période d’observation n’a eu aucune incidence en l’espèce et donc à confirmer la fiabilité des résultats (motifs majoritaires, par 15). à supposer même que ce soit le cas, il appartenait au ministère public de le prouver, par exemple en faisant témoi- gner le technicien qualifié ou un expert à ce sujet. or, cette preuve n’a pas été faite et le ministère public doit en assumer les conséquences. l’application des présomptions d’exactitude et d’identité prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c cr n’était plus justifiée et celles-ci devaient par le fait même être écartées. en l’absence de toute autre preuve démontrant la culpabilité de m. cyr- langlois, le juge du procès n’avait d’autre choix que de prononcer l’acquittement. c la cour ne devrait pas ordonner un nouveau procès sur la base d’arguments présentés pour la première fois en appel [53] in closing, i would add that, even if i agreed with the crown’s position that the accused had to introduce the qualified technician’s training manual in evidence and to testify about his alcohol consump- tion and physiological reactions, i would hesitate to order a new trial in this case. as pointed out by an intervener, the association québécoise des avocats et avocates de la défense, the position taken by the [53] en terminant, j’ajouterais que, même si j’étais en accord avec la thèse du ministère public selon laquelle l’accusé devait mettre en preuve le manuel de formation du technicien qualifié et témoigner sur sa consommation d’alcool et ses réactions physio- logiques, j’hésiterais à ordonner un nouveau procès en l’espèce. comme l’a fait remarquer l’intervenante l’association québécoise des avocats et avocates de [2018] 3 rcs. r c cyr- langlois la juge côté 479 prosecution on appeal is clearly different from the one it took at trial. la défense, la position de la poursuite en appel diffère manifestement de celle adoptée lors du procès. [54] the crown prosecutor never argued before the trial judge that the qualified technician’s testi- mony could not be sufficient in law to counter the presumptions in s. 258(1)(c) cr c. he did not sub- mit that it was necessary to introduce evidence of the recommended procedures by filing the relevant training or instruction manuals (in fact, he seemed to object to the filing of those manuals). most impor- tantly, he did not argue that the accused had to testify about his alcohol consumption and physiological reactions (such as burping) because otherwise there could be no reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results. rather, the prosecutor’s position was that constables boissonneault and cousineau had observed the accused for a period of time that was sufficient in the circumstances. [54] devant le juge du procès, le procureur du mi- nistère public n’a jamais prétendu que le témoignage du technicien qualifié ne pouvait suffire, en droit, à repousser les présomptions prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c cr. il n’a pas plaidé que les procédures recomman- dées devaient être mises en preuve par la production des manuels de formation ou d’instruction pertinents (en fait, il semblait s’objecter à leur production). mais surtout, il n’a pas soutenu que l’accusé se devait de témoigner au sujet de sa consommation d’al- cool et de ses réactions physiologiques (telle qu’une éructation), sans quoi aucun doute raisonnable ne pouvait être soulevé quant à la fiabilité des résultats. la position du procureur était plutôt que les policiers boissonneault et cousineau avaient effectué une pé- riode d’observation suffisante dans les circonstances. [55] to order a new trial would therefore be to give the crown a second chance to have mr. cyr- langlois convicted, on the basis of arguments that were made for the first time on appeal. in my view, such a result would be contrary to the double jeopardy principle (see, for example, r v. varga (1994), 90 ccc (3d) 484 (ont. ca), at p. 494; r v. knight, 2015 abca 24, at para. 22 (canlii); r v. suarez‑ noa, 2017 onca 627, 139 or (3d) 508, at paras. 30-35; r. v. penno, [1990] 2 scr 865, at pp. 895-96; r. v. vaillancourt (1995), 105 ccc (3d) 552 (que. ca);. r v. patel, 2017 onca 702, 356 ccc (3d) 187, at paras. 34 and 58-61; wexler v. the king, [1939] scr 350, at pp 353-56). [55] en conséquence, ordonner la tenue d’un nou- veau procès reviendrait à donner une deuxième chance au ministère public de faire déclarer m. cyr- langlois coupable, et ce, sur la base d’arguments présentés pour la première fois en appel. selon moi, un tel résultat heurterait le principe de la protection contre le double péril (voir notamment r c. varga (1994), 90 ccc. (3d) 484 (ca. ont.), p. 494; r c. knight, 2015 abca 24, par. 22 (canlii); r c. suarez‑ noa, 2017 onca 627, 139 or (3d) 508, par. 30-35; r c. penno, [1990] 2 rcs 865, p. 895- 896; r c. vaillancourt, 1995 canlii 5036 (ca. qc); r c. patel, 2017 onca 702, 356 ccc (3d) 187, par. 34 et 58-61; wexler c. the king, [1939] rcs 350, p. 353- 356). iv conclusion iv conclusion [56] in summary, the trial judge made no reviewa- ble error in finding that mr. cyr- langlois had raised a reasonable doubt about improper operation of the breathalyzer that could affect the results and that the presumptions of accuracy and identity in s. 258(1)(c) cr c had therefore been countered. i agree with hogue ja that the trial judge [trans- lation] “did not have to require anything further from the accused” (para. 50; see also the reasons of chamberland ja, at paras 60-61). [56] en résumé, le juge du procès n’a commis aucune erreur révisable en concluant que m. cyr- langlois avait soulevé un doute raisonnable quant à une utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest suscep- tible d’affecter les résultats, et que les présomptions d’exactitude et d’identité prévues à l’al. 258(1)c) c.  cr étaient par conséquent repoussées je suis d’accord avec la juge hogue pour dire que le juge du procès « n’avait pas à exiger plus de la part de l’accusé » (par. 50; voir aussi les motifs du juge chamberland, par 60-61). 480 r v cyr- langlois côté j. [2018] 3 scr. in my view, the majority’s approach unduly [57] limits the defences based on improper operation of a breathalyzer that in fact make it possible to justify the evidentiary scheme applicable to offences involving driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit under s. 1 of the charter. [58] finally, the majority’s reasons are essentially based on arguments that the crown made for the first time on appeal. it would be all the more inappropri- ate, in the circumstances, to order a new trial. [57] à mon avis, l’approche de la majorité res- treint indûment les moyens de défense fondés sur l’utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest, qui permettent pourtant de justifier, au regard de l’article premier de la charte, le régime de preuve applicable aux infractions liées à la conduite avec une alcoolémie supérieure à la limite permise. [58] enfin, les motifs de la majorité reposent essen- tiellement sur des arguments que le ministère public a fait valoir pour la première fois en appel. il serait d’autant plus inapproprié, dans les circonstances, d’ordonner un nouveau procès. [59] for all these reasons, i would dismiss the appeal. [59] pour tous ces motifs, je rejetterais l’appel. appeal allowed, côté j. dissenting. pourvoi accueilli, la juge côté est dissidente. procureur de l’appelante : directeur des pour‑ and penal prosecutions, québec. suites criminelles et pénales, québec. procureurs de l’intimé : bmd, laval. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné‑ rale de l’ontario : procureure générale de l’ontario, toronto. coise des avocats et avocates de la défense: marcoux et associés, longueuil. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association québé‑ coise des avocats et avocates de la défense : marcoux et associés, longueuil. association: frederick s. fedorsen professional cor‑ poration, toronto; jonathan m. rosenthal, toronto; addario law group, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association : frederick s. fedorsen professional cor‑ poration, toronto; jonathan m. rosenthal, toronto; addario law group, toronto.
i. overview 44 46 51 58 64 69 80 [1] this appeal calls upon the court to clarify the circumstances in which state regulation of land use may effect a de facto or (as we will refer to it) “constructive” taking of private property. [2] the appellant, annapolis group inc., contends that the respondent, halifax regional municipality, improperly used its regulatory powers to effectively seize annapolis’ land for use as a public park without compensation halifax says that annapolis’ claim is a veiled attempt to make taxpayers foot the bill for a decades-long development gamble it sought summary dismissal of this part of annapolis’ claim, while permitting other claims (for misfeasance in public office and unjust enrichment) to proceed to trial. [3] although unsuccessful at first instance, halifax persuaded the nova scotia court of appeal that it should apply this court’s judgment in canadian pacific railway co. v. vancouver (city), 2006 scc 5, [2006] 1 scr 227 (“cpr”), to strike that claim. annapolis asks this court to restore its claim in respect of the alleged constructive taking and allow it to proceed to trial. [4] we would allow annapolis’ appeal. the court of appeal, in our respectful view, misapplied cpr and summary judgment principles. read in harmony with the jurisprudence upon which it was decided, cpr signifies that a constructive taking occurs where: (1) a beneficial interest — understood as an advantage — in respect of private property accrues to the state, which may arise where the use of such property is regulated in a manner that permits its enjoyment as a public resource; and (2) the impugned regulatory measure removes all reasonable uses of the private property at issue. further, the court of appeal erred by holding that halifax’s intention is irrelevant to applying the second part of that analysis. this leaves genuine issues of material fact arising from annapolis’ claim to be tried. annapolis is entitled to adduce evidence at trial to show that, by holding annapolis’ land out as a public park, halifax has acquired a beneficial interest therein; and that, because halifax is unlikely to ever lift zoning restrictions constraining the development of annapolis’ land, annapolis has lost all reasonable uses of its property further, and in support of the latter proposition, annapolis may adduce evidence of halifax’s intention in not doing so. ii. factual background [5] over time from the 1950s, annapolis acquired the subject property, comprising 965 acres of land (“annapolis lands” or “lands”), with the intention of eventually securing enhanced development rights and reselling it. [6] in 2006, halifax adopted the regional municipal planning strategy, a guide for land development in the municipality, including the annapolis lands, over a 25-year period. while the planning strategy reserved a portion of the annapolis lands for possible future inclusion in a regional park, it also zoned the lands as “urban settlement” and “urban reserve” urban settlement denotes an area where urban forms of development may occur urban reserve identifies land that could be developed beyond the 25-year horizon. these designations thus contemplate — but do not permit — future residential serviced development for serviced development to occur on the annapolis lands, halifax must adopt a resolution authorizing a “secondary planning process” and an amendment to the applicable land use by-law. the applicable by-law is the halifax mainland land use by-law, also adopted in 2006. [7] in 2014, halifax adopted a revised version of the planning strategy. the urban settlement and urban reserve designations were maintained, and thus the zoning of the annapolis lands did not change, and has not changed since 2006. nor were the conceptual boundaries for the potential park altered. [8] beginning in 2007, annapolis made several attempts to develop the lands. ultimately, by resolution dated september 6, 2016, halifax refused to initiate the secondary planning process, and annapolis sued, alleging a constructive taking, misfeasance in public office, and unjust enrichment. [9] at issue in this appeal is annapolis’ allegation of a constructive taking. specifically, annapolis says that halifax’s regulatory measures have deprived it of all reasonable or economic uses of its land, resulting in a constructive taking without compensation, contrary to ss. 65 and 237 of the halifax regional municipality charter, sns 2008, c 39, and ss. 6 and 24 of the expropriation act, rsns 1989, c 156. it alleges in particular that halifax has acquired a beneficial interest in the lands by exercising dominion over them so as to effectively create a public park at annapolis’ expense. according to annapolis, members of the public hike, cycle, canoe, camp, and swim on the lands, are encouraged to do so by halifax, and halifax financially supports organizations that also encourage people to use the lands as a park. further, signs posted on the lands allegedly depict the municipality’s logo and phone number, and a media article quotes a municipal employee referred to as “the city staffer overseeing the park’s creation”. [10] on march 11, 2019, halifax moved for partial summary judgment of annapolis’ claim, pursuant to r 13 of the nova scotia civil procedure rules. in its motion, halifax sought the dismissal of annapolis’ constructive taking claim and urged the motion judge to find that, as a matter of law, a constructive taking cannot result from halifax refusing to amend the planning strategy and associated land use by-laws. annapolis resisted the motion, arguing that its claim raises genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial. iii. judicial history a. supreme court of nova scotia, 2019 nssc 341, 17 lcr (2d) 1 (chipman j.) [11] the motion judge dismissed halifax’s partial summary judgment motion. he agreed with annapolis that its constructive taking claim raised “vast” genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial, including: (a) whether halifax had erected signage on the lands depicting halifax’s logo on various trails; (b) whether a halifax employee had been “overseeing the park’s creation”; (c) whether the lands would be treated as development lands and not parklands; (d) the existence of clauses in the planning strategy that mandate consideration of policy concepts without committing council to adopt the policy, and clauses discussing an urban settlement designation boundary; (e) discovery evidence to the effect that halifax had decided that the annapolis lands would be treated as development lands, not parklands; and (f) correspondence between counsel, including letters containing halifax’s denial of annapolis’ allegations. [12] the motion judge also identified a triable issue in affidavit evidence suggesting the possibility of an ulterior motive on halifax’s part — specifically, to reserve part of the annapolis lands for a public park in this regard, he relied on lorraine (ville) v 2646-8926 québec inc., 2018 scc 35, [2018] 2 scr 577, which involved a claim under quebec’s expropriation act, cqlr, c. e-24. in lorraine, this court affirmed that, where property is expropriated outside a legislative framework for an ulterior motive (such as to avoid paying an indemnity), a “disguised” expropriation occurs. in the motion judge’s view, disguised expropriation under the law of quebec may be equated to constructive expropriation as that concept was understood by this court in the queen in right of the province of british columbia v. tener, [1985] 1 scr 533. [13] in light of the foregoing, the motion judge concluded annapolis’ constructive taking claim should proceed to trial expropriation cases, he said, are fact-specific and offer different scenarios in which a constructive taking claim may succeed, and this case is no different he added that the facts material to the constructive taking claim were “sufficiently interwoven” with annapolis’ two other causes of action, such that “to deny annapolis’ right to pursue this claim would not appreciably shorten pre-trial procedures or the trial” (para. 44). thus he did not find the proportionality principle, as described in hryniak v. mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 scr 87, to support granting summary judgment. b nova scotia court of appeal, 2021 nsca 3, 455 dlr (4th) 349 (beveridge, farrar and derrick jja) [14] the court of appeal held that annapolis’ constructive taking claim did not have a reasonable chance of successfully establishing, as cpr requires, an acquisition by halifax of a beneficial interest in the annapolis lands or flowing from the lands, and the removal of all reasonable uses of the lands. citing mariner real estate ltd. v. nova scotia (attorney general), 1999 nsca 98, 177 dlr (4th) 696, it held that limiting the use of land or reducing its value through regulation is insufficient for halifax to acquire a “beneficial interest” in the annapolis lands, land “must actually be taken” from annapolis and acquired by halifax (para. 71). this did not occur. even had halifax placed signage on the property to encourage its use by the public, this would, at most, have constituted a trespass by those using the lands. annapolis has the same rights with respect to the lands under the planning strategy that it has had for years nothing has changed nor, in the court of appeal’s view, would adopting a development plan constitute a taking it simply allows a municipality to set future development goals and to ensure land will be developed (or not) accordingly. [15] finally, it said, halifax’s intended use for the lands is not relevant to the constructive taking analysis. improper motive is not proof of a constructive taking, and lorraine does not dictate a contrary conclusion. iv. issues [16] the foregoing account presents the issues to be decided: (a) did the court of appeal err in holding that an “acquisition of a beneficial interest” under the constructive taking test established by this court in cpr requires land to “actually be taken” from an owner and acquired by the state? if not, should the cpr test be revisited? (b) did the court of appeal err in holding that evidence of the state’s intended use of the impugned land is irrelevant to a claim for constructive taking? v analysis a overview of the law of takings [17] it is useful to begin with a brief overview of the law of takings. given the facts of this appeal, our focus is on expropriation through regulation — which, again, we refer to as a “constructive taking” in preference to other commonly applied terms such as “de facto” or “regulatory taking”, as in our view it more accurately captures the nature of the state action at issue and the effect on the landowner (see eg,. m. lavoie, “canadian common law and civil law approaches to constructive takings: a comparative economic perspective” (2010), 42 ottawa l. rev. 229). [18] a “taking” is a “forcible acquisition by the crown of privately owned property . . for public purposes” (k. horsman and g. morley, eds., government liability: law and practice (loose-leaf), at § 5:1). it may take the form of a constructive taking (effective appropriation of private property by a public authority exercising its regulatory powers), or a de jure taking (formal expropriation), by (in the case of land) taking title. [19] to be clear, not every instance of regulating the use of property amounts to a constructive taking. governments and municipalities holding delegated provincial regulatory authority (toronto (city) v. ontario (attorney general), 2021 scc 34, at para. 2) validly regulate land in the public interest without effecting “takings”, properly understood (see compliance coal corporation v british columbia (environmental assessment office), 2020 bcsc 621, 13 lcr (2d) 215, at para. 91). the line between a valid regulation and a constructive taking is crossed where the effect of the regulatory activity deprives a claimant of the use and enjoyment of its property in a substantial and unreasonable way, or effectively confiscates the property (horsman and morley, at § 5:2). put simply, “in order for a crown measure to effect a constructive taking of property, private rights in the property must be virtually abolished, leaving the plaintiff with ‘no reasonable use’ of the property” (horsman and morley, at § 5:13 (emphasis added)). [20] a series of lower court judgments affirm that, in general, canadian courts require a “total loss of the plaintiff’s interest in property for the crown’s action to constitute a taking” (horsman and morley, at § 5:13; see also lynch v. st. john’s (city), 2016 nlca 35, 400 dlr (4th) 62; sun construction company limited v. conception bay south (town), 2019 nlsc 102, 87 mplr (5th) 256). courts have, therefore, dismissed claims for compensation where the regulation left the owner some reasonable use for the property (genevieve holdings ltd. v. kamloops (city) (1988), 42 mplr 171 (bc. co. ct.); steer holdings ltd. v. manitoba, [1992] 2 wwr. 558 (man. qb), aff’d (1992), 99 dlr (4th) 61 (man. ca);. purchase v. terrace (city) (1995), 26 mplr (2d) 126 (bcsc);. harvard investments ltd. v. winnipeg (city) (1995), 129 dlr (4th) 557 (man. ca)). [21] at common law, taking of property by the state must be authorized by law, and triggers a presumptive right to compensation which can be displaced only by clear statutory language showing a contrary intention — that is, an intention not to compensate (see p. a. warchuk, “rethinking compensation for expropriation” (2015), 48 ubc. l rev 655, at pp. 656 and 678-81) this was recognized in attorney-general v. de keyser’s royal hotel, [1920] ac 508 (hl), wherein lord atkinson stated: “the recognized rule for the construction of statutes is that, unless the words of the statute clearly so demand, a statute is not to be construed so as to take away the property of a subject without compensation” (p 542). explaining the rule’s rationale, his lordship cited to london and north western railway co v evans, [1893] 1 ch. 16 (ca), at p 28, per bowen lj, saying, at p 542: the legislature cannot fairly be supposed to intend, in the absence of clear words shewing such intention, that one man’s property shall be confiscated for the benefit of others, or of the public, without any compensation being provided for him in respect of what is taken compulsorily from him. parliament in its omnipotence can, of course, override or disregard this ordinary principle . . . if it sees fit to do so, but, it is not likely that it will be found disregarding it, without plain expressions of such a purpose. lord parmoor agreed with lord atkinson that this rule was “well-established” and that “justice requires that statutes should not be construed to enable the land of a particular individual to be confiscated without payment”, absent clear words to the contrary (de keyser’s royal hotel, at pp. 576 and 579). [22] it is important to stress that the rule contemplates that governments have the power to immunize themselves from liability to pay compensation for a taking. while, as we explain, we do not “expand” that liability but merely affirm it, the point is that governments may effect takings without paying compensation, so long as the enabling statute clearly expresses that intention notably, in cpr, the legislation at issue — the vancouver charter, sbc 1953, c 55 — immunized the city from compensating landowners for any loss as a result of the restrictions on land development and use (cpr, at paras. 12, 19 and 36-37) from the standpoint of government, the exigencies of the rule are modest and easily satisfied. [23] this court first applied the rule in de keyser’s royal hotel in manitoba fisheries ltd. v. the queen, [1979] 1 scr 101. ritchie j., for the court, cited this passage from lord radcliffe’s speech in belfast corporation v. od. cars ltd., [1960] ac 490 (hl (ni)), at p 523, at p 110, with approval: on the one hand, there would be the general principle, accepted by the legislature and scrupulously defended by the courts, that the title to property or the enjoyment of its possession was not to be compulsorily acquired from a subject unless full compensation was afforded in its place. acquisition of title or possession was “taking.” aspects of this principle are found in the rules of statutory interpretation devised by the courts, which required the presence of the most explicit words before an acquisition could be held to be sanctioned by an act of parliament without full compensation being provided, or imported an intention to give compensation and machinery for assessing it into any act of parliament that did not positively exclude it. this vigilance to see that the subject’s rights to property were protected, so far as was consistent with the requirements of expropriation of what was previously enjoyed in specie, was regarded as an important guarantee of individual liberty. it would be a mistake to look on it as representing any conflict between the legislature and the courts. the principle was, generally speaking, common to both. [24] that the rule in de keyser’s royal hotel is one of common law answers halifax’s submission that interpreting the protection narrowly against uncompensated takings avoids “creat[ing] a common law back door to constitutionalizing rights which were excluded deliberately from the charter” (rf, at paras. 108-09). it is, of course, true that the framers of our constitution did not include the protection of property rights in the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (see warchuk, at pp. 658-59). but the charter is not, and never has been, the sole source of canadians’ rights against the state; in particular, the common law also affords protections of individual liberty. nor is the scope of common law rights dependent on whether such rights are also entrenched in the charter. while this follows as a matter of logic, s 26 of the charter itself affirms that “[t]he guarantee in this charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in canada.” [25] this legal backdrop brings us to cpr, and its elaboration of the common law rule in the form of a two-part test for showing a constructive taking: “. . . (1) an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it, and (2) removal of all reasonable uses of the property . . .” (para. 30 (emphasis added), citing mariner, at p 716; manitoba fisheries; tener). the issues present in this appeal require us to consider the meaning of a “beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it” under the first part of that test. in bringing greater clarity to this aspect of the cpr test, we do not change the doctrine of constructive takings, but simply apply it to the facts of the present dispute. as we will explain, the court in cpr did not use “beneficial interest” in the technical sense that it carries in the domain of equity rather, a “beneficial interest” is to be more broadly understood as an “advantage” — hence the court’s coupling of “beneficial interest” with the phrase “or flowing from [the property]”. clearly, if the interest acquired by the state can be one which flows from the property, what must be shown by the property owner can fall short of an actual acquisition by the state. [26] further, we must also decide the relevance, if any, under the second part of the test of the public authority’s intended use of the land. b. “beneficial interest” [27] the court of appeal, it will be recalled, held that the first part of the test stated in cpr — the “acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it” — requires annapolis to show that halifax actually acquired the lands. deciding whether this is so requires that we give meaning to the expression “beneficial interest”, as it was used in cpr. in our view, that meaning is best appreciated by considering the authorities upon which cpr relied in stating that condition, and especially this court’s decisions in manitoba fisheries and tener. as we will explain, doing so reveals that actual acquisition is not necessary; rather, the obtaining by halifax of an advantage in respect of the lands suffices. (1) manitoba fisheries [28] manitoba fisheries ltd was a private commercial fishery in 1969, parliament enacted the freshwater fish marketing act, rsc 1970, c. f-13, which granted a federal crown corporation a commercial monopoly on the export of fish from manitoba, and delegated power to the corporation to grant licenses to private enterprises like manitoba fisheries to continue operating notwithstanding the act. manitoba fisheries did not receive such a license, and eventually the constraints of the act put manitoba fisheries out of business. in such circumstances, the act required the federal government to transfer funds to the province of manitoba, which would then compensate affected businesses, such as manitoba fisheries manitoba, however, refused to compensate manitoba fisheries (pp. 103-5). [29] significantly, the monopoly created by the act conferred an economic advantage upon the state, but not an actual acquisition of property. it is true that, relying on ulster transport authority v. james brown & sons, ltd., [1953] ni 79 (ca),. ritchie j held that manitoba fisheries’ loss of goodwill deprived the company of property that was acquired by the corporation (p 110). but this rested on his view that the government had acquired an advantage through the acquisition of a statutory monopoly that entitled it to benefits that would otherwise have flowed to the company. this interpretation is made plain in ritchie j.’s conclusion that “[goodwill] is the whole advantage, whatever it may be, of the reputation and connection of the firm”, and that the monopoly “completely extinguished” the appellant’s goodwill, leaving customers with no choice but to do business with the corporation (p 107 (emphasis added)). in other words, the monopoly created by the act restricted competition in the industry, thereby allowing the state to acquire all of the advantage that manitoba fisheries had previously enjoyed on the basis of its reputation and connections. [30] just as significantly, the court was also concerned about the effect of the taking on the property holder. that effect — the loss of the business — was regarded as a taking or acquiring of manitoba fisheries’ business by the state (p 118) a persuasive consideration for ritchie j was that, “[u]ntil the creation of the corporation by the act, persons wishing to purchase freshwater fish from manitoba could purchase such fish from [manitoba fisheries] or other firms in the industry. after the creation of the corporation such purchases could be made only from the corporation or its agents” (p 109). this led him to conclude: “once it is accepted that the loss of the goodwill of the appellant’s business which was brought about by the act and by the setting up of the corporation was a loss of property and that the same goodwill was by statutory compulsion acquired by the federal authority, it seems to me to follow that the appellant was deprived of property which was acquired by the crown” (p 110). [31] that the court in manitoba fisheries ascribed significance to the effects on the property holder is underscored by ritchie j.’s reliance on ulster transport authority. the relevant passage cited lord macdermott’s observations in that case: we are not dealing here with a “mere” prohibition or with a prohibition which is essentially regulatory in character. we are dealing with what i have held to be, according to the intention of the legislature, a device for diverting a definite part of the business of furniture removers and storers from the respondents and others to the appellants. if that is right, the result must be the same whether section 5(1) of the act of 1920 sounds in pith and substance or in effect or partly in one and partly in the other. wherever else a prohibition directed to other ends might lead, the relevant prohibition cannot but constitute a taking if my views as to its effect and underlying intention are correct. [emphasis added.] (ulster transport authority, at p 116, as cited in manitoba fisheries, at p 111.) adopting the reasoning in ulster transport authority, ritchie j concluded that the impugned regulation “had the effect of depriving the appellant of its goodwill as a going concern and consequently rendering its physical assets virtually useless and that the goodwill so taken away constitutes property of the appellant for the loss of which no compensation whatever has been paid” (p 118 (emphasis added)). (2) tener [32] the court in tener, as in manitoba fisheries, also focussed on the effect of a regulatory measure and the advantage acquired therefrom by the government. the teners were the registered holders of mineral claims on lands later included in a provincial park the province of british columbia imposed increasingly onerous conditions governing the exploitation of natural resources in the park, until the teners were informed that no new exploration or development would be permitted, thus denying them the possibility of exploiting their mineral claims (pp. 536-38 and 552). the central issue on appeal to this court was whether the teners were entitled to compensation under the relevant legislation. [33] in finding for the teners, estey j., for the majority, revealed his concern that the regulation had the effect of (or, as he put it, “amount[ed] to”) securing an advantage by confining all reasonable uses of the property to the province’s preferred use as a provincial park. as estey j explained, while there had been “no regulation qua minerals which reduced the value of these minerals or the opportunity of the respondents to remove them”, the “denial of access to these lands occurred under the park act and amounts to a recovery by the crown of a part of the right granted to the respondents in 1937” (p 563 (emphasis added)). [34] thus estey j.’s analysis in tener adhered closely to that in manitoba fisheries the teners retained their mineral rights in securing the advantage of preserving “qualities perceived as being desirable for public parks” (p 564) by regulating away the teners’ ability to exercise those rights, the province had effectively “recover[ed] [. . .] the right granted to the [teners]” (p 563). [35] wilson j., concurring in the result, focussed on the nature of the teners’ interest. she described that interest as “in the nature of a profit à prendre comprising both the mineral claims and the surface rights necessary for their enjoyment” (p 540). but the province could not take the actual profit à prendre, being a registrable interest under british columbia’s land registry system, without actually taking actual title. hence wilson j.’s emphasis that the holder of a profit à prendre “owns . . . mineral claims and the right to exploit them through the process of severance” (p 541 (emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted)). so understood, the interest held by the teners had not been actually acquired, since the province did not itself obtain a right of exploitation. what the province did acquire by preventing the teners from exploiting their mineral rights was an advantage — specifically, preserving the land as a provincial park in the public interest. [36] that the province need not to have been shown to have actually acquired a proprietary interest for the teners to establish a constructive taking, and that the focus is instead on the effect on the landowner of the advantage gained by the land use regulation, is highlighted by wilson j.’s reasons: in my view, this is a case of expropriation under s 11(c) of the park act to which the highways act applies. i reach this conclusion on the basis that the absolute denial of the right to go on the land and sever the minerals so as to make them their own deprives the respondents of their profit à prendre their interest is nothing without the right to exploit it the minerals in situ do not belong to them. severance and the right of severance is of the essence of their interest. while the grant or refusal of a licence or permit may constitute mere regulation in some instances, it cannot be viewed as mere regulation when it has the effect of defeating the respondents’ entire interest in the land. without access the respondents cannot enjoy the mineral claims granted to them in the only way they can be enjoyed, namely by the exploitation of the minerals. [emphasis added; p 550.] [37] we note that wilson j expressly rejected the crown’s submission that “it is not enough to show that what the crown did prevented the respondents from realizing on their interest or rendered it worthless” (p 551). instead, the teners had to show “that the crown has appropriated their interest to itself, that the interest which previously belonged to the respondents now belongs to the crown” (p 551). (3) defining the nature of a “beneficial interest” [38] in our view, the foregoing jurisprudence — upon which the cpr test was expressly stated as resting — supports an understanding of “beneficial interest” as concerned with the effect of a regulatory measure on the landowner, and not with whether a proprietary interest was actually acquired by the government. conversely, that same jurisprudence supports the view that “beneficial interest”, as that term appears in the first part of the test stated in cpr, refers not to actual acquisition of the equity that rests with the beneficial owner of property connoting rights of use and enjoyment, but to an “advantage” flowing to the state. we say this for two reasons. [39] first, to require actual acquisition would collapse the distinction between constructive (de facto) and de jure takings — a distinction which cpr explicitly preserves (paras. 30-37). simply put, if a constructive taking requires an actual taking, then it is no longer constructive. it follows that the court of appeal’s requirement of an actual acquisition of the annapolis lands cannot be necessary to satisfy the cpr test for a constructive taking. [40] secondly, interpreting “beneficial interest” broadly (as meaning a benefit or advantage accruing to the state) ensures cpr’s coherence to manitoba fisheries and tener, neither of which understood “benefits” in the strict equitable sense of that term. again, the references to those authorities in cpr demonstrate that cpr merely sought to affirm, and not to alter, our law of constructive takings this interpretation is supported by the explicit wording under the first part of the cpr test: “. . . a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it . . .” (para. 30 (emphasis added)). an interest flowing from the property affirms that a “beneficial interest” can be more broadly understood as an advantage, and need not be an actual acquisition. [41] to be clear, we are not “depart[ing] from precedent” (para. 111), as our colleagues contend. we aim to illuminate cpr, not overrule it. our colleagues say that courts “have applied the cpr test without difficulty” (para. 112). with respect, this misses the point. the key question is whether the lower courts have applied the cpr test correctly in our respectful view, many of them have not indeed, the court of appeal itself misapprehended the law in this case, by asserting that cpr requires an actual expropriation to establish a constructive taking. as we have explained, and as the authorities confirm, cpr — properly understood — trains the court’s eye on whether a public authority has derived an advantage, in effect, from private property, not on whether it has formally acquired a proprietary interest in the land to hold otherwise would be to erase the long-standing distinction between de jure and de facto expropriation from canadian law. [42] as a final observation, we acknowledge that, in addition to manitoba fisheries and tener, the court in cpr also cited to mariner. but this does not affect our analysis. mariner concerned the province of nova scotia’s designation of privately owned land as a beach under a provincial statute that subjected it to stringent conservation regulations. when the minister refused the respondents’ applications to build homes on the land, they sought a declaration that the crown had expropriated their lands, entitling them to compensation. cromwell ja (as he then was), writing for the nova scotia court of appeal, held that the respondents’ loss of economic value did not amount to an advantage acquired by the provincial authority (see generally mariner, at pp. 713-16). [43] mariner illustrates that regulation alone will not satisfy the test for a constructive taking; there must be something more “beyond drastically limiting use or reducing the value of the owner’s property” (p 716) when this threshold is crossed — that is, where all reasonable uses have been removed — a regulation may be, “in effect, confiscation” (p 727 (emphasis added)). to be clear, mariner does not stray from focussing on both the effect of the taking and the advantage acquired by the government, as required by this court’s jurisprudence and affirmed in the test set out in cpr. rather, and consistent with both manitoba fisheries and tener, mariner asked whether the effect of the regulation was to remove an interest in land (mariner, at p 722, referring to tener). (4) conclusion on “beneficial interest” [44] in sum, we affirm that the test to show a constructive taking is that stated by cpr, properly understood. the reviewing court must decide: (1) whether the public authority has acquired a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it (ie an advantage); and (2) whether the state action has removed all reasonable uses of the property. this gives effect to this court’s acknowledgement of a common law right to compensation where the two-part cpr test is satisfied. it accords with imperatives of justice and fairness, which underpin the court’s assessment of expropriation claims, and remedies situations where cases do not neatly fit within the expropriation legislative framework and would otherwise “fall between the cracks” (warchuk, at pp. 686 and 690). [45] to this, we would add that, because the test focusses on effects and advantages, substance and not form is to prevail. a court deciding whether a regulatory measure effects a constructive taking must undertake a realistic appraisal of matters in the context of the specific case, including but not limited to: (a) the nature of the government action (ie, whether it targets a specific owner or more generally advances an important public policy objective), notice to the owner of the restrictions at the time the property was acquired, and whether the government measures restrict the uses of the property in a manner consistent with the owner’s reasonable expectations; (b) the nature of the land and its historical or current uses. where, for example, the land is undeveloped, the prohibition of all potential reasonable uses may amount to a constructive taking. that said, a mere reduction in land value due to land use regulation, on its own, would not suffice; and (c) the substance of the alleged advantage. the case law reveals that an advantage may take various forms. for example, permanent or indefinite denial of access to the property or the government’s permanent or indefinite occupation of the property would constitute a taking (sun construction, at para. 15). likewise, regulations that leave a rights holder with only notional use of the land, deprived of all economic value, would satisfy the test it could also include confining the uses of private land to public purposes, such as conservation, recreation, or institutional uses such as parks, schools, or municipal buildings. c disguised expropriation in quebec civil law [46] the parties and several interveners invoked civil law authorities in this appeal. the conceptual similarities between the common law doctrine of constructive takings and the civil law doctrine of disguised expropriation have been highlighted by some authors (lavoie, at pp. 241-45; m-a. lechasseur, “l’expropriation de facto au canada et la transcendance des solidarités”, in service de la qualité de la profession du barreau du québec, vol. 509, développements récents en droit municipal (2022), 71; y. emerich, droit commun des biens: perspective transsystémique (2017), at pp. 225-27 and 235-37). we refer to civil law principles “for the purpose of explanation and illustration”, bearing in mind that quebec precedents serve as persuasive, rather than binding, authority (farber v. royal trust co., [1997] 1 scr 846, at para. 32; see also cm. callow inc v. zollinger, 2020 scc 45, at para. 58). to be clear, our analysis does not disregard the distinct features of the respective doctrines from either legal tradition (callow, at para. 158, per brown j., concurring). [47] the doctrine of disguised expropriation in quebec civil law is founded upon art. 952 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”): “no owner may be compelled to transfer his ownership except by expropriation according to law for public utility and in return for a just and prior indemnity.” article 952 establishes a presumption against uncompensated expropriation by the state, as does the common law through the rule in de keyser’s royal hotel, as we have explained (p-a. côté, in collaboration with s. beaulac and m. devinat, the interpretation of legislation in canada (4th ed. 2011), at pp. 511-13). in the context of municipal regulations, an owner subject to disguised expropriation may challenge the validity or operability of the bylaw under administrative law principles or, alternatively, claim an indemnity for disguised expropriation under art. 952 (lorraine, at para. 2; s. pelletier and f. côté, “développements récents en matière d’expropriation déguisée: distinction entre les recours en nullité, en dommages pour responsabilité extracontractuelle d’un organisme public et en expropriation déguisée”, in service de la qualité de la profession du barreau du québec, vol. 468, développements récents en droit de l’environnement (2019), 303). [48] quebec courts have recognized that art. 952 ccq establishes a no-fault liability scheme for disguised expropriation, in contrast to administrative law challenges to the validity of a bylaw based on the municipality’s improper motive (see ville de léry v procureure générale du québec, 2019 qcca 1375, at para. 17; montréal (ville) v. benjamin, 2004 canlii 44591 (que. ca), at para. 57; ville de la prairie v 9255-2504 québec inc., 2020 qccs 307, 2020 carswellque 2737 (wl), at para. 29; spénard v. salaberry-de-valleyfield (cité de), [1983] cs 725). it is now well established in the jurisprudence on disguised expropriation that the criterion applicable to such claims is whether the state action [translation] “remov[es] all reasonable uses of the immovable” (dupras v. ville de mascouche, 2022 qcca 350, at para. 27 (canlii); see also wallot v. québec (ville), 2011 qcca 1165, 24 admin. lr (5th) 306, at para. 42; municipalité de saint-colomban v. boutique de golf gilles gareau inc., 2019 qcca 1402, at para. 64; meadowbrook groupe pacific inc v ville de montréal, 2019 qcca 2037, 2019 carswellque 12262 (wl), at para. 29; ville de québec v rivard, 2020 qcca 146, at para. 64; ville de saint-rémi v 9120-4883 québec inc., 2021 qcca 630, at para. 25 (canlii)) for this reason, disguised expropriation under art. 952 ccq requires no element analogous to the “acquisition” branch of the cpr test a bylaw that removes all reasonable uses of the property suffices, on its own, to effect a disguised expropriation in quebec civil law. [49] there are, however, exceptions that permit us to compare disguised expropriation to constructive takings at common law. the quebec court of appeal’s decision in benjamin provides one such example. in that case, the owner’s claim based on the decades-old bylaw was prescribed but the court of appeal held that [translation] “in the very particular circumstances of this case” (para. 62), the combination of zoning restrictions and the city’s use of the land as an extension of its park justified awarding an indemnity for disguised expropriation (paras. 65 and 82). [50] the criteria applied by the quebec court of appeal in benjamin “pla[y] a functionally similar role” (bhasin v. hrynew, 2014 scc 71, [2014] 3 scr 494, at para. 44) to the “deprivation” and “acquisition” requirements of the cpr test. accordingly, and as we discuss below, we regard benjamin and analogous quebec cases as having persuasive authority in assessing constructive taking claims these rulings, we emphasize, are useful for illustrative purposes only in applying the cpr test. in this case, we need not draw on quebec authorities to fill a doctrinal gap in the common law or to modify or otherwise develop existing legal rules (callow, at para. 123, per brown j., concurring, and para. 191, per côté j., dissenting). d. intention [51] the courts below disagreed on whether the intention of a public authority is relevant to the analysis of constructive taking claims. the motion judge, at para. 35, cited this court’s definition of disguised expropriation articulated in lorraine, at para. 2, which included “an ulterior motive”, and concluded that this was equally applicable to finding a constructive taking at common law (para. 36) the court of appeal, however, held that “[m]otive is not a material fact in the context of a [constructive] expropriation claim” (para. 82). [52] respectfully said, neither position is correct the public authority’s intention is not an element of the test for constructive takings at common law. again, the mischief addressed by the doctrine is one of advantage and effects, not that a public authority acted in bad faith or with an otherwise ulterior motive. indeed, this court held in cpr that, even if the city’s purpose were to “enable the inhabitants to use the corridor for walking and cycling,” its bylaw, in effect, neither encouraged trespassing nor prevented the historical and current use of the land (para. 33) and therefore could not be said to have deprived the landowner of all reasonable uses. [53] this does not mean, however, that intention is irrelevant to the inquiry. indeed, the case law we discuss below suggests that the objectives pursued by the state may be some evidence of constructive taking. stated differently, the intention to take constructively, if proven by the claimant, may support a finding that the landowner has lost all reasonable uses of their land (inasmuch as a finding of this effect can be supported by evidence that such an effect was intended). but the absence of evidence of the state’s intention does not preclude a property holder’s claim. it follows that intent may constitute a “material fact” in the context of a constructive taking claim. we stress, however, that the focus of the inquiry must remain on the effects of state action. [54] a brief review of the jurisprudence illustrates the supporting role of intention in assessing constructive taking claims. in manitoba fisheries, at p 111, as we have already recalled, ritchie j endorsed a passage from ulster transport authority highlighting the relevance of intention in constructive taking cases. the key portion of this passage merits repeating: “. . the relevant prohibition cannot but constitute a taking if my views as to its effect and underlying intention are correct” (emphasis added) thus the objective pursued by the state was considered (ulster transport authority, at pp. 113 and 116; manitoba fisheries, at pp. 111-13) in distinguishing between a mere regulatory prohibition and the constructive taking of a business through the establishment of a public monopoly. [55] likewise, in lynch — which halifax acknowledges was correctly decided — the court of appeal of newfoundland and labrador treated the city’s intention in refusing to allow any development on the subject watershed land as germane to whether a constructive taking had occurred. in concluding it had, the court referred to the city’s express intention “to take away the lynches’ right to appropriate the groundwater on their land” so as to secure the city’s “right to a continuous flow of uncontaminated groundwater downstream to [its] water facilities” (para. 60). moreover, the city took the view that securing this objective required the prohibition of “all activity on the lynch property” (para. 62). the city’s intention, as implemented by its officials, thus indicated that the land in issue had been constructively taken. [56] the quebec court of appeal’s decision in benjamin further illustrates how intent may support a finding of a constructive taking. there, a zoning bylaw designated the claimant’s property as a “park”, and the city [translation] “knowingly” used the land in issue as an extension of its own park for 14 years (para. 50) the city — inadvertently at first — installed a fence and lampposts and created a trail on the claimant’s land, which was effectively incorporated into an adjacent public park. the city then manifested its intention to achieve that very effect by refusing to remove the fence after receiving a demand letter from the claimant. on appeal, the city offered to remove the fence and lampposts, but only if the claimant accepted to adequately maintain his own land for public safety. the court of appeal characterized the city’s behaviour as an [translation] “abuse of right” and underscored its lack of “goodwill” to either formally expropriate the claimant’s land or permit reasonable uses thereof (paras. 49, 54 and 59). the plans transparently set out by the city thus indicated that the claimant would continue to be deprived of all reasonable uses of his land indefinitely. in these circumstances, the city’s intent buttressed the finding of disguised expropriation arising from the bylaw and the persistent use of the claimant’s land. [57] in short, the underlying objective pursued by a public authority may provide supporting evidence for a constructive taking claim. but it is neither necessary nor sufficient. the case law indicates that the assessment of intent has proved helpful in distinguishing between mere regulations in the public interest and takings requiring compensation at common law what ultimately matters, however, irrespective of matters of intent, is whether the state-imposed restrictions on the property conferred an advantage on the state that effectively amounts to a taking (tener, at pp. 563-65, per estey j., and pp. 551-52, per wilson j.; manitoba fisheries, at p 118). e. application [58] the foregoing explains why, in our respectful view, the court of appeal erred by granting halifax’s application for summary judgment dismissing annapolis’ constructive taking claim. while the court of appeal saw “nothing on the facts . . . that could be remotely considered to be a taking of the annapolis lands and a corresponding deprivation of all reasonable uses of the lands” (para. 85), as we have explained, it is well-established in our law that zoning which effectively preserves private land as a public resource may constitute a “beneficial interest” flowing to the state, as contemplated in cpr, where it has the effect of removing all reasonable uses of that land. further, we have already explained why the motion judge did not err by considering halifax’s alleged intent with respect to the annapolis lands in his application of the cpr test. [59] more specifically, we agree with the motion judge’s identification of the material facts to be determined (at paras. 25-26 and 36), arising from:   september, 2019 correspondence between counsel demonstrating [halifax]’s denial of the allegations in the amended statement of claim at paras. 20, 21, 61, 71 and 79. (exhibits ee and ff) signage erected on annapolis’ property depicting [halifax]’s logo on various trails. (exhibits aa, bb and 1)      december 18-23, 2008 the coast article quoting [halifax] employee peter bigelow “. . . the city staffer overseeing the park’s creation”. (exhibit u, p 743 especially) ms. denty’s discovery evidence to the effect that when the 2006 [planning strategy] was finalized, the decision was made that annapolis’ property would be treated as development lands, not parklands. (exhibit a, pp. 54, 55) [the planning strategy], clause 171 denoting what [halifax] council “shall consider” “this ter[m] denotes the mandatory consideration of policy concepts but does not commit [halifax] council to the eventual adoption of policy in secondary planning strategies”. (exhibit d, p 175) [the planning strategy], clause 3.1 and the discussion of “s-2” and s-3” the “urban settlement designation boundary”. (exhibit d, pp. 195, 196) . ms. denty’s discovery evidence as per the transcript and the counsel’s october 16, 2019 clarifications correspondence (exhibit c at p 905 and exhibit a at pp. 859-860). [halifax] in . . . mr. hattie’s affidavit[, elements of which] “point to the possibility of an ulterior motive” on the part of [halifax]. [60] the importance of making findings on these points flows from the motion judge’s correct legal conclusions that (1) a constructive taking need only have the effect of defeating the landowner’s reasonable use of land; and (2) the state’s intent may be relevant in assessing whether all reasonable uses of land has been removed. [61] the court of appeal did not identify any legal error or “patent injustice” that would justify interfering with the motion judge’s decision to dismiss halifax’s summary judgment motion on the basis of the foregoing triable issues (coady v. burton canada co., 2013 nsca 95, 365 dlr (4th) 172, at para. 19). at most, it can be said that the court of appeal merely disagreed with the motion judge’s exercise of discretion. this does not provide a sufficient basis for appellate intervention. [62] further, the court of appeal erred in its r 13.04 analysis. in shannex inc. v. dora construction ltd., 2016 nsca 89, 58 clr (4th) 1, at para. 34, the nova scotia court of appeal set out a five-part sequential test on a r 13.04 motion for summary judgment the first part of the test asks whether the challenged pleading discloses a “genuine issue of material fact”, either pure or mixed with a question of law. if yes, it should not be determined by summary judgment. [63] there was no need for the court of appeal to proceed beyond the first shannex step. the motion judge correctly decided that annapolis’ pleadings contain disputed material facts, mixed with questions of law, and the evidence before the motion judge failed to negate the existence of genuine issues of material fact for trial. we therefore see no basis on which to disturb the motion judge’s conclusion that annapolis’ pleadings in support of its constructive taking claim disclose “vast issues of material fact to be determined” at trial (para. 25). indeed, two disputed factual issues are particularly material to the cpr test. (1) halifax’s alleged acquisition of a beneficial interest in the annapolis lands [64] first, it is disputed whether halifax is promoting the annapolis lands as a public park, for instance by encouraging public use and holding them out as a park, as annapolis alleges. this disputed fact is material because, if proven, it would tend to support annapolis’ claim that halifax acquired a “beneficial interest” in the lands, as we have explained it. preserving a park in its natural state may constitute an advantage accruing to the state, thus satisfying the “acquisition” element of cpr. [65] to be clear, we reject the court of appeal’s formalistic position that a public authority’s alleged encouragement and financial support of trespass can never amount to an acquisition of a beneficial interest. several cases support the proposition that whether a public authority treats private lands as an extension of a public park is a key factor in assessing the acquisition requirement for instance, in benjamin, the quebec court of appeal found that the city of montréal’s knowing use of private land as a public park — entailing the installation of lampposts, a fence, and signage indicating the location of the “park” that included the subject lands — in conjunction with restrictive zoning, effectively constituted a “disguised expropriation” (paras. 65 and 82). [66] similarly, in dupras v. ville de mascouche, 2020 qccs 2538, the quebec superior court held that the city had effectively expropriated the claimant’s lands by subjecting them to “conservation” zoning and treating them as if they were part of a public park. notably, the city had (1) marked off trails, (2) added signage with park maps covering the subject land, (3) encouraged the public to use the lands on the park, and (4) taken out insurance to cover public recreational activities on the land (see paras. 137-40). the quebec court of appeal affirmed the superior court’s reasoning and dismissed the respondent city’s cross-appeal on the finding of disguised expropriation (2022 qcca 350, at paras. 27-40). [67] a similar claim in steer holdings failed, but for reasons which distinguish it from the allegations here. in steer holdings, the manitoba court of appeal held that no benefit was acquired where there was “no suggestion that people will be encouraged in any way to move from the nature park to the subject property” (p 67). moreover, the land was not adjacent to the provincial park. the court of appeal thus rejected the argument that the province of manitoba had effectively enlarged its park system. [68] as we have explained, and as the cases confirm, the doctrine of constructive takings looks to the effects of state action; it does not require a formal acquisition of a proprietary interest by the state the absence of such a proprietary interest does not preclude the argument that, in effect, halifax has functionally treated the annapolis lands as if they were a park for the benefit of the public. if proven, this fact would support annapolis’ claim that halifax acquired a beneficial interest in its property. it is, therefore, plainly material. (2) halifax’s alleged removal of all reasonable uses of the annapolis lands [69] second, it is disputed whether halifax, by allegedly treating the annapolis lands as a public park, has eliminated all uses of the lands except serviced development, which is conditional upon the approval of annapolis’ secondary planning applications. [70] this disputed fact is material because, if proven, it may arguably support annapolis’ claim that it has lost all reasonable uses of its property. this would leave annapolis to shoulder the burden of holding the lands as a public park indefinitely, while halifax enjoys the advantage of having the lands reserved for its own purposes without having to pay compensation it is notable that the court of appeal, after observing that “annapolis’ reasonable uses of its lands have not changed”, failed to identify a single reasonable possible use of the property (para. 92; see lynch, at para. 63). [71] further, the court of appeal’s reasoning — to which our colleagues subscribe — cuts against one of the core lessons from mariner, being to look to “the actual application of the regulatory scheme as opposed simply to its potential for interference with the owner’s activities” (p 718 (emphasis added)). in concluding that there had been no taking in the present case, the court of appeal leaned heavily on the fact that the zoning rules had not changed, such that annapolis’ land use rights remained the same after the release of the 2006 planning strategy. but the court of appeal neglected to consider halifax’s application of the regulatory scheme as alleged by annapolis indeed, manitoba fisheries, tener, and mariner all stand for the proposition that a regulation does not per se eliminate all reasonable uses of property where it provides a mechanism for permits, exemptions, or licenses to allow activities that are otherwise prohibited. in such cases, it is not the regulation alone that effects a constructive taking, but the application of that regulation to the land, including the manner in which the public authority refuses to grant the permit, exemption, or license (see manitoba fisheries, at p 103 (taking of the goodwill resulting from the refusal by the crown corporation to grant a license or exemption for the export of fish); tener, at pp. 564-65 (crown’s notice denying a permit to conduct development work found to be an “expropriation” of the mineral rights)). in sum, “[w]hen . . . the claim is that the impact of a regulatory scheme has, in effect, taken away all rights of ownership, it is not the existence of the regulatory authority that is significant, but its actual application to the lands” (mariner, at p 729 (emphasis in original)). therefore, the court of appeal erred in focussing solely on the “longstanding zoning status quo for the lands” (rf, at para. 18) since the passing of the halifax mainland land use by-law in 2006. [72] according to annapolis, halifax has repeatedly refused to initiate the secondary planning process which could lead to the re-zoning of the annapolis lands. if annapolis can prove at trial that halifax is unlikely to ever grant secondary planning approval, this is clearly material to its constructive taking claim in our view, all reasonable uses of land may be shown to have been eliminated where a permit needed to make reasonable use of the land is refused, such that the state has effectively taken away all rights of ownership. [73] we note our colleagues’ characterization of halifax’s alleged conduct as a mere “refusal to up-zone” which did not affect the reasonable uses of the annapolis lands our colleagues say that halifax’s alleged conduct “simply disappointed” annapolis’ hopes of cashing in on a speculative investment (para. 145) for several reasons, we respectfully reject this view. [74] first, annapolis did not acquire the lands as a “speculative bet” (para. 145) annapolis acquired most of the lands in 1956, slowly adding to its holdings over time. crucially, halifax did not regulate land use in the relevant area prior to 1982. in other words, nothing prevented annapolis from developing the lands when they were first acquired. the conduct alleged is therefore not a mere “refusal to up-zone”, as our colleagues say (para. 115). annapolis originally had the right to use the lands at its discretion. it now alleges that halifax eliminated this right and thereby secured a public advantage without compensation. [75] secondly, and again with respect, our colleagues incorrectly characterize our position as an assertion that a “refusal to up-zone vacant land” is tantamount to a constructive taking (para. 151). a refusal to up-zone, standing alone, will not generally remove all reasonable uses of vacant land. as we have explained, halifax’s alleged conduct in this case is more than a mere refusal to up-zone annapolis claims that halifax has effectively transformed its lands into a public park we emphasize, however, that halifax may defeat annapolis’ constructive taking claim by showing a single reasonable use of the property. [76] in this regard, it is telling that our colleagues do not identify any reasonable use of the annapolis lands. the mere (theoretical) possibility for annapolis to lease the lands is not indicative of any reasonable use of the property — as our colleagues implicitly recognize in discussing benjamin as they acknowledge, the city in benjamin “render[ed] any use of the land practically impossible” (para. 139), despite the absence of any restrictions on leasing. in any event, it is not realistic to assert that annapolis may lease lands which, according to its allegations, are already used as a public park by halifax. [77] moreover, in most cases, a public authority will not benefit from a refusal to up-zone vacant land. as such, even if all reasonable uses of land are eliminated by a zoning refusal, the first element of the cpr test for a constructive taking would not ordinarily be met. accordingly, we cannot agree with our colleagues that our approach “dramatically expands the potential liability of municipalities engaged in land use regulation” (para. 115). to the contrary, our approach is firmly rooted in the common law and does not encroach on the general rule that a refusal to up-zone does not itself effect a constructive taking. [78] lastly, we reiterate that provincial legislatures remain free, as they always have been, to “alter the common law” in respect of constructive takings (cpr, at para. 37, referring to the immunity conferred by s 569 of the vancouver charter) — by, in this case, immunizing halifax by statute from the obligation to pay compensation for taking private property in the public interest. [79] in light of the foregoing, the court of appeal erred in striking annapolis’ claim related to the alleged constructive taking. there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried. vi disposition [80] we would allow the appeal, set aside the court of appeal’s partial summary judgment order, and restore the motion judge’s order dismissing halifax’s motion for partial summary judgment, with costs throughout. annapolis’ claim against halifax, in its entirety, may proceed to trial. the reasons of karakatsanis, martin, kasirer and jamal jj. were delivered by kasirer and jamal jj. — i. overview [81] we have had the advantage of reading the reasons of our colleagues côté and brown jj with respect for their views, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed. [82] this court summarized the test for a de facto (or constructive) taking at common law in its unanimous decision in canadian pacific railway co. v. vancouver (city), 2006 scc 5, [2006] 1 scr 227 (“cpr”), at para. 30, per mclachlin cj:. for a de facto taking requiring compensation at common law, two requirements must be met: (1) an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it, and (2) removal of all reasonable uses of the property (see mariner real estate ltd. v. nova scotia (attorney general) (1999), 177 dlr (4th) 696 (nsca), at p 716; manitoba fisheries ltd. v. the queen, [1979] 1 scr 101; and the queen in right of british columbia v. tener, [1985] 1 scr 533). [83] annapolis group inc. has asked this court to depart from this precedent. it urges the court to allow its appeal from the order of the nova scotia court of appeal granting partial summary judgment dismissing its claim against halifax regional municipality for a de facto taking of its lands. annapolis invited — and needs — this court to depart from cpr for its claim to proceed to trial. [84] our colleagues côté and brown jj have accepted annapolis’ invitation and propose to change the cpr precedent in two respects. we respectfully disagree with the changes they propose and how they apply the law in this case. [85] first, we disagree with our colleagues’ view that the first element of the cpr test — which requires “an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it” — should be replaced with the much broader notion of an “advantage”, whether or not “a proprietary interest was actually acquired by the government” (see paras. 4, 25, 27, 38, 40 and 44-45) our colleagues’ reformulation involves an unwarranted departure from cpr and significantly expands the potential liability of public authorities when regulating land use in the public interest. in our view, this court should retain the cpr test for a de facto taking, which insists that a proprietary interest be acquired courts across common law canada have applied this test without difficulty. [86] second, we disagree with our colleagues’ view that a public authority’s “intention” is a material fact in a claim for a de facto taking (para. 53). this is also an unwarranted departure from cpr and this court’s prior jurisprudence. the material facts for a de facto taking claim concern the effects of the public authority’s regulatory activity, not its intention. [87] here, annapolis’ de facto taking claim arises from halifax’s refusal to “up-zone” (in french: “procéder à un rezonage pour usage plus intensif”) land — to re-zone to enlarge the permissible uses of land, in this case so that annapolis may commercially develop the land for housing — in connection with about 1,000 acres of vacant and treed land owned by annapolis (“annapolis lands”). annapolis’ proposed use for commercial development is impermissible and has been impermissible for many years annapolis now alleges that a halifax municipal council resolution in 2016 refusing to up-zone the land to permit development — a regular occurrence in municipalities across canada — and halifax’s alleged acts of trespass in encouraging the public to hike, canoe, and swim on the lands, give rise to claims for de facto taking, abuse of public office, and unjust enrichment. [88] the claims for abuse of public office and unjust enrichment are proceeding to trial, and, if the court finds halifax liable, it may award a remedy if annapolis succeeds, it will be compensated for the harm occasioned by this conduct. but these matters are distinct from the question of whether annapolis has alleged facts that would substantiate a claim for de facto taking under the applicable common law rules. the only issue on this appeal is whether the claim for de facto taking should also proceed to trial. [89] the nova scotia supreme court declined to grant partial summary judgment on the de facto taking claim because the law could change through “creative interpretations on what may constitute a taking” and because a public authority’s intention may be relevant to a de facto taking claim (2019 nssc 341, 17 lcr (2d) 1, paras. 42 and 36). the nova scotia court of appeal allowed the appeal and granted partial summary judgment (2021 nsca 3, 455 dlr (4th) 349) it ruled that the evidence on the motion, seen in light of cpr and prior jurisprudence, establish no material fact in dispute either that halifax has acquired a proprietary interest or that annapolis has lost all reasonable uses of its lands. the court of appeal also ruled that intention is not a material fact for a de facto taking claim. [90] in our view, this appeal should be dismissed. there is no material fact in dispute on either branch of the cpr test for a de facto taking. first, halifax has acquired no beneficial interest in the annapolis lands or flowing from them it has simply refused to up-zone the lands. second, the uncontradicted evidence is that annapolis has been deprived of no reasonable uses — let alone all reasonable uses — of its lands. the zoning and uses of the annapolis lands remain entirely unchanged the lands remain vacant and treed, just as they have been since annapolis acquired them. importantly, the court of appeal rightly recalled that pursuant to the judgment of this court in cpr, a public authority’s improper motive is not a factor in the analysis and cannot make up for a failure to establish the two settled requirements for a claim of de facto taking. accordingly, partial summary judgment was properly granted dismissing the de facto taking claim as the claim has no real chance of success in law. [91] annapolis’ core claim is that halifax’s refusal to up-zone its land to permit residential development, along with the fact that halifax acted deliberately to secure the advantage of using the annapolis lands as a public park, constitutes a de facto taking however, a refusal to up-zone, in the circumstances of this case, cannot establish a de facto taking unless this court departs from the common law requirements that halifax has acquired a beneficial interest involving the property and that halifax has removed all reasonable uses of the property. we decline to alter the settled law to allow annapolis to proceed with its claim we are respectfully of the view that by acceding to annapolis’ plea to set aside this court’s decision in cpr as a governing precedent, our colleagues’ opinion risks radically changing the complexion of municipal planning law by providing, in like up-zoning contexts, a windfall to developers who speculate at municipal taxpayers’ expense. ii background [92] we take no issue with our colleagues’ summary of the factual background and the decisions below, but we wish to highlight the precise conduct of halifax that annapolis alleges constitutes a de facto taking: (1) refusing to up-zone the annapolis lands and to zone the lands as a park, and (2) encouraging the public to trespass. [93] between the 1950s and 2014, annapolis, a real estate development company, acquired the annapolis lands, consisting of about 1,000 acres of vacant and treed land. annapolis hoped to develop the lands into residential communities and to sell the development for a profit. the annapolis lands — which are still vacant and treed — are next to the blue mountain-birch cove lakes wilderness area, a large wilderness area protected under the wilderness areas protection act, sns 1998, c 27. [94] in 2006, halifax adopted a “regional municipal planning strategy” as a policy statement to guide land development in the municipality. this policy, essentially a vision statement of long-term property development in the municipality, was adopted under the municipal government act, sns 1998, c 18, and the halifax regional municipality charter, sns 2008, c 39 (“halifax charter”) both statutes require halifax to put in place a municipal planning strategy containing “statements of policy” to “guide the development and management of the municipality”, including “the future use, management and development of lands within the municipality” (municipal government act, ss. 212 to 214; halifax charter, ss. 227 to 229) both statutes also expressly provide that “[t]he adoption of a municipal planning strategy does not commit the council to undertake any of the projects suggested in it” (municipal government act, s 217(2); halifax charter, s 232(2) (emphasis added to both statutes)). [95] under halifax’s 2006 regional municipal planning strategy, about a third of the annapolis lands are designated “urban settlement”, which means they could be developed for serviced residential communities within 25 years the remaining two-thirds of the annapolis lands are designated “urban reserve”, which means they could be developed after 25 years serviced development on the annapolis lands cannot occur, however, unless halifax adopts a municipal resolution authorizing a “secondary planning process” and amends its zoning by-law to allow residential development. [96] starting in 2007, annapolis urged halifax to take these legislative measures to permit annapolis to build residential communities on the lands. halifax has consistently refused to do so, preferring to maintain the status quo. in 2016, halifax adopted a municipal resolution stating that it would not authorize a secondary planning process on the annapolis lands “at this time”. [97] the 2016 municipal resolution refusing to up-zone the lands to permit development led to this litigation in 2017, annapolis sued halifax for over $120 million for the alleged de facto taking of its lands and for abuse of public office and unjust enrichment. [98] only the de facto taking claim is in issue on this appeal. annapolis alleges that halifax refused to up-zone the lands because it intends to use them for a park and that halifax has encouraged the public to trespass on the lands to hike, canoe, and swim. annapolis also claims that halifax has refused to zone the lands as a park because it would otherwise have a statutory obligation to buy the lands within a year (see municipal government act, s 222; halifax charter, s 237) annapolis’ key allegations of de facto taking are set out in its amended statement of claim, dated march 22, 2017, at paras. 111-12: [halifax] has de facto expropriated the annapolis lands for public use as a park. [halifax] has delayed and obstructed all of annapolis’ attempts to develop the annapolis lands, and likewise, has deliberately avoided expressly zoning the annapolis lands to avoid its compensation obligation. in doing so, it has obtained the use of the annapolis lands as a public park, and has deprived annapolis of any use of the annapolis lands. indeed, [halifax] encourages members of the public to use the annapolis lands as a park in addition to a variety of other outdoor activities, members of the public hike, cycle, canoe, camp, and swim on the annapolis lands as if [halifax] held the annapolis lands as a park. (ar, vol. i, at p 146) [99] as we will explain, none of these pleaded acts, alone or in combination, amount to a de facto taking. iii law a. this court should not depart from the cpr test for de facto taking (1) introduction [100] our colleagues state that the test for a de facto taking is set out in this court’s decision in cpr, when “properly understood” (para. 44) respectfully, our colleagues then depart from cpr by inappropriately extending cpr’s acquisition requirement — that the public authority’s regulatory actions result in the “acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it” — to encompass any “advantage” accruing to the public authority, whether or not what is acquired is proprietary and whether or not what is acquired corresponds to what is removed. our colleagues depart from precedent and change the common law even though courts across common law canada have applied cpr without difficulty and no court has expressed concern that the law is uncertain or unclear. [101] our colleagues derive this understanding of the acquisition requirement by parsing cpr and the authorities cited by mclachlin cj, even though she referred to “a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it” rather than a mere “advantage”. by stretching the acquisition requirement, our colleagues go some way towards endorsing annapolis’ request that this court should “revisit the cpr test due to the confusion caused by the concept of ‘acquisition of a beneficial interest in property or flowing from it’” (af in response to interveners, at para. 27). annapolis urged this court to abandon cpr’s acquisition requirement because it was “a new element”, “a departure from historical jurisprudence”, and “not a required part of the test” (af, at paras. 36, 45 and 52) according to annapolis, “a taking does not require an acquisition” (af, at para. 59; see also para. 66). [102] annapolis cited, among other authorities, the views of several commentators in support of its position that “this court’s analysis in cpr, if taken literally, effectively abolishes liability for de facto taking” (af, at para. 9; see also paras. 35 and 52). annapolis asserted that cpr should be “confined to its facts” (af, at para. 36) and pointed to similar commentary suggesting that this court was mistaken in including the acquisition of a beneficial interest as part of the test (af, at paras. 89-92). annapolis further criticized cpr by submitting that de facto taking can be satisfied by government conduct without there necessarily having been an acquisition of anything (af, at para. 62). [103] we respectfully disagree with our colleagues’ proposed departure from the acquisition requirement as framed in cpr. by subverting the acquisition requirement, our colleagues effectively accede to the request of the intervener the canadian constitution foundation that this court “revisit” the cpr test by focusing on “the effect of the government measure on the rights of the owner, not what was acquired by the government”, so that the acquisition requirement in cpr becomes “largely superfluous” (if, at paras. 6 and 9). [104] as we explain below, under cpr and the cases it cited, there is a de facto taking only if there is both an acquisition and a corresponding deprivation of a proprietary interest removing all reasonable uses of the property. we also disagree with our colleagues’ claim, at para. 38, that the “beneficial interest” language of the acquisition requirement is concerned with the effect of a regulatory measure on the landowner and not with whether a proprietary interest was acquired by the public authority. while a de facto taking claim is concerned with the effect of a regulatory measure on the landowner, that concern is reflected in the removal requirement. the removal requirement is distinct from the acquisition requirement, which focuses on whether the public authority acquired a proprietary interest moreover, contrary to annapolis’ position, cpr maintains the distinction between de jure and de facto takings: a de jure taking involves the acquisition of legal title (such as when a public authority invokes the statutory expropriation framework), while a de facto taking involves the acquisition of a proprietary interest without legal title. (2) a de facto taking requires the acquisition of and a corresponding deprivation of a proprietary interest [105] cpr and the cases it cited — manitoba fisheries ltd. v. the queen, [1979] 1 scr 101, the queen in right of the province of british columbia v. tener, [1985] 1 scr 533, and mariner real estate ltd. v. nova scotia (attorney general), 1999 nsca 98, 177 dlr (4th) 696 — illustrate how the test for a de facto taking should be applied. in two of these cases, the de facto taking claim was accepted (manitoba fisheries and tener); in the other two cases, the claim was rejected (mariner and cpr). we will briefly discuss each case. (a) manitoba fisheries [106] in manitoba fisheries, this court held that federal legislation granting a fish export monopoly to a crown corporation, which resulted in putting a private fish export company out of business, amounted to a de facto taking of the company’s goodwill the court found that the company’s goodwill was “property” (pp. 110 and 118). the legislation involved a de facto (but not a de jure) taking because it had “the effect” of depriving the company of its goodwill and transferring it to the crown corporation (p 118). the legislation resulted in the company losing all reasonable uses of its goodwill and caused the “obliteration” of its “entire business” (p 115). the court also emphasized the correspondence between the acquisition and the deprivation: the company’s lost goodwill was “the same goodwill” that was “by statutory compulsion acquired by the federal authority”; the company was thus “deprived of property which was acquired by the crown” (p 110). (b) tener [107] in tener, this court held that the crown in right of british columbia engaged in a de facto taking by refusing to grant park use permits to the owners of registered mineral claims within a provincial park. the effect of refusing the permits was that the mineral rights could not be exploited through extraction. estey j., for the majority, determined that the crown’s actions deprived the owners of their ability to access and extract the minerals, a “right” and “property interest” the crown had granted to them by giving them title to the mineral claims (pp. 553-54 and 556-57). the crown had effectively recovered part of the property right by denying access (p 563). the owners thus retained legal title to a property interest (the registered mineral claims), but that interest was rendered virtually useless. a de facto (but not a de jure) taking was made out. the mineral extraction right, though legally retained, was effectively lost by the owners of the registered claims and effectively recovered by the crown. the deprivation thus corresponded to the acquisition. (c) mariner [108] in mariner, the nova scotia court of appeal held that the province did not engage in a de facto taking of a claimant’s property on a provincial beach by refusing to allow the claimant to build single-family dwellings on the property. cromwell ja. (as he then was) affirmed that a de facto taking requires “an acquisition as well as a deprivation” (p 732 (emphasis in original)). he stressed the proprietary nature of what must be acquired (pp. 730 and 732). cromwell ja also highlighted that both tener and manitoba fisheries required the acquisition to correspond to the deprivation: in tener, “the crown re-acquired in fact, though not in law, the mineral rights” (p 731 (emphasis added)), while in manitoba fisheries, “[t]he crucial point . . . is that the asset which was, in effect, lost by [the private company] was the asset gained, in effect, by the new federal corporation” (p 731 (emphasis added)). in mariner, by contrast, there was no de facto taking cromwell j.a held that the “the loss of economic value resulting from land use regulation is not a taking of land” (p 700). the province had acquired nothing because of the regulatory designation of the property as a beach, and the claimant had not lost virtually all rights of ownership (p 700). as cromwell ja. observed, “[i]n this country, extensive and restrictive land use regulation is the norm. such regulation has, almost without exception, been found not to constitute compensable expropriation” (p 713). he decided that, “what is, in form, regulation will be held to be expropriation only when virtually all of the aggregated incidents of ownership have been taken away” (p 717). (d) cpr [109] finally, in cpr, this court held that the city of vancouver did not engage in a de facto taking of cpr’s land (a railway corridor) by enacting a by-law refusing to allow cpr to develop the land for residential and commercial uses. mclachlin cj. determined that the city’s development freeze did not result in it acquiring any beneficial interest in cpr’s land; the freeze was simply an “assurance that the land will be used or developed in accordance with [the city’s] vision, without even precluding the historical or current use of the land” (para. 33). this was “not the sort of benefit” that could be construed as a taking (para. 33). nor had the city removed all reasonable uses of cpr’s property, because cpr was not precluded from using the land to operate a railway — the only historical use — or from leasing the land or otherwise developing it as permitted by law (para. 34) thus, cpr suffered no deprivation and the city enjoyed no acquisition. the claim for de facto taking failed. (e) conclusion [110] cpr and the authorities it cited show there is no de facto taking unless there is both the acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it and a removal of all reasonable uses of the property the interest must be proprietary — not merely an “advantage” — and the acquisition must correspond to the deprivation. these requirements are confirmed by k. horsman and g. morley, eds., government liability: law and practice (loose-leaf), at § 5:1, which our colleagues rely on (at paras. 18-20): a “taking” is “the forcible acquisition by the crown of privately owned property . . . for public purposes” (emphasis added). the authors also recognize that “[i]n takings law, only those rights that are proprietary and vested . are compensable” (§ 5:8) and that “canadian law recognizes that governments have the ability to greatly restrict the potential uses of property without triggering a right to compensation” (§ 5:13). (3) there is no basis to change the common law [111] we believe our colleagues have provided no basis for this court to depart from the acquisition requirement as framed in cpr. they do not suggest that such a departure from precedent is needed to keep the common law in step with the evolution of society, to clarify a legal principle, or to resolve any inconsistency in the law, which are some of the usual grounds justifying evolution of the common law (see friedmann equity developments inc. v. final note ltd., 2000 scc 34, [2000] 1 scr 842, at para. 42; r v. salituro, [1991] 3 scr 654, at pp. 668-69 and 679). [112] to the contrary, courts in common law canada have applied the cpr test without difficulty. no court has expressed any concern that the test is unworkable or unnecessarily complex (see british columbia: fortisbc energy inc. v. surrey (city), 2013 bcsc 2382, 112 lcr 89, at paras. 411 and 418-19; compliance coal corporation v. british columbia (environmental assessment office), 2020 bcsc 621, 13 lcr (2d) 215, at paras. 92-101; alberta: genesis land development corp v. alberta, 2009 abqb 221, 471 ar 1, at paras. 127-29 and 141-42, aff’d 2010 abca 148, 477 ar 390; kalmring v. alberta, 2020 abqb 81, 11 alta. lr (7th) 177, at paras. 68 and 79-82; altius royalty corporation v. alberta, 2021 abqb 3, 23 alta. lr (7th) 105, at paras. 27 and 44-47, aff’d 2022 abqb 255; ontario: club pro adult entertainment inc v ontario (2006), 27 blr (4th) 227 (scj) (“club pro (scj)”), at paras. 77-78 and 82, rev’d in part on other grounds 2008 onca 158, 42 blr (4th) 47; railink canada ltd v ontario (2007), 95 lcr 17 (scj), at para. 19; nova scotia: taylor v. dairy farmers of nova scotia, 2010 nssc 436, 298 nsr (2d) 116, at paras. 74 and 82-85, aff’d 2012 nsca 1, 311 nsr (2d) 300; newfoundland and labrador: lynch v. st. john’s (city), 2016 nlca 35, 400 dlr. (4th) 62, at paras. 54-63; sun construction company limited v. conception bay south (town), 2019 nlsc 102, 87 mplr (5th) 256, at paras. 13 and 15; gosse v. conception bay south (town), 2021 nlca 23, 16 lcr (2d) 123, at paras. 30 and 46; kmk properties inc. v. st. john’s (city), 2021 nlsc 122, 19 mplr (6th) 150, at paras. 18, 40 and 47-50; federal court: dennis v. canada, 2013 fc 1197, 114 lcr. 1, at paras. 21-24, aff’d 2014 fca 232; calwell fishing ltd. v. canada, 2016 fc 312, at paras. 173 and 249-52 (canlii); anglehart v canada, 2016 fc 1159, [2017] 2 fcr 74, at paras. 160-61, aff’d 2018 fca 115, [2019] 1 fcr 504; yukon territory: northern cross (yukon) ltd. v. yukon (energy, mines and resources), 2021 yksc 3, 16 lcr (2d) 1, at paras. 285 and 309, rev’d in part on other grounds 2021 ykca 6, 79 cclt (4th) 179). our colleagues do not suggest that lower courts have applied the cpr test with difficulty but simply assert, without more, that “many” of these courts across canada have applied the test incorrectly (para. 41). [113] we also note that at least one court has declined to abandon cpr’s acquisition requirement as proposed by annapolis here (altius royalty corporation v. her majesty the queen in right of alberta, 2022 abqb 255, at para. 76 (canlii)), while another has rejected the suggestion that cpr is inconsistent with tener and manitoba fisheries and has affirmed that the “the law is very settled on this issue” (club pro (scj), at para. 78, per spies j). [114] this confirms, in our view, that cpr is settled law and that there is no reason to change it. (4) departing from cpr will expose municipalities across canada to significant financial liability in regulating land use [115] our colleagues’ reformulation of the acquisition requirement and departure from cpr as precedent has significant ramifications it dramatically expands the potential liability of municipalities engaged in land use regulation in the public interest and throws into question the settled law that a refusal to up-zone is not a de facto taking. [116] for example, in tener, at pp. 557 and 564, estey j affirmed that “[o]rdinarily, in this country, . . compensation does not follow zoning either up or down. . . the imposition of zoning regulation and the regulation of activities on lands . . . add nothing to the value of public property.” [117] similarly, in mariner, at pp. 713 and 734, cromwell ja stated that “[i]t is settled law . . . that the regulation of land use which has the effect of decreasing the value of the land is not an expropriation. . . . [o]rdinarily compensation does not follow zoning either up or down. . . . development freezes have consistently been held not to give rise to rights of compensation”. [118] this settled law, which our colleagues propose now to set aside, was helpfully summarized by e. c. e. todd in the law of expropriation and compensation in canada (2nd ed. 1992), at pp. 22-23: by the imposition, removal or alteration of land use controls a public authority may dramatically increase, or decrease, the value of land by changing the permitted uses which may be made of it. in such a case, in the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary an owner is not entitled to compensation or any other remedy notwithstanding that subdivision approval or rezoning is refused or development is blocked or frozen pursuant to statutory planning powers in order, for example, to facilitate the future acquisition of the land for public purposes. [footnotes omitted.] see also s. e. hamill, “common law property theory and jurisprudence in canada” (2015), 40 queen’s lj 679, at p 703 (“so long as the owner can continue to use their property as they always have, they cannot be considered to have suffered a legally recognizable loss”); s. m. makuch, n. craik and s. b. leisk, canadian municipal and planning law (2nd ed. 2004), at p 212 (“the courts would be well advised to remain true to their traditional approach, which is in keeping with the general assumptions of no compensation for planning decisions and of allowing municipalities to allocate the benefits and burdens of planning”). b. intention is not a material fact for a claim of de facto taking [119] we are also of the respectful view that our colleagues further depart from precedent when they say that “intent may constitute a ‘material fact’ in the context of a constructive expropriation claim” (para. 53) this statement contradicts their affirmation that “[t]he public authority’s intention is not an element of the test for constructive takings at common law” (para. 52 (emphasis in original)) and that “the underlying objective pursued by a public authority . . is neither necessary nor sufficient” (para. 57). in our view, intention is not an element of the test for a de facto or constructive taking; it is equally not a material fact supporting such a claim. [120] our colleagues seek to reconcile their inconsistent positions by saying that “the intention to take constructively, if proven by the claimant, may support a finding that the landowner has lost all reasonable uses of their land” (para. 53) again, we disagree. although the public authority’s intention may provide narrative background or context or may be relevant to an administrative law claim that its actions were ultra vires as having an improper purpose or being in bad faith (see catalyst paper corp. v. north cowichan (district), 2012 scc 2, [2012] 1 scr 5, at para. 28; mariner, at pp. 717-18; cpr, at paras. 10-37), it is not relevant to a de facto taking claim, which is concerned with the effect of the public authority’s actions, not with its intention. [121] on our reading, none of the three authorities cited by our colleagues support their position that intention is a material fact for a de facto taking claim. our colleagues first rely, at para. 54, on ulster transport authority v. james brown & sons, ltd., [1953] ni 79 (ca) (cited in manitoba fisheries), at pp. 113 and 116. but the issue in ulster was whether legislation purporting to limit the business of furniture removers, properly interpreted, was ultra vires for effectively taking property without compensation, contrary to a statutory prohibition of such taking the discussion of intention in ulster concerned legislative intention, as objectively expressed, rather than the subjective intention or motive of the public authority responsible for the taking. macdermott lcj referred to “deliberate and intentional” drafting but asked what the “intention [of the legislation] was” and invoked the principle that “parliament must be presumed to intend the necessary effect of its enactments” (p 112). he added, at p 114: “whatever in fact [the legislature’s] motives may have been, the intention of the legislature, as gleaned from its terms, is what must guide the court . . . .” [122] second, our colleagues, at para. 55, rely on lynch, at paras. 60 and 62, which considered whether the city of st john’s refusal to permit development amounted to expropriation of the claimants’ property. the effect of the city’s action was to take away the claimants’ right to appropriate the groundwater from their property and to give the city a beneficial interest in the property, consisting of the right to a continuous flow of uncontaminated groundwater. the claimants’ property rights flowing from a crown grant were thereby reduced. but neither the cited paragraphs nor the decision as a whole suggest that intention is a material fact for a de facto taking claim. the case concerned the effect of the city’s actions that “purported” to remove the claimants’ right to appropriate groundwater on their land (para. 60). [123] finally, our colleagues, at para. 56, rely on montréal (ville) v. benjamin, 2004 canlii 44591 (que. ca), which considered whether a zoning by-law and the city of montréal’s actions in fencing off the owner’s land to include it within a public park amounted to “disguised expropriation” under quebec civil law. our colleagues write that the city “manifested its intention” by refusing to remove various structures on the claimant’s land and its “intent buttressed the finding of disguised expropriation”. but our colleagues’ reference to the “manifested” intention shows that the proper focus is on the effect, or intention as expressed, rather than intention itself. and any intention that “buttressed” a finding of disguised expropriation only confirmed such a prior finding; it did not help establish that finding. in our respectful view, benjamin does not support the relevance of intention to a de facto taking claim. [124] the mention of [translation] “abuse of right” in benjamin does not suggest otherwise. a “disguised expropriation” is in itself an abuse of power, because a municipal government that uses its regulatory power to deprive an owner of the enjoyment of their property acts in a manner inconsistent with the municipality’s delegated authority (lorraine (ville) v 2646‑8926 québec inc., 2018 scc 35, [2018] 2 scr 577, at para. 27). this is how the expression “abuse of right”, mentioned in benjamin, was used by the court of appeal of quebec in lorraine (2016 qcca 1803, at para. 13) and has been subsequently interpreted (see pillenière, simoneau v. ville de saint-bruno-de-montarville, 2021 qccs 4031, 19 mplr (6th) 275, at para. 112). this analysis focuses on the effect of municipal action and does not suggest that intent or motive is required for a distinct cause of action seeking compensation for disguised expropriation. [125] to the contrary, quebec courts have expressly held that the public authority’s intention is irrelevant under the quebec civil law of disguised expropriation. disguised expropriation is based on art. 952 of the civil code of québec, whose focus is the effect of the public authority’s actions this was recently confirmed by the unanimous judgment of the quebec court of appeal in dupras v. ville de mascouche, 2022 qcca 350, at para. 29 (canlii): [translation] moreover, the municipality’s good or bad faith — the wrongfulness of its conduct — is not relevant to the analysis; it is “the actual effect of the by-law” that matters. this is why, when the supreme court used the concept of abuse to characterize disguised expropriation, it referred to abuse of the power to regulate in order to proceed, de facto, with an expropriation of property without paying the indemnity required in particular by article 952 of the civil code of québec. the validity of the by-law restricting land use therefore does not preclude the existence of disguised expropriation. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] [126] we also agree with the nova scotia court of appeal that this court’s decision in lorraine, at para. 2, does not support the motion judge’s view, at paras. 35-36, that halifax’s alleged “ulterior motive” is relevant to the de facto taking claim the quebec court of appeal correctly explained the import of lorraine in dupras in the passage quoted above: “. . . when the supreme court used the concept of abuse to characterize disguised expropriation, it referred to abuse of the power to regulate in order to proceed, de facto, with an expropriation of property without paying the indemnity required in particular by article 952 of the civil code of québec”. we accordingly disagree with the view of the motion judge and annapolis that lorraine supports the relevance of motive to a disguised expropriation claim — a view that even our colleagues refrain from endorsing. [127] that said, we do not quarrel with our colleagues’ general remarks, at paras. 47-48, on the quebec law of disguised expropriation. we note, however, that while our colleagues describe disguised expropriation under art. 952 of the civil code of québec as a “no-fault liability scheme”, what the quebec authorities mean by this is that fault, in the sense of bad faith, improper purpose, or improper motive, is not required. nevertheless, the test for disguised expropriation remains extremely onerous: there must be an absolute negation of the exercise of the right of ownership, rendering its use impossible or equivalent to an actual confiscation of the property. as the quebec court of appeal explained when referencing absence of fault in ville de léry v. procureure générale du québec, 2019 qcca 1375, at para. 17: [translation] however, absence of fault in the development of government objectives does not mean that there is no legal relationship between the appellant and the respondent, if what it alleges is shown. in wallot v. québec (ville) [2011 qcca 1165, at paras. 45-47], this court stated that for a by-law to be regarded as effecting disguised expropriation, it must amount to an absolute negation of the exercise of the right of ownership, i.e render its use impossible, or be tantamount to an actual confiscation of the immovable. in such a case, the by-law that permits no uses by the owner on its land is not a zoning by-law but an expropriation. the question of the municipality’s good or bad faith, or of its “fault”, then becomes entirely secondary, if not irrelevant. [emphasis added; footnote omitted.] see also wallot v québec (ville), 2011 qcca 1165, 24 admin l.r (5th) 306, at paras. 41-54; municipalité de saint-colomban v. boutique de golf gilles gareau inc., 2019 qcca 1402, at paras. 64-65; meadowbrook groupe pacific inc v ville de montréal, 2019 qcca 2037, 2019 carswellque 12262 (wl), at para. 29; ressources strateco inc. v. procureure générale du québec, 2020 qcca 18, 32 celr (4th) 231, at paras. 113-14; ville de québec v rivard, 2020 qcca 146, at paras. 64-65; ville de saint-rémi v 9120-4883 québec inc., 2021 qcca 630, at paras. 25-26 (canlii); dupras, at paras. 27-29. [128] accordingly, the quebec law of disguised expropriation does not support the relevance of motive or intention under the common law of de facto taking. [129] we therefore agree with the conclusion of the nova scotia court of appeal, at para. 75, that the law of de facto taking is “clear and settled”: a public authority’s motive or intention is not a material fact for such a claim and “cannot compensate for the failure to establish the two required elements of de facto expropriation”. [130] we will now apply cpr to the partial summary judgment motion at issue in this case. iv application a. introduction [131] in our view, the nova scotia court of appeal did not err in granting partial summary judgment. there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial on either branch of the de facto taking test, both of which annapolis must meet to succeed. we disagree with our colleagues’ conclusion, at para. 63, that there are “vast issues of material fact to be determined”, and also with their view, at para. 61, that the court of appeal “merely disagreed with the motion judge’s exercise of discretion”. under the law enunciated in cpr, annapolis’ de facto taking claim has no real chance of success and should be dismissed. b. the summary judgment test in nova scotia [132] summary judgment is available when there is no genuine issue for trial (hryniak v mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 scr 87, at para. 34) the test for summary judgment on evidence in an action under r 13.04 of the nova scotia civil procedure rules was addressed by the nova scotia court of appeal in shannex inc. v. dora construction ltd., 2016 nsca 89, 58 clr (4th) 1, at para. 34 the nova scotia court of appeal held that r 13.04 asks five sequential questions, only the first three of which are relevant here:  first, does the pleading disclose a genuine issue of material fact — that is, one that would affect the result (either a pure question of fact or a question of mixed fact and law)? if the answer is “yes”, the issue should not be determined on summary judgment. if the answer is “no”, the court proceeds to the second question.  second, does the pleading require the determination of a question of law (either a pure question of law or a question of mixed fact and law)? if the answers to the first and second questions are both “no”, summary judgment must issue. if the answers to the first and second questions are “no” and “yes”, respectively, leaving only an issue of law, then the court proceeds to the third question.  third, the court may grant or deny summary judgment in the exercise of its discretion. the court must ask whether the pleading has a real chance of success if the answer is “no”, summary judgment must issue. if the answer is “yes”, the court considers whether to exercise its discretion to finally determine the issue of law. [133] when the motion judge applies an incorrect legal principle or errs with regard to a purely legal question, the decision should be reviewed on a correctness standard (hryniak, at para. 84). [134] in our view, halifax’s motion for partial summary judgment succeeds under r 13.04 based on the third question in shannex. we accept that there should be flexibility in allowing novel claims to either be determined on summary judgment or proceed to trial (see r v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2011 scc 42, [2011] 3 scr. 45, at para. 21; warman v. law society of alberta, 2015 abca 368, 609 ar 83, at para. 6; condominium corp. no. 0321365 v. cuthbert, 2016 abca 46, 612 ar 284, at para. 35; rudichuk v. genesis land development corp., 2020 abca 42, 98 alta. lr (6th) 339, at para. 35; wallbridge v. brunning, 2018 onca 363, 422 dlr (4th) 305, at para. 26). in this case, however, annapolis’ de facto taking claim has no real chance of success. (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact that halifax has acquired a beneficial interest in the annapolis lands or flowing from them, either in refusing to up-zone the lands or by allegedly encouraging trespass [135] neither halifax’s 2016 municipal resolution refusing to up-zone the annapolis lands nor halifax’s alleged acts of encouraging the public to trespass raises any genuine issue of material fact that halifax has acquired a beneficial interest in the lands or flowing from them. [136] the municipal resolution merely preserved the status quo by refusing to allow lands which have always been vacant and treed and situated next to a protected wilderness area to be developed into serviced residential communities it is of no moment that the 2006 regional municipal planning strategy, as a statement of policy, stated that a possible future use of the annapolis lands included serviced residential development both the municipal government act and the halifax charter confirm that “[t]he adoption of a municipal planning strategy does not commit the council to undertake any of the projects suggested in it” (municipal government act, s 217(2); halifax charter, s 232(2)). [137] halifax’s adoption of a municipal resolution refusing to up-zone the lands also cannot be a basis for a de facto taking claim because the resolution did not result in halifax acquiring any proprietary interest in the lands. as this court held in cpr, at para. 33, a mere assurance that land will be used or developed in accordance with a municipality’s vision, without precluding historical or current uses of the land, is “not the sort of benefit” that can meet the acquisition requirement. this is why the common law has consistently held that a refusal to up-zone is not actionable as a de facto taking. our colleagues claim, at para. 64, that “[p]reserving a park in its natural state may constitute an advantage accruing to the state”, but this flouts cpr’s insistence that the public authority must have acquired a proprietary interest. a mere “advantage” does not suffice. respectfully, our colleagues’ expansive approach to what constitutes a de facto taking departs from precedent and would result in cpr being decided differently. [138] we also respectfully disagree with our colleagues’ suggestion, at para. 65, that halifax’s alleged encouragement of trespass changes this conclusion. for example, at the hearing of the appeal, annapolis insisted that halifax has distributed promotional material encouraging people to hike at fox lake, which is within the annapolis lands. annapolis claimed that this was an example of halifax’s “use [of] the annapolis lands as a regional park” (outline of argument, at para. 5, in condensed book, at p 2). we disagree a public authority does not and cannot acquire a proprietary interest by encouraging others to trespass. if these allegations were made out at trial, halifax might well expose itself to liability on some other basis. but this allegation cannot ground a claim for a de facto taking. [139] annapolis’ position illustrates how incompatible the notion of an “advantage” proposed by our colleagues is with any proprietary interest. the only cases they rely on, at paras. 65-66, are the quebec disguised expropriation cases of benjamin and dupras, but such reliance is misplaced. as dupras, at para. 34, makes plain, and as our colleagues recognize, at para. 48, the acquisition requirement has no direct corollary under quebec civil law (see m. a. lechasseur, “l’expropriation de facto au canada et la transcendance des solidarités”, in service de la qualité de la profession du barreau du québec, vol. 509, développements récents en droit municipal (2022), 71, at p 172). benjamin is also a markedly different case. in benjamin, the city had passed zoning by-laws allowing only public uses of the owner’s land it also took physical possession of the owner’s land by erecting a fence to transform the land into a park. there was both physical dispossession and the prior use of legislative power to render any use of the land practically impossible (benjamin, at paras. 9, 11, 14 and 65; see also rivard, at para. 66) this conduct is a far cry from the refusal to up-zone encountered in this appeal. the focus of benjamin was on the change of regulation that took away the rights of the landowner, which is not the case here therefore, the findings of disguised expropriation in benjamin and dupras do not directly illuminate what can or cannot meet the acquisition requirement at common law. [140] none of the allegedly “vast issues of material fact” listed by our colleagues, at para. 59, and the motion judge, at paras. 25-26 and 36, has any bearing on the de facto taking claim. to the extent that these facts help make halifax liable for abuse of public office or unjust enrichment, an appropriate remedy can be awarded for those claims at trial it bears noting that, as the court of appeal observed, at para. 83, if halifax has acted for an improper purpose, annapolis may succeed in its cause of action for abuse of public office. the court of appeal rightly relied on mariner, at pp. 717-18, where cromwell ja explained that administrative law claims for unlawful actions are distinct from compensatory claims for de facto taking. but these facts are not material facts in support of the de facto taking claim:  correspondence between counsel in which halifax denies allegations in the amended statement of claim are not “material facts” in support of a de facto taking claim.  signage on annapolis’ property depicting halifax’s logo on various trails does not have the effect of halifax acquiring any proprietary interest.  a newspaper article quoting a halifax employee does not support the claim that halifax has acquired a proprietary interest in the annapolis lands what a newspaper says, or quotes a halifax employee as saying, does not affect this issue.  discovery evidence on whether the annapolis lands were to be treated as development lands, not parklands, under the 2006 regional municipal planning strategy is not a material fact in dispute. the strategy speaks for itself. as a matter of law, it “does not commit the council to undertake any of the projects suggested in it” (municipal government act, s 217(2); halifax charter, s 232(2)) the same applies to the next two bullets that our colleagues cite, relating to the planning strategy, clauses 171 and 31.  discovery evidence relating to the 2016 municipal council resolution, and later clarifications from counsel, has no bearing on whether halifax acquired a proprietary interest in the annapolis lands the pleaded allegation of de facto taking relies on the resolution itself, which, as already noted, merely preserved the status quo.  evidence of an alleged ulterior motive of halifax is irrelevant to the de facto taking claim, as already explained above. [141] there are thus no disputed material facts as to whether halifax acquired a proprietary interest in the annapolis lands no such interest was acquired halifax merely refused to up-zone the lands because these are not material facts, we respectfully disagree with the motion judge, at para. 44, that the de facto taking claim may properly go to trial along with the balance of the matters in dispute. (2) there is no genuine issue of material fact that halifax has deprived annapolis of all reasonable uses of the annapolis lands [142] even if annapolis could establish that halifax has acquired a beneficial interest in the annapolis lands or flowing from them, it cannot meet the second requirement of the test for a de facto taking: there is no genuine issue of material fact that halifax has deprived annapolis of all reasonable uses of its lands. this in itself is fatal to annapolis’ appeal given that the two requirements in cpr are cumulative. [143] this second element of the cpr test must be assessed “not only in relation to the land’s potential highest and best use, but having regard to the nature of the land and the range of reasonable uses to which it has actually been put” (cpr, at para. 34, quoting mariner, at p 717). when “a regulatory regime is imposed on land, its actual application in the specific case must be examined, not the potential, but as yet unexploited, range of possible regulation” (mariner, at p 718 (underlining added)). confinement to uneconomic uses is insufficient (cpr, at paras. 8 and 27-31). loss of virtually all economic value is also insufficient (mariner, at pp. 714 and 719-27). [144] in cpr, for example, this court held that the city of vancouver’s by-law did not remove all reasonable uses of the property because it did not prevent the landowner from using its land to operate a railway, the only use to which the land had ever been put during the history of the city (para. 34). [145] the situation here is indistinguishable. as the nova scotia court of appeal noted, at para. 14, “[t]he zoning of the annapolis lands has not changed since the adoption of the land use by-law in 2006.” the court added: “annapolis has the same rights with respect to its lands that it had prior to council’s resolution on september 6, 2016. nothing has changed” (para. 91). the lands were vacant and treed when annapolis acquired them, and they remain vacant and treed. halifax’s refusal to up-zone the lands in 2016 did not deprive annapolis of any reasonable uses of its lands. it simply disappointed annapolis’ hope of developing them. annapolis speculated that, one day, it would have that right the company made a bet and lost there is no principled basis for saying that halifax and its taxpayers now have to guarantee that speculative bet we therefore agree with the submission of halifax’s counsel, that “[annapolis] bought barren land with no rights to do anything more than that the municipality is not the guarantor of their land speculation” (transcript, at p 79). [146] contrary to our colleagues’ suggestion at para. 72, halifax has not taken annapolis’ “right” to develop the lands. annapolis claims that it had an unfettered right to develop the lands before they were first zoned in 1982. yet annapolis grounds its de facto taking claim in the proceedings before us in halifax’s refusal to up-zone in 2016 — which, as already noted, did not affect the zoning of the lands or annapolis’ rights. indeed, our colleagues acknowledge that the zoning has not changed since 2006 (para. 7). the potential permissible uses of the lands before 1982 are thus irrelevant to annapolis’ claim. [147] we therefore agree with the nova scotia court of appeal, at para. 92: “. . . the lands and the reasonable uses to which annapolis can put them remain exactly as they have been for many years”. this responds to our colleagues’ criticism that the court of appeal “failed to identify a single reasonable possible use of the property” (para. 70; see also para. 74). the lands remain vacant and treed and are zoned exactly as before. further, as counsel for halifax conceded during oral argument, subject to the current zoning annapolis can lease the lands (transcript, at p 72), just as cpr could in cpr (cpr, at para. 34). we note, too, that confinement of the land to uneconomic uses does not in itself establish a de facto taking (see cpr, at paras. 8 and 34; horsman and morley, at § 5:13). [148] in our respectful view, there is no basis in the record for our colleagues to assert that “it is disputed whether halifax, by allegedly treating the annapolis lands as a public park, has eliminated all uses of the lands except serviced development, which is conditional upon the approval of annapolis’ secondary planning applications” (para. 69 (emphasis added)). halifax did not eliminate or remove any reasonable use of the property it simply refused to up-zone the lands to allow for residential development. [149] our colleagues nevertheless claim, at para. 76, that “it is telling that [kasirer and jamal jj.] do not identify any reasonable use of the annapolis lands” (emphasis in original). respectfully, this illustrates how our colleagues have changed the law first, our colleagues evaluate the reasonable uses of the lands from the perspective of a commercial property developer, even though our law has never required that the “use” be confined to those of one class of landowner. second, the removal requirement insists not merely that there be no reasonable uses, but also that they have been removed by the public authority. the issue is whether there has been a de facto taking by the public authority. annapolis cannot show that halifax removed any reasonable uses nor, in any event, is there any legal impediment to annapolis leasing the lands. [150] our colleagues respond to the zoning and uses of the annapolis lands having not changed with the suggestion that this ignores “halifax’s application of the regulatory scheme as alleged by annapolis” (para. 71 (emphasis in original)) our colleagues assert that “[i]f annapolis can prove at trial that halifax is unlikely to ever grant secondary planning approval, this is clearly material to its constructive taking claim” (para. 72 (emphasis in original)). we respectfully disagree. as a matter of proof, we do not see how annapolis can prove a negative, particularly one involving a future fact. [151] more importantly, even if annapolis could somehow show that halifax will never up-zone the lands, that could not establish that annapolis has lost all reasonable uses of those lands the lands have never been used for serviced development — they have always been vacant and treed our colleagues’ assertion amounts to saying that a refusal to up-zone vacant land can give rise to a de facto taking merely if all “potential reasonable uses” are prohibited (para. 45 (emphasis in original)) that would upset the settled law reflected in manitoba fisheries, tener, mariner, and cpr, and it would eliminate halifax’s statutory and common law protection from liability for refusing to up-zone. in cpr, this court specifically noted that removal of all reasonable uses of the land must be assessed in relation to both its potential uses as well as the “nature of the land and the range of reasonable uses to which it has actually been put” (para. 34, quoting mariner, at p 717). that statement applies equally in this case. c conclusion [152] we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact that halifax has acquired a beneficial interest in the annapolis lands or flowing from them or that halifax has deprived annapolis of all reasonable uses of its lands. in view of the settled law, the pleading of a de facto taking has no real chance of success like the nova scotia court of appeal, we would grant partial summary judgment dismissing the claim for de facto taking. v disposition [153] we would dismiss the appeal with costs throughout. appeal allowed with costs throughout, karakatsanis, martin, kasirer and jamal jj. dissenting. municipality, halifax. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of canada: attorney general of canada, winnipeg. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. general of nova scotia, halifax. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. thomson, edmonton. solicitors for the intervener the ontario landowners association: mccarthy tétrault, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the canadian home builders’ association: rayman beitchman, toronto. society, halifax.
[1] abella j.  — the years of sustained abuse committed in residential schools represent a pro- foundly shameful era in canada’s history. the leg- acy of the harms committed there consists of deep wounds not only to those who were forced to attend, but also to our national psyche. the recovery pro- cess, when it is possible, is slow and painful. but at least there is a process, one that pays respectful [1] la juge abella — les années de sévices in - fligés de façon soutenue dans les pensionnats in- diens représentent une ère profondément honteuse de l’histoire du canada. l’héritage de ces sévices a causé de profondes blessures non seulement à ceux qui ont été forcés de fréquenter ces établissements, mais aussi à notre conscience collective. le proces- sus de rétablissement, lorsqu’il est possible, est long [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge abella 235 tribute to the enduring character of the harm and the need to address it. the indian residential schools settlement agreement (2006) is part of that healing process. [2] when jw was a young boy at a residential school a nun touched his genitals over his clothing. he was standing in line waiting for a shower. he was wearing what he described as a “little apron”. et pénible. mais au moins il existe un processus, et il tient compte de façon respectueuse des torts durables qui ont été causés et de la nécessité de les réparer. la convention de règlement relative aux pensionnats in- diens (2006) fait partie de ce processus de guérison. [2] jw était un jeune garçon qui fréquentait un de ces pensionnats, lorsqu’une religieuse a touché ses organes génitaux par- dessus ses vêtements. il attendait en file pour la douche. il portait ce qu’il a appelé un [traduction] « petit tablier ». [3] in 2014, jw brought a claim for compensa- tion in accordance with the independent assessment process (iap), the adjudicative component of the agreement, alleging that this incident fell within the following category of abuse: [3] en 2014, jw a présenté une demande d’in- demnisation conformément au processus d’évalua- tion indépendant (péi), le volet juridictionnel de la convention, soutenant que les actes en question entraient dans la catégorie suivante de sévices : any touching of a student, including touching with an object, by an adult employee or other adult lawfully on the premises which exceeds recognized parental contact and violates the sexual integrity of the student. [art. ii] [4] jw’s claim proceeded in manitoba. the hear- ing adjudicator concluded that the “sexual” intent of the nun was an element that had to be shown by the claimant. despite the fact that she accepted that the incident had occurred as jw described, the hearing adjudicator denied his claim because he was unable to prove the nun’s sexual intent. tout contact physique avec un élève, avec ou sans objet, par un employé ou un autre adulte autorisé à être présent sur les lieux, qui excède les normes généralement re- connues de contact physique parental et viole l’intégrité sexuelle de l’étudiant. [art. ii] [4] la demande de jw a été instruite au manitoba. l’adjudicatrice d’audition a conclu que le demandeur devait démontrer l’intention « sexuelle » de la reli- gieuse. même si elle a accepté que l’incident s’était produit tel que jw l’avait relaté, l’adjudicatrice d’audition a refusé sa demande parce qu’il n’avait pas été en mesure de démontrer l’intention sexuelle de la religieuse. [5] the issue in this appeal is whether jw was entitled to judicial recourse. [5] la question en litige dans le présent pourvoi est de savoir si jw a droit à un recours judiciaire. background contexte [6] the agreement represents the negotiated set- tlement of thousands of individual and class action suits filed against a number of defendants, including the government of canada and various churches, relating to the operation of residential schools. [6] la convention représente le règlement négocié de milliers de recours collectifs et d’actions indivi- duelles intentés contre plusieurs défendeurs, dont le gouvernement du canada et diverses églises, relati- vement à la gestion des pensionnats indiens. [7] the agreement includes a procedure for set- tling individual claims through an adjudicative process; provides for support services for former students; sets out a national procedure for healing, [7] la convention prévoit une procédure de rè- glement des réclamations individuelles par le biais d’un processus juridictionnel. elle prévoit également des services de soutien pour les anciens élèves, en 236 j.w v canada (attorney general) abella j. [2019] 2 scr. education and reconciliation through the truth and reconciliation commission; and creates a scheme for the general implementation of public programs to recognize and commemorate the significant and last- ing harms caused by the residential schools system. [8] while not admitting liability, the defendants acknowledged that harms and abuses were commit- ted against indigenous children at these schools. the individuals in the various classes of plaintiffs and potential claimants could opt out of the agreement and pursue their own litigation through the courts, but they could not take this route if they accepted compensation pursuant to the agreement. plus d’établir un mécanisme national de guérison, d’éducation et de réconciliation par l’entremise de la commission de vérité et de réconciliation, ainsi qu’un mécanisme pour la mise en œuvre générale de programmes publics visant à reconnaître et à commé- morer les torts graves et durables qui ont été causés par le régime des pensionnats. [8] sans admettre leur responsabilité, les défen- deurs reconnaissent que des sévices et des torts ont été causés aux enfants autochtones qui ont fréquenté ces établissements. les personnes qui entraient dans les diverses catégories de demandeurs et de deman- deurs éventuels avaient la possibilité de se retirer de la convention et d’exercer leurs propres recours devant les tribunaux, mais perdaient leur droit de s’adresser aux tribunaux si elles acceptaient une indemnité en vertu de la convention. [9] two avenues to compensation are available under the agreement: the “common experience” payment received by all eligible former students, and individual payments awarded to claimants who establish specific compensable harms. these indi- vidual claims are adjudicated through the iap. the rules governing these adjudications are set out in schedule d to the agreement. [9] la convention offre deux voies d’indemnisa- tion : le paiement « d’expérience commune » auquel ont droit tous les anciens élèves admissibles, et les indemnités accordées aux demandeurs qui font la preuve qu’ils ont subi certains sévices indemnisables. ces demandes individuelles sont tranchées par le tru- chement du péi. les règles régissant ces demandes sont énoncées à l’annexe d de la convention. [10] the schedule describes which harms are com- pensable, what must be established by the claimant, and sets out a compensation scale. it includes both standard and complex track claims. certain complex track claims may be referred to the courts by the chief adjudicator of the indian residential schools adjudication secretariat who is generally respon- sible for guiding, training and assisting the adju- dicators. this is the only category of claims which provides a mechanism for court access. [11] there is a system of internal reviews. if the alleged error in an adjudicative decision is a palpable and overriding factual one, the scheme allows for one level of internal review. if the error alleged is a failure to apply the iap model to the facts, there are two levels of internal review available. [10] l’annexe en question énumère les sévices indemnisables, ce dont le demandeur doit faire la preuve, et elle fixe un barème d’indemnisation. elle comporte un volet ordinaire et un volet complexe. certaines réclamations relevant du volet complexe peuvent être renvoyées aux tribunaux par l’adju- dicateur en chef du secrétariat d’adjudication des pensionnats indiens, qui est de façon générale chargé de guider, de former et d’encadrer les adjudicateurs. c’est la seule catégorie de demandes qui permet de recourir aux tribunaux. [11] il existe un mécanisme de révision interne. si l’erreur dont serait entachée la décision de l’adjudi- cateur est une erreur de fait manifeste et dominante, le régime ne prévoit qu’un seul palier de révision interne. si l’erreur reprochée consiste en un défaut d’appliquer le modèle du péi aux faits de l’affaire, on peut recourir à deux paliers de révision interne. [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge abella 237 [12] jw’s claim is a standard track claim. that en- titled him to an in- person hearing and the possibility of two levels of internal review. there is, however, no right of appeal to the courts. [13] because the agreement constitutes the settle- ment of ongoing actions, judicial approval was re- quired. the parties brought the proposed settlement to the superior courts for approval, and between de- cember 2006 and january 2007, nine provincial and territorial superior courts approved the agreement through approval orders. [14] ontario was the first jurisdiction to approve the agreement, subject to certain conditions, in de- cember 2006. in baxter v. canada (attorney general) (2006), 83 or (3d) 481 (scj), the decision ac- companying the first approval order, winkler rsj. emphasized the enduring, harmful legacy of residen- tial schools which ultimately led to the agreement: for over 100 years, canada pursued a policy of requir- ing the attendance of aboriginal children at residential schools, which were largely operated by religious organ- izations under the supervision of the federal government. the children were required to reside at these institutions, in isolation from their families and communities, for var- ying periods of time. this policy was finally terminated in 1996 with the closing of the last of the residential schools and has now been widely acknowledged as a seriously flawed failure. in its attempts to address the damage in- flicted by, or as a result of, this long- standing policy, the settlement is intended to offer a measure of closure for the former residents of the schools and their families. [12] la demande de jw relève du volet ordinaire. il avait donc droit à une audience en personne et à la possibilité de deux paliers de révision interne. il n’avait cependant pas le droit d’interjeter appel devant les tribunaux. [13] puisque la convention constitue le règlement d’actions en instance, il était nécessaire d’obtenir une approbation judiciaire. les parties ont soumis le règlement proposé aux cours supérieures pour approbation et, en décembre 2006 et janvier 2007, neuf cours supérieures provinciales et territoriales ont approuvé la convention par le biais d’ordon- nances d’approbation. [14] l’ontario a été la première province à approu- ver la convention, sous réserve de certaines condi- tions, en décembre 2006. dans baxter c. canada (attorney general) (2006), 83 or (3d) 481 (csj), la décision accompagnant la première ordonnance d’approbation, le juge winkler a insisté sur les sé- quelles durables laissées par les pensionnats indiens à l’origine de la convention : [traduction] pendant plus de 100 ans, le canada a pratiqué une politique obligeant les enfants autochtones à fréquenter des pensionnats qui étaient en grande partie gérés par des organisations religieuses sous la supervision du gouvernement fédéral. les enfants étaient forcés de vivre dans ces établissements, isolés de leurs familles et de leurs communautés, pendant des périodes plus ou moins longues. cette politique, dont il a depuis été largement re- connu qu’elle était un grave échec, a finalement été abolie en 1996 avec la fermeture du dernier pensionnat indien. par les mesures qu’il prévoit en vue de réparer les torts causés par cette politique qui a été en vigueur pendant une aussi longue période, le règlement vise à aider les anciens résidents des pensionnats et leur famille à tourner la page. the flaws and failures of the policy and its implemen- tation are at the root of the allegations of harm suffered by the class members. upon review by the royal commission on aboriginal peoples, it was found that the children were removed from their families and communities to serve the purpose of carrying out a “concerted campaign to obliterate” the “habits and associations” of “aboriginal languages, traditions and beliefs”, in order to accomplish “a radical re- socialization” aimed at instilling the chil- dren instead with the values of euro- centric civilization. the proposed settlement represents an effort to provide les lacunes et les failles de cette politique et de sa mise en œuvre sont à l’origine des allégations de sévices subis par les membres du groupe. la commission royale sur les peuples autochtones a constaté que des enfants avaient été extirpés de leurs familles et de leurs communautés dans le cadre d’une « campagne concertée [  ] pour faire disparaître les habitudes, les souvenirs, les langues, les traditions et les croyances autochtones » dans le but de réaliser un « projet de resocialisation radicale » visant à inculquer aux enfants les valeurs d’une civilisation eu- rocentrique. le règlement proposé se veut une mesure 238 j.w v canada (attorney general) abella j. [2019] 2 scr. a measure of closure and, accordingly, has incorporated elements which provide both compensation to individuals and broader relief intended to address the harm suffered by the aboriginal community at large. [emphasis added; paras 2-3] [15] as winkler rsj emphasized, given the goals of the agreement, significant and ongoing judicial supervision was necessary. as he said, supervising courts must “ensur[e] that the administration and implementation of the settlement are done in a man- ner that delivers the promised benefits to the class members   . once the court is engaged, it cannot abdicate its responsibilities” (baxter, at para 12). additionally, “the court must be in a position to effectively evaluate the administration and the per- formance of the administrator and, further, be em- powered to effect any changes that it finds necessary to ensure that the benefits promised under the settle- ment are being delivered” (para 51). [16] winkler rsj stressed that, as in all class actions, the courts must strive to protect the class members and ensure that the benefits they agreed to are actually delivered. in order to deliver effi- cient, coordinated judicial supervision of the multi- jurisdictional agreement, he suggested that each supervising court approve a court administration protocol. [17] the approval orders in all other provinces were substantially similar, and stated that superior court judges were entitled to hear “requests for di- rections” with respect to the ongoing administration and implementation of the agreement. paragraph 31 of the manitoba approval order, for example, states: concrète visant à aider les victimes à tourner la page et elle intègre par conséquent des aspects qui prévoient à la fois l’indemnisation des individus et des mesures de réparation plus larges visant à réparer les torts subis par la communauté autochtone dans son ensemble. [italiques ajoutés; par 2-3] [15] comme le juge winkler l’a souligné, compte tenu des objectifs de la convention, une surveillance judiciaire continue et rigoureuse était nécessaire. ainsi qu’il l’a déclaré, les tribunaux de surveillance doivent [traduction] « veiller à ce que l’adminis- tration et la mise en œuvre du règlement se fassent de manière à procurer les avantages promis aux membres du groupe [  ]. une fois engagé, le tribu- nal ne peut se soustraire à ses obligations » (baxter, par 12). de plus, « le tribunal doit être en mesure d’évaluer efficacement la gestion et le rendement de l’administrateur et être habilité à effectuer tout chan- gement qu’il juge nécessaire pour s’assurer que les avantages promis par le règlement sont effectivement accordés » (par 51). [16] le juge winkler a insisté sur le fait que, comme pour tout autre recours collectif, le tribunal doit s’efforcer de protéger les membres du groupe et veiller à ce que les avantages sur lesquels ils se sont entendus leur soient effectivement accordés. afin d’assurer la surveillance judiciaire efficace et coordonnée de la convention, qui ressortit à la compétence de plusieurs tribunaux, le juge winkler a suggéré que chaque tribunal de surveillance ap- prouve un protocole des tribunaux régissant l’admi- nistration de l’entente. [17] les ordonnances d’approbation de toutes les autres provinces étaient essentiellement semblables et prévoyaient que les juges des cours supérieures avaient le droit d’instruire des « demandes de di- rectives » concernant l’administration et la mise en œuvre continues de la convention. l’article 31 de l’ordonnance d’approbation du manitoba prévoit par exemple ce qui suit : [traduction] this court declares that the representative plaintiffs, defendants, released church organizations, la cour déclare que les représentants des deman- deurs, les défendeurs, les organismes religieux quittancés, [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge abella 239 class counsel, the national administration committee, or the trustee, or such other person or entity as this court may allow, after fully exhausting the dispute resolution mechanisms contemplated in the agreement, may apply to the court for directions in respect of the implementation, administration or amendment of the agreement or the implementation of this judgment on notice to all affected parties, all in conformity with the terms of the agreement. [emphasis added.] the inclusion of the requests for directions pro- vision in the approval orders contemplates that recourse to the courts is possible in circumstances where all internal mechanisms have been exhausted and directions are needed about the implementation of the agreement. [18] the effect of the approval orders in the prov- inces was the certification of the actions as a class proceeding, subject to certain changes being made to the agreement. les avocats du recours collectif, le comité d’administration national ou le fiduciaire, ou toute autre personne ou entité autorisée par la cour, peuvent, après avoir épuisé tous les mécanismes de règlement des différends prévus par la convention, s’adresser au tribunal pour obtenir des directives sur la mise en application, l’administration ou la modification de la convention ou la mise en œuvre du présent jugement après avis à toutes les parties concernées, le tout conformément aux modalités de la convention. [italiques ajoutés.] l’inclusion dans les ordonnances d’approbation d’une disposition relative à la possibilité de deman- der des directives au tribunal fait en sorte qu’il est possible de recourir aux tribunaux lorsque tous les mécanismes de règlement des différends internes ont été épuisés et qu’il est nécessaire de demander des directives au sujet de la mise en application de la convention. [18] les ordonnances d’approbation qui ont été rendues dans les provinces ont eu pour effet d’at- tester les actions en tant que recours collectif, sous réserve de certaines modifications apportées à la convention. [19] by march 2007, all nine provincial and ter- ritorial jurisdictions implicated by the agreement took the next step and implemented the agreement by court orders. these implementation orders incor- porated the agreement and addressed issues relating to its administration. [19] en mars 2007, les neuf provinces et territoires visés par la convention avaient tous franchi l’étape suivante et mis en œuvre la convention au moyen d’ordonnances judiciaires. ces ordonnances de mise en œuvre incorporaient la convention et abordaient certaines questions concernant son administration. [20] notably, the manitoba implementation order concludes by stating that “the courts shall supervise the implementation of the agreement and this order and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may issue such further and ancillary orders, from time to time, as are necessary to implement and enforce the provisions of the agreement” (para 23). [20] fait à noter, l’ordonnance de mise en œuvre du manitoba se termine par le passage suivant : [tra- duction] « la cour supervisera la mise en œuvre de la convention et de la présente ordonnance et, sans limiter la portée générale de ce qui précède, elle peut rendre les autres ordonnances et ordonnances acces- soires nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre et exécuter les modalités de la convention » (par 23). [21] as proposed by winkler rsj in baxter, a court administration protocol was appended to each province’s implementation order, stating that two administrative judges would be appointed to work in conjunction with the supervising judges from each province to oversee the administration [21] comme le juge winkler l’a proposé dans la décision baxter, un protocole des tribunaux régis- sant l’administration de la convention a été annexé à l’ordonnance de mise en œuvre de chaque pro- vince pour préciser que deux juges administratifs seraient nommés pour travailler de concert avec les 240 j.w v canada (attorney general) abella j. [2019] 2 scr. and implementation of the agreement. the protocol stated that each request for directions brought by a party would be first made to one of the two administrative judges, who would then direct it to a supervising judge for a hearing if necessary. [22] supplemented by the applicable class pro- ceedings regime in each affected province and ter- ritory, and the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts, the approval and implementation orders gave the courts broad supervisory and administra- tive authority in overseeing the application and im- plementation of the agreement. this authority was integral to the agreement’s goal of addressing the serious harms caused by residential schools and was a fundamental precondition to judicial endorse- ment. ongoing judicial supervision was seen to be necessary to ensure that the benefits promised to the claimants — benefits for which they relinquished their litigation rights — were delivered in accordance with the terms of the agreement (baxter, at paras. 12 and 51). juges surveillants de chaque province afin de sur- veiller l’administration et la mise en œuvre de la convention. le protocole déclarait que chaque de- mande de directives présentée par une partie serait d’abord soumise à l’un des deux juges administratifs, qui se chargerait de la transmettre ensuite à un juge surveillant qui tiendrait au besoin une audience. [22] complétées par les règles de droit applicables sur les recours collectifs de tous les territoires et pro- vinces touchés ainsi que la compétence inhérente des cours supérieures, les ordonnances d’approbation et de mise en œuvre confèrent aux tribunaux de vastes pouvoirs de surveillance et d’administration en ce qui concerne l’encadrement de l’application et de la mise en œuvre de la convention. ces pouvoirs fai- saient partie intégrante de l’objectif de la convention de s’attaquer aux graves séquelles laissées par les pensionnats indiens et constituaient une condition préalable fondamentale à toute approbation judi- ciaire. une surveillance judiciaire continue était ju- gée nécessaire pour veiller à ce que les avantages promis aux demandeurs — avantages en contrepartie desquels ils avaient renoncé à leur droit de s’adresser aux tribunaux — leur soient accordés conformément aux modalités de la convention (baxter, par. 12 et 51). [23] this history demonstrates the foundational link between judicial supervision and the agreement. the existence of the agreement was contingent on judicial approval, and judicial approval, in turn, was contingent on ongoing judicial supervision. [23] ce survol historique démontre le lien fonda- mental qui existe entre la surveillance judiciaire et la convention. l’existence de la convention était su- bordonnée à l’approbation judiciaire, laquelle dépen- dait à son tour d’une surveillance judiciaire continue. [24] the ontario court of appeal explained how this ongoing judicial supervision should be exercised in fontaine v. duboff edwards haight & schachter (2012), 111 or (3d) 461 (schachter). the decision concerned a legal fee dispute, which came to the courts by way of a request for directions. while concluding that judicial review in the administra- tive law sense was unavailable, the court of appeal described the appropriate scope of judicial recourse. rouleau ja acknowledged that adjudicators “can- not ignore” the provisions of the implementation orders, and that they must apply the relevant factors in the agreement. but in his view, “[i]n the perhaps unlikely event that the final decision of the chief [24] la cour d’appel de l’ontario a expliqué, dans fontaine c. duboff edwards haight & schachter (2012), 111 or (3d) 461 (schachter), les modalités d’exercice de cette surveillance judiciaire continue. cet arrêt portait sur un litige relatif à des frais juri- diques, dont les tribunaux avaient été saisis par le biais d’une demande de directives. tout en concluant qu’il n’y avait pas ouverture au contrôle judiciaire au sens du droit administratif, la cour d’appel a expliqué la portée qu’il convient de donner au re- cours judiciaire. le juge rouleau a reconnu que les adjudicateurs [traduction] « ne peuvent ignorer » les dispositions des ordonnances de mise en œuvre et qu’ils sont tenus d’appliquer les facteurs requis par la [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge abella 241 adjudicator reflects a failure to consider the terms of the [agreement] and implementation orders    then, in my view, the parties to the [agreement] intended that there be some judicial recourse” (para 53). he found that this judicial recourse was necessary to ensure that the bargain the parties agreed to was respected, a critical consideration given the vul- nerability of the claimants. however, he held that judicial recourse was limited to “very exceptional circumstances” because the parties intended that the implementation of the agreement be expeditious and the agreement aimed to achieve finality. [25] the ontario court of appeal returned to the scope of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction in fon- taine v. canada (attorney general) (2017), 137 or. (3d) 90, and concluded that the “exceptional cir- cumstances” threshold applied to iap adjudicative decisions. writing for the court, sharpe ja held that supervising judges should not conduct “a detailed review of the factual findings made by the adjudica- tor” because that would allow judges to usurp the role of iap review adjudicators (para 55). disagreement with the result reached does not amount to a failure to apply or enforce the agreement. [26] the british columbia court of appeal also adopted the “exceptional circumstances” thresh- old in nn v. canada (attorney general) (2018), 6 bclr (6th) 335. in that case, the majority con- cluded that exceptional circumstances exist if there is a “gap” in the agreement. the inability of adjudi- cators to reopen concluded claims in circumstances where there was new, material evidence was one such “gap”, and therefore an “exceptional circumstance” warranting judicial intervention. convention. mais selon lui, « [d]ans le cas peu pro- bable où la décision finale de l’adjudicateur en chef révèle qu’il n’a pas tenu compte des modalités de la [convention] et des ordonnances de mise en œuvre [  ] les parties [à la convention] voulaient selon moi qu’il y ait un recours judiciaire » (par 53). il a conclu que ce recours judiciaire était nécessaire pour s’assurer que l’entente intervenue entre les parties soit respectée, ce qui était un facteur essentiel compte tenu de la vulnérabilité des demandeurs. il a toutefois jugé que le recours judiciaire ne pouvait être exercé que dans des « circonstances très exceptionnelles » parce que les parties souhaitaient que la mise en œuvre de la convention soit expéditive et que la convention vise à créer un processus juridictionnel ayant un caractère définitif. [25] la cour d’appel de l’ontario s’est penchée de nouveau sur la portée du pouvoir de surveillance des tribunaux dans l’arrêt fontaine c. canada (attorney general) (2017), 137 or (3d) 90, où elle a conclu que le critère préalable des « circonstances excep- tionnelles » s’appliquait aux décisions juridiction- nelles rendues dans le cadre du péi. s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel, le juge sharpe a conclu que les juges surveillants ne devaient pas procéder à [traduction] « un examen détaillé des conclusions de fait tirées par l’adjudicateur » parce qu’ils s’ar- rogeraient alors le rôle des adjudicateurs de révision du péi (par 55). ce n’est pas parce que le tribunal n’est pas d’accord avec la décision qui a été rendue que la convention n’a pas été appliquée ou exécutée. [26] la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a également adopté le critère préalable des « cir- constances exceptionnelles » dans nn c. canada (attorney general) (2018), 6 bclr (6th) 335. dans cet arrêt, la majorité a conclu à l’existence de circonstances exceptionnelles si une « lacune » était constatée dans la convention. l’impossibilité pour les adjudicateurs de rouvrir des réclamations réglées lorsqu’il existe de nouveaux éléments de preuve substantiels constituait une telle « lacune » et, partant, une « circonstance exceptionnelle » justifiant une intervention judiciaire. [27] the appellate authorities in ontario and brit- ish columbia have thus indicated that courts may [27] les juridictions d’appel de l’ontario et de la colombie- britannique se sont par conséquent dites 242 j.w v canada (attorney general) abella j. [2019] 2 scr. intervene in relation to iap adjudications when exceptional circumstances are present, a threshold which is met if there is either a failure to apply the terms of the agreement, including the approval and implementation orders, or if there is a “gap” in the agreement. [28] i agree that there are compelling reasons for setting a high bar for judicial intervention in the iap context. the parties went to significant lengths to make the agreement a “complete code”, with spe- cialized training for adjudicators, levels of internal review, the creation of an iap oversight committee responsible for monitoring the implementation of the iap and the absence of any provision granting court access in the context of standard track iap decisions. d’avis que les tribunaux pouvaient intervenir à l’égard des décisions prises dans le cadre du péi en présence de circonstances exceptionnelles, ajoutant que ce cri- tère préalable était rempli soit en cas de défaut d’ap- plication des modalités de la convention, y compris des ordonnances d’approbation et de mise en œuvre, soit en cas de « lacune » constatée dans la convention. [28] je conviens qu’il existe des raisons impé- rieuses de fixer des exigences rigoureuses pour enca- drer l’intervention judiciaire dans le contexte du péi. les parties se sont donné beaucoup de mal pour faire de la convention un « code complet » en prévoyant une formation spécialisée pour les adjudicateurs, divers paliers de révision interne, la création d’un comité de surveillance du péi chargé d’encadrer la mise en application du péi et l’absence de toute disposition accordant l’accès aux tribunaux dans le cas des décisions relevant du volet ordinaire du péi. [29] on the other hand, the necessity of ongo- ing judicial supervision was recognized when the agreement was approved, as noted by winkler rsj. in baxter. [29] en revanche, la nécessité d’une surveillance judiciaire continue a été reconnue lorsque la con- vention a été approuvée, comme l’a fait remarquer le juge winkler dans baxter. [30] without ongoing judicial supervision, the agreement would not have been recognized. in over- seeing the administration and implementation of the agreement, therefore, courts have a duty to ensure that the claimants receive the benefits they bargained for. the provisions of the approval and implemen- tation orders contemplate ongoing recourse to the courts, with judges supervising the agreement to ensure that the implementation and administration of the agreement take place in the way the parties agreed. [30] sans surveillance judiciaire continue, la con- vention n’aurait pas été reconnue. donc, lorsqu’ils supervisent l’administration et la mise en œuvre de la convention, les tribunaux ont l’obligation de s’assurer que les demandeurs reçoivent les avantages qu’ils ont négociés. les dispositions des ordonnances d’appro- bation et de mise en œuvre prévoient la possibilité de recourir de façon permanente aux tribunaux et chargent les juges de surveiller la convention pour s’assurer que sa mise en œuvre et son administration s’effectuent conformément à l’entente intervenue entre les parties. [31] while the parties do not have a broad right to judicial intervention, they do have a right to the implementation of the terms of the settlement they bargained for. judicial supervision plays a critical role in ensuring that the claimants receive the bene- fits that they were promised. the obligations in the agreement must be read in light of the agreement’s spirit — to address the “damage inflicted by, or as a result of, [canada’s] long- standing [residential schools] policy” (baxter, at para 2). [31] bien que les parties n’aient pas le droit gé- néral de s’adresser aux tribunaux, elles possèdent effectivement le droit de faire exécuter les modalités du règlement qu’elles ont négocié. la surveillance judiciaire joue un rôle essentiel pour s’assurer que les demandeurs obtiennent les avantages qui leur ont été promis. les obligations de la convention doivent être interprétées en fonction de l’esprit de la convention : réparer [traduction] « les torts causés par, ou impu- tables à, la politique [des pensionnats indiens] qui a été en vigueur longtemps [au canada] » (baxter, par 2). [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge abella 243 analysis analyse [32] the question in this appeal is when judges, exercising their supervisory role, should intervene in an iap adjudication. schachter provides a use- ful starting point — judges should intervene when there is a failure to apply or implement the terms of the agreement. unauthorized modifications of the agreement are encompassed by this threshold. if an adjudicator changes the terms or requirements of the plain language of the agreement, this will amount to a failure to apply or implement the terms of the agreement.1 courts have a duty to ensure that the agreement is implemented in accordance with the intentions of the parties as reflected in the agreement’s terms. in determining whether an adju- dicative decision rises to this threshold, supervising judges should be guided by the plain language of the agreement, viewed in light of its remedial, benefit- conferring objectives. [33] given the purposes of the agreement and the ongoing supervisory powers built into the settlement, i do not, with respect, agree with the manitoba court of appeal’s decision in this case that so long as the adjudicator refers to the relevant sections of the iap, there is no basis upon which a supervising judge can intervene, regardless of how these sections are interpreted or applied. reading “apply” and “imple- ment” so narrowly prevents any meaningful judicial supervision of iap decisions. in light of the purposes of the agreement, which include achieving “a fair, comprehensive and lasting resolution of the legacy of indian residential schools” and a “promotion of healing, education, truth and reconciliation and commemoration”2, such an approach reduces judicial supervision to a search for ensuring that the right section of the iap is applied, rather than ensuring that the rights promised by the section are being delivered. [32] la question qui se pose en l’espèce est de savoir dans quels cas un juge exerçant sa fonction de surveillance devrait intervenir dans un dossier du péi. l’arrêt schachter constitue un bon point de départ : le juge devrait intervenir lorsqu’il y a eu dé- faut d’appliquer ou de mettre en œuvre les modalités de la convention. les modifications non autorisées de la convention relèvent de ce critère préalable. si l’adjudicateur modifie les modalités ou les exi- gences du texte clair de la convention, il y a défaut d’appliquer ou de mettre en œuvre les dispositions de la convention1. les tribunaux ont l’obligation de veiller à ce que la convention soit mise en œuvre conformément à l’intention des parties, telle que cette intention a été exprimée dans les modalités de la convention. pour déterminer si une décision juri- dictionnelle satisfait à ce critère préalable, les juges surveillants doivent s’en tenir au libellé clair de la convention, eu égard à ses objectifs réparateurs et aux avantages qu’elle est censée procurer. [33] étant donné les objectifs de la convention et les pouvoirs de surveillance continue prévus par le règlement, je ne suis, avec égards, pas d’accord avec la décision rendue en l’espèce par la cour d’appel du manitoba selon laquelle, dès lors que l’adju- dicateur mentionne les articles pertinents du péi, rien ne permet au juge surveillant d’intervenir, peu importe comment ces articles sont interprétés ou appliqués. donner une interprétation aussi étroite des termes « appliquer » et « mettre en œuvre » empêche toute véritable surveillance judiciaire des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi. compte tenu des objectifs de la convention, notamment de ceux de « résoudre pour de bon et de manière juste et globale les séquelles laissées par les pensionnats indiens » et de « promouvoir la guérison, l’éducation, la vérité, la réconciliation et la commémoration »2, une telle approche réduirait la surveillance judiciaire à la recherche de l’application du bon article du péi plutôt qu’au respect des droits garantis par l’article applicable. 1 adjudicators are bound by the standard for compensable wrongs and for the assessment of compensation as defined in the iap (art ii). 1 les adjudicateurs doivent appliquer la norme relative aux sévices indemnisables et celle concernant l’évaluation de l’indemnité établies par le péi (art ii). 2 see b and c in the recitals of the agreement. 2 voir points b et c de l’attendu de la convention. 244 j.w v canada (attorney general) abella j. [2019] 2 scr. [34] while finality and expediency are important goals, it is also crucial to recognize that claimants agreed to forfeit their litigation rights by not opt- ing out of the agreement. given this trade- off, it is paramount that the agreed- upon terms of the iap model are applied and implemented in a way that is consistent with the parties’ intentions. the courts’ supervisory power must permit intervention when it is necessary to ensure that the benefits promised are delivered. [35] judges, in short, have an ongoing duty to su- pervise the administration and implementation of the agreement, including the iap. in exercising this su- pervisory role in the requests for directions context, judges can intervene if there has been a failure to apply and implement the terms of the agreement. in determining whether this failure exists, supervising judges will focus on the words of the agreement, so that the benefits promised to the class members are delivered. [36] in this case, jw’s claim fell under the iap category “sl1.4”, which is defined in the agreement as: any touching of a student, including touching with an object, by an adult employee or other adult lawfully on the premises which exceeds recognized parental contact and violates the sexual integrity of the student. [34] bien que le caractère définitif des décisions et la célérité du processus soient des objectifs im- portants, il est également essentiel de reconnaître que les demandeurs ont accepté de renoncer à leur droit de s’adresser aux tribunaux en ne se retirant pas de la convention. vu ce compromis, il est primor- dial que les modalités convenues du modèle du péi soient appliquées et mises en œuvre conformément à l’intention des parties. le pouvoir de surveillance des tribunaux doit permettre l’intervention judiciaire lorsque celle-ci est nécessaire pour s’assurer que les parties obtiennent effectivement les avantages qui leur ont été promis. [35] bref, les juges ont le devoir permanent de surveiller l’administration et la mise en œuvre de la convention, y compris du péi. lorsqu’ils exercent cette fonction de surveillance dans le cadre d’une demande de directives, les juges peuvent intervenir en cas de défaut d’appliquer et de mettre en œuvre les modalités de la convention. pour décider s’il y a eu pareil défaut, le juge surveillant se concentre sur le libellé de la convention, pour que les avantages promis aux membres du groupe leur soient effecti- vement accordés. [36] dans le cas qui nous occupe, la réclamation présentée par jw relevait de la catégorie « sl1.4 » du péi, laquelle est définie comme suit dans la convention : tout contact physique avec un élève, avec ou sans objet, par un employé ou un autre adulte autorisé à être présent sur les lieux, qui excède les normes généralement re- connues de contact physique parental et viole l’intégrité sexuelle de l’étudiant. [37] jw’s claim was rejected by the hearing ad- judicator because, despite the fact that she believed jw’s account of what transpired, she was not satis- fied on a balance of probabilities that the perpetrator acted with a sexual purpose when committing the act in question. this was fatal to jw’s case because iap adjudicators “must be satisfied in regard to any allegation of sexual abuse that what took place was done for a sexual purpose” (para 24). in so hold- ing, the hearing adjudicator relied on this court’s decision in r v. chase, [1987] 2 scr 293. sexual [37] la demande de jw a été rejetée par l’adjudi- catrice d’audition parce que, même si elle ajoutait foi au récit des faits de jw, elle n’était pas convaincue selon la prépondérance des probabilités que l’auteure avait agi dans un but sexuel lorsqu’elle avait commis l’acte en question. cette conclusion portait un coup fatal à la demande de jw puisque les adjudicateurs du péi [traduction] « doivent être convaincus, s’agissant de toute allégation d’agression sexuelle, que les actes reprochés ont été commis dans un but sexuel » (par 24). pour rendre cette décision, [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge abella 245 purpose, she held, was a technical requirement of sl14. [38] jw applied for a review of the hearing ad- judicator’s decision. the review adjudicator con- cluded that the hearing adjudicator did not misapply sl1.4 by requiring jw to establish the perpetrator’s sexual purpose. jw’s request for re- review was sim- ilarly unsuccessful. the re- review adjudicator held that the review adjudicator had not misapplied the iap model. having exhausted his internal reme- dies, jw brought a request for directions to the supervising judge, edmond j. l’adjudicatrice s’est fondée sur l’arrêt rendu par notre cour dans r c. chase, [1987] 2 rcs 293. l’adjudicatrice a estimé que le but sexuel constituait une exigence technique de la catégorie sl14. [38] jw a demandé la révision de la décision de l’adjudicatrice d’audition. l’adjudicateur de révision a conclu que l’adjudicatrice d’audition n’avait pas mal appliqué la catégorie sl1.4 en exigeant que jw établisse la motivation sexuelle de l’auteure de l’acte. la demande de deuxième révision présentée par jw a également été rejetée. l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision a conclu que l’adjudicateur de révision n’avait pas mal appliqué le modèle du péi. après avoir épuisé tous les recours internes, jw a présenté une demande de directives au juge surveil- lant, le juge edmond. [39] the supervising judge, edmond j described his role in the following terms: [39] le juge surveillant, le juge edmond, a expli- qué son rôle dans les termes suivants :   . i have the power to review the decision of the re- review adjudicator to determine whether she failed to apply the terms of the [agreement] and specifically the iap compensation rules. i accept that this is a limited form of curial review, reserved for exceptional cases, and that i must ensure that i do not engage in rewriting the [agreement] by effectively giving the requestors a right of appeal and/or review for which they did not bargain. [para. 35] [traduction]    j’ai le pouvoir de réviser la décision ren- due par l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision pour décider si elle a omis d’appliquer les modalités de la [convention] et, plus précisément, les règles d’indemnisation du péi. je reconnais qu’il s’agit d’une forme limitée d’examen judiciaire, réservé aux cas exceptionnels, et que je dois m’assurer de ne pas récrire la [convention] en accordant effectivement aux demandeurs un droit d’appel et/ou de révision qu’ils n’ont pas négocié. [par. 35] edmond j went on to describe the standard of re- view for a request for directions as “ensuring that the re- review adjudicator did not endorse a legal interpretation that is so unreasonable that it amounts to a failure to properly apply the iap to the facts of a particular case” (para 40). le juge edmond a poursuivi en expliquant que la norme de contrôle applicable dans le cas d’une demande de directives consistait à [traduction] « s’assurer que l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision n’a pas adopté une interprétation légale qui est si déraisonnable qu’elle équivaut au défaut d’appliquer correctement le péi aux faits d’une affaire donnée » (par 40). [40] edmond j found three errors warranting judi- cial intervention: the hearing adjudicator replaced the words “any touching” in sl1.4 with the words “sexual touching”; the hearing adjudicator imported a requirement of sexual intent on the part of the perpetrator, contrary to the plain language of sl1.4; and, the hearing adjudicator incorrectly interpreted this court’s decision in chase as requiring a sexual [40] le juge edmond a relevé trois erreurs justifiant l’intervention judiciaire : l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait remplacé les mots « [t]out contact physique » à la catégorie sl1.4 par les mots [traduction] « contact sexuel »; l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait ajouté une exigence d’intention sexuelle de la part de l’auteure de l’acte, contrairement au libellé clair de la catégorie sl1.4; elle avait mal interprété l’arrêt 246 j.w v canada (attorney general) abella j. [2019] 2 scr. purpose as a necessary element of proving an act of sexual abuse. [41] the hearing adjudicator described the ques- tion before her as “whether or not the incident was sexual touching which exceeded recognized parental conduct”. as edmond j correctly noted, there is no requirement for the impugned touching to be “sexual” in sl14. he also properly noted that the formulation relied upon by the hearing adjudicator leads to the illogical proposition that there could be sexual touching which does not exceed the parame- ters of recognized parental conduct. [42] i agree with edmond j that the hearing ad- judicator’s added requirement of “sexual” touching amounted to an unauthorized amendment to the iap, and the improper addition of a new threshold in the language of sl14. this constituted a failure to apply and implement the agreement. [43] in describing what jw needed to establish in order to demonstrate that the touching violated the sexual integrity of the student, the hearing ad- judicator also stated that “[i]n this process an adju- dicator must be satisfied in regard to any allegations of sexual abuse that what took place was done for a sexual purpose”. as edmond j observed, nothing in the plain language of sl1.4 indicates that the sexual intent of the perpetrator is relevant and that “[c]learly, and on a simple plain- language analysis, a child’s sexual integrity can be violated without a perpetrator having any sexual intent whatsoever” (para 48). chase de notre cour en estimant qu’il exigeait un but sexuel comme élément nécessaire à la preuve de l’agression sexuelle. [41] selon l’adjudicatrice d’audition, la question dont elle était saisie était [traduction]  «  celle de savoir si les actes reprochés constituaient des contacts sexuels qui excèdent les normes généra- lement reconnues de contact physique parental ». comme le juge edmond l’a fait observer à juste titre, la catégorie sl14 n’exige pas que le contact reproché soit d’ordre « sexuel ». il a également si- gnalé à bon droit que la formulation sur laquelle se fondait l’adjudicatrice menait à la proposition illo- gique selon laquelle il pouvait y avoir des contacts sexuels qui n’excèdent pas les paramètres reconnus de conduite parentale. [42] je suis d’accord avec le juge edmond pour dire qu’en ajoutant l’exigence que les contacts soient « sexuels », l’adjudicatrice d’audition a modifié le péi sans y être autorisée et qu’elle a inséré de façon illégitime à la catégorie sl1.4 une nouvelle condi- tion préalable. cette façon d’agir constitue un défaut d’appliquer et de mettre en œuvre la convention. [43] pour expliquer ce que j.w devait établir pour démontrer que les contacts violaient l’intégrité sexuelle de l’élève, l’adjudicatrice d’audition a éga- lement déclaré : [traduction] « dans le cadre de ce processus, l’adjudicateur doit être convaincu, s’agis- sant de toute allégation d’agression sexuelle, que les actes reprochés ont été commis dans un but sexuel ». comme l’a fait observer le juge edmond, rien dans le libellé clair de la catégorie sl1.4 n’indique que l’in- tention sexuelle de l’auteur de l’acte est pertinente et que [traduction] « [d]e toute évidence, une analyse du libellé clair et simple de la catégorie sl1.4 montre que l’intégrité sexuelle de l’enfant peut être violée sans que l’auteur de l’acte ait eu la moindre intention sexuelle » (par 48). [44] the effect of these two errors is the same: the hearing adjudicator’s decision constituted an unauthorized modification of sl14. by substituting the phrase “any touching” with “sexual touching” and by adding a requirement of sexual intent unsup- ported by the language of the provision, the hearing [44] l’effet des deux erreurs qu’elle a commises est le même : la décision de l’adjudicatrice d’au- dition constituait une modification non autorisée de la catégorie  sl1.4 en remplaçant les termes « [t]out contact physique » par les mots [traduc- tion] « contact sexuel » et en ajoutant une exigence [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge abella 247 adjudicator relied on additional requirements that were not agreed to by the parties. the unauthorized modifications of the iap model amounted to a failure to apply or implement the terms of the agreement, warranting judicial supervisory intervention to en- sure that the benefits promised in the agreement were delivered. [45] these errors were compounded by the hear- ing adjudicator’s misinterpretation of this court’s decision in chase, the third and final error identi- fied by edmond j. chase dealt with the meaning of “sexual assault” in the criminal code, rsc 1985, c c-46. the court stated that “[s]exual assault is an assault    which is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature, such that the sexual integrity of the victim is violated” (p 302). d’intention sexuelle que le libellé de la disposition ne justifiait pas, l’adjudicatrice d’audition s’est fondée sur des exigences supplémentaires dont les parties n’avaient pas convenu. les modifications non auto- risées ainsi apportées au modèle du péi constituaient un défaut d’appliquer ou de mettre en œuvre les mo- dalités de la convention qui justifiait l’intervention du tribunal de surveillance pour s’assurer que les avantages promis dans la convention sont effecti- vement accordés. [45] l’adjudicatrice d’audition a aggravé ces er- reurs en interprétant mal l’arrêt chase de notre cour. il s’agit de la troisième et dernière erreur relevée par le juge edmond. l’arrêt chase portait sur le sens de l’expression « agression sexuelle » dans le code cri- minel, lrc 1985, c c-46. la cour a affirmé que « [l]’agression sexuelle est une agression [  ] qui est commise dans des circonstances de nature sexuelle, de manière à porter atteinte à l’intégrité sexuelle de la victime » (p 302). [46] the facts of chase were as follows. the ac- cused was a neighbour of the complainant, a 15- year- old girl. he entered the complainant’s home, where she was playing pool with her 11- year-old brother, grabbed her around her shoulders and arms, and grabbed her breasts. eventually, the complainant and her brother were able to call another neighbour for help. [46] les faits de l’affaire chase étaient les sui- vants. l’accusé était un voisin de la plaignante, une fille âgée de 15 ans. il s’est introduit dans le domicile de la plaignante où celle-ci jouait au billard avec son frère de 11 ans. il l’a agrippée par les épaules et les bras et lui a saisi les seins. la plaignante et son frère ont fini par téléphoner à un autre voisin pour demander de l’aide. [47] the accused was convicted of sexual assault in provincial court. his appeal to the court of appeal of new brunswick was dismissed, but a conviction of common assault was substituted for the sexual assault conviction. in making this substitution, the court of appeal held that the word “sexual” in sexual assault should be understood as referring to specific parts of the body — genitalia in particular. body parts with “secondary sexual characteristics” — like breasts — were not encompassed by this definition. [47] l’accusé a été reconnu coupable d’agres- sion sexuelle en cour provinciale. la cour d’appel du nouveau- brunswick a rejeté son appel, mais a substitué un verdict de culpabilité de voies de fait simple à sa déclaration de culpabilité pour agression sexuelle. pour justifier cette substitution, la cour d’appel a expliqué que le qualificatif « sexuelle » dans l’expression « agression sexuelle » devait être interprété comme visant des parties précises du corps, en particulier les organes génitaux. d’autres parties de l’anatomie ayant « des caractéristiques sexuelles secondaires » — comme les seins — ne répondaient pas à cette définition. [48] mcintyre j., writing for this court, rejected the view that sexual assault was confined to “con- tact with specific areas of the human anatomy” and [48] le juge mcintyre, qui s’exprimait au nom de notre cour, a rejeté l’opinion que l’agression sexuelle se limitait au « contact avec des parties précises de 248 j.w v canada (attorney general) abella j. [2019] 2 scr. concluded that the test for sexual assault should be objective: l’anatomie » et estimé que le critère applicable en matière d’agression sexuelle devait être objectif : applying these principles and the authorities cited, i would make the following observations. sexual assault is an assault within any one of the definitions of that concept in s. 244(1) of the criminal code which is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature, such that the sexual integrity of the victim is violated. the test to be applied in determining whether the impugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature is an objective one: “viewed in the light of all the circumstances, is the sexual or carnal context of the assault visible to a reasonable observer” (taylor, supra, per laycraft cja, at p 269). the part of the body touched, the nature of the contact, the situation in which it occurred, the words and gestures accompa- nying the act, and all other circumstances surrounding the conduct, including threats which may or may not be accompanied by force, will be relevant (see s j usprich, “a new crime in old battles: definitional problems with sexual assault” (1987), 29 crim. lq 200, at p 204). the intent or purpose of the person committing the act, to the extent that this may appear from the evidence, may also be a factor in considering whether the conduct is sexual. if the motive of the accused is sexual gratification, to the extent that this may appear from the evidence, it may be a factor in determining whether the conduct is sexual. it must be emphasized, however, that the existence of such a motive is simply one of many factors to be considered, the importance of which will vary depending on the cir- cumstances. [emphasis added; p 302] [49] applied to the facts of the case, mcintyre j. concluded that there was ample evidence upon which the trial judge could have concluded that a sexual assault was committed: “[v]iewed objectively in light of all the circumstances, it is clear that the conduct of [mr. chase] in grabbing the complainant’s breasts constituted an assault of a sexual nature” (p 303). appliquant ces principes et la jurisprudence citée, je fais les observations suivantes. l’agression sexuelle est une agression, au sens de l’une ou l’autre des définitions de ce concept au par. 244(1) du code criminel, qui est com- mise dans des circonstances de nature sexuelle, de manière à porter atteinte à l’intégrité sexuelle de la victime. le cri- tère qui doit être appliqué pour déterminer si la conduite reprochée comporte la nature sexuelle requise est objec- tif : « compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, une per- sonne raisonnable peut- elle percevoir le contexte sexuel ou charnel de l’agression? » (taylor, précité, le juge en chef laycraft, à la p 269). la partie du corps qui est touchée, la nature du contact, la situation dans laquelle cela s’est produit, les paroles et les gestes qui ont accompagné l’acte, et toutes les autres circonstances entourant la conduite, y compris les menaces avec ou sans emploi de la force, constituent des éléments pertinents (voir s j usprich, « a new crime in old battles : definitional problems with sexual assault » (1987), 29 crim. lq 200, à la p 204). l’intention ou le dessein de la personne qui commet l’acte, dans la mesure où cela peut ressortir des éléments de preuve, peut également être un facteur à considérer pour déterminer si la conduite est sexuelle. si le mobile de l’accusé était de tirer un plaisir sexuel, dans la mesure où cela peut ressortir de la preuve, il peut s’agir d’un facteur à considérer pour déterminer si la conduite est sexuelle. toutefois, il faut souligner que l’existence d’un tel mobile constitue simplement un des nombreux facteurs dont on doit tenir compte et dont l’importance variera selon les circonstances. [italiques ajoutés; p 302] [49] appliquant ce raisonnement aux faits de cette affaire, le juge mcintyre a conclu que le juge du pro- cès disposait d’éléments de preuve amplement suffi- sants pour pouvoir décider qu’une agression sexuelle avait été commise : « [s]i l’on examine de façon objective la conduite de [m. chase] en fonction de toutes les circonstances, il est évident que le fait de mettre ses mains sur les seins de la plaignante consti- tuait une agression de nature sexuelle » (p 303). [50] chase, therefore, stands for the proposition that the sexual nature of the assault is determined objectively. the crown is not required to prove the accused had any mens rea with respect to the sex- ual nature of his or her behaviour (see also r v. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 scr 330, at para. 25, per [50] l’arrêt chase appuie donc le principe que le caractère sexuel de l’agression est déterminé de fa- çon objective. le ministère public n’a pas besoin de prouver que l’accusé avait quelque mens rea que ce soit pour ce qui est de la nature sexuelle de son com- portement (voir également r c. ewanchuk, [1999] [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge abella 249 major j). the hearing adjudicator in jw’s case, however, improperly interpreted chase as requiring the complainant to prove sexual intent. she relied upon chase to read in a mens rea requirement that does not exist in either chase or in the sl1.4 cate- gory of the iap. [51] i agree with edmond j that case law may be helpful, but it is the plain language of the agreement that must guide an adjudicator’s reasoning process. case law cannot be used to modify the language of the iap, as the hearing adjudicator did in this case. the hearing adjudicator’s inaccurate interpretation of chase thereby contributed to an unauthorized modification of the iap model. as former chief adjudicator ish rightly concluded in another iap ad- judication review decision, “there is no requirement in the iap that the actor possessed a sexual intent before liability can be found for a sexual assault”. [52] the agreement was entered into to address the abuses caused by the residential schools system and the courts’ ongoing supervision of the settlement must allow judges to intervene where necessary so as to ensure that the benefits promised by the settle- ment are actually delivered. in my view, edmond j. properly identified a failure to apply the iap model in the adjudication of jw’s claim. these failures were confirmed on review and re- review. in inter- vening, edmond j did not usurp the role assigned to iap adjudicators by re- weighing factual findings. instead, in the face of a failure to apply the terms of the agreement as agreed to by the parties, he inter- vened, remitting jw’s claim for re- adjudication. as such, i respectfully disagree that recourse to a “gap” in the agreement is necessary in this case. rather, judicial intervention was necessary in the face of an unauthorized modification of the agreement, con- trary to the intentions of the parties. 1 rcs 330, par. 25, le juge major). dans le cas de jw, l’adjudicatrice d’audition a toutefois mal interprété l’arrêt chase en croyant qu’il obligeait le plaignant à prouver l’intention sexuelle. elle s’est fondée sur l’arrêt chase pour ajouter une exigence en matière de mens rea que l’on ne trouve ni dans l’arrêt chase ni dans la catégorie sl1.4 du péi. [51] je suis d’accord avec le juge edmond pour dire que la jurisprudence peut être utile, mais que c’est le libellé clair de la convention qui doit guider le raisonnement de l’adjudicateur. on ne peut recou- rir à la jurisprudence pour modifier le libellé du péi, comme l’adjudicatrice d’audition l’a fait en l’espèce. l’interprétation inexacte qu’elle a donnée de l’arrêt chase a ainsi contribué à modifier sans autorisation le modèle du péi comme l’ancien adjudicateur en chef ish l’a conclu à juste titre dans une autre décision en révision du volet juridictionnel du péi, [traduction] «  le péi n’exige pas que l’auteur de l’acte ait eu une intention sexuelle avant que sa responsabilité puisse être établie dans le cas d’une agression sexuelle ». [52] la convention vise à corriger les sévices causés par le régime des pensionnats, et la surveillance per- manente des tribunaux en ce qui concerne l’applica- tion du règlement doit permettre aux juges d’intervenir au besoin pour s’assurer que les avantages promis par le règlement sont effectivement accordés. à mon avis, le juge edmond a conclu à juste titre que le modèle du péi n’avait pas été appliqué dans l’examen de la demande de jw. ce défaut a été confirmé lors de la révision et de la deuxième révision. en intervenant, le juge edmond n’a pas usurpé le rôle confié aux adjudi- cateurs du péi en évaluant de nouveau les conclusions de fait. en fait, compte tenu du défaut d’appliquer les modalités de la convention convenues par les parties, il est intervenu et a renvoyé la demande de jw pour nouvel examen. par conséquent, avec égards, je ne suis pas d’accord pour dire qu’il est nécessaire de trouver une « lacune » dans la convention en l’espèce. l’intervention judiciaire était nécessaire vu que la convention avait fait l’objet d’une modification non autorisée, contrairement à l’intention des parties. [53] the nun’s conduct in touching jw’s genitals not only objectively “violates the sexual integrity [53] en l’espèce, le comportement qu’a eu la religieuse en touchant les parties génitales de jw. 250 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. of the student”, contrary to the definition of sexual abuse in category sl1.4 of the agreement, it “ex- ceeds recognized parental contact”. jw’s claim is therefore compensable within the meaning of sl14. this is the only tenable conclusion in light of the factual findings made by the hearing adjudicator. i note that the same conclusion was reached by a reconsideration adjudicator who re- heard — and allowed — jw’s claim before the manitoba court of appeal’s decision was made. [54] jw’s is precisely the type of compensable claim contemplated by the parties to the agreement. failure to correct the hearing adjudicator’s interpre- tation in this case would unacceptably undermine the whole purpose of the agreement. [55] i would allow the appeal with costs and rein- state the decision of the reconsideration adjudicator allowing jw’s claim, plus interest. non seulement «  viol[ait] l’intégrité sexuelle de l’étudiant  » d’une façon objective au sens de la définition de l’agression sexuelle prévue à la ca- tégorie sl1.4 de la convention, mais « excéd[ait] [aussi] les normes généralement reconnues de contact physique parental  » par conséquent, la demande de jw donne ouverture à une indemnité au sens de la catégorie sl14. c’est le seul constat que l’on peut tirer des conclusions de fait de l’adju- dicatrice d’audition. je signale que l’adjudicatrice de réexamen, qui a entendu de nouveau et accueilli la demande de jw avant que la cour d’appel du manitoba ne rende sa décision, est arrivée à la même conclusion. [54] la demande de jw est précisément le type de demande donnant droit à une indemnité qu’avaient en tête les parties à la convention. refuser de cor- riger l’interprétation de l’adjudicatrice d’audition en l’espèce contrecarrerait de façon inacceptable l’objectif global de la convention. [55] je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi avec dé- pens et de rétablir la décision par laquelle l’adjudica- trice de réexamen a fait droit à la demande de jw, plus les intérêts. the reasons of moldaver and côté jj. were de- version française des motifs des juges moldaver livered by côté j. — i. introduction et côté rendus par la juge côté — i. introduction [56] between the 1860s and the 1990s, more than 150,000 first nations, inuit and métis children at- tended indian residential schools operated by reli- gious organizations and funded by the government of canada. as canada acknowledged in its official apology, this system was intended to “remove and isolate children from the influence of their homes, families, traditions and cultures” (“statement of apology to former students of indian residential schools” of the right honourable stephen harper on behalf of canada, june 11, 2008 (online)). thou- sands of these children experienced physical, emo- tional, and sexual abuse while at residential schools (canada (attorney general) v. fontaine, 2017 scc [56] à compter des années 1860 jusqu’aux années 1990, plus de 150 000 enfants — premières nations, inuits et métis  — ont fréquenté des pensionnats indiens dirigés par des organismes religieux et fi- nancés par le gouvernement du canada. comme le canada l’a reconnu dans ses excuses officielles, ce système avait pour objectif « [d’]isoler les enfants et [de] les soustraire à l’influence de leurs foyers, de leurs familles, de leurs traditions et leur culture » (« présentation d’excuses aux anciens élèves des pensionnats indiens » par le très honorable stephen harper au nom du canada, 11 juin 2008 (en ligne)). des milliers de ces enfants furent victimes de sévices physiques, psychologiques et sexuels pendant leur [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 251 47, [2017] 2 scr 205 (“scc records decision”), at para 1). [57] the indian residential schools settlement agreement (“irssa”)3 was signed on may 8, 2006. it settled numerous class actions brought by former students against the government of canada and var- ious religious organizations for the harms suffered at residential schools. its purpose was to achieve a “fair, comprehensive and lasting resolution of the legacy of indian residential schools” (irssa, pre- amble). in 2006 and 2007, the irssa was approved by courts in nine provinces and territories, which is- sued approval and implementation orders providing for ongoing court supervision of its implementation and administration. [58] the irssa is a multifaceted agreement. in addition to provisions intended to further healing, education, and reconciliation, it includes an inde- pendent assessment process (“iap”) to settle indi- vidual claims through specialized adjudication that takes place outside of the court system. although the iap model contains an internal review mechanism, it does not provide a right of appeal to the courts from the decisions of iap adjudicators. séjour dans ces pensionnats (canada (procureur général) c. fontaine, 2017 csc 47, [2017] 2 rcs. 205 (« décision de la csc sur les documents »), par 1). [57] la convention de règlement relative aux pen- sionnats indiens (« crrpi »3 ou « convention ») a été signée le 8 mai 2006. elle a réglé un grand nombre de recours collectifs intentés par d’anciens élèves contre le gouvernement du canada et divers organismes religieux pour les sévices subis dans les pensionnats. l’objet de la crrpi était de « ré- soudre pour de bon et de manière juste et globale les séquelles laissées par les pensionnats indiens » (crrpi, préambule). en 2006 et 2007, la crrpi a reçu l’approbation de neuf cours supérieures provin- ciales et territoriales, qui ont rendu des ordonnances d’approbation et de mise en œuvre prévoyant une supervision judiciaire continue de sa mise en œuvre et de son administration. [58] la crrpi est une convention à volets mul- tiples. en plus de promouvoir la guérison, l’éduca- tion et la réconciliation, elle instaure un processus d’évaluation indépendant (« péi »), une procédure spécialisée visant le règlement extrajudiciaire des réclamations individuelles. bien que le régime du péi comporte un mécanisme de révision interne, il ne prévoit pas de droit d’appel devant les tribunaux à l’égard des décisions rendues par les adjudicateurs du péi. [59] this appeal concerns the ability of the courts to review final decisions of adjudicators under the iap model. jw’s claim was denied by the initial iap hearing adjudicator, and that decision was up- held at two levels of internal review. however, the su- pervising judge tasked with responding to a request for direction (“rfd”) arising from the iap deci- sion on jw’s claim disagreed with the adjudica- tors’ conclusions, substituted his own interpretation of the iap model, and remitted the matter to a first- level adjudicator for reconsideration. the manitoba court of appeal overturned that decision, finding that judicial review of iap decisions is not available [59] le présent pourvoi concerne la possibilité pour les cours de justice d’intervenir à l’égard des dé- cisions définitives rendues par des adjudicateurs dans le cadre du péi. la demande de jw a été rejetée par l’adjudicatrice du péi chargée de l’audition initiale, et cette décision a été confirmée à deux paliers de ré- vision interne. cependant, le juge superviseur chargé de traiter une demande de directives relativement à la décision concernant jw dans le cadre du péi s’est dit en désaccord avec les conclusions tirées par les adjudicateurs, a substitué sa propre interprétation du régime du péi à celle des adjudicateurs et a renvoyé l’affaire à un adjudicateur de premier palier pour 3 a complete list of all acronyms used in these reasons can be found 3 une liste complète des acronymes utilisés dans les présents motifs in the attached appendix. figure en annexe. 252 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. and that recourse to the supervising courts is availa- ble only where there has been a failure to apply the terms of the iap model. jw and his counsel (col- lectively the “appellants”) now appeal that result to this court. they are asking this court to find that decisions of iap adjudicators are subject to judicial review pursuant to the principles of administrative law. in the alternative, they submit that the courts’ supervisory power over the implementation of the irssa includes the jurisdiction to review iap deci- sions, and that this jurisdiction extends to the inter- pretation of the iap. [60] i would allow the appeal and reinstate the supervising judge’s order remitting jw’s claim for reconsideration (and i would reinstate the reconsid- eration adjudicator’s decision allowing jw’s claim and awarding him compensation), but for reasons that differ from those relied upon by the supervis- ing judge. indeed, i disagree with the supervising judge’s decision to substitute his own interpretation of the iap model for that of the iap adjudicators, and i would therefore endorse the manitoba court of appeal’s approach in limiting the scope of judi- cial recourse in respect of iap decisions. while the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over the implemen- tation of the irssa requires them to ensure that iap adjudicators make decisions in accordance with the terms of the iap, the parties clearly intended the interpretation of those terms to fall within the adjudicators’ exclusive jurisdiction. judges cannot take on the role the parties have assigned to those adjudicators. nouvel examen la cour d’appel du manitoba a infirmé cette décision et conclu qu’il n’y avait pas ouverture au contrôle judiciaire des décisions ren- dues dans le cadre du péi et qu’il n’était possible de s’adresser à un tribunal de supervision qu’en cas de défaut d’appliquer les modalités du régime du péi. jw et son avocat (ensemble, « appelants ») se pour- voient devant la cour à l’encontre de cette décision. ils invitent la cour à conclure que les décisions des adjudicateurs du péi sont susceptibles de contrôle judiciaire selon les principes du droit administratif. à titre subsidiaire, ils affirment que les pouvoirs de supervision des tribunaux en ce qui a trait à la mise en œuvre de la crrpi comprennent la compétence requise pour contrôler les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi et que cette compétence vise aussi l’interprétation du péi. [60] je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et de ré- tablir l’ordonnance par laquelle le juge superviseur a renvoyé la demande de jw pour nouvel examen (et je rétablirais la décision de l’adjudicatrice de réexa- men faisant droit à la demande de jw et lui accor- dant une indemnité), mais pour des motifs différents de ceux du juge superviseur. en effet, je ne suis pas d’accord avec la décision du juge superviseur de substituer sa propre interprétation du régime du péi à celle des adjudicateurs du péi, et je me rallierais plutôt à l’approche préconisée par la cour d’appel du manitoba, qui limiterait la portée des recours judiciaires pouvant être exercés contre les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi. bien que la compé- tence des tribunaux chargés de superviser la mise en œuvre de la crrpi les oblige à s’assurer que les ad- judicateurs du péi rendent des décisions conformes aux modalités du péi, les parties à la convention souhaitaient manifestement que l’interprétation de cette dernière relève de la compétence exclusive des adjudicateurs du péi. les juges ne peuvent s’arroger un rôle que les parties ont confié à ces adjudicateurs. [61] this case involves a unique situation for which the irssa makes no provision. the chief adjudi- cator, indian residential schools adjudication sec- retariat (“chief adjudicator”), concedes that jw’s claim was wrongly decided and that the decisions made by the adjudicators in this case are “aberrant”. despite the fact that the chief adjudicator represents [61] la présente affaire implique une situation unique qui n’est visée par aucune des modalités de la crrpi. l’adjudicateur en chef du secrétariat d’ad- judication des pensionnats indiens (« adjudicateur en chef ») admet que la décision concernant la de- mande de jw est erronée et que les décisions ren- dues par les adjudicateurs dans cette affaire étaient [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 253 the final level of review under the iap scheme, he is unable to reopen the claim himself and fulfill his role under the irssa of ensuring consistency in the application of the iap. it is therefore appropriate for this court to step in, not to provide its own interpreta- tion of the iap model, but to fill this procedural gap and ensure a fair outcome for jw that is in keeping with the purpose of the irssa. [traduction] « aberrantes ». bien que l’adjudica- teur en chef représente le dernier palier du processus de révision interne dans le cadre du péi, il n’est pas en mesure de lui- même rouvrir le dossier d’une demande et de s’acquitter du rôle que lui confère la crrpi consistant à veiller à l’application cohérente du péi. il y a donc lieu pour la cour d’intervenir, non pas pour proposer sa propre interprétation du régime du péi, mais pour combler cette lacune procédurale et pour assurer à jw une solution équitable qui est conforme à l’objet de la crrpi. ii context ii contexte a overview of the irssa a aperçu de la crrpi (1) indian residential schools settlement agree- (1) la convention de règlement relative aux pen- ment sionnats indiens [62] the irssa provides for two compensation schemes: the common experience payment (“cep”) and the independent assessment process. the cep is a compensatory payment available to all eligi- ble former students based on the number of years they attended an indian residential school (“irs”). compensation under the cep process does not re- quire proof of physical, sexual, or emotional harm (irssa, art 5). the iap, by contrast, is an adjudica- tive process created to resolve “continuing claims” for serious proven physical or sexual abuse, or other wrongful acts committed against individual students of an irs (irssa, art. 6 and sch. d; rf (attorney general), at para 9). [62] la crrpi instaure deux régimes d’indemnisa- tion : le paiement d’expérience commune (« pec ») et le processus d’évaluation indépendant. le pec est un mécanisme d’indemnisation dont peuvent se prévaloir tous les anciens élèves admissibles en fonction du nombre d’années où ils ont fréquenté un pensionnat indien (« pi »). pour avoir droit à une indemnité sous le régime du pec, il n’est pas né- cessaire de faire la preuve d’un préjudice physique, sexuel ou psychologique (crrpi, art 5). le péi, en revanche, est un processus décisionnel instauré pour résoudre les « demandes continues » portant sur des sévices physiques ou sexuels graves, spécifiques et démontrés, ou sur d’autres actes fautifs subis indi- viduellement par les élèves des pensionnats indiens (crrpi, art. 6 et ann. d; mi (procureur général), par 9). (2) independent assessment process (2) le processus d’évaluation indépendant [63] schedule d of the irssa sets out the iap model. there are three categories of compensable continuing claims under the iap: (1)  sexual and physical assaults committed by adult employees of the government or a church entity that operated the residential school or other adults lawfully on school premises; (2) sexual or physical assaults committed by one student against another on school premises; and (3) any other wrongful act or acts committed by [63] l’annexe d de la crrpi énonce le régime du péi. il existe trois catégories de demandes continues ouvrant droit à une indemnité aux termes du péi : (1) les agressions physiques ou sexuelles commises par un employé adulte du gouvernement ou d’une église qui dirigeait le pi ou par tout autre adulte au- torisé à être présent au pensionnat; (2) les agressions physiques ou sexuelles commises au pensionnat par un élève contre un autre élève; (3) tout autre acte 254 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. adult employees or other adults lawfully on school premises (sch d, art.  i) continuing claims are dealt with in detail in the iap’s compensation rules (art. ii) and instructions for adjudicators (app ix). adjudicators are bound by the standards for compen- sable wrongs and for the assessment of compensation defined for the iap (art iii). sl1.4, the provision under which jw brought his claim, is the first level of sexual assault under the iap compensatory struc- ture (art ii). iap claims can proceed within either the [64] standard track or the complex issues track, and all claimants are entitled to a hearing before a spe- cially trained adjudicator (art. iii(n) and (s); see also app v). the hearing takes place in a location of the claimant’s choice, and costs are paid so that the claimant can bring a support person. counselling services are available, and cultural ceremonies are incorporated at the claimant’s request (art iii(c)). these features, among others, distinguish the iap adjudication process from a court hearing. in fontaine v. canada (attorney general), [65] 2016 bcsc 2218, [2017] 1 cnlr 104 (“bundled rfd”), at para. 11, brown j., the supervising judge for british columbia, aptly described the iap as: “(a) a post- litigation claims assessment process, (b) a contractual component of the irssa, arising from the parties’ negotiations, and (c) a closed adjudica- tive process, operating under the purview of inde- pendent adjudicators without any rights of appeal or judicial review”. fautif commis par un employé adulte ou par tout autre adulte autorisé à être présent au pensionnat (ann. d, art i). les demandes continues sont traitées en détail dans les règles d’indemnisation du péi (art. ii) et dans les instructions aux adjudicateurs (ann ix). les adjudicateurs sont liés par les critères des préjudices indemnisables et celui de l’évalua- tion de l’indemnité, définis dans le péi (art iii). la catégorie sl1.4, la catégorie invoquée par jw. à l’appui de sa demande, correspond au premier degré d’agression sexuelle prévue par le mécanisme d’indemnisation du péi (art ii). [64] les demandes présentées dans le cadre du péi peuvent être traitées selon le volet ordinaire ou selon le volet complexe et tous les demandeurs ont droit à une audience devant un adjudicateur spéciale- ment formé (art. iii(n) et (s); voir également ann v). l’audience se déroule à l’endroit choisi par le de- mandeur, et les frais sont payés, ce qui permet au de- mandeur de se faire accompagner par une personne de confiance. des services de consultation psycho- sociale sont offerts et des cérémonies culturelles peuvent être intégrées aux procédures, à la demande du demandeur (art iii(c)). ces caractéristiques font partie de ce qui distingue le processus décisionnel du péi d’une audience judiciaire habituelle. [65] dans le jugement fontaine c. canada (attor- ney general), 2016 bcsc 2218, [2017] 1 cnlr. 104 (« décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées »), par. 11, la juge brown, la juge super- viseure pour la colombie- britannique, a bien expli- qué en quoi consistait le péi, le décrivant comme : [traduction] « a) un processus d’évaluation des demandes postérieur au litige; b) un volet contractuel de la crrpi qui résulte des négociations des parties; c) un processus décisionnel à huis clos qui relève d’adjudicateurs indépendants et qui n’est pas assorti d’un droit d’appel ou d’un contrôle judiciaire ». (3) role of iap adjudicators (3) le rôle des adjudicateurs du péi [66] the iap is intended to be an inquisitorial pro- cess, requiring adjudicators to manage the hearing, draw out and test the evidence of witnesses, caucus with the parties on proposed lines of questioning, and make any factual and legal findings necessary to [66] le péi se veut une procédure inquisitoire qui oblige les adjudicateurs à veiller au bon déroule- ment de l’audience, à recueillir les témoignages et en vérifier le contenu, à rencontrer les parties pour s’entendre sur les orientations des interrogatoires et [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 255 resolve the claim. only adjudicators can ask claim- ants questions and test evidence where necessary (art iii(e)). they are empowered to make binding findings on credibility, determine whether a claim has been proven, and award compensation where appropriate (art iii(a)). the iap model sets out in detail the procedures to be followed by adjudicators, claimants, and counsel (art. iii(e) to (g)). adjudica- tors are required to render a decision within 30 days for standard track hearings and within 45 days for complex track hearings. the decision must have a specific format, which is set out in app. xii of sch. d; in particular, it must outline key factual findings and provide a rationale for the adjudicator’s findings and for the compensation assessed, if any (sch. d., art iii). [67] adjudicators are chosen by the unanimous agreement of a selection board appointed by the iap oversight committee and composed of one representative of each of former students, plaintiffs’ counsel, church entities and government (app xiii). recognizing that the role of adjudicator requires a unique combination of skills, the parties to the irssa agreed that all adjudicators must have a law degree or a combination of related training and sig- nificant experience, knowledge of and sensitivity to aboriginal culture and history, and sexual and phys- ical abuse issues, the ability to work with staff and participants from diverse backgrounds, knowledge of personal injury law and damages assessment, as well as a variety of competencies generally required of decision makers in adjudicative and administra- tive contexts (app. v; bundled rfd, at para 17). adjudicators receive training approved by the iap oversight committee and ongoing mentoring by the chief adjudicator and other senior adjudica- tors (sch. d., art. iii(s); rf (chief adjudicator), at para 22). à tirer les conclusions de fait et de droit nécessaires pour trancher les demandes. seuls les adjudicateurs peuvent interroger les demandeurs et vérifier au be- soin le contenu des témoignages (art iii(e)). ils ont le pouvoir de tirer des conclusions quant à la crédibilité qui lient les parties, de se prononcer sur le bien- fondé des demandes et d’accorder le cas échéant des indemnités (art iii(a)). le régime du péi expose en détail les procédures que doivent suivre les adjudi- cateurs, les demandeurs et les avocats (art. iii(e) à (g)). l’adjudicateur doit rendre sa décision dans les 30 jours, dans le cas des audiences tenues selon le volet ordinaire, et dans un délai de 45 jours, pour ce qui est des audiences relevant du volet complexe. la décision de l’adjudicateur doit respecter un format particulier, qui figure à l’ann. xii de l’ann. d; en par- ticulier, l’adjudicateur doit exposer ses principales conclusions de fait et les motiver et il doit justifier le montant de l’indemnité accordée, le cas échéant (ann. d, art iii). [67] les adjudicateurs sont choisis à l’unanimité par un jury de sélection nommé par le comité de surveillance du péi et composé d’un représentant de chacun des groupes suivants : anciens élèves, avocats des demandeurs, églises et gouvernement (ann xiii). reconnaissant que le rôle de l’adju- dicateur exige un mélange unique d’habiletés, les parties à la crrpi ont convenu que tous les adjudi- cateurs devaient posséder un diplôme en droit, ou une combinaison de formation connexe et d’expérience pertinente, ou les deux, et une connaissance de la culture et de l’histoire autochtones et des questions liées aux sévices physiques et sexuels, ainsi qu’une sensibilité à leur égard, en plus d’avoir une aptitude à travailler efficacement avec des employés et des participants de milieux variés, une connaissance du droit en matière de préjudices corporels et de l’éva- luation des dommages- intérêts, et diverses compé- tences généralement requises de la part des décideurs œuvrant dans les milieux juridictionnels et adminis- tratifs (ann. v; décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées, par 17). les adjudicateurs reçoivent une formation qui est approuvée par le comité de surveillance du péi, ainsi qu’un encadre- ment suivi de la part de l’adjudicateur en chef et des autres adjudicateurs principaux (ann. d, art. iii(s); mi (adjudicateur en chef), par 22). 256 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. in addressing matters arising from the iap, [68] supervising and appellate courts have commented extensively on the expertise of iap adjudicators. as the ontario court of appeal observed in fontaine v. canada (attorney general), 2016 onca 241, 130 or (3d) 1, at p. 15, “[a]djudicators are spe- cially trained to conduct the hearing in a way that is respectful to the claimant and conducive to obtaining a full description of his or her experience”. in fon- taine v. duboff edwards haight & schachter, 2012 onca 471, 111 or (3d) 461 (“schachter”), the ontario court of appeal recognized the chief adju- dicator’s “broad discretion” and “relative expertise” in overseeing the iap (paras. 54 and 78). brown j. held in bundled rfd that the iap creates “exclusive jurisdiction for independent adjudicators to man- age iap hearings, find facts, and assess iap claims, which in turn fosters their considerable expertise” (para 20). i would agree with perell j., the eastern administrative judge, that “[u]nder the irssa, the adjudicators are — as their name suggests — ex- ercising a judicial function in accordance with the terms of the irssa” (fontaine v. canada (attorney general), 2014 onsc 4024, [2014] 4 cnlr 67, at para 15). [68] dans le cadre de l’examen de questions éma- nant du péi, les tribunaux de supervision et les juridictions d’appel ont formulé de nombreux com- mentaires quant à l’expertise des adjudicateurs du péi. ainsi que la cour d’appel de l’ontario l’a fait observer dans l’arrêt fontaine c. canada (attorney general), 2016 onca 241, 130 or (3d) 1, p. 15, [traduction] « [l]es adjudicateurs sont spéciale- ment formés pour diriger l’audience d’une manière qui respecte le demandeur et qui permet à celui-ci de donner sa version complète des faits ». dans l’arrêt fontaine c. duboff edwards haight & schachter, 2012  onca  471, 111  or  (3d) 461 (« schach- ter »), la cour d’appel de l’ontario a reconnu le [traduction] « vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire » et « l’expertise relative » de l’adjudicateur en chef en ce qui concerne la supervision du péi (par. 54 et 78). la juge brown a déclaré, dans la décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées, que le péi confère [traduction] « aux adjudicateurs indépen- dants une compétence exclusive qui leur permet de veiller au bon déroulement des audiences du péi, d’établir les faits et d’évaluer les demandes présen- tées dans le cadre du péi, grâce à quoi ces derniers ont développé une expertise considérable » (par 20). je suis d’accord avec le juge perell, le juge adminis- tratif de l’est, pour dire que [traduction] « [d]ans le cadre de la crrpi, les adjudicateurs sont  — comme leur nom l’indique — chargés d’exercer des fonctions judiciaires conformément aux modalités de la crrpi » (fontaine c. canada (attorney general), 2014 onsc 4024, [2014] 4 cnlr 67, par 15). (4) internal review of iap decisions (4) la révision interne des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi [69] schedule  d of the irssa provides that a party who is dissatisfied with an iap adjudicator’s decision is entitled to a review on two grounds (see art iii(1)). first, the party may seek a review on the basis that the iap adjudicator’s decision contains a palpable and overriding error. while claimants may seek a review on this ground in respect of decisions made in either the standard track or the complex issues track, defendants may seek such a review only in respect of those made in the complex issues track. second, any party may ask the chief adjudicator or his designate to determine whether an adjudicator’s [69] l’annexe d de la crrpi prévoit que toute partie insatisfaite de la décision d’un adjudicateur du péi peut exiger la révision de cette décision pour l’un ou l’autre des deux motifs prévus par la crrpi (voir art iii(1)). tout d’abord, une partie peut demander la révision de la décision au motif que la décision de l’adjudicateur contient une erreur manifeste et déter- minante. alors que les demandeurs peuvent invoquer ce motif pour demander la révision tant selon le volet ordinaire que selon le volet complexe, les défendeurs ne peuvent demander de révision sur ce fondement qu’en ce qui concerne les décisions rendues selon le [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 257 decision (in either track) properly applied the iap model. [70] a second level of review (“re- review”) is also available on the latter ground and is to be conducted by the chief adjudicator or his designate. the adjudi- cators who conduct this type of review are designated and approved by the iap oversight committee, on the recommendation of the chief adjudicator, “to exercise the chief adjudicator’s review authority” (sch d, art iii(r)(iii)). all such reviews are con- ducted on the record and without oral submissions (art. iii; rf (chief adjudicator), at paras 27-30). [71] neither sch. d nor any other part of the irssa provides for an appeal to the courts from iap deci- sions. this is in contrast with certain provisions of the irssa that specifically contemplate access to the courts: volet complexe. ensuite, toute partie peut demander à l’adjudicateur en chef ou à un adjudicateur en chef désigné de vérifier si l’adjudicateur a (selon l’un ou l’autre volet) appliqué correctement le régime du péi dans sa décision. [70] il existe par ailleurs un deuxième palier de révision (la deuxième révision) fondé sur le deu- xième motif. cette révision est effectuée par l’ad- judicateur en chef ou par un adjudicateur en chef désigné les adjudicateurs qui procèdent à cette deuxième révision sont désignés et approuvés par le comité de surveillance du péi, sur recommandation de l’adjudicateur en chef, « pour exercer le pou- voir de révision de l’adjudicateur en chef » (ann. d, art iii(r)(iii)). ces révisions procèdent toutes à partir de la preuve documentaire et aucune représentation n’est entendue (art. iii; mi (adjudicateur en chef), par 27-30). [71] on ne trouve ni à l’ann. d ni dans la crrpi de modalités prévoyant la possibilité de porter en appel devant les tribunaux les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi, ce qui contraste avec certaines dis- positions de la crrpi, qui prévoient expressément le droit de s’adresser aux tribunaux : • article 4.11 provides for the creation and man- date of the national administration committee (“nac”): • l’article 4.11 prévoit la création du comité d’ad- ministration national (« can ») et en définit le mandat : in the event of any dispute related to the appointment or service of a member of the nac, the affected group or individual may apply to a supervising court for directions (art 411(6); in the event that a majority of five members of the nac cannot be reached to resolve a dispute, the dispute may be referred by the nac to a supervising court (art 411(9)); the nac may refer references from the truth and reconciliation commission (“trc”) to a supervising court for a determination (art 411(12)(j));. en cas de différend entourant la nomina- tion ou les services d’une personne comme membre du can, le groupe ou l’individu en cause peut s’adresser à un tribunal de supervi- sion pour obtenir des directives (art 411(6));. si l’on n’arrive pas à obtenir l’appui d’une majorité de cinq membres du can afin de régler un différend, celui-ci pourra être sou- mis par le can à un tribunal de supervision (art 411(9));. le can peut soumettre les renvois faits par la commission de vérité et de réconciliation (« cvr ») à un tribunal de supervision pour qu’il les tranche (art 411(12)j)); the nac must apply to one of the supervis- ing courts for a determination with respect le can doit s’adresser à un tribunal de super- vision afin qu’il tranche le refus d’ajouter un 258 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. to a refusal to add an institution as set out in art 1201 (arts 411(12)(l) and 12.01); établissement comme le prévoit l’art 1201 (art 411(12)(l) et 12.01); the nac must apply to the supervising courts for orders modifying the iap as set out in art 603(3) (arts 411(12)(q) and 6.03(3)); and where there is a disagreement between the trustee under the irssa and the nac with respect to the terms of the approval orders, the nac or the trustee may refer the dispute to a supervising court (art 411(13)). le can doit demander aux tribunaux de supervision des ordonnances en vue de mo- difier le péi, conformément à l’art 603(3) (art 411(12)q) et 6.03(3)); lorsqu’un désaccord quant aux conditions des ordonnances d’approbation oppose le fiduciaire au can, l’un ou l’autre peut sou- mettre le désaccord à un tribunal de supervi- sion (art 411(13)). • article 5.09 provides for the appeal procedure • l’article 5.09 prévoit la procédure d’appel des for cep applications: demandes faites au titre du pec : in the event that the nac denies an appeal from a decision on a cep application, the applicant may apply to a supervising court for a determination (art 509(2)); and in exceptional circumstances, the nac may apply to a supervising court for an order that the costs of an appeal be borne by canada (art 509(3)). si le can rejette l’appel d’une décision sur une demande faite au titre du pec, le demandeur peut s’adresser à un tribunal de supervision afin qu’il tranche la question (art 509(2));. dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, le can peut s’adresser à un tribunal de super- vision afin d’obtenir une ordonnance selon laquelle le canada devra assumer les frais d’un appel (art 509(3)). • article 6.03 deals with the resources to be pro- • l’article 6.03 traite des ressources à consacrer vided to the iap: au péi : in the event that continuing claims are not processed within the timeframes set out in art 603(1), the nac may apply to the super- vising courts for the necessary orders to meet those timeframes (art 603(3)). advenant que les demandes continues ne soient pas traitées dans les délais prévus à l’art.  6.03(1), le can peut demander aux tribunaux de supervision les ordonnances qui permettront de respecter ces délais (art 603(3)). • article 7.01 pertains to truth and reconciliation: • l’article 7.01 a trait à la vérité et à la réconcilia- where the nac makes a decision on a dis- pute arising in respect of the trc, either or both the implicated church organization and canada may apply to a supervising court for a hearing de novo (art 701(3)). tion : à la suite d’une décision rendue par le can relativement à un différend concernant la cvr, l’organisme religieux en cause ou le canada, ou encore les deux, peuvent s’adres- ser à un tribunal de supervision pour obtenir une nouvelle audition (art 701(3)). • article 13.08 pertains to legal fees: • l’article 13.08 a trait aux honoraires : in the event of a disagreement as to disburse- ment amounts, the federal representative en cas de désaccord quant au montant payable pour les débours, le représentant du [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 259 must refer the matter to a supervising court (art 1308(4)). gouvernement fédéral doit renvoyer la question à un tribunal de supervision (art 1308(4)). [72] clearly, the parties did intend that there be access to the courts in specific circumstances. it is particularly noteworthy that the irssa provides for appeals from determinations made on cep applica- tions, but not from decisions under the iap model. [73] the irssa does, however, permit iap claim- ants to have their claims resolved by the courts in limited circumstances. the iap model provides as follows: at the request of a claimant, access to the courts to re- solve a continuing claim may be granted by the chief adjudicator where he or she is satisfied that: [72] de toute évidence, les parties souhaitaient ac- corder un accès aux tribunaux dans des circonstances spécifiques. il est particulièrement intéressant de si- gnaler que la crrpi prévoit la possibilité d’interjeter appel des décisions rendues au sujet des demandes présentées dans le cadre du pec, mais non des dé- cisions rendues sous le régime du péi. [73] la crrpi permet toutefois à l’auteur d’une demande présentée dans le cadre du péi de faire trancher sa demande par le tribunal dans certaines circonstances limitées. voici ce que prévoit le régime du péi : sur demande du demandeur, l’adjudicateur en chef peut permettre au demandeur de s’adresser aux tribunaux pour régler une demande continue, si ce dernier est convaincu que : • • • there is sufficient evidence that the claim is one where the actual income loss or consequential loss of oppor- tunity may exceed the maximum permitted by this iap; • dans le cas d’une réclamation pour perte de revenus réelle ou perte d’occasion, une preuve suffisante établit que l’indemnité pourrait excéder le maximum permis par le péi; there is sufficient evidence that the claimant suffered catastrophic physical harms such that compensation available through the courts may exceed the maximum permitted by this iap; or, • dans le cas d’une réclamation pour sévices physiques, une preuve suffisante établit que le demandeur a subi un préjudice physique tellement grave que l’indemnité que pourrait lui octroyer un tribunal peut dépasser le maximum permis par le péi; in an other wrongful act claim, the evidence required to address the alleged harms is so complex and exten- sive that recourse to the courts is the more appropriate procedural approach. • dans le cas d’une réclamation fondée sur un autre acte fautif, la preuve requise pour étudier le préjudice subi est à ce point complexe et vaste que le recours au tribunal est plus approprié. in such cases, the approval orders will exempt the con- tinuing claims from the deemed release, and thereafter the matter shall be addressed by the courts according to their own standards, rules and processes. dans de tels cas, les ordonnances d’approbation auront pour effet d’exclure ces demandes continues de la quit- tance réputée, le tribunal devant par la suite traiter ces demandes selon ses propres critères et règles de preuve et de procédure. (sch. d, art. iii(b)(iii)) (ann. d, art. iii(b)(iii)) [74] it is important to note that this provision of the irssa does not allow the courts to intervene in deci- sions of iap adjudicators. rather, a claimant may opt [74] il est important de noter que cette disposition de la crrpi ne permet pas aux tribunaux d’interve- nir à l’égard des décisions des adjudicateurs du péi. 260 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. to have his or her claim resolved by the courts instead of through the iap adjudication process where the claim is particularly complex or merits compensation exceeding the maximum permitted by the iap. [75] in sum, the iap creates a closed process for the determination of claims, with one in- person hear- ing and two levels of internal review (bundled rfd, at para. 23; nn v. canada (attorney general), 2018 bcca 105, 6 bclr (6th) 335, at para. 78; fon- taine v. canada (attorney general), 2017 onca 26, 137 or (3d) 90 (“spanish irs ca”), at para 53). un demandeur peut choisir de faire trancher sa de- mande par les tribunaux plutôt que par le truchement du processus décisionnel du péi lorsque sa demande est particulièrement complexe ou qu’elle justifie l’octroi d’une indemnité qui dépasse le maximum permis par le péi. [75] en résumé, le péi instaure, pour le règlement des demandes, un processus fermé comportant une audience en personne et deux paliers de révision interne (décision relative aux demandes de direc- tives regroupées, par. 23; nn c. canada (attorney general), 2018 bcca 105, 6 bclr (6th) 335, par.  78; fontaine c canada (attorney general), 2017 onca 26, 137 or (3d) 90 (« pi de spanish, ca »), par 53). (5) oversight of the iap (5) la surveillance du péi [76] while the parties to the irssa did not pro- vide for appeals from iap decisions to the super- vising courts, they did agree that guidance on the interpretation and application of the iap model can be provided by the parties themselves through the iap oversight committee (rf (chief adjudicator), at para 32). the committee is established under sch. d and consists of a chairperson and eight other members, including former students (designated by the assembly of first nations and the inuit repre- sentatives), plaintiffs’ counsel, church entities, and government. the committee considers proposed instructions provided by the chief adjudicator, pre- pares its own instructions, monitors the implemen- tation of the iap, and makes recommendations to the nac on changes to the iap as necessary. in- structions are subject to approval by the nac prior to publication (irssa, art 101;. sch. d, art iii(r)). [76] bien que les parties à la crrpi n’aient pas prévu le droit de porter en appel devant les tribunaux de supervision les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi, elles se sont entendues pour qu’elles puissent elles- mêmes se donner des directives quant à l’in- terprétation et l’application du régime du péi, par l’entremise du comité de surveillance du péi (mi. (adjudicateur en chef), par 32). le comité est consti- tué sous le régime de l’ann d. il est composé d’un président et de huit membres, dont d’anciens élèves (désignés par l’assemblée des premières nations et des représentants des inuits), ainsi que d’avocats des demandeurs, d’églises et du gouvernement. le comité examine les instructions proposées par l’ad- judicateur en chef, prépare ses propres instructions, surveille la mise en œuvre du péi et formule des recommandations au can relativement aux mo- difications devant être faites au péi, s’il y a lieu. les instructions sont assujetties à l’approbation du can avant d’être publiées (crrpi, art 101; ann. d, art iii(r)). [77] the chief adjudicator is also tasked with overseeing the administration of the iap. he is ap- pointed by the iap oversight committee, and the appointment is approved by court order. the full list of the chief adjudicator’s duties can be found in art. iii(s) of sch. d and includes assisting in the se- lection of adjudicators, ensuring consistency among [77] l’adjudicateur en chef est également chargé de superviser l’administration du péi. il est nommé par le comité de surveillance du péi et sa nomina- tion est approuvée par ordonnance judiciaire. une liste détaillée des fonctions de l’adjudicateur en chef figure à l’art. iii(s) de l’ann d. parmi ces fonctions, mentionnons celles d’assister dans la sélection des [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 261 iap decisions by implementing training programs and administrative measures, and preparing proposed instructions for consideration by the iap oversight committee to better give effect to the provisions of the iap (art iii(s)). the chief adjudicator possesses broad discretion and “relative expertise” under the iap model and is monitored and guided by the iap oversight committee (schachter, at paras. 54 and 78; bundled rfd, at para. 19; nn, at para 81). adjudicateurs, d’assurer la cohérence entre les dé- cisions rendues dans le cadre du péi par la mise en œuvre de programmes de formation et de mesures administratives, et de préparer et soumettre pour examen au comité de surveillance du péi des ins- tructions pour faciliter l’application des dispositions du péi (art iii(s)). l’adjudicateur en chef possède de vastes pouvoirs discrétionnaires et une [traduc- tion] « expertise relative » sous le régime du péi en plus d’être encadré et guidé par le comité de surveillance du péi (schachter, par. 54 et 78; déci- sion relative aux demandes de directives regroupées, par. 19; nn, par 81). (6) current status of the iap (6) le péi : des statistiques récentes [78] as of october 31, 2018, 26,669 iap hearings had been held, or 99.95 percent of all anticipated hearings of the more than 38,000  claims filed, 99 percent had been resolved. there were still 199 claims in progress, with 36 hearings scheduled for a later date, 1 hearing remaining to be scheduled, 34 claims expected to be resolved through other means and 128 claims awaiting decision. over $3.1 billion had been paid to successful claimants, and close to 90 percent of iap claims that had gone to hearing or been settled had resulted in an award in favour of the claimant (indian residential schools adjudication secretariat, independent assessment process (iap) statistics (online)). [78] en date du 31 octobre 2018, 26 669 audiences avaient été tenues dans le cadre du péi, ce qui corres- pond à 99,95 p. 100 de toutes les audiences prévues. de plus, des quelque 38 000 demandes déposées, 99  p.  100 d’entre elles avaient été réglées cent quatre- vingt- dix-neuf (199) demandes étaient tou- jours en cours de traitement, dont 36 avaient une date d’audience fixée à une date ultérieure et une dont la date était à fixer, 34 dont on s’attendait à ce qu’elles puissent être réglées par d’autres mé- canismes et 128 étaient en attente d’une décision. plus de 3,1 milliards de dollars avaient été versés aux demandeurs ayant obtenu gain de cause et près de 90 p. 100 des demandes présentées dans le cadre du péi et ayant fait l’objet d’une audience ou d’un règlement s’étaient soldées par le versement d’une indemnité au demandeur (secrétariat d’adjudication des pensionnats indiens, statistiques du processus d’évaluation indépendant (pei) (en ligne)). (7) role of the supervising courts (7) le rôle des tribunaux de supervision in december 2006, courts in nine provinces [79] and territories concurrently issued reasons to certify a single national class action arising out of the resi- dential schools system and to approve the irssa as a proposed settlement. the provincial and territorial superior court judges who certified the class action were designated as supervising judges. in 2007, ap- proval and implementation orders were entered in each of the nine supervising courts to give effect to the settlement (ar, vol. i, at pp. 85-97 (“schulman [79] en décembre 2006, des tribunaux de neuf pro- vinces et territoires ont simultanément rendu des motifs autorisant un seul recours collectif national dé- coulant du régime des pensionnats indiens et approu- vant la crrpi à titre de règlement proposé. les juges des cours supérieures provinciales et territoriales qui ont certifié le recours collectif ont été désignés comme juges superviseurs. en 2007, des ordonnances d’approbation et de mise en œuvre ont été rendues par chacun de ces neuf tribunaux de supervision pour 262 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. approval order”); ar, vol. i, at pp. 98- 107 (“schul- man implementation order”)). the approval orders incorporate by reference the terms of the irssa and provide that the applicable provincial and territorial class proceedings law shall apply to the supervision, operation, and implementation of the irssa. they further provide that the courts will supervise the implementation of the irssa and “may issue such orders as are necessary to implement and enforce the provisions of the agreement and this judgment” (schulman approval order, at para 13). the imple- mentation orders incorporate a court administration protocol, under which an rfd may be made to a supervising court in respect of the implementation, administration, or amendment of the irssa or the implementation of the orders (schulman implemen- tation order, sch a). [80] as this court held in scc records decision, the broad powers of supervising judges are both administrative and supervisory in nature and are sup- ported by class action legislation, which provides the courts with “generous discretion to make orders and impose terms as necessary to ensure a fair and ex- peditious resolution of class actions” (paras 31-32). donner effet au règlement (da, vol. i, p. 85-97 (« or- donnance d’approbation du juge schulman »); da, vol. i, p. 98- 107 (« ordonnance de mise en œuvre du juge schulman »)). les ordonnances d’approbation incorporent par renvoi les modalités de la crrpi et prévoient que les lois provinciales et territoriales applicables en matière de recours collectifs s’ap- pliquent à la supervision, à l’application et à la mise en œuvre de la crrpi. elles précisent également que les tribunaux supervisent la mise en œuvre de la crrpi et qu’ils peuvent [traduction] « rendre les ordonnances nécessaires à la mise en œuvre et à l’application des modalités de la convention et du présent jugement » (ordonnance d’approbation du juge schulman, par 13). les ordonnances de mise en œuvre comprennent le protocole des tribunaux régissant l’administration de l’entente, aux termes duquel une demande de directives peut être soumise au tribunal de supervision quant à la mise en œuvre, l’administration ou la modification de la crrpi et la mise en œuvre des ordonnances (ordonnance de mise en œuvre du juge schulman, ann a). [80] comme la cour l’a indiqué dans la décision de la csc sur les documents, les vastes pouvoirs dont sont investis les juges superviseurs sont à la fois des pouvoirs administratifs et des pouvoirs de supervision, et ces pouvoirs trouvent appui dans la législation sur les recours collectifs, qui confère aux tribunaux « un vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire [  ] leur permett[ant], au besoin, de rendre des ordonnances et d’imposer des conditions afin de parvenir à un règlement juste et expéditif des recours collectifs » (par 31-32). b facts b les faits [81] the facts that gave rise to jw’s claim are not contested. in 2014, jw applied for compensation pursuant to the iap, alleging that when he was a student at an irs, a nun had touched his genitals over his clothing while he was waiting in line to take a shower. he argued that this incident fell within cate- gory sl1.4 of the iap, which provides compensation for harm caused by: [81] les faits à l’origine de la demande de jw. ne sont pas contestés. en 2014, jw a présenté une demande d’indemnisation dans le cadre du péi en al- léguant qu’alors qu’il fréquentait un pi, une religieuse avait touché ses organes génitaux par- dessus ses vête- ments pendant qu’il attendait en file pour la douche. selon lui, les actes de la religieuse entraient dans la catégorie sl1.4 du péi, qui prévoit le versement d’une indemnité pour les préjudices subis à la suite de : any touching of a student, including touching with an object, by an adult employee or other adult lawfully on tout contact physique avec un élève, avec ou sans objet, par un employé ou un autre adulte autorisé à être présent [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 263 the premises which exceeds recognized parental contact and violates the sexual integrity of the student. sur les lieux, qui excède les normes généralement re- connues de contact physique parental et viole l’intégrité sexuelle de l’étudiant. (sch. d, art. ii) (ann. d, art. ii) iii iap adjudication and judicial history iii adjudication dans le cadre du péi et historique des procédures judiciaires a decision of the hearing adjudicator a décision de l’adjudicatrice d’audition [82] jw’s claim was heard on may 26, 2014, and the hearing adjudicator rendered her decision on april 7, 2015. while she accepted jw’s testimony and found that the incident had happened as de- scribed, she denied the claim as she was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the nun had acted with a “sexual purpose” when committing the act in question (ar, vol. i, at p 4). she found that iap ad- judicators “must be satisfied in regard to any allega- tions of sexual abuse that what took place was done for a sexual purpose” (ibid.), relying on r v. chase, [1987] 2 scr 293. in that case, which involved an accused charged with sexual assault for grabbing a girl’s breasts, this court identified the following factors to consider in determining whether the im- pugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature: sexual assault is an assault    which is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature, such that the sexual integrity of the victim is violated. the test to be applied in determining whether the impugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature is an objective one: “viewed in the light of all of the circumstances, is the sexual or carnal context of assault visible to a reasonable observer”. the part of the body touched, the nature of the contact, the situation in which it occurred, the words and gestures accompanying the act, and all other circumstances sur- rounding the conduct, including threats which may or may not be accompanied by force would be relevant. [emphasis added; pp 293-94] [82] la demande de jw a été entendue le 26 mai 2014. l’adjudicatrice d’audition a rendu sa déci- sion le 7 avril 2015. bien qu’elle ait accepté le té- moignage de jw et estimé que les faits allégués s’étaient produits tels que jw les avait relatés, elle a refusé la demande au motif qu’elle n’était pas convaincue, selon la prépondérance des probabili- tés, que la religieuse avait commis l’acte reproché à des [traduction] « fins d’ordre sexuel » (da, vol. i, p 4). elle a conclu, en se fondant sur l’arrêt r c. chase, [1987] 2 rcs 293, que les adjudica- teurs du péi « doivent être convaincus, s’agissant de toute allégation d’agression sexuelle, que les actes reprochés ont été commis à des fins d’ordre sexuel » (ibid). dans l’affaire chase, qui mettait en cause un individu accusé d’avoir saisi les seins d’une jeune fille, la cour a énoncé les facteurs suivants permet- tant de juger si les actes reprochés comportaient la nature sexuelle requise : l’agression sexuelle est une agression [  ] qui est com- mise dans des circonstances de nature sexuelle, de ma- nière à porter atteinte à l’intégrité sexuelle de la victime. le critère qui doit être appliqué pour déterminer si la conduite reprochée comporte la nature sexuelle requise est objectif : « compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, une personne raisonnable peut- elle percevoir le contexte sexuel ou charnel de l’agression? » la partie du corps qui est touchée, la nature du contact, la situation dans laquelle cela s’est produit, les paroles et les gestes qui ont accompagné l’acte, et toutes les autres circonstances entourant la conduite, y compris les menaces avec ou sans emploi de la force, constituent des éléments pertinents. [je souligne; p. 293- 294.] in applying chase, the hearing adjudicator [83] acknowledged that the penis is a sexual organ but was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that [83] pour appliquer l’arrêt chase, l’adjudicatrice d’audition a reconnu que le pénis était un organe sexuel, mais a ajouté qu’elle n’était pas convaincue, 264 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. there was a sexual purpose associated with the nun’s conduct, given the context in which the touching had occurred and jw’s failure to point to any evidence or circumstance to suggest such a purpose (ar, vol. i, at pp 4-5). ultimately, she interpreted sl1.4 as including sexual purpose as one of its “technical requirements” and found that jw had not met the burden of proof in this regard (p 5). selon la prépondérance des probabilités, que l’on pouvait associer des fins d’ordre sexuel aux agisse- ments de la religieuse, compte tenu du contexte dans lequel les attouchements avaient eu lieu et de l’inca- pacité de jw de citer des éléments de preuve ou des circonstances permettant de conclure à la présence de telles fins (da, vol. i, p 4-5). en fin de compte, elle a interprété les fins d’ordre sexuel comme étant une des [traduction] « exigences techniques » de la catégorie sl1.4 et a conclu que jw ne s’était pas acquitté du fardeau de la preuve qui lui incombait à cet égard (p 5). b decision of the review adjudicator b décision de l’adjudicateur de révision [84] the appellants applied for a review of the hearing adjudicator’s decision. in a decision dated july  5, 2015, the review adjudicator concluded that the hearing adjudicator had not misapplied the iap by requiring jw to prove sexual purpose and that the decision therefore fell within a range of reasonable outcomes (ar, vol. i, at p 11). in his analysis, the review adjudicator purported to apply the decision rendered by former chief adjudicator ish in another similar iap claim, which i shall refer to as the “b” decision and which is considered to be a seminal decision in the iap context (transcript, at pp. 74, 76 and 82). in applying that decision, the review adjudicator stated that “the former chief adjudicator determined that both of these categories of sl1 abuse require an objective analysis of the effect on the victim    and an objective analysis of the intent of the actor to commit a sexual assault” (ar, vol. i, at p. 9 (emphasis in original)). viewing the claim through this lens, the review adjudicator found that the hearing adjudicator had properly applied the chase factors and had not misapplied the iap model by evaluating the perpetrator’s sexual motivation or lack thereof (p 10). [84] les appelants ont demandé la révision de la décision de l’adjudicatrice d’audition. dans une déci- sion datée du 5 juillet 2015, l’adjudicateur de révision a conclu que l’adjudicatrice d’audition n’avait pas mal appliqué le péi en obligeant jw à prouver les fins d’ordre sexuel. l’adjudicateur de révision a par consé- quent conclu que la décision appartenait aux issues raisonnables (da, vol. i, p 11). dans son analyse, l’adjudicateur de révision se proposait d’appliquer la décision rendue par l’ancien adjudicateur en chef ish à l’égard d’une demande similaire présentée dans le cadre du péi (que j’appellerai la décision « b ») et qui est considérée comme une décision de principe s’agissant du péi (transcription, p. 74, 76 et 82). en appliquant cette décision, l’adjudicateur de révision a déclaré ce qui suit : [traduction] «    l’ancien adjudicateur en chef a déclaré que ces deux catégories de sévices visées à la catégorie sl1 commandent une analyse objective de leurs conséquences sur la victime [  ] et une analyse objective de l’inten- tion de l’auteur de l’acte de commettre une agression sexuelle » (da, vol. i, p. 9 (souligné dans l’original)). abordant la demande sous cet angle, l’adjudicateur de révision a conclu que l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait correctement appliqué les facteurs de l’arrêt chase et qu’elle n’avait pas mal appliqué le régime du péi lorsqu’elle a évalué la présence ou l’absence de motivation sexuelle chez l’auteure de l’acte (p 10). c decision of the re- review adjudicator c décision de l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision [85] the appellants sought a review of the review adjudicator’s decision. on november 22, 2015, the [85] les appelants ont demandé la révision de la dé- cision de l’adjudicateur de révision. le 22 novembre [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 265 re- review adjudicator upheld the review decision, finding that the review adjudicator had conducted his review correctly and had not misapplied the iap model (ar, vol. i, at p 18). she found that the re- view adjudicator had properly considered the ques- tion of whether sexual purpose should be taken into consideration when assessing claims under sl1.4: “[t]he reviewing adjudicator correctly noted that former chief adjudicator ish found that both the first and fourth categories of sl1 abuse require an objective analysis of the effect of the touching upon the victim and as well as an objective analysis of the intent of the perpetrator” (p. 16 (footnote omitted)). she ultimately found no fault with the review adju- dicator’s application of the iap model, concluding that he had completed a “thorough and thoughtful re- view” of the hearing adjudicator’s decision (p 18). d manitoba court of queen’s bench (edmond j.), 2016 mbqb 159, [2016] 4 cnlr 23 [86] the appellants subsequently filed an rfd with the manitoba supervising court under the irssa court administration protocol, taking the position that “jw was wrongly denied compensation in the iap as a result of the failure of adjudicators in the iap to enforce the provisions of the [irssa]” (ar, vol. ii, at p 2). 2015, l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision a con firmé la décision de révision en concluant que l’adjudica- teur de révision avait effectué sa révision correcte- ment et n’avait pas mal appliqué le régime du péi (da, vol. i, p 18). elle a conclu que l’adjudicateur de révision avait bien examiné la question de savoir s’il fallait tenir compte des fins d’ordre sexuel lors de l’examen des demandes présentées au titre de la catégorie sl1.4 : [traduction] « [l’]adjudicateur de révision a fait observer à juste titre que l’ancien adjudicateur en chef ish avait conclu que la première et la quatrième catégories de sévices prévus à la ca- tégorie sl1 commandaient une analyse objective des conséquences des attouchements sur la victime, ainsi qu’une analyse objective de l’intention de l’au- teur de l’acte » (p. 16 (note en bas de page omise)). ultimement, l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision n’a relevé aucune erreur dans la façon dont l’adjudicateur de révision avait appliqué le régime du péi, estimant qu’il avait effectué « une révision approfondie et ré- fléchie » de la décision de l’adjudicatrice d’audition (p 18). d cour du banc de la reine du manitoba (le juge edmond), 2016 mbqb 159, [2016] 4 cnlr. 23 [86] les appelants ont par la suite déposé une de- mande de directives devant le tribunal de supervision du manitoba en vertu du protocole des tribunaux régissant l’administration de l’entente de la crrpi, en faisant valoir que [traduction] « jw s’est vu refuser à tort une indemnité dans le cadre du péi par suite du défaut des adjudicateurs du péi d’appliquer les dispositions de la [crrpi] » (da, vol. ii, p 2). [87] faced with the appellants’ rfd, edmond j., the supervising judge for manitoba, observed that his ongoing supervisory jurisdiction over iap ad- judication decisions was based on: (1) the inherent jurisdiction of a superior court; (2) manitoba’s class proceedings legislation; (3) the manitoba court of queen’s bench’s approval order and implemen- tation order of march 2007; and (4) the express terms of the irssa itself (man. qb. reasons, at para 25). edmond j also accepted that the princi- ples laid down by the ontario court of appeal in schachter were the starting point in considering the [87] saisi de la demande de directives des appe- lants, le juge edmond, le juge superviseur du ma- nitoba, a fait observer qu’il tirait ses pouvoirs de supervision continue à l’égard des décisions d’ad- judication rendues dans le cadre du péi des sources suivantes : (1) la compétence inhérente d’une cour supérieure; (2) la législation manitobaine sur les recours collectifs; (3) l’ordonnance d’approbation et l’ordonnance de mise en œuvre prononcées par la cour du banc de la reine du manitoba en mars 2007; (4) les modalités expresses de la crrpi (motifs de la cour du banc de la reine du manitoba, par 25). le 266 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. jurisdiction of the courts to review decisions of re- review adjudicators under the iap. [88] after discussing schachter and subsequent jurisprudence dealing with the scope of the review powers afforded to supervising courts, edmond j. concluded that iap adjudicators “have a duty to enforce the terms of the irssa and in doing so, they do not have jurisdiction to apply an unreason- able interpretation to the terms of the irssa in de- termining whether a compensable claim has been made out” (para 33). he considered fontaine et al. v. canada (attorney general) et al., 2014 mbqb 200, 311 man. r. (2d) 17, fontaine v. canada (attorney general), 2015 abqb 225, [2015] 4 cnlr 69, and fontaine v. canada (attorney general), 2016 onsc 4326, [2016] 4 cnlr 40 (“spanish irs sc”), and came to the following conclusion re- garding his jurisdiction to review iap decisions (at para. 35):    i have the power to review the decision of the re- review adjudicator to determine whether she failed to apply the terms of the irssa and specifically the iap compensation rules. i accept that this is a limited form of curial review, reserved for exceptional cases, and that i must ensure that i do not engage in rewriting the irssa by effectively giving the requestors a right of appeal and/ or review for which they did not bargain. juge edmond a également accepté que les principes énoncés par la cour d’appel de l’ontario dans l’arrêt schachter constituaient le point de départ lorsqu’il s’agit d’analyser la compétence des tribunaux en matière de contrôle des décisions des adjudicateurs de deuxième révision dans le cadre du péi. [88] après avoir examiné l’arrêt schachter et la jurisprudence ultérieure relative à l’étendue des pou- voirs de contrôle conférés aux tribunaux de supervi- sion, le juge edmond a conclu que les adjudicateurs du péi [traduction] « ont l’obligation d’appliquer les modalités de la crrpi et que, pour ce faire, il ne leur est pas loisible d’appliquer une interprétation déraisonnable des modalités de la crrpi pour dé- cider si une demande ouvrant droit à indemnisation a été présentée » (par 33). le juge edmond s’est penché sur les décisions fontaine et al c. canada (attorney general) et al, 2014 mbqb 200, 311 man. r. (2d) 17, fontaine c. canada (attorney general), 2015 abqb 225, [2015] 4 cnlr 69, et fontaine c. canada (attorney general), 2016 onsc 4326, [2016] 4 cnlr 40 (« pi de spanish, cs »), et il est arrivé à la conclusion suivante en ce qui concerne sa compétence en matière de contrôle des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi (par. 35) : [traduction]    j’ai le pouvoir de réviser la décision rendue par l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision pour dé- cider si elle a omis d’appliquer les modalités de la crrpi et, plus précisément, les règles d’indemnisation du péi. je reconnais qu’il s’agit d’une forme limitée d’examen judiciaire, réservé aux cas exceptionnels, et que je dois m’assurer de ne pas réécrire la crrpi en accordant ef- fectivement aux demandeurs un droit d’appel et/ou de révision qu’ils n’ont pas négocié. [89] edmond j identified the standard of review on an rfd concerning an iap decision as “ensur- ing that the re- review adjudicator did not endorse a legal interpretation that is so unreasonable that it amounts to a failure to properly apply the iap to the facts of a particular case” (para 40). in ap- plying this standard, edmond j. determined that, in this case, “the fact finding process used by the adjudicator involved a failure to apply the irssa’s terms and those of the iap” and that thereafter there had been “a failure to correct that non- compliance through review or re- review” (para 42). in his view, [89] le juge edmond a énoncé la norme de con- trôle applicable dans le cas d’une demande de direc- tives concernant une décision rendue dans le cadre du péi en précisant qu’elle consistait à [traduc- tion] « s’assurer que l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision n’a pas adopté une interprétation légale qui est si déraisonnable qu’elle équivaut au défaut d’ap- pliquer correctement le péi aux faits d’une affaire donnée » (par 40). pour appliquer ce critère, le juge edmond a conclu qu’en l’espèce, « dans sa constata- tion des faits, l’adjudicatrice a omis d’appliquer les modalités de la crrpi et celles du péi » et que, par [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 267 the hearing adjudicator’s interpretation of the com- pensable sexual abuse provision in the irssa was “fundamentally inconsistent” with the plain language of the provision and with the general criminal law ju- risprudence regarding sexual assault, and the review adjudicator and re- review adjudicator had erred in upholding that interpretation. thus, edmond j. found that the interpretation was “simply not reason- able”, for three reasons (para 44). first, the hearing adjudicator had replaced the words “any touch- ing” in sl1.4 with the words “sexual touching”, which was not a reasonable formulation of the test to be applied (para 45). second, she had imported a requirement of sexual purpose on the part of the perpetrator, contrary to the plain language of sl1.4 (para 46). finally, she had incorrectly interpreted chase as requiring a sexual purpose as a necessary element of proving an act of sexual abuse (para 47). [90] as a result, edmond j ordered that jw’s claim be sent back to a first- level iap adjudicator for reconsideration. la suite, « ce problème n’a pas été corrigé lors de la révision ou de la deuxième révision » (par 42). à son avis, l’interprétation par l’adjudicatrice d’audition de la disposition de la crrpi portant sur les sévices sexuels indemnisables était « fondamentalement in- compatible » avec le libellé clair de cette disposition, ainsi qu’avec la jurisprudence générale du droit pénal concernant l’agression sexuelle, et l’adjudicateur de révision ainsi que l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révi- sion avaient commis une erreur en confirmant cette interprétation. le juge edmond a par conséquent conclu que l’interprétation retenue n’était « tout sim- plement pas raisonnable », et ce, pour trois motifs (par 44). d’abord, l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait remplacé les mots « tout contact physique » à la ca- tégorie sl1.4 par les mots « contact sexuel », ce qui ne correspondait pas à une formulation raisonnable du test applicable (par 45). ensuite, l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait ajouté une exigence selon laquelle l’auteure de l’acte devait avoir agi à des fins d’ordre sexuel, ce qui va à l’encontre du libellé clair de la catégorie sl1.4 (par 46). enfin, elle avait mal in- terprété l’arrêt chase en estimant qu’il exigeait que des fins d’ordre sexuel soient établies pour qu’une agression sexuelle soit prouvée (par 47). [90] par conséquent, le juge edmond a ordonné que la demande de jw soit renvoyée à un adjudi- cateur de premier palier du péi pour être examinée de nouveau. e decision of the reconsideration adjudicator e décision de l’adjudicatrice de réexamen [91] on september 30, 2016, the reconsideration adjudicator decided in jw’s favour (ar, vol. ii, at pp 143-61). in evaluating jw’s claim, she relied on the decision rendered by adjudicator ross in file no. t-12783, a claim involving similar facts. she stated the following, at para. 46:    [adjudicator. ross] correctly pointed out that in chase, the test was determined to be an objective one which con- siders general intent. that is, while a perpetrator’s sexual gratification may be taken into account, neither carnal intent or sexual gratification are necessary criteria in order to prove the sexual assault   . [91] le 30 septembre 2016, l’adjudicatrice de ré- examen a tranché en faveur de jw (da, vol. ii, p. 143- 161). pour évaluer la demande de jw, elle s’est fondée sur la décision rendue par l’adjudicatrice ross dans le dossier no t-12783, une demande qui portait sur des faits similaires. elle a déclaré ce qui suit au par. 46 : [traduction]    [l’adjudicatrice. ross] a souligné à juste titre que, dans l’arrêt chase, la cour avait conclu que le test applicable était un test objectif qui tient compte de l’intention générale. autrement dit, bien que l’on puisse tenir compte de la gratification sexuelle que retire l’auteur de l’acte, ni l’intention charnelle ni la gratification sexuelle ne sont des critères essentiels pour prouver l’agression sexuelle  . 268 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. [92] the reconsideration adjudicator also referred to chief adjudicator ish’s “b” decision mentioned earlier, particularly his conclusion that “both fon- dling and violation of sexual integrity categories of sl1 are measured on an objective basis and may not rely on the subjective feelings of the claimant or the subjective intent of the perpetrator” (ar, vol. ii, at p. 153, fn 12). after considering the chase factors and the analysis conducted by adjudicator ross in her decision in file no. t-12783 (including her reliance on chief adjudicator ish’s decision), the reconsideration adjudicator found that jw had proven on a balance of probabilities that the require- ments of sl1.4  had been met, and awarded him $12,720 in compensation (p 161). [93] before the reconsideration decision was im- plemented, the attorney general of canada (“at- torney general”) appealed the supervising judge’s decision to the manitoba court of appeal, and ob- tained an order from the supervising judge staying the original order sending jw’s claim back for re- consideration (ar, vol. ii, at p 162). [92] l’adjudicatrice de réexamen a également men- tionné la décision « b » de l’adjudicateur en chef ish, décision dont il a été question précédemment, notam- ment sa conclusion portant que [traduction] « les catégories relatives aux attouchements et à l’atteinte à l’intégrité sexuelle prévues à la catégorie sl1 sont mesurées de façon objective et ne peuvent reposer sur les perceptions subjectives du demandeur ou les intentions subjectives de l’auteur de l’acte » (da, vol. ii, p. 153, note 12). après avoir examiné les facteurs de l’arrêt chase et l’analyse de l’adjudica- trice ross dans le dossier no t-12783 (y compris le fait pour cette dernière de s’être appuyée sur la dé- cision de l’adjudicateur en chef ish), l’adjudicatrice de réexamen a conclu que jw avait établi, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, qu’il avait été satis- fait aux exigences énoncées à la catégorie sl1.4, et elle lui a accordé une indemnité de 12 720 $ (p 161). [93] avant que la décision de réexamen ne soit mise en œuvre, le procureur général du canada (« procureur général ») a porté en appel la déci- sion du juge superviseur devant la cour d’appel du manitoba et a obtenu du juge superviseur une or- donnance sursoyant à l’exécution de l’ordonnance initiale renvoyant la demande de jw pour réexamen (da, vol. ii, p 162). f manitoba court of appeal (monnin, beard and lemaistre jja), 2017 mbca 54, 413 dlr. (4th) 521 f cour d’appel du manitoba (les juges monnin, beard et lemaistre), 2017 mbca 54, 413 dlr. (4th) 521 [94] the manitoba court of appeal unanimously allowed the attorney general’s appeal on the basis that the supervising judge had exceeded his jurisdic- tion under the irssa. beard ja began by noting that the issue of the supervising judge’s jurisdiction over jw’s. rfd was a question of law to be reviewed on a correctness standard (para 24). she endorsed the approach taken in schachter and affirmed that there is no right to appeal or to seek judicial review of iap decisions. judicial recourse in relation to the iap is available only in “very exceptional cir- cumstances” (paras.  36-37). she emphasized the distinction between failure to apply the terms of the irssa or the implementation orders, on the one hand, and the incorrect or unreasonable inter- pretation or application of those terms, on the other [94] la cour d’appel du manitoba a accueilli à l’unanimité l’appel interjeté par le procureur général, au motif que le juge superviseur avait outrepassé la compétence que lui conférait la crrpi. la juge beard a tout d’abord fait observer que la compétence du juge superviseur à l’égard de la demande de direc- tives de jw était une question de droit assujettie à la norme de contrôle de la décision correcte (par 24). elle a fait sienne la démarche suivie dans l’arrêt schachter et confirmé qu’il n’existait aucun droit d’appel ou de contrôle judiciaire des décisions ren- dues dans le cadre du péi. selon elle, il ne serait pos- sible d’exercer un recours judiciaire sous le régime du péi que dans des [traduction] « circonstances très exceptionnelles » (par 36-37). elle a souligné la distinction qu’il convenait d’établir entre, d’une [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 269 (para 42). only the former falls within those “very limited circumstances in which a party can have recourse to the courts” (ibid). [95] beard ja went on to find that a supervising judge is not entitled to assume the role of a review adjudicator (para 43). the mere fact that a supervis- ing judge disagrees with an adjudicator’s decision does not mean that the adjudicator failed to enforce the irssa or apply the iap model, and as such does not allow the judge to intervene. this reasoning applies regardless of whether there is disagreement with an adjudicator’s findings of fact, interpretation of the terms of the iap or application of those terms to the facts (ibid). overall, beard ja agreed with the attorney general’s position that the irssa is a “complete code” that “limits access to the courts”, with no right of appeal or judicial review of any re- review adjudication decision (para 48). [96] applying these principles to jw’s claim, beard ja held that the supervising judge in the present case had erred in modifying the scope of the courts’ jurisdiction as set out in schachter by find- ing that he had jurisdiction to consider whether the hearing adjudicator had erred in her interpretation of the terms of the iap. while adjudicators cannot refuse or fail to apply the terms of the irssa, they are entitled to interpret those terms, which is part of their adjudicative role. interpreting those terms, “even if unreasonably, does not constitute a failure to consider the irssa and the iap model within the [schachter] parameters of jurisdiction” (para 51). the supervising judge had erred in carrying out the same function that would be carried out on an ap- peal from an iap decision and in focusing on the adjudicator’s interpretation of the iap rather than on whether the adjudicator had considered the cor- rect terms (paras 52-53). his interpretation of the supervising courts’ jurisdiction would make judicial intervention available in many, rather than limited part, le défaut d’appliquer les modalités de la crrpi ou des ordonnances de mise en œuvre et, d’autre part, l’interprétation ou l’application incorrecte ou déraisonnable de ces modalités (par 42). seul le défaut d’appliquer relèverait des « circonstances très limitées dans lesquelles une partie pourrait avoir recours aux tribunaux » (ibid). [95] la juge beard a ensuite conclu que les juges superviseurs n’ont pas le droit d’assumer le rôle d’adjudicateur de révision (par 43). le simple fait de ne pas être d’accord avec la décision d’un adjudi- cateur ne signifie pas que ce dernier a omis de mettre en œuvre la crrpi ou d’appliquer le régime du péi. les juges ne peuvent donc pas intervenir à ce titre. ce raisonnement s’applique, peu importe que le désaccord porte sur les conclusions de fait tirées par l’adjudicateur, son interprétation des modalités du péi ou son application des modalités aux faits (ibid). dans l’ensemble, la juge beard a souscrit à la thèse du procureur général suivant laquelle la crrpi est un « code complet limitant l’accès aux tribunaux » qui ne prévoit aucun droit d’appel ou de contrôle judiciaire relativement aux décisions rendues par les adjudicateurs de deuxième révision (par 48). [96] appliquant ces principes à la demande de jw, la juge beard a conclu que le juge superviseur avait, en l’espèce, commis une erreur en modifiant l’étendue de la compétence du tribunal énoncée dans l’arrêt schachter lorsqu’il a conclu qu’il avait compétence pour examiner la question de savoir si l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait commis une erreur dans son interprétation des modalités du péi. même si l’adjudicateur ne peut refuser ou omettre d’appli- quer les modalités de la crrpi, il a le droit de les interpréter, et cela relève de ses fonctions décision- nelles. l’interprétation de ces modalités, « même si elle est déraisonnable, ne constitue pas un défaut de tenir compte de la crrpi et du régime du péi selon les paramètres de la compétence établis dans l’arrêt [schachter] » (par 51). le juge superviseur avait commis une erreur en exerçant la même fonction que celle qui l’aurait été dans un appel de la déci- sion prise dans le cadre du péi et en se concentrant sur l’interprétation que l’adjudicatrice avait faite du péi, au lieu de se demander si l’adjudicatrice avait 270 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. or exceptional, cases. moreover, such an approach would undermine the irssa’s objective of ensuring the timely resolution of disputes (para 62). [97] beard ja found that the supervising judge’s jurisdiction was limited to determining whether the hearing adjudicator had implemented the provi- sions of the iap in the narrow sense of determining whether she had considered the correct terms. once it was determined that the hearing adjudicator had considered category sl1.4, edmond j.’s jurisdic- tion ended and he should have dismissed the rfd (para 72). as a result, his order was set aside and the re- review adjudicator’s decision was reinstated (ar, vol. i, at p 83). examiné les bonnes modalités du péi (par 52-53). son interprétation de la compétence des tribunaux de supervision donnerait ouverture à une intervention judiciaire dans une foule de situations, plutôt que dans des cas limités ou exceptionnels. en outre, une telle approche irait à l’encontre de l’objectif de la crrpi consistant à veiller au règlement rapide des différends (par 62). [97] la juge beard a conclu que la compétence du juge superviseur se limitait à juger si l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait mis en œuvre les dispositions du péi en s’en tenant strictement à la question de savoir si elle s’était penchée sur les bonnes modalités. dès lors qu’il avait conclu que l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait examiné la catégorie sl1.4, le juge edmond n’avait plus compétence et il aurait dû rejeter la demande de directives (par 72). par conséquent, l’ordonnance du juge edmond a été annulée et la décision de l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision a été rétablie (da, vol. i, p 83). iv issues iv questions en litige [98] while the appellants have raised several inter- related questions, the appeal ultimately turns on the following two issues: [98] bien que les appelants aient soulevé plusieurs questions interreliées, le présent pourvoi se résume essentiellement aux deux questions suivantes : 1. is judicial review of the decisions of iap adju- dicators available? 2. if judicial review is not available, what is the scope of the judicial recourse available to parties seeking intervention by the supervising courts in decisions rendered under the iap? 1 les décisions rendues par les adjudicateurs dans le cadre du péi sont- elles susceptibles de contrôle judiciaire? 2 dans la négative, quelle est l’étendue des recours judiciaires que peuvent exercer les parties qui cherchent à faire intervenir les tribunaux de su- pervision à l’égard des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi? v analysis v analyse [99] to be clear, i would emphasize that there is a distinction between the availability of judicial review based on the principles of administrative law and the availability of judicial recourse as a result of the courts’ ongoing supervisory jurisdiction over the implementation and administration of the irssa. [99] pour dissiper toute équivoque, je tiens à in- sister sur la distinction qui existe entre la possibi- lité de se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire selon les principes du droit administratif et celle d’exercer un recours judiciaire trouvant sa source dans le pouvoir de supervision continue des tribunaux en ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre et l’administration de la crrpi. [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 271 a availability of judicial review a la possibilité de se pourvoir en contrôle judi- [100] the appellants submit that the availability of judicial review of iap decisions is grounded in the court orders approving the irssa, the class proceed- ings statutes applicable to the irssa, and the inher- ent jurisdiction of the superior courts. in my view, these arguments misapprehend the nature of judicial review. i would therefore agree with the respondents, the attorney general and the chief adjudicator, that judicial review under an administrative law analysis is not applicable to iap decisions. [101] judicial review is the means by which the courts “supervise those who exercise statutory pow- ers, to ensure that they do not overstep their legal au- thority” (dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, at para 28). this court recently set out the factors to be applied in determining the availability of judicial review in highwood congre- gation of jehovah’s witnesses (judicial committee) v. wall, 2018 scc 26, [2018] 1 scr 750. as the purpose of judicial review is to ensure the legality of state decision making, it is available only where there is “an exercise of state authority” that is “of a sufficiently public character” (para 14). ciaire [100] les appelants affirment que la possibilité de demander le contrôle judiciaire des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi tire sa source dans les ordonnances judiciaires approuvant la crrpi, dans la législation sur les recours collectifs applicable à la crrpi, ainsi que dans la compétence inhérente des cours supérieures. à mon avis, faire valoir cet argument, c’est se méprendre quant à la nature du contrôle judiciaire. je suis par conséquent d’accord avec les intimés, le procureur général et l’adjudi- cateur en chef, pour dire que le contrôle judiciaire suivant une analyse fondée sur le droit administratif n’est pas applicable aux décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi. [101] le contrôle judiciaire permet aux cours de justice « de s’assurer que les pouvoirs légaux sont exercés dans les limites fixées par le législateur » (dunsmuir c nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, par 28). la cour a récemment énoncé les facteurs à appliquer pour déterminer les cas d’ouverture au contrôle judiciaire dans l’arrêt highwood congregation of jehovah’s witnesses (ju- dicial committee) c. wall, 2018 csc 26, [2018] 1 rcs 750. comme le contrôle judiciaire a pour objet d’assurer la légalité des décisions prises par l’état, ce recours n’est possible que «  lorsqu’un pouvoir étatique a été exercé et que l’exercice de ce pouvoir présente une nature suffisamment publique » (par 14). [102] the appellants submit that the iap is a crea- ture of statute (namely provincial class proceedings legislation), agreement and court order (af, at pa- ras 33-35). respectfully, i disagree. as this court found in scc records decision, the irssa is, at its root, a contract (para 35). it was not created by any act of the executive or the legislature, but is a contractual settlement of private law tort claims, to which effect has been given by court orders. iap adjudicators exercise powers granted by contract and have no statutory authority. their appointment and functions are determined by the parties to the con- tract, and they apply the compensation rules agreed to by the parties. the chief adjudicator’s authority [102] les appelants affirment que le péi tire son origine de la législation — en l’occurrence la lé- gislation provinciale relative aux recours collec- tifs —, d’une entente et d’ordonnances judiciaires (ma, par 33-35). en toute déférence, je ne partage pas leur avis comme l’a statué la cour dans la décision de la csc sur les documents, la crrpi est, à la base, un contrat (par 35). la crrpi n’a pas été créée par une mesure quelconque prise par le pouvoir exécutif ou par le pouvoir législatif; elle constitue plutôt un règlement contractuel portant sur des réclamations de droit privé fondées sur la responsabilité délictuelle auquel des tribunaux ont donné effet au moyen d’ordonnances judiciaires. 272 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. derives from the parties’ agreement, and he does not exercise any statutory decision- making power or any power granted by the executive. the distinct roles of the courts and iap adjudicators under the irssa are determined not by the division between the legislative or executive and judicial branches, but rather by the intentions of the parties (rf (chief adjudicator), at paras. 53, 60 and 62). [103] the appellants err in suggesting that the courts’ supervisory powers include an obligation to ensure that class members receive the promised ben- efits of the irssa and that this entitles the courts to judicially review iap decisions (af, at paras. 41- 44). this argument misconstrues the benefits that the parties intended the irssa to confer. what the irssa and the implementation orders promise to individual claimants is “a contractual right to have compensable claims adjudicated under the negoti- ated iap” (nn, at para 83). the courts’ general supervisory jurisdiction allows them to ensure that this contractual commitment is fulfilled, but this does not mean that iap adjudicators are state actors (rf (chief adjudicator), at para. 65; rf (attorney general), at para 86). les adjudicateurs du péi exercent des pouvoirs qui leur sont conférés par contrat et ils n’ont aucun pou- voir d’origine législative. leur nomination et leurs fonctions sont fixées par les parties au contrat et ils appliquent les règles d’indemnisation convenues par les parties. les pouvoirs de l’adjudicateur en chef découlent de la convention intervenue entre les parties, et il n’exerce pas de pouvoir décisionnel conféré par une loi ou de pouvoir conféré par l’exé- cutif. les rôles distincts que jouent les tribunaux et les adjudicateurs du péi sous le régime de la crrpi ne sont pas établis en fonction du partage des pou- voirs législatif, ou exécutif, et judiciaire, mais dé- pendent de la volonté des parties (mi (adjudicateur en chef), par. 53, 60 et 62). [103] les appelants font fausse route lorsqu’ils laissent entendre que le pouvoir de supervision des tribunaux oblige ceux-ci à s’assurer que les membres du groupe reçoivent les avantages prévus par la crrpi et que cette obligation donne aux tribunaux le droit de procéder au contrôle judiciaire des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi (ma, par 41-44). cet argument constitue une interprétation erronée des avantages que les parties souhaitaient que la crrpi leur confère. ce que la crrpi et les ordonnances de mise en œuvre promettent aux différents deman- deurs, c’est [traduction] « un droit contractuel de faire juger leurs réclamations indemnisables sous le régime du péi, qui a été négocié » (nn, par 83). le pouvoir général de supervision des tribunaux permet à ceux-ci de veiller au respect de cet enga- gement contractuel, mais les adjudicateurs du péi ne sont pas pour autant des représentants de l’état (mi (adjudicateur en chef), par. 65; mi (procureur général), par 86). [104] as the chief adjudicator points out in his written submissions, this analysis does not change just because canada is one of the parties to the irssa. if canada’s participation as a contracting party were enough to trigger judicial review, then any arbitration decision involving canada would be equally subject to judicial review. the availability of judicial review depends on the source of the decision maker’s authority, not the identity of the parties (rf. (chief adjudicator), at para 61). in this case, the iap adjudicators’ authority was conferred on them by the [104] comme l’adjudicateur en chef le souligne dans ses observations écrites, cette analyse ne change pas simplement parce que le canada est l’une des parties à la crrpi. si la participation du canada à titre de partie contractante suffisait pour donner ouverture au contrôle judiciaire, toute décision ar- bitrale mettant en cause le canada serait également susceptible de contrôle judiciaire la possibilité de se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire dépend de la source du pouvoir du décideur et non de l’identité des parties (mi (adjudicateur en chef), par 61). [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 273 parties to the irssa, not by an act of the legislature or the exercise of prerogative powers. [105] moreover, the fact that the contract was ap- proved by court order does not transform the op- eration of this private settlement into a public act. rather, the settlement is the result of lengthy and complex negotiations between private parties, and as the manitoba court of appeal observed in this case, it encompasses “a compensation package that is beyond the jurisdiction of any court to create” (man. ca. reasons, at para 60). further, and contrary to the appellants’ submissions, the fact that the courts have authority to supervise the implementation of the irssa under class proceedings legislation is not relevant to the question of whether judicial review is available. the critical factor is not the source of the courts’ authority, but rather the source of the authority of the adjudicators whose decisions are at issue (rf (chief adjudicator), at para 63). [106] this conclusion is consistent with the on- tario court of appeal’s decision in schachter, in which rouleau ja said the following about whether a legal fee review decision by the chief adjudicator is subject to judicial review: the administrative judge also correctly concluded that there is no right to seek judicial review from a legal fee review decision of the chief adjudicator. the court’s jurisdiction to issue a declaration under s. 2(1)2 of the judicial review procedure act, rso 1990, c. j.1 (the “jrpa”) relates only to “the exercise, refusal to exercise or proposed or purported exercise of a statutory power”. as the administrative judge explained, the chief adjudicator is not exercising a statutory power of decision, but rather renders his fee review appeal decision pursuant to the authority derived from the implementation orders, as ap- proved by the relevant provincial and territorial superior courts. dans le cas qui nous occupe, le pouvoir des adju- dicateurs du péi leur est conféré par les parties à la crrpi et non par une loi ou l’exercice de pouvoirs de prérogative. [105] de plus, le fait que le contrat ait été approuvé au moyen d’une ordonnance judiciaire ne fait pas de l’application de ce règlement privé un acte public. ce règlement est plutôt le fruit de négociations lon- gues et complexes menées entre des parties privées et, comme la cour d’appel du manitoba l’a fait ob- server en l’espèce, ce règlement englobe [traduc- tion] « une indemnisation globale que les tribunaux n’ont pas la compétence de créer » (motifs de la ca. du man., par 60). de plus, et contrairement à ce que prétendent les appelants, le fait que les tribunaux aient le pouvoir de superviser la mise en œuvre de la crrpi en vertu de la législation sur les recours collectifs n’a rien à avoir avec la possibilité de se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire. le facteur détermi- nant n’est pas la source du pouvoir du tribunal, mais bien la source du pouvoir des adjudicateurs dont les décisions sont en cause (mi (adjudicateur en chef), par 63). [106] cette conclusion est conforme à l’arrêt schachter de la cour d’appel de l’ontario. dans cet arrêt, le juge rouleau a déclaré ce qui suit sur la question de savoir s’il était possible de faire contrô- ler par les tribunaux la décision rendue par l’adju- dicateur en chef saisi d’une demande de révision d’honoraires : [traduction] le juge administratif a également con- clu à juste titre qu’il n’existait pas de droit de se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire contre la décision rendue par l’adju- dicateur en chef au sujet de la révision des honoraires. la compétence du tribunal pour rendre un jugement déclara- toire en vertu de la disp. 2(1)2 de la loi sur la procédure de révision judiciaire, lro 1990, c j1 (« lprj »), ne porte que sur « l’exercice réel, projeté ou prétendu d’une compétence légale ou [sur le] refus de l’exercer ». comme le juge administratif l’a expliqué, l’adjudicateur en chef n’exerce pas un pouvoir décisionnel conféré par une loi, mais rend plutôt sa décision d’appel en matière de révision des honoraires en vertu du pouvoir que lui confèrent les ordonnances de mise en œuvre approuvées par les cours supérieures provinciales et territoriales com- pétentes. 274 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. the appellant further contends that the office of the chief adjudicator is a quasi- judicial public body that is subject to judicial review proceedings by way of an application for an order in the nature of mandamus or certiorari under s. 2(1)2 of the jrpa. i do not agree with this assertion. judicial review is not available to review the exercise of authority by a judicially created body, which has been given certain duties as provided by the terms of the sa and the implementation orders. the office of the chief adjudicator was created by order of the courts in approving the negotiated terms of settlement of class action litigation. the authority of that office is exercised in relation to those class members who have elected to advance claims through the iap and their counsel. the terms of the sa and the implementation orders set out the process for reviewing decisions of the iap adjudicators. recourse to the courts is only available if it is provided for in the sa or the implementation orders. [emphasis added; paras 51-52] [107] supervising and appellate courts have fol- lowed this reasoning in affirming that judicial review of decisions of iap adjudicators is not available (see rf (chief adjudicator), at para. 56, for a list of over 20 cases). the british columbia court of appeal most recently reiterated this principle in nn (at para 214). both the supervising judge (at para. 28) and the manitoba court of appeal (at para. 48) in the instant case correctly held that judicial review was not available to jw. [108] because the purpose of judicial review is to ensure the legality of state decision making (high- wood congregation, at para. 13) and because the powers of iap adjudicators are not conferred by the state, but are instead derived from a contract, judicial review of iap decisions is not available. par ailleurs, l’appelante soutient que le bureau de l’ad- judicateur en chef est un organisme public quasi judiciaire susceptible de contrôle judiciaire par voie de demande pré- sentée en vue d’obtenir une ordonnance de la nature d’un mandamus ou d’un certiorari au titre de la disp. 2(1)2 de la lprj. je ne suis pas de cet avis. le recours au contrôle judiciaire n’est pas possible relativement à l’exercice du pouvoir d’un organisme créé par voie judiciaire à qui ont été confiées certaines fonctions précisées par la crrpi et par les ordonnances de mise en œuvre. le bureau de l’adjudicateur en chef a été créé par une ordonnance ju- diciaire approuvant les modalités négociées du règlement des recours collectifs. ce bureau exerce ses pouvoirs à l’égard des membres du groupe qui ont choisi de faire valoir leurs réclamations dans le cadre du péi et de leurs avocats. les modalités de la crrpi et des ordonnances de mise en œuvre établissent le processus de révision des décisions des adjudicateurs du péi. il n’est possible de s’adresser aux tribunaux que dans la mesure prévue par la crrpi ou par les ordonnances de mise en œuvre. [je souligne; par 51-52] [107] les tribunaux de supervision et les juridictions d’appel ont suivi ce raisonnement pour con firmer que les décisions des adjudicateurs du péi n’étaient pas susceptibles de contrôle judiciaire (voir mi (ad- judicateur en chef), par. 56, pour une liste de plus d’une vingtaine de décisions). la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a confirmé très récemment ce principe dans l’arrêt nn (par 214). en l’espèce, le juge superviseur (par. 28) et la cour d’appel du manitoba (par. 48) ont tous les deux con clu à bon droit que jw ne pouvait se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire. [108] comme le contrôle judiciaire a pour objet d’assurer la légalité des décisions prises par l’état (highwood congregation, par. 13) et comme les pouvoirs des adjudicateurs du péi ne leur sont pas conférés par l’état mais qu’ils trouvent plutôt leur source dans un contrat, il n’est donc pas possible de faire contrôler par les tribunaux les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi. b availability of judicial recourse b la possibilité d’exercer un recours judiciaire [109] the parties are in agreement that the stand- ard of review applicable to the question of whether judicial recourse is available is correctness. i am of the same view. [109] les parties conviennent que la norme de contrôle applicable à la question de la possibilité d’exercer un recours judiciaire est celle de la décision correcte. j’abonde dans leur sens. [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 275 [110] the issue on appeal relates to the jurisdic- tion of a supervising judge in hearing and deciding an rfd in finding that the correctness standard applies, beard ja compared the iap to a standard form contract. while individual claimants could opt out of the iap scheme and have their claim deter- mined by the courts, if they failed to opt out within the mandated time period, they were bound by the terms of the irssa and could not negotiate an alter- native resolution (man. ca. reasons, at para 22). beard ja properly applied this court’s decision in ledcor construction ltd. v. northbridge indemnity insurance co., 2016 scc 37, [2016] 2 scr 23. in that case, wagner j (as he then was) found that in reviewing the interpretation of standard form con- tracts, appellate courts are tasked with “ensuring the consistency of the law” (see also sattva capital corp. v. creston moly corp., 2014 scc 53, [2014] 2 scr 633, at para 51). where a court’s interpre- tation of a standard form contract has precedential value beyond the parties to the dispute, that interpre- tation should be reviewed for correctness (ledcor, at para 39). he concluded as follows (at para. 46):    where, like here, the appeal involves the interpretation of a standard form contract, the interpretation at issue is of precedential value, and there is no meaningful factual matrix specific to the particular parties to assist the inter- pretation process, this interpretation is better characterized as a question of law subject to correctness review. [111] the question of the supervising courts’ juris- diction to assess iap decisions will have precedential value beyond the present case, as it extends to all claims under the iap. further, beard ja correctly found that there is no meaningful factual matrix spe- cific to jw’s claim that would assist in interpreting the irssa to determine the jurisdiction of the super- vising courts (man. ca. reasons, at para 23). while this issue has arisen in the course of the adjudication and review of jw’s claim, the facts of the claim have no bearing on the issue. [110] la question en litige porte sur la compétence du juge superviseur pour instruire et trancher une demande de directives. pour conclure que la norme de la décision correcte s’appliquait, la juge beard a comparé la crrpi à un contrat type. ainsi, même si un demandeur pouvait se retirer du régime du péi et faire trancher sa réclamation par les tribunaux, il demeurait tenu par les modalités de la crrpi et ne pouvait négocier un règlement différent s’il n’avait pas exercé son droit de retrait dans le délai prescrit (motifs de la ca du man., par 22). la juge beard a correctement appliqué l’arrêt rendu par la pré- sente cour dans l’affaire ledcor construction ltd. c. société d’assurance d’indemnisation northbridge, 2016 csc 37, [2016] 2 rcs 23. dans cet arrêt, le juge wagner (maintenant juge en chef) a conclu qu’en matière d’interprétation des contrats types, les cours d’appel sont chargées « [d’]assurer la co- hérence du droit » (voir également sattva capital corp c. creston moly corp., 2014 csc 53, [2014] 2 rcs 633, par 51). lorsque l’interprétation d’un contrat type par une cour a une valeur de précédent qui ne se limite pas aux parties au différend, cette interprétation commande l’application de la norme de la décision correcte (ledcor, par 39). voici ce que le juge wagner a conclu (par. 46) :   . lorsque, comme en l’espèce, l’appel porte sur l’inter- prétation d’un contrat type, que l’interprétation en litige a valeur de précédent et que l’exercice d’interprétation ne repose sur aucun fondement factuel significatif qui est propre aux parties concernées, il est plus juste de dire que cette interprétation constitue une question de droit assu- jettie à un contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. [111] la question de la compétence des tribunaux de supervision pour évaluer les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi aura valeur de précédent, et ce, pour bien plus que l’espèce, parce qu’elle concerne toutes les demandes visées par le péi. de plus, la juge beard a conclu à bon droit qu’il n’y avait pas de fondement factuel significatif qui est propre à la demande de jw. qui faciliterait l’interprétation de la crrpi en vue de déterminer la compétence des tribunaux de supervi- sion (motifs de la ca du man., par 23). s’il est vrai que la question s’est posée au cours du traitement et de la révision de la demande de jw, les faits de la demande n’ont aucune incidence sur cette question. 276 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. [112] this case can be distinguished from scc records decision, in which this court found that the standard of review applicable to a supervising judge’s interpretation of the irssa was whether there was a palpable and overriding error in the decision under review. in that case, the palpable and overriding er- ror standard was applied to the supervising judge’s interpretation of the irssa to determine whether it allowed for the destruction of iap documents, not to the question of his jurisdiction to make a destruction order. in the present case, the court is not reviewing edmond j.’s interpretation of the iap model and its application to the facts of jw’s claim. rather, it is determining whether edmond j had the jurisdiction to arrive at his own interpretation of the irssa and substitute it for that of the iap adjudicators. for this reason, the standard of review is correctness. il y a lieu d’établir une distinction entre la [112] présente affaire et la décision de la csc sur les do- cuments, dans laquelle la cour a conclu que la norme de contrôle applicable à l’interprétation de la crrpi par un juge superviseur était celle de savoir si la dé- cision faisant l’objet du contrôle était entachée d’une erreur manifeste et déterminante. dans cette affaire, la norme de l’erreur manifeste et déterminante a été appliquée à l’interprétation que le juge superviseur avait faite de la crrpi afin de juger si elle permettait la destruction des documents du péi et non pas à la question de la compétence du juge superviseur pour rendre l’ordonnance de destruction. dans le cas qui nous occupe, la cour n’est pas appelée à se pencher sur l’interprétation que le juge edmond a faite du régime du péi et l’application de celui-ci aux faits de la demande de jw. nous sommes plutôt appelés à décider si le juge edmond avait compétence pour proposer sa propre interprétation de la crrpi et la substituer à celle des adjudicateurs du péi. pour cette raison, la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la décision correcte. (1) sources of the supervising courts’ authority (1) les sources du pouvoir des tribunaux de su- [113] while it is clear that the parties do not have the option of seeking judicial review of iap de- cisions, they can file rfds with the supervising courts to resolve issues relating to the implementa- tion and administration of the irssa. indeed, after fully exhausting the mechanisms provided for in the irssa, certain groups or individuals may apply to the supervising courts for directions in respect of the implementation, administration, or amendment of the irssa. applications are made in accordance with the court administration protocol, which pro- vides that all matters that require orders or directions must be the subject of an rfd (ar, vol. i, at pp. 93 and 96; rf (attorney general), at paras 27-28). this court is tasked with determining the scope of the supervising courts’ jurisdiction when responding to rfds arising from iap decisions. pervision [113] même s’il est clair qu’elles ne peuvent se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire à l’égard des dé- cisions rendues dans le cadre du péi, les parties peuvent déposer une demande de directives auprès d’un tribunal de supervision pour faire trancher toute question relative à la mise en œuvre et à l’adminis- tration de la crrpi. en effet, après avoir épuisé tous les mécanismes prévus par la crrpi, certains groupes ou individus peuvent s’adresser aux tri- bunaux de supervision pour obtenir des directives au sujet de la mise en œuvre, de l’administration ou de la modification de la crrpi. ces demandes sont présentées conformément au protocole des tribunaux régissant l’administration de l’entente, qui prévoit que toutes les questions nécessitant une ordonnance ou des directives doivent faire l’objet d’une demande de directives (da, vol. i, p. 93 et 96; mi (procureur général), par 27-28). la cour est appelée à préciser la portée de la compétence des tribunaux de supervision lorsqu’ils répondent à une demande de directives découlant d’une décision dans le cadre du péi. [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 277 [114] authority for recourse to the supervising courts can be found in the irssa, the approval and implementation orders, and provincial class proceedings legislation. i will address each of these sources in turn. [115] while the irssa provides for a compre- hensive multi- level process for the resolution of iap claims, it does contemplate recourse to the supervis- ing courts in certain specific circumstances. as stated above, none of these avenues for judicial recourse would allow the courts to intervene in iap deci- sions, and the only provision in the iap model under which access to the courts may be granted (that is, where losses may exceed the maximum compensa- tion available under the iap or where the evidence is overly complex) creates an alternative avenue for dealing with claims that would otherwise be heard by iap adjudicators. it does not permit the courts to intervene in iap decisions (sch. d., art. iii(b); see, for example, fontaine et al. v. canada (attorney general) et al., 2014 mbca 93, 310 man. r. (2d) 162). [116] the supervising courts’ jurisdiction is also grounded in the approval and implementation or- ders. paragraph 13 of the schulman approval order for manitoba4 provides: [114] la possibilité d’exercer un recours devant les tribunaux de supervision est énoncée dans la crrpi, dans les ordonnances d’approbation et de mise en œuvre, ainsi que dans la législation provinciale sur les recours collectifs. je me pencherai sur chacune de ces sources à tour de rôle. [115] bien qu’elle mette en place un processus complet à paliers multiples pour le règlement des demandes présentées dans le cadre du péi, la crrpi prévoit le recours aux tribunaux de supervision dans certaines circonstances spécifiques. comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, aucun de ces possibles recours judi- ciaires ne permet aux tribunaux d’intervenir dans les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi, et la seule disposition du régime du péi qui puisse permettre au demandeur de s’adresser aux tribunaux — à savoir lorsque les pertes subies peuvent excéder l’indemnité maximale permise par le péi ou lorsque la preuve est trop complexe — offre une solution de rechange pour examiner les réclamations qui seraient autrement entendues par les adjudicateurs du péi. la crrpi ne permet pas l’intervention des tribunaux dans les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi (ann.  d, art. iii(b); voir, par exemple, fontaine et al c. ca- nada (attorney general) et al., 2014 mbca 93, 310 man. r. (2d) 162). [116] la compétence des tribunaux de supervision trouve également appui dans les ordonnances d’ap- probation et de mise en œuvre. le paragraphe 13 de l’ordonnance d’approbation du juge schulman pour le manitoba4 prévoit ce qui suit : [traduction] this court orders and declares that this court shall supervise the implementation of the agreement and this judgment and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may issue such orders as are necessary to implement and enforce the provisions of the agreement and this judgment. [emphasis added.] la cour ordonne et déclare que la cour supervisera la mise en œuvre de la convention et du pré- sent jugement et, sans limiter la portée générale de ce qui précède, elle peut rendre les autres ordonnances néces- saires pour mettre en œuvre et exécuter les modalités de la convention et le présent jugement. [je souligne.] (ar, vol. i, at p. 93) (da, vol. i, p. 93) 4 similar or identical wording can be found in the approval and implementation orders made by all nine supervising courts. 4 on trouve un libellé semblable ou identique dans les ordonnances d’approbation de mise en œuvre des neuf tribunaux de surveil- lance. 278 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. paragraph 23 of the schulman implementation order similarly provides: dans le même ordre d’idées, le par. 23 de l’ordon- nance de mise en œuvre du juge schulman énonce ce qui suit : [traduction] this court orders that the courts shall supervise the implementation of the agreement and this order and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may issue such further and ancillary orders, from time to time, as are necessary to implement and enforce the provisions of the agreement, the judgment dated december 15, 2006 and this order. [emphasis added.] la cour ordonne que la cour supervisera la mise en œuvre de la convention et de la présente ordonnance et, sans limiter la portée générale de ce qui précède, elle peut rendre les autres ordonnances et ordonnances accessoires nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre et exécuter les moda- lités de la convention, ainsi que le jugement du 15 dé- cembre 2006 et la présente ordonnance. [je souligne.] (ar, vol. i, at p. 104) (da, vol. i, p. 104) [117] these broad supervisory powers conferred by the orders are in stark contrast to the limited re- course to the courts provided for in the irssa. while the irssa contemplates a few narrow avenues of recourse to the supervising courts, the orders state the courts’ powers in much broader terms. in scc records decision, this court described the supervis- ing courts as playing a “vital role” under the irssa, as they exercise both administrative and supervisory jurisdiction pursuant to the orders (para 31). [118] the final source of the courts’ jurisdiction in overseeing the implementation of the irssa is provincial class proceedings legislation. section 12 of manitoba’s class proceedings act, ccsm, c. c130, provides as follows: [117] ces vastes pouvoirs de supervision conférés par les ordonnances en question contrastent nette- ment avec le recours limité aux tribunaux prévu par la crrpi. bien que la crrpi prévoie quelques cas bien précis où il est possible de recourir aux tribu- naux de supervision, les ordonnances définissent les pouvoirs des tribunaux en termes beaucoup plus généraux. dans la décision de la csc sur les do- cuments, la cour a expliqué que les tribunaux de supervision jouaient un « rôle vital » dans la crrpi du fait qu’ils exercent à la fois un pouvoir admi- nistratif et un pouvoir de supervision en vertu des ordonnances (par 31). [118] la dernière source de la compétence des tribunaux concernant la supervision de la mise en œuvre de la crrpi est la législation provinciale sur les recours collectifs. l’article 12 de la loi sur les recours collectifs du manitoba, cplm, c. c130, est ainsi libellé : the court may at any time make any order that it con- siders appropriate respecting the conduct of a class pro- ceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination and, for that purpose, may impose on one or more of the parties the terms it considers appropriate. le tribunal peut en tout temps rendre toute ordon- nance qu’il estime indiquée concernant le déroulement du recours collectif afin de parvenir à une décision juste et rapide; à cette fin, il peut imposer à une ou à plusieurs parties les conditions qu’il estime indiquées. [119] this provision grants broad supervisory ju- risdiction to ensure that a class action proceeds in a fair and efficient manner (fontaine v. canada (attor- ney general), 2014 onsc 283, [2014] 2 cnlr 86 (“fontaine 283”)). this court has observed that class proceedings legislation supports the broad powers [119] cet article confère de vastes pouvoirs de supervision pour veiller à ce que le recours collectif se déroule de manière juste et efficace (fontaine c. canada (attorney general), 2014 onsc 283, [2014] 2 cnlr 86 (« fontaine 283 »)). la cour a fait ob- server que les vastes pouvoirs conférés aux tribunaux [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 279 conferred on supervising courts by the approval and implementation orders, and that courts must have “generous discretion” to make orders as necessary to ensure a fair and expeditious resolution of class actions (scc records decision, at para 32). in the abstract, there is an apparent tension [120] between the narrow availability of judicial recourse under the irssa, on the one hand, and the broader jurisdiction conferred on the courts by the approval and implementation orders and class proceedings legislation, on the other. however, these broader con- ferrals of authority are given form and content by the facts of particular class proceedings. in the context of the supervision of a settlement agreement, the terms of the agreement are determinative. while super- vising judges are not free to approve an agreement that fully ousts their supervisory jurisdiction, their authority is limited and shaped by the terms of the agreement, once it is approved and determined to be fair, reasonable and in the best interests of the class. [121] my colleague abella j emphasizes that, in the case of the irssa, the rfd process arose as a condition of settlement approval, suggesting that the terms of the agreement on their own are not determinative in ascertaining the jurisdiction of a supervising judge in relation to a particular iap de- cision (abella j. reasons, at para 17). however, one should be mindful of the reasons why conditions were imposed when considering their impact. the concerns regarding the irssa and the iap raised by winkler j in the decision approving the irssa in ontario, baxter v. canada (attorney general) (2006), 83 or (3d) 481 (scj), did not relate to the specific terms under which claims were to be adju- dicated, reviewed and resolved, but to whether there would be independence in the executive oversight of the settlement and whether sufficient resources would be committed to ensure that the claims would be resolved in a timely manner, as promised to an ag- ing class. i would also note that winkler j stated that de supervision par les ordonnances d’approbation et de mise en œuvre trouvaient également appui dans la législation relative au recours collectifs, et que les tribunaux devaient disposer « d’un vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire » afin d’être en mesure de rendre les ordonnances qui s’imposent pour parvenir à un règlement juste et expéditif des recours collectifs (décision de la csc sur les documents, par 32). [120] lorsque l’on examine la situation dans l’abs- trait, il existe une tension apparente entre, d’une part, les cas peu nombreux où la crrpi permet de recou- rir aux tribunaux et, d’autre part, la compétence plus vaste conférée aux tribunaux par les ordonnances d’approbation et de mise en œuvre et la législation sur les recours collectifs. cependant, le contenu de cette vaste attribution de pouvoirs et la forme qu’elle prend dépendent des faits de chaque recours collec- tif. dans le contexte de la supervision d’une conven- tion de règlement, les modalités de la convention sont déterminantes. bien qu’il ne soit pas loisible aux juges superviseurs d’approuver une conven- tion qui leur retire tout pouvoir de supervision, leur pouvoir est limité et modulé par les modalités de la convention, dès lors que celle-ci a été approuvée et déclarée juste, raisonnable et dans l’intérêt supérieur du groupe qu’elle vise. [121] ma collègue la juge abella souligne que, dans le cas de la crrpi, le processus de demande de directives constituait une condition à l’approbation du règlement, donnant ainsi à penser que les moda- lités de la convention ne sont pas déterminantes, à elles seules, lorsque vient le temps d’établir la compétence d’un juge superviseur à l’égard d’une quelconque décision rendue dans le cadre du péi (motifs de la juge abella, par 17). toutefois, il faut se rappeler les raisons ayant mené à ces conditions lorsqu’on en évalue l’incidence. les préoccupations relatives à la crrpi et au péi soulevées par le juge winkler dans la décision par laquelle la crrpi a été approuvée en ontario, soit baxter c. canada (attorney general) (2006), 83 or (3d) 481 (csj), ne portent pas sur les modalités propres à l’adjudi- cation, à la révision et au règlement des demandes, mais bien sur la question de l’indépendance quant à la surveillance de la convention par l’exécutif et sur celle de l’allocation suffisante de ressources pour 280 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. “[t]he changes the court requires to the settlement are neither material nor substantial in the context of its scope and complexity” (baxter, at para 85). as no conditions were imposed or recommended with respect to the specific mechanics of the claims resolution procedures, those procedures should be understood to have the approval of the courts. [122] while it is clear that the courts retain broad supervisory powers pursuant to the approval and implementation orders and class proceedings leg- islation, a distinction must be drawn between pro- viding directions respecting the implementation and administration of the irssa, on the one hand, and reviewing adjudicators’ interpretations of the iap model, on the other. as i explain in further detail below, only the former falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. que les demandes soient réglées rapidement, comme promis aux membres du groupe, qui est vieillissant. je soulignerais également les propos suivants du juge winkler : [traduction] « les changements à la convention exigés par la cour ne sont ni im- portants ni substantiels si l’on tient compte de la portée et du niveau de complexité de la convention » (baxter, par 85). puisqu’aucune condition n’a été imposée ou recommandée en ce qui concerne préci- sément les mécanismes du processus de règlement des demandes, il convient d’interpréter ce processus comme ayant reçu l’approbation des tribunaux. [122] bien qu’il soit clair que les tribunaux con- servent de vastes pouvoirs de supervision aux termes des ordonnances d’approbation et de mise en œuvre et de la législation sur les recours collectifs, il convient d’établir une distinction entre, d’une part, le fait de donner des directives quant à la mise en œuvre et l’administration de la crrpi et, d’autre part, celui de réviser l’interprétation du régime du péi faite par les adjudicateurs. comme je l’explique plus en détail plus loin, seules les directives quant à la mise en œuvre et l’administration de la crrpi relèvent de la compétence des tribunaux. (2) judicial recourse is available only where the adjudicator failed to apply the terms of the iap (2) le recours judiciaire n’est possible que si l’adjudicateur a omis d’appliquer les moda- lités du péi [123] on the question of the supervising courts’ jurisdiction to consider errors in the interpretation of the iap, i would affirm the approach taken by the manitoba court of appeal. parties may seek judicial recourse only in cases where the iap adjudicator failed to apply the terms of the irssa, as this consti- tutes a failure to comply with the irssa and the iap model (man. ca. reasons, at para. 51; schachter, at paras. 53 and 57; bundled rfd, at para 183). while an adjudicator’s decision is reviewable where he or she applied an inapplicable term or failed to apply an applicable term, the interpretation of the terms falls squarely within the adjudicator’s adjudicative role (sch. d, art. iii(a)(v) and app x). [123] sur la question de la compétence des tri- bunaux de supervision pour examiner les erreurs d’interprétation du péi, je confirmerais l’approche suivie par la cour d’appel du manitoba. les parties ne peuvent s’adresser aux tribunaux que lorsque l’adjudicateur du péi a omis d’appliquer les moda- lités de la crrpi, car, en pareil cas, l’adjudicateur a omis de se conformer à la crrpi et au régime du péi (motifs de la ca du man., par. 51; schachter, par. 53 et 57; décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées, par 183). bien que la décision de l’adjudicateur puisse faire l’objet d’un contrôle lorsque ce dernier a appliqué une modalité inappli- cable ou a omis d’appliquer une modalité applicable, l’interprétation des modalités de la crrpi relève carrément de leurs fonctions décisionnelles (ann. d, art. iii(a)(v) et ann x). [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 281 [124] put another way, as long as it can be said that an adjudicator has turned his or her mind to the compensation category raised by the claimant, then the adjudicator has applied the terms of the irssa. since the parties have expressed a clear intention to grant iap adjudicators exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the terms of the irssa and the iap, it must be accepted that an adjudicator who has interpreted these terms, even if a court considers the interpreta- tion unreasonable, has not failed to apply the terms (man. ca. reasons, at para 51). [125] the weight of the authorities supports a high jurisdictional threshold for supervising courts con- sidering iap decisions. i find the following cases to be instructive on this point. in schachter, the ontario court of appeal [126] heard an appeal from a supervising judge’s decision on an rfd concerning the provisions of the iap and the implementation order relating to legal fees. rouleau ja stated that the irssa confers neither a right to appeal nor a right to seek judicial review of iap decisions (at paras. 50-52), and provided the following explanation of the parties’ right to obtain directions from the supervising courts:    the terms of the sa and the implementation orders set out the process for reviewing decisions of the iap adjudicators. recourse to the courts is only available if it is provided for in the sa or the implementation orders. [124] autrement dit, dès lors que l’on peut affirmer que l’adjudicateur a examiné la catégorie d’indem- nisation invoquée par le demandeur, il a appliqué les modalités de la crrpi. comme les parties ont clairement exprimé leur volonté de conférer aux adjudicateurs du péi une compétence exclusive en matière d’interprétation des modalités de la crrpi et du péi, nous devons accepter que l’interprétation que l’adjudicateur fait des modalités en question, même si elle est déraisonnable selon le tribunal, ne constitue pas un défaut d’appliquer ces modalités (motifs de la ca du man., par 51). [125] la jurisprudence impose aux tribunaux de supervision chargés d’examiner les décisions ren- dues dans le cadre du péi un test rigoureux en ce qui concerne leur compétence. j’estime que les décisions suivantes sont révélatrices à cet égard. [126] dans l’affaire schachter, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a entendu l’appel interjeté à l’égard de la décision rendue par un juge superviseur en réponse à une demande de directives concernant des modalités du péi et d’une ordonnance de mise en œuvre au sujet d’honoraires. le juge rouleau a déclaré que la crrpi ne conférait ni un droit d’appel ni celui de demander le contrôle judiciaire des décisions ren- dues dans le cadre du péi (par 50-52). il a expliqué ce qui suit au sujet du droit des parties d’obtenir des directives de la part des tribunaux de supervision : [traduction]  .  .  . les modalités de la crrpi et des ordonnances de mise en œuvre établissent le processus de révision des décisions des adjudicateurs du péi. il n’est possible d’exercer un recours judiciaire que lorsque la crrpi ou l’ordonnance de mise en œuvre le prévoit. i turn now to whether a process, other than an appeal or judicial review, is available to review a decision by the chief adjudicator. the administrative judge properly confirmed that the iap adjudicators “cannot ignore” the provisions of the implementation orders and that “it re- mains necessary for adjudicators to apply the required factors” when conducting a legal fee review at first in- stance. in the perhaps unlikely event that the final decision of the chief adjudicator reflects a failure to consider the terms of the sa and implementation orders, including the factors set out in para. 18 of the implementation orders, then, in my view, the parties to the sa intended that there j’en viens maintenant à la question de savoir s’il existe d’autres mécanismes que celui de l’appel ou du contrôle judiciaire pour réviser les décisions de l’adjudicateur en chef. le juge administratif a confirmé à juste titre que les adjudicateurs du péi « ne peuvent ignorer » les modalités des ordonnances de mise en œuvre et qu’« ils sont toujours tenus d’appliquer les facteurs requis » lorsqu’ils révisent les honoraires en première instance. dans le cas peu pro- bable où la décision finale de l’adjudicateur en chef révèle qu’il n’a pas tenu compte des modalités de la crrpi et des ordonnances de mise en œuvre, et notamment des facteurs énoncés au par. 18 des ordonnances de mise en 282 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. be some judicial recourse. having said that, i emphasize my agreement with the administrative judge’s comment, at para. 22 of his reasons, that “there is no implicit right to appeal each determination made within the context of the claims administration or assessment process as an incident of the judicial oversight function”. as i will go on to explain, the right to seek judicial recourse is limited to very exceptional circumstances. the parties intended that implementation of the sa. be expeditious and not mired in delay and procedural disputes. as noted by the chief adjudicator, there are already many checks and balances in place to ensure that the process is administered fairly and in accordance with the terms of the sa. the chief adjudicator is granted broad discretion by the terms of the sa [emphasis added; paras 52-54] [127] the “very limited circumstances” in which judicial recourse is available would include cases in which the chief adjudicator upholds an adjudica- tor’s decision as fair and reasonable even though the adjudicator failed to apply the appropriate factors un- der the irssa in arriving at the decision (paras. 57, 66 and 78). such an approach attempts to reconcile the “conflicting purposes” of the irssa and the iap: before leaving this issue, i note that i agree with the chief adjudicator’s submission that allowing a party to request directions when it is alleged that the chief adju- dicator’s decision reflects a failure to apply the terms of the implementation orders raises concerns about final- ity, efficiency and has the potential to overburden the administrative judges. however, i am satisfied that these concerns are alleviated by the clear limits on when such a request is available. moreover, the administrative judges who hear such requests are well aware of the concerns that led to the adoption of the implementation orders, namely, the need to protect vulnerable claimants and the need for timely resolution of disputes in light of the advanced age of many claimants: see baxter, at paras. 74 and 85. [emphasis added; para 58] œuvre, les parties à la crrpi voulaient selon moi qu’il y ait un recours judiciaire. cela dit, je tiens à souligner que je souscris aux propos exprimés par le juge administratif, au par. 22 de ses motifs, suivant lesquels « il n’y a pas de droit implicite de faire appel de chaque décision prise dans le cadre du processus d’administration ou d’évaluation des demandes à titre d’aspect accessoire du rôle de surveil- lance du tribunal ». comme je vais l’expliquer plus loin, le droit d’exercer un recours judiciaire ne peut être exercé que dans des circonstances très exceptionnelles. les parties souhaitaient que la mise en œuvre de la crrpi soit rapide et qu’elle ne s’embourbe pas dans des querelles et des délais procéduraux. comme l’adjudicateur en chef l’a fait observer, il existe déjà de nombreux méca- nismes qui visent à établir un certain équilibre et à s’as- surer que le processus est administré équitablement et en conformité avec les modalités de la crrpi. l’adjudicateur en chef jouit d’un vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire aux termes de la crrpi. [je souligne; par 52-54] [127] parmi les «  circonstances très limitées  » dans lesquelles il est possible d’exercer un recours judiciaire, mentionnons les situations où l’adjudica- teur en chef confirme la décision d’un adjudicateur qu’il considère comme juste et raisonnable, même si l’adjudicateur en question a omis d’appliquer les facteurs appropriés prévus par la crrpi pour rendre sa décision (par. 57, 66 et 78). cette approche se veut une tentative de concilier les « objectifs divergents » de la crrpi et du péi : [traduction] avant de passer à un autre sujet, je tiens à signaler que je suis d’accord avec l’adjudicateur en chef pour dire que le fait de permettre à une partie de demander des directives lorsqu’on reproche à l’adjudica- teur en chef d’avoir rendu une décision qui révèle qu’il a omis d’appliquer les modalités des ordonnances de mise en œuvre soulève des questions en ce qui concerne le caractère définitif et l’efficacité de ses décisions et qu’il y a un risque de surcharger les juges administratifs. je suis toutefois convaincu que ces craintes sont apaisées par les limites claires imposées quant aux circonstances où ce type de demande est permis. de plus, les juges administratifs qui sont saisis de ces demandes sont bien conscients des enjeux qui ont motivé l’adoption des or- donnances de mise en œuvre, à savoir la nécessité de pro- téger les demandeurs vulnérables et de régler rapidement les différends, compte tenu de l’âge avancé d’un grand nombre de demandeurs : voir baxter, par. 74 et 85. [je souligne; par 58] [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 283 [128] the ontario court of appeal similarly found in spanish irs ca that the supervising judge had exceeded the limits of his authority by overturning findings of fact and by awarding compensation and costs to the claimant rather than remitting the matter to the chief adjudicator. sharpe ja found that a supervising judge who engages in “a detailed re- view of the factual findings made by the adjudicator” assumes “a role the iap specifically assigns to the review adjudicator” (para 55). he rejected the idea that schachter created a “general curial jurisdiction” in relation to the iap (para 52). he further held that “disagreement with the result reached does not equate to a failure to enforce the irssa agreement or to apply the iap model, thereby justifying judicial intervention. if it did, all iap decisions would be appealable to the courts, the very thing schachter forbids” (para 55). in bundled rfd, brown j heard rfds [129] from five claimants dissatisfied with the results of their iap claims. she confirmed that the appropriate test for judicial recourse is that set out in schachter (at para. 7) and explained the rationale behind this hands- off approach to iap fact finding: “[d]espite my years of administering the irssa, it would be impossible for me to know better than those who have been immersed in the iap   . the courts are simply not well- placed to make findings of fact” (para 180). in another case, she stated the following about the availability of judicial recourse: [128] la cour d’appel de l’ontario a également conclu, dans l’arrêt pi de spanish, ca, que le juge superviseur avait outrepassé les limites de ses pou- voirs en infirmant des conclusions de fait et en ac- cordant une indemnité et les dépens au demandeur au lieu de renvoyer l’affaire à l’adjudicateur en chef. le juge sharpe a conclu que le juge superviseur qui procède à [traduction] « un examen détaillé des conclusions de fait tirées par l’adjudicateur » s’arroge alors « un rôle que le péi a confié expli- citement à l’adjudicateur de révision » (par 55). le juge sharpe a rejeté l’idée que l’arrêt schachter conférait aux tribunaux une « compétence judiciaire générale » relativement au péi (par 52). il a égale- ment jugé que « ce n’est pas parce que le tribunal n’est pas d’accord avec la décision qui a été rendue qu’il y a lieu de conclure que la crrpi n’a pas été mise en œuvre ou que le régime du péi n’a pas été appliqué, et que le tribunal est, de ce fait, justifié d’intervenir. si tel était le cas, toutes les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi seraient susceptibles d’appel devant les tribunaux, ce que l’arrêt schachter interdit précisément » (par 55). [129] dans la décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées, la juge brown était saisie de demandes de directives soumises par cinq deman- deurs insatisfaits des résultats de leurs demandes présentées dans le cadre du péi. elle a confirmé que le test à appliquer en ce qui concerne les recours judiciaires était celui énoncé dans l’arrêt schachter (par. 7) et elle a expliqué comme suit l’approche non interventionniste ainsi appliquée en matière de conclusions de fait sous le régime du péi : [traduc- tion] « [m]algré toutes ces années que j’ai passées à administrer la crrpi, il me serait impossible d’en savoir davantage que ceux qui ont un contact quoti- dien avec les rouages du péi [  ]. les tribunaux ne sont tout simplement pas bien placés pour tirer des conclusions de fait » (par 180). dans une autre déci- sion, elle a ajouté ce qui suit au sujet de la possibilité d’exercer un recours judiciaire : the principles governing rfds    from. iap decisions have been coalesced in a number of recent court decisions. these decisions are the progeny of the ontario court of appeal’s decision in fontaine v. duboff edwards haight and schachter, 2012 onca 471. they all reinforce the [traduction] les principes qui régissent les de- mandes de directives [  ] à l’encontre des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi ont été regroupés dans un certain nombre de décisions judiciaires récentes. ces dé- cisions font suite à l’arrêt de la cour d’appel de l’ontario 284 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. view that the iap was intended by the parties to be a “complete code”. allowing ready access to the courts for appeal or judicial review would seriously compromise the finality of the iap and fail to pay appropriate heed to the expertise of iap adjudicators. as such, judicial recourse is restricted to “very exceptional” cases, where the iap decision in question reflects a “patent disregard” of the iap model. at the risk of stating the obvious, this is a very onerous standard. this high threshold reflects at least two factors. the first is a realization of the jurisdictional limitations of the court when dealing with an iap decision. as i noted in the so- called “bundled rfd” decision, fundamentally, the irssa is a contract. it is outside of the purview of the court to create another level of review of these decisions that is not captured by the language of that agreement. the court must respect the parties’ intention to create an adjudicative process with a sense of finality. the second factor is a policy preference (that was for- malized into the terms of irssa and the iap process itself) for granting deference to the iap adjudicators. this policy is the same as that which encourages deference to trial judges and administrative tribunals. simply put, these bodies which make decisions at first instance are best positioned to make certain determinations and have an expertise that a reviewing court may lack    [emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] dans l’affaire fontaine c. duboff edwards haight and schachter, 2012 onca 471. elles confirment toutes l’idée que le péi était conçu par les parties comme un « code complet ». autoriser un accès immédiat aux tribunaux par voie d’appel ou de contrôle judiciaire compromettrait sérieusement le caractère définitif du péi et ne tiendrait pas dûment compte de l’expertise que possèdent les ad- judicateurs du péi. le recours judiciaire se limite donc à des cas « très exceptionnels », où la décision rendue dans le cadre du péi révèle une « non- observation flagrante » du régime du péi. au risque d’affirmer l’évidence, il s’agit d’une norme très exigeante. ce critère très rigoureux témoigne d’au moins deux facteurs. le premier correspond à une re- connaissance de la compétence limitée du tribunal lors- qu’il examine une décision rendue dans le cadre du péi. comme je l’ai déjà fait observer dans la « décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées », la crrpi est essentiellement un contrat. il n’est pas du ressort des tri- bunaux de créer un autre palier de révision des décisions en question qui n’est pas déjà prévu par le libellé de cette convention. le tribunal doit respecter l’intention des par- ties de créer un processus décisionnel ayant un caractère définitif. le second facteur correspond à un choix de principe — qui a été officialisé dans les modalités de la crrpi et du processus du péi lui- même — suivant lequel il convient de faire preuve de retenue à l’égard des décisions des adjudicateurs du péi. ce principe est le même que celui qui favorise une attitude de déférence envers les juges de première instance et les tribunaux administratifs. en termes simples, ces organismes, qui rendent des décisions en première instance, sont les mieux placés pour rendre certaines décisions, et ils possèdent une expertise qu’une juridiction de contrôle ne possède pas nécessairement  . [je souligne; notes en bas de page omises.] (fontaine v. canada (attorney general), 2017 bcsc 946, at paras. 65-67 (canlii)) (fontaine c. canada (attorney general), 2017 bcsc 946, par. 65-67 (canlii)) [130] these cases highlight several reasons why access to judicial recourse in respect of iap deci- sions should be construed narrowly. first, this ap- proach honours the intentions of the parties to the irssa. the parties went to great lengths to ensure that the iap would be a complete code. the iap model clearly sets out the roles and responsibili- ties of adjudicators and parties, the procedures they must follow and the expertise and competencies [130] ces décisions illustrent diverses raisons pour lesquelles il convient d’interpréter de façon restric- tive l’accès au recours judiciaire à l’égard des déci- sions rendues dans le cadre du péi. premièrement, cette approche respecte l’intention des parties à la crrpi. les parties se sont donné beaucoup de mal pour que le péi soit un code complet. le régime du péi énonce clairement les rôles et attributions des ad- judicateurs et des parties, la procédure qu’ils doivent [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 285 required of adjudicators. adjudicators must undergo specialized training and are empowered to make binding and final findings on credibility, liability, and compensation. the parties provided for a clear and comprehensive internal review mechanism and made no provision for appeals to the supervising courts. these actions clearly demonstrate their intent to retain control over this specialized process and to grant adjudicators exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the terms of the iap (rf (chief adjudicator), at para 39). as brown j observed in bundled rfd (at para. 178):    fundamentally, the irssa is a contract. the iap is a negotiated process, and a complete code. to put it plainly, when the iap model was negotiated, the parties called “done!” at re- review by the chief adjudicator or his or her delegate. the court must honour the parties’ intentions. by limiting access to the courts, finality is preserved and the expertise of the chief adjudicator and those under his supervision is recognized. [131] because the iap is a closed process, any disagreement with respect to the interpretation of its terms should be dealt with internally. the parties foresaw the need to resolve such disputes by provid- ing for the creation of the iap oversight committee, which is specifically designed to monitor the im- plementation of the iap and make changes to the process as necessary, subject to the nac’s approval. should interpretive direction be required, the par- ties entrusted this function to the iap oversight committee, not to the supervising courts. suivre, ainsi que l’expertise et les compétences exi- gées des adjudicateurs. les adjudicateurs doivent suivre une formation spécialisée et ils sont habilités à tirer des conclusions contraignantes et définitives sur la crédibilité, la responsabilité et l’indemnisa- tion. les parties ont prévu un mécanisme de révision interne clair et complet et elles n’ont pas inséré de mécanisme d’appel devant les tribunaux de supervi- sion. ces mesures démontrent clairement l’intention des parties de garder le contrôle de ce processus spé- cialisé et d’accorder aux adjudicateurs la juridiction exclusive sur l’interprétation des modalités du péi (mi (adjudicateur en chef), par 39). comme la juge brown l’a fait observer dans la décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées (par. 178) : [traduction]   . la crrpi est essentiellement un con- trat. le péi est le fruit de négociations et il constitue un code complet. autrement dit, lors des négociations du régime du péi, les parties ont essentiellement mis un « point final » au processus une fois qu’est achevée la deuxième révision effectuée par l’adjudicateur en chef ou un adjudicateur en chef désigné. le tribunal doit respecter l’intention des parties. en limitant l’accès aux tribunaux, on protège le caractère définitif des décisions et on recon- naît l’expertise de l’adjudicateur en chef et des personnes qui sont sous sa gouverne. [131] comme le péi est un processus fermé, tout désaccord concernant l’interprétation de ses moda- lités doit être réglé à l’interne. les parties avaient envisagé la nécessité de régler de tels différends en créant le comité de surveillance du péi, qui est spé- cialement conçu pour surveiller la mise en œuvre du péi et modifier au besoin le processus, sous réserve de l’approbation du can. les parties ont égale- ment prévu que, si des directives d’interprétation s’avéraient nécessaires, ce rôle devait être confié au comité de surveillance du péi et non aux tribunaux de supervision. [132] second, in entering into the irssa, claim- ants relinquished their right to have their claims resolved by the courts in favour of a process with var- ious compensatory and non- compensatory benefits. claimants are entitled to closed hearings at a location of their choice, attendance costs for both themselves and a support person, the incorporation of cultural traditions, and access to counselling (man ca. [132] deuxièmement, en signant la crrpi, les demandeurs ont renoncé à leur droit de faire tran- cher leurs demandes par les tribunaux au profit d’un processus comportant divers avantages liés — ou pas — à l’indemnisation. les demandeurs ont droit à une audience à huis clos au lieu de leur choix et au remboursement des frais de leur présence et de ceux de leur accompagnateur, et ils peuvent demander que 286 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. reasons, at para. 47; bundled rfd, at para 14). as beard ja observed, there are also litigation benefits for claimants, including having an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial hearing, which avoids cross- examination, and having the alleged perpetrator excluded while they are testifying. should an adju- dicator decide a claim without considering the terms of the iap scheme, the claimant would be denied the benefit of the irssa. however, disagreement with the conclusions reached by adjudicators, whether on matters of fact or on the interpretation of the terms of the iap, should be addressed through the review procedures provided for in the iap and, if necessary, by approving binding instructions to adjudicators as set out in sch. d (rf (chief adjudicator), at para 115). these are the features of the iap model for which the parties bargained. [133] third, none of the parties to the irssa can argue that the scheme should be, to use the word employed by counsel for the chief adjudicator, “in- fallible” (transcript, at p 83). as winkler j stated in baxter, at para. 21:    although not perfect in every respect, or perhaps in any respect, perfection is not the standard by which the settlement must be measured settlements represent a compromise between the parties and it is to be expected that the result will not be entirely satisfactory to any party or class member   . l’on tienne compte de leurs traditions culturelles, en plus d’avoir droit à des services de consultation psychosociale (motifs de la ca du man., par. 47; décision relative aux demandes de directives regrou- pées, par 14). comme la juge beard l’a fait observer, ce processus comporte également des avantages pour les demandeurs sur le plan procédural, en raison no- tamment du fait que la procédure est inquisitoire et non contradictoire, de sorte que les demandeurs n’ont pas à subir un contre- interrogatoire, et qu’ils n’ont pas à témoigner en présence de l’auteur de l’acte. si l’adjudicateur devait trancher la demande sans tenir compte des modalités du régime du péi, le de- mandeur se verrait privé des avantages de la crrpi. toutefois, tout désaccord au sujet des conclusions des adjudicateurs, qu’il s’agisse de questions de fait ou de l’interprétation des modalités du péi, doit être réglé dans le cadre de la procédure de révision prévue par le péi et, au besoin, au moyen d’instructions exécu- toires destinées aux adjudicateurs, selon l’ann. d (mi. (adjudicateur en chef), par 115). il s’agit des carac- téristiques du régime du péi qui ont été négociées. [133] troisièmement, aucune des parties à la crrpi ne peut prétendre que le régime devrait, pour reprendre les termes de l’avocat de l’adjudicateur en chef, [traduction] « être infaillible » (transcription, p 83). comme le juge winkler l’a déclaré dans la décision baxter, par. 21 : [traduction]   . bien qu’il ne soit pas parfait à tous les égards, ou peut- être même à quelque égard que ce soit, le règlement ne doit pas être évalué en fonction de la norme de la perfection. le règlement se veut un compromis entre les parties et il faut s’attendre à ce que le résultat ne soit pas entièrement satisfaisant pour toutes les parties ou pour tous les membres du groupe  . [134] fourth, to open iap decisions to interven- tion by the courts would be contrary to the objective of efficient and timely resolution of disputes with finality (man. ca. reasons, at para. 63; spanish irs ca, at paras. 51, 53 and 60; bundled rfd, at para. 12 and 178; schachter, at para 58). more than 150,000 students attended an irs. as of 2008, ap- proximately 80,000 were still living. several years of negotiations preceded the finalization of the irssa. many of the students were elderly by that time and passed away prior to receiving their settlements (man [134] quatrièmement, le fait de permettre aux tribunaux d’intervenir dans les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi irait à l’encontre de l’objectif visant le règlement rapide, efficace et définitif des différends (motifs de la ca du man., par. 63; pi de spanish, ca, par. 51, 53 et 60; décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées, par. 12 et 178; schachter, par 58). plus de 150 000 élèves ont fréquenté un pi. en 2008, environ 80 000 d’entre eux vivaient encore. plusieurs années de négociations ont précédé la signature de la crrpi. un grand nombre [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 287 ca. reasons, at para 62). to use jw’s case as an example, the iap adjudication process began in 2014 and the hearing adjudicator’s decision was not re- leased until april 2015. it took a further 7.5 months for the claim to make its way through the review and re- review processes. it is now 2019, and the outcome of jw’s claim has remained uncertain as the iap decisions are subjected to continued scrutiny by the courts. this type of delay cannot be what the parties intended when they carefully negotiated the iap (bundled rfd, at paras. 3, 10 and 12). [135] moreover, the statistics cited above clearly indicate that the iap model has been largely success- ful in resolving these claims in a timely and efficient manner, with over 99% of claims resolved and close to 90% of admitted claims resulting in compensation for survivors. the irssa is the largest and most complex class action settlement in canada and can serve as a model for future class litigants (bundled rfd, at para 3). overriding the parties’ intentions in negotiating the iap could have a chilling effect on the potential for future class action settlements of this nature (rf (attorney general), at para 71). [136] fifth, a broad right to judicial recourse in respect of iap decisions would allow canada, and not only claimants, to challenge adjudicators’ con- clusions with which it disagreed. this would further undermine the efficiency and finality of the iap, and place an additional burden on claimants by requiring them to battle canada through multiple levels of court to confirm their right to compensation (rf. (chief adjudicator), at para 3). this would surely be contrary to the intentions of the parties in creating a non- adversarial process to resolve iap claims. d’élèves étaient alors âgés ou sont décédés avant d’avoir pu toucher une indemnité (motifs de la ca. du man., par 62). si l’on prend le cas de jw comme exemple, le processus décisionnel dans le cadre du péi a débuté en 2014 et la décision de l’adjudicatrice d’audition n’a été rendue qu’en avril 2015. il a fallu encore sept mois et demi pour que la demande fran- chisse toutes les étapes de la révision et de la deu- xième révision. nous sommes maintenant en 2019 et l’issue de la demande de jw est toujours incertaine, étant donné que les décisions rendues à son sujet dans le cadre du péi font toujours l’objet d’un exa- men de la part des tribunaux. les parties n’avaient sûrement pas en tête de tels délais lorsqu’elles ont soigneusement négocié le péi (décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées, par. 3, 10 et 12). [135] de plus, les statistiques déjà citées indiquent clairement que le régime du péi a dans une large mesure permis de régler en temps opportun et de manière efficace les réclamations présentées : plus de 99 % des réclamations ont été réglées et près de 90 % des réclamations se sont soldées par le verse- ment d’une indemnité aux survivants. la crrpi est le règlement de recours collectif le plus important et le plus complexe au canada et il peut servir de modèle pour les parties à de futurs recours collec- tifs (décision relative aux demandes de directives regroupées, par 3). le fait de passer outre aux inten- tions qu’avaient les parties lorsqu’elles ont négocié le péi pourrait avoir un effet dissuasif lors de futurs règlements de recours collectif de même nature (mi. (procureur général), par 71). [136] cinquièmement, un droit général d’exercer un recours judiciaire contre les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi permettrait au canada — et non seulement aux demandeurs — de contester les conclusions des adjudicateurs avec lesquelles il est en désaccord, ce qui nuirait encore plus à l’efficacité et au caractère définitif du péi et imposerait un far- deau supplémentaire aux demandeurs, qui devraient affronter le canada à plusieurs paliers judiciaires afin de faire confirmer leur droit à une indemnité (mi. (adjudicateur en chef), par 3). tout cela irait sûre- ment à l’encontre de l’intention qu’avaient les parties en créant un processus non contradictoire pour régler les réclamations présentées dans le cadre du péi. 288 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. [137] beard ja put it well when she stated the following (man ca. reasons, at para. 64): [137] la juge beard a bien expliqué la situation en déclarant ce qui suit (motifs de la ca du man., par. 64) : when the objective of providing compensation to indi- vidual claimants is considered in light of the entire irssa, the very extensive and specialized adjudication and two- step review process under the iap, and the objective of having an expeditious process for resolving the claims, i am of the view that the limited right to judicial recourse as described in [schachter] and the perell appeal should continue to be interpreted narrowly. [traduction] lorsque l’objectif consistant à indem- niser les différents demandeurs est examiné à la lumière de l’ensemble de la crrpi, du processus très complet et spécialisé d’adjudication et de révision en deux étapes prévus par le péi et de l’objectif de règlement rapide des demandes, j’estime que l’on devrait continuer à interpréter de façon restrictive le droit limité au recours judiciaire énoncé dans l’arrêt [schachter] et l’appel perell. [138] sixth, if this court were to accept the ap- pellants’ interpretation of the judicial oversight function, supervising judges would be engaging in the same exercise as reviewing adjudicators acting under the iap’s review provisions, resulting in an additional layer of review outside what the parties clearly intended to be a closed process. for this rea- son, a supervising judge should not substitute his or her own decision for that of an iap adjudicator. even if a court were to find that an iap adjudicator made a decision without regard to the terms of the iap, the appropriate remedy would be to set aside the decision and send it back for reconsideration in accordance with the criteria set out in the iap (rf. (chief adjudicator), at para 39). [139] the courts’ broad supervisory authority would, however, allow a supervising judge to order remedies that lie outside the exclusive jurisdiction of iap adjudicators should they be necessary to ensure that the iap is administered fairly. for example, in nn, which will be discussed in greater detail below, the british columbia court of appeal held that because the irssa is silent as to the admission of new evidence after a claim has been heard, the supervising court had the jurisdiction to reopen the claim and order that the evidence be admitted and considered by the chief adjudicator (para 195). [138] sixièmement, si la cour devait retenir l’in- terprétation du rôle de supervision des tribunaux proposée par les appelants, les juges superviseurs se livreraient au même exercice que celui accompli par les adjudicateurs de révision en vertu des mo- dalités de révision du péi, ce qui créerait un niveau de révision de plus que ce qui existe déjà dans le cadre d’un processus que les parties souhaitaient nettement fermé. pour cette raison, le juge supervi- seur ne devrait pas substituer sa propre décision à celle de l’adjudicateur du péi. même si un tribunal devait conclure qu’un adjudicateur du péi a rendu sa décision sans tenir compte des modalités du péi, la réparation appropriée consisterait à annuler sa décision et à renvoyer la demande pour qu’elle soit réexaminée conformément aux critères du péi (mi. (adjudicateur en chef), par 39). [139] les vastes pouvoirs de supervision conférés aux tribunaux permettraient toutefois au juge super- viseur d’accorder des réparations qui débordent le cadre de la compétence exclusive des adjudicateurs du péi si cela s’avère nécessaire pour s’assurer que le péi est administré d’une façon juste. par exemple, dans l’arrêt nn, sur lequel je reviens de façon plus détaillée plus loin, la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a jugé que, comme la crrpi était muette quant à l’admission de nouveaux éléments de preuve après qu’une demande a été entendue, le tribunal de supervision avait compétence pour rouvrir la demande et ordonner que les éléments de preuve en question soient admis et que l’adjudicateur en chef les examine (par 195). [140] before moving on, i pause for a moment to discuss the concept of “exceptional circumstances”. [140] avant de poursuivre, j’ouvre une paren- thèse pour aborder le concept des « circonstances [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 289 at various points in both the written and the oral sub- missions, the phrase “exceptional circumstances” has been referred to as a “threshold” or “test”. i would note that the phrase appears only once in schachter, at para. 53: “   the right to seek judicial recourse is limited to very exceptional circumstances.” in making this statement, the ontario court of appeal was not setting out a test for judicial recourse under the iap. rather, rouleau ja was simply clarifying that cases in which judicial intervention is warranted will be rare. it is not helpful to employ the idea of “exceptional circumstances” as a test, threshold, or standard, as it merely describes the limited nature of judicial recourse in respect of iap decisions. to reiterate, i would adopt the test for judicial recourse articulated by the manitoba court of appeal in this case, namely failure by the iap adjudicator to ap- ply the terms of the iap model, which amounts to failure to enforce the irssa (man. ca. reasons, at paras. 42 and 51; schachter, at para. 53; spanish irs ca, at paras. 55 and 59-60). exceptionnelles  ». à plusieurs reprises dans les observations écrites et orales, l’expression [tra- duction] « circonstances exceptionnelles » a été qualifiée de « critère » ou de « test ». je tiens à si- gnaler que ces mots n’apparaissent qu’une seule fois dans l’arrêt schachter, par. 53 : [traduction] «   . le droit d’exercer un recours judiciaire ne peut être exercé que dans des circonstances très exception- nelles ». en tenant ces propos, la cour d’appel de l’ontario n’établissait pas un test auquel satisfaire afin de pouvoir exercer un recours judiciaire à l’en- contre des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi. le juge rouleau précisait simplement que les cas jus- tifiant l’intervention judiciaire étaient rares. il n’est pas utile d’employer l’expression « circonstances exceptionnelles » comme test, critère ou norme, car elle renvoie seulement au caractère limité des recours judiciaires possibles contre les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi. au risque de me répéter, je confirmerais le test énoncé par la cour d’appel du manitoba en l’espèce en ce qui concerne le recours aux tribunaux, à savoir que celui-ci ne peut être exercé qu’en cas de défaut de l’adjudicateur du péi d’appliquer le régime du péi et, par voie de consé- quence, de mettre en œuvre la crrpi (motifs de la ca du man., par. 42 et 51; schachter, par. 53; pi de spanish, ca, par. 55 et 59-60). (3) where the irssa provides no internal rem- edy, recourse can be sought from the su- pervising courts to fill this gap (3) lorsque la crrpi ne prévoit pas de recours interne, il est possible de demander aux tribu- naux de supervision de combler cette lacune [141] while the parties’ intentions in creating the irssa and the iap must be honoured, it must also be acknowledged that circumstances will inevitably arise that were not foreseen by the parties and are therefore not provided for in their agreement. as the chief adjudicator observes, the parties did an- ticipate that court involvement might be necessary, not to interpret the iap model, but to ensure that adjudicators can in fact implement the iap to achieve the intended results (rf (chief adjudicator), at para 100). as stated above, the parties have clearly turned their minds to the question of whether a right to appeal or to seek review of iap decisions is avail- able. however, should a situation arise which was not contemplated by the parties, courts must have the power to intervene to ensure that the parties receive [141] malgré le besoin de respecter l’intention qu’avaient les parties en créant la crrpi et le péi, il faut également reconnaître qu’il surviendra inévitable- ment des situations que les parties n’ont pas envisagées et qui ne sont donc pas prévues par leur convention. comme l’adjudicateur en chef l’a fait observer, les parties s’attendaient à ce que l’intervention du tribunal puisse s’avérer nécessaire, non pas pour interpréter le régime du péi, mais pour veiller à ce que les ad- judicateurs soient effectivement en mesure de mettre le péi en œuvre pour obtenir les résultats escomptés (mi (adjudicateur en chef), par 100). comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, les parties se sont de toute évidence penchées sur la question de savoir s’il existait un droit d’appel ou de révision des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi. toutefois, s’il survient une situation que 290 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. the benefits of the agreement, ie, what they bar- gained for. [142] a clear example of the courts’ supervisory authority being utilized to fill a gap in the irssa arose recently in nn, a decision of the british co- lumbia court of appeal. in that case, one of the claimants requested a re- review after her claim was denied by the initial adjudicator and that decision was upheld on review. after filing a request for re- review, counsel for the claimant became aware of new information relating to the claim and provided that evidence to the re- review adjudicator. the re- review adjudicator found that while the information might have resulted in a favourable decision for the claimant had it been available at the hearing, all reviews are conducted on the record and no new evidence is permitted. as he found that he lacked the authority to address this issue, he stated that the claimant should apply to the supervising court for directions, since supervising courts have the author- ity to reopen claims on a case-by- case basis (nn, at paras 122-26). the claimant subsequently filed an rfd with the supervising court. the supervising judge found that the new information was not suffi- cient to warrant judicial recourse, but her decision was overturned by the british columbia court of appeal. [143] while reaffirming that courts should not be engaging in detailed reviews of findings of fact made by iap adjudicators, mackenzie ja found that where new information comes to a court’s atten- tion, it will be necessary for that court to determine whether the claim must be remitted for reconsidera- tion (nn, at para 157). this approach is consistent with the objectives of the irssa: les parties n’ont pas envisagée, les tribunaux doivent être autorisés à intervenir de manière à ce que les par- ties reçoivent les avantages de la convention, c’est- à-dire en retirent les avantages qui ont été négociés. [142] un bon exemple de l’utilisation du pouvoir de supervision des tribunaux visant à combler une lacune de la crrpi se trouve dans l’arrêt récent nn de la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique. dans cette affaire, l’une des demanderesses avait réclamé une deuxième révision après que sa de- mande eut été refusée par le premier adjudicateur et que cette décision eut été confirmée au terme d’une première révision. après avoir déposé sa demande de deuxième révision, l’avocat de la demanderesse a pris connaissance des nouveaux renseignements qui avaient trait à la demande et il les a soumis à l’adju- dicateur de deuxième révision. ce dernier a conclu que, même s’il était possible que ces renseignements aient donné lieu à une décision favorable à la deman- deresse s’ils avaient été connus à l’audience, toutes les révisions étaient faites à partir de la preuve au dossier et aucune nouvelle preuve n’était autorisée. comme il avait conclu qu’il n’avait pas le pouvoir de régler cette question, l’adjudicateur a déclaré que la demanderesse devait s’adresser au tribunal de supervision pour obtenir des directives, étant donné que les tribunaux de supervision peuvent rouvrir des demandes au cas par cas (nn, par. 122- 126). la demanderesse a par la suite adressé une demande de directives au tribunal de supervision. la juge super- viseure a conclu que les nouveaux renseignements n’étaient pas suffisants pour justifier l’exercice d’un recours judiciaire, mais sa décision a été infirmée par la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique. [143] tout en réaffirmant que les tribunaux ne de- vaient pas procéder à un examen détaillé des conclu- sions de fait tirées par les adjudicateurs du péi, la juge mackenzie a conclu que, lorsque de nouveaux renseignements étaient portés à l’attention d’un tri- bunal, ce dernier devait décider si la demande devait être renvoyée à l’adjudicateur pour être examinée de nouveau (nn, par 157). cette façon de voir est conforme aux objectifs de la crrpi :    i note that in schachter at para. 57, justice rouleau described an exceptional circumstance as being “where the [traduction]   . je constate que, dans l’arrêt schachter, au par.  57, le juge rouleau définit comme suit les [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 291 final decision of the chief adjudicator reflects a failure to comply with the terms of the [irssa] or the implementa- tion orders” (emphasis added)   . any consideration of an exceptional circumstance must include a consideration of the objectives of the negotiated irssa, reflected in the preamble, to achieve a “fair, com- prehensive and lasting resolution of the legacy of indian residential schools” that seeks to promote “healing, ed- ucation, truth and reconciliation and commemoration”. circonstances exceptionnelles : « lorsque la décision finale de l’adjudicateur en chef révèle qu’il ne s’est pas conformé aux modalités de la [crrpi] ou des ordonnances de mise en œuvre » (italique ajouté)   . tout examen des circonstances exceptionnelles doit te- nir compte des objectifs de la crrpi — laquelle a été né- gociée — énoncés dans son préambule, soit de « résoudre pour de bon et de manière juste et globale les séquelles laissées par les pensionnats indiens » et promouvoir « la guérison, l’éducation, la vérité, la réconciliation et la com- mémoration ». in my view, it may be necessary for a court on judicial recourse to consider new information, and to determine whether a claim must be remitted to the chief adjudicator for reconsideration, but this will only be appropriate in very rare and exceptional cases. [emphasis in original; paras 155-57]. à mon avis, il peut être nécessaire pour le tribunal saisi d’une demande de recours judiciaire d’examiner les nouveaux renseignements et de décider si la demande doit être renvoyée à l’adjudicateur en chef pour réexamen, mais cela ne conviendra que dans des situations très rares et ex- ceptionnelles. [en italique dans l’original; par. 155- 157.] [144] mackenzie ja adopted the approach taken in fontaine 283 by perell j., who found that su- pervising courts have the jurisdiction to direct the reopening of settled iap claims on a case-by- case basis (nn, at para. 164; fontaine 283, at para 225). though perell j made the following statements in the context of a breach of canada’s disclosure obli- gations, i would adopt his reasoning as well:    the. applicants’ rfd raises the question of whether the court may direct the re- opening of settled iap claims on the grounds of canada’s breach of its disclosure ob- ligations. [144] la juge mackenzie a fait sienne l’approche suivie par le juge perell dans la décision fontaine 283, dans laquelle ce dernier avait conclu que les tribunaux de supervision avaient compétence pour ordonner au cas par cas la réouverture des demandes réglées dans le cadre du péi (nn, par. 164; fontaine 283, par 225). bien que le juge perell ait fait les dé- clarations qui suivent dans le contexte d’un manque- ment par le canada à ses obligations en matière de communication de la preuve, je souscris également à son raisonnement : [traduction]    la demande de directives présentée par les demandeurs soulève la question de savoir si le tribu- nal peut ordonner la réouverture des réclamations réglées dans le cadre du péi au motif que le canada a manqué à ses obligations en matière de communication de la preuve. in my opinion, the answer to this question is yes. the court does have the jurisdiction to re- open settled claims but that jurisdiction must be exercised on a case-by- case basis. à mon avis, la réponse à cette question est affirmative. le tribunal a effectivement compétence pour rouvrir les réclamations réglées, mais cette compétence doit être exercée au cas par cas. if truth and reconciliation is to be achieved and if nous le regrettons, we are sorry, nimitataynan, niminchi nowesa- min, mamiattugut, is to be a genuine expression of canada’s request for forgiveness for failing our aboriginal peoples so profoundly, the justness of the system for the compensa- tion for the victims must be protected. the substantive and procedural access to justice of the irssa, like any class si nous souhaitons atteindre les objectifs de vérité et de réconciliation et si nous le regrettons, we are sorry, nimitataynan, niminchinowesamin, mamiattugut expri- ment véritablement la demande de pardon du canada pour avoir si grandement manqué à ses obligations envers les peuples autochtones, le caractère juste du système d’indemnisation des victimes doit être protégé. l’accès à 292 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. action, must also be protected and vouched safe. the court has the jurisdiction to ensure that the irssa provides both procedural and substantive access to justice. la justice que garantit la crrpi, tant sur le fond que sur le plan procédural, doit également être protégé et garanti, comme dans le cas de toute action collective. le tribunal a compétence pour s’assurer que la crrpi protège, tant sur le fond que sur la forme, l’accès à la justice.   .   . thus, i conclude that the court does have the jurisdic- tion to re- open a settled iap claim but whether a claim should be re- opened will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. [emphasis added; paras 224-32] [145] should a situation arise which is not pro- vided for in the irssa and which might affect the outcome of a claim, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the settlement to deny relief to the claimant. this was clearly the case in nn, where the iap model did not provide any procedure for the ad- mission of new evidence on review, and the evidence in question could have had an impact on the result. [146] this is not to say that parties will automati- cally be entitled to have a claim reopened if they are able to point to a procedural gap in the iap model or provide new information that was not before the iap adjudicator(s). a case-by- case analysis is re- quired, and a variety of factors may have to be con- sidered, including whether some prejudice to the party requesting judicial intervention has been shown (fontaine 283, at para 228). cases in which a claim can be reopened will be rare. in nn, for example, mackenzie ja undertook a detailed review of the new evidence and its significance and took into con- sideration the fact that the claimant was not at fault for the late disclosure, nor was she seeking additional compensation as a result (paras 171-87). je conclus par conséquent que le tribunal a effective- ment compétence pour rouvrir une demande déjà réglée dans le cadre du péi, mais que l’opportunité de la rou- vrir dépend des circonstances de l’espèce. [je souligne; par. 224- 232.] [145] s’il se présente une situation non prévue par la crrpi qui est susceptible d’avoir une incidence sur l’issue de la demande, il serait incompatible avec l’objet du règlement de refuser d’accorder une ré- paration au demandeur. c’était de toute évidence le cas dans l’affaire nn, alors que le régime du péi ne prévoyait aucune procédure pour l’admission de nouveaux éléments de preuve lors de la révision, et que les éléments de preuve en question auraient pu avoir une incidence sur le résultat. [146] il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant que les parties ont automatiquement droit à la réouverture de la de- mande dès qu’elles réussissent à signaler une lacune dans le régime du péi ou à fournir de nouveaux ren- seignements qui n’avaient pas été portés à l’attention de l’adjudicateur du péi. une analyse au cas par cas s’impose et divers facteurs peuvent alors entrer en ligne de compte, notamment la preuve que la partie qui sollicite l’intervention judiciaire a subi un pré- judice (fontaine 283, par 228). les situations dans lesquelles il est possible de rouvrir une demande sont rares. dans l’affaire nn, par exemple, la juge mackenzie a entrepris un examen approfondi des nouveaux éléments de preuve et de leur importance et a tenu compte du fait que l’on ne pouvait reprocher la communication tardive à la demanderesse et que cette dernière ne demandait pas d’indemnisation supplémentaire en conséquence (par. 171- 187). [147] in his factum, the chief adjudicator ac- knowledges the need for supervising courts to “fill in the gaps” left by iap provisions and states that this would be an appropriate use of the courts’ su- pervisory authority (para 95). the outcome in nn. [147] dans son mémoire, l’adjudicateur en chef re- connaît la nécessité pour les tribunaux de supervision de [traduction] « combler les lacunes » des dispo- sitions du péi, ajoutant qu’il s’agirait d’un exercice approprié du pouvoir de supervision des tribunaux [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 293 did not hinge on the supervising judge assuming the role of adjudicator or embarking on an interpretive exercise with respect to the provisions of the irssa or the iap. the british columbia court of appeal saw its role as determining whether the claim should be reopened in light of new information, not whether the adjudicator had committed a palpable and over- riding error (nn, at para 152). [148] ultimately, a balance must be struck between resolving claims efficiently and obtaining some sense of finality for the parties, on the one hand, and ensuring fair and just outcomes, on the other (nn, at para 167). this approach gives effect to the parties’ intention that the irssa promote a “fair, comprehensive and lasting resolution of the legacy of indian residential schools” by ensuring compliance with the rules of natural justice. (par 95). l’issue de l’affaire nn ne dépendait pas du fait que le juge superviseur s’était arrogé le rôle de l’adjudicateur ou s’était livré à un exercice d’inter- prétation à l’égard des dispositions de la crrpi ou du péi. la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a estimé qu’il lui incombait non pas de vérifier si l’adjudicateur avait commis une erreur manifeste et déterminante, mais de déterminer s’il y avait lieu de rouvrir la demande, compte tenu des nouveaux renseignements (nn, par 152). [148] en fin de compte, il faut trouver un équilibre entre, d’une part, le règlement efficace des demandes et l’aboutissement du processus pour les parties et, d’autre part, la garantie de résultats justes et équi- tables (nn, par 167). cette façon de voir donne effet à l’intention de parties à la crrpi que cette dernière vise à « résoudre pour de bon et de manière juste et globale les séquelles laissées par les pen- sionnats indiens » en veillant au respect des règles de justice naturelle. c application to the instant case c application en l’espèce (1) the supervising judge erred in substituting his own interpretation of sl1.4 [149] as noted above, edmond j stated that his jurisdiction was limited to “ensuring that the re- review adjudicator did not endorse a legal inter- pretation that is so unreasonable that it amounts to a failure to properly apply the iap to the facts of a particular case” (man. qb. reasons, at para 40). he went on to conduct a detailed review of the hearing adjudicator’s decision, identifying what he inter- preted to be errors in her analysis of sl14. after finding that these errors were unreasonable, he held that the failure of the review adjudicator and the re- review adjudicator to correct them was a sufficient basis for setting aside the re- review decision and ordering a reconsideration of the claim. (1) le juge superviseur a commis une erreur en proposant sa propre interprétation de la catégorie sl1.4 [149] comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, le juge edmond a déclaré que sa compétence se limitait à « s’assurer que l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision n’a pas adopté une interprétation légale qui est si déraison- nable qu’elle équivaut à un défaut d’appliquer cor- rectement le péi aux faits d’une affaire donnée » (motifs de la cour du banc de la reine du manitoba, par 40). il a poursuivi en procédant à un examen détaillé de la décision de l’adjudicatrice d’audition, relevant ce qu’il estimait être des erreurs dans son analyse de la catégorie sl14. après avoir conclu au caractère déraisonnable de ces erreurs, il a estimé que le défaut de l’adjudicateur de révision et de l’adju- dicatrice de deuxième révision de les corriger était suffisant pour justifier l’annulation de la décision rendue au terme de la deuxième révision et pour ordonner un nouvel examen de la demande. i agree with the manitoba court of appeal [150] that edmond j erred in scrutinizing the hearing [150] je suis d’accord avec la cour d’appel du manitoba pour dire que le juge edmond a commis 294 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. adjudicator’s interpretation of sl1.4 and substitut- ing his own. edmond j could not concern himself with the proper interpretation of sl1.4, but was en- titled only to determine whether the hearing adju- dicator had considered the correct terms. instead, he engaged in the same analysis that the parties assigned to iap adjudicators and came to a different result (rf (chief adjudicator), at para 107). in spanish irs sc, the supervising judge, perell j., undertook a similar exercise in reviewing an iap decision. the appellants and the assembly of first nations rely on the approach taken by perell j in that case. however, the ontario court of appeal overturned his decision, and sharpe ja made the following comments: the administrative judge appears to have taken the view that if, in his judgment, mf was entitled to compen- sation, any other conclusion necessarily reflected a failure to apply the iap model. in my respectful opinion, that approach reflects a failure to follow the strictures imposed in schachter on recourse to the courts from iap decisions, and one that, if accepted, could significantly undermine the finality and integrity of the iap. une erreur en analysant l’interprétation que l’adju- dicatrice d’audition avait faite de la catégorie sl1.4 et en y substituant sa propre interprétation. le juge edmond n’était autorisé qu’à vérifier si l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait interprété les bonnes modalités de la crrpi, et non à chercher l’interprétation appro- priée à donner à la catégorie sl14. au lieu de cela, il s’est livré à une analyse que les parties ont réservée aux adjudicateurs du péi et il est arrivé à un résultat différent (mi (adjudicateur en chef), par 107). dans l’affaire pi de spanish, cs, le juge superviseur, le juge perell, s’est livré à un exercice semblable en examinant une décision rendue dans le cadre du péi. les appelants et l’assemblée des premières nations s’appuient sur la démarche retenue par le juge perell dans cette décision. cependant, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a infirmé la décision du juge perell, et le juge d’appel sharpe a formulé les observations suivantes : [traduction] le juge administratif semble avoir considéré que si, à son avis, mf avait droit à une indem- nité, toute autre conclusion révélait immanquablement un défaut d’appliquer le régime du péi. à mon humble avis, cette approche révèle un défaut de respecter les contraintes imposées par l’arrêt schachter en ce qui a trait au recours aux tribunaux à l’encontre des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi. de plus, si on l’acceptait, cette approche serait susceptible de nuire considérablement au caractère définitif et à l’intégrité du péi. (spanish irs ca, at para. 60) (pi de spanish, ca, par. 60) [151] my colleague abella j correctly observes that the hearing adjudicator described the question before her as “whether or not the incident was sex- ual touching which exceeded recognized parental conduct” and that sl1.4 uses the phrase “any touch- ing”, without the word “sexual” (paras. 36 and 41 (emphasis in original)). she argues that the addition of a requirement that the touching be sexual consti- tuted a failure to apply and implement the irssa. respectfully, i disagree. the hearing adjudicator turned her mind to the requirements of sl1.4, as evi- denced in her detailed analysis. while she interpreted the category differently than edmond j., this does not amount to a failure to apply sl14. moreover, the rfd arose from the re- review adjudicator’s deci- sion, which correctly referred to sl1.4 as requiring “any touching” and did not add the word “sexual” [151] ma collègue la juge abella fait observer à juste titre que l’adjudicatrice d’audition a estimé que la question dont elle était saisie était « celle de sa- voir si les actes reprochés constituaient des contacts sexuels qui excèdent les normes généralement re- connues de contact physique parental » et que la catégorie sl1.4 emploie l’expression « tout contact » sans mention du mot « sexuel » (par. 36 et 41 (en italique dans l’original)). elle affirme que l’ajout de l’exigence voulant que les contacts soient d’ordre sexuel constitue un défaut d’appliquer et de mettre en œuvre la crrpi. avec égards, je ne partage pas son avis. l’adjudicatrice d’audition a tenu compte des exigences de la catégorie sl1.4, comme en fait foi l’analyse détaillée à laquelle elle s’est livrée. bien qu’elle ait interprété cette catégorie différemment du juge edmond, on ne peut pour autant conclure qu’elle [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 295 (ar, vol.  i, at pp.  14 and 16). the re- review adjudicator expressly agreed with the assessment carried out by the review adjudicator in finding that the hearing adjudicator had correctly applied the iap model, demonstrating that the choice to deny jw’s claim was based on a deliberate interpretation of and engagement with the sl1.4 category (p 18). [152] the hearing adjudicator in the instant case had regard to and applied the factors in the sl1.4 category, and her decision was upheld by the review adjudicator and the re- review adjudicator, in keep- ing with the mechanism contained in the iap model. while the supervising judge may have disagreed with the outcome, this was not a basis for finding that the adjudicators had failed to apply the terms of the irssa. once he determined that the adjudicators had applied the appropriate terms and provisions of the iap (ie,. sl1.4), and once he agreed that the hearing adjudicator was “entitled to give context and interpretation to the language used in the iap” (para. 56), his jurisdiction ended, and he ought not to have ruled on whether the hearing adjudicator’s interpretation was reasonable. as beard ja of the manitoba court of appeal concluded in this case, edmond j exceeded his jurisdiction by substituting his own interpretation of sl1.4 and directing that the claim be reconsidered in accordance with that interpretation. a omis d’appliquer la catégorie sl14. qui plus est, la demande de directives découlait de la décision de l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision, qui avait signalé à juste titre que l’art sl14 exigeait qu’il y ait un « contact physique », mais non un contact d’ordre « sexuel » (da, vol. i, p. 14 et 16). l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision a expressément souscrit à l’éva- luation de l’adjudicateur de révision en concluant que l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait appliqué correctement le régime du péi, ce qui démontrait que la décision de refuser la demande de jw reposait sur une in- terprétation consciente de la catégorie sl1.4 et sur l’application de cette dernière (p 18). [152] en l’espèce, l’adjudicatrice d’audition a tenu compte des facteurs de la catégorie sl1.4 et les a appliqués, et sa décision a été confirmée par l’adju- dicateur de révision et l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision, conformément au mécanisme prévu par le régime du péi. même si le juge superviseur était en désaccord avec le résultat, on ne peut pour autant en conclure que les adjudicateurs ont omis d’ap- pliquer les modalités de la crrpi. dès lors qu’il avait conclu que les adjudicateurs avaient appliqué les bonnes modalités et dispositions du péi (soit la catégorie sli.4) et qu’il avait convenu que l’adju- dicatrice d’audition était [traduction] « autorisée à contextualiser et à interpréter le libellé du péi » (par. 56), le juge superviseur n’avait plus compétence et il n’aurait pas dû se prononcer sur le caractère raisonnable de l’interprétation retenue par l’adju- dicatrice d’audition. ainsi que la juge beard de la cour d’appel du manitoba l’a conclu dans l’affaire qui nous intéresse, le juge edmond a outrepassé sa compétence en proposant sa propre interprétation de la catégorie sl1.4 et en ordonnant que la demande soit réexaminée selon sa propre interprétation. (2) the chief adjudicator concedes that jw. is entitled to relief, but he lacks a remedy under the irssa (2) l’adjudicateur en chef admet que jw a droit à une réparation, mais ajoute que la crrpi ne lui permet aucun recours [153] while i am in agreement with the manitoba court of appeal that the supervising judge erred in his analysis, i believe this to be an exceptional case in which reconsideration is appropriate. i am not basing this conclusion on edmond j.’s reasoning, which would require the courts to reinterpret the [153] bien que je sois d’accord avec la cour d’ap- pel du manitoba pour dire que le juge superviseur a commis une erreur dans son analyse, j’estime qu’il s’agit d’un cas exceptionnel où il convient de pro- céder à un nouvel examen. je ne fonde pas cette conclusion sur le raisonnement du juge edmond, ce 296 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. iap. rather, jw’s claim has given rise to a unique dilemma for which the irssa provides no internal recourse, and which therefore requires this court to craft a remedy. certain concessions made by the chief adjudicator at the hearing before this court have exposed a gap in the irssa’s provisions. spe- cifically, the chief adjudicator has no authority to reopen jw’s claim despite his conclusion that the decisions on the claim are “aberrant”. the chief adjudicator’s inability to remedy such an error in iap decisions is clearly inconsistent with the role conferred upon him by the parties of ensuring con- sistency in the application of the iap. this is cer- tainly a situation in which the courts can step in to provide a remedy that is consistent with the irssa’s objective of promoting a “fair, comprehensive and lasting resolution of the legacy of indian residential schools” (see b in the recitals of the irssa). qui obligerait les tribunaux à réinterpréter le péi. j’estime en effet que la réclamation de jw pose un dilemme unique pour lequel la crrpi ne prévoit au- cun recours interne et que la présente situation exige donc que la cour élabore une réparation. certaines concessions faites par l’adjudicateur en chef à l’au- dience de la cour ont fait ressortir une lacune dans la crrpi. plus précisément, l’adjudicateur en chef n’a pas le pouvoir nécessaire pour rouvrir la récla- mation de jw malgré sa conclusion que les déci- sions rendues relativement à la demande de jw. sont [traduction] « aberrantes ». l’incapacité de l’adjudicateur en chef de corriger une telle erreur dans des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi est manifestement incompatible avec la mission que lui ont confiée les parties d’assurer une application cohérente du péi. il s’agit certainement d’une situa- tion dans laquelle les tribunaux peuvent intervenir pour accorder une réparation en conformité avec l’objectif de la crrpi de « résoudre pour de bon et de manière juste et globale les séquelles laissées par les pensionnats indiens » (voir le point b de l’attendu de la crrpi). [154] to reach this conclusion, it is necessary to consider the sequence of events that revealed this gap in the irssa. [154] pour en arriver à cette conclusion, il est né- cessaire de revoir le fil des événements qui ont per- mis de révéler cette lacune de la crrpi. [155] in their written submissions, neither the attorney general nor the chief adjudicator directly addressed the substance of the iap adjudicators’ de- cisions or the proper interpretation of sl14. rather, each of them argued that courts should not weigh in on the interpretation of the iap’s terms, as the parties intended this task to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of iap adjudicators. at the hearing, however, the attorney general appeared to defend the merits of the hearing adjudicator’s decision, ar- guing that her interpretation of sl1.4 fell within the range of possible outcomes. the attorney general relied on former chief adjudicator ish’s “b” deci- sion in another similar iap claim discussed earlier, arguing that it supports the position that sexual pur- pose should be taken into consideration (transcript, at pp. 55-58; condensed book (attorney general), at pp. ii- iii). [155] dans leurs observations écrites, ni le procu- reur général ni l’adjudicateur en chef n’ont directe- ment abordé le fond des décisions des adjudicateurs du péi ni l’interprétation qu’il convient de donner à la catégorie sl14. ils ont chacun plutôt fait valoir que les tribunaux ne devaient pas intervenir dans l’inter- prétation des modalités du péi, étant donné que les parties voulaient que ce rôle relève de la compétence exclusive des adjudicateurs du péi. à l’audience, le procureur général a toutefois semblé défendre le bien- fondé de la décision de l’adjudicatrice d’audition en faisant valoir que l’interprétation qu’elle avait faite de la catégorie sl1.4 appartenait aux issues possibles. le procureur général s’est fondé sur la décision « b » de l’ancien adjudicateur en chef ish rendue à l’égard d’une demande similaire présentée dans le cadre du péi, et il a fait valoir que celle-ci appuyait l’argument suivant lequel on doit tenir compte des fins d’ordre sexuel (transcription, p. 55-58; recueil condensé (procureur général), p. ii- iii). [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 297 in response to these submissions, the chief [156] adjudicator directed the court to former chief ad- judicator ish’s decision, which states: “   i find that there is no requirement in the iap that the actor pos- sessed a sexual intent before liability can be found for a sexual assault” (ar, vol. ii, at p. 70 (emphasis added)). at the hearing before this court, the chief adjudicator expressed the view that the decisions of the hearing adjudicator, the review adjudicator and the re- review adjudicator in this case are “ab- errant” and that their interpretation of sl1.4 does not reflect a systemic problem within the iap: [156] en réponse à ces observations, l’adjudicateur en chef a signalé à l’attention de la cour la décision de l’ancien adjudicateur en chef ish, qui déclarait : [traduction] «    j’estime que le péi n’exige pas que l’auteur de l’acte ait eu une intention sexuelle avant que sa responsabilité puisse être établie dans le cas d’une agression sexuelle » (da, vol. ii, p. 70 (je souligne)). lors de l’audience devant la cour, l’adjudicateur en chef s’est dit d’avis que les déci- sions rendues en l’espèce par l’adjudicatrice d’au- dition, l’adjudicateur de révision et l’adjudicatrice de deuxième révision étaient « aberrantes » et que leur interprétation de la catégorie sl1.4 ne révélait pas l’existence d’un problème systémique en ce qui concerne le péi : [traduction] mr. arvay, qc:. these decisions are aberrant. me arvay, cr :. ces décisions sont aberrantes. madam justice karakatsanis: are there other aber- la juge karakatsanis : y a-t-il d’autres décisions rant decisions?   . aberrantes?   .   .   . mr. arvay, qc:. the best i can answer is this way. after justice edmond’s decision there was a reconsid- eration decision and it went the other way. and that of course that decision was stayed when it went to the court of appeal. to our knowledge there has never been an- other decision like this one here in the future because it has been -- the reconsideration decision recognized the correctness, the proper interpretation as set out by mr. ish. madam justice karakatsanis: so there aren’t other claimants out there who have been denied for the same reason, the same interpretation, that you are aware of?   . mr. arvay, qc:. there are seven other [outstanding] claimants who fall within the category sl14. to our knowledge -- or to my knowledge anyway -- none of those involve in this particular issue. me arvay, cr : la meilleure réponse que je peux vous donner est la suivante. après la décision du juge edmond, une décision qui allait dans le sens contraire a été rendue à la suite d’un nouvel examen et, évi- demment, l’exécution de cette décision a été suspendue lorsqu’elle a été portée en appel devant la cour d’appel. à notre connaissance, il n’y a plus jamais eu d’autres décisions comme celle-ci par la suite parce que cette dé- cision rendue à l’issue d’un nouvel examen reconnaissait le caractère approprié -- le bien- fondé de l’interprétation proposée par m ish. la juge karakatsanis : alors, à votre connaissance, il n’y a pas d’autres demandeurs dont les demandes ont été refusées pour la même raison, sur le fondement de la même interprétation?   . me arvay, cr :. il y a sept autres demandeurs qui entrent dans la catégorie sl14 [et dont le dossier est toujours en cours]. à notre connaissance -- du moins à ma connaissance --, aucun de ces dossiers ne porte sur cette question bien précise. (transcript, at pp. 76-77) (transcription, p. 76-77) 298 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. i would also highlight the following ex- [157] change, in which the chief adjudicator agreed that there is no mechanism in the irssa that enables him to reopen a matter where he disagrees with the outcome: [157] je tiens par ailleurs à reproduire l’échange suivant, au cours duquel l’adjudicateur en chef a convenu que la crrpi ne prévoyait aucun méca- nisme qui permettrait à l’adjudicateur en chef de rou- vrir un dossier s’il n’est pas d’accord avec le résultat : madam justice karakatsanis: i accept that, but the chief adjudicator, once something comes to the chief adjudicator’s attention. and my question to you is, there is a responsibility under the schedule to try and ensure consistency, is there no recourse for the chief adjudicator? can you not go to the committee and get an interpretation? is there nothing the chief adjudicator can do to ensure that claimants who are entitled to compensation under the terms they agreed to get it? [traduction] la juge karakatsanis : je reconnais cela, mais l’ad- judicateur en chef, lorsque quelque chose est porté à l’at- tention de l’adjudicateur en chef. ma question pour vous est la suivante : si l’annexe exige que les décisions rendues soient cohérentes entre elles, n’existe-t-il aucun recours pour l’adjudicateur en chef? ne pouvez- vous pas vous adresser au comité et obtenir une interprétation? n’y a-t-il pas quelque chose que l’adjudicateur en chef puisse faire pour s’assurer que les demandeurs qui ont droit à une indemnité en vertu des modalités dont ils ont convenu reçoivent effectivement cette indemnité? mr arvay, qc:. it’s all future looking, justice me arvay, cr :. tout ça ne vaut que pour les dossiers karakatsanis. futurs, madame la juge.   .   . mr. justice moldaver: it’s even more egregious, it seems to me, when you are sitting there conceding that this man’s case should have been heard and now you are telling us they got no remedy. mr. arvay, qc:. right    that happens. in a scheme that allows for 38,000 adjudications, mistakes may be made for which there is no remedy. le juge moldaver  : la situation est encore plus flagrante, il me semble, étant donné que vous reconnais- sez que le dossier de cette personne aurait dû être examiné et que vous nous apprenez maintenant qu’il n’y a aucune réparation possible. me arvay, cr :. c’est vrai [  ]. cela arrive. dans un système qui permet jusqu’à 38 000 adjudications, il est possible que soient commises des erreurs qui ne peuvent être réparées. (transcript, at pp. 83-87) (transcription, p. 84-87) [158] the chief adjudicator also agreed that where the irssa contains no internal remedy, the courts may intervene to fill the gap: [158] l’adjudicateur en chef a également reconnu que, dans les cas où la crrpi ne prévoit pas de re- cours interne, les tribunaux peuvent intervenir pour combler cette lacune : [traduction] mr. justice moldaver:    if as a result of working [the interpretative problems] out [within the four corners of the agreement] we reach -- we have a hiatus, we have a gap, we have an inability to do justice in a particular case -- le juge moldaver : si, après avoir résolu [les pro- blèmes d’interprétation] [en respectant les limites établies par la convention], on constate qu’il y a un hiatus, une lacune, il est alors impossible de rendre justice dans ce cas particulier -- [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 299 mr. arvay, qc:. yes. me arvay, cr :. oui. mr. justice moldaver: -- then you should be able to le juge moldaver : -- vous devriez alors pouvoir vous go to the court to fill that gap. adresser à la cour pour combler cette lacune. mr. arvay, qc:. i agree. me arvay, cr :. je suis d’accord. (transcript, at p. 92; see also, rf (chief adjudica- tor), at para. 95) (transcription, p. 92; voir également mi (adjudica- teur en chef), par. 95) [159] given the chief adjudicator’s role within the iap scheme, i attach significant weight to these statements. as set out above, the chief adjudicator is tasked under the irssa with ensuring consist- ency among the decisions of adjudicators in the in- terpretation and application of the iap model by implementing training programs and administrative measures (sch. d, art iii(m)). he can also propose instructions to the iap oversight committee in or- der to better give effect to the provisions of the iap (sch. d, art iii(r)). [160] in addition to these “future looking” mech- anisms, the chief adjudicator ensures consistency in the application of the iap through his role in the internal review process. as stated above, the final level of review (re- review) is conducted by the chief adjudicator or his designate. while in this case the re- review was conducted by a designate and not by the chief adjudicator himself, “designates” are iden- tified in the scheme as being approved by the iap oversight committee to exercise what the iap refers to as “the chief adjudicator’s review authority”. it is evident that the scheme places the chief adjudicator at the apex of the review process and gives him the authority to ensure that adjudicators are properly applying the iap model. [159] compte tenu du rôle que joue l’adjudicateur en chef dans le cadre du péi, j’accorde beaucoup de poids à ces affirmations. comme je l’ai déjà expli- qué, l’adjudicateur en chef est chargé, sous le régime de la crrpi, de mettre en œuvre des programmes de formation et des mesures administratives pour assu- rer la cohérence dans les décisions des adjudicateurs et dans leur interprétation et leur application du ré- gime du péi (ann. d, art iii(m)). il lui est également loisible de proposer des instructions au comité de surveillance du péi pour faciliter l’application du péi (ann. d, art iii(r)). [160] outre ces mécanismes « qui valent pour les dossiers futurs », l’adjudicateur en chef assure éga- lement la cohérence dans l’application du péi grâce au rôle qu’il joue au sein du processus de révision in- terne. comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, c’est l’adjudica- teur en chef ou un adjudicateur en chef qu’il désigne qui intervient au dernier palier de révision, soit la deuxième révision. bien qu’en l’espèce, la deuxième révision ait été effectuée non pas par l’adjudicateur en chef, mais par un adjudicateur en chef désigné, les « adjudicateurs en chef désignés » sont décrits par le régime comme ayant reçu l’approbation du comité de surveillance du péi dans le but d’exercer ce que le péi appelle « le pouvoir de révision de l’adjudicateur en chef ». il est évident que le processus place l’adju- dicateur en chef au sommet du processus de révision et lui confie le pouvoir de s’assurer que les adjudi- cateurs appliquent correctement le régime du péi. [161] the chief adjudicator has conceded that the decisions of the adjudicators in this case were “aberrant” and did not reflect the direction provided by former chief adjudicator ish. as my colleague brown j observes, the chief adjudicator did not go so far as to concede that there is a gap in this case [161] l’adjudicateur en chef a admis que les déci- sions prises par les adjudicateurs en l’espèce étaient [traduction] « aberrantes » et qu’elles ne corres- pondaient pas aux orientations données par l’ancien adjudicateur en chef ish. comme mon collègue le juge brown le fait observer, l’adjudicateur en chef 300 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. that would warrant intervention by the courts (brown j. reasons, at paras 194-95). this is, however, not determinative of the appeal. in light of the chief adjudicator’s role and responsibilities under the iap scheme, his statement that the re- review resulted in an “aberrant” decision is a significant concession. it indicates that the scheme has broken down such that the chief adjudicator was not able to ensure that the terms of the iap were properly applied in this case. [162] furthermore, the chief adjudicator is not ac- tually a party to the irssa or the iap, but is instead, as my colleague brown j observes, a creation of that scheme (para 190). therefore, while the chief adjudicator’s concession that an iap claim was wrongly decided has great significance, the chief adjudicator’s opinion as to whether this results in a “gap” has no bearing on the court’s interpretation of the parties’ intentions in this regard. as my colleague abella j. points out, courts have a duty to ensure that the claimants receive the benefits they bargained for (abella j. reasons, at para 30). in my view, the sequence of events in this case has exposed a gap in the irssa, and it is the role of this court to step in to fill that gap. [163] the “gap” in this case does not arise as a result of a finding by this court that jw is entitled to compensation based on its own interpretation of the iap. rather, the gap arises as a result of the parties’ intention that adjudicators decide which claimants receive compensation and that the chief adjudicator should represent the final level of review in order to ensure consistency across all iap decisions. the pre- cise unfairness which this court must address stems from the fact that, despite the chief adjudicator’s opinion that an error has been made on this final review, there is no mechanism for reopening a claim or otherwise providing relief to a claimant. n’est pas allé jusqu’à admettre qu’il y avait en l’es- pèce une lacune qui justifierait l’intervention des tribunaux (motifs du juge brown, par.  194- 195). cela n’est toutefois pas déterminant quant à l’issue du présent pourvoi. compte tenu du rôle et des attri- butions que le péi confie à l’adjudicateur en chef, sa conclusion portant que la deuxième révision a donné lieu à une décision « aberrante » représente une im- portante concession. elle révèle que le mécanisme s’est enrayé à un point tel que l’adjudicateur en chef n’a pas été en mesure de s’assurer que les modalités du péi étaient appliquées correctement en l’espèce. [162] de plus, l’adjudicateur en chef n’est pas une des parties à la crrpi ou au péi, mais, comme mon collègue le juge brown le fait remarquer, il en est la créature (par 190). par conséquent, même si la concession de l’adjudicateur en chef suivant la- quelle une demande présentée dans le cadre du péi a fait l’objet d’une décision mal fondée a une grande importance, la question de savoir si l’adjudicateur en chef estime qu’il en résulte ou non une « lacune » n’a aucune incidence sur l’interprétation que la cour fait de l’intention des parties à cet égard. ainsi que ma collègue la juge abella le souligne, les tribunaux ont l’obligation de s’assurer que les demandeurs obtiennent les avantages qu’ils ont négociés (motifs de la juge abella, par 30). à mon avis, le fil des évé- nements a, dans le cas qui nous occupe, fait ressortir l’existence d’une lacune dans la crrpi et il incombe à la cour d’intervenir pour la combler. [163] en l’espèce, cette « lacune » ne découle pas de la conclusion de la cour suivant laquelle jw a droit à une indemnité en raison de l’interprétation que la cour fait elle- même des modalités du péi. cette lacune découle plutôt de l’intention des par- ties, qui voulaient que ce soit les adjudicateurs qui décident quels demandeurs recevraient ou non une indemnité et que l’adjudicateur en chef incarne le dernier palier de révision afin d’assurer la cohérence entre toutes les décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi l’iniquité précise que la cour doit corriger découle du fait que, même si l’adjudicateur en chef est d’avis qu’une erreur a été commise à l’étape de la révision finale, il n’existe aucun mécanisme permettant de rouvrir une demande ou d’accorder autrement réparation à un demandeur. [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 301 [164] given that the iap dictates that the chief adjudicator should have the final word under the re- view mechanism, the practical effect of this situation is that jw did not receive the benefits bargained for. as there is no remedy within the four corners of the agreement that is available to either jw or the chief adjudicator, the courts must step in to fill this gap. it is particularly appropriate that this court intervene in light of the fact that the irssa is a settlement of a class action, and it can be assumed that all similarly situated individuals are entitled to the same treat- ment under the scheme. it is clearly consistent with the scheme to find that there is unfairness when the chief adjudicator concedes before this court that a claimant was improperly denied a claim based on “aberrant” decisions or an isolated error by the adjudicators. [165] this conclusion is not, as my colleague brown j would find, inconsistent with the provi- sion stating that stare decisis does not apply to the iap (sch. d, app. x, s. 5; brown j. reasons, at para 185). the initial hearing adjudicator in any claim is not prevented from declining to follow a prior decision and adopting his or her own interpreta- tion of the iap, and it is open to the chief adjudicator to agree or disagree with the adjudicator’s conclusion on re- review. in this way, the iap scheme allows iap adjudicators to come to an independent conclusion and see that justice is done in each case, while at the same time allowing the chief adjudicator to carry out his mandate to ensure consistency across all iap decisions. the problem in this case stems not from the fact that the adjudicators did not follow prece- dent, but from the chief adjudicator’s admission that jw was wrongly denied compensation at the final level of review in what the chief adjudicator conceded was an “aberrant” decision. [164] comme le péi exige que l’adjudicateur en chef ait le dernier mot dans le cadre du mécanisme de révision, l’effet concret de cette situation est que jw n’a pas obtenu les avantages qui ont été négo- ciés et acceptés. puisque la crrpi ne prévoit aucun recours dont jw ou l’adjudicateur en chef puisse se prévaloir, les tribunaux doivent intervenir pour combler cette lacune. il convient tout particulière- ment que la cour intervienne étant donné que la crrpi représente le règlement d’un recours collectif et qu’il y a lieu de présumer que toutes les personnes se trouvant dans une situation semblable ont droit au même traitement dans le cadre du régime. il est de toute évidence conforme au régime de conclure qu’une injustice est commise lorsque l’adjudicateur en chef admet devant la cour qu’un demandeur a été injustement débouté de sa demande en raison de décisions « aberrantes » ou d’une erreur isolée commise par des adjudicateurs. [165] contrairement à ce que conclurait mon collègue le juge brown, cette conclusion n’est pas incompatible avec la disposition de la crrpi sui- vant laquelle le stare decisis ne s’applique pas au péi (ann. d, ann. x, art. 5; motifs du juge brown, par 185). peu importe la demande dont il est saisi, il n’est jamais interdit à l’adjudicateur d’audition initial de refuser de suivre une décision antérieure et de décider de proposer sa propre interprétation du péi, et il est loisible à l’adjudicateur en chef de souscrire ou non à la conclusion tirée par l’adjudica- teur de deuxième révision. le régime du péi permet ainsi aux adjudicateurs du péi de tirer leurs propres conclusions et de veiller à ce que justice soit faite dans chaque cas, tout en permettant à l’adjudicateur en chef de s’acquitter du mandat qui lui est confié d’assurer la cohérence entre toutes les décisions ren- dues dans le cadre du péi. la difficulté en l’espèce ne découle pas du fait que les adjudicateurs n’ont pas suivi les précédents, mais bien du fait que, de l’aveu de l’adjudicateur en chef, jw s’est vu refuser à tort une indemnité au dernier palier de révision dans une décision dont l’adjudicateur en chef a reconnu le caractère aberrant. [166] as was the case in nn, this gap in the irssa has caused significant prejudice to jw. he was denied any compensation, despite the chief [166] tout comme dans l’affaire nn, cette lacune de la crrpi a causé un grave préjudice à jw, qui s’est vu refuser une indemnité malgré le fait que 302 j.w v canada (attorney general) côté j. [2019] 2 scr. adjudicator’s acknowledgment at the hearing before this court that this result is inconsistent with the proper application of the iap model. i recognize that neither the supervising judge nor the manitoba court of appeal had the benefit of the concessions made by the chief adjudicator in his oral submissions before this court. it is unfortunate that this acknowledgment came about only at the hearing before this court. had the chief adjudicator expressed his disagree- ment with the re- review adjudicator’s decision on jw’s claim at an earlier stage of the proceedings and perhaps sought a remedy from the supervising judge, jw might have been spared the significant delay and the hardship associated with litigating this issue through multiple levels of court. however, to deny a remedy for jw in the face of these circumstances would result in a clear injustice, and this court must therefore intervene. i would clarify that while i find that jw’s [167] claim should be remitted for reconsideration, i would not do so on the basis on which the supervising judge made his order. edmond j erred in applying his own interpretation of the iap model. l’adjudicateur en chef ait reconnu à l’audience devant notre cour que ce résultat était incompatible avec l’application régulière du régime du péi. je recon- nais que ni le juge superviseur ni la cour d’appel du manitoba n’ont eu l’avantage de prendre connais- sance des concessions faites par l’adjudicateur en chef dans les observations orales qu’il a formulées devant nous. il est regrettable que ces admissions n’aient été faites qu’à l’audience devant notre cour. si l’adjudicateur en chef avait exprimé son désaccord avec la décision de l’adjudicatrice de deuxième ré- vision sur la demande de jw à un stade antérieur des procédures et s’il avait sollicité une réparation au juge superviseur, jw aurait peut- être évité les délais importants et les difficultés associés au fait de devoir porter cette question devant plusieurs juridic- tions successives. toutefois, refuser d’accorder une réparation à jw dans ces conditions causerait une injustice flagrante. la cour se doit par conséquent d’intervenir. [167] je tiens à préciser que, même si je conclus que la demande de jw devrait être renvoyée pour ré- examen, je ne fonde pas cette décision sur les mêmes motifs que ceux sur lesquels le juge superviseur a fondé son ordonnance. le juge edmond a commis une erreur en appliquant sa propre interprétation du régime du péi. vi remedy vi réparation [168] for the reasons stated above, i would re- instate the order made by edmond j. on august 3, 2016 that jw’s claim be sent back to a first- level iap adjudicator for reconsideration (ar, vol. i, at pp 48-51). [168] pour les motifs qui précèdent, je rétabli- rais l’ordonnance rendue le 3 août 2016 par le juge edmond portant que la demande de jw soit ren- voyée à un adjudicateur de premier palier du péi pour réexamen (da, vol. i, p 48-51). [169] given that jw’s claim has already been reconsidered and that the chief adjudicator is sat- isfied that the reconsideration adjudicator prop- erly applied the iap model, i would give effect to the reconsideration adjudicator’s decision (ar, vol. ii, at pp 143-61). the compensation award of $12,720 is reinstated, with interest calculated from the date of the reconsideration adjudicator’s deci- sion. the appropriate interest rate is to be determined in accordance with the applicable provincial rules, which in this case are to be found in part xiv of [169] compte tenu du fait que la demande de jw. a déjà fait l’objet d’un réexamen et que l’adjudica- teur en chef s’est dit convaincu que l’adjudicatrice de réexamen avait bien appliqué le régime du péi, je donnerais effet à la décision de l’adjudicatrice de réexamen (da, vol ii, p. 143- 161). l’indemnité de 12 720 $ alors accordée est rétablie, avec les intérêts calculés à compter de la date de la décision de l’adju- dicatrice de réexamen. le taux d’intérêt à appliquer est fixé selon les règles provinciales applicables, à savoir, en l’espèce, celles de la partie xiv de la [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) la juge côté 303 manitoba’s court of queen’s bench act, ccsm, c. c280. loi sur la cour du banc de la reine du manitoba, cplm, c c280. vii costs vii dépens [170] i would award costs to jw per the usual rule however, i note that j.w seeks costs on a solicitor- client basis in this court and in the courts below he submits that this case raises issues of public interest relating to the implementation of the irssa. the attorney general submits that costs should be awarded to the appellants but opposes the request for costs on a solicitor- client basis, arguing that the appellants have not established any reason to deviate from the normal rule as to party- party costs. in carter v canada (attorney general), [171] 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, this court identi- fied two considerations that can help guide the exer- cise of a judge’s discretion on a motion for special costs in a case involving the public interest:    first, the case must involve matters of public interest that are truly exceptional. it is not enough that the issues raised have not previously been resolved or that they tran- scend the individual interests of the successful litigant: they must also have a significant and widespread societal impact. second, in addition to showing that they have no personal, proprietary or pecuniary interest in the litigation that would justify the proceedings on economic grounds, the plaintiffs must show that it would not have been pos- sible to effectively pursue the litigation in question with private funding. in those rare cases, it will be contrary to the interests of justice to ask the individual litigants (or, more likely, pro bono counsel) to bear the majority of the financial burden associated with pursuing the claim. [emphasis added; para 140] [170] j’adjugerais les dépens à jw selon la règle habituelle. je tiens cependant à signaler que jw. a sollicité l’adjudication des dépens sur une base avocat- client tant devant la présente cour que devant les juridictions inférieures. selon lui, la présente af- faire soulève des questions d’intérêt public touchant la mise en œuvre de la crrpi. le procureur général affirme que les dépens devraient être adjugés aux appelants, mais s’oppose à l’adjudication des dépens sur une base avocat- client en faisant valoir que les appelants n’ont pas prouvé l’existence de motifs jus- tifiant de s’écarter de la règle habituelle, qui prévoit que les dépens sont adjugés sur la base partie- partie. [171] dans l’arrêt carter c. canada (procureur général), 2015 csc 5, [2015] 1 rcs 331, la cour a relevé deux facteurs qui peuvent guider l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire lorsque le tribunal est saisi d’une requête en dépens spéciaux dans une affaire concernant l’intérêt public :    premièrement, l’affaire doit porter sur des questions d’intérêt public véritablement exceptionnelles. il ne suffit pas que les questions soulevées n’aient pas encore été tranchées ou qu’elles dépassent le cadre des intérêts du plaideur qui a gain de cause : elles doivent aussi avoir une incidence importante et généralisée sur la société. deuxièmement, en plus de démontrer qu’ils n’ont dans le litige aucun intérêt personnel, propriétal ou pécuniaire qui justifierait l’instance pour des raisons d’ordre économique, les demandeurs doivent démontrer qu’il n’aurait pas été possible de poursuivre l’instance en question avec une aide financière privée. dans ces rares cas, il est contraire à l’in- térêt de la justice de demander aux plaideurs individuels (ou, ce qui est plus probable, aux avocats bénévoles) de supporter la majeure partie du fardeau financier associé à la poursuite de la demande. [je souligne; par 140]. in my view, neither of these considerations [172] supports the awarding of special costs to jw. first, the issue raised in this appeal is not “truly excep- tional”. while the issues relating to the implemen- tation of the irssa will have an impact on the parties to that agreement and the courts tasked with [172] à mon avis, aucune de ces considérations ne justifie l’octroi de dépens spéciaux à jw. d’abord, la question soulevée dans le présent pourvoi n’est pas « véritablement exceptionnelle ». même si les ques- tions relatives à la mise en œuvre de la crrpi auront une incidence sur les parties à cette convention et 304 j.w v canada (attorney general) brown j. [2019] 2 scr. supervising its implementation, they do not have a sufficiently significant and widespread societal im- pact to justify granting solicitor- client costs. given the sui generis nature of the irssa, the guidance provided by this court regarding the scope of judicial oversight of the iap will have little impact outside of this narrow context. with respect to the second consideration, jw clearly has a “personal, proprie- tary or pecuniary interest in the litigation that would justify the proceedings on economic grounds”, as his entitlement to compensation under the iap is at the core of these proceedings. [173] i am therefore not persuaded that it would be appropriate to grant jw’s request for solicitor- client costs. sur les tribunaux chargés d’en superviser la mise en œuvre, elles n’ont pas une incidence suffisamment importante et généralisée sur la société pour justifier l’adjudication des dépens sur une base avocat- client. compte tenu du caractère sui generis de la crrpi, les indications données par la cour sur la portée du rôle de supervision que jouent les tribunaux à l’égard du péi auront peu d’impact en dehors de ce cadre restreint. ensuite, en ce qui concerne le deuxième facteur, jw a nettement un « intérêt personnel, pro- priétal ou pécuniaire qui justifierait l’instance pour des raisons d’ordre économique », étant donné que son droit à une indemnisation dans le cadre du péi est au cœur de la présente instance. [173] je ne suis par conséquent pas convaincue qu’il serait opportun de faire droit à la demande de jw en ce qui concerne l’adjudication des dépens sur une base avocat- client. viii conclusion viii dispositif [174] for these reasons, i would allow the ap- peal and reinstate the reconsideration adjudicator’s award of $12,270, with interest calculated in accord- ance with part xiv of manitoba’s court of queen’s bench act, and with costs to jw per the usual rule. [174] pour ces motifs, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi, de rétablir l’indemnité de 12 270 $ accordée par l’adjudicatrice de réexamen, avec intérêts cal- culés conformément à la partie xiv de la loi sur la cour du banc de la reine du manitoba, et d’adjuger les dépens à jw suivant la règle habituelle. the reasons of brown and rowe jj. were deliv- version française des motifs des juges brown et ered by rowe rendus par [175] brown j (dissenting) — i would dismiss the appeal. paragraphs 56- 138, 140 and 149-52 of the reasons of my colleague côté j correctly state the law for a majority of this court with respect to the jurisdiction of the supervising courts. i there- fore concur with my colleague on this point, and would find that edmond j erred in scrutinizing the interpretation of sl1.4 (indian residential schools settlement agreement (2006) (“irssa”), sch. d, art. ii) undertaken by the hearing adjudicator and substituting his own (côté j. reasons, at para 150). i do not, however, agree that any “gap” exists in the irssa to allow this court to remit jw’s claim for reconsideration. while my colleague côté j has striven admirably to justify landing where she does, the parties to the irssa did not agree to a particular [175] le juge brown (dissident) — je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. les paragraphes 56-138, 140 et 149-152 des motifs de ma collègue la juge côté énoncent correctement l’état du droit au nom de la majorité de notre cour en ce qui concerne la compé- tence des tribunaux de surveillance. je partage donc l’avis de ma collègue sur ce point, et je conclurais que le juge edmond a commis une erreur en ana- lysant l’interprétation que l’adjudicatrice d’audi- tion a faite de la catégorie sl1.4 (convention de règlement relative aux pensionnats indiens (2006) (« crrpi »), ann. d, art. ii) et en substituant son interprétation à la sienne (motifs de la juge côté, par 150). je ne suis toutefois pas d’accord pour dire qu’il existe dans la crrpi une « lacune » qui permet à notre cour de renvoyer la demande de jw pour [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) le juge brown 305 interpretation of a contractual term, but to a particu- lar process, which my colleague’s reasons undermine by her disposition of this appeal. [176] the irssa expressly precludes our interven- tion in the independent assessment process (“iap”), even where we might be of the view that it has been incorrectly interpreted and applied. it is “‘a com- plete code’ that limits access to the courts, preserves the finality of the iap process and respects the ex- pertise of iap adjudicators” (fontaine v. canada (attorney general), 2017 onca 26, 137 or (3d) 90 (“spanish irs ca”), at para 53). straining to find a “gap” in the irssa so as to pry open a little space for judicial recourse where the parties clearly intended to preclude it defeats the intentions of the parties and — i repeat — undermines the integrity of the process that they settled upon. [177] to support having found this supposed gap, côté j points to the chief adjudicator’s concession that (1) jw’s claim was wrongly decided by the hearing adjudicator (“aberrant”) and wrongly con- firmed by two review adjudicators, and (2) that he has no authority to reopen jw’s claim (para 153). it follows, my colleague says, that courts may step in to furnish a remedy. as i explain below, however, the chief adjudicator’s concession does not expose any “gap” in the irssa, much less any basis for judicial intervention to fill it — such judicial intervention being contrary to the express intentions of the parties. my colleague simply has no basis for rewriting the terms of the irssa. nouvel examen. bien que ma collègue la juge côté se soit admirablement efforcée de justifier la conclusion à laquelle elle est arrivée, les parties à la crrpi ne se sont pas mises d’accord sur une interprétation particulière d’une disposition contractuelle, mais bien sur un processus particulier, que compromettent les motifs de ma collègue par la manière dont elle tranche le présent pourvoi. [176] la crrpi nous interdit explicitement d’in- tervenir dans le processus d’évaluation indépendant (« péi »), même lorsque nous pourrions être d’avis qu’il a été mal interprété et mal appliqué. il s’agit d’un [traduction] « “code complet” qui limite l’accès aux tribunaux, protège le caractère définitif des déci- sions prises dans le cadre du péi et respecte l’exper- tise des adjudicateurs du péi » (fontaine c. canada (attorney general), 2017 onca 26, 137 or (3d) 90 (« pi de spanish, ca »), par 53). chercher à tout prix à trouver une « lacune » dans la crrpi pour y déceler un cas d’ouverture à un recours judiciaire alors que les parties entendaient manifestement ex- clure cette possibilité va à l’encontre de la volonté des parties et — je le répète — porte atteinte à l’intégrité du processus sur lequel elles se sont entendues. [177] pour appuyer sa conclusion que cette préten- due lacune existe, la juge côté souligne la concession de l’adjudicateur en chef selon laquelle (1) l’adju- dicatrice d’audition a mal statué ([traduction] «  aberrante  ») sur la demande de jw, décision qu’ont confirmée à tort deux adjudicateurs de révi- sion, et (2) il n’avait pas compétence pour rouvrir la demande de jw (par 153). il s’ensuit, d’après ma collègue, que les tribunaux peuvent intervenir pour accorder réparation. toutefois, comme je l’ex- pliquerai plus loin, la concession de l’adjudicateur en chef ne révèle aucune « lacune » dans la crrpi, encore moins un motif d’intervention judiciaire per- mettant de la combler, cette intervention judiciaire étant contraire à l’intention expresse des parties. ma collègue n’est tout simplement pas justifiée de récrire les modalités de la crrpi. i rewriting the terms of the irssa i réécriture des modalités de la crrpi [178] the irssa is a contract (canada (attorney general) v. fontaine, 2017 scc 47, [2017] 2 scr. [178] la crrpi est un contrat (canada (procureur général) c. fontaine, 2017 csc 47, [2017] 2 rcs. 306 j.w v canada (attorney general) brown j. [2019] 2 scr. 205 (“scc records decision”), at para 35). inter- preting its terms therefore requires a court to discern the contracting parties’ intentions, and to enforce the bargain to which they committed (g r. hall, cana- dian contractual interpretation law (3rd ed. 2016), at p. 174; scc records decision, at para 35). [179] it is of course true that, where the parties have failed in their contract to address a particu- lar situation arising in the course of their relation- ship, a court may imply a contractual term (mjb. enterprises ltd. v. defence construction (1951) ltd., [1999] 1 scr 619, at para. 27, citing canadian pacific hotels ltd. v. bank of montreal, [1987] 1 scr 711, at p 775). this is not, however, an un- limited power. more to the point, it does not permit a court to rewrite a contract or to imply a term which is contrary to the clearly expressed intentions of the parties (hall, at pp.180-83; mjb. enterprises, at para. 29; and vorvis v. insurance corporation of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 1085, at p 1097). [180] a degree of circumspection in implying a term permitting judicial recourse is particularly im- portant here. given the finality promised by the iap, it is easy to appreciate why the parties might have seen prolonged litigation of iap claims in the courts to be undesirable (see spanish irs ca, at paras. 51, 53 and 60; côté j. reasons, at para 134). it is there- fore worth scrutinizing where my colleague côté j. sees her opening for prolonging this litigation: in the absence of any authority for the chief adjudicator under the terms of the irssa to reopen jw’s claim, despite his conclusion that jw’s claim resulted in an error which is “aberrant”. but merely because the irssa does not contain certain terms does not mean that there is a “gap” waiting to be filled by judges (see a. swan, j. adamski and a y. na, ca- nadian contract law (4th ed. 2018), at p 793). it depends on why the terms were not included. there is a difference between failing to grant authority that the parties would have granted (a true “gap”), and deciding not to grant such authority. and, in my respectful view, a review of the terms of the irssa reveals that the absence of a term authorizing the 205 (« décision de la csc sur les documents »), par 35. l’interprétation de ses modalités oblige par conséquent le tribunal à discerner l’intention des par- ties et à faire exécuter le marché qu’elles ont conclu (g r hall,. canadian contractual interpretation law (3e éd. 2016), p. 174; décision de la csc sur les documents, par 35). [179] certes, il est vrai que lorsque, dans leur con trat, les parties n’ont pas prévu une situation particulière survenant au cours de leurs rapports, le tribunal peut conclure à l’existence d’une disposi- tion contractuelle implicite (mjb. enterprises ltd. c. construction de défense (1951) ltée, [1999] 1 rcs 619, par. 27, citant société hôtelière cana- dien pacifique ltée c. banque de montréal, [1987] 1 rcs 711, p 775). ce pouvoir n’est cependant pas illimité. plus précisément, il ne permet pas au tribunal de récrire le contrat ou d’y insérer une condition implicite contraire à l’intention expri- mée clairement par les parties (hall, p.180- 183; mjb. enterprises, par. 29; et vorvis c. insurance corporation of british columbia, [1989] 1 rcs. 1085, p 1097). il est particulièrement important ici de faire [180] preuve d’une certaine circonspection avant de con- clure à l’existence implicite d’une modalité autori- sant l’exercice d’un recours judiciaire. compte tenu du caractère définitif garanti par le péi, il est facile de comprendre pourquoi les parties ont peut- être jugé indésirable de voir s’éterniser devant les tribunaux les litiges touchant les demandes présentées dans le cadre du péi (voir pi de spanish, ca, par. 51, 53 et 60; motifs de la juge côté, par 134). il vaut donc la peine de s’arrêter sur la raison pour laquelle ma collègue la juge côté estime qu’il s’agit d’un cas dans lequel il est possible de prolonger le présent litige, en l’occurrence le fait que les modalités de la crrpi ne donnent aucun pouvoir à l’adjudicateur en chef de rouvrir la demande de jw, malgré sa conclusion que la demande de jw a entraîné une erreur « aberrante ». mais le simple fait que l’on ne retrouve pas certains termes dans la crrpi ne signifie pas pour autant que celle-ci comporte une « lacune » que les juges doivent s’empresser de com- bler (voir a. swan, j. adamski et a y na,. canadian contract law (4e éd. 2018), p 793). tout dépend de [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) le juge brown 307 chief adjudicator to reopen claims clearly represents an instance of the latter. [181] the iap is intended to be a “closed adjudica- tive process, operating under the purview of inde- pendent adjudicators without any rights of appeal or judicial review” (côté j. reasons, at para. 65, citing fontaine v. canada (attorney general), 2016 bcsc 2218, [2017] 1 cnlr 104, at para. 11 (emphasis added)). as a result, the adjudication of iap claims is limited to one in- person hearing and two levels of in- ternal review without any judicial recourse (sch. d, art. iii(l); côté j. reasons, at paras. 69 and 75). this can be contrasted with the common experience payment review process, which clearly provides for judicial recourse where a claim has been denied (irssa, art 509). [182] nor is the irssa silent on the circumstances in which recourse can be had to the courts under the iap. it provides that the chief adjudicator may per- mit the claimant to access the courts where the value of the harm or loss exceeds the compensation limits, or where the evidence is overly complex (sch. d, art. iii(b)(iii); côté j. reasons, at paras 73-74). the internal mechanisms of review in the irssa have clearly been designed to allow for judicial recourse in specific situations, which do not include incorrect interpretations of the iap. la raison pour laquelle les termes en question n’y ont pas été insérés. il y a une différence entre le fait de ne pas accorder un pouvoir que les parties auraient conféré (ce qui serait une véritable « lacune »), et le fait de décider de ne pas accorder ce pouvoir. de plus, à mon humble avis, l’examen des modalités de la crrpi révèle que l’absence de stipulation auto- risant l’adjudicateur en chef à rouvrir des demandes constitue clairement un exemple de cette dernière catégorie. [181] le péi se veut un « processus décisionnel fermé qui relève d’adjudicateurs indépendants et qui n’est pas assorti d’un droit d’appel ou d’un contrôle judiciaire » (motifs de la juge côté, par. 65, citant fontaine c. canada (attorney general), 2016 bcsc 2218, [2017] 1 cnlr 104, par. 11 (je souligne)). par conséquent, le règlement des demandes présen- tées dans le cadre du péi se limite à une audience en personne et à deux paliers de révision interne sans re- cours judiciaire (ann. d, art. iii(1); motifs de la juge côté, par. 69 et 75), contrairement à la procédure de révision du paiement d’expérience commune, qui prévoit clairement la possibilité d’exercer un recours judiciaire en cas de rejet d’une demande (crrpi, art 509). [182] la crrpi n’est pas non plus muette en ce qui concerne les situations dans lesquelles il est possible de recourir aux tribunaux dans le cadre du péi. elle indique que l’adjudicateur en chef peut permettre au demandeur de s’adresser aux tribunaux lorsque le préjudice ou la perte excède l’indemnité maximale permise ou que la preuve est trop complexe (ann. d, art. iii(b)(iii); motifs de la juge côté, par 73-74). le mécanisme de révision interne que l’on trouve dans la crrpi a de toute évidence été conçu pour permettre le recours aux tribunaux dans certaines situations précises, lesquelles ne comprennent pas les cas d’interprétation inexacte du péi. [183] that it was the parties’ intention that the chief adjudicator not have the authority to respond to incorrect interpretations of the iap by reopening claims is also demonstrated by how the irssa does empower the chief adjudicator to respond to incor- rect interpretations. although the chief adjudicator cannot reopen claims where there has been an [183] l’intention des parties de ne pas conférer à l’adjudicateur en chef le pouvoir d’intervenir pour corriger les interprétations erronées du péi en rou- vrant les demandes ressort également de la façon dont la crrpi habilite effectivement l’adjudicateur en chef à réagir face à une interprétation erronée. bien que ce dernier ne puisse rouvrir une demande 308 j.w v canada (attorney general) brown j. [2019] 2 scr. incorrect interpretation of the iap, he (or his des- ignate) does have, as côté j acknowledges, a right of final review of iap decisions (côté j. reasons, at paras. 69-70 and 160). this final “review authority” empowers the chief adjudicator to correct an inter- pretative error in applying the iap made by either the hearing or review adjudicator. as stated in sch. d to the irssa:    [a]ny party may ask the chief adjudicator or desig- nate to determine whether an adjudicator’s, or reviewing adjudicator’s, decision properly applied the iap model to the facts as found by the adjudicator, and if not, to correct the decision, and the chief adjudicator or designate may do so. [emphasis added; art iii(l)(i)] [184] further, and even where the chief adjudicator or his designate has (as here) failed to exercise his final review authority to correct an error in inter- preting the iap, he is empowered to remedy on a prospective basis such incorrect interpretations of the iap as are brought to his attention. specifically, he is authorized to prepare instructions for the iap oversight committee’s consideration with the goal of assisting adjudicators in better giving effect to the provisions of the irssa (sch. d, art iii(s)). while, as i say, this operates only prospectively in that any resulting instructions will bind only those participants who have had at least two weeks’ no- tice of the instructions before their hearing (sch. d, art. iii(r)(iii)), this power, coupled with the chief adjudicator’s final review authority, nonetheless affirms that the parties to the irssa had turned their minds to the powers of the chief adjudicator in re- spect of incorrect interpretations of the iap. and, in so doing, they declined to confer those powers which my colleague côté j would now in effect bestow. en cas d’interprétation erronée du péi, il (ou l’adju- dicateur en chef désigné) détient, comme le reconnaît la juge côté, un droit de révision finale des décisions rendues au terme du péi (motifs de la juge côté, par. 69, 70 et 160). ce « pouvoir de révision » finale permet à l’adjudicateur en chef de corriger une erreur d’interprétation commise dans l’application du péi par l’adjudicateur d’audition ou l’adjudicateur de révision. comme l’indique l’annexe d de la crrpi :    [t]oute partie peut demander à l’adjudicateur en chef, ou à l’adjudicateur en chef désigné, de déterminer si la décision de l’adjudicateur au dossier ou de l’adjudicateur de révision applique correctement les critères du péi aux faits déterminés par l’adjudicateur et, s’il y a lieu, de corriger celle-ci pour qu’elle se conforme à ces critères. l’adjudicateur en chef ou l’adjudicateur en chef désigné peut faire une telle révision. [je souligne; art iii(1)(i)] [184] de plus, même si l’adjudicateur en chef ou l’adjudicateur en chef désigné n’a pas (comme en l’espèce) exercé son pouvoir de révision finale pour corriger une erreur dans l’interprétation du péi, il peut remédier pour l’avenir à cette interprétation erronée du péi qui est portée à son attention. plus précisément, il est autorisé à soumettre au comité de surveillance du péi des instructions dans le but d’aider les adjudicateurs à mieux donner effet aux dispositions de la crrpi (ann. d, art iii(s)). bien que, comme je l’affirme, ces dispositions ne vaillent que pour l’avenir, en ce sens que les instructions ne lient que les participants qui en ont été avisés au moins deux semaines avant leur audition (ann. d, art. iii(r)(iii)), le pouvoir en question, conjugué au pouvoir de révision finale de l’adjudicateur en chef, confirme néanmoins que les parties à la crrpi se sont penchées sur les pouvoirs de l’adjudicateur en chef relativement aux interprétations incorrectes du péi. ce faisant, elles ont refusé de conférer ces pou- voirs comme le ferait ma collègue la juge côté. [185] further, by providing that stare decisis does not apply to iap decisions (sch. d, app. x, item 5), the irssa clearly contemplates that the various iap adjudicators will provide inconsistent and even incorrect interpretations of the iap. as the chief adjudicator observed before this court, the parties to the irssa did not bargain for an infallible scheme. [185] de plus, en précisant que le principe de l’au- torité de la chose jugée ne s’applique pas aux déci- sions rendues dans le cadre du péi (ann. d, ann. x, point 5), la crrpi envisage nettement la possibilité que les divers adjudicateurs du péi donnent de ce- lui-ci des interprétations contradictoires, voire erro- nées. comme l’adjudicateur en chef l’a fait observer [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) le juge brown 309 with 38,000 adjudications and 80,000 applicants, “no one would have imagined that the scheme was going to result in error- free decisions” (transcript, at p 83). [186] both my colleagues abella j (at paras. 26- 27) and côté j (at paras. 139 and 141-48) point to the majority decision at the british columbia court of appeal in nn v. canada (attorney general), 2018 bcca 105, 6 bclr (6th) 335, at paras. 83-85, in support of the proposition that courts can intervene to fill in “gaps” where the irssa is silent. with great respect, and putting aside his use of the threshold of “exceptional circumstances” (in respect of which i agree with the reasons of côté j., at para. 140), i prefer the dissenting reasons given in that appeal by hunter ja, who stated (at para. 227):    [j]udicial intervention by a supervising judge may occur only in very exceptional circumstances when there has been a failure by the chief adjudicator or his designate to apply the terms of the irssa or the implementation orders. the purpose of such intervention is not to review the merits of the underlying decision, but rather to ensure that the dispute resolution process agreed upon by the parties is followed. devant notre cour, les négociations des parties à la crrpi ne visaient pas à instaurer un système infail- lible. avec 38 000 dossiers à traiter et 80 000 deman- deurs, [traduction] « personne n’a imaginé que ce système produirait des décisions à l’abri de toute erreur » (transcription, p 83). [186] tant mes collègues la juge abella (par. 26-27) que la juge côté (par. 139 et 141-148) citent les mo- tifs majoritaires de la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique dans l’arrêt nn c. canada (attorney general), 2018 bcca 105, 6 bclr (6th) 335, par. 83-85, à l’appui de la proposition suivant la- quelle les tribunaux peuvent intervenir pour corriger des « lacunes » lorsque la crrpi est muette. en toute déférence, mis à part son application du critère préalable des « circonstances exceptionnelles » (à l’égard de laquelle je souscris aux motifs de la juge côté au par. 140), je préfère les motifs dissidents énoncés dans cet appel par le juge hunter, qui écri- vait ce qui suit (par. 227) : [traduction]   . un juge surveillant ne peut intervenir que dans des circonstances très exceptionnelles lorsque l’adjudicateur en chef ou l’adjudicateur en chef désigné n’a pas appliqué les modalités de la crrpi ou les or- donnances de mise en œuvre. ce genre d’intervention judiciaire n’a pas pour objet de contrôler le bien- fondé de la décision à l’examen, mais bien de s’assurer que le processus de règlement des différends sur lequel les parties se sont entendues a été suivi. [187] my colleague côté j leans heavily (at pa- ras. 144-46), as did the majority in nn, on the de- cision of perell j of the ontario superior court of justice in fontaine v. canada (attorney general), 2014 onsc 283, [2014] 2 cnlr 86, as suggest- ing that settled claims can be reopened on a “case- by- case” basis. but as hunter ja points out (at para. 260 of nn),. perell j later acknowledged, in fontaine v. canada (attorney general), 2018 onsc 103, at paras. 51 and 170 (canlii), that “much of what i said about reopening iap claims was over- ruled three years later in [spanish irs ca]” and that “judicial recourse is available only where a decision of the chief adjudicator or his designate reflects a patent failure to apply the iap model.” more par- ticularly, perell j acknowledged (at para. 170) that [187] à l’instar de la majorité dans l’arrêt nn, la juge côté table fortement (par. 144- 146) sur la déci- sion rendue par le juge perell, de la cour supérieure de l’ontario, dans l’affaire fontaine c. canada (at- torney general), 2014 onsc 283, [2014] 2 cnlr. 86, pour affirmer qu’il est possible de rouvrir « au cas par cas » des réclamations réglées. mais comme le juge d’appel hunter le souligne (par. 260 de l’arrêt nn), le juge perell a ultérieurement reconnu, dans fontaine c. canada (attorney general), 2018 onsc 103, par. 51 et 170 (canlii), [traduction] « qu’une grande partie de ce que j’ai dit au sujet de la réouver- ture des demandes présentées dans le cadre du péi a été infirmée trois ans plus tard dans l’arrêt [pi de spanish, ca] » et qu’« il n’est possible d’exercer un recours judiciaire que si la décision de l’adjudicateur 310 j.w v canada (attorney general) brown j. [2019] 2 scr. “[s]upervising [j]udges do not have jurisdiction to perform an appellate or error correcting function in respect of iap decisions.” [188] it is therefore clear that, by imposing a pro- cess to which the parties did not agree (and which — going by what they did include in the irssa — they would have rejected), my colleague côté j is rewrit- ing the irssa. clear textual and contextual direction that she cannot do so is met with invocations of “nat- ural justice” (para. 148) without explaining just how it is implicated here — except to say that denying a remedy to jw would result in “clear injustice” such that “this court must    intervene” (para 166). but i reject the premise that my colleague is remedying “injustice”. remedying injustice — that is, doing justice — does not mean arriving at the most palata- ble result. in this case, justice is served by respecting and enforcing the terms of a voluntary agreement be- tween the parties, including the procedural and sub- stantive rules and the jurisdictional boundaries upon which they agreed (spanish irs ca, at para 63). en chef ou de l’adjudicateur en chef désigné révèle un défaut évident d’appliquer le modèle du péi ». plus particulièrement, il a reconnu (par. 170) que « les juges surveillants ne peuvent connaître en appel des décisions rendues dans le cadre du péi ni corri- ger les erreurs qu’elles contiennent ». [188] il est donc évident qu’en imposant un pro- cessus dont les parties n’ont pas convenu (et qu’elles auraient rejeté si l’on se fie à ce qu’elles ont effecti- vement stipulé dans la crrpi), ma collègue la juge côté récrit la crrpi. malgré l’interdiction explicite et tacite qui lui est faite de récrire la crrpi, elle in- voque les princes de « justice naturelle » (par. 148), sans expliquer en quoi ces principes entrent en jeu dans le cas qui nous occupe, sauf pour affirmer que refuser d’accorder une réparation à jw causerait « une injustice flagrante » telle que « [l]a cour se doit [  ] d’intervenir » (par 166). je rejette toutefois la prémisse suivant laquelle ma collègue corrige une « injustice ». corriger une injustice — autrement dit, rendre justice — ne signifie pas qu’il faut en arriver à la solution la plus acceptable. dans le cas qui nous occupe, justice est rendue en respectant et en faisant exécuter les modalités d’une entente conclue de plein gré par les parties, y compris les règles de procédure et de fond et les limites de compétence sur lesquelles elles se sont entendues (pi de spanish, ca, par 63). ii the chief adjudicator’s concession ii la concession de l’adjudicateur en chef [189] i now turn to the concession which my col- league côté j seizes upon as grounds for rewriting the parties’ contract. in oral argument, counsel to the chief adjudicator noted that the hearing adjudicator and review adjudicators interpreted sl1.4 in a man- ner that contradicted a previous decision made by former chief adjudicator ish. counsel for the chief adjudicator stated that this was “aberrant” — that is, as an error that departed from an accepted in- terpretation of sl14. as i have already canvassed, this leads my colleague to her “gap”, since the chief adjudicator has no authority under the irssa to provide a remedy for claimants where he discov- ers an error in the final review (côté j. reasons, at para 163). [189] je passe maintenant à la concession à la- quelle ma collègue la juge côté s’accroche pour justifier la réécriture du contrat intervenu entre les parties. lors de l’audition, l’avocat de l’adjudicateur en chef a fait observer que l’adjudicatrice d’audition et les adjudicateurs de révision avaient donné à la catégorie sl1.4 une interprétation qui contredisait une décision antérieure de l’ancien adjudicateur en chef ish. l’avocat de l’adjudicateur en chef a dit que c’était une erreur « aberrante », c’est-à-dire une erreur qui s’écarte de l’interprétation acceptée de la catégorie sl14. comme je l’ai déjà dit, il s’agit de la « lacune » que ma collègue a constatée en expliquant que la crrpi ne permettait pas à l’adjudicateur en chef d’accorder une réparation au demandeur lorsqu’il découvre une erreur dans la révision finale (motifs de la juge côté, par 163). [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) le juge brown 311 i observe, preliminarily, that the chief ad- [190] judicator is not a party to the irssa, but rather a creation of it (sch. d, art iii(s)). any concession on his part as to the scope of his authority is therefore of limited value to a judicial determination of what the parties intended that power to be. [191] further, and as i have already recounted, the chief adjudicator does have authority to respond to incorrect interpretations of the iap by exercise of his final review authority. i grant that he did not catch the error here, because his designates failed to notice the hearing adjudicator’s erroneous inter- pretation of sl14. what this signifies, however, is not that the denial of compensation to jw was the upshot of any “gap” or “break- down” in the agree- ment which required judicial recourse so as to reopen the claim (côté j. reasons, at paras. 161-62), but that it resulted from the chief adjudicator failing to properly discharge his final review obligations under the irssa. [192] that this is so is made plain by the chief adjudicator’s submission before this court that the courts could not provide a remedy in this case, de- spite the aberrant interpretation of the iap: [190] je tiens d’entrée de jeu à faire observer que l’adjudicateur en chef n’est pas une des parties à la crrpi, mais qu’il en est une créature (ann. d, art iii(s)). toute concession qu’il pourrait faire sur l’étendue de ses pouvoirs n’a donc qu’une valeur limitée lorsqu’un tribunal est appelé à se prononcer sur l’intention qu’avaient les parties relativement à ses pouvoirs. [191] en outre, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, l’adjudicateur en chef a compétence pour réagir à des interprétations erronées du péi en exerçant son pouvoir de révision finale. je reconnais qu’il n’a pas relevé l’erreur ici, car les adjudicateurs qu’il avait désignés n’ont pas constaté l’interprétation erronée donnée par l’adjudicatrice d’audition à la catégorie sl14. ce que cela signifie, toutefois, ce n’est pas que le refus d’indemniser jw découle d’une « la- cune » ou « enrayement » dans la convention en raison de laquelle il était nécessaire de recourir aux tribunaux pour faire rouvrir la demande (motifs de la juge côté, par. 161- 162), mais qu’il résulte du défaut de l’adjudicateur en chef de s’acquitter correctement de ses obligations de révision finale prévues dans la crrpi. [192] c’est ce qui ressort de l’argument avancé par l’adjudicateur en chef devant notre cour suivant lequel les tribunaux ne pouvaient pas accorder de réparation en l’espèce malgré l’interprétation aber- rante du péi : [traduction] mr. arvay, qc:   . we reject that approach.  we reject any approach that will allow a supervising court to set aside a decision of an adjudicator when the point of disagreement is on a matter of interpretation of a provision in the iap. that doesn’t constitute exceptional circum- stances that warrants judicial recourse. and i agree with justice rowe that that is actually a rather question begging sort of statement. me arvay, cr :   . nous rejetons cette approche. nous rejetons toute approche qui permettrait à un tribunal de surveillance d’annuler la décision d’un adjudicateur lorsque le désaccord porte sur une question d’interpréta- tion d’une disposition du péi. cela ne constitue pas une des circonstances exceptionnelles justifiant un recours judiciaire. et je suis d’accord avec le juge rowe pour dire qu’il s’agit en fait d’une question qui mérite d’être posée. but we [will] seize on the idea that this judicial re- course should be rare and it should really be limited to cases where, in the words of the manitoba court of appeal, there wasn’t even a consideration of the terms. not that there was a bad interpretation or an unreasonable inter- pretation, or so unreasonable interpretation, or patent nous sommes également d’accord pour dire que ce type de recours judiciaire ne devrait être exercé que rarement et qu’il devrait en réalité être limité aux cas où, pour re- prendre les propos de la cour d’appel du manitoba, on n’a même pas tenu compte des dispositions de la convention. non pas qu’il y ait eu une mauvaise interprétation ou une 312 j.w v canada (attorney general) brown j. [2019] 2 scr. disregard interpretation, it’s just that there was no consid- eration    [emphasis added; pp 80-81] interprétation déraisonnable, ni même une interprétation totalement déraisonnable ou une interprétation témoignant d’une négligence flagrante; on n’a tout simplement pas tenu compte des modalités de la convention   [je sou- ligne; p 80-81] [193] i recognize that, in response to questions from the hearing panel, the chief adjudicator went further. the exchange proceeded as follows: [193] je constate qu’en réponse aux questions du tribunal, l’adjudicateur en chef est allé plus loin. voici la teneur de cet échange : [traduction] mr. justice moldaver: why are you taking such a technical position on that when you say if it’s fresh evi- dence, you know, we can go back to the court, even though the proceedings are complete. but if it’s a fresh view and a right view of the interpretation that would have allowed this man to get his claim off the ground you can’t do it. le juge moldaver : pourquoi adoptez- vous une posi- tion aussi technique à ce sujet quand vous dites que, s’il s’agit de nouveaux éléments de preuve, on peut revenir devant le tribunal, même si la procédure est terminée, alors que si c’est un point de vue nouveau et une vision juste de l’interprétation qui aurait permis à l’intéressé de faire valoir ses droits, on ne peut pas le faire. mr. arvay, qc:. okay. me arvay, cr :. d’accord. mr. justice moldaver: really, with respect, that’s an le juge moldaver : vraiment, avec tout le respect que absurd position. je vous dois, c’est une position absurde. mr. arvay, qc:. okay. so then maybe i’m wrong. maybe i’m wrong. maybe that would allow -- that might be allowed, i don’t know. that hasn’t been done. me arvay, cr :. d’accord. j’ai peut- être tort alors. je me trompe peut- être. peut- être que cela permettrait -- cela pourrait être permis, je ne sais pas. cela n’a pas été fait.   .   . mr. justice moldaver:  -- and now you are saying nothing can be done. you just backed off of that a little bit and said, “well, maybe something can be done”, which would be going back to the supervising judge to get an order, i suppose, to reopen this case. le juge moldaver : -- et maintenant vous dites qu’on ne peut rien faire. vous avez seulement fait un peu marche arrière et vous dites : « eh bien, peut- être qu’on peut faire quelque chose », ce qui reviendrait à demander au juge surveillant de rendre une ordonnance, je suppose, pour rouvrir l’affaire. are you going to concede that that would be a reason- êtes- vous prêt à admettre que ce serait une solution able solution to the problem? raisonnable au problème? mr. arvay, qc:. well, you can tell i seem to be of me arvay, cr :. eh bien, comme vous pouvez le voir, mixed minds on it. mon opinion est plutôt mitigée à ce sujet. my first impression, my first reaction was that that just seems to bring back the reasonableness interpretation. i take your point, it might be different. it might be different. ma première impression, ma première réaction était qu’on ramenait simplement l’interprétation du caractère raisonnable. je vois ce que vous voulez dire, c’est peut- être différent. c’est peut- être autre chose.   .   . [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) le juge brown 313 mr. justice moldaver:   . if as a result of working [the interpretative problems] out [within the four corners of the agreement] we reach -- we have a hiatus, we have a gap, we have an inability to do justice in a particular case -- le juge moldaver :   . si, après avoir résolu [les problèmes d’interprétation] [en respectant les limites éta- blies par la convention], on constate qu’il y a un hiatus, une lacune, il est alors impossible de rendre justice dans ce cas particulier -- mr. arvay, qc:. yes. me arvay, cr :. oui. mr. justice moldaver: -- then you should be able to le juge moldaver : -- vous devriez alors pouvoir vous go to the court to fill that gap. adresser au tribunal pour combler cette lacune. mr. arvay, qc:. i agree. [emphasis added; pp. 87-89 me arvay, cr :. je suis d’accord. [je souligne; p. 87- and 92.] 89 et 92.] in short, the chief adjudicator acknowl- [194] edged that “maybe [he is] wrong”, and that he was “of mixed minds”. he also agreed that where there is a “gap”, a court might fill it. as to that last prop- osition, and subject to what i have said about doing so in accordance with the parties’ intentions, i agree. but the chief adjudicator did not clearly agree that such a gap existed here. and, when asked about whether a court could reopen jw’s claim to correct the hearing adjudicator’s interpretation of sl1.4, the chief adjudicator replied that, although such a result might be possible, he was unsure if it was allowed on the terms of the irssa. [194] en résumé, l’adjudicateur en chef a admis qu’il avait [traduction] « peut- être tort » et que son « opinion [était] plutôt mitigée ». il a également convenu que, lorsqu’il y a une « lacune », le tribu- nal est peut- être en mesure de la combler. sur ce dernier point, sous réserve de ce que j’ai déjà dit au sujet du respect de la volonté des parties, j’abonde dans son sens. mais l’adjudicateur en chef n’a pas clairement convenu qu’une telle lacune existait en l’espèce. lorsqu’on lui a demandé si un tribunal pouvait rouvrir la demande de jw pour rectifier l’interprétation que l’adjudicatrice d’audition avait donnée de la catégorie sl1.4, l’adjudicateur en chef a répondu que, même si ce résultat était envisageable, il n’était pas certain que les modalités de la crrpi le permettaient. [195] if this exchange could tenably be said to have left open the possibility of a gap, such possibility was closed immediately thereafter when the chief adjudicator appeared to recoil from that very sug- gestion in responding to the next line of questioning from the hearing panel: [195] si l’on peut défendre l’idée que cet échange n’exclut pas la possibilité qu’il existe une lacune, cette possibilité a été écartée immédiatement après, lorsque l’adjudicateur en chef a semblé prendre ses distances par rapport à cette suggestion en répondant à la série de questions suivantes de la cour : mr. justice rowe:    [t]he circumstances which we are now faced with in this case may constitute exceptional circumstances such that a supervising judge could deal with a highly problematic -- a fundamentally troubling application of the agreement that warrants reconsideration, but the only means to bring it back before an adjudicator is through the intervention of a supervising judge? [traduction] le juge rowe :    [l]es circonstances devant les- quelles nous nous trouvons en l’espèce peuvent consti- tuer des circonstances exceptionnelles telles qu’un juge surveillant pourrait être confronté à une application très problématique -- une application fondamentalement trou- blante de la convention qui justifie un réexamen, mais demander l’intervention d’un juge surveillant est- elle le seul moyen de soumettre de nouveau la demande à un adjudicateur? 314 j.w v canada (attorney general) brown j. [2019] 2 scr. mr. arvay, qc:. but the difference between what i think you are positing is -- that’s not what happened here, right. what i think you are positing is what justice moldaver is saying maybe should have happened, which is that there should have been an rfd brought by the chief adjudicator or somebody else bringing to the attention of the court that there was, you know, this   . me arvay, cr :. mais la différence entre ce que je pense que vous postulez est -- ce n’est pas ce qui s’est passé ici, n’est-ce pas? ce que je pense que vous postulez, c’est ce que le juge moldaver dit qu’il aurait peut- être dû se produire, c’est-à-dire que l’adjudicateur en chef ou quelqu’un d’autre aurait dû soumettre une demande de directives au tribunal  . so so i think that’s not what happened. what justice edmond did, he just re- interpreted himself, he didn’t rely on mr. ish’s decision. je ne pense pas que c’est ce qui a été fait ici. le juge edmond s’est contenté de réinterpréter lui- même la con- vention; il ne s’est pas fondé sur la décision de m ish. mr. justice rowe: so therefore you disagree with his general approach, which is substituting his view, although you seem to be saying that it would be -- it would serve the ends of justice if this matter were to be sent back for re- adjudication. le juge rowe : par conséquent, vous n’êtes pas d’ac- cord avec son approche générale, qui consiste à proposer son interprétation à la place de celle de l’adjudicateur, même si vous semblez dire que ce serait -- cela servirait les fins de la justice si l’affaire était renvoyée pour nouvel examen. mr. arvay, qc:. well, i don’t know if i would go that far. as justice sharpe says, you know, justice in this particular case is following the processes, the boundaries, the terms of this agreement. me arvay, cr :. je ne sais pas si j’irais aussi loin. comme le juge sharpe l’a dit, vous savez, dans ce cas particulier, la justice respecte le processus, les limites et les modalités de cette convention. mr. justice brown: so we have to go back -- just to be clear, we are back to the bright line then? le juge brown : il faut donc revenir -- juste pour être sûr qu’on se comprend bien, il faut donc respecter rigou- reusement le processus établi? mr. arvay, qc:. we are back to the bright line then. me arvay, cr :. oui, il faut respecter le processus qui [emphasis added; pp 94-95] a été établi. [je souligne; p 94-95]. iii conclusion iii conclusion [196] my colleague côté j has simply gone too far, with too little. a concession by the chief adjudicator that jw’s claim was wrongly decided does not sup- port a judicial rewrite of the terms of a complex settlement agreement reflecting the common inten- tions of the parties, particularly where his concession accompanies a submission that that the irssa does not allow for judicial recourse in such circumstances. i appreciate that the plainly incorrect interpretation of sl1.4 adopted by the hearing adjudicator and (somehow) affirmed by two review adjudicators is difficult to let pass, but that is the result compelled by law, even if it obliges us to avert our nostrils (spencer v. continental insurance co., [1945] 4 dlr 593, at p. 609, per wilson j (as he then was)). [196] ma collègue la juge côté est tout simplement allée trop loin, avec trop peu. la concession de l’adju- dicateur en chef selon laquelle il a été mal statué sur la demande de jw ne justifie pas un tribunal de récrire les modalités d’une convention de règlement com- plexe qui exprimait l’intention commune des parties, surtout lorsque sa concession accompagne l’argument que la crrpi n’autorise pas le recours aux tribunaux en pareilles circonstances. j’admets qu’il est difficile de s’abstenir d’intervenir pour corriger l’interprétation manifestement erronée de la catégorie sl1.4 qu’a retenue l’adjudicatrice d’audition et qui a été — sans qu’on sache trop comment — confirmée par deux adjudicateurs de révision, mais c’est le résultat que la loi commande, même si nous sommes contraints de le faire à contrecœur (spencer c. continental insurance co., [1945] 4 dlr 593, p. 609, le juge wilson (plus tard juge en chef de la colombie- britannique)). [2019] 2 rcs. j.w c canada (procureur général) 315 appendix annexe cep iap irs irssa nac rfd trc common experience payment independent assessment process indian residential school indian residential schools settlement agree- ment national administration committee request for direction truth and reconciliation commission comité d’administration national can crrpi convention de règlement relative aux pension- nats indiens commission de vérité et de réconciliation paiement d’expérience commune processus d’évaluation indépendant pensionnat indien cvr pec péi pi appeal allowed with costs, brown and rowe pourvoi accueilli avec dépens, les juges brown jj. dissenting. et rowe sont dissidents. procureurs des appelants : olschewski davie, winnipeg. winnipeg. of canada: attorney general of canada, vancouver. procureur de l’intimé le procureur général du canada : procureur général du canada, vancouver. tor of the indian residential schools adjudication secretariat: arvay finlay, vancouver; susan e. ross law corporation, victoria. procureurs de l’intimé l’adjudicateur en chef, secrétariat d’adjudication des pensionnats indiens : arvay finlay, vancouver; susan e. ross law cor- poration, victoria. nations: assembly of first nations, ottawa. procureur de l’intimée l’assemblée des premières nations : assemblée des premières nations, ottawa. solicitors for the intervener the independent procureurs de l’intervenant avocats indépen- counsel: dionne schulze, montréal. dants : dionne schulze, montréal. procureurs de l’intervenant kb :. donovan & company, vancouver. company, vancouver.
i. overview [1] under canadian tort law, there is no doubt that governments may sometimes be held liable for damage caused by their negligence in the same way as private defendants. at the same time, the law of negligence must account for the unique role of public authorities in governing society in the public interest. public bodies set priorities and balance competing interests with finite resources. they make difficult public policy choices that impact people differently and sometimes cause harm to private parties. this is an inevitable aspect of the business of governing. accountability for that harm is found in the ballot box, not the courts. courts are not institutionally designed to review polycentric government decisions, and public bodies must be shielded to some extent from the chilling effect of the threat of private lawsuits. [2] accordingly, courts have recognized that a sphere of government decision- making should remain free from judicial supervision based on the standard of care in negligence. defining the scope of this immunity has challenged courts for decades. in r v imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2011 scc 42, [2011] 3 scr 45, this court explained that “core policy” government decisions — defined as “decisions as to a course or principle of action that are based on public policy considerations, such as economic, social and political factors” — must be shielded from liability in negligence (para. 90). in ascertaining whether a decision is one of core policy, the key focus is always on the nature of the decision. [3] in the decade since imperial tobacco, there has been continued confusion on when core policy immunity applies. this appeal requires the court to clarify how to distinguish immune policy decisions from government activities that attract liability for negligence we conclude that the rationale for core policy immunity serves as an overarching guiding principle core policy decisions are immune from negligence liability because each branch of government has a core institutional role and competency that must be protected from interference by the other branches. we identify four factors from this court’s jurisprudence that help in assessing the nature of a government’s decision: (1) the level and responsibilities of the decision-maker; (2) the process by which the decision was made; (3) the nature and extent of budgetary considerations; and (4) the extent to which the decision was based on objective criteria. the separation of powers rationale animating the immunity guides how the factors weigh in the analysis. [4] the respondent, taryn joy marchi, was injured while attempting to cross a snowbank created by the appellant, the city of nelson, british columbia. she sued the city for negligence. dismissing her claim, the trial judge concluded that the city did not owe ms. marchi a duty of care because its snow removal decisions were core policy decisions in the alternative, he also found that there was no breach of the standard of care and, if there was a breach, ms. marchi was the proximate cause of her own injuries the court of appeal concluded that the trial judge erred on all three conclusions and ordered a new trial. [5] we agree with the court of appeal that the trial judge erred on all three conclusions. on duty of care, the relevant city decision was not a core policy decision immune from negligence liability. the city therefore owed ms. marchi a duty of care. on standard of care and causation, the trial judge’s analysis was tainted by legal errors. as key factual findings are required, this court is not well placed to determine the standard of care and causation issues. we would therefore dismiss the appeal and order a new trial in accordance with these reasons. ii. facts [6] the city of nelson experienced heavy snowfall on january 4th and 5th, 2015. it started plowing and sanding the streets to respond to the snowfall. among the tasks completed by city employees was the clearing of snow in angled parking stalls on baker street, located in the downtown core. employees plowed the snow to the top of the parking spaces, creating a snowbank along the curb that separated the parking stalls from the sidewalk. having created the snowbank, the city did not clear an access route to the sidewalk for drivers parking in the stalls. [7] on the evening of january 6th, ms. marchi parked in one of the angled parking stalls on baker street she was attempting to access a business, but the snowbank created by the city blocked her route to the sidewalk. she decided to cross the snowbank as her right foot stepped onto it, however, she dropped through the snow, stepped directly into an area which bent her forefoot up, and seriously injured her leg she sued the city for negligence and the parties agree that she suffered $1 million in damages. [8] since 2000, the city has relied on a written document called “streets and sidewalks snow clearing and removal” (policy). broadly, the policy states that snow removal, sanding, and plowing will be carried out “on a priority schedule to best serve the public and accommodate emergency equipment within budget guidelines” (ar, vol. i, at p 56). the policy sets out the following priorities: emergency routes and the downtown core; transit routes; plowing hills; cross streets; and dead end streets. ms. marchi was injured in the 300 block of baker street, which is in the “downtown core”. the policy also provides specific guidelines that snow plowing will occur during the early morning hours and that snow removal may be carried out as warranted by buildup levels it does not specifically mention clearing parking stalls or creating snowbanks. [9] in addition to the written policy, the city also has several unwritten practices for example, it plows, sands, and removes snow from the designated sidewalk route and the various stairs located in the city. it focuses on baker street in the downtown core for snow removal, but to ensure safety, city workers begin to remove snow from other areas, including the civic centre and around schools, when the downtown core starts to get busy (typically around 11:00 am). they return to baker street as soon as possible. the city does not remove snow from the downtown core overnight due to noise complaints received in the past as well as the cost of overtime. [10] throughout the snowfall, the city’s public works supervisor followed the policy and made decisions about how many employees should be on snow removal shifts her evidence was that all streets in the city are first cleared of snow, and snowbanks are only removed after all snow plowing is complete. the downtown core was completely cleared of snow, and all snowbanks were removed, by january 9th, 2015. iii decisions below a supreme court of british columbia, 2019 bcsc 308, 89 mplr (5th) 323 (mcewan j.) [11] the trial judge held that the city did not owe ms. marchi a duty of care because its snow removal decisions were core policy decisions. the city followed its written and unwritten policies on snow removal and its decisions were dictated by the availability of resources. alternatively, the trial judge found that the city did not breach the standard of care because the snowbank did not pose an objectively unreasonable risk of harm — the city did what was reasonable in the circumstances. in the further alternative, the trial judge concluded that the city’s alleged negligence did not cause the accident because ms. marchi was the “author of her own misfortune” (para. 45). b court of appeal for british columbia, 2020 bcca 1, 98 mplr (5th) 31 (willcock, fitch and hunter jja) [12] the court of appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on duty of care, it held that the trial judge did not properly engage with the distinction between government policy and operation, simply accepting the city’s submission that all snow removal decisions were core policy decisions. on standard of care, it held that the trial judge’s analysis was improperly coloured by his view that the snow removal decisions were core policy decisions. the trial judge accepted the city’s submission that this was “the way it has always been done” (para. 35) without engaging with other municipalities’ evidence on snow removal on causation, the court of appeal held that the trial judge misunderstood how to factor in ms. marchi’s own fault. the trial judge improperly reasoned that, if ms. marchi could have avoided the accident, she was the proximate cause of her injuries. this was a failure to apply the “but for” test for causation. iv analysis [13] there are three issues on appeal: whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the city did not owe ms. marchi a duty of care because its snow removal decisions were core policy decisions immune from negligence liability; whether the trial judge erred in his standard of care analysis; and whether the trial judge erred in his causation analysis. a duty of care [14] duty of care is the central issue. to determine whether the trial judge erred, we proceed as follows. first, we set out the duty of care framework. second, we explain how the previously established category from just v. british columbia, [1989] 2 scr. 1228, operates, clarifying why this case falls within the just category third, we consider the law on distinguishing core policy decisions from government activities that attract liability in negligence we then apply the law to the trial judge’s determination in this case that the city did not owe ms. marchi a duty of care. (1) duty of care framework [15] the foundation of the modern law of negligence is the neighbour principle established in donoghue v. stevenson, [1932] ac 562 (hl), under which “parties owe a duty of care to those whom they ought reasonably to have in contemplation as being at risk when they act” (rankin (rankin’s garage & sales) v. jj, 2018 scc 19, [2018] 1 scr 587, at para. 16) the neighbour principle does not discriminate between private and public defendants — it is applicable to both alike, subject to any contrary statutory provision or common law principle (cooper v hobart, 2001 scc 79, [2001] 3 scr 537, at para. 22). [16] in canada, the anns/cooper test provides a unifying framework to determine when a duty of care arises under the wide rubric of negligence law, including for allegations of negligence against government officials but as cooper and subsequent cases make clear, the framework applies differently depending on whether the plaintiff’s claim falls within or is analogous to an established duty of care or whether the claim is novel because proximity has not been recognized before. [17] in novel duty of care cases, the full two-stage anns/cooper framework applies. under the first stage, the court asks whether a prima facie duty of care exists between the parties. the question at this stage is whether the harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct, and whether there is “a relationship of proximity in which the failure to take reasonable care might foreseeably cause loss or harm to the plaintiff” (rankin’s garage, at para. 18). proximity arises in those relationships where the parties are in such a “close and direct” relationship that it would be “just and fair having regard to that relationship to impose a duty of care in law upon the defendant” (cooper, at paras. 32 and 34). [18] if there is sufficient proximity to ground a prima facie duty of care, it is necessary to proceed to the second stage of the anns/cooper test, which asks whether there are residual policy concerns outside the parties’ relationship that should negate the prima facie duty of care (cooper, at para. 30). as stated in cooper, at para. 37, the residual policy stage of the anns/cooper test raises questions relating to “the effect of recognizing a duty of care on other legal obligations, the legal system and society more generally”, such as: does the law already provide a remedy? would recognition of the duty of care create the spectre of unlimited liability to an unlimited class? are there other reasons of broad policy that suggest that the duty of care should not be recognized? [19] when the duty of care at issue is not novel, there is generally no need to proceed through the full two-stage anns/cooper framework. over the years, courts in canada have developed a body of negligence law recognizing categories of cases in which a duty of care has previously been established (cooper, at para. 41; childs v. desormeaux, 2006 scc 18, [2006] 1 scr 643, at para. 15; mustapha v. culligan of canada ltd., 2008 scc 27, [2008] 2 scr 114, at para. 5) in such cases, “the requisite close and direct relationship is shown” and the first stage of the anns/cooper framework will be complete, as long as the risk of injury was reasonably foreseeable (deloitte & touche v. livent inc. (receiver of), 2017 scc 63, [2017] 2 scr 855, at para. 26). the second stage of the anns/cooper test will rarely be necessary because residual policy concerns will have already been taken into account when the duty was first established (cooper, at paras. 36 and 39; livent, at paras. 26 and 28; see also edwards v law society of upper canada, 2001 scc 80, [2001] 3 scr 562, at paras. 9-10). (2) how the just category operates [20] this court’s majority decision in just established a duty of care the plaintiff sought damages for personal injury suffered when a boulder fell from a slope above a public highway onto his car. he claimed that the defendant government owed a private law duty of care to properly maintain and inspect the highway and that his loss was caused by the government’s negligent failure to do so. [21] just provided this court with an opportunity to apply the full two-stage duty of care framework to a case involving personal injury on a public road. at the prima facie stage, the court held that users of a highway are in a sufficiently proximate relationship to the province because in creating public highways, the province creates a physical risk to which road users are invited. the province or department in charge can also readily foresee a risk to road users if highways are not reasonably maintained (p 1236). [22] at the second stage, the court in just did not have residual policy concerns about indeterminate liability or the effect of recognizing a duty on other legal obligations the court found that the duty of care should apply to public authority defendants “unless there is a valid basis for its exclusion” (just, at p 1242). the court referred to two such bases: first, statutory provisions that exempt the defendant from liability, and second, immunity for “true” policy decisions (pp. 1240-44). while such policy decisions are exempt from claims in negligence, the operational implementation of policy may be subject to the duty of care in negligence. [23] the court thus determined that public authorities owe road users a duty to keep roads reasonably safe, but recognized that the duty was subject to a public authority’s immunity for true policy decisions on the facts of just, the impugned system of inspection was operational in nature, meaning it could be reviewed by a court to determine whether the government breached the standard of care (pp. 1245-46). the court’s reasoning is worth quoting at length: here what was challenged was the manner in which the inspections were carried out, their frequency or infrequency and how and when trees above the rock cut should have been inspected, and the manner in which the cutting and scaling operations should have been carried out. in short, the public authority had settled on a plan which called upon it to inspect all slopes visually and then conduct further inspections of those slopes where the taking of additional safety measures was warranted. those matters are all part and parcel of what mason j described [in sutherland shire council v. heyman (1985), 157 clr 424 (hc), at p 469] as “the product of administrative direction, expert or professional opinion, technical standards or general standards of reasonableness”. they were not decisions that could be designated as policy decisions rather they were manifestations of the implementation of the policy decision to inspect and were operational in nature as such, they were subject to review by the court to determine whether the respondent had been negligent or had satisfied the appropriate standard of care. [24] as we shall explain, the principles and considerations set out by the court in just to assist in distinguishing between policy and operation are relevant to any case in which a public authority is alleged to have been negligent, whether it falls under an established or analogous duty of care or a novel duty of care. the court recognized the continuing judicial struggle to differentiate policy from operation, but nonetheless understood the necessity of ascertaining when public authorities owe duties in negligence. [25] the just category of duty of care is firmly established in canadian law. over a decade later in cooper, when this court gave examples of categories in which proximity had previously been recognized, it specifically observed: “. . . governmental authorities who have undertaken a policy of road maintenance have been held to owe a duty of care to execute the maintenance in a non-negligent manner” (para. 36, citing just, and swinamer v. nova scotia (attorney general), [1994] 1 scr 445). [26] the case at bar raises the issue of how the decision in just applies to ms. marchi’s claim below, we explain why this case fits within the duty of care previously recognized by this court in just. [27] to determine whether a previously established category of duty applies, “a court should be attentive to the particular factors which justified recognizing that prior category in order to determine whether the relationship at issue is, in fact, truly the same as or analogous to that which was previously recognized” (livent, at para. 28). in just, the court’s finding of proximity was based on various factors, including the nature of the loss (personal injury) and the fact that the injury occurred on a highway to which the public was invited. users of the highway could expect that it would be reasonably maintained and there was a reasonably foreseeable risk that harm might befall highway users if it was not. [28] a substantial number of cases have applied the just category, including decisions of this court. in brown v. british columbia (minister of transportation and highways), [1994] 1 scr 420, the plaintiff’s car accident occurred on a sheet of black ice on the road. the court held that the duty of care to reasonably maintain roads from just “would extend to the prevention of injury to users of the road by icy conditions” (brown, at p 439) similarly, in swinamer, a large tree fell on the plaintiff’s truck while he was driving, causing serious injuries. the court held that the duty of care from just to reasonably maintain roads clearly applied (pp. 457-59) in both cases, however, the court went on to find that the decisions at issue were core policy decisions immune from negligence liability. lower courts have also applied just where a pedestrian alleges that they suffered personal injury because a public authority failed to maintain a public road, sidewalk, or path in a reasonably safe condition (eg,. tambeau v vancouver (city), 2001 bcsc 651, 20 mplr (3d) 195; talarico v. northern rockies (regional district), 2008 bcsc 861, 47 mplr (4th) 242, at paras. 57-58; bowden v. withrow’s pharmacy halifax (1999) ltd., 2008 nssc 252, 48 mplr (4th) 250, at para. 113; lichy v. city of surrey, 2016 bcpc 55). [29] as demonstrated by just and subsequent jurisprudence, the factors uniting cases under the just category are as follows: a public authority has undertaken to maintain a public road or sidewalk to which the public is invited, and the plaintiff alleges they suffered personal injury as a result of the public authority’s failure to maintain the road or sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. where these factors are present, the just category will apply, obviating the need to establish proximity afresh. [30] in this case, the plaintiff suffered significant physical injury on a municipal street in the city’s downtown core. by plowing the parking spaces on baker street, the city invited members of the public to use them to access businesses along the street. the plaintiff was attempting to do just that when she fell into a snowbank that had been created by the city during snow removal the just category covers a variety of situations, including the prevention of injuries from rocks falling onto the road (just), the prevention of injuries from trees falling onto the road (swinamer), and the prevention of injuries from black ice on the road (brown). it also clearly extends to the prevention of injuries from snowbanks created by a government defendant on the road and sidewalk. in our view, ms. marchi has proved that her circumstances fall within the scope of the just category. as discussed below, it remains open to the city to prove that the relevant government decision was a core policy decision immune from liability in negligence. [31] we are also of the view that the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is sufficiently close to satisfy a novel proximity analysis. this case involves foreseeable physical harm to the plaintiff and therefore engages one of the core interests protected by the law of negligence (cooper, at para. 36). other hallmarks of proximity are also evident: road users are physically present on a space controlled by the public authority; they are invited to the risk by the public authority; and the public authority intends and plans for people to use its roads and sidewalks it would be reasonably foreseeable to the city that carrying out snow removal in a negligent manner could cause harm to those invited to use the streets and sidewalks in the downtown core. [32] we note that the city suggested in oral argument that its duty of care is grounded in the occupiers liability act, rsbc 1996, c 337. the act does not apply to a “public road” or “public highway” occupied by a municipality (s 8(2)). we heard no submissions on whether ms. marchi’s fall occurred on a public road or highway as those terms are defined in the act the trial judge noted that it makes no practical difference in this case whether the act applies, and for the purposes of these reasons, we assume it does not. both parties agreed that core policy immunity must be addressed in any event. [33] finally, some confusion arose in oral argument about where to consider core policy immunity in the duty of care analysis when a previously established category applies. in novel duty of care cases, this court has conceived of core policy immunity as a stage two residual policy consideration, as was done in imperial tobacco and cooper. where an established duty of care applies, on the other hand, this court has stated that a full two-stage anns/cooper analysis is generally unnecessary (cooper, at para. 39). thus, where the just category applies, there is no need to repeat the full two-stage analysis already done in just. [34] nonetheless, the decision in just did not decide for all future purposes when an impugned government decision with respect to road maintenance is core policy. the core policy analysis in one case will not necessarily apply to other cases because the factual nature of a decision will likely vary from case to case. while other stage two concerns, like indeterminate liability, need not be taken into account because they were rejected in just, it will be open to a public authority to raise core policy immunity in each case depending on the factual circumstances. [35] as the city acknowledged before this court, the onus is always on the public authority to establish that it is immune from liability because a core policy decision is at issue thus, once a plaintiff proves that her case falls within the just category, a duty of care will be imposed, unless the public authority can show that the relevant government decision is protected by core policy immunity in addition, the government decision must neither be irrational nor taken in bad faith (imperial tobacco, at para. 90). [36] for the purposes of this case, we need not decide whether core policy immunity is best conceived of as a rule for how the just category operates, or whether it should be viewed as a stage two consideration under the anns/cooper framework even when an established category of duty applies. it makes no practical difference to the outcome of the appeal. regardless of where core policy immunity is located in the duty of care framework, the same principles apply in determining whether an immune policy decision is at issue those principles apply in any case in which a public authority defendant raises core policy immunity, whether the case involves a novel duty of care, falls within the just category, or falls within another established or analogous category. what is most important is that immunity for core policy decisions made by government defendants is well understood and fully explored where the nature of the claim calls for it it is for this reason that we will now articulate the principles underlying the immunity. (3) core policy decisions [37] before determining whether core policy immunity applies in this case, we will examine the law on how to distinguish core policy decisions from government activities that attract liability for negligence first, we trace the development of government liability for negligence, explaining why core policy decisions are immune from liability. second, we describe the principles and factors this court has already developed to identify a core policy decision. third, we provide additional guidance on this issue by offering some clarifications and a framework to structure the analysis. fourth, we apply the law on core policy immunity to the facts of this case. (a) government liability for negligence and rationale for core policy immunity [38] before the enactment of crown proceedings legislation in the mid- twentieth century, governments in canada could not be held directly or vicariously liable for the negligence of crown servants (p. w hogg, p. j monahan and w. k. wright, liability of the crown (4th ed. 2011), at p 7). as government functions expanded, however, this state of affairs became untenable; governments were increasingly involved in activities “that would have led to tortious liability if they had occurred between private citizens” (just, at p 1239). accordingly, parliament and the provincial legislatures enacted legislation allowing the crown to be held liable for the torts of officials in a manner akin to private persons british columbia’s crown proceeding act, rsbc 1996, c 89, s 2, for example, provides that “the government is subject to all the liabilities to which it would be liable if it were a person”. even before this legislation was enacted, municipal corporations were distinguished from the crown and held liable for claims in negligence from the late eighteenth century onwards (d. g boghosian and j. m davison, the law of municipal liability in canada (loose-leaf), at § 2.4; n v. poole borough council (aire centre intervening), [2019] uksc 25, [2020] ac 780, at para. 26). [39] applying private law negligence principles to public authorities presents “special problems” (sutherland shire council, at p 456, per mason j.) while legislation makes the crown subject to liability as though it were a person, “the crown is not a person and must be free to govern and make true policy decisions without becoming subject to tort liability as a result of those decisions” (just, at p 1239). government decision-making occurs across a wide spectrum. at one end are public policy choices that only governments make, such as decisions taken “at the highest level” of government to adopt a course of action based on health policy or other “social and economic considerations” (imperial tobacco, at para. 95). courts are reluctant to impose a common law duty of care in relation to these policy choices (see dalehite v. united states, 346 us 15 (1953), at p 57, per jackson j., dissenting). at the other end of the spectrum, government employees who drive vehicles or public authorities who occupy buildings clearly owe private law duties of care and must act without negligence (l. n. klar and c. s. g. jefferies, tort law (6th ed. 2017), at p 348). tort law must ensure that liability is imposed in this latter category of cases without extending too far into the sphere of public policy decisions. [40] although there is consensus “that the law of negligence must account for the unique role of government agencies”, there is disagreement on how this should be done (imperial tobacco, at para. 76). some even argue that private law principles of negligence are wholly incompatible with the role and nature of public authorities. echoing the obiter in paradis honey ltd. v. canada (attorney general), 2015 fca 89, [2016] 1 fcr 446, at paras. 130 and 139, for example, the city of abbotsford intervened to propose that only public law principles should govern public authority liability. instead of examining how core policy immunity operates within negligence law, it suggests that courts should focus on indefensibility in the administrative law sense and exercise remedial discretion where appropriate to grant monetary relief. [41] such an approach has no basis in this court’s jurisprudence. it also runs counter to crown proceedings legislation in canada, which subjects the crown to liability as if it were a private person. this court’s approach has been to accept that, “[a]s a general rule, the traditional tort law duty of care will apply to a government agency in the same way that it will apply to an individual” (just, at p 1244). however, to resolve the tension arising from the application of private law negligence principles to public authorities, the court has adopted the principle from anns v. merton london borough council, [1978] a.c 728 (hl), that certain policy decisions should be shielded from liability for negligence, as long as they are not irrational or made in bad faith. this approach accounts for the unique nature of public authority defendants and is firmly grounded in both the legislation and this court’s jurisprudence dating back to barratt v. corporation of north vancouver, [1980] 2 scr 418, and kamloops (city of) v. nielsen, [1984] 2 scr 2. [42] the primary rationale for shielding core policy decisions from liability in negligence is to maintain the separation of powers. subjecting those decisions to private law duties of care would entangle the courts in evaluating decisions best left to the legislature or the executive the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government play distinct and complementary roles in canada’s constitutional order (ontario v. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr. 3, at paras. 27-29). each branch also has core institutional competencies: the legislative branch has the power to make new laws, the executive branch executes the laws enacted by the legislative branch and the judicial branch decides disputes arising under the laws (p. w. hogg and w. k. wright, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), at § 9:1 (“definition of responsible government”)). [43] it is fundamental to the constitutional order that each branch plays its proper role and that “no one of them overstep its bounds, that each show proper deference for the legitimate sphere of activity of the other” (new brunswick broadcasting co. v. nova scotia (speaker of the house of assembly), [1993] 1 scr. 319, at p 389; see also just, at p 1239) separation of powers thus protects the independence of the judiciary, the legislature’s ability and freedom to pass laws (mikisew cree first nation v. canada (governor general in council), 2018 scc 40, [2018] 2 scr 765, at paras. 2 and 35; chagnon v. syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du québec, 2018 scc 39, [2018] 2 scr 687, at para. 65), and the executive’s ability to execute those laws, set priorities, and allot resources for good governance since municipalities hold delegated provincial powers, they enjoy the same protection for certain responsibilities. [44] core policy decisions of the legislative and executive branches involve weighing competing economic, social, and political factors and conducting contextualized analyses of information. these decisions are not based only on objective considerations but require value judgments — reasonable people can and do legitimately disagree (see b. a. peterson and m. e. van der weide, “susceptible to faulty analysis: united states v. gaubert and the resurrection of federal sovereign immunity” (1997), 72 notre dame l. rev. 447, at p 450). if courts were to weigh in, they would be second-guessing the decisions of democratically-elected government officials and simply substituting their own opinions (andrews v. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143, at p 194, per la forest j (concurring); s. m. makuch, “municipal immunity from liability in negligence”, in f. m. steel and s. rodgers- magnet, eds., issues in tort law (1983), 221, at pp. 232-34). [45] relatedly, the adversarial process and the rules of civil litigation are not conducive to the kind of polycentric decision-making done through the democratic process (hogg, monahan and wright, at p 226; home office v dorset yacht co., [1970] ac 1004 (hl), per lord diplock at pp. 1066-1068). nor is the fact that one core policy decision is better than the other amenable to proof in the sense that courts usually require (just, at pp. 1239-40, citing blessing v united states, 447 f supp. 1160 (e.d pa 1978); see also berkovitz v united states, 486 u.s 531 (1988), at p 545). [46] moreover, if all government decisions were subject to tort liability, this could hinder good governance by creating a chilling effect (l. n. klar, “the supreme court of canada: extending the tort liability of public authorities” (1990), 28 alta. l. rev. 648, at p 650; see also united states v. muniz, 374 us 150 (1963), at p 163). public authorities must be allowed to “adversely affect the interests of individuals” when making core policy decisions without fear of incurring liability (laurentide motels ltd. v. beauport (city), [1989] 1 scr 705, at p 722). [47] for these reasons, although there is no question that the legislative and executive branches sometimes make core policy decisions that ultimately cause harm to private parties (klar, at p 650), the remedy for those decisions must be through the ballot box instead of the courts (anns, at p 754; george v newfoundland and labrador, 2016 nlca 24, 378 nfld & peir 46, at para. 159) unlike public (administrative) law, where delegated government decisions are reviewed by the courts to uphold the rule of law, private law liability for core policy decisions would undermine our constitutional order. [48] conversely, there are good reasons to hold public authorities liable for negligent activities falling outside this core policy sphere where they cause harm to private parties “municipalities function in many ways as private individuals or corporations do” and have the ability to “spread losses” (makuch, at p 239). liability for operational activities is “a useful protection to the citizen whose ever-increasing reliance on public officials seems to be a feature of our age” (kamloops, at p 26). [49] as we will explain, the rationale for core policy immunity — protecting the legislative and executive branch’s core institutional roles and competencies necessary for the separation of powers — should serve as an overarching guiding principle in the analysis. ultimately, whether a public authority ought to be immune from negligence liability depends on whether and the extent to which the underlying separation of powers rationale is engaged (see, eg,. united states v. varig airlines, 467 us 797 (1984), at p 814; berkovitz, at pp. 536-37). (b) defining the scope of core policy decisions [50] this court explained in just that “[t]rue policy decisions” must be distinguished from “operational implementation” which is subject to private law principles of negligence (p 1240) as demonstrated by lower court decisions and academic literature — as well as the submissions before this court — the question of what constitutes a “true” or core policy decision is a “vexed one, upon which much judicial ink has been spilled” (imperial tobacco, at para. 72). there can be no magic formula or litmus test producing an obvious answer for every government decision (para. 90). [51] nevertheless, our jurisprudence provides helpful guidance core policy decisions, shielded from negligence liability, are “decisions as to a course or principle of action that are based on public policy considerations, such as economic, social and political factors, provided they are neither irrational nor taken in bad faith” (imperial tobacco, at para. 90). they are a “narrow subset of discretionary decisions” because discretion “can imbue even routine tasks” and protecting all discretionary government decisions would therefore cast “the net of immunity too broadly” (paras. 84 and 88). [52] activities falling outside this protected sphere of core policy — that is, activities that open up a public authority to liability for negligence — have been defined as “the practical implementation of the formulated policies” or “the performance or carrying out of a policy” (brown, at p 441; see also laurentide motels, at p 718). such “operational” decisions are generally “made on the basis of administrative direction, expert or professional opinion, technical standards or general standards of reasonableness” (brown, at p 441). [53] in imperial tobacco, mclachlin cj suggested that the policy/operational distinction may not work well as a legal test, as many decisions can be characterized as one or the other when abstractly pitting policy against operation (para 78). the court in imperial tobacco therefore chose to focus on the positive features of core policy decisions and move away from the policy-operational distinction (para. 87). while we agree, the distinction nevertheless remains useful. in some cases, the juxtaposition of core policy and operational implementation may clearly identify the decisions that should not be subject to court oversight as opposed to those which attract liability in negligence. [54] however, the key focus must remain on the nature of the decision (just, at p 1245; see also imperial tobacco, at para. 87), and this focus is supported by the identification of additional hallmarks of core policy decisions in just, this court explained that core policy decisions will usually (but not always) be made “by persons of a high level of authority” (p 1245) this was later echoed by mclachlin c.j in imperial tobacco when she stated that, generally, core policy decisions will be made “by legislators or officers whose official responsibility requires them to assess and balance public policy considerations” (para. 87). in brown, the court explained that core policy decisions involve “planning and predetermining the boundaries of [a government’s] undertakin[g]” (p 441). in addition, “decisions concerning budgetary allotments for departments or government agencies will be classified as policy decisions” (just, at pp. 1242 and 1245 (emphasis added)). [55] the characteristics of “planning”, “predetermining the boundaries” or “budgetary allotments” accord with the underlying notion that core policy decisions will usually have a sustained period of deliberation, will be intended to have broad application, and will be prospective in nature. for example, core policy decisions will often be formulated after debate — sometimes in a public forum — and input from different levels of authority. government activities that attract liability in negligence, on the other hand, are generally left to the discretion of individual employees or groups of employees they do not have a sustained period of deliberation, but reflect the exercise of an agent or group of agents’ judgment or reaction to a particular event (see h. j krent, “preserving discretion without sacrificing deterrence: federal governmental liability in tort” (1991), 38 ucla. l. rev. 871, at pp. 898-99). [56] thus, four factors emerge from this court’s jurisprudence that help in assessing the nature of a government’s decision: (1) the level and responsibilities of the decision-maker; (2) the process by which the decision was made; (3) the nature and extent of budgetary considerations; and (4) the extent to which the decision was based on objective criteria. [57] below, we offer two clarifications and provide a framework to structure the analysis. [58] the first clarification is that a public servant’s choice on how to approach government services frequently involves financial implications for this reason, the mere presence of budgetary, financial, or resource implications does not determine whether a decision is core policy — too many government decisions, even the most operational decisions, involve some consideration of a department’s budget or the scarcity of its resources (see, eg,. peterson and van der weide, at pp. 498-501; a. deegan, “the public/private law dichotomy and its relationship with the policy/operational factors distinction in tort law” (2001), 1 qutljj 241, at p 253). in just, cory j was referring to budgetary allotments for departments, which are far removed from the budgetary decisions of individual employees on a day-to-day basis (p 1245). while a department’s budget “has the feel of a large and complex issue that would be miserable for a judge to attempt to unravel” (peterson and van der weide, at pp. 500-501), an individual employee’s budgetary or resource allocation decisions are not necessarily difficult to assess whether a government decision involved budgetary considerations cannot be a test for whether it constituted core policy; it is but one consideration among many. [59] the second clarification is that the word “policy” has a wide range of meaning, from broad directions to a set of ideas or a specific plan (see, eg,. cambridge dictionary (online): “policy” means “a set of ideas or a plan of what to do in particular situations that has been agreed to officially by a group of people, a business organization, a government, or a political party”; merriam-webster’s collegiate dictionary (11th ed. 2003), at p 960: “policy” means “a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions” or “a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body”). this is why our jurisprudence has so often qualified the word policy to focus on “true” or “core” policy, pointing towards the type of policy question that requires immunity. accordingly, the fact that the word “policy” is found in a written document, or that a plan is labelled as “policy” may be misleading and is certainly not determinative of the question. similarly, that a certain course of conduct is mandated by written government documents is of limited assistance. while core policy might be expected to be reduced to writing, this may depend on the public authority and the circumstances; implementation procedures may also be documented. the focus must remain on the nature of the decision itself rather than the format or the government’s label for the decision. (c) how to structure the analysis [60] in addition to these cautions, the principles and factors set out in our jurisprudence, viewed from the perspective of the underlying rationale for core policy immunity, provide a helpful contextual framework for determining whether a government decision is a core policy decision. as noted, the key focus is always on the nature of the decision. public policy choices are clearly within the role and competence of the legislative and executive branches of government a court must consider the extent to which a government decision was based on public policy considerations and the extent to which the considerations impact the underlying purpose of the immunity — protecting the legislative and executive branch’s core institutional roles and competencies necessary for the separation of powers. [61] the rationale for core policy immunity should also serve as an overarching guiding principle for how to assess and weigh the factors this court has developed for identifying core policy decisions. we will elaborate. [62] first: the level and responsibilities of the decision-maker. with this factor, what is relevant is how closely related the decision-maker is to a democratically- accountable official who bears responsibility for public policy decisions. the higher the level of the decision-maker within the executive hierarchy, or the closer the decision-maker is to an elected official, the higher the possibility that judicial review for negligence will raise separation of powers concerns or have a chilling effect on good governance similarly, the more the job responsibilities of the decision-maker include the assessment and balancing of public policy considerations, the more likely this factor will lean toward core policy immunity conversely, decisions made by employees who are far-removed from democratically accountable officials or who are charged with implementation are less likely to be core policy and more likely to attract liability under regular private law negligence principles (just, at pp. 1242 and 1245; imperial tobacco, at para. 87). [63] second: the process by which the decision was made. the more the process for reaching the government decision was deliberative, required debate (possibly in a public forum), involved input from different levels of authority, and was intended to have broad application and be prospective in nature, the more it will engage the separation of powers rationale and point to a core policy decision. on the other hand, the more a decision can be characterized as a reaction of an employee or groups of employees to a particular event, reflecting their discretion and with no sustained period of deliberation, the more likely it will be reviewable for negligence. [64] third: the nature and extent of budgetary considerations a budgetary decision may be core policy depending on the type of budgetary decision it is. government decisions “concerning budgetary allotments for departments or government agencies will be classified as policy decisions” because they are more likely to fall within the core competencies of the legislative and executive branches (see, eg,. criminal lawyers’ association, at para. 28) on the other hand, the day-to-day budgetary decisions of individual employees will likely not raise separation of powers concerns. [65] fourth: the extent to which the decision was based on objective criteria. the more a government decision weighs competing interests and requires making value judgments, the more likely separation of powers will be engaged because the court would be substituting its own value judgment (makuch, at pp. 234-36 and 238). conversely, the more a decision is based on “technical standards or general standards of reasonableness”, the more likely it can be reviewed for negligence. those decisions might also have analogues in the private sphere that courts are already used to assessing because they are based on objective criteria. [66] thus, in the course of weighing these factors, the key focus must always be on the underlying purpose of the immunity and the nature of the decision. none of the factors is necessarily determinative alone and more factors and hallmarks of core policy decisions may be developed; courts must assess all the circumstances. [67] to summarize, core policy decisions are “decisions as to a course or principle of action that are based on public policy considerations, such as economic, social and political factors, provided they are neither irrational nor taken in bad faith” (imperial tobacco, at para. 90). they are a “narrow subset of discretionary decisions” — meaning, the presence of choice is not a marker of core policy (ibid., at paras. 84 and 88). core policy decisions are immune from negligence liability because the legislative and executive branches have core institutional roles and competencies that must be protected from interference by the judiciary’s private law oversight a court must consider the extent to which a government decision was based on public policy considerations and the extent to which the considerations impact the rationale for core policy immunity. [68] in addition, four factors emerge that help in assessing the nature of a government’s decision: (1) the level and responsibilities of the decision-maker; (2) the process by which the decision was made; (3) the nature and extent of budgetary considerations; and (4) the extent to which the decision was based on objective criteria. the underlying rationale — protecting the legislative and executive branch’s core institutional roles and competencies necessary for the separation of powers — serves as an overarching guiding principle for how to weigh the factors in the analysis. thus, the nature of the decision along with the hallmarks and factors that inform its nature must be assessed in light of the purpose animating core policy immunity. (d) application of core policy immunity [69] the city does not claim any statutory exemption from the duty of care in just and there is no allegation that it was acting irrationally or in bad faith. as such, having determined that this case falls under the just category, the only remaining issue at the duty of care stage is whether the city is immune from liability in negligence because the plaintiff has challenged a core policy decision if the city’s impugned actions fall outside the scope of core policy immunity, the city may be held liable for any negligence just as a private defendant would be. [70] the city observes that core policy immunity is a case-specific inquiry, dependent on evidence to do with “the decision-maker’s role, the decision-maker’s level of discretion and the various social, economic and political interests at play” (af, at para. 88) accordingly, the city submits that the characterization of a government decision as core policy is a question of mixed fact and law, reviewable on a standard of palpable and overriding error. [71] we disagree. in 1688782 ontario inc. v. maple leaf foods inc., 2020 scc 35, this court reiterated that whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care is a question of law (para. 24; see also rankin’s garage, at para. 19) while the underlying facts as found by the trial judge deserve deference, whether those facts meet the legal test of core policy immunity and, by extension, whether a duty of care arises, is a question of law and must be correct. [72] the trial judge concluded that the city did not owe ms. marchi a duty of care because its actions were the result of core policy decisions about the sequence for clearing snow from roadways. he focused on the city’s snow removal in a general way and concluded that the city “followed its policy” in particular, it allocated several employees to work on snow removal shifts and waited to remove snowbanks from the downtown core until after all city streets were clear to “best serve the public and accommodate emergency equipment” (paras. 4 and 13). more employees could not be called on shifts due to the limited availability of equipment, and the city: . . could not remove the windrows from downtown without creating a dangerous situation on the tops of the steep and snowy streets in nelson in the winter as it would mean diverting equipment from plowing and clearing in favour of removing snow from downtown. [para.15] [73] the trial judge concluded that, as the city’s decisions were dictated by the availability of resources, the written policy’s mandate, and several “unwritten policies”, the “city’s actions were the result of policy decisions” (paras. 5 and 14). [74] the city asks this court to endorse the trial judge’s reasoning. it submits that its written and unwritten “snow clearance and removal policies” are core policy decisions because they involve allocating scarce resources in circumstances where not all stakeholders can be satisfied at once. the allocation of “scarce resources based on a good faith exercise of discretion” is the “core of a political decision” (af, at para. 59) the written policy, for example, requires snow removal to be carried out “within budget guidelines” (para. 60). the written policy is supplemented by unwritten practices that “further attemp[t] to prioritize certain areas of the city for snow clearance and removal, allocate city resources in an efficient and effective manner, and reduce disruption to residents caused by these operations” (para 61) at trial, many of the city’s arguments similarly focused on the public works supervisor’s budgetary decisions. the city emphasized that the january snowfall was the city’s first snowfall of the year and the public works supervisor chose not to use more than 20 percent of the year’s snow removal budget. [75] ms. marchi submits that the trial judge erred in crucial ways, improperly focusing on snow removal in general without narrowing in on the impugned decision. this case is not about the written policy’s priority schedule for plowing and sanding or its “snow clearance and removal policies” generally, which are unchallenged. at issue is the clearing of snow from the parking stalls in the 300 block of baker street and the creation of a snowbank along the curb without ensuring safe access to sidewalks. ms. marchi submits that even assuming that the written policy is core policy, the clearing of parking stalls and the creation of snowbanks was not mandated by any of the city’s documents; it was the operationalization or implementation of snow removal. [76] we agree with ms. marchi and the court of appeal that the trial judge erred. first, he described the decision or conduct at issue too broadly, focusing on the entire process of snow removal. at issue is the city’s clearing of snow from the parking stalls in the 300 block of baker street by creating snowbanks along the sidewalks — thereby inviting members of the public to park in those stalls — without creating direct access to sidewalks. even if the written policy was core policy, this does not mean that the creation of snowbanks without clearing pathways for direct sidewalk access was a matter of core policy. in a duty of care analysis, the decision or conduct at issue must be described with precision to ensure that immunity only attaches to core policy decisions (see, eg,. imperial tobacco, at para. 67). the duty asserted must be tied to the negligent conduct alleged in this case, the plaintiff claims that the city was negligent in how they actually plowed the parking spaces. the trial judge’s conclusion that the “city’s actions were the result of policy decisions” was overbroad, merging together all of the city’s snow removal decisions and activities. the city’s submissions before this court do the same. [77] second, we agree with ms. marchi that the trial judge placed too much weight on the label of “policy”, appearing to accept without question the city’s description of its unwritten snow removal practices as “unwritten policies”. as we have stated above, however, the word “policy” cannot be determinative of whether government conduct should be immune from negligence liability the trial judge’s conclusion that all of the city’s unwritten snow removal practices were “unwritten policies” improperly coloured his conclusion that all of the city’s snow removal practices were core policy. [78] third, the trial judge improperly treated budgetary implications as determinative of the core policy question. the city also goes as far as saying that all of its decisions about extending snow removal hours were core policy decisions because they struck a balance between preserving the budget for future snow events and responding appropriately to the early january snowfall. again, as noted above, whether a government decision involved budgetary considerations cannot be a test for whether it constituted core policy: even the most routine ones involve some consideration of budget or the scarcity of resources. [79] the city also suggests, relying on white j.’s comments in united states v. gaubert, 499 us 315 (1991), at p 324, that if a discretionary government decision could have been made based on policy factors, it will be deemed a policy decision immune from liability. we would reject this submission; whether a decision was in fact core policy must be proven by the public authority. [80] for these reasons the trial judge erred in his legal analysis of whether core policy immunity applied. in our view, applying the correct legal principles to the trial judge’s findings on this record, the city’s clearing of snow from the parking stalls in the 300 block of baker street by creating snowbanks along the sidewalks — thereby inviting members of the public to park in those stalls — without ensuring direct access to sidewalks was not the result of a core policy decision immune from negligence liability. instead, as we shall explain, it was a routine part of the city’s snow removal process, to which little thought was given. [81] the city reacted to the early january snowfall in the usual course: it followed the priority routes for plowing and sanding in the written policy (unchallenged by ms. marchi); it waited to remove snowbanks from the downtown core until after all city streets were plowed; and it followed several unwritten practices, including with respect to snow removal from stairs around the city. although clearing parking stalls was not covered in the written policy, the city cleared the angled parking stalls in the 300 block of baker street and created a continuous snowbank blocking the stalls from the sidewalk. throughout this process, the public works supervisor made decisions about how many employees to deploy she also completed “road patrol throughout the day to ensure the streets [were] safe, and crews [were] working in a timely and efficient manner” (trial reasons, at para. 5(h)). [82] the trial judge found that it “did not occur” to the supervisor that this process could be done in a different manner (para. 35). when the supervisor was asked at trial whether she had ever considered the potential dangers caused by clearing the parking stalls, she responded that her job was simply to follow “[the] normal protocol” and “follow direction from above me” (trial transcript, ar, vol. iv, at p 75). she also testified that changing the way the city plowed the streets would have required some “planning ahead” and she would not have had the authority to change the plowing method but would have had to ask her director (p 79). the city chose not to call any other employees of the city as witnesses. [83] on this record, the city’s decision bore none of the hallmarks of core policy although the extent to which the supervisor was closely connected to a democratically-elected official is unclear from the record, she disclosed that she did not have the authority to make a different decision with respect to the clearing of parking stalls (the first factor). in addition, there is no suggestion that the method of plowing the parking stalls on baker street resulted from a deliberative decision involving any prospective balancing of competing objectives and policy goals by the supervisor or her superiors. indeed, there was no evidence suggesting an assessment was ever made about the feasibility of clearing pathways in the snowbanks; the city’s evidence is that this was a matter of custom (the second factor) although it is clear that budgetary considerations were involved, these were not high-level budgetary considerations but rather the day-to-day budgetary considerations of individual employees (the third factor). [84] finally, the city’s chosen method of plowing the parking stalls can easily be assessed based on objective criteria (the fourth factor) cases involving the just category will not generally raise institutional competence concerns because courts routinely consider road and sidewalk maintenance issues in occupiers’ liability cases. the just category engages conduct that is similar in kind to what courts routinely assess. the same was true in hendry v. united states, 418 f.2d 774 (2d cir. 1969), a public authority negligence case about finding a merchant marine officer mentally unfit for service. the court concluded that the decision was reviewable because it was “not different in kind or complexity from those which courts are accustomed to entertain when tort suits are brought against private physicians” (p 783). in this case, the court would be well-equipped to determine whether the snowbanks posed an objectively unreasonable risk of harm (the standard of care question) the safety of a road or sidewalk can be measured based on objective or commonly accepted standards as it is in the private sector (see also peterson and van der weide, at pp. 451-52, fn. 13; j. w. bagby and g. l. gittings, “the elusive discretionary function exception from government tort liability: the narrowing scope of federal liability” (1992), 30 am. bus. lj 223, at p 239). [85] thus, the city has not shown that the way it plowed the parking stalls was the result of a proactive, deliberative decision, based on value judgments to do with economic, social or political considerations. in these circumstances, a court’s review of the city’s chosen means of clearing the parking stalls in the 300 block of baker street does not engage the underlying purpose for core policy immunity insulating these kinds of decisions from negligence liability does not undermine the ability to make important public interest policy choices. the public interest is not served when ad hoc decisions that fail to balance competing interests or that fail to consider how best to mitigate harms are insulated from liability in negligence oversight of such decisions respects the respective roles of each branch of government under the separation of powers doctrine. [86] therefore, the city has not met its burden of proving that ms. marchi seeks to challenge a core policy decision immune from negligence liability. while there is no suggestion that the city made an irrational or bad faith decision, the city’s “core policy defence” fails and it owed ms. marchi a duty of care the regular principles of negligence law apply in determining whether the city breached the duty of care and, if so, whether it should be liable for ms. marchi’s damages. [87] we now turn to the remaining two issues: standard of care and causation. b standard of care [88] the trial judge also concluded in the alternative that, even if a duty of care was owed, the city did not breach the standard of care because the snowbank did not pose an objectively unreasonable risk of harm after a reference to the evidence of neighbouring municipalities, he concluded: the city followed its policy. the policy was to clear snow in accordance with long established practices. the attempt to compare the practices in nelson with those of other places was not very useful each of the municipalities faced difficult conditions. nothing in the evidence showed that the policy of the city was unreasonable or the result of a manifest lack of appreciation for the risks involved the policy is rational it is very difficult to fault the city on a policy basis. [para. 36] [89] the city submits that when assessing the standard of care for a public body, courts must consider all of the surrounding circumstances, including budgetary pressures and the availability of personnel and equipment. in this case, the city acted reasonably within the context ms. marchi submits that the trial judge’s standard of care analysis was flawed because he conflated considerations relevant to policy immunity with the standard of care analysis and made errors in his treatment of the evidence. [90] we agree with ms. marchi and the court of appeal that the trial judge’s treatment of the standard of care was flawed. while he acknowledged that the standard of care applicable to the city is reasonableness, he imported considerations relating to core policy immunity into standard of care and failed to engage with the practices of the neighbouring municipalities. [91] to avoid liability, a defendant must “exercise the standard of care expected that would be of an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person in the same circumstances” (ryan v victoria (city), [1999] 1 scr 201, at para. 28) relevant factors in this assessment include whether the risk of injury was reasonably foreseeable, the likelihood of damage and the availability and cost of preventative measures (p. h. osborne, the law of torts (6th ed. 2020), at pp. 29-30; bolton v. stone, [1951] a.c 850 (hl)). a reasonable person “takes precautions against risks which are reasonably likely to happen” (bolton, at p 863). [92] the reasonableness standard applies regardless of whether the defendant is a government or a private actor (just, at p 1243). in just, cory j recognized that the “standard of care imposed upon the crown may not be the same as that owed by an individual” (at p 1244). however, this is not because public policy concerns applicable to governments displace the reasonableness standard. in fact, cory j was clear that the analysis under duty of care must be “kept separate and distinct” from the analysis of the standard of care (at p 1243). it is important that the standard of care analysis not be used as another opportunity to immunize governments from liability, especially when a determination has already been made that the impugned government conduct was not core policy. [93] thus, the trial judge erred in principle in reaching his conclusion on the standard of care. however, we would reject ms. marchi’s invitation to decide this issue without a new trial. this court is not well-placed to make factual findings regarding the impact of the evidence from other municipalities on the obligations imposed on the city. c causation [94] in the further alternative, the trial judge found that the city was not the cause of ms. marchi’s injuries because ms. marchi assumed the risk in crossing the snowbank: she was the “author of her own misfortune”. the city submits that the trial judge’s causation analysis is owed deference and, even if a correctness standard applies, the city is not the proximate cause of ms. marchi’s injuries because it was not reasonably foreseeable that an individual living in a city prone to snow events would behave the way that ms. marchi did. ms. marchi submits that the trial judge erred by conflating the analysis of voluntary assumption of risk with causation — ms. marchi’s lack of due care is relevant to contributory negligence, not causation. [95] again, we agree with ms. marchi and the court of appeal that the trial judge also erred in his causation analysis. [96] it is well established that a defendant is not liable in negligence unless their breach caused the plaintiff’s loss. the causation analysis involves two distinct inquiries (mustapha, at para. 11; saadati v. moorhead, 2017 scc 28, [2017] 1 scr 543, at para. 13; livent, at para. 77; am. linden et al., canadian tort law (11th ed. 2018), at p 309-10). first, the defendant’s breach must be the factual cause of the plaintiff’s loss factual causation is generally assessed using the “but for” test (clements v. clements, 2012 scc 32, [2012] 2 scr 181, at paras. 8 and 13; resurfice corp. v. hanke, 2007 scc 7, [2007] 1 scr 333, at paras. 21-22). the plaintiff must show on a balance of probabilities that the harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s negligent act. [97] second, the breach must be the legal cause of the loss, meaning that the harm must not be too far remote (mustapha, at para. 11; saadati, at para. 20; livent, at para. 77). the remoteness inquiry asks whether the actual injury was the reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligent conduct (mustapha, at paras. 14-16; livent, at para. 79). remoteness is distinct from the reasonable foreseeability analysis within duty of care because it focuses on the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff, whereas the duty of care analysis focuses on the type of injury (livent, at para. 78; klar and jefferies, at p 565). [98] it is unclear whether the trial judge made any finding on factual causation. he concluded that factual causation could not be proven unless the city had met a standard of care that was impossible to meet however, this conclusion appears to improperly conflate the standard of care and causation analyses. the trial judge never asked whether, but for the city’s breach of the standard of care, ms. marchi would have been injured. [99] the trial judge then turned to remoteness, or legal causation, and concluded that “[t]he plaintiff assumed the risk of crossing the snowbank”; she was the “author of her own misfortune” (at para. 45) the trial judge misapplied a number of distinct concepts in this part of his analysis. remoteness asks whether the specific injury was reasonably foreseeable. the relevant question is whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the city’s failure to remove the snowbanks could cause ms. marchi’s injury. the trial judge never addressed this remoteness question. [100] instead, the trial judge focused on ms. marchi’s conduct. the plaintiff’s conduct is generally relevant to a defence, such as contributory negligence or assumption of risk. defences are distinct from the causation analysis and the onus is on the defendant to plead and prove defences (linden et al., at p 463; british columbia electric railway co v dunphy, [1919] 59 scr 263, at p 268).the trial judge appears to have misapplied the defence of contributory negligence. under provincial statutes such as british columbia’s negligence act, rsbc 1996, c 333, contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to recovery. instead, damages are apportioned on the basis of comparative fault (s 1(1); resurfice corp., at para. 21). therefore, even if the trial judge found that ms. marchi was also negligent, that would not justify his conclusion that the city cannot be blamed for the accident. [101] the trial judge also erred in law in relying on the plaintiff’s assumption of risk, or volenti non fit injuria, which is a complete bar to recovery this narrowly applied defence requires the defendant to prove that the plaintiff accepted both the physical and legal risks of the activity (linden et al., at p 483; dube v. labar, [1986] 1 scr 649, at pp. 658-59). however, the plaintiff must have “understood that she bargained away her right to sue” (linden et al., at p 483). there was no evidentiary basis to conclude that ms. marchi either explicitly or implicitly bargained away her right to sue for her injuries. [102] therefore, the causation analysis will have to be considered in accordance with these reasons. v. conclusion [103] for these reasons, the trial judgment must be set aside. on duty of care, we would conclude that the impugned city decision was not a core policy decision and the city therefore owed ms. marchi a duty of care the standard of care and causation assessments require a new trial we would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs throughout.
[1] at the beginning of the twentieth century, canada needed more electricity to fuel winnipeg’s economic growth the governments of canada, manitoba, and ontario decided to create a water reservoir in northern ontario to power hydroelectricity generation. they settled on lac seul, which flows into both ontario and manitoba, and determined that if they raised the water level of lac seul by 10 feet, or approximately 3 metres, they could generate substantial electricity. construction of the dam was completed in 1929 and the water steadily rose through the 1930s. the project was a success for the three governments. [2] the project was also a tragedy for the lac seul first nation (lsfn). the lsfn’s reserve (reserve) is located on the southeastern shore of lac seul. almost one- fifth of its best land was flooded and its members were “deprived of their livelihood, robbed of their natural resources, and driven out of their home[s]” (2017 fc 906, [2018] 4 cnlr 63, at para. 156). [3] canada was aware from the outset that flooding lac seul by 10 feet would cause “very considerable” damage to the reserve in the late 1920s, the supervisor responsible for valuing the loss warned that the reserve would be “ruined for any purpose [for] which it was set aside”, that the members of the first nation were “helpless to avert this calamity”, and that they viewed their future “with utter dismay” (trial reasons, at paras. 152 and 156). [4] despite repeated warnings from government officials about the impact that the project would have on the first nation, the project advanced without the consent of the lac seul first nation, without any compensation, and without the lawful authorization required. [5] since the royal proclamation, 1763 (gb), 3 geo 3 (reproduced in rsc 1985, app. ii, no. 1), indigenous interests in land, including reserve land, cannot be taken or used without legal authorization from the crown. the indian act, rsc 1927, c 98, permitted expropriation for public works, but only with the approval of cabinet through the governor in council. treaty no. 3 (1873), that set aside the reserve land for the lsfn, required “due compensation” for any taking or appropriation in addition, this court recognized in guerin v the queen, [1984] 2 scr 335, and subsequent decisions, that the crown is subject to a fiduciary duty when it exercises control over indigenous interests. this fiduciary duty imposes strict obligations on the crown to advance the best interests of indigenous peoples. [6] the trial judge concluded that canada failed to meet its fiduciary duty to the lac seul first nation in respect of its interest in reserve land. on appeal, canada does not dispute this conclusion. [7] canada did not keep the lsfn informed about the project; did not consult the lsfn; did not negotiate on the lsfn’s behalf to get the best compensation possible; did not use its power to refuse to authorize the project until the other parties agreed to fair compensation; and the compensation canada did manage to negotiate — 14 years after the flooding began — was inadequate. this was unlawful and egregious conduct, even by the standards of the time. as the trial judge observed, this outcome was “inexplicable” (para. 298). [8] the results of canada’s failures are tragic and well documented. roughly 17 percent of the reserve — 11,304 acres or approximately 4,575 hectares — is now permanently flooded homes were destroyed, as were wild rice fields, gardens, haylands, and gravesites. fishing, hunting, and trapping were all impacted. the lsfn was separated because one part of the reserve became an island and, despite the sacrifices suffered by the lsfn to make the hydroelectricity project possible, the reserve was not provided with electricity until the 1980s. [9] the lsfn challenges the trial judge’s evaluation of equitable compensation for the loss of the flooded lands. the issue for this court is how to assess equitable compensation for the loss caused by canada’s breach of fiduciary duty. the central inquiry is: what position would the beneficiary be in had the fiduciary fulfilled its obligations? [10] the trial judge valued the flooded land based on its value in 1929, with 10 percent valued as waterfront land and 90 percent valued as bushland. he determined that because canada was authorized to expropriate the land for a public work under the indian act provisions in force at the time, the land should be valued based upon an expropriation in 1929. thus, the trial judge concluded that the first nation was not entitled to be compensated for any value that the land provided to the hydroelectricity project itself. [11] in my view, this approach to equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty is flawed by looking solely at the amount the lsfn would have received if canada had complied with the general law relating to expropriation, the trial judge gave no effect to the unique obligations imposed by the fiduciary duty. the trial judge improperly focused on what canada would likely have done, as opposed to what canada ought to have done as a fiduciary. while i agree with much of the trial judge’s analysis, this error tainted his assessment of equitable compensation. [12] the fiduciary duty imposes heavy obligations on canada. the duty does not melt away when canada has competing priorities. canada was under an obligation to preserve and protect the lsfn’s interest in the reserve. this included an obligation to negotiate compensation for the lsfn on the basis of the value of the land to the hydroelectricity project. compensation must be assessed on that basis. [13] i would allow the appeal and remit the case back to the federal court for reassessment of the equitable compensation to include the value of the flooded land to the hydroelectricity project. i. background [14] the lsfn is a treaty 3 first nation in northern ontario. the members are anishinaabe people according to chief clifford bull, they have always been lake dwellers who travelled through the water, kept their homes and gardens near the water, cultivated wild rice in the water, fished in the water, and hunted near the water. [15] the lsfn’s traditional territory extends from the trout lake region in northwestern ontario, southeast through the lac seul region, and northeast towards lake st joseph the lsfn has one reserve, called the lac seul indian reserve no. 28, which is located on the southeastern shore of lac seul in northern ontario. the reserve has three communities — kejick bay, whitefish bay, and frenchman’s head. [16] the reserve was created under treaty 3, which required canada to select and set aside reserves that would be “most convenient and advantageous for each band or bands of indians” in 1875, the lsfn chose lac seul as the site of the reserve because of the resources along the shoreline and the social, cultural, and spiritual importance of the area. [17] in the early twentieth century, canada wanted to provide more electricity to winnipeg by 1911, canada identified lac seul as a potential reservoir for hydroelectricity generation (project). lac seul flows into the english river in ontario, which in turn flows into the winnipeg river in manitoba. in 1915, the dominion water power branch, within the department of the interior, prepared a report noting that a 10 foot flooding of lac seul would increase the power potential on the english river by 233 percent. [18] in the same year, the manitoba hydrographic survey began preliminary fieldwork chief john akewance of the lsfn first became aware of the potential project through the fieldwork, and wrote to indian agent r. s mckenzie in 1915 outlining his concerns canada advised the indian agent that “there is no present intention to raise the waters of lac seul” (trial reasons, at para. 127). [19] the fieldwork report was released in 1916 and noted that the project would flood portions of the reserve. in 1917, canada recommended to ontario that it obtain flowage rights over the land that would need to be flooded. in 1919, canada informed itself about the procedure for granting flowage rights on reserve land: if after negotiation the offer is accepted on behalf of the indians, or amended and so accepted, the amount of compensation agreed upon is deposited with the minister of finance for the use of the band of indians and the land is surrendered. (trial reasons, at para. 132) canada wrote to ontario again in 1921 urging that they reserve the flooding rights. there is no record of a response. [20] in 1924, chief paul thomas met with indian agent frank edwards to express the lsfn’s concerns. agent edwards told chief thomas that canada would “protect their interests as far as possible” (trial reasons, at para. 137 (emphasis in original)). [21] in february 1928, canada, ontario, and manitoba entered into the lac seul storage agreement which governed the construction and ownership of the project. the agreement apportioned the capital costs among the governments, which included “the cost of acquiring flooding privileges or other necessary easements” and “compensation for timber, buildings and improvements, including ontario crown lands, indian lands and lands owned by private individuals” (trial reasons, at para. 147). [22] in april 1928, ontario wrote to affected landowners regarding the project. ontario also notified the department of indian affairs and indicated that the water levels would be raised by approximately 12 feet. in the summer of 1928, h. j. bury, the supervisor of indian timber lands, appraised the value of the lsfn’s anticipated losses at $120,200. ontario disagreed with the estimate. mr. bury reiterated his position in two internal memoranda. on may 14, 1929, he wrote that “[t]he reserve is ruined for any purpose [for] which it was set aside for the indians” (trial reasons, at para. 156). two days later, he wrote: there are 688 indians on the reserve, who are helpless to avert this calamity, and who view the future with utter dismay, but i feel that the associated governments concerned, will not permit these indians to be deprived of their livelihood, robbed of their natural resources, and driven out of their home[s], without not only allowing them generous monetary compensation, but also make provision, during the period of years in which they will have to re-adjust themselves to new and strange conditions, for exclusive trapping rights for them in a district remote from civilization. (trial reasons, para. 156) [23] on may 17, 1929, the deputy superintendent general of indian affairs wrote to his superior that “[t]he situation is certainly serious; and hardship and disaster appear to face these poor indians unless some arrangement is made at once, providing for reasonable compensation and the allocation of suitable hunting and fishing grounds elsewhere” (trial reasons, at para. 157). no agreement regarding compensation to the lsfn was reached with ontario. [24] ontario applied for necessary approvals in july 1928 the application noted that “[i]t will be necessary in connection with the proposed work to acquire flowage rights over lands on an indian reserve” (trial reasons, at para. 159 (emphasis deleted)). even though those rights were never acquired, the dam was completed by june 1929. the power site, the ear falls generating station, was completed and began delivering power in february 1930. [25] the flooding of lac seul was delayed by disagreements between canada and ontario regarding timber clearing. ontario wanted to harvest its crown timber prior to flooding. to resolve the impasse, canada proposed that the timber clearing could be accomplished as an unemployment project under canada’s depression-era unemployment relief act, 1930, sc 1930, c 1. as negotiations for this relief project unfolded, canada assured the lsfn’s members that “their interests will be protected to the fullest possible extent” (trial reasons, at para. 181 (emphasis in original)). [26] in july 1933, canada’s minister of the interior signed the agreement for the relief project. a week later, the local indian agent and the timber supervisor assured the lsfn that the water would not be raised “for several years to come” (trial reasons, at para. 183). the relief project was a failure. less than 700 acres were cleared at a cost of over $850,000 to canada. members of the lsfn were excluded from employment in the project. [27] despite the assurances given to the lsfn, the waters of lac seul began to rise in 1934 the damage was extensive agent edwards estimated that at least 29 houses would need to be rebuilt — in total, one-quarter to one-third of the houses ultimately had to be moved or replaced. between 1935 and 1939, additional damage was documented. in august 1936, canada’s superintendent general of indian affairs wrote to ontario’s minister of lands and forests: . . . the lac seul indian reserve has been flooded to such a serious extent that we have been compelled already to construct many new houses for the indians at a cost of $25,000 and the flood conditions have not only submerged the indian hay lands, gardens and cultivated land, but have also seriously impaired the efforts of these indians to earn their livelihood. . . the indians of this reserve have been definitely assured that their interests would be fully protected and they are at present much disturbed and alarmed at the damage already caused. [emphasis deleted.] (trial reasons, at para. 192) [28] in march 1937, mr bury wrote a memorandum regarding the ongoing failure to provide compensation. he wrote: i desire to again draw your attention to the serious breach of faith that our department has made with the indians of the lac seul reserve, respecting promises made to them regarding flooding compensation . i consider that these indians have been very shabbily treated. their reserve lands, timber, houses, gardens, rice beds, musk-rat swamps have been flooded now for some years, and we still procrastinate[.] [i]f it had been a white settlement, no person would have dared to flood the property, without paying compensation before flooding took place [emphasis deleted.] (trial reasons, at para. 194) [29] negotiations between canada and ontario continued in 1940, ontario determined that $50,000 would be a “fair valuation” of compensation, but ontario also claimed it was owed compensation for what it viewed as excess acres on the reserve as well as outstanding claims for timber clearing. the lsfn was not consulted nor informed of the impending settlement. [30] in 1943, canada and ontario finally agreed to a claim amount of $72,539, with deductions of $5,000 to pay a timber claim submitted by a lumber company and $17,276 to pay ontario for “excess acres” on the reserve. the balance, $50,263, was deposited into the lsfn’s trust account on november 17, 1943. [31] by contrast, ontario and canada negotiated compensation with other non- indigenous groups whose property fell within the flood plain of the dam project, such as the anglican church missionary society, the hudson’s bay company, and the canadian national railway for instance, the anglican church missionary society received compensation for the timber destroyed in the floods and for the costs of relocating its church and cemetery. similarly, the hudson’s bay company engaged in protracted negotiations with the federal government that resulted in compensation not only for “flowage rights” over the company’s territory, but also for the value of the buildings and other facilities. [32] canada’s conduct towards the lsfn also differs from its conduct in three earlier projects that impacted another first nation. in the early 1910s, calgary power and transmission sought permission from indian affairs to flood reserve lands of the stoney indian band in alberta for three hydroelectricity projects (kananaskis falls projects). for all three projects, canada negotiated a surrender on behalf of the first nation and insisted on compensation reflecting the value of the land to hydroelectricity generation. calgary power entered into three agreements which provided two forms of compensation: a one-time payment for flooded land and a yearly water power rental agreement. this compensation was based upon the value of the land to the project. [33] here, there was never a negotiated surrender of the land by the lsfn and canada did not at any point expropriate the land in accordance with the provisions of the indian act nonetheless, the project was completed in 1929 and the lands were steadily flooded throughout the 1930s a total of 11,304 acres, approximately 17 percent of the reserve, is now flooded the flooding destroyed wild rice fields, gardens, and haylands for livestock it impacted fishing and damaged homes, campsites, and shoreline infrastructure. the flooding damaged and exposed graves that were not relocated prior to the flooding. one of the lsfn’s communities, kejick bay, became an island separated from the other communities. [34] in september 1985, the lsfn submitted a claim for flooding damages to the specific claims branch of the department of indian and northern affairs canada. in 1991, roger southwind, for himself and on behalf of the members of the lac seul band of indians, filed a civil claim against canada. in november 2006, 63 years after the settlement, the lsfn entered into an agreement with ontario power generation (opg), the current operator of the ear falls generating station the agreement included $11,200,000 in compensation for losses arising from the ear falls generating station on the lsfn’s traditional territory, but expressly excluded damages caused by the flooding in the 1930s. the settlement included a plan to open a new generating station and provided the lsfn with the opportunity to purchase an equity position of 25 percent. in february 2009, opg opened the new generating station in partnership with the first nation. in 2009, a causeway was built to finally reconnect kejick bay island and the reserve mainland the lsfn contributed $1,750,000 to this and a related project. a. trial decision, 2017 fc 906, [2018] 4 cnlr 63 (zinn j.) [35] in 1991, roger southwind, for himself and on behalf of the members of the lac seul band of indians, filed a civil claim against canada in federal court for breach of canada’s fiduciary duty and its obligations under the indian act and treaty 3. the trial, which lasted more than 50 days, began before justice zinn in september 2016. [36] the parties called 24 witnesses, 22 of whom were expert witnesses whose testimony included how to value the loss and bring that loss forward to present value. the plaintiff proposed various models for assessing compensation, including a revenue-sharing agreement, the loss of revenues from traditional activities, and a land lease. the plaintiff also led evidence regarding canada’s arrangements with another first nation in contemporaneous hydroelectricity projects. both parties called expert witnesses to testify about different models for translating historic losses into present value. [37] the trial judge held that canada owed the lsfn a fiduciary duty in respect of land reserved for its benefit under treaty 3 he particularized the following obligations: a duty of loyalty and good faith in the discharge of its mandate as a trustee of the reserve land; a duty to provide full disclosure and consult with the band; a duty to act with ordinary prudence with a view to the best interests of the lsfn; and a duty to protect and preserve the band’s proprietary interests in the reserve from exploitation (para. 226). the trial judge found that canada breached each of these obligations. [38] canada accepted that equitable compensation was the appropriate remedy for breach of fiduciary duty the trial judge summarized the principles of equitable compensation as follows: (1) the goal of equitable compensation is to restore what the plaintiff has lost due to the breach; (2) the plaintiff’s loss is an opportunity that was not realized because of the breach; (3) the plaintiff’s loss must be assessed with the benefit of hindsight and not based on what was foreseeable or known at the date of the breach; (4) the losses are to be determined on a common sense view of causation; (5) the court must assume the plaintiff would have made the most favourable use of the trust property; and (6) the court must assume that the defendant would have carried out its duties in a lawful manner (para. 285). [39] in applying these principles, the trial judge focused on what would have happened had canada not breached its duties. he determined that the project was a public work and it would have been completed opposition from the lsfn or the indian affairs branch would likely not have stopped the project. indeed, the trial judge found that canada could have legally taken the lands without the lsfn’s consent through expropriation. the trial judge determined that it was unlikely that the lsfn could have negotiated a revenue-sharing agreement he distinguished agreements reached with a first nation in earlier hydroelectricity projects, which included both a one-time payment and annual rent, on the bases that the hydroelectricity generating stations were located on the reserves rather than downstream and the utility company in the earlier projects had no authority to expropriate the land, but canada did have that authority in this project. [40] in light of these findings, the trial judge determined that canada would have likely obtained a negotiated settlement for a flowage easement or expropriated the land for the limited purpose of facilitating the project. he assessed the market value of the flooded land based upon a hypothetical flowage easement, valued as if it had been lawfully expropriated according to general expropriation law in doing so, the trial judge rejected expert opinion seeking to incorporate the value of the land for hydroelectricity generation, reasoning that any value “attributable to the project” was to be excluded under both the expropriation act, rsc 1985, c e-21, and the expropriations act, rso 1990, c. e26. he therefore assessed the value of the flooded land at $1.29 per acre based on its value as 90 percent bushland and 10 percent waterfront land, concluding that “the suggestion that canada could and should have paid more than this for the land, amounts to nothing more than optimistic speculation” (para. 383). [41] the trial judge then assessed other calculable losses he ordered $13,847,870 in calculable damages. the calculable damages included: $3,272,572 for the hypothetical flowage easement, based on the $1.29 per acre value in 1929; $7,836,252 for timber dues; $1,959,094 for the excess acreage deduction; and $1,913,949 for community infrastructure he then deducted amounts that canada had previously paid. [42] the trial judge also added $16,152,130 in non-calculable damages for a total award of $30,000,000. the trial judge assessed the non-calculable losses based on factors including the amount of the calculable loss, the duration of the non-quantifiable losses, the loss of hayland, gardens, and rice fields, and the separation of two lsfn communities. b appeal decision, 2019 fca 171, [2020] 1 fcr 745 (per nadon and webb jja,. gleason ja. dissenting) [43] roger southwind, for himself, and on behalf of the members of the lac seul band of indians and the lac seul first nation (lsfn or appellant), appealed the assessment of equitable compensation to the federal court of appeal. the appellant’s primary argument was that the trial judge should have included the loss of a revenue- sharing agreement in the compensation. in the alternative, the appellant argued that the trial judge was incorrect in his approach to assessing compensation for the flooded land, in applying current expropriation law instead of the law applicable in 1929, and in distinguishing the kananaskis falls projects. [44] in dissent, gleason ja would have allowed the appeal. while she rejected the primary argument that the breach resulted in the loss of a revenue-sharing agreement, she agreed that the value calculated for the flooded land should have taken into account downstream hydroelectricity generation the trial judge was wrong to discount the possibility that canada could have pursued a negotiated settlement that would have included a premium on the land in light of the project as a fiduciary, canada “was arguably required to pursue a negotiated surrender before proceeding to expropriation as a negotiated resolution would probably have been less detrimental to the lac seul first nation” (para 84) the trial judge also made a legal error in distinguishing the kananaskis falls projects. canada had identical legal powers in each case but behaved differently. [45] for the majority, nadon ja (webb ja concurring) dismissed the appeal. he disagreed with gleason ja that the trial judge committed any error of law or any palpable and overriding error. more specifically, he disagreed that the trial judge erred in distinguishing the kananaskis falls projects comparing the two projects was a factual determination; there was no palpable and overriding error of fact; and there was no legal error that went to the core of the determination thus, the trial judge was entitled to distinguish the projects and assess the fair market value of the land at $1.29 per acre. c applicable provisions [46] the provisions of the indian act in force in 1929 provided two ways to remove land from a reserve. section 48 governed takings for a public purpose: 48 no portion of any reserve shall be taken for the purpose of any railway, road, public work, or work designed for any public utility without the consent of the governor in council, but any company or municipal or local authority having statutory power, either dominion or provincial, for taking or using lands or any interest in lands without the consent of the owner may, with the consent of the governor in council as aforesaid, and subject to the terms and conditions imposed by such consent, exercise such statutory power with respect to any reserve or portion of a reserve. 2. in any such case compensation shall be made therefor to the indians of the band, and the exercise of such power, and the taking of the lands or interest therein and the determination and payment of the compensation shall, unless otherwise provided by the order in council evidencing the consent of the governor in council, be governed by the requirements applicable to the like proceedings by such company, municipal or local authority in ordinary cases. 4 the amount awarded in any case shall be paid to the minister of finance for the use of the band of indians for whose benefit the reserve is held, and for the benefit of any indian who has improvements taken or injured. [47] land could also be surrendered by consent under ss. 50 and 51. [48] treaty 3 states: and her majesty the queen hereby agrees and undertakes to lay aside reserves for farming lands, due respect being had to lands at present cultivated by the said indians, and also to lay aside and reserve for the benefit of the said indians, to be administered and dealt with for them by her majesty’s government of the dominion of canada, in such a manner as shall seem best, other reserves of land in the said territory hereby ceded, which said reserves shall be selected and set aside where it shall be deemed most convenient and advantageous for each band or bands of indians, by the officers of the said government appointed for that purpose, and such selection shall be so made after conference with the indians; provided, however, . . . that the aforesaid reserves of lands, or any interest or right therein or appurtenant thereto, may be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of by the said government for the use and benefit of the said indians, with the consent of the indians entitled thereto first had and obtained. it is further agreed between her majesty and her said indians that such sections of the reserves above indicated as may at any time be required for public works or buildings of what nature soever may be appropriated for that purpose by her majesty’s government of the dominion of canada, due compensation being made for the value of any improvements thereon. ii. parties’ submissions [49] the lsfn submits that the courts below erred in their application of the principles of equitable compensation. the central issue is how to compensate the lsfn in a manner that accords with equitable and constitutional principles, including reconciliation and the honour of the crown. the trial judge erred in considering how canada would likely have proceeded before considering how canada as a fiduciary ought to have proceeded a hypothetical expropriation is the wrong paradigm and improperly shifts the analysis from restoring what the lsfn lost to fixing canada’s unlawful conduct a hypothetical expropriation also ignores canada’s fiduciary obligations and, even if an expropriation had been pursued, canada had to impair the lsfn’s interest as little as possible. it was also incorrect to view canada’s breaches as inevitable, and, in any event, whether the flooding was inevitable does not break the causal connection between canada’s breach and the lsfn’s loss the appellant submits that the trial judge did not properly consider the lsfn’s perspective and the unique nature of its losses and connection to the land. finally, the appellant submits that the trial judge’s approach does not deter canada’s behaviour. [50] canada submits that the trial judge fairly compensated the lsfn for its losses on the merits of the appeal, canada submits that the principles of equitable compensation are settled and were properly applied by the courts below. the lsfn cannot be compensated for a scenario that would have never occurred at trial, the lsfn was claiming compensation for a loss — a revenue-sharing agreement — that was not caused by the breach. the trial judge referred to a hypothetical expropriation scenario to determine what likely would have happened without a breach, in line with this court’s jurisprudence the determination that canada would have obtained a flowage easement was appropriate in light of the evidence and would have fulfilled canada’s duty to minimally impair the right finally, canada submits that the compensation award respects the goal of reconciliation and fulfills the deterrent requirement. [51] canada also submits that the lsfn is improperly making a new argument before this court by asking that the land be valued on the basis of its use for flooding purposes the pleadings, canada argues, show that the plaintiff sought a revenue- sharing agreement at trial, not the value of the land for flooding purposes. it asks that this court not entertain what it submits is a new issue. iii analysis [52] the issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in his assessment of equitable compensation, specifically in relation to the value of the flooded land. to determine whether the trial judge erred, i must consider the content of the fiduciary duty in this case, what obligations it imposed, and how the trial judge assessed equitable compensation in light of those obligations. [53] my analysis proceeds in three parts. first, i consider the relevant principles of the crown’s relationship to indigenous peoples, and more specifically of the fiduciary duty that may arise second, i consider the principles of equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty. third, i apply those principles to the trial judge’s assessment of equitable compensation. a canada’s fiduciary duty to indigenous peoples [54] the existence of a fiduciary duty is not in dispute in this appeal. canada does not contest the trial judge’s determination that canada owed a fiduciary duty to the lsfn and breached that duty however, the specific nature of the crown’s fiduciary duty to indigenous peoples, especially over reserve land, informs how equitable compensation must be assessed. [55] the crown’s fiduciary duty is rooted in the obligation of honourable dealing and in the overarching goal of reconciliation between the crown and the first inhabitants of canada (haida nation v. british columbia (minister of forests), 2004 scc 73, [2004] 3 scr 511, at paras. 17-18). professor slattery describes the honour of the crown as a “grounding postulate of canadian constitutional law” (b. slattery, “the aboriginal constitution” (2014), 67 sclr (2d) 319, at p 320). mclachlin cj. explained in haida nation that the “process of reconciliation flows from the crown’s duty of honourable dealing toward aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn from the crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the control of that people” (para. 32; see also r v. desautel, 2021 scc 17, at para. 22). this is an ongoing project that seeks the “reconciliation of aboriginal and non-aboriginal canadians in a mutually respectful long-term relationship” (beckman v. little salmon/carmacks first nation, 2010 scc 53, [2010] 3 scr 103, at para. 10). [56] this court first acknowledged a fiduciary duty in guerin in guerin, canada argued that it could not be subject to a fiduciary duty and, at best, the crown’s control over indigenous interests in land is a political trust which is unenforceable by the courts (p 371) dickson j., writing for a majority, rejected canada’s argument. instead, he found that indigenous interests in land are “a pre-existing legal right not created by royal proclamation, by s 18(1) of the indian act, or by any other executive order or legislative provision” (p 379; see also j. t. s. mccabe, the honour of the crown and its fiduciary duties to aboriginal peoples (2008), at pp. 150-51). in other words, the indigenous interest in land did not flow from the crown; it pre-existed the crown’s assertion of sovereignty. [57] through the royal proclamation, 1763, the crown undertook discretionary control over these pre-existing indigenous interests in land the proclamation provided: “and we do hereby strictly forbid, on pain of our displeasure, all our loving subjects from making any purchases or settlements whatever, or taking possession of any of the lands above reserved, without our especial leave and licence for that purpose first obtained.” the indian act and its predecessor statutes formalized the process for setting aside reserve land and the crown’s legal control over that land. the crown thus undertook the “historic responsibility . . . to act on behalf of the indians so as to protect their interests in transactions with third parties” (guerin, at p 383). in guerin, this court recognized that a fiduciary duty arose because the crown interposed itself between indigenous lands and those who want to lease or purchase the land, thereby exercising discretionary control over the land (pp. 383-84). the crown has a duty that is “in the nature of a private law duty” (p 385). [58] in osoyoos indian band v. oliver (town), 2001 scc 85, [2001] 3 scr. 746, gonthier j., dissenting, but not on that point, clarified that the same fiduciary duty applies even where the reserve is not situated on traditional territory in which the first nation may have a pre-existing legal interest. he noted: “. . . an interest in reserve lands to which no aboriginal title attaches and an interest in non-reserve lands to which aboriginal title does attach are the same with respect to the generation of a fiduciary obligation on the part of the crown” (para. 163). [59] guerin set to rest the idea that the trust-like language of historic treaties, laws, and proclamations constituted a mere “political trust” unenforceable in courts. instead, an enforceable sui generis fiduciary duty arose where the crown asserted discretionary power over indigenous peoples’ specific aboriginal interests and assumed responsibility for those interests (r v sparrow, [1990] 1 scr 1075, at p 1108). this relationship is not paternalistic in nature; it emerged in a context where the military capacities of indigenous peoples were strong and the crown needed to mitigate the risk of conflict between indigenous peoples and settlers (manitoba metis federation inc. v. canada (attorney general), 2013 scc 14, [2013] 1 scr 623, at para. 66; slattery, at pp. 322 and 326). [60] rooted in the honour of the crown, the crown’s fiduciary duty exists to further a socially important relationship. it structures the role voluntarily undertaken by the crown as the intermediary between indigenous interests in land and the interest of settlers. professor rotman, in the context of fiduciary relationships generally, puts it this way: “. . while it may appear that the fiduciary concept exists to protect beneficiaries’ interests, that effect is merely ancillary to its protection of fiduciary relationships” (l i rotman, “understanding fiduciary duties and relationship fiduciarity” (2017), 62 mcgill lj 975, at pp. 987-88). in the context of our national history, the relationship between the crown and indigenous peoples goes to the very foundation of this country and to the heart of its identity. indeed, the need to reconcile the assertion of crown sovereignty with the pre-existence of indigenous peoples, and to reconcile indigenous and non-indigenous canadians is of “fundamental importance” (r v. van der peet, [1996] 2 scr 507, at para. 310, per mclachlin j., dissenting, but not on this point). the honour of the crown — and the sui generis fiduciary duty to which it gives rise — is a vital component of the relationship between the crown and indigenous peoples. [61] however, not all aspects of this relationship are fiduciary in nature (haida nation, at para. 18; wewaykum indian band v. canada, 2002 scc 79, [2002] 4 scr. 245, at paras 81 and 83) the fiduciary duty does not attach to every interest of indigenous peoples. as binnie j stated in wewaykum, “[t]he fiduciary duty imposed on the crown does not exist at large but in relation to specific indian interests” (para. 81) the fiduciary duty imposes heavy obligations when it does arise the fiduciary duty may arise when the crown exercises discretionary control over cognizable indigenous interests or where the conditions of a private law ad hoc fiduciary relationship are met (williams lake indian band v canada (aboriginal affairs and northern development), 2018 scc 4, [2018] 1 scr 83, at para 44; manitoba metis, at paras. 48-50; wewaykum, at para. 85). [62] the fiduciary duty itself is shaped by the context to which it applies, which means that its content varies with the nature and the importance of the right being protected (williams lake, at para 55; wewaykum, at para 86; manitoba metis, at para. 49). the crown’s control over indigenous interests in land is at the core of the relationship between the crown and indigenous peoples consequently, a strong fiduciary duty arises where the crown is exercising control over a first nation’s land. the same is true where the crown is exercising control over aboriginal and treaty rights that are protected under s 35 of the constitution act, 1982 (ermineskin indian band and nation v. canada, 2009 scc 9, [2009] 1 scr 222, at para. 46). [63] in a case involving reserve land, the sui generis nature of the interest in reserve land informs the fiduciary duty reserve land is not a fungible commodity. instead, reserve land reflects the essential relationship between indigenous peoples and the land in osoyoos, iacobucci j wrote that aboriginal interests in land has an “important cultural component that reflects the relationship between an aboriginal community and the land and the inherent and unique value in the land itself which is enjoyed by the community” (para. 46). the importance of the interest in reserve land is heightened by the fact that, in many cases such as this one, the reserve land was set aside as part of an obligation that arose out of treaties between the crown and indigenous peoples. [64] the fiduciary duty imposes the following obligations on the crown: loyalty, good faith, full disclosure, and, where reserve land is involved, the protection and preservation of the first nation’s quasi-proprietary interest from exploitation (williams lake, at para. 46; wewaykum, at para. 86). the standard of care is that of a person of ordinary prudence in managing their own affairs (williams lake, at para. 46). in the context of a surrender of reserve land, this court has recognized that the duty also requires that the crown protect against improvident bargains, manage the process to advance the best interests of the first nation, and ensure that it consents to the surrender (blueberry river indian band v. canada (department of indian affairs and northern development), [1995] 4 scr 344, at paras. 35 and 96). in an expropriation, the obligation to ensure consent is replaced by an obligation to minimally impair the protected interest (osoyoos, at para. 54). b principles of equitable compensation [65] the basic principles of equitable compensation are not in dispute in this appeal however, the parties disagree about their application to breaches of the crown’s fiduciary duty in relation to land held for the benefit of indigenous peoples. [66] as i shall explain, equitable compensation is a loss-based remedy that deters wrongdoing and enforces the trust at the heart of the fiduciary relationship. it differs from common law damages because of the “unique foundation and goals of equity” (canson enterprises ltd. v. boughton & co., [1991] 3 scr 534, at p 543, per mclachlin j). the trial judge must begin by closely analyzing the nature of the fiduciary relationship so as to ensure that the loss is assessed in relation to the obligations owed by the fiduciary. the loss must be caused in fact by the fiduciary’s breach, and the causation analysis is not limited by foreseeability (to use the language in canson, at p 552, where foreseeability was used synonymously with remoteness in this context). [67] this court’s decision in guerin explained that, although a fiduciary relationship is different than a traditional trust relationship, breach of the crown’s fiduciary duty gives rise to the same equitable remedies as breach of trust (p 376; see also wewaykum, at para. 94). the available equitable remedies include, among others, accounting for profits, constructive trust, and equitable compensation (canson, at p 588, per la forest j.) accounting for profits and constructive trust are gains-based remedies, meaning they are measured by the fiduciary’s gain rather than the plaintiff’s loss. the purpose is to undo the fiduciary’s gain. equitable compensation, on the other hand, is a loss-based remedy; the purpose is to make up the plaintiff’s loss (s. l. bray, “fiduciary remedies”, in e. j. criddle, p. b. miller and r. h. stikoff, eds., the oxford handbook of fiduciary law (2019), 449, at pp. 449 and 456). [68] when the crown breaches its fiduciary duty, the remedy will seek to restore the plaintiff to the position the plaintiff would have been in had the crown not breached its duty (guerin, at p 360, citing re dawson; union fidelity trustee co. v. perpetual trustee co (1966), 84 w.n (pt. 1) (nsw) 399 (sc);. hodgkinson v. simms, [1994] 3 scr 377, at p 440) when it is possible to restore the plaintiff’s assets in specie, accounting for profits and constructive trust are often appropriate (see guerin, at pp 360-61; hodgkinson, at pp. 452-53) when, however, restoring the plaintiff’s assets in specie is not available, equitable compensation is the preferred remedy (canson, at p 547) the lsfn seeks equitable compensation in this case because what it lost — its land — cannot be returned. it is therefore unnecessary to consider gains-based remedies. [69] equitable compensation is equity’s counterpart to common law damages (see whitefish lake band of indians v. canada (attorney general), 2007 onca 744, 87 or (3d) 321, at para. 48). it is discretionary and restitutionary in nature, aiming to restore the actual value of the thing lost through the fiduciary’s breach, referred to as the plaintiff’s lost opportunity (canson, at pp. 547-48, 551-52, 555 and 585). (1) causation [70] to award equitable compensation, there must be factual causation: the fiduciary’s breach must have caused, in fact, the plaintiff’s lost opportunity (canson, at p 551; see also stirrett v. cheema, 2020 onca 288, 150 or (3d) 561, at para. 69). this basic principle, that equitable compensation restores the lost opportunity caused in fact by the fiduciary’s breach, is uncontroversial. however, there has been debate about the extent to which the causation analysis should borrow from the common law of damages and import limiting factors such as foreseeability. [71] in concurring reasons in canson, mclachlin j stressed the differences between equitable remedies and common law damages, explaining that the purpose of equity is to enforce the trust which lies at its heart (p 543). analogy with common law damages may not be appropriate given this misalignment between the purpose of fiduciary obligations and obligations through tort and contract the same point was adopted by lord reed jsc in aib group (uk) plc v. mark redler & co. solicitors, [2014] uksc 58, [2015] ac 1503, at para. 83: in negligence and contract the parties were taken to be independent and their own self-interest. equal actors, concerned primarily with consequently, the law sought a balance between enforcing obligations by awarding compensation, and preserving optimum freedom for those involved in the relationship the essence of a fiduciary relationship, by contrast, was that one party pledged herself to act in the best interests of the other. the freedom of the fiduciary was diminished by the nature of the obligation she had undertaken the fiduciary relationship had trust, not self-interest, at its core. [72] another difference between equitable compensation and common law damages is that equity is especially concerned with deterring wrongful conduct by fiduciaries as professor rotman observed, “[b]eneficiaries are . . implicitly dependent upon and peculiarly vulnerable to their fiduciaries’ use, misuse, or abuse of power over their interests” (p 991). it is therefore crucial that equitable remedies deter fiduciaries from misusing their powers. by restoring the beneficiary’s lost opportunity, equitable compensation enforces the fiduciary relationship and deters the fiduciary’s wrongful conduct. [73] due to these differences, rather than relying on common law principles, mclachlin j explained that the proper approach to equitable compensation “is to look to the policy behind compensation for breach of fiduciary duty and determine what remedies will best further that policy” (canson, at p 545). mclachlin j.’s approach was subsequently followed by this court in cadbury schweppes inc. v. fbi foods ltd., [1999] 1 scr 142, and recognizes that the applicable rules will depend both on the nature of the fiduciary relationship and the fiduciary obligations: “differences between different types of fiduciary relationships may, depending on the circumstances, dictate different approaches to damages” (canson, at p 546) in other words, “[t]he rules appropriate to a breach of duty by a trustee . . . have to be determined in the light of the characteristics of the obligation in question” (aib, at para. 93). there must be a close relationship between the fiduciary duty and the fiduciary remedy, and the fiduciary duty must “forcefully shape the content of [the] fiduciary remed[y]” (bray, at p 451). thus, while factual causation will always apply to equitable compensation in the sense that the fiduciary’s breach must cause in fact the plaintiff’s loss, common law limiting factors will not readily apply because of the nature of the fiduciary relationship and obligations. [74] equity assesses the loss at the date of trial and with the benefit of hindsight (guerin, at pp 361-62, per wilson j.; canson, at p 556; target holdings ltd v. redferns, [1996] 1 ac 421 (hl), at pp. 437-39). this means that equity compensates the plaintiff for the lost opportunity caused by the breach, regardless of whether that opportunity could have been foreseen at the time of breach. mclachlin j described the analysis as follows: the plaintiff’s actual loss as a consequence of the breach is to be assessed with the full benefit of hindsight foreseeability is not a concern in assessing compensation, but it is essential that the losses made good are only those which, on a common sense view of causation, were caused by the breach. (canson, at p 556) [75] mclachlin j.’s use of the phrase “common sense view of causation” in canson should not be taken to mean that the causation analysis in equitable compensation cases will always have an “intuitively obvious answer” (aib, at para. 95) this is not always the case; trial judges are often faced with difficult questions of causation in claims for equitable compensation instead, the phrase “common sense” clarifies that the rules developed in legal causation, such as foreseeability, do not readily apply in equity: “the requirement that the loss must result from the breach of the relevant equitable duty does not negate the fact that ‘causality’ in the legal sense as limited by foreseeability at the time of breach does not apply in equity” (canson, at p 552). professor rotman explains the same point as follows: each starts with the idea of “but for,” “cause-in-fact,” or “sine qua non,” causation this generally satisfies equity, but the common law requires more; it demands a finding of materiality or substantial cause to link the impugned activity with the harm to the plaintiff. further, the common law imports ideas of foreseeability (or reasonable contemplation) and remoteness into its assessment of causality. . . . these other considerations do not readily enter into equity’s assessment of fiduciary accountability. (fiduciary law (2005), at p 634). see, also, target holdings, where lord browne-wilkinson observed that “the common law rules of remoteness of damage and causation do not apply” (p 434). [76] canada argues that in valuing the loss the benefit of hindsight cannot mean that the beneficiary is put in a better position than it would have been in had the fiduciary observed its duty at the time of breach. this argument was explicitly rejected by this court in blueberry river, where mclachlin j wrote that concern about “unexpected windfall” amounted to “bringing foreseeability into the fiduciary analysis through the back door” (para. 103). similarly, in guerin, compensation was assessed at a higher level than would have been possible at the moment of breach because the most valuable use of the asset between breach and date of trial was not foreseeable at the time of breach concerns about a “windfall” cannot therefore subtract from the “equitable approach of looking at what actually happened to values in later years” (canson, at p 551). equity will not be limited by foreseeability, unless it is “necessary to reach a just and fair result” (hodgkinson, at p 443, per la forest j). [77] there are very good reasons why foreseeability does not apply to the crown’s breach of fiduciary duty in this case. in canson, la forest j held that it would not apply where a fiduciary has discretionary control over a beneficiary’s property (p 578) indigenous interests in land are quasi-proprietary in nature; they are at the heart of the crown-indigenous relationship and are central to indigenous identity and culture (wewaykum, at paras. 74 and 86; osoyoos, at para. 46). moreover, in guerin, wilson j accepted that foreseeability would not apply to breaches of the crown’s fiduciary duty towards indigenous peoples (pp 360-62; see also whitefish lake, at paras. 52-55). the crown’s fiduciary duty is grounded in the honour of the crown and breaches of the duty are different in kind than private law breaches of contract or tort. (2) equitable presumptions [78] to achieve these purposes of equitable compensation, the assessment is also guided by presumptions that equity makes against breaching fiduciaries. [79] equity presumes that the plaintiff would have made the most favourable use of the trust property (guerin, at pp 362-63; canson, at p 545; oosterhoff on trusts: text, commentary and materials (9th ed 2019), by a. h. oosterhoff, r. chambers and m. mcinnes, at p 1018) in guerin, for example, the musqueam indian band expected certain advantageous terms in a lease agreement that canada negotiated on its behalf with a private developer. canada failed to secure those terms, but instead entered into a less-favourable agreement that was not authorized by the band in determining how to compensate the band for breach of canada’s fiduciary duty, however, the trial judge determined that the favourable lease terms were not the appropriate measure of compensation because no third party would have agreed to such terms and that measure of loss was not, therefore, causally connected to the breach. the trial judge then considered what the highest and best use of the asset was between breach and date of trial, finding that it was a residential development. this was even though the trial judge found that the area would likely not have developed until some years after the breach. as mclachlin j observed in canson, the trial judge “assessed, as best he could, the value of the actual opportunity lost as a result of the breach” (p 552). [80] the focus is always on whether the plaintiff’s lost opportunity was caused in fact by the fiduciary’s breach equity will assess that opportunity under the presumption that the beneficiary would have put the asset to its most favourable use. the most favourable use must be realistic. the common law requires a plaintiff to lead evidence to that effect. [81] there are additional equitable presumptions that are applicable in appropriate cases the presumption of legality, discussed in more detail below, prevents breaching fiduciaries from reducing compensation by arguing they would not have complied with the law. [82] another presumption, the so-called brickenden rule, applies where the fiduciary breached a duty to disclose material facts the breaching fiduciary is prevented from arguing that the outcome would be the same regardless of whether the facts were disclosed (brickenden v. london loan & savings co., [1934] 3 dlr 465 (pc)). [83] in summary, equitable compensation deters wrongful conduct by fiduciaries in order to enforce the relationship at the heart of the fiduciary duty it restores the opportunity that the plaintiff lost as a result of the fiduciary’s breach. the trial judge must begin by closely analyzing the nature of the fiduciary relationship so as to ensure that the loss is assessed in relation to the obligations undertaken by the fiduciary. the loss must be caused in fact by the fiduciary’s breach, but the causation analysis will not import foreseeability into breaches of the crown’s fiduciary duty towards indigenous peoples. equitable presumptions — including most favourable use — apply to the assessment of the loss. the most favourable use must be realistic. the trial judge must be satisfied that the assessment reflects the value the beneficiary could have actually received from the asset between breach and trial and the importance of the relationship between the crown and indigenous peoples. c application [84] in light of these principles, i turn now to the question of whether the trial judge erred in his assessment of equitable compensation. [85] the standards of review identified in housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, apply to awards of equitable compensation. questions of law are reviewable on a standard of correctness the application of the relevant equitable principles to the facts is reviewable on a standard of palpable and overriding error, absent an extricable error in principle which is reviewed on a correctness standard. as discussed below, the trial judge’s reasons are tainted by legal errors reviewable on a correctness standard. [86] as noted above, the trial judge concluded that canada owed a fiduciary duty to the lsfn and breached that duty. he determined that canada had the following specific obligations: (1) a duty of loyalty and good faith to the lsfn in the discharge of its mandate as trustee of the reserve land; (2) a duty to provide full disclosure and to consult with the band; (3) a duty to act with ordinary prudence with a view to the best interests of the first nation; and (4) a duty to protect and preserve the lsfn’s proprietary interest in the reserve from exploitation. further, the trial judge noted that canada’s duties may have expanded when it committed to the lsfn that it would protect its interest “to the fullest possible extent” (para. 227). the trial judge held that canada breached these duties. these findings are not challenged in this court. [87] however, the trial judge also concluded that canada’s duty only required it to obtain the amount provided for under general expropriation law as payment for a hypothetical flowage easement he reached this conclusion largely based on the following findings: the project could not be stopped because canada, ontario, and manitoba wanted it completed; the lsfn had little bargaining power to extract a better deal; canada could have lawfully expropriated the reserve land as a public work and paid only the amount required under applicable expropriation law; and, realistically, the lsfn would have surrendered the land or it would have been expropriated under those terms. the trial judge suggests that paying anything greater than fair market value would have violated canada’s duties to the canadian public. he assessed the value of the flooded land at an average of $1.29 an acre as bushland and waterfront land, based on canada’s evidence regarding the 1929 value of the land without the project. the trial judge determined the value of this loss at the time of the trial to be $3,272,572. [88] canada submits that the trial judge correctly considered the “non-breach” world and determined, based upon the evidence, that a flowage easement measured by expropriation values is what would have likely happened had canada not breached its duties. [89] i agree with the appellant that the trial judge erred in concluding that a hypothetical expropriation — the minimum statutory obligation — would have fulfilled canada’s fiduciary obligations. this legal error impacted his assessment of equitable compensation because it led him to rely on general principles of expropriation law to value the loss and to conclude that compensation would not be assessed at a higher value than the minimum required under an expropriation. the fundamental error of the trial judge was that he focused on what canada would likely have done instead of what canada ought to have done as a fiduciary. (1) the appellant is not precluded from raising these arguments on appeal [90] first, as a preliminary matter, i would reject canada’s argument that there are procedural obstacles to considering the merits of this appeal. canada submits that the appellant’s proposal to assess compensation on the basis of “the use of the lands for flooding purposes” is a new issue that is not properly before this court and should not be given effect by this court (rf, at para. 55). while it is true that the appellant’s theory of compensation has changed during this litigation, the approach of valuing the lands for flooding purposes was in issue at trial. [91] the argument that the appellant relies on at this court is the same argument relied on at the court of appeal and was subject to full submissions at both the court of appeal and this court the “use of the lands for flooding purposes” assessment is the approach that was accepted as one of two alternatives by gleason ja. in dissent below and rejected by nadon j.a, for the majority. [92] more importantly, the argument that the land should be valued on the basis of its use as flooded land for the project was an issue at trial the lsfn proposed various models of compensation at trial and the primary model — a revenue-sharing agreement — presumes that the use is as land flooded for hydroelectricity generation. according to the trial judge, the lsfn’s main theory at trial was the “loss of opportunity for hydroelectric benefits” (para 10) the appellant’s expert witness, norris wilson, also testified that the value of the land must include the anticipated improvements in the land due to the hydroelectricity project. the trial judge rejected this approach (para 380) the evidence from the kananaskis falls and related agreements was also available to the trial judge and the trial judge correctly understood the implication of this evidence to be that the land would be valued on the basis of its “usefulness in connection with the development of power” (para. 381). the trial judge acknowledged that those agreements were “relied upon by the lsfn as a precedent of what canada ought to have obtained to protect the interests of the lsfn” (para. 24). thus, i see no bar to addressing the merits of this appeal. (2) the nature of the fiduciary obligations [93] following the approach taken by this court in guerin, the first step in assessing equitable compensation is to determine what the fiduciary would have been expected to do had it not breached its obligations. [94] in applying what canada’s obligations to the lsfn required in this case, the trial judge focused on the fact that canada could legally expropriate the land under s 48 of the indian act because the project was a public work. this led the trial judge to improperly conclude that canada’s fiduciary obligations required canada to do no more than the minimum required in an expropriation of fee simple lands. as i shall explain, the fiduciary duty required more than compensation based upon expropriation principles in this case for three reasons. first, the presence of legal discretion to take or expropriate the land in s 48 of the indian act did not define the obligations imposed by canada’s fiduciary duty. second, the fact that the land was required for a public work did not negate the obligations imposed by canada’s fiduciary duty. and third, the principles of expropriation law are fundamentally different than those underlying indigenous interest in land. instead, the fiduciary obligations in this case must reflect the nature of the interest, the impact of the loss on the first nation, the importance of the fiduciary relationship, and reconciliation, which is the overarching goal of the fiduciary duty itself, based in the honour of the crown. [95] therefore, for reasons that follow, i conclude that even though the land was needed for a public work, the fiduciary duty still required canada to first attempt to negotiate a surrender with the lsfn. if negotiations failed and canada expropriated the land under s 48, it would at least have had to provide fair compensation reflecting the land’s use as water storage for hydroelectricity generation. (a) the presence of legal discretion in section 48 of the indian act [96] the provisions of the indian act in force at the time provided two routes to remove land from a reserve: a taking and a surrender. sections 50 and 51 provided that reserve land could be surrendered to the crown with the consent of the first nation. alternatively, subs. 48(1) provided that land could be taken for a public work, but only with the “consent of the governor in council” and “subject to the terms and conditions imposed by such consent”. compensation was to be governed by the “requirements applicable to the like proceedings by such company, municipal or local authority in ordinary cases” unless “otherwise provided by the order in council” (subs. 48(2)). the indian act did not, therefore, limit the discretion of the crown to negotiate, or the discretion of the governor in council to determine the terms of a taking. there was no conflict between the requirements of the statute and the requirements imposed by the fiduciary duty. the statute accommodated the exercise of the crown’s fiduciary duty by recognizing the discretion to provide for special requirements. [97] the provisions in s 48 must therefore be understood in light of the pre- existing fiduciary duty of the crown the fiduciary duty, not just the indian act, imposed substantive obligations on how canada was to exercise its discretion over the reserve land. dickson j explained the relationship between the crown’s discretion its fiduciary duty as follows: “. . . discretion on the part of the crown, far from ousting, as the crown contends, the jurisdiction of the courts to regulate the relationship between the crown and the indians, has the effect of transforming the crown’s obligation into a fiduciary one” (guerin, at p 384). similarly, wagner j (as he then was) recently stated that the “fiduciary obligation requires that the crown’s discretionary control be exercised in accordance with the standard of conduct to which equity holds a fiduciary” and that this is embodied in the “fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith and full disclosure” (see williams lake, at para 46) equity, by its very nature, imposes additional considerations. the legal authority of the crown in s 48 does not answer the question of what the fiduciary duty required in this case that authority imposed a minimum — not a maximum — requirement on the exercise of the crown’s discretion. the presence of legal discretion in the indian act, did not, therefore, negate or define the obligations imposed by the crown’s fiduciary duty. [98] the effect of the trial judge’s reliance on the legal powers conferred in the indian act also raises a question regarding the role of the presumption of legality in this case. the presumption of legality or lawfulness is an equitable presumption meant to prevent fiduciaries from reducing compensation by arguing that they would have broken the law (whitefish lake, at para. 69). it cannot be inverted and used instead to limit compensation by suggesting that the fiduciary is expected to do no more than what the law, not equity, requires. the trial judge placed great emphasis on what canada would have done had it acted “legally” and equated this with what canada should have done had it fulfilled its fiduciary duty (see, eg, para. 358). however, correctly applied, the presumption of legality simply means that canada is prevented from arguing that it would not have complied with the rules in the indian act or treaty 3. the presumption is of little assistance in determining either the fiduciary obligations or the assessment of loss in this case. [99] the trial judge’s reasons can also be read as relying on the legal powers conferred in s 48 to improperly focus on the inequality of bargaining power between the lsfn and canada, its fiduciary, as a factor to limit compensation. it is appropriate in assessing the lost opportunity to consider as one factor what third parties, such as ontario or manitoba, would have been willing to pay and what their relative bargaining power was. however, the trial judge should not consider the “little leverage” the first nation had with its fiduciary in assessing compensation (para. 318). obviously, canada is not permitted to use its legal power over the beneficiary to force an unfair settlement on the beneficiary. such reasoning effectively turns canada’s fiduciary obligation on its head, allowing canada to benefit from the very discretionary power over the lsfn which is the source of its fiduciary duty. [100] the legal authority of canada to expropriate the land under s 48 therefore does not define the fiduciary duty in this case. (b) the presence of a public work [101] because of canada’s public responsibilities to canadians generally, it may sometimes need to consider broader public interests in addition to its sui generis fiduciary duty to indigenous peoples while an ordinary fiduciary is not generally permitted to balance its own interests against those of the beneficiary, here, s 48 empowers canada to expropriate reserve land without consent if the land is needed for a public work however, this court’s jurisprudence shows that the fiduciary duty continues to apply even if the land is needed for a public work. [102] this court held in guerin that canada could not escape liability in equity by arguing that it was only bound by a public trust. in other words, the court rejected the idea that the fiduciary duty is comparable to the normal exercise of government powers that balances competing priorities or interests. this was confirmed in osoyoos where iacobucci j applied the fiduciary duty to expropriations and wrote that the “public interest [cannot] trump” the indigenous interests (para. 52) in osoyoos, the court explicitly rejected canada’s argument that the fiduciary duty does not arise if there is a conflict between canada’s public law duties and its obligation to hold reserve land for the benefit of a first nation (para. 51) while the crown can decide that a public work is in the public interest and should thus proceed, the manner in which it proceeds is subject to the fiduciary duty (para. 52; s. luk, “not so many hats: the crown’s fiduciary obligations to aboriginal communities since guerin” (2013), 76 sask. l. rev. 1, at p 17). [103] similarly, this court’s statement in wewaykum that the crown is expected to “have regard to the interest of all affected parties, not just the indian interest”, does not support the argument that canada must simply balance existing indigenous interests in reserve land against other public interests (para. 96). in wewaykum, canada owed a narrower fiduciary duty towards the various first nations because canada’s actions took place prior to reserve creation and involved land on which the first nations did not claim title based on an existing aboriginal or treaty right. the first nations therefore did not have a quasi-proprietary interest in the land at issue at the relevant time (para. 96; luk, at p 19). while canada had an obligation of loyalty, good faith, full disclosure, and ordinary diligence, there was no obligation to protect the quasi- proprietary interest. the court emphasized, however, that once a reserve is created, the fiduciary duty expands to include the obligation of “protection and preservation of the band’s quasi-proprietary interest in the reserve from exploitation” and this includes protection from “exploitation by the crown itself” (wewaykum, at paras. 86 and 100). in this case, there is no dispute that the lsfn had a quasi-proprietary interest in the reserve. (c) the content of the fiduciary duty flows from the nature of the indigenous interest and is not defined by expropriation principles [104] in the context of an expropriation or taking, our jurisprudence has imposed a duty requiring the crown to minimally impair the protected interest (osoyoos, at para. 52) this means that the crown must preserve the indigenous interest “to the greatest extent practicable” (para 53) this requirement of minimal impairment is consistent with binnie j.’s observation in wewaykum that the fiduciary duty also prevents exploitation of indigenous interests by the crown, not just by third parties. an apparent conflict with the general fiduciary obligation of strict loyalty is created where the crown decides that reserve land is necessary for a public work and takes that land without the consent of the first nation to resolve this tension, the fiduciary duty requires the crown to seriously consider the impact on the first nation and how best to minimize that impact. as a fiduciary, the crown has the duty to preserve the first nation’s quasi-proprietary interest in the land as much as possible and to ensure fair compensation reflecting the sui generis interest this duty applies even where the crown considers a taking to be necessary for the public interest. [105] canada submits that the duty to preserve the interest to the greatest extent possible is met even if expropriation principles are applied in this case. i cannot agree. under an expropriation of fee simple land, the value of the land to the public work is generally removed from compensation. therefore, even though the expropriation value considers the highest and best use of the land at the time of expropriation, this generally does not include the value of the land to the scheme itself (r. mainville, an overview of aboriginal and treaty rights and compensation for their breach (2001), at pp. 88- 89). this is because expropriation law prevents landowners from reaping a windfall from the public work, and instead seeks to provide them with the compensation necessary to purchase replacement land. conversely, in osoyoos, the court emphasized the unique importance of indigenous interests in land: they are at the centre of the relationship between the crown and indigenous peoples and are not fungible commodities that can be easily replaced by buying additional fee simple land (paras. 45-46; mainville, at p 106) this led the court to affirm that the principles underlying indigenous interests in land are fundamentally different from the principles underlying expropriation law (osoyoos, at para 45) expropriation law reflects fee simple interests in land, not the sui generis indigenous interests in land although expropriation law “can serve as a reference point from which to consider compensation in cases of justifiable infringements of aboriginal or treaty rights, . . . it cannot serve as the governing legal framework in such cases” (mainville, at p 106). expropriation law is not the appropriate legal framework governing historic breaches of the crown’s fiduciary duty to protect a first nation’s interest in reserve land. [106] if expropriation law does not limit the fiduciary duty in this case, there is no basis to say that canada’s duty to preserve the lsfn’s interest to the greatest extent possible must exclude a duty to obtain compensation for the value of the land to the scheme instead, given the lsfn’s sui generis interest in the reserve land and the impact on the lsfn, the duty here clearly required canada to capture the full potential value of the land for the lsfn. to that end, the highest and best use of the land at the time of breach was clearly the land’s intended use as water storage for hydroelectricity generation. [107] there is no doubt that the nature of the interest impacted in this case is of fundamental importance to the lsfn and lies at the heart of its relationship with the crown. it is a quasi-proprietary interest in 11,304 acres of reserve land that was set aside for the lsfn’s communal use in exchange for traditional territory that it surrendered in treaty 3. the location of the reserve was established in consultation with the lsfn. the land was chosen because of its economic, cultural, and spiritual importance to its members. the land sustained its way of life, and the proximity to lac seul was particularly important. the riparian area — the area that was flooded — was of special importance to the lsfn. it is where its members hunted, trapped, fished and cultivated wild rice, built their homes and grew their gardens. [108] expropriation principles are also inappropriate given the tremendous impact that canada knew the project would have on the lsfn. here, canada knew early in the development of the project that the impact would be catastrophic. as the trial judge noted, the local government supervisor observed at the time that the reserve would be “ruined for any purpose [for] which it was set aside” (trial reasons, at para. 156). this was followed by repeated warnings of the impact of the flooding. and the impact was ultimately as bad as had been feared. after the water levels rose, 11,304 acres of the reserve were left flooded and rendered permanently unusable. the flooded sections were the most important sections of the reserve — the lakefront land — land that was central to the life of the first nation. the project caused “very considerable” damage to the reserve (para. 152, quoting ar. supp., vol. lii, at p 316) and mr. bury understood, at the time, what was expected of canada given the enormous impact: “. . generous monetary compensation” (para. 156). [109] the nature of the interest and the impact on the first nation will always be relevant to assessing the appropriate compensation for the use of its reserve land. because a first nation must consent in a negotiated surrender, its members will clearly consider the interest they are giving up and the impact on their community. and canada must also consider these factors as part of its obligation to protect the first nation against an improvident bargain. equally, where canada proceeds through a taking, the fiduciary duty requires canada to consider both the nature of the interest and the impact of the taking on the first nation in assessing how to minimally impair the protected interest. [110] while legal expropriation represents the minimum entitlement, this is not to suggest that the value of compensation in equity will always exceed a comparable expropriation of fee simple land. however, canada is never entitled to proceed in the same manner as an expropriation of fee simple lands. canada must always keep the first nation informed, attempt to negotiate a surrender before proceeding to an expropriation, and ensure compensation reflecting the nature of the interest and the impact on the community. (d) summary of the fiduciary obligations [111] therefore, the trial judge’s description of the fiduciary obligations in this case was based on his narrow focus on legal discretion in s 48. even though 11,304 acres, or 17 percent of the reserve, would be flooded, the trial judge determined that s 48 allowed canada to take the land for its value under expropriation law — without regard to the value of the land to the project — and that the fiduciary duty required no more. this is despite the fact that canada was warned that the reserve would be “ruined for any purpose [for] which it was set aside”. i disagree. the fiduciary duty set a higher bar than expropriation law given the sui generis interest in the reserve land and the tremendous impact on the lsfn. [112] instead, canada ought to have first attempted to negotiate a surrender. canada’s fiduciary obligations to preserve the lsfn’s quasi-proprietary interest, advance its best interests, and protect it from an improvident bargain required it to ensure the highest compensation possible the lsfn’s interest in the reserve land included an interest in its anticipated use — which was as land for hydroelectricity generation. canada was under an obligation to secure compensation for this value if the project was to go forward and the fact that the land was needed for a public work did not change this. [113] if negotiations for a surrender of the land by the lsfn under s 50 of the indian act were unsuccessful, canada could have proceeded through a taking under s 48. however, given the impact of the flooding on the lsfn, cabinet would have had to seriously consider how to fulfill canada’s fiduciary duty in the context of an expropriation. in a memorandum from may 1929, mr. bury suggested that exclusive trapping rights would have to be given to the lsfn, at least for a period of time, while the deputy superintendent general suggested allocating hunting and fishing grounds elsewhere. cabinet may have decided, for example, to set aside additional reserve land or fishing or harvesting rights for the lsfn in addition to providing financial compensation. even in an expropriation, canada was required to preserve the lsfn’s interest in the land to the greatest extent possible and should have secured compensation for the lsfn that reflected the nature of the interest, the impact on the community, and the value of the land to the project. [114] in sum, the trial judge was correct that canada’s fiduciary obligations to the lsfn included a duty of loyalty and good faith; a duty to provide full disclosure and to consult with the lsfn; a duty to act with ordinary prudence with a view to its best interests; and a duty to protect and preserve the lsfn’s proprietary interest in the reserve from exploitation. if canada pursued a negotiated surrender, it would have to advance the best interests of the lsfn and protect it from an improvident bargain. in an expropriation, canada would also have to minimally impair the protected interest. however, the duty to preserve and protect the lsfn’s sui generis interest in the reserve is not satisfied by the application of expropriation principles instead, given the nature of the interest and the harm to the lsfn, canada was obligated to negotiate in order to secure compensation reflecting that impact and the value of the land for its anticipated use — hydroelectricity generation. it should have negotiated for the best possible compensation. canada breached this obligation. (3) the loss [115] the value of the loss flows from the nature of the breach and the obligations that the fiduciary should have fulfilled. the valuation of the loss must reflect canada’s obligation to negotiate compensation based upon the best price that could have been obtained for the land’s use for hydroelectricity generation. [116] here, the trial judge valued the land as bushland and waterfront land. his assessment of equitable compensation flows from his conclusion that expropriation was permitted under the indian act and that canada would likely have compensated on the basis of expropriation law, excluding the value of the land as water storage for the project itself this improper conclusion underlies the trial judge’s rejection of the appellant’s proposed methods of valuation at trial. [117] at trial, the appellant primarily relied on the hypothetical of a revenue- sharing agreement as the best valuation, but its experts also put forward additional models for evaluating the lost opportunity, including contemporaneous agreements reached with another first nation. canada’s experts put forward evidence regarding the expropriation value the trial judge rejected any valuation greater than a hypothetical flowage easement based upon the limited value that expropriation law would have permitted. [118] i have already determined that equitable compensation in this case should have been assessed on the basis that canada was under an obligation to negotiate in order to obtain the best possible compensation based upon the value of the land to the project. the question is how to assess this value. (a) application of equitable compensation principles [119] before considering how to value the lsfn’s lost opportunity, it is necessary to clarify how the principles of equitable compensation apply in this appeal. [120] first, in my view, the trial judge was correct in assessing compensation on the basis of what would have happened at the time of breach had canada fulfilled its fiduciary duty unlike guerin, this is not a case in which the plaintiff is advancing different, more valuable uses of the land than the use that the land was actually put to. instead, the appellant submits that the land should be valued on the basis of its actual use as flooded land for hydroelectricity generation and that this is the most valuable use. in other words, the loss is the lost opportunity to negotiate compensation for the land’s use for hydroelectricity generation, not as the opportunity to put the land to other uses since 1929. because of the presumption of highest and best use, there may be cases where a first nation seeks compensation for other valuable uses even where it was inevitable that the land would have been used for a public work. however, in this case, the focus is on the use that the land was actually put to. [121] there were two options available to canada: a negotiated surrender under s 51 and a taking under s 48. canada concedes that the lost opportunity in this case includes the opportunity to negotiate a surrender. similarly, the trial judge accepted that canada should have attempted to negotiate a surrender before pursuing a taking (para. 322). in my view, equitable compensation should be assessed on the basis of a negotiated surrender. a negotiated surrender more clearly aligns with the nature of the breach, which included a failure to keep the lsfn informed and a failure to prevent the project from proceeding until the negotiation for compensation had been resolved. as rowe j recently emphasized in a different context, negotiation can foster reconciliation (desautel, at paras. 87-91) compensation was based on negotiated agreements with non-indigenous parties, including the hudson’s bay company and the anglican church missionary society, even though canada and ontario owed no fiduciary duty to those parties. [122] the presumption of most favourable use and valuable accounting also allows equitable compensation to focus on a successful negotiation in this case. the presumption focuses on choices that would be available to the beneficiary in a non- breach world, thus maintaining the causal connection. for example, equity presumes that the beneficiary would have sold securities at their highest value or developed land in the most advantageous way (guerin, at p 362). here, canada should have negotiated compensation for the lsfn for the best possible price, which in this case was the value of the land to the project, without the limitations of expropriation law equity can presume that the lsfn would have consented to a negotiated settlement at the best price the crown could have realistically obtained at the time. but the trial judge must determine what the highest value of the land to the project realistically was in 1929. as i will explain below, that value of the compensation that canada should have negotiated for the lsfn is not determined based on an evidentiary presumption. it is based on evidence that was available to the trial judge, such as comparable agreements with another first nation. [123] as the trial judge correctly noted, equitable compensation is a discretionary remedy that is assessed and not precisely calculated (para. 465, citing whitefish lake, at para. 90). it is unlikely that the trial judge could recreate with mathematical precision what would have happened nearly a century ago had canada fulfilled its duty. instead, a trial judge will often have to provide a global assessment of the lost opportunity and that assessment needs to be realistic. this will often require that the trial judge assess various hypotheticals or proxies for that value. [124] in my view, the benefit of hindsight also has a narrow application in this case, as noted by gleason ja (ca reasons, at para. 60). the benefit of hindsight simply means that equitable compensation is not limited by foreseeability (canson, at p 555). as an illustrative example, the benefit of hindsight would be highly relevant if the trial judge had determined that the lost opportunity included the opportunity to receive an equity interest in the project had canada fulfilled its obligations. following the example from guerin, that interest would be valued at the date of trial on the basis of facts known at trial — such as the development of additional power sites — that were not foreseeable at the time of breach but would clearly impact the value of any ownership interest in the project however, the benefit of hindsight does not aid in determining whether an equity interest is part of the lost opportunity in the first place. again, the trial judge must rely on evidence to assess the value of the land to the project at the time of breach. [125] finally, the appellant submits that canada has an ongoing fiduciary duty in respect of the reserve land because the land was never lawfully taken and the third party use of the land cannot be undone. for the appellant, the fact that the land was flooded without legal authorization appears to be relevant to the assessment of equitable compensation because it means that the ongoing nature of the breach must also be compensated. [126] i agree that canada has an ongoing fiduciary duty in respect of the reserve land. however, in my view, characterizing the breach as ongoing does not affect the assessment of compensation in the way the appellant suggests. the ongoing dimension of a breach is accommodated in a number of ways in equity. properly understood, the presumptions of most favourable use and the benefit of hindsight recognize the ongoing dimension of the lost opportunity. if, for example, the beneficiary was deprived of the opportunity to put an interest to another use, equity already adopts the perspective that the interest is back in the hands of the beneficiary and then considers the most advantageous use to which the beneficiary would have put the interest between breach and trial this was explained in re dawson, at p 406, and adopted by wilson j in guerin, at pp. 361-62: the obligation to restore to the estate the assets of which he deprived it necessarily connotes that, where a monetary compensation is to be paid in lieu of restoring assets, that compensation is to be assessed by reference to the value of the assets at the date of restoration and not at the date of deprivation. in this sense the obligation is a continuing one and ordinarily, if the assets are for some reason not restored in specie, it will fall for quantification at the date when recoupment is to be effected, and not before. [emphasis added.] [127] focusing on the lawfulness of the taking would not modify or aid the analysis of the value of the lsfn’s lost opportunity. the central inquiry remains: what is the measure of the plaintiff’s lost opportunity in light of the breach? the lost opportunity at issue in this case is the opportunity to negotiate a surrender reflecting the highest value of the land, which was its anticipated use for hydroelectricity generation. this is the obligation that canada failed to meet. the fact that canada also failed to meet its obligation to comply with the provisions in the indian act does not ultimately change the value of that lost opportunity. [128] this is not to suggest that the lawfulness of the taking should have no impact on the assessment of equitable compensation equitable compensation must fulfill the deterrent objectives of equity deterrence, in this context, aims at the fundamental goal of reconciliation and upholds the honour of the crown the lawfulness of the taking could inform whether the award — in addition to compensating for the value of the lost opportunity — fulfills the deterrent function of equity. [129] in conclusion, the lsfn is entitled to compensation for the lost opportunity to negotiate a surrender of the flooded land based on its value to hydroelectricity generation. this requires the trial judge to presume that the project would have moved forward and that canada would have fulfilled its fiduciary obligation at that time by ensuring the best possible compensation for the lsfn based on the value of the land to the project. (b) valuing the lost opportunity [130] the issue remains how to assess compensation based on the lost opportunity to negotiate a surrender reflecting the value of the land to the project. in valuing the lost opportunity, the trial judge must assume that canada fulfilled the fiduciary obligations required in a negotiated surrender, including the obligations to keep the lsfn fully informed, advance its best interests, and protect it from an improvident bargain. [131] the appellant submits that, because we know the use the land was put to, it was inappropriate for the trial judge to consider a hypothetical surrender or expropriation to assess the value of that use. i cannot agree. while there is only one proposed use of the land, the trial judge still has to determine how to value that use and the valuation must be causally connected to the breach of canada’s obligations. because the lsfn is to be compensated for the land’s value to the project, on the basis that it was going forward, the trial judge must consider how canada could have proceeded to fulfill its duty the error in the trial judge’s reasons is not that he considered hypotheticals to value the lost opportunity, but that he relied on a hypothetical expropriation that would not have fulfilled canada’s fiduciary obligations. [132] the trial judge should account for any uncertainty or realistic contingencies in assessing the evidence regarding the value of the land in a negotiated surrender the idea of realistic contingencies, which was accepted by this court in guerin, simply reinforces the principle that the loss must be caused in fact by the breach. the trial judge has to be satisfied that the lost opportunity represents what could have happened had canada fulfilled its obligations it does not mean, as canada suggests, that the fiduciary obligations themselves can be defined according to what realistically would have happened. the fiduciary obligations must always be defined first, and then the trial judge assesses reasonable, or realistic, outcomes in light of those obligations as gleason j.a correctly noted, the trial judge must take into account “events that could have occurred had the fiduciary duty not been breached and that might have increased (or decreased) the value of what the beneficiary lost as a result of the breach” (ca reasons, at para. 82). [133] at trial, the appellant led evidence from the kananaskis falls projects that showed that negotiations in comparable projects led to substantial compensation based upon the lands’ “usefulness in connection with the development of power”. the trial judge rejected this evidence and did not assess any value for the lost opportunity to negotiate. [134] in my view, the evidence from the kananaskis falls projects was relevant to the assessment of loss in this case. the trial judge distinguished this evidence based on one factor: calgary power could not expropriate the land for the kananaskis falls projects, but canada could expropriate the land for this project. however, this factor is not material. what is relevant is that canada, the fiduciary, had an obligation to get the best value for the land’s intended use, notwithstanding its legal power to expropriate. with respect to the kananaskis falls projects, canada insisted that calgary power negotiate agreements with the first nation reflecting the value of its lands to the project. in this project, canada did not do so. [135] canada submits that the court should defer to the trial judge’s findings on the kananaskis falls projects. however, but for the legal determination that canada was under no legal duty to compensate for more than an expropriation, the trial judge’s factual findings support the view that the kananaskis falls projects were relevant to the valuation of the flooded lands in this case. [136] the appellant led evidence at trial regarding the compensation that canada negotiated on behalf of the stoney indian band for the kananaskis falls projects:  horseshoe falls 1909: calgary power purchased 1,000 acres at $10 per acre plus a perpetual lease for $1,500 per year;  kananaskis falls 1914: the pre-project value of the land was $5 to $7 per acre, but canada requested payment of either $320 to $360 per acre, as a one-time payment, or an annual rent plus $60 to $90 per acre as a one-time payment to reflect the value of the land to the project. this is a very substantial premium on the traditional use valuation of the land. calgary power ultimately agreed to pay $9,000 for 93.85 acres ($95.90 per acre) plus $1,500 annually;  ghost river 1929: calgary power agreed to pay $21,200 for 1,324.3 acres of land ($16.00 per acre) plus 50 percent of the water power in rental fees. [137] the trial judge made three relevant findings based on these projects: (1) hydroelectric benefits to the first nation were allocated on the basis of the dam location, not on the basis of the lands flooded to create the water reservoir; (2) flooded lands were compensated at a fixed one-time price per acre; (3) the value of the flooded lands was not based on their value as agricultural lands but on their “usefulness in connection with the development of the power” (para. 345) based on this, the trial judge determined that the lsfn would have been compensated with a one-time payment because the water power site was not located on the reserve. however, when the trial judge assessed the value of that payment, he did not provide compensation for the value of the land to the project for only one reason: canada could expropriate the lsfn’s land and was not required to do anything more. this is contrary to the approach taken in kananaskis falls where canada sought compensation for the flooded lands’ “considerable value” in connection with the development of hydroelectricity. absent this error, the trial judge’s findings established that the flooded land was valued based on its usefulness to the project. [138] obviously, these agreements provide relevant historical evidence of how much of a premium on the undeveloped value of the land may be warranted in this case. this is not to suggest that there is no basis upon which to distinguish the various agreements reached in the kananaskis falls projects as they relate to the valuation of the loss caused by canada’s failure to negotiate. it is up to the trial judge to assess how the differences in the location of the dam, or the amount of land involved, or the nature of the impact on the first nation, would impact the value of the land for flooding purposes. here, the trial judge determined that the evidence from the kananaskis falls projects did not support a yearly rental agreement for the lsfn because the power site was not located on the reserve. however, in assessing a lost opportunity to negotiate, the trial judge must consider all factors that would distinguish the kananaskis falls projects from this project, including the fact that the lsfn was contributing a significantly greater amount of land than the stoney indian band had. [139] the trial judge had other proxies for measuring the value of the land to the project. for example, the lsfn led evidence regarding the value of a land lease. in that model, the lsfn’s expert, arthur j. hosios, valued the lost opportunity if the flooded land had been rented for comparable treaty 3 rates since the time of breach. the land lease model assumed the flooded land would be rented for $1.97 an acre beginning in 1929 and, adjusted only for inflation, produced a value of $149,023,172 at the time of trial (although the model assumed 14,891 acres of flooded land instead of the 11,304 acres agreed at trial) at the very least, these values could have impacted canada’s negotiating position on behalf of the lsfn it was also open to the trial judge to consider the evidence from later agreements where canada was clearly fulfilling its obligations as a fiduciary. [140] the trial judge should also give appropriate weight to the evidence regarding the impact on the community and the lsfn’s perspective. a relevant factor to a negotiated surrender is clearly the impact on the first nation and the importance of the land to the first nation negotiations are not one-sided and the lsfn’s perspective is an important consideration. and, if we presume that canada had fulfilled its fiduciary obligations, the lsfn would have gone into the negotiations fully informed of the significant value of its land to the project and the anticipated impact on its communities. [141] canada submits that even if it had been under an obligation to negotiate for the value of the land to the project, it would be improper to compensate the lsfn on this basis because there is no evidence that ontario or manitoba would have been willing to pay more than the expropriation value. on this view, any compensation in excess of expropriation principles is not caused by the breach and does not represent an opportunity the lsfn lost. [142] i cannot agree. the lsfn cannot provide evidence showing definitively what level of compensation ontario, manitoba, or canada would have agreed to in 1929 had canada made it clear that the project would be delayed until the issue of compensation was resolved. the lsfn cannot prove what compensation could have been negotiated precisely because canada failed to fulfill its fiduciary duty. additional useful evidence that could inform the level of compensation that ontario or manitoba would have accepted could include the kananaskis falls projects, the economic fundamentals of the project, and the anticipated benefit that the provinces stood to receive from the project. the lsfn did advance evidence at trial showing how cost- effective the project was and the incredible economic advantages that it conferred on ontario and manitoba the evidence shows that the parties were very motivated to finish this project and realize its economic benefits. for example, in the 1930s, canada spent over $850,000 on a failed timber clearing project to advance the project and resolve an impasse with ontario. [143] thus, equitable compensation must reflect canada’s obligation to ensure the lsfn was compensated for the value of the land to the project given the nature of the interest and the impact on the lsfn. the trial judge should have considered the kananaskis falls projects and other evidence available at trial as relevant proxies for what this premium was worth the trial judge also had evidence at trial regarding agreements that were reached with another first nation. [144] after assessing the lost opportunity, the trial judge must determine whether the new total compensation award is sufficient to fulfill the deterrent function of equity (hodgkinson, at p 453) deterrence has special importance in this case because deterring the crown from breaching its fiduciary duty encourages it to act honourably and orients it towards the ongoing project of reconciliation as this court stated in williams lake, the just resolution of claims arising from the crown’s failure to honour its obligations is essential to reconciliation (para 2) given the facts of this case, including canada’s “inexplicable” conduct, the fact the land was never legally surrendered or taken, and the significant harm to the lsfn, the trial judge must seriously consider whether the total award will be an effective deterrent, thus reflecting the honour of the crown and the goal of reconciliation. [145] in conclusion, the assessment of the lost opportunity was flawed because it was based on an incorrect view of what the fiduciary duty required. by valuing the loss as the amount required under expropriation law, the trial judge failed to account for a fiduciary obligation to negotiate for compensation reflecting the lsfn’s interest in the reserve land, impact on the community, and the value of the land given its intended use as water storage for hydroelectricity generation as a result, the assessment of the value of the flooded land must be reassessed the trial judge’s assessment of other losses were not challenged in this appeal. similarly, i take no issue with the manner in which the trial judge brought forward historic losses to present value. iv conclusion [146] a hypothetical flowage easement at $1.29 an acre is not an appropriate measure of compensation in this case because it does not reflect the value of the land to the project. the sole basis for this valuation is the conclusion that because the project was a public work, and canada could have expropriated the land, canada was not expected to secure compensation for the lsfn reflecting the value of its land to the project i cannot agree as i have explained, this approach is inconsistent with the unique nature of the indigenous interest in reserve land and the devastating impact of the flooding on the lsfn. it does not reflect the honour of the crown nor serve the overarching goal of reconciliation. the lsfn is entitled to equitable compensation for the lost opportunity to negotiate for an agreement reflecting the value of the land to the hydroelectricity generation project. [147] the award for equitable compensation must be returned for reassessment in accordance with these reasons. i would allow the appeal with costs to the appellant throughout. i would set aside the judgment of the court of appeal and the trial judge’s award of equitable damages and return that question to the trial court for reassessment. the following are the reasons delivered by côté j — [148] canada breached its fiduciary duty to lac seul first nation (“lsfn”) when it unlawfully allowed the flooding of over 11,000 acres (or approximately 4575 hectares) of lsfn reserve lands for a hydroelectric project that was completed in 1929 (“project”) the flooding had devastating effects on lsfn, including the complete deprivation of the use and benefit of a large part of its reserve. canada did not obtain the right to flood the lands through either of the two routes established by the indian act, rsc 1927, c 98, as it read in 1929: it neither sought lsfn’s consent to surrender the lands, nor did it expropriate the lands. [149] no party to this appeal questions this reality canada acknowledges its breach of fiduciary duty and its “inexplicable” historical treatment of the appellants, and rightly so the question, then, is how to compensate for the harms caused by canada’s breach in a manner that accords with settled equitable compensation principles the appellants contest the basis upon which the trial judge calculated an aspect of the equitable compensation he awarded, namely the value attributed to the flooded lands (2017 fc 906, [2018] 4 cnlr 63). canada submits that, to the extent that a financial award can accomplish it, the amount awarded by the trial judge for the fair market value of the flooded lands, in combination with the award for non-calculable losses, fairly and reasonably compensates the appellants for their losses. [150] both the majority judges and the dissenting judge at the federal court of appeal were in complete agreement on two issues (2019 fca 171, [2020] 1 fcr. 745). first, the court of appeal unanimously found that the trial judge correctly held that there was no basis to award compensation for loss of a revenue-sharing agreement and that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding that the lac seul situation was not comparable to the other revenue-sharing situations on which the appellants relied. second, with respect to the trial judge’s conclusions on one-time compensation for the loss of the flooded lands, the court of appeal agreed that there was no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s conclusion that, had canada expropriated the flooded lands in 1929, it would not have paid more than the fair market value of $1.29 per acre. the sole disagreement between the majority and the dissent concerned the appellants’ second submission regarding the trial judge’s conclusions on one-time compensation, namely that he had erred in distinguishing the kananaskis falls development project (“kananaskis project”) from the lac seul situation. [151] however, my colleagues in the majority go further than the court of appeal, seemingly undertaking a fresh equitable compensation analysis. the majority does not agree with the trial judge’s assessment of equitable compensation, not because of any palpable and overriding error that he committed, but because his assessment does not accord with the majority’s view that lsfn is entitled to equitable compensation for the lost opportunity to negotiate an agreement reflecting the value of the lands for hydroelectric purposes specifically, as opposed to equitable compensation for the lost opportunity to negotiate generally. [152] the value of the compensation that canada should have negotiated for lsfn cannot be determined in an evidentiary or factual vacuum, and it is improper to fault a trier of fact regarding possible alternative findings based on a newly raised theory of the case. that is not the proper standard of appellate review. in my view, the majority of the federal court of appeal was correct to find that there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s equitable compensation assessment as i will explain below, the trial judge assessed compensation for the value of the flooded lands in 1929 based on a thorough examination of the facts as established in the record i find no reviewable error in the trial judge’s analysis, and i would dismiss the appeal. i. standard of review [153] while the majority largely refrains from discussing the applicable standard of review, the parties took opposing positions concerning the proper standard for questions related to the trial judge’s compensation assessment therefore, clear guidance on this point ought to be provided. [154] appellate review of an award of damages is to be conducted in accordance with the standards of review articulated in housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235. the appellants submit that the errors in this case relate to the failure of the courts below to correctly apply the legal principles they identified, and therefore should be assessed on a correctness standard. the respondent submits that the issues raised by the appellants are matters of mixed fact and law and that there are no extricable questions of law to which the standard of correctness applies. [155] both parties rely on the same passage from whitefish lake band of indians v canada (attorney general), 2007 onca 744, 87 o.r (3d) 321, at para. 28, although the respondent emphasizes the first sentence and the appellants focus on the second: a trial judge’s damages or compensation assessment is entitled to considerable deference on appeal. an appellate court should interfere with that assessment only if it is tainted by an error in principle, or is unreasonably high or low. [156] a similar pronouncement was made by justice wilson in guerin v. the queen, [1984] 2 scr 335, at p 363: “. . . i do not think it is the function of this court to interfere with the quantum of damages awarded by the trial judge if no error in principle in determining the measure of damages has been demonstrated. . . . the trial judge’s task was not an easy one but i think he ‘did the best he could’ . . . .” [157] thus, the question to be decided is whether the assessment is tainted by a reviewable error the appellants attempt to get around this exacting standard by asserting that the courts below erred in “apprehending how the assessment of equitable compensation should be carried out”, which they suggest is an “extricable question of principle or pure law [that is] reviewable on a correctness standard” (af, at para. 72). i disagree. not only is the trial judge’s determination that the appellants should have been compensated through a one-time payment in 1929 based on an expropriation model in accordance with the indian act not an extricable error, and thus not reviewable on a correctness standard, but the appellants have also not identified any particular findings of fact by the trial judge as constituting a palpable and overriding error. [158] under the standard of review for questions of mixed fact and law, “an appellate court’s role is not to reconsider the evidence globally and reach its own conclusions, but simply to ensure that the trial judge’s conclusions — including the trial judge’s legal inferences — are supported by the evidence” (modern cleaning concept inc v comité paritaire de l’entretien d’édifices publics de la région de québec, 2019 scc 28, [2019] 2 scr 406, at para. 69). “the possibility of alternative findings based on different ascriptions of weight is . . . [not a] basis for overturning the findings of a fact-finder” (nelson (city) v. mowatt, 2017 scc 8, [2017] 1 scr 138, at para. 38). appellate intervention is not warranted “absent an error that is ‘plainly seen’ and has affected the result” (para. 38, quoting housen, at para. 6). [159] even if an appellate court might have come to a different conclusion, it cannot overturn the trial judge’s discretionary decision unless a reviewable error has been made as noted by stratas j.a in mahjoub v canada (citizenship and immigration), 2017 fca 157, [2018] 2 fcr 344: palpable and overriding error is often best defined by describing what it is not. if an appellate court had a free hand, it might weigh the evidence differently and come to a different result it might be inclined to draw different inferences or see different factual implications from the evidence. but these things, without more, do not rise to the level of palpable and overriding error. [para. 70] [160] in my view, the trial judge made no reviewable errors. the majority of the federal court of appeal properly applied the deferential standard of review, holding that there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s factual findings. the alleged errors raised before this court relate to questions of fact and mixed fact and law, and the appellants have not demonstrated that the trial judge made any palpable and overriding errors the trial judge properly reviewed and assessed the voluminous quantities of evidence. his legal inferences are supported by the evidence. therefore, the appellants have not established a basis for interfering with his valuation. ii the trial judge’s equitable compensation assessment [161] the principles of equitable compensation, including the special importance of its deterrent effect in furthering the ongoing project of reconciliation between canada and indigenous peoples, are settled and not at issue in this appeal it is the application of those principles that is at issue. therefore, it is important to begin by outlining the trial judge’s assessment. in his decision, the trial judge made it clear that the goal of equitable compensation is to restore what the plaintiff has lost due to a breach of fiduciary duty, the loss being an opportunity not realized because of the breach. the plaintiff’s loss arising from the breach is to be assessed with the advantage of hindsight, not based on what may have been known at the date of the breach or what would have been reasonably foreseeable. in assessing the loss, courts must assume both that the plaintiff would have made the most favourable use of the trust property at issue and that the defendant, had it not committed the breach, would have carried out its duties vis-à-vis the plaintiff in a lawful manner (trial reasons, at para. 285). [162] the trial judge applied these settled principles, specifically looking back to when the breach occurred in 1929, and, with the benefit of hindsight and the evidentiary record, assessed what position the appellants would have been in but for the breach. based on the evidence, the trial judge determined that, had canada acted legally, it would have taken the reserve lands in 1929 through expropriation or surrender (para. 358). [163] the trial judge noted the public importance of the project and held that “[t]here is no reasonable likelihood that the project would have been shelved had the lsfn or indian affairs refused to have the land flooded” (paras. 292 and 327; see also ca. reasons, at paras. 23 and 50, per gleason ja, dissenting, but not on this point). having found that the project and the resulting flooding would have occurred when they did, the trial judge presumed that canada would have acted lawfully if it had not breached its fiduciary duty and determined that canada would have, and should have, either obtained a surrender of the reserve lands to be flooded as provided for in treaty no. 3 (1873) and ss. 50 and 51 of the indian act, or expropriated the necessary lands in accordance with treaty 3 and s 48 of the indian act. in either case, canada would have compensated the appellants for the flooded lands in 1929, the year of the dam’s construction (trial reasons, at paras. 350-71) the parties accept this finding (ca. reasons, at para. 50). [164] the evidence proffered at trial focused broadly on two concepts: a revenue- or benefit-sharing agreement and one-time compensation for the loss of the flooded lands the trial judge rejected the revenue-sharing agreement as unprecedented and inconsistent with the historical approach taken in other instances of reserve land compensation, and found that there was no evidence that the parties would have been amenable to such an arrangement (paras. 351-57) the federal court of appeal unanimously upheld this finding (paras. 57 and 106-7). [165] therefore, the trial judge concluded that canada would have compensated the appellants through a one-time payment for the flooded lands and would not have secured an indefinite revenue-sharing agreement. in order to assess the quantum of the one-time compensation for the loss of the flooded lands, the trial judge reviewed all evidence proffered at trial on how to value the lands. he noted that the question of how the fair market value was to be assessed had been discussed by two experts: duncan bell, called jointly by canada and ontario, and norris wilson, called by the appellants. both experts agreed that the fair market value had to be assessed on the basis of the highest and best use of the lands (d. bell, appraisal report: lac seul first nation — southwind action, february 28, 2014, at p 78, reproduced in a.r supp., vol. ccxli, at p 168; n. wilson, technical review of an appraisal report by: charles bell real estate appraisals ltd., may 16, 2016, at p 2, reproduced in ar. supp., vol. ccxxxv, at p 320). [166] in his appraisal report, mr. bell stated that prior to 1934, the highest and best use of the lac seul reserve lands would have been for continued traditional uses by lsfn, and it would be expected that the majority of the flooded lands would have remained vacant and unimproved mr. bell stated that when flooding of the reserve lands occurred in order to accommodate the development of a hydroelectric dam “the flooded lands had a greater utility as flooded land rather than their previous use” (p 79). he estimated the value of the subject lands as at april 1, 1929, april 1, 1934, and april 1, 1943, in accordance with canada and ontario’s terms of reference in mr. bell’s opinion, the overall effective price per acre of the reserve lands was $1.29 in 1929, $1.06 in 1934, and $1.24 in 1943. in his testimony, mr. bell noted that he had valued the land as unflooded in each of the years for which he provided an estimated value because, if he had valued them differently once they were flooded, “[t]hat would be like somebody damaging your car and say, yes, i owe you a newer car but your car’s damaged now so i’m only going to pay you for the damaged car. so the valuations for traditional uses were simply just brought forward in those dates based on the market changes and the market evidence” (ar. supp., vol. xv, at p 247). [167] mr. wilson criticized mr. bell on three points: (1) a failure to correctly apply the principle of highest and best use; (2) the decision to apply the direct comparison approach; and (3) a failure to make findings and assumptions consistent with the historical record. mr. wilson found that while mr. bell had acknowledged that the highest and best use of the lands had changed once it was flooded, all three of his valuations, for 1929, 1934, and 1943, were almost identical from mr. wilson’s perspective, either mr. bell had not made any attempt to analyze the impact of the hydroelectric project on the value of the reserve lands, or he had concluded that the project had no impact on the value of the lands. regardless, mr. wilson submitted that mr. bell’s highest and best use analysis was unsound. as the trial judge summarized: . . . in his view, the flooded reserve land formed part of a storage project that facilitated a hydroelectric system down the english and winnipeg rivers. he testified that the hydroelectric project at ear falls would affect the value of the land around the foreshore of lac seul, because the highest and best use of that land would change to the storage of water for the power project from traditional uses before it was flooded. [para. 377] however, both in his report and his testimony, mr. wilson did not propose an alternative valuation. [168] the trial judge found that mr. bell’s method of valuation was “appropriate and proper in the circumstances” and adopted his conclusions (para. 380). he noted that “[t]his manner of proceeding may seem contrary to that advanced by indian affairs in the kananaskis falls development where, it will be recalled, the department informed calgary power that the cost of the land must exceed its agricultural value as the ‘value in the lands consists in their usefulness in connection with the development of power at kananaskis falls and in this connection they have a considerable value’” (para. 381, referring to a.r supp., vol. xli, at p 184) however, the trial judge distinguished the kananaskis project on the basis that there was no ability to expropriate any reserve lands in that example, whereas there was in the instant case. therefore, calgary power was in an entirely different position vis-à-vis the stoney indian band than canada vis-à-vis the lsfn reserve (paras. 382-83). [169] in determining the price per acre, the trial judge rejected canada’s submission that $1.00 per acre would be a more appropriate basis to calculate the amount payable. he held that “[w]hile $1.29 is slightly more than may have been in the contemplation of [manitoba and ontario, the provinces with whom canada was negotiating], i have no evidence that had canada insisted, it would not have been accepted by the provinces” (para. 384). the trial judge considered additional avoidable losses, finding calculable financial losses of $14,582.16 in 1929 for a flowage easement over the reserve lands, $34,917.33 in 1929 for timber dues, and $1,750,000 in 2008 for community infrastructure (para. 443). in addition, the trial judge awarded $16.2 million for non-calculable losses, namely loss of livelihood both on and off the reserve as well as loss of easy shore access, damage to boats, and overall damage to the aesthetic of the lake shore. iii the appellants were fairly and appropriately compensated for their losses [170] the appellants submit that the lower courts improperly applied the principles of equitable compensation and failed to compensate lsfn for what it actually lost. according to them, “[r]ather than compensating for those losses in light of the use to which the lands have been put, the courts re-wrote history and relied on a fictional expropriation scenario to improperly approach lsfn’s losses as if they were one-time lost expropriation funds” (para. 69). i cannot agree. based on the evidence before him, the trial judge assessed the appellants’ losses presuming the highest and best use and with the benefit of hindsight the appellants have not identified or established any palpable and overriding errors. a defining and valuing the lost opportunity [171] i am in agreement with the majority that equitable compensation in this case should be assessed on the basis of a negotiated surrender (paras. 118 and 121). this is not controversial. canada agrees that the lost opportunity in this case includes the opportunity to negotiate a surrender the court of appeal unanimously agreed, finding that “the federal court correctly identified the impact of the breaches of fiduciary duty committed by canada as being both the deprivation of an opportunity to negotiate a surrender of the flooded land in 1929 and the deprivation in 1929 of the funds that ought to have been paid had canada taken and exercised the right to flood the reserve land” (para. 59 (emphasis in original)). [172] as a fiduciary, canada was arguably required to pursue a negotiated surrender before proceeding to expropriation, as the former more closely aligns with the nature of the breach and probably would have been less detrimental to lsfn. however, it does not necessarily follow that the lost opportunity to negotiate a surrender of the lands to be flooded equates to a lost opportunity to negotiate a surrender of those lands for hydroelectricity generation in my view, the majority’s characterization presupposes that the trial judge had the requisite factual basis to make such a finding. it is clear from the record that he did not. [173] for the appellants to recover the value of a lost opportunity to negotiate a surrender for hydroelectric benefits specifically, they would have had to establish their entitlement through specific facts and evidence, including expert evidence, led at trial. they did not do so. as noted by the majority, the appellants’ theory of compensation has changed during this litigation at trial, the appellants’ theory, and their expert valuation evidence, were focused on their revenue-sharing claims. they did not provide evidence regarding a one-time payment for the flooded lands for hydroelectric purposes, and chose to limit themselves to criticizing canada’s expert valuation. therefore, the trial judge was correct to find that the argument that canada could, and should, have paid more than fair market value for the lands was “nothing more than optimistic speculation” (para. 383). [174] the value of the compensation that canada should have negotiated for lsfn cannot be assessed in an evidentiary or factual vacuum. as i explain below, the trial judge determined the compensation for the flooded lands in 1929 based on a “meticulous examination of the facts” (hodgkinson v. simms, [1994] 3 scr 377, at pp. 413-14, quoting national westminster bank plc v. morgan, [1985] 1 all er 821 (hl), at p 831). i find no palpable and overriding error. b. the trial judge’s findings are not tainted by error [175] the trial judge’s findings regarding what would have actually happened in 1929 had canada not breached its duty to the appellants are factual determinations, not legal ones. they were based entirely on the evidence before him, including a lengthy historical record and numerous expert reports. as i outline below, i am of the view that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in his compensation assessment, and therefore deference is owed to his determination that $1.29 per acre in 1929 dollars was the proper compensation for the appellants’ flooded lands. (1) kananaskis project example [176] the majority takes issue with the trial judge’s assessment and ultimate rejection of the evidence from the kananaskis project agreements in the majority’s view, that evidence was relevant to the assessment of loss in this case, and the factor used by the trial judge to distinguish this example is not material. [177] first, it is important to identify what evidence was actually proffered on this point. there was minimal discussion of this example in the record. the extent of our knowledge is from the expert report addendum and testimony of gwynneth c. d. jones and a brief response to ms. jones’ addendum in dr. betsey baldwin’s expert report. in her addendum, ms. jones discussed the process used to deal with the interests of the stoney indian band in the course of the development of three hydroelectric power sites on the bow river, including kananaskis falls she outlined the specific instructions given by the department of indian affairs to calgary power, the dam’s proponent, to negotiate a resolution with the stoney indian band that resulted in a payment for the flooded lands in excess of their value as agricultural lands in response to ms. jones’ addendum, dr. baldwin identified that ms. jones did not provide any comparison with the lac seul situation. dr. baldwin’s response noted two overarching differences: the hydro developments were differently situated in relation to the reserves and water-power in ontario and alberta was differently administered (b. baldwin, a history of the lac seul storage project, flooding on the lac seul indian reserve no. 28, and related compensation to the lac seul band, 1873 to 1943, april 30, 2014, at p 202, reproduced in ar. supp., vol. ccxxxix, at p 305). [178] in her testimony, ms. jones summarized the differences between what happened at lac seul and what happened at kananaskis falls as follows: well the most salient difference of course is the extent to which the indian people were consulted. and not just consulted, but were asked to give formal consent to the arrangements, to give consent to the taking of their reserve lands for the power sites, but also for the land to be flooded by the power site. the difference in the valuations of the land comments that it should be valued in terms of its value to the stoney and also in terms of its value to the power site. in other words, that its value was intimately tied up with the fact that it was going to be part of what was necessary to generate revenue and power from these sites. of course, the issue of heavy annual payments which would be made, as well as this upfront payment. in other words, that the stoney people were to be offered a toll or dues on the power that was generated by the private company as a result of their being — the private companies being able to flood indian reserve land; that’s a salient difference. and of course, just the difference in relationship of the department of indian affairs and even the water power branch in these cases. (ar. supp., vol. v, at pp. 69-70) [179] additionally, ms. jones noted that in the kananaskis project, there was an agreement between the department of the interior and calgary power that the “company will have the power to acquire and take [lands] for the purposes of its undertaking, essentially, powers the same as those conferred by the railway act on railway companies” (ar. supp., vol. v, at p 93), even though no formal expropriation occurred. [180] while noting that there may be a basis upon which to distinguish this evidence as it relates to the valuation of the loss, the majority finds that “[t]he trial judge should have considered the kananaskis falls projects and other evidence available at trial as relevant proxies for what [the] premium was worth” (para. 143). [181] with respect, the majority’s analysis of this evidence seems to stray from the settled standards of appellate review and instead focuses on how the trial judge ought to have undertaken an assessment of the evidence. that is not this court’s role. we must not reconsider the evidence globally and reach our own conclusions; our role is to ensure that there is no error in principle or overriding and palpable error in the trial judge’s conclusions. [182] i am in agreement with the majority of the court of appeal that the limited evidence proffered at trial concerning the kananaskis project does not substantiate a finding that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in refusing to grant the appellants a sum in excess of the fair market value of $1.29 per acre. the trial judge’s determination regarding the comparability of the kananaskis project and the lac seul situation is a factual determination. based on his review of the evidence and ms. jones’ testimony, he found that the kananaskis project could be distinguished in at least one material respect: there was no ability to expropriate, and therefore “calgary power vis- à-vis the stoney indian band [was] in an entirely different position than canada was vis-à-vis lsfn reserve” (para. 382). [183] the record before us provides no evidence as to why canada was not in a position to utilize its expropriation powers for the kananaskis project, and thus it is simply speculation to conclude that canada’s differing approach in that matter leads, per se, to the conclusion that it breached its duty towards the appellants in this case. it may be, as the majority of the court of appeal noted, “that the fact that the kananaskis project was located on the reserve led indian affairs to take the view that the band’s land had a fair market value much greater than its agricultural value, resulting in a payment of approximately $93.85 per acre of reserve land” (para. 138). it may also be, as the majority in this court identifies, that a fundamental difference between the two projects is that in the kananaskis project, the compensation included a one-time payment plus an annual water power rental payment. [184] while my colleagues in the majority acknowledge that “[i]t is up to the trial judge to assess how the differences in the location of the dam, or the amount of land involved, or the nature of the impact on the first nation, would impact the value of the land for flooding purposes” (para. 138), they insist that “[t]he trial judge should have considered the kananaskis falls projects and other evidence available at trial as relevant proxies for what [the] premium was worth” (para. 143) the majority’s reconsideration of evidence to reach its own conclusions is not a basis for overturning the fact-finder’s findings. while there may be a possibility of alternative findings based on differing ascriptions of weight, the trial judge’s finding that the kananaskis project was not a relevant proxy was supported by the limited evidence before him. the trial judge therefore cannot be said to have made a palpable and overriding error in distinguishing the kananaskis project. (2) impact on the community and lsfn’s perspective [185] the majority further critiques the trial judge’s reasoning by noting that he ought to have given “appropriate weight to the evidence regarding the impact on the community and . . lsfn’s perspective” (para. 140) these two points relate to profound losses not susceptible of mathematical calculation. i am of the view that the trial judge appropriately acknowledged and incorporated the impact on the community and lsfn’s perspective in his non-calculable loss analysis. i see no error here either. [186] it is important to note that the trial judge’s valuation at $1.29 per acre is not the total valuation of the lands. it is simply the value of the lands as agricultural lands, based on the accepted expert evidence. the trial judge subsequently valued other calculable and non-calculable losses in order to arrive at his final conclusion the $16.2 million he awarded as compensation for non-calculable losses was influenced by a number of factors: 1 the amount of the calculable losses; 2 that many of the non-quantifiable losses created in 1929 persisted over decades, and some are still continuing; 3 the failure to remove the timber from the foreshore created an eyesore and impacted the natural beauty of the reserve land; 4 the failure to remove timber from the foreshore also created a very long-term water hazard effecting travel and fishing for members of the lsfn; 5 the flooding negatively affected hunting and trapping requiring members to travel further to engage in these pursuits and the number of animals were reduced for some period as a result of the flooding; 6 although canada supplied the materials to build the replacement houses, the lsfn members supplied their own labour; 7 the lsfn docks and other outbuildings were not replaced; 8 lsfn hay land, gardens and rice fields were destroyed; 9 the hunting and trapping grounds on the reserve were negatively impacted; 10 two lsfn communities were separated by water and one became an island, impacting the ease of movement of the people who lived there; 11 canada failed to keep the lsfn informed and never consulted with the band on any of the flood related matters that affected it, creating uncertainty and, doubtless, some anxiety for the band; and 12 canada failed to act in a prompt and effective manner to deal with compensation with the lsfn prior to the flooding and did not do so for many years after the flooding, despite being aware of the negative impact on the band members. [para. 512] it is the total equitable compensation, not simply the $1.29 per acre figure, which ensures that the appellants are compensated for the value of the lands given the nature of their interest and the impact on lsfn. [187] when the compensation analysis is viewed in this way, it is clear that the trial judge’s inclusion of a robust non-calculable loss analysis allowed him to meaningfully consider the impact of the flooding on lsfn, such as the negative impact on hunting and trapping, hayland, gardens, and rice fields, including off-reserve losses. c concluding remarks [188] as outlined above, i have found that the trial judge’s equitable compensation analysis does not contain any reviewable errors and that neither of the points raised by the majority provides any basis for interfering with his judgment. nonetheless, some concluding remarks are in order. [189] while i agree with the majority that the appellants’ strategic decision to change their theory of compensation during this litigation is not a bar to addressing the merits of this appeal, a reconsideration of the merits must take place within the appropriate scope of appellate review and must take into account the evidence — or lack thereof — adduced at trial. in this case, the appellants’ position, and hence their strategy at trial, was that compensation for their flooded lands ought to have included the value of a revenue-sharing agreement. the evidence introduced at trial was to this effect. the appellants were seemingly content with attacking canada’s expert valuation of their lands and did not introduce any expert evidence regarding the fair market value of the lands or any premium that ought to have been paid in relation to the use of the lands for hydroelectric purposes. [190] despite the appellants’ focus on their revenue-sharing claims and the fact that their “loss of use” valuation expert was found not to be credible, the trial judge nevertheless undertook a thorough review of all of the evidence adduced by the parties, rejected canada’s submission that the value of the lands should be $1.00 per acre, found that $1.29 per acre was the proper compensation for the flooded reserve lands, and subsequently awarded over $16 million in additional compensation for the non- calculable losses suffered by lsfn. [191] i find that the majority’s reasons seek to impose a greater obligation on a trial judge than the law demands. the trial judge had a daunting task. this trial lasted 56 days, and all but 2 of the 24 witnesses called were expert witnesses he had to resolve a myriad of difficult factual questions by examining a voluminous factual record consisting of 8,347 documents entered as exhibits and thousands of pages of expert reports the majority returns the award of equitable compensation for reassessment based on an alternative valuation methodology that is currently unsupported by the trial record. it is wrong to fault the trial judge for accepting the sole evidence proffered on the value of the flooded lands without pointing to any palpable and overriding error in his analysis i could not say it better than justice wilson in guerin: the trial judge “‘did the best he could’”. [192] the appellants must bear the consequences of their tactical choice to advance a predominant theory of the case based on revenue-sharing claims in retrospect, it may have been a more appropriate trial strategy for the appellants to present, alongside their revenue-sharing claims, fulsome expert evidence on the value of the flooded reserve lands in the event that compensation was awarded as a one-time payment, including a premium based on the usefulness of the lands for hydroelectric purposes the appellants are responsible for the ramifications of their trial strategy, even though they have changed tack on appeal. [193] returning the award of equitable compensation for reassessment, which will inevitably require additional discovery and historical and valuation expert evidence, would permit the appellants to repair the deficiencies in their case and forward their new theory of the case de novo. absent any reviewable error, and i have found none, this is not the proper role of appellate intervention. iv conclusion [194] the trial judge reviewed, analyzed, and weighed the evidence before him. based on the record, he was entitled to find that the argument that canada could, and should, have paid more than fair market value for the reserve lands was “nothing more than optimistic speculation”. as the trial judge did not commit any errors in principle, his compensation assessment “is entitled to considerable deference on appeal” (whitefish, at para. 28). i would accord the trial judge this considerable deference and would not disturb his findings and conclusions. i would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs throughout. appeal allowed with costs throughout, côté j dissenting. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of saskatchewan: attorney general of saskatchewan, regina. calgary. solicitors for the intervener the tseshaht first nation: dgw law corporation, victoria. solicitors for the intervener manitoba keewatinowi okimakanak inc.: olthuis, kleer, townshend, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the treaty land entitlement committee of manitoba inc.: duboff edwards haight & schachter law corporation, winnipeg. solicitors for the intervener the anishinabek nation: westaway law group, ottawa. leitch professional corporation, toronto. first nation, the naotkamegwanning first nation and the niisaachewan first nation: donald r. colborne barrister & solicitor, victoria. solicitors for the interveners the coalition of the union of british columbia indian chiefs, the penticton indian band and the williams lake first nation: mandell pinder, vancouver. solicitors for the intervener the federation of sovereign indigenous nations: maurice law, calgary. solicitors for the intervener the atikameksheng anishnawbek first nation: maurice law, calgary. solicitors for the intervener the kwantlen first nation: jfk law corporation, vancouver. solicitor for the intervener the assembly of first nations: assembly of first nations, ottawa. solicitors for the intervener the assembly of first nations quebec-labrador: cain lamarre, roberval, que. law corporation, vancouver. council of kahnawà:ke legal services, mohawk territory of kahnawà:ke, que.
[1] moldaver j. — i have had the benefit of read- ing the reasons of my colleague justice martin. in her reasons, my colleague provides a thorough and comprehensive review of the facts, and i see no need to replicate her work. [1] le juge moldaver — j’ai pris connaissance des motifs de ma collègue la juge martin. dans ses motifs, ma collègue dresse un portrait rigoureux et exhaustif des faits, et je ne vois pas la nécessité de dupliquer son travail ici. [2] furthermore, i  agree with justice martin, for the reasons she has given, that the evidence of mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct was admissible as circumstantial evidence on both the issue of causa- tion and the mental element for second degree mur- der. accordingly, i also agree with my colleague that it is unnecessary to address the directed verdict issue. [3] my colleague takes the position that it was essential for the trial judge to provide a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning — namely, the reasoning that because mr. calnen was a person of bad character who engaged in disreputable and morally repugnant conduct, he was more likely to have committed the crime charged. his failure to provide such a limiting instruction, in her view, renders the jury’s verdict of second degree murder suspect and warrants a new trial. [2] de plus, je conviens avec la juge martin, pour les motifs qu’elle a exposés, que les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait de m. calnen étaient admissibles comme preuve cir- constancielle tant sur la question du lien de causa- lité que sur celle de l’élément moral requis pour un meurtre au deuxième degré. par conséquent, je suis également d’accord avec ma collègue pour dire qu’il n’est pas nécessaire d’aborder la question du verdict imposé. [3] de l’avis de ma collègue, il était essentiel que le juge du procès donne une directive restrictive contre le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale — à savoir le raisonnement suivant lequel, parce qu’il était un individu de mauvaise moralité qui s’était comporté de façon moralement odieuse et déshonorante, m. calnen était davantage suscep- tible d’avoir commis le crime qui lui était reproché. selon elle, le défaut du juge du procès de donner une telle directive restrictive rend suspect le verdict de meurtre au deuxième degré prononcé par le jury et commande la tenue d’un nouveau procès. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 315 [4] as a preliminary matter, i am of the view that the alleged error upon which my colleague would order a new trial is properly characterized as an alleged error of law under s.  686(1)(a)(ii) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, as opposed to an unreasonable verdict under s 686(1)(a)(i). the distinction is an important one from the crown’s perspective because in an appropriate case where the error comes within s. 686(1)(a)(ii), the crown would be able to rely on the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) — something it could not do if the case truly involved an unreasonable verdict as con- templated under s 686(1)(a)(i). to be clear, however, this is not a case where the crown needed to rely on the curative proviso because, as i will explain, there was no legal error that required its use. [5] on the question of whether the trial judge was required to provide a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning, i must respectfully part ways with my colleague. in my view, although the trial judge could have given such an instruction, the fact that he did not do so does not amount to reversible error. put simply, this is not a case of a non- direction amounting to misdirection. [4] d’entrée de jeu, j’estime qu’il convient de qualifier la présumée erreur pour laquelle ma col- lègue ordonnerait la tenue d’un nouveau procès de présumée erreur de droit pour l’application du sous-al. 686(1)a)(ii) du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, et non de verdict déraisonnable pour l’ap- plication du sous-al 686(1)a)(i). cette distinction est importante du point de vue de la couronne parce que, le cas échéant, si l’erreur tombe sous le coup du sous-al.  686(1)a)(ii), la couronne pourrait se prévaloir de la disposition réparatrice édictée au sous-al. 686(1)b)(iii), alors qu’elle ne pourrait le faire s’il s’agissait véritablement d’un verdict dé- raisonnable visé au sous-al.  686(1)a)(i) je tiens toutefois à préciser qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un cas où la couronne devait s’appuyer sur la disposition répa- ratrice parce que, comme je vais l’expliquer, il n’y avait pas d’erreur de droit qui nécessitait le recours à cette disposition. [5] soit dit en tout respect, je ne puis souscrire à l’opinion de ma collègue quant à la question de savoir si le juge du procès était tenu de donner une directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale. à mon avis, même si le juge du procès pouvait donner une telle directive, son défaut de le faire ne constitue pas une erreur justifiant l’infirmation de sa décision. en clair, il n’est pas question ici d’une absence de directives équivalant à des directives erronées. [6] when the trial judge’s charge is considered fairly, contextually, and as a whole, i am satisfied that the jury was properly equipped to decide the case in the absence of a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning. and i am not alone in this. experienced defence counsel at trial seemed to be of the same view. were it otherwise, i would have expected him to seek the kind of limiting instruction which my colleague now says was both obvious and crucial — and to have forcefully objected had the trial judge not capitulated. and yet, as we shall see, defence counsel did neither, despite being acutely aware, as my colleague points out, of the emotive and discreditable evidence which, in her view, “very likely” caused the jury to reach a verdict on sec- ond degree murder that was irreparably tainted by [6] en examinant l’exposé du juge du procès au jury de façon juste et globale tout en tenant compte du contexte, je suis convaincu que les jurés étaient bien outillés pour trancher l’affaire même s’ils n’avaient pas reçu une directive restrictive les mettant en garde contre un raisonnement fondé sur la propension géné- rale. et je ne suis pas le seul à le penser. au procès, l’avocat de la défense, un juriste expérimenté, sem- blait être du même avis. s’il en avait été autrement, je me serais attendu à ce qu’il réclame le genre de directive restrictive qui, selon ma collègue, était à la fois évidente et essentielle, et à ce qu’il s’oppose éner- giquement si le juge du procès n’avait pas accédé à sa demande. et pourtant, comme nous le verrons, l’avo- cat de la défense n’a ni demandé une directive ni ma- nifesté son opposition, même s’il était très conscient, 316 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. moral and reasoning prejudice: martin j.’s reasons, at para 191. [7] with respect, for reasons that follow, i do not share my colleague’s concerns. accordingly, i would allow the appeal and restore mr. calnen’s conviction for second degree murder. comme le souligne ma collègue, des éléments de preuve émotifs et déshonorants sur lesquels, à son avis, le jury s’était « fort vraisemblablement » appuyé pour rendre un verdict de meurtre au deuxième degré, lequel était irrémédiablement entaché d’un préjudice moral et d’un préjudice par raisonnement : motifs de la juge martin, par 191. [7] en toute déférence, pour les motifs qui suivent, je ne partage pas les préoccupations exprimées par ma collègue. par conséquent, je suis d’avis d’ac- cueillir le pourvoi et de rétablir la déclaration de culpabilité de meurtre au deuxième degré prononcée contre m calnen. i standard of review i norme de contrôle [8] an appellate court undertakes a functional ap- proach in reviewing a jury charge, asking whether the charge as a whole enabled the trier of fact to decide the case according to the law and the evi- dence: r v. mack, 2014 scc 58, [2014] 3 scr 3, at para. 49; r v. jaw, 2009 scc 42, [2009] 3 scr. 26, at para 32. as bastarache j. wrote in r v. daley, 2007 scc 53, [2007] 3 scr 523, at para. 30: the cardinal rule is that it is the general sense which the words used must have conveyed, in all probability, to the mind of the jury that matters, and not whether a particular formula was recited by the judge. the particular words used, or the sequence followed, is a matter within the dis- cretion of the trial judge and will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. [9] in short, the test is whether the jury was prop- erly, not perfectly, instructed: r v. jacquard, [1997] 1 scr 314, at para 62. at the end of the day, the overriding question is whether the jury was properly equipped to decide the case absent a limiting instruc- tion against general propensity reasoning. [8] lorsqu’elle examine l’exposé qui a été donné au jury, la juridiction d’appel entreprend une dé- marche fonctionnelle et se demande si, globalement, l’exposé permettait au juge des faits de trancher l’affaire selon la loi et la preuve : r c. mack, 2014 csc 58, [2014] 3 rcs 3, par. 49; r c. jaw, 2009 csc 42, [2009] 3 rcs 26, par 32. ainsi que le juge bastarache l’a écrit dans l’arrêt r c. daley, 2007 csc 53, [2007] 3 rcs 523, par. 30 : la règle cardinale veut que ce qui importe soit le message général que les termes utilisés ont transmis au jury, selon toutes probabilités, et non de savoir si le juge a employé une formule particulière. le choix des mots et l’ordre des différents éléments relèvent du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge et dépendront des circonstances. [9] en résumé, le test applicable consiste à se deman- der si le jury a reçu, non pas des directives parfaites, mais des directives appropriées : r c. jacquard, [1997] 1 rcs 314, par 62. en fin de compte, la question essentielle est celle de savoir si le jury était convenable- ment outillé pour trancher l’affaire même s’il n’a pas reçu une directive restrictive le mettant en garde contre un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale. ii analysis ii analyse [10] i agree with my colleague’s articulation of the legal principles governing the admissibility of [10] je souscris à l’énoncé que ma collègue fait des principes de droit régissant l’admissibilité des [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 317 discreditable conduct evidence and its potential for moral and reasoning prejudice. however, for reasons i will develop, i respectfully disagree with her ap- plication of those principles to the facts of this case. [11] allegations of non- direction amounting to misdirection must be assessed contextually, in line with the facts and circumstances of the particular case. at trial, the crown led relevant and admissible evidence of discreditable conduct on mr. calnen’s part that was extrinsic to the offence charged. that evidence can be divided temporally into two broad categories. [12] first, the crown adduced discreditable conduct evidence from the period preceding ms. jordan’s death. there was evidence that mr. calnen habitu- ally used crack cocaine. further, he apparently had an open and sexually adventurous relationship with ms. jordan, in which he encouraged her to perform sex work out of his basement. also, she once texted a friend, mr. weeks, that mr. calnen “put his hands on [her]”. [13] second, the crown led discreditable conduct evidence of mr. calnen’s conduct after ms. jordan’s death, including evidence that he moved and then burned ms. jordan’s body while high on crack co- caine and made other attempts to cover up her death, including lying to the police about her disappearance. éléments de preuve de conduite déshonorante et du risque que ceux-ci causent un préjudice moral ou un préjudice par raisonnement. en toute déférence, pour les motifs exposés plus loin, je ne suis toutefois pas d’accord avec l’application qu’elle fait de ces principes aux faits de la présente affaire. [11] chaque cas présumé d’absence de directives équivalant à des directives erronées doit être examiné en contexte, en fonction des faits et des circonstances qui lui sont propres. au procès, la couronne a pré- senté des éléments de preuve pertinents et admissibles relatifs à la conduite déshonorante de m. calnen qui portaient sur des faits extrinsèques à l’infraction re- prochée à ce dernier. ces éléments de preuve peuvent être répartis chronologiquement en deux grandes catégories. [12] en premier lieu, la couronne a présenté des éléments de preuve de conduite déshonorante portant sur la période antérieure au décès de mme jordan. suivant la preuve, m. calnen consommait réguliè- rement du crack. de plus, il aurait apparemment entretenu une relation ouverte et sexuellement auda- cieuse avec mme jordan, dans le cadre de laquelle il incitait cette dernière à se prostituer dans son sous- sol. de plus, mme jordan a envoyé un texto à un ami, m. weeks, lui disant que m. calnen l’avait [traduction] « pognée ». [13] en second lieu, la couronne a présenté des éléments de preuve relatifs à la conduite déshono- rante de m. calnen après le décès de mme jordan, dont certains éléments de preuve selon lesquels il avait déplacé puis brûlé le cadavre de mme jordan alors qu’il était sous l’emprise du crack et avait pris d’autres mesures pour tenter de camoufler son dé- cès, notamment en mentant à la police au sujet de sa disparition. [14] mr. calnen challenged the admissibility of much of this evidence at trial and again on appeal. defence counsel argued that mr. calnen’s police statement and re- enactment, in which he admitted to burning ms. jordan’s body in a drug- fueled panic and lying to various people including the police, was involuntary and lacked probative value. the defence submitted that ms. jordan’s text message [14] monsieur calnen a contesté l’admissibilité d’une grande partie de cette preuve au procès et, de nouveau, en appel. l’avocat de la défense a soutenu que la déclaration que m. calnen avait faite à la po- lice ainsi que sa reconstitution des faits — au cours de laquelle il avait admis avoir brûlé le cadavre de mme jordan dans un accès de panique provoqué par la drogue et avait reconnu avoir menti à diverses 318 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. conversation with mr. weeks was inadmissible hear- say, unreliable and incapable of proving motive. despite these submissions, the trial judge and the court of appeal held that most of the disputed evi- dence was admissible. furthermore, for the reasons given by my colleague, i am satisfied that the ev- idence of mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct was admissible as circumstantial evidence on both the issue of causation and the mental element for second degree murder. [15] the question remains: did the relevant and admissible discreditable conduct evidence pose such an elevated risk of propensity reasoning that the trial judge was required to provide a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning and that his failure to do so amounted to reversible error? my answer to that question proceeds in two parts. [16] first, the risk that the jury would engage in general propensity reasoning based on the evidence of mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct was consid- erably offset by the trial judge’s introductory and final jury instructions, which were neutral, fair and balanced. [17] second, experienced defence counsel, well aware of the issue of potential propensity reasoning, did not raise that issue, much less seek a limiting instruction, during the pre- charge conference while vetting the proposed final jury instructions. in short, he signed off on the trial judge’s charge knowing full well that it did not contain the kind of limiting instruction that my colleague now says was both obvious and crucial — and indeed fatal to sustaining mr. calnen’s conviction for second degree murder. personnes, dont la police — étaient involontaires et n’avaient aucune valeur probante. la défense a fait valoir que l’échange de messages textes entre mme jordan et m. weeks constituait du ouï- dire inad- missible et que cette preuve était peu fiable et ne pou- vait servir à prouver le mobile. malgré ces arguments, le juge du procès et la cour d’appel ont déclaré ad- missible la majorité des éléments de preuve contestés. en outre, pour les motifs énoncés par ma collègue, je suis convaincu que les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait de m. calnen étaient admissibles comme preuve circonstancielle tant pour la question du lien de causalité que celle de l’élément moral du meurtre au deuxième degré. [15] toutefois, une question demeure : les éléments de preuve pertinents et admissibles se rapportant à la conduite déshonorante comportaient- ils un risque si élevé de raisonnement fondé sur la propension que le juge du procès était tenu de donner une directive restrictive interdisant le raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale et que le défaut de donner une telle directive constituait une erreur justifiant l’infir- mation de sa décision? ma réponse à cette question se décline en deux parties. [16] premièrement, le risque que le jury tienne un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale en s’appuyant sur les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait de m. calnen était considérablement atténué par les directives prélimi- naires et les directives finales données par le juge du procès au jury, lesquelles étaient neutres, justes et équilibrées. [17] deuxièmement, l’avocat de la défense, qui était expérimenté et bien conscient du risque d’un raisonnement fondé sur la propension, n’a pas sou- levé cette question — et il a encore moins demandé une directive restrictive — lorsqu’il a été appelé à examiner la version finale du projet de directives à présenter au jury lors de la conférence préalable à l’exposé. en bref, il a entériné l’exposé du juge du procès tout en sachant pertinemment qu’il ne conte- nait pas le genre de directive restrictive qui, selon ma collègue, était à la fois évidente, essentielle et, qui plus est, nécessaire pour que m. calnen soit déclaré coupable de meurtre au deuxième degré. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 319 in these circumstances, i consider it fair to [18] ask: why did defence counsel not raise the issue of general propensity reasoning with the trial judge and seek a limiting instruction of the kind that my colleague now says was essential? the answer, as i will explain, is that in all likelihood defence counsel made a deliberate and conscious tactical decision to marshal the discreditable conduct evidence in an attempt to bolster the truthfulness of mr. calnen’s out-of- court statement and re- enactment, upon which his defence rested. in these circumstances, while it would have been open to the trial judge to provide a limiting instruction against impermissible propensity reasoning, such an instruction would have had the potential to undermine mr. calnen’s credibility and thereby undercut his defence. [19] i will address these features in turn. [18] dans ces conditions, j’estime qu’on peut à juste titre se poser les questions suivantes : pourquoi l’avocat de la défense n’a-t-il pas soulevé la question du raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale devant le juge du procès et pourquoi n’a-t-il pas demandé que soit donnée une directive restrictive comme celle qui, selon ma collègue, était essen- tielle? comme je l’explique plus loin, selon toute vraisemblance, c’est parce que l’avocat de la dé- fense a consciemment et délibérément décidé, pour des raisons d’ordre stratégique, d’organiser les élé- ments de preuve de conduite déshonorante dans le but de renforcer la véracité de la déclaration extra- judiciaire et de la reconstitution des faits produites par m. calnen et sur lesquelles sa défense reposait. dans de telles circonstances, même s’il était loisible au juge du procès de donner une directive restrictive contre le recours au raisonnement interdit fondé sur la propension, une telle directive aurait pu ébranler la crédibilité de m. calnen et nuire à sa défense. [19] je vais examiner à tour de rôle chacun de ces aspects. a neutral, fair and balanced after­ the­fact con­ a directives neutres, justes et équilibrées sur le duct instructions comportement après le fait [20] for reasons that follow, i am satisfied that the trial judge’s introductory instructions on the sig- nificance of mr. calnen’s guilty plea to indecent interference with ms. jordan’s remains, and his final instructions on mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct, were neutral, fair and balanced. read as a whole, the jury instructions sufficiently protected against the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice from the evidence of mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct. [20] pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis convaincu que les directives préliminaires que le juge du pro- cès a données quant à l’importance du plaidoyer de culpabilité de m. calnen à l’accusation d’indé- cence envers les restes de mme jordan, ainsi que ses directives finales sur le comportement après le fait de m. calnen, étaient neutres, justes et équilibrées. prises globalement, les directives prémunissaient suffisamment le jury contre les risques de préjudice moral et de préjudice par raisonnement que les élé- ments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait de m. calnen étaient susceptibles d’engendrer. (1) introductory instructions and a question (1) les directives préliminaires et une question from the jury du jury [21] at the outset of the trial, mr. calnen pleaded guilty to indecently interfering with ms. jordan’s remains by burning her body in his opening in- structions, the trial judge noted that mr. calnen’s guilty plea to indecent interference with ms. jordan’s [21] à l’ouverture du procès, m. calnen a reconnu sa culpabilité relativement à l’accusation d’avoir commis des actes d’indécence envers les restes de mme jordan en brûlant son cadavre. dans ses direc- tives préliminaires, le juge du procès a fait observer 320 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. remains could not be permitted to water down the presumption of innocence, stressing that “mr. calnen starts the trial with a clean slate” and that “[i]t is crown counsel who must prove guilt beyond a rea- sonable doubt, not mr. calnen who must prove his innocence”: ar, vol. iii, at p 683. [22] on the second day of trial, in a note to the trial judge, the jury queried whether it could con- sider mr. calnen’s guilty plea “either during its daily discussions or in reaching its final verdict”: ar, vol. iii, at p 936. the trial judge told the jury to “put mr. calnen’s guilty plea    out of [their] minds” because they required “all of the evidence” before coming to their decision at the end of trial: ar, vol. iii, at pp 947-48. the crown and the defence endorsed the trial judge’s response. [23] in proceeding this way, the trial judge in- sulated the jury from reasoning that mr. calnen’s guilty plea to indecent interference with ms. jordan’s remains meant it was more likely that he committed second degree murder. this feature of the record militates against a conclusion that the instructions were inadequate — a conclusion that is strengthened when one considers the trial judge’s final instruc- tions, which i will describe below. qu’on ne pouvait permettre que le plaidoyer de culpa- bilité de m. calnen quant à l’accusation d’indécence envers les restes de mme jordan vienne affaiblir sa présomption d’innocence, en soulignant que [tra- duction] « m. calnen repart à zéro dans ce procès » et que « [c]’est au procureur de la couronne qu’il incombe d’établir la culpabilité de m. calnen hors de tout doute raisonnable et non à ce dernier de prouver son innocence » : da, vol. iii, p 683. [22] le deuxième jour du procès, dans une note qu’ils lui ont adressée, les jurés ont demandé au juge du procès s’ils pouvaient tenir compte du plaidoyer de culpabilité de m. calnen [traduction] « soit lors de leurs discussions quotidiennes, soit pour rendre leur verdict final » : da, vol. iii, p 936. le juge du procès a invité les jurés « à faire abstraction [  ] du plaidoyer de culpabilité de m. calnen », parce qu’ils devaient disposer de « toute la preuve » avant de rendre leur décision à l’issue du procès : da, vol. iii, p 947-948. la couronne et la défense se sont dites d’accord avec la réponse du juge du procès. [23] en agissant ainsi, le juge du procès a protégé le jury contre tout raisonnement selon lequel le plai- doyer de culpabilité de m. calnen à l’égard l’accu- sation d’indécence envers les restes de mme jordan signifiait qu’il était davantage probable que ce der- nier ait commis un meurtre au deuxième degré. cette caractéristique du dossier milite contre la conclusion portant que les directives étaient insuffisantes, la- quelle conclusion est renforcée au regard des direc- tives finales du juge du procès, que je vais maintenant analyser. (2) the final instructions (2) les directives finales [24] my colleague observes that there were many other rational inferences available from the circum- stantial evidence in this case and the jury was there- fore being “asked to engage in inferential reasoning”, increasing the risk that they would draw a forbidden inference based on impermissible propensity rea- soning: martin j.’s reasons, at paras 167-74. indeed, she goes so far as to say that it is “very likely” the jury did just that in arriving at its verdict on second degree murder and that this irreparably tainted the outcome: para 191. with respect, i disagree. when [24] ma collègue fait observer que de nombreuses autres inférences rationnelles pouvaient être tirées de la preuve circonstancielle dans la présente af- faire et qu’on a donc demandé au jury « de se livrer à un raisonnement inférentiel », augmentant ainsi le risque qu’ils tirent une inférence interdite en se livrant à un exercice tout aussi interdit de raisonne- ment fondé sur la propension : motifs de la juge martin, par 167-174. d’ailleurs, elle va jusqu’à af- firmer que c’est « fort vraisemblablement » ce qu’a fait le jury pour rendre son verdict de culpabilité de [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 321 the trial judge’s final instructions are read fully and fairly, it becomes clear that the trial judge properly equipped the jury to make reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence without resorting to specious reasoning or speculation. [25] the record reveals that the trial judge was alive to the “substantial risk of jury error” from after- the-fact conduct evidence and the temptation to “jump too quickly from evidence of post- offence conduct to an inference of guilt” without proper consideration of alternate explanations: r v. white, 2011 scc 13, [2011] 1 scr 433, at para. 23, citing r v. white, [1998] 2 scr 72, at para 57. the trial judge’s de- tailed limiting instructions on after- the-fact conduct evidence and his caution against drawing speculative inferences from circumstantial evidence are signif- icant factors when assessing the risk that the jury would engage in general propensity reasoning. [26] several portions of the jury charge guarded against the risk of general propensity reasoning. as detailed below, these included the instructions on the risks associated with circumstantial after- the-fact conduct evidence, how to assess circumstantial evi- dence against the criminal standard of proof, how to draw reasonable inferences in a circumstantial case, the parties’ theories and inferences sought, and the principles articulated by this court in r v. w (d), [1991] 1 scr 742. meurtre au deuxième degré, ce qui a entaché de façon irrémédiable le résultat : par 191. en toute déférence, je ne suis pas de cet avis. une lecture équitable de l’ensemble des directives finales permet de constater que le juge du procès a bien outillé le jury pour qu’il tire des inférences raisonnables de la preuve circons- tancielle sans recourir à un raisonnement spécieux ou à des hypothèses. [25] le dossier révèle que le juge du procès était conscient de l’« important risque d’erreur de la part du jury » associé à la preuve relative au comporte- ment après le fait et du fait que les jurés pouvaient être tentés de « conclu[re] trop rapidement, à partir de la preuve relative au comportement postérieur à l’infraction, que l’accusé est coupable » sans te- nir dûment compte des autres explications : r c. white, 2011 csc 13, [2011] 1 rcs 433, par. 23, citant r c. white, [1998] 2 rcs 72, par 57. les directives restrictives détaillées données par le juge du procès au sujet des éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait et sa mise en garde quant à des inférences spéculatives fondées sur de la preuve circonstancielle sont des facteurs impor- tants à prendre en compte lorsqu’on évalue le risque que le jury se livre à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale. [26] à plusieurs reprises dans ses directives, le juge du procès a mis les jurés en garde contre le risque d’un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale. comme je l’expliquerai en détail plus loin, le juge leur a notamment donné des directives sur les risques que comportait la preuve circonstancielle relative au comportement après le fait, sur la façon d’évaluer la preuve circonstancielle en fonction de la norme de preuve applicable en matière criminelle, sur la façon de tirer des inférences raisonnables dans une affaire fondée sur de la preuve circonstancielle, sur la thèse des parties et les inférences recherchées, ainsi que sur les principes énoncés par notre cour dans l’arrêt r c. w (d.), [1991] 1 rcs 742. [27] the trial judge told the jury to leave the after- the-fact conduct evidence, in particular mr. calnen’s burning of ms. jordan’s body, “somewhat at large, until the final stage of putting all the evidence to- gether and seeing if it proves the case beyond a [27] le juge du procès a expliqué aux jurés qu’ils devaient mettre les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait, en particulier le fait que m. calnen avait brûlé le cadavre de mme jordan, [traduction] « quelque peu en suspens jusqu’à 322 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. reasonable doubt”: ar, vol. i, at pp. 134 and 163- 64. the jury was repeatedly told to keep an “open mind” (ar, vol. i, at pp. 72, 76 and 173); to use reason, logic, common sense and experience; and to render their verdict without “sympathy, prejudice or fear”: ar, vol. i, at p 67. [28] the trial judge also explained the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence. he in- structed the jury that before drawing an inference about mr. calnen’s state of mind based on the latter type of evidence, “you must examine all of the evi- dence, and only if, after examining all the evidence, you are satisfied the inference is proper to draw, can you then draw the inference”: ar, vol. i, at p 140. he added that “[i]n order to find paul trevor calnen guilty on the basis of circumstantial evidence, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that his guilt is the only rational conclusion or inference that can be drawn from the whole of the evidence”: ar, vol. i, at p 83. thus, the jury was correctly instructed that proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” meant that a conviction could rest on circumstantial evidence only if they were satisfied there was no rational inference inconsistent with guilt. l’étape finale consistant à rassembler tous les élé- ments de preuve pour vérifier s’ils établissent la culpabilité hors de tout doute raisonnable » : da, vol. i, p. 134 et 163-164. le juge a invité à plusieurs reprises les jurés à « garder l’esprit ouvert » (da, vol. i, p. 72, 76 et 173), à utiliser la raison, la logique, le bon sens et l’expérience, et à rendre leur verdict sans « sympathie, préjugé ou crainte » : da, vol. i, p 67. [28] le juge du procès a également expliqué la différence entre une preuve directe et une preuve circonstancielle. il a expliqué aux jurés qu’avant de tirer une inférence sur l’état d’esprit de m. calnen en se fondant sur une preuve circonstancielle [tra- duction] « vous devez examiner l’ensemble de la preuve et, si après avoir examiné tous les éléments de preuve, vous êtes convaincus que cette inférence peut légitimement être tirée, ce n’est qu’alors que vous pouvez tirer cette inférence » : da, vol. i, p 140. il a ajouté que « pour pouvoir déclarer paul trevor calnen coupable sur le fondement de la preuve cir- constancielle produite, vous devez être convaincus hors de tout doute raisonnable que sa culpabilité est la seule conclusion ou inférence rationnelle que l’ensemble de la preuve permet de tirer » : da, vol. i, p 83. ainsi, le juge du procès a correctement ex- pliqué au jury que la preuve « hors de tout doute raisonnable » signifiait qu’ils ne pouvaient déclarer l’accusé coupable en s’appuyant sur une preuve cir- constancielle que s’ils étaient convaincus qu’aucune inférence rationnelle n’était incompatible avec sa culpabilité. [29] to that end, the jury was told repeatedly to con- sider potential innocent explanations for mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct, and the trial judge provided detailed examples to consider. he explained the com- peting inferences available from mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct and situated that evidence in the context of the parties’ theories. he further clarified that after- the-fact conduct was merely circumstantial evidence — that is, evidence capable of giving rise to various reasonable inferences when considered in light of the evidence as a whole — that may or may not assist the jury. further, and crucially, he cautioned that the evidence of mr. calnen burning ms. jordan’s body could not, by itself, satisfy the standard of proof [29] à cette fin, on a répété à maintes reprises aux jurés de tenir compte des explications disculpatoires susceptibles de justifier le comportement après le fait de m. calnen, et le juge du procès a fourni des exemples détaillés à prendre en compte. il a évoqué les diverses inférences concurrentes que le compor- tement après le fait de m. calnen permettait de tirer et il a mis ces éléments de preuve dans le contexte de la thèse des parties. il a également précisé que le comportement après le fait n’était qu’une preuve cir- constancielle — c’est-à-dire une preuve susceptible de donner lieu à diverses inférences raisonnables à la lumière de l’ensemble de la preuve — qui pouvait ou non être utile aux jurés. en outre — et cet aspect [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 323 beyond a reasonable doubt; it was only a piece of cir- cumstantial evidence to be considered with the whole. [30] furthermore, owing to mr. calnen’s exculpa- tory police statement and videotaped re- enactment of ms. jordan’s fall down the stairs, the trial judge articulated the principles from w (d) not once, but twice in the charge. [31] against this backdrop, i have no trouble con- cluding that the jury understood the legal issues in this case, how the evidence related to those issues and the competing inferences available from the ev- idence. the jury would have considered the various potential explanations for mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct and would have drawn reasonable inferences from the whole of the evidence. [32] while my colleague stresses that the trial judge expressed his intention to address the prejudice of mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct in his jury charge, the foregoing analysis reveals that, in fact, he did: see martin j.’s reasons, at paras 201-3. not only that, but evidently he did so to the satisfaction of defence counsel, who did not object. as i explain below, this failure to object was in all likelihood tied to a defence strategy to use mr. calnen’s discreditable conduct to its own advantage while at the same time avoiding a potentially damaging instruction on mr. calnen’s credibility. i turn to those two factors now — the failure to object and the defence strategy. each plays a central role in my conclusion that a limiting in- struction against general propensity reasoning was not necessary in this case. est crucial —, il a mis les jurés en garde contre le fait que les éléments de preuve concernant le fait que m. calnen avait brûlé le cadavre de mme jordan ne pouvaient, à eux seuls, satisfaire à la norme de la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable; il ne s’agissait que d’un élément de preuve circonstancielle dont ils devaient tenir compte parmi l’ensemble de la preuve. [30] de plus, en raison de la déclaration disculpa- toire que m. calnen avait faite à la police et de sa reconstitution enregistrée sur bande vidéo de la chute de mme jordan dans l’escalier, le juge du procès a, dans son exposé au jury, rappelé les principes énon- cés dans l’arrêt w (d.) non pas à une, mais bien à deux reprises. [31] dans ce contexte, je n’ai aucune difficulté à conclure que le jury comprenait bien les questions de droit en litige en l’espèce, le rapport entre ces questions et la preuve, de même que les diverses inférences concurrentes que la preuve leur permettait de tirer. le jury aurait examiné les diverses explica- tions concurrentes du comportement après le fait de m. calnen et aurait tiré des inférences raisonnables de l’ensemble de la preuve. [32] bien que ma collègue souligne que le juge du procès a exprimé son intention d’aborder la question du préjudice associé au comportement après le fait de m. calnen dans son exposé au jury, l’analyse qui précède révèle que c’est effectivement ce qu’il a fait : voir les motifs de la juge martin, par 201-203. qui plus est, il a manifestement abordé cette question d’une manière jugée satisfaisante par l’avocat de la défense, qui ne s’y est pas opposé. comme je l’ex- plique plus loin, ce défaut de s’opposer s’inscrivait selon toute vraisemblance dans le cadre d’une straté- gie de la défense visant à utiliser la conduite désho- norante de m. calnen à son propre avantage tout en évitant une directive sur la crédibilité de m. calnen qui était susceptible de lui nuire. je vais maintenant me pencher sur ces deux facteurs, à savoir le défaut de s’opposer et la stratégie de la défense. chacun a joué un rôle déterminant dans ma conclusion qu’une directive restrictive contre le recours à un raisonne- ment fondé sur la propension générale n’était pas nécessaire en l’espèce. 324 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. b vetting the charge and the failure to object on the basis that a limiting instruction was required b examen de l’exposé au jury et le fait de ne pas s’y opposer au motif qu’une directive restrictive était nécessaire [33] as my colleague notes, the parties were alive to the issue of general propensity reasoning at trial. indeed, defence counsel raised this issue on three occasions in which he sought to have various pieces of evidence excluded. and yet, when the time came to vet the charge at the pre- charge conference, he chose not to raise the issue of general propensity reasoning, much less seek a limiting instruction on it. [34] defence counsel first raised the issue of moral prejudice during a voir dire concerning the admis- sibility of mr.  calnen’s police statement and re- enactment. the defence argued that mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct “paint[ed] him in a bad light”: ar, vol. iii, at p 704. in his reasons for admitting parts of mr. calnen’s statement and his entire re- enactment, the trial judge noted that he would be seeking counsel’s input in the pre- charge conference in order to craft appropriate final instructions on how after- the-fact conduct should be treated. [35] the issue arose a second time during the crown’s direct examination of mr. weeks, when the defence objected to anticipated testimony that mr. calnen had forcibly removed a woman from his house. the trial judge agreed that the proposed evi- dence was inadmissible due to the risk of propensity reasoning, and the jury did not hear it. [33] comme ma collègue le fait remarquer, les par- ties étaient conscientes de la question du raisonne- ment fondé sur la propension générale au procès. d’ailleurs, l’avocat de la défense a soulevé cette question à trois reprises en demandant l’exclusion de divers éléments de preuve. et pourtant, lorsque l’occasion lui a été offerte d’examiner l’exposé lors de la conférence préalable à l’exposé, il a choisi de ne pas soulever la question du raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale et, a fortiori, il n’a pas demandé une directive restrictive à ce sujet. [34] l’avocat de la défense a soulevé pour la pre- mière fois la question du préjudice moral au cours d’un voir- dire qui portait sur l’admissibilité de la déclaration faite par m. calnen à la police et de sa reconstitution du crime. la défense soutenait que le comportement après le fait de m. calnen [traduc- tion] « le présent[e] sous un jour peu flatteur » : da, vol. iii, p 704. dans les motifs qu’il a énoncés pour justifier sa décision d’admettre certaines parties de la déclaration de m. calnen et l’intégralité de la reconstitution, le juge du procès a fait observer qu’il solliciterait l’avis des avocats lors de la conférence préalable à l’exposé afin de pouvoir rédiger des di- rectives finales appropriées quant à la bonne façon d’utiliser le comportement après le fait. [35] la question a été soulevée une deuxième fois lors de l’interrogatoire direct de m. weeks par la couronne, lorsque la défense s’est opposée au témoi- gnage prévu suivant lequel m. calnen avait expulsé de force une femme de chez lui. le juge du procès a convenu que le témoignage proposé n’était pas ad- missible en raison du risque de raisonnement fondé sur la propension, et le jury ne l’a pas entendu. [36] the subject surfaced a third time when the de- fence submitted that ms. jordan’s “[h]e put his hands on me” text message to mr. weeks was inadmissible because it posed the risk of forbidden propensity rea- soning. the crown argued that it was admissible evi- dence of animus and ms. jordan’s state of mind. the trial judge admitted all of ms. jordan’s text messages [36] le sujet a refait surface une troisième fois lorsque la défense a fait valoir que le message texte dans lequel mme jordan racontait à m. weeks que m. calnen l’avait [traduction] « pognée » était inadmissible puisqu’il comportait un risque de raisonnement fondé sur la propension. la couronne soutenait que cet élément de preuve était admissible pour démontrer l’animosité [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 325 and gave a mid- trial hearsay instruction approved by the crown and the defence. in that instruction, the trial judge reminded the jury to scrutinize the text messages, asking whether mr. weeks may have been mistaken about their meaning. [37] against this backdrop, defence counsel’s fail- ure to raise the risk of general propensity reasoning at the pre- charge conference cannot be explained by the possibility that he simply overlooked the is- sue. to the contrary, the issue was squarely in his mind, as demonstrated on three separate occasions. counsel was in the best position to assess whether, in the concrete reality of the case at hand, a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning was desirable. he did not request such an instruction and maintained only one objection to the final charge, submitting that mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct was not probative of the mental element for second degree murder. [38] in my respectful view, defence counsel’s fail- ure to object to the absence of a limiting instruc- tion against general propensity reasoning of the kind my colleague now says was essential speaks not only to “the overall satisfactoriness of the jury charge on this issue”, but also to “the gravity of any omissions in the eyes of defence counsel”; it may further be taken as an indication that defence coun- sel felt such an instruction would not have been in his client’s interests: r v. kociuk, 2011 mbca 85, 278 ccc (3d) 1, at para. 86, cited with approval by rothstein j. in r v. mian, 2014 scc 54, [2014] 2 scr 689, at para. 66; see also r v. rth, 2007 nsca 18, 251 nsr (2d) 236, at paras. 98-99, per cromwell ja (as he then was). as bastarache j. explained in daley, at para. 58: ainsi que l’état d’esprit de mme jordan. le juge du pro- cès a admis tous les messages texte de mme jordan et a donné, au cours du procès, une directive sur le ouï- dire qui a été approuvée par la couronne et par la défense. dans cette directive, le juge du procès a rappelé au jury d’examiner attentivement les messages textes et de se demander si m. weeks avait pu se méprendre quant à leur signification. [37] dans ce contexte, le fait que l’avocat de la dé- fense n’a pas soulevé la question du risque d’un rai- sonnement fondé sur la propension générale lors de la conférence préalable à l’exposé ne saurait être attribué au fait qu’il ait simplement pu oublier de le faire. au contraire, cette question était bien présente dans son es- prit, comme le démontre le fait qu’elle a été soulevée à trois reprises. l’avocat était la personne la mieux placée pour décider, eu égard à la réalité concrète de l’affaire en cause, si une directive restrictive interdisant le re- cours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension géné- rale était souhaitable. or, il n’a pas demandé au juge de donner une telle directive et il n’a formulé qu’une seule objection à l’exposé final, soit que le comportement après le fait de m. calnen ne permettait pas d’établir l’élément moral du meurtre au deuxième degré. [38] à mon humble avis, le défaut de l’avocat de la défense de s’opposer à l’absence de directive restric- tive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale comme celle qui, selon ma collègue, est essentielle, nous éclaire non seu- lement sur [traduction] « le caractère satisfaisant dans l’ensemble des directives au jury sur cette ques- tion », mais également « sur la gravité d’omissions éventuelles, aux yeux de l’avocat de la défense ». ce défaut peut également être interprété comme une indication que, selon l’avocat de la défense, une telle directive n’était pas dans l’intérêt de son client : r c. kociuk, 2011 mbca 85, 278 ccc (3d) 1, par. 86, cité et approuvé par le juge rothstein dans l’arrêt r. c. mian, 2014 csc 54, [2014] 2 rcs 689, par. 66; voir également r c. rth, 2007 nsca 18, 251 nsr (2d) 236, par. 98-99, le juge cromwell (plus tard juge de notre cour). comme le juge bastarache l’a expliqué dans l’arrêt daley, par. 58 :    it is expected of counsel that they will assist the trial judge and identify what in their opinion is problematic    on attend des avocats qu’ils assistent le juge du pro- cès, en relevant les aspects des directives au jury qu’ils 326 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. with the judge’s instructions to the jury. while not deci- sive, failure of counsel to object is a factor in appellate review. the failure to register a complaint about the aspect of the charge that later becomes the ground for the appeal may be indicative of the seriousness of the alleged viola- tion. see jacquard, at para. 38: “in my opinion, defence counsel’s failure to object to the charge says something about both the overall accuracy of the jury instructions and the seriousness of the alleged misdirection.” estiment problématiques. bien qu’elle ne soit pas déter- minante, l’omission d’un avocat de formuler une objection est prise en compte en appel. l’absence de plainte contre l’aspect de l’exposé invoqué plus tard comme moyen d’ap- pel peut être significative quant à la gravité de l’irrégularité reprochée. voir jacquard, par. 38 : « à mon avis, l’omis- sion de l’avocat de la défense de s’opposer à l’exposé est révélatrice quant à la justesse générale des directives au jury et à la gravité de la directive qui serait erronée. » (see also thériault v. the queen, [1981] 1 scr. 336, at pp. 343-44, where dickson j. (as he then was) wrote: “although by no means determinative, it is not irrelevant that counsel for the accused did not comment, at the conclusion of the charge, upon the failure of the trial judge to direct the attention of the jury to the evidence    ”) [39] similarly, in r v. polimac, 2010 onca 346, 254 ccc (3d) 359, at para. 96, leave to appeal refused, [2010] 3 scr vi, doherty ja stressed that counsel’s vetting and endorsement of the jury charge is a significant factor in assessing whether the jury was properly instructed: counsel’s duty to assist the court in fulfilling its obligation to properly instruct the jury, referred to by fish j. in r. v. khela, [2009] 1 scr 104 at para. 49, 238 ccc (3d) 489, takes on added significance where counsel has been given a full copy of the proposed instructions and an ample opportunity to vet them, and has engaged in a detailed pre- trial dialogue with the trial judge. in those circumstances, counsel’s position at trial becomes very important when evaluating complaints, raised for the first time on appeal, that matters crucial to the defence were not properly ad- dressed by the trial judge in her instructions. [emphasis added.] (voir également l’arrêt thériault c. la reine, [1981] 1 rcs 336, p. 343-344, dans lequel le juge dickson (plus tard juge en chef) écrivait : « bien que ce ne soit pas concluant, il n’est pas sans importance de remarquer que l’avocat de l’accusé n’a fait aucun commentaire, à la fin de l’exposé, sur l’omission du juge du procès d’attirer l’attention du jury sur les témoignages    ») [39] de même, dans l’arrêt r c. polimac, 2010 onca 346, 254 ccc (3d) 359, par. 96, autori- sation d’appel refusée, [2010] 3 rcs vi, le juge doherty a souligné que le fait pour les avocats d’avoir examiné et approuvé l’exposé au jury est un facteur important à prendre en compte pour juger si le jury a reçu les directives appropriées : [traduction] l’obligation qu’ont les avocats d’aider le tribunal à s’acquitter de son devoir de donner des direc- tives appropriées au jury dont le juge fish parle dans l’arrêt r c. khela, [2009] 1 rcs 104, par. 49, 238 ccc (3d) 489, tire encore plus à conséquence lorsque l’avocat a reçu une copie intégrale des directives proposées, qu’il a eu amplement l’occasion de les examiner et qu’il a pu s’en- tretenir longuement à ce sujet avec le juge du procès avant le procès. dans ces conditions, la position que l’avocat a adoptée au procès revêt une grande importance lorsque vient le temps d’évaluer des critiques, formulées pour la première fois en appel, quant au fait que des éléments es- sentiels pour la défense n’ont pas été adéquatement abor- dés par la juge du procès dans ses directives. [je souligne.] [40] finally, in r v. minor, 2013 onca 557, 303 ccc (3d) 382, at para. 89, in the context of a com- plaint that the trial judge failed to adequately review the evidence for the jury, strathy ja emphasized that defence counsel’s failure to object to the charge was a factor to be considered when assessing the adequacy of the charge, adding that “counsel may have made a tactical decision not to request further [40] enfin, au par. 89 de l’arrêt r c. minor, 2013 onca 557, 303 ccc (3d) 382, où l’on reprochait au juge du procès de ne pas avoir suffisamment passé en revue la preuve à l’intention des jurés, le juge strathy a souligné que le défaut de l’avocat de la dé- fense de s’opposer à l’exposé était un facteur à consi- dérer pour décider du caractère suffisant de l’exposé, ajoutant qu’[traduction] « il se peut que l’avocat [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 327 instructions out of concern that in so doing the judge might re- emphasize damaging evidence.” [41] with these principles in mind, in the circum- stances of the present case, defence counsel’s failure to object on the basis that the trial judge was required to provide a limiting instruction against general pro- pensity reasoning may reasonably be taken as an in- dication that the defence considered the charge to be satisfactory and that a limiting instruction would not be in his client’s interests. indeed, the record in this case strongly supports a finding that in all likelihood, defence counsel’s silence on the matter was no acci- dent — it was instead a deliberate tactical decision. ait décidé, pour des raisons d’ordre stratégique, de ne pas demander d’autres directives par crainte que cette demande n’incite le juge à revenir sur des éléments de preuve susceptibles de nuire à son client ». [41] sur la foi de ces principes, dans les condi- tions de l’espèce, le défaut de l’avocat de la défense de s’opposer, au motif que le juge du procès était tenu de donner une directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propen- sion générale, peut raisonnablement être interprété comme une indication que la défense estimait que l’exposé était satisfaisant et qu’une directive restric- tive ne servirait pas l’intérêt de son client. en effet, le dossier en l’espèce appuie fortement la conclusion portant que, selon toute vraisemblance, le silence de l’avocat de la défense à ce propos n’était pas le fruit du hasard : il s’agissait plutôt d’une décision stratégique prise de propos délibéré. c indicia of a tactical decision c indices de l’existence d’une décision stratégique [42] the evidence of mr. calnen’s extrinsic dis- creditable conduct was relevant and admissible. if the defence had requested a limiting instruction, it would have included three main components: r. v. t (ja), 2012 onca 177, 288 ccc (3d) 1, at para 53. first, it would have identified the ex- trinsic discreditable conduct evidence. second, it would have articulated the forbidden use of that ev- idence — namely, drawing an inference based on general propensity reasoning. third, and importantly, it would also have identified the permissible uses of that evidence, which in this case would have in- cluded its use in assessing mr. calnen’s credibility and, by extension, whether his police statement and re- enactment could be believed. [43] as i will explain, in light of the parties’ re- spective theories and treatment of the evidence, any limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning might well have accrued to mr. calnen’s detriment. this consideration weighs heavily against concluding that the charge was deficient. [42] les éléments de preuve relatifs à la conduite déshonorante extrinsèque de m. calnen étaient perti- nents et admissibles. si la défense avait réclamé une directive restrictive, celle-ci aurait comporté trois éléments principaux : r c. t (ja), 2012 onca 177, 288 ccc (3d) 1, par 53. premièrement, elle aurait énoncé les éléments de preuve de conduite déshonorante extrinsèque. deuxièmement, elle aurait expliqué en quoi consistait l’utilisation interdite de ces éléments de preuve, en l’occurrence, le fait de tirer une inférence à partir d’un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale. troisièmement — et cela est important —, elle aurait également précisé les uti- lisations permises de ces éléments de preuve, ce qui, en l’espèce, aurait englobé la possibilité d’évaluer la crédibilité de m. calnen et, par extension, de décider si l’on pouvait ajouter foi à sa déclaration faite à la police ainsi qu’à sa reconstitution des faits. [43] comme je vais l’expliquer plus en détail, compte tenu de la thèse de chacune des parties et de leur utilisa- tion respective de la preuve, toute directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale aurait fort bien pu jouer contre m calnen. cette considération milite fortement contre la conclusion que l’exposé au jury était insuffisant. 328 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. (1) the parties’ theories (1) thèse des parties [44] a proper understanding of the respective the- ories of the defence and the crown is crucial to de- termining whether the defence likely made a tactical decision not to request a limiting instruction. where, as here, the issue is whether the trial judge committed reversible error in not providing a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning, two principles come to the fore. first, the crown is not entitled to “ease its burden” by stigmatizing the accused: r v. handy, 2002 scc 56, [2002] 2 scr 908, at para 72. thus, the crown’s reliance on general propensity reasoning would be an important factor on appeal: see, eg,. r v. mariani, 2007 onca 329, 220 ccc (3d) 74, at para 85. second, the court should consider whether the accused attempted to benefit from the discreditable conduct evidence by weaving it prominently into the defence theory: see, eg,. r v. smith, 2007 abca 237, 225 ccc (3d) 278, at para 27. [44] il est essentiel de bien comprendre la thèse de la défense et celle de la couronne pour juger si la défense a vraisemblablement pris la décision stratégique de ne pas réclamer de directive restric- tive. lorsque, comme en l’espèce, il s’agit de savoir si le juge du procès a commis une erreur justifiant l’infirmation de sa décision en ne donnant pas de directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un rai- sonnement fondé sur la propension générale, il y a deux principes qui jouent un rôle essentiel. tout d’abord, la couronne n’est pas habilitée à « alléger la charge qui lui incombe » en stigmatisant l’accusé : r c. handy, 2002 csc 56, [2002] 2. rcs 908, par 72. par conséquent, le fait pour la couronne d’invoquer le raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale constituerait un facteur important en appel : voir, p ex, r c. mariani, 2007 onca 329, 220 ccc (3d) 74, par 85. en second lieu, le tribunal devrait vérifier si l’accusé a cherché à tirer profit des éléments de preuve concernant sa conduite déshono- rante en l’intégrant manifestement à sa thèse : voir, p ex, r c. smith, 2007 abca 237, 225 ccc (3d) 278, par 27. (a) crown’s theory a) thèse de la couronne [45] the crown’s theory was as follows. mr. cal- nen and ms. jordan were in a serious relationship which came to a sudden and violent end when ms. jordan announced she was finally leaving him and tried to steal his valuables. in a state of rage, mr. calnen killed her. at first, he tried to make it seem as though she had simply run off. the police then launched a homicide investigation, thereby raising the stakes. mr. calnen then made a calcu- lated decision to burn ms. jordan’s body, thereby destroying the only evidence capable of establishing the cause of her death. mr. calnen’s story about how ms. jordan died in an accident after falling down the stairs was, according to the crown, incredi- ble. mr. calnen lied to the police and ms. jordan’s friends and family in the wake of her disappearance, disclaiming any knowledge of her whereabouts. he buttressed his story by sending a misleading text message to mr. weeks from her cellphone. he also [45] la thèse de la couronne est la suivante. mon- sieur calnen et mme jordan entretenaient une relation sérieuse qui a pris fin de façon abrupte et violente lorsque mme jordan a annoncé à m. calnen qu’elle le quittait finalement et qu’elle a tenté de lui dérober des objets de valeur. dans un accès de colère, m. calnen l’a tuée. il a d’abord essayé de faire croire qu’elle avait simplement pris la fuite. la police a alors ouvert une enquête pour homicide, faisant ainsi monter les enjeux. monsieur calnen a alors pris la décision cal- culée de brûler le cadavre de mme jordan, détruisant ainsi la seule preuve susceptible d’établir la cause de son décès. la version des faits donnée par m. calnen quant au décès accidentel de mme jordan à la suite de sa chute dans l’escalier n’était pas crédible, selon la couronne. monsieur calnen a menti à la police, de même qu’aux amis et à la famille de mme jordan à la suite de la disparition de cette dernière, prétendant qu’il ignorait où elle se trouvait. il a tenté d’étayer [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 329 minimized the significance of his relationship with ms jordan. sa version des faits en envoyant un message texte trompeur à m. weeks à partir du téléphone cellulaire de mme jordan. il a également minimisé l’importance de sa relation avec mme jordan. (b) defence theory b) thèse de la défense [46] the defence theory was that mr. calnen’s ac- count of ms. jordan’s accidental fall down the stairs should be believed. mr. calnen’s defence of accident hinged on the truthfulness of his police statement and videotaped re- enactment. the defence high- lighted the physical evidence tending to corroborate mr. calnen’s narrative, including the steps he took to burn ms. jordan’s body. the crucial question for the jury was his motivation for doing so. [47] mr. calnen was, in the defence’s submission, in an open relationship with ms jordan. he was neither jealous nor possessive. ms. jordan was angry, verbally abusive and harboured animosity against mr calnen. mr. calnen, by contrast, was more sad than angry at her wanting to leave him. she chased him around the house, threw a bottle of pop at him, then took a swing at him that caused her to lose her balance and fall down the stairs. high on crack co- caine, mr. calnen made the initial mistake of moving her body, setting in motion a chain of events in which he took increasingly desperate measures to cover up her death. mr. calnen initially misled ms. jordan’s mother and the authorities because he did not trust that anyone would believe it was an accident. each subsequent step was fueled by further crack cocaine consumption and growing panic at failed attempts to conceal and then destroy her body. [46] la thèse de la défense est que le récit de m. calnen quant à la chute accidentelle de mme jordan dans l’escalier est digne de foi. la défense d’accident invoquée par m. calnen dépend de la véracité de sa déclaration à la police et de sa reconstitution des faits enregistrée sur bande vidéo. la défense a mis en lumière de la preuve matérielle tendant à corro- borer la version des faits de m. calnen, notamment les mesures qu’il a prises pour brûler le cadavre de mme jordan. la question cruciale sur laquelle le jury devait s’attarder était celle de savoir ce qui avait mo- tivé m. calnen à agir ainsi. [47] selon la défense, m. calnen entretenait une relation ouverte avec mme jordan. il n’était ni ja- loux ni possessif. madame jordan était en colère, elle s’était montrée violente verbalement et avait manifesté de l’animosité envers lui. en revanche, m. calnen était davantage triste que furieux d’ap- prendre qu’elle voulait le quitter. elle l’a pourchassé dans la maison, a lancé une bouteille de boisson gazeuse dans sa direction, puis a essayé de le frap- per et, dans son élan, elle a perdu l’équilibre et est tombée dans l’escalier. sous l’effet du crack qu’il avait consommé, m. calnen a dès le départ commis l’erreur de déplacer le corps, déclenchant ainsi une série d’événements au cours desquels il a pris des mesures de plus en plus désespérées pour camoufler le décès de mme jordan. il a d’abord menti à la mère de mme jordan et aux autorités parce qu’il pensait que personne ne croirait à la thèse de l’accident. chacune des mesures suivantes était alimentée par d’autres consommations de crack et par sa panique croissante devant ses tentatives infructueuses pour dissimuler puis détruire le corps de la victime. (2) the parties’ treatment of the evidence (2) utilisation de la preuve par les parties [48] as indicated, the defence attempted to bol- ster mr. calnen’s police statement and re- enactment [48] comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, la défense a essayé d’étayer la déclaration de m. calnen à la 330 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. by marshalling the discreditable conduct evidence in his favour. mr. calnen’s crack cocaine use ex- plained his irrational decisions to move and then burn ms. jordan’s body. his open and sexually adventur- ous relationship with ms. jordan demonstrated his lack of possessiveness or jealousy, despite her deci- sion to leave him. the physical evidence of burning ms. jordan’s body corroborated what he described to the police in his statement and re- enactment. [49] the crown, for its part, emphasized the very narrow relevance of mr. calnen’s attempts to burn ms. jordan’s body and the circumstantial evidence which pointed to a tumultuous breakup. police et sa reconstitution des faits en organisant les éléments de preuve de conduite déshonorante de façon à aider m calnen. la consommation de crack par ce dernier explique ses décisions irration- nelles de déplacer et, ensuite, de brûler le cadavre de mme jordan. sa relation ouverte et sexuellement audacieuse avec mme jordan démontrait qu’il n’était ni possessif ni jaloux en dépit de la décision de mme jordan de le quitter. la preuve matérielle ten- dant à démontrer qu’il avait brûlé le cadavre de mme jordan corrobore les explications qu’il a don- nées à la police dans sa déclaration et sa reconsti- tution des faits. [49] la couronne a, pour sa part, insisté sur la pertinence limitée des tentatives faites par m. calnen pour brûler le cadavre de mme jordan et sur les élé- ments de preuve circonstancielle indiquant une rup- ture tumultueuse. (a) burning of ms. jordan’s body a) cadavre de mme jordan brûlé par m. calnen [50] there is no indication in the record of a de- fence application to sever the charge of interference with human remains from the indictment to facilitate mr. calnen’s guilty plea. hence, it would appear the defence decided, as a strategic matter, that the jury should learn that mr. calnen took responsibility for burning ms. jordan’s body. [51] mr. calnen’s defence of accident depended on the truthfulness of his exculpatory statement. the defence submitted that mr. calnen’s willingness to take responsibility for his actions made that state- ment more believable. the defence knew that the crown was relying on the burning of ms. jordan’s body, along with evidence of mr. calnen’s animosity towards her, as the crux of its case. the defence me- thodically highlighted the physical evidence, includ- ing the steps mr. calnen took to burn ms. jordan’s body, to corroborate his narrative. [50] rien dans le dossier ne laisse entendre que la défense a présenté de demande pour dissocier l’ac- cusation d’indécence envers des restes humains de l’acte d’accusation afin de faciliter le plaidoyer de culpabilité de m calnen. il semblerait donc que la défense ait décidé, pour des raisons stratégiques, que les jurés devaient être mis au courant que m. calnen assumait la responsabilité d’avoir brûlé le cadavre de mme jordan. [51] la défense d’accident de m. calnen dépen- dait de la véracité de sa déclaration disculpatoire. la défense a fait valoir que la volonté de m. calnen d’assumer la responsabilité de ses actes ajoutait à la crédibilité de cette déclaration. la défense savait que la thèse de la couronne reposait essentiellement sur le fait que m. calnen avait brûlé le cadavre de mme jordan, et sur des éléments de preuve tendant à démontrer son animosité envers elle. la défense a méthodiquement mis en évidence les éléments de preuve matérielle, y compris les mesures prises par m. calnen pour brûler le cadavre de mme jordan, afin de corroborer sa version des faits. [52] the crown, for its part, did not invite the jury to engage in propensity reasoning based on [52] pour sa part, la couronne n’a pas invité le jury à se livrer à un raisonnement fondé sur la [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 331 mr. calnen’s guilty plea. to the contrary, crown counsel exhorted the jury to keep the guilty plea separate and not to use it in respect of the murder charge, stressing that “it’s important that you don’t take the fact that he pled guilty to one charge and apply it to this [murder charge]. he remains innocent of this charge till we fully prove he’s guilty of it”: ar, vol. iii, at p 2191. [53] the chain of inferences that the crown urged upon the jury was straightforward: mr. calnen took a series of calculated and extreme risks to obliterate any evidence of how ms. jordan died, and he did so because her cause of death would have revealed that he murdered her. propension en s’appuyant sur le plaidoyer de culpa- bilité de m calnen. au contraire, le procureur de la couronne a exhorté le jury à faire abstraction du plaidoyer de culpabilité et à ne pas en tenir compte relativement à l’accusation de meurtre, soulignant qu’[traduction] « il est important que vous ne vous serviez pas du fait qu’il a plaidé coupable à un chef d’accusation pour l’appliquer à la présente [accusation de meurtre] il demeure innocent de cette accusation tant que nous n’avons pas com- plètement prouvé qu’il en est coupable  »  : da, vol. iii, p 2191. [53] la série d’inférences que la couronne a ex- horté le jury à tirer est simple : m. calnen a pris une série de risques extrêmes et calculés pour éli- miner toute preuve permettant de savoir comment mme jordan était décédée et il a agi de la sorte parce que la cause du décès aurait révélé qu’il l’avait as- sassinée. (b) use of crack cocaine b) consommation de crack [54] the crown’s theory hinged on the notion that mr.  calnen was calculating and rational, calmly weighing the risks of each attempt to conceal and de- stroy evidence. the crown minimized mr. calnen’s drug use, relying on mr. weeks’s observation that mr. calnen handled the effects of crack cocaine well. [54] la thèse de la couronne repose sur l’idée que m. calnen a agi de façon calculée et ration- nelle, soupesant froidement les risques de chacune de ses tentatives de dissimulation et de destruction des éléments de preuve. la couronne a minimisé la consommation de drogues de m. calnen, invoquant l’observation de m. weeks selon laquelle m. calnen gérait bien les effets du crack. [55] by contrast, the defence sought to paint mr. calnen as a heavy crack cocaine user incapable of making rational decisions. [55] en revanche, la défense a tenté de dépeindre m. calnen comme un grand consommateur de crack incapable de prendre des décisions rationnelles. [56] in sum, the defence looked to amplify the significance of his drug use, while the crown argued it was immaterial. [56] en somme, la défense a cherché à amplifier sa consommation de drogues, alors que la couronne a affirmé qu’elle était sans importance. (c) open relationship and ms. jordan’s sex work c) relation ouverte et travail sexuel de mme jordan [57] the crown sought to show that mr. calnen cared deeply about ms. jordan and could not stand the thought of her leaving him. the crown submitted that mr. calnen’s statement to police that he was not in a real relationship with ms. jordan — “the sex is good” and “she’s only a hooker” — was an insincere [57] la couronne a tenté de prouver que m. calnen était très attaché à mme jordan et qu’il ne pouvait supporter l’idée qu’elle le quitte. la couronne a fait valoir que la déclaration que m. calnen avait faite à la police suivant laquelle lui et mme jordan n’entre- tenaient pas vraiment une relation — [traduction] 332 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. attempt to distance himself from her disappearance: ar, vol. iii, at p 2220. « le sexe est bon » et « ce n’est qu’une prostituée » — était une tentative peu sincère de prendre ses dis- tances par rapport à sa disparition : da, vol. iii, p 2220. [58] by contrast, the defence argued that mr. cal- nen and ms. jordan had an open and sexually ad- venturous relationship, incompatible with feelings of possessiveness, jealousy and animosity. the de- fence emphasized the unconventional nature of the relationship, whereas the crown downplayed that evidence. [58] en revanche, selon la défense, m. calnen et mme jordan avaient une relation ouverte et sexuelle- ment audacieuse incompatible avec tout sentiment de possessivité, de jalousie ou d’animosité. la défense a insisté sur le caractère non conventionnel de leur relation, tandis que la couronne a minimisé ces élé- ments de preuve. (d) ms. jordan’s “he put his hands on me” text d) message texte de mme jordan : « il m’a po­ [59] as indicated, ms. jordan sent a text message to mr. weeks which said that mr. calnen “put his hands on [her].” there was no suggestion at trial, however, that she had disclosed any abuse to her mother or her other friends. to the contrary, her mother held mr. calnen in high esteem, perceiving him to be “a stable man” and “a good influence”: ar, vol. iii, at p 1327. mr. calnen and ms. jordan would often stay over at her parents’ home. the trial judge gave mid- trial and final limiting instructions, asking the jury to consider whether mr. weeks mis- interpreted ms. jordan’s hearsay text messages. in its final address, the crown made no ref- [60] erence to the “[h]e put his hands on me” text and did not argue from propensity. the defence argued that ms. jordan emotionally manipulated mr. weeks with the “[h]e put his hands on me” text so that he would help her to steal mr. calnen’s property and move out of his basement. this was a major theme of mr. weeks’ cross- examination. according to mr. weeks, in his visits to their home, he had never witnessed violence or jealousy between mr. calnen and ms jordan. gnée » [59] comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, mme jordan a envoyé à m. weeks un message texte dans lequel elle lui racontait que m. calnen l’avait [traduction] « pognée ». toutefois, nul n’a donné à penser, pen- dant le procès, qu’elle avait révélé quelque acte de violence que ce soit à sa mère ou d’autres amis. au contraire, sa mère tenait m. calnen en haute estime, le percevant comme [traduction] «  un homme stable », qui avait « une bonne influence » : da, vol. iii, p 1327. monsieur calnen et mme jordan passaient souvent la nuit chez les parents de cette dernière. le juge du procès a, tant au cours du procès que dans ses directives finales, donné des directives restrictives dans lesquelles il invitait les jurés à se demander si m. weeks avait mal interprété les mes- sages textes de mme jordan, lesquels constituaient du ouï- dire. [60] dans sa plaidoirie finale, la couronne n’a fait aucune allusion au message texte dans lequel mme jordan racontait que m. calnen l’avait [tra- duction] « pognée » et n’a pas présenté d’argument fondé sur la propension. la défense a soutenu que mme jordan avait manipulé les émotions de m. weeks avec ce message texte pour qu’il l’aide à dérober des biens à m. calnen et à déménager de son sous- sol ce point était très important dans le contre- interrogatoire de m weeks. selon m. weeks, lors de ses visites à leur domicile, il n’avait jamais été témoin de scènes de violence ou de jalousie entre m. calnen et mme jordan. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 333 (3) tactical considerations (3) considérations stratégiques [61] in light of the parties’ treatment of the evi- dence, there are two aspects to the tactical bargain that the defence appears to have made. [61] compte tenu de l’utilisation de la preuve par les parties, il y a deux considérations qui ont joué dans le pari que semble avoir pris la défense. [62] first, the defence used the discreditable con- duct evidence — mr. calnen’s crack cocaine use, the nature of his open relationship with ms. jor- dan, and the corroborative physical evidence that he burned ms. jordan’s body — to bolster the truth- fulness of mr. calnen’s exculpatory statement and re- enactment: see, eg,. smith, at paras 27-29. [63] second, the defence would have realized that a limiting instruction against general propensity rea- soning risked highlighting the negative impact of mr. calnen’s discreditable conduct on his credibility. it was within the ambit of defence counsel’s tactical discretion to attempt to avoid such an instruction with a view to bolstering mr. calnen’s narrative. the absence of the proposed limiting instruction meant, in effect, that the jury was not informed, anywhere in the charge, that mr. calnen’s discreditable conduct could be used to undermine his credibility and, by extension, the trustworthiness of his exculpatory statement and re- enactment, notwithstanding the fact that, as i will explain, it would have been open to the jury to use the evidence for these purposes. [64] as the majority of the court of appeal noted, the evidence of mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct was admissible on the question of his credibility. evidence of extrinsic discreditable conduct that is otherwise relevant and admissible with respect to an issue in the case may be used to assess the ac- cused’s overall credibility. in r v. g (sg), [1997] 2 scr 716, at para. 70, cory j. laid to rest any doubt about this common sense proposition: [62] premièrement, la défense a utilisé la preuve de conduite déshonorante — la consommation de crack par m. calnen, la nature de sa relation ouverte avec mme jordan et les éléments de preuve matérielle corroborant le fait qu’il avait brûlé le cadavre de mme jordan — pour renforcer la véracité de sa dé- claration disculpatoire et de sa reconstitution : voir, p ex, smith, par 27-29. [63] deuxièmement, la défense aurait su qu’une directive restrictive interdisant le raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale risquait de mettre en évi- dence les conséquences négatives de la conduite déshonorante de m. calnen sur sa crédibilité. il était loisible à l’avocat de la défense, dans le cadre des décisions stratégiques qu’il pouvait prendre, de ten- ter d’éviter que le juge donne une telle directive, afin de renforcer la version des faits de m calnen. l’absence de la directive restrictive proposée signi- fiait, en fait, que l’exposé n’indiquait aucunement au jury que la conduite déshonorante de m. calnen pouvait être utilisée pour miner sa crédibilité et, par extension, pour attaquer la véracité de sa déclaration disculpatoire et de sa reconstitution des faits, et ce, malgré le fait, comme je vais l’expliquer, qu’il aurait été loisible au jury d’utiliser à ces fins les éléments de preuve en question. [64] comme les juges majoritaires de la cour d’ap- pel l’ont souligné, les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait de m. calnen étaient admissibles quant à la question de sa crédibilité. les éléments de preuve de la conduite déshono- rante extrinsèque qui sont par ailleurs pertinents et admissibles relativement à une question en litige peuvent être utilisés pour évaluer la crédibilité géné- rale de l’accusé. dans l’arrêt r c. g (sg), [1997] 2 rcs 716, par. 70, le juge cory a dissipé tout doute quant à cette proposition sensée : to require a jury to compartmentalize its thinking even further than this would be artificial and unnecessarily il serait artificiel et inutilement compliqué d’exiger des membres d’un jury qu’ils compartimentent davantage 334 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. convoluted. it is a matter of common sense that evidence of bad character may reflect badly on the accused’s credi- bility, and that the jury can use it as a factor in determining if the accused is likely to be telling the truth. this is not the same thing as suggesting that the accused is guilty because she is a bad person, or may have a disposition to commit the type of crime for which she is charged. leur pensée. cela va de soi que la preuve de mauvaise moralité peut nuire à la crédibilité de l’accusé et que le jury peut l’utiliser comme facteur pour déterminer si l’accusé est susceptible de dire la vérité. ce n’est pas la même chose que de supposer que l’accusé est coupable parce qu’il est une mauvaise personne ou peut avoir une propension à commettre le genre de crime qui lui est reproché. (see also r v. sheriffe, 2015 onca 880, 333 ccc. (3d) 330, at para 70)1 (voir également r c. sheriffe, 2015 onca 880, 333 ccc (3d) 330, par 701) [65] this general principle holds true of discred- itable conduct that occurred after the fact: jaw, at para 39. had the trial judge given the limiting in- struction that my colleague now says was essential, the charge would necessarily have included a dam- aging instruction on mr. calnen’s credibility flowing from the discreditable conduct evidence. this, in turn, could well have shaken the foundation of his defence, which hinged on the jury’s assessment of the truthfulness of his statement to the police and the videotaped re- enactment. in this regard, while my colleague takes the view that such an instruc- tion would have been discretionary, i respectfully disagree. i say this because crown counsel would unquestionably have insisted on such an instruction so as to level the playing field. [65] ce principe général vaut aussi pour la conduite déshonorante après le fait : jaw, par 39. si le juge du procès avait donné la directive restrictive que ma collègue qualifie d’essentielle, l’exposé au jury aurait nécessairement compris une directive qui au- rait nui à la crédibilité de m. calnen en raison de la preuve de sa conduite déshonorante, ce qui aurait pu ébranler le fondement de sa défense, qui dépendait de l’appréciation par le jury de la véracité de sa dé- claration à la police et de sa reconstitution des faits enregistrée sur bande vidéo. à cet égard, même si ma collègue est d’avis qu’une telle directive aurait été discrétionnaire, je ne partage pas son opinion, parce que j’estime que le procureur de la couronne aurait sans aucun doute insisté pour qu’une directive de la sorte soit donnée de manière à égaliser les chances de part et d’autre. [66] relatedly, my colleague emphasizes that crown counsel could have requested such an in- struction on credibility at any time and clearly chose not to do so: see martin j.’s reasons, at para 209. however, the reality is that while crown counsel ev- idently considered the charge given by the trial judge to be fair and balanced, there is no reason to assume crown counsel would have felt the same way had the charge included a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning. had such a limiting instruction been added to the charge, the natural consequence [66] dans le même ordre d’idées, ma collègue souligne que le procureur de la couronne aurait pu demander en tout temps une telle directive sur la crédibilité et qu’il a manifestement décidé de ne pas le faire : voir motifs de la juge martin, par 209. toutefois, même si le procureur de la couronne a de toute évidence jugé juste et équilibré l’exposé du juge du procès, il n’en demeure pas moins que rien ne permet de présumer qu’il aurait eu la même opinion si l’exposé avait compris une directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la 1 i note that the accused in g (sg) testified. however, nothing in cory j.’s reasons limits the principles he articulated to an accused’s in- court testimony, as opposed to an out-of- court statement and videotaped re- enactment of the kind at issue here. nor do i see any reason to distinguish g (sg) on that basis: see, eg,. r v. malik, 2005 canlii 15453, at paras 7-11. 1 je constate que, dans l’affaire g (sg), l’accusée avait témoigné. toutefois, rien dans les motifs du juge cory ne limite les prin- cipes qu’il a énoncés au témoignage donné par un accusé devant le tribunal, par opposition à une déclaration extrajudiciaire et à une reconstitution enregistrée sur bande vidéo comme celle qui nous intéresse en l’espèce. par ailleurs, je ne vois aucune raison d’établir sur ce fondement une distinction entre la présente affaire et celle dans g (sg) : voir, p ex, r c. malik, 2005 canlii 15453, par 7-11. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen le juge moldaver 335 would have been crown counsel’s legitimate insist- ence on an instruction on credibility, which would have gone hand in hand with the limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning. in the absence of the latter instruction, it is not at all surprising that the crown saw no need to insist on the former. propension générale. si une telle directive avait été incorporée à l’exposé, il va de soi que le procureur de la couronne aurait insisté auprès du juge pour qu’il donne également une directive sur la crédibilité, qui aurait été indissociable de la directive restrictive relative au raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale. en l’absence de cette dernière directive, il n’est pas surprenant que la couronne n’ait pas vu la nécessité d’insister auprès du juge pour qu’il donne la première. (4) conclusion on the indicia of a tactical (4) conclusion sur les indices de l’existence decision d’une décision stratégique [67] in light of all the circumstances, including defence counsel’s failure to ask the trial judge for a limiting instruction and the absence of any sug- gestion that defence counsel was ineffective, much less incompetent, the record strongly supports the conclusion that defence counsel made a tactical de- cision to avoid highlighting the discreditable con- duct evidence. this weighs heavily against finding that the jury charge was inadequate: see, eg,. r v. bukmeier (1998), 103 bcac 303, at para. 37; r. v. f (j), 2011 onca 220, 105 or (3d) 161, at paras. 57-59, aff’d on other grounds, 2013 scc 12, [2013] 1 scr 565. moreover, it is not for this court to pass judgment on the merits of defence counsel’s tactical decision, particularly in the absence of an allegation by mr. calnen that his trial counsel failed to assist him effectively: r v. gdb, 2000 scc 22, [2000] 1 scr 520, at paras 33-35. [67] vu l’ensemble des circonstances de l’espèce, y compris le fait que l’avocat de la défense n’a pas demandé au juge du procès de donner une direc- tive restrictive, et compte tenu de l’absence de toute suggestion que l’avocat de la défense était ineffi- cace, et encore moins incompétent, le dossier appuie fortement la conclusion selon laquelle l’avocat de la défense a décidé, pour des raisons stratégiques, d’éviter de mettre en évidence les éléments de preuve relatifs à la conduite déshonorante de l’accusé, ce qui milite fortement contre la conclusion portant que l’exposé au jury était insuffisant : voir, p ex, r c. bukmeier (1998), 103 bcac 303, par. 37; r c. f. (j.), 2011 onca 220, 105 or (3d) 161, par. 57-59, conf. pour d’autres motifs par 2013 csc 12, [2013] 1 rcs 565. de plus, il n’appartient pas à notre cour de se prononcer sur le bien- fondé de la déci- sion stratégique de l’avocat de la défense, d’autant plus que m. calnen ne prétend pas que l’avocat qui le représentait au procès ne l’a pas bien défendu : r c. gdb, 2000 csc 22, [2000] 1 rcs 520, par 33-35. iii summary and conclusion iii résumé et conclusion [68] at trial, as i  have explained, mr.  calnen did not seek a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning. rather, he adopted a strat- egy of using the discreditable conduct to bolster the credibility of his statement and re- enactment, upon which his defence of accidental death rested. that the defence adopted a deliberate strategy to use the discreditable conduct evidence to its own advantage is an important factor that distinguishes this case [68] comme je l’ai expliqué, m. calnen n’a pas de- mandé, au procès, de directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale. il a plutôt adopté la stratégie consistant à utiliser sa conduite déshonorante pour renforcer la crédibilité de sa déclaration et de sa reconstitution des faits, lesquelles constituaient le fondement de sa défense de mort accidentelle. le fait que la défense a délibérément adopté comme stratégie d’utiliser à 336 r v calnen moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. from others where the discreditable conduct evidence plays no part in the defence theory and is little more than a breeding ground for the moral and reasoning prejudice about which my colleague expresses con- cern. given the strategy adopted by the defence, a limiting instruction against general propensity rea- soning would have risked highlighting the negative impact of mr. calnen’s discreditable conduct on his credibility and thereby unravelling his defence — a risk which the defence chose not to take. [69] despite my colleague’s rejection of that thesis, respectfully, i see no other reasonable explanation for defence counsel’s failure to seek the kind of limiting instruction which my colleague now says was both obvious and crucial — and indeed fatal to sustaining mr. calnen’s conviction for second degree murder. [70] this court has stated that the principle of finality is “essential to the integrity of the criminal process”: gdb, at para. 19, citing r v. m (ps) (1992), 77 ccc (3d) 402 (ont. ca), at p. 411, per doherty ja;. r v. st­ cloud, 2015 scc 27, [2015] 2 scr 328, at para 130. it has also stated, as my colleague rightly points out, that the due diligence criterion for the admission of fresh evidence on ap- peal, which exists to ensure finality, “must yield where its rigid application might lead to a miscar- riage of justice”: gdb, at para 19. but here, in my respectful view, there is simply no basis on which to conclude that the application of the finality princi- ple might lead to a miscarriage of justice. as i see it, the defence made a legitimate tactical decision at trial and lost. with respect, it must live with the consequences of that decision. mr. calnen had a fair trial. the jury instructions, which both crown and defence counsel evidently considered to be fair and balanced, properly equipped the jury to decide the case before it and, in particular, adequately guarded against the risk of general propensity reasoning. that they could have been more fulsome is not the son propre avantage les éléments de preuve rela- tifs à la conduite déshonorante de m. calnen est un facteur important qui distingue la présente espèce d’autres affaires où la preuve relative à la conduite déshonorante ne joue aucun rôle dans la thèse de la défense et n’est guère plus qu’un terreau fertile pour le préjudice moral et le préjudice par raisonnement au sujet desquels ma collègue a exprimé ses craintes. compte tenu de la stratégie adoptée par la défense, une directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale au- rait risqué de mettre en évidence les conséquences négatives de la conduite déshonorante de m. calnen sur la crédibilité de ce dernier, faisant ainsi voler en éclats sa défense, un risque que la défense a préféré ne pas courir. [69] malgré le rejet de cette thèse par ma collègue, je ne vois, en toute déférence, aucune autre explica- tion raisonnable au fait que l’avocat de la défense n’a pas réclamé le genre de directive restrictive qui, selon ma collègue, était à la fois évidente, essentielle et, qui plus est, nécessaire pour que m. calnen soit déclaré coupable de meurtre au deuxième degré. [70] notre cour a déclaré que le principe du carac- tère définitif des décisions est « essentie[l] à l’inté- grité du processus en matière criminelle » : gdb, par. 19, citant r c. m (ps) (1992), 77 ccc (3d) 402 (ca. ont.), p. 411, le juge doherty; r c. st­ cloud, 2015 csc 27, [2015] 2 rcs 328, par 130. elle a également déclaré, comme ma collègue le souligne avec raison, que le critère de la diligence raisonnable concernant l’admission de nouveaux élé- ments de preuve en appel, qui vise à faire respecter ce principe du caractère définitif des décisions, « ne doit pas être retenu lorsque son application rigide est susceptible d’entraîner une erreur judiciaire » : gdb, par 19. mais dans le cas qui nous occupe, il n’y a, à mon humble avis, tout simplement aucune raison de conclure que l’application du principe du caractère définitif des décisions est susceptible d’en- traîner une erreur judiciaire. selon moi, la défense a pris une décision légitime d’ordre stratégique lors du procès et elle a perdu. en toute déférence, elle doit assumer les conséquences de sa décision. monsieur calnen a joui d’un procès équitable. les directives au jury, que le procureur de la couronne et l’avocat [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 337 issue. in the circumstances, i am of the view that the principle of finality must prevail. [71] for these reasons, i would allow the crown’s appeal and restore mr. calnen’s conviction for sec- ond degree murder. de la défense ont, de toute évidence, tous les deux jugées justes et équilibrées, ont fait en sorte que les jurés étaient bien outillés pour trancher l’affaire dont ils étaient saisis et, en particulier, qu’ils étaient adéquatement protégés contre les dangers d’un rai- sonnement fondé sur la propension générale. le fait que l’exposé aurait pu être plus complet n’est pas la question. eu égard aux circonstances de l’espèce, j’estime que le principe du caractère définitif des décisions doit avoir préséance. [71] par conséquent, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi de la couronne et de rétablir la déclaration de culpabilité de meurtre au deuxième degré pronon- cée contre m calnen. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [72] martin j. (dissenting in part) — this ap- peal concerns the inferences that can logically — and legally — be supported by certain after- the-fact conduct evidence. is it open to the jury to infer the requisite intent for second degree murder from the accused’s successive steps to reduce a human body to ash? in my view, on these facts, the answer is yes. [72] la juge martin (dissidente en partie) — le présent pourvoi concerne les inférences que certains éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait permettent logiquement — et juridiquement — de tirer. est-il loisible au jury d’inférer que l’accusé avait l’intention requise pour commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré des mesures successives prises par ce dernier en vue de réduire un corps humain en cendres? à mon avis, vu les faits de l’espèce, la réponse à cette question est affirmative. i facts i les faits [73] paul trevor calnen was charged with second degree murder and indecent interference with hu- man remains in the death of reita louise jordan, his domestic partner. he was tried by a judge and jury. at the outset of the trial, he pled guilty to the interference charge. the jury found him guilty of second degree murder. [73] paul trevor calnen a été accusé de meurtre au deuxième degré et d’indécence envers des restes hu- mains relativement au décès de sa compagne, reita louise jordan. il a subi son procès devant juge et jury. à l’ouverture du procès, il a plaidé coupable à l’accusation d’indécence. le jury l’a reconnu cou- pable de meurtre au deuxième degré. [74] mr. calnen, then 50, and ms. jordan, 35, had been in a relationship for about two years, and they had been living together in mr. calnen’s home in hammonds plains, nova scotia. ms. jordan was re- ported missing on march 28, 2013. after her mother and sister contacted the police, the police com- menced a missing person investigation. mr. calnen was first interviewed on april 5, 2013 and he told the police that he had last seen ms. jordan when he left [74] alors âgés respectivement de 50 et de 35 ans, m. calnen et mme jordan étaient en couple depuis environ deux ans et vivaient ensemble dans la maison de m. calnen à hammonds plains, en nouvelle- écosse. on a signalé la disparition de mme jordan le 28 mars 2013. après avoir été contactée par la mère et la sœur de mme jordan, la police a ouvert une en- quête concernant une personne disparue. monsieur calnen a été interrogé pour la première fois le 5 avril 338 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. their home for work on the morning of march 18, 2013. [75] with the passage of time, the police found no trace of ms jordan. the missing person investigation became a homicide investigation. [76] the police suspected mr. calnen of murder and he was arrested on june 17, 2013. near the end of his questioning on june 18, the police brought ms. jordan’s mother into the interview. she em- braced mr. calnen and begged for information about her daughter. mr. calnen began talking. he described how ms. jordan died, and explained what he did with her body both immediately after her death and subsequently. his statement to the police was entirely exculpatory on the second degree murder charge: he claimed that ms. jordan’s death was an accident, and that it did not involve or result from any force on his part. in describing the circumstances of her death, [77] mr. calnen claimed that ms. jordan died on march 18, in his presence, in the home they shared. he explained that when he returned home from work that day, ms. jordan had her bags packed at the front door and was leaving. ms. jordan asked about his contact with another woman and they argued. mr. calnen discovered that she had taken his laptop and his gold ring, and “[t]hat kind of got [him] pissed off”: ar, vol. ii, at p 695. however, he later claimed to have no knowledge of various texts between ms. jordan and a male friend, mr. wade weeks, discussing plans to steal mr. calnen’s vehicle and other property. 2013; il a déclaré à la police avoir vu mme jordan pour la dernière fois lorsqu’il avait quitté leur domi- cile pour aller travailler le matin du 18 mars 2013. [75] le temps passait et la police ne trouvait au- cune trace de mme jordan. l’enquête concernant la disparition de mme jordan est donc devenue une en- quête sur un homicide. [76] soupçonnant m. calnen de meurtre, la police l’a arrêté le 17 juin 2013. vers la fin de son inter- rogatoire, le 18 juin, les policiers ont fait entrer la mère de mme jordan dans la pièce où se déroulait l’interrogatoire. elle a pris m. calnen dans ses bras et l’a supplié de lui donner des renseignements sur sa fille. monsieur calnen s’est mis à parler. il a ra- conté de quelle manière mme jordan était morte, et a expliqué ce qu’il avait fait de son corps juste après son décès et dans les jours qui ont suivi. sa décla- ration à la police était entièrement disculpatoire en ce qui a trait à l’accusation de meurtre au deuxième degré : il prétendait que la mort de mme jordan était accidentelle et qu’il n’avait employé aucune force ayant mené ou contribué à la mort. [77] relatant les circonstances entourant la mort de mme jordan, m. calnen a affirmé que cette dernière était décédée le 18 mars, en sa présence, dans la maison où ils vivaient ensemble. il a expliqué que, lorsqu’il est rentré chez lui après le travail ce jour-là, mme jordan avait fait ses valises et les avait déposées devant la porte d’entrée et qu’elle s’apprêtait à partir. madame jordan lui avait posé des questions sur ses contacts avec une autre femme et ils se sont dispu- tés. monsieur calnen s’était rendu compte qu’elle lui avait pris son ordinateur portable et sa bague en or, et [traduction] « ça [l’avait] comme vraiment frustré » : da, vol. ii, p 695. toutefois, il a par la suite affirmé ne pas avoir été au courant des divers messages textes que mme jordan avait échangés avec un de ses amis, m. wade weeks, et dans lesquels ils avaient projeté de voler le véhicule de m. calnen et d’autres biens. [78] according to mr.  calnen, ms.  jordan de- manded that he call a taxi for her, and that he give her money. she became physically aggressive and threatened to trash the house she kicked some [78] aux dires de m. calnen, mme jordan avait exigé qu’il lui appelle un taxi et qu’il lui donne de l’argent. elle était devenue physiquement agressive et avait menacé de saccager la maison. elle avait [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 339 furniture and threw a bottle of pop at him, which he avoided. donné des coups de pied dans des meubles et lui avait lancé une bouteille de boisson gazeuse qu’il a évitée. [79] mr. calnen told the police that he then moved to the front door, and ms. jordan followed. with her back to the stairs, she attempted to punch him. he ducked, and the momentum of her swing caused her to fall down the stairs. he tried to resuscitate her, to no avail. he thought she must have hit her head and said that no blood came from her head. mr. calnen also conducted a re- enactment for the police on june 18 concerning what he said occurred at the home. [80] mr.  calnen said that he panicked he had used crack cocaine on the way home, and he used it again after ms. jordan died. he moved her body from the bottom of the stairs to the top of the stairs. he claimed that he wrapped her body in a blanket and put her body and her belongings in his truck. he drove around for a while, first into town and then to peggy’s cove, and then he eventually hid her body near a logging road in the woods close to ingramport. he went through her bags to make sure she did not have anything else of his. then, either at that time or the next day, he burned her belongings, including her cell phone, about a thousand feet away from the body on the same logging road. [81] after work the next day, he went back to the same woods near ingramport. when he saw that ms. jordan’s elbow was visible from the logging road, he dragged her further into the woods and cov- ered her body with spruce boughs. he took the metal items that would not burn, like her earrings, perfume bottle, and cell phone parts, and “tossed it wherever” further into the woods: ar, vol. ii, at p 717. [79] monsieur calnen a raconté à la police qu’il s’était ensuite dirigé vers la porte d’entrée et que mme jordan l’avait suivi. alors qu’elle tournait le dos à l’escalier, mme jordan avait essayé de lui assener un coup de poing. il avait esquivé le coup et, dans son élan, elle était tombée dans l’escalier. il avait tenté en vain de la réanimer. selon lui, elle avait dû se heurter la tête, et il a affirmé ne pas avoir vu de sang s’écouler de la tête. de plus, le 18 juin, il a reconstitué pour les policiers la scène qui, selon ses dires, s’était déroulée dans le domicile. [80] monsieur calnen a dit avoir paniqué. il avait consommé du crack en rentrant à la maison, et il en avait consommé de nouveau après le décès de mme  jordan. il avait hissé le corps jusqu’en haut de l’escalier. il a expliqué qu’il avait alors enve- loppé le corps de mme jordan dans une couverture et qu’il l’avait déposé avec ses effets personnels dans son camion. il avait roulé pendant un certain temps, d’abord en ville, puis jusqu’à peggy’s cove, et il avait finalement caché le corps près d’un chemin fo- restier dans un bois situé près d’ingramport. il avait fouillé les sacs de mme jordan pour s’assurer qu’ils ne contenaient rien d’autre lui appartenant. ensuite, le jour même ou le lendemain, il avait brûlé les effets personnels de mme jordan, y compris son téléphone portable, à environ mille pieds du corps, sur le même chemin forestier. [81] le lendemain, après le travail, il était retourné dans le même bois près d’ingramport. s’étant aperçu que le coude de mme jordan était visible depuis le chemin forestier, il avait traîné le corps plus loin dans le bois et l’avait recouvert de branches d’épinette. il avait récupéré les objets métalliques qui n’avaient pas brûlé, comme ses boucles d’oreilles, son flacon de parfum et les pièces de son téléphone portable, et il les avait [traduction] « jetés n’importe où » un peu plus loin dans le bois : da, vol. ii, p 717. [82] on april 11, the police told mr. calnen that the missing person inquiry had become a homicide investigation. mr. calnen said that on april 12, he purchased drugs, retrieved ms. jordan’s body from [82] le 11 avril, la police a informé m. calnen que l’enquête concernant une personne disparue était de- venue une enquête sur un homicide. monsieur calnen a expliqué que, le 12 avril, il avait acheté de la drogue, 340 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. the first logging road, and transported it in his truck to a remote logging road in pleasant valley. he got stuck and obtained road side assistance. mr. calnen then went down a third logging road, where he gath- ered branches and trees, built a large fire and burned ms. jordan’s remains. while he was doing this, the po- lice telephoned him and sought a meeting. mr. calnen told them that he was at a plumbing job elsewhere. at this point, mr. calnen put out that fire and placed the remaining portion of ms. jordan’s body — the torso — into a canvas bag. he then drove home with this canvas bag in the closed back compartment of his truck. [83] on april 13, mr. calnen met the police at his home, where they executed a search warrant. he later claimed that ms. jordan’s torso was in his truck when he met the police at his home. on that day, the police took extensive photographs of the house. they conducted a room by room search, and looked for blood stains using a white light and forensic laser. the police testified that after a thorough review, they found nothing of forensic value in the home. they did, however, report a sticky substance on the tele- vision and the floor, which was not blood. [84] sometime later — either on the night of april 14 or 19 — mr. calnen finished burning ms. jordan’s re- mains in the fire pit behind his home. he put her ashes in a bucket, drove to a lake near the jordan family cottage, and placed her ashes near the diving rock. the next night he took the parts of her that were not consumed in the fire and used a boat to put these fur- ther remains in the same lake. he told the police that he put her remains in the lake because that is what he and ms. jordan had discussed previously about what they each wanted done with their respective remains. avait récupéré la dépouille de mme jordan sur le pre- mier chemin forestier et l’avait transportée dans son camion jusqu’à un autre chemin forestier éloigné situé dans pleasant valley. son camion s’était embourbé et il avait dû demander de l’assistance routière. il avait alors emprunté un troisième chemin forestier où il avait ramassé des branches et des arbres, fait un grand feu et brûlé les restes de mme jordan. au même moment, la police lui avait téléphoné pour lui demander une rencontre. monsieur calnen avait répondu qu’il était ailleurs en train d’accomplir des travaux de plomberie. il avait alors éteint le feu et placé le reste du corps de mme jordan — son torse — dans un sac en toile. il avait ensuite conduit jusqu’à chez lui avec ce sac en toile dans le compartiment arrière fermé de son camion. [83] le 13 avril, m. calnen a rencontré des poli- ciers chez lui, où ces derniers ont exécuté un mandat de perquisition. plus tard, il a déclaré que le torse de mme jordan se trouvait dans son camion lorsqu’il avait rencontré les policiers chez lui. ce jour-là, les policiers ont pris de nombreuses photographies de la maison. ils ont fouillé toutes les chambres, une à une, et cherché des taches de sang au moyen d’une lumière blanche et d’un laser médicolégal. un poli- cier a témoigné que, au terme d’une fouille exhaus- tive, le domicile n’avait rien révélé ayant une valeur médicolégale. il a toutefois indiqué avoir trouvé une substance collante sur le téléviseur et le plancher qui n’était pas du sang. [84] plus tard, le 14 ou le 19  avril  en soirée, m. calnen a achevé de brûler les restes de mme jordan dans le foyer situé derrière sa maison. il a mis les cendres dans un seau, a conduit jusqu’à un lac situé près du chalet de la famille jordan et a déposé les cendres près du rocher de plongée. le lendemain soir, m. calnen est sorti avec les parties du cadavre que le feu n’avait pas consumées et, au moyen d’un bateau, il a jeté les restes dans ce même lac. il a expliqué aux policiers qu’il avait déposé les restes dans le lac parce que c’est ce que lui et mme jordan avaient convenu après avoir discuté de la façon dont ils souhaitaient que l’on dispose de leurs restes. [85] mr. calnen stated: “   i’ve been on drugs like it’s nobody’s business and -- but i did not kill her” (ar, vol. ii, at p 703). [85] monsieur calnen a déclaré : [traduction] «    j’ai pris vraiment beaucoup de drogue --, mais je ne l’ai pas tuée » (da, vol. ii, p 703). [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 341 [86] the investigators found the burn site in in- gramport and physical items of a personal nature like a frame, perfume bottle, lipstick, and belt buckle, which appeared to have been burnt. police divers also found unidentifiable bone fragments in the lake — fragments which also appeared to have been burnt. further investigations at the home where ms. jordan died were conducted subsequently, in june. at that time, the police found no signs of blood or clean-up activities and no visible impact areas or damage in the area of the stairwell, either to the drywall, gyproc, or railings. [87] the evidence at trial also included text mes- sages, which suggested a disintegrating relationship between mr. calnen and ms. jordan; allegations in a text from ms. jordan’s phone of mr. calnen’s abusive behaviour towards ms. jordan; and plans by ms. jordan to leave mr. calnen and steal his property with the help of mr weeks. on the day she died, text messages indicated that mr. calnen and ms. jordan were fighting and mr. calnen threatened suicide. ms. jordan’s mother testified that ms. jordan wanted to move home prior to her death, but there was insuf- ficient room for her. [88] mr. calnen was arrested on june 17, 2013, and charged with second degree murder, contrary to s. 235 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, and indecent interference with ms. jordan’s remains, contrary to s. 182(b) of the criminal code. at trial, he pled guilty to indecent interference. [86] les enquêteurs ont retrouvé l’endroit où m.  calnen a brûlé le corps, à ingramport, ainsi que des effets personnels, notamment un cadre, un flacon de parfum, du rouge à lèvres et une boucle de ceinture, qui semblaient avoir été brûlés les plongeurs de la police ont également trouvé dans le lac des fragments d’os non identifiables qui sem- blaient aussi avoir été brûlés des enquêtes sup- plémentaires ont été menées par la suite, en juin, dans la maison où mme jordan était décédée. elles n’ont révélé ni trace de sang ou indice d’activités de nettoyage ni zone d’impact ou de dommage apparents dans la zone de la cage d’escalier, que ce soit sur la cloison sèche, les panneaux de plâtre ou le garde- corps. [87] la preuve présentée au procès comprenait en outre des messages textes, qui laissaient sous- entendre la détérioration des rapports entre m. calnen et mme jordan, l’existence d’allégations dans un mes- sage texte envoyé à partir du téléphone de mme jordan au sujet du comportement violent de m. calnen envers elle, et le projet de mme jordan de quitter m. calnen et de voler ses biens avec l’aide de m weeks. le jour de sa mort, des messages textes indiquaient que mme jordan et m. calnen s’étaient querellés et que m. calnen avait menacé de se suicider. la mère de mme jordan a témoigné que sa fille avait voulu venir vivre chez elle avant sa mort, mais qu’il n’y avait pas assez de place pour elle. [88] monsieur calnen a été arrêté le 17 juin 2013 et a été accusé de meurtre au deuxième degré, en contravention de l’art. 235 du code criminel, lrc. 1985, c. c-46, et d’indécence envers les restes de mme jordan, en contravention de l’al. 182b) du code criminel. au procès, il a plaidé coupable à l’accusa- tion d’indécence envers des restes humains. [89] in relation to the charge of second degree murder, the crown was required to establish that mr. calnen caused ms. jordan’s death, and that he did so intentionally or that he intended to cause her bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause her death and was reckless as to whether death ensued. mr. calnen has argued throughout that the crown has failed to prove causation and intent: in essence, he claims that he did not cause or intend ms. jordan’s [89] en ce qui concerne l’accusation de meurtre au deuxième degré, il incombait à la couronne d’établir que m. calnen avait causé la mort de mme jordan, et qu’il avait l’intention de causer sa mort ou des lésions corporelles qu’il savait être de nature à cau- ser sa mort et qu’il lui était indifférent que la mort s’ensuive ou non. monsieur calnen affirme depuis le début que la couronne n’a pas réussi à établir le lien de causalité et l’intention; il soutient essentiellement 342 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. death, that her death was an accident, and that there is no unlawful act for which he bears any responsibility. [90] no admissibility concerns were raised regard- ing certain aspects of mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct, such as failing to call emergency services when ms. jordan died, telling the police and others that she had left him and their home alive, sending messages from her phone after her death to others saying that she had gone into the city, burning her possessions to create the impression that she had left him, and calling a third party after her death to ask whether ms. jordan was with that person. [91] the contested after- the-fact conduct concerns mr. calnen’s actions in relation to ms. jordan’s body and his destruction of evidence. the use of this after- the-fact conduct was a live issue from the outset of the case and throughout the trial. there was, and con- tinues to be, a division on whether this after- the-fact conduct could be used as evidence of mr. calnen’s intent. it is this issue we must resolve. qu’il n’a pas causé la mort de mme jordan et qu’il n’avait pas l’intention de causer sa mort, qu’il s’agit d’un décès accidentel, et qu’on ne peut lui reprocher aucun acte illégal. [90] aucune question d’admissibilité n’a été soule- vée quant à certains aspects du comportement après le fait de m. calnen, comme le fait qu’il n’a pas appelé les services d’urgence lorsque mme jordan est décédée, qu’il a dit à la police et à d’autres personnes qu’elle était encore vivante lorsqu’elle était partie de la maison et l’avait quitté, qu’il avait envoyé — après le décès de mme jordan — des messages textes à d’autres personnes à partir du téléphone de cette dernière leur disant qu’elle était allée en ville, qu’il avait brûlé ses effets personnels pour donner l’im- pression qu’elle l’avait quitté, et qu’il avait appelé un tiers après le décès de mme jordan pour lui demander s’il était avec elle. [91] le comportement après le fait contesté con- cerne les actes exécutés par m. calnen à l’égard du corps de mme jordan et sa destruction des éléments de preuve. l’utilisation de ce comportement après le fait est une question qui était en litige dès le début de l’affaire et qui l’est demeurée pendant tout le procès. les avis étaient — et sont toujours — partagés quant à savoir si ce comportement après le fait peut servir comme preuve de l’intention de m calnen. c’est la question que nous sommes appelés à trancher. ii decisions below ii décisions des juridictions inférieures a decision on committal — 2014 nspc 17 a décision sur le renvoi à procès — 2014 nspc 17 [92] following the preliminary inquiry, derrick j. of the provincial court discharged mr. calnen of the charge of second degree murder and the included charge of manslaughter, pursuant to s. 548(1) of the criminal code. he was committed on the interfer- ence charge. derrick j. looked at the whole of the crown’s case and considered whether there was “any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly in- structed could return a verdict of guilty”: see united states of america v. shephard, [1977] 2 scr 1067, at p 1080. [92] à la suite de l’enquête préliminaire, la juge derrick, de la cour provinciale, a libéré m. calnen de l’accusation de meurtre au deuxième degré et de l’infraction incluse d’homicide involontaire cou- pable, au titre du par. 548(1) du code criminel. elle l’a renvoyé pour subir son procès relativement à l’accusation d’indécence. la juge derrick a examiné l’ensemble de la preuve de la couronne et s’est de- mandé s’il existait ou non « des éléments de preuve au vu desquels un jury équitable, ayant reçu des directives appropriées, pourrait conclure à la culpa- bilité » : voir états­ unis d’amérique c. shephard, [1977] 2 rcs 1067, p 1080. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 343 [93] as the crown’s case was circumstantial in nature, derrick j. engaged in a limited weighing of the evidence in order to assess whether it was “rea- sonably capable of supporting the inferences that the crown asks the jury to draw”: para. 15 (canlii). the crown’s case at this stage was comprised of a number of elements: testimony from three witnesses (the lead homicide investigator; mr. wade weeks, a friend of the deceased; and the forensic ident investigator), a booklet of photographs taken by the forensic ident investigator, phone records, and mr. calnen’s june 18 statement to the police. the question was whether this evidence, if believed, could reasonably support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [94] ultimately, derrick j. determined that there was no evidence upon which a reasonable, properly instructed jury could return a verdict of guilt with respect to two essential elements of second degree murder: causation and the requisite mental state. this decision turned largely on her conclusion that mr.  calnen’s after- the-fact conduct could not be used to support the inference that he intended to kill ms jordan. quoting ontario court of appeal cases r v. peavoy (1997), 117 ccc (3d) 226, and r v. mujku, 2011 onca 64, 226 crr (2d) 234 — but without the benefit of this court’s decision in r v. rodgerson, 2015 scc 38, [2015] 2 scr 760 —. derrick j. stated that it was well established that after- the-fact conduct could not be used to determine the level of culpability, and more specifically that it could not be used to determine what the accused’s state of mind was at the time of the participation in any unlawful act that caused death. [93] comme la preuve de la couronne était de na- ture circonstancielle, la juge derrick ne l’a évaluée que sommairement pour décider si elle était [tra- duction] « raisonnablement susceptible d’étayer les inférences que la couronne demande au jury de tirer » : par. 15 (canlii). à cette étape, la preuve de la couronne était constituée d’un certain nombre d’éléments : le témoignage de trois témoins (l’enquê- teur principal de l’homicide; m. wade weeks, un ami de la défunte; et l’enquêteur de l’identité judiciaire), de même que d’un livret de photographies prises par l’enquêteur de l’identité judiciaire, des relevés télé- phoniques et la déclaration faite par m. calnen à la police le 18 juin. la question était celle de savoir si ces éléments de preuve étaient, si on y ajoutait foi, raisonnablement de nature à étayer une conclusion de culpabilité hors de tout doute raisonnable. [94] en fin de compte, la juge derrick a estimé qu’il n’y avait pas d’éléments de preuve au vu des- quels un jury raisonnable, ayant reçu des directives appropriées, pourrait conclure à la culpabilité quant à deux éléments essentiels du meurtre au deuxième de- gré : le lien de causalité et l’état d’esprit requis. cette décision reposait en grande partie sur la conclusion de la juge derrick suivant laquelle le comportement après le fait de m. calnen ne pouvait être utilisé pour étayer l’inférence qu’il avait l’intention de tuer mme jordan. citant les arrêts rendus par la cour d’ap- pel de l’ontario dans les affaires r c. peavoy (1997), 117 ccc (3d) 226, et r c. mujku, 2014 onca 64, 226 crr (2d) 234 — mais sans avoir eu l’avantage de l’arrêt rendu par notre cour dans l’affaire r c. rodgerson, 2015 csc 38, [2015] 2 rcs 760 — la juge derrick a déclaré qu’il était de jurisprudence constante que l’on ne pouvait se servir du compor- tement après le fait de l’accusé pour déterminer son degré de culpabilité et, plus précisément, que l’on ne pouvait s’en servir pour déterminer quel était son état d’esprit au moment de son implication dans tout acte illégal ayant causé la mort. [95] after considering the entirety of the evidence, she concluded that no reasonable inference could be drawn that mr. calnen had animus toward ms. jordan or intended to kill her. all the evidence was capable of showing was that mr. calnen did not want anyone to suspect that ms. jordan was dead — it was “pure [95] après avoir examiné l’ensemble de la preuve, la juge derrick a conclu qu’on ne pouvait raisonna- blement conclure que m. calnen était motivé par un sentiment d’animosité envers mme jordan ou qu’il avait l’intention de la tuer. la seule chose que la preuve était susceptible de démontrer, c’était que 344 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. speculation” that he hid and disposed of her body in order to hide the fact that he killed her by an unlawful act: para 95. [96] after derrick j. discharged mr. calnen on the charge of murder and the included charge of manslaughter, the crown elected to proceed by way of a direct indictment. m. calnen ne voulait pas que quelqu’un soupçonne que mme jordan était morte. affirmer qu’il avait ca- ché la dépouille et s’en était débarrassé pour dissimu- ler le fait qu’il avait tué mme jordan en commettant un acte illégal relevait de la [traduction] « pure spéculation » : par 95. [96] après que la juge derrick eut libéré m. calnen de l’accusation de meurtre et de l’accusation incluse d’homicide involontaire coupable, la couronne a choisi de procéder par voie de mise en accusation directe. b decision on motion for a directed verdict of acquittal — 2015 nssc 331, 368 nsr (2d) 129 b décision relative à la requête en verdict im­ posé d’acquittement — 2015 nssc 331, 368 nsr (2d) 129 [97] at trial, there were multiple voir dires on var- ious aspects of the evidence, many of which touched on mr. calnen’s contested after- the-fact conduct. the trial judge first determined that mr. calnen’s state- ments to the police were voluntary (2015 nssc 291, 366 nsr (2d) 71). a second voir dire concerned which portions of the police interviews should be before the jury, the focus being on prejudice and probative value. defence counsel also sought the exclusion of portions of mr. calnen’s statement on the basis that it was a misuse of after- the-fact conduct evidence. the trial judge determined that at this early stage of the proceeding, and absent hearing evidence at trial, he would admit the final part of the statement and the re- enactment statement, but he put counsel on notice that he would be seeking their input with respect to the crafting of the instructions on after- the-fact conduct (2015 nssc 318, 368 nsr (2d) 93). [97] au procès, le juge a tenu de multiples voir- dire sur divers aspects de la preuve, en particulier sur le comportement après le fait de m. calnen qui est contesté. le juge du procès a tout d’abord conclu que les déclarations que m. calnen avait faites à la police étaient volontaires (2015 nssc 291, 366 nsr (2d) 71). un deuxième voir- dire concernait la question de savoir à quels extraits des interrogatoires avec les policiers le jury devait avoir accès, en tenant surtout compte du préjudice et de la valeur probante. l’avo- cat de la défense a également demandé l’exclusion de certaines parties de la déclaration de m. calnen au motif qu’il s’agissait d’une mauvaise utilisation des éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait. le juge du procès a estimé que, à ce stade peu avancé de l’instance et à défaut d’avoir entendu les témoignages au procès, il admettrait en preuve la dernière partie de la déclaration ainsi que la déclaration relative à la reconstitution, tout en prévenant les avocats qu’il solliciterait leur avis relativement à l’élaboration des directives concer- nant le comportement après le fait (2015 nssc 318, 368 nsr (2d) 93). [98] the crown’s case against mr. calnen was entirely circumstantial. at trial, evidence was ad- duced through lay and expert witnesses. the crown attempted to establish animus and motive through text messages sent by ms jordan. some showed indifference toward mr. calnen, as well as plans to leave him and to steal his property. mr. wade [98] la preuve de la couronne contre m. calnen était entièrement circonstancielle. au procès, la preuve a été présentée par l’entremise de témoins profanes et de témoins experts. la couronne a tenté d’établir l’animosité et le mobile de m. calnen au moyen des messages textes envoyés par mme jordan. certains messages montraient l’indifférence de cette [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 345 weeks testified that ms. jordan sent him text mes- sages indicating that mr. calnen had “put his hands on her”, and that she thought she might not be safe: para 27. mr. calnen’s statement indicated that he and ms. jordan were fighting on the day she died. some of mr. calnen’s messages to her were also in evidence, including his threats of suicide. it was mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct evidence, how- ever, that the crown submitted supported the strong- est inferences about his guilt. [99] at the close of trial, mr. calnen brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. the trial judge dismissed the motion, finding that there was sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury, prop- erly instructed, could find mr. calnen guilty: see r. v. rowbotham, [1994] 2 scr 463. the trial judge relied on rodgerson and allowed the after- the-fact conduct as evidence of intent, stating: “   i am par- ticularly mindful of the testimony of wade weeks and donna jordan, along with reita jordan’s te[x]ts and the statements of mr. calnen which have been placed in evidence before the jury”: para 39. the trial judge determined that if the jury accepted parts of this evidence, it would be “more than sufficient” to establish the requisite intent for second degree murder: para 39. dernière envers m. calnen et faisaient état de ses plans de le quitter et de voler ses biens. monsieur wade weeks a affirmé dans son témoignage que mme jordan lui avait envoyé des messages textes lui racontant que m. calnen l’avait [traduction] « pognée » et qu’elle pensait qu’elle n’était peut- être plus en sécurité : par 27. selon la déclaration de m. calnen, lui et mme jordan s’étaient disputés le jour où elle est morte certains messages que m.  calnen a envoyés à mme  jordan ont aussi été présentés en preuve, notamment des menaces de suicide. la couronne a toutefois affirmé que c’était la preuve relative au comportement après le fait de m. calnen qui étayait les inférences les plus solides quant à sa culpabilité. [99] à la clôture du procès, m. calnen a présenté une requête en vue d’obtenir un verdict imposé d’ac- quittement. le juge du procès a rejeté la requête, estimant qu’il y avait suffisamment de preuve pour permettre à un jury raisonnable, ayant reçu des direc- tives appropriées, de déclarer m. calnen coupable : voir r c. rowbotham, [1994] 2 rcs 463. se fon- dant sur l’arrêt rodgerson, le juge du procès a ad- mis en preuve le comportement après le fait comme preuve de l’intention. il a ajouté : [traduction] «    je tiens en particulier compte du témoignage de wade weeks et de donna jordan, de même que des messages textes de reita jordan et des déclarations de m. calnen qui ont été présentés en preuve au jury » : par 39. le juge du procès a conclu que l’acceptation par le jury de certains de ces éléments de preuve « suffirait amplement » à établir l’intention requise dans le cas d’un meurtre au deuxième degré : par 39. [100] the jury convicted mr. calnen of second degree murder. [100] le jury a reconnu m. calnen coupable de meurtre au deuxième degré. c decision of the court of appeal — 2017 nsca c décision de la cour d’appel — 2017 nsca 49, 49, 358 ccc (3d) 362 358 ccc (3d) 362 [101] mr. calnen advanced seven grounds of ap- peal. the majority at the court of appeal held that the trial judge had failed to properly instruct the jury on the use of after- the-fact conduct evidence as it relates to proof of intent for second degree murder. they were of the view that as there was no evi- dence contradicting mr. calnen’s story, the issue was [101] monsieur calnen a fait valoir sept moyens d’appel. les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont estimé que le juge du procès n’avait pas donné au jury des directives appropriées quant à l’utilisation des élé- ments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait en rapport avec la preuve de l’intention de commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré. selon eux, comme il 346 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. whether evidence of after- the-fact conduct, alone, could prove that mr. calnen had the requisite intent. [102] the majority found that, on the facts of this case, the after- the-fact conduct evidence was not rel- evant and had no probative value for distinguishing between intent for murder and manslaughter. the jury should have been instructed that this evidence could not assist the jury in determining mr. calnen’s level of culpability. the majority concluded that it would have been “safer” to allow the defence’s motion for a directed verdict and take second degree murder away from the jury. mr. calnen’s conviction for second degree murder was therefore set aside and a new trial was ordered on the charge of man- slaughter only. [103] macdonald cj, in dissent, determined that after- the-fact conduct can be relevant not only to establish the commission of an offence, but also to determine the degree of culpability. in this case, the trial judge understood — and explained — the uses that could be made of the after- the-fact conduct evidence. macdonald cj found that there was suf- ficient circumstantial evidence to put second degree murder to the jury. n’y avait pas d’éléments de preuve contredisant la ver- sion des faits de m. calnen, la question à se poser était celle de savoir si, à eux seuls, les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait pouvaient dé- montrer que m. calnen avait l’intention requise. [102] les juges majoritaires ont conclu que, au vu des faits de l’espèce, les éléments de preuve re- latifs au comportement après le fait n’étaient pas pertinents et n’avaient aucune valeur probante sus- ceptible d’établir une distinction entre l’intention de commettre un meurtre plutôt qu’un homicide involontaire coupable. on aurait dû dire aux jurés que ces éléments de preuve ne pouvaient les aider à déterminer le degré de culpabilité de m calnen. les juges majoritaires ont conclu qu’il aurait été plus [traduction] « sage » d’accueillir la requête en verdict imposé de la défense et de ne pas demander au jury de se prononcer sur l’accusation de meurtre au deuxième degré. la cour d’appel a donc annulé la déclaration de culpabilité pour meurtre au deuxième degré prononcée contre m. calnen et ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès à l’égard de l’accusation d’homicide involontaire coupable seulement. [103] le juge en chef macdonald, dissident, a estimé que le comportement après le fait pouvait être utile, non seulement pour établir la perpétration d’une infraction, mais également pour déterminer le degré de culpabilité. dans le cas qui nous occupe, le juge du procès a compris — et expliqué — les utilisations qui pouvaient être faites de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait. le juge en chef macdonald a conclu qu’il y avait suffisam- ment d’éléments de preuve circonstancielle pour demander au jury de se prononcer sur l’accusation de meurtre au deuxième degré. iii issues iii questions en litige [104] the crown appealed. four basic issues di- vide the parties. they are: 1 was the contested after- the-fact conduct evi- dence admissible to prove the requisite intent for second degree murder? [104] la couronne a formé le présent pourvoi. les parties sont en désaccord relativement aux quatre questions fondamentales suivantes : 1 la preuve contestée de comportement après le fait était- elle admissible pour établir l’intention requise dans le cas d’un meurtre au deuxième degré? [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 347 2 should the trial judge have granted mr. calnen’s 2 le juge du procès aurait-il dû accueillir la re- application for a directed verdict? quête en verdict imposé de m. calnen? 3 did the trial judge properly instruct the jury? 3 le juge du procès a-t-il donné des directives appropriées au jury? 4 was the jury verdict unreasonable? 4 le verdict du jury était-il déraisonnable? [105] i conclude the trial judge was correct to ad- mit this after- the-fact conduct evidence, and to in- struct the jury that it could be used as evidence for the purposes of determining both causation and intent for second degree murder. there is no need to address the issue of the directed verdict. further, the jury charge was sufficient to explain the uses that could be made of this after- the-fact conduct evidence and the possible general risks that it posed. however, in response to the parties’ arguments on unreasonable verdict, i have reached the conclusion that the jury ought to have been warned about the specific risks of prohibited propensity reasoning associated with this after- the-fact conduct, as well as other evidence about mr. calnen’s character, conduct and lifestyle. the absence of a limiting instruction on propensity was a serious error of law necessitating a new trial. iv was the contested after- the-fact conduct evi- dence admissible to prove the requisite intent for second degree murder? [105] je conclus que le juge du procès a eu rai- son d’admettre ces éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait et de dire au jury que ces éléments pouvaient être utilisés en preuve pour établir à la fois le lien de causalité et l’intention de commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré point n’est besoin de trancher la question du verdict im- posé. de plus, l’exposé au jury était suffisant pour expliquer les utilisations qui pouvaient être faites de ces éléments de preuve et les risques éventuels qu’ils comportaient en général. toutefois, pour ce qui est des arguments des parties concernant le verdict dé- raisonnable, j’arrive à la conclusion qu’il aurait fallu mettre le jury en garde contre les risques précis que pose le raisonnement interdit fondé sur la propension en ce qui concerne ce comportement après le fait, de même que d’autres éléments de preuve relatifs à la moralité, au comportement et au mode de vie de m calnen. l’absence de directive restrictive au sujet de la question de propension constituait une erreur de droit grave commandant la tenue d’un nouveau procès. iv la preuve contestée de comportement après le fait était- elle admissible pour établir l’intention requise dans le cas d’un meurtre au deuxième degré? a general principles a principes généraux [106] after- the-fact conduct encompasses what the accused both said and did after the offence charged in the indictment was allegedly committed. it covers a large range of possible circumstances, and its con- tent and contours are confined only by the limits of human experience. after- the-fact conduct may also arise in respect of all types of criminal offences and in different legal settings: for example, in cases in which the accused pleads not guilty, admits all or part of an offence, admits some of the offences charged, and/or asserts a defence, excuse, or justification. it [106] le comportement après le fait englobe tant ce que l’accusé a dit que ce qu’il a fait après qu’au- rait été commise l’infraction reprochée dans l’acte d’accusation. il couvre un large éventail de scénarios possibles, et sa teneur et ses paramètres ne sont cir- conscrits que par les limites de l’expérience humaine. le comportement après le fait peut également s’ap- pliquer à tous les types d’infractions criminelles et dans différents contextes juridiques : par exemple, lorsque l’accusé plaide non coupable, qu’il reconnaît sa culpabilité en totalité ou en partie relativement à 348 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. is this potential breadth, variety, and mix of consid- erations that lies at the heart of the much repeated observation that the proper legal treatment of after- the-fact conduct is highly context and fact specific. une infraction, qu’il avoue avoir commis certaines des infractions reprochées et/ou qu’il invoque une défense, une excuse ou une justification. c’est ce potentiel éventail, cette diversité et cette combinai- son de variables qui sont au cœur de l’observation maintes fois répétée suivant laquelle la façon dont il convient, sur le plan juridique, d’analyser le com- portement après le fait est largement tributaire du contexte et des faits. (1) admissibility (1) admissibilité [107] as with other types of evidence, evidence of after- the-fact conduct is admissible if it is relevant to a live, material issue in the case, its admission does not offend any other exclusionary rule of evidence, and its probative value exceeds its prejudicial effects. [108] relevance involves an inquiry into the logi- cal relationship between the proposed evidence and the fact that it is tendered to establish. the threshold is not high and evidence is relevant if it has “some tendency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would be in the absence of that evidence”: r v. white, 2011 scc 13, [2011] 1 scr 433, at para. 36, quoting d. m. paciocco and l. stuesser, the law of evidence (5th ed. 2008), at p 31. in other words, the question is whether a piece of evidence makes a fact more or less likely to be true. relevance does not require a “minimum probative value”: r v. arp, [1998] 3 scr 339, at para 38. as the admissibility of after- the-fact conduct evidence is, “[a]t its heart”, one of relevance, determining the relevance of any piece of after- the-fact conduct evidence is necessarily a case-by- case, “fact- driven exercise”: white (2011), at paras.  22 and 42; see also r v. white, [1998] 2 scr 72, at para 26. [107] comme tout autre type de preuve, la preuve relative au comportement après le fait est admis- sible si elle est pertinente à l’égard d’une question importante en litige, si elle n’est visée par aucune autre règle d’exclusion en matière de preuve et si sa valeur probante l’emporte sur ses effets préju- diciables. [108] pour déterminer la pertinence, il faut exa- miner le lien logique entre la preuve proposée et le fait qu’elle vise à établir. le critère à respecter n’est pas exigeant; une preuve répond à la norme de la pertinence [traduction] « lorsque, selon la logique et l’expérience humaine, elle tend d’une fa- çon quelconque à rendre la thèse qu’elle appuie plus vraisemblable qu’elle ne le paraîtrait sans elle » : r c. white, 2011 csc 13, [2011] 1 rcs 433, par. 36, citant d. m. paciocco et l. stuesser, the law of evidence (5e éd. 2008), p 31. autrement dit, la question à se poser est celle de savoir si l’élé- ment de preuve accroît ou diminue la probabilité de l’existence d’un fait. aucune « valeur probante minimale  » n’est requise pour qu’un élément de preuve soit considéré comme pertinent : r c. arp, [1998] 3 rcs 339, par 38. étant donné que l’ad- missibilité de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait est « [f]ondamentalement » fonction de sa pertinence, l’appréciation de la pertinence de tout élément de preuve relatif au comportement après le fait s’effectue nécessairement au cas par cas, « en fonction des faits » : white (2011), par. 22 et 42; voir également r c. white, [1998] 2 rcs 72, par 26. [109] to establish materiality, the evidence must be relevant to a live issue; if it is not relevant to a live issue, it must be excluded or the jury should be [109] pour être considérée comme importante, la preuve doit se rapporter à une question en litige; si elle n’est pas pertinente à l’égard d’une question en [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 349 instructed that the evidence is of no probative value: see white (2011), at para 36. [110] trial judges retain the general discretion to exclude relevant evidence when its potential preju- dice exceeds its probative force: see white (2011), at para 31. counsel for mr. calnen sought the exclusion of the after- the-fact conduct evidence in a voir dire, on the basis that its prejudice outweighed its probity. the trial judge admitted portions of mr. calnen’s statement to the police and found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. [111] after- the-fact conduct is circumstantial evi- dence. like other forms of circumstantial evidence, after- the-fact conduct allows a fact finder to draw particular inferences based on a person’s words or actions: see white (1998), at para. 21; white (2011), at para. 22; peavoy, at para 24. this process of in- ductive reasoning is a cornerstone of the law of ev- idence, and is used frequently to draw inferences from circumstantial evidence, as well as to assess credibility and to determine the relevance and proba- tive value of evidence: see d. m. tanovich, “ angelis: inductive reasoning, post- offence conduct and in- timate femicide” (2013), 99 cr (6th) 338. litige, elle doit être soustraite à l’appréciation du jury ou le jury doit recevoir la directive qu’elle n’a aucune valeur probante : voir white (2011), par 36. [110] les juges du procès conservent leur pouvoir discrétionnaire général d’écarter des éléments de preuve pertinents dont les effets préjudiciables l’em- portent sur la valeur probante : voir white (2011), par 31. l’avocat de m. calnen a réclamé l’exclusion des éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait dans le cadre d’un voir- dire, au motif que leurs effets préjudiciables l’emportaient sur leur valeur probante. le juge du procès a admis en partie les déclarations faites par m. calnen à la police et il a conclu que leur valeur probante l’emportait sur tout effet préjudiciable. [111] la preuve relative au comportement après le fait est circonstancielle. comme toute autre preuve cir- constancielle, elle permet au juge des faits de tirer des inférences particulières en se fondant sur les paroles ou les actes de l’intéressé : voir white (1998), par. 21; white (2011), par. 22; peavoy, par 24. ce raisonne- ment par induction constitue une des pierres angulaires du droit de la preuve et on y recourt fréquemment pour tirer des inférences à partir d’éléments de preuve circonstancielle, ainsi que pour évaluer la crédibilité et déterminer la pertinence et la valeur probante d’un élément de preuve : voir d m tanovich, « angelis : inductive reasoning, post- offence con duct and inti- mate femicide » (2013), 99 cr (6th) 338. [112] in order to draw inferences, the decision maker relies on logic, common sense, and experi- ence. as with all circumstantial evidence, a range of inferences may be drawn from after- the-fact conduct evidence. the inferences that may be drawn “must be reasonable according to the measuring stick of human experience” and will depend on the nature of the conduct, what is sought to be inferred from the conduct, the parties’ positions, and the total- ity of the evidence: r v. smith, 2016 onca 25, 333 ccc (3d) 534, at para 77. that there may be a range of potential inferences does not render the after- the-fact conduct null: see r v. allen, 2009 abca 341, 324 dlr (4th) 580, at para 68. in most cases, it will be for the jury or judge to deter- mine which inferences they accept and the weight [112] pour pouvoir tirer de telles inférences, le dé- cideur se fonde sur la logique, le bon sens et l’expé- rience. comme pour toute preuve circonstancielle, les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait permettent de tirer une foule d’inférences. celles-ci [traduction] « doivent être raisonnables selon les critères de l’expérience humaine » et elles dépendent de la nature du comportement, de l’infé- rence que l’on cherche à tirer de ce comportement, de la thèse des parties, et de l’ensemble de la preuve : r c. smith, 2016 onca 25, 333 ccc (3d) 534, par 77. le fait qu’il puisse exister une gamme de conclusions potentielles ne rend pas nul le comporte- ment après le fait : voir r c. allen, 2009 abca 341, 324 dlr (4th) 580, par 68. dans la plupart des cas, il appartiendra au jury ou au juge de déterminer 350 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. they ascribe to them. “it is for the trier of fact to choose among reasonable inferences available from the evidence of after- the-fact conduct”: smith, at para 78. quelles inférences il est prêt à tirer et le poids qu’il leur attribue. [traduction] « c’est au juge des faits qu’il incombe de choisir parmi les inférences raison- nables que la preuve relative au comportement après le fait permet de tirer » : smith, par 78. (2) articulating the purpose and use of the ev- idence and the proposed inferences (2) formulation de l’objet de la preuve, de son utilisation prévue et des inférences proposées in addition to being aware of the general [113] principles, it is important for counsel and trial judges to specifically define the issue, purpose, and use for which such evidence is tendered and to articulate the reasonable and rational inferences which might be drawn from it. this often requires counsel and the court to expressly set out the chain of reasoning that supports the relevance and materiality of such evidence for its intended use. evidence is to be used only for the particular purpose for which it was ad- mitted. when evidence is admissible for one purpose, but not for another, the finder of fact, whether judge or jury, needs to be mindful of and respectful of its permissible and impermissible uses. in such cases, a specific instruction to a jury that certain evidence has a limited use or is of no probative value on a particular issue is required. [114] this case illustrates how admissibility as- sessments are to be tied to intended uses and do not exist in the abstract. clearly, mr. calnen’s actions in relation to ms. jordan’s body would have been admissible to the charge of interference with human remains, had he not pled guilty to that charge. it was also common ground that his actions were admissible and could be used to rebut the allegation of accident, and to establish causation and an unlawful act for the included offence of manslaughter. the divisive evidentiary issue was whether or not mr. calnen’s actions to destroy ms. jordan’s body were relevant and admissible for the purpose of establishing intent to commit second degree murder. il est important non seulement que les avocats [113] et les juges du procès connaissent bien les principes généraux applicables, mais aussi qu’ils définissent précisément la question, la raison et l’utilisation pour lesquelles la preuve en cause est présentée, en plus de formuler les inférences raisonnables et rationnelles qui peuvent en être tirées. pour ce faire, l’avocat et le tribunal doivent souvent exposer expressément le raisonnement qui justifie la pertinence et l’importance de cette preuve par rapport à l’utilisation qu’on entend en faire. la preuve ne doit être utilisée que pour la fin pour laquelle elle a été admise. lorsqu’un élément de preuve est admissible à une fin, mais non à une autre, le juge des faits — le juge ou le jury — doit être conscient et respectueux des utilisations permises et non permises de cette preuve. dans de tels cas, le juge devra donner au jury une directive pour préciser qu’un élément de preuve donné ne peut faire l’objet que d’une utilisation limitée ou qu’il n’a aucune valeur probante relativement à une question en particulier. [114] la présente affaire montre bien que l’évalua- tion de l’admissibilité ne peut être dissociée de l’utili- sation que l’on entend faire de la preuve et que cette appréciation n’existe pas dans l’abstrait. de toute évidence, les actes commis par m. calnen sur le corps de mme jordan auraient été admissibles relativement à l’accusation d’indécence envers des restes humains s’il n’avait pas plaidé coupable à ce chef d’accusa- tion. il était aussi reconnu que les actes de m. calnen étaient admissibles et pouvaient être utilisés pour réfuter l’allégation d’accident et pour établir le lien de causalité et la perpétration d’un acte illégal dans le cas de l’infraction incluse d’homicide involontaire coupable. la question de preuve litigieuse consistait à savoir si les actes accomplis par m. calnen pour détruire le corps de mme jordan étaient pertinents et admissibles dans le but de démontrer son intention de commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 351 [115] while the focus should be on the intended use of the evidence when determining admissibility and crafting jury instructions, it is also important to expressly state the inferences available to the jury. in rodgerson, this court made clear that judicial expertise may be required in order to “present the evidence and the available inferences to the jury in a comprehensible form”: para 31. the question in this case was therefore whether, as a matter of logic, common sense, and human experience it was open for the jury, on these facts, to infer mr. calnen’s mental state at the time of ms. jordan’s death from what he subsequently did to destroy her body. the in- ference on intent advanced by the crown is based on the following chain of reasoning: ms. jordan’s body would, if available, reveal how she died. mr. calnen took extraordinary steps to destroy ms.  jordan’s body. therefore, the common sense inference is that mr. calnen destroyed the body in order to conceal the nature and extent of her injuries and the degree of force required to inflict them because such may have been evidence of intent. the after- the-fact conduct evidence — the extraordinary steps that mr. calnen took to completely destroy ms. jordan’s body — makes the proposition that mr. calnen intended to inflict the requisite type of bodily harm for second degree murder more likely than without this evi- dence. [115] bien que la détermination de l’admissibi- lité et l’élaboration des directives au jury doivent être axées sur l’utilisation que l’on entend faire des éléments de preuve, il importe aussi de formuler ex- plicitement les inférences que le jury peut tirer. dans l’arrêt rodgerson, notre cour a bien précisé que l’expertise judiciaire pouvait être nécessaire « pour présenter de façon compréhensible la preuve et les conclusions que le jury pouvait en tirer » : par 31. la question qui se posait dans le cas qui nous occupe était donc de savoir si, selon la logique, le bon sens et l’expérience humaine, il était loisible au jury, au vu des faits de l’espèce, d’inférer l’état d’esprit de m. calnen au moment du décès de mme jordan à partir de ce qu’il avait fait par la suite pour détruire son corps. l’inférence sur l’intention que propose la couronne repose sur le raisonnement suivant : s’il existait encore, le cadavre de mme jordan révélerait de quelle manière elle est décédée. monsieur calnen a pris des mesures extraordinaires pour détruire le corps de mme jordan. l’inférence suivant le bon sens est donc que m. calnen a détruit le corps afin de dissimuler la nature et la gravité des blessures subies par mme jordan et la force nécessaire pour les lui infliger, car cela aurait pu prouver son intention. les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait — soit les mesures extraordinaires prises par m. calnen pour détruire le corps complètement — rendent la thèse selon laquelle m. calnen avait l’in- tention d’infliger le type de lésions corporelles exigé dans le cas d’un meurtre au deuxième degré plus probable qu’elle ne l’aurait été sans ces éléments de preuve. (3) cautions and limits (3) mises en garde et limites [116] even if admitted for a particular purpose, after- the-fact conduct may pose some unique rea- soning risks: see d. m. paciocco, “simply com- plex: applying the law of ‘post- offence conduct’ evidence” (2016), 63 crim. lq 275. conduct that is “after- the-fact”, and therefore removed in time from the events giving rise to the charge, carries with it a temporal element that may make it more difficult to draw an appropriate inference. this ev- idence may also appear more probative than it is, it may be inaccurate, and it may encourage speculation. after- the-fact conduct evidence may thus give rise [116] même s’il est admis en preuve dans un but particulier, le comportement après le fait est sus- ceptible de poser certains risques de raisonnement uniques : voir d m paciocco, « simply complex : applying the law of “post- offence conduct” evi- dence » (2016), 63 crim. lq 275. un acte commis « après le fait », et qui survient donc après les événe- ments à l’origine de l’accusation, comporte un élé- ment temporel qui peut rendre plus difficile la tâche consistant à tirer une inférence appropriée. cette preuve peut aussi sembler plus probante qu’elle ne l’est en réalité; elle peut être inexacte et encourager 352 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. to imprecise reasoning and may encourage decision makers to jump to questionable conclusions. [117] to meet the general concern that such evi- dence may be highly ambiguous and susceptible to jury error, the jury must be told to take into account alternative explanations for the accused’s behav- iour. in this way, jurors are instructed to avoid a mistaken leap from such evidence to a conclusion of guilt when the conduct may be motivated by and attributable to panic, embarrassment, fear of a false accusation, or some other innocent explanation: see white (1998), at para. 22; white (2011), at paras. 23- 25; r v. arcangioli, [1994] 1 scr 129, at p 143. [118] however, in addition to this general instruc- tion, trial judges should consider whether any further specific limiting instructions or cautions may be re- quired to counter any of the specific reasoning risks associated with the particular after- the-fact conduct at issue. in some cases, courts have recognized that certain types of evidence have other reasoning risks associated with them. for example, additional guid- ance may be necessary where after- the-fact conduct relates to the accused’s demeanour, false alibis or lies put forward by the accused, or the silence or refusal (or, conversely, the readiness) of an accused to take part in an investigation: see paciocco. individual attention to the actual evidence at issue is necessary because any caution or limiting instruction is also context and fact specific, and needs to be fashioned to meet the specific risks posed by the particular type of after- the-fact conduct at issue in any given case. la spéculation. ainsi, les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait peuvent susciter un raisonnement imprécis et encourager les décideurs à tirer de façon précipitée des conclusions discutables. [117] pour répondre à la crainte répandue suivant laquelle les éléments de preuve de ce type peuvent être très ambigus et induire le jury en erreur, il faut appeler le jury à prendre en considération les autres explications possibles du comportement de l’accusé. les jurés reçoivent ainsi pour directive d’éviter de commettre l’erreur consistant à conclure trop hâti- vement à la culpabilité en se fondant sur la preuve relative au comportement après le fait, alors que ce comportement peut être motivé ou expliqué par une raison légitime, telles la panique, la gêne ou la crainte d’être accusé à tort : voir white (1998), par. 22; white (2011), par. 23-25; r c arcangioli, [1994] 1 rcs 129, p 143. [118] toutefois, en plus de cette directive géné- rale, les juges du procès devraient se demander s’ils doivent adresser aux jurys d’autres directives limi- tatives ou mises en garde de nature particulière afin d’atténuer tout risque de raisonnement particuliè- rement associé au comportement après le fait en cause. dans certains cas précis, les tribunaux ont reconnu que certains types d’éléments de preuve étaient assortis d’autres risques de raisonnement. par exemple, des directives supplémentaires peuvent être nécessaires lorsque le comportement après le fait concerne l’attitude de l’accusé, ou les faux alibis ou mensonges qu’il avance, ou encore son silence ou son refus (ou, inversement, sa volonté) de prendre part à l’enquête : voir paciocco. il est nécessaire d’accorder une attention particulière aux éléments de preuve en cause, parce que toute mise en garde ou directive restrictive est également tributaire du contexte et des faits et doit être adaptée aux risques précis que pose le type particulier de comportement après le fait dont il s’agit dans un cas donné. b after­ the­fact conduct and intention b comportement après le fait et intention [119] contrary to certain suggestions made in the courts below, there is no legal impediment to using after- the-fact conduct evidence in determining the accused’s intent. the jurisprudence of this court is [119] contrairement à ce que les juridictions infé- rieures ont laissé entendre, il n’y a aucun obstacle juridique à l’utilisation d’éléments de preuve rela- tifs au comportement après le fait pour déterminer [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 353 clear: after- the-fact conduct evidence may be rele- vant to the issue of intent and may be used to dis- tinguish between different levels of culpability (see white (1998), at para. 32; white (2011), at para. 42; rodgerson, at para 20). specifically, this court has said that “[w]hether or not a given instance of post- offence conduct has probative value with respect to the accused’s level of culpability depends entirely on the specific nature of the conduct, its relationship to the record as a whole, and the issues raised at trial”: white (2011), at para 42. there is therefore “no per se rule  declaring post- offence conduct irrelevant to the perpetrator’s state of mind”: r v. jackson, 2016 onca 736, 33 cr (7th) 130, at para. 20, per doherty ja. as there are also no automatic la- bels which make certain kinds of after- the-fact con- duct always or never relevant to a particular issue, “we must consider all the circumstances of a case to determine whether the post- offence conduct is probative and, if so, what use the jury may prop- erly make of it”: see r v. angelis, 2013 onca 70, 296 ccc (3d) 143, at para 55. [120] this court’s decision in arcangioli does not stand for the proposition that after- the-fact con- duct cannot, as a matter of law, be used to establish intent or levels of culpability as between different offences. in that case, the accused fled the scene and admitted only that he punched the victim (common assault), but claimed he did not stab him (aggravated assault). in that context, the court said that “where an accused’s conduct may be equally explained by reference to consciousness of guilt of two or more offences, and where an accused has admitted culpa- bility in respect of one or more of these offences, a trial judge should instruct a jury that such evidence has no probative value with respect to any particular offence”: p 145. l’intention de l’accusé. la jurisprudence de notre cour est claire sur ce point : la preuve relative au comportement après le fait de l’accusé peut être pertinente pour trancher la question de l’intention et elle peut servir à étayer une distinction entre divers degrés de culpabilité : voir white (1998), par. 32; white (2011), par. 42; rodgerson, par 20. en parti- culier, notre cour a déclaré que « [l]a valeur probante de la preuve du comportement postérieur à l’infrac- tion à l’égard du degré de culpabilité de l’accusé dans un cas donné dépend entièrement de la nature particulière du comportement, de son rapport avec l’ensemble du dossier et des questions soulevées au procès » : white (2011), par 42. en conséquence, il n’existe [traduction] « pas à proprement parler de règle qui déclare que le comportement postérieur à l’infraction n’est pas pertinent lorsque vient le temps de déterminer l’état d’esprit de l’auteur de l’infrac- tion » : r c. jackson, 2016 onca 736, 33 cr (7th) 130, par. 20, le juge doherty. vu qu’on ne considère pas automatiquement que certains types de compor- tements après le fait sont toujours pertinents quant à une question particulière ou ne le sont jamais, [traduction] « nous devons tenir compte de l’en- semble des circonstances de l’affaire pour juger si le comportement postérieur à l’infraction a une valeur probante et, dans l’affirmative, quelle utilisation le jury est autorisé à en faire » : voir r c. angelis, 2013 onca 70, 296 ccc (3d) 143, par 55. [120] l’arrêt arcangioli de notre cour n’appuie pas la thèse suivant laquelle, en droit, le comporte- ment après le fait ne peut servir à établir l’intention ou le degré de culpabilité de l’accusé d’une manière qui distingue diverses infractions. dans cette affaire, l’accusé, qui avait fui les lieux du crime, a seule- ment admis avoir assené des coups de poing à la victime (voies de fait simples), mais prétendait qu’il ne l’avait pas poignardée (voies de fait graves). dans ce contexte, la cour a dit que, « lorsque le comporte- ment de l’accusé peut s’expliquer tout autant par une conscience de culpabilité de deux infractions ou plus, et que l’accusé a reconnu sa culpabilité à l’égard d’une seule ou de plusieurs parmi ces infractions, le juge du procès devrait donner comme directive au jury que cette preuve n’a aucune valeur probante relativement à une infraction précise » : p 145. 354 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. [121] when grounded in its facts, arcangioli sim- ply established that where an accused has admitted culpability, after- the-fact conduct evidence may, in some cases, be unable to assist the trier of fact in determining the accused’s level of culpability as between two offences: see pp. 145-46; white (1998), at para. 23; white (2011), at para. 41; angelis, at para 53. this court subsequently tied that finding to when the accused admitted the actus reus, saying that a no probative value instruction on intent is most likely to be warranted where, as in arcangioli itself, the accused has admitted to committing the actus reus of a criminal act but has denied a specific level of culpability for that act, or has denied committing some related offence arising from the same operative set of facts. in such cases, the participation of the accused in the culpable event is not at issue; the question to be decided is merely the extent or legal significance of that participation. [121] sur le fondement des faits propres à cette affaire, l’arrêt arcangioli a simplement établi que, lorsque l’accusé a reconnu sa culpabilité, il arrive que, dans certains cas, les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait ne soient pas utiles pour permettre au juge des faits de décider du degré de culpabilité de l’accusé d’une manière qui distingue deux infractions : voir p. 145-146; white (1998), par. 23; white (2011), par. 41; angelis, par 53. notre cour a subséquemment rattaché cette conclusion à la situation où l’accusé a avoué l’actus reus, affirmant ce qui suit sur le recours à une directive selon laquelle un élément de preuve n’a aucune valeur probante pour établir l’intention : une telle directive sera très probablement justifiée lorsque, comme dans l’affaire arcangioli, l’accusé avoue avoir accompli l’actus reus, mais nie un degré de culpa- bilité donné à l’égard de cet acte ou nie avoir perpétré une infraction connexe découlant du même ensemble de faits considérés. en pareil cas, la participation de l’accusé à l’acte coupable n’est pas contestée; seule l’ampleur de cette participation ou son incidence sur le plan légal doit être déterminée. (white (1998), at para 28) (white (1998), par. 28) [122] however, justice rothstein expressed it this way in white (2011), at para. 37: [122] toutefois, le juge rothstein a exprimé ce point de la façon suivante dans white (2011), par. 37 : arcangioli, and its successor case white (1998), stand for the proposition that a “no probative value” instruction will be required when the accused’s post- offence conduct is “equally explained by” or “equally consistent with” two or more offences (white (1998), at para. 28; arcangioli, at pp. 145 and 147). l’arrêt arcangioli, et l’arrêt white (1998) qui l’a suivi, énoncent le principe qu’une directive selon laquelle la preuve n’a « aucune valeur probante » est nécessaire lorsque le comportement de l’accusé postérieur à l’infraction peut « s’expliquer tout autant par » la perpétration de deux in- fractions ou plus, ou est « tout aussi compatible » avec deux infractions ou plus (white (1998), par. 28; arcangioli, p. 145 et 147). [123] some read this passage to suggest that the reasoning in arcangioli is not limited to cases in which the accused has admitted culpability: see paciocco, at p.  318. i  agree. however, relevance is tied directly to the issues raised at trial: white (2011), at para 42. the presence of an admission is an important contextual factor because it establishes a baseline culpability such that the legal issue be- comes whether the after- the-fact conduct evidence is equally consistent with two or more offences. [123] certains interprètent ce passage comme si- gnifiant que le raisonnement dans arcangioli ne se limite pas aux situations où l’accusé a avoué sa culpa- bilité : voir paciocco, p 318. je suis d’accord. toute- fois, la pertinence est directement liée aux questions soulevées au procès : white (2011), par 42. la pré- sence d’un aveu est un facteur contextuel important, parce qu’elle établit une culpabilité de base faisant en sorte que la question juridique devient celle de savoir si la preuve relative au comportement après le [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 355 when an accused denies culpability in respect of the offence charged and any included offence, the legal issues are different and the comparison expands to include other potential inferences, specifically that there has been no offence committed at all. that said, an admission is not the only way to establish culpability. the above passage from white (2011) addresses the stage of the analysis when there are two or more offences under consideration: a point at which some baseline culpability has already been established. culpability will arise whenever the fact finder has determined that the presumption of inno- cence has been rebutted by proof beyond a reasona- ble doubt and any proffered defence of accident has already been rejected. it should not matter whether that culpability arises from an admission or a finding to that effect. [124] after- the-fact conduct evidence will not al- ways or necessarily be equally consistent with two offences, and it is open to the trier of fact to conclude that the conduct is more consistent with one offence than the other: see white (1998), at para 27. the key is therefore determining what “equally explained by” or “equally consistent with” means. this court has never said that every time multiple possible ex- planations for conduct are proposed, they become “equally probable” and the evidence in question therefore loses relevance (because it does not make any fact more or less likely). the existence of alter- native explanations for the accused’s conduct does not mean that certain evidence is no longer relevant. the overall conduct and context must be such that it is not possible to choose between the available inferences as a matter of common sense, experience and logic. this is a composite standard in which the three considerations interact and one may take on greater significance in a particular case. for exam- ple, when hypothetically it could be one offence or another, common sense and experience may support one inference over the other. pure logic is not the only, or even primary consideration. any threshold determination of relevance must also respect that it is normally the function of the trier of fact to determine what inference is accepted and the weight to be given to it, and “[f]or the trial judge to interfere in that process will in most cases constitute a usurpation of fait est tout aussi compatible avec deux ou plusieurs infractions. lorsqu’un accusé nie sa culpabilité rela- tivement à l’infraction reprochée et à toute infraction incluse, les questions juridiques sont différentes et la comparaison s’étend pour englober d’autres infé- rences possibles, notamment celle voulant qu’aucune infraction n’a été commise. cela dit, un aveu n’est pas la seule façon d’établir la culpabilité. le passage précité de white (2011) traite l’étape de l’analyse où l’examen porte sur deux ou plusieurs infractions, c’est-à-dire à un point où une culpabilité de base a déjà été établie. la culpabilité est établie lorsque le juge des faits a déterminé que la présomption d’inno- cence a été réfutée par une preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable et que toute défense d’accident offerte a déjà été rejetée. il devrait être indifférent que cette culpabilité découle d’un aveu ou d’une conclusion en ce sens. [124] la preuve relative au comportement après le fait n’est pas toujours ou nécessairement tout aussi compatible avec la perpétration de deux infractions, et il est loisible au juge des faits de conclure que le comportement est plus compatible avec la perpétra- tion d’une infraction plutôt que l’autre : voir white (1998), par 27. la clé consiste donc à déterminer ce qu’il faut entendre par « s’expliquer tout autant par » ou « est tout aussi compatible ». notre cour n’a jamais affirmé que chaque fois que plusieurs explications possibles d’un comportement sont avan- cées, elles deviennent « tout aussi probables les unes que les autres » et que les éléments de preuve en question perdent d’autant leur pertinence (au motif qu’ils ne rendent pas un fait plus ou moins vraisem- blable). l’existence d’explications subsidiaires du comportement de l’accusé ne signifie pas que cer- tains éléments de preuve ne sont plus pertinents. le comportement global et le contexte doivent être tels qu’il n’est pas possible de choisir entre les inférences possibles en fonction du bon sens, de l’expérience et de la logique. il s’agit d’une norme composée dans laquelle les trois considérations interagissent et où une d’elles peut revêtir davantage d’importance dans un cas particulier. par exemple, lorsqu’hypothéti- quement il pourrait s’agir d’une infraction ou d’une autre, le bon sens et l’expérience pourraient étayer une inférence plus que l’autre. la logique pure n’est pas la seule considération, ni même la principale. 356 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. the jury’s exclusive fact- finding role”: white (1998), at para 27. [125] a key factor in assessing probative value is the specific nature of the conduct. in arcangioli, when the sole issue was whether flight by the ac- cused made it more likely he committed a common or aggravated assault, the nature of that accused’s conduct was singular, relatively simple, and occurred over a short period of time. in contrast, the nature of mr. calnen’s conduct is very different. mr. calnen acted over the course of many days, he took numer- ous risky steps to achieve the total destruction of evidence, and he began to burn ms. jordan’s body only after he learned that the missing person inves- tigation had become a homicide investigation. there is a wide range of possible ways to alter, conceal or destroy evidence: from trying to wipe a surface clean to completely obliterating the evidence. what steps were taken, when they were taken, and at what risk may all be factors to consider when assessing the nature of the conduct in a particular case. toute détermination préliminaire de la pertinence doit également respecter le principe selon lequel il incombe normalement au juge des faits de décider quelle inférence est acceptée et quel poids doit lui être attribué, et, « [d]ans la plupart des cas, le juge du procès qui s’immisce dans ce processus usurpe le rôle de juge des faits exclusivement dévolu au jury » : white (1998), par 27. [125] un facteur clé dans l’appréciation de la va- leur probante est la nature particulière du comporte- ment. dans l’arrêt arcangioli, où la seule question à trancher était de savoir si la fuite de l’accusé rendait plus probable la perpétration de voies de fait simples ou celle de voies de fait graves, le comportement de cet accusé avait été de nature singulière, relativement simple, et il s’était produit sur une courte période. en revanche, la nature du comportement de m. calnen est très différente. les actes commis par m. calnen se sont étalés sur plusieurs jours; il a pris une série de mesures risquées pour parvenir à détruire tota- lement la preuve, et il n’a commencé à brûler le corps de mme jordan qu’après avoir appris que l’en- quête concernant la disparation de mme jordan était devenue une enquête sur un homicide. il existe de nombreuses façons possibles d’altérer, de dissimu- ler ou de détruire des éléments de preuve, allant de la tentative de nettoyer une surface en l’essuyant jusqu’à l’élimination complète de la preuve. les mesures qui ont été prises, le moment où elles l’ont été et le risque encouru pour les prendre peuvent tous être des facteurs à prendre en compte lorsque l’on apprécie la nature du comportement dans une situation en particulier. [126] the relationship between any explanation provided by the accused for his or her actions and the accused’s actual actions may also inform the determination of whether the inference is reasonable and rational as a matter of logic, common sense, and human experience. in white (1998), at para. 32, the court stated: [126] la relation entre l’explication fournie par l’accusé de ses gestes et les gestes réellement po- sés par l’accusé peut également aider à trancher la question de savoir si l’inférence est raisonnable et rationnelle selon la logique, le bon sens et l’expé- rience humaine. dans l’arrêt white (1998), para. 32, la cour a déclaré ce qui suit : it is possible to imagine cases in which evidence of post- offence conduct could logically support a distinction be- tween two levels of culpability for a single act, or between two offences arising from the same set of facts. by way of illustration, where the extent of the accused’s flight or il est possible d’imaginer des cas dans lesquels la preuve relative au comportement de l’accusé après l’infraction pourrait logiquement étayer une distinction entre deux degrés de culpabilité à l’égard d’un même acte, ou entre deux infractions découlant d’un même ensemble de faits. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 357 concealment is out of all proportion to the level of culpa- bility admitted, it might be found to be more consistent with the offence charged. à titre d’exemple, lorsque la fuite ou la dissimulation est démesurée par rapport au degré de culpabilité reconnu par l’accusé, on pourrait conclure que la preuve est plus compatible avec la perpétration de l’infraction reprochée. when assessing the actions of an accused and the inferences that may be drawn from the after- the-fact conduct at the admissibility or no probative value stage, the trial judge may take into account the dis- proportionality between the explanation proffered and the conduct at issue. dans son appréciation des gestes de l’accusé et des inférences qui peuvent être tirées du comportement après le fait au stade de l’admissibilité ou de l’ab- sence de valeur probante, le juge du procès peut prendre en compte la disproportion entre l’explica- tion offerte et les gestes en cause. after- the-fact conduct evidence may be admissible on intent les éléments de preuve relatifs au compor- tement après le fait peuvent être admissibles pour établir l’intention in rodgerson, this court considered how [127] evidence of concealment and the destruction of evi- dence may be probative on the issue of the accused’s intent. in that case, the accused claimed that he was acting in self- defence when he caused the deceased’s death. he said that the deceased attacked him with a knife, and the two struggled. he pressed down on the deceased’s face with his forearm until she appar- ently passed out, and he passed out shortly thereafter. when he awoke in the morning, he found that she was dead. the accused moved the deceased’s body to the backyard, where he removed her clothing and jewelry, placed the body in a shallow grave, poured bleach over it, and filled the grave with dirt. he dis- posed of items including the bloodstained mattress and carpet and used bleach to clean his home. [128] the issue in that case was whether the evi- dence of the accused’s concealment of the body and his attempts at clean up were relevant to the issue of his intent at the time of her death. the court found that these actions were relevant to the accused’s in- tent, stating: [127] dans l’arrêt rodgerson, notre cour a examiné la mesure dans laquelle des éléments de preuve portant sur la dissimulation et la destruction d’éléments de preuve avaient une valeur probante quant à l’inten- tion de l’accusé. dans cette affaire, l’accusé affirmait qu’il avait agi en état de légitime défense lorsqu’il avait causé la mort de la victime. il affirmait que la victime l’avait attaqué avec un couteau et qu’ils en étaient venus aux coups. il avait exercé une pression sur le visage de la victime avec son bras jusqu’à ce qu’elle semble perdre connaissance et il s’était lui aussi évanoui peu de temps après. à son réveil le lendemain matin, il s’est rendu compte qu’elle était morte. l’accusé a ensuite traîné le corps de la défunte jusqu’à la cour arrière, où il lui a retiré ses vêtements et ses bijoux; il a déposé son corps dans une tombe peu profonde, a versé du javellisant sur le corps et a rempli la tombe de terre. il s’est débarrassé de divers objets, y compris le matelas et le tapis maculés de sang et s’est servi de javellisant pour nettoyer la maison. [128] la question en litige dans cette affaire était celle de savoir si les éléments de preuve portant sur la dissimulation du corps de la victime par l’accusé et les tentatives faites par ce dernier pour nettoyer les lieux étaient pertinents quant à son intention au moment de la mort de la victime. la cour a conclu que ces actes présentaient un intérêt pour ce qui est d’établir l’intention de l’accusé. voici ce qu’elle a déclaré : it is relatively straightforward to understand how mr. rodgerson’s efforts at concealment and clean-up were il est relativement aisé de comprendre de quelle façon les efforts déployés par m. rodgerson pour dissimuler le 358 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. capable of supporting the inference that he acted unlaw- fully. the jury could reasonably have concluded that he was attempting to conceal evidence of a crime that he had com- mitted — that is, unlawfully causing ms. young’s death. however, these efforts were also capable of supporting the further inference that he was acting not merely to hide the fact that a crime had occurred, but to hide the extent of the crime. in other words, the jury might reasonably have concluded that he sought to conceal ms. young’s body and clean up the scene of her death in order to conceal the nature and extent of ms. young’s injuries and the degree of force required to inflict them. as indicated, the more severe the injuries, and the more force required to inflict them, the stronger the inference that he intended to kill ms. young or cause her bodily harm which he knew was likely to cause death. this is not the only inference that could be drawn from the concealment and clean-up, but it is one the jury was entitled to draw. [emphasis deleted; para 20] [129] the inferences available in rodgerson are virtually identical to the inferences proposed by the crown in this case. the crown argued that mr. calnen’s extraordinary efforts to destroy the body support the further inference that he was not simply acting to conceal evidence of a crime he committed, but also to hide the extent of that crime because the nature and extent of her injuries were such that they would support a further inference that the person who inflicted them had the intent for sec- ond degree murder. this flows from common sense inferences. first, that the nature of some wounds may make them relevant to intent on second degree murder: for example, a knife wound to the heart. and second, the more severe the injuries, and the more force required to inflict them, the stronger the inference that mr. calnen had the requisite intent for second degree murder. corps et nettoyer les lieux pouvaient étayer l’inférence qu’il a agi de façon illégale. le jury aurait raisonnable- ment pu conclure qu’il tentait de dissimuler les preuves d’un crime qu’il avait commis — soit celui d’avoir causé illégalement la mort de mme young. toutefois, ces ef- forts pouvaient également permettre de conclure aussi que m. rodgerson tentait non seulement de cacher le fait qu’un crime avait été commis, mais aussi de cacher la gravité de ce crime. en d’autres mots, le jury aurait raisonnablement pu conclure que m. rodgerson cherchait à dissimuler le corps de mme young et à nettoyer les lieux de son décès afin de dissimuler la nature et la gravité des blessures su- bies par mme young et le degré de force requis pour les lui infliger. comme indiqué précédemment, plus les blessures infligées étaient graves et plus grande était la force requise pour les infliger, plus il était possible de conclure qu’il avait l’intention de tuer mme young ou de lui causer des lésions corporelles qu’il savait de nature à causer la mort. ce n’est pas la seule conclusion qui pouvait se dégager de la dissimulation et du nettoyage, mais c’est une conclusion que le jury pouvait tirer. [italique omis; par 20] [129] les inférences qui pouvaient être tirées dans l’affaire rodgerson sont pratiquement identiques à celles qu’avance la couronne en l’espèce la couronne a plaidé que les efforts extraordinaires qu’avait déployés m. calnen pour détruire le corps permettaient également d’inférer qu’il cherchait non seulement à dissimuler toute preuve du crime qu’il avait commis, mais aussi à camoufler la gravité de ce crime, parce que la nature et la gravité des blessures étaient telles qu’elles permettraient en outre d’inférer que la personne qui les lui avait infligées avait l’in- tention de commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré. cette conclusion est le résultat d’inférences fondées sur le bon sens. premièrement, que la nature de cer- taines blessures puissent les rendre pertinentes quant à l’intention de commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré : par exemple, une blessure au couteau portée au cœur. et deuxièmement, que plus les blessures infligées étaient graves et plus grande était la force requise pour les infliger, plus il était possible d’in- férer que m. calnen avait l’intention requise pour commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré. [130] the defence argued, and the majority of the court of appeal accepted, that the reasoning in rodgerson was unavailable here because, in that case, there was physical and forensic evidence about [130] la défense a soutenu — et les juges ma- joritaires de la cour d’appel ont accepté — que le raisonnement suivi dans l’arrêt rodgerson ne te- nait pas en l’espèce parce que, dans cette affaire, [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 359 the nature and extent of the deceased’s injuries. the defence asserted that in the absence of similar phys- ical evidence of the cause of death or the nature and extent of ms. jordan’s injuries, using after- the-fact conduct as evidence of intent was pure speculation in the guise of an inference. without knowing what ms. jordan’s injuries were, there was nothing to ground the chain of reasoning. the majority of the court of appeal looked at the other evidence in the trial to determine if there was a sufficient logical connection between this conduct and mr. calnen’s intent. concluding that there was no other such ev- idence, the majority held that the requested infer- ence on intent was simply speculative. the majority stated: i wish to make a broader reference to cases to explain, as i understand it, why in some cases after- the-fact con- duct is probative of the issue of intent, yet in others it is not. when doing so i keep in mind that the case on appeal is somewhat unique. the only evidence, other than the appellant’s statement to the police and his re- enactment, is the circumstantial evidence based on texts to and from ms. jordan’s phone and the appellant’s after- the-fact con- duct. that puts the issue of what limitations there are in the use of after- the-offence conduct to prove both causation and intent squarely before the court. in other cases where after- the-fact conduct has been used to prove intent there was other evidence to be considered. [para. 56] des éléments de preuve matérielle et médicolégale avaient été présentés pour démontrer la nature et la gravité des blessures subies par la défunte. la défense a fait valoir que, faute d’éléments de preuve matérielle semblables portant sur la cause du décès ou la nature et la gravité des blessures de mme jordan, l’utilisation du comportement après le fait comme preuve de l’intention n’était que spéculation for- mulée sous forme d’inférence. en l’absence d’élé- ments de preuve sur la nature des blessures subies par mme jordan, ce raisonnement ne reposait sur aucune base. les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont examiné les autres éléments de preuve présentés au procès pour décider s’il existait un lien logique suffisant entre ce comportement et l’intention de m calnen. concluant à l’absence d’autres éléments de preuve de ce genre, les juges majoritaires ont sta- tué que l’inférence recherchée au sujet de l’intention relevait simplement de la spéculation. ils ont déclaré ce qui suit : [traduction] je voudrais élargir mon analyse pour englober d’autres affaires pour expliquer pourquoi, à mon sens, le comportement après le fait a, dans certains cas, une valeur probante quant à la question de l’intention, alors que, dans d’autres, il n’en a pas. pour ce faire, je tiens compte du fait que le dossier porté en appel est quelque peu inusité. hormis la déclaration que l’appelant a faite à la police et sa reconstitution des événements, la seule preuve dont nous disposons est une preuve circonstancielle fondée sur des messages textes en provenance et à desti- nation du téléphone de mme jordan et sur le comportement de l’appelant après le fait, de sorte que le tribunal est di- rectement saisi de la question des limites de l’utilisation du comportement après le fait pour prouver à la fois le lien de causalité et l’intention. dans d’autres affaires où le comportement après le fait a été utilisé pour prouver l’intention, il existait d’autres éléments de preuve dont le tribunal pouvait tenir compte. [par. 56] [131] in my view, this claimed distinction fails to persuade. first, this appeal does not require the court to determine whether after- the-fact conduct evidence, alone, can be used to infer intent. this was not a case in which the only evidence adduced by the crown was the contested after- the-fact conduct evidence. there was other evidence to be considered in this case. indeed, the above- cited paragraph item- izes some of the other evidence before the jury: [131] à mon avis, cette supposée distinction n’est pas convaincante. premièrement, le présent pourvoi n’oblige pas la cour à trancher la question de savoir si les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait, à eux seuls, peuvent être utilisés pour inférer l’intention. il ne s’agit pas d’une affaire où la seule preuve présentée par la couronne était la preuve contestée de comportement après le fait. il y avait d’autres éléments de preuve à considérer en 360 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. texts to and from ms. jordan’s phone, mr. calnen’s statement to the police, and his re- enactment. there was also the non- contested after- the-fact conduct evidence, the photographs of the home and stair- well, measurements of the stairwell, ms. jordan’s theft of mr. calnen’s ring and laptop, and the police evidence about finding no forensic evidence in the home (which included no signs of a clean up and no physical damage to the stairwell, walls, or railings). [132] second, nothing said by this court in rodger­ son conditions an inference concerning intent on the presence of other physical or forensic evidence demon- strating the nature and extent of injuries suffered by the deceased. such other evidence may strengthen the inference of intent, as it did in rodgerson, but rodgerson does not suggest that the physical evidence available in that case was a necessary prerequisite for any inference on intent. the chain of reasoning employed by the court in rodgerson, linking the destruction of evidence and intent for murder, does not arise from, nor rest upon, the presence of other confirmatory or contradictory evidence. it is not the law that an offence must be separately established before after- the-fact conduct evidence can be used by the trier of fact to determine an accused’s intent; after- the-fact conduct evidence is not merely comple- mentary evidence. l’espèce. de fait, le paragraphe précité énumère cer- tains autres éléments de preuve présentés au jury : des messages textes en provenance et à destination du té- léphone de mme jordan, la déclaration de m. calnen à la police et sa reconstitution des événements. il y avait aussi la preuve non contestée de comportement après le fait, les photographies de la maison et de la cage d’escalier, les mesures de la cage d’escalier, le vol par mme jordan de la bague et de l’ordinateur portable de m. calnen, et le témoignage du policier affirmant qu’aucune preuve médicolégale n’avait été trouvée dans la maison (notamment l’absence d’indices de nettoyage et de dommages matériels à la cage d’escalier, aux murs ou aux garde- corps). [132] deuxièmement, rien de ce que notre cour a dit dans l’arrêt rodgerson ne permet de penser qu’une inférence d’intention dépend de l’existence d’autres éléments de preuve matérielle ou médico- légale tendant à démontrer la nature et la gravité des blessures subies par la victime. ces autres éléments de preuve peuvent renforcer l’inférence d’intention, comme ce fut le cas dans l’arrêt rodgerson, mais cet arrêt ne laisse pas entendre que les éléments de preuve matérielle qui existaient dans cette affaire étaient une condition préalable qui devait néces- sairement être remplie pour qu’une inférence sur l’intention puisse être tirée. le raisonnement qui a été suivi par la cour dans l’arrêt rodgerson et qui établissait un lien entre la destruction des éléments de preuve et l’intention de commettre un meurtre ne découlait pas de l’existence d’autres éléments de preuve corroborante ou contradictoire pas plus qu’il n’était fondé sur de tels éléments de preuve. il n’existe aucune règle de droit qui exige que l’on établisse d’abord qu’une infraction a été commise avant que le juge des faits puisse utiliser des éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait pour déterminer l’intention de l’accusé; les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait ne sont pas de simples éléments de preuve complémentaires. [133] the idea that the probative value of par- ticular after- the-fact conduct may be assessed by reference to the record as a whole simply conveys that whether an inference is rational and reasonable must be assessed in context. it does not mean that no reasonable and rational inference can be drawn [133] l’idée que la valeur probante d’un compor- tement après le fait particulier puisse être évaluée à la lumière de l’ensemble du dossier est simple : il faut tenir compte du contexte pour décider si une inférence est raisonnable et rationnelle. il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant qu’on ne puisse pas tirer d’inférence [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 361 from the after- the-fact conduct unless there is some other direct evidence that somehow supports or cor- roborates it. it may be that other evidence supports a particular inference (like a body which demonstrates certain injuries were sustained), but such is not a pre- condition when the inference is available as a matter of common sense, logic, and human experience. the suggestion that additional and direct evidence of the nature and extent of the deceased’s injuries is required before an inference is available thus finds no basis in the jurisprudence, and cannot be recon- ciled with the general principles and practices which govern admissibility determinations. after- the-fact conduct is assessed in context. its significance may be strengthened or weakened by the presence or absence of other evidence, but it is not a secondary form of evidence. [134] not only is it an error to relegate after- the- fact conduct evidence to a supporting or secondary role, there is also a need to maintain the distinction between the threshold admissibility of evidence and the separate issue of whether the crown has met its ultimate burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. the test for the admission of evidence is first focussed on rele- vance, and the tendency of the evidence, as a matter of logic, common sense and human experience, to make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would be in the absence of that evidence. after- the-fact conduct evidence, when admitted, simply adds that piece of evidence as a building block in the crown or defence case. it is at the end of the case, when all the evidence has been heard, that the fact finder is required to determine how much, if any, weight they will place on this evidence, how it fits with other evidence, and whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the crown has proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. conflating these standards means that those charged with the difficult task of weighing evidence and determining innocence or guilt may be deprived of relevant evidence. raisonnable et rationnelle du comportement après le fait s’il n’existe pas d’autres éléments de preuve directs qui confirment ou corroborent cette inférence dans un sens ou dans l’autre. il se peut que d’autres éléments de preuve étayent une inférence particulière (comme le fait qu’un cadavre démontre que certaines blessures ont été subies), mais il ne s’agit pas d’une condition préalable qui doit être remplie dès lors que le bon sens, la logique et l’expérience humaine per- mettent de tirer cette inférence. la thèse suivant la- quelle il est nécessaire de présenter d’autres éléments de preuve directs au sujet de la nature et de la gravité des blessures subies par la victime avant de pouvoir tirer une conclusion ne trouve aucun appui dans la jurisprudence et ne peut être conciliée avec les pra- tiques et principes généraux qui régissent les décisions en matière d’admissibilité. il faut tenir compte du contexte pour évaluer le comportement après le fait. son importance peut être renforcée ou affaiblie par la présence ou l’absence d’autres éléments de preuve, mais il ne s’agit pas d’un type de preuve secondaire. [134] non seulement fait-on erreur en reléguant les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait à un rôle de soutien ou à un rôle secondaire, mais il est aussi essentiel de conserver la distinction entre la norme minimale d’admissibilité de la preuve et la question distincte de savoir si la couronne s’est acquittée de son fardeau ultime consistant à établir la culpabilité de l’accusé hors de tout doute raisonnable. le critère régissant l’admissibilité de la preuve s’in- téresse en premier lieu à la pertinence, à savoir si la preuve tend, selon la logique, le bon sens et l’expé- rience humaine, à rendre la thèse qu’elle appuie plus vraisemblable qu’elle ne le paraîtrait sans elle. la preuve relative au comportement après le fait, lors- qu’elle est admise, vient simplement étoffer la thèse de la couronne ou celle de la défense. c’est au terme du procès, lorsqu’il a entendu toute la preuve, que le juge des faits est appelé à se prononcer sur le poids, s’il en est, de cette preuve, et qu’il décide comment elle s’insère avec le reste de la preuve, et si, vu l’en- semble de la preuve, la couronne a fait la preuve des actes reprochés hors de tout doute raisonnable. si l’on confond ces critères, les personnes chargées de la tâche difficile d’apprécier la preuve et de se prononcer sur l’innocence ou la culpabilité d’un accusé pour- raient être privées d’éléments de preuve pertinents. 362 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. in addition, the absence of supporting phys- [135] ical evidence does not, as a general rule, make the inference sought speculative. to hold otherwise is to unduly limit the scope of after- the-fact conduct evidence in certain cases, and to place cases in which the accused has successfully destroyed the body of the deceased beyond the realm of proof. as in all cases engaging after- the-fact conduct evidence, the strength of the inference will be determined by the nature of the conduct, what is sought to be inferred from the conduct, the parties’ positions, and the total- ity of the evidence: smith, at para 77. if the totality of the evidence satisfies the chain of reasoning for a particular inference, then that inference is avail- able — regardless of whether supporting physical evidence is part of the evidentiary record. [136] other cases have recognized that the absence of a body does not preclude an inference on intent. in r v. teske (2005), 32 cr (6th) 103, the ontario court of appeal considered the relevance of after- the-fact evidence of concealment to the issue of the accused’s intent. in that case, the accused admitted to cremating his wife’s body. he claimed that his wife had died during an altercation during which she was punching and kicking him; he pushed her, and she fell down the stairs, hit her head, and died. he stated that after he cremated his wife’s body in the backyard of their home, he spread her ashes on the river — later, he admitted that he had actually dumped her ashes in a ditch. a police search of the ditch revealed the victim’s ashes, bones, and teeth, as well as carpet from the accused’s vehicle. further, a forensic examination of the home exposed signifi- cant efforts to clean up evidence of bloodstains and blood spattering. [135] de plus, en règle générale, l’absence d’élé- ments de preuve matérielle corroborante ne rend pas hypothétique l’inférence souhaitée. conclure autre- ment reviendrait à restreindre indûment la portée de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait dans certains cas, et à rendre impossibles à prouver les situations dans lesquelles l’accusé a réussi à détruire le corps de la victime. comme dans toutes les affaires où entre en jeu la preuve relative au comportement après le fait, la force de l’inférence sera déterminée par la nature du comportement, l’inférence que l’on cherche à tirer de ce comportement, la thèse des parties, et l’ensemble de la preuve : smith, par 77. si l’ensemble de la preuve satisfait au raisonnement menant à une inférence en particulier, cette inférence peut alors être tirée, qu’il y ait ou non une preuve matérielle corroborante au dossier. [136] d’autres décisions ont reconnu que l’absence de cadavre n’empêche pas de tirer d’inférence au sujet de l’intention. ainsi, dans l’affaire r c. teske (2005), 32 cr (6th) 103, la cour d’appel de l’on- tario s’est penchée sur la pertinence des éléments de preuve portant sur des actes après le fait visant à dissimuler de la preuve relativement à l’intention de l’accusé. dans cette affaire, l’accusé avait admis avoir incinéré le corps de sa femme. il prétendait que sa femme était morte à la suite d’une altercation au cours de laquelle elle lui avait assené des coups de poing et des coups de pied. il affirmait qu’il l’avait poussée, qu’elle était tombée dans l’escalier, s’était cogné la tête et était morte. il a déclaré qu’après avoir incinéré le corps de sa femme dans la cour arrière de leur maison, il avait répandu ses cendres dans la rivière. il avait plus tard admis qu’il avait en fait jeté ses cendres dans un fossé. après avoir fouillé le fossé, les policiers ont découvert les cendres, les os et les dents de la victime, ainsi qu’une carpette provenant du véhicule de l’accusé. de plus, une ana- lyse médicolégale de la maison avait révélé que des efforts énergiques avaient été déployés pour effacer les traces et les éclaboussures de sang. [137] the ontario court of appeal concluded that the accused’s after- the-fact conduct could be admit- ted as evidence of his intent to commit murder. the court recognized that “[t]he evidentiary value of this evidence depends on the reasonable inferences that [137] la cour d’appel de l’ontario a conclu que le comportement après le fait de l’accusé pouvait être admis comme preuve de son intention de commettre un meurtre. la cour a reconnu que [traduction] « [l]a valeur probante de ces éléments de preuve [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 363 a trier of fact can draw from it when considered in the context of the entirety of the evidence and the issues raised at trial”: para 85. as a matter of com- mon sense and human experience, when viewed in the entire evidentiary context, some after- the-fact conduct may be “reasonably capable” of supporting an inference as to the accused’s state of mind at the relevant time: para 85. the court described the reasonableness of the inference sought, in that case, as follows: the trial judge found that the appellant’s course of con- duct from the time he killed his wife on sunday evening until his arrest some four days later was consistent with the conduct of a person who had intentionally inflicted serious injuries on his wife and then went to great length to try to cover up what he had done and to develop an “innocent” explanation for his wife’s disappearance. for example, the trial judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s cremation of his wife’s body, which took several hours and created a strong stench, was a calculated and risky attempt to ensure that the police would be unable to determine the cause of mrs. teske’s death and the exact nature of her injuries. proof of those facts could have gone a long way to determining whether the appellant acted with the intent required by s. 229(a)(ii) when he caused his wife’s death. as a matter of common sense, it is reasonable to infer that someone who destroys a body after causing the death of that person does so because he knows that the victim suffered injuries that are inconsistent with a non- intentional cause of death. the appellant engaged in an elaborate cover-up of his wife’s killing. faced with this evidence, the trial judge inferred that the appellant had engaged in this concerted effort to cover up his wife’s death because he had de- liberately inflicted serious bodily harm likely to cause death. i think this was an eminently reasonable inference. more to the point, once it is acknowledged that the infer- ence could be drawn, it was for the trier of fact to decide whether the inference should be drawn: r v. trochym [(2005), 186 ccc (3d) 417], at para 25 [paras. 86-87] dépend des conclusions raisonnables que le juge des faits peut en tirer lorsqu’il tient compte de l’en- semble de la preuve et des questions soulevées au procès » : par 85. selon le bon sens et l’expérience humaine, lorsqu’on tient compte de l’ensemble du contexte de la preuve, certains comportements après le fait peuvent être « raisonnablement susceptibles » de permettre de tirer une inférence quant à l’état d’es- prit de l’accusé au moment des faits : par 85. voici comment la cour a décrit le caractère raisonnable de l’inférence tirée dans cette affaire : [traduction] le juge du procès a conclu que le com- portement de l’appelant entre le moment où il avait tué sa femme dimanche soir et celui de son arrestation quelque quatre jours plus tard concordait avec l’attitude d’une personne ayant infligé intentionnellement des blessures graves à sa femme et qui s’était ensuite donné beaucoup de mal pour essayer de camoufler ce qu’il avait fait et pour trouver une explication de la disparition de sa femme qui tendrait à l’innocenter. par exemple, la conclusion du juge du procès selon laquelle l’incinération du corps de son épouse par l’appelant, qui avait duré plusieurs heures et provoqué une forte odeur nauséabonde, était une ten- tative calculée et risquée de s’assurer que la police serait incapable de déterminer la cause du décès de mme teske et la nature exacte de ses blessures. la preuve de ces faits aurait pu contribuer grandement à aider le juge à établir si l’appelant avait agi avec l’intention requise pour l’applica- tion du sous-al. 229a)(ii) lorsqu’il avait causé le décès de son épouse. selon le bon sens, il est raisonnable d’inférer que quelqu’un qui détruit le cadavre d’une personne après avoir causé la mort de cette personne le fait parce qu’il sait que la victime a subi des blessures qui sont incompatibles avec une cause non intentionnelle de décès. l’appelant s’est livré à une vaste opération de camou- flage du meurtre de sa femme. au vu de ces éléments de preuve, le juge du procès a conclu que l’appelant avait tout fait pour dissimuler la mort de son épouse parce qu’il avait délibérément infligé des lésions corporelles graves susceptibles de causer la mort. je pense que cette inférence était éminemment raisonnable. mais ce qui importe plus encore, dès lors que l’on reconnaît que cette inférence pouvait être tirée, c’est qu’il appartenait au juge des faits de décider si elle devait être tirée : r c. trochym [(2005), 186 ccc (3d) 417], par 25 [par. 86-87] [138] thus, there is no categorical legal rule against using after- the-fact conduct evidence to infer the [138] il n’existe donc pas de règle de droit inter- disant catégoriquement d’utiliser la preuve relative 364 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. accused’s intent. this jurisprudence clearly estab- lishes that after- the-fact conduct evidence may be relevant to the issue of intent. further, contrary to the submissions of defence counsel, the cases indicate that the relevance of after- the-fact conduct to intent does not depend on the existence of further evidence (such as a body). [139] it bears repeating that the determination of the relevance of after- the-fact conduct evidence is a case-by- case, “fact- driven exercise”: white (2011), at para 42. as such, the statement in teske above — that “[a]s a matter of common sense, it is reasonable to infer that someone who destroys a body after causing the death of that person does so because he knows that the victim suffered injuries that are in- consistent with a non- intentional cause of death” — must be read as referring to the facts of that case: para 86. it may not always be reasonable to infer that an individual who destroys a body after causing their death has done so to conceal the nature and extent of the injuries. the reasonableness of that proposition will depend on the record as a whole and the issues raised at trial. [140] with these principles in mind, i now turn to the relevance and admissibility of the after- the-fact conduct evidence on the facts of this case. au comportement après le fait pour inférer l’in- tention de l’accusé la jurisprudence est claire  : les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait peuvent être pertinents lorsque vient le temps de trancher la question de l’intention. de plus, contrairement à ce que prétend l’avocat de la défense, selon la jurisprudence, la pertinence du comportement après le fait en ce qui a trait à l’intention ne dépend pas de l’existence d’autres éléments de preuve (comme la présence d’un ca- davre). [139] il vaut la peine de répéter que l’appréciation de la pertinence de tout élément de preuve relatif au comportement après le fait s’effectue aux cas par cas « en fonction des faits » : white (2011), par 42. en conséquence, le passage précité du jugement teske — où le tribunal affirme que [traduction] « [s]elon le bon sens, il est raisonnable d’inférer que quelqu’un qui détruit le cadavre d’une personne après avoir causé la mort de cette personne le fait parce qu’il sait que la victime a subi des blessures qui sont incompatibles avec une cause non intentionnelle de décès » — doit être lu comme se rapportant aux faits de cette affaire : par 86. il n’est peut- être pas toujours raisonnable d’inférer qu’une personne qui détruit le corps de quelqu’un après avoir causé sa mort l’a fait pour dissimuler la nature et la gravité des blessures. le caractère raisonnable de cette thèse dépendra du dossier dans son ensemble et des ques- tions soulevées au procès. [140] en gardant ces principes à l’esprit, j’aborde maintenant la pertinence et l’admissibilité des élé- ments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait au vu des faits de l’espèce. c the admissibility of the evidence c admissibilité de la preuve [141] it remains to be determined whether, as a matter of logic, common sense, and human experi- ence, mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct makes the crown’s proposition — that he intended to cause ms. jordan bodily harm knowing that it was likely to cause her death and was reckless as to whether death ensued — more likely than that proposition would be in the absence of that evidence. in my view, the same inferences permitted in rodgerson [141] il reste à juger si, selon la logique, le bon sens et l’expérience humaine, le comportement après le fait de m. calnen tend à rendre la proposition de la couronne — suivant laquelle m. calnen avait l’intention de causer à mme jordan des lésions cor- porelles qu’il savait être de nature à causer sa mort et qu’il lui était indifférent que la mort s’ensuive ou non — plus vraisemblable qu’elle ne le paraîtrait sans cette preuve. à mon avis, les faits de l’espèce [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 365 also arise on these facts in respect of mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct. [142] as noted, if a trial judge finds that a piece of evidence is not relevant to a live issue (ie, if it is incapable of making the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than it would be in the absence of the evidence), then it is her responsibility to either exclude the evidence, or, if it is already admissible for another purpose, provide a limiting or no pro- bative value instruction. if, however, the evidence is found to be relevant (ie, it has some tendency to make the proposition more likely), then it will be up to the trier of fact to determine how much weight it should be given. [143] the defence argued that because there are multiple explanations for mr. calnen’s behaviour, any inference concerning intent lacks probative force and is stripped of relevance. there are multiple ex- planations for mr. calnen’s conduct. they include that he panicked and did not want anyone to find out ms. jordan was dead; that he sought to hide the fact that her death was not an accident but was caused by him; and/or that he wanted to hide injuries that showed that he intended to cause ms. jordan’s death. [144] however, the mere existence of two or more plausible explanations for given after- the-fact con- duct does not make that conduct equally consistent with those explanations such that a proffered in- ference may lose its probative force. further, the fact that multiple explanations can be produced for after- the-fact conduct does not automatically mean that that conduct is equally consistent with multiple offences — it simply means that alternative expla- nations exist and are arguable. permettent de tirer, relativement au comportement après le fait de m. calnen, des inférences comme celles qui sont permises par l’arrêt rodgerson. [142] rappelons que si la juge d’un procès conclut qu’un élément de preuve n’est pas pertinent à l’égard d’une question en litige (c-à-d s’il est incapable de rendre la thèse pour laquelle il a été présenté plus vraisemblable qu’elle ne le serait en l’absence de cette preuve), il lui incombe d’exclure la preuve, ou, si celle-ci est déjà admissible à une autre fin, de donner une directive restrictive ou une direc- tive indiquant qu’elle n’a aucune valeur probante. toutefois, si la preuve est jugée pertinente (c-à-d. qu’elle tend d’une façon quelconque à rendre la thèse plus vraisemblable), il appartiendra au juge des faits de décider du poids à lui attribuer. [143] la défense soutenait que, comme on pouvait avancer plusieurs raisons pour expliquer le com- portement de m. calnen, toute inférence sur son intention était dépourvue de force probante et de pertinence. le comportement de m. calnen peut s’expliquer de multiples façons, notamment par le fait que ce dernier a paniqué et qu’il tenait à ce que personne ne sache que mme jordan était décédée, qu’il a essayé de dissimuler le fait que sa mort n’était pas accidentelle, mais qu’elle avait bien été causée par lui ou qu’il voulait dissimuler les blessures qui révélaient qu’il avait l’intention de causer la mort de mme jordan. [144] cependant, le simple fait qu’il existe deux ou plusieurs explications plausibles pour un comporte- ment après le fait donné ne rend pas ce comporte- ment tout aussi compatible avec ces explications au point de faire perdre sa force probante à l’inférence proposée. de plus, le fait que diverses explications peuvent être avancées pour un comportement après le fait ne signifie pas automatiquement que ce compor- tement est tout aussi compatible avec la perpétration de multiples infractions; cela signifie simplement qu’il existe d’autres explications et qu’elles sont défendables. [145] whether an inference is available is meas- ured against what is reasonable and rational accord- ing to logic, human experience, and common sense. [145] la réponse à la question de savoir s’il est permis de tirer une inférence donnée dépend de ce qui est raisonnable et rationnel, selon la logique, 366 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. it is this combination which informs the determina- tion of whether the impugned evidence makes the proposition more or less likely. this is an evaluative assessment, which is not defeated simply by listing alternative explanations. as long as the evidence is more capable of supporting the inference sought than the alternative inferences, then it is up to the fact finder, after considering all explanations, to de- termine what, if any, inference is accepted, and the weight, if any, to be provided to a piece of circum- stantial evidence. [146] the drawing of inferences is fact specific. however, the strength of the inferential link between the evidence in question and the fact to be estab- lished is often assessed based on factors such as what was done, when it occurred, and the risks as- sociated with such conduct. in this case, mr. calnen first hid ms. jordan’s body in a remote location. after he learned the missing person investigation became a homicide investigation, he embarked on a multi- step process to completely destroy the body by reducing it to ash and fragments. he retrieved a body that had been exposed in the woods and had been compromised by the elements. he took that body to one location, built a fire, and burned it. he moved the torso to his home and burned it further in his backyard, until it was only unidentifiable remains. he traveled with those remains on two occasions and placed them in a lake. this conduct involved repeated, risky, and successive actions across a con- siderable span of time. l’expérience humaine et le bon sens c’est cette combinaison de facteurs qui permet de juger si la preuve contestée rend la proposition avancée plus ou moins vraisemblable. on ne peut faire échec à cette évaluation en se contentant d’énumérer d’autres explications possibles. dès lors que la preuve est plus susceptible d’étayer l’inférence souhaitée que les autres inférences, il appartient au juge des faits, après avoir tenu compte de toutes les explications avan- cées, de décider s’il y a lieu le cas échéant d’accepter une inférence et le poids, s’il en est, qu’il accorde à un élément de preuve circonstancielle. [146] l’opération consistant à tirer une inférence est tributaire des faits. cependant, la solidité du lien inférentiel entre la preuve en question et le fait que l’on cherche à établir est souvent évaluée en fonction de facteurs tels que la nature des actes qui ont été accomplis et le moment où ils l’ont été, ainsi que les risques que comporte ce type de comportement. dans le cas qui nous occupe, m. calnen a d’abord caché le corps de mme jordan dans un endroit éloi- gné. après avoir appris que l’enquête concernant la disparation de mme jordan était devenue une en- quête sur un homicide, il a entrepris une série de démarches afin de détruire complètement le cadavre en le réduisant en cendres et en fragments. il a récu- péré le corps qu’il avait laissé dans le bois et qui avait été exposé et soumis aux intempéries. il a amené le cadavre à un autre endroit où il a allumé un feu et a brûlé le corps. il a rapporté le torse chez lui et a continué à le brûler dans sa cour arrière jusqu’à ce qu’il ne reste plus que des restes non identifiables. il s’est déplacé avec les restes en question à deux reprises puis a fini par les jeter dans un lac. ce com- portement impliquait la prise de mesures risquées, systématiques et successives échelonnées sur une longue période. [147] on the day that ms. jordan died, she and mr. calnen fought. mr. calnen threatened suicide: showing a distressed emotional state. mr. calnen was the only person present when ms. jordan died. the text messages exchanged between ms. jordan and mr. weeks in the weeks prior to ms. jordan’s death reveal that ms. jordan and mr. calnen had a tumul- tuous, even violent, domestic relationship, and that it was ending. ms. jordan did not feel safe and wanted [147] le jour où mme jordan est décédée, elle et m. calnen s’étaient querellés. monsieur calnen a menacé de se suicider, manifestant un état de dé- tresse émotive. monsieur calnen était la seule per- sonne présente lorsque mme jordan est décédée. les messages textes que ce sont échangés mme jordan et m. weeks au cours des semaines qui ont précédé le décès de mme jordan révèlent que cette dernière et m. calnen entretenaient une relation conjugale [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 367 to move back to her mother’s home. ms. jordan was leaving their home with some of his property. [148] in my view, the nature of the conduct (mr. calnen’s successful destruction of ms. jordan’s body, and with it any evidence of her injuries), its relationship to the evidentiary record (which in- cludes evidence of a relationship fraught with dis- cord, including violence and threats of suicide), and the issues raised at trial (the crown’s theory that mr. calnen destroyed the body to hide the nature and extent of the injuries) indicate that the evidence was relevant to mr. calnen’s level of culpability. in other words, the after- the-fact conduct evidence makes the crown’s proposition — that mr. calnen intended to cause ms. jordan bodily harm knowing that it was likely to cause her death and was reckless as to whether death ensued — more likely than that proposition would be in the absence of this evidence. mr. calnen’s determined efforts over numerous days to destroy ms. jordan’s body strengthen the infer- ence that he attempted to remove any ability to as- certain ms. jordan’s cause of death and the nature and extent of her injuries. [149] in addition, and as stated above, proportion- ality is one possible element of the “reasonableness” of an inference: white (1998), at para 32. it was open to the trial judge, in his gatekeeper function, to determine that mr. calnen’s attempts to conceal and destroy ms. jordan’s body were out of all pro- portion to either the claim that this was an accidental death and/or to the offence of manslaughter. indeed, macdonald cj considered the extreme measures mr. calnen took to destroy ms. jordan’s body to infer that the nature of the injuries on ms. jordan’s body would reveal that mr. calnen had the intention to kill ms. jordan (second degree murder), not just the fact that he did kill her by committing an unlawful act (manslaughter). tumultueuse, voire violente, et qu’elle tirait à sa fin. madame jordan ne se sentait pas en sécurité et vou- lait retourner vivre chez sa mère. elle s’apprêtait à quitter leur demeure avec certains biens de monsieur. [148] à mon avis, la nature du comportement de m. calnen (le fait qu’il a réussi à détruire le cadavre de mme jordan et, du même coup, tout élément de preuve portant sur les blessures qu’elle a subies), son lien avec le dossier de la preuve (qui révèle notam- ment une relation de couple marquée par la discorde, des actes de violence et des menaces de suicide), et les questions soulevées au procès (la thèse de la couronne selon laquelle m. calnen avait détruit le corps pour cacher la nature et la gravité des blessures) indiquent que la preuve était pertinente à l’égard du degré de culpabilité de m calnen. autrement dit, la preuve relative au comportement après le fait tend à rendre la proposition de la couronne — suivant laquelle m. calnen avait l’intention de causer à mme jordan des lésions corporelles qu’il savait être de nature à causer sa mort et qu’il lui était indifférent que la mort s’ensuive ou non — plus vraisemblable qu’elle ne le paraîtrait sans cette preuve. les efforts soutenus qu’a déployés m. calnen pendant plusieurs jours pour dé- truire le cadavre de mme jordan renforcent l’inférence selon laquelle il tentait de supprimer toute capacité de déterminer la cause du décès de mme jordan ainsi que la nature et la gravité de ses blessures. [149] en outre, rappelons que la proportionnalité est l’un des éléments possibles du « caractère rai- sonnable » d’une inférence : white (1998), par 32. il était loisible au juge du procès, dans l’exercice de son rôle de gardien, de déterminer que les mesures prises par m. calnen pour tenter de dissimuler et de détruire le cadavre de mme jordan étaient démesurées par rapport à l’allégation qu’il s’agissait d’un décès accidentel ou à l’infraction d’homicide involontaire coupable. d’ailleurs, le juge en chef macdonald a tenu compte des mesures extrêmes qu’a prises m. calnen pour détruire le cadavre de mme jordan afin d’inférer que la nature des blessures infligées au corps de mme jordan révélerait que m. calnen avait l’intention de tuer mme jordan (meurtre au deuxième degré) et non seulement qu’il l’avait effectivement tuée en commettant un acte illégal (homicide invo- lontaire coupable). 368 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. in conclusion, the relevant, reasonable, and [150] rational inference that the jury could draw regarding mr. calnen’s level of culpability, on the basis of the contested after- the-fact conduct evidence, is similar to that described in rodgerson — that mr. calnen concealed and destroyed ms. jordan’s body “in order to conceal the nature and extent of her injuries and the degree of force required to inflict them”: para. 27; see also teske, at paras 86-87. ms. jordan’s body would have provided evidence of how she died. if mr. calnen had not destroyed ms. jordan’s body, that evidence could have established the cause of her death and been relevant to his intent to kill her. the common sense inference is that he took those actions to conceal evidence of what he had done. his successful destruction of this evidence is out of all proportion to the explanation put forward and could support the inference that mr. calnen sought to con- ceal this evidence and to hide not only the existence of a crime, but its extent. [150] pour terminer, l’inférence pertinente, raison- nable et rationnelle que le jury pouvait tirer au sujet du degré de culpabilité de m. calnen, compte tenu de la preuve contestée de comportement après le fait, est semblable à celle dont il était question dans l’arrêt rodgerson : m. calnen a dissimulé et détruit le corps de mme jordan « afin de dissimuler la nature et la gravité de ses blessures et le degré de force requis pour les infliger » : par. 27; voir également teske, par 86-87. la dépouille de mme jordan aurait fourni des éléments de preuve sur la manière dont elle était décédée. si m. calnen n’avait pas détruit le corps de mme jordan, ces éléments de preuve au- raient pu établir la cause de sa mort et être pertinents relativement à son intention de la tuer. l’inférence fondée sur le bon sens est qu’il a pris ces mesures pour dissimuler la preuve de ce qu’il avait fait. sa destruction de ces éléments de preuve est démesurée par rapport à l’explication qu’il a avancée et serait susceptible d’étayer l’inférence suivant laquelle m. calnen a tenté de dissimuler ces éléments de preuve et de camoufler non seulement l’existence d’un crime, mais sa gravité. v should the trial judge have granted the de- fence application for a directed verdict? v le juge du procès aurait-il dû accueillir la re- quête en verdict imposé de la défense? [151] the defence stated that if the after- the-fact conduct was admissible on the issue of mr. calnen’s intent for second degree murder, there would have been sufficient evidence to withstand the directed verdict application. there is therefore no need to address this issue. [151] l’avocat de la défense a souligné que, si le comportement après le fait était admissible en preuve au sujet de la question de l’intention de m. calnen relativement à un meurtre au deuxième degré, il y aurait eu suffisamment d’éléments de preuve pour résister à la requête en verdict imposé. par conséquent, il n’est pas nécessaire d’examiner cette question. vi did the trial judge properly instruct the jury? vi le juge du procès a-t-il donné des directives appropriées au jury? [152] most of mr. calnen’s critique on the suf- ficiency of the jury charge centred on whether the after- the-fact conduct was properly before the jury on the issue of intent and whether a no probative value limiting instruction was necessary given my previous findings, only two of the defence’s remaining arguments about the instructions need to be addressed. first, did the jury charge differentiate between using after- the-fact conduct evidence on [152] la critique de m. calnen sur la suffisance de l’exposé au jury portait principalement sur la question de savoir si le comportement après le fait avait été soumis de façon appropriée au jury au re- gard de la question de l’intention et si une direc- tive restrictive quant à l’absence de valeur probante était nécessaire. vu les conclusions auxquelles je suis déjà arrivée, il ne reste que deux arguments à examiner parmi ceux qu’avait soulevés la défense [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 369 causation and intent? second, did the instructions sufficiently delineate how this after- the-fact conduct evidence could be used to infer intent? a using after­ the­fact conduct evidence on causation and intent [153] the reviewing court will assess the jury charge in its entirety: see r v. jacquard, [1997] 1 scr 314, at paras. 14 and 20; r v. jaw, 2009 scc 42, [2009] 3 scr 26, at para 32. in each case, the jury must be properly — but not perfectly — in- structed: see jacquard, at para 2. the trial judge’s instructions to the jury must be sufficient to inform the jurors on “the issues involved, the law relating to the charge the accused is facing, and the evidence they should consider in resolving the issues”: r v. cooper, [1993] 1 scr 146, at p 163. [154] in my view, the instructions adequately dif- ferentiated between using this evidence in relation to causation and intent. the trial judge gave two in- structions on after- the-fact conduct evidence: first in relation to causation, and second on intent for second degree murder. certain statements and principles were repeated in both parts of the instructions. relativement aux directives. premièrement, l’exposé au jury a-t-il fait la distinction entre l’utilisation de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait selon qu’il s’agissait du lien de causalité ou de l’intention? deuxièmement, les directives circonscrivaient- elles suffisamment la manière dont cette preuve relative au comportement après le fait pouvait être utilisée pour inférer l’intention? a l’utilisation de la preuve relative au comporte­ ment après le fait au regard du lien de causalité et de l’intention [153] la juridiction de contrôle examine l’exposé au jury au complet : voir r c. jacquard, [1997] 1 rcs 314, par. 14 et 20; r c. jaw, 2009 csc 42, [2009] 3 rcs 26, par 32. dans chaque cas, le jury doit avoir reçu des directives non pas parfaites, mais appropriées : voir jacquard, par 2. les direc- tives que le juge du procès donne aux jurés doivent être suffisantes pour leur permettre de comprendre les « questions soulevées, le droit relatif à l’accusa- tion à laquelle l’accusé fait face et les éléments de preuve dont ils devraient tenir compte pour trancher les questions » : r c. cooper, [1993] 1 rcs 146, p 163. [154] à mon avis, les directives ont adéquatement fait la distinction entre l’utilisation de ces éléments de preuve selon qu’il s’agissait du lien de causalité ou de l’intention. le juge du procès a donné deux directives au sujet de la preuve relative au comporte- ment après le fait : la première concernait le lien de causalité et la seconde, l’intention requise dans le cas d’un meurtre au deuxième degré. certains principes et explications ont été répétés dans les deux parties des directives. in terms of causation, the trial judge set [155] out the inference that the crown requested — that these actions were evidence that mr. calnen knew he committed a crime. the trial judge also set out other available inferences and informed the jury that they need not draw the requested inference by the crown. the trial judge informed the jury that “[w]hat a person does after a crime was committed may help you decide whether it was that person who committed it. it may help, it may not help”: ar, [155] pour ce qui est du lien de causalité, le juge du procès a énoncé l’inférence que la couronne demandait de tirer, soit que les actes en question constituaient une preuve du fait que m. calnen savait qu’il avait commis un crime. le juge du procès a également exposé les autres inférences possibles et informé les jurés qu’ils n’étaient pas tenus de tirer l’inférence demandée par la couronne. le juge du procès a fait savoir aux jurés que [traduction] « [c]e que fait une personne après qu’un crime a 370 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. vol. i, at p 133. the jury was told that, generally, after- the-fact conduct evidence may support an in- ference of culpability, but that “the conduct may be that of an innocent person who simply wants to avoid involvement in a police investigation or embarrass- ment for himself or others or because the person is anxious and confused”: p 133. more specifically, they were informed: evidence that a person burned the body of a deceased may show that the person acted in a manner which, based on human experience and logic, is consistent with the conduct of a person who is blameworthy and inconsistent with the conduct of a person who is not blameworthy. burning a body may also be caused by some other reason that has nothing to do with having committed an unlawful act. [p. 133] [156] in addition, the jury was asked to consider the weight to be given to this circumstantial evi- dence, together with all of the other evidence, and told to consider this at the end of their deliberations. there was also an express caution against jumping too quickly to a conclusion and the jury was warned further that after- the-fact conduct evidence would not, alone, establish the guilt of mr. calnen beyond a reasonable doubt: keep in mind that any inference you may draw to the effect that the accused burned reita jordan’s body to evade the consequences is not by itself sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. it is simply another piece of circumstantial evidence to use in making your ultimate determination. [p. 134] été commis peut vous aider à juger si c’est cette personne qui en est l’auteur. cela peut vous aider, mais pas toujours » : da, vol. i, p 133. le jury a été informé que, de façon générale, la preuve relative au comportement après le fait peut étayer une inférence de culpabilité, mais que « le comportement peut être celui d’une personne innocente qui veut simplement éviter d’être mêlée à une enquête de la police ou à une situation embarrassante pour elle- même ou pour d’autres, ou encore celui d’une personne qui est anxieuse et confuse » : p 133. plus précisément, les jurés ont été informés en ces termes : [traduction] la preuve du fait qu’une personne a brûlé le corps d’une autre personne décédée peut montrer qu’elle a agi d’une manière qui, selon l’expérience hu- maine et la logique, est compatible avec le comportement d’une personne ayant commis un acte répréhensible et incompatible avec celui d’une personne qui n’a rien fait de mal. il se peut aussi qu’une personne brûle un corps pour une raison qui n’a rien à voir avec la perpétration d’un acte illicite. [p. 133] [156] de plus, le juge du procès a demandé aux jurés de se pencher sur la question du poids à at- tribuer à cette preuve circonstancielle, ainsi qu’à l’ensemble des autres éléments de preuve, et de faire cette appréciation à l’issue de leurs délibérations. il a aussi prévenu expressément les jurés de ne pas tirer une conclusion de façon précipée et il les a en outre mis en garde que la preuve relative au comportement après le fait n’établirait pas, à elle seule, la culpabilité de m. calnen hors de tout doute raisonnable : [traduction] rappelez- vous que toute inférence que vous pourriez tirer selon laquelle l’accusé a brûlé le corps de reita jordan pour éviter les conséquences n’est pas suffisante en soi pour établir la culpabilité de l’accusé hors de tout doute raisonnable. elle constitue simplement un autre élément de preuve circonstancielle dont vous pourrez tenir compte pour rendre votre décision finale. [p. 134] [157] the second instruction on the after- the-fact conduct evidence occurred squarely within the trial judge’s discussion of intent for second degree murder. the trial judge introduced his discussion of intent as follows: “if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that what happened to reita jordan was not an accident, you must go on to the next [157] la deuxième directive sur la preuve relative au comportement après le fait a été donnée dans l’exposé du juge du procès sur l’intention relative au meurtre au deuxième degré. le juge a introduit son exposé sur l’intention en ces termes : [traduction] « si vous êtes convaincus hors de tout doute raison- nable que ce qui est arrivé à reita jordan n’était pas [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 371 question. did paul trevor calnen have the    state of mind required for murder?” (p 160). the trial judge then instructed the jury on how to determine mr. calnen’s state of mind at the time of the mur- der, looking to his “words and conduct before, at the time and after reita jordan’s death”: p 161. the trial judge repeated his earlier instructions on after- the-fact conduct evidence. he then expressly provided further instructions that signalled to the jury that it was to consider the after- the-fact conduct evi- dence in relation to intent differently and separately from the issue of causation: in this regard, you may take into account the evidence of mr. calnen’s burning of reita jordan’s body in de- termining whether he intended to kill ms. jordan or to cause her serious bodily harm which he knew was likely to cause death. on this issue, you will need to consider the evidence in a different way than i have instructed you previously. you may conclude that mr. calnen sought to burn ms. jordan’s body in order to conceal the evidence. you may or not reach this conclusion. it is up to you. but if you do reach this conclusion, you may consider this along with all of the other pertinent evidence in determining whether paul trevor calnen had the requisite intent for second degree murder. please remember, as i have said before, that awareness of having committed a blameworthy act is not the only reason why someone might burn a body. mr. calnen’s actions in burning and hiding the body are after- the-fact conduct which may or may not assist you in determining his guilt or innocence. this evidence may or may not assist you in determining intent. in the event, based on all of the evidence; you determine guilt, this after- the-fact conduct may help -- may or may not help you decide whether it was murder or manslaughter. [pp. 164-65] un accident, vous devez passer à la question sui- vante : paul trevor calnen avait-il [  ] l’état d’esprit requis pour commettre un meurtre? » (p 160). le juge du procès a ensuite expliqué aux jurés comment déterminer l’état d’esprit de m. calnen au moment du meurtre, c’est-à-dire en examinant « ses paroles et ses gestes au moment du décès de reita jordan, ainsi qu’avant et après » : p 161. le juge du procès a répété ses directives précédentes au sujet de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait. il a ensuite expressément donné d’autres directives qui signa- laient clairement aux jurés qu’ils devaient prendre en compte la preuve relative au comportement après le fait en rapport avec l’intention différemment et de façon distincte de la question du lien de causalité : [traduction] à cet égard, vous pouvez tenir compte de la preuve du fait que m. calnen a brûlé le corps de reita jordan pour décider s’il avait l’intention de la tuer ou de lui causer de graves lésions corporelles qu’il savait être de nature à causer sa mort. sur ce point, vous devrez examiner la preuve d’une façon différente de celle que j’ai déjà expliquée. vous pouvez conclure que m. calnen a cherché à brûler le corps de mme jordan afin de dissimu- ler la preuve. vous pouvez en arriver à cette conclusion, mais pas forcément. c’est une décision qui vous appar- tient. cependant, si vous en arrivez à cette conclusion, vous pourrez en tenir compte au même titre que tous les autres éléments de preuve pertinents pour décider si paul trevor calnen avait l’intention requise pour commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré. rappelez- vous, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, que la conscience d’avoir commis un acte répréhensible n’est pas la seule raison qui inciterait une personne à brûler un corps. le fait que m. calnen a brûlé et dissimulé le corps constitue un comportement après le fait qui peut vous aider à déterminer sa culpabilité ou son innocence, mais pas nécessairement. cette preuve peut vous aider à déterminer l’intention, mais pas forcément. si vous en arrivez, à la lumière de l’ensemble de la preuve, à la conclusion que l’accusé est coupable, ce comportement après le fait peut vous aide — peut vous aider, mais pas forcément, à juger s’il s’agissait d’un meurtre ou d’un homicide involontaire coupable. [p. 164-165] [158] the trial judge’s instructions on the after- the-fact conduct evidence as they related to intent were framed within his instructions on second degree murder, and he expressly stated that the after- the-fact [158] les directives du juge du procès sur la preuve relative au comportement après le fait en lien avec l’in- tention ont été formulées à l’intérieur de ses directives sur le meurtre au deuxième degré, et il a expressément 372 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. conduct evidence was being discussed in relation to a different purpose than he had instructed previously on causation. the jury would have known that it was being asked to consider the evidence for the new and distinct purpose of intent. in my view, this clear structure and proper guidance adequately explained the different uses of this evidence as between causa- tion and intent. b the instructions sufficiently delineated which aspects of this after­ the­fact conduct evidence could be used to infer intent [159] the defence also argued that the instructions on intent were not clear or adequate because the judge should have expressly connected the after- the-fact conduct evidence of concealment to the na- ture and extent of injuries that ms. jordan may have suffered: see rodgerson, at para 28. the defence claimed that the trial judge’s reference to “conceal the evidence” was too general to be of assistance. [160] by way of background, in the pre- charge meetings with defence counsel and the crown, the crown requested and the trial judge originally pro- posed instructions which tracked the wording used in rodgerson: “you may conclude that mr. calnen sought to burn ms. jordan’s body in order to conceal the nature of the injuries and the degree of force required to inflict them” (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 2151- 52). in response, defence counsel objected to this wording and argued that the more specific wording drawn from rodgerson amounted to “directing the jury to speculate”: p 2152. at defence counsel’s suggestion, the judge then changed the charge to read: “   you may conclude that mr. calnen sought to burn ms. jordan’s body in order to conceal the evidence   ” (p 2154). thus, the trial judge’s final choice of wording, being “conceal the evidence”, was crafted in response to a request by defence counsel. affirmé que son exposé sur la preuve relative au com- portement après le fait était livré dans un but diffé- rent de celui de son exposé précédent sur le lien de causalité. les jurés auraient su qu’on leur demandait d’examiner la preuve dans le but nouveau et distinct de l’intention. à mon avis, cette structure claire et ces directives appropriées expliquaient adéquatement les différentes utilisations de cette preuve, selon qu’il s’agissait du lien de causalité ou de l’intention. b les directives circonscrivaient suffisamment les aspects de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait qui pouvaient être utilisés pour in­ férer l’intention [159] la défense a en outre soutenu que les di- rectives concernant l’intention n’étaient ni claires ni suffisantes, parce que le juge aurait dû établir un lien explicite entre la preuve relative au com- portement après le fait et la nature et la gravité des blessures que mme jordan aurait pu avoir subies : voir rodgerson, par 28. la défense a fait valoir que la mention, par le juge du procès, de l’intention de [traduction] « dissimuler la preuve » était trop générale pour être utile. [160] en fait, au cours des rencontres préalables à l’exposé au jury tenues avec l’avocat de la défense et la couronne, la couronne a demandé — et le juge du procès a initialement proposé — des directives dont la formulation suivait celle de l’arrêt rodgerson : [tra- duction] « vous pouvez conclure que m. calnen a tenté de brûler le corps de mme jordan afin de dis- simuler la nature des blessures et le degré de force requis pour les infliger » (da, vol. iii, p 2151-2152). en réponse, l’avocat de la défense s’est opposé à cette formulation et a fait valoir que l’utilisation de mots plus précis semblables à ceux qui avaient été employés dans l’affaire rodgerson équivalait à « de- mander aux jurés de formuler des hypothèses » : p 2152. donnant suite à la suggestion de l’avocat de la défense, le juge a alors modifié l’exposé pour qu’il soit ainsi libellé : «    vous pouvez conclure que m. calnen a tenté de brûler le corps de mme jordan afin de dissimuler la preuve    » (p 2154). en consé- quence, la formulation retenue par le juge du procès, à savoir « dissimuler la preuve », a été élaborée en réponse à une demande de l’avocat de la défense. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 373 [161] trial judges bear the ultimate responsibility for the content, accuracy, and fairness of the jury charge: see jaw, at para. 44; jacquard, at para. 37; r v. khela, 2009 scc 4, [2009] 1 scr 104, at para.  49 both crown and defence counsel are obliged to “assist the trial judge and identify what in their opinion is problematic with the judge’s instruc- tions to the jury”: r v. daley, 2007 scc 53, [2007] 3 scr 523, at para 58. in this case, the suggestions of defence counsel are assumed to be in furtherance of that obligation and to help the judge leave the jury with a “sufficient understanding of the facts as they relate to the relevant issues”: jacquard, at para 14. in this instance, a sufficient understanding was achieved. no confusion or unfairness was gen- erated by counsel’s suggestion that the instruction be shortened and generalized. in most cases, a more precise explanation, and an express statement of the available inferences, are likely to provide greater guidance to the jury. nonetheless, this particular treatment of the subject is sufficient in the circum- stances. the jury knew they were dealing with the in- tent for second degree murder, and the judge clearly outlined the intent requirements for second degree murder. in addition, the trial judge expressly told the jury that they would need to consider the after- the-fact conduct in a different way for intent than for causation and that they may or may not be assisted by this evidence. the trial judge referred to competing inferences the jury could draw from the after- the-fact conduct evidence and cautioned them to reserve their judgment on the after- the-fact conduct evidence until they were “putting all the evidence together”: ar, vol. i, at p 134. [161] c’est au juge du procès qu’incombent en définitive la teneur, la justesse et l’équité de l’exposé qu’il présente au jury : voir jaw, par. 44; jacquard, par. 37; r c. khela, 2009 csc 4, [2009] 1 rcs 104, par 49. tant le procureur de la couronne que l’avo- cat de la défense ont l’obligation « [d’assister] le juge du procès, en relevant les aspects des direc- tives au jury qu’ils estiment problématiques » : r c. daley, 2007 csc 53, [2007] 3 rcs 523, par 58. en l’espèce, nous présumons que les suggestions de l’avocat de la défense sont données en exécution de cette obligation et pour aider le juge à faire en sorte que les jurés aient « une compréhension suffi- sante des faits relatifs aux questions pertinentes » : jacquard, par 14. en l’espèce, cet objectif a été atteint. la demande de l’avocat d’abréger la directive et de la rendre plus générale ne prêtait nullement à confusion ni n’a entraîné un traitement inéquitable. dans la plupart des cas, une explication plus précise et une description explicite des inférences possibles vont vraisemblablement guider davantage les jurés. néanmoins, le traitement particulier de la question est suffisant en l’espèce. les jurés savaient qu’ils devaient se prononcer sur l’intention requise dans le cas d’un meurtre au deuxième degré et le juge a décrit de façon claire les exigences relatives à cette intention. de plus, il a mentionné expressément aux jurés qu’ils devraient examiner le comportement après le fait d’une façon différente selon qu’il s’agis- sait de l’intention ou du lien de causalité et que cette preuve pourrait leur être utile, mais pas forcément. le juge du procès a mentionné les inférences concur- rentes que le jury pourrait tirer de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait et il a demandé aux jurés de ne tirer leur conclusion définitive au sujet de cette preuve qu’une fois [traduction] « qu’ils auraient réuni tous les éléments de preuve » : da, vol. i, p 134. [162] according to daley, at para. 58, the jury charge is also to be understood in the context of the arguments made by the parties. the link between in- tent and concealing evidence was made by the crown in its closing argument. the crown’s theory was that the reason mr. calnen burned ms. jordan’s body was so that the police would not find the injuries he inflicted upon her. the trial judge also referred to this link when addressing the crown’s theory of the case, [162] selon l’arrêt daley, par. 58, l’exposé au jury doit en outre être interprété en fonction des argu- ments invoqués par les parties. la couronne a fait le lien entre l’intention et la dissimulation de la preuve au cours de sa plaidoirie finale. elle a soutenu que m. calnen aurait brûlé le corps de mme jordan afin que la police ne puisse voir les blessures qu’il avait infligées à la victime. le juge du procès a également fait allusion à ce lien lorsqu’il a commenté la thèse 374 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. and explained the relevance that the crown sought to draw from the evidence — that mr. calnen intended to kill ms. jordan or to cause her serious bodily harm which he knew was likely to cause death. [163] jury charges do not have to adhere to pre- scriptive formulas — it is the substance of the charge that matters: see r v. mack, 2014 scc 58, [2014] 3 scr 3, at para 48. in this case, the trial judge explicitly linked the destruction of ms.  jordan’s body with the concealment of evidence. the trial judge has “a general duty to inform the jury of the relevant evidence, and to assist the jury in linking that evidence to the issues that it must consider in reaching a verdict”: rodgerson, para 30. however, “[t]he level of detail that is required varies depending on the context”: para 30. in context, this level of detail provided sufficient guidance to the jury on the inference available to them on mr. calnen’s intent. de la couronne et a expliqué la pertinence que la couronne demandait au jury de tirer de la preuve, à savoir que m.  calnen avait l’intention de tuer mme jordan ou de lui causer des lésions corporelles graves qu’il savait être de nature à causer sa mort. [163] il n’est pas nécessaire que l’exposé au jury respecte des formules consacrées; c’est la teneur de l’exposé qui compte : voir r c. mack, 2014 csc 58, [2014] 3 rcs 3, par 48. dans la présente affaire, le juge du procès a explicitement fait le lien entre la destruction du corps de mme jordan et la dissi- mulation d’éléments de preuve. le juge du procès a « l’obligation générale d’informer le jury des élé- ments de preuve pertinents et de l’aider à établir les liens nécessaires entre ces éléments de preuve et les questions dont le jury doit tenir compte pour parve- nir à un verdict » : rodgerson, par 30. cependant, « [l]’abondance des détails requis varie en fonction du contexte » : par 30. mises en contexte, les pré- cisions données en l’espèce étaient suffisantes pour guider les jurés au sujet de l’inférence qu’ils pou- vaient tirer quant à l’intention de m calnen. c conclusion on after­ the­fact conduct and c conclusion sur le comportement après le fait et intent l’intention [164] the after- the-fact conduct evidence was relevant to a live, material issue — mr. calnen’s in- tent — and it was therefore admissible. the instruc- tions to the jury adequately differentiated between using after- the-fact conduct evidence on causation and intent, and they sufficiently delineated how this after- the-fact conduct evidence could be used to infer intent. [164] la preuve relative au comportement après le fait était pertinente à l’égard d’une question im- portante en litige — l’intention de m. calnen — et était donc admissible. les directives au jury faisaient adéquatement la distinction entre l’utilisation de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait selon qu’il s’agissait du lien de causalité ou de l’intention, et elles circonscrivaient suffisamment comment cette preuve relative au comportement après le fait pouvait être utilisée pour inférer l’intention. vii unreasonable verdict vii verdict déraisonnable a introduction a introduction [165] given my conclusions on the previous is- sues, i am now required to consider whether the jury verdict was unreasonable. an unreasonable verdict, or a verdict which cannot be supported by the evi- dence, is one that “a properly instructed jury acting judicially could not reasonably have rendered”: r v. [165] vu mes conclusions sur les questions précé- dentes, je dois maintenant me demander si le verdict du jury était déraisonnable. on entend par verdict déraisonnable, ou verdict qui ne peut s’appuyer sur la preuve, celui « [qu]’un jury ayant reçu les direc- tives appropriées et agissant de manière judiciaire [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 375 wh, 2013 scc 22, [2013] 2 scr 180, at para. 26; see also r v. yebes, [1987] 2 scr 168, at p. 185; r v. biniaris, 2000 scc 15, [2000] 1 scr 381, at para 36. in wh, this court described the ap- pellate court’s task in assessing the reasonableness of a verdict. not only must the court ask whether there is some evidence which, if believed, supports the conviction, it is required to review, analyze and weigh the evidence, and consider through the lens of judicial experience, whether “judicial fact- finding precludes the conclusion reached by the jury”: wh, at para. 28 (emphasis deleted), quoting biniaris, at para 39. thus:    in deciding whether the verdict is one which a properly instructed jury acting judicially could reasonably have rendered, the reviewing court must ask not only whether there is evidence in the record to support the verdict, but also whether the jury’s conclusion conflicts with the bulk of judicial experience: biniaris, at para 40. n’aurait pu raisonnablement [  ] rendre » : r c. wh, 2013 csc 22, [2013] 2 rcs 180, par. 26; voir également r c. yebes, [1987] 2 rcs 168, p. 185; r c. biniaris, 2000 csc 15, [2000] 1 rcs. 381, par 36. dans l’arrêt wh, notre cour explique comment un tribunal d’appel s’y prend pour vérifier si un verdict est raisonnable. non seulement le tri- bunal doit-il se demander s’il existe des éléments de preuve qui, s’il leur est ajouté foi, étayent la déclara- tion de culpabilité, mais il doit également examiner, analyser et apprécier la preuve et se demander, à la lumière de l’expérience judiciaire, si « l’appréciation judiciaire des faits exclut la conclusion tirée par le jury » : wh, par. 28 (soulignement omis), citant biniaris, par 39. ainsi :    pour déterminer si le verdict est de ceux qu’un jury ayant reçu des directives appropriées et agissant d’une manière judiciaire aurait raisonnablement pu rendre, le tri- bunal d’appel doit se demander non seulement si le verdict s’appuie sur des éléments de preuve, mais également si la conclusion du jury ne va pas à l’encontre de l’ensemble de l’expérience judiciaire : biniaris, par 40. (wh, at para. 28) (wh, par. 28) [166] the reasonableness of this jury verdict was directly at issue before both the court of appeal and this court. although one of mr. calnen’s listed grounds of appeal at the court of appeal was that the jury verdict was unreasonable, the majority at the court of appeal did not need to consider the defence’s arguments on unreasonable verdict be- cause of its other conclusions. however, macdonald cj, in dissent, found that the jury’s verdict was reasonable. before this court, the crown noted the majority’s silence on the issue of unreasonable ver- dict, and argued in support of macdonald cj’s decision that the verdict was reasonable: af, at pa- ras 130-44. the defence argued that the verdict was not supported by the evidence and was unreasonable: rf, at para 115. [166] le caractère raisonnable du verdict rendu en l’espèce par le jury était directement en cause tant devant la cour d’appel que devant notre cour. même si l’un des moyens d’appel invoqués par m. calnen devant la cour d’appel était que le verdict du jury était déraisonnable, les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel n’ont pas eu à se pencher sur les arguments de la défense concernant le verdict déraisonnable en raison de leurs autres conclusions. toutefois, le juge en chef macdonald, dissident, a estimé que le ver- dict rendu par le jury était raisonnable. devant notre cour, la couronne a souligné le silence des juges majoritaires sur la question du verdict déraisonnable et a soutenu l’opinion du juge en chef macdonald suivant laquelle le verdict était raisonnable : ma, par 130-144. la défense a soutenu que le verdict n’était pas étayé par la preuve et qu’il était déraison- nable : mi, par 115. [167] the defence’s main argument before this court continued to be that the after- the-fact conduct was inadmissible on intention. but the defence also [167] devant notre cour, la défense a continué de faire valoir comme principal argument que la preuve relative au comportement après le fait n’était pas 376 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. asserted that this was a case built on circumstantial evidence and the evidence was not consistent only with mr. calnen’s guilt because many other rational inferences could be drawn from it. in particular, the defence argued: even if [the inferences] were reasonable, the weight of ju- dicial experience would dictate that they are not capable of supporting a valid finding beyond a reasonable doubt. the jury could not have been acting reasonably and judicially in reaching their verdict. they could easily have been unduly inflamed by the deplorable nature of the evidence of the after the fact conduct of the respondent. admissible pour prouver l’intention. cependant, elle a également soutenu que la présente affaire reposait sur de la preuve circonstancielle et que la preuve n’était pas compatible uniquement avec la culpabilité de m. calnen, parce qu’elle permettait de tirer de nombreuses autres inférences rationnelles. en parti- culier, la défense a fait valoir ce qui suit : [traduction] même si [les inférences] étaient raison- nables, le poids de l’expérience judiciaire commanderait de conclure qu’elles ne sont pas susceptibles d’étayer une conclusion valide hors de tout doute raisonnable. les jurés n’auraient pas pu agir raisonnablement et de façon judiciaire en rendant leur verdict. ils auraient facilement pu être indûment révoltés par le caractère déplorable de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait de l’intimé. (rf, at para. 114) (mi, par. 114) [168] the defence claims that because the jurors could have been unduly inflamed, the verdict was unreasonable, and mr. calnen should be acquitted. in response to this argument, i accept that, based on the jury charge as a whole, there was a real risk that the jurors could have been inflamed by the de- plorable nature of mr. calnen’s conduct. however, accepting this argument leads me to a different result and remedy. [168] la défense soutient que, comme les jurés au- raient pu être indûment révoltés, le verdict était dérai- sonnable et que m. calnen devrait être acquitté. en réponse à cet argument, j’accepte que, compte tenu de l’exposé au jury dans son ensemble, il y avait un risque réel que les jurés aient pu être révoltés par le caractère déplorable du comportement de m calnen. toutefois, le fait d’accepter cet argument m’amène à un résultat et à une réparation différents. [169] when a court reviews the reasonableness of a verdict, it is assumed that the jury has been properly instructed. when addressing the prejudice associ- ated with this evidence, the logically prior question, before taking the step into unreasonableness, is to ask why the jurors could have been unduly inflamed when it is clear that the law does not allow jurors to reason based on an accused’s discreditable conduct or propensity. [169] lorsqu’un tribunal contrôle le caractère rai- sonnable d’un verdict, il part du principe que le jury a reçu des directives appropriées. lorsqu’on aborde la question du préjudice associé à ce type de preuve, la question préalable qui s’impose logiquement avant l’étape de l’examen du caractère raisonnable est celle de savoir pourquoi les jurés auraient pu être indû- ment révoltés alors qu’il est clair que la loi ne permet pas aux jurés de fonder leur raisonnement sur la conduite déshonorante ou la propension de l’accusé. [170] a jury can only be acting judicially if they are properly informed about the law which governs their deliberations. this jury needed to know that the law prevents them from engaging in impermissible propensity reasoning. but this jury received no lim- iting instructions on how to think about the obvious prejudice associated with mr. calnen’s contested after- the-fact conduct. the trial judge never told [170] le jury ne peut agir judiciairement que s’il est bien informé des règles de droit régissant ses délibérations. dans la présente affaire, les jurés de- vaient savoir que la loi leur interdisait de se livrer à un raisonnement interdit fondé sur la propension, mais ils n’ont reçu aucune directive restrictive sur la façon dont ils devaient réfléchir au préjudice évident associé au comportement après le fait de m. calnen [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 377 them not to fill in the gaps in the evidence by drawing inferences based on the type of person mr. calnen’s actions may have shown him to be. in this case, the defence’s argument about an unreasonable verdict is based upon and demonstrates a deficiency in the jury charge. whether the jury was properly charged on the prejudice of the after- the-fact conduct stems directly from the issue of whether this was a reasonable ver- dict. in my view, in this case, when the jury has not been properly instructed in how to act reasonably and judicially, the better remedy is not an acquittal based on an unreasonable verdict, but to find that there is an error in the jury charge that necessitates a new trial. [171] in this next section, i begin by explaining why a limiting instruction against propensity rea- soning based on discreditable conduct was neces- sary in the circumstances and how its absence is a serious error of law warranting a new trial. i then answer three observations made by the majority. specifically, i say: first, fundamental problems of trial fairness in the jury charge cannot be ignored because the defence counsel did not specifically ask for a limiting instruction on propensity reason- ing at the pre- charge conference. second, i do not accept the statement that defence counsel made a strategic choice not to ask for limiting instructions on propensity reasoning, and that therefore, on this basis, no remedy should be given for its absence. finally, while the principle of finality is of funda- mental importance in criminal proceedings, it must be balanced with the equally fundamental societal interest in a fair trial. qui est contesté. le juge du procès ne leur a jamais dit de ne pas combler les lacunes de la preuve en tirant des inférences en fonction du type de personne que les actions de m. calnen pouvaient laisser penser qu’il était. dans le cas qui nous occupe, l’argument de la défense au sujet du verdict déraisonnable re- pose sur une lacune dans l’exposé du juge au jury et en fait la preuve. la question de savoir si les jurés ont reçu les directives appropriées au sujet du préju- dice associé au comportement après le fait découle directement de la question de savoir si le verdict était raisonnable ou non. en l’espèce, comme les jurés n’ont pas reçu de directives appropriées sur la façon d’agir de manière raisonnable et judiciaire, j’estime que la meilleure réparation ne consiste pas à ordonner un acquittement fondé sur un verdict déraisonnable, mais plutôt à conclure que l’exposé au jury est entaché d’une erreur qui justifie la tenue d’un nouveau procès. [171] dans la prochaine section, j’expliquerai d’abord pourquoi il était nécessaire, dans les circons- tances, de donner une directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension en raison de la conduite déshonorante de l’accusé et en quoi le défaut de le faire constitue une erreur de droit grave justifiant la tenue d’un nouveau procès. je répondrai ensuite à trois observations formulées par les juges majoritaires. je tiens à préciser que, premièrement, on ne peut ignorer les graves man- quements à l’équité procédurale dont est entaché l’exposé au jury en raison du fait que l’avocat de la défense n’a pas expressément demandé de directive restrictive sur les risques d’un raisonnement fondé sur la propension lors de la conférence préalable à l’exposé. deuxièmement, je ne suis pas d’accord avec l’affirmation selon laquelle l’avocat de la dé- fense a choisi, pour des raisons d’ordre stratégique, de ne pas demander de directives restrictives sur le raisonnement fondé sur la propension et que, pour cette raison, aucune réparation ne devrait être accor- dée du fait de cette omission. troisièmement, bien que le principe du caractère définitif des décisions soit d’une importance fondamentale dans les pro- cédures en matière criminelle, il doit être mis en balance avec l’intérêt tout aussi fondamental de la société à un procès juste. 378 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. b a limiting instruction against the use of pro­ pensity reasoning was required to ensure that the jury was properly instructed b une directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension était nécessaire pour veiller à ce que le jury ait reçu des directives appropriées (1) a difficult, even borderline case (1) une affaire difficile, voire limite [172] in order to convict mr. calnen of second degree murder, the jury must have been satisfied, be- yond a reasonable doubt, that (1) mr. calnen caused ms. jordan’s death by means of an unlawful act, and (2) mr. calnen meant to cause ms. jordan’s death, or that he meant to cause her bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death ensued. the criminal standard of proof would require that the jurors were “sure” that mr. calnen committed second degree murder, and not merely that they thought that he was probably or likely guilty.2 [172] pour pouvoir déclarer m. calnen coupable de meurtre au deuxième degré, le jury devait être convaincu, hors de tout doute raisonnable, (1) que m. calnen avait causé la mort de mme jordan en com- mettant un acte illégal et (2) que m. calnen avait l’in- tention de causer la mort de mme jordan, ou qu’il avait l’intention de lui causer des lésions corporelles qu’il savait être de nature à causer sa mort et qu’il lui était indifférent que la mort s’ensuive ou non. la norme de preuve en matière criminelle exigeait des jurés qu’ils soient « sûrs » que m. calnen a commis un meurtre au degré, et non seulement qu’ils estiment que ce dernier était probablement ou vraisemblablement coupable2. [173] the bulk of judicial experience would sug- gest that this case would be very close to the line when it came to determining whether the crown met its ultimate burden of establishing each constituent element of second degree murder beyond a reason- able doubt: see wh, at para. 26; see also yebes, at p. 185; biniaris, at para. 36; and rf, at para 111. remember that whatever caused ms. jordan’s death left no evidence of a clean up or damage in the house, and mr. calnen destroyed the information that might have been garnered from an examination of ms. jordan’s body. there was therefore no evidence as to the cause of death other than mr.  calnen’s statement and his after- the-fact conduct. the case was based on circumstantial evidence and the jury was asked to engage in inferential reasoning. there [173] l’ensemble de l’expérience judiciaire lais- serait entendre que la présente affaire frôlerait la li- mite lorsqu’il s’agit de juger si la couronne s’est acquittée ou non du fardeau ultime qui lui incombait consistant à établir chacun des éléments constitutifs du meurtre au deuxième degré hors de tout doute rai- sonnable : voir wh, par. 26; voir également yebes, p. 185; biniaris, par. 36; et mi, par 111. il faut se rappeler que, quelle qu’ait pu être la cause du décès de mme jordan, elle n’a laissé aucune preuve de nettoyage ou de dommage dans la maison, et m. calnen a détruit l’information qui aurait pu être recueillie d’un exa- men de la dépouille de mme jordan. il n’y avait donc aucun élément de preuve quant à la cause du décès, hormis la déclaration de m. calnen et son comporte- ment après le fait. le dossier reposait sur de la preuve 2 once a trial judge has adequately explained the meaning of the expression “beyond a reasonable doubt”, the jury may be advised that they can convict if they are “sure” or “certain” of the accused’s guilt: r v. lifchus, [1997] 3 scr 320, at pa- ras. 33-34 and 39. accordingly, in the case at bar, the trial judge first gave proper instructions regarding the meaning of “beyond a reasonable doubt” and then instructed the jury as follows: “if, at the end of the case, after considering all the evidence, you are sure that mr. calnen committed the offence, you should find paul trevor calnen guilty of it, since you would have been satisfied of his guilt of that offence beyond a reasonable doubt”: ar, vol. i, at p. 75 (emphasis added). 2 une fois le sens de l’expression « hors de tout doute raisonnable » bien expliqué par le juge du procès, il est possible de dire aux jurés qu’ils peuvent déclarer l’accusé coupable s’ils sont « sûrs » ou « certains » de la culpabilité de l’accusé : r c. lifchus, [1997] 3 rcs 320, par. 33-34 et 39. ainsi, dans le cas qui nous occupe, le juge du procès a d’abord donné des directives appropriées quant au sens de l’expression « hors de tout doute raisonnable » pour ensuite donner la directive suivante au jury : [traduction] « si, à la fin de l’affaire, après avoir examiné toute la preuve, vous êtes sûrs que m. calnen a commis l’infraction, vous devriez déclarer paul trevor calnen coupable de cette infraction, puisque vous aurez été convaincus hors de tout doute raisonnable de sa culpa- bilité à l’égard de l’infraction » : da, vol. i, p. 75 (je souligne). [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 379 were reasonable inferences other than murder which could be drawn from the evidence, as my colleague justice karakatsanis discusses. further, the fine line between innocence and guilt is reflected in the fact that not only were the judges divided on the main legal issues, but mr. calnen was discharged at a preliminary inquiry. [174] for the verdict to be assessed for its rea- sonableness, the jury first needed to be properly instructed. i have already decided that the trial judge properly addressed the general risks of after- the-fact conduct by outlining how it may invite specula- tion and imprecise reasoning. the trial judge also brought alternative inferences and explanations to the attention of the jury so they did not jump to a particular conclusion: see white (1998); white (2011). however, a review of the charge indicates that the jury was never told about the specific perils of filling in gaps, drawing inferences, or reaching conclusions based on mr. calnen’s propensity or character. without such instructions, the jury would have felt free to fill in gaps or draw inferences based on mr. calnen’s discreditable after- the-fact conduct and to use this evidence improperly to help them reach the verdict of guilty on second degree murder. circonstancielle et on a demandé au jury de se livrer à un raisonnement inférentiel. comme ma collègue la juge karakatsanis l’explique, la preuve permettait de tirer d’autres inférences raisonnables que le meurtre. de plus, la fine ligne séparant innocence et culpabilité est également illustrée non seulement par le fait que les juges étaient divisés sur les principales questions de droit, mais également par le fait que m. calnen a été libéré lors de l’enquête préliminaire. [174] pour que le caractère raisonnable du verdict puisse être contrôlé, il est tout d’abord nécessaire que les jurés aient reçu des directives appropriées. j’ai déjà statué que le juge du procès avait correctement traité les risques généraux associés au comportement après le fait en précisant comment celui-ci pouvait inciter à la spéculation et à un raisonnement impré- cis. le juge du procès a aussi porté d’autres infé- rences et explications possibles à l’attention des jurés pour éviter qu’ils ne tirent de façon précipitée une conclusion en particulier : voir white (1998); white (2011). toutefois, un examen de l’exposé révèle que les jurés n’ont jamais été informés des risques parti- culiers de combler les lacunes, de tirer des inférences ou d’arriver à des conclusions sur le fondement de la propension ou de la moralité de m calnen. sans directive de la sorte, les jurés se seraient sentis libres de combler les lacunes ou de tirer des inférences à partir du comportement après le fait déshonorant de m. calnen et d’utiliser à tort ces éléments de preuve pour les aider à rendre un verdict de culpabilité pour meurtre au deuxième degré. (2) propensity reasoning (2) raisonnement fondé sur la propension [175] the perniciousness of propensity evidence is well known and managing its risks has been a preoccupation of the courts since at least the sev- enteenth century: harrison’s trial (1692), 12 how. st. tr. 833 (old bailey (london)), at p. 864, cited in r v. handy, 2002 scc 56, [2002] 2 scr 908, at para 32. in handy, at para. 139, this court outlined the contours of bad character evidence and its “poi- sonous potential” (at para. 138) to result in moral prejudice: [175] le caractère pernicieux de la preuve de pro- pension est bien connu et la gestion de ses risques est une préoccupation des tribunaux depuis au moins le dix- septième siècle  : harrison’s trial (1692), 12 how. st. tr. 833 (old bailey (london)), p. 864, cité dans r c. handy, 2002 csc 56, [2002] 2 rcs. 908, par 32. dans l’arrêt handy, par. 139, notre cour a tracé les limites de la preuve de mauvaise moralité et de ses « effets pernicieux » (par. 138), susceptibles de causer un préjudice moral : it is frequently mentioned that “prejudice” in this con- text is not the risk of conviction. it is, more properly, the on mentionne souvent que le « préjudice » dans ce contexte n’est pas le risque de déclaration de culpabilité. 380 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. risk of an unfocussed trial and a wrongful conviction. the forbidden chain of reasoning is to infer guilt from general disposition or propensity. the evidence, if believed, shows that an accused has discreditable tendencies. in the end, the verdict may be based on prejudice rather than proof, thereby undermining the presumption of innocence en- shrined in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. [emphasis in original; para 139] [176] there is also the possibility of reasoning prejudice, which distracts the members of the jury from their proper focus on the charge: handy, at paras.  144-45 distraction can occur in different ways. in r v. d (le) (1987), 20 bclr (2d) 384 (ca),. mclachlin ja (as she then was) (in dissent but adopted in handy, at para. 145) observed, at p. 399, that similar facts are capable of “raising in the minds of the jury sentiments of revulsion and condemnation which might well deflect them from the rational, dispassionate analysis upon which the criminal process should rest”. [177] while this court’s statements of principle regarding bad character evidence often arise in the context of similar fact evidence, the dangers of pro- pensity reasoning can surface in any case in which the crown seeks to introduce discreditable conduct on the part of the accused that may compromise the jury’s ability to conduct a dispassionate analysis: r. v. b (ff), [1993] 1 scr 697, at p 735. le préjudice réside davantage dans le risque de procès diffus et de déclaration de culpabilité injustifiée. le rai- sonnement interdit est l’inférence de culpabilité à partir d’une prédisposition ou propension générale. la preuve, si on y ajoute foi, démontre que l’accusé a des tendances déshonorantes. en définitive, le verdict peut être fondé sur un préjudice plutôt que sur une preuve, compromettant ainsi la présomption d’innocence consacrée à l’art. 7 et à l’al. 11d) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. [en italique dans l’original; par 139] [176] il existe aussi la possibilité de préjudice par raisonnement, qui empêche les membres du jury de bien se concentrer sur l’accusation elle- même : handy, par 144-145. le détournement d’attention du jury peut se produire de différentes façons. dans l’arrêt r c. d (le) (1987), 20 bclr (2d) 384 (ca), la juge mclachlin (plus tard juge en chef du canada) (dans des motifs dissidents adoptés dans l’arrêt handy, par.  145) a fait remarquer, à la p.  399, que la preuve de faits similaires peut éveiller [traduction] «  dans l’esprit des jurés des sentiments de répugnance et de réprobation qui risqueraient bien de les détourner de l’analyse rationnelle et objective sur laquelle devrait reposer le processus criminel ». [177] bien que les énoncés de principe de la cour concernant la preuve de mauvaise moralité s’ap- pliquent souvent dans le contexte de la preuve de faits similaires, les dangers posés par le raisonne- ment fondé sur la propension peut survenir dans toute affaire où la couronne tente d’introduire une conduite déshonorante de la part de l’accusé qui peut compromettre la capacité du jury de faire une analyse objective : r c. b (ff), [1993] 1 rcs 697, p 735. (3) analysis (3) analyse in admitting the contested after- the-fact [178] conduct evidence, the trial judge decided that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prej- udicial effects. that decision was correct. however, the conclusion that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial did not negate the trial judge’s re- sponsibility to meet and address any specific pro- pensity prejudice of that evidence in the jury charge. clear instructions to the jury about the uses that they [178] en admettant la preuve contestée de compor- tement après le fait, le juge du procès a décidé que la valeur probante de la preuve l’emportait sur ses effets préjudiciables. cette décision était correcte. toutefois, la conclusion selon laquelle la preuve était plus probante que préjudiciable ne déchargeait pas le juge de sa responsabilité de reconnaître et de traiter tout préjudice particulier fondé sur la propen- sion de cette preuve dans son exposé au jury. des [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 381 could — and could not — make of the discreditable conduct evidence were essential: it is an obligation on trial judges that they properly instruct juries as to the use that those juries can make of evidence which is highly prejudicial to an accused in rela- tion to the accused’s character   . given that the testimony might have a strong prejudicial effect on the jury and that the jury might then convict on the basis that the accused is a bad person of the sort likely to commit the offences in question, clear directions to the jury about the use that they could make of the testimony were essential. more specifically, the judge was required to explain clearly in the instructions to the jurors that they must not infer from the evidence that tended to show the appellant’s bad char- acter that the appellant was guilty because he is the sort of person who is likely to commit the offences in question. directives claires aux jurés sur les utilisations qu’ils pouvaient — et ne pouvaient pas — faire des élé- ments de preuve relatifs à la conduite déshonorante étaient essentielles : il incombe aux juges du procès de donner aux jurés des directives appropriées quant à l’utilisation qu’ils peuvent faire de la preuve qui est fortement préjudiciable à l’ac- cusé sur le plan de sa moralité. [  ]. étant donné que ces témoignages pourraient avoir un effet fortement préjudi- ciable sur le jury qui pourrait alors prononcer un verdict de culpabilité pour le motif que l’accusé est le genre de mauvaise personne susceptible de commettre les infrac- tions en cause, il était essentiel de donner au jury des directives claires quant à l’utilisation qu’il pouvait faire de cette preuve. plus précisément, le juge était tenu, dans ses directives, d’expliquer clairement aux jurés qu’ils ne devaient pas déduire de la preuve qui tendait à démontrer la mauvaise moralité de l’appelant que celui-ci était cou- pable parce qu’il est le genre de personne susceptible de commettre les infractions en cause. (b (ff), at pp. 733-34) (b (ff), p. 733-734) [179] a permissible line of reasoning in this case would have been that mr. calnen destroyed ms. jordan’s body in order to destroy evidence that he had caused her death unlawfully. the jury was also permitted to reason that mr. calnen’s total de- struction of ms. jordan’s body, over multiple days and in multiple locations, could support the further inference that he was not simply acting to conceal evidence of a crime he committed, but also to hide the extent of that crime. the jury was not, however, permitted to reason that because mr. calnen moved and burned a human being’s body, he was the type of person who would kill, and that therefore, he did kill ms jordan. yet the risk that the jury would engage in precisely this line of forbidden reasoning was very real in the circumstances. thus, while the evi- dence was admissible for the purposes of causation and intent, it bore all the hallmarks of propensity evidence that could, absent proper limiting instruc- tions, import both moral prejudice and reasoning prejudice into the jury’s analysis. [179] un raisonnement que le jury aurait pu suivre en l’espèce aurait été que m. calnen a détruit la dé- pouille de mme jordan dans le but de détruire de la preuve tendant à montrer qu’il a causé sa mort par suite d’un acte illégal. le jury pouvait également déduire que la destruction totale de la dépouille de mme jordan par m. calnen, sur une période de plusieurs jours et à de nombreux endroits, pouvait également étayer l’inférence qu’il n’agissait pas simplement pour dissimuler un crime qu’il avait commis, mais aussi pour cacher la gravité de ce crime. toutefois, il n’était pas loisible au jury de déduire que, parce que m. calnen avait déplacé et brûlé le cadavre d’un être humain, il était le genre de personne qui tuerait, et donc qu’il a effectivement tué mme jordan. pourtant, le risque que le jury se livre précisément à ce type de raisonnement était très réel en l’espèce. en conséquence, même si la preuve était admissible pour ce qui est d’établir le lien de causalité et l’intention, elle avait tous les traits de preuve de propension qui pourrait, en l’absence de directives restrictives adéquates, importer un préju- dice moral et un préjudice par raisonnement dans l’analyse du jury. 382 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. [180] let me explain further the nature of mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct was likely to elicit a strong emotional reaction in the jurors. burning ms. jordan’s body was morally and viscerally repug- nant. these actions were variously and repeatedly described in the decisions below as “horrific” (four times in the court of appeal’s majority reasons alone); “extreme”; “shocking”; “desperate”; “obsessive”; and “extraordinary”. the disturbing nature of the conduct was made clear to the jury. in the closing address to the jury, crown counsel described mr. calnen’s conduct in great detail and tied it directly to a request to draw the inference that mr. calnen intended to kill ms jordan. the nature of the evidence, while admissible, thus ushered in a significant risk that mr. calnen would be convicted of second degree murder not because the jury had concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he had killed ms. jordan, but because his after- the-fact conduct had convinced the jurors that he was the sort of person who would kill: see handy, at paras. 31-36; b (ff), at p 734. there was the further risk of reasoning prejudice. as the jurors assessed whether the totality of the evidence established causation and intent beyond a reasonable doubt, they were likely to be experiencing the precise mix of “revulsion and condemnation” that could de- flect them from a rational and dispassionate analysis of the evidence. [180] je m’explique. le comportement après le fait de m. calnen était susceptible de provoquer une forte réaction émotive chez les jurés. l’acte de brûler la dépouille de mme jordan était moralement et viscéralement révoltant. dans les jugements rendus par les juridictions inférieures, les actes posés ont, à plusieurs reprises, été qualifiés de diverses façons : [traduction] « horribles » (terme employé quatre fois dans les seuls motifs des juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel); « extrêmes »; « choquants »; « dé- sespérés »; « obsessifs »; et « extraordinaires ». le caractère troublant des actes a été clairement exposé au jury. dans son exposé final au jury, le procureur de la couronne a longuement décrit la conduite de m. calnen et l’a associée directement à sa demande aux jurés de conclure que m. calnen avait l’intention de tuer mme jordan. la nature de la preuve, même si celle-ci était admissible, faisait ainsi naître un risque important que m. calnen soit déclaré coupable de meurtre au deuxième degré, non pas parce que le jury avait conclu hors de tout doute raisonnable qu’il avait tué mme jordan, mais parce que son comportement après le fait avait convaincu les jurés qu’il était le genre de personne qui tuerait : voir handy, par. 31- 36; b (ff), p 734. il y avait par ailleurs le risque de préjudice par raisonnement. alors que les jurés évaluaient la question de savoir si la preuve dans son ensemble établissait les éléments du lien de causalité et de l’intention hors de tout doute raisonnable, ils éprouvaient vraisemblablement le mélange précis de [traduction] « répugnance et de réprobation » qui risquerait de les détourner d’une analyse rationnelle et objective de la preuve. [181] further, mr. calnen was a habitual user of illegal drugs. he told the police that he first met ms. jordan when he engaged her services as a sex worker. mr. calnen had advertised ms. jordan’s sex- ual services in the newspaper. mr. weeks testified that he had had three- way sex with mr. calnen and ms jordan. illegal drug use, hiring and advertising sex workers, and sexual adventurousness are fre- quent subjects of social censure. taken together, these facts were such that the jurors may have assem- bled a mental image of a man whose moral compass was so broken that he may well have been capable of murder. this constituted another form of general propensity or bad character evidence that required [181] de plus, m. calnen était un consommateur régulier de drogues illicites. il a affirmé aux policiers qu’il avait rencontré mme jordan la première fois lorsqu’il avait retenu ses services comme travailleuse du sexe. monsieur calnen avait annoncé les services sexuels de mme jordan dans le journal. dans son té- moignage, m. weeks a affirmé qu’il avait eu une re- lation sexuelle à trois avec m. calnen et mme jordan. la consommation de drogues illicites, l’embauche et la promotion de travailleuses du sexe et l’aventu- risme sexuel sont fréquemment l’objet de censure sociale. pris ensemble, ces faits étaient susceptibles de faire en sorte que les jurés se soient formé une image mentale d’un homme dont la boussole morale [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 383 legal guidance from the trial judge to ensure that it would not prejudice the jury’s reasoning. in other words, there was a risk that the jury may, at least in part, convict on the basis of “bad personhood”: handy, at para 31. [182] the prejudicial nature of the after- the-fact conduct was an issue throughout the trial. for ex- ample, at the first voir dire, defence counsel ar- gued that the admission of mr. calnen’s statements would have an “enormous prejudicial effect with a jury” (ar, vol. ii, at p. 22), and that the state- ments ask the jury “to draw a forbidden inference” (ar, vol. iii, at p 585). at the second voir dire heard on november 2, 2015, the defence argued that mr. calnen’s statement was inadmissible, because its “probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect”: ar, vol. ii, at p 66. in oral submissions, the defence said of the statement: “it’s prejudicial because it paints him in a bad light because of what he did afterwards   ” (ar, vol. iii, at p 704). the defence again raised the prejudicial nature of the after- the-fact conduct evidence in its motion for a directed verdict. it is here that the defence first intro- duced the spectre of an unreasonable verdict caused by propensity reasoning, arguing: “as noted in beals [2011 nsca 42, 302 nsr (2d) 358] the risk of a wrongful conviction may be considered. the facts of this case give rise to a substantial possibility of an unreasonable verdict based on the inflammatory nature of the evidence of the after the fact conduct” (ar, vol. ii, at p 180). counsel further argued in oral submissions: était à ce point déréglée qu’il était tout à fait ca- pable de commettre un meurtre. ceci constituait une autre forme de preuve de propension générale ou de mauvaise moralité qui obligeait le juge du procès à expliquer le droit pour veiller à ce que cette preuve ne vicie pas le raisonnement du jury. autrement dit, il existait un risque que le jury puisse, en partie du moins, déclarer l’accusé coupable en raison de sa « mauvaise personnalité » : handy, par 31. [182] la nature préjudiciable du comportement après le fait est une question qui a été soulevée tout au long du procès. par exemple, lors du premier voir- dire, l’avocat de la défense a fait valoir que l’admission des déclarations de m. calnen aurait un [traduction] « énorme effet préjudiciable sur le jury » (da, vol. ii, p. 22) et que ces déclarations invi- taient les jurés « à tirer une inférence interdite » (da, vol. iii, p 585). lors de la tenue du deuxième voir- dire, le 2 novembre 2015, la défense a soutenu que la déclaration de m. calnen n’était pas admissible étant donné que « son effet préjudiciable l’emporte sur sa valeur probante » : da, vol. ii, p 66. dans sa plaidoirie orale, la défense a affirmé, au sujet de la déclaration, qu’elle « est préjudiciable parce qu’elle le présente sous un jour peu flatteur en raison de ce qu’il a fait par la suite    » (da, vol. iii, p 704). la défense a de nouveau soulevé le caractère préju- diciable de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait dans sa requête en verdict imposé. c’est ici que l’avocat de la défense a évoqué pour la première fois la possibilité d’un verdict déraisonnable causé par un raisonnement fondé sur la propension, en faisant valoir ce qui suit : [traduction] « comme le tribunal l’a fait observer dans la décision beals [2011 nsca 42, 302 nsr (2d) 358], le risque de condamnation injustifiée peut être pris en compte. les faits de l’espèce permettent de penser qu’il y a une forte possibilité qu’un verdict déraisonnable soit rendu en raison du caractère incendiaire des éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait » (da, vol. ii, p 180). l’avocat a ajouté ce qui suit dans sa plaidoirie orale :    when you’re trying to -- when the crown is trying to prove a case entirely by a piece of evidence which, you know, has been treated with caution consistently in the case law, you know, you’re running a real risk, if this [traduction]    lorsqu’on essaie -- lorsque la cou- ronne essaie de prouver l’accusation en se fondant exclu- sivement sur un élément de preuve qui, comme vous le savez, a toujours été traité avec prudence par les tribunaux, 384 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. goes to the jury, of a wrongful conviction   . that is a concern here. and, you know, there’s no sugarcoating the fact that the after- the-fact evidence here is -- as i’ve said in my brief, it’s inflammatory and it’s susceptible to overuse. [emphasis added.] on court un risque réel, si le jury en est saisi, de se retrou- ver avec une condamnation injustifiée [  ]. ce problème est bien réel en l’espèce. et, comme je l’ai expliqué dans mon mémoire on ne peut faire abstraction du fait qu’en l’espèce — la preuve relative au comportement après le fait est incendiaire et qu’elle risque d’être utilisée de façon excessive. [je souligne.] (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 2040-41) (da, vol. iii, p. 2040-2041) the record thus reflects that defence counsel repeat- edly raised the prejudicial nature of this evidence. [183] the trial judge was also alive to these con- cerns. after the second voir dire in which he admitted portions of mr. calnen’s statements, the trial judge emphasized that he would require the help of coun- sel to draft the charge on the after- the-fact conduct evidence: 2015 nssc 318, 368 nsr (2d) 93, at para 42. in addition, in his decision denying the defence’s motion for directed verdict, the trial judge stated: “any risk of prejudice can be averted by a proper instruction on the proper use of this evidence” (2015 nssc 331, 368 nsr (2d) 129, at para 42). il ressort donc du dossier que l’avocat de la défense a soulevé à plusieurs reprises le caractère préjudiciable de cette preuve. [183] le juge du procès était lui aussi conscient de ces préoccupations. après le deuxième voir- dire, au terme duquel il a admis en preuve certains passages des déclarations de m. calnen, le juge du procès a souligné qu’il solliciterait l’assistance des avocats pour formuler l’exposé concernant la preuve relative au comportement après le fait : 2015 nssc 318, 368 nsr (2d) 93, par 42. de plus, dans sa décision rejetant la requête en verdict imposé de la défense, le juge du procès a affirmé : [traduction] « tout risque de préjudice peut être évité par une directive appropriée sur la bonne façon d’utiliser cette preuve » (2015 nssc 331, 368 nsr (2d) 129, par 42). [184] indeed, even the majority of the court of appeal, at para. 1, understood the potential effect of emotion: [184] par ailleurs, les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel, au premier paragraphe de leurs motifs, com- prenaient eux aussi l’effet éventuel des émotions : trial judges routinely instruct juries that cases must be decided based upon legally admissible evidence, not emo- tion. the actions of the appellant in this case; repeatedly burning the body of reita louise jordan after her death, would inflame the emotions of most people. it is of the utmost importance that the trial judge in this case precisely proscribe any limitations in the use of that evidence as it relates to the issue of proof of the intent to murder. [traduction] il est courant que les juges du procès disent aux jurys que les affaires doivent être jugées sur le fondement de la preuve légalement admissible et non de l’émotion. les gestes posés par l’appelant en l’espèce, c’est-à-dire avoir brûlé à maintes reprises le corps de reita louise jordan après son décès, provoqueraient une vive réaction émotive chez la plupart des gens. il est absolu- ment essentiel que le juge du procès dans ce cas prescrive précisément toute restriction touchant l’utilisation de cette preuve dans son rapport avec la question de la preuve de l’intention de commettre un meurtre. although this statement was directed at a different subject, i also accept that this evidence would in- flame the emotions of most people and that it is of the utmost importance that the trial judge precisely proscribe any limitations on the use of that evidence. même si cette affirmation portait sur un autre sujet, je suis également d’avis que cette preuve provoquerait une vive réaction émotive chez la plupart des gens et qu’il est absolument essentiel que le juge du pro- cès prescrive précisément toute restriction touchant [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 385 in my view, that includes limitations on both the gen- eral risks of all after- the-fact conduct and the specific propensity risks arising from this particular evidence. [185] i agree with the majority that the jury charge adequately guarded against the risks that are gener- ally associated with after- the-fact conduct evidence. however, the trial judge’s generic instructions on after- the-fact conduct evidence did not adequately address the perils of propensity reasoning and its possible impact on the jury’s reasoning and ultimate conclusions. a propensity instruction is not the same as the instructions developed to address after- the-fact conduct evidence. they are separate instructions which address different thought processes. in addi- tion, not all after- the-fact conduct evidence is highly prejudicial. after- the-fact conduct can range from failing to answer the door when the police knock to burning a body to ash. while all after- the-fact con- duct requires the general instructions provided by the trial judge in this case, in some circumstances, further specific limiting instructions will be required to address other reasoning risks associated with the evidence. l’utilisation de cette preuve. selon moi, cette obliga- tion consiste à donner des restrictions tant en ce qui concerne les risques généraux de tout comportement après le fait que les risques de propension propres à cette preuve particulière. [185] à l’instar des juges majoritaires, j’estime que l’exposé au jury mettait suffisamment en garde le jury contre les risques généralement associés à une preuve relative au comportement après le fait. toutefois, dans ses directives générales sur la preuve relative au comportement après le fait, le juge du procès n’a pas adéquatement traité des risques du raisonnement fondé sur la propension ni de son in- cidence éventuelle sur le raisonnement et les conclu- sions ultimes du jury. il y a une différence entre une directive sur la propension et une directive visant à traiter d’éléments de preuve relatifs au comporte- ment après le fait. il s’agit de directives distinctes portant sur des processus de réflexion distincts. en outre, les éléments de preuve relatifs au comporte- ment après le fait ne sont pas tous préjudiciables. les actes qui peuvent être qualifiés de comportements après le fait vont du refus de répondre à des policiers qui frappent à la porte au fait de réduire un cadavre en cendres. bien que tous les comportements après le fait exigent des directives générales comme celles que le juge du procès a données en l’espèce, dans certains cas, des directives restrictives plus précises sont nécessaires pour tenir compte d’autres risques de raisonnement associés à la preuve. [186] in this case, there existed a reasoning risk beyond the risks generally associated with after- the-fact conduct evidence — the further reasoning risk was that mr. calnen’s actions were so morally repugnant that he would be convicted on the basis of bad personhood. this required the trial judge to “explain clearly in the instructions to the jurors that they must not infer from the evidence that tended to show the [accused’s] bad character that the [ac- cused] was guilty because he is the sort of person who is likely to commit the offences in question”: b (ff), at p 734. this was not done. the charge was silent on the specific propensity reasoning risks that arise when a jury is asked to assess evidence that is acknowledged to be “horrific”, “extreme”, “shocking”, and “distract[ing]”. thus while the trial [186] en l’espèce, il existait un risque de raisonne- ment plus élevé que les risques qui sont généralement associés aux éléments de preuve relatifs au compor- tement après le fait, à savoir le risque que les actes de m. calnen étaient si répugnants sur le plan moral que ce dernier soit condamné en raison de sa mau- vaise personnalité. ainsi le juge du procès était-il tenu « d’expliquer clairement aux jurés qu’ils ne devaient pas déduire de la preuve qui tendait à démontrer la mauvaise moralité de [l’accusé] que celui-ci était coupable parce qu’il est le genre de personne sus- ceptible de commettre les infractions en cause » (b. (ff), p. 734), ce qu’il n’a pas fait. l’exposé au jury était muet quant aux risques précis d’un raisonnement fondé sur la propension que suscitait le fait de deman- der aux jurés d’évaluer des éléments de preuve dont on 386 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. judge’s instructions adequately warned the jury to avoid jumping to a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the after- the-fact conduct evidence alone, they did not equip the jury to handle the mix of revulsion and condemnation that was elicited by this particular evidence. [187] nor did the trial judge’s introductory re- marks with respect to mr. calnen’s guilty plea on the charge of indecent interference constitute sufficient instruction to guard against propensity reasoning. the instruction to the jury to put the guilty plea out of their minds was helpful — but given that the jury went on to hear multiple days of testimony detailing mr. calnen’s interference with human remains, the introductory remarks had to be bolstered by further specific instructions on propensity. none were forth- coming. [188] had this been a judge- alone trial, the risk of propensity reasoning would have been effectively managed by the trial judge. trial judges can be ex- pected to warn themselves against the prejudice of propensity reasoning because they “are presumed to know the law with which they work day in and day out”: r v. burns, [1994] 1 scr 656, at p. 664; fh. v. mcdougall, 2008 scc 53, [2008] 3 scr 41, at para. 54; r v. youvarajah, 2013 scc 41, [2013] 2 scr 720, at para 47. admettait qu’ils étaient [traduction] « horribles », « extrêmes », « troublants » et susceptibles « de dé- tourner l’attention ». par conséquent, bien que, dans ses directives, le juge du procès ait suffisamment pré- venu les jurés d’éviter de conclure trop rapidement à la culpabilité en se fondant uniquement sur les éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait, ces directives n’ont pas outillé les jurés pour composer avec le mélange de répulsion et de répugnance que ces éléments de preuve particuliers ont suscité. [187] les remarques introductives faites par le juge du procès au sujet du plaidoyer de culpabilité de m. calnen à l’égard de l’accusation d’indécence ne constituaient pas non plus une directive suffisante pour mettre le jury en garde contre les dangers d’un raisonnement fondé sur la propension. la directive donnée au jury de faire abstraction du plaidoyer de culpabilité était certes utile, mais comme le jury a par la suite entendu, pendant plusieurs jours, des témoignages détaillant les agissements de m. calnen à l’égard de restes humains, ces remarques introduc- tives auraient dû s’accompagner d’autres directives portant précisément sur la propension. le jury n’a reçu aucune directive de la sorte. [188] si le procès s’était déroulé devant un juge seul, ce dernier aurait su efficacement gérer le risque que représente le raisonnement fondé sur la propen- sion. on peut s’attendre à ce que les juges du procès se mettent eux- mêmes en garde contre le caractère préjudiciable du raisonnement fondé sur la propen- sion parce qu’ils « sont censés connaître le droit qu’ils appliquent tous les jours » : r c. burns, [1994] 1 rcs 656, p. 664; fh c. mcdougall, 2008 csc 53, [2008] 3 rcs 41, par. 54; r c. youvarajah, 2013 csc 41, [2013] 2 rcs 720, par 47. [189] a jury, however, requires instructions. juries are not presumed to know the law and trial judges bear the ultimate responsibility for the content, ac- curacy, and fairness of the jury charge: see jaw, at para. 44; jacquard, at para. 37; khela, at para 49. to properly bring to our justice system the “healthy measure of common sense” that makes jurors such an invaluable part of the legal process, jurors must first be equipped with the correct rules of law: r v. cor­ bett, [1988] 1 scr 670, at p 692. jury instructions [189] toutefois, un jury a besoin de directives. les jurés ne sont pas présumés connaître le droit et il revient ultimement au juge du procès de s’assurer de la teneur, de la justesse et de l’équité de l’exposé au jury : voir jaw, par. 44; jacquard, par. 37; khela, par 49. pour conférer adéquatement à notre système de justice la « saine mesure de bon sens » qui fait des jurés une partie si précieuse du processus judiciaire, les jurés doivent d’abord être outillés des bonnes règles de droit : r c. corbett, [1988] 1 rcs 670, [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 387 ensure that the path of permissible reasoning has been adequately explained to the jurors, and that they have received any necessary cautions and limiting instructions on the uses to which certain evidence can be put. equipped with clear instructions in the law, juries can reach sound, lawful, and reasonable verdicts. [190] while the crown did not argue propensity at trial, it did argue for the jurors to use their com- mon sense. indeed, this continues to be the crown’s argument on appeal to this court: af, at para 114. without an express limiting instruction, jurors can- not be expected to know that at the same time that they are being told to use common sense, they are in fact prohibited from engaging in what many jurors may also see as just another form of common sense reasoning: propensity reasoning. the reason judges caution against propensity reasoning is precisely because this form of thinking is recognized as being so intuitive and powerful. in this instance, the jurors could not have understood the potentially poisonous nature of propensity evidence, and the manner in which the law has circumscribed its use, without an express instruction on the issue. [191] we therefore have a situation in which the jury (1) was left to rely on evidence that carried a recognized and specific risk of prejudice; (2) was not equipped with a limiting instruction as to how to avoid the pitfalls of prejudicial propensity or bad character reasoning; and (3) very likely relied on that evidence to arrive at its verdict of guilt. the highly emotive nature of the evidence was recognizable to every judge who presided over this matter. though the evidence was admissible, it required a clear in- struction in law to ensure that the jury would use the evidence properly, both generally and specifically. in the circumstances, the failure to instruct on this crucial point resulted in a jury that was not properly instructed in law. p 692. les directives au jury font en sorte que le mode de raisonnement admissible a été adéquate- ment expliqué aux jurés et que ces derniers ont reçu les mises en garde et les directives restrictives né- cessaires sur les utilisations qu’ils peuvent faire de certains éléments de preuve. outillés de directives claires sur le plan du droit, les jurys peuvent rendre des verdicts valables, légitimes et raisonnables. [190] bien que la couronne n’ait pas fait valoir la question de la propension au procès, elle a effec- tivement demandé aux jurés de faire preuve de bon sens. elle a d’ailleurs repris cet argument dans le cadre du présent pourvoi devant notre cour : ma, par 114. sans directive restrictive explicite, on ne peut s’attendre à ce que les jurés sachent que, en même temps qu’on les invite à faire preuve de bon sens, il leur est en fait interdit de se livrer à ce que plusieurs d’entre eux peuvent simplement percevoir comme une autre forme de raisonnement fondé sur le bon sens : le raisonnement fondé sur la propension. la raison pour laquelle les juges procèdent à des mises en garde contre un raisonnement fondé sur la propension est précisément parce qu’il est bien connu que cette manière de raisonner est intuitive et puissante. en l’espèce, faute de directive explicite sur la question, les jurés ne pouvaient pas avoir compris le caractère potentiellement pernicieux de la preuve fondée sur la propension et la manière dont le droit en a circonscrit l’utilisation. [191] en conséquence, nous nous retrouvons dans une situation où le jury (1) devait s’appuyer sur une preuve qui comportait un risque reconnu et précis de préjudice, (2) n’était pas outillé d’une directive restrictive sur la façon d’éviter les pièges d’un rai- sonnement préjudiciable fondé sur la propension ou la mauvaise moralité et (3) s’est fort vraisemblable- ment appuyé sur cette preuve pour rendre son verdict de culpabilité. tous les juges saisis de ce dossier ont reconnu le caractère fort émotif de la preuve. même si la preuve était admissible, son admission néces- sitait une directive juridique claire pour veiller ce que le jury se serve de la preuve correctement, tant en général que de façon particulière. dans de telles circonstances, le défaut de donner une directive sur ce point capital a fait en sorte que le jury n’a pas reçu des directives appropriées sur le plan juridique. 388 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. c remedy c réparation [192] in this case, the trial judge’s failure to cau- tion on propensity evidence was not advanced as a discrete ground of appeal. the prejudice of this evi- dence was, however, part of the defence’s argument about unreasonable verdict and was also relied upon throughout the appeal in relation to other legal issues. [193] given the history of this matter, nothing turns on the fact that the defence did not argue against the prejudice of this evidence under the rubric of a defi- ciency in the jury charge. it is in no way a new issue per this court’s definition in r v. mian, 2014 scc 54, [2014] 2 scr 689, at para. 30: see also quan v. cusson, 2009 scc 62, [2009] 3 scr 712, at para 39. it is not a “new basis for potentially finding error in the decision under appeal” because it is not “[g]enuinely new”: mian, at para 30. instead, the prejudicial nature of the evidence and the jury’s ina- bility to deal with it formed the basis of the defence’s argument of an unreasonable verdict. the prejudice of this evidence is thus not “legally and factually distinct” from the ground of unreasonable verdict raised by the defence: para 30. on the contrary, it arises squarely from the evidence and arguments before this court, and “stem[s] from the issues as framed by the parties”: para 30. [192] dans le cas qui nous occupe, le défaut du juge du procès de mettre en garde les jurés contre un raisonnement fondé sur la propension n’a pas été invoqué à titre de moyen d’appel distinct. le préjudice associé à ce type de preuve faisait tou- tefois partie de l’argumentaire de la défense sur le verdict déraisonnable et il a été invoqué tout au long de l’appel relativement à d’autres questions de droit. [193] compte tenu de la façon dont l’instance s’est déroulée, le fait que la défense ne s’est pas opposée au préjudice associé à cette preuve au motif que l’exposé au jury comportait de ce fait une lacune ne tire pas à conséquence. il ne s’agissait nullement d’une nouvelle question au sens que notre cour a donné à ce terme dans l’arrêt r c. mian, 2014 csc 54, [2014] 2 rcs 689, par. 30 : voir également quan c. cusson, 2009 csc 62, [2009] 3 rcs 712, par 39. cette question ne constitue pas « un nouveau fondement sur lequel on pourrait s’appuyer [  ] pour conclure que la décision frappée d’appel est erronée », parce qu’elle n’est pas « véritablement nouvell[e] » : mian, par 30. l’argument de l’intimé quant au caractère déraisonnable du verdict repose plutôt sur le caractère préjudiciable de la preuve et sur l’incapacité du jury à en tenir compte. le pré- judice causé par cette preuve n’est donc pas « dif- féren[t] [  ] sur les plans juridique et factuel » du moyen tiré du verdict déraisonnable par la défense : par 30. au contraire, ce préjudice résulte carrément de la preuve et des arguments présentés devant notre cour, et « découl[e] des questions formulées par les parties » : par 30. [194] although the prejudicial nature of the evi- dence formed the basis of the defence’s argument of an unreasonable verdict, in my view, the failure of the trial judge to provide a limiting instruction on propensity reasoning is best seen as an error of law under s. 686(1)(a)(ii) of the criminal code. an appellate court’s review of the reasonableness of a verdict is “predicated on the accused having had a proper trial on legally admissible evidence accom- panied by instructions that are correct in law”: r. v. s (pl), [1991] 1 scr 909, at p 915. in this [194] bien que l’argument de verdict déraison- nable que formule la défense repose sur le caractère préjudiciable de la preuve, j’estime qu’il convient de qualifier d’erreur de droit pour l’application du sous-al.  686(1)a)(ii) du code criminel le défaut du juge du procès de donner une directive restric- tive sur le raisonnement fondé sur la propension. le contrôle du caractère raisonnable d’un verdict par un tribunal d’appel « suppose que l’accusé a subi un procès régulier fondé sur une preuve qui était légalement admissible et qui était assortie de [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 389 case, there is an undeniable connection between the allegation of an unreasonable verdict and an error of law, because the error of law meant the jury was not properly instructed and was not, therefore, equipped to reach a reasonable verdict. [195] given that this was an error of law, the crown would be able to rely on the curative proviso if the legal error was harmless or if the evidence against mr. calnen was so overwhelming that a trier of fact would inevitably convict: r v. o’brien, 2011 scc 29, [2011] 2 scr 485, at para. 34; r v. khan, 2001 scc 86, [2001] 3 scr 823, at paras. 26-31; r v. jolivet, 2000 scc 29, [2000] 1 scr 751, at paras. 48 and 54; r v. van, 2009 scc 22, [2009] 1 scr 716, at paras 34-36. however, i conclude that, in this case, the legal error was not harmless. even though a jury charge does not have to be per- fect, and this was a single omission in a compre- hensive charge, the trial judge’s failure to provide a limiting instruction on propensity resulted in a jury that was not properly instructed to assess the key piece of evidence supporting the crown’s theory of guilt. in the result, important reasoning risks were left unaddressed and the potential impact of this error is sufficiently serious to warrant a new trial. directives correctes en droit » : r c. s (pl), [1991] 1 rcs 909, p 915. dans l’affaire qui nous oc- cupe, il existe un lien indéniable entre l’allégation de verdict déraisonnable et l’existence d’une erreur de droit, parce qu’en raison de cette erreur de droit, le jury n’a pas reçu de directives appropriées et, de ce fait, il n’était pas outillé pour rendre un verdict raisonnable. [195] comme il s’agissait d’une erreur de droit, il serait loisible à la couronne d’invoquer la disposi- tion réparatrice si l’erreur en question était inoffen- sive ou si la preuve contre m. calnen était à ce point accablante que le juge des faits rendrait inévitable- ment un verdict de culpabilité : r c. o’brien, 2011 csc 29, [2011] 2 rcs 485, par. 34; r c. khan, 2001 csc 86, [2001] 3 rcs 823, par. 26-31; r c. jolivet, 2000 csc 29, [2000] 1 rcs 751, par. 48 et 54; r c. van, 2009 csc 22, [2009] 1 rcs 716, par 34-36. j’estime toutefois que, dans le cas qui nous occupe, l’erreur de droit n’était pas inoffensive. même si l’exposé fait à un jury n’a pas à être parfait et qu’il s’agit en l’espèce d’une seule omission dans un exposé par ailleurs étoffé, le défaut du juge du procès de donner une directive restrictive au sujet du raisonnement fondé sur la propension a plutôt fait en sorte que le jury n’a pas reçu de directives appropriées lui permettant d’évaluer le principal élément de preuve présenté par la couronne pour conclure à la culpabilité de l’accusé. en définitive, d’importants risques liés au raisonnement n’ont pas été abordés et l’incidence potentielle de cette erreur est suffisamment grave pour justifier un nouveau procès. [196] further, the evidence was not such that the jury would inevitably convict on second degree murder. it was open to the jury to conclude that the evidence did not establish any criminal culpability. alternatively, the jury could have concluded that the evidence supported an inference that mr. calnen had some unlawful involvement in ms. jordan’s death and that he caused her death. it was not inevita- ble that a properly instructed jury would go even further down the path of inferential reasoning and conclude that the crown had proven beyond a rea- sonable doubt that mr. calnen intentionally caused ms. jordan’s death. a verdict of not guilty, or guilty [196] de plus, la preuve n’était pas telle que le jury reconnaîtrait forcément l’accusé coupable de meurtre au deuxième degré. il était loisible au jury de conclure que la preuve n’établissait aucune culpa- bilité criminelle. le jury aurait aussi pu conclure que la preuve permettait de conclure à une implication illicite de m. calnen dans la mort de mme jordan et qu’il avait causé sa mort. il n’était pas inévitable qu’un jury ayant reçu des directives appropriées soit allé encore plus loin dans son raisonnement inféren- tiel et ait conclu que la couronne avait prouvé hors de tout doute raisonnable que m. calnen avait causé intentionnellement la mort de mme jordan. un verdict 390 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. on manslaughter, rather than murder, was also pos- sible in this case. i conclude that the jury was not properly in- [197] structed, and that there is legally admissible evidence on which a conviction could reasonably be based. the reasonableness of any verdict of second degree murder could only be assessed if jurors knew they could not reason that because mr. calnen destroyed ms. jordan’s body in the manner that he did, he was the type of person who would have murdered her. in my view, the trial judge’s instructions were not correct in law on this point and the remedy is not an acquittal, but a new trial. de non- culpabilité, ou de culpabilité d’homicide in- volontaire coupable plutôt que de meurtre, était aussi possible dans cette affaire. [197] j’arrive à la conclusion que le jury n’a pas reçu des directives appropriées et qu’il existe des éléments de preuve légalement admissibles qui pourraient raisonnablement justifier une déclaration de culpabilité. le caractère raisonnable d’un ver- dict quant à l’accusation de meurtre au deuxième n’aurait pu être évalué que si les jurés savaient qu’il leur était interdit de tenir un raisonnement suivant lequel, parce qu’il a détruit le corps de mme jordan comme il l’a fait, m. calnen était le type de personne qui l’aurait tuée. à mon avis, les directives du juge du procès à cet égard n’étaient pas conformes aux règles de droit et la réparation à accorder n’est pas un acquittement, mais un nou- veau procès. d other concerns d autres questions [198] in this section, i will answer certain concerns raised by the majority in its reasons for judgment. by way of a general statement, it would have been preferable had the defence requested a limiting in- struction against propensity reasoning at the pre- charge conference and raised the failure to instruct against propensity and bad personhood reasoning as a distinct ground of appeal, rather than as part of the unreasonable verdict argument. it is also to be hoped, even expected, that counsel will do just that in the future when the after- the-fact conduct at issue carries other specific reasoning risks, like those associated with propensity reasoning. however, in my view, the focus in this case should be on overall trial fairness, not finality, and on ensuring that the jury did not take a wrong turn when asked to consider multiple and progressive inferences from circumstantial evidence. [198] dans la présente section, je vais répondre à certaines questions soulevées par les juges ma- joritaires dans leurs motifs de jugement. de façon générale, je dirais qu’il aurait été préférable que la défense demande, lors de la conférence préalable à l’exposé au jury, une directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propen- sion et qu’elle invoque le défaut du juge du procès de donner des directives mettant le jury en garde contre un raisonnement fondé sur la propension ou la mauvaise personnalité comme un moyen d’appel distinct, plutôt que de le soulever dans le cadre de son argument sur le verdict déraisonnable. souhaitons par ailleurs que les avocats suivent ces consignes à l’avenir lorsque le comportement après le fait en cause comporte des risques particuliers liés au rai- sonnement, comme ceux associés au raisonnement fondé sur la propension; on s’attend d’ailleurs qu’ils agissent ainsi. j’estime toutefois qu’en l’espèce, l’ac- cent devrait être mis sur l’équité globale du procès et non sur le caractère définitif des décisions, et qu’on doit s’assurer que le jury n’a pas dévié de sa route lorsqu’il a été invité à se pencher sur diverses in- férences tirées progressivement à partir de preuve circonstancielle. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 391 (1) the trial judge is responsible for the ade- (1) il appartient au juge du procès de s’assurer quacy of the jury charge que son exposé au jury est suffisant [199] the majority is of the view that “defence counsel’s failure to object on the basis that the trial judge was required to provide a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning may reasonably be taken as an indication that the defence consid- ered the charge to be satisfactory and that a limiting instruction would not be in his client’s interests”: para 41. with respect, and on the facts of this case, i cannot agree. [200] though not determinative, counsel’s failure to object to a jury charge is a factor that is worthy of consideration: thériault v. the queen, [1981] 1 scr 336, at pp. 343-44; jacquard, at paras. 37-38; r v. chambers, [1990] 2 scr 1293, at pp. 1319- 20; arcangioli, at p. 143; van, at para. 43; r v. araya, 2015 scc 11, [2015] 1 scr 581, at para 51. the determining factor is, however, context — not only the context of the charge, but the context of the trial as a whole: “   we should not divorce the jury charge from the greater context of the trial” (jacquard, at para. 33; see also araya, at para 52). [201] counsel’s failure to object must therefore be assessed in light of the jury charge and trial as a whole, alongside other factors such as whether and to what extent the parties and the trial judge were alive to the issue throughout the trial and how important the issue was to the accused’s defence. the context of this trial was that defence counsel was consistently concerned about the propensity prejudice associated with the disputed after- the-fact conduct evidence, and the trial judge intended to ad- dress that prejudice in the jury charge. this is unlike jacquard, in which “the ‘planned and deliberate’ issue was not expressly raised by the [accused] as a live issue at trial”: para 33. similarly, thériault is distinguishable because, unlike in thériault, the trial judge’s failure to instruct in the case at bar concerned evidence that was foundational to the key issues of causation and intent: see pp 342-44. here counsel’s failure to object is outweighed by his repeated and express references to the inflammatory [199] les juges majoritaires estiment que «  le défaut de l’avocat de la défense de s’opposer, au motif que le juge du procès était tenu de donner une directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale, peut raisonnablement être interprété comme une indica- tion que la défense estimait que l’exposé était satis- faisant et qu’une directive restrictive ne servirait pas l’intérêt de son client » : par 41. en toute déférence, vu les faits de l’espèce, je ne partage pas cet avis. [200] bien qu’il ne soit pas déterminant, le défaut de l’avocat de s’opposer à l’exposé au jury constitue un facteur qui mérite d’être considéré : thériault c. la reine, [1981] 1 rcs 336, p. 343-344; jacquard, par. 37-38; r c. chambers, [1990] 2 rcs 1293, p. 1319-1320; arcangioli, p. 143; van, par. 43; r c. araya, 2015 csc 11, [2015] 1 rcs 581, par 51. le facteur déterminant est le contexte, non seulement le contexte entourant l’exposé au jury, mais celui en- tourant l’ensemble du procès : «    nous ne devons pas dissocier l’exposé du juge au jury du contexte plus général du procès » (jacquard, par. 33; voir également araya, par 52). [201] le défaut de l’avocat de s’opposer doit donc être évalué à la lumière de l’exposé au jury et du pro- cès dans leur ensemble, au même titre que d’autres facteurs, comme le fait de savoir si les parties et le juge du procès étaient conscients de l’enjeu tout au long du procès — et, le cas échéant, la mesure dans laquelle ils l’étaient —, ainsi que l’importance de l’enjeu pour la défense de l’accusé. le contexte du procès en cause montre que l’avocat de la défense était constamment préoccupé par la question du pré- judice fondé sur la propension qui est associé à la preuve contestée de comportement après le fait et que le juge du procès avait l’intention de tenir compte de ce préjudice dans son exposé au jury. le cas qui nous intéresse diffère de celui dans l’arrêt jacquard, où « l’[accusé] n’a[vait] pas soulevé expressément la question de la “préméditation et [du] propos délibéré” comme une question en litige au procès » : par 33. de même, la présente affaire peut être distinguée de celle dans thériault, puisque contrairement à cet arrêt, le 392 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. nature of the evidence throughout the trial, as well as the importance of the issue of propensity to mr. calnen’s defence. [202] ultimately, “the jury charge is the respon- sibility of the trial judge and not defence counsel”: jacquard, at para.  37; see also jaw, at para.  44; khela, at para 49. thus, even where both parties agree on the adequacy of the charge, it falls to the trial judge, as the judge of the law and the guaran- tor of trial fairness, to decide on its content. in r. v. pickton, 2010 scc 32, [2010] 2 scr 198, at para. 27, charron j. stated this principle as follows: discussions between counsel and the trial judge about the content of the charge can provide invaluable assistance in crafting correct jury instructions and, as such, should be encouraged. however, it is the trial judge’s role to instruct the jury on all relevant questions of law that arise on the evidence. in some cases, these instructions will not accord with the position advanced by counsel for the crown or the defence. défaut du juge du procès de donner des directives en l’espèce portait sur de la preuve qui constituait le fondement des questions centrales du lien de causa- lité et de l’intention : voir p 342-344. en l’espèce, le défaut de s’opposer de l’avocat est supplanté par le fait pour lui d’avoir mentionné de façon expresse et répétée la nature incendiaire de la preuve tout au long du procès, ainsi que par l’importance de la question de la propension pour la défense de m calnen. [202] ultimement, « l’exposé au jury est la res- ponsabilité du juge du procès et non de l’avocat de la défense » : jacquard, par. 37; voir également jaw, par. 44; khela, par 49. ainsi, même lorsque les deux parties sont d’accord pour dire que l’exposé au jury était suffisant, il appartient au juge du procès, en tant que juge du droit et garant de l’équité du procès, de décider de sa teneur. dans l’arrêt r c. pickton, 2010 csc 32, [2010] 2 rcs 198, par. 27, la juge charron a énoncé comme suit ce principe : les discussions entre les avocats et le juge du procès au sujet de la teneur de l’exposé au jury peuvent s’avérer extrêmement utiles pour rédiger des directives au jury approprié et elles devraient, pour cette raison, être en- couragées. il n’en demeure pas moins que c’est au juge du procès qu’il incombe d’instruire le jury sur toutes les questions de droit pertinentes que soulève la preuve. dans certains cas, ces directives ne s’accordent ni avec la thèse défendue par le procureur du ministère public ni avec celle de l’avocat de la défense. (see also b (ff), at pp. 735-36; r v. macleod, 2014 nsca 63, 346 nsr (2d) 222, at para 95) (voir également b (ff), p. 735-736; r c. macleod, 2014 nsca 63, 346 nsr (2d) 222, par 95) [203] while the obligation to assist in the charge rests on all counsel (daley, at para. 58), it was ul- timately the trial judge’s role to instruct the jury on relevant questions of law so that the jury could return a lawful verdict, control the prejudice asso- ciated with propensity reasoning, and ensure that mr.  calnen received a fair trial given that the defence consistently raised the prejudice associated with mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct, and the trial judge recognized the need to address prejudice in the charge, ultimately it was the trial judge’s responsi- bility to inquire further into the issue of propensity reasoning when it came time to draft the charge. in [203] bien que l’obligation d’assister le juge relati- vement à l’exposé au jury incombe à tous les avocats concernés (daley, par. 58), il appartenait ultimement au juge du procès de donner au jury des directives sur les questions de droit pertinentes pour que le jury puisse rendre un verdict légitime, de contrôler tout préjudice associé au raisonnement fondé sur la propension et de veiller à ce que m. calnen jouisse d’un procès équitable. puisque la défense a constam- ment évoqué le risque de préjudice associé au com- portement après le fait de m. calnen et que le juge du procès a reconnu la nécessité de tenir compte du préjudice dans son exposé aux jurés, il revenait donc [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 393 such circumstances, defence counsel’s failure to object is of a more limited import: “   it is the duty of the trial judge to consider the admissibility of all evidence and to charge the jury properly: absence of comment or objection by counsel for the accused does not vitiate this duty” (b (ff), at pp 735-36). [204] nor can a failure to raise an issue bar a court from ordering a new trial where the trial judge’s error may contribute to a miscarriage of justice: chambers, at pp 1319-20. au juge du procès de faire un examen plus poussé de la question du raisonnement fondé sur la propension au moment de formuler son exposé. dans ces condi- tions, le défaut de l’avocat de la défense de s’opposer revêt une importance limitée : «    c’est au juge du procès qu’il incombe d’examiner l’admissibilité de tous les éléments de preuve et de donner au jury des directives appropriées : l’absence d’observation ou d’objection de la part de l’avocat de l’accusé n’a pas pour effet de supprimer cette obligation » (b (ff), p 735-736). [204] en outre, le fait de ne pas soulever une ques- tion ne saurait empêcher un tribunal d’ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès dès lors que l’erreur com- mise par le juge du procès est susceptible de causer une erreur judiciaire : chambers, p 1319-1320. (2) there is no basis to say that defence coun- sel made a tactical decision (2) rien ne permet d’affirmer que l’avocat de la défense a pris une décision stratégique [205] the majority, at para. 18, also states that “in all likelihood defence counsel made a deliberate and conscious tactical decision to marshal the discredit- able conduct evidence in an attempt to bolster the truthfulness of mr. calnen’s out-of- court statement and re- enactment, upon which his defence rested”, and further, at para. 68, that “[g]iven the strategy adopted by the defence, a limiting instruction against general propensity reasoning would have risked highlighting the negative impact of mr. calnen’s discreditable conduct on his credibility and thereby unravelling his defence — a risk which the defence chose not to take.” i do not share this view for three reasons. [206] first, great caution needs to be used when speculat- ing about why counsel acted in a particular manner at trial. courts will not ordinarily have full informa- tion about what is going on behind the scenes and concluding that something is a conscious, deliberate, and tactical decision often has profound legal conse- quences for the accused. [205] les juges majoritaires, au par. 18, affirment également que « selon toute vraisemblance, c’est parce que l’avocat de la défense a consciemment et délibérément décidé, pour des raisons d’ordre straté- gique, d’organiser les éléments de preuve de conduite déshonorante dans le but de renforcer la véracité de la déclaration extrajudiciaire et de la reconstitution des faits produites par m. calnen et sur lesquelles sa défense reposait » et, au par. 68, que « [c]ompte tenu de la stratégie adoptée par la défense, une directive restrictive interdisant le recours à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale aurait risqué de mettre en évidence les conséquences négatives de la conduite déshonorante de m. calnen sur la crédibilité de ce dernier, faisant ainsi voler en éclats sa défense, un risque que la défense a préféré ne pas courir. » [206] je ne partage pas cette opinion, et ce, pour trois raisons. premièrement, il convient de faire preuve de beaucoup de prudence lorsqu’on spécule au sujet des raisons pour lesquelles un avocat a agi d’une façon par- ticulière au procès. d’ordinaire, les tribunaux ne dis- posent pas de tous les renseignements leur permettant de savoir ce qui se passe dans les coulisses, et le fait de conclure qu’il s’agissait d’une décision consciente et délibérée d’ordre stratégique a souvent des consé- quences juridiques importantes pour l’accusé. 394 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. [207] this is not a case in which bad character evidence was primarily led by the defence to suit its own tactical purposes; nor is it a case in which defence counsel expressly waived the accused’s right to seek a propensity limiting instruction: r. v. rth, 2007 nsca 18, 251 nsr (2d) 236, at para. 98; r v. smith, 2007 abca 237, 77 alta. lr. (4th) 327, at paras 26-27. remember that the key issue in this trial was the admissibility and use of the after- the-fact conduct evidence in relation to intent. considering the thrust and parry of a criminal trial, when the contest is occurring primarily on one issue or in one arena, it is not uncommon for alternative ar- guments, even good ones, to slip through the cracks. sometimes different ways of seeing what should have been done only come later. [208] what we do know is that defence coun- sel did not ask for a propensity limitation. nor did the crown, who is a quasi- judicial officer with a recognized responsibility to contribute to a proper charge. the trial judge recognized prejudice as a future issue to address in the jury charge but did not raise it again at the pre- charge conference. if the trial judge had specifically inquired about inserting a limiting instruction at the pre- charge conference as a way to control the prejudice of the after- the-fact conduct, and defence counsel had rejected it, then there would be some basis in fact to suggest that defence counsel made a deliberate decision driven by tactical motivations. however, without any further information, the failure of the defence, crown and trial judge to direct their minds to the prejudice of the after- the-fact conduct may be equally consistent with forgetfulness, fatigue, or by having placed the focus elsewhere. il ne s’agit pas d’un cas où la preuve de [207] mauvaise moralité a été surtout présentée par la dé- fense pour des raisons d’ordre stratégique qui lui sont propres; il ne s’agit pas non plus d’une affaire dans laquelle l’avocat de la défense a expressément renoncé aux droits de l’accusé de réclamer une direc- tive restrictive sur la propension : r c. rth, 2007 nsca 18, 251 nsr (2d) 236, par. 98; r c. smith, 2007 abca 237, 77 alta. lr (4th) 327, par. 26- 27. il ne faut pas oublier que la principale question au procès était l’admissibilité et l’utilisation de la preuve relative au comportement après le fait par rap- port à l’intention. dans le feu de l’action lors de pro- cès en matière criminelle, quand l’affrontement porte principalement sur une question ou un domaine, il n’est pas rare que des arguments subsidiaires, aussi bons soient- ils, échappent à la vigilance du tribunal. il arrive parfois qu’on ne se rende compte que plus tard que d’autres façons de faire existent. [208] ce que nous savons, c’est que l’avocat de la défense n’a pas demandé de directive restrictive por- tant sur le raisonnement fondé sur la propension. la couronne, qui exerce une fonction quasi judiciaire et à qui incombe l’obligation reconnue de contribuer à la formulation d’un exposé au jury approprié, n’en a pas non plus demandé. le juge du procès a reconnu que le préjudice était une question à aborder ulté- rieurement dans l’exposé au jury, mais il ne l’a pas soulevée de nouveau lors de la conférence préalable à l’exposé. si le juge du procès avait expressément envisagé la possibilité d’ajouter une directive res- trictive lors de la conférence préalable à l’exposé comme moyen d’éviter le préjudice engendré par le comportement après le fait, et que l’avocat de la défense avait écarté cette possibilité, il existerait alors des raisons factuelles de croire que l’avocat de la défense avait pris une décision délibérée moti- vée par des raisons stratégiques. toutefois, à défaut d’autres renseignements, le fait pour la défense, la couronne et le juge du procès de ne pas avoir envi- sagé le préjudice associé au comportement après le fait pourrait tout aussi bien s’expliquer par l’oubli, la fatigue ou le fait qu’ils ont accordé de l’importance à d’autres facteurs. [209] second, if a strategy is to be imputed to coun- sel, it should be clear not only that it was a strategy, [209] deuxièmement, si l’on doit imputer une stratégie à un avocat, il doit être évident qu’il s’agit [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 395 but that it was a coherent and sound one as well. the strategy put forward by the majority is problematic, not only because it involves a complex chain of rea- soning, but because the strength of each link is weak- ened by other considerations. as the majority rightly points out (at para. 64), “[i]t is a matter of common sense that evidence of bad character may reflect badly on the accused’s credibility, and that the jury can use it as a factor in determining if the accused is likely to be telling the truth”: r v. g (sg), [1997] 2 scr 716, at para. 70; see also white (1998), at para 26. accordingly, it was always open to the trial judge to tell the jury that mr. calnen’s after- the-fact conduct could be used to assess his credibility: jaw, at para 39. it was also always open to the crown to request this instruction. the crown would not have needed to wait for a defence request for a limiting instruction on propensity to make its own request for an instruction on credibility in respect of any of the discreditable conduct evidence. it therefore cannot be the case that the crown would “unquestionably have insisted on such an instruction” as the majority states, because the crown already had the chance to do so and did not: para 65. it is not logical to theorize that the defence was avoiding a limiting instruction on propensity to avoid an instruction on credibility when that credibility instruction did not hinge on a propensity limiting instruction and, in fact, could have been requested at any time. d’une stratégie, mais aussi que cette stratégie est co- hérente et solide. la stratégie qu’exposent les juges majoritaires est problématique, non seulement du fait qu’elle comporte un raisonnement complexe, mais également parce que chaque étape de ce rai- sonnement est affaiblie par d’autres facteurs. comme les juges majoritaires le soulignent avec raison (au par. 64) : « [c]ela va de soi que la preuve de mauvaise moralité peut nuire à la crédibilité de l’accusé et que le jury peut l’utiliser comme facteur pour déterminer si l’accusé est susceptible de dire la vérité » (r c. g (sg), [1997] 2 rcs 716, par. 70; voir égale- ment white (1998), par 26). par conséquent, il était toujours loisible au juge du procès d’expliquer aux jurés qu’ils pouvaient utiliser le comportement après le fait de m. calnen pour évaluer sa crédibilité : jaw, par 39. il était également loisible à la couronne de demander une telle directive à tout moment; elle n’avait pas à attendre que la défense demande au juge de donner une directive restrictive sur la pro- pension pour demander elle- même une directive sur la crédibilité concernant l’un ou l’autre des éléments de preuve relatifs à la conduite déshonorante. on ne peut donc pas affirmer que la couronne « aurait sans aucun doute insisté pour qu’une directive de la sorte soit donnée », comme l’affirment les juges majoritaires, parce que la couronne avait déjà eu la possibilité de le faire et s’en était abstenue : par 65. l’idée suivant laquelle la défense n’a pas demandé de directive restrictive sur la propension pour éviter une directive sur la crédibilité alors que cette dernière était indépendante de toute directive restrictive sur la propension n’est pas logique. en fait, une telle directive aurait pu être demandée en tout temps. [210] furthermore, even if the crown had insisted on an additional credibility instruction, the majoirty overstates the damage that such an instruction would have caused to mr. calnen’s defence. the truthful- ness of mr. calnen’s june 18 statement was already in issue in this trial. even if mr. calnen’s defence relied on much of the discreditable conduct evi- dence as support for his exculpatory statement, the truthfulness of that statement was already called into question based on other evidence, namely: the inconsistency between mr. calnen’s statements to the police on april 5 and june 18, and the evidence, introduced by wade weeks, krista andrews, donna [210] de plus, même si la couronne avait insisté pour qu’une directive additionnelle soit donnée sur la question de crédibilité, les juges majoritaires sures- timent le tort qu’une telle directive aurait causé à la défense de m calnen. la véracité de la déclaration du 18 juin de m. calnen était déjà en cause au procès. même si la défense de m. calnen reposait sur une grande partie des éléments de preuve de sa conduite déshonorante présentée à l’appui de sa déclaration disculpatoire, la véracité de cette déclaration était déjà mise en doute par d’autres éléments de preuve, à savoir la contradiction entre les déclarations faites à la police par m. calnen le 5 avril et le 18 juin, et 396 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. jordan, and mr. calnen himself, that mr. calnen repeatedly lied to the police and to ms. jordan’s family and friends with respect to ms.  jordan’s whereabouts and his involvement in her death. in the closing address, crown counsel thoroughly attacked mr. calnen’s credibility. given that mr. calnen’s credibility was already at the forefront, he would have had more to gain, and little to lose, by having the trial judge instruct on propensity, even if that meant including another instruction on credibility. [211] there is therefore no inherent link or trade- off between requesting a limiting instruction on propensity and having a trial judge instruct on credi- bility. and even if there was, mr. calnen’s credibility was already so central an issue that it is not logical to imagine that counsel would have resisted requesting a propensity instruction in order to avoid a discussion of mr. calnen’s credibility. the tactic imputed to defence counsel is, in my view, based on an either-or formulation of the use of mr. calnen’s statement when the reality is that he could have asked the jury to use it to corroborate his story and also asked for a limiting instruction to prevent the jury from en- gaging in propensity reasoning. there is no reason to believe that the theory of the defence in this case and a limiting instruction on propensity would have been at cross purposes. on the contrary. it was in mr. calnen’s interest to guard against a possible wrongful conviction borne of forbidden propensity reasoning. limiting instructions on propensity would have helped achieved this. [212] third, in any event, whether the defence counsel’s decisions were tactical or not, “a lawyer’s position on the appropriate parameters of a jury charge, driven by tactical considerations, cannot change the law”: macleod, at para 94. a jury that engages in propensity reasoning is a jury that is not acting judicially. les témoignages de wade weeks, de krista andrews, de donna jordan et de m. calnen lui- même sui- vant lesquels ce dernier avait menti à plusieurs re- prises à la police ainsi qu’à la famille et aux amis de mme jordan au sujet de la disparition de mme jordan et de son implication dans le décès de cette dernière. dans son exposé final, le procureur de la couronne a attaqué à fond la crédibilité de m calnen. comme la crédibilité de m. calnen était déjà l’avant- plan, ce dernier aurait eu plus à gagner et peu à perdre à obtenir du juge du procès qu’il donne une directive sur la propension, même si cela signifiait qu’il donne également une autre directive sur la crédibilité. [211] il n’y a donc aucun lien ou compromis inhé- rents entre le fait de demander une directive restrictive sur la propension et le fait que le juge du procès donne des directives sur la crédibilité. par ailleurs, même si c’était le cas, la crédibilité de m. calnen était déjà une question tellement centrale qu’il est illogique de penser que son avocat se serait abstenu de demander une directive sur la propension dans le but d’éviter une discussion sur la crédibilité de m calnen. la stratégie que l’on impute à l’avocat de la défense repose à mon avis sur une conception dichotomique de l’utilisation de la déclaration de m. calnen alors qu’en réalité, l’avocat de la défense aurait pu à la fois demander au jury d’utiliser cette déclaration pour corroborer sa version des faits et réclamer une directive restrictive pour empêcher le jury de se livrer à un raisonnement fondé sur la propension. il n’y a aucune raison de croire que la thèse de la défense en l’espèce et la formulation d’une directive restric- tive sur la propension auraient été incompatibles. au contraire, il était dans l’intérêt de m. calnen de se prémunir contre une éventuelle condamnation injus- tifiée fondée sur un raisonnement interdit fondé sur la propension. la formulation de directives restrictives sur la propension aurait aidé en ce sens. [212] troisièmement, en tout état de cause, peu importe que les décisions de l’avocat de la défense fussent stratégiques ou non, [traduction] « la po- sition de l’avocat sur les paramètres appropriés de l’exposé au jury, motivée par des considérations straté- giques, ne saurait modifier la loi » : macleod, par 94. le jury qui se livre à un raisonnement fondé sur la pro- pension est un jury qui n’agit pas de façon judiciaire. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge martin 397 (3) the principle of finality does not prevail over the right of an accused to a fair trial (3) le principe du caractère définitif des déci- sions n’a pas préséance sur le droit de l’ac- cusé à un procès équitable [213] the majority, at para. 70, states that the jury instructions “adequately guarded against the risk of general propensity reasoning” and that, in such a context, the principle of finality should prevail. [214] respectfully, and as i have discussed above, the jury charge did not adequately guard against the risk of propensity reasoning. there was nothing in the jury charge that would have informed the jury that it could not reason that because mr. calnen en- gaged in discreditable conduct, he was more likely to have killed ms jordan. to the extent that the majority finds that the jury was informed of the spe- cific dangers associated with this forbidden line of reasoning, i respectfully cannot agree. [215] thus the principle of finality does not come into play in the manner in which the majority has framed it. this is not a case in which “the defence made a legitimate tactical decision at trial and lost”: para 70. rather, this is a case in which, regardless of defence counsel’s tactical decisions, the jury was not properly instructed and was therefore unable to reach a reasonable verdict. at stake was nothing less than mr. calnen’s right to a fair trial based on lawful reasoning. [213] les juges majoritaires, au par. 70, affirment que les directives au jury « protég[eaient adéquate- ment les jurés] contre les dangers d’un raisonnement fondé sur la propension générale », de sorte que le principe du caractère définitif des décisions devrait avoir préséance. [214] à mon humble avis, et comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, l’exposé au jury ne protégeait pas adéqua- tement contre les dangers d’un raisonnement fondé sur la propension. on ne trouve rien dans l’exposé qui aurait expliqué aux jurés qu’ils ne pouvaient conclure que, parce qu’il s’était comporté de façon déshonorante, m. calnen était davantage susceptible d’avoir tué mme jordan. dans la mesure où les juges majoritaires estiment que le jury a été mis au courant des risques particuliers que comportait ce type de raisonnement interdit, je ne puis, en toute déférence, souscrire à leur conclusion. [215] le principe du caractère définitif des déci- sions n’entre donc pas en ligne de compte de la ma- nière évoquée par les juges majoritaires. il ne s’agit pas d’une affaire dans laquelle la défense a « pris une décision légitime d’ordre stratégique lors du procès et [  ] a perdu » : par 70. il s’agit plutôt d’une af- faire dans laquelle, indépendamment des décisions que l’avocat de la défense a pu prendre pour des raisons d’ordre stratégique, le jury n’a pas reçu de directives appropriées et n’était donc pas en mesure de rendre un verdict raisonnable. ce qui était en jeu n’était rien de moins que le droit de m. calnen à un procès équitable basé sur un raisonnement légitime. in r v gdb, 2000 scc 22, [2000] [216] 1 scr 520,. major j. tempered his discussion of the importance of finality and order in the context of the due diligence criterion respecting fresh evidence by stating, “[t]hat criterion must yield where its rigid application might lead to a miscarriage of justice”: para 19. thus “despite the importance of these val- ues [of finality and order], this court has also stated that the due diligence criterion should not be applied as strictly in criminal matters as in civil cases”: r. [216] dans l’arrêt r c gdb, 2000 csc 22, [2000] 1 rcs 520, le juge major nuance son ana- lyse de l’importance du caractère définitif et du dé- roulement ordonné des procédures judiciaires dans le contexte du critère de la diligence raisonnable en ce qui a trait aux éléments de preuve nouveaux, en déclarant que « [c]e critère ne doit pas être re- tenu lorsque son application rigide est susceptible d’entraîner une erreur judiciaire » : par 19. ainsi, « malgré l’importance de ces valeurs [le caractère 398 r v calnen martin j. [2019] 1 scr. v. st­ cloud, 2015 scc 27, [2015] 2 scr 328, at para. 131, referencing palmer v. the queen, [1980] 1 scr 759, at p. 775, referencing mcmartin v. the queen, [1964] scr 484, at p 493. [217] indeed, this court has rarely adopted a rigid approach to the principle of finality rather, the criminal justice system is predicated on two equally important principles that must be counter balanced: the principle of finality and the principle of trial fairness: see, eg,. r v. wong, 2018 scc 25, [2018] 1 scr 696, at para 29. where an individual is at risk of wrongful conviction, the principle of trial fairness outweighs that of finality as this court “has consistently affirmed that it is a fundamental princi- ple of justice, protected by the charter, that the in- nocent must not be convicted”: r v. leipert, [1997] 1 scr 281, at para 24. a majority of this court further stated in r v. mills, [1999] 3 scr 668, at para. 89, that “our justice system has always held that the threat of convicting an innocent individual strikes at the heart of the principles of fundamental justice.” [218] the risk of conviction on the basis of propen- sity reasoning is the risk of a wrongful conviction, thereby undermining the presumption of innocence enshrined in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms: handy, at para 139. in the case at bar, the jury was presented with highly prej- udicial conduct evidence and was not adequately in- structed on the prohibited uses of that evidence. the risk that the jury engaged in propensity reasoning is real and directly undermined mr. calnen’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. in such circumstances, the principle of finality cannot, and does not, supersede the accused’s right to a fair trial. définitif et le déroulement ordonné des procédures judiciaires], notre cour a également précisé que le critère de la diligence raisonnable ne devait pas être appliqué de manière aussi stricte dans les af- faires criminelles que dans les affaires civiles » : r c. st­ cloud, 2015 csc 27, [2015] 2 rcs 328, par. 131, mentionnant palmer c. la reine, [1980] 1 rcs 759, p. 775, mentionnant mcmartin c. the queen, [1964] rcs 484, p 493. [217] en réalité, notre cour a rarement appliqué de façon rigide le principe du caractère définitif. le système de justice pénale repose plutôt sur deux principes d’égale importance qui doivent être mis en balance : le principe du caractère définitif et le principe de l’équité du procès : voir, p ex, r c. wong, 2018 csc 25, [2018] 1 rcs 696, par 29. lorsqu’il existe un risque que quelqu’un soit déclaré coupable injustement, le principe de l’équité du pro- cès l’emporte sur le principe du caractère définitif, étant donné que notre cour « a constamment affirmé que la règle selon laquelle l’innocent ne doit pas être déclaré coupable est un principe de justice fonda- mentale garanti par la charte » : r c. leipert, [1997] 1 rcs 281, par 24. une majorité de notre cour a en outre déclaré dans l’arrêt r c mills, [1999] 3 rcs 668, par. 89, que « notre système de justice a toujours considéré que le risque de déclarer cou- pable un innocent est au cœur des principes de justice fondamentale ». [218] le risque d’une condamnation reposant sur un raisonnement fondé sur la propension est le risque que cette condamnation soit injustifiée, ce qui com- promettrait la présomption d’innocence consacrée à l’art. 7 et à l’al. 11d) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés : handy, par 139. en l’espèce, le jury a été saisi d’éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement après le fait qui étaient extrêmement préjudiciables et il n’a pas reçu de directives appro- priées sur les utilisations interdites de ces éléments de preuve. le risque que le jury se soit livré à rai- sonnement fondé sur la propension est bien réel et il a porté directement atteinte au droit de m. calnen d’être présumé innocent jusqu’à preuve du contraire. dans ces conditions, le principe du caractère définitif des décisions ne saurait avoir préséance sur le droit de l’accusé à un procès équitable. [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge karakatsanis 399 e conclusion on unreasonable verdict e conclusion sur le verdict déraisonnable [219] mr.  calnen’s argument that the verdict was unreasonable because the jury could easily be inflamed shows that the jury was not properly in- structed in respect of the prejudice arising from this after- the-fact conduct and its specific risks of forbid- den propensity reasoning. in this way, the jury was not equipped to return a reasonable verdict because there was an error in law in the instructions with which they were provided. in such a case, the pref- erable remedy is not an acquittal, but a new trial. [219] l’argument de m. calnen suivant lequel le verdict était déraisonnable parce que le jury pouvait facilement être révolté montre que le jury n’a pas reçu de directives appropriées en ce qui concerne le préjudice découlant de ce comportement après le fait et les risques particuliers d’un raisonnement interdit fondé sur la propension le jury n’était par conséquent pas outillé pour rendre un verdict raisonnable, car les directives qu’il avait reçues étaient entachées d’une erreur de droit. dans ces conditions, la meilleure solution ne consiste pas à ordonner l’acquittement, mais plutôt la tenue d’un nouveau procès. viii disposition viii dispositif [220] i would therefore allow in part the crown’s appeal i  agree with the court of appeal that mr.  calnen’s second degree murder conviction should be set aside, however, a new trial should be ordered on second degree murder. [220] je suis par conséquent d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi de la couronne en partie. je conviens avec la cour d’appel que la déclaration de culpabilité pour meurtre au deuxième degré prononcée contre m. calnen devrait être annulée. toutefois la tenue d’un nouveau procès devrait être ordonnée relative- ment à l’accusation de meurtre au deuxième degré. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [221] karakatsanis  j (dissenting)  — i  have read the reasons of my colleagues, moldaver and martin jj. i agree with the general principles set out in martin j.’s reasons regarding the admissibility of after- the-fact conduct. however, i reach a different conclusion from both of my colleagues on the ap- plication of those principles to the evidence in this case. in my view, the accused’s destruction of the deceased’s body was inadmissible as evidence of intent for second degree murder. [221] la juge karakatsanis (dissidente) — j’ai pris connaissance des motifs de mes collègues, les juges moldaver et martin je souscris aux prin- cipes généraux énoncés par la juge martin en ce qui concerne l’admissibilité en preuve du comportement après le fait, mais j’arrive à une conclusion différente de celles de mes deux collègues quant à l’application de ces principes aux éléments de preuve présentés en l’espèce. à mon avis, la destruction, par l’accusé, de la dépouille de la victime n’était pas admissible en preuve pour démontrer son intention de commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré. [222] while mr. calnen’s conduct in destroying the body is relevant to the issue of whether he unlaw- fully caused ms. jordan’s death and was admissible for that purpose, it cannot assist in distinguishing between manslaughter and second degree murder. if the jury concluded that the accused had unlawfully caused the death of the deceased, then the accused’s [222] bien que le comportement qu’a adopté m. calnen en détruisant le cadavre soit pertinent pour savoir si ce dernier a illégalement causé la mort de mme jordan, et bien que ce comportement ait été admissible à cette fin, il n’est d’aucune utilité pour distinguer un homicide involontaire coupable d’un meurtre au deuxième degré. dans la mesure où le 400 r v calnen karakatsanis j. [2019] 1 scr. destruction of the body could only be equally con- sistent with both offences. [223] i would add this. i agree with martin j. that the failure to provide instructions warning the jury of the dangers of propensity reasoning requires a new trial. however, given my view that the evidence in this case was not probative of intent for murder and that a directed verdict of acquittal should have been granted, i would uphold the decision of the majority of the court of appeal (2017 nsca 49, 358 ccc (3d) 362), which ordered a new trial on the manslaughter charge only. jury a conclu que l’accusé avait illégalement causé la mort de la victime, la destruction du corps par l’accusé ne pouvait qu’être tout aussi compatible avec ces deux infractions. [223] je tiens à ajouter ce qui suit. je suis d’ac- cord avec la juge martin pour dire que l’absence de directives mettant le jury en garde contre les dangers d’un raisonnement fondé sur la propension commande la tenue d’un nouveau procès. toutefois, puisqu’à mon avis la preuve présentée en l’espèce n’avait pas de valeur probante quant à l’intention requise pour commettre un meurtre et qu’un ver- dict imposé d’acquittement aurait dû être rendu, je confirmerais la décision des juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel (2017 nsca 49, 358 ccc (3d) 362), qui ordonnait la tenue d’un nouveau procès à l’égard de l’accusation d’homicide involontaire coupable seulement. i i [224] my colleague, martin j., sets out the facts of this case in detail. mr. calnen told the police that ms. jordan’s death was an accident: the two had an argument as a result of her decision to leave him and the fact that she was departing with some of his belongings; she became violent and tried to take a swing at him; the momentum of her swing caused her to fall down the stairs. [224] ma collègue la juge martin relate en détail les faits de la présente affaire. monsieur calnen a affirmé à la police que la mort de mme jordan était accidentelle : ils se sont querellés parce qu’elle avait décidé de le quitter et qu’elle partait avec quelques- uns de ses effets personnels; elle est devenue violente et a tenté de le frapper; dans son élan, elle est tombée dans l’escalier. [225] the crown pointed to evidence of a diffi- cult relationship with overtones of domestic vio- lence (“[h]e put his hands on me i don’t think im safe here”); mr. calnen’s threats of suicide should ms. jordan leave him (“i cant leave him hes suicidal because he dosnt want me to go hes a mess”); the plan between ms. jordan and her friend to steal some of mr. calnen’s belongings; the heightened tension on the day of ms. jordan’s death (“shit is hittin the fan 4 me right now”); and mr. calnen’s state of mind on finding ms. jordan with her bags packed along with his laptop and gold ring (he testified: “that kind of got [him] pissed off”). [225] la couronne a relevé certains éléments de preuve tendant à démontrer l’existence d’une relation difficile teintée de violence familiale ([traduction] « [y] m’a pognée pis je pense pas que je suis en sé- curité ici »); les menaces de m. calnen qu’il allait se suicider si mme jordan le quittait (« je peux pas le laisser y veut se tuer y veut pas que je parte y va vraiment mal »); le projet de mme jordan et de son ami de dérober des effets personnels à m. calnen; la tension accrue entre m. calnen et mme jordan le jour du décès de cette dernière (« ok là ça chie solide pour moi »); et l’état d’esprit de m. calnen lorsqu’il s’est aperçu que mme jordan avait fait ses bagages et qu’elle lui avait pris son ordinateur portable et sa bague en or (il a témoigné que « ça [l’avait] comme vraiment frustré »). [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge karakatsanis 401 in the days following ms. jordan’s death, the [226] accused went to great lengths to destroy her body — he made multiple attempts to hide the body before ultimately burning it on two separate occasions and putting the remains in a lake. the crown’s theory was that this after- the-fact conduct was evidence that mr.  calnen had not only unlawfully caused ms. jordan’s death, but was also evidence indicative of an intent to kill. [226] dans les jours qui ont suivi la mort de mme jordan, l’accusé a déployé beaucoup d’efforts pour détruire le corps de la victime : il a tenté à plu- sieurs reprises de cacher son corps avant de finir par le brûler par deux fois et de déposer les restes dans un lac. selon la thèse de la couronne, ce comportement après le fait prouvait non seulement que m. calnen avait illégalement causé la mort de mme jordan, mais aussi qu’il avait l’intention de la tuer. [227] the actions an accused takes after a crime has been committed may be relevant and admissible as evidence of guilt. the relevance of this type of evidence is often highly fact specific. what was the jury entitled to infer from the actions the accused took to destroy the body of the victim in this case? [228] it is undisputed that mr.  calnen’s after- the-fact conduct can support the inference that he was involved in ms. jordan’s unlawful death. the jury was entitled to reject the accused’s description of an accident and instead infer from these actions that the accused committed an unlawful act that re- sulted in death, and wanted to avoid detection for that unlawful act. this evidence is relevant and admissi- ble to show a guilty conscience. [229] but is the evidence that the accused burned the body capable of establishing not only that the deceased was the victim of a crime, but also the degree of culpability of the crime that resulted in her death? was the evidence relevant to proving the specific intent required for second degree murder? that is the specific issue in this case. [227] les mesures prises par un accusé après qu’un crime a été commis peuvent être pertinentes et ad- missibles pour prouver sa culpabilité. souvent, la pertinence de ce type de preuve est largement tribu- taire des faits. quelles inférences le jury avait-il le droit de tirer des mesures prises par l’accusé pour détruire le corps de la victime en l’espèce? [228] nul ne conteste que le comportement après le fait de m. calnen puisse étayer l’inférence selon laquelle il était impliqué dans la mort illégale de mme jordan. le jury avait le droit de rejeter la des- cription de l’accident faite par l’accusé et de plutôt inférer des mesures prises par ce dernier qu’il avait commis un acte illégal ayant entraîné la mort et qu’il voulait éviter de se faire prendre relativement à cet acte illégal. cette preuve est pertinente et admissible pour démontrer une conscience de culpabilité. [229] toutefois, la preuve que l’accusé a brûlé le corps de la victime permet- elle de démontrer non seulement que la personne décédée a été victime d’un crime, mais aussi d’établir le degré de culpabi- lité associé au crime ayant entraîné sa mort? cette preuve était- elle pertinente pour établir l’intention spécifiquement requise pour commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré? voilà la question précise que soulève la présente affaire. ii ii [230] the actus reus for both murder and man- slaughter requires proof of an act of killing. the mens rea for second degree murder requires that the accused intended either to cause death, or to inflict bodily harm knowing that it was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death ensued. unlawful act manslaughter requires fault [230] l’actus reus, tant pour le meurtre que pour l’homicide involontaire coupable, exige la preuve de l’acte d’avoir causé la mort. la mens rea requise pour le meurtre au deuxième degré exige que l’accusé ait eu l’intention soit de causer la mort, soit d’infliger des lésions corporelles dont il savait qu’elles étaient de nature à causer la mort et qu’il lui était indifférent 402 r v calnen karakatsanis j. [2019] 1 scr. short of an intention to kill. more specifically, the mens rea for unlawful act manslaughter is made out if a reasonable person, in all of the circumstances of the accused, would have appreciated that bodily harm was the foreseeable consequence of the dan- gerous act of the accused (r v. creighton, [1993] 3 scr 3, at pp 44-45). in the circumstances of this case, the “dangerous act of the accused” would be an assault- based offence. [231] is the accused’s after- the-fact conduct ca- pable of distinguishing between the mens rea for second degree murder and the mens rea for man- slaughter? que la mort s’ensuive ou non. l’homicide involon- taire coupable résultant d’un acte illégal requiert une faute qui reste en deçà de l’intention de tuer. plus précisément, la mens rea requise en cas d’homicide involontaire coupable résultant d’un acte illégal est établie si toute personne raisonnable se trouvant dans la même situation que l’accusé se serait rendu compte que l’acte dangereux de l’accusé avait pour conséquence prévisible de causer des lésions corpo- relles à autrui (r c. creighton, [1993] 3 rcs 3, p 44-45). eu égard aux circonstances de l’espèce, « l’acte dangereux de l’accusé » serait une infraction fondée sur des voies de fait. [231] le comportement après le fait de l’accusé nous permet-il d’établir une distinction entre la mens rea requise pour le meurtre au deuxième degré et la mens rea exigée en cas d’homicide involontaire coupable? iii iii [232] as noted by this court in r v. white, [1998] 2 scr 72, evidence of after- the-fact conduct is not fundamentally different from other types of circum- stantial evidence and may be used to demonstrate culpability (para 21). in certain circumstances, it may also be used to ground an inference with respect to an accused’s degree of culpability; ie whether the accused had the mens rea required for a given offence. however, its relevance and probative value must be assessed on a case-by- case basis. whether or not after- the-fact conduct is probative with respect to an accused’s intent for a specific offence “depends entirely on the specific nature of the conduct, its relationship to the record as a whole, and the issues raised at trial” (r v. white, 2011 scc 13, [2011] 1 scr 433, at para. 42, per rothstein j). to be relevant, such evidence must have “some tendency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would be in the absence of that evidence” (white (2011), at para. 36, citing d. m. paciocco and l. stuesser, the law of evidence (5th ed. 2008), at p 31). however, if conduct could be “equally explained by” or “equally consistent with” two or more offences, it is not probative with respect to determining guilt as between the offences [232] comme l’a souligné la cour dans l’arrêt r. c. white, [1998] 2 rcs 72, la preuve relative au comportement après le fait ne diffère pas fondamen- talement des autres types de preuve circonstancielle, et elle peut être utilisée pour démontrer la culpabilité (par 21). dans certaines circonstances, elle peut aussi servir pour tirer une inférence au sujet du degré de culpabilité de l’accusé, c’est-à-dire pour décider si l’accusé avait la mens rea requise pour une infraction donnée. toutefois, la pertinence et la valeur probante de cette preuve doivent être appréciées au cas par cas. la valeur probante de la preuve relative au compor- tement après le fait quant à l’intention de l’accusé à l’égard d’une infraction donnée « dépend entière- ment de la nature particulière du comportement, de son rapport avec l’ensemble du dossier et des ques- tions soulevées au procès » (r c. white, 2011 csc 13, [2011] 1 rcs 433, par. 42, le juge rothstein). la preuve satisfait à la norme de la pertinence [tra- duction] « lorsque, selon la logique et l’expérience humaine, elle tend d’une façon quelconque à rendre la thèse qu’elle appuie plus vraisemblable qu’elle ne le paraîtrait sans elle » (white (2011), par. 36, citant d. m. paciocco et l. stuesser, the law of evidence (5e éd. 2008), p 31). cependant, lorsqu’un comportement donné peut « s’expliquer tout autant [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge karakatsanis 403 (white (2011), at para. 37, citing white (1998), at para. 28; r v. arcangioli, [1994] 1 scr 129, at pp. 145 and 147). [233] i agree with the crown that the mere exist- ence of alternative plausible explanations for the accused’s conduct does not mean that those expla- nations are equally consistent. admissibility of ev- idence as to the state of the accused’s mind at the time of the offence turns on whether the after- the-fact conduct is capable of being more consistent with intent for murder than with manslaughter. as my colleague points out, to be inadmissible, “[t]he over- all conduct and context must be such that it is not possible to choose between the available inferences as a matter of common sense, experience and logic” (martin j.’s reasons, at para. 124 (emphasis added)). it falls to the jury to determine whether the conduct was or was not equally consistent with murder and manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt, if they can do so based on common sense, experience and logic, rather than bare speculation. a trial judge does not usurp the jury’s function, however, by determining that the conduct could not assist in differentiating between second degree murder and manslaughter, and is thus inadmissible as evidence of the specific intent required for second degree murder. par » la perpétration de deux infractions ou plus, ou est « tout aussi compatible » avec deux infractions ou plus, la preuve n’a aucune valeur probante lorsqu’il s’agit de décider si l’accusé est coupable de l’une ou de l’autre des infractions (white (2011), par. 37, citant white (1998), par. 28; r c. arcangioli, [1994] 1 rcs 129, p. 145 et 147). [233] je suis d’accord avec la couronne lorsqu’elle affirme que la simple existence d’autres explications plausibles du comportement de l’accusé ne signifie pas que ces explications sont tout aussi compatibles. l’admissibilité des éléments de preuve quant à l’état d’esprit de l’accusé au moment de la perpétration de l’infraction dépend de la question de savoir si son comportement après le fait est susceptible d’être davantage compatible avec l’intention de commettre un meurtre qu’avec celle de commettre un homi- cide involontaire coupable. comme ma collègue le souligne, pour être déclaré non admissible, « [l]e comportement global et le contexte doivent être tels qu’il n’est pas possible de choisir entre les inférences possibles en fonction du bon sens, de l’expérience et de la logique » (motifs de la juge martin, par. 124 (je souligne)). il incombe au jury de décider si le comportement était ou n’était pas tout aussi com- patible avec le meurtre et l’homicide involontaire coupable hors de tout doute raisonnable, dès lors que le jury peut tirer cette conclusion selon la logique, le bon sens et l’expérience humaine, plutôt qu’en se fondant sur de simples hypothèses. cependant, le juge du procès n’usurpe pas le rôle du jury lorsqu’il conclut que ce comportement ne pouvait être utile pour établir une distinction entre le meurtre au deu- xième degré et l’homicide involontaire coupable et que ce comportement n’était donc pas admissible pour démontrer l’intention spécifiquement requise pour le meurtre au deuxième degré. [234] the crown puts the logical inference sought as follows. the deceased’s body would have pro- vided evidence of her injuries, and the degree of force required to inflict them. the more severe the injuries, and the more force required to inflict them, the stronger the inference that there was an inten- tion to kill (r v. rodgerson, 2015 scc 38, [2015] 2 scr 760, at para 20). because the accused went to such extreme lengths to destroy ms. jordan’s body, [234] voici comment la couronne formule l’infé- rence logique recherchée. la dépouille aurait fourni des preuves des blessures subies par la victime, ainsi que du degré de force requis pour les lui infliger. plus les blessures infligées étaient graves et plus grande était la force requise pour les infliger, plus il était possible d’inférer l’intention de tuer (r c. rodgerson, 2015  csc  38, [2015] 2 rcs 760, par 20). comme l’accusé s’est donné tout ce mal 404 r v calnen karakatsanis j. [2019] 1 scr. it was open to the jury — faced with some evidence of motive and animus — to infer that the accused destroyed the body in order to conceal evidence of injuries that would have shown his guilt for murder, rather than manslaughter. [235] this inference rests entirely on the assump- tion that the accused destroyed the body because it could have yielded evidence of injuries more consist- ent with murder than manslaughter. as a matter of logic and experience, i accept that, had the body not been destroyed, it could have revealed such extreme and forceful injuries as to make the intent for murder more likely than manslaughter. similarly, however, the body might also have provided evidence of in- juries more consistent with manslaughter than mur- der. there must be something in the factual context to ground the inference that the accused destroyed the body to hide evidence that he intended to cause ms. jordan’s death; otherwise, that inference rests entirely on speculation. [236] the absence of any evidence whatsoever regarding the nature of the injuries distinguishes the facts here from cases like rodgerson or r v. teske (2005), 32 cr (6th) 103 (ont. ca). in teske, “significant efforts had been made to clean up the home and to obliterate any evidence of bloodstains or splattering” (para 14). the crown expert testified that the blood splatter patterns indicated a number of medium (at least) velocity impacts, as well as other evidence that indicated a prolonged struggle (para.  16) similarly, in rodgerson, the crown’s interpretation of the evidence was that it “revealed a more prolonged and violent physical altercation than the version of events described by mr rodgerson. it was open to the jury to look to the post- offence concealment and clean-up as evidence that tended to confirm this interpretation” (para 21). in those cases, the evidence supported factual findings about pour détruire le corps de mme jordan, il était loisible au jury — en présence de certains éléments de preuve tendant à établir le mobile et l’animosité — d’inférer que l’accusé avait détruit la dépouille dans le but de dissimuler les éléments de preuve des blessures qui auraient démontré sa culpabilité quant à l’infraction de meurtre plutôt qu’à l’égard de celle d’homicide involontaire coupable. [235] cette inférence repose entièrement sur l’hy- pothèse que l’accusé a détruit le cadavre parce que celui-ci aurait pu fournir des preuves de blessures qui étaient davantage compatibles avec un meurtre qu’avec un homicide involontaire coupable. selon la logique et l’expérience humaine, j’accepte que, si le corps n’avait pas été détruit, il aurait pu révéler que la victime avait subi des blessures si extrêmes et vio- lentes que l’intention de commettre un meurtre aurait été plus probable que celle de commettre un homi- cide involontaire coupable. toutefois, le cadavre aurait tout aussi pu fournir des preuves de blessures qui étaient davantage compatibles avec un homi- cide involontaire coupable qu’avec un meurtre. le contexte factuel doit, d’une quelconque façon, per- mettre d’inférer que l’accusé a détruit le corps pour dissimuler des éléments de preuve selon lesquels il avait l’intention de causer la mort de mme jordan; sinon, cette inférence repose entièrement sur des hypothèses. [236] l’absence de la moindre preuve sur la nature des blessures distingue les faits de la présente affaire de celles comme rodgerson ou r c. teske (2005), 32 cr (6th) 103 (ca. ont). dans l’affaire teske, [traduction] « on avait déployé beaucoup d’efforts pour nettoyer le domicile et éliminer toute trace de sang ou d’éclaboussure » (par 14). l’expert de la couronne avait expliqué dans son témoignage que les éclaboussures de sang indiquaient un certain nombre d’impacts à vitesse (au moins) moyenne, ainsi que d’autres éléments de preuve indiquant que la victime s’était longuement débattue (par 16). de même, dans l’affaire rodgerson, l’interprétation que la couronne avait donnée de la preuve était qu’elle « révélait une altercation physique plus prolongée et violente que ce que m. rodgerson avait laissé entendre dans sa version des faits. il était loisible au jury de considé- rer que la dissimulation et le nettoyage postérieurs à [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge karakatsanis 405 the extent of the injuries, and it was those factual findings that allowed the jury to draw the inference linking the after- the-fact conduct to the required mens rea for murder. in contrast, the evidence here did not yield any information about the extent of the injuries: there is no evidence whatsoever of blood splatters, an attempted clean up of the crime scene, or any other evidence of a “prolonged and violent physical altercation”. such evidence could have sug- gested injuries more capable of supporting the intent for murder than for manslaughter. without it, we are being asked to ground an inference regarding mens rea on speculation about what the evidence might have revealed about the injuries. [237] further, i do not accept the crown’s proposi- tion that, as a matter of logic, the accused’s conduct in destroying the body was out of all proportion to manslaughter. the crown submits that the extremity of the efforts to destroy this evidence, sustained over time and entailing significant risks, was out of all proportion to either accident or to a lesser offence like manslaughter and can therefore only speak to second degree murder. l’infraction constituaient des éléments de preuve qui tendaient à confirmer cette interprétation » (par 21). dans ces affaires, la preuve appuyait des conclusions factuelles concernant l’ampleur des blessures, et c’est en raison de ces conclusions factuelles que le jury a pu tirer une inférence établissant un lien entre le comportement après le fait et la mens rea requise dans le cas d’un meurtre. en revanche, la preuve présentée en l’espèce ne fournit aucune information sur l’ampleur des blessures : il n’y a pas la moindre preuve concernant des éclaboussures de sang, une tentative de nettoyage de la scène de crime ou tout autre élément de preuve concernant « une alterca- tion physique plus prolongée et violente ». de tels éléments de preuve auraient pu laisser sous- entendre des blessures permettant davantage de conclure à l’intention de commettre un meurtre qu’à celle de perpétrer un homicide involontaire coupable. à dé- faut de tels éléments de preuve, on nous demande de faire reposer une inférence concernant la mens rea sur des hypothèses quant à ce que la preuve aurait pu révéler au sujet des blessures. [237] par ailleurs, je n’accepte pas l’argument de la couronne selon lequel, en toute logique, le comportement qu’a adopté l’accusé en détruisant le corps de la victime était démesuré, s’agissant d’un homicide involontaire coupable. la couronne affirme que le caractère extrême des efforts déployés par l’accusé pour détruire cette preuve — efforts qui se sont échelonnés sur une certaine période et qui comportaient d’importants risques — était démesuré par rapport à la thèse de l’accident ou de celle d’une infraction moindre comme l’homicide involontaire coupable, et que ces éléments de preuve ne sont donc compatibles qu’avec un meurtre au deuxième degré. [238] the preliminary inquiry judge found that the evidence was capable only of showing that mr. calnen did not want anyone to suspect ms. jordan was dead — it was “pure speculation” to infer that he hid and disposed of her body in order to hide the fact that he killed her by an unlawful act (2014 nspc 17, at paras. 94-95 (canlii)). however, in this court, it was not disputed that the after- the-fact conduct was admissible to infer that an unlawful act had occurred. that the conduct was extreme, extended, and risky [238] la juge qui a présidé l’enquête préliminaire a conclu que la preuve permettait seulement d’infé- rer que m. calnen ne voulait pas qu’on soupçonne que mme jordan était morte, ajoutant qu’affirmer qu’il avait caché la dépouille et s’en était débarrassé pour dissimuler le fait qu’il avait tué mme jordan en commettant un acte illégal [traduction] « relevait de la pure spéculation » (2014 nspc 17, par. 94- 95 (canlii)). toutefois, devant notre cour, nul n’a contesté que le comportement après le fait était 406 r v calnen karakatsanis j. [2019] 1 scr. could logically be seen as out of all proportion to an accident, and is capable of supporting the inference that the accused wanted to destroy any evidence that he was criminally involved in ms. jordan’s death, de- spite the accused’s testimony that it was heavy crack cocaine use influencing his extreme after- the-fact conduct. mr. calnen went to some effort to make it appear that ms. jordan had left him and their home, but was still alive. as a matter of logic and common sense, the jury could infer that an individual may de- cide to destroy evidence of a culpable homicide — a serious crime with heavy penal consequences — and may go to extreme lengths to do so. but given that both manslaughter and second degree murder are serious crimes, it is difficult to understand why, log- ically, the extent of his destruction of the body could assist the jury in differentiating between the mens rea for manslaughter and second degree murder. it flies in the face of logic to suggest that a person would only go to great lengths to cover up an intentional homicide, but not an unintentional one. [239] finally, i do not accept that the evidence regarding the relationship between the deceased and the accused or the circumstances of that day — which the crown says establishes motive and animus — strengthens the significance of the after- the-fact con- duct or makes it relevant to the level of culpability. admissible pour soutenir l’inférence qu’un acte illé- gal est survenu. le fait que le comportement adopté était extrême, qu’il s’est échelonné sur une certaine période et qu’il comportait des risques pouvait logi- quement être considéré comme démesuré par rapport à un accident, et il est susceptible d’étayer l’inférence que l’accusé voulait détruire toute preuve tendant à démontrer qu’il était criminellement impliqué dans la mort de mme jordan, malgré le témoignage de l’accusé portant que sa grande consommation de crack avait influencé son comportement excessif après le fait. monsieur calnen a tenté de faire croire que mme jordan l’avait quitté et avait quitté leur do- micile, mais qu’elle était toujours en vie. suivant la logique et le bon sens, il était possible pour le jury d’inférer qu’une personne pouvait décider de détruire les éléments de preuve d’un homicide coupable — un crime grave assorti de lourdes conséquences pénales — et prendre des mesures extrêmes pour détruire ces éléments de preuve. mais étant donné que l’homicide involontaire coupable et le meurtre au deuxième degré sont tous deux des crimes graves, il est difficile de comprendre comment, logiquement, les mesures que m. calnen a prises pour détruire le cadavre pourraient aider le jury à établir une dis- tinction entre la mens rea requise pour un homicide involontaire coupable et celle exigée dans le cas d’un meurtre au deuxième degré. il est illogique de laisser entendre qu’une personne ne se donnerait autant de mal que pour dissimuler un homicide intentionnel et non un homicide non intentionnel. [239] enfin, je n’accepte pas que les éléments de preuve concernant la nature de la relation entre la victime et l’accusé ou la situation qui existait le jour du crime — qui, selon la couronne, démontrent à la fois le mobile et l’animosité — viennent renfor- cer l’importance du comportement après le fait ou rendent celui-ci pertinent lorsqu’il s’agit d’établir le degré de culpabilité. [240] the crown submits, and martin j. accepts, that the evidence speaking to “the disintegration of [mr. calnen and ms. jordan’s] relationship and the range of emotions mr. calnen cycled through the day of ms. jordan’s death” strengthens the inference that mr. calnen had the requisite intent to commit murder, and therefore permits the inference that the [240] la couronne soutient — et la juge martin accepte — que les éléments de preuve portant sur [traduction] « la détérioration des rapports entre [m.  calnen et mme  jordan] et la gamme d’émo- tions ressenties par m. calnen le jour de la mort de mme jordan » étayent l’inférence que m. calnen avait l’intention requise pour commettre un meurtre, ce [2019] 1 rcs. r c calnen la juge karakatsanis 407 after- the-fact conduct shows an intent to commit murder (af, at para 61). in my view, the evidence relating to motive [241] and animus cannot assist the jury in finding that the after- the-fact conduct makes it more likely the accused had the intent for second degree murder rather than manslaughter, because it is equally sup- portive of both. the evidence is not sufficient to distinguish between an intent to cause harm, reckless of whether death resulted (the mens rea for second degree murder) or an intent to commit assault that a reasonable person could foresee would cause bodily harm (the mens rea for manslaughter). the evidence of domestic violence, of threats of suicide if the de- ceased should leave, and of heightened tensions on the day of ms. jordan’s death would all be equally consistent with the inference that ms. jordan’s death may have arisen as the unintended result of an un- lawful act, such as assault causing bodily harm or aggravated assault. such evidence cannot make the specific intent for second degree murder more likely than the general intent for unlawful act manslaughter. in the absence of any evidence regarding the na- ture of the injuries, it stretches any logic to find that mr. calnen’s actions in destroying the body — even within the evidentiary context of what the crown characterized as motive and animus — were capable of being more consistent with second degree murder than with manslaughter. in the context of this case, this additional inference would be based on pure speculation. qui permet par conséquent d’inférer que son compor- tement après le fait démontre qu’il avait l’intention de commettre un meurtre (ma, par 61). [241] à mon avis, les éléments de preuve concer- nant le mobile et l’animosité ne peuvent aider le jury à conclure qu’il est plus probable, en raison du comportement après le fait, que l’accusé ait eu l’intention de commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré plutôt qu’un homicide involontaire coupable, parce que ces éléments de preuve sont compatibles tout autant avec l’une ou l’autre de ces infractions. la preuve n’est pas suffisante pour tirer la distinction entre l’intention de causer des lésions tout en étant indifférent que la mort s’ensuive (la mens rea requise pour un meurtre au deuxième degré) et l’intention de commettre des voies de fait qui, selon ce qu’une personne raisonnable pouvait prévoir, causeraient des lésions corporelles (la mens rea requise dans le cas d’un homicide involontaire coupable). les éléments de preuve concernant la violence fami- liale, les menaces de suicide en cas de départ de la défunte et les tensions accrues le jour du décès de mme jordan seraient tout aussi compatibles avec l’inférence que le décès de mme jordan pouvait être le résultat involontaire d’un acte illégal, comme des voies de fait causant des lésions corporelles ou des voies de fait graves. de tels éléments de preuve ne peuvent rendre l’intention spécifique du meurtre au deuxième degré plus probable que l’intention générale de l’homicide involontaire coupable résul- tant d’un acte illégal. faute d’éléments de preuve concernant la nature des blessures, c’est de déformer la logique que de conclure que les actes accomplis par m. calnen pour détruire le corps — même dans le contexte de la preuve portant sur ce que la couronne a qualifié de mobile et d’animosité — étaient suscep- tibles d’être davantage compatibles avec un meurtre au deuxième degré qu’avec un homicide involontaire coupable. dans le contexte de la présente affaire, cette inférence supplémentaire ne reposerait que sur de simples hypothèses. [242] the conduct in this case can be “equally ex- plained by” or “equally consistent with” two or more offences (white (2011), at para 37). therefore, the evidence is not probative with respect to determining guilt as between the offences of manslaughter and [242] le comportement de l’accusé en l’espèce peut « s’expliquer tout autant par » la perpétration de deux infractions ou plus ou il est « tout aussi compatible » avec deux infractions ou plus (white (2011), par 37). par conséquent, la preuve n’est pas 408 r v calnen karakatsanis j. [2019] 1 scr. murder. it should not have been admissible for this purpose. because it was admissible to show culpable homicide but not to prove second degree murder, the jury required strong direction as to the limitations of its use. [243] given my conclusion that the after- the-fact conduct was inadmissible on the issue of intent for second degree murder, it follows that there would not have been sufficient evidence to withstand the de- fence’s application for a directed verdict of acquittal on second degree murder. indeed, the crown submit- ted that the strongest inference of mr. calnen’s guilt arose from the after- the-fact conduct evidence (2014 nspc 17, at para 82). in my view, the evidence relating to the relationship between the accused and the deceased and the circumstances on the day of her death did not provide any evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find the accused guilty of second degree murder. i agree with the majority of the court of appeal that the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal should have been granted. [244] for these reasons, i would dismiss the appeal. i agree with the court of appeal that the conviction for second degree murder should be set aside and any new trial be restricted to the charge of manslaughter. suffisamment probante pour permettre d’établir la culpabilité de l’accusé d’une manière qui distingue l’infraction d’homicide involontaire coupable et celle de meurtre. elle n’aurait pas dû être admissible à cette fin. comme la preuve était admissible pour établir l’homicide coupable, mais non pour prouver le meurtre au deuxième degré, il était nécessaire de donner au jury de solides directives au sujet des limites que comportait son utilisation. [243] vu ma conclusion selon laquelle le comporte- ment après le fait n’était pas admissible relativement à l’intention de commettre un meurtre au deuxième degré, il s’ensuit qu’il n’y aurait pas eu suffisam- ment d’éléments de preuve pour que l’on s’oppose au verdict imposé d’acquittement pour meurtre au deuxième degré réclamé par la défense. en effet, la couronne a soutenu que l’inférence la plus solide quant à la culpabilité de m. calnen découlait de la preuve relative à son comportement après le fait (2014 nspc 17, par 82). à mon avis, les éléments de preuve concernant les rapports entre l’accusé et la défunte et la situation qui existait le jour de la mort de cette dernière ne constituaient pas des éléments de preuve qui auraient permis à un jury raisonnable, ayant reçu des directives appropriées, de déclarer l’accusé coupable de meurtre au deuxième degré. je suis d’accord avec les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel pour dire que la requête en verdict imposé d’acquittement aurait dû être accueillie. [244] pour les motifs qui précèdent, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. je suis d’accord avec la cour d’appel pour dire que la déclaration de culpabilité pour meurtre au deuxième degré devrait être annulée et que tout nouveau procès devrait se limiter à l’ac- cusation d’homicide involontaire coupable. appeal allowed, martin j. dissenting in part and pourvoi accueilli, la juge martin est dissidente karakatsanis j. dissenting. en partie et la juge karakatsanis est dissidente. procureur de l’appelante : public prosecution service of nova scotia, halifax. service of nova scotia, halifax. procureurs de l’intimé : planetta hughes, halifax. halifax.
[1] this appeal concerns both a hotel establish- ment’s civil liability for the theft of cars belonging to its guests and the applicability of an exclusion clause in its liability insurance policy in this situation. [1] ce pourvoi concerne, d’une part, la responsa- bilité civile d’un établissement hôtelier pour le vol de voitures appartenant à ses clients et, d’autre part, l’application d’une clause d’exclusion de sa police d’assurance responsabilité civile dans cette situation. [2] éconolodge aéroport (“éconolodge”) is a park and fly hotel located near mont réal–pierre elliott trudeau international airport. its main purpose is to provide travellers with accommodation before they leave for the airport and upon their return from a trip. during the winters of 2005 and 2006, two of éconolodge’s guests had their cars stolen from the hotel’s parking lot while they were abroad. the owners were compensated for their losses by their respective insurers, axa insurance inc. (now intact insurance company) (“axa”) and pro mutuel insur- ance portneuf- champlain (“promutuel”). since each insurer was subrogated to the rights of its insured, it brought an action against éconolodge to recover the amount of compensation paid to its client. promutuel [2] éconolodge aéroport («  éconolodge  ») est un hôtel offrant la formule hébergement, station- nement et envol (« park and fly ») situé à proximité de l’aéroport international pierre- elliott- trudeau de mont réal. sa vocation principale est d’accueillir les voyageurs avant leur départ pour l’aéroport et à leur retour de voyage. au cours des hivers 2005 et 2006, les voitures de deux clients d’éconolodge sont volées dans le stationnement de l’hôtel pen- dant leur séjour à l’étranger. les propriétaires sont indemnisés pour leur perte par leur assureur respec- tif, soit axa assurances inc. (maintenant intact compagnie d’assurance) («  axa  ») et promutuel portneuf- champlain, société mutuelle d’assurance générale (« promutuel »). subrogé dans les droits de [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge gascon 15 also brought a direct action against éconolodge’s insurer, lombard general insurance company of canada (now northbridge general insurance cor- poration) (“lombard”). in the case between écono- lodge and axa, éconolodge itself impleaded its insurer, lombard, in warranty. son assuré, chacun des assureurs intente alors un re- cours contre éconolodge pour recouvrer le montant de l’indemnisation versée à son client. promutuel intente également un recours direct contre l’assu- reur d’éconolodge, la compagnie canadienne d’as- surances générales lombard (maintenant société d’assurance générale northbridge) (« lombard »). dans le dossier qui l’oppose à axa, éconolodge ap- pelle elle- même son assureur lombard en garantie. [3] the actions concerning the two thefts were joined and were heard together in the court of québec. in the case between éconolodge and axa, the trial judge found éconolodge liable for the theft of the car and the court of appeal upheld that find- ing. in the case between éconolodge and promutuel, éconolodge’s liability was accepted, since a default judgment had been rendered in that case against the hotel operator. it should be noted that, at the times the thefts occurred, éconolodge was owned successively by two different entities, 3091- 5177 québec inc. (theft from axa’s insured) and ama. investments inc. (theft from promutuel’s insured). [3] les recours concernant les deux vols sont réu- nis et instruits ensemble devant la cour du québec. la juge de première instance retient la responsabilité d’éconolodge pour le vol de la voiture dans le dos- sier qui l’oppose à axa, et la cour d’appel confirme cette conclusion. la responsabilité d’éconolodge est acquise dans le dossier qui l’oppose à promutuel, puisque jugement y est rendu par défaut à l’encontre de l’hôtelier. il faut retenir que deux entités dis- tinctes, 3091- 5177 québec inc. (pour l’assuré d’axa) et les investissements ama inc. (pour l’assuré de promutuel), sont successivement propriétaires d’éconolodge au moment des vols. [4] the judge also held that the standard care, cus- tody or control exclusion clause in éconolodge’s liability insurance policy did not apply in these cases, with the result that lombard had to compensate its insured in the first case and promutuel in the second. however, the court of appeal found that the judge had made a palpable and overriding error in this regard; in its view, the clause applied in the circum- stances and the stolen cars were therefore excluded from éconolodge’s insurance coverage. the central point on which the courts below were divided was how the guests’ handover of car keys to the hotel op- erator affected the determination of who had custody of the vehicles. [4] la juge décide par ailleurs que la clause d’ex- clusion standard de « garde, direction ou gestion » incluse dans la police d’assurance responsabilité civile d’éconolodge ne s’applique pas en l’espèce, si bien que lombard doit indemniser son assurée dans le premier dossier et promutuel dans le second. la cour d’appel estime toutefois que la juge a commis une erreur manifeste et déterminante à cet égard; à ses yeux, la clause trouve application dans les cir- constances, ce qui exclut les voitures volées de la couverture d’assurance d’éconolodge. l’élément névralgique qui divise les instances inférieures est l’impact de la remise par les clients des clés de la voiture à l’hôtelier sur la détermination de la garde des véhicules. [5] this court is called upon to decide two issues in this context. first, in the case involving axa only, it must be decided whether éconolodge is liable for the theft of the car because it did not take reasona- ble steps to secure its parking lot. second, in both cases, it must be determined whether the clause in éconolodge’s insurance contract excluding coverage for property damage (loss of use or physical injury) [5] notre cour est appelée à trancher deux ques- tions dans ce contexte. premièrement, dans le dos- sier impliquant axa uniquement, il faut décider si éconolodge est responsable pour le vol de la voi- ture en raison de l’absence de mesures raisonnables pour sécuriser son stationnement. deuxièmement, dans les deux dossiers cette fois, il faut déterminer si la clause du contrat d’assurance d’éconolodge 16 éconolodge aéroport v lombard gascon j. [2018] 3 scr. to personal property in the care, custody or control of the insured applies on the facts. [6] with respect, i am of the view that the court of appeal erred in intervening and that the judg- ment of the court of québec should be restored. i would therefore dismiss the appeal of 3091- 5177 québec inc. against axa in the first file (37421), but i would allow its appeal in the same file against its insurer, lombard, as well as promutuel’s appeal against the same insurer in the second file (37422). prévoyant une exclusion de couverture pour la priva- tion de jouissance, la détérioration ou la destruction des biens meubles dont l’assuré a la garde ou sur lesquels elle a un pouvoir de direction ou gestion s’applique dans les faits. [6] soit dit avec égards, je suis d’avis que la cour d’appel a eu tort d’intervenir et qu’il y a lieu de rétablir le jugement de la cour du québec. je re- jetterais donc l’appel de 3091- 5177 québec inc. à l’égard d’axa dans le premier dossier (37421), mais j’accueillerais son appel dans ce même dossier à l’égard de son assureur lombard, ainsi que l’appel de promutuel contre ce même assureur dans le second dossier (37422). ii factual background ii contexte factuel [7] in the two cases before us, éconolodge was owned successively in 2005 and 2006 by 3091- 5177 québec inc. (theft from axa’s insured) and ama. investments inc. (theft from promutuel’s insured). under both of those companies, éconolodge adopted the same promotional strategy. capitalizing on its convenient location a few minutes from the site of the airport, the hotel invited travellers to sleep in its rooms, leave their car in its parking lot while travel- ling and use its shuttle service to get to the airport. [8] éconolodge’s parking lot was located behind the hotel. it was an open, unfenced and unattended lot that was freely accessible to guests of the hotel, clients of the neighbouring office building and restau- rant and others who were passing by. éconolodge’s guests kept their car keys after parking. however, during the winter, guests who left their car in the hotel’s parking lot while travelling had to hand over their keys at the front desk so that their car could be moved if necessary for snow removal. they filled out a registration form to enable the hotel staff to identify their car. the form did not indicate the date when the vehicle was expected to be picked up. [7] dans les deux dossiers qui nous occupent, 3091- 5177 québec inc (pour l’assuré d’axa) et les investissements ama inc. (pour l’assuré de promutuel) sont successivement propriétaires d’éco- nolodge au cours des années 2005 et 2006. sous les deux administrations, éconolodge adopte la même stratégie promotionnelle. profitant de son empla- cement avantageux à quelques minutes de la zone aéroportuaire, l’hôtel invite les voyageurs à dormir dans ses chambres, à laisser leur voiture dans son sta- tionnement pendant leur déplacement et à se rendre à l’aéroport grâce à son service de navette. [8] le stationnement d’éconolodge se situe der- rière l’hôtel. il est à aire ouverte, non clôturé, non surveillé et librement accessible à la fois aux clients de l’hôtel et des immeubles à bureaux et restaurant voisins, ainsi qu’aux autres passants. après avoir stationné leur véhicule, les clients d’éconolodge conservent les clés de leur voiture. cependant, du- rant la période hivernale, les clients qui laissent leur voiture dans le stationnement de l’hôtel pendant leur voyage doivent remettre leurs clés à la réception afin que leur voiture puisse être déplacée si cela s’avère nécessaire pour assurer le déneigement. les clients remplissent une fiche d’enregistrement pour permettre aux préposés de l’hôtel d’identifier leur voiture. cette fiche n’indique pas la date prévue pour la reprise du véhicule. [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge gascon 17 [9] on returning from a trip in january 2005, a first guest of éconolodge discovered that his car was no longer in the parking lot. he turned to his insur- ance company, axa, which compensated him for his loss. as axa was subrogated to the rights of its in- sured, it sued éconolodge (3091- 5177 québec inc.) to recover the amount of compensation it had paid. éconolodge impleaded its insurer, lombard, in war- ranty. [9] au retour d’un voyage en janvier 2005, un pre- mier client d’éconolodge constate que sa voiture n’est plus dans le stationnement. il se tourne vers sa compagnie d’assurance, axa, qui l’indemnise pour sa perte. subrogée dans les droits de son assuré, axa poursuit éconolodge (3091- 5177 québec inc.) pour recouvrer le montant de l’indemnisation versée. cette dernière appelle son assureur, lombard, en garantie. [10] in march 2006, a second guest of éconolodge made the same discovery. his insurance company, promutuel, also compensated him and became sub- rogated to his rights. it instituted proceedings both against éconolodge (ama. investments inc.) and against lombard directly. [11] both victims of the thefts in question had handed over their keys at the hotel’s front desk be- fore leaving. éconolodge was not aware that their cars had been stolen from its parking lot until they informed it. the keys were, at that point, still in the same place and in the hotel operator’s possession. at the time of the thefts, éconolodge held property and liability insurance policies issued by lombard. two successive policies, which were identical with respect to the issues in these cases, were therefore in effect during the relevant period. both of them con- tained a clause excluding liability insurance coverage for property damage to personal property in the care, custody or control of the insured. [10] en mars 2006, un second client d’éconolodge fait le même constat. sa compagnie d’assurance, promutuel, l’indemnise également et devient subro- gée dans les droits de son assuré. elle intente pour sa part un recours à la fois contre éconolodge (les investissements ama inc.) et contre lombard di- rectement. [11] les deux victimes des vols en question avaient remis leurs clés à la réception de l’hôtel avant leur départ éconolodge ignorait que leurs voitures avaient été volées dans son stationnement avant que ses clients ne l’en informent. les clés étaient alors toujours au même endroit et en possession de l’hôte- lier. au moment des vols, éconolodge était titulaire de polices d’assurance biens et responsabilité civile émises par lombard. deux polices identiques quant aux enjeux en cause se succèdent ainsi au cours de la période pertinente. toutes deux contiennent une clause qui exclut de la couverture d’assurance responsabilité civile la privation de jouissance, la dé- térioration ou la destruction des biens meubles dont l’assuré a la garde ou sur lesquels il a un pouvoir de direction ou de gestion. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire a court of québec (2015 qccq 1539) a cour du québec (2015 qccq 1539) [12] the actions brought by axa and promutuel were joined and were heard together by judge chalifour of the court of québec. in both cases, the quantum of damages was agreed. [12] les recours intentés par axa et promutuel sont réunis et instruits ensemble devant la juge chalifour de la cour du québec. dans les deux dossiers, le montant des dommages subis est admis. [13] in the case between éconolodge and pro- mutuel, éconolodge’s liability for the theft of the car was accepted, since a default judgment had been rendered against ama. investments inc. the judge [13] la responsabilité d’éconolodge pour le vol de la voiture est acquise dans le dossier qui l’op- pose à promutuel puisque jugement est rendu par défaut contre les investissements ama inc. la 18 éconolodge aéroport v lombard gascon j. [2018] 3 scr. found that the hotel operator was also liable for the theft of the car insured by axa. refusing to separate the various services offered through éconolodge’s park and fly system, the judge found the contractual relationship between éconolodge and its guests to be a contract for services that included an obligation to look after the guests’ interests with prudence and diligence. in light of its business model, the hotel operator’s failure to take reasonable steps to secure its parking lot was a fault that engaged its liability. [14] in éconolodge’s action in warranty against its insurer, lombard, and promutuel’s direct action against lombard, the judge found that the thefts of the guests’ cars were covered by éconolodge’s liability insurance policies. in her view, the exclu- sion clause relied on by lombard did not apply in these cases because éconolodge had neither custody nor real control or care of its guests’ cars. the fact that the keys had been left at the front desk so that the parking lot could be cleared of snow did not have the effect of transferring custody of the cars to éconolodge. the judge noted that applying the exclusion clause in such a manner would produce absurd results. juge conclut que l’hôtelier est également responsable pour le vol de la voiture assurée par axa. refusant de scinder les divers services offerts par sa formule de type « park and fly », la juge considère la relation contractuelle entre éconolodge et ses clients comme un contrat de services qui comprend une obligation de veiller avec prudence et diligence aux intérêts des clients. l’absence de mesures raisonnables pour sécuriser son stationnement constitue une faute géné- ratrice de responsabilité pour l’hôtelier compte tenu de sa formule commerciale. [14] sur le recours en garantie d’éconolodge con- tre son assureur lombard et sur le recours direct de promutuel contre celui-ci, la juge conclut que les vols des voitures des clients sont couverts par les polices d’assurance responsabilité d’écono- lodge. selon elle, la clause d’exclusion invoquée par lombard ne s’applique pas aux cas présents, car éconolodge n’a ni la garde ni un réel pouvoir de di- rection ou de gestion sur les voitures de ses clients. le fait que les clés soient laissées à la réception pour permettre le déneigement du stationnement n’entraîne pas de ce fait un transfert de la garde de la voiture à éconolodge. la juge souligne qu’une telle application de la clause d’exclusion mènerait à des résultats absurdes. b quebec court of appeal (2016 qcca 1903) b cour d’appel du québec (2016 qcca 1903) [15] lombard filed an appeal against éconolodge and promutuel on the issue of the applicability of the care, custody or control exclusion clause. écono- lodge appealed the judge’s finding concerning its liability for the theft of the car insured by axa. [15] lombard se pourvoit en appel à l’encontre d’éconolodge et de promutuel sur la question de l’applicabilité de la clause d’exclusion de garde, direction ou gestion. éconolodge fait appel de la conclusion de la juge quant à sa responsabilité pour le vol de la voiture assurée par axa. [16] the court of appeal affirmed the trial judge’s judgment with respect to éconolodge’s liability. how- ever, it came to a different conclusion on the appli- cation of the exclusion clause. in its view, the judge had made a reviewable error by failing to consider the evidence concerning the handover to the hotel operator of the keys to the stolen cars. the court of appeal found that possession of the keys meant that éconolodge had custody of the cars and that the in- surance coverage was therefore inapplicable. it added [16] la cour d’appel confirme le jugement de la juge de première instance sur la responsabilité d’éconolodge la cour parvient toutefois à une conclusion différente sur l’application de la clause d’exclusion. elle estime que la juge a commis une erreur révisable en ne tenant pas en compte la preuve de la remise à l’hôtelier des clés des voitures volées. la cour d’appel conclut que la possession des clés implique qu’éconolodge a la garde des voitures et que la couverture d’assurance ne s’applique donc [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge gascon 19 that the judge had been wrong to [translation] “try to come up with a single solution applicable to every case” (para. 22 (canlii)). the court of appeal stated that it would be incongruous for the hotel operator to have an obligation of prudence and diligence without having custody of its guests’ vehicles. pas. elle ajoute que la juge a eu tort de « chercher à parvenir à une solution unique applicable à tous les cas de figure » (par. 22 (canlii)). la cour d’appel affirme qu’il serait incongru que l’hôtelier ait une obligation de prudence et de diligence sans toutefois avoir la garde des véhicules de ses clients. iv analysis iv analyse a éconolodge’s civil liability for the theft a la responsabilité civile d’éconolodge pour le vol [17] to begin with, i am of the view that the courts below did not err in finding éconolodge liable for the theft of the car insured by axa. i note that écono- lodge’s civil liability is in issue only in the case between it and axa. the hotel operator’s liability for the theft of the car insured by promutuel is not disputed by anyone before this court. [18] as the court of appeal stated, the charac- terization of the contractual relationship between éconolodge and its guests is a question of mixed fact and law (para 17). characterizing a contract in- volves determining the purpose of the contract or the essential prestation that is central to it (d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (2nd ed. 2012), at no 1733). however, the characterization of a contract is not a pure question of law when this de- termination makes it necessary, as it does here, to consider the evidence of the parties’ common inten- tion (uniprix inc v. gestion gosselin et bérubé inc., 2017 scc 43, [2017] 2 scr 59, at para. 42; station mont‑ tremblant v. banville‑ joncas, 2017 qcca 939, at paras. 63-64 (canlii); mont réal, maine & atlantique canada cie (montreal, maine & atlantic canada co.) (mma), re, 2014  qcca  2072, 49 rpr (5th) 210, at para 20). as a mixed question, the trial judge’s characterization of the contract is therefore entitled to deference on appeal (housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at para 32). [17] dans un premier temps, je suis d’avis que les instances inférieures n’ont pas erré en concluant qu’éconolodge est responsable du vol de la voiture assurée par axa. je rappelle que cette question de la responsabilité civile d’éconolodge ne concerne que le dossier qui l’oppose à axa. la responsabi- lité de l’hôtelier pour le vol de la voiture assurée par promutuel n’est pas remise en question par qui- conque devant nous. [18] comme le mentionne la cour d’appel, la quali- fication de la relation contractuelle entre éconolodge et ses clients est une question mixte de fait et de droit (par 17). l’exercice de qualification du contrat consiste à rechercher le but ou la prestation essen- tielle au cœur de celui-ci (d. lluelles et b. moore, droit des obligations (2e éd. 2012), nº 1733). or, la qualification d’un contrat n’est pas une question de droit pure quand une telle détermination nécessite, comme ici, l’examen de la preuve de l’intention com- mune des parties (uniprix inc. c. gestion gosselin et bérubé inc., 2017 csc 43, [2017] 2 rcs 59, par. 42; station mont‑ tremblant c. banville‑ joncas, 2017 qcca 939, par. 63-64 (canlii); mont réal, maine & atlantique canada cie (montreal, maine & atlantic canada co.) (mma), re, 2014 qcca 2072, 49 rpr (5th) 210, par 20). en tant que question mixte, la qualification du contrat par la juge de pre- mière instance commande par conséquent la défé- rence en appel (housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, par 32). [19] in characterizing the contract, the trial judge properly considered the full range of services offered [19] la juge de première instance a considéré avec raison la globalité de l’offre de services 20 éconolodge aéroport v lombard gascon j. [2018] 3 scr. by éconolodge. as a park and fly hotel, éconolodge offered its guests a number of services, including accommodation, parking and a shuttle service. it is not appropriate to separate these services given that a package of services is what was considered by guests and advertised by éconolodge. in fact, éconolodge encouraged its guests — mainly travellers — to leave their vehicle in its parking lot while they were away. in doing so, the guests were reasonably entitled to expect that éconolodge would look after their inter- ests and take such security measures as were neces- sary in the circumstances. d’éconolodge pour procéder à la qualification du contrat. en tant qu’hôtel de type « park and fly », éconolodge offre plusieurs services à ses clients, notamment des services d’hébergement, de station- nement et de navette. il est inapproprié de dissocier ces services alors que c’est l’ensemble de l’offre qui est considérée par les clients et qui est publicisée par éconolodge. de fait, les clients d’éconolodge — essentiellement des voyageurs — sont invités par l’hôtelier à laisser leur véhicule dans son sta- tionnement pendant leur absence. ce faisant, les clients sont raisonnablement en droit de s’attendre à ce qu’éconolodge veille à leurs intérêts et prenne les mesures de sécurité qui s’imposent dans les cir- constances. [20] this holistic approach to the contract between éconolodge and its guests is consistent with the tes- timony given by the owner of the car insured by axa, the prestations provided for in the contract and the case law on park and fly hotels (groupe ledor inc., mutuelle d’assurances v. 7041730 canada inc. (éconolodge aéroport (tm)), 2014 qccq 2920, at paras.  41-43 (canlii); tremblay  v.  4328175 canada inc. (marriott fairfield inn & suites mont‑ réal aéroport), 2017 qccq 13774, at paras. 14-15 (canlii)). [20] cette approche globale du contrat entre éco- no lodge et ses clients est cohérente avec le témoi- gnage du propriétaire de la voiture assurée par axa, les prestations prévues au contrat, ainsi que la ju- risprudence relative aux hôtels de type « park and fly » (groupe ledor inc., mutuelle d’assurances c. 7041730 canada inc. (éconolodge aéroport (tm)), 2014 qccq 2920, par. 41-43 (canlii); tremblay c 4328175 canada inc. (marriott fairfield inn & suites mont réal aéroport), 2017 qccq 13774, par. 14-15 (canlii)). [21] on the basis of this analysis, the trial judge characterized the contract between éconolodge and its guests as a contract for services within the meaning of art. 2098 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”) (cq reasons, at para 24). under art 2100 ccq,. éconolodge therefore had an obligation “to act in the best interests of [its] client[s], with prudence and diligence”. [21] sur la foi de cette analyse, la juge de première instance qualifie le contrat qui lie éconolodge à ses clients de contrat de services au sens de l’art. 2098 du code civil du québec («  ccq ») (motifs de la cq, par 24). aux termes de l’art 2100 ccq. éconolodge a ainsi l’obligation « d’agir au mieux des intérêts de [ses] client[s], avec prudence et di- ligence ». [22] both the court of québec and the court of appeal found that éconolodge had breached its obligation of prudence and diligence by failing to take reasonable steps to secure its parking lot, un- beknownst to its guests (cq reasons, at para. 30; ca reasons, at para 20). the evidence before the trial judge showed that éconolodge was not taking even minimal steps to watch over or monitor the parking lot. the judge was also of the view that the discrepancy between the guests’ reasonable expec- tations and éconolodge’s nonchalant attitude toward [22] tant la cour du québec que la cour d’ap- pel retiennent qu’éconolodge a violé son obligation de prudence et de diligence en ne prenant pas des mesures raisonnables afin de sécuriser son station- nement, et ce, à l’insu de sa clientèle (motifs de la cq, par. 30; motifs de la ca, par 20). la preuve présentée à la juge de première instance révèle en effet qu’éconolodge ne prenait aucune mesure pour garder ou surveiller le stationnement, même de façon minimale. la juge estime d’ailleurs que la dispa- rité entre les attentes raisonnables des clients et la [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge gascon 21 the security of its parking lot was such that the hotel operator could be found to have deceived its guests. nonchalance d’éconolodge quant à la sécurité de son stationnement est telle que l’on peut conclure que l’hôtelier dupe sa clientèle. [23] this determination of fault is a finding of mixed fact and law (st‑ jean v. mercier, 2002 scc 15, [2002] 1 scr 491, at paras. 60 and 104). it is entitled to deference on appeal, since an assess- ment of the facts is necessary to make such a finding (housen, at para 32). in the instant case, there is no error that would justify reversing the trial judge’s finding on this point. [23] cette détermination portant sur la faute est une conclusion mixte de fait et de droit (st‑ jean c. mercier, 2002 csc 15, [2002] 1 rcs 491, par. 60 et 104). elle commande la déférence en appel, car une évaluation des faits est nécessaire pour parvenir à cette conclusion (housen, par 32). en l’espèce, aucune erreur ne justifie de renverser la conclusion de la juge de première instance sur cet aspect. [24] the judge further found that [translation] “the causal connection between this fault and the damage is clear” (para 30). again, the determination of causation is a question of fact that is not open to review by an appellate court unless a palpable and overriding error has been made (mont réal (ville) v. lonardi, 2018 scc 29, [2018] 2 scr 103, at para. 41; benhaim v. st‑ germain, 2016 scc 48, [2016] 2 scr 352, at para. 36; st‑ jean, at pa- ras 104-5). in any event, the parties are not chal- lenging the judge’s finding on this point. [24] la juge a en outre conclu que « le lien cau- sal entre cette faute et le dommage est évident » (par 30). là encore, la détermination du lien de cau- salité est une question de fait qui ne peut être révisée par un tribunal d’appel en l’absence d’erreur mani- feste et déterminante (mont réal (ville) c. lonardi, 2018 csc 29, [2018] 2 rcs 103, par. 41; benhaim c. st‑ germain, 2016 csc 48, [2016] 2 rcs 352, par. 36; st‑ jean, par. 104- 105). du reste, les parties ne contestent pas la conclusion de la juge à cet égard. [25] the court of appeal was therefore right to uphold éconolodge’s liability for the theft of the car insured by axa. there are no grounds for this court’s intervention on this first issue. il s’ensuit que la cour d’appel a eu raison [25] de confirmer qu’éconolodge est responsable du vol de la voiture assurée par axa. il n’y a pas matière à intervention de notre part sur cette première question. b the care, custody or control exclusion clause b la clause d’exclusion dite de « garde, direction ou gestion » [26] on the second issue raised by these cases, this court must decide whether the court of appeal was correct in stating that the trial judge had made a reviewable error by finding that the handover of keys did not trigger the application of the care, custody or control exclusion clause. this issue relates to lombard’s defence both to the direct action brought against it by promutuel and to éconolodge’s action in warranty in the case between it and axa. [26] sur la deuxième question qui se soulève, notre cour doit décider si la cour d’appel a eu raison d’af- firmer que la juge de première instance commet une erreur révisable lorsqu’elle retient que la remise des clés n’entraîne pas l’application de la clause d’ex- clusion de garde, direction ou gestion. cette question touche à la défense qu’invoque lombard tant à l’en- contre du recours direct de promutuel contre elle que du recours en garantie d’éconolodge dans le dossier qui l’oppose à axa. [27] in this regard, lombard argues that it does not have to compensate éconolodge for the theft of its guests’ cars because that property is excluded from its liability insurance coverage. lombard relies on [27] à ce chapitre, lombard soutient qu’elle n’a pas à indemniser éconolodge pour les vols des voi- tures de ses clients puisque ces biens sont exclus de sa couverture d’assurance responsabilité. lombard 22 éconolodge aéroport v lombard gascon j. [2018] 3 scr. the care, custody or control exclusion clause in its insurance policies, which reads as follows: invoque la clause d’exclusion de garde, direction ou gestion des polices d’assurance qui se lit comme suit : [translation] this insurance does not apply to: sont exclus de la présente assurance :   .   . (h) “property damage” to: h) la privation de jouissance, la détérioration ou la des- truction :   .   . (d) personal property in your care, custody or control; d) de biens meubles dont vous avez la garde ou sur lesquels vous avez pouvoir de direction ou gestion; (see ar, vol. ii, at pp. 123-24, and ar, vol. iii, at pp 64-65) (voir da, vol. ii, p. 123- 124, et da, vol. iii, p. 64-65.) [28] it is well established that the party relying on an exclusion clause in an insurance policy has the onus of proving that the clause applies on the facts of the case (ledcor construction ltd. v. northbridge indemnity insurance co., 2016 scc 37, [2016] 2 scr 23, at para. 52; american home assurances inc v. compagnie d’assurances générales lombard, 2006 qcca 112, [2006] rra 35, at para 23). in order to succeed, lombard therefore had to establish that the vehicles in question were in éconolodge’s care, custody or control. in this regard, lombard submits that custody of a vehicle is necessarily trans- ferred by handing over the keys, which are needed to start it. [28] il est acquis que la partie qui invoque une clause d’exclusion d’une police d’assurance a le fardeau de prouver que celle-ci s’applique aux faits concer- nés (ledcor construction ltd. c. société d’assurance d’indemnisation northbridge, 2016 csc 37, [2016] 2 rcs 23, par. 52; american home assurances inc. c. compagnie d’assurances générales lombard, 2006 qcca 112, [2006] rra 35, par 23). pour avoir gain de cause, lombard devait donc établir qu’éco- nolodge avait la garde ou un pouvoir de direction ou de gestion sur les véhicules en question. à ce propos, lombard soutient que la garde d’un véhicule est né- cessairement transférée par la remise de ses clés, les- quelles sont nécessaires pour le mettre en marche. [29] in the instant cases, the applicability of the ex- clusion clause is the point on which the judges below were divided. the court of québec judge found the exclusion inapplicable because éconolodge did not have care, custody or control of its guests’ vehicles (cq reasons, at paras 39-49). the court of appeal was rather of the view that éconolodge had [trans- lation] “a real power of preservation, safekeeping, direction and physical control over its guests’ cars while they were travelling” (para 33). [29] en l’espèce, c’est l’applicabilité de la clause d’exclusion qui divise les juges des instances infé- rieures. la juge de la cour du québec considère que l’exclusion est inapplicable, car éconolodge n’avait ni la garde ni un pouvoir de direction ou de gestion sur les véhicules de ses clients (motifs de la cq, par 39-49). la cour d’appel est plutôt d’avis qu’éconolodge a « un réel pouvoir de préservation, de conservation, de direction et de contrôle physique sur les voitures de ses clients, pendant que ceux-ci sont en voyage » (par 33). [30] as the court of appeal correctly stated, whether éconolodge had custody of the vehicles [30] comme le mentionne avec justesse la cour d’appel, déterminer si éconolodge avait ou non la [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge gascon 23 is, once again, a question of mixed fact and law; the trial judge’s answer to this question is entitled to deference on appeal (para 22). while custody is a legal concept, the determination of custody is a highly factual question that [translation] “de- pends on the specific circumstances of each case” (j-l baudouin,. p. deslauriers and b. moore, la res‑ ponsabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at no 1-958). the applicability of the care, custody or control clause is therefore [translation] “largely a question of fact” (arkwright‑ boston manufacturers insurance co.  v zurich insurance co., [1996] rra 923 (que. ca), at p. 928; guay inc v. ici. canada inc., [1997] rra 717 (que. sup ct), at p 727). [31] i also note that the issue before us involves the application of the clause, not its interpretation. it is true that this court established in ledcor that the interpretation of a standard form contract is a question of law subject to correctness review where the interpretation is of precedential value and is not based on any meaningful factual matrix (para 24). however, this principle does not apply here. there is no ambiguity in the care, custody or control clause that needs to be resolved through the interpretation process. rather, what is in issue is the application of the clause to the facts (see guardian insurance co. of canada v. dale and co., [1972] ca 231 (que.), at p 239). specifically, the issue before us is whether the clause applies in a factual context in which guests handed over the keys to their vehicle at the hotel’s front desk. garde des véhicules est, ici encore, une question mixte de fait et de droit; la réponse donnée par la juge de première instance mérite la déférence en appel (par 22). en effet, bien que la garde soit un concept juridique, la détermination de la garde est une question hautement factuelle qui « reste tribu- taire des circonstances particulières de chaque es- pèce » (j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers et b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8e éd. 2014), nº 1-958). conséquemment, l’application de la clause de garde, direction ou gestion est « largement une question de faits » (arkwright‑ boston manufacturers insurance co c zurich insurance co., [1996] rra  923 (ca. qc), p. 928; guay inc. c. ici. canada inc., [1997] rra 717 (cs. qc), p 727). [31] je précise par ailleurs que la question devant nous en est une d’application de la clause, et non pas d’interprétation de celle-ci. dans l’arrêt ledcor, notre cour a certes établi que l’interprétation d’un contrat type qui a valeur de précédent et ne repose sur aucun fondement factuel significatif est une question de droit sujette à révision selon la norme de la décision correcte (par 24). ce principe n’est cependant pas applicable en l’espèce. la clause de garde, direction ou gestion ne comporte ici aucune ambiguïté qui requiert d’être dissipée par un exercice d’interprétation. c’est plutôt son application aux faits qui est en cause (voir guardian insurance co. of canada c. dale and co., [1972] ca 231 (qc), p 239) plus précisément, la question qui nous oc- cupe est l’application de la clause dans le contexte factuel de la remise des clés des véhicules par les clients à la réception de l’hôtel. [32] this being the case, i am of the view that the trial judge’s finding of mixed fact and law with re- gard to custody of the stolen vehicles was not open to appellate review unless a palpable and overriding error had been made. as a result, in my view, the court of appeal’s intervention was unwarranted, for three reasons. [32] cela étant, je considère que la conclusion mixte de fait et de droit de la juge de première ins- tance sur la garde des véhicules volés ne pouvait être révisée en appel en l’absence d’une erreur manifeste et déterminante. partant, je suis d’avis que l’interven- tion de la cour d’appel était injustifiée, et ce, pour trois raisons. [33] first, it is not accurate to say that the judge did not consider the handover of keys. on the contrary, she did consider it, but she found that, in the cir- cumstances, it was not sufficient in itself to transfer custody of the vehicles to éconolodge. second, the [33] premièrement, il est inexact d’affirmer que la juge n’a pas tenu compte de la remise des clés. elle en a au contraire bel et bien tenu compte, mais elle a considéré que, dans les circonstances, la remise des clés n’était pas en soi suffisante pour transférer la 24 éconolodge aéroport v lombard gascon j. [2018] 3 scr. record did not permit the court of appeal to review the judge’s finding on the reason why the guests handed over their keys to the hotel. third, there is no contradiction or inconsistency in law between the judge’s finding that éconolodge had an obligation of prudence and diligence and her finding that the stolen cars were not in its care, custody or control. garde des véhicules à éconolodge. deuxièmement, le dossier ne permettait pas à la cour d’appel de réviser la conclusion de la juge concernant la rai- son pour laquelle les clients ont remis leurs clés à l’hôtel. troisièmement, il n’y a pas de contradiction ou d’incohérence en droit entre les conclusions de la juge voulant que, d’une part, éconolodge ait une obligation de prudence et de diligence et que, d’autre part, elle n’ait pas la garde des voitures volées ou de pouvoir de direction ou de gestion sur celles-ci. (1) trial judge’s consideration of the handover (1) la considération par la juge de première ins- of keys tance de la remise des clés [34] the court of appeal stated that the judgment of the court of québec [translation] “contains an overriding error in that it fails to take into account the specific circumstances in which the two losses occurred. the judge had to consider the evidence concerning the handover of keys by the guests   ” (para 22). with respect, i believe that this statement does not do justice to the judge’s reasons. she spe- cifically considered the handover of keys at paras. 38 and 39 of her judgment: [34] selon la cour d’appel, le jugement de la cour du québec « comporte une erreur déterminante en ce qu’il ne tient pas compte des circonstances par- ticulières dans lesquelles les deux sinistres se sont produits. la juge devait tenir compte de la preuve de la remise des clés par les clients    » (par 22). avec égards, je considère que cette affirmation ne rend pas justice aux motifs de la juge. cette dernière a expli- citement considéré la remise des clés aux par. 38-39 de son jugement : [translation] counsel for lombard argues that the handover of keys during the winter months is fatal to the insured; the exclusion then becomes applicable. had the theft occurred in the summer, lombard could not have relied on the exclusion. the court cannot accept this ar- gument; it might lead to absurd results, depending on the situation. in the cases at bar, the hotel does not have a “real power of preservation, safekeeping, direction and physical control” over its guests’ cars. the hotel operator’s duties do not change simply because the keys to vehicles are left on site during the winter in case the parking lot needs to be cleared of snow. [emphasis in original.] le procureur de lombard plaide que la remise des clés durant les mois d’hiver est fatale à l’assuré; l’exclusion devient dès lors applicable. si le vol avait eu lieu en été, lombard n’aurait pas pu l’invoquer. cet argument ne peut être retenu par le tribunal; il peut conduire à des solutions insensées selon les situations. en l’espèce, l’hôtel n’a pas un « véritable pouvoir de préservation, de conservation, de direction et de contrôle physique » sur les voitures de ses clients. les devoirs de l’hôtelier ne sont pas modifiés du seul fait que les clés des véhicules sont laissées sur place pendant la période hivernale, au cas où il faudrait déneiger le stationnement. [en italique dans l’original.] [35] based on these paragraphs, it cannot be said that the judge failed to consider the handover of keys by the hotel’s guests. she considered it, but she found that it was insufficient in itself to transfer custody of the car to éconolodge in the circumstances. in my view, the judge did not make a palpable and overrid- ing error on this point, and her finding on the limited effect of the handover of keys was firmly based on [35] à la lecture de ces paragraphes, on ne peut affirmer que la juge n’a pas tenu compte de la re- mise des clés par les clients de l’hôtel. elle l’a prise en considération, mais elle a jugé ce fait insuffisant en soi pour entraîner un transfert de la garde de la voiture à éconolodge dans les circonstances. je suis d’avis que la juge n’a pas commis d’erreur manifeste et déterminante à ce chapitre et que sa conclusion [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge gascon 25 an assessment of all of the evidence. essentially, the court of appeal criticized her for coming to a different conclusion than it did on the transfer of custody of the vehicles because of the limited effect she attributed to the handover of keys. with respect, this did not justify appellate intervention. [36] the clause at issue here excludes liability in- surance coverage for personal property that is in the care, custody or control of the insured. its purpose is to prevent liability coverage from being transformed into property coverage (here, for the property of another). since liability insurance is not intended to cover the risk of loss of the insured’s property, it is equally not intended to cover the risk of loss of property of which the insured assumes custody. an insurer does not want to cover a risk that is unre- lated to the purpose for which coverage is purchased, since it is unable to assess the value of the property entrusted to the insured and to set premiums that re- flect the risk of its loss (united states fire insurance co. v. bouchard et blanchette marine ltée, [1990] rra 667 (que. ca), at pp 671-72). in short, the exclusion attaches to certain property, not to the acts of the insured (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no. 2-533; c. massé, “l’exclusion des biens sous les ‘soin, garde et contrôle’ de l’assuré: où en sommes- nous?”, in barreau du québec, vol. 243, développe‑ ments récents en droit des assurances (2006), 121, at p. 127; bouchard et blanchette marine, at p. 671; guay, at p 727). [37] while the clause in the instant cases is clear and does not need to be interpreted, it is helpful to consider the meaning given by the authorities to the words used in the original french: “garde” (custody), “direction” (direction) and “gestion” (management). it is not a matter of determining the nature of these concepts, which is already well established. rather, this exercise offers guidance in assessing whether the particular facts of these cases show that these con- cepts apply here (see guardian insurance, at p 239). sur la portée limitée de la remise des clés prend so- lidement appui sur l’évaluation de l’ensemble de la preuve administrée. essentiellement, la cour d’appel lui reproche d’être parvenue à une conclusion dif- férente de la sienne sur le transfert de la garde des véhicules en raison de la portée limitée que la juge a accordée à la remise des clés. avec égards, cela ne justifiait pas une intervention en appel. [36] la clause qui nous concerne exclut de la cou- verture d’assurance responsabilité les biens meubles dont l’assuré a la garde ou sur lesquels il exerce un pouvoir de direction ou de gestion. elle vise à em- pêcher de transformer une garantie de responsabilité civile en une garantie d’assurance pour les biens (d’autrui en l’occurrence). une garantie de respon- sabilité civile n’étant pas conçue pour couvrir le risque de perte des biens de l’assuré, elle ne l’est pas davantage pour couvrir le risque de perte des biens dont l’assuré assume la garde. l’assureur ne veut pas couvrir un risque étranger à l’objet de la garantie souscrite puisqu’il n’est pas en mesure d’évaluer la valeur des biens confiés à l’assuré et de refléter sur ses primes le risque de leur perte (united states fire insurance co. c. bouchard et blanchette marine ltée, [1990] rra 667 (ca. qc), p. 671- 672). en somme, l’exclusion s’attache à certains biens, et non aux actes de l’assuré (baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 2-533; c. massé, « l’exclusion des biens sous les “soin, garde et contrôle” de l’assuré : où en sommes- nous? », dans barreau du québec, vol. 243, développements récents en droit des assurances (2006), 121, p. 127, bouchard et blanchette marine, p. 671; guay, p 727). [37] bien que la clause en l’espèce soit claire et ne nécessite pas ici d’interprétation, il est utile de se pencher sur le sens que la doctrine et la jurispru- dence attribuent aux termes « garde », « direction » et « gestion ». il ne s’agit pas de déterminer la nature déjà bien établie de ces notions. cet exercice nous éclaire plutôt pour évaluer si les faits particuliers des présents dossiers démontrent l’application de ces no- tions en l’espèce (voir guardian insurance, p 239). [38] the authorities indicate that “garde” (custody) and “pouvoir de direction ou de gestion” (power [38] la doctrine et la jurisprudence enseignent que les notions de « garde » et de « pouvoir de direction 26 éconolodge aéroport v lombard gascon j. [2018] 3 scr. of direction or management) are related concepts pertaining to control over property. according to professor karim, [translation] “the custodian of a thing is the person that exercises a power of supervi- sion, control or direction” (v. karim, les obligations (4th ed.  2015), vol.  1, at para.  3109). baudouin, deslauriers and moore state that [translation] “custody is assessed directly by reference to the power of control, supervision and direction over the property” and that the “power of direction and man- agement must    enable the insured to prevent the damage that may be caused to the property   ” (at nos. 1-970 and 2-533, respectively). chantale massé notes that the concept of [translation] “power of direction or management” has guided the courts in determining when a person has custody of property (massé, at p 126). in indemnity insurance co. of north america [39] v excel cleaning service, [1954]  scr  169,1 this court interpreted the clause at issue here — the french version of which used the words “soin, garde et contrôle” (care, custody and control) at the time — as requiring that control and responsi- bility for the preservation of the property be trans- ferred sufficiently to change legal custody of the property (pp.  174-75, per rand  j., and 179, per estey j.; see also baudouin, deslauriers and moore, who note at no. 2-533 that while the french word- ing of this standard clause has changed somewhat over the years, its logic has remained the same). in arkwright, the quebec court of appeal determined that this clause [translation] “will apply only if the insured exercises a real power of preservation, safekeeping, direction and physical control over the property” (p 927). this is the same language used by the courts below in the instant cases (cq reasons, at para. 39; ca reasons, at para 33). in guay, the superior court similarly found that [translation] “[c]ustody is    in a broad sense, the relationship between the person responsible and the object, a re- lationship based on a power of supervision, control and direction that enables the former to prevent the damage that may be caused to the latter” (p 726). ou de gestion » sont des notions connexes en ce qui a trait à la maîtrise d’un bien. selon le professeur karim, « le gardien d’une chose est la personne qui exerce un pouvoir de surveillance, de contrôle ou de direction » (v. karim, les obligations (4e éd. 2015), vol. 1, par 3109). baudouin, deslauriers et moore affirment pour leur part que la « garde s’appréci[e] directement par rapport au pouvoir de contrôle, de surveillance et de direction sur le bien » et que le « pouvoir de direction et de gestion doit [  ] per- mettre à l’assuré de prévenir le dommage susceptible d’être causé au bien    » (respectivement nos 1-970 et 2-533). me chantale massé souligne que la notion de « pouvoir de direction ou de gestion » a inspiré les tribunaux pour déterminer quand une personne a la garde d’un bien (massé, p 126). [39] dans l’arrêt indemnity insurance co. of north america c. excel cleaning service, [1954] rcs. 1691, notre cour a interprété la clause qui nous in- téresse — quoique sous son ancien libellé de « soin, garde et contrôle » — comme exigeant un transfert suffisant du contrôle et de la responsabilité pour la préservation du bien pour qu’il y ait un changement de la garde juridique de celui-ci (p. 174- 175, le juge rand, et 179, le juge estey; voir aussi baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 2-533, qui notent que si le libellé de cette clause standard a quelque peu changé au fil des ans, sa logique est demeurée la même). dans l’arrêt arkwright, la cour d’appel du québec a déterminé que cette clause « ne sera applicable que si l’assuré exerce un véritable pouvoir de préservation, de conservation, de direction et de contrôle physique sur le bien » (p 927). cette dernière formulation est d’ailleurs celle utilisée dans les décisions des instances inférieures dans la présente affaire (motifs de la cq, par. 39; motifs de la ca, par 33). dans l’affaire guay, la cour supérieure a conclu de façon similaire que « [l]a garde est [  ], dans un sens large, la relation entre le responsable et l’objet, relation qui est basée sur un pouvoir de surveillance, de contrôle et de direction permettant au premier de prévenir le dommage pouvant être causé au second » (p 726). 1 excel cleaning is a common law case. however, the principles laid down in that case have been reiterated by the quebec courts on many occasions: see, for example, american home, at para. 29; arkwright, at pp. 926-27; guardian insurance, at p 240. 1 l’arrêt excel cleaning est issu de la common law. ses ensei- gnements ont cependant été repris à maintes occasions par les tribunaux québécois : voir, par exemple, american home, par. 29; arkwright, p. 926- 927; guardian insurance, p 240. [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge gascon 27 [40] here, there is no doubt that the handover of keys is a relevant fact in determining custody of the property, since the keys provide access to the vehi- cle (see atlantic consolidated foods ltd v. barnes security ltd., [1981] cs 7 (que.), at pp 10-11). nevertheless, i cannot accept lombard’s argument that custody is transferred automatically when the keys to a vehicle are handed over. such an absolute rule is inconsistent with the highly contextual na- ture of the determination of custody and with the principles developed in the case law. for example, in 9144‑ 6765 québec inc v. plante, 2013 qccs 1279, the superior court held that custody of a boat had not been transferred despite the handover of keys because the delegated power over the boat was too limited in time (para. 55 (canlii)). in société d’assurance des caisses populaires v. hains, [1986] rra 644 (que. ca), and garage gtd inc v. lévesque, [1986] rjq 466 (sup ct), the court of appeal and the superior court both found that custody of immovable property had not been trans- ferred despite the handover of keys because the keys had been handed over solely to provide access and to accommodate the insured. [40] en l’espèce, il ne fait aucun doute que la re- mise des clés est un fait pertinent dans la détermina- tion de la garde du bien puisque celles-ci permettent l’accès au véhicule (voir atlantic consolidated foods ltd. c. barnes security ltd., [1981] cs 7 (qc), p 10-11). je ne peux néanmoins adhérer à l’ar- gument de lombard qui soutient qu’un transfert de garde s’opère automatiquement avec la remise des clés d’un véhicule. un tel absolu est incompatible avec la nature hautement contextuelle de la détermi- nation de la garde et est contraire aux enseignements de la jurisprudence. par exemple, dans l’affaire 9144‑ 6765 québec inc. c. plante, 2013 qccs 1279, la cour supérieure a décidé qu’il n’y a pas eu transfert de la garde d’un bateau malgré la remise des clés étant donné que le pouvoir délégué sur celui-ci était trop limité dans le temps (par. 55 (canlii)). dans les affaires société d’assurance des caisses populaires c. hains, [1986] rra 644 (ca. qc), et garage gtd inc. c. lévesque, [1986] rjq 466 (cs), la cour d’appel et la cour supérieure ont toutes deux conclu qu’il n’y avait pas de transfert de la garde d’un immeuble malgré la remise des clés parce que cette remise n’était qu’une question d’accès et d’ac- commodement. [41] to determine whether there has been a transfer of custody and thus control of property, a court must consider all the circumstances, including the reason for any handover of keys. this is precisely what the trial judge did in the instant cases. this brings me to the second error in the court of appeal’s inter- vention. [41] pour déterminer s’il y a eu transfert de la garde et donc du contrôle d’un bien, il faut tenir compte de l’ensemble des circonstances, incluant, le cas échéant, la raison pour laquelle il y a eu une remise de clés. c’est précisément ce que la juge de première instance a fait ici. ceci m’amène à la deuxième er- reur entachant l’intervention de la cour d’appel. (2) reason for the handover of keys (2) la raison pour laquelle il y a eu remise des clés [42] the court of appeal found that, when guests hand over their car keys at the front desk, éconolodge [translation] “is then responsible for looking after the vehicles, not only when there is a build-up of snow, but also if anything at all occurs that may affect them while they are parked in its lot” (ca reasons, at para. 33; see also para 23). however, in writing this, the court of appeal unjustifiably overturned the trial judge’s finding of fact that the keys were handed over solely for the purpose of snow removal in the parking lot (cq reasons, at paras. 15 and 39). with [42] la cour d’appel conclut que, lorsque les clients remettent les clés de leur voiture à la récep- tion, éconolodge « a alors la responsabilité de voir aux véhicules, non seulement lorsqu’il y a accumu- lation de neige, mais aussi s’il se produit quelque in- cident que ce soit pouvant affecter ceux-ci lorsqu’ils sont stationnés sur son terrain » (motifs de la ca, par. 33; voir aussi par 23). or, en écrivant cela, la cour d’appel se trouve à écarter sans justification la conclusion de fait de la juge de première instance voulant que la remise des clés avait pour seul objectif 28 éconolodge aéroport v lombard gascon j. [2018] 3 scr. all due respect for the appellate judges, i am of the view that this intervention was unwarranted. de permettre le déneigement du stationnement (mo- tifs de la cq, par. 15 et 39). en tout respect pour les juges d’appel, cette intervention est selon moi injustifiée. [43] the reason the guests handed over their keys is important because it distinguishes custody from mere physical holding of the vehicles. of course, both custody and physical holding imply that there is some power to control property. they are none- theless two distinct concepts. a holder of property does not have custody of it where the holder is able to exercise only a limited, and not a general, power over the property (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no 1-962). [43] la raison pour laquelle les clients ont remis leurs clés est importante, car elle marque la distinc- tion entre la garde et la simple détention physique des véhicules. certes, la garde et la détention phy- sique impliquent l’existence d’un certain pouvoir de contrôle sur un bien. il n’en demeure pas moins qu’il s’agit de deux notions distinctes. le détenteur d’un bien n’en a pas la garde lorsqu’il ne peut exer- cer qu’un pouvoir limité, et non général, sur le bien (baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 1-962). [44] where a contractual relationship exists, as in the instant cases, [translation] “reference must be made to the obligational content of the agreement to determine whether custody has been transferred” (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no 1-964). for example, in excel cleaning, estey j. noted that the owner of the property had given the service pro- vider permission to deal with the property only to the extent necessary to perform the service. because of the nature of the service in question, that limited permission was not sufficient to transfer custody of the property. thus, mere permission to handle a rug in order to clean it did not give rise to an obligation to keep it intact and to preserve it generally (p 179). [44] dans le cadre d’une relation contractuelle comme dans les cas présents, « c’est au contenu obli- gationnel de la convention qu’il faut se référer pour déterminer s’il y a transfert de garde » (baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 1-964). par exemple, dans excel cleaning, le juge estey souligne que le pro- priétaire du bien n’avait accordé au prestataire de service qu’une autorisation d’agir sur le bien limitée à ce qui était nécessaire pour accomplir le service. vu la nature du service en question, cette autorisation restreinte n’était pas suffisante pour opérer transfert de la garde du bien. ainsi, la simple autorisation de manipuler un tapis pour le nettoyer n’entraînait pas l’obligation d’assurer son intégrité et sa préservation de manière générale (p 179). [45] here, the trial judge’s finding that the keys were handed over solely for the purpose of snow removal in the parking lot is supported by the evi- dence concerning the parties’ intention, particularly the testimony given by the owner of one of the stolen cars and by the first owner of the hotel. moreover, the fact that éconolodge required keys to be handed over only during the winter by guests who left their car in the hotel parking lot while they were away supports the finding that the handover of keys gave the hotel operator only a limited, clearly circumscribed power. it was therefore open to the judge to conclude from her analysis of the evidence heard that éconolodge had the power to move vehicles only when there was a build-up of snow and that this was not sufficient in itself to transfer custody of the stolen cars. contrary [45] en l’espèce, la conclusion de la juge de pre- mière instance que la remise des clés avait pour seul but de permettre le déneigement du stationnement prend appui sur la preuve de l’intention des parties, plus particulièrement les témoignages du propriétaire d’une des voitures volées et du premier propriétaire de l’hôtel. de plus, le fait qu’éconolodge n’exige la remise des clés qu’aux clients qui laissent leur voi- ture l’hiver dans le stationnement de l’hôtel pendant leur absence confirme la conclusion que la remise des clés n’accordait à l’hôtelier qu’un pouvoir bien circonscrit et limité. la juge pouvait ainsi conclure de son analyse de la preuve entendue que le pouvoir d’éconolodge de déplacer les véhicules était limité aux cas d’accumulation de neige et que cela n’était pas suffisant en soi pour opérer transfert de la garde [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge gascon 29 to what lombard argues, the handover of keys does not automatically transfer custody regardless of the circumstances. [46] with respect, the court of appeal’s statement that the handover of keys could serve other purposes was not based on the facts in evidence, let alone on an improper assessment of that evidence by the trial judge that could be characterized as a palpable and overriding error. des voitures volées. contrairement à ce que soutient lombard, la remise des clés ne constitue pas auto- matiquement un transfert de la garde, peu importe les circonstances. [46] avec égards, l’affirmation de la cour d’ap- pel voulant que la remise des clés puisse servir à d’autres fins ne relève pas des faits mis en preuve, et encore moins d’une appréciation inappropriée de cette preuve par la juge de première instance qui puisse se qualifier d’erreur manifeste et déterminante de sa part. (3) distinction between custody and an obliga- (3) la distinction entre la garde et l’obligation tion of prudence and diligence de prudence et de diligence [47] lastly, i am of the view that the court of appeal erred in suggesting that there was an in- consistency in the findings of the trial judge, who recognized both that éconolodge had an obligation of prudence and diligence and that the cars were not in its care, custody or control (ca reasons, at paras. 3 and 33). in arkwright, the quebec court of appeal [48] specifically rejected the idea of equating a contrac- tor’s obligation of prudence with a power of direction or management under a care, custody and control exclusion clause in a liability insurance policy: [47] finalement, j’estime que la cour d’appel se trompe en suggérant qu’il y aurait une incohérence entre les conclusions de la juge de première instance qui reconnaît d’une part, qu’éconolodge avait une obligation de prudence et de diligence et, d’autre part, qu’elle n’avait pas la garde des voitures ou de pouvoir de direction ou de gestion sur celles-ci (motifs de la ca, par. 3 et 33). [48] dans l’arrêt arkwright, la cour d’appel du québec a explicitement rejeté l’idée d’une adéqua- tion entre l’obligation de prudence d’un entrepreneur et le pouvoir de direction ou de gestion au sens d’une clause d’exclusion de « soin, garde et contrôle » incluse dans une police d’assurance responsabilité : [translation]    i understand that the [care, custody and control] exclusion will apply only where the insured exer- cises a real power of preservation, safekeeping, direction and physical control over the property and does not merely have a duty of prudence or care in carrying out an activity in respect of the property. [emphasis added; p 927]    je comprends que l’exclusion [de soin, garde et con- trôle] ne sera applicable que si l’assuré exerce un véritable pouvoir de préservation, de conservation, de direction et de contrôle physique sur le bien et n’est pas seulement soumis à un simple devoir de prudence ou de soin à l’occasion d’une activité sur ce bien. [je souligne; p 927] [49] the obligations are indeed different in nature. éconolodge’s obligation of prudence and diligence originates in art 2100 ccq, which governs con- tracts for services. it therefore attaches to the perfor- mance of services by the hotel operator. but as i have stated, unlike the obligations in art 2100 ccq, the care, custody or control clause excludes coverage for property over which the insured exercises certain powers; it does not attach to the insured’s acts. the [49] il s’agit en effet d’obligations de nature diffé- rente. l’obligation de prudence et de diligence d’éco- nolodge trouve sa source dans l’art 2100 ccq qui régit le contrat de service. elle s’attache donc à l’exé- cution des services rendus par l’hôtelier. or, comme je le mentionne, contrairement aux obligations de l’art 2100 ccq, la clause de garde, direction ou gestion exclut de la couverture les biens sur lesquels l’assurée exerce certains pouvoirs et ne s’attache 30 éconolodge aéroport v lombard gascon j. [2018] 3 scr. fact that the insured breached its duty of prudence and diligence in performing a service does not mean that it necessarily had legal custody of the property in question; it must still be found that the insured had control over the property and an obligation to preserve it. pas à ses actes. ce n’est pas parce que l’assurée a contrevenu à son devoir de prudence et de diligence dans l’exécution d’un service qu’elle avait nécessai- rement la garde juridique du bien en question; encore faut-il conclure qu’elle avait le contrôle de ce bien et l’obligation de le préserver. in excel cleaning, rand j. emphasized the [50] distinction between an obligation that exists in per- forming a service and the powers granted in relation to property: “clearly custody [of the property] was not transferred; the only care called for was in the execution of the service, not toward the property as such; and no control [over the property in question], in a proprietary sense, was intended” (p 175). more recently, the quebec court of appeal reiterated this admonition against confusing the insured’s obliga- tions relating to the manner of providing a service with the insured’s obligations toward the property (american home, at paras 27-29). in these two de- cisions, the courts were specifically considering the application of the exclusion clause at issue here. [51] in her judgment, the trial judge properly dis- tinguished éconolodge’s obligation of prudence and diligence from custody of the cars. the hotel opera- tor’s obligation to take reasonable steps to secure its parking lot — such as monitoring the lot or putting up fences, cameras or concrete blocks — did not ipso facto lead to a change in custody of the vehicles left in the lot. there was no inconsistency in the judge’s findings in this regard. éconolodge could very well have been merely holding a vehicle phys- ically and been subject to an obligation of prudence and diligence in performing a service. in itself, this obligation does not imply a sufficient transfer of control and of responsibility for the preservation of the vehicle to result in a change in legal custody. i therefore conclude that the trial judge’s judg- [52] ment contained no error warranting appellate inter- vention as regards éconolodge’s liability insurance coverage. my conclusion is also supported by two additional considerations. [50] dans excel cleaning, le juge rand insiste sur la distinction entre l’obligation dans l’exécution d’un service et les pouvoirs conférés à l’égard d’un bien : [traduction] « de toute évidence, la garde [du bien] n’a pas été transférée; la seule obligation de soin requise visait l’exécution du service, et non le bien en tant que tel; et aucun pouvoir de contrôle [sur le bien en question], au sens du droit de pro- priété, n’était envisagé » (p 175). plus récemment, la cour d’appel du québec réitérait cette mise en garde contre la confusion entre les obligations de l’assuré quant à la manière de fournir un service et celles quant au bien (american home, par 27-29). dans ces deux décisions, les tribunaux se penchaient précisément sur l’application de la clause d’exclu- sion qui nous concerne. [51] dans son jugement, la juge de première ins- tance a correctement distingué l’obligation de pru- dence et de diligence d’éconolodge et la garde des voitures. l’obligation de l’hôtelier de prendre des me- sures raisonnables pour sécuriser son stationnement — telles qu’assurer une surveillance ou installer des clôtures, des caméras ou des blocs de béton — n’en- traîne pas ipso facto un changement de garde des véhi- cules laissés dans le stationnement en question. il n’y avait aucune incohérence entre les conclusions de la juge à ce chapitre. éconolodge peut très bien avoir la simple détention physique d’un véhicule ainsi qu’une obligation de prudence et de diligence dans l’exécution d’un service. à elle seule, cette obligation ne suppose pas un transfert suffisant du contrôle et de la responsa- bilité de préservation de ce véhicule pour entraîner un changement de la garde juridique de celui-ci. [52] j’en conclus que le jugement de la juge de première instance n’était entaché d’aucune erreur justifiant une intervention en appel sur la couverture d’assurance responsabilité civile d’éconolodge. je suis en outre conforté dans cette conclusion par deux éléments additionnels. [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge gascon 31 [53] first, the care, custody or control exclusion clause should not be applied in such a way that the coverage offered by the insurer becomes ineffective (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no. 2-533; j-g. bergeron, les contrats d’assurance (terrestre): lignes et entre‑ lignes (1989), t. 1, at p 237). the courts have therefore been reluctant to exclude cov- erage for the main activities engaged in by an insured (excel cleaning, at p. 179, per estey j.; groupe com‑ merce compagnie d’assurances v. service d’entretien ribo inc., [1992] rra 959, at p. 964 (que. ca); 3457265 canada inc v 9124‑ 8948 québec inc., 2016 qccs 2462, at paras. 37-38 (canlii); at lantic con‑ solidated, at p 11). this approach helps to maintain some balance between the coverage taken out by an insured and the exclusions in the policy (3457265 canada inc., at para. 35) and promotes a sensible commercial result in accordance with consolidated‑ bathurst export ltd. v. mutual boiler and machin‑ ery insurance co., [1980] 1 scr 888, at pp. 901-2; see also d. lluelles, droit des assurances terrestres (6th ed. 2017), at nos. 130, 133 and 157. [54] in this regard, i note that one rationale for the care, custody or control exclusion clause is to prevent the insurer from [translation] “tying its obliga- tion to pay compensation to uncertainties resulting from initiatives that may be taken by an insured who agrees to store items that belong to third parties and have nothing to do with the kind of commercial ac- tivities engaged in by the insured and known to the insurer” (bouchard et blanchette, at p 671). in the instant cases, however, parking was a key component of the package of services offered by éconolodge as a park and fly hotel. excluding liability for its guests’ cars from its insurance coverage would have undercut the usefulness of the coverage for one of its main activities. the trial judge found that lombard was well aware of éconolodge’s business model and had chosen to insure it with full knowledge of the situation (cq reasons, at paras 43-48). as the judge put it, [translation] “lombard is not taken by surprise by the claims in issue” (para 48). [53] d’abord, il faut éviter d’appliquer la clause d’exclusion de garde, direction ou gestion d’une façon telle qu’elle rendrait inefficace la garantie offerte par l’assureur (baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 2-533; j-g. bergeron, les contrats d’assurance (terrestre) : lignes et entre‑ lignes (1989), t. 1, p 237). les tribu- naux se sont ainsi montrés réticents à exclure de la couverture les activités principales d’un assuré (excel cleaning, p. 179, le juge estey; groupe commerce compagnie d’assurances c. service d’entretien ribo inc., [1992] rra 959, p. 964 (ca qc); 3457265 canada inc. c 9124‑ 8948 québec inc., 2016 qccs 2462, par. 37-38 (canlii); atlantic consolidated, p 11). cette approche permet de maintenir un cer- tain équilibre entre la couverture souscrite par un as- suré et les exclusions de la police (3457265 canada inc., par. 35) et de favoriser l’atteinte d’un résul- tat commercial raisonnable conformément à l’arrêt exportations consolidated bathurst ltée c. mutual boiler and machinery in surance co., [1980] 1 rcs. 888, p. 901- 902; voir aussi d. lluelles, droit des as‑ surances terrestres (6e éd. 2017), nos 130, 133 et 157. [54] à ce propos, je rappelle qu’une raison qui sous- tend la clause d’exclusion de garde, direction ou gestion est d’éviter à l’assureur de « lier son obli- gation d’indemniser à des aléas résultant des initia- tives que peut entreprendre l’assuré qui accepterait d’entreposer des objets appartenant à des tiers et qui n’auraient rien à voir avec le genre d’activités commerciales auquel il s’adonne et que l’assureur connaît » (bouchard et blanchette, p 671). or ici, le stationnement constitue une composante cruciale de la gamme de services offerts par éconolodge en tant qu’hôtel de type « park and fly ». exclure de la couverture d’assurance sa responsabilité pour les voitures de ses clients minerait l’utilité de la garantie quant à l’une des activités principales de l’assurée. la juge de première instance a conclu que lombard savait fort bien quelle était la formule commerciale d’éconolodge et avait choisi de l’as- surer en toute connaissance de cause (motifs de la cq, par 43-48). pour reprendre les mots de la juge, « lombard n’est pas prise par surprise par les récla- mations en litige » (par 48). [55] second, i agree with the trial judge that lombard’s argument leads to results that are incongruous, if not [55] ensuite, à l’instar de la juge de première ins- tance, je considère que l’argumentaire de lombard 32 éconolodge aéroport v lombard gascon j. [2018] 3 scr. absurd. in the court of québec, lombard’s senior an- alyst conceded that the exclusion clause was inappli- cable in the summer, since éconolodge did not have the keys to parked vehicles in its possession during that time. in short, in the same year of coverage, the applicability of the exclusion clause would depend on the season or even on the amount of precipitation. moreover, if we follow lombard’s line of reasoning, the insurance policy would cover the theft of a car during the winter if its owner remained at the hotel, but not the contemporaneous theft of the car next to it whose owner went abroad and handed over the keys at the front desk in case the parking lot needed to be cleared of snow. the purpose of highlighting the absurdity of this situation is not to [translation] “come up with a single solution applicable to every case”, as the court of appeal suggested (para 22). rather, it is to emphasize the importance of consid- ering all the relevant facts and not presumptively giving decisive weight to a particular fact without factoring in all the relevant circumstances. mène à des résultats qui restent incongrus, voire insensés. devant la cour du québec, l’analyste prin- cipale de lombard a en effet concédé que la clause d’exclusion était inapplicable pendant la période estivale, puisqu’éconolodge n’avait alors pas en sa possession les clés des véhicules stationnés. bref, au cours d’une même année de couverture, la clause d’exclusion serait applicable au gré des saisons, voire des précipitations reçues. en outre, si l’on suit le raisonnement de lombard, la police d’assurance couvrirait le vol d’une voiture intervenu au cours de l’hiver si son propriétaire était resté à l’hôtel, mais non le vol concomitant de la voiture voisine dont le propriétaire est parti à l’étranger en remettant ses clés à la réception au cas où un déneigement du station- nement s’avérait nécessaire. l’intérêt de souligner l’absurde de cette situation n’est pas de « parvenir à une solution unique applicable à tous les cas de figure » comme le suggère la cour d’appel (par 22). il s’agit plutôt de mettre en relief l’importance de prendre en considération tous les faits pertinents et de ne pas accorder de manière présomptive un poids décisif à un fait en particulier sans le situer dans l’ensemble des circonstances pertinentes. v conclusion v conclusion [56] the finding by the courts below that écono- lodge is liable for the theft of the car insured by axa does not warrant any intervention by this court. i would therefore dismiss the appeal of 3091- 5177 québec inc. against axa in file 37421, with costs. [56] la conclusion des instances inférieures qu’éco- no lodge est responsable du vol de la voiture assurée par axa ne justifie aucune intervention de notre part. par conséquent, je rejetterais avec dépens l’appel de 3091- 5177 québec inc. à l’égard d’axa dans le dos- sier 37421. [57] however, the trial judge did not make any palpable and overriding error that is reviewable on appeal in finding that the keys were handed over solely for the purpose of snow removal in the park- ing lot and that this was insufficient to transfer cus- tody and control to éconolodge. since the exclusion clause in éconolodge’s liability insurance policy is therefore inapplicable on the facts, i would allow the appeal of 3091- 5177 québec inc. against lombard in file 37421 as well as promutuel’s appeal against the same insurer in file 37422, with costs through- out. i would thus restore the trial judge’s decision ordering lombard to pay damages, interest and the [57] par contre, la juge de première instance n’a commis aucune erreur manifeste et déterminante pouvant faire l’objet d’une révision en appel en concluant que la remise des clés avait pour seul but de permettre le déneigement du stationnement, ce qui était insuffisant pour en transférer la garde et le contrôle à éconolodge. puisque la clause d’exclu- sion de la police d’assurance responsabilité civile d’éconolodge est en conséquence inapplicable dans les faits, j’accueillerais avec dépens dans toutes les cours l’appel de 3091- 5177 québec inc. à l’égard de lombard dans le dossier 37421, ainsi que l’ap- pel de promutuel contre ce même assureur dans [2018] 3 rcs. éconolodge aéroport c lombard le juge rowe 33 additional indemnity to 3091- 5177 québec inc. and promutuel. [58] i note in closing that the parties have agreed on terms for the payment by lombard of éconolodge’s extrajudicial defence costs for the proceedings in the court of appeal and this court. it is therefore un- necessary for me to deal with this aspect of the case. le dossier 37422. je rétablirais donc le jugement de la juge de première instance en ce qui a trait à la condamnation de lombard au paiement des dommages, des intérêts et de l’indemnité addition- nelle en faveur de 3091- 5177 québec inc et de promutuel. [58] je note en terminant que les parties se sont en- tendues sur les modalités du paiement par lombard des frais extrajudiciaires de défense d’éconolodge pour les procédures devant la cour d’appel et devant notre cour. il n’est donc pas nécessaire que je me prononce sur cet aspect du débat. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [59] rowe j. — i agree with my colleague justice gascon in his analysis and in the result. i would add only the following regarding the jurisprudence relat- ing to contract characterization. my colleague states (at para. 18) that characterization of the contract between éconolodge and its clients is a question of mixed fact and law. as the trial judge found it neces- sary to have regard to extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain the true nature of the contract (2015 qccq 1539, at paras. 17-24 (canlii)), i would agree that, in this case, characterization is a mixed question. by contrast, where having regard to extrinsic evidence is not needed, characterization remains a question of law: uniprix inc. v. gestion gosselin et bérubé inc., 2017 scc 43, [2017] 2 scr 59, at para 42. appeal of 3091‑ 5177 québec inc., cob as éco‑ no lodge aéroport, allowed in part. appeal of pro mu‑ tuel insurance portneuf‑ champlain allowed. [59] le juge rowe — je souscris à l’analyse de mon collègue le juge gascon ainsi qu’au résultat auquel il arrive. j’ajouterais uniquement ce qui suit quant à la jurisprudence portant sur la qualification des contrats. mon collègue affirme (au par. 18) que la qualification du contrat qui lie éconolodge et ses clients est une question mixte de fait et de droit. comme la juge de première instance a estimé né- cessaire de tenir compte d’éléments de preuve ex- trinsèques pour établir la véritable nature du contrat (2015 qccq 1539, par. 17-24 (canlii)), je recon- nais que, dans la présente cause, la qualification était une question mixte. en revanche, lorsqu’il n’est pas nécessaire de recourir à des éléments de preuve extrinsèques, la qualification du contrat reste une question de droit : uniprix inc. c. gestion gosselin et bérubé inc., 2017 csc 43, [2017] 2 rcs 59, par 42. pourvoi de 3091‑ 5177 québec inc., fasrs. éco‑ nolodge aéroport, accueilli en partie. pourvoi de promutuel portneuf‑ champlain, société mutuelle d’assurance générale accueilli. inc., cob as éconolodge aéroport (37421): martel, cantin, mont réal. procureurs de l’appelante 3091‑ 5177 québec inc., fasrs. éconolodge aéroport (37421) : martel, cantin, mont réal. insurance company of canada (now known as northbridge general insurance corporation) procureurs de l’intimée la compagnie cana‑ dienne d’assurances générales lombard (mainte‑ nant connue sous le nom de société d’assurance 34 éconolodge aéroport v lombard [2018] 3 scr. (37421 and 37422): gasco goodhue st‑ germain, mont réal. générale northbridge) (37421 et 37422) : gasco goodhue st‑ germain, mont réal. solicitors for the respondent axa insurance inc (now known as intact insurance company) (37421): romanowski & associés, île‑ des‑sœurs, quebec. procureurs de l’intimée axa assurances inc. (maintenant connue sous le nom d’intact compagnie d’assurance) (37421) : romanowski & associés, île‑ des‑sœurs, québec. solicitors for the intervener (37421) and ap‑ pellant (37422) promutuel insurance portneuf‑ champlain: carter gourdeau, québec. procureurs de l’intervenante (37421) et l’ap‑ pelante (37422) promutuel portneuf‑ champlain, société mutuelle d’assurance générale  :  carter gourdeau, québec.
i. overview [1] since the introduction of the first mediation service for families at the quebec superior court in 1981, quebec law has embraced this private dispute prevention and resolution process, which differs in many respects from civil justice administered by the courts according to the data of the ministère de la justice for 2013-14 — at the time of the dispute between the spouses in this case — about 15,000 couples received free family mediation sessions, and 80 percent of them reached an agreement resolving their various conflicts (committee of accrediting organizations in family mediation (“coamf”), standards of practice in family mediation (2016) (“2016 guide”), at p 3). in quebec, family mediation by certified mediators is made available to married, civil union and de facto spouses with or without children. significantly subsidized, mediation unquestionably has the favour of the government: the law even provides that spouses must attend a family mediation information session before a court may hear their judicial application. [2] although this record is impressive and represents a considerable step forward for access to justice, some debate persists about certain aspects that are rooted in the very nature of this procedure and, as this appeal shows, about the role of confidentiality in family mediation, as opposed to civil or commercial mediation. at a time when the quebec legislature has made private dispute prevention and resolution processes central to its reform of civil justice in the new code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01 (“nccp”), this appeal affords the court an opportunity to clarify the scope of family mediation as a mechanism of what is known as participatory and consensual justice the issue reflects a shift that has taken place in other parts of canada, where it is recognized in a variety of contexts that “alternative models of adjudication are no less legitimate than the conventional trial” for ensuring timely and affordable access to civil justice (hryniak v. mauldin, 2014 scc 7, [2014] 1 scr 87, at para. 27; see also para. 2). [3] after ending their de facto union, isabelle bisaillon and michel bouvier undertook a mediation process to resolve their disputes with respect to custody and support arrangements for their children, their respective rights in the immovable that served as their residence, and the determination of compensation for ms. bisaillon to remedy the impact of childcare responsibilities on her career. once their meetings had ended, the certified mediator recorded his conclusions about what had been agreed upon in mediation in a document called a “summary of mediated agreements”, which is the term used in the standard family mediation contract in quebec. sometime later, ms. bisaillon filed a court action seeking greater financial compensation than was provided for in the summary of mediated agreements, including in relation to the partition of the immovable. in defence, mr. bouvier argued that the parties had entered into a contract during mediation, the terms of which were set out in the summary. ms. bisaillon denied the existence of that contract and objected to the summary being admitted in evidence on the ground that it was protected by the confidentiality of the mediation process. [4] the trial judge dismissed ms. bisaillon’s objection, relying in part on union carbide canada inc. v. bombardier inc., 2014 scc 35, [2014] 1 scr 800, a commercial mediation case, and found that there was a contract between the parties dealing, among other things, with rights in the residence the court of appeal unanimously dismissed ms. bisaillon’s appeal, though the judges did not agree about the application of the principles enunciated in union carbide in the family mediation context. ms. bisaillon decided not to appeal the court of appeal’s decision. [5] the association de médiation familiale du québec obtained leave from this court to be substituted as appellant in order to raise ms. bisaillon’s objection and have the court of appeal’s judgment set aside. the association argues that discussions during family mediation and the summary of mediated agreements prepared by a mediator are protected by a rule of absolute confidentiality that is necessary for such a process to function fairly and effectively without such confidentiality, mediation would entail risks for vulnerable spouses. [6] i disagree with the association on this point it is certainly true that confidentiality is necessary in any mediation to allow for frank discussions between the parties in order to encourage settlements. it is also true that, unlike in the case of civil or commercial mediation, negotiations following the breakdown of a relationship often take place during a period of personal upheaval that may heighten the vulnerability of either spouse however, the protection of vulnerable individuals is assured not by absolute confidentiality, but by a set of special norms — some of which are legislated, while others reflect usages in practice or are found in the standard mediation contract — that provide spouses, parents and children with [translation] “procedural safeguards” while at the same time protecting public order (i take the term “procedural safeguard” from j-f. roberge, la justice participative: fondements et cadre juridique (2017), at p 106). [7] these safeguards are implemented primarily by two actors who are, by comparison, absent from civil and commercial mediation: the government-certified family mediator chosen by the parties under the standard mediation contract, and the judge who is asked to confirm any agreement arising from family mediation. these two actors play a key role in the protection of more vulnerable parties, one that is unique to this form of mediation in that it serves to alleviate the risks associated with the absence of legal advisers during family mediation sessions. [8] given the significance of the procedural safeguards inherent in family mediation, it is, in my respectful view, an error to insist on the absolute nature of confidentiality a rule of absolute confidentiality might not only deflect family mediation from its participatory and consensual foundations, but also undermine the parties’ adherence to this process for resolving their dispute, or even to the settlement itself. to reject the settlement exception recognized by this court in union carbide in favour of absolute confidentiality would interfere with the primary objective of family mediation, which is to reach an agreement resolving an existing or anticipated dispute. moreover, the interpretation of the standard mediation contract widely used in quebec, and of the contract signed by the spouses in this case, supports the conclusion that parties to such a process do not exclude from the outset the settlement exception from union carbide therefore, where spouses enter into a settlement at the end of a mediation process governed by the standard contract, the settlement exception can apply and allow them to file in evidence the communications that are necessary to establish the existence or terms of their agreement. [9] even though the settlement exception applies in family mediation governed by the standard contract scheme, proof that the parties actually entered into an agreement must still be made in accordance with the rules of the law of evidence. it is useful to put an end to a debate that has long troubled family mediation in quebec: the summary of mediated agreements provided to the parties by the mediator at the end of the family mediation process is not a contract that can serve to prove such an agreement, but simply a working tool for the spouses. prepared by the mediator on the basis of the spouses’ discussions during mediation, the summary cannot satisfy the requirement that there be an agreement of wills for the formation of a valid contract, because, at the time it is given to the parties, it does not reflect firm offers to contract or firm acceptances by the spouses. that being said, nothing prevents the parties from entering into a contract whose terms are identical to those recorded by the mediator in the summary of mediated agreements. they can do so by signing the summary or by consenting expressly or tacitly after it has been given to them. because the parties are encouraged to obtain independent legal advice after receiving that document, they may also decide to bind themselves contractually on different terms, or not to bind themselves at all. in any event, the unsigned summary of mediated agreements given to the spouses is not a contract, because it is not a juridical act that results from an agreement of wills between the spouses and that is intended to produce legal effects. in this regard, and subject to the rule of evidence in art. 2859 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”), which limits a court’s power to raise grounds of inadmissibility of its own motion, an unsigned summary is a simple writing and is generally not admissible to prove the existence of an agreement arising from mediation. [10] in this case, the trial judge was correct in finding that the parties, through their communications following the mediation sessions, had expressed their intention to be bound contractually. even without the summary of mediated agreements, their testimony regarding their communications during mediation and the evidence concerning their communications thereafter were admissible and could serve to prove the existence and terms of a settlement, in accordance with the principles set out in union carbide and in the absence of any objection based on the applicable rules of evidence. the parties exchanged consents after being given the summary and entered into a binding agreement, which, in the circumstances of this case, reflected the terms recorded in the summary. i would therefore dismiss the appeal. ii background [11] ms. bisaillon and mr. bouvier were de facto spouses from april 2009 to july 2012. they had two children, born in 2009 and 2011. in 2010, they purchased a residence for the family the notarial deed provided that the spouses were equal undivided co-owners of that immovable. mr. bouvier agreed to pay the costs for as long as ms. bisaillon was not working and was caring for the children. later, they were to divide those costs equally. the spouses disagree about their respective contributions to the purchase price of the residence and to the cost of its renovation. [12] in july 2012, they ended their relationship. between august and december 2012, ms. bisaillon and mr. bouvier participated in a family mediation process dealing with child custody and support, the fate of the family’s residence and possible compensation for ms. bisaillon because of the time she had spent caring for the children rather than pursuing her career the parties signed the mediation contract proposed by the mediator, modelled largely on the standard contract prepared by the coamf. [13] clause 1 of their mediation contract provided that the goal of the process was to come to an agreement: [translation] 1 we the undersigned understand that the objective of mediation is to allow spouses who have separated, divorced or have made the decision not to live together anymore to come to an agreement regarding the exercise of parental authority, access and the residence of the children, the financial responsibilities, the division of the family assets and the settlement of the matrimonial regime, if any. (ar, at p 94) [14] clause 2 recognized this objective by setting out the matters in dispute. in cl. 3, the spouses stated that the mediator’s role was to help them [translation] “negotiate an agreement”. clause 4 provided that the discussion between the spouses was to take place in an [translation] “atmosphere of cooperation” and that each of them would “work towards finding solutions in their mutual interest and more particularly in the best interests of the children”. clause 8 dealt with the confidential nature of the mediation: [translation] 8 we acknowledge that the content of our meetings, of the interviews and of our file is confidential. we commit ourselves to not use as a proof in front of a court any document contained in the file, including the summary of mediated agreements, without the consent of both parties. the mediator cannot communicate this information to anyone except when the law expressly orders it. (ar, at p 95) [15] following the five mediation sessions between mr. bouvier and ms. bisaillon, the mediator drew up a summary of mediated agreements, as provided for by the mediation contract and the instructions in the guide. the purpose of that summary was to set out the consensus resulting from mediation. adopting the wording of the standard contract, cl. 10 of their mediation contract stated the following about the summary: [translation] 10. we are informed that the summary of mediated agreements prepared at the end of the mediation process will not constitute a legal document nor an enforceable agreement. it will serve to help the legal advisers who will be retained to prepare the appropriate legal documents. we are also informed that the signature of the summary of mediated agreements produces legal effects, even if it is not enforceable, and that it is preferable to obtain independent legal advice [before] signing it. (ar, at p 95) [16] the summary of mediated agreements included a reminder of the confidentiality of the mediation documents, [translation] “including this summary of mediated agreements”, and of the undertaking not to use the summary as proof in court without the consent of both parties. [17] the parties did not sign the summary of mediated agreements and never had any agreement relating to their union homologated by a court. [18] in 2013, mr. bouvier wrote ms. bisaillon three cheques, two of which specifically referred to [translation] “mediation” ms. bisaillon cashed those cheques. in an exchange of emails concerning the children, the parties alluded to the terms of an arrangement they had made during mediation. in the last two emails that ms. bisaillon sent mr. bouvier, she denied the existence of any agreement between them. [19] in october 2014, ms. bisaillon filed a court action seeking equal partition of their former residence through a sale under judicial authority. mr. bouvier filed a defence and a cross demand in which he argued that the summary of mediated agreements, which determined the fate of the residence, was a transaction contract, within the meaning of the civil code of québec, that he was seeking to have homologated in his view, the application for equal partition did not reflect the agreement entered into at the end of the mediation process, as recorded in the summary of mediated agreements. [20] in answer, ms. bisaillon raised a ground of inadmissibility, arguing that the summary of mediated agreements could not be admitted in evidence because it was confidential under the parties’ mediation contract. she alleged that there had never been a binding agreement between the parties. iii. judicial history a quebec superior court, 2017 qccs 3788 (moore j.) [21] in a judgment rendered during the course of a proceeding, the superior court dismissed ms. bisaillon’s exception to dismiss (2015 qccs 5019) nantel j. found that the confidentiality rule applicable to mediation did not make the summary of mediated agreements inadmissible in evidence. in her view, ms. bisaillon had acted as if there were a binding agreement between the parties and had not objected to its partial performance. it followed that she had waived confidentiality and therefore that the summary of mediated agreements was admissible in evidence. [22] ruling on the merits of the case, moore j., as he then was, dismissed ms. bisaillon’s application for partition of the residence he also dismissed mr. bouvier’s cross demand for homologation of a transaction. however, he found that there was an agreement concerning the partition of the residence dated the day on which the mediator had given the parties the summary. [23] considering, on the merits, the issue of whether the summary of mediated agreements was admissible in evidence, the trial judge acknowledged that such a document is, in principle, subject to the rule of confidentiality. however, like nantel j., moore j explained that the parties could waive confidentiality implicitly. taking note of ms. bisaillon’s cashing of the three cheques and of the parties’ exchange of emails, the trial judge found that the parties had waived confidentiality [translation] “by performing and referring to the agreement entered into” (para. 39 (canlii)). [24] furthermore, as an exception to settlement privilege, union carbide allows the admission of evidence that is necessary to prove the existence and terms of a settlement. the judge therefore dismissed ms. bisaillon’s objection and admitted in evidence the summary of mediated agreements and any other evidence that could establish the existence of the parties’ agreement. [25] however, the trial judge declined to homologate the agreement as a transaction, noting that, in the context of child custody and support, an agreement dealing with matters of public order cannot be a transaction under the civil code of québec accordingly, even though mr. bouvier’s cross demand concerned only the partition of an immovable, the judge preferred to take note of the existence of an overall agreement and to order its performance as far as such partition was concerned. b quebec court of appeal, 2020 qcca 115 (doyon, hogue and roy jja) [26] ms. bisaillon appealed the judgment of the superior court. she challenged mainly the trial judge’s finding that she had waived the confidentiality of the mediation process and his decision to admit the summary of mediated agreements in evidence. [27] vauclair ja, sitting alone, authorized the association to intervene in the appeal as a friend of the court, since he was of the view that the case raised, among other things, [translation] “an important issue of public interest” relating to the confidentiality of the family mediation process (2017 qcca 1793, at para. 2 (canlii)). he gave the association permission to [translation] “file a memorandum to provide the court with guidance on the nature and legal scope of the discussions and of the summary of mediated agreements” (para. 4). [28] the court of appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal on the merits. hogue ja wrote reasons with which roy ja agreed; doyon ja wrote concurring reasons. [29] after providing an overview of the legal framework of family mediation, hogue ja noted that the process is confidential because of settlement privilege, which protects communications between parties attempting to resolve a dispute citing union carbide, she explained that the settlement exception allows communications to be disclosed despite confidentiality if their disclosure is necessary to prove the existence or scope of an agreement. [30] in hogue ja’s view, the parties had confirmed that the privilege applied through their mediation contract but had not displaced the settlement exception, although they had been free to do so. she also rejected the argument that the exception cannot apply in the family mediation context. because the purpose of family mediation is the same as that of civil mediation — to prevent or resolve a dispute by entering into a freely negotiated agreement — the principles established in union carbide are equally valid in this context the trial judge had therefore been correct to dismiss ms. bisaillon’s objections based on confidentiality. [31] however, hogue ja found that ms. bisaillon could have raised another ground of inadmissibility to object to the filing of the summary of mediated agreements. given that an unsigned summary is a simple writing and not a contract, it may not be admitted in evidence to prove a juridical act. ms. bisaillon had not raised this ground, and it was not for the trial judge to raise it of his own motion (art. 2859 ccq). in any event, on the facts of this case, the objection would not have changed the result, because the testimonial evidence and the post-mediation conduct of the parties could nonetheless have established the existence of a binding agreement, even without the summary of mediated agreements. [32] in his concurring reasons, doyon ja wrote that the settlement exception recognized in union carbide does not apply in family matters unless it is shown that this was what the parties wished. in family mediation, unlike in civil or commercial mediation, parties cannot be represented by legal advisers during the mediation sessions. it would therefore be unrealistic for a party who is a layperson, and who is also in the process of separating or divorcing, to understand the subtleties of the settlement exception. [33] on the facts of this case, however, doyon j.a found that the post-mediation exchanges of emails and cheques amounted either to recognition of the existence of an agreement or to an implied waiver of confidentiality. like hogue ja. and the trial judge, he was of the view that the testimonial and written evidence showed that there was an agreement between the parties. iv. issue and grounds of appeal [34] the issue in this appeal is whether the exception to settlement privilege that allows the existence or scope of a settlement to be proved, an exception recognized by this court in union carbide, applies in the family mediation context. specifically, the court must decide whether the family mediation process established by the legislature and governed, as in this case, by the coamf’s standard contract scheme excludes the exception recognized in that case. [35] according to the association, there is absolute confidentiality in family mediation, which means that the exception must be excluded once a mediation contract is signed, except where the parties indicate that it applies. the association asks the court to reach this conclusion because of the special nature of family mediation and the protection it must afford to vulnerable individuals. the association also submits that the summary of mediated agreements prepared by a mediator and the parties’ testimony may not be admitted in evidence to prove the existence or terms of a settlement arising from family mediation it further argues that the summary of mediated agreements is not a contract, but simply a working tool. [36] i note that the parties generally refer to the new code of civil procedure in their factums, but also, on occasion, to the former code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25 (“fccp”). when account is taken of the usages and practices specific to the standard contract scheme in question, one observes that the norms relevant under the new code are similar in many respects to the sources of the former law (the 2016 guide states that “[t]he new code of civil procedure largely includes the contents of the guide to standards developed by the coamf more than 15 years ago” (notice page)). this is the case for the principle that private dispute prevention and resolution processes are confidential, which used to be in art. 815.3 fccp and is now set out as a general principle in art. 4 nccp, supplemented by arts. 606 and 607 and by art. 617 for family mediation specifically. however, the outcome of this case, though closely tied to the law of civil procedure, depends on whether a judge-made rule of evidence developed in union carbide applies in family mediation, a question that arises under both the new code of civil procedure and the former law. v analysis [37] to understand whether the spouses did in fact exclude the exception to privilege that would allow them to prove the existence or terms of an agreement, it is useful to begin by considering the place of mediation in the civil justice system and by looking at the specific nature of family mediation (a). next, it should be reiterated that parties to family mediation enjoy additional procedural safeguards that can protect spouses (b). having regard to the very nature of family mediation, to these procedural safeguards and to the terms of the standard contract, it is neither necessary nor desirable, for the protection of vulnerable parties, to establish a rule of absolute confidentiality or to depart from the rule developed in union carbide relating to the settlement exception. systematically displacing the exception in the family mediation context would interfere with the main objective of the process, which is to reach a settlement. moreover, the coamf’s standard contract, as adapted by the parties in this case, cannot be interpreted as excluding the exception (c). on the facts of this case, the parties could prove the existence or terms of an agreement by relying — to the extent necessary and subject to the rules of the general law of evidence — on what was said, written or done during mediation (d). a family mediation is a private dispute prevention and resolution process that is an integral part of the civil justice system (1) sources of family mediation law [38] both parties assert that the very nature of family mediation supports their respective positions. this apparent contradiction can be explained in part by the fact that the sources of family mediation law are sometimes difficult to identify and are, at first glance, somewhat disparate. among these sources are legislation and regulations, the will of the parties as expressed in their mediation contract, and practices and usages in the field, including the norms set out in the standard contract and in the guide for certified mediators. [39] first of all, the general law of civil mediation — a set of norms of general application for any mediation — should be distinguished from the special law of family mediation, which applies to the category of mediation dealing with the resolution of a dispute between spouses or parents largely governed by rules of public order laid down in the civil code of québec, the code of civil procedure and the regulation respecting family mediation, cqlr, c. c-25.01, r 0.7 (“regulation”), the special law of family mediation is, in many respects, designed to recognize the fact that spouses negotiate a potential agreement “on the fault line of one of the most emotionally charged junctures of their relationship” (rick v. brandsema, 2009 scc 10, [2009] 1 scr 295, at para. 40). [40] second, family mediation is heavily influenced by contractual practice and the usages established in the field over the past 30 years or so in quebec family mediation usages are set out partly in the guide prepared by the coamf.1 the guide states that the standards of practice were developed “[i]n order to insure high practice standards as well as harmonization in the quality of family mediation practices” (2016 guide, at p 5; 2012 guide, at p 5) and that, while they do not have the force of law, they nonetheless guide the practice of the family mediation profession as a “type of auto-regulation specific to this field” (2016 guide, at p 5; 2012 guide, at p 5) a certified family mediator “must inform his clients of the existence of the[se] standards” (2016 guide, at p 6; 2012 guide, at p 5). [41] additional norms are set out in the standard family mediation contract appended to the guide, which is offered to certified mediators as a model. this standard contract is often adopted by spouses, as it was in this case, and governs several aspects of family mediation for which the law does not otherwise provide, such as the duty of mediators to prepare a “summary of mediated agreements” as a tool “to encourage reflection and to orient future legal actions” (2016 guide, at p 34; 2012 guide, at p 32) the standard contract also includes additional protections meant to address certain vulnerabilities of the parties that are unique to family mediation. 1 two versions of the guide will be cited throughout these reasons, the 2012 guide and the 2016 guide. the 2016 guide is a revision of the 2012 guide. (2) family mediation: a form of participatory and consensual civil justice whose primary objective is to conclude an agreement resolving a dispute [42] the association submits that the specific context of family mediation, including the vulnerability of the parties, distinguishes it from commercial and civil mediation the association thus reasons that the confidentiality scheme set out in union carbide is ill-suited to the family context, which requires what it describes as airtight or absolute confidentiality. [43] mediation in the broad sense is a [translation] “process of reaching a decision as a result of dialogue and negotiation assisted or facilitated by a neutral and impartial third party who has no decision-making power and who is freely chosen by the parties to resolve a problematic situation in an amicable and mutually acceptable manner and, ideally, to restore or improve the relationship” (j-f. roberge, la justice participative: changer le milieu juridique par une culture intégrative de règlement des différends (2011), at p 66; see also p-c. lafond and m. thériault, “la médiation”, in p-c. lafond, ed., régler autrement les différends (2nd ed 2018), 103, at no. 3-1). mediation is a confidential process that favours free and open discussions between the parties. it is true that family mediation takes place in a unique context, one that is often charged and emotional, which mediation law must take into account. that being said, i do not consider family mediation to be intrinsically different from civil or commercial mediation in terms of its primary objective, that is, to prevent an anticipated dispute or resolve an existing one. [44] entering into an agreement that resolves the parties’ dispute is the objective that defines family mediation, like civil or commercial mediation, as a form of civil justice (see arts. 605 and 613 nccp; see also art. 151.16 fccp). according to the 2012 guide, [translation] “[t]he objective of family mediation is to enable the spouses/parents to reach a fair agreement to which both parties have given their free and enlightened consent” (p 6) this purpose is confirmed by the standard family mediation contract at issue in this appeal, which provides that the objective of mediation is enable spouses “to come to an agreement” on the various aspects of the conflict, as they have, themselves, defined it (cls. 1 and 2; 2016 guide, at p 28; 2012 guide, at p 26). the focus is on the “consensus of the spouses/parents on the subjects discussed during mediation” (2016 guide, at p 22; 2012 guide, at p 20) family mediators therefore do not dictate the outcome of mediation. they facilitate the parties’ negotiations to support “the preparation of an agreement that will meet both the spouses’/parents’ needs and the needs of the children” (2016 guide, at p 7; 2012 guide, at p 6; see also standard contract, cl. 3; 2016 guide, at p 28; 2012 guide, at p 26). because of its participatory and consensual nature, mediation is thus recognized as being particularly well-suited to the resolution of family disputes (see, eg,. comité consultatif sur le droit de la famille, pour un droit de la famille adapté aux nouvelles réalités conjugales et familiales (2015), at p 81; action committee on access to justice in civil and family matters, access to civil & family justice: a roadmap for change (2013), at pp. 11 and 19). mediation, whether family, civil or commercial, can also be aimed at preventing a dispute (p. noreau, droit préventif: le droit au-delà de la loi (exp. ed. 2016), at pp. 111-12; l. marquis, droit de la prévention et du règlement des différends (prd): principes et fondements — une analyse dans la perspective du nouveau code de procédure civile du québec (2015), at p 42). this component is part of the very definition of a dispute prevention and resolution process. in any event, the objective of mediation will always be to address a dispute, be it existing or potential. without a dispute, mediation loses its purpose. [45] in some circumstances, particularly where parties dealing with a dispute have to maintain a relationship over the longer term, they may use mediation to improve the dialogue between them and to prevent conflicts beyond their specific dispute. for example, family mediation can be aimed at [translation] “maintaining an ongoing relationship over a long period in cases where the parties do in fact have to continue dealing with each other, either as former spouses or as parents” (noreau, at p 112-13). this dispute prevention and resolution process is a particularly good fit for family law because some of the aspects negotiated, such as childcare responsibilities, tie in with the logic of continuity rather than a complete break (m-c. belleau and g. talbot-lachance, “la valeur juridique des ententes issues de la médiation familiale: présentation des mésententes doctrinales et jurisprudentielles” (2008), 49 c de d 607, at pp. 612 and 614-15). [46] however, the relational dimension of family mediation and this so-called transformative purpose are not unique to this type of mediation (see m. shea and s. clairmont, “le droit collaboratif: la diversification de la pratique”, in service de la formation continue du barreau du québec, vol. 259, développements récents en justice participative: la diversification de la pratique de l’avocat (2006), 105, at p 130). civil mediation proceeds from this same logic, for example in the case of neighbourhood disturbances or conflicts between co-owners it allows parties, as they resolve their dispute, to [translation] “reshape their relationship” in order to “preserve a relationship in the future”, because “the neighbours will remain neighbours and will have to continue living side by side” (p-c. lafond, “les troubles de voisinage, la médiation et le notaire”, [2018] 1 c.p du n 81, at pp. 95-96) similarly, since co-owners will have to see each other regularly following the resolution of their dispute, [translation] “it is also essential that the ‘personal’ relationship between the individuals involved in the dispute be preserved and maintained over time” (s. chianetta, “médiation et arbitrage en copropriété”, in service de la qualité de la profession du barreau du québec, vol. 447, développements récents en droit de la copropriété divise (2018), 275, at p 325). in employment law as well, civil mediation serves to defuse interpersonal conflicts between coworkers with a view to [translation] “improving the relationship” and giving them a “safe discussion space” to “restore their relationship” (m. flynn, “les facettes méconnues de la médiation en 2016”, in service de la formation continue du barreau du québec, vol. 422, développements récents en matière de cessation d’emploi et d’indemnités de départ (2016), 75, at p 85). [47] this relational logic can also characterize commercial mediation for example, it may be an aspect of dispute resolution between franchisors and franchisees where legal persons seek, beyond a specific dispute, to [translation] “maintain and even strengthen the quality of the relationship and communications” between them (j. h. gagnon, “les meilleurs outils et pratiques de règlement des différends en franchisage depuis l’entrée en vigueur du nouveau code de procédure civile”, in service de la formation continue du barreau du québec, vol. 420, développements récents en droit de la franchise (2016), 1, at p 31) article 605 nccp in fact provides that, in any type of mediation, the mediator must not only help the parties reach an agreement but must also encourage them to engage in dialogue and to communicate their respective needs. [48] to be sure, the issues of public order that arise in family cases must not be conflated with civil and commercial conflicts, but it must be acknowledged that the relational dimension of dispute resolution is not exclusive to family mediation. in any form of mediation, the dialogue established to reach a settlement is a mechanism for addressing a relationship conflict. it is therefore essential to give parties the tools they need to give effect to their compromise and, whether or not a settlement is reached, to maintain their relationship going forward. [49] in addition, family mediation, like the other types of mediation, is characterized by the “self-determination” aspect of the process, which is to say that the parties together choose the justice process that will allow them to resolve their dispute in a spirit of cooperation, despite the conflict that remains between them (m-c. belleau, “la médiation familiale au québec: une approche volontaire, globale, interdisciplinaire et accessible”, in lafond, régler autrement les différends, 299, at no. 8-12; see also art. 2 nccp;. j-g. belley, “une justice de la seconde modernité: proposition de principes généraux pour le prochain code de procédure civile” (2001), 46 mcgill lj 317, at pp. 360-63). indeed, mediation is based on an [translation] “agreement culture” (roberge (2017), at p 8; see also marquis, at p 90). this culture finds expression at two stages: first, when the parties establish a dispute resolution process on a consensual basis, through the mediation contract itself and, second, if they work out an agreement to end the dispute, through the settlement contract. the purpose of the first contract is to create the framework in which the parties can enter into the second. the interpretation of the first contract makes it possible to determine how the parties can prove the existence and scope of the second contract, if any, setting out the resolution of their conflict. [50] it is true, as the association notes, that the special law of family mediation differs from general mediation law in that it does not allow the parties to be accompanied by legal advisers during the mediation sessions (art. 617 para. 1 nccp; see also art. 814.7 fccp). however, the absence of lawyers during the sessions is not incompatible with this idea of participatory justice and this agreement culture. [51] the legislature’s purpose in preventing legal advisers from being present during family mediation sessions is in fact to ensure [translation] “that the parties really have the floor” (ministère de la justice, commentaires de la ministre de la justice: code de procédure civile, chapitre c-25.01 (2015), art. 617). belleau writes that family mediation is based on an “empowerment” model that enables spouses to take charge of the resolution process that concerns them; it is above all they who speak, rather than a third-party decision maker or lawyers acting on their behalf (no. 8-8). this is intended to facilitate their future cooperation and to give them greater accountability for any undertaking they make (see noreau, at pp. 112-13). authors note that mediation is particularly well-suited to family conflicts [translation] “because it helps to restore better communication between spouses and to preserve their relationship in the future in cases where there are children” (lafond and thériault, at no. 3-39) moreover, studies show that spouses are more likely to adhere to a settlement they have actively shaped (g. a. legault, “la médiation et l’éthique appliquée en réponse aux limites du droit” (2002-2003), 33 rdus 153). [52] finally, the coming into force of the new code of civil procedure in 2016 has resulted in dispute prevention and resolution processes, including family mediation, being recognized [translation] “as justice processes with the same importance” as the traditional court process (l. chamberland, ed., le grand collectif: code de procédure civile — commentaires et annotations (5th ed. 2020), at p 8; commentaires de la ministre de la justice, art. 1). this significant shift in quebec’s legal culture was expressly undertaken by the legislature as an [translation] “access to justice” measure designed to make the system “much more accessible, faster, less cumbersome, less expensive” (le grand collectif, at pp. 8-9, quoting former minister bertrand st-arnaud; see also roberge (2017), at p 36; civil procedure review committee, une nouvelle culture judiciaire (2001), at p 34) of course, the question of the relative quality of the justice ensured by private dispute prevention and resolution processes in comparison with that rendered by the traditional courts is beyond the scope of this appeal. nevertheless, it is clear that mediation facilitates access to settlements in family matters and that it is a dispute resolution process that is not only permitted but encouraged. indeed, the quebec government, through the family mediation service it offers, promotes affordable access to dispute resolution by making the information session and five family mediation sessions free where the interests of children are at stake. in addition to these fully subsidized sessions, the fees of certified mediators are fixed by regulation (see regulation, ss. 10 and 10.1; see also, for spouses who have no common dependent children, regulation respecting a family mediation pilot project for couples who have no common dependent children, cqlr, c. c-25.01, r 61). b protection of the interests of spouses, parents and children in family mediation [53] the association submits that dispute resolution in the family context presents a serious risk of abuse for a vulnerable party, a risk of a different nature than in civil or commercial mediation. in miglin v. miglin, 2003 scc 24, [2003] 1 scr. 303, a case concerning the validity of contracts negotiated by spouses further to a divorce, bastarache and arbour jj noted that negotiations entered into upon the breakdown of a marriage may make the parties particularly vulnerable “unlike emotionally neutral economic actors negotiating in the commercial context,” they wrote, “divorcing couples inevitably bring to the table a host of emotions and concerns that do not obviously accord with the making of rational economic decisions” (para. 74) they also cautioned against “the power imbalance” that may vitiate the bargaining process and pointed out that the absence of legal counsel in this context may amplify the parties’ vulnerability (para. 83). [54] these concerns are legitimate. even though miglin involved a divorce and the parties in that case did not go through mediation, the problem of vulnerability raised by the case is a real one, and family mediation is not immune from this problem. [55] however, procedural safeguards that are inherent in family mediation, as a mechanism of participatory justice, serve to counter this vulnerability these safeguards arise from legislated norms, some of which are of public order, from family mediation practice, as shown by the guide, and from the contractual will of the parties, as expressed in the standard contract. by voluntarily entering into a mediation contract that confers protections not otherwise provided for by law, the parties are therefore themselves responsible for establishing a number of procedural safeguards. as we will see, these safeguards are implemented by two main actors: certified mediators and, in some circumstances, judges. (1) independent legal advice [56] relying on the concurring reasons of doyon ja, the association argues that the vulnerability of the parties in family mediation is compounded by the absence of independent legal advisers during the sessions. in its opinion, this concern is unique to family mediation because of the harmful consequences of the power imbalance observed in connection with agreements entered into by spouses when their relationship ends. [57] in miglin, the court noted that in determining the validity of a separation agreement negotiated by spouses, it is essential to consider whether either party was vulnerable such vulnerability can be “effectively compensated by the presence of counsel” during the negotiations (para. 83). [58] it is true that parties to family mediation do not have the option of being assisted by a lawyer or notary during the sessions, unlike in a negotiation process such as the one in miglin. however, this does not mean that the vulnerability of such parties cannot be effectively “compensated” for, as they will have many opportunities to obtain legal advice. in particular, nothing prevents the parties from consulting a legal adviser prior to or in the course of mediation (belleau and talbot-lachance, at p 618). because the prohibition in art. 617 nccp against using the services of legal advisers applies only during mediation sessions, spouses are thus able to obtain legal advice before signing their mediation contract, including to assist them in understanding the confidentiality rules. the standard mediation contract also provides in its addendum that each spouse reserves the right to consult a legal adviser “during the mediation process” (2016 guide, at pp. 32-33; 2012 guide, at pp. 30-31), and the mediation contract signed by the parties in this case states that an independent legal consultation is recommended before the parties sign the summary of mediated agreements or have it confirmed as well, as hogue j.a noted, [translation] “mediators generally recommend that parties consult a legal adviser before binding themselves firmly. this was the case here” (ca reasons, at para. 72 (canlii)). spouses may also suspend a session in order to consult a lawyer or any other person, and mediators have a duty to [translation] “suggest that advice be sought from a legal professional” if they perceive an “imbalance” between the spouses or if one spouse “is about to negotiate an unfair agreement” (2012 guide, at p 11; see also 2016 guide, at p 12; art. 618 nccp; art. 814.7 fccp). the absence of legal advisers during the sessions is therefore by no means fatal to considerations of fairness in family mediation. [59] in addition to the possibility of consulting a legal adviser at various times during the process, procedural safeguards inherent in family mediation also help “compensate” for the exclusion of lawyers and notaries from the sessions. moreover, as we will see, the standard family mediation contract establishes a scheme that makes it impossible to enter into a binding agreement during the mediation sessions, when no legal adviser is present. let us now turn to a review of these safeguards. (2) a certified and impartial family mediator [60] foremost among these procedural safeguards for the parties is the presence of a mediator, who must be impartial and act fairly (2016 guide, at p 8; 2012 guide, at p 8; see arts. 605 and 610 nccp). in the family context, a mediator must also be certified in accordance with the standards established by the government the conditions for certification, which are determined by regulation (art. 619 nccp; see also arts. 827.2 to 827.4 fccp;. regulation), require in particular that a mediator be a member of one of the designated professional orders and receive training in the legal and psychological aspects of the breakdown of a relationship (regulation, ss. 1 and 2). section 2 of the regulation provides that the training must pertain in part to “obstacles to negotiation and the balance of forces between the parties” and to “domestic violence”. the guide specifies that this training imposes a duty on family mediators to “maintain balance and equality during the negotiations and . . not [to] tolerate any intimidation or manipulation from . . . the spouses/parents during . . . mediation” (2016 guide, at p 15; 2012 guide, at p 13). mediators must take this training and learn the responsibilities attached to their role as family mediators during the sessions, regardless of their original profession. all certified family mediators, whatever their professional background, will therefore be required to help spouses achieve their primary objective of resolving their dispute (art. 609 nccp; 2016 guide, at p 8) indeed, the multidisciplinary nature of family mediation assists in achieving this objective by facilitating the [translation] “negotiation of agreements that cover all arrangements upon the breakdown of a spousal relationship” (belleau, at no. 8-4). [61] echoing the regulation, the guide imposes, among other things, a duty on certified family mediators to take any signs of domestic violence into account (2016 guide, at pp. 20-21; 2012 guide, at pp. 18-19). mediators have an obligation to make sure “at all times during the family mediation process of the ability to negotiate on an equal basis and of a free and enlightened consent of each of the spouses/parents” (2016 guide, at p 21; 2012 guide, at p 19). the guide further states that family mediators have a duty to suspend or put an end to the process when mediation is being misused by one of the parties, for example when one spouse is using the children to perpetuate the conflict, scorning the other spouse, hiding assets or using the process to exhaust the other spouse (2016 guide, at p 17; 2012 guide, at p 15). [62] the legislature also gives mediators the powers needed to protect the integrity of the process and the participants’ rights for example, mediators may suspend the process “in the interests of the parties or of one of the parties” (art. 610 para. 2 nccp) and take action [translation] “where there is a significant imbalance, intimidation or manipulation” (le grand collectif, at p 3081). these powers are in addition to the general power of mediators to put an end to the mediation process if the circumstances warrant, particularly where serious prejudice is likely to be caused to one of the parties (art. 614 para. 2 nccp). moreover, art. 613 nccp, which applies to mediation generally, requires mediators to make sure at the end of the mediation process that the parties understand the settlement agreement (see art. 613 para. 2 nccp; 2016 guide, at p 15). these rules, which apply in family mediation, oblige mediators to ensure that spouses or parents understand the nature and scope of the consensus they have reached by the end of the sessions, as recorded in the summary of mediated agreements. roberge sees this as [translation] “an important procedural safeguard” that will help the parties give their free and enlightened consent if they decide, following mediation and possibly with the assistance of a legal professional, to bind themselves contractually on terms reflecting the summary of mediated agreements (le grand collectif, at p 3086). [63] finally, mediators are required to preserve the confidentiality of the sessions and must explain to spouses that neither mediators nor participants can be compelled, in judicial proceedings, to disclose anything they hear in the course of the mediation process. however, mediators must also explain to spouses that this principle of confidentiality is not absolute: the guide states that mediators must, for example, reveal certain information obtained during mediation when the law requires them to do so (2016 guide, at p 11; 2012 guide, at p 10). the family mediation context therefore calls for active supervision by mediators, who, despite their impartiality, must intervene to protect spouses. [64] as the scope of mediators’ duties and powers is well established, it is important to address directly the association’s concern about the vulnerability of spouses and the risks arising from the absence of a legal adviser to support them at certain times. [65] with respect, the association’s position seems to trivialize the work of its own members: because of their duty to intervene and their training, certified family mediators can “compensat[e]” for the vulnerability of spouses, to invoke the idea referred to in a different context by bastarache and arbour jj. in miglin (para. 83). in miglin, it was the presence of independent legal counsel that had this compensating effect. in the different context of family mediation, this vulnerability is offset in part by certified mediators i would add that, in keeping with the new culture of participatory justice, legal professionals who practise mediation [translation] “must free themselves from the logic of the adversarial system operating against a backdrop of opposition and conflict” and adopt the participatory and consensual logic of family mediation (belleau, at no. 8-16). the role and participation of legal professionals are therefore different in the mediation context, particularly in light of their ethical obligation to promote settlements (see code of ethics of notaries, cqlr, c. n-3, r 2, s 3; code of professional conduct of lawyers, cqlr, c. b-1, r 3.1, s 42; m-c. rigaud, “la déontologie et l’éthique dans le contexte des marc”, in lafond, régler autrement les différends, 465, at nos. 12-4 and 12-5; j. macfarlane, the new lawyer: how clients are transforming the practice of law (2nd ed 2017), at pp. 123-24). (3) formation of a binding agreement under the standard contract scheme [66] the legal principles surrounding the formation of a binding agreement in family mediation confer additional protection on the parties the conclusions that follow apply where parties enter into a mediation process under the coamf’s standard mediation contract scheme, or under a contract scheme that is substantially based on the standard one and that incorporates the “summary of mediated agreements” model, as is the case here. (a) end of the mediation process governed by the standard contract scheme [67] first, it is important to clarify the parties’ situation at the end of a family mediation process governed by the standard contract. one possibility is that the parties will find common ground, on all or some points, with respect to the resolution of their disputes under general mediation law, the parties may enter into a settlement agreement in the course of mediation (see art. 613 nccp). under the special law of family mediation, where the standard contract scheme applies, the concept of “settlement agreement” referred to in art. 613 nccp must be interpreted in a specific manner: while the parties may “agree” in the ordinary sense of the word, they do not enter into a binding agreement — a contract — during the family mediation process. at best, when they agree on one or more points, they will end the process with a [translation] “proposed agreement” recorded in the summary of mediated agreements provided by the mediator at the close of mediation (le grand collectif, at p 3085). as we will see, this unsigned summary of mediated agreements is not binding and [translation] “must be distinguished from the agreement” that the parties may enter into later “and that may be confirmed by a court” (d. lambert and l. bérubé, la médiation familiale: étape par étape (3rd ed. 2016), at p 303). of course, it is possible that mediation will end without any agreement or proposed agreement (art. 614 nccp). [68] in principle, therefore, the end of the mediation process does not coincide with the end of the dispute. it is possible that parties who have a proposed agreement will decide to change the terms discussed and recorded in the summary after they have consulted a legal adviser. it is also possible that parties whose mediation process has ended without a proposed agreement will ultimately be able to reach a settlement. in every case, the parties will have an opportunity to think about the terms of settlement for their dispute after the mediation sessions have ended, once the mediator has given them the summary of mediated agreements. (b) impossibility of entering into a contract during the mediation sessions [69] second, the rules on contract formation in the civil law, when applied in the family mediation context, show that parties cannot enter into a binding agreement during the mediation sessions. [70] to be binding on spouses, an agreement arising from mediation must comply with the conditions of contract formation (m. tétrault, droit de la famille: la procédure, la preuve et la déontologie (4th ed 2010), vol. 4, at pp. 338-39) the general rule in quebec civil law is that a contract is an agreement of wills formed “by the sole exchange of consents between persons having capacity to contract” (art. 1385 ccq); this exchange is accomplished by the express or tacit manifestation of the will of one spouse to accept an offer made by the other (art. 1386 ccq) and, unless another exception applies, does not require any formalities (see j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obligations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at no. 168; d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (3rd ed. 2018), at no. 247). [71] it is therefore important to distinguish offers that can, once accepted, give rise to a meeting of the minds from communications made during mediation that are designed to explore the possibility of reaching an agreement and are not firm offers. a communication amounts to an offer to contract only if it signifies the willingness of the party making it to be bound (art. 1388 ccq). parties may begin discussing a potential contract during the mediation sessions without either of them making an offer that is [translation] “firm” enough to constitute an offer to contract for the purposes of the civil code of québec (jobin and vézina, at no. 176; lluelles and moore, at no. 281; howick apparel ltd. v. champoux, 2007 qcca 674, at paras. 13 and 17 (canlii)). [72] in fact, in the context of a family mediation process governed by the standard contract, or by a contract that replicates its content, as in this case, the parties do not make each other firm offers to contract during the sessions. the spouses know during the sessions that they are working on a proposed agreement only or, as stated in the guide, on the development of a “consensus” that may subsequently be strengthened (2016 guide, at p 22; 2012 guide, at p 20). they know that, at the end of the mediation sessions, the consensus will be recorded in a summary of mediated agreements, which “will not constitute a legal document nor an enforceable agreement”, and that they will have an opportunity to obtain “independent legal advice” on its appropriateness at a later date (cl. 10). they therefore negotiate knowing that the proposals they make do not bind them firmly and that they will have an opportunity to think about them and to consult a legal adviser before entering into a binding agreement. [73] accordingly, insofar as their mediation contract provides that the consensus recorded in the summary of mediated agreements may be reviewed by a legal adviser before it becomes binding, the spouses can assume that their communications with each other during the sessions do not amount to binding offers within the meaning of art. 1388 ccq. of course, the parties remain in control of their process, so there is nothing to stop them from ending the mediation process early and resolving their dispute in another way (see art. 614 nccp). [74] as under the general law of obligations, a contract arising from a mediation process will not be valid unless the parties’ consent is “free and enlightened”, which means that it “may [not] be vitiated by error, fear or lesion” (art. 1399 ccq; see also jobin and vézina, at no. 203; tétrault, at p 347; le grand collectif, at p 3086). of course, where divorce is one of the matters in issue, the legal principles arising from the divorce act, rsc 1985, c 3 (2nd supp.), and from miglin will also apply (tétrault, at pp. 343-44; see droit de la famille — 211056, 2021 qccs 2431, at para. 103 (canlii); droit de la famille — 133025, 2013 qcca 1869, at paras. 44-46 (canlii)). [75] in summary, if the parties wish to bind themselves contractually, they may do so in accordance with the rules of contract formation after being given the summary of mediated agreements. before they are given the summary, the solutions identified by them during the sessions — the potential “consensus” to which the guide refers — at best represent a proposed agreement that must be confirmed by them in order to have contractual effect. the parties will therefore not be bound by offers made during the sessions until they have had an opportunity to think about them and, if need be, to consult a legal adviser these rules established by the standard contract serve as an important procedural safeguard against any rash undertaking by the parties. (c) the summary of mediated agreements is not a contract [76] third, it is important to clarify the legal status of the summary of mediated agreements, which has been a subject of debate in family mediation law. [77] unlike the mediator’s administrative report (art. 617 para. 3 nccp), the summary of mediated agreements is a document required not by enactment, but by parties who, as in this case, sign the coamf’s standard family mediation contract. its name is misleading: legally speaking, it is not a summary of “agreements”. the guide states that the summary given to the parties is a working tool and one that they can use for reflection (2016 guide, at p 23; 2012 guide, at p 20). if they wish, for example, the summary can be used as a [translation] “reference” document for the subsequent drafting of a contract between them (lambert and bérubé, at p 316; see also belleau, at no. 8-50). as the wording of the standard contract shows, the consensus recorded in the summary by the mediator does not yet reflect a true agreement of wills. clause 12 of the standard contract, which is reproduced verbatim in the mediation contract signed by the parties in this case, suggests that no binding agreement will be entered into until the parties have had an opportunity to consult a legal adviser about the appropriateness of their agreement once the mediation process has ended. the standard contract thus steers the mediation process simply toward a proposed agreement, embodied in the summary of mediated agreements. [78] it is true that the summary of mediated agreements in this case states that [translation] “[a]s a result of the mediation sessions, ms. bisaillon and mr. bouvier have arrived at an agreement that represents the overall result of a process of thinking about their common and respective needs as well as those of their children” (ar, at p 99). however, we know that this is a statement made not by the spouses, but by a third party, the family mediator, and that he says in the same document that [translation] “the parties have been informed that this proposed settlement agreement does not constitute a contract or judgment and therefore cannot have legal effect” (ar, at p 101). this wording is essentially the same as that proposed by the coamf and its standard contract the proposed wording encourages the parties to have any future agreement confirmed by a court, and it too notes that an “independent legal consultation is recommended” before proceeding (2016 guide, at p 34; 2012 guide, at p 32). [79] the unsigned summary of mediated agreements, as provided by the mediator at the end of the sessions, is therefore not a contract. following mediation, the parties will be free to enter into a contract whose terms differ in whole or in part from those recorded by the mediator in the summary. the court of appeal was thus correct to find that this document is a working tool that is not binding on the parties (c.a reasons, at paras. 97-101; see also sup ct reasons, at para. 56; r. tremblay, “réflexions sur le dialogue entre la médiation familiale et le droit de la famille”, in j. torres-ceyte, g-a. berthold and c-a. m. péladeau, eds., le dialogue en droit civil (2018), 201, at pp. 218-19 and 227-28). [80] it nonetheless remains possible for parties to bind themselves contractually in accordance with the terms recorded in the summary of mediated agreements in two specific situations. [81] first, the parties may sign the summary of mediated agreements, in which case it is clear that they will be bound contractually in accordance with its terms because they have expressed a firm intention to bind themselves (tétrault, at p 409). that being said, the parties’ mediation contract in this case and the guide urge them not to sign the summary without consulting an independent legal adviser. in addition, the summary itself contains a cautionary note about the possible consequences of signing it: [translation] we also inform you that the signature of the summary of mediated agreements would produce legal effects, even if it is not enforceable, and that it is therefore preferable to obtain independent legal advice before signing it. (ar, at p 97) [82] second, the parties may decide, following mediation and after being given the summary, to enter into an oral or written contract by expressing their intention to bind themselves in accordance with the terms of the summary. just as it is possible that the parties, after the sessions have ended, will enter into a contract that rejects all or some of the agreed points set out in the summary, as hogue ja correctly noted (ca. reasons, at para. 101; see also droit de la famille — 171578, 2017 qccs 3018; droit de la famille — 111393, 2011 qccs 2411, at para. 16 (canlii)), it is also possible that they will subsequently decide that the summary of mediated agreements is a true and accurate representation of their respective intentions, once they have had an opportunity to think about it (lambert and bérubé, at p 315). indeed, the parties can express either explicitly or implicitly, including through their conduct, their intention to be bound by terms reflecting those of the summary. the summary also contains a cautionary note to this effect: [translation] similarly, we wish the implementation of all or part of the agreements may also produce legal effects in the sense that it may constitute an acknowledgement of the agreement before it goes before a court. inform you that to (ar, at p 97) [83] it is important to note that, in such circumstances, the summary of mediated agreements will not be “transformed” into a contract, even if the parties express a firm intention to bind themselves in accordance with its terms after the sessions have ended. the juridical act will not be formed until there is an exchange of wills subsequent to the mediation sessions, when the parties agree on terms even where the parties’ conduct in this exchange shows that they intended the terms of their contract to be exactly the same as those of the summary, the unsigned summary will not be the juridical act itself and will remain a simple writing. this distinction is important, as it affects the admissibility of the summary of mediated agreements in evidence, which will be discussed below. [84] in sum, contract law and the standard contract used in this case confer additional protections on the parties to family mediation, who will not be bound automatically by proposed agreements without having formally consented to them after being given the summary of mediated agreements. where the parties decide to turn to the courts or where one of them challenges the validity of an agreement, it will then be up to a judge to determine whether there is indeed an agreement of wills between the parties and whether it is valid. (4) enforcement of an agreement [85] in family mediation, even when the parties enter into a binding agreement following the sessions and there is a meeting of the minds, the agreement they enter into will not be enforceable unless the courts have had an opportunity to review its appropriateness, as the trial judge noted (sup ct reasons, at paras. 51-52; see also g. latulippe, la médiation judiciaire: un nouvel exercice de justice (2012), at pp. 79 and 81). this additional “procedural safeguard” can be explained by the fact that any matter of public order is subject to judicial scrutiny when the parties ask a court to confirm their settlement. the content of any settlement that relates, as in this case, to custody of children (arts. 522, 604, 606 and 612 ccq) or child support (arts. 586, 587.1 and 587.3 ccq; see also belleau and talbot-lachance, at p 632) is therefore reviewable by a court to determine its appropriateness. this principle applies where the parties were de facto spouses (vf v. td, 2005 qcca 907, at para. 13 (canlii)), but also in the context of marriage and civil union i note as well that, even after being confirmed, such settlements may be reviewed by a court if this is “warranted by circumstances” (see, eg, arts. 594 and 612 ccq). it is true that not all couples actually decide to have their agreement confirmed by a court, but it remains important to point out that, if they do, courts can intervene in the name of public order and thereby protect the most vulnerable spouses (belleau, at no. 8-6). [86] this also suggests that a binding agreement between spouses arising from family mediation, to the extent that it deals with matters of public order, cannot be a transaction within the meaning of art. 2631 ccq, because no transaction may be made with respect to such matters (art. 2632 ccq; art. 613 nccp;. le grand collectif, at pp. 3085-86; droit de la famille — 083185, 2008 qcca 2405, [2009] rdf 8, at paras. 25-29). this is a major difference between family mediation and commercial mediation. very often, the parts of an agreement between spouses that do not concern matters of public order cannot be considered separately, because a transaction is “indivisible as to its subject” (art. 2631 ccq; see also m. lachance, le contrat de transaction (3rd ed 2018), at paras. 32-34) accordingly, a court can generally review the appropriateness of an agreement and not just its legality — an additional procedural safeguard for vulnerable parties — as would be the case, for example, with the homologation of a transaction arising from commercial mediation. in the context of civil or commercial mediation, an agreement that meets the conditions for a transaction contract set out in art. 2631 ccq — unlike one arising from family mediation — will have the authority of res judicata between the parties (see art. 2633 ccq;. le grand collectif, at p 24). [87] therefore, the trial judge properly declined to homologate the “transaction” relied on by mr. bouvier as a defence to ms. bisaillon’s action (sup. ct. reasons, at para. 74) because their contract concerned public order — as certain matters related to the children — the judge was not bound by its terms. [88] to conclude on this point, family mediation is a mechanism of civil justice that involves inherent protections to guard against the possibility that vulnerable parties will unknowingly end up bound by an ill-considered agreement. the process is guided by impartial third parties, who are certified and specially trained to address the psychological and legal needs of spouses and parents. mediators are subject to strict professional obligations and have, among other things, the power to put an end to the mediation process in order to avoid irreparable prejudice moreover, there is no requirement that the parties enter into a contract when the mediation ends. in fact, the standard contract specifically provides that family mediation sessions lead to a proposed agreement that is not binding. in addition, even where a binding agreement is entered into following mediation, it will not be enforceable unless a court has reviewed it to determine its appropriateness, to the extent that it deals with matters of public order. c proof of an agreement (1) limits imposed by the law of evidence [89] in principle, a summary of mediated agreements is not admissible in court proceedings to prove a juridical act as hogue j.a noted, the rules of the law of evidence significantly limit the manner in which juridical acts can be proved, including the contract that the respondent mr. bouvier alleges arose from mediation. [90] an unsigned summary of mediated agreements is a simple writing it is prepared by a third party to reflect the proposed agreement reached by the parties and, as discussed above, it is not a contract. even when it can be considered an accurate tangible representation of the parties’ consensus, this does not make it a juridical act (l. ducharme, précis de la preuve (6th ed. 2005), at nos. 430-32; c. piché, la preuve civile (6th ed. 2020), at no. 403). [91] as a result, an unsigned summary of mediated agreements, as a simple writing that emanates from a third party, does not fall within the category of documents that can be used to prove a juridical act (tétrault, at pp. 357 and 364) the rule in art. 2862 ccq against proving a juridical act by testimony applies to simple writings filed as testimony. however, a summary will be admissible on an exceptional basis where there is a commencement of proof (arts. 2862 para. 2 and 2865 ccq). in any case, i agree with hogue ja that, as a general rule, a party can object to the admission in evidence of an unsigned summary of mediated agreements to prove a juridical act. [92] parties may also object to the use of testimony to prove the existence of a binding agreement again, i agree with hogue j.a that the rules that prohibit testimonial evidence to establish a juridical act also apply, as does the exception where there is a commencement of proof (art. 2862 ccq). in this regard, it is important to specify that an unsigned summary of mediated agreements cannot be such a commencement of proof it does not suggest the existence of a juridical act and certainly does not make it plausible, not to mention the fact that it emanates from a third party and not from the adverse party. [93] i also agree with hogue ja’s view that a court may not raise this rule of its own motion (art. 2859 ccq) and with her explanation of the impact of this rule in the present case. because ms. bisaillon did not raise this ground of inadmissibility, the trial judge could not do so in her place. in other circumstances, the inadmissibility in principle of a summary of mediated agreements to prove a juridical act is an important tool in the hands of a party who denies the existence of a contract entered into orally following mediation. of course, such an objection will be relevant only if an exception allows settlement privilege to be lifted otherwise, the summary of mediated agreements, like any communication arising from mediation, will already be inadmissible on the basis that it is confidential. (2) confidentiality of family mediation (a) settlement privilege and its exceptions [94] i will now consider the evidentiary rule that divided the court of appeal: the rule of settlement privilege. [95] settlement privilege is a rule of evidence that protects the confidentiality of communications and information exchanged for the purpose of settling a dispute (union carbide, at paras. 1 and 31; globe and mail v canada (attorney general), 2010 scc 41, [2010] 2 scr 592, at para. 80; lafond and thériault, at no. 3-9). it is recognized as fundamental to the making of an agreement between parties (sable offshore energy inc. v. ameron international corp., 2013 scc 37, [2013] 2 scr. 623; union carbide, at para. 1) because it promotes honest and frank discussions, which can make it easier to reach a settlement in all types of mediation (union carbide, at para. 31). the privilege applies in the general law of mediation without having to be invoked by the parties, because it [translation] “presupposes that all discussions in the course of mediation between the parties are protected at all times” (piché, at nos. 1284-86; see also union carbide, at para. 34). unlike a confidentiality clause in a contract, “settlement privilege applies to all communications that lead up to a settlement, even after a mediation session has concluded” (union carbide, at para. 51). this common law rule, often called the “duty of confidentiality” in quebec law, has been codified in art. 4 nccp since the reform of the code of civil procedure (d. ferland and b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (6th ed. 2020), vol. 1, at no. 1-41). the new code of civil procedure also sets out the principle that mediators and mediation participants are non-compellable (art. 606). [96] settlement privilege is not absolute, however. for one thing, the parties can change its scope by contract (union carbide, at paras. 39, 54 and 58), as long as they do not deprive a court of its supervisory jurisdiction over matters of public order. there are also some exceptions developed by the courts or established by law that allow confidentiality to be lifted on an exceptional basis, for example where there is fraud or professional misconduct by a mediator (sable offshore, at para. 19; union carbide, at paras. 34 and 49; art. 606 nccp; 2016 guide, at p 11). [97] in union carbide, this court reiterated the importance of another exception developed by the courts, the settlement exception, which is central to this appeal this exception allows protected communications to be disclosed in order to prove the existence or scope of a settlement arising from mediation (union carbide, at paras. 35-36; roberge (2017), at p 104) it applies even where an agreement is not entered into until after mediation (union carbide, at para. 34) in keeping with its purpose, the exception applies only to what is necessary to prove the existence or scope of the settlement (ibid., at para. 35). [98] in union carbide, wagner j., as he then was, explained that the settlement exception serves the same public interest as the privilege itself, that is, the promotion of settlements: “once the parties have agreed on a settlement, the general interest of promoting settlements requires that they be able to prove the terms of their agreement” (para. 35). it is in this sense, as wagner j observed, that disclosure to prove the terms of an agreement promotes settlements generally. it follows that the exception in no way weakens the principle of privilege in mediation as noted by paul m. perell (now a justice of the ontario superior court), “where the without prejudice settlement offer has been accepted, there is no longer any public policy reason to exclude the evidence, the goal of the policy having been achieved” (“the problems of without prejudice” (1992), 71 can. bar rev. 223, at p 234). within the limits of public order, this logic applies, in my view, both in family mediation and in civil and commercial mediation when parties opt for confidentiality to serve their primary objective of reaching a settlement as the trial judge wrote: [translation] “prohibiting the submission of such evidence based on the principle of confidentiality would make it impossible to homologate such an agreement once its existence is contested, which would make little sense” (para. 41). [99] nevertheless, parties are free to contract out of the settlement exception. because a failure to apply the exception “could frustrate the broader purpose of promoting settlements”, parties must express this intention clearly in their mediation contract (union carbide, at para. 50; see also para. 54). (b) application of these principles in the family mediation context [100] the application of the settlement exception in family mediation is at the heart of the disagreement between the parties in this case. the respondent mr. bouvier concedes that the confidentiality of family mediation is necessary, indeed essential, when mediation fails and the spouses are unable to reach an agreement. even when they reach an agreement and carry it out without difficulty, the discussions that took place during mediation must remain confidential because their disclosure is not necessary. however, he believes that the exception should allow him to prove a contract entered into by him and ms. bisaillon insofar as she denies its existence. [101] the association submits that because of the unique context of family mediation, it must be presumed that the parties, who are potentially vulnerable, who are not legal experts and who participate in the sessions without legal advisers, intended the family mediation process to be absolutely confidential it argues that this presumption may be rebutted where there is evidence showing that the parties waived confidentiality. [102] i am of the view that, as a general rule, the settlement exception applies in family mediation and that the parties in this case did not displace it by adopting a contract modelled on the coamf’s standard contract. [103] first of all, the association’s general proposition that the settlement exception does not apply in family mediation must be rejected while i agree that parties to family mediation have unique vulnerabilities, which merit legal protection, in my respectful opinion, the association’s proposition does not assist in achieving this objective. [104] as we have seen, many procedural safeguards specific to family mediation already protect spouses and parents from unknowingly entering into an ill-considered agreement. in this context, it can be assumed that the various protections put in place by law, the guide and the standard mediation contract adopted by parties make it possible for spouses to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. it is true that, where there is no settlement, preserving the absolute confidentiality of communications is an essential aspect of mediation and is necessary to encourage frank discussions but confidentiality is above all a means to an end: where spouses resolve their dispute, this concern must yield, as far as necessary, to that of giving them the proper tools to implement their agreement. [105] excluding the settlement exception in favour of absolute confidentiality once a dispute has been resolved could prevent a spouse from asserting their rights against a spouse acting in bad faith. it must be remembered that parties have a duty to participate in the mediation process in good faith (art. 6 ccq; art. 2 nccp), and absolute confidentiality could impede a spouse’s ability to raise the bad faith of the other spouse where the latter, capitalizing on this airtight confidentiality, is dishonest about their own position taken during mediation (see e. b. zweibel and j. c. kleefeld, “mediation”, in j. c. kleefeld et al., eds., dispute resolution: readings and case studies (4th ed 2016), 291, at p 463) above all, it must be kept in mind that the settlement exception may be essential for a vulnerable spouse who has been able to negotiate a fair agreement and would like to prove it, and that absolute confidentiality could undermine the protection of that spouse if the other took advantage of the power imbalance and denied the agreement finally, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature sought to impose “absolute confidentiality” when enacting the confidentiality rules applicable under the special law of family mediation. [106] second, the application of the exception to confidentiality that allows agreements to be proved is just as relevant in the family mediation context as hogue ja wrote, the exception must apply in family matters because [translation] “[t]he aim of such mediation is in fact the same as that of any other mediation, whatever its form: to prevent a potential dispute or resolve an existing one by entering into a freely negotiated agreement” (c.a reasons, at para. 84) although the context of family mediation is distinct from that of civil or commercial mediation, this does not change the fact that these types of mediation are not intrinsically different in this regard: they have the same primary objective and the same consensual and participatory foundations. it is not a matter of denying the specific nature of family mediation, but of recognizing that because of the many procedural safeguards governing the process, absolute confidentiality is not necessary and would, on the contrary, be detrimental to the parties where the parties enter into a binding agreement, it would therefore be contrary to the objective being pursued to prohibit them from using the communications needed to prove it. [107] third, it is important to clarify that the standard family mediation contract used in quebec does not displace the settlement exception. even though the exception generally applies in family matters, freedom of contract does allow the parties to displace it, provided that they do so clearly. it must therefore be determined, through contractual interpretation in accordance with quebec’s general law of obligations, whether the standard contract clearly displaces the exception. accordingly, rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the words in a disputed clause, a court must focus on the common intention of the parties, which is central in interpreting a mediation contract (union carbide, at para. 59; art. 1425 ccq). this requires analyzing the nature of the contract, the circumstances in which it was formed, and usage (art. 1426 ccq). [108] clause 8 of the contract entered into by the parties (reproduced above) — modelled on cl. 9 of the coamf’s standard contract (2016 guide, at p 29; 2012 guide, at p 27) — deals with the confidentiality of the mediation process. a reading of the clause leads to a first observation: the parties did not intend their communications to be absolutely confidential without exception. indeed, the clause specifically provides for the possibility of disclosing certain documents if both parties consent the association’s proposition that there is absolute confidentiality fails already at this stage it is also noteworthy that cl. 9 of the standard contract (the equivalent of the confidentiality clause in this case) refers to arts. 4, 5 and 606 nccp (2016 guide, at p 29, fn. 6). in her commentary on art. 4 nccp, the then minister of justice clarified the circumstances in which the confidentiality of mediation must be lifted: [translation] “this may be the case for an agreement if its implementation and application require that it be disclosed” (see also le grand collectif, at pp. 24-25, discussing union carbide and its application in the family context). by referring to these articles of the new code of civil procedure in its standard contract reproduced in the guide, the coamf is therefore suggesting that the settlement exception applies in family mediation. [109] in addition, a proper interpretation of the confidentiality clause requires that it be considered in light of the contract as a whole, including cls. 1, 2, 3 and 4 (art. 1427 ccq). clause 1 of the contract provides that the objective of the mediation is “to come to an agreement” (ar, at p 94). clause 2, individualized by ms. bisaillon and mr. bouvier, specifies the subject matter of the dispute to be resolved these clauses make it clear that the spouses’ primary intention was to resolve their dispute. this is crucial to the interpretation of the confidentiality clause, which cannot be regarded as preventing the parties from achieving this objective. clauses 3 and 4 are also to the same effect, as they define the roles of the mediator and the spouses by reference to the objective of arriving at a mutually satisfactory agreement. [110] the nature of the contract and the circumstances in which it was formed lead to the same conclusion. by its very nature, a mediation contract is meant to provide a framework for the family mediation process. the dominant intention of parties who enter into such a process is to resolve their disputes, existing or potential, through an agreement (belleau, at no. 8-45; cl. 1) in this case, ms. bisaillon and mr. bouvier chose mediation because they had a genuine dispute and wanted to settle all aspects of their separation, including custody of their children, the partition of their immovable and compensation for ms. bisaillon. it is true that mediation might incidentally have a beneficial effect on their long-term relationship, but it is clear that their primary objective here was to resolve their disputes the parties therefore had a legitimate expectation that they would have the tools needed to implement this agreement and thus that they could, if necessary, lift confidentiality to prove its existence and its terms. [111] lastly, the parties’ conduct after a contract is formed must also be taken into account to guide the interpretation of the contract where it is ambiguous: [translation] “this is why an act of partial performance of a contract, provided that it is free and not the result of an error, may prevent the party who performed the act from suggesting later, in court, an interpretation at odds with the act” (jobin and vézina, at no. 418; art. 1426 ccq). therefore, the interpretation of a mediation contract also depends on the parties’ conduct, particularly where it shows that their objective was indeed to enter into and implement an agreement and that they did not keep the content or outcome of their discussions confidential. this was in fact the case here, since the evidence shows that ms. bisaillon and mr. bouvier specifically referred to the mediation after the process had ended, thereby expressing their intention to implement the agreement arising from it. [112] in this context, to regard cl. 8 as imposing absolute confidentiality would be inconsistent with the parties’ intention as expressed in the contract they signed and as inferred from the circumstances this clause simply confirms the general rule of confidentiality, without excluding the exception to settlement privilege. in my view, the following explanation given by wagner j in union carbide is just as applicable to family mediation: “absent an express provision to the contrary, i find it unreasonable to assume that parties who have agreed to mediation for the purpose of reaching a settlement would renounce their right to prove the terms of the settlement. such a result would be illogical” (para. 65) indeed, interpreting a confidentiality clause as displacing the settlement exception may undermine the objective of reaching a settlement (union carbide, at para. 50). [113] to interpret the standard contract or the contract signed by the parties as creating airtight and absolute confidentiality would therefore be to disregard the primary intention of parties who enter into a mediation process while making it impossible to enforce a valid agreement that can be understood properly only in the context of the communications made during mediation. to conclude on this point, i agree with hogue ja, who wrote that it would be beneficial if, as a precaution, the standard mediation contract clearly referred to the limits of settlement privilege and to the application of its exceptions, although such a statement was not, as she explained, necessary to decide this case. [114] in short, the settlement exception adopted by this court in union carbide must apply equally in family mediation governed by the standard contract. however, it must be kept in mind that the parameters for its application will be different in the context of family mediation based on the coamf’s standard contract than under other contractual schemes governing civil or commercial mediation. a notable influence on how union carbide is applied is the fact that the standard contract scheme makes it impossible to form a binding agreement during family mediation sessions, because the proposals made by the spouses are not firm offers. the scheme provides that the process ends with the parties being given a summary of mediated agreements, not with a binding agreement, and that the parties will have an opportunity to consult an independent legal adviser before they are bound contractually by an agreement arising from mediation these aspects specific to the standard contract scheme are crucial, because their effect is to defer the moment when the parties can enter into a binding agreement and, therefore, the moment when the exception could apply and cause confidentiality to be lifted. [115] it follows that, under the standard family mediation contract scheme, all communications made by spouses for the purpose of resolving their dispute will remain completely confidential unless one of the recognized exceptions applies the settlement exception will apply only if (1) the spouses reach a settlement after the process ends and after they are given the summary of mediated agreements, once they have had an opportunity to consult an independent legal adviser, and (2) one of them denies the existence or terms of the agreement or objects to its implementation in addition, even where these two conditions are met, the settlement exception will allow disclosure only of the communications that are necessary to establish the existence or terms of the agreement, not of all communications (union carbide, at para. 35). there should therefore be no fear that private communications concerning the parties’ relationship will be revealed: if such communications are not necessary to prove the settlement, they will be shielded from the exception and will remain confidential forever. d application of the law to the facts [116] the application of these principles to the facts of this case confirms that the trial judge was right not to allow ms. bisaillon’s objection and, as the court of appeal held, that there was no reason to intervene on appeal. [117] before participating in family mediation, ms. bisaillon and mr. bouvier signed a mediation contract modelled on the coamf’s standard contract their contract contained a general confidentiality clause and an unambiguous statement that the objective of their mediation process was to come to an agreement none of the contract’s clauses clearly displaced settlement privilege or its exceptions, and the interpretation of the contract in this case cannot lead to the contrary conclusion. according to union carbide, this means that the confidentiality clause in the contract signed by the parties leaves room for the exception that allows the existence and terms of a settlement to be proved. [118] in keeping with the terms of the standard contract, the parties attempted to negotiate a proposed agreement and took the time to think about whether it was appropriate after the family mediator gave them the summary. they never signed the summary of mediated agreements and did not have it homologated however, their subsequent conduct indicates that they had an agreement of wills that was clear enough for the formation of a true agreement, which also reflected the terms recorded in the summary of mediated agreements. in this regard, it must be noted that the fact that one party cashes cheques written by the other is not always sufficient to establish an intention to be bound: it is, of course, possible that a party will accept money out of need rather than in recognition of an agreement resolving their dispute. in this case, however, the trial judge did not accept ms. bisaillon’s explanation that she had cashed the cheques out of need and rejected her claim that they did not reach an agreement (sup. ct. reasons, at paras. 59 and 61; ca reasons, at para. 113). [119] because the union carbide exception to settlement privilege applied, the parties could prove the existence and terms of their agreement, subject to the rules of the law of evidence set out in the civil code of québec together, the emails, the cheques written and cashed and the parties’ testimony allowed the trial judge to conclude that that subsequent agreement, unlike the proposed one recorded in the summary, met the conditions of contract formation and was therefore binding on the parties as hogue j.a rightly noted, the summary of mediated agreements was not needed to reach that conclusion. [120] there were other grounds on which ms. bisaillon could have objected to the admission of the unsigned summary of mediated agreements to prove the existence or terms of the settlement agreement. since she did not raise those grounds, the trial judge could not raise them of his own motion because of art. 2859 ccq. in these exceptional circumstances, he could therefore admit the summary of mediated agreements in evidence given the fact that the union carbide exception applied and that the objections had not been raised. the judge was correct in law in considering whether the [translation] “circumstances show[ed] that the spouses intended to bind themselves by contract”, while declining to recognize the contract as enforceable without any review of its appropriateness (sup. ct. reasons, at para. 56). vi conclusion [121] accordingly, the trial judge did not err in giving effect to the contract in the circumstances, and the court of appeal’s conclusion was correct i too would dismiss the appeal. [122] party and party costs are generally awarded to the successful party, but this court may, in its discretion, decide otherwise (supreme court act, rsc 1985, c. s-26, s 47; caron v. alberta, 2015 scc 56, [2015] 3 scr 511, at paras. 110 and 114; montréal (city) v octane stratégie inc., 2019 scc 57, at para. 95) the association, no doubt guided by the usual rule that is applied in family matters in quebec, argues that the parties should each pay their own costs in view of the nature of the appeal. mr. bouvier argues that we should award him costs on a solicitor-client basis because the association sought leave to raise issues of general importance and asked that the judgment under appeal be overturned, in order to make this appeal a test case. he notes that the association is asking us to set aside the judgment of the court of appeal, which, despite the difference of opinion between doyon j.a and hogue ja, unanimously concluded that the trial judgment should be affirmed. he also maintains that the association imposed upon him [translation] “a debate that would not otherwise have taken place before this honourable court, given that the respondent bisaillon did not seek leave to appeal the court of appeal’s decision” (rf, at para. 146). [123] this court has the discretion to depart from the usual practice and to order solicitor-client costs in exceptional circumstances (octane stratégie inc., at para. 95; mackin v. new brunswick (minister of finance), 2002 scc 13, [2002] 1 scr 405, at para. 86; roberge v. bolduc, [1991] 1 scr 374). such costs are awarded mainly in two types of circumstances: where there has been reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct by one of the parties (see, eg,. young v. young, [1993] 4 scr 3, at p 134) or where an appeal raises issues of general interest that go beyond the particular case of the successful party (see, eg,. finney v. barreau du québec, 2004 scc 36, [2004] 2 scr 17, at para. 48) there is nothing to suggest that the association’s conduct could justify such an order under the first category of exceptional cases. rather, the question is whether the request made by the respondent mr. bouvier is justified under the second category. [124] in my view, several factors weigh in favour of finding that this is an exceptional case that justifies an award of costs on a solicitor-client basis. that being said, the specific circumstances and the association’s status as a non-profit organization call for caution in this regard. [125] not only has mr. bouvier been successful in this court, as he was in the superior court and the court of appeal, but he has also had to mount a defence against a third party to the original litigation, a third party that, despite ms. bisaillon’s absence from the proceeding, is asking that the appeal be allowed. in the court of appeal, the association intervened as a friend of the court; as directed by the judge who authorized its intervention, the association confined itself to making submissions on questions of law relating to family mediation in order to provide the court of appeal with guidance (2017 qcca 1793, at paras. 5-6). when ms. bisaillon chose not to appeal the court of appeal’s decision, the association decided to give up its role as intervener and to seek leave to be substituted as appellant and to appeal the judgment. the court granted the association’s motion and its application with costs in the cause. in contrast to its role in the court of appeal, the association is asking this court to allow the appeal and uphold the objection to the evidence made by ms. bisaillon at trial despite the association’s stated intention of limiting its arguments to questions of law, it has taken a formal position on the merits of the decisions of the superior court and the court of appeal, decisions that, as we know, were based on significant findings of fact the respondent mr. bouvier therefore had to defend the decisions of the trial judge and the court of appeal or risk losing his case in this court. i also note that the association neglected to file in this court’s record several pieces of evidence on which the decisions of the courts below were based, including the emails and cheques exchanged by the parties and excerpts from the transcripts of the testimony of mr. bouvier and ms. bisaillon. this meant that mr. bouvier had to file in his respondent’s record the evidence needed to defend the judgments appealed from, in accordance with r 39 of the rules of the supreme court of canada, sor/2002-156. [126] at the hearing in this court, counsel for the association argued that [translation] “[t]he respondent bouvier, with respect, . . . did not have to be before you. he could have deferred to the court’s decision. he could also have done like the respondent bisaillon, who isn’t present, and not intervened” (transcript, at p 50). this argument must be rejected. the outcome of this appeal had serious implications for mr. bouvier given that his rights in the immovable that had served as a residence for the family were at stake and he risked incurring a direct and significant financial loss. he therefore had to defend the conclusions of the courts below, in addition to having to file the evidence the appellant had failed to file and to take a position on general questions of law. mr. bouvier did not have to personally bear the cost of such a “test case”, which went far beyond the facts of his original dispute (see friends of the oldman river society v. canada (minister of transport), [1992] 1 scr 3). [127] in addition, the association was on notice pursuant to the rules applicable in this court that it might have to pay exceptional costs in seeking to be substituted as appellant. it is true that the court agreed that the association could be substituted for ms. bisaillon as a party, but if it feared not being able to pay costs, it could have expressed this concern in its application for leave to appeal or requested a special undertaking as to costs, as was done by the respondents in roberge v. bolduc. [128] however, i am of the view that we should limit the total amount of solicitor-client costs to be awarded to mr. bouvier. [129] the association is a non-profit organization that, on the face of it, has no direct financial interest in the outcome of this appeal. moreover, mr. bouvier has not argued that he cannot bear the financial burden of this appeal. while he states that he is of more modest means than the association, it is clear from the evidence in the trial record that his situation is not comparable to that of the respondents in other cases where solicitor-client costs were awarded in roberge v bolduc, for example, the respondents’ resources were so limited that, without a favourable costs order, their counsel would have ceased representing them. [130] most importantly, i am mindful of the fact that awarding solicitor-client costs against the association could have a deterrent effect on other, less well-off organizations or litigants, who might hesitate to defend their rights or other unrepresented interests for fear that very high costs awards may be made against them if they raise questions of more general interest it is thus necessary to proceed with caution. in the very specific context of this case, i am of the view that a compromise is in order. [131] having regard to all of these considerations, i would dismiss the appeal and award mr. bouvier solicitor-client costs not exceeding $15,000, in addition to disbursements. the reasons of abella, karakatsanis and martin jj. were delivered by karakatsanis j — i. overview [132] the specific issue in this case is whether the exception to settlement privilege in union carbide canada inc. v. bombardier inc., 2014 scc 35, [2014] 1 scr 800, applies to the family mediation regime in quebec. more importantly, this case is about the centrality of confidentiality to family mediation and raises the appropriateness of importing a private law rule from the civil and commercial context without adapting it to address the special context of family law. [133] my colleague kasirer j concludes that the union carbide exception to settlement privilege applies to communications that occur during family mediation sessions in quebec although i agree with many aspects of kasirer j.’s thoughtful reasons, i cannot agree with this conclusion. in my view, discussions that occur within mediation sessions remain confidential and cannot be disclosed or adduced as evidence unless the parties specifically agree otherwise. rules relating to the confidentiality of settlement negotiations applied in civil and commercial cases cannot simply be transposed to the family law context: doing so undermines both the unique legal approach to family law settlements developed by our courts and the broader objectives of the family mediation regime. [134] our court has long recognized that family law settlements are unique. in decisions spanning at least four decades, this court has highlighted the central reality of vulnerability in family negotiations; the importance (and limitations) of legal representation to address that vulnerability; the need for distinct modes of calculating spouses’ economic contributions; the critical role of disclosure and informational symmetry; the influence of negotiations upon children; and the difficulties of balancing the personal autonomy of spouses to arrange their affairs, with rights granted under family legislative regimes.2 it has resisted importing principles that apply to commercial settlements into the family context, accepting that principles appropriate to other settings are often ill suited to address the issues that arise in the wake of a family breakdown and its leading case law on confidentiality in the commercial setting has referred to the family jurisprudence only by way of contrast: see union 2 rathwell v rathwell, [1978] 2 scr 436; pettkus v becker, [1980] 2 scr 834, at p 850; richardson v. richardson, [1987] 1 scr 857, at p 883, per la forest j., dissenting; pelech v. pelech, [1987] 1 scr 801, at p 850; lacroix v. valois, [1990] 2 scr 1259, at p 1278; moge v. moge, [1992] 3 scr 813, at p 848; peter v. beblow, [1993] 1 scr 980; bracklow v. bracklow, [1999] 1 scr. 420; boston v. boston, 2001 scc 43, [2001] 2 scr 413, at para. 55; miglin v. miglin, 2003 scc 24, [2003] 1 scr 303, at paras. 74 and 82; rick v. brandsema, 2009 scc 10, [2009] 1 scr 295, at paras. 1 and 43; lmp v ls, 2011 scc 64, [2011] 3 scr 775, at para. 15; quebec (attorney general) v. a, 2013 scc 5, [2013] 1 scr 61, at paras. 114 and 254; colucci v. colucci, 2021 scc 24, at para. 51. carbide, at para. 41 the two realms have developed separately for good reason i would not depart from that approach in this case. [135] the reasons for a unique approach to family law disputes are simple. family law seeks to manage human relationships in a particularly unique and challenging context the breakdown of a spousal relationship is often wrought with emotional turmoil, power imbalance and vulnerability. typically, family disputes cover a broad range of issues, from the primary legal issues of support, custody and access, and division of property, to the intricate untangling of interdependent family affairs — issues that often require cooperation on a sustained basis. when children are involved, the best interests of the child deserve the ongoing ability of parents to communicate and resolve disputes and in this context, settlement agreements must respond to changing circumstances and may not represent the final resolution of the parties’ issues. [136] because the family unit is an organizing feature of everyday life, efforts to reduce the collateral harm flowing from family separations have broad societal implications beyond the effects on the separating couple, particularly for children. given the pervasive incidence of family breakdowns, how family matters are resolved has implications for society more broadly. [137] special alternative dispute resolution (adr) regimes for family disputes now exist in each province, reflecting the increasing awareness by legislators and judges of the need to encourage a cooperative environment, particularly for the sake of children: b. landau, “overview of dispute resolution options”, in b. landau et al., the family dispute resolution handbook (6th ed 2018), 1, at p 3 special rules enhance the ability of parties to participate; provide better information and support as the parties navigate the process; ensure that vulnerable parties are protected; and institute more judicial involvement and oversight. [138] the family mediation process, therefore, not only strives to reach settlements it also aims to restructure relationships by cultivating dialogue and equipping the parties with the necessary tools to collectively navigate the traumatic upheaval of a family breakdown it invites the parties to work together to forge a stronger foundation for a continuing relationship, and the ability to respond to future circumstances. at the same time, mediation aims to compensate for pre-existing power imbalances that are often exacerbated by the economic consequences of separation. creating a confidential space where parties can speak freely and without prejudice is essential to achieving these goals. [139] in quebec, confidentiality is particularly crucial because the family mediation regime prohibits the presence of lawyers during mediation sessions, which take place before a trained and accredited mediator, who need not have legal training. the prohibition of lawyers means that parties do not necessarily know or contemplate the legal implications of what they say in an environment that is designed to be confidential. the absence of lawyers in the mediation room can also enhance, rather than mitigate, a power imbalance between the parties. [140] commercial mediation is intrinsically different: the parties are often sophisticated, they are usually assisted by counsel, and in most cases the only objective is reaching a settlement thus, in the commercial context, the justification for settlement privilege and its exception is to promote the settlement of legal disputes. but the disclosure of mediation discussions does not advance — and indeed, may undermine — other broader objectives of family mediation. a rule that applies in the context of commercial negotiations should not be used to undermine a unique mediation regime, which relies on confidentiality to support broader objectives of family law settlements. [141] the reasoning in union carbide is also incompatible with the framework of family mediation in quebec. as my colleague convincingly concludes, the unique structure of the regime does not permit the parties to reach any settlements during the mediation sessions, and there can be no binding offer and acceptance. it follows that the terms of an agreement can only be reached outside the mediation process. [142] even if union carbide were to apply to the family law context, it remains open to the parties to contract for greater confidentiality than is available at common law: paras. 49, 50 and 56 in my view, the standard mediation contract in quebec, properly interpreted, evinces an intention by the parties to maintain complete confidentiality with respect to any discussions that took place during mediation unless both parties otherwise agree. [143] thus, i agree with the association de médiation familiale du québec that any communications in the mediation sessions were inadmissible because they were protected by settlement privilege and the confidentiality terms of the contract and while i adopt kasirer j.’s conclusion that the summary of mediated agreements is merely the mediator’s understanding of the potential for agreement and does not reflect any contract, in my view, the summary of mediated agreements was inadmissible. in the unusual circumstances of this appeal, however, i am unable to conclude that the particular disposition in this case must be set aside. i would dismiss the appeal. [144] my reasons proceed as follows. first, i expand on the unique context of family disputes and settlement processes second, i explain that confidentiality is necessary to advance the broader objectives of family mediation. third, i demonstrate why the basis for the union carbide exception to settlement privilege is incompatible with the family law context. fourth, i set out how the standard mediation contract in quebec contemplates absolute confidentiality. finally, i address the merits and explain why the summary of mediated agreements was inadmissible in this case, before turning to the issue of costs. ii the unique context of family mediation [145] the long arc of our family law jurisprudence reflects an evolving understanding of the distinct challenges relating to the settlement of disputes in the family law context: rick v. brandsema, 2009 scc 10, [2009] 1 scr 295, at para. 1. indeed, a family breakdown is no ordinary legal issue. familial relationships are “not an economic partnership nor a mere business relationship, nor a casual encounter”: pettkus v. becker, [1980] 2 scr 834, at p 850. they may “be the location of safety and comfort . . . where [their] members have their most intimate human contact”; may represent an “emotional and economic support system”; and may serve as “a means to pass on the values that we deem to be central to our sense of community”: moge v. moge, [1992] 3 scr 813, at p 848. their dissolution may be a catastrophic event in the lives of participants. in these respects, “family law cases, and in particular cases involving marital settlements, stand on an entirely different footing from commercial cases”: logan v. williams (1989), 41 bclr (2d) 34 (ca), at p 42. [146] this court has consistently recognized the need for a discrete approach to address the challenges of resolving family disputes, adjusting the general private law for that purpose: see rathwell v. rathwell, [1978] 2 scr 436; pettkus; lacroix v. valois, [1990] 2 scr 1259, at p 1278; peter v. beblow, [1993] 1 scr 980; miglin v. miglin, 2003 scc 24, [2003] 1 scr 303, at para. 82; rick, at para. 43; lmp v. ls, 2011 scc 64, [2011] 3 scr 775, at para. 15 it has noted the sometimes devastating effects of separation (lacroix, at p 1275; moge, at p 871; bracklow v. bracklow, [1999] 1 scr 420; boston v. boston, 2001 scc 43, [2001] 2 scr 413, at para. 55; hartshorne v. hartshorne, 2004 scc 22, [2004] 1 scr 550, at para. 91, per deschamps j., dissenting in part), which can render parties “uniquely vulnerable” (rick, at para. 47), and “ill-equipped to form decisions of a permanent and legally binding nature”: miglin, at para. 74, citing j. d. payne and m. a. payne, dealing with family law: a canadian guide (1993), at p 78; see also richardson v. richardson, [1987] 1 scr 857, at p 883, per la forest j., dissenting. it has acknowledged that those vulnerabilities may beget or enable unseen forms of influence (miglin, at para. 75); and has emphasized the importance — and limitations — of independent legal advice in attenuating that risk: pelech v. pelech, [1987] 1 scr 801, at p 850; miglin, at para. 212, per lebel j., dissenting; hartshorne, at para. 60; rick, at paras. 60-61. it has emphasized the need for full and frank disclosure as a “precondition to good faith negotiation” (colucci v. colucci, 2021 scc 24, at para. 51), and a means of “protect[ing] the integrity of the result of negotiations undertaken in these uniquely vulnerable circumstances”: rick, at para. 47. and it has been alive to the breadth and prospective nature of family agreements, which may affect third parties, including children: miglin, at para. 76; lmp, at para. 15. it has explained, in light of this, that “contract law principles are not rigidly applied in the family law context”: lmp, at para. 15. [147] the majority’s conclusion that the rule in union carbide applies to mediation discussions in this case is grounded in the view that family mediation is not intrinsically different from commercial mediation (at paras. 43 and 106), and that the overarching objective of family mediation is to settle a legal dispute but the jurisprudence emphasizes that it is important to recognize the unique dimensions of family disputes, which fit uneasily within a civil and commercial paradigm the objectives of family mediation are much broader than simply promoting the settlement of a specific legal dispute. in particular, two overarching public interest objectives are key. [148] first, family mediation sets the groundwork for restructuring relationships that can navigate the traumatic consequences of familial breakdowns on a long-term basis, especially when children are involved: m-c. belleau, “la médiation familiale au québec: une approche volontaire, globale, interdisciplinaire et accessible”, in p-c. lafond, ed., régler autrement les différends (2nd ed 2018), 299, at no. 8-38. the aim of reshaping relationships carries much greater significance in the family context given the intimacy of family bonds indeed, “the restructuring of familial relationships rather than their termination . . is the central objective of the family justice process”: n. bala, “reforming family dispute resolution in ontario: systemic changes and cultural shifts”, in m. trebilcock, a. duggan and l. sossin, eds., middle income access to justice (2012), 271, at p 275; see also belleau, at no. 8-8 this objective is achieved through family mediation’s unique focus on promoting earnest discussions, dialogue and active listening: see belleau, at no. 8-16 in quebec, the priority placed on restructuring relationships is reflected in the interdisciplinary nature of the regime: it deals with every aspect of a relationship breakdown, whether the issues are emotional, relational, financial or legal in nature: m-c. belleau and g. talbot-lachance, “la valeur juridique des ententes issues de la médiation familiale: présentation des mésententes doctrinales et jurisprudentielles” (2008), 49 c de d 607, at p 615 this explains why mediators do not necessarily come from the legal profession; they may, for example, be guidance counsellors, psycho-educators, psychologists or social workers: belleau, at no. 8-13. [149] second, family mediation strives to protect vulnerable parties and compensate for power imbalances to achieve equitable outcomes the process is designed for parties who, in the tumult of separation, enter not as “emotionally neutral economic actors negotiating in the commercial context”, but as actors who “inevitably bring to the table a host of emotions and concerns that do not obviously accord with the making of rational economic decisions”: miglin, at para. 74. this objective plays a broader role in family mediation and negotiation than it does in commercial settings because the intimate nature of the relationship between the parties “makes it difficult to overcome potential power imbalances and modes of influence”: ibid., at paras. 74- 75. family mediation in quebec aims to reach a fair settlement, not just any form of settlement: committee of accrediting organizations in family mediation, standards of practice in family mediation (2016), at pp. 6 and 8. [150] quite simply, the family law context is not the same as a commercial law context. as the association argues, the situation of the parties, the processes, and the objectives of settlement in the two spheres are markedly different that is why this court has [translation] “repeatedly emphasized the uniquely emotional context surrounding the negotiation of agreements between spouses, which, as a result, cannot be looked upon as commercial contracts”: p. j. dalphond and a. nag, “le contexte social dans l’exercice du droit de la famille”, in collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2020-2021, vol. 4, droit de la famille (2020), 25, at p 35. iii the importance of confidentiality to the objectives of family mediation [151] in my view, confidentiality furthers mediation’s participatory and consensual foundations, as well as the objective of reaching settlements in the family context. moreover, the broader objectives of family mediation — restructuring familial relationships, protecting vulnerable parties — depend on complete confidentiality in the mediation sessions. the effectiveness of family mediation in promoting settlements is predicated on the creation of a confidential space where the parties can fully explore common ground on a diverse range of interrelated issues and engage without fear of legal repercussions. [152] first, confidentiality is essential for full and frank discussions, which are necessary to establishing functional familial dynamics going forward it is often a precondition to honest, open and constructive dialogue and negotiations: l. d. elrod, “the need for confidentiality in evaluative processes: arbitration and med/arb in family law cases” (2020), 58 fcr 26 the problem-solving focus of mediation depends upon the participants disclosing their underlying interests and needs, rather than just their bargaining positions or demands: j. watson hamilton, “protecting confidentiality in mandatory mediation: lessons from ontario and saskatchewan” (1999), 24 queen’s lj 561. if the sessions are not confidential, parties may hesitate to speak openly or to explore compromises for fear that their words may later be used against them in legal proceedings. indeed, confidentiality in family mediation “offers the needed reassurance that shared information will not be weaponized to injure family members or escalate family conflict”: f. tetunic and g. firestone, “confidentiality and privilege for family and child protection mediation: a roadmap for navigating the innovation, inconsistency and confusion” (2020), 58 fcr 46, at p 46. in this way, complete confidentiality during the mediation sessions promotes the objective of restructuring family relationships. [153] second, confidentiality is critical for protecting vulnerable parties and compensating for power imbalances. i agree with kasirer j.’s thorough outline of the procedural guarantees offered to vulnerable parties in the family mediation regime in quebec: paras. 55-88. i also endorse his conclusions that the unique structure of the regime does not permit the parties to reach any settlements during the mediation sessions and that the summary of mediated agreements cannot reflect a binding agreement between the parties: paras. 79 and 84. however, in my view, the regime’s protections do not guarantee that vulnerable parties will not unwittingly bind themselves to ill-advised agreements thus, i cannot accept that complete confidentiality is unnecessary for the protection of vulnerable parties. [154] complete confidentiality prevents the more powerful party from using the words of the more vulnerable party to substantiate an unfair agreement. this risk is pronounced in quebec given the regime’s prohibition on lawyers being present during the sessions: code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25.01, art. 617 as kasirer j. observes, this prohibition is designed to prevent mediation sessions from devolving into a dialogue between lawyers, and to facilitate cooperation by encouraging parties to address their issues together: paras. 50-51. yet, it is well recognized that lawyers help attenuate power imbalances between parties: miglin, at paras. 82 and 93; rick, at paras. 60-61 thus, in the absence of lawyers, confidentiality provides a necessary guard against the risk that the more powerful spouse may abuse the mediation process and capitalize on pre-existing power dynamics and vulnerabilities to elicit unfair compromises from the other spouse. [155] further, while family law mediators must be accredited and impartial, and have the duty to protect the integrity of the process and the rights of the participants, in practice, they will not always be able to intervene to protect vulnerable parties: see w. wiegers and m. keet, “collaborative family law and gender inequalities: balancing risks and opportunities” (2008), 46 osgoode hall l.j 733, at pp. 739, 750-51 and 754 abusive dynamics are not always evident and while judicial oversight of agreements provides a level of protection for the vulnerable party, its reach is limited, since only agreements involving issues of public order are subject to review by a court to determine their appropriateness. notably, it does not apply to questions of support and transfer of property between de facto spouses. [156] thus, i agree with the association that while the family mediation regime includes special protections for the vulnerable party, those protections cannot eliminate power imbalances between spouses, who participate in the mediation sessions without legal counsel. [157] in sum, the features unique to family mediation are best served by complete confidentiality over mediation sessions confidentiality is an added protection that permits full, meaningful and equitable participation without fear of legal repercussions. it is essential to meeting the broader objectives of the regime, both with respect to restructuring family dynamics and the protection of vulnerable parties, as well as to finding common ground between the parties. iv union carbide and family mediation [158] there are two overriding problems with the application of the settlement exception discussed in union carbide to confidential communications during the family mediation sessions first, the justification for the exception to settlement privilege — to encourage settlement of legal disputes — does not account for the unique context of family settlement, nor the broader objectives of family mediation. second, the exception’s underlying reasoning is fundamentally incompatible with the nature of family mediation in quebec. i address each in turn. [159] settlement privilege is a common law evidentiary rule that applies to all communications undertaken with the purpose of settling an action: union carbide, at para. 34, quoting sable offshore energy inc. v. ameron international corp., 2013 scc 37, [2013] 2 scr 623, at para. 14. it is subject to exceptions where “a defendant . show[s] that, on balance, ‘a competing public interest outweighs the public interest in encouraging settlement’”: union carbide, at para. 34, quoting sable offshore, at para. 19 exceptions should be applied with regard to their purpose and not mechanically: meyers v. dunphy, 2007 nlca 1, 262 nfld. & peir 173, at para. 19, citing unilever plc v the procter & gamble co., [2001] 1 all e.r 783 (ca), at p 789. [160] union carbide addressed one such exception as wagner j (as he then was) explained, protected communications may be disclosed in order to prove the existence or scope of a settlement: para. 35. he reasoned that the exception “makes sense because it serves the same purpose as the privilege itself: to promote settlements”: para. 35. [161] but as i have noted, encouraging the settlement of legal disputes is not the only public interest at stake in the family law context. finding common ground and cultivating safe environments for families to address disputes in the wake of conflict has significant societal implications. restructuring familial relationships and protecting vulnerable parties are additional policy interests. confidentiality is essential to meeting those objectives. the justifications for waiving settlement privilege set out in union carbide cannot, therefore, simply be transposed into family mediation. [162] in addition to the dissymmetry between the objectives of family mediation and the purpose of the exception to settlement privilege, the reasoning of union carbide does not hold in the family mediation context. in union carbide, the objective of promoting settlement was served by the possible disclosure of communications constituting the offer and acceptance of a contract as explained by a. w. bryant, s. n. lederman and m. k. fuerst (quoted in union carbide, at para. 35): if the negotiations are successful and result in a consensual agreement, then the communications may be tendered in proof of the settlement where the existence or interpretation of the agreement is itself in issue such communications form the offer and acceptance of a binding contract, and thus may be given in evidence to establish the existence of a settlement agreement. [emphasis added.] (the law of evidence in canada (3rd ed. 2009), at §14.340) yet, in the present context, no offer and acceptance can occur during mediation sessions it follows that the terms of an agreement can only be reached outside the mediation process. [163] union carbide suggests that it would be unreasonable, “[a]bsent an express provision to the contrary, . . . to assume that parties who have agreed to mediation for the purpose of reaching a settlement would renounce their right to prove the terms of the settlement”: para. 65 but the quebec mediation regime forecloses parties from reaching a settlement in mediation sessions — they are a forum for exploratory negotiations that may, but need not, lead to a settlement outside of mediation. [164] in summary, the reasoning in union carbide is incompatible with family mediation in quebec. the unique context and broader objectives of family mediation dictate a different approach. the family mediation regime in quebec requires that the mediation sessions be completely confidential, except where the parties expressly state otherwise. v confidentiality in the mediation contract [165] in any event, a straightforward interpretation of the mediation contract reveals an intention to provide greater confidentiality protections in this context than are otherwise afforded by settlement privilege. union carbide makes clear that “parties [may] contract for greater confidentiality protection than is available at common law”: para. 49; see also paras. 50 and 56. as explained in union carbide, at para. 47: “the question is whether an absolute confidentiality clause in a mediation agreement displaces the common law exception . . . .” furthermore, “[i]t must be asked whether the confidentiality clause actually conflicts with settlement privilege or with the recognized exceptions to that privilege”: para. 49. [166] the inquiry, in each case, begins with an interpretation of the contract: union carbide, at para. 49. this is centered on the intent of the parties and their true will at the time of forming the contract: civil code of québec (ccq), art. 1425. when a court is called upon to interpret a contract, it must consider its “nature . . . , the circumstances in which it was formed, the interpretation which has already been given to it by the parties or which it may have received, and usage”: art. 1426 ccq; see also union carbide, at para. 60 therefore, art. 1426 ccq permits the court to consider contextual elements external to the contract that can help reveal the common intention of the parties: groupe blouin inc v société radio-canada, 2016 qcca 1715, at para. 9 (canlii). [167] in this case, the trial judge (2017 qccs 3788) did not interpret the clauses of the contract to determine whether, in this context, those clauses displaced the exception to settlement privilege discussed in union carbide. a review of the text and nature of the contract, as well as the circumstances in which it was formed, leads to the conclusion that the parties intended complete confidentiality during mediation sessions, therefore displacing the exception to settlement privilege. [168] clauses 8 and 10 of the mediation contract state: [translation] 8 we acknowledge that the content of our meetings, of the interviews and of our file is confidential we commit ourselves to not use as a proof in front of a court any document contained in the file, including the summary of mediated agreements, without the consent of both parties. the mediator cannot communicate this information to anyone except when the law expressly orders it. 10. we are informed that the summary of mediated agreements prepared at the end of the mediation process will not constitute a legal document nor an enforceable agreement. it will serve to help the legal advisers who will be retained to prepare the appropriate legal documents. we are also informed that the signature of the summary of mediated agreements produces legal effects, even if it is not enforceable, and that it is preferable to obtain independent legal advice [before] signing it. (ar, at p 95) [169] these clauses confirm the vital importance of confidentiality a plain reading of cl. 8 implies that complete confidentiality reigns, unless and until both parties specifically agree otherwise. the complementary cl. 10 makes it clear that the mediation sessions are exploratory discussions that will not constitute binding agreements. references to the aim of resolving a dispute do not, in my view, limit the effect of these more specific clauses. [170] the text of the confidentiality clause in union carbide was similar to cl. 8 in this case. but whether the terms of the contract were “intended to . . . displace the exception . . . that applies where a party seeks to prove the existence or the scope of a settlement” (union carbide, at para. 62), cannot depend on similar wording alone. [171] the confidentiality clause in union carbide — part of a protracted thirty million dollar commercial lawsuit — was entered into in far different circumstances. the court’s interpretation of the contract reflected the dispute’s commercial backdrop. for example, the court referred to the united nations commission on international trade law’s model law on international commercial conciliation: paras. 52-53. further, the parties — large corporations — were advised and assisted by lawyers at every stage of the process. this can readily be distinguished from family mediation in both respects. [172] indeed, in the present context, the circumstances affirm what is made plain by the text: family mediation sessions are meant to assure complete confidentiality except where parties otherwise consent to disclosure the mediation contract’s unambiguous text carries particular importance because the parties sign the contract in front of the mediator, without legal counsel present: code of civil procedure, art. 617. the contract itself educates the parties about the process of family mediation, including any confidentiality protections they may be entitled to: belleau, at no. 8-41 they cannot be said to intend to accept a lesser confidentiality based on the settlement privilege exception that they most likely do not know exists. [173] moreover, as doyon j.a explains in his concurring opinion in the judgment under appeal, in interpreting this mediation contract it is necessary to consider the information made readily accessible to the public by the government of quebec (2020 qcca 115). that information emphasizes the complete confidentiality of communications during family mediation in order to encourage its use justice québec’s website advises the public: mediation is confidential and takes place behind closed doors. nothing revealed during a mediation session can be used as evidence in court. (mediation: nature and goals (online)) as doyon ja notes, the government has consistently emphasized family mediation’s confidential nature: para. 15 (canlii). the way this information is presented shapes the expectations of the parties with respect to mediation: r. field and n. wood, “marketing mediation ethically: the case of confidentiality” (2005), 5 qutljj. 143, at p 145. [174] in addition, many characteristics unique to family law and family mediation are relevant to understanding the parties’ true intentions in signing the mediation contract. first, the regime’s design and special rules promote an expectation that nothing parties say in the absence of counsel will be used against them to impose legal obligations. second, family mediation occurs when spouses are separating and touches upon the most intimate facets of their lives; facets the parties would naturally expect to remain confidential. third, as i have explained, reaching an agreement is not family mediation’s sole purpose — it also aims to restructure the familial relationship and protect vulnerable parties this is predicated on earnest discussions, honest dialogue and active listening; features best served by a confidential environment. [175] considered in light of all the circumstances, the mediation contract shows that the parties intended to maintain complete confidentiality. the contract, interpreted in context, implicitly excludes (and indeed conflicts with) the exception to settlement privilege during mediation sessions. the discussions that occurred during mediation sessions were confidential and could not be relied upon as evidence of the terms of a subsequent contract. vi merits and costs [176] as i have already stated, i agree with kasirer j and the association that no binding agreement can be reached during the mediation sessions. i also agree that the summary of mediated agreements cannot reflect a binding agreement and it is simply the mediator’s understanding of the potential basis for agreement at the conclusion of the mediation sessions. [177] however, i conclude that the summary of mediated agreements was not admissible the summary of mediated agreements contains protected confidential information. moreover, it is an out-of-court written statement made by the mediator and, when adduced to prove the truth of its contents, would be inadmissible under the prohibition against hearsay evidence (art. 2843 ccq). [178] thus, the trial judge erred in proceeding on the basis that a contract could have been formed during mediation sessions. he also erred in admitting confidential information from the mediation sessions and the summary of mediated agreements into evidence. i would sustain ms. bisaillon’s objection to the admissibility of the summary of mediated agreements to prove the terms of a contract formed after mediation sessions. [179] the trial judge concluded that a contract had been formed on december 10, 2012, concerning both property and financial compensation. he relied, at least in part, on the summary of mediated agreements, dated december 10, 2012, which he considered central to this case: para. 11 (canlii). further, the entirety of the evidence contained in the record before this court (apart from the summary of mediated agreements) refers only to child support and not to the transfer of property. however, given the limited record before this court, it is difficult to assess whether the evidence would otherwise have been sufficient to justify the trial judge’s conclusion regarding the existence of a contract. in these unusual circumstances — indeed, ms. bisaillon is not a party to this appeal — i am not persuaded that the disposition appealed from should be overturned. i would dismiss the appeal. in light of the association’s success on the legal issues, i would make no order as to costs. [180] the majority’s award of solicitor-client costs against the association in this case is unprecedented and unwarranted. of all the reported cases of this court, i could find only four cases where the court ordered solicitor-client costs against a private party that raised a question of public importance: see ouellet (trustee of), 2004 scc 64, [2004] 3 scr 348; lefebvre (trustee of), 2004 scc 63, [2004] 3 scr 326; cibc mortgage corp. v. vasquez, 2002 scc 60, [2002] 3 scr 168; and roberge v. bolduc, [1991] 1 scr 374. this court has never ordered costs on a solicitor-client basis against a non-profit organization that raised an issue of public importance. [181] in this case, the association was substituted as a party and granted leave to appeal because this court considered that the association raised an issue of public importance to family mediation in quebec the importance of these legal issues is evident from the extent of both the majority and concurring reasons in this case. an award of full indemnity or solicitor-client costs is an extraordinary measure that effectively penalizes this non-profit organization for bringing forth an issue of obvious importance to an area of law that touches the lives of so many canadians. it can only deter such parties from doing so in the future.
i. introduction i. introduction les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin [1] as state actors, police must respect the rights and freedoms of all canadians and be accountable to the public they serve and protect. at the same time, police require various investigative techniques to enforce the criminal law. while giving wide latitude to police to investigate crime in the public interest, the law also imposes constraints on certain police methods. [1] en tant que représentants de l’état, les corps de police doivent respecter les droits et libertés de toute la population canadienne et rendre des comptes au public qu’ils servent et protègent. par ailleurs, les corps de police ont besoin de diverses techniques d’enquête pour appliquer le droit criminel. bien que le droit confère à ceux‑ci une grande latitude pour effectuer des enquêtes criminelles dans l’intérêt public, il impose également des contraintes à l’égard de certaines de leurs méthodes. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 591 [2] for that reason, this court in r v. mack, [1988] 2 scr 903, sanctioned, but narrowly confined, the power of police to step beyond their normal investi‑ gative role and tempt people into committing crim‑ inal offences. where they do so without reasonable suspicion, or where they go further and induce the commission of a criminal offence, they commit en‑ trapment. without a requirement of reasonable sus‑ picion, the police could target individuals at random, thereby invading people’s privacy, exposing them to temptation and generating crimes that would not otherwise have occurred. such conduct threatens the rule of law, undermines society’s sense of decency, justice and fair play, and amounts to an abuse of the legal process of such significance that, where it is shown to have occurred, a stay of proceedings is required. [3] these appeals concern the application of this settled doctrine to investigations of suspected dial‑ a‑dope operations, in which drug traffickers use cell phones to connect with their customers and sell them illicit drugs. specifically, we are asked to determine when and how reasonable suspicion is established when an officer receives a tip or information that a phone number may be used for drug dealing. [2] pour cette raison, dans l’arrêt r c mack, [1988] 2 rcs 903, la cour a reconnu, mais étroitement circonscrit, le pouvoir de la police d’outrepasser son rôle habituel d’enquête et de tenter d’amener des gens à commettre des infractions criminelles. lorsqu’elle le fait sans avoir de soupçons raisonna‑ bles, ou lorsqu’elle va plus loin et incite une personne à commettre une infraction criminelle, il y a provo‑ cation policière. sans l’exigence des soupçons rai‑ sonnables, la police pourrait cibler des personnes au hasard, portant ainsi atteinte à la vie privée de gens, les exposant à la tentation et provoquant des crimes qui n’auraient autrement pas eu lieu. une telle con‑ duite menace la primauté du droit, mine le sens de la décence, de la justice et du franc‑jeu qu’a la société et constitue un abus de procédure d’une importance telle que, lorsque son existence est démontrée, un arrêt des procédures est requis. [3] les présents pourvois portent sur l’applica‑ tion de cette doctrine établie aux enquêtes sur de présumées opérations de vente de drogue sur appel (« dial‑a‑dope »), dans le cadre desquelles des trafi‑ quants de drogue utilisent des téléphones cellulaires pour communiquer avec leurs clients et leur vendre des drogues illicites. plus précisément, nous sommes appelés à établir quand et comment les soupçons raisonnables sont établis dans le cas où un policier est avisé qu’un numéro de téléphone serait utilisé pour faire le trafic de drogue. [4] we say our jurisprudence affirms that police cannot offer a person who answers a cell phone the opportunity to commit an offence without having formed reasonable suspicion that the person using that phone, or that phone number, is engaged in criminal activity. whether the police are targeting a person, place or phone number, the legal standard for entrapment is a uniform one, requiring reasonable suspicion in all cases where police provide an op‑ portunity to commit a criminal offence. reasonable suspicion is a familiar legal standard that provides courts with the necessary objective basis on which to determine whether the police have justified their actions. a bare tip from an unverified source that [4] nous affirmons que notre jurisprudence con‑ firme que la police ne peut offrir à une personne qui répond à un téléphone cellulaire l’occasion de com‑ mettre une infraction sans avoir de soupçons raison‑ nables que la personne qui utilise ce téléphone, ou ce numéro de téléphone, se livre à une activité criminelle. que la police cible une personne, un lieu ou un numéro de téléphone, la norme juridi que à appliquer dans le contexte de la provocation policière est uniforme; elle exige que la police ait des soupçons raisonna‑ bles dans tous les cas où elle donne une occasion de commettre une infraction criminelle. la norme des soupçons raisonnables est une norme juridique courante qui fournit aux tribunaux le fondement 592 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. someone is dealing drugs from a phone number can‑ not ground reasonable suspicion. [5] in each of these two appeals, the police received an unsubstantiated tip that a phone number was asso‑ ciated with drug dealing. an officer called the num‑ ber and, after a brief conversation, requested drugs. in javid ahmad’s case, the trial judge, allen j., con‑ cluded that ahmad was not entrapped because the police did not offer him an opportunity to traffic drugs until they had sufficiently corroborated the tip in the course of the conversation (2015 onsc 652). in landon williams’ case, trotter j found that williams was entrapped because the police provided him an opportunity to sell cocaine before forming a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in drug trafficking (2014 onsc 2370, 11 cr (7th) 110). the court of appeal dismissed ahmad’s appeal and allowed the crown appeal in williams’ case (2018 onca 534, 141 or (3d) 241). [6] applying mack, we agree with both trial judges. ahmad was not entrapped, but williams was. we would therefore dismiss ahmad’s appeal but allow williams’ appeal. objectif nécessaire pour établir si la police a justifié ses actions. une simple information provenant d’une source non vérifiée portant qu’une personne fait le trafic de drogue à l’aide d’un numéro de téléphone ne peut fonder des soupçons raisonnables. [5] dans chacun des présents pourvois, la police avait reçu une information non confirmée selon laquelle un numéro de téléphone était associé au trafic de drogue. un policier a appelé au numéro et, après une brève conversation, il a demandé s’il pouvait avoir des drogues dans le cas de javid ahmad, la juge du procès, la juge allen, a conclu que m. ahmad n’avait pas été victime de provocation policière parce que la police ne lui a offert l’occasion de faire le trafic de drogue qu’après avoir suffisam‑ ment corroboré l’information lors de la conversation (2015 onsc 652). dans le cas de landon williams, le juge trotter a conclu que m. williams avait été victime de provocation policière parce que la po‑ lice lui a donné l’occasion de vendre de la cocaïne avant d’avoir des soupçons raisonnables qu’il se livrait au trafic de drogue (2014 onsc 2370, 11 cr (7th) 110). la cour d’appel a rejeté l’appel interjeté par m. ahmad et a accueilli celui formé par la couronne dans l’instance concernant m. williams (2018 onca 534, 141 or (3d) 241). [6] en nous appuyant sur l’arrêt mack, nous sous crivons à l’opinion des deux juges du procès. monsieur ahmad n’a pas été victime de provoca‑ tion policière, mais m. williams l’a été. nous som‑ mes donc d’avis de rejeter l’appel de m. ahmad, mais d’accueillir celui de m williams. ii background a ahmad ii contexte a monsieur ahmad [7] detective constable michael limsiaco received information from another officer that a person named “romeo” was selling drugs using a specified phone number. dc. limsiaco called the number without investigating the reliability of the information or how the other officer had procured it. dc. limsiaco’s [7] le gendarme‑détective michael limsiaco avait été informé par un autre policier qu’une personne dénommée « romeo » vendait de la drogue à l’aide d’un numéro de téléphone précis le gendarme‑ détective limsiaco a appelé au numéro sans avoir vérifié la fiabilité de cette information ou cherché [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 593 understanding was that the other officer had received the tip from a confidential source. [8] after a brief conversation, the officer asked for “2 soft”, meaning two grams of powder cocaine. the man on the line subsequently agreed to meet to effect the sale. the officer went to the meeting place, called the number again, met the man who answered the phone, and exchanged $140 for two small plastic bags of cocaine. police arrested and searched the man, later revealed to be ahmad. on his person, police found an envelope with the handwritten word “romeo” on it containing cash, the $140, the cell phone that had been used to set up the transaction, and two small bags of powder cocaine. in ahmad’s backpack, the police found a large quantity of co‑ caine and three envelopes containing cash. [9] allen j concluded that ahmad was not en‑ trapped. ahmad was convicted of one count of pos‑ session of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and two counts of possession of the proceeds of crime. à savoir comment l’autre policier l’avait obtenue. selon ce que le gendarme‑détective limsiaco avait compris, l’autre policier avait reçu l’information d’une source confidentielle. [8] après une brève conversation, le policier a demandé s’il pouvait avoir [traduction] « 2 de coupée » (« 2 soft »), ce qui signifie deux grammes de poudre de cocaïne. l’homme au bout du fil a par la suite accepté de le rencontrer pour réaliser la vente. le policier s’est rendu au lieu de rencontre, a rappelé au numéro de téléphone, a rencontré l’homme qui a répondu au téléphone et lui a remis la somme de 140 $ en échange de deux petits sachets de cocaïne. des policiers ont arrêté et fouillé l’homme, qui a été identifié plus tard comme étant m ahmad. les policiers ont trouvé sur lui une enveloppe portant le prénom « romeo » écrit à la main et contenant de l’argent comptant, soit la somme de 140 $, le télé‑ phone cellulaire qui avait été utilisé pour organiser la transaction et deux petits sachets de poudre de cocaïne. dans le sac à dos de m. ahmad, les policiers ont trouvé une grande quantité de cocaïne et trois enveloppes contenant de l’argent comptant. [9] la juge allen a conclu que m. ahmad n’avait pas été victime de provocation policière. celui‑ci a été déclaré coupable d’un chef d’accusation de possession de cocaïne en vue d’en faire le trafic et de deux chefs d’accusation de possession de produits de la criminalité. b williams b monsieur williams [10] detective constable brooke hewson, a member of the drug squad, received an informa‑ tion package from another officer about “jay”, who was alleged to be selling cocaine in a certain area in toronto. the package identified “jay” as landon williams and included a collection of in‑ formation about him, including that, according to a tip, he was a “cocaine dealer” who worked in a certain area. the record discloses that the tip was from a confidential source of unknown reliability but not what the tip actually said, how williams was [10] la gendarme‑détective brooke hewson, membre de l’escouade antidrogue, avait reçu d’un autre policier un dossier d’information au sujet d’un dénommé « jay », qui vendrait de la cocaïne dans un certain secteur de toronto. ce dossier identifiait « jay » comme landon williams et comprenait des renseignements à son sujet, notamment l’informa‑ tion selon laquelle il était un [traduction] « trafi‑ quant de cocaïne » dans un secteur en particulier. le dossier indiquait que l’information provenait d’une source confidentielle dont la fiabilité était inconnue, 594 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. connected to the name “jay”, or the currency of the informa tion. [11] dc. hewson did not ask about the reliability of the source or the currency of the information. she had been involved in williams’ arrest 20 months earlier for trafficking cocaine, although williams ultimately pleaded guilty to simple possession. she had not known him to use the name “jay”. [12] detective constable tony canepa was given some of this information and called the number. the man who answered the phone confirmed his name was “jay”. the officer said that he needed “80   . [h]ard”, meaning $80 worth of crack cocaine, and the man replied that they should meet at a particular intersection. the officer met the man, later revealed to be williams, and exchanged $80 for the crack cocaine. eleven days later, he arranged a second transaction and made the same purchase. the next month, police arrested williams. [13] at the end of the crown’s case, williams ac‑ knowledged that the evidence established his guilt on two counts of trafficking cocaine and two counts of possession of the proceeds of crime. trotter j. found there was no reasonable suspicion before the officer provided the opportunity to commit a crime and entered a stay. mais n’indiquait pas son contenu exact; il n’indiquait pas non plus de quelle façon m. williams était lié au prénom « jay » ou si cette information était actuelle. [11] la gendarme‑détective hewson n’a pas posé de questions quant à la fiabilité de la source ou à l’actualité de l’information. elle avait participé à l’arrestation de m. williams pour trafic de cocaïne 20 mois auparavant, mais celui‑ci avait finalement plaidé coupable à une accusation de possession simple. elle ne savait pas qu’il utilisait le prénom « jay ». [12] le gendarme‑détective tony canepa a reçu certains de ces renseignements et a appelé le numéro. l’homme qui a répondu au téléphone a confirmé qu’il se nommait « jay ». le policier a dit qu’il avait besoin pour [traduction] « 80 [  ] de roche » (« 80    [h]ard »), ce qui veut dire pour 80 $ de crack, et l’homme lui a répondu qu’ils devraient se rencontrer à une intersection précise. le policier a rencontré l’homme, qui s’est révélé plus tard être m. williams, et lui a échangé 80 $ pour du crack. onze jours plus tard, il a organisé une deuxième transaction et a effectué le même achat. le mois suivant, la police a arrêté m williams. [13] après que la couronne eut fini de présenter sa preuve, m. williams a reconnu que celle‑ci établissait sa culpabilité à l’égard de deux chefs d’accusation de trafic de cocaïne et de deux chefs d’accusation de possession de produits de la criminalité le juge trotter a conclu que le policier n’avait aucun soupçon raisonnable lorsqu’il a donné l’occasion de commettre un crime à m. williams, et il a ordonné l’arrêt des procédures. c court of appeal decision c décision de la cour d’appel [14] the crown appeal from the stay in williams’ case and the defence appeal from the conviction in ahmad’s case were heard together hourigan ja, writing for himself and brown ja, held that entrapment was not made out for either ahmad or williams. he concluded that where reasonable sus‑ picion relates to the phone number itself, the police can provide opportunities to commit offences to a [14] l’appel interjeté par la couronne contre l’arrêt des procédures prononcé dans le cas de m. williams et l’appel interjeté par la défense contre la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée dans le cas de m. ahmad ont été instruits ensemble le juge hourigan, s’expri mant en son nom et en celui du juge brown, a statué qu’il n’avait pas été prouvé que m. ahmad et m. williams avaient été victimes de provocation [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 595 person associated with that phone number, even if they do not also have a reasonable suspicion about the person who answers the phone. himel j (ad hoc) concurred in the result, but disagreed with the ma‑ jority’s differentiation between reasonable suspicion over a phone number and reasonable suspicion over the individual who answers that phone. policière. il a conclu que lorsque les soupçons raison‑ nables se rapportent au numéro de téléphone comme tel, la police peut donner à une personne associée à ce numéro des occasions de commettre des infractions, et ce, même si elle n’a pas de soupçons raisonnables à l’égard de la personne qui répond au téléphone. la juge himel (ad hoc) a souscrit au résultat, mais pas à la distinction faite par les juges majoritaires entre les soupçons raisonnables à l’égard d’un numéro de téléphone et les soupçons raisonnables à l’égard de la personne qui répond à un appel sur cette ligne. iii the entrapment doctrine iii la doctrine de la provocation policière a the principles of the entrapment doctrine in mack and barnes a les principes de la doctrine de la provocation policière établis dans les arrêts mack et barnes [15] over 30 years ago, this court’s decision in mack settled the law of entrapment in canada. it set out two alternative branches, either of which is sufficient to ground an accused’s claim of entrapment and justify a stay of proceedings: il y a plus de 30 ans, la décision de la cour [15] dans l’arrêt mack a fixé le droit de la provocation policière au canada. deux volets y ont été étab‑ lis, lesquels peuvent tous deux être suffisants pour fonder l’allégation de provocation policière d’un accusé et justifier un arrêt des procédures : there is, therefore, entrapment when: (a) the author‑ ities provide an opportunity to persons to commit an of‑ fence without reasonable suspicion or acting mala fides    or, (b) having a reasonable suspicion or acting in the course of a bona fide inquiry, they go beyond providing an opportunity and induce the commission of an offence. [p. 959] il y a, par conséquent, provocation policière lorsque : a) les autorités fournissent l’occasion de com‑ mettre une infraction en l’absence de soupçon raisonnable ou agissent de mauvaise foi [  ] ou b) ayant des soupçons raisonnables ou au cours d’une véritable enquête, elles ne se contentent pas de fournir une occasion de commettre une infraction mais incitent à la commettre. [p. 959] [16] at the most general level, the doctrine ex‑ ists because “[i]t is a deeply ingrained value in our democratic system that the ends do not justify the means” (mack, at p 938). some of those means are unacceptable in a free society with strong notions of fairness, decency, and privacy. although police must be afforded latitude, entrapment is a species of abuse of process because police involvement in the commission of a crime can bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [16] au niveau le plus général, la doctrine existe parce qu’« [u]ne valeur profondément enracinée de notre système démocratique est que la fin ne justifie pas les moyens » (mack, p 938). certains de ces moyens sont inacceptables dans une société libre ayant de solides principes d’équité, de décence et de protection de la vie privée. bien que la police doive disposer d’une certaine latitude, la provoca‑ tion policière est un type d’abus de procédure car la participation policière à la perpétration d’un crime est susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice. [17] mack determined that the purpose and ra‑ tionale of the entrapment doctrine lies in a court’s [17] dans l’arrêt mack, la cour a statué que l’ob‑ jet et le fondement de la doctrine de la provocation 596 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its own processes. entrapment is not a substantive defence leading to an acquittal, because in most cases the es‑ sential elements of the offence will be satisfied, even where entrapment occurred. rather, the appropriate remedy is a stay of proceedings because “while on the merits the accused may not deserve an acquittal, the crown by its abuse of process is disentitled to a conviction” and a conviction would therefore bring the administration of justice into disrepute (mack, at p. 944 (emphasis deleted), citing r v. jewitt, [1985] 2 scr 128, at p 148). such a remedy also affirms the primacy of personal freedom: the state simply has no business unjustifiably intruding into individ‑ uals’ private lives, randomly testing their virtue, and manufacturing crime (mack, at p 941). [18] some crimes, however, are particularly dif‑ ficult to investigate because they are “consensual” (such as drug trafficking), victimize those who are reluctant or unable to report them (such as child luring), or lead to such great harm that they must be actively prevented (such as terrorism) (mack, at p. 916; amato v. the queen, [1982] 2 scr 418, at p. 457, per estey j., dissenting; a. ashworth, “what is wrong with entrapment?”, [1999] sing. jls 293, at pp 293‑94). it is therefore in the public interest to allow police the flexibility to develop effective, pro‑ active law‑enforcement measures to suppress crime. policière résident dans le pouvoir inhérent du tri‑ bunal d’empêcher tout abus de ses procédures. la provocation policière n’est pas un moyen de défense au fond menant à un acquittement car, dans la plu‑ part des cas, les éléments essentiels de l’infraction seront réunis, même lorsqu’il y a eu provocation policière. il convient plutôt d’ordonner un arrêt des procédures parce que, « sur le plan du fond, il se peut que l’accusé ne mérite pas d’être acquitté, et que la poursuite est incapable d’obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité en raison de l’abus de procédure qu’elle a commis », et une déclaration de culpabilité est donc susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice (mack, p. 944 (soulignement omis), citant r c. jewitt, [1985] 2 rcs 128, p 148). une telle réparation confirme également la primauté de la liberté de la personne : il n’appartient tout sim‑ plement pas à l’état de s’ingérer de façon injustifiée dans la vie privée des individus, à éprouver au hasard leur vertu et à créer un crime (mack, p 941). [18] cependant, il est particulièrement difficile de faire enquête sur certains crimes parce qu’ils sont «  consensuels  » (comme le trafic de drogue), ils victimisent ceux qui sont réticents à les signaler ou incapables de le faire (comme le leurre d’enfants) ou ils causent un préjudice si grave qu’il faut les empêcher de façon active (comme le terrorisme) (mack, p. 916; amato c. la reine, [1982] 2 rcs. 418, p. 457, le juge estey, dissident; a. ashworth, « what is wrong with entrapment? », [1999] sing. jls 293, p 293‑294). il est donc dans l’intérêt public que la police ait la flexibilité nécessaire pour élaborer des mesures efficaces et proactives destinées à faire respecter la loi en vue de la répression de la criminalité. [19] to reconcile these competing imperatives, the court imposed a safeguard against opportunity‑based entrapment. on the first branch in mack, at issue in these appeals, police may present an opportunity to commit a crime only upon forming reasonable sus‑ picion that either: (1) a specific person is engaged in criminal activity; or (2) people are carrying out criminal activity at a specific location, sometimes referred to as a bona fide inquiry (mack, at pp. 956 [19] afin de concilier ces impératifs concurrents, la cour a imposé une mesure de protection contre la provocation policière fondée sur l’occasion. selon le premier volet du critère établi dans l’arrêt mack, dont il est question dans les présents pourvois, la police peut donner une occasion de commettre un crime seulement si elle a des soupçons raisonnables : (1) qu’une personne en particulier prend part à une activité criminelle; ou (2) que des personnes se livrent [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 597 and 959; confirmed in r v. barnes, [1991] 1 scr. 449, at p 463). [20] the reasons in mack make clear that a bona fide inquiry into a location is premised upon and tethered to reasonable suspicion. an investigation is “bona fide” where the police have a reasonable suspi‑ cion over a location or area, as well as a genuine pur‑ pose of investigating and repressing crime. a bona fide investigation is not a separate and freestanding way for police to entrap an individual, but a means of expressing the threshold of reasonable suspicion in a location. the offer of an opportunity to commit a crime must always be based upon a reasonable suspicion of particular criminal activity, whether by a person, in a place defined with sufficient precision, or a combination of both. [21] the court affirmed these principles in barnes. there, the court found the police had engaged in a bona fide inquiry by providing people within an area of the granville mall in vancouver the opportunity to sell drugs. their reasonable suspicion, the court held, was grounded on objective extrinsic evidence that showed significant drug dealing activity in the area (barnes, at pp 460‑62). this provided an expla‑ nation, which a court could meaningfully review, for why people were being targeted in that area. [22] this framework balances and reconciles im‑ portant public interests. the rule of law, and the need to protect privacy interests and personal freedom from state overreach are balanced against the state’s legitimate interest in investigating and prosecuting crime by permitting but also constraining entrap‑ ment techniques (mack, at pp 941‑42). à des activités criminelles dans un lieu précis, ce que l’on appelle parfois une « véritable enquête » (mack, p. 956 et 959; confirmé dans r c barnes, [1991] 1 rcs 449, p 463). [20] les motifs dans l’arrêt mack indiquent claire‑ ment qu’une véritable enquête à l’égard d’un lieu est fondée sur des soupçons raisonnables et s’y rattache. une enquête est « véritable » lorsque la police a des soupçons raisonnables à l’égard d’un lieu ou d’un secteur, et qu’elle a l’objectif réel d’enquêter et de réprimer des activités criminelles. une vérita‑ ble enquête ne constitue pas un moyen distinct et indépendant dont dispose la police pour piéger une personne, mais un moyen d’exprimer le critère des soupçons raisonnables à l’égard d’un lieu. l’offre d’une occasion de commettre un crime doit toujours être fondée sur des soupçons raisonnables d’une activité criminelle précise, que ce soit par une per‑ sonne, dans un lieu défini avec suffisamment de pré‑ cision ou une combinaison de ces deux éléments. [21] la cour a confirmé ces principes dans l’arrêt barnes, où elle a conclu que la police avait mené une véritable enquête en donnant à des personnes se trou‑ vant dans un secteur de granville mall à vancouver l’occasion de vendre de la drogue. la cour a statué que les soupçons raisonnables de la police étaient fondés sur des éléments de preuve extrinsèques ob‑ jectifs indiquant qu’un important trafic de drogue se faisait dans le secteur (barnes, p. 460‑462); cela expliquait pourquoi les personnes fréquentant le sec‑ teur en question étaient visées, cette explication pou‑ vant faire l’objet d’un examen judiciaire véritable. [22] ce cadre d’analyse met en équilibre et concilie d’importants intérêts publics. la primauté du droit et la nécessité de protéger le droit à la vie privée et la liberté personnelle de la portée excessive de l’état sont mis en balance avec l’intérêt légitime de l’état à faire enquête sur les crimes et à intenter des poursuites contre leurs auteurs en permettant, mais aussi en restreignant, les techniques de provocation policière (mack, p 941‑942). [23] we see no reason to alter this carefully cal‑ ibrated balance struck in mack and affirmed in barnes the entrapment framework has proved [23] nous ne voyons aucune raison de modifier cet équilibre soigneusement pondéré énoncé dans l’arrêt mack et confirmé dans l’arrêt barnes le 598 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. workable for decades in a variety of contexts, in‑ cluding drug trafficking (r v. campbell, [1999] 1 scr 565, at para. 21), terrorism (r v. nuttall, 2018 bcca 479, 368 ccc (3d) 1, at paras. 417‑43), and child luring (r v. bayat, 2011 onca 778, 280 ccc (3d) 36, at paras 15‑23). it has stood the test of time, furnishing a principled, stable and generally applicable doctrine that is fully capable of adapting to a variety of circumstances and responding to the evolution of crime and police tactics. no principled reason supports departing from it. cadre d’analyse relatif à la provocation policière est appliqué efficacement depuis des décennies dans divers contextes, dont ceux du trafic de drogue (r c. campbell, [1999] 1 rcs 565, par. 21), du terro risme (r c nuttall, 2018 bcca 479, 368 ccc (3d) 1, par. 417‑443) et du leurre d’enfants (r c. bayat, 2011 onca 778, 280 ccc (3d) 36, par 15‑23). il a résisté à l’épreuve du temps, four‑ nissant une doctrine fondée sur des principes, stable et généralement applicable qui peut tout à fait être adaptée à diverses circonstances et à l’évolution du crime et des tactiques policières. aucune raison de principe ne justifie de s’en écarter. b objective reasonable suspicion ensures judicial oversight over police conduct b les soupçons raisonnables objectifs garantissent un contrôle judiciaire de la conduite policière in every context, the reasonable suspicion [24] standard ensures courts can conduct meaningful ju‑ dicial review of what the police knew at the time the opportunity was provided (r v. chehil, 2013 scc 49, [2013] 3 scr 220, at paras. 26 and 58; r v mackenzie, 2013 scc 50, [2013] 3 scr. 250, at para 41). this standard requires the police to disclose the basis for their belief and to show that they had legitimate reasons related to criminal‑ ity for targeting an individual or the people associ‑ ated with a location (k. roach, “entrapment and equality in terrorism prosecutions: a comparative examination of north american and european approaches” (2011), 80 miss lj 1455, at pp. 1472‑ 73; ashworth, at pp 304‑5). an objective standard like reasonable suspicion allows for exacting curial scrutiny of police conduct for conformance to the canadian charter of rights and freedoms and soci‑ ety’s sense of decency, justice, and fair play because it requires objectively discernible facts. as is the case with warrantless searches, “the trial judge [must be]    in a position to ascertain [these objective facts], and not bound by the personal conclusions of the officer who conducted the [investigation]” (p. sankoff and s. perrault, “suspicious searches: what’s so reasonable about them?” (1999), 24 cr (5th) 123, at p 126 (emphasis added)). this is essential to upholding the rule of law and prevent‑ ing the state from arbitrarily infringing individuals’ [24] dans tous les contextes, la norme des soupçons raisonnables permet aux tribunaux de procéder à un véritable examen judiciaire des ren‑ seignements dont disposait la police au moment où l’occasion de commettre un crime a été donnée (r c. chehil, 2013 csc 49, [2013] 3 rcs 220, par. 26 et 58; r c mackenzie, 2013 csc 50, [2013] 3 rcs 250, par 41). cette norme exige des polici‑ ers qu’ils dévoilent le fondement de leur croyance et qu’ils démontrent qu’ils avaient des motifs légitimes relatifs à la criminalité de cibler une ou des per‑ sonnes associées à un lieu (k. roach, « entrapment and equality in terrorism prosecutions  : a comparative examination of north american and european approaches » (2011), 80 miss lj 1455, p. 1472‑1473; ashworth, p 304‑305). une norme objective comme celle des soupçons raisonnables permet aux tribunaux de soumettre la conduite policière à un contrôle rigoureux afin de s’assurer qu’elle respecte la charte canadienne des droits et libertés et le sens de la décence, de la justice et du franc‑jeu de la société parce qu’elle exige des faits objectivement discernables. comme c’est le cas pour les fouilles sans mandat, [traduction] « le juge du procès [doit être] [  ] en mesure de confirmer [ces faits objectifs], et il ne doit pas être lié par les conclusions personnelles du policier qui a effectué [l’enquête] » (p. sankoff et s. perrault, « suspicious searches : what’s so reasonable about them? » [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 599 privacy interests and personal freedoms (chehil, at para 45). [25] doherty ja, in r v simpson (1993), 79 ccc (3d) 482 (ont. ca), at pp. 502‑3, makes the point compellingly: a reasonable suspicion standard is necessary where there is the fundamental need to balance society’s interest in the detection and punishment of crime with its interest in maintaining individual freedoms. a careful balancing of interests is as relevant in entrapment as it is in warrantless searches and detention. in each case, the reasonable suspicion standard is uniquely “designed to avoid indiscriminate and discriminatory” police conduct (chehil, at para. 30; see also paras. 3, 26 and 47; r v. kang‑brown, 2008 scc 18, [2008] 1 scr 456, at paras. 75‑77 and 165; simpson, at p 502). this is particularly critical in cases of entrapment, since entrapment is a “breeding ground for racial profil‑ ing” (d m tanovich, “rethinking the bona fides of entrapment” (2011), 43 ubcl. rev. 417, at p. 432), and has “a disproportionate impact on poor and racialized communities” (pp 417‑18). courts must be able to assess the extent to which the police, in seeking to form reasonable suspicion over a person or a place, rely upon overtly discriminatory or stere‑ otypical thinking, or upon “intuition” or “hunches” that easily disguise unconscious racism and stere‑ otyping (t. quigley, annotation to r v. sterling (2004), 23 cr (6th) 54, at p 55; r v. faqi, 2010 abpc 157, 491 ar 194, at para. 14; tanovich, at pp. 437‑38; mackenzie, at paras 64‑65). (1999), 24 cr (5th) 123, p. 126 (nous soulignons)). ce concept est essentiel pour maintenir la primauté du droit et empêcher l’état de porter atteinte arbi‑ trairement aux droits à la vie privée et aux libertés personnelles des individus (chehil, par 45). [25] dans l’arrêt r c. simpson (1993), 79 ccc. (3d) 482 (ca. ont.), p. 502‑503, le juge doherty souligne de façon convaincante que la norme des soupçons raisonnables doit être appliquée lorsqu’il est fondamentalement nécessaire d’établir un équili‑ bre entre l’intérêt de la société à ce que les crimes soient détectés et sanctionnés et son intérêt à ce que les liber tés individuelles soient préservées. un juste équilibre entre les intérêts est aussi pertinent dans les cas de provocation policière que dans les cas de fouilles sans mandat et de détention. dans chaque cas, la norme des soupçons raisonnables est spécifiquement « conçue pour prévenir [les con‑ duites policières] aveugles et discriminatoires  » (chehil, par. 30; voir aussi les par. 3, 26 et 47; r c. kang‑brown, 2008 csc 18, [2008] 1 rcs 456, par. 75‑77 et 165; simpson, p 502). cet aspect est particulièrement important dans les cas de provoca‑ tion policière, car celle‑ci est un [traduction] « ter‑ reau propice au profilage racial » (d m tanovich, « rethinking the bona fides of entrapment » (2011), 43 ubcl. rev. 417, p. 432) et a « des répercus‑ sions disproportionnées sur les collectivités pau‑ vres et racialisées  » (p.  417‑418) les tribunaux doivent pouvoir évaluer la mesure dans laquelle les soupçons raisonnables de la police à l’égard d’une personne ou d’un lieu sont fondés sur des critères ouvertement discrimi natoires ou des stéréotypes év‑ idents, ou sur des [traduction] « intuitions » ou « pressentiments » qui peuvent facilement dissimuler la présence de racisme inconscient et de stéréotypes (t. quigley, « annotation to r v sterling » (2004), 23 cr (6th) 54, p. 55; r c faqi, 2010 abpc 157, 491 a.r 194, par.  14; tanovich, p.  437‑438; mackenzie, par 64‑65). [26] requiring reasonable suspicion before tempt‑ ing individuals into committing crimes also reflects canadian law’s cautious approach to the expansion of police powers. as a significant instance of that approach, our law does not consider whether the tar‑ geted accused was predisposed to commit the crime [26] exiger de la police qu’elle ait des soupçons raisonnables avant de tenter d’amener une personne à commettre un crime reflète aussi l’approche pru‑ dente du droit canadien à l’égard de l’élargissement des pouvoirs policiers. exemple significatif de cette approche : le droit canadien ne tient pas compte de 600 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. (mack, at pp. 924 and 951‑56). allowing objectively improper police conduct to be justified by reference to the predisposition of the accused would “per‑ mit unequal treatment” (mack, at p. 955), and risks imprisoning people even when their fundamental rights and procedural guarantees have been disre‑ garded. there is a “fundamental inequality inherent in an approach that measures the permissibility of entrapment by reference to the predisposition of the accused” (mack, at p 955). [27] people are not protected against random virtue testing if we assume that entrapment occurs only when virtuous people would be tempted to com‑ mit crimes. the opportunity‑based branch of the mack test therefore establishes that police cannot subject anyone to random virtue testing — virtuous or non‑virtuous, predisposed or non‑predisposed — without reasonable suspicion. many commentators support the test established in mack for this very reason — that is, because its objective threshold protects everyone from random testing (ashworth, at p. 305; d. ormerod and a. roberts, “the trouble with teixeira: developing a principled approach to entrapment” (2002), 6 int’l j of evidence & proof 38, at pp. 46‑48; s. bronitt, “the law in undercover policing: a comparative study of entrapment and covert interviewing in australia, canada and europe” (2004), 33 comm. l. world rev. 35, at p. 78; roach, at p. 1462; d. stuart, canadian criminal law: a treatise (7th ed. 2014), at p 653). la question de savoir si l’accusé ciblé était prédisposé à commettre le crime (mack, p. 924 et 951‑956). permettre qu’une conduite policière objectivement irrégulière soit justifiée par la prédisposition de l’ac‑ cusé « autoriser[ait] un traitement inégal » (mack, p. 955), et entraîne le risque que des gens soient emprisonnés même lorsque leurs droits fondamen‑ taux et les garanties procédurales auxquels ils ont droit ont été bafoués. il existe une « inégalité fon‑ damentale inhérente à une démarche qui mesure l’admissibilité de la provocation par référence à la prédisposition de l’inculpé » (mack, p 955). [27] les gens ne sont pas à l’abri des opérations visant à éprouver au hasard leur vertu si nous par‑ tons du principe que la provocation policière a lieu seulement lorsque des gens vertueux sont incités à commettre des crimes. le volet fondé sur l’occa‑ sion du critère énoncé dans l’arrêt mack établit donc que la police ne peut éprouver au hasard la vertu de quiconque — que la personne soit vertueuse ou non, prédisposée ou non — sans soupçons raison‑ nables. de nombreux commentateurs adhèrent au critère établi dans l’arrêt mack précisément pour cette raison — c’est‑à‑dire parce que la norme ob‑ jective qu’elle prévoit protège toute personne con‑ tre les opérations visant à éprouver au hasard sa vertu (ashworth, p. 305; d. ormerod et a. roberts, « the trouble with teixeira : developing a princi‑ pled approach to entrapment » (2002), 6 int’l j of evidence & proof 38, p. 46‑48; s. bronitt, « the law in undercover policing : a comparative study of entrapment and covert interviewing in australia, canada and europe » (2004), 33 comm. l. world rev. 35, p. 78; roach, p. 1462; d. stuart, canadian criminal law : a treatise (7e éd 2014), p 653). [28] providing individuals the opportunity to com‑ mit offences without the foundation of a reasonable suspicion also unacceptably increases the likelihood that people will commit crimes when they other‑ wise would not have. the risk is at its highest when the person given the opportunity is comparatively vulnerable or otherwise marginalized. random vir‑ tue testing therefore violates the principle that it is wrong for the police to manufacture crime because it “prey[s] on the weakness of human nature” to entice individuals into offending (r v. looseley, [28] donner à une personne l’occasion de com‑ mettre une infraction sans que cette action repose sur des soupçons raisonnables augmente aussi de manière inacceptable la probabilité que cette per‑ sonne commette un crime alors qu’elle n’en aurait autrement pas commis. le risque est exacerbé lors‑ que la personne qui se voit donner une telle occasion est relativement vulnérable ou autrement margina‑ lisée. par conséquent, les opérations visant à éprou‑ ver au hasard la vertu des gens violent le principe selon lequel il est inadmissible que la police crée [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 601 [2001] ukhl 53, [2001] 4 all er 897, at para. 58, per lord hoffmann). marginalized people, with the limited resources they possess, will rarely, if ever, be able to meet the high burden of proving bad faith. there will rarely be evidence of intentional racial profiling or targeting of the vulnerable. conversely, the test in mack — grounded in reasonable suspi‑ cion — is attainable for everyone, designed as it is to accommodate the “qualities of humanness which all of us share” (mack, at p 940). it seeks to protect the justice system and preserve the rule of law by ensuring that all individuals, predisposed or not, are protected from improper police conduct (mack, at p 961). [29] a standard of “bad faith” police conduct in this branch of the entrapment doctrine is no substitute for the objective standard of reasonable suspicion, which is reviewable by an independent assessor. a test of “bad faith” cedes primacy to the police’s own asser‑ tions. reasonable suspicion insists on an objective assessment of the information the police actually had. reasonable suspicion thus shifts the protection of the public against unreasonable intrusions from the shadows of police discretion to the light of curial scrutiny. as described in the context of warrantless arrests by the supreme court of the united states in beck v. state of ohio, 85 sct 223 (1964), at p. 229: we may assume that the officers acted in good faith in arresting the petitioner. but “good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough”. if subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the fourth amendment would evaporate, and the people would be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” only in the discretion of the police. [citation omitted.] un crime, car le fait d’inciter des individus à com‑ mettre des infractions [traduction] « exploit[e] la faiblesse de la nature humaine » (r c looseley, [2001] ukhl 53, [2001] 4 all er 897, par. 58, le lord hoffmann). les personnes marginalisées, avec les ressources limitées qu’elles possèdent, seront rarement, voire jamais, capables de s’acquitter du lourd fardeau de prouver la mauvaise foi. il y aura rarement des preuves du profilage racial intentionnel ou de la prise pour cible de personnes vulnérables. inversement, tout le monde a la possibilité de satis‑ faire au critère établi dans l’arrêt mack — fondé sur des soupçons raisonnables — car il est conçu pour tenir compte des « valeurs humaines que nous partageons tous » (mack, p 940). il vise à protéger le système de justice et à préserver la primauté du droit en veillant à ce que toutes les personnes, prédis‑ posées ou non, soient protégées contre la conduite irrégulière des policiers (mack, p 961). [29] sous ce volet de la doctrine de la provocation policière, une norme de conduite policière de « mau‑ vaise foi » ne peut remplacer la norme objective des soupçons raisonnables, laquelle peut faire l’objet d’un examen par un évaluateur indépendant un critère de « mauvaise foi » accorde la primauté aux affirmations des policiers. les soupçons raisonnables exigent une évaluation objective des renseignements dont disposait la police. ils font donc en sorte que la protection du public contre les intrusions déraison‑ nables sorte de l’ombre du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la police pour passer à la lumière de l’examen judiciaire. comme l’a expliqué la cour suprême des états‑unis dans le contexte des arrestations sans mandat (beck c. state of ohio, 85 sct 223 (1964), p. 229) : [traduction] nous pouvons présumer que les poli ciers ont agi de bonne foi en arrêtant le requérant. cependant, « la bonne foi des policiers responsables de l’arrestation ne suffit pas ». si la norme subjective de la bonne foi constituait à elle seule le critère applicable, les protections qu’offre le quatrième amendement disparaîtraient, et la « sécurité des personnes, de leur maison, de leurs docu‑ ments et de leurs biens » serait laissée à l’entière discrétion de la police. [référence omise.] 602 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. [30] further, and unlike reasonable suspicion, a standard of bad faith fails to give meaningful guid‑ ance to police officers called upon to determine whether they can offer an opportunity to commit a crime. reasonable suspicion is an ex ante standard that has stood the test of time, is “readily applicable in practice”, and is familiar and “meaningful to the police and trial judges” (kang‑brown, at para. 164, per deschamps j., dissenting but not on this point). it fosters in police officers a sense of the importance of obtaining objective evidence of criminal activity before offering an opportunity to commit a crime, and of being alive to indicators that suggest that their intuitions or hunches may be wrong (chehil, at paras 33‑34). and it compels police to disclose objective evidence that is amenable to exacting re‑ view, precluding them from relying on peremptory assertions of suspicion. [31] any lower bar — and certainly any bar that would allow the police to respond to bare tips by immediately offering an opportunity to commit a crime — would effectively be no bar at all. [32] that this is so is made plain by asking the following question: if a name and number were suffi‑ cient to allow police to intrude on protected interests, what less could possibly be required? the police need at least a number to make the phone call. such a low bar would do nothing to protect people from ran‑ dom virtue testing: being called by police and invited to commit an offence based on malice, rumour or gossip. the reasonably informed observer would be dismayed to learn that police are permitted to act on this information in this way simply by virtue of hav‑ ing received it. just as the hunch or “mere suspicion” of one police officer cannot become something more simply because it was shared with other officers (r v. swan, 2009 bcca 142, 244 ccc (3d) 108, at para. 23), a source’s hunch does not transform into something more once placed into the hands of the police (r v. mcmahon, 2018 skca 26, 361 ccc. (3d) 429, at paras. 60 and 62; r v. jir, 2010 bcca 497, 264 ccc (3d) 64, at para. 46, per groberman ja, concurring; r v. whyte, 2011 onca 24, 266 [30] de plus, et contrairement aux soupçons rai‑ sonnables, une norme de mauvaise foi ne fournit pas d’indications utiles aux policiers appelés à établir s’ils peuvent donner l’occasion de commettre un crime. les soupçons raisonnables constituent une norme préalable qui a résisté à l’épreuve du temps, qui « s’applique facilement en pratique », qui est bien connue et « significative pour les policiers et les juges de première instance » (kang‑brown, par. 164, la juge deschamps, dissidente mais pas sur ce point). cette norme contribue à ce que les policiers com‑ prennent l’importance d’obtenir une preuve objective d’une activité criminelle avant d’offrir l’occasion de commettre un crime, et d’être à l’affût d’indices qui portent à croire que leurs intuitions ou leurs pressen‑ timents peuvent être erronés (chehil, par 33‑34). de plus, elle oblige la police à dévoiler les éléments de preuve objectifs susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un contrôle rigoureux, ce qui l’empêche de se fonder sur des affirmations péremptoires de soupçons. [31] tout critère moins exigeant — et certainement tout critère qui permettrait à la police de répondre à de simples informations en offrant sur‑le‑champ une occasion de commettre un crime — n’impose pas en fait une réelle exigence. [32] le fait qu’il en soit ainsi est mis en évidence lorsque l’on pose la question suivante : si un nom et un numéro étaient suffisants pour permettre à la police de porter atteinte aux intérêts protégés, qu’est‑ce qui pourrait bien être exigé de moins? la police a besoin, à tout le moins, d’un numéro pour faire l’appel. un critère si peu exigeant ne ferait rien pour protéger les gens contre les opérations visant à éprouver au hasard leur vertu : recevoir un appel de la police et être invité à commettre une infrac‑ tion sur le fondement d’une intention malveillante, de rumeurs ou de commérages. l’observateur rai‑ sonnablement informé serait consterné d’apprendre que la police peut agir de cette façon sur la foi de ces renseignements simplement du fait qu’elle les a reçus. tout comme une intuition ou de « simples soupçons » d’un policier ne deviennent pas quelque chose d’autre simplement parce que le policier en fait part à ses collègues (r c. swan, 2009 bcca 142, 244 ccc (3d) 108, par. 23), l’intuition d’une source ne se transforme pas en autre chose une fois [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 603 ccc (3d) 5, at para. 17, aff’d 2011 scc 49, [2011] 3 scr 364). we see no basis — in this court’s jurisprudence or elsewhere — for abandoning the reasonable suspicion standard and granting police unrestricted licence to offer people the opportunity to commit crimes, free from independent and mean‑ ingful judicial oversight. entre les mains de la police (r c. mcmahon, 2018 skca 26, 361 ccc (3d) 429, par. 60 et 62; r c. jir, 2010 bcca 497, 264 ccc (3d) 64, par. 46, le juge groberman, motifs concordants; r c. whyte, 2011 onca 24, 266 ccc (3d) 5, par. 17, conf. par 2011 csc 49, [2011] 3 rcs 364). nous ne voyons aucune raison — dans la jurisprudence de la cour ou ailleurs — d’abandonner la norme des soupçons raisonnables et d’autoriser sans réserve la police à offrir à des gens l’occasion de commettre des crimes, sans aucune surveillance judiciaire indépendante et véritable. iv issues iv questions [33] several issues arise when entrapment is ex‑ amined in the dial‑a‑dope context: a can a phone number — a virtual place — qualify as a location for the purposes of entrapment? b what circumstances can give rise to reasonable suspicion in the dial‑a‑dope context? [33] plusieurs questions se posent lorsque l’on se penche sur la provocation policière dans le contexte de la vente de drogues sur appel : a un numéro de téléphone — un endroit virtuel — peut‑il être considéré comme un lieu aux fins de l’analyse de la provocation policière? b quelles situations peuvent donner lieu à des soupçons raisonnables dans le contexte de la vente de drogue sur appel? c how should courts review the conversation between police and the accused in deciding whether reasonable suspicion has been estab‑ lished and when the opportunity to offend was offered? c de quelle façon les tribunaux devraient‑ils exa‑ miner la conversation entre un policier et l’ac‑ cusé pour décider si des soupçons raisonnables ont été établis et à quel moment l’occasion de commettre une infraction a été offerte? d what constitutes provision of an opportunity to traffic in drugs during a phone call? d qu’est‑ce qui constitue une occasion de faire le trafic de drogue pendant un appel téléphonique? the answers to these questions must be determined in light of the purposes of the doctrine of entrapment. il convient de répondre à ces questions en tenant compte des objectifs de la doctrine de la provocation policière. v analysis v analyse a can a phone number qualify as a “place” over which police may form reasonable suspicion? a un numéro de téléphone peut‑il être considéré comme un « lieu » à l’égard duquel la police pourrait former des soupçons raisonnables? [34] these appeals require us to consider how the reasonable suspicion standard applies when police are investigating a phone number, or another virtual means of communication between people, like a [34] les présents pourvois nous obligent à exa‑ miner de quelle façon s’applique la norme des soupçons raisonnables lorsque la police enquête sur un numéro de téléphone, ou sur un autre moyen 604 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. message board on a website. the parties agree that a phone number can qualify as a “place” for the purposes of the entrapment doctrine. the intervener the independent criminal defence advocacy society disagrees, submitting that there is an enhanced pri‑ vacy interest in virtual places as compared to phys‑ ical places. alternatively, it says a multi‑factored analysis should inform the consideration of whether a place has been adequately defined. the british columbia civil liberties association adds that it is concerned that places, both physical and virtual, may be defined too broadly to allow the entrapment doctrine to be sufficiently protective. [35] the difficulty, of course, is that technology aids in the commission of crime. and in order to investigate and detect those crimes, police must also make use of technology. further, while some virtual spaces may be too broad to support a sufficiently particularized reasonable suspicion, that concern does not arise where the space is a single phone number. as we will explain, reasonable suspicion can attach to a phone number, because it is precisely and narrowly defined. [36] of course, a phone number is not the same thing as a public physical location. a phone is a means of private communication between persons, and calling a number, or exchanging text messages, is an inherently private activity (unlike conversing on a busy downtown vancouver street, as in barnes, where we might expect chance encounters with the state). a phone number provides access to an intensely private virtual space. we cultivate per‑ sonal, work and family relationships through our phones; they are a portal of immediate access re‑ served for the select few closest to us. we carefully guard access to that space by choosing to whom we disclose our phone number and with whom we converse. similarly, this court has held that a per‑ son reasonably expects privacy in most digital com‑ munications, precisely because conversations over text message, social media messaging, or email, are de communication virtuelle entre des gens, comme un babillard sur un site web. les parties convien‑ nent qu’un numéro de téléphone peut être considéré comme un « lieu » pour l’application de la doc‑ trine de la provocation policière. l’intervenante la independent criminal defence advocacy society n’est pas de cet avis et soutient que l’intérêt en matière de protection de la vie privée est plus grand dans les lieux virtuels que dans les lieux physiques. subsidiairement, elle affirme qu’une analyse multi‑ factorielle devrait permettre de déterminer si un lieu a été défini adéquatement. la british columbia civil liberties association ajoute qu’elle craint que les lieux, tant physiques que virtuels, soient définis trop largement pour que la doctrine de la provocation policière assure une protection suffisante. [35] évidemment, la difficulté réside dans le fait que la technologie contribue à la perpétration de crimes; et pour détecter ces crimes et enquêter sur ceux‑ci, la police doit également utiliser la tech‑ nologie. de plus, bien que certains espaces virtuels puissent être trop vastes pour fonder des soupçons raisonnables suffisamment spécifiques, cette préoc‑ cupation ne se pose pas lorsque l’espace est un seul numéro de téléphone. comme nous l’expliquerons, les soupçons raisonnables peuvent se rapporter à un numéro de téléphone, car il est défini de manière précise et restreinte. [36] évidemment, un numéro de téléphone n’est pas la même chose qu’un lieu physique public. le téléphone est un moyen de communication privée entre des personnes, et appeler un numéro de télé‑ phone, ou échanger des messages textes, est une activité intrinsèquement privée (contrairement à converser dans une rue occupée du centre‑ville de vancouver, comme dans l’arrêt barnes, où l’on pourrait s’attendre à rencontrer de façon fortuite des agents de l’état). un numéro de téléphone donne accès à un espace virtuel éminemment privé. nous entretenons des relations personnelles, familiales et professionnelles par l’intermédiaire de nos télé‑ phones; ceux‑ci constituent un portail d’accès immé‑ diat réservé à ceux dont nous sommes le plus près. nous prenons soin de surveiller l’accès à cet espace en choisissant à qui nous donnons notre numéro de téléphone et avec qui nous conversons. de même, la [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 605 not analogous to a “public post” (r v. marakah, 2017 scc 59, [2017] 2 scr 608, at paras. 28 and 34‑36, per mclachlin cj, and at paras. 106 and 116, per moldaver j., dissenting). virtual spaces raise unique concerns for the intrusion of the state into individuals’ private lives, because of the breadth of some virtual places (for example, social media websites), the ease of remote access to a potentially large number of targets that technology provides law enforcement, and the increasing prominence of technology as a means by which individuals conduct their personal lives. [37] it follows that state surveillance over virtual spaces is of an entirely different qualitative order than surveillance over a public space. technology and remote communication significantly increase the number of people to whom police investigators can provide opportunities, thereby heightening the risk that innocent people will be targeted. online anonymity allows police to increasingly fabricate identities and “pose” as others to a degree that would not be possible in a public space like the granville mall. and they can do so anytime and anywhere, since cell phones are a 24/7 gateway into a person’s private life. individuals must be able to enjoy that privacy free from state intrusion, subject only to the police meeting an objective and reviewable standard allowing them to intrude (see barnes, at p. 481, per mclachlin j., dissenting but not on this point). cour a conclu qu’une personne s’attend raisonna‑ blement au respect de sa vie privée dans la plupart de ses communications numériques, précisément parce que les conversations par messages textes, les messages échangés sur les médias sociaux et les courriels ne sont pas analogues à une « publi‑ cation publique » (r c. marakah, 2017 csc 59, [2017] 2 rcs 608, par. 28 et 34‑36, la juge en chef mclachlin, et par. 106 et 116, le juge moldaver, dissident). les espaces virtuels soulèvent des préoc‑ cupations uniques pour ce qui est de l’intrusion de l’état dans la vie privée des gens en raison de l’éten‑ due de certains lieux virtuels (comme les sites web de médias sociaux), de la faci lité avec laquelle les policiers peuvent avoir accès à distance à un nombre potentiellement élevé de cibles grâce à la technolo‑ gie, et de l’importance croissante de la technologie en tant que moyen avec lequel les gens mènent leur vie personnelle. [37] il s’ensuit que la surveillance par l’état d’es‑ paces virtuels est d’un ordre qualitatif entièrement différent de la surveillance sur un espace public. la technologie et la communication à distance aug‑ mentent considérablement le nombre de personnes auxquelles les enquêteurs de police peuvent don‑ ner des occasions, ce qui accroît le risque que des personnes innocentes soient ciblées. l’anonymat en ligne permet aux policiers de créer plus facile‑ ment de fausses identités et de « se faire passer » pour d’autres personnes dans une mesure qui serait impossible dans un lieu public comme le granville mall. de plus, ils peuvent le faire en tout temps et partout, puisque les téléphones cellulaires sont un point d’accès 24/7 à la vie privée d’une personne. les gens doivent pouvoir jouir de cette vie privée à l’abri de l’intrusion de l’état, sous réserve unique‑ ment du respect par la police d’une norme objective et révisable lui permettant de porter atteinte à leur vie privée (voir barnes, p. 481, la juge mclachlin, dissidente, mais pas sur ce point). [38] section 8 jurisprudence recognizes that at the “heart of liberty in a modern state” is the need to “set a premium” on the ability of its citizens to carve out spaces in their lives, sanctuaries where they may interact freely, unhindered by the possibility of encounters with the state (r v. edwards, [1996] 1 [38] la jurisprudence portant sur l’art. 8 reconnaît qu’« au cœur de la liberté dans un état moderne » il y a la nécessité d’accorder une importance par‑ ticulière à la capacité des citoyens de trouver des espaces dans leur vie, des sanctuaires où ils peuvent interagir libre ment, sans possibilité de rencontrer des 606 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. scr 128, at para. 67; r v. wong, [1990] 3 scr. 36, at p. 53; see also r v. dyment, [1988] 2 scr. 417, at pp.  427‑28; r v fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621, at para. 114, per karakatsanis j., dissenting). in the words of mclachlin cj (writ‑ ing extra‑judicially), “the right ‘to be let alone’ and to define a protected sphere of individual au‑ tonomy within which neither one’s neighbours nor the state can intrude without permission, is an important aspect of fundamental human dignity” (hon b mclachlin, “courts, transparency and public confidence — to the better administration of justice” (2003), 8 deakin l. rev. 1, at p. 3, cit‑ ing s d. warren and l d. brandeis, “the right to privacy” (1890), 4 harv. l. rev. 193, at p 195). the human condition flourishes as the fear of state intrusion fades. [39] relatedly, the entrapment doctrine ensures canadians can “go about their daily lives without courting the risk that they will be subjected to the clandestine investigatory techniques of agents of the state” (barnes, at p. 480, per mclachlin j., dissent‑ ing). it is therefore important to carefully delineate and tightly circumscribe virtual locations in which police can provide the opportunity to commit a crime. as lamer cj noted in barnes, at pp. 462‑63, a reasonable suspicion can attach to a place only if it is defined with sufficient precision and “in many cases, the size of the area itself may indicate that the investigation is not bona fide.” given that such an in‑ quiry hinges on the presence of reasonable suspicion, the location must be “sufficiently particularized” (chehil, at para. 30; see also s. penney, “standards of suspicion” (2018), 65 crim. lq 23, at pp. 24 and 26). agents de l’état (r c. edwards, [1996] 1 rcs 128, par. 67; r c. wong, [1990] 3 rcs 36, p. 53; voir aussi r c. dyment, [1988] 2 rcs 417, p. 427‑428; r c. fearon, 2014 csc 77, [2014] 3 rcs 621, par.  114, la juge karakatsanis, dissidente). dans les mots de la juge en chef mclachlin (dans un écrit extra‑ judiciaire), [traduction] « le droit “de ne pas être importuné” et de délimiter une sphère protégée d’autonomie individuelle dans laquelle ni un voisin ni l’état ne peut s’immiscer sans permis‑ sion, est un aspect important de la dignité humaine fondamentale  » (hon b mclachlin, «  courts, transparency and public confidence — to the better administration of justice » (2003), 8 deakin l. rev. 1, p. 3, citant s d. warren et l. d. brandeis, « the right to privacy » (1890), 4 harv. l. rev. 193, p 195). la condition humaine s’épanouit lorsque s’atténue la peur de l’intrusion de l’état. [39] dans le même ordre d’idées, la doctrine de la provocation policière fait en sorte que les canadiens peuvent « mener leur vie quotidienne sans s’exposer au risque d’être soumis à des techniques clandestines d’enquête de la part des agents de l’état » (barnes, p. 480, la juge mclachlin, dissidente). il est donc important de définir soigneusement et de circons‑ crire précisément les lieux virtuels où la police peut donner l’occasion de commettre un crime. comme l’a fait remarquer le juge en chef lamer dans l’arrêt barnes, aux p. 462 et 463, les soupçons raisonnables peuvent se rattacher à un lieu seulement si ce lieu est défini avec suffisamment de précision et, « dans bien des cas[,] l’étendue du secteur indique qu’il [ne] s’agit [pas] d’une véritable enquête ». étant donné qu’une telle enquête dépend de la présence de soup‑ çons raisonnables, le lieu doit être « suffisamment spécifique » (chehil, par. 30; voir aussi s. penney, « standards of suspicion » (2018), 65 crim. lq. 23, p. 24 et 26). [40] the crown stresses that we now find our‑ selves in a virtual age; while drugs used to be bought and sold in specific locations, they are now deliv‑ ered into the hands of the buyer in a transaction that involves modern technology. we accept that communicating in a virtual space adds “a layer of unpredictability” (r v. mills, 2019 scc 22, [2019] 2 scr 320, at para. 23, per brown j). but it is this [40] la couronne souligne que nous nous trou‑ vons maintenant dans une ère virtuelle; alors qu’au‑ paravant, les drogues étaient achetées et vendues à des endroits précis, elles sont maintenant livrées entre les mains de l’acheteur dans le cadre d’une transaction comportant le recours à la technologie moderne. nous reconnaissons que les communica‑ tions dans un espace virtuel ajoutent « un élément [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 607 very unpredictability that necessitates applying the doctrine of entrapment in a way that ensures the free‑ doms protected in a physical space are also protected in our virtual communications. drug dealing over the phone may well be difficult to detect, but individu‑ als also have considerable privacy interests in their phones that must be protected from arbitrary state intrusion. the risks posed to individual interests, although different, are not ameliorated where police investigate virtual communications as opposed to a physical space. we say, to properly protect these interests, police must have reasonable suspicion over an individual or a well‑defined virtual space, like a phone number, before providing an opportunity to commit a crime. [41] we emphasize that the virtual space in ques‑ tion must be defined with sufficient precision in order to ground reasonable suspicion. reviewing courts must scrutinize the evidence that prompted the in‑ quiry to ensure the police have narrowed their scope so that the purview of their inquiry is no broader than the evidence allows. to ensure that random virtue testing is avoided, factors such as (but not limited to) the following may be helpful: the seriousness of the crime in question; the time of day and the num‑ ber of activities and persons who might be affected; whether racial profiling, stereotyping or reliance on vulnerabilities played a part in the selection of the location; the level of privacy expected in the area or space; the importance of the virtual space to freedom of expression; and the availability of other, less in‑ trusive investigative techniques. d’imprévi sibilité » (r c. mills, 2019 csc 22, [2019] 2 rcs 320, par. 23, le juge brown). cependant, c’est exactement cet élément d’imprévisibilité qui rend nécessaire d’appliquer la doctrine de la provoca‑ tion policière de façon à ce que les libertés protégées dans un espace physique soient aussi protégées dans nos communications virtuelles. le trafic de drogue par téléphone peut sans aucun doute être difficile à détecter, mais les gens ont également d’importants intérêts pour ce qui est du respect de leur vie privée à l’égard de leur téléphone, qui doivent être protégés contre l’intrusion arbitraire de l’état. les risques pour les intérêts individuels, bien que différents, ne sont pas moins élevés lorsque la police enquête sur des communications virtuelles par opposition à un espace physique. selon nous, afin de protéger adéquatement ces intérêts, la police doit avoir des soupçons raisonnables à l’égard d’une personne ou d’un espace virtuel bien défini, comme un numéro de téléphone, avant de donner à quiconque l’occasion de commettre un crime. [41] il importe de préciser que l’espace virtuel en question doit être défini avec suffisamment de pré‑ cision pour fonder des soupçons raisonnables. les tribunaux de révision doivent examiner attentivement la preuve qui a suscité l’enquête afin de s’assurer que la police en a restreint la portée pour qu’elle ne soit pas plus large que la preuve le permet. en vue d’éviter que la vertu des gens soit éprouvée au hasard, les facteurs comme les suivants (entre autres) peuvent être utiles : la gravité du crime en question; le moment de la journée et le nombre d’activités et de personnes qui peuvent être touchées; la question de savoir si le profilage racial, les stéréotypes ou les vulnérabilités ont joué un rôle dans le choix du lieu; l’attente relative au niveau de protection de la vie privée à l’égard du secteur ou de l’espace; l’impor‑ tance de l’espace virtuel pour la liberté d’expression; et l’existence d’autres techniques d’enquête, moins envahissantes. [42] as previously explained, an individual phone number is sufficiently precise and narrow to qualify as a place for the purposes of the first branch of the entrapment doctrine. we agree with himel j.: “   phones are increasingly personal” and, in most cases, there will be “little real difference between [42] comme il a déjà été expliqué, un numéro de téléphone individuel est suffisamment précis et restreint pour être qualifié de lieu en vue de l’appli‑ cation du premier volet de la doctrine de la provo‑ cation policière. nous souscrivons à l’opinion de la juge himel : [traduction] «    les téléphones 608 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. information that the police obtain about the phone line and information that they obtain about the per‑ son who answers it” (ca reasons, at para 109). typically, and as himel j noted, it will be a dis‑ tinction without a difference, since reasonable sus‑ picion over one grounds reasonable suspicion over the other. we therefore ought not to force categorical distinctions based upon the form such information takes — that is, information about people and in‑ formation about their location (or phone numbers). ultimately, it is a person before the court as an ac‑ cused. and the question will always be the same: are there objective factors supporting a reasonable suspi‑ cion of drug trafficking by the individual answering the cell phone when police provide the opportunity to commit such a crime? those factors may relate in part to reasonable suspicion of the individual, or of the phone number itself, or to both. [43] finally, we note that lower courts have already found that police can conduct bona fide inquiries into virtual spaces other than phone numbers. we repeat, however, that the serious risk of random virtue test‑ ing in such inquiries requires that the virtual space be defined narrowly and with precision (barnes, at p 463). in our view, entire websites or social media platforms will rarely, if ever, be sufficiently particu‑ larized to support reasonable suspicion. to permit police to target wide virtual spaces is inconsistent with mack and its threshold of reasonable suspicion, and disregards that legitimate communities exist as much online as they do in the physical world. b how does reasonable suspicion apply to dial‑a‑dope investigations? sont de plus en plus personnels » et, dans la plupart des cas, il y aura « peu de différence réelle entre les renseignements qu’obtient la police au sujet de la ligne téléphonique et les renseignements qu’elle obtient au sujet de la personne qui y répond » (motifs de la ca, par 109). habituellement, et comme l’a noté la juge himel, il s’agira d’une distinction sans importance, car les soupçons raisonnables à l’égard de l’un fondent les soupçons raisonnables à l’égard de l’autre. nous ne pouvons donc pas imposer des distinctions catégoriques fondées sur la forme que prennent ces renseignements — c’est‑à‑dire, les ren‑ seignements sur des gens et sur l’endroit où ils se trouvent (ou leur numéro de téléphone). en défini‑ tive, c’est une personne qui est devant le tribunal en tant qu’accusé. de plus, la question sera toujours la même : des facteurs objectifs justifiaient‑ils l’exis‑ tence de soupçons raisonnables que la personne qui a répondu au téléphone cellulaire se livrait au trafic de drogue lorsque la police lui a donné l’occasion de commettre un tel crime? ces facteurs peuvent être liés en partie aux soupçons raisonnables à l’égard de la personne, ou du numéro de téléphone, ou des deux. [43] en dernier lieu, nous faisons remarquer que les tribunaux d’instance inférieure ont déjà conclu que la police peut mener de véritables enquêtes sur des espaces virtuels autres que des numéros de télé‑ phone. cependant, nous répétons que le risque grave lié au fait que la vertu des gens puisse être éprouvée au hasard lors de telles enquêtes exige que l’espace virtuel soit défini de façon étroite et avec préci‑ sion (barnes, p 463). à notre avis, des sites web entiers ou des plateformes de médias sociaux seront rarement, voire jamais, suffisamment spécifiques pour fonder des soupçons raisonnables. permettre à la police de cibler de larges espaces virtuels est contraire à l’arrêt mack et à sa norme des soupçons raisonnables, et ne tient pas compte du fait que des communautés légitimes existent autant en ligne que dans le monde physique. b comment la norme des soupçons raisonnables s’applique‑t‑elle aux enquêtes sur les opérations de vente de drogue sur appel? [44] as we have explained, reasonable suspicion plays a central role in the first branch of the entrap‑ ment doctrine. police may provide an opportunity to [44] comme nous l’avons expliqué, les soupçons raisonnables jouent un rôle central dans le premier volet de la doctrine de la provocation policière. la [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 609 commit a crime only upon forming reasonable sus‑ picion. but what does reasonable suspicion mean? the appellants say it is an objective and rigorous standard that cannot be grounded in a bald tip. the crown, however, describes a lower standard, capable of being satisfied by a single tip about a responsive target who appears to understand slang particular to the drug subculture. [45] reasonable suspicion is, by definition, an ob‑ jective standard that protects individuals’ interests and preserves the rule of law by ensuring courts can meaningfully review police conduct. for this reason, it is fundamental to restraining the power of police to provide opportunities to commit crimes. that said, reasonable suspicion is not “unduly onerous” (mack, at p 958). as a lower standard than reason‑ able grounds, it allows police additional flexibility in enforcing the law and preventing crime. in the entrapment doctrine, reasonable suspicion emerges from the first branch’s concern with police behaviour that falls short of actually inducing an offence, yet nonetheless constitutes police involvement in the commission of a crime. police peut donner l’occasion de commettre un crime à une personne seulement lorsqu’elle a des soupçons raisonnables. mais qu’entend‑on par soupçons rai‑ sonnables? les appelants affirment qu’il s’agit d’une norme objective et rigoureuse qui ne peut être fondée sur une simple information. la couronne, cependant, décrit une norme moins rigoureuse, qui peut être satisfaite par une seule information au sujet d’une cible réceptive qui semble comprendre le jargon particulier du milieu de la drogue. [45] par définition, les soupçons raisonnables con‑ stituent une norme objective qui protège les intérêts individuels et préserve la primauté du droit en faisant en sorte que les tribunaux puissent examiner de façon valable la conduite policière. pour cette raison, il est fondamental de restreindre le pouvoir policier de donner des occasions de commettre des crimes. cela dit, la norme des soupçons raisonnables n’est pas « indûment sévère » (mack, p 958). puisqu’il s’agit d’une norme moins exigeante que celle des motifs raisonnables, elle permet à la police d’avoir une plus grande souplesse pour faire respecter la loi et prévenir le crime. dans le cadre de la doctrine de la provocation policière, cette norme se dégage de la préoccupation relative au premier volet concernant le comportement policier qui n’incite pas réellement une personne à commettre une infraction, mais qui constitue tout de même une participation de la police à la perpétration d’un crime. [46] while the reasonable suspicion standard re‑ quires only the possibility, rather than probability, of criminal activity (chehil, at para. 27), it must also be remembered that it provides police officers with justification to engage in otherwise impermissible, intrusive conduct such as searches and detentions. it is therefore subject to “rigorous”, “independent” and “exacting” judicial scrutiny (chehil, at paras. 3 and  26) the suspicion must be focused, pre‑ cise, reasonable, and based in “objective facts that stand up to independent scrutiny” (mackenzie, at para 74). in simpson, at pp. 500‑503, the court of appeal for ontario, drawing from us jurispru‑ dence, this court’s application of reasonable sus‑ picion in mack, and the articulable cause doctrine in r v. wilson, [1990] 1 scr 1291, summarized [46] bien que la norme des soupçons raisonnables n’exige que la possibilité, plutôt que la probabilité, d’une activité criminelle (chehil, par. 27), il faut également se souvenir qu’elle fournit aux policiers la justification nécessaire pour adopter une conduite par ailleurs inadmissible et intrusive, comme les fouilles et les détentions. elle est donc assujettie à un examen judiciaire « rigoureux » et « indépen‑ dant » (chehil, par. 3 et 26). les soupçons doivent être bien délimités, précis, raisonnables et fondés sur des « faits objectifs qui résistent à un examen indépendant » (mackenzie, par 74). dans l’arrêt simpson, p. 500‑503, la cour d’appel de l’ontario, en se fondant sur la jurisprudence américaine, sur l’application par la cour de la norme des soupçons raisonnables dans l’arrêt mack et sur la doctrine 610 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. reasonable suspicion as requiring a “constellation of objectively discernible facts” giving the officer “reasonable cause to suspect” that a certain kind of crime was being committed by a particular person or in a particular place. this definition continues to be applied by this court (see, eg,. r v. jacques, [1996] 3 scr 312, at paras. 24‑25; kang‑brown, at para. 76; chehil, at para 3). ultimately, the evi‑ dence said to satisfy reasonable suspicion must be carefully examined. [47] although innocent explanations and exculpa‑ tory information remain relevant to an assessment of reasonable suspicion, the police are not required to undertake further investigation to rule out those explanations (chehil, at paras 33‑34). nevertheless, the facts must indicate the possibility of criminal behaviour: characteristics that apply broadly to in‑ nocent people are not markers of criminal activity (chehil, at para 35). mere hunches and intuition will not suffice (barnes, at p 460). however, an officer’s training or experience can make otherwise equivocal information probative of the presence of criminal activity (chehil, at para 47). [48] reasonable suspicion is also individualized, in the sense that it picks an individual target — whether a person, an intersection or a phone number — out of a group of persons or places. as noted above, the criminal law’s objections to “generalized sus‑ picion” hinge on its embrace of “such a number of presumably innocent persons as to approach a subjectively administered, random basis” (chehil, at para. 30, quoting united states v. gooding, 695 f.2d 78 (1982), at p 83). when an objectively grounded suspicion instead attaches to a “sufficiently particu‑ larized constellation of factors” (chehil, at para. 30), like those relating to an individual phone number, the objection falls away. in other words, the ill sought to be remedied by individualization is police intruding on the protected interests of all persons in broadly or poorly defined locations, especially on the basis des motifs concrets dans l’arrêt r c. wilson, [1990] 1 rcs 1291, a résumé la norme des soupçons raisonnables comme exigeant un [traduction] « ensemble de faits objectivement discernables », donnant au policier un « motif raisonnable de soup‑ çonner » qu’un certain type de crime était commis par une personne en particulier ou dans un lieu en particulier. la cour continue d’ailleurs d’appliquer cette définition (voir, p ex., r c. jacques, [1996] 3 rcs 312, par. 24‑25; kang‑brown, par. 76; chehil, par 3). en définitive, la preuve qui permettrait de satisfaire à la norme des soupçons raisonnables doit être examinée attentivement. [47] bien que les explications innocentes et les renseignements disculpatoires demeurent pertinents pour une évaluation des soupçons raisonnables, la police n’est pas tenue de pousser l’enquête pour écar‑ ter ces explications (chehil, par 33‑34). toutefois, les faits doivent révéler la possibilité d’un comporte‑ ment criminel : les caractéristiques qui s’appliquent globalement aux personnes innocentes ne sont pas des indices révélant la tenue d’une activité criminelle (chehil, par 35). de simples intuitions et pressenti‑ ments ne suffisent pas (barnes, p 460). cependant, la formation et l’expérience d’un policier peuvent faire en sorte que des renseignements par ailleurs équivoques soient probants en ce qui concerne la présence d’activité criminelle (chehil, par 47). [48] les soupçons raisonnables sont aussi indivi‑ dualisés, en ce sens qu’ils visent une cible en particu‑ lier — que ce soit une personne, une intersection ou un numéro de téléphone — parmi un groupe de per‑ sonnes ou de lieux. comme il est indiqué ci‑dessus, les objections formulées en droit criminel à l’égard de la norme des « soupçons généraux » s’articulent autour du fait qu’elle engloberait [traduction] « un tel nombre de personnes censément innocentes qu’elle se rapprocherait d’une mesure subjective administrée aléatoirement » (chehil, par. 30, citant united states c. gooding, 695 f.2d 78 (1982), p 83). lorsque des soupçons reposant sur des fondements objectifs sont plutôt liés à un « ensemble de facteurs suffisamment spécifiques » (chehil, par. 30), comme ceux associés à un numéro de téléphone particulier, l’objection ne tient plus. autrement dit, le préjudice [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 611 of generalized evidence (kang‑brown, at para. 73, per binnie j). this is a complete answer to our colleague’s concern about dissonance between the entrapment framework set out in mack and barnes and the reasonable suspicion standard required by chehil. [49] the target to which reasonable suspicion must attach varies with the context. it must be borne in mind that in cases such as chehil and kang‑brown, this court was concerned with ensuring that rea‑ sonable suspicion for a sniffer‑dog search of an in‑ dividual is sufficiently targeted. in that particular context — the physical search of a person by a po‑ lice dog — reasonable suspicion cannot attach to a location, but only to a specific person or, at most, to a number of closely linked people (kang‑brown, at para 73). indeed, the reasonable suspicion standard was selected in mack because, as later emphasized in chehil, while it is a uniform “common standard that arises in a number of contexts”, it can be adapted to suit a variety of circumstances (chehil, at para 21). [50] each of these appeals originated with a single tip of unknown reliability. although a sole tip devoid of predictive information cannot meet the reasonable suspicion standard, such a tip can be sufficiently cor‑ roborated such that the standard is met (see florida v. j. l., 529 us 266 (2000), at pp 270‑71). such corroboration must suggest that the “tip [is] relia‑ ble in its assertion of illegality, [and] not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person” (p 272). auquel on cherche à remédier au moyen de l’indivi‑ dualisation est l’empiètement par la police sur les intérêts protégés de toutes les personnes se trouvant dans des endroits définis de façon large ou insuffi‑ sante, particulièrement sur le fondement de preuves générales (kang‑brown, par. 73, le juge binnie). cela constitue une réponse complète à la préoccu‑ pation de notre collègue concernant la dissonance entre le cadre d’analyse de la provocation policière établi dans les arrêts mack et barnes et la norme des soupçons raisonnables exigée par l’arrêt chehil. [49] la cible à laquelle doivent se rapporter les soupçons raisonnables varie selon le contexte. il faut garder à l’esprit que dans des affaires comme chehil et kang‑brown, la cour devait s’assurer que les soupçons raisonnables pour la fouille d’une personne effectuée à l’aide d’un chien renifleur étaient suffi‑ samment circonscrits. dans ce contexte particulier (la fouille physique d’une personne par un chien po‑ licier), les soupçons raisonnables ne peuvent se rap‑ porter à un endroit, mais seulement à une personne précise ou, à tout le moins, à plusieurs personnes étroitement liées (kang‑brown, par 73). d’ailleurs, la norme des soupçons raisonnables a été choisie dans l’arrêt mack parce que, comme il a plus tard été souligné dans l’arrêt chehil, bien qu’il s’agisse d’une « norme courante [uniforme] qui entre en jeu dans plusieurs contextes », elle peut être adaptée à diverses circonstances (chehil, par 21). [50] chacun des présents pourvois découle d’une seule information dont la fiabilité est inconnue. bien qu’une seule information dépourvue de renseigne‑ ments tenant de la prévision ne puisse satisfaire à la norme des soupçons raisonnables, elle peut être suffisamment corroborée de façon à satisfaire à la norme (voir florida c j l, 529 us 266 (2000), p 270‑271). une telle corroboration doit démontrer que [traduction] « l’information [est] fiable en ce qui concerne l’allégation d’illégalité, [et] pas seule‑ ment en ce qui concerne sa tendance à identifier une personne en particulier » (p 272). [51] police practice itself shows that, whether the police are investigating an individual or a phone num‑ ber, various steps can be taken upon receiving a tip [51] les pratiques policières elles‑mêmes démon‑ trent que, peu importe si la police fait enquête sur une personne ou un numéro de téléphone, diverses 612 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. associating a phone number with dial‑a‑dope activity before acting on it by calling the number. police may wait to see if more tips are received about the same person or phone number. police may cross‑reference the person’s name or phone number to find other connections between it and criminal activity. police may also consider any details contained in the tip or, if known, the reliability of the informant. for ex‑ ample, does the source have a criminal record? how long have the police used the source? has the source provided credible tips in the past? is there a possible motivation for giving a false tip (as in r v. olazo, 2012 bcca 59, 287 ccc (3d) 379, at para. 7, where the informant gave the tip to avoid a traffic ticket)? is the source’s information first‑hand? (see r v. lal (1998), 130 ccc (3d) 413 (bcca), at paras. 11 and 27; r v townsend, [1997] oj. no. 6516 (ql) (cj (gen. div.)), at para. 5; r v. williams, 2010 onsc 1698 (williams (2010)), at para. 12 (canlii); r v. sawh, 2016 onsc 2776, at para. 8 (canlii)). as in mack, whether a tip can generate reasonable suspicion will also be connected to the currency of the information (p 958). mesures peuvent être prises suivant la réception d’une information associant un numéro de téléphone à une opération de vente de drogue sur appel avant que l’appel au numéro obtenu soit fait. la police peut attendre de voir si elle reçoit d’autres informations au sujet de la même personne ou du même numéro de téléphone. elle peut tenter de faire des recoupe‑ ments avec le nom de la personne ou le numéro de téléphone pour trouver d’autres liens entre ce nom ou ce numéro et une activité criminelle. elle peut aussi examiner tous les détails que comporte l’in‑ formation ou vérifier la fiabilité de l’informateur, si son identité est connue. par exemple, la source a‑t‑elle des antécédents judiciaires? depuis combien de temps la police a‑t‑elle recours aux services de la source? la source a‑t‑elle déjà fourni des informa‑ tions crédibles? la source aurait‑elle une raison de fournir une fausse information (comme dans l’arrêt r c olazo, 2012 bcca 59, 287 ccc (3d) 379, par. 7, où l’informateur a fourni l’information afin d’éviter une contravention)? l’information de la source est‑elle de première main? (voir r c. lal (1998), 130 ccc (3d) 413 (ca. c‑b), par. 11 et 27; r c. townsend, [1997] oj. no. 6516 (ql) (cj (div. gén.)), par. 5; r c williams, 2010 onsc 1698 (williams (2010)), par. 12 (canlii); r c sawh, 2016 onsc 2776, par. 8 (canlii)). comme dans l’arrêt mack, la question de savoir si une informa‑ tion peut faire naître des soupçons raisonnables sera également liée au caractère actuel de l’information (p 958). [52] in short, there are various ways in which the police may seek to establish reasonable suspicion before the call is made (see, eg,. r v. pucci, 2018 abca 149, 359 ccc (3d) 343, at para. 11; r v. clarke, 2018 oncj 263, at paras.  40 and 56‑57 (canlii)). in british columbia, police officers are required to record on a “swan sheet” the steps they took to establish reasonable suspicion before making the call — which belies any suggestion that mack is impractical to apply in a digital age, or that reasona‑ ble suspicion in the virtual world should represent a lower threshold than in the physical world (r v. li, 2019 bcca 344, 381 ccc (3d) 363, at paras. 3‑4; b a macfarlane,. r. j. frater and c. michaelson, drug offences in canada (4th ed (loose‑leaf)), vol. 2, at pp. 26‑4 to 26‑7). this practice was adopted [52] en résumé, la police peut chercher à établir des soupçons raisonnables de diverses façons avant de faire l’appel (voir, p ex., r c. pucci, 2018 abca 149, 359 ccc (3d) 343, par.  11; r c clarke, 2018 oncj 263, par.  40 et 56‑57 (canlii)) en colombie‑britannique, les policiers sont tenus de consigner sur un [traduction] « relevé du type requis dans l’arrêt swan » les mesures qu’ils ont prises pour établir des soupçons raisonnables avant de faire l’appel — ce qui contredit l’idée qu’il est impossible, en pratique, d’appliquer l’arrêt mack à l’ère numérique, ou que la norme des soupçons rai‑ sonnables dans le monde virtuel devrait être moins rigoureuse que dans le monde physique (r c. li, 2019 bcca 344, 381 ccc (3d) 363, par. 3‑4; b a macfarlane,. r j. frater et c. michaelson, drug [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 613 after the court of appeal for british columbia crit‑ icized the police for making hundreds of random phone calls on the basis of bare, uncorroborated tips in swan, at para 43. [53] of course, it is for the police to determine how to proceed with their investigations. but to be clear, reasonable suspicion cannot be grounded on a bald tip alone (simpson, at p. 504; j. l., at pp. 270‑ 71; see also r v. arriagada, [2008] oj. no. 5791 (ql) (scj), at para. 25; clarke, at para 44). as this court held in r v. debot, [1989] 2 scr 1140, when the police use a tip from a confidential or anon‑ ymous source to justify an intrusion on someone’s liberty, courts must scrutinize the tip.1 it should be examined to see whether its detail is compelling, the informant is credible, and its information is corrob‑ orated in any way (debot, at p 1168). [54] although it would be prudent for police of‑ ficers to investigate the reliability of the tip before placing the call where they are able to do so, it is also possible for the police to form reasonable sus‑ picion in the course of a conversation with the target, but prior to presenting the opportunity to commit a crime (see, eg,. townsend, at para 50). while this is a necessary part of the “leeway” mack requires (at p. 978), police must be aware that in placing the call without reasonable suspicion, they are walking on thin ice, having already intruded upon the private life of their interlocutor. offences in canada (4e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), vol. 2, p. 26‑4 à 26‑7). cette pratique a été adoptée après que la cour d’appel de la colombie‑britannique eut reproché à la police d’avoir fait des centaines d’ap‑ pels au hasard sur la foi de simples informations non corroborées dans l’arrêt swan, au par 43. [53] évidemment, c’est à la police de décider de quelle façon elle mène ses enquêtes cependant, précisons que les soupçons raisonnables ne peuvent se fonder uniquement sur une simple information (simpson, p. 504; j. l., p. 270‑271; voir aussi r c. arriagada, [2008] o.j no 5791 (ql) (csj), par. 25; clarke, par 44). comme l’a jugé la cour dans l’arrêt r c debot, [1989] 2 rcs 1140, lorsque la police s’appuie sur une information de source confidentielle ou anonyme pour justifier une atteinte à la liberté d’une personne, les tribunaux doivent examiner attentivement cette information1 pour voir si ses détails sont convaincants, si l’infor‑ mateur est fiable et si elle peut être corroborée d’une quelconque façon (debot, p 1168). [54] il serait prudent que les policiers, avant de faire l’appel, enquêtent sur la fiabilité de l’informa‑ tion lorsqu’ils sont en mesure de le faire; toutefois, il est aussi possible que des soupçons raisonnables prennent forme chez eux au cours d’une conversation avec la cible, mais avant qu’ils lui présentent l’occa‑ sion de commettre un crime (voir, p ex., townsend, par 50). même s’il s’agit d’une partie nécessaire de la « marge de manœuvre » qu’exige l’arrêt mack (p. 978), la police doit avoir conscience qu’en faisant l’appel sans avoir de soupçons raisonnables, elle s’aventure sur un terrain glissant puisqu’elle a déjà porté atteinte à la vie privée de son interlocuteur. [55] that said, the target’s responsiveness to de‑ tails in the tip, along with other factors, may tend to confirm the tip’s reliability. for example, the target’s use of or response to language particular to the drug subculture properly forms part of the constellation of [55] cela dit, le fait que la cible corresponde aux détails de l’information, conjugué à d’autres facteurs, peut tendre à confirmer la fiabilité de l’information. par exemple, l’utilisation par la cible du jargon parti‑ culier du milieu de la drogue et sa capacité à répondre 1 while that case addressed the standard of “reasonable and probable grounds,” it is still helpful “in screening for objec‑ tive markers when applying the reasonable suspicion stand‑ ard” (williams stay decision, at para. 12), even if those mark‑ ers are to be assessed more leniently in the latter context. 1 bien que cette affaire porte sur la norme des « motifs raisonnables et probables », elle est tout de même utile pour la [traduction] « recherche de repères objectifs lors de l’application de la norme des soupçons raisonnables » (décision relative à l’arrêt des procé‑ dures dans williams, par 12). toutefois, ces repères doivent être évalués avec plus d’indulgence dans ce dernier contexte. 614 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. factors supporting reasonable suspicion (see olazo, at para 26). even so, the understanding of “coded” drug language by a target is not, on its own, neces‑ sarily a reliable ground for reasonable suspicion. some phrases admit of innocent interpretation. and some people — especially vulnerable people — are simply familiar with the coded language of drug trafficking, a point made convincingly by pringle j., writing in clarke: respectfully, i think it dangerous to place too much emphasis on whether the target’s mind is innocent and his history blameless. for example, in mack, the appellant was a reformed drug dealer. while i appreciate that he was induced, the fact remained that because of his prior life experience, he understood drug trafficking transactions and retained drug contacts that could secure him $27 000 worth of cocaine. a reformed drug dealer could get a call from police asking for drugs, based entirely on a stale tip, and fall off the rehabilitative wagon because he struggles to pay rent that month. the little brother of a drug dealer could pick up his phone, understand the street language, and decide that what he hears is an easy way to make $100. this kid can intend to sell the caller baking soda, even, but once he says “yes” on the phone, he has committed a criminal offence. à ce jargon fait partie à juste titre de l’ensemble des facteurs qui justifient l’existence de soupçons rai‑ sonnables (voir olazo, par 26). néanmoins, le fait qu’une cible comprend le langage « codé » de la drogue ne constitue pas, à lui seul, un motif de soup‑ çons raisonnables nécessairement fiable. certaines phrases permettent une interprétation innocente. de plus, certaines personnes — particulièrement celles qui sont vulnérables — connaissent bien le jargon codé du trafic de drogue, un point que le juge pringle a nettement établi dans la décision clarke : [traduction] avec égards, je trouve dangereux d’ac‑ corder trop d’importance à la question de savoir si les intentions de la cible sont innocentes et si ses antécédents sont irréprochables. par exemple, dans l’arrêt mack, l’ap‑ pelant était un ancien trafiquant de drogue. bien que je reconnaisse qu’il ait été incité à commettre un crime, il demeure qu’en raison de son vécu, il comprenait les tran‑ sactions de trafic de drogue et avait toujours des contacts qui pouvaient lui fournir une quantité de cocaïne d’une valeur de 27 000 $. un ancien trafiquant de drogue pourrait recevoir un appel de la part d’un policier qui cherche à acheter de la drogue, entièrement sur la base d’une information désuète, et faire échouer sa réadaptation parce qu’il a de la difficulté à payer le loyer du mois. le petit frère d’un trafiquant de drogue pourrait répondre au téléphone de ce dernier, comprendre le langage de la rue et décider que ce qu’il entend représente un moyen facile de gagner 100 $. ce jeune peut avoir l’intention de vendre du bicarbonate de soude à la personne qui appelle, mais dès qu’il dit « oui » au téléphone, il commet une infraction criminelle.   .   . the emphasis, in my opinion, is not on what the “inno‑ cent” person would do, but what information police relied upon when they provided someone with the opportunity to commit a crime.    [w]hen police do this without a proper basis, meaning without reasonable suspicion, this will always carry the risk of ensnaring the innocent. [underlining added; paras. 20‑21 and 23.] selon moi, l’accent n’est pas sur ce que ferait une per‑ sonne « innocente », mais plutôt sur les renseignements sur lesquels s’est fondée la police lorsqu’elle a donné à une personne l’occasion de commettre un crime   [e]n agis‑ sant ainsi sans fondement valable, c’est‑à‑dire sans soup‑ çons raisonnables, la police risquera toujours de prendre au piège un innocent. [nous soulignons; par. 20‑21 et 23.] [56] whether or not responding to such terminol‑ ogy is neutral or adds to the weight of other factors will depend on the circumstances. there is no re‑ quirement that the police rule out innocent explana‑ tions for these responses. but by the same token, the [56] que la capacité de répondre à ce jargon consti‑ tue un facteur neutre ou qui s’ajoute au poids d’autres facteurs dépendra des circonstances. rien n’oblige la police à écarter les explications innocentes pour de telles réponses. cependant, dans le même ordre [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 615 more general the language used, the more the need for specific evidence regarding police experience and training (chehil, at para 47). in particular, where a police officer testifies that a generic or everyday phrase is indicative of involvement in the drug trade, a trial judge must carefully consider whether this is a reasonable connection to make, based on rigorous scrutiny of all the evidence, including any other fac‑ tors said to establish reasonable suspicion. moreover, if the target seems confused by the officer’s use of such language, such exculpatory information must be taken into account as part of the “entirety of the circumstances” (chehil, at para 6). courts must keep in mind that relevant factors are not to be parsed separately and assessed individually to determine whether they support reasonable suspicion. rather, they are assessed together and in light of each other. [57] to conclude, an objective assessment rigor‑ ously safeguards several rights that are engaged in the entrapment context: to liberty, to privacy, to be left alone, and to equality (mack, at pp. 941 and 955; barnes, at pp. 479‑83, per mclachlin j., dissent‑ ing). reasonable suspicion is the minimum objective standard the court has chosen to protect these es‑ sential rights. at the same time, it also allows police the flexibility necessary to enforce the criminal law against crimes that are difficult to investigate (mack, at pp. 916 and 958). c how should courts review the words spoken during a police call to the target? d’idées, plus le langage utilisé est général, plus il faudra fournir une preuve particulière de la forma‑ tion et de l’expérience policières (chehil, par 47). plus précisément, lorsqu’un policier affirme lors de son témoignage qu’une expression générale ou courante indique la participation au trafic de drogue, le juge du procès doit examiner attentivement s’il s’agit là d’un lien raisonnable pouvant être établi, en fonction de l’examen rigoureux de l’ensemble de la preuve, y compris tout autre facteur qui permettrait d’établir des soupçons raisonnables. de plus, si la cible semble décontenancée par le fait que le policier utilise un tel jargon, ce renseignement disculpatoire doit être pris en compte avec « l’ensemble des cir‑ constances » (chehil, par 6). les tribunaux doivent prendre en considération que les facteurs pertinents ne doivent pas être disséqués séparément et évalués individuellement pour établir s’ils peuvent fonder des soupçons raisonnables. ils doivent plutôt être évalués ensemble et les uns par rapport aux autres. [57] pour conclure, un examen objectif protège rigoureusement plusieurs droits qui sont en jeu dans le contexte de la provocation policière : le droit à la liberté, le droit à la vie privée, le droit de ne pas être importuné et le droit à l’égalité (mack, p. 941 et 955; barnes, p. 479‑483, la juge mclachlin, dis‑ sidente). la norme des soupçons raisonnables est la norme objective minimale que la cour a choisie pour protéger ces droits fondamentaux. par ailleurs, elle permet aussi à la police d’avoir la souplesse nécessaire pour faire respecter le droit criminel et combattre les crimes pour lesquels il est difficile de faire enquête (mack, p. 916 et 958). c de quelle façon les tribunaux devraient‑ils examiner les propos échangés pendant une conversation téléphonique entre un policier et une cible? [58] in both of these appeals, the police engaged in transcribed phone conversations with the appel‑ lants as part of their investigations. both trial judges reviewed those conversations to determine whether the appellants were entrapped. the crown says they were wrong to do so. instead, the crown argues that the “totality of the exchange” between undercover operators and their targets should be examined in [58] dans les deux appels en l’espèce, les poli‑ ciers ont eu des conversations téléphoniques avec les appelants dans le cadre de leur enquête, et celles‑ci ont été transcrites. les deux juges du procès ont examiné les transcriptions de ces conversations pour établir si les appelants avaient été victimes de provo‑ cation policière. la couronne affirme qu’ils ont eu tort de le faire. elle soutient plutôt que [traduction] 616 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. determining whether entrapment has been made out, including looking at the circumstances that follow the request to purchase the drugs. [59] we disagree. unless the police had formed reasonable suspicion before a phone call was made, reviewing the words spoken during the call is una‑ voidable. reviewing conversations between under‑ cover officers and their targets in the dial‑a‑dope context is the inevitable consequence of accepting that the police must have reasonable suspicion before offering an opportunity to commit an offence. while we agree that the conversation must be considered contextually, that is in order to determine whether the undercover officer made a specific request to purchase drugs, and whether reasonable suspicion existed before the opportunity to commit a crime was offered. [60] our point about timing is fundamental. reasonable suspicion is not formed retroactively. rather, it is applied prospectively. from its inception, the entrapment doctrine has required that police of‑ ficers have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before providing an opportunity to commit an of‑ fence. reasonable suspicion — like any level of in‑ vestigative justification — can justify an action only on the basis of information already known to police (see, eg,. swan, at para. 27; r v. saeed, 2016 scc 24, [2016] 1 scr 518, at para. 64; ormerod and roberts, at p. 46, fn. 31). it follows that the decision to intrude into an individual’s private life and offer them the opportunity to commit a crime is justified only if the grounds predate the measure. this is no different than the rule that applies to every context in which this standard (or indeed any standard) is used to justify state actions that interfere with indi‑ viduals’ protected interests. police may not detain an individual for investigative purposes unless they already have reasonable suspicion the individual is connected to a particular crime (r v. mann, 2004 scc 52, [2004] 3 scr 59, at para 34). nor may police undertake a safety search unless they already « l’ensemble de la conversation » entre les agents d’infiltration et leurs cibles devraient être examinées pour établir si la preuve de l’existence de la provoca‑ tion policière a été établie, et que les circonstances qui suivent la demande d’achat de drogue doivent également être prises en compte. [59] nous ne sommes pas de cet avis. à moins que les policiers aient eu des soupçons raisonnables avant que l’appel téléphonique soit fait, l’examen des propos échangés pendant l’appel est inévitable. l’examen des conversations entre des agents d’infil‑ tration et leurs cibles dans le contexte de la vente de drogue sur appel est la conséquence inévitable de la reconnaissance de l’exigence selon laquelle les poli‑ ciers doivent avoir des soupçons raisonnables avant de donner une occasion de commettre un crime. bien que nous soyons d’accord pour dire que la conver‑ sation doit être examinée dans son contexte, cela doit être fait afin d’établir si l’agent d’infiltration a demandé précisément d’acheter de la drogue, et s’il avait des soupçons raisonnables avant de donner l’occasion de commettre un crime. [60] notre point de vue sur le moment où les soup‑ çons raisonnables sont formés est fondamental. les soupçons raisonnables ne peuvent prendre forme rétroactivement; ils s’appliquent plutôt prospec‑ tivement depuis son adoption, la doctrine de la provocation policière exige que les policiers aient des soupçons raisonnables d’une activité crimi‑ nelle avant de donner l’occasion de commettre une infraction. les soupçons raisonnables — comme tout degré de justification dans le cadre d’une en‑ quête — peuvent justifier une action seulement sur le fondement de renseignements que possède déjà la police (voir, p ex,. swan, par. 27; r c saeed, 2016 csc 24, [2016] 1 rcs 518, par. 64; ormerod et roberts, p. 46, note 31). il s’ensuit que la décision de porter atteinte à la vie privée d’une personne et de lui offrir l’occasion de commettre un crime n’est justifiée que si les motifs de le faire sont antérieurs à la mesure. cela n’est pas différent de la règle qui s’applique dans toutes les situations où cette norme (ou par ailleurs toute norme) est appliquée pour justi‑ fier des actes de l’état qui portent atteinte aux intérêts individuels protégés. la police ne peut détenir une personne aux fins d’enquête si elle n’a pas déjà des [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 617 have reasonable grounds to believe that their safety or the safety of others is at risk (r v. macdonald, 2014 scc 3, [2014] 1 scr 37, at para 41). this court has also been clear that reasonable suspicion must be assessed at the time of a sniff search and not after (chehil, at para 68). [61] we acknowledge that there has been criticism of an approach sometimes described as narrowly “parsing” conversations between police officers and the individuals they are investigating. the term “parsing” however, captures neither the purpose of the exercise nor the way it is carried out. a court must examine all of the circumstances, and not merely the language used during the call, in order to determine whether police had formed reasonable suspicion by the time the opportunity was provided. in dial‑a‑ dope cases, conversations are a means of forming a reasonable suspicion and the means of committing the offence itself. given that police cannot verify the identities of their interlocutors when operating in a virtual world, determining when a target is provided with an opportunity to make an offer to traffic una‑ voidably requires that courts scrutinize the language used. this is a common basis upon which police make professional judgment calls about what ac‑ tions are legally permitted. it is also the basis upon which courts review the legality of those actions. examining the language used may reveal, as it does in the cases at bar, the difference between an officer who is investigating whether there is reasonable sus‑ picion of criminal activity through careful attention to the answers received, and an officer who makes no serious attempt to verify a tip of unknown reliability and immediately asks for drugs. soupçons raisonnables que cette personne est impli‑ quée dans un crime donné (r c mann, 2004 csc 52, [2004] 3 rcs 59, par 34). elle ne peut non plus procéder à une fouille de sécurité si elle n’a pas déjà des motifs raisonnables de croire que sa sécurité ou celle des autres est menacée (r c macdonald, 2014 csc 3, [2014] 1 rcs 37, par 41). qui plus est, la cour a clairement établi que les soupçons raisonnables doivent être évalués au moment de la fouille effectuée à l’aide d’un chien renifleur et non après (chehil, par 68). [61] nous reconnaissons que des critiques ont été formulées à l’égard de l’approche qui est parfois décrite comme une « dissection » stricte des conver‑ sations entre les policiers et les personnes visées par leur enquête. le terme « dissection », cependant, ne rend pas l’objet de la démarche ni la façon dont elle est effectuée. le tribunal doit examiner toutes les circonstances, et non simplement le langage utilisé lors de l’appel, afin d’établir si la police avait des soupçons raisonnables au moment où l’occasion a été donnée. dans les cas de vente de drogue sur appel, les conversations sont un moyen par lequel des soupçons raisonnables peuvent prendre forme et le moyen de perpétrer l’infraction en tant que telle. étant donné que la police ne peut vérifier l’identité de ses interlocuteurs lorsqu’elle mène des opéra‑ tions dans un monde virtuel, le fait de déterminer le moment où une cible se voit donner l’occasion de faire du trafic exige inévitablement que les tribunaux examinent attentivement le langage utilisé. il s’agit d’un fondement sur lequel la police s’appuie souvent pour porter des jugements professionnels concernant les actes qui sont légalement autorisés. c’est aussi sur ce fondement que s’appuient les tribunaux pour examiner la légalité de ces actes. l’examen du lan‑ gage utilisé peut révéler, comme il le fait en l’espèce, la différence entre le policier qui étudie attentivement les réponses reçues pour savoir si elles justifient des soupçons raisonnables, et le policier qui ne fait aucune tentative sérieuse de vérifier une information dont la fiabilité est inconnue et qui demande immé‑ diatement des drogues. [62] in sum, if police have not been able to estab‑ lish reasonable suspicion prior to making the call, then inevitably courts will have to scrutinize the [62] en résumé, si la police n’a pas réussi à établir des soupçons raisonnables avant de faire l’appel, les tribunaux devront alors inévitablement examiner 618 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. precise wording of the call. of course, the preferable course of action — and the most sure way to avoid curial “parsing” — is for police to form reasonable suspicion prior to making the call. in our view, these two avenues strike an appropriate balance: they af‑ ford police sufficient latitude, while also protecting canadians from unwarranted invitations to commit an offence. in other words, this approach recognizes that “[t]he reasonable suspicion requirement    is not a heavy price to pay to uphold    the rule of law” (pucci, at para 12). attentivement les mots précis utilisés lors de l’appel. bien sûr, il est préférable — et il s’agit de la façon la plus sûre d’éviter la « dissection » par les tribu‑ naux — que la police ait des soupçons raisonnables avant de faire l’appel. à notre avis, ces deux voies établissent un juste équilibre : elles accordent suffi‑ samment de latitude à la police, tout en protégeant la population canadienne contre les invitations injusti‑ fiées à commettre une infraction. autrement dit, cette approche reconnaît que [traduction] « [l]’exigence relative aux soupçons raisonnables    n’est pas un prix très élevé à payer pour maintenir    la primauté du droit » (pucci, par 12). d what constitutes provision of an opportunity d qu’est‑ce qui constitue une occasion de faire le to traffic in drugs? trafic de drogue? [63] the determination of whether a police action constitutes an opportunity to commit an offence is informed both by the definition of the offence and the context in which the action occurred. like other aspects of the entrapment doctrine, it reflects the balance struck between the state’s interest in inves‑ tigating crime and the law’s constraint against un‑ warranted intrusion into individuals’ personal lives. in a conversation, an opportunity will be established when an affirmative response to the question posed by the officer could satisfy the material elements of an offence. in the dial‑a‑dope context, in which the initial interaction between the police and target occurs entirely over the phone, the exercise centres on determining whether words spoken by the police officer constitute an opportunity to commit drug trafficking. [63] pour établir si une action policière constitue une occasion de commettre une infraction, il faut se pencher à la fois sur la définition de l’infraction et sur le contexte dans lequel l’action a été posée. à l’ins‑ tar d’autres aspects de la doctrine de la provocation policière, ce processus reflète l’équilibre établi entre l’intérêt qu’a l’état à enquêter sur les crimes et la limite qu’impose le droit contre l’intrusion injustifiée dans la vie personnelle des gens. lors d’une conver‑ sation, une occasion sera établie lorsqu’une réponse affirmative à la question posée par le policier pourra satisfaire aux éléments matériels d’une infraction. dans le contexte de la vente de drogue sur appel, où le contact initial entre le policier et la cible se fait entièrement par téléphone, la démarche consiste essentiellement à établir si les mots utilisés par le policier constituent une occasion de commettre une infraction de trafic de drogue. [64] the inquiry, then, is properly directed to how close the police conduct is to the commission of an offence. to allow the police sufficient flexibility to investigate crime, an officer’s action — to constitute an offer of an opportunity to commit a crime — must therefore be sufficiently proximate to conduct that would satisfy the elements of the offence. for example, in bayat, rosenberg ja concluded that beginning an online conversation with a target was not an opportunity to commit the offence of child luring. he likened the first contact to a “knock on a door” (para. 19). in his view, that initial contact was [64] par conséquent, il s’agit d’établir à quel point la conduite policière se rapproche de la perpétra‑ tion d’une infraction. afin que la police puisse avoir suffisamment de souplesse pour enquêter sur les crimes, les actions d’un policier — pour constituer une offre d’une occasion de commettre un crime — doivent se rapprocher suffisamment d’une conduite qui satis ferait aux éléments de l’infraction par exemple, dans l’arrêt bayat, le juge rosenberg a conclu que le fait d’engager une conversation en ligne avec une cible ne constituait pas une occa‑ sion de commettre l’infraction de leurre d’enfants. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 619 too remote from the commission of the offence to constitute the provision of an opportunity to commit an offence (see also r v. vezina, 2014 cmac 3, 461 nr 286, at paras. 5‑6; williams (2010), at paras. 45‑ 47). in the particular context of drug trafficking, we would adopt the conclusion reached by trotter j. at para. 27 of the williams stay decision: an opportunity to commit an offence is offered when the officer says something to which the accused can commit an offence by simply answering “yes”. [65] the definition of drug trafficking in the controlled drugs and substances act, sc 1996, c 19 (cdsa), is broad. it includes not only selling, transporting and administering illegal drugs, but also making an offer to do so (cdsa, ss. 2(1), “traffic” and 5(1); r v. murdock (2003), 176 ccc (3d) 232 (ont. ca), at para. 14; macfarlane, frater and michaelson, vol. 1, at pp. 5‑18.1 to 5‑21). the defi‑ nition of “traffic” is limited to activity “in respect of a substance included in any of schedules i to v.” a general agreement to sell “drugs” or “product” will not suffice unless there are contextual markers that narrow what is intended to a particular drug listed in those schedules. il a comparé le premier contact au fait de [traduc‑ tion] « frapper à une porte » (par 19). à son avis, ce premier contact avait trop peu de liens avec la perpétration de l’infraction pour constituer une offre d’une occasion de commettre une infraction (voir aussi r c vezina, 2014 cacm 3, par. 5‑6; williams (2010), par 45‑47). dans le contexte particulier du trafic de drogue, nous faisons nôtre la conclusion tirée par le juge trotter au par. 27 de sa décision rela‑ tive à l’arrêt des procédures dans l’affaire williams : une occasion de commettre une infraction est offerte lorsque le policier pose une question à l’accusé et que celui‑ci peut commettre une infraction simplement en y répondant « oui ». [65] la définition du trafic de drogue dans la loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances, lc 1996, c. 19 (lrcdas), est large. elle com‑ prend non seulement la vente, le transport et l’admi‑ nistration de substances illicites, mais aussi toute offre d’effectuer l’une de ces opérations (lrcdas, art.  2(1), «  trafic  » et par.  5(1); r c murdock (2003), 176 ccc (3d) 232 (ca. ont.), par. 14; macfarlane, frater et michaelson, vol. 1, p 5‑181 à 5‑21). la définition de « trafic » est restreinte à toute opération « relativement à une substance ins‑ crite à l’une ou l’autre des annexes i à v ». une entente géné rale de vente de « drogue » ou d’un « produit » ne sera pas suffisante, à moins qu’il y ait des éléments contextuels qui restreignent l’opération relativement à une drogue en particulier inscrite à l’une de ces annexes. [66] for these reasons, police can make exploratory requests of the target, including asking whether they sell drugs, without providing an opportunity to traffic in illegal drugs (see, eg,. r v. ralph, 2014 onca 3, 313 oac 384, at para 32). an opportunity has been provided only when the terms of the deal have narrowed to the point that the request is for a specific type of drug and, therefore, the target can commit an offence by simply agreeing to provide what the officer has requested. in some cases, a request to purchase a specific quantity of drugs will suffice. for example, in williams’ case, where the police were working from a tip that the individual was a cocaine dealer, a request for a particular quantity of that drug (ie, “i need 80”) constituted an opportunity (stay [66] pour ces motifs, les policiers peuvent poser des questions exploratoires à la cible, en lui deman‑ dant par exemple si elle vend de la drogue, sans lui donner l’occasion de faire le trafic de drogues illicites (voir, p ex,. r c ralph, 2014 onca 3, 313 oac 384, par 32). une occasion n’est four‑ nie que lorsque les détails de la transaction sont restreints au point où la demande vise un type de drogue en particulier et, par conséquent, la cible peut commettre une infraction en acceptant simplement de fournir ce que le policier lui a demandé. dans cer‑ tains cas, une demande visant l’achat d’une quantité précise de drogue suffira. par exemple, dans le cas de m. williams, alors que la police cherchait à vérifier une information selon laquelle l’individu était un 620 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. decision, at para. 9). indeed, courts have consistently recognized that a request to purchase a specific type of drug during the conversation will amount to an opportunity to commit a crime (ralph, at paras. 29 and 31‑32; r v. imoro, 2010 onca 122, 251 ccc. (3d) 131, at paras. 3 and 15‑16, aff’d 2010 scc 50, [2010] 3 scr 62; townsend, at paras. 42 and 47; r v. gould, 2016 onsc 4069, at paras. 18 and 30 (canlii)). statements such as “i need 40”, “i need six greens”, “i want a 60 piece”, “four for a hun‑ dred”, “a ball”, and “half a b” have all been found to present opportunities (r v. marino‑montero, [2012] oj. no. 1287 (ql) (sup ct), at para. 15; r v. izzard, [2012] oj. no. 2516 (ql) (sup ct), at para. 22; williams (2010), at para. 19, see also para. 54; r v. gladue, 2012 abca 143, 285 ccc (3d) 154, at paras. 4 and 11; r v. stubbs, 2012 onsc 1882, at para. 12 (canlii); arriagada, at para. 26; clarke, at para 37)2 [67] before this court, the crown submitted that the opportunity to commit the offence — within the meaning of the doctrine of entrapment — arises not when the agreement to sell drugs is secured during the call, but only afterwards, when the police officer meets the suspect in person, and the in‑person trans‑ action is made. this argument lacks merit. drug‑ related entrapment cases have implicitly rejected such an approach by considering whether the ac‑ cused was entrapped during the initial conversation, even though the in‑person transaction occurred later. in swan, for example, although the accused eventu‑ ally met up with the undercover officer and sold $40 worth of cocaine (para. 7), prowse ja’s analysis focused on the call itself (paras 27‑29). in olazo, the accused eventually met up with the undercover officer (at para. 10), but donald ja focused on the call (para 26). in ralph, the accused sold the officer drugs six times after their initial phone call trafiquant de cocaïne, une demande visant à obtenir une quantité précise de cette drogue (p ex., [tra‑ duction] « ça m’en prend pour 80 ») constituait une occasion (décision relative à l’arrêt des procédures, par 9). de fait, les tribunaux ont toujours reconnu qu’une demande visant l’achat d’un type précis de drogue formulée pendant une conversation équivau‑ dra à une occasion de commettre un crime (ralph, par. 29 et 31‑32; r c. imoro, 2010 onca 122, 251 ccc (3d) 131, par. 3 et 15‑16, conf. par 2010 csc 50, [2010] 3 rcs 62; townsend, par. 42 et 47; r c. gould, 2016 onsc 4069, par. 18 et 30 (canlii)). par conséquent, des expressions comme [traduc‑ tion] « j’en veux pour 40 », « il me faut six vertes », « j’en voudrais pour 60 », « 4 pour 100 », « un hui‑ tième » et « un demi‑huitième » ont toutes été consi‑ dérées comme des occasions (r c marino‑montero, [2012]  oj . no.  1287 (ql) (cs), par.  15; r c. izzard, [2012] oj. no. 2516 (ql) (cs), par. 22; williams (2010), par. 19, voir aussi par. 54; r c. gladue, 2012 abca 143, 285 ccc (3d) 154, par. 4 et 11; r c stubbs, 2012 onsc 1882, par. 12 (canlii); arriagada, par. 26; clarke, par 37)2. [67] devant la cour, la couronne a soutenu que l’occasion de commettre une infraction — au sens où on l’entend pour l’application de la doctrine de la provocation policière — ne survient pas au moment où l’entente de vente de drogue est conclue pendant l’appel, mais seulement après, lorsque le policier rencontre le suspect en personne et que la transaction en personne est effectuée. cet argument n’est pas fondé. dans les affaires de provocation policière liées à la drogue, les tribunaux ont implicitement rejeté une telle approche en se demandant si l’accusé avait été victime de provocation policière pendant la conversation initiale, même si la transaction en per‑ sonne a eu lieu ultérieurement. dans l’affaire swan, par exemple, bien que l’accusé ait finalement rencon‑ tré l’agente d’infiltration et lui ait vendu pour 40 $ de cocaïne (par. 7), l’analyse de la juge prowse portait principalement sur l’appel téléphonique (par 27‑29). dans l’affaire olazo, l’accusé a finalement rencontré 2 in each case, the meaning of the specific slang term at issue will have to be established. 2 dans chaque cas, la signification du terme argotique en cause devra être établie. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 621 (at para. 2), but rosenberg ja still focused on the words spoken in that phone call (para 32). [68] it follows that, to ensure the fairness of state conduct, proceedings must be stayed in respect of charges that are related to the conduct targeted by abusive police conduct — that is, to the offence of trafficking by offer and to the in‑person trafficking or possession for the purpose of trafficking offences to which the offer directly relates. concluding oth‑ erwise would ignore the entrapment that occurs dur‑ ing the phone call and its direct relationship to the offences that were eventually charged. the police conduct in dial‑a‑dope investigations is directed at drug trafficking. the very reason that police inter‑ act with their targets in person is to carry out the opportunities offered over the phone. to follow the crown’s reasoning and stay charges arising from the offer while entering convictions for drug trafficking to which the offer related would be highly technical and, indeed, artificial, thereby defeating the purposes of the entrapment doctrine and ignoring its underly‑ ing rationale of preventing intrusion into people’s lives to test their virtue. l’agent d’infiltration (par. 10), mais le juge donald s’est concentré sur l’appel (par 26). dans l’affaire ralph, l’accusé a vendu de la drogue au policier à six reprises après leur premier appel téléphonique (par. 2), mais le juge rosenberg s’est tout de même concentré sur les mots utilisés pendant cet appel (par 32). [68] il s’ensuit que, pour assurer l’équité de la conduite des représentants de l’état, il doit y avoir arrêt des procédures relativement aux accusations qui se rapportent au comportement visé par une conduite policière abusive — c’est‑à‑dire, l’infraction de tra‑ fic qui a été offerte et les infractions de trafic en personne ou de possession en vue de faire le trafic auxquelles l’offre est directement liée. conclure au‑ trement ne tiendrait pas compte de la provocation policière qui a lieu pendant l’appel téléphonique et de son lien direct avec les infractions qui ont par la suite été reprochées. la conduite policière lors des enquêtes sur les opérations de vente de drogue sur appel vise le trafic de drogue. la raison même pour laquelle les policiers interagissent avec leurs cibles en personne est de mener à bien les occasions offertes par téléphone. suivre le raisonnement de la couronne et suspendre les accusations découlant de l’offre tout en inscrivant des déclarations de culpa‑ bilité pour l’infraction de trafic de drogue à laquelle se rapportait l’offre serait hautement technique et, de fait, artificiel, ce qui irait à l’encontre des objectifs de la doctrine de la provocation policière et ferait abstraction de sa raison d’être, soit d’empêcher l’in‑ trusion dans la vie privée des gens pour éprouver leur vertu. [69] in conclusion, given the principles govern‑ ing our entrapment doctrine, police investigating a dial‑a‑dope operation by calling a phone number they suspect is being used to traffic illegal drugs must form reasonable suspicion before offering an opportunity to traffic drugs. if they cannot form rea‑ sonable suspicion before making the call, they must in the course of their conversation form reasonable suspicion before making the offer. a determination of whether this requirement is satisfied must be the product of strict judicial scrutiny, taking into account the constellation of factors that indicate involvement [69] en conclusion, étant donné les principes ré‑ gissant la doctrine de la provocation policière, les policiers qui enquêtent sur des opérations de vente de drogue sur appel en appelant à un numéro de télé‑ phone qu’ils soupçonnent d’être utilisé pour le trafic de drogues illicites doivent avoir des soupçons rai‑ sonnables avant d’offrir l’occasion de faire le trafic de drogue. s’ils n’ont pas de soupçons raisonnables avant de faire l’appel, ils doivent en avoir au cours de leur conversation avant de faire l’offre. la décision quant à savoir si cette exigence est satisfaite doit être le produit d’un examen judiciaire rigoureux, tenant 622 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. in drug trafficking. and, if it is determined that the offer was presented before reasonable suspicion was formed, entrapment is established and the proceed‑ ings must be stayed. compte de l’ensemble des facteurs indiquant une participation au trafic de drogue. en outre, s’il est établi que l’offre a été présentée avant que les soup‑ çons raisonnables aient pris forme, la provocation policière est alors démontrée et il doit y avoir arrêt des procédures. vi application vi application [70] the facts of each of these two appeals lead us to different conclusions. specifically, applying this court’s entrapment framework and in particular its reasonable suspicion standard, we would affirm the decision of each trial judge. while ahmad was not entrapped, williams was. [71] the only question to be answered in deciding each appeal is whether, based on the constellation of factors known to police, they had a reasonable suspicion that the target or the phone number was engaged in drug trafficking at the time the officer provided an opportunity to commit a crime. [72] in ahmad’s case, dc. limsiaco received a tip that “romeo” was selling drugs using a particular phone number. he called the number and engaged in the following conversation: [70] les faits dans chacun des deux pourvois en l’espèce nous mènent à des conclusions différentes. plus particulièrement, en appliquant le cadre d’ana‑ lyse de la provocation policière de la cour et notam‑ ment la norme des soupçons raisonnables qui en découle, nous sommes d’avis de confirmer la déci‑ sion de chaque juge du procès. bien que m. ahmad n’ait pas été victime de provocation policière, m. williams l’a été. [71] la seule question à laquelle il faut répondre pour trancher chaque pourvoi est de savoir si, en fonction de l’ensemble des facteurs connus de la police, celle‑ci avait des soupçons raisonnables que la cible ou le numéro de téléphone était associé au trafic de drogue au moment où le policier a donné l’occasion de commettre un crime. [72] dans le cas de m.  ahmad, le gendarme‑ détective limsiaco avait été informé qu’un dénommé « romeo » vendait de la drogue à l’aide d’un numéro de téléphone en particulier. il a appelé au numéro et a eu la conversation suivante avec la personne qui a répondu : male: hello [traduction] homme : allô? officer: hey, it’s mike, matt said i can give you a call, this is romeo? policier : salut, c’est mike, matt a dit que j’pouvais t’ap‑ peler, c’est romeo? male: he did, did he? homme : y a dit ça, ouais? officer: yeah, said you can help me out? policier : ouais, y’a dit que tu pouvais m’aider? male: what do you need? homme : t’as besoin de quoi? [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 623 officer: 2 soft policier : 2 de coupée. male: hold on, i’ll get back to you. homme : attends un peu, j’te reviens. officer: alright. policier : ok. (ahmad stay decision, at para. 21) [73] dc. limsiaco provided an opportunity for ahmad to commit drug trafficking when he asked for “2 soft” in response to the question, “what do you need?” in context, given the meaning of “2 soft”, this amounted to asking ahmad whether he would sell him two grams of cocaine. since the cdsa al‑ lows trafficking to be committed by a simple offer to sell drugs, saying “yes” to the officer’s question would have constituted trafficking. of course, ask‑ ing whether ahmad could “help [him] out”, as the officer did earlier, was not an opportunity to traffic. responding “yes” to that question would not have been trafficking, because the inquiry had not been narrowed to a particular substance listed in a sched‑ ule of the cdsa. [74] given the point at which the opportunity was provided, the constellation of factors that existed at that time consisted of the tip and the nature of ahmad’s responses to dc. limsiaco’s questions. (décision relative à l’arrêt des procédures dans ahmad, par. 21) [73] le gendarme‑détective limsiaco a donné à m. ahmad l’occasion de faire le trafic de drogue lorsqu’il a répondu « 2 de coupée » à la question « t’as besoin de quoi? » dans ce contexte, en utili‑ sant l’expression « 2 de coupée », le gendarme‑dé‑ tective demandait à m. ahmad s’il voulait lui vendre deux grammes de cocaïne. puisque la lrcdas pré‑ voit qu’il y a trafic lorsqu’une simple offre de vendre de la drogue est faite, répondre « oui » à la question du policier aurait constitué du trafic. évidemment, demander à m. ahmad s’il pouvait « [l]’aider », comme l’a fait le policier, ne constituait pas une occasion de faire le trafic. répondre « oui » à cette question n’aurait pas non plus constitué du trafic, parce que la question n’était pas restreinte à une substance précise inscrite à l’une des annexes de la lrcdas. [74] compte tenu du moment où l’occasion a été donnée, l’ensemble des facteurs qui existaient alors se composait de l’information et de la nature des réponses de m. ahmad aux questions du gendarme‑ détective limsiaco. [75] allen j concluded that reasonable suspicion crystallized when ahmad asked d.c limsiaco, “[w]hat do you need?” by that point, the officer had asked ahmad if he went by the name “romeo,” which he did not deny. when the officer asked ahmad, “you can help me out?”, ahmad responded posi‑ tively to this use of language particular to the drug subculture: “what do you need?” having connected the tip to the person on the phone, the aspect of the tip that asserted illegality was corroborated by ahmad’s understanding of drug‑trafficking slang and willingness to engage in it. allen j. found that, in this context, these markers of reliability together sufficiently corroborated the initial tip to give rise to [75] la juge allen a conclu que les soupçons rai‑ sonnables avaient pris forme lorsque m. ahmad a demandé « [t]’as besoin de quoi? » au gendarme‑dé‑ tective limsiaco. à ce moment‑là, le policier avait déjà demandé à m. ahmad s’il s’appelait « romeo », ce qu’il n’avait pas nié. lorsque le policier a de‑ mandé à m.  ahmad «  tu [peux] m’aider?  », ce dernier a réagi positivement à cette utilisation du langage particulier du milieu de la drogue en ré‑ pondant : « t’as besoin de quoi? » le lien entre l’information reçue et l’interlocuteur ayant été établi, le fait que m. ahmad comprenne le jargon relatif au trafic de drogue et qu’il soit disposé à faire le trafic de drogue corroborait l’élément de l’information selon 624 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. an objective possibility that ahmad was involved in drug trafficking before the officer asked for “2 soft”. [76] while this is an extremely close call, we are satisfied that allen j did not err in her conclusion that the police had a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking before providing the opportunity to com‑ mit an offence. we acknowledge that the answer “[w]hat do you need?” to the question “you can help me out?” can admit of innocent responses, but the reasonable suspicion standard did not require the police to direct the conversation to rule out innocent explanations for ahmad’s positive response. nor can the question and answer be assessed in isolation. it came after the officer’s references to both romeo and the police’s concocted “drop name” matt, and after ahmad evinced no surprise and did not deny he was romeo or ask who matt was. significantly, he betrayed no surprise that a stranger, on another person’s recommendation, would be reaching out to him for “help”; in fact, he did the opposite, continu‑ ing to engage the caller to ascertain what he wanted. the officer was entitled to rely on what he knew of illicit drug transactions and all of the circumstances, as well as the response “[w]hat do you need?” in re‑ sponse to a request that he “help . . . out” a stranger, in forming reasonable suspicion that the individual with whom he was speaking was engaged in drug trafficking. perhaps no one of these factors, on its own, was sufficient to establish reasonable suspi‑ cion. but we share allen j.’s conclusion that, taken together, they disclosed a reasonable possibility that this individual was involved in drug trafficking. lequel il menait des activités illégales. la juge allen a conclu que, dans ce contexte, ces indices de fiabilité considérés ensemble corroboraient suffisamment l’information initialement obtenue pour donner lieu à une possibilité objective que m. ahmad se livrait au trafic de drogue avant que le policier lui demande « 2 de coupée ». [76] bien qu’il s’agisse d’un cas extrêmement limite, nous sommes convaincus que la juge allen n’a pas commis d’erreur lorsqu’elle a conclu que les policiers avaient des soupçons raisonnables que leur interlocuteur se livrait au trafic de drogue avant de lui donner l’occasion de commettre une infraction. nous reconnaissons que la réponse « [t]’as besoin de quoi? » à la question « tu [peux] m’aider? » puisse être considérée comme innocente, mais la norme des soupçons raisonnables n’exigeait pas que le policier oriente la conversation de manière à exclure les explications innocentes pour justifier la réponse positive de m ahmad. la question et sa réponse ne peuvent pas non plus être appréciées isolément. elles ont été formulées après que le policier eut fait réfé‑ rence à romeo et au « nom à placer » matt, inventé par la police, après quoi m. ahmad n’a manifesté aucune surprise et n’a pas non plus nié être romeo ni demandé qui était matt. fait important à signaler, il n’a pas paru surpris qu’un inconnu, sur la recom‑ mandation d’une autre personne, l’appelle pour lui demander de l’« aide ». en fait, il a même fait le contraire; il a continué à parler avec son interlocuteur pour savoir ce qu’il voulait. le policier pouvait s’ap‑ puyer sur ce qu’il savait au sujet des transactions de drogues illicites et de l’ensemble des circonstances, ainsi que sur la phrase « [t]’as besoin de quoi? » donnée en réponse à la demande d’un inconnu de « [l]’aider » pour établir des soupçons raisonnables que la personne à laquelle il parlait était impliquée dans le trafic de drogue. il se peut qu’aucun de ces facteurs, à lui seul, n’ait été suffisant pour établir des soupçons raisonnables. cependant, nous souscrivons à la conclusion de la juge allen portant qu’ensemble, ils révélaient une possibilité raisonnable que cette personne se livrait au trafic de drogue. [77] in williams’ case, police received a tip that “jay” was selling drugs using a phone number. police [77] dans le cas de m. williams, la police a reçu une information selon laquelle « jay » vendait de [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 625 prepared a package relating the phone number and the name “jay” to williams, who had previously been arrested for drug trafficking. the package in‑ cluded information about williams, including an address at which he had allegedly been trafficking drugs, a description of his physical appearance, a note that he was a “cocaine dealer” who worked in a certain area, and a home address. [78] having been provided the phone number, the name “jay”, the nature of the drug, and a picture of williams, dc. canepa called the number and had the following conversation: la drogue à l’aide d’un numéro de téléphone. la police a préparé un dossier établissant des liens entre le numéro de téléphone, le prénom « jay » et m. williams, qui avait déjà été arrêté pour trafic de drogue. ce dossier comprenait des renseignements au sujet de m. williams, dont l’adresse d’un lieu où il aurait fait du trafic de drogue, une description de son apparence physique, une note selon laquelle il était un [traduction] « trafiquant de cocaïne » dans un secteur en particulier, et une adresse domiciliaire. [78] après qu’on lui eut fourni le numéro de té‑ léphone, le prénom « jay », la nature de la drogue et une photographie de m. williams, le gendarme‑ détective canepa a appelé au numéro et la conver‑ sation suivante a eu lieu : male: hello. canepa: jay? male: yeah. [traduction] homme : allô? canepa : jay? homme : ouais. canepa: you around? canepa : t’es dans le coin? male: who is this? canepa: it’s vinny. male: vinny who? homme : qui parle? canepa : c’est vinny. homme : vinny qui? canepa: vinny. jesse from queen and jarvis gave me your name    your number. said you could help me out. i need 80. canepa : vinny. jesse de queen et jarvis m’a donné ton nom    ton numéro. y’a dit qu’tu pouvais m’aider. ça m’en prend pour 80. male: okay. you have to come to me. homme : ok. faut que tu viennes me rejoindre. canepa: okay. where? canepa : ok. où? male: queen and dufferin. homme : queen et dufferin. canepa: okay. it’ll take me a few because i’m at yonge & bloor. canepa : ok. ça va m’prendre quelques minutes, parce que j’suis au coin de yonge et bloor. male: okay, hurry up. homme : ok. dépêche‑toi. canepa: i’ll call you when i get there. canepa : j’t’appelle quand j’arrive. 626 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. male: okay. what you want, soft or hard. homme : ok. veux‑tu de la coupée ou de la roche? canepa: hard. hard buddy. canepa : de la roche. de la roche mon chum. male: okay. homme : ok. (williams stay decision, at para. 9) [79] as soon as the person who answered con‑ firmed that he was jay, dc canepa provided an op‑ portunity to traffic drugs when he presented williams with the specific request to sell him “80”, slang for a dollar amount of cocaine. once williams responded “okay”, the offence of trafficking by offer was com‑ plete. [80] unlike in ahmad’s case, there was nothing in williams’ responses — before dc. canepa provided the opportunity to traffic — to suggest that the phone number was being used to sell drugs. dc. canepa did not wait to see how williams would respond to an investigative question that could have corroborated that williams was engaged in criminal activity prior to providing the opportunity to commit the crime. this means williams did not respond positively to slang particular to the drug subculture until after the opportunity had been provided. that one aspect of a tip has been corroborated — here, “jay’s” name — does not allow that tip to ground a reasonable suspicion. the corroboration of the name does not strengthen the reliability of the tip “in its assertion of illegality” (j. l., at p 272). (décision relative à l’arrêt des procédures dans williams, par. 9) [79] dès que la personne qui a répondu à l’appel a confirmé être jay, le gendarme‑détective canepa lui a donné l’occasion de faire le trafic de drogue lors‑ qu’il a présenté à m. williams la demande spécifique selon laquelle il voulait « 80 », ce qui signifiait un montant en argent de cocaïne. lorsque m. williams a répondu « ok », l’infraction de trafic à la suite d’une offre a été commise. [80] contrairement au cas de m.  ahmad, rien dans les réponses de m. williams — avant que le gendarme‑détective canepa lui donne l’occasion de faire le trafic de drogue — ne laissait entendre que le numéro de téléphone était utilisé pour vendre de la drogue. le gendarme‑détective canepa n’a pas attendu de voir comment m. williams répondrait à une question d’enquête qui aurait pu corroborer qu’il se livrait à une activité criminelle avant de lui donner l’occasion de commettre le crime. cela signifie que ce n’est qu’après qu’une occasion lui eut été fournie que m. williams a répondu positivement au jargon particulier du milieu de la drogue. le fait qu’un seul élément d’une information ait été corroboré — en l’occurrence, le prénom « jay » — ne permet pas que cette information fonde l’existence de soupçons raisonnables. corroborer un prénom ne rend pas plus fiable [traduction] « l’allégation d’illégalité » faite dans l’information fournie (j. l., p 272). [81] the crown relies on the police brief that identified “jay” as williams and included his home address, an address where he trafficked drugs, and his criminal record. however, there was no evidence of the basis upon which the officer preparing the brief made the connection between williams and the name “jay”. trotter j reasoned that he could not conclude that the name “jay” was sufficiently linked [81] la couronne s’appuie sur le dossier de la police, qui identifiait « jay » comme m. williams et qui indiquait son adresse domiciliaire, l’adresse d’un lieu où il faisait le trafic de drogue et ses anté‑ cédents judiciaires. cependant, il n’y avait aucune preuve des raisons pour lesquelles le policier ayant préparé ce dossier avait fait un lien entre m. williams et le prénom « jay ». le juge trotter a expliqué [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad les juges karakatsanis, brown et martin 627 to williams, and therefore he could not rely on the information in that package as part of a constellation of factors supporting reasonable suspicion. given the lack of evidence on the reliability of the source or the information provided, trotter j concluded that neither the officers nor he could determine the reliability or currency of the information. [82] we agree. the court can consider all the ob‑ jective factors known to members of the investigative team at the relevant time in determining whether the decision was made with reasonable suspicion. obviously, police officers must be able to rely on the investigative work of other officers and it is not necessary for the particular officer making the call to personally have all the information that supports reasonable suspicion (see, eg,. debot, at p 1166). police work often relies on multiple officers conduct‑ ing individual parts of an investigation. in the context of dial‑a‑dope investigations, several lower courts have also taken this approach (see r v. gladue, 2011 abqb 194, 54 alta. lr (5th) 84, at para. 60, aff’d 2012 abca 143, 285 ccc (3d) 154; r v. coutre, 2013 abqb 258, 557 ar 144, at para. 14; sawh, at para 112). qu’il ne pouvait pas conclure que des liens suffi‑ sants avaient été faits entre le prénom « jay » et m. williams, et qu’il ne pouvait donc pas se fonder sur les renseignements contenus dans ce dossier en tant qu’éléments d’un ensemble de facteurs étayant l’existence de soupçons raisonnables. compte tenu de l’insuffisance de la preuve en ce qui a trait à la fiabilité de la source ou des renseignements fournis, le juge trotter a conclu que ni lui ni les policiers ne pouvaient conclure que les renseignements fournis étaient fiables ou exacts. [82] nous sommes aussi de cet avis. les tribunaux peuvent tenir compte de l’ensemble des facteurs objectifs connus des membres de l’équipe d’enquête au moment pertinent pour établir si la décision a été prise sur le fondement de soupçons raisonnables. de toute évidence, les policiers doivent pouvoir se fier aux enquêtes des autres policiers et il n’est pas nécessaire que le policier qui fait l’appel dispose personnellement de tous les renseignements qui jus‑ tifient l’existence de soupçons raisonnables (voir, p ex,. debot, p 1166). souvent, le travail de la police mobilise de nombreux policiers qui font chacun une partie de l’enquête. dans le contexte des enquêtes concernant la vente de drogues sur appel, plusieurs tribunaux d’instances inférieures ont aussi adopté cette approche (voir r c. gladue, 2011 abqb 194, 54 alta. lr (5th) 84, par. 60, conf. par 2012 abca 143, 285 ccc (3d) 154; r c. coutre, 2013 abqb 258, 557 ar 144, par. 14; sawh, par 112). [83] however, the facts relied upon to ground rea‑ sonable suspicion must be put before the court for independent review. as we have emphasized, the primary purpose of the reasonable suspicion standard is to allow for meaningful judicial review of police conduct (see paras. 24 and 45‑46, above). requiring the police to disclose their reasons for targeting an accused does not alter the onus on the accused to prove entrapment; it merely recognizes that only the police can point to the circumstances known to them that give rise to reasonable suspicion. to free the police from the requirement of having to provide objectively reviewable evidence — in this case, evidence of the connection between “jay” and [83] cependant, les faits ayant servi à fonder les soupçons raisonnables doivent être présentés aux tribunaux en vue d’un examen indépendant. comme nous l’avons souligné, l’objectif principal de la norme des soupçons raisonnables est que la conduite policière fasse l’objet d’un examen judiciaire vala‑ ble (voir par. 24 et 45‑46 ci‑dessus). exiger que la police révèle les raisons pour lesquelles elle a ciblé un accusé ne modifie pas le fardeau qui incombe à ce dernier de prouver qu’il y a eu provocation poli‑ cière; cela ne fait que reconnaître que seule la police peut mettre en avant les circonstances dont elle avait connaissance et qui ont donné lieu aux soupçons raisonnables. libérer la police de l’exigence d’avoir 628 r v ahmad karakatsanis, brown and martin jj. [2020] 1 scr. williams — would be to engage in the very same “good faith” reasoning that has been soundly rejected in the reasonable suspicion jurisprudence. [84] in this case, police appear to have pro‑ ceeded on the assumption that the tip — that jay was trafficking in cocaine using the phone number provided — was about williams. but there was no evidence to establish that the source connected jay with williams. nor did the evidence establish any other basis upon which to conclude they were the same person. indeed, the officer who had previously dealt with williams said she had not known him to use the name “jay”. while the report itself asserted a connection between the two, there was no evidence to show whether such a connection was warranted or reasonable. in the absence of such evidence, this court cannot simply presume that a bald tip that jay was using a particular phone number to traffic in cocaine was reliable and current. confirmation that the speaker was jay confirmed only that aspect of the tip — that jay was using that phone. there was no confirmation that he was using the phone to sell cocaine until after the police officer provided him with the opportunity to do so. the only conclusion that can be safely drawn from the record as it stands is the one trotter j drew: the police had no more than a bare tip that someone using a particular phone number was selling drugs and this did not ground reasonable suspicion. à fournir des éléments de preuve objectivement sus‑ ceptibles de faire l’objet d’un examen — en l’espèce, la preuve du lien entre « jay » et m. williams — reviendrait à adopter le même raisonnement fondé sur la « bonne foi » qui a été rejeté à juste titre dans la jurisprudence sur les soupçons raisonnables. [84] en l’espèce, la police semble avoir tenu pour acquis que l’information — selon laquelle jay fai‑ sait le trafic de cocaïne à l’aide du numéro de télé‑ phone fourni — concernait m williams. or, aucun élément de preuve n’établissait que la source avait fait un lien entre jay et m. williams, et rien ne per‑ mettait de conclure qu’il s’agissait de la même per‑ sonne. en effet, la policière qui avait déjà eu affaire à m. williams a dit qu’elle ne savait pas qu’il utilisait le prénom « jay ». bien qu’un lien entre les deux soit établi dans le rapport, rien ne démontrait que ce lien était justifié ou raisonnable. en l’absence d’une telle preuve, la cour ne peut présumer qu’une simple information selon laquelle jay utilisait un numéro de téléphone en particulier pour faire le trafic de cocaïne était fiable et actuelle. la confirmation que l’interlocuteur était jay ne confirmait que cet élément de l’information — soit qu’une personne prénommée « jay » utilisait ce téléphone. ce n’est qu’après que le policier lui eut donné l’occasion de vendre de la cocaïne qu’il a été confirmé que l’interlocuteur utilisait ce téléphone à cette fin. la seule conclusion qui peut être tirée sans risque d’erreur du dossier tel qu’il est constitué est celle qu’a tirée le juge trotter : la police ne disposait de rien de plus qu’une simple information selon laquelle une personne utilisant un numéro de téléphone en particulier vendait de la drogue et cela ne pouvait fonder des soupçons raisonnables. vii. conclusion vii. conclusion [85] for these reasons, we would dismiss ahmad’s appeal and allow williams’ appeal, setting aside the convictions entered by the court of appeal and rein‑ stating the stay of proceedings entered by trotter j. [85] pour ces motifs, nous sommes d’avis de reje‑ ter le pourvoi de m. ahmad et d’accueillir celui de m. williams, d’annuler les déclarations de culpa‑ bilité prononcées par la cour d’appel et de rétablir l’arrêt des procédures ordonné par le juge trotter. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 629 the reasons of wagner cj and moldaver, côté and rowe jj. were delivered by version française des motifs du juge en chef wagner et des juges moldaver, côté et rowe ren‑ dus par moldaver j (dissenting in part) — le juge moldaver (dissident en partie) — i overview i aperçu [86] the criminal landscape has changed dramat‑ ically since the seminal entrapment cases of r v. mack, [1988] 2 scr 903, and r v. barnes, [1991] 1 scr 449, were decided. the days when drug dealers, particularly low‑level dealers, would as‑ sociate themselves with a fixed location are largely gone. now, these dealers regularly associate them‑ selves with a phone number and run their businesses through so‑called “dial‑a‑dope” operations. the pro‑ liferation of mobile phones and other forms of instant communication has allowed modern day drug dealers to traffic from any number of different locations as a means of evading police detection. as these appeals demonstrate, attempting to apply the doctrine of entrapment as formulated in mack and barnes to present‑day dial‑a‑dope operations has revealed both doctrinal and policy concerns that this court, in my view, should address. [87] the doctrine of entrapment, as a species of abuse of process, “draws on the notion that the state is limited in the way it may deal with its citizens” (mack, at p 939). the state may not engage in con‑ duct that “violates our notions of ‘fair play’ and ‘decency’ and which shows blatant disregard for the qualities of humanness which all of us share” (p 940). a claim that the police entrapped the indi‑ vidual before the court is “a very serious allegation against the state”, and a finding of entrapment is accordingly reserved for the “clearest of cases” of intolerable state conduct (pp 976‑77). [86] le paysage criminel a radicalement changé depuis que les arrêts de principe en matière de pro‑ vocation policière r c. mack, [1988] 2 rcs 903, et r c barnes, [1991] 1 rcs 449, ont été rendus. l’époque où les trafiquants de drogue, particulière‑ ment les petits trafiquants, s’associaient à un lieu fixe est en grande partie révolue. maintenant, ils s’associent couramment à un numéro de téléphone et exercent leurs activités sous forme d’opérations dites « de vente de drogue sur appel ». avec la proli‑ fération des téléphones mobiles et d’autres formes de communication instantanée, les trafiquants de drogue peuvent, de nos jours, mener leurs activités à partir de plusieurs emplacements différents afin d’échap‑ per à la détection policière. comme l’illustrent les présents pourvois, tenter d’appliquer la doctrine de la provocation policière telle qu’elle a été formulée dans mack et barnes aux opérations actuelles de vente de drogue sur appel a mis en évidence des préoccupations d’ordres théorique et de principe qui, selon moi, doivent être résolues par la cour. [87] la doctrine de la provocation policière, en tant que type d’abus de procédure, « est fondée sur la notion que l’état est limité dans la manière dont il peut traiter ses citoyens » (mack, p 939). l’état ne saurait se livrer à un comportement qui « viole nos notions de “franc‑jeu” et de “décence”, [et] qui fait montre d’un mépris flagrant pour les valeurs humaines que nous partageons tous » (p 940). la prétention de provocation policière à l’endroit d’un accusé est « une allégation très grave faite contre l’état », si bien que la conclusion de provocation policière se limite aux « cas les plus manifestes » de conduite intolérable de l’état (p 976‑977). [88] in canadian law, entrapment has two branches. under the first branch, entrapment is made out where the police offer an individual the opportunity to com‑ mit an offence without reasonably suspecting that the [88] en droit canadien, la provocation policière comporte deux volets. au titre du premier volet, elle est établie lorsque les agents fournissent à une personne l’occasion de commettre une infraction 630 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. individual is already engaged in that type of criminal activity (the “individualized suspicion prong”), or without acting pursuant to a bona fide inquiry (the “bona fide inquiry prong”). under the second branch, entrapment is made out where the police go beyond providing an individual with the opportunity to com‑ mit an offence and instead induce the commission of the offence. [89] the dial‑a‑dope jurisprudence has revealed problems with how the first branch of entrapment is currently formulated. attempting to apply the in‑ dividualized suspicion prong in dial‑a‑dope cases has resulted in some courts closely parsing under‑ cover calls to determine whether an individual was entrapped. this parsing approach has been justifia‑ bly criticized as both unprincipled and impractical. further, as i will explain, the bona fide inquiry prong has been rendered incoherent by judicial develop‑ ment of the reasonable suspicion standard in the context of s 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. in the end, both prongs have failed to remain faithful to the balance this court struck in mack and barnes between protecting an individ‑ ual’s legitimate interest in being left alone by the state and effective law enforcement. to maintain an appropriate balance between these competing values, the court in mack and barnes recognized that the police must be given “substantial leeway” in investigating crimes like drug trafficking, which may be difficult to detect through traditional means (mack, at pp 977‑78). in sum, the fundamental bal‑ ance struck in those cases was aimed at ensuring that law enforcement techniques that society would not view as intolerable, and which may be necessary to combat certain types of crime, are not labelled as entrapment. sans raisonnablement soupçonner que cette personne est déjà engagée dans ce type d’activité criminelle (le « sous‑volet des soupçons précis ») ou sans agir dans le cadre d’une véritable enquête (le « sous‑ volet de la véritable enquête »). au titre du deuxième volet, la provocation policière est établie lorsque les agents font plus que fournir à quelqu’un l’occasion de commettre une infraction et l’incitent plutôt à la perpétration de celle‑ci. [89] la jurisprudence relative à la vente de drogue sur appel a révélé des problèmes quant à la formu‑ lation actuelle du premier volet de la doctrine de la provocation policière. en effet, en tentant d’ap‑ pliquer le sous‑volet des soupçons précis dans les affaires de vente de drogue sur appel, certains tri‑ bunaux en sont venus à disséquer les appels d’infil‑ tration pour déterminer si une personne a été l’objet de provocation policière. cette façon de faire a été critiquée à juste titre parce qu’elle a été jugée in‑ justifiée et peu pratique qui plus est, comme je l’expliquerai, le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête a été rendu incohérent par l’élaboration jurispruden‑ tielle de la norme des soupçons raisonnables dans le contexte de l’application de l’art. 8 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. en définitive, ni l’un ni l’autre de ces deux sous‑volets n’est demeuré fidèle à l’équilibre que la cour a établi dans les arrêts mack et barnes entre la protection du droit légitime d’une personne de ne pas être importunée par l’état et l’application efficace de la loi. pour maintenir un équilibre approprié entre ces valeurs contradic‑ toires, la cour a reconnu dans ces deux arrêts qu’il faut donner aux policiers une « marge de manœuvre considérable » pour enquêter sur les crimes comme le trafic de drogue, qui peuvent être difficiles à dé‑ tecter en utilisant les moyens traditionnels d’enquête (mack, p 977‑978). bref, l’équilibre fondamental atteint dans ces causes visait à faire en sorte que les techniques d’application de la loi que la société ne considère pas comme intolérables, et qui peuvent être nécessaires dans la lutte contre certains types de crime, ne soient pas qualifiées de provocation policière. i am of the view that the bona fide inquiry [90] prong must be revised to preserve this fundamental balance, to rectify doctrinal issues within the prong [90] j’estime que le sous‑volet de la véritable en‑ quête doit être révisé pour préserver cet équilibre fondamental, pour rectifier des problèmes théoriques [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 631 itself, and to address policy concerns that have arisen with respect to the prong’s application. this revision will ensure that only the clearest of cases of intolera‑ ble state conduct are captured by the doctrine of en‑ trapment by refocusing the doctrine on its principled origin: abuse of process. moving forward, a bona fide inquiry should be defined as a factually‑grounded in‑ vestigation into a tightly circumscribed area, whether physical or virtual, that is motivated by genuine law enforcement purposes. in the end, while i would adopt a different [91] analytical approach, i agree with the court of appeal that the police were engaged in bona fide inquiries when they offered each of the appellants an oppor‑ tunity to commit the offence of drug trafficking. accordingly, i would dismiss both of the appeals. qui se posent en son sein même et pour résoudre des questions de principe qui se sont soulevées rela‑ tivement à son application. par suite de cette révi‑ sion, seuls les cas les plus manifestes de conduite intolérable de l’état tomberaient sous le coup de la doctrine de la provocation policière puisqu’elle serait recentrée sur sa raison d’être première, soit l’abus de procédure. dorénavant, la véritable enquête devrait être définie comme en étant une qui est fondée sur des faits relatifs à un lieu bien délimité, physique ou virtuel, et motivée par des objectifs véritables d’application de la loi. [91] en définitive, même si je crois bon d’adopter une approche analytique différente, je souscris à l’opinion de la cour d’appel selon laquelle les poli‑ ciers étaient engagés dans de véritables enquêtes lorsqu’ils ont offert à chacun des appelants une occa‑ sion de commettre l’infraction de trafic de drogue. en conséquence, je suis d’avis de rejeter les deux pourvois. ii background facts and proceedings in the ii faits à l’origine du litige et procédures devant la ontario superior court of justice cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario a mr. williams’s case a le cas de m. williams (1) facts (1) les faits [92] the investigation that led to the charges against mr. williams began when police constable fitkin of the toronto police service (“tps”) re‑ ceived information from a confidential source that someone who went by the name of “jay” was selling drugs in the queen and church area of downtown toronto. on january 31, 2011, pc fitkin emailed detective constable hewson asking her to place a “cold call” in relation to the information he had received. he attached a person of interest package that he had prepared, which included a phone number and identified mr. williams as “jay”, though it is not clear how the link between mr. williams and “jay” was made. the person of interest package also in‑ cluded biographical information about mr. williams, and stated that he dealt cocaine in the 389 church street and yonge‑dundas areas of toronto. it also stated that he was arrested for trafficking in 2009 and pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine in early [92] l’enquête qui a mené aux accusations portées contre m. williams a commencé lorsque le policier fitkin, du service de police de toronto (« spt »), a été informé par une source confidentielle qu’un dé‑ nommé « jay » vendait de la drogue dans le secteur des rues queen et church au centre‑ville de toronto. le 31 janvier 2011, le policier fitkin a envoyé un courriel à la gendarme‑détective hewson lui deman‑ dant de faire un « appel à froid » en lien avec les renseignements qu’il avait reçus. il a joint à son message une trousse de personne d’intérêt qu’il avait préparée. celle‑ci contenait un numéro de téléphone et identifiait m. williams comme « jay », bien que la façon dont le lien entre l’homme et le prénom a été établi soit obscure. la trousse de personne d’in‑ térêt comprenait en outre des renseignements biogra‑ phiques au sujet de m. williams et indiquait que ce dernier faisait le trafic de cocaïne dans les secteurs du 389, rue church et de la place yonge‑dundas à 632 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. 2010. in the body of the email, pc. fitkin indicated that he had not been able to get a “drop name” from his source yet, but that he would continue to try.3 [93] dc. hewson had some familiarity with mr. williams, having been involved in his 2009 arrest. however, she did not ask pc. fitkin about the relia‑ bility of his source, the currency of the information, or how the link was made between mr. williams and “jay”. she did run the phone number provided through tps databases, but derived no information from this search pc. fitkin was not called as a wit‑ ness and was therefore not able to shed light on any of these unknowns. [94] on february 11, 2011, the drug squad held a briefing about the case. they determined that dc. canepa would make a cold call to the number pro‑ vided for mr williams. dc. canepa was provided with some basic information, including the name “jay”, the phone number provided for mr. williams, and the nature of the drug. he did not know whether any checks had been performed to verify the infor‑ mation because, as he explained in his testimony, he preferred to know as little as possible. [95] that evening, dc. canepa made the cold call and the following conversation took place: toronto. elle indiquait aussi que m. williams avait été arrêté pour trafic en 2009 et qu’il avait plaidé coupable à une accusation de possession de cocaïne au début de 2010. dans le corps du courriel, le poli‑ cier fitkin affirmait qu’il n’avait pas été en mesure d’obtenir de sa source un [traduction] « nom à pla‑ cer », mais qu’il allait continuer à tenter de le faire3. [93] la gendarme‑détective hewson connaissait un peu m. williams, ayant participé à son arrestation en 2009. toutefois, elle n’a pas posé de questions au policier fitkin quant à la fiabilité de sa source, à l’actualité de l’information ou à la manière dont le lien avait été fait entre m. williams et « jay ». elle a par ailleurs interrogé les bases de données du spt à propos du numéro de téléphone fourni, mais n’a tiré aucun renseignement de cette recherche. le policier fitkin n’a pas été appelé comme témoin, si bien qu’il n’a pas été en mesure de faire la lumière sur ces inconnues. [94] le 11 février 2011, l’escouade antidrogue a tenu une séance de breffage à propos de l’affaire. il a été décidé que le gendarme‑détective canepa ferait un appel à froid au numéro fourni pour m williams. on a fourni au gendarme‑détective canepa des ren‑ seignements de base, y compris le prénom « jay », le numéro de téléphone fourni pour m. williams et la nature de la drogue. il ne savait pas si des vérifica‑ tions de l’information avaient été faites, car, comme il l’a expliqué dans son témoignage, il préférait en savoir le moins possible. [95] ce soir‑là, le gendarme‑détective canepa a fait l’appel à froid et la conversation suivante a eu lieu : male: hello. canepa: jay? male: yeah. [traduction] homme : allô? canepa : jay? homme : ouais. canepa: you around? canepa : t’es dans le coin? 3 a “drop name” is a name that the would‑be buyer “drops” into 3 un « nom à placer » est un nom que l’acheteur potentiel « place » the conversation to put the seller at ease. dans la conversation pour mettre le vendeur à l’aise. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 633 male: who is this? canepa: it’s vinny. male: vinny who? homme : qui parle? canepa : c’est vinny. homme : vinny qui? canepa: vinny. jesse from queen and jarvis gave me your name    your number. said you could help me out. i need 80. canepa  : vinny jesse de queen et jarvis m’a donné ton nom    ton numéro. y’a dit qu’tu pouvais m’aider. ça m’en prend pour 80. male: okay. you have to come to me. homme : ok. faut que tu viennes me rejoindre. canepa: okay. where? canepa : ok. où? male: queen and dufferin. homme : queen et dufferin. canepa: okay. it’ll take me a few because i’m at yonge & bloor. canepa : ok. ça va m’prendre quelques minutes, parce que j’suis au coin de yonge et bloor. male: okay, hurry up. homme : ok. dépêche‑toi. canepa: i’ll call you when i get there. canepa : j’t’appelle quand j’arrive. male: okay. what you want, soft or hard. homme : ok. veux‑tu de la coupée ou de la roche? canepa: hard. hard buddy. canepa : de la roche. de la roche mon chum. male: okay. homme : ok. [96] a few more phone calls were made to arrange the transaction. later that night, the men met and dc. canepa purchased $80 of crack cocaine from mr williams. on february 22, 2011, dc. canepa arranged another $80 transaction. the drug squad tried to arrange a third transaction, but mr. williams did not respond to dc. canepa’s calls. accordingly, they decided to conclude the investigation and arrest mr. williams based on the previous transactions. [96] quelques autres appels téléphoniques ont été faits pour organiser la transaction. plus tard cette nuit‑là, les hommes se sont rencontrés et le gendarme‑ détective canepa a acheté pour 80 $ de crack de m.  williams le 22 février 2011, le gendarme‑ détective canepa a organisé une autre transaction de 80 $. l’escouade antidrogue a tenté d’organiser une troisième transaction, mais m. williams n’a pas répondu aux appels du gendarme‑détective canepa. en conséquence, les policiers ont décidé de clore l’enquête et d’arrêter m. williams sur le fondement des transactions antérieures. [97] a few weeks later, a tps officer who was aware that the drug squad was attempting to lo‑ cate mr. williams saw him walking down the street. the officer arrested mr. williams and searched his person. the search uncovered a handgun, a box of ammunition, a small amount of marijuana, and two cellphones. [97] quelques semaines plus tard, un agent du spt qui savait que l’escouade antidrogue tentait de localiser m. williams a aperçu ce dernier marchant dans la rue. l’agent l’a arrêté et fouillé. la fouille a permis de découvrir une arme de poing, une boîte de munitions, une petite quantité de marijuana et deux téléphones cellulaires. 634 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. [98] mr. williams was subsequently charged with two counts of trafficking in cocaine, two counts of possession of the proceeds of crime, and various firearm, ammunition, and breach of recognizance offences. the charges for trafficking and posses‑ sion of the proceeds of crime stemmed from the drug transactions with dc canepa, while the other offences, which were charged on a separate indict‑ ment, stemmed from the search subsequent to mr. williams’s arrest. [98] monsieur williams a subséquemment été in‑ culpé de deux chefs d’accusation de trafic de cocaïne, de deux chefs d’accusation de possession de produits de la criminalité, et de diverses infractions relatives aux armes à feu, aux munitions et aux manquements à un engagement. les accusations de trafic et de possession de produits de la criminalité découlaient des transactions de drogue effectuées avec le gen‑ darme‑détective canepa, alors que les autres infrac‑ tions, qui ont fait l’objet d’une mise en accusation distincte, découlaient de la fouille subséquente à l’arrestation de m williams. (2) proceedings in the ontario superior court of (2) procédure devant la cour supérieure de justice (trotter j.) justice de l’ontario (le juge trotter) [99] in the proceedings on the first indictment, mr. williams admitted that the evidence established his guilt for trafficking and possession of the pro‑ ceeds of crime. he argued, however, that the charges should be stayed on the basis of entrapment. the trial judge agreed, finding that there was no reason to suspect that mr. williams was involved in selling drugs when dc. canepa gave him the opportunity to traffic in cocaine. he held that the words “i need 80”, referring to $80 of cocaine, constituted an op‑ portunity to traffic because it involved a request for a specific amount of a specific type of drug (2014 onsc 2370, 11 cr (7th) 110, at para. 9 (“williams first stay application reasons”)). further, the trial judge was of the view that the police, having only unconfirmed information obtained from a confiden‑ tial source, did not have reasonable suspicion that mr. williams was dealing drugs. [99] dans le cadre de la procédure relative au pre‑ mier acte d’accusation, m. williams a avoué que la preuve établissait sa culpabilité pour trafic et pos‑ session de produits de la criminalité. toutefois, il a prétendu que les accusations devaient être suspen‑ dues pour cause de provocation policière. le juge du procès était du même avis, concluant qu’il n’y avait aucune raison de soupçonner que m. williams était impliqué dans la vente de drogue lorsque le gendarme‑détective canepa lui a donné l’occasion de faire le trafic de cocaïne. il a statué en outre que les mots [traduction] « [ç]a m’en prend pour 80 », en parlant de 80 $ de cocaïne, constituaient une oc‑ casion de faire le trafic, parce qu’il s’agissait d’une demande portant sur une quantité précise d’un type précis de drogue (2014 onsc 2370, 11 cr (7th), 110, par. 9 (« motifs quant à la première demande en arrêt des procédures de m williams »)). qui plus est, le juge du procès était d’avis que les policiers, ne disposant que de renseignements non confirmés obtenus d’une source confidentielle, n’avaient pas de soupçons raisonnables que m. williams vendait de la drogue. [100] mr. williams also argued that the firearm, ammunition, and breach of recognizance charges should be stayed because they were “inextricably linked” to the conduct that formed the basis for the finding of entrapment (2014 onsc 3005, 11 cr (7th) 124, at para. 6 (“williams second stay application reasons”)). the trial judge disagreed and entered convictions on those charges. in his view, [100] monsieur williams a également plaidé que les accusations relatives à l’arme à feu, aux muni‑ tions et aux manquements à un engagement devaient être suspendues, parce qu’elles étaient [traduc‑ tion] « inextricablement liées » à la conduite qui constituait le fondement de la conclusion de provoca‑ tion policière (2014 onsc 3005, 11 cr (7th) 124, par. 6 (« motifs quant à la deuxième demande en arrêt [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 635 mr. williams was acting independently when he decided, a few weeks after the last transaction with dc canepa, to walk around armed with a gun and ammunition — the police did nothing to encourage or facilitate that decision. des procédures de m williams »)). le juge du procès n’était pas de cet avis et il a inscrit des déclarations de culpabilité relativement à ces chefs d’accusation. à son avis, m. williams agissait indépendamment des transactions avec le gendarme‑détective canepa lorsque, quelques semaines après la dernière d’entre elles, il a décidé de se promener avec une arme à feu et des munitions — la police n’avait rien fait pour encourager ou faciliter cette décision. b mr. ahmad’s case b le cas de m. ahmad (1) facts (1) les faits [101] on april 19, 2012, dc. wallace provided dc. limsiaco with a phone number and told him that, if he called that number, a person who went by the name of “romeo” would sell him drugs. that information was not investigated any further before dc. limsiaco called the number and had the fol‑ lowing conversation with the person who answered: [101] le 19 avril 2012, le gendarme‑détective wallace a fourni un numéro de téléphone au gen‑ darme‑détective limsiaco et lui a dit que, s’il appe lait à ce numéro, un dénommé « romeo » lui vendrait de la drogue. ces renseignements n’ont pas fait l’objet d’une enquête plus poussée avant que le gendarme‑détective limsiaco appelle au numéro en question et qu’il ait la conversation suivante avec la personne qui a répondu : male: hello [traduction] homme : allô? officer: hey, it’s mike, matt said i can give you a call, this is romeo? agent : salut, c’est mike, matt a dit que j’pouvais t’ap‑ peler, c’est romeo? male: he did, did he? homme : y a dit ça, ouais? officer: yeah, said you can help me out? agent : ouais, y’a dit que tu pouvais m’aider? male: what do you need? homme : t’as besoin de quoi? officer: 2 soft agent : 2 de coupée. male: hold on, i’ll get back to you. homme : attends un peu, j’te reviens. officer: alright. agent : ok. [102] the male then called dc. limsiaco back later the same day, and they had the following con‑ versation: [102] l’homme a rappelé le gendarme‑détective limsiaco plus tard le jour même et ils ont eu la conversation suivante : officer: hello agent : allô? 636 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. male: so what do you need again? homme : t’as besoin de quoi déjà? officer: 2 soft, where you at? agent : 2 de coupée, t’es où? male: can meet you at yorkdale. homme : j’peux te rencontrer à yorkdale. officer: sure, $160 good an hour? agent : ok, 160 $ ok, une heure? male: $140, hours good, go by theatres homme : 140 $, l’heure, c’est bon, passe devant les ci‑ némas. officer: cool agent : cool. [103] the male who answered the phone, later found to have been mr. ahmad, went along with the conversation without hesitation and without questioning the identity of “matt”, a made up name. at no point did mr. ahmad question being called “romeo”, though he neither confirmed nor denied that was his name. he also did not question the mean‑ ing of “2 soft”, which was a coded reference to two grams of powder cocaine. [104] later that day, according to the police officers who testified at mr. ahmad’s trial, dc limsiaco met mr. ahmad at the yorkdale shopping centre. dc limsiaco completed the undercover buy just outside the mall, where he gave mr. ahmad $140 of buy money in exchange for two small bags of cocaine. the drug squad team then arrested mr. ahmad. he was subsequently charged with traffick‑ ing cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of the proceeds of crime. the crown withdrew the trafficking charge at the preliminary hearing. [103] l’homme qui a répondu au téléphone, iden‑ tifié plus tard comme étant m. ahmad, a pris part à la conversation sans hésitation et sans poser de ques‑ tions sur l’identité de « matt », un prénom inventé. en aucun temps m. ahmad n’a demandé pourquoi on l’appelait « romeo », bien qu’il n’ait ni confirmé ni nié que tel était son prénom. de plus, il n’a pas posé de question sur ce que voulait dire « 2 de coupée », qui était une référence voilée à deux grammes de poudre de cocaïne. [104] plus tard ce jour‑là, selon les policiers qui ont témoigné au procès de m. ahmad, le gendarme‑ détective limsiaco a rencontré m. ahmad au centre d’achat yorkdale. le gendarme‑détective limsiaco a effectué l’achat clandestin tout juste à l’extérieur du centre d’achat, où il a remis à m. ahmad la somme de 140 $ en échange de deux petits sachets de co‑ caïne. l’équipe de l’escouade antidrogue a alors arrêté m ahmad. il a subséquemment été accusé de trafic de cocaïne, de possession de cocaïne en vue d’en faire le trafic et de possession de produits de la criminalité. la couronne a retiré l’accusation de trafic à l’enquête préliminaire. (2) proceedings in the ontario superior court of (2) procédure devant la cour supérieure de justice (allen j.) justice de l’ontario (la juge allen) [105] mr. ahmad proceeded to trial, where he pleaded not guilty to the possession charges. he testified that on the day of his arrest, he met his friend “mikey” at the mall, and suggested that it was mikey, not him, who had sold dc. limsiaco the drugs. however, the trial judge rejected mr. ahmad’s evi‑ dence and ultimately found him guilty of one count [105] monsieur ahmad a subi son procès, durant lequel il a plaidé non coupable relativement aux accusations de possession il a témoigné que, le jour de son arrestation, il avait rencontré son ami « mikey » au centre d’achat et a prétendu que c’était ce dernier, et non lui, qui avait vendu la drogue au gendarme‑détective limsiaco. la juge du procès a [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 637 of possession of cocaine for the purpose of traffick‑ ing and two counts of possession of the proceeds of crime (2014 onsc 3818, at para. 60 (canlii)). [106] after the convictions were entered, mr. ahmad applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment. the trial judge dismissed the application (2015 onsc 652). she acknowledged that the officer did not have reason to suspect the person on the other end of the line was trafficking in drugs before placing the call. however, in her view, dc. limsiaco had built reasonable suspicion that “romeo” was trafficking in drugs during the call before offering him an opportunity to commit an offence by requesting a specific quantity of powder cocaine. accordingly, the trial judge held that mr. ahmad had not been entrapped. toutefois rejeté ce témoignage et fini par le déclarer coupable d’un chef d’accusation de possession de cocaïne en vue d’en faire le trafic et de deux chefs d’accusation de possession de produits de la crimi‑ nalité (2014 onsc 3818, par. 60 (canlii)). [106] après l’inscription des déclarations de culpa‑ bilité, m. ahmad a demandé un arrêt des procédures pour cause de provocation policière. la juge du pro‑ cès a rejeté la demande (2015 onsc 652). elle a reconnu que, avant de faire l’appel, l’agent n’avait aucune raison de soupçonner que la personne au bout du fil faisait le trafic de drogue. toutefois, selon elle, le gendarme‑détective limsiaco s’est mis à avoir des soupçons raisonnables que « romeo » faisait le trafic de drogue pendant l’appel, avant de lui donner l’occasion de commettre une infraction en deman‑ dant une quantité précise de poudre de cocaïne. en conséquence, elle a statué que m. ahmad n’avait pas été victime de provocation policière. iii appeals to the ontario court of appeal (hourigan iii appels à la cour d’appel de l’ontario (les juges and brown jja and himel j (ad hoc)) hourigan et brown, et la juge himel (ad hoc)) [107] the appeals in mr williams’s and mr. ahmad’s cases were heard together. the crown ap‑ pealed from the stay of mr. williams’s convictions for trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime. mr. williams cross‑appealed the dismissal of his entrapment application with respect to the firearm, ammunition, and breach of recognizance convictions. for his part, mr. ahmad appealed from, among other things, the dismissal of his stay appli‑ cation. [108] the court of appeal allowed the crown’s ap‑ peal in mr. williams’s case, dismissed mr. williams’s cross‑appeal, and dismissed mr. ahmad’s appeal (2018 onca 534, 141 or (3d) 241). the court was unanimous in holding that there was no entrapment in either case. it divided, however, in its reasons. [107] les appels dans les dossiers de mm. williams et ahmad ont été instruits ensemble. la couronne a interjeté appel de l’arrêt des procédures prononcé relativement aux accusations de trafic et de pos‑ session de produits de la criminalité portées contre m williams. ce dernier a interjeté un appel incident du rejet de sa demande d’arrêt des procédures fondée sur la provocation policière relativement aux décla‑ rations de culpabilité quant aux infractions liées aux armes à feu, aux munitions et aux manquements à un engagement. pour sa part, m. ahmad a interjeté appel, notamment, du rejet de sa demande en arrêt des procédures. [108] la cour d’appel a accueilli l’appel de la couronne dans le dossier de m.  williams, mais a rejeté l’appel incident de ce dernier et celui de m. ahmad (2018 onca 534, 141 or (3d) 241). la cour a statué à l’unanimité qu’il n’y avait eu aucune provocation policière dans un cas comme dans l’autre. toutefois, les juges étaient divisés quant aux motifs. 638 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. [109] hourigan ja, writing for the majority, rea‑ soned that there was no entrapment because the po‑ lice in both cases were acting pursuant to a bona fide inquiry. specifically, the police reasonably suspected that each of the phone numbers was being used in a dial‑a‑dope scheme. while mack and barnes con‑ templated the offering of opportunities at physical spaces over which the police held reasonable sus‑ picion, the majority was of the view that the law must keep up with the modern realities of crime and analogized the specific virtual space of a suspected dial‑a‑dope line to a specific physical space. the majority concluded that, on the facts of both mr. williams’s and mr. ahmad’s respective cases, the police had the necessary reasonable suspicion before they extended an opportunity to traffic. [110] himel j concurred in the result but took a different analytical approach. in her view, the police reasonably suspected both mr. williams and mr. ahmad as individuals at the time they extended the respective opportunities. there was accordingly no need to resort to the bona fide inquiry prong. [109] au nom des juges majoritaires, le juge hourigan a expliqué qu’il n’y avait eu aucune pro‑ vocation policière, parce que, dans les deux cas, les agents avaient agi dans le cadre d’une véritable enquête. plus particulièrement, ils soupçonnaient rai‑ sonnablement que chacun des numéros de téléphone était utilisé dans des stratagèmes de vente de drogue sur appel. alors que les affaires mack et barnes envisageaient la fourniture d’occasions à des endroits physiques à l’égard desquels la police entretenait des soupçons raisonnables, en l’espèce, les juges majori‑ taires étaient d’avis que le droit doit suivre l’évolu‑ tion des réalités modernes du crime et ont assimilé l’espace virtuel précis d’une ligne d’achat de drogue sur appel soupçonnée à un espace physique pré‑ cis. les juges majoritaires ont conclu, au regard des faits dans les cas respectifs de m. williams et de m. ahmad, que les policiers avaient les soupçons raisonnables requis avant d’avoir donné une occasion de faire le trafic. [110] la juge himel a souscrit au résultat, mais a suivi une approche analytique différente. à son avis, les policiers soupçonnaient raisonnablement m. williams et m. ahmad, en particulier au moment où ils ont donné les occasions respectives. en consé‑ quence, il était inutile d’avoir recours au sous‑volet de la véritable enquête. iv analysis iv analyse [111] these appeals call upon this court to clarify the proper scope and application of the first branch of entrapment. [111] les présents pourvois invitent la cour à clari‑ fier la portée et l’application appropriées du premier volet de la doctrine de la provocation policière. a entrapment in canadian law a la provocation policière en droit canadien [112] the doctrine of entrapment is “simply an application of the abuse of process doctrine” (r v. campbell, [1999] 1 scr 565, at para. 21; see also mack, at pp 938‑42). it shields individuals from state conduct that society regards as intolerable — conduct that “violates our notions of ‘fair play’ and ‘decency’ and which shows blatant disregard for the qualities of humanness which all of us share” (mack, at p 940). in essence, the doctrine of entrap‑ ment sends the message from the court to the state that, notwithstanding the state’s ability to prove an [112] la doctrine de la provocation policière est « simplement une application de la théorie de l’abus de procédure » (r c. campbell, [1999] 1 rcs 565, par. 21; voir aussi mack, p 938‑942). elle sert de bouclier contre un comportement de l’état que la société juge intolérable — un comportement qui « viole nos notions de “franc‑jeu” et de “décence”, qui fait montre d’un mépris flagrant pour les valeurs humaines que nous partageons tous » (mack, p 940). essentiellement, la doctrine de la provocation poli‑ cière envoie le message du tribunal à l’état que, [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 639 accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court will not allow the state to avail itself of the judicial process because the state’s conduct in bringing the accused before the court was intolerable (mack, at p. 942; r v. ahluwalia (2000), 149 ccc (3d) 193 (ont. ca), at para 30). [113] this high threshold justifies restricting the remedy for entrapment to a stay of proceedings, which “permanently halts the prosecution of an ac‑ cused” and is “the most drastic remedy a criminal court can order” (r v. babos, 2014 scc 16, [2014] 1 scr 309, at para 30). as doherty ja recognized in ahluwalia, the doctrine of entrapment is not “a vague licence to stay proceedings whenever police conduct offends a particular judge’s sensitivities or his or her perception of how the police should go about doing their business” (para 31). indeed, en‑ trapment should only be recognized in the “clearest of cases” (mack, at p 977). [114] the doctrine of entrapment reflects the no‑ tions that the police should be limited to investigating and preventing — as opposed to creating — crime, and that the state should not randomly test the virtue of its citizens. more specifically, the court in mack articulated several rationales for recognizing the doctrine of entrapment in canadian law, including that: (1) there must be limits on the state’s power to intrude on individuals’ personal lives and engage in random virtue testing; (2) “entrapment techniques may result in the commission of crimes by people who would not otherwise have become involved in criminal conduct”; and (3) police powers should not be used to manufacture crime for the purpose of obtaining convictions (p 941). même si ce dernier est capable de prouver la culpa‑ bilité de l’accusé hors de tout doute raisonnable, le tribunal ne lui permettra pas de se prévaloir du processus judiciaire parce qu’il s’est comporté de façon intolérable afin que l’accusé soit traduit en justice (mack, p. 942; r c ahluwalia (2000), 149 ccc (3d) 193 (ca. ont.), par 30). [113] ce critère rigoureux justifie qu’on restreigne la réparation en cas de provocation policière à l’ar‑ rêt des procédures, qui «  met un terme de façon définitive à la poursuite de l’accusé » et qui consti‑ tue « la réparation la plus draconienne qu’une cour criminelle puisse accorder  » (r c babos, 2014 csc 16, [2014] 1 rcs 309, par 30). comme le juge doherty l’a reconnu dans ahluwalia, la doctrine de la provocation policière n’est pas [traduction] « une vague autorisation d’arrêter les procédures toutes les fois que la conduite des policiers heurte les sensibilités d’un juge en particulier ou sa perception de la manière dont les policiers devraient accomplir leur travail » (par 31). en effet, la provocation poli‑ cière ne doit être reconnue que dans les « cas les plus manifestes » (mack, p 977). [114] la doctrine de la provocation policière tra‑ duit les idées que la police doit se limiter à enquêter sur le crime et à le prévenir — par opposition à le créer —, et que l’état n’a pas à éprouver au hasard la vertu de ses citoyens. plus particulièrement, dans mack, la cour a justifié de plusieurs façons la recon‑ naissance de la doctrine de la provocation policière en droit canadien en exprimant notamment (1) qu’il doit y avoir des limites au pouvoir de l’état de s’in‑ gérer dans la vie personnelle des gens ou d’éprouver au hasard leur vertu, (2) que « les techniques de pro‑ vocation policières [peuvent] amener à commettre des crimes des gens qui autrement n’auraient pas eu de comportement criminel » et (3) que les pouvoirs policiers ne doivent pas servir à fabriquer des crimes dans le but d’obtenir des déclarations de culpabilité (p 941). [115] entrapment can be made out in two ways, that is, when: [115] la provocation policière peut être établie de deux façons, soit : (a) the authorities provide a person with an opportunity to commit an offence without acting on a reasonable (a) lorsque les autorités fournissent à une personne l’occasion de commettre une infraction sans pouvoir 640 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. suspicion that this person is already engaged in crim‑ inal activity or pursuant to a bona fide inquiry [(“op‑ portunity‑based entrapment”)]; raisonnablement soupçonner que cette personne est déjà engagée dans une activité criminelle, ni se fonder sur une véritable enquête [« provocation fondée sur l’occasion »]; (b) although having such a reasonable suspicion or acting in the course of a bona fide inquiry, [the author‑ ities] go beyond providing an opportunity and induce the commission of an offence [(“inducement‑based entrapment”)]. (b) lorsque, quoiqu’elles aient ce soupçon raisonnable ou qu’elles agissent au cours d’une véritable enquête, les autorités font plus que fournir une occasion et in‑ citent à perpétrer une infraction [« provocation fondée sur l’incitation »]. (mack, at pp. 964‑65; see also barnes, at p 460) (mack, p. 964‑965; voir aussi barnes, p 460) [116] these appeals are only concerned with the first branch of entrapment, which has two prongs. first, the police may provide an individual with an opportunity to commit an offence if they reasona‑ bly suspect that the targeted individual is already engaged in criminal activity of the same type (the individualized suspicion prong). second, even if the police do not reasonably suspect that a particular individual is involved in criminal activity, the police may nonetheless provide that individual with an opportunity to commit a criminal offence if they are acting “in the course of a bona fide inquiry” (the bona fide inquiry prong) (barnes, at p. 460 (emphasis deleted)). [117] the bona fide inquiry prong requires some elaboration. while it was first mentioned in mack, that case involved the second branch of entrapment (ie, inducement‑based entrapment). the court had the opportunity to develop, clarify, and apply the bona fide inquiry prong in barnes, which remains this court’s authoritative statement on the first branch (ie, opportunity‑based entrapment). the bona fide inquiry prong was said to refer to an investigation that is “motivated by the genuine purpose of inves‑ tigating and repressing criminal activity” (barnes, at p. 460), and targets persons associated with “a particular location or area where it is reasonably suspected that certain criminal activity is occurring” (mack, at p. 956 (emphasis added)). within an area that is “defined with sufficient precision”, the bona fide inquiry prong of entrapment gives law enforce‑ ment significant latitude to investigate “any person associated with the area” (barnes, p. 463 (emphasis [116] les présents pourvois ne concernent que le premier volet de la provocation policière, constitué de deux sous‑volets premièrement, les policiers peuvent fournir à une personne ciblée l’occasion de commettre une infraction s’ils soupçonnent rai‑ sonnablement qu’elle est déjà engagée dans une ac‑ tivité criminelle de même nature (le sous‑volet des soupçons précis) deuxièmement, même s’ils ne soupçonnent pas raisonnablement qu’une personne en particulier est impliquée dans une activité crimi‑ nelle, les policiers peuvent fournir à cette dernière l’occasion de commettre une infraction criminelle s’ils agissent « au cours d’une véritable enquête » (le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête) (barnes, p. 460 (soulignement omis)). [117] il est nécessaire de donner certaines préci‑ sions quant au sous‑volet de la véritable enquête. bien qu’il ait été mentionné pour la première fois dans l’arrêt mack, cette cause portait sur le second volet de la doctrine de la provocation policière (c‑à‑d. celui relatif à la provocation fondée sur l’incitation). la cour a eu l’occasion d’élaborer, de clarifier et d’appliquer le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête dans l’arrêt barnes, qui reste l’arrêt de principe quant au premier volet (c‑à‑d celui relatif à la provocation fondée sur l’occasion). selon la cour, le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête renvoyait à une enquête « mo‑ tivée par l’objectif réel d’enquêter et de réprimer des activités criminelles » (barnes, p. 460), et ciblant des personnes associées à « [u]n lieu ou une zone parti‑ culiers qu’on peut raisonnablement suspecter d’être le théâtre d’une certaine activité criminelle » (mack, p. 956 (je souligne)). dans une zone qui est « défi‑ ni[e] avec suffisamment de précision », le sous‑volet [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 641 in original)). indeed, as lamer cj put it in barnes, “[s]uch randomness is permissible within the scope of a bona fide inquiry” (p 463). notably, the location in barnes, which the court found to be defined with sufficient precision, consisted of a busy six‑block area in downtown vancouver. practically speaking, based on evidence that drug trafficking was prevalent in that six‑block area, barnes enabled the police to target thousands of unknown persons and provide them with an opportunity to traffic in drugs. b the dial‑a‑dope jurisprudence reveals problems with the first branch of entrapment de la véritable enquête en matière de provocation policière donne aux forces de l’ordre une grande latitude pour enquêter sur « toute personne qui [  ] est associée [à cette zone] » (barnes, p. 463 (souligné dans l’original)). en effet, comme l’a affirmé le juge en chef lamer dans l’arrêt barnes, « [c]ette façon de procéder au hasard est permise dans le cadre d’une véritable enquête » (p 463). fait à signaler, le lieu dont il était question dans cette affaire — que la cour a estimé défini avec suffisamment de préci‑ sion — était constitué d’une zone de six pâtés de maisons achalandée au centre‑ville de vancouver. en pratique, sur le fondement d’éléments de preuve selon lesquels le trafic de drogue était répandu dans cette zone de six pâtés de maisons, l’arrêt barnes a autorisé les policiers à cibler des milliers de per‑ sonnes inconnues et à leur donner l’occasion de faire du trafic de drogue. b la jurisprudence relative à la vente de drogue sur appel révèle des problèmes relatifs au pre‑ mier volet de la doctrine de la provocation policière (1) the individualized suspicion prong leads to anomalous results in the dial‑a‑dope context (1) le sous‑volet des soupçons précis mène à des résultats incongrus dans le contexte de la vente de drogue sur appel [118] in the context of entrapment, the individual‑ ized suspicion prong has come under fire for leading to anomalous results, particularly in dial‑a‑dope cases where police call alleged drug dealers based on min‑ imal information (see, eg,. s. penney, “entrapment minimalism: shedding the ‘no reasonable suspicion or bona fide inquiry’ test” (2019), 44 queen’s lj. 356, at pp. 357‑58; r v. le, 2016 bcca 155, 28 cr. (7th) 187; ca reasons, at para. 128, per himel j., concurring; williams second stay application rea‑ sons, at paras 22‑23). the concern expressed is that even though the investigating officer may not possess individualized reasonable suspicion at the time he or she offers an opportunity, the police conduct in a typical dial‑a‑dope case cannot be said to rise to the level of an abuse of process warranting a stay of pro‑ ceedings. further, as these appeals demonstrate, the individualized suspicion prong has been interpreted to require a minute parsing of the language used by [118] dans le contexte de la provocation po‑ licière, des auteurs et des tribunaux ont reproché au sous‑volet des soupçons précis de mener à des résultats incongrus, particulièrement dans les af‑ faires de vente de drogue sur appel où des policiers appellent des trafiquants de drogue présumés sur le fondement de renseignements minimaux (voir, p ex., s. penney, « entrapment minimalism : shedding the “no reasonable suspicion or bona fide inquiry” test » (2019), 44 queen’s lj 356, p. 357‑358; r c. le, 2016 bcca 155, 28 cr (7th) 187; motifs de la ca, par. 128, avec l’accord de la juge himel; motifs quant à la deuxième demande en arrêt des procédures de m. williams, par 22‑23). le souci découlerait de ce que même si l’agent enquêteur n’a aucun soupçon raisonnable à l’égard d’une personne en particulier au moment de fournir une occasion, le comportement des policiers dans une affaire typique de vente de drogue sur appel ne saurait être assimilé à 642 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. the undercover officer, which has led to artificial distinctions between cases where a stay is granted and cases where the convictions are upheld. these distinctions are often picayune, difficult to draw, and promote an approach that, in my view, is akin to dancing on the head of a pin. moreover, of fun‑ damental concern, these distinctions are completely untethered from the abuse of process doctrine that is the cornerstone of entrapment. [119] in order to avoid a finding of entrapment under the individualized suspicion prong, mack and barnes instruct that an officer must have reasonable suspicion before he or she can provide an individual with an opportunity to commit an offence. post‑mack and barnes, this court has defined reasonable sus‑ picion as “something more than a mere suspicion and something less than a belief based upon reason‑ able and probable grounds” (r v. chehil, 2013 scc 49, [2013] 3 scr 220, at para. 26, quoting r v. kang‑brown, 2008 scc 18, [2008] 1 scr 456, at para 75). it is a “robust standard” that “derives its rigour from the requirement that it be based on objectively discernible facts, which can then be sub‑ jected to independent [and exacting] judicial scru‑ tiny” (chehil, at paras. 3 and 26). un abus de procédure justifiant l’arrêt des procédures. en outre, comme le démontrent les présents pour‑ vois, selon l’interprétation qui lui a été donnée, le sous‑volet des soupçons précis exigerait de disséquer les paroles des agents d’infiltration, ce qui a donné lieu à des distinctions artificielles entre les causes qui aboutissent à l’arrêt des procédures et celles où les déclarations de culpabilité sont maintenues. ces distinctions sont souvent insignifiantes et difficiles à établir, en plus d’inciter à adopter une approche qui, selon moi, revient à couper les cheveux en quatre. de plus, il est fondamentalement préoccupant que ces distinctions n’aient aucun lien avec la doctrine de l’abus de procédure qui est la pierre angulaire de la doctrine de la provocation policière. [119] pour éviter une conclusion de provocation policière en application du sous‑volet des soupçons précis, les arrêts mack et barnes nous enseignent qu’un policier doit avoir des soupçons raisonnables avant de pouvoir fournir à une personne l’occasion de commettre une infraction. postérieurement aux arrêts mack et barnes, la cour a défini les soupçons raison‑ nables comme étant « plus que de simples soupçons, [sans pour autant correspondre] à une croyance fon‑ dée sur des motifs raisonnables et probables » (r c. chehil, 2013 csc 49, [2013] 3 rcs 220, par. 26, citant r c kang‑brown, 2008 csc 18, [2008] 1 rcs 456, par 75). il s’agit d’une « norme solide » qui « découle de l’exigence que ces soupçons soient fondés sur des faits objectivement discernables, qui peuvent ensuite être soumis à [un] examen judiciaire indépendant [et rigoureux] » (chehil, par. 3 et 26). in an attempt to both adhere to the formal [120] requirement of reasonable suspicion and preserve the substantive abuse of process character of entrap‑ ment in dial‑a‑dope cases, some courts have devel‑ oped an approach that, with respect and unlike my colleagues, i cannot endorse. presently, the juris‑ prudence in some jurisdictions, including ontario, draws a distinction between taking an “investigative step” (which does not require reasonable suspicion) and presenting an “opportunity” to commit an of‑ fence (which does). investigative steps can furnish the reasonable suspicion necessary to present an opportunity. on its face, this distinction appears un‑ problematic — clearly, there is a difference between [120] pour tenter de respecter l’exigence formelle des soupçons raisonnables tout en préservant la nature substantielle de la provocation policière — c‑à‑d un abus de procédure — dans les affaires de vente de drogue sur appel, certains tribunaux ont élaboré une approche à laquelle, en toute défé‑ rence et contrairement à mes collègues, je ne saurais souscrire. présentement, la jurisprudence de certains ressorts, y compris l’ontario, fait une distinction entre une « étape de l’enquête » (qui n’exige pas de soupçons raisonnables) et la présentation d’une « oc‑ casion » de commettre une infraction (qui l’exige). les étapes de l’enquête peuvent fournir les soupçons raisonnables nécessaires pour donner une occasion. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 643 taking a step in the investigation and offering an opportunity. [121] the issue, however, is how the courts have drawn the line. a review of the jurisprudence reveals that “investigative steps” have been held to involve engaging a potential drug dealer over the phone and asking general questions, such as “can you hook me up” or “are you rolling”. an opportunity, on the other hand, has been defined as a request to purchase a specific quantity of drugs. for example, an officer could provide an opportunity by stating “i need 80” (referring to $80 worth of cocaine) (see ca reasons, at para. 42; williams first stay application reasons, at paras.  20‑27; c.  de sa, “entrapment: clearly misunderstood in the dial‑a‑dope context” (2015), 62 crim. lq 200, at pp 202‑3). this distinction is the reason why, at first instance, mr. williams’s entrapment application was allowed while mr. ahmad’s was dismissed. [122] the problem with the “fine line” distinc‑ tion this approach draws is that it requires courts to closely parse undercover calls to determine whether an accused was entrapped judges and academ‑ ics, as well as interveners in the cases at bar,4 have criticized this as being unprincipled and imprac‑ tical. professor penney, echoing the comments of ducharme j in r v. henneh, 2017 onsc 4835, [2017] oj. no. 7173 (ql), at para. 24, has observed that “‘asking someone if he is dealing drugs’ (which courts have typically characterized as a mere inves‑ tigative step) is ‘no different from asking if he will sell you a specific kind and amount of drugs’ (which is undoubtedly opportuning)” ((2019), at pp. 374‑75 (footnote omitted)). he states that “[w]hile the im‑ petus to avoid finding entrapment in these circum‑ stances is understandable, the plausibility of the distinction is dubious” (p. 374 (footnote omitted); see also d m tanovich, “rethinking the bona fides of entrapment” (2011), 43 ubcl. rev. 417, at à première vue, cette distinction ne semble pas poser de problème — puisque, manifestement, il y a une différence entre passer par une étape de l’enquête et donner une occasion. [121] or, la manière dont les tribunaux ont tracé la ligne est problématique. un examen de la juris‑ prudence révèle que téléphoner à un trafiquant de drogue présumé et lui poser des questions générales telles que « peux‑tu m’en trouver? » ou « es‑tu en business? » a été considéré comme une « étape [  ] de l’enquête ». par ailleurs, une occasion a été définie comme une demande d’acheter une quantité précise de drogue. par exemple, un agent pourrait fournir une occasion en affirmant : « ça m’en prend pour 80 » (parlant de 80 $ de cocaïne) (voir les motifs de la ca, par. 42; motifs quant à la première demande en arrêt des procédures de m. williams, par. 20‑27; c. de sa, « entrapment : clearly misunderstood in the dial‑a‑dope context » (2015), 62 crim. lq. 200, p.  202‑203) cette distinction est la raison pour laquelle, en première instance, la demande de m. williams fondée sur la provocation policière a été accueillie, alors que celle de m. ahmad a été rejetée. [122] la distinction « subtile » qu’établit cette approche est problématique dans la mesure où elle oblige les tribunaux à disséquer les appels d’infiltra‑ tion pour déterminer si un accusé a été victime de provocation policière. les juges et les auteurs, ainsi que les intervenants en l’espèce4, ont critiqué cette approche, lui reprochant d’être injustifiée et peu pra‑ tique. le professeur penney, reprenant les commen‑ taires du juge ducharme dans r c. henneh, 2017 onsc 4835, [2017] oj. no. 7173 (ql), par. 24, a fait remarquer qu’il [traduction] « n’y a pas vraiment de différence entre demander à quelqu’un s’il fait le trafic de la drogue (que les tribunaux ont eu l’habitude de qualifier de simple étape de l’en‑ quête) et lui demander s’il vous vendrait une sorte et une quantité précise de drogue (ce qui constitue assurément le fait de fournir une occasion) » ((2019), p. 374‑375 (note de bas de page omise)). il a en outre affirmé que « [b]ien qu’il soit compréhensible de vouloir éviter de conclure à la provocation policière 4 the criminal lawyers’ association of ontario and the canadian 4 la criminal lawyers’ association of ontario et l’association association of chiefs of police. canadienne des chefs de police. 644 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. p. 437; criminal lawyers’ association of ontario’s factum, at para 12). [123] i agree that parsing conversations with a view to distinguishing between taking investigative steps and offering opportunities is often artificial, perhaps even arbitrary. moreover, by getting caught up in the precise language used by undercover of‑ ficers in dial‑a‑dope cold calls, courts have lost sight of the fundamental relationship between entrapment and abuse of process. i note that bennett ja raised a similar concern in le, at para. 93: defence counsel argued that there is a meaningful distinction between veiled statements asking if the other party is a drug dealer and more specific requests for types, quantities, or values of drugs. it was argued that the former statement is an investigatory step while the latter is an offer to commit an offence. parsing the language of undercover drug calls in dial‑a‑dope investigations in this way takes an unnecessarily narrow approach. it ignores the surrounding circumstances, but more importantly, it strays far from the core principle underlying mack. [emphasis added.] dans ces situations, la plausibilité de cette distinc‑ tion est douteuse » (p. 374 (note de bas de page omise); voir aussi d. m. tanovich, « rethinking the bona fides of entrapment » (2011), 43 ubcl. rev. 417, p. 437; mémoire de la criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, par 12). [123] je suis d’accord que la dissection des conver‑ sations menée dans le but d’établir une distinction entre une étape de l’enquête, d’une part, et la fourni‑ ture d’occasions, d’autre part, est souvent artificielle, voire arbitraire. qui plus est, en s’embourbant dans les termes précis employés par les agents d’infiltra‑ tion qui font des appels à froid dans le contexte de la vente de drogue sur appel, les tribunaux ont perdu de vue le lien fondamental entre la provocation policière et l’abus de procédure. je note que la juge bennett a soulevé une préoccupation semblable au par. 93 de la décision le : [traduction] l’avocat de la défense a plaidé qu’il y a une distinction utile entre le fait de demander, à mots couverts, si l’interlocuteur est un trafiquant de drogue, et le fait de demander plus précisément des types, des quantités ou des valeurs de drogues. on a fait valoir que la première affirmation constitue une étape de l’enquête, alors que la deuxième constitue une offre de commettre une infraction. en disséquant de la sorte les propos échangés lors d’appels d’infiltration dans le cadre d’enquêtes relatives à la vente de drogue sur appel, on se trouve à adopter une approche inutilement étroite qui fait abstraction du contexte, mais plus important encore, qui s’écarte considérablement du principe fondamental qui sous‑tend mack. [je souligne.] [124] justice himel, concurring in the court below, commented in a similar vein: [124] dans ses motifs concordants en cour d’appel, la juge himel a abondé dans le même sens : a number of cases have narrowly focused on the minute language choices of the investigating officer to find en‑ trapment despite the fact that the police conduct does not risk causing an innocent person to sell drugs. the court must never lose sight of the core question: is the police’s conduct really offensive? as the supreme court identified in mack, at p. 942 scr, “[i]n the entrapment context, the court’s sense of justice is offended by the spectacle of an accused’s being convicted of an offence which is the work of the state”. staying cases in which there is no actual offensive police conduct is harmful to the integrity of the administration of justice. it is crucial “that the police be allowed to carry out their duties without undue scepticism [traduction] dans un certain nombre d’affaires, les tri‑ bunaux se sont étroitement penchés sur le choix des mots précis employés par les agents enquêteurs pour conclure à la provocation policière, même si la conduite des policiers ne risquait pas d’amener une personne innocente à vendre de la drogue. or, le tribunal ne doit jamais perdre de vue la question fondamentale, soit celle de savoir si la conduite des policiers est réellement offensante. comme la cour suprême l’a affirmé dans mack, à la p. 942 rcs, « [d] ans le contexte de la provocation policière, le sens de la justice du tribunal se révolte face au spectacle qu’offri‑ rait un inculpé reconnu coupable d’une infraction qui est l’œuvre de l’état ». arrêter une procédure en l’absence [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 645 or the requirement that their every move be placed under a scanning electron microscope” (mackenzie, at para 65). d’une conduite policière réellement offensante porterait préjudice à l’intégrité de l’administration de la justice. il est essentiel « de [  ] donner [aux policiers] les coudées franches sans se montrer trop sceptiques à leur égard ou sans exiger que chacun de leurs gestes soit scruté à la loupe » (mackenzie, par 65).   .   . neither mr. williams’ case nor mr. ahmad’s case is one of those “clearest of cases” warranting a stay based on entrapment: see mack, at pp. 976‑77 scr. the police conduct in these cases did not carry the risk that innocent persons would commit a crime that they would have not otherwise committed. neither was this conduct that the citizenry cannot tolerate. on the contrary, the police relied on legitimate investigative techniques that are responsive to the modern realities of the drug trade and its reliance on virtual spaces to evade police scrutiny. [emphasis added; paras 126‑28] [125] these concerns with the individualized sus‑ picion prong and the parsing approach it has spawned are well‑founded. the doctrine of entrapment was never intended to interfere with law enforcement techniques that society would not find intolerable and which may be necessary to investigate certain types of crime (mack, at pp 977‑78). and yet, the development of the dial‑a‑dope jurisprudence under the individualized suspicion prong has produced precisely that result. ni le cas de m. williams ni celui de m. ahmad ne font partie des « cas les plus manifestes » justifiant l’arrêt des procédures pour cause de provocation policière : voir mack, p. 976‑977 rcs. la conduite des policiers dans ces cas n’emporte pas le risque que des personnes in‑ nocentes commettent un crime qu’elles n’auraient pas commis autrement. cette conduite n’en est pas une non plus que les citoyens ne sauraient tolérer. au contraire, les policiers se sont appuyés sur des techniques d’enquête légitimes, adaptées aux réalités modernes du trafic de la drogue et au recours des trafiquants aux espaces virtuels pour se soustraire à l’attention de la police. [je souligne; par 126‑128] [125] ces préoccupations à l’égard du sous‑volet des soupçons précis et de l’approche qui consiste à disséquer les paroles des policiers qu’il a engendrées sont bien fondées. la doctrine de la provocation policière n’a jamais été censée faire obstacle à des techniques des forces de l’ordre que la société ne jugerait pas intolérables et qui peuvent être néces‑ saires pour enquêter sur certains types de crime (mack, p 977‑978). or, l’élaboration de la juris‑ prudence en matière de vente de drogue sur appel au regard du sous‑volet des soupçons précis a mené précisément à ce résultat. [126] the manner in which my colleagues propose to dispose of these appeals provides a clear example of the dubious distinctions that flow from an applica‑ tion of the parsing approach. in mr. williams’s case, my colleagues would order a stay of proceedings — “the most drastic remedy a criminal court can order” (babos, at para 30). in mr. ahmad’s case, however, they would allow the convictions to stand. in both cases, an undercover officer made a call based on information from an anonymous or a confidential source. each call was answered by a then‑unknown man. seemingly without surprise, each man con‑ firmed or did not deny that he went by a name that, [126] la façon dont mes collègues proposent de trancher les présents pourvois donne un exemple probant des distinctions douteuses qu’engendre l’ap‑ plication de l’approche fondée sur une dissection des paroles prononcées. dans le cas de m. williams, mes collègues ordonneraient un arrêt des procé‑ dures — « la réparation la plus draconienne qu’une cour criminelle puisse accorder » (babos, par 30). en revanche, dans le cas de m. ahmad, ils ordonne‑ raient le maintien des déclarations de culpabilité. dans les deux cas, un agent d’infiltration a fait un appel fondé sur des renseignements fournis par une source anonyme ou confidentielle. c’est un homme 646 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. based on the officer’s information, belonged to a drug dealer operating out of the phone line (in mr. ahmad’s case, “romeo”; in mr. williams’s case, “jay”). the only distinction between these cases is that the undercover officer in mr. ahmad’s case waited for the man to say “[w]hat do you need?” in response to a request for “help” before asking for a specific quantity of cocaine: alors inconnu qui a répondu à chacun de ces ap‑ pels. apparemment sans être surpris, chacun de ces hommes a confirmé ou n’a pas nié être connu sous un nom qui, selon les renseignements dont disposait l’agent, était celui d’un trafiquant de drogue qui fai‑ sait de la vente sur appel (« roméo » dans le cas de m. ahmad, et « jay » dans celui de m williams). la seule distinction entre ces causes réside dans le fait que l’agent d’infiltration, lorsqu’il s’est agi de m.  ahmad, a attendu que l’homme lui demande « [t]’as besoin de quoi? » en réponse à une demande d’« aide » avant de demander une quantité précise de cocaïne : relevant portion of the conversation between dc. limsiaco and mr. ahmad relevant portion of the conversation between dc. canepa and mr. williams [limsiaco]: hey, it’s mike, matt said i can give you a call, this is romeo? male: hello. canepa: jay? male: he did, did he? male: yeah. [limsiaco]: yeah, said you can help me out? canepa: you around? male: what do you need? [limsiaco]: 2 soft man: hold on, i’ll get back to you. [limsiaco]: alright. male: who is this? canepa: it’s vinny. male: vinny who? canepa: vinny. jesse from queen and jarvis gave me your name.  .  .your num‑ ber.  said you could help me out. i need 80. portion pertinente de la conversation entre le gendarme-détective limsiaco et m. ahmad [limsiaco] : salut, c’est mike, matt a dit que j’pouvais t’appeler, c’est romeo? homme : y a dit ça, ouais? [limsiaco] : ouais, y a dit que tu pouvais m’aider? homme : t’as besoin de quoi? [limsiaco] : 2 de coupée. homme : attends un peu, j’te reviens. male: okay. you have to come to me. [limsiaco] : ok. portion pertinente de la conversation entre le gendarme détective canepa et m. williams homme : allô? canepa: jay? homme : ouais. canepa : t’es dans le coin? homme : qui parle? canepa : c’est vinny. homme : vinny qui? canepa : vinny. jesse de queen et jarvis m’a donné ton nom    ton numéro. y’a dit qu’tu pouvais m’aider. ça m’en prend pour 80. homme : ok. faut que tu viennes me rejoindre. it bears repeating at this point that the doc‑ [127] trine of entrapment is only intended to catch state conduct that society would view as intolerable (mack, at p. 942; ahluwalia, at para 30). with respect to the contrary view, i struggle to see how the conduct of [127] à cette étape‑ci, il vaut la peine de répéter que la doctrine de la provocation policière ne vise qu’à détecter la conduite de l’état que la société juge‑ rait intolérable (mack, p. 942; ahluwalia, par 30). quant à l’opinion contraire, j’ai du mal à concevoir [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 647 either undercover officer in the cases at bar could be viewed as intolerable — indeed, it seems to me the officers were doing precisely what society would expect them to do upon receiving information about an alleged dial‑a‑dope operation, ie, investigate whether it is true. more significantly, i am at a loss to see how the conduct of the undercover officer in mr. williams’s case can be said to rise to the level of an abuse of process — conduct which society will simply not tolerate — while the conduct of the un‑ dercover officer in mr. ahmad’s case is found to be acceptable. with respect, i believe that the reasona‑ bly informed observer in our society would be utterly bewildered by this distinction. that the jurisprudence of this court has been interpreted to demand results that do not make sense when considered through an abuse of process lens is a sign that something has gone wrong, either in the interpretation or the formulation of the entrapment doctrine. comment la conduite de l’un ou l’autre des agents d’infiltration dans les présentes causes pourrait être jugée intolérable, puisqu’il me semble qu’ils ont fait précisément ce que la société attend d’eux lorsqu’ils reçoivent des renseignements quant à une opération alléguée de vente de drogue sur appel  — c‑à‑d. enquêter pour savoir si ces renseignements sont véri diques. fait plus important, je n’arrive pas non plus à voir comment on peut dire que la conduite de l’agent d’infiltration dans le cas de m. williams est intolérable au point de constituer un abus de procé‑ dure — soit une conduite que la société ne saurait tout simplement pas tolérer — tandis que celle de l’agent d’infiltration, dans le cas de m. ahmad, est jugée acceptable. soit dit en tout respect, je crois qu’un observateur raisonnablement averti dans notre société serait totalement déconcerté par cette distinc‑ tion. le fait que la jurisprudence de la cour a été interprétée de telle sorte qu’elle donnerait lieu à des résultats insensés lorsqu’ils sont examinés du point de vue de l’abus de procédure signale que quelque chose a mal tourné, soit dans l’interprétation, soit dans la formulation de la doctrine de la provocation policière. (2) judicial development of the reasonable suspicion standard has produced doctrinal incoherence within the bona fide inquiry prong (2) l’élaboration jurisprudentielle de la norme des soupçons raisonnables a produit de l’in‑ cohérence théorique dans le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête [128] in the wake of the anomalous results pro‑ duced under the individualized suspicion prong, some courts have turned to the bona fide inquiry prong to analyze police conduct in dial‑a‑dope cases (see eg. ca reasons, at paras. 49‑68; le, at para 96). this approach has intuitive appeal in this context. the bona fide inquiry prong was intended to give law enforcement a measure of flexibility in investigating crimes, particularly crimes that are “consensual” in nature or otherwise difficult to detect through traditional modes of investigation. although the entire first branch of entrapment is animated by the notion that the state should not be permitted to randomly test the virtue of its citizens, the court in mack and barnes nonetheless recognized that it is ac‑ ceptable for the police to randomly approach citizens and offer them opportunities to commit offences, so [128] en raison des résultats incongrus produits par l’application du sous‑volet des soupçons précis, certains tribunaux ont eu recours au sous‑volet de la véritable enquête pour analyser la conduite des policiers dans les affaires de vente de drogue sur appel (voir, p ex., motifs de la ca, par. 49‑68; le, par 96). cette approche est intuitivement séduisante dans le présent contexte. le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête était censé conférer aux forces de l’ordre un certain degré de souplesse dans leurs enquêtes criminelles, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les crimes à caractère « consensuel » ou qui sont autre‑ ment difficiles à détecter par les méthodes d’enquête traditionnelles. bien que l’entièreté du premier volet de la doctrine de la provocation policière soit animée par l’idée que l’état ne doit pas pouvoir éprouver au hasard la vertu de ses citoyens, dans les arrêts mack 648 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. long as the area within which they are operating is “defined with sufficient precision” and they “reason‑ ably suspec[t]” that that type of crime is occurring in the area (barnes, at p 463). fundamentally, the court in those cases confirmed that maintaining an appropriate balance between individual liberty and legitimate law enforcement requires affording the police “substantial leeway” to investigate certain types of crime (mack, at pp 977‑78). indeed, when one examines the police conduct that was considered acceptable by this court in the leading bona fide inquiry case of barnes — ie, randomly approach‑ ing any person, amongst potentially thousands of people, within a bustling six‑block area of downtown vancouver and giving them an opportunity to com‑ mit an offence — it becomes abundantly clear that the court intended to give the police a wide measure of deference in investigating criminal activity. in light of that result, it follows that the conduct at issue in these appeals was never intended to fall within the ambit of the doctrine of entrapment. [129] the problem in applying the bona fide inquiry prong as defined in mack and barnes to present‑day dial‑a‑dope investigations is that the reasonable suspicion standard has evolved since those cases were decided. as i elaborate below, the development of the reasonable suspicion standard in the context of s 8 of the charter has given rise to doctrinal issues within the bona fide inquiry prong. briefly, in chehil, this court rejected the notion that reasonable suspicion includes generalized suspi‑ cion that “attaches to a particular activity or location rather than to a specific person” (para. 28 (emphasis added); see also s. penney, “standards of suspicion” (2018), 65 crim. lq 23, at pp 40‑41). and yet, that is precisely the kind of generalized “reasonable suspicion” which the court in mack and barnes incorporated into the bona fide inquiry prong. this deliberate choice reflects the court’s view that re‑ quiring the police to meet a more stringent standard, et barnes, la cour a reconnu qu’il est acceptable que des policiers approchent des citoyens au hasard et leur offre des occasions de commettre des infrac‑ tions, pourvu que la zone dans laquelle ils mènent leurs opérations soit « défini[e] avec suffisamment de précision » et qu’ils « [puissent] raisonnable‑ ment soupçonner » que ce type de crime s’y produit (barnes, p 463). essentiellement, dans ces causes, la cour a confirmé que, pour maintenir un équilibre approprié entre la liberté individuelle et l’application légitime de la loi, il faut accorder aux policiers une « marge de manœuvre considérable » pour enquêter sur certains types de crimes (mack, p 977‑978). en effet, en examinant la conduite policière que la cour a jugée acceptable dans barnes, l’arrêt de principe sur l’enquête véritable, — c‑à‑d approcher une personne au hasard, parmi des milliers d’autres qui auraient pu l’être, dans un quartier achalandé composé de six pâtés de maisons au centre‑ville de vancouver et lui donner l’occasion de commettre une infraction — il devient vraiment clair que la cour avait l’intention de faire preuve d’une bonne dose de déférence à l’égard de la police en matière d’enquêtes criminelles. à la lumière de ce résultat, il appert donc qu’il n’a jamais été prévu que la conduite en cause dans les présents pourvois soit visée par la doctrine de la provocation policière. [129] l’application du sous‑volet de la véritable enquête, tel qu’il est défini dans mack et barnes, aux enquêtes actuelles portant sur la vente de drogue sur appel pose problème du fait que la norme des soup‑ çons raisonnables a évolué depuis que ces arrêts ont été rendus. en effet, comme je l’expliquerai ci‑après, l’élaboration de cette norme dans le contexte de l’application de l’art. 8 de la charte a donné lieu à des problèmes théoriques quant au sous‑volet de la véritable enquête. brièvement, dans chehil, la cour a rejeté l’idée que les soupçons raisonnables com‑ prennent les soupçons généraux « non pas au sujet d’une personne bien précise mais plutôt au sujet d’un lieu ou d’une activité en particulier » (par. 28 (je souligne); voir aussi s. penney, « standards of suspicion » (2018), 65 crim. lq 23, p 40‑41). or, il s’agit‑là précisément du type de « soupçons raison‑ nables » généraux que la cour avait incorporés dans le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête dans les arrêts [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 649 such as individualized reasonable suspicion, would unduly hinder law enforcement efforts and thereby fail to strike an appropriate balance between individ‑ ual liberties and legitimate law enforcement. [130] since mack and barnes were decided, in‑ dividualization has come to define the reasonable suspicion standard. chehil is now the leading de‑ cision on the meaning of reasonable suspicion. in that case, karakatsanis j., writing on behalf of a unanimous court, described reasonable suspicion as “a robust standard determined on the totality of the circumstances, based on objectively discernible facts, and is subject to independent and rigorous judicial scrutiny” (para 3). while chehil and the companion case of r v. mackenzie, 2013 scc 50, [2013] 3 scr 250, were concerned with the con‑ stitutionality of sniffer dog searches, the court — recognizing that reasonable suspicion “is a common standard that arises in a number of contexts” — took the opportunity to provide guidance on the general principles that lie at the core of the reasonable sus‑ picion standard (chehil, at para 21). [131] in the entrapment context, the notion of “rea‑ sonable suspicion” was invoked by the court under both the individualized suspicion prong, as described in the previous section, and the bona fide inquiry prong. mack and barnes both indicate that the bona fide inquiry prong permits police to conduct genuine investigations that target persons associated with “a particular location or area where it is reasonably suspected that certain criminal activity is occurring”. mack et barnes. ce choix délibéré reflète l’opinion de la cour selon laquelle le fait d’exiger de la police qu’elle réponde à une norme plus stricte, telle que celle des soupçons raisonnables précis, entraverait indûment les efforts des forces de l’ordre et ne per‑ mettrait donc pas d’atteindre un équilibre approprié entre les libertés individuelles et l’application légi‑ time de la loi. [130] depuis que les arrêts mack et barnes ont été rendus, l’individualisation a fini par définir la norme des soupçons raisonnables la décision chehil constitue désormais l’arrêt de principe sur la notion de soupçons raisonnables. la juge karakatsanis, s’exprimant au nom de la cour unanime, y a qua‑ lifié ces soupçons de « norme solide, qui appelle la prise en compte de l’ensemble des circonstances, en fonction de faits objectivement vérifiables, et dont l’application est assujettie à un examen rigoureux et indépendant par les tribunaux » (par 3). même si l’arrêt chehil et la décision connexe r c. mackenzie, 2013 csc 50, [2013] 3 rcs 250, portaient sur la constitutionnalité de fouilles effectuées à l’aide de chiens renifleurs, la cour — reconnaissant que le cri‑ tère des soupçons raisonnables est « une norme cou‑ rante qui entre en jeu dans plusieurs contextes » — a profité de l’occasion pour fixer des balises quant aux principes généraux qui sont au cœur de la norme des soupçons raisonnables (chehil, par 21). [131] dans le contexte de la provocation policière, la cour a invoqué la notion de « soupçons raison‑ nables » tant pour l’application du sous‑volet des soupçons précis, décrit dans la partie précédente, que pour l’application du sous‑volet de la véritable enquête. tant dans mack que dans barnes, la cour a affirmé que ce second sous‑volet permet aux poli‑ ciers d’effectuer de réelles enquêtes qui ciblent des personnes associées à « un lieu ou [à] une zone par‑ ticuliers qu’on peut raisonnablement suspecter d’être le théâtre d’une certaine activité criminelle ». [132] however, in chehil, this court rejected the possibility of the kind of generalized location‑based suspicion that barnes incorporated into the bona fide inquiry prong. under barnes, bona fide inquiries only require a kind of generalized suspicion that, [132] toutefois, dans chehil, la cour a rejeté la possibilité du type de soupçons généraux fondés sur le lieu que barnes avait incorporé au sous‑volet de la véritable enquête. en effet, suivant barnes, la véritable enquête n’exige qu’un type de soupçons 650 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. when cast over an area that is defined with sufficient precision, justifies randomly presenting individuals with opportunities to commit crime (p 463). in that case, lamer cj spoke of the police having “reason‑ able suspicion” over a six‑block area in downtown vancouver. in chehil, this court identified that type of suspicion as “generalized suspicion”, and held that however flexible the reasonable suspicion standard may be, it does not include generalized suspicion: the fact that reasonable suspicion deals with possibil‑ ities, rather than probabilities, necessarily means that in some cases the police will reasonably suspect that innocent people are involved in crime. in spite of this reality, prop‑ erly conducted sniff searches that are based on reasonable suspicion are charter‑compliant in light of their minimally intrusive, narrowly targeted, and highly accurate nature: see kang‑brown, at para. 60, per binnie j., and am, at paras. 81‑84, per binnie j. however, the suspicion held by the police cannot be so broad that it descends to the level of generalized suspicion, which was described by bastarache j., at para. 151 of am, as suspicion “that attaches to a particular activity or location rather than to a specific person”. [emphasis added; para 28] [133] to place this paragraph of chehil in context, it is necessary to appreciate that in carving “gen‑ eralized suspicion” out of “reasonable suspicion”, the court was rejecting the view that bastarache j. had advanced in his dissenting reasons in the com‑ panion cases of kang‑brown and r v. am, 2008 scc 19, [2008] 1 scr 569. in those cases, this court considered whether the police had a common law power to use sniffer dogs to detect drugs. a five‑judge majority of the court held that sniffer dog searches were permissible on a charter‑compliant standard of “reasonable suspicion”. according to binnie j., whose view on this point was later adopted in chehil, reasonable suspicion means individual‑ ized suspicion (kang‑brown, at para 75). justice bastarache, dissenting in the result, agreed that police only needed reasonable suspicion to con‑ duct a sniffer dog search. however, his definition of généraux qui, lorsqu’ils portent sur une zone définie avec suffisamment de précision, justifient que l’on fournisse au hasard à des personnes des occasions de commettre un crime (p 463). dans cette affaire, le juge en chef lamer a affirmé que les policiers avaient des « soupçons raisonnables » à l’égard d’une zone constituée de six pâtés de maisons au centre‑ville de vancouver. dans chehil, la cour a qualifié ce type de soupçons de « soupçons généraux » et a statué que, aussi souple que puisse être la norme des « soupçons raisonnables », elle ne comprend pas les soupçons généraux : les soupçons raisonnables étant une affaire de possi‑ bilité, plutôt que de probabilité, il s’ensuit nécessairement que les policiers soupçonneront raisonnablement, dans certains cas, des personnes innocentes d’être des criminels. malgré cette réalité, la fouille bien effectuée à l’aide d’un chien renifleur et fondée sur des soupçons raisonnables est conforme à la charte, vu son caractère peu envahissant, étroitement ciblé et hautement fiable (voir kang‑brown, par. 60, le juge binnie, et am, par. 81‑84, le juge binnie). toutefois, les soupçons des policiers ne doivent pas être à ce point vagues qu’ils se réduisent à des soupçons géné‑ raux, décrits par le juge bastarache, au par. 151 de l’arrêt am, comme des soupçons « non pas au sujet d’une per‑ sonne bien précise mais plutôt au sujet d’un lieu ou d’une activité en particulier ». [je souligne; par 28] [133] pour mettre en contexte ce paragraphe de chehil, il faut comprendre qu’en excluant « les soup‑ çons généraux » des « soupçons raisonnables », la cour rejetait l’opinion qu’avait exprimée le juge bastarache en dissidence dans les arrêts connexes kang‑brown et r c. am, 2008 csc 19, [2008] 1 rcs 569. dans ces arrêts, la cour s’est demandé si la common law reconnaissait aux policiers le pouvoir d’utiliser les chiens renifleurs pour détec‑ ter des drogues. les cinq juges majoritaires de la cour ont statué que les fouilles effectuées à l’aide de tels chiens étaient acceptables en se fondant sur une norme des « soupçons raisonnables » conforme à la charte. selon le juge binnie, dont l’opinion sur cette question a été adoptée par la suite dans chehil, les soupçons raisonnables s’entendent de soupçons précis (kang‑brown, par 75). le juge bastarache, dissident quant au résultat, reconnaissait que pour [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 651 “reasonable suspicion” included generalized suspi‑ cion (paras 213‑15). effectuer une fouille à l’aide d’un chien renifleur, il suffisait que les policiers aient des soupçons rai‑ sonnables. toutefois, sa définition de « soupçons raisonnables » comprenait les soupçons généraux (par 213‑215). [134] justice bastarache neatly summarized his conception of reasonable suspicion in am: [134] le juge bastarache a clairement résumé sa conception des soupçons généraux dans am :. in kang‑brown, i emphasized the important role sniffer dogs can play in the prevention and deterrence of crime and found that the use of these dogs is appropriate, under certain conditions, where police have a reasonable sus‑ picion about the presence of illicit substances. in some instances, this suspicion will attach to a particular indi‑ vidual, as was demonstrated in kang‑brown itself. in other situations, however, police will have a reasonable suspicion that attaches to a particular activity or location rather than to a specific person. this generalized suspicion will form a sufficient basis to justify random searches of bags or luggage in some circumstances. [emphasis added; para 151] [135] professor tanovich has observed the incon‑ gruity between this court’s rejection of generalized reasonable suspicion and the suspicion contemplated by the bona fide inquiry prong in his article, at p. 443: in kang‑brown, justice bastarache, in dissent and alone on this point, was of the view that the ancillary powers doctrine authorized a dog‑sniffer search on the basis of either individualized reasonable suspicion or, in cases where the search occurs at a place of public transportation where “the police had a reasonable suspicion that drug activity might be occurring at the terminal, and reasona‑ bly informed passengers were aware of the fact that their baggage may be subject to a sniffer‑dog search.” this is, in general terms, the bona fide test for entrapment   . what is significant about kang‑brown is that justice [bastarache] was alone in extending reasonable suspi‑ cion to the location. [emphasis added; footnote omitted.] dans [l’arrêt kang‑brown], j’ai insisté sur le rôle im‑ portant que peuvent jouer les chiens renifleurs dans la prévention du crime et la dissuasion des criminels, et j’ai conclu que le recours à ces chiens est approprié, sous réserve de certaines conditions, lorsque la police a des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner la présence de subs‑ tances illicites. dans certains cas, ces soupçons viseront une personne en particulier, ainsi qu’il a été démontré dans kang‑brown. dans d’autres cas, toutefois, la police aura des soupçons raisonnables non pas au sujet d’une personne bien précise mais plutôt au sujet d’un lieu ou d’une activité en particulier. dans certaines circonstances, ces soupçons généraux pourront justifier les fouilles au hasard de sacs ou de bagages. [je souligne; par 151] [135] dans son article, le professeur tanovich a souligné, à la p. 443, l’incongruité entre le rejet par la cour des soupçons raisonnables généraux et les soupçons envisagés dans le contexte du sous‑volet de la véritable enquête : [traduction] dans kang‑brown, le juge bastarache, dissident et seul à adopter cette approche sur cette ques‑ tion, était d’avis que la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires autorise une fouille effectuée à l’aide de chiens renifleurs sur le fondement de soupçons raisonnables précis ou, dans les cas où la fouille est effectuée dans un lieu de transport public, lorsque « [les policiers ont] des soupçons raisonnables qu’une activité liée à la drogue [peut] avoir lieu dans la gare et [  ] que des passagers raisonnable‑ ment bien informés [savent] que leurs bagages [peuvent] faire l’objet d’une fouille à l’aide d’un chien renifleur ». il s’agit, grosso modo, du critère de la véritable enquête en matière de provocation policière. [  ]. l’importance de l’arrêt kang‑brown se rattache au fait que le juge [bastarache] était seul à étendre les soupçons raisonnables au lieu en cause. [je souligne; note de bas de page omise.] [136] indeed, the type of “reasonable suspi‑ cion” described by bastarache j (ie, generalized [136] en effet, le type de « soupçons raisonnables » décrit par le juge bastarache (c‑à‑d les soupçons 652 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. reasonable suspicion) is the very type of “reasonable suspicion” that lamer cj had in mind in barnes — this court’s seminal case on the bona fide inquiry prong. justice bastarache suggested that, in the s. 8 context, the reasonable possibility of crime at a place like a bus depot or a high school could justify the otherwise random searching of individuals in those areas using a sniffer dog. chief justice lamer, writing in the entrapment context, held that the rea‑ sonable possibility of a certain type of crime in an even wider area than those considered by bastarache j could justify the otherwise random offering of op‑ portunities to individuals associated with that area. in sum, both bastarache j and lamer cj defined “reasonable suspicion” in the same way — that is, to include “generalized suspicion”. however, this court explicitly carved generalized suspicion out of the definition of reasonable suspicion in chehil, which made it clear that “reasonable suspicion” means “in‑ dividualized suspicion”. [137] accordingly, on a faithful reading of chehil, the police could never hold “reasonable suspicion” — as that standard has now been de‑ fined — over the area at issue in barnes. the use of generalized suspicion in barnes is the only reason why the result in that case was possible. the facts on which the undercover officer’s “reasonable sus‑ picion” in barnes were based were not at all indi‑ vidualized. the six‑block area was simply “known as an area of considerable drug activity”, and the statistical evidence before the court was limited to raw data regarding the number of arrests made in the area and the proportion of charged drug offences that arose from that area (barnes, at pp 461‑62). no doubt similar statistics could be marshalled for the various locations to which bastarache j would have held “reasonable suspicion” could apply, such as airports and bus terminals (see kang‑brown, at para 214). nonetheless, the court in chehil rejected the concept of “reasonable suspicion” advanced by bastarache j. — not because there was insufficient raisonnables généraux) est le type même de « soup‑ çons raisonnables » que le juge en chef lamer avait en tête dans barnes — l’arrêt de principe de la cour sur le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête. selon le juge bastarache, dans le contexte de l’application de l’art. 8, la possibilité raisonnable qu’un crime soit commis dans un lieu comme une gare d’autobus ou une école secondaire peut justifier des fouilles, aléatoires par ailleurs, de personnes dans ces lieux en utilisant des chiens renifleurs. le juge en chef lamer, s’exprimant dans le contexte de la provoca‑ tion policière, a statué que la possibilité raisonnable qu’un certain type de crimes puisse être commis dans une zone encore plus étendue que celles envisagées par le juge bastarache pouvait justifier la fourniture, aléatoire par ailleurs, d’occasions de commettre une infraction à des personnes associées à cette zone. en somme, le juge bastarache et le juge en chef lamer ont défini les « soupçons raisonnables » de la même façon — soit, des soupçons qui comprennent des « soupçons généraux ». la cour a néanmoins expli‑ citement retranché les soupçons généraux de la défi‑ nition des soupçons raisonnables dans l’arrêt chehil, ce qui indiquait clairement que les « soupçons rai‑ sonnables » s’entendent de « soupçons précis ». [137] ainsi, suivant une interprétation fidèle de chehil, les policiers ne pourraient jamais avoir de « soupçons raisonnables » — comme cette norme est maintenant définie — à l’égard de la zone en cause dans barnes. c’est uniquement parce que la cour a utilisé la norme des soupçons généraux qu’elle a pu, dans barnes, conclure comme elle l’a fait. les faits sur lesquels les « soupçons raisonnables » de l’agent d’infiltration s’appuyaient dans cette affaire ne portaient nullement sur une personne en particu‑ lier. la zone de six pâtés de maisons était simplement « connu[e] comme zone où le trafic de drogues [était] très actif » et la preuve statistique devant la cour se limitait à des données brutes sur le nombre d’ar‑ restations faites dans cette zone et sur la proportion d’accusations pour des infractions liées aux drogues associées à cette zone (barnes, p 461‑462). des sta‑ tistiques semblables pourraient sans aucun doute être colligées relativement aux divers endroits à l’égard desquels le juge bastarache aurait statué que des « soupçons raisonnables » pouvaient s’appliquer, [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 653 evidence of drug crime at vancouver international airport in that case — but on the principled con‑ clusion that reasonable suspicion must be individ‑ ualized. [138] this exposes the fundamental dissonance between barnes and chehil: the court in barnes did not require any degree of individualization, but post‑chehil, individualization now defines the reasonable suspicion standard (see penney (2018); tanovich, at p 433). this dissonance has signifi‑ cant implications for the doctrine of entrapment. in particular, the more restrictive meaning this court ascribed to “reasonable suspicion” in chehil has rendered it incompatible with the balance between individual liberties and legitimate law enforcement struck by the bona fide inquiry prong in barnes. [139] contrary to their assertion that they have provided a “complete answer” to the foregoing, my colleagues fail to explain how the result in barnes could possibly be justified on a chehil‑compliant standard of reasonable suspicion (para 48). they accept that individualization is now essential to the reasonable suspicion standard, and state that “the ill sought to be remedied by individualization is police intruding on the protected interests of all persons in broadly or poorly defined locations, especially on the basis of generalized evidence” (para 48). on these points of law, i substantially agree. however, this requirement of individualization was neither imposed nor met in barnes — as i have explained, the police relied exclusively on generalized evidence to ground their “reasonable suspicion”. here, it also bears noting that the court rejected mr. barnes’s argument that the police should have focused their investigation on the “specific” areas of the granville mall where the evidence indicated drug trafficking was prevalent. indeed, the court took the view that “[i]t would be unrealistic for the police to focus their par exemple les aéroports et les gares d’autobus (voir kang‑brown, par 214). néanmoins, dans chehil, la cour a rejeté la notion de « soupçons raisonnables » mise de l’avant par le juge bastarache, non pas faute d’une preuve suffisante dans cette affaire de crimes liés à la drogue à l’aéroport international de vancouver, mais sur le fondement de la conclusion de principe que les soupçons raisonnables doivent porter sur une personne en particulier. [138] cela met en évidence la dissonance fonda‑ mentale entre les arrêts barnes et chelil : dans le premier, la cour n’a exigé aucun degré d’individua‑ lisation; or, depuis que le second a été rendu, celle‑ci définit la norme des soupçons raisonnables (voir penney (2018); tanovich, p 433). cette dissonance a des incidences considérables sur la doctrine de la provocation policière. plus particulièrement, compte tenu du sens plus restrictif que la cour a donné aux « soupçons raisonnables » dans chehil, cette notion est devenue incompatible avec l’équilibre atteint par le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête énoncé dans barnes entre les libertés individuelles et l’application légitime de la loi. [139] contrairement à leur affirmation selon la‑ quelle ils ont fourni une « réponse complète » aux remarques qui précèdent, mes collègues n’expliquent pas comment le résultat atteint dans l’affaire barnes pourrait être justifié selon la norme des soupçons raisonnables conforme à l’arrêt chehil (par 48). ils acceptent que l’individualisation soit désormais essentielle lorsqu’il s’agit d’appliquer cette norme et déclarent que « le préjudice auquel on cherche à re‑ médier au moyen de l’individualisation est l’empiè‑ tement par la police sur les intérêts protégés de toutes les personnes se trouvant dans des endroits définis de façon large ou insuffisante, particulièrement sur le fondement de preuves générales » (par 48). sur ces points de droit, je suis en substance d’accord. cependant, cette exigence d’individualisation n’a été ni imposée ni atteinte dans l’affaire barnes — où, comme je l’ai expliqué, la police s’est appuyée exclusivement sur des éléments de preuve généraux pour fonder ses « soupçons raisonnables ». ici, il convient également de noter que la cour a rejeté l’argument de m. barnes selon lequel la police aurait 654 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. investigation on one specific part of the mall” (p. 461, per lamer cj; contra: p. 486, per mclachlin j., dissenting). in light of this, i have great difficulty accepting the conclusion — which necessarily un‑ derpins my colleagues’ reasons — that the suspicion held by the police in barnes was somehow suffi‑ ciently individualized so as to be consistent with the reasonable suspicion standard set out in chehil. [140] ultimately, i understand the dispute between myself and my colleagues in this case to come down to this: should the court continue to invoke the words “reasonable suspicion” when applying the bona fide inquiry prong, which, in light of chehil, would pre‑ clude the type of investigation undertaken in barnes; or, should the court revise the bona fide inquiry prong so as to remain true to the fundamental balance between legitimate law enforcement and individual liberties struck in mack and barnes? with respect to the contrary view, i am of the opinion that, while the bona fide inquiry prong must be revised to address the doctrinal issues outlined above and the policy concerns that have arisen since its creation, the re‑ vised approach that i would adopt is more consistent with the holdings and underlying principles of this court’s entrapment jurisprudence than the solution offered by my colleagues. dû concentrer son enquête sur des zones « spéci‑ fiques » du granville mall où les éléments de preuve indiquaient que le trafic de drogue était répandu. en effet, selon la cour « [i]l serait irréaliste que les policiers concentrent leur enquête en un seul endroit particulier de la rue piétonnière » (p. 461, le juge en chef lamer; contra : p. 486, la juge mclachlin, dissidente). dans ce contexte, j’ai beaucoup de mal à accepter la conclusion — qui sous‑tend forcément les motifs de mes collègues — selon laquelle les soup‑ çons qu’avait la police dans barnes étaient d’une manière ou d’une autre suffisamment précis pour qu’ils satisfassent à la norme des soupçons raison‑ nables énoncée dans chehil. [140] en définitive, je comprends que, en l’es‑ pèce, mes collègues et moi divergeons d’opinions sur le fait de savoir si la cour doit continuer à utiliser l’expression « soupçons raisonnables » lorsqu’elle applique le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête qui, compte tenu de chehil, exclurait le type d’enquête entreprise dans barnes, ou si elle doit plutôt réviser ce sous‑volet, de manière à ce qu’il demeure fidèle à l’équilibre fondamental établi dans mack et barnes entre l’application légitime de la loi et les libertés individuelles. soit dit en tout respect pour l’opinion contraire, je suis d’avis que même si le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête doit être révisé pour résoudre les problèmes théoriques exposés précédemment et les questions de principe qui se sont posées depuis sa création, l’approche révisée que j’adopterais est plus compatible avec les décisions de la cour et les principes sous‑jacents de sa jurisprudence sur la provocation policière que la solution offerte par mes collègues. c the solution is to revise the bona fide inquiry c la solution consiste à réviser le sous‑volet de la prong véritable enquête [141] as indicated, i take the view that the solution to the doctrinal incoherence and policy concerns re‑ vealed by the dial‑a‑dope entrapment jurisprudence is to revise the bona fide inquiry prong. however, be‑ fore turning to what i believe is the best way to move forward in the law of entrapment, i will consider three potential solutions to the problems outlined [141] comme je viens de l’affirmer, je suis d’avis que la solution à l’incohérence théorique et aux pré‑ occupations de principe qui ressortent de la jurispru‑ dence en matière de provocation policière dans le contexte de la vente de drogue sur appel consiste à ré‑ viser le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête. toutefois, avant d’aborder ce qui me semble être la meilleure [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 655 above and explain why i do not believe that any of those solutions are appropriate. [142] first, and with respect to my colleagues who would adopt this approach, i do not believe that this court should bring the blurry line some courts have drawn between an “investigative step” and an “opportunity” into sharper relief. i have reviewed the principled concerns with this parsing approach earlier in these reasons. in sum, it creates an artificial distinction based on the specific words used by the undercover officer rather than focusing on whether society would view the officer’s conduct, considered in context, as simply intolerable. indeed, the parsing approach strays so far from the abuse of process foundation that underlies the doctrine of entrapment as to appear entirely divorced from it. a “solution” that involves dancing on the head of a pin in this way is surely no solution at all. [143] second, i do not believe that the answer is to adjust the robust individualized reasonable suspicion standard set out in chehil to the specific context of dial‑a‑dope investigations, or to water down the standard across the board. the crown’s position in these appeals is that, at least in the dial‑a‑dope context, reasonable suspicion is made out on the basis of uncorroborated information obtained from an anonymous source. in my view, this would be an unwelcome development of the law. in chehil, this court acknowledged that the reasonable sus‑ picion standard applies across a variety of contexts (para 21). to avoid uncertainty in the law of reason‑ able suspicion, the standard should remain consistent across those contexts. façon de faire évoluer le droit relatif à la provocation policière, je vais examiner trois solutions possibles aux problèmes exposés précédemment et expliquer pourquoi j’estime qu’aucune d’elles ne convient. [142] premièrement, et avec respect pour mes collègues qui adopteraient une telle approche, je ne crois pas que la cour doive préciser la ligne de démarcation incertaine que certains tribunaux ont tracée entre une « étape de l’enquête » et une « occa‑ sion ». j’ai déjà examiné dans les présents motifs les considérations de principe que soulève cette approche fondée sur la dissection des paroles des policiers. en somme, elle crée une distinction artifi‑ cielle fondée sur les paroles précises qu’emploient les agents d’infiltration, plutôt que de se concentrer sur la question de savoir si la société considérerait que leur comportement, dans le contexte en cause, est tout simplement intolérable. en effet, l’approche fondée sur la dissection des paroles des policiers s’éloigne tellement de l’abus de procédure qui fonde la doctrine de la provocation policière qu’elle en semble complètement dissociée. une « solution » qui suppose de couper les cheveux en quatre de la sorte n’en est assurément pas une. [143] deuxièmement, je ne crois pas que la solu‑ tion consiste à ajuster la norme solide des soup‑ çons raisonnables précis exposée dans chehil au contexte particulier des enquêtes portant sur la vente de drogue sur appel, ou à la diluer dans tous les cas. dans les présents pourvois, la couronne fait valoir que, du moins dans le contexte de la vente de drogue sur appel, les soupçons raisonnables sont établis sur le fondement de renseignements non corroborés obtenus d’une source anonyme. à mon avis, il n’est pas souhaitable que le droit évolue en ce sens. dans chehil, la cour a reconnu que la norme des soup‑ çons raisonnables s’applique dans toutes sortes de contextes (par 21). pour éviter l’incertitude du droit relatif à ce type de soupçons, il convient que la norme demeure uniforme dans tous ces contextes. [144] further, under the individualized reasonable suspicion standard described in chehil, it cannot be said that the investigating officers in either of the cases at bar reasonably suspected that mr. williams [144] qui plus est, suivant la norme des soup‑ çons raisonnables précis adoptée dans chehil, on ne peut prétendre que les agents enquêteurs dans l’un ou l’autre des dossiers en cause ici soupçonnaient 656 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. or mr. ahmad — or either phone line — was engaged in or associated with drug trafficking. my colleagues make a point of stressing that reasonable suspicion is not “unduly onerous” (para. 45, quoting from mack, at p. 958, which pre‑dated chehil). while they note the “rigorous” nature of the judicial scrutiny that the reasonable suspicion standard attracts at the time of judicial review (at para. 46), neither their review of the law nor the result that they reach acknowledges or gives effect to the “robust” threshold the standard imposes on the police in conducting their investi‑ gation (chehil, at para 3). my colleagues go on to conclude that the undercover officer built reasona‑ ble suspicion in the course of his phone call with mr. ahmad because mr. ahmad failed to deny that he was “romeo”, did not ask who “matt”5 was, and gave the ambiguous answer of “what do you need?” in response to the officer’s request for “help” — an answer that my colleagues acknowledge admits of an innocent explanation (para 76). in other words, the police did not obtain confirmation of any of the in‑ formation they received from the confidential source or obtain any independent evidence of criminality before extending an opportunity to mr. ahmad to commit a crime by asking for “2 soft”. nonetheless, my colleagues say this surpasses the threshold of reasonable suspicion. with respect, i see this result as constituting an erosion of the present individu‑ alized reasonable suspicion standard. such an ero‑ sion is concerning, since it risks insulating police interference with individual liberties from judicial review across the various contexts where reasonable suspicion applies, including police‑citizen interac‑ tions like investigative detentions, which are more intrusive and susceptible to abuse. raisonnablement que m. williams ou m. ahmad — ou l’une ou l’autre des lignes téléphoniques — était impliqué dans le trafic de drogue ou associé à un tel trafic. mes collègues insistent sur le fait que la norme des soupçons raisonnables n’est pas « indûment sé‑ vère » (par. 45, citant l’arrêt mack, p. 958, antérieur à l’arrêt chehil). bien qu’ils mentionnent le carac‑ tère « rigoureux » de l’examen judiciaire que com‑ mande cette norme au moment du contrôle judiciaire (par. 46), ni leur revue du droit ni le résultat auquel ils aboutissent ne reconnaît l’exigence « solide » qu’impose la norme aux policiers dans la conduite de leurs enquêtes ou n’y donne effet (chehil, par 3). mes collègues concluent ensuite que l’agent d’in‑ filtration a développé des soupçons raisonnables durant son appel téléphonique avec m. ahmad parce que ce dernier n’a pas nié être « romeo », n’a pas demandé qui était « matt »5 et a répondu de manière ambiguë « [t]’as besoin de quoi? » en réponse à une demande d’«  aide  » — une réponse qui, comme le reconnaissent mes collègues, donne ouverture à une explication innocente (par 76). autrement dit, la police n’a réussi à confirmer aucun des rensei‑ gnements obtenus de la source confidentielle ou à obtenir quelque preuve indépendante que ce soit de criminalité avant de donner à m. ahmad l’occasion de commettre un crime en lui demandant « 2 de coupée ». quoi qu’il en soit, mes collègues estiment que cela franchit le seuil des soupçons raisonnables. j’estime pour ma part que ce résultat constitue une érosion de la norme actuelle des soupçons raison‑ nables précis. une telle érosion est préoccupante puisqu’elle risque de mettre l’atteinte policière aux libertés individuelles à l’abri du contrôle judiciaire dans les divers contextes où s’appliquent les soup‑ çons raisonnables, y compris lors des interactions entre les policiers et les citoyens comme les déten‑ tions aux fins d’enquête, qui sont plus attentatoires et susceptibles de donner lieu à des abus. [145] third and finally, i would not undermine the balance struck by the bona fide inquiry prong by re‑ quiring chehil‑compliant individualized reasonable suspicion before the police can offer an opportunity. [145] troisièmement, pour terminer, je ne minerais pas l’équilibre atteint par le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête en exigeant des soupçons raisonnables précis conformes à chehil avant que les policiers puissent 5 “matt” was the name the undercover officer invented in the place of a “drop name”. 5 « matt » est le prénom que l’agent d’infiltration a inventé comme « nom à placer ». [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 657 by creating the bona fide inquiry prong in the first place, this court acknowledged that individualized reasonable suspicion is not required in order for police to offer an opportunity to commit an offence: fournir une occasion. en créant le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête, la cour a reconnu que la police peut fournir une occasion de commette une infraction sans avoir de soupçons raisonnables précis : . . . in certain situations the police may not know the identity of specific individuals, but they do know certain other facts, such as a particular location or area where it is reasonably suspected that certain criminal activity is oc‑ curring. in those cases it is clearly permissible to provide opportunities to people associated with the location under suspicion, even if these people are not themselves under suspicion. [emphasis added.]    dans certains cas, la police peut connaître l’identité d’individus précis, sans connaître certains autres faits, comme un lieu ou une zone particuliers qu’on peut rai‑ sonnablement suspecter d’être le théâtre d’une certaine activité criminelle. dans ces cas, il est tout à fait permis de fournir des occasions à ceux qui sont associés aux lieux suspectés même si ces gens ne sont pas eux‑mêmes soupçonnés. [je souligne.] (mack, at p 956). (mack, p. 956) [146] the court in mack and barnes did not re‑ quire individualized reasonable suspicion because to do so would unduly hinder law enforcement ef‑ forts to combat crimes like drug trafficking, which may be difficult to detect through traditional means. indeed, the court recognized that the police must be given “substantial leeway” in investigating crimes of this nature in order to maintain an appropriate balance between the competing values of individual liberty and legitimate law enforcement (mack, at pp 977‑78). [146] dans les arrêts mack et barnes, la cour n’a pas exigé de soupçons raisonnables précis, car cela aurait indûment entravé les forces de l’ordre dans leur lutte contre les crimes comme le trafic de la drogue, qui peuvent être difficiles à détecter par les moyens traditionnels. de fait, la cour a reconnu qu’il fallait donner aux policiers « une marge de manœuvre considérable » dans les enquêtes de cette nature afin de maintenir un juste équilibre entre les valeurs concurrentes que sont la liberté individuelle et l’application légitime de la loi (mack, p 977‑978). [147] there is no reason to believe that this funda‑ mental balance has shifted such that individualized reasonable suspicion should now be required in all cases to avoid a finding of entrapment. if anything, the need to afford substantial leeway to law enforce‑ ment has been made all the more pressing in the dig‑ ital age. crimes that were already difficult to detect at the time of mack can now be committed more covertly than ever before. even then, lamer j rec‑ ognized that “[i]f the struggle against crime is to be won, the ingenuity of criminals must be matched by that of the police; as crimes become more sophisti‑ cated so too must be the methods employed to detect their commission” (at p. 916), and that “[t]he state must be given substantial room to develop techniques which assist it in its fight against crime in society” (p 976). the law of entrapment must not unduly [147] il n’y a aucune raison de croire que cet équilibre fondamental se soit rompu de sorte que les soupçons raisonnables précis soient maintenant nécessaires dans tous les cas pour éviter une conclu‑ sion de provocation policière. en fait, le besoin de donner une marge de manœuvre considérable aux forces de l’ordre est encore plus pressant à l’ère du numérique. des crimes qui étaient déjà difficiles à détecter à l’époque de mack peuvent maintenant être commis encore plus secrètement que jamais. même à l’époque, le juge lamer a reconnu que « [s]i l’on veut vaincre le crime, l’ingéniosité des criminels doit se heurter à celle de la police; au fur et à mesure que les crimes deviennent plus subtils, de même doivent le devenir les méthodes employées pour les dépister » (p. 916), et que « [l]’état doit pouvoir jouir d’une marge de manœuvre considérable afin d’élaborer des 658 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. stifle law enforcement in developing and employing those techniques. [148] that said, there will be cases where the police conduct an investigation into the informa‑ tion received, potentially forming individualized reasonable suspicion, before calling the suspected dial‑a‑dope line. nothing in these reasons should be taken as discouraging the police from doing so. however, i am of the view that the police should not be required to conduct such an investigation or build individualized reasonable suspicion before making a call and offering an opportunity in order to avoid a finding of entrapment. techniques qui puissent l’aider à combattre le crime dans la société » (p 976). il ne faut pas que le droit relatif à la provocation policière empêche indûment les forces de l’ordre d’élaborer et d’employer de telles techniques. [148] cela dit, il y aura des cas où les policiers mèneront une enquête sur les renseignements obte‑ nus et développeront possiblement des soupçons raisonnables précis, avant de faire un appel à la ligne téléphonique soupçonnée de servir à la vente de drogue sur appel. rien dans les présents motifs ne devrait être interprété de manière à décourager les policiers d’agir de la sorte. je suis cependant d’avis que les policiers ne devraient pas être tenus de mener une telle enquête ou de développer des soupçons raisonnables précis avant de faire un appel et d’offrir une occasion afin d’éviter une conclusion de provo‑ cation policière. [149] it is worth noting here that no comparable jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine of entrap‑ ment require individualized reasonable suspicion in order to extend a mere opportunity to commit an offence (see k. roach, “entrapment and equality in terrorism prosecutions: a comparative examination of north american and european approaches” (2011), 80 miss.  l.j 1455; penney (2019), at pp. 366‑67, fn. 64). [149] qui plus est, il convient de souligner ici qu’au‑ cun ressort comparable qui reconnaît la doctrine de la provocation policière n’exige l’existence de soup‑ çons raisonnables précis pour fournir ne serait‑ce que l’occasion de commettre une infraction (voir k. roach, « entrapment and equality in terrorism prosecutions : a comparative examination of north american and european approaches » (2011), 80 miss lj 1455;. penney (2019), p. 366‑367, n 64). [150] the house of lords has held that in de‑ termining whether the police conduct was unac‑ ceptable, the courts must take a holistic approach to ascertain “whether the conduct of the police or other law enforcement agency was so seriously im‑ proper as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (r v. looseley, [2001] ukhl 53, [2001] 4 all er 897, at para 25). this involves consider‑ ing, among other things: the nature of the offence; the intrusiveness of the technique; the extent of the police involvement in the offence; whether the tech‑ nique was “applied in a random fashion, and used for wholesale ‘virtue‑testing’, without good reason”; and whether the police were acting in good faith (paras 23‑28). notably, on the requirement for good faith, lord nicholls of birkenhead stated, at para. 27: [150] la chambre des lords a statué que pour tran‑ cher la question de savoir si la conduite des policiers a été inacceptable, les tribunaux doivent adopter une approche holistique afin de déterminer [traduc‑ tion] « si la conduite des policiers ou de l’organisme d’application de la loi en cause était irrégulière à un degré de gravité tel que l’administration de la justice serait susceptible d’être déconsidérée » (r c. looseley, [2001] ukhl 53, [2001] 4 all. er 897, par 25). pour ce faire, il faut notamment prendre en compte la nature de l’infraction, le caractère atten‑ tatoire de la technique, l’étendue de la participation des policiers à l’infraction, la question de savoir si la technique a été « appliquée de façon aléatoire et uti‑ lisée pour “éprouver la vertu” à une échelle générale, sans motif valable » et celle de savoir si les policiers agissaient de bonne foi (par 23‑28). fait important, pour ce qui concerne l’exigence de bonne foi, lord nicholls of birkenhead a affirmé, au par. 27 : [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 659 it goes without saying that the police must act in good faith and not, for example, as part of a malicious ven‑ detta against an individual or group of individuals. having reasonable grounds for suspicion is one way good faith may be established, but having grounds for suspicion of a particular individual is not always essential. sometimes suspicion may be centred on a particular place, such as a particular public house. sometimes random testing may be the only practicable way of policing a particular trading activity. [emphasis added.] [traduction] il va sans dire que les policiers doivent agir de bonne foi et non, par exemple, dans le cadre d’une vendetta malveillante contre un individu ou un groupe de personnes. avoir des motifs raisonnables d’entretenir des soupçons est une des façons dont la bonne foi peut être établie, mais avoir des motifs de soupçonner quelqu’un en particulier n’est pas toujours essentiel. parfois, les soupçons peuvent avoir pour objet un lieu en particulier, par exemple un débit de boissons donné. parfois, les mises à l’épreuve aléatoires peuvent être la seule façon pratique de surveiller une activité commerciale en particulier. [je souligne.] (see also para. 65, per lord hoffmann, concurring.) (voir aussi par. 65, lord hoffmann, motifs concor‑ dants.) [151] indeed, lord nicholls took the position that the provision of an unexceptional opportunity to commit an offence — ie, where an undercover of‑ ficer in the course of a drug offence investigation behaves in the same manner as a typical individual seeking to buy drugs — will typically not amount to entrapment in english law (paras. 23 and 28; see also paras. 77‑78, per lord hoffmann; s. bronitt, “sang is dead, loosely speaking”, [2002] sing. jls 374, at p 381). however, lord nicholls stressed that all of the circumstances must be considered in answering the overarching question of whether the state con‑ duct was abusive (looseley, at paras 24‑25). lord hoffmann’s and lord hutton’s respective concurring reasons are to similar effect (paras. 50‑59 and 69‑71, per lord hoffmann; paras. 100‑102 and 112, per lord hutton). in the united states, the federal courts have [152] held that merely providing an individual with an opportunity to commit a crime is unobjectionable; entrapment will only be found if the police induce the commission of an offence by an individual who was not already predisposed to commit that type of offence (see roach, at pp 1467‑68). this derives from the american federal courts’ understanding of entrapment as a substantive defence that impacts on individual culpability rather than as an aspect of abuse of process that focuses on the conduct of the state. [151] en effet, lord nicholls était d’avis que le fait de donner une occasion n’ayant rien d’exceptionnel de commettre une infraction — p ex, lorsqu’un agent d’infiltration, dans le cadre d’une enquête sur une infraction relative à la drogue, se comporte de la même manière qu’une personne typique qui cherche à acheter de la drogue — n’équivaudra pas, généra‑ lement, à de la provocation policière en droit anglais (par. 23 et 28; voir aussi par. 77‑78, lord hoffman; s. bronitt, « sang is dead, loosely speaking », [2002] sing.  jls  374, p.  381). toutefois, lord nicholls a souligné que toutes les circonstances doivent être prises en compte pour répondre à la question centrale de savoir si la conduite de l’état a été abusive (looseley, par.  24‑25) les motifs concordants respectifs de lord hoffman et de lord hutton vont dans le même sens (par. 50‑59 et 69‑71, lord hoffman; par. 100‑102 et 112, lord hutton). [152] aux états‑unis, les tribunaux fédéraux ont statué que le simple fait de fournir à quelqu’un l’occasion de commettre un crime n’avait rien de répréhensible; le tribunal ne conclura à la provoca‑ tion policière que si les policiers ont incité à com‑ mettre une infraction quelqu’un qui n’était pas déjà prédisposé à commettre ce type d’infraction (voir roach, p 1467‑1468). cette approche découle de la manière dont les tribunaux fédéraux américains conçoivent la provocation policière, c’est‑à‑dire comme une défense au fond qui a une incidence sur la culpabilité de l’intéressé, plutôt que comme un aspect de l’abus de procédure qui met l’accent sur la conduite de l’état. 660 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. in australia, entrapment does not operate [153] as a substantive defence or lead inevitably to a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, but it may be a relevant consideration in determining the admissibil‑ ity of evidence or operate as a mitigating factor on sentence (see b. murphy and j. anderson, “‘mates, mr big and the unwary’: ongoing supply and its relationship to entrapment” (2007), 19 cicj 5, at p.  12; b.  murphy and j. anderson, “after the serpent beguiled me: entrapment and sentencing in australia and canada” (2014), 39 queen’s lj 621, at pp. 629‑30, 634 and 649). while the australian courts have not offered a comprehensive definition of entrapment, instead preferring a discretionary case‑by‑case approach, it is notable that they equate entrapment with inducement — the provision of a mere opportunity does not amount to entrapment (murphy and anderson (2007), at pp. 12‑13; murphy and anderson (2014), at pp 628‑29). it therefore goes without saying that individualized reasonable suspicion is not required for an officer to provide an individual with an opportunity to commit an offence. [154] having rejected these three alternative ap‑ proaches — (1) endorsing the “investigative step” versus “opportunity” approach; (2) adopting a wa‑ tered down version of reasonable suspicion; or (3) requiring individualized reasonable suspicion in all circumstances in order to provide an opportunity — i am of the view that the bona fide inquiry prong should be revised to bring coherence to this area of the law and preserve the balance between individual liberties and legitimate law enforcement that this court struck in mack and barnes. as i explain below, this would also permit the court to effectively ad‑ dress other criticisms of the bona fide inquiry prong, including how its current formulation creates the potential for large‑scale random virtue testing, ra‑ cial profiling, and targeting the marginalized and vulnerable. [153] en australie, la provocation policière ne se présente pas comme une défense au fond et ne mène pas inévitablement à un arrêt des procédures pour abus de procédure, mais elle peut constituer un fac‑ teur pertinent à prendre en compte pour déterminer l’admissibilité de la preuve ou agir comme facteur atténuant dans la détermination de la peine (voir b. murphy et j. anderson, « “mates, mr big and the unwary” : ongoing supply and its relationship to entrapment » (2007), 19 cicj 5, p. 12; b. murphy et j. anderson, « after the serpent beguiled me : entrapment and sentencing in australia and canada » (2014), 39 queen’s lj 621, p. 629‑630, 634 et 649). bien que les tribunaux australiens n’aient pas donné de définition exhaustive de la provocation policière, préférant plutôt une approche discrétionnaire au cas par cas, il convient de souligner qu’ils l’assimilent à l’incitation — et que le fait d’offrir une simple occasion n’équivaut pas à de la provocation policière (murphy et anderson (2007), p. 12‑13; murphy et anderson (2014), p 628‑629). il va donc sans dire que l’agent n’a pas à avoir de soupçons raisonnables précis avant de donner à quelqu’un une occasion de commettre une infraction. [154] ayant rejeté ces trois autres approches — (1) souscrire à l’approche qui consiste à faire la dis‑ tinction entre l’« étape de l’enquête » et « l’occa‑ sion »; (2) adopter une version diluée des soupçons raisonnables; (3) exiger l’existence de soupçons raisonnables précis dans toutes les situations avant qu’il soit permis de fournir une occasion —, j’estime qu’il y a lieu de revoir le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête pour apporter de la cohérence à ce domaine du droit et préserver l’équilibre entre les libertés individuelles et l’application légitime de la loi que la cour avait établi dans mack et barnes. comme je l’expliquerai plus loin, ceci permettrait en outre à la cour de répondre efficacement aux autres critiques dont le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête fait l’objet, notamment la manière dont sa formulation actuelle permet d’éprouver au hasard, à grande échelle, la vertu des gens, de faire du profilage racial et de cibler des personnes marginalisées et vulnérables. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 661 d how a bona fide inquiry should be defined d comment définir la véritable enquête? (1) the revised framework (1) le cadre d’analyse révisé in my view, the police should be found to be [155] acting pursuant to a bona fide inquiry where: [155] selon moi, il y aurait lieu de conclure que les policiers ont agi dans le cadre d’une véritable enquête lorsqu’il est satisfait aux trois conditions suivantes : (a) their investigation was motivated by genuine a) law enforcement purposes; leur enquête était motivée par des objectifs vé‑ ritables d’application de la loi; (b) they had a factually‑grounded basis for their b) leur enquête s’appuyait sur des faits; investigation; and (c) their investigation was directed at investigating a specific type of crime within a tightly circum‑ scribed location (whether physical or virtual). [156] lest there be any doubt, this test places im‑ portant restraints on the police; it does not give them “unrestricted licence to offer people the opportunity to commit crimes” (karakatsanis, brown and martin jj.’s reasons, at para 32). the end‑game of the bona fide inquiry prong remains ensuring that the police are not allowed to randomly test the virtue of citi‑ zens, and that their conduct is subject to independent and objective review by the courts. consistent with the doctrine of entrapment generally, the test i pro‑ pose is grounded in abuse of process. although this test differs from an analysis of whether the police met the reasonable suspicion standard, the judicial scrutiny it demands is no less meaningful. c) leur enquête portait sur un type précis de crime dans un lieu bien délimité (physique ou virtuel). [156] pour qu’aucun doute ne subsiste, ce test restreindrait abondamment l’action policière; il n’« autoriser[ait pas] sans réserve la police à offrir à des gens l’occasion de commettre des crimes » (motifs des juges karakatsanis, brown et martin, par 32). le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête viserait encore à garantir que les policiers ne puissent pas éprouver au hasard la vertu des citoyens, et que leur conduite fasse l’objet d’un examen judiciaire indé‑ pendant et objectif. conformément à la doctrine de la provocation policière dans son ensemble, le test que je propose est fondé sur l’abus de procédure. bien que ce test ne consisterait pas à analyser si les policiers ont satisfait à la norme des soupçons rai‑ sonnables, l’examen judiciaire qu’il commanderait n’en serait pas moins significatif. [157] first, the police officers’ investigation must be motivated by genuine law enforcement purposes. this was an integral component of the test set out in mack and barnes and it remains integral under this revised framework. it bears noting here that an inves‑ tigation that is pursued in bad faith will not be one that is motivated by genuine law enforcement pur‑ poses (see mack, at pp. 956‑57 and 959). examples of bad faith in this context include pursuing an inves‑ tigation that is motivated by racial profiling or based on information from a source that they know or have reason to believe is unreliable. intentionally target‑ ing marginalized or vulnerable individuals — for [157] premièrement, l’enquête des policiers devrait être motivée par des objectifs véritables d’application de la loi. il s’agissait là d’un élément fondamental du test énoncé dans mack et barnes et il demeurerait inchangé dans ce cadre d’analyse révisé. il convient de souligner ici qu’une enquête effectuée de mauvaise foi n’en serait pas une qui est motivée par des objectifs véritables d’application de la loi (voir mack, p. 956‑957 et 959). des exemples de mauvaise foi dans ce contexte incluent les cas où l’enquête est motivée par le profilage racial ou fondée sur de l’information provenant d’une source que les policiers savent ou ont des raisons de croire 662 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. example, individuals who were previously involved in the drug trade or addicted to drugs, but whom the police know or have reason to believe are making efforts to reform or stay sober — is another example of bad faith conduct that cannot be accepted. [158] second, the police must have a factually‑ grounded basis for their investigation. the police must be able to point to a specific reason for their investigation beyond a mere hunch, though this need not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion as that standard is presently defined. for instance, the police may have a factually‑grounded basis for their inves‑ tigation into a suspected dial‑a‑dope line where they receive information from an anonymous source, such as crime stoppers, that a specific phone number is a dial‑a‑dope line and, consistent with the requirement that their investigation be motivated by genuine law enforcement purposes, they have no reason to believe that the information received is unreliable. acting on information received from an anonymous source is not the same as acting on a hunch. qu’elle n’est pas fiable. cibler intentionnellement des personnes marginalisées ou vulnérables — par exemple des personnes qui ont déjà été impliquées dans le trafic de la drogue ou qui sont toxicomanes, alors que les policiers savent ou ont des raisons de croire qu’elles font des efforts pour se réhabiliter ou pour demeurer sobres — constituerait un autre exemple de conduite de mauvaise foi qui ne saurait être acceptée. [158] deuxièmement, l’enquête des policiers de‑ vrait s’appuyer sur des faits. les policiers devraient être en mesure d’indiquer une raison précise pour laquelle ils enquêtent, au‑delà d’une simple intui‑ tion, quoique cette raison n’ait pas nécessairement à atteindre le degré des soupçons raisonnables, suivant la définition actuelle de cette norme. par exemple, l’enquête des policiers sur une ligne téléphonique soupçonnée d’être utilisée pour la vente de drogue sur appel pourrait s’appuyer sur des faits lorsque les policiers reçoivent des renseignements d’une source anonyme, comme échec au crime, selon laquelle un numéro de téléphone en particulier est une ligne utilisée pour faire la vente de drogue sur appel et, conformément à l’exigence que leur enquête soit motivée par des objectifs véritables d’application de la loi, lorsqu’ils n’ont aucune raison de croire que l’information reçue n’est pas fiable. agir sur la foi de renseignements reçus d’une source anonyme ne revient pas à agir en fonction d’une intuition. [159] by requiring the police to have a factually‑ grounded basis for their investigation, the revised approach imposes a meaningful limit on the police. to answer the question, posed by my colleagues, of “what less could possibly be required” (at para. 32 (emphasis deleted)) if an undercover officer is per‑ mitted to make a phone call where they have re‑ ceived anonymous information consisting of a name, a phone number, and an allegation of criminal activ‑ ity, i wish to make clear that the police will not have a factually‑grounded basis for their investigation if they flip through the phone book or use a random number generator and call numbers at random, hop‑ ing to find a dial‑a‑dope line. that is the type of random virtue testing about which this court was [159] en exigeant que l’enquête policière soit fon‑ dée sur des faits, l’approche révisée imposerait des limites considérables aux forces de l’ordre. pour répondre à la question posée par mes collègues, à savoir « qu’est‑ce qui pourrait bien être exigé de moins » (par. 32 (italique omis)) si l’agent d’infil‑ tration est autorisé à faire un appel téléphonique lorsque la police reçoit des renseignements d’une source anonyme comprenant un nom, un numéro de téléphone et une allégation d’activité criminelle, je tiens à préciser que la police n’obtiendra pas de fon‑ dement factuel pour mener une enquête en feuilletant l’annuaire téléphonique, en utilisant un générateur de numéros de téléphone aléatoires ou en appelant des numéros au hasard, et en espérant tomber sur [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 663 concerned in mack and barnes (mack, at p. 957; see also le, at para 84). [160] significantly, this requirement also provides an objective basis for judicial review. as explained earlier in these reasons, the type of “reasonable sus‑ picion” that the court incorporated into the bona fide inquiry prong in mack and barnes — namely generalized suspicion — did not survive chehil. post‑chehil, in which this court determined that “reasonable suspicion” must be individualized, i am of the view that the requirement that the police have a “factually‑grounded basis” for their investi‑ gation most accurately captures the type of objective requirement the court in mack and barnes incorpo‑ rated into the bona fide inquiry prong. [161] third, the location of the inquiry must be tightly circumscribed. whether the precision of the location meets this threshold should be determined by reference to the overarching question entrapment poses, that is, whether, in all the circumstances, soci‑ ety would view the inquiry as abusive. this require‑ ment is in line with lamer cj’s acknowledgment that the location of a bona fide inquiry must be “de‑ fined with sufficient precision” (barnes, at p 463). inevitably, whether a particular type of location is sufficiently circumscribed for the purposes of a par‑ ticular type of investigation will need to be consid‑ ered on a location‑by‑location basis, until a body of jurisprudence develops. as that happens, courts must ensure sensitivity to the problems of racial profiling and random virtue testing that have raised concerns about the current approach under the bona fide in‑ quiry prong, which i will describe further below. that said, the following non‑exhaustive list of factors may assist in making this determination: une ligne de vente de drogue sur appel. il s’agirait d’ailleurs là du type de démarche qui consisterait à éprouver au hasard la vertu des citoyens qui préoc‑ cupait la cour dans mack et barnes (mack, p. 957; voir aussi le, par 84). [160] fait important, cette exigence fournirait aussi un fondement objectif pour effectuer le contrôle judiciaire. comme je l’ai expliqué précédemment, le type de « soupçons raisonnables » que la cour a incorporé dans le sous‑volet de la véritable en‑ quête dans mack et barnes — à savoir les soupçons généraux — n’a pas survécu à chehil. depuis cet arrêt, dans lequel la cour a statué que les « soupçons raisonnables » devaient être précis, je suis d’avis que l’exigence selon laquelle l’enquête des policiers devrait être « fondé[e] sur des faits » traduit avec le plus d’exactitude le type d’exigence objective que la cour a incorporé dans le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête dans ses arrêts mack et barnes. [161] troisièmement, le lieu de l’enquête devrait être bien délimité. la question de savoir si la pré‑ cision du lieu respecte ce critère devrait être déci‑ dée en fonction de la question centrale que pose la provocation policière, c’est‑à‑dire si, eu égard à toutes les circonstances, la société considérerait l’enquête comme abusive. cette exigence s’accor‑ derait avec la reconnaissance par le juge en chef lamer que le lieu d’une véritable enquête doit être « défini avec suffisamment de précision » (barnes, p 463). inévitablement, la question de savoir si un type de lieu en particulier est suffisamment délimité aux fins d’un type particulier d’enquêtes devrait être examinée au cas par cas, jusqu’à l’émergence d’une jurisprudence sur la question. ce faisant, les tribu‑ naux devraient demeurer sensibles aux problèmes de profilage racial et d’opérations visant à éprouver au hasard la vertu des gens qui ont soulevé des préoc‑ cupations quant à l’approche actuelle du sous‑volet de la véritable enquête et que je vais décrire plus en détail ultérieurement. cela étant dit, voici une liste non exhaustive de facteurs qui pourraient aider à trancher cette question : • the nature and seriousness of the type of crime under investigation (eg, a wider investigative • la nature et la gravité du type de crime visé par l’enquête (p ex., il peut être nécessaire d’élargir 664 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. net may be necessary to effectively capture cer‑ tain types of criminal activity); le champ de l’enquête pour cerner efficacement certains types d’activités criminelles); • the number of citizens that may be impacted by the investigation technique used by the police (eg, a technique that sweeps in too many citi‑ zens, even in a relatively small geographic area, may not be sufficiently circumscribed); • the nature of the location under investigation (eg, society may be more accepting of police opportuning in a shopping mall versus a residen‑ tial neighbourhood or housing complex, even if the same number of people are potentially implicated in each case); and • the intrusiveness of the technique (eg, if the police are employing a more intrusive technique, such as a face‑to‑face technique, they may need to restrict the area in which they are opportuning more than if they were engaged in a less intru‑ sive technique). [162] these factors apply equally to virtual and physical locations. as i will explain in applying this revised approach, mr. williams’s and mr. ahmad’s cases provide examples involving a virtual loca‑ tion — a phone number. (2) how the revised framework improves upon barnes [163] in my view, this revision remedies the doctri‑ nal incongruity between barnes and chehil, and re‑ focuses the bona fide inquiry prong on its principled origin: abuse of process. it strikes the appropriate balance by ensuring that law enforcement techniques which society would not view as intolerable and which may be necessary in combatting certain types of crime are not caught by the entrapment doctrine, while still protecting individuals’ legitimate interest in being left alone by the state. • le nombre de citoyens susceptibles d’être tou‑ chés par la technique d’enquête employée par les policiers (p ex, il se peut qu’une technique qui englobe un trop grand nombre de citoyens, même dans un espace géographique relative‑ ment petit, ne soit pas suffisamment bien déli‑ mitée); • la nature du lieu visé par l’enquête (p ex., il se peut que la société accepte davantage que les policiers fournissent des occasions dans un centre commercial, par opposition à un quartier résidentiel ou à un complexe d’habitation, même si un nombre égal de personnes est éventuelle‑ ment touché dans chacun des cas); • le caractère attentatoire de la technique (p ex., si les policiers emploient une technique plus attentatoire, par exemple une technique face à face, il leur faudra peut‑être restreindre davan‑ tage la zone dans laquelle ils offrent des occa‑ sions que s’ils employaient une technique moins attentatoire). [162] ces facteurs s’appliqueraient aux lieux tant virtuels que physiques. comme je l’explique‑ rai en appliquant cette approche révisée, les cas de mm. williams et ahmad fournissent des exemples où il est question d’un lieu virtuel, soit un numéro de téléphone. (2) en quoi le cadre d’analyse révisé repré‑ sente‑t‑il une amélioration par rapport à l’ar‑ rêt barnes? [163] à mon avis, cette révision corrigerait l’incon‑ gruité théorique entre les arrêts barnes et chehil, et recentrerait le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête sur sa raison d’être première, soit l’abus de procédure. elle établirait le juste équilibre en faisant en sorte que les techniques policières d’application de la loi que la société ne considérerait pas comme intolérables et qui peuvent être nécessaires dans la lutte contre certains types de crimes ne tombent pas sous le coup de la doctrine de la provocation policière, tout en protégeant le droit légitime des citoyens de ne pas être importunés par l’état. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 665 [164] additionally, this revision addresses existing problems with the bona fide inquiry prong. by taking into account factors such as the number of citizens potentially impacted by the technique, the revision mitigates the risk that police may be able to indis‑ criminately offer opportunities within an expansive area (ie, to conduct large‑scale random virtue test‑ ing). the revision also effectively addresses the risks of police targeting the vulnerable and marginalized and engaging in racial profiling. [164] de plus, cette révision résoudrait les pro‑ blèmes actuels qui touchent le sous‑volet de la véri‑ table enquête. en prenant en compte des facteurs comme le nombre de citoyens éventuellement tou‑ chés par la technique, l’approche révisée réduirait le risque que les policiers puissent offrir des occasions à des individus pris au hasard à l’intérieur d’une vaste zone (c‑à‑d effectuer des opérations à grande échelle visant à éprouver au hasard la vertu des gens). en outre, l’approche révisée écarterait efficacement les risques que les policiers ciblent des personnes vulnérables et marginalisées et se livrent à du pro‑ filage racial. [165] if the police deliberately target the margin‑ alized and vulnerable, that will amount to impermis‑ sible bad faith conduct. society will not tolerate that type of police conduct. additionally, by considering the nature of the location under investigation and the number of citizens potentially impacted, together with other relevant factors, reviewing courts will be able to discern whether the risk of ensnaring the marginalized and vulnerable was so high in a given case that society would not tolerate that risk, notwith‑ standing the legitimate law enforcement interests at stake. [165] si des policiers ciblaient délibérément des personnes marginalisées et vulnérables, cela équi‑ vaudrait à de la mauvaise foi inacceptable. la société ne tolère pas ce type de conduite policière. de plus, en examinant la nature du lieu visé par l’enquête et le nombre de citoyens éventuellement touchés, ainsi que d’autres facteurs pertinents, les tribunaux de révi sion seraient en mesure de déterminer si le risque de prendre au piège des personnes marginalisées et vulnérables était tellement élevé dans un cas donné que la société ne tolérerait pas ce risque, malgré les intérêts légitimes en jeu liés à l’application de la loi. [166] before turning to those considerations, how‑ ever, it must be recognized that the balance struck between individual liberties and law enforcement in mack and barnes contemplates that the mere risk that a particularly vulnerable individual may inad‑ vertently be caught by a bona fide inquiry does not, in itself, make the police technique intolerable. taking, for instance, the facts of the investigation in barnes, there was no doubt a risk that street‑involved per‑ sons within the six‑block area who knew the lingo of the drug trade and who knew where to access the drugs requested by the undercover officer would find themselves unable to resist the opportunity to make some easy money. so too for an individual involved in a dial‑a‑dope investigation. nonetheless, the risk associated with a dial‑a‑dope investigation is accept‑ able due to the tightly circumscribed and minimally intrusive nature of these investigations, which target a type of crime that is prevalent in our society and [166] toutefois, avant d’examiner ces considé‑ rations, il faut reconnaître que l’équilibre établi dans mack et barnes entre les libertés individuelles et l’application de la loi veut que le simple risque qu’une personne particulièrement vulnérable puisse par inadvertance être prise au piège par une véritable enquête ne rend pas, à lui seul, la technique employée par la police intolérable. par exemple, dans l’affaire barnes, selon les faits révélés par l’enquête, il exis‑ tait sans aucun doute un risque que des personnes de la rue qui se trouvaient dans la zone de six pâtés de maisons, qui connaissaient le jargon du trafic de la drogue et qui savaient où se procurer la drogue demandée par l’agent d’infiltration, se retrouvent incapables de résister à l’occasion de faire de l’argent facilement. il en irait de même de quelqu’un visé par une enquête sur la vente de drogue sur appel. néanmoins, le risque lié à une enquête sur ce type de vente serait acceptable en raison de la nature bien 666 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. difficult to detect through reactive, as opposed to proactive, policing. in the event that a bona fide inquiry captures [167] a particularly vulnerable individual, there are two potential pathways to relief. first, the individual may be able to establish, under the second branch of entrapment, that they were induced into committing the offence (see mack, at pp. 960 and 963). in mack, lamer j observed that in cases where a particularly vulnerable individual, such as someone suffering from an addiction, takes the opportunity offered by the police, “it is desirable for the purposes of [the in‑ ducement] analysis to consider whether the conduct was likely to induce criminal conduct in those people who share the characteristic” (p 960). alternatively, if the evidence falls short of establishing inducement and a conviction is entered, the individual’s circum‑ stances may be taken into account by the sentencing judge in fashioning an appropriate sentence. [168] this revision also improves upon the for‑ mulation set out in mack and barnes by explicitly instructing courts to consider whether racial profiling played a role in the police investigation. if the race of the individual who was offered an opportunity in the course of a purported bona fide inquiry — or the racial composition of the area said to be the subject of that inquiry — motivated the police investigation, the bona fide inquiry prong will have no application. put simply, an investigation based on racial profiling is a bad faith investigation (see r v. dudhi, 2019 onca 665, 147 or (3d) 546, at paras. 56‑62; peart v. peel regional police services board (2006), 43 cr (6th) 175 (ont. ca), at para 91). définie et minimalement attentatoire des enquêtes de ce genre, qui ciblent un type de crime répandu dans notre société et difficile à détecter par des mesures de maintien de l’ordre réactives, par opposition à proactives. [167] dans l’éventualité où une véritable enquête prenait au piège une personne particulièrement vul‑ nérable, deux voies de redressement pourraient être empruntées. premièrement, l’intéressé pourrait être en mesure d’établir, en application du deuxième volet de la doctrine de la provocation policière, qu’on l’a incité à commettre l’infraction (voir mack, p. 960 et 963). en effet, dans mack, le juge lamer a fait remarquer que lorsqu’une personne particulièrement vulnérable — par exemple quelqu’un qui souffre d’une quelconque dépendance — s’est prévalue de l’occasion que lui a offerte la police, « il est souhai‑ table, pour les fins de l’analyse [de l’incitation], de se demander si la conduite était susceptible d’in‑ duire une conduite criminelle chez ceux qui sont affectés des mêmes caractéristiques  » (p.  960). deuxièmement, si la preuve ne permet pas d’établir qu’il y a eu incitation et que la personne est décla‑ rée coupable, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine pourrait prendre en compte la situation de l’intéressé pour lui infliger une peine appropriée. [168] cette révision améliorerait également la formulation de mack et de barnes en enjoignant explicitement aux tribunaux de se demander si le pro‑ filage racial a joué un rôle dans l’enquête policière. en effet, si l’enquête en cause, que l’on dit véritable, était motivée par la race de la personne qui s’est fait offrir la possibilité de commettre un crime — ou par la composition raciale de la zone qui était censément l’objet de l’enquête —, le sous‑volet de la véritable enquête ne s’appliquerait pas. en termes simples, une enquête fondée sur le profilage racial est une enquête menée de mauvaise foi (voir r c. dudhi, 2019 onca 665, 147 or (3d) 546, par. 56‑62; peart c. peel regional police services board (2006), 43 cr (6th) 175 (ca. ont.), par 91). [169] since the time when mack and barnes were decided, the courts have recognized the realities of racial profiling and the differential impact of pro‑ active police techniques on racialized communities [169] depuis l’époque où les arrêts mack et barnes ont été rendus, les tribunaux ont reconnu les réalités du profilage racial et de l’effet particulier de tech‑ niques proactives employées par la police sur les [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 667 (see eg. peart, at para. 94 (stating that there is now “an acceptance by the courts that racial profiling occurs and is a day‑to‑day reality in the lives of those minorities affected by it”)). as professor tanovich has observed: collectivités racialisées (voir p ex. peart, par. 94 (où il est affirmé que [traduction] « la jurisprudence reconnaît [désormais] l’existence du profilage racial qui fait partie du quotidien des minorités visées »)). comme le professeur tanovich l’a signalé : . . . entrapment is a breeding ground for racial profiling, as evidenced by the number of drug cases involving racial‑ ized individuals. this social reality provides compelling justification, in addition to the doctrinal developments discussed in the next section, for reconsideration of the barnes test. [footnote omitted; p 432] [170] although these realities were not considered in the original formulation of the bona fide inquiry branch of entrapment, they must now be taken into account in determining whether the police conduct at issue would be viewed as intolerable by our society. [171] under the revised approach, a consideration of the factors outlined above may reveal a racialized dimension to the investigation that would not have been exposed under the barnes framework. the na‑ ture of the location under investigation will be a particularly relevant factor to consider in this regard. to borrow an example from professor roach, writing in the terrorism context: if the crown argues that a police officer was engaged in a bona fide inquiry into terrorist offences by offering opportunities at a mosque, this may raise a red flag signaling that the police were engaged in discriminatory targeting (pp 1473‑74). the court in such a case would need to carefully consider all the facts to determine whether the police investigation was based on discriminatory stereotypes or biases rather than legitimate investi‑ gative leads. [traduction]    la provocation policière est un terreau propice au profilage racial, comme en témoigne le nombre d’affaires liées à la drogue intéressant les personnes racia‑ lisées. cette réalité sociale fournit une raison impérieuse, outre les virages théoriques discutés dans la partie qui suit, de réexaminer le test formulé dans l’arrêt barnes. [note de bas de page omise; p 432] [170] bien que ces réalités n’aient pas été consi‑ dérées dans la formulation initiale du sous‑volet de la véritable enquête en matière de provocation policière, elles devraient maintenant être prises en compte lorsqu’il s’agit de savoir si la conduite poli cière en cause serait jugée intolérable par notre société. [171] suivant l’approche révisée, un examen des facteurs énoncés précédemment serait susceptible de révéler une dimension racialisée de l’enquête qui n’aurait pas été mise en évidence en utilisant le cadre d’analyse préconisé par l’arrêt barnes. la nature du lieu visé par l’enquête serait un facteur particuliè‑ rement pertinent à prendre en compte à cet égard. pour reprendre un exemple donné par le professeur roach écrivant dans le contexte du terrorisme : si la couronne plaide qu’un policier était engagé dans une véritable enquête sur des infractions terroristes en donnant des occasions dans une mosquée, cela pourrait signaler que les policiers se livraient à un ciblage discriminatoire (p 1473‑1474). dans une affaire semblable, il faudrait que le tribunal exa‑ mine soigneusement tous les faits pour déterminer si l’enquête policière était fondée sur des stéréotypes ou des préjugés discriminatoires, plutôt que sur des pistes d’enquête légitimes. in this way, the revised framework preserves [172] the fundamental balance struck by this court in mack and barnes by ensuring that the police are able to engage in genuinely motivated investigations that society would not find intolerable. however, it offers significant improvements to the bona fide inquiry [172] de cette façon, le cadre d’analyse révisé préserverait l’équilibre fondamental qu’a établi la cour dans mack et barnes en faisant en sorte que les policiers puissent se livrer à des enquêtes moti‑ vées par des objectifs véritables que la société ne jugerait pas intolérables. toutefois, il apporterait des 668 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. prong by bringing it in line with recent doctrinal de‑ velopments, and by placing limitations on the scope of the location under investigation that are responsive to, among other things, the concerns about racial profiling that have arisen since mack and barnes were decided. améliorations appréciables au sous‑volet de la véri‑ table enquête en l’alignant sur les développements théoriques récents et en imposant des limites à la portée du lieu qui fait l’objet de l’enquête qui seraient sensibles, entre autres choses, aux préoccupations relatives au profilage racial qui ont émergé depuis que les arrêts mack et barnes ont été rendus. v application to mr. williams’s and mr. ahmad’s v application aux pourvois de mm. williams et appeals ahmad [173] turning to the facts of the cases at bar, i am of the view that neither mr. williams nor mr. ahmad were entrapped. the police in both cases were act‑ ing in the course of bona fide inquiries into the cell phone numbers in issue at the time they extended the respective opportunities to traffic in narcotics. [174] applying the new framework, there is no suggestion that the police were not motivated by genuine law enforcement purposes, nor is there is any evidence of bad faith further, they had factually‑ grounded basis for their investigations, having received information containing the names and phone numbers of alleged drug dealers. finally, their inquiry was sufficiently tightly circumscribed. as already noted, whether a location is sufficiently circumscribed for the purposes of a particular type of investigation will need to be developed in future cases. however, it is clear that no matter how the courts choose to define “tightly circumscribed”, a single phone number in a dial‑a‑dope investigation will be included. this is borne out when one consid‑ ers the factors outlined above, at para 161. [175] turning first to the nature and seriousness of the crime: drug trafficking is a serious crime. additionally, the mobile and “consensual” nature of this type of crime makes it difficult to investigate using traditional investigative techniques. with the proliferation of cell phones, drug dealers are able to traffic in dangerous substances without associating with a fixed physical location. [173] examinant les faits des présents pourvois, je suis d’avis que ni m. williams ni m. ahmad n’ont été victimes de provocation policière. dans les deux cas, les policiers ont agi dans le cadre de véritables enquêtes visant les numéros de téléphones cellulaires en cause aux moments où ils ont donné les occasions respectives de faire le trafic de stupéfiants. [174] appliquant le nouveau cadre d’analyse, rien n’indique que les policiers n’étaient pas motivés par des objectifs véritables d’application de la loi et rien n’indique non plus qu’ils agissaient de mauvaise foi. qui plus est, ils avaient des motifs fondés sur des faits pour mener leurs enquêtes, ayant reçu des renseignements, dont les noms et les numéros de téléphone des trafiquants de drogue présumés. enfin, leurs enquêtes étaient suffisamment bien délimitées. comme je l’ai déjà souligné, il appartiendrait aux tribunaux d’élaborer les critères qui permettraient de déterminer si un lieu est suffisamment délimité aux fins d’un type d’enquête en particulier. toutefois, il est manifeste que peu importe la manière dont ils choisiraient de définir l’expression « bien délimité », un numéro de téléphone unique dans une enquête sur la vente de drogue sur appel serait visé. c’est ce que révèle un examen des facteurs énoncés précédem‑ ment, au par 161. [175] en premier lieu, en ce qui concerne la nature et la gravité du crime : le trafic de la drogue est un crime grave. de plus, les techniques d’enquête traditionnelles s’avèrent mal adaptées à ce type de crimes vu son caractère mobile et « consensuel ». avec la prolifération des téléphones cellulaires, les trafiquants de drogue sont capables de faire le trafic de substances dangereuses sans s’associer à un lieu physique fixe. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 669 [176] second, it is instructive to consider how many citizens may be impacted by the investigation technique used by the police. in these appeals, the information the police received from each of the sources only related to one phone number. the num‑ ber of individuals potentially impacted by the police conduct is accordingly extremely low. further, the police tactic used does not engage the “serious [and] unnecessary risk of attracting innocent and otherwise law‑abiding individuals into the commission of a criminal offence” (mack, at p. 957) — most citizens would not understand the “coded drug language” used on these calls or be tempted to start trafficking in drugs as a result of the call. indeed, the risk of an innocent person being tempted to commit a crime is much lower than the street‑level opportuning that barnes contemplated. since the technique in barnes was held not to be entrapment, this factor militates in favour of finding that a typical dial‑a‑dope investiga‑ tion is not one that society would view as intolerable. [177] third, the “location” under investigation in each of these appeals was a phone number. as a result, any concerns that racial profiling or other unconscious biases may have played a role in the investigations are highly attenuated — the oppor‑ tunities were extended to whomever answered the phones and engaged in coded conversation with the undercover officers. additionally, notwithstanding the locations at issue were phone numbers, the in‑ vestigatory technique did not involve accessing any of the information on either mr. ahmad’s or mr. williams’s cell phone. as examined in more detail below, an individual’s privacy interest in respect of their phone number in this context is limited to their interest in being left alone by the state. the state is not accessing the biographical core of information that has led this court to extend significant protec‑ tions to the contents of cell phones in the context of s 8 of the charter. [176] en deuxième lieu, il est utile de se deman‑ der combien de citoyens sont susceptibles d’être touchés par la technique d’enquête employée par la police. dans les présents pourvois, les renseigne‑ ments que la police a reçus de chacune des sources ne se rapportaient qu’à un seul numéro de téléphone. en conséquence, le nombre de personnes éventuel‑ lement touchées par la conduite des policiers était extrêmement faible. qui plus est, la tactique poli‑ cière employée n’a pas fait entrer en jeu les « risques graves et inutiles d’entraîner des individus innocents et respectueux de la loi à commettre une infraction criminelle » (mack, p. 957) — la plupart des ci‑ toyens ne comprendraient pas le « jargon encodé de la drogue » employé lors de ces appels ou ne seraient pas tentés de commencer le trafic de drogue par suite de l’appel. en effet, le risque qu’une personne innocente soit tentée de commettre un crime est nettement moins élevé que dans le cas d’une occa‑ sion offerte dans la rue qu’a envisagée l’arrêt barnes. la technique utilisée dans cette affaire n’ayant pas été considérée comme de la provocation policière, ce facteur militerait en faveur de la conclusion qu’une enquête typique sur la vente de drogue sur appel n’est pas une enquête que la société considérerait comme intolérable. [177] en troisième lieu, le « lieu » visé par l’en‑ quête dans chacun des présents pourvois était un numéro de téléphone. en conséquence, toute préoc‑ cupation selon laquelle le profilage racial ou d’autres préjugés inconscients auraient pu jouer un rôle dans l’enquête est grandement atténuée — les occasions ont été offertes à quiconque répondait aux appels et se livrait à une conversation encodée avec les agents d’infiltration. de plus, même si les lieux en cause étaient des numéros de téléphone, la technique d’enquête n’impliquait pas l’accès à de l’information qui se trouvait dans les téléphones cellulaires de mm. ahmad ou williams. comme nous le verrons plus en détail ci‑après, le droit au respect de la vie privée de quelqu’un à l’égard de son numéro de télé‑ phone dans ce contexte se limite à son droit de ne pas être importuné par l’état. or, ici, l’état n’a pas ac‑ cédé à l’ensemble des renseignements biographiques qui a amené la cour à conférer des protections im‑ portantes au contenu de téléphones cellulaires dans le contexte de l’application de l’art. 8 de la charte. 670 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. [178] my colleagues invoke this court’s jurispru‑ dence under s 8 of the charter to suggest that the police must have reasonable suspicion to conduct a typical dial‑a‑dope investigation because “[v]irtual spaces raise unique concerns for the intrusion of the state into individuals’ private lives”, owing in part to the reasonable expectation of privacy indi‑ viduals hold in certain “digital communications” (karakatsanis, brown and martin jj.’s reasons., at para 36). they argue that “cell phones are a 24/7 gateway into a person’s private life” and that “[i]ndi‑ viduals must be able to enjoy that privacy free from state intrusion, subject only to the police meeting an objective and reviewable standard allowing them to intrude” (para 37). while these statements are no doubt true, my colleagues’ reliance on this court’s s 8 charter jurisprudence in this context is, with respect, misplaced. [179] in its jurisprudence respecting searches of electronic devices, this court has been concerned with protecting individuals’ informational privacy interests (see eg,. r v. marakah, 2017 scc 59, [2017] 2 scr 608, at paras. 31‑34 and 37; r v. fearon, 2014 scc 77, [2014] 3 scr 621, at pa‑ ras. 51 and 63; r v. spencer, 2014 scc 43, [2014] 2 scr 212, at para 37). specifically, this court has recognized that in today’s society, searching an individual’s electronic device may uncover core biographical information, including “information which tends to reveal intimate details of the [indi‑ vidual’s] lifestyle and personal choices” (marakah, at para. 32, per mclachlin cj, quoting r v. plant, [1993] 3 scr 281, at p. 293; see also para. 92, per moldaver j., dissenting; spencer, at para 27). this is so because of the capacity modern electronic de‑ vices have to store vast quantities of information and because of the manner in which individuals engage with and through their electronic devices in today’s society. [178] mes collègues invoquent la jurisprudence de la cour relative à l’art. 8 de la charte pour affirmer que les policiers doivent avoir des soupçons raison‑ nables afin d’effectuer une enquête typique sur la vente de drogue sur appel parce que les « espaces vir‑ tuels soulèvent des préoccupations uniques pour ce qui est de l’intrusion de l’état dans la vie privée des gens », compte tenu notamment de l’attente raison‑ nable d’une personne en matière de vie privée quant à certaines « communications numériques » (motifs des juges karakatsanis, brown et martin, par 36). selon eux, « les téléphones cellulaires sont un point d’accès 24/7 à la vie privée d’une personne » et les « gens doivent pouvoir jouir de cette vie privée à l’abri de l’intrusion de l’état, sous réserve unique‑ ment du respect par la police d’une norme objective et révisable lui permettant de porter atteinte à leur vie privée » (par 37). bien que ces affirmations soient assurément vraies, c’est à tort que mes collègues s’appuient sur la jurisprudence de la cour relative à l’art. 8 de la charte dans le présent contexte. [179] dans sa jurisprudence relative aux fouilles d’appareils électroniques, la cour s’est souciée de la protection du droit au respect du caractère privé des renseignements personnels des individus (voir, p ex., r c. marakah, 2017 csc 59, [2017] 2 rcs 608, par. 31‑34 et 37; r c. fearon, 2014 csc 77, [2014] 3 rcs  621, par.  51 et 63; r c spencer, 2014 csc 43, [2014] 2 rcs 212, par 37). plus parti‑ culièrement, la cour a reconnu que dans la société d’aujourd’hui, la fouille de l’appareil électronique d’un individu est susceptible de dévoiler des rensei‑ gnements biographiques fondamentaux, y compris des « renseignements tendant à révéler des détails intimes sur le mode de vie et les choix personnels de l’individu » (marakah, par. 32, la juge en chef mclachlin, citant r c. plant, [1993] 3 rcs 281, p. 293; voir aussi par. 92, le juge moldaver, dissi‑ dent; spencer, par 27). il en est ainsi en raison de la capacité des appareils électroniques modernes de mettre en mémoire d’énormes quantités de ren‑ seignements de même que la manière dont les per‑ sonnes se servent de leurs appareils électroniques dans la société d’aujourd’hui. [180] however, the informational privacy interests that find protection under s. 8 of the charter do not [180] toutefois, le droit au respect du carac‑ tère privé des renseignements personnels protégé [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 671 come into play in the context of dial‑a‑dope inves‑ tigations. these investigations do not involve “state surveillance over virtual spaces”, nor does the under‑ cover officer “investigate virtual communications” (karakatsanis, brown and martin jj.’s reasons, at paras. 37 and 40). dial‑a‑dope investigations do not involve a search or seizure of the person’s phone, or any of the information it contains. all that di‑ al‑a‑dope investigations involve is a conversation between an undercover officer and the person on the other end of the line. as such, i cannot agree with my colleagues’ suggestion that merely “calling a [phone] number . . . is an inherently private activity” (para 36). [181] the untenability of the position taken by my colleagues on the privacy interests at stake in a typical dial‑a‑dope investigation is made clear by the result they reach in mr. ahmad’s case and, more generally, their position that it is open to the po‑ lice to cold call a phone number without reasonable suspicion and attempt to form reasonable suspicion over the phone. my colleagues’ acceptance that the police may phone an individual and engage them in potentially extensive conversation without first hold‑ ing reasonable suspicion — indeed, as i understand it, absent any objective and verifiable basis — belies their contention that a typical dial‑a‑dope investi‑ gation engages the privacy interests that s 8 of the charter protects. while my colleagues suggest that “[t]he reasonably informed observer would be dis‑ mayed to learn” that the police may “intrud[e] upon [an individual’s] private life” by phoning that indi‑ vidual when the only information the police have at the time they make the call is a name, a phone num‑ ber, and an allegation of drug dealing (at paras. 32 and 54), i see nothing in their approach prevents the police from doing precisely that. par l’art. 8 de la charte n’entre pas en jeu dans le contexte des enquêtes sur la vente de drogue sur appel. il ne s’agit ni de « surveillance par l’état d’es‑ paces virtuels » ni d’agents d’infiltration qui « en‑ quête[nt] sur des communications virtuelles » (motifs des juges karakatsanis, brown et martin, par. 37 et 40). elles ne font pas appel à la fouille ou à la saisie du téléphone de quelqu’un, ni aux renseignements qu’il contient. les enquêtes sur la vente de drogue sur appel ne font appel qu’à une conversation entre un agent d’infiltration et la personne à l’autre bout du fil. ainsi, je ne peux souscrire à la suggestion de mes collègues que le simple fait d’« appeler un numéro de téléphone [  ] est une activité intrinsèquement privée » (par 36). [181] le caractère insoutenable de la position adoptée par mes collègues sur les droits au respect du caractère privé des renseignements personnels en jeu dans une enquête typique sur la vente de drogue sur appel ressort clairement du résultat auquel ils arrivent dans la cause de m. ahmad et, plus géné‑ ralement, de leur position selon laquelle les poli‑ ciers peuvent faire un appel à froid à un numéro de téléphone sans soupçon raisonnable et tenter de développer de tels soupçons durant la conversation. en acceptant que des policiers puissent téléphoner à quelqu’un et avoir, avec cette personne, une conver‑ sation éventuellement prolongée sans avoir préala‑ blement de soupçons raisonnables — en fait, si je comprends bien, en l’absence de tout fondement objectif et vérifiable  — contredit leur prétention selon laquelle une enquête typique sur la vente de drogue sur appel met en jeu les droits au respect de la vie privée que protège l’art. 8 de la charte. bien que mes collègues suggèrent que « [l]’obser‑ vateur raisonnablement informé serait consterné d’apprendre » que la police peut « port[er] atteinte à la vie privée [d’un individu] » en lui téléphonant lorsque les seuls renseignements dont elle dispose au moment de l’appel sont un nom, un numéro de télé‑ phone et une allégation de trafic de drogue (par. 32 et 54), j’estime que rien dans leur approche n’empêche la police d’agir précisément de cette façon. [182] respectfully, my colleagues do not ex‑ plain why calling an individual and asking “are you working” does not engage the “considerable privacy [182] soit dit en tout respect, mes collègues n’ex‑ pliquent pas pourquoi le fait d’appeler quelqu’un et de lui demander « [t]ravailles‑tu? » ne met pas en jeu 672 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. interests” (at para. 40) they see as inherent in cell phones, while calling that same individual and stat‑ ing “i need 80” does engage those interests such that the police must first hold reasonable suspicion. in my view, this dissonance flows from a failure to account for the fundamentally different considerations at play in this court’s s 8 jurisprudence — consider‑ ations which simply do not come into play in a typ‑ ical dial‑a‑dope case. both of these interactions are equally intrusive from a privacy perspective, yet my colleagues suggest that the police need reasonable suspicion to initiate the latter interaction but not the former. in truth, however, a call to a potential di‑ al‑a‑dope line does not engage the informational pri‑ vacy interests protected by s 8 and accordingly does not demand the imposition of a standard as “robust” as the individualized reasonable suspicion standard developed in this court’s s 8 jurisprudence. as i have already indicated, the nature of the individual privacy interests at play in this context are limited to individuals’ interest in being left alone by the state. [183] finally, i find it difficult to imagine a less intrusive technique than those used in typical di‑ al‑a‑dope cases like these ones. the impacted indi‑ vidual can terminate the interaction at any time by hanging up the phone; the language used and the substance of the conversation are not threatening or offensive; and there is no face‑to‑face interaction. [184] in sum, the police conduct in these cases cannot be said to be conduct that society would find intolerable. neither of these cases are among the “clearest of cases” warranting a stay of proceedings. les « importants intérêts pour ce qui est du respect de leur vie privée » (par. 40) qu’ils jugent inhérents aux téléphones cellulaires, alors que le fait d’appeler cette même personne et d’affirmer que « [ç]a m’en prend pour 80 » met en jeu ces droits, de telle sorte que les policiers doivent d’abord avoir des soupçons raisonnables. à mon avis, cette dissonance découle du fait qu’ils négligent de tenir compte des consi‑ dérations fondamentalement différentes en jeu dans la jurisprudence de la cour relative à l’art. 8 — des considérations qui n’interviennent tout simplement pas dans une cause typique de vente de drogue sur appel. les deux interactions envisagées dont il est question ici sont tout aussi attentatoires l’une que l’autre du point de vue du respect de la vie privée. pourtant, mes collègues prétendent que les policiers doivent avoir des soupçons raisonnables pour entre‑ prendre la seconde, mais non la première. or, en réalité, un appel à une ligne téléphonique présumée de vente de drogue sur appel ne met pas en jeu le droit au respect du caractère privé des renseigne‑ ments personnels protégé par l’art. 8 et ne requiert donc pas le recours à une norme aussi « solide » que la norme des soupçons raisonnables précis élaborée par la jurisprudence de la cour relative à cette dis‑ position. comme je l’ai déjà précisé, les droits de l’individu au respect de la vie privée en jeu dans le contexte en cause ici se limitent à son droit de ne pas être importuné par l’état. [183] enfin, j’ai du mal à imaginer une technique d’enquête moins attentatoire que celles employées dans des affaires typiques de vente de drogue sur appel comme celles dont nous sommes saisis en l’espèce la personne touchée peut mettre fin à l’interaction à tout moment en raccrochant le télé‑ phone, les propos tenus et le contenu de la conver‑ sation ne sont ni menaçants ni offensants, et il n’y a aucune interaction face à face. [184] en somme, on ne saurait dire que la société jugerait intolérable la conduite des policiers dans ces affaires. ni l’une ni l’autre d’entre elles ne fait partie des « cas les plus manifestes » justifiant un arrêt des procédures. [2020] 1 rcs. r c ahmad le juge moldaver 673 vi conclusion vi conclusion [185] the state is limited in how it may deal with its citizens. the doctrine of entrapment restricts the police to investigating — rather than creating — crime, and ensures that the state is not permitted to randomly test the virtue of its citizens. at the same time, however, the doctrine of entrapment has always recognized that the police must be afforded substan‑ tial leeway to investigate and prevent crime. [186] the criminal landscape has evolved sig‑ nificantly in the decades since this court decided the seminal entrapment cases of mack and barnes. attempting to apply the doctrine of entrapment as it was formulated in those cases to modern day di‑ al‑a‑dope operations has revealed issues with the doctrine’s present articulation the revisions i would make to the bona fide inquiry prong of the first branch of entrapment are necessary to preserve the fundamental balance struck in mack and barnes between protecting individual liberties and fostering effective law enforcement while also bringing the doctrine in line with the realities of the digital age. [185] l’état est limité dans la façon dont il peut traiter ses citoyens. la doctrine de la provocation policière astreint les policiers à enquêter sur des crimes — plutôt qu’à les créer — et fait en sorte que l’état n’est pas autorisé à éprouver au hasard la vertu de ses citoyens. parallèlement, cette doctrine a toujours reconnu qu’il faut donner aux policiers une latitude considérable pour enquêter sur les crimes et les prévenir. [186] le paysage criminel a considérablement évo‑ lué au cours des décennies qui ont suivi les décisions de principe mack et barnes rendues par la cour en matière de provocation policière. la tentative d’appliquer la doctrine de la provocation policière telle qu’elle a été formulée dans ces affaires aux opérations modernes de vente de drogue sur appel a révélé des problèmes avec sa formulation actuelle. les modifications que j’apporterais au sous‑volet de la véritable enquête du premier volet de cette doctrine sont nécessaires pour préserver l’équilibre fondamental établi dans les arrêts mack et barnes entre la protection des libertés fondamentales et la promotion de l’application efficace de la loi, tout en la mettant en concordance avec les réalités de l’ère du numérique. [187] fundamentally, the approach i would adopt refocuses the entrapment doctrine on its principled abuse of process underpinnings, so as to ensure that stays of proceedings are only issued in the clearest of cases of intolerable state conduct. it avoids the minute parsing of conversations between the sus‑ pected drug dealer and the undercover officer, which results in dubious distinctions between cases where stays are granted and cases where the convictions are upheld. additionally, it remedies a doctrinal incon‑ sistency that has arisen from the manner in which the reasonable suspicion standard has developed in the canadian jurisprudence since the time when mack and barnes were decided. with respect to those who see the matter differently, the approach i would adopt is, in my view, the best way to remain faithful to the [187] fondamentalement, l’approche que j’adop‑ terais recentrerait la doctrine de la provocation poli‑ cière sur son fondement de principe, soit l’abus de procédure, de manière à garantir que les arrêts de procédures ne soient prononcés que dans les cas les plus manifestes de comportement intolérable de l’état. elle éviterait la dissection des conversations entre les trafiquants de drogue présumés et les agents d’infiltration, une démarche qui entraîne des distinc‑ tions douteuses entre les cas où les arrêts des pro‑ cédures sont accordés et ceux où les condamnations sont maintenues. en outre, elle remédierait à une in‑ cohérence doctrinale qui découle de la manière dont le critère des soupçons raisonnables s’est développé dans la jurisprudence canadienne depuis l’époque où les arrêts mack et barnes ont été rendus. en tout 674 r v ahmad moldaver j. [2020] 1 scr. holdings and underlying principles of this court’s entrapment jurisprudence. respect pour ceux qui voient les choses différem‑ ment, j’estime que l’approche que j’adopterais serait la meilleure façon de rester fidèles aux positions et aux principes sous‑jacents de la jurisprudence de la cour en matière de provocation policière. [188] for these reasons, i would dismiss the ap‑ peals. [188] pour ces motifs, je suis d’avis de rejeter les pourvois. appeal of javid ahmad dismissed. pourvoi de javid ahmad rejeté. appeal of landon williams allowed, wagner cj. and moldaver, côté and rowe jj. dissenting. pourvoi de landon williams accueilli, le juge en chef wagner et les juges moldaver, côté et rowe sont dissidents. procureurs de l’appelant javid ahmad : brauti thorning, toronto. thorning, toronto. solicitors for the appellant landon williams: procureurs de l’appelant landon williams  : goddard nasseri, toronto. goddard nasseri, toronto. procureur de l’intimée : service des poursuites service of canada, vancouver. pénales du canada, vancouver. civil liberties association:  ritchie sandford mcgowan, vancouver; michael sobkin, ottawa; kate oja, yellowknife. procureurs de l’intervenante british columbia civil liberties association  :  ritchie sandford mcgowan, vancouver; michael sobkin, ottawa; kate oja, yellowknife. association of ontario: grant & marshman, toronto; goldbloom law, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association of ontario  :  grant & marshman, toronto; goldbloom law, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the canadian association of chiefs of police: edmonton police service, edmonton; delta police service, delta, bc. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana‑ dienne des chefs de police : edmonton police service, edmonton; delta police service, delta (c‑b). solicitors for the intervener the independent criminal defence advocacy society: arvay finlay, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante independent criminal defence advocacy society : arvay finlay, vancouver.
[1] on may 24, 2009, officers of the ontario pro- vincial police (“opp”) arrested the appellant, ran- dolph (randy) fleming, in caledonia, ontario. he had committed no crime. he had broken no law. he was not about to commit any offence, harm anyone, or breach the peace. in essence, the opp officers claimed to have arrested mr. fleming for his own protection. the question before this court is whether mr. fleming’s arrest was lawful. [1] le 24 mai 2009, des agents de la police provin- ciale de l’ontario (« ppo ») ont arrêté l’appelant, randolph (randy) fleming, à caledonia, en ontario. il n’avait commis aucun crime ni enfreint aucune loi. il n’était pas sur le point de commettre une in- fraction, de blesser quiconque ou de violer la paix. essentiellement, les agents de la ppo ont affirmé avoir arrêté m. fleming pour sa propre sécurité. la question dont la cour est saisie est celle de savoir si cette arrestation était légale. [2] police officers are tasked with fulfilling many important duties in canadian society these in- clude preserving the peace, preventing crime, and [2] les policiers sont chargés de s’acquitter de nombreux devoirs importants dans la société cana- dienne. ils doivent, entre autres, maintenir la paix, 526 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. protecting life and property. the execution of these duties sometimes necessitates interference with the liberty of individuals. however, a free and demo- cratic society cannot tolerate interference with the rights of law- abiding people as a measure of first resort. there is a line that cannot be crossed. the rule of law draws that line. it demands that, when intruding on an individual’s freedom, the police can only act in accordance with the law. [3] in most cases, police powers are clearly out- lined in statutes enacted by legislatures. but statute law is not the only source of police powers. this court has long held that the common law may also serve this role in certain circumstances. [4] when our courts are asked to recognize new common law police powers, it is important to keep in mind the words of la forest j. in r v. wong, [1990] 3 scr 36, that “it does not sit well for the courts, as the protectors of our fundamental rights, to widen the possibility of encroachments on these personal liberties” (p 57). [5] the common law has long striven to defend individuals against abuses of state power. the courts of this country, as custodians of the common law, must act cautiously when asked to use it to authorize actions that interfere with individual liberty. this is never truer than in cases like the one at bar, in which the exercise of the police power in question would restrict lawful activities of individuals. in such cir- cumstances, the courts must apply the test for com- mon law police powers with particular stringency so as to ensure that any powers that might result in intrusions on liberty are in fact necessary. prévenir le crime et protéger la vie des personnes et les biens. l’exécution de ces devoirs requiert parfois de porter atteinte à la liberté de certains individus. une société libre et démocratique ne peut toutefois tolérer que l’on porte atteinte aux droits des indivi- dus qui respectent la loi comme mesure de premier recours. il y a une limite à ne pas franchir et cette limite est établie par la primauté du droit. celle-ci exige que les policiers qui portent atteinte à la liberté d’un individu agissent en conformité avec la loi. [3] dans la plupart des cas, les pouvoirs des poli- ciers sont clairement énoncés dans des lois adoptées par les assemblées législatives. la législation n’est cependant pas la seule source de ces pouvoirs. la cour reconnaît depuis longtemps que, dans certaines circonstances, ils peuvent également être conférés par la common law. [4] lorsqu’on demande aux tribunaux de recon- naître de nouveaux pouvoirs policiers en common law, il est important de garder à l’esprit ce que le juge la forest a déclaré dans l’arrêt r c. wong, [1990] 3 rcs 36 : «    il n’est pas du ressort des tribunaux, à titre de protecteurs de nos droits fonda- mentaux, d’élargir la possibilité de porter atteinte à ces libertés personnelles » (p 57). [5] depuis longtemps, la common law cherche à protéger les individus contre les abus du pouvoir étatique. les tribunaux du canada, en tant que gar- diens de la common law, doivent agir avec prudence lorsqu’on leur demande de se fonder sur elle pour au- toriser des actes qui ont pour effet de porter atteinte à la liberté individuelle. cela n’est jamais aussi vrai que dans les cas, comme celui qui nous occupe, où l’exercice du pouvoir policier en cause limiterait les activités licites d’un individu. dans de telles circons- tances, les tribunaux doivent appliquer de manière particulièrement rigoureuse le test pour juger de l’existence d’un pouvoir policier en common law afin de s’assurer que tout pouvoir susceptible de porter atteinte à la liberté est réellement nécessaire. [6] the respondents in this case, the province of ontario and seven named opp officers, do not rely on any statute to justify the lawfulness of their arrest of mr fleming. instead, they argue that their actions [6] les intimés en l’espèce, soit la province de l’ontario et sept agents désignés de la ppo, n’in- voquent aucune loi pour établir la légalité de l’ar- restation de m fleming. ils plaident plutôt que leur [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 527 were authorized at common law by application of the ancillary powers doctrine that was originally laid down by the united kingdom court of criminal appeal in r v. waterfield, [1963] 3 all er 659, at pp 660-62. they claim that, according to that doc- trine, there is a common law police power to arrest an individual in mr. fleming’s circumstances in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace. in essence, the respondents propose a common law power to arrest individuals who have not committed any offence, who are not about to commit any of- fence, who have not already breached the peace and who are not about to breach the peace themselves. for the purposes of these reasons and for the sake of simplicity, i will refer to this power as the power to “arrest someone who is acting lawfully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace”. [7] as i will explain, no such power exists at com- mon law. the ancillary powers doctrine does not give the police a power to arrest someone who is acting lawfully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace. a drastic power such as this that involves substantial interference with the liberty of law- abiding individuals would not be reasonably necessary for the fulfillment of the police duties of preserving the peace, preventing crime, and protect- ing life and property. this is particularly so given that less intrusive powers are already available to the po- lice to prevent breaches of the peace from occurring. [8] in this case, mr. fleming’s arrest was not au- thorized by law. the opp officers had no power of arrest in the circumstances on may 24, 2009. as a result, mr. fleming’s arrest was unlawful, and i would allow his appeal. conduite était autorisée en common law par appli- cation de la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires ini- tialement établie par la cour d’appel criminelle du royaume- uni dans l’arrêt r c. waterfield, [1963] 3 all er 659, p. 660- 662. selon eux, en vertu de cette doctrine, il existe un pouvoir policier en com- mon law d’arrêter un individu dans la situation de m. fleming pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix. essentiellement, les intimés proposent que la common law reconnaisse un pouvoir d’arrêter des individus qui n’ont commis aucune infraction, qui ne sont pas sur le point d’en commettre une, qui n’ont pas encore violé la paix, et qui ne sont pas eux- mêmes sur le point de la violer. pour les fins des présents motifs et par souci de simplicité, je vais faire référence à ce pouvoir comme au pouvoir « d’arrêter un individu qui agit en toute légalité pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix ». [7] comme je l’expliquerai, un tel pouvoir n’existe pas en common law. la doctrine des pouvoirs ac- cessoires ne confère pas aux policiers le pouvoir d’arrêter un individu qui agit en toute légalité pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix. un pouvoir aussi intrusif que celui proposé, qui donne lieu à une atteinte considérable à la liberté d’indivi- dus qui respectent la loi, n’est pas raisonnablement nécessaire pour que les policiers s’acquittent de leur devoir de maintenir la paix, de prévenir le crime et de protéger la vie des personnes et les biens. cela est particulièrement le cas, compte tenu de l’existence de pouvoirs moins intrusifs auxquels les policiers peuvent déjà recourir pour prévenir les violations de la paix. [8] en l’espèce, l’arrestation de m. fleming n’était pas autorisée par la loi. les agents de la ppo ne jouissaient pas d’un pouvoir d’arrestation dans les circonstances du 24 mai 2009. par conséquent, l’ar- restation en cause était illégale et j’accueillerais le pourvoi. ii facts ii faits [9] this case has its origins in a longstanding land dispute between the crown and the first nation of six nations of the grand river. that dispute resulted, in february 2006, in the occupation by six nations [9] la présente affaire découle d’un conflit foncier de longue date entre la couronne et la première nation six nations de la rivière grand. ce conflit a mené à l’occupation, en février 2006, par des manifestants 528 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. protestors of a piece of land in caledonia known as douglas creek estates (“dce”) (i will refer to this group of protesters as the “dce. protesters”). in the course of the protest, some dce. protesters also hung indigenous flags along argyle street, which runs in front of the property. in june of that year, the crown purchased dce and permitted the dce. protesters to continue to occupy the property. the early stages of the dispute were discussed in detail by the ontario court of appeal in henco industries ltd. v. haudenosaunee six nations confederacy council (2006), 82 or (3d) 721. [10] the occupation of dce sparked other groups in the community to organize counter- protests against the occupation and against the response of the ontario government and the opp. the contentious atmos- phere in the community culminated in violent clashes between the two sides. on numerous occasions, the opp, including many of the respondent officers, were called in to deal with the violence. police lines and buffer zones were occasionally used to allow the two groups to demonstrate peacefully near one another. the violence peaked in 2006, but declined steadily after that. [11] one counter- protest group decided to hold a “flag rally” on may 24, 2009 to protest the occupa- tion of dce, the flying of indigenous flags along argyle street and the opp’s actions. the plan for the rally was that participants would march south on argyle street and raise a canadian flag across the street from dce’s front entrance. des six nations, d’un lopin de terre à caledonia ap- pelé les domaines de douglas creek (« ddc ») (je désignerai ce groupe comme les « manifestants des ddc »). au cours de l’occupation, certains de ces manifestants ont aussi suspendu des drapeaux autochtones en bordure de la rue argyle, qui longe le devant des terres. en juin de cette année-là, la couronne a acheté les ddc et a autorisé les ma- nifestants à continuer d’occuper les terres. les pre- mières étapes du conflit ont aussi été traitées en détail par la cour d’appel de l’ontario dans la décision henco industries ltd. c. haudenosaunee six nations confederacy council (2006), 82 or (3d) 721. [10] l’occupation des ddc a incité d’autres groupes de la communauté à organiser des contre- manifestations pour s’opposer à l’occupation ainsi qu’à la réponse du gouvernement de l’ontario et de la ppo. l’ambiance conflictuelle qui régnait dans la communauté a donné lieu à des affrontements violents entre les deux camps. à de nombreuses reprises, la ppo — y compris plusieurs des agents intimés — a été appelée pour mettre fin à la violence. à l’occasion, la police a eu recours à des cordons policiers et des zones tampons pour permettre aux deux groupes de manifester de manière pacifique à proximité l’un de l’autre. la violence a atteint un sommet en 2006 et est en déclin depuis. [11] l’un des groupes de contre- manifestants a dé- cidé d’organiser un « rallye du drapeau » le 24 mai 2009 afin de manifester contre l’occupation des ddc, l’installation de drapeaux autochtones sur la rue argyle et les actes de la ppo. selon le plan pour ce rallye, les participants devaient descendre la rue argyle vers le sud et hisser un drapeau canadien en face de l’entrée des ddc. [12] the opp became aware of the flag rally in the months preceding it and developed an op- erational plan. the goal of the plan was to ensure public safety while allowing all groups to express themselves peacefully. the operational plan was developed in accordance with opp policies, in- cluding the framework for police preparedness for aboriginal critical incidents (“aboriginal critical incidents framework”). the aboriginal critical inci- dents framework is a policy document that provides [12] la ppo a eu connaissance que le rallye du drapeau s’organisait dans les mois qui l’ont précédé et a mis au point un plan opérationnel. celui-ci visait à assurer la sécurité publique tout en permettant à tous les groupes de s’exprimer pacifiquement. le plan opérationnel a été élaboré conformément aux politiques de la ppo, y compris le cadre de réfé- rence pour la préparation des services policiers en cas d’incident critique concernant les autochtones (« cadre en cas d’incident critique concernant les [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 529 guidance to the police for managing relationships with indigenous peoples. it applies “before, during and after any aboriginal related critical incident where the source of conflict may stem from asser- tions associated with aboriginal or treaty rights”, such as “a demonstration in support of a land claim” (ar, vol. v, at p 50). in addition, the officer in charge of developing the operational plan met with members of the local indigenous community, the city council, and the flag rally organizers. [13] ultimately, the opp determined that the flag rally participants and the dce. protesters should be kept apart and that no flag rally participants would be permitted to enter dce. the opp thus informed the organizers of the flag rally that they would not be allowed on dce land. however, no police line or buffer zone was put in place on the day of the rally. the operational plan included two public order units, each with about 30 officers, that were to be present in caledonia on may 24. autochtones »). il s’agit d’un document stratégique qui fournit aux policiers une orientation sur la façon de gérer les relations avec les peuples autochtones. il s’applique [traduction] « avant, pendant et après tout incident critique concernant les autochtones lorsque la source du conflit peut découler de reven- dications de droits ancestraux ou issus de traités », par exemple une « manifestation à l’appui d’une revendication territoriale » (da, vol. v, p 50). en outre, l’agent responsable de l’élaboration du plan opérationnel a consulté la collectivité autochtone locale, le conseil municipal et les organisateurs du rallye du drapeau. [13] en fin de compte, la ppo a jugé que les participants au rallye et les manifestants des ddc. ne devaient pas se mêler les uns aux autres et décidé qu’aucun des participants au rallye du drapeau ne serait autorisé à pénétrer sur les terres des ddc. la ppo a donc informé les organisateurs du rallye du drapeau de cette décision. cependant, aucun cordon policier n’a été installé et aucune zone tampon n’a été établie le jour du rallye. le plan opérationnel prévoyait notamment la présence, le 24 mai, de deux unités de maintien de l’ordre public à caledonia, chacune comptant une trentaine d’agents. [14] mr. fleming was a resident of caledonia who intended to participate in the flag rally in order to express his views about the contentious issues sur- rounding the dce occupation. on the day of the rally, mr. fleming began walking north along argyle street towards the place where it was to be held, where he planned to meet up with the rest of the participants, who were marching from the opposite direction. he was carrying a canadian flag on a 40- to 42- inch wooden pole. [14] monsieur fleming était un résident de caledo- nia qui entendait participer au rallye du drapeau afin d’exprimer son point de vue sur les questions litigieuses entourant l’occupation des ddc. le jour du rallye, il a commencé à marcher en direction nord sur la rue argyle, vers l’emplacement où devait se tenir le rallye et où il prévoyait rejoindre le reste des participants qui se déplaçaient dans la direction opposée. il transportait un drapeau canadien attaché à un mât en bois de 40 à 42 pouces. [15] as mr. fleming walked on the shoulder of argyle street, one of the opp squads — including the respondent officers — was driving north on the street in three vehicles: two minivans, one marked and one unmarked, and an offender transport unit van. the officers spotted mr. fleming as they drove past him, turned around and headed towards his loca- tion with the intention of placing themselves between him and the entrance to dce. [15] alors que m. fleming marchait sur l’acco- tement de la rue argyle, une des escouades de la ppo — dont faisaient partie les agents intimés — remontait la rue vers le nord dans trois véhicules : deux fourgonnettes, dont une banalisée, et un véhi- cule de transport de contrevenants. les agents ont remarqué m. fleming lorsqu’ils sont passés à côté de lui. ils ont rebroussé chemin et se sont dirigés vers lui dans l’intention de s’interposer entre lui et l’entrée des ddc. 530 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. [16] mr. fleming saw the vans as they moved to the shoulder of the road and continued to drive fast towards him. to avoid the approaching vehicles, he moved off the shoulder, walking down into a grassy ditch, up the opposite side and over a low fence onto dce property. he claimed to have crossed the fence in order to get to level ground. the officers exited their vehicles and began yelling various com- mands at mr. fleming, including “stop” and “return to the shoulder”. he did not realize that the officers were speaking to him, as he believed he was not doing anything wrong. [17] mr. fleming stepping onto dce property appeared to cause a reaction in a group of dce. protesters who were at the entrance of the prop- erty, approximately 100 metres away. eight to ten of them began moving towards his location, some walking and some jogging. none of the protesters were carrying weapons and none uttered any threats. mr. fleming did not say anything to them. with the protesters still ten to twenty feet away, officer miller approached mr. fleming and told him that he was under arrest. [18] officer miller took mr. fleming by the arm and led him back across the fence, off of dce. property. the officers then ordered mr. fleming to drop his flag. he refused. the officers then forced him to the ground, took his flag and handcuffed him. mr. fleming says that as he was being handcuffed, his left arm was yanked behind his back, causing him severe pain and a lasting injury. [19] the incidents surrounding mr. fleming’s ar- rest were captured on video, though some of them are obscured on the video by a bush. this video was entered as evidence at the trial. [16] monsieur fleming a vu les fourgonnettes se déplacer vers l’accotement et se diriger rapidement vers lui. afin d’éviter les véhicules qui s’appro- chaient, il a quitté l’accotement, franchi un fossé gazonné du côté opposé et enjambé une clôture basse pour mettre les pieds sur les terres des ddc. il a déclaré par la suite avoir franchi la clôture pour se trouver sur un terrain plat. les agents sont sortis de leurs véhicules et ont commencé à crier divers ordres à m.  fleming, lui demandant notamment [traduction] « [d’] arrête[r] » et « [de] retourne[r] sur l’accotement ». ce dernier n’a pas réalisé que les agents s’adressaient à lui, car il croyait ne rien faire de mal. [17] la présence de m.  fleming sur les terres des ddc semble avoir causé une réaction dans un groupe de manifestants des ddc qui se trou- vaient à l’entrée de la propriété, environ 100 mètres plus loin huit à dix d’entre eux ont commencé à se rapprocher, certains en marchant, d’autres en joggant. aucun des manifestants ne transpor- tait d’arme et aucun n’a proféré de menaces. de même, m. fleming ne leur a pas adressé la parole. alors que les manifestants étaient toujours à en- viron 10 à 20 pieds, l’agent miller s’est approché de m. fleming et lui a dit qu’il était en état d’ar- restation. [18] l’agent miller a pris m. fleming par le bras et l’a ramené de l’autre côté de la clôture, hors des terres des ddc. les agents ont ensuite ordonné à m. fleming de laisser tomber son drapeau, ce qu’il a refusé de faire. les agents l’ont forcé à s’allonger sur le sol, ont pris son drapeau et l’ont menotté. monsieur fleming soutient que lorsqu’on lui a passé les menottes, son bras gauche a été tiré vers l’arrière et que cela lui a causé une grande douleur et une blessure permanente. [19] les circonstances de l’arrestation de m. fleming ont été captées sur bande vidéo, bien que certaines parties des événements soient cachées par un buis- son. cet enregistrement a été déposé comme élément de preuve au procès. [20] after being arrested, mr. fleming was placed in an offender transport unit van and moved to a jail [20] après l’arrestation de m. fleming, les po- liciers l’ont fait monter à bord d’un véhicule de [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 531 cell at the local opp detachment. he was eventually released approximately two and a half hours after his arrest. [21] in relation to these events, mr. fleming was charged with obstructing a peace officer for resisting his arrest by officer miller. he appeared in court on 12 separate occasions to defend himself on this charge before it was eventually withdrawn by the crown almost 19 months after having been laid. in march 2011, mr. fleming filed a statement [22] of claim against the province of ontario and the seven opp officers who had been involved in his arrest. he claimed general damages for assault and battery, wrongful arrest, and false imprisonment, as well as aggravated or punitive damages and damages for violations of his rights under ss. 2(b), 7, 9 and 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. transport de contrevenants et amené dans une cellule du détachement local de la ppo. il a éventuellement été remis en liberté, approximativement deux heures et demie après son arrestation. [21] en lien avec cet incident, m. fleming a été accusé d’entrave au travail d’un agent de la paix pour avoir résisté à l’agent miller lors de son arrestation. il a comparu devant le tribunal à 12 reprises afin de se défendre contre cette accusation qui, en fin de compte, a été retirée par le ministère public presque 19 mois après son dépôt. [22] en mars 2011, m. fleming a intenté une pour- suite contre la province de l’ontario et les sept agents de la ppo qui ont participé à son arrestation. il a demandé des dommages- intérêts généraux pour voies de fait, arrestation illégale et séquestration ainsi que des dommages- intérêts majorés ou punitifs et des dommages- intérêts pour violation des droits qui lui sont garantis par l’al. 2b) et les art. 7, 9 et 15 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. iii procedural history iii historique des procédures a ontario superior court of justice (carpenter‑ gunn j.), 11‑ 26190, september 22, 2016 a cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario (la juge carpenter‑ gunn), 11‑ 26190, 22 septembre 2016 [23] at the conclusion of the trial, carpenter- gunn j. found in mr. fleming’s favour and ordered the respondents to pay a total of $139,711.90 in general damages, special damages, tort damages and charter damages. she also ordered the respondents to pay mr. fleming’s costs in an agreed- upon amount of $151,000. [23] au terme du procès, la juge carpenter- gunn a rendu un jugement en faveur de m. fleming et ordonné aux intimés de lui verser la somme totale de 139 711,90 $ en dommages- intérêts généraux, dommages- intérêts spéciaux, dommages- intérêts résultants d’un délit civil et dommages- intérêts en application de la charte. elle a également or- donné aux intimés de payer les dépens engagés par m. fleming dont le montant convenu s’élevait à 151 000 $. [24] the trial judge found as a fact that the opp. had intended “to prevent mr. fleming from walking up argyle street with a canadian flag, and that he was arrested for walking a few feet onto [dce. property] and standing there for a few seconds with a canadian flag” (ar, vol. i, at p 42). she noted that a crucial question in the case was whether the of- ficers had had legal authority to arrest mr fleming. she stressed that the respondents had adduced no [24] la juge du procès a tiré la conclusion de fait que la ppo a eu l’intention [traduction] « d’em- pêcher que m. fleming marche le long de la rue argyle avec un drapeau canadien, et qu’il a été mis en état d’arrestation pour avoir marché sur une dis- tance de quelques pieds sur [les terres des ddc] et pour y être resté debout durant quelques secondes en tenant un drapeau canadien » (da, vol. i, p 42). elle a noté qu’une des questions cruciales en l’espèce 532 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. evidence that he had broken any laws prior to his arrest. [25] the trial judge, relying on the ontario court of appeal’s decision in brown v. durham regional police force (1998), 43 or (3d) 223, accepted that the police have a common law power of arrest to pre- vent an apprehended breach of the peace, provided that the apprehended breach is imminent and the risk of it occurring is substantial. however, she concluded on the facts of the case at bar that the officers’ con- duct had not been authorized at common law. she found that by taking the actions they did, the officers had not been “preserving the peace”. she noted that a “breach of the peace” involves violence and harm to individuals and that, since neither had occurred in this case, there had been no actual breach of the peace. she also found that any apprehended breach of the peace by the approaching dce. protesters had not been imminent and that the risk of it occur- ring had not been substantial. she explained that the officers’ concern over mr. fleming’s safety had been based not on the actual events of the day, but rather on a generalized concern rooted in past violence. the trial judge stated that there were less invasive options that could have defused the situation, such as setting up a buffer zone between mr. fleming and the protesters. [26] the trial judge also criticized the opp’s use of the aboriginal critical incidents framework in developing its operational plan. in her view, the flag rally was not an “aboriginal critical incident”. était celle de savoir si les agents détenaient l’autorité légale d’arrêter m fleming. elle a insisté sur le fait que les intimés n’ont présenté aucune preuve démon- trant que m. fleming avait enfreint quelque loi que ce soit avant son arrestation. [25] se fondant sur la décision de la cour d’ap- pel de l’ontario dans brown c. durham regional police force (1998), 43 or (3d) 223, la juge du procès a accepté que la police dispose d’un pouvoir d’arrestation, reconnu en common law, pour préve- nir une violation appréhendée de la paix, à condi- tion que la violation en question soit imminente et que le risque qu’elle survienne soit important. cependant, compte tenu des faits de la cause, elle a conclu que la conduite des agents n’était pas au- torisée en common law. elle a jugé que, en posant les gestes qu’ils ont posés, les agents n’avaient pas [traduction] « préservé la paix ». à son avis, une « violation de la paix » suppose de la violence et un dommage à des individus. ainsi, pour elle, en l’absence de l’une et de l’autre dans la présente affaire, il n’y avait pas eu de véritable violation de la paix. elle a aussi conclu que toute violation appréhendée de la paix par les manifestants des ddc qui approchaient n’était pas imminente et qu’il n’y avait pas de risque important qu’elle se matérialise. elle a expliqué que la crainte des agents à l’égard de la sécurité de m. fleming n’était pas fondée sur les événements réels de la journée, mais plutôt sur une préoccupation générale découlant des affrontements violents passés. selon la juge du procès, il existait des options moins attentatoires qui auraient pu désamorcer la situation, comme celle d’établir une zone tampon entre m. fleming et les manifestants. [26] la juge du procès a également critiqué le recours au cadre en cas d’incident critique concer- nant les autochtones par la ppo dans l’élaboration de son plan opérationnel. à son avis, le rallye du drapeau ne constituait pas un «  incident critique concernant les autochtones ». [27] as a result of these findings, the trial judge concluded that mr. fleming’s claims for false arrest and unlawful imprisonment were made out she also determined that the respondents were liable for [27] par suite de ces constatations, la juge du pro- cès a conclu au bien- fondé des allégations d’arres- tation illégale et de séquestration de m fleming. elle a également déterminé que les intimés avaient [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 533 battery because the force they had used could not be justified. commis des voies de fait parce que la force qu’ils avaient utilisée ne pouvait être justifiée. in considering mr. fleming’s claims for char‑ [28] ter damages, the trial judge found that his rights under ss. 2(b), 7 and 9 had been violated when the police had unlawfully arrested him and prevented him from attending a political demonstration. she also held that no breach of s. 15 had been established on the facts of the case she ultimately awarded mr. fleming an additional $5,000 in charter dam- ages for the s. 2(b) breach. [28] en examinant les réclamations de m. fleming pour des dommages- intérêts en vertu de la charte, la juge du procès a conclu qu’il y avait eu violation de ses droits garantis par l’al. 2b) et par les art. 7 et 9 lorsque les policiers l’ont arrêté illégalement et l’ont empêché d’assister à une manifestation politique elle a également déclaré que, d’après les faits de l’espèce, aucun manquement à l’art. 15 n’avait été établi elle a ultimement accordé à m.  fleming des dommages- intérêts supplémen- taires de 5  000  $ en vertu de la charte pour le manquement à l’al 2b). b court of appeal for ontario (cronk, huscroft and nordheimer jja), 2018 onca 160 b cour d’appel de l’ontario (les juges cronk, huscroft et nordheimer), 2018 onca 160 [29] a majority of the court of appeal allowed the appeal, concluding that the opp officers had had the authority at common law to arrest mr. fleming for an anticipated breach of the peace. the majority set aside the trial judge’s award of damages and ordered a new trial solely on the issue of excessive force. [30] nordheimer  ja, writing for himself and cronk ja, identified a number of supposed errors in the trial judge’s analysis. in his view, the trial judge had been wrong to focus on the actions of the police as an isolated event rather than considering them in the context of ongoing disputes in caledonia. he was also of the opinion that the aboriginal critical incidents framework was clearly relevant to the flag rally; he found it hard to understand why the trial judge had criticized the opp for using it in developing the operational plan. nordheimer ja. further concluded that there was no evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that the officers had prevented mr. fleming from walking along argyle street with his flag, or that they had intended to do so. in particular, he explained that “[n]othing [had] occurred” until mr. fleming had entered dce, and that mr. fleming had willingly chosen to leave the shoulder of the street. as a result of these errors, nordheimer ja concluded that it was necessary [29] une majorité des juges de la cour d’appel a accueilli l’appel, concluant que les agents de la ppo étaient autorisés par la common law à arrêter m. fleming pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix. les juges majoritaires ont annulé l’octroi des dommages- intérêts adjugés par la juge du procès et ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès uniquement sur la question du recours à une force excessive. [30] le juge  nordheimer, s’exprimant en son nom et en celui de la juge cronk, a relevé un certain nombre de supposées erreurs dans l’analyse de la juge du procès. à son avis, cette dernière avait eu tort de mettre l’accent sur les gestes posés par les policiers en les considérant comme un événement isolé, plutôt que de les examiner dans le contexte des conflits perdurant à caledonia. il était également d’avis que le cadre en cas d’incident critique concer- nant les autochtones était clairement pertinent dans le contexte du rallye du drapeau; il avait du mal à comprendre pourquoi la juge du procès avait critiqué son utilisation par la ppo dans l’élaboration de son plan opérationnel. le juge nordheimer a également conclu qu’aucun élément de preuve n’appuyait la conclusion de la juge du procès selon laquelle les agents avaient empêché m. fleming de marcher le long de la rue argyle avec son drapeau ou qu’ils avaient eu l’intention de le faire. plus particulière- ment, il a expliqué qu’il [traduction] « ne [s’était] 534 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. to determine afresh whether the arrest had been lawful. [31] nordheimer ja determined that the officers had been acting in the execution of their duty to keep the peace and protect the public. on the issue of whether the interference with mr. fleming’s liberty was justifiable, he emphasized that the opp had been dealing with clashes related to the occupation of dce for years, and they knew that minor inci- dents could escalate quickly with little warning. in this context, mr. fleming’s actions amounted to an unexpected event that required the police to react. [32] further, nordheimer ja, relying on mr. flem- ing’s own testimony, explained that the dce. pro- testers rushing towards mr. fleming had posed a real risk to his safety and that the trial judge’s conclusion that there had been no threatened breach of the peace could not be reconciled with this evidence. the of- ficers had therefore been justified in taking action to prevent harm to mr. fleming and a likely breach of the peace. nordheimer ja noted that, while other options may have been available, there was no need to resort to them if the situation could be easily ad- dressed by removing mr. fleming from dce prop- erty, especially since alternative measures could have inflamed tensions. rien passé » jusqu’à ce que m. fleming pénètre sur les terres des ddc, et qu’il choisisse volontaire- ment de quitter l’accotement de la rue. étant donné ces erreurs, le juge nordheimer a conclu qu’il était nécessaire de tenir un nouveau procès pour détermi- ner si l’arrestation avait été légale. [31] le juge nordheimer a conclu que les agents avaient agi dans le cadre de leurs devoirs visant à préserver la paix et à protéger le public. quant à savoir s’il était justifié de porter atteinte à la liberté de m. fleming, il a souligné que les agents de la ppo étaient aux prises avec des affrontements liés à l’occupation des terres des ddc depuis des an- nées et qu’ils savaient que des incidents mineurs pouvaient dégénérer rapidement, sans préavis. dans ce contexte, les actes de m. fleming constituaient un événement imprévu à l’égard duquel les agents devaient réagir. [32] en outre, se fondant sur le témoignage de m. fleming, le juge nordheimer a expliqué que les manifestants des ddc qui se sont précipités vers m. fleming représentaient un risque réel pour sa sécurité et indiqué que la conclusion de la juge du procès selon laquelle il n’y avait eu aucune menace de violation de la paix n’était pas compatible avec cet élément de preuve. les policiers avaient donc eu rai- son de poser des gestes pour éviter que m. fleming ne soit blessé et prévenir une violation possible de la paix. selon le juge nordheimer, bien que les po- liciers aient pu disposer d’autres options, il n’était pas nécessaire qu’ils y recourent si l’expulsion de m. fleming des terres des ddc pouvait facilement régler la situation, surtout que d’autres mesures au- raient pu attiser les tensions. [33] however, nordheimer ja added that having lawful authority to effect an arrest does not give the police permission to use excessive force in doing so. the trial judge found that excessive force had been used, but nordheimer ja explained that this finding was tainted by her erroneous conclusion that the ar- rest had been unlawful. he noted that the record did not make it possible to determine which officer had yanked mr. fleming’s left arm back, how this had been done, or why. as a result, the court of appeal could not decide whether excessive force had been [33] cela dit, le juge nordheimer a ajouté que l’autorisation légale de procéder à une arrestation ne donne pas la permission aux agents d’utiliser une force excessive pour ce faire. la juge du procès a conclu qu’une telle force excessive avait été utilisée, mais, pour le juge nordheimer, cette conclusion était entachée par son autre conclusion erronée selon la- quelle l’arrestation avait été illégale. il a souligné que le dossier ne permettait pas de déterminer quel agent avait tiré le bras gauche de m. fleming vers l’arrière ni comment cela s’était produit ou pourquoi. par [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 535 used. nordheimer ja therefore ordered a new trial on this one issue. [34] huscroft ja dissented, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion that the of- ficers had not been justified in arresting mr fleming. he disagreed that any of the purported errors could in fact be characterized as palpable and overriding. [35] huscroft ja did not agree that the appel- late court was entitled to substitute its own factual findings in this case for those of the trial judge. in his view, mr. fleming’s arrest had not been a valid first resort, even in the face of potential illegal vio- lence, the risk of which was neither imminent nor substantial. he explained that the police power to arrest someone for an apprehended breach of the peace is exceptional, and that exercising it was not justified in this case. huscroft ja would therefore have dismissed the appeal. conséquent, la cour d’appel n’était pas en mesure de se prononcer sur l’utilisation ou non d’une force excessive. le juge nordheimer a donc ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès sur cette seule question. [34] selon le juge huscroft, dissident, rien ne justifiait de modifier la conclusion de la juge du procès selon laquelle les agents n’étaient pas en droit d’arrêter m fleming. il n’était pas d’accord pour dire que l’une quelconque des soi- disant er- reurs pouvait effectivement être qualifiée d’erreur manifeste et dominante. [35] toujours selon lui, la cour d’appel n’avait pas le droit de substituer ses propres conclusions de fait à celles de la juge de première instance. à son avis, l’arrestation de m. fleming n’avait pas été une mesure valide de premier recours, même en présence d’un risque que des actes illégaux violents soient commis, risque qui n’était ni imminent ni important. il a expliqué que le pouvoir policier d’arrêter un in- dividu pour une violation appréhendée de la paix est un pouvoir exceptionnel et qu’il n’était pas justifié de l’exercer en l’espèce. le juge huscroft aurait donc rejeté l’appel. iv issues iv questions en litige [36] the central issue in this case is whether the police acted lawfully in arresting mr. fleming on may 24, 2009. to answer this question, we must determine whether, and in what circumstances, the police have a common law power to arrest someone who is acting lawfully in order to prevent an appre- hended breach of the peace. does the common law permit police officers to arrest individuals who have not committed any offence, who are not about to commit any offence, who have not already breached the peace and who are not about to breach the peace themselves? [37] a secondary issue is whether the court of appeal erred in ordering a new trial on the issue of excessive force. [36] la question centrale en l’espèce est celle de savoir si les policiers ont agi légalement lorsqu’ils ont arrêté m. fleming le 24 mai 2009. pour répondre à cette question, nous devons déterminer si, et dans quelles circonstances, les forces policières ont en common law le pouvoir d’arrêter un individu qui agit en toute légalité pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix. la common law permet- elle aux policiers d’arrêter des individus qui n’ont commis aucune infraction, qui ne sont pas sur le point d’en commettre une, qui n’ont pas encore violé la paix, et qui ne sont pas eux- mêmes sur le point de le faire? [37] une question secondaire est celle de savoir si la cour d’appel a commis une erreur en ordonnant la tenue d’un nouveau procès sur la question du recours à une force excessive. 536 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. v analysis v analyse a the ancillary powers doctrine a la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires [38] the police, in fulfilling the important duties they are tasked with in a free and democratic society, are sometimes required to interfere with the liberty of individuals. this is a fact that legislatures and courts in common law jurisdictions have long recognized. however, the rule of law requires that strict limits be placed on police powers in this regard in order to safeguard individual liberties. in dedman v. the queen, [1985] 2 scr 2,. dickson cj, dissenting but not on this point, set out the foundation for the analysis on this subject: it has always been a fundamental tenet of the rule of law in this country that the police, in carrying out their general duties as law enforcement officers of the state, have limited powers and are only entitled to interfere with the liberty or property of the citizen to the extent author- ized by law. laskin cj dissenting, in r v. biron, [1976] 2 scr 56, made the point at pp. 64-65: far more important, however, is the social and legal, and indeed, political, principle upon which our criminal law is based, namely, the right of an individual to be left alone, to be free of private or public restraint, save as the law provides otherwise. only to the extent to which it so provides can a person be detained or his freedom of movement arrested. [38] lorsqu’ils exercent les devoirs importants qui leur incombent dans une société libre et démocra- tique, les policiers sont parfois tenus de restreindre la liberté de certains individus. il s’agit d’un fait que les assemblées législatives et les tribunaux des ressorts de common law reconnaissent depuis long- temps. cependant, la primauté du droit exige que ces pouvoirs policiers soient strictement limités afin de protéger les libertés individuelles. dans l’arrêt dedman c. la reine, [1985] 2 rcs 2, le juge en chef dickson, dissident, mais non sur ce point, a énoncé ainsi le fondement de l’analyse sur ce sujet : on a toujours considéré, comme principe fondamental de la primauté du droit dans ce pays, que dans l’accom- plissement de leurs devoirs généraux à titre d’agents de l’état chargés de l’application de la loi, les policiers ont des pouvoirs limités et n’ont le droit de porter atteinte à la liberté personnelle ou à la propriété que dans la mesure autorisée par la loi. le juge en chef laskin, dissident, dans l’arrêt r c. biron, [1976] 2 rcs 56, a exprimé cette opinion aux pp. 64 et 65 : toutefois, beaucoup plus important est le principe so- cial, juridique et même politique sur lequel notre droit criminel est fondé, c’est-à-dire, le droit d’un individu à vivre en paix, à être libre de contrainte de nature privée ou publique, sauf dispositions contraires de la loi. et c’est seulement dans la mesure où de pareilles dispositions de la loi existent qu’une personne peut être détenue ou qu’on peut supprimer sa liberté de mouvement. absent explicit or implied statutory authority, the police must be able to find authority for their actions at common law. otherwise they act unlawfully. [pp. 10-11] en l’absence de pouvoir explicite ou implicite fondé sur la loi, la police doit être en mesure de trouver le pouvoir de poser ses actes dans la common law. autrement, elle agit illégalement. [p. 10-11] [39] when interfering with the freedom of indi- viduals, the police must act in accordance with the law. in many cases, their powers are clearly outlined in statutes, such as the criminal code, rsc 1985, c c-46. but, as this court recognized in dedman, statute law is not the only source of legal authority for police powers. in particular circumstances, the [39] lorsqu’ils portent atteinte à la liberté d’in- dividus, les policiers doivent agir conformément à la loi. dans de nombreux cas, leurs pouvoirs sont clairement énoncés dans des textes de loi, comme le code criminel, lrc 1985, c c-46. or, comme la cour l’a reconnu dans l’arrêt dedman, les lois ne sont pas la seule source légale des pouvoirs policiers. [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 537 common law may also provide a legal basis for care- fully defined powers. in this court, the respondents do not cite or [40] seek to rely on any statute to authorize their arrest of mr. fleming while he was standing on dce. rather, they rely entirely on a common law power of arrest the exercise of which, they submit, was justified in the circumstances of this case. this appeal therefore requires the court to determine whether the common law power in question exists. [41] before embarking on an analysis of common law police powers, it is important to consider the appropriate role of the courts in such an exercise. establishing and restricting police powers is some- thing that is well within the authority of legislatures. accordingly, the courts should tread lightly when considering proposed common law police powers. [42] that being said, the courts cannot abdicate their role of incrementally adapting common law rules where legislative gaps exist (see r v. mann, 2004 scc 52, [2004] 3 scr 59, at para. 17; r v. kang‑ brown, 2008 scc 18, [2008] 1 scr 456, at paras. 6, 10, 50-51, and 61). this court has in fact relied on the ancillary powers doctrine to recognize the existence of common law powers in many cir- cumstances in the past. as moldaver j. explained in concurring reasons in r v. reeves, 2018 scc 56, [2018] 3 scr 531, the ancillary powers doctrine has been used dans des circonstances particulières, la common law peut aussi constituer un fondement juridique à des pouvoirs soigneusement définis. [40] devant la cour, les intimés n’invoquent pas une loi en particulier ni ne citent ou ne tentent de se fonder sur une loi pour justifier l’arrestation de m. fleming alors qu’il se trouvait sur les terres des ddc. ils se fondent plutôt entièrement sur un pou- voir d’arrestation en common law dont l’exercice, selon eux, était justifié dans les circonstances de la présente affaire. en l’espèce, la cour est donc appe- lée à déterminer si le pouvoir en question existe en common law. [41] avant de procéder à une analyse des pou- voirs policiers reconnus en common law, il importe d’examiner le rôle qui revient aux tribunaux dans le contexte d’un tel exercice. établir et restreindre les pouvoirs policiers relève du pouvoir des législateurs. en conséquence, les tribunaux doivent agir avec prudence lorsqu’ils sont appelés à se prononcer sur l’existence en common law de pouvoirs policiers proposés. [42] cela étant dit, les tribunaux ne peuvent abdi- quer le rôle qui leur incombe d’adapter progressi- vement des règles de common law lorsqu’il existe des lacunes législatives (voir r c. mann, 2004 csc 52, [2004] 3 rcs 59, par. 17; r c. kang‑ brown, 2008 csc 18, [2008] 1 rcs 456, par. 6, 10, 50-51 et 61). la cour s’est d’ailleurs déjà fondée, dans de nombreuses circonstances, sur la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires pour reconnaître l’existence de pouvoirs en common law. comme le juge moldaver l’a expliqué dans des motifs concordants dans l’arrêt r c reeves, 2018 csc 56, [2018] 3 rcs 531, la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires a été utilisée to affirm many common law police powers now consid- ered fundamental. for example, the ride program stops (dedman v. the queen, [1985] 2 scr 2), inves- tigative detentions (r v. mann, 2004 scc 52, [2004] 3 scr 59), searches incident to arrest (cloutier v. langlois, [1990] 1 scr 158), 911 home entries (r v. godoy, [1999] 1 scr 311), sniffer dog searches (r v. kang‑ brown, 2008 scc 18, [2008] 1 scr 456), and safety searches (r v. macdonald, 2014 scc 3, [2014] pour affirmer plusieurs pouvoirs policiers reconnus en common law qui sont maintenant considérés comme fon- damentaux. par exemple, les contrôles routiers dans le cadre d’un programme ride (dedman c. la reine, [1985] 2 rcs 2), les détentions aux fins d’enquête (r. c. mann, 2004 csc 52, [2004] 3 rcs 59), les fouilles accessoires à une arrestation (cloutier c. langlois, [1990] 1 rcs 158), les entrées dans une maison d’habitation pour répondre à un appel au 911 (r c. godoy, [1999] 538 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. 1 scr 37) were all affirmed through the waterfield framework. [para. 77] referring to whether this court should exercise its authority to recognize ancillary police powers, binnie j. stated: “we have crossed the rubicon” (kang‑ brown, at para 22). of course, the legislature always retains the power to expand, modify, restrict or abolish such common law powers, subject to constitutional limits. [43] to determine whether a particular police action that interferes with individual liberty is au- thorized at common law, this court applies the framework that was originally set out in waterfield. this approach has often been referred to as the “waterfield test”. i prefer to use the terminology of the “ancillary powers doctrine”. this is because, as binnie j. observed in r v. clayton, 2007 scc 32, [2007] 2 scr 725, “waterfield is an odd godfa- ther for common law police powers” (para 75). at issue in waterfield was whether a certain constable had been acting in the execution of his duties when he was assaulted; the case did not actually concern the recognition of a purported new common law police power. however, regardless of the doctrine’s origins, this court has consistently applied the test set out by the majority in dedman. [44] furthermore, the english court in waterfield was concerned with actions related to investigat- ing crime. but the ancillary powers doctrine has a broader reach than that: it can be applied to purported police powers — with appropriate clarifications that i will discuss below — even where no crime is alleged. 1 rcs 311), les fouilles par chiens renifleurs (r c. kang‑ brown, 2008 csc 18, [2008] 1 rcs 456), et les fouilles de sécurité (r c. macdonald, 2014 csc 3, [2014] 1 rcs 37) ont tous été affirmés par l’application du cadre de l’arrêt waterfield. [par. 77] en se demandant si la cour devrait exercer son pou- voir de reconnaître des pouvoirs policiers acces- soires, le juge binnie a indiqué que : « nous avons franchi le rubicon » (kang‑ brown, par 22). bien entendu, le législateur conserve toujours le pouvoir d’élargir, de modifier, de restreindre ou d’abolir de tels pouvoirs reconnus en common law, sous réserve de certaines limites constitutionnelles. [43] pour déterminer si une action policière par- ticulière qui a pour effet de restreindre la liberté d’un individu est autorisée en common law, la cour applique le cadre établi initialement dans l’arrêt waterfield. cette approche est souvent appelée le test de l’arrêt waterfield. je préfère parler de la « doc- trine des pouvoirs accessoires », car, comme le juge binnie l’a noté dans l’arrêt r c clayton, 2007 csc 32, [2007] 2 rcs 725, « il est étrange d’invoquer l’arrêt waterfield à l’appui des pouvoirs policiers en common law » (par 75). l’arrêt waterfield portait sur la question de savoir si un agent agissait dans le cadre de l’exécution de ses fonctions lorsqu’il a été agressé; ainsi, la cause ne portait pas sur la recon- naissance d’un nouveau pouvoir policier en common law. cela dit, peu importe les origines de la doctrine, la cour a toujours appliqué le test établi par les juges majoritaires dans l’arrêt dedman. [44] par ailleurs, dans l’arrêt waterfield, la cour d’appel anglaise devait examiner des actes liés à une enquête concernant un crime. or, la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires a une portée plus large que cela : elle peut être appliquée à de soi- disant pouvoirs policiers — en tenant compte des éclaircissements appropriés dont je discuterai ci- après —, même lors- qu’aucun crime n’est allégué. [45] the basis of the doctrine is that police actions that interfere with individual liberty are permitted at common law if they are ancillary to the fulfillment of recognized police duties. intrusions on liberty are accepted if they are reasonably necessary — in [45] le fondement de la doctrine est que les actes policiers qui portent atteinte à la liberté individuelle sont autorisés en common law s’ils sont accessoires à l’accomplissement des devoirs reconnus des poli- ciers. les atteintes à la liberté sont acceptées si elles [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 539 accordance with the test set out below — in order for the police to fulfill their duties. sont raisonnablement nécessaires — suivant le test énoncé ci- après — pour que les policiers puissent s’acquitter de leurs devoirs. [46] at the preliminary step of the analysis, the court must clearly define the police power that is be- ing asserted and the liberty interests that are at stake (figueiras v. toronto police services board, 2015 onca 208, 124 or (3d) 641, at paras 55-66). the ancillary powers doctrine comes into play where the power in issue involves prima facie interference with liberty. the term “liberty” here encompasses both constitutional rights and freedoms and traditional common law civil liberties (see clayton, at para. 59; figueiras, at para 49). once the police power and the liberty interests have been defined, the analysis proceeds in two stages: [46] à l’étape préliminaire de l’analyse, le tribunal doit clairement définir le pouvoir policier invoqué, ainsi que le droit à la liberté en cause (figueiras c. toronto police services board, 2015 onca 208, 124 or (3d) 641, par 55-66). la doctrine des pou- voirs accessoires entre en jeu lorsque le pouvoir en question porte atteinte à première vue à la liberté individuelle. ici, le terme « liberté » englobe tant les droits et libertés constitutionnels que les libertés civiles traditionnelles reconnues par la common law (voir clayton, par. 59; figueiras, par 49). une fois le pouvoir policier et le droit à la liberté définis, l’analyse se fait en deux étapes : (1) does the police action at issue fall within the general scope of a statutory or common law police duty? (1) la conduite policière en cause s’inscrit- elle dans le cadre général d’un devoir policier statutaire ou en common law? (2) does the action involve a justifiable exercise of police powers associated with that duty? (2) la conduite constitue-t-elle un exercice justifiable des pouvoirs policiers afférents à ce devoir? (r v. macdonald, 2014 scc 3, [2014] 1 scr 37, at paras. 35-36; reeves, at para. 78) (r c. macdonald, 2014 csc 3, [2014] 1 rcs 37, par. 35-36; reeves, par. 78) [47] at the second stage of the analysis, the court must ask whether the police action is reasonably nec- essary for the fulfillment of the duty (macdonald, at para 36). as this court stated in dedman: [47] à la deuxième étape de l’analyse, le tribunal doit se demander si la conduite des policiers est rai- sonnablement nécessaire pour accomplir le devoir (macdonald, par 36). comme la cour l’a affirmé dans l’arrêt dedman : the interference with liberty must be necessary for the carrying out of the particular police duty and it must be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the liberty inter- fered with and the importance of the public purpose served by the interference. [p. 35] l’atteinte à la liberté doit être nécessaire à l’accomplis- sement du devoir particulier de la police et elle doit être raisonnable, compte tenu de la nature de la liberté entravée et de l’importance de l’objet public poursuivi par cette atteinte. [p. 35] in macdonald, the majority of the court set out three factors to be weighed in answering this question: dans l’arrêt macdonald, les juges majoritaires de la cour ont énoncé trois facteurs à soupeser pour répondre à cette question : 1 the importance of the performance of the duty to the 1 l’importance que présente l’accomplissement de ce public good; devoir pour l’intérêt public; 2 the necessity of the interference with individual liberty 2 la nécessité de l’atteinte à la liberté individuelle pour for the performance of the duty; and l’accomplissement de ce devoir; 540 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. 3 the extent of the interference with individual liberty. 3 l’ampleur de l’atteinte à la liberté individuelle. [par. 37; [para. 37; citations omitted.] renvois omis.] [48] throughout the analysis, the onus is always on the state to justify the existence of common law police powers that involve interference with liberty. [48] tout au long de l’analyse, il incombe à l’état de justifier l’existence en common law des pouvoirs policiers qui entraînent une atteinte à la liberté. [49] the ancillary powers doctrine has repeatedly been applied by this court to determine whether — and in what circumstances — a particular power exists at common law. in each case, the court has endeavoured to define the power at issue and to clearly specify the particular conditions for its use (see macdonald, at paras. 39-40; mann, at paras. 34 and 40; reeves, at para. 95 (per moldaver j.); r. v. godoy, [1999] 1 scr 311, at para. 22; kang‑ brown, at paras. 58-60 (per binnie j.) and 169 (per deschamps j.); cloutier v. langlois, [1990] 1 scr. 158, at pp.  185-86) once the court has defined the parameters of the power, it has then considered whether the police action in question fit within those parameters (ie did the police act in accordance with their common law power). [50] for example, this court held in mann that a power of investigative detention exists at common law where (a) the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that there is a clear nexus between an individual and a recent or ongoing criminal offence, and (b) the decision to detain is reasonable, based on an overall assessment of all the circumstances (see para 34). [51] similarly, in macdonald, a majority of this court held that police officers have a common law power to conduct a “safety search” in a private home if the officer “believes on reasonable grounds that his or her safety is at stake and that, as a result, it is nec- essary to conduct a search” (para 41). the majority then went on to consider whether the officer in that case had had the requisite reasonable grounds for his belief (see para 44). [49] la cour a appliqué la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires à maintes reprises afin de déterminer si — et dans quelles circonstances — un pouvoir particulier existe en common law. dans chaque cas, elle a cherché à définir le pouvoir en cause et à énon- cer clairement les conditions dans lesquelles il peut être exercé (voir macdonald, par.  39-40; mann, par. 34 et 40; reeves, par. 95 (le juge moldaver); r c. godoy, [1999] 1 rcs 311, par. 22; kang‑ brown, par. 58-60 (le juge binnie) et 169 (la juge deschamps); cloutier c. langlois, [1990] 1 rcs. 158, p. 185- 186). une fois que la cour eût défini les paramètres du pouvoir, elle s’est demandé si les actes policiers en cause s’inscrivaient à l’intérieur de ces paramètres (c-à-d si les policiers avaient agi conformément aux pouvoirs que leur reconnaît la common law). [50] par exemple, la cour a jugé dans l’arrêt mann qu’il existe un pouvoir de détention aux fins d’en- quête en common law lorsque : a) le policier a des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner qu’il existe un lien clair entre l’individu et une infraction criminelle commise récemment ou en cours; et b) la décision de détenir une personne est raisonnable, suivant une considération objective de l’ensemble des circons- tances (voir par 34). [51] de même, dans l’arrêt macdonald, les juges majoritaires de la cour ont conclu que les policiers détiennent un pouvoir en common law d’effectuer une « fouille de sécurité » dans une résidence privée si le policier « croi[t] pour des motifs raisonnables que [sa] sécurité est menacée et qu’il est donc né- cessaire de procéder à une fouille » (par 41). ils ont ensuite examiné la question de savoir si le policier, dans cette affaire, avait les motifs raisonnables requis (voir par 44). [52] this approach sets clear guidelines for the police, who are expected to react quickly and flexibly [52] cette approche établit des lignes directrices claires pour les policiers, qui doivent agir avec [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 541 to real- life situations that can evolve rapidly. it is important for the courts to give officers the clearest possible guidance as to what common law powers are available to them within the general scope of their duties. the police will then be able to apply these guidelines to their day-to- day operations. [53] while the ancillary powers doctrine concerns police action that interferes with liberty — a term that, as noted above, encompasses many constitu- tional rights — determining whether a common law power exists does not itself require the court to ap- ply s. 1 of the charter (clayton, at para 21). that being said, the two frameworks are not completely unrelated. [54] certain concepts which play a significant role in the charter justification context — such as min- imal impairment and proportionality — have clear parallels in the ancillary powers doctrine analysis (see r. jochelson, “ancillary issues with oakes: the development of the waterfield test and the problem of fundamental constitutional theory” (2012), 43 ottawa l. rev. 355; j. burchill, “a horse gallops down a street   . policing and the resilience of the common law” (2018), 41 man. lj 161, at p 175). for example, the three factors from macdonald re- quire a proportionality assessment. moreover, the concept of reasonable necessity requires that other, less intrusive measures not be valid options in the circumstances. if the police can fulfill their duty by an action that interferes less with liberty, the pur- ported power is clearly not reasonably necessary (see clayton, at para 21). [55] ultimately, the ancillary powers doctrine is designed to balance intrusions on an individual’s liberty with the ability of the police to do what is reasonably necessary in order to perform their duties (see clayton, at para 26). célérité et faire preuve de souplesse dans des situa- tions réelles susceptibles d’évoluer rapidement. il importe que les tribunaux donnent aux policiers des directives les plus claires possibles sur les pouvoirs dont ils disposent en common law dans la portée générale de leurs devoirs. cela permet ensuite aux policiers d’appliquer ces lignes directrices dans leurs activités quotidiennes. [53] bien que la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires concerne les interventions policières qui portent at- teinte à la liberté — un terme qui, je le répète, en- globe de nombreux droits constitutionnels —, un tribunal n’a pas à appliquer l’article premier de la charte lorsqu’elle se prononce sur l’existence de pouvoirs policiers en common law (clayton, par 21). cela dit, les deux cadres d’analyse ne sont pas tota- lement sans lien. [54] il est possible de dresser des parallèles évi- dents entre certains concepts qui jouent un rôle important dans le contexte de la justification au regard de la charte — comme ceux de l’atteinte minimale et de la proportionnalité  — et la doc- trine des pouvoirs accessoires (voir r. jochelson, « ancillary issues with oakes : the development of the waterfield test and the problem of funda- mental constitutional theory  » (2013), 43 rd. ottawa 355; j. burchill, « a horse gallops down a street  .  .  policing and the resilience of the common law » (2018), 41 man. lj 161, p 175). par exemple, les trois facteurs énoncés dans l’arrêt macdonald exigent une évaluation de la propor- tionnalité. en outre, selon le concept de la nécessité raisonnable, il ne doit pas être possible dans les circonstances de recourir à d’autres mesures moins intrusives. si les policiers peuvent accomplir leur devoir d’une manière qui porte moins atteinte à la liberté, le pouvoir invoqué n’est clairement pas raisonnablement nécessaire (voir clayton, par 21). [55] ultimement, la doctrine des pouvoirs acces- soires est conçue pour établir un juste équilibre entre les atteintes à la liberté individuelle et la possibilité pour les policiers de faire ce qui est raisonnable et nécessaire pour s’acquitter de leurs fonctions (voir clayton, par 26). 542 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. [56] with this general context in mind, i will now move on to consider the particular police power that the respondents are asserting in this case. [56] en gardant ce contexte général en tête, je me pencherai maintenant sur le pouvoir policier particu- lier qu’invoquent les policiers en l’espèce. b the preliminary step: defining the power and b l’étape préliminaire : définir le pouvoir et le the liberty interests at issue droit à la liberté en cause [57] at the outset, it is important to clearly define the power at issue and the liberty interests with which it prima facie interferes. the purported power in this case is a power to arrest someone who is acting law- fully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace. in targeting someone who is acting lawfully, this proposed power is aimed at individuals who have not committed, and are not about to commit, either an indictable offence or a breach of the peace. [57] d’emblée, il importe de définir clairement le pouvoir en cause et le droit à la liberté qu’il restreint à première vue. le pouvoir invoqué en l’espèce est celui d’arrêter un individu qui agit en toute légalité pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix. en ciblant un tel individu, ce pouvoir qu’on propose de reconnaître vise des personnes qui n’ont commis ni infraction ni violation de la paix et qui ne sont pas sur le point d’en commettre. [58] the term “breach of the peace” requires elab- oration. violence lies at the core of this concept. at common law, a breach of the peace has always involved “danger to the person” (g. l. williams, “ar- rest for breach of the peace”, [1954] crim. lr 578, at p.  579). the united kingdom supreme court recently stated in r (on the application of hicks) v. metropolitan police comr, [2017] uksc 9, [2018] 1 all er 374, that “[t]he essence of a breach of the peace is violence” (para. 4) (see also r (on the ap‑ plication of laporte) v. chief constable of glouces‑ tershire constabulary, [2006] ukhl 55, [2007] 2 all er 529, at para 27). in brown, doherty ja, writing for the ontario court of appeal, defined the concept as follows: “a breach of the peace con- templates an act or actions which result in actual or threatened harm to someone” (p. 248 (footnote omitted)). in frey v. fedoruk, [1950] scr 517, kerwin j. (as he then was), in concurring reasons, proposed the following definition of a breach of the peace: it may be difficult to define exhaustively what is a breach of the peace but, for present purposes, the statement in clerk and lindsell on torts, (10th edition), page 298, may be accepted: — [58] l’expression « violation de la paix » exige des précisions. la violence est au cœur de ce concept. en common law, une violation de la paix a toujours im- pliqué un [traduction] « danger pour l’individu » (g. l. williams, « arrest for breach of the peace », [1954] crim. lr 578, p 579). la cour suprême du royaume- uni a récemment déclaré, dans l’ar- rêt r (on the application of hicks) c. metropolitan police comr, [2017] uksc 9, [2018] 1 all er. 374, que [traduction] « l’essence d’une violation de la paix est la violence » (par. 4) (voir aussi r (on the application of laporte) c. chief constable of gloucestershire constabulary, [2006] ukhl 55, [2007] 2 all er 529, par 27). dans l’arrêt brown, le juge doherty, s’exprimant pour la cour d’appel de l’ontario, a ainsi défini le concept : [traduction] « une violation de la paix envisage un acte ou des actions qui entraînent une menace de préjudice ou un préjudice réel pour quelqu’un » (p. 248 (note de bas de page omise)). dans l’arrêt frey c. fedoruk, [1950] rcs 517, le juge kerwin (plus tard juge en chef), dans des motifs concordants, a proposé la définition suivante d’une violation de la paix : [traduction] il peut être difficile de définir de manière exhaustive ce qui constitue une violation de la paix, mais pour les besoins de la présente affaire, la définition donnée dans clerk and lindsell on torts (10e édition), page 298, peut être acceptée : — a breach of the peace takes place when either an actual assault is committed on an individual or public il y a violation de la paix lorsqu’une agression réelle est commise sur un individu ou qu’il en résulte de [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 543 alarm and excitement is caused. mere annoyance or insult to an individual stopping short of actual per- sonal violence is not a breach of the peace. thus a householder — apart from special police legislation — cannot give a man into custody for violently and persis- tently ringing his door- bell. [emphasis added; p 519] [59] as these authorities make clear, an act can be considered a breach of the peace only if it involves some level of violence and a risk of harm. it is only in the face of such a serious danger that the state’s ability to lawfully interfere with individual liberty comes into play. behaviour that is merely disruptive, annoying or unruly is not a breach of the peace. [60] it is also essential at this point to be clear about what police powers are not at issue. specifically, as i indicated above, the case at bar does not concern a power to arrest a person for the purpose of preventing that person from breaching the peace. it appears that such a power may have existed historically at com- mon law (see hicks, at para 4). indeed, the ontario court of appeal considered this very power in obiter in brown and suggested that it does exist, stating that “a police officer may also arrest or detain a per- son who is about to commit a breach of the peace” (p. 248 (emphasis added)). while it is not necessary to decide this in the instant case, i seriously question whether a common law power of this nature would still be necessary in canada today. l’inquiétude et de l’excitation au sein de la population. le simple fait de déranger ou d’insulter quelqu’un sans recourir réellement à la violence ne constitue pas une vio- lation de la paix. par conséquent, un propriétaire ne peut pas faire incarcérer un homme qui sonne violemment et continuellement à sa porte — sauf en vertu d’une loi spéciale sur les pouvoirs policiers. [je souligne; p 519] [59] comme ces arrêts l’indiquent clairement, un acte ne peut être considéré comme une violation de la paix que s’il comporte un certain degré de violence et un risque de préjudice. ce n’est qu’en présence d’un danger de cette gravité que le pouvoir de l’état de porter légalement atteinte à la liberté d’un individu entre en jeu. un comportement qui est simplement perturbateur, embêtant ou indiscipliné n’est pas une violation de la paix. [60] à cette étape, il est également essentiel de pré- ciser quels pouvoirs policiers ne sont pas en cause. plus particulièrement, comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, il n’est pas question en l’espèce du pouvoir d’ar- rêter une personne afin d’empêcher cette personne de commettre une violation de la paix. il semble qu’un tel pouvoir ait déjà existé en common law (voir hicks, par 4). en effet, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a examiné précisément ce pouvoir en obiter dans l’arrêt brown, et suggéré qu’il existait, en affirmant qu’un [traduction] « policier peut aussi arrêter un individu qui est sur le point de violer la paix ou le détenir » (p. 248 (je souligne)). bien qu’il ne soit pas nécessaire de trancher la question en l’espèce, je me demande sérieusement s’il est encore nécessaire au canada de nos jours que la common law reconnaisse un pouvoir de cette nature aux policiers. [61] the criminal code provides explicitly for a number of warrantless arrest powers that obviate the need for such a common law power. in particular, under s. 31(1), a police officer can arrest anyone found committing a breach of the peace or who the officer believes is “about to join in or renew the breach of the peace”. in addition, s. 495(1)(a) pro- vides that an officer can arrest any person “who, on reasonable grounds, he believes has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence”. this applies to all offences that may be prosecuted by indictment (interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-21, s. 34(1)(a); [61] le code criminel prévoit explicitement un certain nombre de pouvoirs d’arrestation sans mandat qui écartent la nécessité d’un tel pouvoir en common law. en particulier, le par. 31(1) prévoit qu’un poli- cier peut arrêter tout individu qu’il trouve en train de commettre une violation de la paix ou qu’il croit « être sur le point d’y prendre part ou de la renou- veler ». en outre, aux termes de l’al. 495(1)a), un agent peut arrêter tout individu « qui, d’après ce qu’il croit pour des motifs raisonnables, a commis ou est sur le point de commettre un acte criminel ». cela s’applique à toutes les infractions pour lesquelles 544 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. s. coughlan and g. luther, detention and arrest (2nd ed. 2017), at pp. 22-23), a category that en- compasses — and extends beyond — the activities which have historically been classified as breaches of the peace, such as various forms of assault (ss 2641 to 269), mischief (s. 430), careless use of a firearm (s. 86) and taking part in a riot (s. 65) (see williams, at pp 578-79). thus, police officers already have ex- tensive powers to arrest, without a warrant, a person they reasonably believe is about to commit an act which would amount to a breach of the peace. i there- fore have difficulty seeing any need for the courts to fill a legislative gap by recognizing a common law power of arrest for the purpose of preventing individuals from committing breaches of the peace themselves. i make no comment about other possible powers short of arrest in such circumstances. [62] this case does not concern a situation in which an arrested individual was about to commit a breach of peace. instead, the power at issue in this case would target individuals who are not sus- pected of being about to break any law or to initiate any violence themselves, in situations in which the police nonetheless believe that arresting the individ- uals in question will prevent a breach of the peace from occurring. for example, these individuals might themselves be the targets or victims of anticipated vi- olence. they could be “provocateurs” whose lawful actions or words are feared to be prompting others to respond violently. in such a situation, the police might believe that removing the person from the area will defuse the situation, avert the apprehended violence and even protect him or her. [63] it has long been recognized that such “provoc- ative” conduct is not itself unlawful. as far back as 1950, a majority of this court held: le contrevenant peut être poursuivi par mise en ac- cusation (loi d’interprétation, lrc 1985, c. i-21, al. 34(1)a); s. coughlan et g. luther, detention and arrest (2e éd. 2017), p. 22-23), une catégorie d’in- fractions qui englobe notamment les activités qui sont depuis toujours classées comme des violations de la paix, comme les divers types de voies de fait (art 2641 à 269), le méfait (art. 430), l’usage négli- gent d’une arme à feu (art. 86) et la participation à une émeute (art. 65) (voir williams, p. 578- 579). ainsi, les policiers disposent déjà de vastes pouvoirs qui leur permettent d’arrêter, sans mandat, un individu qui, d’après ce qu’ils croient pour des motifs raisonnables, est sur le point de commettre un acte qui constitue- rait une violation de la paix. j’ai donc du mal à voir pourquoi il serait nécessaire que les cours de common law comblent une lacune législative en reconnaissant un pouvoir d’arrestation pour empêcher des individus de violer eux- mêmes la paix. je ne formule pas de commentaires sur l’existence possible de pouvoirs autres que l’arrestation, dans de telles circonstances. [62] en l’espèce, il n’est pas question d’un indi- vidu mis en état d’arrestation alors qu’il aurait été sur le point de violer la paix. le pouvoir en cause ici viserait plutôt des individus qui ne sont pas eux- mêmes soupçonnés d’être sur le point d’enfreindre la loi ou de commettre un acte de violence, dans des situations où, néanmoins, aux yeux des policiers, l’arrestation de ces individus permet de prévenir une violation de la paix. par exemple, ces individus pourraient être eux- mêmes des cibles ou des victimes d’un acte de violence appréhendé. ils pourraient être des « provocateurs » dont on craint que les actes ou les propos légaux incitent d’autres personnes à répondre de manière violente. dans une telle situa- tion, les policiers peuvent être d’avis que le fait de retirer l’individu de la zone désamorcera la situation, préviendra l’acte de violence appréhendé et assurera même sa propre sécurité. [63] il est reconnu depuis longtemps qu’une telle conduite « provocante » n’est pas en soi illégale. déjà, en 1950, les juges majoritaires de la cour ont affirmé ceci : i do not think that it is safe to hold as a matter of law, that conduct, not otherwise criminal and not falling within [traduction] je ne crois pas qu’il soit sage de statuer, en droit, qu’une conduite qui n’est pas par ailleurs criminelle [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 545 any category of offences defined by the criminal law, becomes criminal because a natural and probable result thereof will be to provoke others to violent retributive action. if such a principle were admitted, it seems to me that many courses of conduct which it is well settled are not criminal could be made the subject of indictment by setting out the facts and concluding with the words that such conduct was likely to cause a breach of the peace. et qui ne relève d’aucune catégorie d’infractions établie par le droit criminel devient criminelle parce que son résul- tat naturel et probable sera d’inciter les autres à répliquer de manière violente. si un tel principe était reconnu, il me semble que de nombreuses conduites dont il est bien établi qu’elles ne sont pas criminelles pourraient faire l’objet d’une mise en accusation. il suffirait d’énoncer les faits et d’en conclure que la conduite en question est susceptible de causer une violation de la paix. (frey, at p. 526) (frey, p. 526) yet the effect of the respondents’ position, on the facts of this case, is to claim a power to arrest in- dividuals engaged in non- criminal conduct of this nature in order to prevent the violence the conduct could provoke. [64] neither of the courts below highlighted the distinction between a power to arrest someone who is personally about to breach the peace and a power to arrest someone whose lawful conduct may provoke others to breach the peace. they relied, as do the respondents, on the obiter comments from brown to conclude that, where certain conditions are met, the police have the power to arrest an individual in order “to avoid a breach of the peace” (see trial judge’s reasons, ar, vol. i, at p 47). as i explained above, however, brown concerned only the first situation, that of arresting “a person who is about to commit a breach of the peace”, which does not reflect the circumstances of the case at bar. the court in brown did not discuss the common law power actually at issue in this appeal: the power to arrest someone who is not about to breach the peace in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace by other persons. whether such a power is reasonably necessary for the purpose of fulfilling a police duty in accordance with the ancillary powers doctrine does not appear to have been addressed in any canadian case. it is therefore necessary for this court to do so now. l’effet de la position des intimés, eu égard aux faits de l’espèce, revient néanmoins à revendiquer le pouvoir d’arrêter des individus engagés dans une conduite non criminelle de cette nature afin de pré- venir la violence que cette conduite pourrait en- traîner. [64] ni l’une ni l’autre des cours d’instances in- férieures n’a souligné la distinction entre le pouvoir d’arrestation d’un individu qui est personnellement sur le point de violer la paix et celui qui vise un individu agissant en toute légalité qui pourrait en inciter d’autres à violer la paix. ces cours, à l’instar des intimés, se sont fondées sur les commentaires formulés en obiter dans brown pour conclure que, s’il est satisfait à certaines conditions, les policiers détiennent le pouvoir d’arrêter un individu [traduc- tion] « pour éviter une violation de la paix » (voir les motifs de la juge du procès, da, vol. i, p 47). toutefois, comme je l’ai expliqué précédemment, l’arrêt brown ne traitait que du premier scénario — soit de l’arrestation d’« une personne qui est sur le point de violer la paix » — ce qui ne correspond pas aux circonstances de la présente affaire. en effet, dans l’arrêt brown, la cour n’a pas traité du pouvoir en common law dont il est effectivement question dans le présent pourvoi, soit le pouvoir d’arrêter un individu qui n’est pas sur le point de violer la paix pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix par d’autres individus. aucune cause canadienne ne semble avoir traité de la question de savoir si, comme l’exige la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires, un tel pouvoir est raisonnablement nécessaire pour que les policiers s’acquittent d’une de leurs obli- gations. il est donc nécessaire que la cour le fasse maintenant. 546 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. [65] this proposed power of arrest would involve substantial prima facie interference with significant liberty interests. indeed, few police actions interfere with an individual’s liberty more than arrest — an action which completely restricts the person’s ability to move about in society free from state coercion. as this court recently noted, “placing a person under arrest inherently infringes his or her liberty” (r. v. penunsi, 2019 scc 39, [2019] 3 scr 91, at para 73). freedom from arbitrary arrest and deten- tion is of course itself constitutionally guaranteed by s. 9 of the charter. further, where the police use force to effect an arrest, they also directly engage a general liberty interest in being free from the exer- cise of force by the state as well as the interests in liberty and security of the person protected by s. 7 of the charter. [66] in many cases, such as that of mr. fleming, the lawful activity that is being restricted by the ar- rest may itself be protected by the charter. where a police action prevents individuals from lawfully ex- pressing themselves because their expression might provoke or enrage others, freedom of expression as guaranteed by s. 2(b) is also implicated. indeed, the trial judge specifically found, correctly in my view, that the respondents’ actions in this case had infringed mr. fleming’s right under s. 2(b) (see ar, vol. i, at pp 59-61). [65] ce pouvoir d’arrestation proposé donnerait lieu à première vue à une atteinte importante aux droits fondamentaux relatifs à la liberté. en fait, il existe peu d’actions policières qui portent davantage atteinte à la liberté d’un individu qu’une arresta- tion  — une action qui restreint complètement la capacité d’une personne de se déplacer dans l’es- pace public, sans coercition de l’état. comme la cour l’a récemment signalé, « l’arrestation d’une personne porte foncièrement atteinte à sa liberté » (r c. penunsi, 2019 csc 39, [2019] 3 rcs 91, par 73). bien entendu, le droit à la protection contre l’arrestation et la détention arbitraires est garanti par l’art. 9 de la charte. en outre, lorsque des policiers emploient la force pour effectuer une arrestation, ils font aussi directement intervenir un droit général d’être protégé contre l’exercice de la force par l’état, de même que les droits à la liberté et à la sécurité de la personne protégés par l’art. 7 de la charte. [66] dans de nombreux cas, comme dans celui de m. fleming, l’activité légale qui est restreinte du fait de l’arrestation pourrait en soi être protégée par la charte. lorsqu’une intervention de la police empêche un individu de s’exprimer légalement parce que cette expression pourrait provoquer ou fâcher autrui, la liberté d’expression garantie par l’al. 2b) entre aussi en jeu. en effet, la juge du procès a ex- pressément conclu, à bon droit selon moi, que les actions des intimés en l’espèce ont enfreint le droit de m. fleming protégé par l’al. 2b) (voir da, vol. i, p 59-61). [67] the purported power in this case would di- rectly impact on a constellation of rights that are fundamental to individual freedom in our society. it would directly undermine the expectation of all individuals, in the lawful exercise of their liberty, to live their lives free from coercive interference by the state. [67] le pouvoir invoqué en l’espèce toucherait directement une panoplie de droits qui sont fon- damentaux pour la liberté individuelle dans notre société. il minerait directement l’attente de tous les individus de pouvoir, dans l’exercice légal de leur liberté, vivre leur vie sans interférence coercitive de la part de l’état. in light of the substantial prima facie inter- [68] ference with liberty that may be occasioned by this power of arrest, the next question in the ancillary powers doctrine analysis is if — and when — such a power would be justified for the purpose of fulfilling a valid police duty. [68] compte tenu de l’atteinte importante à la li- berté qui pourrait, à première vue, découler de ce pouvoir d’arrestation, la question suivante à trancher dans l’analyse de la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires est celle de savoir si un tel pouvoir serait justifié pour que la police s’acquitte d’un devoir valide et, le cas échéant, dans quelles circonstances. [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 547 c the first stage: the police duty c la première étape : le devoir policier [69] in this case, the purported police power falls within the general scope of the duties of preserving the peace, preventing crime, and protecting life and property. [69] en l’espèce, le présumé pouvoir policier relè- verait de la portée générale des devoirs de maintenir la paix, de prévenir le crime et de protéger la vie des personnes et les biens. [70] these duties have been acknowledged as “principal duties” of the police at common law (p.  ceyssens, legal aspects of policing (loose- leaf), at p 2-1). as far back as dedman, le dain j. noted that preserving the peace and protecting life and property are among the common law duties of police officers (p 32). in ontario, the duty to preserve the peace is also explicitly enumerated in legislation in s. 42(1)(a) of the police services act, rso 1990, c. p15. [70] ces devoirs ont été reconnus comme des [tra- duction] « fonctions principales » de la police par la common law (p. ceyssens, legal aspects of po licing (feuilles mobiles), p 2-1). déjà, dans l’arrêt dedman, le juge le dain a noté que la préservation de la paix et la protection de la vie et de la propriété figuraient parmi les pouvoirs relevant des policiers en common law (p 32). en ontario, la fonction de préservation de la paix est aussi explicitement énumérée à l’al. 42(1)a) de la loi sur les services policiers, lro 1990, c p15. [71] preventing breaches of the peace, which en- tail violence and a risk of harm, is plainly related to these duties. [71] la prévention de violations de la paix, qui supposent de la violence et un risque de préjudice, est directement liée à ces devoirs. [72] with respect, the trial judge’s conclusion on this stage of the ancillary powers doctrine was erro- neous. in a single sentence on the issue, she found that, “on the specific facts of this case with respect to mr. fleming, the defendants were not ‘preserving the peace’” (ar, vol. i, at p 46). this statement confused the different stages of the test. [73] although the trial judge’s comments were brief, she appears to have concluded that the re- spondents’ actions were not justified — on the basis that there was no serious risk of a breach of the peace — and that, as a result, they could not meet the requirements of the first stage. whether the power is necessary in order to achieve the goal of preserving the peace is a question that is properly left for the second stage. at the first stage, it is clear that actions to prevent a breach of the peace do further the police duties of preserving the peace, preventing crime, and protecting life and property. [72] à mon avis, la conclusion de la juge du procès quant à cette étape de la doctrine des pouvoirs acces- soires était erronée. en une seule phrase sur la ques- tion, elle a déclaré que [traduction] « d’après les faits propres à cette affaire concernant m. fleming, les défendeurs ne “préservaient pas la paix” » (da, vol. i, p 46). cette déclaration confond les diffé- rentes étapes du test. [73] bien que les commentaires de la juge du pro- cès furent brefs, elle semble avoir conclu que les actes des intimés n’étaient pas justifiés — car il n’y avait pas de risque sérieux de violation de la paix — et que, en conséquence, ils ne pouvaient satisfaire à la première étape du test. or, la question de savoir si le pouvoir est nécessaire pour atteindre l’objectif de préservation de la paix appartient à la deuxième étape. à la première étape, il est évident que les actes visant à prévenir une violation de la paix permettent aux policiers d’accomplir leurs devoirs de maintenir la paix, de prévenir le crime et de protéger la vie des personnes et les biens. [74] because the requirements of the first stage are met, the key question in this case concerns the second stage. [74] puisqu’il est satisfait aux exigences de la pre- mière étape, la question principale en l’espèce con- cerne la deuxième étape. 548 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. d the second stage: reasonably necessary d la deuxième étape : raisonnablement nécessaire (1) the unique context of the power at issue in (1) le contexte unique du pouvoir en cause en this case l’espèce [75] courts must always apply the second stage of the ancillary powers doctrine with rigour to ensure that the state has satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the interference with individual liberty is justi- fied and necessary. as abella j. stated in clayton: in determining the boundaries of police powers, cau- tion is required to ensure the proper balance between preventing excessive intrusions on an individual’s liberty and privacy, and enabling the police to do what is reason- ably necessary to perform their duties in protecting the public. [para. 26] [76] the unique context of the respondents’ pur- ported power of arrest makes it particularly difficult to justify at the second stage of the analysis. this court has held that “[t]he standard of justification must be commensurate with the fundamental rights at stake” (clayton, at para 21). there are a num- ber of reasons why the “standard of justification” is especially stringent here. the characteristics of the power, and in particular its impact on law- abiding individuals, its preventative nature and the fact that it would be evasive of review, all mean that it will be more difficult to justify as reasonably necessary compared to other common law powers. the bar is higher. [75] les tribunaux doivent toujours appliquer la deuxième étape de la doctrine des pouvoirs acces- soires avec rigueur pour veiller à ce que l’état s’ac- quitte de son fardeau de démontrer que l’atteinte à la liberté individuelle est justifiée et nécessaire. comme la juge abella l’a mentionné dans l’arrêt clayton : il faut délimiter les pouvoirs policiers avec prudence afin d’établir un juste équilibre entre la prévention de l’atteinte injustifiée à la liberté et à la vie privée d’une personne et l’octroi aux policiers de pouvoirs raisonna- blement nécessaires à la protection des citoyens. [par. 26] [76] compte tenu du contexte unique du pouvoir proposé d’arrestation des intimés, il est particulière- ment difficile de le justifier au regard de la deuxième étape de l’analyse. la cour a jugé que « [l]a norme de justification doit être proportionnée aux droits fondamentaux en cause » (clayton, par 21). dans ce cas, la « norme de justification » est particulièrement rigoureuse pour plusieurs raisons. les caractéris- tiques du pouvoir, et notamment ses conséquences sur les individus qui respectent la loi, sa nature pré- ventive et le fait qu’il échapperait à l’examen des tribunaux, indiquent toutes qu’il serait plus difficile de le justifier comme étant raisonnablement néces- saire en comparaison à d’autres pouvoirs reconnus en common law. la barre est haute. [77] firstly, the purported police power would expressly be exercised against someone who is not suspected of any criminal wrongdoing or even of threatening to breach the peace. in the past, this court has only recognized common law police pow- ers that involve interference with liberty where there has been some connection with criminal activities. in these cases, the powers were restricted to circum- stances in which there was at least a suspicion that the person affected by the exercise of the power was involved in, or might commit, some offence. for example, this court has accepted powers intended to prevent an assault on the person of a foreign [77] premièrement, le présumé pouvoir policier serait expressément exercé à l’encontre d’un individu qui n’est pas soupçonné d’avoir commis un acte cri- minel ou même de menacer de violer la paix. dans le passé, la cour n’a reconnu des pouvoirs policiers en common law qui supposent une atteinte à la li- berté que lorsqu’il y avait un certain lien avec des activités criminelles. dans ces cas, les pouvoirs se limitaient aux circonstances où il existait au moins un soupçon que l’individu touché par l’exercice du pouvoir avait participé à une infraction ou était sus- ceptible d’en commettre une. par exemple, la cour a reconnu l’existence de pouvoirs visant la prévention [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 549 dignitary (r v. knowlton, [1974] scr 443), detect impaired driving (dedman) or eliminate threats to officers posed by weapons (macdonald; mann). in other cases, the recognized powers related directly to the investigation of particular crimes (godoy; mann; clayton; kang‑ brown). d’une attaque sur la personne d’un dignitaire étranger (r c. knowlton, [1974] rcs 443), la détection de la conduite avec facultés affaiblies (dedman) et l’élimination des menaces que représentent les armes à l’endroit de policiers (macdonald; mann). dans d’autres cas, les pouvoirs reconnus étaient directe- ment liés aux enquêtes sur des crimes particuliers (godoy; mann; clayton; kang‑ brown). [78] the instant case is different. here, the re- spondents are proposing a power that would enable the police to interfere with the liberty of someone who they accept is acting lawfully and who they do not suspect or believe is about to commit any offence. it would be difficult to overemphasize the extraordinary nature of this power. such a power would constitute a major restriction on the lawful actions of individuals in this country. it is especially important for the courts to guard against intrusions on the liberty of persons who are neither accused nor suspected of committing any crime (see penunsi, at para 68). [78] le cas présent est différent. les intimés pro- posent la reconnaissance d’un pouvoir qui autori- serait les policiers à porter atteinte à la liberté d’un individu qui, ils le reconnaissent, agit en toute léga- lité et qu’ils ne soupçonnent pas ou ne croient pas être sur le point de commettre une infraction. on ne peut trop insister sur la nature extraordinaire qu’au- rait ce pouvoir. il constituerait une atteinte majeure aux actes légaux d’individus dans ce pays. il est par- ticulièrement important que les tribunaux protègent les individus contre les restrictions à leur liberté lorsqu’ils ne sont ni accusés ni soupçonnés d’avoir commis une infraction (voir penunsi, par 68). [79] as lord mance stated in laporte, “wherever possible, the focus of preventive action should, on any view, be on those about to act disruptively, not on innocent third parties” (para 149). similarly, lord brown of eaton- under- heywood noted that “the police’s first duty is to protect the rights of the innocent rather than to compel the innocent to cease exercising them” (para 124). [79] comme lord mance l’a déclaré dans l’arrêt laporte, [traduction] « chaque fois que cela est possible, la mesure préventive devrait, à mon avis, viser les individus qui sont sur le point de troubler la paix et non les tiers innocents » (par 149). de même, lord brown d’eaton- under- heywood a observé que [traduction] « le premier devoir de la police est de protéger les droits des innocents et non d’obliger ceux-ci à cesser de les exercer » (par 124). [80] the fundamental nature of the liberty interests at stake coupled with the extraordinary proposition of interfering with those interests where the affected individual is under no suspicion of unlawful con- duct mandates a stringent and exacting justificatory analysis. [80] la nature fondamentale des droits relatifs à la liberté en cause jumelée à la proposition ex- traordinaire de porter atteinte à ces droits lorsque l’individu touché n’est pas soupçonné de conduite illégale requiert une analyse de justification rigou- reuse et exigeante. [81] secondly, the purported police power in the case at bar is preventative. the respondents propose a power that would enable the police to act to prevent breaches of the peace before they arise. [81] deuxièmement, le présumé pouvoir policier en l’espèce en est un de prévention. les intimés pro- posent la reconnaissance d’un pouvoir qui permet- trait aux policiers d’agir de manière à prévenir des violations de la paix avant qu’elles ne surviennent. [82] the ancillary powers doctrine does not limit police actions to cases in which a crime has already [82] la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires ne limite pas l’action policière aux cas où une infraction ou 550 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. been committed or a breach of the peace has already taken place. the common law police duties of pre- serving the peace, preventing crime and protecting life and property clearly entail an ability to act pro- actively when appropriate. in this sense, i agree with doherty ja that: not all law enforcement is reactive. the police duty to prevent crime and maintain the public peace commands proactive measures on their part   . une violation de la paix a déjà été commise. les devoirs des policiers découlant de la common law qui visent à maintenir la paix, à prévenir le crime et à protéger la vie des personnes et les biens supposent clairement une capacité d’agir de manière proactive, au besoin. en ce sens, je souscris aux commentaires suivants du juge doherty : [traduction] ce ne sont pas tous les pouvoirs d’ap- plication de la loi qui sont réactifs. le devoir des policiers de prévenir le crime et de maintenir l’ordre public exige des mesures proactives de leur part   . proactive policing is in many ways more efficient and effective than reactive policing. les mesures proactives de maintien de l’ordre sont, à de nombreux égards, plus efficaces que les mesures réactives. (brown, at p. 246) (brown, p. 246) [83] where such preventative actions do not inter- fere with individual liberty, the police do of course have broad latitude. once invasive police actions do intrude upon individual liberty, however, the courts must be very cautious about authorizing them merely because an unlawful or disruptive act could occur in the future. vague or overly permissive standards in such situations would sanction profound intrusions on liberty with little societal benefit. as a general rule, it will be more difficult for the state to justify invasive police powers that are preventative in nature than those that are exercised in responding to or investigating a past or ongoing crime (figueiras, at para. 45; see also brown, at pp 249-51). [83] lorsque de telles actions préventives ne portent pas atteinte à la liberté d’un individu, la police dispose, bien sûr, d’une grande latitude. tou- tefois, lorsque ces actions policières attentatoires empiètent sur la liberté individuelle, les tribunaux doivent faire preuve d’une grande prudence quant au fait de les autoriser uniquement parce qu’un acte illégal ou perturbateur pourrait être commis. des normes vagues ou trop permissives dans de telles si- tuations auraient pour effet d’autoriser des atteintes importantes à la liberté, qui auraient par ailleurs peu d’avantages pour la société. en règle générale, il sera plus difficile pour l’état de justifier des pouvoirs policiers invasifs qui sont de nature préventive que ceux qui sont exercés en réponse à un crime ou qui permettent de mener une enquête sur un crime com- mis ou en cours (figueiras, par. 45; voir également brown, p. 249- 251). [84] thirdly, the exercise of the respondents’ pur- ported police power would be evasive of review. since this power of arrest would generally not result in the laying of charges, the affected individuals would often have no forum to challenge the legal- ity of the arrest outside of a costly civil suit (see j. esmonde, “the policing of dissent: the use of breach of the peace arrests at political demonstra- tions” (2002), 1 jl & equality 246, at pp 254-55). judicial oversight of the exercise of such a police [84] troisièmement, l’exercice des présumés pou- voirs policiers des intimés échapperait à l’examen des tribunaux. en effet, puisque ce pouvoir d’ar- restation n’entraînerait généralement pas le dépôt d’accusations, l’individu concerné n’aurait souvent pas l’occasion de contester la légalité de l’arresta- tion, outre une poursuite coûteuse au civil (voir j. esmonde, « the policing of dissent : the use of breach of the peace arrests at political demonstra- tions » (2002), 1 jl & equality 246, p. 254- 255). [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 551 power would therefore be rare. for this reason, any standard outlined at the outset would have to be clear and highly protective of liberty. [85] these factors demonstrate that the application of the ancillary powers doctrine to the purported po- lice power at issue in this case must be particularly stringent at the second stage. the standard of justi- fication will be onerous and the respondents bear a heavy burden if they are to establish that the power is reasonably necessary. [86] this restrictive approach to justification is consistent with how courts have treated similar or related common law powers whose purpose is to prevent breaches of the peace both in this coun- try (see brown; figueiras; r v. ce, 2009 nsca 79, 279 nsr (2d) 391, at paras. 36-39) and in other common law jurisdictions (see bibby v. chief constable of essex police, [2000] ewca civ 113; austin v. metropolitan police comr, [2007] ewca civ 989, [2008] 1 all er 564;. laporte). les tribunaux ne se pencheraient donc que rarement sur l’exercice de ce pouvoir policier. pour cette rai- son, toute norme établie devrait d’entrée de jeu être claire et assurer une grande protection du droit à la liberté. [85] ces facteurs démontrent que la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires au présumé pouvoir policier en cause en l’espèce doit être appliquée de manière particulièrement rigoureuse à la deuxième étape de l’analyse. la norme de justification sera sévère et les intimés devront s’acquitter d’un lourd fardeau pour démontrer que le pouvoir est raisonnablement nécessaire. [86] cette approche restrictive relative à la justi- fication est conforme à la façon dont les tribunaux traitent des pouvoirs similaires en common law dont l’objet est de prévenir des violations de la paix tant dans notre pays (voir brown; figueiras; r c. ce, 2009 nsca 79, 279 nsr (2d) 391, par. 36-39) que dans d’autres ressorts de common law (voir bibby c. chief constable of essex police, [2000] ewca civ 113; austin c metropolitan police comr, [2007] ewca civ 989, [2008] 1 all er 564; laporte). [87] i will now turn to the application of the second stage of the ancillary powers doctrine to the particu- lar police power at issue in the instant case. [87] je passe maintenant à l’application de la deu- xième étape de la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires au pouvoir policier en cause en l’espèce. (2) the power to arrest someone who is acting lawfully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace (2) le pouvoir d’arrêter un individu qui agit en toute légalité pour prévenir une violation ap- préhendée de la paix [88] in applying the second stage of the ancillary powers doctrine stringently in this case, it becomes clear that a police power to arrest someone who is acting lawfully in order to prevent a breach of the peace is not reasonably necessary for the fulfillment of the relevant duties. [88] en appliquant rigoureusement la deuxième étape de la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires au pré- sent cas, il devient évident que le pouvoir d’arrêter un individu qui agit en toute légalité pour prévenir une violation de la paix n’est pas raisonnablement nécessaire pour l’accomplissement des devoirs per- tinents. [89] i will begin my analysis with the three factors from macdonald. regarding the importance of the duty, there is no doubt that preserving the peace and protecting people from violence are immensely im- portant. breaches of the peace can threaten the safety [89] je commence mon analyse par les trois fac- teurs établis dans l’arrêt macdonald en ce qui concerne l’importance du devoir, il ne fait aucun doute que préserver la paix et protéger les gens contre la violence sont des devoirs extrêmement importants. 552 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. and lives of individuals and can erode the public’s sense of security. les violations de la paix peuvent menacer la sécurité et la vie d’individus et peuvent compromettre le sentiment de sécurité du public. [90] concerning the necessity of the infringement for the performance of the duty, there may be ex- ceptional circumstances in which some interference with liberty is required in order to prevent a breach of the peace. [90] pour ce qui est du caractère nécessaire de l’at- teinte pour l’accomplissement du devoir, il se peut qu’il existe de rares circonstances dans lesquelles une certaine atteinte à la liberté est nécessaire pour prévenir une violation de la paix. [91] with respect to the extent of the infringe- ment, any interference with individual liberty will be justified only insofar as it is necessary in order to prevent the breach of the peace from occurring (see macdonald, at para 39). as i mentioned earlier, an arrest is one of the most extreme intrusions on in- dividual liberty available to the police. where there are less invasive measures that would be effective in preventing the breach, they must be taken instead. [91] quant à l’ampleur de l’atteinte à la liberté individuelle, celle-ci n’est justifiée que dans la me- sure où elle est nécessaire pour prévenir la violation de la paix (voir macdonald, par 39). comme je l’ai mentionné précédemment, l’arrestation est une des mesures dont dispose la police qui porte le plus at- teinte à la liberté individuelle. ainsi, lorsque d’autres mesures moins attentatoires permettraient aussi de prévenir la violation, il faut y avoir recours. [92] on considering these factors, i do not see how so drastic a power as that of arrest can be reasonably necessary. i cannot conceive of circumstances in which a common law power of arrest will be re- quired in order to prevent violence from occurring where there are no other means — available either at common law or in legislation — that would serve this purpose. [92] après analyse de ces facteurs, je ne vois pas comment un pouvoir aussi draconien qu’un pouvoir d’arrestation pourrait être raisonnablement néces- saire. je ne peux concevoir dans quelles circonstances un pouvoir d’arrestation en common law serait né- cessaire pour prévenir un acte violent lorsqu’aucune autre mesure — autorisée par la common law et par les lois — ne permettrait d’atteindre cette fin. in this regard, it is important to note the stat- [93] utory powers of arrest that are already available to police officers in such situations. section 129 of the criminal code reads: [93] à cet égard, il importe de noter que les lois prévoient déjà des pouvoirs d’arrestation pour les policiers dans de telles situations. l’art. 129 du code criminel mentionne notamment ce qui suit : every one who quiconque, selon le cas : (a) resists or wilfully obstructs a public officer or peace officer in the execution of his duty or any person lawfully acting in aid of such an officer, (b) omits, without reasonable excuse, to assist a public officer or peace officer in the execution of his duty in arresting a person or in preserving the peace, after having reasonable notice that he is required to do so a) volontairement entrave un fonctionnaire public ou un agent de la paix dans l’exécution de ses fonctions ou toute personne prêtant légalement main- forte à un tel fonctionnaire ou agent, ou lui résiste en pareil cas; b) omet, sans excuse raisonnable, de prêter main- forte à un fonctionnaire public ou à un agent de la paix qui exécute ses fonctions en arrêtant quelqu’un ou en pré- servant la paix, après un avis raisonnable portant qu’il est requis de le faire;   .   . [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 553 is guilty of est coupable : (d) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or d) soit d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonne- ment maximal de deux ans; (e) an offence punishable on summary conviction. e) soit d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire. additionally, s. 270 creates an offence for assaulting “a public officer or peace officer engaged in the ex- ecution of his duty or a person acting in aid of such an officer”. all of these offences may be prosecuted by indictment, which means that under s. 495(1)(a), an officer may arrest a person who is committing one of them without a warrant. en outre, l’art. 270 crée une infraction pour les voies de fait contre « un fonctionnaire public ou un agent de la paix agissant dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, ou une personne qui leur prête main- forte ». toutes ces infractions peuvent être punissables par mise en accusation, de sorte qu’un agent peut arrêter sans mandat en vertu de l’al. 495(1)a) la personne qui commet l’une ou l’autre de ces infractions. [94] consequently, if an individual fails to comply with less intrusive measures taken by a police officer to avert a breach of the peace — by “resist[ing] or wilfully obstruct[ing]” the officer in the lawful ex- ecution of his or her duty, assaulting the officer, or omitting to assist the officer in preserving the peace after “having reasonable notice” of a requirement to do so — a statutory power of arrest already exists under the criminal code. [94] en conséquence, lorsqu’un individu ne se conforme pas à des mesures policières moins intru- sives visant à empêcher une violation de la paix — en faisant « volontairement entrave » au travail de l’agent qui agit dans l’exercice légitime de ses fonc- tions, en l’agressant ou en ne l’aidant pas à préserver la paix après « un avis raisonnable portant qu’il est requis de le faire » —, le code criminel prévoit déjà un pouvoir statutaire d’arrestation. [95] the respondents’ purported power of arrest would result in serious interference with individual liberty. as a result, such an arrest cannot be justified under the ancillary powers doctrine. there is already a statutory power of arrest that can be exercised should an individual resist or obstruct an officer tak- ing other, less intrusive measures. it is not reasonably necessary to recognize another common law power of arrest in such circumstances. therefore, to be clear, the only available powers to arrest someone in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace initiated by other persons are the ones that are expressly provided for in the criminal code. in my view, these statutory powers are sufficient, and any additional common law power of arrest would be unnecessary. [95] le pouvoir d’arrestation proposé par les in- timés porterait gravement atteinte à la liberté in- dividuelle. ainsi, une telle arrestation ne peut être justifiée au regard de la doctrine des pouvoirs acces- soires. il existe déjà un pouvoir d’arrestation statu- taire qui peut être exercé si un individu résiste ou fait entrave au travail d’un policier qui recourt à d’autres mesures moins intrusives. il n’est pas raisonnable- ment nécessaire qu’un autre pouvoir d’arrestation soit reconnu en common law dans ces circonstances. donc, pour être claire, les seuls pouvoirs d’arresta- tion d’un individu dont disposent les policiers pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix initiée par d’autres individus sont les pouvoirs qui sont expressément prévus au code criminel. à mon avis, ces pouvoirs d’arrestation statutaires suffisent et tout autre pouvoir d’arrestation que pourrait reconnaître la common law serait inutile. [96] to the extent that the judges in the majority of the court of appeal concluded that mr. fleming’s [96] dans la mesure où les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont conclu que l’arrestation de 554 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. arrest was justified under the ancillary powers doc- trine because it had been effective in preventing any breach of the peace from occurring, they were re- spectfully in error. nordheimer ja stated: the trial judge faults the officers for not instituting a buffer zone between the respondent and the protestors and for not calling for backup from other available officers, as alternatives to arresting the respondent. while both of these routes were available, the basis for the trial judge’s criticism of the officers is unclear. there was no need to institute a buffer zone if the matter could be addressed by removing the respondent as the source of the friction. further, there is no reason to believe that a buffer zone of six or seven officers against eight to ten rushing protestors (with others available to join that group) would have been effective or whether it would have simply resulted in a larger confrontation. similarly, there was no reason to call for backup, and run the risk of inflaming tensions by such a show of force if, again, the matter could be addressed by removing the respondent. [para. 57] [97] firstly, the argument that mr. fleming’s arrest was effective in preventing violence is not very per- suasive, given the trial judge’s finding that there was not a real risk of such violence (ar, vol. i, at p 49). in other words, mr. fleming’s arrest cannot be said to have prevented violence if violence was unlikely to occur even had he not been arrested. m. fleming était justifiée en application de la doc- trine des pouvoirs accessoires parce qu’elle avait été efficace pour prévenir une violation de la paix, j’estime qu’ils avaient tort. le juge nordheimer a déclaré ce qui suit : [traduction] la juge du procès reproche aux policiers de ne pas avoir établi de zone tampon entre l’intimé et les manifestants et de ne pas avoir demandé de renforts au lieu d’arrêter l’intimé. bien que les policiers aient pu recourir à ces deux options, le fondement des critiques de la juge du procès n’est pas clair. il n’y avait pas lieu d’établir une zone tampon si l’affaire pouvait être réglée par l’expulsion de l’intimé, qui était la source des tensions. de plus, il n’y a aucune raison de croire qu’une zone tampon de six ou sept agents contre huit à dix manifestants qui approchaient rapidement (en plus des autres qui étaient prêts à rejoindre le groupe) aurait été efficace, ni aucune façon de savoir si elle n’aurait pas simplement donné lieu à une plus grande confrontation. de même, il n’y avait aucune raison de demander des renforts et de courir le risque d’aggraver la situation par une telle démonstration de force si, encore une fois, l’affaire pouvait être réglée par l’expulsion de l’intimé. [par. 57] [97] premièrement, l’argument selon lequel l’ar- restation de m. fleming avait été efficace pour pré- venir la violence n’est pas très convaincant étant donné les conclusions de la juge du procès selon lesquelles il n’y avait pas de risque réel d’une telle violence (da, vol. i, p 49). autrement dit, on ne peut pas affirmer que l’arrestation de m. fleming a permis de prévenir des actes de violence s’il était improbable que de tels actes soient commis, même s’il n’avait pas été arrêté. [98] secondly, the mere fact that a police action was effective cannot be relied upon to justify its being taken if it interfered with an individual’s lib- erty. for an intrusion on liberty to be justified, the common law rule  is that it must be “reasonably necessary”. if the police can reasonably attain the same result by taking an action that intrudes less on liberty, a more intrusive measure will not be reason- ably necessary no matter how effective it may be. an intrusion upon liberty should be a measure of last resort, not a first option. to conclude otherwise would be generally to sanction actions that infringe the freedom of individuals significantly as long as [98] deuxièmement, on ne peut se fonder sur le simple fait qu’une action policière ait été efficace pour justifier qu’elle ait été prise si elle a porté at- teinte à la liberté d’un individu. pour qu’une telle atteinte soit justifiée, la common law exige qu’elle soit « raisonnablement nécessaire ». si les policiers peuvent raisonnablement atteindre le même résultat en prenant une mesure qui porte moins atteinte à la liberté, une mesure plus intrusive ne sera pas raison- nablement nécessaire, quelle que soit son efficacité. une atteinte à la liberté devrait être une mesure de dernier recours et non la première option choisie par les autorités. conclure autrement aurait pour [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 555 they are effective. that is a recipe for a police state, not a free and democratic society. [99] the courts have held that police powers that involve interference with liberty will not be justified if they are ineffective at preventing breaches of the peace. for example, in figueiras, the ontario court of appeal said: “if the interference with individual rights bears no rational connection to the duty being performed or is not effective in furthering the police duty, then surely it is not a ‘necessary’ interference” (para 93). this is not the same as saying that any powers are justified if they are effective. [100] as binnie j. stated in his concurring reasons in clayton, “[w]hile the effectiveness itself of police action does not confer legitimacy, the absence of likely effectiveness would argue strongly against a valid blockade” (para. 99 (emphasis in original)). thus, the respondents cannot rely merely on the fact that arresting mr. fleming was effective in order to establish that doing so was justified. effet d’autoriser généralement des actions qui portent considérablement atteinte à la liberté des individus, tant qu’elles sont efficaces. il s’agirait d’une recette pour un état policier et non pour une société libre et démocratique. [99] selon la jurisprudence, les pouvoirs policiers qui entraînent une atteinte à la liberté ne sont pas justifiés lorsqu’ils ne permettent pas de prévenir des violations de la paix. par exemple, dans l’arrêt figueiras, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a déclaré ce qui suit : [traduction] « si l’atteinte aux droits individuels n’a pas de lien rationnel avec le devoir accompli ou ne permet pas de favoriser l’accomplis- sement du devoir policier, il ne s’agit manifestement pas d’une atteinte “nécessaire” » (par 93). cela est différent de l’affirmation selon laquelle tous les pou- voirs sont justifiés pourvu qu’ils soient efficaces. [100] comme le juge binnie l’a mentionné dans ses motifs concordants dans l’arrêt clayton : « même si, en soi, l’efficacité d’une intervention policière ne lui confère pas de légitimité, l’absence de toute chance de succès milite sérieusement contre sa va- lidité » (par. 99 (en italique dans l’original)). ainsi, les intimés ne peuvent pas se fonder uniquement sur l’efficacité de l’arrestation de m. fleming pour la justifier. e was mr. fleming’s arrest lawful? e l’arrestation de m. fleming était‑ elle légale? [101] in light of the above conclusion, mr. flem- ing’s arrest on may 24, 2009, was not authorized at common law. [101] compte tenu de la conclusion que j’ai ti- rée précédemment, l’arrestation de m. fleming le 24 mai 2009 n’était pas autorisée en common law. [102] because there is no common law power to arrest someone who is acting lawfully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace, the officers in this case did not have lawful authority to arrest mr fleming. the trial judge specifically found that mr. fleming had not done anything unlawful before being arrested; there was no evidence before her that he had committed any offence in walking along argyle street, entering dce property or standing there with his canadian flag (ar, vol. i, at pp 66-67). nor was there evidence that he had himself been about to commit an indictable offence or a breach of the peace. the respondents have not [102] comme il n’existe aucun pouvoir en com- mon law d’arrêter un individu qui agit en toute lé- galité pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix, les policiers n’avaient pas l’autorité légale d’arrêter m. fleming en l’espèce. la juge du procès a spécifiquement conclu que m. fleming n’avait rien fait d’illégal avant d’être arrêté; aucune preuve dans le dossier ne démontrait qu’il avait commis une infraction en marchant le long de la rue argyle, en pénétrant sur les terres des ddc ou en se trou- vant debout avec son drapeau canadien (da, vol. i, p 66-67). aucune preuve ne démontrait non plus qu’il était lui- même sur le point de commettre un 556 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. sought to challenge this finding on appeal, nor have they cited or relied on any statutory power to arrest mr fleming. they do not claim that the arrest was authorized pursuant to s. 129, s. 270, s. 495(1)(a) or any other provision of the criminal code. they rely entirely on a common law power to arrest someone who is acting lawfully in order to prevent an appre- hended breach of the peace by other persons — a power that i have found to be non- existent. [103] one purported error by the trial judge — re- lied on by both the majority of the court of appeal and the respondents in this appeal to challenge her conclusion that mr. fleming’s arrest was not law- ful — lies in her comments that the flag rally was not an “aboriginal critical incident” and that the opp was wrong to apply the aboriginal critical incidents framework in developing its operational plan. some of the trial judge’s comments in referring to the opp’s use of the framework and her criticism of the opp’s consultation with local indigenous groups were unfortunate and unwarranted. [104] that being said, it is my view that this pur- ported error is largely irrelevant to the central legal issues in this case. how the opp characterized the event in advance has no impact on the ques- tion of whether the respondents’ actions in arresting mr. fleming were lawful. i agree with huscroft ja. that any error on the trial judge’s part in this regard could not be legally relevant, because: nothing follows from it: the opp’s policy had no special status in law. even assuming that the trial judge erred — assuming that the flag rally was an “aboriginal critical incident” and the police were following the policy they had established — the lawfulness of mr. fleming’s arrest [did] not [depend] on whether it complied with police policy    [para. 82] acte criminel ou de violer la paix. les intimés n’ont pas cherché à contester cette conclusion en appel et n’ont pas non plus invoqué de pouvoir statutaire, ni ne se sont fondés sur un tel pouvoir, pour arrêter m fleming. ils ne soutiennent pas que l’arrestation était autorisée par les art. 129, 270 ou l’al. 495(1)a) ou par quelque autre disposition du code criminel. ils se fondent entièrement sur un pouvoir de common law d’arrêter un individu qui agit en toute légalité pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix par d’autres individus — un pouvoir qui, comme je l’ai conclu, n’existe pas. [103] une erreur qu’aurait commise la juge du procès et sur laquelle tant les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel que les intimés au présent pourvoi se sont fondés pour contester sa conclusion selon laquelle l’arrestation de m. fleming n’était pas légale découle de ce qu’elle a mentionné que le rallye du drapeau n’était pas un « incident critique concernant les autochtones » et que la ppo avait eu tort d’ap- pliquer le cadre en cas d’incident critique concernant les autochtones dans l’élaboration de son plan opéra- tionnel. certains commentaires de la juge du procès concernant l’utilisation de ce cadre par la ppo. ainsi que ses critiques à l’égard de la consultation des groupes autochtones locaux par la ppo étaient maladroits et injustifiés. [104] cela dit, je suis d’avis que cette prétendue erreur est très peu pertinente en ce qui concerne les questions de droit centrales en l’espèce la manière dont la ppo a catégorisé l’événement à l’avance n’a pas d’incidence sur la légalité de l’arrestation de m. fleming par les intimés. je suis d’accord avec le juge huscroft pour dire que toute erreur de la part de la juge du procès à cet égard ne pouvait être juridiquement pertinente pour les raisons suivantes : [traduction] rien n’en découle : la politique de la ppo. n’avait aucun statut légal spécial. même en supposant que la juge du procès a commis une erreur — donc en tenant pour acquis que le rallye du drapeau était un « incident critique concernant les autochtones » et que la police suivait la politique qu’elle avait établie —, la légalité de l’arrestation de m. fleming ne dépendait pas de sa confor- mité à la politique de la police    [par. 82] [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 557 [105] the conclusion that the respondents’ pur- ported common law power of arrest does not exist is on its own sufficient for this court to allow the appeal, as it leads inevitably to the result that the re- spondents had no authority at common law to arrest mr. fleming in the circumstances of this case. as no other legal authority was proposed for the arrest, it was therefore unlawful. [105] la conclusion selon laquelle les pouvoirs des intimés supposément reconnus par la common law n’existent pas suffit, à elle seule, pour que la cour accueille l’appel, puisqu’elle mène inévitablement au résultat que les intimés ne disposaient d’aucun pouvoir en common law d’arrêter m. fleming dans les circonstances de la présente affaire. comme les intimés n’ont invoqué aucun autre fondement pour justifier l’arrestation, elle était illégale. [106] at the hearing of this appeal, however, the question arose whether the police have the power to require a person to temporarily move out of im- mediate harm’s way in fulfillment of their common law duty to protect life. this discussion concerned an unlikely, but conceivable, situation in which an angry mob is about to attack someone who is law- fully exercising his or her freedom of speech and the person refuses to voluntarily accompany a lone police officer at the scene. counsel for mr. fleming accepted that such a power “must be able to exist in certain type[s] of restricted circumstances” (tran- script, at p 10). [106] toutefois, lors de l’audition du présent pour- voi, il a été question de savoir si les policiers ont le pouvoir d’exiger qu’une personne s’éloigne tempo- rairement du danger immédiat pour s’acquitter de leur devoir de common law de protéger la vie. cette discussion concernait une situation improbable, mais concevable, dans laquelle une foule en colère est sur le point d’attaquer une personne qui exerce légalement sa liberté d’expression et qui refuse d’accompagner volontairement un policier seul sur les lieux. l’avocat de m. fleming a reconnu qu’un tel pouvoir [traduc- tion] « doit pouvoir exister dans certains types de circonstances restreintes » (transcription, p 10). [107] over the years, some courts have recog- nized that a common law police power short of arrest may exist “in truly extreme and exceptional circum- stances” for the purpose of preventing an imminent breach of the peace (austin, at para 119). stringent standards have been developed to ensure that any such substantial police interference with a person’s liberty was demonstrably and reasonably necessary. the limited number of cases on this subject show that the exercise of such powers, if they exist, will generally not be found to be reasonably necessary unless, at a minimum, the apprehended breach of the peace is imminent, the risk of violence is sufficiently serious, the risk of it occurring is substantial, and no less intrusive measures are reasonably availa- ble (see the irish case of o’kelly v. harvey (1883), 14 lri 105 (ca), at p. 109, and the decision of the house of lords in laporte, at paras. 62, 66, 68-69, 101-2, 114 and 141). additionally, it must be demonstrated that the exercise of the power can in fact be effective in preventing the breach of the peace (see figueiras, at para 93). [107] au fil des ans, certains tribunaux ont reconnu qu’un pouvoir policier de common law, moins sé- vère que l’arrestation, peut exister [traduction] « dans des circonstances vraiment extrêmes et ex- ceptionnelles » dans le but de prévenir une violation imminente de la paix (austin, par 119). des normes rigoureuses ont été élaborées pour s’assurer que toute atteinte policière aussi importante à la liberté d’une personne était manifestement et raisonnablement né- cessaire. le nombre limité de causes sur ce sujet dé- montre que l’exercice de tels pouvoirs, s’ils existent, ne sera généralement pas jugé raisonnablement né- cessaire à moins que, minimalement, la violation appréhendée de la paix soit imminente, le risque de violence soit suffisamment grave, le risque que la violence survienne soit important et que les policiers ne puissent raisonnablement recourir à aucune me- sure moins intrusive (voir l’affaire irlandaise o’kelly c. harvey (1883), 14 lri 105 (ca), p. 109, et la décision de la chambre des lords dans laporte, par. 62, 66, 68-69, 101- 102, 114 et 141). en outre, il doit être démontré que l’exercice du pouvoir peut de fait être efficace pour prévenir la violation de la paix (voir figueiras, par 93). 558 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. it is neither necessary nor advisable for this [108] court to comment on whether, when fulfilling their duties of preserving the peace, preventing crime, and protecting life and property, the police may have some other common law powers short of arrest to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace. the instant case was not advanced on the basis that such a power exists at common law in canada. any such power is clearly not the power the respondents ex- ercised against mr. fleming in the instant case: they intended to arrest mr. fleming, and that is plainly what they did. there is no dispute on this point. therefore, it is not necessary to determine whether such powers exist and whether one of them would have been available to the respondents in the circum- stances of this case. [109] further, in canada, because any such hypo- thetical power would infringe on individual liberty (see r v. grant, 2009 scc 32, [2009] 2 scr 353, at para. 25), it would also need to be justified under the ancillary powers doctrine. it would be incon- sistent with the cautious and restrained approach to common law police powers that courts are required to take if we were to recognize this power in this case on the basis of hypothetical scenarios. i would therefore leave the recognition of such a power, if one exists, either to parliament or to a court hearing a case in which the power is raised squarely on the facts. il n’est ni nécessaire ni souhaitable que la [108] cour formule des commentaires sur l’existence ou non de pouvoirs hypothétiques en common law, moins sévères que l’arrestation, auxquels pourraient recourir les policiers lorsqu’ils s’acquittent de leurs devoirs de maintenir la paix, de prévenir le crime et de protéger la vie des personnes et les biens, pour prévenir une violation appréhendée de la paix. la présente cause n’a pas été présentée sur la base de l’existence d’un tel pouvoir en common law au canada. un tel pouvoir n’est clairement pas le pouvoir que les intimés ont exercé contre m. fleming dans la présente affaire; ils entendaient mettre m. fleming en état d’arrestation et c’est clairement ce qu’ils ont fait. cette question ne fait l’objet d’aucun débat. il n’est donc pas nécessaire que nous déterminions l’existence de tels pouvoirs et la possibilité pour les intimés d’y recourir dans les circonstances de la présente affaire. [109] en outre, au canada, puisque tout pouvoir hypothétique de ce type porterait atteinte à la liberté individuelle (voir r c. grant, 2009 csc 32, [2009] 2 rcs 353, par. 25), il devrait également être justi- fié au regard de la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires. il ne serait pas compatible avec l’approche prudente et mesurée que les tribunaux sont tenus d’adopter en matière de reconnaissance de pouvoirs policiers en common law que nous ayons à reconnaître ce pouvoir en l’espèce sur le fondement de scénarios hypothétiques. je laisserais donc le soin au législa- teur ou au tribunal saisi d’une cause où la question de ce pouvoir sera clairement soulevée compte tenu des faits en cause de le reconnaître, s’il en existe un. f the breach of mr. fleming’s right under sec‑ f l’atteinte au droit garanti à m. fleming par tion 2(b) of the charter l’al. 2b) de la charte [110] the trial judge held that the actions of the police had violated mr. fleming’s right to freedom of expression by preventing him from taking part in the flag rally and expressing his views about contentious political issues in his community. the respondents have not challenged this conclusion specifically other than by endorsing the court of appeal’s conclusion that mr. fleming’s arrest was lawful. i will only make a few additional comments on this issue. [110] la juge du procès a conclu que l’interven- tion policière avait porté atteinte au droit à la liberté d’expression de m. fleming, parce qu’elle l’avait empêché de prendre part au rallye du drapeau et d’exprimer son point de vue sur les questions po- litiques litigieuses dans sa collectivité. les intimés n’ont pas contesté cette conclusion spécifiquement, autrement qu’en appuyant la conclusion de la cour d’appel selon laquelle l’arrestation de m. fleming était légale. je ne formulerai que quelques commen- taires additionnels à cet égard. [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 559 [111] the ancillary powers doctrine has been ap- plied by this court previously in the context of char‑ ter rights that are qualified by the language used in the charter itself — such as the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure as provided for in s. 8 or the right not to be arbitrarily detained as provided for in s 9. the court has held that, where a police action is authorized by the common law, there is no infringement of these charter rights, because the internal limits of the rights are respected. for ex- ample, a lawful detention pursuant to a common law power was held not to be arbitrary for the purposes of s. 9 in clayton and mann; likewise, a lawful search pursuant to a common law power was held not to be unreasonable for the purposes of s. 8 in macdonald. the internal limits of those rights require that the po- lice conduct be authorized by law, which can include the common law. provided that the remaining criteria of the applicable internal limits are satisfied, there will be no charter breach, and therefore no need to justify a breach pursuant to s 1. [112] however, some of the interveners in this appeal are suggesting — as the ontario court of appeal did in figueiras, at para. 53 — that the anal- ysis is different in the case of rights that are guaran- teed by the charter in unqualified language, such as the right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b) (see p w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed. supp.), vol. 2, at p 43-6). these interveners argue that the ancillary powers doctrine is insufficient to demonstrate the absence of a charter breach where such rights are limited by police powers, since the language of the relevant charter provisions does not restrict infringements to “unreasonable” or “ar- bitrary” state action. they submit that, where a common law police power limits freedom of ex- pression, the state would still be required to justify the limit under s. 1 of the charter by means of the familiar test from r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103. in their opinion, the fact that the limit is authorized by the common law — and is therefore “prescribed by law” (see r v. swain, [1991] 1 scr 933, at pp.  978-79)  —  does not mean that the limit can [111] la doctrine des pouvoirs accessoires a déjà été appliquée par la cour dans le contexte de droits garantis par la charte qui comportent des limites énoncées dans le libellé même des dispositions per- tinentes — c’est le cas notamment du droit de ne pas être assujetti à des fouilles et saisies abusives garanti par l’art. 8 ou de celui de ne pas être dé- tenu arbitrairement prévu à l’art 9. la cour a jugé que, lorsqu’une intervention policière est autori- sée par la common law, il n’y a pas d’atteinte à ces droits garantis par la charte, parce que leur limite intrinsèque est respectée. par exemple, il a été jugé dans les arrêts clayton et mann qu’une détention légale en vertu d’un pouvoir reconnu par la common law n’était pas arbitraire aux termes de l’art. 9; de même, il a été jugé dans l’arrêt macdonald qu’une fouille légale menée en vertu d’un pouvoir conféré par la common law n’était pas abusive aux termes de l’art 8. les limites intrinsèques de ces droits exigent que la conduite policière soit autorisée par la loi, ce qui peut inclure la common law. dans la mesure où les autres critères des limites intrinsèques applicables sont respectés, il n’y a pas atteinte aux droits garantis par la charte et il n’est pas nécessaire de la justifier au regard de l’article premier. [112] cependant, certains des intervenants dans le présent pourvoi — ainsi que la cour d’appel de l’on- tario dans l’arrêt figueiras, au par. 53 — laissent en- tendre que l’analyse est différente lorsque les droits en jeu garantis par la charte ne comportent pas de limites intrinsèques, comme le droit à la liberté d’ex- pression prévu à l’al. 2b) (voir p w hogg,. constitu‑ tional law of canada (5e éd. suppl.), vol. 2, p 43-6). selon ces intervenants, la doctrine des pouvoirs ac- cessoires est insuffisante pour démontrer l’absence d’une violation de la charte lorsque les droits qu’elle protège sont restreints par des pouvoirs des policiers, puisque le libellé des dispositions pertinentes de la charte ne limite pas les atteintes aux mesures prises par l’état qui sont « abusives » ou « arbitraires ». ils plaident que, lorsqu’un pouvoir policier reconnu par la common law limite la liberté d’expression, l’état est tout de même tenu de justifier l’atteinte au re- gard de l’article premier de la charte, en appliquant le test bien connu établi dans r c oakes, [1986] 1 rcs 103. à leur avis, le fait que la restriction soit autorisée par la common law — et qu’elle soit 560 fleming v ontario côté j. [2019] 3 scr. be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. [113] it is unnecessary to resolve this issue in this case. given that the actions that limited mr. fleming’s freedom of expression were not authorized at com- mon law, they were not “prescribed by law” and therefore cannot possibly be justified under s. 1 (see clayton, at para. 19, per abella j., and at para. 80, per binnie j). the issue of whether the oakes test must be applied in order to justify a limit on a s. 2(b) right where the limiting action is the valid exercise of a common law police power is best left for another case in which it arises squarely and is fully argued. ainsi « prescrite par une règle de droit » (voir r c. swain, [1991] 1 rcs 933, p. 978- 979) — ne veut pas dire qu’il peut être démontré qu’elle est justifiée dans une société libre et démocratique. [113] il n’est pas nécessaire de résoudre cette question en l’espèce. puisque les actes qui ont porté atteinte à la liberté d’expression de m.  fleming n’étaient pas autorisés en common law, ils n’étaient pas « prescrits par une règle de droit » et ne peuvent donc pas se justifier au regard de l’article premier (voir clayton, par. 19, la juge abella, et par. 80, le juge binnie). la question de savoir s’il faut appli- quer le critère établi dans l’arrêt oakes pour justifier les atteintes au droit garanti par l’al. 2b) lorsque les actes qui restreignent la liberté font partie de l’exercice valide d’un pouvoir policier en common law est une question qu’il sera préférable d’aborder dans un autre cas où elle sera directement soulevée et entièrement débattue. g excessive force g force excessive [114] the majority of the ontario court of appeal, having found that mr. fleming’s arrest was lawful, ordered a new trial solely on the issue of whether the respondents had used excessive force. in light of my earlier conclusions, a new trial on this issue is not warranted. [115] section 25(1) of the criminal code states: [114] les juges majoritaires de la cour d’ap- pel de l’ontario, ayant conclu que l’arrestation de m. fleming était légale, ont ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès uniquement sur la question de savoir si les intimés avaient employé une force excessive. compte tenu de mes conclusions, la te- nue d’un nouveau procès sur cette question n’est pas justifiée. [115] le paragraphe 25(1) du code criminel est ainsi libellé : every one who is required or authorized by law to do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law quiconque est, par la loi, obligé ou autorisé à faire quoi que ce soit dans l’application ou l’exécution de la loi :   .   . (b) as a peace officer or public officer, b) soit à titre d’agent de la paix ou de fonctionnaire public;   .   . is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in doing what he is required or authorized to do and in using as much force as is necessary for that purpose. est, s’il agit en s’appuyant sur des motifs raisonnables, fondé à accomplir ce qu’il lui est enjoint ou permis de faire et fondé à employer la force nécessaire pour cette fin. [2019] 3 rcs. fleming c ontario la juge côté 561 [116] this section authorizes police officers to use “as much force as is necessary” in the execution of their duties. it affords them a defence to a claim of battery, provided that the section’s requirements are satisfied. the provision will not shield officers from liability if the force they used is found to be excessive. [116] ce paragraphe autorise les policiers à em- ployer la « force nécessaire » dans l’exécution de leurs devoirs. il leur fournit un moyen de défense contre des accusations de voies de fait, à condition qu’il soit satisfait aux exigences qui y sont énoncées. cette disposition ne les met toutefois pas à l’abri de leur responsabilité si la force qu’ils ont utilisée est jugée excessive. [117] however, police officers cannot rely on s. 25(1) to justify the use of force if they had no legal authority — either under legislation or at common law — for their actions (see figueiras, at para. 147; coughlan and luther, at p 32). [117] les policiers ne peuvent toutefois pas se fon- der sur le par. 25(1) pour justifier le recours à la force s’ils n’avaient pas le pouvoir — reconnu par une loi ou par la common law — d’agir comme ils l’ont fait (voir figueiras, par. 147; coughlan et luther, p 32). [118] because the respondents were not authorized at common law to arrest mr. fleming, no amount of force would have been justified for the purpose of accomplishing that task. they were not doing what they were “required or authorized to do” within the meaning of s 25(1). [119] as a result, no new trial is needed on the issue of excessive force. there is no basis for in- tervening in the trial judge’s conclusion that the re- spondents were liable for battery for their use of force in unlawfully arresting mr fleming. [118] comme les intimés n’étaient pas autorisés par la common law à arrêter m. fleming, aucune force n’aurait été justifiée aux fins d’accomplir cette tâche. ils n’étaient pas en train de s’acquitter de ce qu’ils étaient « obligé[s] ou autorisé[s] à faire » au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’application du par 25(1). [119] en conséquence, la tenue d’un nouveau pro- cès n’est pas nécessaire pour examiner la question de l’utilisation d’une force excessive. il n’y a aucune raison de modifier la conclusion de la juge du procès selon laquelle les intimés étaient responsables de voies de fait pour avoir utilisé la force lors de l’ar- restation illégale de m fleming. vi conclusion vi conclusion [120] for the foregoing reasons, i would allow the appeal, set aside the order of the ontario court of appeal and restore the trial judge’s order. costs are awarded throughout: costs in this court and the agreed- upon trial and appeal costs of $151,000 and $48,000 respectively. [120] pour les motifs qui précèdent, j’accueillerais le pourvoi, j’annulerais l’ordonnance de la cour d’appel de l’ontario et je rétablirais l’ordonnance de la juge du procès. les dépens sont accordés devant toutes les cours, à savoir ceux devant cette cour, ainsi que ceux pour le procès et l’appel, dont les parties ont convenu, soit 151 000 $ et 48 000 $ respectivement. appeal allowed. pourvoi accueilli. procureurs de l’appelant : gowling wlg (canada), ada), hamilton. hamilton. procureur des intimés : procureur général de of ontario, toronto. l’ontario, toronto. 562 fleming v ontario [2019] 3 scr. of canada: attorney general of canada, ottawa. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général du canada : procureur général du canada, ottawa. of quebec: attorney general of quebec, québec. liberties association: dewart gleason, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné‑ rale du québec : procureure générale du québec, québec. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association ca‑ nadienne des libertés civiles : dewart gleason, to‑ ronto. yers’ association (ontario): louis p. strezos and associate, toronto; greenspan humphrey weinstein, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association (ontario) : louis p. strezos and as‑ sociate, toronto; greenspan humphrey weinstein, toronto. ciation of chiefs of police: city of vancouver, law department, vancouver. procureur de l’intervenante l’association cana‑ dienne des chefs de police : city of vancouver, law department, vancouver. ation for progress in justice: norton rose fulbright canada, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante canadian associa‑ tion for progress in justice : norton rose fulbright canada, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante canadian constitu‑ stitution foundation: mccarthy tétrault, toronto. tion foundation : mccarthy tétrault, toronto.
i. overview the principles of predictability, certainty, and fairness and respect for the right of taxpayers to legitimate tax minimization are the bedrock of tax law in the context of international tax treaties, respect for negotiated bargains between contracting states is fundamental to ensure tax certainty and predictability and to uphold the principle of pacta sunt servanda, pursuant to which parties to a treaty must keep their sides of the bargain. section 245 of the income tax act, rsc 1985, c 1 (5th supp.) (“act”), known as the general anti-avoidance rule (“gaar”), acts as a legislative limit on tax certainty by barring abusive tax avoidance transactions, including those in which taxpayers seek to obtain treaty benefits that were never intended by the contracting states. this intention is found by going behind the text of the provisions under which a tax benefit is claimed in order to determine their object, spirit, and purpose in the bilateral treaty context, there are two sovereign states whose intentions are relevant; a robust analysis must take both into consideration in order to give proper effect to the tax treaty as a carefully negotiated instrument. in this case, the appellant, her majesty the queen, as represented by the minister of national revenue (“minister”), submits that the transaction at issue abused the convention between the government of canada and the government of the grand duchy of luxembourg for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital, can. ts 2000 no. 22 (“treaty”). according to the minister, the drafters did not intend the treaty to benefit residents without “sufficient substantive economic connections” to their state of residence (af, at para. 100). in the view of the respondent, alta energy luxembourg sarl (“alta luxembourg”), the minister has failed to discharge her burden of establishing that the object, spirit, or purpose of the provisions was frustrated or defeated. in my view, the minister is asking this court to use the gaar to change the result, not by interpreting the provisions of the treaty through a unified textual, contextual, and purposive analysis, but by fundamentally altering the criteria under which a person is entitled to the benefits of the treaty, thus frustrating the certainty and predictability sought by the drafters. tax treaties are replete with choices. one key choice made by canada and luxembourg was to deviate from the organisation for economic co-operation and development (“oecd”) model tax convention on income and on capital (“oecd model treaty”)1 by including a specific carve-out provision for immovable property, also called the business property exemption this carve-out allocates to a person’s residence state the right to tax capital gains realized on the disposition of shares or other similar interests deriving their value principally from immovable property used in a corporation’s business. the rationale of the carve-out is not connected to the theory of economic allegiance. in fact, this provision is a clear departure from this theory, for the 1 several versions of the oecd model treaty and its introductions and commentaries are cited in these reasons: the 1977 “commentary on article 1”, in model double taxation convention on income and on capital; the 1998 “model convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital”, “commentary on article 1”, “commentary on article 4” and “commentary on article 13”, in model convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital: condensed version; the 2003 “model convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital”, “introduction” and “commentary on article 1”, in model tax convention on income and on capital: condensed version; and the 2017 “model convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital” and “introduction”, in model tax convention on income and on capital: condensed version. source state normally has the greater economic claim to tax income derived from immovable property or a business situated within its territory. canada’s decision to forego its right to tax such capital gains realized in canada was based on economic considerations broader than generating tax revenues. tax law is designed not only to bring revenues into a state’s coffers but also to incentivize or disincentivize certain behaviours (canada trustco mortgage co v. canada, 2005 scc 54, [2005] 2 scr 601, at para. 53). indeed, in agreeing to include the carve-out in the treaty, canada sought to encourage investments by luxembourg residents in business assets embodied in immovable property located in canada (eg. mines, hotels, or oil shales) and to reap the ensuing economic benefits. this incentive was never intended to be limited to luxembourg residents with “sufficient substantive economic connections” to luxembourg. internationally, residency typically does not depend on the existence of such connections; formal criteria for residency are just as well accepted as factual criteria. in this case, alta luxembourg made exactly such an investment it is a resident of luxembourg and, as such, is exempt from canadian taxes on the capital gain realized on the disposition of shares of its wholly owned canadian subsidiary. in my respectful view, my colleagues rowe and martin jj. undertake their analysis as though the treaty were a simple statute rather than a freely negotiated bargain whose interpretation must reflect the intentions of the parties that drafted it. canada understood that it was dealing with a low-tax jurisdiction, and, in recognition of this reality, it agreed to specific terms in the treaty, such as the business property exemption in this way, canada effectively agreed to give up its right to tax certain entities incorporated in luxembourg in exchange for the jobs and economic opportunities that the business property exemption would promote. this decision can hardly be questioned. in raising the gaar, canada is now seeking to revisit its bargain in order to secure both foreign investments and tax revenues. but if the gaar is to remain a robust tool, it cannot be used to judicially amend or renegotiate a treaty. for the reasons that follow, i agree with the courts below that the minister has not discharged her burden of proving abusive tax avoidance. therefore, i would dismiss the appeal. ii background in april 2011, alta resources llc, a texas-based oil and gas firm, and blackstone group lp (“blackstone”), a new york-based private equity firm, founded alta energy partners, llc, a delaware limited liability company, for the purpose of acquiring and developing unconventional oil and natural gas properties in north america one such property was the duvernay shale formation in northwestern alberta. alta energy partners canada ltd. (“alta canada”), a wholly owned canadian subsidiary of the delaware limited liability company, was incorporated in order to carry on that business. alta canada invested almost $300 million in its canadian business through its acquisition of the oil and natural gas drill and recovery rights in certain lands in alberta. a restructuring of alta canada was undertaken in 2012 as part of the restructuring, alta luxembourg was incorporated under the laws of luxembourg to hold interests in luxembourg and foreign companies prior to the restructuring, blackstone’s counsel obtained a ruling from the luxembourg tax authorities that the restructuring was in compliance with tax legislation and administrative policies in luxembourg the shares of alta luxembourg were issued to a new canadian partnership formed in alberta, alta energy canada partnership (“partnership”). on the same day, the delaware limited liability company sold all of its shares of alta canada to alta luxembourg. this was a taxable transaction in canada under the act, as more than 50 percent of the value of the shares was derived from canadian resource properties. in august 2013, alta luxembourg agreed to sell its shares of alta canada to chevron canada ltd when the sale closed on september 10, 2013, for $679,712,251.45, alta luxembourg realized a capital gain in excess of $380 million on the disposition pursuant to a direction to pay, alta luxembourg directed its proceeds from the sale (less an amount paid to the minister) to the partnership in exchange, the partnership issued promissory notes to alta luxembourg, which were set off, in part, by an existing interest-free loan and profit-participating loan. in other words, alta luxembourg did not receive any of the sale proceeds following the disposition of its shares of alta canada, alta luxembourg did not conduct any other business or hold any other investments. all tax was reported. alta luxembourg’s capital gain was reported to the luxembourg tax authorities and was subject to full taxation by them under their domestic laws. in its canadian tax return filed for the 2013 taxation year, alta luxembourg claimed an exemption from canadian tax on the basis that the gain was not included in its “taxable income earned in canada” under s 115(1)(b) of the act because the shares were “treaty-protected property” under art. 13(4) and (5) of the treaty these provisions create a carve-out for residents of luxembourg from canadian tax arising from a capital gain on the alienation of “shares . . . the value of which . . . is derived principally from immovable property situated in [canada]” and “in which the business of the company . . . was carried on” (art. 13(4) of the treaty). the minister denied the treaty exemption, and alta luxembourg appealed to the tax court of canada. in their lengthy statement of agreed facts, the parties make important concessions. first and foremost, the minister agrees that alta luxembourg is a resident of luxembourg for the purposes of the treaty. the minister and alta luxembourg also agree that alta canada was a “principal business corporation” pursuant to s 66(15) of the act, that its shares were taxable canadian property within the meaning of s 248(1) of the act and that the series of restructuring transactions and the sale of the shares of alta canada to chevron were an “avoidance transaction” as defined in s 245(3) of the act. iii. judicial history a. tax court of canada, 2018 tcc 152, [2019] 5 ctc 2183 (hogan j.) before the tax court, the minister raised two arguments first, the minister argued that alta canada did not carry on business in the immovable property in question, such that the business property exemption in art. 13(4) of the treaty did not apply. in the alternative, if the shares did qualify as treaty-protected property, the minister argued that the gaar should apply. hogan j found that alta canada carried on business in the immovable property; therefore, the carve-out in art. 13(4) applied, and alta canada’s shares were treaty-protected property for the purposes of the act. with respect to the gaar, the parties agreed that the restructuring was an avoidance transaction that resulted in a tax benefit. thus, the tax court had to determine if the gaar applied, that is, whether the avoidance transaction resulted in a misuse or abuse of the provisions of the act or the treaty. with respect to the abuse analysis under the gaar, hogan j held that the avoidance transaction did not result in an abuse of ss. 2(3), 38, 39, 115(1)(b) and 248(1) of the act, or of the act as a whole. in his view, the provisions of the act had operated in the manner intended by parliament. without citing this court’s decision in canada trustco, hogan j followed the two-step approach it established, acknowledging that a tax treaty, as an international convention, should be given a liberal interpretation with a view to implementing the true intention of the parties. hogan j conducted a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis of arts. 1, 4 and 13 of the treaty and held that their rationale is “to exempt residents of luxembourg from canadian taxation where there is an investment in immovable property used in a business” (para. 100). he relied in part on the 2017 oecd model treaty, on which the treaty is modeled, and its commentaries as interpretive aids. he observed that the business property exemption in art. 13(4) of the treaty does not exist in the oecd model treaty, which demonstrates an intention to depart from the model treaty in order to attract foreign investment in business property situated in canada. despite the minister’s objections, hogan j found nothing improper about alta luxembourg, a single-purpose holding corporation resident in luxembourg, availing itself of the benefits of the treaty. in his view, the minister was seeking to achieve through the courts the same result with the gaar as was intended by the minister of finance’s proposed rule against tax treaty shopping, but the gaar could not be used in this way. hogan j held that the overall result of the transaction was not contrary to the rationale of arts. 1, 4 and 13 because the “significant investments of [alta luxembourg] to de-risk the duvernay shale constitute an investment in immovable property used in a business” (para. 100). therefore, the gaar did not preclude alta luxembourg from claiming the exemption provided for in art. 13(5) of the treaty, and the matter was referred back to the minister for reconsideration and reassessment. b federal court of appeal, 2020 fca 43, [2020] 5 ctc 193 (webb, near and locke jja). the minister did not appeal the tax court’s finding that alta luxembourg satisfied the requirements for the business property exemption thus, the sole issue before the federal court of appeal was whether the gaar applied because of an abuse of the act or the treaty. webb ja, writing for a unanimous court, dismissed the appeal in his analysis of the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions, webb ja noted that most of the minister’s submissions were in reference to general principles and failed to identify any clear rationale for the provisions at issue: arts. 1, 4 and 13(4) of the treaty. relying on r v. mil (investments) sa, 2007 fca 236, [2007] 4 ctc. 235, webb ja concluded “that the object, spirit and purpose of the relevant provisions of the [treaty] is reflected in the words as chosen by canada and luxembourg. since the provisions operated as they were intended to operate, there was no abuse” (para. 80) he also determined that commentaries on the oecd model treaty published subsequently to the signature and ratification of the treaty were “of little assistance in determining the rationale for the exemption” (para. 36). in addition to finding that the minister had failed to identify any clear rationale for arts. 1, 4 and 13(4) of the treaty, webb ja found that the minister’s five further submissions did not withstand scrutiny, as they all added qualifications to or modified the words of the treaty. the minister’s submissions changed the identity of who would qualify for the exemption from “residents” to “investors” and added the qualification that an “entity” had to have the potential to earn income in luxembourg in order to be considered a resident of luxembourg. in webb ja’s view, the fact that the net effect of the profit-participating loan was that alta luxembourg never realized taxable income in luxembourg “is a matter for the luxembourg tax authorities” (para. 57) additionally, there was no underlying requirement that the exemption benefit only persons with commercial or economic ties to luxembourg, nor was the residence of the partners of alta luxembourg’s sole shareholder relevant to the analysis. he found that these qualifications were not included in the exemption in the treaty, even though they could easily have been added. webb ja declined to find that treaty shopping is abusive, agreeing with the tax court judge in mil (investments) sa v. r., 2006 tcc 460, [2006] 5 ctc. 2552 (“mil (tcc)”), at para. 69, that “[t]here is nothing inherently proper or improper with selecting one foreign regime over another” and that, though “the selection of a low tax jurisdiction may speak persuasively as evidence of a tax purpose for an alleged avoidance transaction, . . . the shopping or selection of a treaty to minimize tax on its own cannot be viewed as being abusive”. in short, webb j.a found that “the object, spirit and purpose of the relevant provisions of the [treaty] is reflected in the words as chosen by canada and luxembourg since the provisions [had] operated as they were intended to operate, there was no abuse” (para. 80). the appeal was therefore dismissed. iv. issues the minister has accepted that alta luxembourg is a resident of luxembourg for the purposes of the treaty and that a business was being carried on in the immovable property in question. furthermore, alta luxembourg has admitted the existence of a tax benefit and an avoidance transaction. therefore, the only element in dispute is the abusive nature of the transaction, which raises the following issues: a) what are the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions of the treaty? b) did the courts below err in concluding that the avoidance transaction in this case did not result in an abuse of those provisions? v analysis a general anti-avoidance rule (“gaar”) like all statutes, tax legislation must be interpreted by conducting a “textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the act as a whole” (canada trustco, at para. 10). however, where tax provisions are drafted with “particularity and detail”, a largely textual interpretation is appropriate in light of the well-accepted duke of westminster principle that “taxpayers are entitled to arrange their affairs to minimize the amount of tax payable” (canada trustco, at para. 11, citing commissioners of inland revenue v. duke of westminster, [1936] ac. 1 (hl)). this principle, derived from the rule of law, has been deemed the “foundation stone of canadian law on tax avoidance” (b. j. arnold, “reflections on the relationship between statutory interpretation and tax avoidance” (2001), 49 can. tax j 1, at p 3). this established principle was affected by the enactment of s 245 of the act, also known as the gaar, which “superimposed a prohibition on abusive tax avoidance, with the effect that the literal application of provisions of the act may be seen as abusive in light of their context and purpose” (canada trustco, at para. 1). thus, if the minister can establish abusive tax avoidance under the gaar, s 245 of the act will apply to deny the tax benefit even where the tax arrangements are consistent with a literal interpretation of the relevant provisions (copthorne holdings ltd v. canada, 2011 scc 63, [2011] 3 scr 721, at para. 66). the gaar applies both to the abuse of provisions found in the act and to the abuse of provisions found in a tax treaty (s 245(4)(a)(i) and (iv) of the act; s 4.1 of the income tax conventions interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i-4). applying the gaar involves a three-part process meant to determine: (1) whether there is a tax benefit arising from a transaction; (2) whether the transaction is an avoidance transaction; and (3) whether the avoidance transaction is abusive (canada trustco, at para. 17). as mentioned above, the third part is the only one in issue before this court. to determine whether a transaction is abusive, this court has set out a two-step inquiry (canada trustco, at paras. 44 and 55). under the first step, the provisions relied on for the tax benefit are interpreted to determine their object, spirit, and purpose the second step is to undertake a factual analysis to determine whether the avoidance transaction at issue is consistent with or frustrates the object, spirit, and purpose of the provisions. the onus rests on the minister to demonstrate the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions and to establish that allowing alta luxembourg the benefit of the exemption would be a misuse or an abuse of the provisions (canada trustco, at para. 65). abusive tax avoidance occurs “when a taxpayer relies on specific provisions of the income tax act in order to achieve an outcome that those provisions seek to prevent” or when a transaction “defeats the underlying rationale of the provisions that are relied upon” (canada trustco, at paras. 45; see also para. 57; lipson v. canada, 2009 scc 1, [2009] 1 scr 3, at para. 40) abusive tax avoidance can also occur when an arrangement “circumvents the application of certain provisions, such as specific anti-avoidance rules, in a manner that frustrates or defeats the object, spirit or purpose of those provisions” (para. 45). canada trustco recognized that the line between legitimate tax minimization and abusive tax avoidance is “far from bright” (para. 16) as a result, “[i]f the existence of abusive tax avoidance is unclear, the benefit of the doubt goes to the taxpayer” (canada trustco, at para. 66; see also copthorne, at para. 72). b. international tax treaties (1) general principles in r v. melford developments inc., [1982] 2 scr 504, at p 513, this court applied the principle that tax treaties do not themselves levy new taxes, they simply authorize the contracting parties to do so. reciprocity is a fundamental principle underlying tax treaties, as they confer rights and impose obligations on each of the contracting states hogan j observed that “[p]arties to a tax treaty are presumed to know the other country’s tax system when they negotiate a tax treaty; they are presumed to know the tax consequences of a tax treaty when they negotiate amendments to that treaty” (para. 84). this only makes sense. the objective of tax treaties, broadly stated, is to govern the interactions between national tax laws in order to facilitate cross-border trade and investment. one of the most important operational goals is the elimination of double taxation, where the same source of income is taxed by two or more states without any relief if left unchecked, double taxation risks creating barriers to international trade and investment, which are vital in a globalized economy thus, many substantive provisions of the oecd model treaty, a model for numerous bilateral tax treaties, are directed to achieving this goal and resolving conflicting claims between residence-based taxation and source-based taxation. another important consideration is the dual nature — contractual and statutory — of tax treaties. consideration of the contractual element is crucial to the application of the gaar because it focuses the analysis on whether the particular tax planning strategy is consistent with the compromises reached by the contracting states. as noted by international tax law scholars jinyan li and arthur cockfield: whether the particular outcome of tax planning is defensible may depend on the understanding of the “bargain” struck by the two treaty partner countries. every dispute involving the application of a tax treaty needs to ask the question of whether and how one treaty partner can dispute or should be allowed to upset the “bargain” struck in its own national interest that inheres in the treaty “contract” despite the offence that one treaty partner may take, in retrospect, to how a treaty provision is applied, the question remains: might the particular outcome be one that the other treaty partner foresaw or reflect the “contractual intention” of the other treaty partner? after all, the “bargain” was entered into by the parties out of mutual self-interest this is particularly relevant in applying general anti-avoidance rules. [emphasis added.] (j. li and a. cockfield, with j. s. wilkie, international taxation in canada: principles and practices (4th ed. 2018), at p 376) as tax treaties are treaties, their interpretation is governed by the vienna convention on the law of treaties, can. ts 1980 no. 37 (“vienna convention”), but the methodology prescribed is not radically different from the modern principle applicable to domestic statutes in canada — that is, one must consider the ordinary meaning of the text in its context and in light of its purpose (art. 31(1) of the vienna convention; crown forest industries ltd. v. canada, [1995] 2 scr 802, at para. 43; stubart investments ltd v the queen, [1984] 1 scr 536, at p 578) however, unlike statutes, treaties must be interpreted “with a view to implementing the true intentions of the parties” (j. n. gladden estate v the queen, [1985] 1 ctc 163 (fctd), at p 166, quoted approvingly in crown forest, at para. 43). the national self-interest of each contracting state must be reconciled in the interpretive process in order to give full effect to the bargain codified by the treaty. this principle applies with equal force where a court is engaged in the process of ascertaining a treaty’s “object, spirit, and purpose” as part of the gaar framework. (2) oecd commentaries as interpretative aids article 31 of the vienna convention permits courts to consider contextual factors such as other agreements and instruments made by parties in connection with a treaty. in my view, the oecd model treaty and its commentaries are relevant to the interpretation of treaties based on that model. the introduction to the oecd model treaty indicates that the commentaries “can . . . be of great assistance in the application and interpretation of the conventions and, in particular, in the settlement of any disputes”, and this court has affirmed the “high persuasive value” of the oecd model treaty and its commentaries (“introduction” to the oecd model treaty (1998, 2003 and 2017), at para. 29; crown forest, at para. 55; see also d. a. ward, “principles to be applied in interpreting tax treaties” (1977), 25 can tax j 263, at p 268). however, the relevance of commentaries released subsequent to the signing of a treaty is disputed (see, eg, “introduction” to the oecd model treaty (1998, 2003 and 2017), at para. 35; mil (tcc), at para. 83; cudd pressure control inc. v. r., [1999] 1 ctc. 1 (fca), at para. 28, per mcdonald ja;. sa andritz, no. 233894, conseil d’état (section du contentieux), december 30, 2003 (france); li and cockfield, at p 57). in the instant case, the minister relies on revisions to the commentaries on the oecd model treaty that were published in 2003 and 2017, several years after canada and luxembourg negotiated the treaty in the 2003 commentaries, treaty shopping is characterized as an abuse of the concept of residence, whereas previous commentaries published at the time the treaty was signed were silent on this question. a revision to the 2017 commentaries, made in connection with the addition of a new art. 29 to the oecd model treaty, provides that legal residency alone is not an automatic entitlement to all benefits under a tax treaty. while revisions to the commentaries are relevant to tax treaty interpretation, the key issue is the weight that they should receive although some scholars submit that the oecd has a tendency of revising the commentaries too often and too dramatically, thereby sometimes diverging from the original intentions of the parties, i am not prepared to reject all subsequent commentaries as interpretative aids (see li and cockfield, at p 57; p. malherbe, elements of international income taxation (2015), at pp. 49-50). i instead prefer the nuanced approach adopted by the federal court of appeal in prévost car inc. v. canada, 2009 fca 57, [2010] 2 fcr. 65. indeed, in prévost car, the federal court of appeal held that subsequent commentaries expanding or clarifying notions already captured by the oecd model treaty are relevant, but not those that extend the scope of provisions in a manner that could not have been considered by the drafters (paras. 10-12; see also li and cockfield, at p 57). thus, while later amendments to the commentaries are not part of the context as defined in art. 31(2) of the vienna convention, given that such amendments were not made “in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty”, they may play a role under art. 31(3), which refers to “[a]ny subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” and “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. in this case, i am of the view that the 2003 and 2017 commentaries do not reflect the intentions of the drafters of the treaty. the extensive revisions made to the commentaries in 2003 purported to clarify the relationship between tax treaties and domestic anti-avoidance rules, and, in particular, one of the revisions was made to include the prevention of tax avoidance as a purpose of such treaties. the changes were not mere clarifications and have been described as being “created out of thin air by the oecd in 2003” and as “a significant change in the stated attitude of the oecd to the relationship between tax treaties and tax avoidance” (b. j. arnold, “tax treaties and tax avoidance: the 2003 revisions to the commentary to the oecd model” (2004), 58 ibfd. bulletin 244, at pp. 249 and 260). using the federal court of appeal’s language in prévost car (at para. 12), the 2003 commentaries do not elicit, but rather contradict, the views previously expressed. when canada and luxembourg signed the treaty in 1999, the applicable commentaries indicated that anti-abuse measures, to be effective, had to be included in a treaty (“commentary on article 1” of the 1998 oecd model treaty, at para. 21). further, they referred to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which supports the position that where nothing in a treaty speaks directly to fiscal avoidance, there is a strong argument that the treaty partners negotiated the treaty not intending such rules to apply (“commentary on article 1” of the 1998 oecd model treaty, at paras. 11-26; d. a. ward et al., the interpretation of income tax treaties with particular reference to the commentaries on the oecd model (2005), at pp. 91-92). moreover, interpreting art. 1 of the treaty with reference to the 2003 commentaries would overlook luxembourg’s registered observation on the “commentary on article 1” of the 2003 oecd model treaty. that observation reads as follows: luxembourg does not share the interpretation in paragraphs 9.2, 22.1 and 23 which provide that there is generally no conflict between anti-abuse provisions of the domestic law of a contracting state and the provisions of its tax conventions absent an express provision in the convention, luxembourg therefore believes that a state can only apply its domestic anti-abuse provisions in specific cases after recourse to the mutual agreement procedure. [para. 27.6] in effect, even if the minister were able to rely on the commentaries postdating the treaty, they would be of no assistance because luxembourg’s observation expresses disagreement with the “commentary on article 1” of the oecd model treaty, which includes the anti-abuse commentary (ward et al., at p 64; “commentary on article 1” of the 2003 oecd model treaty, at p 7). it follows, then, that in the interpretation of art. 1 of the treaty, commentaries on art. 1 of the oecd model treaty that postdate the treaty cannot be relied on to introduce terms that modify the treaty. not only would this effectively amend the treaty in a manner not agreed upon by the parties, but it would also usurp the role of the governor in council by allowing for judicial amendment of bilateral treaties against the expressed wishes of the contracting states. c cautionary preface to the gaar analysis before i proceed, it is important to sound some notes of caution. first and foremost, tax avoidance is not tax evasion, and there is no suggestion by either party that the transaction in this case was evasive. in addition, tax avoidance should not be conflated with abuse. even if a transaction was designed for a tax avoidance purpose and not for a bona fide non-tax purpose, such as an economic or commercial purpose, it does not mean that it is necessarily abusive within the meaning of the gaar (canada trustco, at paras. 36 and 57; see also lipson, at para. 38). the purpose of a transaction is relevant mainly to characterize it as either an avoidance transaction or a bona fide transaction and, specifically, to assess the abusive nature of the transaction in their factual analysis, courts may consider whether an avoidance transaction was “motivated by any economic, commercial, family or other non-tax purpose” (canada trustco, at para. 58). however, a finding that a bona fide non-tax purpose is lacking, taken alone, should not be considered conclusive evidence of abusive tax avoidance. justices rowe and martin are taking exactly that approach, and it colours their entire analysis moreover, such a finding should not be allowed to impair the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions in a manner that makes substantive economic connections or the presence of a bona fide non-tax purpose a condition precedent to every tax benefit; the goal is to ensure the relevant provisions are properly interpreted in light of their context and purpose (canada trustco, at para. 62). second, it is also important to distinguish what is immoral from what is abusive. it is true, as reiterated in copthorne, that the gaar is a legislative measure by which “parliament has conferred on the court the unusual duty of going behind the words of the legislation to determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provision or provisions relied upon by the taxpayer” (para. 66). but, in copthorne, rothstein j was quick to note the limits to that legislative mandate. in contrast to what my colleagues are proposing, rothstein j observed that courts should not infuse the abuse analysis with “a value judgment of what is right or wrong nor with theories about what tax law ought to be or ought to do” (para. 70). taxpayers are allowed to minimize their tax liability to the full extent of the law and to engage in “creative” tax avoidance planning, insofar as it is not abusive within the meaning of the gaar (para. 65). therefore, even though one may consider treaty shopping in tax havens to be immoral, this is not determinative of a finding of abuse. finally, the abuse analysis is not meant to be a “search for an overriding policy of the act that is not based on a unified, textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific provisions in issue” (canada trustco, at para. 41). the focus of the interpretation is on the object, spirit, and purpose of the specific provisions and not on the broader policy objective of the act or of a particular tax treaty. therefore, policy objectives such as “avoiding double taxation” and “encouraging trade and investment” that are found in bilateral tax treaties cannot be invoked to override the wording of the provisions in issue. d first step: object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions as mentioned above, the first step of the abuse analysis is to ascertain the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions. because this is a question of treaty interpretation, however, this must be done with a view to implementing the true intentions of the parties. this is a question of law and the analysis of this first step is therefore subject to the correctness standard (canada trustco, at para. 44). the minister’s submissions centre on an alleged abuse by alta luxembourg of arts. 1, 4(1) and 13(4) and (5) of the treaty. i analyze these provisions in two separate groups for the purposes of the first step: first, arts. 1 and 4(1), which pertain to resident status; and second, art. 13(4) and (5), under which the right to tax the capital gain at issue is allocated to the residence state. (1) residence (arts. 1 and 4(1)) residence is at the core of bilateral tax treaties, given that access to treaty benefits is normally reserved to persons residing in one or both of the contracting states. the text of arts. 1 and 4(1) of the treaty also makes residence central to the application of the treaty. indeed, the residency requirement established in art. 1 of the treaty is modeled on the oecd model treaty: this convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the contracting states. article 4(1) elaborates on the definition of “residence” under the treaty: for the purposes of this convention, the term “resident of a contracting state” means any person who, under the laws of that state, is liable to tax therein by reason of that person’s domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature this term also includes a contracting state or a political subdivision or local authority thereof or any agency or instrumentality of any such state, subdivision or authority. this term, however, does not include any person who is liable to tax in that state in respect only of income from sources in that state. according to this provision, a resident under the treaty is a person who is liable to tax in one or both of the contracting states (canada and luxembourg) by reason of one of the connecting factors listed (ie domicile, residence, place of management or another similar criterion) (see crown forest, at paras. 23-25). i also note that the use of the word “means” in this provision indicates that the definition should be “construed as comprehending that which is specifically described or defined” and thus as setting out all requirements that must be met to be considered a resident under the treaty (r v. hauser, [1979] 1 scr 984, at p 1009, per dickson j.; see also r v. mcleod (1950), 97 ccc 366 (bcca), at pp. 371-72, quoting dilworth v. commissioner of stamps, [1899] ac 99 (pc), at pp. 105-6). in the context of corporations, the “liable to tax” requirement is met under the treaty where the domestic law of a contracting state exposes the corporation to full tax liability on its worldwide income because it has its residence in that state (see crown forest, at paras. 40 and 45). liability to full taxation is established by the nexus between that state and the corporation’s resident status. the “liable to tax” requirement is often described in terms that may perhaps appear misleading, such as “comprehensive taxation” or “full liability to tax”. these terms convey the idea that residents enjoying tax holidays may be more suspicious than others in reality, this requirement is not concerned with whether the person claiming benefits is in fact subject to taxation. being liable to tax is better understood as being “liable to be liable to tax”, meaning that taxes are a possibility, regardless of whether the person actually pays any (r. couzin, corporate residence and international taxation (2002), at p 107; see also pp. 106 and 111). therefore, corporate residents enjoying certain tax holidays, for example on capital gains, do not automatically lose their resident status under the treaty because they are not subject to every possible form of taxation (couzin, at pp. 110-11 and 150) this can be contrasted with fiscally transparent vehicles like partnerships that are not exempted from taxation but, rather, are not exposed to tax at all, as their income is taxed in the partners’ hands instead. aside from the “liable to tax” requirement, the purpose of art. 4(1) is not to establish specific standards for defining residence. this provision expressly states that residence is to be defined by the laws of the contracting state of which the person claims to be a resident. this provision of the treaty is modeled almost word for word on art. 4(1) of the 1998 oecd model treaty, whose commentary also made it clear that the intention was to leave the core definition of residence to domestic law, not to bilateral tax treaties: conventions for the avoidance of double taxation do not normally concern themselves with the domestic laws of the contracting states laying down the conditions under which a person is to be treated fiscally as “resident” and, consequently, is fully liable to tax in that state. they do not lay down standards which the provisions of the domestic laws on “residence” have to fulfil in order that claims for full tax liability can be accepted between the contracting states in this respect the states take their stand entirely on the domestic laws. [emphasis added.] (“commentary on article 4” of the 1998 oecd model treaty, at para. 4) consideration of the context of the treaty confirms this intention expressed in the commentary indeed, this preference for leaving the meaning of residence to domestic law is totally consistent with the scheme of the treaty. most terms found in the treaty are defined under domestic law and not by the treaty itself. as emphasized by professor arnold, “[b]ecause the language of tax treaties is broad and general, it seems inevitable that recourse must be had to the domestic laws of the contracting states in order to provide flesh for the bare bones of the treaty” (b. j. arnold, reforming canada’s international tax system: toward coherence and simplicity (2009), at p 325). although the treaty does define residence in art. 4 and some other terms in arts. 3(1), 5, and 6(2), these definitions are far from exhaustive in fact, the list of defined terms is rather scant, and important concepts, such as “business” and “profits”, take their meaning directly from domestic law. the importance of domestic law as a source of substantive content for the application of the treaty is expressly spelled out in art. 3(2): as regards the application of the convention at any time by a contracting state, any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that state for the purposes of the taxes to which the convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that state prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that state. despite the clear pronouncement made in the commentary above and the well-established preference for leaving important definitions to domestic law, and despite her admission that alta luxembourg is a resident of luxembourg, the minister argues that meeting the definition of resident under domestic law is not sufficient to qualify as a resident under the treaty. according to the minister, the benefits of the treaty “are intended to be available only to persons who have sufficient substantive economic connections” to their state of residence (af, at para. 100 (emphasis added)). mere formalistic or legal attachment to their state of residence would thus be insufficient. it is worth noting that the words “sufficient substantive economic connections” are conspicuous by their absence in the text of both arts. 1 and 4. although the gaar invites courts to go beyond the text to understand the object, spirit, and purpose of the provisions, there are limits to this exercise, especially when attempting to discern the intent of bilateral treaty partners. in the face of a complete absence of express words, the inclusion of an unexpressed condition must be approached with circumspection it must be remembered that the text also plays an important role in ascertaining the purpose of a provision. the proper approach is one that unifies the text, context, and purpose, not a purposive one in search of a vague policy objective disconnected from the text (canada trustco, at para. 41). nonetheless, i acknowledge that treaty partners do not have the unfettered liberty to alter or redefine residence as they wish for the purposes of a tax treaty. the broader context of international tax law and the law of treaties helps to understand what was within the contemplation of canada and luxembourg when they drafted arts. 1 and 4(1) of the treaty. pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, parties to a treaty must keep their sides of the bargain and perform their obligations in good faith (art. 26 of the vienna convention) domestic law definitions of residence should therefore broadly correspond to international norms and not have the effect of redefining residence in a way “that takes the words unmistakably past their accepted usage” (couzin, at p 136), including the definitions of residence that were in effect in the two states at the time the treaty was drafted. i pause here to observe that the definition of residence in luxembourg law is consistent with international practice. broadly speaking, there are two internationally recognized methods used to determine corporate residency: (1) the “place of incorporation” or “legal seat” rule, pursuant to which residence is determined by a purely formal criterion, that is, where the corporation was incorporated or has its legal seat; and (2) the “real seat” rule, pursuant to which residence depends on a combination of factual factors aimed at identifying the corporation’s place of effective management (r. s. avi-yonah, n. sartori and o. marian, global perspectives on income taxation law (2011), at p 130, quoting m. a. kane and e. b. rock, “corporate taxation and international charter competition” (2008), 106 mich l rev 1229, at p 1235). luxembourg law grants resident status to corporations having either their legal seat or their central management in luxembourg — two criteria consistent with these methods (statement of agreed facts, ar, vol. ii, at p 28, para. 122; opinion on the luxembourg tax residence of the company, ar, vol. vii, at pp. 5 and 7, paras. 7.2 and 821). in the instant case, the parties agree that alta luxembourg is a resident of luxembourg as its legal seat is located there (statement of agreed facts, ar, vol. ii, at p 28, para. 122). interestingly, the “sufficient substantive economic connections” rationale put forward by the minister bears similarities to the “real seat” rule emphasizing substance over form and seemingly rejects a formal, legalistic rule like the “place of incorporation” or “legal seat” rule. thus, i understand the minister’s submissions as suggesting that establishing residence merely on the basis of a formal criterion is insufficient to conform to the spirit of the rules of residence under the treaty. something more would be needed: some real connections to the country of residence. what the minister’s submissions overlook, however, is that many of the world’s most developed economies — including canada itself — accept and apply the “place of incorporation” or “legal seat” rule (avi-yonah, sartori and marian, pp. 130 and 133-34; see s 250(4)(a) of the act). although a formal criterion may sometimes be unable to capture the real location of a corporation’s economic activities, it nevertheless became widespread internationally because of its certainty and simplicity, considerations that are vital to a well-functioning tax system based on the rule of law and the duke of westminster principle (li and cockfield, at p 77) hence, the definition in luxembourg law does not depart from accepted usage such that the bargain struck in the treaty could be upheld only if luxembourg residents claiming benefits have “sufficient substantive economic connections” to their country of residence. given this broad international acceptance of formal residency, if the drafters had truly intended to include only corporations with “sufficient substantive economic connections” to their country of residence within the scope of the treaty, they would have clearly signalled their intention to depart from a well-established criterion like the “place of incorporation” or “legal seat” rule. they would not have simply incorporated arts. 1 and 4(1) of the oecd model treaty, which reflect an international consensus, with no alteration. this indicates, in my view, that the object of arts. 1 and 4(1) is not to exclude all corporations with minimal economic connections to their country of residence, such as those whose residence is established solely on the basis of a formal, legal attachment. access to the benefits of the treaty by virtue of a domestic law definition of residence like the “legal seat” rule is therefore entirely consistent with the spirit of these provisions. another contextual element further reinforces my opinion that the purpose of arts. 1 and 4 is not to reserve benefits to corporations with “sufficient substantive economic connections” to their country of residence: the inclusion of art. 28(3) in the treaty, which denies benefits to certain luxembourg holding companies the “commentary on article 1” of the 1998 oecd model treaty specifically warned against the use of conduit companies, that is, “legal entit[ies] created in a state essentially to obtain treaty benefits that would not be available directly” (para. 9). several solutions were proposed in the commentary, but “no definitive texts [were] drafted” and “no strict recommendations [were] made” (para. 12) oecd members were left to choose which solution suited them. chief among these solutions were the “look-through” approach and the exclusion approach a “look-through” provision disallows treaty benefits to corporations that are resident in a contracting state but owned by residents of a third country (para. 13). when combined with a provision safeguarding bona fide business activities, a provision of this type has the effect of allowing treaty benefits to corporations owned by residents of a third country that conduct bona fide business activities in the contracting state of which they claim to be residents, while excluding those conducting “little substantive business activities” there (para. 14). the exclusion approach denies treaty benefits to certain types of companies enjoying special tax privileges that constitute harmful tax competition (para. 15). the main advantage of the exclusion approach over the “look-through” one is its clarity and simplicity (para. 16) it does not require an assessment of the substantive nature of business activities to determine whether they are bona fide or not, unlike the “look-through” approach or the approach focusing on the existence of “sufficient substantive economic connections” invoked by the minister. at the time of the treaty, luxembourg was well known as an international tax haven exempting certain holding companies from most taxes, provided they had no direct presence in the local economy (see grundy’s tax havens: a world survey (4th ed. 1983), at pp. 2 and 157-64; w. h. diamond et al., tax havens of the world (loose-leaf), vol. 2, ch. luxembourg, at pp. 5-6). to deny the benefits of the treaty to such holding companies with minimal economic connections to luxembourg, canada and luxembourg preferred the exclusion approach over the “look-through” approach. indeed, the two contracting states did not insert a “look-through” provision combined with a safeguarding provision, as canada did in the treaties it entered into during the same period with kazakhstan (1996) and peru (2001) (art. 28(3) of the convention between the government of canada and the government of the republic of kazakhstan for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital, can ts 1998 no. 13; art. 28(3) of the convention between the government of canada and the government of the republic of peru for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital, can. ts 2002 no. 23). canada and luxembourg included instead a provision denying the benefits of the treaty to certain holding companies established in luxembourg, that is, art. 28(3): the convention shall not apply to holding companies within the meaning of the special luxembourg laws (currently the act of july 31, 1929 and the grand duchy order of december 17, 1938) or any other similar law enacted in luxembourg after the signature of the convention, nor to companies subjected to similar fiscal laws in luxembourg. pursuant to the principle of implied exclusion, this choice made by the parties in favour of the exclusion approach — one that favours form over substance — should be understood as a rejection of the relevance of economic ties for delineating which corporations should be entitled to benefits and which should not. this leads me to conclude that the drafters intended to exclude a corporation with minimal economic connections to one of the contracting states only where the corporation is a holding company benefiting from luxembourg’s international tax haven regime in light of this clear intention to reject only luxembourg holding companies and not every company with limited economic ties to its country of residence, i am even more persuaded that the spirit of arts. 1 and 4(1) was not to limit access to the benefits of the treaty to corporations with “sufficient substantive economic connections” to their country of residence. in sum, the object, spirit, and purpose of arts. 1 and 4(1) are to allow all persons who are residents under the laws of one or both of the contracting states to claim benefits under the treaty so long as their resident status could expose them to full tax liability (regardless of whether there is actual taxation) they are broadly consistent with international norms. this is normally the case for corporations that are residents by virtue of the “place of incorporation” or “legal seat” rule, unless they fall within the exclusion provided for in art. 28(3). as a result, i conclude that the spirit of these provisions is not to reserve the benefits of the treaty to residents that have “sufficient substantive economic connections” to their country of residence. (2) carve-out from source-based capital gains tax (“business property exemption”) (art. 13(4) and (5)) the carve-out from source-based capital gains tax, also called the business property exemption, is provided for in art. 13(4) and (5). these provisions create an exception to source-based taxation for capital gains derived from the alienation of shares deriving their value principally from immovable property used in a corporation’s business and allocate to the residence state the exclusive right to tax such capital gains: article 13 capital gains . 4 gains derived by a resident of a contracting state from the alienation of: (a) shares (other than shares listed on an approved stock exchange in the other contracting state) forming part of a substantial interest in the capital stock of a company the value of which shares is derived principally from immovable property situated in that other state; or (b) an interest in a partnership, trust or estate, the value of which is derived principally from immovable property situated in that other state, may be taxed in that other state. for the purposes of this paragraph, the term “immovable property” does not include property (other than rental property) in which the business of the company, partnership, trust or estate was carried on; and a substantial interest exists when the resident and persons related thereto own 10 per cent or more of the shares of any class or the capital stock of a company. 5 gains from the alienation of any property, other than that referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be taxable only in the contracting state of which the alienator is a resident. with respect to the object, spirit, and purpose of art. 13(4) and (5), the crux of the minister’s argument turns on the theory of economic allegiance. in accordance with this theory, the minister submits that the provisions of the treaty distributing taxing rights seek to avoid double taxation by allocating these rights to the contracting state to which the income and the taxpayer are more closely connected. according to the minister, the carve-out provided for in art. 13(4) exempts the capital gains at issue from source-based taxation because the taxpayer’s economic connection to the state of residence outweighs the connection between the source state and the immovable property the connection with the residence state is considered greater, for that state is said to provide the benefits that allow its residents to earn such capital gains (eg economy, infrastructure, education, social services). the social and economic environment of the residence state therefore provides the taxpayer with the tools necessary to grow the business carried on in the immovable property located in the source state. in return for these benefits, the taxpayer is expected to pay taxes to the state of residence, not to the source state. in the minister’s view, this logic holds only where the taxpayer owes economic allegiance to the state of residence, which can be tested by the presence of “sufficient substantive economic connections” to that state in the absence of such connections, the residence state’s greater claim to tax would retreat so that the connection between the source state and the immovable property would prevail. as a consequence, the source state would possess the greater claim, and the carve-out from source-based taxation should be unavailable. the theory of economic allegiance is indeed the principle underlying the allocation of taxing rights, and giving effect to this principle thus constitutes the broad purpose of provisions of the treaty, such as art. 13, that distribute the right to tax between the residence and source states (j. li and f. avella, “article 13: capital gains”, in global tax treaty commentaries, last reviewed may 30, 2020 (online), at s 1121). however, i disagree with the minister’s articulation of the theory in this case. broadly speaking, the apportionment of taxing rights between the residence and source states under the oecd model treaty, which serves as a model for the treaty, is centred on the distinction between active and passive income (li and cockfield, at p 12; avi-yonah, sartori and marian, at p 155). the source state has the primary right to tax active income (eg business profits and employment income), and the residence state has only residual rights pursuant to the theory of economic allegiance, the source state has a greater claim to tax active income because its economic environment has the closest connection with the origin of wealth (malherbe, at p 56; li and cockfield, at pp. 66 and 151) non-residents owe allegiance to the source state as a result, and they are expected to pay tax for the public services from which they benefit in carrying on their active economic activities in the source state. conversely, the residence state has the primary right to tax passive income (eg interest, dividends, and capital gains), and the source state has only residual rights. the source state’s claim to tax passive income is considered weaker in comparison to that of the residence state because generating such income is assumed to require few public services from the source state moreover, the economic environment of the source state is considered less material to the earning prospect of passive investments, as such passive activities may be conducted in various jurisdictions without either improving or negatively affecting their earning prospect therefore, non-residents earning passive income owe little allegiance to the source state. the allocation of the right to tax capital gains in the treaty relies on this articulation of economic allegiance distinguishing between active and passive income. this allocation serves as the broad purpose of art. 13. under art. 13(5) of the treaty, the residence state has the primary right to tax capital gains, as they are passive income. under art. 13(1) to (4), there are exceptions allowing the source state to tax capital gains realized by non-residents for example, gains derived from the alienation of immovable property, movable property forming part of the business property of a permanent establishment located in the source state, and shares whose value is derived principally from immovable property may be taxed by the source state. the rationale of these exceptions is that the origin of the wealth acquired from sales of immovable property and the like is the source state, which therefore has a greater claim to tax (malherbe, at pp. 58-59) for instance, the sale of immovable property situated in canada is, in essence, a sale of a “piece of canada” — “the ‘canadianness’ of the property . . . is the source of the gains” (li and cockfield, at pp. 198 and 151). the business property exemption applies where a capital gain is realized on the sale of shares whose value is derived principally from immovable property in which a business was carried on. as a consequence, the default rule is reinstated, so that the residence state has the primary right to tax the gain in my opinion, this constitutes a departure from the theory of economic allegiance as articulated in the treaty and the oecd model treaty and shows that the business property exemption has a different purpose. according to the logic of economic allegiance, the source state normally has a greater claim to tax income derived from a business carried on within its territory or from the disposition of immovable property located within its territory, because the source state’s economic environment has the closest connection to the origin of wealth. under art. 13(4) and (5), however, the taxing right is allocated to the residence state instead of the source state. this departure can be explained by the fact that economic allegiance is not the sole principle or policy consideration underlying the rules applicable to source-based taxation; the principle of capital import neutrality, the concern to prevent tax base erosion, and the desire to attract foreign investment also underlie these rules (li and cockfield, at pp. 151-54). since all these principles and policy considerations cannot be accommodated in every single rule, a balancing exercise is inevitable (see shell canada ltd v canada, [1999] 3 scr 622, at para. 43; canada trustco, at para. 53; sun indalex finance, llc v united steelworkers, 2013 scc 6, [2013] 1 scr 271, at para. 174). article 13(4) is also the result of a balancing exercise. the theory of economic allegiance is not the dominating rationale underlying the carve-out provided for in art. 13(4). rather, the main objective is to attract foreign investment, as i explain below. canada was and still is a large importer of foreign capital and thus a source country (arnold (2009), at pp. 10-11). as a source country, canada would have had an interest in negotiating broad source-based taxation rights in bilateral treaties in order to collect larger tax revenues. according to learned authors, canada must have been alive, however, to the fact that its position on source-based taxation could also be used as an instrument to attract foreign investment crucial to its economy (li and cockfield, at p 153). harsh source taxes chase away foreign investors, whereas tax breaks attract them. importers of capital thus have an interest in maintaining a balance between these disincentives and incentives if they want to remain competitive in the global economy. li and avella say that canada has routinely included the carve-out in many of its tax treaties, including this treaty, for this specific reason (s 31463). this tax break encourages foreigners to invest in immovable property situated in canada in which businesses are carried on (eg mines, hotels, or oil shales), rather than simply to invest in assets to be held for speculative purposes. importantly, i note that only a very small number of the world’s tax treaties include the carve-out, thereby signalling that its inclusion in the treaty was no accident on canada’s part to begin with, less than 35 percent of the world’s pre-2014 double-tax treaties include a provision allocating to the source state the right to tax capital gains from the disposition of shares of a company or interests in a partnership, trust, or estate whose value is derived principally from immovable property, as provided for in the first part of art. 13(4) (li and avella, at ss. 215 and 31412). and out of that 35 percent, an even smaller number of treaties contain the carve-out provided for at the end of art. 13(4) (li and avella, at s 31463). the remaining question is whether the contracting states intended that persons without “sufficient substantive economic connections” to their state of residence be able to take advantage of the carve-out to avoid paying any taxes. put simply, the question is whether the use of conduit corporations in this context perverts the bargain struck between canada and luxembourg. in my view, it does not. the gaar was enacted to catch unforeseen tax strategies. however, the use of conduit corporations, “legal entit[ies] created in a state essentially to obtain treaty benefits that would not be available directly”, was not an unforeseen tax strategy at the time of the treaty (“commentary on article 1” of the 1998 oecd model treaty, at para. 9) indeed, it was far from being a novel phenomenon that emerged subsequently to the signing of the treaty back in the 1970s, the “commentary on article 1” of the 1977 oecd model treaty criticized tax planning strategies involving conduit corporations (paras. 8-9). this was also an issue discussed by learned authors (see, eg,. a. a. knechtle, basic problems in international fiscal law (1979), at p 115; d. r. davies, principles of international double taxation relief (1985), at paras. 1.13 and 322). and more contemporaneously to the treaty, the “commentary on article 1” of the 1998 oecd model treaty discussed the use of conduit corporations as well. luxembourg is a country well known for its broad tax treaty network and international tax haven regime, making it an attractive jurisdiction to set up a conduit corporation and take advantage of treaty benefits as mentioned above, one can presume that canada had knowledge of these features of luxembourg’s tax system when it entered into the treaty. canada nevertheless entered into a bilateral tax treaty with luxembourg with only minimal safeguards and thereby ignored many of the oecd’s suggestions. at that time, as discussed above, the “commentary on article 1” of the 1998 oecd model treaty set out a whole menu of potential anti-avoidance provisions that might have short-circuited the creation of conduit corporations in luxembourg. i acknowledge that the absence of specific anti-avoidance rules that would have prevented the situation is not necessarily determinative of the application of the gaar (see copthorne, at paras. 108-11) of course, one could always imagine a potential anti-avoidance rule that would have pre-empted the tax strategy at issue. if that were the standard, i agree that it would provide a full response in every case and gut the gaar in this case, the absence of specific anti-avoidance provisions represents, however, an enlightening contextual and purposive element as it sheds light on the contracting states’ intention. this is not a case where parliament did not or could not have foreseen the tax strategy employed by the taxpayer. options to remediate the situation were available and known by the parties, but they made deliberate choices to guard some benefits against conduit corporations and to leave others unguarded. had the parties truly intended to prevent such corporations from taking advantage of the carve-out, they could have done so. combined with canada’s preference at the time of the treaty for taking advantage of economic benefits yielded by foreign investments rather than higher tax revenues (as will be discussed below), this makes the rationale of the carve-out even clearer in my opinion, canada and luxembourg made a deliberate choice to leave the business property exemption unguarded. the parties agreed to exclude luxembourg holding companies from their treaty (art. 28(3)). however, as explained above, the parties did not follow the oecd’s suggestion to include a “look-through” provision combined with a provision safeguarding bona fide business activities doing so would have excluded conduit corporations that were owned by residents of a third country and that conducted few “substantive business activities” in luxembourg. moreover, luxembourg and canada added provisions reserving the benefits of the treaty to the beneficial owners of certain income, but only in respect of dividends, interest, and royalties, not capital gains (arts. 10 to 12). if the parties had applied the concept of beneficial ownership to the carve-out, it would have prevented conduit corporations from taking advantage of this benefit where their beneficial owners were residents of a third country (see, eg,. prévost car). although the oecd model treaty may not have specifically recommended extending the concept of beneficial ownership to capital gains, nothing barred the parties from doing so. after all, the oecd model treaty remains a model, not a binding legal instrument. i fail to see, as rowe and martin jj. do, a fundamental difference between capital gains, on the one hand, and dividends, interest, and royalties, on the other, that would have made beneficial ownership unsuitable in respect of capital gains it is true that, in a paper prepared in 2008 for the united nations, professor philip baker questioned the possible extension of the beneficial ownership concept to capital gains because it is harder to identify the beneficial owner of a capital gain than to identify the beneficial owner of a traceable flow of income like dividends, interest, and royalties (the united nations model double taxation convention between developed and developing countries: possible extension of the beneficial ownership concept, un. doc. e/c18/2008/crp2/add1,. ann., october 17, 2008, at para. 55). but professor baker explained that this difference is “not insurmountable” (para. 58). in the end, he even suggested the potential wording of a beneficial ownership provision applicable to capital gains: 6. gains from the alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 shall be taxable only in the contracting state of which the beneficial owner is a resident. [para. 59] as suggested in the “commentary on article 13” of the 1998 oecd model treaty, canada could also have insisted on a subject-to-tax provision if it had truly been concerned about the erosion of its tax base (para. 21). pursuant to such a provision, a contracting state foregoes its right to tax capital gains only if the other state actually taxes these gains. the inclusion of a provision of this sort would have meant that capital gains exempt from or subject to very little tax in luxembourg would be taxable in canada, instead of having almost double non-taxation. canada’s decision is, however, not surprising. situations of double non-taxation are intentional and part of the bargain in most cases (couzin, at p 109). the absence of a subject-to-tax provision, combined with canada’s knowledge of luxembourg’s tax system, confirms my view that canada’s primary objective in including art. 13(4) was to cede its right to tax capital gains of a certain nature realized in canada in order to attract foreign investment it was not part of the bargain that luxembourg actually tax the gains to the same extent that canada would have taxed them. further, consideration of tax treaties in pari materia forming part of the broader context of the treaty corroborates the parties’ deliberate choice to leave the business property exemption unguarded against conduit corporations established in luxembourg. as noted by professor arnold, canada began including discrete purpose tests designed to prevent treaty shopping in some of the treaties it entered into around the same time it entered into the treaty, which was signed in 1999 ((2009), at p 358). see, eg, the treaties with nigeria2, ukraine3, kazakhstan4, uzbekistan5, and peru6. these provisions were designed to take back certain treaty benefits where the purpose of a transaction was to gain access to these benefits most likely, the creation of a conduit corporation in luxembourg to access the exemption would have been caught by such a purpose test. had the parties truly intended to deprive such corporations of the benefits of the carve-out, they would have made the carve-out subject to a purpose test. the absence of any such anti-avoidance measure that would have limited access to the carve-out in a treaty with a country known for not taxing capital gains leads me to believe that canada weighed the pros and cons and concluded that its national interest in attracting foreign investors, using luxembourg as a conduit to take advantage of the carve-out, outweighed its interest in collecting more tax revenues on such capital gains. this answers the question of “why the benefit was conferred” posed under the gaar (canada trustco, at para. 66) this choice must also have been 2 agreement between the government of canada and the government of the federal republic of nigeria for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital gains, can. ts 1999 no. 48, arts. 10(7), 11(8) and 12(7). 3 convention between the government of canada and the government of ukraine for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital, can. ts 1997 no. 39, arts. 11(8) and 12(8). 4 convention between the government of canada and the government of the republic of kazakhstan for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital, can. ts 1998 no. 13, arts. 11(8) and 12(7). 5 convention between the government of canada and the government of the republic of uzbekistan for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital, can. ts 2000 no. 18, arts. 11(8) and 12(7). 6 convention between the government of canada and the government of the republic of peru for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital, can. ts 2002 no. 23, arts. 10(7), 11(7), and 12(7). motivated by the fact that canada was not keen on going its own way at a time when the international community was not yet as serious about curtailing treaty shopping as it was during the years leading to the signature and ratification of the multilateral convention to implement tax treaty related measures to prevent base erosion and profit shifting, can. ts 2019 no. 26, in 2017 and as it has remained to this day (see multilateral instrument in respect of tax conventions act, sc 2019, c 12; arnold (2009), at p 18). as a relatively small country, “canada does not have the luxury of setting its own policy without considering what other countries do”, and it must have rightly seen multilateralism as the way forward (li and cockfield, at p 25). this is not an absurd proposition, as my colleagues assert there is no better way to describe canada’s attitude at the time of the treaty when faced with the dilemma between higher tax revenues and competitiveness than to quote the words of the department of finance’s response to the report of the auditor general of canada to the house of commons, 1992, at p 52: to a large degree, international norms limit the range of options available to the canadian government and, in this context, the government’s policy has generally been to favour competitiveness concerns over those of revenue generation. [emphasis added.] in conclusion, the object, spirit, and purpose of the carve-out provided for in art. 13(4) and (5) of the treaty are to foster international investment by exempting residents of a contracting state from taxes in the source state on capital gains realized on the disposition of immovable property in which a business was carried on, or on the disposition of shares whose value is derived principally from such immovable property. the fact that the capital gains may not be taxed in luxembourg, leading to double non-taxation, and the fact that conduit corporations can take advantage of the carve-out are tax planning outcomes consistent with the bargain struck between canada and luxembourg. although canada had a greater claim to tax such income based on the theory of economic allegiance and would have most likely received more tax revenues without the carve-out given its traditional status as a source state, canada agreed to forego its right to tax such capital gains, regardless of whether they would be taxed in luxembourg, in order to attract foreign investment in business assets embodied in immovable property located in canada (eg hotels, mines, or oil shales) and to reap the economic benefits generated by that investment. this is what was actually agreed upon. it appears that canada was aware of tax planning strategies using conduit corporations in luxembourg but that it made a deliberate choice not to include anti-avoidance provisions that would have addressed this situation in the treaty. e. second step: abusiveness of the transaction the second step of the methodology for the abuse analysis is “to examine the factual context of a case to determine whether the avoidance transaction defeated or frustrated the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions in issue” (canada trustco, at para. 55). alta luxembourg was created as part of a restructuring of activities to take advantage of the carve-out provided for in art. 13(4) of the treaty. it concedes that this tax benefit was derived from a transaction not arranged primarily for a bona fide purpose other than to obtain this benefit. however, i fail to see how this avoidance transaction was abusive. in this court, as in the federal court of appeal, the minister rightly concedes that alta luxembourg is a resident of luxembourg for the purposes of the treaty, as it has its legal seat there. moreover, nothing indicates that alta luxembourg was not liable to tax in luxembourg. the gain it realized on the disposition of its shares of alta canada was reported to the luxembourg authorities and was subject to full taxation under their domestic laws the fact that alta luxembourg paid less tax in luxembourg on this gain than it would have paid if it were a canadian resident paying tax in canada changes nothing in this determination as noted by this court in copthorne, “determining the rationale of the relevant provisions of the act should not be conflated with a value judgment of what is right or wrong nor with theories about what tax law ought to be or ought to do” (para. 70). therefore, from the moment that alta luxembourg realized a gain on the disposition of its shares of alta canada, the laws of luxembourg applied and canada’s interest in the gain ceased. as a result, alta luxembourg’s resident status falls squarely within the object, spirit, and purpose of arts. 1 and 4(1) of the treaty. the minister has failed to discharge her burden of establishing that the avoidance transaction defeats the underlying rationale, the “object, spirit, or purpose”, beyond the words of the provisions. alta luxembourg met the clear requirements of arts. 1, 4, and 13(4). the treaty makes it clear that canada and luxembourg agreed that the power to tax would be allocated to luxembourg where the conditions of the carve-out were met there is nothing in the treaty suggesting that a single-purpose conduit corporation resident in luxembourg cannot avail itself of the benefits of the treaty or should be denied these benefits due to some other consideration such as its shareholders not being themselves residents of luxembourg. in this case, the provisions operated as they were intended to operate; there was no abuse, and, therefore, the gaar cannot be applied to deny the tax benefit claimed. this result accords with the true intention of the partners to the treaty and must be respected. as pelletier ja held in mil (investments), “[t]o the extent that the appellant argues that the tax treaty should not be interpreted so as to permit double non-taxation, the issue raised by gaar is the incidence of canadian taxation, not the foregoing of revenues by the luxembourg fiscal authorities” (para. 8). a final note on the minister’s implication that treaty shopping arrangements are inherently abusive. a broad assertion of “treaty shopping” does not conform to a proper gaar analysis in accordance with the separation of powers, developing tax policy is the task of the executive and legislative branches. courts do not have the constitutional legitimacy and resources to be tax policy makers (canada trustco, at para. 41). it is for the executive and legislative branches to decide what is right and what is wrong, and then to translate these decisions into legislation that courts can apply. it bears repeating that the application of the gaar must not be premised on “a value judgment of what is right or wrong [or] theories about what tax law ought to be or ought to do” (copthorne, at para. 70). taxpayers are “entitled to select courses of action or enter into transactions that will minimize their tax liability” (copthorne, at para. 65). the courts’ role is limited to determining whether a transaction abuses the object, spirit, and purpose of the specific provisions relied on by the taxpayer. it is not to rewrite tax statutes and tax treaties to prevent treaty shopping when these instruments do not clearly do so. vi conclusion for these reasons, i would dismiss the appeal. the respondent is entitled to its costs in this appeal. the reasons of wagner cj and rowe and martin jj. were delivered by rowe and martin jj. — i. overview multinational companies exploiting gaps and mismatches in international tax rules erode domestic tax bases and cost countries an estimated us$100 to us$240 billion in lost revenue annually (organisation for economic co-operation and development (“oecd”), background brief: inclusive framework on beps, january 2017 (online), at p 9). as a result, aggressive international tax avoidance has received increasing political and media scrutiny (see, eg,. the economist’s “the big carve-up” (may 15, 2021), at pp. 65-66, and le monde’s series openlux: enquête sur le luxembourg, coffre-fort de l’europe by j. baruch et al., february 8, 2021 (online)). although it is a long standing principle in canadian law that taxpayers may arrange their affairs to minimize their amount of tax payable (commissioners of inland revenue v. duke of westminster, [1936] ac 1 (hl);. canada trustco mortgage co. v. canada, 2005 scc 54, [2005] 2 scr 601, at para. 11), the freedom to do so is not without limits canada has acted to curb abusive international tax avoidance by enacting the general anti-avoidance rule (“gaar”), which denies tax benefits when taxpayers engage in transactions that conform with the text of the tax rules relied upon, but do not accord with their rationale. in introducing the gaar in our tax legislation some 30 years ago, and in making it clear that it was applicable to abuses of tax treaties, parliament made a policy choice by which it intended to fight harmful tax avoidance schemes that cross the line of legitimate tax planning and venture into the realm of abusive tax avoidance. courts now have the responsibility to give proper effect to the intention of parliament and ensure the gaar plays a meaningful role in controlling avoidance transactions that technically comply with the provisions of a tax treaty but frustrate their underlying rationale the interpretation exercise that is mandated in a gaar analysis thus vests upon courts the unusual duty to look beyond the words of the applicable provisions to determine whether the transactions in question frustrate the underlying rationale of those provisions. giving an interpretation confined to the black letter of these legislative provisions instead defeats parliament’s will and fails to fulfil the courts’ role “to interpret and apply the act as it was adopted by parliament” (shell canada ltd. v. canada, [1999] 3 scr 622, at para. 45; see also canada trustco, at para. 13). given that the gaar can only find application where a taxpayer has complied with the strict requirements of a provision, absolute certainty cannot be achieved, nor was it intended. this is a legislative choice that parliament made in order to strike a necessary balance between the uncertainty inherent in the gaar and the fairness of the canadian tax system as a whole achieved by defeating abusive tax avoidance schemes. alta energy luxembourg sarl (“alta luxembourg”) is a luxembourg corporation created so that shareholders of alta energy partners, llc (“alta us”), who are residents neither of canada nor of luxembourg, could benefit from an exemption from canadian income tax under the convention between the government of canada and the government of the grand duchy of luxembourg for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital, can. ts 2000 no. 22 (“treaty”), with respect to liquidation of an investment in oil and gas properties. despite being a mere conduit interposed in luxembourg, alta luxembourg claimed a tax exemption for a capital gain of more than $380 million. the issue in this case is whether this transaction constitutes abuse under the gaar. in effect, does alta luxembourg get to claim this exemption and, thereby, pay no tax at all in canada on a multimillion dollar profit made from property in canada, even though it had no genuine connection to luxembourg? we conclude that alta luxembourg’s claim for a tax benefit under the treaty is the result of abusive avoidance transactions. in our respectful view, the courts below did not properly identify the rationale underlying the relevant provisions of the treaty. they gave weight only to the text and failed to consider why the provisions were put in place. this is not the exercise mandated under the gaar. the object, spirit or purpose of the relevant provisions of the treaty is to assign taxing rights to the state with the closest economic connection to the taxpayer’s income. article 13(4) allocates to luxembourg the right to tax its residents’ indirect gains from immovable property situated in canada used in a business. in such cases, luxembourg is deemed to have the closer economic connection with the taxpayer’s income because the business activity, rather than the immovable property itself, drives the value of the property. here, a review of the factual matrix reveals that alta luxembourg utterly lacks a genuine economic connection with luxembourg. allowing it to benefit from art. 13(4) and (5) would frustrate the rationale of this provision and is thereby abusive. the common intention of canada and luxembourg in entering into a tax treaty could not have been to provide avenues for residents of third-party states to indirectly obtain benefits from luxembourg’s tax regime they could not obtain directly, despite the absence of genuine ties to that state. accordingly, we would allow the appeal. ii background in june 2011, alta energy partners canada ltd (“alta canada”) was incorporated under the laws of alberta. it was a wholly owned subsidiary of alta us, whose shareholders were foreign investors from the united states or other countries. alta canada carried on an unconventional shale oil business in northern alberta. the indirect owners of the shares of alta canada were advised by tax professionals that their current corporate structure was undesirable from a tax perspective — the capital gain resulting from the future disposition of the shares would be subject to canadian taxes because the shares of alta canada were taxable canadian property and canada reserves the right to tax such capital gains under the convention between canada and the united states of america with respect to taxes on income and on capital (enacted in law in canada by the canada-united states tax convention act, 1984, sc 1984, c 20, sch. i; see ss. 2(3)(c) and 115(1)(b) of the income tax act, rsc 1985, c 1 (5th supp.) (“act”). the advice highlighted the existence of a favourable exemption under other tax treaties that would lead to the non-taxation of the capital gain to be realized on the sale of the shares. in april 2012, alta luxembourg was formed under the laws of luxembourg for the purpose of taking advantage of the treaty the shares of alta luxembourg were still indirectly controlled by shareholders of alta us alta luxembourg had no genuine connection to luxembourg: it had no business activity in luxembourg and it did not hold any other investment the sole purpose for the incorporation was to avoid paying taxes in canada on the sale of the shares of alta canada. on the same day, alta us sold all its shares of alta canada to alta luxembourg the investors had received a confirmation from the luxembourg tax authorities that capital gains realized on the participation in alta canada would be exempt from luxembourg tax the result was to replace alta us with alta luxembourg as shareholder of alta canada, but to keep the same persons effectively in control. in 2013, alta luxembourg sold the shares of alta canada for an amount of approximately $680 million the resulting capital gain was in excess of $380 million. alta luxembourg then claimed an exemption from canadian income tax under art. 13(5) of the treaty. the minister of national revenue denied the exemption, partially on the basis that the gaar operated to deny the benefit alta luxembourg appealed the assessment. the tax court of canada allowed alta luxembourg’s appeal. it found that alta luxembourg could claim the exemption from canadian income tax and that the gaar did not prevent this entitlement (2018 tcc 152, [2019] 5 ctc 2183). the federal court of appeal agreed with the tax court (2020 fca 43, [2020] 5 ctc. 193). iii analysis a. the legal framework under the general anti-avoidance rule the gaar, set out at s 245 of the act, is a tool to preserve the integrity of our tax system which seeks to respond to “the need to prevent further erosion of tax revenues through purely tax-motivated strategies” (j. sasseville, “implementation of the general anti-avoidance rule”, in corporate management tax conference, income tax enforcement, compliance, and administration (1988), 4:1, at p 4:2). indeed, an unbridled application of the duke of westminster principle providing that a taxpayer may arrange their affairs to minimize their tax burden “can mislead taxpayers into believing that tax plans that merely comply with the technical provisions of the act are acceptable” (v. krishna, income tax law (2nd ed. 2012), at p 473). establishing the line between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance is a complex balancing exercise. parliament drew that line by enacting the gaar — “the apex of all anti-avoidance measures” (krishna (2012), at p 470). section 245, which sets out the gaar reads, in part: (2) where a transaction is an avoidance transaction, the tax consequences to a person shall be determined as is reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny a tax benefit that, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, from that transaction or from a series of transactions that includes that transaction. (4) subsection (2) applies to a transaction only if it may reasonably be considered that the transaction (a) would, if this act were read without reference to this section, result directly or indirectly in a misuse of the provisions of any one or more of (iv) a tax treaty . . . or . (b) would result directly or indirectly in an abuse having regard to those provisions, other than this section, read as a whole. there are three requirements for the gaar to apply and to deny tax benefits: (1) there must be a tax benefit; (2) the transaction giving rise to the tax benefit must be an avoidance transaction under s 245(3), “in the sense that it cannot be said to have been reasonably undertaken or arranged primarily for a bona fide purpose other than to obtain a tax benefit”; and (3) the avoidance transaction must result in a misuse or abuse of the act or a tax treaty, “in the sense that it cannot be reasonably concluded that a tax benefit would be consistent with the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions relied upon by the taxpayer” (canada trustco, at para. 66(1.); s 245(3) of the act). thus, where there is a tax benefit and an avoidance transaction, the application of the gaar to deny the tax benefit will only be avoided “if it may be reasonable to consider that it did not result from abusive tax avoidance under s 245(4)” (para. 35, see also department of finance, explanatory notes to legislation relating to income tax (1988), at p 464). the terms “misuse” and “abuse” are not defined in the act. as such, courts had to ascertain the appropriate test for determining whether abusive tax avoidance had taken place. (1) determining whether there has been abuse under the gaar the third requirement of the gaar is subdivided into two steps. the first is to determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions giving rise to the tax benefit; the second is to determine whether the transaction frustrates that purpose (canada trustco, at para. 44). first, the court must identify the “object, spirit or purpose of the provisions of the income tax act that are relied on for the tax benefit, having regard to the scheme of the act, the relevant provisions and permissible extrinsic aids” (canada trustco, at para. 55) as justice rothstein emphasized in copthorne holdings ltd v canada, 2011 scc 63, [2011] 3 scr 721, parliament, in enacting the gaar, has conferred an “unusual duty” on the courts to look beyond the words of the statute to ascertain the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions at issue (para. 66) even if the taxpayer complies with the text of the provisions of the act or tax treaty, courts must determine whether the taxpayer’s transactions are in accord with the rationale of the provisions relied upon (copthorne, at para. 66; krishna (2012), at p 486). although the gaar analysis involves a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis, the inquiry differs from traditional statutory interpretation. whereas the object of traditional statutory interpretation is to “determine what the words of the statute mean”, the gaar analysis is a “search . . . for the rationale that underlies the words that may not be captured by the bare meaning of the words themselves” (copthorne, at para. 70). the question under the gaar is not whether the taxpayer can claim a tax benefit, but rather “why the benefit was conferred” (canada trustco, at para. 66(4)). thus, a traditional statutory interpretation “is constrained by the text of the relevant provisions in a way that a gaar analysis is not” (d. g. duff, “the interpretive exercise under the general anti-avoidance rule”, in b. j. arnold, ed., the general anti-avoidance rule — past, present, and future (2021), 383, at p 406). this follows by necessary implication. to determine whether a taxpayer can claim a tax benefit in the first place, the provisions of the act must be interpreted applying the traditional textual, contextual and purposive approach. and, in any gaar case, “the text of the provisions at issue will not literally preclude a tax benefit the taxpayer seeks by entering into the transaction or series” (copthorne, at para. 88). if the gaar simply replicated the statutory interpretation exercise, it would be meaningless. this difference in the methodology of interpretation is pivotal to giving proper effect to the gaar. similarly, in determining the meaning of tax treaties, art. 31 of the vienna convention on the law of treaties, can. ts 1980 no. 37, requires the terms of a treaty to be interpreted in light of their context and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. the gaar directs courts to go behind this meaning and to identify the rationale underlying the relevant provision of the treaty. once the court has identified the rationale underlying the relevant provisions, the second step of the abuse analysis is “to determine whether the avoidance transaction defeated or frustrated the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions in issue” (canada trustco, at para. 55) there will be a finding of abuse: “. . (1) where the transaction achieves an outcome the statutory provision was intended to prevent; (2) where the transaction defeats the underlying rationale of the provision; or (3) where the transaction circumvents the provision in a manner that frustrates or defeats its object, spirit or purpose . . .” (copthorne, at para. 72). these considerations “are not independent of one another and may overlap” (ibid.) the abusive nature of the transaction “must be clear” (canada trustco, at para. 62). in summary, the gaar will not apply “to deny the tax benefi[t] that results from these transactions as long as they are carried out within the object and spirit of the provisions of the act read as a whole” (krishna (2012), at p 486, quoting department of finance (1988), at p 464). the same rule would undoubtedly apply to tax benefits arising under the treaty. however, the gaar applies when the taxpayer carries out transactions to obtain a tax benefit not intended by specific provisions of the act or treaty read as a whole. in such cases, the gaar “will override other provisions of the act [or tax treaties] since, otherwise, its object and purpose would be defeated” (p 489, quoting department of finance (1988), at p 465). (2) certainty, predictability and fairness to the extent that the gaar is only invoked where there will be compliance with the requirements on a literal reading of a provision, the gaar, by nature, gives rise to an “unavoidable degree of uncertainty for taxpayers” (copthorne, at para. 123). allowing the gaar to create this uncertainty was a deliberate choice that parliament made when it enacted a provision that can defeat tax avoidance schemes that exploit canada’s legislation and treaties the act contains numerous anti- avoidance provisions that target specific factual scenarios. inventive tax planners may successfully avoid these provisions by using structured transactions, but those transactions may still constitute abusive tax avoidance. the gaar was designed to act as the final, catch-all provision which can be applied where no specific anti-avoidance provision applies, exists or was circumvented. it is a “provision of last resort” (canada trustco, at para. 21). absolute certainty under the gaar does not exist. parliament has made a tax policy choice in order to balance the principles of certainty and predictability with another principle that is as fundamental to our tax system — the principle of fairness (lipson v canada, 2009 scc 1, [2009] 1 scr 3, at para. 52) the gaar “is designed, in the complex context of the [act], to restrain abusive tax avoidance and to make sure that the fairness of the tax system is preserved” (ibid.) sophisticated taxpayers who can afford tax professionals have access to planning strategies that lower or eliminate their tax burden through what may cross the line into abusive tax avoidance territory. not applying the gaar to those abusive schemes is deeply unfair not solely because only this select group of taxpayers may have access to such professionals, but also because the tax burden avoided by the select group falls back on the taxpayers who do not, for instance through higher tax rates (d. a. dodge, “a new and more coherent approach to tax avoidance” (1988), 36 can. tax j 1, at pp 4, 8 and 9). professor j. li underscores this essential balancing role the gaar plays in our tax system, as recognized in our jurisprudence: as the supreme court noted in canada trustco, the preservation of “certainty, predictability and fairness” for individual taxpayers is considered a “basic tenet of tax law” [at para. 61]. on the other hand, the gaar requires the balancing of this set of policy concerns against the concern for protection of the tax base and the fairness of the tax system as a whole. . . . the gaar cases generally involve situations that do not concern the majority of taxpayers, and the transactions are well planned and executed on the basis of professional tax advice therefore, the requirement of certainty does not ring true in gaar cases. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] (“‘economic substance’: drawing the line between legitimate tax minimization and abusive tax avoidance” (2006), 54 can. tax j 23, at p 40) consequently, a finding that the gaar applies to deny the tax benefits conferred by clear provisions where avoidance transactions defeat their underlying rationale does not run counter to the principles of certainty, predictability and fairness. the application of the gaar in these circumstances upholds the balance parliament sought to strike between those principles and gives effect to its intent to curb abusive tax avoidance (department of finance (1988), at p 461, cited in canada trustco, at para. 15). this is the view that the majority upheld in lipson in that case, the dissenting judges were of the view that the duke of westminster principle should prevail over the gaar on the basis that, if not contained, the gaar was a “weapon” that “could have a widespread, serious and unpredictable effect on legitimate tax planning” (para 55) justice lebel, for the majority, found that this approach “essentially gut[ted] the gaar and rea[d] it out of the [act] under the guise of an exercise in legal interpretation” (para. 52). overemphasizing the principles of certainty and predictability to the detriment of that of fairness is contrary to parliament’s will. in the words of lebel j., the “desire to avoid uncertainty cannot justify ignoring a provision of the [act] that is clearly intended to apply to transactions that would otherwise be valid on their face” (ibid). courts have the obligation to animate all parts of parliament’s legislation, including s 245 of the act. (3) the application of the gaar to bilateral tax conventions following the introduction of s 245 of the act, the question of whether this provision applied to tax treaties gave rise to much debate among commentators and scholars (w. i. innes, p. j. boyle and j. a. nitikman, the essential gaar manual: policies, principles and procedures (2006), at p 198-204). this debate is now settled. as bowman j (as he then was) had opined in rmm canadian enterprises inc. v. r., [1998] 1 ctc 2300, at paras. 52-54 and 56, quoting mcnichol v. the queen (1997), 97 dtc 111, at pp. 120-21, the minister could use the gaar to deny tax benefits arising from the exploitation of canada’s tax treaties parliament later confirmed that s 245 applied to tax treaty benefits when it enacted s 245(4)(a)(iv) of the act in the budget implementation act, 2004, no. 2, sc 2005, c 19, s 52(2). it also enacted s 4.1 of the income tax conventions interpretation act, rsc 1985, c. i- 4 (“itcia”), which provides that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of a convention . it is hereby declared . . . that section 245 of the [act] applies to any benefit provided under the convention.” and, in the event of inconsistency between the treaty and the itcia, the provisions of that act prevail (income tax conventions implementation act, 1999, sc 2000, c 11, s 51(2)). the courts are bound to give effect to parliament’s legislative efforts to clearly communicate its intent to curb tax avoidance arising from an improper use of some of canada’s tax treaties through the application of the gaar. the result is that “tax treaties must be interpreted in the same manner as domestic legislation when analyzing potentially abusive avoidance transactions” (mil (investments) s.a v r., 2006 tcc 460, [2006] 5 ctc 2552 (“mil (tcc)”), at para. 28). contrary to our colleague côté j.’s suggestion, this is not an impermissible extension of the gaar. if there were any doubts about the application of the gaar to tax treaties, they were unequivocally resolved when parliament amended the act in 2005 (see standing senate committee on national finance, proceedings of the standing senate committee on national finance, nos. 19 and 20, 1st sess., 38th parl., april 20 and may 2, 2005, at pp. 19:16-17, 19:22, and 19:26-27). therefore, although this court’s pronouncements on the gaar were made in the context of alleged abuses of the act, there is no dispute that the gaar also applies to avoidance transactions that abuse or misuse tax treaties. the backdrop against which this amendment was brought provides insight. it followed a report by the auditor general of canada on what was then the canada customs and revenue agency (“ccra”), in which it identified a number of tax avoidance schemes that exploited some of canada’s tax treaties. in discussing the tax treaty canada concluded with barbados, the auditor general observed the following: during our review of non-resident files, we noted that the agency has discovered a number of schemes developed to exploit the canada- barbados income tax agreement canada usually signs tax treaties to avoid double taxation. barbados does not tax capital gains. however, the agreement allows a resident of barbados to claim a canadian tax exemption on a capital gain that would otherwise be subject to canadian tax. the agency is currently reviewing transactions that move capital gains from canada to barbados. [emphasis added.] (office of the auditor general, report of the auditor general of canada to the house of commons — chapter 7 — canada customs and revenue agency, international tax administration: non-residents subject to canadian income tax (2001), at para. 7.85) one of the schemes given as an example of an exploitation of canada’s tax treaties is strikingly similar to the facts of the present case: a non-resident company held shares of a canadian company, the proceeds of the sale of which shares would be taxable in canada the non-resident company shifted its residence to barbados and claimed a canadian tax exemption on the capital gain provided under the treaty between canada and barbados (para 789). the auditor general recommended that the ccra “continue to be vigilant in ensuring that tax treaties are not used inappropriately to reduce canadian tax and, if necessary, should seek legislative or treaty changes to protect canada’s tax base” (para. 7.91 (emphasis added)). parliament opted to make clear that the gaar would be its preferred tool to curb tax avoidance arising from an improper use of canada’s tax treaties. b application we now turn to applying the principles laid out above to the facts of this case. since the first two steps of the gaar framework are not at issue, we will focus solely on the abuse analysis. (1) object, spirit or purpose of articles 1, 4 and 13 of the treaty the crown submits that, with respect to “shares which derive their value principally from immovable property used in a company’s business”, the rationale underlying the relevant provisions of the treaty is to allocate taxing rights to the state of residence, as the economic connection to the company’s state of residence would usually outweigh the connection to the source state as the situs of the immovable property (af, at para 65) alta luxembourg adopts the view of the courts below, according to which the rationale is no broader than the text of the relevant provisions of the treaty (af, at para 97) the rationale is simply to “exempt residents of luxembourg from canadian taxation where there is an investment in immovable property used in a business” (tcc reasons, at para. 100; see also ca reasons, at para. 67). we agree with the crown contrary to the result reached in the courts below, this is not a case where the text of a provision fully expresses its underlying rationale; failing to have regard to this rationale renders the gaar “meaningless” (copthorne, at paras. 110-11). we conclude that the rationale underlying arts. 1, 4 and 13 of the treaty is to assign taxing rights to the state with the stronger economic claim to the income canada is presumed to have the stronger connection to capital gains related to passive investment in immovable property situated in canada realized by residents of luxembourg. however, when the value of the immovable is driven by a company’s business — that is, when residents of luxembourg realize a gain from immovable property used in a business — luxembourg is deemed to have the closer economic connection. the rationale underlying the carve-out in art. 13(4) is to reflect the state of residence’s stronger economic claim to tax the income. in this case, the state of residence is luxembourg but the state with the stronger economic claim to tax the income is canada. (a) the text of the relevant provisions the relevant provisions of the treaty are the following: article 1 i. scope of the convention persons covered this convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the contracting states. article 4 resident 1 for the purposes of this convention, the term “resident of a contracting state” means any person who, under the laws of that state, is liable to tax therein by reason of that person’s domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature. this term also includes a contracting state or a political subdivision or local authority thereof or any agency or instrumentality of any such state, subdivision or authority. this term, however, does not include any person who is liable to tax in that state in respect only of income from sources in that state. article 13 capital gains 1. gains derived by a resident of a contracting state from the alienation of immovable property situated in the other contracting state may be taxed in that other state. 4 gains derived by a resident of a contracting state from the alienation of: a shares (other than shares listed on an approved stock exchange in the other contracting state) forming part of a substantial interest in the capital stock of a company the value of which shares is derived principally from immovable property situated in that other state; or b an interest in a partnership, trust or estate, the value of which is derived principally from immovable property situated in that other state, may be taxed in that other state. for the purposes of this paragraph, the term “immovable property” does not include property (other than rental property) in which the business of the company, partnership, trust or estate was carried on; and a substantial interest exists when the resident and persons related thereto own 10 per cent or more of the shares of any class or the capital stock of a company. 5 gains from the alienation of any property, other than that referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be taxable only in the contracting state of which the alienator is a resident. article 1 provides that the treaty applies to “residents” of canada or luxembourg. article 4 defines “resident” as persons who are liable to pay tax under the laws of the state. article 13 of the treaty provides for the allocation of the right to tax capital gains between canada and luxembourg under art. 13(5), the state of residence (here, luxembourg) retains its jurisdiction to tax capital gains unless the exceptions in art. 13(1) to (4) of the treaty apply. article 13(1) preserves the right of the source state (here, canada) to tax gains derived from immovable property situated in that state this exception is reinforced by art. 13(4), which provides that the source state also preserves its right to tax capital gains arising from the disposition of shares the value of which is derived principally from immovable property situated in the source state article 13(4) is effectively an anti-avoidance rule: it prevents companies from avoiding source state taxation and thereby contradicting art. 13(1) simply by using a corporate vehicle to hold and sell the immovable property (j. li and f. avella, “article 13: capital gains”, in global tax treaty commentaries, may 30, 2020 (online), at s 1125; see also tcc. reasons, at para. 41). finally, there is a carve-out to the exception set out by art. 13(4), for property in which the company carries on business capital gains arising from the disposition of such property will be taxable in the state of residence as such gains fall under the rule provided by art. 13(5). in this case, the tax court judge found that the carve-out applies to the disposition of the shares in alta canada, which can be taxed by the state of residence (luxembourg) and not by canada. although the text of art. 13 of the treaty sets out a clear distributive scheme to allocate taxing rights, it sheds little light on the rationale underlying this allocation. canada and luxembourg did not allocate taxing rights at random; there is a logic underlying the distributive scheme set out in art. 13 of the treaty it is this rationale that we must identify in order to give effect to the gaar. (b) context: specific anti-avoidance provisions alta luxembourg argues that the crown’s submitted rationale, specifically what it calls a “substantial economic connection test”, has the effect of changing the bargain struck between canada and luxembourg. it contends that the crown is seeking to add the unstated condition that a taxpayer must have substantial economic ties to the contracting state of residence in order to qualify as a “resident” under the treaty. canada could have negotiated the inclusion of a provision that could have achieved a similar effect but elected not to specifically, alta luxembourg submits that, in negotiating with luxembourg, canada chose not to include one — or many — of the specific anti-avoidance rules discussed in the 1998 oecd “commentary on article 1”, in model tax convention on income and capital: condensed version. therefore, alta luxembourg says, the minister should not be allowed to rely on the gaar to deny treaty benefits to an entity meeting the residency requirements outlined in the treaty. this argument must fail as it ignores the very justifications behind the legislative choice to introduce a general anti-avoidance provision in a tax system. while there are specific rules that may have permitted the denial of the tax benefits conferred here had they been included in the treaty, it does not follow that the gaar cannot apply to deny the tax benefit. since not every tax avoidance strategy can be foreseen, the effectiveness of specific provisions is limited to parliament’s ability to anticipate such schemes. for this reason, those provisions cannot completely thwart inappropriate tax avoidance (canada, report of the royal commission on taxation (1966), vol. 3, at p 554). before the inception of the gaar, the increased use of complex tax avoidance schemes and matching responses to curb them left taxpayers with the expectation that purely tax- motivated transactions that were inconsistent with the rationale of the provisions relied upon were acceptable as long as they are not targeted by specific legislation (dodge, at p 4). additionally, because legislation is generally prospective, specific anti-avoidance rules permit the early participants in avoidance schemes — those who can afford “the most astute tax advisers” — to enjoy the benefits of those schemes (p 9). this may result in the loss of significant tax revenues. the gaar was enacted as a much needed modernization of canada’s tools against tax avoidance. it was meant to respond appropriately to the proliferation of such complex arrangements and to reduce the burden of having to perpetually address abusive schemes with specific legislation matching each newly marketed “purely tax- motivated scheme” (dodge, at pp. 4 and 8) the explanatory notes issued with the gaar stated that it was to apply “as a provision of last resort after the application of the other provisions of the act, including specific anti-avoidance measures” (department of finance (1988), at p 461 (emphasis added)). here, alta luxembourg’s position essentially amounts to an argument based on the “implied exclusion” rule: if the contracting parties had meant to include an anti-avoidance provision within the treaty, they would have done so expressly. this very reasoning was unanimously rejected by this court in copthorne. in that case, a parent and a subsidiary corporations strategically became sister corporations to conduct a horizontal, rather than vertical, amalgamation. this had the effect of increasing the paid-up capital of the shares of the amalgamated corporations compared to the paid-up capital that would have been otherwise available. the taxpayer argued that because its transactions were not caught by the detailed provisions seeking to prevent taxpayers from inappropriately preserving paid-up capital, no abusive tax avoidance could have resulted. parliament, the argument went, would have expressly referred to such transactions if it had meant for them to be included under the provisions. this court rejected this argument. rothstein j stated that the implied exclusion argument, while relevant in an exercise of statutory interpretation, does not align with “the nature of a gaar analysis” and “is misplaced where it relies exclusively on the text of the [paid-up capital] provisions without regard to their underlying rationale” (paras. 109 and 111). he also warned that “[i]f such an approach were accepted, it would be a full response in all gaar cases, because the actions of a taxpayer will always be permitted by the text of the act” (para. 111). as a result, although the provisions at issue did not impose express limits on the preservation of paid-up capital on a horizontal amalgamation, the gaar applied to deny the tax benefit. this conclusion was justified because the series of transactions allowed for the preservation of the paid-up capital upon a “horizontal” amalgamation that allowed the taxpayer to obtain tax benefits that would not have been available in a vertical amalgamation, a result contrary to the underlying rationale of the relevant provision (copthorne, at para. 126). moreover, relying on prévost car inc. v. canada, 2009 fca 57, [2010] 2 fcr 65, to suggest that canada could have relied on the notion of beneficial ownership to prevent the tax avoidance that took place here is misplaced. not only was canada entitled to rely on the gaar rather than negotiate a specific anti-avoidance rule in the treaty, it is important to note that the provision at issue in that case was art. 10, not art. 13, dealing not with capital gains but with dividends. indeed, beneficial ownership is utterly foreign to art. 13 this notion is relevant to, as noted, art. 10, as well as arts. 11 and 12 of the 2003 oecd “model convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital”, in model tax convention on income and on capital: condensed version, dealing respectively with the payment of dividends, interest and royalties. in a paper on whether the concept of beneficial ownership should be extended to arts. 13 and 21 of the 2001 united nations model double taxation convention between developed and developing countries, u.n doc. st/esa/pad/ser.e/213 (identical in structure to the oecd “model convention”), professor p. baker explained, in 2008, that “the inclusion of a beneficial ownership limitation in the capital gains article of specific, bi-lateral conventions is not part of the current treaty practice of any state” and that “[t]here is also something of a conceptual gulf between applying the beneficial ownership concept to items of income — such as dividends, interest and royalties — and applying it to a capital gain” (the united nations model double taxation convention between developed and developing countries: possible extension of the beneficial ownership concept, un. doc e/c18/2008/crp2/add1,. ann., october 17, 2008, at paras. 54-55 (emphasis added)) while professor baker did state that the “theoretical differences between a flow of income — as in the case of dividends, interest and royalties — and the effective beneficiary of a capital gain, are not insurmountable”, he then went on to state that “[i]t [was] also worth bearing in mind that there is something of a conflict in legal concepts in recognising that the owner of an asset who disposes of that asset may not be the beneficial owner of the capital gain arising from the asset” (para. 58 (emphasis added)). further, in a subsequent report, the united nations’ committee of experts overseeing the subcommittee who had commissioned professor baker’s paper concluded that “[t]here was ultimately only limited support for inserting beneficial ownership in article 13” (committee of experts on international cooperation in tax matters, report on the fourth session (20-24 october 2008), un. doc. e/2008/45 (supp.), 2008, at para. 46). but, of more relevance to the present debate, the examples of tax treaty abuse through the use of art. 13 reviewed by professor baker involved, as here, transfers of residence before the disposal of an asset. he explained that the introduction of “[a] beneficial ownership limitation would not necessarily counter [these] transactions” (para. 53). for all these reasons, beneficial ownership would not be an appropriate anti-avoidance tool to curb tax treaty exploitation involving art. 13 dealing with the realization of capital gains. in sum, by alta luxembourg’s logic, if the lack of a specific tax-avoidance provision in the treaty is fatal to the crown’s position, not only would the gaar be prevented from applying to tax treaties, it would also be prevented from applying in cases of abuse of the act that are not specifically addressed. in our view, no inference can be drawn from the absence of an anti-avoidance rule designed to counter the particular scheme employed in this case. to do so would be inconsistent with of the role of the gaar relative to other anti-avoidance tools it would also be patently contrary to this court’s repeated holding that the gaar is a provision of last resort, and can only find application where no other provisions of the act do (canada trustco, at para. 21; copthorne, at para. 66). thus, the absence of specific anti-avoidance rules in the relevant provisions of the treaty sheds little light on their underlying rationale. (c) the purpose of the relevant provisions: economic allegiance underlies the distributive scheme the treaty, like other bilateral tax treaties, allocates the right to tax between contracting states so as to avoid double taxation (e. c. c. m. kemmeren, “legal and economic principles support an origin and import neutrality-based over a residence and export neutrality-based tax treaty policy”, in m. lang et al., eds., tax treaties: building bridges between law and economics (2010), 237, at pp. 239 and 243; k. vogel, “double tax treaties and their interpretation” (1986), 4 int’l tax & bus. law. 1, at pp. 8 and 22; crown forest industries ltd. v. canada, [1995] 2 scr. 802, at para. 46) the allocation of taxing powers follows the theory of “economic allegiance”, under which an economic connection between the state and the taxpayer serves as the basis of taxation (li and avella, at s 1121, referring to league of nations, economic and financial commission, report on double taxation submitted to the financial committee (1923)). this means that taxes should be paid on income where it has the strongest “economic interests” or ties, either in the state of residence or the source state. the theory of economic allegiance explains why arts. 1 and 4 provide that beneficiaries of the treaty are the residents of either state. contracting states extend the benefits of the tax treaties only to their residents (that is, persons liable to pay tax in their state) because residence is an appropriate criterion to ensure that the treaty will “cover only persons who had an economic allegiance to one or both of the contracting states” (p. j. hattingh, “article 1 of the oecd model: historical background and the issues surrounding it” (2003), 57 bull. int’l fisc. doc. 215, at p 221). following the theory of economic allegiance, active income is generally taxable in the source country (where the income is earned) while passive income is taxed primarily in the residence country (j. li and a. cockfield, with j. s. wilkie, international taxation in canada: principles and practices (4th ed. 2018), at pp. 46- 47). while capital gains “do not fit nicely in either ‘active income’ or ‘passive income’” (j. li, a. cockfield and j. s. wilkie, international taxation in canada: principles and practices (2nd ed. 2011), at p 44), nonetheless the distributive scheme of art. 13 reflects, as well, the theory of economic allegiance (li and avella, at s 1121). depending on where the economic connection is stronger, the right to tax the capital gain will be allocated to either the source state or the residence state. as a general rule, residence is taken to indicate the state to which economic ties are closest. the state of residence is typically where “capital is accumulated and consumed” (ibid.), so it has the greater claim to tax. as professor krishna explains, “[t]he obligation to pay tax based on residence derives from the principle that persons who benefit from their economic and social affiliation with a country have an obligation to contribute to its public finances” (fundamentals of canadian income tax (2nd ed. 2019), vol. 1, at p 103). article 13(5) of the treaty reflects this principle: with certain exceptions, capital gains are taxable only in the state in which the taxpayer is a resident, because residence connotes this close connection. gains deriving from immovable property form part of such an exception (see, generally, art. 13(1) and (4)). in relation to immovable property, the capital gain is generally connected predominantly to the situs of the property, which justifies allocating taxing rights to the source state. the rationale behind source taxation is that “a person who receives income from a person or property situated in a state has such a close relation with the state where the person or property is physically located that an obligation to support that state is justified on grounds of the relationship” (kemmeren, at p 262 (emphasis in original); see also a. christians and n. benoît-guay, “status and structure of tax treaties”, in j-p. vidal, ed., introduction to international tax in canada (9th ed. 2021), at p 4/14 to 4/15). this principle explains why art. 13(1) and (4) allocates to the source state the right to tax gains derived directly or indirectly from immovable property situated in that state (li and avella, at ss. 1121 and 1125;. oecd, “commentary on article 13”, in model tax convention on income and on capital: condensed version (2017) (“2017 commentary”), at para. 4; s. simontacchi, taxation of capital gains under the oecd model convention: with special regard to immovable property (2007), vol. 29, at p 201). finally, the carve-out of art. 13(4) allocates the taxing right to the state of residence for its residents’ capital gains from immovable property when it is driven by business activity, to reflect what canada and luxembourg considered to be closer economic ties with the residence state. “the rationale underlying this carve-out is that where a non-resident actively invests in immovable property situated in the source country, tax should be levied in the residence country” (christians and benoît-guay, at p 4/15 (emphasis added)). when business is carried on in an immovable property, the business activity — rather than the immovable property itself — drives value. accordingly, the economic justification for source state taxation is weaker. it is worth recalling that art. 13(4) is intended to prevent taxpayers from circumventing source state taxation (art. 13(1)) by interposing a company to alienate immovable property this justification for source state taxation is weaker when the company carries on a business in the immovable property because “the assumption that a corporate veil has been interposed between the shareholder and the immovable property is questionable, and equating the alienation of shares in the company to the alienation of the underlying immovable property does not seem tenable” (s. simontacchi, “immovable property companies as defined in article 13(4) of the oecd model” (2006), 60 bull. int’l tax’n 29, at p 31). the carve-out is not in the 2017 oecd “model convention”, but it is contemplated by the oecd’s commentaries as an option for contracting parties who want to allocate taxing rights to the residence state for immovable properties such as mines and hotels (2017 commentary, at paras. 285-287). as a result, we agree with the tax court that one of the purposes of the carve-out is “to encourage investments by luxembourg residents in immovable property acquired to be used in a company’s business” (para. 43). relying on fundy settlement v. canada, 2010 fca 309, [2012] 2 fcr. 374, the federal court of appeal rejected the theory of “economic allegiance” as the rationale underlying art. 13(4) of the treaty because “[t]here is no distinction in the luxembourg convention between residents with strong economic or commercial ties and those with weak or no commercial or economic ties” (r v. mil (investments) sa, 2007 fca 236, [2007] 4 ctc 235 (“mil (fca)”), at para. 6). in our view, the reasoning adopted in fundy settlement, mil (tcc) and mil (fca) departs from the proper approach under the gaar, which focuses on the “why” — the rationale — behind the text of the relevant provisions; these cases should not be followed. if relying on the text of a treaty provision is sufficient to avoid abusing a treaty, then the gaar is effectively rendered powerless to address abusive transactions structured around tax treaties, notwithstanding the retroactive 2005 amendments to s 245 of the act to ensure that the gaar applied to tax treaties. as professor g. t. loomer explains, this analysis “seems to ensure that any avoidance strategy involving a canadian tax treaty, no matter how blatant, will be immune to the gaar provided the intermediate entity is formally established in the particular state and meets the technical requirements of the particular treaty provisions relied upon” (“tax treaty abuse: is canada responding effectively?”, in oxford university centre for business taxation, working paper no. 09/05 (revised march 2009), at s 433). we would also note that, when this court disposed of the appeal in fundy settlement on other grounds, it specified that it “should not be understood as endorsing the reasons of the federal court of appeal” on the gaar (fundy settlement v. canada, 2012 scc 14, [2012] 1 scr 520, at para. 19). alta luxembourg similarly argues that this court held, in crown forest, that residence under bilateral tax conventions is established where a taxpayer is subject to full tax liability in the contracting state. in its view, the crown is seeking to add the unstated condition that a taxpayer must have substantial economic ties to the contracting state of residence in order to qualify as a “resident” under the treaty. we disagree. this argument ignores the fact that crown forest did not deal with the application of the gaar the court in that case had to interpret the term “resident” under the canada-united states tax convention act, 1984 by contrast, where, as here, the gaar is invoked to deny a tax benefit that would otherwise be available based on the text of the provisions, one must look beyond the text in order to determine whether conferring such benefit frustrates or exploits the underlying rationale of the provisions. this does not mean that alta luxembourg must meet an “unstated condition” in addition to qualifying as a “resident” under arts. 1 and 4 of the treaty. rather, the crown raises the need for economic ties to luxembourg in relation to the object, spirit or purpose underpinning the relevant provisions. for the crown, granting the tax benefit to alta luxembourg in the circumstances where it fails to have any real, substantial economic connection to the state of residence would frustrate the underlying rationale of the relevant provisions this accords with the proper methodology under the gaar. in sum, the distributive scheme allocates taxing rights based on the strength of the economic connection between the income and the contracting states. the carve- out of art. 13(4) follows the same logic: when a taxpayer carries on a business in an immovable property, it derives benefits more from the residence state and that state’s commercial legal framework than from the source state’s infrastructure this connection between the income and the residence state forms the economic basis for residence state taxation. (d) conclusion on the rationale for the relevant provisions we conclude that the rationale for the relevant provisions of the treaty is to allocate taxation rights to the contracting state which has the strongest economic claim to the relevant income. the carve-out assigns the right to tax capital gains arising from the disposition of immovable property in which business is carried on to the resident state. the rationale behind the carve-out is to encourage investment; it reflects the fact that the business activity, rather than the immovable property itself, drives the value of the property. accordingly, the economic justification for source state taxation — an exception to the general principle of taxation in the state of residence — is weaker. the state of residence has the stronger economic claim to tax the income. (2) was there an abuse of the provisions of the treaty? the courts below erred in law by failing to identify the object, spirit or purpose of the treaty’s relevant provisions and, instead, merely restated art. 13(5). the courts failed to focus on the reason for the article. consequently, we are called on to conduct the abuse analysis afresh and to determine whether the transaction falls within or frustrates the rationale of the relevant provisions of the treaty (canada v 594710 british columbia ltd., 2018 fca 166, [2019] 5 ctc 1, at para. 64). in our view, alta luxembourg’s presence in luxembourg is not genuine — it is mere gossamer. as such allowing it to enjoy tax benefits conferred on the basis of the stronger economic connection between the taxpayer’s income and luxembourg frustrates the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions of the treaty. alta luxembourg’s lack of substantial economic connection is plain from a review of the record. alta luxembourg was created and controlled by alta us and its american and other foreign shareholders whose jurisdiction did not have a tax treaty with a similar exemption as the treaty. the transaction was structured to ensure no gain would be realized in luxembourg and that all proceeds of the sale would flow to the shareholders. as a senior managing director of the private equity firm behind the restructuring said, the objective was not to establish a genuine presence in luxembourg, but rather to ensure that “everything will . . . flow through vehicles and no canadian taxes will be paid” (ar, vol. iv, at p 106). after the transaction, alta luxembourg did not carry business in luxembourg. alta luxembourg’s presence in luxembourg was manufactured out of whole cloth the shareholders and investors of alta us retained “domiciliation services” to provide a corporate presence in luxembourg and benefit from the treaty. email exchanges preceding the transaction make it clear that the service provider’s role was solely to ensure that alta luxembourg had the minimum “substance requirements” so the shareholders and investors of alta us could “avail [themselves of] the benefits under the canada/luxembourg tax treaty (ie, to alleviate canadian tax leakage)” (ar, vol. iv, at pp. 138-39) calls for alta luxembourg would be routed to a switchboard and answered by an employee from the service provider. in addition to providing a corporate presence to alta luxembourg, the service provider also held board meetings for alta luxembourg. the members of the board of alta luxembourg were composed of two classes of managers: class a managers, and class b managers. all class b managers were provided by the service provider and never met with class a managers in essence, alta luxembourg only existed through the service provider. it was an empty shell. canada and luxembourg agreed to the carve-out for the purpose of reflecting the closer economic connection between luxembourg and its residents who carry on business in an immovable property situated in canada yet the avoidance transactions were structured around a shell company with no real ties to luxembourg, which was created solely to obtain a tax benefit under the treaty therefore, the transactions led to an outcome that defeats the rationale underlying the allocation of taxing rights to luxembourg over a class of capital gains. indeed, this is precisely the type of transaction that the authors li and avella qualify as abusive uses of tax treaties: “. . . using interposed companies in an intermediary jurisdiction to take advantage of that jurisdiction’s treaty network . . .” in relation to capital gains (s 2113). canada has deliberately decided not to extend the benefit of the treaty exemption found in the treaty to the residents of the jurisdictions of the shareholders of alta us. with regards to the provisions at issue, the common intention of canada and luxembourg could not have been to provide an avenue for residents of third-party states to indirectly obtain tax benefits they could not obtain directly absent any real economic connection with luxembourg this is “patently contrary to the basis on which” states cede their “jurisdiction to tax as the source country” (crown forest, at para. 52). our colleague’s reasons assume that the federal government deliberately set out, in the exercise of its treaty making authority, to create the conditions for unlimited tax avoidance by means of schemes such as that in which alta luxembourg was used. to state such a proposition is to expose its absurdity, yet our colleague seeks to legitimize such blatantly abusive tax avoidance based on her view that canada should have negotiated different treaty terms the focus on what else could hypothetically have been agreed to is misplaced. it involves ex ante speculation about how the treaty parties ought to have proceeded based on alternatives said to have been available to them. however, such an argument gives primacy to what is not there. we are of the view that parliament was entitled to rely on the gaar to address abusive uses of the treaty rather than negotiate the inclusion of a specific rule. the focus should be on what was actually agreed upon and whether the underlying rationale of the relevant provisions was frustrated by the avoidance transactions undertaken in the give and take of treaty negotiation, canada certainly did not give up the gaar. the auditor general raised concerns with precisely these types of schemes 20 years ago and recommended that parliament take legislative action to protect canada’s tax base. parliament addressed this “mischief” with the enactment of s 4.1 itcia to ensure the minister could rely on the gaar to deny tax benefits obtained through the use of schemes found to be abusive under the gaar analysis. to borrow the words of li and cockfield, to “ascertain whether parliament . . . intended to prohibit a particular tax-avoidance transaction”, it is wise to determine what is the “mischief” it sought to remove (p 380). in addition, the avoidance transactions run contrary to the objective of encouraging trade and investment which underlies the carve-out they were not an acquisition or an investment, but rather a liquidation of an existing investment in canada without paying tax on the capital gain. thus, the transactions are disconnected from the economic objectives underlying the bargain. further, although “insufficient by itself to establish abusive tax avoidance”, our jurisprudence is clear that the absence of a bona fide non-tax purpose “may form part of the factual context that the courts may consider in the analysis of abusive tax avoidance allegations under s 245(4)” (canada trustco, at para. 58; see also lipson, at para. 38). the absence of bona fide non-tax purpose is relevant when the rationale of the provisions at issue means “that a particular tax benefit may apply only to transactions with a certain economic, commercial, family or other non-tax purpose” (canada trustco, at para. 58). here, the minister is seeking to apply the gaar in the context of a purely tax-motivated corporate restructuring resulting in a shift of residence to luxembourg, a reorganization for which there was no bona fide non-tax purpose given that the rationale of the relevant provisions is to reflect the economic ties with luxembourg, the state of residence, this utter lack of any non-tax purpose is a relevant underlying factor that can be considered in the analysis under s 245(4) of the act. while the crown has conceded that alta luxembourg was a resident of luxembourg under art. 4 of the treaty, contrary to the federal court of appeal, we do not consider the residency requirement to be determinative in the context of a gaar analysis. again, the gaar framework requires courts to give effect to the rationale underlying the text of the relevant provisions. the reasoning of the federal court of appeal would effectively amount to holding that the gaar does not apply to tax treaties when the benefit is to be exempt from taxation in canada, ie when canada has ceded its right to its treaty partner. since being exempt from taxation in canada is the main tax benefit provided by tax treaties, the gaar, a general rule of last resort, would be rendered nugatory as a rule in relation to abuses of tax treaties. technical compliance with a tax treaty in a way that frustrates the underlying rationale of the provisions relied upon by the taxpayer is precisely what triggers the gaar. alta luxembourg complied with the words of the relevant provisions of the treaty, but not their rationale. it is that to which the gaar requires courts to give effect. we acknowledge that finding that a transaction structured to claim tax benefits from a treaty can be abusive when a resident lacks economic connections to the state of residence may produce more uncertainty than mechanically applying the words of the treaty however, parliament struck the balance it considered proper between certainty and fairness to the tax system as a whole. the facts of this case are a patent example of a sophisticated taxpayer effecting a restructuring on the basis of professional tax advice to avoid canadian tax. in such cases, the principle of fairness ought not to be ignored. as for the degree of uncertainty introduced by the gaar, it is counterbalanced by the crown’s burden to show that the avoidance transactions frustrate the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions relied on by the taxpayer and by the fact that any doubt under the gaar analysis is to be resolved in favour of the taxpayer (canada trustco, at para. 69). in this case, the abuse is clear. the evidence demonstrates that alta luxembourg had no genuine economic connections with luxembourg as it was a mere conduit interposed in luxembourg for residents of third- party states to avail themselves of a tax exemption under the treaty. we agree with our colleague that the lack of any non-tax purpose, although relevant, does not on its own lead to the determination of abuse in this case. rather, it is this lack of any genuine economic connection to luxembourg that frustrates the rationale of the relevant provisions of the treaty. the crown has discharged its burden. finally, we wish to comment on an observation made at paras. 84-85 of the tax court decision. the tax court explained that a party negotiating a tax treaty is presumed to be aware of the other state’s tax system, such that canada, as a state which taxes capital gains, should have seen to the prevention of a double exemption of this type of income. to be clear, the crown’s position, as we understand it, is not that the gaar is invoked because the capital gain did not go on to be taxed in luxembourg. rather, the crown is seeking the application of the gaar because in its view, alta luxembourg had no economic connection to luxembourg and therefore the underlying rationale of arts. 1, 4 and 13(4) that it identified is frustrated. in sum, we are of the view that alta luxembourg’s patent lack of economic connection to luxembourg frustrates the underlying rationale of the relevant provisions of the treaty to allocate the taxation rights to the contracting state with the strongest economic claim the transactions are the product of a contrivance which was not reasonably contemplated within the object, spirit or purpose of art. 13(4). as a result, the avoidance transactions frustrate the rationale of art. 13(4) and constitute abuse under the gaar. accordingly, the tax benefit conferred by the relevant provisions is denied. (3) a word on treaty shopping we pause to say a word on whether treaty shopping constitutes an improper use of tax treaties, as this was extensively discussed by the parties and in the courts below the oecd glossary of tax terms (online) defines “treaty shopping” as follows: an analysis of tax treaty provisions to structure an international transaction or operation so as to take advantage of a particular tax treaty. the term is normally applied to a situation where a person not resident of either the treaty countries establishes an entity in one of the treaty countries in order to obtain treaty benefits. (see also crown forest, at para. 52.) on this issue, we agree with the crown that the treaty is not intended to provide avenues for residents of third-party states to benefit from their treaty partner’s tax regime in the absence of genuine ties to that state. as this court held in crown forest, there is no reason to assume that canada would enter into tax treaties to “ced[e] its taxing authority to a jurisdiction that is a stranger to the convention” (para. 49). treaty shopping connotes “a premeditated effort to take advantage of the international tax treaty network, and careful selection of the most favorable treaty for a specific purpose” (h. d. rosenbloom, “tax treaty abuse: policies and issues” (1983), 15 law & pol’y int’l bus 763, at p 766, cited in d. g. duff, “tax treaty abuse and the principal purpose test — part 1” (2018), 66 can. tax j 619, at pp. 623- 24) treaty shopping typically involves the practice of non-residents establishing a minimal presence or economic activity in a country in order to benefit from the jurisdiction’s treaty network with other countries (v. krishna, “using beneficial ownership to prevent treaty shopping” (2009), 56 tax notes int’l 537, at p 540). treaty shopping has notably been criticized on the grounds that it produces outcomes contrary to the intention of the contracting states, such as reduced taxation and non-taxation, which can lead to an unintended erosion of national tax bases (duff (2018), at pp. 624-25; see also b. j. arnold and j. r. wilson, “aggressive international tax planning by multinational corporations: the canadian context and possible responses”, university of calgary school of public policy, vol 7, research paper no. 29 (2014), at p 56). indeed, treaty shopping can indirectly and unwittingly provide tax benefits for residents of third-party states, contrary to canada’s intention to extend such benefits solely to the residents of the treaty partner (department of finance, consultation paper on treaty shopping — the problem and possible solutions, august 12, 2013 (online)) as a result, treaty shopping can upset the “balance of sacrifices” that underlies a tax treaty and reduce the incentive to conclude a tax treaty. why would a state negotiate a tax treaty with canada and make the concessions such a process entails if its residents can access canada’s tax treaty network through treaty shopping arrangements (duff (2018), at p 624; oecd, action 6 prevention of tax treaty abuse (online); see also j. li, “beneficial ownership in tax treaties: judicial interpretation and the case for clarity”, in p. baker and c. bobbett, eds., tax polymath: a life in international taxation (2011), 187, at p 191)? in crown forest, this court unanimously stated that treaty shopping is “highly undesirable” and “patently contrary to the basis on which canada ceded its jurisdiction to tax as the source country” (para. 52). it added that such behaviour “is not to be encouraged or promoted by judicial interpretation of existing agreements” (para. 49). nevertheless, we agree with alta luxembourg that treaty shopping is not inherently abusive there is nothing necessarily improper about minimizing tax liability by selecting a beneficial tax regime in making an investment in a foreign jurisdiction (crown forest, at para. 49) certain jurisdictions may provide tax incentives to attract businesses and investment; as such, taxpayers are entitled to avail themselves of such benefits to minimize tax thus, merely selecting a treaty to minimize tax, on its own, is not abusive. in fact, it may be consonant with one of the main purposes of tax treaties: encouraging trade and investment. however, where taxing rights in a tax treaty are allocated on the basis of economic allegiance and conduit entities claim tax benefits despite the absence of any genuine economic connection with the state of residence, treaty shopping is, in our view, abusive. as professors n. bammens and l. de broe explain, the use of “conduit companies” is disconnected from the objectives of bilateral tax treaties: . . tax treaties are concluded for reasons of an economic nature: the contracting states want to stimulate reciprocal commercial relations by preventing double taxation the use of conduit companies and treaty shopping structures has very little to do with this economic objective. treaty shopping thus upsets the balance and reciprocity of the tax treaty: in order to preserve a tax treaty’s inherent reciprocity, its benefits must not be extended to persons not entitled to them. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] (“treaty shopping and avoidance of abuse”, in lang et al., tax treaties, 51, at p 52; see also li and avella, at s 2113). in such cases, as here, the avoidance transaction would be contrary to the objectives of bilateral tax treaties and frustrate the object, spirit or purpose of the specific provisions related to the allocation of taxing rights. preventing such abuse is the purpose of the gaar: “. . most double tax treaties do not contain specific limitations on the ability of third-country residents to treaty shop [and instead] rely on the concept of beneficial ownership or on domestic anti-abuse legislation to safeguard against hollow conduits” (krishna (2009), at p 540) similarly, c. a. brown and j. bogle are of the view that the gaar is “[t]he primary tool to fight treaty shopping in canada currently” (“treaty shopping and the new multilateral tax agreement — is it business as usual in canada?” (2020), 43 dal. lj 1, at p 4). in conclusion, not all types of treaty shopping lead to abuse of a tax treaty. only when an avoidance transaction frustrates the rationale of the relevant treaty provision will treaty shopping be abusive and the tax benefit denied for instance, where contracting parties allocate taxing rights to the state of residence on the basis of economic allegiance, as in this case, treaty shopping will be abusive if the resident of a third-party state uses a conduit company to claim treaty benefits conferred by provisions requiring a genuine economic connection with the residence state. therein lies the undermining of these provisions’ rationale clothed in a formalistic adherence to their text. ignoring this is to render the gaar empty of meaningful effect. iv disposition we would allow the crown’s appeal and set aside the judgments of the federal court of appeal and the tax court of canada, with costs. alta luxembourg’s appeal under the act from the minister of national revenue’s assessment for the 2013 taxation year should be dismissed. appeal dismissed with costs, wagner c.j and rowe and martin jj. dissenting.
[1] this appeal concerns the admissibility of hearsay evidence, being testimony of an overheard phone conversation that included an admission of criminal responsibility central to these reasons is the view that the admissibility of such evidence is governed by foundational legal principles, rather than some unique rule. thus, in deciding this case i will consider relevance, hearsay and the discretionary weighing of probative value against prejudicial effect. it will be necessary, as well, to apply this court’s decision in r v. ferris, [1994] 3 scr 756. [2] in deciding this appeal, i will answer three questions. first, whether what the witness overheard had meaning, such that it was relevant to an issue at trial. second, whether what the witness overheard was admissible under an exception to the general exclusionary rule against hearsay. third, whether the trial judge appropriately refused to exclude the evidence on the basis that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect i answer each question in the affirmative what the witness overheard the accused say on the phone was capable of non-speculative meaning such that it was relevant; it was admissible under the “party admission” exception to hearsay; and there is no basis to disturb the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence. [3] the police charged the respondent, william victor schneider (“accused”), with second degree murder and interfering with a dead body contrary to ss. 235(1) and 182(b) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. at trial, the crown sought to adduce hearsay evidence from the accused’s brother, warren schneider jr. (“brother”), who overheard the accused speaking on the phone with his wife. the brother testified that, while he could not recall the precise words the accused said, during that call the accused admitted to killing the victim. this is the evidence at issue. at the close of the crown’s case, the accused pleaded guilty to interfering with the body. thus, this appeal deals only with the murder charge. [4] the trial judge admitted the brother’s testimony as to the overheard conversation. the jury convicted the accused of second degree murder. the accused appealed, arguing the trial judge erred, inter alia, by admitting the brother’s testimony as to the overheard conversation. a majority of the british columbia court of appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that the at- issue testimony was inadmissible the dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal as she would have upheld the trial judge’s admission of the evidence and affirmed the conviction. [5] the judges of the court of appeal all agreed that r v. ferris (1994), 149 ar 1 (ca), as affirmed by this court, governed whether the brother’s testimony was admissible. all were of the view that the evidence was admissible if it was capable of meaning and, thus, relevant to an issue at trial. however, the judges disagreed as to what other trial evidence could inform the analysis of whether the evidence had meaning and was, thus, relevant. the majority drew a tight contextual circle around the evidence that could inform meaning in doing so, the majority held that only the “micro” context, ie the words before and after the evidence at issue, was pertinent to meaning. the dissent saw all the evidence as capable of informing the meaning of what the brother overheard. [6] the crown asks this court to allow the appeal and restore the conviction. i would do so. the trial judge did not err in admitting this part of the brother’s evidence. there is no basis in law to differentiate between “micro” and “macro” context when determining whether evidence is capable of meaning and, therefore, relevant. all the evidence is capable of informing a judge’s analysis of this question. [7] in response to the crown’s as of right appeal, the accused raised an additional issue. he argues that the trial judge erred in dealing with a mid-deliberation question from the jury. on this point, i am in substantial agreement with the unanimous court of appeal. the jury’s question was not ambiguous and the trial judge did not err in answering it. i. facts [8] the victim, ms. natsumi kogawa, was reported missing on 12 september 2016 police issued a news release on 27 september 2016 with a picture showing ms. kogawa with an unidentified male at a mall police asked for the public’s assistance identifying that man. police then received a tip from the accused’s brother as to the whereabouts of ms. kogawa’s body. that tip led to police recovering ms. kogawa’s body, two weeks after she was reported missing, in a suitcase hidden in vancouver’s west end. after investigation, police arrested the accused and charged him with second degree murder and interfering with ms. kogawa’s body after death. [9] between the police news release and his tip to police, the brother had several critical conversations with the accused. i describe these below. as the accused did not testify, the descriptions come entirely from the brother’s testimony. a. 27 september 2016 [10] on 27 september 2016, the brother’s daughter brought the police news release to his attention. she asked if the unidentified man was the accused (her uncle). the brother said yes he then called the accused to tell him about the police news release. the accused did not respond and hung up the phone. [11] the brother went to where the accused was staying and the two went for a walk. during this walk, the accused described his relationship with ms. kogawa. he said that he had gone on three dates with her. he told his brother that on the third date they took “medication”. the brother testified that the accused appeared “[r]emorsefully sad” during this conversation and that the accused told him “it’s true” (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 113-14). the trial judge excluded the brother’s evidence as to what he thought the accused meant by this statement. the brother told the accused that they should speak again in the morning. b. 28 september 2016 [12] the next morning, the accused told the brother that he intended to purchase heroin and use the drug to die by suicide. the accused asked the brother to be with him; the brother agreed they both purchased alcohol and the accused purchased heroin. together, they went to a park. [13] after arriving at the park, and before taking heroin, the accused told the brother the location of ms. kogawa’s body. the brother was to inform the police of the body’s location after the accused died by suicide. the accused then injected himself with heroin. however, he did not die. [14] after this suicide attempt, the accused asked the brother for his cellphone. the accused called his wife, a non-compellable witness. this call is at the center of this appeal. although the brother was about 10 feet away and “not actively trying to listen” (ca reasons, 2021 bcca 41, 400 ccc (3d) 131, at para. 42), he overheard portions of the accused’s conversation what the brother can testify to regarding what he overheard is the principal issue in this appeal. ii testimony at issue a. the brother’s voir dire testimony [15] the trial judge held a voir dire regarding the admissibility of the brother’s testimony as to what he overheard the accused say to his wife. [16] in the voir dire examination-in-chief, the brother testified that the accused began the call by saying “[d]id you see the news of the missing japanese woman, student?” (ar, vol. ii, at p 135). he also testified that the accused later said, “i did it” and “i killed her” (ibid). [17] in the voir dire cross-examination, defence counsel confronted the brother with his preliminary inquiry testimony in which he had testified that he “believe[d]” the accused said “i did it” or “i killed her” (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 141 and 147). after seeing the preliminary inquiry transcript, the brother said that “word-for-word” he could not remember what the accused said, but that the statements made were “along those lines” (pp. 138-45). [18] the trial judge ruled the testimony was admissible. b. the brother’s trial testimony [19] during examination-in-chief, the brother stated that the accused, at the beginning of the phone conversation, said “[d]id you hear the news about the missing japanese student?” (ar, vol ii, at p 170) he testified he did not know the exact words the accused said after, but thought that “[n]ear halfway through the conversation” the accused said that “he did it, he killed her” (ibid.) although the brother heard only one side of the conversation, the gist of what he overheard was that the accused was taking responsibility for ms. kogawa’s death. the brother testified that the conversation “wasn’t . . . mild” or “loving” (ar, vol. ii, at p 171). [20] during cross-examination, the brother acknowledged that he did not recall the exact words that the accused used. further, even if he was correct in remembering that the accused said “i did it” or “i killed her”, he was unaware what these phrases were said in response to the brother could not be sure if the phrases were said in response to a question or if they related to ms. kogawa’s disappearance. the brother testified he was not trying to listen to the conversation, that he was under significant stress at the time, and that he had consumed alcohol. iii decisions in issue a. the voir dire ruling, 2018 bcsc 2546 [21] the trial judge took the view that admissibility of the brother’s evidence hinged on whether: (1) there was “some evidence” (para. 19, reproduced in ar, vol. i, at p 5) that the jury could use to determine the meaning of the words the brother overheard, such that the words were relevant and (2) the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect. [22] that the brother was unable to recall the exact words did not make his testimony inadmissible. he testified that the accused said “i killed her” or “i did it” and that he understood the “gist” of the conversation (paras. 16-17). there was sufficient context for the jury to give meaning to the words. the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect; as well, a “strong caution to the jury” could ameliorate any issues associated with the evidence (para. 21). on this basis, the trial judge admitted the evidence. b answer to the jury’s mid-deliberation question and conviction [23] during deliberation, the jury sent a handwritten note to the court setting out the following question (see the reproduction in the appendix to these reasons): could you please expand on the definition of bodily harm in q3 (intent required for murder) versus bodily harm as described in para 109./111 for manslaughter.  bodily harm any hurt or injury . interfers [sic] health . more than just brief/minor.  concept of bodily harm that the accused knows is “likely” to cause death and reckless . [emphasis in original.] (ar, vol. iv, at p 215; see also ca reasons, at para. 115.) [24] the references to “q3” and “para 109./111” are to the following passages in the jury instructions: [109] the criminal fault in manslaughter is the commission of the unlawful act which is objectively dangerous in the sense that a reasonable person, in the same circumstances as the accused, would recognize that the unlawful act would subject another person to the risk of bodily harm. “bodily harm” is any hurt or injury that interferes with a person’s health or comfort and is more than just brief or of a minor nature. [110] in the offence of murder there is in addition to the unlawful act, the ingredient of either an intention to cause death or an intention to cause bodily harm that the accused knows is likely to cause death and is reckless as to whether death ensues these are the legal differences between the offences of second degree murder and manslaughter. [111] therefore, what distinguishes murder from manslaughter is the mental state, or what we describe in criminal law as the intent of the person causing the death. [q3: did mr. schneider have the intent required for murder?] [132] to prove that mr. schneider had the intent required for murder, the crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt one of two things, either: 1 that mr. schneider meant to cause ms. kogawa’s death; or 2 that mr. schneider meant to cause ms. kogawa bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause her death and was reckless whether death ensued or not. [133] in other words, you must decide whether the crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt either that mr schneider meant to kill ms. kogawa, or that mr schneider meant to cause ms. kogawa bodily harm that he knew was so dangerous and serious it was likely to kill ms. kogawa and proceeded despite his knowledge of that risk. [emphasis deleted.] (see ca reasons, at paras. 116-17.) [25] the trial judge conferred with counsel regarding the jury’s question. she asked if they thought that she should provide the jury with an expanded definition of intent. crown counsel replied that the jury “seem[ed] to be caught up that with bodily harm there must be some injury or bruising or something of that nature” (ar, vol. iii, at p 327) defence counsel recommended that the judge provide to the jury the definition of “bodily harm” set out in s 2 of the criminal code. the judge agreed with this and indicated that initially she had misread the jury’s question. although crown counsel went on to suggest an expanded definition of intent, defence counsel was firm that this was not what the jury was asking about. the trial judge decided that she would “wait until [they] get there” on intent (ar, vol. iii, at p 331). she called in the jury and twice read the definition of “bodily harm” from s 2 of the criminal code. the jury asked no further questions and convicted the accused of second degree murder. c british columbia court of appeal, 2021 bcca 41, 400 ccc (3d) 131 [26] the accused appealed his conviction on three grounds. two are relevant to the appeal before this court. he asked the court of appeal to consider if the trial judge erred: (1) by admitting the brother’s testimony regarding the overheard telephone conversation (“admissibility issue”); and (2) in responding to the question from the jury (“jury question issue”). [27] the court of appeal unanimously dismissed the jury question issue but divided on the admissibility issue. the majority held that the brother’s testimony as to the overheard telephone conversation was inadmissible; dewitt-van oosten ja, in dissent, held that the trial judge did not err in admitting this testimony. (1) the admissibility issue [28] the court of appeal judges agreed that the brother’s testimony was admissible if: (1) it was relevant; and (2) the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. however, the majority and dissent differed as to the context that a trial judge could use to decide whether the party admission was capable of meaning and, therefore, relevant the majority held there are two facets to context: “micro” and “macro” (para. 203). only the micro context, ie the words said before and after the overheard admission, were pertinent in determining whether the admission had meaning. as the brother could not recall “what was said before or after the overheard words[,] no properly instructed jury could conclude that the overheard fragment was an admission” (paras. 205-6). the testimony was not relevant and, accordingly, should not have been admitted. [29] justice dewitt-van oosten, in dissent, would have held that trial judges can consider all the evidence when determining if the words had meaning and, thus, are relevant. in this case, there was significant evidence (beyond the “micro” context) to inform the meaning of the words the brother overheard the brother had several conversations with the accused leading up to the phone call; the accused responded to the brother’s questions about the news release identifying a missing woman by saying “it’s true”; the accused had informed the brother of the location of ms. kogawa’s body; the accused displayed a remorseful demeanour during interactions that he had with the brother leading up to the phone call. the words the brother overheard “formed part of an ongoing interaction and dialogue” (para. 89). from the entirety of the evidence, a properly instructed jury would be able to give meaning to the words overheard in a manner that was not speculative. as such, the brother’s testimony was relevant. [30] considering the next step of admissibility, dewitt-van oosten ja held the trial judge’s weighing of probative value against prejudicial effect was entitled to deference further, any prejudice that might have arisen had been limited by appropriate jury instructions explaining the proper use of the party admission. in the result, dewitt-van oosten ja would have dismissed this ground of appeal. (2) the jury question issue [31] the accused argued that the trial judge erred in two ways: first, by failing to ask the jury for clarification of the question, as it was ambiguous; and, second, by failing to answer it correctly. the panel unanimously dismissed this ground of appeal. the question was not ambiguous and there was no validity to the accused’s suggestion that the definition of bodily harm was different for manslaughter than for murder. principles of statutory interpretation demand that the same definition for bodily harm apply to both offences. the difference between the two offences is not in the degree of bodily harm an accused inflicts, but rather in the intent that accompanies the act. the panel concluded there was “no reasonable possibility of the jury having been misled and convicting the [accused] of second degree murder based on a diminished form of intent” (para. 148). iv. issues on appeal [32] the crown appealed the court of appeal’s decision on the admissibility issue as of right. the accused raised the jury question issue as an alternative basis on which this court could uphold the order from the court of appeal. v analysis [33] i address this appeal in two parts. first, i address the admissibility issue. i conclude that the trial judge did not err in admitting the brother’s testimony. second, i address the jury question issue. on this issue i am in substantial agreement with the unanimous reasons of the court of appeal like them, i conclude that the jury’s question was not ambiguous and that the trial judge did not err in answering it. in the result, i would allow the crown’s appeal, set aside the court of appeal decision and restore the accused’s conviction for second degree murder. a admissibility issue [34] the court of appeal focused on the fact that the evidence is a party admission. while being mindful of this, my analysis situates the admissibility issue in the broader context of the law of evidence, rather than treating it as a unique or niche issue. [35] i proceed first by describing what i consider to be settled law as to the general procedure for determining admissibility of evidence at a criminal trial, including party admissions i then apply the foregoing to the brother’s testimony, concluding that the trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence. (1) legal framework for admissibility of evidence at a criminal trial [36] evidence that is relevant to an issue at trial is admissible, as long as it is not subject to an exclusionary rule and the trial judge does not exercise their discretion to exclude it (r v. khelawon, 2006 scc 57, [2006] 2 scr 787, at para. 2; d. m. paciocco, p. paciocco and l. stuesser, the law of evidence (8th ed. 2020), at p. 32; s. n. lederman, m. k. fuerst and h. c. stewart, sopinka, lederman & bryant: the law of evidence in canada (6th ed 2022), at ¶2.48; m. vauclair and t. desjardins, in collaboration with p lachance, traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales 2022 (29th ed. 2022), at pp. 905-6). this is the three-part test for admission of all evidence. judges must consider: (a) whether the evidence is relevant; (b) whether it is subject to an exclusionary rule; and (c) whether to exercise their discretion to exclude the evidence. [37] when questions arise as to the admissibility of evidence, a voir dire is often needed. that said, this court has noted in obiter that a voir dire may not be necessary for party admission evidence (r v sgt, 2010 scc 20, [2010] 1 scr 688, at para. 20). whether a voir dire is needed for such evidence is to be determined in the circumstances of each case. (a) determine whether the evidence is relevant to an issue at trial [38] the first step in determining admissibility is considering whether the evidence is relevant at this stage, this is often referred to as “logical relevance”. however, i will use the word “relevance” (rather than “logical relevance”) in this decision. [39] to determine relevance, a judge must ask whether the evidence tends to increase or decrease the probability of a fact at issue (r v. arp, [1998] 3 scr 339, at para. 38). beyond this, there is no “legal test” for relevance (paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 35). judges, acting in their gatekeeping role, are to evaluate relevance “as a matter of logic and human experience” (r v. white, 2011 scc 13, [2011] 1 scr. 433, at para. 44). when doing so, they should take care not to usurp the role of the finder of fact, although this evaluation will necessitate some weighing of the evidence, which is typically reserved for the jury (vauclair and desjardins, at p 687, citing r v. hart, 2014 scc 52, [2014] 2 scr 544, at paras. 95 and 98). the evidence does not need to “firmly establish . . . the truth or falsity of a fact in issue” (arp, at para. 38), although the evidence may be too speculative or equivocal to be relevant (white, at para. 44). the threshold for relevance is low and judges can admit evidence that has modest probative value (arp, at para. 38; r v. grant, 2015 scc 9, [2015] 1 scr. 475, at para. 18). a judge’s consideration of relevance “does not involve considerations of sufficiency of probative value” and “admissibility . . . must not be confused with weight” (r v. corbett, [1988] 1 scr 670, at p 715 , per la forest j., dissenting, but not on this point, quoting morris v the queen, [1983] 2 scr 190, at p 192). concepts like ultimate reliability, believability, and probative weight have no place when deciding relevance. whether evidence is relevant is a question of law, reviewable on the standard of correctness (r v. mohan, [1994] 2 scr 9, at pp. 20-21). [40] this leads to the issue that divided the court below: what evidentiary context can a trial judge use to determine whether the evidence is capable of meaning, such that it could be relevant? justice charron addressed this in r v. blackman, 2008 scc 37, [2008] 2 scr 298, at para. 30: relevance can only be fully assessed in the context of the other evidence at trial however, as a threshold for admissibility, the assessment of relevance is an ongoing and dynamic process that cannot wait for the conclusion of the trial for resolution. depending on the stage of the trial, the “context” within which an item of evidence is assessed for relevance may well be embryonic. often, for pragmatic reasons, relevance must be determined on the basis of the submissions of counsel the reality that establishing threshold relevance cannot be an exacting standard is explained by professors d m paciocco and l stuesser in the law of evidence (4th ed 2005), at p 29, and, as the authors point out, is well captured in the following statement of cory j in r v. arp, [1998] 3 scr. 339, at para. 38: to be logically relevant, an item of evidence does not have to firmly establish, on any standard, the truth or falsity of a fact in issue the evidence must simply tend to “increase or diminish the probability of the existence of a fact in issue”. [emphasis deleted.] [41] as charron j explained, trial judges can consider relevance having regard to evidence that parties have adduced, as well as evidence that a party indicates that they intend to adduce the judge can admit the evidence at issue conditional on counsel’s undertaking as to evidence to be adduced (lederman, fuerst and stewart, at ¶272). given the connection between meaning and relevance, charron j.’s writing in blackman logically extends to evidence that can inform meaning. [42] this general proposition applies to party admissions. there is no basis to treat party admissions differently in the determination of relevance. at this stage in the analysis, trial judges do not need to have classified the evidence as a party admission. in drawing a tight circle around what other evidence can be taken into account in determining the relevance of party admissions (the “micro” versus “macro” distinction), the court of appeal majority erred in law. [43] in making this point, i am mindful that evidence does not need to be unequivocal to be relevant. in r v. evans, [1993] 3 scr 653, sopinka j underlined that while questions of admissibility are for the trial judge, whether a statement was made and whether it is true are questions for the trier of fact (pp 664-66; see also vauclair and desjardins, at pp. 865-66). party admissions, like other evidence, are not rendered inadmissible because the witness is equivocal in their testimony. witnesses often have imperfect recollection and express uncertainty in their testimony to the extent that these are matters related to admissibility (rather than the weight that the trier of fact gives to the evidence), they are properly to be considered by the trial judge when balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. thus, the fact that a witness cannot recall the exact words used does not mean that such evidence has no relevance. [44] of course, parties are not permitted to “bootstrap” their argument on the admissibility of a party admission to any and all evidence. the party seeking to admit the proposed evidence should limit their submissions to the evidentiary context that is relevant to determining the meaning of the statement at issue. in a criminal case, the crown may not argue that any evidence pointing towards the accused’s guilt provides relevant context. the focus should remain on whether the jury can give meaning to the witness’s testimony in a manner that is non-speculative, not the overall strength of the crown’s case. [45] in summary, judges determine relevance by asking whether, in light of all the other evidence, the at-issue evidence logically tends to make a fact in issue more or less likely. this standard applies to all evidence in criminal trials. (b) determine whether the evidence is subject to an exclusionary rule [46] evidence that is relevant is ordinarily admissible, subject to various exclusionary rules. hearsay evidence, which is at issue in this appeal, is subject to an exclusionary rule and various exceptions. [47] hearsay evidence has three components: (1) a statement (or action) made outside of court by a declarant; (2) which a party seeks to adduce in court for the truth of its content; (3) without the ability of the other party to contemporaneously cross-examine the declarant (khelawon, at para. 35; evans, at pp. 661-62; see also r. v. smith, [1992] 2 scr 915, at p 924). [48] historically, the common law excluded hearsay evidence (smith, at pp. 924-25; r v. starr, 2000 scc 40, [2000] 2 scr 144, at para. 153; r v. mapara, 2005 scc 23, [2005] 1 scr 358, at para. 13). courts premised this exclusion on two primary concerns. first, hearsay evidence may be unreliable and does not afford parties the ability to test reliability by cross-examination (khelawon, at para. 2; mapara, at para. 14). second, direct evidence is preferable and, thus, hearsay evidence may not be the best available (mapara, at para. 14). accordingly, as a general proposition, hearsay evidence was excluded as a safeguard against inaccurate fact finding. [49] however, excluding hearsay in some circumstances impeded rather than assisted accurate fact finding (khelawon, at para. 2; mapara, at para. 14). over time, courts created exceptions to the general exclusionary bar against hearsay (mapara, at para. 14). often referred to as pigeonholes, such exceptions developed where hearsay evidence arose in circumstances that lessened concerns of reliability or where hearsay evidence was the best available these exceptions “became rigid” and formalism abounded (mapara, at para. 14; paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 151). the law of hearsay became a complex array of categories each defined by narrow rules, on occasion giving rise to arbitrary results and detracting from accurate fact finding. [50] in response, this court developed a principled approach to hearsay in r v. khan, [1990] 2 scr 531 (mapara, at para. 12) this was intended to arrest the development of circumstance-specific exceptions to hearsay — pigeonholes — and “introduce a measure of flexibility into the hearsay rule” to avoid arbitrary outcomes (mapara, at para. 15) the principled approach provides for hearsay evidence to be admitted on the basis of two factors: necessity and reliability (khan, at pp 540-42; starr, at para. 153; paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at pp 152-54; vauclair and desjardins, at pp. 1078-89). [51] in mapara, the court provided that recognized exceptions remain presumptively operative (para. 15, as confirmed in khelawon, at para. 42; r v. baldree, 2013 scc 35, [2013] 2 scr 520, at para. 34) however, litigants can challenge an exception on the basis that it is not “supported by indicia of necessity and reliability” (mapara, at para. 15). [52] the exception at issue in this case is a party admission. these include any “acts or words of a party offered as evidence against that party” (paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 191 (emphasis added)). although there has been debate as to whether party admissions are hearsay, i agree with the prevailing view set out by charron j.: “. . . admissions from an accused fall within a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule” (r v. couture, 2007 scc 28, [2007] 2 scr 517, at para. 75; see also paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 192). [53] in criminal trials, a party admission will be evidence that the crown adduces against an accused. as explained in evans, the common law justifies allowing party admissions into evidence on the basis that a party cannot “complain of the unreliability of his or her own statements” (evans, at p 664) unlike many other exceptions, justification for allowing party admissions does not relate to necessity or reliability (vauclair and desjardins, at p 911) this is one aspect in which party admissions do not conform to general rules. [54] this was confirmed by charron j in khelawon: “some of the traditional exceptions stand on a different footing, such as admissions from parties . . . . [t]he criteria for admissibility are not established in the same way” (para. 65). see also hart, at para. 63; couture, at para. 75; sgt, at para. 20; r v. bradshaw, 2017 scc 35, [2017] 1 scr 865, at para. 82. [55] accordingly, party admissions are admissible without reference to necessity and reliability (r v gordon gray, 2021 qcca 882, at paras 27-28 (canlii); r v. foreman (2002), 169 ccc (3d) 489 (ont. ca), at para 37; r v. osmar, 2007 onca 50, 84 or (3d) 321, at para. 53; r v. lo, 2020 onca 622, 152 or (3d) 609, at para. 81). thus, with the exception of the “rare cas[e]” where judges retain discretion to exclude any hearsay evidence on the basis that it is unreliable or unnecessary (mapara, at para 15), reliability and necessity are not relevant to the admissibility of a party admission. [56] i digress briefly to underline a point. the party admission exception to the hearsay rule should not be confused with other exceptions that bear some similarity, for example a declaration against interest by a non-party see lo, at paras 65-66; paciocco, paciocco and stuesser at p 192. party admissions include “acts or words of a party offered as evidence against that party” (paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 191 (emphasis added)) in contrast, declarations against interest are not adduced against the person who made the statement, as that person is not party to the litigation. party admissions and declarations against interest have unique foundations courts began to permit the admission of declarations against interest on the presumption that “people do not readily make statements that admit facts contrary to their interests, unless those statements are true” (paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 208). as stated earlier, courts allow party admissions on the basis that “what a party has previously stated can be admitted against the party in whose mouth it does not lie to complain of the unreliability of his or her own statements” (evans, at p 664). the unique foundation of each leads to different preconditions for admission. [57] in this appeal the party admission was something the accused said, that the witness overheard, and that the crown tendered as evidence of the accused’s guilt (evans, at p 664; paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at pp 191-92) however, party admissions can constitute more than words; the common law has held party admissions to include, inter alia, silence, actions, and demeanour (see, eg,. r v scott, 2013 mbca 7, 288 man. r (2d) 188; see also lederman, fuerst and stewart, at ¶¶6.470- 6.512; vauclair and desjardins, at p 911). as noted by professor i. younger, a rule of thumb is that “[a]nything the other side ever said or did will be admissible so long as it has something to do with the case” (an irreverent introduction to hearsay (1977), at p 24, cited in paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at pp. 191-92). i do not seek to describe here the precise boundaries of party admissions, as that is not at issue. [58] a trial judge’s determination that evidence is hearsay but falls within an exception from the general exclusionary rule is a question of law, reviewable on a standard of correctness. (c) determine whether to use judicial discretion to exclude the evidence [59] finally, judges must determine whether they should exercise their discretion to exclude evidence by balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. judges sitting with juries should consider the extent to which any prejudicial effect can be attenuated by appropriate instructions to the jury as to the use to which the evidence can properly be put. in addition, evidence can be excluded where there was a significant unfairness associated with obtaining it, such that it would render the accused’s trial unfair (mohan; paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at pp. 47-48; lederman, fuerst and stewart, at ¶¶275-277;. vauclair and desjardins, at pp. 905-6). no such consideration arises in the circumstances of this case. [60] probative value relates to the degree of relevance to trial issues and the strength of inference that can be drawn from evidence (r v. handy, 2002 scc 56, [2002] 2 scr 908, at para. 26, citing r v. robertson, [1987] 1 scr 918, at p 943; hart, at paras. 94-98). prejudicial effect relates to the likelihood that a jury will misuse the evidence (hart, at para. 106; paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at p 52). weighing probative value against prejudicial effect has been referred to as a “cost benefit analysis” (mohan, at pp. 21-22; hart, at para. 94; vauclair and desjardins, at pp. 905- 6). [61] as noted, the “cost” associated with the evidence (ie the prejudice) can be attenuated by appropriate jury instructions proper instructions can effectively equip juries with an understanding of how to use evidence in a judicial manner (r v. khill, 2021 scc 37, at para. 116; r v. griffin, 2009 scc 28, [2009] 2 scr 42, at para. 69). [62] a trial judge’s determination that the probative value of evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect is discretionary and should be reviewed with deference (r v. araya, 2015 scc 11, [2015] 1 scr 581, at para. 31; r v. shearing, 2002 scc 58, [2002] 3 scr 33, at para. 73). in addition, appellate courts are to review alleged errors in jury instructions “in the context of the entire charge and of the trial as a whole” (r v. jaw, 2009 scc 42, [2009] 3 scr 26, at para. 32, as cited in araya, at para. 39) so as to afford trial judges “some flexibility in crafting the language of jury instructions” (araya, at para. 39). i would underscore the importance of trial judges providing clear analysis on the probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence to facilitate appellate review. (2) application of the legal framework to the circumstances of this case (a) the evidence was relevant [63] the brother’s testimony regarding the overheard conversation was relevant. first, there was sufficient context for the jury to give meaning to the words that the brother overheard, such that the evidence overcomes the low threshold for (logical) relevance. second, it is not fatal that the brother was uncertain as to the exact words that he heard the accused say. the equivocal nature of the brother’s testimony is a factor for consideration when weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect. it also relates to ultimate reliability and believability; but those are for the trier of fact in weighing the evidence, rather than the judge in the relevance analysis. [64] the trial judge needed to determine whether, on the basis of all the evidence, the jury could give meaning (in a way that was not speculative) to what the brother testified that he overheard. the context extended beyond the narrow scope that the majority of the court of appeal applied other evidence properly informed the brother’s testimony as to what he overheard in the days leading up to the phone call at issue, the accused and the brother had spoken about the victim during these conversations, the accused admitted he had done “something bad”, told the brother that it was “true” (ar, vol ii, at pp 107, 111 and 113), and the brother said that the accused was “remorsefully sad. glad to get it off his chest, per se” (p 121). on the day of the phone call: the accused told the brother where the victim’s body was; the brother was with the accused when he attempted suicide; and the brother was with the accused in the time leading up to the phone call to his wife. finally, the brother testified that the accused referred to the victim at the opening of the call the brother was present, although standing approximately 10 feet away, for the entire call. [65] i turn now to ferris, the decision of this court that the trial judge and court of appeal below agreed governed the admissibility of the evidence. [66] ferris concerned admissibility of hearsay evidence that the crown sought to adduce as a party admission. police arrested mr. ferris for murder and brought him to the station. mr. ferris asked to make a phone call. an officer placed the call, handed mr. ferris the phone, then walked towards his desk. as the officer walked away, he overheard mr. ferris say “i’ve been arrested” and then, sometime later, “i killed david” (ferris (ca), at para. 7). the trial judge admitted the officer’s testimony as to what he heard mr. ferris say. mr. ferris was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. [67] the alberta court of appeal overturned the trial decision, holding that a properly instructed jury would be unable to ascribe meaning to the words the officer overheard. words that were incapable of meaning could not be probative of any issue, and, therefore, were not relevant. evidence that was not relevant was not admissible. the issue was not what weight to ascribe to the officer’s testimony, but whether the words he overheard had any meaning. the court observed that “hearsay rules do not do away with the requirement of relevancy” (para. 32). [68] the court of appeal explained that the phrase “i killed david” could have been an admission. it also could have been part of a reply to the question “what [do] the police think [you] did?” (para. 17). the words, “on their own”, did not “allow for the proper understanding and appreciation of the meaning of the statement” (para. 24). the officer’s testimony was inadmissible because the jury could not interpret the meaning of the words without “gross speculation” (para. 49). [69] this court upheld the court of appeal’s decision in ferris in the result. in a short, oral judgment, sopinka j stated that even if the evidence had relevance, its meaning was “so speculative and its probative value so tenuous that the trial judge ought to have excluded it on the ground its prejudicial effect overbore its probative value” (p 756). on a careful reading, what sopinka j said was not that the evidence was inadmissible based on relevance. this court did not affirm the court of appeal’s relevance analysis or their application of the principled approach. rather, sopinka j. said that even if the testimony was relevant, it should have been excluded after balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. [70] the trial evidence in ferris was dissimilar to the evidence in this case. in ferris, the accused and the police officer were strangers. there was nothing at all like the circumstances, sequence of events and conversations that led up to what in this case the brother overheard in the accused’s conversation with his wife. [71] again, we must bear in mind the difference between relevance and ultimate reliability. how well the brother could recall the words said by the accused relates to the latter, which is a question for the trier of fact few people would remember the exact words used in a recent conversation that they listened to intently. nonetheless, many of us would be able to recall the gist of that conversation. the rules of evidence must respond to this reality probative value analysis and the weight given to the evidence by the trier of fact are sufficient mechanisms to address frailties of memory. these frailties do not also need to be addressed when determining relevance. [72] ferris is good law, but must be carefully read indeed, [translation] “[e]xclusion of a partial conversation is . . . not automatic and the analysis is above all a contextual one” (vauclair and desjardins, at p 970). i would note its application in three decisions: r v. bennight, 2012 bcca 190, 320 bcac 195, r v. buttazzoni, 2019 onca 645, and r v. hummel, 2002 ykca 6, 166 ccc (3d) 30. see also r. v. reierson, 2010 bcca 381, 259 ccc (3d) 32, at para. 40. [73] bennight is factually somewhat similar to this case. the british columbia court of appeal allowed testimony from a corrections officer who could not recall the particular words that the offender said to her. the court held it was sufficient that “the witness could testify to both the ‘gist’ of the statement and the context in which it was made” (para. 92). that the officer was unable to remember the precise words said was not pertinent to the judge’s relevance analysis: incompleteness was a matter of weight for the jury. the accused argued before this court that bennight was different because the corrections officer heard both sides of the conversation. i find this to be a distinction without a difference. what matters is whether the evidence tends to increase or decrease the probability of a fact, not the particular circumstances in which the evidence arose. [74] in buttazzoni, the ontario court of appeal determined that the trial judge properly admitted “recounted utterances [that] were described as ‘almost verbatim’”, and also properly admitted recounted utterances that were a “paraphrased synopsis” (para. 56). issues with accuracy of recollection did not relate to relevance, but were an issue of weight for the trier of fact. similarly to bennight, the witness overheard both sides of the conversation. however, as noted, that is not a principled basis on which to distinguish these decisions from the circumstances in this appeal. [75] the accused in hummel argued on appeal that the trial judge improperly admitted testimony that suggested he said “i hear a woman’s voice calling my name” and “from a grave” (para 8) the yukon court of appeal held there was “ample context in which the words could be considered”, as the accused had uttered the words the morning after the victim was last seen alive and there was other evidence connecting him to the victim’s disappearance (para 32) the jury could infer the accused was expressing remorse through these words. [76] these decisions illustrate that ferris should not be understood as standing for the proposition that incomplete recollection of a party admission leads to exclusion of such evidence or that it is only “micro context” that can inform meaning and, thus, relevance. in assessing (logical) relevance, what matters is whether the evidence tends to increase or decrease the probability of the existence of a fact at issue (arp, at para. 38). [77] although he could not remember the exact words the accused said, the brother’s testimony was that he overheard a phone call in which the accused admitted to killing ms. kogawa. the brother’s recollection of the phone call, if believed by the jury, (to use the words from arp) “tend[s] to ‘increase . . . the probability’” that the accused was responsible for the victim’s death. in light of other evidence, the brother’s evidence was capable of non-speculative meaning and relevant. (b) the evidence was hearsay, but subject to the party admissions exception to the exclusionary rule [78] the crown adduced the brother’s evidence for the purpose of showing that the accused admitted to killing ms kogawa this evidence was hearsay and, thus, inadmissible under the general exclusionary rule. however, the brother’s evidence was that the accused had, by his words, admitted responsibility for ms. kogawa’s death. this evidence is something that a party said or did and relates to an issue at trial (see paciocco, paciocco and stuesser, at pp 191-92; younger, at p 24) as such, the evidence is a party admission and comes within a recognized exception to the general exclusionary rule. (c) in light of the comprehensive jury instructions, the trial judge did not err by admitting the evidence [79] the balancing of probative weight against prejudicial effect can be critical in deciding the admissibility of a party admission. this is a discretionary decision by the trial judge. such decisions are to be reviewed with deference. the accused has not shown error in this exercise of the trial judge’s discretion. this is particularly so in light of the well-structured instructions provided to the jury on appropriate use of the party admission. [80] the brother’s testimony contained weaknesses he was unsure of the particular words that the accused said. he testified that he was not trying to listen and that he only heard one side of the conversation. he did not know whether the accused was responding to questions from his wife. the brother admitted he consumed alcohol before and after the call and that the accused was under the influence of intoxicants. the brother testified that the accused’s speech was impacted by the heroin he had taken. these factors decreased the probative value of the party admission. [81] with respect to the prejudicial effect, i agree with arbour j., dissenting, but not on this point, that juries are likely to give significant weight to confession-like evidence (r v. oickle, 2000 scc 38, [2000] 2 scr 3, at para. 146). this court has recognized the significant potential for prejudicial use of confessions (see, eg,. hart, at para 106) and this party admission was akin to a confession the possibility for prejudicial use by the jury was real. [82] when balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect, the trial judge noted “[t]he prejudicial effect can be ameliorated by a strong caution to the jury about what use can be made of the evidence” (para 21) the trial judge provided such a caution on the proper use of the admission at issue. this demonstrates the trial judge was mindful of potential prejudice. the trial judge told the jury that it was up to them to decide whether the statements attributed by the brother to the accused had been made. they were to “[c]onsider the circumstances in which the conversation took place [and to b]ear in mind anything else that may make the witness’s evidence more or less reliable” (ar, vol iv, at p 197) the trial judge methodically addressed the weaknesses in the brother’s testimony in the jury instructions. she emphasized that the brother heard only one side of the conversation and that he did not recall the exact words that the accused said she noted that the accused had consumed alcohol and heroin prior to the call, and that those intoxicants could have affected what he said. the judge made clear that it was for the jury to determine whether the accused had used a particular phrase and what was meant by it. the judge told the jury they could ignore the admission if they were uncertain as to what was said or what it meant. she told the jury that they could not rely on the brother’s testimony as to the accused’s state of mind. rather, it was for the jury to consider such matters. [83] the trial judge provided the jury with clear and effective instructions on proper use of the brother’s testimony the instructions gave the jury the guidance needed to weigh the evidence in accordance with legal principles as such, the instructions effectively and adequately limited the possibility of prejudicial use. [84] in light of the foregoing, the trial judge did not err in admitting the brother’s testimony as to what he overheard the accused say. b. jury question issue [85] i am in substantial agreement with the reasons of the court of appeal on the jury question issue the jury’s question was not ambiguous and the trial judge answered it correctly. notwithstanding my agreement, i wish to underscore two points. [86] first, the accused argues on appeal that the jury question demonstrated confusion as to the intent needed for murder and that needed for manslaughter. however, the accused’s counsel at trial (not appellate counsel) was adamant that this was not what the jury’s question related to. that trial counsel advocated for a certain response to a jury’s question is not determinative of the issue on appeal, but it is an important factor for consideration (r v. jacquard, [1997] 1 scr 314, at para. 38; araya, at para 51) while the burden of perfection should not be placed on trial counsel, they are the ones most attuned to the accused’s interests in this case, trial counsel pivoted away from intent and suggested that the trial judge provide to the jury an “expanded definition of bodily harm” (ar, vol. iii, at p 330). this approach likely represented trial counsel’s view as to how to answer the question correctly, in a manner beneficial to his client i see no error in the trial judge’s handling of the question, particularly in light of trial counsel’s submissions on this point. [87] second, there is no merit to the accused’s argument that the definition of “bodily harm” in s 2 of the criminal code does not apply to s 229(a)(ii), which defines murder. the meaning of the phrase “bodily harm” is consistent throughout the criminal code. when parliament means to deviate from the meaning of “bodily harm”, it does so by adding qualifying words (eg, “grievous bodily harm” in s 25(3)). no authority from this court, including r v. miljevic, 2011 scc 8, [2011] 1 scr 203, should be read as suggesting otherwise. the accused’s argument that murder requires bodily harm that is serious, dangerous or grave seems to stem from an inaccurate understanding of the model jury instructions the words that he suggests describe bodily harm — dangerous, serious, grave — concern foreseeability to reiterate, the definition of “bodily harm” set out in s 2 applies to s 229(a)(ii). vi conclusion [88] i would allow the crown’s appeal, set aside the order of the court of appeal, and restore the accused’s conviction for second degree murder. the following are the reasons delivered by karakatsanis and brown jj. — [89] we would dismiss this appeal we do not disagree with our colleagues’ framework for assessing relevance and probative value what divides us is its application here. in our view, for the reasons of justice goepel at the court of appeal, a jury could not ascertain the meaning or relevance of the overheard statements (2021 bcca 41, 400 ccc (3d) 131) as well, their prejudicial effect outweighed any tenuous probative value they may have had the overheard statements were inadmissible. [90] on the evidence before the jury, it was impossible to know what schneider said to his wife during the overheard phone call. the witness, schneider’s brother, did not know the words that he heard he was deliberately trying not to listen to the 13-minute conversation he neither participated in the conversation nor heard both sides of it. he acknowledged that he did not know what was said, and did not even recall knowing the substance of what was said initially, he testified in examination-in-chief that he heard schneider say, “i did it. i killed her” about half-way into the phone call (ar, vol. ii, at p 170). he then clarified that he could not say those were the exact words spoken but that this was “the gist” of schneider’s side of the conversation (ar, vol. ii, at p 171) it appears that this “gist” was derived from a statement he had heard six or seven minutes earlier in the conversation and, the crown says, from the trauma of having accompanied his brother during a suicide attempt. in cross-examination, the witness confirmed that because he did not know schneider’s exact words, they may have just been something like “i did it” and that the words — whatever they were — could have come at the beginning, middle or end of a longer sentence (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 189-90). [91] at trial, the crown sought to tender the words overheard by schneider’s brother as an admission of responsibility for the death of the victim, natsumi kogawa. in closing submissions, the crown stated that schneider was overheard telling his wife “i did it” or “i killed her” ⸺ though also acknowledging the exact words spoken were unknown ⸺ and told the jury that “you can infer from these words that he intended to kill natsumi kogawa or meant to kill natsumi kogawa” (ar, vol. iii, at p 286). [92] assessing the relevance of schneider’s brother’s testimony (including the crown’s own interpretive gloss thereon) is an exercise in pure speculation the crown’s reliance on “context” to assist in identifying the relevance of the witness’s “gist” of the conversation is not only a strain; it is also far more harmful than it is helpful. for the crown, this “context” includes the fact that the brother knew schneider, that they had talked about the victim in the days leading up to the phone call, that schneider told his brother some details of his relationship with ms. kogawa and that her body could be found in a suitcase prior to the phone conversation, that the brother was physically present for the phone conversation and the attempted suicide, and that he had an understanding of the “tone” of the conversation. these factors add nothing to the assessment of what had been said during the phone call. [93] our colleagues overstate the significance of the court of appeal’s references to the “macro” and “micro” contexts (rowe j.’s reasons, at paras. 6, 28 and 42). these statements were not intended to alter assessments of relevance. rather, they were simply shorthand for what the majority and the dissent considered to be the relevant context justice dewitt-van oosten took a broader view of the relevant context (which, in our respectful view, overreached by considering the same irrelevant factors as the crown), while justice goepel (correctly) confined himself to considering the context arising from the conversation itself. this is not to say that context beyond the immediate conversation can never inform the meaning of statements made within the conversation. rather, in this case, the crown relies on contextual features beyond the conversation itself that were irrelevant, and there was insufficient context arising from the conversation itself to inform the meaning of the overheard statements. [94] in our view, the crown relies on “context” that is not only irrelevant, but which augments the prejudicial effect of admitting the statements even if they were relevant. the jury may have focused on aspects of the context which tended to implicate schneider in the death ⸺ such as his statement about where ms. kogawa’s body was located ⸺ to reason that schneider must have therefore admitted responsibility for the death. in r v. ferris (1994), 149 ar 1 (ca), at para. 27, conrad ja described the danger involved in this type of reasoning as follows: there would be an enormous temptation for any trier of fact to look at the outside evidence that tends to implicate the accused in the murder, use those facts to conclude that the accused probably committed the murder, and that therefore he admitted that he did. that finding would then be used to raise the probability of guilt to a conclusion of guilt. the danger implicit in that type of circuitous reasoning is obvious. this very concern arises in the instant case where the jury was left to assess the logical relevance of a “gist”, unaccompanied by any recollection of what was said, or at least any recollection of the substance of what was said. [95] the trial judge did not explicitly identify any dangers of admitting the evidence of the overheard statements or how they might impact the fairness of the trial. she simply concluded that “[t]he prejudicial effect can be ameliorated by a strong caution to the jury about what use can be made of the evidence” (2018 bcsc 2546, at para. 21, reproduced in ar, vol. i, at p 5). in our view, the jury instruction did not cure the prejudice it presupposed that the jury could decide what schneider said despite having no basis in the evidence to do so. [96] we conclude that the evidence of the overheard statements should not have been admitted. we acknowledge that the threshold for logical relevance is low. but it is still a threshold, in that it must “increase or diminish the probability of the existence of a fact in issue” (r v arp, [1998] 3 scr 339, at para. 38, citing r eggleston, evidence, proof and probability (2nd ed 1978), at p 83) if schneider’s brother’s testimony meets this threshold, it would be difficult to conceive of anything schneider might have said (or might be felt to have said), howsoever partial, oblique or indistinct, that would not be “relevant”. in any event, when the potential for misuse is measured against the absence of any significant probative value, the result is that the evidence should have been removed from the jury’s consideration altogether. [97] we would therefore dismiss the appeal. appendix appeal allowed, karakatsanis and brown jj. dissenting.
i. introduction i. introduction [1] the convention on the civil aspects of inter- national child abduction, can. ts 1983. no. 35 (“hague convention”), sets out the rules that apply to the parental abduction of children across inter- national borders. the question before us concerns the application of the hague convention concept of habitual residence — a concept not defi ned in the treaty, but much considered by the courts of sub- scribing states around the world. [1] la convention sur les aspects civils de l’enlè- vement international d’enfants, rt. can. 1983 no 35 (« convention de la haye »), énonce les règles qui s’appliquent à l’enlèvement international d’un en- fant par l’un de ses parents. la question dont nous sommes saisis a trait à l’application de la notion de résidence habituelle propre à la convention de la haye, une notion que cette dernière ne défi nit pas, mais que les tribunaux des pays signataires abordent dans bon nombre de décisions. [2] the story begins in germany, where the fam- ily — a father, a mother, and two children, all citizens of canada — were living. because the children were struggling in school, the parents decided that the [2] l’histoire débute en allemagne, où habitait la famille — le père, la mère et leurs deux enfants, tous citoyens canadiens. comme les enfants éprouvaient des diffi cultés à l’école, les parents ont décidé que [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 409 mother should take the children to canada for 16 months to experience the canadian school system. during that period, the father purported to revoke his consent and brought an action under the hague convention for an order that the children be returned. while he pursued remedies in the german courts — unsuccessfully — the period of consent expired and the mother remained in canada with the children. after the father resumed the application, a judge of the ontario superior court of justice ordered that the children be returned to germany. the divisional court reversed this decision. the court of appeal re- instated it. that decision was appealed to this court. [3] i note at the outset that events have rendered this appeal moot. the children were returned to ger- many in accordance with the application judge’s or- der. custody proceedings ensued. the german courts granted the mother sole custody, and the children returned to canada. however, the issues raised in this appeal are important, and the law on how cases such as this fall to be decided requires clarifi cation. hence these reasons. [4] a fi nding that the children were habitually res- ident in germany at the time of the alleged wrongful retention is a requirement for a return order under the hague convention. the parties and interveners put forward three approaches to determining the habitual residence of the children. the appellant, the offi ce of the children’s lawyer (“ocl”), argues for a child- centred approach, which emphasizes the situation and perspective of the children at the time of the application for their return to the original coun- try. the respondent father argues for an approach based on the intention of the parents at the time the children left their original country. the respondent mother, and a number of interveners, argue for a hy- brid approach, which treats the circumstances of the children and the intentions of the parents as factors to be considered in achieving a just result which fulfi lls the objectives of the hague convention. la mère les emmènerait au canada pendant 16 mois pour qu’ils y poursuivent leurs études. pendant cette période, le père a dit révoquer son consentement à ce séjour et présenté sur le fondement de la convention de la haye une demande d’ordonnance de retour. tandis qu’il saisissait — en vain — les tribunaux allemands, la période visée par le consentement a pris fi n et la mère est demeurée au canada avec les enfants. après que le père eut réactivé l’instance engagée en ontario, une juge de la cour supérieure de justice de la province a ordonné le retour des en- fants en allemagne. la cour divisionnaire a infi rmé sa décision, puis la cour d’appel l’a rétablie. cette dernière décision fait l’objet du pourvoi devant notre cour. [3] signalons au départ que la suite des événements a rendu le pourvoi théorique. les enfants sont rentrés en allemagne conformément à l’ordonnance de la juge des requêtes. une instance a ensuite été enga- gée concernant la garde des enfants. les tribunaux allemands ont accordé la garde exclusive à la mère, et les enfants sont revenus au canada. or, les questions soulevées dans le pourvoi sont importantes, et le droit qui régit le processus décisionnel dans un dossier apparenté à la présente affaire doit être clarifi é. d’où les présents motifs. [4] pour ordonner leur retour en allemagne en ap- plication de la convention de la haye, le tribunal de- vait conclure que les enfants y avaient leur résidence habituelle au moment où ils auraient été retenus illicitement. les parties et les intervenants proposent trois façons de déterminer le lieu de la résidence ha- bituelle des enfants. l’appelant, le bureau de l’avo- cat des enfants (« bae »), préconise une approche axée sur l’enfant qui met l’accent sur la situation et le point de vue de l’enfant au moment où son retour dans le pays d’origine est demandé. le père, l’un des intimés, plaide en faveur d’une approche fondée sur l’intention qu’ont les parents au moment où l’enfant quitte son pays d’origine. l’autre partie intimée, la mère, et plusieurs intervenants, préconisent une approche hybride qui tient compte des éléments que sont la situation de l’enfant et l’intention des parents afi n de parvenir à un résultat juste qui réponde aux objectifs de la convention de la haye. 410 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. [5] for the reasons that follow, i conclude that this court should adopt the hybrid approach to de- termining habitual residence under article 3 of the hague convention, and a non- technical approach to considering a child’s objection to removal under article 13(2).1 [5] pour les motifs qui suivent, je conclus que la cour devrait recourir à l’approche hybride pour dé- terminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle suivant l’article 3 de la convention de la haye et à une approche non technique pour se prononcer sur l’op- position de l’enfant au retour suivant l’article 13(2)1. [6] because this appeal is moot, it is not necessary to decide whether the application judge erred in or- dering the children returned to germany. [6] le pourvoi étant théorique, il n’est pas né- cessaire de décider si la juge des requêtes a eu tort d’ordonner le retour des enfants en allemagne. ii background a facts ii contexte a les faits [7] the mother and father were married in ontario in 2000. they moved to germany in 2001 and ac- quired permanent resident status. they had two chil- dren, b and m., who were born in germany in 2002 and 2005. [7] la mère et le père des enfants se sont mariés en ontario en 2000. ils ont déménagé en allemagne en 2001, où ils sont devenus résidents permanents. ils y ont eu leurs deux enfants, b et m., en 2002 et en 2005. [8] the family lived together in dreieich, in a home that the parents purchased in 2008. the children attended school in germany, apart from two visits to ontario during which time the children attended school in st. catharines. the parents separated in 2011, but reunited in 2012. during the period of separation, the father had custody of the children. ils ont vécu ensemble à dreieich, dans une [8] maison que les parents ont achetée en 2008. les enfants ont fréquenté l’école en allemagne, sauf lors de deux séjours en ontario au cours desquels ils ont fréquenté une école à st catharines. les parents se sont séparés en 2011, mais ont repris la vie commune en 2012. durant la séparation, le père avait la garde des enfants. [9] the children struggled in school, and the par- ents agreed that the mother should take the children to canada for the 2013- 2014 school year. the father gave his consent for the children to stay in canada until august  15, 2014, and he agreed to transfer physical custody of the children to the mother tem- porarily so that the children could be enrolled in school. the father’s consent letter contemplated the possibility of extension, but not early termination, of the temporary stay. [9] les enfants éprouvaient des diffi cultés à l’école, et les parents sont convenus que la mère les emmè- nerait au canada pour l’année scolaire 2013-2014. le père a consenti à ce que les enfants séjournent au canada jusqu’au 15 août 2014; il a accepté de céder temporairement leur garde physique à la mère pour qu’elle puisse les inscrire à l’école. la lettre dans laquelle le père consent au séjour temporaire fait mention de la possibilité de prolonger le séjour, mais non d’y mettre fi n avant la date convenue. [10] the children arrived in canada on april 19, 2013, and began attending school in st. catharines four days later. the mother and the children left the bulk of their belongings in germany. the father [10] les enfants sont arrivés au canada le 19 avril 2013 et ont commencé à fréquenter l’école à st. catharines quatre jours plus tard. leur mère et eux avaient laissé la plupart de leurs effets personnels 1 although this provision is not numbered in the hague convention (unlike article 13(a) and article 13(b)), it is generally referred to as article 13(2). 1 bien que cette disposition ne soit pas numérotée dans la conven- tion de la haye (contrairement aux alinéas 13a) et b)), on consi- dère généralement qu’il s’agit de l’article 13(2). [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 411 maintained weekly contact with the children through skype and telephone calls, and he visited the chil- dren twice in ontario. one of these visits took place during the alleged wrongful retention. en allemagne. chaque semaine, le père communi- quait avec les enfants grâce à skype et par téléphone, et il les a visités deux fois en ontario. l’une de ces visites a eu lieu pendant la rétention illicite alléguée. [11] because he suspected that the mother would not return the children to germany at the end of the school year, the father resumed custody proceedings in germany and purported to revoke his consent to the mother’s temporary custody in march 2014. he commenced an application seeking the return of the children to germany pursuant to the hague convention on april 11, 2014, through the central authority in germany; this application was received by the ontario central authority on may 5, 2014. on june 26, 2014, he commenced the application before the courts in ontario. around the same time, in march of 2014, the father also pursued custody (and relief under the hague convention) before the german courts. pursuant to a consent order from the ontario court dated july 17, 2014, the mother remained in ontario with the children. during this time, on august 15, 2014, the original consent agree- ment lapsed. this then became the alleged wrong- ful retention triggering return under the hague convention. the father was ultimately unsuccessful before the german courts, and on february 6, 2015, counsel for the father requested that the matter be set for a hearing before the ontario court. [11] en mars 2014, parce qu’il soupçonnait la mère de ne pas renvoyer les enfants en allemagne à la fi n de l’année scolaire, le père a réactivé l’instance engagée en allemagne pour obtenir la garde des en- fants et signifi é la révocation de son consentement à ce que la mère ait la garde temporaire des enfants. le 11 avril 2014, il a demandé le retour des enfants en allemagne sur le fondement de la convention de la haye en saisissant l’autorité centrale allemande; le 5 mai 2014, sa demande parvenait à l’autorité centrale ontarienne. le 26 juin suivant, il présentait sa demande aux tribunaux de la province. peu avant, en mars 2014, il avait également saisi les tribunaux allemands d’une demande de garde (et d’ordonnance fondée sur la convention de la haye). conformé- ment à une ordonnance rendue sur consentement par le tribunal ontarien le 17 juillet 2014, la mère est demeurée au canada avec les enfants. pendant ce temps, le 15 août 2014, la période visée par le consentement initial a pris fi n. le père a alors assi- milé ce fait à un non- retour illicite afi n d’obtenir une ordonnance de retour en application de la convention de la haye. les tribunaux allemands l’ont fi nale- ment débouté et, le 6 février 2015, son avocat a sol- licité l’inscription au rôle de la demande ontarienne. [12] on april 21, 2015, the application judge re- quested that the ocl become involved to represent the interests of the children. [12] le 21 avril 2015, la juge des requêtes a de- mandé que l’appelant, le bae, soit désigné pour défendre les intérêts des enfants. [13] the children were ultimately returned to germany on october 15, 2016. the mother initiated proceedings in the german courts for custody and access, and was awarded sole custody. the children returned to canada on april 5, 2017. [13] les enfants ont fi nalement été renvoyés en allemagne le 15 octobre 2016. la mère a saisi les tribunaux allemands d’une demande de garde et de droit de visite, et elle s’est vu accorder la garde exclusive des enfants. ces derniers sont rentrés au canada le 5 avril 2017. b judicial history b historique judiciaire (1) superior court of justice, 2015 onsc 5383 (1) cour supérieure de justice, 2015 onsc 5383 [14] the application judge, macpherson j., found that the children had “become integrated into their [14] la juge des requêtes, la juge macpherson, conclut que les enfants [traduction] «  se sont 412 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. community” in ontario. she nevertheless held that the children were habitually resident in germany immediately prior to the alleged wrongful retention. she found that the parents did not have a “settled intention” that the children would stay in canada, and that the father consented only to a temporary stay in canada for an educational exchange. [15] having concluded that a case for return to germany had been established, the application judge turned to the exceptions under the hague conven- tion. she rejected the mother’s argument that the children had “settled in” under article 12 because the father had commenced proceedings within a year of the wrongful retention, barring an article 12 de- fence. under article 13(2), she found that the chil- dren were of an age (9 and 12) and degree of maturity at which she could consider their views. however, she concluded that the children had not expressed “substantial” objections with the requisite “strength of feeling”. the application judge ordered the return of the children to germany. intégrés à leur milieu  » en ontario elle décide néanmoins qu’ils avaient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne immédiatement avant le non- retour illicite allégué. elle estime que les parents n’avaient pas l’« intention arrêtée » que les enfants demeurent au canada et que le père n’a consenti qu’à un séjour temporaire au canada pour les besoins d’un échange scolaire. [15] après avoir statué que la preuve justifi ait le re- tour en allemagne, la juge des requêtes se penche sur les exceptions prévues par la convention de la haye. elle rejette la prétention de la mère selon laquelle les enfants se sont « intégrés » au sens de l’article 12, car moins d’un an s’était écoulé depuis le non- retour illicite lorsque le père avait présenté sa demande, ce qui fait obstacle au moyen de défense prévu à l’article 12. sur le fondement de l’article 13(2), elle conclut que les enfants ont atteint un âge (9 et 12 ans) et une maturité qui lui permettent de tenir compte de leur opinion. elle décide toutefois que les enfants ne se sont pas opposés au retour pour des motifs [traduction] « sérieux », non plus qu’avec l’« in- tensité » requise. elle ordonne le retour des enfants en allemagne. (2) superior court of justice  — divisional court, 2016 onsc 55, 344 oac 159 (2) cour supérieure de justice — cour division- naire, 2016 onsc 55, 344 oac 159 [16] the divisional court allowed the mother’s appeal. in its view, the key question was whether the habitual residence of the children had changed from germany to ontario while they lived in ontario with the father’s consent, precluding the father from claiming their return under the hague convention. the court found that the children’s habitual residence had changed because the parents had a “settled in- tention” that the children would live temporarily in canada, and during this time the children became integrated into the community, speaking english, attending school, and living with their mother and their maternal grandparents. [16] la cour divisionnaire accueille l’appel de la mère. à son avis, la question principale consiste à savoir si les enfants ont cessé d’avoir leur rési- dence habituelle en allemagne au profi t de l’ontario pendant qu’ils vivaient dans cette province avec le consentement de leur père, de sorte que ce dernier ne pouvait plus demander leur retour sur le fondement de la convention de la haye. elle conclut que le lieu de la résidence habituelle des enfants a changé parce que les parents avaient l’[traduction] « intention arrêtée » que les enfants vivent temporairement au canada et que, pendant ce séjour, les enfants se sont intégrés à la collectivité en parlant anglais, en fré- quentant l’école et en vivant avec leur mère et leurs grands- parents maternels. [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 413 (3) court of appeal, 2016 onca 680, 133 or. (3) cour d’appel, 2016 onca 680, 133 or. (3d) 735 (3d) 735 [17] the court of appeal allowed the father’s ap- peal and restored the order of the application judge. it held that where the parents have joint custody, one parent cannot unilaterally change the habitual resi- dence of a child. further, a child’s habitual residence does not shift when one parent gives consent to a time- limited stay in another jurisdiction. [17] la cour d’appel accueille l’appel du père et rétablit l’ordonnance de la juge des requêtes. elle conclut que, en cas de la garde partagée, un parent ne peut modifi er unilatéralement le lieu de la résidence habituelle d’un enfant. elle ajoute que la résidence habituelle d’un enfant ne change pas du fait que l’un des parents consent à un séjour temporaire à l’étranger. [18] while a child’s acclimatization may be rele- vant to determining habitual residence in some cir- cumstances, if an application is brought within one year of a wrongful removal or retention, evidence that a child has “settled in” is not relevant: article 12. the court of appeal therefore concluded that the children were habitually resident in germany at the relevant time, and that there had been a wrongful retention pursuant to article 3 of the hague con- vention. [18] l’acclimatation d’un enfant constitue parfois un élément pertinent pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle, mais lorsque la demande est présentée moins d’un an à compter du déplacement ou du non- retour illicite, le fait que l’enfant s’est « intégré » est sans pertinence (article 12). la cour d’appel conclut donc que les enfants avaient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne au moment consi- déré et qu’il y a eu non- retour illicite au sens de l’article 3 de la convention de la haye. [19] with respect to article 13(2), the court of ap- peal accorded deference to the application judge’s fi ndings that the children’s objections to return were not substantial and did not exhibit the requisite strength of feeling. therefore, the court of appeal ordered that the children be returned to germany. [19] s’agissant de l’article 13(2), la cour d’appel défère aux conclusions de la juge des requêtes selon lesquelles les motifs d’opposition des enfants à leur retour ne sont pas sérieux et n’ont pas été invoqués avec l’intensité requise. elle ordonne donc le retour des enfants en allemagne. [20] following the release of the court of appeal’s decision, the ocl applied for leave to appeal to this court. the court of appeal and this court dis- missed an application for a stay pending this appeal. the children were returned to germany where the german courts awarded custody to the mother. the children are now back in canada. [20] dans la foulée de la décision de la cour d’ap- pel, le bae a présenté une demande d’autorisation d’appel devant notre cour. la cour d’appel et notre cour ont rejeté la demande de sursis à l’exécution de la décision jusqu’à ce qu’il soit statué sur le présent pourvoi. les enfants ont été renvoyés en allemagne, où les tribunaux ont accordé la garde à la mère. les enfants sont rentrés au canada et y sont toujours. iii analysis iii analyse [21] the parents in this case agreed that the mother would take the children from germany to canada for educational purposes. subsequently, the father sued under the hague convention for return of the children to germany. we are asked to determine what principles apply when a parent in another country [21] dans la présente affaire, les parents étaient convenus que la mère emmènerait les enfants au canada pour qu’ils y poursuivent leurs études. ultérieurement, le père a engagé une instance sur le fondement de la convention de la haye afi n d’ob- tenir le retour des enfants en allemagne. on nous 414 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. seeks to have children in canada returned under the hague convention. demande de dégager les principes qui s’appliquent lorsque, dans un pays étranger, l’un des parents de- mande le retour d’un enfant en application de la convention de la haye. a the hague convention a la convention de la haye [22] the hague convention was concluded on october 25, 1980. with more than 90 contracting parties, it ranks as one of the most important and suc- cessful family law instruments completed under the auspices of the hague conference on private inter- national law. canada has been a party from the be- ginning. the hague convention is implemented by legislation in every province and territory. [22] la convention de la haye a vu le jour le 25 octobre 1980 et compte plus de 90 états contrac- tants, ce qui en fait l’un des instruments du droit de la famille les plus importants et les plus fructueux établis sous l’égide de la conférence de la haye de droit international privé. le canada y a souscrit dès le début. elle est mise en œuvre par voie législative dans chacune des provinces et chacun des territoires. [23] the harms the hague convention seeks to remedy are evident. international child abductions have serious consequences for the children abducted and the parents left behind. the children are removed from their home environments and often from con- tact with the other parents. they may be transplanted into a culture with which they have no prior ties, with different social structures, school systems, and some- times languages. dueling custody battles waged in different countries may follow, delaying resolution of custody issues. none of this is good for children or parents. [23] le préjudice auquel la convention de la haye vise à remédier est manifeste. l’enlèvement interna- tional a de graves conséquences sur l’enfant enlevé et sur le parent laissé derrière. l’enfant est retiré de son milieu familial et souvent privé de contacts avec l’autre parent. il peut se retrouver dans une culture avec laquelle il n’a aucun lien préalable, dans un pays où les structures sociales, le système scolaire et, parfois, la langue sont différents. des affrontements judiciaires pour l’obtention de sa garde peuvent avoir lieu dans différents pays, ce qui retarde le prononcé d’une décision. rien de tout cela n’est bon pour l’enfant ou les parents. [24] the hague convention is aimed at enforcing custody rights and securing the prompt return of wrongfully removed or retained children to their country of habitual residence: see article 1; thomson v. thomson, [1994] 3 scr 551, at pp 579-81. the return order is not a custody determination: article 19. it is simply an order designed to restore the status quo which existed before the wrongful removal or retention, and to deprive the “wrongful” parent of any advantage that might otherwise be gained by the abduction. its purpose is to return the child to the jurisdiction which is most appropriate for the determination of custody and access. [24] la convention de la haye vise à faire respec- ter le droit de garde et à assurer le retour immédiat de l’enfant dans le pays de sa résidence habituelle en cas de déplacement ou de non- retour illicite (voir article 1; thomson c. thomson, [1994] 3 rcs 551, p 579-581). l’ordonnance de retour ne constitue pas une décision sur la garde (article 19). elle vise seu- lement à rétablir la situation d’avant le déplacement ou le non- retour illicite et à empêcher le parent qui a agi de façon « illicite » de tirer par ailleurs avantage de l’enlèvement. elle a pour but le retour de l’enfant dans le ressort où il convient le plus que le tribunal décide de la garde et du droit de visite. [25] prompt return serves three related purposes. first, it protects against the harmful effects of wrong- ful removal or retention: see r. schuz, the hague child abduction convention: a critical analysis [25] le retour immédiat a trois raisons d’être connexes premièrement, il protège les intéres- sés des effets nuisibles d’un déplacement ou d’un non- retour illicite (voir r. schuz, the hague child [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 415 (2013), at p. 96; e. gallagher, “a house is not (nec- essarily) a home: a discussion of the common law approach to habitual residence” (2015), 47 nyuj. int’l l & pol. 463, at p. 465; thomson, at p. 559; re b (a minor) (abduction), [1994] 2 flr. 249 (ewca), at p 260. abduction convention : a critical analysis (2013), p. 96; e. gallagher, « a house is not (necessarily) a home : a discussion of the common law approach to habitual residence » (2015), 47 nyuj. int’l l. & pol. 463, p. 465; thomson, p. 559; re b. (a mi- nor) (abduction), [1994] 2 flr 249 (ewca), p 260). [26] second, it deters parents from abducting the child in the hope that they will be able to establish links in a new country that might ultimately award them custody: see e. pérez- vera, “explanatory re- port”, in acts and documents of the fourteenth ses- sion (1980), t. iii, child abduction (1981),2 at p. 429; see also w (v) v. s (d), [1996] 2 scr 108, at para. 36; gallagher, at p. 465; a. m. greene, “seen and not heard?: children’s objections under the hague convention on international child abduc- tion” (2005), 13 u. miami int’l & comp. l. rev. 105, at pp 111-12. [26] deuxièmement, il dissuade les parents de re- courir à l’enlèvement dans le but de créer des liens dans un nouveau pays où la garde de l’enfant pourrait ultérieurement leur être accordée (voir e. pérez- vera, « rapport explicatif », dans actes et documents de la quatorzième session (1980), t. iii, enlèvement d’enfants (1981)2, p. 429; voir également w (v) c. s (d), [1996] 2 rcs 108, par. 36; gallagher, p. 465; a m greene, « seen and not heard? : chil- dren’s objections under the hague convention on international child abduction » (2005), 13 u. miami int’l & comp l. rev. 105, p 111-112). [27] finally, prompt return is aimed at speedy adju- dication of the merits of a custody or access dispute in the forum of a child’s habitual residence, elimi- nating disputes about the proper forum for resolution of custody and access issues: see schuz, at p. 96; gallagher, at p 465. [28] the heart of the hague convention’s prompt return mechanism is article 3, which provides that the removal or retention of a child is wrongful (a)  where it is in breach of custody rights under the law of the state in which the child was habit- ually resident immediately before the removal or retention and (b) where those rights were actually being exercised or would have been exercised but for the wrongful removal or retention. crucially for the purposes of this appeal, the concept of habitual residence is not defi ned in the treaty. [27] enfi n, le retour immédiat vise le prononcé rapide d’une décision au fond sur la garde ou le droit de visite dans le ressort où l’enfant a sa résidence habituelle, ce qui est de nature à éviter toute contes- tation de la compétence du tribunal saisi pour statuer sur la garde et le droit de visite (voir schuz, p. 96; gallagher, p 465). [28] l’axe central du mécanisme de retour im- médiat de la convention de la haye est l’article 3. cette disposition prévoit que le déplacement ou le non- retour d’un enfant est illicite a) lorsqu’il a lieu en violation d’un droit de garde selon le droit de l’état dans lequel l’enfant avait sa résidence habi- tuelle immédiatement avant son déplacement ou son non- retour et b) lorsque ce droit était exercé de façon effective au moment du déplacement ou du non- retour, ou l’eût été si de tels événements n’étaient survenus. la notion de résidence habituelle n’est pas défi nie dans le traité, et cette omission se révèle déterminante pour l’issue du pourvoi. 2 the explanatory report was drawn up after the conclusion of the hague convention by e. pérez- vera, the rapporteur of the commission. it has been infl uential in the interpretation of the hague convention and has been cited in numerous cases interna- tionally: see r. k. gardiner, treaty interpretation (2nd ed. 2015), at p 403. 2 le rapport explicatif a été rédigé après la conclusion de la convention de la haye par la rapporteuse de la commission, e. pérez- vera. il a infl ué sur l’interprétation de la convention de la haye et a été cité dans nombre d’affaires à l’échelle interna- tionale (voir r k gardiner,. treaty interpretation (2e éd. 2015), p 403). 416 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. if the requirements of article 3 are estab- [29] lished, article 12 requires the judge in the requested state to order “the return of the child forthwith” un- less certain exceptions apply. these exceptions can be summarized as follows: [29] lorsque les conditions de l’article 3 sont ré- unies, l’article 12 exige du tribunal de l’état requis qu’il « ordonne [le] retour immédiat [de l’enfant] », sauf application d’une exception. les exceptions prévues peuvent être résumées comme suit : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) the parent seeking return was not exercising custody or consented to the removal or reten- tion (article 13(a)); there is grave risk that return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or place the child in an intolerable situation (article 13(b)); the child of suffi cient age and maturity ob- jects to being returned (article 13(2)); the return of the child would not be per- mitted by fundamental human rights and fundamental freedoms of the requested state (article 20); and, the application was brought one year or more from the date of wrongful removal or reten- tion, and the judge determines the child is settled in the new environment (article 12). (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) le parent qui sollicite le retour n’exerçait pas le droit de garde ou avait consenti au dépla- cement ou au non- retour (article 13a)); il existe un risque grave que le retour de l’en- fant ne l’expose à un danger physique ou psychique ou ne le place dans une situation intolérable (article 13b)); l’enfant a atteint un âge et une maturité suf- fi sants et s’oppose au retour (article 13(2)); le retour de l’enfant ne serait pas permis par les principes fondamentaux de l’état requis en matière de droits de l’homme et de libertés fondamentales (article 20); la demande a été présentée un an ou plus après le déplacement ou le non- retour illicite, et le juge conclut que l’enfant s’est intégré dans son nouveau milieu (article 12). [30] only one requirement of article 3 is chal- lenged in this case — whether the children were habitually resident in germany at the time of the wrongful retention. and only the third exception remains relevant — the children’s alleged objection to being returned to germany. [30] le respect d’une seule exigence de l’article 3 est contesté en l’espèce, à savoir que les enfants avaient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne au moment du non- retour illicite. et seule l’application de la troisième exception demeure possible, soit l’opposition alléguée des enfants à leur retour en allemagne. b principles of treaty interpretation b principes d’interprétation des traités [31] the hague convention is implemented in on- tario by s. 46(2) of the children’s law reform act, rso 1990, c. c12. since the purpose of that sec- tion is to implement the underlying convention, this court must adopt an interpretation consistent with canada’s obligations under it: see pushpanathan v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), [1998] 1 scr 982, at para 51. [31] le paragraphe 46(2) de la loi portant réforme du droit de l’enfance, lro 1990, c. c.12, assure la mise en œuvre de la convention de la haye en ontario. comme l’objet de la disposition est la mise en œuvre du traité, la cour doit adopter une interpré- tation qui se concilie avec les obligations que celui-ci confère au canada (voir pushpanathan c. canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immigration), [1998] 1 rcs 982, par 51). [32] canada is a party to the vienna convention on the law of treaties, can. ts 1980. no. 37 (“vienna [32] le canada est partie à la convention de vienne sur le droit des traités, rt. can. 1980 no 37 [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 417 convention”), which provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”: article 31(1); see also crown forest industries ltd. v. canada, [1995] 2 scr 802, at para 22. these international principles generally parallel the domestic approach to statutory interpre- tation: see r. sullivan, statutory interpretation (3rd ed. 2016), at p 279. (« convention de vienne »), qui prévoit qu’« [u]n traité doit être interprété de bonne foi suivant le sens ordinaire à attribuer aux termes du traité dans leur contexte et à la lumière de son objet et de son but » (article 31(1); voir également crown forest indus- tries ltd. c. canada, [1995] 2 rcs 802, par 22). ces principes internationaux s’apparentent géné- ralement à l’approche canadienne en matière d’in- terprétation des lois (voir r.  sullivan, statutory interpretation (3e éd. 2016), p 279). [33] a clear purpose of multilateral treaties is to harmonize parties’ domestic laws around agreed- upon rules, practices, and principles. the hague convention was intended to establish procedures common to all the contracting states that would en- sure the prompt return of children: see preamble. the objective of multilateral treaty making “would be seriously weakened if the courts of every coun- try interpreted [the treaty at issue] without any re- gard to how it was being interpreted and applied elsewhere”: connaught laboratories ltd. v. brit- ish airways (2002), 61 or (3d) 204 (scj), at para 46. to avoid frustrating the harmonizing pur- pose behind the hague convention, domestic courts should give serious consideration to decisions by the courts of other contracting states on its meaning and application: see vienna convention, article 31(3)(b); thibodeau v. air canada, 2014 scc 67, [2014] 3 scr 340, at para. 50; stag line, limited v. fos- colo, mango and co., [1932] ac 328 (hl), at p.  350; scruttons ltd v midland silicones ltd., [1962] ac 446 (hl), at p. 471; air france v. saks, 470 us 392 (1985), at pp. 403-4; lk v. director- general, department of community services, [2009] hca 9, 237 clr 582, at para 36. [33] l’une des raisons d’être manifestes d’un traité multilatéral est l’harmonisation du droit national de chacune des parties avec les règles, les pratiques et les principes dont il est convenu. l’objectif de la convention de la haye était l’établissement d’une procédure commune à tous les états contractants pour garantir le retour immédiat de l’enfant (voir le préambule) l’objectif d’un traité multilatéral [traduction] « serait sérieusement compromis si les tribunaux de chacun des pays interprétaient [le traité en cause] sans tenir compte de la façon dont on l’a interprété et appliqué ailleurs » (connaught laboratories ltd. c. british airways (2002), 61 or. (3d) 204 (csj), par 46). pour ne pas aller à l’en- contre de la volonté d’harmonisation qui sous- tend la convention de la haye, les tribunaux nationaux doivent examiner de près les décisions des tribu- naux des autres états contractants sur sa portée et sur son application (voir convention de vienne, ar- ticle 31(3)(b); thibodeau c. air canada, 2014 csc 67, [2014] 3 rcs 340, par. 50; stag line, limited c. foscolo, mango and co., [1932] ac 328 (hl), p. 350; scruttons ltd. c. midland silicones ltd., [1962] ac 446 (hl), p. 471; air france c. saks, 470 us 392 (1985), p. 403-404; lk c. director- general, department of community services, [2009] hca 9, 237 clr 582, par 36). [34] the parties before us raised two further inter- pretive issues. the fi rst is whether the hague con- vention confl icts with the convention on the rights of the child, can. ts 1992. no. 3 (“crc”). for present purposes, there is no confl ict between the two conventions. both conventions seek to protect the best interests of children — the one by deterring child abduction and promoting prompt resolution of custody disputes, and the other by ensuring that [34] les parties soulèvent en l’espèce deux autres points d’interprétation. premièrement, la convention de la haye entre-t-elle en confl it avec la convention relative aux droits de l’enfant, rt. can. 1992 no 3 (« cde »)? pour les besoins du présent pourvoi, je réponds par la négative. les deux visent à protéger l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, l’une en décourageant l’enlèvement d’enfant et en favorisant le dénouement rapide des instances de garde, l’autre en faisant en 418 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. decision making focuses on the best interests of the child. both conventions seek to protect the child’s identity and family relations. the hague convention does this by mandating the return of a child to the place of his or her habitual residence (article 3) so that a custody determination may be made in that place — a place normally central to a child’s identity; article 8 of the crc rests on the same policy. both conventions seek to prevent the illicit transfer and retention of children: see crc, article 11; united nations children’s fund, implementation hand- book for the convention on the rights of the child (rev. 3rd ed. 2007), by r. hodgkin and p. newell, at pp 143-47. and both conventions accept the prin- ciple that a child of suffi cient maturity should have a say in where the child lives, as discussed below in connection with article 13(2) of the hague con- vention. [35] the second issue raised is whether the hague convention should be interpreted consistently with the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, and in particular the s. 6 guarantee of right of return and the s. 7 guarantee of liberty and security of person. the answer is no. the charter cannot be used to interpret the hague convention or any international agreement: see febles v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2014 scc 68, [2014] 3 scr 431, at para. 64; vienna convention, articles 27 and 31. in any event, when the hague convention is interpreted as set out in these reasons, no confl ict with ss. 6 or 7 of the charter is made out. sorte que la décision se fonde sur l’intérêt supé- rieur de l’enfant. toutes deux ont pour but de pro- téger l’identité et les liens familiaux de l’enfant. la convention de la haye y parvient en ordonnant le retour de l’enfant dans le pays de sa résidence habi- tuelle (article 3) — un lieu normalement déterminant quant à l’identité de l’enfant — afi n qu’il y soit statué sur sa garde; l’article 8 de la cde reprend le même principe. les deux conventions visent à empêcher le déplacement et le non- retour illicite d’enfant (voir cde, article 11; united nations children’s fund, implementation handbook for the convention on the rights of the child (3e éd. rév. 2007), par r. hodgkin et p. newell, p 143-147). de plus, les deux conven- tions reconnaissent le principe selon lequel l’enfant suffi samment mature devrait avoir son mot à dire sur le lieu où il sera appelé à vivre, ce sur quoi je revien- drai plus en détail dans l’examen de l’article 13(2) de la convention de la haye. [35] deuxièmement, la convention de la haye doit- elle recevoir une interprétation qui se concilie avec la charte canadienne des droits et libertés et, en particulier, avec le droit au retour que garantit son art. 6 et le droit à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne que garantit son art. 7? il faut répondre par la négative. la charte ne saurait servir à interpréter ni la convention de la  haye, ni quelque accord international (voir febles c. canada (citoyenneté et immigration), 2014 csc 68, [2014] 3 rcs 431, par. 64; convention de vienne, articles 27 et 31). quoi qu’il en soit, lorsque la convention de la haye est interprétée conformément aux présents motifs, il n’y a pas de confl it avec les art. 6 ou 7 de la charte. c approaches to habitual residence under arti- c approches de la résidence habituelle pour l’ap- cle 3 plication de l’article 3 [36] the father in this case applied under the hague convention for the return of the children. to establish a case for return under article 3, the father had to show that at the time immediately before the alleged wrongful retention (ie, upon the expiry of the father’s consent on august 15, 2014) the children were habitually resident in germany. within the overall scheme of the hague convention, the purpose of habitual residence in article 3 is to defi ne the chil- dren to whom the hague convention applies. if the [36] en l’espèce, le père a sollicité le retour des en- fants sur le fondement de la convention de la haye. pour établir le respect des conditions auxquelles le retour peut être ordonné selon l’article 3, le père devait démontrer que, immédiatement avant le non- retour illicite allégué (c-à-d au terme de la période visée par son consentement, le 15 août 2014), les en- fants avaient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne. eu égard à l’économie générale de la convention de la haye, le renvoi à la résidence habituelle à [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 419 children were not habitually resident in germany at the time of the alleged wrongful retention, the hague convention does not apply. [37] the requirement that the child’s habitual res- idence be in the state of the parent seeking return serves to ensure that the state to which the child is returned is the proper state to determine custody. in principle, custody should be determined in the state in which the child is habitually resident. this sup- ports the goals of mitigating psychological trauma to the child, respecting the jurisdiction of the state of habitual residence to make decisions on custody and access, and deterring abductions and wrongful retentions. [38] under canadian law, whether habitual resi- dence is viewed as a question of fact or a question of mixed fact and law, appellate courts must defer to the application judge’s decision on a child’s ha- bitual residence, absent palpable and overriding er- ror: see housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at paras. 10, 25 and 36. the need for deference may be inferred from the intention of the original states parties (see pérez- vera, at p. 445) and the decision not to defi ne habitual residence in the body of the hague convention. the goal was to avoid legal technicalities and to adopt a fact- based determination: see pérez- vera, at p 445. l’article 3 vise à préciser à quels enfants s’applique le traité. si les enfants n’avaient pas leur résidence habituelle en allemagne au moment du non- retour illicite allégué, la convention de la haye ne s’ap- plique pas. [37] l’exigence que l’enfant ait sa résidence habi- tuelle dans l’état du parent qui sollicite son retour sert à garantir que l’état dans lequel l’enfant est renvoyé est celui dont les tribunaux peuvent statuer sur la garde. en principe, la garde devrait être attri- buée dans l’état où l’enfant a sa résidence habituelle, et ce, afi n d’atténuer le risque qu’un traumatisme psychologique soit infl igé à l’enfant, de respecter la compétence des tribunaux de l’état de la résidence habituelle pour décider de la garde et du droit de visite, ainsi que de décourager l’enlèvement et le non- retour illicite. [38] en droit canadien, que la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant constitue une question de fait ou une question mixte de fait et de droit, la cour d’appel doit déférer à la décision du juge des requêtes sur la résidence habituelle de l’en- fant, sauf erreur manifeste et dominante (voir housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, par. 10, 25 et 36). la déférence s’impose du fait de l’intention exprimée par les premiers états parties (voir pérez- vera, p. 445), ainsi que de l’absence de défi nition de la résidence habituelle dans la conven- tion de la haye comme telle. l’objectif était d’éviter les subtilités juridiques et de privilégier un mode de décision axé sur les faits (voir pérez- vera, p 445). [39] this brings us to the central question in this case — how should an application judge approach the determination of habitual residence under ar- ticle 3? the parties and the interveners offer three different approaches for determining a child’s ha- bitual residence: the parental intention approach, the child- centred approach, and the hybrid approach. [39] d’où la question qui se révèle centrale en l’es- pèce : suivant quelle approche le juge des requêtes doit-il déterminer le lieu de résidence habituelle de l’enfant pour l’application de l’article 3? les parties et les intervenants en proposent trois : l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents, celle axée sur l’enfant et l’approche hybride. [40] the parental intention approach determines the habitual residence of a child by the intention of the parents with the right to determine where the child lives: see mozes v. mozes, 239 f.3d 1067 (9th cir. 2001), at pp. 1076-79; gitter v. gitter, 396 f.3d 124  (2nd cir.  2005), at pp.  131-33; r v barnet [40] l’approche fondée sur l’intention des pa- rents permet de déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant à partir de l’intention des pa- rents habilités à décider du lieu où vit l’enfant (voir mozes c mozes, 239  f.3d 1067  (9th cir 2001), p. 1076-1079; gitter c. gitter, 396 f.3d 124 (2nd 420 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. london borough council, ex parte nilish shah, [1983] 2 ac 309, at p 3433. under this approach, time- limited travel to which the parents agree does not change the child’s habitual residence. “where the children are sent abroad to live with relatives or for educational purposes, their habitual residence will not change where the parents intend for them to return, but may change after a period of time where there is no such intention”: schuz, at p. 187, fn 87. where the parents have agreed that the child will stay outside the country of habitual residence for a lim- ited time, that intent governs throughout the agreed period, and allows the parent in the original country to mount a claim for the child’s return under the hague convention at the end of the agreed period. this approach currently dominates canadian juris- prudence, where courts in a number of jurisdictions consider parental intent to be the primary consid- eration in determining a child’s habitual residence: see, for example, chan v. chow, 2001 bcca 276, 90 bclr (3d) 222, at paras. 30-34; korutowska- wooff v. wooff (2004), 242 dlr (4th) 385 (ont. ca), at para. 8; aes v. amw, 2013 abca 133, 544 ar 246, at para. 20; rifkin v. peled- rifkin, 2017 nbca 3, 89 rfl (7th) 194, at para. 2; sk. v. jz, 2017 skqb 136, at paras. 44-47 (canlii); monteiro v. locke (2014), 354 nfl d & peir 132 (prov. ct.), at paras 13-22. cir. 2005), p. 131-133; r c. barnet london borough council, ex parte nilish shah, [1983] 2 ac 309, p 3433). un séjour d’une durée limitée auquel les parents consentent ne modifi e alors pas le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant. [traduction] « lorsque l’enfant est envoyé à l’étranger pour y ha- biter chez des membres de la famille ou pour y pour- suivre ses études, le lieu de sa résidence habituelle ne change pas si les parents ont voulu qu’il revienne, mais il peut changer après un certain temps à dé- faut d’une telle intention » (schuz, p. 187, note 87). lorsque les parents sont convenus que l’enfant sé- journera hors du pays de sa résidence habituelle pen- dant un certain temps, cette intention demeure tout au long de la période convenue et permet au parent resté dans le pays d’origine de demander le retour de l’enfant sur le fondement de la convention de la haye au terme de cette période. telle est l’ap- proche actuellement privilégiée au canada. les tri- bunaux d’un certain nombre de ressorts voient dans l’intention des parents la considération première pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant (voir p ex chan c. chow, 2001 bcca 276, 90 bclr (3d) 222, par. 30-34; korutowska- wooff c. wooff (2004), 242 dlr (4th) 385 (ca. ont.), par. 8; aes c. amw, 2013 abca 133, 544 ar 246, par. 20; rifkin c. peled-rifkin, 2017 nbca 3, 89 rfl (7th) 194, par. 2; sk c. jz, 2017 skqb 136, par. 44-47 (canlii); monteiro c. locke (2014), 354 nfl d & peir 132 (c prov.), par 13-22). [41] the child- centred approach determines a child’s habitual residence under article  3 by the child’s acclimatization in a given country, rendering the intentions of the parents largely irrelevant. it is backward- focused, looking to the child’s connections with the state, rather than the more forward- looking parental intention model: see friedrich v. friedrich, 983 f.2d 1396 (6th cir. 1993), at p. 1401; feder v. evans- feder, 63 f.3d 217 (3rd cir. 1995), at p 224. no canadian jurisdiction currently follows the [41] suivant l’approche axée sur l’enfant, le lieu de la résidence habituelle est déterminé, pour l’appli- cation de l’article 3, en fonction de l’acclimatation de l’enfant dans le pays, de sorte que l’intention des parents n’importe pas vraiment. elle s’attache ré- trospectivement aux liens que l’enfant a établis avec l’état, contrairement à l’approche plus prospective fondée sur l’intention des parents (voir friedrich c. friedrich, 983 f.2d 1396 (6th cir. 1993), p. 1401; feder c. evans- feder, 63 f.3d 217 (3rd cir. 1995), 3 shah did not concern habitual residence, but rather the term “or- dinary residence”. nonetheless, it was taken up for use in hague convention cases. shah stated: “   a man’s abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being, whether of short or of long duration” (p. 343, per lord scarman). 3 l’arrêt shah ne porte pas sur la résidence habituelle, mais plutôt sur la [traduction] « résidence ordinaire ». on s’y reporte néanmoins dans les affaires relatives à la convention de la haye. en voici un passage : «    une personne réside dans le lieu ou le pays qu’elle a adopté, volontairement et dans un dessein arrêté, dans le cours normal de sa vie, que ce soit pour une courte période ou une longue » (p. 343, lord scarman). [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 421 child- centred approach, although courts in quebec followed this approach (see droit de la famille — 2454, [1996] rjq 2509 (ca)) until 2017, when it was abandoned in favour of the hybrid approach (see droit de la famille — 17622, 2017 qcca 529, at paras. 20, 27 and 29-30 (canlii)). [42] finally, the hybrid approach holds that instead of focusing primarily or exclusively on either paren- tal intention or the child’s acclimatization, the judge determining habitual residence under article 3 must look to all relevant considerations arising from the facts of the case at hand. as noted above, in canada, the hybrid approach has been adopted in quebec: see droit de la famille — 17622, at paras 29-30. [43] on the hybrid approach to habitual residence, the application judge determines the focal point of the child’s life — “the family and social environment in which its life has developed” — immediately prior to the removal or retention: pérez- vera, at p. 428; see also jackson v. graczyk (2006), 45 rfl (6th) 43 (ont. scj), at para 33. the judge considers all relevant links and circumstances — the child’s links to and circumstances in country a; the circumstances of the child’s move from country a to country b; and the child’s links to and circumstances in country b. [44] considerations include “the duration, regu- larity, conditions and reasons for the [child’s] stay in the territory of [a] member state” and the child’s nationality: mercredi v. chaffe, c-497/10, [2010] ecr i-14358, at para 56. no single factor dom- inates the analysis; rather, the application judge should consider the entirety of the circumstances: see droit de la famille — 17622, at para 30. relevant considerations may vary according to the age of the child concerned; where the child is an infant, “the environment of a young child is essentially a family environment, determined by the reference person(s) with whom the child lives, by whom the child is in fact looked after and taken care of”: ol. v. pq (2017),. c-111/17 (cjeu), at para 45. p 224). aucun ressort canadien ne l’applique ac- tuellement, bien que des tribunaux québécois y aient adhéré jusqu’en 2017 (voir droit de la famille — 2454, [1996] rjq 2509 (ca)) pour se tourner alors vers l’approche hybride (voir droit de la fa- mille — 17622, 2017 qcca 529, par. 20, 27 et 29-30 (canlii)). [42] enfi n, l’approche hybride veut qu’au lieu de s’attacher surtout ou seulement à l’intention des pa- rents ou à l’acclimatation de l’enfant, le tribunal appelé à déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle pour l’application de l’article 3 se penche sur toutes les considérations pertinentes au vu des faits propres à l’affaire. rappelons que, au canada, les tribunaux du québec l’ont adoptée (voir droit de la famille — 17622, par 29-30). [43] suivant cette approche, le juge des requêtes détermine quel était le point de fuite de la vie de l’enfant, soit « l’environnement familial et social dans lequel sa vie se déroulait », immédiatement avant le déplacement ou le non- retour (pérez- vera, p. 428; voir également jackson c. graczyk (2006), 45 rfl (6th) 43 (csj. ont.), par 33). il tient compte de tous les liens et faits pertinents, à savoir les liens de l’enfant avec le pays a et sa situation dans ce pays, les circonstances du déplacement de l’enfant du pays a au pays b, ainsi que les liens de l’enfant avec le pays b et sa situation dans ce pays. [44] au nombre des considérations pertinentes mentionnons «  la durée, la régularité, les condi- tions et les raisons du séjour [de l’enfant] sur le territoire [d’un] état membre  » et la nationalité de l’enfant (mercredi c. chaffe, c-497/10, [2010] ecr i-14358, par 56). aucun élément ne pré- domine, le juge des requêtes devant plutôt exami- ner la situation dans son ensemble (voir droit de la famille — 17622, par 30). les considérations pertinentes peuvent varier en fonction de l’âge de l’enfant; lorsqu’il s’agit d’un nourrisson, « [l’]envi- ronnement [d’un jeune enfant] est essentiellement fa- milial, déterminé par la personne ou les personnes de référence avec lesquelles il vit, qui le gardent effecti- vement et prennent soin de lui » (ol c. pq (2017),. c-111/17 (cjue), par 45). 422 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. [45] the circumstances of the parents, including their intentions, may be important, particularly in the case of infants or young children: see mercredi, at paras. 55-56; a v. a. (children: habitual residence), [2013] uksc 60, [2014] ac 1, at para. 54; lk, at paras. 20 and 26-27. however, recent cases cau- tion against over- reliance on parental intention. the court of justice of the european union stated in ol that parental intention “can also be taken into account, where that intention is manifested by cer- tain tangible steps such as the purchase or lease of a residence”: para 46. it “cannot as a general rule by itself be crucial to the determination of the habitual residence of a child    but constitutes an ‘indicator’ capable of complementing a body of other consistent evidence”: para 47. the role of parental intention in the determination of habitual residence “depends on the circumstances specifi c to each individual case”: para 48. it follows that there is no “rule” that the ac- [46] tions of one parent cannot unilaterally change the habitual residence of a child. imposing such a legal construct onto the determination of habitual resi- dence detracts from the task of the fi nder of fact, namely to evaluate all of the relevant circumstances in determining where the child was habitually res- ident at the date of wrongful retention or removal: see in re r. (children), [2015] uksc 35, [2016] ac 76, at para. 17; see also a v. a., at paras 39-40. [47] the hybrid approach is “fact- bound, practical, and unencumbered with rigid rules, formulas, or pre- sumptions”: redmond v. redmond, 724 f.3d 729 (7th cir. 2013), at p 746. it requires the application judge to look to the entirety of the child’s situation. while courts allude to factors or considerations that tend to recur, there is no legal test for habitual residence and the list of potentially relevant factors is not closed. the temptation “to overlay the factual concept of habitual residence with legal constructs” must be resisted: a v. a., at paras 37-39. [45] la situation des parents, y compris leurs in- tentions, peut se révéler importante, surtout dans le cas de nourrissons ou de jeunes enfants (voir mer- credi, par. 55-56; a c. a. (children : habitual res- idence), [2013] uksc 60, [2014] ac 1, par. 54; lk, par. 20 et 26-27). cependant, on a récemment mis les tribunaux en garde contre une trop grande importance accordée à l’intention des parents. dans l’arrêt ol, la cour de justice de l’union européenne dit que l’intention des parents « peut également être prise en compte, lorsqu’elle est exprimée par cer- taines mesures tangibles telles que l’acquisition ou la location d’un logement » (par 46). elle « ne sau- rait en principe être à elle seule décisive pour déter- miner la résidence habituelle d’un enfant [  ], mais constitue un “indice” de nature à compléter un fais- ceau d’autres éléments concordants » (par 47). sa fonction dans la détermination du lieu de la rési- dence habituelle « dépend des circonstances propres à chaque cas » (par 48). il n’existe donc pas de « règle » selon laquelle [46] les actes d’un parent ne peuvent emporter la modifi - cation unilatérale du lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant. assujettir à une telle construction juridique la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle rompt avec la tâche qui incombe au juge des faits, à savoir apprécier toutes circonstances pertinentes pour déterminer le ressort dans lequel l’enfant avait sa résidence habituelle au moment du déplacement ou du non- retour illicite (voir in re r. (children), [2015] uksc 35, [2016] ac 76, par. 17; voir éga- lement a c. a., par 39-40). [47] l’approche hybride est [traduction] « axée sur les faits, pragmatique et affranchie de l’applica- tion rigide de règles, de formules ou de présomp- tions » (redmond c. redmond, 724 f.3d 729 (7th cir. 2013), p 746). elle oblige le juge des requêtes à examiner la situation de l’enfant dans sa totalité. les tribunaux renvoient certes à des éléments ou à des considérations qui se présentent souvent, mais aucun critère juridique ne permet de déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle, et la liste des éléments suscep- tibles d’être pertinents n’est pas exhaustive. il faut résister à la tentation [traduction] « de superposer des constructions juridiques à la notion factuelle de résidence habituelle » (a c. a., par 37-39). [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 423 d the hybrid approach should be adopted in d le recours à l’approche hybride s’impose au canada canada [48] the hybrid approach should be adopted in canada for the following reasons: (1) the principle of harmonization supports the hybrid approach; and (2) the hybrid approach best conforms to the text, structure, and purpose of the hague convention. [48] il convient de recourir à l’approche hybride au canada pour les raisons suivantes : (1) le principe d’harmonisation milite en sa faveur et (2) elle est celle qui se concilie le mieux avec le texte, la struc- ture et l’objet de la convention de la haye. (1) the principle of harmonization supports the (1) le principe de l’harmonisation milite en hybrid approach faveur de l’approche hybride [49] as discussed above, a prime consideration in interpreting treaties is the principle of harmonization. the aim of treaties like the hague convention is to establish uniform practices in the adhering coun- tries. this court has faithfully followed this precept: see, for example, mugesera v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), 2005 scc 40, [2005] 2 scr 100, at paras. 82, 126 and 178; ezokola v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2013 scc 40, [2013] 2 scr 678, at paras. 30 and 42. it fol- lows that this court should prefer the interpretation that has gained the most support in other courts and will therefore best ensure uniformity of state practice across hague convention jurisdictions, unless there are strong reasons not to do so. in recent years, many hague convention [50] states have adopted a hybrid approach. absolute consensus has not yet emerged. but the clear trend is to rejection of the parental intention approach and to adoption of the hybrid approach. recent decisions from the european union, the united kingdom, aus- tralia, new zealand, and the united states endorse the hybrid approach. [49] rappelons que l’une des considérations pre- mières lorsqu’il s’agit d’interpréter un traité est le principe d’harmonisation. le but d’un traité comme la convention de la haye est l’établissement de pra- tiques uniformes dans les pays signataires. notre cour suit rigoureusement ce précepte (voir p ex. mugesera c. canada (ministre de la citoyenneté et de l’immi- gration), 2005 csc 40, [2005] 2 rcs 100, par. 82, 126 et 178; ezokola c. canada (ministre de la ci- toyenneté et de l’immigration), 2013 csc 40, [2013] 2 rcs 678, par. 30 et 42). elle devrait donc privi- légier l’interprétation qui recueille le plus l’adhésion des autres juridictions et qui est de nature à assurer le mieux l’uniformité des pratiques de l’état dans les ressorts signataires de la convention de la haye, à moins que des motifs sérieux ne s’y opposent. [50] ces dernières années, bon nombre des états signataires de la convention de la haye ont opté pour une approche hybride. nul consensus absolu ne se dégage encore, mais on tend nettement à écar- ter l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents au profi t de l’approche hybride. dans des décisions récentes, des tribunaux de l’union européenne, du royaume- uni, d’australie, de nouvelle- zélande et des états- unis adhèrent à l’approche hybride. [51] the court of justice of the european union adopted the hybrid approach to determining habitual residence in mercredi. it recently confi rmed this approach in ol, holding that a child’s habitual residence “corresponds to the place which refl ects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment”, and must be established “taking account of all the circumstances of fact spe- cifi c to each individual case”: para 42. the court [51] dans son arrêt mercredi, la cour de justice de l’union européenne opte pour l’approche hybride pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle. elle confi rmait récemment ce choix dans ol, où elle conclut que la résidence habituelle de l’enfant « correspond au lieu qui traduit une certaine intégra- tion de celui-ci dans un environnement social et fa- milial » et que ce lieu doit être déterminé « au regard de l’ensemble des circonstances de fait particulières 424 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. held that while parental intention may be relevant in some cases, it must be approached with caution. the european union comprises 28 countries. the decisions of its court of justice bring nearly one- third of the over 90 countries that subscribe to the hague convention under the umbrella of the hybrid approach to habitual residence. à chaque cas d’espèce » (par 42). elle statue que même si l’intention des parents peut parfois importer, il faut faire preuve de prudence à cet égard. l’union européenne regroupe 28 pays. les décisions de sa cour de justice font en sorte que près du tiers des quelque 90 pays qui souscrivent à la convention de la haye appliquent l’approche hybride pour déter- miner le lieu de la résidence habituelle. [52] the supreme court of the united kingdom followed suit in a v. a., abandoning the parental intention approach to habitual residence in favour of the hybrid approach. baroness hale of richmond concluded that the european approach was prefer- able to that earlier adopted by the english courts, which had incorrectly shifted the focus of the habit- ual residence inquiry “from the actual situation of the child to the intentions of his parents”: para 38. the purposes and intentions of the parents are “merely one of the relevant factors”: para 54. the supreme court recently confi rmed the hybrid approach in in re r. [52] dans a c. a., la cour suprême du royaume- uni emboîte le pas en abandonnant l’approche fon- dée sur l’intention des parents au profi t de l’approche hybride. la baronne hale of richmond conclut que la démarche européenne est préférable à celle que les tribunaux anglais appliquaient jusqu’alors et qui mettait à tort l’accent non pas [traduction] « sur la situation réelle de l’enfant, mais sur l’intention des parents » (par 38). le dessein et l’intention des parents constituent « seulement l’un des éléments à considérer » (par 54). récemment, dans in re r., la cour suprême du royaume- uni a confi rmé l’appli- cation de l’approche hybride. [53] a similar movement away from parental in- tention and towards the hybrid approach can be seen in new zealand and australia. the new zealand court of appeal, in punter v. secretary for justice, [2007] 1 nzlr 40, expressly rejected counsel’s submission that parental purpose should determine a child’s habitual residence: see paras. 91- 108. instead, the court described the considerations relevant to habitual residence in these terms (at para. 88):    the inquiry into habitual residence [is] a broad factual inquiry. such an inquiry should take into account all relevant factors, including settled purpose, the actual and intended length of stay in a state, the purpose of the stay, the strength of ties to the state and to any other state (both in the past and currently), the degree of assimilation into the state, including living and schooling arrange- ments, and cultural, social and economic integration. in this catalogue,    settled purpose (and with young chil- dren the settled purpose of the parents) is important but not necessarily decisive. it should not in itself override what mcgrath j. called    the underlying reality of the connection between the child and the particular state    . [53] on observe pareille mise à l’écart de l’ap- proche fondée sur l’intention des parents au profi t de l’approche hybride en nouvelle- zélande et en aus- tralie. dans l’arrêt punter c. secretary for justice, [2007] nzlr 40, la cour d’appel de nouvelle- zélande rejette expressément la prétention de l’avo- cat selon laquelle le dessein des parents devrait déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’en- fant (voir par 91-108). elle énonce comme suit les considérations qui devraient plutôt présider à cette détermination (au par. 88) : [traduction]    l’examen relatif à la résidence habi- tuelle [est] largement factuel. il doit tenir compte de tous les éléments pertinents, dont le dessein arrêté, la durée réelle du séjour dans l’état et la durée dont les parties étaient convenues, l’objet du séjour, la solidité des liens avec l’état en cause et tout autre état (tant dans le passé qu’actuellement), le degré d’intégration dans l’état, y compris les conditions d’habitation et de scolarisation, ainsi que l’intégration culturelle, sociale et économique. parmi ces éléments, [  ] le dessein arrêté (dans le cas de jeunes enfants, celui de leurs parents) est important mais pas forcément décisif. il ne devrait pas à lui seul primer ce que le juge mcgrath appelle [  ] la réalité sous- jacente du lien entre l’enfant et l’état en cause   . [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 425 [54] the high court of australia approved punter in l.k notably, that court observed that while punter’s references to “settled purpose” directs at- tention to the intentions of the parents, the question of habitual residence must still be decided “by refer- ence to all the circumstances of any particular case”: para. 44, quoting in re j. (a minor) (abduction: custody rights), [1990] 2 ac 562 (hl), at p. 578 (emphasis added in lk). [54] dans lk, la haute cour d’australie ap- prouve punter. elle fait observer en particulier que même si, dans punter, les renvois au « dessein ar- rêté » attirent l’attention sur l’intention des parents, la résidence habituelle doit toujours être déterminée [traduction] « en fonction de toutes les circons- tances propres au dossier » (par. 44, citant in re j. (a minor) (abduction : custody rights), [1990] 2 ac. 562 (hl), p. 578 (italique ajouté dans lk)). [55] finally, while courts in the united states disa- gree on the appropriate approach to determining ha- bitual residence, there is strong support for the hybrid approach: see redmond, at p. 746; martinez v. cahue, 826 f.3d 983 (7th cir. 2016), at p. 990; silverman v. silverman, 338 f.3d 886 (8th cir. 2003), at pp. 898- 99; tsai-yi yang v. fu- chiang tsui, 499 f.3d 259 (3rd cir. 2007), at pp. 271-72; karkkainen v kovalchuk, 445 f.3d 280 (3rd cir. 2006), at p 297. in silverman, the eighth circuit court of appeals for the united states considered a number of factors relevant to that case: the degree of settled purpose from the perspec- tive of the children, the change in geography (with possessions and pets), the abandonment of the prior residence (including sale of the family home), the passage of time, the parent’s application for benefi ts, the children’s enrolment in school, and, “to some de- gree”, the intentions of the parents at the time of the move: see pp 898-99. in tsai-yi yang, the third cir- cuit court of appeals focused on the circumstances of the child in determining habitual residence, but also considered the intentions of the parents to be relevant: see pp 271-72. and in redmond, the sev- enth circuit court of appeals considered both the in- tentions of the parents and the circumstances of the child in determining habitual residence, commenting that “[i]n substance, all circuits — ours included — consider both parental intent and the child’s accli- matization, differing only in their emphasis”: p. 746 (emphasis in original). [55] enfi n, bien que les tribunaux américains ne s’entendent pas sur l’approche qui convient pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle, bon nombre d’entre eux appuient le recours à l’approche hybride (voir redmond, p. 746; martinez c. cahue, 826 f.3d 983 (7th cir. 2016), p. 990; silverman c. silverman, 338 f.3d 886 (8th cir. 2003), p. 898-899; tsai-yi yang c. fu- chiang tsui, 499 f.3d 259 (3rd cir. 2007), p. 271-272; karkkainen c. kovalchuk, 445 f.3d 280 (3rd cir. 2006), p 297). dans l’arrêt silverman, la cour d’appel du huitième circuit des états- unis se penche sur un certain nombre d’élé- ments jugés pertinents dans cette affaire, à savoir la mesure dans laquelle le dessein était arrêté du point de vue des enfants, le déplacement géographique (avec effets personnels et animaux de compagnie), l’abandon de la résidence précédente (y compris la vente de la résidence familiale), l’écoulement du temps, la demande de prestations par le parent, l’ins- cription de l’enfant à l’école et, « jusqu’à un certain point », l’intention qu’avaient les parents au moment du déménagement (voir p 898-899). dans tsai-yi yang, la cour d’appel du troisième circuit s’attache à la situation de l’enfant pour déterminer le lieu de sa résidence habituelle, mais elle tient aussi pour pertinente l’intention des parents (voir p 271-272). dans redmond, la cour d’appel du septième circuit tient compte à la fois de l’intention des parents et de la situation de l’enfant pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle et fait remarquer que, [traduc- tion] « essentiellement, tous les circuits, y compris le nôtre, tiennent compte à la fois de l’intention des parents et de l’acclimatation de l’enfant, seule l’im- portance accordée respectivement à l’une et à l’autre étant variable » (p. 746 (en italique dans l’original)). it is true that, at one time, many courts ap- [56] plied a parental intention approach to determining [56] de nombreux tribunaux ont certes un temps eu recours à l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents 426 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. habitual residence under the hague convention. but more recent cases indicate a clear shift from the parental intention approach to the hybrid approach. a large number of countries — among them coun- tries with which canada has close legal ties — now adopt a hybrid approach to determining habitual res- idence under the hague convention. within canada, quebec courts have recently decided to join this international trend: see droit de la famille — 17622, at paras 29-30. [57] the desirability of harmonization weighs heavily in favour of following the dominant thread of hague convention jurisprudence, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary. as discussed below, no such reasons have been shown. i conclude that this court should follow the current trend of hague convention jurisprudence and reject the parental intention approach in favour of the hybrid approach. pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle dans le cadre de l’application de la convention de la haye. mais il appert nettement de la jurisprudence récente que l’on est passé de cette approche à celle qualifi ée d’hybride. un grand nombre de pays, dont certains avec lesquels le canada entretient des liens juridiques étroits, se tournent désormais vers l’approche hybride pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle dans le cadre de l’application de la convention de la haye. au canada, des tribunaux québécois ont récemment résolu de s’inscrire dans ce courant international (voir droit de la famille — 17622, par. 29-30) [57] le caractère souhaitable de l’harmonisation milite fortement en faveur de l’adhésion au courant jurisprudentiel dominant en ce qui concerne l’appli- cation de la convention de la haye, sauf lorsque des motifs sérieux s’y opposent. comme je l’indique ci- après, de tels motifs n’ont pas été établis. j’arrive à la conclusion que la cour devrait suivre la tendance actuelle de la jurisprudence relative à la convention de la haye et abandonner l’approche fondée sur l’in- tention des parents au profi t de l’approche hybride. (2) the hybrid approach best conforms to the text, structure, and purpose of the hague convention (2) l’approche hybride est celle qui se concilie le mieux avec le texte, la structure et l’objet de la convention de la haye [58] there are good reasons why courts around the world are adopting the hybrid approach. the hybrid approach best adheres to the text, structure, and purpose of the hague convention. [58] de bonnes raisons justifi ent les tribunaux du monde entier de s’en remettre à l’approche hybride. cette dernière est celle qui respecte le plus le texte, la structure et l’objet de la convention de la haye. [59] the hybrid approach best fulfi lls the goals of prompt return: (1) deterring parents from abducting the child in an attempt to establish links with a coun- try that may award them custody, (2) encouraging the speedy adjudication of custody or access disputes in the forum of the child’s habitual residence, and (3) protecting the child from the harmful effects of wrongful removal or retention. [59] l’approche hybride respecte le plus les ob- jectifs du retour immédiat, à savoir (1) dissuader les parents de recourir à l’enlèvement dans le but de créer des liens dans un pays où la garde de l’enfant pourrait leur être accordée, (2) favoriser le prononcé rapide d’une décision sur la garde ou le droit de visite dans le ressort où l’enfant a sa résidence habituelle et (3) protéger l’enfant des effets nuisibles d’un dé- placement ou d’un non- retour illicite. [60] the hybrid approach deters parents from attempting to manipulate the hague convention. it discourages parents from attempting to alter a child’s habitual residence by strengthening ties with a particular state (see my colleagues’ reasons, at [60] l’approche hybride est de nature à dissuader les parents de tenter d’exploiter la convention de la haye. elle décourage toute tentative de faire en sorte que la résidence habituelle de l’enfant change du fait de la consolidation des liens avec un état en [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 427 paras. 134-35; mozes, at p. 1079), for two reasons: (1) parental intent is a relevant consideration under the hybrid approach, and (2) parents who know that the judge will look at all of the circumstances will be deterred from creating “legal and jurisdictional links which are more or less artifi cial” (pérez- vera, at p 429). particulier (voir motifs de mes collègues, par. 134- 135; mozes, p.  1079), et ce, pour deux raisons  : (1) l’intention des parents demeure une considéra- tion pertinente et, (2) comme le tribunal examinera la situation de l’enfant dans sa totalité, la création « d[e] liens plus ou moins artifi ciels de compétence judiciaire » est découragée (pérez- vera, p 429). [61] by contrast, the parental intention approach facilitates manipulation of the hague convention scheme. it may lead parents to exercise intention in ways that artifi cially maintain the child’s habit- ual residence in the initial state: see gallagher, at p. 480; s i. winter, “home is where the heart is: determining ‘habitual residence’ under the hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction” (2010), 33 wash. ujl & pol’y 351, at p. 377; ruiz v. tenorio, 392 f.3d 1247 (11th cir. 2004), at p 1254. the parental intention ap- proach may also allow parents to create artifi cial ju- risdictional links by way of an agreement stipulating the parents’ shared intent as to the child’s habitual residence: see barzilay v. barzilay, 600 f.3d 912 (8th cir 2010). the hybrid approach guards against these manipulations. [62] the hybrid approach also promotes prompt custody and access decisions in the most appropriate forum, and thus offers the best hope of prompt return of the child. the parental intention and child- centred approaches may, on their face, seem less complex and hence more likely to lead to speedy determina- tion of the habitual residence of the child. but the reality is different. the parental intention approach in practice often leads to detailed and confl icting evi- dence as to the intentions of the parents: see schuz, at p 211. when parents disagree as to their intentions, the application judge may be faced with a large vol- ume of evidence, including oral evidence, on those intentions. the hybrid approach is not an “invitation to litigate”: my colleagues’ reasons, at para 149. on the contrary, it is the best assurance of a prompt return of the child and resolution of custody. [61] à l’opposé, l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents facilite l’exploitation du régime établi par la convention de la haye. elle peut en effet amener les parents à exprimer leur intention de manière à faire en sorte que l’enfant conserve artifi ciellement sa rési- dence habituelle dans l’état d’origine (voir gallagher, p. 480; s i winter, « home is where the heart is : determining “habitual residence” under the hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction » (2010), 33 wash. ujl & pol’y 351, p. 377; ruiz c. tenorio, 392 f.3d 1247 (11th cir. 2004), p 1254). cette approche peut aussi per- mettre aux parents de créer des liens artifi ciels avec un ressort au moyen d’un accord faisant état de leur intention commune quant au lieu de la résidence habi- tuelle de l’enfant (voir barzilay c. barzilay, 600 f.3d 912 (8th cir 2010). l’approche hybride prémunit contre pareilles formes d’exploitation. [62] l’approche hybride promeut par ailleurs le prononcé rapide d’une décision sur la garde et le droit de visite dans le ressort qui convient le plus. elle offre donc la meilleure chance d’obtenir le retour immédiat de l’enfant. l’approche fondée sur l’inten- tion des parents et celle axée sur l’enfant peuvent, à première vue, paraître moins complexes et, de ce fait, plus susceptibles de mener à la détermination rapide du lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant. or, la réalité est tout autre. dans les faits, l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents ouvre souvent la voie à une preuve détaillée et contradictoire sur l’intention des parents (voir schuz, p 211). lorsque ces derniers ne s’entendent pas sur leur intention, le juge des requêtes peut se trouver aux prises avec une preuve abondante sur ce point, y compris une preuve testimoniale. l’approche hybride n’« invit[e] [pas] les parties à saisir la justice » (motifs de mes collè- gues, par 149). au contraire, elle est la plus apte à assurer le retour immédiat de l’enfant et le prononcé rapide d’une décision sur la garde. 428 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. [63] this point was pivotal in the recent decision of the court of justice of the european union in ol. the court, employing a hybrid approach, stated that “to consider that the initial intention of the parents is a factor of crucial importance in determining the habitual residence of a child would be detrimental to the effectiveness of the return procedure and to legal certainty” (para. 56), and could “compel the national courts either to gather a substantial quan- tity of evidence and testimony in order to determine with certainty that intention, which would be diffi - cult to reconcile with the requirement that a return procedure should be expeditious, or to issue their judgments while not in possession of all the relevant information, which would result in legal uncertainty” (para 59). in a similar manner, the child- centred approach may lead to confl icting evidence, includ- ing expert evidence, on the child’s connection to country a and country b. the hybrid approach, by contrast, allows the judge to make an order on all the evidence. in particular, treating parental intention as one consideration among many means that the appli- cation judge “may not necessarily have to come to a defi nitive conclusion as to which parent’s version is more accurate”: schuz, at p 212. [64] the hybrid approach also favours choice of the most appropriate forum. it focuses on the factual connections between the child and the countries in question, as well as the circumstances of the move — considerations that “mirror the closest connection test often used in determining the forum conveniens”: schuz, at p 210. this allows for custody and access disputes to be adjudicated in the most convenient forum with the best available evidence: see punter, at para 187. the hybrid approach thus avoids the problem that a child may be found to be habitually resident in a country with which the child has little or no connection: see schuz, at pp 209-10. [63] cet aspect s’est révélé décisif dans le récent arrêt ol de la cour de justice de l’union euro- péenne. sur le fondement d’une approche hybride, ce tribunal estime que « considérer l’intention initiale des parents comme étant un facteur prépondérant pour déterminer la résidence habituelle de l’enfant serait contraire à l’effi cacité de la procédure de re- tour et à la sécurité juridique » (par. 56) et pourrait « contraindre les juridictions nationales soit à recueil- lir un grand nombre de preuves et de témoignages afi n de déterminer avec certitude ladite intention, ce qui serait diffi cilement compatible avec le caractère expéditif de la procédure de retour, soit à rendre leurs décisions sans disposer de tous les éléments perti- nents, ce qui serait source d’insécurité juridique » (par 59). de même, l’approche axée sur l’enfant peut ouvrir la voie à une preuve contradictoire, y compris une preuve d’expert, concernant les liens de l’enfant avec le pays a et le pays b. à l’opposé, l’approche hybride permet au tribunal de rendre une ordonnance fondée sur la totalité de la preuve. plus particulièrement, voir dans l’intention des parents une considération parmi bien d’autres fait en sorte que le juge des requêtes [traduction] « n’est pas nécessairement tenu de tirer une conclusion défi ni- tive quant à savoir la version de quel parent est la bonne » (schuz, p 212). [64] l’approche hybride favorise également la dé- signation du for qui convient le plus. elle met l’ac- cent sur les liens factuels entre l’enfant et les pays en cause, ainsi que sur les circonstances du déména- gement, des considérations qui [traduction] « cor- respondent au critère du lien le plus étroit souvent utilisé pour déterminer le forum conveniens » (schuz, p 210). le tribunal peut ainsi statuer sur la garde et le droit de visite dans le ressort le plus approprié, à partir de la meilleure preuve possible (voir punter, par 187). l’approche hybride permet donc d’éviter que le tribunal décide que l’enfant a sa résidence ha- bituelle dans un pays avec lequel il a peu de liens ou n’en a pas (voir schuz, p 209-210). [65] finally, by focusing on the actual circum- stances of the child, the hybrid approach best pro- tects children from the harmful effects of wrongful removal or retention. unlike the parental intention approach and the child- centred approach, it allows [65] enfi n, parce qu’elle met l’accent sur la si- tuation réelle de l’enfant, l’approche hybride est la plus apte à protéger les enfants des effets nui- sibles d’un déplacement ou d’un non- retour illicite. contrairement à l’approche fondée sur l’intention [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 429 all relevant factors to be considered in a fact- based inquiry that does not rely on formulas or presump- tions: see redmond, at p 746. [66] there is no confl ict between the hybrid ap- proach and the “settled in” exception under arti- cle 12: see my colleagues’ reasons, at paras. 120-21 and 131-32. article 12 comes into play only after habitual residence is determined, and functions to provide a limited exception to the requirement that a child wrongfully removed or retained be returned to his or her habitual residence. it may be that on the hybrid approach habitual residence favours return of the child, but that the one- year period and settling in indicate that the child should not be uprooted and returned to his or her place of habitual residence. [67] nor does the hybrid approach “ignor[e] the fact that a child could develop genuine links to a new jurisdiction following a wrongful removal or retention”: my colleagues’ reasons, at para. 146; see also para 149. habitual residence is determined im- mediately prior to the wrongful removal or retention: see articles 3 and 4. subsequent links are relevant only to the exception under article 12. [68] in sum, the hybrid approach represents a prin- cipled advance on the parental intention and child- centred approaches. it recognizes that the child is the focus of the analysis, but acknowledges that it may be necessary to consider parental intention in order to properly assess the child’s connections to a country: see schuz, at p 192. it is an incremental response to the jurisprudence and the fact- based nature of the inquiry required by the hague convention. des parents et celle axée sur l’enfant, elle permet la prise en compte de tous les éléments pertinents dans le cadre d’un examen qui privilégie les données factuelles et ne s’en remet pas à l’application de for- mules ou de présomptions (voir redmond, p 746). [66] il n’y a pas de confl it entre l’approche hy- bride et l’exception que prévoit l’article 12 lorsque l’enfant « s’est intégré » dans son nouveau milieu (voir motifs de mes collègues, par. 120-121 et 131- 132). l’article 12 n’entre en jeu qu’une fois déter- miné le lieu de la résidence habituelle et prévoit une exception d’application restreinte à l’obligation d’ordonner le retour dans le pays de la résidence ha- bituelle d’un enfant déplacé ou retenu illicitement. il se peut que, suivant l’approche hybride, la résidence habituelle milite en faveur du retour de l’enfant, mais que l’écoulement d’une année ou plus et l’intégration justifi ent de ne pas déraciner l’enfant et de ne pas le renvoyer dans l’état de sa résidence habituelle. il est également erroné d’affi rmer que l’ap- [67] proche hybride « ne tient pas compte du fait que l’en fant pourrait établir des liens véritables avec le nouveau pays à la suite d’un déplacement ou d’un non- retour illicite » (motifs de mes collègues, par. 146; voir aussi par 149). la résidence habituelle de l’enfant est celle qu’il avait immédiatement avant son déplacement ou son non- retour illicite (voir ar- ticles 3 et 4). les liens établis subséquemment ne sont pertinents que pour l’application de l’exception prévue à l’article 12. [68] somme toute, l’approche hybride résulte d’une amélioration raisonnée de l’approche fondée sur l’in- tention des parents et de celle axée sur l’enfant. elle reconnaît que l’enfant est au centre de l’analyse, mais aussi qu’il peut être nécessaire de tenir compte de l’intention des parents afi n de bien apprécier les liens de l’enfant avec un pays (voir schuz, p 192). elle correspond à l’adaptation progressive à la ju- risprudence et à la nature foncièrement factuelle de l’examen que commande la convention de la haye. [69] in doing these things, the hybrid approach faces the shortcomings of the parental intention ap- proach directly and moves beyond them. the fact is that the parental intention approach is unable to [69] dès lors, l’approche hybride prend acte des failles de l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents directement et développe plus avant la dé- marche qui s’impose le fait est que l’approche 430 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. provide answers in all cases. courts using this ap- proach have admitted that in some circumstances — such as where parental intent is ambiguous or inconclusive — parental intent is not determinative, and they have considered objective factors connect- ing the child to the jurisdiction: see my colleagues’ reasons, at para. 116; gitter, at p. 134; punter, at para. 107; murphy v. sloan, 764 f.3d 1144 (9th cir. 2014), at p. 1152; rey v. getta, 2013 bcca 369, 342 bcac 30, at paras. 23 and 32-33. similarly, courts using the child- centred approach have rec- ognized that parental intention is a relevant factor: see redmond, at p. 746; feder, at p 224. the hy- brid approach simply acknowledges that absolute approaches to determining habitual residence under the hague convention do not work. [70] the reality is that every case is unique. the application judge charged with determining the child’s habitual residence should not be forced to make a blinkered decision that disregards consider- ations vital to the case under review. nor should an approach that tolerates manipulation be adopted. the application judge is best placed to weigh the factors that will achieve the objects of the hague convention in the case at hand. in the end, the best assurance of certainty lies in following the developing interna- tional jurisprudence that supports a multi- factored hybrid approach. fondée sur l’intention des parents ne permet pas de statuer dans tous les cas. des tribunaux y ayant recours reconnaissent que, parfois, cette intention n’est pas décisive (p ex lorsqu’elle est équivoque ou incertaine), si bien qu’ils tiennent compte d’élé- ments objectifs qui rattachent l’enfant au ressort (voir motifs de mes collègues, par.  116; gitter, p. 134; punter, par. 107; murphy c. sloan, 764 f.3d 1144 (9th cir. 2014), p. 1152; rey c. getta, 2013 bcca 369, 342 bcac 30, par. 23 et 32-33). de même, des tribunaux ayant recours à l’approche axée sur l’enfant reconnaissent l’importance de l’intention des parents (voir redmond, p. 746; feder, p 224). l’approche hybride reconnaît simplement que l’ap- plication d’une approche aux contours stricts pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle suivant la convention de la haye est vouée à l’échec. [70] dans les faits, chaque cas est unique. le juge des requêtes appelé à déterminer le lieu de la rési- dence habituelle de l’enfant ne devrait pas avoir à rendre une décision qui fait abstraction de considé- rations essentielles, comme s’il portait des œillères. il ne devrait pas non plus recourir à une approche qui admet l’exploitation de la convention de la haye. il est le mieux placé pour soupeser les éléments qui permettront d’atteindre les objectifs de celle-ci dans le dossier. en fi n de compte, la meilleure garantie de certitude réside dans l’adhésion à la jurisprudence internationale qui se fait jour et qui privilégie une approche hybride multifactorielle. [71] i conclude that the hybrid approach to habit- ual residence best conforms to the text, structure, and purpose of the hague convention. there is no reason to decline to follow the dominant trend in hague convention jurisprudence. the hybrid ap- proach should be adopted in canada. [71] je conclus que l’approche hybride de la rési- dence habituelle respecte le mieux le texte, la struc- ture et l’objet de la convention de la haye. rien ne justifi e le refus de suivre la jurisprudence dominante relative à l’application de celle-ci. l’approche hy- bride devrait être adoptée au canada. [72] i come to the question of whether under the hybrid approach, a child’s habitual residence can change while he or she is staying with one parent under the time- limited consent of the other. [72] je passe à la question de savoir si, au regard de l’approche hybride, le lieu de la résidence habi- tuelle peut changer pendant que l’enfant habite avec l’un de ses parents pour une durée précise, avec le consentement de l’autre. [73] applying the hybrid approach, the application judge considers the intention of the parents that the move would be temporary, and the reasons for that [73] suivant l’approche hybride, le juge des re- quêtes examine l’intention des parents que le dépla- cement soit temporaire et les raisons de leur accord. [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 431 agreement. but the judge also considers all other ev- idence relevant to the child’s habitual residence. the court must do so mindful of the risk of overlaying the factual concept of habitual residence with legal constructs like the idea that one parent cannot uni- laterally change a child’s habitual residence, or that a parent’s consent to a time- limited stay cannot shift the child’s habitual residence. the court must also avoid treating a time- limited consent agreement as a contract to be enforced by the court. such an agree- ment may be valuable as evidence of the parents’ intention, and parental intention may be relevant to determining habitual residence. but parents can- not contract out of the court’s duty, under canadian laws implementing the hague convention, to make factual determinations of the habitual residence of children at the time of their alleged wrongful reten- tion or removal. mais il tient également compte de tous les autres éléments de preuve pertinents pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant. il doit le faire en demeurant conscient du risque que comporte la superposition à la notion factuelle de résidence habituelle de constructions juridiques comme l’idée qu’un parent ne peut changer unilatéralement le lieu de la résidence habituelle d’un enfant ou que le consentement d’un parent à un séjour d’une durée limitée ne peut modifi er ce lieu. il doit en outre se garder de considérer pareil consentement comme un contrat dont le tribunal doit assurer l’exécution. un tel accord peut servir à prouver l’intention des pa- rents, et celle-ci peut être pertinente pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant. or, les parents ne peuvent convenir d’écarter l’obligation du tribunal, suivant les dispositions canadiennes de mise en vigueur de la convention de la haye, de tirer des conclusions de fait sur la résidence habituelle de l’enfant au moment du déplacement ou du non- retour illicite allégué. [74] as this appeal is moot, it is unnecessary to decide whether the application judge’s decision that the children were habitually resident in germany was properly upheld by the court of appeal. for the purposes of the next issue, i proceed on the assump- tion that the father established the requirements of article 3. [74] le pourvoi étant désormais théorique, point n’est besoin de décider si la cour d’appel confi rme à bon droit la décision de la juge des requêtes selon laquelle les enfants avaient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne. pour les besoins de la question exa- minée ci- après, je tiens pour acquis que le père a établi le respect des exigences prévues à l’article 3. e the child’s objection under article 13(2) of the e l’opposition de l’enfant suivant l’article 13(2) hague convention de la convention de la haye [75] the hague convention provides exceptions to the general rule that the child must be returned forthwith to the country of habitual residence if he or she has been wrongfully removed or retained and the application has been commenced within one year. one of these exceptions is article 13(2), which provides: [75] la convention de la haye prévoit des excep- tions à la règle générale voulant que l’enfant doive être renvoyé immédiatement dans le pays de sa rési- dence habituelle s’il a fait l’objet d’un déplacement ou d’un non- retour illicite et que la demande a été in- troduite dans un délai inférieur à un an. l’une de ces exceptions est prévue à l’article 13(2), qui dispose : the judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it fi nds that the child ob- jects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. l’autorité judiciaire ou administrative peut aussi re- fuser d’ordonner le retour de l’enfant si elle constate que celui-ci s’oppose à son retour et qu’il a atteint un âge et une maturité où il se révèle approprié de tenir compte de cette opinion. 432 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. [76] the exceptions to the rule that the child should be returned to the country of the child’s habitual residence are just that — exceptions. their elements must be established, and they do not confer a general discretion on the application judge to refuse to return the child. article 13(2) is an exception to the general rule that a wrongfully removed or retained child must be returned to her country of habitual residence, and it should not be read so broadly that it erodes the general rule: see pérez- vera, at p 434. this, how- ever, does not preclude a fact- based, common- sense approach to determining whether the elements of article 13(2) are established, as discussed below. [76] les exceptions à la règle générale voulant que doive être ordonné le retour de l’enfant dans le pays de sa résidence habituelle ne sont précisément que cela, des exceptions. les conditions de leur ap- plication doivent être réunies, et elles ne confèrent pas au juge des requêtes un pouvoir discrétionnaire général qui lui permet de refuser d’ordonner le retour de l’enfant. l’article 13(2) prévoit une exception à la règle générale selon laquelle l’enfant déplacé ou retenu illicitement doit être renvoyé dans le pays de sa résidence habituelle, et il ne faut pas l’interpréter si largement que le caractère général de la règle en soit compromis (voir pérez- vera, p 434). il demeure toutefois possible de recourir à une méthode axée sur les faits et sur le sens commun pour décider si les conditions énoncées à l’article 13(2) sont réunies. j’y reviendrai. [77] the application judge’s discretion to refuse to return the child to the country of habitual residence arises only if the party opposing return establishes that: (1) the child has reached an appropriate age and degree of maturity at which his or her views can be taken into account, and (2) the child objects to re- turn: see pérez- vera, at pp. 433 and 450; schuz, at p. 319; p. mceleavy, “evaluating the views of ab- ducted children: trends in appellate case- law” (2008), 20 cflq 230, at p. 232; de silva v. pitts, 2008 onca 9, 232 oac 180, at para. 42; thompson v. thompson, 2017 abca 299, at para. 16 (canlii); in re m (abduction: rights of custody), [2007] ukhl 55, [2008] 1 ac 1288, at para 46. [77] le pouvoir discrétionnaire qui permet au juge des requêtes de refuser d’ordonner le retour de l’en- fant dans le pays de sa résidence habituelle ne naît que si la personne qui s’oppose au retour établit (1) que l’enfant a atteint un âge et une maturité où il peut être tenu compte de son opinion et (2) qu’il s’oppose au retour (voir pérez- vera, p. 433 et 450; schuz, p. 319; p. mceleavy, « evaluating the views of abducted children : trends in appellate case- law » (2008), 20 cflq 230, p. 232; de silva c. pitts, 2008 onca 9, 252 oac 180, par. 42; thompson c. thompson, 2017 abca 299, par. 16 (canlii); in re m. (abduction : rights of custody), [2007] ukhl 55, [2008] 1 ac 1288, par 46). [78] although much ink has been spilled on pre- cisely what must be shown, it is telling that the hague convention does not specify particular requirements or procedures to establish suffi cient age and maturity and an objection. basically, it is for the application judge to determine, as a matter of fact, whether those elements are established. in most cases, the object of article 13(2) can be achieved by a single process in which the judge decides if the child possesses suffi cient age and maturity to make her evidence useful, decides if the child objects to return, and, if so, exercises his or her judicial discretion as to whether to return the child. [78] les éléments précis qu’il faut prouver ont certes fait couler beaucoup d’encre, mais il est ré- vélateur que la convention de la haye ne prévoit pas d’exigences ou de démarches particulières pour établir l’âge et la maturité voulus et l’opposition. il appartient foncièrement au juge des requêtes de décider à partir des faits si ces éléments sont établis. la plupart du temps, l’objectif de l’article 13(2) peut être atteint au moyen d’une seule mesure judiciaire qui consiste à décider s’il a un âge et une matu- rité qui rendent son témoignage utile, à décider s’il s’oppose au retour et, le cas échéant, à exercer le pouvoir discrétionnaire qui permet d’ordonner ou non son retour. [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 433 [79] determining suffi cient age and maturity in most cases is simply a matter of inference from the child’s demeanor, testimony, and circumstances: see thompson, at para. 17; england v. england, 234 f.3d 268 (5th cir. 2000), at pp. 273-74, per demoss j., dissenting; m fernando and n ross, “stifled voices: hearing children’s objections in hague child abduction convention cases in australia” (2018), 32 int’l jl. pol’y & fam. 93, at pp 102-3. in some cases, it may be appropriate to call expert evidence or have the child professionally examined: see rm v. js, 2013 abca 441, 566 ar 230, at paras. 25-26; greene, at pp 127-28. however, this should not be allowed to delay the proceedings. [79] dans la plupart des cas, le caractère suffi sant de l’âge et de la maturité s’infère simplement du comportement de l’enfant, de son témoignage et des circonstances qui lui sont propres (voir thompson, par. 17; england c. england, 234 f.3d 268 (5th cir. 2000), p. 273-274, le juge demoss, dissident; m. fernando et n. ross, « stiftled voices : hearing children’s objections in hague child abduction convention cases in australia » (2018), 32 int’l jl. pol’y & fam. 93, p 102-103). dans certains cas, le témoignage d’un expert ou l’examen de l’enfant par un spécialiste peut être indiqué (voir rm c. js, 2013 abca 441, 566 ar 230, par. 25-26; greene, p 127-128). cependant, de telles démarches ne doivent pas retarder le déroulement de l’instance. [80] as in the case of age and maturity, the child’s objection should be assessed in a straight- forward fashion — without the imposition of formal condi- tions or requirements not set out in the text of the hague convention. [80] comme pour l’âge et la maturité, le tribunal doit apprécier l’opposition purement et simplement, sans exiger le respect de conditions ou d’exigences de forme qui ne fi gurent pas dans la convention de la haye. [81] if the elements of (1) age and maturity and (2) objection are established, the application judge has a discretion as to whether to order the child re- turned, having regard to the “nature and strength of the child’s objections, the extent to which they are ‘authentically her own’ or the product of the infl u- ence of the abducting parent, the extent to which they coincide or are at odds with other considera- tions which are relevant to her welfare, as well as the general convention considerations”: in re m., at para 46. [81] lorsque les éléments que sont (1) l’âge et la maturité et (2) l’opposition sont établis, le juge des requêtes jouit d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire qui lui per- met d’ordonner ou non le retour de l’enfant eu égard à ce qui suit : [traduction] « les motifs pour lesquels l’enfant s’oppose au retour et la vigueur de cette oppo- sition, si ces motifs sont “vraiment les siens” ou sont invoqués sous l’infl uence du parent ravisseur, s’ils coïncident ou non avec d’autres considérations liées au bien- être de l’enfant, et les considérations générales qui sous- tendent la convention » (in re m., par 46). f delay f lenteur du système de justice [82] the time it took to bring this hague convention application to hearing and resolve the ensuing ap- peals was unacceptably long. in another context, this court has recently decried a culture of compla- cency towards delay within the justice system: see r v. jordan, 2016 scc 27, [2016] 1 scr 631, at para 4. complacency towards judicial delay is objectionable in all contexts, but some disputes can better tolerate it. hague convention cases cannot. [82] en l’espèce, le temps qui s’est écoulé avant que l’on entende la demande fondée sur la conven- tion de la haye et qu’il soit statué sur les appels interjetés subséquemment a été trop long. dans un autre contexte, la cour a récemment déploré une culture de complaisance à l’égard de la lenteur du système de justice (voir r c. jordan, 2016 csc 27, [2016] 1 rcs 631, par 4). pareille complaisance est toujours condamnable, mais certaines instances en souffrent moins que d’autres. ce n’est pas le cas de l’instance engagée sur le fondement de la conven- tion de la haye. 434 office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. [83] the fi rst object of the hague convention is the prompt return of children: see article 1(a). for this reason, contracting states are required, by article 2, to “use the most expeditious procedures available” to secure within their territories the implementation of the hague convention’s objects. [83] le premier objectif de la convention de la haye est le retour immédiat de l’enfant (voir article 1a)). c’est pourquoi, à l’article 2, les états contractants sont tenus de « recourir à leurs pro- cédures d’urgence » pour assurer, dans les limites de leur territoire, la réalisation des objectifs de la convention de la haye. [84] article 11 specifi cally requires the contracting states’ judicial authorities to “act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children”. responsi- bility for performing canada’s article 11 obligation falls to judges and court administrators. this is un- usual, but it is not unheard of. canada is a party to other treaties that depend, in part, on judicial action to ensure performance. [84] l’article 11 oblige expressément les autorités judiciaires des états contractants à « procéder d’ur- gence en vue du retour de l’enfant ». il appartient aux juges et aux administrateurs judiciaires de s’acquitter de l’obligation que l’article 11 fait au canada, ce qui est inhabituel, mais non sans précédent. le canada est signataire d’autres traités dont l’application re- pose en partie sur l’action judiciaire. [85] when international agreements come before the courts, performance of canada’s obligation to apply and interpret them according to the rules of treaty interpretation falls to canada’s judges. lord diplock made this point, in respect of united king- dom courts, in fothergill v. monarch airlines ltd., [1981] ac 251 (hl), at p. 283: [85] lorsqu’un tribunal canadien est saisi d’un litige sur l’application d’un accord international, il lui incombe de s’acquitter de l’obligation du canada d’appliquer et d’interpréter cet accord conformé- ment aux règles d’interprétation des traités. dans l’arrêt fothergill c. monarch airlines ltd., [1981] ac 251 (hl), p. 283, lord diplock fait la remarque suivante au sujet des tribunaux du royaume- uni : by ratifying the convention, her majesty’s government has undertaken an international obligation on behalf of the united kingdom to interpret future treaties in this manner and since under our constitution the function of interpret- ing the written law is an exercise of judicial power and rests with the courts of justice, that obligation assumed by the united kingdom falls to be performed by those courts. [traduction] en ratifi ant la convention, le gouvernement de sa majesté a contracté, au nom du royaume- uni, l’obligation internationale d’interpréter ainsi les traités futurs, et puisque, selon notre constitution, l’interprétation du droit écrit constitue un exercice du pouvoir judiciaire et relève des cours de justice, celles-ci doivent s’acquitter de cette obligation du royaume- uni. [86] zingre v. the queen, [1981] 2 scr 392, is another example. the central question was whether the court should make an evidentiary order in fa- vour of swiss investigators acting under a swiss- british extradition treaty binding on canada. justice dickson (as he then was), at p. 409, noted that by granting the order the court would ensure canada’s performance of its treaty obligation to switzerland: [86] l’arrêt zingre c. la reine, [1981] 2 rcs. 392, offre un autre exemple. dans cette affaire, il s’agissait principalement de décider si la cour devait rendre une ordonnance en matière de preuve au bé- néfi ce d’enquêteurs suisses qui se réclamaient d’un traité d’extradition anglo- suisse liant le canada. le juge dickson (plus tard juge en chef) souligne à la p. 409 que, en rendant l’ordonnance, la cour ferait en sorte que le canada s’acquitte de son obligation envers la suisse suivant le traité : the argument in favour of granting the order in the case at bar does not rest merely on the notion of “comity”. it rests on treaty. in responding affi rmatively to the request which has been made the court will be recognizing and giving l’argument en faveur de l’octroi de l’ordonnance en l’espèce ne repose pas seulement sur la notion de la « courtoisie ». il se fonde sur un traité. en répondant par l’affi rmative à la demande, la cour reconnaîtra et [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev la juge en chef 435 effect to a duty to which canada is subject, by treaty, under international law. [emphasis added.] appliquera une obligation qui incombe au canada en droit international, en vertu d’un traité. [je souligne.] [87] so it was up to the judicial authorities in this case to ensure canada lived up to its obligation to act expeditiously. i am doubtful that we did so. while each of the three ontario courts involved in the pro- cess gave their judgments quickly, the proceeding still moved too slowly. the key steps in this proceed- ing, and ensuing delays, were as follows: [87] ainsi, en l’espèce, il appartenait aux autorités judiciaires de faire en sorte que le canada s’acquitte de son obligation d’agir sans tarder. je doute qu’elles l’aient fait. les trois tribunaux ontariens saisis ont certes rendu jugement rapidement, mais les instances se sont déroulées encore trop lentement. voici les principales étapes de l’instance et le temps écoulé correspondant : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 26 june  2014: the father commences his hague convention proceeding by applica- tion in the ontario superior court of justice at st. catharines. this was about six weeks before august 15, 2014, when the father’s time- limited consent ended. 9 march  2015: the application comes on for hearing before macpherson j., a delay of nearly seven months after the expiry of the consent agreement. the application judge attributes this delay to the father’s decision to proceed in germany despite having com- menced (and not discontinued) in ontario. 21 april 2015: the application is heard for a second day to consider submissions on whether the court should order the appoint- ment of the offi ce of the children’s lawyer. the court did so, requiring that the ocl act on an expedited basis to provide evidence as to the children’s objections to returning to germany. 7 august 2015: the ocl fi les evidence in the proceeding, now nearly one year after the expiry of the consent period. 27 august 2015: three days after the third and fi nal day of the hearing, macpherson j. orders the children’s return to germany with reasons for judgment. 30 november 2015: the divisional court hears the mother’s appeal, three months after macpherson j.’s order. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 26 juin 2014 : le père saisit de sa demande fondée sur la convention de la  haye la cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario, à st.  catharines, soit environ six semaines avant le 15 août, date à laquelle prenait fi n la période visée par son consentement. 9 mars 2015 : la demande est entendue par la juge macpherson, soit presque sept mois après l’expiration de la période visée par le consentement. la juge des requêtes attribue ce retard à la décision du père de saisir les tribunaux allemands même s’il avait engagé une instance (dont il ne s’était pas désisté) en ontario. 21 avril 2015 : le tribunal siège une deu- xième journée pour entendre les parties sur l’opportunité de désigner le bae pour dé- fendre les intérêts des enfants. le tribunal juge la mesure opportune et exige du bae qu’il présente sans tarder ses éléments de preuve concernant l’opposition des enfants à leur retour en allemagne. 7 août 2015 : le bae dépose sa preuve, soit alors presque un an après l’expiration de la période visée par le consentement. 27  août  2015  : trois jours après le troi- sième et dernier jour de l’audience, la juge macpherson ordonne le retour des enfants en allemagne, motifs à l’appui. 30 novembre 2015 : la cour divisionnaire en- tend l’appel de la mère, soit presque trois mois après l’ordonnance de la juge macpherson. 436 (7) (8) (9) office of the children’s lawyer v balev the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. 5 january 2016: the divisional court allows the appeal from macpherson j.’s order. 31 august 2016: the court of appeal for ontario hears the father’s appeal from the decision of the divisional court. over two years have now passed since the expiry of the father’s time- limited consent. 13 september 2016: the court of appeal al- lows the appeal and restores macpherson j.’s order. the court of appeal notes (at para. 82) that by this time the children have already been in ontario for more than three years and “moving them back to germany is likely to be diffi cult”. (7) (8) (9) 5 janvier 2016 : la cour divisionnaire ac- cueille l’appel visant l’ordonnance de la juge macpherson. 31 août 2016 : la cour d’appel de l’onta- rio entend l’appel du père à l’encontre de la décision de la cour divisionnaire, soit plus de deux ans après l’expiration de la période visée par le consentement. 13  septembre  2016  : la cour d’appel ac- cueille l’appel et rétablit l’ordonnance de la juge macpherson. elle souligne (au par. 82 de ses motifs) que les enfants se trouvent alors déjà en ontario, depuis plus de trois ans, et que [traduction] « les renvoyer en allemagne risque d’être diffi cile ». (10) 14 october 2016: the ocl fi les a notice of application for leave to appeal to this court and a stay of execution of the court of ap- peal’s order. the ocl also applies to the court of appeal for a stay. benotto ja of the court of appeal dismisses the application in that court. justice moldaver dismisses the stay application in this court. (10) 14 octobre 2016 : le bae dépose à la cour un avis de demande d’autorisation d’appel ac- compagnée d’une demande de sursis à l’exé- cution de l’ordonnance de la cour d’appel. il demande également un sursis à la cour d’appel, qui le déboute par la voix du juge benotto. le juge moldaver rejette la demande de sursis au nom de la cour. (11) 15 october 2016: the children return to ger- many, 26 months after the expiry of the fa- ther’s time- limited consent. (11) 15  octobre  2016  : les enfants rentrent en allemagne, soit 26 mois après l’expiration de la période visée par le consentement. (12) 27 april 2017: this court grants the ocl’s application for leave to appeal, over six months after it was fi led. (12) 27 avril 2017 : la cour accueille la demande d’autorisation d’appel du bae, soit plus de six mois après son dépôt. (13) 1 may 2017: having learned the appeal may be moot, the court seeks submission from the parties. (13) 1er mai 2017 : après avoir appris que le pour- voi risquait d’être théorique, la cour demande aux parties de formuler des observations. (14) 9 november 2017: at the hearing of the ap- peal in this court, all parties acknowledged, by this point, that the appeal would have no bearing on the residence of the children. (14) 9 novembre 2017 : à l’audition du pourvoi par la cour, toutes les parties reconnaissent que l’issue du pourvoi n’aura aucune inci- dence sur la résidence des enfants. [88] despite the quick work of all the judges be- low in deciding the case before them and releasing reasons for their decisions, this proceeding was un- acceptably delayed. the hardship and anxiety that such delays impose on children are exactly what the hague convention’s contracting parties sought to [88] même si les juges de toutes les juridictions inférieures se sont efforcés de statuer et de rendre leurs motifs rapidement, le dénouement de l’instance a été retardé de manière inacceptable. ce sont préci- sément les diffi cultés et l’anxiété que peuvent causer de tels retards à un enfant que les états signataires [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 437 prevent by insisting on prompt return and expeditious procedures. in light of this appeal, this court has taken [89] steps to ensure that hague convention cases are fl agged internally and expedited by our registry. i hope other canadian courts will consider what further steps they can take to ensure that hague convention proceedings are determined using the most expeditious procedures available. judges seized of hague convention applications should not hesi- tate to use their authority to expedite proceedings in the interest of the children involved. unlike much civil litigation in canada, hague convention pro- ceedings should be judge- led, not party- driven, to ensure they are determined expeditiously. de la convention de la haye ont voulu prévenir en privilégiant le retour immédiat et le recours à des procédures d’urgence. [89] dans la foulée du présent pourvoi, la cour a pris des mesures afi n que les dossiers relatifs à la convention de la haye soient repérés rapidement et traités sans tarder par son greffe. j’ose espérer que les autres cours de justice du pays examineront les mesures qu’elles pourraient prendre par ailleurs pour faire en sorte que les instances fondées sur la convention de la haye soient tranchées en appli- cation de leurs procédures d’urgence. le juge saisi d’une demande fondée sur la convention de la haye ne devrait pas hésiter à exercer son pouvoir pour accélérer le déroulement de l’instance dans l’intérêt de l’enfant en cause. contrairement à la conduite de bien des instances civiles au canada, celle d’une instance fondée sur la convention de la haye de- vrait relever du juge et non des parties de manière à assurer la rapidité du déroulement. iv conclusion iv conclusion [90] this court adopts the hybrid approach to de- termining habitual residence under article 3 of the hague convention, and a non- technical approach to considering the child’s objection under article 13(2). [90] la cour adopte l’approche hybride pour dé- terminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant suivant l’article 3 de la convention de la haye et une approche non technique pour se prononcer sur l’opposition de l’enfant suivant l’article 13(2). [91] the children were returned to germany, and the german courts granted the mother custody. the children are now living with their mother in canada, and there are no outstanding legal issues. there will be no award of costs. [91] les enfants sont rentrés en allemagne, et les tribunaux allemands ont accordé leur garde à la mère, si bien qu’ils vivent désormais avec elle au canada et qu’il n’y a plus de litige à trancher. aucuns dépens ne sont adjugés. the reasons of moldaver, côté and rowe jj. were version française des motifs des juges moldaver, delivered by côté et rowe rendus par côté and rowe jj. (dissenting) — les juges côté et rowe (dissidents) — i overview i aperçu [92] the convention on the civil aspects of in- ternational child abduction, can. ts 1983. no. 35 (“hague convention” or “convention”), establishes an international legal framework that aims to deter the abduction of children across state borders. in [92] la convention sur les aspects civils de l’enlè- vement international d’enfants, rt. can. 1983 no 35 (« convention de la haye » ou « convention »), établit un cadre juridique international pour prévenir l’enlèvement transfrontière d’enfants. dans certaines 438 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. certain circumstances, it requires courts to order the return of a child to another country, if the child was “wrongfully removed or retained” in a different jurisdiction. this analysis turns, in part, on where the child was “habitually resident” at the time of the alleged removal or retention. the meaning of habitual residence in article 3 of the convention is the central issue in this appeal. [93] the father, one of the respondents, fi led an application under the convention seeking to have his two children returned from canada to germany. in his view, their mother wrongfully retained the children in canada by refusing to return them to germany after the expiry of the father’s letter of consent, which permitted the children to travel to and live in canada with their mother for a period of roughly 16 months. circonstances, elle impose au tribunal d’ordonner le retour d’un enfant dans son pays lorsque ce dernier a été « déplacé ou retenu illicitement » dans un pays différent. l’issue de l’analyse repose en partie sur le lieu où l’enfant « avait sa résidence habituelle » au moment où il aurait été déplacé ou retenu. la signi- fi cation de la résidence habituelle dont fait mention l’article 3 de la convention est au cœur du présent pourvoi. [93] l’un des intimés, le père, a demandé le retour de ses deux enfants du canada vers l’allemagne en application de la convention. il a fait valoir que leur mère les avait retenus illicitement au canada en refusant de les renvoyer en allemagne à l’expiration du consentement du père attesté par lettre, lequel per- mettait aux enfants de se rendre et de vivre au canada avec leur mère pour une période d’environ 16 mois. [94] the application judge found that the children were habitually resident in germany at the time of their retention in canada and ordered their return to germany (2015 onsc 5383). the divisional court allowed the mother’s appeal, concluding that the children’s habitual residence had changed to canada during their stay (2016 onsc 55, 344 oac 159). the court of appeal for ontario restored the order of the application judge, fi nding that the children’s habitual residence did not change from germany during their stay in canada pursuant to the father’s time- limited consent (2016 onca 680, 133 or. (3d) 735). [94] la juge des requêtes a conclu que les enfants avaient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne au moment de leur rétention au canada et a ordonné leur retour en allemagne (2015 onsc 5383). la cour divisionnaire a accueilli l’appel de la mère et conclu que la résidence habituelle des enfants avait changé pour le canada durant leur séjour (2016 onsc 55, 344 oac 159). la cour d’appel de l’ontario a rétabli l’ordonnance de la juge des requêtes au motif que la résidence habituelle des enfants en allemagne n’avait pas changé pendant le séjour d’une durée li- mitée au canada auquel avait consenti le père (2016 onca 680, 133 or (3d) 735). [95] we agree with the court of appeal. in our view, the children were habitually resident in ger- many at the time of the alleged wrongful retention in canada because there was no shared parental intent for canada to become the children’s habitual resi- dence. to the contrary, the father’s consent permit- ting the children to travel to and live in canada was expressly time limited. therefore, we would dismiss the appeal. [95] nous sommes d’accord avec la cour d’ap- pel. selon nous, les enfants avaient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne au moment où ils auraient été retenus illicitement au canada, car il n’y avait pas d’intention commune des parents de faire du canada le lieu de la résidence habituelle des enfants. au contraire, le consentement du père à ce que les enfants séjournent au canada visait une période ex- pressément limitée. nous sommes donc d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 439 ii facts ii faits [96] the mother and father were married in on- tario in 2000 and moved to germany in 2001. their two children were both born in germany — in 2002 and 2005, respectively. in 2011, the parents separated and the father was granted interim custody of the children. [96] la mère et le père se sont mariés en ontario en 2000 et ont déménagé en allemagne en 2001. leurs deux enfants sont nés en allemagne en 2002 et en 2005, respectivement. en 2011, les époux se sont séparés et le père a obtenu la garde intérimaire des enfants. [97] by september  2012, the parents had reu- nited, and the family once again lived together until april 2013. at that point, the children were experi- encing diffi culties in school. these academic trou- bles were, at least in part, what prompted the move to canada. the father, who remained in germany, signed a letter of consent permitting the children to travel to and live in canada with their mother un- til august 15, 2014. he also signed a notarized let- ter temporarily transferring custody to the mother, so that the children could be enrolled in school. the father characterized the move as an “educational exchange” opportunity that would allow the chil- dren to spend the 2013- 2014 school year in canada. both children moved to canada with their mother in april 2013 pursuant to this mutually agreed- upon arrangement. [98] the father revoked his consent in march 2014, fi ve months before it was set to expire. he subse- quently commenced a hague convention proceeding in ontario. the ontario proceedings were delayed for approximately 10 months while he sought relief in germany — in particular, a custody application (which was dismissed on the basis that the german courts lacked jurisdiction while the children were living in canada) and a hague convention petition (which he eventually withdrew at the suggestion of the german court). [97] en septembre 2012, les parents ont repris la vie commune et la famille a de nouveau vécu en- semble jusqu’en avril 2013. les enfants éprouvaient alors des diffi cultés à l’école, ce qui est à l’origine, du moins en partie, de leur séjour au canada. comme il allait demeurer en allemagne, le père a signé une lettre dans laquelle il consentait à ce que les enfants se rendent au canada et y vivent avec leur mère jusqu’au 15 août 2014. il a également signé une lettre devant notaire dans laquelle il transférait tem- porairement la garde à la mère afi n que les enfants puissent être inscrits à l’école. le père voyait le sé- jour comme un [traduction] « échange étudiant » qui permettrait aux enfants de passer l’année scolaire 2013-2014 au canada. les deux enfants ont quitté l’allemagne à destination du canada avec leur mère en avril 2013, conformément à l’entente intervenue entre leurs parents. [98] le père a révoqué son consentement en mars 2014, soit cinq mois avant l’expiration de la période convenue. il a ensuite engagé en ontario une instance fondée sur la convention de la haye. le déroule- ment de l’instance ontarienne a été retardé d’environ 10 mois tandis qu’il saisissait les tribunaux d’alle- magne, notamment d’une demande de garde (qui a été rejetée au motif que les tribunaux allemands n’avaient pas compétence pendant que les enfants vivaient au canada), et d’une demande fondée sur la convention de la haye (dont il s’est fi nalement désisté à l’instigation des tribunaux allemands). [99] after the ontario proceedings and subsequent appeals concluded — with the court of appeal re- instating the application judge’s return order — the children returned to germany in october 2016. cus- tody proceedings then took place in germany, where the family court granted the mother sole custody in december 2016. the children returned to canada to [99] après le dénouement des procédures onta- riennes, y compris les appels interjetés — la cour d’appel ayant rétabli l’ordonnance de retour de la juge des requêtes —, les enfants sont rentrés en al- lemagne en octobre 2016. une procédure relative à la garde des enfants a été entreprise en allemagne devant le tribunal de la famille, lequel a accordé la 440 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. live with their mother in april 2017. as the children now live in canada under the exclusive custody of their mother, this appeal is moot. the court agreed to hear this case to resolve the important question of how habitual residence should be determined in subsequent hague convention proceedings. garde exclusive à la mère en décembre 2016. les enfants sont revenus au canada pour y vivre avec leur mère en avril 2017. étant donné que les enfants vivent désormais au canada et que leur mère s’est vu accorder leur garde exclusive, le présent pourvoi est théorique. la cour a cependant accepté d’entendre l’affaire afi n de statuer sur l’importante question concernant la démarche à suivre pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle dans une instance fondée sur la convention de la haye. iii the hague convention iii la convention de la haye [100] the hague convention was adopted in re- sponse to the problem of international parental child abduction, which became a growing concern by the mid- 1970s. it provides a mechanism for courts in one country to order the return of a child to another country where it fi nds that the child was wrongfully removed or retained. the concept of habitual resi- dence is central to this framework. [100] la convention de la haye a été adoptée afi n de contrer le problème de l’enlèvement international d’enfant par l’un des parents, un problème qui a pris de l’ampleur au milieu des années 1970. elle pré- voit un mécanisme qui permet au tribunal d’un pays d’ordonner le retour d’un enfant dans un autre pays lorsqu’il estime que l’enfant a été déplacé ou retenu illicitement. la notion de résidence habituelle est au cœur de ce cadre d’analyse. [101] article 12 of the convention contains the return provision that authorizes a court to issue a return order. it states: [101] l’article 12 de la convention, qui porte sur le retour, autorise le tribunal à ordonner cette mesure. en voici le libellé : where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the contracting state where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. lorsqu’un enfant a été déplacé ou retenu illicitement au sens de l’article 3 et qu’une période de moins d’un an s’est écoulée à partir du déplacement ou du non- retour au moment de l’introduction de la demande devant l’auto- rité judiciaire ou administrative de l’état contractant où se trouve l’enfant, l’autorité saisie ordonne son retour immédiat. the judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expira- tion of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. l’autorité judiciaire ou administrative, même saisie après l’expiration de la période d’un an prévue à l’alinéa précédent, doit aussi ordonner le retour de l’enfant, à moins qu’il ne soit établi que l’enfant s’est intégré dans son nouveau milieu. where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested state has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another state, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child. lorsque l’autorité judiciaire ou administrative de l’état requis a des raisons de croire que l’enfant a été emmené dans un autre état, elle peut suspendre la procédure ou rejeter la demande de retour de l’enfant. [102] article  3 of the convention defines the circumstances in which a removal or retention is [102] l’article 3 de la convention précise les cir- constances dans lesquelles le déplacement ou le [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 441 wrongful, thereby triggering the return mechanism in article 12: non- retour est illicite, enclenchant ainsi le méca- nisme de retour prévu à l’article 12 : the removal or the retention of a child is to be consid- le déplacement ou le non- retour d’un enfant est consi- ered wrongful where: déré comme illicite : (a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the state in which the child was habitually resident immedi- ately before the removal or retention; and (b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. the rights of custody mentioned in sub- paragraph (a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by rea- son of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that state. [103] under these provisions, courts presented with return applications pursuant to article 12 must perform a two- step analysis. the fi rst step is to de- termine the child’s habitual residence immediately before the wrongful removal or retention. if the child was removed from his or her habitual residence or retained in another country by one parent in breach of the other parent’s custody rights, then that removal or retention is deemed to be wrongful under article 3. this triggers the return provision in article 12. a) b) lorsqu’il a lieu en violation d’un droit de garde, attribué à une personne, une institution ou tout autre organisme, seul ou conjointement, par le droit de l’état dans lequel l’enfant avait sa rési- dence habituelle immédiatement avant son dépla- cement ou son non- retour; et que ce droit était exercé de façon effective seul ou conjointement, au moment du déplacement ou du non- retour, ou l’eût été si de tels événements n’étaient survenus. le droit de garde visé en a) peut notamment résulter d’une attribution de plein droit, d’une décision judiciaire ou administrative, ou d’un accord en vigueur selon le droit de cet état. [103] suivant ces dispositions, le tribunal saisi d’une demande de retour fondée sur l’article 12 doit se livrer à une analyse en deux étapes. la première consiste à déterminer le lieu de la résidence habi- tuelle de l’enfant immédiatement avant son dépla- cement ou son non- retour illicite. si l’enfant a été déplacé du lieu de sa résidence habituelle ou retenu dans un autre pays par l’un des parents en violation du droit de garde de l’autre, ce déplacement ou ce non- retour est réputé illicite suivant l’article 3, ce qui enclenche le mécanisme de retour prévu à l’ar- ticle 12. [104] the second step is to determine whether an exception to the return order applies, such that the child should not be returned to his or her habitual residence. three articles of the convention contain exceptions. first, article 12 provides that if one year or more has passed since the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the court can consider whether the child “is now settled in its new environment”, in which case the court has discretion to refuse to make the order. there is no dispute that this exception does not apply here because the father brought his application within one year of the alleged wrongful [104] à la deuxième étape, le tribunal se demande si une exception s’applique, de sorte que l’enfant ne devrait pas être renvoyé dans le lieu de sa résidence habituelle. trois articles de la convention prévoient des exceptions. premièrement, l’article 12 dispose que lorsqu’un an ou plus s’est écoulé depuis le dé- placement ou le non- retour illicite, le tribunal peut examiner si l’enfant « s’est intégré dans son nou- veau milieu », auquel cas il a discrétion pour refuser d’ordonner le retour. il n’est pas contesté que cette exception ne s’applique pas en l’espèce, car le père a présenté sa demande moins d’une année après le 442 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. retention — namely, following the expiration of his time- limited consent on august 15, 2014. non- retour illicite allégué, soit après l’expiration de la durée de son consentement limité (le 15 août 2014). [105] second, article 13 provides that, notwith- standing article 12, certain other exceptions may warrant a refusal of a return order. these exceptions are: where the parent left behind has consented to, or acquiesced in, the child’s removal or retention; where there is a grave risk that return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or oth- erwise place the child in an intolerable situation; or where the child objects to return and is of an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his or her views. [105] deuxièmement, l’article 13 prévoit que, no- nobstant l’article 12, d’autres exceptions peuvent justifi er le refus d’ordonner le retour. ces exceptions sont les suivantes : le parent laissé derrière a consenti ou acquiescé au déplacement ou au non- retour de l’enfant; il existe un risque grave que le retour de l’enfant l’expose à un danger physique ou psychique ou de toute autre manière le place dans une situation intolérable; l’enfant s’oppose à son retour et a atteint un âge et une maturité où il est approprié de tenir compte de son opinion. [106] finally, article 20 provides a further excep- tion where the child’s return would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested state relating to the protection of human rights and fun- damental freedoms. [106] enfi n, l’article 20 prévoit une exception dans le cas où le retour de l’enfant ne serait pas permis par les principes fondamentaux de l’état requis re- lativement à la sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et aux libertés fondamentales. [107] any of these exceptions could apply only after a court has made an initial determination as to where the child was habitually resident at the time of the removal or retention. this approach is sensible: if the child was not habitually resident in the country to which the petitioner is seeking a return order, there is no need to consider whether any exception applies as no return order will be made. [108] the central dispute in this appeal is at the fi rst step of the analysis: deciding where the children are habitually resident under article 3 (for purposes of determining whether to issue a return order under article 12). [107] chacune de ces exceptions peut seulement s’appliquer après qu’une cour de justice a d’abord décidé où l’enfant avait sa résidence habituelle au moment du déplacement ou du non- retour. cette démarche tombe sous le sens : si l’enfant n’avait pas sa résidence habituelle dans le pays visé par la demande d’ordonnance de retour, point n’est besoin de se prononcer sur l’application d’une exception, car aucune ordonnance de retour ne sera rendue. [108] dans la présente affaire, la principale ques- tion en litige se pose à la première étape de l’analyse : où les enfants avaient- ils leur résidence habituelle pour les besoins de l’article 3 (afi n de décider s’il y a lieu ou non d’ordonner le retour en vertu de l’ar- ticle 12)? iv habitual residence under article 3 iv la résidence habituelle suivant l’article 3 [109] three approaches have emerged in inter- national jurisprudence for determining habitual residence, which the majority defi nes as follows: the parental intention approach, which “determines the habitual residence of a child by the intention of the parents with the right to determine where the child lives” (para. 40); the child- centred approach, which “determines a child’s habitual residence [109] trois approches se dégagent de la jurispru- dence internationale quant à la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle, et les juges majoritaires les défi nissent comme suit : l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents, qui « permet de déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant à partir de l’intention des parents habilités à décider du lieu où vit l’enfant » (par. 40); l’approche axée sur l’enfant, [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 443 under article 3 by the child’s acclimatization in a given country, rendering the intentions of the par- ents largely irrelevant” (para. 41); and the hybrid approach, in which the application judge “must look to all relevant considerations” in order to “de- termin[e] the focal point of the child’s life — ‘the family and social environment in which its life has developed’ — immediately prior to the removal or retention” (paras 42-43). [110] in our view, habitual residence should be as- certained via the parental intention approach. in ap- plying this approach to most cases, the determination of habitual residence will turn on a straightforward question: where did the parents last mutually intend for the child to be habitually resident?4 where the evidence allows the court to answer this question, the determination of habitual residence ends there. this approach focuses on the intentions of the parents as the key element in the analysis, not the strength of the relevant contacts between the child and the competing jurisdictions. [111] the majority agrees that parental intent must play some role in the habitual residence analysis, at least in some subset of cases. by adopting the hybrid approach, however, the majority dilutes the importance of parental intent as the primary varia- ble in favor of a multi- factor test. the result, in our respectful view, is an unprincipled and open- ended approach — untethered from the text, structure, and purpose of the convention — that creates a recipe for litigation. in what follows, we set out the merits of the parental intention approach, assess the risks and weaknesses inherent in the hybrid approach, and apply the correct approach based on parental intention to determine habitual residence in this case. suivant laquelle « le lieu de la résidence habituelle est déterminé, pour l’application de l’article 3, en fonction de l’acclimatation de l’enfant dans le pays, de sorte que l’intention des parents n’importe pas vraiment » (par. 41); l’approche hybride, suivant laquelle le juge des requêtes doit « se penche[r] sur toutes les considérations pertinentes » afi n de « dé- termine[r] quel était le point de fuite de la vie de l’enfant, soit “l’environnement familial et social dans lequel sa vie se déroulait”, immédiatement avant le déplacement ou le non- retour » (par 42-43). [110] à notre avis, c’est l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents qui doit présider à la détermi- nation du lieu de la résidence habituelle. lorsque l’on applique cette approche dans la plupart des cas, la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle com- mande une question simple : quelle a été la dernière intention commune des parents quant au lieu où l’en- fant aurait sa résidence habituelle4? lorsque la preuve permet au tribunal de répondre à cette question, la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle s’ar- rête là. suivant cette approche, l’intention des parents importe davantage que la solidité des liens pertinents entre l’enfant et chacun des pays concurrents. [111] les juges majoritaires conviennent que l’in- tention des parents doit jouer un certain rôle dans la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle, du moins dans certains cas. cependant, en optant pour l’approche hybride, ils font de l’intention des parents un simple élément parmi d’autres. en tout respect, il en résulte une approche non raisonnée et non balisée qui ne prend appui ni sur le texte de la convention, ni sur sa structure, ni sur son objet. à notre avis, cette approche constitue une recette parfaite pour entraîner des litiges. ci- après, nous examinons les avantages de l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents, nous examinons les risques et les faiblesses de l’approche hybride et nous appliquons la bonne approche, celle fondée sur l’intention des parents, pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle des enfants en l’espèce. 4 although we use the term “parents” as shorthand in the context of this case, the relevant inquiry focuses on the intentions of the persons with “the right to determine the child’s place of residence” (hague convention, article 5) — which may be, for example, a child’s legal guardians rather than biological parents. 4 même si, pour simplifi er, nous employons le terme « parents » dans les présents motifs, l’analyse doit porter sur l’intention des personnes qui ont « le droit [  ] de décider [du] lieu de résidence [de l’enfant] » (convention de la haye, article 5). il peut par exemple s’agir des tuteurs légaux au lieu des parents biologiques. 444 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. a the parental intention approach a l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents [112] the parental intention approach determines habitual residence with reference to the intentions of the child’s custodial parents. the central focus of this inquiry, in most cases, will be the last mutually shared intent of the parents (or of the persons entitled to fi x the child’s residence) as to where the child was to be habitually resident. in the most common scenario, where a child has spent most of his or her life in one jurisdiction and then moves to another, a court must ascertain whether both parents intended for the new jurisdiction to become the child’s ha- bitual residence, or whether the intent was for the stay to be temporary. if only one parent intends for the move to be permanent, the prior jurisdiction re- mains the child’s habitual residence. if both parents intend for the move to be permanent, and the child does subsequently move to the new jurisdiction, the child’s habitual residence has changed. [113] in looking to objective evidence of shared parental intent, courts should consider the expressed intentions of both parents. if the parents have agreed in writing that the move to the new jurisdiction is meant to be temporary, then that agreement should be given decisive weight. beyond expressed inten- tions, however, courts may “look at actions as well as declarations” (koch v. koch, 450 f.3d 703 (7th cir. 2006), at p 715). for example, if a mother trav- els with her child to a new country, holding only a temporary visitor’s visa and taking few of her be- longings with her, such evidence would be probative of a lack of intent for the new jurisdiction to become child’s habitual residence (see, eg,. delvoye v. lee, 329 f.3d 330 (3rd cir. 2003), at p 334). conversely, if a family takes all of their belongings with them and sells their home in the fi rst jurisdiction, such evidence would tend to support the opposite conclu- sion. evidence of this nature can offer insight where the parties’ statements or expressed intentions do not point to a clear answer. [112] suivant l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents, le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant est déterminé en fonction de l’intention des parents qui en ont la garde. dans la plupart des cas, le point central de l’analyse sera la dernière intention commune des parents (ou des personnes habilitées à décider du lieu de résidence de l’enfant) pour savoir où résidait habituellement l’enfant. le plus souvent, lorsque l’enfant a passé la plus grande partie de sa vie dans un pays pour ensuite déménager dans un autre, le tribunal doit examiner si les deux parents ont voulu que le nouveau pays devienne le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant ou que le séjour soit temporaire. si un seul des parents a voulu que le séjour soit permanent, le pays initial demeure le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant. lorsque les deux parents ont voulu que le séjour soit permanent et que l’enfant a ensuite déménagé dans le nouveau pays, ce dernier est devenu le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant. [113] dans son examen de la preuve objective de l’intention commune des parents, le tribunal doit tenir compte de l’intention exprimée par les deux parents. lorsque ces derniers ont convenu par écrit que le séjour dans le nouveau pays serait temporaire, cette entente doit se voir accorder un poids déci- sif. cependant, au- delà des intentions exprimées, le tribunal peut [traduction] « examiner tant les actes que les déclarations » (koch c. koch, 450 f.3d 703 (7th cir. 2006), p 715). par exemple, la preuve selon laquelle une mère s’est rendue à l’étranger avec son enfant munie d’un visa de visiteur temporaire en emportant seulement quelques effets personnels établirait l’absence d’intention que le nouveau pays devienne le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’en- fant (voir p ex delvoye c. lee, 329 f.3d 330 (3rd cir. 2003), p 334). à l’inverse, la preuve selon la- quelle une famille a emporté tous ses effets person- nels et vendu sa maison dans le premier pays tendrait à étayer la conclusion contraire. de tels éléments de preuve peuvent se révéler éclairants lorsque les déclarations des parties ou les intentions qu’elles ont exprimées n’apportent pas de réponse claire. [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 445 [114] where shared parental intent is made explicit in an agreement, or is otherwise clear from the evi- dence before the application judge, it should be de- terminative of habitual residence, absent exceptional circumstances. one such circumstance was raised by sharpe ja in the court below: “   where a con- sensual time- limited stay is so long that it becomes time- limited in name only and the child’s habitual residence has changed” (ca reasons, at para 49). in such cases, where a purportedly time- limited stay in a foreign jurisdiction has stretched on for many years, it may not be realistic to say that the parents still intend for the child to be habitually resident in the fi rst jurisdiction (see mozes v. mozes, 239 f.3d 1067 (9th cir. 2001), at pp 1075-76). [115] this accords with the approach of some american courts, which recognize a narrow excep- tion for where the evidence “unequivocally points to the conclusion that the child has acclimatized to the new location” (gitter v. gitter, 396 f.3d 124 (2nd cir. 2005), at p. 134; see also mozes, at p 1081). such cases are rare and require evidence of more than simply “settling in” to a new location in or- der for shared parental intent to be disregarded (see r. schuz, the hague child abduction convention: a critical analysis (2013), at p. 189, fn 104). [116] in most cases, evidence of parental intent — such as an explicit agreement between both cus- todial parents — will be suffi cient to establish ha- bitual residence. however, where evidence of shared parental intent is inconclusive, courts may then look to other objective evidence to determine the habitual residence of the child. this aligns with how other courts have applied the parental intention approach (see, eg,. murphy v. sloan, 764 f.3d 1144 (9th cir. 2014), at p. 1152; rey v. getta, 2013 bcca 369, 342 bcac 30, at para 33). in murphy, for example, the ninth circuit court of appeals found that where parental intent was not dispositive, “[c]ertain circum- stances related to a child’s residence and socializa- tion in another country    may change the calculus” (p 1152). the point, however, is that courts may only look to additional evidence pertaining to the [114] lorsque l’intention commune des parents est formulée expressément dans un accord ou qu’elle ressort par ailleurs de la preuve dont dispose le juge des requêtes, cela devrait être déterminant quant au lieu de la résidence habituelle, sauf circonstances exceptionnelles. le juge sharpe de la cour d’ap- pel signale une telle circonstance : [traduction] «    lorsque le séjour consensuel d’une durée limitée est si long que sa durée n’est limitée que sur papier, le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant a changé » (motifs de la ca, par 49). en pareil cas, lorsque le séjour dans le pays étranger censé avoir une durée li- mitée s’est prolongé pendant de nombreuses années, il serait irréaliste de dire que les parents ont encore l’intention que l’enfant ait sa résidence habituelle dans le premier pays (voir mozes c. mozes, 239 f.3d 1067 (9th cir. 2001), p 1075-76). [115] telle est l’approche de certains tribunaux américains, qui reconnaissent une exception d’ap- plication restreinte lorsque la preuve [traduction] « mène de façon non équivoque à la conclusion que l’enfant s’est acclimaté au nouveau lieu » (gitter c. gitter, 396 f.3d 124 (2nd cir. 2005), p. 134; voir aussi mozes, p 1081). ces cas sont rares, et il faut prouver plus que le seul fait de « s’être intégré » dans un nouveau milieu pour que l’intention commune des parents soit écartée (voir r. schuz, the hague child abduction convention : a critical analysis (2013), p. 189, note 104). [116] le plus souvent, une preuve de l’intention des parents — tel un accord exprès entre les deux parents ayant la garde de l’enfant — suffi ra pour dé- terminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle. toutefois, lorsque cette preuve n’est pas concluante, le tribunal peut examiner d’autres éléments de preuve objectifs pour déterminer ce lieu. cette démarche s’accorde avec la manière dont d’autres tribunaux appliquent l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents (voir p.  ex murphy c sloan, 764  f.3d 1144 (9th cir. 2014), p. 1152; rey c. getta, 2013 bcca 369, 342 bcac 30, par 33). par exemple, dans murphy, la cour d’appel du neuvième circuit conclut que lorsque l’intention des parents n’est pas concluante, [tra- duction] « [c]ertaines circonstances liées à la rési- dence de l’enfant et à sa socialisation dans un autre pays [  ] peuvent changer la donne » (p 1152). 446 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. child’s contacts in each jurisdiction where evidence of parental intent is inconclusive. in other words, if the court can make a fi nding regarding the last shared intent of both custodial parents — which, as we have stated, will be the case in most situations — that shared intent must be the decisive variable in the habitual residence analysis. [117] as the majority notes, “canada is a party to the vienna convention on the law of treaties, can. ts 1980. no. 37 (‘vienna convention’), which pro- vides that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’” (para 32). [118] we agree. in our view, the parental intention approach is mandated by (1) the ordinary meaning of the text and the structure of the convention, (2) the object and purpose of the convention, and fi nally (3) policy concerns. we consider each in turn. cependant, le tribunal examinera des éléments de preuve supplémentaires sur les liens de l’enfant dans chacun des pays seulement lorsque la preuve de l’in- tention des parents ne sera pas concluante. autrement dit, si le tribunal peut tirer une conclusion quant à la dernière intention commune des deux parents ayant la garde de l’enfant — ce qui, rappelons-le, sera le cas la plupart du temps —, cette intention commune doit être la variable décisive dans l’analyse que com- mande la détermination de la résidence habituelle. [117] comme le font remarquer les juges majo- ritaires, «  [l]e canada est partie à la convention de vienne sur le droit des traités, rt. can. 1980 no 37 (“convention de vienne”), qui prévoit qu’“[u]n traité doit être interprété de bonne foi suivant le sens ordinaire à attribuer aux termes du traité dans leur contexte et à la lumière de son objet et de son but” » (par 32). [118] nous sommes d’accord. à notre avis, le re- cours à l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents est dicté par (1) le sens ordinaire du texte et la struc- ture de la convention, (2) l’objet et la raison d’être de la convention et, enfi n, (3) des considérations de principe. nous examinons ces éléments tour à tour. (1) text and structure (1) texte et structure [119] a focus on shared parental intent is dictated by the text and structure of the convention. there are three strong indications that parental intent should be the decisive factor. [119] le texte et la structure de la convention commandent que l’on mette l’accent sur l’inten- tion commune des parents. trois indices sérieux permettent de conclure que l’intention des parents devrait constituer l’élément décisif. [120] first, article 12 contains two distinct provi- sions depending on when a convention proceeding is initiated. when proceedings have been commenced one year or more after the alleged wrongful removal or retention, a court need not order the child’s return if “it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment”. alternatively, when pro- ceedings are commenced within one year, there is no such exception. in such cases, the convention is clear: the court “shall order the return of the child forthwith”. the fact that article 12 does not include a “settling in” provision for when a proceeding is initiated within one year is a strong indication that [120] premièrement, l’article 12 renferme deux dispositions distinctes dont l’application dépend du moment où est engagée la procédure fondée sur la convention. lorsque la procédure est commencée un an ou plus après le déplacement ou le non- retour illicite allégué, le tribunal n’est pas tenu d’ordonner le retour s’il est « établi que l’enfant s’est intégré dans son nouveau milieu ». par contre, lorsque la procédure est engagée dans un délai inférieur à un an, aucune exception de cette nature ne peut s’appliquer. dans ce cas, la convention est claire : le tribunal « ordonne [le] retour immédiat [de l’enfant] ». le fait que l’article 12 ne contient aucune référence à [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 447 evidence of settling in should not play any role in the analysis of habitual residence. [121] for this reason, the range of facts that may support a habitual residence determination under the parental intent approach is not completely open ended. in most cases, only evidence that is germane to the question of parental intent will be relevant. given the structure of the convention, it would not be proper to consider evidence that speaks to the strength or quality of the child’s connections to each jurisdiction where evidence of shared parental intent is clear. indeed, other objective evidence — includ- ing evidence of social or cultural integration — may be relevant to a determination of whether a child has “settled in” to his or her new environment. but as article 12 makes clear, that analysis is only permit- ted where the proceeding is commenced one year or more after the alleged wrongful removal or retention. and, even then, it occurs only after the court reaches a determination as to the child’s habitual residence. [122] second, the two- step analysis required by the convention differentiates the concept of habitual residence (at stage one) from evidence regarding the child’s circumstances (which pertain to some of the discretionary exceptions to a return order at stage two). article 13 contains two exceptions that specifi cally focus on the circumstances of the child: whether there is a grave risk of harm if the child is returned, and whether a child objects to a return. in- corporating considerations of this nature into the pre- liminary determination of habitual residence would inappropriately collapse the steps of the analysis, as the intervener the attorney general of canada observed in its submissions to the court. quelque « intégration » dans le cas où l’instance est engagée dans un délai inférieur à un an est une forte indication que la preuve de l’intégration ne devrait pas jouer dans l’analyse relative à la résidence ha- bituelle. [121] c’est pourquoi les faits susceptibles d’étayer la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle selon l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents ne sont pas n’importe lesquels. dans la plupart des cas, seuls les éléments de preuve relatifs à l’intention des parents seront pertinents. étant donné la structure de la convention, il serait inapproprié de prendre en compte des éléments de preuve se rapportant à la solidité ou à la qualité des liens de l’enfant avec chacun des pays lorsque la preuve établit claire- ment l’intention commune des parents en effet, d’autres éléments de preuve objectifs, dont la preuve de l’intégration sociale ou culturelle, peuvent être pertinents pour décider si l’enfant « s’est intégré » dans son nouveau milieu. mais comme l’indique clairement l’article 12, cette analyse ne peut avoir lieu que lorsque l’instance est engagée un an ou plus après le déplacement ou le non- retour illicite allégué. et même alors, elle intervient seulement après que le tribunal a déterminé le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant. [122] deuxièmement, l’analyse en deux étapes que commande la convention distingue la notion de résidence habituelle (qui fait l’objet de la première étape) de la preuve relative à la situation de l’enfant (qui est pertinente pour l’application de certaines des exceptions de nature discrétionnaire à la règle vou- lant que le retour soit ordonné, à la deuxième étape). l’article 13 prévoit deux exceptions qui intéressent précisément la situation de l’enfant : l’existence d’un risque grave que le retour de l’enfant l’expose à un danger et l’opposition de l’enfant à son retour. tenir compte de tels éléments à l’étape préliminaire de la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle serait confondre à tort les deux étapes de l’analyse, comme le fait observer l’intervenant le procureur général du canada dans ses observations à la cour. [123] third, article 5 provides that custody rights include “the right to determine the child’s place of residence”. thus, although the convention does not [123] troisièmement, l’article  5 précise que le droit de garde comprend « le droit [  ] de décider [du] lieu de résidence [de l’enfant] ». ainsi, bien 448 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. directly defi ne habitual residence, it at least envisions that parents, by virtue of their custody rights, must have some infl uence over where their child is deemed to be habitually resident. the majority’s approach minimizes the rights provided for in article 5 by equivocating as to the role that parental intent should play in determining habitual residence. que la convention ne défi nisse pas directement la résidence habituelle, elle prévoit à tout le moins que les parents, en raison de leur droit de garde, doivent avoir une certaine infl uence sur la détermination du lieu où leur enfant est réputé avoir sa résidence habituelle. les juges majoritaires minimisent l’im- portance des droits reconnus à l’article 5 en traitant de façon équivoque le rôle de l’intention des parents dans la détermination du lieu de la résidence habi- tuelle. (2) purpose (2) objet [124] the clear purpose of the convention also supports an approach based on parental intention. this court identifi ed the purpose of the conven- tion in thomson v. thomson, [1994] 3 scr 551, at p. 579: “it is clear    that the primary object of the convention is the enforcement of custody rights” (emphasis in original). this is evident from the convention itself. article 1 states that its objects are “to secure the prompt return of children” who are wrongfully removed or retained, and “to ensure that rights of custody and of access” are respected across international borders. these objects operate harmoniously: ensuring the prompt return of children who are wrongfully removed is the essential means by which rights of custody and access are respected and protected. [124] l’objet manifeste de la convention milite également en faveur de l’approche fondée sur l’inten- tion des parents. dans l’arrêt thomson c. thomson, [1994] 3 rcs 551, p. 579, la cour précise cet objet : « il ressort [  ] que l’objectif principal de la convention est l’exécution du droit de garde » (souligné dans l’original). cet objectif ressort du texte de la convention comme tel. l’article 1 dit que la raison d’être de celle-ci est « d’assurer le retour immédiat des enfants » déplacés ou retenus illicite- ment et « de faire respecter [  ] les droits de garde et de visite » dans tous les états signataires. ces objets ont un lien étroit entre eux : assurer le retour immédiat des enfants qui sont déplacés illicitement est essentiel au respect et à la protection des droits de garde et de visite. [125] the object of a legal proceeding under the convention is not to determine whether an order returning the child to another country, or residing with a particular parent, is in the child’s best inter- ests. this follows from article 16, which states that a court “shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this convention”. subject to the specifi c exceptions to return in article 13, cus- tody proceedings, not convention proceedings, are the appropriate forum for this analysis. the hague convention can be seen as addressing a more prelim- inary question: in which jurisdiction should a cus- tody determination be made? in the context of this case, for example, custody proceedings took place in germany after it was determined that the children should be returned to their habitual residence. this is how the system is intended to work. it is in those [125] l’objet d’une procédure judiciaire engagée en vertu de la convention n’est pas de décider s’il est dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant d’ordonner son retour dans un autre pays ou d’ordonner qu’il réside avec l’un ou l’autre parent. cela découle de l’article 16, qui énonce que le tribunal « ne pourr[a] statuer sur le fond du droit de garde jusqu’à ce qu’il soit établi que les conditions de la présente conven- tion pour un retour de l’enfant ne sont pas réunies ». sous réserve des exceptions au retour prévues à l’article  13, c’est dans le cadre de l’instance sur la garde, et non de celle fondée sur la convention, qu’il convient de se pencher sur la question de l’in- térêt supérieur de l’enfant. on peut considérer que la convention de la haye s’intéresse à une question plus préliminaire : dans quel pays devrait-on statuer sur la garde? dans la présente affaire, par exemple, une procédure relative à la garde a été engagée en [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 449 subsequent proceedings, not in the initial hague convention application, that a court is entitled (and in the best position) to assess the individual child’s best interests with respect to custody. [126] this is not to suggest that the interests of children are irrelevant to the convention. rather, as la forest j. discussed in thomson, the convention is concerned with the interests of children generally, “not the interest of the particular child before the court” (p 578). it advances the interests of children generally by ensuring their prompt return in cases where they are removed from their habitual resi- dence, thus discouraging parental abductions in the fi rst instance. the concept of habitual residence must be interpreted in light of these principles. [127] if respect for custody rights is the guiding purpose of the convention, as the majority at least partially acknowledges (at para. 24), it follows that parental intent should be a central focus — if not the presumptively determinative focus — in assessing habitual residence. this case, in which the father granted a time- limited consent for his children to live in another country, offers a prime example of why this must be so. if the children’s habitual residence changed to canada notwithstanding the fact that the father did not consent to them living here on a per- manent basis, his custody rights would be effectively disregarded. examining habitual residence from the perspective of the parents’ last shared mutual intent protects rights of custody and access because it pre- vents one parent from unilaterally changing a child’s habitual residence and thereby preventing the child’s return to the left- behind parent. allemagne après qu’il eut été décidé que les enfants devaient être renvoyés dans le pays où ils avaient leur résidence habituelle. c’est ainsi que le système est censé fonctionner. c’est dans le cadre de cette pro- cédure subséquente, et non dans celui de la demande initiale fondée sur la convention de la haye, que le tribunal peut se pencher (et qu’il est le mieux placé pour le faire) sur l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant en vue de statuer sur sa garde. [126] il ne s’en suit pas pour autant que l’inté- rêt supérieur de l’enfant n’a aucune pertinence dans l’application de la convention. au contraire, comme l’explique le juge la forest dans thomson, la convention se soucie de l’intérêt supérieur de l’en- fant en général, « et non de [celui] de l’enfant qui est devant le tribunal » (p 578). elle défend cet intérêt de façon générale en assurant le retour immédiat de l’enfant qui a été déplacé du lieu où il a sa résidence habituelle, décourageant ainsi dès le départ l’enlève- ment de l’enfant par l’un de ses parents. la notion de résidence habituelle doit être interprétée à la lu- mière de ces principes. [127] si, comme le reconnaissent les juges majo- ritaires, du moins en partie (par. 24), l’objet premier de la convention est de faire respecter le droit de garde, l’intention des parents devrait être centrale, voire tenue pour décisive, dans la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle. la présente affaire, où le père a consenti à un séjour d’une durée limitée des enfants dans un autre pays, démontre parfaite- ment qu’il doit en être ainsi. si le lieu de la résidence habituelle des enfants devait changer pour devenir le canada même si le père n’a pas consenti à ce qu’ils y vivent de façon permanente, son droit de garde serait de fait bafoué. se prononcer sur la résidence habituelle en fonction de la dernière intention com- mune des parents protège les droits de garde et de visite, car cela empêche l’un des parents de modifi er unilatéralement le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant et de faire ainsi obstacle au retour de l’enfant chez le parent laissé derrière. (3) policy (3) considérations de principe [128] finally, policy reasons support the parental intention approach as well. this approach to habitual [128] enfi n, des considérations de principe mi- litent également en faveur de l’approche fondée sur 450 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. residence creates comparatively clear and certain law: absent shared parental intent, neither parent has anything to gain by abducting a child (or retaining a child after the expiration of a time- limited consent) because the child’s habitual residence will remain the original country, absent exceptional circumstances. nor does an abducting parent have anything to gain by drawing out the legal proceedings in the hopes that the child will develop deeper connections to the second jurisdiction. therefore, the parental intent approach best aligns with the convention’s purposes by protecting custody rights and deterring abductions that may result from any approach that permits, or even facilitates, unilateral changes to habitual resi- dence. [129] moreover, by making evidence of shared intentions presumptively determinative (especially where there is a written agreement), the parental intent approach creates a strong incentive for par- ties to create a record of their intentions, which would reduce subsequent litigation and needless appellate review. in this case, for example, the di- visional court — had it adopted the approach we propose — would have been bound by the written agreement and would have quickly upheld the return order without the delay of relitigating and reweigh- ing the evidence. the case would have been resolved expeditiously and the children would have been re- turned to germany more quickly — an outcome that would have benefi tted all parties. l’intention des parents. adopter cette approche pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle crée un droit clair et certain comparativement aux autres ap- proches. en l’absence d’une intention commune, au- cun des parents n’a intérêt à enlever l’enfant (ou à le retenir au terme du séjour d’une durée limitée auquel l’autre a consenti) parce que le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant demeure le pays d’origine, sauf circonstances exceptionnelles. le parent ravis- seur n’a pas intérêt non plus à faire traîner le débat judiciaire dans l’espoir que l’enfant consolide ses liens avec le second pays. par conséquent, l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents est celle qui se concilie le mieux avec les objectifs de la convention en ce qu’elle protège le droit de garde et décourage les enlèvements susceptibles de résulter d’une ap- proche qui permet ou, encore, facilite la modifi cation unilatérale du lieu de la résidence habituelle. [129] en outre, en supposant que la preuve de l’in- tention commune est décisive (surtout lorsqu’il y a accord écrit), l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents incite fortement les parties à consigner leurs intentions par écrit afi n de réduire le risque de litiges subséquents et d’appels inutiles. dans la présente af- faire, par exemple, si elle avait adopté l’approche que nous préconisons, la cour divisionnaire aurait été liée par l’accord écrit et aurait rapidement confi rmé l’ordonnance de retour sans que la réouverture du dé- bat et le réexamen de la preuve ne viennent retarder sa décision. le dossier aurait été réglé rapidement, et les enfants seraient rentrés en allemagne plus ra- pidement, ce qui aurait bénéfi cié à toutes les parties. b the hybrid approach b l’approche hybride [130] according to the majority, the hybrid ap- proach requires judges to look “to all relevant con- siderations arising from the facts of the case at hand”, and therefore “the list of potentially relevant factors is not closed” (paras. 42 and 47). by incorporating other factors that could supplant parental intent into the determination of habitual residence — which effectively permits one parent to unilaterally change a child’s habitual residence without the other par- ent’s consent even in the face of an express agree- ment — the majority’s hybrid approach blurs the [130] selon les juges majoritaires, l’approche hy- bride veut que le tribunal se penche sur « toutes les considérations pertinentes au vu des faits propres à l’affaire », de sorte que « la liste des éléments suscep- tibles d’être pertinents n’est pas exhaustive » (par. 42 et 47). en tenant compte d’autres éléments suscep- tibles de supplanter l’intention des parents dans la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle — ce qui permet de fait à l’un des parents de modifi er unilatéralement le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant sans le consentement de l’autre même en [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 451 distinction between custody adjudications and hague convention applications and undermines the convention’s goals. we cannot escape the conclu- sion that the majority’s approach is, in substance, a determination of who should be awarded custody. [131] assessing this approach in light of (1) the text and structure of the convention, (2) the pur- pose of the convention, and (3) policy concerns, we conclude that the majority’s reasons bring about unnecessary confusion in the determination of ha- bitual residence and undermine the certainty that the convention seeks to create. présence d’un accord exprès —, l’approche hybride proposée par les juges majoritaires brouille la dis- tinction entre l’instance relative à la garde et celle fondée sur la convention de la haye et elle com- promet la réalisation des objectifs de la convention. force est de conclure que l’approche des juges ma- joritaires revient essentiellement à décider lequel des parents devrait se voir attribuer la garde. [131] après examen de cette approche à la lumière (1) du texte et de la structure de la convention, (2) de l’objet de la convention et (3) des considérations de principe qui la sous- tendent, nous concluons que l’opinion des juges majoritaires sème inutilement la confusion lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle et nuit à la certitude voulue par la convention. (1) text and structure (1) texte et structure [132] first, the hybrid approach is inconsistent with the text of the convention. by inviting courts to consider an open list of unspecifi ed factors that any individual judge deems to be relevant, the majority ignores the explicit distinction made by article 12 of the convention. as we have discussed, that pro- vision clearly distinguishes the evidence that may be considered for applications brought within one year of the wrongful removal or retention, from that which may be considered for applications brought on or after that time. the hybrid approach renders this express textual distinction meaningless by en- couraging courts in all cases to consider evidence of “settling in”. [132] premièrement, l’approche hybride est incom- patible avec le texte de la convention. en invitant les cours de justice à prendre en considération une liste non exhaustive de facteurs non précisés, selon ce que chaque juge trouve pertinent, les juges majori- taires ignorent la distinction établie explicitement à l’article 12 de la convention. tel que mentionné pré- cédemment, cette disposition établit une distinction nette entre la preuve qui peut être examinée dans le cadre d’une demande présentée moins d’un an après le déplacement ou le non- retour illicite et celle qui peut être examinée dans le cadre d’une demande présentée après ce délai. l’approche hybride enlève tout sens à cette distinction textuelle expresse en encourageant les tribunaux à tenir compte dans tous les cas de la preuve de quelque « intégration ». [133] for example, any assessment of the child’s family and social connections in each country un- doubtedly requires courts to look to whether a child has settled in to the new country, irrespective of whether the proceedings were initiated within one year of the removal or retention. so too is the case with other factors the majority alludes to and that are typically considered by other courts applying the hy- brid approach — conditions of the stay ( mercredi v. chaffe, c-497/10, [2010] ecr i-14358, at para. 56), the location of friends and social networks (punter v. [133] par exemple, l’évaluation des liens familiaux et sociaux de l’enfant dans chacun des pays oblige indubitablement le tribunal à se demander si l’enfant s’est intégré dans le nouveau pays, indépendamment de la question de savoir si l’instance a été engagée moins d’un an après le déplacement ou le non- retour. il en va de même pour les autres facteurs auxquels les juges majoritaires font allusion et dont tiennent habituellement compte les autres tribunaux qui ap- pliquent l’approche hybride, à savoir les conditions du séjour (mercredi c chaffe, c-497/10, [2010] 452 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. secretary for justice, [2007] 1 nzlr 40 (ca), at para. 192), the child’s living and schooling arrange- ments (punter, at para. 88), and the geographic and family origins of the parents and the child (punter, at para. 88; mercredi, at para 56). these factors may all require evidence of whether and to what extent a child is settled into his or her new environment. this development is not faithful to the text of the convention. [134] for these same reasons, the hybrid approach blurs the distinction between habitual residence and the exceptions to a return order. it does so by incor- porating aspects of the child’s circumstances into the fi rst stage of the analysis rather than respecting the disjunctive two- step process established by the convention’s structure. it also creates a signifi cant risk that convention proceedings will functionally devolve into custody proceedings by focusing the analysis on the child’s individual connections to each jurisdiction — in effect, by asking the court to consider whether the child would be better off in one country rather than the other. this belies the notion that the convention is concerned with the best interests of children generally rather than the inter- ests of the specifi c child before the court (thomson, at p. 578), and that convention proceedings should not be concerned with the merits of custody disputes (article 16). ecr i-14358, par. 56), [traduction] l’endroit où se trouvent les amis et les membres du réseau social (punter c. secretary for justice, [2007] 1 nzlr. 40 (ca), par. 192), les modalités relatives au loge- ment de l’enfant et à son éducation (punter, par. 88) et les origines géographiques et familiales des parents et de l’enfant (punter, par. 88; mercredi, par 56). ces facteurs peuvent tous requérir une preuve quant à sa- voir si et, le cas échéant, dans quelle mesure, l’enfant s’est intégré dans son nouveau milieu. cette tournure n’est pas fi dèle au texte de la convention. [134] pour les mêmes motifs, l’approche hybride brouille la distinction entre la résidence habituelle et les exceptions à la règle selon laquelle le retour doit être ordonné. elle produit ce résultat parce qu’elle tient compte de certains aspects de la situation de l’enfant à la première étape de l’analyse au lieu de respecter le caractère disjonctif de la démarche en deux étapes que commande la structure de la convention. cette approche crée également un risque important que l’instance fondée sur la convention se transforme de facto en instance sur la garde du fait qu’elle s’attache aux liens de l’enfant avec chacun des pays et se trouve ainsi à demander au tribunal de se pencher sur la question de savoir si l’enfant serait mieux dans un pays que dans l’autre. cela contredit le principe que la convention se soucie de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant en général, et non de l’inté- rêt supérieur de l’enfant qui est devant le tribunal (thomson, p. 578), et que le tribunal saisi d’une ins- tance fondée sur la convention ne devrait pas s’in- téresser au fond d’un litige sur la garde (article 16). (2) purpose (2) objet [135] second, the hybrid approach undermines the primary purpose of the convention: deterring abductions by enforcing parental rights of custody and access. it does so by effectively stripping the convention of its deterrent effect. given that pa- rental intent can be outweighed or undercut by the connections a child develops to the new jurisdiction, an abducting parent — in the most common case, a parent who refuses to return a child after a period of consent expires — stands to benefi t by quickly establishing roots in a new home (mozes, at p 1079). in other words, the uncertainty generated by this [135] deuxièmement, l’approche hybride mine la réalisation de l’objet principal de la convention, soit décourager l’enlèvement d’enfants en veillant à l’exécution du droit de garde et du droit de visite des parents. elle prive en effet la convention de son effet dissuasif. étant donné que l’intention des parents peut être évincée ou voir son importance réduite en raison des liens de l’enfant dans le nouveau pays, un parent ravisseur — la plupart du temps, celui qui refuse de rendre l’enfant au terme d’une période convenue — a tout à gagner de l’acclimatation rapide dans un nouveau lieu (mozes, p 1079). autrement [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 453 ad hoc approach benefi ts would-be abductors. this unhappy consequence is most glaring when one con- siders that, by marshalling suffi cient evidence “of all relevant factors”, an abducting parent can now effectively vitiate an express agreement regarding the time- limited nature of the child’s stay in the foreign jurisdiction. in light of this concern, even courts that [136] apply the hybrid or child- centred approaches have recognized the need to “ensure that neither parent is acting unilaterally to alter a joint understanding reached by the parents” (karkkainen v. kovalchuk, 445 f.3d 280 (3rd cir. 2006), at p. 292; see also punter, at para. 173; feder v. evans- feder, 63 f.3d 217 (3rd cir. 1995), at p 221). thus, courts applying the hybrid approach often afford considerable weight to parental intent — suggesting, for example, that a child’s new residence must exhibit the “necessary quality of stability” before shared intent can be set aside (in re r. (children), [2015] uksc 35, [2016] ac 76, at para 21). [137] unfortunately, the majority disregards the weight of this international jurisprudence (a factor it otherwise fi nds dispositive in adopting the hybrid approach) by rejecting any concerns about unilat- eral changes to habitual residence and declining to express a view on the relative importance of parental intent (paras 44-46). the fact that the hybrid ap- proach is “unencumbered with rigid rules” is cold comfort for left- behind parents whose custody rights can now be disregarded by a judge- made doctrine that permits an abducting parent to unilaterally alter mutually agreed- upon living arrangements. dit, l’incertitude engendrée par cette approche ad hoc profi te au ravisseur en puissance. cette fâcheuse conséquence est encore plus évidente lorsque l’on considère qu’un parent ravisseur, en rassemblant suf- fi samment d’éléments de preuve à l’égard de « tous les éléments pertinents », peut alors réduire à néant une entente expresse quant à la durée limitée du séjour de l’enfant dans le pays étranger. [136] à la lumière de cette préoccupation, même les tribunaux qui appliquent l’approche hybride ou l’approche axée sur l’enfant reconnaissent la néces- sité de [traduction] « veiller à ce qu’aucun des parents ne modifi e unilatéralement l’accord mutuel intervenu » (karkkainen c. kovalchuk, 445 f.3d 280 (3rd cir. 2006), p. 292; voir aussi punter, par. 173; feder c. evans- feder, 63 f.3d 217 (3rd cir. 1995), p 221). les tribunaux qui appliquent l’approche hy- bride accordent donc souvent un poids considérable à l’intention des parents, suggérant par exemple que la nouvelle résidence habituelle d’un enfant doit présenter le [traduction] « degré voulu de stabi- lité » pour que l’intention des parents puisse être écartée (in re r. (children), [2015] uksc 35, [2016] ac 76, par 21). [137] malheureusement, les juges majoritaires ignorent le poids de cette jurisprudence internatio- nale (un facteur qu’ils jugent par ailleurs décisif en adoptant l’approche hybride) par leur rejet de toute préoccupation liée à la modifi cation unilatérale de la résidence habituelle et par leur refus de se pro- noncer sur l’importance relative de l’intention des parents (par 44-46). le fait que l’approche hybride est « affranchie de l’application rigide de règles » est bien peu rassurant pour le parent laissé derrière dont le droit de garde peut dès lors être écarté par une doctrine jurisprudentielle qui permet au parent ra- visseur de modifi er unilatéralement l’accord conclu avec l’autre parent quant aux modalités du séjour de l’enfant. (3) policy (3) considérations de principe [138] finally, the majority advances three principal policy arguments in favor of its position. with re- spect, we are of the view that the majority overstates [138] enfi n, les juges majoritaires avancent prin- cipalement trois arguments de principe à l’appui de leur thèse. en tout respect, nous estimons qu’ils 454 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. these arguments, and that a focus on shared parental intent is preferable on policy grounds as well. [139] the fi rst policy argument proposed by the majority is that the hybrid approach has been adopted by other courts, which points to an emerging interna- tional consensus (para 50). in our view, this factor should not be afforded signifi cant weight since, as we have described, the hybrid approach stems from an improper analysis of the convention’s text, structure, and purpose. [140] there is also strong jurisprudential support for the parental intent model. as the majority ac- knowledges, a number of leading courts — includ- ing nearly every appellate court in this country to have considered the issue — have adopted and reaf- fi rmed approaches to habitual residence that empha- size the primacy of parental intent to varying degrees (see, eg,. murphy, at p. 1150; mozes, at pp. 1073-80; gitter, at p. 134; mauvais v. herisse, 772 f.3d 6 (1st cir. 2014), at pp. 11-12; guzzo v. cristofano, 719 f.3d 100 (2nd cir. 2013), at pp. 107-9; larbie v. larbie, 690 f.3d 295 (5th cir. 2012), at p. 310; koch, at p. 717; ruiz v. tenorio, 392 f.3d 1247 (11th cir. 2004), at pp. 1253-54; r v. barnet london bor- ough council, ex parte nilish shah, [1983] 2 ac. 309; korutowska- wooff v. wooff (2004), 242 dlr. (4th) 385 (ont. ca), at para. 8; rifkin v. peled- rifkin, 2017 nbca 3, 89 rfl (7th) 194, at para. 2; aes v. amw, 2013 abca 133, 544 ar 246, at paras. 20 and 23). this is especially true in the united states, where relatively few (if any) jurisdictions have adopted a hybrid model in which no guidance is offered to lower courts as to how the various fac- tors should be weighed or analyzed. indeed, some of the american cases that the majority cite apply an ap- proach that is entirely different than the one the ma- jority adopts in its own reasons (see, eg,. silverman v. silverman, 338 f.3d 886 (8th cir. 2003), at p. 898 (“the [lower] court should have determined the de- gree of settled purpose from the children’s perspec- tive   ”);. tsai-yi yang v fu- chiang tsui, 499 f.3d 259 (3rd cir. 2007), at p. 271 (“we have defi ned ha- bitual residence as ‘[focusing on the] degree of set- tled purpose from the child’s perspective’”), quoting surestiment ces arguments et qu’il est préférable, également pour des raisons de principe, de s’attacher à l’intention commune des parents. [139] le premier argument de principe invoqué par les juges majoritaires veut que d’autres tribunaux souscrivent à l’approche hybride, ce qui permettrait de conclure qu’un consensus se dessine à l’échelle internationale (par 50). à notre avis, on ne saurait accorder beaucoup de poids à ce facteur car, rappe- lons-le, l’approche hybride découle d’une analyse erronée du texte, de la structure et de l’objet de la convention. [140] un fort courant jurisprudentiel appuie par ailleurs le modèle fondé sur l’intention des parents. comme le reconnaissent les juges majoritaires, un certain nombre de tribunaux principaux, y compris la quasi- totalité des cours d’appel du pays qui ont été saisies de la question, ont opté et optent encore pour une approche de la résidence habituelle qui met l’accent à différents degrés sur l’intention des parents (voir p ex murphy, p. 1150; mozes, p. 1073-1080; gitter, p. 134; mauvais c. herisse, 772 f.3d 6 (1st cir. 2014), p. 11-12; guzzo c. cristofano, 719 f.3d 100 (2nd cir. 2013), p. 107-109; larbie c. larbie, 690 f.3d 295 (5th cir. 2012), p. 310; koch, p. 717; ruiz c. tenorio, 392 f.3d 1247 (11th cir. 2004), p. 1253-1254; r c. barnet london borough coun- cil, ex parte nilish shah, [1983] 2 ac 309 (hl);. korutowska- wooff c wooff (2004), 242  dlr. (4th) 385 (ca ont), par. 8; rifkin c. peled- rifkin, 2017 nbca 3, 89 rfl (7th) 194, par. 2; aes c. amw, 2013 abca 133, 544 ar 246, par. 20 et 23). tel est spécialement le cas aux états- unis, où relativement peu de tribunaux (s’il en est) ont adopté un modèle hybride qui n’offre aux juridictions in- férieures aucune indication quant à la manière de soupeser ou d’analyser les différents facteurs. en fait, certaines des décisions américaines invoquées par les juges majoritaires appliquent une approche totalement différente de celle que ces derniers in- voquent à l’appui de leur thèse (voir p ex. silver- man c silverman, 338 f.3d 886 (8th cir. 2003), p. 898 : [traduction] « le tribunal [inférieur] au- rait dû déterminer la mesure dans laquelle le des- sein était arrêté du point de vue des enfants    »;. tsai-yi yang c fu- chiang tsui, 499 f.3d 259 (3rd [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 455 baxter v. baxter, 423 f.3d 363 (3rd cir. 2005), at p 368). [141] furthermore, much of the international ju- risprudence cited by the majority does not speak to situations where evidence of parental intent was clear rather, the cases cited involve situations where, faced with inconclusive or ambiguous evi- dence about parental intent, the court was required to consider other objective evidence in the determi- nation of habitual residence. [142] in punter, for example, the parents agreed to a shuttle agreement, where the children were to spend two years in new zealand, followed by two years in australia. the ongoing nature of a shuttle agreement made the intent of the parents as to the habitual residence of the children more diffi cult to ascertain (para 169). this lack of clarity is what led the court to consider other factors. cir. 2007), p. 271 : [traduction] « nous avons dé- fi ni la résidence habituelle en “[fonction de] la me- sure dans laquelle le dessein était arrêté du point de vue de l’enfant” », citant baxter c. baxter, 423 f.3d 363 (3rd cir. 2005), p 368). [141] en outre, la plus grande partie de la jurispru- dence internationale invoquée par les juges majori- taires ne se rapporte aucunement à une situation où la preuve établit clairement l’intention des parents. cette jurisprudence vise plutôt des situations où, saisi d’une preuve non concluante ou équivoque de l’intention des parents, le tribunal a dû examiner des éléments de preuve objectifs pour établir le lieu de la résidence habituelle. [142] dans punter, par exemple, les parents avaient conclu un accord d’alternance selon lequel les en- fants habiteraient deux ans en nouvelle- zélande, puis deux ans en australie. vu le caractère continu de l’application d’un accord d’alternance, il était plus diffi cile de déterminer le lieu de la résidence habituelle des enfants (par. 169), de sorte que l’in- certitude du tribunal l’a amené à considérer d’autres facteurs. [143] similarly, in lk v. director- general, de- partment of community services, [2009] hca 9, 237  clr  582, evidence of parental intent was found to be “ambiguous” (para.  29) in fact, the court’s principal rationale for not giving the par- ents’ intention controlling weight in their analytical framework was that intention is often ambiguous (paras. 28 and 32). the case is silent on what role the parents’ intent should play where the application judge fi nds that it is clear. [143] de même, dans lk c. director- general, department of community services, [2009] hca 9, 237 clr 582, la preuve de l’intention des parents est jugée [traduction] « équivoque » (par 29). en fait, la principale raison pour laquelle la cour juge l’intention des parents non décisive est que celle-ci est souvent équivoque (par. 28 et 32). il n’est pas précisé dans cet arrêt l’importance que devrait revêtir cette intention lorsque le juge des requêtes conclut qu’elle est claire. [144] in mercredi, i-14358, the mother had sole custody of the child when she moved the child from england to réunion (para 23). unlike the present case, the father had no rights of custody. that case therefore offers no guidance on how to approach a case where the shared and settled intention of the parents, both of whom have some parental rights, is clear. [144] dans l’affaire mercredi, i-14358, la mère avait la garde exclusive de l’enfant lorsqu’elle a quitté l’angleterre en sa compagnie à destination de l’île de la réunion (par 23). contrairement aux faits de la présente espèce, le père n’avait pas de droit de garde. par conséquent, cette décision n’offre au- cune indication utile pour statuer lorsque l’intention commune et arrêtée des parents, qui ont tous deux un droit de garde, est claire. 456 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. [145] thus, the international jurisprudence cited by the majority does not foreclose the possibility of assigning controlling weight to parental intent where the court fi nds that evidence of shared parental intent is clear. [145] ainsi, la jurisprudence internationale citée par les juges majoritaires n’exclut pas la possibilité d’attribuer un poids décisif à l’intention des parents lorsque le tribunal conclut que la preuve de l’inten- tion commune des parents est claire. [146] the second policy argument is that the hybrid approach comports with the convention’s purposes (majority reasons, at paras 59-61). with respect, we disagree. as we have explained, the hybrid approach permits one parent to unilaterally change a child’s habitual residence, which undercuts custody rights and encourages parents to remove or retain children if they are able to quickly develop ties to the new jurisdiction. the suggestion that parents will be de- terred from creating “legal and jurisdictional links which are more or less artifi cial” (para. 60) begs the question of what constitutes an “artifi cial” link and how a judge would distinguish such links from genu- ine connections. more importantly, it ignores the fact that a child could develop genuine links to a new ju- risdiction following a wrongful removal or retention. the very fact that such connections would, under the majority’s approach, counsel in favor of a change in habitual residence is what encourages (or at mini- mum, rewards) abductions and retentions — all at the expense of the left- behind parent’s custodial rights. it is rather the certainty generated by the parental in- tent approach that prevents such manipulation and best advances the convention’s goals. [147] the third argument is that the hybrid ap- proach “offers the best hope of prompt return of the child” (majority reasons, at para. 62 (emphasis in original)). again, with respect, this hope is deeply misguided, as concerns about practical effi cacy cut strongly in favor of adopting the parental intent ap- proach. [146] le deuxième argument de principe avancé est que l’approche hybride se concilie avec les ob- jectifs de la convention (opinion majoritaire, par. 59- 61). en tout respect, nous ne sommes pas d’accord. comme nous l’expliquons précédemment, l’ap- proche hybride permet à l’un des parents de modi- fi er unilatéralement le lieu de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant, ce qui sape le droit de garde et incite le parent à déplacer ou à retenir l’enfant dans la me- sure où ce dernier peut établir rapidement des liens avec le nouveau pays. la suggestion selon laquelle un parent sera dissuadé de créer « des liens plus ou moins artifi ciels de compétence judiciaire » (par. 60) soulève la question de savoir ce qui constitue un lien « artifi ciel » et comment le tribunal pourrait le distinguer d’un lien véritable. mais surtout, elle ne tient pas compte du fait que l’enfant pourrait établir des liens véritables avec le nouveau pays à la suite d’un déplacement ou d’un non- retour illicite. le fait même que ces liens pourront, suivant l’approche adoptée par les juges majoritaires, militer en faveur de la modifi cation du lieu de la résidence habituelle encourage (ou, à tout le moins, récompense) l’enlè- vement et le non- retour, et ce, au détriment du droit de garde du parent laissé derrière. c’est plutôt la certitude assurée par l’approche fondée sur l’inten- tion des parents qui est de nature à empêcher pareille manipulation de la convention et qui favorise le plus la réalisation de ses objectifs. [147] selon le troisième argument, l’approche hy- bride « offre [  ] la meilleure chance d’obtenir le retour immédiat de l’enfant » (opinion majoritaire, par. 62 (en italique dans l’original)). encore une fois, avec respect, cet argument est foncièrement non fondé, car les considérations liées à l’effi cacité de facto militent fermement en faveur de l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents. [148] it is important to recognize that any approach to habitual residence will involve some difficult cases where judges are called upon to make tough [148] il importe de reconnaître que toute approche adoptée pour déterminer le lieu de la résidence habi- tuelle se heurtera à certaines situations épineuses où [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 457 decisions. but under the parental intent approach, there are many cases that are straightforward. where there is unambiguous evidence of what the parents intended, the parental intent model offers a clear and predictable answer to the question of habitual residence. this is one such case: the father executed a short, time- limited consent, and there was no dis- pute that the last mutually shared intention was that the children were habitually resident in germany. moreover, if the parental intent approach was to be adopted moving forward, there would be even stronger incentives for parties to expressly specify their intentions upfront (as the father did here) be- cause those intentions would be afforded presump- tively determinative weight. [149] by adopting the hybrid model, the majority offers parties an invitation to litigate even in clear cases like this one — because even in the face of unambiguous and binding agreements, there is al- ways the possibility that evidence of other factors can outweigh parental intent. (it is not entirely clear when or how, under the majority’s analysis; but all the more reason to try.) the scope of this litigation will be broad: the majority instructs judges to look at “all relevant factors” because “the list    is not closed” (paras. 65 and 47). the end result will be ex- pensive and prolonged litigation in which parties are encouraged to seek discovery into everything from school and medical records to tax returns and credit card statements. all the while, the child continues to develop connections to the new jurisdiction that might, on some accounts, bolster the argument that his or her habitual residence has changed. this is a far cry from the prompt and fair decisions that the majority envisions. le tribunal saisi devra rendre une décision diffi cile. mais si l’on recourt à l’approche fondée sur l’inten- tion des parents, de nombreuses affaires se révèlent simples. en présence d’une preuve non équivoque de ce que les parents ont voulu, le modèle fondé sur l’intention des parents apporte une réponse claire et prévisible à la question du lieu de la résidence habituelle. c’est le cas en l’espèce. le père a signé une courte lettre dans laquelle il consent à un séjour d’une durée limitée, et nul ne conteste que la dernière intention commune des parents était que les enfants aient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne. de plus, si l’approche fondée sur l’intention des parents devait désormais s’appliquer, les parties seraient encore plus incitées à consigner leurs intentions par écrit dès le départ (comme l’a fait le père en l’es- pèce), car l’importance de ces intentions serait tenue pour décisive. [149] en optant pour l’approche hybride, les juges majoritaires invitent les parties à saisir la justice même dans des cas clairs comme celui visé en l’espèce, car malgré la présence d’un accord non équivoque ayant force obligatoire, il sera toujours possible que la preuve d’autres facteurs l’emporte sur celle de l’intention des parents (l’opinion ma- joritaire ne précise pas à quelles conditions ni selon quelles modalités, mais raison de plus pour tenter sa chance). la portée du débat sera grande, les juges majoritaires enjoignant au tribunal de prendre en compte « tous les éléments pertinents » parce que « la liste [  ] n’est pas exhaustive » (par. 65 et 47). il en résultera de longs et coûteux litiges où les parties seront incitées à demander la communication de toutes sortes de documents, allant des dossiers scolaires et médicaux aux déclarations de revenus et aux relevés de carte de crédit. pendant tout ce temps, l’enfant continuera d’établir avec le nouveau pays des liens susceptibles d’étayer, sous certains rapports, la prétention voulant que sa résidence ha- bituelle ait changé. nous sommes loin de la décision rapide et juste évoquée par les juges majoritaires. [150] even in the subset of cases where shared parental intent is not immediately apparent, it is far from clear that the hybrid approach is superior. this is because there are still strong incentives for the parties to litigate the issue of intent (as well as [150] même pour les dossiers où l’intention com- mune des parents ne ressort pas d’emblée, la supé- riorité de l’approche hybride est loin d’être claire. en effet, les parties demeurent fortement incitées à s’adresser au tribunal relativement à la question de 458 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. any other factors that may be considered under the hybrid approach), and to devote signifi cant time and resources to doing so. these incentives are particu- larly strong where resource asymmetries between the parties may encourage one side to leverage litigation threats as a pressure tactic in the context of negotia- tions. thus, it is beside the point that the judge may not need to defi nitely resolve the issue — the hybrid model will still lead to protracted and expensive proceedings. and even if the judge need not resolve the question of parental intent, the hybrid approach simply replaces that form of indeterminacy with another: balancing incommensurate variables with little to no guidance as to how much weight they should be afforded in the fi nal analysis. [151] as this discussion suggests, the essential problem with the hybrid approach, at the level of policy, is its indeterminacy. it is easy for this court to make broad proclamations instructing judges to “look to all relevant considerations” and to determine the relative weight assigned to each as they see fi t (majority reasons, at para. 42) — but what does that actually mean for judges who are required to carry out that instruction in the context of specifi c cases? and what evidence would the parties need to put forward for a judge to make this type of determina- tion? these concerns multiply as more factors (and additional facts providing context for those factors) are put forward by litigants. l’intention (ainsi que relativement à tout autre facteur pertinent suivant l’approche hybride) et à consacrer beaucoup de temps et de ressources à pareille dé- marche. les incitations sont encore plus grandes lorsque l’asymétrie des ressources respectives des parties peut inciter l’une d’elles à brandir la menace d’un procès pour faire pression sur l’autre dans le cadre de négociations. que le tribunal n’ait pas à trancher défi nitivement la question importe donc peu, le modèle hybride entraînera toujours des pro- cédures longues et coûteuses. et même si le tribunal n’est pas tenu de se prononcer sur l’intention des parents, l’approche hybride remplace simplement cette forme d’incertitude par une autre : la mise en balance d’innombrables variables sans indications utiles ou presque quant à l’importance qu’il convient de leur accorder en dernière analyse. [151] comme le suggère la présente analyse, le problème fondamental de l’approche hybride sur le plan des principes est l’incertitude qui en résulte. il est aisé pour la cour de faire des déclarations géné- rales enjoignant aux tribunaux de « se penche[r] sur toutes les considérations pertinentes » et de décider quelle importance relative il convient d’attribuer à chacune selon ce qu’ils jugent indiqué (opinion majoritaire, par. 42), mais qu’est-ce que cela signi- fi e concrètement pour le juge appelé à suivre cette directive dans une affaire donnée? et quels éléments de preuve les parties doivent- elles présenter pour que le juge puisse rendre une décision sur ce point? plus les parties au litige invoquent de facteurs (et de faits supplémentaires offrant un contexte à ces facteurs), plus ces interrogations se multiplient. [152] the result of this approach, we fear, is to grant judges unbridled discretion to consider or to disregard whatever they deem to be appropriate, leading to outcomes that may be as inconsistent as they are unpredictable. the effects will be felt most acutely by parents and potential litigants who will lack any discernable guidance as to how they should order their family affairs. this is particularly important in the context of educational exchanges, family visits, or other forms of international travel, where the majority’s approach effectively vitiates the purpose of time- limited consents. if one par- ent can override such an agreement by presenting [152] nous craignons que cette approche ne confère au tribunal un pouvoir discrétionnaire illimité lui permettant de tenir compte ou non d’éléments à son gré et n’entraîne ainsi des résultats aussi incohérents qu’imprévisibles. ceux qui en subiront le plus grand impact seront les parents et les plaideurs éventuels, car ils ne disposeront d’aucun repère pour organiser leur vie familiale. cela est particulièrement impor- tant dans le contexte d’échanges étudiants, de vi- sites familiales ou de tout autre voyage international, l’approche des juges majoritaires ayant pour effet de réduire à néant la raison d’être du consentement à un séjour d’une durée limitée. si l’un des parents [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 459 competing evidence based on “all relevant factors”, then the certainty provided for by time- limited con- sent agreements is only ever illusory. other courts have discussed this problem at length: without intelligibility and consistency in [how the con- vention is applied], parents are deprived of crucial in- formation they need to make decisions, and children are more likely to suffer the harms the convention seeks to prevent. imagine, for example, a parent trying to decide whether to travel with a child to attempt reconciliation with an estranged spouse in another country, or whether to consent to a child’s trip abroad to stay with in- laws. such parents would be vitally interested in knowing under what circumstances a child’s habitual residence is likely to be altered, and it is cold comfort to be told only that this is “a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the circumstances of any particular case.” parents faced with this response would likely regard the introduction of a few judicial “presuppositions and presumptions,”   . with more relief than alarm. [footnotes omitted; citations omitted.] peut passer outre à pareille entente en présentant une preuve contraire reposant sur « tous éléments pertinents », la certitude assurée par le consentement à un séjour d’une durée limitée ne sera qu’illusoire. d’autres tribunaux ont examiné ce problème avec moult détails : [traduction] ne pas rendre [l’application de la conven- tion] intelligible et cohérente c’est priver les parents des données cruciales dont ils ont besoin pour prendre des décisions et faire en sorte que les enfants soient plus susceptibles de subir le préjudice auquel la convention vise à les soustraire. prenons l’exemple du parent qui se demande s’il devrait entreprendre un voyage avec son enfant pour tenter de se réconcilier avec son ex- conjoint, ou s’il devrait consentir à ce que son enfant se rende à l’étranger pour y séjourner dans la belle- famille. ce parent aurait vraiment intérêt à connaître les conditions auxquelles la résidence habituelle de l’enfant pourrait être modifi ée, et il est peu rassurant de se faire dire seulement que c’est [traduction] « une question de fait qui doit être tranchée eu égard à l’ensemble des faits propres à une affaire donnée ». le parent auquel pareille réponse est faite accueillera avec plus de soulagement que d’in- quiétude l’application de quelques « présuppositions et présomptions » judiciaires. [notes en bas de page omises; références omises.] (mozes, at pp. 1072-73) (mozes, p. 1072-1073) [153] in summary, we view the majority’s approach as embedding indeterminacy in a context that simply cannot tolerate it. multi- factor balancing tests can play a helpful role in certain contexts. unfortunately, this is not one of them: the convention requires swift and predictable decisions, and the hybrid model pro- vides neither. as we turn to below, this case convinc- ingly illustrates the comparative advantages of the parental intention approach. [153] en résumé, nous sommes d’avis que l’ap- proche des juges majoritaires consacre une in- certitude dans un domaine qui ne s’y prête tout simplement pas. un test multifactoriel peut se révéler utile dans certains contextes. mais ce n’est malheu- reusement pas le cas en l’espèce. la convention requiert des décisions rapides et prévisibles, et le modèle hybride n’offre ni les unes ni les autres. la présente affaire illustre de façon convaincante les avantages comparatifs de l’approche fondée sur l’in- tention des parents. voici pourquoi. c application c application [154] the relevant point in time for determin- ing the children’s habitual residence in this case is august 15, 2014 — the date on which the father’s [154] en l’espèce, le moment en fonction duquel il convient de déterminer le lieu de la résidence ha- bituelle des enfants est le 15 août 2014, soit le jour 460 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. period of consent expired.5 there is no question that the children were habitually resident in germany prior to their trip to canada in april 2013. the only issue is whether their habitual residence changed from germany to canada during the roughly 16 months that they lived here. [155] in our view, germany remained the chil- dren’s habitual residence. there is an express agree- ment indicating that the father only consented to a temporary stay in canada. the validity of this agreement is not disputed. thus, there was no shared intent for canada to displace germany as the chil- dren’s habitual residence. even if a prolonged period in another jurisdiction can, in some extreme cases, become “time- limited in name only” (ca reasons, at para. 49), a period of just 16 months in another country falls well short of that standard. with re- spect, the majority’s reluctance to apply their new framework to the facts of this case is indicative of the extent to which its open- ended analysis will prove unhelpful to judges who must apply this approach moving forward. [156] that said, we agree with the majority that this case involved unacceptably long delays (see majority reasons, at paras 82-89). regardless of how courts approach the question of habitual residence, the convention requires that return applications are litigated and decided expeditiously. in our view, a clear statement by this court that delay will not af- fect the determination of habitual residence would encourage the effi cient and expeditious resolution of disputes. this underscores why we believe that a focus on shared parental intent is preferable to the majority’s approach. où a pris fi n le séjour auquel avait consenti le père5. il ne fait aucun doute que les enfants avaient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne avant leur départ pour le canada en avril 2013. la seule question qui se pose est de savoir si le lieu de leur résidence ha- bituelle est devenu le canada au cours de la période d’environ 16 mois où ils ont habité au pays. [155] selon nous, les enfants ont continué d’avoir leur résidence habituelle en allemagne. il y a une entente expresse dans laquelle le père n’a consenti qu’à un séjour temporaire au canada. la validité de cette entente n’est pas contestée. il n’y avait donc pas d’intention commune que le canada remplace l’allemagne comme lieu de la résidence habituelle des enfants. même si la durée d’un séjour prolongé dans un autre pays peut, dans certains cas extrêmes, n’être « limitée que sur papier » (motifs de la ca, par. 49), c’est loin d’être le cas d’un séjour de tout juste 16 mois dans un autre pays. avec respect, la réticence des juges majoritaires à appliquer leur nou- veau cadre d’analyse aux faits de la présente espèce montre à quel point leur démarche sans limites se révélera peu utile aux tribunaux qui devront désor- mais appliquer leur approche. [156] cela dit, nous convenons avec les juges ma- joritaires que, dans la présente affaire, la longueur du débat judiciaire a été inacceptable (voir opinion ma- joritaire, par 82-89). peu importe l’angle sous lequel les tribunaux abordent la question de la résidence habituelle, la convention exige que la demande de retour fasse l’objet d’une audition et d’une décision rapides. selon nous, une déclaration claire de la cour portant que le temps écoulé n’aura pas d’incidence sur la détermination du lieu de la résidence habituelle favoriserait le règlement effi cace et expéditif des litiges. raison de plus pour laquelle nous croyons qu’une approche axée sur l’intention commune des parents est préférable à celle que préconisent les juges majoritaires. 5 there is no dispute that the mother’s removal of the children to canada was not wrongful because the father consented to the move. at issue is whether the mother’s retention of the children in canada after the father’s time- limited consent expired was wrongful. 5 nul ne conteste que le déplacement des enfants par la mère vers le canada n’était pas illicite, car le père y avait consenti. la question est de savoir si le non- retour des enfants en allemagne au terme du séjour d’une durée limitée auquel avait consenti le père était illicite. [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 461 v objections under article 13(2) v opposition prévue à l’article 13(2) [157] after a court has determined that a child has been wrongfully removed from his or her country of habitual residence, article 13(2) of the convention provides judges with discretion to refuse to issue a return order on the basis of the child’s objections. article 13(2) states: [157] une fois établi que l’enfant a été déplacé illicitement du lieu de sa résidence habituelle, l’ar- ticle 13(2) de la convention confère au tribunal un pouvoir discrétionnaire qui lui permet de refuser d’ordonner le retour au motif que l’enfant s’y op- pose. l’article 13(2) est libellé comme suit : the judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it fi nds that the child ob- jects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. l’autorité judiciaire ou administrative peut aussi re- fuser d’ordonner le retour de l’enfant si elle constate que celui-ci s’oppose à son retour et qu’il a atteint un âge et une maturité où il se révèle approprié de tenir compte de cette opinion. if both criteria are satisfi ed (the child objects, and the child has attained a suffi cient age and degree of maturity), the judge may decline to issue a return order, but is not required to do so. we offer some guidance on how that discretion should be exercised under the majority’s framework. [158] the majority adopts “fact- based, common- sense approach” (para. 76) that invites judges to consider the totality of the circumstances. several aspects of the majority’s analysis warrant elabo- ration. first, a child’s objection should not be de- terminative, or even presumptively determinative, of whether a court should exercise its discretion to refuse a return order. second, the policy objectives of the hague convention must be considered in deter- mining whether to refuse a return order. in our view, this must include the express objective of protecting rights of custody and access. third, the issue is not solely what the child wants, and the analysis is not to be treated as an application for custody. each of these points are consistent with the majority’s admo- nition that article 13(2) should not be read broadly such that it would erode the general rule of habitual residence (para 76). si les deux conditions sont remplies (l’enfant s’op- pose et il a atteint un âge et une maturité suffi sants), le tribunal peut refuser d’ordonner le retour, mais il n’est pas requis de le faire. voici quelques indications quant à la façon dont ce pouvoir discrétionnaire de- vrait être exercé selon le cadre d’analyse des juges majoritaires. [158] leur « méthode axée sur les faits et sur le sens commun » (par. 76) invite le tribunal à tenir compte de toutes les circonstances. des précisions s’imposent quant à plusieurs aspects de leur analyse. premièrement, l’opposition de l’enfant ne devrait pas nécessairement, ni même de manière présomptive, être décisive quant à l’opportunité que le tribunal exerce le pouvoir discrétionnaire qui lui permet de refuser d’ordonner le retour. deuxièmement, les ob- jectifs de politique générale de la convention de la haye doivent être considérés pour décider s’il y a lieu ou non de refuser d’ordonner le retour. à notre avis, ces objectifs doivent englober l’objectif exprès de protéger les droits de garde et de visite. troisièmement, il ne s’agit pas seulement de savoir ce que veut l’enfant, et l’analyse ne doit pas être celle que commande une demande de garde. chacun de ces points se concilie avec l’exhortation des juges majoritaires à ne pas interpréter l’article 13(2) trop largement de sorte que le caractère général de la règle de la résidence habituelle soit compromis (par 76). [159] in light of these considerations, we are of the view that article 13(2) should not be lightly invoked so as to systematically undermine custody rights of [159] à la lumière de ces considérations, nous es- timons que l’article 13(2) ne devrait pas être invoqué à la légère de manière à porter systématiquement 462 office of the children’s lawyer v balev côté and rowe jj. [2018] 1 scr. left- behind parents. judges should therefore apply this exception in a manner that does not routinely override shared parental intent. indeed, to allow a child’s objections to routinely trump evidence of shared parental intent would render the determina- tion of habitual residence entirely superfl uous. thus, as the majority notes, the exceptions in article 13(2) “are just that — exceptions”, and they “do not confer a general discretion on the application judge to refuse to return the child” (para 76). in our view, courts should pay careful attention to ensure that a child’s objections are not the result of the undue infl uence of one parent. similarly, when assessing the nature and strength of the child’s objections, courts should be cognizant of the fact that the effect of refusing a return order is that a child will not be returned to his or her habitual residence, and the status quo prior to the removal or retention will not be restored. that reality must factor into the analysis. [160] the assessment of evidence relative to the objections of children under article 13(2) and the subsequent decision as to whether those objections justify refusing to issue a return order are both dis- cretionary decisions. consequently, the application judge’s decision relative to article 13(2) is entitled to deference (see housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at paras. 10, 25 and 36). in this case, the application judge concluded that the children had not expressed objections with the requi- site strength of feeling. we do not fi nd any reversible error in this analysis, nor does the majority point to any such error. as a result, there is no basis to refuse a return order after concluding that germany was the children’s habitual residence. atteinte au droit de garde du parent laissé derrière. les juges devraient donc appliquer cette exception de façon que l’intention commune des parents ne soit pas occultée. en effet, permettre que l’opposition de l’enfant écarte automatiquement la preuve de l’intention commune des parents rendrait la détermi- nation du lieu de la résidence habituelle totalement superfl ue. ainsi, comme le soulignent nos collè- gues, les exceptions prévues à l’article 13(2) « ne sont précisément que cela, des exceptions », et elles « ne confèrent pas au juge des requêtes un pouvoir discrétionnaire général qui lui permet de refuser d’ordonner le retour » (par 76). selon nous, les tri- bunaux devraient bien s’assurer que l’opposition de l’enfant n’est pas le fruit de l’infl uence indue de l’un des parents. de même, lorsqu’il s’agit d’apprécier la nature et la solidité des motifs d’opposition de l’enfant, les tribunaux ne doivent pas oublier que le refus d’ordonner le retour empêchera le retour de l’enfant dans le lieu de sa résidence habituelle et le rétablissement de la situation d’avant le déplace- ment ou le non- retour. cette réalité doit être prise en compte dans l’analyse. [160] l’appréciation de la preuve relative à l’oppo- sition de l’enfant pour l’application de l’article 13(2) et la décision subséquente quant à savoir si les mo- tifs de cette opposition justifi ent le refus d’ordonner le retour sont toutes deux de nature discrétionnaire. par conséquent, la décision de la juge des requêtes relativement à l’application de l’article 13(2) com- mande la déférence (voir housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, par. 10, 25 et 36). en l’espèce, la juge des requêtes a conclu que les enfants ne se sont pas opposés au retour avec l’intensité re- quise. nous ne voyons dans son analyse aucune er- reur justifi ant l’annulation de sa décision, et les juges majoritaires ne relèvent pas une telle erreur non plus. dès lors, rien ne permettait de refuser d’ordonner le retour après avoir conclu que les enfants avaient leur résidence habituelle en allemagne. vi conclusion vi conclusion [161] although the appeal is factually moot, we would nonetheless dismiss the appeal based on our fi nding that the application judge correctly deter- mined that the children were habitually resident in [161] malgré le caractère théorique du pourvoi, nous sommes d’avis de le rejeter en raison de notre conclusion selon laquelle la juge des requêtes était justifiée de décider que les enfants avaient leur [2018] 1 rcs. bureau de l’avocat des enfants c balev les juges côté et rowe 463 germany at the expiry of the time- limited consent granted by their father, and there was no basis to decline to issue a return order under article 13(2). résidence habituelle en allemagne au terme du séjour d’une durée limitée auquel avait consenti le père, et que rien ne lui permettait de refuser d’ordonner le retour sur le fondement de l’article 13(2). judgment accordingly, moldaver, côté and jugement en conséquence, les juges moldaver, rowe jj. dissenting. côté et rowe sont dissidents. dren’s lawyer, toronto; houghton, slonlowski, stengel, welland (ontario). procureurs de l’appelant : bureau de l’avocat des enfants, toronto; houghton, slonlowski, stengel, welland (ontario). bookman law professional corporation barristers, toronto. procureurs de l’intimé john paul balev : bookman law professional corporation barristers, toronto. solicitors for the respondent catharine- rose baggott: senson law, toronto; tammy law, barrister and solicitor, toronto. procureurs de l’intimée catharine- rose baggott : senson law, toronto; tammy law, barrister and solicitor, toronto. of canada: attorney general of canada, ottawa. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général du canada : procureur général du canada, ottawa. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’ontario : procureur général de l’ontario, toronto. of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, vancouver. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de la colombie- britannique : procureur général de la colombie- britannique, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenant defence for children international- canada: wilson christen, toronto. international- canada : wilson christen, toronto. commemorative clinic: barbra schlifer commem- orative clinic, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante barbra schlifer com- memorative clinic : barbra schlifer commemorative clinic, toronto.
[1] this appeal concerns several complaints under the canadian human rights act, rsc 1985, c. h-6 (“chra”), that were dismissed by the canadian human rights tribunal (“tribunal”) in two deci- sions. the complaints alleged that the legislative entitlements to registration under the indian act, rsc 1985, c. i-5, were discriminatory practices prohibited by the chra. at issue before this court is, fi rst, whether deference is owed to a human rights tribunal interpreting its home statute and, second, whether the tribunal’s decisions dismissing the complaints as direct attacks on legislation were rea- sonable. [1] le présent pourvoi concerne plusieurs plaintes fondées sur la loi canadienne sur les droits de la per- sonne, lrc 1985, c. h-6 (« lcdp »), que le tribu- nal canadien des droits de la personne (« tribunal ») a rejetées dans deux décisions. d’après ces plaintes, les droits à l’inscription prévus dans la loi sur les indiens, lrc 1985, c. i-5, constitueraient des actes discriminatoires prohibés par la lcdp. en l’espèce, notre cour est appelée à décider, premièrement, s’il convient de faire preuve de déférence à l’égard de l’interprétation de sa loi constitutive par un tribunal des droits de la personne et, deuxièmement, si les dé- cisions par lesquelles le tribunal a rejeté les plaintes en cause au motif qu’elles constituaient des attaques directes contre un texte de loi étaient raisonnables. [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 243 [2] all of the complaints arise from the lingering effects of “enfranchisement”, a discriminatory and damaging policy previously enshrined in the indian act. enfranchisement stripped individuals of their indian act status and prevented their children from registering as status “indians”. parliament has put an end to enfranchisement and enacted remedial regis- tration provisions. the complainants challenge the suffi ciency of these remedial measures, claiming that they and their children continue to suffer discrimina- tion as a legacy of enfranchisement. [3] the complaints were heard by the tribunal sep- arately. in both decisions, the tribunal determined that the complaints were a direct attack on the indian act. in order to establish a discriminatory practice to which the tribunal could respond, the complainants needed to demonstrate that the legislative provisions fell within the statutory meaning of a service. after a thorough and thoughtful review of their enabling statute, the jurisprudence and policy considerations, the adjudicators in both decisions concluded that legislation was not a service under the chra and dismissed the complaints. on judicial review, both the federal court and the federal court of appeal found that the tribunal decisions were reasonable and should be upheld. i agree, and i would dismiss the appeal. [2] toutes les plaintes découlent des effets que continue d’avoir l’« émancipation », une politique discriminatoire et préjudiciable autrefois consacrée dans la loi sur les indiens. l’émancipation retirait aux individus leur statut obtenu en vertu de la loi sur les indiens et empêchait leurs enfants d’être ins- crits à titre d’« indiens ». le législateur a mis un terme à l’émancipation, et adopté des dispositions réparatrices en matière d’inscription. les plaignants soutiennent que ces mesures réparatrices sont in- suffi santes, parce qu’eux- mêmes et leurs enfants continuent de souffrir de discrimination en raison des séquelles laissées par l’émancipation. [3] le tribunal a instruit les plaintes séparément. dans les deux décisions, il a statué que les plaintes constituaient une attaque directe à la loi sur les indiens. pour pouvoir établir l’existence d’actes dis- criminatoires susceptibles de justifi er l’intervention du tribunal, les plaignants devaient démontrer que les dispositions législatives en cause constituaient un service aux termes de la lcdp. après une analyse fouillée et réfl échie de leur loi habilitante, de la juris- prudence et de diverses considérations de principe, les membres décideurs dans les deux décisions ont conclu que la loi n’était pas un service aux termes de la lcdp et ont rejeté les plaintes. saisies de de- mandes de contrôle judiciaire, la cour fédérale et la cour d’appel fédérale ont toutes deux conclu que les décisions rendues par le tribunal étaient raisonnables et devaient être maintenues. je suis du même avis; je rejetterais donc le pourvoi. ii background ii contexte a indian act registration a l’inscription sous le régime de la loi sur les indiens [4] since its enactment in 1876, the indian act has governed the recognition of an individual’s status as an “indian”. in its current form, the indian act creates a registration system under which individuals qualify for status on the basis of an exhaustive list of eligibility criteria. the indian act’s registration entitlements do not necessarily correspond to the customs of indigenous communities for determin- ing their own membership or refl ect an individu- al’s aboriginal identity or heritage. however, it is [4] depuis son adoption, en 1876, la loi sur les indiens régit la reconnaissance du statut d’« indien ». dans sa version actuelle, cette loi établit un régime d’inscription prévoyant une liste exhaustive de cri- tères d’admissibilité au statut d’« indien ». cepen- dant, les conditions relatives au droit à l’inscription prévues dans la loi sur les indiens ne correspondent pas nécessairement aux coutumes propres à chaque communauté autochtone pour ce qui est de défi nir l’appartenance de ses membres. elles ne cadrent 244 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. incontrovertible that status confers both tangible and intangible benefi ts. [5] the complaints underlying this appeal are rooted in a history of deeply harmful and discrim- inatory aspects of the indian act that were largely removed in 1985 and 2011 reforms (an act to amend the indian act, rsc 1985, c. 32 (1st supp.), an act to amend the indian act (death rules), rsc 1985, c. 43 (4th supp.), and gender equity in indian regis- tration act, sc 2010, c 18). prior to these reforms, individuals could be “enfranchised”, a euphemism for various legislative processes that would strip them of their indian act status. in one form of enfran- chisement, the government incentivized individuals to renounce their status by offering such basic rights as citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to hold land in fee simple (canada (attorney general) v. larkman, 2012 fca 204, [2012] 4 cnlr 87, at para 12). in another form, a status woman who married a non- status man would be involuntarily “enfranchised” along with any of her children (re- port of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples, vol. 4, perspectives and realities (1996), at p 25). this policy refl ected a discriminatory view of women as subservient to their husbands and entrenched a system of patrilineal descent unfamiliar to many indigenous communities (report, at p 25). parlia- ment’s stated intention for enfranchisement was to gradually reduce the number of status “indians” (see, eg,. an act to encourage the gradual civilization of the indian tribes in this province, and to amend the laws respecting indians, s. prov. c. 1857, 20 vict., c. 26, preamble). at its root, enfranchisement was a discriminatory policy aimed at eradicating abo- riginal culture and assimilating aboriginal peoples (larkman, at para 11). pas non plus nécessairement avec l’identité ou le patrimoine autochtones. reste que le statut procure indubitablement des avantages, aussi bien tangibles qu’intangibles. [5] les plaintes à l’origine du présent pourvoi prennent leur source dans un historique d’aspects profondément préjudiciables et discriminatoires de la loi sur les indiens que les réformes de 1985 et de 2011 ont en grande partie supprimés (loi modifi ant la loi sur les indiens, lrc 1985, c 32 (1er suppl),. loi modifi ant la loi sur les indiens (règles relatives au décès), lrc 1985, c 43 (4e suppl), et loi sur l’équité entre les sexes relativement à l’inscription au registre des indiens, lc 2010, c 18). avant ces réformes, des personnes ayant le statut d’« indien » sous le régime de la loi sur les indiens pouvaient obtenir une « émancipation », euphémisme employé pour désigner divers processus législatifs par les- quels ce statut leur était retiré. suivant l’une des formes d’émancipation, le gouvernement encoura- geait les individus à renoncer à leur statut, en leur octroyant en retour des droits fondamentaux, no- tamment la citoyenneté et le droit de vote, ainsi que le droit de détenir une terre en fi ef simple (canada (procureur général) c. larkman, 2012 caf 204, par. 12 (canlii)). sous une autre forme, une femme inscrite qui épousait un homme non inscrit devenait involontairement « émancipée », à l’instar de chacun de ses enfants (rapport de la commission royale sur les peuples autochtones, vol. 4, perspectives et réa- lités (1996), p 26-27). cette politique, qui traduisait une conception discriminatoire des femmes comme étant subordonnées à leur mari, entérinait par ailleurs un système de descendance patrilinéaire étranger à de nombreuses communautés autochtones (rapport, p 26-27). selon l’intention déclarée du législateur, l’émancipation avait pour objectif de réduire pro- gressivement le nombre d’« indiens » inscrits (voir, p ex, le préambule de l’acte pour encourager la civilisation graduelle des tribus sauvages en cette province, et pour amender les lois relatives aux sauvages, s. prov. c. 1857, 20 vict., c 26). à la base, l’émancipation était une politique discriminatoire qui visait l’éradication de la culture autochtone ainsi que l’assimilation des peuples autochtones (larkman, par 11). [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 245 in 1985, parliament enacted new legislation [6] that eliminated enfranchisement as a practice and created registration provisions entitling those who had lost their status to register (an act to amend the indian act). in 2011, further reforms granted registration eligibility to the children of women who had lost status for marrying a non- status man (gender equity in indian registration act). during the course of these proceedings, new amendments to the indian act have come into force that may im- pact the matson siblings’ status eligibility (an act to amend the indian act in response to the superior court of quebec decision in descheneaux c. canada (procureur général), sc 2017, c 25). the issue of mootness was not, however, fully argued by the par- ties and it is not necessary to consider it for the dis- position of this appeal. i will therefore not comment further on the impact, if any, of the new entitlement provisions. [7] underlying all of the complaints are the indian act’s rules for the transmission of status eligibil- ity. under the current indian act, individuals may qualify for one of two forms of status. section 6(1) status is conferred on individuals who qualify under an exhaustive list of eligibility criteria. section 6(2) status is conferred on individuals who are ineligible under s. 6(1) but who have a single parent entitled to s. 6(1) registration. the two forms of status differ mainly in the ability to transmit eligibility to one’s children: a child who has only one parent with s. 6(1) status will be eligible for s. 6(2) status, while a child who has only one parent with s. 6(2) status will not be eligible for status. [6] en 1985, le législateur a adopté un nouveau texte de loi qui éliminait la pratique de l’émanci- pation et qui créait de nouvelles dispositions en matière d’inscription, redonnant ainsi à ceux ayant perdu leur statut le droit de s’inscrire (loi modifi ant la loi sur les indiens) puis, en 2011, une autre réforme est venue accorder le droit à l’inscription aux enfants nés d’une mère ayant perdu son statut par suite d’un mariage avec un homme non ins- crit (loi sur l’équité entre les sexes relativement à l’inscription au registre des indiens). au cours de la présente instance, de nouvelles modifi cations à la loi sur les indiens qui sont susceptibles d’avoir une incidence sur le droit des membres de la fra- trie matson au statut d’« indien » sont entrées en vigueur (loi modifi ant la loi sur les indiens pour donner suite à la décision de la cour supérieure du québec dans l’affaire descheneaux c. canada (procureur général), lc 2017, c 25). toutefois, la question du caractère théorique des plaintes des matson n’a pas été pleinement débattue par les parties, et il n’est pas nécessaire de l’examiner afi n de statuer sur le présent pourvoi. je ne m’at- tarderai donc pas plus longuement sur les éventuels effets des nouvelles dispositions relatives au droit à l’inscription. [7] toutes les plaintes se fondent sur les règles de la loi sur les indiens applicables à la transmission du droit au statut d’« indien ». selon la version ac- tuelle de cette loi, une personne peut être admissible à l’une ou l’autre de deux catégories de statut. ainsi, les personnes qui satisfont aux critères exhaustifs d’admissibilité peuvent se voir conférer le statut visé au par 6(1). quant au statut prévu au par. 6(2), il peut être accordé aux personnes inadmissibles au statut visé au par. 6(1), mais dont un seul parent jouit d’un droit à l’inscription en vertu du par 6(1). la différence entre les deux catégories de statut tient principalement à la capacité qu’aura la personne inscrite de transmettre à ses enfants le droit à l’ins- cription : l’enfant dont un seul parent a le statut au titre du par. 6(1) sera admissible au statut visé par le par. 6(2), alors qu’un enfant dont un seul parent a le statut au titre du par. 6(2) ne sera pas admissible au statut d’« indien » inscrit. 246 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. b the complaints in matson v. canada (indian b les plaintes dans matson c. canada (affaires and northern affairs), 2013 chrt 13 indiennes et du nord), 2013 tcdp 13 [8] the complaints in matson involve three siblings who allege that sex- based discrimination led to their ineligibility for s. 6(1) status, and their children’s ineligibility for s. 6(2) status. their grandmother lost her status under the indian act when she married a non- status man. following the 1985 amendments, their grandmother was able to regain her status under s 6(1)(c). the 2011 amendments then allowed their father to obtain status under s 6(1)(c1) and the sib- lings to obtain status under s 6(2). their children are, however, ineligible for status. if the siblings’ status grandparent had been male, they would have been eligible for s. 6(1)(a) registration and their children would have been entitled to s. 6(2) registration. [8] les plaintes dans l’affaire matson concernent trois membres d’une fratrie qui allèguent qu’une discrimination fondée sur le sexe a entraîné leur inadmissibilité au statut visé au par. 6(1), de même que l’inadmissibilité de leurs enfants au statut visé au par 6(2). leur grand- mère a perdu son statut lorsqu’elle a épousé un homme non inscrit. après l’entrée en vigueur des modifi cations législatives de 1985, elle a pu recouvrer son statut par application de l’al 6(1)c). les modifi cations apportées en 2011 ont ensuite permis au père d’obtenir le statut visé à l’al 6(1)c1); et les membres de la fratrie ont obtenu le statut visé au par 6(2). en revanche, leurs enfants ne sont pas admissibles au statut. si le grand- parent autochtone des membres de la fratrie avait été de sexe masculin, ces derniers auraient été admissibles à l’inscription au titre de l’al. 6(1)a), et leurs enfants, à l’inscription au titre du par 6(2). c the complaints in andrews v. canada (indian c les plaintes dans andrews c. canada (affaires and northern affairs), 2013 chrt 21 indiennes et du nord), 2013 tcdp 21 [9] the andrews’ complaints concern the impact of the enfranchisement provisions and the scope of subsequent remedial legislation. mr. andrews’ father lost his status through an enfranchisement order. consequently, his fi rst wife and their daughter also lost their status. mr. andrews was born after the enfranchisement order was issued and his mother was a non- status woman unaffected by the order. following the 1985 legislation, mr. andrews’ fa- ther and his half- sister became eligible for s. 6(1)(d) status. however, as mr. andrews’ mother was never eligible for status, mr. andrews is eligible only for s. 6(2) status and his daughter is ineligible for status. if mr. andrews had been born before the enfran- chisement order, or if no order had been made, he would qualify for s. 6(1) status and his daughter would be eligible for s. 6(2) status. mr. andrews’ complaints allege that this result constitutes prohib- ited discrimination on the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin and family status. [9] les plaintes des andrews concernent les effets des dispositions relatives à l’émancipation, ainsi que la portée des dispositions réparatrices adoptées par la suite. le père de m. andrews a perdu son statut d’« indien » à la suite d’une ordonnance d’émanci- pation. en conséquence, sa première épouse et leur fi lle ont également perdu leur statut. m. andrews est né après que l’ordonnance d’émancipation ait été rendue, et sa mère, qui n’était pas inscrite, n’était pas touchée par l’ordonnance. à la suite de l’adoption des modifi cations législatives en 1985, le père et la demi- sœur de m. andrews sont devenus admissibles au statut au titre de l’al 6(1)d). cependant, puisque la mère de m. andrews n’a jamais été admissible au statut, celui-ci est admissible uniquement au statut visé au par. 6(2) et sa fi lle n’est admissible à aucun statut. or, si m. andrews était né avant l’ordonnance d’émancipation, ou s’il n’y avait pas eu d’ordon- nance, il serait admissible au statut visé au par. 6(1), et sa fi lle, au statut visé au par 6(2). dans ses plaintes, m. andrews allègue que pareil résultat constitue de la discrimination illicite fondée sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique et la situation de famille. [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 247 d canadian human rights act d loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne [10] under the chra, individuals can fi le a com- plaint regarding an enumerated discriminatory prac- tice, and anyone found to have engaged in such a practice may be made subject to an order by the tribunal (chra, s 4). the complaints allege that indian and northern affairs canada (“inac”) en- gaged in a discriminatory practice in the provision of services contrary to s. 5 of the chra when it denied a form of registration that would permit the com- plainants to pass on entitlements to their children. section 5 reads as follows: 5 it is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods, services, facilities or accommodation customarily availa- ble to the general public [10] une personne peut, en vertu de la lcdp, déposer une plainte concernant l’un des actes dis- criminatoires énoncés dans cette loi, et quiconque est reconnu coupable d’un tel acte peut faire l’objet d’une ordonnance du tribunal (art. 4 de la lcdp). dans les plaintes en l’espèce, il est allégué qu’af- faires indiennes et du nord canada (« ainc ») a commis un acte discriminatoire dans le cadre de la prestation de services, en contravention de l’art. 5 de la lcdp, lorsqu’il a privé les plaignants d’une forme d’inscription qui leur aurait permis de trans- mettre à leurs enfants le droit au statut d’« indien ». l’article 5 est ainsi libellé : 5 constitue un acte discriminatoire, s’il est fondé sur un motif de distinction illicite, le fait, pour le fournisseur de biens, de services, d’installations ou de moyens d’héber- gement destinés au public : (a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such good, ser- vice, facility or accommodation to any individual, or a) d’en priver un individu; (b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any indi- vidual, b) de le défavoriser à l’occasion de leur fourniture. on a prohibited ground of discrimination. iii decisions below iii décisions des juridictions inférieures a canadian human rights tribunal decisions a les décisions du tribunal canadien des droits de la personne (1) the matson decision (1) la décision matson [11] in response to the request of the canadian human rights commission (“commission”), the tribunal launched an inquiry into the matson sib- lings’ complaints pursuant to s. 49 of the chra. in its decision, the tribunal addressed three issues: (1) whether the complaints involved a direct chal- lenge to the indian act; (2) whether the tribunal was bound by the federal court of appeal’s decision in public service alliance of canada v. canada reve- nue agency, 2012 fca 7, 428 nr 240 (“murphy”); and (3) whether the complaints, properly character- ized, concerned a discriminatory practice. [11] en réponse à la demande de la commission canadienne des droits de la personne (« commis- sion »), le tribunal a instruit les plaintes de la famille matson en vertu de l’art. 49 de la lcdp. dans sa décision, il s’est penché sur trois questions : (1) les plaintes constituaient- elles une contestation directe de la loi sur les indiens? (2) le tribunal était-il lié par la décision de la cour d’appel fédérale dans al- liance de la fonction publique du canada c. canada (agence du revenu), 2012 caf 7 (« murphy »)? et enfi n, (3) les plaintes — correctement qualifi ées — mettaient- elles en cause un acte discriminatoire? 248 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. in the tribunal decision, the adjudicator, [12] member lustig, began the task of characterizing the complaints by referring, fi rst, to the test for deter- mining what constituted a service stated in canada (attorney general) v. watkin, 2008 fca 170, 378 nr 268, and, second, to the holding in murphy that the chra did not permit complaints that directly targeted legislation. the adjudicator reviewed the matson siblings’ submissions and concluded that their complaints, in substance, challenged the eli- gibility criteria under s. 6 of the indian act. it was noted that inac did not have any involvement in determining the eligibility criteria under s. 6 of the indian act, nor did it have any discretion in applying the criteria. while the act of processing applications and registering individuals could be characterized as a service customarily held out to the public, the underlying statutory entitlement to registration was not a service held out by inac to the public. rather, it was a benefi t offered by an act of parliament. [13] the adjudicator considered whether he was bound by the federal court of appeal decision in murphy, which held that the tribunal was unable to consider direct challenges to legislation. in murphy, the complainant had received a settlement payment for wage discrimination that had occurred over a number of years. under the income tax act, rsc. 1985, c. 1 (5th supp.), the settlement was deemed to be employment income accrued in the year the pay- ment was made. the canada revenue agency did not apply the qualifying retroactive lump- sum pay- ment analysis, which would have spread the income over previous tax years. this was because the com- pound interest on the notional tax the complainant would have owed outweighed the benefi ts of being taxed at a lower rate. the complainant challenged the assessment as a discriminatory practice under the chra. the tribunal dismissed the complaint on the basis that it targeted the statutory provisions establishing the impugned assessment calculations (2010 chrt 9, [2011] 1 ctc 215). writing for the federal court of appeal, noël ja (as he then was) upheld the tribunal’s decision. despite apply- ing a reasonableness standard, noël ja endorsed [12] dans la décision du tribunal, le membre dé- cideur, m. lustig, a entrepris de qualifi er les plaintes en commençant par d’abord rappeler le critère à employer — énoncé dans l’arrêt canada (procureur général) c. watkin, 2008 caf 170, 378 nr 268 — pour établir ce qui constitue un service. il a ensuite rappelé la teneur de l’arrêt murphy, selon lequel la lcdp ne permet pas l’instruction de plaintes visant directement des dispositions législatives. le membre décideur a examiné les observations présentées par les membres de la fratrie matson et conclu que leurs plaintes étaient essentiellement une contestation des critères relatifs au droit à l’inscription énoncés à l’art. 6 de la loi sur les indiens. il a relevé qu’ainc n’a rien à voir avec la détermination de ces critères, et ne dispose pas non plus d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire quant à leur application. bien que le fait de traiter les demandes de requérants et d’inscrire ceux-ci au registre puisse être qualifi é de service habituellement fourni au public, le droit sous- jacent à l’inscrip- tion établi par voie législative n’est pas un service qu’ainc offre au public. il s’agit plutôt d’un avan- tage conféré par une loi fédérale. [13] le membre décideur s’est demandé s’il était tenu de suivre l’arrêt de la cour d’appel fédérale dans murphy, où il a été conclu que le tribunal n’est pas compétent pour examiner les contestations di- rectes visant un texte législatif. dans murphy, la plaignante avait reçu une somme en règlement d’une plainte pour une pratique salariale discriminatoire subie pendant plusieurs années. cette somme était considérée, au sens de la loi de l’impôt sur le re- venu, lrc 1985, c 1 (5e suppl), comme un revenu d’emploi gagné au cours de l’année où le paiement avait été fait. l’agence du revenu du canada n’avait pas appliqué le mécanisme des paiements forfai- taires rétroactifs admissibles, qui aurait eu pour effet de répartir ces revenus sur les années d’imposition antérieures, car les intérêts composés sur l’impôt théorique que la plaignante aurait dû payer dé- passaient les avantages liés au fait que les impôts étaient calculés selon un taux inférieur. celle-ci a contesté la validité de cette cotisation, en alléguant qu’il s’agissait d’un acte discriminatoire au sens de la lcdp. le tribunal a rejeté sa plainte, au motif qu’elle visait les dispositions de la loi prescrivant les calculs à effectuer dans le cadre de la cotisation [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 249 as “correct” the view that the chra did not permit direct challenges to legislation (para 6). he distin- guished the prior federal court of appeal decision in canada (attorney general) v. druken, [1989] 2 fc 24, which had endorsed a direct attack on legislation, on the basis that the attorney general in that case had conceded that s. 5 of the chra applied to the impugned provisions of the unemployment insurance act, 1971, sc 1970-71-72, c. 48 (mur- phy, at para 7). [14] the adjudicator rejected arguments that mur- phy was superseded by binding authority from this court in insurance corp of british columbia v. heerspink, [1982] 2 scr 145, winnipeg school division no 1 v. craton, [1985] 2 scr 150, ca- nadian national railway co. v. canada (canadian human rights commission), [1987] 1 scr 1114 (“action travail des femmes”), andrews v law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143, quebec (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. communauté urbaine de mont réal, 2004 scc 30, [2004] 1 scr 789 (“laro- cque”), and tranchemontagne v. ontario (director, disability support program), 2006 scc 14, [2006] 1 scr 513. after careful consideration of this authority, the adjudicator concluded that, while this court had recognized the primacy of human rights legislation and the power of human rights tribunals to render confl icting legislation inoperative, none of these decisions stood for the premise that an order could be issued without fi rst impugning a discrimi- natory practice. en cause (2010 tcdp 9). s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel fédérale, le juge noël (maintenant juge en chef), a confi rmé la décision du tribunal. bien qu’ayant appliqué la norme de contrôle de la décision raisonnable, le juge noël a jugé « correcte » l’opinion suivant laquelle la lcdp ne permet pas l’instruction de plaintes qui constituent une attaque directe contre la loi (par. 6 (canlii)). il a conclu à l’inapplicabilité de l’arrêt canada (procureur géné- ral) c. druken, [1989] 2 cf 24, où la cour d’appel fédérale avait approuvé une attaque directe contre un texte législatif, puisque, dans cette affaire, le procu- reur général avait concédé que l’art. 5 de la lcdp s’appliquait aux dispositions contestées de la loi de 1971 sur l’assurance chômage, sc 1970-71-72, c. 48 (murphy, par 7). [14] le membre décideur a rejeté les arguments selon lesquels l’arrêt murphy avait été supplanté par des décisions de notre cour ayant force de précédent, soit les arrêts insurance corp. of british colum- bia c. heerspink, [1982] 2 rcs 145, winnipeg school division no 1 c. craton, [1985] 2 rcs. 150, compagnie des chemins de fer nationaux du canada c. canada (commission canadienne des droits de la personne), [1987] 1 rcs 1114 (« ac- tion travail des femmes »), andrews c. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 rcs 143, québec (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) c. communauté urbaine de mont réal, 2004 csc 30, [2004] 1 rcs 789 (« larocque »), et tranchemontagne c. ontario (directeur du pro- gramme ontarien de soutien aux personnes handi- capées), 2006 csc 14, [2006] 1 rcs 513. après avoir soigneusement analysé cette jurisprudence, le membre décideur a conclu que, bien que notre cour ait effectivement reconnu la primauté de la législation en matière de droits de la personne et le pouvoir des tribunaux des droits de la personne de déclarer inopérant un texte de loi incompatible avec cette législation, aucun des arrêts invoqués n’étayait l’argument voulant qu’une ordonnance en ce sens puisse être rendue sans qu’il n’y ait, au préalable, mise en cause d’un acte discriminatoire. [15] the adjudicator also considered whether there was confl icting federal court jurisprudence or anal- ogous provincial human rights jurisprudence that [15] le membre décideur s’est également demandé s’il existait des décisions de la cour fédérale ou une jurisprudence provinciale analogue en matière de 250 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. supported the proposition that the tribunal could consider direct challenges to legislation, and he came to the same result. he recognized that in some cir- cumstances a human rights complaint could chal- lenge the conduct of an administrator carrying out mandatory aspects of a statutory provision, but he held that the complaint still needed to identify a discriminatory practice that engaged the tribunal’s remedial authority. [16] the adjudicator rejected arguments that ss. 2, 49(5) and 62(1) of the chra supported an expansive interpretation of the term “services” to encompass legislative provisions. instead, in keeping with the jurisprudence, these provisions pointed to the tribunal’s remedial power to render confl ict- ing legislation inoperative, but they did not indicate that legislation itself constituted a service under the chra. he similarly rejected the argument that s. 67 of the chra had been enacted primarily to shield the indian act registration provisions, and he held that s. 67 had the broader purpose of insulating actions and decisions made pursuant to the indian act. [17] the adjudicator thus concluded that, absent a discriminatory practice enumerated under the chra, the complainants could not challenge the provisions of the indian act. the adjudicator stated that an application under s. 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms would be more appropriate, cit- ing alberta v. hutterian brethren of wilson colony, 2009 scc 37, [2009] 2 scr 567, in support of the position that the charter framework was a better analytical fi t for challenges to legislation than the bona fi de justifi cation analysis under the chra. he then dismissed the complaints. droits de la personne qui seraient contraires à cette conclusion, et qui appuieraient la thèse selon laquelle le tribunal peut connaître d’une plainte contestant directement un texte de loi, et il est parvenu à la même conclusion. il a admis que, dans certaines circonstances, une plainte relative aux droits de la personne peut contester les agissements d’un déci- deur administratif qui met à exécution les aspects obligatoires d’une disposition législative, mais il a conclu que le plaignant doit tout de même faire état d’un acte discriminatoire qui entraîne l’exercice du pouvoir de réparation du tribunal. [16] le membre décideur a ensuite rejeté les argu- ments selon lesquels l’art. 2 et les par. 49(5) et 62(1) de la lcdp appuient une interprétation élargie du terme « services » qui engloberait les dispositions législatives. il a ajouté que, au contraire, conformé- ment à la jurisprudence, ces dispositions mettent en évidence le pouvoir du tribunal de rendre inopé- rantes des lois incompatibles à titre de réparation, mais n’indiquent pas que la loi elle- même constitue un service au sens de la lcdp. de même, le membre décideur a rejeté l’argument selon lequel l’art. 67 de la lcdp a été adopté principalement dans le but de mettre à l’abri les dispositions de la loi sur les indiens en matière d’inscription; il a déclaré que l’ancien art. 67 poursuivait l’objectif plus large de soustraire les mesures et les décisions prises sous le régime de la loi sur les indiens à l’application de la lcdp. [17] le membre décideur est donc parvenu à la conclusion que, faute d’un acte discriminatoire visé par la lcdp, les plaignants ne peuvent contester les dispositions de la loi sur les indiens. il a ajouté qu’une demande fondée sur l’art. 15 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés est davantage in- diquée. il a cité alberta c. hutterian brethren of wilson colony, 2009 csc 37, [2009] 2 rcs 567, à l’appui de sa conclusion selon laquelle le cadre d’analyse fondé sur la charte représente un moyen plus adéquat pour la contestation d’un texte de loi qu’une analyse consistant à démontrer l’existence d’un motif justifi able aux termes de la lcdp. le membre décideur a donc rejeté les plaintes. [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 251 (2) the andrews decision (2) la décision andrews [18] the tribunal also commenced an inquiry into the andrews’ complaints at the request of the commission. the adjudicator, member marchildon, started her analysis from the proposition that the his- torical enfranchisement provisions were contrary to human rights values. however, the adjudicator then identifi ed the determinative issues in andrews as being whether the complaints involved the discrim- inatory provision of services and, if not, whether the chra allowed for complaints that were solely a challenge to legislation. [19] as in matson, the adjudicator considered the jurisprudence on what constituted a service along with the complainant’s submissions and concluded that she was faced with a direct attack on s. 6 of the indian act. the adjudicator recognized that, while status registration may be a service, the un- derlying entitlement provisions were the product of parliament’s sui generis legislative power, which could not be construed as a service under s. 5 of the chra. the adjudicator adopted the matson fi nd- ing that murphy had not been superseded by deci- sions of this court and rejected the submission that other authority submitted to her by the commission amounted to a confl icting line of authority. she fur- ther stated that the justifi cation framework set out in r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, was the more appropriate approach for determining whether rules of general application should be upheld. [18] à la demande de la commission, le tribunal a aussi procédé à l’instruction des plaintes de la famille andrews. comme point de départ de son analyse, le membre décideur, mme marchildon, a examiné la thèse suivant laquelle les dispositions relatives à l’émancipation sont contraires aux valeurs des droits de la personne. néanmoins, elle a ensuite précisé que, dans le cadre de cette affaire, les questions dé- terminantes étaient celles de savoir si les plaintes portaient sur une prestation de services à caractère discriminatoire, et, dans la négative, si la lcdp permettait l’instruction de plaintes qui constituent uniquement une contestation de la loi. [19] comme dans la décision matson, le membre décideur a étudié la jurisprudence sur ce qui consti- tue un service, en la mettant en parallèle avec les observations du plaignant. elle en a conclu qu’elle était en présence d’une contestation directe de l’art. 6 de la loi sur les indiens. elle a reconnu que même si l’inscription à titre d’« indien » peut constituer un service, les dispositions prévoyant le droit à l’inscrip- tion qui sous- tendent ce service découlent de l’exer- cice du pouvoir législatif sui generis du parlement, qui ne peut être considéré comme un service aux termes de l’art. 5 de la lcdp. le membre décideur a fait sienne la conclusion tirée dans la décision matson, selon laquelle l’arrêt murphy n’a pas été supplanté par les arrêts de notre cour. elle a ensuite rejeté la prétention voulant que les autres décisions soumises à son examen par la commission consti- tuent un courant jurisprudentiel contradictoire. elle a en outre déclaré que le cadre de justifi cation établi dans l’arrêt r c. oakes, [1986] 1 rcs 103, est la méthode la plus appropriée pour décider s’il y a lieu de confi rmer la validité de règles d’application générale. b federal court (2015 fc 398, 477 ftr 229). b la cour fédérale (2015 cf 398) [20] the federal court dismissed the commis- sion’s application for judicial review of the matson and andrews decisions. [20] la cour fédérale a rejeté la demande de con- trôle judiciaire présentée par la commission à l’en- contre des décisions matson et andrews. [21] mcveigh j. held that the tribunal had rea- sonably relied on murphy to exclude legislation [21] la juge mcveigh a statué que le tribunal s’était raisonnablement fondé sur l’arrêt murphy pour 252 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. from the defi nition of a service. she rejected the commission’s argument that murphy was not bind- ing and had been wrongly decided. the tribunal was, in her view, obliged to follow the vertical convention of precedent. regardless, she did not view murphy as wrongly decided and thus there was no reason for the tribunal to depart from it. further, mcveigh j. found that the tribunal had reasonably concluded that, while it had the power to render confl icting legislation inoperable, it did not have the power to grant a remedy unless a discriminatory practice was established under the chra. lastly, after reviewing the legislative history behind s. 67 of the chra, mcveigh j. concluded that the tribunal had reason- ably held that this was insuffi cient to ground an ex- pansive interpretation of the registration provisions as constituting a service. exclure les textes de loi du sens du terme service. elle a rejeté l’argument avancé par la commission selon lequel l’arrêt murphy n’a pas valeur de précédent et est erroné. à son avis, le tribunal était tenu de suivre la convention verticale du précédent. quoi qu’il en soit, elle ne jugeait pas l’arrêt murphy erroné, de sorte qu’il n’y avait pas lieu pour le tribunal de s’en écarter. qui plus est, la juge mcveigh a estimé que le tribunal avait raisonnablement conclu qu’en dépit du fait qu’il pouvait déclarer un texte de loi inopérant, il n’avait pas le pouvoir d’accorder une réparation à moins que l’existence d’un acte discriminatoire, au sens de la lcdp, n’ait été établie. en défi ni- tive, après avoir passé en revue l’historique législatif de l’art. 67 de la lcdp, la juge mcveigh a conclu que le tribunal avait raisonnablement jugé que la preuve soumise à cet égard n’était pas suffi sante pour justifi er l’interprétation large des dispositions sur l’inscription, selon laquelle cette dernière serait considérée comme un service. c federal court of appeal (2016 fca 200, [2017] c la cour d’appel fédérale (2016 caf 200, [2017] 2 fcr 211) 2 rcf 211) [22] a unanimous federal court of appeal dis- missed the commission’s appeal from the federal court’s decision. [22] dans un arrêt unanime, la cour d’appel fé- dérale a rejeté l’appel interjeté par la commission à l’encontre de la décision de la cour fédérale. [23] writing for the federal court of appeal, gleason ja fi rst considered the application of the standard of review to human rights tribunal decisions following dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190. she held that the reasonable- ness standard presumptively applied to a tribunal’s interpretation of its home statute except where a rec- ognized exception applied or where certain contex- tual factors indicated that correctness should apply. [23] s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel fé- dérale, la juge gleason a d’abord examiné l’appli- cation de la norme de contrôle aux décisions des tribunaux des droits de la personne à la suite de l’arrêt dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190. elle a déclaré que la norme de la décision raisonnable doit, en principe, être appliquée aux décisions des tribunaux administratifs interprétant leur loi constitutive, sauf dans les cas où une exception reconnue s’applique, ou lorsque des facteurs contextuels donnent à penser qu’il convient d’appliquer la norme de la décision correcte. [24] while recognizing that the correctness stand- ard had on occasion been applied to the review of human rights tribunal decisions, gleason ja. found that the applicable standard of review could be determined by applying general principles of administrative law the interpretation of human rights legislation did not rise to the standard of a [24] tout en reconnaissant que des décisions des tribunaux spécialisés en matière de droits de la per- sonne ont parfois été examinées selon la norme de la décision correcte, la juge gleason a estimé que l’on peut déterminer la norme de contrôle applicable en ayant recours aux principes généraux du droit administratif. l’interprétation de la législation sur [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 253 constitutional question warranting correctness re- view. while the questions determined by human rights tribunals could be of such broad import as to be of central importance to the legal system as a whole, they generally did not fall outside the tribunal’s expertise. gleason ja considered the possibility that the correctness standard could be applied where other tribunals had jurisdiction to interpret the same provisions of the chra, but no such overlap existed in the present case. therefore, the reasonableness standard applied to the tribunal’s interpretation of s. 5, as well as its interpretation of the facts of the matson and andrews decisions. [25] gleason ja went on to fi nd that the results reached by the tribunal, and the reasons given, were reasonable. she accepted the tribunal’s characteri- zation of the complaints as challenges to the act of legislating, agreed that legislatures do not provide “services” when passing laws, and confi rmed that the principle of the primacy of human rights law applied only where confl icts between the chra and other legislation arose in cases addressing a discriminatory practice. gleason ja also held that the tribunal’s inability to grant an effective remedy supported the conclusion that s. 5 was not engaged. she considered the tribunal’s approach to have an unassailable policy rationale, fi nding that there was no reason why the tribunal should be an alternate forum for adjudicating issues regarding the alleged discriminatory nature of legislation when a charter application was a more appropriate vehicle. finally, on the issue of access to justice, gleason ja disa- greed with the commission’s view that the tribunal was a more accessible forum than the courts. les droits de la personne ne soulève pas de ques- tion constitutionnelle justifi ant un contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. bien que les questions tranchées par les tribunaux des droits de la personne puissent avoir une portée générale telle qu’elles re- vêtent une importance capitale pour l’ensemble du système juridique, elles n’échappent généralement pas aux domaines d’expertise du tribunal. la juge gleason a examiné la possibilité que la norme de la décision correcte s’applique lorsque d’autres tri- bunaux ont compétence pour interpréter les mêmes dispositions de la lcdp; cependant, il n’y avait aucun chevauchement de cet ordre en l’espèce. par conséquent, selon la juge gleason, c’est la norme de la décision raisonnable qui s’applique à l’interpré- tation de l’art. 5 par le tribunal, de même qu’à son interprétation des faits dans les décisions matson et andrews. [25] la juge gleason a poursuivi en statuant que les conclusions tirées par le tribunal, ainsi que les motifs à l’appui de celles-ci, étaient raisonnables. elle a retenu la qualifi cation des plaintes faite par le tribunal, à savoir qu’il s’agit d’attaques directes contre l’acte de légiférer, pour ensuite reconnaître que les législatures ne fournissent pas des « ser- vices » lorsqu’elles adoptent des mesures législa- tives. ensuite, elle a confi rmé que le principe de la primauté des lois sur les droits de la personne s’ap- plique uniquement en cas de confl it entre la lcdp et un autre texte de loi dans le cadre d’affaires portant sur un acte discriminatoire. la juge gleason a en outre estimé que l’incapacité du tribunal d’accorder une réparation effi cace appuie la conclusion selon laquelle l’art. 5 n’entre pas en jeu. elle a déclaré que, à son avis, l’approche retenue par le tribunal repose sur des considérations de politique inattaquables, pour ensuite juger que rien ne justifi e que le tribunal fasse offi ce de tribunal subsidiaire habilité à statuer sur des allégations concernant la nature discrimina- toire d’une loi, alors qu’une demande fondée sur la charte est un mécanisme qui convient davantage à cette fi n. enfi n, en ce qui a trait à la question de l’accès à la justice, la juge gleason s’est dite en dé- saccord avec la prétention de la commission voulant que le tribunal soit plus accessible que les cours de justice. 254 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. [26] for all of the foregoing reasons, gleason ja. concluded that there was no basis upon which to de- clare that murphy was no longer good law or that the tribunal’s decisions were otherwise unreasonable. [26] pour l’ensemble de ces motifs, la juge gleason a conclu que rien ne permettait d’affi rmer que l’arrêt murphy n’était plus valable, ou que les décisions du tribunal étaient par ailleurs déraisonnables. iv analysis iv analyse a applicable standard of review a la norme de contrôle applicable [27] this court has for years attempted to sim- plify the standard of review analysis in order to “get the parties away from arguing about the tests and back to arguing about the substantive merits of their case” (alberta (information and privacy com- missioner) v. alberta teachers’ association, 2011 scc 61, [2011] 3 scr 654, at para. 36, citing dunsmuir, at para. 145, per binnie j). to this end, there is a well- established presumption that, where an administrative body interprets its home statute, the reasonableness standard applies (dunsmuir, at para. 54; alberta teachers, at para. 39; wilson v. atomic energy of canada ltd., 2016 scc 29, [2016] 1 scr 770, at para. 15; edmonton (city) v. edmon- ton east (capilano) shopping centres ltd., 2016 scc 47, [2016] 2 scr 293, at para. 22; quebec (attorney general) v. guérin, 2017 scc 42, [2017] 2 scr 3, at paras. 33-34; delta air lines inc. v. lukács, 2018 scc 2, [2018] 1 scr 6, at para 8). [28] the presumption may be rebutted and the cor- rectness standard applied where one of the following categories can be established: (1) issues relating to the constitutional division of powers; (2) true ques- tions of vires; (3) issues of competing jurisdiction be- tween tribunals; and (4) questions that are of central importance to the legal system and outside the ex- pertise of the decision maker (capilano, at para. 24; dunsmuir, at paras 58-61). exceptionally, the pre- sumption may also be rebutted where a contextual inquiry shows a clear legislative intent that the cor- rectness standard be applied (capilano, at para. 34; mouvement laïque québécois v. saguenay (city), 2015 scc 16, [2015] 2 scr 3, at para. 46; tervita corp. v. canada (commissioner of competition), 2015 scc 3, [2015] 1 scr 161, at paras. 35-36 and 38-39; mclean v. british columbia (securities commission), 2013 scc 67, [2013] 3 scr 895, at [27] depuis plusieurs années, notre cour tente de simplifi er l’analyse relative à la norme de contrôle applicable, afi n de « faire en sorte que les parties cessent de débattre des critères applicables et fassent plutôt valoir leurs prétentions sur le fond » (alberta (information and privacy commissioner) c al- berta teachers’ association, 2011 csc 61, [2011] 3 rcs 654, par. 36, citant dunsmuir, par. 145, le juge binnie). dans cette optique, il existe une pré- somption bien établie selon laquelle la décision d’un tribunal administratif qui interprète sa loi constitutive est assujettie à la norme de la décision raisonnable (dunsmuir, par. 54; alberta teachers, par. 39; wilson c. énergie atomique du canada ltée, 2016 csc 29, [2016] 1 rcs 770, par. 15; edmonton (ville) c. edmonton east (capilano) shopping centres ltd., 2016 csc 47, [2016] 2 rcs 293, par. 22; qué- bec (procureure générale) c. guérin, 2017 csc 42, [2017] 2 rcs 3, par. 33-34; delta air lines inc. c. lukács, 2018 csc 2, [2018] 1 rcs 6, par 8). [28] cette présomption peut être réfutée, et la norme de la décision correcte appliquée, lorsqu’il est possible d’établir que les questions en jeu relèvent des catégories suivantes : (1) les questions touchant au partage constitutionnel des compétences; (2) les questions touchant véritablement à la compétence; (3) les questions touchant la compétence concurrente entre tribunaux administratifs; et (4) les questions d’importance capitale pour le système juridique et qui échappent au domaine d’expertise du décideur (capilano, par. 24; dunsmuir, par 58-61). à titre exceptionnel, la présomption peut également être réfutée lorsqu’une analyse contextuelle révèle que le législateur avait clairement l’intention que la norme de la décision correcte s’applique (capilano, par. 34; mouvement laïque québécois c. saguenay (ville), 2015 csc 16, [2015] 2 rcs 3, par. 46; tervita corp. c. canada (commissaire de la concurrence), [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 255 para. 22; rogers communications inc. v. society of composers, authors and music publishers of can- ada, 2012 scc 35, [2012] 2 scr 283, at para 15). [29] in applying the standard of review analysis, there is no principled difference between a human rights tribunal and any other decision maker inter- preting its home statute (canada (canadian human rights commission) v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 53, [2011] 3 scr 471 (“mowat”), at paras. 22-24; saskatchewan (human rights com- mission) v. whatcott, 2013 scc 11, [2013] 1 scr. 467, at paras. 167-168; saguenay, at para. 50; stew- art v. elk valley coal corp., 2017 scc 30, [2017] 1 scr 591, at para 22). human rights tribunals are equally entitled to deference where they apply their home statute. [30] in both of its decisions, the tribunal was called upon to characterize the complaints before it and as- certain whether a discriminatory practice had been made out under the chra. this falls squarely within the presumption of deference. still, the commission has submitted that the presumption can be rebutted on the basis that the tribunal’s decisions raise a ques- tion of central importance outside its expertise or on the basis that a contextual analysis shows deference is unwarranted. while not urged by the commission, continued uncertainty as to the applicability of the category of true questions of vires necessitates also addressing it briefl y. 2015 csc 3, [2015] 1 rcs 161, par.  35-36 et 38-39; mclean c. colombie- britannique (securi- ties commission), 2013 csc 67, [2013] 3 rcs. 895, par. 22; rogers communications inc. c. société canadienne des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs de musique, 2012 csc 35, [2012] 2 rcs 283, par 15). [29] lors de l’analyse relative à la norme de con- trôle applicable, il n’existe aucune distinction de principe entre un tribunal des droits de la personne interprétant sa loi constitutive et tout autre déci- deur interprétant la sienne (canada (commission canadienne des droits de la personne) c. canada (procureur général), 2011 csc 53, [2011] 3 rcs. 471 (« mowat »), par. 22-24; saskatchewan (hu- man rights commission) c. whatcott, 2013 csc 11, [2013] 1 rcs 467, par. 167-168; saguenay, par. 50; stewart c. elk valley coal corp., 2017 csc 30, [2017] 1 rcs 591, par 22). les tribunaux des droits de la personne ont également droit à la déférence lorsqu’ils appliquent leur loi constitutive. [30] dans ses deux décisions, le tribunal a été appelé à qualifi er les plaintes dont il était saisi et à vérifi er si l’existence d’un acte discriminatoire au sens de la lcdp avait été établie. cette démarche est clairement visée par la présomption de déférence. la commission a néanmoins fait valoir que la pré- somption pouvait être réfutée, pour le motif que les deux décisions du tribunal soulèvent une question d’une importance capitale qui échappe à l’exper- tise de celui-ci, ou pour le motif qu’il ressort d’une analyse contextuelle qu’aucune déférence n’est de mise à son endroit. bien que la commission n’ait pas plaidé en ce sens, l’incertitude qui persiste au sujet de l’applicabilité de la catégorie des questions touchant véritablement la compétence fait en sorte qu’il est aussi nécessaire de l’examiner brièvement. (1) true questions of jurisdiction (1) les questions touchant véritablement à la compétence [31] true questions of vires have been described as a narrow and exceptional category of correctness review (alberta teachers, at para. 39), confi ned to instances where the decision maker must determine whether it has the authority to enter into the inquiry [31] les questions touchant véritablement à la compétence ont été décrites comme une catégorie ex- ceptionnelle et étroite de questions appelant une révi- sion selon la norme de la décision correcte (alberta teachers, par 39). elles se limitent aux situations 256 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. before it (dunsmuir, at para. 59; guérin, at para 32). in this sense, “true” questions of jurisdiction involve a far narrower meaning of “jurisdiction” than the one ordinarily employed. this narrow sense of ju- risdiction was emphasized by dickson j. (as he then was) in canadian union of public employees, local 963 v. new brunswick liquor corp., [1979] 2 scr. 227 (“cupe”), where he warned that courts “should not be alert to brand as jurisdictional, and therefore subject to broader curial review, that which may be doubtfully so” (p 233). this court reaffi rmed the narrow approach to jurisdiction in dunsmuir when it explicitly rejected a return to the jurisdiction/pre- liminary question doctrine that had “plagued the jurisprudence” (para. 59; see also halifax (regional municipality) v. nova scotia (human rights com- mission), 2012 scc 10, [2012] 1 scr 364, at para 34). a departure from this constrained under- standing of jurisdiction would only risk resurrecting long- buried debates. [32] neither the commission nor any lower court has suggested that this case involves the enigmatic category of true questions of vires. but the issue on appeal has, at times, been characterized by the parties and the courts below as being whether the tribunal has the “jurisdiction” to consider direct attacks to legislation or whether the courts are the better forum to ascertain the validity of legislation. however, distilled to its essentials, the question be- fore the tribunal was whether legislative entitle- ments under the indian act fell within the defi nition of a service under the chra. as such, the tribunal was determining whether the complaints concerned a discriminatory practice as defi ned by the chra. où le décideur est appelé à déterminer s’il a la fa- culté de connaître de la question (dunsmuir, par. 59; guérin, par 32). en ce sens, les « véritables » ques- tions de compétence renvoient à une signifi cation bien plus restreinte de la « compétence » que celle habituellement donnée à ce mot. ce sens étroit du terme compétence a été souligné par le juge dickson (plus tard juge en chef) dans l’arrêt syndicat cana- dien de la fonction publique, section locale 963 c. société des alcools du nouveau- brunswick, [1979] 2 rcs 227 (« scfp »), lorsqu’il a formulé la mise en garde selon laquelle les tribunaux « devraient évi- ter de qualifi er trop rapidement un point de question de compétence, et ainsi de l’assujettir à un examen judiciaire plus étendu, lorsqu’il existe un doute à cet égard » (p 233). dans l’arrêt dunsmuir, la cour a confi rmé l’approche étroite à adopter sur ce plan lorsqu’elle a expressément rejeté l’idée de revenir à la théorie de la compétence ou de la condition préalable qui a longtemps « pesé sur la jurispru- dence » (par. 59; voir également halifax (regional municipality) c. nouvelle- écosse (human rights commission), 2012 csc 10, [2012] 1 rcs 364, par 34). si l’on s’éloigne de cette conception étroite de la compétence, on ne fait donc que courir le risque de ressusciter des débats clos depuis longtemps. [32] ni la commission ni les tribunaux d’instances inférieures n’ont laissé entendre que l’espèce mettait en jeu l’énigmatique catégorie des questions tou- chant véritablement à la compétence. toutefois, à l’instar des parties, ils ont parfois décrit la question faisant l’objet du présent pourvoi comme étant celle de savoir si le tribunal a « compétence » pour ins- truire des contestations directes d’un texte de loi, ou si les cours de justice sont les juridictions les plus à même de statuer sur la validité d’une loi. quoi qu’il en soit, ramenée à l’essentiel, la question dont était saisi le tribunal était celle de savoir si les droits à l’inscription prévus dans la loi sur les indiens consti- tuent un service aux termes de la lcdp. c’est dans ce contexte que le tribunal a cherché à établir si les plaintes en question visaient un acte discriminatoire au sens de la lcdp. [33] there is no question that the tribunal had the authority to hear a complaint about a discriminatory practice. to that end, the question of what falls within [33] il ne fait aucun doute que le tribunal avait le pouvoir d’instruire une plainte portant sur un acte discriminatoire. à cet égard, la question de savoir [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 257 the meaning of “services” is no more exceptional than those found in other cases where a majority of this court has repeatedly declined to recognize a true question of jurisdiction (guérin, at paras. 33-36; capilano, at para. 26; alberta teachers, at para. 33; cupe, at pp. 233-34; canadian broadcasting corp. v. sodrac 2003 inc., 2015 scc 57, [2015] 3 scr. 615, at para. 39; nolan v. kerry (canada) inc., 2009 scc 39, [2009] 2 scr 678, at para. 35; smith v. alliance pipeline ltd., 2011 scc 7, [2011] 1 scr. 160, at para. 36; mowat, at paras 24-25). to fi nd that the tribunal was faced with a true question of vires would only risk disinterring the jurisdiction/prelim- inary question doctrine that was clearly put to rest in dunsmuir. plainly, the defi nition of a service under the chra is not a true question of vires. [34] that being said, the persistent uncertainty over this category’s scope requires further comments. since its inclusion as a category of correctness re- view in dunsmuir, the concept of true questions of vires has been as elusive as it has been controver- sial. in alberta teachers, a majority of this court considered eliminating vires review, remarking that it served little purpose but “has caused confusion to counsel and judges alike” (para. 38; see also pa- ras 34-42). the majority stressed that it was “una- ble to provide a defi nition of    a true question of jurisdiction” (para 42). ce qu’inclut le terme « services » n’a rien de plus exceptionnel que les questions qui se posaient dans le cadre d’autres affaires où notre cour, à la majorité, a maintes fois refusé de voir une question touchant véritablement à la compétence (guérin, par. 33-36; capilano, par. 26; alberta teachers, par. 33; scfp, p. 233-234; société radio- canada c. sodrac 2003 inc., 2015 csc 57, [2015] 3 rcs 615, par. 39; nolan c. kerry (canada) inc., 2009 csc 39, [2009] 2 rcs 678, par. 35; smith c. alliance pipeline ltd., 2011 csc 7, [2011] 1 rcs 160, par. 36; mowat, par 24-25). conclure que le tribunal devait trancher une question touchant véritablement à la compétence risquerait uniquement de tirer de l’oubli la théorie de la compétence ou de la condition préalable qui a clairement été mise au rancart dans dunsmuir. en clair, défi nir ce qui constitue un service aux termes de la lcdp n’est pas une question touchant vérita- blement à la compétence. [34] cela dit, l’incertitude persistante quant à la portée de cette catégorie appelle des remarques supplémentaires. depuis son inclusion, dans l’ar- rêt dunsmuir, au sein des catégories de questions appelant la norme de la décision correcte, la notion de question touchant véritablement à la compétence s’est révélée aussi insaisissable que controversée. dans l’arrêt alberta teachers, les juges majoritaires de la cour ont envisagé d’éliminer la notion de com- pétence véritable dans le contexte de l’analyse re- lative à la norme de contrôle applicable, en faisant remarquer qu’elle est peu utile et qu’elle « sème la confusion tant chez les juges que chez les avocats » (par. 38; voir également les par 34-42). les juges majoritaires ont souligné qu’ils ne pouvaient « offrir de défi nition quant à [  ] une question touchant véritablement à la compétence » (par 42). i pause here to note that it is indeed a chal- [35] lenge to identify a true question of jurisdiction in a coherent manner without returning to the jurisdic- tion/preliminary question doctrine that this court clearly rejected in both cupe (p. 233) and dunsmuir (para.  35) in the view of some, most questions that might be identifi ed as “jurisdictional” involve nothing more than an interpretation of a decision maker’s home statute or a closely related statute (p. daly, the hopeless search for “true” questions of [35] j’ouvre ici une parenthèse pour souligner qu’il est en effet diffi cile d’établir de façon cohérente l’existence d’une pareille question sans pour au- tant revenir à la théorie de la compétence ou de la condition préalable que la cour a clairement écartée dans les arrêts scfp (p. 233) et dunsmuir (par 35). d’aucuns sont d’avis que la plupart des questions pouvant être qualifi ées de [traduction] « questions de compétence » consistent simplement en l’inter- prétation, par un décideur, de sa loi constitutive ou 258 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. jurisdiction (august 15, 2013) (online)). in mclean, moldaver j. observed that the us. supreme court has rejected the distinction between jurisdictional and non- jurisdictional interpretations of a home stat- ute as a “mirage” (fn. 3, citing city of arlington, texas v. federal communications commission, 133 s ct 1863 (2013), at p 1868). [36] nonetheless, in alberta teachers, the majority stayed its hand and instead emphasized that, if they exist, “[t]rue questions of jurisdiction are narrow and will be exceptional” (para 39). it was left to future litigants to overcome the heavy burden of establish- ing that they have indeed discovered a true question of vires (para 42). yet, to date, no litigant has met this challenge before us. [37] since alberta teachers, the search for true questions of vires has, in fact, been fruitless. when the existence of such a question has been argued by litigants, this court has reasserted the narrow and exceptional nature of this category (guérin, at para. 32; capilano, at para. 26; sodrac, at para. 39; atco gas and pipelines ltd. v. alberta (utilities commission), 2015 scc 45, [2015] 3 scr 219, at para. 27; canadian national railway co. v. canada (attorney general), 2014 scc 40, [2014] 2 scr. 135, at para 61). in 2013, an academic commentator characterized the search for a true question of juris- diction as “hopeless”, noting that this court had yet to identify one fi ve years after dunsmuir (daly). it is now 10 years from dunsmuir and the search remains just as hopeless. in applying dunsmuir, this court has been unable to identify a single instance where this category was found to be applicable. d’une loi qui y est étroitement liée (p. daly, the hopeless search for « true » questions of jurisdiction (15 août 2013) (en ligne)). dans mclean, le juge moldaver a noté que la cour suprême des états- unis a rejeté la distinction entre l’interprétation qui touche à la compétence et celle qui n’y touche pas parce qu’elle est [traduction] « illusoire » (note 3, citant city of arlington, texas c. federal communications commission, 133 s ct 1863 (2013), p 1868). [36] néanmoins, dans l’arrêt alberta teachers, les juges majoritaires se sont contentés de souligner que, si elles existent, « [l]es véritables questions de compétence ont une portée étroite et se présentent rarement » (par 39). ils ont précisé qu’il appartiendra aux futures parties à un litige de s’acquitter du lourd fardeau de démontrer qu’elles ont bel et bien trouvé une question touchant véritablement à la compétence (par 42). toutefois, jusqu’à maintenant, aucune par- tie à un litige n’a pu relever ce défi devant nous. [37] depuis l’arrêt alberta teachers, la quête des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence est en fait demeurée vaine. chaque fois que des parties à un litige ont plaidé l’existence d’une question de ce genre, notre cour a réaffi rmé le caractère restrictif et la nature exceptionnelle de cette catégorie (gué- rin, par. 32; capilano, par. 26; sodrac, par. 39; atco gas and pipelines ltd. c. alberta (utilities commission), 2015 csc 45, [2015] 3 rcs 219, par. 27; compagnie des chemins de fer nationaux du canada c. canada (procureur général), 2014 csc 40, [2014] 2 rcs 135, par 61). en 2013, un auteur de doctrine a qualifi é la quête de questions touchant véritablement à la compétence de [traduction] « désespérée », en faisant également observer que la cour, cinq ans après l’arrêt dunsmuir, n’en avait pas encore trouvé une seule (daly). dix années se sont maintenant écoulées depuis l’arrêt dunsmuir, et cette quête reste toujours aussi désespérée. toutes les fois où elle a appliqué l’arrêt dunsmuir, notre cour n’a jamais été en mesure de trouver un seul cas où cette catégorie aurait pu être jugée applicable. [38] no more would need to be said on this matter if true questions of vires had simply faded into ob- scurity. however, that has not happened. the diffi - culty with true questions of vires is that jurisdiction is [38] si les questions touchant véritablement à la compétence étaient tout bonnement tombées dans l’oubli, il serait inutile d’en dire davantage à ce sujet. cependant, cela ne s’est pas produit. la diffi culté [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 259 a slippery concept. where decision makers interpret and apply their home statutes, they inevitably de- termine the scope of their statutory power (alberta teachers, at para 34). there are no clear markers to distinguish between simple questions of jurisdiction (ie, questions that determine the scope of one’s authority) and true questions of vires (ie, questions that determine whether one has authority to enter into the inquiry). such imprecision tempts litigants and judges alike to return to a broad understanding of jurisdiction as justifi cation for correctness review contrary to this court’s jurisprudence. as a result, the elusive search for true questions of vires may both threaten certainty for litigants and undermine legislative supremacy. [39] for some, the continued existence of the cat- egory of true questions of vires may seem to pro- vide conceptual value, at most. in his concurrence in alberta teachers, cromwell j. wrote a spirited defence of the conceptual necessity of correctness review for jurisdiction given the courts’ supervi- sory power over the bounds of jurisdiction, but even he conceded that the category of true questions of vires has little analytical value in the standard of review analysis (para 94). it remains an open ques- tion whether conceptual necessity can justify the resources that courts and parties devote to the attempt to defi ne an inherently nebulous concept. inhérente à ce type de questions tient au fait que la compétence est un concept aux contours fl ous. lorsque les décideurs interprètent et appliquent leurs lois constitutives, ils déterminent nécessairement la portée du pouvoir que leur confère la loi (alberta teachers, par 34). il n’existe aucune balise claire qui permettrait de distinguer les simples questions de compétence (soit celles permettant de décider de l’étendue du pouvoir d’une personne) des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence (soit celles permettant de décider si la personne a compétence pour procéder à l’instruction). devant pareille impré- cision, les avocats tout comme les juges sont tentés de revenir à une interprétation large de la notion de compétence pour justifi er l’application de la norme de la décision correcte, contrairement à la jurispru- dence de notre cour. en conséquence, non seulement la recherche illusoire de questions touchant vérita- blement à la compétence peut- elle mettre en péril la certitude dont ont besoin les parties, mais elle peut aussi miner la suprématie législative. [39] pour certains, le maintien de la catégorie des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence peut, au mieux, sembler offrir une certaine valeur au plan théorique. dans ses motifs concordants dans l’arrêt alberta teachers, le juge cromwell a souli- gné avec emphase la nécessité conceptuelle d’un examen de la compétence en fonction de la norme de la décision correcte étant donné le pouvoir de surveillance des cours de justice à l’égard des limites de la compétence. or, même lui a reconnu que la catégorie des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence apportait peu à l’analyse relative à la norme de contrôle applicable (par 94). l’on peut donc se demander si cette nécessité conceptuelle justifi e que l’on consacre les ressources des cours de justice et des parties à tenter de défi nir un concept intrinsèquement nébuleux. [40] our jurisprudence has held that the consti- tutional guarantee of judicial review is premised on the courts’ duty to ensure that public authorities do not overreach their lawful powers (dunsmuir, at para. 29; crevier v. attorney general of quebec, [1981] 2 scr 220, at pp 234-38). however, the jurisprudence has also affi rmed that judicial review is based on respect for the choices of the legislature’s [40] notre jurisprudence reconnaît que la garantie constitutionnelle dont bénéfi cie le contrôle judiciaire repose sur l’obligation des cours de justice de veiller à la légalité de l’action administrative (dunsmuir, par. 29; crevier c. procureur général du québec, [1981] 2 rcs 220, p 234-238). cependant, notre jurisprudence a également confi rmé que le contrôle judiciaire repose sur le respect des choix des décideurs 260 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. delegated decision makers and recognizes the legit- imacy of multiple reasonable interpretations of a statute (dunsmuir, at para. 35; mclean, at para 33). in matters of statutory interpretation where there is only one reasonable answer, this court has shown that the reasonableness standard still allows the re- viewing court to properly deal with the principles of the rule of law and legislative supremacy that remain at the core of the judicial review analysis (mclean, at para. 38; mowat, at para. 34; dunsmuir, at para 75). in this regard, reasonableness review is often more than suffi cient to fulfi l the courts’ supervisory role with regard to the jurisdiction of the executive. [41] the reality is that true questions of jurisdiction have been on life support since alberta teachers. no majority of this court has recognized a single example of a true question of vires, and the existence of this category has long been doubted. absent full submissions by the parties on this issue and on the potential impact, if any, on the current standard of review framework, i will only reiterate this court’s prior statement that it will be for future litigants to establish either that the category remains necessary or that the time has come, in the words of binnie j., to “euthanize the issue” once and for all (alberta teachers, at para 88). à qui le législateur a confi é des fonctions, et reconnaît qu’une loi puisse légitimement se prêter à plusieurs interprétations raisonnables (dunsmuir, par.  35; mclean, par 33). en ce qui a trait aux questions d’in- terprétation législative qui n’appellent qu’une seule réponse raisonnable, notre cour a démontré que la norme de la raisonnabilité permet toujours aux cours de révision de statuer effi cacement sur des questions en tenant compte tant des principes de la primauté du droit que de la suprématie législative qui sont au cœur de l’analyse que commande le contrôle judi- ciaire (mclean, par. 38; mowat, par. 34; dunsmuir, par 75). sous ce rapport, l’application de la norme de la raisonnabilité permet bien souvent aux tribunaux de remplir aisément leur fonction de surveillance à l’égard de la compétence de l’exécutif. [41] en réalité, la catégorie des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence est maintenue en vie artifi ciellement depuis l’arrêt alberta teachers. ja- mais les juges majoritaires de la cour n’ont reconnu un seul exemple de question de ce type, et son exis- tence même est mise en doute depuis longtemps. comme les parties n’ont pas présenté d’observations complètes sur cette question et son effet potentiel, s’il en est, sur le cadre d’analyse actuel applicable à la norme de contrôle, je me contenterai de réitérer le commentaire déjà formulé par la cour, c’est-à-dire que ce sera aux éventuelles parties à un litige d’éta- blir si cette catégorie est toujours nécessaire ou si le moment est venu, pour reprendre les termes du juge binnie, « d’en fi nir avec cette catégorie de questions » une fois pour toutes (alberta teachers, par 88). (2) questions of central importance (2) les questions d’une importance capitale [42] the commission argues that the tribunal’s decisions raise a question of central importance in which it lacks expertise because other federal tribu- nals with the power to determine general questions of law have concurrent jurisdiction to interpret the scope of s. 5 of the chra. dunsmuir recognized that the correctness standard of review can apply to ques- tions of law that are both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the decision maker’s specialized area of expertise (paras. 55 and 60). since dunsmuir, this category of correctness review has been applied only twice by this court [42] la commission soutient que les décisions du tribunal soulèvent une question d’une importance capitale à l’égard de laquelle celui-ci ne possède pas l’expertise voulue, puisque d’autres tribunaux fédéraux habilités à trancher des questions générales de droit ont une compétence concurrente à l’égard de l’interprétation de la portée de l’art. 5 de la lcdp. l’arrêt dunsmuir a établi que la norme de contrôle de la décision correcte pouvait s’appliquer aux ques- tions de droit qui, à la fois, présentent une importance capitale pour le système juridique dans son ensemble, et sont étrangères au domaine d’expertise du décideur [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 261 — fi rst in saguenay, at paras. 49-51, and then in alberta (information and privacy commissioner) v. university of calgary, 2016 scc 53, [2016] 2 scr 555, at paras. 21-22 and 26. indeed, this court has repeatedly rejected a liberal application of this category (see, eg,. nor- man regional health au- thority inc. v. manitoba association of health care professionals, 2011 scc 59, [2011] 3 scr 616, at para. 38; whatcott, at para. 168; kanthasamy v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2015 scc 61, [2015] 3 scr 909, at para. 44; commission scolaire de laval v. syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de laval, 2016 scc 8, [2016] 1 scr 29, at para. 34; alberta teachers, at para. 32; barreau du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2017 scc 56, [2017] 2. scr 488, at para. 18; canadian national railway, at paras. 60 and 62; mclean, at para 28). [43] here, the tribunal has extensive expertise in determining what is meant by a discriminatory prac- tice. the ability of other federal tribunals to apply the chra does not rob the tribunal of its expertise in its home statute. regardless of whether the ques- tions before the tribunal rose to the requisite level of importance, they were clearly within the tribunal’s expertise. this category does not apply. (par. 55 et 60). depuis dunsmuir, notre cour a ap- pliqué cette catégorie commandant l’utilisation de la norme de la décision correcte à seulement deux reprises — d’abord dans l’arrêt saguenay, par. 49- 51, et ensuite dans l’arrêt alberta (information and privacy commissioner) c. university of calgary, 2016 csc 53, [2016] 2 rcs 555, par. 21-22 et 26. en fait, la cour a maintes fois rejeté une application libérale de cette catégorie (voir, p ex, nor-. man re- gional health authority inc. c. manitoba association of health care professionals, 2011 csc 59, [2011] 3 rcs 616, par. 38; whatcott, par. 168; kanthasamy c. canada (citoyenneté et immigration), 2015 csc 61, [2015] 3 rcs 909, par. 44; commission sco- laire de laval c. syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de laval, 2016 csc 8, [2016] 1 rcs 29, par. 34; alberta teachers, par. 32; barreau du qué- bec c. québec (procureure générale), 2017 csc 56, [2017] 2 rcs 488, par. 18; compagnie des chemins de fer nationaux du canada, par. 60 et 62; mclean, par 28). [43] ici, le tribunal possède une vaste expertise pour ce qui est de déterminer ce qui constitue un acte discriminatoire. le fait que d’autres tribunaux fédéraux soient habilités à appliquer la lcdp ne dé- pouille nullement le tribunal de son expertise relati- vement à sa loi constitutive. indépendamment du fait qu’elles aient ou non atteint l’importance requise, les questions soumises au tribunal relevaient clairement de son expertise. par conséquent, en l’espèce, cette catégorie de questions ne trouve pas application. (3) contextual approach (3) l’analyse contextuelle [44] the commission also urged that a contextual analysis rebuts the presumption of reasonableness re- view. it argued that this shows clear legislative intent that the correctness standard applies, largely on the ground that the tribunal changed the “foundational legal test” for what constitutes a service under the chra. on the basis of their contextual analysis, my colleagues côté and rowe jj. would also apply a cor- rectness standard of review. respectfully, i disagree with both positions. [44] la commission a aussi soutenu qu’une ana- lyse contextuelle réfute la présomption d’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable en l’espèce. selon elle, cette analyse révèle l’intention claire du législateur que la norme de la décision correcte s’ap- plique, en s’appuyant sur le fait que le tribunal a modifi é le [traduction] « critère juridique fonda- mental » servant à déterminer ce qui constitue un service aux termes de la lcdp. en se fondant sur l’analyse contextuelle qu’ils ont effectuée, mes col- lègues les juges côté et rowe appliqueraient égale- ment la norme de la décision correcte. soit dit en tout respect, je suis en désaccord avec ces deux positions. 262 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. [45] the presumption of reasonableness was in- tended to prevent litigants from undertaking a full standard of review analysis in every case. where the presumption applies, such simplicity requires that the contextual approach play a subordinate role in the standard of review analysis. certainly, this court has indicated that, occasionally, such a con- textual inquiry can rebut the presumption of defer- ence (saguenay, at para. 46; capilano, at para. 32; tervita, at para. 35; mclean, at para. 22; barreau du québec, at para 23). however, the court has also noted that this will occur in the “exceptional other case” (rogers, at para. 16 (emphasis in original)). [46] this contextual approach should be applied sparingly. as held by the majority of this court in alberta teachers, it is inappropriate to “retreat to the application of a full standard of review analysis where it can be determined summarily” (para 44). after all, the “contextual approach can generate uncertainty and endless litigation concerning the standard of review” (capilano, at para 35). the pre- sumption of reasonableness review and the identifi ed categories will generally be suffi cient to determine the applicable standard in the exceptional cases where such a contextual analysis may be justifi ed to rebut the presumption, it need not be a long and detailed one (capilano, at para 34). where it has been done or referred to in the past, the analysis has been limited to determinative factors that showed a clear legislative intent justifying the rebuttal of the presumption (see, eg,. rogers, at para. 15; tervita, at paras. 35-36; see also, saguenay, at paras 50-51). [45] la présomption d’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable se voulait un moyen d’évi- ter aux parties d’avoir systématiquement à passer par une analyse exhaustive de la norme de contrôle applicable. lorsque la présomption s’applique, il est nécessaire, pour que le processus soit ainsi sim- plifi é, que l’analyse contextuelle joue un rôle qui reste subordonné dans l’analyse relative à la norme de contrôle. notre cour a certes déjà indiqué que, occasionnellement, la présomption de déférence peut être réfutée par une analyse contextuelle (saguenay, par. 46; capilano, par. 32; tervita, par. 35; mclean, par. 22; barreau du québec, par 23). cependant, la cour a aussi souligné que cela était le cas dans une « situation exceptionnelle nouvelle » (rogers, par. 16 (en italique dans l’original)). [46] cette approche contextuelle devrait être ap- pliquée avec parcimonie. comme l’ont déclaré les juges majoritaires de la cour dans l’arrêt alberta teachers, il est inapproprié de « revenir à l’analyse exhaustive lorsqu’une démarche sommaire permet de déterminer la norme de contrôle » (par 44). en effet, le « recours à une analyse contextuelle peut être source d’incertitude et d’interminables litiges au sujet de la norme de contrôle applicable » (capilano, par 35). la présomption d’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable et les catégories déjà énu- mérées suffi ront généralement pour déterminer la norme de contrôle applicable. dans les cas excep- tionnels où il serait justifi é de recourir à une analyse contextuelle pour repousser la présomption, celle-ci n’a pas à être longue et détaillée (capilano, par 34). dans les situations où tel était le cas, ou lorsqu’il en a été question par le passé, l’analyse ne portait que sur les facteurs déterminants qui révélaient une in- tention claire du législateur justifi ant la réfutation de la présomption (voir, p ex, rogers, par. 15; tervita, par. 35-36; voir également saguenay, par 50-51). [47] in this regard, i cannot agree with my col- leagues côté and rowe jj.’s characterization of the current standard of review framework as requiring correctness review wherever the “contextual factors listed in dunsmuir point towards correctness as the appropriate standard” (para.  73). where the pre- sumption of reasonableness review applies, as it does here, this suggestion is contrary to the contextual [47] à cet égard, je ne peux souscrire à la quali- fi cation que mes collègues les juges côté et rowe donnent au cadre d’analyse actuel applicable à la norme de contrôle, qui exigerait selon eux l’applica- tion de la norme de la décision correcte dès que « les facteurs contextuels énumérés dans l’arrêt dunsmuir tendent plutôt vers la norme de la décision correcte » (par 73). lorsque la présomption d’application de la [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 263 approach’s ancillary role in our current jurisprudence and would undermine the certainty this court has sought to establish in the past decade. while this court may eventually fi nd it necessary to revisit the standard of review framework, dissatisfaction with the current state of the law is no reason to ignore our precedents following dunsmuir. to do so only adds confusion to an already challenging area of law. [48] turning to the specifi cs of this case with this guidance in mind, there are no factors present in this appeal that would necessitate a long and detailed contextual analysis to rebut the presumption. the commission’s submission that changes to “founda- tional legal tests” require the application of a correct- ness standard must be rejected. it has no basis in the jurisprudence, is not a clear indicator of legislative intent, and would risk adding only more uncertainty to the standard of review analysis. moreover, i would be cautious not to expand the appropriate factors beyond those enumerated in dunsmuir without a principled basis for doing so, as this would invite unprincipled interference with the legislature’s del- egates. i also consider it necessary to address my col- [49] leagues côté and rowe jj.’s own application of the contextual analysis in this case. none of the factors they raise, in my opinion, warrants the application of the contextual approach or, by extension, correctness review. with respect, i am of the view that their treat- ment of the contextual analysis is unsupported by, and at points contrary to, this court’s jurisprudence. norme de la raisonnabilité joue, comme en l’espèce, l’approche qu’ils suggèrent d’adopter irait à l’en- contre du rôle accessoire de l’analyse contextuelle dans notre jurisprudence actuelle, et compromettrait la stabilité que notre cour a cherché à établir au cours de la dernière décennie. bien que notre cour puisse ultérieurement juger nécessaire d’examiner à nouveau le cadre d’analyse applicable à la norme de contrôle, une insatisfaction face à l’état actuel du droit ne permet pas de faire abstraction de notre jurisprudence postérieure à l’arrêt dunsmuir. cela ne fait que créer de la confusion inutile dans un domaine du droit qui est déjà complexe. [48] dans cette perspective, au regard des circons- tances particulières de la présente affaire, aucun fac- teur ne rend nécessaire une analyse contextuelle longue et détaillée pour tenter de réfuter la présomp- tion en l’espèce. l’argument de la commission se- lon lequel les modifi cations apportées aux « critères juridiques fondamentaux » exigent l’application de la norme de la décision correcte doit être rejeté. en effet, cet argument n’a aucun fondement dans la jurisprudence, ne constitue pas une indication claire de l’intention du législateur, et risquerait d’ajouter encore plus à l’incertitude dans l’analyse de la norme de contrôle applicable. de plus, je prendrais garde de ne pas ajouter aux facteurs appropriés énumérés dans dunsmuir à moins que ce ne soit fondé sur une raison valable de principe, sans quoi cela risquerait de donner lieu à une ingérence injustifi ée dans l’exer- cice des pouvoirs des décideurs à qui le législateur a choisi de déléguer certaines fonctions. [49] j’estime par ailleurs que je dois aussi me pen- cher sur l’application de l’analyse contextuelle que font mes collègues les juges côté et rowe en l’es- pèce. à mon avis, aucun des facteurs qu’ils soulèvent ne justifi e l’application de cette analyse, ou, par ex- tension, de la norme de la décision correcte. n’en déplaise à mes collègues, je suis d’avis que la façon dont ils appliquent l’analyse contextuelle ne trouve pas appui dans la jurisprudence de notre cour et, à certains égards, qu’elle est même contraire à celle-ci. [50] with regard to the absence of a privative clause, this court has long since established that such an omission does not rebut the presumption of deference [50] pour ce qui est de l’absence de clause privative, notre cour a établi depuis longtemps qu’une telle omission ne repousse pas la présomption de déférence 264 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. (canada (citizenship and immigration) v. khosa, 2009 scc 12, [2009] 1 scr 339, at para. 25; mo- wat, at para 17). to the contrary, the fact that the legis- lature has allocated authority to a decision maker other than the courts is itself an indication that the legisla- ture intended deferential review (khosa, at para 25). (canada (citoyenneté et immigration) c. khosa, 2009 csc 12, [2009] 1 rcs 339, par. 25; mowat, par 17). au contraire, le fait que le législateur a confi é certains pouvoirs à un décideur administratif plutôt qu’aux tri- bunaux judiciaires porte à croire qu’il avait l’intention que la déférence s’impose (khosa, par 25). [51] this court’s jurisprudence also does not sup- port correctness review on the basis that other admin- istrative tribunals may consider the chra. certainly, this court has recognized that correctness review may be applied where a tribunal is not part of a “dis- crete and special administrative regime” because it shares jurisdiction with the courts or because there is clear language indicating that it is to be treated as if it were a court (rogers, at para. 15 (emphasis deleted), citing dunsmuir, at para. 55; see also tervita, at para 38). this is distinguishable, however, from the situation where a tribunal applies its home statute, the courts have no concurrent jurisdiction and there is no explicit appeal clause. indeed, in my view, the approach taken by côté and rowe jj. would create a new category of correctness review for alleged questions of central importance regardless of the tribunal’s expertise. [52] the potential for confl icting lines of author- ity does not warrant correctness review either. this court has recognized that confl icting lines of author- ity do not, on their own, justify judicial review and it has applied a deferential standard where they have been raised (wilson, at para. 17; barreau du québec, at para. 19; smith, at para. 38; domtar inc. v. quebec (commission d’appel en matière de lésions profes- sionnelles), [1993] 2 scr 756, at pp 800-801). i also doubt that there is a confl icting line of author- ity in this case. the approach to s. 5 of the chra taken in druken in 1998 was set aside in murphy in 2012, and this guidance has since been followed. tellingly, the most recent confl icting authority côté and rowe jj. have identifi ed dates back 17 years. [51] de plus, la jurisprudence de la cour n’étaye pas une application de la norme de la décision cor- recte fondée sur le fait que d’autres tribunaux admi- nistratifs peuvent trancher des questions relatives à la lcdp. notre cour a certes reconnu que la norme de la décision correcte peut s’appliquer lorsqu’un tribunal ne fait pas partie d’un « régime administratif distinct et particulier » parce qu’il a compétence concurrente avec les cours de justice ou parce qu’il est clairement indiqué dans une disposition que la décision doit être traitée comme si elle avait été rendue par une cour de justice (rogers, par. 15 (italique omis), citant dunsmuir, par. 55; voir également tervita, par 38). cette situation diffère par contre de celle où un tribu- nal applique sa loi constitutive, où les cours de justice n’ont pas compétence concurrente et où il n’y a pas de disposition expresse créant un droit d’appel. de fait, à mon avis, la démarche adoptée à ce chapitre par mes collègues les juges côté et rowe créerait une nouvelle catégorie appelant la norme de la décision correcte pour les questions qui auraient une impor- tance capitale, peu importe l’expertise du tribunal. [52] la possibilité que des courants jurispruden- tiels divergents existent ne justifi e pas non plus l’ap- plication de la norme de la décision correcte. notre cour a reconnu que les courants de ce type ne justi- fi ent pas à eux seuls un contrôle judiciaire, et elle a appliqué une norme empreinte de déférence dans les cas où ils ont été soulevés (wilson, par. 17; barreau du québec, par. 19; smith, par. 38; domtar inc. c. québec (commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), [1993] 2 rcs 756, p 800-801). je doute aussi qu’il existe un tel courant jurispru- dentiel divergent relativement aux questions soule- vées dans la présente affaire. la démarche relative à l’art. 5 de la lcdp adoptée dans druken en 1998 a été écartée dans l’arrêt murphy en 2012, lequel fait autorité depuis. qui plus est, la décision contradic- toire la plus récente dont font mention mes collègues les juges côté et rowe a été rendue il y a 17 ans. [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 265 [53] lastly, i take issue with the treatment côté and rowe jj. give to the nature of the question at issue and the purpose of the tribunal. interpreting the scope of the term “services” does not have a constitutional dimension. no interpretation of s. 5 of the chra could prevent superior courts from hearing challenges under s. 15 of the charter or give the tribunal the power to hear charter appli- cations. indeed, framing these factors as a question of whether certain questions are better suited for courts effectively applies the jurisdiction/preliminary question doctrine. as discussed, this doctrine was long ago put to rest (cupe, at p. 233; dunsmuir, at para. 59; halifax, at para 34). [53] enfi n, je suis en désaccord avec la façon dont mes collègues les juges côté et rowe analysent la nature de la question en litige et l’objet du tribunal. l’interprétation de la portée du terme « services » ne comporte pas de dimension constitutionnelle. aucune interprétation de l’art. 5 de la lcdp ne peut empêcher les cours supérieures de statuer sur des contestations fondées sur l’art. 15 de la charte, ni ne peut habiliter le tribunal à connaître des demandes fondées sur la charte. de fait, formuler l’analyse de ces facteurs comme consistant à savoir si les cours de justice sont mieux placées pour trancher certaines questions revient à effectivement mettre en cause la théorie de la compétence ou de la condition préa- lable. comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, cette théorie a été écartée il y a longtemps (scfp, p. 233; dunsmuir, par. 59; halifax, par 34). [54] as the presumption that reasonableness re- view applies is not rebutted, the tribunal’s decisions will be reviewed on a reasonableness standard, as it was at the federal court and the federal court of appeal. [54] puisque la présomption d’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable n’est pas réfutée, à l’instar de la cour fédérale et de la cour d’appel fédérale, j’examinerai les décisions du tribunal selon la norme de la décision raisonnable. b review of the decisions b le contrôle des décisions (1) the reasonableness standard (1) la norme de la décision raisonnable [55] in reasonableness review, the reviewing court is concerned mostly with “the existence of justifi - cation, transparency and intelligibility within the decision- making process” and with determining “whether the decision falls within a range of pos- sible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” (dunsmuir, at para. 47; newfoundland and labrador nurses’ union v. new- foundland and labrador (treasury board), 2011 scc 62, [2011] 3 scr 708, at para 14). when applied to a statutory interpretation exercise, rea- sonableness review recognizes that the delegated decision maker is better situated to understand the policy concerns and context needed to resolve any ambiguities in the statute (mclean, at para 33). reviewing courts must also refrain from reweigh- ing and reassessing the evidence considered by the decision maker (khosa, at para 64). at its core, reasonableness review recognizes the legitimacy of [55] lorsqu’une cour de révision examine une dé- cision selon la norme de la décision raisonnable, elle doit principalement s’intéresser à « la justifi cation de la décision, à la transparence et à l’intelligibilité du processus décisionnel », de même qu’à « l’apparte- nance de la décision aux issues possibles acceptables pouvant se justifi er au regard des faits et du droit » (dunsmuir, par. 47; newfoundland and labrador nurses’ union c. terre- neuve-et- labrador (conseil du trésor), 2011 csc 62, [2011] 3  rcs  708, par 14). lorsqu’elle est appliquée à l’interpréta- tion législative, la norme de la décision raisonnable reconnaît que le décideur, titulaire de pouvoirs dé- légués, est le mieux placé pour comprendre les consi- dérations de politique générale et le contexte qu’il faut connaître pour résoudre toute ambiguïté dans le texte de loi (mclean, par 33). les cours de révision doivent par ailleurs éviter de soupeser et d’apprécier à nouveau la preuve prise en compte par le décideur 266 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. multiple possible outcomes, even where they are not the court’s preferred solution. (khosa, par 64). fondamentalement, la norme de la raisonnabilité reconnaît qu’il peut légitimement y avoir de multiples issues possibles, même lorsque celles-ci ne correspondent pas à la solution optimale que la cour de révision aurait elle- même retenue. (2) application (2) application [56] in both decisions, the tribunal provided care- ful and well- considered reasons explaining why the complaints had not established a discriminatory prac- tice under the chra. the adjudicators fi rst charac- terized the complaints as direct attacks on legislation. they then found that, while the chra conferred remedial authority to render confl icting legislation inoperable, the tribunal could not grant a remedy unless a discriminatory practice had fi rst been es- tablished. they then concluded that legislation per se was not a service under the s. 5 prohibition of discriminatory practices in the provision of services. in coming to this conclusion, the adjudicators con- sidered the complainants’ evidence and submissions, the governing jurisprudence, the purpose, nature and scheme of the chra, and relevant policy considera- tions. the decisions meet the dunsmuir standard of intelligibility, transparency and justifi ability, and fall within the range of reasonable outcomes (para 47). [56] dans les deux décisions qu’il a rendues, le tribunal a fourni des motifs soigneusement rédigés et mûrement réfl échis où il a expliqué les raisons pour lesquelles les plaignants n’avaient pas réussi à établir l’existence d’un acte discriminatoire au sens de la lcdp. les membres décideurs ont d’abord qualifi é les plaintes de contestations visant direc- tement un texte de loi. ils ont ensuite conclu que, s’il était vrai que la lcdp conférait au tribunal le pouvoir réparateur de déclarer inopérantes des lois incompatibles, ce dernier ne pouvait accorder une telle réparation sans que l’existence d’un acte discri- minatoire ait été prouvée au préalable. ils ont ajouté qu’un texte de loi en soi n’était pas un service aux termes de l’art. 5, qui interdit les actes discrimina- toires dans le cadre de la prestation de services. pour parvenir à cette conclusion, les membres décideurs ont étudié les éléments de preuve et les observations des plaignants, la jurisprudence applicable, l’objet, la nature et l’économie de la lcdp et enfi n, les considérations de politique générale pertinentes. les décisions en cause respectent les critères de justifi ca- tion, de transparence et d’intelligibilité défi nis dans dunsmuir, et elles appartiennent aux issues possibles raisonnables (par 47). [57] the critical issue for the adjudicators to de- cide was whether the complaints constituted a di- rect attack on legislation or whether they concerned discrimination in the provision of a service. it is uncontroversial that actions of the executive in pro- viding services primarily available to the public are reviewable under human rights legislation (see, eg,. tranchemontagne; beattie v. canada (aboriginal affairs and northern development), 2014 chrt 1; canada (attorney general) v. davis, 2013 fc 40, 425 ftr 200; canada (canadian human rights commission) v. canada (attorney general), 2012 fc 445, [2013] 4 fcr 545). what is controversial is consideration of complaints that, in substance, solely [57] la question déterminante que les membres décideurs devaient trancher était celle de savoir si les plaintes constituaient une attaque directe contre un texte de loi ou si elles mettaient en cause un acte dis- criminatoire dans la prestation d’un service. il est in- contesté que les actions de l’exécutif dans le cadre de la fourniture de services destinés principalement au public sont susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un examen fondé sur les lois en matière de droits de la personne (voir, p ex, tranchemontagne;. beattie c. canada (affaires indiennes et du nord), 2014 tcdp 1; ca- nada (procureur général) c. davis, 2013 cf 40; canada (commission canadienne des droits de la personne) c. canada (procureur général), 2012 cf [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 267 target legislation. in reviewing such complaints, hu- man rights tribunals are faced with the challenging task of distinguishing between administrative ser- vices and legislation. human rights tribunals in fed- eral and provincial jurisdictions have taken various approaches to making such a distinction (c. mummé, “at the crossroads in discrimination law: how the human rights codes overtook the charter in canadian government services cases” (2012), 9 jl. & equality 103, at pp 116-17). since this raises a question of mixed fact and law squarely within their expertise, human rights tribunals are best situated to develop an approach to making such distinctions. under reasonableness review, the reviewing court’s task is to supervise the tribunal’s approach in the context of the decision as a whole. its role is not to impose an approach of its own choosing. [58] the adjudicators approached the characteriza- tion of the complaints by looking at the jurisprudence for determining what constitutes a service under s. 5 of the chra and by considering the nature of the al- legations, the wording of the complainants’ submis- sions and the relationship between the registrar and the s. 6 entitlement provisions of the indian act. both adjudicators placed weight on the complainants’ sub- missions that framed their complaints as targeting the indian act entitlement provisions. the adjudicators found that the complaints did not impugn the means by which the registrar had processed their applica- tions, but substantively targeted the eligibility criteria that the registrar was required to apply. on this basis, the adjudicators reasonably concluded that the complaints before them were properly characterized as direct attacks on legislation. 445, [2013] 4 rcf 545). ce qui est en litige, c’est plutôt l’examen de plaintes qui, essentiellement, visent uniquement des textes de loi. lorsqu’ils exa- minent de telles plaintes, les tribunaux des droits de la personne font face à la tâche diffi cile d’établir une distinction entre les services administratifs et la lé- gislation. les tribunaux des droits de la personne des administrations fédérale et provinciales ont adopté diverses approches pour faire une telle distinction (c. mummé, « at the crossroads in discrimination law : how the human rights codes overtook the charter in canadian government services cases » (2012), 9 jl & equality 103, p 116-117). puisque cette distinction soulève une question mixte de fait et de droit qui relève directement de leur champ d’expertise, les tribunaux des droits de la personne sont les mieux placés pour élaborer une approche permettant d’établir les distinctions de cette nature. dans le cadre d’un contrôle selon la norme de la rai- sonnabilité, la cour de révision a pour tâche d’exercer une surveillance à l’égard de l’approche utilisée par le tribunal dans le contexte de la décision prise dans son ensemble. son rôle n’est pas d’imposer l’ap- proche de son choix. [58] les membres décideurs ont abordé la quali- fi cation des plaintes en examinant la jurisprudence afi n d’établir ce qui constitue un service aux termes de l’art. 5 de la lcdp. ils ont étudié la nature des allégations, la formulation des observations des plai- gnants et le rapport qui existe entre le registraire et les dispositions sur le droit à l’inscription à l’art. 6 de la loi sur les indiens. les deux membres décideurs ont accordé de l’importance aux observations des plaignants dont la formulation donnait à penser que les plaintes visaient les dispositions sur le droit à l’inscription de la loi sur les indiens. de l’avis des membres décideurs, les plaintes ne mettaient pas en cause les moyens employés par le registraire pour traiter leurs demandes, mais visaient essentiellement les critères d’admissibilité que le registraire était tenu d’appliquer. sur ce fondement, les membres déci- deurs ont raisonnablement conclu que les plaintes portées devant eux pouvaient être qualifi ées à bon droit d’attaques directes contre un texte de loi. [59] after concluding that the complaints im- pugned legislative criteria rather than the process [59] après avoir conclu que les plaintes mettaient en cause des critères législatifs plutôt que le processus 268 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. of registration, the adjudicators turned to consider whether the complainants were capable of making out a discriminatory practice under the chra. all of the complaints alleged that inac had engaged in a discriminatory practice by denying a service, or by subjecting the complainants to adverse dif- ferentiation with respect to a service, on prohibited grounds. the adjudicators therefore sought to de- termine whether legislation fell within the statutory defi nition of a service. d’inscription, les membres décideurs ont examiné la question de savoir si les plaignants étaient en mesure d’établir l’existence d’un acte discriminatoire au sens de la lcdp. dans toutes les plaintes, il était allégué qu’ainc s’était livré à des actes discriminatoires en refusant aux plaignants un service, ou en leur faisant subir, en ce qui a trait à un service, une distinction dé- favorable fondée sur un motif illicite. les membres décideurs ont donc cherché à établir si le texte de loi constituait un service aux termes de la loi. [60] the tribunal reasonably considered the guid- ance provided by the federal court of appeal in murphy and the underlying tribunal decision that the federal court of appeal had endorsed in that judgment. it is unnecessary for the disposition of this appeal to determine the degree to which murphy constituted binding authority or how such a decision could be overturned by this court on reasonableness review. while the adjudicators considered them- selves bound by murphy, they still conducted a thor- ough analysis to determine whether or not murphy had been superseded either by binding authority or by the chra. both decisions can stand on their own merits. in considering the authorities from both this [61] court and provincial jurisdictions, the adjudicators distinguished the primacy of human rights legislation and the statutory prohibition against discriminatory practices. they recognized that decisions such as heerspink, craton, action travail des femmes, an- drews v. law society of british columbia, larocque, and tranchemontagne considered that human rights legislation could render confl icting legislation in- operable. hence, where a discriminatory practice without bona fi de justifi cation is established, the tribunal has the power to order administrators to stop applying confl icting provisions. however, as the tribunal indicated, in all such cases the human rights tribunals were responding to an established discrim- inatory practice. none of these cases stood for the proposition that legislation in general fell within the meaning of “services”. the tribunal reasonably did not take the jurisprudence on its remedial authority [60] le tribunal a raisonnablement examiné les lignes directrices que la cour d’appel fédérale a énoncées dans l’arrêt murphy, de même que la dé- cision sous- jacente du tribunal à laquelle la cour d’appel fédérale a souscrit dans cet arrêt. il n’est pas nécessaire, pour trancher le présent pourvoi, de déterminer la mesure dans laquelle l’arrêt murphy avait valeur de précédent, ni de quelle manière notre cour aurait pu infi rmer une telle décision au terme d’un contrôle selon la norme de la raisonnabilité. en effet, même si les membres décideurs s’estimaient liés par l’arrêt murphy, ils ont tout de même mené une analyse approfondie afi n d’établir si cet arrêt avait été supplanté, que ce soit par un précédent qui les lie ou par la lcdp. ainsi, les deux décisions ont été rendues en fonction des faits qui leur sont propres. [61] dans le cadre de leur analyse de la jurispru- dence émanant de notre cour et des juridictions provinciales, les membres décideurs ont fait une dis- tinction entre la préséance des lois sur les droits de la personne et l’interdiction que prévoit la loi à l’égard des actes discriminatoires. ils ont reconnu que se- lon les décisions rendues dans des affaires comme heerspink, craton, action travail des femmes, an- drews c. law society of british columbia, larocque et tranchemontagne, les lois sur les droits de la per- sonne pouvaient rendre inopérantes des dispositions législatives incompatibles. c’est ainsi que lorsqu’un acte discriminatoire sans motif justifi able est démon- tré, le tribunal a le pouvoir d’ordonner à un décideur administratif de cesser d’appliquer les dispositions incompatibles. mais comme le tribunal l’a indiqué, dans les arrêts précédemment mentionnés, les tri- bunaux des droits de la personne étaient intervenus pour remédier à un acte discriminatoire établi. rien [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge gascon 269 as overturning murphy or as necessitating an ex- pansive interpretation of the meaning of “services”. [62] the adjudicators also reasonably considered whether legislation could fall under the defi nition of a service based on gould v. yukon order of pioneers, [1996] 1 scr 571, and watkin. the adjudicator in andrews noted that the sui generis nature of par- liament’s power to legislate is inconsistent with the characterization of law- making as a public service and that law- making does not have the transitive con- notation necessary to identify a service customarily offered to the public. [63] there is also no issue with the tribunal’s re- view of the scheme of the chra. both adjudicators found that the provisions raised by the commission were entirely consistent with the distinction made between the primacy of human rights legislation and the scope of the chra’s prohibition of discrimina- tory practices. section 49(5), which requires that the adjudicator assigned to cases where legislation may be rendered inoperable be a lawyer, and s. 62(1), which immunizes pension legislation from review, are consistent with the distinction between the pri- macy of the chra and the scope of its prohibition of discriminatory practices. neither provision sup- ports the interpretation that all legislation could be subject to review by the tribunal. the now repealed s. 67 of the chra, which immunized the indian act from human rights complaints, was consistent with parliament’s intent to shield services rendered pursuant to the indian act from challenge. in any event, on its own, s. 67 was insuffi cient to infer that parliament intended to allow direct challenges to all other legislation. dans ces décisions ne permettait d’affi rmer que les textes de loi en général constituaient des « services ». le tribunal s’est raisonnablement abstenu d’inférer de la jurisprudence concernant son pouvoir de ré- paration qu’elle infi rmait l’arrêt murphy, ou qu’elle exigeait une interprétation large du sens du terme « services ». [62] les membres décideurs ont aussi raisonna- blement évalué la question de savoir si un texte de loi pouvait constituer un service compte tenu des arrêts gould c. yukon order of pioneers, [1996] 1 rcs 571, et watkin. le membre décideur saisi de l’affaire andrews a souligné que la nature sui generis du pouvoir de légiférer du parlement était incom- patible avec le fait de considérer l’acte de légiférer comme un service public, et que l’acte de légiférer n’avait pas la connotation transitive nécessaire pour pouvoir être considéré comme un service destiné au public. [63] aucune question ne se soulève non plus quant à l’examen de l’économie de la lcdp par le tribu- nal. les deux membres décideurs ont conclu que les dispositions invoquées par la commission étaient pleinement cohérentes avec la distinction entre la préséance des lois sur les droits de la personne et la portée de l’interdiction relative aux actes discrimi- natoires prévue dans la lcdp. le paragraphe 49(5), qui exige que le membre décideur affecté aux affaires dans lesquelles des dispositions législatives pour- raient être déclarées inopérantes soit un avocat, et le par. 62(1), qui place la législation sur les régimes de retraite à l’abri d’un examen, sont compatibles avec la différence qui existe entre la préséance de la lcdp et la portée de l’interdiction relative aux actes discriminatoires qu’elle prévoit. aucune de ces dispositions n’appuie l’interprétation selon laquelle toute loi serait susceptible de révision par le tribu- nal. l’article 67 de la lcdp (maintenant abrogé), qui soustrayait la loi sur les indiens aux plaintes en matière de droits de la personne, correspondait à l’in- tention qu’avait le législateur de mettre à l’abri d’une contestation les services fournis conformément à la loi sur les indiens. toutefois, l’art. 67 ne permettait pas, à lui seul, de conclure que le législateur avait eu l’intention de permettre des contestations directes de toutes les autres lois. 270 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. [64] the commission and interveners have raised numerous policy grounds upon which direct chal- lenges to legislation should be considered by the tribunal. however, it is not for a reviewing court to reweigh policy considerations. the adjudicators clearly considered the practical diffi culties and chal- lenges to democratic legitimacy involved in evalu- ating challenges to legislation under the bona fi de justifi cation requirement. there is nothing unreason- able about this determination. i would conclude by noting that the analysis [65] of s. 5 of the chra in côté and rowe jj.’s reasons does not differ signifi cantly from that of the tribunal. indeed, i fail to see where their analysis adds to the tribunal’s interpretation of its own statute, which engaged substantially with the human rights jurispru- dence and addressed the diffi cult question of when a complaint is properly characterized as an attack on legislation. given this, i would question whether this court, or any reviewing court, is necessarily bet- ter situated to interpret this decision maker’s home statute. [64] la commission et les intervenants ont soulevé de nombreuses raisons de politique générale qui justifi eraient que les contestations directes visant des textes de loi soient examinées par le tribunal. cependant, il n’appartient pas à une cour de révision de soupeser à nouveau les considérations de politique générale les membres décideurs ont clairement tenu compte des diffi cultés d’ordre pratique et des remises en question de la légitimité démocratique que suppose l’examen des contestations de la loi en fonction du critère du motif justifi able. la conclusion qu’ils ont tirée n’a rien de déraisonnable. [65] je conclurai en soulignant que l’analyse de l’art. 5 de la lcdp contenue dans les motifs des juges côté et rowe ne diffère pas beaucoup de celle qu’a faite le tribunal. en fait, je ne vois pas de quelle façon leur analyse ajoute à l’interprétation que le tribunal donne à sa loi constitutive, qui portait en grande partie sur la jurisprudence en matière de droits de la personne et qui abordait l’épineuse question de savoir dans quels cas une plainte peut être qualifi ée à juste titre d’attaque contre un texte de loi. compte tenu de cela, je doute que notre cour, ou toute autre cour de révision, soit nécessairement mieux placée pour interpréter la loi constitutive de ce décideur. v conclusion v conclusion [66] the tribunal reviewed all of the complaints in carefully considered, thorough and logical decisions that fell within the range of possible, acceptable out- comes. both decisions were reasonable and should be upheld. [66] le tribunal a examiné toutes les plaintes dans des décisions détaillées, logiques et mûrement réfl é- chies qui faisaient partie des issues possibles accep- tables. les deux décisions sont raisonnables, et elles devraient être maintenues. [67] in closing, i would emphasize that the dispo- sition of this appeal says nothing as to whether the indian act infringes the rights of the complainants under s. 15 of the charter. in this regard, i would simply note that in recent years, there have been two successful challenges to the indian act registration provisions, both of which have prompted legislative reform (descheneaux v. canada (attorney general), 2015 qccs 3555, [2016] 2 cnlr 175;. mcivor v. canada (indian and northern affairs, registrar), 2009 bcca 153, 306 dlr (4th) 193). [67] en terminant, je tiens à souligner que le pré- sent pourvoi est tranché sans que nous ayons à juger si la loi sur les indiens porte atteinte aux droits que l’art. 15 de la charte garantit aux plaignants. à ce chapitre, je fais simplement remarquer que, ces dernières années, deux contestations des dispositions relatives à l’inscription de la loi sur les indiens ont été couronnées de succès, et ont entraîné une réforme de la loi (descheneaux c. canada (procureur géné- ral), 2015 qccs 3555; mcivor c. canada (indian and northern affairs, registrar), 2009 bcca 153, 306 dlr (4th) 193). [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). les juges côté et rowe 271 i would accordingly dismiss the appeal. [68] costs were not sought by either party and will not be awarded. [68] en conséquence, je rejetterais le pourvoi. puisqu’aucune des parties n’a demandé de dépens, aucuns ne seront adjugés. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par côté and rowe jj. — les juges côté et rowe — i overview i aperçu [69] at issue in this case is whether the canadian human rights tribunal (“tribunal”) erred in fi nd- ing that legislative enactments cannot be challenged pursuant to s. 5 of the canadian human rights act, rsc 1985, c.  h-6 (“chra”) section  5 of the chra prohibits (among other things) the making of discriminatory distinctions in the provision of services customarily available to the general public. in both andrews v. canada (indian and northern affairs), 2013 chrt 21, and matson v. canada (in- dian and northern affairs), 2013 chrt 13, the tri- bunal dismissed several complaints brought against the registration provisions of the indian act, rsc. 1985, c. i-5, on the basis that they did not impugn discrimination “in the provision of    services” (s. 5 of the chra). applying a deferential standard of review, both the federal court (2015 fc 398, 477 ftr 229) and the federal court of appeal (2016 fca 200, [2017] 2 fcr 211) held that the tribu- nal’s decisions in matson and andrews were reason- able. a majority of this court would do the same. [70] we agree with our colleague gascon j. as to the disposition of this appeal, as well as with his summary of the facts and judicial history. how- ever, we part ways with respect to the selection of the appropriate standard of review. in our view, a contextual analysis leads to the conclusion that the tribunal’s decisions should be reviewed for correct- ness. applying this standard, we would hold that the tribunal correctly decided the issue, and dismiss the appeal accordingly. [69] le présent pourvoi soulève la question de sa- voir si le tribunal canadien des droits de la personne (« tribunal ») a commis une erreur en concluant que les textes de loi ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une contestation en vertu de l’art. 5 de la loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne, lrc 1985, c. h-6 (« lcdp »). cette disposition interdit, notamment, les distinctions discriminatoires par un fournisseur de services destinés au public. dans les décisions andrews c. canada (affaires indiennes et du nord), 2013 tcdp 21, et matson c. canada (affaires in- diennes et du nord), 2013 tcdp 13, le tribunal a rejeté plusieurs plaintes déposées à l’encontre des dispositions en matière d’inscription de la loi sur les indiens, lrc 1985, c. i-5, au motif qu’elles ne mettaient pas en cause un acte discriminatoire commis par « le fournisseur de [  ] services » (art. 5 de la lcdp). appliquant une norme de contrôle qui commande la déférence, la cour fédérale (2015 cf 398) et la cour d’appel fédérale (2016 caf 200, [2017] 2 rcf 211) ont toutes deux conclu que les décisions matson et andrews du tribunal étaient raisonnables. les juges majoritaires de notre cour en feraient de même. [70] nous sommes d’accord avec notre collègue le juge gascon quant à l’issue du présent pourvoi, et nous souscrivons également à son résumé des faits et de l’historique judiciaire. toutefois, nous sommes en désaccord en ce qui concerne le choix de la norme de contrôle applicable. à notre avis, une analyse contex- tuelle mène à la conclusion que les décisions du tribunal devraient être examinées selon la norme de la décision correcte. en appliquant cette norme, nous concluons que le tribunal a correctement tranché la question en litige, et nous rejetterions le pourvoi en conséquence. 272 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). côté and rowe jj. [2018] 2 scr. ii analysis ii analyse a what is the applicable standard of review? a quelle est la norme de contrôle applicable? in dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [71] [2008] 1 scr 190, at para. 62, this court estab- lished a two- stage framework for determining the degree of deference owed to an administrative body’s decision on judicial review. first, the reviewing court is to survey the jurisprudence to ascertain whether the applicable standard of review has already been settled. if so, the inquiry ends there and the court applies that standard in reviewing the merits of the impugned decision. if the appropriate standard has not been settled in the jurisprudence, however, the second stage of the analysis directs the court to undertake a more rigorous analysis to determine whether the statutory body’s decision ought to be reviewed for reasonableness or for correctness. [72] the standard of review analysis set out in dunsmuir requires the court to consider several contextual factors, which include the nature of the question at issue, the presence or absence of a priv- ative clause, the tribunal’s statutory purpose, and the expertise of the tribunal (para 64). these factors help to determine the standard that strikes the appropriate balance between respect for the rule of law on the one hand, and legislative supremacy on the other. [71] dans dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, par. 62, la cour a établi un cadre d’analyse en deux étapes pour déterminer le degré de déférence qui doit être accordé à la dé- cision d’un organisme administratif lors du contrôle judiciaire. à la première étape, la cour de révision examine la jurisprudence pour vérifi er si la norme de contrôle applicable a déjà été établie. dans l’affi r- mative, l’analyse s’arrête là et la cour applique cette norme dans son examen sur le fond de la décision contestée. toutefois, si la jurisprudence n’a pas établi la norme applicable, la deuxième étape de l’analyse prévoit que la cour doit entreprendre une analyse plus rigoureuse afi n de déterminer si la décision de l’organisme statutaire doit être examinée selon la norme de la décision raisonnable ou selon la norme de la décision correcte. [72] l’analyse relative à la norme de contrôle énon- cée dans l’arrêt dunsmuir exige que la cour tienne compte de plusieurs facteurs contextuels, dont la nature de la question en cause, l’existence ou l’inexis- tence d’une clause privative, la raison d’être du tri- bunal selon sa loi habilitante, ainsi que l’expertise du tribunal (par 64). ces facteurs aident à déterminer la norme qui permet d’atteindre un juste équilibre entre le respect de la primauté du droit, d’une part, et la suprématie législative, d’autre part. [73] in the jurisprudence that followed dunsmuir, this court has placed signifi cant emphasis on the na- ture of the question at issue when determining the ap- plicable standard of review. in alberta (information and privacy commissioner) v. alberta teachers’ association, 2011 scc 61, [2011] 3 scr 654, at para. 39, this court affi rmed that reasonableness will be the presumptive standard for the review of questions that involve the tribunal’s interpretation and application of its home statute or of a statute closely related to its function. there are, however, two situations where the presumption will not apply. first, the jurisprudence recognizes four “categories” of questions that will necessarily attract review on a standard of correctness: constitutional questions, [73] dans la jurisprudence qui a suivi l’arrêt duns- muir, la cour a accordé beaucoup d’importance à la nature de la question en cause pour déterminer la norme de contrôle applicable. dans alberta (infor- mation and privacy commissioner) c. alberta tea- chers’ association, 2011 csc 61, [2011] 3 rcs. 654, par. 39, la cour a affi rmé qu’il convient de présumer que la norme de la décision raisonnable sera applicable aux décisions qui impliquent l’in- terprétation et l’application par le tribunal de sa loi constitutive, ou d’une loi étroitement liée à son mandat. il existe toutefois deux situations où cette présomption ne s’appliquera pas premièrement, la jurisprudence reconnaît quatre « catégories » de questions qui devront nécessairement être examinées [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). les juges côté et rowe 273 questions of law that are both of central importance to the legal system and that are outside of the tribu- nal’s specialized area of expertise, questions that in- volve the drawing of jurisdictional lines between two or more competing specialized tribunals, and true questions of jurisdiction. second, the presumption of reasonableness will be rebutted if the contextual factors listed in dunsmuir point towards correctness as the appropriate standard. [74] turning to the present case, we agree with the canadian human rights commission (“commis- sion”) that the jurisprudence is unclear as to which standard applies to the review of the particular ques- tion before us. this was the conclusion reached by the unanimous federal court of appeal panel; after undertaking a careful review of the relevant case law, gleason ja observed the diffi culty in “draw[ing] a bright line as to when the reasonableness or the correctness standard will apply to decisions of hu- man rights tribunals interpreting the scope of the protections afforded in their constituent legislation” (para 69). and while this court in canada (cana- dian human rights commission) v. canada (attor- ney general), 2011 scc 53, [2011] 3 scr 471 (“mowat”), applied a reasonableness standard when reviewing a decision of the tribunal fi nding that it had the statutory authority to order costs in favour of a successful complainant, it nevertheless recognized that the dunsmuir framework may direct that certain decisions of the tribunal be reviewed for correctness (para 23). selon la norme de la décision correcte : les questions constitutionnelles, les questions de droit qui revêtent une importance capitale pour le système juridique et qui sont étrangères au domaine d’expertise du tribunal, les questions impliquant la délimitation des compétences respectives de tribunaux spécia- lisés concurrents, ainsi que les questions touchant véritablement à la juridiction. deuxièmement, la présomption d’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable sera réfutée si les facteurs contextuels énumérés dans l’arrêt dunsmuir tendent plutôt vers la norme de la décision correcte. [74] en l’espèce, nous convenons avec la commis- sion canadienne des droits de la personne (« com- mission ») que la jurisprudence n’est pas claire quant à la norme applicable à la question particulière dont nous sommes saisis. c’est la conclusion unanime à laquelle en sont arrivés les juges de la cour d’appel fédérale; suite à un examen attentif de la jurispru- dence pertinente, la juge gleason a fait remarquer la diffi culté à « tracer une ligne de démonstration nette entre les décisions assujetties à la norme de contrôle de la décision raisonnable et celles qui ap- pellent la norme de la décision correcte lorsque les tribunaux des droits de la personne sont appelés à interpréter la portée des garanties prévues par leurs lois constitutives » (par 69). de plus, bien que dans l’arrêt canada (commission canadienne des droits de la personne) c. canada (procureur général), 2011 csc 53, [2011] 3 rcs 471 (« mowat »), la cour ait appliqué la norme de la décision raisonnable au contrôle d’une décision du tribunal où celui-ci avait conclu qu’il avait le pouvoir statutaire d’adjuger des dépens en faveur de la plaignante après que celle-ci eut obtenu gain de cause, elle a néanmoins reconnu que le cadre d’analyse établi dans l’arrêt dunsmuir peut exiger que certaines décisions du tribunal soient examinées selon la norme de la décision cor- recte (par 23). [75] the parties frame the issue in the present case around the tribunal’s interpretation of s. 5 of the chra, and neither disputes that this is a question to which the presumption of reasonableness applies. the respondent, the attorney general of canada, submits that this presumption is not rebutted on ei- ther a categorical or a contextual basis. by contrast, [75] selon les parties, la question en litige repose principalement sur l’interprétation de l’art. 5 de la lcdp, par le tribunal, et nul ne conteste qu’il s’agit d’une question à l’égard de laquelle la présomption de la norme de la décision raisonnable s’applique. l’intimé, le procureur général du canada, prétend que cette présomption n’est pas réfutée, que ce soit 274 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). côté and rowe jj. [2018] 2 scr. the appellant, commission, submits that a contextual analysis leads to the conclusion that the standard of correctness ought to apply in these circumstances. [76] since the interpretation of s. 5 of the chra is at issue in this case, we agree that reasonableness presumptively applies. gascon j. is of the view that the issue before us does not fall within any of the recognized categories that attract correctness re- view — but has much more to say in this regard. without it having been raised as an issue before this court, he goes to great lengths to point out the perceived diffi culties associated with the category of jurisdictional questions, and expresses signifi cant doubt as to whether this category even remains an analytically useful component of the standard of review analysis (paras 31-41). [77] we would strongly distance ourselves from these obiter comments. recognizing that the concept of jurisdiction has and continues to play a crucial role in administrative law, this court has made clear on several occasions that administrative decision makers must be correct in their determinations as to the scope of their delegated authority (crevier v. attorney gen- eral of quebec, [1981] 2 scr 220, at pp. 236-37; united taxi drivers’ fellowship of southern alberta v. calgary (city), 2004 scc 19, [2004] 1 scr. 485, at para. 5; dunsmuir, at para 29). this is be- cause jurisdictional questions are fundamentally tied to both the maintenance of legislative supremacy, which requires that a given statutory body operate within the sphere in which the legislature intended that it operate, as well as the rule of law, which re- quires that all exercises of delegated authority fi nd their source in law (dunsmuir, at para 28). nothing in our reasons should be read as undermining these longstanding principles of judicial review. we agree with our colleague gascon  j., however, that any uncertainty surrounding the jurisdictional question category ought to be resolved another day, when this issue is squarely raised by the parties. sur le fondement d’une catégorie de questions, ou sur le fondement de facteurs contextuels. l’appelante, la commission, plaide plutôt qu’une analyse contex- tuelle mène à la conclusion que la norme de la déci- sion correcte devrait s’appliquer en l’espèce. [76] puisque l’interprétation de l’art. 5 de la lcdp est en cause dans la présente affaire, nous sommes d’accord que l’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable doit être présumée. le juge gascon est d’avis que la question dont nous sommes saisis ne fait partie d’aucune des catégories reconnues qui em- portent l’assujettissement à la norme de la décision correcte — mais il en dit beaucoup plus à cet égard. sans que cette question ait été soulevée devant la cour, il va même jusqu’à souligner les diffi cultés que pose selon lui la catégorie des questions touchant la juridiction et il dit avoir de sérieuses réserves quant à l’utilité même de cette catégorie dans l’analyse re- lative à la norme de contrôle applicable (par 31-41). [77] nous nous dissocions fermement de ces com- mentaires faits en obiter. reconnaissant que la no- tion de juridiction a joué, et joue encore, un rôle essentiel en droit administratif, notre cour a claire- ment indiqué à plusieurs reprises que les décideurs administratifs doivent déterminer correctement la portée du pouvoir qui leur a été délégué (crevier c. procureur général du québec, [1981] 2 rcs. 220, p. 236-237; united taxi drivers’ fellowship of southern alberta c. calgary (ville), 2004 csc 19, [2004] 1 rcs 485, par. 5; dunsmuir, par 29). il en est ainsi parce que les questions de juridiction sont fondamentalement liées tant au maintien de la suprématie législative — qui exige qu’un organisme statutaire donné agisse dans les limites que le lé- gislateur a prévues — qu’au respect de la primauté du droit — qui veut que tout exercice de l’autorité déléguée procède de la loi (dunsmuir, par 28). rien dans nos motifs ne doit être interprété comme une menace à ces principes bien établis de contrôle judi- ciaire. toutefois, nous convenons avec notre collègue le juge gascon que toute incertitude qui entoure la catégorie de questions touchant la juridiction devra être réglée à une autre occasion, lorsque les parties soulèveront directement cette question. [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). les juges côté et rowe 275 [78] we also disagree with the proposition that the contextual approach plays merely a subordinate role in the standard of review analysis (reasons of gascon j., at para 45). on our reading of the appli- cable case law, resort to the contextual approach is not exceptional at all; the framework set out by this court in dunsmuir is manifestly contextual in nature. the “correctness categories”, as they have become known, are simply instances where the jurisprudence has already settled the appropriate standard, such that a more extensive analysis of the relevant contextual factors needs not be performed (dunsmuir, at pa- ras. 57-61; hon. m. bastarache, dunsmuir 10 years later (march 9, 2018) (online)). in this regard, we can only repeat what this court said regarding the determination of the appropriate standard of review 10 years ago in dunsmuir: in summary, the process of judicial review involves two steps. first, courts ascertain whether the jurispru- dence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question. second, where the fi rst inquiry proves unfruitful, courts must proceed to an anal- ysis of the factors making it possible to identify the proper standard of review. [78] nous sommes également en désaccord avec la proposition selon laquelle l’approche contextuelle ne joue qu’un rôle subordonné dans l’analyse rela- tive à la norme de contrôle (motifs du juge gascon, par 45). selon notre interprétation de la jurispru- dence applicable, le recours à l’analyse contextuelle n’a absolument rien d’exceptionnel; le cadre d’ana- lyse établi par notre cour dans dunsmuir est mani- festement de nature contextuelle. les « catégories de questions auxquelles s’applique la norme de la décision correcte », comme on en est venu à les qualifi er, sont simplement des situations où la juris- prudence a déjà établi la norme applicable, si bien qu’une analyse plus poussée des facteurs contextuels pertinents n’est plus nécessaire (dunsmuir, par. 57- 61; l’hon. m. bastarache, dunsmuir 10 years later (9 mars 2018) (en ligne)). à cet égard, il suffi t de répéter ce qu’a affi rmé notre cour il y a 10 ans dans dunsmuir quant à la détermination de la norme de contrôle applicable : bref, le processus de contrôle judiciaire se déroule en deux étapes. premièrement, la cour de révision vérifi e si la jurisprudence établit déjà de manière satisfaisante le degré de déférence correspondant à une catégorie de questions en particulier. en second lieu, lorsque cette démarche se révèle infructueuse, elle entreprend l’analyse des éléments qui permettent d’arrêter la bonne norme de contrôle. the existing approach to determining the appropriate standard of review has commonly been referred to as “prag- matic and functional”. that name is unimportant. reviewing courts must not get fi xated on the label at the expense of a proper understanding of what the inquiry actually entails. because the phrase “pragmatic and functional approach” may have misguided courts in the past, we prefer to refer simply to the “standard of review analysis” in the future. l’analyse qui préside actuellement à la détermination de la norme de contrôle applicable est généralement quali- fi ée de « pragmatique et fonctionnelle ». cette appellation importe peu, et la cour de révision ne doit pas s’y attacher au détriment de ce qu’exige réellement la démarche. il se peut qu’elle ait induit les cours de justice en erreur dans le passé. c’est pourquoi, à l’avenir, nous parlerons simplement d’« analyse relative à la norme de contrôle ». the analysis must be contextual. as mentioned above, it is dependent on the application of a number of relevant factors, including: (1) the presence or absence of a priva- tive clause; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the question at issue, and; (4) the expertise of the tribunal. in many cases, it will not be necessary to consider all of the factors, as some of them may be determinative in the application of the reasonableness standard in a specifi c case. [emphasis added; paras 62-64]. l’analyse doit être contextuelle. nous rappelons que son issue dépend de l’application d’un certain nombre de facteurs pertinents, dont (1) l’existence ou l’inexistence d’une clause privative, (2) la raison d’être du tribunal administratif suivant l’interprétation de sa loi habilitante, (3) la nature de la question en cause et (4) l’expertise du tribunal administratif. dans bien des cas, il n’est pas né- cessaire de tenir compte de tous les facteurs, car certains d’entre eux peuvent, dans une affaire donnée, déterminer l’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable. [nous soulignons; par 62-64] 276 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). côté and rowe jj. [2018] 2 scr. [79] with this in mind, we simply cannot agree with the suggestion that the contextual analysis “should be applied sparingly”, or that “[t]he pre- sumption of reasonableness review and the identifi ed categories will generally be suffi cient to determine the applicable standard” (reasons of gascon j., at para 46). dunsmuir provides that such an analysis must be undertaken where the categories identifi ed in the jurisprudence do not apply. and we observe that a number of post-dunsmuir decisions from this court have done just that: canada (citizenship and immi- gration) v. khosa, 2009 scc 12, [2009] 1 scr. 339; nolan v. kerry (canada) inc., 2009 scc 39, [2009] 2 scr 678; nor- man regional health au- thority inc. v. manitoba association of health care professionals, 2011 scc 59, [2011] 3 scr 616; rogers communications inc. v. society of compos- ers, authors and music publishers of canada, 2012 scc 35, [2012] 2 scr 283; barreau du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2017 scc 56, [2017] 2 scr 488. the importance of context within the dunsmuir framework should not be downplayed. [80] for this reason, we dispute gascon j.’s qual- ifi cation of our standard of review analysis as be- ing “unsupported by, and at points contrary to, this court’s jurisprudence” (para 49). [79] à la lumière de ces considérations, nous ne pouvons souscrire à la proposition selon laquelle l’approche contextuelle « devrait être appliquée avec parcimonie » ou que « [l]a présomption d’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable et les catégo- ries déjà énumérées suffi ront généralement pour dé- terminer la norme de contrôle applicable » (motifs du juge gascon, par 46). suivant l’arrêt dunsmuir, une telle analyse doit être entreprise lorsque les catégo- ries identifi ées dans la jurisprudence ne s’appliquent pas. et nous observons que c’est précisément ce qu’a fait notre cour dans de nombreux arrêts postérieurs à dunsmuir : canada (citoyenneté et immigration) c. khosa, 2009 csc 12, [2009] 1 rcs 339; nolan c. kerry (canada) inc., 2009 csc 39, [2009] 2 rcs. 678; nor- man regional health authority inc c. manitoba association of health care professionals, 2011 csc 59, [2011] 3 rcs 616; rogers com- munications inc. c. société canadienne des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs de musique, 2012 csc 35, [2012] 2 rcs 283; barreau du québec c. qué- bec (procureure générale), 2017 csc 56, [2017] 2 rcs 488. on ne doit pas minimiser l’importance du contexte dans le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans l’arrêt dunsmuir. [80] c’est pourquoi nous contestons la qualifi ca- tion que fait le juge gascon de notre analyse relative à la norme de contrôle, selon laquelle celle-ci « ne trouve pas appui dans la jurisprudence de la cour et, à certains égards, [  ] est même contraire à celle-ci » (par 49). [81] returning to the present case, and without deciding whether or not this question falls within any category of questions calling for correctness review, the relevant contextual factors listed in dunsmuir lead us to conclude that the presumption has been re- butted in this case, and that the appropriate standard of review is therefore correctness. in this respect, we would also note that correctness review for questions that involve the scope of human rights protections under the chra — on the basis of either catego- ries or context — is not at all unprecedented (see, for example, mowat, at para. 23; canada (attorney general) v. watkin, 2008 fca 170, 378 nr 268, at para. 23; canada (attorney general) v. johnstone, 2014 fca 110, [2015] 2 fcr 595, at paras. 44-52; [81] revenant à la présente affaire, et sans décider si cette question appartient à l’une ou l’autre des catégories qui appellent l’application de la norme de la décision correcte, nous concluons, en fonc- tion des facteurs contextuels pertinents énumérés dans dunsmuir, que la présomption a été réfutée en l’espèce, et que la norme qu’il convient d’appliquer est donc celle de la décision correcte. à cet égard, notons également que l’application de la norme de la décision correcte aux questions touchant la portée des protections en matière de droits de la personne sous le régime de la lcdp — sur le fondement des catégories ou du contexte — n’est pas du tout une situation inédite (voir, par exemple, mowat, par. 23; canada (procureur général) c. watkin, 2008 caf [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). les juges côté et rowe 277 canadian national railway v. seeley, 2014 fca 111, 458 nr 349, at paras 35-36). 170, 378 nr 268, par. 23; canada (procureur gé- néral) c. johnstone, 2014 caf 110, [2015] 2 rcf. 595, par. 44-52; compagnie des chemins de fer natio- naux du canada c. seeley, 2014 caf 111, par. 35-36 (canlii)). (1) absence of a privative clause (1) absence de clause privative [82] first is the absence of a privative clause. this court in dunsmuir noted that the existence of “a privative clause is evidence of parliament or a legis- lature’s intent that an administrative decision maker be given greater deference and that interference by reviewing courts be minimized” (para 52). put differently, while these statutory provisions do not oust the superior courts’ inherent and constitutional authority to judicially review administrative action, they nevertheless provide a strong indication that deference is to be shown to that particular decision maker. [82] le premier facteur à considérer est l’absence de clause privative. dans l’arrêt dunsmuir, la cour a souligné que l’existence d’une clause privative « atteste la volonté du législateur que les décisions du décideur administratif fassent l’objet de plus de déférence et que le contrôle judiciaire soit mini- mal » (par 52). autrement dit, bien que ces disposi- tions statutaires n’écartent pas le pouvoir inhérent et constitutionnel des cours supérieures de procéder au contrôle judiciaire de décisions administratives, elles donnent fortement à penser qu’il faut faire preuve de déférence envers le décideur concerné. [83] although the chra confers onto the tribunal the power to “decide all questions of law or fact nec- essary to determining the matter” before it (s. 50(2)), parliament opted not to shield these decisions from exacting review behind a privative clause. we ap- preciate that the absence of a privative clause does not, on its own, rebut the presumption of deference, though we would nevertheless note that it does not support reasonableness review either. (2) expertise of the tribunal: section 5 of the chra is not interpreted exclusively within a discrete and special administrative regime [83] bien que la lcdp confère au tribunal le pouvoir de « tranche[r] les questions de droit et les questions de fait dont il est saisi » (par. 50(2)), le législateur a décidé de ne pas soustraire ces déci- sions à un contrôle rigoureux au moyen d’une clause privative. nous reconnaissons que l’absence d’une telle clause n’a pas pour effet, à elle seule, de réfuter la présomption de déférence, mais nous notons par ailleurs qu’elle n’appuie pas non plus un contrôle selon la norme de la décision raisonnable. (2) l’expertise du tribunal : l’art. 5 de la lcdp n’est pas interprété exclusivement dans le cadre d’un régime administratif distinct et particulier [84] the second factor militating in favour of correctness review is the desirability of a uniform interpretation of the term “services” as it appears in s. 5 of the chra across federal statutory bodies. on several occasions, this court has affi rmed that human rights protections must be interpreted consist- ently across jurisdictions, unless the legislative intent clearly indicates otherwise (university of british columbia v. berg, [1993] 2 scr 353, at p. 373; gould v. yukon order of pioneers, [1996] 1 scr. 571, at para. 47; new brunswick (human rights [84] un deuxième facteur milite en faveur de la norme de la décision correcte : il serait souhaitable que tous les organismes fédéraux statutaires adoptent une interprétation uniforme du terme « services » tel qu’il apparaît à l’art. 5 de la lcdp. à plusieurs reprises, la cour a affi rmé que les protections en matière de droits de la personne doivent être in- terprétées uniformément dans les divers ressorts, sauf intention contraire manifeste du législateur (université de la colombie- britannique c berg, [1993] 2 rcs 353, p. 373; gould c. yukon order 278 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). côté and rowe jj. [2018] 2 scr. commission) v. potash corporation of saskatch- ewan inc., 2008 scc 45, [2008] 2 scr 604, at para. 68, per mclachlin cj, concurring in part). in our view, it is even more imperative that provisions within a given human rights statute be interpreted consistently among courts and tribunals tasked with its application. the rule of law is undermined where the same anti- discrimination protection is interpreted and applied a certain way by one administrative de- cision maker, and altogether differently by another. [85] the tribunal is not the only administrative decision maker at the federal level that is tasked with enforcing the anti- discrimination protections of the chra. this court has found that administrative de- cision makers other than human rights tribunals may also have the authority to interpret and apply human rights legislation in connection with matters properly before them (tranchemontagne v. ontario (director, disability support program), 2006 scc 14, [2006] 1 scr 513; see, for example, canada employment insurance commission v. m. w., 2014 sstad 371, at paras. 51-69 (canlii)). we are therefore of the view that the particular question at issue — whether legislation can be challenged as discrimination in the provision of a service — does not arise within a par- ticularly discrete administrative regime over which the tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction (dunsmuir, at para. 55; rogers communications, at para. 18; johnstone, at paras 47-48). various other decision makers — including the commission, the social security tribunal, and labour arbitrators — have been and will continue to be asked that very same question. to borrow the words of slatter  j.a in garneau community league v. edmonton (city), 2017 abca 374, 60 alta. lr (6th) 1, at para. 95: of pioneers, [1996] 1 rcs 571, par. 47; nouveau- brunswick (commission des droits de la personne) c. potash corporation of saskatchewan inc., 2008 csc 45, [2008] 2 rcs 604, par. 68, la juge en chef mclachlin, dans ses motifs concordants en partie). à notre sens, il est encore plus impératif que les tribunaux judiciaires et administratifs chargés de l’application d’une loi donnée sur les droits de la per- sonne interprètent uniformément ses dispositions. la primauté du droit se trouve ébranlée lorsque la même protection contre la discrimination est interprétée et appliquée d’une certaine manière par un décideur administratif, et d’une manière complètement diffé- rente par un autre décideur. [85] le tribunal n’est pas le seul décideur admi- nistratif à l’échelle fédérale qui est chargé d’assurer le respect des protections contre la discrimination prévues par la lcdp. notre cour a conclu que les décideurs administratifs autres que les tribunaux des droits de la personne peuvent aussi disposer du pouvoir d’interpréter et d’appliquer les lois sur les droits de la personne relativement aux affaires dont ils sont dûment saisis (tranchemontagne c. ontario (directeur du programme ontarien de sou- tien aux personnes handicapées), 2006 csc 14, [2006] 1 rcs 513; voir, par exemple, commission de l’assurance- emploi du canada c. m. w., 2014 tssda 371, par. 51-69 (canlii)). par conséquent, nous sommes d’avis que la question particulière en litige — à savoir si une loi peut être contestée au motif qu’elle constitue un acte discriminatoire dans la prestation d’un service — ne se pose pas dans le cadre d’un régime administratif particulièrement distinct à l’égard duquel le tribunal a juridiction exclusive (dunsmuir, par. 55; rogers communica- tions, par. 18; johnstone, par 47-48). divers autres décideurs, y compris la commission, le tribunal de la sécurité sociale et les arbitres en droit du travail, ont examiné et continueront d’examiner cette même question. pour reprendre les termes utilisés par le juge slatter dans garneau community league c. ed- monton (city), 2017 abca 374, 60 alta. lr (6th) 1, par. 95 :    it cannot be the legislative intent that public statutes mean different things in different parts of the [country]. in a related but analogous context, the supreme court [traduction]    le législateur n’a certainement pas voulu que des lois publiques prennent un sens différent dans dif- férentes parties du [pays]. dans un contexte connexe mais [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). les juges côté et rowe 279 accepted in housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33 (scc) at paras. 9-10, [2002] 2 scr 235 (scc) that appellate courts perform legitimate law- settling and law- making roles. it is part of the legitimate role of appellate courts to ensure that the same legal rules are applied in similar situations. for that same reason, the standard of review of correctness should be applied when many tribunals have to interpret the same statute. [86] the principal concern regarding this con- current jurisdiction is therefore that these decision makers will arrive at competing conclusions as to the scope of the very same human rights protec- tion — or, to put it more generally, that the answer to a given legal question will depend on the decision maker considering it. this concern is fundamentally tied to the rule of law. and in our view, it matters not that jurisdiction is shared between a statutory body and a court, or instead among several statutory bodies; the fact that an administrative decision may have ramifi cations beyond a single, discrete tribunal underscores this rule of law concern, and supports review of that decision on a standard of correctness. [87] this rule of law concern is more than just theoretical. as was highlighted in both andrews and in matson, there exists diverging lines of au- thority as to whether the human rights protection in s. 5 of the chra permits challenges aimed at legislation and nothing else. in druken, both the tribunal and the federal court of appeal accepted that unemployment insurance, which was availa- ble pursuant to the unemployment insurance act, 1971, sc 1970-71-72, c. 48, and its regulations, was a “service” for the purpose of s. 5 of the chra (druken v. canada (employment and immigration commission), 1987 canlii 99; canada (attorney general) v. druken, [1989] 2 fc 24). this reason- ing was followed by the federal court in gonzalez v. canada (employment and immigration commis- sion), [1997] 3 fc 646 (td), and by the tribunal in mcallister- windsor v. canada (human resources development), 2001 canlii 20691 by contrast, other decision makers interpreting that very same non identique, la cour suprême a reconnu, dans l’arrêt housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33 (csc), par. 9-10, [2002] 2  rcs 235  (csc), que les cours d’appel exercent un rôle légitime dans la création du droit. dans le cadre de ce rôle légitime qu’exercent les cours d’appel, celles-ci veillent à ce que les mêmes règles de droit soient appliquées dans des situations similaires. pour cette même raison, la norme de contrôle de la décision correcte doit être appliquée lorsque plusieurs tribunaux administratifs sont appelés à interpréter la même loi. [86] la principale préoccupation concernant cette juridiction concurrente est donc que ces décideurs parviendront à des conclusions divergentes quant à la portée d’une seule et même protection en matière de droits de la personne ou, plus généralement, que la réponse à une question de droit donnée dépendra du décideur qui l’étudie. cette préoccupation est fondamentalement liée à la primauté du droit. et, à notre avis, il importe peu que la juridiction soit partagée entre un organisme statutaire et une cour de justice ou entre plusieurs organismes de ce genre; la possibilité qu’une décision administrative ait des répercussions qui vont au- delà d’un seul tribunal distinct fait ressortir cette préoccupation relative à la primauté du droit et justifi e le contrôle de cette décision selon la norme de la décision correcte. [87] cette préoccupation relative à la primauté du droit n’est pas simplement théorique. comme il a été souligné dans les décisions andrews et matson, il existe deux courants jurisprudentiels opposés quant à savoir si la protection offerte par l’art. 5 de la lcdp permet des contestations visant une loi et rien d’autre. dans druken, le tribunal et la cour d’appel fédérale ont tous deux reconnu que l’assurance- emploi, qui était offerte sous le ré- gime de la loi de 1971 sur l’assurance- chômage, lc 1970-71-72, c. 48, et son règlement, était un « service » aux fi ns de l’art. 5 de la lcdp (druken c. canada (commission de l’emploi et de l’immi- gration), 1987 canlii 99; canada (procureur géné- ral) c. druken, [1989] 2 cf 24). ce raisonnement a été suivi par la cour fédérale dans gonzalez c. canada (commission de l’emploi et de l’immigra- tion), [1997] 3 cf 646 (1re inst), et par le tribunal dans mcallister- windsor c. canada (développement des ressources humaines), 2001 canlii 20691. en 280 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). côté and rowe jj. [2018] 2 scr. provision of the chra reached the opposite con- clusion. for example, the federal court of appeal in public service alliance of canada v. canada reve- nue agency, 2012 fca 7, 428 nr 240 (“murphy”), held that “the chra does not provide for the fi ling of a complaint directed against an act of parliament” (para 6). this echoed the holding of the tribunal in forward v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2008 chrt 5, and of the federal court in canada (human rights commission) v. mnr, 2003 fc 1280, [2004] 1 fcr 679, at para. 30, as well as the comments made by robertson ja of the federal court of appeal in canada (attorney general) v. mckenna, [1999] 1 fc 401, at paras 78-80. [88] can both of these ostensibly reasonable in- terpretations of the same human rights protection co- exist side-by- side? should the scope of s. 5 of the chra be contingent on the view of the tribunal member or judge before whom the litigants fi nd themselves? we would say no. given the foregoing, and bearing in mind the quasi- constitutional status of human rights legislation, the question arising in the present case is precisely one that calls for uniform and consistent answers across canadian courts and statutory bodies. this cannot be achieved, however, if superior courts require only that these decisions fall within a range of reasonable outcomes. rather, applying a non- deferential correctness standard al- lows the courts to provide meaningful guidance as to the scope of these fundamentally important human rights protections, and ensure respect for the rule of law in such cases. revanche, d’autres décideurs ayant interprété cette même disposition de la lcdp sont parvenus à la conclusion contraire. par exemple, dans alliance de la fonction publique du canada c. canada (agence du revenu), 2012 caf 7 (« murphy »), la cour d’ap- pel fédérale a conclu que « la lcdp ne prévoit pas la possibilité de déposer de plaintes contre une loi fédérale » (par 6). cette conclusion n’est pas sans rappeler celle du tribunal dans forward c. canada (citoyenneté et immigration), 2008 tcdp 5, et celle de la cour fédérale dans canada (commission des droits de la personne) c. mrn, 2003 cf 1280, [2004] 1 rcf 679, par. 30, ainsi que les commen- taires du juge robertson de la cour d’appel fédé- rale dans canada (procureur général) c. mckenna, [1999] 1 cf 401, par 78-80. [88] ces deux interprétations apparemment raison- nables de la même protection en matière de droits de la personne peuvent- elles coexister? la portée de l’art. 5 de la lcdp devrait- elle être tributaire de l’opinion du membre du tribunal ou du juge devant lequel se trouvent les parties au litige? à notre avis, il faut répondre à ces questions par la négative. étant donné ce qui précède, et le statut quasi constitutionnel des lois en matière de droits de la personne, la question qui se pose en l’espèce en est précisément une qui exige une réponse uniforme et cohérente de la part des tribunaux et des orga- nismes statutaires canadiens. toutefois, cet objectif est impossible à atteindre si les cours supérieures exigent seulement que ces décisions appartiennent aux issues raisonnables. plutôt, l’application de la norme de la décision correcte, qui commande peu de déférence, permet aux cours de fournir des di- rectives utiles quant à la portée de ces protections fondamentalement importantes en matière de droits de la personne et d’assurer le respect de la primauté du droit en pareils cas. (3) the purpose of the tribunal and the nature (3) l’objet du tribunal et la nature de la question of the question at issue en litige [89] finally, the issue before this court touches on the very purpose for which the tribunal exists. in deciding whether or not challenges to legislation are caught within the meaning of a “discriminatory practice” under the chra, the tribunal’s decision [89] enfi n, la question soumise à la cour concerne l’objet même de l’existence du tribunal. en décidant si les contestations d’un texte de loi sont visées par la défi nition d’« acte discriminatoire » de la lcdp, le tribunal répond à une question de droit qui comporte [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). les juges côté et rowe 281 responds to a question of law with a constitutional dimension: who gets to decide what types of chal- lenges can be brought against legislative action? the commission argued that a determination that legislative challenges are not caught within the scope of s. 5 undermines the primacy of human rights law by barring claimants from bringing certain types of challenges before the tribunal. while this appeal is not constitutional in the narrow sense — in that it does not directly engage rights protected under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, for example — it necessarily implicates the rule of law and the duty of superior courts under s. 96 of the constitution act, 1867 to uphold this fundamental constitutional principle (dunsmuir, at paras. 29 and 31). no deference is owed to the decision of an ad- ministrative decision maker in these circumstances. une dimension constitutionnelle : qui peut décider du type de contestations pouvant être présentées à l’encontre d’une mesure législative? d’après la commission, décider que les contestations d’un texte de loi ne sont pas visées à l’art. 5 mine la primauté des lois en matière de droits de la personne en em- pêchant les demandeurs de soumettre certains types de contestations au tribunal. bien que le présent pourvoi n’en soit pas un constitutionnel au sens strict (c’est-à-dire qu’il ne met pas directement en cause des droits protégés par la charte canadienne des droits et libertés, par exemple), il fait nécessaire- ment intervenir la primauté du droit et l’obligation des cours supérieures au sens de l’art. 96 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 d’assurer le respect de ce principe constitutionnel fondamental (dunsmuir, par. 29 et 31). dans ces circonstances, il n’y a pas lieu de faire preuve de déférence à l’égard de la dé- cision d’un décideur administratif. (4) conclusion (4) conclusion [90] we accept that the analysis in the present case begins with the presumption of reasonableness, but it cannot be disputed that this presumption is rebuttable through a contextual analysis. we also agree with our colleague gascon j. that the omission of a privative clause “does not rebut the presumption of deference” (para 50). indeed, this court has recognized that “their presence or absence is no longer determina- tive about whether deference is owed to the tribunal or not” (mowat, at para 17). furthermore, there is no dispute that the potential for confl icting lines of authority does not, on its own, warrant a less defer- ential standard of review (reasons of gascon j., at para 52). in our view, however, they are each indicia that point toward correctness. while neither factor may independently call for correctness, we repeat that “[t]he analysis must be contextual” (dunsmuir, at para 64). and when this court stated that “[i]n many cases, it will not be necessary to consider all of the factors, as some of them may be determinative in the application of the reasonableness standard in a specifi c case” (dunsmuir, at para. 64), it did so, recognizing that, in other cases, the whole context would be determinative. this is such a case. for this reason, a contextual analysis leads us to the conclu- sion that the presumption is rebutted in this case, and [90] nous reconnaissons que l’analyse en l’es- pèce commence par la présomption d’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable, mais il est incontestable que cette présomption peut être réfutée au moyen d’une analyse contextuelle. nous conve- nons aussi avec notre collègue le juge gascon que l’absence d’une clause privative « ne repousse pas la présomption de déférence » (par 50). en effet, notre cour a reconnu que « [sa] présence ou [son] absence ne sont plus déterminantes quant à savoir si la déférence s’impose ou non à l’endroit du tribunal administratif » (mowat, par 17). d’ailleurs, nul ne conteste que l’éventualité de courants jurispruden- tiels contradictoires ne justifi e pas, à elle seule, l’ap- plication d’une norme de contrôle moins déférente (motifs du juge gascon, par 52). toutefois, à notre avis, ce sont tous des indices qui militent en faveur de la norme de la décision correcte. bien qu’aucun de ces facteurs ne puisse à lui seul commander l’ap- plication de la norme de la décision correcte, nous réitérons que « [l]’analyse doit être contextuelle » (dunsmuir, par 64). et lorsque notre cour a affi rmé que « [d]ans bien des cas, il n’est pas nécessaire de tenir compte de tous les facteurs, car certains d’entre eux peuvent, dans une affaire donnée, déterminer l’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable » 282 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). côté and rowe jj. [2018] 2 scr. that the impugned decision ought to be reviewed for correctness. b does section 5 of the chra permit bare chal- lenges to legislation? (dunsmuir, par. 64), elle fi t ainsi en reconnaissant que, dans d’autres affaires, le contexte dans son en- semble serait déterminant. c’est le cas en l’espèce. pour ce motif, une analyse contextuelle nous mène à la conclusion que la présomption est réfutée en l’es- pèce, et que la décision contestée doit être examinée selon la norme de la décision correcte. b l’article 5 de la lcdp permet-il l’instruction de plaintes qui constituent une simple contestation d’une loi? [91] any complainant making a claim of discrimi- nation before the tribunal must ensure that his or her claim falls within the scope of the chra. section 40 of the chra permits individuals and groups to bring complaints that allege “discriminatory practices”. under s. 39, a “discriminatory practice” is defi ned to include all the human rights prohibitions listed in ss. 5 to 14.1 of the chra. [91] le plaignant qui dépose une plainte de dis- crimination devant le tribunal doit s’assurer que celle-ci relève du champ d’application de la lcdp. l’article 40 de cette loi permet aux individus et aux groupes de déposer une plainte à l’égard d’un « acte discriminatoire ». selon l’art. 39, l’« acte discrimi- natoire » englobe toutes les interdictions énumérées aux art. 5 à 14.1 de la lcdp. [92] this case is about the scope of s. 5 of the chra, which reads as follows: il est question en l’espèce de la portée de [92] l’art. 5 de la lcdp, dont le libellé est le suivant : 5 it is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods, services, facilities or accommodation customarily availa- ble to the general public 5 constitue un acte discriminatoire, s’il est fondé sur un motif de distinction illicite, le fait, pour le fournisseur de biens, de services, d’installations ou de moyens d’héber- gement destinés au public : (a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such good, ser- vice, facility or accommodation to any individual, or a) d’en priver un individu; (b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any indi- vidual, b) de le défavoriser à l’occasion de leur fourniture. on a prohibited ground of discrimination. [93] do the present complaints allege a discrimina- tory practice in the provision of a service customarily available to the general public? before the tribunal, the complainants sought to challenge the registration provisions of the indian act as making discrimina- tory distinctions on the basis of race, national or eth- nic origin, sex and family status (matson, at para. 2 (canlii); andrews, at para. 11 (canlii)). they did not challenge the actions of the registrar in pro- cessing their applications. at their core, these com- plaints are about parliament’s decision not to extend [93] les plaintes en l’espèce allèguent- elles un acte discriminatoire dans la prestation d’un service destiné au public? devant le tribunal, les plaignants cherchaient à contester les dispositions en matière d’inscription de la loi sur les indiens au motif qu’elles créaient des distinctions illicites du fait de leur race, de leur origine nationale ou ethnique, de leur sexe et de leur situation de famille (matson, par. 2 (canlii); andrews, par. 11 (canlii)). ils n’ont pas contesté les actes du registraire dans le cadre du traitement de leurs demandes. pour l’essentiel, [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). les juges côté et rowe 283 “indian” status to persons in similar circumstances. this was properly characterized by the tribunal as a bare challenge to legislation. [94] the remedy resulting from a successful chal- lenge on this basis would be to render the impugned provisions inoperable. however, granting this rem- edy — or indeed, any other remedy — is contingent upon the tribunal being validly seized of the matter in the fi rst place. the federal court of appeal cor- rectly noted that one must not confl ate the scope of s. 5 with the extent of the tribunal’s remedial author- ity (ca reasons, at para 99). moreover, the notion that human rights statutes take primacy where they are inconsistent with another statute does not inform this court’s interpretation of the scope of s 5. the meaning of this provision must be determined on its own as a matter of statutory interpretation. [95] what, then, is encompassed in s. 5? the word- ing of this section focuses on the provision of ser- vices. the french version of the chra says that it is a discriminatory practice for the service provider (“le fournisseur    de services”) to deny or differ- entiate adversely in relation to an individual. the use of this language suggests that s. 5 is geared towards discrimination perpetrated by service providers. [96] in our view, parliament is not a service pro- vider, and was not providing a service when it en- acted the registration provisions of the indian act. moreover, law- making is unlike any of the other terms listed in s. 5; it does not resemble a good, facility or accommodation (see forward, at para. 42 (canlii)). as observed by the tribunal in andrews, the legislative process is unique: ces plaintes portent sur la décision du parlement de rendre inaccessible le statut d’«  indien  » aux personnes dans des circonstances semblables. le tri- bunal a correctement qualifi é ces plaintes de simple contestation d’une loi. [94] la réparation découlant d’une contestation tranchée en faveur des plaignants sur ce fondement consisterait à déclarer les dispositions contestées inopérantes. or, le tribunal doit d’abord être vali- dement saisi de l’affaire avant que cette réparation — ou toute autre réparation — puisse être octroyée. la cour d’appel fédérale a indiqué à juste titre qu’il ne faut pas confondre la portée de l’art. 5 et celle du pouvoir du tribunal d’accorder des réparations (mo- tifs de la ca, par 99). de plus, la primauté des lois sur les droits de la personne en cas d’incompatibilité avec d’autres lois ne guide pas l’interprétation que la cour doit donner quant à la portée de l’art 5. le sens de cette disposition doit être établi de façon indépendante selon les principes d’interprétation législative. [95] quelle est donc la portée de l’art. 5? en an- glais, le libellé de cette disposition met l’accent sur la prestation de services («  the provision of ser- vices »). la version française de la lcdp indique que le fournisseur de [  ] services commet un acte discriminatoire s’il prive un individu de services ou s’il le défavorise à l’occasion de leur fourniture. ce libellé donne à penser que l’art. 5 est axé sur la dis- crimination exercée par un fournisseur de services. [96] à notre avis, le législateur n’est pas un four- nisseur de services, et il ne fournissait pas un ser- vice lorsqu’il a adopté les dispositions en matière d’inscription de la loi sur les indiens. en outre, le processus législatif se distingue des autres termes énumérés à l’art. 5; il ne s’apparente ni à un bien, ni à une installation, ni à un moyen d’hébergement (voir forward, par. 42 (canlii)). comme l’a fait observer le tribunal dans andrews, le processus législatif est unique : law- making is one of parliament’s most fundamental and signifi cant functions and sui generis in its nature. this is confi rmed by the powers, privileges and immunities that parliament and the legislatures possess to ensure their la législation est l’une des fonctions les plus fonda- mentales et les plus importantes du parlement et est de nature sui generis. cela est confi rmé par les pouvoirs, les privilèges et les immunités que le parlement et les 284 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). côté and rowe jj. [2018] 2 scr. proper functioning, which are rooted in the constitution, by virtue of the preamble and section 18 of the constitution act, 1867, 30 & 31 victoria, c. 3, [constitution act] and in statute law, in sections 4 and 5 of the parliament of canada act, rsc 1985, c. p-1: telezone inc. v. canada (attorney general) (2004), 235 dlr (4th) 719 at paras 13-17. indeed, the dignity, integrity and effi cient functioning of the legislature is preserved through parliamentary privi- lege which, once established, is afforded constitutional sta- tus and is immune from review: harvey v. new brunswick (attorney general) (1996), 137 dlr (4th) 142, [1996] 2 scr 876;. canada (house of commons) v. vaid, 2005 scc 30 at para. 33 [vaid]. to consider the act of legislating along the same lines as that of delivering householders as in pankiw or to processing a citizenship application as in forward is fundamentally problematic and emblematic of an approach which ignores the special role law- making possesses in our society. in legislating, parliament is not a service provider and there is no “transitive connotation” to this function. rather, it is fulfi lling a constitutionally mandated role, at the very core of our democracy. as such, while law- making is an activity that could be said to take place “in the context of a public relationship” (gould at para. 16) or “creates a public relationship” (gould at para. 68, cited above) as per the second part of the gould test, to characterize it as a service would ignore this sui generis quality. [text in brackets in original; para 57] [97] parliament can be distinguished from the administrative decision makers that operate under legislative authority. these individuals and statutory bodies, which include the registrar, may be “service providers”, or entities that “provi[de]    services    customarily available to the general public”. if they use their statutory discretion in a manner that effectively denies access to a service or makes an adverse differentiation on the basis of a prohibited ground, s. 5 will be engaged. but, when their job is simply to apply legislated criteria, the challenge is not to the provision of services, but to the legislation itself (murphy, at para 6). législatures possèdent afi n de garantir leur fonctionne- ment adéquat, qui sont fondés dans la constitution, en vertu du préambule et de l’article 18 de la loi consti- tutionnelle de 1867, 30 & 31 victoria, ch.  3 (la loi constitutionnelle) et dans le droit législatif, aux articles 4 et 5 de la loi sur le parlement du canada, lrc 1985, ch.  p-1  : telezone inc v canada (attorney general) (2004), 235 dlr (4th) 719, aux paragraphes  13 à 17. en effet, la dignité, l’intégrité et le fonctionnement effi cace de la législature est préservé par le privilège du parlement qui, lorsqu’il est établi, a droit au statut constitutionnel et est à l’abri de tout examen  : har- vey c. nouveau- brunswick (procureur général) (1996), 137 dlr (4th) 142, [1996] 2 rcs 876; canada (chambre des communes) c. vaid, 2005 csc 30, au pa- ragraphe 33 (vaid). le fait de mettre l’acte de législation dans la même catégorie que la livraison des bulletins parlementaires, comme dans pankiw, ou le traitement des demandes de citoyenneté, comme dans forward, est fondamentalement problématique et emblématique d’une approche qui ne tient pas compte du rôle spécial que la législation joue dans notre société. en légiférant, le parlement ne fournit pas un service et il n’y a pas de « connotation transitive » pour cette fonction. en fait, la législation remplit un rôle mandaté par la constitu- tion par conséquent, bien que la législation soit une activité qui puisse être considérée comme prenant place « dans le cadre d’une relation publique » (gould, au pa- ragraphe 16) ou comme créant « une relation publique » (gould, au paragraphe 68, précité) au sens du deuxième volet du critère gould, le fait de la qualifi er de service ne tiendrait pas compte de sa nature sui generis. [par 57] [97] le parlement se distingue des décideurs admi- nistratifs qui exercent leurs fonctions conformément à une autorisation statutaire. ces derniers et les orga- nismes statutaires, dont le registraire, pourraient être considérés comme des « fournisseurs de services » ou des entités qui « fournisse[nt] [  ] de[s] services [  ] destinés au public ». s’ils utilisent leur pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré par la loi d’une manière qui prive un individu de ces services ou qui le défavorise sur le fondement d’un motif de distinction illicite, l’art. 5 s’applique. toutefois, lorsque leur travail consiste simplement à appliquer des critères prévus par la loi, la contestation ne vise pas la prestation de services, mais la loi elle- même (murphy, par 6). [98] furthermore, the relevant jurisprudence sug- gests that the enactment of legislation is not a service. [98] en outre, la jurisprudence applicable indique que l’adoption d’une loi n’est pas un service. la [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). les juges côté et rowe 285 this court has defi ned a service as (1) something of benefi t (2) that is held out or offered to the pub- lic (gould; see also watkin, at para 31). in gould, la forest j. (concurring) said, at para. 55: cour a défi ni un service comme (1) quelque chose d’avantageux (2) qui est mis à la disposition du pu- blic ou lui est offert (gould; voir également watkin, par 31). dans l’arrêt gould, le juge la forest, dans ses motifs concordants, a affirmé ce qui suit au par. 55 : there is a transitive connotation from the language em- ployed by the various provisions; it is not until the service, accommodation, facility, etc., passes from the service provider and has been held out to the public that it attracts the anti- discrimination prohibition. la formulation des dispositions a une connotation tran- sitive; ce n’est qu’une fois que le service, le logement, l’installation, etc., passe par le fournisseur et qu’il est mis à la disposition du public qu’il est visé par l’interdiction de la discrimination. again, la forest j.’s defi nition in gould focuses on the service provider. when parliament crafts statu- tory eligibility criteria, there is no “transitive conno- tation”. nothing is being held out by parliament to the public. it is only when the service provider itself discriminates that s. 5 is engaged. [99] the federal court of appeal took a similar view in murphy. in that case, the commission argued that income tax assessments by the canada revenue agency pursuant to the income tax act, rsc 1985, c. 1 (5th supp.) (“ita”), were “services” within the meaning of the chra. finding that the mandatory duty to assess taxes in conformity with the law fl ow- ing from the ita was at the heart of the allegation, the court of appeal characterized the complaint as a direct attack on the applicable ita provisions. in dismissing the appeal, the court of appeal was un- equivocal that s. 5 of the chra “does not provide for the fi ling of a complaint directed against an act of parliament” (para 6). là encore, la défi nition qu’énonce le juge la forest dans l’arrêt gould met l’accent sur le fournisseur de services. lorsque le législateur élabore des critères d’admissibilité dans une loi, il n’y a aucune « conno- tation transitive ». rien n’est mis à la disposition du public par le législateur. ce n’est que lorsque le fournisseur de services commet lui- même un acte discriminatoire que l’art. 5 s’applique. [99] la cour d’appel fédérale a adopté un point de vue semblable dans murphy. dans cette affaire, la commission a fait valoir que les cotisations d’im- pôt sur le revenu établies par l’agence du revenu du canada conformément à la loi de l’impôt sur le revenu, lrc 1985, c 1 (5e suppl) (« lir »), étaient des « services » au sens de la lcdp. en concluant que l’obligation impérative d’établir le montant des impôts en conformité avec la lir était au cœur de l’allégation, la cour d’appel a qualifi é la plainte d’attaque directe à l’encontre des dispositions appli- cables de la lir. lorsqu’elle a rejeté l’appel, la cour d’appel a affi rmé sans équivoque que l’art. 5 de la lcdp « ne prévoit pas la possibilité de déposer de plaintes contre une loi fédérale » (par 6). [100] we also note that the equivalent of s. 5 of the chra in provincial human rights statutes may be worded in broader terms, and without reference to “the provision of services” or the “service provider”. for instance, s. 1 of the ontario human rights code, rso 1990, c h19, states that “[e]very person has a right to equal treatment with respect to ser- vices, goods and facilities, without discrimination”. whether challenges to legislation would be permis- sible under this statute or other provincial human [100] nous tenons également à souligner que la disposition équivalente à l’art. 5 de la lcdp dans les lois provinciales sur les droits de la personne peut être formulée dans des termes plus généraux, et sans nécessairement faire référence à « la prestation de services » ou au « fournisseur de services ». par exemple, l’article premier du code des droits de la personne, lro 1990, c h19, de l’ontario, indique que « [t]oute personne a droit à un traitement égal en matière de services, de biens ou d’installations, 286 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). côté and rowe jj. [2018] 2 scr. rights statutes is not before this court, and should be left for another day. [101] two additional contextual arguments were put to the court by the commission in support of the proposition that challenges to legislation may be brought under the chra. first, it is argued that the repeal of s. 67 of the chra (sc 2008, c. 30, s. 1) indicates that direct challenges to legislation were contemplated by parliament. section 67 stated that “[n]othing in [the chra] affects any provision of the indian act or any provision made under or pursuant to that act.” the commission submits that through the repeal of this statutory exception to the primacy of the chra, parliament brought the indian act in its entirety under the ambit of the chra, including the impugned registration provisions. to go further, the commission argues that s. 67 was enacted (and subsequently repealed) specifi cally because of the concern that the registration provisions of the indian act might be considered discriminatory. [102] second, the commission argues that s. 49(5) of the chra also indicates that parliament contem- plated direct challenges to legislation. this provision requires a member of the bar of a province or the chambre des notaires du québec to form part of the tribunal panel if the complaint raises the potential inconsistency between the chra and another legis- lative enactment. sans discrimination ». la question de savoir si la contestation d’un texte de loi serait autorisée sur le fondement de cette loi ou d’autres lois provinciales en matière de droits de la personne n’est pas en cause en l’espèce, et la cour pourra y répondre à une autre occasion. [101] la commission a présenté à la cour deux autres arguments contextuels pour étayer sa thèse voulant qu’une loi puisse être contestée sur le fon- dement de la lcdp. premièrement, elle allègue que l’abrogation de l’art. 67 de la lcdp (lc 2008, c. 30, art. 1) démontre que le législateur avait en- visagé la possibilité que les lois fassent l’objet de contestations directes. l’article 67 prévoyait que « [l]a [lcdp] est sans effet sur la loi sur les indiens et sur les dispositions prises en vertu de cette loi. » la commission soutient qu’en abrogeant cette ex- ception à la primauté de la lcdp, le législateur a assujetti la loi sur les indiens, dans sa totalité, à la lcdp, y compris les dispositions contestées qui portent sur l’inscription. pour appuyer davantage sa position, la commission fait valoir que l’art. 67 avait été adopté (et subséquemment abrogé) préci- sément par crainte que les dispositions en matière d’inscription de la loi sur les indiens soient jugées discriminatoires. [102] deuxièmement, la commission allègue qu’il ressort également du par. 49(5) de la lcdp que le lé- gislateur a envisagé la possibilité que les lois puissent être contestées directement. cette disposition exige que la formation du tribunal soit composée d’un membre du barreau d’une province ou de la chambre des notaires du québec si la plainte soulève l’incom- patibilité potentielle de la lcdp avec une disposition d’un autre texte de loi. [103] with respect, neither of these provisions sheds much light on the actual question at issue: can the act of legislating be qualifi ed as a service such that discriminatory legislation can be challenged directly under s. 5 of the chra? these arguments confl ate the ability of the tribunal to hear a com- plaint with the extent of its remedial power. again, the possibility of inoperability as a remedy provides no guidance to determining the scope of what actu- ally constitutes a discriminatory practice pursuant [103] en tout respect, nous estimons qu’aucune de ces dispositions ne nous éclaire sur la question en litige : l’acte de légiférer peut-il être qualifi é de service, de sorte qu’une disposition discriminatoire puisse être contestée directement sur le fondement de l’art.  5 de la lcdp? les arguments évoqués précédemment confondent la capacité du tribunal d’instruire une plainte et la portée de son pouvoir de réparation. là encore, la possibilité de déclarer une loi inopérante à titre de mesure de réparation ne nous [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). les juges côté et rowe 287 to s 5. these two inquiries are distinct and must remain as such. permet pas de déterminer la portée de ce qui consti- tue un acte discriminatoire aux termes de l’art 5. ces deux questions sont distinctes et doivent le demeurer. iii conclusion iii conclusion [104] in sum, we agree with the tribunal and the courts below that bare challenges to legislation can- not be brought under s. 5 of the chra. the act of legislating is not a service. accordingly, the tribunal was correct in dismissing the complaints for want of an underlying discriminatory practice. [105] gascon  j suggests that the correctness review we undertake does not differ signifi cantly from the analysis undertaken by the tribunal at fi rst instance, and on this basis, questions whether this court is any better situated to interpret the decision maker’s home statute (para 65). with respect, this misses the purpose of the courts’ role on judicial re- view. that the above analysis largely tracks what was said by the tribunal itself does not undermine our earlier conclusion as to the standard of review. in any instance of correctness review, it is open to the court to fi nd that the tribunal arrived at the correct decision. from this conclusion one cannot draw the inference that the tribunal is necessarily “better situated” to make decisions than the courts, or that legislative supremacy must always prevail over concerns as to the rule of law. [104] en somme, nous convenons avec le tribunal et les cours d’instances inférieures que les plaintes qui constituent une simple contestation d’un texte de loi ne peuvent être présentées sur le fondement de l’art. 5 de la lcdp. l’acte de légiférer n’est pas un service. par conséquent, c’est à bon droit que le tribunal a rejeté les plaintes au motif qu’il n’y avait aucun acte discriminatoire sous- jacent. [105] le juge gascon affirme que le contrôle fondé sur la norme de la décision correcte que nous entreprenons ne diffère pas vraiment de l’analyse effectuée par le tribunal en première instance et, pour cette raison, il se demande si notre cour est mieux placée pour interpréter la loi constitutive du décideur (par 65). n’en déplaise à notre collègue, cette affi rmation ne tient pas compte du rôle des cours de justice lors d’un contrôle judiciaire. ce n’est pas parce que notre analyse calque en grande partie celle du tribunal que la conclusion à laquelle nous sommes arrivés relativement à la norme de contrôle applicable est moins valable dans tout contrôle fondé sur la norme de la décision correcte, la cour de justice peut conclure que le tribunal est parvenu à la décision correcte. on ne peut conclure pour autant que le tribunal est nécessairement « mieux placé » que les tribunaux judiciaires pour rendre des déci- sions, ou que la suprématie législative doit toujours avoir préséance sur les préoccupations quant à la primauté du droit. [106] superior courts have the constitutional ob- ligation to oversee the exercise of administrative decision making (s. 96 of the constitution act, 1867; crevier, at p. 234; dr. q v. college of physicians and surgeons of british columbia, 2003 scc 19, [2003] 1 scr 226, at para. 21; dunsmuir, at para 29). the standard of review analysis is what assists courts in determining the degree of deference they ought to afford to the administrative decision maker for the purpose of striking the appropriate balance between the rule of law and the maintenance of legislative [106] les cours supérieures ont l’obligation consti- tutionnelle de surveiller l’exercice du pouvoir déci- sionnel en matière administrative (art. 96 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867; crevier, p. 234; dr q c. college of physicians and surgeons of british columbia, 2003 csc 19, [2003] 1  rcs  226, par. 21; dunsmuir, par 29). l’analyse relative à la norme de contrôle aide les tribunaux judiciaires à dé- terminer le degré de déférence dont ils doivent faire preuve à l’égard de la décision du décideur adminis- tratif dans le but d’atteindre un juste équilibre entre 288 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). brown j. [2018] 2 scr. supremacy — not to identify who is best situated to decide what. moreover, the outcome of the judicial review analysis should play no role in determining the appropriate standard. the correctness standard is integral to the law of judicial review, insofar as it “promotes just decisions and avoids inconsistent and unauthorized application of law” (dunsmuir, at para 50). [107] like our colleagues in the majority, we would therefore dismiss the appeal. we also agree that this disposition says nothing about the complainants’ ability to bring a claim under s. 15 of the charter with respect to the impugned indian act provisions. la primauté du droit et le maintien de la suprématie législative — et non pour identifi er qui est mieux placé pour trancher les questions qui se posent. de plus, le résultat de l’analyse effectuée dans le cadre d’un contrôle judiciaire ne devrait jouer aucun rôle dans le choix de la norme applicable. la norme de la décision correcte fait partie intégrante du droit relatif au contrôle judiciaire, en ce sens où elle « favorise ainsi le prononcé de décisions justes tout en évitant l’application incohérente et irrégulière du droit » (dunsmuir, par 50). [107] à l’instar de nos collègues majoritaires, nous rejetterions le pourvoi. nous sommes aussi d’avis que cette conclusion ne vise aucunement la possibi- lité ou non pour les plaignants de présenter une de- mande fondée sur l’art. 15 de la charte relativement aux dispositions contestées de la loi sur les indiens. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [108] brown  j — i agree with my colleague gascon j. that the canadian human rights tribunal’s answers to the questions before it — that the act of legislating is not a “service” within the meaning of s. 5 of the canadian human rights act, rsc 1985, c. h-6, and that there was therefore no underlying discriminatory practice — were reasonable. i also agree with my colleagues côté and rowe jj. that the tribunal’s answers were correct. indeed, paras. 56 to 66 of gascon j.’s reasons also support the conclusion that the tribunal reached the correct result. [109] in view of the unassailability of the tribunal’s decisions on either standard of review, nothing more needs to be said on that subject, at least as it applies to this appeal. i write briefl y, to highlight my more general concern regarding my colleague gascon j.’s obiter dicta regarding true questions of jurisdiction, and to highlight some diffi culties that may well arise from his statements regarding contextual analysis. [108] le juge brown — je suis d’accord avec mon collègue le juge gascon pour dire que les ré- ponses du tribunal canadien des droits de la per- sonne aux questions qui lui ont été soumises — soit que l’acte de légiférer n’est pas un « service » au sens de l’art. 5 de la loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne, lrc 1985, c. h-6, et qu’il n’y avait donc aucun acte discriminatoire sous- jacent — étaient raisonnables. je conviens en outre avec mes collègues les juges côté et rowe que les réponses du tribunal étaient correctes. en effet, les par. 56 à 66 des motifs du juge gascon étayent eux aussi la conclusion que la décision à laquelle est arrivé le tribunal était correcte. [109] vu l’impossibilité d’attaquer les décisions du tribunal en fonction d’une norme de contrôle ou de l’autre, il n’y a rien à ajouter à ce sujet, du moins en ce qui concerne le présent pourvoi. j’écris de brefs motifs pour exprimer ma réserve plus générale concernant les remarques incidentes de mon col- lègue le juge gascon à propos des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence, et pour souligner quelques diffi cultés que peuvent fort bien poser ses déclarations sur l’analyse contextuelle. [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge brown 289 [110] justice gascon’s discussion regarding true questions of jurisdiction omits a central point that, while not determinative, is in my respectful view an important consideration which militates against his suggestion that this category of correctness review might be “euthanized”. i refer to the court’s expres- sion, in dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, of the continued recognition of this category as being fundamental to judicial review. my colleague observes that “dissatisfaction with the current state of the law is no reason to ig- nore our precedents following dunsmuir” (para 47). but this observation applies with equal force to dunsmuir itself. and, in dunsmuir, this court, citing the honourable thomas cromwell, wrote that “the rule of law is affi rmed by assuring that the courts have the fi nal say on the jurisdictional limits of a tribunal’s authority” (para. 30, citing t. cromwell, “appellate review: policy and pragmatism”, in 2006 isaac pitblado lectures, appellate courts: policy, law and practice, v-1, at p v-12). this presupposes not only that the treatment of such questions is a matter of fi rst importance, but that such questions continue to exist. while, therefore, one might “euth- anize” the category of true jurisdictional questions, it would not follow that such questions themselves will disappear. [110] dans son analyse des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence, le juge gascon passe sous silence un point central qui, sans être détermi- nant, me semble être une considération importante militant contre sa proposition d’« en fi nir avec » cette catégorie de questions assujetties à un contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. je me reporte à l’arrêt dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, où la cour affi rme qu’elle continue de reconnaître que cette catégorie est fon- damentale pour le contrôle judiciaire. mon collègue fait remarquer qu’« une insatisfaction face à l’état actuel du droit ne permet pas de faire abstraction de notre jurisprudence postérieure à l’arrêt dunsmuir » (par 47). cette observation vaut toutefois tout au- tant pour l’arrêt dunsmuir lui- même. or, la cour y a écrit, citant l’honorable thomas cromwell, que [traduction] « la primauté du droit est consacrée par le pouvoir d’une cour de justice de statuer en dernier ressort sur l’étendue de la compétence d’un tribunal administratif » (par. 30, citant t. cromwell, « appellate review : policy and pragmatism », dans 2006 isaac pitblado lectures, appellate courts : policy, law and practice, v-1, p v-12). cela sup- pose non seulement que l’examen de ces questions est de la plus haute importance, mais également que ces questions existent toujours. par conséquent, bien que l’on puisse « en fi nir avec » la catégorie des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence, cela ne veut pas dire que ces questions elles- mêmes disparaîtront. [111] deciding whether and how any “euthaniz- ing” of true questions of jurisdiction is to proceed will, therefore, require a measure of circumspection. the exercise of public power, including delegated public power, must always be authorized by law. judicial review guarantees fi delity to that principle. as i indicated in west fraser mills ltd. v. british co- lumbia (workers’ compensation appeal tribunal), 2018 scc 22, [2018] 1 scr 635, at para. 124, i accept that it is often diffi cult to distinguish between exercises of delegated power that raise truly jurisdic- tional questions from those entailing an unremark- able application of an enabling statute. but there will remain questions that tend more to the former, including matters which are still widely regarded as jurisdictional by lower courts (for example, a [111] il faut donc faire preuve de circonspection pour décider de l’opportunité et, le cas échéant, de la manière d’« en fi nir avec » les questions touchant vé- ritablement à la compétence. l’exercice d’un pouvoir public, notamment un pouvoir public délégué, doit toujours être autorisé par la loi. le contrôle judiciaire est un gage de fi délité à ce principe. comme je l’ai indiqué dans west fraser mills ltd. c. colombie- britannique (workers’ compensation appeal tribu- nal), 2018 csc 22, [2018] 1 rcs 635, par. 124, je reconnais qu’il est souvent diffi cile de distinguer l’exercice d’un pouvoir délégué qui soulève des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence de l’exercice du pouvoir qui fait intervenir l’appli- cation ordinaire d’une loi habilitante. il reste cepen- dant des questions qui s’apparentent davantage à la 290 canada (chrc) v canada (ag). brown j. [2018] 2 scr. decision to enact subordinate legislation: canadian copyright licensing agency (access copyright) v canada, 2018 fca 58, at para.  80 (canlii)), and which raise squarely the same concerns for the rule of law identifi ed by this court in dunsmuir as demanding a more exacting standard of review. to consign such questions to the same, one- size-fi ts- all “reasonableness” standard of review that all other questions receive would render that standard far less useful, since it would furnish a reviewing court with no basis for distinguishing matters warranting def- erence from those which do not. it follows that abolition of the category of [112] true questions of jurisdiction will necessitate a con- comitant shift towards a more fl exible, rather than a strictly binary (or strictly reasonableness) standard of review framework. première catégorie, notamment celles encore large- ment reconnues comme des questions de compétence par les juridictions inférieures (comme la décision d’adopter un texte législatif subordonné : canadian copyright licensing agency (access copyright) c. canada, 2018 caf 58, par. 80 (canlii)), et qui suscitent nettement les mêmes préoccupations rela- tives à la primauté du droit que celles qui, aux dires de la cour dans dunsmuir, appellent une norme de contrôle plus rigoureuse. attribuer uniformément à pareilles questions la même norme de contrôle de la « raisonnabilité » qu’à toutes les autres questions rendrait cette norme beaucoup moins utile, car cela ne donnerait à la cour de révision aucun fondement pour distinguer les éléments méritant la déférence des autres. [112] par conséquent, l’abolition de la catégorie des questions touchant véritablement à la compé- tence devra s’accompagner d’une transition conco- mitante à un cadre plus souple relatif à la norme de contrôle, plutôt qu’à un cadre strictement binaire (ou fondé uniquement sur la raisonnabilité). [113] this brings me to my second concern, which is the extremely narrow scope for contextual anal- ysis that my colleague gascon j. states, and which would signifi cantly impede that necessary fl exibil- ity. contextual analysis is, he says, “exceptional”, should be undertaken “sparingly”, and plays a “sub- ordinate role” in deciding the standard of review (paras 45-46). [113] cela m’amène à ma seconde réserve, soit la portée extrêmement restreinte attribuée par mon col- lègue le juge gascon à l’analyse contextuelle, portée qui nuira considérablement à la souplesse nécessaire. selon lui, l’analyse contextuelle est « exception- nelle » et doit être utilisée « avec parcimonie ». en outre, elle joue un « rôle subordonné » lors du choix de la norme de contrôle applicable (par 45-46). [114] descriptors like “exceptional” and “spar- ingly” are, of course, the same sort of cautions which this court has from time to time stated in respect of true questions of jurisdiction, which suggests that contextual analysis may be next in line for “eutha- nizing”. that aside, and with respect, and accepting that my colleague can draw from past statements of this court for support, such statements give little if any meaningful guidance to lower courts. indeed, statements suggesting that contextual review should be applied “sparingly” or that it plays a “subordinate role” are not easily reconciled with my colleague’s acknowledgment (at para. 46) that reviewing courts ought to examine “factors that sho[w] a clear legisla- tive intent justifying the rebuttal of the presumption”. [114] les termes descriptifs comme « exception- nel » et « avec parcimonie » constituent naturelle- ment le même type de mises en garde que celles énoncées de temps à autre par la cour à l’égard des questions touchant véritablement à la compétence, ce qui laisse croire que la cour pourrait à court terme vouloir « en fi nir avec » l’analyse contextuelle. cela mis à part, et soit dit en tout respect, et reconnaissant que mon collègue peut s’appuyer sur des déclarations antérieures de la cour, ces déclarations ne donnent que peu d’indications utiles, sinon aucunes, aux ju- ridictions inférieures. en effet, il n’est pas facile de concilier les affi rmations donnant à penser qu’il faut procéder à un examen contextuel « avec parcimo- nie » ou que cet examen joue un « rôle subordonné » [2018] 2 rcs. canada (ccdp) c canada (pg). le juge brown 291 if one is considering factors which show legislative intent, one is undertaking a contextual analysis. [115] my concerns with these aspects of my col- league’s reasons do not, however, affect the result. i agree that the appeal should be dismissed. et la reconnaissance par mon collègue (au par. 46) du fait que les cours de révision devraient examiner « les facteurs [  ] qui rév[èlent] une intention claire du législateur justifi ant la réfutation de la présomp- tion ». si l’on tient compte des facteurs qui révèlent l’intention du législateur, on procède dans les faits à une analyse contextuelle. [115] les réserves que j’ai à propos de ces aspects des motifs de mon collègue n’infl uent toutefois pas sur le résultat. je suis également d’avis qu’il y a lieu de rejeter le pourvoi. appeal dismissed. pourvoi rejeté. solicitor for the appellant:  canadian human procureur de l’appelante : commission cana- rights commission, ottawa. dienne des droits de la personne, ottawa. procureur de l’intimé  :  procureur général du canada, toronto. canada, toronto. of quebec: attorney general of quebec, québec. procureure de l’intervenante la procureure géné- rale du québec : procureure générale du québec, québec. solicitors for the intervener tania zulkoskey: procureurs de l’intervenante tania zulkoskey : cavalluzzo, toronto. cavalluzzo, toronto. rity advocacy centre, the sudbury community le- gal clinic, the chinese and southeast asian legal clinic, the community legal assistance society and the hiv & aids legal clinic ontario: income se- curity advocacy centre, toronto. procureur des intervenants le centre d’action pour la sécurité du revenu, la clinique juridique communautaire de sudbury, chinese and southeast asian legal clinic, community legal assistance society et hiv & aids legal clinic ontario : centre d’action pour la sécurité du revenu, toronto. lawyers association: karimjee greene, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana- dienne des avocats musulmans : karimjee greene, toronto. nadians with disabilities:  arch disability law centre, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le conseil des ca- nadiens avec défi ciences : arch disability law centre, toronto. education and action fund and the native women’s association of canada: law offi ce of mary eberts, toronto; women’s legal education and action procureurs des intervenants le fonds d’action et d’éducation juridiques pour les femmes et l’asso- ciation des femmes autochtones du canada : law office of mary eberts, toronto; fonds d’action 292 canada (chrc) v canada (ag) [2018] 2 scr. fund inc., toronto; native women’s association of canada, ottawa. et d’éducation juridiques pour les femmes inc., toronto; association des femmes autochtones du canada, ottawa. solicitors for the intervener amnesty interna- procureurs de l’intervenante amnistie internatio- tional: stockwoods, toronto. nale : stockwoods, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the first nations child and family caring society of canada: conway baxter wilson, ottawa; equality law, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenante la société de soutien à l’enfance et à la famille des premières nations du canada : conway baxter wilson, ottawa; equality law, ottawa. dian legal clinic: african canadian legal clinic, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le bureau d’aide ju- ridique afro- canadien : bureau d’aide juridique afro- canadien, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant aboriginal legal ser- services: aboriginal legal services, toronto. vices : aboriginal legal services, toronto. alliance of canada: raven, cameron, ballantyne & yazbeck, ottawa. procureurs de l’intervenante l’alliance de la fonction publique du canada : raven, cameron, ballantyne & yazbeck, ottawa.
i. overview [1] an appeal is not a retrial. nor is it licence for an appellate court to review the evidence afresh. when appellate courts stray beyond the proper bounds of review, finality and order in our system of justice is compromised. but not every trial decision can weather a dynamic and unpredictable future. once it is rendered, lives go on and circumstances may change when additional evidence is put forward, how should appellate courts reconcile the need for finality and order in our legal system with the need for decisions that reflect the just result in the proceedings before the court? and conversely, what framework should guide trial judges when they determine whether relocation is in a child’s best interests, to ensure a just result that can navigate what lies ahead? this appeal raises both questions. [2] the court must first determine the test that applies to the admission of additional evidence on appeal. the court is asked to decide whether a legal distinction should be drawn between admitting “fresh evidence” (concerning events that occurred before trial) and “new evidence” (concerning events that occurred after trial). [3] in my view, the test in palmer v. the queen, [1980] 1 scr 759, applies whenever a party seeks to adduce additional evidence on appeal for the purpose of reviewing the decision below, regardless of whether the evidence relates to facts that occurred before or after trial appellate courts must apply the palmer criteria to determine whether finality and order in the administration of justice must yield in service of a just outcome the overarching consideration is the interests of justice, regardless of when the evidence, or fact, came into existence. [4] in cases where the best interests of the child are the primary concern, the palmer test is sufficiently flexible to recognize that it may be in the interests of justice for a court to have more context before rendering decisions that could profoundly alter the course of a child’s life. at the same time, finality and order are critically important in family proceedings, and factual developments that occur subsequent to trial are usually better addressed through variation procedures. [5] in this case, the court of appeal for british columbia held that palmer did not strictly govern the admission of new evidence on appeal instead, it applied a different test and admitted the evidence. it erred in doing so. [6] in my view, the evidence did not satisfy the palmer criteria the respondent sought to overturn an unfavourable trial outcome by adducing evidence on appeal that could have been available at first instance, had he acted with due diligence. effectively, he was allowed to remedy the deficiencies in his trial evidence on appeal — with the benefit, and guidance, of the trial reasons. this gave rise to considerable unfairness. and in any event, evidence in family law appeals that is tendered for the purpose of showing a material change of circumstances is more appropriately raised at a variation hearing. palmer should not be used to circumvent a variation scheme that parliament specifically designed to address such developments admission of this evidence on appeal was not in the interests of justice. [7] the second broad issue in this case relates to the legal framework for determining whether it is in a child’s best interests to allow a parent to relocate with the child, away from the other parent. it concerns the application of gordon v. goertz, [1996] 2 scr 27, as refined by the case law over the past two decades and viewed in light of the recent amendments of the divorce act, rsc 1985, c 3 (2nd supp). [8] determining the best interests of the child is a heavy responsibility, with profound impacts on children, families and society in many cases, the answer is difficult — the court must choose between competing and often compelling visions of how to best advance the needs and interests of the child. the challenge is even greater in mobility cases. geographic distance reduces flexibility, disrupts established patterns, and inevitably impacts the relationship between a parent and a child the forward- looking nature of relocation cases requires judges to craft a disposition at a fixed point in time that is both sensitive to that child’s present circumstances and can withstand the test of time and adversity. [9] the law relating to the best interests of the child has long emphasized the need for individualized and discretionary decision making but children also need predictability and certainty. to balance these competing interests, the law provides a framework and factors to structure a judge’s discretion. this case calls on the court to examine how some of those considerations apply in mobility cases in particular, i clarify that a moving parent’s reasons for relocation and the “maximum contact factor” are relevant only to the extent they bear upon the best interests of the child; a parent’s testimony about whether they will move regardless of the outcome of the relocation application should not be considered; and family violence is a significant factor impacting the best interests of the child. [10] here, the trial judge did not err in his conclusion that relocation was in the best interests of the children. his factual findings and the weight he ascribed to factors bearing on the children’s best interests warranted deference on appeal. in the absence of any reviewable error, the court of appeal was wrong to intervene. [11] at the conclusion of the hearing, the court (côté j dissenting in part) allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge’s order, for reasons to follow. these are the reasons. ii background [12] ashley barendregt, the mother, met geoff grebliunas, the father, in 2011 in the bulkley valley, in northern british columbia. she followed him to kelowna in 2012, where he had moved for a change of scenery. soon after, they got married. they bought a house and had two boys, who were aged three and five at the time of trial in 2019. they shared parenting duties throughout the marriage. [13] the home purchase, already a burden on their modest finances, proved to be a project an electrical fire shortly after they moved in exposed underlying problems — “rodents, water ingress, mould, and compromise of a structural floor joist” (2019 bcsc 2192, 34 rfl (8th) 331, at para. 6) — that the father, with his background in carpentry, pledged to repair. he tore out drywall, planning to proceed room by room. but progress was slow. by trial, six years later, the house remained an “ongoing construction project” (trial reasons, at para. 5), with a makeshift kitchen and an only recently completed upstairs bathroom the father’s own expert witness described it as “a working environment, not a living environment”: para. 33. significant money was needed to bring it to marketable condition — funds the couple lacked, being well into six figures of debt by trial. [14] their relationship ended in november 2018, when the father “likely” assaulted the mother during an argument that night, she drove the 2 boys some 10 hours to her parents’ home in telkwa, a village in the bulkley valley. the parenting arrangement that emerged in the aftermath was formalized in an interim order, splitting parenting time between the parents, alternately in telkwa and kelowna, before they agreed to keep the children in kelowna with the father. when the mother returned to kelowna, they were to alternate weekly parenting time. but she did not return. a court order gave her parenting time with the boys in telkwa in august 2019, but she had no further parenting time before the trial, which was held later that year. [15] the central issue at trial was whether the children should be relocated to telkwa with the mother or remain in kelowna. she was willing to move to kelowna if the father prevailed; he was unwilling to move to the bulkley valley under any circumstances. [16] after a nine-day trial, the judge awarded primary residence of the children to the mother and allowed them to relocate to telkwa. the father appealed and sought to adduce additional evidence. the court of appeal admitted the evidence, set aside the trial decision, and ordered the children to be returned to kelowna. that decision was stayed pending appeal to this court. iii decisions below a. supreme court of british columbia, 2019 bcsc 2192, 34 rfl (8th) 331 (saunders j.) [17] the trial judge found that both parents played active parts in raising the children, and relocation to telkwa would have a significant impact on the children’s relationship with their father. two key issues, however, favoured the move. [18] the more significant issue was the parties’ acrimonious relationship and its implications for the children he doubted they could collaborate to promote the children’s best interests their marriage had involved “possibly some degree of emotional abuse”; the father had assaulted and emotionally traumatized the mother; and his conduct at trial was “abusive, and profoundly offensive”: para. 41. there was, he found, “compelling evidence of [the father’s] continuing animosity towards [the mother]”: para. 42. [19] he concluded that granting the mother primary care of the children would be in their best interests she was more likely than the father to promote a positive attitude in the boys toward the other parent, and distancing the parents would help isolate the children from their discord. it was also unlikely that the parents could work cooperatively to promote the children’s best interests in a shared parenting structure in the near future the children would furthermore benefit indirectly from the mother living in telkwa, where she had a stronger support network. [20] the “less significant” issue was the parties’ financial situation: para. 31. the house needed an influx of money to make it habitable. the father said he would accelerate the renovations but had not prepared a budget for the ongoing work. his plan to live in the house with the boys depended on his parents paying off the mortgage and line of credit, an arrangement they had yet to confirm by trial. the judge concluded that the father’s ability to remain in the house, or even in west kelowna, was less than certain. [21] the trial judge concluded that relocation would best promote the children’s interests. he awarded the mother primary residence and granted her application. b court of appeal for british columbia, 2021 bcca 11, 45 bclr (6th) 14 (newbury, dewitt-van oosten and voith jja) [22] the appeal proceeded, and the hearing had nearly ended, when the father’s counsel informed the court that her client’s financial situation had suddenly changed. the father later elaborated in an affidavit: he had taken steps to purchase the mother’s interest in the property; his parents had purchased a half interest in the home and had increased their personal line of credit to finance renovations; the three of them had refinanced the home, nearly halving the monthly mortgage payments; he had completed the bathroom and master bedroom; and a contractor had been hired to finish the kitchen. he sought to admit evidence of all of these developments in the appeal. [23] voith ja, for the court, characterized this as “new” evidence because it had not existed at the time of trial. as such, it was not subject to the palmer test, and the due diligence criterion did not strictly govern its admission instead, “new evidence” could be admitted if it established “that a premise or underpinning or understanding of the trial judge that was significant or fundamental or pivotal has been undermined or altered”: para. 43. [24] the court admitted the evidence, finding that it undermined a primary underpinning of the trial decision, namely, the judge’s findings on the parties’ finances. specifically, the father had done almost exactly what he had said he would; and the “assumption[s]” that he might not be able to remain in the family home and might not “possibly even [be] able to remain in west kelowna” had been displaced: para. 57. one of trial judge’s two main considerations no longer applied. [25] and given this, the other consideration — the parties’ acrimonious relationship — could “no longer support the ultimate result arrived at by the trial judge”: para. 69. the mother’s need for emotional support could not justify relocation, even at the cost of “some friction between the parties”: paras. 74-75. and the trial judge should have considered whether the children could have stayed with their father in kelowna. the court concluded that the children’s best interests were best served by staying in kelowna with both parents and ordered accordingly. iv. issues [26] this appeal raises two broad issues: (i) what test governs the admission of additional evidence on appeal, and did the court of appeal err in admitting the evidence in this case? (ii) did the trial judge err in his relocation analysis, warranting appellate intervention? [27] in brief, i answer as follows. regardless of whether the evidence relates to facts that occurred before or after trial, the palmer test governs the admission of additional evidence on appeal when it is adduced for the purpose of reviewing the decision below. the court of appeal erred by applying a different test and admitting the evidence on appeal. the evidence did not satisfy the palmer test because it could have been available for trial with the exercise of due diligence. in any event, given the availability of a variation procedure designed to address any material change in circumstances, its admission was not in the interests of justice. [28] moreover, the trial judge did not err in his relocation analysis. his analysis of the best interests of the children is consonant with the mobility framework set out in gordon as refined over the past two decades. his factual findings and the weight he ascribed to factors bearing on the children’s best interests warranted deference on appeal. the court of appeal was wrong to intervene. v analysis a. the test for admitting additional evidence on appeal [29] appellate courts have the discretion to admit additional evidence to supplement the record on appeal: catholic children’s aid society of metropolitan toronto v. m (c.), [1994] 2 scr 165, at p 188; united states of america v. shulman, 2001 scc 21, [2001] 1 scr 616, at para. 43. whether in criminal or non-criminal matters (may v. ferndale institution, 2005 scc 82, [2005] 3 scr 809, at para. 107), courts have typically applied the four criteria set out by this court in palmer when parties seek to adduce evidence on appeal: (i) the evidence could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been obtained for the trial (provided that this general principle will not be applied as strictly in a criminal case as in civil cases); (ii) the evidence is relevant in that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue; (iii) the evidence is credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief; and (iv) the evidence is such that, if believed, it could have affected the result at trial. [30] palmer applies when evidence is adduced on appeal “for the purpose of asking the court to review the proceedings in the court below”: shulman, at para. 44. palmer does not, however, apply to evidence going to the validity of the trial process itself (r v taillefer, 2003 scc 70, [2003] 3 scr 307, at paras. 76-77), nor to evidence adduced “as a basis for requesting an original remedy in the court of appeal”, such as a stay of proceedings for an abuse of process (shulman, at paras. 44-46). [31] the palmer test is purposive, fact-specific, and driven by an overarching concern for the interests of justice. it ensures that the admission of additional evidence on appeal will be rare, such that the matters in issue between the parties should “narrow rather than expand as [a] case proceeds up the appellate ladder”: public school boards’ assn. of alberta v. alberta (attorney general), 2000 scc 2, [2000] 1 scr 44, at para. 10. [32] the test strikes a balance between two foundational principles: (i) finality and order in the justice system, and (ii) reaching a just result in the context of the proceedings the first criterion seeks to preserve finality and order by excluding evidence that could have been considered by the court at first instance, had the party exercised due diligence. this protects certainty in the judicial process and fairness to the other party. the remaining criteria — that the evidence be relevant, credible and could have affected the outcome — are concerned with reaching a just result. [33] while the interest in the finality of a trial decision and order in the justice system must sometimes give way to reach a just result, as i will explain, a proper application of palmer reflects and safeguards both principles, as well as fairness to the parties. [34] for the reasons that follow, i conclude that the palmer test applies to all evidence tendered on appeal for the purpose of reviewing the decision below. in my view, the palmer test ensures the proper balance and is sufficiently flexible to respond to any unique concerns that arise when considering whether to admit evidence regarding facts or events that occurred after the trial. [35] my analysis proceeds as follows. first, i discuss the four palmer criteria. second, i address the unique challenges that arise when litigants seek to adduce “new” evidence. third, i consider how palmer applies in the family law context. finally, i address the use of properly admitted evidence, before turning to the merits of the fresh evidence motion in this case. (1) the palmer criteria (a) due diligence [36] functionally, the first palmer criterion — that the evidence could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been obtained for the trial — focuses on the conduct of the party seeking to adduce the evidence. it requires litigants to take all reasonable steps to present their best case at trial. this ensures finality and order in the judicial process: r v. st-cloud, 2015 scc 27, [2015] 2 scr 328, at para. 130; r v. gdb, 2000 scc 22, [2000] 1 scr 520, at para. 19; r v. angelillo, 2006 scc 55, [2006] 2 scr 728, at para. 15. [37] the relationship between due diligence, and finality and order are deeply rooted in our common law. the law generally “requires litigants to put their best foot forward to establish the truth of their allegations when first called upon to do so”: danyluk v ainsworth technologies inc., 2001 scc 44, [2001] 2 scr 460, at para. 18 this animates, for example, the cause of action estoppel doctrine, which safeguards “the interest of an individual in being protected from repeated suits and prosecutions for the same cause” and “the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions”: k. r. handley, spencer bower and handley: res judicata (4th ed. 2009), at pp. 3-4 this doctrine achieves these ends through a due diligence component: it precludes a party from bringing an action against another party where the basis of the cause of action was argued or could have been argued in the prior action if the party in question had exercised reasonable diligence (grandview (town of) v. doering, [1976] 2 scr 621, at pp. 634-38, citing henderson v. henderson (1843), 3 hare 100). [38] the palmer test’s due diligence criterion plays a similar role: it ensures that litigants put their best foot forward when first called upon to do so. [39] the principle of finality and order has both individual and systemic dimensions in this setting. on an individual level, it speaks to the profound unfairness in providing “a party the opportunity to make up for deficiencies in [their] case at trial”: stav v. stav, 2012 bcca 154, 31 bclr (5th) 302, at para. 32. a party who has not acted with due diligence should not be afforded a “second kick at the can”: sfd v. mt, 2019 nbca 62, 49 ccpb (2nd) 177, at para. 24. and the opposing party is entitled to certainty and generally should not have to relitigate an issue decided at first instance, absent a reviewable error otherwise, the opposing party must endure additional delay and expense to answer a new case on appeal. permitting a party in an appeal to fill the gaps in their trial evidence based on the failings identified by the trial judge is fundamentally unfair to the other litigant in an adversarial proceeding. [40] on a systemic level, this principle preserves the distinction between the roles of trial and appellate courts. evaluating evidence and making factual findings are the responsibilities of trial judges. appellate courts, by contrast, are designed to review trial decisions for errors the admission of additional evidence on appeal blurs this critical distinction by permitting litigants to effectively extend trial proceedings into the appellate arena. [41] by requiring litigants to call all evidence necessary to present their best case at first instance, the due diligence criterion protects this distinction. this, in turn, sustains the proper functioning of our judicial architecture (r v. sipos, 2014 scc 47, [2014] 2 scr 423, at para. 30), and ensures the efficient and effective use of judicial resources (see housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at para. 16). [42] the importance of the due diligence criterion may vary, however, depending on the proposed use of the evidence. evidence sought to be adduced as a basis for intervention — to demonstrate the first instance decision was wrong — raises greater concerns for finality and order than evidence that may help determine an appropriate order after the court has found a material error. since appellate intervention is justified on the basis of a reviewable error in the decision below, there is less concern for finality and order. accordingly, in such cases, the due diligence criterion has less bearing on the interests of justice. [43] in sum, the due diligence criterion safeguards the importance of finality and order for the parties and the integrity of the judicial system. the focus at this stage of palmer is on the conduct of the party this is why evidence that could, by the exercise of due diligence, have been available for trial should generally not be admitted on appeal. (b) the criteria that the evidence be relevant, credible and could have affected the result [44] the last three palmer criteria require courts to only admit evidence on appeal when it is relevant, credible, and could have affected the result at trial. unlike the first criterion, which focuses on the conduct of the party, these three criteria focus on the evidence adduced and unlike due diligence, the latter three criteria are “conditions precedent” — evidence that falls short of them cannot be admitted on appeal: r v. lévesque, 2000 scc 47, [2000] 2 scr 487, at para. 14. [45] these criteria reflect the other principle that animates the palmer test: the importance of reaching a just result in the context of the proceedings (sipos, at paras. 30-31; r v. warsing, [1998] 3 scr 579, at para. 56). this principle is directly linked to the correctness of the trial decision and the truth-seeking function of our trial process evidence that is unreliable, not credible, or not probative of the issues in dispute may hinder, rather than facilitate, the search for the truth and as cory j. observed in r v. nikolovski, [1996] 3 scr 1197, at para. 13, “[t]he ultimate aim of any trial, criminal or civil, must be to seek and to ascertain the truth.” [46] after a court has decided to admit evidence on appeal, it should remain mindful that the evidence has not been put to the test of cross-examination or rebuttal at trial, and the adverse party may not have had the ability to verify its accuracy: lévesque, at para. 25. if the evidence is challenged or its probative value is in dispute, appellate courts may, among other things, provide the opposing party an opportunity to respond, allow cross‑examination of a witness, permit the submission of expert evidence in response to additional expert evidence, or remit the matter to the court of first instance: lévesque, at para. 25; see also child and family services of winnipeg v. jmf, 2000 mbca 145, 153 man. r (2d) 90, at para. 27; children’s aid society of windsor-essex (county) v. b (y.) (2004), 5 rfl (6th) 269 (ont. ca), at paras. 12 and 19. (c) palmer resolves the tension between the need for finality and order, and the interest in reaching a just result [47] the palmer test reconciles the tension between these two foundational principles — the need for finality and order, and the interest in reaching a just result — to determine the interests of justice in the circumstances of each case: sipos, at para. 31. it is against this backdrop that i address whether the palmer test applies to what has been called “new” evidence (more accurately referred to as evidence of facts or events that occurred after trial). (2) the palmer test applies to evidence of facts that arise after trial [48] the primary issue in this appeal is whether and how the palmer test applies to “new” evidence. according to the court of appeal, evidence is “new” if it pertains to facts that occurred after trial; “fresh” evidence pertains to facts that occurred before trial, but which, for one reason or another, could not be put before the court. [49] appellate courts across the country have differed in their approaches to “new” evidence. some have applied the palmer criteria (jws v. cjs, 2019 abca 153, at para. 37 (canlii); sheikh (re), 2019 onca 692, at para. 7 (canlii); riel v. riel, 2017 skca 74, 99 rfl (7th) 367, at para. 16; hellberg v. netherclift, 2017 bcca 363, 2 bclr (6th) 126, at paras. 53-54), while others have applied a different or modified test (north vancouver (district) v. lunde (1998), 60 bclr (3d) 201 (ca), at paras. 25-26; jens v jens, 2008 bcca 392, 300 dlr (4th) 136, at paras. 24-29; dickson v. vuntut gwitchin first nation, 2021 ykca 5, at paras. 159-61 and 166 (canlii); miller v. white, 2018 peca 11, 10 rfl (8th) 251, at para. 19; beauchamp v. beauchamp, 2021 skca 148, at para. 36 (canlii)). [50] this dissonance in the jurisprudence reflects two apparent paradoxes that arise in applying the first and fourth palmer criteria to “new” evidence. courts have queried whether new evidence could ever fail the due diligence criterion, since it relates to facts not yet in existence at the time of trial: see cory v. marsh (1993), 77 bclr. (2d) 248 (ca), at paras. 21 and 28-29; jmf, at para. 21. others have asked how such evidence could possibly have affected a trial outcome that it postdated: north vancouver (district), at para. 25; radcliff v. radcliff (2000), 7 rfl (5th) 425 (ont. ca), at para. 10; sengmueller v sengmueller (1994), 17 o.r (3d) 208 (ca), at p 211. [51] in the face of conflicting british columbia case law, the court of appeal concluded that the palmer test only applies to fresh evidence, and the due diligence criterion did not strictly govern the admission of new evidence it outlined the following test: . . . depending on the circumstances, new evidence may be admitted if it establishes that a premise or underpinning or understanding of the trial judge that was significant or fundamental or pivotal has been undermined or altered. [para. 43] [52] the mother takes issue with the court of appeal’s approach: she submits that the palmer criteria apply to both fresh and new evidence. the father argues that the test applied below was appropriate because the new evidence “falsified” the trial decision. [53] i conclude that the court of appeal erred by applying a different test to “new” evidence. [54] applying a different test for admitting new evidence — which dispensed with the due diligence criterion — failed to safeguard the delicate balance between finality and order, and the interest in a just result. it is also inconsistent with this court’s palmer jurisprudence. indeed, this court has consistently applied palmer to evidence pertaining to events that occurred between the trial and appeal: see, for example, catholic children’s aid society, at p 188; r v. owen, 2003 scc 33, [2003] 1 scr. 779, at paras. 50-51; sipos, at paras. 29-30. the evidence in palmer concerned facts that occurred both before and after trial and thus included both “fresh” and “new” evidence. the additional evidence included sworn declarations made by one of the key trial witnesses who recanted his testimony after trial, declaring that the rcmp promised him money before trial and made the payment after trial. [55] the palmer test is sufficiently flexible to deal with both types of evidence. as i will explain, the core inquiries under all four criteria remain the same regardless of when the evidence, or the specific fact, came into existence. because the same test applies, it is unnecessary to distinguish between “fresh” and “new” evidence. palmer applies to the admission of all additional evidence tendered on appeal for the purpose of reviewing the decision below. (a) the due diligence criterion [56] a common thread running through the parties’ submissions and the court of appeal’s decision is that conceptual difficulties arise when applying the due diligence criterion to evidence about facts arising after trial. the mother accepts that due diligence should be eased in instances where it was impossible to adduce the evidence at trial. for the father, it is “by definition . . . not an appropriate consideration” in such cases: rf, at para. 75. similarly, the court of appeal decided that the due diligence criterion does not strictly govern the admission of new evidence. [57] but under such a formalistic approach, the timing of events — and not the litigant’s conduct — would dictate the application of the due diligence criterion. for events occurring subsequently, the criterion would effectively be eliminated this would run counter to our jurisprudence, ignore the litigant’s conduct and would fail to safeguard finality and order within the palmer test. that is precisely what happened in this case. focusing exclusively on whether the decision would be different gives undue weight to the interest in reaching a just result — and distorts the delicate balance that the palmer test seeks to maintain. [58] the due diligence criterion is sufficiently flexible to adapt to any unique concerns raised by evidence of facts that occurred subsequent to trial as this court held in bent v. platnick, 2020 scc 23, at para. 60, the due diligence criterion is not a rigid one and has been held to be a practical concept that is context-sensitive. [59] ultimately, this criterion seeks to determine whether the party could — with due diligence — have acted in a way that would have rendered the evidence available for trial. the due diligence inquiry should focus on the conduct of the party seeking to adduce such evidence rather than on the evidence itself. and in doing so, a court should determine, quite simply, why the evidence was not available at the trial: gdb, at para. 20. [60] the reason why “new” evidence was unavailable for trial may have its roots in the parties’ pre-trial conduct. for facts arising after trial, courts should consider whether the party’s conduct could have influenced the timing of the fact they seek to prove. consider this case. if finances are at issue and a party does not take steps to obtain a financing commitment until after trial, the court may ask why the evidence could not have been obtained for trial. parties cannot benefit from their own inaction when the existence of those facts was partially or entirely within their control. again, litigants must put their best foot forward at trial. in the end, what matters is that this criterion properly safeguards finality and order in our judicial process. [61] in sum, the focus of the due diligence criterion is on the litigant’s conduct in the particular context of the case. considering whether the evidence could have been available for trial with the exercise of due diligence is tantamount to the requirement that the evidence could not, with the exercise of due diligence, have been obtained for trial. where a party seeks to adduce additional evidence on appeal, yet failed to act with due diligence, the palmer test will generally foreclose admission. (b) the other palmer criteria [62] there is no suggestion by the parties that the remaining palmer criteria should operate differently depending on when the fact the evidence seeks to prove occurred needless to say, the evidence must be relevant and credible regardless of when it arose. the interest in reaching a just result requires nothing less. [63] as for the fourth factor — whether the evidence, if believed, could have affected the result at trial — the logic remains the same: a court must approach this criterion purposively. while it is tempting to conclude that evidence of facts arising after trial could never have affected the result at trial, the inquiry is not so narrow. the question is not the evidence’s timing but whether the evidence is sufficiently probative of the trial issues, had it been available. an overly formalistic approach at this stage ignores the underlying rationale of the palmer criteria — here, the interest in reaching a just result in the context of the proceedings. [64] as noted in palmer, at p 776, the fourth criterion will be satisfied if the evidence, assuming it was presented to the trier of fact and believed, possesses such strength or probative force that it might, taken with the other evidence adduced, have affected the result. (3) the palmer test in family law cases involving the best interests of the child [65] i turn now to an underlying question raised by this appeal: the flexible application of palmer in cases involving the best interests of the child. [66] this court has explained that these cases may require a more flexible application of the fourth palmer criterion: catholic children’s aid society, at p 188. the court recognized that the best interests analysis — which takes into account a broad range of considerations, including the needs, means, condition and other circumstances unique to the child before the court — widens the scope of evidence that could affect the result. this criterion, however, remains a condition precedent for the admission of evidence in family appeals but the flexible approach to the fourth criterion is not the only aspect of palmer that warrants further discussion in the family law context two other aspects include (i) the exceptional circumstances where a failure to meet due diligence is not fatal; and (ii) the existence of variation schemes that address factual developments that postdate trial. i address each in turn. (a) a failure to meet due diligence is not fatal in exceptional circumstances [67] first, given both the premium placed on certainty in cases involving children and the importance of having accurate and up-to-date information when a child’s future hangs in the balance (catholic children’s aid society, at p 188), evidence that does not meet the due diligence criterion may nonetheless be admitted in exceptional circumstances let me explain finality and order — in both their individual and systemic dimensions — are particularly important in cases involving the best interests of the child: van de perre v. edwards, 2001 scc 60, [2001] 2 scr. 1014, at para. 13 children should be afforded the comfort of knowing, with some degree of certainty, where they will live and with whom. and unfortunately, an appeal only prolongs the cloud of uncertainty and the hardship and stress a child must endure. [68] protracted litigation also places additional strain on the parties’ resources. in the context of a spousal separation, families who resort to the adversarial process are often in crisis, with two households now in need of support. as this court recognized in moge v. moge, [1992] 3 scr 813, family litigants, particularly women, are often already shouldering the economic consequences of a marital breakdown. some will be unable to afford the financial and emotional cost of court proceedings at first instance, let alone the strain of relitigating the facts on appeal needlessly prolonging this adversarial process does little to assist parties who must find a way to restructure their relationships and cooperate for the sake of their children. [69] certainty in a trial outcome can ensure an end to a period of immense turmoil, strife, and costs; parties should do what they can to promote it. evidence that does not satisfy the due diligence criterion should therefore generally not be admitted, even on an appeal of a best-interests-of-the-child determination. [70] that said, an absence of due diligence may in rare instances be superseded by the interests of justice: see children’s aid society of halton (region) v. a (kl) (2006), 32 rfl (6th) 7 (ont ca), at para. 56 there may be exceptional cases involving a child’s best interests where the need for finality and order may need to yield in the interests of justice. the intervener the office of the children’s lawyer provides one such example: in urgent matters requiring an immediate decision — a pressing medical or other issue bearing on the child’s best interests — it may not serve the interests of justice to require a party to show due diligence and further prolong or delay proceedings. [71] in other cases, admitting the additional evidence may not offend the principle of finality at all, despite the failure to meet the due diligence criterion. for instance, where the appellate court has already identified a material error in the trial judgment below, evidence that may help determine an appropriate order — whether to show the need for a new trial, support a substitute order, or otherwise — may exceptionally warrant admission: children’s aid society of halton (region), at paras. 27 and 52-56; children’s aid society of toronto v p (d.) (2005), 19 rfl. (6th) 267 (ont. ca), at paras. 8-9. this may promote timely justice, consistent with a child’s need to have their future determined with due dispatch: c. leach, e. mccarty and m. cheung, “further evidence in child protection appeals in ontario” (2012), 31 cflq 177. [72] to be clear, such exceptional circumstances do not dispense with the other palmer criteria — the evidence still must be relevant, credible, and have some material bearing on the outcome. similarly, the best interests of the child cannot be routinely leveraged to ignore the due diligence criterion and admit additional evidence on appeal. an appeal is not the continuation of a trial. rather, the party must satisfy the judge that the interest of finality and order is clearly outweighed by the need to reach a just result in the context of the proceedings. in such circumstances, the interests of justice may demand additional evidence to be admitted on appeal. (b) the existence of variation schemes that address factual developments that postdate trial in parenting cases [73] turning to the second feature that arises in the family law context, the admission of post-trial evidence on appeal may be unnecessary because, unlike decisions that award damages in one final order, litigation about ongoing parenting arrangements remains subject to court oversight. specifically, variation schemes permit a judge of first instance to vary a parenting order where a change of circumstances justifies a review of a child’s best interests. as i will explain, the admission of post-trial evidence on appeal unnecessarily undercuts both finality and order in family law judgments, as well as parliament’s statutory design. [74] because variation procedures are available in parenting cases to address changes arising post-trial, the interest in reaching a just result can be fostered through other means. the admission of post-trial evidence on appeal therefore unnecessarily undermines finality and order in family law decisions. [75] moreover, courts must be wary of permitting parties to use the palmer framework to circumvent legislative schemes that provide specific procedures for review. an appeal cannot serve as an indirect route of varying the original parenting order a variation application and an appeal are distinct proceedings based on fundamentally different premises. [76] in a variation proceeding, “[t]he court cannot retry the case, substituting its discretion for that of the original judge; it must assume the correctness of the decision”: gordon, at para. 11 the applicant bears the burden of proving that a child’s best interests differ from those determined in the original decision because the circumstances on which that decision was based have materially changed since trial. once an applicant discharges this burden, the assessment is prospective: a variation judge must enter into a fresh inquiry to determine where the best interests of the child lie, considering the findings of fact of the judge who made the previous order, together with the evidence of new circumstances (gordon, at para. 17). finality in this context respects the trial judge’s original determination of the child’s best interests: gordon, at para. 17; willick v. willick, [1994] 3 scr 670, at p 688, per sopinka j. [77] an appeal, in contrast, is designed to determine whether there is an error in the trial decision. in other words, the correctness of the previous decision — and not the implications of subsequent events — is the focal point in an appeal. this assessment is inherently retrospective, with the review typically circumscribed within the four corners of the judgment below. here, finality in the original decision is preserved unless the court identifies a material error. [78] it is essential that variation procedures and appeals remain distinct in the family law context: holding otherwise would unfairly require the opposing party to defend the original order — absent a material error — in the wrong forum, with appellate judges effectively performing the work assigned to first instance judges in variation procedures. this would displace the corrective function of appellate courts and allow litigants to circumvent parliament’s variation scheme. [79] litigants must not be permitted to game the system in this way: an appeal is not an opportunity to avoid the evidentiary burden in a variation proceeding; nor is it an opportunity to seek a fresh determination, after remedying gaps in a trial strategy with the assistance of the trial judge’s “preliminary” reasons. such a tactical approach in family cases will often be at the expense of the children. [80] consequently, in an appeal of a parenting order, courts should consider whether a variation application would be more appropriate in the circumstances. where an application for additional evidence amounts to what is “in substance a disguised application to vary” (riel, at para. 20), a court may refuse to admit additional evidence without considering the palmer criteria. (4) the use of properly admitted evidence on appeal [81] as a final observation, even when evidence is properly admitted on appeal, appellate courts must defer to the trial judge’s factual findings that are unaffected by the additional evidence while assessing the proper outcome in light of additional evidence may require a global consideration of the case (st-cloud; gordon), appellate courts are not entitled to reweigh or disregard the trial judge’s underlying factual findings absent palpable and overriding error. (5) did the court of appeal err in admitting the additional evidence? [82] in this case, the court of appeal erred in admitting the father’s evidence on appeal. it applied the wrong test and failed to consider whether the father exercised due diligence. the evidence could have been available for trial with due diligence. and in any event, this matter could have been dealt with solely on the basis that a fresh evidence motion was not in the interests of justice given the availability of a variation procedure. [83] the father sought to adduce an affidavit at the conclusion of the appeal hearing. he deposed that he had taken steps to pay the mother her interest in the family property “to comply with the order of the trial judge”: ca reasons, at para. 27. he also deposed that he refinanced the home and his parents increased their personal line of credit, which went towards renovations that had been partially completed. [84] the father argues that the evidence addressed the trial judge’s concerns that because of their financial position, his ability to remain in the family home, or even in west kelowna, was “less than certain”: see rf, at para. 5; see also trial reasons, at para. 40 these preoccupations, he says, are now “demonstrably incorrect”: rf, at para. 31. [85] in a similar vein, the court of appeal admitted the evidence because it was “cogent and material”, and it “directly addresse[d] one of the two primary underpinnings of the trial decision” (para. 51), since the trial judge’s “concern, or expectation, or ‘assumption’” regarding the father’s ability to remain in the family home “ha[d] been displaced” (para. 57). [86] the trial judge’s predictions about the state of the father’s finances and his ability to remain at his residence, however, should not be mischaracterized. it was open to the trial judge to make an assessment about the future and make a finding of fact based on the evidence before him. here, the fact that the father later moved to cure evidentiary deficiencies regarding his ability to finance and renovate the home does not mean that the trial judge erred in his findings or conclusions. [87] more to the point, the father failed to act with due diligence most obviously, the facts he now seeks to prove and rely upon on appeal — that he had the necessary financing to keep his home and make it habitable for the children — were squarely at issue before the trial judge. he could have taken reasonable steps to obtain financing before trial, since he was aware that he needed to refinance to stay in the house: trial reasons, at para. 35. his plan was contingent on obtaining financing from his father, whose testimony was “less definite” (para. 36): mr. grebliunas sr. has no commitment letters regarding financing. asked whether he was prepared to offer any more than the amount of the debt, he hedged, saying “we’ll see what the final number is”, and offered his opinion that the property would be “a good investment”. [emphasis added; para. 38.] as the trial judge concluded, the practicability of that arrangement remained “an open question”: para. 39. [88] allowing the father to resolve these concerns and redraw the factual landscape at the eleventh hour of the appeal occasioned considerable unfairness in effect, he was allowed to relitigate the same issues on the basis of more favourable facts, displacing the corrective function of the appellate court. nothing on the record indicates that he was prevented from obtaining the financing commitments before trial. this ran firmly against the interest in finality and order that due diligence is meant to safeguard. [89] further, as noted above, an alternative legislative mechanism for varying the trial order was available to deal with any material changes of circumstances arising after trial: divorce act, s 17(5); gordon, at para. 10 by successfully adducing the additional evidence, the father was able to circumvent the burden he would have faced in a variation application — that is, proving a change of circumstances from those that justified the children’s relocation to telkwa. instead, he received what amounted to a near fresh evaluation of the children’s best interests. [90] a flexible approach to palmer in cases involving the welfare of children must not permit what is “in substance a disguised application to vary”: riel, at para. 20. and as stated above, courts should be mindful of not permitting parties to use the palmer framework to circumvent and undermine parliamentary schemes that provide specific procedures for review or variation upon shifts in the factual landscape. [91] there are no circumstances here that render the admission of this evidence necessary in the interests of justice the court of appeal erred in admitting the additional evidence on appeal. b. the framework governing relocation cases [92] i turn now to the second question in this appeal: whether the trial judge erred in his analysis of the mother’s application to relocate to telkwa with the children. [93] the father argues that the trial judge erred in his application of the common law framework that governs relocation applications, and that this framework should be updated. he raises concerns regarding the trial judge’s application of gordon to the parties’ shared parenting arrangement; his treatment of the “maximum contact principle”; the weight he afforded to the mother’s reasons for moving; his neglect of the mother’s testimony that she would stay in kelowna and co-parent if her application failed; and the impact of family violence and discord between the parties on his analysis: rf, at paras. 24-29, 33-37, 67 and 84-88. [94] these submissions all bring into focus how case law across the country has refined and supplemented the gordon framework for over 25 years. indeed, the gordon framework is flexible by design; it is not an unyielding set of rules. and with decades of gordon jurisprudence as a guide, the federal government and many provinces have now enacted statutory relocation regimes that largely reflect the judicial experience evinced in the case law. as i will explain, this jurisprudential and legislative lineage provides a clear framework for all family arrangements going forward. the trial judge’s assessment of the best interests of the child is consistent with this refined framework. it was free from material error and entitled to deference on appeal. [95] my reasons proceed as follows. first, i touch on the best interests of the child and the unique nature of mobility cases. second, i underline the importance of deference in cases involving parenting issues third, i set out the refined gordon framework in light of jurisprudential and legislative refinements that have occurred over the past two decades finally, i turn to the specific issues raised in this case: whether the trial judge erred in his application of the gordon framework. (1) the best interests of the child [96] the best interests of the child are an important legal principle in our justice system: canadian foundation for children, youth and the law v. canada (attorney general), 2004 scc 4, [2004] 1 scr 76, at para. 9. it is a staple in domestic statutes, international law, and the common law: see, for example, divorce act, s 16; convention on the rights of the child, can. ts 1992 no. 3, art. 3(1); gordon; baker v canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), [1999] 2 scr 817; a.c v. manitoba (director of child and family services), 2009 scc 30, [2009] 2 scr 181; kanthasamy v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2015 scc 61, [2015] 3 scr. 909. [97] but, even with a wealth of jurisprudence as guidance, determining what is “best” for a child is never an easy task. the inquiry is “highly contextual” because of the “multitude of factors that may impinge on the child’s best interest”: canadian foundation for children, youth and the law, at para. 11; gordon, at para. 20. [98] the difficulties inherent to the best interests principle are amplified in the relocation context. untangling family relationships may have profound consequences, especially when children are involved. a child’s welfare remains at the heart of the relocation inquiry, but many traditional considerations do not readily apply in the same way. [99] in gordon, this court set out a framework for deciding whether relocation is in the best interests of the child. under this framework, a judge has the onerous task of determining a child’s best interests in the tangle of competing benefits and detriments posed by either outcome: hejzlar v. mitchell-hejzlar, 2011 bcca 230, 334 dlr (4th) 49, at para. 23. and as abella ja (as she then was) once observed, “[i]t can be no more than an informed opinion made at a moment in the life of a child about what seems likely to prove to be in that child’s best interests”: macgyver v. richards (1995), 22 or (3d) 481 (ca), at p 489. (2) the importance of deference in parenting cases affecting the best interests of the child [100] the scope of appellate review in family law cases is narrow: van de perre, at para. 11 determining a child’s best interests is always a fact-specific and highly discretionary determination: van de perre, at para. 9 and as gonthier j observed, “courts of appeal should be highly reluctant to interfere with the exercise of a trial judge’s discretion”: elsom v. elsom, [1989] 1 scr 1367, at p 1374. [101] the trial judge is the fact finder and has the benefit of the intangible impact of conducting the trial: r v. gf, 2021 scc 20, at para. 81. after hearing from the parties directly, weighing the evidence, and making factual determinations, the trial court is best positioned to determine the best parenting arrangement. [102] an appellate court’s role, as noted, is instead generally one of error correction; it is not to retry a case. permitting appellate courts to become venues for dissatisfied parties to relitigate issues already resolved at trial erodes the public’s confidence in the judicial process and the rule of law. the proper functioning of our judicial system requires each level of court to remain moored to its respective role in the administration of justice. [103] therefore, an appellate court may only intervene where there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error in law: hickey v. hickey, [1999] 2 scr 518, at para. 12; van de perre, at para. 11. [104] absent an error of law or a palpable and overriding error of fact, deference is vital: housen, at paras. 8, 10, 36 and 39. appellate courts must review a trial judge’s reasons generously and as a whole, bearing in mind the presumption that trial judges know the law: gf, at para. 79 as i have explained, an appeal is not a litigant’s opportunity for a “second kick at the can”, especially in parenting cases where finality is of paramount importance: van de perre, at para. 13. (3) the legal principles governing relocation applications [105] for over 25 years, gordon has been the governing authority for mobility applications. mclachlin j (as she then was) set out a two-stage inquiry for determining whether to vary a parenting order under the divorce act and permit a custodial parent to relocate with the child: first, the party seeking a variation must show a material change in the child’s circumstances; second, the judge must determine what order reflects the child’s best interests in the new circumstances gordon then provided factors to be considered in relocation cases. [106] although gordon concerned a variation order, courts have also applied the framework when determining a parenting arrangement at first instance, with appropriate modifications: see nunweiler v. nunweiler, 2000 bcca 300, 186 dlr. (4th) 323, at paras. 27-28; ldd v. jad, 2010 nbca 69, 364 nbr (2d) 200, at paras. 10, 24-25, 27 and 29; bjornson v. creighton (2002), 62 or (3d) 236 (ca), at para. 18. as well, courts have applied the framework in cases governed by provincial family law acts, even though gordon concerned an application under the divorce act: bjornson, at paras. 8 and 17; gj v. cm, 2021 yksc 20, at para. 26 (canlii); droit de la famille — 2294, 2022 qcca 125, at paras. 11-12 (canlii). [107] at the time gordon was rendered, the divorce act and provincial family legislations did not contain any provisions pertaining to relocation. in 2019, parliament amended the divorce act to provide a statutory regime that governs relocation applications several provinces have enacted similar statutory relocation regimes in recent years: see family law act, sbc 2011, c 25, ss. 65 to 71; the children’s law act, 2020, ss 2020, c 2, ss. 13 to 17; children’s law reform act, rso 1990, c. c.12, s 39.4; family law act, snb 2020, c 23, ss. 60 to 66; parenting and support act, rsns 1989, c 160, ss. 18e to 18h; children’s law act, spei 2020, c 59, ss. 46 to 52. [108] subject to some notable exceptions, the divorce act and these provincial statutes largely codified this court’s framework in gordon. as i will explain, where they depart from gordon, the changes reflect the collective judicial experience of applying the framework for over 25 years. [109] the divorce act amendments came into force on march 1, 2021, after the courts below decided this case therefore, the mobility application under appeal proceeded under the gordon framework. that said, the transitional provision in s 35.3 of the amended divorce act provides: 35.3 a proceeding commenced under this act before the day on which this section comes into force and not finally disposed of before that day shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with this act as it reads as of that day. [110] this court did not receive any submissions on the application of s 353. as i will explain, however, the outcome would be the same regardless of whether this case were decided under the amended divorce act or the refined gordon framework. the new relocation provisions in the divorce act largely mirror developments in the common law since gordon as a result, i leave the discussion of the transitional provision for another day this case, however, provides an opportunity to bring the common law framework in line with the amended divorce act to assist judges in dealing with future mobility cases. [111] in the sections that follow, i clarify how certain aspects of the framework for determining parental relocation issues have evolved since this court decided gordon. (a) determining relocation issues at first instance and by way of variation applications [112] the approach to mobility issues when they are raised at first instance, as in this case, differs from the approach to such issues when they are raised by way of a variation application, as in gordon. without a pre-existing judicial determination, a parent’s desire to relocate is simply part of the factual matrix in the assessment of what parenting arrangement is in the best interests of the child. therefore, the first stage of gordon — which sets out the usual requirement for a variation order — has no application. [113] even where there is an existing parenting order, relocation will typically constitute a material change in circumstances and therefore satisfy the first stage of the gordon framework: gordon, at para. 14; see also divorce act, s 17(52). [114] therefore, regardless of how the relocation issue is brought before the court, the first stage of the gordon inquiry will likely not raise a contentious issue. that said, when the relocation issue arises by way of a variation application, a court must consider the findings of fact of the judge who made the previous order, together with the evidence of new circumstances: gordon, at para. 17 the history of parenting arrangements is always relevant to understanding a child’s best interests. (b) determining a child’s best interests in mobility cases [115] accordingly, the so-called second stage of the gordon framework is often the sole issue when determining a relocation issue the crucial question is whether relocation is in the best interests of the child. [116] five considerations that bear upon the best-interests-of-the-child analysis arise in this case: (i) the application of gordon to shared parenting arrangements and the so-called “great respect principle”; (ii) a moving parent’s reasons for relocation; (iii) the “maximum contact principle”; (iv) a moving parent’s testimony about how the outcome of the application will influence their decision to relocate; and (v) the impact of family violence. i address each in turn, looking at their evolution in the case law since gordon and their reflection in amendments to the divorce act. (i) the application of gordon to shared parenting arrangements and the so- called “great respect principle” [117] in determining the best interests of the child, gordon first instructs that “[t]he inquiry does not begin with a legal presumption in favour of the custodial parent, although the custodial parent’s views are entitled to great respect”: para. 49. [118] in this case, the father contends that this aspect of gordon is of limited value where there is a shared parenting arrangement: rf, at para. 28. he says the trial judge should not have paid special “respect” to the mother’s decision to move given their history of shared parenting roles he relies on newbury ja’s observation in q (re) v. k (gj), 2012 bcca 146, 348 dlr (4th) 622, at para. 58, that “[i]t is not clear how the ‘great respect’ principle should work where both parents are custodial parents.” [119] the parent who cares for the child on a daily basis is in a unique position to assess what is in their best interests: gordon, at para. 48. this logic applies to both parents in a shared parenting arrangement, and accordingly, both of their views are entitled to great respect in an assessment of the child’s best interests. this makes sense: a court always pays careful attention to the views of the parents. in my view, it adds little value to this analysis to label it a separate principle of “great respect”. [120] as for any legal presumption in relocation cases, the court in gordon noted that the wording of the divorce act belied the need to defer to the custodial parent rather, the act expressly stipulated that the judge hearing the application should be concerned only with the best interests of the child, and the variation provisions did not place a burden on any parent at the merits stage of the analysis: paras. 37 and 39. [121] but over time, certain patterns have emerged. in practice, a move is more likely to be approved where the clear primary caregiver for a child seeks to relocate and more likely to be denied if there is a shared parenting arrangement professor thompson refers to this as the unspoken “primary caregiver presumption”: see d. a. r. thompson, “ten years after gordon: no law, nowhere” (2007), 35 rfl. (6th) 307, at p 317; r. thompson, “where is bc. law going? the new mobility” (2012), 30 cflq 235. [122] in discussing presumptions, gordon relied on the fact that parliament had not set out any general rules. it has since done so. in 2019, parliament enacted a burden of proof, set out in s 16.93 of the divorce act, which corresponds to the broad trends in the jurisprudence. [123] therefore, in all cases, the history of caregiving will be relevant. and while it may not be useful to label the attention courts pay to the views of the parent as a separate “great respect” principle, the history of caregiving will sometimes warrant a burden of proof in favour of one parent. indeed, federal and provincial legislatures have increasingly enacted presumptions, bringing clarity to the law. in all cases, however, the inquiry remains an individual one. the judge must consider the best interests of the particular child in the particular circumstances of the case. other considerations may demonstrate that relocation is in the child’s best interests, even if the parties have historically co-parented. (ii) the reasons for relocation [124] the second refinement to the gordon framework concerns the moving parent’s reasons for relocating. here, the father and the court of appeal took issue with the weight the trial judge ascribed to the mother’s reasons for relocation, the implication being that this consideration detracted from his focus on the child’s best interests. [125] in gordon, mclachlin j cautioned that courts should avoid “descend[ing] into inquiries into the custodial parent’s reason or motive for moving” because “[u]sually, the reasons or motives for moving will not be relevant to the custodial parent’s parenting ability”: paras. 22-23. therefore, “absent a connection to parenting ability, the custodial parent’s reason for moving should not enter into the inquiry”: para. 23. to hold otherwise, mclachlin j reasoned, would shift the focus from the best interests of the child to the conduct of the custodial parent: para. 22. [126] in practice, courts across the country have found that the reason for the move often bears on the best interests of the child: n. bala, “bill c-78: the 2020 reforms to the parenting provisions of canada’s divorce act” (2020), 39 cflq 45, at p 71; thompson (2007); e. jollimore and r. sladic, “mobility — are we there yet?” (2008), 27 cflq 341. [127] recent amendments to the divorce act now instruct courts to consider the moving parent’s reasons for relocation: s 16.92(1)(a) similarly, provinces across canada have incorporated the moving parent’s reasons for relocation within their statutory relocation regimes: family law act, s 69(6)(a) (bc);. the children’s law act, 2020, s 15(1)(a) (sask.); children’s law reform act, s 39.4(3)(a) (ont.); family law act, s 62(1)(a) (nb);. parenting and support act, s 18h(4)(b) (ns);. children’s law act, s 48(1)(a) (pei). [128] indeed, isolating the custodial parent’s reasons for the move from the broad, individualized inquiry of the child’s best interests has frequently proven impractical. there will often be a connection between the expected benefits of the move for the child and the relocating parent’s reasons for proposing the move in the first place. relocation for financial reasons, for instance, will clearly carry implications for a child’s material welfare. considering the parent’s reasons for moving can be relevant, and even necessary, to assess the merits of a relocation application. [129] that said, the court should avoid casting judgment on a parent’s reasons for moving. a moving parent need not prove the move is justified. and a lack of a compelling reason for the move, in and of itself, should not count against a parent, unless it reflects adversely on a parent’s ability to meet the needs of the child: ligate v. richardson (1997), 34 or (3d) 423 (ca), at p 434. [130] ultimately, the moving parent’s reasons for relocating must not deflect from the focus of relocation applications — they must be considered only to the extent they are relevant to the best interests of the child. (iii) the “maximum contact principle” or “parenting time consistent with the best interests of the child” [131] gordon requires courts to consider “the desirability of maximizing contact between the child and both parents”: para. 49. this consideration has been referred to as the “maximum contact principle”: see gordon, at para. 24; see also young v. young, [1993] 4 scr 3, at p 53, per l’heureux-dubé j., and p 118, per mclachlin j (as she then was) in this case, the father contends that the trial judge neglected this consideration. [132] concerns about parenting time with the child will inevitably be engaged in relocation cases: the crux of the dispute is whether it is in the child’s best interests to move notwithstanding the impact on their relationship with the other parent. in other words, this concern is folded into the central inquiry before the court. [133] what is known as the maximum contact principle has traditionally emphasized that children shall have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with their best interests. a corollary to this is sometimes referred to as the “friendly parent rule”, which instructs courts to consider the willingness of a parent to foster and support the child’s relationship with the other parent, where appropriate: see young, at p 44. both of these considerations have long been recognized by the divorce act: see divorce act, pre-amendments, ss. 16(10) and 17(9); and divorce act, post-amendments, ss. 16(6) and 16(3)(c). [134] although gordon placed emphasis on the “maximum contact principle”, it was clear that the best interests of the child are the sole consideration in relocation cases, and “if other factors show that it would not be in the child’s best interests, the court can and should restrict contact”: gordon, at para. 24; see also para. 49. but in the years since gordon, some courts have interpreted what is known as the “maximum contact principle” as effectively creating a presumption in favour of shared parenting arrangements, equal parenting time, or regular access: folahan v folahan, 2013 onsc 2966, at para. 14 (canlii); slade v. slade, 2002 yksc 40, at para. 10 (canlii); see also f. kelly, “enforcing a parent/child relationship at all cost? supervised access orders in the canadian courts” (2011), 49 osgoode hall lj 277, at pp. 278 and 296-98. indeed, the term “maximum contact principle” seems to imply that as much contact with both parents as possible will necessarily be in the best interests of the child. [135] these interpretations overreach. it is worth repeating that what is known as the maximum contact principle is only significant to the extent that it is in the child’s best interests; it must not be used to detract from this inquiry it is notable that the amended divorce act recasts the “maximum contact principle” as “[p]arenting time consistent with best interests of child”: s 16(6). this shift in language is more neutral and affirms the child-centric nature of the inquiry indeed, going forward, the “maximum contact principle” is better referred to as the “parenting time factor”. (iv) a parent’s testimony about whether they will relocate regardless of the outcome of the relocation application [136] gordon is silent as to whether, and how, a trier of fact may consider how the outcome of an application would affect the parties’ relocation plans. in this case, the mother indicated that she would return to kelowna if her application was refused, while the father indicated he would not move to the bulkley valley if her application was granted. [137] in the years since gordon, many courts have recognized the danger that such evidence will place parties in a “double bind” as paperny j.a explained in spencer v. spencer, 2005 abca 262, 257 dlr (4th) 115, at para. 18: in conducting this inquiry, it is problematic to rely on representations by the custodial parent that he or she will not move without the children should the application to relocate be denied. the effect of such an inquiry places the parent seeking to relocate in a classic double bind. if the answer is that the parent is not willing to remain behind with the children, he or she raises the prospect of being regarded as self interested and discounting the children’s best interests in favour of his or her own. on the other hand, advising the court that the parent is prepared to forgo the requested move if unsuccessful, undermines the submissions in favour of relocation by suggesting that such a move is not critical to the parent’s well-being or to that of the children. if a judge mistakenly relies on a parent’s willingness to stay behind “for the sake of the children,” the status quo becomes an attractive option for a judge to favour because it avoids the difficult decision the application presents. [138] i agree. considering a parent’s willingness to move with or without the child can give rise to a double bind: a parent can either appear to be putting their own interests ahead of their child, or they risk undermining the strength of their relocation application (see d.p v rb, 2009 peca 12, 285 nfld & peir 61, at para. 32; jollimore and sladic, at pp. 373-74). [139] this risk has led appellate courts in many provinces to discourage trial judges from relying on a parent’s representations about whether they will move without the children: see hopkins v. hopkins, 2011 abca 372, at para. 6 (canlii); hejzlar, at paras. 24-27; dp, at para. 32; nt v. wp, 2011 nlca 47, 309 nfld. & peir 350, at para. 9; morrill v. morrill, 2016 mbca 66, 330 man. r (2d) 165, at para. 12. [140] the same approach is now reflected in the divorce act: s 16.92(2) precludes the court from considering whether the moving parent would relocate with or without the children. i would add that a responding parent could just as easily fall victim to the problematic inferences associated with the double bind: see joseph v. washington, 2021 bcsc 2014, at paras. 101-11 (canlii). therefore, in all cases, the court should not consider how the outcome of an application would affect the parties’ relocation plans. (v) family violence as a relevant factor [141] in this case, the acrimonious relationship between the parties — featuring abusive conduct during the marriage, at separation, and at trial — was a significant factor in the trial judge’s relocation analysis. on appeal, the father argues that such “friction” is “not unusual for separating couples”: rf, at para. 35. [142] since gordon, courts have increasingly recognized that any family violence or abuse may affect a child’s welfare and should be considered in relocation decisions: see prokopchuk v borowski, 2010 onsc 3833, 88 rfl (6th) 140; lawless v. lawless, 2003 abqb 800, at para. 12 (canlii); cameron v. cameron, 2003 mbqb 149, 41 rfl (5th) 30; abbott-ewen v. ewen, 2010 onsc 2121, 86 rfl. (6th) 428; ndl v. msl, 2010 nssc 68, 289 nsr (2d) 8, at paras. 22-23 and 35; esm v. jbb, 2012 nsca 80, 319 nsr (2d) 232, at paras. 55-57. courts have been significantly more likely to allow relocation applications where there was a finding of abuse: department of justice, a study of post-separation/divorce parental relocation (2014), at ch. 334. [143] the suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability is untenable. research indicates that children who are exposed to family violence are at risk of emotional and behavioural problems throughout their lives: department of justice, risk factors for children in situations of family violence in the context of separation and divorce (february 2014), at p 12. harm can result from direct or indirect exposure to domestic conflicts, for example, by observing the incident, experiencing its aftermath, or hearing about it: s. artz et al., “a comprehensive review of the literature on the impact of exposure to intimate partner violence for children and youth” (2014), 5 ijcyfs 493, at p 497. [144] domestic violence allegations are notoriously difficult to prove: p. g. jaffe, c. v. crooks and n. bala, “a framework for addressing allegations of domestic violence in child custody disputes” (2009), 6 j child custody 169, at p 175; a. m. bailey, “prioritizing child safety as the prime best-interest factor” (2013), 47 fam l.q 35, at pp. 44-45 as the interveners west coast leaf association and rise women’s legal centre point out, family violence often takes place behind closed doors and may lack corroborating evidence: see s. b. boyd and r. lindy, “violence against women and the b.c family law act: early jurisprudence” (2016), 35 cflq 101, at p 115. thus, proof of even one incident may raise safety concerns for the victim or may overlap with and enhance the significance of other factors, such as the need for limited contact or support. [145] the prospect that such findings could be unnecessarily relitigated on appeal will only deter abuse survivors from coming forward and as it stands, the evidence shows that most family violence goes unreported: l. c. neilson, responding to domestic violence in family law, civil protection & child protection cases (2nd ed. 2020), 2017 canliidocs 2 (online), at ch. 452. [146] the recent amendments to the divorce act recognize that findings of family violence are a critical consideration in the best interests analysis: s 16(3)(j) and (4). the divorce act broadly defines family violence in s 2(1) to include any violent or threatening conduct, ranging from physical abuse to psychological and financial abuse courts must consider family violence and its impact on the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child. [147] because family violence may be a reason for the relocation and given the grave implications that any form of family violence poses for the positive development of children, this is an important factor in mobility cases. (c) summary of the framework for determining whether relocation is in the best interests of the child [148] more than two decades ago, this court set out a framework for relocation applications in gordon: paras. 49-50. it applies to relocation issues that arise at first instance and in the context of applications to vary existing parenting orders. [149] since then, our jurisprudence has refined the gordon framework, and, subject to two notable exceptions, the divorce act has largely codified it. where the divorce act departs from gordon, the changes reflect the collective judicial experience of applying the gordon factors. while gordon rejected a legal presumption in favour of either party, the divorce act now contains a burden of proof where there is a pre-existing parenting order, award or agreement: s 16.93 and although gordon restricted whether courts could consider a moving party’s reasons for relocating, this is now an express consideration in the best-interests-of-the-child analysis: s 1692(1)(a). [150] the new divorce act amendments also respond to issues identified in the case law over the past few decades, which did not arise in gordon. section 16.92(2) now provides that trial judges shall not consider a parent’s testimony that they would move with or without the child. furthermore, ss. 16(3)(j) and 16(4) of the divorce act now instruct courts to consider any form of family violence and its impact on the perpetrator’s ability to care for the child. [151] in light of the jurisprudential and legislative refinements, the common law relocation framework can be restated as follows. [152] the crucial question is whether relocation is in the best interests of the child, having regard to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. this inquiry is highly fact-specific and discretionary. [153] our jurisprudence and statutes provide a rich foundation for such an inquiry: see, for example, s 16 of the divorce act. a court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, which may include the child’s views and preferences, the history of caregiving, any incidents of family violence, or a child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage. a court shall also consider each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent, and shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent, as is consistent with the best interests of the child these examples are illustrative, not exhaustive while some of these factors were specifically noted under gordon, they have broad application to the best interests of the child. [154] however, traditional considerations bearing on the best interests of the child must be considered in the context of the unique challenges posed by relocation cases. in addition to the factors that a court will generally consider when determining the best interests of the child and any applicable notice requirements, a court should also consider:    the reasons for the relocation; the impact of the relocation on the child; the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;  the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;  the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision making responsibility or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the travel expenses; and  whether each person who has parenting time or decision- making responsibility or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance. the court should not consider how the outcome of an application would affect either party’s relocation plans — for example, whether the person who intends to move with the child would relocate without the child or not relocate. these factors are drawn from s 16.92(1) and (2) of the divorce act and largely reflect the evolution of the common law for over 25 years. [155] as i have explained, several pillars underlying the court’s reasoning in gordon have shifted over time, leading courts and now legislatures to refine, modify, and supplement the gordon factors. these refinements leave us with a clear framework going forward. (4) did the trial judge err in his relocation analysis? [156] the father raises four issues with the trial judge’s analysis. he argues that (i) the trial judge failed to account for the historical parenting roles of the parties; (ii) the trial judge’s decision was inconsistent with the parenting time factor; (iii) the mother’s need for emotional support could not justify relocation in this case; and (iv) the trial judge paid undue attention to the acrimonious relationship between the parties. [157] i would not accede to any of these submissions. the trial judge’s gordon analysis was free from a material error, serious misapprehension of evidence, or error of law. (a) the trial judge’s decision considered the historical parenting roles of the parties [158] the father first contends the trial judge’s analysis did not reflect the parties’ shared parenting responsibilities throughout the marriage and after separation. this submission relies on the trial judge’s statement, derived from gordon, that “barring an improper motive, relocation must be approached from the perspective of respect for a parent’s decision to live and work where they choose”: para. 21 this statement, says the father, may be applicable to the views of a “custodial” parent, but it is not applicable where both parents have been fully engaged in a shared parenting arrangement. [159] in my view, the trial judge’s reasons do not suggest that he gave more “respect” or undue weight to the mother’s desire to live and work in telkwa. rather, the trial judge canvassed, in detail, why staying in kelowna with their father was not best for the children. most notably, the trial judge was concerned about the father’s animosity towards the mother and the possibility that it could influence or otherwise impact the children: paras. 41-42 there were significant issues with the kelowna residence, which was described as a working environment, not a living environment: para. 33. and the children and the mother would benefit from family support in telkwa, including from her parents and siblings: para. 44. [160] nevertheless, the court of appeal concluded that the trial judge erred by failing to consider kelowna as a viable option, especially because the mother testified that she was willing to move to kelowna should the application be denied the mother’s evidence on this point, however, could not be determinative. the trial judge understood the risk posed by the double bind. [161] the court of appeal also took issue with the trial judge’s failure to consider whether the children should stay with their father in kelowna since he also concluded that either “parent was, in concept, able to care for the children”: ca. reasons, at para. 86 however, the trial judge expressed serious reservations about whether the father would foster a positive relationship between the children and their mother: para. 42 the trial judge was right to take this into consideration when determining the options before him. [162] the trial judge’s reasoning on these points disclosed no reviewable error. it was owed deference on appeal. (b) the trial judge considered parenting time consistent with the best interests of the child [163] the father submits the trial judge failed to give due weight to the parenting time factor. the court of appeal took a similar position, concluding that “[p]ermitting the relocation was inconsistent with the object of maximizing contact between the children and both their parents indeed the relocation was likely to permanently and profoundly alter the relationship of the children with their father”: para. 87. i have two concerns with this line of reasoning. [164] first, the question before the trial judge was not how to best promote the parenting time factor; it was how to best promote the best interests of the children. these considerations are not synonymous nor are they necessarily mutually reinforcing. courts should only give effect to the parenting time factor to the extent that it is in the best interests of the child. [165] second, the trial judge did not fail to consider that children should have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with their best interests. he considered that “the children would suffer a very significant loss in being deprived of frequent care from and contact with their father” and “[t]here would also be some detriment to the children in removing them from the community they have lived in and the friends they have made”: para. 50 he was clearly alive to the risk of reducing contact with the father. [166] the trial judge also did not fail to consider the corollary of the parenting time factor: whether either parent would be willing to facilitate contact and help foster a positive relationship between the children and the other parent. again, the trial judge concluded that the father harboured animus towards the mother, and that she was more likely to build a positive relationship between the children and him than the converse. [167] on the whole, the trial judge found that relocation would best promote the children’s welfare, notwithstanding the impact on the relationship between the children and their father. this was a determination the trial judge was entitled to make, and it was owed deference on appeal. (c) the mother’s need for emotional support [168] the father submits the trial judge gave undue weight to the mother’s need for emotional support the court of appeal similarly held that a parent’s need for emotional support, “even with some friction between the parties”, cannot justify relocation: para. 74. [169] the mother’s need for emotional support was a relevant consideration in the best interests analysis. the mother followed the father to kelowna, but her family remained in telkwa. a move that can improve a parent’s emotional and psychological state can enrich a parent’s ability to cultivate a healthy, supportive, and positive environment for their child courts have frequently recognized that a child’s best interests are furthered by a well-functioning and happy parent: burns v. burns, 2000 nsca 1, 183 dlr (4th) 66, at pp. 81-82; l (ss) v. w (jw), 2010 bcca 55, 316 dlr (4th) 464, at para. 33; bjornson, at para. 30; orring v. orring, 2006 bcca 523, 276 dlr (4th) 211, at para. 57. [170] it is also simplistic to suggest that emotional support for the mother was the only benefit that weighed in favour of relocation. the trial judge described, in great detail, how the continuing animosity between the parents would impact the children should they stay in kelowna. he also noted that the move would provide the mother with the benefit of housing support, childcare, better employment, and opportunities to advance her education: paras. 1, 44 and 46-47. [171] these considerations all have direct or indirect bearing on the best-interests-of-the-child assessment relocation that provides a parent with more education, employment opportunities, and economic stability can contribute to a child’s wellbeing: larose v. larose, 2002 bcca 366, 1 bclr (4th) 262, at paras. 6 and 19; hs v. cs, 2006 skca 45, 279 sask. r 55, at para. 26; see also e. el fateh, “a presumption for the best?” (2009), 25 can. j. fam. l 73, at pp. 80-83. [172] similarly, the additional support of family and community at the new location can enhance the parent’s ability to care for the children: daf v. smo, 2004 abca 261, 354 a.r 387, at para. 17 extended family, for example, can provide additional support to children while their parents begin to navigate the new terrain of post-separation life: harnett v clements, 2019 nlca 53, 30 rfl (8th) 49, at paras. 22 and 42; cm v. rl, 2013 nsfc 29, at para. 139 (canlii). [173] it is often difficult to disentangle the interests of a parent from the interests of a child. indeed, “the reality that the nurture of children is inextricably intertwined with the well-being of the nurturing parent” is far from novel: pelech v. pelech, [1987] 1 scr 801, at p 845; see also willick, at pp. 724-25, per l’heureux-dubé j a child’s welfare is often advanced in tandem with improvements in the parent’s financial, social, and emotional circumstances. the trial judge found this to be the case here. [174] at all times, the trial judge remained focused on the child’s best interests. he only considered the mother’s needs — emotional or otherwise — to the extent that they were relevant to the children. the trial judge was clearly of the view that relocation would both directly and indirectly benefit the children, whereas “they would at least suffer indirectly to some degree if their mother remained in the okanagan”: para. 46. [175] once again, his analysis on this point was free from any reviewable error. (d) the parties’ acrimonious relationship [176] the father also submits the trial judge erred in placing undue emphasis on the acrimonious relationship between the parties. for the father, the “friction” was a “thing of the past” (rf, at para. 34), it was nothing unusual for parties who are separating, and there was no evidence that it occasioned any distress for the children. [177] i disagree. the trial judge’s factual findings were well supported by the evidence. [178] the trial judge carefully explained why he viewed the parties’ relationship as acrimonious, both during the marriage and at the time of trial. he found that there was friction during the marriage: the mother had been subject to the father’s controlling and overbearing personality; there was “possibly some degree of emotional abuse”; she had been physically assaulted; and she was emotionally traumatized. [179] and the father’s continued animosity towards the mother became readily apparent during the trial itself. the trial judge found his conduct at trial to be abusive: para. 41. most notably, the father adduced a nude “selfie” of the mother in an affidavit, which the trial judge found served no purpose but to humiliate her. the trial judge also noted that the assault, and the father’s denials that it had occurred, was “likely to be an ongoing source of acrimony”: para. 41 (emphasis added).the trial judge concluded that this high-conflict relationship between the parties had “particularly significant” implications for the children: para. 41. these considerations weighed in favour of the children staying primarily with the mother. in these circumstances, it was open for the trial judge to conclude that a co-parenting arrangement could only work in telkwa. if the mother returned to kelowna, she would likely be socially isolated and reliant on the father. [180] despite the trial judge’s findings, which were well supported by the record, the court of appeal intervened because “the trial judge’s concerns about mr. grebliunas’ behaviour towards ms. barendregt warrant some context”: para. 70. [181] the court identified four factors that purportedly “attenuated” the seriousness of the circumstances. first, the mother never argued that hostility between the parties supported her move; her evidence was that the parties were getting along better than when they first separated. second, many of the issues the judge had been concerned about had taken place in the past. third, there was no evidence of any event involving or taking place in the presence of the children since separation. and fourth, the trial judge failed to consider the evidence that the parties’ relationship was improving. [182] none of these factors gave the court of appeal licence to disturb the trial judge’s factual findings regarding the relationship between the parties. [183] first, although counsel for the mother did not advance the father’s animus as a factor that supported relocation, the state of the parties’ relationship was obviously relevant and as the interveners west coast leaf association and rise women’s legal centre point out, it is important to be aware of the social and legal barriers to women disclosing family violence in family law proceedings. [184] second, the parties’ acrimonious relationship was far from a relic of the distant past. again, the acrimony surfaced during the trial itself. and abusive dynamics often do not end with separation — in fact, the opposite is often true: jaffe, crooks and bala, at p 171; neilson, at ch. 451, 722 and 726. trial judges have the advantage of observing the dynamic between the parties first-hand; any resulting assessment of their ability to work together in the future must attract deference. [185] third, the fact that there was no evidence of any event involving the children, or taking place in the children’s presence, could not be determinative. not only can indirect exposure to conflict have implications for the children’s welfare, the trial judge found there was a significant risk that conflict between the parties would spill over and directly impact the children. he was entitled to make that finding on the evidence before him. [186] fourth, the record discloses no indication that the trial judge forgot, ignored, or misconceived the evidence showing improvements in the parties’ relationship an omission in the reasons, in and of itself, does not mean that the appellate court is permitted to review the evidence heard at trial and in any event, cooperating, staying, or reconciling with a party does not necessarily indicate that an incident of abuse or violence was not serious: see d. martinson and m. jackson, “family violence and evolving judicial roles: judges as equality guardians in family law cases” (2017), 30 can. j. fam. l 11, at p 34. in the end, what mattered was the trial judge’s conclusion that it was unlikely that the parents could work cooperatively to promote the children’s best interests in a shared parenting structure in the near future: para. 42. [187] nevertheless, the court of appeal concluded that the trial judge’s findings regarding the acrimonious relationship between the parties could “no longer support the ultimate result arrived at by the trial judge”: para. 69. [188] quite simply, however, it was not the place of the court of appeal to decide that the broader context could “attenuate” the seriousness of the father’s behavior in the absence of an overriding and palpable error. nor was it the court’s place to reweigh a factor that had been carefully considered by the trial judge. a difference in opinion does not provide an appellate court licence to eclipse the trial court’s judgment in favour of its own the court of appeal was wrong to dispense with deference in the absence of a reversible error. (e) the other gordon factors [189] i am satisfied that the trial judge’s gordon analysis was free from material error. the following factors all supported the trial judge’s conclusion that relocation was in the children’s best interests: there was a significant risk that the high-conflict nature of the parents’ relationship would impact the children if they stayed in kelowna; the mother needed her family’s support to independently care for the children, which was only available in telkwa; she was more willing to facilitate a positive relationship between the children and the father than the converse; and there were findings of family violence. i see no reason to set aside the trial judge’s decision. vi disposition [190] the appeal is allowed. the decision of the court of appeal is set aside, and paras. 1 to 6 of the trial judge’s order regarding the primary residence of the children are restored. the mother is entitled to her costs in this court and the courts below. the following are the reasons delivered by côté j — i. overview [191] i have had the benefit of reading my colleague justice karakatsanis’s reasons. while i agree that the test laid out in palmer v. the queen, [1980] 1 scr. 759, governs, as it applies to both “fresh” and “new” evidence, i disagree with my colleague’s application of palmer to the facts of this appeal. for the reasons that follow, i would uphold the court of appeal’s ultimate conclusion that the evidence is admissible, but reject its treatment of palmer and its decision to reassess the best interests of the children. [192] i respectfully part company with my colleague’s analysis on two points. first, it is in my view inappropriate to comment on the gordon v. goertz, [1996] 2 scr 27, framework in the context of this appeal. this issue was not raised by the appellant, ms. barendregt (“mother”), nor was it formally raised by the respondent, mr. grebliunas (“father”), who did not cross-appeal. it is therefore not properly before this court. even if it were, i do not believe it prudent to comment on amendments to the divorce act, rsc 1985, c 3 (2nd supp.), without the benefit of submissions and of a full evidentiary record on the matter it follows that i cannot agree with my colleague’s analysis as set out in paras. 105-89 of her reasons. i will say no more on this issue; it ought to be left for another day. [193] second, as i mentioned, i disagree with my colleague’s application of palmer to the facts of this case. appellate courts that strictly apply the palmer test tend to focus too narrowly on the potential for further evidence to distort the appellate standard of review rather than properly focusing on the best interests of the child as the overriding consideration the palmer test must be applied flexibly in all cases involving the welfare of children my colleague recognizes this well-established principle, yet her application of palmer is devoid of flexibility. [194] on a proper application of palmer, i would admit the new evidence and remand the appeal to the trial court for reconsideration of the children’s best interests in light of the new information regarding the father’s financial situation and the condition of the west kelowna home the effect of holding otherwise would be to relocate 2 children 1,000 km away from their father based on an inaccurate picture of reality. ii analysis [195] as my colleague rightfully notes, the palmer test must be applied more flexibly in family law cases involving the best interests of a child (para. 67; catholic children’s aid society of metropolitan toronto v. m (c.), [1994] 2 scr 165). in such cases, an accurate assessment of the current situation of the parties, and of the children in particular, is of crucial importance (catholic children’s aid, at p 188). a child’s welfare is “ongoing and fluid, an undammed stream, and usually it is better that the court have the full context” (tg v. nova scotia (minister of community services), 2012 nsca 43, 316 nsr (2d) 202, at para. 82). [196] although the rules for admitting new evidence are not designed to permit litigants to retry their cases, it is trite law that the best interests of a child “may provide a compelling reason to admit evidence on appeal” (cks v. oss, 2014 abca 416, at para. 10 (canlii)). after all, a custody appeal “is ultimately about a child and will affect the welfare of a child” (bacic v. ivakic, 2017 skca 23, 409 dlr (4th) 571, at para. 24; see also p (j.) v. p (j.), 2016 skca 168, 89 rfl (7th) 92, at para. 24; o (a.) v. e (t.), 2016 skca 148, 88 rfl (7th) 34, at paras. 115-17; clb v. jab, 2016 skca 101, 484 sask. r 228, at paras. 21-22). [197] this flexibility is borne out by a review of the relevant case law. over the last decade, canadian appellate courts admitted additional evidence in family law cases in 48 out of 152 reported cases reviewed notably, however, the national rate of admission was considerably higher in cases involving child custody and the welfare of children. in 85 such cases, the court admitted the evidence almost half the time (41 out of 85). by contrast, the national rate of admission in cases not concerning children was closer to one tenth (7 out of 67). this supports my view that the rules for admitting further evidence ought to be relaxed — and in practice are relaxed — where the best interests of a child are at stake. [198] my colleague appears to accept the importance of flexibility in this context. she notes that there may be “exceptional cases” where a child’s best interests favour admitting further evidence. for instance, she observes that the need for “finality” and “order” may yield “in the interest of justice” in “urgent matters requiring an immediate decision” (para. 70). [199] but, respectfully, my colleague’s approach — narrowing palmer’s flexibility to “exceptional cases” — is unduly rigid and undermines the specificity needed in cases involving children’s welfare. indeed, it would often deny judges the full context they need in order to make a sound determination of the best interests of the child in a particular case. [200] contrary to my colleague’s reasoning, all of the criteria must be applied flexibly in cases involving the best interests of children. i will briefly explain why this is so with respect to the first and fourth of the palmer criteria — due diligence and whether the evidence could have affected the result at trial — as only these criteria are at issue in this appeal i will then move on to apply palmer — with the requisite flexibility — to the facts of this case. a palmer test (1) flexibility in assessing due diligence [201] finality and order are not judicial straitjackets. infants grow quickly into toddlers and then — in what may seem like the blink of an eye — into young adults. this development and maturation process demands that our courts have ample flexibility to decide each child custody case based on the most current information available i could not agree more with the intervener the office of the children’s lawyer that a flexible approach “recognizes the need to be aware of children’s updated circumstances to understand how appellate decisions will impact their current lives, not the lives they had when the original decision was made” (para. 6). [202] with respect, my colleague takes a rigid view of due diligence. she focuses inordinately and narrowly on the “litigant’s conduct”, stating that parties should not be permitted to “benefit from their own inaction” (paras. 60-61). she asserts that only in exceptional circumstances may courts admit evidence that does not meet the due diligence criterion. i respectfully disagree with this rigid approach for three reasons. [203] first, i believe the reason for flexibility in this context to be obvious. it is to ensure that reviewing courts have the full context, given the ongoing nature of a child’s welfare — the undammed stream this is precisely why appellate courts nationwide have held that due diligence is to be applied flexibly (shortridge-tsuchiya v tsuchiya, 2010 bcca 61, 315 dlr (4th) 498, at para. 87; jiang v shi, 2017 bcca 232, at para. 11 (canlii); pt v. alberta, 2019 abca 158, 88 alta. lr (6th) 235, at para. 61; g (jd) v. g (sl), 2017 mbca 117, [2018] 4 wwr 543, at para. 39). these cases stand for a clear, principled proposition: the mere fact that new evidence could potentially have been obtained for the trial should not, on its own, preclude an appellate court from reviewing information that bears directly upon the welfare of a child (see, eg,. babich v. babich, 2020 skca 25; bacic, at para. 24). moreover, even if some of the evidence could have been adduced at trial, this does not end the palmer analysis, as it is well established that a “failure to meet the due diligence criterion is not always fatal” (r v lévesque, 2000 scc 47, [2000] 2 scr 487, at para. 42). where there has been such a failure, it must be determined whether the strength of the other palmer criteria “is such that failure to satisfy the due diligence requirement is overborne” (ibid). this clearly further supports my view that due diligence in the child custody context must be applied with greater flexibility than my colleague’s approach permits. [204] second, finality is a double-edged sword my colleague is rightly concerned about the impact of protracted litigation on “women, [who] are often already shouldering the economic consequences of a marital breakdown” and who “will be unable to afford the financial and emotional cost of court proceedings” (para. 68). but she seems to overlook the fact that a strict application of due diligence would only add to the burden she describes. by requiring all family law litigants to “put their best foot forward at trial” (para. 60), my colleague would require a self-represented single mother of modest means to advance her claim while simultaneously assembling up-to-date financial documentation, the relevance of which may not be apparent until after the initial hearing otherwise, this single mother runs the risk that new and potentially decisive evidence about her present circumstances will be ruled inadmissible the result of my colleague’s approach to palmer is that such a single mother would face a significant legal hurdle in pursuing custody of her children simply because she is unable to get her finances in order in a timely fashion. i fail to see how this promotes my colleague’s conception of “the interests of justice”. [205] third, i acknowledge that an application to vary may in some circumstances be the appropriate procedure. but an application to vary, like a motion to adduce further evidence on appeal, is “adversarial”. it would also place “additional strain on the parties’ resources” and generate further delays (para. 68). this begs the question: how does the variation mechanism mitigate the “financial and emotional” cost which so concerns my colleague? i do not find an answer for this in her reasons. put simply, and with respect, my colleague’s conception of the due diligence criterion undercuts the interests of all family litigants, and “particularly women”, in child welfare cases (para. 68). (2) flexibility in assessing whether the new evidence could have affected the result [206] the fourth palmer criterion requires the court to ask whether the further evidence, if believed, could have affected the result. [207] as with due diligence, however, flexibility is once again nowhere to be found in my colleague’s analysis she does of course recite the definition of this criterion from palmer and note that it must be approached “purposively” but she leaves it to readers to discern for themselves what this might mean (para. 63). [208] such an approach fails to recognize that in catholic children’s aid, this court explicitly contemplated the need for flexibility in applying the fourth palmer criterion. l’heureux-dubé j., writing for a unanimous court, held as follows: counsel for the child supports the approach advanced by the respondent society and also relies on genereux. . . as the appropriate test in matters where the best interests of the child are the paramount concern. although i doubt that genereux. . . intended to depart significantly from the test of palmer . . . its approach is to be commended. . . . if genereux. . has enlarged the scope of the admission of fresh evidence on appeal, it has done so, in the present case at least, with regard to the final arm of the [palmer] test, that is, whether the fresh evidence may affect the result of the appeal when considered with the other evidence. if that is so, and the fact that the admission of up-to-date evidence is essential in cases such as the one at hand, genereux. . . should be applied in cases determining the welfare of children. [emphasis added; pp. 188-89.] [209] this excerpt affirms what is by now beyond dispute: the palmer criteria — particularly the fourth criterion — are more flexible in appeals concerning the best interests of children, “where it is important to have the most current information possible ‘[g]iven the inevitable fluidity in a child’s development’” (kk v. mm, 2022 onca 72, at para. 17 (canlii) (text in brackets in original)). [210] in light of the foregoing, i will now apply palmer to the situation in the case at bar. b application of palmer [211] as i mentioned above, only the first and fourth of the palmer criteria are in issue in this appeal. with respect to the first criterion, the mother argues that the new evidence could, with proper diligence, have been adduced at trial. in any event, relying on the fourth criterion, she contends that the new evidence could not have affected the outcome of the case. [212] as i will explain, i disagree with the mother on both counts. (1) due diligence [213] first, due diligence is not a barrier to admitting the new evidence. by its nature, the evidence could not have been adduced at trial. i acknowledge that the father could have acted more expeditiously in taking steps to address his financial situation and the condition of the family home, and in bringing these matters to the court’s attention. however, an inescapable fact remains: the evidence the father produced on appeal was not in existence at the time of the trial. the first palmer factor therefore does not preclude its admission. [214] further, even if the evidence in question could have been obtained for the trial, this would not end the analysis. as i have indicated, giving effect to the need for flexibility in the child custody context demands that we apply the well-established principle that due diligence is not a condition precedent to admission yet this is precisely how my colleague treats due diligence, contrary to this court’s holding in lévesque. [215] unlike my colleague, i do not accept that the existence of the variation procedure weighs against admission. she asserts that “[a] variation application and an appeal are distinct proceedings based on fundamentally different premises” (para. 75), and i agree with her but in this case the father’s appeal would have gone ahead regardless of whether he brought a separate application to vary in the trial court. hence, the mere existence of the possibility of a variation order does not foreclose a litigant’s right to appeal and therefore the right to present a motion to adduce additional evidence, particularly where the evidence in question is linked to the alleged error. (2) whether the new evidence could have affected the result [216] applying the fourth palmer criterion, i conclude that the new evidence could have affected the result. [217] it is noteworthy that my colleague does not even reach this branch of the palmer test. she bases her conclusion on the father’s alleged lack of due diligence and on an absence of “circumstances” which might “render the admission of this evidence necessary in the interests of justice” (para. 91). all i would say in this regard is that i do not understand “necessity in the interests of justice” to be a palmer criterion. [218] more to the point, however, the fourth palmer criterion favours admission of the new evidence. i say this for three reasons. [219] first, the new evidence bears on a critical aspect of the trial judge’s reasoning. the trial judge found that the “parties’ financial situation, particularly as it pertains to the house”, was an issue that “significantly impact[ed]” his analysis of the children’s best interests (paras. 30-31). it matters not in my view that this issue was comparatively less significant than the relationship between the parties. the trial judge devoted 10 paragraphs of his best interests analysis to the financial issues related to the west kelowna home. it is thus plain that the new evidence, which suggests that the father’s financial position and the condition of the home are much improved, could have affected the trial judge’s ultimate conclusion on the question whether permitting the children to relocate with their mother was in their best interests. [220] second, the new evidence addresses concerns the trial judge had regarding the home environment the father would provide for the children. if believed, the new evidence suggests that the house is now much closer to a “living environment” than to a “working environment”, as it was described at the time of trial (para. 33). the new evidence indicates that the father has renovated the bathroom and the master bedroom, and has definite plans to complete the kitchen renovation. [221] finally, the new evidence undermines the trial judge’s conclusion that, given the father’s dire financial straits, his ability to remain in the west kelowna home was “less than certain” (para. 40) the trial judge found that the father’s “plan to continue living in the house with the boys [was], for all practical purposes, entirely dependent on the willingness and ability of his parents to pay off the mortgage and the debt on the line of credit secured by the home, and finance the remainder of the renovations” (para. 39). as of the date of the trial, this was uncertain. his father had spoken with bankers about buying an interest in the home, but nothing concrete about this plan had been filed in evidence if believed, the new evidence shows that the father’s plan has come to fruition. [222] the best interests analysis is of course highly contextual and fact-dependent it is thus impossible to gauge exactly how this new evidence might have affected the trial judge’s carefully calibrated analysis. however, i agree with the father that the new evidence plainly bears on “one significant pillar” of the trial judge’s two-pronged rationale (rf, at para. 67). in my view, this evidence could have altered the trial judge’s view that the children’s best interests would be better served by their living with their mother in telkwa rather than in a shared parenting arrangement with both parents in the kelowna area. (3) conclusion on palmer [223] accordingly, on a properly flexible application of palmer, i would admit the new evidence. i see no reason why the interest in “finality and order”, to which my colleague refers numerous times, should have tied the court of appeal’s hands in admitting new evidence that was plainly relevant to the issues it had to decide in any event. i will now turn to the separate question of the proper use of that evidence. c proper use of the new evidence [224] i agree with the office of the children’s lawyer that the real concern with the new evidence in this appeal is not about appellate courts having up-to-date information on current circumstances which may affect a child’s best interests. rather, it is about the use of new evidence by appellate courts without proper deference to lower courts, which is contrary to the principles developed by this court in van de perre v. edwards, 2001 scc 60, [2001] 2 scr 1014. this issue should be dealt with separately from the admissibility analysis so as not to discourage the admission of new evidence about children’s current circumstances that may be invaluable to appellate courts. [225] the parties agree that an appellate court admitting further evidence in child custody matters may use that evidence in one of two ways: (1) to justify remanding the matter to the trial court for reconsideration in light of a potentially material change in circumstances or (2) to make its own determination of the best interests of the child. [226] the mother concedes that if the new evidence is admitted, “the matter should [be] remitted to the trial judge because. . . he ha[s] ‘extensive knowledge of this family and [these] child[ren]’” (af, at para. 71). [227] i agree with the mother’s concession in my view, while the court of appeal was correct to admit this evidence, it should not have used the new evidence regarding the father’s financial situation as a pretext to reweigh the trial judge’s findings regarding the relationship between the parties those findings were not affected by the new evidence and were entitled to appellate deference. [228] as this court held in hickey v hickey, [1999] 2 scr 518, appellate courts are not entitled to overturn trial court decisions in family law matters “simply because [they] would have made a different decision or balanced the factors differently” (para. 12). [229] the court of appeal accordingly erred in making its own determination based on the new evidence. moreover, i agree with the father that finality, although important, should not tie the hands of a reviewing court so as to prevent it from crafting a remedy that would advance the best interests of the child in this case, the new evidence bears directly — and perhaps decisively — on a matter of significance to the children’s welfare any additional delay and expense resulting from the reconsideration of this matter is justified by the need to assess whether it is in the children’s best interests to live closer to their father in his current circumstances i would add that an application to vary in these circumstances would be pointless, since it would likewise, as was discussed above, involve further delay and expense to both parties. iii disposition [230] for the foregoing reasons, i would admit the new evidence and allow the appeal in part, with costs to the father in this court and in the court below. [231] in the result, i would remand the appeal to the trial court for reconsideration of the children’s best interests in light of the new evidence. appeal allowed with costs throughout, côté j dissenting in part. the children’s lawyer, toronto. fund association and the rise women’s legal centre: hunter litigation chambers, vancouver; west coast legal education and action fund association, vancouver; rise women’s legal centre, vancouver.
i. overview in these appeals, the appellants ask this court to abolish the starting-point method of sentencing. like sentencing ranges, starting points are a form of appellate guidance that provide a place to begin the exercise of reaching a fit and proportionate sentence. the appellants, patrick douglas felix and cameron o’lynn parranto, pleaded guilty to various offences arising out of unrelated drug trafficking operations, including fentanyl trafficking contrary to s 5(1) and s 5(2) of the controlled drugs and substances act, s.c 1996, c 19 (“cdsa”) both appellants were found to be operating at the “wholesale” commercial level at sentencing, mr. felix received a global 7-year sentence (2019 abqb 183), and mr. parranto received a global sentence of 11 years (2018 abqb 863) the crown appealed the sentences to the court of appeal of alberta, where a five-member panel heard the appeals jointly for the express purpose of setting a “starting point” for wholesale fentanyl trafficking in separate decisions released concurrently, the court of appeal set a 9-year starting point for wholesale fentanyl trafficking and increased mr. felix’s sentence to 10 years (2019 abca 458, 98 alta. lr (6th) 136), and mr. parranto’s to 14 years (2019 abca 457, 98 alta. lr (6th) 114). the appellants and several interveners sought to discredit the starting-point approach by arguing that it has undesirable results, including higher rates of incarceration for indigenous and other offenders these criticisms lose their force, however, if starting points are properly treated as non-binding guidance by both sentencing and appellate courts. further, such criticisms speak to the risks inherent in using any form of quantitative sentencing guidance, including sentencing ranges. but these risks can be avoided if appellate courts adhere to the deferential standard of review in sentencing appeals, and if this court provides clear direction on how appellate courts should account for starting points when reviewing sentences for errors in principle and demonstrable unfitness. what follows, therefore, is not an endorsement of starting points as they have sometimes been enforced at the court of appeal of alberta, but rather a revised understanding, bringing them into conformance with the standard of appellate review and principles and objectives of sentencing. accordingly, there is no need to disavow the starting-point approach to sentencing. sentencing ranges and starting points are simply different tools that assist sentencing judges in reaching a proportionate sentence. it is not for this court to dictate which of these tools can or cannot be used by appellate courts across the country. provincial appellate courts should be afforded the respect and latitude to provide their own forms of guidance to sentencing judges, as long as that guidance comports with the principles and objectives of sentencing under the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, and with the proper appellate standard of review. nor would we interfere with the sentences imposed upon mr. felix and mr. parranto at the court of appeal. in our respectful view, the sentences imposed on these offenders by the respective sentencing judges were demonstrably unfit. the court of appeal’s intervention was therefore appropriate. therefore, and for the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeals, affirm the orders of the court of appeal, and confirm that starting points, when properly understood and applied, represent a valid form of sentencing guidance. ii. parties’ submissions the appellants submit that the court of appeal erred in intervening to impose its own views over those of the sentencing judge in each case. the foundation of this error, they say, is the starting-point approach to sentencing. the appellants raise several criticisms of the starting-point approach and argue that sentencing ranges are a preferable means of providing quantitative guidance to sentencing judges. they submit that, in light of these concerns, this court must abolish starting-point sentences. the crown, on the other hand, submits that there is no reason to abolish starting-point sentences starting points are merely guidelines and functionally no different from sentencing ranges. the crown argues that the court of appeal correctly intervened as the sentences imposed at first instance were demonstrably unfit and, in the case of mr. parranto, the trial judge’s sentencing decision contained errors in principle that affected the sentence. iii analysis a. standard of review (1) basic sentencing principles this court has repeatedly expressed that sentencing is “one of the most delicate stages of the criminal justice process in canada” (r v. lacasse, 2015 scc 64, [2015] 3 scr 1089, at para. 1). more of an art than a science, sentencing requires judges to consider and balance a multiplicity of factors. while the sentencing process is governed by the clearly defined objectives and principles in part xxiii of the criminal code, it remains a discretionary exercise for sentencing courts in balancing all relevant factors to meet the basic objectives of sentencing (lacasse, at para. 1). the goal in every case is a fair, fit and principled sanction. proportionality is the organizing principle in reaching this goal. unlike other principles of sentencing set out in the criminal code, proportionality stands alone following the heading “fundamental principle” (s 718.1) accordingly, “[a]ll sentencing starts with the principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender” (r v. friesen, 2020 scc 9, at para. 30). the principles of parity and individualization, while important, are secondary principles. despite what would appear to be an inherent tension among these sentencing principles, this court explained in friesen that parity and proportionality are not at odds with each other. to impose the same sentence on unlike cases furthers neither principle, while consistent application of proportionality will result in parity (para. 32). this is because parity, as an expression of proportionality, will assist courts in fixing on a proportionate sentence (para. 32). courts cannot arrive at a proportionate sentence based solely on first principles, but rather must “calibrate the demands of proportionality by reference to the sentences imposed in other cases” (para. 33). as to the relationship of individualization to proportionality and parity, this court in lacasse aptly observed: proportionality is determined both on an individual basis, that is, in relation to the accused him or herself and to the offence committed by the accused, and by comparison with sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. [para. 53] individualization is central to the proportionality assessment. whereas the gravity of a particular offence may be relatively constant, each offence is “committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile” (para. 58) this is why proportionality sometimes demands a sentence that has never been imposed in the past for a similar offence. the question is always whether the sentence reflects the gravity of the offence, the offender’s degree of responsibility and the unique circumstances of each case (para. 58). (2) role of sentencing courts and appellate courts appellate and sentencing courts each have distinct roles in sentencing, based on the code and their respective institutional capacities in s 718.3(1), parliament has “explicitly vested sentencing judges with a discretion to determine the appropriate degree and kind of punishment under the criminal code” (r v. m (ca), [1996] 1 scr 500, at para. 90 (emphasis deleted)) sentencing courts are best-positioned to craft a fit sentence for the offenders before them. sentencing is a “profoundly subjective process”, and the sentencing judge “has the advantage of having seen and heard all of the witnesses whereas the appellate court can only base itself upon a written record” (r v. shropshire, [1995] 4 scr 227, at para. 46). the sentencing judge also has “unique qualifications of experience and judgment from having served on the front lines” and “will normally preside near or within the community which has suffered the consequences of the offender’s crime” (m (ca), at para. 91). in sentencing appeals, provincial appellate courts play two roles “in ensuring the consistency, stability and permanence of the case law” (lacasse, at para. 36). first, the court of appeal must “consider the fitness of the sentence appealed against” and is empowered to vary the sentence (code, s 687). in fulfilling this role, appellate courts safeguard against errors of law made by sentencing courts while reviewing the reasonableness of the judge’s exercise of discretion. they also ensure that sentencing courts state the law correctly and apply it consistently (lacasse, at para. 36). secondly, provincial appellate courts must promote stability in the development of the law while providing guidance to lower courts to ensure the law is applied consistently in a particular jurisdiction (lacasse, at para. 37). in carrying out this role, appellate courts may provide guidance to assist sentencing judges in reaching a proportionate sentence that properly balances parity and individualization (para. 2). appellate courts are well-positioned to provide such guidance because of their appreciation of “overall sentencing practices, patterns and problems” in their jurisdiction (r v arcand, 2010 abca 363, 40 alta l.r (5th) 199, at para. 153). appellate guidance may take the form of quantitative tools (such as sentencing ranges and starting points), non-quantitative guidance explaining the harms entailed by certain offences, or a mix of both (see, eg,. friesen, at paras. 42-105 and 114-16; r v. williams, 2019 bcca 295, at paras. 64-66 and 71 (canlii); r v. sandercock (1985), 40 alta. lr (2d) 265 (ca), at pp. 270-71). (3) forms of quantitative appellate guidance quantitative appellate guidance generally takes one of two forms: starting points, or sentencing ranges. these tools are best understood as “navigational buoys” that operate to ensure sentences reflect the sentencing principles prescribed in the criminal code busy sentencing judges face a challenging task; the code often provides for a wide range of possible sentences and the factual circumstances of each case vary infinitely sentencing must begin somewhere, and both starting-point and range methodologies assist sentencing judges by providing a place to start in the form of either a single number or a range. as this court has recognized, however, “there is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a particular crime” (m (ca), at para. 92). neither tool relieves the sentencing judge from conducting an individualized analysis taking into account all relevant factors and sentencing principles. sentencing ranges generally represent a summary of the case law that reflects the minimum and maximum sentences imposed by trial judges in the past (lacasse, at para. 57; friesen, at para. 36). they “provide structure and guidance and can prevent disparity”, while leaving judges space to “weigh mitigating and aggravating factors and arrive at proportional sentences” (r v. smith, 2019 skca 100, 382 ccc (3d) 455, at para. 126). the range, therefore, “reflects individual cases, but does not govern them” (c. c. ruby, sentencing (10th ed. 2020), at § 23.7, citing r v. brennan and jensen (1975), 11 nsr (2d) 84 (ca)). contrary to the comments of the court of appeal in arcand, at para. 148, this court has subsequently and expressly held that starting points are an “alternative” to ranges, with “[s]imilar principles” applying to both (friesen, at para. 36) the starting-point methodology has three stages: (1) defining the category of an offence to which the starting point applies; (2) setting a starting point; and (3) individualization of the sentence by the sentencing court (sandercock, at p 269). both ranges and starting points are attached to “a category of offences that share enough common features that it is useful to judge them by the same rubric” (friesen, at para. 39). at the second stage, the court of appeal must choose a “reasonable” number which “may be viewed as the mid-point in the traditional range of sentences for a particular sort of crime” (r v. mcdonnell, [1997] 1 scr 948, at para. 60, per mclachlin j.; contra, arcand, at paras. 150-56). at the final stage, the sentencing judge considers whether aggravating or mitigating factors justify moving the sentence up or down from the starting point (mcdonnell, at paras. 79-80). the quantitative guidance set by appellate courts can be distinguished from informal or “discerned” ranges relied on by sentencing courts. since starting points and appellate sentencing ranges — which may be described as “formal” or “established” ranges — do not exist for every offence, sentencing judges must often attempt to discern the appropriate range from the case law with the assistance of counsel. as with appellate guidance, discerned ranges are a tool for reaching a fit and proportionate sentence after hearing the parties’ submissions on analogous case law and on the appropriate disposition in the circumstances, the exercise of discerning a range requires the sentencing judge to consider comparator cases that best represent the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. starting points and sentencing ranges set by appellate courts, on the other hand, often reflect judicial consensus on the gravity of the offence, helping to advance parity and “prevent any substantial and marked disparities” in sentencing (lacasse, at para. 2; see also r v. stone, [1999] 2 scr 290, at para. 244; r v. nasogaluak, 2010 scc 6, [2010] 1 scr 206, at para. 44; smith (2019), at para. 126) the primary rationale for the use of starting points is to “reduce idiosyncratic decision-making” (arcand, at para. 102; r v. hajar, 2016 abca 222, 39 alta. lr (6th) 209, at para. 72; r v. mccowan, 2010 mbca 45, 251 man. r (2d) 295, at para. 11; r v. lemaigre, 2018 skca 47, at para. 20 (canlii)). in sandercock, for instance, a three-year starting point was established to address the “wide, and unjustified, divergence amongst judges about appropriate sentences for rape and equally serious forms of sexual assault” (arcand, at para. 102). the starting point stated in sandercock was intended to ensure that the harms caused by a particular category of offence — “major sexual assaults” — are consistently accounted for in sentencing. quantitative appellate guidance — whether in the form of a range or a starting point — may draw on sentences imposed in past cases, or it may be intended to change the existing approach to sentencing for a particular offence as we have explained, sentencing ranges generally represent a “historical portrait” of past decisions this portrait reflects “all the principles and objective of sentencing” (lacasse, at para. 57) as well as the “collective wisdom of the appellate courts” (m. a. crystal, “are the days of range sentencing and starting points numbered? the cases of r v. felix and r v. parranto” (2021), 15 jppl 125, at p 139). in some cases, however, an appellate court must also set a new direction, bringing the law into harmony with a new societal understanding of the gravity of certain offences or the degree of responsibility of certain offenders (r v. stone, [1999] 2 scr 290, at para. 239). . . . as a general rule, appellate courts should take the lead in such circumstances and give sentencing judges the tools to depart from past precedents and craft fit sentences [emphasis added.] (friesen, at para. 35) this reflects the reality that “[i]t is a common phenomenon . . . for sentences to increase and decrease as societal and judicial knowledge and attitudes about certain offences change” (r v. smith, 2017 bcca 112, at para. 36 (canlii) (emphasis deleted), citing r v. nur, 2011 onsc 4874, 275 ccc (3d) 330, at para. 49). the same applies to starting points while some jurisprudence from the court of appeal of alberta suggests that starting points are established through an independent policy-laden inquiry rather than by looking to precedent (eg,. arcand, at para. 104), an appellate court may derive a starting point in whole or in part from past sentencing decisions. it may also choose to depart from past trends to recalibrate how the gravity of the offence is weighed in the proportionality analysis. like established ranges, then, starting points may reflect “collective court experience” by drawing on an overview of the case law for a range of sentences imposed, but they may also represent a departure based on a “consensus view of [all] the social values and policy considerations relating to the category of crime in question” (arcand, at para. 104). while each jurisdiction tends to prefer one of these two methodologies, describing a jurisdiction as either a “range jurisdiction” or “starting-point jurisdiction” represents an incomplete view of appellate guidance contrary to the references contained in submissions from many parties on these appeals, the division between “range jurisdictions” and “starting-point jurisdictions” cannot be described in absolute or dichotomous terms. even in so-called “starting-point jurisdictions”, appellate courts have established starting points only for a limited number of offences, with other forms of guidance — including established and discerned sentencing ranges — used to reach a proportionate sentence for other offences. this flexibility in sentencing modalities also applies in “range jurisdictions” in practice, courts that have either rejected or failed “to fully endorse the starting point” approach have, in effect, adopted something similar to the starting-point methodology by either setting sentencing ranges without a top end (smith (2017)), or by incorporating mitigating factors such as prior good character into the sentencing range, an approach usually associated with starting points (r v. h (cn) (2002), 62 or (3d) 564 (ca), at para. 52; r v. voong, 2015 bcca 285, 374 bcac 166; r v. cunningham (1996), 27 or (3d) 786 (ca), at p 790; see also p. moreau, “in defence of starting point sentencing” (2016), 63 crim. lq. 345, at pp. 356 and 365-66). this flexibility in sentencing modalities is reflective of the primary goal of sentencing: to impose a fit sentence in our view, irrespective of the preferred sentencing methodology, the purpose of the modality is to assist the sentencing judge in achieving the objectives and principles of sentencing, primarily proportionality. ranges and starting points are simply different paths to the same destination: a proportionate sentence courts of appeal have discretion to choose which form of guidance they find most useful and responsive to the perceived needs of their jurisdiction, which may vary across the country. as long as that guidance conforms to the principles and objectives of sentencing in the code, this court should respect the choices made by appellate courts. both sentencing ranges and starting points, where properly applied and subject to the correct standard of review on appeal, are consistent with the code. it is not this court’s role to decide which form of guidance is superior, nor would it be desirable to confine appellate courts to giving one or another form of quantitative guidance. a final point that merits discussion is how a range or starting point is modified once it has been established. the court of appeal for ontario has described how ranges vary: “ranges” are not embedded in stone. given their nature as guidelines only, i do not view them as being fixed in law, as is the case with binding legal principles they may be altered deliberately, after careful consideration, by the courts or, they may be altered practically, as a consequence of a series of decisions made by the courts which have that effect. if a range moves by virtue of the application of individual cases over time, it is not necessary to overrule an earlier range that may once have been in vogue; it is only necessary to recognize that the courts have adapted and the guidelines have changed. (r v. wright (2006), 83 or (3d) 427 (ca), at para. 22) in contrast, in alberta, the court of appeal has required parties to formally apply for reconsideration of a starting point under r 16.27 of the alberta rules of court, a.r 124/2010 our colleague rowe j views this procedure as a judicial mandate and an expression of the court of appeal’s “aggressive enforcement” of starting points (para. 164) the reconsideration procedure, however, is a legislative requirement of general application (alberta rules of court, r 1627). the process is a judicial one whereby the court of appeal weighs several criteria in deciding whether to “reconsider” the starting point, such as whether the starting point is new or old, has been disapproved of or is contrary to decisions of other courts of appeal, was created by overlooking binding statute or authority, contains some “simple, obvious, demonstrable flaw”, or was established in reasons for judgment reserved or a memorandum of judgment (arcand, at para. 199) with the exception of the final criterion, all of these considerations are relevant in determining whether the starting point for a particular offence should be recalibrated. while our colleague finds it difficult to reconcile the reconsideration procedure with the standard of review, the answer, in light of this court’s direction on the standard of review and the non-binding nature of starting points, is clear. parties seeking to challenge a starting point need not have resort to the procedure, because starting points are not binding precedents if the procedure is used, the effect of a successful reconsideration application is merely to re-establish the point from which trial judges begin their thinking. such applications provide the court of appeal with the opportunity to consider the sentencing landscape to determine if the starting point still provides relevant appellate guidance and accurately reflects the gravity of the offence. to the extent the reconsideration procedure is perceived to be necessary to change starting points because they are binding precedents (arcand, at para. 199; r v. melnyk, 2014 abca 313, 580 a.r 389, at para. 2), this perception cannot survive lacasse and friesen, as it is mistaken in law. (4) basis for appellate intervention it is trite law that appellate courts cannot interfere with sentencing decisions lightly (see r v. suter, 2018 scc 34, [2018] 2 scr 496, at para. 23, citing shropshire, at para. 48; r v. lfw, 2000 scc 6, [2000] 1 scr 132, at para. 25; r v. lm, 2008 scc 31, [2008] 2 scr 163, at para. 14; nasogaluak, at para. 46; lacasse, at para. 39; and friesen, at para. 25). sentencing judges are to be afforded wide latitude, and their decisions are entitled to a high level of deference on appeal (lacasse, at para. 11). it remains the case that, where a judge deviates from a sentencing range or starting point, no matter the degree of deviation, this does not in itself justify appellate intervention. it bears emphasizing that the sentencing judge’s discretion includes the choice of a sentencing range or of a category within a range, and that this exercise of discretion cannot in itself constitute a reviewable error (lacasse, at para. 51). it is an error of law for an appellate court to intervene merely on the ground that it would have placed the offence in a different range or category. unless a sentence is demonstrably unfit or the sentencing judge made an error in principle that impacts the sentence, an appellate court must not vary the sentence on appeal (paras. 11 and 67). the focus of the demonstrable unfitness inquiry is on whether the sentence is proportionate, not whether the sentencing judge applied the correct starting point, sentencing range or category within a range (lacasse, at paras. 51 and 53; friesen, at para. 162). following the recent judgments of this court in lacasse and friesen, we are of the view that these appeals do not require the court to chart a new path, but rather requires us to reiterate and reinforce the standard for appellate intervention in particular, the court must clarify the role that sentencing ranges or starting points play in appellate review of sentences. the relationship between quantitative appellate guidance and the standard of review on appeal had led to exchanges between the various levels of court but lacasse and friesen have brought finality to the matter, and they leave no room for doubt, interpretation or equivocation. in friesen, this court made it clear that “[r]anges of sentence and starting points cannot be binding in either theory or practice, and appellate courts cannot interpret or apply the standard of review to enforce them, contrary to [arcand], at paras. 116-18 and 273” (para. 37 (emphasis added)) the attorney general of alberta intervened on these appeals and argued that this passage is open to interpretation, as the paragraphs it cites from arcand closely mirror this court’s guidance in lacasse. in lacasse, at para. 67, this court stated that “a deviation from such a range or category is not an error in principle and cannot in itself automatically justify appellate intervention unless the sentence that is imposed departs significantly and for no reason from the contemplated sentences” (emphasis added). while we agree that the court of appeal’s comments in arcand do closely mirror this court’s direction in lacasse, there is an important distinction between arcand and this court’s sentencing jurisprudence. the clear direction from this court is that “[a]ppellate courts cannot treat the departure from or the failure to refer to a range of sentence . . . as an error in principle” (friesen, at para. 37 (emphasis added)). the court of appeal in arcand, however, suggested the contrary, stating “that sentencing judges will give due consideration to those starting points and the process that starting point sentencing entails” (at para. 273 (emphasis added)). to resolve any possible ambiguity that could have survived friesen, we say this: the directions relating to the binding nature of starting points or the starting-point approach as set out in arcand have been overtaken by lacasse and friesen and no longer reflect the required standard of appellate review. while the goal of the starting-point methodology has been framed as “uniformity of approach” (arcand, at para. 92; r v. johnas (1982), 41 ar 183 (ca), para. 31), the standard of review limits its function in this regard. certainly, it is open to appellate courts to provide guidance to assist sentencing judges in minimizing idiosyncrasies and to promote consistency in approaches to sentencing as r v. ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1 scr 433, and friesen make clear, however, there is no one uniform approach to sentencing in canada. attempts to create a single uniform approach are therefore misguided. different cases may require different methods, and selecting the method of sentencing is within the discretion of the sentencing judge. moreover, it is not the role of appellate courts to enforce a uniform approach to sentencing through the application of the standard of review. rather, the proper focus of appellate review is whether the sentence was fit and whether the judge properly applied the principles of sentencing to be clear, those principles do not include an obligation to follow a particular uniform approach to sentencing while promoting consistency in method of sentencing may have a role to play in setting appellate guidance, at the stage of appellate review, focusing on uniformity of approach is apt to mislead the reviewing court appellate courts must guard against undue scrutiny of the sentencing judge’s discretionary choice of method, as this may stray from the standard of review. the key principles are as follows: 1 starting points and ranges are not and cannot be binding in theory or in practice (friesen, at para. 36); 2 ranges and starting points are “guidelines, not hard and fast rules”, and a “departure from or failure to refer to a range of sentence or starting point” cannot be treated as an error in principle (friesen, at para. 37); 3 sentencing judges have discretion to “individualize sentencing both in method and outcome”, and “[d]ifferent methods may even be required to account properly for relevant systemic and background factors” (friesen, at para. 38, citing ipeelee, at para. 59); and, 4 appellate courts cannot “intervene simply because the sentence is different from the sentence that would have been reached had the range of sentence or starting point been applied” (friesen, at para. 37). the focus should be on whether the sentence was fit and whether the judge properly applied the principles of sentencing, not whether the judge chose the right starting point or category (friesen, at para. 162). these principles settle the matter. contrary to the crown’s submission, it is not an open question whether sentencing judges are free to reject the starting-point approach. sentencing judges retain discretion to individualize their approach to sentencing “[f]or this offence, committed by this offender, harming this victim, in this community” (r v gladue, [1999] 1 scr 688, at para. 80 (emphasis in original)). there is no longer space to interpret starting points (or ranges) as binding in any sense. having made clear that starting points and ranges are tools and not straitjackets, we turn to the role that a sentencing range or starting point plays in appellate sentence review. as we have already stated, sentencing is an individualized process, and parity is secondary to proportionality. therefore, departures from the starting point or sentences above or below the range are to be expected. even significant departures are not to be treated as a prima facie indication of an error or demonstrable unfitness. fitness is assessed with reference to the principles and objectives of sentencing in the code, not with reference to how far the sentence departs from quantitative appellate guidance. ultimately, the sentencing judge’s reasons and the record must allow the appellate court to discern whether the sentence is fit in light of the principles and objectives in the code. section 726.2 requires the sentencing court to provide reasons for the sentence imposed. this is not a new standard in criminal law. in sentencing, as with any decision, the reasons must, when read in conjunction with the record, show why the judge reached a particular result. most particularly, and irrespective of the modality used, the trial judge’s reasons and the record must demonstrate why the sentence is proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the gravity of the offence this may involve adopting appellate guidance such as this court’s comments in friesen on the harms of the offence quantitative appellate guidance may also be part of the jurisprudential background informing the gravity of the offence. as noted, it is not an error in principle for the sentencing judge to fail to refer to a starting point. since starting points and ranges reflect the gravity of the offence, however, the sentencing judge’s reasons and the record must allow the reviewing court to understand why the sentence is proportionate despite a significant departure from the range or starting point this applies regardless of whether the reasons refer to the starting point or not. at the very least, the appellate court must be able to discern from the reasons and the record why the sentence is fit in the circumstances of the offence and the offender. we emphasize, however, that it is inappropriate for appellate courts to “artificially constrain sentencing judges’ ability to impose a proportionate sentence” by requiring “exceptional circumstances” when departing from a range (friesen, at paras. 111-12; r v. burnett, 2017 mbca 122, 358 ccc (3d) 123, at para. 26). departing from a range or starting point is appropriate where required to achieve proportionality. in arcand, the court of appeal asked whether “starting point sentencing has a meaningful function in canada” (para. 116). the answer is that it does, but that function is not to bind trial judges or to licence boundless appellate intervention. quantitative sentencing tools need not be binding to provide useful guidance to busy sentencing courts starting-point sentences, like ranges, assist sentencing judges in their day-to-day work by providing a frame of reference and a shorthand for judicial views on the gravity of the offence this guidance is especially important where parliament has left open the possibility of a wide range of sentences (r v. proulx, 2000 scc 5, [2000] 1 scr 61, at para. 86). b. starting points the court heard many criticisms of the starting-point approach to sentencing in the course of these appeals. so long, however, as appellate courts apply the appropriate standard of review to sentencing decisions, many of these criticisms fall away. further, any risks associated with starting-point sentencing are inherent in other forms of quantitative appellate guidance, including sentencing ranges. such risks therefore do not serve to compel the abolition of starting-point sentencing; they do, however, demonstrate the importance of individualizing sentences and applying the proper appellate standard of review, irrespective of the form of quantitative guidance used. moreover, a caricatured version of the starting-point approach as it is pronounced in arcand should not be relied on to reject starting points altogether. focussing on arcand fails to account for both subsequent developments in the law in alberta (see, eg,. r v. stewart, 2021 abca 79, 21 alta. lr (7th) 213; r v. gandour, 2018 abca 238, 73 alta l.r (6th) 26, at para. 55) and jurisprudence in other jurisdictions that use starting points. in manitoba, for instance, the court of appeal has been clear that starting points are simply tools or guidelines, “not rigid tariffs that fetter the discretion of a sentencing judge to impose an individualized sentence” (burnett, at para. 10; see also r v. sidwell, 2015 mbca 56, 319 man. r (2d) 144, at para. 50). other jurisprudence thus shows that the starting-point approach can be compatible with the principles of sentencing and the standard of review on appeal. the starting-point methodology ought not to be rejected wholesale by focusing on pre-friesen cases decided at a time in which the court of appeal of alberta still spoke of starting points as binding as we have made clear, and as the court of appeal of alberta has acknowledged in stewart and gandour, starting points are not binding and the jurisprudence of this court prevails over any case law that suggests otherwise. while not binding, however, sentencing ranges and starting points are useful tools because they convey to sentencing judges an appreciation of the gravity of the offence. and, as we have already observed, they offer judges a place to begin their thinking. when applying these tools, sentencing judges must individualize the sentence in a way that accounts for both aspects of proportionality: the gravity of the offence and the offender’s individual circumstances and moral culpability at the stage of individualizing the sentence, the sentencing judge must therefore consider “all of the relevant factors and circumstances, including the status and life experiences, of the person standing before them” (ipeelee, at para. 75). those factors and circumstances may well justify a significant downward or upward adjustment in the sentence imposed. starting points also do not relieve the sentencing judge from considering all relevant sentencing principles. the principles of denunciation and deterrence are generally built into starting points and reflected in ranges, but those objectives “cannot be allowed to obliterate and render nugatory or impotent other relevant sentencing objectives” (r v. okimaw, 2016 abca 246, 340 ccc (3d) 225, at para. 90). when conducting an individualized analysis, sentencing judges are expected to account for other relevant sentencing objectives, including rehabilitation and restraint. indeed, this court has held that the 1996 sentencing reforms were intended to both ensure courts consider restorative justice principles and to address the problem of over-incarceration in canada (gladue, at para. 57; proulx, at paras. 16-20) sentencing judges have discretion over which objectives to prioritize (nasogaluak, at para. 43; lacasse, at para. 54) and may choose to weigh rehabilitation and other objectives more heavily than “built-in” objectives like denunciation and deterrence. appellate courts should not lose sight of these principles — nor the deferential standard of review — when reviewing sentences that depart from a starting point or range. one objection to starting points advanced in these appeals is that they can easily harden into de facto minimums because they build in the mitigating factor of prior good character, thus preventing sentencing judges from relying on that factor to justify a downward departure (a. manson, the law of sentencing (2001), at p 72; r. v. kain, 2004 abca 127, 35 alta. lr (4th) 5, at para. 32, per berger ja). but the same is sometimes true of ranges (cunningham; voong) importantly, neither tool incorporates other potential mitigating circumstances or gladue factors, nor should it. appellate sentencing guidance ought not to purport to pre-weigh or “build-in” any mitigating factors (contra, arcand, at para. 135) likewise, since starting points are intended to reflect the gravity of the offence and the resulting need for deterrence and denunciation, they should not be viewed as incorporating sentencing principles such as restraint or rehabilitation, contrary to the suggestion in arcand, at para. 293. where sentencing judges choose to refer to the starting point or range, they are not precluded from considering any factor that is “built in” as mitigating in the individual circumstances, and they retain the discretion to consider and weigh all relevant factors in their global assessment of a fit sanction. this comports with the principle that the sentencing judge must always consider all relevant individual circumstances in reaching a fit sentence tailored to the offender before the court. moreover, when setting starting points and ranges, appellate courts must be mindful of what is built into those forms of guidance any inclusion of characteristics of an archetypal offender could impede individualization of sentences, rendering the guidance inconsistent with the standard of review (m (ca), at para. 90; nasogaluak, at para. 43) and with parliament’s express choice to vest sentencing judges with the discretion to determine a fit sanction (code, s 7183(1)). while this court’s role is not to dictate how provincial appellate courts should establish sentencing ranges and starting points, we emphasize that those tools are applicable only inasmuch as they solely speak to the gravity of the offence by restricting starting points and ranges to strictly offence-based considerations, they will continue to be useful to sentencing judges without fettering their discretion or impeding individualization in a way that could produce clustering of sentences. while we heard arguments regarding the clustering effect starting points may have on sentences, we were provided with no empirical data demonstrating this effect. further, the literature relied on by the parties in support of this psychological “anchoring effect” relates to sentencing guidelines in other jurisdictions that involve ranges (m. w. bennett, “confronting cognitive ‘anchoring effect’ and ‘blind spot’ biases in federal sentencing: a modest solution for reforming a fundamental flaw” (2014), 104 j. crim. l & criminology 489; i. d. marder and j. pina-sánchez, “nudge the judge? theorizing the interaction between heuristics, sentencing guidelines and sentence clustering” (2020), 20 ccj 399) this suggests that concerns about clustering apply equally when other forms of quantitative appellate guidance are used, not solely in the context of starting points. in any event, any risk of clustering — beyond what is appropriate in seeking a proportionate sentence that reflects the principle of parity — is properly addressed by ensuring sentencing judges consider all factors relevant to each individual offender, and by clarifying the proper standard of review on appeal. further, knowledge of this risk will go far in mitigating the potential negative impacts of clustering by ensuring sentencing courts are on guard against it. we also heard submissions that starting points impede sentencing judges in applying the principles in gladue to indigenous offenders as noted, sentencing judges have the authority to adopt a different and individualized method of sentencing to reach a fit sentence for indigenous offenders (ipeelee, at para. 59). this does not mean that gladue and starting-point methodologies are mutually incompatible. when applied properly, starting points do not prevent judges from giving effect to s 718.2(e) and the principles in gladue, as demonstrated by r v. skani, 2002 abqb 1097, 331 ar 50, a case involving the three-year starting point from johnas, and r v. paul, 2016 abpc 113, a case engaging the eight-year starting point from r v matwiy (1996), 178 ar 356 (ca). in paul, for example, gladue factors played a central role in assessing the moral culpability of the offender, ultimately justifying a downward departure from the eight-year starting point to a sentence of five years (para. 56). these examples show that starting-point jurisdictions have been able to integrate gladue principles into the starting-point methodology (see also r v. beardy, 2017 mbpc 32, at paras. 9, 12 and 16 (canlii), aff’d 2018 mbca 52). when reviewing sentences imposed on indigenous offenders, appellate courts must bear in mind that a “formalistic approach to parity” should not be allowed to “undermine the remedial purpose of s 718.2(e)” (ipeelee, at para. 79) whether starting points or ranges are used, sentencing judges are under an obligation to factor in the “unique circumstances of an aboriginal offender which could reasonably and justifiably impact on the sentence imposed” (para. 72; see also r v. park, 2016 mbca 107, 343 ccc 3(d) 347, at para. 24). as recognized by the court of appeal of alberta in r v. swampy, 2017 abca 134, 50 alta. lr (6th) 240, at para. 36, “[t]here can be no sound proportionality analysis in the case of an aboriginal offender without considering the impact of the offender’s aboriginal heritage on his moral culpability.” the court of appeal has also stated that it is an error in principle for a sentencing judge to refer to gladue factors without considering the impact of those factors on moral blameworthiness (r v. bird, 2021 abca 243, at para. 20 (canlii)). another argument advanced before us is that starting points are inconsistent with s 718.2(d) of the code, which demands that trial judges consider sentences other than imprisonment in appropriate cases (r v. drake (1997), 151 nfld. & peir 220 (peisc (app. div.)), at para. 5). nothing about the nature of starting points or ranges compels this result. but this court was clear in lacasse that courts may have few options other than imprisonment where general or specific deterrence and denunciation must be emphasized, as in this case (lacasse, at para. 6). as we have discussed, ranges and starting points are properly understood as a reflection of the gravity of the offence. the reality is that the gravity of some offences may effectively remove the option of non-custodial sentences. further, in cases involving indigenous offenders, starting points do not relieve sentencing judges from considering whether “different or alternative sanctions may more effectively achieve the objectives of sentencing in a particular community” (ipeelee, at para. 74). for example, in skani, the starting-point sentence of three years’ imprisonment was reduced to a sentence of 23 months served in the community, taking into account “the perspective of the aboriginal offender’s community” (para. 66). as with every offender, but especially indigenous offenders, consideration of different sanctions reflects the second arm of the proportionality assessment. that is, while the gravity of the offence may dictate a custodial sentence, the offender’s individual situation must also support the sentence imposed. a final concern raised by these appeals is that starting-point sentencing, through the use of judicially created categories, is a quasi-legislative endeavour. judicially created categories for sentencing are not, however, unique to starting points; both the range and starting-point approaches rely on categorization of offences to ensure parity (lacasse, at paras. 2 and 51; arcand, at para. 93) this court has recognized that courts may use categories to situate conduct along a continuum for the purposes of sentencing (lacasse, at para. 67) categorization can make sentencing more manageable, since many offences under the code cover a wide range of conduct and may attract a broad range of sentences (mcdonnell, at para. 85). categorization assists sentencing judges by breaking down a single offence under the code based on factors such as the type of conduct at issue, the circumstances in which it was committed, and the consequences for the victim or community (arcand, at para. 95). appellate courts are entitled to conclude that certain forms of conduct are generally more serious and thus should attract a higher range or starting point. the risk of incursion into the legislative sphere arises only where an appellate court departs from the standard of review by treating a sentencing judge’s failure to select the “correct” category as an error in principle. as always, the reviewing court is limited to questioning whether there is an error in principle that impacted the sentence or whether the sentence is demonstrably unfit in some cases, mischaracterization of the offence will result in a sentence that is demonstrably unfit, but only if selecting the “wrong” category led the trial judge to misapprehend the gravity of the offence an appellate court cannot conclude that the sentence is unfit simply because the judge failed to adhere to a judicially created category or range. further, as in friesen, a sentencing judge may make a “reasoned choice” — based on individualized factors — to place an offence in a sub-category even where the established criteria for that sub-category do not apply. iv application: sentences on appeal a. setting a starting point in our view, the court of appeal did not err in setting a starting point for wholesale fentanyl trafficking. relying heavily on para. 57 of lacasse, in which this court stated that sentencing ranges are “nothing more than summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past”, mr. felix argues that there was insufficient case law on sentencing for fentanyl trafficking to allow the court of appeal to create a “prospective” starting point (af (f.), at paras. 86-87). relatedly, mr. felix urges this court to reject the creation of a starting point in this case on the basis that it is beyond an appellate court’s purview to determine the gravity of an offence without a “broad jurisprudential base” (af (f.), at para. 100). in effect, mr. felix takes the position that there must be a sufficient “historical portrait” before an appellate court may set a range or a starting point. it is true that appellate courts often ground quantitative guidance in judicial experience and past decisions. as noted in friesen, at para. 33, “[p]recedents embody the collective experience and wisdom of the judiciary.” it is unnecessary, however, for a provincial appellate court to wait for the development of a “historical portrait” of past sentences to give guidance on the gravity of the offence as noted, this court has affirmed that appellate courts must sometimes “set a new direction” that reflects a contemporary understanding of the gravity of the offence (friesen, at para. 35). it follows that provincial appellate courts are not restricted to providing guidance only where a historical body of precedent has developed; they may also revise the sentencing landscape just as the court in friesen provided guidance to ensure sentencing judges would appreciate the harm of sexual offences against children, it was open to the court of appeal in this case to set out guidance conveying the gravity of wholesale trafficking in fentanyl. regardless of the form of guidance at issue, appellate courts may consider the harms involved in a given offence and conclude that further guidance is needed to ensure lower courts appreciate the gravity of the offence. accepting the appellant’s position would not only be contrary to this court’s direction in friesen, it would result in a perverse waiting game in which the court of appeal must delay providing quantitative guidance — such as a starting point or appropriate range reflecting the harmfulness of a new drug — until there are sufficient sentencing decisions (and sufficient instances of harm to victims and to society) to be considered a “historical portrait”. moreover, the core offence in this case — drug trafficking — is not new. as the crown points out, “[d]rug trafficking as an offence is easily quantifiable by reference to a variety of independent factors such as volume of drugs, price, and level of commerciality” (rf, at para. 92). another key factor in the categorization of drug offences, both in relation to criminality and sentencing, has always been the nature of the drug at issue the composition and dangers of the drugs trafficked may change quickly as the harms caused by the substance speak directly to the gravity of the offence, appellate courts may step in to provide guidance to ensure sentences reflect those harms, even where the drug is relatively new. we underscore the importance of this fact because harm-based analyses are not an unfamiliar judicial exercise in the sentencing context (friesen, at para. 114). further, the court of appeal was entitled to take the lead and consider the public health crisis in alberta in the creation of the nine-year starting point it is noteworthy that alberta has one of the highest rates of opioid-related deaths and overdoses, relative to other provinces and territories (l. belzak and j. halverson, “the opioid crisis in canada: a national perspective” (2018), 38 hpcdpc 224) as lamer cj stated in m (ca), at para. 91, a just and appropriate sentence may take into consideration “the needs and current conditions of and in the community”. local conditions may enter into the assessment of the gravity of the offence and militate in favour of prioritizing certain sentencing goals (lacasse, at paras. 13 and 89). we stress that other jurisdictions are free to establish ranges or starting points that differ from that in alberta, as any sentencing guidance should strive to reflect and be responsive to the local conditions in those jurisdictions. in addition to mr. felix’s concerns, mr. parranto urges the court to reject the creation of a starting point in this case on the basis that there “is no evidence to support a contention that the [opioid] crisis was created or caused by overly lenient sentences for drug traffickers” (af (p.), at para. 44) even if “criminal justice responses alone cannot solve the problem”, however, the courts must use the tools parliament has provided to address societal ills (friesen, at para. 45). parliament has chosen to employ the mechanisms of criminal law and sentencing law to advance public safety, hold those who distribute drugs accountable, and communicate the wrongfulness of poisoning people and communities. this is perhaps most apparent in the maximum sentence for trafficking in a schedule i drug, which is life in prison (cdsa, s 5(3)(a)). as stated in friesen, “[m]aximum penalties are one of parliament’s principal tools to determine the gravity of the offence” (para. 96, citing c. c. ruby et al., sentencing (9th ed 2017), at § 2.18; r v sanatkar (1981), 64 ccc (2d) 325 (ont. ca), at p 327; hajar, at para. 75). we reiterate that the nine-year starting point is just “one tool among others that [is] intended to aid trial judges in their work” (lacasse, at para. 69). sentencing judges are free to depart from the starting point and move up or down from this marker based on the specific characteristics of the offender in order to meet the primary sentencing principle of proportionality. b mr. felix mr. felix entered guilty pleas to two counts of trafficking in fentanyl and two counts of trafficking in cocaine, both contrary to s 5(1) of the cdsa. he entered his guilty pleas after exhausting his charter challenges related to these offences. the following is a summary of the pertinent facts derived from an agreed statement of facts. mr. felix was the directing mind of a drug trafficking operation in fort mcmurray, alberta, that included selling drugs destined for nunavut (sentencing reasons (felix), at para. 15) it was structured as a “dial-a-dope” operation with “runners” filling orders from the stash location and remitting the proceeds to a “boss”, who then, in turn, remitted the money to mr. felix weekly. the structure functioned to insulate mr. felix from criminal exposure. the fentanyl trafficking convictions relate to five completed transactions and one incomplete transaction the five completed transactions involved a total of 1398 fentanyl tablets and 19.75 ounces of cocaine sold for $76,000 (sentencing reasons (felix), at para. 20 (canlii)). the one incomplete transaction involved 987 fentanyl tablets and 1974 g (69.63 ounces) of cocaine in fort mcmurray in 2015, the 987 fentanyl tablets had an approximate street value of between $107,000 and $214,000 if sold by the tablet. the sentencing decision describes mr. felix, at the time of the offence, as a 34-year-old college-educated individual with no prior criminal record and a successful owner-operator of a non-drug related business. mr. felix had no physical or mental impairments, had no relevant addiction or substance abuse issues, and provided the court with a positive presentence report indicating that, among other things, he maintains a good parental relationship with his children mr. felix also provided 17 letters of reference speaking to his good character. after considering all of these factors, the sentencing judge imposed a seven-year global sentence: seven years on both counts of trafficking fentanyl to be served concurrently, and four years for each count of trafficking in cocaine to be served concurrently the crown appealed the court of appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit and indicated that it would have imposed a 13-year sentence on each of the two counts of trafficking in fentanyl to run concurrently. in recognition of the fact that the crown sought a 10-year sentence at the sentencing hearing and that the parties’ sentencing positions were taken when the jurisprudence was still evolving, the court of appeal imposed a global 10-year term of incarceration. in our view, the court of appeal correctly intervened. we agree that the seven-year sentence imposed at first instance was demonstrably unfit it is clear the sentencing judge misapprehended the gravity of the offence after reviewing a selection of cases, the sentencing judge concluded the range in alberta was five to seven years, while the range was five to nine and one-half years if other canadian jurisdictions were taken into account we agree with the court of appeal that the alberta cases referred to by the sentencing judge were significantly factually distinct from this case. a more accurate range based on a review of reported case law nationally would be in the region of 8 to 15 years for example, eight-year sentences were imposed in smith (2019) (1834 pills, as part of an 11-year sentence), as well as r v. leach, 2019 bcca 451 (11,727 pills, as part of a 16-year sentence); r v. sinclair, 2016 onca 683; r v. solano-santana, 2018 onsc 3345 (5000 pills); r v. white, 2020 nsca 33, 387 ccc (3d) 106 (2086 pills); and r v. borris, 2017 nbqb 253 (4200 pills). other sentences imposed include: an 8-year and two-month sentence in r v. sidhu, cj. ontario, no. 17-821, june 16, 2017, aff’d 2019 onca 880, in which the offender trafficked 89 g of fentanyl and other drugs soon after being released on parole; a 10-year sentence in r v. petrowski, 2020 mbca 78, 393 ccc (3d) 102, for trafficking 51 g fentanyl where the offender used a co-accused to insulate himself from detection; 11 years for trafficking 204.5 g of a fentanyl blend in r v. vezina, 2017 oncj 775; 13 years for trafficking 232 g fentanyl and large quantities of other drugs as part of a sophisticated drug trafficking operation in r v. mai, [2017] oj. no. 7248 (ql) (ont. scj); and 15 years for a profit-motivated offender who was the directing mind of “a large-scale drug trafficking operation involving an enormous amount of fentanyl” in r v. fuller, 2019 oncj 643 (the offender possessed about 3 kg of fentanyl in the course of the conspiracy). the sentencing judge’s error with respect to the range ultimately impacted his assessment of parity. it is clear that seven years is a demonstrably unfit sentence given the gravity of this offence and sentences imposed in other cases. indeed, cases from alberta show a range of five to seven years for offenders who are engaged in “commercial trafficking [of fentanyl] on more than a minimal scale”, in much smaller quantities and with less sophistication than mr. felix (r v. mma, 2018 abqb 250, at para. 21 (canlii); r v. adams, 2018 abpc 82). the sentence imposed on mr. felix by the sentencing judge was therefore a “substantial and marked departure from the sentences customarily imposed for similar offenders committing similar crimes” (m (ca), para. 92). while not raised by the parties or the court below, this appeal provides an opportunity to emphasize that, when assessing the gravity of the offence, it is open to both the sentencing judge and the court of appeal to take into account the offender’s willingness to exploit at-risk populations and communities in this regard, choices which demonstrate a reckless disregard for human life increase not only the gravity of the offence but the moral culpability of the offender and may amount to an aggravating factor in sentencing. while all people and places merit protection, sentencing judges may, as they consider appropriate, give special consideration to the disproportionate harm caused to particularly vulnerable groups and/or vulnerable and remote locations, where escaping traffickers is more difficult and resources for combating addiction are more sparse. here, for example, mr. felix was trafficking fentanyl destined for resale in the remote communities comprising the territory of nunavut. as an outsider, he chose to traffic drugs to those vulnerable communities for easy money. it would have been open to the courts below to consider this as a significantly aggravating factor. indeed, the supreme court of the northwest territories, which would “have front-line experience and understand the needs of the community where the crime was committed” (rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 121), has specifically denounced this sort of predatory conduct: it has been said repeatedly, but bears repeating again, trafficking in cocaine has had a devastating effect on the people in yellowknife and elsewhere in the northwest territories. . those that traffic in cocaine contribute directly to this. they prey on the most vulnerable members of the community for profit. and there are those who come to this jurisdiction simply to traffic in drugs because it is lucrative there is easy money to be made off the addiction of others. [emphasis added]. (r v. dube, 2017 nwtsc 77, at pp. 12-13 (canlii)). similarly, in ontario, trafficking fentanyl to vulnerable northern communities has been found to be an aggravating factor (solano-santana, at para. 28 (canlii)). accordingly, the objective harm caused by outsiders who engage in wholesale fentanyl trafficking to vulnerable communities may amount to an aggravating circumstance that carries with it the expectation that a sentence will be aimed at holding the offender accountable and communicating the wrongfulness of the behaviour. we do agree, however, that mr. felix has strong rehabilitative prospects. he has engaged in exclusively prosocial pursuits following his arrest, has demonstrated a commitment to change, and has the clear support of many friends and family. accordingly, the sentence of 10 years imposed by the court of appeal should be upheld, given the submissions at trial, a review of the case law and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in upholding the decision of the court of appeal, we emphasize that the commission of wholesale trafficking offences in fentanyl may very well be expected to attract more significant sentences as the harm to the end user and the devastating consequences to communities plagued by addiction is not contested. c mr. parranto mr. parranto entered guilty pleas on two counts of possession of fentanyl for the purposes of trafficking in a wholesale commercial operation (cdsa, s 5(2)); two counts of illegal possession of a loaded handgun for use in the trafficking operation (criminal code, s 95); one count of possession of a handgun, knowing he was prohibited by court order (criminal code, s 117.01(1)); and breach of a recognizance (criminal code, s 145(3)) these charges arose from events that occurred on two separate dates: march 24, 2016, and october 22, 2016. what follows is a summary of the relevant facts derived from an agreed statement of facts. at the time of his march arrest, mr. parranto was under a lifetime firearm prohibition and was bound by a recognizance order prohibiting him from possessing controlled substances and firearms in march police recovered 27.8 g of fentanyl powder with an approximate street value of $5560 and $55,575 in cash in october police recovered 485.12 g of fentanyl powder (capable of producing 500,000 individual doses) with an approximate street value of $97,064, along with $20,690 in cash. the sentencing judge reviewed all the information before him and calculated a notional global sentence of 20 years, with sentences of seven and eight years allocated to the two fentanyl trafficking counts respectively. the judge reduced the sentence by one-third for mr. parranto’s guilty plea and by a further 1.2 years for “other mitigating circumstances” (sentencing reasons (parranto), at para. 93 (canlii)). he then reduced it by one year based on the totality principle. the resulting period of incarceration was 11 years less time served. the crown appealed. the court of appeal concluded that the sentencing judge made several errors in principle and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit as a result, it substituted a global sentence of 14 years’ incarceration, less time served. we are of the view that the 11-year global sentence imposed at first instance was demonstrably unfit and court of appeal did not abrogate the standard of review in intervening. there is no reason for this court to disturb the sentence of 14 years imposed by the court of appeal. much like in the case of mr. felix, the trial judge erred in his selection of comparator cases and in finding that the relevant range was five to seven years’ imprisonment. as described above, the national range for this offence is approximately 8 to 15 years. the sentencing judge referred to the seven-year sentence in r v. aujla, 2016 abpc 272, the only reported decision in alberta referring to “wholesale fentanyl trafficking.” however, aujla is a poor comparator, as it dealt with smaller quantities of drugs (454 fentanyl pills), a single arrest, and a first-time offender with no record and good rehabilitative prospects. mr. parranto was in possession of significant amounts of fentanyl in addition to large quantities of other drugs, guns1 and body armour.2 he had a lengthy 1 criminal code, s 95 and cdsa s 5(3)(a)(i)(c) 2 contrary to body armour control act, sa 2010, c. b-4.8 and related criminal record, and following his release from detention in july 2016 for the march offences, he was able to and did re-establish his presence as a wholesale trafficker in approximately 12 weeks. against the gravity of the offence and these aggravating factors, this case also calls for consideration of gladue principles despite being métis, the record indicates that mr. parranto waived his right to a gladue report and did not file a presentence report. even where a gladue report is waived, however, courts must “take judicial notice of the systemic and background factors affecting aboriginal people in canadian society”, including “such matters as the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential schools” (ipeelee, at para. 60; gladue, at para. 83). moreover, counsel made submissions indicating that mr. parranto had a disjointed childhood surrounded by drugs, alcohol and abuse. he began using drugs in the 1990s and has struggled with addiction to heroin. it was incumbent on the sentencing judge and the court of appeal to consider these circumstances in the context of the “broad systemic and background factors affecting aboriginal people generally” (ipeelee, at paras. 59-60). the offender is not required to show a “causal link between background factors and the commission of the current offence”, and gladue principles must be applied in every case regardless of the seriousness of the offence (ipeelee, at paras. 81 and 87) in our view, mr. parranto’s background circumstances can be said to have played a part in bringing him before the court against this must be weighed the reality that mr. parranto committed the second set of offences less than three months after being released on bail for the first set of offences this suggests that restorative justice principles such as rehabilitation are less salient in this case compared to other objectives including protection of the public. based on the gravity of the offence, gladue factors and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we agree with the court of appeal that a global sentence of 14 years is appropriate. while we would not make any finding as to how the 14 years should be apportioned between the various counts, we note that it would have been appropriate to impose the 9- and 12-year sentences sought by the crown at first instance with respect to the two fentanyl offences, with those sentences to run concurrently. a 12-year sentence for the second fentanyl trafficking count would send an appropriately strong message that wholesale fentanyl trafficking is a serious offence consistent with a high level of moral culpability. as we concluded with respect to mr. felix, it will not be uncommon to see lengthy penitentiary terms imposed for this offence. finally, contrary to mr. parranto’s submissions, the court of appeal did not intervene on the basis that the sentencing judge failed to apply the starting point of nine years that did not exist at the time mr. parranto was sentenced as discussed above, the court of appeal correctly intervened because the sentence imposed was demonstrably unfit. irrespective of the correctness of the intervention, we agree with the appellants that the court of appeal’s comments with respect to starting-points and the starting-point approach are incorrect in law (ca reasons (parranto), at paras. 29 and 68; friesen, at para. 37; lacasse, at para. 60). these comments, however, were not the basis of the court of appeal’s intervention. v conclusion we would dismiss both appeals and affirm the orders of the court of appeal of alberta. in doing so, we confirm the legitimacy of starting points on this revised basis as a permissible form of appellate guidance, within the framework provided by this court that emphasizes deference to sentencing judges in the delicate task that parliament has charged them with (lacasse; friesen) just as the law recognizes the soundness of considering local conditions in crafting a fit sentence, there need not be a singular norm in achieving the goals of sentencing. irrespective of the sentencing modality chosen, provincial appellate courts are best positioned to give the guidance necessary to achieve consistency of both reasoning and approach. the reasons of moldaver and côté jj. were delivered by moldaver j — i. introduction i would dismiss the appeals from sentence and uphold the sentences of 10 years and 14 years imposed by the court of appeal. the sentences imposed by the sentencing judges in both cases were demonstrably unfit. they fall markedly below the range of sentences that are warranted in cases like this, involving the directing minds of largescale fentanyl trafficking operations. in such cases, more severe sentences than those imposed by the court of appeal would have been justified; however, in the circumstances, the court of appeal cannot be faulted for failing to impose higher sentences than those sought by the crown at the sentencing hearings. with respect to the role of starting points in sentencing, i agree with my colleague, rowe j. i find it necessary, however, to write separately to raise what i believe to be an issue of overriding concern in these cases. specifically, i wish to focus on the gravity of largescale trafficking in fentanyl for personal gain and the need to impose severe penalties, ranging from mid-level double digit penitentiary terms up to and including life imprisonment, for those who do so. in r v. friesen, 2020 scc 9, this court held that appellate courts can and should depart from prior sentencing precedents when those precedents no longer reflect “society’s current understanding and awareness of the gravity of a particular offence and blameworthiness of particular offenders” (para. 35; see also paras. 108 and 110). in my view, society’s understanding of the gravity of largescale fentanyl trafficking has increased such that an upward departure is mandated. ii analysis a. the dangers posed by trafficking in hard drugs the dangers posed by trafficking in hard drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, have long been recognized in canada. over the past few decades, however, society’s awareness of the true gravity of trafficking in such drugs has grown to the point that we are reminded, on a daily basis, of the death, destruction, and havoc it causes in communities across canada. trafficking in such substances causes both direct and indirect harms to society directly, the distribution and abuse of hard drugs leads to addiction, debilitating adverse health effects, and, all too frequently, death by overdose as lamer j (as he then was) astutely observed, where addiction and death occur — as they so often do — those who oversee the distribution of these drugs are personally “responsible for the gradual but inexorable degeneration of many of their fellow human beings” (r v. smith, [1987] 1 scr 1045, at p 1053). trafficking also leads indirectly to a host of other ills, including an increase in all manner of crime, committed by those seeking to finance their addiction, as well as by organized crime syndicates (pushpanathan v. canada (minister of citizenship and immigration), [1998] 1 scr 982, at paras. 85-87, per cory j., dissenting, but not on this point; r v. kang-brown, 2008 scc 18, [2008] 1 scr 456, at para. 184, per deschamps j., dissenting, but not on this point) given that much of this criminal activity is violent, trafficking has come to be understood as an offence of violence, even beyond the ruinous consequences it has for those who abuse drugs and in the process, destroy themselves and others. indeed, as doherty ja has explained, violence is such a predictable consequence of the illicit drug trade that it cannot be dissociated from it: cocaine sale and use is closely and strongly associated with violent crime. cocaine importation begets a multiplicity of violent acts viewed in isolation from the conduct which inevitably follows the importation of cocaine, the act itself is not a violent one in the strict sense it cannot, however, be disassociated from its inevitable consequences [emphasis added.] (r v. hamilton (2004), 72 or (3d) 1 (c.a), at para. 104) see also, r v. pearson, [1992] 3 scr 665, at pp. 694-95, where the court relied on the groupe de travail sur la lutte contre la drogue (1990), rapport du groupe de travail sur la lutte contre la drogue, at pp. 18-19, which noted that it is a mistake to view drug trafficking under the control of organized crime as less serious than more openly violent crimes. a further and perhaps even more devastating consequence of the hard drug trade is its impact on families and the intergenerational trauma it causes: trafficking in drugs, and in particular hard drugs such as cocaine, is a crime whose victims can be found far beyond the individuals who become addicted to the drugs. families can be torn apart by either the loss of the individual to the addiction itself or to the violence that all too often accompanies the drug trade. . children suffer immense harm from the effects of addiction in their home, whether this addiction be from pre-natal impact or from physical and/or emotional violence in the homes that they should be safe in. the future of these children and their families is damaged and all of society pays the price. (r v. profeit, 2009 yktc 39, at paras. 25-26 (canlii)) see also m. barnard, drug addiction and families (2007), at pp. 14-17, explaining that children whose parents abuse drugs are at an increased risk of physical abuse, emotional abuse, and neglect. finally, the trafficking of hard drugs leads to “significant if not staggering” costs to society in terms of health care and law enforcement expenses, as well as lost productivity (pushpanathan, at para. 89; see also r v. lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr 130, at para. 82). in 2017, for example, it is estimated that abuse of opioids and cocaine in canada resulted in total costs of $9.6 billion (canadian substance use costs and harms scientific working group, canadian substance use costs and harms (2015-2017) (2020), at p 1). trafficking in hard drugs is thus a “crime with such grievous consequences that it tears at the very fabric of society” (pushpanathan, at para. 79) significant penitentiary sentences are regularly imposed for individuals who traffic in large quantities of such drugs, which, as we shall see, are far less deadly than fentanyl (see, eg,. r v. bains, 2015 onca 677, 127 or (3d) 545 (9 years for possession of one kilogram of heroin for the purpose of trafficking); r v. athwal, 2017 onca 222 (12 years for conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking); r v. chukwu, 2016 skca 6, 472 sask r 241 (10 years for the possession of 0.59 kilograms of heroin for the purpose of trafficking); r v. dritsas, 2015 mbca 19, 315 man. r (2d) 205 (9 years for possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking for a “high-level cocaine trafficker involved in kilo-level deals” (para. 9)). b. the dangers posed by largescale fentanyl trafficking as grave a threat as drugs such as heroin and cocaine pose, that threat pales in comparison to the one posed by fentanyl and its analogues. indeed, over the past decade, fentanyl has altered the landscape of the substance abuse crisis in canada, revealing itself as public enemy number one. synthetically produced and readily available on the illicit market, fentanyl is an extremely dangerous and powerful painkiller and sedative. as with other opioids, such as heroin and morphine, it is a highly addictive substance, which, when taken outside of controlled medical environments, puts its users at risk of serious harm, including brain damage, organ damage, coma, and death. fentanyl’s potential for harm is, however, significantly greater than other opioids. it is, for example, estimated to be 80-100 times more potent than morphine and 25-50 times more potent than pharmaceutical grade heroin. given its strength, a lethal dose will often be less than two milligrams, an amount as small as a single grain of salt (r v. smith, 2016 bcsc 2148, 363 crr (2d) 365, at para. 24). the risk of overdose and death from fentanyl is thus extremely high, particularly for naïve users or where it is taken in combination with other substances, such as alcohol or other opioids. the risk of overdose is also one that can be difficult to guard against, as traffickers often surreptitiously mix small amounts of fentanyl with other substances to create a cheaper product with the same effects, thereby drastically increasing their profitability (h hrymak, “a bad deal: british columbia’s emphasis on deterrence and increasing prison sentences for street-level fentanyl traffickers” (2018), 41 man. lj 149, at p 153). this deceptive practice leaves users vulnerable and unaware, especially as fentanyl is physically indistinguishable from other hard drugs, such as heroin, oxycodone, and cocaine (c. c. ruby, sentencing (10th ed. 2020); smith, at para. 24; r v. joumaa, 2018 onsc 317, at para. 12 (canlii)). analogues or derivatives of fentanyl further exacerbate the risks, as these substances can be far more potent than even fentanyl itself, with some estimated to be as much as 100 times more potent than fentanyl. one such analogue, carfentanil, is so toxic that it “has no safe or beneficial human use, even within the medical community in highly controlled environments” (a sabbadini and a boni, sentencing drug offenders (loose-leaf), at s 2:160010). beyond its mere potential to cause harm, however, fentanyl has had — and continues to have — a real and deadly impact on the lives of canadians indeed, trafficking in fentanyl is so deadly that various courts have described it as a national crisis, reflective of an increased understanding of the gravity of the harm it causes (see, eg,. r v. smith, 2017 bcca 112, at para. 50 (canlii); r v. vezina, 2017 oncj 775, at para. 58 (canlii); r v. aujla, 2016 abpc 272, at para. 1 (canlii)). this heightened understanding is supported by the available statistical evidence. the expert evidence on the record before us establishes, for instance, that fentanyl-related deaths in alberta increased by 4,858 percent between 2011 and 2017, rising from 12 deaths in 2011 to 583 deaths in 2017. more broadly, federal statistics on opioid-related deaths show that, between january 2016 and march 2021, approximately 23,000 canadians lost their lives due to accidental apparent opioid-related deaths, with fentanyl involved in 71 percent of these deaths (special advisory committee on the epidemic of opioid overdoses, opioid and stimulant-related harms in canada (september 2021) (online). the epidemic also shows no signs of abating, with over 6,000 accidental deaths occurring in 2020 alone, 82 percent of which involved fentanyl (government of canada, federal actions on opioids to date (june 2021) (online)). these figures throw into stark relief the dark and inescapable reality that “[e]very day in our communities, fentanyl abuse claims the lives of canadians” (r v. loor, 2017 onca 696, at para. 33 (canlii)). the scale of fentanyl’s devastating impact becomes even more apparent when one considers that, between 2016 and 2020, there were approximately 3,400 homicides across canada, a number far below the number of fentanyl-related deaths (statistics canada, table 35-10-0069-01 — number of homicide victims, by method used to commit the homicide, july 27, 2021 (online)) this disparity makes clear that, in a very real way, those individuals responsible for the largescale distribution of fentanyl within our communities are a source of far greater harm than even those responsible for the most violent of crimes. the time has thus come for our perception of the gravity of largescale trafficking in fentanyl to accord with the gravity of the crisis it has caused. largescale trafficking in fentanyl is not a crime marked merely by the distribution and sale of an illicit substance; rather, it is a crime marked by greed and the pursuit of profit at the expense of violence, death, and the perpetuation of a public health crisis previously unseen in canadian society in many ways, “[t]rafficking in fentanyl is almost the equivalent of putting multiple bullets in the chambers of a revolver and playing russian roulette. it is the most efficient killer of drug users on the market today” (r v. frazer, 2017 abpc 116, 58 alta. lr (6th) 185, at para. 11). put simply, it is a crime that can be expected to not only destroy lives, but to undermine the very foundations of our society. my comments that follow do not apply to sentences for street-level trafficking, or where traffickers are motivated by a need to support their own addiction. rather, the focus of this guidance is on the directing minds of largescale fentanyl trafficking operations. in my view, heavy penitentiary sentences will be appropriate where offenders have trafficked in large quantities of fentanyl and assumed leadership roles in the trafficking operation indeed, in the context of largescale fentanyl trafficking operations, substantial sentences should be neither unusual nor reserved for exceptional circumstances. as this court has previously explained, maximum sentences should not be reserved for the “abstract case of the worst crime committed in the worst circumstances”, but rather should be imposed whenever the circumstances warrant it (r v lm, 2008 scc 31, [2008] 2 scr 163, at para. 22; see also friesen, at para. 114). iii conclusion ultimately, largescale trafficking in fentanyl is a crime that preys disproportionally on the misery of others — the marginalized and those whose lives are marked by hopelessness and despair it is a crime motivated by greed and by a callous disregard for the untold grief and suffering it leaves in its wake. above all, it is a crime that kills — often and indiscriminately. it follows, in my view, that what matters most is that those individuals who choose to prey on the vulnerable and profit from the misery of the canadian public for personal gain are sentenced in accordance with the severity of the harms they have caused. fentanyl trafficking, and largescale trafficking in particular, are a source of unspeakable harm accordingly, while the range of sentences currently imposed for the directing minds of largescale fentanyl operations straddles the upper single digits and lower double digits, sentencing judges should feel justified, where circumstances warrant, in applying a higher range, consisting of mid- level double digit sentences and, in particularly aggravating circumstances, potential sentences of life imprisonment. introduction these appeals provide an opportunity for this court to resolve the “issue of importance” it identified in r v friesen, 2020 scc 9, at para. 41: are “starting points . . . a permissible form of appellate guidance”? i would answer this question in the negative. the starting-point approach pioneered by the court of appeal of alberta is, in theory and in practice, contrary to parliament’s sentencing regime and this court’s jurisprudence the starting-point approach undermines the discretion of sentencing judges and departs from the standard of deference required by appellate courts. as a result, it thwarts the imposition of proportionate and individualized sentences. that the starting-point methodology constrains sentencing judges’ discretion and operates as an effective instrument of control for the court of appeal should come as no surprise, as that is what it was designed to do nor can we be uncertain as to what the court of appeal intended it has been forthright and plain spoken, in r v. arcand, 2010 abca 363, 40 alta. lr (5th) 199, and in its subsequent decisions. where i differ from the court of appeal is on these foundational points: the rigid control they exercise over sentencing and the constraints on individualized sentencing are, in my view, neither legitimate, nor necessary. this is neither accidental nor is it hidden. to the contrary, it is deliberate and it is open. my colleagues say that they are putting forth “a revised understanding” of starting points (brown and martin jj.’s reasons, at para. 3). i am skeptical, however, as to the impact this so-called revised approach will have this court has provided guidance on numerous prior occasions, yet the court of appeal’s approach has remained unchanged (r v. mcdonnell, [1997] 1 scr 948; r v. lacasse, 2015 scc 64, [2015] 3 scr 1089; friesen). as a result, in my view, to offer yet more helpful suggestions to ameliorate the problems inherent in starting-point methodology is naïve. the problems are baked into the methodology and they are rooted in the purposes for which it was developed and for which it has been maintained there is only one effective response: to say that starting-point methodology can no longer be used. being definitive in so saying is long overdue. lastly, on the merits and on the additional guidance he provides, i agree with justice moldaver and would adopt his reasons. i would dismiss the appeals. ii analysis my analysis proceeds in three steps first, i review the principles of sentencing and appellate review second, i show how the rationale underlying the starting-point approach is inconsistent with these principles finally, i turn to the practical effects of starting points and their incompatibility with these same principles. a principles of sentencing and appellate review (1) sentencing: broad discretion to arrive at proportionate and individualized sentences until 1996, the criminal code, rsc 1985, c c-46, did not provide guidance as to the principles or objectives of sentencing (a. manson et al., sentencing and penal policy in canada: cases, materials, and commentary (3rd ed. 2016), at pp. 37-38). in common with other common law jurisdictions, canadian courts adopted an approach to sentencing emphasizing discretion, proportionality and individualization (g. brown, criminal sentencing as a practical wisdom (2017), at p 25). this approach was notably articulated by the court of appeal for ontario in r. v. willaert, [1953] or 282, in an oft-cited passage: i am respectfully of opinion that the true function of criminal law in regard to punishment is in a wise blending of the deterrent and reformative, with retribution not entirely disregarded, and with a constant appreciation that the matter concerns not merely the court and the offender, but also the public and society as a going concern. punishment is, therefore, an art — a very difficult art — essentially practical, and directly related to the existing needs of society. . . . it is therefore impossible to lay down hard and fast and permanent rules. [emphasis added; p 286.] although parliament later gave additional direction to sentencing judges, the “wise blending” approach remains good law: judges must use their discretion to weigh different penal aims in light of all circumstances to arrive at sentences that are “fit” for the offence and the offender (manson et al., at p 41a). in its 1996 sentencing reform, parliament codified the objectives and principles of sentencing in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the criminal code section 718 now provides that the “fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions” this purpose is achieved having regard to six objectives: denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation of offenders, rehabilitation, reparation, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgement of the harm caused to the victim and to the community (r v. nasogaluak, 2010 scc 6, [2010] 1 scr 206, at para. 39). the controlled drugs and substances act, sc 1996, c 19, contains similar provisions on sentencing (ss. 10(1) and (2)). as mandated by s 718.1 of the criminal code, in all cases, “whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the objectives listed above, the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality” (nasogaluak, at para. 40 (emphasis in original)). proportionality is the “sine qua non of a just sanction” (r v. ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1 scr 433, at para. 37). this principle provides that “sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender” (friesen, at para. 30) there are two converging perspectives on proportionality: first, it serves a restraining function as it requires that a sentence not exceed what is just and appropriate, and second, it seeks to ensure that the sentence “properly reflects and condemns [the role of offenders] in the offence and the harm they caused” (nasogaluak, at para. 42). at the end of the day, a just sanction is one that reflects both of these “perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense of the other” (ipeelee, at para. 37). for its part, s 718.2 provides a non-exhaustive list of secondary principles that must guide the sentencing process. these principles include “the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the principles of parity and totality, and the instruction to consider ‘all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances’, with particular attention paid to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders” (nasogaluak, at para. 40, quoting s 718.2 of the criminal code). in particular, parity requires that “similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances . . receive similar sentences” (friesen, at para. 31) it is principally because of parity that appellate courts sometimes adopt sentencing ranges or starting points to serve as a guide for sentencing judges (lacasse, at paras. 56-57). in friesen, this court explained that parity is an expression of proportionality: “a consistent application of proportionality will lead to parity. conversely, an approach that assigns the same sentence to unlike cases can achieve neither parity nor proportionality . . .” (para. 32). in order to produce proportionate sentences, sentencing must be a “highly individualized exercise” (lacasse, at para. 58; see also r v. boudreault, 2018 scc 58, [2018] 3 scr 599, at para. 58) sentencing judges must decide a profoundly contextual issue: “. . . for this offence, committed by this offender, harming this victim, in this community, what is the appropriate sanction under the criminal code?” (r v. gladue, [1999] 1 scr 688, at para. 80 (emphasis in original)). they must determine which objectives of sentencing merit greater weight and evaluate the importance of mitigating or aggravating factors, to best reflect the circumstances of each case (nasogaluak, at para. 43; r v. lyons, [1987] 2 scr 309; r v. m (ca), [1996] 1 scr 500, at para. 92; r v. hamilton (2004), 72 or (3d) 1 (ca)). individualization flows from proportionality: a sentence that is not tailored to the specific circumstances of both the offender and the offence will not be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender (r v. proulx, 2000 scc 5, [2000] 1 scr 61, at para. 82). simply stated, [translation] “[a] proportional sentence is thus an individualized sentence (j. desrosiers and h. parent, “principes”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit pénal — droit pénal général (loose-leaf), by m-p. robert and s. roy, eds., fasc. 20, at para. 17). parliament vested sentencing judges with “a broad discretion” to craft individualized and proportionate sentences (nasogaluak, at para. 43; see also m (ca), at para. 90, referring to what is now s 718.3(1) of the criminal code). “far from being an exact science or an inflexible predetermined procedure, sentencing is primarily a matter for the trial judge’s competence and expertise. the trial judge enjoys considerable discretion because of the individualized nature of the process” (r v. lm, 2008 scc 31, [2008] 2 scr 163, at para. 17). it is possible that, in a given case, more than one particular sentence would be appropriate and reasonable (m. vauclair and t. desjardins, in collaboration with p. lachance, traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales (28th ed. 2021), at no. 472) “proportionality will be achieved by means of a ‘complicated calculus’ whose elements the trier of fact understands better than anyone” (lm, at para. 22) thus, flexibility is essential to meet the needs of individual justice in short, discretion is the means to achieve proportionality in sentencing. (2) appellate review: a deferential approach appellate courts play a dual role in sentence appeals: they are courts of error correction and they have a role “in developing the law and providing guidance” (friesen, at paras. 34-35; lacasse, at paras. 36-37). (a) error correction as a corollary to the wide discretion conferred to sentencing judges in the determination of a “just and appropriate” sentence, this court has adopted a deferential approach to appellate review of sentencing decisions. an appellate court can only vary a sentence if (1) the sentence is demonstrably unfit or (2) the sentencing judge made an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence (friesen, at para. 26). a sentence is “demonstrably unfit” if it constitutes an “unreasonable departure” from the fundamental principle of proportionality, which is a “very high threshold” (lacasse, at paras. 52-53). it will reach this level where it “is in substantial and marked departure from the sentences customarily imposed for similar offenders committing similar crimes” (m (ca), at para. 92; see also lacasse, at para. 67; r v. suter, 2018 scc 34, [2018] 2 scr 496, at paras. 23-24). as for errors in principle, they include “an error of law, a failure to consider a relevant factor, or erroneous consideration of an aggravating or mitigating factor” (friesen, at para. 26) an appellate court can only intervene if the error in principle had an impact on the sentence (ibid., citing lacasse, at para. 44). accordingly, an appellate court cannot intervene simply because it would have weighed relevant factors and objectives differently (lacasse, at paras. 49-51). the weighing of factors can form an error in principle “[o]nly if by emphasizing one factor or by not giving enough weight to another, the trial judge exercises his or her discretion unreasonably” (friesen, at para. 26 (text in brackets in original), quoting r v. mcknight (1999), 135 ccc (3d) 41 (ont. ca), at para. 35). similarly, an appellate court cannot vary a sentence simply because it would have put the sentence in a different range or category (friesen, at para. 37). deference arises from parliament’s choice to grant discretion to sentencing judges to individualize sentences (para. 38) the appellate standard of review “complement[s] and reinforce[s]” the view that proportionate sentences are best achieved by the application of judicial discretion (p. healy, “sentencing from there to here and from then to now” (2013), 17 can. crim. lr 291, at p 295). appellate courts’ limited powers to vary sentences “underscores the importance of individualized decision-making in determining a fit disposition” (ibid). in addition, this court in friesen emphasized three functional reasons justifying the appellate standard of review: (1) sentencing judges see and hear all the evidence in person; (2) they usually have front-line experience and understand the needs of the community where the crime was committed; and (3) appellate courts should generally defer to sentencing judges’ decisions “to avoid delay and the misuse of judicial resources” (para. 25; see also lacasse, at paras. 11 and 48; r v. shropshire, [1995] 4 scr 227, at para. 46). if the appellate court finds an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence, or that the sentence is demonstrably unfit, it can intervene and “apply the principles of sentencing afresh to the facts” (friesen, at para. 27). it must, however, defer to the judge’s findings of fact and identification of aggravating and mitigating factors if they are not affected by an error in principle (para. 28). (b) developing the law and providing guidance to sentencing judges second, appellate courts “serve an important function” in providing guidance to sentencing judges and “minimizing the disparity of sentences . . for similar offenders and similar offences committed throughout canada” (m (ca), at para. 92, see also vauclair and desjardins, no 47.37, at p 1168) while appellate courts often use sentencing ranges, other courts, particularly alberta’s, use starting points as a form of guidance. i will review both forms of appellate guidance in general terms before turning to the issue of whether starting points are an appropriate form of guidance in sentencing. (i) sentencing ranges sentencing ranges are “summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives” (lacasse, at para. 57). ranges can also develop the law in the ordinary way of appellate courts, responding to emerging needs that are not addressed in the existing jurisprudence (friesen, at para. 35). sentencing ranges can assist sentencing judges when considering all the relevant circumstances of the offence and the offender to arrive at a fit sentence. they are not “averages”, “hard and fast rules”, or “binding” (lacasse, at para. 57; friesen, at para. 37). the usual range of sentences imposed for an offence may be a useful tool at the disposal of sentencing judges as it “gives some sense [to] proportionality and parity” (a. manson, the law of sentencing (2001), at p 65). but sentencing judges are not obliged to have regard to ranges or to begin the sentencing exercise at the range. their fundamental duty is to impose a sentence that is “proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender” (s 718.1 of the criminal code). conversely, sentencing within a range is not determinative of fitness: [translation] [i]t should be borne in mind that ranges are only indications. care must be taken not to apply them categorically. although they constitute a useful reference tool for a judge, they do not exempt him or her from analyzing the particular circumstances of each case, as the focus of the sentencing process continues to be on the individual. this is why offenders sometimes receive different sentences for the same offence. [emphasis added.] (calderon v. r., 2015 qcca 1573, at para. 30 (canlii)) since sentencing ranges are only guidelines, they do not, and cannot, increase the authority of appellate courts to vary a sentence. ensuring that sentences are similar cannot short-circuit the standard of review and “be given priority over the . . deference [owed] to the [sentencing] judges’ exercise of discretion” (lm, at para. 35; see also ferland v. r., 2009 qcca 1168, [2009] rjq 1675, at para. 22). (ii) starting points the starting-point approach involves a three-step process. first, the court of appeal must describe the category created (eg, “commercial cocaine trafficking”, “major sexual assault”) second, it sets a starting point for that category which represents the sentence that would apply to a typical offender of good character with no criminal record in a typical case (mcdonnell, at para. 59, per mclachlin j., dissenting, citing r v. sandercock (1985), 22 ccc (3d) 79 (alta. ca); see also r. v felix, 2019 abca 458, 98 alta l.r (6th) 136 (“felix (abca)”), at para. 45). third, the sentencing judge refines the sentence to the specific facts of the individual case and offender (arcand, at para. 104). starting points are, by their nature, a prescriptive form of appellate guidance, in that they provide a sequence for sentencing judges to follow when determining a fit sentence. as the expression “starting point” makes clear, sentencing judges must identify the relevant category and corresponding starting point to commence the sentencing exercise. they must then adjust the sentence depending on the facts of the case and the characteristics of the offender, in light of the factors built into the starting point (mcdonnell, at para. 60; arcand, at para. 105). although this court has not disavowed the starting-point approach, it has been clear that they cannot alter the broad discretion granted to sentencing judges (mcdonnell, at paras. 32-33 and 43; friesen, at para. 37) it also specifically disapproved of the court of appeal of alberta’s treatment of starting points as binding and its failure to give proper effect to the standard of review (friesen, at paras. 37 and 40-41). as this court noted in friesen (at para. 41), practitioners, academics, and judges — including judges at the court of appeal of alberta — have nevertheless expressed concerns about the starting-point approach and whether it is consistent with the broad discretion of sentencing judges to impose individualized sentences (see, eg,. a. manson, “mcdonnell and the methodology of sentencing” (1997), 6 cr (5th) 277; j. rudin, “eyes wide shut: the alberta court of appeal’s decision in r v. arcand and aboriginal offenders” (2011), 48 alta. l. rev. 987; arcand, at para. 352; r v. lee, 2012 abca 17, 58 alta. lr (5th) 30, at paras. 55, 61 and 76; r v. gashikanyi, 2017 abca 194, 53 alta lr (6th) 11, at paras. 19, 22 and 77-78; r v. dsc, 2018 abca 335, [2019] 3 wwr 259, at para. 40). this case gives us the opportunity to assess the merits of these concerns. at the outset, i note that although “local characteristics in a given region may explain certain differences in the sentences imposed on offenders by the courts” (lacasse, at para. 89), the criminal code sets out uniform principles and objectives for sentencing in the country in my view, this uniformity should ideally extend to sentencing methodology (c. c. ruby, sentencing (10th ed 2020), at § 2.12) for instance, the methodology for choosing whether sentences should be consecutive or concurrent and for assessing joint submissions does not and should not vary across provinces and territories. in the same manner, the use of sentencing ranges or starting points should also be generally consistent in this country. the starting-point approach is a distinct form of appellate guidance — indeed, a distinct theory of sentencing — with its own rationale and methodology. below, i review the starting-point approach set out in arcand, noting how the rationale and functions of this approach depart from the ordinary operation of canadian sentencing law articulated by the criminal code and this court’s jurisprudence. i begin with a discussion of issues in the underlying rationale for starting points, and then turn to methodological problems with the starting-point approach in application. b. the rationale underlying the starting-point approach the foundational rationale of starting points is the idea that appellate courts are institutionally responsible for creating and enforcing a uniform approach to sentencing to prevent the injustice that would inevitably flow from variation in sentencing on this view, variations are an impediment to the rule of law goal of maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system starting points aim to achieve a greater degree of parity and thus reduce and confine discretion of sentencing judges. as i will explain, this rationale is incompatible with the principles of sentencing and this court’s jurisprudence. (1) discretion and individualization first, the starting-point approach seeks to reduce arbitrariness, disparity and idiosyncratic decision-making in sentencing in order to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice (arcand, at paras. 24, 70 and 102). according to arcand, appellate courts bear a “special institutional responsibility” to maintain public trust in sentencing (para. 7). absent such appellate leadership, unjust sanctions and associated erosion of public confidence in the justice system inevitably flow from the lack of a uniform approach (paras. 8 and 119). the objective is thus to achieve parity and constrain sentencing judges’ discretion. conversely, the court of appeal of alberta reasons that sentencing ranges do not sufficiently constrain sentencing judges’ discretion and they lead to disparity. starting points provide more guidance than ranges to sentencing judges who are left to “[t]hro[w] a mental dart at the range” (arcand, at para. 122). according to the court of appeal of alberta, sentencing ranges are often the product of “limited and parochial” research, where counsel will only try to find cases supporting their point of view (para. 123). ranges also provide an insufficient basis for appellate intervention because “the mere fact a sentence falls within a range, or not significantly outside it, tells an appeal court little, if anything, about whether the actual sentence is fit” (para. 124). the flaw in this rationale is apparent variability resulting from individualization is an essential feature of just sentencing, not a problem. establishing a sentence for a “typical offender” is counterproductive: “. . . the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction” (m (ca), at para. 92). giving effect to parliament’s choice to confer broad discretion on sentencing judges to impose individualized sentences will inevitably produce variation in sentences. as cory and iacobucci jj. said in gladue, “[d]isparity of sentences for similar crimes is a natural consequence of th[e] individualized focus [of sentencing]” (para. 76, see also proulx, at para. 86; healy, at pp. 294-95). eliminating disparity is “practically impossible” given the many and varied factors arising in a given case that make it difficult to compare with “seemingly similar cases” (t. quigley, “has the role of judges in sentencing changed . . . or should it?” (2000), 5 can. crim. lr 317, at p 324). i agree with lebel ja’s (as he then was) assessment of individualization and its relationship with parity: [translation] sentence individualization remains a fundamental principle in the canadian sentencing system. it certainly provokes much criticism, sometimes relating to disparities between sentences, such criticism at times being levelled with almost no knowledge of the specifics of each case. this principle is so important that the imposition of a sentence that is abstract and standardized and takes no account of individual factors can constitute an error of law. (r v. lafrance (1993), 59 qac 213, at para. 33) although the court of appeal of alberta frequently relies on disparity in sentencing for a given offence to justify setting a starting point, such “disparity” is often (1) merely asserted (see, eg,. arcand, at para. 102) or (2) the natural result of individualized sentencing (see, eg,. gashikanyi, at paras. 29-31, for berger ja’s rebuke of the claim of disparity in r v. hajar, 2016 abca 222, 39 alta. lr (6th) 209). focussing on variability as the problem is not only inconsistent with this court’s jurisprudence, it also “helps to create or reinforce other problems: jail becomes the norm, starting point or ranges of sentence become hardened into fixed sentences, and factors leading to systemic discrimination are either ignored or inadequately dealt with” (quigley, at p 324 (footnote omitted)). moreover, sentencing ranges are not a “rudimentary sentencing guideline . . . of limited value” (arcand, at para. 122). the fear of arbitrary sentencing and undue disparity is belied by the criminal code itself, which codifies proportionality and parity. the code explicitly directs judges to consider the facts of other cases to identify patterns when sentencing ranges provide a reference to the sentences imposed in similar cases while preserving the individualized and discretionary nature of the sentencing process as i explained, the mere fact that a sentence falls within a range does not necessarily makes it fit or render it immune from appellate review. the court of appeal of alberta has taken upon itself the role as the guardian of a system of sentencing that, without its tight supervision, would fall into disorder thereby undermining the confidence of the public. however, this is a dubious claim as it is difficult to see how the public could have an informed opinion about sentencing decisions in their jurisdictions given the limited data on such issues (a. n. doob, “the unfinished work of the canadian sentencing commission” (2011), 53 cjccj 279, at p 281) more importantly, there is no evidence of a crisis of public confidence in the sentencing system in provinces that do not use starting points. despite its repeated claims about the risks that variability in sentencing has bred distrust within the public, the court of appeal of alberta in arcand failed to “provide any basis for the assumptions regarding how the public feels about sentencing” (rudin, at p 997). in fact, research shows that “the public is supportive of judicial discretion and individualized sentencing” (k. n. varma and v. marinos, “three decades of public attitudes research on crime and punishment in canada” (2013), 55 cjccj 549, at pp. 555-56). this is a far cry from the claim that, under the sentencing range approach, “the public may suspect that some courts too simply sift the collection until they find a case that produces the result the judge is looking for” (arcand, at para. 123). thus, the premise of the starting-point approach — that variability is a problem that needs to be fixed — means that the entire approach is built on a flawed foundation. individualization is critical to canadian sentencing; it is an imperative, not a problem. (2) proportionality second, the starting-point approach is grounded in an erroneous view of the fundamental principle of proportionality. the court of appeal of alberta positions the starting-point approach itself as the foundation of proportionality: “inherent in the proportionality principle are (1) the relative ranking of offences as well as ranking of categories within offences based on varying degrees of seriousness; and (2) the setting of starting points for those offences or categories” (arcand, at fn. 73, see also para. 103) for the court of appeal of alberta, unlike starting points, “a sentencing range is not an essential component of the proportionality principle. a range develops as an outcome of proportionality; it is not necessarily a determinant of it” (para. 125 (emphasis in original)) but proportionality is not achieved by such a ranking of offences and categories of offences rather, it is achieved in each case through individualized sentencing that takes into account the “the specific circumstances of both the offender and the offence so that the ‘punishment fits the crime’” (proulx, at para. 82). sentencing judges also give effect to proportionality through the common law process, by examining sentences imposed in similar cases. however, the court of appeal’s approach is dismissive of the value of precedent in achieving proportionality, which draws on the experience, philosophy and perspective of all judges over time. as it explained, the use of precedent for sentences “is not usually a useful exercise. . instead, the value of sentencing precedent lies in its principles and (where given) its starting points” (r v. m (bs), 2011 abca 105, 44 alta. lr (5th) 240, at para. 7). essentially, the court of appeal has rejected the common law method in sentencing, which, as explained in friesen, achieves both parity and proportionality over time through individualized sentencing in each case: in practice, parity gives meaning to proportionality a proportionate sentence for a given offender and offence cannot be deduced from first principles; instead, judges calibrate the demands of proportionality by reference to the sentences imposed in other cases. sentencing precedents reflect the range of factual situations in the world and the plurality of judicial perspectives precedents embody the collective experience and wisdom of the judiciary. they are the practical expression of both parity and proportionality. [para. 33] this is a key distinguishing feature between starting points and sentencing ranges. (3) role of appellate courts finally, according to the court of appeal of alberta, appellate courts have significant advantages over sentencing judges, which justifies their “leadership role” in sentencing (arcand, at para 87) appellate courts are “institutionally better able to properly assure similarity of treatment in sentencing” (para. 82). they can “appreciate overall sentencing practices, patterns and problems in their jurisdiction” and have “an enlarged reservoir of experience, philosophy and perspective to be synthesized into acceptable, and accepted, starting points” (para. 153). in fact, by codifying parity as a principle of sentencing in 1996, “parliament necessarily reinforced the powers of courts of appeal” (para. 82). as the foregoing makes clear, the starting-point approach is premised on a misconception of the role of appellate courts in sentencing. the “reinforced” role of appellate courts is incompatible with this court’s sentencing jurisprudence, which emphasizes discretion and adopted a correspondingly deferential standard of appellate review (see, eg,. r v. stone, [1999] 2 scr 290, at para. 230). sentencing judges, rather than appellate courts, are in a privileged position and possess “unique qualifications of experience and judgment” to determine what is a just and appropriate sentence (m (ca), at para. 91). moreover, appellate courts can demonstrate “leadership” and provide guidance without setting starting points. as mentioned, appellate courts can “depart from prior precedents and sentencing ranges in order to impose a proportionate sentence” (friesen, at para. 108; see also manson (2001), at p 66), while respecting the sentencing judges’ primary responsibility for sentencing. in sum, because the starting-point approach sees individualization of approach as a threat to the rule of law, it requires appellate courts to create and enforce a uniform approach to sentencing it reverses the logic of deference to sentencing judges and frames appellate courts, rather than sentencing courts, as being primarily institutionally responsible and capable for sentencing. (4) conclusion the starting-point approach is flawed, as it rests on unsound legal foundations. the foundational problems of the starting-point approach i described go to the root of it it views the wide discretion of sentencing judges as a problem, sentencing ranges as rudimentary and insufficient constraints, and appellate courts as endowed with an interventionist role it is premised on a fundamentally different understanding of the roles of appellate and sentencing courts. thus, starting points are a mechanism to shift effective decision-making authority from individual sentencing judges and concentrate that authority in the court of appeal as a body that tightly supervises sentencing in the province given these foundational problems, i would disavow the approach as a whole. c. starting points in practice i turn now from doctrinal concerns with starting points to the practical problems that arise from their use. the latter is a manifestation in practice of what the former describes at the level of principle. in short, applying unsound doctrine gives rise to problematic consequences. to tinker with those consequences while leaving intact the unsound doctrine will yield little of significance. it is with this perspective that i address the application of the starting-point approach. in my view, the starting-point approach produces practical issues at each of its stages: (1) how starting points are set; (2) how they are applied by sentencing judges; and (3) how they are reviewed by appellate courts. i examine each in turn. (1) setting the starting point and the role of appellate courts (a) setting starting points extends beyond the role of appellate courts the first step in the starting-point approach involves the appellate court categorizing offences and setting a number for each category. this court has made it clear that such judicially-created categories cannot be treated as binding, because it would usurp parliament’s role (mcdonnell, at para. 33). judicial categorization of offences is not, per se, an issue a degree of categorization is necessary for broad offences with wide penalty ranges. this court has emphasized the importance of clarity in categorization for all appellate guidance in sentencing (friesen, at para. 39; stone, at para. 245). however, even if starting points are not treated as binding, setting starting points is a policy-intensive process, which the legislature or a statutory body such as a sentencing commission would be better suited to conduct. this is made clear by the court of appeal of alberta’s approach to setting starting points, which resembles a legislative process for example, in setting a starting point for major sexual interference, the court sought “evidence, records, literature and arguments” in relation to 13 complex issues (r v. bjornson, 2012 abca 230, 536 ar 1, at para. 8; hajar, at para. 54). the court of appeal in bjornson and hajar can be seen as exercising a parallel function to parliament, defining subcategories of offences and new rules of sentencing for each subcategory. starting points can then operate like judicially-created criminal offences. for example, the three-year starting point for commercial trafficking in cocaine applies to “more than a minimal” trafficking (r v maskill (1981), 29 a.r 107 (ca), at para. 20). whether the three-year starting-point applies is determined by reference to various “indicia” of commerciality, which can be “developed through the case law” (r. v. melnyk, 2014 abca 313, 580 ar 389, at para. 6). in effect, the court of appeal has created an offence for the purpose of sentencing. but creating new offences is the exclusive preserve of parliament, not the courts (s 9(a) of the criminal code; mcdonnell, at paras. 33-34; friesen, at para. 37). the principle of separation of powers demands that courts respect the limits of their role in the constitutional order and “show proper deference for the legitimate sphere of activity” of the other branches of the state (new brunswick broadcasting co. v. nova scotia (speaker of the house of assembly), [1993] 1 scr 319, at p 389), which have distinct roles and institutional capacities (ontario v. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr. 3, at para. 29; r v. chouhan, 2021 scc 26, at paras. 130-31, per rowe j). provincial appellate courts are not suited to make policy on sentencing, since they lack the resources to gather information to do so and are structured to respond to individual cases (canadian sentencing commission, sentencing reform: a canadian approach (1987), at p xxiv; see also manson (1997), at pp. 291-92; m. r. bloos and w. n. renke, “stopping starting points: r v. mcdonnell” (1997), 35 alta. l. rev. 795, at pp. 806-7). appellate courts can certainly provide guidance and develop the law in light of policy considerations, but they are ill-equipped to make general sentencing policy such as establishing starting points. they do not have the institutional capacity to gather and process the type of information the court of appeal of alberta sought in bjornson and hajar sentencing ranges do not raise similar concerns. even when appellate courts set the law in a new direction, they do not engage in the policy-intensive exercise as the court of appeal of alberta did in cases like hajar. in friesen, for instance, this court simply said that an upward departure from prior precedents may be required (paras. 107-14). it did not “adop[t] a form of starting point”, contrary to the suggestion of the alberta court of appeal in r v. hotchen, 2021 abca 119, 22 alta. lr (7th) 64, at para. 12. in other jurisdictions with starting-point sentencing, setting starting points is generally undertaken by sentencing commissions, which are better equipped than appellate courts to deal with these interlocking policy issues (see, eg,. a. ashworth and j. v. roberts, “the origins and nature of the sentencing guidelines in england and wales”, in a. ashworth and j. v. roberts, eds., sentencing guidelines: exploring the english model (2013), 1, at p 3). in fact, the canadian sentencing commission rejected the use of numerical sentencing grids found in some states in the united states (pp. 296-300; j. v. roberts, “structuring sentencing in canada, england and wales: a tale of two jurisdictions” (2012), 23 crim. lf 319, at p 323). more importantly, parliament rejected models of guideline sentencing established or overseen by provincial appellate courts. rather, it chose broad discretion guided by a common set of purposes and principles. i would add that among other problems, starting points raise procedural fairness concerns. the offender is in a difficult position because he or she may not have the resources to bring before the court all the evidence, social science literature, statistics and arguments to guide the court in setting a starting point offenders are concerned with their own case, not future hypothetical offenders or general principles of sentencing. in addition, the starting point set then applies to future offenders, who do not have the opportunity to challenge the crown’s evidence. (b) ossification and starting points sentencing requires flexibility “to ensure a result that is fit for the offender and for the administration of criminal justice” (manson et al., at p 38) flexibility means that what is considered to be a “fit sentence” can evolve. as mackay ja said in willaert, “[a] punishment appropriate to-day might have been quite unacceptable two hundred years ago and probably would be absurd two hundred years hence. it is therefore impossible to lay down hard-and-fast and permanent rules” (p 286) the starting-point approach does not provide adequate room for such flexibility. in alberta, for instance, starting points can only be varied by the court of appeal in accordance with its reconsideration procedure, which requires leave (arcand, at paras. 107 and 195-200). the premise of this requirement is that the variation of a starting point changes the law by overturning a binding precedent (para. 187) this issue of rigidity is compounded by the fact that starting points are often established in response to the prevalence of an offence in a community, with a view of requiring the imposition of higher sentences (see, eg,. r v. johnas (1982), 41 ar 183 (c.a), at para. 5; r v matwiy (1996), 178 ar 356 (ca), at para. 33) for instance, in the instant case, the court of appeal considered the public health crisis in alberta in the creation of the starting point (felix (abca), at para. 40). but, even if the circumstances seen as justifying a high starting point may subside, the starting point remains in place until it is overruled. the inability of starting points to evolve is borne out in practice i am unaware of a starting point that has been reconsidered by the court of appeal of alberta. thus far, in effect, once a starting point has been established, it is set in stone. by contrast, variation of sentencing ranges occurs gradually through the common law method: “ranges” are not embedded in stone. given their nature as guidelines only, i do not view them as being fixed in law, as is the case with binding legal principles they may be altered deliberately, after careful consideration, by the courts or, they may be altered practically, as a consequence of a series of decisions made by the courts which have that effect. if a range moves by virtue of the application of individual cases over time, it is not necessary to overrule an earlier range that may once have been in vogue; it is only necessary to recognize that the courts have adapted and the guidelines have changed. [emphasis added.] (r v. wright (2006), 83 or (3d) 427, at para. 22; see also h. parent and j. desrosiers, traité de droit criminel, t iii, la peine (3rd ed. 2020), at pp. 699-700.) in my view, the application of the reconsideration procedure to starting points is another sign that the starting-point approach is fundamentally incompatible with canadian sentencing law. like many other aspects of the starting-point approach, it is premised on the notion that starting points are and must be binding. the rigidity of starting points is not only due to their aggressive enforcement by the court of appeal. rather, it is ingrained into its operation, including the reconsideration procedure. (2) starting-point sentencing is inconsistent with the principles of sentencing once starting points are set, the next step is for sentencing judges to apply them in my view, this is another area in which the starting-point approach is inconsistent with the principles of sentencing prescribed by parliament and by this court. even if the court of appeal were to give proper effect to the standard of review and stopped treating starting points as binding, something that the court of appeal of alberta has resisted, it does not resolve the inherent issues raised by sentencing judges applying the starting-point approach first, sentencing judges applying the starting-point approach have less discretion to fully consider all relevant circumstances and are thus are less likely to arrive at individualized and proportionate sentences. second, starting points overemphasize deterrence and denunciation third, they are incompatible with parliament’s direction for sentencing aboriginal offenders. finally, they fail to provide guidance to sentencing judges in certain important matters. (a) starting points impede individualized sentencing and constrain discretion sentencing judges must individualize sentencing “both in method and outcome” (friesen, at para. 38) but the starting-point approach does not enable sentencing judges to sufficiently individualize sentencing as its very purpose is to restrain judicial discretion. (i) starting points privilege consideration of the gravity of the offence over the offender’s moral blameworthiness starting points are defined solely in relation to the gravity of the offence. the moral blameworthiness and personal characteristics of the offender are only a secondary consideration, when adjusting the sentence away from the starting point. this is a methodological problem because both the gravity of the offence and the offender’s moral blameworthiness must be considered in an integrated manner to achieve proportionate sentences. parliament defines proportionality in terms of both of these factors (s 718.1 of the criminal code). while the starting-point approach allows for deviation to take into account the individual circumstances of the accused, this is an inadequate response. sentencing judges ought not to prioritize one element of proportionality as a matter of law, even if the process as a whole ultimately accounts for both elements of proportionality in proulx, lamer c.j explained that offence-based presumptions in sentencing are inconsistent with the sentencing methodology prescribed by parliament because they lead to insufficient consideration of the moral blameworthiness of the offender: my difficulty with the suggestion that the proportionality principle presumptively excludes certain offences from the conditional sentencing regime is that such an approach focuses inordinately on the gravity of the offence and insufficiently on the moral blameworthiness of the offender. the principle. this proportionality requires that full consideration be given to both factors. [emphasis in original; para. 83] fundamentally misconstrues the nature of i agree with bennett j.a of the court of appeal for british columbia, dissenting, but not on this point: the real difficulty with “starting point sentences” is that they tend to ignore, or at least lessen the importance of the circumstances of the offender and focus on the circumstances of the offence. this may result in sentences that are not proportional, as they do not sufficiently consider the moral blameworthiness of the offender. (r v. agin, 2018 bcca 133, 361 ccc (3d) 258, at para. 97) sentencing judges using a presumptive sentence crafted solely in relation to the gravity of the offence do not follow a truly individualized process: it is submitted that though our system permits greater divergence in sentence it retains the undoubted virtue of placing the particular offence and the particular offender first in priority. this helps to keep sentencing human and minimize any tendency to devolve into a mechanical enterprise. it would be wrong, in our sentencing system, to make any single factor more important than the principle that sentence be appropriate to the particular offence and the individual offender. sensitivity and flexibility in sentencing requires that the approach to be taken should flow from the facts of the case and not from any single rule, however useful or certain that rule may be. [emphasis added.] (c. c. ruby, sentencing (2nd ed. 1980), at pp. 423-24) unlike starting points, ranges are not presumptions. sentencing judges do not have to begin their analysis at the range and adjust the sentence to reflect the individualized circumstances of the accused. ranges simply demonstrate the typical breadth of sentences for an offence. in considering the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender together, they allow judges to give full effect to both of these elements. i find it telling that the court of appeal of alberta considered that using starting points for young offenders was inappropriate because of the significant measure of individualization in sentencing a young person (r v. w (cw) (1986), 43 alta. lr (2d) 208, at pp. 212-13). this court has now clearly stated that “sentencing is first and foremost an individualized exercise” for adult offenders as well (boudreault, at para. 58) if starting points are incompatible with individualization for young offenders, they should be for adult offenders as well. (ii) pre-weighing factors by the appellate court by “building in” some factors to the starting point, the appellate court effectively prescribes the weight to be given to these factors by sentencing judges, displacing the sentencing judges’ discretion to determine their weight. a portion of the analysis is already conducted. pre-weighing factors directly encroaches on sentencing judges’ discretion: “the weighing of relevant factors, the balancing process is what the exercise of discretion is all about” (mcknight, at para. 35, cited with approval in nasogaluak, at para. 46). even where it is not done explicitly, as my colleagues propose (at para. 46), mitigating factors will always be implicitly “built in” to starting points, as the very notion of a starting point requires a baseline or archetypal offence and offender. take “good character”, a factor built in starting points (arcand, at para. 132; felix (abca), at para. 45). absent a finding that the offender’s character was “even better than might be supposed”, a sentencing judge may not give it different or additional weight (arcand, at para. 135). sentencing judges, not appellate courts, should determine what weight to give to this factor in light of the individual circumstances of the offender. building this factor into the starting point interferes with sentencing judges’ ability and duty to consider all relevant circumstances in sentencing (stone, at para. 244). moreover, building in “good character” assumes that it applies in the same way to all offenders and overlooks that good character has many degrees (bloos and renke, at p 803). such a methodology is incompatible with individualized sentencing. i acknowledge that some sentencing ranges have also incorporated mitigating factors such as prior good character into the sentencing range (see, eg,. r. v. h (cn) (2002), 62 or (3d) 564 (ca), at para. 32; r v. voong, 2015 bcca 285, 374 bcac 166; r v cunningham (1996), 104 ccc (3d) 542 (ont ca), at p 546). they do not represent the norm. in my view, building in such factors in ranges is also questionable having regard to individualization but, in any case, building in factors in a range does not impede individualization in the same way as starting points. sentencing judges retain the discretion to evaluate the weight of the good character of the accused (for example) within or even outside the range. judges using the starting- point approach do not. (iii) starting points produce an artificial sentencing methodology by overemphasizing the judicially created category under the starting-point approach, categorization is pivotal. for example, while “not always easy to draw” (felix (abca), at para. 51), the distinction between commercial and wholesale trafficking in cocaine is the difference between a three and four and one-half-year starting point (r v. rahime, 2001 abca 203, 95 alta. lr. (3d) 237, at para. 18; r v. ma, 2003 abca 220, 23 alta. lr (4th) 14). if the same proportion applies to fentanyl, this elusive distinction will determine whether a six or nine-year starting point is applicable this improperly shifts the main focus from whether a sentence is just and appropriate for an offender to which judicially-created category applies. in addition, the starting-point approach requires parties and judges to identify which factors can justify deviation from the starting point having regard to the factors that are already built in the hypothetical baseline offence. as m. r. bloos and m. c. plaxton say, starting points “subject the sentencing process to an unnatural compartmentalization of factors that either over-complicates the process, or forces the sentencing judge to give certain factors more or less weight than is appropriate” (“starting-point sentencing and the application of laberge in unlawful act manslaughter cases” (2003), 6 cr (6th) 346, at p 352). sentencing judges should not be burdened with such artificial and convoluted debates, rules and categories they should instead consider all relevant factors in an integrated manner and compare them to comparable cases to determine the just and appropriate sentence for the offender before the court (bloos and plaxton, at p 352). sentencing ranges do not raise similar concerns ranges for related categories typically overlap, while the jump from one starting point to the next is jagged. ranges instruct sentencing judges to view the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender as a matter of degree, on a continuum. as a result, as the intervener the legal aid society of alberta notes, ranges “rarely see judges bogged down in disagreements about whether an offence comes within a defined subcategory, or whether a fact aggravates or mitigates compared to some hypothetical baseline offence” (if, at para. 3) it is a methodology more conducive to individualized sentencing. (iv) the “clustering” effect of starting points commentators have noted that the starting-point approach has the “natural effect of bunching sentences around a median rather than spreading them across a range to suit individualized circumstances” (manson (1997), at p 282) this is the “clustering” effect, which is “antithetical to individualization: the more clustering we observe, the less likely it is that sentence outcomes reflect the unique nature of each case or are proportionate” (i. d marder and j. pina-sánchez, “nudge the judge? theorizing the interaction between heuristics, sentencing guidelines and sentence clustering” (2020), 20 ccj 399, at p 401). by contrast, sentences spread along ranges can better reflect individualized circumstances. the parties contest whether “clustering” can be empirically established. however, i note that “clustering” effects in sentencing have been studied by several commentators (see, eg,. marder and pina-sánchez; m. w. bennett, “confronting cognitive ‘anchoring effect’ and ‘blind spot’ biases in federal sentencing: a modest solution for reforming a fundamental flaw” (2014), 104 j. crim. l & criminology 489, at pp. 523-29 (finding that even advisory sentencing grids acted as a “hulking anchor for most judges”); d. m. isaacs, “baseline framing in sentencing” (2011), 121 yale lj 426, at p 426 (finding that “sentences disproportionately cluste[r] around the typical sentence in a typical crime baseline regime” (emphasis deleted)); c. guthrie, j. j. rachlinski and a. j. wistrich, “inside the judicial mind” (2001), 86 cornell l. rev 777, at pp. 787-94 (on the “anchoring” effect of numerical values more generally)). the anchoring effect is a well-known cognitive bias: final judgments are disproportionately biased toward the starting point of a decision-maker’s reasoning (a. tversky and d. kahneman, “judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases” (1974), 185 science 1124, at p 1128) while sentencing ranges can also produce clustering effects, this tends to be in jurisdictions where ranges are established by sentencing grids (eg, various u.s states) or by sentencing commissions (eg, the united kingdom) (marder and pina-sánchez; bennett). the crown points to sentences that deviate significantly from the starting point as evidence of the absence of clustering effect in many of the cases it cites, however, the court of appeal intervened and varied restrained sentences that were crafted because of the individual circumstances of offenders and offences for not properly applying a starting point (r v. corbiere, 2017 abca 164, 53 alta. lr (6th) 1; r v. giroux, 2018 abca 56, 68 alta. lr (6th) 21; r v. l’hirondelle, 2018 abca 33; r v. melnyk, 2014 abca 344, 584 ar 238). consequently, these cases do not stand for the proposition that the starting-point approach is compatible with individualized sentencing and do not refute the clustering effect. in addition, “clustering” also follows logically. for instance, it will be more difficult to impose a 90-day sentence for an offender convicted of trafficking in cocaine or crack cocaine with strong rehabilitative potential and significant mitigating factors if the starting point is 3 years than if there is a 6 months to 4 years range of sentence (comp. r v. godfrey, 2018 abca 369, 77 alta. lr (6th) 213, and r v. zawahra, 2016 qcca 871). while there is a paucity of empirical evidence, what there is reinforces the views that starting points are problematic in practice, as well as in principle. (b) starting points overemphasize denunciation and deterrence in theory, the court of appeal could set starting points to account for the various principles of sentencing. but this would overlook how starting points operate in practice starting points are often established to emphasize deterrence and denunciation and, in turn, to ensure more retributive punishment (manson (1997), at p 279, citing r v. sprague (1974), 19 ccc (2d) 513 (alta. ca);. johnas). this runs contrary to the objectives of the 1996 sentencing reform: “. . . reducing the use of prison as a sanction [and] expanding the use of restorative justice principles in sentencing” (gladue, at para. 48; s 718.2(e) of the criminal code). as one author notes: restorative justice principles do not appear in any of the alberta starting point decisions. invariably, they describe offences as calling for sentences which emphasize deterrence and denunciation. while some offences and offenders deserve harsh sanctions, to create a judicial category of an offence, and to then remove from the sentencing matrix all reference to restorative justice principles is not aligned with the philosophy expressed by parliament in the enactment of part xxiii of the criminal code, particularly ss. 718.2(d) and (e) [emphasis added.] (p. l. moreau, “trouble for starting points?” (2021), 68 cr (7th) 129, at p 135) starting points make it more difficult for judges to give adequate weight to restorative justice principles because they are designed to be easy to move up and hard to move down as mentioned, starting points generally build in the absence of a criminal record, prior good character, and the principle of restraint (arcand, at paras. 132-36, 293 and 333). moreover, “[t]he connection of the crime to addiction is not significantly mitigating” and “[c]ompliance with bail conditions [is] at best neutral” (godfrey, at para. 16). of course, starting points are not minimum sentences (arcand, at para. 131). still, they explicitly or implicitly foreclose reliance on multiple mitigating factors (bloos and renke, at p 803; manson (2001), at p 68). in short, judges applying a sentencing tool that overemphasizes deterrence and denunciation and that forecloses reliance on multiple mitigating factors risk overlooking lower, appropriate sentences. (c) the starting-point approach is contrary to parliament’s direction for sentencing aboriginal offenders section 718.2(e) directs sentencing judges to pay “particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders”. in gladue, this court explained that “the effect of s 718.2(e) is to alter the method of analysis which sentencing judges must use in determining a fit sentence for aboriginal offenders” (para. 93(5); ipeelee, at para. 59). gladue requires sentencing judges “to undertake the sentencing of aboriginal offenders individually, but also differently”, taking into account the systemic and background factors that bear on the culpability of the offender and the types of sanctions which might be appropriate because of the offender’s aboriginal heritage or connection (para. 93(6); ipeelee, at paras. 72-73 and 75). sentencing aboriginal offenders is a highly individualized process that acknowledges that “the circumstances of aboriginal people are unique” (gladue, at para. 93(6)). therefore, methodologically, it would be an error for sentencing judges to determine an appropriate sentence for aboriginal offenders by reference to a “typical” non-aboriginal offender: if the offender is aboriginal, then courts must consider all of the circumstances of that offender, including the unique circumstances described in gladue there is no sense comparing the sentence that a particular aboriginal offender would receive to the sentence that some hypothetical non-aboriginal offender would receive, because there is only one offender standing before the court. [emphasis added.] (ipeelee, at para. 86) “[c]omparing the sentence that a particular aboriginal offender would receive to the sentence that some hypothetical non-aboriginal offender would receive” is precisely the starting-point methodology, applied to aboriginal offenders the starting-point approach reduces the holistic gladue analysis to a matter of minor subtraction from the starting point (in some instances) (see, eg,. corbiere and arcand). this is an inherent problem with the starting-point approach. the failure to give proper effect to the gladue methodology constitutes an error justifying appellate intervention (ipeelee, at para. 87). unsurprisingly given this improper sentencing methodology, the starting-point approach appears to deflect alberta courts from the different process of sentencing set out in gladue. for instance, in arcand, the court of appeal of alberta was almost silent on the significance of mr. arcand being an aboriginal person and to the impact of gladue (rudin, at p 1007; for other cases that show how starting points work to frustrate gladue considerations, see l’hirondelle; corbiere; giroux; r v. wilson, 2009 abca 257, 9 alta. lr (5th) 283; r v. huskins, 2018 abpc 227; r v. soosay, 2017 abqb 478) professor t. quigley also noted that appellate judges “armed with the starting point approach and the fetish against disparity” were less open to conditional sentences and sentencing circle dispositions (“are we doing anything about the disproportionate jailing of aboriginal people?” (1999), 42 crim. lq 129, at p 144). this is not a coincidence. rather, it is a consequence of the starting point approach, which is driven by the “typical offender” and only adjusts for individual offenders and which tends to increase the rates of incarceration (manson (1997), at pp. 280-83) the current approach is contrary to parliament’s direction for a highly individualized process that takes fully into account the unique circumstances of aboriginal offenders. (d) the starting-point approach does not provide sufficient guidance to sentencing judges in addition to constraining discretion, starting points are paradoxically not as effective as sentencing ranges to provide adequate guidance to sentencing judges in important respects. first, starting points do not inform the normal range of variation. ranges are more illustrative because they emerge from a series of precedents and show the typical breadth of possible sentences. by contrast, as even a proponent of starting point sentencing accepts, starting points provide little guidance about “the degree or quantum of effect generated by aggravating or mitigating factors” (p. moreau, “in defence of starting point sentencing” (2016), 63 crim. lq 345, at p 355). second, unlike ranges, starting points cannot “reflect the range of factual situations in the world and the plurality of judicial perspectives” and “embody the collective experience and wisdom of the judiciary” (friesen, at para. 33). the absence of illustrating precedents can make starting points more mechanical in their application. i agree with professor ruby’s critique of the court of appeal of alberta’s approach to precedent: the alberta court of appeal — alone amongst all the provincial courts of appeal — has developed a doctrine where only cases, even from their own court, that the court itself has designated as sentencing precedents can be used in argument by counsel. . however, this insistence that some precedents from the court of appeal are simply not to be used runs counter to the statutory mandate in section 718.2(b) of the criminal code, which requires that a court take into consideration the principle that “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances” the code does not say that a similarity with some sentences, but not all relevant ones, is sufficient. indeed, the rule seems to be a violation of that principle it is an instruction suitable for children: “do as we say, not as we do”. [emphasis added.] ((2020), at §§ 4.22 and 4.23) thus, starting points limit sentencing judges’ ability to draw from a broad pool of experience which, in turn, runs counter to the principle of parity. (3) rigid appellate intervention is inevitable the last relevant feature of the starting-point approach is its aggressive enforcement by appellate courts. sentencing judges who do not commence sentencing from a starting point or who deviate significantly from the starting point can expect to be overturned (r v. ilesic, 2000 abca 254, 89 alta. lr (3d) 299, at para. 6; arcand, at paras. 116-17; ruby (2020), at § 412). in my view, reiterating the settled standard of appellate review is insufficient to address this. this court has consistently reminded provincial appellate courts not to vary sentences unless they are demonstrably unfit or tainted by a material error in principle (lacasse, at para. 11; friesen, at para. 26). yet the court of appeal of alberta continues to rely on starting points to circumvent this standard. indeed, by faithfully adhering to starting-point methodology, it is difficult for them to do otherwise. in mcdonnell, this court disapproved of the interventionist approach of the court of appeal of alberta in relation to starting points. it stated that “it can never be an error in principle in itself to fail to place a particular offence within a judicially created category . . for the purposes of sentencing” because deference should be shown to sentencing judges’ decisions (para. 32). in proulx, it reiterated that starting points can only be set out as “guides” to lower courts (para. 86). despite this strong language, “the alberta court of appeal refuses to view starting points as mere guidance” (ruby (2020), at § 2315). the court of appeal has made it clear that since starting points are designed to minimize disparity in sentencing, sentencing judges are not free to ignore them or to pay lip service to them (arcand, at para. 118; r v innes, 2012 abca 283, at para. 5 (canlii)) it has reminded sentencing judges that although they can deviate from the starting point, “caution is in order” because “[f]acts relied on to deviate from the starting point should be relevant to sentence and reasonably justify deviation” (arcand, at para. 106). in other words, it has treated starting points as binding. as o’brien and hunt jja noted in their separate reasons in arcand, the majority did not “adhere completely to supreme court authority” and effectively elevated starting points to a “rule of law” (paras. 302(a) and 352). even after lacasse, where this court reaffirmed that appellate courts may not intervene because they would have put the sentence in another category (at para. 51), the court of appeal of alberta has continued say that failure to place an offence within the correct category constitutes a reviewable error (see, eg,. r v. reddekopp, 2018 abca 399, 79 alta. lr (6th) 215, at para. 5; godfrey, at para. 6) and to refer to its jurisprudence establishing starting points as “binding” (godfrey, at para. 15; r v. jas, 2019 abca 376, at paras. 12-13 (canlii); hajar, at para. 160- 61; dsc, at para. 40). in parranto, the court of appeal said that departure from the starting-point approach constitutes an error and that sentencing judges cannot treat starting points as “merely hortatory or suggestive” (2019 abca 457, 98 alta lr. (6th) 114, at paras. 28-29). this does not respect the authority of mcdonnell, lacasse and other decisions from this court. sentencing judges have stated that the court of appeal of alberta’s approach restrains their discretion and their ability to craft individualized sentences or to depart from the starting-point approach despite the supreme court’s clear pronouncements (see, eg,. r v. moriarty, 2016 abpc 25, 34 alta. lr (6th) 110, at para. 145; r v. boriskewich, 2017 abpc 202, 62 alta. lr (6th) 194, at paras. 51-52). the relationship between the standard of review and starting points was reiterated, again, in friesen: “. . . starting points cannot be binding in either theory or practice, and appellate courts cannot interpret or apply the standard of review to enforce them, contrary to r v. arcand . . .” (para. 37). yet, at least in some cases, the court of appeal of alberta continues to treat starting points as binding and as constraining sentencing judges’ discretion to consider all relevant factors. for instance, in r v. wakefield, 2020 abca 352, it found it was an error in principle to proceed from the wrong starting point and varied the sentence (para. 26 (canlii), see also r v roberts, 2020 abca 434, 17 alta lr. (7th) 255, at paras. 26 and 50; r v. morton, 2021 abca 29, at para. 25 (canlii)). this court’s calls for deference and individualized sentencing have not been heeded. the continued rigid enforcement of starting points by the court of appeal of alberta makes clear the fundamental incompatibility between the starting-point approach and a deferential standard of review the court of appeal of alberta has identified several avenues to circumvent the standard of review because of starting points: it intervenes if the sentencing judge failed to advert to the prescribed starting point (r v. tran, 2010 abca 317, 490 ar 229, at para. 16; giroux, at para. 12); if the sentence fails to give sufficient weight to deterrence and denunciation, as recorded in the starting point (godfrey, at para. 17); if the sentencing judge considered a factor already built in the starting point, which leads to double counting (r v gb, 2013 abca 93, 544 ar 127, at para. 5; r v. brodt, 2016 abca 373, 46 alta. lr (6th) 213, at para. 7); and if the sentence departs significantly from the starting point (corbiere, at paras. 25-27) departures from starting points facilitate appellate intervention in comparison to sentencing ranges: . . . it is much easier to upset a sentence of, say, 15 months’ imprisonment when the starting point is 3 years than it is when the range is 12 months to 3 years the departure from the low end of the range may be seen on appellate review as acceptable while the departure from the starting point is more readily adjudged to be reversible error. (gashikanyi, at para. 35) in effect, the starting-point approach multiplies potential “errors” and, in turn, increases the scope for the court of appeal to vary sentences. the time is past due to deal decisively with the methodological problems inherent in starting points those flaws are structural they cannot be cured by repeating, yet again, exhortations relating to the standard of review. this should come as no surprise since the purpose of the starting-point methodology is appellate control and this purpose is embedded in how it is designed to operate accordingly, the undermining of proper appellate review of sentencing is not a misapplication of starting-point methodology. rather, it is the fulfilment of its purpose. thus, the only effective response, in my view, is to say that the starting-point methodology should no longer be used. iii disposition i would disavow the starting-point approach to sentencing i agree with justice moldaver and adopt his reasons for the disposition of the appeals and the additional guidance he provides. the reasons of abella and karakatsanis jj. were delivered by karakatsanis j — i have read the reasons of my colleagues brown and martin jj. i agree with their analysis, from paras. 9 to 54, that starting points are a permissible form of appellate sentencing guidance, provided that starting points are not used to curtail the highly deferential sentencing standard of appellate review however, i do not agree with their disposition to dismiss these two appeals despite the emphasis on the starting-point approach in the parties’ submissions, the merits of these appeals ultimately stand or fall on the well-settled principles of appellate deference in sentencing. sentencing is an art, not a science, and appellate courts must show great deference to the trial judge’s exercise of discretion in crafting a fit, individualized sentence. unless the trial judge made an error in principle that impacted the sentence or the sentence was demonstrably unfit, appellate intervention is not justified: r v. lacasse, 2015 scc 64, [2015] 3 scr 1089, at paras. 39-44 and 52-55. in my view, neither trial judge made an error in principle, nor was either sentence demonstrably unfit in both appeals, the court of appeal did not act with restraint and deference but rather assumed a scrutineering, interventionist posture. the trial judges were faulted for their reasonable exercises of discretion, their factual findings were disregarded, and their demonstrated appreciations of the gravity of the offences before them were ignored. both appeals should therefore be allowed with the original sentences restored. my colleagues set out the facts of each appeal in detail and i do not propose to re-state those facts suffice to say the appellants were both very prolific and sophisticated fentanyl traffickers felix received a global sentence of 7 years (2019 abqb 183), while parranto received a global sentence of 11 years (2018 abqb 863). as i will explain, their respective sentencing reasons show that both trial judges appreciated the very grave nature of the offences committed by the appellants. if the sentences ultimately imposed were more lenient than the gravity of the offences would suggest, this was not because the trial judges took lenient views of wholesale fentanyl trafficking. rather, it was because each trial judge reasonably exercised their discretion to place great weight on mitigating factors and rehabilitative sentencing principles. it was not open to the court of appeal — and it is not open to this court — to reweigh those factors or to second-guess those principles. i. decisions below a r v. felix, 2019 abqb 183 (burrows j.) the trial judge in felix’s case spoke in clear terms of the dangers of fentanyl and the seriousness of felix’s offences: mr. felix’s crimes involve two very dangerous illicit drugs — fentanyl and cocaine both are highly addictive their use can cause serious physical and mental injury and even death to the user. a fentanyl user takes a particularly serious risk even a relatively modest dose can be an overdose and can easily cause death. the illicit use of these dangerous drugs impacts not only on the user but also on the rest of society in a many ways. the already strained resources of the health care system must respond to the physical and mental injury sustained by users. drug users often finance their addictions through crime. in addition, violent crimes are often committed by those active in the drug trade in order to protect sales territories or to retaliate when drug debts are not paid. the victims of these crimes are often innocent bystanders. drug trafficking crimes are fundamentally different than other crimes. both the criminal and the immediate victim, the user, are willing participants in the crime. no one involved resists the commission of the offence. this feature magnifies the already very significant seriousness of drug offences. [paras. 37-39 (canlii)] the trial judge clearly recognized that fentanyl trafficking was a very serious offence. similarly, the trial judge did not minimize felix’s high degree of culpability he found that felix’s moral blameworthiness was “very significantly aggravating” and “toward the high end” of the moral blameworthiness range: paras. 41-42. however, the trial judge considered a number of strong mitigating factors. he found that felix’s rehabilitation prospects were “extremely promising”: para. 48. he emphasized that felix had no criminal record and a positive background, including operating a legitimate company that worked to rebuild and restore fort mcmurray in the aftermath of the 2016 wildfire: paras. 31 and 44. the trial judge also noted felix’s “very solid and widespread support among his friends, family members, work colleagues, and neighbors” (para. 44), and referred to an “impressive collection” of 17 positive reference letters (para. 35). finally, he noted the reduced mitigating effect of felix’s guilty plea that, while late, did avoid a lengthy trial: para. 43. the trial judge then turned to the sentencing range that could be deduced from alberta’s fentanyl trafficking jurisprudence. he identified a five- to seven-year range but noted that, given felix’s high moral blameworthiness, his sentence “should be placed at least at the top” of that range: paras. 79-80. the trial judge also considered placing felix within a higher range of five to nine and a half years but did not do so as this “would not give appropriate weight to the mitigating factors . . . or to the fact that the other two persons accused with mr. felix received sentences of 5 years”: para. 81. the trial judge concluded his reasons with a discussion of sentencing objectives he emphasized the need to “strongly denounce” felix’s conduct with a sentence that would “constitute a strong deterrence to others”: para. 82. however, he balanced the emphasis on denunciation and deterrence with the mitigating factors he had identified and felix’s rehabilitative prospects, including his commitment to “socially positive pursuits”, and imposed a seven-year sentence: paras. 83-84. b r v. felix, 2019 abca 458 (antonio ja,. paperny, watson, slatter and crighton jja concurring) the court of appeal overturned felix’s seven-year sentence. in the court of appeal’s view, the trial judge chose “incorrect” comparator cases in deducing the five- to seven-year range: para. 72 the court of appeal identified three errors stemming from the trial judge’s “direct handling of the precedents he considered” (paras. 72-73): • failing to adequately distinguish commercial from wholesale trafficking when selecting comparators; • failing to account for the accused’s role in the organization, in particular by treating sentences imposed on his “runners” as direct comparators; and • double-counting the mitigation of the guilty plea, by using it to discount the sentence relative to precedents that had already been discounted by guilty pleas. the court of appeal further held that “[t]hese errors resulted in a sentence that [was] demonstrably unfit”: para. 73. the court of appeal then sentenced felix afresh in light of the nine-year starting point it had set. it held that felix’s role at the top of his organization was a “weighty aggravating factor”: para. 75. in stark contrast to the trial judge’s findings, the court of appeal found that there was “little to offer in mitigation”: para. 76. the court of appeal found reference letters that the trial judge called an “impressive collection” (para. 35) to be of “little mitigating value”, containing “inaccurate assumptions about mr. felix’s character and contribution to the community” (para. 77). in sum, the court of appeal found that a fit sentence would have been 13 years but reduced this to 10 years; the sentence the crown sought at trial: paras. 79, 82. c r v. parranto, 2018 abqb 863 (ouellette j.) like the trial judge in felix’s case, the trial judge in parranto’s case was clearly aware of the dangers of fentanyl, noting its addictive nature, potential to cause death, and the rise of fentanyl-related deaths in recent years: paras. 49-52 and 66-67. he found that the primary focus needed to be denunciation and deterrence: para. 66. as the trial judge stated: the fact that at least one person dies every day from a fentanyl-related death requires condemnation of the people who are in the business of selling fentanyl. [para. 66] once again, the trial judge clearly viewed wholesale fentanyl trafficking to be a very grave offence. in terms of parranto’s moral culpability, the trial judge found him to be a “middleman in wholesale fentanyl trafficking” because, while parranto was not on the “low end” of moral culpability, he was less morally culpable than those producing or importing fentanyl: para. 69. like in felix’s case, the trial judge in parranto’s case deduced a range of five to seven years for wholesale fentanyl trafficking: para. 65. the trial judge then identified a number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances he found it aggravating that parranto had a criminal record and committed his second set of offences while on release for the first set: paras. 77-79. he found one “significant” mitigating factor in the form of parranto’s early guilty pleas and the remorse they showed: paras. 80-81 he also found that parranto’s métis heritage was a mitigating factor and that parranto’s addiction was relevant to sentence, even if it was not a “true mitigating circumstance”: paras. 82-83. the trial judge then turned to the task of crafting a fit sentence for parranto. the trial judge’s approach was clear and methodical with respect to the weight he afforded to each relevant factor. he first determined what would be fit sentences for each set of offences charged without regard to mitigating circumstances and the totality principle. for the first set of offences, the trial judge found that a fit sentence would be nine years: seven years for the fentanyl trafficking, two years consecutive for the firearms charges, with concurrent sentences for the breaches of the court order and recognizance: paras. 88-89. for the second set of offences, the trial judge found that a fit sentence would be 11 years: 8 years for fentanyl trafficking, 3 years consecutive for the firearms charges, and again, concurrent sentences for the breaches of the court order and recognizance: para. 90. therefore, the notional global sentence, before considering mitigation and totality, was a 20-year prison sentence. the trial judge then turned to the mitigating circumstances and totality. he took up the crown’s initial suggestion to reduce the sentence by one-third in light of the remorse shown by parranto’s guilty pleas, leaving a sentence of 13.2 years: para. 92. he reduced this to 12 years given parranto’s métis heritage and addiction: paras. 93-94. finally, the sentence was reduced by another year on the basis of totality, leaving an 11-year global sentence: paras. 95-96. d r v. parranto, 2019 abca 457 (watson ja,. paperny, slatter, crighton and antonio jja concurring) the court of appeal overturned parranto’s sentence, finding that the trial judge made a “series of interrelated errors”, with the “principal error aris[ing] in his handling of the starting point approach”: para. 24. the court of appeal further held that the sentence was demonstrably unfit as it did not “serve the objectives of denunciation, deterrence . . . or protection of the public”: para. 25. the court of appeal identified four errors in principle in the trial judge’s reasons. first, the trial judge’s finding that knowledge of potential harm should not be imputed to parranto was dismissed as a “matter of conjecture”: paras. 46-47. second, the trial judge’s use of parranto’s addiction to reduce the sentence was critiqued for resting on a “questionable” evidential basis: paras. 51-52. third, the court of appeal held that there was “no clear foundation” for the trial judge to use parranto’s métis heritage as a mitigating factor: para. 53. fourth and finally, the court of appeal found a number of errors in the trial judge’s totality analysis. totality, the court of appeal said, is a “concept” rather than a “principle”, and as such “does not outweigh sentencing principles”: para. 54. according to the court of appeal, the trial judge erred by using totality “multiple times”, resulting in “free rides” for certain offences: para. 56. in the end, the court of appeal increased parranto’s global sentence to the 14 years initially sought by the crown at trial: paras. 68-69. ii analysis the principles governing appellate sentencing review are well-settled. appellate courts can only intervene if the trial judge has erred in principle in a way that impacted the sentence or if the sentence was demonstrably unfit: lacasse, at paras. 43- 44 and 52-55. errors in principle include errors of law, the failure to consider a relevant factor, the erroneous consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors, and unreasonable weighing or balancing of different factors: r v. friesen, 2020 scc 9, at para 26 a trial judge has not erred in principle simply because the appellate court would have weighed the relevant factors differently: lacasse, at para. 49. appellate intervention on the basis of the weight or emphasis given to different factors will only be justified if the trial judge exercised their discretion unreasonably: r v. nasogaluak, 2010 scc 6, [2010] 1 scr 206, at para. 46, citing r v. mcknight (1999), 135 ccc. (3d) 41 (ont. ca), per laskin ja. similarly, where the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, does not dictate otherwise, the sentencing judge has discretion over which sentencing objectives in s 718 to prioritize, such as denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and how much weight to afford to the secondary sentencing principles in s 718.2, such as parity and restraint: lacasse, at paras. 54-55; nasogaluak, at para. 43. it is also not an error in principle to use the “wrong” sentencing range. the choice of a sentencing range is a matter that falls within the trial judge’s discretion and an appellate court cannot intervene just because it would have used a different range: lacasse, at para. 51; r v. lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr 130, at para. 52. even if an error in principle is found, this does not necessarily permit appellate intervention. deference must still be shown to the original sentence unless the error in principle impacted the sentence imposed: lacasse, at paras. 43-44. in the absence of any errors in principle that impacted the sentence, an appellate court can only intervene if the sentence imposed is demonstrably unfit a sentence is demonstrably unfit where it constitutes an unreasonable departure from the fundamental principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: lacasse, at paras. 53-55; criminal code, s 7181. a sentence is not demonstrably unfit simply because it falls outside of a particular sentencing range. a proportionate sentence must reconcile the principles of individualization and parity: the trial judge must calibrate a sentence that is proportionate for this offence by this offender, while also being consistent with sentences for similar offences in similar circumstances: lacasse, at para. 53. however, parity is a secondary sentencing principle, subordinate to proportionality (lacasse, at para. 54), and cannot “be given priority over the principle of deference to the trial judge’s exercise of discretion”: r v lm, 2008 scc 31, [2008] 2 scr 163, at para. 35. as lebel j explained in lm, “[t]he principle of parity does not preclude disparity where warranted by the circumstances: para. 36 (emphasis in original), citing f. dadour, de la détermination de la peine: principes et applications (2007), at p 18. however, sentences that significantly depart from an established sentencing range or starting point may signal potential fitness concerns sentencing ranges and starting points are tools to provide busy trial judges with a jurisprudential view of the gravity of the offence sentencing ranges provide trial judges with “historical portraits” of how past judges have applied the principles and objectives of sentencing in similar circumstances: lacasse, at para. 57. similarly, a properly applied starting point represents appellate guidance regarding the gravity of a given type of offence: brown and martin jj.’s reasons, at paras. 20 and 44 when a sentence significantly departs from a range or starting point, there is an understandable concern that the trial judge may have exercised their discretion unreasonably in some way. a significant deviation does not necessarily reflect a demonstrably unfit sentence as this court stated in lacasse, deviation from a range cannot justify appellate intervention “unless the sentence that is imposed departs significantly and for no reason from the contemplated sentences. absent an error in principle, an appellate court may not vary a sentence unless the sentence is demonstrably unfit”: para. 67. even though the starting point reflects appellate guidance regarding the gravity of the offence, where there is a significant deviation, appellate review must be conducted in accordance with the ordinary sentencing standard of review if, for example, the deviation results from an unreasonably lenient view of the gravity of the offence, or from unreasonably minimizing the offender’s moral blameworthiness, then the sentence will be an unreasonable departure from the proportionality principle and will be demonstrably unfit if, on the other hand, the deviation stems from heavy but reasonable emphasis on mitigating factors and rehabilitative principles, appellate intervention is not justified. in other words, whether a sentence is demonstrably unfit is a qualitative rather than a quantitative assessment. what matters is whether the trial judge imposed a proportionate sentence by reasonably appreciating the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender in the specific circumstances of the case: lacasse, at paras. 58 and 67; nasogaluak, at para. 44; lm, at para. 36. if the trial judge has done so then appellate intervention is not justified, regardless of how far the sentence deviates from a range or starting point: lacasse, at paras. 53 and 67; brown and martin jj.’s reasons, at paras. 29-30 and 38. iii application in my view, the court of appeal was not justified in intervening in either case. none of the purported errors in principle are borne out on a fair reading of the trial judge’s reasons and neither sentence was demonstrably unfit. i begin with felix’s appeal and then turn to parranto’s appeal. a felix in my view, the trial judge did not err in principle. the court of appeal identified three errors in principle in the trial judge’s analysis but all three stem from the trial judge’s purportedly “incorrect” identification of the five- to seven-year range: paras. 72-73. similarly, my colleagues say the trial judge should have used the “more accurate” 8- to 15-year range: brown and martin jj.’s reasons, at para. 68. however, the range chosen was within the trial judge’s discretion and the court of appeal could only intervene if the sentence was demonstrably unfit: lacasse, at para. 51; lloyd, at para. 52. nor was the seven-year sentence demonstrably unfit. as i have explained, the trial judge demonstrated his appreciation of the severity of felix’s offences, commenting on the dangers of fentanyl and the seriousness of the drug trafficking: paras. 37-39. he also recognized felix’s “significantly aggravating” degree of moral blameworthiness and culpability (paras. 40-42) and the need to “strongly denounce” and deter this conduct (para. 82). in my view, it cannot be said that the trial judge took such a lenient view of wholesale fentanyl trafficking or minimized felix’s culpability to such a degree that the sentence was an unreasonable departure from the proportionality principle: see lacasse, at para. 53 rather, the reason the sentence imposed was seven years — and not longer — was because of the trial judge’s weighty but reasonable emphasis on the mitigating factors and rehabilitative principles: paras. 48 and 83. that other judges may have weighed those factors differently does not justify appellate intervention. my colleagues suggest that “[i]t is clear the sentencing judge misapprehended the gravity of the offence”: brown and martin jj.’s reasons, at para. 67. however, such a conclusion has no foundation in the trial judge’s reasons. rather, it seems to stem solely from the trial judge’s failure to use the “more accurate” range that my colleagues would have used. just as the choice of a range itself cannot be an error in principle and does not render a sentence demonstrably unfit, it cannot be said that the choice of the “wrong” range demonstrates a misapprehension of the gravity of the offence to find otherwise, in my view, is directly contrary to this court’s continuous line of authority in lm,. nasogaluak, lacasse, and friesen. the court of appeal did not take issue with the trial judge’s appreciation of the gravity of felix’s offences. where the opinion of the court of appeal differed from that of the trial judge was with regard to the mitigating factors. the trial judge found multiple strong mitigating factors, including felix’s “extremely promising” prospects of rehabilitation: para. 48. conversely, the court of appeal found that there was “little to offer in mitigation”: para. 76. in the absence of errors in principle though, it was not open to the court of appeal to reweigh these mitigating factors. the trial judge’s sentence, even if it significantly departed from the “correct” range or starting point, represented a reasonable appreciation of the gravity of the offence and felix’s degree of responsibility. in sum, while the original sentence certainly could have been longer, the trial judge made no errors in principle that impacted the sentence and it was not demonstrably unfit i would therefore allow the appeal and restore the original sentence. b parranto as with felix, the court of appeal and my colleagues take issue with the trial judge’s selection of a five- to seven-year range in parranto’s case: ca reasons, at para. 30; brown and martin jj.’s reasons, at para. 77. again, the choice of a range was within the trial judge’s discretion. this choice is not itself an error in principle, nor does it indicate a misapprehension of the gravity of the offences. in my view, the sentence was not demonstrably unfit the trial judge appreciated the gravity of parranto’s offences and his moral blameworthiness. the trial judge’s initial notional sentence for the fentanyl offences, before considering mitigating factors and totality, was 15 years. this lengthy notional sentence represents an appropriately grave view of grave offences. indeed, neither the court of appeal nor my colleagues appear to take issue with the trial judge’s notional sentence. rather, their concerns arise with what it was reduced to after the trial judge considered the mitigating factors and totality. the court of appeal took issue with the trial judge’s use of three mitigating factors: (i) parranto’s lack of knowledge of the harms of fentanyl; (ii) parranto’s addiction; and (iii) parranto’s métis heritage (paras. 46-47 and 51-53). however, all three critiques impermissibly intrude upon the trial judge’s factual findings. first, the trial judge found that “it would be wrong to impute knowledge of potential harm to mr. parranto”: para. 68. the court of appeal disagreed, dismissing this finding as a “matter of conjecture”: para. 47 in the absence of palpable and overriding error though, the court of appeal was required to defer to the trial judge’s factual findings and was not entitled to disagree. furthermore, the court of appeal found that the trial judge erred in using parranto’s addiction as a mitigating factor because of its “questionable” evidentiary basis: para. 52. again, this was not open to the court of appeal. the trial judge made a factual finding that parranto suffered from addiction: paras. 48, 83 and 93. the court of appeal was obliged to respect that finding absent palpable and overriding error. similarly, the court of appeal faulted the trial judge for using parranto’s métis heritage as a mitigating factor: para. 53. this seemed to be rooted in the court of appeal’s concern that the defence did not request a gladue report at trial: para. 5. however, the crown conceded that parranto’s métis heritage was a mitigating factor (trial reasons, at para. 82) — a fair concession given this court’s direction to take judicial notice of the systemic factors that affect indigenous persons: r v. ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1 scr 433, at paras. 59-60. the trial judge evidently found there was a sufficient factual basis to make this finding even in the absence of a gladue report. once again, it was not open to the court of appeal to disagree. finally, the court of appeal identified an error in principle in the trial judge’s totality analysis however, the court of appeal began from the erroneous premise that totality is a “concept” that “does not outweigh sentencing principles”: para. 54. on the contrary, totality is indeed a sentencing principle — it is a function of the fundamental principle of proportionality that is engaged when consecutive sentences are imposed: r v. m (ca), [1996] 1 scr 500, at para. 42; friesen, at paras. 157-58. different judges may have approached totality differently in this case but that does not mean the trial judge erred in his analysis, nor that the sentence was demonstrably unfit. again, parranto certainly could have received a longer sentence but that is not the test the trial judge did not err in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit. the original sentence should be restored. iv conclusion for these reasons, i would allow both appeals and restore the original sentences.
i. introduction [1] this appeal affords this court a first opportunity to interpret s 669.2(3) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, which lays down the rules that apply if a trial judge dies or is unable to continue when no adjudication has been made or verdict rendered the key issue concerns the rules of evidence in a trial commenced again before a new judge sitting alone. the parties are asking this court to rule on the legal framework governing the admissibility in evidence in a trial that is commenced again, as evidence on the merits, of transcripts of testimony from a first trial that have been filed by mutual consent. [2] section 669.2(3) provides that the judge before whom the proceedings are continued must, if the trial was before a judge alone and no adjudication was made or verdict rendered, commence the trial again as if no evidence on the merits had been taken. however, s 669.2 says nothing about whether evidence adduced before the first judge may be adduced as evidence on the merits in the trial that is commenced again. [3] although it is common ground that such evidence can be filed at the trial that is commenced again, the parties disagree on the test to be applied when the prosecution and the accused consent to the filing of a transcript of testimony heard by the judge before whom the trial first commenced. the quebec court of appeal, relying on the rule that testimony is conventionally given orally at trial, proposed a two-part inquiry first, the court must — even if the accused is represented by counsel — determine whether the consent of the accused is voluntary, informed and unequivocal. second, the court must ensure that the filing of the evidence will not undermine the fairness of the trial. the appellant, her majesty the queen, has appealed to this court, arguing that the court of appeal erred by requiring an inquiry that is not provided for by law. [4] with all due respect, i conclude that the court of appeal erred in its interpretation and application of s 6692. there is no reason to require an inquiry that is not provided for by law where the parties have consented to the filing, in a trial that was commenced again, of a transcript of testimony given at a first trial. such an inquiry would completely alter the judge’s role, minimize the judge’s ability to assess the transcript of prior testimony and run counter to the presumption of the competence of counsel. [5] at the end of the hearing before us, this court allowed the appeal and restored the convictions and the sentences on counts 1, 2 and 9 to 13, with reasons to follow. these are the reasons. ii background [6] the respondent, jd, was charged in 2012 with 18 counts of sexual offences involving victims who were minors that were committed between 1974 and 1993. two of the complainants were his children cd and sd, while the other two were his nephew and niece. [7] the hearing of the prosecution’s evidence began on march 29, 2016 before judge valmont beaulieu of the court of québec. cd, the daughter of the accused, gave her testimony, both in chief and in cross-examination, on march 29 and 30. on march 30, 2016, the respondent suffered an attack, and the case was postponed for a later date. during the period of the stay of proceedings, judge beaulieu fell ill. [8] the case would be postponed several times until, more than a year later, in april 2017, the court of québec informed the parties that judge beaulieu would be replaced under s 669.2 of the criminal code. a new trial was scheduled to begin on september 18, 2017 before judge paul chevalier. [9] only cd had been heard by the first trial judge. on june 16, 2017, the coordinating judge for the district sent a letter to counsel for the parties that noted their consent to having the transcript of cd’s testimony given to the new judge. as a result, counsel for the parties, by common agreement, filed the transcript of cd’s testimony in the record. at the opening of the second trial, on september 18, 2017, counsel for the defence reiterated his consent and the transcript of cd’s testimony was admitted by judge chevalier as evidence on the merits. iii. judicial history a court of québec, 2017 qccq 19515 (judge chevalier) [10] in addition to the transcript filed in lieu of testimony of cd, three other complainants, including sd, the respondent’s son, testified for the prosecution and described in detail the assaults they had allegedly experienced during their childhood. the assaults recounted by sd were corroborated in part by the testimony of cd, the transcript of which had been filed in the record. [11] after analyzing the whole of the facts for each complainant, judge chevalier found the respondent guilty on 9 of the 18 counts, ordered a conditional stay of proceedings on 2 of the counts and acquitted him on 7 other counts, 6 concerning c.d and the only one concerning jjd, another of the respondent’s children. b quebec court of appeal, 2020 qcca 1108 (dutil, hamilton and moore jja) [12] in the court of appeal, five issues with regard to the convictions were stated. only one of them is relevant to the appeal in this court: did the trial judge err in allowing the testimony of cd, given before another judge, to be filed in the record? [13] hamilton ja, writing for a unanimous court, stressed that the rule stated in s 669.2(3) of the criminal code requires the new judge to commence the trial again in its entirety. the court of appeal relied on gauthier v. r., 2020 qcca 751, and jetté v. r., 2020 qcca 750, in which it had ordered new trials in contexts similar to the one in the case at bar. in gauthier and jetté, the court of appeal had held that the accused may consent to the filing of evidence that was adduced before the first judge. however, the new judge must not accept that the testimony be filed in the record unless satisfied that the consent of the accused is voluntary, informed and unequivocal. the new judge must also be satisfied that filing the evidence that was adduced before the first judge will not undermine the fairness of the trial. [14] the court of appeal concluded that [translation] “the trial judge should not have accepted that [cd]’s testimony be filed without ensuring that the consent of the [accused] was voluntary, informed and unequivocal and that the filing of [cd]’s testimony would not undermine the fairness of the trial” (para. 36 (canlii)). if he was not satisfied in this regard, he should not have allowed the evidence in question to be filed as evidence on the merits and should have commenced the trial again in its entirety. in the court of appeal’s view, even though the evidence adduced before the first judge was limited to cd’s testimony, it was important evidence in a case in which credibility was key. [15] the court of appeal ordered a new trial on the counts concerning cd. (counts 1 and 2), but also on those relating to sd (counts 9 to 13), because one of the acts alleged against the respondent concerned an incident involving both cd and sd. cd’s testimony was a factor relevant to the assessment of the credibility of the respondent and of sd, because cd had contradicted the respondent and corroborated sd’s testimony [translation] “it would therefore be dangerous to affirm the convictions relating to [sd] if the trial judge did not hear [cd]’s testimony” (para. 41). as a result, a motion to set aside the sentences on counts 1 and 2 with respect to cd and on counts 9 to 13 with respect to sd was also granted. [16] as for the other two complainants, the incidents in question did not involve cd, and her testimony was immaterial other than on secondary points. the court of appeal affirmed the convictions on counts 14 and 17 in relation to those two complainants. it also affirmed the sentences on these counts. iv. issue [17] this appeal concerns only the counts with respect to cd and sd and raises only one question: did the court of appeal err in its interpretation and application of s 669.2 of the criminal code by requiring a test that is not provided for by law for assessing the validity of the accused’s consent to the filing, in a second trial, of a transcript of testimony previously given at a first trial? v analysis [18] the court of appeal acknowledged that s 669.2(3) of the criminal code does not preclude the application of the usual rules of evidence: [translation] “despite subsection 669.2(3) crc, the accused may consent to the filing of evidence that was adduced before the first judge” (para. 33). it nonetheless held that the judge at the second trial must conduct a two-part inquiry. first, that judge must ask whether the consent given by the accused to the filing in evidence of a transcript in lieu of testimony was voluntary, informed and unequivocal. second, the judge must ensure that admitting prior testimony in evidence will not undermine the fairness of the trial. [19] the inquiry required by the court of appeal exceeds the scope of the jurisdictional function of s 6692. with respect, i find that the court of appeal erred by imposing a test that is not provided for by law. absent evidence to the contrary, waiver of a procedural right by counsel for an accused is presumed to be intentional. a. section 669.2 of the criminal code [20] to answer the question raised by this appeal, a statutory interpretation exercise is required. section 669.2 reads as follows: continuation of proceedings 669.2 (1) subject to this section, where an accused or a defendant is being tried by (a) a judge or provincial court judge, (b) a justice or other person who is, or is a member of, a summary conviction court, or (c) a court composed of a judge and jury, as the case may be, and the judge, provincial court judge, justice or other person dies or is for any reason unable to continue, the proceedings may be continued before another judge, provincial court judge, justice or other person, as the case may be, who has jurisdiction to try the accused or defendant. where adjudication is made (2) where a verdict was rendered by a jury or an adjudication was made by a judge, provincial court judge, justice or other person before whom the trial was commenced, the judge, provincial court judge, justice or other person before whom the proceedings are continued shall, without further election by an accused, impose the punishment or make the order that is authorized by law in the circumstances. if no adjudication made (3) subject to subsections (4) and (5), if the trial was commenced but no adjudication was made or verdict rendered, the judge, provincial court judge, justice or other person before whom the proceedings are continued shall, without further election by an accused, commence the trial again as if no evidence on the merits had been taken. if no adjudication made — jury trials (4) if a trial that is before a court composed of a judge and a jury was commenced but no adjudication was made or verdict rendered, the judge before whom the proceedings are continued may, without further election by an accused, continue the trial or commence the trial again as if no evidence on the merits had been taken. where trial continued (5) where a trial is continued under paragraph (4)(a) [sic], any evidence that was adduced before a judge referred to in paragraph (1)(c) is deemed to have been adduced before the judge before whom the trial is continued but, where the prosecutor and the accused so agree, any part of that evidence may be adduced again before the judge before whom the trial is continued. [21] statutory interpretation involves reading the words of a provision “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (e. a. driedger, construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87, quoted in rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, and bell expressvu limited partnership v. rex, 2002 scc 42, [2002] 2 scr 559, at para. 26). [22] the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words of s 669.2 is clear. subsections (3) and (4) are in no way ambiguous. the rule of s 669.2(3), applicable to a trial by judge alone, is strict: the new judge “shall . . . commence the trial again as if no evidence on the merits had been taken”. in the case of a trial by judge and jury, the rule of s 669.2(4) is much more flexible: the new judge “may . . . continue the trial or commence the trial again as if no evidence on the merits had been taken”. [23] the purpose of this section is to preserve trial fairness a new judge presiding a jury trial may continue the trial or commence the trial again, whereas a new judge sitting alone is required to commence the trial again. in the first case, the trial can continue without undermining trial fairness, because the “trier of facts”, the jury, is not replaced. the situation is different, however, in the case of a trial by judge alone. because such a judge is both the judge of the law and the trier of facts, the trial cannot simply be resumed at the same place before a new judge (gauthier, at para. 55). on the contrary, to require the parties to continue the trial would amount to a breach of procedural fairness. [24] until the coming into force of a statutory amendment on february 15, 1995, the former s 669.2 required that the trial be commenced again regardless of whether the trial was by judge alone or by judge and jury it seems clear from this amendment that parliament wanted to distinguish the two modes of trial. parliament’s intention is evident: where a trial is by judge alone and must be commenced again before a new judge, that judge may not require the parties, or one of them, to file evidence from the first trial. the trial must absolutely be commenced again. [25] this section, which is included in part xx of the criminal code, is found in a division entitled “jurisdiction”. this means that s 669.2(3) does not preclude the application of the usual rules with respect to the presentation of evidence: it concerns jurisdiction, not evidence. [26] at the outset of the second trial, both the prosecution and the defence are free to proceed as they see fit as regards the presentation of their evidence. the parties may take the conventional approach, the one based on the view that “[t]he law has . favoured the evidence of witnesses who give evidence in court because they can be observed” (r v. youvarajah, 2013 scc 41, [2013] 2 scr 720, at para. 19). but the parties may also elect — usually without having to justify their decision — to proceed by filing transcripts of prior testimony. indeed, the court of appeal recognized this in saying that [translation] “the accused may consent to the filing of evidence that was adduced before the first judge” (para. 33; see also gauthier, at para. 57; r v. aa, 2012 onsc 3270, at paras. 77-78 (canlii)). [27] yet the court of appeal required that the new judge conduct a real inquiry. with respect, i am of the view that it erred by requiring a test that is not provided for by law, as is clear from an analysis of the scheme of the criminal code when parliament intends to require that a judge conduct an inquiry, it does so explicitly. for example, s 606(1.1) of the criminal code specifically sets out the factors the court must verify before accepting a guilty plea. it is because of the finality of a guilty plea and its extremely serious consequences — the accused forgoes a trial as well as the presentation of the prosecution’s case against him or her — that the judge must ensure the plea is voluntary, unequivocal and informed (r v. wong, 2018 scc 25, [2018] 1 scr 696, at paras. 2-3; dallaire v. r., 2021 qcca 785, at para. 17 (canlii)). [28] but there is no justification for transposing such an inquiry to a context like the one in the instant case. electing to file a transcript of testimony from a previous trial does not have the same implications. although proceeding in this way is not the conventional approach, it is in no way exceptional this is a tactical decision that resembles other decisions of the same nature, such as choosing to cross-examine a witness, consent to certain admissions or waive a voir dire (park v. the queen, [1981] 2 scr 64, at pp. 73-75; r v. white (1997), 32 or (3d) 722 (ca), at p 751). all such decisions can of course have major repercussions on the outcome of a trial, but they do not require preventive intervention by the court for example, in analogous circumstances, the british columbia court of appeal stated that “[w]here both crown and defence counsel agree that hearsay evidence is admissible, the judge is not required to embark on an independent inquiry to determine whether their positions are legally sound” (r v verma, 2016 bcca 220, 336 ccc (3d) 441, at para. 38 (emphasis added)). [29] in sum, this statutory interpretation exercise shows how straightforward the provision is. the only function of s 669.2(3) is to require a judge sitting alone to commence the trial again. once the judge has done so, the parties have control over the presentation of their own evidence. therefore, for the transcript of testimony given at the first trial to be admitted in the second trial as evidence on the merits, all that is needed is that the transcript be duly filed and that the parties consent to its being filed (matheson v. the queen, [1981] 2 scr 214, at pp. 217-18). [30] given that the parties have control over their own evidence, the judge must, absent either circumstances in which the legislation — or the common law — requires an inquiry or any indication to the contrary, presume that the professional experience and judgment of counsel have guided him or her in conducting the case in such a way as to protect the client’s fundamental interests (r v. gdb, 2000 scc 22, [2000] 1 scr 520, at para. 27; white, at p 751). [31] calling evidence necessarily involves making tactical decisions in which the judge need not intervene. not only does the judge need not do so, but he or she should in fact refrain from intervening. this court recently noted the deference owed to counsel in regard to tactical decisions made in the best interests of the client: . . . our adversarial system does accord a high degree of deference to the tactical decisions of counsel. in other words, while courts may sanction the conduct of the litigants, they should generally refrain from interfering with the conduct of the litigation itself. in r v. sgt, 2010 scc 20, [2010] 1 scr 688, at paras. 36-37, this court explained why judges should be very cautious before interfering with tactical decisions: in an adversarial system of criminal trials, trial judges must, barring exceptional circumstances, defer to the tactical decisions of counsel . . . [c]ounsel will generally be in a better position to assess the wisdom, in light of their overall trial strategy, of a particular tactical decision than is the trial judge. by contrast, trial judges are expected to be impartial arbiters of the dispute before them; the more a trial judge second-guesses or overrides the decisions of counsel, the greater is the risk that the trial judge will, in either appearance or reality, cease being a neutral arbiter and instead become an advocate for one party. . [emphasis in original deleted.] (r v. anderson, 2014 scc 41, [2014] 2 scr 167, at para. 59) [32] however, s 669.2 does not eliminate the judge’s residual discretion (see, by analogy, r v rv, 2019 scc 41, [2019] 3 scr 237, at para. 75) as the gatekeeper for trial fairness, the judge retains at all times the power to inquire on his or her own initiative even where doing so is required neither by statute nor at common law. where there are indications suggesting that the consent of the accused might be vitiated, the court should exercise its residual discretion and investigate further in order to ensure that the consent of the accused to the procedure is voluntary and informed (gauthier; jetté). [33] gauthier is of some interest in this regard. in that case, the defence had announced — after all the evidence had been called and all that remained was to render the verdict — that the accused could not afford to have the trial commence again in its entirety owing to a lack of financial resources. in this way, the accused was consenting to all the transcripts from the first trial being filed as evidence on the merits before the judge charged with commencing the trial again and rendering judgment. the court of appeal, having indications before it that suggested that the consent of the accused had not been voluntary and informed, ordered a new trial. because the trial judge had not inquired further into the consent of the accused, the fairness of the trial had been undermined this leads to the inference that had there been no such indications, an inquiry would probably not have been necessary. [34] before concluding, i emphasize that the accused in the case at bar was represented by counsel. this court is therefore not required to determine whether the trial judge’s duty to a self-represented accused would be different allow me nonetheless to digress by making a few comments, although without ruling definitively on this issue. in the case of a self-represented accused, the court has a duty to ensure that the accused can have a fair trial that is respectful of his or her fundamental rights. the judge is at that time [translation] “charged with a particular responsibility” to ensure that the trial is fair (r v leblanc, 2010 qcca 1891, 78 c.r (6th) 359, at para. 47). the judge has, in this sense, a duty to assist the accused (guenette v. r., 2002 canlii 7883 (que. ca), at para. 20; r v. richards, 2017 onca 424, 349 ccc. (3d) 284, at para. 110). this duty to assist is [translation] “variable”, however, as it differs according to the circumstances and is limited to what is reasonable (mr v. r., 2018 qcca 1983, 53 cr (7th) 182, at para. 25, citing jarrah v. r., 2017 qcca 1869, and r v. breton, 2018 onca 753, 366 ccc (3d) 281, at para. 13; see also richards, at paras. 110-11). although the court is not required to give advice to the accused, it must be reasonably certain that the accused is aware of his or her procedural rights. it could be necessary in such circumstances to inquire further into the consent of the accused. i will now return to the matter at hand. [35] in sum, s 669.2(3) does not bar a transcript of testimony given at a first trial from being filed as evidence on the merits in a second trial, nor does it require an inquiry by the judge in this regard. nevertheless, s 669.2 does not eliminate the judge’s power not to allow a transcript to be filed if he or she finds that the prejudicial effect of filing it would undermine the fairness of the trial. a judge who finds that trial fairness is undermined must intervene. [36] let us now turn to the situation in this case. b application [37] the trial did in fact commence again before judge chevalier. he did not unilaterally require the parties to file the transcripts from the first trial. as i mentioned above, for the transcript of cd’s testimony to be admitted in evidence, all that was needed was that the transcript be duly filed and that the parties consent to its being filed. both these conditions were met in this case. the respondent’s second trial was fair. [38] first, i note that it was the prosecution, not the defence, that decided — despite the weaknesses of cd’s testimony — not to enhance its evidence and not to call her to testify again. if the prosecution had decided to call cd again, the accused could not have objected to that, as she was a witness for the prosecution. [39] second, the accused was in no way obligated to consent to the filing of the transcript of cd’s testimony. consenting to the filing of the transcript was a tactical decision, and i would add that this tactic seems to have worked, given that the accused was acquitted on six of the eight counts with respect to cd. [40] if the accused had refused to consent to the filing of the transcript of cd’s testimony, the prosecution would have had no choice but to have cd testify again (there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the prosecution could not have called her again) or to abandon that evidence as well, judge chevalier could not himself have forced the accused to consent to the filing of the transcript as evidence on the merits, especially given that no exception to the hearsay rule had been raised. what is more, the accused could have withdrawn his consent either before judge chevalier or on appeal by claiming, for example, ineffective assistance of his counsel. [41] but that did not happen in all likelihood, the accused, on his counsel’s advice, considered that it was to his advantage to consent to the filing of the transcript. i would add that at no time did the accused cast any doubt on his consent to proceeding in this way it was not even included among his grounds of appeal in the court of appeal. before being invited by the court of appeal to make submissions on this point, the accused never suggested that his consent to the filing of the transcript of cd’s testimony was vitiated or, at the very least, that he had changed his mind. [42] contrary to the situation in gauthier, there were no indications in the instant case that might have led judge chevalier to question the consent of the accused. when he received the parties’ consent, he was satisfied that the fairness of the trial was assured. the fact that judge chevalier presumed that the consent of the accused was valid does not constitute procedural unfairness. on the contrary, it is consistent with the guiding principles of criminal procedure. [43] furthermore, the court of appeal erred in concluding that, because the transcript of cd’s testimony was [translation] “important evidence in a case in which credibility was key”, judge chevalier should not have admitted it without ensuring that the respondent’s consent was voluntary, informed and unequivocal and that its filing would not undermine the fairness of the trial (para. 37). conducting a defence necessarily involves making tactical decisions in which the judge need not intervene, especially when the accused is duly represented by counsel. the fact that credibility is in issue changes nothing in this case. [44] as the appellant explains, [translation] “[t]he effect of the court of appeal’s decision is that it is hard, if not impossible, to imagine a case in which the judge before whom a trial commences again can admit in evidence a transcript of testimony of a victim of a crime whose credibility is in issue. only ancillary testimony would be compatible with the stated conditions the court of appeal is practically prohibiting an accused from consenting to the filing of such evidence upon the resumption of the trial” (af, at para. 48). [45] as to the counts with respect to sd,. i find that the court of appeal also erred in ordering a new trial solely on the basis that cd’s testimony was a relevant factor in the assessment of the acts committed against sd. [46] cd’s testimony was not necessary in order to find the accused guilty on the counts involving s.d in assessing the evidence with respect to sd,. judge chevalier used the transcript of cd’s testimony to only a limited extent and that limited use did not have the effect of vitiating all of the findings of fact (independent of cd’s testimony) judge chevalier reached. [47] it is clear from judge chevalier’s reasons that he was satisfied, independently of cd’s corroboration — which, as i said, was not necessary — that the assaults alleged by sd actually took place. judge chevalier stated that he believed s.d [translation] “because of the consistency between what he said and the accounts he had given previously, because of the lack of any sort of collusion with his sister, whom he even contradicted at times, and because of the objectivity he displayed in testifying, despite the contradictions by the accused and ms. g., regarding the photos in particular” (para. 115 (canlii)) judge chevalier then added that he “believes [sd]’s testimony and is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the other types of sexual assault he experienced . . the descriptions of which are very detailed, took place” (para. 118). as a result, [translation] “[t]his limited corroboration could not cast doubt on the conclusion concerning sd’s credibility” (af, at para. 104). [48] in sum, because the parties had agreed to proceed with the filing of the transcript of cd’s testimony, judge chevalier had only to determine the weight to be given to it. the absence of cd at trial goes to the weight of her testimony, not to its admissibility (r v. hawkins, [1996] 3 scr 1043, at para. 79). the court of appeal should not have questioned the valid consent of the accused, which resulted from the exercise of reasonable professional judgment that tactical decision by his counsel “[fell] within the wide latitude afforded counsel in the conduct of the case” (if, at para. 13). [49] in conclusion, i must specify that it would not be appropriate to remand the appeal to the court of appeal. the accused has appealed to this court on only a single issue and has neither reiterated nor stressed the other grounds he raised in the court of appeal to return the case to that court would not be an efficient use of judicial resources. vi conclusion [50] i would allow the appeal. the convictions and the sentences on counts 1, 2 and 9 to 13 are restored. appeal allowed. gatineau.
[1] in r v. jordan, 2016 scc 27, [2016] 1 scr 631, this court delivered a clear message to all participants in the criminal justice system in canada: everyone must take proactive measures to prevent delay and to uphold the right to be tried within a reasonable time guaranteed to an accused by s 11(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. by creating ceilings beyond which trial delay is presumptively unreasonable, the court developed a prospective approach that allows the various participants to know, from the outset of the proceedings, the temporal limits within which the trial must take place. [2] this appeal affords the court an opportunity to decide whether the jordan framework applies when a motion for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay is brought in the course of a retrial. two questions arise: (1) after a new trial is ordered, can an accused file a s 11(b) motion for a stay of proceedings based on delay in the accused’s first trial? (2) do the presumptive ceilings established in jordan apply to retrial delay? [3] the first question requires this court to determine when an accused must indicate that their right to be tried within a reasonable time has not been respected. given that the jordan framework offers greater predictability and clarity and encourages all parties to act proactively, it follows, in my view, that an accused must raise the unreasonableness of trial delay in a timely manner. as a general rule, in the context of a single trial, an accused who believes that their right to be tried within a reasonable time has been infringed must act diligently and apply for a remedy before their trial is held however, an accused may in some circumstances be justified in bringing such an application later, as is the case exceptionally on appeal. that being said, when an accused brings an application after an appeal court has ordered a new trial, the accused will no longer be able to raise the delay from their first trial. only the retrial delay will be counted in calculating delay based on the presumptive ceilings applicable under the jordan framework. [4] the ceilings set in jordan apply to retrial delay. the framework established in that case protects the right of an accused to be tried within a reasonable time pursuant to s 11(b), and that provision equally guarantees this right to an accused who is tried a second time. although it is generally accepted that retrials must be prioritized when scheduling hearings and that they will be shorter than first trials, i do not think it is appropriate to adopt different presumptive ceilings for retrials. the jordan framework is flexible enough to be adapted to the specific circumstances of an accused who is retried. i. background [5] in february 2011, j.f was charged by indictment with seven counts involving sexual offences against his daughter. the charges covered a period from 1986 to 2001. [6] the preliminary inquiry was completed on march 28, 2012 the trial, whose estimated length was two days, began on december 3, 2013 in the court of québec, district of montréal. [7] on december 4, 2013, the prosecution announced a voir dire on the admissibility into evidence of the complainant’s video statement. the trial was then adjourned, and it resumed on october 20, 2014. on october 24, 2014, the voir dire ended and the trial judge reserved decision on it. just over six months later, on may 8, 2015, the judge rendered his decision and found that the complainant’s statement was inadmissible. [8] the trial resumed on january 18, 2016 and ended the same day. argument was postponed and was then completed on may 16, 2016, at which time judgment was reserved. while judgment was reserved, this court rendered its decision in jordan. on february 10, 2017, six years after he was charged, j.f was acquitted on all seven counts. [9] the crown appealed the decision and, on june 13, 2018, the quebec court of appeal set aside the acquittal on the ground that the trial judge had analyzed the complainant’s credibility by relying erroneously on stereotypes and prejudices (2018 qcca 986). it therefore ordered a new trial. [10] on october 15, 2018, the parties agreed on dates for the retrial, which was to last 10 days. the retrial was then scheduled for april 29 to may 31, 2019. [11] on december 28, 2018, jf filed a motion for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s 11(b) of the charter. that was the first time he alleged an infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time. in january 2019, the trial dates were moved up to march 11 to april 18, 2019 the motion for a stay of proceedings was argued on february 5, 2019. ii decisions below a court of québec, 2019 qccq 1236 (judge roy) [12] after making a global assessment of the delay for the first trial and the retrial, the trial judge held that the respondent’s right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed. [13] she rejected the crown’s argument that the accused’s long silence regarding the delay amounted to a waiver of his right to be tried within a reasonable time, because such a waiver must be clear, unequivocal and informed. noting that there was uncontested evidence showing that the accused was concerned about the delay, the judge found that he had never waived his right to be tried within a reasonable time. [14] the judge then calculated the delay. she found a gross delay of 72 months and 3 days between the charges and the verdict at the first trial, and she determined that, of that total, 70 months and 25 days were not attributable to the defence. [15] in the court of québec, the crown did not challenge the calculation or categorization of the first-trial delay nor did it argue that there were exceptional circumstances or that the transitional circumstance provided for in jordan applied. in its opinion, only the retrial delay had to be considered, that is, 10 months and 5 days. the judge rejected that argument taking a [translation] “global and contextual” approach to delay, she found that the first-trial delay could not be disregarded in this case given that it “is clearly unreasonable” (paras. 73 and 75 (canlii)). not to consider it would be to deny the accused’s rights and would be contrary to the shift in culture sought by this court. the judge held that the entire delay, including the first-trial delay, had to be counted. she granted the motion based on unreasonable delay and entered a stay of proceedings. b quebec court of appeal, 2020 qcca 666 (levesque, hogue and sansfaçon jja) [16] the crown appealed the trial judge’s decision and argued that, under the jordan framework, first-trial delay cannot be included once an appeal court has ordered a new trial for the reasons given by levesque ja, the quebec court of appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the stay of proceedings, though it adopted a different approach than the trial judge. [17] the court of appeal stated that the calculation of delay must restart at zero in cases where a new trial is ordered by an appeal court and that therefore the delay in the first trial cannot be added to the delay in the second. however, it refused to accept the crown’s argument that the fact that a new trial has been ordered prevents an accused from raising a violation of s 11(b) based on delay in their first trial. in the court of appeal’s view, [translation] “it would undoubtedly be unfair for an accused to be barred from presenting an initial motion on the sole ground that a violation was not raised in a timely manner” (para. 60 (canlii)). the court of appeal also rejected the crown’s argument that jf’s very long silence could be considered to be a waiver of the delay preceding the order for a new trial, given that the late presentation of a motion cannot in itself amount to a clear and unequivocal waiver. in this regard, the court of appeal further noted that although this court explained in r v. morin, [1992] 1 scr. 771, that inaction by an accused could lead to an inference that the accused suffered no actual prejudice, this reasoning no longer applies under jordan because prejudice is no longer a factor in calculating delay. [18] the court of appeal added that there cannot be an unqualified refusal to consider first-trial delay. the fact that delay was not raised during the first trial does not mean that it is reasonable while it is preferable for an accused to raise the unreasonableness of delay as soon as possible, an acquittal may be more advantageous than a stay of proceedings. in this regard, however, levesque ja cautioned that his remarks should not be taken to mean that [translation] “the late presentation of motions under s 11(b) should be encouraged” (para. 76). [19] the court of appeal proposed a two-step approach for calculating delay in a context where a new trial is ordered. because the delays in the two trials must be considered separately, the first step is to assess the first-trial delay under the jordan framework. only where that delay is reasonable does it become necessary to proceed to the second step and assess the retrial delay, starting from the order for a new trial. however, the court of appeal did not discuss the framework that applies in analyzing retrial delay. [20] applying the two-step approach it had adopted to this case, the court of appeal began by noting that the total delay between the charges and the end of the argument at the first trial was 63 months and 8 days,1 from which it subtracted 1 day attributable to the defence finding that this total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established by this court in jordan, the court of appeal stated that it was up to the crown to show that the delay was reasonable because of an exceptional circumstance or transitional considerations. since the crown had not pleaded any such circumstance, the court of appeal held that it had not rebutted the presumption that the delay was unreasonable the court of appeal therefore dismissed the appeal and upheld the stay of proceedings. iii. issues [21] the appeal raises the following questions: 1 the court of appeal arrived at a different total delay than the trial judge, because the judge had included the verdict deliberation time in her calculation. but as this court stated in r v. kgk, 2020 scc 7, at paras. 3, 24 and 50, and as the court of appeal correctly pointed out, delay attributable to deliberation time is excluded from the jordan framework. (1) after a new trial is ordered, can an accused file a s 11(b) motion for a stay of proceedings based on delay in the accused’s first trial? (2) do the presumptive ceilings established in jordan apply to retrial delay? iv analysis a. section 11(b) of the charter and the temporal scope of the right to be tried within a reasonable time (1) protection conferred by having the status of a person charged with an offence [22] timely justice is one of the characteristics of a free and democratic society, and the conduct of trials within a reasonable time is of central importance in the administration of canada’s criminal justice system (jordan, at paras. 1 and 19). section 11(b) of the charter reflects the importance of this principle by guaranteeing any person charged with an offence the right “to be tried within a reasonable time”. the purpose of this provision is to protect both the rights of accused persons and the interests of society as a whole (r v kjm, 2019 scc 55, [2019] 4 scr 39, at para. 38). at the individual level, trials within a reasonable time are essential to protect the liberty, security and fair trial interests of any person charged with an offence, who, it should be remembered, is presumed to be innocent (jordan, at para. 20; see also r. v. godin, 2009 scc 26, [2009] 2 scr 3, at para. 30, citing morin, at pp. 801-3). at the collective or societal level, timely trials encourage better participation by victims and witnesses, minimize the “worry and frustration [they experience] until they have given their testimony” and allow them to move on with their lives more quickly (jordan, at para. 24, quoting r v. askov, [1990] 2 scr 1199, at p 1220; see also jordan, at para. 23) timely trials also help to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice (jordan, at para. 25; askov, at pp. 1220-21). [23] section 11(b) protects an accused only while they have the status of a person charged with an offence (r v. potvin, [1993] 2 scr 880, at p 908). the term “person charged with an offence” has been interpreted broadly by this court and refers to a person who is the subject of criminal proceedings (r v. macdougall, [1998] 3 scr 45, at paras. 11-13) a person is charged with an offence from the time the charge is laid (r v. kalanj, [1989] 1 scr 1594, at p 1602; potvin, at p 910) until the final resolution of the matter and the end of the sentencing process (macdougall, at paras. 10 and 17-18; r v kgk, 2020 scc 7, at paras. 26-27) on appeal, an accused is no longer a person charged with an offence (potvin, at pp. 911-12; macdougall, at para. 17). the accused reverts to this status only if the trial decision is set aside and a new trial is ordered (potvin, at p 912). [24] while s 11(b) protects an accused throughout the period when they have the status of a person charged with an offence, the framework established in jordan has a limited temporal scope. the presumptive ceilings apply only to delay in holding the trial. (2) temporal scope of the jordan ceilings [25] prior to jordan, s 11(b) applications were decided under the framework established in morin. that framework involved a test with four factors that were to be balanced to determine whether trial delay was unreasonable: “. . . (1) the length of the delay; (2) defence waiver; (3) the reasons for the delay, including the inherent needs of the case, defence delay, crown delay, institutional delay, and other reasons for delay; and (4) prejudice to the accused’s interests in liberty, security of the person, and a fair trial” (jordan, at para. 30; godin, at para. 18; morin, at pp. 787-88). [26] in an effort to end the culture of complacency that had developed in the criminal justice system, which tolerated excessive delay in bringing accused persons to trial, this court established a new framework in jordan for the application of s 11(b). the court set two ceilings beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable: (1) a ceiling of 18 months for simple cases going to trial in the provincial court, and (2) a ceiling of 30 months for cases going to trial in the superior court or in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry (para. 46) delay attributable to the defence is subtracted from the total delay (paras. 47 and 60) if the net total delay exceeds the applicable ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable. the crown can then attempt to show that the delay is reasonable by raising exceptional circumstances (para. 47). if the net total delay is below the ceiling, the defence can try to establish that the delay is unreasonable by showing that “(1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have” (para. 48 (emphasis in original)). [27] the presumptive ceilings set in jordan do not apply to the entire period when an accused is a person charged with an offence. the framework established in that case is limited in scope, since it provides a solution to a specific problem. jordan deals with the culture of complacency that allows for excessive delay in bringing an accused to trial (kgk, at para. 34, citing jordan, at paras. 2, 4, 13, 117, 121 and 129). the new framework applies to the delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial, that is, “when the parties’ involvement in the merits of the trial is complete, and the case is turned over to the trier of fact” (kgk, at para. 31; see also para. 33; jordan, at para. 47; r v. rice, 2018 qcca 198, at para. 41 (canlii)). deliberation time is excluded from this framework (kgk, at para. 50). sentencing proceedings are also excluded from the framework although the court recognized in jordan that s 11(b) continues to apply between conviction and sentencing, it made no comment on how such delay should be treated (para. 49, fn. 2). [28] jordan also does not address the question of when an accused must bring a motion for a stay of proceedings in this regard, it should be noted that the court declined to decide how the presumptive ceilings should be applied where, for example, a s 11(b) application is brought following a conviction (para. 49, fn. 2) nor does jordan set out the framework that applies in cases where a new trial is ordered. [29] to determine whether first-trial delay may be raised under the jordan framework after a new trial has been ordered, it is necessary to consider, first, the duty of an accused to act proactively with respect to delay and, second, the timing of an application based on unreasonable delay and the possibility of obtaining a remedy for the delay complained of. b after a new trial is ordered, can an accused file a section 11(b) motion for a stay of proceedings based on delay in the accused’s first trial? (1) jordan and the duty of an accused to raise an infringement of their right to be tried within a reasonable time in a timely manner [30] while jordan does not indicate the point in time when an accused must bring a s 11(b) motion, the court has nonetheless been clear about how it wishes all participants in the criminal justice system to act: at all stages of the trial process, everyone must take proactive measures to remedy any delay and to ensure that the accused is tried in a timely manner (jordan, at paras. 137-39; r v. thanabalasingham, 2020 scc 18, at para. 9). [31] the new framework marks a shift away from a retrospective approach and adopts a prospective standpoint that allows the various participants to know the bounds of reasonableness from the outset of the proceedings (jordan, at para. 108; kgk, at para. 43). the predictability of the new framework makes the parties more accountable and encourages them to be proactive about delay (jordan, at para. 112; r v cody, 2017 scc 31, [2017] 1 scr 659, at para. 36) in the case of the crown, the prospective approach clarifies the content of its constitutional obligation to bring the accused to trial within a reasonable time (jordan, at para. 112). as for the accused, the predictability provided by the new framework requires that they be an active part of the solution to the problem of delay in criminal cases (jordan, at paras. 84-86 and 113). [32] as this court wrote in morin, “[t]he purpose of s 11(b) is to expedite trials and minimize prejudice and not to avoid trials on the merits” (p 802). this section was not intended to make it possible for an accused to frustrate the ends of justice (jordan, at paras. 21, 60 and 63). as the court also recently noted, an accused may not benefit from the lengthening of delay where it is caused by the accused’s own conduct (r v. boulanger, 2022 scc 2, at para. 6; r v. ste-marie, 2022 scc 3, at para. 11). [33] defence conduct is considered under the jordan framework, since the delay attributable to the defence is subtracted from the gross total delay (para. 60). defence delay has two components: (1) delay waived by the defence, and (2) delay caused solely or directly by the defence (jordan, at paras. 61 and 63; cody, at para. 26). inaction may amount to illegitimate conduct on the part of the defence, because “[i]llegitimacy may extend to omissions as well as acts” (cody, at para. 33). as this court said in cody, the defence may not benefit from its own inaction or lateness in taking action; it must act proactively: accused persons must bear in mind that a corollary of the s 11(b) right “to be tried within a reasonable time” is the responsibility to avoid causing unreasonable delay. defence counsel are therefore expected to “actively advanc[e] their clients’ right to a trial within a reasonable time, collaborat[e] with crown counsel when appropriate and . . us[e] court time efficiently” (jordan, at para. 138). [para. 33] [34] an accused who sees delay lengthening must therefore respond in a proactive manner being proactive may mean filing a s 11(b) motion where the accused believes that their right to be tried within a reasonable time is not being or will not be respected (jordan, at para. 85). like any other application made by an accused, a motion of this kind must be brought “reasonably and expeditiously” (para. 85). lateness in raising delay is contrary to the proper administration of justice, because such a practice serves to waste judicial resources indeed, the jordan framework is specifically designed to eliminate inefficient practices that impact on the justice system (paras. 41 and 116). bringing a s 11(b) motion before the end of the trial allows the accused to alert the crown and the court to their concerns about delay. as a result, all parties can take proactive measures and cooperate to expedite the proceedings. [35] it is generally recognized that an accused who raises the unreasonableness of delay after trial (r v rabba (1991), 64 ccc (3d) 445 (ont ca)), and particularly after conviction (r v. warring, 2017 abca 128, 347 ccc (3d) 391, at para. 11; r v. cd, 2014 abca 392, 588 ar 82), is not acting in a timely manner. in kgk,. moldaver j interpreted the prospective approach adopted in jordan as “encourag[ing] pre-trial s 11(b) applications” (para. 43 (emphasis added)) the defence is in fact encouraged to act before the start of the trial, since the jordan framework allows “the parties to know ‘in advance, the bounds of reasonableness so proactive measures can be taken to remedy any delay’” (kgk, at para. 43, quoting jordan, at para. 108 (emphasis in original)). [36] in short, a duty to act proactively also rests on the accused. as a result, the accused must indicate that their right to be tried within a reasonable time has not been respected and, where the circumstances require, bring a motion for a stay of proceedings in a timely manner. as a general rule, this means before the trial is held. by the time the trial dates are set, the parties are generally in a position to know whether the trial delay will exceed the applicable presumptive ceiling, and the defence can raise any concerns it may have. however, it is not out of the question that, exceptionally, an infringement of the s 11(b) right will reveal itself only once the trial has begun. in such a case, the accused must also act proactively. (2) a section 11(b) application can be brought on appeal only exceptionally [37] if a s 11(b) motion is considered late when filed after the end of a trial, only exceptionally will an accused be able to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. [38] raising new arguments on appeal is generally discouraged in criminal matters, because the best interests of justice require finality in the adjudication of such matters at trial, as l’heureux-dubé j., dissenting, but not on this point, explained in r. v. brown, [1993] 2 scr 918: both the crown and the defence would face uncertainty, as counsel for both sides, having discovered that the strategy adopted at trial did not result in the desired or expected verdict, devised new approaches. costs would escalate and the resolution of criminal matters could be spread out over years in the most routine cases moreover, society’s expectation that criminal matters will be disposed of fairly and fully at the first instance and its respect for the administration of justice would be undermined. juries would rightfully be uncertain if they were fulfilling an important societal function or merely wasting their time for these reasons, courts have always adhered closely to the rule that such tactics will not be permitted. [pp. 923-24] [39] a motion for a stay of proceedings brought for the first time on appeal, without the trial judge having had an opportunity to consider its merits, should normally be dismissed (rabba; r v g (l.), 2007 onca 654, 228 ccc (3d) 194, at paras. 42-43; phillips v. r., 2017 qcca 1284, at paras. 29-31 (canlii)). the trial court is best placed to rule on such a motion, because it is the one that has a complete picture of the proceedings. indeed, this court noted in jordan that trial judges are uniquely positioned to categorize various periods of delay (paras. 71 and 79). [40] generally speaking, appeal courts are reluctant to entertain new arguments, because they are deprived of the trial court’s perspective (r v. roach, 2009 onca 156, 246 oac 96, at para. 6; ontario (labour) v. cobra float service inc., 2020 onca 527, 65 ccel (4th) 169, at para. 19). this is also the case for constitutional issues (roach, at para. 6; r v chambers, 2013 onca 680, 311 oac 307, at para. 45). only in exceptional circumstances will a party be permitted to raise a new argument on appeal (guindon v canada, 2015 scc 41, [2015] 3 scr 3, at paras. 20-23; phillips, at para. 14). [41] where an argument is raised for the first time on appeal, the appeal court must determine whether the situation is an exceptional one in which the exercise of its discretion is warranted, having regard to all of the circumstances. for this purpose, the court must consider, among other things, “the state of the record, fairness to all parties, the importance of having the issue resolved by this [c]ourt, its suitability for decision and the broader interests of the administration of justice” (guindon, at para. 20). what is meant by “state of the record” is that there must be sufficient evidence in the record for the court to decide the issue (see phillips, at para. 19; r v. kitaitchik (2002), 166 ccc (3d) 14 (ont. ca), at para. 36). in every case, an appeal court’s “discretion to hear and decide new issues should only be exercised exceptionally and never unless the challenger shows that doing so causes no prejudice to the parties” (guindon, at para. 23; performance industries ltd. v. sylvan lake golf & tennis club ltd., 2002 scc 19, [2002] 1 scr 678, at para. 33; phillips, at para. 14; ontario (labour), at para. 20; g (l.), at para. 43). [42] it is therefore only exceptionally that an infringement of the right to be tried within a reasonable time can be raised by an accused for the first time on appeal. the outcome of an unreasonable delay application brought following an order for a new trial must now be considered. (3) an accused’s silence or inaction does not in itself amount to a waiver of delay [43] the crown argues that where an accused raises first-trial delay in the course of a retrial, the accused’s failure to allege an infringement of their right to be tried within a reasonable time during their first trial or on appeal can be raised against them in support of this argument, the crown suggests that a court can regard an accused’s long silence or lengthy inaction as [translation] “amount[ing] to a clear and unequivocal waiver or an acceptance of the delay associated with a past trial” (af, at para. 24; see also para. 42). [44] i must reject that proposition. although the time at which an accused raises the unreasonableness of trial delay may affect the outcome of their motion, waiver of the delay cannot be inferred solely from the accused’s silence or failure to act. this is what the court’s jurisprudence teaches, and, in my view, it would be inappropriate to depart from it. in addition to being wrong in law, this proposition by the crown is a needless one, because this court has clearly established how an accused’s inaction or lateness in taking action must be assessed. [45] this court has repeatedly stated that the requirements for finding a waiver of a constitutional right must be strictly construed but that this does not preclude an accused from waiving a procedural right (r v. hebert, [1990] 2 scr 151, at p 203; korponay v attorney general of canada, [1982] 1 scr 41, at pp. 48-49) an accused may waive a procedural rule as long as this is done “with full knowledge of the rights the procedure was enacted to protect and the effect that waiver will have on those rights” (r v. tran, [1994] 2 scr 951, at p 997). [46] section 11(b) of the charter states that any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time. such a person may waive a given delay, which will then be subtracted from the total delay (jordan, at para. 61) it is important to note that, where “waiver” concerns the right set out in s 11(b) of the charter, “it is not the right itself which is being waived but merely the inclusion of specific periods in the overall assessment of reasonableness” (r v. conway, [1989] 1 scr 1659, at p 1686, quoted in jordan, at para. 61). [47] waiver “can be explicit or implicit, but in either case, it must be clear and unequivocal” (jordan, at para. 61; see also morin, at p 790; askov, at p 1228). in this sense, as the court stated in askov, an accused’s mere silence or inaction cannot indicate a waiver of delay: the failure of an accused to assert the right does not give the crown licence to proceed with an unfair trial. failure to assert the right would be insufficient in itself to impugn the motives of the accused as might be the case with regard to other s 11 rights. rather there must be something in the conduct of the accused that is sufficient to give rise to an inference that the accused has understood that he or she had a s 11(b) guarantee, understood its nature and has waived the right provided by that guarantee although no particular magical incantation of words is required to waive a right, nevertheless the waiver must be expressed in some manner silence or lack of objection cannot constitute a lawful waiver. [emphasis added; pp. 1228-29.] (see also mills v. the queen, [1986] 1 scr 863, at p 929.) [48] waiver must be proved by the prosecution (askov, at p 1229). for a court to find that delay has been waived, the accused must therefore take “some direct action from which a consent to delay can be properly inferred” (askov, at p 1229). the “mere silence of the accused is not sufficient to indicate a waiver of a charter right” (askov, at p 1229; see also mills, at p 929) to be inferable, implicit waiver “requires advertence to the act of release rather than mere inadvertence. if the mind of the accused or his or her counsel is not turned to the issue of waiver and is not aware of what his or her conduct signifies, then this conduct does not constitute waiver” (morin, at p 790). [49] lateness in bringing a s 11(b) motion for a stay of proceedings nonetheless remains an important factor in determining whether an accused has waived delay. in rabba, arbour ja, as she then was, noted that the fact that such a motion is brought after trial “would, in most cases, be fatal” and “would normally amount to a waiver of any claim which may arise under s 11(b) of the charter” (p 447). while lateness in bringing a motion for a stay of proceedings may be a relevant factor, it cannot in itself establish waiver. this is how arbour ja’s comments in rabba must be interpreted. waiver is established on the basis of an accused’s conduct (askov, at p 1228), having regard to the circumstances of each case (see, eg,. warring, at paras. 11-13 and 27). [50] i note as well that the crown’s general proposition is not easily incorporated into the new framework established by jordan, under which prejudice to the accused is no longer considered as an analytical factor, as it was under the morin framework the crown’s proposition is at odds with the new framework, in that it resurrects the uncertainty and complexity of the prejudice inquiry. under the morin framework, it could be inferred that long delays had prejudiced an accused even where there was no direct evidence of prejudice (p 801; godin, at para. 31). conversely, the crown could raise the accused’s inaction to show that such conduct was inconsistent with a desire for a timely trial (morin, at pp. 790 and 802-3). however, establishing prejudice was a complicated and uncertain process, as the absence of a consistent standard made the application of the former framework “highly unpredictable” and the treatment of prejudice “highly subjective” (jordan, at paras. 32-33) the jordan framework eliminates the uncertainty of the previous framework, because prejudice is taken into consideration in a different way: once the presumptive ceiling is breached, the accused is now presumed to have suffered prejudice to their liberty, security of the person, and fair trial interests (para. 54) adopting the crown’s proposition would therefore, to some degree, have the effect of indirectly resurrecting the possibility of raising an accused’s inaction or lateness in taking action in order to disprove the existence of prejudice. [51] this proposition by the crown also makes the application of the current framework more complex. indeed, it involves a multi-factored test for inferring waiver from an accused’s inaction. the factors that the crown suggests considering include the duration of the inaction, the accused’s conduct and situation, the prosecution’s conduct and the manner in which the earlier proceeding unfolded (af, at paras. 25 and 77 et seq). however, jordan already specifies how an accused’s inaction or silence is to be treated. delay may be attributed to the defence where it is waived by the accused or where it is caused solely by the accused’s conduct, which includes inaction (jordan, at paras. 61-63; cody, at para. 33). [52] in short, therefore, the crown’s proposition cannot be adopted an accused’s silence or inaction cannot in itself give rise to an inference that the accused has waived delay, although it may be a relevant and important factor in the waiver inquiry. this conclusion is an obvious one given the fact that any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time without having to explicitly state their wish to be protected by this right (rabba; see also morin, at p 802). an accused nonetheless has a duty to raise an infringement of their right to be tried within a reasonable time in a timely manner. at the risk of repeating myself, an accused may not benefit from their own inaction or lateness in taking action. the new framework sanctions an accused’s inaction or lateness in taking action. inaction may be considered illegitimate conduct, and the delay associated with it may be attributed to the defence when the unreasonableness of delay is being determined (jordan, at paras. 63, 113 and 121; cody, at para. 33). (4) an accused may not raise first-trial delay once a new trial is ordered [53] in jordan, the court established that delay runs from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (para. 47), but it did not specify how an order for a new trial affects the calculation of delay. however, potvin provides useful guidance in this regard. first, sopinka j stated in that case that such an order revives the accused’s status as a person charged with an offence (p 912) second, he added, citing d. h. doherty, that the “constitutional clock” for calculating delay begins running at the time the appellate court orders a new trial: this does not mean that when there is an adjudication relating to a charge which is appealed, s 11(b) is spent. if on the appeal the judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted for trial, the accused reverts to the status of a person charged. as stated by d. h. doherty (now a justice of the court of appeal for ontario) in “more flesh on the bones: the continued judicial interpretation of s 11(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms” (1984), canadian bar association — ontario; annual institute on continuing legal education, at p 9: section 11(b) does not appear to operate at the appellate stage. section 11(b) guarantees a trial within a reasonable time, not a final determination of the matter at an appellate level within that time if, however, a new trial is ordered on appeal, or some other order is made directing the continuation of the trial proceedings, the constitutional clock should be rewound at the time of the order by the appellate court. [bold and underlining added; pp. 912-13.] [54] prior to jordan, appellate jurisprudence seemed to allow an accused who was sent back to be tried again to raise the delay in both their first trial and their retrial (see r v. boisvert, 2014 qcca 191, at para. 54 (canlii); r v. barros, 2014 abca 367, 317 ccc (3d) 67, at paras. 51-53; r v. nikkel, 2009 mbca 8, 240 man. r (2d) 1; r v. fitts, 2015 oncj 746, at para. 5 (canlii)). in the view of m. vauclair and t. desjardins, that approach was implicitly endorsed by this court in r v collins, [1995] 2 scr 1104 (traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales (28th ed. 2021), at no. 28.30) in that case, the accused persons had applied for a stay of proceedings at their retrial, and the stay had been ordered by the trial judge but set aside by the court of appeal. this court restored the stay of proceedings on the ground that the delay was unreasonable under morin. however, it did not discuss the right of an accused to bring such an application in a retrial. [55] the situation is completely different now, because the court has made stays of proceedings subject to new parameters, as set out in jordan. it should now be understood that the computation of delay restarts at zero when a new trial is ordered. this is also the interpretation adopted by the ontario court of appeal and the alberta court of appeal (r v. macisaac, 2018 onca 650, 141 or (3d) 721, at para. 31; r. v jev, 2019 abca 359, 381 ccc (3d) 392, at paras. 36-37; r v jal, 2019 abca 415, at para. 6 (canlii)). what was said in potvin cannot be interpreted in any other way today since the adoption of the jordan framework, which requires an accused to take appropriate action in a timely manner, an accused cannot bring a s 11(b) motion during a retrial based on delay in their first trial. [56] lateness in taking action impedes the proper administration of justice and contributes to maintaining inefficient practices that have a negative impact on the justice system and its limited resources (jordan, at paras. 41 and 116) because the prospective approach adopted in jordan allows the parties to know from the outset what time is reasonable for their proceedings, they have a responsibility to take proactive measures to prevent that time from being exceeded. this responsibility lies upon both the crown and the defence. an accused who sees delay lengthening must act reasonably and expeditiously (jordan, at para. 85). bringing a motion in a retrial for a stay of proceedings based on first-trial delay is contrary to this duty and interferes with the proper administration of justice. it disregards the very reason for which a new trial was ordered, as it essentially results in a stillborn trial. moreover, given that such a motion is generally recognized as being late if it is brought after a trial has begun, it would be illogical to permit an accused to bring it even later, in the course of a retrial. [57] in the instant case, even though the quebec court of appeal recognized that the delay clock is reset to zero after a new trial is ordered, it found that this principle does not prevent an accused from raising first-trial delay after such an order is made (para. 59) in support of this position, levesque j.a made two main points first, relying on the principle that silence does not amount to a waiver, he suggested that a motion cannot be dismissed solely for being late (paras. 60-61, 64 and 70). second, he stated that jordan does not seem to prohibit such a motion from being brought in the course of a retrial, since the new framework no longer allows the crown to raise lateness in taking action against the accused (para. 69). [58] that approach should not be adopted the court of appeal failed to consider the fact that an accused also has a duty to act proactively. on the first point made by the court of appeal, i must acknowledge that the court was correct in stating that an accused’s long silence cannot in itself give rise to an inference that delay has been waived. with respect, however, i am of the view that the court of appeal erred in accepting that this may justify bringing a s 11(b) motion after a new trial has been ordered. while an accused has no legal obligation to assert their right to be tried within a reasonable time in order for that right to exist (morin, at p 802, cited by the court of appeal, at para. 60), this does not entitle the accused to do nothing when they believe that their s 11(b) right is not being or will not be respected. the court’s teachings are clear on this point: s 11(b) does not allow an accused to benefit unduly from the lengthening of delay, notwithstanding the fact that it is the crown that has a constitutional obligation to bring the accused to trial. [59] with regard to the second justification it put forward, the court of appeal also failed to consider the responsibility that rests on accused persons when it comes to delay. it is true that prejudice is no longer a factor to be taken into account under the new framework and that the crown can no longer attempt to justify a delay that is now presumptively unreasonable by inferring from an accused’s lateness in bringing a motion that the accused is satisfied with the situation (jordan, at paras. 54 and 81). however, the fact that the crown can no longer raise the lateness of a motion against an accused does not authorize a lack of diligence by the accused in this regard. jordan is clear on this point. [60] when a new trial is ordered, the constitutional clock for calculating delay is reset to zero (gakmakge v. r., 2017 qccs 3279; jev, at para. 37; masson v. r., 2019 qccs 2953, 57 cr (7th) 415, at para. 91). it follows that only the retrial delay can be counted when a s 11(b) application is brought in that new trial. this is not to say, however, that a court may not consider first-trial delay in assessing the reasonableness of retrial delay in certain exceptional circumstances. c do the presumptive ceilings established in jordan apply to retrial delay? (1) the presumptive ceilings established in jordan apply to the delay in a new trial [61] in jordan, the court did not discuss how the framework it created would apply in a context where a new trial was ordered. however, this does not mean that the presumptive ceilings it established do not apply to new trials jordan has a limited temporal scope and does not encompass all types of delay (para. 49; kgk, at para. 39); the presumptive ceilings set by the court relate specifically to trial delay. jordan’s particular focus was on addressing the culture of complacency toward courtroom delay (para. 45) the presumptive ceilings are intended to facilitate this culture shift by encouraging parties to act proactively in order to expedite proceedings (para. 112) after a new trial is ordered, the accused regains the status of a person charged with an offence and the crown once again has a duty to bring the accused to trial within a reasonable time. delay following such an order is trial delay and therefore falls within jordan. although i do not consider it appropriate to set new ceilings for retrials, as i will explain below, i nevertheless cannot adopt the approach of the alberta court of appeal, which declined to apply any ceiling in this context (jev, at paras. 40, 42 and 50) not applying the jordan ceilings to retrials would be contrary to the principles established in that case. (2) the presumptive ceilings should not be changed [62] the respondent and certain interveners propose the adoption of lower presumptive ceilings for retrials. this proposal cannot be accepted. [63] this court recently had to consider a similar proposal in kjm. in that case, the appellant asked the court to establish a 12-month presumptive ceiling for single-stage proceedings in youth justice courts under the youth criminal justice act, sc 2002, c 1. however, the court declined to set a lower ceiling for youth cases. moldaver j., writing for the majority, noted in particular that the appellant had failed to show that the criminal justice system specifically for young persons had a problem with delay that warranted “the imposition of a new constitutional standard” (para. 63). [64] it must be remembered that the presumptive ceilings adopted in jordan address a particular problem, that is, the culture of complacency toward trial delay. the retrospective approach that characterized the morin framework, together with the difficulties that arose in applying that framework, played a part in exacerbating that situation. the problem was a real one, which the presumptive ceilings established by this court in jordan were specifically intended to remedy. [65] in this case, the respondent has not shown that there is a real problem, let alone one that could warrant the imposition of a new constitutional standard. to support their proposal, the respondent and the association des avocats de la défense de montréal-laval-longueuil refer mainly to the suggestion made by a. d. gold, m. lacy and l. metcalfe that a six-month ceiling for trials in provincial courts and an eight-month ceiling for trials in superior courts would be appropriate (a practical guide to the charter: section 11(b) (2019), at pp. 15-16). [66] i must point out that the presumptive ceilings established in jordan provide a uniform general framework for assessing the reasonableness of the delay between the charge and the end of trial, “irrespective of the varying degrees of prejudice experienced by different groups and individuals” (kjm, at para. 65) like moldaver j., i am of the view that setting ceilings applicable to new trials “would undermine this uniformity and lead to a multiplicity of ceilings, each varying with the unique level of prejudice experienced by the particular category or subcategory of persons in question” (para. 65). it follows that the creation of a new ceiling in this case would also be “incompatible with the uniform-ceiling approach adopted in jordan and would undermine its objective of simplifying and streamlining the s 11(b) framework” (para. 65). [67] i would also observe, as moldaver j noted in kjm, that jordan establishes ceilings for reasonableness, not floors for unreasonableness, and that in most cases accused persons should be brought to trial within a time that is below the ceilings: while the presumptive ceilings are a significant chapter in jordan, they are not the full story jordan established ceilings, not floors while the ceilings offer a bright-line approach, they are supplemented by a more flexible, case-specific approach to delay below the ceiling in this way, jordan marries uniformity with flexibility. in embracing this proactive approach, prosecutors should bear in mind that the presumptive ceiling “is not an aspirational target”, 18 or 30 months is still “a long time to wait for justice”, and most cases “can and should” be completed in less time (jordan, at paras. 56-57). [underlining added; paras. 69 and 82.] [68] the jordan framework is therefore flexible enough to be used by courts to determine whether retrial delay is reasonable, even where it is below the presumptive ceiling. delay is not reasonable simply because it is within the applicable ceiling; it is only presumptively reasonable. delay may be found to be unreasonable “even if it falls below the presumptive ceiling” (jordan, at para. 82). (3) factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of retrial delay where it is below the applicable presumptive ceiling [69] the retrial context differs from that of a first trial, since normally the parties have already presented their evidence and arguments a first time to take account of the specific nature of this context, i propose two factors that can be considered in analyzing the reasonableness of retrial delay these factors must, of course, be applied flexibly, having regard to the circumstances of each case. [70] the first factor is the need to prioritize retrials when scheduling hearings. the parties are agreed on this point. appeal courts and trial courts have also recognized it on a number of occasions (jev, at para. 38; macisaac, at paras. 23-25; jal, at para. 14; r v. richard, 2017 mbqb 11, 375 crr (2d) 61, at para. 32). participants in the criminal justice system, particularly the crown and the court, must act proactively when a new trial is ordered so that dates can quickly be set for that trial, which must normally be prioritized. as mentioned above, the accused also has a role to play in this regard and must take proactive measures for this purpose. [71] the second factor goes hand in hand with the first: retrials are, as a general rule, to be conducted in less time than first trials. the parties are also agreed on this point. it is commonly recognized that retrials will have a shorter time frame than first trials because the parties’ respective evidence and positions have been presented a first time (jev, at para. 38; macisaac, at para. 27; masson, at para. 91). however, i note that it is not out of the question for a retrial comparable in length to the first trial to be justified in certain circumstances. for example, a change in strategy by the prosecution or the accused might mean that the work done during the first trial is no longer relevant (jev, at para. 41; masson, at para. 89). this is why the analysis of delay must remain contextual and take account of the specific circumstances of each case. [72] these two factors are grounded in the duty of all participants in the criminal justice system to act in a timely manner. in the retrial context, this means that everyone, and especially the crown, must ensure that retrials are prioritized when trial dates are set and that retrial delay is as short as possible. recognition of these factors is based on the objectives of s 11(b). first, prioritizing retrials and considering that, as a general rule, retrials should be conducted in less time protects the s 11(b) rights of accused persons and limits the negative consequences of being charged with a criminal offence (jordan, at para. 20; morin, at pp. 801-3). the making of an order for a new trial prolongs the period during which the accused is a person charged with an offence as well as the stress, anxiety and stigma associated with having that status. indeed, this court reiterated in jordan that lengthy delay gives rise to an inference of prejudice to the accused (paras. 34, 54 and 110) although jordan eliminates the concept of prejudice as an analytical factor, this concept nonetheless remains central under the new framework, because the setting of presumptive ceilings was in fact based on the presumption that significant delay is prejudicial to an accused (para. 54). second, the adoption of these two factors reflects recognition of the fact that prolonged delay also causes prejudice to victims, witnesses and the justice system as a whole (para. 110; see also paras. 22-27). [73] these factors must be assessed contextually, as required by jordan. in this regard, first-trial delay is one of the circumstances that may be taken into account in the assessment. in a context where the first-trial delay exceeds the applicable ceiling, failure to act expeditiously and to prioritize the case could weigh in favour of a finding that the retrial delay is unreasonable. however, the analysis remains contextual and flexible, and it is for the court to make this determination in light of the specific circumstances of each case. the fact that this contextual element is considered does not allow an accused to raise first-trial delay indirectly. it must be remembered that the constitutional clock for delay is reset to zero when a new trial is ordered and that, from that point on, first-trial delay can no longer be counted. giving too much weight to first-trial delay would be contrary to the principles set out in jordan, which creates, first and foremost, a prospective framework that encourages parties to act proactively. where a s 11(b) motion is brought in the course of a retrial, it is the delay in that trial that remains the focus of the analysis. v application to this appeal [74] in this case, the respondent did not act in a timely manner. neither before nor during his first trial did he raise an infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time. nor did he make an argument to this effect in the court of appeal after the crown decided to appeal the verdict. it was not until a few months before his retrial was to be held that he brought his s 11(b) motion. [75] although the retrial judge found that there was evidence to suggest that the accused had been concerned about delay during the first trial, the fact remains that he never applied for a remedy for that delay. the respondent was charged in february 2011, and his first trial ended in may 2016. he was acquitted in february 2017. the crown appealed the trial judge’s decision. in the court of appeal, the respondent did not allege that there had been unreasonable delay in his trial. a new trial was ordered on june 13, 2018, and the respondent brought a s 11(b) motion for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay for the first time on december 28, 2018 that motion concerned the delays in the first trial and the retrial. [76] given that the respondent brought his s 11(b) application in the course of his retrial, the delay in his first trial cannot be considered in calculating the total delay. only the delay since the order for a new trial is counted. the trial judge therefore erred in combining the delays for the two trials in assessing whether the s 11(b) right had been infringed. such an approach in fact leads to an absurd result, because adding the delays together makes ordering a new trial pointless while the court of appeal correctly recognized that combining the delays for the two trials was inconsistent with the new framework established in jordan, the two-step approach it proposed is also wrong, because it allows an accused to raise first-trial delay after a retrial has been ordered. [77] to determine whether a motion for a stay of proceedings is well founded, a court must begin by calculating the total delay between the order for a new trial and the actual or anticipated end of that trial. here, the order was made by the court of appeal on june 13, 2018. at the time the motion for a stay of proceedings was argued, the anticipated end of the trial was april 18, 2019, and the total delay was estimated at 10 months and 5 days. none of the delay was attributable to the defence. this delay is well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling applicable to the first trial.2 [78] in this case, if the respondent were to be retried, none of the factors associated with this specific context supports a finding that his right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed. there is no evidence establishing that the retrial was not prioritized. in october 2018, the parties scheduled that trial for the first available period, april 29 to may 31, 2019, resulting in a total delay of 11.5 months. in january 2019, after the respondent brought his s 11(b) application, the trial dates were moved up to march 11 to april 18, 2019. the anticipated retrial delay then became 10 months and 5 days, which is reasonable and much shorter than the first-trial delay, in addition to being below the 30-month presumptive ceiling. it is true that the first trial seems to have taken markedly longer than it should have. in this case, however, the length of the 2 the presumptive ceiling applicable in this case is the 30-month ceiling, because a preliminary inquiry was held in the first trial. first-trial delay has relatively little, if any, weight given that the anticipated retrial delay is very short and that the case was prioritized, i conclude that the delay is reasonable and that there are no grounds for a stay of proceedings. [79] in the end, i am of the view that both the trial judge and the court of appeal erred in finding that the respondent’s right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed. vi disposition [80] for these reasons, i would allow the appeal, set aside the stay of proceedings and remand the case to another judge of the court of québec for the continuation of the trial. english version of the reasons delivered by côté j — i. overview [81] this appeal concerns the interaction between the culture shift introduced by this court since r v. jordan, 2016 scc 27, [2016] 1 scr 631, the presumptive ceilings within which an accused must be brought to trial, and the situation — not contemplated by jordan — in which a new trial is ordered we must propose a pragmatic solution that respects the right of an accused to be tried within a reasonable time while also remaining true to the principles established in jordan when analyzing delay in the context of a retrial. [82] in rendering its decision in jordan on july 8, 2016, this court reaffirmed the fundamental right of accused persons to be tried within a reasonable time and thoroughly changed the manner in which delay is treated. a change of direction was required to counter the culture of complacency that had developed among canadian courts. new ceilings were established, and any delay that exceeds these ceilings is now presumptively unreasonable; an accused no longer has to prove prejudice to obtain a stay of proceedings. [83] the corollary to this prospective framework is that it requires a certain level of proactivity from all participants in the justice system. an accused can be faulted for their inaction or lateness in taking action. illegitimate conduct by an accused that is contrary to the values promoted by jordan may justify attributing a portion of the delay to them. [84] of course, the court’s purpose in jordan was not to provide second-rate justice to accused persons, but rather to ensure that their constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time, guaranteed by s 11(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, is respected where the prosecution breaches its duty and infringes this fundamental right, a stay of proceedings is the only possible remedy (r v rahey, [1987] 1 scr 588, at p 614; jordan, at paras. 35 and 47; r v. cody, 2017 scc 31, [2017] 1 scr 659, at para. 24). ii analysis [85] i will say from the outset that i agree with the main principles in the analysis of my colleague wagner cj, including the fact that in jordan the court did not discuss how the ceilings would apply in the context of a retrial and that it is not necessary to set new ceilings. i also accept the two factors he proposes to consider in the analysis of the reasonableness of delay following an order for a new trial, where the delay is below the applicable presumptive ceiling. i agree that retrials should, generally, take less time than first trials and that retrials should be prioritized. my colleague’s approach makes it possible, among other things, to fulfil the purpose for which a new trial is ordered, as such a trial might otherwise be “stillborn” (chief justice’s reasons, at para. 56). i have no reservations in endorsing that approach, for the future. it reflects the culture shift required by jordan and provides a pragmatic solution; it clarifies how an order for a new trial affects the calculation of delay, while retaining the ceilings established in jordan. i will also say that i would most likely agree with my colleague’s conclusion if the issue of reasonableness of delay arose in a situation where a new trial was ordered and all of the delay in the first trial was subsequent to jordan. however, that is not the case here. [86] therefore, with great respect, i disagree with the result reached by my colleague, namely that the accused cannot obtain a stay of proceedings. i would dismiss the appeal and uphold the stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge (2019 qccq 1236) and upheld by the court of appeal (2020 qcca 666) because of a key feature of this case: the accused’s first trial had been completed and judgment had been reserved by the time this court rendered its decision in jordan. i will explain. [87] as my colleague aptly states at para. 68 of his reasons, the jordan ceilings are merely presumptive. if they are exceeded, it is open to the prosecution to try to rebut the presumption and show that the delay is reasonable (jordan, at paras. 68 et seq). conversely, the defence may attempt to rebut the presumption of reasonableness and show that the delay is unreasonable despite being below the ceiling (jordan, at paras. 82 et seq). [88] this presumption of reasonableness may be rebutted through a contextual analysis of delay in which first-trial delay can be considered, as my colleague states (para. 73) in my view, this is one of the exceptional cases in which a stay of proceedings must be entered even though the accused did not raise the infringement of s 11(b) until after a retrial was ordered. the specific context of the transition from the framework established in r v. morin, [1992] 1 scr 771, to the jordan framework created an exceptional circumstance that justifies taking the delay of the first trial into account. when the first-trial delay is considered in assessing the reasonableness of the retrial delay, the presumption that the delay is reasonable is rebutted, notwithstanding the fact that the retrial delay is below the presumptive ceiling (see chief justice’s reasons, at paras. 68 and 73). [89] to begin with, silence alone cannot be held against the accused; he does not have to assert his right in order for it to exist (chief justice’s reasons, at paras. 43-52). an accused may choose not to raise an infringement of s 11(b) at a first trial and decide instead to tolerate the delay, particularly if they believe they will be acquitted seeking an acquittal cannot be viewed as inaction that amounts to illegitimate defence conduct. [90] nor do i think that the accused can be faulted for not raising delay in the court of appeal, for two reasons. first, he was acquitted at trial. it was the crown that appealed the case. what then could be reasonably expected of the accused? he had to fight to have the appeal dismissed and the verdict of acquittal upheld. it seems to me that to hold otherwise is a disguised way of reproaching him for wanting an acquittal rather than a stay of proceedings, despite the fact that seeking an acquittal is not a legal strategy. [91] second, choosing to raise the issue of delay after trial, in the alternative, would not have been a good defence strategy, especially since, as my colleague says, “only exceptionally will an accused be able to raise this issue for the first time on appeal” (para. 37) in this regard, i agree with the general principles stated by my colleague with respect to new arguments raised for the first time on appeal. other than in exceptional circumstances, it is not appropriate, once on appeal, to raise the delay in a trial that has come to an end. appeal courts generally regard the fact that a s 11(b) motion for a stay of proceedings is brought for the first time on appeal as being “fatal” to the motion (r v. rabba (1991), 64 ccc (3d) 445 (ont. ca), at p 447). in mg. v. r., 2019 qcca 1170, the quebec court of appeal stated that this is [translation] “fatal” largely because bringing such a motion is improper given that the trial judge had no opportunity to assess the evidence and facts in support of it (para. 42). [92] as the intervener the association québécoise des avocats et avocates de la défense quite rightly noted, faulting an accused for not raising such an issue on appeal, while at the same time suggesting that it is improper to do so, creates a no-win situation for the accused. such a situation is, moreover, especially detrimental to an accused who has been acquitted: [translation] appeal courts ordinarily find that new grounds of appeal may not be raised in the absence of a factual analysis or decision by a trial judge. similarly, it would be unthinkable for an accused who is acquitted to be able to file a cross-appeal on an issue that has never been raised. an accused who is acquitted has no right of appeal, yet this is the criticism made by the [crown] against the [accused]. (if, at para. 23) [93] it is therefore problematic to assert that the accused did not raise delay in a timely manner, given the fact that he was acquitted at trial and that he was, all things considered, restricted by law from raising it on appeal. at what point could he allege an infringement of his charter right? does an accused have to choose between the right to an acquittal, which flows from the presumption of innocence also guaranteed by the charter, and the right to be tried within a reasonable time? [94] accordingly, and with respect, the result reached by my colleague strikes me as harsh and seems to disregard a fundamental fact: the accused’s first trial had been completed and judgment had been reserved by the time this court rendered its decision in jordan on july 8, 2016. in my view, the delay in this case is markedly longer than it reasonably should have been. the fact that the retrial delay is below the presumptive ceiling does not protect all of the delay from the application of s 11(b). the specific context of the transition from the subjective morin framework to the prospective jordan framework created an exceptional circumstance that justifies upholding the stay of proceedings. [95] in reality, it has been more than 11 years since the respondent was charged, and his fate has still not been conclusively determined. certain facts must be recalled. the delay from the first trial is 63 months and 8 days (1,924 days), only 1 day of which is attributable to the defence a period of 38 days qualifies as a discrete event: the accused’s counsel was appointed to the bench, which caused a delay. the net first-trial delay is therefore 62 months. the accused was charged on february 8, 2011, his trial ended on may 16, 2016, and judgment was reserved prior to jordan. it was not until february 10, 2017 that the verdict was finally rendered: the accused was acquitted of all the charges against him. the crown appealed the acquittal, and on june 13, 2018, the court of appeal ordered a new trial between june and november 2018, the accused did not know who would represent him at his new trial. an agreement was not reached until november 21, 2018, when the accused’s counsel who represented him in the court of appeal accepted a mandate to defend him at the new trial just over a month later, on december 28, 2018, the accused filed his motion for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay. [96] the crown’s conduct following the order for a new trial warrants further comment. the delay between the order and the anticipated end date for the retrial, may 31, 2019, was 11 months. however, it was not until the accused filed his motion for a stay of proceedings that the prosecution, for the first time since 2011, adopted a proactive stance and took the necessary steps to move up the accused’s retrial the anticipated retrial delay then became 10 months and 5 days. however, in this case, even such a delay below the presumptive ceiling does not make it possible to disregard the first-trial delay. [97] although the charges involved are serious, this is not a complex case with an abundance of evidence. while the accused made sure that he had all the evidence in his possession in order to avoid a possible postponement of the trial, in addition to accepting the first dates available, the prosecution’s actions are difficult to reconcile with the proactivity that is now expected of it. despite the fact that the evidence already existed, the accused’s counsel struggled to gain access to it. [98] by the time a new trial was ordered on june 13, 2018, nearly two years had passed since jordan not only was the crown well aware of its obligations, but in addition, earlier dates were offered as soon as the motion for a stay of proceedings was served. yet the retrial was treated [translation] “in the same manner as if it were a first trial” (rf, at para. 94). [99] it seems to me that such a situation corresponds perfectly to the circumstances referred to by my colleague at para. 73 of his reasons. the crown failed to prioritize the accused’s case. in this context, even a delay of 10 months and 5 days in a non-complex case like this one is sufficiently long to justify taking the first-trial delay into account. moreover, i note that such a situation is unlikely to happen again, as jordan was decided more than five years ago. the fact remains that the system failed to try the accused in a diligent and reasonable manner. the stay of proceedings must be upheld; excessive delays cannot be tolerated. [100] i cannot fault the accused for not acting proactively and filing a motion for a stay of proceedings before the end of his first trial. he had a right to have the trial completed and to obtain an acquittal. fighting to secure an acquittal is a right, not a strategy. nor can i bring myself to fault the accused for not acting in keeping with a culture shift that had not occurred at the time of the events. as i have said, the new framework is prospective. not only had the culture shift not yet taken place, but the conduct of the prosecution and the court was the primary cause of the delay in the first trial if the accused may not benefit from the delay he causes to obtain a stay of proceedings, it stands to reason that the prosecution cannot wipe the slate clean of the 62 months of first-trial delay attributable to it simply because the constitutional clock is reset “to zero” (chief justice’s reasons, at para. 60). [101] at the risk of repeating myself, it took 62 months to complete a trial that was supposed to last 2 days more than eight months were then needed to reach a verdict of acquittal. a new trial was subsequently ordered, on the application of the crown, because of errors in the trial judgment apart from the 39 days mentioned above, the accused’s conduct was beyond reproach between the charges in february 2011 and the order for a new trial in june 2018. once his counsel was mandated, the motion for a stay of proceedings was filed little more than a month later, in december 2018. the accused cannot be faulted for not acting in a timely manner: in nearly 8 years of proceedings, only a period of 39 days from the first trial can be attributed to him. [102] in my view, the accused is entitled to a stay of proceedings. he was a victim of the culture of complacency specifically addressed by jordan. given the uncertainty of the previous morin framework, the fact that the accused did not move for a stay of proceedings cannot be held against him. he had a right to have the trial completed and to obtain an acquittal this is a case in which the presumption that the delay is reasonable is rebutted to conclude otherwise would be to lay on the accused’s shoulders the prosecution’s failure to bring him to trial in a manner respectful of his fundamental rights. iii conclusion [103] i would dismiss the appeal and uphold the stay of proceedings. appeal allowed, côté j dissenting. québec. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. solicitor for the intervener the attorney general of british columbia: attorney general of british columbia, victoria. solicitor general, appeals, education & prosecution policy branch, edmonton. henein hutchison, toronto; andrew burgess, toronto.
[1] consent is the foundational principle upon which canada’s sexual assault laws are based. for decades, this court has recognized that “control over who touches one’s body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity and autonomy”: r v. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 scr 330, at para. 28 as such, the contours of consent are carefully delineated and jealously guarded it is now indisputable that consent is a subjective state of mind, entirely personal to the complainant there is no room for implied consent in canada, and the range of mistaken beliefs an accused may lawfully hold about the complainant’s consent are tightly restricted by the criminal code, rsc. 1985, c. c-46. [2] this appeal provides the court with an opportunity to clarify the relationship between consent and the capacity to give consent. in my view, capacity and consent are inextricably joined. subjective consent to sexual activity requires both that the complainant be capable of consenting and does, in fact, consent. [3] the respondents take a different view, and argue that incapacity is a vitiating factor that renders subjective consent of no force or effect. accordingly, they argue that the trial judge erred by blending his assessments of consent and capacity and by failing to assess subjective consent first and separately from the capacity to consent. [4] i do not agree. only if subjective consent exists, or if there is a reasonable doubt as to subjective consent, does a trier of fact need to go further and ask whether that consent is otherwise vitiated. vitiation was not at issue in this case; the only live issue was whether the complainant subjectively consented the crown argued that subjective consent was absent for two reasons: the complainant was incapable of consenting and she did not agree to the sexual activity in question. the trial judge was under no obligation to evaluate these two issues separately or in any particular order. [5] nor did the trial judge err by failing to review the jurisprudence on when intoxication results in incapacity to consent. in the court of appeal’s view, the trial judge’s reasons could be read as equating any degree of intoxication with incapacity to consent. obviously, such an equation would be an error in law. however, in the context of this trial, no such reading was available given that the trial judge accepted the complainant’s testimony of her extreme intoxication, “any degree of intoxication” was not a live issue. this court has consistently reiterated the importance of a functional and contextual reading of the trial judge’s reasons. the duty of the appellate court is to determine whether the aggrieved party understands what the trial judge decided and why, and whether the reasons permit appellate review. in this case, the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient to satisfy this purpose i would also take this opportunity to discourage the technical search for error and to re-affirm the importance of approaching a trial judge’s reasons with sensitivity to the trial judge’s role and advantage in making findings of fact and credibility. [6] i would therefore allow the crown’s appeal and restore the convictions. i. background [7] the complainant, 16 years old at the time, went on a camping trip for the 2013 canada day weekend with her family and her mother’s co-workers. two of those co-workers were gf and rb, common-law spouses and the respondents in this case. [8] on the final night of the camping trip, the respondents engaged in sexual activity with the complainant. the issue at trial was whether this sexual activity was consensual the complainant and g.f both testified and presented diametrically opposed versions of events. rb did not testify. [9] the complainant testified that she drank heavily throughout the night, consuming between 8 and 10 shots in total. almost all of this alcohol was provided by g.f she testified that g.f gave her alcohol while the group was sitting around a campfire. she felt nauseous and went to lay down in the respondents’ trailer, where gf continued to give her more alcohol. she vomited repeatedly and the last thing she remembered before the assault was playing with her phone until she eventually passed out or fell asleep she was woken up when she felt her pants and underwear being pulled down. she heard gf tell rb to perform cunnilingus on her, which rb did while gf held her down. gf then inserted his penis into the complainant’s vagina and directed the complainant to perform cunnilingus on rb, which she did not do. the complainant testified that she felt dizzy, intoxicated, scared, and repeatedly told the respondents to stop. gf told her to “be quiet”. she did not call for help because she was sick, confused, and felt out of control. she testified that she did not feel able to make a choice of whether or not to participate. she tried to push away for a bit but got tired and then “just went along with it” eventually, she passed out again she disclosed the assault to her aunt the next day. [10] in contrast, gf testified that the complainant was not very intoxicated. he said he gave the complainant a beer and two half-ounce shots of alcohol by the fire but nothing in the trailer. he agreed that the complainant vomited but said that she told him she felt “fine” afterwards. he went fishing and then returned later that night to find the complainant lying in bed naked next to rb. he asked the complainant to leave but the complainant said she wanted to stay. he testified that the complainant and rb began to kiss and that the complainant allowed him to rub her thigh. the three of them then participated in consensual oral and vaginal intercourse. gf testified that he asked for and received assurances, at least seven times, that the complainant was consenting to the sexual activity. [11] in sum, the complainant’s testimony portrayed an extremely intoxicated 16-year-old who awoke to sexual acts being performed on her, who resisted but then acquiesced, thinking she did not have any choice in the matter g.f described the complainant as a sober, active, and enthusiastic participant. a. trial decision, 2016 onsc 3465 (per koke j.) [12] the trial crown invited the trial judge to treat this as a case of credibility. he argued that the trial judge did not need to “delve into degrees of intoxication versus sobriety” because he was presented with a stark choice: accept the complainant’s evidence, which would clearly establish incapacity, or accept gf’s evidence, which would clearly establish capacity. he also argued that the complainant did not agree to the sexual activity. [13] the respondents argued that the complainant was not credible they submitted that the complainant was not as intoxicated as she claimed and certainly not so intoxicated as to be incapable of consenting. most of their submissions, however, focused on the argument that the complainant agreed to engage in the sexual activity. [14] the trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence and convicted the respondents, finding that the complainant “did not consent to the sexual activity”: para. 52 (canlii). he found the complainant’s evidence to be internally consistent and corroborated by other evidence. in contrast, he found that gf’s evidence was “riddled with inconsistencies”: para. 54 after explaining these inconsistencies and rejecting other defence arguments, the trial judge concluded his decision, at paras. 71-73: [rb] did not testify. i find [gf’s] evidence to be unbelievable. it does not leave me with reasonable doubt as to his or [rb’s] guilt and in my view, the balance of the evidence at trial convincingly supports the conclusion that [gf] and [rb] forced [the complainant] into having non- consensual sex. section 273.1(2)(b) of the criminal code indicates that no consent is obtained where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity. this applies in instances where a complainant is intoxicated. accordingly, i find the two accused guilty of sexual assault as charged. b appeal decision, 2019 onca 493, 146 or (3d) 289 (per pardu ja,. watt and nordheimer jja concurring) [15] gf and rb appealed to the court of appeal for ontario. gf’s factum argued that the verdict was unreasonable because the complainant’s awareness and memory of the sexual activity demonstrated that she was capable of consenting. rb’s factum raised further grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial; and that the trial judge unevenly scrutinized the evidence. [16] the court of appeal rejected gf’s argument that the verdict was unreasonable, concluding that the complainant’s awareness and memory were not “demonstrably incompatible with incapacity to consent” (para. 25) and that the trial judge properly considered this evidence however, it found that a new trial was required for related reasons. [17] the court of appeal found two related errors in the trial judge’s reasons. first, he failed to identify the relevant factors to consider when assessing whether intoxication deprived the complainant of her capacity to consent. as such, his reasons “may be read as equating any degree of impairment by alcohol with incapacity”: para. 2 second, the trial judge failed to consider the issue of consent first and separately from the issue of capacity. [18] the court of appeal held that when both consent and incapacity to consent are at issue, the trial judge should first consider whether the complainant did not provide consent. only if the complainant did consent or if there is a reasonable doubt about the lack of consent is the trial judge required to ask whether that consent was vitiated by incapacity the court of appeal viewed this court’s decision in r v. hutchinson, 2014 scc 19, [2014] 1 scr 346, as mandating this two-step process. [19] the court of appeal found that the trial judge failed to follow this two- step process and that it was unclear whether he considered the issue of consent separately from the issue of capacity at all. as a result, the court of appeal concluded that a new trial was necessary for both gf and rb. the court did not address rb’s other grounds of appeal. ii analysis [20] this appeal raises four issues: 1 did the trial judge err in his assessment of consent and capacity? 2 were the trial judge’s reasons sufficient? 3 did the court of appeal breach the rules of natural justice? 4 do rb’s other arguments demonstrate any error? a did the trial judge err in his assessment of consent and capacity? [21] the first and primary issue in this case concerns the relationship between consent and capacity and whether it was an error for the trial judge to address these concepts together throughout his reasons. [22] at issue at trial was whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity. the trial crown argued that consent was absent because the complainant both did not consent and was incapable of consenting. acceptance of either argument would establish the absence of consent and therefore the actus reus of sexual assault. before this court, the crown submits that the trial judge did not, therefore, err by addressing consent and capacity together throughout his reasons. [23] the respondents, however, argue that incapacity vitiates the complainant’s voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question. as such, the trial judge needed to engage in the two-step process set out by hutchinson, first determining if the complainant actually consented, and only then proceeding to consider whether that consent was vitiated by incapacity the respondents argue that, by blending his assessments of consent and capacity throughout his reasons, the trial judge erred in failing to follow this two-step process. [24] i cannot agree in my view, where the complainant is incapable of consenting, there can be no finding of fact that the complainant voluntarily agreed to the sexual activity in question. in other words, the capacity to consent is a necessary — but not sufficient — precondition to the complainant’s subjective consent. as i shall explain, this is distinct from circumstances where a person may provide subjective consent that is not legally effective, due to, for example, duress or fraud. thus, when a trial engages both the issues of whether the complainant was capable of consenting and whether the complainant did agree to the sexual activity in question, the trial judge is not necessarily required to address them separately or in any particular order as they both go to the complainant’s subjective consent to sexual activity. (1) the role of consent in the offence of sexual assault [25] the actus reus of sexual assault requires the crown to establish three things: (i) touching; (ii) of an objectively sexual nature; (iii) to which the complainant did not consent: ewanchuk, at para. 25; r v. chase, [1987] 2 scr 293. the first two elements are determined objectively, while the third element is subjective and determined by reference to the complainant’s internal state of mind towards the touching: ewanchuk, at paras. 25-26. at the mens rea stage, the crown must show that (i) the accused intentionally touched the complainant; and (ii) the accused knew that the complainant was not consenting, or was reckless or wilfully blind as to the absence of consent: ewanchuk, at para. 42. the accused’s perception of consent is examined as part of the mens rea, including the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent: r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, at para. 90. [26] this appeal concerns the third element of the actus reus, requiring the absence of consent. [27] parliament has provided a broad definition of consent for the purposes of sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm, and aggravated sexual assault in s 273.1(1) of the criminal code: meaning of consent 273.1 (1) subject to subsection (2) and subsection 265(3), consent means, for the purposes of sections 271, 272 and 273, the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question. [28] this definition is subject to two other provisions in the criminal code, ss. 273.1(2) and 265(3): no consent obtained 273.1 (2) for the purpose of subsection (1), no consent is obtained if (a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the complainant; (a.1) the complainant is unconscious; (b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity for any reason other than the one referred to in paragraph (a.1); (c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority; (d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity; or (e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity. consent 265 (3) for the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason of (a) the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the complainant; (b) threats or fear of the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the complainant; (c) fraud; or (d) the exercise of authority. [29] turning first to s 273.1(1), consent is defined as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question” this court’s jurisprudence establishes that whether or not the complainant consented is a purely subjective analysis, determined by reference to the complainant’s internal state of mind at the time of the touching: ewanchuk, at paras. 26-27; r v. ja, 2011 scc 28, [2011] 2 scr 440, at paras. 34 and 43-44. at the actus reus stage, consent means that the complainant, in their mind, agreed to the sexual touching taking place: ewanchuk, at para. 48; ja, at para. 23; r v. park, [1995] 2 scr 836, at para. 16, per l’heureux- dubé j.; barton, at para. 89; r v goldfinch, 2019 scc 38, at para. 44 consent requires “the conscious agreement of the complainant to engage in every sexual act in a particular encounter”: ja, at para. 31; see also para. 34. furthermore, consent is not considered in the abstract but rather must be linked to the sexual activity in question. in hutchinson, the court explained that “the sexual activity in question” involves only the physical act, its sexual nature, and the specific identity of the complainant’s partner or partners: paras. 54-57 to provide consent, therefore, the complainant must subjectively agree to the act, its sexual nature, and the specific identity of their partner or partners: barton, at para. 88. [30] this court’s jurisprudence is replete with a variety of terms to refer to different aspects of consent while the criminal code simply speaks of “consent” (ss. 265 and 273.1(1)), this court has variously talked about “meaningful consent” (ja, at para. 36), “true consent” (r v. cuerrier, [1998] 2 scr 371, at para. 127), “apparent consent” (ewanchuk, at para. 36; hutchinson, at para. 4), and “subjective consent” (hutchinson, at para. 37). [31] as i will explain, there are two aspects to the overarching concept of consent, the absence of which is an essential element of the offence of sexual assault. the first is what this court has called “apparent consent” or “subjective consent”: see hutchinson, at paras. 4 and 37. that aspect relates to the factual findings of the trier of fact about whether the complainant subjectively and voluntarily agreed to the sexual activity in question. if the trier of fact finds that there was no such agreement, the actus reus of sexual assault will be established. [32] while this court has previously used “subjective consent” and “apparent consent” seemingly interchangeably, the term “apparent consent” is not consonant with the fact that consent is a subjective assessment of the complainant’s personal state of mind. considerations of what may be “apparent” are not relevant, coming dangerously close to reinjecting into our sexual assault law the long rejected concept of implied consent. i prefer the term “subjective consent” which more accurately conveys what is required by the criminal code and our jurisprudence for a complainant, in their own mind, to provide “voluntary agreement . . . [to] the sexual activity in question”. [33] if the complainant did not subjectively consent (for whatever reason) then the actus reus is established however, the presence of subjective consent, or a reasonable doubt as to subjective consent, does not necessarily end the matter and result in an acquittal. there is a second aspect to “consent” for the purposes of the actus reus of sexual assault — subjective consent must also be effective “as a matter of law”: ewanchuk, at paras. 36-40; see also r v. lutoslawski, 2010 onca 207, 260 oac. 161, at para. 15. another way of framing that question is to ask whether the subjective consent has been vitiated. [34] whether subjective consent will not be legally effective is ultimately a matter of policy the law steps in to say that despite the complainant’s subjective agreement, it will not be given legal effect. sometimes, the policy that vitiates consent comes from the common law.1 other times, the policy is codified. in the context of sexual assault, the criminal code sets out a series of factors that will vitiate subjective consent in ss. 265(3) and 2731(2). [35] section 265(3) sets out four factors that will vitiate subjective consent to sexual activity. subjective consent will not be given legal effect where it is the product of force, threats or fear of force, certain types of fraud, or the exercise of authority: s 265(3)(a) to (d) section 273.1(2)(c) also vitiates subjective consent where the complainant is induced into sexual activity by the accused abusing a position of trust, power, or authority: hutchinson, at para. 4. when subjective consent is the product of these factors, the complainant has been deprived of control over who touches their 1 in r v. jobidon, [1991] 2 scr 714, for example, this court explained that the common law vitiates subjective consent to a fist-fight where bodily harm is both intended and caused: see also r v. paice, 2005 scc 22, [2005] 1 scr 339. body, and how, and there is no consent in law: ewanchuk, at paras. 28 and 37-39; saint- laurent v. hétu, [1994] rjq 69 (ca), per fish ja. [36] however, these factors do not prevent subjective consent rather, they recognize that even if the complainant has permitted the sexual activity in question, there are circumstances in which that subjective consent will be vitiated — deemed of no force or effect. the distinction between preventing subjective consent and rendering it ineffective may be subtle, but it is important. a factor that prevents subjective consent must logically be linked to what subjective consent requires. conversely, a factor that vitiates subjective consent is not tethered to the conditions of subjective consent and must find footing and justification in broader policy considerations. [37] the example of fraud demonstrates this distinction. depending on the type, fraud can do one of three things: it can prevent subjective consent, it can vitiate subjective consent, or it can simply not relate to the legal analysis of consent at all. [38] fraud that prevents subjective consent must be inherently linked to the conditions of subjective consent. for example, subjective consent requires agreement to the act being done by the specific person the complainant thinks is doing it: hutchinson, at para. 57 if, as a result of fraud, the complainant engages in sexual activity with someone other than the person they think they are with, then there is no subjective consent because the conditions for subjective consent are not met: hutchinson, at paras. 57-63. however, at the actus reus stage, a simple mistake has the same effect. a complainant does not consent “to the sexual activity in question” when the complainant mistakenly engages in sexual activity with the wrong person: see, eg,. r v. gc, 2010 onca 451, 266 oac 299, at paras. 20-24. [39] fraud that is not tied to the conditions for subjective consent cannot logically prevent subjective consent from forming but can vitiate subjective consent. thus s 265(3)(c) captures fraud that relates to something other than the “sexual activity in question”: hutchinson, at para. 55. as a matter of criminal policy though, fraud that vitiates consent is held to a far higher standard than fraud that prevents consent. while fraud preventing consent is interchangeable with a mistake, fraud will only vitiate consent where it entails the “reprehensible character of criminal acts”: cuerrier, at para. 133; see also hutchinson, at para. 42. [40] if a fraud is not linked to the conditions for subjective consent and does not entail the reprehensible character of criminal acts, then it will not affect the legal analysis of consent in any way. that is why lying about matters such as one’s profession or net worth may be immoral, but it is not criminal: cuerrier, at paras. 133-35. [41] fraud thus demonstrates the distinction between factors that prevent subjective consent, factors that vitiate it, and factors that do not relate to the legal analysis of consent. to prevent subjective consent, the factor must prevent a condition of subjective consent from being satisfied. if it does not then it can only vitiate consent, which entails questions of broad criminal law policy untethered from the conditions of subjective consent. if the answers to those questions do not justify the heavy hand of the criminal law then the factor does not relate to the legal analysis of consent. [42] the respondents, with the support of the intervener, argue that incapacity vitiates rather than prevents subjective consent i reject this proposition for three reasons. [43] first, capacity must be understood as a precondition to subjective consent as a matter of logic subjective consent requires the complainant to formulate a conscious agreement in their own mind to engage in the sexual activity in question: ja, at paras. 31, 36 and 45; barton, at para. 88 it naturally follows that the complainant must be capable of forming such an agreement. [44] second, incapacity as a vitiating factor would be inconsistent with the structure of the criminal code. the definition of consent for the purposes of sexual assault in s 273.1(1) is “[s]ubject to” ss. 265(3) and 273.1(2), which set out circumstances where “no consent is obtained” section 265(3) is a purely vitiating provision, whereas s 273.1(2) is multi-faceted, primarily serving to clarify the broad definition of “consent” in s 273.1(1): ja, at para. 29 only s 273.1(2)(c) vitiates consent, where the complainant’s induced agreement by reason of an abuse of power, trust, or authority is deemed ineffective in law: hutchinson, at para. 4; r v. snelgrove, 2019 scc 16, [2019] 2 scr 98, at paras. 3-4. the other factors in s 273.1(2) appear to clarify what subjective consent requires. it cannot be said that a complainant who expresses a lack of agreement has subjectively consented: s 273.1(2)(d) and (e). similarly, there can be no subjective consent to vitiate if the agreement comes from a third-party rather than the complainant: s 273.1(2)(a) in ja, this court, in determining that the agreement must be contemporaneous to the touching, rejected the suggestion that unconsciousness, under what is now s 2731(2)(a1), vitiates consent: para. 33. in my view, incapacity under s 273.1(2)(b) is another clarifying provision. like unconsciousness, incapacity deprives the complainant of the ability to formulate a subjective agreement: ja, at para. 33. an incapacitated complainant cannot provide voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question and therefore cannot provide subjective consent. [45] the third and final reason comes from the need for certainty in the criminal law. capacity as a precondition to subjective consent provides certainty because it is inextricably linked to what subjective consent requires: contemporaneous voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question capacity to consent requires that the complainant be capable of understanding what is required for subjective consent — no more, no less. [46] conversely, incapacity as a vitiating factor would bring with it a host of uncertainties untethered from the conditions for consent, an incapacity assessment would need to say that even though the complainant voluntarily agreed to the sexual activity in question, at some undefined point their decision-making process was so impaired that subjective consent was no longer effective. this would inject significant uncertainty into the task of establishing the actus reus of sexual assault; the blunt tool of the criminal law is poorly suited to such a delicate task as determining at what point a complainant has made an impaired but free and voluntary choice. further difficulties and uncertainty would arise at the mens rea stage where the accused’s awareness of the complainant’s impaired decision-making process would need to be assessed. [47] for these reasons, it must be that the capacity to consent is a precondition to subjective consent it is not a matter of vitiation if the crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not have an operating mind capable of consenting, or did not agree to the sexual activity in question, then the crown has proven a lack of subjective consent and the actus reus is established. [48] despite these reasons why capacity to consent must be understood as a precondition to subjective consent, the court of appeal, like the respondents and the intervener, understood incapacity to be a vitiating factor as such, they relied on hutchinson for the proposition that a trial judge must consider whether the complainant provided subjective consent first and separately from the issue of the complainant’s capacity to consent. specifically, they read para. 4 of hutchinson as setting out a “two- step process” that the trial judge must follow. [49] paragraph 4 of hutchinson does not relate to incapacity in any way. that paragraph reads as follows: the criminal code sets out a two-step process for analyzing consent to sexual activity the first step is to determine whether the evidence establishes that there was no “voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question” under s 273.1(1) if the complainant consented, or her conduct raises a reasonable doubt about the lack of consent, the second step is to consider whether there are any circumstances that may vitiate her apparent consent section 265(3) defines a series of conditions under which the law deems an absence of the complainant’s ostensible consent or consent, notwithstanding participation: ewanchuk, at para. 36. section 273.1(2) also lists conditions under which no consent is obtained. for example, no consent is obtained in circumstances of coercion (s 265(3)(a) and (b)), fraud (s 265(3)(c)), or abuse of trust or authority (ss. 265(3)(d) and 2731(2)(c)). [50] this introductory paragraph does not contain any novel or controversial propositions of law the sequential operation of subjective consent (“apparent consent”, in the language of hutchinson) and whether that subjective consent is effective in law has always formed the common law of assault and is continued by the criminal code: r v jobidon, [1991] 2 scr 714, at pp 731-32 paragraph 4 of hutchinson is merely summarizing the process that “[t]he criminal code sets out”. it is nothing more than a concise description of the two aspects of consent when both subjective consent and effective consent are at issue. hutchinson dealt with whether fraud by sabotaging a condom related to the “sexual activity in question” such that there was no subjective consent — or whether it vitiated consent. it has nothing to do with incapacity, does not engage in the issue, and does not suggest that incapacity to consent must be viewed as a vitiating factor. [51] further, hutchinson does not mandate that the different aspects of subjective consent be considered in any rigid order. while a complainant logically must be capable of consenting before there can be a factual finding that they did consent, a trial judge may be faced with evidence that the complainant was incapable of consenting and also did not agree to the sexual activity in question, and a finding of either will establish a lack of subjective consent. while in some cases it may be more respectful of a complainant’s dignity to first address whether the complainant agreed to the sexual activity in question (see j benedet and i grant, “hearing the sexual assault complaints of women with mental disabilities: consent, capacity, and mistaken belief” (2007), 52 mcgill lj 243, at p 270), there is no strict requirement for a trial judge to consider one before or after the other. [52] similarly, hutchinson should not be read as imposing a strict order-of- operations upon triers of fact when considering both subjective consent and whether that consent is effective in law. while it may usually make analytical sense to consider subjective consent first and legal effectiveness second, a trial judge will not necessarily err if they do not follow this order. there may be clear evidence that any subjective consent is vitiated for example, if a complainant is forced into sexual activity by threats of violence, it would hardly be reversible error for a trial judge to find that there could not be effective consent in law, even if there was subjective consent. [53] in sum, a finding of subjective consent requires both that the complainant was capable of consenting and did agree to the sexual activity finding that a complainant was either incapable of consenting or did not agree to the sexual activity in question will establish a lack of subjective consent. these two aspects of subjective consent do not need to be considered in any rigid order only if subjective consent exists, or if there is a reasonable doubt as to subjective consent, does a trier of fact need to go on and ask whether that consent was vitiated. [54] the question of whether a complainant had the capacity to consent will not always be at issue; nor will the question of whether subjective consent was vitiated always be at issue. such questions are driven by the facts and context of each individual case. (2) the four requirements for capacity [55] as capacity is a precondition to subjective consent, the requirements for capacity are tied to the requirements for subjective consent itself since subjective consent must be linked to the sexual activity in question, the capacity to consent requires that the complainant have an operating mind capable of understanding each element of the sexual activity in question: the physical act, its sexual nature, and the specific identity of their partner: barton, at para. 88; hutchinson, at paras. 54-57. [56] there is one further requirement because subjective consent requires a “voluntary agreement”, the complainant must be capable of understanding that they have a choice of whether or not to engage in the sexual activity in question: criminal code, s 273.1(1) at the very least, a voluntary agreement would require that the complainant exercise a choice to engage in the sexual activity in question in this narrow sense, in order to voluntarily agree to the sexual activity in question, the complainant must understand that saying “no” is an option. in ja, this court held that consent requires that the complainant have “an operating mind” at the time of the touching, capable of evaluating each sexual act and choosing whether or not to consent to it: paras. 36 and 43-44 thus, an unconscious complainant could not provide contemporaneous consent it follows that where the complainant is incapable of understanding that they have this choice to engage or refuse to engage, they are incapable of consenting. accordingly, a complainant who is unable to say no, or who believes they have no choice in the matter, is not capable of formulating subjective consent: see r v. al-rawi, 2018 nsca 10, 359 ccc (3d) 237, at para. 60, citing r. v. daigle (1997), 127 ccc (3d) 130 (que. ca), aff’d [1998] 1 scr 1220. [57] in sum, for a complainant to be capable of providing subjective consent to sexual activity, they must be capable of understanding four things: 1 the physical act; 2 that the act is sexual in nature; 3 the specific identity of the complainant’s partner or partners; and 4 that they have the choice to refuse to participate in the sexual activity. [58] the complainant will only be capable of providing subjective consent if they are capable of understanding all four factors. if the crown proves the absence of any single factor beyond a reasonable doubt, then the complainant is incapable of subjective consent and the absence of consent is established at the actus reus stage. there would be no need to consider whether any consent was effective in law because there would be no subjective consent to vitiate. (3) application [59] based on their view that incapacity is a vitiating factor and their understanding of hutchinson, the respondents submit that the trial judge erred in failing to consider consent and capacity separately and sequentially. as i have explained, i do not accept either of these propositions. nor do i accept that the trial judge erred in his treatment of consent in this case. [60] both the complainant’s capacity to consent and agreement to the sexual activity were at issue here. the trial judge was faced with evidence of incapacity to consent. most significantly, the complainant testified that she drank heavily throughout the night, was passed out when the sexual activity began and, while she struggled briefly, she gave up as she thought she had no choice in the matter. the trial judge was also faced with evidence that the complainant did not agree to the sexual activity as the complainant testified that she tried to push away from the respondents and repeatedly told them to stop. it was open to the trial judge to accept the evidence of incapacity and the evidence that the complainant did not agree to the sexual activity. hutchinson did not require these to be addressed separately or in any particular order. [61] the respondents argued here, as they argued below, that the trial judge’s error went beyond blending his consent and capacity assessments — they argue that he could not find both that the complainant was incapable of consenting and that she did not agree to the sexual activity. they argue that these findings are “mutually exclusive” and a complainant who is incapable of consenting is not capable of withholding agreement to sexual activity. i do not agree for two reasons. [62] first, i am not convinced that these findings are mutually exclusive at the theoretical level in my view, the capacity to consent requires a higher level of understanding than the capacity to withhold consent as discussed, the capacity to consent is a cumulative assessment, requiring the degree of understanding necessary to appreciate all the conditions of subjective consent if a complainant is incapable of understanding any one of those conditions, then they are incapable of consenting. conversely, the capacity to withhold consent inherently requires a lesser degree of understanding because that capacity is established by a complainant’s capacity to understand any of the necessary factors. for example, if a complainant is incapable of understanding the sexual nature of proposed touching but knows they do not want to be touched, then they are capable of withholding consent despite being incapable of consenting. [63] second, the continuous nature of consent provides a further reason why the respondents’ argument must fail at a practical level consent must be specifically directed to each sexual act: ja, at para. 34; criminal code, s 2731(2)(e). there is no reason why the entire course of sexual activity must be blanketed with a single finding of consent, non-consent, or incapacity this case provides an example on the trial judge’s findings, the sexual activity began when the complainant was passed out — evidence of incapacity as it continued, the complainant struggled and told the respondents to stop — evidence that she expressly refused to engage in the sexual activity when those struggles and demands were ignored by the respondents, the complainant, in her confused and intoxicated state, acquiesced, believing she had no choice in the matter — again, evidence of incapacity. [64] accordingly, it was open to the trial judge to find both that the complainant was incapable of consenting and did not agree to the sexual activity in question. in the context of this case, the trial judge did not err in addressing these issues together in his reasons. both findings went to a lack of subjective consent, thus establishing the final element of the actus reus they did not need to be reconciled with each other, nor approached in any particular order. [65] as a final note, i reject the respondents’ argument that the complainant’s claim of incapacity was belied by her thorough recollection of the sexual activity. whether the complainant has a memory of events or not does not answer the incapacity question one way or another. the ultimate question of capacity must remain rooted in the subjective nature of consent the question is not whether the complainant remembered the assault, retained her motor skills, or was able to walk or talk the question is whether the complainant understood the sexual activity in question and that she could refuse to participate. b were the trial judge’s reasons sufficient? [66] the court of appeal identified two concerns with the sufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons first, the trial judge’s reasons “may be read as equating any degree of impairment by alcohol with incapacity”. second, it was unclear if the trial judge found that the complainant did not consent, regardless of capacity. [67] as i explain below, i disagree. in the context of this case, the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient the trial judge’s reasons should not be held to an abstract standard that is foreign to the realities of the case before him. all parties agreed at trial that the complainant’s evidence, if accepted, established incapacity the trial judge accepted that evidence, and incapacity was clearly established. similarly, all parties recognized that factual consent was at issue. the complainant testified that she did not consent, repeatedly told the respondents to stop, and was told to be quiet the trial judge accepted that evidence, and the absence of agreement to sexual activity was clearly established. (1) appellate review of trial reasons [68] the importance of trial reasons should not be understated it is through reasoned decisions that judges are held accountable to the public, ensuring transparency in the adjudicative process and satisfying both the public and the parties that justice has been done in a particular case: r v. sheppard, 2002 scc 26, [2002] 1 scr 869, at paras. 15, 42 and 55; r. j. sharpe, good judgment: making judicial decisions (2018), at p 134 however, this court in sheppard emphasized that, for the purposes of appellate review, “the duty to give reasons is driven by the circumstances of the case rather than abstract notions of judicial accountability”: para. 42. on appeal, the issue is whether there is reversible error. what is required are reasons that are sufficient in the context of the case for which they were given. [69] this court has repeatedly and consistently emphasized the importance of a functional and contextual reading of a trial judge’s reasons when those reasons are alleged to be insufficient: sheppard, at paras. 28-33 and 53; r v. gagnon, 2006 scc 17, [2006] 1 scr 621, at para. 19; hill v hamilton-wentworth regional police services board, 2007 scc 41, [2007] 3 scr 129, at para. 101; r v. dinardo, 2008 scc 24, [2008] 1 scr 788, at para. 25; r v. rem, 2008 scc 51, [2008] 3 scr. 3, at para. 15; r v. laboucan, 2010 scc 12, [2010] 1 scr 397, at para. 16; r v. vuradin, 2013 scc 38, [2013] 2 scr 639, at paras. 10, 15 and 19; r v. villaroman, 2016 scc 33, [2016] 1 scr 1000, at para. 15; r v. chung, 2020 scc 8, at paras. 13 and 33. appellate courts must not finely parse the trial judge’s reasons in a search for error: chung, at paras. 13 and 33 their task is much narrower: they must assess whether the reasons, read in context and as a whole, in light of the live issues at trial, explain what the trial judge decided and why they decided that way in a manner that permits effective appellate review as mclachlin c.j put it in rem, “the foundations of the judge’s decision must be discernable, when looked at in the context of the evidence, the submissions of counsel and the history of how the trial unfolded”: para. 17. and as charron j stated in dinardo, “the inquiry into the sufficiency of the reasons should be directed at whether the reasons respond to the case’s live issues”: para. 31. [70] this court has also emphasized the importance of reviewing the record when assessing the sufficiency of a trial judge’s reasons. this is because “bad reasons” are not an independent ground of appeal. if the trial reasons do not explain the “what” and the “why”, but the answers to those questions are clear in the record, there will be no error: rem, at paras. 38-40; sheppard, at paras. 46 and 55. [71] the reasons must be both factually sufficient and legally sufficient. factual sufficiency is concerned with what the trial judge decided and why: sheppard, at para. 55. factual sufficiency is ordinarily a very low bar, especially with the ability to review the record even if the trial judge expresses themselves poorly, an appellate court that understands the “what” and the “why” from the record may explain the factual basis of the finding to the aggrieved party: para. 52. it will be a very rare case where neither the aggrieved party nor the appellate court can understand the factual basis of the trial judge’s findings: paras. 50 and 52. [72] sheppard itself was such a case. the trial judge’s reasons for conviction read, in their entirety: having considered all the testimony in this case, and reminding myself of the burden on the crown and the credibility of witnesses, and how this is to be assessed, i find the defendant guilty as charged. [paras. 2 and 10] [73] this court found that these reasons were factually insufficient because the pathway the trial judge took to the result was unintelligible: sheppard, at para. 60. it was simply not possible for the parties, counsel, or the courts to determine why the trial judge found as he did: paras. 2 and 61-62. [74] legal sufficiency requires that the aggrieved party be able to meaningfully exercise their right of appeal: sheppard, at paras. 64-66 lawyers must be able to discern the viability of an appeal and appellate courts must be able to determine whether an error has occurred: paras. 46 and 55. legal sufficiency is highly context specific and must be assessed in light of the live issues at trial. a trial judge is under no obligation to expound on features of criminal law that are not controversial in the case before them this stems from the presumption of correct application — the presumption that “the trial judge understands the basic principles of criminal law at issue in the trial”: rem, at para. 45. as stated in r v. burns, [1994] 1 scr 656, at p 664, “trial judges are presumed to know the law with which they work day in and day out”: see also sheppard, at para. 54. a functional and contextual reading must keep this presumption in mind. trial judges are busy. they are not required to demonstrate their knowledge of basic criminal law principles. [75] conversely, legal sufficiency may require more where the trial judge is called upon to settle a controversial point of law. in those cases, cursory reasons may obscure potential legal errors and not permit an appellate court to follow the trial judge’s chain of reasoning: sheppard, at para. 40, citing r v mcmaster, [1996] 1 scr 740, at paras. 25-27. while trial judges do not need to provide detailed maps for well-trod paths, more is required when they are called upon to chart new territory. however, if the legal basis of the decision can nonetheless be discerned from the record, in the context of the live issues at trial, then the reasons will be legally sufficient. [76] despite this court’s clear guidance in the 19 years since sheppard to review reasons functionally and contextually, we continue to encounter appellate court decisions that scrutinize the text of trial reasons in a search for error, particularly in sexual assault cases, where safe convictions after fair trials are being overturned not on the basis of legal error but on the basis of parsing imperfect or summary expression on the part of the trial judge. frequently, it is the findings of credibility that are challenged. [77] in three recent appeals as of right, this court reinstated sexual assault convictions that were set aside on appeal, endorsing the reasons of a dissenting justice. [78] in r v. langan, 2020 scc 33, rev’g 2019 bcca 467, 383 ccc (3d) 516, this court adopted the dissenting reasons of bauman cjbc that held that the trial judge’s ambiguous use of certain text messages did not demonstrate error on a functional and contextual reading. bauman cjbc concluded that since there was a permissible basis on which to admit the text messages, “we should not speculate that the properly admitted evidence was improperly used, without clear indications to the contrary”: langan (ca), at para. 103; see also para. 140. [79] to succeed on appeal, the appellant’s burden is to demonstrate either error or the frustration of appellate review: sheppard, at para. 54. neither are demonstrated by merely pointing to ambiguous aspects of the trial decision. where all that can be said is a trial judge may or might have erred, the appellant has not discharged their burden to show actual error or the frustration of appellate review. where ambiguities in a trial judge’s reasons are open to multiple interpretations, those that are consistent with the presumption of correct application must be preferred over those that suggest error: r v cly, 2008 scc 2, [2008] 1 scr 5, at paras. 10-12, citing r v. morrissey (1995), 22 or (3d) 514 (ca), at pp. 523-25. it is only where ambiguities, in the context of the record as a whole, render the path taken by the trial judge unintelligible that appellate review is frustrated: sheppard, at para. 46. an appeal court must be rigorous in its assessment, looking to the problematic reasons in the context of the record as a whole and determining whether or not the trial judge erred or appellate review was frustrated. it is not enough to say that a trial judge’s reasons are ambiguous — the appeal court must determine the extent and significance of the ambiguity. [80] in r v. kishayinew, 2020 scc 34, rev’g 2019 skca 127, 382 ccc (3d) 560, and r v. slatter, 2020 scc 36, rev’g 2019 onca 807, 148 or (3d) 81, this court adopted the reasons of a dissenting judge holding that the trial judge did not err in conflating credibility and reliability in both cases, the trial judges accepted the complainants’ evidence and found them to be credible, even if their reliability findings were not explicit on the face of the reasons. [81] as slatter demonstrates, a trial judge’s findings of credibility deserve particular deference. while the law requires some articulation of the reasons for those findings, it also recognizes that in our system of justice the trial judge is the fact finder and has the benefit of the intangible impact of conducting the trial sometimes, credibility findings are made simpler by, for example, objective, independent evidence. corroborative evidence can support the finding of a lack of voluntary consent, but it is of course not required, nor always available. frequently, particularly in a sexual assault case where the crime is often committed in private, there is little additional evidence, and articulating reasons for findings of credibility can be more challenging. mindful of the presumption of innocence and the crown’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a trial judge strives to explain why a complainant is found to be credible, or why the accused is found not to be credible, or why the evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt. but, as this court stated in gagnon, at para. 20: assessing credibility is not a science. it is very difficult for a trial judge to articulate with precision the complex intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various versions of events. [82] credibility findings must also be assessed in light of the presumption of the correct application of the law, particularly regarding the relationship between reliability and credibility the jurisprudence often stresses the distinction between reliability and credibility, equating reliability with the witness’ ability to observe, recall, and recount events accurately, and referring to credibility as the witness’ sincerity or honesty: see, eg,. r v. hc, 2009 onca 56, 244 oac 288, at para. 41. however, under a functional and contextual reading of trial reasons, appellate courts should consider not whether the trial judge specifically used the words “credibility” and “reliability” but whether the trial judge turned their mind to the relevant factors that go to the believability of the evidence in the factual context of the case, including truthfulness and accuracy concerns. a trial judge’s determination to accept or believe inculpatory witness evidence includes an implicit assessment of truthfulness or sincerity and accuracy or reliability: vuradin, at para. 16. often, the term “credibility” is used in this broader sense to mean the believability of the evidence and it necessarily includes both truthfulness and accuracy: mcwilliams’ canadian criminal evidence (5th ed. (loose-leaf)), vol. 3, at pp. 30-1 and 30-2. for example, black’s law dictionary (11th ed. 2019), at p 463, defines credibility as “[t]he quality that makes something (as a witness or some evidence) worthy of belief” and model jury instructions include both truthfulness and accuracy within “credibility” assessments: g. a. ferguson and m. r. dambrot, crimji: canadian criminal jury instructions (4th ed. (loose-leaf)). provided trial judges turn their mind to these considerations, there is no requirement that they utter the word “reliable”. (2) application [83] in my view, the court of appeal in the present case did not conduct a functional and contextual reading of the trial judge’s reasons, but rather assessed those reasons removed from the context of the live issues at trial. [84] the court of appeal found that the trial judge’s reasons “may be read as equating any degree of impairment by alcohol with incapacity”. the respondents also urge this reading. obviously, equating any degree of intoxication with incapacity would be wrong in law in my view, however, no such reading is appropriate here, on a functional, contextual approach. [85] the trial judge made two references to intoxication as rendering the complainant incapable when setting out his task, at para. 51, he framed one of the questions as whether the complainant “was unable to provide her consent to this sexual activity because she was impaired by alcohol consumption” when concluding his judgment, at para. 72, he wrote that “no consent is obtained where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity. this applies in instances where a complainant is intoxicated.” [86] the trial judge’s references to intoxication must be read in light of the live issues at trial. he recognized that intoxication could lead to incapacity. but “any degree of impairment” was not at issue — what was at issue was the extreme degree of intoxication to which the complainant testified. the complainant did not testify about some mild or abstract level of intoxication her evidence was that she was so intoxicated that she vomited repeatedly, passed out, felt “out of control” during the sexual activity, felt that she had no choice in the matter, and could not do anything to stop it all parties recognized at trial that this evidence, if accepted, established incapacity to consent. it is that degree of extreme intoxication that the trial judge was referring to when discussing whether the complainant was so intoxicated as to be incapable of consenting. in the context of this trial, the trial judge’s reasons should not be read as equating any degree of intoxication with incapacity. [87] similarly, the trial judge’s blending of consent and capacity reveals neither an error in law nor insufficient reasons. it would have been preferable for the trial judge to clearly identify what aspect of consent he was referring to in concluding that there was no consent. however, failing to do so did not amount to error. [88] capacity was not the only issue at trial. while a finding of incapacity would establish the actus reus, the trial judge also considered whether, if the complainant was capable, she did agree to the sexual activity. [89] the trial judge’s reasons can be read as finding both that the complainant was incapable of consenting and that she did not agree to the sexual activity as explained earlier, these findings are not legally contradictory and both were available to him. indeed, having chosen to accept and believe her evidence, both findings are obvious. [90] the respondents, in their arguments before the court of appeal and before this court, stressed that the trial crown did not “invite” the trial judge to convict on the basis that the complainant did not agree to the sexual activity. while the trial crown certainly focused on incapacity, it is not fair to say that he disavowed this theory. the charge was not particularized and the crown adduced evidence that the complainant both was incapable of consenting and did not consent. the trial crown’s written and oral submissions both highlighted the complainant’s evidence that she did not consent, such as her evidence that she told the respondents to stop and tried to push rb away. whether the complainant agreed to the sexual activity was a live issue indeed, the defence urged the trial judge to find that the complainant provided such an agreement. it was open to the trial judge to find that the complainant was incapable and that she expressly refused to engage in the sexual activity — either way, he found that the respondents sexually assaulted the complainant. [91] the respondents received a fair trial they were presumed innocent and held the crown to its burden to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt they thoroughly cross-examined the complainant and mounted a multi-faceted defence against the charge but fairness does not require perfection: r v harrer, [1995] 3 scr 562, at para. 45, per mclachlin j. the trial judge accepted the evidence of the complainant that sexual activity began when she was unconscious and continued despite her pleas for the respondents to stop. his reasons revealed no error on a proper appellate reading the respondents’ convictions should not have been overturned simply because the trial judge expressed himself poorly. c did the court of appeal breach the rules of natural justice in deciding the appeal for reasons not raised by the parties? [92] after rejecting gf’s unreasonable verdict argument, the court of appeal did not proceed to examine the grounds of appeal raised by rb’s arguments but rather found that the trial judge had committed the errors it identified. the court of appeal recognized that it was not addressing “the precise argument advanced” by g.f and rb but proceeded because “issues related to consent and capacity were central to the arguments made on appeal” by all parties: para. 29. the crown argues that the court of appeal should not have decided the appeal on the basis of its concerns in the trial judge’s reasons without providing the parties an express opportunity to respond it argues that this was a breach of natural justice, in contravention of this court’s decision in r v. mian, 2014 scc 54, [2014] 2 scr 689. [93] while this point is moot as i have determined that the court of appeal erred in reaching its conclusion, i do not agree that mian was breached. mian sought to strike a balance between the adversarial process and the appellate court’s duty to ensure that justice is done. in pursuit of that duty, sometimes the appellate court will need to raise a new issue that suggests error in the decision below that goes beyond the arguments set forth by the parties. if the appellate court raises a new issue, fairness to the adversarial process requires the court to provide the parties with notice and an opportunity to respond to it: mian, at para. 30 however, where the appellate court raises an issue that is not “new” but rather is rooted in or forms a component of the issues raised by the parties, mian gives appellate courts a discretion to determine whether notice and submissions are warranted: para. 33. [94] here, this court would have no basis upon which to interfere with the court of appeal’s exercise of discretion while the respondents’ unreasonable verdict argument did not directly engage the framework for assessing consent and capacity or the sufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons, the court of appeal reasonably exercised its discretion to address these issues, noting that they were not “new” because “issues related to consent and capacity were central to the arguments made on appeal by both the [respondents] and the crown”: para. 29. the respondents focused their argument on whether the complainant’s evidence, even if accepted, could establish incapacity. however, they also argued that the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient insofar as they concerned the issue of factual non-consent free from incapacity the crown argued below that the trial judge’s reasons on consent and incapacity were free of error. notably, the crown argued that the trial judge’s blending of these issues was not an error. this was not a case where natural justice demanded that the court of appeal provide the parties with notice or invite further submissions. d other issues [95] the respondents raise three further issues that were not addressed by the court of appeal. the respondents argue that the trial judge erred in failing to declare a mistrial, erred in not considering whether the respondents harboured honest but mistaken beliefs that the complainant communicated consent, and unevenly scrutinized the evidence of the complainant and gf. in my view, there is no merit to any of these arguments. [96] first, the trial judge did not err in refusing to declare a mistrial. rb states she wanted to testify and her right to do so was usurped by her counsel. she claims that there was an agreement in place with her counsel that he would not close the defence case without first consulting her about whether she wanted to testify. defence counsel, she submits, did not honour this agreement. as the crown aptly notes though, rb. made these submissions before the trial judge, who found that there was no such agreement. therefore, on the findings of the trial judge, there is no factual foundation for this ground of appeal. [97] similarly, there is no factual foundation for the argument that the trial judge erred in not considering whether the respondents had an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent. this argument is predicated on gf’s testimony that he asked for and received repeated assurances of consent from the complainant. the trial judge rejected that evidence and accepted the complainant’s evidence that she was unconscious when the sexual activity began, told the respondents to stop, and was told by gf to “be quiet”. there could be no air of reality to an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent. [98] finally, there is no merit to the claim that the trial judge applied a stricter level of scrutiny to gf’s evidence than to the complainant’s evidence the respondents take issue with each of the 10 reasons why the trial judge found the complainant to be a credible witness and each of the 12 reasons why the trial judge found gf’s evidence to be inconsistent. i agree with the crown that this argument is simply a veiled attempt to re-litigate the trial judge’s factual findings. [99] this court has never ruled on whether “uneven scrutiny” of crown and defence evidence is an independent ground of appeal: r v. mehari, 2020 scc 40. it was described by the court of appeal for ontario in r v. howe (2005), 192 ccc. (3d) 480, at para. 59, as a common argument “on appeals from conviction in judge alone trials where the evidence pits the word of the complainant against the denial of the accused and the result turns on the trial judge’s credibility assessments”. in the last decade, provincial appellate courts have dealt with uneven scrutiny extensively and stressed that it is a notoriously difficult argument to prove: howe, at para. 59; r v. kiss, 2018 onca 184, at para. 83 (canlii); r v wanihadie, 2019 abca 402, 99 alta. lr (6th) 56, at para. 34; see also r v. jms, 2020 nsca 71; r v. cam, 2017 mbca 70, 354 ccc (3d) 100, at para. 54; r v. kp, 2019 nlca 37, 376 ccc. (3d) 460. credibility findings are the province of the trial judge and attract significant deference on appeal: r v. aird (a.), 2013 onca 447, 307 oac 183, at para. 39; gagnon, at para. 20. as explained by doherty ja:. it is not enough to show that a different trial judge could have reached a different credibility assessment, or that the trial judge failed to say something that he could have said in assessing the respective credibility of the complainant and the accused, or that he failed to expressly set out legal principles relevant to that credibility assessment. to succeed in this kind of argument, the appellant must point to something in the reasons of the trial judge or perhaps elsewhere in the record that make it clear that the trial judge had applied different standards in assessing the evidence of the appellant and the complainant. (howe, at para. 59) [100] i have serious reservations about whether “uneven scrutiny” is a helpful analytical tool to demonstrate error in credibility findings as reflected in the submissions here, it appears to focus on methodology and presumes that the testimony of different witnesses necessarily deserves parallel or symmetrical analysis in my view, the focus must always be on whether there is reversible error in the trial judge’s credibility findings. even in howe, doherty ja ultimately chose to frame the uneven scrutiny argument slightly differently: para. 64. rather than say that the appellant had demonstrated uneven scrutiny of the evidence, doherty ja explained that the essential problem in the trial judge’s reasons was that he had “failed to factor into his assessment of [the complainant’s] credibility his finding that she deliberately lied on important matters in the course of testifying in reply”: para. 64. in appellate cases that have accepted an uneven scrutiny argument, there was some specific error in the credibility assessments: see, eg,. kiss, at paras. 88-106; r v. gravesande, 2015 onca 774, 128 or (3d) 111, at paras. 37-43; r v willis, 2019 nsca 64, 379 ccc (3d) 30, at paras. 55-62; r v. roth, 2020 bcca 240, 66 cr (7th) 107, at para. 54. as shown in howe, uneven scrutiny easily overlaps with other arguments for why a trial judge’s credibility findings are problematic. it is therefore unsurprising to see uneven scrutiny tacked on to arguments like insufficiency of reasons, misapprehension of evidence, reversing the burden of proof, palpable and overriding error, or unreasonable verdict. [101] nevertheless, without full submissions, i would not comment further on whether uneven scrutiny is a helpful or independent ground of appeal. in this case, it is clear that the respondents have neither demonstrated that the trial judge unevenly scrutinized the evidence in the course of his credibility assessments nor that any alleged error in reasoning figured in his ultimate conclusion as to the respondents’ guilt: see, eg,. gravesande, at paras. 18-19 and 43; howe, at para. 65 while the respondents have pointed to 22 reasons why they disagree with the trial judge’s findings, there is no suggestion that he treated similar inconsistencies, or similar positive evidence, differently when making credibility findings for each side: see, eg,. kiss, at paras. 93-97 the respondents simply invite this court to reassess the trial judge’s credibility determinations even based on the law of uneven scrutiny as it exists in appellate courts today, there is no basis for this court to do so: aird (a.), at para. 39. iii conclusion [102] the trial judge’s reasons were not perfect. they did not have to be. the trial judge did not err in addressing consent and capacity together throughout his reasons. capacity is a precondition to consent, and as such there was no need for the trial judge to consider capacity separately from or after the issue of factual consent. it was open to the trial judge to find that the complainant was both incapable of consenting and factually did not consent and convict the respondents on either or both routes. [103] nor did the trial judge equate any degree of intoxication with incapacity. the trial judge explained what he found and why, and what he found was that the respondents committed a sexual assault upon the extremely intoxicated complainant, who was passed out when the assault commenced. their convictions were safe and the trial judge made no error. [104] for these reasons, i would allow the crown’s appeal, set aside the order of the court of appeal, and restore the respondents’ convictions. the following are the reasons delivered by brown and rowe jj. — [105] there is much in the reasons of our colleague justice karakatsanis to endorse, including the result (at which we also arrive, but via a different path) we agree, for example, that capacity to consent should be understood as a precondition to consent under s 273.1 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. we also agree that it is possible to find that a complainant lacked capacity to consent while being capable of withholding consent (see j benedet and i grant, “hearing the sexual assault complaints of women with mental disabilities: consent, capacity, and mistaken belief” (2007), 52 mcgill lj 243, at p 270). [106] subject to the observations we make below, we also accept much of our colleague’s recounting of the law regarding appellate review for sufficiency of reasons. what divides us, above all, is its application to the trial judge’s reasons in this case. in convicting the respondents on the basis of the complainant’s incapacity to consent, he explained neither the standard by which he decided incapacity, nor its application to these circumstances in which, significantly, the complainant’s evidence was not determinative of the issue. this was, in our respectful view, an error. [107] that said, the evidence that the complainant did not consent is overwhelming. we would therefore apply the curative proviso, allow the appeal and restore the respondents’ convictions. i. sufficiency of reasons [108] it is by now well established that a trial judge’s reasons in a criminal case, read as a whole in the context of the evidence and the arguments at trial, must be sufficient to explain the verdict to the accused, to provide public accountability and to permit effective appellate review (r v. rem, 2008 scc 51, [2008] 3 scr 3, at paras. 15-16; r v dinardo, 2008 scc 24, [2008] 1 scr 788, at para. 25; r v. vuradin, 2013 scc 38, [2013] 2 scr 639, at para. 12; r v. sheppard, 2002 scc 26, [2002] 1 scr 869, at paras. 24-25 and 52). where an appellate court cannot discern the basis for the verdict such that meaningful appellate review is impossible, this constitutes an error of law (sheppard, at paras. 28 and 46; rem, at para. 17). this is a highly context-specific inquiry whether an appellate court can be said to have appropriately reviewed or inappropriately “parsed” a trial judge’s reasons in a search for error will depend entirely on the reasons and record in each case. [109] as our colleague karakatsanis j generally recounts, in the criminal justice system the mandate of an appellate court is to review trial decisions, and trial judges must provide reasons sufficient for this purpose. she cautions that appellate reviewers must not “finely parse” the judge’s reasons in a search for error, and laments “appellate court decisions that scrutinize the text of trial reasons” on “the basis of parsing imperfect or summary expression on the part of the trial judge” (paras. 69 and 76 (emphasis added)). it remains, however, the case ⸺ and we do not take our colleague as disagreeing ⸺ that an appellate reviewer’s role is not discharged by giving trial reasons for judgment a once-over-lightly perusal, but by reading and considering the trial judgment in order to assess whether, in light of the evidence and arguments at trial, it shows that the trial judge discerned and decided the live issues so as to permit meaningful appellate review (sheppard, at para. 28; rem, at para. 57). seen in that light, abstract warnings about “parsing” and “scrutinizing” are not, in our respectful view, particularly helpful as concrete guidance to appellate reviewers rather, the degree of scrutiny that appellate courts should bring to bear follows from the purposes of that scrutiny, which is to ensure that the trial judge’s reasons are (as noted above) sufficient to explain the verdict to the accused, to provide public accountability and to permit effective appellate review. [110] a further problem is presented by our colleague’s statement that, despite this court’s guidance in sheppard, “we continue to encounter appellate court decisions that scrutinize the text of trial reasons in a search for error” where “safe convictions after fair trials are being overturned not on the basis of legal error but on the basis of parsing imperfect or summary expression on the part of the trial judge” (para. 76). of course, safe convictions free from legal error should not be overturned. but, and with respect, this is an unhelpful observation, since it is not possible to conclude that convictions are “safe” or that trials were “fair” where the reasons are insufficient to permit appellate review. our colleague’s critique assumes the conclusion. while a trial judge’s reasons need not be letter-perfect, we do not consider scrutiny of a trial judge’s reasons to be inconsistent with this court’s guidance in sheppard to the contrary, appellate courts are tasked with reviewing a trial judge’s reasons on appeal, and an appellant from a conviction has a statutorily granted right to have the trial verdict “properly scrutinized” (sheppard, at para. 46 (emphasis in original)). [111] similarly, while we accept that trial judges are presumed to know the law with which they regularly work and that they are not required to “expound on features of criminal law that are not controversial in the case before them” (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at para. 74), this does not obviate the importance of the appellate reviewer properly and carefully discharging its role. as this court has noted, the presumption cited by our colleague “is of limited relevance”, since “it is the correctness of the decision in a particular case that the parties are entitled to have reviewed by the appellate court” (sheppard, at para. 55, point 9). meaning, the presumption that trial judges know the law does not negate the appellate reviewer’s duty to insist upon trial reasons for judgment that, read together with the record, show that the law was correctly applied in a particular case (sheppard, at para. 55, points 2 and 9; rem, at para. 47). [112] that said, our central point of departure arises from our colleague’s statement: where all that can be said is a trial judge may or might have erred, the appellant has not discharged their burden to show actual error or the frustration of appellate review where ambiguities in a trial judge’s reasons are open to multiple interpretations, those that are consistent with the presumption of correct application must be preferred over those that suggest error. [para. 79] respectfully, this statement departs from settled precedent. [113] accused persons and their lawyers have to make informed decisions about whether to appeal and on what grounds (rem, at para. 11, point 3; sheppard, at para. 24). they are, therefore, entitled to know not only that the trial judge was left with no reasonable doubt, but also why this was so (dinardo, at para. 35, citing r v. gagnon, 2006 scc 17, [2006] 1 scr 621, at para. 21; rem, at para. 17) as mclachlin cj said in rem, at para. 37: the question is whether, viewing the reasons in their entire context, the foundations for the trial judge’s conclusions — the “why” for the verdict — are discernable. [114] since the “why” for the verdict matters, it follows that, where a trial judge’s reasons remain obscure or uncertain when read in light of the record, the reasons are insufficient for this reason, “where the appeal court considers itself unable to determine whether the decision is vitiated by error”, this court’s answer in sheppard was not to give the reasons a pass, but instead to hold them to be insufficient (para. 28). significantly, in sheppard this included circumstances where “there are conflicting theories for why the trial judge might have decided as he or she did, at least some of which would clearly constitute reversible error” (para. 46) our colleague does not account for this. [115] it is therefore inaccurate to say, as our colleague says, that reasons are sufficient even where ambiguities therein leave open the possibility that the judge “may or might have erred”. insufficiency arises precisely where an appellate court finds itself unable to determine whether a judge’s reasoning is tainted by error. nor do we accept that the presumption that trial judges know the law can be used as a tool for holding reasons to be sufficient when the reasons are obscure or uncertain. not only does this fail to fulfill the proper role of the appellate reviewer; it effectively leaves accused persons ignorant of the reasons for their conviction. [116] in this case, the trial judge’s reasons make clear that he convicted on the basis of incapacity alone. his reasons conclude as follows: section 273.1(2)(b) of the criminal code indicates that no consent is obtained where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity. this applies in instances where a complainant is intoxicated. accordingly, i find the two accused guilty of sexual assault as charged. [emphasis added.] (2016 onsc 3465, at paras. 72-73 (canlii)) he confirmed this sole basis for convicting the respondents on two further occasions: in his decision on the mistrial application and in his reasons for sentence. in the former, he reiterated that “[t]he court accepted the crown’s evidence that [the complainant] was impaired due to excessive alcohol consumption and was unable to provide the requisite consents”. in sentencing the respondents, he repeated: “the crown satisfied the court beyond a reasonable doubt that [the complainant] was impaired due to excessive alcohol consumption and was unable to provide the required consent” (2017 onsc 5203, at para. 1 (canlii)). [117] the difficulty is that, while it is clear that the trial judge convicted on the basis of the complainant’s incapacity to consent, his reasons do not disclose what standard he applied in deciding that the complainant was incapable of consenting. this was a critical omission, since the complainant’s evidence was unclear as to capacity, and certainly did not lead unavoidably to a finding of incapacity. she did not testify, for example, that she was unable to understand the physical act, that the act was sexual in nature, the specific identity of the accused, or that she had the choice to refuse to participate in the sexual activity nor did she testify to unconsciousness during the sexual acts, such that a finding of incapacity necessarily followed rather, her testimony was that she was very intoxicated, and that her ability to resist the accused was correspondingly impaired. [118] we do not dispute that a finding of incapacity was certainly available on this evidence. the problem is that this evidence could also support the conclusion that the complainant had the cognitive capacity to consent throughout the interaction, notwithstanding her intoxication, and that the trial judge’s reasons are ambiguous as to the threshold he applied in determining that the complainant lacked capacity. without any reference to the threshold for a finding of incapacity, or findings of fact that demonstrate an appreciation of that threshold, it remains possible ⸺ and, indeed, from his reasons it is difficult to conclude otherwise ⸺ that the trial judge simply accepted that the complainant was intoxicated and ended his analysis at that point, without considering the further question of whether that intoxication was such as to result in incapacity while our colleague emphasizes (at paras. 86-89) that the trial judge believed the complainant’s evidence that she was intoxicated and did not consent, this is not dispositive. not every instance of intoxication will result in incapacity. in order to convict the respondents, as he did, on the basis that the complainant was incapable of consenting, it was crucial that the trial judge satisfy himself that the complainant was intoxicated to the point that she could not provide consent. [119] our colleague says “[a]ll parties agreed at trial that the complainant’s evidence, if accepted, established incapacity” (para. 67) this is not accurate the respondents did not concede that a finding of incapacity would inevitably flow from a finding that the complainant was credible. more fundamentally, the issue of incapacity cannot be resolved by an appellate reviewer simply having regard as our colleague does to the trial judge’s credibility finding. the absence of consent is an element of the actus reus of sexual assault (r v. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 scr 330, at para. 25). to say that the trial judge believed the complainant does not resolve the issue of whether the trial judge applied the proper yardstick in determining capacity to consent. ii the curative proviso [120] notwithstanding the insufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons, we would uphold the convictions via the curative proviso. in light of the overwhelming evidence that the complainant did not consent, no other verdict was possible the trial judge, having accepted that the complainant was credible, could not plausibly have believed her to be lying about her subjective state of mind at the material time and in that regard, her evidence of non-consent (irrespective of incapacity) was categorical: the sexual activity was not consensual, and she wanted it to stop. indeed, she testified that she went so far as to communicate this to the respondents by saying stop and by trying to push them away. [121] conversely, the trial judge disbelieved gf, whose evidence was that he repeatedly asked the complainant whether she consented to engaging in sex with him and rb and that she did consent. rb did not testify. this left no evidence available to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the complainant consented. [122] the respondents resist application of the curative proviso, saying, first, that the complainant’s evidence relating to her lack of capacity conflicted with her evidence that she did not consent, and, secondly, that the trial judge should have analyzed each issue separately in order to reconcile those (alleged) conflicts specifically, the respondents point to the following: a) on the one hand, the complainant said she was unable to say stop or scream for help. on the other hand, she testified that she did say stop multiple times and was able to scream if she wanted to, but did not do so out of fear. b) on the one hand, the complainant said she was physically incapable of pushing or pulling away because of her intoxication. on the other hand, she testified that she did push or pull away on several occasions during the sexual activity. c) on the one hand, the complainant said that gf was dragging her by the hips and manipulating her body into various positions for intercourse (effectively implying that her body was limp) on the other hand, she testified that she herself got onto her hands and knees and bent over rb’s body as gf penetrated her because she was going along with it and did not know what else to do. [123] when the record is reviewed as a whole, none of this reveals inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence. she estimated that the sexual activity lasted between half an hour and an hour, during which time she “kept blacking out and going in and out of it”. in the circumstances of someone experiencing varying degrees of awareness, there is nothing inconsistent about feeling unable to say stop or physically resist at some moments of the encounter, and being able to do these things at other moments. iii conclusion [124] the trial judge’s reasons are insufficient to allow appellate review of his finding that the complainant did not have the capacity to consent in view of the overwhelming evidence that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity in question, however, no verdict other than guilt was possible. we would allow the appeal and restore the convictions. the following are the reasons delivered by côté j — [125] i agree with the position taken by my colleagues justices brown and rowe on the law regarding appellate review for sufficiency of reasons moreover, my colleagues would find that the trial judge erred in convicting the respondents on the basis of the complainant’s incapacity to consent without explaining both the standard by which he decided incapacity as well as its application to the complainant’s evidence. i agree, and i outline below a further error with respect to the trial judge’s conflation of consent and capacity. [126] however, i must depart from my colleagues with respect to their view that “a finding of incapacity was certainly available on th[e] evidence” (brown and rowe jj.’s reasons, at para. 118) and that the convictions can therefore be saved by the curative proviso in s 686(1)(b)(iii) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46. in my view, the trial judge’s errors were not harmless or trivial, nor do i think that the evidence is so overwhelming that the trier of fact would inevitably convict. given that credibility was the central issue at trial and that i do not find the crown’s case to be otherwise “staggering” (r v lkw (1999), 126 oac 39, at para. 101), i do not believe that this is an appropriate case in which to apply the curative proviso. therefore, i would dismiss the appeal and uphold the court of appeal’s order for a new trial. i. sufficiency of reasons [127] in her reasons, my colleague justice karakatsanis acknowledges that “[o]bviously, equating any degree of intoxication with incapacity would be wrong in law” (para. 84 (emphasis in original)), but states that no such reading of the trial judge’s reasons is appropriate in the instant case. with respect, my colleague supplants the trial judge’s clear statements with an interpretation that is not supported by the record. [128] the sole paragraph in the trial judge’s reasons that shows any reasoning whatsoever on this point is as follows: “section 273.1(2)(b) of the criminal code indicates that no consent is obtained where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity this applies in instances where a complainant is intoxicated” (2016 onsc 3465, at para. 72 (canlii)). [129] i agree with brown and rowe jj. that “while it is clear that the trial judge convicted on the basis of the complainant’s incapacity to consent, his reasons do not disclose what standard he applied in deciding that the complainant was incapable of consenting. this was a critical omission, since the complainant’s evidence was unclear as to capacity, and certainly did not lead unavoidably to a finding of incapacity” (para. 117 (emphasis in original)). i am also in agreement that “[i]n order to convict the respondents, as he did, on the basis that the complainant was incapable of consenting, it was crucial that the trial judge satisfy himself that the complainant was intoxicated to the point that she could not provide consent” (para. 118). [130] i would add the following. the record shows that the trial judge was led to the conclusion that incapacity is automatically established if the complainant was intoxicated. the crown explicitly stated in its closing submissions that any level of intoxication amounts to incapacity: [the crown]: . . . so your honour doesn’t really have to, in the crown’s submission, delve into degrees of intoxication versus sobriety, at least, insofar as, as it applies to applying 273.1 rather, in the crown’s submission, you’re presented with a starker choice, of either accepting [the complainant’s] evidence, which was that she was quite intoxicated – in the crown’s submission, if you accept her evidence, it’s, it’s pretty much a given that 273.1 will apply on the basis that she was incapable. on the other hand, the other stark choice you’ve been given is [gf] telling the court that she was as sober as when she appeared here in court so by that assessment of things, if you do conclude that that’s the case, then 273.1 would have no application whatsoever. so i just thought i’d mention that, your honour, in terms of framing the legal analysis in this case. the court: so you’re saying it’s more an issue of credibility? [the crown]: very much so, as, as opposed to assessing degree of how drunk or not drunk she was. (ar, vol. vii, at p 51) the trial judge applied this flawed reasoning and found incapacity without assessing the complainant’s level of intoxication. [131] while trial judges are presumed to know the basic legal principles with which they engage on a regular basis (r v. burns, [1994] 1 scr 656, at p 664), there must be an intelligible foundation for their verdicts in the instant case, it cannot be presumed that the trial judge both knew and applied the law based solely on one conclusory statement i strongly echo the court of appeal’s concern that the trial judge’s statement that s 273.1(2)(b) “applies in instances where a complainant is intoxicated” suggests that his view was that any level of intoxication is sufficient to vitiate consent, and it is not clear that this belief did not constitute the basis for his statement that there was no consent. therefore, the presumption of correct application is not relevant. [132] with the greatest of respect, it is simply conjecture for the majority to say that the trial judge was referring to a degree of extreme intoxication when discussing whether the complainant was so intoxicated as to be incapable of consenting the record indicates that the trial judge was erroneously told not to delve into degrees of intoxication, and he did not do so. the only reasonable conclusion from the trial judge’s reasons is that so long as the complainant was intoxicated, as she claimed, then she was incapable of consenting. this is a clear error in law. [133] the trial judge’s credibility-centred analysis led him to equate consent and capacity; therefore, his decision rests on a legally incorrect presumption. the majority is of the view that when both factual consent and capacity are at issue, the trial judge is not necessarily required to address them separately or in any particular order. with respect, i disagree. [134] in my view, the proper framework for analyzing consent to sexual activity was succinctly set out in r v hutchinson, 2014 scc 19, [2014] 1 scr 346, at para. 4: the criminal code sets out a two-step process for analyzing consent to sexual activity the first step is to determine whether the evidence establishes that there was no “voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question” under s 273.1(1) if the complainant consented, or her conduct raises a reasonable doubt about the lack of consent, the second step is to consider whether there are any circumstances that may vitiate her apparent consent section 265(3) defines a series of conditions under which the law deems an absence of consent, notwithstanding the complainant’s ostensible consent or participation: ewanchuk, at para. 36. section 273.1(2) also lists conditions under which no consent is obtained. for example, no consent is obtained in circumstances of coercion (s 265(3)(a) and (b)), fraud (s 265(3)(c)), or abuse of trust or authority (ss. 265(3)(d) and 273.1(2)(c)) [emphasis added.] [135] while i acknowledge that this court in hutchinson did not specifically address consent vitiated by incapacity and was instead focused on resolving the challenges created by the intersection of misinformation on the part of the complainant (including as a result of fraud or mistake) and consent, in my view, it is not hutchinson, but the criminal code, which establishes the requirement of a two-step analysis of consent to sexual activity. [136] the first step in the statutory framework is to determine whether the complainant voluntarily agreed to the “sexual activity in question” (s 2731(1)). if the complainant voluntarily agreed to the sexual activity within the meaning of s 273.1(1) (or a reasonable doubt is raised in this regard), the court should then turn to the second step and consider whether this agreement was obtained in circumstances vitiating consent (ss. 265(3) and 2731(2)). as noted in hutchinson (at para. 25), “[t]he scheme of the provisions — a basic definition of ‘consent’ in s 273.1(1), coupled with circumstances vitiating such agreement in s 265(3) and s 273.1(2) — also supports a narrow interpretation of ‘voluntary agreement . . . to . . . the sexual activity in question’”. [137] section 273.1(2)(b) of the criminal code plainly shows that incapacity is a circumstance that may vitiate a complainant’s apparent consent contrary to the majority’s view, s 273.1(2) does not distinguish between para. (c) (“the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority”), as a vitiating factor, and the other factors set out in that section, including incapacity, which the majority contends simply clarify what subjective consent requires. i echo the concern of the criminal lawyers’ association of ontario that the approach affirmed by the majority would shift all non-fraud concerns into an assessment of whether consent has been established, thereby undermining the balancing act described in hutchinson. rather than accepting the steps of the analysis as outlined in the criminal code, the majority adopts an understanding of the relationship between consent and capacity that renders the incapacity provision in s 273.1(2)(b) redundant in many cases, which is “contrary to the principle that every word and provision in a statute has a meaning and a function” (hutchinson, at para. 26). [138] the trial judge’s blending of the issues is apparent in his reasons for judgment (at paras. 51-52 and 71-73): the main issue in this case is one of credibility. the parties agree that mr. gf and ms. rb engaged in sexual relations with [the] 16 year old [complainant]. if i find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the complainant] was unable to provide her consent to this sexual activity because she was impaired by alcohol consumption, and that mr. gf and ms. rb knew or should have known that she was unable to give her consent, then they are guilty of the charges against them. if i find that [the complainant]’s ability to give consent was not impaired by alcohol consumption and that she freely gave her consent, then the two accused persons are not guilty. i have considered the evidence and the submissions of counsel, and after doing so i have concluded that [the complainant] did not consent to the sexual activity, and that mr. gf and ms. rb are guilty of the offence of sexual assault. . ms. rb did not testify. i find mr. gf’s evidence to be unbelievable. it does not leave me with reasonable doubt as to his or ms. rb’s guilt and in my view, the balance of the evidence at trial convincingly supports the conclusion that mr. g.f and ms. r.b forced [the complainant] into having non-consensual sex. section 273.1(2)(b) of the criminal code indicates that no consent is obtained where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity. this applies in instances where a complainant is intoxicated. accordingly, i find the two accused guilty of sexual assault as charged. [139] in my view, in accordance with the criminal code’s provisions, the trial judge was first required to determine whether the evidence established that there was no consent and then, if the complainant did consent or her conduct raised a reasonable doubt in this regard, whether her apparent consent was vitiated by incapacity. the trial judge did not do so, which is an error of law. his statement that “the balance of the evidence at trial convincingly supports the conclusion that mr. g.f and ms. rb. forced [the complainant] into having non-consensual sex” is unclear as to whether the conviction could be sustained on the basis that the complainant did not consent, regardless of her capacity. [140] while findings of incapacity or non-consent are not tainted by error simply because of the order in which they are made, the absence of analysis to substantiate the trial judge’s conclusory statement does not provide the basis for meaningful appellate review. ii curative proviso [141] the conclusion that the trial judge committed an error is not immediately dispositive of the appeal the curative proviso set out in s 686(1)(b)(iii) permits an appellate court to dismiss an appeal from conviction where there is “no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice” despite an error of law. as outlined in r v. van, 2009 scc 22, [2009] 1 scr 716, at para. 34, “the crown bears the burden of showing the appellate court that the provision is applicable, and satisfying the court that the conviction should stand notwithstanding the error.” in r v. khan, 2001 scc 86, [2001] 3 scr 823, this court held that applying the curative proviso is appropriate in two circumstances: (i) where the error is so harmless or trivial that it could not have had any impact on the verdict; or (ii) where the evidence is so overwhelming that the trier of fact would inevitably convict (paras. 29-31). [142] consideration as to the seriousness of any error and, related to the issue of trial fairness, an assessment as to the potential impact of that error are required. in my opinion, such an examination leads to the conclusion that this is not an appropriate case in which to apply the curative proviso. [143] the trial judge’s error cannot be said to be so minor, so irrelevant to the ultimate issue in the trial, or so clearly non-prejudicial that any reasonable judge could not possibly have rendered a different verdict if the error had not been made (van, at para. 35). the complainant’s incapacity was a live issue at trial, and acceptance of her evidence as credible is insufficient to ground a conviction. i agree with the court of appeal that “the trier of fact must consider all the evidence to make the factual determination of the complainant’s capacity at the relevant time” (2019 onca 493, 146 or (3d) 289, at para. 38 (emphasis added)). [144] had the trial judge considered all of the evidence of the complainant’s capacity at the relevant time, i find that there is a reasonable possibility that he would have concluded that she was capable of consenting. this is particularly so given the toxicology evidence indicating that no alcohol was detected in the complainant’s blood or urine approximately 24 hours after the sexual activity, thus increasing the likelihood that alcohol absorption did not occur. read fully, the complainant’s evidence cut both ways on incapacity. she was able to recall the events in question in considerable detail, including that she said “stop” several times; that she was able to physically push and pull the respondents; and that she understood gf’s direction to perform cunnilingus on rb but refused to do so. [145] this case turned on credibility. as noted in r v. perkins (t.), 2016 onca 588, 352 oac 149, at para. 32, “while there is no rule excluding the proviso in cases turning upon credibility, . . . the hurdle is a difficult one and caution should be exercised prior to its application” (see also r v. raghunauth (g.) (2005), 203 oac. 54, at para. 9; lkw, at para. 97). where credibility is the central issue at trial, the curative proviso has been applied where the crown’s case is otherwise “staggering” (see lkw, at para. 101). [146] applying these principles here, i do not believe that this is an appropriate case in which to apply the curative proviso. the trial judge’s errors were not harmless or trivial, nor do i think that the evidence is so overwhelming that the trier of fact would inevitably convict. it is not possible to precisely gauge the impact of the error of law committed by the trial judge. his reasons are unclear as to whether he considered the issue of consent separately from the issue of capacity, and whether his incorrect view that any level of intoxication was sufficient to vitiate consent constituted the basis for his statement that there was no consent. in my view, the convictions cannot be upheld based on the simple statement, prior to his analysis of the case, that “[the complainant] did not consent to the sexual activity” and on a general conclusion that “the balance of the evidence at trial convincingly supports the conclusion that mr. gf and ms. rb. forced [the complainant] into having non-consensual sex”. not only did the trial crown not invite the trial judge to convict on this basis, but these two statements do not make it clear that the trial judge convicted the respondents on the basis of non-consent irrespective of incapacity. [147] given that the crown’s case against the respondents depended largely on the credibility of the complainant’s evidence, i cannot say that the crown’s case is otherwise “staggering”. this difficult hurdle has not been cleared. iii conclusion [148] accordingly, i would dismiss the appeal and uphold the court of appeal’s order for a new trial. appeal allowed, côté j dissenting.
[1] in 1970, the royal commission on the status of women in canada set out a galvanic blueprint for redressing the legal, economic, social and political barriers to full and fair participation faced by canadian women for generations many of the inequities it identified have been spectacularly reversed, and the result has been enormous progressive change for women in this country but despite the sweep of legislative initiatives and the positive realignment of many social expectations, the long reach of entrenched assumptions about the role of women in a family continues to leave its mark on what happens in the workplace. [2] one of the ways it does so is in how women are remunerated generally; the corollary is how they are remunerated when they seek to combine work with family responsibilities by working part-time. as the royal commission noted, “ways must be found to provide [part-time] employees with pay and working conditions no less equitable than those provided for the full-time worker” (report of the royal commission on the status of women in canada, at p 105). fifty years later, this appeal raises that very issue. [3] members of the royal canadian mounted police (“rcmp”) receive benefits upon retirement from a pension plan. greater benefits are provided to members with a record of high pay and long, uninterrupted full-time service. certain gaps in a member’s record of service — such as being suspended or time spent on unpaid leave — can be filled in through a “buy back” process, leaving the member’s pension benefits unaffected. no such choice is available to full-time members who temporarily reduced their working hours under a job-sharing agreement. nearly all of the participants in the job-sharing program are women and most of them reduced their hours of work because of child care. [4] three retired members of the rcmp claim that the pension consequences of job-sharing have a discriminatory impact on women and violate s 15(1) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms their claim failed at the federal court (2017 fc 557) the application judge concluded that job-sharing is not disadvantageous when compared to unpaid leave and, even if it is, that any such disadvantage is the result of an individual employee’s choice to job-share, not her gender or family status. the federal court of appeal upheld the application judge’s decision ([2019] 2 fcr 541). [5] i would allow the appeal. full-time rcmp members who job-share must sacrifice pension benefits because of a temporary reduction in working hours this arrangement has a disproportionate impact on women and perpetuates their historical disadvantage it is a clear violation of their right to equality under s 15(1) of the charter. background [6] ms. fraser, ms. pilgrim and ms. fox served as police officers in the rcmp for over 25 years ms fraser was posted to fort saskatchewan, alberta, where she worked rotating 10-hour shifts, 7 days a week. ms. pilgrim worked in the commercial crime unit in quebec city. ms. fox began her policing work in toronto before being transferred to a small community in central newfoundland. [7] ms fraser, ms pilgrim and ms fox took maternity leaves in the early-to-mid 1990s. upon returning to full-time service, they experienced difficulties combining their work obligations with caring for their children. ms. fraser described feeling “overwhelmed” as she tried to balance work and family; ms. pilgrim felt like she was “on a treadmill”; and ms fox described the experience as “hell on earth”. these difficulties caused ms fox to retire from the rcmp in 1994 and resulted in ms. fraser taking unpaid leave in 1997. at the time, the rcmp did not permit regular members to work part-time. [8] in december 1997, the rcmp introduced a job-sharing program to provide members with an alternative to taking leave without pay under the job-sharing program, two or three rcmp members could split the duties and responsibilities of one full-time position, which allowed each participant to work fewer hours than a full-time employee. parties to a job-sharing agreement could be asked, on one month’s notice, to resume full-time work based on administrative or operational needs. [9] job-sharing was meant to be “mutually beneficial” for the rcmp and participating members. participants were able to “remain operationally connected to the force while having a work schedule that better accommodated their individual circumstances” (appeal record, vol v, at p 810) the rcmp benefitted from the participants’ services, which helped, among other things, in addressing staff shortages in smaller communities and in emergency situations. [10] ms. fraser, ms. fox and ms. pilgrim enrolled in the job-sharing program along with 137 other rcmp members between 1997 and 2011. most participants were women with children. from 2010 to 2014, all rcmp members who job-shared were women, and most of them cited childcare as their reason for joining the program. [11] after enrolling in the job-sharing program, ms fraser, ms fox and ms. pilgrim became aware that their participation would have consequences for their pensions. understanding those consequences requires a brief review of the rcmp’s pension plan. [12] all rcmp members engaged to work at least 12 hours a week must enrol in and contribute to a statutory pension plan.1 upon retirement, members receive benefits based on, among other things, their years of service.2 one year of work counts as one year of pensionable service. more years of pensionable service lead to higher pension benefits. [13] years of full-time work and part-time work are treated differently when pension benefits are calculated. part-time work is pro-rated to reflect the lower number 1 the royal canadian mounted police superannuation act, rsc 1985, c r-11 (“act”); and the associated royal canadian mounted police superannuation regulations, crc, c 1393 (“regulations”). except where necessary to distinguish between the act and regulations, i refer to them throughout these reasons as the “pension plan” or “plan”. 2 the formula used is: 2% × years of pensionable service × average annual pay. average annual pay is calculated using the member’s five best consecutive years of highest-paid pensionable service (appeal record, vol. v, at pp. 805-6). of hours worked. it is therefore less valuable than full-time work in the formula used to calculate pension benefits. [14] rcmp members acquire full-time pension credit for periods of service in which they were engaged to work 40 hours a week. members can also treat certain gaps in full-time service, such as leave without pay, as fully pensionable. upon returning from unpaid leave, a member can “buy back” the service they missed by making the contributions that both she and the rcmp would have made had she been actively employed. this increases the member’s years of full-time pensionable service, which results in a more valuable pension. [15] ms. fraser, ms. fox and ms. pilgrim expected that job-sharing, like leave without pay, would be eligible for full pension credit both situations, they noted, involve a temporary interruption in regular service for full-time members — a decrease to between 12 and less than 40 hours of work a week when job-sharing, and to 0 hours a week when on unpaid leave it was logical, in their view, that members in both situations would be allowed to “buy back” their lost service and associated pension benefits. [16] the rcmp initially accepted this position in communications with ms. pilgrim. subsequently, however, the rcmp took the position that job-sharing was part-time work for which participants could not receive full-time pension credit. [17] when informed that they would not be able to purchase full-time pension credit for their job-sharing service, participants in the program raised concerns with senior management in a memo to the rcmp’s commissioner, 14 female members from across canada explained why they considered the pension consequences of job-sharing to be illogical and unfair: members returning to full-time work from maternity leave, lwop [leave without pay], sflwop [self-funded leave without pay], and disciplinary actions (suspended without pay) are given the opportunity to buy back their pension benefits. members returning to work from extended periods of ods [off duty sick] and disciplinary actions (suspended with pay) maintain their pension benefits, despite not working. members who have departed the force and are subsequently re-engaged are able to buy back their pension. . . . thus, it would seem logical that members returning to full-time work from job-share arrangements would be entitled to the same opportunity to purchase pension benefits. job-sharing is a progressive, proactive and innovative step for the rcmp. it is time to support members who choose to job-share, rather than penalizing them for choosing an option the force has made available. it is important for management to remember that it is not only the member who benefits from job-sharing, but also the rcmp. job-sharing allows the force to retain its investment in human resources; members with training, skills and seniority. it provides a pool of trained people who can be called on in emergency situations members who job-share stay current with changing technology, legislation and training, among other things, because they are still working. why is the rcmp penalizing those who choose to job-share when it stands to benefit from the arrangement? [18] the rcmp’s then-assistant commissioner, g. j. loeppky, responded to the memo and acknowledged that there “may be an element of unfairness” to the rcmp’s approach. he presented the matter to the rcmp pension advisory committee, which retained an actuary to provide advice on available options. the actuary acknowledged that the rcmp’s pension plan could be amended under the income tax act and income tax regulations3 to extend pension buy-back rights to participants in the job-sharing program. the actuary noted that the flexibility under the income tax regulations “is particularly useful in responding to employee requests for reduced work-hours at various stages of their family life or career” (p 459). [19] while this process was ongoing, three female rcmp members filed internal grievances challenging the denial of their requests to buy back full-time pension credit for their job-sharing service. the rcmp external review committee found in their favour. the committee saw no legal barriers to the rcmp’s defining job-sharing as a combination of hours worked and a period of leave without pay. the committee cited a similar treasury board policy about the working hours of certain public service employees on the verge of retirement: . . . there was a precedent for such a categorization in 1999, the treasury board instituted a program of pre-retirement transition leave by introducing the pre-retirement transition leave policy this policy allowed certain public service employees close to retirement to reduce their hours of work by up to 40%. their pay was reduced accordingly, but the hours not worked were treated as lwop with respect to pay, deductions, allowances, other leave, benefits, and pensions. 3 rsc 1985, c 1 (5th supp.); and crc, c 945, respectively. [20] the rcmp’s acting commissioner, william sweeney, did not follow the external review committee’s recommendations and dismissed the grievances. in his view, it was not legally possible for job-sharing to be defined as a combination of full-time work and leave without pay although “immensely sympathetic” to the grievances, he concluded that the classification of job-sharing as part-time work was not discriminatory. [21] after the commissioner’s decision, ms. fraser, ms. fox and ms. pilgrim started this charter application. they advanced two submissions first, they argued that the pension plan, properly interpreted, allows participants in the job-sharing program to acquire full pension credit. second, if this was not possible, they argued that the pension plan violates s 15(1) of the charter because it prevents women with children — the majority of participants in the job-sharing program — from contributing to their pensions in the same way as members who work full-time or take leave without pay. in support of their application, ms. fraser, ms. fox and ms. pilgrim filed expert evidence and other material addressing the disadvantages women with children face in the labour force. [22] the application judge found that job-sharing is part-time work for which participants cannot obtain full-time pension credit. this outcome, in her view, did not violate s 15(1) because there was insufficient evidence that job-sharing was disadvantageous compared to unpaid leave. even assuming that there were negative consequences to job-sharing, these outcomes were the result of a participant’s choice to job-share. the charter application was therefore dismissed. [23] an appeal to the federal court of appeal was unsuccessful. the court held that job-sharing rcmp members did not receive inferior compensation to members on leave without pay, and that any adverse impact on job-sharing participants flowed from their choice to work part-time, not from the pension plan. [24] for the reasons that follow, i would allow the appeal. analysis [25] unlike full-time members who work regular hours,4 who are suspended or who take unpaid leave, full-time rcmp members who job-share are classified as part-time workers under the regulations and cannot, under the terms of the pension plan, obtain full-time pension credit for their service. ms. fraser and her colleagues submit that this limitation violates s 15(1) of the charter on the basis of sex and, alternatively, on the basis of family/parental status. [26] section 15(1) of the charter states: 4 the regulations use the phrase “normal number of hours of work”, which are set at 40 hours per week. 15. (1) every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. [27] section 15(1) reflects a profound commitment to promote equality and prevent discrimination against disadvantaged groups (quebec (attorney general) v. a, [2013] 1 scr 61, at para. 332; kahkewistahaw first nation v. taypotat, [2015] 2 scr 548, at paras. 19-20). to prove a prima facie violation of s 15(1), a claimant must demonstrate that the impugned law or state action:  on its face or in its impact, creates a distinction based on enumerated or analogous grounds; and  imposes burdens or denies a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage. (quebec (attorney general) v. alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, [2018] 1 scr 464, at para. 25; centrale des syndicats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), [2018] 1 scr 522, at para. 22.) [28] ms fraser does not suggest that the negative pension consequences of job-sharing are explicitly based on sex. rather, she claims that they have an adverse impact on women with children. [29] how adverse impact or systemic discrimination is applied has received extensive academic consideration (see, for example, colleen sheppard, inclusive equality: the relational dimensions of systemic discrimination in canada (2010), at pp. 19-21; evelyn braun, “adverse effect discrimination: proving the prima facie case” (2005), 11 rev const stud 119; jonnette watson hamilton and jennifer koshan, “adverse impact: the supreme court’s approach to adverse effects discrimination under section 15 of the charter” (2015), 19 rev const stud 191; michèle rivet and anne-marie santorineos, “juger à l’ère des droits fondamentaux” (2012), 42 rdus 363, at p 374; diane l. demers, “la discrimination systémique: variation sur un concept unique” (1993), 8 cjls 83; lisa philipps and margot young, “sex, tax and the charter: a review of thibaudeau v. canada” (1995), 2 rev. const. stud. 221). as prof. colleen sheppard notes: why is it so critical to expand on our understanding of adverse effect discrimination? if we do not, there is a significant risk that discrimination embedded in apparently neutral institutional policies, rules, or procedures will not be recognized as discriminatory. this risk is accentuated by the necessity in anti-discrimination law to connect the experience of exclusion, harm, prejudice, or disadvantage recognized ground of discrimination. . . . we need a sophisticated and coherent theory of adverse effect discrimination to assist claimants, lawyers, and adjudicators with the complexities of the manifestations of systemic discrimination. to a (“of forest fires and systemic discrimination: a review of british columbia (public service employee relations commission) v. bcgseu” (2001), 46 mcgill l.j 533, at p 542; see also braun, at p 122.) [30] it is helpful to start by defining the concept. adverse impact discrimination occurs when a seemingly neutral law has a disproportionate impact on members of groups protected on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground (see watson hamilton and koshan (2015), at p 196; sheppard (2001), at p 549; see also withler v. canada (attorney general), [2011] 1 scr 396, at para. 64; taypotat, at para. 22). instead of explicitly singling out those who are in the protected groups for differential treatment, the law indirectly places them at a disadvantage (sophia moreau, “what is discrimination?” (2010), 38 philosophy & public affairs 143, at p 155). [31] increased awareness of adverse impact discrimination has been a “central trend in the development of discrimination law”, marking a shift away from a fault-based conception of discrimination towards an effects-based model which critically examines systems, structures, and their impact on disadvantaged groups (denise g réaume, “harm and fault in discrimination law: the transition from intentional to adverse effect discrimination” (2001), 2 theor inq l 349, at pp. 350-51; see also béatrice vizkelety, proving discrimination in canada (1987), at p 18; sheppard (2010), at pp. 19-20). accompanying this shift was the recognition that discrimination is “frequently a product of continuing to do things ‘the way they have always been done’”, and that governments must be “particularly vigilant about the effects of their own policies” on members of disadvantaged groups (fay faraday, “one step forward, two steps back? substantive equality, systemic discrimination and pay equity at the supreme court of canada” (2020), 94 sclr (2d) 301, at p 310; sophia moreau, “the moral seriousness of indirect discrimination”, in hugh collins and tarunabh khaitan, eds., foundations of indirect discrimination law (2018), 123, at p 145). [32] griggs v. duke power co., 401 us 424 (1971) was one of the first cases to apply this concept and is a classic example of adverse impact discrimination. an employer required employees to have a high school diploma and pass standardized tests to work in certain departments at a power plant. neither requirement was significantly related to successful job performance; both, however, had the effect of disqualifying african americans at a substantially higher rate than white applicants. [33] the united states supreme court held that the education and testing requirements infringed title vii of the civil rights act of 1964, pub. l 88-352, 78 stat. 241 (1964). the court emphasized that the act prohibits “practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”: congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. on the contrary, congress has now required that the posture and condition of the job seeker be taken into account it has — to resort again to the fable — provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use. the act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. . . good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as “built-in headwinds” for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability. [emphasis added; pp. 431-32.] [34] griggs explains that the application of “neutral” rules may not produce equality in substance for disadvantaged groups membership in such groups often brings with it a unique constellation of physical, economic and social barriers. laws which distribute benefits or burdens without accounting for those differences — without accounting for the “posture and condition of the job seeker”, as in griggs — are the prime targets of indirect discrimination claims. i agree with profs. lisa philipps and margot young that we are not always conscious of the ways in which the distinctions we draw . . . will implicate group identities and single out specific groups for distinctive treatment this is because the constellations of factors or characteristics that go into the construction of identities often masquerade as unconnected, purely individual traits, behaviours, choices, or situations. yet, in social reality they may be tightly linked to one group or another. so the law has had to recognize that state action may be discriminatory even though on its face and in terms of the intentions informing it there is no obvious evidence that such discrimination is occurring. [p 258] (see also sandra fredman, discrimination law (2nd ed. 2011), at pp. 38 and 108.) [35] addressing adverse impact discrimination can be among the “most powerful legal measures available to disadvantaged groups in society to assert their claims to justice” (hugh collins and tarunabh khaitan, “indirect discrimination law: controversies and critical questions”, in hugh collins and tarunabh khaitan, eds., foundations of indirect discrimination law (2018), 1, at p 30) not only is such discrimination “much more prevalent than the cruder brand of openly direct discrimination”,5 it often poses a greater threat to the equality aspirations of disadvantaged groups: . . . even more common are situations where the discrimination occurs in a context like an employment relationship, government program or statute, or educational setting, and there is no single identifiable “villain”, no single action identifiable as “discriminatory”, and the outward appearance of a neutral set of rules or practices being applied across the board this invisible structure, with its accompanying set of practices, is a powerful limit on the equality aspirations of many who must deal within that structure but have characteristics that do not match those of persons intended to benefit from the structure. (mary eberts and kim stanton, “the disappearance of the four equality from canadian equality rights jurisprudence” (2018), 38 njcl 89, at p 92) and systemic discrimination [36] by recognizing the exclusionary impact of such discrimination, courts can better address “discrimination in its diverse forms”, including at “the systemic or institutional level” (vizkelety, at p viii; see also colleen sheppard, “mapping anti-discrimination law onto inequality at work: expanding the meaning of equality in international labour law” (2012), 151 int’l lab rev 1, at p 8; faraday, at p 319). remedying adverse effects discrimination allows courts [to] go to the heart of the equality question, to the goal of transformation, to an examination of the way institutions and relations must be changed in order to make them available, accessible, meaningful and rewarding for the many diverse groups of which our society is composed. 5 british columbia (public service employee relations commission) v bcgseu, [1999] 3 scr 3 (“meiorin”), at para. 29, citing canada (human rights commission) v. taylor, [1990] 3 scr 892, at p 931. (meiorin, at para. 41, quoting shelagh day and gwen brodsky, “the duty to accommodate: who will benefit?” (1996), 75 can. bar rev. 433, at p 462) [37] this court first dealt with adverse impact discrimination in ontario human rights commission v. simpsons-sears ltd., [1985] 2 scr 536. employees at a department store were periodically required to work on friday evenings and saturdays theresa o’malley, an employee of the store and a member of the seventh-day adventist church, was required by her faith to observe the sabbath from sundown friday until sundown saturday she brought a complaint against the store under the ontario human rights code, rso 1980, c 340, claiming that the rule requiring her to work on saturdays discriminated against her on the basis of religion. [38] writing for a unanimous court, mcintyre j agreed. he stressed that the ontario human rights code was meant to provide protection against the “result or the effect” of discriminatory conduct (p 547) citing griggs and several canadian decisions, mcintyre j concluded that the act prohibited adverse effects discrimination, which he distinguished from direct discrimination as follows: a distinction must be made between what i would describe as direct discrimination and the concept already referred to as adverse effect discrimination in connection with employment direct discrimination occurs in this connection where an employer adopts a practice or rule which on its face discriminates on a prohibited ground. for example, “no catholics or no women or no blacks employed here.” there is, of course, no disagreement in the case at bar that direct discrimination of that nature would contravene the act on the other hand, there is the concept of adverse effect discrimination it arises where an employer for genuine business reasons adopts a rule or standard which is on its face neutral, and which will apply equally to all employees, but which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground on one employee or group of employees in that it imposes, because of some special characteristic of the employee or group, obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the work force. [p 551] [39] simpsons-sears was the first of several human rights decisions where this court grappled with adverse effects discrimination in canadian national railway co. v. canada (canadian human rights commission), [1987] 1 scr 1114 (“action travail”), dickson c.j upheld a discrimination claim against an employer whose hiring and promotion practices led to women being drastically under-represented in certain jobs. some of these practices were neutral on their face; dickson cj, however, highlighted the importance of looking “at the results of a system”: a thorough study of “systemic discrimination” in canada is to be found in the abella report on equality in employment. discrimination . . . means practices or attitudes that have, whether by design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual’s or a group’s right to the opportunities generally available because of attributed rather than actual characteristics . it is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an intentional desire to obstruct someone’s potential, or whether it is the accidental by-product of innocently motivated practices or systems. if the barrier is affecting certain groups in a disproportionately negative way, it is a signal that the practices that lead to this adverse impact may be discriminatory. this is why it is important to look at the results of a system . . . . [emphasis added; pp. 1138-39.] [40] these principles were soon imported into the court’s s 15 jurisprudence. in andrews v. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143, the court rejected a “sameness” or formal theory of equality, instead identifying substantive equality as the philosophical premise of s 15 and outlining a theory of equality centred on “the impact of the law on the individual or the group concerned” (p 165). in developing this theory, mcintyre j emphatically rejected the approach to s 15 adopted by the british columbia court of appeal, which had defined the “essential meaning” of equality as ensuring that the “similarly situated be similarly treated” ((1986), 2 bclr (2d) 305, at p 311, quoting joseph tussman and jacobus tenbroek, “the equal protection of the laws” (1949), 37 cal. l. rev. 341, at p 344). justice mcintyre described this approach as “seriously deficient”, on the basis that “mere equality of application to similarly situated groups or individuals does not afford a realistic test for a violation of equality rights” (pp. 165-67). [41] drawing on the court’s human rights jurisprudence, while recognizing that “not all distinctions and differentiations created by law are discriminatory” (at p 182), mcintyre j endorsed an approach to equality and discrimination that was centred on the actual effects, rather than the purpose or facial neutrality of a law on a claimant group: i would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. [p 174] andrews provided a robust template for substantive equality that subsequent decisions “enriched but never abandoned” (r v. kapp, [2008] 2 scr 483, at para. 14). it was a remedy for exclusion and a recipe for inclusion. [42] our subsequent decisions left no doubt that substantive equality is the “animating norm” of the s 15 framework (withler, at para. 2; see also kapp, at paras. 15-16; alliance, at para. 25); and that substantive equality requires attention to the “full context of the claimant group’s situation”, to the “actual impact of the law on that situation”, and to the “persistent systemic disadvantages [that] have operated to limit the opportunities available” to that group’s members (withler, at para. 43; taypotat, at para 17; see also quebec v a, at paras. 327-32; alliance, at para. 28; centrale, at para. 35). [43] the court, applying these principles, has acknowledged the existence of adverse impact discrimination under s 15(1). in eldridge v. british columbia (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr 624, the court recognized that there is a disparate impact on persons with hearing loss in a health-care system in which they are unable to access interpreters the court confirmed that a s 15(1) violation could arise through “the adverse effects of rules of general application” (para. 77). [44] similarly, in vriend v. alberta, [1998] 1 scr 493, the court declared unconstitutional an alberta human rights statute which did not include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination, because of its “disproportionate impact” on members of the lgbtq+ community: . . . there is, on the surface, a measure of formal equality: gay or lesbian individuals have the same access as heterosexual individuals to the protection of the [act] in the sense that they could complain to the commission about an incident of discrimination on the basis of any of the grounds currently included however, the exclusion of the ground of sexual orientation, considered in the context of the social reality of discrimination against gays and lesbians, clearly has a disproportionate impact on them as opposed to heterosexuals. therefore the [act] in its underinclusive state denies substantive equality former group. [emphasis added; para. 82.] the to [45] several other decisions of this court have confirmed that “not only does the charter protect from direct or intentional discrimination, it also protects from adverse impact discrimination” (mckinney v. university of guelph, [1990] 3 scr. 229, at p 279; tétreault-gadoury v canada (employment and immigration commission), [1991] 2 scr 22, at p 41; see also law v canada (minister of employment and immigration), [1999] 1 scr 497, at para. 36; withler, at para. 64; taypotat, at para. 23). [46] the court most recently addressed this issue in taypotat while concluding that there was no discrimination demonstrated on the facts of the case, the court acknowledged that “facially neutral qualifications like education requirements” can be a breach of s 15(1) because of their “disproportionate effect” on protected groups (paras. 15 and 22). [47] there is no doubt, therefore, that adverse impact discrimination “violate[s] the norm of substantive equality” which underpins this court’s equality jurisprudence (withler, at para. 2). at the heart of substantive equality is the recognition that identical or facially neutral treatment may “frequently produce serious inequality” (andrews, at p 164) this is precisely what happens when “neutral” laws ignore the “true characteristics of [a] group which act as headwinds to the enjoyment of society’s benefits” (eaton v. brant county board of education, [1997] 1 scr 241, at para. 67; eldridge, at para. 65). [48] the “animating norm” of the current s 15 framework guaranteeing substantive equality is also the core value engaged in cases of adverse effects discrimination (withler, at para. 2; watson hamilton and koshan (2015), at pp. 192 and 197). this court has never suggested that cases of adverse impact discrimination should be resolved under a different approach (see, for example, andrews, at pp. 173-74; eldridge, at paras. 59-60; vriend, at paras. 81-82 and 87-89; law, at paras. 36-39; taypotat, at paras. 19-22; alliance, at para. 25). on the contrary, we have clarified that the same approach applies regardless of whether the discrimination alleged is direct or indirect. withler leaves little doubt on this point: the substantive equality analysis under s 15(1), as discussed earlier, proceeds in two stages . . . . the role of comparison at the first step is to establish a “distinction”. identifying in some cases, the distinction will be relatively straightforward, because a law will, on its face, make a distinction on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground (direct discrimination) . . . . in other cases, establishing the distinction will be more difficult, because what is alleged is indirect discrimination: that although the law purports to treat everyone the same, it has a disproportionately negative impact on a group or individual that can be identified by factors relating to enumerated or analogous grounds . . . . in that kind of case, the claimant will have more work to do at the first step. historical or sociological disadvantage may assist in demonstrating that the law imposes a burden or denies a benefit to the claimant that is not imposed on or denied to others. the focus will be on the effect of the law and the situation of the claimant group. [emphasis added; paras. 61-62 and 64.] [49] in the human rights context, the court has not used different legal tests for direct and indirect discrimination since meiorin (paras. 50-54; see also british columbia (superintendent of motor vehicles) v. british columbia (council of human rights), [1999] 3 scr 868, at paras. 18-19; moore v. british columbia (education), [2012] 3 scr 360, at para. 61). a unified approach, in my view, is equally justified under the charter. [50] to prove discrimination under s 15(1), claimants must show that a law or policy creates a distinction based on a protected ground, and that the law perpetuates, reinforces or exacerbates disadvantage. these requirements do not require revision in adverse effects cases. what is needed, however, is a clear account of how to identify adverse effects discrimination, because the impugned law will not, on its face, include any distinctions based on prohibited grounds (withler, at para. 64) any such distinctions must be discerned by examining the impact of the law (alliance, at para. 25). [51] this inquiry has frequently been described as a search for a “disproportionate” impact on members of protected groups (see vriend, at para. 82; withler, at para. 64; taypotat, at paras. 21-23; action travail, at p 1139; egan v. canada, [1995] 2 scr 513, at para 138, per cory and iacobucci jj dissenting; moreau (2010), at p 154; braun, at pp. 124-25; vizkelety, at p 176; watson hamilton and koshan (2015), at p 196; collins and khaitan, at pp. 3-4; dianne pothier, “m’aider, mayday: section 15 of the charter in distress” (1996), 6 njcl 295 at p 322). [52] in other words, in order for a law to create a distinction based on prohibited grounds through its effects, it must have a disproportionate impact on members of a protected group. if so, the first stage of the s 15 test will be met. [53] how does this work in practice? instead of asking whether a law explicitly targets a protected group for differential treatment, a court must explore whether it does so indirectly through its impact on members of that group (see eldridge, at paras. 60-62; vriend, at para. 82). a law, for example, may include seemingly neutral rules, restrictions or criteria that operate in practice as “built-in headwinds” for members of protected groups. the testing requirement in griggs is the paradigmatic example; other examples include the aerobic fitness requirement in meiorin, and the policy requiring employees to work on saturdays in simpsons-sears (see also central alberta dairy pool v. alberta (human rights commission), [1990] 2 scr 489). to assess the adverse impact of these policies, courts looked beyond the facially neutral criteria on which they were based, and examined whether they had the effect of placing members of protected groups at a disadvantage (moreau (2018), at p 125). [54] in other cases, the problem is not “headwinds” built into a law, but the absence of accommodation for members of protected groups (tarunabh khaitan, a theory of discrimination law (2015), at p 77; dianne pothier, “tackling disability discrimination at work: toward a systemic approach” (2010), 4 mjlh 17, at pp. 23-24). eldridge is a good example. under the health care scheme in that case, all patients lacked access to sign language interpreters — but this lack of access had a disproportionate impact on those who had hearing loss and required interpreters to meaningfully communicate with health care providers (paras. 69, 71 and 83). [55] disproportionate impact can be proven in different ways in eldridge, it was established because “the quality of care received by [those with hearing loss] was inferior to that available to hearing persons” (para. 83 (emphasis added)) in griggs and meiorin, by contrast, the relevant impact was the higher rate at which african americans and women were disqualified from employment. both are examples of how a law or policy can have a disproportionate impact on members of a protected group. griggs, meiorin, and other leading cases leave no doubt that disproportionate impact can be established if members of protected groups are denied benefits or forced to take on burdens more frequently than others. a difference in “quality” of treatment, as in eldridge, may strengthen a claim of disproportionate impact, but it is not a necessary element (philipps and young, at pp. 244-45; see also pothier (1996), at p 322; selene mize, “indirect discrimination reconsidered” (2007), nzl. rev. 27, at p 39). [56] two types of evidence will be especially helpful in proving that a law has a disproportionate impact on members of a protected group. the first is evidence about the situation of the claimant group. the second is evidence about the results of the law. [57] courts will benefit from evidence about the physical, social, cultural or other barriers which provide the “full context of the claimant group’s situation” (withler, at para. 43; see also para. 64). this evidence may come from the claimant, from expert witnesses, or through judicial notice (see r v. spence, [2005] 3 scr. 458). the goal of such evidence is to show that membership in the claimant group is associated with certain characteristics that have disadvantaged members of the group, such as an inability to work on saturdays or lower aerobic capacity (homer v. chief constable of west yorkshire police, [2012] uksc 15, [2012] 3 all e.r 1287, at para. 14; simpsons-sears; meiorin, at para. 11). these links may reveal that seemingly neutral policies are “designed well for some and not for others” (meiorin, at para. 41). when evaluating evidence about the group, courts should be mindful of the fact that issues which predominantly affect certain populations may be under-documented. these claimants may have to rely more heavily on their own evidence or evidence from other members of their group, rather than on government reports, academic studies or expert testimony. [58] courts will also benefit from evidence about the outcomes that the impugned law or policy (or a substantially similar one) has produced in practice. evidence about the “results of a system” may provide concrete proof that members of protected groups are being disproportionately impacted (action travail, at p 1139; vizkelety, at pp. 170-74). this evidence may include statistics, especially if the pool of people adversely affected by a criterion or standard includes both members of a protected group and members of more advantaged groups (sheppard (2001), at pp. 545-46; braun, at pp. 120-21). [59] there is no universal measure for what level of statistical disparity is necessary to demonstrate that there is a disproportionate impact, and the court should not, in my view, craft rigid rules on this issue the goal of statistical evidence, ultimately, is to establish “a disparate pattern of exclusion or harm that is statistically significant and not simply the result of chance” (sheppard (2001), at p 546; see also vizkelety, at p 175; fredman (2011), at pp. 186-87). the weight given to statistics will depend on, among other things, their quality and methodology (vizkelety, at pp. 178-84). [60] ideally, claims of adverse effects discrimination should be supported by evidence about the circumstances of the claimant group and about the results produced by the challenged law. evidence about the claimant group’s situation, on its own, may amount to merely a “web of instinct” if too far removed from the situation in the actual workplace, community or institution subject to the discrimination claim (taypotat, at para. 34) evidence of statistical disparity, on its own, may have significant shortcomings that leave open the possibility of unreliable results. the weaknesses with each type of evidence can be overcome if they are both present (braun, at p 135; vizkelety, at p 192; vancouver area network of drug users v. downtown vancouver business improvement association (2018), 10 bclr (6th) 175 (ca), at para. 98). prof. colleen sheppard (2001) recognizes this possibility: while in some cases the overwhelming correspondence between certain categories and the gender or racial composition of the category makes the sex or race discrimination claims relatively easy to substantiate, in other cases the statistical preponderance may be less marked in such cases it may also be important to consider the qualitative components of the harm that constitutes discrimination. [p 548] [61] this is not to say, of course, that both kinds of evidence are always required. in some cases, evidence about a group will show such a strong association with certain traits — such as pregnancy with gender — that the disproportionate impact on members of that group “will be apparent and immediate” (taypotat, at para. 33; see also fredman (2011), at pp. 187-88; sheppard (2001), at pp. 544-45; gaz métropolitain inc. v. commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, 2011 qcca 1201, at paras. 27 and 47 (canlii); oršuš v. croatia, no. 15766/03, echr 2010-ii, at para. 153). [62] similarly, clear and consistent statistical disparities can show a disproportionate impact on members of protected groups, even if the precise reason for that impact is unknown. prof. sandra fredman has argued forcefully against requiring claimants to specify “the reason why” they are being disadvantaged by a rule or policy: to require the complainants to show the ‘reason why’ the pcp [policy, criteria or practice] disadvantages the group as a whole is to fundamentally misunderstand the meaning of indirect discrimination it is the disparate impact on the group of a pcp itself which constitutes the prima facie discrimination . (“direct and indirect discrimination: is there still a divide?”, in hugh collins and tarunabh khaitan, eds., foundations of indirect discrimination law (2018), 31, at p 46; see also sandra fredman, “the reason why: unravelling indirect discrimination” (2016), 45 indus. lj. 231.) [63] i agree. if there are clear and consistent statistical disparities in how a law affects a claimant’s group, i see no reason for requiring the claimant to bear the additional burden of explaining why the law has such an effect in such cases, the statistical evidence is itself a compelling sign that the law has not been structured in a way that takes into account the protected group’s circumstances (see fredman (2011), at p 181; vizkelety, at pp. 174-76; action travail, at p 1139). [64] the united kingdom supreme court reached a similar conclusion in essop v. home office (uk. border agency), [2017] uksc 27, [2017] 3 all er 551. at issue was a core skills assessment that immigration officers had to pass to be promoted. racial minorities and older candidates were shown to be less likely to pass the assessment, but there was no evidence available to explain why this disparity was occurring (para. 9). [65] the supreme court concluded that there was disparate impact. lady hale dpsc explained that a claimant does not need to “establish the reason for the particular disadvantage to which the group is put” (para. 33) she noted that such a requirement made it more difficult to combat “hidden barriers which are not easy to anticipate or to spot” (para. 25). she also recognized that it is “commonplace for the disparate impact, or particular disadvantage, to be established on the basis of statistical evidence” — which would be impossible if claimants had to offer an explanation for why any given statistical imbalances had occurred (para. 28). [66] essop confirmed a flexible approach to proving disparate impact, under which proof of statistical disparity and broader group disadvantage may each be sufficient to establish a claim, but are not rigid requirements (see also o’connor v. bar standards board, [2017] uksc 78, [2018] 2 all er 779, at para. 43). the european court of human rights has similarly held that “when it comes to assessing the impact of a measure or practice on an individual or group, statistics which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant will be sufficient to constitute the prima facie evidence the applicant is required to produce”; however, “[t]his does not . . . mean that indirect discrimination cannot be proved without statistical evidence” (d.h v the czech republic, no. 57325/00, echr 2007-iv, at para. 188 (emphasis added); see also oršuš, at paras. 152-53; horváth and kiss v hungary, [2013] elr 102 (echr), at para. 107). [67] i agree with this approach. both evidence of statistical disparity and of broader group disadvantage may demonstrate disproportionate impact; but neither is mandatory and their significance will vary depending on the case. [68] some further observations. [69] first, whether the legislature intended to create a disparate impact is irrelevant (sheppard (2001), at pp. 543-44; watson hamilton and koshan (2015), at pp. 196-97; faraday, at p 310). proof of discriminatory intent has never been required to establish a claim under s 15(1) (andrews, at pp. 173-74; eldridge, at para. 62; vriend, at para. 93; alliance, at para. 28; centrale, at para. 35). nor is an ameliorative purpose sufficient to shield legislation from s 15(1) scrutiny (centrale, at paras. 8 and 35; alliance, at paras. 32-33). [70] second, if claimants successfully demonstrate that a law has a disproportionate impact on members of a protected group, they need not independently prove that the protected characteristic “caused” the disproportionate impact (tarunabh khaitan and sandy steel, “wrongs, group disadvantage and the legitimacy of indirect discrimination law”, in hugh collins and tarunabh khaitan, eds., foundations of indirect discrimination law (2018), 197, at pp. 203-4 and 220; fredman (2018), at p 46; braun, at p 146; watson hamilton and koshan (2015), at p 197; west yorkshire police, at paras. 12-14; essop, at paras. 24-27). put differently, there was no need for the claimant in griggs to address whether his exclusion was based on his race or lack of a high school education. the whole point of the adverse impact analysis was to show that the use of a high school education as a criteria for employment had a disproportionate impact on african americans (fredman (2011), at p 189). [71] it is also unnecessary to inquire into whether the law itself was responsible for creating the background social or physical barriers which made a particular rule, requirement or criterion disadvantageous for the claimant group. returning to griggs, this would amount to asking whether duke power co. was responsible for lower rates of high school education among african americans. plainly, it was not — but this was entirely irrelevant to whether a disproportionate impact had been established. section 15(1) has always required attention to the systemic disadvantages affecting members of protected groups, even if the state did not create them (alliance, at para. 41; centrale, at para. 32; vriend, at paras. 84 and 97; eldridge, at paras. 64-66; eaton, at para. 67; r v. turpin, [1989] 1 scr 1296, at pp. 1331-32). [72] third, claimants need not show that the criteria, characteristics or other factors used in the impugned law affect all members of a protected group in the same way. this court has long held that “[t]he fact that discrimination is only partial does not convert it into non-discrimination” (brooks v canada safeway ltd., [1989] 1 scr 1219, at p 1248, quoting james macpherson, “sex discrimination in canada: taking stock at the start of a new decade” (1980), 1 chrr. c/7, at p. c/11). in brooks, the court held that a corporate plan which denied benefits to employees during pregnancy discriminated on the basis of sex. the employer argued that the plan did not deny benefits to “women”, but only to “women who are pregnant” (p 1248, quoting macpherson, at p. c/11). writing for the court, dickson cj explained that practices amounting to “partial discrimination” are no less discriminatory than those in which all members of a protected group are affected (pp. 1247-48). [73] the court reiterated this principle in janzen v platy enterprises ltd., [1989] 1 scr 1252, where it held that the sexual harassment of two female employees was discrimination on the basis of sex. the court rejected the employer’s argument that sex discrimination had not occurred because only some of the female employees at the store had been sexually harassed. dickson cj reiterated the approach to partial discrimination he had previously set out in brooks: if a finding of discrimination required that every individual in the affected group be treated identically, legislative protection against discrimination would be of little or no value. it is rare that a discriminatory action is so bluntly expressed as to treat all members of the relevant group identically. in nearly every instance of discrimination the discriminatory action is composed of various ingredients with the result that some members of the pertinent group are not adversely affected, at least in a direct sense, by the discriminatory action to deny a finding of discrimination in the circumstances of this appeal is to deny the existence of discrimination in any situation where discriminatory practices are less than perfectly inclusive. it is to argue, for example, that an employer who will only hire a woman if she has twice the qualifications required of a man is not guilty of sex discrimination if, despite this policy, the employer nevertheless manages to hire some women. [emphasis added; pp. 1288-89.] [74] the court’s approach in brooks and janzen “had obvious implications for claims based on multiple grounds of discrimination” (dianne pothier, “connecting grounds of discrimination to real people’s real experiences” (2001), 13 cjwl 37, at p 58). as dianne pothier has explained: it is an easy step to move from saying, as in janzen, that not all women need be affected to constitute sex discrimination to also accepting that different groups of women . . can be differently affected by, or have different experiences of, sex discrimination. janzen also meant that a claim based on, for example, both gender and race could not be defeated simply by saying that it could not be sex discrimination because white women were unaffected or that it could not be race discrimination because black men were unaffected. [p 58] [75] the court subsequently confirmed that “heterogeneity within a claimant group does not defeat a claim of discrimination” (quebec v. a, at para. 354). in quebec v. a, for example, the court held that certain provisions of the civil code of québec that distinguished between de facto and legally married spouses for the purposes of support and division, discriminated on the basis of marital status it reached this conclusion even though there was “a range of need or vulnerability among de facto spouses” (para. 354) similarly, in nova scotia (workers’ compensation board) v. martin, [2003] 2 scr 504, the court held that a provincial compensation scheme that provided lesser benefits to those suffering from chronic pain, discriminated on the basis of disability. the court confirmed that “differential treatment can occur on the basis of an enumerated ground despite the fact that not all persons belonging to the relevant group are equally mistreated” (para. 76; see also centrale, at para. 28; pothier (2010), at pp. 35-36; watson hamilton and koshan (2015), at pp. 197-98; braun, at p 147; sheppard (2001), at p 549). [76] this brings us to the second step of the s 15 test: whether the law has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage (alliance, at para. 25). this inquiry will usually proceed similarly in cases of disparate impact and explicit discrimination. there is no “rigid template” of factors relevant to this inquiry (quebec v. a, at para. 331, quoting withler, at para. 66). the goal is to examine the impact of the harm caused to the affected group. the harm may include “[e]conomic exclusion or disadvantage, [s]ocial exclusion . . . [p]sychological harms . . . [p]hysical harms . [or] [p]olitical exclusion”, and must be viewed in light of any systemic or historical disadvantages faced by the claimant group (sheppard (2010), at pp. 62-63 (emphasis deleted)). [77] the purpose of the inquiry is to keep s 15(1) focussed on the protection of groups that have experienced exclusionary disadvantage based on group characteristics, as well as the protection of those “who are members of more than one socially disadvantaged group in society” (colleen sheppard, “grounds of discrimination: towards an inclusive and contextual approach” (2001), 80 can. bar rev. 893, at p 896; see also withler, at para. 58). as the court noted in quebec v. a when discussing the second stage of the s 15 test: the root of s 15 is our awareness that certain groups have been historically discriminated against, and that the perpetuation of such discrimination should be curtailed. [para. 332] (see also taypotat, at para. 20.) [78] notably, the presence of social prejudices or stereotyping are not necessary factors in the s 15(1) inquiry they may assist in showing that a law has negative effects on a particular group, but they “are neither separate elements of the andrews test, nor categories into which a claim of discrimination must fit” (quebec v a, at para. 329), since [w]e must be careful not to treat kapp and withler as establishing an additional requirement on s 15 claimants to prove that a distinction will perpetuate prejudicial or stereotypical attitudes towards them. such an approach improperly focuses attention on whether a discriminatory attitude exists, not a discriminatory impact, contrary to andrews, kapp and withler. [emphasis in original; para. 327.] (see also paras. 329-31.) [79] the perpetuation of disadvantage, moreover, does not become less serious under s 15(1) simply because it was relevant to a legitimate state objective. i agree with dean mayo moran that adding relevance to the s 15(1) test — even as one contextual factor among others — risks reducing the inquiry to a search for a “rational basis” for the impugned law (“protesting too much: rational basis review under canada’s equality guarantee”, in sheila mcintyre and sanda rodgers, eds., diminishing returns: inequality and the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (2006), 71, at pp. 81-84; eberts and stanton, at pp. 90 and 119-20; sheila mcintyre, “deference and dominance: equality without substance”, in sheila mcintyre and sanda rodgers, eds., diminishing returns: inequality and the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (2006), 95, at pp. 108-13). the test for a prima facie breach of s 15(1) is concerned with the discriminatory impact of legislation on disadvantaged groups, not with whether the distinction is justified, an inquiry properly left to s 1 (andrews, at pp. 181-82; turpin, at pp. 1325-26; miron v. trudel, [1995] 2 scr 418, at paras. 129-30; eldridge, at paras. 77 and 79; quebec v. a, at para. 333; centrale, at para. 35). [80] similarly, there is no burden on a claimant to prove that the distinction is arbitrary to prove a prima facie breach of s 15(1) it is for the government to demonstrate that the law is not arbitrary in its justificatory submissions under s 1 (see eberts and stanton, at p 117; jonnette watson hamilton and jennifer koshan, “kahkewistahaw first nation v. taypotat: an arbitrary approach to discrimination” (2016), 76 sclr (2d) 243, at pp. 259-60; alicja puchta, “quebec v a and taypotat: unpacking the supreme court’s latest decisions on section 15 of the charter” (2018), 55 osgoode hall lj 665, at p 704). [81] in sum, then, the first stage of the s 15 test is about establishing that the law imposes differential treatment based on protected grounds, either explicitly or through adverse impact. at the second stage, the court asks whether it has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage (alliance, at para. 25). [82] where possible, the two inquiries should be kept distinct, but there is clearly potential for overlap in adverse effects cases based on “the impossibility of rigid categorizations” (sheppard (2010), at p 21). what matters in the end is that a court asks and answers the necessary questions relevant to the s 15(1) inquiry, not whether it keeps the two steps of the inquiry in two impermeable silos. application [83] returning to the claim before us in this appeal, as previously noted, full-time rcmp members who work regular hours, who are suspended, or who go on unpaid leave can obtain full pension credit for those periods of service under the pension plan full-time members who temporarily reduce their hours under a job-sharing agreement, however, are classified as part-time workers under the regulations and are unable to acquire full-time pension credit for their service. [84] under the pension scheme, therefore, a full-time rcmp member’s temporary reduction in working hours results in their losing out on potential pension benefits. the question is whether this arrangement has a disproportionate impact on women. [85] the federal court and court of appeal acknowledged that the vast majority of members in the job-sharing program who lose out on pension benefits are women with children in their view, however, these losses occurred because “the appellants . . . elected to job-share”, not because of their gender or parental status (ca. reasons, at para. 53). [86] in relying on ms. fraser’s “choice” to job-share as grounds for dismissing her claim, the federal court and court of appeal, with respect, misapprehended our s 15(1) jurisprudence. this court has consistently held that differential treatment can be discriminatory even if it is based on choices made by the affected individual or group. [87] in brooks, for example, dickson cj rejected an employer’s argument that providing unequal benefits to pregnant women is not sex discrimination because pregnancy is “voluntary” (pp. 1237-38). after brooks, the court “repeatedly rejected arguments that choice protects a distinction from a finding of discrimination” (quebec v. a, at para. 336). in lavoie v. canada, [2002] 1 scr 769, for example, the court held that a statute which gave preferential treatment to canadian citizens infringed s 15(1), despite the government’s argument that becoming a canadian citizen was a choice. chief justice mclachlin and justice l’heureux-dubé, concurring on this issue, made clear that the fact that a person could avoid discrimination by modifying his or her behaviour does not negate the discriminatory effect. if it were otherwise, an employer who denied women employment in his factory on the ground that he did not wish to establish female changing facilities could contend that the real cause of the discriminatory effect is the woman’s “choice” not to use men’s changing facilities. the very act of forcing some people to make such a choice violates human dignity, and is therefore inherently discriminatory the law of discrimination thus far has not required applicants to demonstrate that they could not have avoided the discriminatory effect in order to establish a denial of equality under s 15(1). the court in andrews was not deterred by such considerations. on the contrary, la forest j specifically noted that acquiring canadian citizenship could in some cases entail the “serious hardship” of losing an existing citizenship. he left no doubt that this hardship was a cost to be considered in favour of the individual affected by the discrimination. [emphasis added; citation omitted; para. 5.] (see also para. 51, per bastarache j.) [88] justice l’heureux-dubé had expressed a similar view in her dissenting reasons in nova scotia (attorney general) v. walsh, [2002] 4 scr 325, a decision the court overturned in quebec v a, explaining that a choice-based approach was fundamentally flawed: in walsh, the majority’s focus on choice rather than on the impact of the distinction on members of the group also paid insufficient attention to the requirement for a true substantive equality analysis, affirmed in kapp and withler in contrast to formal equality, which assumes an “autonomous, self-interested and self-determined” individual, substantive equality looks not only at the choices that are available to individuals, but at “the social and economic environments in which [they] pla[y] out”. [emphasis added; citation omitted; para. 342.] [89] several scholars have made this point as well prof margot young, for example, points out that th[e] closure of critical examination by way of characterization of the inequality of which an individual complains as “natural”, “chosen” or “merited” is deeply problematic. indeed, many of the major steps in the progression towards women’s equality have come precisely from the revelation of the “natural” as “social”, the “chosen” as “coerced” and the “merited” as “undeserved”. claims of merit, nature and choice are difficult to critically unpack; they so often are the roots of discrimination. this makes these notions deeply functional in the perpetuation and obfuscation of inequality. (“blissed out: section 15 at twenty”, in sheila mcintyre and sanda rodgers, eds., diminishing returns: inequality and the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (2006), 45, at pp. 55-56; see also margot young, “unequal to the task: ‘kapp’ing the substantive potential of section 15” (2010), 50 sclr (2d) 183, at pp. 190-91 and 196.) [90] prof. sonia lawrence makes the critical point that choices are themselves shaped by systemic inequality: . . a contextual account of choice produces a sadly impoverished narrative, in which choices more theoretical than real serve to eliminate the possibility of a finding of discrimination . . . . the result is a jurisprudence which almost mocks a more nuanced version of the what and how of discrimination, through frequent recourse to the idea that any harm to the claimant was actually the result of her choice, or her unwise exercise of her own judicially protected liberty. any number of structural conditions push people towards their choices, with the result that certain choices may be made more often by people with particular “personal characteristics” this is a key feature of systemic inequality — it develops not out of direct statutory discrimination, but rather out of the operation of institutions which may seem neutral at first glance. [emphasis added.] (“choice, equality and tales of racial discrimination: reading the supreme court on section 15”, in sheila mcintyre and sanda rodgers, eds., diminishing returns: inequality and the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (2006), 115, at pp. 115-16 and 124-25; see also diana majury, “women are themselves to blame: choice as a justification for unequal treatment”, in fay faraday, margaret denike and m kate stephenson, eds., making equality rights real: securing substantive equality under the charter (2006), 209, at pp. 219-25.) [91] the case before us highlights the flaws of over-emphasizing choice in the s 15 inquiry. for many women, the decision to work on a part-time basis, far from being an unencumbered choice, “often lies beyond the individual’s effective control” (miron, at para. 153; quebec v. a, at para. 316; see also watson hamilton and koshan (2015), at p 202). deciding to work part-time, for many women, is a “choice” between either staying above or below the poverty line the job-sharing program, moreover, was introduced precisely because some members required access to an alternative to taking leave without pay “due to [their] personal or family circumstances” (appeal record, vol. v, at p 810). ms. fox made a similar point in her affidavit: in my experience, this policy is particularly harmful to women who work in rural or isolated communities. the rcmp regularly posts women members in such communities where there is simply no around-the-clock child care available as such, job-sharing is often the only child care solution for members with children. [92] by invoking the “choice” to job-share as a basis for rejecting the s 15(1) claim, the federal court and court of appeal removed the “challenged inequality from scrutiny, effectively taking it off the radar screen so as to circumvent examination of the equality issues at stake” (majury, at p 219). it is an approach that this court’s s 15 jurisprudence eschews. [93] the federal court and court of appeal also held that the pension plan does not treat those who job-share less favourably than those who go on unpaid leave. they reached this conclusion based on a formalistic comparison between the remuneration offered under job-sharing and leave without pay. [94] this is precisely the type of “mirror comparator group” analysis that this court squarely rejected in withler (paras. 55-64; see also moore, at paras. 28-31). section 15(1) guarantees ms. fraser and others in the job-sharing program the right to substantive equality with respect to full-time rcmp workers, not merely members on leave without pay. a narrow focus on the buy-back provisions ignores their role within the pension scheme: they are themselves the means by which those who go on unpaid leave “get meaningful access” to the pension benefits available to all full-time employees (moore, at para. 28). [95] this aspect of ms fraser’s claim is indistinguishable from centrale in that case, quebec delayed implementation of a pay equity program by up to four years for women employed in workplaces with male comparators, and six years for women employed in workplaces with no male comparators this court held that the implementation delay infringed s 15(1). rather than comparing the situation of women in different workplaces, the court explained how the delay in implementing pay equity disadvantaged women relative to men in other workplaces earning full value for their work: the legislature chose to act to address pay discrimination against women, but denied access by delaying it for a group of women, leaving them, in comparison to male workers, paid less for longer. whatever the motives behind the decision, this is “discrimination reinforced by law”, which this court has denounced since andrews (p 172) the fact, then, that women in one type of workplace — with male comparators — received a remedy promptly is not an answer to the question of whether women in another type of workplace were also disadvantaged it is no defence to a claim of discrimination by one group of women to suggest that another group has had its particular discrimination addressed. [emphasis added; para. 33.] (see also paras. 29, per abella j., and 155-56, per mclachlin cj, concurring on this point.) [96] this leaves the question of whether, under a proper assessment, the s 15(1) claim should succeed. [97] in my respectful view, the use of an rcmp member’s temporary reduction in working hours as a basis to impose less favourable pension consequences plainly has a disproportionate impact on women the relevant evidence — the results of the system — showed that:  rcmp members who worked reduced hours in the job-sharing program were predominantly women with young children.  from 2010-2014, 100 percent of members working reduced hours through job-sharing were women, and most of them cited childcare as their reason for doing so. [98] these statistics were bolstered by compelling evidence about the disadvantages women face as a group in balancing professional and domestic work. evidence submitted by ms fraser indicated that women have historically borne the overwhelming share of childcare responsibilities, that part-time workers in canada are disproportionately women, and that they are far more likely than men to work part-time due to child care responsibilities. as a result, they experience less stable employment and periods of “scaling back at work”, including within police services. [99] this evidence finds firm support in commission reports, judicial decisions and academic work. the landmark report of the royal commission on the status of women in canada (florence bird, chair) acknowledged that a “larger proportion of women work[ed] only part-time” (at p 61) and warned that the inequitable treatment of part-time workers would disadvantage women: we recognize one major problem in the use of part-time workers: the provision of fringe benefits for those not employed on a regular basis. we nevertheless believe that ways must be found to provide these employees with pay and working conditions no less equitable than those provided for the full-time worker. [p 105] [100] in its report, the commission of inquiry into part-time work (1983, joan wallace, comm.) confirmed that most employees in part-time, lower-paid positions were women (part-time work in canada: report of the commission of inquiry into part-time work (1983), at pp. 21-22, 46 and 151). the commission also studied the use of job-sharing programs across canada. the data it collected suggested that almost all job-sharing participants were women, and that “[t]he arrival of a new baby was the most common primary reason for initiating job sharing” (pp. 177-78). [101] the report of the commission on equality in employment (1984, rosalie silberman abella, comm.) expanded on the link between part-time work and childcare, observing that [t]he demand and the need for remedial measures derive from the increasing number of mothers in the workforce their children need adequate care. by canadian law both parents have a duty to care for their children, but by custom this responsibility has consistently fallen to the mother it is the mother, therefore, who bears any guilt or social disapprobation for joining the workforce and it is the mother who normally bears the psychological and actual responsibility for making childcare arrangements. from the point of view of mothers, access to childcare and the nature of such care limits employment options. “in balancing the responsibilities of family and career, women more frequently than men must make decisions (such as to withdraw from the labour force to care for young children) of consequence to their career” . . . various studies show that a major reason women are over-represented in part-time work is that they are combining childcare responsibilities with jobs in the paid labour market. [emphasis added.] (pp 177 and 185-86, quoting ontario manpower commission, the employment of women in ontario: background paper (1983), at p 17) [102] the final report of the law commission of ontario’s 2012 study on vulnerable workers also confirmed that canadian studies show that women are more likely to be engaged in precarious work than men. for example, women are over-represented in part-time and temporary work. the high numbers of women in precarious work are, in some measure, the result of their traditional social role as caregivers. under the “gender contract” that typified the 1950s middle class, men were primarily responsible for financial support and women stayed home to care for the family (women in many working-class families have always worked outside the home, caring for other women’s children, cleaning homes and working in factories and shops, for example.) today, under current social and economic conditions, two incomes are often necessary to support a family and women’s choices and involvement in many spheres of life have expanded. the majority of women have joined the workforce. the family unit is also more varied with increasing numbers of single parents. and yet women continue to bear primary responsibility for care-giving in 2010 canadian women spent an average total of 50 hours per week caring for household children, double that spent by men (24 hours). in 2008, just over 9 percent of women reported working part-time because of childcare responsibilities as compared to less than 1 percent of men. as a result, the precarity of women’s jobs is partly influenced by public policy on maternity benefits and childcare. [emphasis added.] (vulnerable workers and precarious work, at pp. 19-20; see also statistics canada, women in canada: a gender-based statistical report (7th ed. 2017).) [103] judgments of this court have also recognized that women face disadvantages in the workplace because of their largely singular responsibility for domestic work. the court has acknowledged the sacrifices women make at work “for the sake of domestic considerations” (moge v. moge, [1992] 3 scr 813, at p 861; new brunswick (minister of health and community services) v g (j.), [1999] 3 scr 46, at para. 113, per l’heureux-dubé j., concurring); and that “women bear a disproportionate share of the child care burden in canada” (symes v. canada, [1993] 4 scr 695, at pp. 762-63; see also young v. young, [1993] 4 scr 3, at pp. 49-50, per l’heureux-dubé j., dissenting). [104] recognizing the reality of gender divisions in domestic labour and their impact on women’s working lives is neither new nor disputable (see beijing declaration and platform for action, un. doc. a/conf.177/20, october 17, 1995, at paras. 155-56 and 158). elizabeth shilton has eloquently described the link between the division of unpaid care work and women’s over-representation in part-time work: in twenty-first-century canada, the male breadwinner family has largely vanished along with the idea of the “family wage”; women are almost as likely as men to belong to the paid workforce two constants remain, however employers continue to demand an “unencumbered worker,” along with the right to organize work without regard to workers’ care obligations. and gender roles within families have been slow to change. care work still needs to be done, and women still bear most of the practical responsibility for doing it. in consequence, women are forced to manage family care without impinging on their work obligations. their strategies — euphemistically labelled “choices” — often include part-time and precarious forms of work that typically come with lower wages, fewer benefits, fewer promotional opportunities, and minimal or no retirement pensions the impact on women’s economic welfare is compounded by stereotypical assumptions that women do not merit or want more responsible, higher-paying jobs because they will inevitably prioritize family over work. the unequal burden of family care creates and reinforces women’s continuing inequality both inside and outside the workplace. [emphasis added.] (“family status discrimination: ‘disruption and great mischief’ or bridge over the work-family divide?” (2018), 14 jl & equality 33, at p 35; see also sheppard (2010), at p 26; richard p. chaykowski and lisa m. powell, “women and the labour market: recent trends and policy issues” (1999), 25 can pub pol’y s1; braun, at pp. 137-38; fredman (2011), at pp. 38, 45 and 181; rivet and santorineos, at p 373; suzi macpherson, “reconciling employment and family care-giving: a gender analysis of current challenges and future directions for uk policy”, in nicole busby and grace james, eds., families, care-giving and paid work: challenging labour law in the 21st century (2011), 13, at pp. 13-30; susan bisom-rapp, “what we know about equal employment opportunity law after fifty years of trying” (2018), 22 employee rts. & employment pol’y j 337, at pp. 348-49.) [105] courts, by identifying adverse impact discrimination, have “been particularly effective in dealing with criteria which specifically disadvantage women with childcare responsibilities” (fredman (2011), at p 181). the european court of justice, for example, has held that providing workers with less favourable benefits based on their working hours can amount to adverse impact discrimination against women (see jenkins v. kingsgate (clothing productions) ltd, c-96/80, [1981] ecr. i-911; bilka-kaufhaus gmbh v weber von hartz, c-170/84, [1986] ecr. i-1607; rinner-kühn v fww spezial-gebäudereinigung gmbh, c-171/88, [1989] ecr. i-2743; vroege v nciv instituut voor volkshuisvesting bv, c-57/93, [1994] ecr. i-4541; schönheit v stadt frankfurt am main, c-4/02 and c-5/02, [2003] ecr. i-12575; see also reg v secretary of state for employment, ex parte equal opportunities commission, [1995] 1 ac 1 (hl);. braun, at pp. 137-40). [106] all of these sources — and more — show the clear association between gender and fewer or less stable working hours they provide powerful support for ms. fraser’s core argument: that the rcmp’s use of a temporary reduction in working hours as a basis for imposing less favourable pension consequences has an adverse impact on women. the first part of the s 15(1) test has therefore been met. [107] this leads me to the second part of the s 15(1) inquiry: whether this adverse impact reinforces, exacerbates or perpetuates disadvantage. [108] there is no doubt that it does i agree with ms fraser that the negative pension consequences of job-sharing perpetuate a long-standing source of disadvantage to women: gender biases within pension plans, which have historically been designed “for middle and upper-income full-time employees with long service, typically male” (report of the royal commission on the status of pensions in ontario (1980), at p 116). [109] the national action committee on the status of women (“nac”) expressed concerns about gender biases within pension plans in a brief to the house of commons sub-committee on equality rights (presented in june 1985 by louise dulude and carole wallace). in the brief, the nac described how pension plans treat women unequally: the differences in impact of pensions on women and men are well known and amply documented. they are the results of the combined effects of the elements which make up the multilayered cake that is canada’s pension system today. women are more affected by these inadequacies than men because they have a higher rate of turnover and drop out of the labour force more often than their male counterparts. as a result, the small proportion of female earners who are members of employer pension plans are exceedingly unlikely to ever collect decent pensions from that source. in fact, experts have said that many women who participate in employer-sponsored pension plans would probably have been better off putting their contributions to them in a bank. (brief on equality for women in pensions, taxation and federal benefits to parents, at pp. 2 and 8-9) [110] others have echoed these concerns. elizabeth shilton notes that although progress has been made in securing equal pension coverage for women, the level of benefits they derive from those pensions remains unequal (“gender risk and employment pension plans in canada” (2013), 17 clelj 101, at pp. 110-12). she links the gender biases in pension plans to their preference for “male pattern employment”: from the beginning, pension plans were calibrated to the career trajectories of skilled workers whose training and experience were particularly valuable to their employers. the reward structures embedded in those plans therefore favoured permanent, full-time workers with long service and relatively high pay — what has been called “male pattern employment.” long after explicitly gendered pension plan rules were made illegal, typical benefit structures still forced temporary or part-time employees — those in typical “female pattern employment” — to subsidize the benefits of workers with more market power. this is true of all pension plans, although the way in which the gender dynamic works depends on the type of plan. [p 112] lower-paid, [111] the international labour organization has also commented on how increased periods of part-time work result in lower pension benefits for women: throughout their life cycles, women accumulate disadvantages that pile up at older ages double or triple discrimination is often amplified as women advance in age. women are especially vulnerable owing to their high numbers in unpaid, low-paid, part-time, frequently interrupted, or informal economy work as a result they are less often entitled to any contributory pension benefits in their own right even if they are, their pensions are often significantly lower than those of men due to lower earnings and shorter contribution periods. (rights, jobs and social security: new visions for older women and men (2008)) [112] the structural inequality within pension plans has tangible impacts for women upon retirement. this court has described the “feminization of poverty” as an “entrenched social phenomenon” in canada (moge, at p 853). claire young has linked this problem to disparities in pension policies: . . . when one examines statistics on income security in retirement, women are disproportionately worse off financially than men, with 7.6 percent of women having incomes below the low income cut off (lico), which is colloquially called the poverty line, compared to 3.6 percent of elderly men . . . . [c]urrent canadian pension policies are a major contributing factor to this income disparity. . . . over 72 percent of those aged sixty-five or older living below the poverty line are women it is also important to note that single elderly women are the poorest of the poor in canada, with 80 percent of unattached women over the age of sixty-five living in poverty. [emphasis added.] (“pensions, privatization, and poverty: the gendered impact” (2011), 23 cjwl 661, at pp. 663 and 665; see also shilton (2013), at pp. 102-3; commission of inquiry into part-time work, at p 151; gender wage gap strategy steering committee, final report and recommendations of the gender wage gap strategy steering committee (2016), at pp. 18 and 60-61; fredman (2011), at pp. 47-48; susan bisom-rapp and malcolm sargeant, “it’s complicated: age, gender, and lifetime discrimination against working women — the united states and the uk as examples” (2014), 22 elder lj 1, at p 99.) [113] pension design choices have, in sum, “far-reaching normative, political and tangible economic implications for women” (shilton (2013), at p 140, quoting bernd marin, “gender equality, neutrality, specificity and sensitivity — and the ambivalence of benevolent welfare paternalism”, in bernd marin and eszter zólyomi, eds., women’s work and pensions: what is good, what is best? designing gender-sensitive arrangements (2010), 203, at p 210). because the rcmp’s design perpetuates a long-standing source of economic disadvantage for women, the second stage of the s 15(1) test is satisfied and there is a prima facie breach of s 15 based on the enumerated ground of sex. [114] in light of the conclusion that there is a prima facie breach of s 15(1) based on sex, it is unnecessary to decide whether ms. fraser’s alternative argument that this court recognize parental/family status as an analogous ground should succeed.6 some observations may be helpful, however, for future cases. [115] the attorney general was prepared to accept that the narrower ground of “parental” status should be recognized as an analogous ground under s 15(1), but only for these proceedings. i am uncomfortable with this court accepting a new analogous ground as a one-off. it is either a sustainable legal principle that this court should accept or it is not. it should not get a trial run subject to periodic review. moreover, where it is protected in human rights statutes in canada, parental status is part of family status, not a distinct category. i would be reluctant to sever them without submissions on what the implications are. [116] in my respectful view, this is not the right case to resolve whether family/parental status should be recognized as an analogous ground under s 15(1). not only is recognizing a new analogous ground unnecessary to fully and fairly resolve ms. fraser’s discrimination claim, a robust intersectional analysis of gender and parenting — as this case shows — can be carried out under the enumerated ground of sex, by acknowledging that the uneven division of childcare responsibilities is one of 6 ms. fraser’s notice of constitutional question identified “parental status” as the relevant analogous ground under s 15(1). before this court, she identified the relevant ground as “family status”. the “persistent systemic disadvantages [that] have operated to limit the opportunities available” to women in canadian society (taypotat, at para. 17; see also withler, at para. 43; quebec v. a, at paras. 327-32; alliance, at para. 28; centrale, at para. 35). human rights cases in other jurisdictions confirm that claims of parental discrimination can be brought as claims of adverse impact discrimination on the basis of sex (see fredman (2011), at pp. 181-82; shilton (2018), at p 36; london underground ltd. v. edwards (no. 2), [1999] icr 494 (ewca);. phillips v. martin marietta corp., 400 u.s 542 (1971); bostock v clayton county, georgia, 140 s ct 1731 (2020), at p 1743). [117] there is another more compelling basis for not definitively resolving the issue in this appeal: the record and submissions before us do not provide the necessary assistance in exploring the implications of such a step. there are several complex questions about recognizing family/parental status as an analogous ground that have not been addressed at any stage of these proceedings. there was only a brief discussion of family/parental status in ms. fraser’s factum, the issue was largely unaddressed in the submissions of the attorney general, almost all the interveners and during oral argument,7 and it was completely absent in the reasons of the federal court and court of appeal. 7 at the appeal hearing, counsel for ms. fraser was questioned on whether it is necessary for the court to recognize family or parental status as an analogous ground under s 15(1) (transcript, at pp. 36-40). counsel acknowledged that “one could just argue [the appeal] on sex”, but did not abandon his position [118] the parties recognized that family status is a protected ground in most provincial human rights statutes, and that while there is no separate express protection for parental status, family status has been defined or interpreted to include protection for parents (british columbia law institute, human rights and family responsibilities: family status discrimination under human rights law in british columbia and canada (2012), at p 26). the question of what constitutes a prima facie case of family status discrimination has been the source of considerable “uncertainty and controversy” in the human rights arena (british columbia law institute, at p 10; see ontario human rights commission, the cost of caring: report on the consultation on discrimination on the basis of family status (2006), at p 4; campbell river & north island transition society v. health sciences assn. of british columbia (2004), 28 bclr (4th) 292 (ca);. brown v department of national revenue (1993), 93 cllc ¶17,013 (chrt);. canada (attorney general) v. johnstone, [2015] 2 fcr 595 (ca);. misetich v. value village stores inc. (2016), 39 ccel (4th) 129 (ont hrt), at paras. 35-48; see also shilton (2018); sheila osborne-brown, “discrimination and family status: the test, the continuing debate, and the accommodation conversation” (2018), 14 jl & equality 87; lyle kanee and adam cembrowski, “family status discrimination and the obligation to self-accommodate” (2018), 14 jl & equality 61). on family status (p 37). the intervener women’s legal education and action fund inc. argued that the court does not “need the analogous ground of family status” to rule for ms. fraser (p 64). [119] but there were almost no submissions before us about whether or how the unsettled state of the human rights jurisprudence does or should affect the recognition of family/parental status under the charter, about the definition or possible scope of “family” or “parental” status, or about the possibility of addressing parental or family status discrimination by recognizing other grounds (see thibaudeau v. canada, [1995] 2 scr 627, at pp. 722-25, per mclachlin j., dissenting (“separated or divorced custodial parent”); canada (attorney general) v. lesiuk (ca), [2003] 2 fc 697, at para. 37 (“women in a parental status”)). [120] nor did we receive any submissions or evidence on how or whether recognition of family/parental status would affect protection for women above and beyond that available under the enumerated ground of sex. the record is similarly silent on the nature of the disadvantages that fathers may have experienced or continue to experience because of parenting responsibilities, or on the possible impact of recognizing a new analogous ground on fathers’ relationships with a co-parent. [121] and finally, we received no submissions on whether or how these questions are or should be relevant to the test for recognizing a new analogous ground under s 15(1), a test which has itself been the subject of renewed scholarly attention (see joshua sealy-harrington, “assessing analogous grounds: the doctrinal and normative superiority of a multi-variable approach” (2013), 10 jl & equality 37; jessica eisen, “grounding equality in social relations: suspect classification, analogous grounds and relational theory” (2017), 42 queen’s lj 41). [122] these are some of the issues that merit close examination by this court, as do issues like the “growing and urgent need related to eldercare” (ontario human rights commission, at p 12), and the implications of our evolutionary understanding from a conjugal-centric meaning of “family”, to one more appreciative of the variations in intimate relationships that make up today’s households (see elaine craig, “family as status in doe v canada: constituting family under section 15 of the charter” (2007), 20 njcl 197, at pp. 207-208). but these issues were barely addressed in this appeal. [123] while recognizing multiple, interactive grounds of discrimination can allow for a fuller appreciation of the discrimination involved in particular cases, the gap in submissions and evidence means that critical questions about the implications of adopting family/parental status as an analogous ground were not explored in the record that is not to say that this status should not eventually be recognized as an analogous ground, or that we should shy away from recognizing analogous grounds which raise complexities — rarely do enumerated or analogous grounds come neatly packaged — but before we do so, it seems to me to be wiser to have the benefit of sufficient argument and submissions so that the recognition, when it comes, pays full tribute to the breadth of what is at stake. [124] and so to s 1. [125] section 1 allows the state to justify a limit on a charter right as “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” to start, the state must identify a pressing and substantial objective for limiting the charter right (r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103, at pp. 138-39). the attorney general bears the burden of showing that classifying full-time rcmp members who enter job-sharing as part-time workers and excluding them from accessing full-time pension credit, achieves a compelling state objective. as the court noted in alliance, it is the limitation on equality rights that must be justified, not the legislative scheme as a whole: where a court finds that a specific legislative provision infringes a charter right, the state’s burden is to justify that limitation, not the whole legislative scheme. thus, the “objective relevant to the s 1 analysis is the objective of the infringing measure, since it is the infringing measure and nothing else which is sought to be justified” (rjr-macdonald inc v. canada (attorney general), [1995] 3 scr 199, at para. 144; r v. krj, [2016] 1 scr 906, at para. 62). [emphasis in original; para. 45.] [126] the attorney general, in my respectful view, has identified no pressing and substantial policy concern, purpose or principle that explains why job-sharers should not be granted full-time pension credit for their service. on the contrary, this limitation is entirely detached from the purposes of both the job-sharing scheme and the buy-back provisions, which were intended to ameliorate the position of female rcmp members who take leave to care for their children. as the hon. gilles loiselle, then president of the treasury board, said in support of amendments to the public service superannuation legislation: i might mention too that this provision, like that for coverage of part-time employees, would particularly benefit women who continue to be the employees with the greatest need for room to balance family and career commitments many women, for example, take advantage of extended periods of leave without pay for the purpose of caring for young children or for elders, and this provision would enhance their ability to return to work without undue financial hardship. [emphasis added.] (house of commons debates, vol. vi, 3rd sess., 34th parl., february 24, 1992, at p 7487) [127] the job-sharing program had a similar objective, as confirmed in an affidavit filed as part of the attorney general’s record for the application hearing: the job-sharing policy was instituted to facilitate work-life balance for members of the force who, due to personal or family circumstances, would benefit from being able to work part-time instead of taking extended leaves of absence in the form of lwop. job-sharing was thus seen as being mutually beneficial as it enabled members to remain operationally connected to the force while having a work schedule that better accommodated their individual circumstances. [emphasis added.] (appeal record, vol. v, at p 810) [128] job-sharing was clearly intended as a substitute for leave without pay for those members who could not take such leave “due to personal or family circumstances”. it is unclear, then, what purpose is served by treating the two forms of work reduction differently when extending pension buy-back rights. the rcmp’s plan provides buy-back rights when a full-time member reduces her hours from 40 to 0 to care for her child, but, inexplicably, withholds such rights if the same member for the same reasons reduces her hours from 40 to 10, 20, 30 or some other number. and this despite the rcmp benefitting from the member’s services in the latter scenario. i see no justification for this limitation, let alone a pressing and substantial one the distinction becomes even more difficult to understand when considering that buy-back rights are available to members who have been suspended. [129] in my respectful view, therefore, the government has not offered a compelling objective for the limitation on job-sharing participants wishing to buy back full-time pension credit. [130] since the prima facie breach cannot be justified under s 1, it is a violation of s 15 to preclude ms fraser and her colleagues from buying back their pension credits. [131] finally, my colleagues’ reasons call for response. [132] the version of s 15(1) advanced in my colleagues’ reasons is essentially that advanced in the dissenting reasons in alliance. they argued then, as they do now, that a finding of a breach would have a “chilling effect” on legislatures;8 that the 8 rejected by the majority at para. 42 of alliance: “. . . there is no evidence to support the in terrorem view advanced by my colleagues that finding a breach would have a ‘chilling effect’ on legislatures. impugned legislation was not “the source of the differences in compensation between men and women” (at para. 97);9 that the court should not interfere with “incremental” efforts intended to narrow the gap between a group and the rest of society;10 and that finding a s 15(1) breach would place legislatures under a freestanding positive obligation “to act in order to obtain specific societal results such as the total and definitive eradication of gender-based pay inequities” (para. 65).11 [133] all of these propositions were squarely rejected by the majority in alliance. nothing, as far as i can see, has happened since alliance was decided in 2018 to justify discarding its premises. and no one involved in this case argued that we should, except, inferentially, my colleagues, who tug at the strands of a prior decision they disagree with in search of the occasional phrase or paragraph by which they can unravel the that amounts to an argument that requiring legislatures to comply with charter standards would have such an effect. speculative concerns about the potential for inducing statutory timidity on the part of legislatures has never, to date, been an accepted analytic tool for deciding whether the constitution has been breached. legislatures understand that they are bound by the charter and that the public expects them to comply with it. the courts are facilitators in that enterprise, not bystanders.” 9 rejected by the majority at para. 41: “. . . my colleagues imply that there is no breach of s 15(1) of the charter because the quebec legislature did not create pay discrimination against women. no one has suggested that it did. but when the government passes legislation in a way that perpetuates historic disadvantage for protected groups, regardless of who caused their disadvantage, the legislation is subject to review for s 15 compliance . . .” (emphasis in original). 10 this argument did not deter the court from finding a s 15(1) breach in alliance or in the companion case centrale (see also mckinney, at p 279). and the argument is even less convincing in this case, where no attempt was made by the government to justify the absence of buy-back rights as a necessary part of an ongoing strategy to address inequality, and where no support exists for that position in the record. 11 it was in rejecting this concern that the majority in alliance made the two statements at para. 42 which my colleagues repeatedly invoke: “the result of finding that quebec’s amendments breach s 15 in this case is not, as quebec suggests, to impose a freestanding positive obligation on the state to enact benefit schemes to redress social inequalities nor does it undermine the state’s ability to act incrementally in addressing systemic inequality but s 15 does require the state to ensure that whatever actions it does take do not have a discriminatory impact.” (emphasis added)). precedent their arguments are based on conjecture not reality, calling to mind one writer’s wry observation that “setting straw men on fire is not what we mean by illumination”.12 [134] and, above all, they continue their insistent attack on the foundational premise of this court’s s 15 jurisprudence — substantive equality — in favour of a formalistic approach that embraces “a mechanical and sterile categorization process conducted entirely within the four corners of the impugned legislation” (turpin, at p 1332) this court has consistently rejected this “thin and impoverished vision of s 15(1)” (eldridge, at para. 73), as have even the scholars cited by my colleagues.13 it is unfortunate that as the global jurisprudence has increasingly embraced substantive equality, my colleagues continue to endorse an approach which evokes the rejected pre-charter theory whose effect was to deny access to benefits when that access required accommodation based on difference. [135] whatever my colleagues’ definition of “rule of law” is, it must surely include the assumption that decisions of the supreme court will be respected not only by the public, but by members of the court and it must surely also include an assurance to those seeking constitutional protections that the ongoing repetition in 12 adam gopnik, “the illiberal imagination: are liberals on the wrong side of history?”, the new yorker, march 20, 2017, 88, at p 92. 13 see also young (2010), at pp. 192-98; jennifer koshan and jonnette watson hamilton, “meaningless mantra: substantive equality after withler” (2011), 16 rev. const. stud. 31, at p 59; patricia hughes, “supreme court of canada equality jurisprudence and ‘everyday life’” (2012), 58 sclr (2d) 245, at pp. 271-72. dissenting reasons of rejected arguments will not require them “with each new case, [to] stand ready to defend the exact gains that have been won multiple times in the past” (faraday, at p 330; see also jonnette watson hamilton and jennifer koshan, “equality rights and pay equity: déjà vu in the supreme court of canada” (2019), 15 jl & equality 1). [136] for over 30 years, the s 15 inquiry has involved identifying the presence, persistence and pervasiveness of disadvantage, based on enumerated or analogous grounds. its mandate is ambitious but not utopian: to address that disadvantage where it is identified so that in the pursuit of equality, inequality can be reduced one case at a time. that is why there is a s 15(1) breach in this case — not because women continue to have disproportionate responsibility for childcare and less stable working hours than men, but because the pension plan “institutionalize[s] those traits as a basis on which to unequally distribute” pension benefits to job-sharing participants (see faraday, at p 318). this is ‘“discrimination reinforced by law’, which this court has denounced since andrews” (centrale, at para. 33, quoting andrews, at p 172) contrary to the views of my colleagues, there is nothing “extraordinary” about holding, as we do here, that such discrimination violates s 15(1) of the charter. based on our jurisprudence, it would be extraordinary if we did not. [137] the final question relates to remedy. [138] in my view, the appropriate remedy is a declaration that there has been a breach of the s 15(1) rights of full-time rcmp members who temporarily reduced their working hours under a job-sharing agreement, based on the inability of those members to buy back full pension credit for that service. the methodology for facilitating the buy-back of pension credit is for the government to develop, but any remedial measures it takes should be in accordance with this court’s reasons they should also have retroactive effect in order to give the claimants in this case and others in their position a meaningful remedy (vancouver (city) v ward, [2010] 2 scr 28, at para. 20; doucet-boudreau v nova scotia (minister of education), [2003] 3 scr 3, at paras. 55-58). [139] i would allow the appeal with costs throughout. the following are the reasons delivered by brown and rowe jj. — i. introduction [140] at one level, this appeal presents the simple question: is tying pension benefits to hours worked discriminatory? the royal canadian mounted police (“rcmp”) allows two or more of its regular members (“members”) to share one full-time position through the option of “job-sharing.” the pension benefits of members who job-share, like all other members, are determined through the royal canadian mounted police superannuation act, rsc 1985, c. r-11 and the royal canadian mounted police superannuation regulations, crc, c 1393 (collectively, the “plan”) under the plan, the pension benefits of members who job-share are prorated to reflect the hours they worked during the job-sharing period. [141] in addition to job-sharing, the rcmp has also given its members the option of taking leave without pay (“lwop”) these members may “buy back” pension benefits when they return to work from an extended period of lwop. [142] through its job-sharing policy and the lwop provisions, the rcmp has sought to provide flexible working arrangements in recognition of the burden women face in pursuing a career due to the unequal distribution of childcare responsibilities in society. for members with childcare responsibilities, job-sharing accommodates those who are able to remain operationally connected to the force and want to keep their policing skills up to date, while lwop accommodates those who temporarily leave the force by enhancing their ability to return to work without undue financial hardship. the plan and the rcmp’s policy on job-sharing are not anathema to the vision of equality that underlies s 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, but instead represent an attempt to accommodate employees in light of their particular circumstances. [143] and yet, our colleague abella j finds these aspects of the plan to be unconstitutional. she describes the historical disadvantages women have faced in the workplace and then concludes, in effect, that the plan does not do enough to remedy these disadvantages. one may reach this conclusion as a matter of policy, but that is not the question to be decided. rather, and at its most fundamental level, it is whether, as a matter of law, the constitution empowers (or even requires) the courts to substitute their views as to how to remedy those disadvantages for those of the legislature and the executive. [144] the circumstances here are extraordinary, in that it is acknowledged that parliament was not obliged to enact the plan (see, eg, transcript, at p 66), nor is it barred from repealing it (see quebec (attorney general) v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 14, [2015] 1 scr 693, at para. 25; quebec (attorney general) v. alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, 2018 scc 17, [2018] 1 scr 464, at para. 33). but is not the next extension of our colleague’s line of reasoning that governments (federal and provincial) have a positive duty under s 15(1) to initiate measures that will remove all effects of historic disadvantage, and that they are constitutionally barred from repealing or even amending such measures? these are profoundly complex matters of public policy that no canadian court is institutionally competent to deal with. [145] our colleague’s line of reasoning in this case lays the groundwork for just that position. among other things, it effectively overrules this court’s recent statement in alliance that the state may “act incrementally in addressing systemic equality” (para. 42 (emphasis added)). that the plan does not eradicate disadvantage should not mean that it should attract censure as “discriminatory.” rather, considered in its entirety and with proper attention to its object, the plan is a package of benefits designed to balance the needs of some rcmp employees during their child-raising years, prorated according to hours worked. on any permutation of s 15(1), its effect surely cannot be to hinder government efforts to address pre-existing inequality. [146] this leads to a more fundamental concern presented by this appeal — a concern which, we observe, has been repeatedly made by legal commentators, but which has yet to be taken up by this court the gauge of “substantive equality” by which this court has measured s 15(1) claims of right, not having been defined (except by reference to what it is not — eg “formal equality”), has become an open-ended and undisciplined rhetorical device by which courts may privilege, without making explicit, their own policy preferences. as we explain below, and with respect, this case is an instance of that inherent malleability being deployed so as to strike down a scheme which was, after all, designed to be ameliorative. [147] the impugned provisions of the plan are not unconstitutional. for the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeal. ii. facts [148] while we agree generally with the facts as recounted by our colleague, we would add some observations regarding the appellants’ employment status further, her description of the plan obscures some key aspects of how it functions. this is not a small matter: understanding the plan and the underlying legislative scheme in its entirety is key to adjudicating the s 15 claim. as this court has explained: where . . . the impugned distinction is the denial of a benefit that is part of a statutory benefit scheme that applies to a large number of people, the discrimination assessment must focus on the object of the measure alleged to be discriminatory in the context of the broader legislative scheme, taking into account the universe of potential beneficiaries. [emphasis added.] (withler v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 12, [2011] 1 scr 396, at para. 3) a. the appellants’ employment status [149] our colleague does not directly engage with the appellants’ employment status. at para. 21, she notes that the appellants argued that “the pension plan, properly interpreted, allows participants in the job-sharing program to acquire full pension credit.” this passage refers to an issue before the federal court: the appellants argued that job-sharers were “presumptively” full-time members who agreed to work temporarily reduced hours or that they worked full-time with periods of lwop (2017 fc 557, at paras. 43-44 (canlii)). this argument was also advanced before this court. and, having considered this issue in detail, the federal court found that the appellants worked part-time while job-sharing (para. 47). this finding was based on a thorough review of the record, including the 1997 bulletin that introduced job-sharing, the rcmp administration manual ii.10, and the appellants’ memoranda of agreement (paras. 48-53) we highlight that the manual explicitly states that “[j]ob sharing is considered as part-time employment” (ar, vol. ii, at p 238 (emphasis added)). further, the federal court expressly rejected the arguments that job-sharers were partly on lwop (at para. 55) or worked full-time with temporarily reduced hours (para. 56). the federal court of appeal upheld these findings, noting that the federal court’s conclusions on this point were “largely factual” (2018 fca 223, [2019] 2 fcr 541, at para. 33). applying a standard of palpable and overriding error, it found no basis to interfere (paras. 33-36). [150] despite this, our colleague repeatedly refers to job-sharers as “full-time members who temporarily reduced their working hours” (at para. 3; see also paras. 83, 97 and 138) or “full-time rcmp members who job-share” (paras. 5 and 25) she therefore seems to overturn this finding without setting out the applicable standard or explaining the error. [151] this finding is key to the rest of our colleague’s decision by treating job-sharers as full-time employees, she is able to say they are entitled to the same pension benefits as full-time employees. with respect, this approach skates over key aspects of the plan, most notably how it treats part-time members and the different situations in which members take lwop. in other words, our colleague does not account for the context of the entire scheme, which she must do in order to be faithful to withler. b. the operation of the plan [152] at the outset, it is important to note that the appellants do not allege that it is unfair in general for members who work part-time to have their pensions adjusted for periods of part-time work. rather, the core of their argument is that they should be able to “buy back” pensionable service in the same way as members who take lwop, a submission we dismiss below to properly assess this submission, it is crucial to understand how the plan operates and, in particular, how it applies in the same manner to full-time and part-time members except to make adjustments to account for hours actually worked. [153] the plan is a “contributory defined benefit pension plan,” which means that contribution rates are based on a percentage of a member’s earnings (ar, vol. v, at p 801; see also a. kaplan and m. frazer, pension law (2nd ed. 2013), at pp. 2-3). both members and the rcmp are required to contribute to the plan (act, ss. 5 and 292). a member’s pension is determined based on the years of “pensionable service,” that is, the period of service credited to a member at retirement (act, s 6). all members accrue pensionable service at the same rate regardless of whether they work part- or full-time. this means that one-year of part-time work and one year of full-time work both count as one year of pensionable service. [154] this important nuance is missing from our colleague’s reasons, which speak only of full-time pensionable service (see, eg, para. 14). [155] the only employment statuses provided for under the plan are full-time, part-time, and lwop. the regulations define a “full-time member” as one who is engaged to work 40 hours per week (s 2.1; see also ar, vol. v, at p 803). meanwhile, a “part-time member” is described as a member who is engaged to work a minimum of 12 hours per week and is not a full-time member (ss. 2.1 and 52(1)). importantly, there are no specific provisions relating to job-sharing in the plan. this makes sense, given that the relevant policies define job-sharing as a form of part-time work. job-sharers are therefore treated as working part-time during the period in which they job-share. [156] all members contribute to the pension fund at the same rate, set by treasury board as a percentage of their salary. upon retirement, members receive a pension benefit that is proportional to the assigned hours of work: the benefits are prorated to account for any part-time service as the respondent’s pension expert explained, “this approach aims to ensure that part-time members and full-time members are treated equitably by tying pension benefits to assigned hours of work” (ar, vol. v, at p 805). [157] members’ pension benefits are based on the average annual pay received for the five best consecutive years of highest paid pensionable service. for periods of part-time pensionable service, the average annual pay is based on the “full-time equivalent” of the authorized rate of pay and is then prorated to reflect the hours actually worked. the respondent’s pension expert explains that “[t]his method ensures that members will not be penalized based on when in their career the part-time service occurred” (p 806). [158] as we will discuss, the core of the appellants’ argument focuses on the “buy-back” option available to members who take lwop. it is therefore also important to understand how the “buy-back” option works. members who take lwop have no assigned hours of work and are therefore not remunerated but maintain continuity of employment. for the first three months of an lwop period, members must contribute to the pension fund the amount they would have contributed had they been working (act, s 6(a)(ii)(a); regulations, s 10(1)(a) and (4)). following that period, members may elect not to contribute for some or all of the balance of the lwop period (act, s 7(1)) however, members who choose to treat the remaining lwop period as pensionable must pay two or two and a half times the amount they would have paid had they been working (act, s 7(1); regulations, s 10(1)(b)).14 this is what is meant by “buying back” pensionable service. [159] crucially, pension benefits for members who take lwop are determined based on the status they held immediately before taking lwop (regulations, ss. 5.4, 10(4) and 101). in other words, members who worked part-time prior to taking lwop and buy back that pensionable service will earn a part-time pension benefit for the period of lwop. [160] as the foregoing shows, members who “buy back” pensionable service following a period of lwop are making contributions for periods in which they did not work. conceptually, therefore, it makes sense to say that they are “buying back” that time. in contrast, members who job-share make pension contributions throughout the job-sharing period. we therefore agree with the respondent that it is inaccurate to speak of “buying back” service when it comes to job-sharing. the hours worked while job-sharing are already fully pensionable; there is no remaining time to be “bought back”. job-sharers worked part-time hours and received part-time pension benefits for the period they job-shared. the appellants, however, are seeking to obtain a full-time pension benefit in respect of a period where they have worked part-time hours. to be clear, no other members are entitled to such a benefit. even members who take lwop 14 if a member elects not to treat the period as pensionable, he or she may later choose to buy back the pensionable service at a rate of two or two and a half times plus interest (regulations, s 108). are limited to the hours they worked prior to taking lwop (eg the part-time member who takes lwop is able to buy back part-time, but not full-time, pension benefits for their time spent on lwop). the appellants are, in this sense, asking to be put in a better position than everyone else under the plan, and, indeed, under any of the other 10 public sector pension plans our colleague elides this vital point, which underlies our reasoning and undermines hers. [161] instead, she draws attention to the fact that members who are suspended can obtain full-time pension credit (para. 25). the rcmp’s administration manual ii.8 does state that “[t]he period of time a member is suspended without pay and allowances will count as pensionable service” (ar, vol. ii, at p 229) but there is almost no evidence before the court as to how this works. it may be that a member who worked part-time prior to a suspension is entitled only to part-time pension credit, which would seem to align with how the plan otherwise works. we simply do not know. moreover, during the hearing, the respondent stated this option is no longer available and has not been for some time, noting that the document relied on by the appellants dates back to 2003. it is not appropriate to ascribe any significance whatsoever to the situation of suspended members given this evidentiary void. [162] in short, it is incumbent upon this court in judging the constitutionality of the plan to understand and account for how the scheme operates as a whole, rather than compare options that are available to different groups line-by-line. and, considering the plan as a whole, it is clear that it accommodates various stages of a member’s life and career. it is meant to be flexible and meet different needs at different times. iii analysis [163] the appellants say the plan violates s 15 of the charter in its application to members who job-share, by denying them the right to accrue full-time pension credit for periods when they job-shared for childcare reasons. in our view, it does not. [164] we stress in coming to this conclusion that the court is not called upon to decide whether the plan represents good or bad policy on the part of parliament (in the legislation) and the executive (in the regulations). the task of the court, rather, is to assess whether the plan respects the bounds of the constitutional obligations imposed on the state (vriend v. alberta, [1998] 1 scr 493, at para. 136). [165] section 15 protects individuals against state-imposed discrimination. like any other charter right, it applies to the actions of the state, and not to private acts of discrimination (s 32; rwdsu v. dolphin delivery ltd., [1986] 2 scr 573, at p 597; p. w. hogg, constitutional law of canada (5th ed supp. (loose-leaf)), vol. 2, at pp. 55-12 to 55-13) in the case at bar, the appellants’ claim is premised on the relationship between their sex, the allocation of childcare responsibilities in society, and the fact they job-shared. their argument is that, because primary responsibility for childcare has historically fallen on women, the plan ought to have allowed them to “buy back” additional pensionable service for the time they job-shared to fulfill their childcare responsibilities. [166] it is indisputable that women have historically been disadvantaged in the workplace in part by the demands of childcare this court has recognized this disadvantage, notably in matters of compensation, in alliance, at para. 6, and centrale des syndicats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2018 scc 18, [2018] 1 scr. 522, at paras. 2, 58 and 138. in this case, the application judge was presented with, and accepted, evidence showing that “women continue to assume traditional roles in the home and [that] women are more likely than their male counterparts to scale back at work to respond to ‘role overload’ and work-life conflict” (para. 72). she also accepted evidence that women continue to make up a larger proportion of the part-time labour force, particularly between the ages of 25 and 44 when they are most likely to be raising children (para. 168). [167] further, the federal court of appeal has described systemic discrimination as “a continuing phenomenon which has its roots deep in history and in societal attitudes [and] cannot be isolated to a single action or statement” (public service alliance of canada v. canada (department of national defence) (ca), [1996] 3 fc. 789, at para. 16). and it exists within the private and public spheres. some aspects of government employment policies, for example, have contributed to women’s systemic disadvantage (see, eg,. newfoundland (treasury board) v. nape, 2004 scc 66, [2004] 3 scr 381) however, many private sources — that is, longstanding phenomena other than government policies — also contribute to women’s ongoing systemic disadvantage. a clear example of this is how parents share and expect each other to share domestic responsibilities, including childcare. [168] in the present case, the plan represents neither a public nor private source of ongoing systemic disadvantage it does not contribute to women’s systemic disadvantage; nor does it reinforce, perpetuate, or exacerbate the pre-existing disadvantage of women in the workplace which arises in part from unequal distribution of parental responsibilities. rather, it seeks to ameliorate (although without eliminating) the effects of that pre-existing disadvantage on women’s careers in the rcmp by providing employment options which allow them the flexibility to continue to pursue their careers while raising children. this case therefore raises the question: can a court strike down part of a statutory scheme for simply being insufficiently remedial? in our respectful view, and as we explain below, it cannot. a. step one of the section 15 analysis [169] as our colleague explains, this claim alleges adverse-impact discrimination. we agree that the s 15 test, as it is framed, can address such claims (paras. 48-50). that test consists of the following two steps: 1 does the law, on its face or in its impact, create a distinction on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground? 2 does the law fail to respond to the actual capacities and needs of the group and instead impose burdens or deny a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating their disadvantage? (kahkewistahaw first nation v taypotat, 2015 scc 30, [2015] 2 scr 548, at paras. 19-20; alliance, at para. 25; centrale, at para. 22.) [170] that the test can account for adverse-impact discrimination is shown by its inquiry into whether a law creates a distinction in its impact. as this court recognized in withler, in adverse-impact cases, “the claimant will have more work to do at the first step” (para. 64). [171] the concept of a “distinction” has been central to our s 15 jurisprudence since andrews v law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 143, which described discrimination as “a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group” (p 174 (emphasis added)). as the court explained in withler: inherent in the word “distinction” is the idea that the claimant is treated differently than others. comparison is thus engaged, in that the claimant asserts that he or she is denied a benefit that others are granted or carries a burden that others do not, by reason of a personal characteristic that falls within the enumerated or analogous grounds of s 15(1). [emphasis added; para. 62.] [172] as this passage demonstrates, the focus at step one upon identifying a distinction is consistent with the comparative nature of equality indeed, and as this court has repeatedly emphasized, equality is “an inherently comparative concept” (r v. kapp, 2008 scc 41, [2008] 2 scr 483, at para. 15; see also andrews, at p 164; winko v british columbia (forensic psychiatric institute), [1999] 2 scr 625, at para. 77; withler, at para. 62). comparison is relevant throughout both steps of the s 15 analysis (withler, at para. 61). [173] despite the comparative nature of equality, however, this court has also cautioned that seeking out a “mirror comparator group” is not the proper method to evaluate s 15 claims (withler, at paras. 55-60). as stated in withler, “[t]he analysis is contextual, not formalistic, grounded in the actual situation of the group and the potential of the impugned law to worsen their [circumstances]” (para. 37; see also centrale, at para. 135). nonetheless, the identification of a distinction is crucial. [174] our colleague identifies a distinction between job-sharers and full-time members who work regular hours, who are suspended or who take lwop (while failing, as noted, to consider individuals who work part-time prior to taking lwop) (paras. 25 and 83). yet, she later rejects (at least facially) a comparison to members who take lwop, dismissing it as a “formalistic” and “mirror comparator group” analysis (at paras. 93-94), maintaining that job-sharers are entitled to substantive equality relative to full-time members (para. 94) as we explain below, however, it becomes evident upon closer examination that her rejection of a comparison to members who take lwop is only superficial. the existence of the buy-back provisions for members who take lwop is the very reason that she finds a breach; absent that basis for comparison, the alleged breach disappears. [175] as noted, step one of the s 15 analysis considers whether there is a distinction “in . . impact” (centrale, at para. 22 (emphasis added)) a search for impact is a search for causation. the inquiry here is into whether the gap in outcomes is fully explained by pre-existing disadvantage or whether state conduct has contributed to it. in other words, s 15 is concerned with state conduct that contributes to — that is, augments — pre-existing disadvantage (taypotat, at para. 20, citing quebec (attorney general) v. a, 2013 scc 5, [2013] 1 scr 61, at para. 332; vriend, at paras. 75-76). [176] further, the analysis is directed to “the effects of the challenged law or action on the claimant group” (taypotat, at para. 18 (emphasis added), citing quebec v. a, at para. 331). while disadvantage may persist with or without the impugned law or state action, a demonstration that it has the effect of contributing to that disadvantage is necessary. [177] establishing causation is particularly critical in instances where the state acts in order to address systemic discrimination. in such cases, policies that narrow a gap may fail to close it. despite our colleague’s views to the contrary, this court made clear in alliance that the state does not have, by virtue of s 15, a freestanding positive obligation to remedy social inequalities. moreover, when the state does act with such a purpose, it can do so incrementally: the result of finding that quebec’s amendments breach s 15 in this case is not, as quebec suggests, to impose a freestanding positive obligation on the state to enact benefit schemes to redress social inequalities. nor does it undermine the state’s ability to act incrementally in addressing systemic inequality. but s 15 does require the state to ensure that whatever actions it does take do not have a discriminatory impact (vriend; eldridge v. british columbia (attorney general), [1997] 3 scr 624, at paras. 72-80). [emphasis added; para. 42.] this is consistent with the general focus of s 15, as explained in quebec v. a: “if the state conduct widens the gap between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of society rather than narrowing it, then it is discriminatory” (para. 332 (emphasis added)). these clear and recent statements of this court should mandate dismissal of this appeal. [178] our colleague overcomes the requirement of causation, and these statements, by relaxing the claimant’s evidentiary burden to the point of insignificance. she posits that “evidence of statistical disparity and of broader group disadvantage may demonstrate disproportionate impact,” although she adds that “neither is mandatory and their significance will vary depending on the case” (para. 67 (emphasis added)). with respect to “broader group disadvantage,” a single claimant’s “own evidence,” or even judicial notice, is all she requires (paras. 57 and 66-67) while courts must evaluate evidence in light of “the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted” (snell v. farrell, [1990] 2 scr 311, at p 328, quoting blatch v. archer (1774), 1 cowp. 63, 98 er 969, at p 970), ultimately the onus is on the claimant to establish causation. in many contexts, subjective anecdotal evidence is simply incapable of meeting this objective onus (eg. taypotat, at paras. 33-34; auton (guardian ad litem of) v. british columbia (attorney general), 2004 scc 78, [2004] 3 scr 657, at paras. 58 and 62; gosselin v. quebec (attorney general), 2002 scc 84, [2002] 4 scr 429, at paras. 8 and 47) our colleague’s relaxed approach also risks overlooking the interests of the public good (b. w. miller, “majoritarianism and pathologies of judicial review”, in g. webber et al., legislated rights: securing human rights through legislation (2018), 181, at p 196). [179] with respect to statistical disparity, our colleague contends that “clear and consistent statistical disparities can show a disproportionate impact on members of protected groups, even if the precise reason for that impact is unknown” (para. 62). in this case, then, because there is a statistical disparity between women and men with respect to who has taken advantage of the job-sharing program, and because there is evidence that women have historically borne a greater part of childcare responsibilities and formed a greater proportion of the part-time labour force, she finds that the law has a disproportionate impact on women (paras. 97-106). [180] with respect, this analysis is unsound, since it assumes that correlation between the number of women who have taken advantage of the job-sharing program and evidence of disproportionate childcare responsibilities falling upon women is the function of causation, whereas it might well be the function of independent factors. correlation itself is not proof of causation. indeed, where one is dealing with complex social and economic considerations, like sex and employment, one can readily assume that there are many factors involved, some of which will give rise to causation while others will simply be the result of coincidence (that is, caused by independent factors). [181] but it is causation that must be demonstrated between the law and the disadvantage. it is not enough for our colleague to refer to a statistical disparity and a broader group disadvantage. indeed, the presence of a statistical disparity is precisely what is to be expected where a law is enacted, as the relevant portions of the plan were, to incrementally narrow a pre-existing systemic disadvantage. when the law fails to completely eradicate such disadvantage, an element of disparity will obviously remain. it follows that to accept statistical disparity and broader group disadvantage as sufficient to demonstrate that a law creates a distinction in impact is to do away with this court’s statement made only two years ago in alliance that s 15 neither imposes “a freestanding positive obligation on the state to . . . redress social inequalities” nor “undermine[s] the state’s ability to act incrementally in addressing systemic inequality” (para. 42). it would also represent an undisciplined judicial expansion of the scope of s 15, which does not apply to private acts of discrimination, because it would render the state responsible for discrimination it has not caused. [182] we turn now to the appellants’ argument that the plan, on its face or in its impact, draws a distinction based on not just the enumerated ground of sex, but also on “family status,” or “parental status” which they argue should be recognized as an analogous ground. [183] we agree with our colleague that it is inappropriate to recognize an analogous ground solely for the purpose of this litigation (para. 114). not only is this inappropriate, this approach was squarely rejected in corbiere v. canada (minister of indian and northern affairs), [1999] 2 scr 203, at paras. 8-9. we also agree that, because this case can be resolved on the basis of the enumerated ground of sex, it is, substantially for the reasons she gives, unnecessary and unwise to consider parental or family status. the recognition of an analogous ground has significant implications as it opens up the possibility of new lines of charter claims; once an analogous ground is recognized, it “always stand[s] as a constant marker of potential legislative discrimination” (corbiere, at para. 10) recognition of further analogous grounds should be left for cases where there is sufficient argument and evidence, and where it is necessary to do so. it should not be done on an ad hoc basis. [184] focusing, then, on the enumerated ground of sex, there are two ways in which a distinction can be framed in this case each is based to some extent on comparison, which is to be expected given the inherently comparative nature of s 15. but neither is based on the “mirror comparator” group approach rejected by this court, in which the comparator ‘“mirrors the characteristics of the claimant (or claimant group) relevant to the benefit or advantage sought’ except for the personal characteristic on which the claim [is] based” (withler, at para. 49, quoting hodge v. canada (minister of human resources development), 2004 scc 65, [2004] 3 scr. 357, at para. 23). in other words, these distinctions do not look for a situation that is in every way identical to the claimant group except for the enumerated ground our analysis, rather, is contextual, considering the various facets of the plan and the evidence that is available on the composition of rcmp membership. [185] the first distinction can be drawn by looking to full-time members. job-sharers, unlike full-time members, do not obtain a full 40 hours of weekly pensionable service. the distinction is said to be based on sex because members of the job-sharing program are disproportionately women, whereas uninterrupted full-time employment is a male pattern of employment we agree that a distinction is shown here. [186] a second way of identifying a distinction in this case is by comparison to members who take lwop. our colleague expressly rejects this as the relevant comparison (paras. 93-94) nonetheless, she begins her analysis by stating that “[u]nlike full-time members who work regular hours, who are suspended or who take unpaid leave, full-time rcmp members who job-share are classified as part-time workers under the regulations and cannot . . . obtain full-time pension credit for their service” (para. 25 (emphasis added; footnote omitted)). in other words, the reason that our colleague finds a distinction is based on a comparison to members who take lwop. if the option to buy back pensionable service for periods of lwop did not exist, the distinction would vanish. further, and as we have already observed, not all members who take lwop have the right to receive full-time pension credit for their service. only members who were working full-time hours before taking lwop may do so. throughout her reasons, our colleague fails to account for this nuance. [187] in any event, the substance of this alleged distinction is that, with respect to pensionable service, job-sharers are limited to the numbers of hours they work per week, while members who take lwop are not as they have the option to “buy back” pensionable service. but this distinction is not based on sex: there is no evidence that members taking lwop are less likely to be women than members participating in the job-sharing program as the court of appeal noted, “there was very little evidence about the number of rcmp members who have opted to job share or to work part-time and no evidence about those who have opted to take an unpaid leave of absence” (para. 17 (emphasis added)). nor was there “any evidence to suggest that more men than women or more childless individuals than those with children had opted to take leaves without pay” (para. 52). further, the rcmp’s administration manual ii.5 on leave recognizes various approved reasons for lwop: education, spousal relocation, care and nurturing of preschool-aged children, and personal needs our colleague cannot simply assume, without evidence, that job-sharers as a group are more likely to be women than members who take lwop. both options are specifically but not exclusively available for women. [188] therefore, the distinction between job-sharing and lwop is not based on an enumerated or analogous ground. the analysis fails at step one. however, bearing in mind that we have found that the comparison between job-sharers (who do not obtain a full 40 hours of weekly pensionable service) and full-time members (who do) qualifies at the first step of the s 15 analysis as a distinction based on sex, we turn to the second step. here, given the contextual nature of the analysis, taking lwop into account remains important. b. step two of the section 15 analysis [189] having shown that the plan creates a distinction that, in its impact, is based on sex, the second stage of the s 15(1) analysis asks whether that distinction is discriminatory in that it fails to respond to the actual capacities and needs of the group and instead imposes burdens or denies a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating the disadvantage of women (andrews, at p 182; withler, at para. 31; taypotat, at para. 20). [190] this court has said that historic disadvantage plays a significant role in identifying substantive discrimination (law v. canada (minister of employment and immigration), [1999] 1 scr 497, at paras. 63-67; kapp, at paras. 15-16 and 35-36; taypotat, at para. 20) substantive discrimination, however, cannot be reduced to historical disadvantage in some circumstances, laws can maintain significant disadvantage while treating individuals equally and without discrimination for example, securities and property legislation represent state action that supports a system of private property ownership. where the distribution of private property between men and women is unequal, this legislation allows that unequal distribution to persist nonetheless, the legislation is not discriminatory under our colleague’s approach, the second step of the s 15 test serves only to check if the unequal impact of a law impacts a historically disadvantaged group; there is no analysis of whether the unequal impact corresponds with a group’s actual circumstances or needs or whether it is in any other sense substantively discriminatory. [191] though substantive discrimination has been described differently over the years, it has always required an element of arbitrariness or unfairness. this element has been most often expressed as a failure to respond to individuals’ actual capacities, needs and circumstances (andrews, at pp. 174-75; law, at para. 70; withler, at paras. 32 and 65; taypotat, at para. 20) for a time, perpetuating prejudice and stereotyping were seen as essential features of substantive discrimination (kapp, at paras. 23-24; withler, at paras. 34-36). more recently, a more contextual analysis has been preferred, because arbitrary discrimination need not take the form of promoting negative attitudes (quebec v. a, at paras. 327-31; see also alliance, at para. 28). [192] howsoever it has been expressed, this element of arbitrariness or unfairness has never been confused with a discriminatory purpose. a discriminatory purpose can indicate substantive discrimination, but is not required to establish it (andrews, at p 174; quebec v. a, at paras. 325-30; centrale, at para. 35). substantive discrimination is focused on effect rather than intention. [193] the academic literature cited by our colleague supports requiring an element of arbitrariness or unfairness to establish discrimination. it indicates that, while discrimination need not be intentional, it is fundamentally a form of wrongful behaviour (d. g réaume, “harm and fault in discrimination law: the transition from intentional to adverse effect discrimination” (2001), 2 theor inq l 349, at pp. 351 and 376-80; h collins and t khaitan, “indirect discrimination law: controversies and critical questions”, in h. collins and t. khaitan, eds., foundations of indirect discrimination law (2018), 1, at pp. 25-29; s moreau, “what is discrimination?” (2010), 38 philosophy & public affairs 143, at p 146). [194] our colleague now suggests, however, that the sole focus of the substantive discrimination analysis is historical disadvantage (at para. 77) and that any factors relating to arbitrariness or unfairness must be confined to the s 1 analysis (paras. 78-80) this robs the substantive discrimination analysis of its purpose, departing significantly and without acknowledgment or justification from decades of jurisprudence. [195] our colleague’s removal of considerations of arbitrariness or unfairness from the s 15 analysis has far-reaching consequences for this appeal. as we identified above, a distinction arises based on sex when comparing members who job-share to members with male pattern employment, that is, members who work 40-hour weeks throughout their careers. because the pension benefits of members in the job-sharing program are prorated to reflect the lower number of hours they worked, they receive a lower level of pension benefits than members with a male pattern of employment. [196] pension benefits are best viewed as part of a whole compensation package, as they are a form of remuneration (ibm canada limited v. waterman, 2013 scc 70, [2013] 3 scr 985, at para. 4; parry v. cleaver, [1970] ac 1 (hl), at p 16). in this case, members who job-share receive no additional compensation to offset their lower level of pension benefits. on the contrary, they receive lower pay as well as lower pension benefits, because both pay and pension benefits are tied to hours worked. our colleague suggests that offering a lower level of pension benefits to members in the job-sharing program “perpetuates a long-standing source of economic disadvantage” of women relative to men (para. 108). this disadvantage, she says, cannot be justified on the basis that job-sharers choose to work fewer hours. [197] we accept that in most contexts, choice cannot protect differential treatment from a finding of discrimination. in this case, however, the logical extension of our colleague’s argument is that if other part-time members (i.e those in arrangements other than job-sharing) are predominantly women (as it has been suggested), they too are entitled to substantive equality relative to full-time members in matters of compensation. are all part-time members therefore entitled to the option of contributing to the plan as though they were full-time members? [198] herein lies the significance of our colleague’s relegation of considerations of arbitrariness or unfairness to the s 1 analysis. it is not, in general, discriminatory (in an arbitrary or unfair sense) for an employer to prorate benefits according to hours worked (see, eg,. royal commission on equality in employment, report of the commission on equality in employment (1984), at pp. 27-28).15 employers are expected to treat employees equally within the context of an employment relationship that is predicated on an exchange of work for compensation. prorating compensation, including benefits, according to work is not arbitrary or discriminatory when it responds to employees’ actual capacities and circumstances (taypotat, at para. 20). [199] but even were we to take our colleague’s recasting of the s 15(1) analysis as legitimate, her open-ended approach leaves much to be desired as a matter of logic. for example, if, as she says, it is discriminatory towards the appellants to tie pension benefits and other compensation to hours worked, why stop at allowing part-time and job-sharing members to “buy back” additional pension benefits? after all, full-time members do not have to “buy back” their pensions. on our colleague’s logic, if hours worked are not relevant, then part-time and job-sharing members should receive a full-time pension without buying back hours. and if compensation cannot be tied to hours worked, then part-time and job-sharing members should receive a full-time salary as well taking our colleague’s argument to its natural conclusion shows the vast implications of her position. one searches in vain for a logical or rational stopping point 15 “if [employees] work part-time, they should not bear the unfair financial brunt of a perception that part-time work is not serious work. they should be remunerated and receive benefits on a prorated basis with workers employed full-time” (emphasis added). to either the entitlements that would flow from her line of reasoning, or the scope of judicial intervention to award them. [200] conversely, we posit simply that employers must be able to compensate employees based on hours worked. this is our central point, which our colleague does not attempt to answer. [201] while prorating pension benefits according to hours worked is not in itself discriminatory, it might be so on this court’s jurisprudence if some groups of employees were to receive more favourable treatment than others where such treatment reinforces, perpetuates, or exacerbates disadvantage as we have discussed, the distinction based on members who job-share compared to those who take lwop is not based on sex however, in accordance with the contextual analysis of the broader scheme mandated by withler, the lwop provisions remain an important consideration at step two. [202] we accept, as our colleague says (at para. 94), that the proper analysis as it was described in withler must not devolve into a narrow comparison between members who job-share and those who take lwop. there is, however, a degree of inconsistency in our colleague’s approach as she states that members who job-share are entitled to “substantive equality” to members with a male pattern of employment and yet focuses her comparison on members who take lwop, who (unlike members with a male pattern of employment) have the option to buy back additional pension benefits. this is made plain by our colleague’s remedy: she does not require that all part-time members should have the option of buying back the same pension benefits as full-time members; rather, this option is made available only to those who have temporarily reduced their hours like those on lwop. it is, therefore, the presence of lwop, and buy-back rights for members on lwop, that render the plan unconstitutional for our colleague. lwop is the linchpin of her decision. [203] with respect, this is contrary to the contextual approach mandated by withler job-sharing and lwop are options that may be valuable to members at different points in their lives and careers. job-sharing allows members to continue to work with reduced hours, while lwop allows members to maintain continuity of employment without working. each of these programs represents a package of benefits and responsibilities designed to balance the needs of the employer and of members at various stages of their careers. it is inappropriate to cherry-pick particular elements out of such packages and compare them in isolation, seeking line-by-line parity (withler, at paras. 73, 76 and 79). instead, a contextual analysis must consider the full packages and ask “whether the lines drawn are generally appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the persons impacted and the objects of the scheme perfect correspondence between a benefit program and the actual needs and circumstances of the claimant group is not required” (para. 67). in other words, the focus must be on the “actual impact” of the law in its full context (p. j. monahan, b shaw and p. ryan, constitutional law (5th ed. 2017), at p 469). [204] each benefit program will have its advantages and drawbacks while members who take lwop must pay the employer contribution for any pension benefits they buy back, the employer makes contributions for job-sharers for each hour they work. while members who take lwop receive no pay, job-sharers receive income for the hours they work. the option to buy back pensionable service is an attractive feature of the lwop package, and it is understandable that members in the job-sharing program might want it. but on the whole, the record does not suggest that the lwop package confers improved financial security or pension benefits when taking into account the job-sharing program as well as continuous full-time employment. nor does it suggest that the lines drawn are inappropriate, having regard to all the circumstances. [205] offering pension benefits that are prorated to hours worked is not substantive discrimination, and it does not become substantive discrimination because members who take lwop have the right to buy back hours of pension benefits. as a result, s 15(1) of the charter is not infringed, and there is no need to consider s 1. c practical implications [206] while the foregoing is sufficient to dispose of the matter, we wish to highlight the practical implications of our colleague’s reasons for judgment. [207] governments must be afforded the latitude to act incrementally when addressing a deeply ingrained, complex and persistent social phenomenon such as inequality. (this assumes that the inequality arises from factors in society; where the government itself has created the inequality, matters are, as we have already indicated, somewhat different.) there are processes by which a government must set its priorities, allocate its budget, and obtain parliamentary approval of its programs in designing legislation to address a particular equality issue, a government can draw on far more internal and external expertise than we judges can. as a result, it is better positioned than we are to appreciate the consequences of a particular course of law-making, both upon society and upon public resources. with these practical realities in mind, we must also recognize that, were a government expected to remove all inequalities for all groups on every occasion it acted, it may be disinclined to act, given that any remedial scheme will inevitably be under-inclusive in some respect governments would, understandably, become “reluctant to create any new [remedial] benefit schemes because their limits would depend on an accurate prediction of the outcome of court proceedings under s 15(1) of the charter” (egan v. canada, [1995] 2 scr 513, at para. 104, per sopinka j). [208] to avoid this chilling effect, and to encourage governments to enact remedial legislation addressing pre-existing disadvantage, this court has (until now) judiciously accepted that governments may implement reforms “one step at a time, [and] addres[s] [the reforms] to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind” (r v. edwards books and art ltd., [1986] 2 scr 713, at p 772, quoting williamson v. lee optical of oklahoma, 348 us 483 (1955), at p 489). the focal point in assessing remedial legislation is not to ask whether the government has met “the gold standard” (auton, at para. 62; see also paras. 59-61), but to recognize that government should not be obliged to deal with all aspects of a problem at once. it must surely be permitted to take incremental measures it must be given reasonable leeway to deal with problems one step at a time, to balance possible inequalities under the law against other inequalities resulting from the adoption of a course of action, and to take account of the difficulties, whether social, economic or budgetary, that would arise if it attempted to deal with social and economic problems in their entirety, assuming such problems can ever be perceived in their entirety. [emphasis added.] (mckinney v university of guelph, [1990] 3 scr 229, at p 317, per la forest j.; see also pp. 318-19; schachter v. canada, [1992] 2 scr. 679, at p 727, per la forest j., concurring; alberta (aboriginal affairs and northern development) v cunningham, 2011 scc 37, [2011] 2 scr. 670, at para. 41.) [209] at the risk of repeating ourselves, we stress that, as recently as two years ago in alliance, the court affirmed this commitment to judicial restraint by permitting the government to address pre-existing disadvantage incrementally (para. 42). and it also bears repeating that alliance stated that, first, there is no freestanding positive obligation to remedy social inequities, and secondly, that the state is entitled to act incrementally to address such inequities. [210] that is precisely what the impugned provisions of the plan represent: an example of a government acting incrementally to address inequities that exist in society, when it has no obligation to do so, using provisions that do not in themselves have a discriminatory impact like our colleague, we note that both the lwop buy-back provisions and job-sharing option are ameliorative (para. 126) under this court’s statement of the law in alliance, these provisions should be upheld. [211] our colleague disagrees. under her approach legislation must not simply be favourable or beneficial, but sufficiently so to achieve substantive equality: s 15(1) is breached because the plan, though part of a remedial scheme, perpetuates (that is, fails to remove) economic disadvantage for women (para. 113). in other words, the plan is insufficiently remedial. [212] the practical effect of this decision is to abandon the foundational principles so recently affirmed in alliance and to discourage governments from offering ameliorative programs (or, as in this case, employment options to its employees) in the future this is because our colleague has, in effect, imposed a positive obligation on legislatures, where they attempt merely to ameliorate the effects of inequality, to eradicate those effects altogether such an obligation exceeds the ambit this court has given s 15(1), which, unlike certain other provisions of the charter that appear to compel government action (eg ss. 3, 14, 20 and 23), “does not impose upon governments the obligation to take positive actions to remedy the symptoms of systemic inequality” (thibaudeau v canada, [1995] 2 scr 627, at para. 38, per l’heureux-dubé j., dissenting, but not on this point; see also auton, at paras. 2 and 41; alliance, at para. 42; centrale, at para. 33; andrews, at pp. 163, 171 and 175; mckinney, at p 318; lovelace v. ontario, 2000 scc 37, [2000] 1 scr 950, at paras. 90-92). [213] requiring that legislation be sufficiently remedial not only changes the scope of s 15(1), but also pulls courts outside their institutional competence the judiciary is ill-equipped to grapple with the public policy and budgetary complexities in legislating benefit plans “[a]dvancing the cause of human rights . . . invites a measure of deference for legislative choice” (mckinney, at p 318) this is because only legislatures have the institutional capacity to conduct the research and study necessary to assess how, and at what pace, its resources should be applied to most effectively address a particular pre-existing equality issue (and ultimately, to oversee that implementation). courts are not well placed to define the nature and scope of an obligation to enact sufficiently remedial legislation (ferrel v ontario (attorney general) (1998), 42 or (3d) 97 (ca), at p 113). [214] consider this plan, for example. in light of our colleague’s decision, what is to stop an rcmp employee from working full-time for a very short time before entering a job-sharing agreement? that employee would apparently be permitted to buy back full-time pension benefits, whereas the employee who entered the force as a part-time member, and has since remained part-time, will not. relatedly, what does it mean for employees to “temporarily reduce” their hours? what if an employee entered a job-sharing agreement to care for her children, but did not return to full-time work once her children became adults? of course, we do not know these things, and we cannot know them. nor are we expected to know them, or even anticipate them. but for that same reason, we are expected to keep to the limits of our institutional competencies, and not fiddle with the complex mechanics of legislative schemes like the plan. [215] in the case at bar, any disadvantage the appellants face is caused not by the impugned provisions or any government action, but by the unequal division of household and family responsibilities and social circumstances such as the availability of quality childcare. the solution to addressing these underlying matters, which exist outside of the plan and the purview of courts, is surely not to strike down remedial legislation. in our colleague’s view, however, these true causes of the disadvantage are “entirely irrelevant” (para. 71). she allows for judicial intervention whenever a court is able to identify in the case before it a related social circumstance it wishes to address. courts are now empowered to engage in “transformation” of the law if they simply believe that “institutions and relations must be changed” (para. 36, citing british columbia (public service employee relations commission) v bcgseu, [1999] 3 scr 3, at para. 41, quoting s. day and g. brodsky, “the duty to accommodate: who will benefit?” (1996), 75 can. bar rev. 433, at p 462). respectfully, we say that this is not our role. [216] a related and final point on the practical implications of our colleague’s decision for 30 years, this court has struggled to define the term “substantive equality.” an intelligible and principled definition continues to be elusive. indeed, this case illustrates the difficulties posed by the slippery quality of “substantive equality” — the core value of our colleague’s decision (at paras. 47-48) — and its constant shifting in this court’s jurisprudence. [217] while the court has stated that substantive equality is not formal equality (withler, at paras. 2 and 39; kapp, at para. 15; centrale, at para. 25; hodge, at para. 25), it has said little to address what substantive equality is. scant guidance has been offered beyond describing substantive equality as the “animating norm,” “goal,” “approach,” “engine,” and now the “philosophical premise” of s 15(1) (withler, at para. 2; cunningham, at para. 38; alliance, at para. 25; centrale, at para. 25; taypotat, at para. 17; majority reasons, at paras. 40, 42 and 48) metaphor and ascription has prevailed over actual definition. commentators have taken notice: it is . . essential [for this court] to frame a conceptually rigorous understanding of substantive equality as it operates in canadian equality jurisprudence. . . . there has been no comparable agreement on substantive equality as a state of affairs, ie, what a situation in which the ideal is instantiated through law would look like, as opposed to the ideal’s methodological dimension. nor has substantive equality been given a positive definition by the court rather, it has been defined negatively as an approach to section 15(1) contrasting with a formal equality approach. [emphasis added.] (a. r. sangiuliano, “substantive equality as equal recognition: a new theory of section 15 of the charter” (2015), 52 osgoode hall lj 601, at pp. 606-8) others have gone further, for example, noting that despite the efforts of “[m]any scholars . . . to flesh out the precise requirements of substantive equality,” this court’s elaboration of same has been “sketchy and occasionally contradictory” (j eisen, “grounding equality in social relations: suspect classification, analogous grounds and relational theory” (2017), 42 queen’s lj 41, at pp. 60-61). [218] to be clear, we do not seek to overturn the jurisprudence that our colleague recounts in her reasons. rather, we aim to give effect to it. our disagreement is about the meaning and requirements of substantive equality: we view her approach as lacking in the clarity and guidance necessary to give effect properly to the charter’s purposes, notably with regard to legislation that is fundamentally ameliorative. it is for this reason that we highlight the lack of a substantive definition surrounding the norm of “substantive equality” in this court’s jurisprudence. the concept has not been defined in a manner that renders s 15 rights, or even the criteria by which they are adjudicated, knowable in advance by claimants and the state, or applicable with any consistency by courts. [219] this lack of definition ex ante is antithetical to any notion of judicial restraint where a legal test lacks defined bounds, courts applying it exercise truly arbitrary powers of review and that is the point at which we have arrived with “substantive equality.” it has become an unbounded, rhetorical vehicle by which the judiciary’s policy preferences and personal ideologies are imposed piecemeal upon individual cases consider our colleague’s approach here: legislation that is ameliorative in both intent and effect is judicially reconfigured because it is not ameliorative enough, or more precisely, not ameliorative in ways our colleague would prefer. it is also a prime example of how the goalposts of “substantive equality” are constantly on the move, evidenced most clearly by our colleague’s abandonment of the prudent guidance in alliance, at para. 42, regarding incremental measures to alleviate systemic inequality indeed, her approach in this case lends support to professor young’s damning criticism that substantive equality is “an unelaborated, cryptic guidepost pointing to the equality outcome the author prefers” (m. young, “unequal to the task: ‘kapp’ing the substantive potential of section 15” (2010), 50 sclr. (2d) 183, at p 185). justice oliver wendell holmes’s observation, made in baldwin v. missouri, 281 us 586 (1930), at p 595, regarding the us doctrine of substantive due process, is also apposite: as the decisions now stand, i see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this court as for any reason undesirable i cannot believe that the [fourteenth] amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions. yet i can think of no narrower reason that seems to me to justify the present and the earlier decisions to which i have referred. [220] the result of all this is corrosive of the rule of law. our colleague wonders aloud what our definition of the rule of law is (para. 135). we share the views of jurists such as lord bingham and sharpe ja: the concept of the rule of law has interlocking components (see t bingham, the rule of law (2010), at pp. 160-70; r. j sharpe, good judgment: making judicial decisions (2018), at pp. 122-24). one is pertinent here: canadians should be governed by rules, stated and knowable in advance, that enable them to guide their conduct. as sharpe ja writes: . . the [supreme] [c]ourt has insisted that there must be an intelligible standard, capable of providing “an adequate basis for legal debate . . . as to its meaning by reasoned analysis applying legal criteria.” in irwin toy . . the majority wrote that . . . “[w]here there is no intelligible standard” and where the decision-maker has been “given a plenary discretion to do whatever seems best in a wide set of circumstances,” the essential minimum requirements of the rule of law are not met. (p 123, quoting r v. nova scotia pharmaceutical society, [1992] 2 scr. 606, at p 639; irwin toy ltd v quebec (attorney general), [1989] 1 scr 927, at p 983) [221] our colleague’s appeal to stare decisis, we say with respect, therefore misses the point. the issue is not whether this court’s s 15 jurisprudence should be “respected” (para. 135) the issue, rather, is whether that jurisprudence as she has interpreted it states a standard that is practically knowable and reasonably predictable as to results. in our view, the concept of “substantive equality” has become so vague that it is impossible for claimants or legislatures to anticipate its demands in advance. legislatures are, in effect, expected to hit a moving target, as “the court continues to revise its analytical approach to section 15(1) without ever overruling or even really disapproving of its earlier judgments on the aspects of those judgments that have now been reversed” (j. koshan and j. watson hamilton, “meaningless mantra: substantive equality after withler” (2011), 16 rev const stud 31, at p 61) this “revisionist approach” — the constant moving of the goal posts of “substantive equality” to suit judicial preference — “will undoubtedly continue to cause further confusion” (p 61). [222] this suggests another, less normative, but more practical concern: if the demands of substantive equality could be predicted, governments might actually be able to comply with them. instead, [i]n the view of many commentators, the equality jurisprudence, despite the court’s self-identified efforts to establish clear interpretations, has been muddled and inconsistent . . . . put simply, it lacks the coherence to offer serious guidance about how to realize substantive equality “on the ground”. (p. hughes, “supreme court of canada equality jurisprudence and ‘everyday life’” (2012), 58 sclr (2d) 245, at pp. 254-55) in other words, legislatures can comply only with rules they can know well enough to abide by how can a legislature know what any given court will determine to be sufficiently remedial? the immensity of the obligation that our colleague foists upon legislatures and governments — in both its unpredictability and in the amount of resources it requires — is such that none of them can reasonably be expected to bear it. this wholly disregards la forest j.’s apt admonition in mckinney that inequality issues cannot even be fully understood, let alone remedied, all at once. [223] the failure to properly define the scope of s 15(1) also has the practical effect of pushing the bulk of the analysis to s 1 (eg majority reasons, at paras. 79-80). as a result, courts are not to engage in a substantive analysis of discrimination (where they have a comparative advantage relative to the legislature), but rather in the evaluation of policy (where they do not) (law society of british columbia v. trinity western university, 2018 scc 32, [2018] 2 scr 293, at paras. 190 and 192, per rowe j., concurring). this fails to attend to the limits inherent in s 15. by their very nature, “the demands of equality [cannot] be determined without considering the needs and circumstances of persons and groups in addition to the claimant,” including the practical, moral, economic and social underpinnings of the legislation in question (b. w. miller, “justification and rights limitations”, in g. huscroft, ed., expounding the constitution: essays in constitutional theory (2010), 93, at p 106; see also p 100). otherwise, we risk allowing “for the intermediate conclusion of a right infringement to trade on the higher prestige and greater strength of a moral right that provides an undefeated reason for action” (at p 96), watering down the significance of a finding of a s 15(1) infringement beyond recognition, and requiring the state to justify even its most trivial decisions. [224] in defining substantive equality, courts must bear in mind two considerations. first, s 15(1) cannot actually guarantee equality, in its broadest sense, throughout society systemic disadvantage is just that — systemic, being rooted in social attitudes and institutions. this does not mean that systemic discrimination cannot or should not be addressed; rather, it simply means that s 15(1) is limited in its capacity to do so. section 15(1) responds only to state action, and judicial review of state action is ill-suited to implementing the kind of wide-ranging institutional or policy changes that are necessary to fully address systemic disadvantage that this is so becomes apparent when one considers that all of the reports cited by our colleague are directed towards government, not court, action (eg. royal commission on the status of women in canada, report of the royal commission on the status of women in canada (1970), at p vii). secondly, bringing analytical discipline to s 15(1) must start by reaffirming that equality is an inherently comparative notion (withler, at paras. 61-67; koshan and watson hamilton, at pp. 45-46). while mirror comparators have proved unworkable, the analysis must be imbued with a measure of comparison in order to avoid what our colleague now endorses: an unbounded, unpredictable search for “inequality.” [225] to all this, our colleague suggests (at paras. 133-34) that we — and, by extension, those scholars and judges who have questioned the utility and meaning of the court’s jurisprudence on “substantive equality” — advance a straw man argument which, at root, is an argument for “formal equality.” but, and again with respect, it is our colleague who marshals a straw man argument. our reasons apply an approach to substantive equality firmly rooted in this court’s jurisprudence, including alliance. the conclusion we reach was shared by all four lower-court judges who tried to apply this court’s jurisprudence to the facts of this case. [226] our colleague, on the other hand, casts aside para. 42 of alliance as a useless “stran[d]” (at paras. 132-33) and sidesteps withler’s call for a contextual approach, which notably arose precisely in the circumstances of a pension scheme. in fact, her reasons are entirely devoid of any consideration of the approach to pension schemes necessitated by withler. [227] indeed, more telling than what our colleague does say in response is what she does not say notably, she does not explain what “substantive equality” means (save by reference to what it is not — “formal equality”) she fails to define “substantive equality” in terms that allow its meaning to be understood so that the requirements of s 15 can be practically knowable and reasonably predictable in advance thus loosely defined, substantive equality is almost infinitely malleable, allowing judges to invoke it as rhetorical cover for their own policy preferences in deciding a given case. such vast and little-bounded discretion does not accord with, but rather departs from, the rule of law. iv conclusion [228] as we see it, the sole reason the plan is being judicially reviewed is because parliament and the government tried to be accommodating in their employment options. if they had not offered pension buy-back rights for members who take lwop, there would be no basis for judicial intervention at all. the upshot of our colleague’s reasoning is that the public is now burdened with new financial obligations, simply because parliament and the executive dared to address pre-existing inequality incrementally, instead of taking more radical measures to eliminate it. in the future, they may well reason that inaction is the safer route. [229] similar issues will undoubtedly arise with any other social welfare legislation or government attempts to remedy systemic disadvantage. by reserving the right to arbitrarily second-guess and undo any legislation that attempts to incrementally address systemic disadvantage, the court makes it more practically difficult for legislatures and governments to implement policies that promote equality. put simply, we see restricting the government’s ability to incrementally address disadvantage as a peculiar way to promote equality. [230] we would therefore dismiss the appeal. the following are the reasons delivered by côté j — i. introduction [231] discrimination on the basis of sex is of the most invidious order. like race, sex is an innate and immutable characteristic, and bears no relevant relationship to capability. without question, women have faced a prolonged fight for equal treatment under the law, a fight marked by a society where women have historically been disadvantaged and where they continue to be so today: public service alliance of canada v canada (department of national defence) (ca), [1996] 3 f.c 789, at para. 16; quebec (attorney general) v alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, 2018 scc 17, [2018] 1 scr 464. but that is not the question before this court. nor is the question before this court whether the impugned legislative provisions16 are irrational, illogical, or even under- inclusive — that a law is not perfect, or even excludes some, does not make it per se unconstitutional: gosselin v quebec (attorney general), 2002 scc 84, [2002] 4. scr 429, at para. 55; andrews v. law society of british columbia, [1989] 1 scr. 143, at pp. 168-69. rather, over the course of three decades, this court has carefully crafted a test to assess whether a particular form of alleged discrimination is discrimination in fact and runs afoul of the guarantee of equal treatment under the law found in s 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. a crucial element of s 15(1) of the charter is that it enumerates the grounds of discrimination that fall within its constitutional prohibition here, with respect, i cannot agree with my colleagues that the impugned provisions of the pension plan create a distinction on the basis of the enumerated ground of sex. i proceed to elucidate why. ii analysis [232] my colleagues offer a comprehensive overview of this court’s s 15(1) jurisprudence, so i do not purport to do so here. while there exists clear disagreement between them as to certain elements of doctrine, i understand my colleagues and i to agree on the following: to prove discrimination under s 15(1), including in cases of 16 the provisions on part-time employment in the royal canadian mounted police superannuation act, rsc 1985, c. r-11, and the associated royal canadian mounted police superannuation regulations, crc, c 1393. like my colleagues, i will refer to these laws interchangeably throughout these reasons as the “pension plan” or “plan”, or simply refer to the impugned provisions. adverse effect discrimination, a claimant must (i) show that a law creates an adverse distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground, and (ii) show that the law perpetuates, reinforces, or exacerbates pre-existing disadvantage (majority reasons, at paras. 27 and 50; brown and rowe jj.’s reasons, at para. 169; r v. kapp, 2008 scc 41, [2008] 2 scr 483, at para. 17; withler v. canada (attorney general), 2011 scc 12, [2011] 1 scr 396, at paras. 30 and 61; quebec (attorney general) v. a, 2013 scc 5, [2013] 1 scr 61, at para. 185; kahkewistahaw first nation v. taypotat, 2015 scc 30, [2015] 2 scr 548, at paras. 19-20; centrale des syndicats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2018 scc 18, [2018] 1 scr 522, at para. 22). [233] here, i am of the view that there is no need to proceed to the second step of the analysis, as my colleagues do, because no distinction can be made out on the basis of sex under step one. [234] with the greatest respect, allowing the appeal on the basis of sex simpliciter is an attempt to square a circle. the effect of the impugned provisions of the pension plan is to create a distinction not on the basis of being a woman, but being a woman with children in other words, a distinction exists not because one is a woman, but because one has caregiving responsibilities. it is telling that the statistics used by my colleague abella j to make her point — setting aside for now the question of their validity and even their appropriate role in a s 15(1) analysis — are all in reference to women with children: in my respectful view, the use of an rcmp member’s temporary reduction in working hours as a basis to impose less favourable pension consequences plainly has a disproportionate impact on women the relevant evidence — the results of the system — showed that:  rcmp members who worked reduced hours in the job-sharing program were predominantly women with young children.  from 2010-2014, 100 percent of members working reduced hours through job-sharing were women, and most of them cited childcare as their reason for doing so. the data [the commission of inquiry into part-time work] collected suggested that almost all job-sharing participants were women, and that “[t]he arrival of a new baby was the most common primary reason for initiating job sharing” (pp. 177-78). the report of the commission on equality in employment (1984, rosalie silberman abella, comm.) expanded on the link between part- time work and childcare . . . . [emphasis added; paras. 97 and 100-101.] [235] the notion of women with children is inextricable from the evidence presented. it seems to me, then, that caregiving status is the only distinction created by the pension plan. in other words, the distinction in this case exists not on the basis of being a woman, but on the basis of needing to take care of someone: see taypotat, at para. 21 (holding that under step one a claimant must “demonstrate that the law at issue has a disproportionate effect on the claimant based on his or her membership in an enumerated or analogous group”) (emphasis added); contra centrale, at para. 28 (finding that step one was satisfied on the basis that “the claimants disproportionately suffer an adverse impact because they are women”) (emphasis in original). one does not job-share because one is a woman; one job-shares because one needs to take care of someone: appellants’ affidavits, ar, vol. ii, at pp. 129 et seq., and vol. iii, at pp. 327-42; 2017 fc 557, at para. 22 and annex a (canlii). [236] importantly, i wish to draw particular attention to the following illustration. consider, for instance, same-sex male couples who also have to bear the burden of taking care of their children. consider further those individuals who bear the burden of taking care of their aging parents or spouse. these individuals, along with women with children, will all be under disproportionate pressure to job-share due to their caregiving responsibilities. those individuals with no caregiving responsibilities will have no such pressure to job-share. the impugned provisions therefore create a distinction on the basis of caregiving responsibilities, not sex simpliciter: withler, at para. 62. [237] as i see it, it is essential to consider the nature of the claim before this court. indeed, the appellants make their claim on behalf of women with children, and not simply women — nobody has asserted a claim on behalf of women without children it is critical to the claim, then, that the appellants had caregiving responsibilities in relation to children that made them decide to job-share. this explains why the appellants argued their claim on appeal on the basis of “intersecting” grounds of sex and parental or family status: af; 2018 fca 223, [2019] 2 fcr 541, at paras. 3 and 42. [238] however, of crucial importance to the disposition of this appeal is the fact that caregiving, parental, or family status is not recognized by this court as an analogous ground under s 15(1) of the charter, nor would i recognize any of them as such here indeed, my colleague abella j provides compelling reasons not to (at paras. 119-23), as do my colleagues brown and rowe jj (at para. 183), and i find myself in agreement that it would be inappropriate to do so. accordingly, in light of the conclusion that any distinction here depends not on sex but on caregiving responsibilities alone and that this court cannot recognize caregiving, parental, or family status as an analogous ground in this case, the appellants’ claim must fail at step one of the s 15(1) analysis. [239] thus, at least doctrinally, this case is relatively straightforward. lengthy reasons are elicited only by virtue of the attempt to fit the claim under the enumerated ground of sex simpliciter. however, it is clear that the distinction created by the pension plan manifests itself not as a result of sex alone, but as a result of a combination of sex with caregiver status if the majority wishes to allow the appeal, then the more doctrinally sound method would be to either recognize intersecting grounds as the appellants urge, or recognize a new analogous ground.17 without doing so, however, this court has only attempted to square a circle. and, as a result, doctrinal uncertainty 17 to be clear, i am not endorsing an intersecting grounds approach or the recognition of new analogous grounds; my point is only that, rather than fiddle with existing doctrine under s 15, it would have been more doctrinally sound (in the sense of adhering to existing doctrine) to reach the result preferred by the majority in this way. seeps into this court’s s 15(1) jurisprudence and obscures, rather than illuminates, the way forward. [240] this brings me to my next point — responding to the analytical and doctrinal methodology needed to support the conclusion that the pension plan creates a distinction on the basis of sex alone. [241] first, in order to support the finding that the impugned provisions create a distinction on the basis of sex (without recognizing an intersecting or analogous ground of parental, family or caregiving status), my colleague abella j says that, in effect, discrimination on the basis of childcare is tantamount to discrimination on the basis of sex due to their historical association with one another: see paras. 98 et seq this argument follows the rationale of brooks v canada safeway ltd., [1989] 1 scr. 1219, where the court recognized that pregnancy-based discrimination necessarily constituted sex-based discrimination indeed, my colleague abella j posits that evidence about certain groups “will show such a strong association with certain traits — such as pregnancy with gender — that the disproportionate impact on members of that group ‘will be apparent and immediate’”: para. 61, quoting taypotat, at para. 33. [242] setting aside for now the doctrinal proposition that disproportionate impact is sufficient to meet step one, i am of the view that there is a meaningful distinction between pregnancy and sex, on the one hand, and caregiving status and sex, on the other. this case is accordingly unlike brooks. in brooks, the court held that a corporate insurance plan which denied benefits to employees during pregnancy discriminated on the basis of sex chief justice dickson grounded this conclusion on the fact that pregnancy, by definition, affects only women writing for the court, dickson cj. explained that “[w]hile pregnancy-based discrimination only affects part of an identifiable group, it does not affect anyone who is not a member of the group”: p 1247. the present case is manifestly different. caregiving status can be separated from sex. in brooks, an insurance plan that discriminated against pregnant employees necessarily discriminated against women. here, impugned provisions of the pension plan that discriminate against those with caregiving responsibilities do not necessarily discriminate against women. in other words, caregiving, unlike pregnancy, is not, by definition, associated with sex rather, same-sex couples with children and other individuals with caregiving responsibilities will also all be disproportionately affected. the appellants — women with children — are not “denied a benefit that others are granted . . . by reason of a personal characteristic that falls within the enumerated . . . grounds of s 15(1)”: withler, at para. 62 the impugned provisions create a distinction on the basis of caregiver status, not sex simpliciter. [243] accordingly, the only remaining way to support the conclusion that the pension plan discriminates against women — without recognizing an intersecting or analogous ground or relying on the brooks argument — is to dispose of any requirement of causation, nexus, or tether between the impugned provisions and their effect, and look only to the statistical disparity in results (i.e women are disproportionately affected). indeed, my colleague abella j takes this doctrinal step and seemingly reduces the step one analysis to a mere search for disproportionate impact evidenced by statistical disparity: she says that “in order for a law to create a distinction based on prohibited grounds through its effects, it must have a disproportionate impact on members of a protected group. if so, the first stage of the s 15 test will be met” (para. 52 (emphasis added); see also paras. 5, 63, 66-67, 70 and 84). my colleague then expresses “agree[ment]” (at para. 67) with the proposition that statistical disparity “will be sufficient” by itself to demonstrate disproportionate impact (para. 66, quoting d.h v the czech republic, no. 57325/00, echr 2007-iv, at para. 188) this doctrinal development warrants significant caution — and not just because it confounds a necessary condition with a sufficient one.18 [244] disproportionate impact alone cannot be sufficient to meet step one of the s 15(1) analysis in other words, simply pointing to the fact that the majority of job-sharers are presently women with children cannot in itself be sufficient to say that step one has been met. otherwise, for example, a law that regulates the top one percent of income earners in canada would proceed past the step one analysis simply by virtue 18 my colleague first says that in order for a law to create a distinction, “it must have a disproportionate impact on members of a protected group” — this is a necessary condition: para. 52 (emphasis added). in the very next sentence, however, she says that “[i]f so, the first stage of the s 15 test will be met” — this also makes it a sufficient condition: para. 52 (emphasis added). of the fact that the top one percent of income earners in canada are majority male.19 analogously, a law regulating the nursing profession would proceed past the step one analysis simply by virtue of the fact that the nursing profession is majority female.20 surely, the aforementioned examples are not instances of prima facie discrimination, yet they exemplify how, if disproportionate impact alone were sufficient, step one would become a mere rubber stamp in cases of adverse effect discrimination, rather than a step at which “the claimant will have more work to do”, belying the sage guidance from withler: para. 64 worse yet, if statistical disparities alone were sufficient, the s 15(1) analysis would, in effect, be replaced with a green light to s 1, where the burden is reversed and placed on the government. my colleagues may very well consider such a state of affairs to be appropriate or desirable, and i cast no judgment in this regard; however, i simply wish to point out that such a doctrinal development is not currently supported by this court’s jurisprudence — or if it is, then with respect, it requires more justification or clarification. [245] relatedly, i express further trepidation over the majority’s potential invitation for statistics-based litigation: paras. 58-59, 62-63 and 66-67. in effect, as i see it, parties may now routinely proffer and challenge statistical evidence (my colleague invites claimants to “rely . . . on their own evidence . . . rather than on 19 from 2013-2017, the top 1 percent of income earners in canada were 78.0, 78.3, 76.8, 76.1, and 75.8 percent male, respectively: see statistics canada, table 11-10-0055-01 — high income tax filers in canada (online). 20 in 2019, approximately 90 percent of regulated nurses in canada were female: see canadian institute for health information, nursing in canada, 2019: a lens on supply and workforce (2020). government reports, academic studies or expert testimony” (at para. 57)), and trial judges must now become arbiters of statistics and their veracity (my colleague says that the “weight given to statistics will depend on, among other things, their quality and methodology” (at para. 59)), thereby bolstering their findings, which are owed deference upon appellate review (and which are findings the judiciary is institutionally ill-equipped to be making (see, eg,. p. yowell, constitutional rights and constitutional design: moral and empirical reasoning in judicial review (2018), at pp. 70-71)). the nature of statistics means that they are presented to courts frozen at a point in time, yet in reality, they are constantly shifting — it cannot be that the very same law that is constitutional one day is unconstitutional the next based solely on statistical evidence. [246] on this point, my colleague abella j.’s reliance on griggs v duke power co., 401 u.s 424 (1971) is, respectfully, inapposite she repeatedly cites griggs (see paras. 32-34, 38, 53, 55 and 70-71) for the proposition that disproportionate impact is sufficient in itself to demonstrate that a law creates an adverse distinction based on a protected ground and thereby satisfies step one: see paras. 55 and 70-71. i do not think griggs can be read in such a manner. griggs was a statutory interpretation case concerned with title vii of the civil rights act of 1964, pub l 88-352, 78 stat. 241 (1964) — not a constitutional case. its result was compelled by the text of the statute rather than by the principles underlying unconstitutional adverse effect discrimination: washington, mayor of washington, dc v. davis, 426 us 229 (1976). further, as evidenced by its progeny, griggs is limited in its scope, such that it cannot stand for the proposition that statistical disparity alone is sufficient: see watson v. fort worth bank & trust, 487 u.s 977 (1988), at p 994 (holding that “the plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities” and that “the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group”) (emphasis added); see also texas department of housing and community affairs v. inclusive communities project, inc., 135 s. ct. 2507 (2015); ricci v. destefano, 557 u.s 557 (2009); smith v city of jackson, mississippi, 544 u.s 228 (2005). regardless, in hopes of avoiding a jurisprudential debate on case law sourced from outside this country, at bottom the american tradition of equality is markedly distinct from the canadian tradition while griggs was admittedly a case of adverse effect discrimination, it was also fundamentally a case informed by the unique legacy of slavery and segregated schools endemic to american history: in griggs, a high school education effectively served as a proxy for race (indeed, the impugned high school education and aptitude test requirements there were imposed on the same day the civil rights act of 1964 came into force). in this way, in griggs, there was a legitimate nexus established between the imposition of a high school education and aptitude test requirements and racial discrimination, and not simply a nexus that depended on statistical disparity alone (as the majority says is sufficient). [247] while this court has of course cited griggs in the past, it has never done so to support the proposition that step one can be satisfied in the absence of a nexus between the impugned law and the disproportionate impact. since the inception of our jurisprudence interpreting s 15(1), this court has cautioned as follows: if the adverse effects analysis is to be coherent, it must not assume that a statutory provision has an effect which is not proved. we must take care to distinguish between effects which are wholly caused, or are contributed to, by an impugned provision, and those social circumstances which exist independently of such a provision. (symes v. canada, [1993] 4 scr 695, at pp. 764-65) this pronouncement continues to be applied in the search for a necessary nexus between the impugned law and its effects in cases of adverse effect discrimination: see miceli-riggins v. canada (attorney general), 2013 fca 158, [2014] 4 fcr 709, at para. 76; grenon v minister of national revenue, 2016 fca 4, 482 n.r 310, at paras. 38-39 and 45; see also canada (attorney general) v. lesiuk (c.a), 2003 fca 3, [2003] 2 fc 697, at para. 33; begum v. canada (citizenship and immigration), 2018 fca 181, [2019] 2 fcr 488, at para. 81. [248] ultimately, the question under step one is whether the law, while facially neutral, creates an adverse distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground: see kapp, at para. 17; withler, at paras. 30 and 61; quebec v. a, at para. 185; taypotat, at para. 19. this means that the claimant “must therefore demonstrate that the law at issue has a disproportionate effect on the claimant based on his or her membership in an enumerated or analogous group”: taypotat, at para. 21 (emphasis added). although my colleague abella j.’s phrasing of the question under step one correctly uses the word creates (at para. 50), she later seems to read this word out by determining that mere disproportionate impact is sufficient: para. 52. this cannot be the case: to proceed past step one and show a prima facie breach, “the evidence must amount to more than a web of instinct” (taypotat, at para. 34). a nexus between the impugned legislation and the disproportionate impact is required. [249] this is essential to understanding why both the federal court and the federal court of appeal held that the claim here fails at step one. indeed, both courts found that this case “turns on the first step”: ca reasons, at para. 40. applying step one to the facts, they each found that the pension plan creates no distinction based on the enumerated ground of sex. they held the following: the fact that the vast majority of part-time members and members in a job- sharing arrangement are women, and that these job-sharers do not have the option of contributing to their pension at the full-time rate, is not a consequence of or connected to the provisions of the rcmpsa the “trigger” is whether the member works part-time. this is not connected to the rcmpsa. rather, this is based on the decisions the member makes, as difficult as those may be, as a family to balance work and child care, by having one parent, usually the woman, work part-time for a few years. (fc reasons, at para. 137) . . . the mere fact that women disproportionately take advantage of the job-sharing option does not mean that the pension treatment afforded to those who job-share under the rcmpsa and the regulation creates a distinction on an enumerated or analogous ground. likewise, as in begum, the general expert opinion evidence filed by the appellants fails to establish the requisite nexus between the impugned provisions and a protected ground so as to give rise to a section 15 breach. in sum, the appellants were not denied buy-back rights based on their personal characteristics of being female rcmp members with young children, but rather because they elected to job-share as opposed to taking care and nurturing leave the requisite nexus to establish a breach of section 15 of the charter is therefore absent in this case as the appellants cannot show that the impugned provisions in the rcmpsa and regulation impact them more negatively than others because of their sex . (ca reasons, at para. 53) [250] my colleague abella j rejects this reasoning and its emphasis on “choice” (at paras. 85-92), and my colleagues brown and rowe jj. — by implication of finding that the appellants have satisfied step one (at para. 186) — also seem to reject this reasoning (albeit perhaps for different reasons). i need not express any conclusion in this regard because, in any case, no distinction can be demonstrated here on the basis of sex. [251] as i have established, it is hard to see how the impugned provisions create a distinction on the basis of being a woman alone. i reiterate that one does not job-share because one is a woman (i.e sex simpliciter); one job-shares because one has caregiving responsibilities (in this case, children to take care of). the claim brought by the appellants — on behalf of women with children — crucially depends on the intersection of sex and parental or family status. the arguments proffered and statistics employed are all in reference to women with children. like my colleague abella j., i accept the appellant ms. fox’s evidence that “job-sharing is often the only child care solution for members with children” because “there is simply no around-the-clock child care available” in “rural or isolated communities”: para. 91, quoting ar, vol. iii, at p 334. but there is no reason why this is a singularly sex-based issue: rather, it is a caregiving status issue. for instance, in those same rural or isolated areas, there is likely no around-the-clock elderly care available either, making job-sharing the only solution available for members with caregiving responsibilities. thus the burden to job-share, and the associated distinction created by the impugned provisions of the pension plan, is faced by those members with caregiving responsibilities and is not limited to those of a certain sex. indeed, those without such responsibilities do not face any comparable pressure to job-share but without recognition of an analogous protected ground of parental, family, or caregiver status, or alternatively the intersection of that ground and sex (as in lesiuk, at para. 37), the appellants’ claim must fail at step one of the s 15(1) analysis. [252] to be sure, the impugned provisions may very well not be rational — there may indeed be no logical reason to deprive job-sharers of full pension benefits that are guaranteed to full-time members and members on leave without pay. but it is not this court’s role to constitutionalize normative judgments to this effect; that is the role of the electorate, and in turn, the legislature. [253] in this sense, i wish to add one final point on the role of the judiciary vis-à-vis the role of the legislature. the result the majority reaches may certainly be desirable insofar as it guarantees the opportunity for increased pension benefits to rcmp members who job-share but when the court reaches this result in such a doctrinally precarious fashion, and when and if the impugned provisions are illogical, irrational, or under-inclusive, then it is the legislature’s role to rectify — the remedy does not lie in the constitution, which proscribes particular forms of discrimination, forms that do not exist here. with the greatest respect, then, the remedy sought in the case at bar should be granted by the democratic process. iii conclusion [254] while i agree with abella j that sex-based discrimination is particularly insidious and i similarly lament society’s continued history of discrimination against women, i am in respectful disagreement as to whether the appellants have sufficiently made out a s 15 violation here under this court’s well-established jurisprudence. [255] likewise, while i agree with my colleagues brown and rowe jj.’s proposed disposition of the appeal, as well as with their observations regarding the appellants’ employment status and the majority’s unprincipled expansion of the scope of s 15(1), i write separately to express disagreement with their dismissal of the appeal on the second step of the s 15(1) analysis rather than the first step, which is the step on which this case turns: ca reasons, at para. 40. further, i write separately in order to highlight the under-inclusive nature of the pension plan, which disproportionately affects all those with caregiving responsibilities, including same-sex couples with children and individuals with caregiving responsibilities for their aging partners or parents it therefore falls to the legislature, not the courts, to remedy any under- inclusiveness in this legislation, which was purportedly meant to assist with caregiving responsibilities in the first place. [256] for these reasons, and with the greatest respect for my colleagues, i would dismiss the appeal. appeal allowed with costs throughout, côté, brown and rowe jj. dissenting.
[1] the appellant, shawn metzger, appeals as of right from a decision of the court of appeal of alberta dismissing his appeal from convictions by a judge sitting alone for a number of offences arising from a home invasion robbery: 2022 abca 16. identity was the sole issue at trial. neither of the two victims of the robbery clearly saw the perpetrators, who numbered three or four, as the perpetrators were masked. the crown’s case to identify the appellant as a participant in the robbery relied entirely on two pieces of circumstantial evidence: (1) the appellant’s dna found on a cigarette butt in the vehicle of one of the victims, mr. iten, which was stolen from the scene and found abandoned approximately 11 hours after the robbery; and (2) the testimony of mr. iten that he may have heard the name “metzger” spoken by one of the intruders during the robbery. on this evidence, the trial judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant participated in the robbery. a majority of the court of appeal dismissed the appellant’s conviction appeal veldhuis ja, dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and substituted acquittals on the basis that the verdicts of guilt were unreasonable. [2] i am of the view that the verdicts were unreasonable and that the appeal should be allowed. even accounting for the privileged position of the trial judge, i am satisfied that the guilty verdicts cannot be supported by the evidence: r v. brunelle, 2022 scc 5, at para. 7. [3] the trial judge acknowledged that the dna evidence, standing alone, would not be sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. i agree with that conclusion. the dna evidence at best permitted an inference that the appellant was in the vehicle at some point in time prior to its recovery by the police there was no evidence indicating when and why the appellant may have been in the vehicle, which was unaccounted for during the 11 hours between the robbery and its recovery. mr. iten also routinely left the keys in the vehicle prior to the robbery. as the dissenting judge of the court of appeal noted, there were also pieces of clothing and other items in the vehicle that the forensic identification officer acknowledged were not sent for dna analysis. in these circumstances, the dna evidence alone could not have established a case to meet against the appellant with respect to participation in the robbery. [4] the other piece of circumstantial evidence that supported the dna evidence was mr. iten’s testimony that he had heard the name “metzger” during the robbery. however, that evidence was fraught with frailties. mr. iten was struck on the head with a baseball bat at the outset of the robbery and was fading in and out of consciousness. in his testimony, he actively questioned his own recollection of what he had heard. he did not mention to the police during his initial interviews that he had overheard the name “metzger”; rather, an investigating officer first mentioned the name to mr. iten during a telephone interview, months or possibly years after the robbery. when asked at trial whether he recalled hearing the name before that telephone interview, mr. iten said that he did; he indicated this was based on discussions that he had after the robbery with the second victim, mr. rivard, who mr. iten believed shared the same recollection however, this was not corroborated by mr rivard in his testimony mr. iten also contemplated that his recollection of hearing the name may have been a false memory due to childhood trauma arising from personal associations with the german word “metzger”, meaning “butcher”, which is mr. iten’s lifetime vocation. [5] although no issue is raised with respect to mr. iten’s honesty, in my view, this is one of the rare instances where the trial judge’s acceptance of the reliability of mr. iten’s evidence cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence: r v. burke, [1996] 1 scr 474, at para. 7; brunelle, at para. 8. the trial judge wrongly concluded that “[n]othing turns” on the inconsistency between mr. iten’s and mr. rivard’s evidence because they were in different rooms and may have heard different things; the trial judge misapprehended the fact that mr. iten testified they had the same recollection. the trial judge also failed to meaningfully address many of the concerns surrounding mr. iten’s physical or mental state during and after the robbery. [6] considering the totality of the evidence — including the frailties in mr. iten’s evidence and the absence of any other inculpatory evidence except for the presence of the appellant’s dna on the cigarette butt — i am satisfied that no “trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accused’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available”: r v. villaroman, 2016 scc 33, [2016] 1 scr. 1000, at para. 55. the verdicts were therefore unreasonable. [7] in light of the evidentiary weaknesses of both the dna evidence and mr. iten’s recollection, i respectfully disagree with the view that this is an instance in which the appellant’s decision not to testify at trial can be raised against him. as the dissenting judge noted, quoting from r v. phillips, 2018 onca 651, 364 ccc (3d) 220, at para. 69, this was not a case in which the evidence cried out for an explanation that only the appellant’s testimony could have provided, such that he must accept the consequences of having remained silent it was a very weak crown case built on identification. the failure of the accused to testify does not undermine his argument that the verdict was unreasonable. (ca reasons, at para. 87 (canlii)) [8] it is not necessary to address the appellant’s additional arguments concerning the doctrine of recent possession. [9] i would allow the appeal, set aside the convictions, and substitute verdicts of acquittal. the reasons of côté and o’bonsawin jj. were delivered by côté j — [10] the appellant, shawn metzger, appeals as of right from his convictions for robbery and break and enter arising from a home invasion on june 24, 2017. identity was the sole issue at trial neither of the victims was able to see the three or four intruders, who were masked. after the robbery, the intruders drove away in a truck owned by one of the occupants, mr. valentin iten. the truck was found abandoned and locked roughly 11 hours later. a cigarette butt was found under the driver’s seat and sent for dna analysis, which returned a single profile matching the appellant. [11] the main issue in this appeal is whether it was unreasonable for the trial judge to convict the appellant based on (1) the presence of his dna in the stolen truck; and (2) mr. iten’s testimony that he heard the appellant’s last name, “metzger”, used during the robbery. the majority of the court below dismissed the appellant’s appeal, finding that the verdicts were not unreasonable (2022 abca 16). i agree. in my view, the trial judge could reasonably be satisfied that the appellant’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence (r v. villaroman, 2016 scc 33, [2016] 1 scr 1000, at para. 55). [12] in the circumstances, there was no reasonable explanation for why the appellant’s dna was found on a cigarette butt under the driver’s seat of the stolen truck, if not for his involvement in the robbery less than 12 hours earlier. the trial judge did not consider the dna evidence in a vacuum rather, he relied on additional evidence to eliminate the possibility that the cigarette butt could have gotten into the stolen truck before or outside of the robbery. it is undisputed that mr. iten did not know the appellant. it is important to emphasize that “[n]obody else used the truck” around the time of the robbery (trial reasons, reproduced in ar, at p 21). mr. iten and his roommate both heard the truck start at the end of the robbery. the truck was found locked and showed no signs of forced entry. the cigarette butt was found under the driver’s seat, and the dna matched only the appellant’s profile. taken together, this evidence “cried out for an explanation that only the appellant’s testimony could have provided, such that he must accept the consequences of having remained silent” (r v. phillips, 2018 onca 651, 364 ccc (3d) 220, at para. 69; see also r v. george-nurse, 2019 scc 12, [2019] 1 scr 570, at para. 1). it was open to the judge to consider the “total absence of any kind of reasonable explanation” (r v. kowlyk, [1988] 2 scr 59, at p 73; see also r v. noble, [1997] 1 scr 874, at para. 103) for the presence of the appellant’s dna in a stolen truck found mere hours after the robbery and a short distance away from the victims’ residence. [13] while some may view the “metzger” identification evidence as weaker, the trial judge was in a privileged position to assess the evidence (r v. brunelle, 2022 scc 5, at para. 9, citing r v. beaudry, 2007 scc 5, [2007] 1 scr 190, at para. 62). the question is whether his findings were [translation] “sufficiently supported by the evidence and involve[d] no palpable and overriding error” (brunelle, at para. 8). i agree with the majority of the court below that the trial judge’s finding that mr. iten was a credible and reliable witness is entitled to deference. whether a different trier of fact may have reached a different conclusion does not justify appellate interference (ca reasons, at paras. 26 and 34 (canlii)). in any event, it was the combined effect of the identification evidence and the strong dna evidence that allowed the judge to infer guilt on the underlying robbery. [14] the authorities referred to by the appellant, in which dna or fingerprint evidence was found insufficient to infer guilt on the underlying theft or robbery, are distinguishable in r v mars (2006), 206 oac 387, there was no evidence that assisted in determining when the accused’s fingerprint was placed on a pizza box used in committing a robbery (para. 21) further, evidence given by a neighbour, who described all three robbers as black, “effectively excluded the appellant who . . is white” (per doherty ja, at para. 27). similarly, in r v. nicholl (2004), 190 ccc. (3d) 549 (ont. ca), where a pop can with the accused’s thumbprint on it was found in a vehicle two weeks after it was stolen, and in r v grayston, 2016 onca 784, where a balaclava with dna from the accused and other individuals was found in a stolen vehicle, this evidence was held to be compatible with explanations other than guilt. in r v. ahmed, 2015 onca 848, the accused’s dna was found — together with three other dna matches — on a plastic grocery bag used during a robbery, which bags are “commonplace, portable, disposable and reusable” (para. 7 (canlii)). given the generic nature of the eyewitness descriptions relied on by the crown, the evidence did not go far enough to support the inference that the accused’s dna had been deposited on the bag during the robbery. [15] by contrast, there was additional evidence in this case that permitted the trial judge to determine when the appellant’s cigarette was left in the stolen truck. i also note that dna evidence, either alone or in combination with “less than strong” identification evidence, has served to ground verdicts of guilt in similar cases (r v. stjepanovic, 2006 bcca 169, 223 bcac 226, at paras. 10-11; see also r v. o’brien, 2011 scc 29, [2011] 2 scr 485, at paras. 2 and 13-16). [16] this is not a case where the judge’s verdict “cannot be supported by the evidence” (brunelle, at para. 7). rather, the verdict is one that a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably have rendered (villaroman, at para. 55). the judge was entitled to conclude that the “circumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience”, was not reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that the appellant was guilty (villaroman, at para. 38). i would dismiss the appeal and uphold the appellant’s convictions. appeal allowed, côté and o’bonsawin jj. dissenting.
i. introduction i. introduction [1] a tree faller was fatally struck by a rotting tree while working within the area of a forest license held by the appellant west fraser mills ltd. as the [1] un abatteur a été frappé mortellement par un arbre en décomposition pendant qu’il travaillait dans un secteur pour lequel l’appelante, west fraser mills 644 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. license holder, west fraser mills was the “owner” of the workplace, as defi ned in part 3 of the workers compensation act, rsbc 1996, c 492. the faller was employed, not by west fraser mills, but by an independent contractor. [2] the workers’ compensation board of british columbia investigated the accident and concluded that west fraser mills had failed to ensure that all activities of the forestry operation were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with s 262(1) of the occupational health and safety regulation, bc. reg 296/97. the board also imposed an ad- ministrative penalty on west fraser mills pursuant to s. 196(1) of the act — a fi ne of $75,000. these aspects of the board’s decision were confi rmed by the review division. [3] on appeal to the workers’ compensation ap- peal tribunal, west fraser mills argued: (1) that s 262(1) of the regulation was ultra vires; and (2) that an administrative penalty under s. 196(1) of the act can only be levied against an entity acting as an “employer”, and not against an “owner”. west fraser mills argued that it was not the faller’s em- ployer, but solely an “owner” within the terms of the act, and so s. 196(1) did not apply and west fraser mills could not be fi ned. ltd., détenait un permis d’exploitation forestière. aux termes du permis, west fraser mills était « pro- priétaire » du lieu de travail au sens de la partie 3 de la workers compensation act, rsbc 1996, c. 492 (« loi »). l’abatteur travaillait non pas pour elle, mais pour un entrepreneur indépendant. [2] à l’issue de son enquête sur l’accident, la workers’ compensation board de la colombie- britannique (« commission ») a conclu que west fraser mills avait omis de faire en sorte que toutes les activités d’exploitation forestière soient planifi ées et exercées conformément au par 262(1) de l’occupa- tional health and safety regulation, bc reg 296/97 (« règlement »). la commission a par ailleurs infl igé à west fraser mills, en application du par. 196(1) de la loi, une sanction administrative (une amende de 75 000 $). ces volets de la décision de la commission ont été confi rmés par la section de révision. [3] en appel devant le workers’ compensation appeal tribunal (« tribunal »), west fraser mills a soutenu (1) que le par 262(1) du règlement était ultra vires et (2) que la sanction administrative pré- vue au par. 196(1) de la loi ne pouvait être infl igée qu’à un « employeur », pas à un « propriétaire ». west fraser mills a fait valoir qu’elle n’était pas l’employeur de l’abatteur, mais seulement le « pro- priétaire » du lieu de travail au sens de la loi, de sorte que le par. 196(1) ne s’appliquait pas et qu’elle ne pouvait être condamnée à une amende. [4] the tribunal rejected west fraser mills’ ar- guments and dismissed the appeal (2013 canlii 79509). noting west fraser mills’ general history of compliance with safety standards and that it had not intentionally disregarded such standards leading up to the incident in question, the tribunal reduced the administrative penalty by 30 percent. the british columbia supreme court (2015 bcsc 1098, 2 admin. lr (6th) 148) and court of appeal (2016 bcca 473, 405 dlr (4th) 621) upheld the tribunal’s order. west fraser mills now appeals to this court. [4] le tribunal a écarté les arguments et rejeté l’appel de west fraser mills (2013 canlii 79509). comme l’entreprise avait généralement respecté les normes de sécurité dans le passé et que, dans le cas de cet accident, elle n’avait pas délibérément passé outre à ces normes, le tribunal a réduit la sanction administrative de 30 p 100. la cour suprême (2015 bcsc 1098, 2 admin. lr (6th) 148) et la cour d’appel (2016 bcca 473, 405 dlr (4th) 621) de la colombie- britannique ont confi rmé l’ordon- nance du tribunal. west fraser mills se pourvoit aujourd’hui devant notre cour. [5] for the reasons that follow, i would dismiss the appeal and uphold the tribunal’s order against west fraser mills. [5] pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi et de confi rmer l’ordonnance du tribunal visant west fraser mills. [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge en chef 645 ii the validity of section 26.2(1) of the regulation ii validité du par 262(1) du règlement [6] section 225 of the act gives the board broad powers to make regulations for workplace safety. it states, in relevant part: [6] l’article 225 de la loi confère à la commission un vaste pouvoir de réglementation en matière de sécurité au travail. il dispose notamment ce qui suit : [traduction] 225 (1) in accordance with its mandate under this part, the board may make regulations the board considers necessary or advisable in relation to occupational health and safety and occupational environment. 225 (1) conformément au mandat que lui confère la présente partie, la commission peut prendre les règlements qu’elle juge nécessaires ou souhaitables relativement à la santé et à la sécurité au travail et à l’environnement de travail. (2) without limiting subsection (1), the board may make regulations as follows: (2) sans que soit limitée la portée du paragraphe (1), la commission peut prendre des règlements sur ce qui suit : (a) respecting standards and requirements for the protection of the health and safety of workers and other persons present at a workplace and for the well- being of workers in their occupational environment; a) les normes et les exigences relatives à la pro- tection de la santé et de la sécurité des travail- leurs et des autres personnes se trouvant dans un lieu de travail et au bien- être des travailleurs dans leur environnement de travail; (b) respecting specifi c components of the gen- eral duties of employers, workers, suppliers, su- pervisors, prime contractors and owners under this part; b) des éléments précis des obligations générales des employeurs, travailleurs, fournisseurs, super- viseurs, entrepreneurs principaux et propriétaires suivant la présente partie;   .   . [7] pursuant to s. 225 of the act, the board adopted the regulation at issue in this case. section 26.2(1) of the regulation imposes a duty on owners to ensure that forestry operations are planned and conducted in accordance with the regulation and safe work practices: [7] en vertu de l’art. 225 de la loi, la commission a pris le règlement contesté en l’espèce — le par 262(1) du règlement — selon lequel le propriétaire est tenu de faire en sorte que les activités d’exploitation fo- restière soient planifi ées et exercées conformément au règlement et aux pratiques de travail sécuritaires : [traduction] 26.2 (1) the owner of a forestry operation must ensure that all activities of the forestry operation are both planned and conducted in a manner consistent with this regulation and with safe work practices accept- able to the board. 26.2 (1) le propriétaire d’une entreprise d’exploitation forestière doit faire en sorte que toutes les activités d’exploitation forestière soient planifi ées et exer- cées conformément au présent règlement et aux pratiques de travail sécuritaires jugées acceptables par la commission. [8] this court summarized the approach courts should take to judicial review of the exercise of del- egated administrative powers in dunsmuir v. new [8] dans l’arrêt dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, la cour résume la démarche que doit suivre la cour de révision lors 646 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190. for situations where the jurisprudence has not already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be accorded, this court emphasized the importance of referring to the legislative and admin- istrative context to determine the level of discretion the legislature conferred on a board or tribunal. in most cases, a contextual assessment leads to the conclusion that the appropriate standard of review is reasonableness. [9] applying this central teaching of dunsmuir, this court has adopted a fl exible standard of rea- sonableness in situations where the enabling statute grants a large discretion to the subordinate body to craft appropriate regulations: see catalyst paper corp. v. north cowichan (district), 2012 scc 2, [2012] 1 scr 5, at paras. 13, 18 and 24; green v. law society of manitoba, 2017 scc 20, [2017] 1 scr 360, at para 20. those authorities point us to reasonableness as the applicable standard of re- view. reasonableness review “recognizes the reality that, in many instances, those working day to day in the implementation of frequently complex adminis- trative schemes have or will develop a considerable degree of expertise or fi eld sensitivity to the imper- atives and nuances of the legislative regime”: d. j. mullan, “establishing the standard of review: the struggle for complexity?” (2004), 17 cjalp 59, at p. 93, cited with approval in dunsmuir, at para 49. du contrôle judiciaire de l’exercice d’un pouvoir ad- ministratif délégué. lorsque la jurisprudence n’éta- blit pas déjà de manière satisfaisante le degré de déférence qui s’impose dans une situation donnée, la cour insiste sur l’importance de s’en remettre au contexte législatif et administratif pour déterminer l’étendue du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré par le législateur à l’organisme ou au tribunal administratif. dans la plupart des cas, l’analyse contextuelle mène à la conclusion que la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la décision raisonnable. [9] conformément à ce principal enseignement de dunsmuir, la cour applique une norme de raisonna- bilité souple dans le cas où la loi habilitante accorde à l’organisme subordonné un grand pouvoir discré- tionnaire pour la conception de règlements appro- priés (voir catalyst paper corp c. north cowichan (district), 2012 csc 2, [2012] 1 rcs 5, par. 13, 18 et 24; green c. société du barreau du manitoba, 2017 csc 20, [2017] 1 rcs 360, par 20). selon les arrêts catalyst et green, la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la raisonnabilité. l’application de cette norme [traduction] « reconnaît que dans beaucoup de cas, les personnes qui se consacrent quotidiennement à l’application de régimes admi- nistratifs souvent complexes possèdent ou acquièrent une grande connaissance ou sensibilité fi ne à l’égard des impératifs et des subtilités de ces régimes » (d j. mullan, « establishing the standard of review : the struggle for complexity? » (2004), 17 rcdap 59, p. 93, cité avec approbation dans dunsmuir, par 49). [10] the question before us is whether s 262(1) of the regulation represents a reasonable exercise of the board’s delegated regulatory authority is s 262(1) of the regulation within the ambit of s. 225 of the act? section 225 of the act is very broad. section 225(1) empowers the board to make “reg- ulations the board considers necessary or advisable in relation to occupational health and safety and occupational environment”. this makes it clear that the legislature wanted the board to decide what was necessary or advisable to achieve the goal of healthy and safe worksites and pass regulations to accom- plish just that. the opening words of s. 225(2) — “without limiting subsection (1)” — confi rm that this plenary power is not limited by anything that [10] la cour doit décider si le par.  26.2(1) du règlement résulte d’un exercice raisonnable du pou- voir de réglementation délégué à la commission. le paragraphe 26.2(1) du règlement relève-t-il du pou- voir délégué par l’art. 225 de la loi? ce dernier est libellé de façon très générale. le paragraphe 225(1) confère à la commission le pouvoir de prendre les « règlements qu’elle juge nécessaires ou souhai- tables relativement à la santé et à la sécurité au tra- vail et à l’environnement de travail ». à l’évidence, le législateur a voulu confi er à la commission le soin de décider de ce qui est nécessaire ou souhai- table pour atteindre l’objectif lié à la santé et à la sécurité dans les lieux de travail et de prendre des règlements en conséquence. l’énoncé liminaire du [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge en chef 647 follows. in short, the legislature indicated it wanted the board to enact whatever regulations it deemed necessary to accomplish its goals of workplace health and safety. the delegation of power to the board could not be broader. [11] from this broad and unrestricted delegation of power we may conclude that any regulation that may reasonably be construed to be related to workplace health and safety is authorized by s. 225 of the act. the legislature, through s. 225 of the act, is asking the board to use its good judgment about what regu- lations are necessary or advisable to accomplish the goals of workplace health and safety. a regulation that represents a reasonable exercise of that judgment is valid: catalyst, at para. 24; green, at para 20. [12] determining whether the regulation at issue represents a reasonable exercise of the delegated power is, at its core, an exercise in statutory inter- pretation, considering not only the text of the laws, but also their purpose and the context. the reviewing court must determine if the regulation is “incon- sistent with the objective of the enabling statute or the scope of the statutory mandate” to the point, for example, of being “‘irrelevant’, ‘extraneous’ or ‘completely unrelated’”: katz group canada inc. v. ontario (health and long- term care), 2013 scc 64, [2013] 3 scr 810, at paras. 24 and 28. to do this, the court should turn its mind to the typical purposive approach to statutory interpretation and seek an “interpretative approach that reconciles the regulation with its enabling statute”: katz, at pa- ras 25-26. [13] first, applying the usual principles of statutory interpretation to s. 225 of the act, it is clear that it authorizes s 262(1). i have already discussed the broad wording of s. 225 of the act. the board is expected to craft such regulations as it deems nec- essary or appropriate in order to promote workplace health and safety. section 26.2(1) is clearly linked to workplace safety and meets this requirement. paragraphe (2) — « sans que soit limitée la portée du paragraphe (1) » — confi rme qu’il s’agit d’un pou- voir entier, non restreint par ce qui suit le par 225(1). en résumé, le législateur a exprimé la volonté que la commission prenne tout règlement jugé nécessaire pour réaliser ses objectifs liés à la santé et à la sécu- rité dans les lieux de travail. la délégation de pouvoir à la commission ne pourrait être plus large. [11] cette délégation de pouvoir générale et sans réserve permet de conclure que l’art. 225 de la loi autorise tout règlement dont on peut raisonnablement considérer qu’il se rapporte à la santé et à la sécurité au travail. par cette disposition, le législateur s’en re- met au bon jugement de la commission pour décider des règlements qui sont nécessaires ou souhaitables pour atteindre les objectifs de santé et de sécurité au travail. tout règlement qui résulte d’un exercice raisonnable de ce bon jugement est valide (catalyst, par. 24; green, par 20). [12] décider si le règlement contesté résulte d’un exercice raisonnable du pouvoir délégué relève es- sentiellement de l’interprétation législative. il faut alors tenir compte non seulement du texte de la loi, mais aussi de son objet et du contexte. la cour de révision doit se demander si le règlement est « in- compatible avec l’objectif de [l]a loi habilitante ou encore [s]’il déborde le cadre du mandat prévu par la loi » au point, par exemple, de reposer sur des considérations « sans importance », d’être « non per- tinent » ou d’être « complètement étranger » à l’objet de la loi (katz group canada inc. c. ontario (santé et soins de longue durée), 2013 csc 64, [2013] 3 rcs 810 (par. 24 et 28)). pour ce faire, elle doit recourir à l’approche téléologique habituelle et privi- légier « une méthode d’interprétation qui concilie le règlement avec sa loi habilitante » (katz, par 25-26). [13] premièrement, lorsqu’il est interprété selon les principes habituels, l’art. 225 autorise clairement le par 262(1). rappelons le caractère général du libellé de l’art. 225 de la loi. la commission est censée concevoir les règlements qu’elle juge néces- saires ou souhaitables pour favoriser la santé et la sécurité au travail. le paragraphe 26.2(1) se rapporte nettement à la sécurité au travail et satisfait à cette exigence. 648 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. [14] second, the regulation fi ts with other provi- sions of the statute. section 26.2(1) is consistent with s. 230(2)(a) of the act, which allows the board to make regulations that apply to any “persons working in or contributing to the production of an industry”. this would include forest license owners like the appellant. section 26.2(1) is also consistent with s. 111 of the act, which provides that the board’s mandate includes making regulations in support of the purpose of part 3 of the act. the purpose of part 3 is captured in s. 107: it aims to promote occupational health and safety in the workplace in broad terms. section 26.2(1) shares that purpose. [15] my colleague, côté j., argues that s 262(1) is at odds with the way the act sets out the respon- sibilities of owners and employers. she reads the act as creating two silos of responsibility — one for “owners” and one for “employers” — which can never overlap. she argues that because s 262(1) makes an owner’s responsibilities overlap to some extent with an employer’s responsibilities, it cannot be reconciled with the act and must be held to be invalid. [16] i cannot agree with the central premise of this argument — that the act creates two silos of responsibility and that the duties of owners and employers can never overlap. côté j. grounds this premise in ss. 115 and 119 of the act, which state the duties of “employers” and “owners” respectively, and s. 107(2)(e), which my colleague reads to in- dicate the legislature’s intent to preclude overlap- ping obligations for different parties. for reference, s. 107(2)(e) provides: [14] deuxièmement, le règlement cadre bien avec les autres dispositions de la loi. le pa ra gra- phe 26.2(1) se concilie avec l’al. 230(2)a) de la loi, qui permet à la commission d’assujettir à un règle- ment toute [traduction] « personne participant ou contribuant à la production dans un secteur d’acti- vité », ce qui devrait englober le titulaire d’un permis d’exploitation forestière, telle l’appelante. le para- graphe 26.2(1) se concilie également avec l’art. 111 de la loi, qui prévoit que le mandat de la commis- sion comprend la prise de règlements à l’appui de l’objet de la partie 3 de la loi. l’article 107 énonce de manière générale l’objet de la partie 3, à savoir favoriser la santé et la sécurité au travail. le para- graphe 26.2(1) du règlement a le même objet. [15] ma collègue la juge côté fait valoir que le par 262(1) va à l’encontre de la défi nition légale des obligations du propriétaire et de l’employeur. suivant son interprétation, la loi crée deux catégories dis- tinctes d’obligations — l’une visant l’« employeur », l’autre le « propriétaire » — censées ne jamais se chevaucher. comme le par 262(1) fait en sorte que les obligations du propriétaire chevauchent jusqu’à un certain point celles de l’employeur, elle soutient que la disposition ne peut être conciliée avec la loi et doit par conséquent être invalidée. [16] je ne puis souscrire à sa prémisse de départ, à savoir que la loi crée deux catégories distinctes d’obligations et que les obligations du propriétaire et celles de l’employeur ne peuvent jamais se che- vaucher. la juge côté fait reposer sa prémisse sur les art. 115 et 119 de la loi, qui énumèrent les obli- gations respectives de l’« employeur » et du « pro- priétaire », ainsi que sur l’al. 107(2)e), qui attesterait selon elle l’intention du législateur d’empêcher le chevauchement des obligations de l’un et de l’autre. voici le libellé de l’al. 107(2)e) : [traduction] (2) without limiting subsection (1), the specifi c purposes of this part are (2) sans que soit limitée la portée du paragraphe (1), la présente partie vise ce qui suit :   .   . (e) to ensure that employers, workers and others who are in a position to affect the occupational health and e) faire en sorte qu’employeurs, travailleurs et autres personnes susceptibles d’influer sur la santé et la [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge en chef 649 safety of workers share that responsibility to the extent of each party’s authority and ability to do so   . sécurité des travailleurs partagent cette obligation dans la mesure où ils ont le pouvoir et la capacité de le faire   . [17] the practical effect of côté j.’s interpretation is to limit the scope of regulations impacting owners to only those obligations outlined in s. 119 of the act. under that interpretation, any regulation not specif- ically tethered to s. 119 would be impermissible. however, this is inconsistent with the text of s. 119 itself — s. 119 is not a complete and exhaustive state- ment of owners’ duties. it does not say “the owners’ duties are the following”, much less that these are owners’ only duties. it is true that s 262(1) of the regulation imposes duties not set out in s. 119(a) and (b) of the act, which deal with maintaining land and premises, and providing information to employers and contractors. however, s. 119 of the act does not say that owners’ duties are limited to the specifi c duties found in s. 119(a) and (b). on the contrary, s. 119 (c) imposes a broad duty, not only to “comply with this part,” but also with “the regulations”. the legislature has thus indicated that other duties can be imposed by regulation. the text of s. 119 directly invites readers to consider owners’ obligations in light of the scheme as a whole. [17] suivant l’interprétation que préconise la juge côté, les dispositions réglementaires ne s’applique- raient en fait au propriétaire que pour les seules obli- gations énoncées à l’art. 119 de la loi. ainsi, tout règlement que l’on ne pourrait expressément re- lier au texte précis de l’art. 119 serait inadmissible. or, cette interprétation contredit le libellé même de l’art. 119, lequel ne se veut pas une énumération complète et exhaus tive des obligations du proprié- taire. l’article 119 ne dit pas « les obligations du propriétaire sont les suivantes », et encore moins que ce sont les seules obligations du propriétaire. le paragraphe 26.2(1) du règlement impose certes des obligations qui ne fi gurent pas aux al. 119a) et b) de la loi, lesquels portent sur l’entretien du bien- fonds et des locaux et la communication d’élé- ments d’information à l’employeur et à l’entrepre- neur. l’ar ticle 119 de la loi ne dispose cependant pas que les obligations du propriétaire se limitent à celles qui sont énoncées aux al. 119a) et b). au contraire, l’al. 119c) fait au propriétaire l’obliga- tion générale non seulement de [traduction] « se conformer à la présente partie », mais aussi de [tra- duction] « [se conformer] aux règlements [  ] ap- plicables ». le législateur indique donc que d’autres obligations peuvent être prévues par règlement. le texte de l’art. 119 appelle directement à considérer les obligations du propriétaire à la lumière de ce que commande le régime dans sa globalité. [18] similarly, s. 107(2) simply lists particular fac- ets of the scheme’s broad purpose to promote work- place safety. the text of s. 107(2) explicitly states that the specifi c purposes detailed, including s. 107(2)(e), are not meant to limit the broad workplace safety purpose outlined in s 107(1). section 107(1) pro- vides a clear indication that the scheme is meant to promote workplace safety in the broadest sense. in addition, s. 107(2)(e) specifi cally notes that occu- pational health and safety is a shared responsibility between “employers, workers and others who are in a position to affect the    safety of workers”. similarly, s. 107(2)(f) asks these parties to “foster cooperative and consultative relationships” regarding [18] de même, le par. 107(2) précise simplement certains aspects de l’objectif général consistant à fa- voriser la sécurité au travail. il dit expressément que ces précisions, dont celle fi gurant à l’al. 107(2)e), ne sont pas censées limiter la portée de l’objectif général consistant à favoriser la sécurité au travail énoncé au par.  107(1) le paragraphe  107(1) dit clairement que le régime vise à favoriser la sécurité au travail au sens le plus large. de plus, l’al. 107(2)e) prévoit expressément qu’« employeurs, travailleurs et autres personnes susceptibles d’infl uer sur [  ] la sécurité des travailleurs » partagent cette obliga- tion. de même, l’al. 107(2)f) invite ces personnes à [traduction] «  favoriser la coopération et la 650 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. workplace safety. in my view, it is inconsistent with a purposive interpretation of the scheme to read the phrase “to the extent of each party’s authority and ability to do so” from s.  107(2)(e)  — which my colleague fi nds to be dispositive — in a formalistic manner that disregards the scheme’s focus on shared responsibility. [19] finally, two additional external contextual fac- tors are relevant for this inquiry: canada (citizenship and immigration) v. khosa, 2009 scc 12, [2009] 1 scr 339, at para. 59; catalyst, at paras. 18 and 24. these considerations are both within the exper- tise and capacity of the board. [20] first, the board adopted s 262(1) of the reg- ulation in its present form in 2008 in response to a concern in the province about the growing rate of workplace fatalities in the forestry sector. this concern is plainly one of “occupational health and safety and occupational environment”, the focus of s 225. the board’s adoption of s 262(1) of the regulation in response to this signifi cant workplace safety concern provides a clear illustration of why a legislature chooses to delegate regulation- making authority to expert bodies — so that gaps can be addressed effi ciently. [21] second, s 262(1) is a natural extension of an owner’s duty under s. 119(a) to maintain the work- site. forestry worksites are constantly changing due to weather and other natural occurrences. to main- tain the worksite in the face of the dynamic interac- tion of natural forces and work practices, the owner must ensure that the work in question is planned and conducted safely. therefore, to fulfi ll the duty of maintaining a safe worksite under s. 119 of the act, the owner must ensure that the work is planned and conducted safely. the two go hand in hand. consultation » en matière de sécurité au travail. à mon sens, l’interprétation téléologique du régime est incompatible avec toute lecture formaliste de l’énoncé « dans la mesure où ils ont le pouvoir et la capacité de le faire » qui fi gure à l’al. 107(2)e) — jugé déterminant par ma collègue — qui ne tiendrait pas compte de l’importance que le régime accorde au partage de l’obligation. [19] enfin, deux autres éléments contextuels externes doivent être pris en compte en l’espèce (canada (citoyenneté et immigration) c. khosa, 2009 csc 12, [2009] 1 rcs 339, par. 59; catalyst, par. 18 et 24). ces considérations de principe relèvent toutes deux de l’expertise et des compétences de la commission. [20] d’abord, la commission a adopté le par 262(1) du règlement dans sa version actuelle en 2008 par suite de l’inquiétude exprimée par le gouvernement provincial face à l’augmentation du nombre de dé- cès au travail dans le secteur forestier, une inquié- tude clairement liée à l’objet principal de l’art. 225, soit « la santé et [  ] la sécurité au travail et [  ] l’environnement de travail ». cette mesure prise en réponse à cette préoccupation majeure en matière de sécurité au travail illustre bien la raison pour laquelle le législateur délègue un pouvoir de réglementation à un organisme spécialisé, c’est-à-dire afi n que toute lacune puisse être comblée effi cacement. [21] ensuite, le par 262(1) est le prolongement naturel de l’obligation que l’al. 119a) fait au proprié- taire de veiller à l’entretien du lieu de travail. dans le domaine de l’exploitation forestière, le lieu de tra- vail change constamment en fonction des conditions météorologiques et d’autres phénomènes naturels. pour entretenir le lieu de travail malgré l’interaction dynamique des forces de la nature et des pratiques de travail, le propriétaire doit faire en sorte que ses activités soient planifi ées et exercées de façon sé- curitaire. pour s’acquitter de son obligation d’assu- rer la sécurité des lieux de travail conformément à l’art. 119 de la loi, le propriétaire doit veiller à ce que les activités soient planifi ées et exercées de façon sécuritaire. les deux vont de pair. [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge en chef 651 i conclude that s 262(1) represents a reason- [22] able exercise of the delegated power conferred on the board by s. 225 of the act to “make regulations [it] considers necessary or advisable in relation to occupational health and safety and occupational en- vironment”. [22] je conclus que l’adoption du par 262(1) ré- sulte d’un exercice raisonnable du pouvoir délégué que l’art. 225 de la loi confère à la commission de « prendre les règlements qu’elle juge nécessaires ou souhaitables relativement à la santé et à la sécurité au travail et à l’environnement de travail ». [23] it is true that this court, in dunsmuir, referred to prior jurisprudence to indicate that true questions of jurisdiction, which some suggest the present mat- ter raises, are subject to review on a standard of correctness — noting, however, the importance of taking a robust view of jurisdiction. post-dunsmuir, it has been suggested that such cases will be rare: alberta (information and privacy commissioner) v. alberta teachers’ association, 2011 scc 61, [2011] 3 scr 654, at para 33. we need not delve into this debate in the present appeal. where the statute con- fers a broad power on a board to determine what reg- ulations are necessary or advisable to accomplish the statute’s goals, the question the court must answer is not one of vires in the traditional sense, but whether the regulation at issue represents a reasonable exer- cise of the delegated power, having regard to those goals, as we explained in catalyst and green, two re- cent post-dunsmuir decisions of this court where the court unanimously identifi ed the applicable standard of review in this regard to be reasonableness. in any event, s 262(1) of the regulation plainly falls within the broad authority granted by s. 225 of the act as an exercise of statutory interpretation. this is so even if no deference is accorded to the board and if we disregard all of the external policy considerations offered in support of its position. [23] dans dunsmuir, la cour invoque certes des décisions antérieures pour affi rmer qu’une véritable question de compétence — la présente affaire en soulèverait une selon certains — fait l’objet d’un contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte, mais elle signale qu’il importe de considérer la compé- tence avec rigueur. dans la foulée de cet arrêt, elle a laissé entendre que pareil cas se présenterait rare- ment (alberta (information and privacy commis- sioner) c. alberta teachers’ association, 2011 csc 61, [2011] 3 rcs 654, par 33). le présent pour- voi n’exige pas que nous approfondissions le sujet. lorsque la loi confère à un organisme un large pou- voir de décider des règlements qui sont nécessaires ou souhaitables pour la réalisation des objectifs légis- latifs, la question que la cour de révision doit trancher n’a pas trait à la compétence au sens traditionnel, mais au fait que le règlement en cause résulte ou non d’un exercice raisonnable du pouvoir délégué, eu égard à ces objectifs, comme nous l’expliquons dans les arrêts catalyst et green, deux arrêts récents postérieurs à dunsmuir dans lesquels la cour conclut à l’unanimité que la norme de contrôle applicable dans ce cas est celle de la raisonnabilité. quoi qu’il en soit, l’application des règles d’interprétation lé- gislative mène à la conclusion que le par 262(1) du règlement ressortit clairement au large pouvoir que confère l’art. 225 de la loi. c’est également le cas si l’on ne manifeste pas de déférence à l’endroit de la commission et que l’on ne tient pas compte des considérations de principe externes invoquées à l’ap- pui de sa décision. iii the penalty under section 196(1) of the act iii la sanction suivant le par. 196(1) de la loi [24] west fraser mills argues that it was not open to the board to issue a penalty against the company under s. 196(1) of the act because it was not acting [24] west fraser mills soutient qu’elle n’était pas un « employeur » au moment des faits constitutifs de l’infraction, de sorte qu’elle ne peut se voir infl iger 652 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. as an “employer” during the breach in question. section 196(1) provides: une sanction sur le fondement du par. 196(1) de la loi, dont voici le libellé : [traduction] 196 (1) the board may, by order, impose on an em- ployer an administrative penalty under this section if the board is satisfi ed on a balance of probabilities that 196 (1) en vertu du présent article, la commission peut infl iger à un employeur une sanction administrative au moyen d’une ordonnance si elle est convaincue, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, (a) the employer has failed to take suffi cient precautions for the prevention of work related injuries or illnesses, a) que l’employeur n’a pas pris des précautions suffi santes pour prévenir les lésions ou les ma- ladies professionnelles, (b) the employer has not complied with this part, the regulations or an applicable order, or b) que l’employeur ne s’est pas conformé à la présente partie, au règlement ou à une ordon- nance applicable, (c) the employer’s workplace or working con- ditions are not safe. c) que le lieu de travail de l’employeur ou les conditions de travail ne sont pas sécuritaires. [25] the tribunal rejected west fraser mills’ ar- gument and upheld the penalty. [25] le tribunal a rejeté la thèse de west fraser mills et confi rmé la décision de la commission. a standard of review a norme de contrôle [26] the administrative tribunals act, sbc. 2004, c. 45, applies to the tribunal’s decision in this matter. section 58 of that statute provides in relevant part: [26] l’administrative tribunals act, sbc 2004, c. 45, s’applique aux décisions du tribunal en l’es- pèce. son article 58 dispose : [traduction] 58 (1) if the act under which the application arises contains or incorporates a privative clause, relative to the courts the tribunal must be considered to be an expert tribunal in relation to all matters over which it has exclusive jurisdiction. 58 (1) lorsque la loi sous le régime de laquelle la demande est présentée contient ou incorpore une clause privative, le tribunal est considéré comme un tribunal spécialisé par une cour de justice pour toute matière dans laquelle il a compétence exclusive. (2) in a judicial review proceeding relating to ex- pert tribunals under subsection (1) (2) dans le cadre d’un contrôle judiciaire visant un tribunal spécialisé au sens du paragraphe (1), (a) a fi nding of fact or law or an exercise of discretion by the tribunal in respect of a matter over which it has exclusive jurisdiction under a privative clause must not be interfered with unless it is patently unreasonable, a) une conclusion de fait ou de droit ou une me- sure discrétionnaire du tribunal dans une matière qui relève de sa compétence exclusive par ap- plication d’une disposition d’inattaquabilité ne peut être modifi ée que si elle est manifestement déraisonnable; [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge en chef 653 (b) questions about the application of common law rules of natural justice and procedural fair- ness must be decided having regard to whether, in all of the circumstances, the tribunal acted fairly, and b) toute question touchant à l’application des règles de justice naturelle et d’équité procédu- rale en common law est tranchée en fonction du caractère équitable ou non des actes du tribunal au vu de l’ensemble des circonstances; (c) for all matters other than those identifi ed in paragraphs (a) and (b), the standard of review to be applied to the tribunal’s decision is cor- rectness. c) la norme de contrôle applicable à la décision du tribunal sur toute autre question que celles précisées aux paragraphes a) et b) est celle de la décision correcte. [27] section 254 of the act grants the tribunal ex- clusive jurisdiction over “all appeals from board de- cisions”. sections 254 and 255 of the act constitute a strong privative clause. it follows that the appropriate standard of review is “patent unreasonableness”, pur- suant to s. 58(2)(a) of the administrative tribunals act. [28] a legal determination like the interpretation of a statute will be patently unreasonable where it “almost border[s] on the absurd”: voice construc- tion ltd. v. construction & general workers’ union, local 92, 2004 scc 23, [2004] 1 scr 609, at para 18. in the workers’ compensation context in british columbia, a patently unreasonable decision is one that is “openly, clearly, evidently unreasonable”: speckling v. british columbia (workers’ compensa- tion board), 2005 bcca 80, 46 bclr (4th) 77, at para. 33; vandale v. british columbia (workers’ compensation appeal tribunal), 2013 bcca 391, 342 bcac 112, at para. 42 (emphasis deleted). [29] by stipulating the standard of patent unrea- sonableness, the legislature has indicated that courts should accord the utmost deference to the tribunal’s interpretation of the legislation and its decision. [27] l’article 254 de la loi confère au tribunal une compétence exclusive pour statuer sur [traduction] « tout appel d’une décision de la commission ». les articles 254 et 255 de la loi établissent une clause privative (parfois appelée « disposition d’inat- taquabilité » stricte), de sorte que la bonne norme de contrôle est celle de la « décision manifestement déraisonnable » suivant l’al. 58(2)a) de l’adminis- trative tribunals act. [28] une conclusion de droit comme celle issue de l’interprétation d’une loi est manifestement déraison- nable lorsqu’elle « frôl[e] l’absurde » (voice con- struction ltd. c. construction & general workers’ union, local 92, 2004 csc 23, [2004] 1 rcs 609, par 18). dans le contexte de l’indemnisation des accidentés du travail en colombie- britannique, la dé- cision manifestement déraisonnable est celle qui re- vêt un caractère déraisonnable [traduction] « que l’on ne peut contester, qui est tout à fait éviden[t] » (speckling c. british columbia (workers’ compen- sation board), 2005 bcca 80, 46 bclr (4th) 77, par. 33; vandale c. british columbia (workers’ compensation appeal tribunal), 2013 bcca 391, 342 bcac 112, par. 42 (soulignement omis)). [29] en prescrivant la norme de la décision ma- nifestement déraisonnable, le législateur indique que la cour de révision doit accorder la plus grande déférence à l’interprétation de la loi par le tribunal ainsi qu’à sa décision. b the tribunal’s interpretation of section 196(1) b l’interprétation par le tribunal du par. 196(1) of the act de la loi [30] the board imposed an administrative penalty on west fraser mills pursuant to s. 196(1) of the act, [30] la commission infl ige une sanction adminis- trative à west fraser mills en vertu du par. 196(1) 654 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. which permits the board to penalize an “employer”. west fraser mills submits that it was not an “em- ployer” in relation to the fatality, but only an “owner”, and hence cannot be penalized under s. 196(1) of the act. west fraser mills was an employer under the act on other sites, and indeed employed a person to supervise this particular site. however, it submits that, because the events in question led to its breach as an “owner”, it therefore cannot be penalized sep- arately as an “employer”. [31] the tribunal found that s. 196(1) of the act allows the board to issue an administrative penalty against an entity that is an “employer” under the act, even if the impugned conduct could also lead to con- sequences for the entity as the owner of a worksite. at the worksite where the incident occurred, west fraser mills was both an owner and an employer as defi ned by the act. as an owner of the forest li- cense, it had suffi cient knowledge and control over the workplace to enable it to ensure the health and safety of workers at the worksite locations. its obli- gation in that regard was not limited to the health and safety of its own employees. the tribunal held that as both an employer and as an owner, west fraser mills’ duty extended to ensure the health and safety of all workers and to take suffi cient precautions for the prevention of work- related injuries. [32] the question is whether the tribunal’s inter- pretation of s. 196(1) to enable a penalty against west fraser mills qua “employer” was patently unreason- able. i conclude that the decision cannot be said to reach the high threshold imposed by the standard of patent unreasonableness — being “openly, clearly [or] evidently unreasonable”, or to “border on the absurd”: vandale, at para. 42; voice, at para 18. de la loi, qui lui permet de sanctionner un « em- ployeur ». west fraser mills soutient qu’elle n’était pas « employeur » lors du décès, mais seulement « propriétaire », de sorte qu’elle ne peut être sanc- tionnée par application du par. 196(1) de la loi. elle était employeur au sens de la loi à d’autres endroits et avait de fait retenu les services d’une per- sonne pour surveiller le lieu où s’est produit le décès. cependant, elle soutient que, en l’espèce, les événe- ments survenus lui ont fait commettre une infraction à titre de « propriétaire », si bien qu’elle ne saurait être sanctionnée en sus à titre d’« employeur ». [31] le tribunal conclut que le par. 196(1) de la loi permet à la commission d’infl iger une sanction administrative à l’entité qui est un « employeur » au sens de la loi même lorsque les actes reprochés pourraient également entraîner des conséquences pour l’entité en tant que propriétaire du lieu de tra- vail. là où s’est produit l’accident, west fraser mills était à la fois propriétaire et employeur au sens de la loi. en tant que titulaire du permis d’exploitation forestière, elle possédait des connaissances et une maîtrise suffi santes à l’égard du lieu de travail pour assurer la santé et la sécurité des travailleurs aux différents emplacements. elle n’était pas seulement tenue d’assurer la santé et la sécurité de ses propres employés. le tribunal statue qu’à titre d’employeur et de propriétaire, west fraser mills avait l’obli- gation d’assurer la santé et la sécurité de tous les travailleurs et de prendre des précautions suffi santes pour prévenir les accidents de travail. [32] la question est de savoir si l’interprétation du par. 196(1) selon laquelle une sanction pouvait être infl igée à west fraser mills en tant qu’« employeur » était manifestement déraisonnable. je conclus qu’on ne saurait dire que la décision atteint le seuil élevé correspondant à ce qui est manifestement déraison- nable, c’est-à-dire que la décision revêt un caractère déraisonnable « que l’on ne peut contester, qui est tout à fait éviden[t] » ou qui « frôl[e] l’absurde » (vandale, par. 42; voice, par 18). [33] west fraser mills mounts arguments against the tribunal’s interpretation of s. 196(1) on the basis that, once the events in question were deemed to [33] west fraser mills conteste cette interpréta- tion du par. 196(1) par le tribunal en faisant valoir que, dès lors que les faits en cause sont présumés [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge en chef 655 constitute an “owner’s” breach, s. 196(1) was not available. constituer un manquement du « propriétaire », cette disposition ne peut être invoquée. [34] first, it argues that the wording and context of s. 196(1) push against an interpretation that allows a penalty against an “employer” in its capacity as an “owner”. the act distinguishes between “employ- ers” and “owners” and lays out the duties of each: ss. 115 and 119. [35] second, it asserts that the legislature made specifi c choices about who to target in the enforce- ment provisions laid out in the act. some provisions apply to an “employer” only: ss 1861, 196(1) and 1961. others apply more broadly to a “person” in the sense of ‘anyone’: ss. 194, 195 and 198. to read “employer” broadly to capture breaches committed by an entity in its role as an “owner” in light of this drafting is idiosyncratic, it contends. [36] third, west fraser mills points out that s. 123 of the act provides that where an entity acts as both an employer and an owner “in respect of one workplace”, it must meet the duties of both. this suggests that the legislature anticipated overlap between functions, but only where the functions are linked by the same workplace. west fraser mills argues that the tribunal did not fi nd that there was an employment- like relationship between west fraser mills and the tree faller, and that this case is there- fore distinguishable from petro- canada v. british columbia (workers’ compensation board), 2009 bcca 396, 98 bclr (4th) 1, upon which the tribunal relied. [34] premièrement, elle soutient que le libellé du par. 196(1) et le contexte dans lequel il s’inscrit mi- litent contre une interprétation qui permet d’infl iger à un « propriétaire » une sanction dont la loi prévoit l’infl iction à un « employeur ». la loi établit une distinction entre « employeur » et « propriétaire » et énonce les obligations de chacun (art. 115 et 119). [35] deuxièmement, elle avance que, dans les dispositions d’exécution de la loi, le législateur fait des choix précis quant aux personnes visées. certaines dispositions s’appliquent uniquement à un « employeur » (art 1861, par. 196(1) et art 1961), d’autres plus généralement à une [traduction] « personne », soit à n’importe qui (art. 194, 195 et 198). elle fait valoir que, au vu de ce libellé, il est singulier d’interpréter largement le terme « em- ployeur » de manière à englober une entité qui com- met une infraction en tant que « propriétaire ». [36] troisièmement, west fraser mills signale que, selon l’art. 123 de la loi, l’entité qui est à la fois employeur et propriétaire [traduction] « à l’égard d’un lieu de travail » doit s’acquitter des obligations de l’un et de l’autre. on peut donc penser que le législateur a prévu le chevauchement des fonctions, mais seulement lorsque ces dernières sont liées au même lieu de travail. west fraser mills soutient que le tribunal ne conclut pas à l’existence d’un lien employeur- employé entre l’abatteur et elle, de sorte que les faits de la présente affaire se distinguent de ceux à l’origine de l’arrêt petro- canada c. british columbia (workers’ compensation board), 2009 bcca 396, 98  bclr  (4th) 1, qu’invoque le tribunal. [37] however, these arguments are not conclusive. they support one way of interpreting s. 196(1) — a plausible but narrow way. they are countered by other arguments that support the broader interpreta- tion of s. 196(1) that the tribunal chose. [37] ces arguments ne sont toutefois pas convain- cants. ils appuient une interprétation plausible, mais étroite du par. 196(1), et ils sont réfutés par d’autres qui militent en faveur de l’interprétation large du par. 196(1) retenue par le tribunal. [38] a second plausible interpretation of s. 196(1) — one more supportive of the goal of promoting safety and the overall operation of the scheme — is [38] une seconde interprétation plausible du par. 196(1) appuie davantage l’objectif de sécurité et l’application générale du régime. suivant cette 656 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. available. on this interpretation, west fraser mills, while it was the “owner” of the license to log on the site, was also an “employer” in relation to the worksite and the fatality that occurred. the evidence, accepted by the tribunal and not challenged here, showed that west fraser mills employed persons to carry out the duties imposed by s 262(1) of the regulation. those employees had responsibilities directly related to the worksite where the accident occurred. in this sense, west fraser mills was an “employer” for purposes of s. 196(1) because there is a factual link between west fraser mills’ activities and choices as an employer of individuals meant to monitor the worksite and the incident that occurred. more broadly, west fraser mills had statutory and regulatory duties with respect to this particular site that, as a corporation, it could discharge only as an employer. [39] the difference between the two interpreta- tions comes down to this. the fi rst interpretation — the logical extension of the interpretation urged by west fraser mills — holds that s. 196(1), in these circumstances, would apply only to the actual em- ployer of the person injured or killed in the accident, which would exclude west fraser mills. the second interpretation says s. 196(1) extends to employers under the act generally and therefore would include owners who employ people to fulfi ll their duties with respect to the worksite where the accident occurred, which would include west fraser mills. both inter- pretations posit an actual connection to the specifi c accident at issue. one limits itself to the employment relationship with the person injured, while the other extends to employment with respect to the worksite that led to the accident and injury. interprétation, même si elle était « propriétaire » suivant son permis d’exploitation, west fraser mills était également « employeur » relativement au lieu de travail et au décès survenu. il appert de la preuve acceptée par le tribunal et non contestée devant nous que west fraser mills avait retenu les services de personnes pour s’acquitter de ses obligations suivant le par 262(1) du règlement. ces employés s’ac- quittaient d’obligations directement liées au lieu de travail où est survenu l’accident. en ce sens, west fraser mills était un « employeur » pour l’applica- tion du par. 196(1) puisqu’il existe un lien factuel entre, d’une part, ses activités et ses choix en tant qu’employeur de personnes censées surveiller le lieu de travail et, d’autre part, l’accident survenu. de façon plus générale, west fraser mills avait à l’égard de ce lieu précis des obligations d’origine législative et réglementaire dont elle ne pouvait s’acquitter, en tant que personne morale, qu’à titre d’employeur. [39] la différence entre ces deux interprétations se résume à ce qui suit. selon la première — qui est le prolongement logique de celle préconisée par west fraser mills —, en pareil cas, le par. 196(1) s’ap- plique seulement à l’employeur véritable de la vic- time de l’accident, ce qui exclurait west fraser mills. selon la deuxième, le par. 196(1) s’applique géné- ralement à tout employeur au sens de la loi et, par conséquent, au propriétaire qui retient les services d’une personne pour s’acquitter de ses obligations à l’égard du lieu de travail où survient l’accident, ce qui engloberait west fraser mills. les deux inter- prétations supposent l’existence d’un lien réel avec l’accident en cause. l’une s’en tient au lien d’emploi avec la victime, tandis que l’autre embrasse tout em- ploi lié au lieu de travail où surviennent l’accident et le préjudice physique. [40] so we arrive at the crux of the debate. the tribunal had before it two competing plausible in- terpretations of s. 196(1) (although it did not artic- ulate the options precisely as i have). one was a narrow approach that would undermine the goals of the statute. the other was a broad approach, which both recognized the complexity of overlapping and interacting roles on the actual worksite and would further the goals of the statute and the scheme built upon it. the tribunal chose the second approach. [40] nous voilà donc parvenus au cœur du débat. le tribunal était aux prises avec deux interprétations plausibles mais opposées du par. 196(1) (quoiqu’il ne formule pas les deux aussi précisément que je le fais). l’une est étroite et mine les objectifs de la loi. l’autre est large et reconnaît la complexité du chevauchement et de l’interaction des fonctions sur le lieu de travail; elle promeut en outre la réalisation des objectifs de la loi et du régime établi par celle-ci. le tribunal opte pour la seconde approche. s’agit-il [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge en chef 657 was this choice “openly, clearly [and] evidently un- reasonable” so as to border on the absurd? i cannot conclude that it was. [41] courts reviewing administrative decisions are obliged to consider, not only the text of the law and how its internal provisions fi t together, but also the consequences of interpreting a provision one way or the other and the reality of how the statutory scheme operates on the ground: see eg. edmonton (city) v. edmonton east (capilano) shopping centres ltd., 2016 scc 47, [2016] 2 scr 293, at para 61. this is particularly the case where the standard of review is patent unreasonableness. practical justifi cations and the avoidance of impacts that would undermine the objects of the statute may close the door to a conclusion that a particular interpretation “border[s] on the absurd” or is “openly, clearly [and] evidently unreasonable”. [42] in this case, the respective consequences of the competing interpretations militate against fi nd- ing that the interpretation chosen by the tribunal is patently unreasonable. the same is true when one considers the intended operation of the scheme. d’un choix qui revêt un caractère déraisonnable « que l’on ne peut contester, qui est tout à fait éviden[t] », au point de « frôl[er] l’absurde »? je ne peux le conclure. [41] la cour de justice qui contrôle une décision administrative est tenue de prendre en considération non seulement le texte de la loi et l’interaction de ses dispositions, mais aussi les conséquences du choix d’interpréter une disposition d’une manière plutôt que d’une autre et la façon dont le régime lé- gislatif fonctionne concrètement (voir p ex edmon- ton (ville) c. edmonton east (capilano) shopping centres ltd., 2016 csc 47, [2016] 2 rcs 293, par 61). elle y est particulièrement tenue lorsque la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la dé- cision manifestement déraisonnable. des raisons d’ordre pratique et la crainte de répercussions qui mineraient les objectifs de la loi peuvent justifi er le refus de conclure qu’une interprétation donnée « frôle l’absurde » ou revêt un caractère déraison- nable « que l’on ne peut contester, qui est tout à fait éviden[t] ». [42] dans la présente affaire, les conséquences respectives des interprétations concurrentes et la manière concrète dont le régime législatif est censé fonctionner militent contre la conclusion selon la- quelle l’interprétation retenue par le tribunal est manifestement déraisonnable. [43] first, as already discussed, a broad interpre- tation of s. 196(1) to include employers under the act whose conduct can constitute a breach of their obligations as owners will best further the statutory goal of promoting workplace health and safety and deterring future accidents. this broad interpretation supports the statutory purpose, which, again, is “to benefi t all citizens of british columbia by promoting occupational health and safety and protecting work- ers and other persons present at workplaces from work related risks to their health and safety”: s. 107 of the act. there is a connection between increased remedies against owners who hold duties as employ- ers for given workplaces and increased occupational health and safety. the general scheme of the act is to hold both owners and employers responsible in [43] premièrement, je le rappelle, l’interpréta- tion large qui inclut dans le champ d’application du par. 196(1) l’employeur au sens de la loi dont les actes sont susceptibles de constituer un manquement à ses obligations de propriétaire est celle qui permet le plus la réalisation de l’objectif de la loi de favo- riser la santé et la sécurité au travail et de prévenir de futurs accidents. cette interprétation large appuie l’objectif légal, qui est, rappelons-le, de [traduc- tion] « bénéfi cier à tous les citoyens de la colombie- britannique en favorisant la santé et la sécurité au travail et en protégeant les travailleurs et les autres personnes se trouvant dans un lieu de travail contre les risques professionnels » (art. 107 de la loi). il y a un lien entre, d’une part, des recours accrus contre le propriétaire qui a des obligations d’employeur à 658 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) the chief justice [2018] 1 scr. an overlapping and cooperative way for ensuring worksite safety. [44] second, this interpretation is responsive to the reality that maintaining workplace safety is a complex exercise involving shared responsibilities of all concerned. by contrast, a narrow interpretation of s. 196(1) would hold only one actor — the actual employer of the person injured — responsible for what is, in fact, a more complex joint set of inter- actions that, in combination, produced the accident. [45] third, and crucially, while it is true that s. 196(1) can be engaged on the basis of an employ- er’s failure to comply with its specifi c obligations as an “employer” under the act and any applicable regulations (by virtue of s. 196(1)(b)), the provision is not limited to such circumstances. employers can also be subject to a penalty under s. 196(1) if they fail “to take suffi cient precautions for the prevention of work related injuries or illnesses” (s. 196(1)(a)) or if “the employer’s workplace or working conditions are not safe” (s 196(1)(c)). section 196(1)(c) in par- ticular indicates the legislature’s choice to focus, not on the specifi c relationship between the impugned employer and the victim of a workplace accident, but on the relationship between the employer and the worksite that led to the accident and injury. l’égard d’un lieu de travail et, d’autre part, une santé et une sécurité professionnelles accrues. l’économie générale de la loi veut que, par le chevauchement de leurs fonctions et la collaboration qui s’impose alors, il incombe au propriétaire et à l’employeur d’assurer la sécurité du lieu de travail. [44] deuxièmement, cette interprétation tient compte du fait qu’assurer la sécurité du lieu de travail est complexe et fait intervenir des obligations dont l’exé- cution incombe à tous les intéressés. en revanche, suivant une interprétation étroite du par. 196(1), un seul intéressé — le véritable employeur de la vic- time — est tenu responsable de ce qui constitue en fait un faisceau complexe d’interactions qui, en- semble, sont à l’origine de l’accident. [45] troisièmement, et il s’agit d’une considération majeure, même s’il est vrai que le par. 196(1) peut s’appliquer dès lors qu’un « employeur » omet de s’acquitter des obligations précises que lui font la loi et tout règlement applicable (suivant l’al. 196(1)b)), cette disposition ne vaut pas que dans ce cas. l’em- ployeur peut également faire l’objet d’une sanction sur le fondement du par. 196(1) s’il ne prend pas de « précautions suffi santes pour prévenir les lésions ou les maladies professionnelles » (al. 196(1)a)) ou si « le lieu de travail de l’employeur ou les conditions de travail ne sont pas sécuritaires » (al 196(1)c)). l’alinéa 196(1)c) fait particulièrement ressortir la volonté du législateur de mettre l’accent non pas sur le lien spécifi que entre l’employeur fautif et la victime d’un accident de travail, mais bien sur la relation entre l’employeur et le lieu de travail qui a mené à l’accident et au préjudice physique. [46] seen in this light, it is not specifi cally west fraser mills’ violation of s 262(1) of the regulation (in its role as owner) that triggers s 196(1). instead, the same failures that led to the infraction under s 262(1) can be separately seen as either a failure “to take suffi cient precautions” or as an indication that the “workplace or working conditions are not safe” (or perhaps both). the same misconduct may attract multiple sanctions. for example, the negli- gence of a forest license owner in particular factual scenarios could amount to a breach of s 262(1) of the regulation as well as a “fail[ure] to take suffi cient [46] partant, ce n’est pas précisément l’infraction de west fraser mills au par 262(1) du règlement (en sa qualité de propriétaire) qui emporte l’applica- tion du par 196(1). en fait, chacune des omissions ayant mené à l’infraction au par 262(1) peut être considérée comme une omission de « [prendre des] précautions suffi santes » ou une indication que « le lieu de travail de l’employeur ou les conditions de travail ne sont pas sécuritaires » (voire les deux). un même acte fautif peut emporter plusieurs sanctions. à titre d’exemple, la négligence du titulaire d’un per- mis d’exploitation forestière pourrait, dans certaines [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge en chef 659 precautions” under s. 196(1) of the act. indeed, it was at least partly on this basis that the penalty was initially imposed on west fraser mills and deemed appropriate by the tribunal. [47] the tribunal’s approach in this regard is supported by prior jurisprudence. in my view, the tribunal did not err in relying on petro- canada. petro- canada held that it was reasonable for the board to conclude that the corporate employer/ owner of various service stations had obligations as an employer under s. 115 of the act for those diverse workplaces because it exercised suffi cient control over them. here, west fraser mills had suffi cient knowledge and control over the worksite in question to render it responsible for the safety of the work- site. it was not erroneous for the tribunal to rely on petro- canada, which would suggest that west fraser mills’ obligations with respect to the worksite were not limited to concerns about the health and safety of its own employees. [48] it is true that the tribunal in this case did not fi nd an employment- like relationship between west fraser mills and the fatally injured faller, but, as discussed above, it did fi nd a relationship between west fraser mills and the safety of the worksite — west fraser mills employed an individual whose job it was to monitor the worksite in a manner consistent with west fraser mills’ duties under the act. west fraser mills’ relationship to the safety of the work- site was not solely that of an owner; west fraser mills was implicated in the fatality as an “employer”. therefore, it was not “absurd” for the tribunal to in- terpret s. 196(1) to apply in this case, and to fi nd that west fraser mills failed in its role as an employer under the act, given both west fraser mills’ link to the worksite and the factual basis underlying the s 262(1) infraction. situations, équivaloir à une infraction au par 262(1) du règlement, ainsi qu’à une « [omission de prendre] des précautions suffi santes » suivant le par. 196(1) de la loi. d’ailleurs, c’est au moins en partie pour cette raison que la sanction a été infl igée au départ à west fraser mills et a été jugée indiquée par le tribunal. [47] la jurisprudence appuie la démarche du tribunal. à mon avis, ce dernier n’a pas tort de se fonder sur l’arrêt petro- canada. dans cette décision, la cour d’appel statue que la commission a conclu à raison que la personne morale qui est à la fois em- ployeur et propriétaire de plusieurs stations- service a des obligations en tant qu’employeur aux termes de l’art. 115 de la loi relativement aux différents lieux de travail parce qu’elle possède une maîtrise suffi sante sur eux. dans le cas qui nous occupe, west fraser mills possédait à l’égard du lieu de travail en cause des connaissances et une maîtrise suffi - santes pour avoir l’obligation d’assurer sa sécurité. le tribunal ne commet pas d’erreur en invoquant l’arrêt petro- canada, d’où la conclusion que west fraser mills n’avait pas, à l’égard du lieu de travail, que l’obligation d’assurer la santé et la sécurité de ses propres employés. [48] certes, le tribunal ne conclut pas en l’espèce à l’existence entre west fraser mills et l’abatteur blessé mortellement d’une relation apparentée à celle qui lie un employeur et un employé. mais, je le ré- pète, il conclut qu’un lien existait entre west fraser mills et la sécurité du lieu de travail : west fraser mills avait embauché une personne pour surveiller le lieu de travail conformément aux obligations que lui faisait la loi. le lien de west fraser mills avec la sécurité du lieu de travail n’était pas qu’à titre de propriétaire; l’entreprise a joué un rôle à titre d’« employeur » dans le décès survenu. il n’était donc pas « absurde » que le tribunal considère que le par. 196(1) s’applique en l’espèce et conclue que west fraser mills avait manqué à son obligation d’employeur suivant la loi, compte tenu à la fois du lien entre l’entreprise et le lieu de travail et des faits sous- jacents à l’infraction au par 262(1). [49] finally, while the tribunal did not put the matter precisely as i have in these reasons, this is not fatal. it cannot be denied that the tribunal understood [49] enfi n, même si le tribunal n’a pas formulé la question en litige aussi précisément que je le fais dans les présents motifs, ce n’est pas fatal. on ne 660 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. the debate that it was tasked to resolve; it recognized the big picture and understood the implications of competing interpretations of s 196(1). it understood and discussed the fundamental choice it faced — the choice between a narrow, textual approach and a broader, more contextual approach. its decision is reasoned and presents a justiciable basis for review. reviewing courts are entitled to supplement the rea- sons of an administrative body, within appropriate limits: newfoundland and labrador nurses’ union v. newfoundland and labrador (treasury board), 2011 scc 62, [2011] 3 scr 708, at paras 16-18. this case clearly falls within those limits. peut nier qu’il comprend bien le débat qu’il est ap- pelé à trancher : il dégage la vue d’ensemble et saisit les conséquences qui découlent des interprétations concurrentes du par 196(1). il comprend et analyse l’alternative qui lui est présentée : adopter une ap- proche étroite et textuelle ou une approche plus large, plus contextuelle. sa décision est rationnelle et offre une base juridique au contrôle. la cour de révision peut étoffer les motifs d’un décideur administratif en respectant les limites qui s’imposent (newfoundland and labrador nurses’ union c terre- neuve-et- labrador (conseil du trésor), 2011 csc 62, [2011] 3 rcs 708, par 16-18). le tribunal ne franchit clairement pas ces limites en l’espèce. [50] for these reasons, i conclude that the tri- bunal’s interpretation of s.  196(1), which covers west fraser mills as it operated with respect to the worksite where the fatality occurred, is not patently unreasonable. [50] pour ces motifs, je conclus que l’interprétation du tribunal selon laquelle le par. 196(1) s’applique à west fraser mills du fait que celle-ci exerçait ses activités en lien avec le lieu de travail où le décès est survenu n’est pas manifestement déraisonnable. iv conclusion iv dispositif [51] i would dismiss the appeal and confi rm the decision of the tribunal, with no costs to the tribunal and costs here and below to the board, both as re- quested. [51] je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi et de con- fi rmer la décision du tribunal. aucuns dépens ne sont adjugés au tribunal, mais des dépens devant la cour et les juridictions inférieures sont adjugés à la commission, conformément aux vœux des deux parties. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par côté j. (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i. introduction i. introduction [52] west fraser mills ltd. (“west fraser”) hired an independent contractor to fall “trap trees” to re- duce beetle population levels on its property. the contractor, in turn, hired a faller to carry out the work. the faller reported to and was supervised by the contractor, not west fraser. although west fraser was an “owner” of the workplace within the meaning of the workers compensation act, rsbc 1996, c. 492, all parties agree that it was not the faller’s employer. [52] west fraser mills ltd. (« west fraser ») a re- tenu les services d’un entrepreneur indépendant pour abattre des « arbres pièges » en vue de réduire la po- pulation d’insectes sur sa propriété. l’entrepreneur a embauché à son tour un abatteur pour exécuter les travaux. l’abatteur rendait compte à l’entrepreneur et travaillait sous sa surveillance, et non celle de west fraser. west fraser était certes « propriétaire » du lieu de travail au sens de la workers’ compensation act, rsbc 1996, c. 492 (« loi »), mais les par- ties conviennent qu’elle n’était pas l’employeur de l’abatteur. [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 661 [53] the workers’ compensation board of british columbia (“board”) investigated the faller’s death after he was struck by a rotting tree. it issued a re- port concluding, in relevant part, that west fraser violated s 262(1) of the occupational health and safety regulation, bc. reg 296/97. it also imposed an administrative penalty under s. 196(1) of the act with respect to the violations of s 262(1) of the regulation. [53] la workers’ compensation board de la colombie- britannique (« commission ») a fait en- quête sur le décès de l’abatteur causé par la chute d’un arbre en décomposition. dans son rapport, elle conclut notamment que west fraser a contrevenu au par 262(1) de l’occupational health and safety regulation, bc. reg. 296/97 (« règlement »). elle lui a également imposé une sanction administrative en vertu du par. 196(1) de la loi pour cette infraction. [54] this appeal raises two questions first, is s 262(1) of the regulation ultra vires? and if not, can the board impose an administrative penalty on west fraser for violating its obligations as an owner? in my view, s 262(1) falls beyond the board’s del- egated authority and is therefore ultra vires. but even if s 262(1) was intra vires, the board erred in imposing an administrative penalty on west fraser. therefore, i would allow the appeal. [54] le présent pourvoi soulève deux questions. premièrement, le par 262(1) du règlement est-il ultra vires? deuxièmement, dans la négative, la commission peut- elle imposer à west fraser une sanction administrative pour avoir manqué à ses obli- gations de propriétaire? à mon avis, le par 262(1) outrepasse le pouvoir délégué de la commission, de sorte que la disposition est ultra vires. et même si le par 262(1) était intra vires, la commission a eu tort d’imposer une sanction administrative à west fraser. je suis donc d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi. ii validity of section 26.2(1) of the regulation ii validité du par 262(1) du règlement [55] the workers compensation act empowers the board to enact certain types of regulations. pursuant to those powers, the board promulgated s 262(1), which imposes specifi c obligations on owners of forestry operations. west fraser, which the board found to have violated s 262(1), challenges whether the board had lawful authority to enact this provision of the regulation under the terms of the act. [55] la loi confère à la commission le pouvoir d’adopter certains types de règlement. c’est en vertu de ce pouvoir qu’elle a adopté le par 262(1), qui as- sujettit le propriétaire d’une entreprise d’exploitation forestière à certaines obligations. west fraser, que la commission a déclarée coupable d’une infraction au par 262(1), conteste le pouvoir de la commission d’adopter cette disposition réglementaire aux termes de la loi. a standard of review a norme de contrôle [56] correctness is the appropriate standard of review for determining whether a regulator exceeded the scope of its statutory authority to promulgate regulations. the fi rst question in this appeal is ju- risdictional in nature: whether the board has the authority to adopt a regulation of this nature at all. this is not a challenge to the merits or the substance of a regulation. this inquiry lends itself to only one answer: either the board acted within its powers, or it did not. there is no “reasonable” range of out- comes when a court is asked to determine whether the board — which possesses only the authority that [56] la norme de la décision correcte est la norme de contrôle qu’il convient d’appliquer pour décider si un organisme a outrepassé ou non son pouvoir de réglementation. la première question que soulève le présent pourvoi est de nature juridictionnelle : la commission a-t-elle même seulement le pouvoir d’adopter un tel règlement? il ne s’agit pas de se prononcer sur la valeur ou la teneur du règlement. la question appelle seulement une réponse : soit la commission a agi dans les limites de ses pouvoirs, soit elle a outrepassé ceux-ci. il n’y a pas plusieurs issues « raisonnables » possibles lorsqu’il s’agit de 662 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. is delegated to it by statute — exercised its legislative powers in accordance with its mandate. in this con- text, correctness simply means that a reviewing court must engage in a de novo analysis of the regulator’s statutory authority to promulgate regulations, apply- ing the usual approach to statutory interpretation, and determine whether the impugned regulation falls within that grant of authority. [57] this appeal highlights an important distinc- tion between actions taken by a regulator in an adju- dicative capacity and actions taken by a regulator in a legislative capacity — a distinction that is central to the policy concerns that animate judicial review and the traditional standard of review analysis. [58] a regulator (in this case, the board) acts in an adjudicative capacity when it resolves case- specifi c disputes that are brought before it in accordance with its statutory mandate and applicable law. it is in this context that a tribunal may bring technical expertise to bear or exercise discretion in accordance with policy preferences. it is also in this context that there may exist a range of reasonable conclusions, as it may not be possible to say that there is one “single ‘correct’ outcome” for any given dispute (dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, at para. 146, per binnie j). décider si la commission — qui ne possède que le pouvoir qui lui est délégué par le législateur — a exercé son pouvoir de réglementation conformément à son mandat. dès lors, l’application de la norme de la décision correcte oblige simplement la cour de révision à entreprendre sa propre analyse du pouvoir de réglementation conféré par la loi, en recourant aux règles habituelles d’interprétation législative, et à décider si le règlement contesté relève ou non de ce pouvoir. [57] le présent pourvoi fait ressortir une distinc- tion importante entre les mesures prises par un or- ganisme de réglementation dans l’exercice de sa fonction décisionnelle et les mesures qu’il prend dans l’exercice de sa fonction réglementaire, une distinction qui est au cœur des considérations de principe qui sous- tendent le contrôle judiciaire et l’analyse qui préside traditionnellement à la déter- mination de la norme de contrôle applicable. [58] un organisme de réglementation (en l’oc- currence, la commission) agit dans l’exercice de sa fonction décisionnelle lorsqu’il statue sur un différend dont il est saisi conformément à son man- dat statutaire et au droit applicable. c’est dans ce contexte qu’un tribunal administratif peut faire ap- pel à son expertise technique ou exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire en fonction de ses préférences sur le plan des principes. c’est également dans ce contexte qu’il peut exister de multiples conclusions raison- nables lorsqu’il n’est pas possible d’affi rmer qu’il n’y a qu’une « seule décision correcte » dans une affaire donnée (dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, par. 146, le juge binnie). [59] on the other hand, a regulator acts in a legis- lative capacity when it enacts subordinate legislation pursuant to a statutory grant of power. the scope of the body’s regulation- making authority is a question of pure statutory interpretation: did the legislature permit that body to enact the regulation at issue, or did the body exceed the scope of its powers? a regulator does not possess greater expertise than the courts in answering this question. moreover, a challenge to a regulator’s exercise of legislative powers involves no case- specifi c facts and no direct [59] par ailleurs, un organisme de réglementation agit dans l’exercice de sa fonction réglementaire lorsqu’il exerce le pouvoir de législation déléguée que lui confère la loi. l’étendue de son pouvoir de réglementation est une question qui relève stricte- ment de l’interprétation statutaire : le législateur autorise-t-il cet organisme à adopter le règlement ou l’organisme a-t-il outrepassé son pouvoir? un organisme de réglementation ne possède pas à cet égard une expertise plus grande qu’une cour de justice pour trancher qui plus est, la remise en [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 663 considerations of policy, as the merits of the im- pugned regulation are not at issue. in this context, respect for legislative intent — a cornerstone of judi- cial review — requires that courts accurately police the boundaries of delegated power. [60] here, the board was unquestionably engaged in an exercise of legislative rather than adjudicative power when it enacted s 262(1) of the regulation, as the board itself concedes. to determine the stand- ard of review, the question the court must answer is whether this board is entitled to any deference as to its own conclusion that it had the authority to enact the impugned regulation. [61] the standard of review framework established in dunsmuir was developed in the context of a chal- lenge to a tribunal’s exercise of adjudicative power. the issue there was the validity of an adjudicator’s conclusions regarding an employee’s dismissal and the standard of review that should apply. dunsmuir’s categories of reasonableness review and correctness review must be understood in that context. in con- trast, this case does not raise the issue of whether a case- specifi c dispute was resolved appropriately. rather, the issue it raises is whether a regulator ex- ceeded its authority when it enacted an impugned regulation, which is an exercise of legislative power. question de l’exercice du pouvoir d’un organisme de réglementer ne fait pas intervenir l’examen de faits particuliers ou de considérations de principe directes, puisque la valeur du règlement contesté n’est pas en cause. dès lors, le respect de l’intention du législateur  — l’une des pierres angulaires du contrôle judiciaire — requiert des cours de justice qu’elles surveillent étroitement les frontières du pouvoir délégué. [60] en l’espèce, et comme elle l’admet elle- même, la commission a incontestablement agi dans l’exer- cice de son pouvoir de réglementation, et non de son pouvoir décisionnel, en adoptant le par 262(1) du règlement. pour déterminer la norme de contrôle applicable, la cour doit se demander s’il y a lieu d’accorder déférence à la conclusion de la commis- sion selon laquelle elle avait le pouvoir d’adopter le règlement contesté. [61] le cadre d’analyse de la norme de contrôle établi dans dunsmuir l’a été dans le contexte de la contestation de l’exercice du pouvoir décisionnel d’un tribunal administratif. le litige portait sur la validité des conclusions d’un arbitre quant au congé- diement d’un employé et à la norme de contrôle à appliquer. c’est dans ce contexte que la norme de contrôle de la décision raisonnable et celle de la décision correcte établies dans dunsmuir doivent être considérées. or, dans la présente affaire, il n’y a pas lieu de décider si l’organisme de réglementation a bien statué sur un différend dont il était saisi. il s’agit plutôt de savoir s’il a outrepassé son pouvoir en adoptant la disposition réglementaire contestée, c’est-à-dire en exerçant son pouvoir de réglemen- tation. [62] however, dunsmuir is instructive it rec- ognized that “[a]dministrative bodies must    be correct in their determinations of true questions of jurisdiction or vires” (para. 59 (emphasis added)). it also cited approvingly to united taxi drivers’ fel- lowship of southern alberta v. calgary (city), 2004 scc 19, [2004] 1 scr 485, in which this court considered whether a calgary bylaw that froze the issuance of taxi plate licences was within the city’s statutory powers under the municipal government [62] l’arrêt dunsmuir est cependant éclairant. la cour y reconnaît qu’« [u]n organisme administra- tif doit [  ] statuer correctement sur une question touchant véritablement à la compétence » (par. 59 (je souligne)). elle cite aussi en l’approuvant l’arrêt united taxi drivers’ fellowship of southern alberta c. calgary (ville), 2004 csc 19, [2004] 1 rcs. 485, dans lequel elle avait examiné si un règlement de la ville de calgary ayant pour effet de geler le nombre de plaques de taxi pouvant être délivrées 664 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. act, sa 1994, c m-261. writing for a unanimous court, bastarache j. stated, at para. 5: the only question in this case is whether the freeze on the issuance of taxi plate licences was ultra vires the city un- der the municipal government act. municipalities do not possess any greater institutional competence or expertise than the courts in delineating their jurisdiction. such a question will always be reviewed on a standard of cor- rectness: nanaimo (city) v. rascal trucking ltd., [2000] 1 scr 342, 2000 scc 13, at para 29. there is no need to engage in the pragmatic and functional approach in a review for vires; such an inquiry is only required where a municipality’s adjudicative or policy- making function is being exercised. [emphasis added.] [63] united taxi squarely governs this case. it rec- ognized the distinction between legislative and adju- dicative power (see also canadian national railway co. v. canada (attorney general), 2014 scc 40, [2014] 2 scr 135, at para. 51) and the imperative of applying correctness review where there is a direct challenge to the vires of a regulation. this is why dunsmuir held that true questions of jurisdiction must be reviewed on the standard of correctness. unlike exercises of adjudicative power, which may be reviewed for reasonableness under dunsmuir and its progeny, depending on the particular context, questions of vires can attract only one answer. as a result, lower courts have generally understood the enactment of subordinate legislation to be subject to correctness review. see d j m. brown and j m. evans, with the assistance of d. fairlie, judicial re- view of administrative action in canada (loose- leaf), at pp. 15-58 to 15-59, in which the authors write, “[c]ourts apply the standard of correctness when de- ciding whether delegated legislation is ultra vires”, at p 15-58. see also noron inc. v. city of dieppe, 2017 nbca 38, 66 mplr (5th) 1, at para. 11; gander (town) v. trimart investments ltd., 2015 nlca 32, 368 nfl d & peir 96, at para. 14; 1254582 alberta ltd. v. edmonton (city), 2009 abca 4, 448 ar 58, at para. 12; canadian council for refugees v. can- ada, 2008 fca 229, [2009] 3 fcr 136, at para. 57; cargill ltd. v. canada (attorney general), 2014 fc relevait du pouvoir conféré à la municipalité par la municipal government act, sa 1994, c m-261. au nom des juges unanimes de la cour, le juge bas- tarache écrit (au par. 5) : en l’espèce, il faut seulement se demander si, en vertu de la municipal government act, la ville a commis un excès de pouvoir en gelant la délivrance des plaques de taxi. les municipalités ne possèdent pas une expertise ou compétence institutionnelle plus grande que les tri- bunaux pour délimiter leur compétence. l’examen d’une telle question devra toujours se faire selon la norme de la décision correcte : nanaimo (ville) c. rascal trucking ltd., [2000] 1 rcs 342, 2000 csc 13, par 29. il n’est pas nécessaire de procéder à une analyse pragmatique et fonctionnelle pour déterminer s’il y a eu excès de pouvoir; une telle démarche ne s’impose que dans le cas où une municipalité exerce une fonction juridictionnelle ou une fonction de prise de décisions de principe. [je souligne.] [63] l’arrêt united taxi s’applique clairement en l’espèce. il reconnaît la distinction entre le pouvoir de réglementation et le pouvoir décisionnel (voir aussi compagnie des chemins de fer nationaux du canada c. canada (procureur général), 2014 csc 40, [2014] 2 rcs 135, par. 51), ainsi que l’appli- cation impérative de la norme de la décision correcte lorsque la validité d’un règlement est directement contestée. c’est pourquoi, dans dunsmuir, la cour a statué qu’une véritable question de compétence doit faire l’objet d’un contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. contrairement à l’exercice du pouvoir décisionnel, qui peut être assujetti à la norme de la raisonnabilité selon l’arrêt dunsmuir et ceux rendus dans sa foulée, selon le contexte en cause, la question de la compétence n’appelle qu’une seule réponse. voilà pourquoi les juridictions inférieures considèrent généralement que l’adoption d’un rè- glement est assujettie à la norme de la décision cor- recte. voir d j m brown et j m evans, assistés de d. fairlie, judicial review of administrative action in canada (feuilles mobiles), p. 15-58 à 15-59, où les auteurs écrivent [traduction] « [l]es cours de justice appliquent la norme de la décision correcte pour décider de la validité de la législation délé- guée », p 15-58. voir également noron inc. c. ville de dieppe, 2017 nbca 38, 66 mplr (5th) 1, par. 11; gander (town) c. trimart investments ltd., 2015 nlca 32, 368 nfl d & peir 96, par. 14; [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 665 243, 450 ftr 121, at para. 56; broers v. real estate council of alberta, 2010 abqb 497, 489 ar 219, at para. 29; algoma central corp. v. canada, 2009 fc 1287, 358 ftr 236, at para 66. indeed, in this case, it is instructive that the trial court (2015 bcsc 1098, 2 admin. lr (6th) 148), the court of appeal (2016 bcca 473, 405 dlr (4th) 621), west fraser, and the board all agreed that correct- ness was the appropriate standard of review for the vires question. [64] catalyst paper corp. v. north cowichan (dis- trict), 2012 scc 2, [2012] 1 scr 5, and green v. law society of manitoba, 2017 scc 20, [2017] 1 scr 360, are not to the contrary. neither case ad- dressed the question at issue here: whether a regula- tor had the authority to adopt a particular regulation. rather, both involved challenges to the substance or merits of an impugned regulation. in catalyst, the issue was whether a municipality had exercised its taxation powers in a reasonable manner by imposing a particular tax rate for a certain class of property (para 7). there was no question as to the munici- pality’s authority to impose the tax rate, since the relevant enabling legislation gave municipalities “a broad and virtually unfettered legislative discretion to establish property tax rates” (para 26). in green, the issue was whether the law society of manitoba had acted reasonably in imposing particular rules of conduct. as in catalyst, there was no question that the enabling legislation provided “clear authority for the law society to create a [continuing professional development] program” (para 44). 1254582 alberta ltd c edmonton (city), 2009 abca 4, 448 ar 58, par. 12; conseil canadien pour les réfugiés c. canada, 2008 caf 229, [2009] 3 rcf 136, par. 57; cargill ltd. c. canada (procu- reur général), 2014 cf 243, par. 56 (canlii); broers c. real estate council of alberta, 2010 abqb 497, 489 ar 219, par. 29; algoma central corp c. ca- nada, 2009 cf 1287, par. 66 (canlii). il est d’ail- leurs intéressant de constater que, en l’espèce, le tribunal de première instance (2015 bcsc 1098, 2 admin. lr (6th) 148), la cour d’appel (2016 bcca 473, 405 dlr (4th) 621), west fraser et la commission conviennent tous que la question de compétence doit faire l’objet d’un contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. [64] les arrêts catalyst paper corp c. north cow- ichan (district), 2012 csc 2, [2012] 1 rcs 5, et green c. société du barreau du manitoba, 2017 csc 20, [2017] 1 rcs 360, ne vont pas dans le sens contraire. ni l’un ni l’autre ne portent sur la question soulevée en l’espèce : un organisme de réglemen- tation avait-il le pouvoir de prendre un règlement donné? les deux portent plutôt sur la teneur ou la valeur du règlement contesté. dans catalyst, la cour devait décider si une municipalité avait exercé son pouvoir de taxation de manière raisonnable en sou- mettant certains biens- fonds à un taux d’imposition particulier (par 7). le pouvoir de la municipalité de fi xer le taux d’imposition n’était pas contesté, la loi habilitante conférant à celle-ci « un pouvoir discré- tionnaire large et quasi illimité de fi xer les taux de l’impôt foncier à payer » (par 26). dans green, la cour devait décider si le barreau du manitoba avait agi raisonnablement en imposant certaines règles de conduite. tout comme dans catalyst, nul ne contes- tait que la loi habilitante conférait « clairement au barreau le pouvoir de créer un programme [de per- fectionnement professionnel permanent] » (par 44). [65] moreover, there were policy considerations in both cases that militated against correctness review. in catalyst, where the parties agreed that reason- ableness was the appropriate standard of review, the court relied on the fact that municipalities are democratic institutions. applying reasonableness review in this context ensures that courts “respect the responsibility of elected representatives to serve the [65] par ailleurs, dans ces deux affaires, des consi- dérations de principe militaient contre l’application de la norme de la décision correcte. dans catalyst, où les parties avaient convenu que la norme de contrôle applicable était celle de la décision raisonnable, la cour s’est fondée sur le fait que les municipalités sont des institutions démocratiques. l’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable fait alors 666 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. people who elected them and to whom they are ulti- mately accountable” (para 19). this was especially compelling given that a “deferential approach to judicial review of municipal bylaws has been in place for over a century” (para. 21) — a historical tradition that does not exist here. green invoked the same democratic accountability rationale in the context of an impugned law society rule because benchers “are elected by and accountable to members of the legal profession”, the only persons to whom the rules apply (para 23). [66] here, the democratic accountability rationale counsels in favour of the correctness standard. the board is an unelected institution that may exercise only the powers the legislature chose to delegate to it. the correctness standard ensures that the board acts within the boundaries of that delegation and does not aggrandize its regulation- making power against the wishes of the province’s elected representatives. [67] i take no issue with the notion that courts should interpret statutory authorization to promul- gate regulations in a broad and purposive manner, in accordance with modern principles of interpretation. this is precisely how the court approached the issue in katz group canada inc. v. ontario (health and long- term care), 2013 scc 64, [2013] 3 scr. 810. but that proposition is quite different from the idea that courts should defer to a regulator’s incorrect conclusion as to its authority to enact a particular regulation. it is still possible to interpret statutory mandates broadly and purposively while recognizing that there can be only one answer to the question of whether a regulator exceeded its mandate in prom- ulgating an impugned regulation. en sorte que les tribunaux « respect[ent] le devoir qui incombe aux représentants élus de servir leurs concitoyens, qui les ont élus et devant qui ils sont ultimement responsables » (par 19). cette position était d’autant plus convaincante que la « retenue dans la façon d’aborder la révision des règlements muni- cipaux existe depuis plus d’un siècle » (par. 21), une tradition absente en l’espèce. dans l’arrêt green, la cour a invoqué le même principe de responsabilité démocratique à l’égard d’une règle adoptée par le barreau parce que les conseillers sont « élus par les membres de la profession juridique [les seules per- sonnes visées par les règles] et [doivent] leur rendre des comptes » (par 23). [66] en l’espèce, le principe de la responsabilité démocratique milite en faveur de la norme de la décision correcte. la commission est une institution formée de non- élus qui peut uniquement exercer les pouvoirs que lui délègue le législateur. l’application de la norme de la décision correcte fait en sorte que la commission agisse dans les limites de cette délé- gation et n’accroisse pas la portée de son pouvoir de réglementation contre la volonté des représentants provinciaux élus. [67] je ne nie pas que, conformément aux principes modernes d’interprétation, les tribunaux doivent interpréter de manière libérale et téléologique le pouvoir statutaire d’adopter des règlements. c’est précisément ce qu’a fait la cour dans l’arrêt katz group canada inc. c. ontario (santé et soins de longue durée), 2013 csc 64, [2013] 3 rcs 810. mais cela est très différent de l’idée qu’un tribu- nal doive déférer à la conclusion incorrecte d’un organisme de réglementation quant à son pouvoir d’adopter un règlement en particulier. il demeure néanmoins possible d’interpréter de manière libérale et téléologique le pouvoir conféré par une loi tout en reconnaissant qu’il ne peut y avoir qu’une seule réponse à la question de savoir si l’organisme a outre- passé son pouvoir en adoptant le règlement contesté. [68] in fact, katz supports the case for correctness review. first, nowhere in katz did the court pur- port to depart from the traditional reasonableness/ correctness framework. one would expect such a signifi cant doctrinal development, if it occurred, to [68] en fait, l’arrêt katz appuie la thèse favorable à l’application de la norme de la décision correcte. premièrement, à aucun moment la cour ne s’écarte du cadre traditionnel des normes de la décision raison- nable et de la décision correcte. un virage théorique [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 667 be announced rather than implied. to the extent that katz did not openly state the standard of review, it should not be read as sub silentio overturning this court’s express holding in united taxi, reaffi rmed in dunsmuir, that the vires of a regulation is subject to correctness review. [69] second, several of the hallmarks of reasona- bleness review — paying “respectful attention” to the tribunal’s reasons (law society of new brunswick v ryan, 2003 scc 20, [2003] 1  scr  247, at para. 49) and determining whether the decision was “defensible in respect of the    law” (dunsmuir, at para. 47) — were conspicuously missing in katz. perhaps this is because a regulator may not produce a recorded set of reasons when it acts in a legislative capacity, as it does when it engages in adjudicative functions — a distinction that further illustrates the awkwardness of applying anything but correctness review to determine the vires of a regulation. if a court does not know the reasons justifying a decision or an exercise of jurisdiction, how can it afford any deference? but, in any case, the court in katz effec- tively engaged in a de novo analysis of the statutory authority for the regulations at issue, looking to the text of the legislative grants of authority and the purpose behind the enabling statutes. this is, by any defi nition, correctness review. thus, katz is relevant to this appeal only to the extent that it illustrates the applicable principles of statutory interpretation. [70] for these reasons, i am of the view that cor- rectness is the appropriate standard of review. the majority evidently disagrees; but its rationale largely escapes me. in an effort to sidestep many of the ar- guments i have raised about the standard of review, the majority posits that “[w]e need not delve into this debate in the present appeal” (para 23). as a result, important points go unaddressed, and the basis for applying the reasonableness standard remains largely unexplained. aussi important aurait été fait explicitement, et non simplement de manière tacite. dans la mesure où l’arrêt katz n’énonce pas clairement la norme de contrôle applicable, il ne faut pas y voir l’infi rmation sub silentio de la conclusion expresse de la cour dans l’arrêt united taxi, confi rmée dans dunsmuir, selon laquelle la validité d’un règlement commande l’ap- plication de la norme de la décision correcte. [69] deuxièmement, plusieurs des caractéristiques du contrôle selon la norme de la décision raisonnable, comme l’« attention respectueuse » portée aux mo- tifs (barreau du nouveau- brunswick c. ryan, 2003 csc 20, [2003] 1 rcs 247, par. 49) et le fait que la décision « se justifi [e] au regard [  ] du droit » (dunsmuir, par. 47), sont manifestement absentes dans katz. peut- être est-ce parce qu’un organisme de réglementation n’a pas à motiver ses décisions lorsqu’il exerce sa fonction réglementaire, alors qu’il le doit lorsqu’il exerce sa fonction décisionnelle, une distinction qui fait ressortir encore plus l’incongruité d’appliquer une autre norme que celle de la décision correcte pour statuer sur la validité d’un règlement. comment une cour de justice qui ne sait rien de ce qui motive une décision ou l’exercice d’un pouvoir peut- elle faire montre de déférence? quoi qu’il en soit, dans l’arrêt katz, la cour se livre effectivement à une nouvelle analyse du pouvoir statutaire d’adop- ter le règlement en cause, puis elle examine le texte de la disposition habilitante et la raison d’être de cette disposition. cela correspond par défi nition à l’application de la norme de la décision correcte. l’arrêt katz n’est donc pertinent en l’espèce que dans la mesure où il illustre les principes d’interprétation législative applicables. [70] pour ces raisons, je suis d’avis que la norme de contrôle appropriée est celle de la décision cor- recte. les juges majoritaires ne sont manifestement pas du même avis, mais la justifi cation de leur po- sition m’échappe pour l’essentiel. dans le but de réfuter bon nombre de mes arguments concernant la norme de contrôle, la majorité affi rme que « [l]e présent pourvoi n’exige pas que nous approfondis- sions le sujet » (par 23). des points importants ne sont donc pas abordés, et leur application de la norme de la décision raisonnable demeure en grande partie inexpliquée. 668 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. [71] first, the majority simply asserts — with no analysis or explanation — that catalyst and green prescribe reasonableness review where an enabling statute grants a subordinate body discretion to enact regulations. it does not tell us why this is the case. as i have already described, that is not a proper reading of these cases. the majority offers no rebuttal. [71] premièrement, les juges majoritaires affi rment simplement, sans aucune analyse ou explication, que les arrêts catalyst et green prescrivent l’application de la norme de la décision raisonnable lorsque la loi habilitante confère à l’organisme subordonné le pouvoir d’adopter à son gré des règlements. ils omettent cependant de préciser pourquoi il en est ainsi. je le répète, il ne s’agit pas de la bonne lec- ture de ces arrêts. les juges majoritaires n’avancent aucun élément de réfutation à cet égard. [72] second, the majority reasons do not address united taxi. and so one can only speculate whether the majority has chosen to disregard authorities that are contrary to its position, or whether united taxi is now impliedly overturned. prospective litigants would be well served by having a clear answer to that question. [72] deuxièmement, les juges majoritaires ne ré- fèrent aucunement à l’arrêt united taxi. on ne peut donc que conjecturer quant à savoir s’ils ont choisi d’ignorer les décisions qui n’appuient pas leur thèse ou s’il faut y voir une infi rmation tacite de l’arrêt united taxi. il serait utile aux plaideurs éventuels que la cour le précise. [73] third, the majority does not address the dis- tinction between an exercise of legislative power and an exercise of adjudicative power. this distinction, in my view, provides a principled basis for recog- nizing the jurisdictional nature of the question at issue in this case. the majority offers no basis for its disagreement. [73] troisièmement, les juges majoritaires ne se penchent pas sur la distinction entre l’exercice du pouvoir réglementaire et l’exercice du pouvoir dé- cisionnel. or, selon moi, cette distinction offre un fondement rationnel pour reconnaître que la question en litige touche en l’espèce à la compétence. les juges majoritaires ne justifi ent pas leur désaccord. [74] in sum, the majority has offered almost no analysis on a question that will prove to be important in subsequent cases where the vires of a regulation is at issue. in light of the fact that the parties in this case devoted signifi cant attention to this question, a more thorough account of this issue than the majority’s reasons provide would have been helpful. [74] en somme, les juges majoritaires n’offrent à peu près aucune analyse à l’égard d’une question qui sera assurément importante dans les dossiers ultérieurs où le pouvoir d’adopter un règlement sera contesté. comme les parties au pourvoi ont consacré une grande attention à la question, il aurait été utile que les juges majoritaires l’examinent plus attenti- vement. b analysis b analyse [75] section  26.2(1) of the regulation is ultra vires because it impermissibly confl ates the duties of owners and employers in the context of a statutory scheme that sets out separate and defi ned obligations for the relevant workplace entities. therefore, it does not accord with the board’s enabling legislation and falls beyond the scope of the board’s delegated pow- ers. [75] le paragraphe 26.2(1) du règlement est ultra vires en ce qu’il confond indûment les obligations du propriétaire et celles de l’employeur, alors que le régime législatif dans lequel il s’inscrit impose à l’un et à l’autre des obligations distinctes et défi nies. il n’est donc pas compatible avec la loi habilitante de la commission, et son adoption a outrepassé le pouvoir délégué de cette dernière. [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 669 [76] section 26.2(1) of the regulation requires owners to assume responsibility for how forestry operation activities are “planned and conducted” on their premises. it states: [76] le paragraphe 26.2(1) du règlement requiert du propriétaire qu’il assume la responsabilité quant à la manière dont sont « planifi ées et exercées » les activités d’exploitation forestière sur les lieux qui lui appartiennent. en voici le libellé : 26.2 (1) the owner of a forestry operation must ensure that all activities of the forestry operation are both planned and conducted in a manner consistent with this regulation and with safe work practices acceptable to the board. [77] the board’s regulation- making authority is codifi ed in s. 225 of the act. that section provides a relatively broad grant of authority, but subject to the limitation that the board’s regulations must be “[i]n accordance with its mandate under this part”. it states, in relevant part: [traduction] 26.2 (1) le propriétaire d’une entreprise d’exploitation forestière fait en sorte que toutes les activités d’exploita- tion forestière soient planifi ées et exercées conformément au présent règlement et aux pratiques de travail sécuritaires jugées acceptables par la commission. [77] le pouvoir de réglementation de la commis- sion est prévu à l’art. 225 de la loi. il s’agit d’un pouvoir relativement large, mais qui fait l’objet d’une restriction, à savoir que les règlements de la commis- sion soient adoptés [traduction] « [c]onformément au mandat que lui confère la présente partie ». les passages pertinents de cette disposition sont rédigés comme suit : [traduction] 225 (1) in accordance with its mandate under this part, the board may make regulations the board considers necessary or advisable in relation to occupational health and safety and occupational environment. 225 (1) conformément au mandat que lui confère la présente partie, la commission peut prendre les règlements qu’elle juge nécessaires ou souhaitables relativement à la santé et à la sécurité au travail et à l’environnement de travail. (2) without limiting subsection (1), the board may make regulations as follows: (2) sans que soit limitée la portée du paragraphe (1), la commission peut prendre des règlements sur ce qui suit : (a) respecting standards and requirements for the protection of the health and safety of workers and other persons present at a workplace and for the well- being of workers in their occupational environment; a) les normes et les exigences relatives à la pro- tection de la santé et de la sécurité des travail- leurs et des autres personnes se trouvant dans un lieu de travail et au bien- être des travailleurs dans leur environnement de travail; (b) respecting specifi c components of the gen- eral duties of employers, workers, suppliers, su- pervisors, prime contractors and owners under this part; b) des éléments précis des obligations générales des employeurs, travailleurs, fournisseurs, super- viseurs, entrepreneurs principaux et propriétaires suivant la présente partie;   .   . [78] to determine whether s 262(1) falls within the grant of authority in s.  225 of the act, it is [78] pour décider si le par 262(1) respecte les li- mites du pouvoir conféré par l’art. 225 de la loi, 670 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. necessary to examine part 3 of the act in its entirety “to understand the part the provision” — here, the grant of regulation- making power — “plays within the broader scheme” (toronto star newspapers ltd. v. canada, 2010 scc 21, [2010] 1 scr 721, at para 21). see also greenshields v. the queen, [1958] scr 216, at p. 225, per locke j., dissenting; and r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), who writes, at § 13.12, “when analyz- ing the scheme of an act, the court tries to discover how the provisions or parts of the act work together to give effect to a plausible and coherent plan. it then considers how the provision to be interpreted can be understood in terms of that plan.” in other words, the scope of the board’s regulation- making power must be understood against the backdrop of the legislative design. a regulation will not be consistent with the act, or “[i]n accordance with [the board’s] mandate under [part 3]”, if it runs contrary to or otherwise undercuts the legislative scheme. this is one example of where, in the language of katz, it would not be “possible” to construe the regulation “in a manner which renders it intra vires” (para. 25 (emphasis deleted)). [79] in the legislative scheme at issue in this ap- peal, the act defi nes “employer” and “owner” as separate entities, with distinct defi nitions in s 106. it then goes on to expressly differentiate the duties of owners, employers, and others in ss. 115 to 121. the general duties of employers are outlined in s. 115: il faut examiner la partie 3 de la loi dans sa tota- lité afi n de « comprendre le rôle que joue la disposi- tion » (en l’occurrence la disposition attributive du pouvoir de réglementation) « au regard de l’[écono- mie générale] » de la loi (toronto star newspapers ltd. c. canada, 2010 csc 21, [2010] 1 rcs 721, par.  21). voir aussi greenshields c the queen, [1958] rcs 216, p. 225, le juge locke, dissident; r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6e éd. 2014), qui écrit au § 13.12 : [traduction] « dans son analyse de l’économie d’une loi, le tribu- nal tente de découvrir de quelle façon les dispositions ou les parties de la loi interagissent pour donner ef- fet à un plan plausible et cohérent. il examine ensuite comment la disposition à interpréter peut se com- prendre eu égard à ce plan ». autrement dit, la por- tée du pouvoir de réglementation de la commission doit être considérée à la lumière de l’intention du lé- gislateur. un règlement ne sera pas compatible avec la loi ou « [conforme] au mandat que [confère à la commission la partie 3] » s’il va à l’encontre du ré- gime législatif ou mine autrement celui-ci. voilà un cas où, pour reprendre les termes employés par la cour dans l’arrêt katz, il ne serait pas « possible » d’interpréter le règlement « d’une manière qui le rend intra vires » (par. 25 (italique omis)). [79] dans le cadre du régime législatif applicable en l’espèce, la loi définit à son art.  106 «  em- ployeur » et « propriétaire » comme étant des entités séparées, et ce, au moyen de défi nitions distinctes. elle précise ensuite expressément aux art. 115 à 121 les obligations propres au propriétaire, à l’employeur et à d’autres personnes. les obligations générales de l’employeur sont énoncées à l’art. 115 : [traduction] 115 (1) every employer must 115 (1) chaque employeur doit : (a) ensure the health and safety of a) assurer la santé et la sécurité de : (i) all workers working for that employer, and (i) tous ses travailleurs; (ii) any other workers present at a workplace at which that employer's work is being carried out, and (ii) tous les autres travailleurs se trouvant dans un lieu de travail où il exerce ses ac- tivités; [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 671 (b) comply with this part, the regulations and any applicable orders. b) se conformer à la présente partie, aux règle- ments et aux ordonnances applicables. (2) without limiting subsection (1), an employer must (2) sans limiter la portée du paragraphe (1), un employeur doit : (a) remedy any workplace conditions that are hazardous to the health or safety of the employ- er’s workers, a) apporter les correctifs requis lorsque le lieu de travail présente un danger pour la santé ou la sécurité de ses travailleurs; (b) ensure that the employer’s workers b) veiller à ce que ses travailleurs : (i) are made aware of all known or reason- ably foreseeable health or safety hazards to which they are likely to be exposed by their work, (i) soient informés de tous les risques connus ou prévisibles pour la santé ou la sécurité auxquels leur travail les expose; (ii) comply with this part, the regulations and any applicable orders, and (ii) se conforment à la présente partie, aux règlements et aux ordonnances applicables; (iii) are made aware of their rights and duties under this part and the regulations, (iii) soient informés de leurs droits et de leurs obligations suivant la présente partie et les règlements; (c) establish occupational health and safety policies and programs in accordance with the regulations, c) établir des programmes et des politiques de santé et de sécurité au travail conformes aux règlements; (d) provide and maintain in good condition protective equipment, devices and clothing as required by regulation and ensure that these are used by the employer’s workers, d) mettre à disposition le matériel, les dispositifs et les vêtements de protection exigés par règle- ment, assurer leur bon état et veiller à ce que ses travailleurs les utilisent; (e) provide to the employer’s workers the in- formation, instruction, training and supervision necessary to ensure the health and safety of those workers in carrying out their work and to ensure the health and safety of other workers at the workplace, (f) make a copy of this act and the regulations readily available for review by the employer’s workers and, at each workplace where workers of the employer are regularly employed, post and keep posted a notice advising where the copy is available for review, e) offrir à ses travailleurs l’information, la for- mation, l’entraînement et la surveillance né- cessaires à leur santé et leur sécurité et ainsi qu’à celles des autres travailleurs dans le lieu de travail; f) mettre une copie de la présente loi et des règlements à la disposition de ses travailleurs de façon qu’ils puissent la consulter à leur gré et, dans chacun des lieux de travail où ils sont appelés à travailler régulièrement, affi cher en permanence un avis indiquant l’endroit où cette copie peut être consultée; (g) consult and cooperate with the joint commit- tees and worker health and safety representatives for workplaces of the employer, and g) consulter les comités mixtes et les représen- tants en santé et sécurité de ses lieux de travail, et collaborer avec eux; 672 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. (h) cooperate with the board, offi cers of the board and any other person carrying out a duty under this part or the regulations. h) collaborer avec la commission, ses dirigeants et toute autre personne qui exerce une fonction prévue à la présente partie ou aux règlements. [80] read in their entirety, the duties established by s. 115 relate to the supervisory relationship between employers and workers — for instance, employers must ensure the health and safety of workers, ensure that they are aware of known hazards, and provide them with instruction and training in relation to health and safety. it is telling that nearly every pro- vision uses the term “workers”. framed differently, the act makes employers responsible for the manner in which work is carried out at the workplace. [80] considérées dans leur ensemble, les obli- gations prévues à l’art. 115 sont liées à la surveil- lance qu’exerce l’employeur sur ses travailleurs; par exemple, assurer la santé et la sécurité de ses travailleurs, veiller à ce qu’ils soient informés des risques connus et leur offrir de la formation et de l’entraînement en matière de santé et de sécurité. il est révélateur que presque tous les alinéas emploient le terme « travailleurs ». autrement dit, la loi tient l’employeur responsable de la façon dont le travail est effectué dans le lieu de travail. [81] the general duties of owners are set out in s. 119: [81] les obligations générales du propriétaire sont énoncées à l’art. 119 : 119 every owner of a workplace must 119 le propriétaire d’un lieu de travail doit : [traduction] (a) provide and maintain the owner’s land and premises that are being used as a workplace in a manner that ensures the health and safety of persons at or near the workplace, (b) give to the employer or prime contractor at the workplace the information known to the owner that is necessary to identify and eliminate or control hazards to the health or safety of per- sons at the workplace, and a) mettre à disposition et entretenir le bien- fonds et les locaux qui servent de lieu de travail de façon à assurer la santé et la sécurité des per- sonnes qui se trouvent dans le lieu de travail ou à proximité; b) donner à l’employeur ou à l’entrepreneur principal du lieu de travail l’information dont il dispose et qui est nécessaire pour cerner et supprimer ou maîtriser les risques pour la santé et la sécurité des personnes se trouvant dans le lieu de travail; (c) comply with this part, the regulations and any applicable orders. c) se conformer à la présente partie, aux règle- ments et aux ordonnances applicables. [82] read in their entirety, the duties established by s. 119 relate to the relationship between owners and employers — for instance, owners must maintain the land in a certain manner and provide the employer or prime contractor (but not workers) with the nec- essary information to control hazards. none of these duties relates to workers, unlike in s. 115, where all of the duties of employers relate to workers. [82] considérées dans leur ensemble, ces obliga- tions se rattachent à la relation entre le propriétaire et l’employeur; par exemple, le propriétaire doit en- tretenir le bien- fonds d’une certaine manière et com- muniquer à l’employeur ou à l’entrepreneur principal (mais non aux travailleurs) l’information nécessaire à la maîtrise des risques. aucune de ces obligations ne concerne les travailleurs, contrairement à celles énoncées à l’art. 115, qui toutes les concernent. [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 673 [83] read together, ss. 115 and 119 create separate silos of responsibility, whereby the duties ascribed to employers and owners are tethered to their unique roles and capacities to ensure workplace safety. employers, for example, are in the best position to ensure that workers are informed of known or rea- sonably foreseeable safety hazards because of their direct supervisory relationship with their employ- ees — ie, they are in the best position to assume responsibilities relating to the activities that occur at the workplace during the course of employment. owners are in the best position to assume macro- level responsibilities pertaining to the workplace more generally — for instance, ensuring that the premises are adequately maintained. this is the man- ner in which the legislature went about achieving its goal of protecting health and safety at workplaces in the province. [84] this structural reading of the statute is bol- stered by s. 107(2)(e), which states that one of the purposes of part 3 of the act is “to ensure that em- ployers, workers and others who are in a position to affect the occupational health and safety of workers share that responsibility to the extent of each party’s authority and ability to do so”. employers are men- tioned fi rst, and owners are not expressly mentioned at all — emphasizing the primacy of employers in the legislative scheme. this is in contrast to other pro- visions of the statute in which owners are expressly referenced (see, eg, s 123(2)). [83] lus ensemble, les art. 115 et 119 créent des catégories distinctes d’obligations, les obligations de l’employeur et celles du propriétaire étant liées à la fonction et à la capacité particulières de cha- cun d’eux d’assurer la sécurité du lieu de travail. par exemple, les employeurs sont les mieux placés pour informer les travailleurs des risques connus ou raisonnablement prévisibles pour leur sécurité du fait de la surveillance qu’ils exercent directe- ment sur eux, c’est-à-dire qu’ils sont les mieux placés pour s’acquitter d’obligations liées aux ac- tivités que les travailleurs exercent sur le lieu de travail en cours d’emploi les propriétaires sont les mieux placés pour s’acquitter au niveau macro d’obligations liées aux lieux de travail en général; ils doivent par exemple assurer le bon entretien de ces endroits. telle est la démarche adoptée par le législateur en vue d’atteindre son objectif de pro- tection de la santé et de la sécurité au travail dans la province. [84] cette interprétation fondée sur la struc- ture de la loi est étayée par l’al.  107(2)e), selon lequel l’un des objectifs de la partie  3 de la loi est qu’[traduction] « employeurs, travailleurs et autres personnes susceptibles d’infl uer sur la santé et la sécurité des travailleurs partagent cette obliga- tion dans la mesure où ils ont le pouvoir et la capa- cité de le faire ». les employeurs sont mentionnés en premier, alors que les propriétaires ne le sont pas expressément, ce qui fait ressortir le rôle pré- dominant des employeurs dans le régime législatif. cette disposition se distingue d’autres dispositions qui font expressément mention des propriétaires (voir p ex le par 123(2)). [85] moreover, s. 107(2)(e) makes clear that the act aims to impose obligations on parties only “to the extent of [their] authority and ability”, which aligns with the manner in which duties are assigned to employers and owners, respectively, under ss. 115 and 119 of the act. therefore, even though the pur- pose statement in s. 107(1) contains broad language about “promoting occupational health and safety and protecting workers”, the statement itself expressly limits the extent to which (and the means by which) the legislature pursued that purpose. and, of course, declarations of policy (such as the broad statement [85] qui plus est, l’al. 107(2)e) précise que la loi n’impose des obligations aux personnes visées que « dans la mesure où [elles] ont le pouvoir et la ca- pacité [de s’en acquitter] », ce qui s’accorde avec la manière dont les obligations sont attribuées à l’em- ployeur et au propriétaire aux art. 115 et 119 de la loi. par conséquent, même si l’objet du par. 107(1) est énoncé en termes généraux — « favoris[er] la santé et la sécurité au travail et [  ] protég[er] les tra- vailleurs » —, il limite expressément la mesure dans laquelle (et les moyens avec lesquels) le législateur poursuit cet objectif. et, bien sûr, les déclarations de 674 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. in s. 107(1)) “are not jurisdiction- conferring provi- sions” and “cannot serve to extend the powers of the subordinate body to spheres not granted by [the legislature] in jurisdiction- conferring provisions” (reference re broadcasting regulatory policy crtc 2010-167 and broadcasting order crtc 2010-168, 2012 scc 68, [2012] 3 scr 489, at para 22). [86] the impugned regulation does not respect these silos of responsibility. section 26.2(1) requires owners to assume responsibility for the manner in which activities are planned and conducted  —  a function that relates to the relationship between em- ployers and workers and the micro- level decisions about how day-to- day activities at the workplace are carried out. this obligation is categorically different from the macro- level duties related to workplace conditions that are assigned to owners under s 119. as a result, the board imposed, by regulation, a type of obligation that the act reserves to employers. in doing so, it contravened the clear structure of di- vided responsibility that the act creates; it therefore exceeded its mandate and the scope of its delegated legislative powers under s 225. principe (tel l’énoncé général fi gurant au par. 107(1)) « ne sont pas des dispositions attributives de com- pétence » et « ne peuvent donc pas servir à élargir les pouvoirs de [l’]organisme [subordonné] à des domaines non précisés par le législateur dans les dispositions attributives de compétence » (renvoi relatif à la politique réglementaire de radiodiffusion crtc 2010-167 et l’ordonnance de radiodiffusion crtc 2010-168, 2012 csc 68, [2012] 3 rcs 489, par 22). [86] la disposition réglementaire contestée ne respecte pas cette répartition des obligations. le paragraphe  26.2(1) oblige le propriétaire à faire en sorte que les activités soient planifi ées et exer- cées d’une certaine manière, une obligation qui se rattache au lien entre l’employeur et le travail- leur, ainsi qu’aux décisions prises au niveau micro concernant le déroulement des activités au quoti- dien sur le lieu de travail. cette obligation se dis- tingue nettement des obligations au niveau macro quant à l’état du lieu de travail qui incombent au propriétaire suivant l’art.  119 la commission a donc créé, par règlement, une obligation que la loi ne réserve qu’aux employeurs. ce faisant, elle a contrevenu à la structure claire de la division des obligations dans la loi; elle a donc outrepassé son mandat et débordé le cadre du pouvoir qui lui est délégué à l’art 225. [87] section 225(1) of the act does authorize the board to make regulations it considers necessary or advisable. but this grant of authority cannot be read as permitting the board to undermine the statutory scheme established by the province’s elected rep- resentatives through legislation. otherwise, there would be no functional limit on the board’s ability to enact regulations, provided that each regulation is in some way connected to some abstract vision of occupational health and safety. [87] le paragraphe 225(1) de la loi permet à la commission d’adopter les règlements qu’elle juge nécessaires ou souhaitables, mais on ne saurait y voir l’autorisation de miner le régime législatif établi par les représentants élus de la province. autrement, le pouvoir de réglementation de la commission ne connaîtrait aucune limite fonctionnelle dans la me- sure où chaque règlement est de quelque manière lié à une certaine notion abstraite de la santé et la sécurité au travail. [88] consider a slightly different case. section 115(2)(d) of the act makes employers responsible for providing and ensuring the use of protective equipment by workers. could the board, by regu- lation, impose that same overlapping responsibil- ity on owners, despite the fact that the legislature clearly chose to assign that duty to employers and [88] considérons un cas légèrement différent. l’ali- néa 115(2)d) de la loi oblige l’employeur à mettre du matériel de protection à la disposition de ses travail- leurs et à veiller à ce qu’ils l’utilisent. la commis- sion pourrait- elle, par règlement, imposer la même obligation au propriétaire alors que le législateur a manifestement choisi de l’imposer à l’employeur et [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 675 not to owners? under the majority’s reasons, it surely could — because, as the majority states, “the legis- lature indicated it wanted the board to enact what- ever regulations it deemed necessary” (chief justice mclachlin’s reasons, at para 10). this illustrates the boundless nature of the majority’s interpretive approach, which would permit the board to erode, or outright ignore, the careful and considered legislative scheme that the province enacted. [89] i agree with the majority that s. 119 of the act is not “a complete and exhaustive statement of owners’ duties” (chief justice mclachlin’s reasons, at para 17). but the question here is not whether the board can impose additional duties on owners that are not specifi ed or particularized in the statute — it clearly can. rather, the question we are asked to answer is whether the board may impose on owners an obligation of this nature. contrary to what the majority states, at para. 17, it is not my position that a regulation must necessarily be “specifi cally tethered to s. 119” to be valid in all cases. my point is simply that a regulation enacted pursuant to the act — whether or not it is expressly linked to the text of the obligations outlined in s. 119 — may not undermine the operation of the statute as a whole by assigning duties to owners that are clearly not contemplated by the act, when read in light of its structure and the statement of purpose in s 107(2)(e). non au propriétaire? selon les juges majoritaires, elle le pourrait assurément car, disent- ils, « le législateur a exprimé la volonté que la commission [adopte] tout règlement jugé nécessaire » (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par 10). cet exemple démontre que la méthode d’interprétation préconisée par la majorité manque à ce point de délimitation qu’elle permettrait à la commission de saper le régime lé- gislatif soigneusement conçu par la province ou d’en faire carrément abstraction. [89] je conviens avec les juges majoritaires que l’art.  119 de la loi n’est pas «  une énumération complète et exhaustive des obligations du proprié- taire » (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par 17). cependant, il ne s’agit pas en l’espèce de savoir si la commission peut imposer au propriétaire d’autres obligations en sus de celles qui sont précisées dans la loi, car elle peut manifestement le faire. nous sommes plutôt appelés à décider si la commission peut assujettir le propriétaire à une obligation de cette nature. contrairement à ce qu’affi rment les juges majoritaires (au par. 17), je ne prétends pas que, dans tous les cas, un règlement doit forcément être « expressément reli[é] au texte précis de l’art. 119 » pour être valide. je dis simplement qu’un règlement adopté en vertu de la loi — qu’il soit expressément relié ou non au texte des obligations énoncées à l’art. 119 — ne saurait miner l’application de la loi dans son ensemble en rendant le propriétaire débi- teur d’obligations que la loi ne prévoit clairement pas lorsque celle-ci est interprétée à la lumière de sa structure et de l’objectif énoncé à l’al 107(2)e). [90] nor do i fi nd the external contextual factors that the majority outlines to be persuasive — factors that, in any event, are not appropriate considerations when assessing the vires of subordinate legislation (see justice brown’s reasons, at paras 117-20). the board may well have enacted s 262(1) in response to the government’s concern about the growing rate of workplace fatalities in the forestry sector (chief justice mclachlin’s reasons, at para 20). but this does not permit the board to undermine the leg- islature’s statutory scheme for addressing workplace health and safety — particularly since the scheme, as i have described it, creates clear lines of author- ity and accountability for workplace safety issues. [90] j’estime de plus que les facteurs contextuels externes dont font mention les juges majoritaires ne sont pas convaincants. de toute manière, il ne s’agit pas de considérations pertinentes pour décider de la validité d’une disposition issue de l’exercice du pouvoir délégué (voir motifs du juge brown, par 117-120). la commission peut bien avoir adopté le par 262(1) en raison de l’inquiétude exprimée par le gouvernement provincial face à l’augmentation du nombre de décès au travail dans le secteur forestier (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par 20). elle ne peut pas pour autant miner le régime législatif établi par le législateur pour assurer la santé et la sécurité au travail, d’autant plus que le régime, dont 676 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. in contrast, the impugned regulation would diffuse responsibility across multiple actors. [91] moreover, s.  26.2(1) is not a “natural ex- tension” of an owner’s obligations under s. 119(a) (chief justice mclachlin’s reasons, at para 21). as discussed, providing and maintaining land or workplace premises is conceptually distinct from managing and supervising the activities undertaken by workers on those premises; and it invokes a dif- ferent type of competency and authority. je fais état précédemment, établit clairement des pouvoirs et des responsabilités distincts en matière de sécurité au travail. or, suivant la disposition régle- mentaire contestée, une même responsabilité rejaillit sur les différents acteurs. [91] par ailleurs, le par 262(1) n’est pas un « pro- longement naturel » des obligations du propriétaire prévues à l’al.  119a) (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par 21). rappelons que la mise à dispo- sition et l’entretien du bien- fonds et des locaux dans le lieu de travail est conceptuellement distinct de la gestion et de la surveillance des activités exercées par les travailleurs à ces endroits et relève d’un type différent de compétence et de pouvoir. [92] as a result, i would fi nd that s 262(1) is ultra vires, and i would allow the appeal on that basis. [92] j’estime donc que le par 262(1) est ultra vires, et j’accueillerais le pourvoi pour cette raison. iii application of an administrative penalty to west iii imposition d’une sanction administrative à west fraser in its capacity as owner fraser à titre de propriétaire [93] even assuming that the impugned regulation is intra vires, as the majority concludes, i would nevertheless allow the appeal on the basis that the board erred in imposing an administrative penalty on west fraser. west fraser was charged with violating its obligations as an owner under s 262(1) of the regulation. yet, it was subjected to an administra- tive penalty under s. 196(1) of the act, which only authorizes the board to impose such a penalty on an entity acting in the capacity of an employer. since there is no nexus between the underlying violation (as an owner) and the imposition of an administrative penalty (applicable only to employers), the board’s decision was patently unreasonable. [93] à supposer même que la disposition réglemen- taire contestée soit intra vires comme le concluent les juges majoritaires, j’accueillerais quand même le pourvoi au motif que la commission a eu tort d’im- poser une sanction administrative à west fraser. west fraser a été accusée d’avoir violé ses obligations à titre de propriétaire aux termes du par 262(1) du règlement. elle a cependant fait l’objet, suivant le par. 196(1) de la loi, d’une sanction administrative qui ne peut être imposée qu’à une entité agissant à titre d’employeur. puisqu’il n’existe aucun lien entre l’infraction sous- jacente (commise par un proprié- taire) et l’imposition d’une sanction administrative (applicable seulement à un employeur), la décision de la commission est manifestement déraisonnable. a standard of review a norme de contrôle [94] the administrative tribunals act, sbc 2004, c. 45 (“ata”), dictates the standard of review for the second question on appeal. section 58 of the ata provides, in relevant part: [94] l’administrative tribunals act, sbc 2004, c. 45 (« ata ») prescrit, pour les besoins de la se- conde question en litige, la norme de contrôle ap- plicable. l’article 58 de l’ata prévoit ce qui suit : [traduction] 58 (1) if the act under which the application arises contains or incorporates a privative clause, relative 58 (1) lorsque la loi sous le régime de laquelle la demande est présentée contient ou incorpore une [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 677 to the courts the tribunal must be considered to be an expert tribunal in relation to all matters over which it has exclusive jurisdiction. [clause privative], le tribunal est considéré comme un tribunal spécialisé par une cour de justice pour toute matière dans laquelle il a compétence exclu- sive. (2) in a judicial review proceeding relating to ex- pert tribunals under subsection (1) (2) dans le cadre d’un contrôle judiciaire visant un tribunal spécialisé au sens du paragraphe (1), (a) a fi nding of fact or law or an exercise of discretion by the tribunal in respect of a matter over which it has exclusive jurisdiction under a privative clause must not be interfered with unless it is patently unreasonable, (b) questions about the application of common law rules of natural justice and procedural fair- ness must be decided having regard to whether, in all of the circumstances, the tribunal acted fairly, and a) une conclusion de fait ou de droit ou une me- sure discrétionnaire du tribunal dans une matière qui relève de sa compétence exclusive par appli- cation d’une [clause privative] ne peut être modi- fi ée que si elle est manifestement déraisonnable; b) toute question touchant à l’application des règles de justice naturelle et d’équité procédu- rale en common law est tranchée en fonction du caractère équitable ou non des actes du tribunal au vu de l’ensemble des circonstances; (c) for all matters other than those identifi ed in paragraphs (a) and (b), the standard of review to be applied to the tribunal's decision is cor- rectness. c) la norme de contrôle applicable à la décision du tribunal sur toute autre question que celles précisées aux paragraphes a) et b) est celle de la décision correcte. [95] according to the majority, the appropriate standard of review is patent unreasonableness (chief justice mclachlin’s reasons, at para 29). assuming that this is the applicable standard of review, i would allow the appeal on the basis that the decision of the workers’ compensation appeal tribunal (“tribu- nal”) (2013 canlii 79509) was patently unreason- able. [95] selon les juges majoritaires, la norme de con trôle applicable est celle de la décision mani- festement déraisonnable (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par 29). à supposer qu’il s’agisse de la norme applicable, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pour- voi au motif que la décision du workers’ compen- sation appeal tribunal (« tribunal ») (2013 canlii 79509) est manifestement déraisonnable. b analysis b analyse [96] section 196(1) of the act, the administrative penalty provision, reads as follows: [96] le paragraphe 196(1) de la loi — la dispo- sition relative aux sanctions administratives — est rédigé comme suit : [traduction] 196 (1) the board may, by order, impose on an em- ployer an administrative penalty under this section if the board is satisfi ed on a balance of probabilities that 196 (1) en vertu du présent article, la commission peut infl iger à un employeur une sanction administrative au moyen d’une ordonnance si elle est convaincue, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, (a) the employer has failed to take suffi cient precautions for the prevention of work related injuries or illnesses, a) que l’employeur n’a pas pris des précautions suffi santes pour prévenir les lésions ou les ma- ladies professionnelles, 678 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. (b) the employer has not complied with this part, the regulations or an applicable order, or b) que l’employeur ne s’est pas conformé à la présente partie, au règlement ou à une ordon- nance applicable, (c) the employer’s workplace or working con- ditions are not safe. c) que le lieu de travail de l’employeur ou les conditions de travail ne sont pas sécuritaires. [97] on a plain reading of this provision, the board may only impose an administrative penalty on “an employer”, not on an owner or any other entity. the wording also makes clear that the underlying vio- lation must have occurred when the offender was acting in the capacity of an employer. this is what the statute means when it says that “the employer has failed to take suffi cient precautions” and that “the employer has not complied with this part, the regulations or an applicable order”. an employer fully complies with applicable law where it satisfi es the obligations that are assigned to employers. [98] the tribunal read this provision to apply to an owner, so long as that owner is also an employer at the workplace — even if it satisfi ed all of the duties and obligations assigned to employers under the act and the regulation. this was erroneous for several reasons. [97] suivant le texte clair de cette disposition, la commission ne peut imposer une sanction adminis- trative qu’à « un employeur », à l’exclusion d’un pro- priétaire ou d’une autre personne. il ressort aussi de son libellé que l’infraction sous- jacente doit s’être produite pendant que le contrevenant agissait à titre d’employeur. c’est ce qu’il faut conclure des énon- cés « l’employeur n’a pas pris des précautions suf- fi santes » et « l’employeur ne s’est pas conformé à la présente partie, au règlement ou à une ordon- nance applicable ». l’employeur se conforme en tous points à la loi applicable lorsqu’il s’acquitte des obli- gations qui lui sont dévolues. [98] pour le tribunal, cette disposition s’applique au propriétaire qui est également employeur dans le lieu de travail, et ce, même s’il s’est acquitté de toutes ses obligations d’employeur suivant la loi et le règlement. cela est erroné pour plusieurs raisons. [99] first, the category of “employer” does not encompass “owner”. this is evident from the sepa- rate defi nitions of the two terms in s. 106 as well as the distinct responsibilities allocated to each entity in ss. 115 and 119. there is no mention whatsoever of any power to impose an administrative penalty on an owner or on an entity acting in the capacity of an owner — which is precisely what the board did in this case. [99] premièrement, le terme « employeur » n’en- globe pas le « propriétaire », comme il appert des défi nitions distinctes de ces deux termes à l’art. 106, ainsi que des obligations distinctes dévolues à chacun d’eux et prévues respectivement aux art. 115 et 119. nulle mention n’est faite de quelque pouvoir d’im- poser, comme la commission l’a fait en l’espèce, une sanction administrative à un propriétaire ou à une entité agissant à titre de propriétaire. [100] second, the fact that s. 196(1) specifi es that an administrative penalty may be imposed on an employer suggests, by negative implication, that a penalty may not be imposed on other categories of persons under the act (see sullivan, at § 8.92 (“when a provision specifi cally mentions one or more items but is silent with respect to other items that are com- parable, it is presumed that the silence is deliberate and refl ects an intention to exclude the items that are not mentioned”)). [100] deuxièmement, le fait que le par. 196(1) pré- cise que la commission peut imposer une sanction administrative à un employeur indique, par inférence négative, qu’elle ne peut pas en imposer une aux autres personnes visées par la loi (voir sullivan, § 8.92 ([traduction] « lorsqu’une disposition fait expressément état d’un ou de plusieurs éléments, mais qu’elle demeure silencieuse sur d’autres qui sont comparables, on présume que son silence est dé- libéré et refl ète son intention d’exclure les éléments qui ne sont pas mentionnés »)). [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 679 [101] third, the tribunal’s interpretation fails to give effect to the legislature’s specifi c choice of lan- guage in s. 196(1), which differs from the language used in other provisions in the act. the legislature would have used broader language if it had intended to empower the board to impose an administrative penalty on an owner (or, as in this case, an owner that is also an employer, but was only found to have breached its obligations as an owner). in other pro- visions, the legislature used the word “person” or “persons” where it intended to encompass multiple entities or entities acting simultaneously in multiple roles. (see, eg, s. 111(2)(d), which states that one of the board’s functions is “to ensure that persons concerned with the purposes of [part 3] are provided with information and advice relating to its adminis- tration and to occupational health and safety”.) the most salient example is s. 217, the general penalties provision. section 217 is analogous to s. 196(1) in so far as it authorizes the imposition of penalties and gives the board an enforcement mechanism. section 217 states that “a person is liable” to the specifi ed penalties — not only “an employer”, which is the word used in s 196(1). likewise, s. 213(1) makes clear that “[a] person who contravenes a pro- vision of this part” commits an offence subject to the general penalties in s 217 “[w]hen different terms are used in a single piece of legislation, they must be understood to have different meanings. if [the legis- lature] has chosen to use different terms, it must have done so intentionally” (agraira v. canada (public safety and emergency preparedness), 2013 scc 36, [2013] 2 scr 559, at para 81). the tribunal’s interpretation disregards this choice of language and treats s. 196(1) as though it was written identically to ss. 213(1) and 217. [101] troisièmement, l’interprétation du tribu- nal ne tient pas compte du libellé choisi par le légis- lateur au par. 196(1), qui diffère de celui des autres dispositions de la loi. le législateur aurait employé un libellé plus général s’il avait voulu que la com- mission puisse imposer une sanction administra- tive à un propriétaire (ou, comme en l’espèce, à un propriétaire qui est aussi employeur, mais dont l’inobservation vise seulement ses obligations à titre d’employeur). dans d’autres dispositions, le légis- lateur emploie le terme « personne » au singulier ou au pluriel afi n d’englober des entités multiples ou des entités agissant simultanément à plusieurs titres. (voir p ex l’al 111(2)d), qui dispose que l’une des fonctions de la commission est [traduction] « de faire en sorte que les personnes concernées par les objectifs de la [partie 3] obtiennent de l’information et des conseils sur l’administration de celle-ci et en matière de santé et de sécurité professionnelles »). l’exemple le plus frappant se trouve à l’art. 217, la disposition générale sur les sanctions. l’article 217 s’apparente au par. 196(1) en ce qu’il permet d’im- poser des sanctions et confère à la commission un pouvoir d’exécution. suivant son libellé, « une per- sonne est passible » des sanctions énumérées, et non seulement « un employeur » comme au par 196(1). de même, le par. 213(1) précise qu’« une personne qui contrevient à une disposition de la présente par- tie » commet une infraction et encourt les sanctions générales prévues à l’art 217 « [l]orsque des termes différents sont employés dans un même texte légis- latif, il faut considérer qu’ils ont un sens différent. il faut tenir pour acquis que le législateur a délibéré- ment choisi des termes différents dans le but d’indi- quer un sens différent » (agraira c. canada (sécurité publique et protection civile), 2013 csc 36, [2013] 2 rcs 559, par 81). l’interprétation du tribunal ne tient pas compte des termes choisis et considère le par. 196(1) comme si son libellé était identique à ceux du par. 213(1) et de l’art 217. [102] fourth, a fuller examination of s. 196 itself confi rms that the use of the term “employer” was no accident, as none of its other subsections uses the term “person” or “owner” rather than “employer”. for example, the due diligence defence (s. 196(3)), the review procedure (s. 196(4)), and the payment procedure (s. 196(5)) all refer to “the employer” or [102] quatrièmement, un examen plus approfondi de l’art. 196 confi rme que le terme « employeur » n’y est pas employé fortuitement puisqu’il est repris dans chacune des autres dispositions au lieu des termes « personne » ou « propriétaire ». par exemple, les dispositions relatives à la défense de diligence raisonnable (par. 196(3)), à la procédure de révision 680 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. “an employer”. the majority’s reasoning in this case effectively rewrites those provisions as well. [103] fifth, given that the act sets out different silos of responsibility for owners and employers, as discussed above, at paras. 79-85, it is consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole for certain remedial measures — here, administrative penalties — to be reserved for breaches of certain types of obligations and not others. [104] the fact that west fraser is an employer in the province, or even at this workplace — although not the employer of the faller who died — does not advance the tribunal’s position. west fraser stood accused of breaching its obligations as an owner under s 262(1) of the regulation. there was no accusation whatsoever that west fraser, as the em- ployer of a supervisor who was temporarily present at the workplace, breached any duty it owed in that capacity. the tribunal did not merely choose be- tween a “narrow approach” and a “broad approach” to the statute (chief justice mclachlin’s reasons, at para 40). rather, it adopted an unbounded inter- pretation — one that is “openly, clearly, evidently unreasonable” because it fails to establish any nexus between the underlying breach (of west fraser’s obligations as an owner under s 262(1)) and the ap- plicability of the administrative penalty (to breaches of the regulation or act by an entity acting in the capacity of an employer, as described above). in order for an administrative penalty to be available, the underlying violation must have occurred when the entity was acting in its capacity as an employer. that was not the case here. (par. 196(4)) et au mode de paiement (par. 196(5)) renvoient toutes à « l’employeur » ou à « un em- ployeur ». le raisonnement des juges majoritaires en l’espèce revient en fait à réécrire ces dispositions. [103] cinquièmement, comme je l’indique pré- cédemment (aux par. 79 à 85), puisqu’elle crée des catégories distinctes d’obligations pour le proprié- taire et pour l’employeur, la loi se concilie avec le régime législatif dans sa globalité en ce qui a trait à certaines mesures réparatrices — en l’occurrence, la sanction administrative — qui ne s’appliquent qu’au manquement à certaines obligations, à l’exclusion du manquement aux autres. [104] le fait que west fraser est un employeur dans la province, voire même dans le lieu de tra- vail visé en l’espèce, bien qu’il n’ait pas été l’em- ployeur de l’abatteur décédé, n’appuie pas la thèse du tribunal. west fraser s’est vu reprocher le man- quement à ses obligations à titre de propriétaire sur le fondement du par 262(1) du règlement. elle n’a pas été accusée en tant qu’employeur d’un surveillant qui se trouvait temporairement dans le lieu de travail, d’avoir manqué à une obligation qui lui incombait à ce titre. le tribunal n’a pas simplement choisi entre une « interprétation étroite » et une « inter- prétation large » de la loi (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par 40). il a plutôt opté pour une inter- prétation non délimitée, une interprétation qui revêt un caractère manifestement déraisonnable « que l’on ne peut contester, qui est tout à fait éviden[t] » parce qu’elle n’établit aucun lien entre le manquement sous- jacent (aux obligations de west fraser en tant que propriétaire suivant le par 262(1)) et l’applica- bilité de la sanction administrative (en cas d’infrac- tion au règlement ou à la loi en tant qu’employeur, comme indiqué précédemment). pour qu’une sanc- tion administrative puisse être imposée, l’inobser- vation sous- jacente doit s’être produite pendant que l’entité agissait en tant qu’employeur. ce n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. [105] the tribunal’s reasoning would expose every owner to administrative penalties in the con- text of forestry operations. consider the effect of its liability fi nding in tandem with its interpretation of s 196(1). as to liability, the tribunal faulted west [105] le raisonnement du tribunal veut que tout propriétaire s’expose à une sanction administrative dans le cadre de ses activités d’exploitation fores- tière examinons l’effet de sa conclusion sur la responsabilité à la lumière de son interprétation du [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) la juge côté 681 fraser because its supervisor did not take reasonable steps to document potential risks at the second work location (tribunal’s reasons, at para 72). thus, in order to comply with applicable law, a forestry op- erations owner must have an employee attend to the workplace. but, by doing so, the owner is necessarily exposed to administrative penalties because a super- visor’s presence makes it an “employer” under the tribunal’s interpretation of s 196(1). the result is that every owner of a forestry operation that complies with the law — not only west fraser on the facts of this case — is potentially subject to administrative penalties. the breadth of this interpretation demon- strates that the tribunal effectively rewrote s. 196(1), replacing the word “employer” with “person”. by doing so, it fundamentally recalibrated the carefully designed scheme of liability set forth in the act, ren- dering the distinction between owners and employ- ers — and the specifi c use of the term “employer” in s. 196(1) — largely meaningless. in my view, the preceding analysis is not sim- [106] ply a “plausible but narrow way” of reading s. 196(1) (chief justice mclachlin’s reasons, at para 37). it is the only way. the tribunal’s conclusion is patently unreasonable because it fails to account for — in- deed, it expressly defi es — the clear and unambigu- ous language of s 196(1). where there is no doubt as to a statutory provision’s meaning, a tribunal’s dis- regard of that meaning renders its decision patently unreasonable. the case for patent unreasonableness is even stronger where, as here, the tribunal’s clearly erroneous interpretation contradicts and undermines the broader statutory scheme. par 196(1). quant à la responsabilité, le tribunal a blâmé west fraser parce que son surveillant n’avait pas pris de mesures raisonnables pour documenter les risques éventuels au deuxième lieu de travail (motifs du tribunal, par 72). ainsi, pour se confor- mer au droit applicable, le propriétaire d’une entre- prise d’exploitation forestière doit s’assurer de la présence d’un employé sur le lieu de travail. or, ce faisant, il s’expose nécessairement à une sanction administrative, car la présence d’un surveillant fait de lui un « employeur » selon l’interprétation du par. 196(1) retenue par le tribunal. dès lors, tout propriétaire d’une entreprise d’exploitation fores- tière qui se conforme à la loi, et non seulement west fraser dans la présente affaire, est passible d’une sanction administrative. la portée de cette interpré- tation démontre que le tribunal réécrit effectivement le par. 196(1) et y remplace le mot « employeur » par le mot « personne ». il modifi e ainsi en profondeur le régime de responsabilité soigneusement conçu par le législateur, vidant essentiellement de leur sens la distinction entre le propriétaire et l’employeur et, en particulier, l’emploi du terme « employeur » au par 196(1). [106] à mon avis, l’analyse qui précède ne consti- tue pas seulement une « interprétation plausible, mais étroite » du par. 196(1) (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par 37). c’est la seule interpréta- tion possible. la conclusion du tribunal est mani- festement déraisonnable parce qu’elle ne tient pas compte — et va en fait expressément à l’encontre — du libellé clair et non équivoque du par 196(1). la décision d’un tribunal administratif qui va à l’en- contre du sens clair d’une disposition législative est manifestement déraisonnable. le caractère manifes- tement déraisonnable d’une décision est encore plus évident lorsque, comme en l’espèce, l’interprétation clairement erronée du tribunal administratif contredit et mine le régime législatif général. [107] it is no answer to suggest that the tribunal’s interpretation “will best further the statutory goal of promoting workplace health and safety and deterring future accidents” (chief justice mclachlin’s rea- sons, at para 43). the legislature may have intended to pursue that purpose, but it did so through limited means — and those means are clearly evident in [107] il ne suffi t pas d’affi rmer que l’interprétation du tribunal est celle qui « permet le plus la réalisa- tion de l’objectif de la loi de favoriser la santé et la sécurité au travail et de prévenir de futurs accidents » (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par 43). le législateur a pu vouloir atteindre cet objectif, mais les moyens adoptés en ce sens — et qui ressortent 682 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) côté j. [2018] 1 scr. s 196(1). to hold that any interpretation that the tribunal views as advancing the goal of health and safety can survive patent unreasonableness scrutiny would render judicial review meaningless. patent unreasonableness may be a highly deferential stand- ard, but there are some interpretations of law that are so far beyond the pale that they cannot be permitted to stand. [108] in fact, it is not even clear that the tribunal’s interpretation does best further the goal of occupa- tional safety. under the tribunal’s approach, west fraser could have avoided an administrative penalty altogether by simply not having a supervisor pres- ent at that workplace. surely that does not promote health and safety. alternatively, the board could have taken other forms of recourse against west fraser under the act rather than pursuing an admin- istrative penalty. the majority considers neither of these possibilities. at a minimum, the suggestion that the tribunal’s interpretation best furthers the act’s purposes is an untested and uncertain proposition on its own terms. the mere fact that the tribunal puts forward this justifi cation cannot serve as a basis for blindly deferring to its interpretation of the statute. [109] finally, the majority suggests that there could be a different basis for imposing an admin- istrative penalty on west fraser than its breach of s 262(1) of the regulation. such an approach totally ignores or disregards what happened in this case. the record is unambiguous: the only regulatory viola- tions that the board cited in support of its decision to impose an administrative penalty were violations of s 262 — which, as i have described, outlines du- ties applicable to owners. nor was there any inde- pendent fi nding that west fraser failed to prevent workplace injuries or did not maintain a safe work- place, apart from its violation of s 262(1). this is confi rmed by the tribunal’s reasons, which focused on the fact of the violation in upholding the admin- istrative penalty: “the violation by [west fraser] of section 26.2(1) of the regulation provides the basis du par. 196(1) — sont limités. conclure que toute interprétation qui, selon le tribunal, promeut l’objec- tif de favoriser la santé et la sécurité au travail peut résister à un contrôle suivant la norme de la décision manifestement déraisonnable revient à vider de son sens la notion de contrôle judiciaire. l’application de la norme de la décision manifestement déraison- nable peut commander une grande déférence, mais certaines interprétations de la loi dépassent tellement les bornes qu’elles ne sauraient être maintenues. [108] et il n’est même pas certain que l’interpré- tation du tribunal soit celle qui permet effective- ment le plus la réalisation de l’objectif de sécurité au travail. suivant cette interprétation, west fraser aurait pu échapper à la sanction administrative en n’affectant tout simplement pas un surveillant au lieu de travail, ce qui, de toute évidence, n’aurait pas été de nature à favoriser la santé et la sécurité. en outre, la commission aurait pu, en vertu de la loi, prendre à l’égard de west fraser d’autres mesures que l’imposition d’une sanction administrative. les juges majoritaires n’examinent aucune de ces possi- bilités. l’affi rmation selon laquelle l’interprétation du tribunal est celle qui permet le plus la réalisation des objectifs de la loi est à tout le moins à la fois non vérifi ée et incertaine. le seul fait que le tribunal avance cette justifi cation ne saurait être suffi sant pour qu’on défère aveuglément à son interprétation de la loi. [109] enfi n, les juges majoritaires laissent entendre que l’imposition d’une sanction administrative à west fraser pourrait avoir un autre fondement que l’in- fraction au par 262(1) du règlement. c’est faire totalement abstraction de ce qui s’est produit dans la présente affaire. les faits révélés par le dossier sont clairs : les seules infractions règlementaires invoquées par la commission à l’appui de sa décision d’im- poser une sanction administrative visent l’art 262, lequel énonce des obligations qui, je le rappelle, ne sont imposées qu’au propriétaire. il n’y a pas non plus de conclusion indépendante selon laquelle west fraser a omis de prévenir les lésions professionnelles ou n’a pas assuré la sécurité du lieu de travail en plus de contrevenir au par 262(1). les motifs du tribunal, qui s’attachent à la perpétration de l’infrac- tion pour confi rmer la sanction administrative, vont [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) le juge brown 683 for fi nding [west fraser] failed to take suffi cient pre- cautions for the prevention of work related injuries” (para. 96 (emphasis added)). [110] the majority’s efforts to tether the penalty to something other than west fraser’s violations of its obligations as an owner disregard what the tribunal actually said. a reviewing court is “not empower[ed]    to ignore the [tribunal’s] reasons altogether and substitute its own” (delta air lines inc. v. lukács, 2018 scc 2, [2018] 1 scr 6, at para. 24, per mclachlin cj), even on a standard of patent unreasonableness. but that is precisely what has occurred here. west fraser’s violations as an owner cannot be repackaged as violations by an employer where the act provides no authority to impose an administrative penalty. as a result, the tribunal’s decision to uphold the imposition of an administrative penalty was patently unreasonable. dans le même sens [traduction] : « l’infraction de [west fraser] au par 262(1) du règlement permet de conclure que [west fraser] a omis de prendre des précautions suffi santes pour prévenir les lésions professionnelles » (par. 96 (je souligne)). [110] les efforts que déploient les juges majori- taires pour relier la sanction à autre chose que les manquements par west fraser à ses obligations de propriétaire font fi de ce que dit vraiment le tribu- nal. une cour de révision n’est « [pas autorisée] à faire complètement abstraction des motifs [du tribu- nal] et à y substituer les siens » (delta air lines inc. c. lukács, 2018 csc 2, [2018] 1 rcs 6, par. 24, la juge en chef mclachlin), même au regard de la norme de la décision manifestement déraisonnable. or, c’est précisément ce qui se produit en l’occur- rence. les infractions reprochées à west fraser à titre de propriétaire ne peuvent se muter en infrac- tions à titre d’employeur lorsque la loi ne confère pas le pouvoir d’imposer une sanction administra- tive. partant, la décision du tribunal de confi rmer l’infl iction d’une sanction administrative était ma- nifestement déraisonnable. iv conclusion iv conclusion [111] in summary, i  would find that s.  26.2(1) of the regulation is ultra vires on the correctness standard of review, and i would allow the appeal for that reason. but even if this was not the case, it was patently unreasonable to impose an administrative penalty — applicable only to breaches committed when acting in the capacity of an employer — on the basis that west fraser was found guilty of breaching its obligations as an owner under s 262(1). i would therefore allow the appeal on this alternative basis as well. [111] en résumé, je suis d’avis d’invalider le par 262(1) du règlement par application de la norme de la décision correcte et d’accueillir en conséquence le pourvoi. à supposer même que la disposition ne soit pas invalide, il était manifestement déraison- nable d’imposer une sanction administrative — la- quelle ne vise que les infractions commises à titre d’employeur — au motif que west fraser a été re- connue coupable de manquements à ses obligations de propriétaire suivant le par 262(1). j’accueillerais donc le pourvoi pour ce motif également. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [112] brown j. (dissenting) — while i agree with the chief justice that the workers’ compensation board of british columbia had the authority to adopt s 262(1) of the occupational health and safety regulation, bc. reg. 296/97, i arrive at that con- clusion via different reasoning. [112] le juge brown (dissident) — bien que je partage l’opinion de la juge en chef selon laquelle la workers’ compensation board de la colombie- britannique (« commission ») avait le pouvoir d’adop- ter le par 262(1) de l’occupational health and safety regulation, bc. reg. 296/97 (« règlement »), j’arrive à cette conclusion au terme d’un raisonnement différent. 684 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) brown j. [2018] 1 scr. [113] the chief justice says, at para. 23, that “[i]t is true” that dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, stated that true questions of jurisdiction “are subject to review on a stand- ard of correctness”. but with respect, that signifi - cantly downplays what this court actually said in dunsmuir, which was that “[a]dministrative bodies must    be correct in their determinations of true questions of jurisdiction or vires”: para. 59 (empha- sis added). further, it is no answer to west fraser’s jurisdictional objection to say, as the chief justice also says, at para. 23, that “such [truly jurisdictional] cases will be rare”. this is a particularly inadequate response where, as here, the chief justice does not herself doubt the jurisdictional quality of the issue at bar. indeed, the issue is elided altogether by the statement that “[w]e need not delve” into whether the board’s authority in this case to adopt s 262(1) is such a question, since “the question the [review- ing] court must answer is not one of vires in the traditional sense, but whether the regulation at issue represents a reasonable exercise of the delegated power”: para 23. [114] to that, i  offer three points in response. first, the issue of the board’s authority to adopt s 262(1) is “an issue of vires relating to subordinate legislation”: canadian copyright licensing agency (access copyright) v canada, 2018 fca 58, at para 80. the question of whether a statutory dele- gate is authorized to enact subordinate legislation is therefore manifestly jurisdictional “in the traditional sense”, as this court’s jurisprudence understands such questions. in other words, this issue does not go to the reasonableness of the board’s decision to adopt s 262(1), but rather to its authority to do so. this falls squarely within the class of questions described by this court in dunsmuir, at para. 59, as arising “where the tribunal must explicitly determine whether its statutory grant of power gives it the au- thority to decide a particular matter”. [113] la juge en chef dit au par. 23 de ses motifs que la cour affi rme « certes », dans dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs. 190, qu’une véritable question de compétence [  ] « fait l’objet d’un contrôle selon la norme de la dé- cision correcte ». en tout respect, cependant, c’est minimiser considérablement ce que dit effectivement la cour dans dunsmuir, à savoir qu’« [u]n organisme administratif doit [  ] statuer correctement sur une question touchant véritablement à la compétence » (par. 59 (je souligne)). de plus, on ne saurait op- poser à la contestation de west fraser relative à la compétence ce que dit par ailleurs la juge en chef au par. 23, c’est-à-dire que « pareil cas [soulevant une véritable question de compétence] se présenter[a] rarement ». une telle réponse est particulièrement inadéquate dans la mesure où la juge en chef ne dit pas elle- même douter du fait que la question soule- vée en l’espèce en est une de compétence. le débat est en fait complètement escamoté par l’affi rmation selon laquelle le pourvoi « n’exige pas que nous ap- profondissions » le sujet, à savoir si, en l’espèce, le pouvoir de la commission d’adopter le par 262(1) soulève une question de cette nature, car « la question que la cour de révision doit trancher n’a pas trait à la compétence au sens traditionnel, mais au fait que le règlement en cause résulte ou non d’un exercice raisonnable du pouvoir délégué » (par 23). [114] je réponds à ces affirmations en formu- lant trois remarques. premièrement, la question du pouvoir de la commission d’adopter le par 262(1) constitue [traduction] «  une question de com- pétence liée à la législation déléguée » (canadian copyright licensing agency (access copyright) c. canada, 2018 caf 58, par 80). la question de sa- voir si un délégataire légal est habilité à réglementer est donc manifestement une question de compétence « au sens traditionnel », selon la manière dont la cour conçoit cette question dans ses arrêts. en d’autres termes, il ne s’agit pas de se prononcer sur le carac- tère raisonnable de la décision de la commission d’adopter le par 262(1), mais plutôt sur son pou- voir de le faire. la question fait clairement partie de celles qui, selon la cour dans dunsmuir (au par. 59), se posent lorsque « le tribunal administratif doit dé- terminer expressément si les pouvoirs dont le législa- teur l’a investi l’autorisent à trancher une question ». [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) le juge brown 685 [115] secondly, courts have almost always ap- plied “the standard of correctness when decid- ing whether delegated legislation is ultra vires”: d j m. brown and j m. evans, with the assistance of d. fairlie, judicial review of administrative ac- tion in canada (loose- leaf), at pp. 15-58 to 15-59; see also united taxi drivers’ fellowship of south- ern alberta v. calgary (city), 2004 scc 19, [2004] 1 scr 485; noron inc. v. city of dieppe, 2017 nbca 38, 66 mlpr (5th) 1, at para. 11; gan- der (town) v. trimart investments ltd., 2015 nlca 32, 368 nfl d & peir 96, at para. 14; 1254582 alberta ltd v edmonton (city), 2009 abca 4, 448 ar 58, at para. 12; canadian council for refu- gees v. canada, 2008 fca 229, [2009] 3 fcr 136, at para. 57; broers v. real estate council of alberta, 2010 abqb 497, 489 ar 219, at para. 29; algoma central corp. v. canada, 2009 fc 1287, 358 ftr. 236, at para 66. [116] this is confi rmed by the court’s own juris- prudence. in dunsmuir, it referred approvingly to its earlier statement in united taxi drivers’ fellowship where (as here) the issue was whether the city of calgary was authorized under the relevant statute to enact subordinate or delegated legislation. in that case, bylaws limited the number of taxi plate li- cences. this was, the court said, at para. 5, a ques- tion of jurisdiction which is always to be reviewed for correctness. this is because a central judicial function is to ensure that statutory delegates such as the board act only within the bounds of authority granted to them by the legislature. this understood, the label matters little. howsoever one characterizes this question — as one of jurisdiction, vires or even as a species of a question of law — the principle remains the same. public power must always be au- thorized by law. it follows that no statutory delegate, in enacting subordinate legislation (that is, in mak- ing law), may ever exceed its authority. the rule of law can tolerate no departure from this principle: dunsmuir, at para 29. [115] deuxièmement, les cours de révision ap- pliquent presque toujours [traduction] « la norme de la décision correcte pour décider de la validité de la législation déléguée » (d j m brown et j m. evans, assistés de d. fairlie, judicial review of administra- tive action in canada (feuilles mobiles), p. 15-58 à 15-59; voir aussi united taxi drivers’ fellowship of southern alberta c. calgary (ville), 2004 csc 19, [2004] 1 rcs 485; noron inc. c. ville de dieppe, 2017 nbca 38, 66 mlpr (5th) 1, par. 11; gan- der (town) c. trimart investments ltd., 2015 nlca 32, 368 nfl d & peir 96, par. 14; 1254582 alberta ltd. c. edmonton (city), 2009 abca 4, 448 ar 58, par. 12; conseil canadien pour les réfugiés c. ca- nada., 2008 caf 229, [2009] 3 rcf 136, par. 57; broers c. real estate council of alberta, 2010 abqb 497, 489 ar 219, par. 29; algoma central corp c. canada, 2009 cf 1287, par. 66 (canlii)). [116] la jurisprudence de la cour le confi rme. dans dunsmuir, la cour cite en l’approuvant une conclusion tirée dans united taxi drivers’ fellow- ship, où (comme en l’espèce) la question en litige était de savoir si la loi en cause autorisait la ville de calgary à adopter une disposition réglementaire en vertu d’un pouvoir subordonné ou délégué. dans ce cas, la disposition réglementaire limitait le nombre de plaques de taxi. selon la cour (au par. 5), la ques- tion soulevée en était une de compétence, ce qui appelait toujours l’application de la norme de la décision correcte. il en est ainsi parce qu’une des principales fonctions d’une cour de justice est de faire en sorte qu’un délégataire comme la commis- sion ne puisse agir que dans les limites du pouvoir que lui confère le législateur. une fois le principe posé, l’étiquette importe peu quelle que soit la façon dont on qualifi e la question (une question de compétence, une question de validité, voire une sorte de question de droit), le principe demeure le même. l’exercice du pouvoir public doit toujours être autorisé par la loi. dès lors, nul délégataire ne peut, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir de législation subordonnée (c’est-à-dire, lorsqu’il légifère), outre- passer le pouvoir qui lui est conféré. la primauté du droit ne saurait tolérer aucune entorse à ce principe (dunsmuir, par 29). 686 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) brown j. [2018] 1 scr. [117] thirdly, i respectfully disagree with the chief justice’s framing of the issue before the court as be- ing whether the board’s adoption of s 262(1) rep- resents a reasonable exercise of its delegated power under the workers compensation act, rsbc. 1996, c 492. while the judicial role properly and necessarily includes seeing that statutory delegates operate within the bounds of their grant of authority, the overall “reasonableness” of how a statutory del- egate has chosen to exercise its lawful authority is not the proper subject of judicial attention. in short, while the board’s authority to regulate is (and must be) reviewable, the board’s chosen means of regula- tion are — subject to what i say below about cata- lyst paper corp. v. north cowichan (district), 2012 scc 2, [2012] 1 scr 5 — a matter for the board, and not for this or any other court. [117] troisièmement, je suis malheureusement en désaccord avec la juge en chef quant à la manière dont elle formule la question en litige : l’adoption du par.  26.2(1) par la commission résulte-t-elle d’un exercice raisonnable du pouvoir délégué par la workers compensation act, rsbc 1996, c. 492? bien qu’il incombe légitimement et nécessairement à l’autorité judiciaire de veiller à ce que les délé- gataires agissent dans les limites des pouvoirs qui leur sont conférés, ce n’est pas sur le « caractère raisonnable » global de la manière dont le déléga- taire choisit d’exercer son pouvoir légitime que la cour de révision doit diriger son attention. en bref, même si le pouvoir de la commission d’adopter des règlements peut (et doit) être susceptible de contrôle, les moyens que choisit la commission pour régle- menter sont, sous réserve de ce que j’affi rme plus loin au sujet de l’arrêt catalyst paper corp. c. north cowichan (district), 2012 csc 2, [2012] 1 rcs 5, du ressort de la commission, non de la cour ou de quelque autre juridiction. [118] the chief justice’s reasons on this point go well beyond this court’s judgment in catalyst by effectively recognizing a new generalized basis for judicial review of the regulatory means chosen by statutory delegates acting within the bounds of their grant of legal authority. by way of explanation, un- reasonableness, as a ground recognized in catalyst for invalidating an action by a statutory delegate, operates narrowly (and only once vires has been established). as this court explained in catalyst, at paras. 21 and 24, the sorts of measures which, in the context of municipal bylaws, would be illegitimate for municipal councillors to take are those which are unreasonable in the sense described by lord russell cj in kruse v. johnson, [1898] 2 qb 91 (div. ct.): [118] les motifs de la juge en chef sur ce point vont bien au- delà de ce que dit la cour dans catalyst en ce qu’ils reconnaissent un nouveau fondement universel au contrôle judiciaire d’une mesure réglementaire choisie par un délégataire dans les limites de son pou- voir légal. précisons que le caractère déraisonnable, en tant que motif reconnu dans catalyst pour inva- lider l’acte d’un délégataire, s’applique de manière restreinte (et seulement lorsque la validité est établie). comme l’explique la cour dans catalyst, par. 21 et 24, les mesures qui, dans le cas de règlements muni- cipaux, seraient prises illégitimement par un conseil municipal correspondent à celles qui sont déraison- nables au sens que précise le juge en chef lord russell dans kruse c. johnson, [1898] 2 qb 91 (c div.) : but unreasonable in what sense? if, for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppres- sive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could fi nd no justifi cation in the minds of reasonable men, the court might well say, “parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.” [pp. 99-100] [traduction] mais déraisonnable en quel sens? on peut penser, par exemple, à des règlements partiaux et d’appli- cation inégale pour des catégories distinctes, à des règle- ments manifestement injustes, à des règlements empreints de mauvaise foi, à des règlements entraînant une immix- tion abusive ou gratuite dans les droits des personnes qui y sont assujetties, au point d’être injustifi ables aux yeux d’hommes raisonnables; la cour pourrait alors dire « le parlement n’a jamais eu l’intention de donner le pouvoir de faire de telles règles; elles sont déraisonnables et ultra vires. » [p. 99-100] [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) le juge brown 687 unreasonableness, in the sense affi rmed in catalyst, therefore concerns factors or considerations which have long been understood as illegitimate in the con- text of municipal governance (eg. saumur v. city of quebec, [1953] 2 scr 299), and not factors which might lead a reviewing court to think a measure “un- reasonable” in the sense of being merely unnecessary or inadvisable in light of the goals of a particular enabling statute. [119] the point merits restating: the issue before us is not directed to whether the regulation “represents a reasonable exercise of the delegated power”: chief justice mclachlin’s reasons, at para 23. rather, the issue is whether the board is authorized to adopt the regulation at issue. i note that the parties in the present appeal and the courts below all viewed the s 262(1) issue as a matter of jurisdiction or vires. it follows that i also reject the chief justice’s [120] sidestepping of the jurisdictional inquiry in favour of a review of various contextual factors which are said to support reasonableness review: chief justice mclachlin’s reasons, at paras 19-21. if the board’s adoption of s 262(1) presents a jurisdictional ques- tion — which the chief justice does not deny — such contextual factors are irrelevant. [121] i agree, however, with the chief justice that s. 225 of the act, which empowers the board to make regulations it “considers necessary or advisa- ble in relation to occupational health and safety and occupational environment” is suffi ciently broad to support the conclusion that the board’s adoption of s 262(1) of the regulation is intra vires. le caractère déraisonnable, au sens précisé dans catalyst, tient donc à des éléments ou à des consi- dérations qui sont depuis longtemps tenus pour illégitimes dans le contexte de l’administration mu- nicipale (p ex saumur c. city of quebec, [1953] 2 rcs 299), et non à des éléments susceptibles d’amener la cour de révision à tenir une mesure pour « déraisonnable » simplement parce qu’elle n’est pas nécessaire ou souhaitable au vu des objectifs d’une loi habilitante en particulier. [119] il vaut la peine de répéter que la question dont nous sommes saisis n’est pas de savoir si le rè- glement en cause « résulte ou non d’un exercice rai- sonnable du pouvoir délégué » (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par. 23), mais bien si la commission a le pouvoir d’adopter ce règlement. je signale que pour les parties au pourvoi et les juridictions infé- rieures, la question que soulève le par 262(1) en est une de compétence ou de validité. [120] je ne suis donc pas non plus d’accord avec la juge en chef lorsqu’elle met à l’écart l’examen de la compétence au profi t de la prise en compte de divers facteurs contextuels censés appuyer un contrôle selon la norme de la décision raisonnable (motifs de la juge en chef mclachlin, par 19-21). si l’adoption du par 262(1) par la commission soulève une question de compétence — ce que ne nie pas la juge en chef —, de tels facteurs contextuels ne sont pas pertinents. [121] cependant, je conviens avec elle que le libellé de l’art. 225 de la loi, qui confère à la commission le pouvoir de prendre les règlements qu’elle « juge nécessaires ou souhaitables relativement à la santé et à la sécurité au travail et à l’environnement de tra- vail », est suffi samment large pour étayer la conclu- sion selon laquelle l’adoption du par 262(1) du règlement est intra vires. [122] on the question of the penalty, i agree with my colleague côté j. that the board’s decision to impose a penalty upon west fraser under s. 196(1) of the act for a breach of s 262(1) of the regulation was patently unreasonable, and i endorse her reasons offered in support. [122] en ce qui concerne la sanction, je conviens avec ma collègue la juge côté que la décision de la commission d’en infl iger une à west fraser en application du par. 196(1) de la loi pour une infrac- tion au par 262(1) du règlement est manifestement déraisonnable, et je souscris à ses motifs sur ce point. 688 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) brown j. [2018] 1 scr. i add this. the foregoing reasons are driven, [123] as i say, at para. 114, by the understanding of ques- tions of jurisdiction as stated in this court’s ju- risprudence, particularly in dunsmuir. while the category and defi nition of jurisdictional questions in dunsmuir have occasionally been doubted (al- berta (information and privacy commissioner) v. alberta teachers’ association, 2011 scc 61, [2011] 3 scr 654, at para. 42) or marginalized as “nar- row”, “exceptional” and “rare” (alberta teachers, at para. 39; edmonton (city) v. edmonton east (cap- ilano) shopping centres ltd., 2016 scc 47, [2016] 2 scr 293, at para. 26; and quebec (attorney gen- eral) v. guérin, 2017 scc 42, [2017] 2 scr 3, at para. 42), the framework in dunsmuir, as a matter of stare decisis, continues to govern the treatment of such questions. [124] this is not to say that all is well. i accept that, in many cases, the distinction between mat- ters of statutory interpretation which implicate truly jurisdictional questions and those going solely to a statutory delegate’s application of its enabling stat- ute will be, at best, elusive. more generally, while binary standards of review are suitable for appel- late review under housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, more fl exibility — that is, something focussing more closely on intensity of review, rather than binary categories — might bet- ter account for the unavoidably varying contextual considerations that arise in judicial review of admin- istrative decisions. such contextual considerations could include the breadth of discretion contained in the statutory grant, the nature of the decision, the nature of the decision maker, and the stakes for the affected parties. (see, eg,. pham v. secretary of state for the home department, [2015] uksc 19, [2015] 1 wlr 1591, at para. 107, per lord sumption.) such an approach, which other jurisdictions have applied, has also found favour in some canadian appellate courts: canada (transport, infrastructure and communities) v. farwaha, 2014 fca 56, [2015] 2 fcr 1006, at paras. 90-92; mills v. workplace safety and insurance appeals tribunal, 2008 onca 436, 237 oac 71, at para 22. i see nothing in this general principle — that the framework for deciding [123] j’ajoute ce qui suit. les motifs qui précèdent prennent appui, comme je le dis au par. 114, sur la manière dont la cour conçoit la question de com- pétence au vu de ses arrêts, en particulier l’arrêt dunsmuir. même si on a parfois exprimé des doutes concernant la catégorie et la défi nition de la question de compétence dans dunsmuir (alberta (information and privacy commissioner) c. alberta teachers’ association, 2011 csc 61, [2011] 3 rcs 654, par. 42) ou minimisé l’importance de cette ques- tion en affi rmant qu’elle avait une « portée étroite » ou qu’elle «  se présent[ait] rarement  » (alberta teachers, par. 39; edmonton (ville) c. edmonton east (capilano) shopping centres ltd., 2016 csc 47, [2016] 2 rcs 293, par. 26; québec (procureure générale) c. guérin, 2017 csc 42, [2017] 2 rcs 3, par. 42), le cadre établi dans dunsmuir continue de s’appliquer à son égard en raison de la règle du stare decisis. [124] je ne dis pas pour autant que tout est parfait. je reconnais que, dans bien des cas, la distinction entre une affaire qui soulève une véritable question de compétence et celle qui fait seulement intervenir l’application de la loi habilitante par le délégataire sera au mieux insaisissable. de manière plus géné- rale, même si suivant l’arrêt housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, une approche binaire de la norme de contrôle applicable convient en appel, une démarche plus souple, qui s’attache au degré d’intensité du contrôle requis plutôt qu’à l’appartenance de la question à l’une des deux caté- gories, pourrait mieux s’adapter aux considérations contextuelles qui varient inévitablement d’une dé- cision administrative à l’autre. au nombre de ces considérations contextuelles mentionnons l’étendue du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré par la loi habili- tante, la nature de la décision, celle du décideur et les enjeux pour les intéressés (voir p ex pham c. secretary of state for the home department, [2015] uksc 19, [2015] 1  wlr  1591, par.  107, lord sumption). appliquée dans d’autres ressorts, une telle démarche compte également des adeptes au sein de cours d’appel du pays (canada (transports, infrastructure et collectivités) c. farwaha, 2014 caf 56, [2015] 2 rcf 1006, par. 90-92; mills c. workplace safety and insurance appeals tribunal, 2008 onca 436, 237 oac 71, par 22). à mon [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) le juge rowe 689 the standard of review should allow for suffi cient fl exibility to refl ect the varied nature of adminis- trative bodies, the questions before them, their de- cisions, their expertise and their mandates — that is inconsistent with the dual constitutional func- tions performed by judicial review: upholding the rule of law, and maintaining legislative supremacy (dunsmuir, at paras. 27 and 30). avis, ce principe général, à savoir que le cadre pré- sidant à la détermination de la norme de contrôle devrait être suffi samment souple pour tenir compte de la diversité des organismes administratifs, des questions dont ils sont saisis, de leurs décisions, de leur expertise et de leurs mandats, n’a rien d’incon- ciliable avec la double fonction constitutionnelle du contrôle judiciaire, à savoir maintenir la primauté du droit et assurer la suprématie législative (dunsmuir, par. 27 et 30). [125] i would allow the appeal. [125] je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [126] rowe j. (dissenting) — judicial review of delegated authority is fundamental to upholding the rule of law. as chief justice mclachlin described it in catalyst paper corp. v. north cowichan (dis- trict), 2012 scc 2, [2012] 1 scr 5, at para. 10: “it is a fundamental principle of the rule of law that state power must be exercised in accordance with the law. the corollary of this constitutionally protected principle is that superior courts may be called upon to review whether particular exercises of state power fall outside the law.” [126] le juge rowe (dissident) — le contrôle judiciaire de l’exercice du pouvoir délégué est fon- damental à la primauté du droit. comme le dit la juge en chef mclachlin dans l’arrêt catalyst paper corp c. north cowichan (district), 2012 csc 2, [2012] 1 rcs 5, par. 10 : « la primauté du droit pose comme principe fondamental que le pouvoir de l’état doit être exercé en conformité avec la loi. ce principe protégé par la constitution a pour corollaire que les cours supérieures peuvent être appelées à examiner si un exercice particulier du pouvoir de l’état est conforme à la loi ou non. » [127] one instance in which such review occurs relates to the validity of a regulation. this has two steps. the fi rst relates to jurisdiction “in the narrow sense of whether or not the [board] had the authority to make the inquiry” (dunsmuir v. new brunswick, 2008 scc 9, [2008] 1 scr 190, at para 59). the second is a substantive inquiry into the exercise of the grant of authority: “   the substance of [the regulations] must conform to the rationale of the statutory regime set up by the legislature” (catalyst, at para 25). both steps involve interpretation of the authorizing statute, the fi rst focusing more on the grant of regulation- making authority, the second having regard more generally to the scheme and objects of the statute. [127] pareil contrôle a notamment lieu lorsqu’il s’agit de décider si une disposition réglementaire est valide ou non. l’examen comporte alors deux étapes. la première s’intéresse à la compétence « au sens strict de la faculté [de l’organisme] de connaître de la question » (dunsmuir c. nouveau- brunswick, 2008 csc 9, [2008] 1 rcs 190, par 59). la seconde s’intéresse à la teneur de la disposition et vise l’exer- cice du pouvoir conféré : «    la teneur [du] règle- men[t] doit être conforme à la raison d’être du régime mis sur pied par la législature » (catalyst, par 25). les deux étapes supposent l’interprétation de la loi habilitante, la première s’attachant surtout à l’octroi du pouvoir de réglementer, la seconde s’intéressant plus généralement au régime de la loi et à son objet. [128] without referring to the two steps i have noted above, in effect the chief justice addresses the fi rst in paras. 10-11 and the second in paras. 12- 22. with the foregoing comment, i concur with her [128] sans s’y référer expressément, la juge en chef se penche sur la première étape aux par. 10-11 de ses motifs, puis sur la seconde aux par 12-22. compte tenu des remarques qui précèdent, je 690 west fraser mills v bc (wcat) rowe j. [2018] 1 scr. analysis that s 262(1) of the occupational health and safety regulation, bc. reg. 296/97, is intra vires. souscris à sa conclusion selon laquelle le par 262(1) de l’occupational health and safety regulation, bc. reg. 296/97, est intra vires. i would add a further comment. in para. 9, [129] the chief justice quotes d. j. mullan to the effect that reasonableness review recognizes “the reality that, in many instances, those working day to day in the im- plementation of frequently complex administrative schemes have or will develop a considerable degree of expertise or fi eld sensitivity to the imperatives and nuances of the legislative regime” (“establishing the standard of review: the struggle for complex- ity?” (2004), 17 cjalp 59, at p. 93; dunsmuir, at para 49). this is an over- generalization that ob- scures rather than enlightens. i would agree that “working day to day” with an administrative scheme can build “expertise” and “fi eld sensitivity” to policy issues and to the weighing of factors to be taken into account in making discretionary decisions. but how does “working day to day” give greater insight into statutory interpretation, including the scope of jurisdiction, which is a matter of legal analysis? the answer is that it does not. this is one of the myths of expertise that now exist in administrative law (garneau community league v. edmonton (city), 2017 abca 374, 60 alta. lr (6th) 1, at para 94). [129] je me permets cependant quelques remarques supplémentaires. au paragraphe 9 de ses motifs, la juge en chef cite à l’appui de sa thèse d j mullan, selon lequel l’application de la norme de la raisonna- bilité [traduction] « reconnaît que, dans beaucoup de cas, les personnes qui se consacrent quotidienne- ment à l’application de régimes administratifs sou- vent complexes possèdent ou acquièrent une grande connaissance ou sensibilité [fi ne] à l’égard des im- pératifs et des subtilités de ces régimes » (« estab- lishing the standard of review : the struggle for complexity?  » (2004), 17  rcdap  59, p.  93; dunsmuir, par 49). il s’agit d’une généralisation excessive qui embrouille davantage la question qu’elle ne la clarifi e. certes, « [appliquer] quotidien- nement » un régime administratif permet d’acqué- rir une « connaissance » et une « sensibilité [fi ne] » à l’égard des questions de principe qui se posent et de la mise en balance d’éléments à considérer lors- qu’il s’agit de rendre une décision discrétionnaire. mais en quoi « appliquer quotidiennement » une loi rend-il plus apte à interpréter celle-ci, notamment pour déterminer l’étendue de la compétence, ce qui relève de l’analyse juridique? en fait, ce n’est pas le cas. c’est l’une des idées reçues sur l’expertise qui ont actuellement cours en droit administratif (gar- neau community league c. edmonton (city), 2017 abca 374, 60 alta. lr (6th) 1, par 94). [130] concerning the monetary penalty, i agree with my colleague côté j. that the decision of the workers’ compensation appeal tribunal (2013 canlii 79509) was patently unreasonable and runs directly contrary to the clear wording of s. 196(1) of the workers compensation act, rsbc 1996, c 492. accordingly, i concur with paras. 94-110 of her reasons. i would therefore allow the appeal on that basis. [130] en ce qui concerne la peine pécuniaire, je conviens avec ma collègue la juge côté que la dé- cision du workers’ compensation appeal tribunal (2013 canlii 79509) est manifestement déraison- nable et va directement à l’encontre du texte clair du par.  196(1) de la workers compensation act, rsbc 1996, c 492. je souscris donc aux par. 94- 110 de ses motifs. par conséquent, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi pour ce motif. appeal dismissed with costs to the workers’ com- pensation board of british columbia, côté, brown and rowe jj. dissenting. pourvoi rejeté avec dépens en faveur de la work- ers’ compensation board of british columbia, les juges côté, brown et rowe sont dissidents. [2018] 1 rcs. west fraser mills c cb (wcat) 691 procureurs de l’appelante : harris & company, vancouver. vancouver. pensation appeal tribunal: workers’ compensation appeal tribunal, richmond. procureur de l’intimé workers’ compensation appeal tribunal : workers’ compensation appeal tribunal, richmond. sation board of british columbia: workers’ compen- sation board of british columbia, richmond. procureur de l’intimée workers’ compensation board of british columbia : workers’ compensation board of british columbia, richmond. sation board of alberta: workers’ compensation board of alberta, edmonton. procureur de l’intervenante workers’ compen- sation board of alberta : workers’ compensation board of alberta, edmonton.
i. introduction [1] this appeal is brought by 1688782 ontario inc., a former franchisee of mr. submarine limited (“mr. sub”) and the class representative of 424 other mr. sub franchisees (“appellant” or “mr sub franchisees”) the appellant says that class members were affected by the decision of the respondents (collectively, “maple leaf foods”) to recall meat products that had been processed in a maple leaf foods factory in which a listeria outbreak had occurred. specifically, it says that they experienced a shortage of product for six to eight weeks causing economic loss and reputational injury due to their association with contaminated meat products. by this class proceeding, the appellant advances claims in tort law against maple leaf foods, seeking compensation for lost past and future sales, past and future profits, capital value of the franchises and goodwill. [2] the question for this court to decide is whether maple leaf foods (with which neither the appellant nor any other franchisee was in contractual privity, but rather linked indirectly through a chain of contracts) owed mr. sub franchisees a duty of care, enforceable under the canadian law of negligence the appellant says that maple leaf foods, as a manufacturer, owed a duty to mr. sub franchisees to supply a product fit for human consumption more specifically, the appellant says that the circumstances of its claim fall within two categories of proximity that have been recognized in respect of two forms of pure economic loss: negligent misrepresentation or performance of a service, and the negligent supply of shoddy goods or structures. further, the appellant says that the relationship between maple leaf foods and mr. sub franchisees is analogous to an established category of proximity that has been previously recognized in the caselaw finally, and while it is unclear whether the appellant actually advances a novel duty argument before us, we note that maple leaf foods takes the appellant as having done so, and that both the motion judge and our colleague karakatsanis j would recognize a novel duty in this case. in order to take the appellant’s claim at its strongest, we therefore proceed on the basis that it also advances such an argument. [3] maple leaf foods says it owed no duty of care to mr. sub franchisees, and brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing these claims. [4] the appellant successfully resisted summary judgment before the motion judge at the ontario superior court of justice, but failed before the court of appeal for ontario in the court of appeal’s view, the motion judge’s decision to allow these claims to proceed could not stand in light of this court’s decision in deloitte & touche v. livent inc. (receiver of), 2017 scc 63, [2017] 2 scr 855, which had been decided since the motion judge’s judgment in the appellant’s favour. the court of appeal held that this disposed not only of the negligent misrepresentation claim, but also of the claim for negligent supply of dangerous or shoddy goods, since it followed from livent “that the motion judge erred in her duty of care analysis” (2018 onca 407, 140 or. (3d) 481, at para. 87). [5] for the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeal. maple leaf foods does not owe a duty of care to mr. sub franchisees in respect of these matters. ii background [6] as clarke j (as he then was) explained in cromane seafoods ltd v. minister for agriculture, [2016] iesc 6, [2017] 1 i.r 119, at para. 66, like “chaos theory” in mathematics, “the true underlying difficulty [in the law of negligence] stems from the fact that we live in a highly interactive world, where each of our fortunes are constantly affected, sometimes trivially, sometimes significantly, by decisions made or actions taken or avoided [by others]” so it is in this case as in most modern commercial arrangements of even modest complexity, the parties here operated through a multipartite arrangement comprising a chain of contracts ⸺ in this case a contract between mr sub and mr sub franchisees that was typical of franchisor-franchisee relationships, and a contract of supply between mr sub and maple leaf foods. as we explain below, in the context of a claim brought in tort law as opposed to the law of contract, these are significant considerations. [7] more particularly, at the material time, the relationship between mr. sub and its franchisees was governed by the franchisee renewal agreement, dated february 1, 2006 (“franchise agreement”) (ar, vol. ii, p 89). [8] the relationship between mr. sub and maple leaf foods was governed by an exclusive supply agreement — pursuant to which maple leaf foods was made the exclusive supplier of 14 core mr. sub menu items: ready-to-eat (“rte”) meats served in all mr. sub restaurants (“partnership agreement”, signed december 12, 2005, ar, vol. ii, at p 12) in order to give effect to this exclusive supply arrangement, the franchise agreement between mr. sub and its franchisees required them to purchase rte meats produced exclusively by maple leaf foods (franchise agreement, art. 62). this was done not by way of direct dealings between mr. sub franchisees and maple leaf foods; instead, the franchisees placed an order with a distributor, which would in turn place an order with maple leaf foods. no contractual relationship ever existed between the franchisees and maple leaf foods. rather, each was linked to the other indirectly, through separate contracts with mr. sub. [9] it is worth noting that, while their franchise agreement with mr sub required mr sub franchisees to purchase rte meats exclusively from maple leaf foods, the latter was under no obligation by the terms of its contract with mr. sub to supply. further, the franchise agreement also provided that the franchisees could not sue mr sub for delays in supply of rte meats nor could they look to alternative sources of supply without first seeking mr sub’s permission (franchise agreement, art. 62). [10] on august 16, 2008, maple leaf foods learned that one of its products had been found to contain listeria. it was required to recall that product, along with another. several days later, it voluntarily recalled additional products, including two of the rte meat products used by mr sub franchisees (these products were immediately destroyed, and it is unknown whether they were actually contaminated.) in early september 2008, maple leaf foods released mr sub from the exclusive supply arrangement. by mid-september 2008, an alternate supplier had been selected. [11] there is no suggestion of wrongfulness in the decision to issue this voluntary recall that said, it interrupted an important source of supply to the franchisees, leaving them without those products for a period of six to eight weeks. during that period, the franchisees did not take advantage of the clause in the franchise agreement allowing them to seek mr. sub’s permission to find a different supplier. a ontario superior court of justice, no. 60680cp (november 18, 2016), leitch j. [12] the motion judge held that maple leaf foods owed mr. sub franchisees a duty to supply a product fit for human consumption in doing so, she accepted the appellant’s argument that she should be guided by decisions in which other courts had recognized this duty, citing plas-tex canada ltd. v. dow chemical of canada ltd., 2004 abca 309, 357 ar 137, 376599 alberta inc. v. tanshaw products inc., 2005 abqb 300, 379 ar 1, and country style food services inc. v 1304271 ontario ltd. (2005), 200 oac 172 (scj reasons, at para. 40 (ar, vol. i, at p 54)). further, she found that the contaminated rte meats posed a “real and substantial danger”, described by this court as grounding a duty of care in winnipeg condominium corporation no. 36 v. bird construction co., [1995] 1 scr 85 (para. 53 (ar, vol. i, p 58)). she also concluded that a “special relationship” existed between the appellant and maple leaf foods, grounded on foreseeability of reasonable reliance upon a representation (here, that the rte meats were fit for human consumption), so as to ground a viable cause of action in negligent misrepresentation (para. 49 (ar, vol. i, at p 56)). [13] in an abundance of caution, however, in adjudicating the accompanying certification motion (2016 onsc 4233), the motion judge conducted her own duty of care analysis as if this were a novel claim. she recognized that this required her to apply the traditional foreseeability-based test from anns v london borough of merton, [1977] 2 all er 492 (hl), as refined by this court in cooper v. hobart, 2001 scc 79, [2001] 3 scr 537, so as to give greater prominence to the proximity, or “closeness and directness” of the relationship between the parties ⸺ a point which this court has since confirmed in livent, at paras. 25-31. doing so led her to conclude the anns/cooper test was satisfied here mr sub franchisees’ losses were foreseeable (scj certification reasons, para. 61), and it was not plain and obvious that their relationship to maple leaf foods was insufficiently proximate: “[the appellant and other mr sub franchisees are] within a known and readily identifiable category of persons. [maple leaf foods] supplied to [the appellant], an entity it had a close and direct relationship with as an exclusive supplier, a defective product dangerous to public health, knowing that the product would be offered for sale to consumers who could be injured from consuming the product thereby causing economic losses to [the franchisees]” (scj certification reasons, at para. 70) no policy considerations negated or militated against liability. b court of appeal for ontario, 2018 onca 407, 140 or (3d) 481, sharpe, rouleau and fairburn jja. [14] the court of appeal allowed maple leaf foods’ appeal, and granted it summary judgment. the case authorities relied upon by the motion judge — plas-tex, tanshaw and country style — were not truly analogous to the mr. sub franchisees’ claims (paras. 49 and 59), and the motion judge erred in finding that the facts in this case fell within a well-established category of duty to supply a product fit for human consumption it was therefore necessary to review her conclusion under the anns/cooper framework regarding a novel duty of care (para. 59). [15] the court of appeal noted that the alleged damages are substantially the result of the recall and the consequent publicity, including publicity of the illness and death of people who had eaten tainted meat (albeit not at a mr sub restaurant) (para. 65). to recognize a duty here “would constitute an unwarranted expansion of a duty owed to one class of plaintiffs”, the consumers, and “bootstrap” it so as to “extend it to the fundamentally different claim advanced by the franchisees” (para. 66). the motion judge’s conclusion regarding negligent misrepresentation is similarly unfounded. in concluding that the franchisees reasonably relied on maple leaf foods’ representation that its meats were safe for human consumption, the motion judge failed to consider the scope of the proximate relationship between the parties (para. 80). the purpose of maple leaf foods’s undertaking of responsibility was not to protect the business or reputational interests of the franchisees, but “to ensure that mr sub customers who ate rte meats would not become ill or die as [a] result of eating the meats” (ibid). accordingly, the loss suffered by the franchisees was not reasonably foreseeable (para. 84). [16] owing to what it saw as the motion judge’s erroneous duty of care analysis, the court of appeal did not consider whether the losses were recoverable as a consequence of the negligent supply of a dangerous or shoddy product (para. 87). iii analysis a pure economic loss in negligence law [17] as the lower courts recognized, the claims of the appellant and other mr. sub franchisees are for pure economic loss, in the form of lost profits, sales, capital value and goodwill pure economic loss is economic loss that is unconnected to a physical or mental injury to the plaintiff’s person, or to physical damage to property (martel building ltd v canada, 2000 scc 60, [2000] 2 scr 860, at para. 34; d’amato v. badger, [1996] 2 scr 1071, at para. 13; saadati v. moorhead, 2017 scc 28, [2017] 1 scr 543, at para. 23) it is distinct, therefore, from consequential economic loss, being economic loss that results from damage to the plaintiff’s rights, such as wage losses or costs of care incurred by someone physically or mentally injured, or the value of lost production caused by damage to machinery, or lost sales caused by damage to delivery vehicles. [18] to recover for negligently caused loss, irrespective of the type of loss alleged, a plaintiff must prove all the elements of the tort of negligence: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) that the defendant’s conduct breached the standard of care; (3) that the plaintiff sustained damage; and (4) that the damage was caused, in fact and in law, by the defendant’s breach. to satisfy the element of damage, the loss sought to be recovered must be the result of an interference with a legally cognizable right. as cardozo cj explained in palsgraf v. long island railroad co., 162 ne 99 (ny 1928), “[n]egligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right” (p 99; see also odhavji estate v woodhouse, 2003 scc 69, [2003] 3 scr 263, at para. 45; livent, at para. 30; r. stevens, torts and rights (2007), at p 24). it is well established that the law imposes liability for negligent interference with and injury to the rights in bodily integrity, mental health and property (saadati, at para. 23, citing a. ripstein, private wrongs (2016), at pp. 87 and 252-53). recovery for injuries to these rights is grounded in the duty of care recognized in donoghue v. stevenson, [1932] ac 562 (hl). [19] this explains why the common law has been slow to accord protection to purely economic interests. while this court has recognized that pure economic loss may be recoverable in certain circumstances, there is no general right, in tort, protecting against the negligent or intentional infliction of pure economic loss. for example, economic loss caused by ordinary marketplace competition is not, without something more, actionable in negligence (ai. enterprises ltd. v. bram enterprises ltd., 2014 scc 12, [2014] 1 scr 177, at para. 31, citing mogul steamship company v. mcgregor, gow & co. (1889), 23 qbd 598 (ca), at p 614, aff’d [1892] ac 25 (hl)). such loss falls outside the scope of a plaintiff’s legal rights — the loss is damnum absque injuria and unrecoverable (e. j weinrib, “the disintegration of duty” (2006), 31 adv. q 212, at p 226; d. nolan, “rights, damage and loss” (2017), 37 oxf. j. leg. stud. 255, at pp. 262-68). indeed, the essential goal of competition is to attract more business, which may mean taking business away from others. absent a contractual or statutory entitlement, there is no right to a customer or to the quality of a bargain, let alone to a market share. as taylor ja wrote for the british columbia court of appeal in kripps v. touche ross & co. (1992), 94 dlr (4th) 284, at p 297: it seems possible that pure economic loss simpliciter accounts for the overwhelming majority of all loss suffered by one person as a foreseeable and proximate result of the acts or omissions of another . . . . this must necessarily be so in a free market for goods and services, employment and investment, and the continuing struggle for property, promotion and profit. [20] citing the work of professor feldthusen (b. feldthusen, “economic loss in the supreme court of canada: yesterday and tomorrow” (1991), 17 can. bus. lj. 356, at pp. 357-58; b feldthusen, economic negligence: the recovery of pure economic loss (2nd ed. 1989), at para. 200 (currently in its sixth edition)), this court has applied a classificatory scheme that identifies four categories of pure economic loss that can arise between private parties (canadian national railway co. v. norsk pacific steamship co., [1992] 1 scr 1021, at p 1049; winnipeg condominium, at para. 12).1 in livent, the court effectively reduced the categories to three, by its treatment of two of the previously stated categories ⸺ negligent misrepresentation, and negligent performance of a service ⸺ as a single kind of pure economic loss. this made sense, because the considerations that inform the proximity analysis are identical for both in particular, the same two factors ⸺ the defendant’s undertaking, and the plaintiff’s reliance ⸺ are in such cases determinative of the proximity analysis (para. 30), upon which we will elaborate below. [21] the current categories of pure economic loss incurred between private parties are, therefore: (1) negligent misrepresentation or performance of a service; (2) negligent supply of shoddy goods or structures; and (3) relational economic loss. 1 a fifth category, “the independent liability of statutory public authorities”, as the name makes clear, arises not between private parties but between a statutory public authority and private parties. the distinguishing feature among each of these categories is that they describe how the loss occurred. focussing exclusively upon how the loss occurs can, however, put strain on the analysis by obfuscating both fundamental differences and similarities among cases of pure economic loss (j. stapleton, “duty of care and economic loss: a wider agenda” (1991), 107 law q. rev. 249, at pp. 262 and 284). further, it obscures the starting point in a principled analysis of an action in negligence, which is to identify what rights are at stake and whether a reciprocal duty of care exists (livent, at para. 30). it is proximity, and not a template of how a loss factually occurred, that remains a “controlling concept” and a “foundation of the modern law of negligence” (norsk, at p 1152; design services ltd v canada, 2008 scc 22, [2008] 1 scr 737, at para. 25). [22] properly understood, then, these categories are simply “analytical tools” that “provide greater structure to a diverse range of factual situations . . that raise similar . . . concerns” (martel, at para. 45; design services, at para. 31). organizing cases in this way was and is therefore done for ease of analysis in ensuring that courts treat like cases alike the fact that a claim arises from a particular kind of pure economic loss does not necessarily signify that such loss is recoverable.2 where the loss is recoverable, however, this court has clarified that the decided cases within these categories should be regarded as reflecting particular kinds of proximate relationships 2 indeed, this court has said that relational economic loss is recoverable only in “exceptional” circumstances (bow valley husky (bermuda) ltd v. saint john shipbuilding ltd., [1997] 3 scr. 1210, at para 44) and, as we make clear below, merely “shoddy” construction does not support recovery under tort law. rather, the limited nature of the duty of care in such circumstances operates to confine recovery to the cost of removing only such defects that pose a real and substantial danger to persons or property. (cooper, at para. 36; livent, at paras. 26-27) but to be clear, the invocation of a category, by itself, offers no substitute for the necessary examination that must take place “of the particular relationship at issue in each case” between the plaintiff and the defendant (livent, at para. 28; see also dorset yacht co. v. home office, [1970] ac. 1004 (hl), at p 1038). in other words, what matters is whether the requirements for imposing a duty of care are satisfied ⸺ and, in particular, whether the parties were at the time of the loss in a sufficiently proximate relationship. where they are, it may be because the relationship falls within a previously established category of relationship in which the requisite qualities of closeness and directness were found, or is analogous thereto (livent, at para. 26; see also childs v desormeaux, 2006 scc 18, [2006] 1 scr 643, at para. 15; mustapha v. culligan of canada ltd., 2008 scc 27, [2008] 2 scr 114, at para. 5). or, a plaintiff may seek to establish a “novel” duty of care after undertaking a full anns/cooper analysis. [23] with respect, the appellant’s submissions reflect a misunderstanding of the significance of the categories of pure economic loss. the appellant argues that a duty of care in this case “is established through the application of two well-established categories of recovery for pure economic loss [of] negligent misrepresentation or negligent performance of a service, and negligent supply of dangerous goods” (af, at para. 50). again, a duty of care cannot be established by showing that a claim fits within a category of pure economic loss. it is necessary to determine whether the appellant’s alleged loss represents an injury to a right that can be the subject of recovery in tort law and possesses the requisite factors to support a finding of proximity under that category. we repeat: the manner in which pure economic loss is said to have occurred or how that loss has been catalogued within the categories of pure economic loss does not signify that the defendant whose negligence caused that loss owes the plaintiff a duty of care. the relevant “category” for the purpose of supporting a duty of care is that of proximity of relationship. meaning, what is necessary to support a duty of care is that the relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant bear the requisite closeness and directness, such that it falls within a previously established category of proximity or is analogous to one (livent, at para. 26; see also childs, at para. 15; mustapha, at para. 5). b. standard of review [24] maple leaf foods argues that the standard of review to be applied to a motion judge’s decision on duty of care is that of correctness. as the question of whether maple leaf foods owed the appellant a duty of care is a question of law, we agree (galaske v. o’donnell, [1994] 1 scr 670, at p 690; rankin (rankin’s garage & sales) v. jj, 2018 scc 19, [2018] 1 scr 587, at para. 19; l. n. klar and c. s. g. jefferies, tort law (6th ed 2017), at pp. 210-11 and fn 60; a. m linden et al., canadian tort law (11th ed 2018), at §6.2) duty in tort law is “a general notion describing a class or type of case, not a particular fact situation” (a. m. linden and b. feldthusen, canadian tort law (10th ed. 2015), at §957). that this is so becomes readily apparent when one considers that the existence of a duty of care is a preliminary question, typically answered when “the facts are not yet known to a sufficiently specific degree because breach of the standard of care and causation have not been addressed” (linden et al., at §73). it follows that each component of the anns/cooper analysis supporting a prima facie duty ⸺ proximity of relationship and reasonable foreseeability of injury (livent, at paras. 20 and 23) ⸺ raise questions of law (klar and jefferies, at pp. 210-11 and fn. 60). [25] the implications of this standard of review for the duty analysis, and particularly for its constituent inquiry into reasonable foreseeability of injury, was considered by this court in stewart v. pettie, [1995] 1 scr 131: the question of whether a duty of care exists is a question of the relationship between the parties, not a question of conduct. . . . the point is made by fleming, in his book the law of torts (8th ed 1992), at pp. 105-6: . . in the first place, the duty issue is already sufficiently complex without fragmenting it further to cover an endless series of details of conduct “duty” is more appropriately reserved for the problem of whether the relation between the parties (like manufacturer and consumer or occupier and trespasser) warrants the imposition upon one of an obligation of care for the benefit of the other, and it is more convenient to deal with individual conduct in terms of the legal standard of what is required to meet that obligation . . it is for the court to determine the existence of a duty relationship and to lay down in general terms the standard of care by which to measure the defendant’s conduct . . . . [emphasis added; para. 32.] [26] the proper inquiry is therefore not into whether the loss suffered by a particular plaintiff could have been foreseen, but whether the type of injury to a class of persons, within which the plaintiff falls, could have been foreseen (hill v. hamilton-wentworth regional police services board, 2007 scc 41, [2007] 3 scr. 129, at paras. 32-33; livent, at para. 78; linden et al., at §7.4; galaske, at p 691). and again, this question is a question of law. c. the appellant’s claims [27] as we have already recounted, the appellant says that it and other mr. sub franchisees are owed a duty of care by the manufacturer maple leaf to provide rte meats fit for consumption, such that they may recover lost profits, sales, capital value and goodwill when their supply is disrupted by the recall of the meat products. [28] respectfully, we have found it somewhat difficult to pinpoint with precision the legal bases on which the appellant grounds this duty. in the circumstances, and to treat as fairly as possible the appellant’s claim, we first of all assume that its arguments are concerned with categories of proximate relationships and not categories of pure economic loss. the appellant appears to propose, as we have also recounted, three different pathways to impressing maple leaf foods with a duty of care: first, under the principles of livent governing negligent misrepresentation and negligent performance of a service; secondly, under the parameters of the duty of care recognized in winnipeg condominium — and subsequent cases — involving the negligent supply of shoddy goods or structures; and thirdly, based on the recognition of a novel duty of care. (1) negligent misrepresentation or performance of a service [29] in livent, this court restated the analytical framework governing cases of negligent misrepresentation or performance of a service in doing so, it brought the analytical approach in such cases into accord with the refined anns/cooper framework laid out in cooper previously, the duty analysis had been stated in hercules managements ltd. v. ernst & young, [1997] 2 scr 165, which grounded a prima facie duty of care on mere foreseeability of injury. cooper, however, “signalled a shift from th[at] test” (livent, at para. 22; see also para. 23). [30] under the anns/cooper framework, a prima facie duty of care is established by the conjunction of proximity of relationship and foreseeability of injury. as this court affirmed, “foreseeability alone” is insufficient to ground the existence of a duty of care. rather, a duty arises only where a relationship of “proximity” obtains (cooper, at paras. 22 and 30-32; see also livent, at para. 23) whether a proximate relationship exists between two parties at large, or inheres only for particular purposes or in relation to particular actions, will depend on the nature of the relationships at issue (livent, at para. 27) it may also depend on the nature of the particular kind of pure economic loss alleged. [31] a party may seek “to base a finding of proximity upon a previously established or analogous category” (livent, at para. 28) but where no established proximate relationship can be identified, courts must undertake a full proximity analysis in order to determine whether the close and direct relationship ⸺ which this court has repeatedly affirmed to be the hallmark of the common law duty of care ⸺ exists in the circumstances of the case (ibid., at para. 29; saadati, at para. 24; cooper, at para. 32). [32] in cases of negligent misrepresentation or performance of a service, two factors are determinative of whether proximity is established: the defendant’s undertaking, and the plaintiff’s reliance (livent, at para. 30). specifically, “[w]here the defendant undertakes to provide a representation or service in circumstances that invite the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance, the defendant becomes obligated to take reasonable care”, and “the plaintiff has a right to rely on the defendant’s undertaking to do so” (ibid) “these corollary rights and obligations”, the court added, “create a relationship of proximity” (ibid). in other words, the proximate relationship is formed when the defendant undertakes responsibility which invites reasonable and detrimental reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant for that purpose (p. benson, “should white v jones represent canadian law: a return to first principles”, in j. w neyers, e. chamberlain and s. g. a. pitel, eds., emerging issues in tort law (2007), 141, at p 166). [33] taking cooper and livent together, then, this court has emphasized the requirement of proximity within the duty analysis, and has tied that requirement in cases of negligent misrepresentation or performance of a service to the defendant’s undertaking of responsibility and its inducement of reasonable and detrimental reliance in the plaintiff. framing the analysis in this manner also illuminates the legal interest being protected and, therefore, the right sought to be vindicated by such claims. when a defendant undertakes to represent a state of affairs or to otherwise do something, it assumes the task of doing so reasonably, thereby manifesting an intention to induce the plaintiff’s reliance upon the defendant’s exercise of reasonable care in carrying out the task. and where the inducement has that intended effect ⸺ that is, where the plaintiff reasonably relies, it alters its position, possibly foregoing alternative and more beneficial courses of action that were available at the time of the inducement. that is, the plaintiff may show that the defendant’s inducement caused the plaintiff to relinquish its pre-reliance position and suffer economic detriment as a consequence. [34] in other words, it is the intended effect of the defendant’s undertaking upon the plaintiff’s autonomy that brings the defendant into a relationship of proximity, and therefore of duty, with the plaintiff. where that effect works to the plaintiff’s detriment, it is a wrong to the plaintiff. having deliberately solicited the plaintiff’s reliance as a reasonable response, the defendant cannot in justice disclaim responsibility for any economic loss that the plaintiff can show was caused by such reliance. the plaintiff’s pre-reliance circumstance has become “an entitlement that runs against the defendant” (weinrib, at p 230). [35] that entitlement, however, operates only so far as the undertaking goes. as this court cautioned in livent, “[r]ights, like duties, are . . . not limitless. any reliance on the part of the plaintiff which falls outside of the scope of the defendant’s undertaking of responsibility ⸺ that is, of the purpose for which the representation was made or the service was undertaken ⸺ necessarily falls outside the scope of the proximate relationship and, therefore, of the defendant’s duty of care” (para. 31, citing weinrib and a. beever, rediscovering the law of negligence (2007), at pp. 293-94). this “end and aim” rule precludes imposing liability upon a defendant for loss arising where the plaintiff’s reliance falls outside the purpose of the defendant’s undertaking. livent makes clear, then, that considerations of undertaking and reliance furnish not only a principled basis for drawing the line in cases of negligent misrepresentation or performance of a service between duty and no-duty, but also for delineating the scope of the duty in particular cases, based upon the purpose for which the defendant undertakes responsibility reliance that exceeds the purpose of the defendant’s undertaking is not reasonable, and therefore not foreseeable (para. 35). [36] it follows from the foregoing that the allegations advanced on behalf of mr. sub franchisees of negligent misrepresentation require us to direct our attention to whether an undertaking of responsibility on the part of maple leaf foods had the effect of inducing foreseeable, reasonable and detrimental reliance on the part of mr sub franchisees. [37] the appellant says that maple leaf foods undertook to provide rte meats fit for human consumption (and, relatedly, that these meats were safe). that this is so is supported, it says, by maple leaf foods’ reputation for product quality and safety, and by its public motto “we take care” (af, at para. 60; see also paras. 53 and 59). [38] but as we have also canvassed (at paras. 32-34), it is not enough to show that a defendant made an undertaking. again, an undertaking of responsibility, where it induces foreseeable and reasonable reliance, is formative of a relationship of proximity between two parties. we must therefore consider whether this undertaking, if made, was made to mr. sub franchisees, and for what purpose. reliance on the part of the franchisees which falls outside the scope and purpose of that representation is neither foreseeable nor reasonable (livent, at para. 31) and therefore does not connote a proximate relationship. the appellant attempts to address this requirement by pointing not to mr sub franchisees’ reliance, but instead back to the undertaking, saying that the franchisees’ reliance was “on the basis that customers could trust that [the] franchisees used . . . a supplier whose public motto is ‘we take care’” (af, at para. 60). [39] the reference to “customers” and a “public motto” is, in our view, telling, and supports the court of appeal’s identification of the scope and purpose of maple leaf foods’ undertaking as being “to ensure that mr sub customers who ate rte meats would not become ill or die as [a] result of eating the meats” (ca reasons, at para. 80). that is, the undertaking, properly construed, was made to consumers, with the purpose of assuring them that their interests were being kept in mind, and not to commercial intermediaries such as mr sub or mr. sub franchisees their business interests lie outside the scope and purpose of the undertaking. [40] further, and in any event, the appellant has failed to establish that mr. sub franchisees relied reasonably, or at all, on the undertaking that it says they received from maple leaf foods. bear in mind that detrimental reliance is manifested by the plaintiff altering its position, thereby foregoing more beneficial courses of action that it would have taken, absent the defendant’s inducement the appellant offers no evidence of such a change in position by mr. sub franchisees, and indeed the evidence affirms that changing their position would not have been possible. as recalled earlier (at paras. 8-9), mr sub franchisees were bound by their franchise agreement with mr. sub to purchase rte meats produced exclusively by maple leaf foods. while they were able to seek mr. sub’s permission to find alternative sources of supply, there is no evidence that they did so. it follows that no undertaking on the part of maple leaf foods, even had one been made to mr. sub franchisees, caused the franchisees to alter their position in reliance thereon. generally, they were bound, and had no alternative courses of action to pursue; and, to the extent they had a course of action that was contingent upon the permission of mr. sub, they did not seek it. at bottom, there was no interference with the autonomy of mr sub franchisees like many franchising arrangements, theirs had already restricted their autonomy in ways that foreclose their ability to sue for negligent misrepresentation. (2) negligent supply of shoddy goods or structures (a) the correlative right and duty of care in winnipeg condominium [41] until this appeal, the sole occasion on which this court has considered a claim for pure economic loss arising from the negligent supply of shoddy goods or structures is its judgment in winnipeg condominium it is therefore worth carefully reviewing the liability rule that it established, with attention to the nature of the legal right and correlative duty of care on which it is founded. further, and as we will explain, subsequent developments to the law of negligence in cooper and livent signify that claims under winnipeg condominium must now account for the requisite element of proximity. [42] in winnipeg condominium, the plaintiff condominium corporation sued the defendant builder for the cost of repairing exterior four-inch thick stone cladding on its 15-storey building. approximately eight years after construction, the board of directors of the condominium corporation observed that some of the cladding had broken away and that cracks were developing in the remaining cladding. they retained engineers, who recommended minor remedial work, which was done. seven years later, a storey-high section of the cladding fell from the ninth-storey level of the building to the ground below. again, engineers were retained and they recommended removal and replacement of the cladding at substantial cost, for which the condominium corporation sued the builder. not being in privity, the claim was brought in tort, raising the issue of whether the builder owed a duty to the condominium owners, as “subsequent purchasers” (meaning that they came after the original purchaser on the distributive chain). [43] on that question, and for the court, la forest j recognized a duty of care based on the reasonable foreseeability of injury to “other persons and property in the community” (para. 21) in doing so, he posited that the presence of danger was the linchpin of the analysis. as he emphasized, the building structure in this case was “not merely shoddy; it was dangerous” (para. 12 (emphasis added)). further, he added that “the degree of danger to persons and other property” created by the negligent construction is “a cornerstone” of the analysis that must be undertaken in determining whether the cost of repair is recoverable in tort (ibid. (emphasis added)). as opposed to merely substandard construction, only those defects that posed “a real and substantial danger to the occupants of the building” and had “the capacity to cause serious damage to other persons and property in the community” were actionable (para. 21). returning to this point later in his reasons, he reiterated: [t]he facts of the present case . . . fall squarely within the category of what i would define as a “real and substantial danger” it is clear from the available facts that the masonry work . . . was in a sufficiently poor state to constitute a real and substantial danger to inhabitants of the building and to passers-by. the piece of cladding that fell from the building was a storey high, was made of 4” thick tyndall stone, and dropped nine storeys. had this cladding landed on a person or on other property, it would unquestionably have caused serious injury or damage. [emphasis added; para. 38.] given the “reasonable likelihood that a defect in a building will cause injury to its inhabitants . . . if it poses a real and substantial danger”, the court held that a builder owed a duty to take reasonable care in the design or construction of building structures to avoid creating a real and substantial danger to health and safety (para. 36). [44] at first glance, the liability rule in winnipeg condominium may appear curious, since it appears as though liability is imposed not in respect of damage that has occurred to the plaintiff’s rights, but in respect of a real and substantial danger thereto as a general principle, there is no liability for negligence “in the air”, for “[t]here is no right to be free from the prospect of damage” but “only a right not to suffer damage that results from exposure to unreasonable risk” (atlantic lottery corp. inc. v. babstock, 2020 scc 19, at para. 33 (emphasis in original); clements v. clements, 2012 scc 32, [2012] 2 scr 181, at para. 16; ratych v. bloomer, [1990] 1 scr 940, at p 964). [45] we maintain, however, that, properly understood, the liability rule in winnipeg condominium is consonant with that principle. in that case, the court was clear about the source of the right to which the duty of care corresponds: the plaintiff’s rights in person or property (paras. 21, 36 and 42).3 where a design or construction defect poses a real and substantial danger ⸺ that is, what fraser cja and côté ja. described in blacklaws v 470433 alberta ltd., 2000 abca 175, 261 a.r 28, at para. 62, as “imminent risk” of “physical harm to the plaintiffs or their chattels” or property ⸺ and the danger “would unquestionably have caused serious injury or damage” if realized, given the “reasonable likelihood that a defect . . . will cause injury to its inhabitants”, it makes little difference whether the plaintiff recovers for an injury actually suffered or for expenditures incurred in preventing the injury from occurring (winnipeg condominium, at paras. 36 and 38; see also morrison steamship co v. greystoke castle (cargo owners), [1947] a.c 265 (hl), at p 280; murphy v. brentwood district council, [1991] 1 ac 398 (hl), at p 488, per lord oliver of aylmerton) thus, the economic loss incurred to avert the danger “is analogized to 3 while the plaintiff in winnipeg condominium was the condominium corporation itself, la forest j. conceived of its position as akin to that of an occupier of a building. he reasoned that the defendant contractor’s negligence had “the capacity to cause serious damage to other persons and property in the community”, including potential damage to the corporation (para. 21). physical injury to the plaintiff’s person or property” (p. benson, “the basis for excluding liability for economic loss in tort law”, in d. g. owen, ed., philosophical foundations of tort law (1995), 427, at p 429). the point is that the law views the plaintiff as having sustained actual injury to its right in person or property because of the necessity of taking measures to put itself or its other property “outside the ambit of perceived danger” (ibid, at p 440; see also aktieselskabet cuzco v. the sucarseco, 294 us 394 (1935), at p 404). [46] as we see it, then, recovery for the economic loss sustained in winnipeg condominium was founded upon the idea that, in the eyes of the law, the defendant negligently interfered with rights in person or property. we see this as having been la forest j.’s point in winnipeg condominium where he explained: if a contractor can be held liable in tort where he or she constructs a building negligently and, as a result of that negligence, the building causes damage to persons or property, it follows that the contractor should also be held liable in cases where the dangerous defect is discovered and the owner of the building wishes to mitigate the danger . . . . in both cases, the duty in tort serves to protect the bodily integrity and property interests of the inhabitants of the building. [emphasis added; para. 36.] in our view, this normative basis for the duty’s recognition ⸺ that it protects a right to be free from injury to one’s person or property ⸺ also delimits its scope this is because this basis vanishes where the defect presents no imminent threat. [47] the appellant urges us to extend the liability rule in winnipeg condominium so as to recognize what la forest j refrained from recognizing (para. 41), which is a duty owed to subsequent purchasers for the cost of repairing non-dangerous defects in building structures and products but merely shoddy products, as opposed to dangerous products, raise different questions pertaining to issues such as implied conditions and warranties as to quality and fitness for purpose, and not of real and substantial threats to person or property (winnipeg condominium, at para. 42). in our view, those claims are better channelled through the law of contract, which is the typical vehicle for allocating risks where the only complaint is of defective quality (hasegawa & co. v. pepsi bottling group (canada) co., 2002 bcca 324, 169 bcac 261, at paras. 57-61). further, and even more fundamentally, such concerns do not implicate a right protected under tort law. as laskin ja explained in hughes v sunbeam corp. (canada) ltd (2002), 61 o.r (3d) 433 (ca), at para. 36 in identifying the limits of the duty, “compensation to repair a defective but not dangerous product will improve the product’s quality but not its safety.” again, we observe that, absent a contractual or statutory entitlement, there is no right to the quality of a bargain. [48] it follows that the normative basis for the duty not only limits its scope, but in doing so also furnishes a principled basis for limiting the scope of recovery. as la forest j explained, the potential injury to persons or property grounds not only the duty but also one’s entitlement to “the cost of repairing the defect”, that is, the cost of mitigating the danger by “fixing the defect and putting the building back into a non-dangerous state” (para. 36). in other words, allowing recovery exceeding the costs associated with removing the danger goes beyond what is necessary to safeguard the right to be free from injury caused to one’s person or property (see winnipeg condominium, at para. 49). like our colleague at para. 125, we note that, in making this point, la forest j relied on the dissenting reasons of laskin j (as he then was) in rivtow marine ltd. v. washington iron works, [1974] scr 1189. [49] we do agree with the appellant, however, that this same normative force of protecting physical integrity in the face of a real and substantial danger can apply to products other than building structures ⸺ that is, to goods. that said, in applying the winnipeg condominium liability rule to goods, it must be borne in mind that, properly understood, it states a narrow duty. while, therefore, there is no principled reason for confining its application to dangerously defective building structures, what a plaintiff can recover, irrespective of whether the claim is in respect of a building structure or a good, will be confined by the duty’s concern for averting danger. the point is not to preserve the plaintiff’s continued use of a product; rather, recovery is for the cost of averting a real and substantial danger of “personal injury or damage to other property” (winnipeg condominium, at para. 35). [50] it follows that where it is feasible for the plaintiff to simply discard the defective product, the danger to the plaintiff’s rights, along with the basis for recovery, falls away. the significance of this point is perhaps best appreciated by recalling that, in winnipeg condominium, la forest j cited an argument made by lord keith of kinkel at the house of lords in murphy, at p 465, that “[i]t is difficult to draw a distinction in principle between an article which is useless or valueless and one which suffers from a defect which would render it dangerous in use but which is discovered by the purchaser in time to avert any possibility of injury. the purchaser may incur expense in putting right the defect, or, more probably, discard the article” (para. 39). on the facts of winnipeg condominium, which involved a residential structure, la forest j did not accept that this argument should apply: [i]t is based upon an unrealistic view of the choice faced by home owners in deciding whether to repair a dangerous defect in their home. in fact, a choice to “discard” a home instead of repairing the dangerous defect is no choice at all: most home owners buy a home as a long term investment and few home owners, upon discovering a dangerous defect in the home, will choose to abandon or sell the building rather than to repair the defect. indeed, in most cases, the cost of fixing a defect in a house or building, within the reasonable life of that house or building, will be far outweighed by the cost of replacing the house or buying a new one. this was certainly demonstrated in this case by the fact that the condominium corporation incurred costs of over $1.5 million in repairing the building rather than choosing to abandon or sell the building. [emphasis added; para. 40.] [51] whether, then, one is considering defects in a building structure or a good, it is the feasibility of discarding the thing as the means of averting the danger which will determine whether the plaintiff’s loss is recoverable we agree that few homeowners or owners of other kinds of building structures can reasonably remove the real and substantial danger posed by a defect by walking away from the building structure. and we accept that, in winnipeg condominium, this court held that, in such circumstances, no legally significant distinction could be drawn between the cost of removing the danger and the cost of repairing the defect or replacing the defective component. no party has asked us to reconsider that holding and, in the absence of full submissions, we would not risk clarity and certainty in the law by doing so here (r v. bernard, [1988] 2 scr 833, at pp. 858-59; canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v. vavilov, 2019 scc 65, at para. 20). in our view, however, lord keith of kinkel’s argument is more readily applicable in dealing with goods, and courts must be alive to this possibility. we reiterate that a breach of the duty recognized in winnipeg condominium exposes the defendant to liability for the cost of averting a real and substantial danger, and not of repairing a defect per se. [52] an instructive example of a dangerously defective good which could not be feasibly discarded is provided by plas-tex, where the defendant dow chemical sold polyethylene resin to the plaintiffs, knowing that it would be used in the construction of 3000 miles of pipeline (1,700 miles of which was buried underground) used to transport natural gas, and knowing that it was dangerously defective (the resin tended to crack, allowing natural gas to escape, creating the risk of an explosion, and indeed had already caused an explosion). this dangerously defective product was so integrated with the plaintiffs’ pipeline operation (and with the pipeline itself) that repair was the only feasible option indeed, discarding the pipeline without undertaking mitigation might well have increased the already real and substantial danger which picard ja. identified. [53] there will, of course, be other goods containing defects which present real and substantial dangers, and to which la forest j.’s observations in winnipeg condominium about the impossibility of discarding homes and other building structures may apply. to be clear, this is a high threshold that we do not anticipate will be regularly met. the plaintiff must, like most homeowners faced with a dangerously defective home, be shown to be effectively bereft of reasonable options. when applied to goods, this describes the rare case. [54] the foregoing kind of good stands in contrast to two other kinds of goods. first, and more commonly, there is the good whose dangerous defect can realistically be addressed by discarding it. this will, we expect, apply to most defective consumer goods. again, the liability rule in winnipeg condominium protects a right to be free of a negligently caused real and substantial danger, not to the continued use of a product. if the danger can be removed without repair, the right is no less vindicated. (to be clear, if the plaintiff incurs a reasonably foreseeable cost in discarding the product ⸺ such as a regulatory disposal fee ⸺ that is recoverable as a cost of removing the danger). [55] secondly, there is the kind of good like the rte meats, for which “repair” is simply not possible the good must, therefore, also be discarded while in such circumstances the plaintiff may recover any costs of disposal, that is the extent of its possible recovery under this liability rule. it must be remembered that, because the right protected by this liability rule is that in the physical integrity of person or property, recovery is confined to the cost of removing a real and substantial danger to that right ⸺ by, where possible, discarding it. conversely, it does not extend to the diminution or loss of other interests that the appellant invokes here, such as business goodwill, business reputation, sales, profits, capital value or replacement of the rte meats. [56] we add this we find ourselves in respectful disagreement with our colleague’s view that laskin j.’s dissenting reasons in rivtow, “which were explicitly adopted in winnipeg condominium, at para. 36, suggest that additional economic losses may be recoverable under this class of duty” (para. 125). this is significant, she explains, because it suggests that courts ought not to restrict recovery to that which was allowed in winnipeg condominium, since “the absence of a claim for lost profits or other direct economic losses should not be read to preclude recovery of those losses in future cases” (para. 124 (emphasis in original)). in our respectful view, this overstates the breadth of laskin j.’s dissent and of this court’s adoption thereof in winnipeg condominium. in rivtow, the court was unanimously of the view that the lost profits of the charterer by demise of the defective cranes were recoverable due to the manufacturer’s breach of its duty to warn laskin j dissented on one narrow issue: whether the cost of repairing the cranes was also recoverable. the reasoning of laskin j., therefore, was directed ⸺ and applied by this court in winnipeg condominium (at para. 36) ⸺ only to support the plaintiff’s claim for those costs. there is simply no suggestion, either in rivtow, including laskin j.’s dissent, or in winnipeg condominium, that “additional economic losses may be recoverable” rather, they suggest the opposite. (b) whether the rte meats created a real and substantial danger to the appellant [57] in our view, the appellant’s claim based on negligent supply of goods must fail for two reasons. first, a duty of care in respect of the negligent supply of shoddy goods or structures is predicated, as we have explained, upon a defect posing a real and substantial danger to the plaintiff’s rights in person or property. in this case, any danger posed by the supply of rte meats ⸺ which arose from the possibility that they were actually contaminated with listeria ⸺ could be a danger only to the ultimate consumer. no such danger was posed to the mr. sub franchisees. even if the rte meats posed a real and substantial danger to consumers, this offers no support for the franchisees’ claim that the alleged loss of past and future sales, past and future profits, capital value and goodwill was the result of interference with their rights. effectively, the mr. sub franchisees are seeking to bootstrap their claim to the rights of consumers further, even if the franchisees could have established an imminent risk to their own rights in person or property, the most they could have recovered would have been the cost of averting this danger. [58] this leads us to our second reason why the appellant’s claim must fail. while the rte meats may have posed a real and substantial danger to consumers when they were manufactured, any such danger evaporated when they were recalled and destroyed in other words, their dangerousness was in their latency (cardwell v. perthen, 2007 bcca 313, 243 bcac 135, at paras. 34-35). it bears repeating that removing a danger ⸺ whether in a product like the rte meats that cannot be repaired, or in the case of goods that can ⸺ will in many (and, indeed, in most) cases be achieved by simply discarding the good at little or no expense. we therefore agree that, once that was accomplished in this case by way of the recall, the facts would not support a finding that the rte meats posed a real and substantial danger thereafter to anyone ⸺ not to consumers, and certainly not to mr. sub franchisees, who can therefore show no injury to a relevant right protected under tort law. (c) whether the parties were in a relationship of proximity [59] nonetheless, even if the rte meats had posed a real and substantial danger within the meaning of winnipeg condominium to mr. sub franchisees’ rights and had not been discarded, our analysis would not end here. in winnipeg condominium, the duty of care analysis was undertaken in accordance with the then-prevailing test for recognizing a duty of care in canadian negligence law: the anns test, under which a duty of care would, prima facie, arise where injury to the plaintiff is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. and so, la forest j concluded that a prima facie duty of care existed on the basis of foreseeability of “personal injury or damage to other property”, without inquiring into whether the parties were in a relationship of proximity (para. 35). [60] but just as the duty analysis to be applied in cases of alleged negligent misrepresentation and performance of a service had to be adjusted in livent to account for its refinement in cooper in the form of the anns/cooper framework, so too must the duty analysis in cases of negligent supply of shoddy goods or structures conform to that framework. as professor klar has observed, the court’s judgment in livent “has implications for the application of the anns/cooper duty of care formula to all negligence actions and should not be confined merely to negligent misrepresentation cases” (l klar, “duty of care for negligent misrepresentation — and beyond?” (2018), 48 adv. q 235, at p 238). while, therefore, winnipeg condominium remains binding authority governing the duty of care in respect of shoddy goods or structures, the framework by which that duty is imposed must now distinguish more clearly between foreseeability and proximity. [61] as we will explain, this provides a further reason to dispose not only of the appellant’s claim under winnipeg condominium, but also of the arguments favouring recognition of a novel duty of care. (i) proximity [62] as the court explained in livent (albeit in the context of negligent misrepresentation or performance of a service), proximity ⸺ which is “a distinct and more demanding hurdle than reasonable foreseeability” (para. 34) ⸺ informs the foreseeability inquiry, and should therefore be considered prior to assessing foreseeability of injury. as professor klar has explained, “[t]he existence of proximity depend[s] upon the nature of the relationship between the parties [which] in turn dictate[s] the type of injury which could flow from this relationship and hence the losses which could be considered to have been reasonably foreseeable” (p 242). we agree: in all claims, including claims of dangerous goods or structures, the considerations that support a finding of proximity also limit the type of injury that may be reasonably foreseen to result from the defendant’s negligence. (the result of doing so in this case is to render a foreseeability analysis unnecessary since, as we shall explain, the appellant cannot demonstrate a proximate relationship between itself and maple leaf foods.) [63] assessing proximity requires asking whether, in light of the nature of the relationship at issue (livent, at para. 25), the parties are in such a “close and direct” relationship that it would be “just and fair having regard to that relationship to impose a duty of care in law” (livent, at para. 25, citing cooper, at paras. 32 and 34). this assessment proceeds in two steps. [64] first, the court must ask whether proximity can be made out by reference to an established or analogous category of proximate relationship (livent, at paras. 26-28) this question comes first because “[i]f a relationship falls within a previously established category, or is analogous to one, then the requisite close and direct relationship is shown” (livent, at para. 26). analogous categories of proximity step into a prior and continuing stream of legal development. they are, in other words, just that: analogous, in the sense of being like an established category, although different in scope. applying an established category of proximity so as to recognize another is simply an instance of the inductive reasoning whereby the common law is developed and a duty recognized in one set of cases is applied to a similar set of cases. [65] in determining whether proximity can be established on the basis of an existing or analogous category, “a court should be attentive to the particular factors which justified recognizing that prior category in order to determine whether the relationship at issue is, in fact, truly the same as or analogous to that which was previously recognized” (livent, at para. 28). this is because, as between parties to a relationship, some acts or omissions might amount to a breach of duty, while other acts or omissions within that same relationship will not. merely because particular factors will support a finding of proximity and recognition of a duty within one aspect of a relationship and for one purpose to compensate for one kind of loss does not mean a duty will apply to all aspects of that relationship and for all purposes and to compensate for all forms of loss. while, therefore, proximity may inhere between two parties at large, it may inhere only for particular purposes or for particular actions; whether it is one or the other, and (if the other) for which purposes and which actions, will depend, as we have already recounted, upon the nature of the particular relationship at issue (livent, at para. 27) or the type of pure economic loss alleged ultimately, then, to ground an analogous duty, the case authorities relied upon by the appellant must be shown to arise from an analogous relationship and analogous circumstances (ibid). [66] secondly, if the court determines that proximity cannot be based on an established or analogous category of proximate relationship, then it must conduct a full proximity analysis (livent, at para. 29) in making this assessment, courts must examine all relevant factors present in the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant ⸺ which, while “diverse and depend[ent] on the circumstances of each case” (livent, at para. 29), include “expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved” (cooper, at para. 34). [67] in a case of negligent supply of shoddy goods or structures, the claim may arise in circumstances in which the parties could have protected their interests under contract even without being in privity of contract, the parties may nonetheless be “linked by way of contracts with a middle party”, as maple leaf and the mr sub franchisees are linked by way of contracts with mr. sub (stapleton, at p 287). this is particularly the case in commercial transactions (as opposed to consumer purchases: arora v. whirlpool canada lp, 2013 onca 657, 118 or (3d) 115, at para. 106). taken together, those contracts may reflect a “clear tripartite understanding of where the risk is to lie” (stapleton, at p 287). we see this consideration as crucial here when considering the “expectations [and] other interests involved” that must be accounted for in analysing the nature of the relationship (cooper, at para. 34). [68] given the possibility of an existing allocation of risk by contract, a proximity analysis must account for two concerns. first, the reasonable availability of adequate contractual protection within a commercial relationship, even a multipartite relationship, from the risk of loss is an “eminently sensible anti-circumvention argument” that militates strongly against the recognition of a duty of care (stapleton, at p 287; see also p 286). as la forest j., dissenting, recognized in norsk, at p 1116, “the plaintiff’s ability to foresee and provide for the particular damage in question is a key factor in the proximity analysis”. for example, a plaintiff may have been able to anticipate risk and remove, confine, minimize or otherwise address it by way of a contractual term (linden et al., at §987). we agree with professor stapleton that the boundaries of tort liability should respect that “the principal alternative paths of protection which are theoretically available . . . are by way of contracts made directly with th[e] responsible party or indirectly with a middle party” (p 271 (emphasis added)). [69] this court recognized as much in design services, where the defendant had launched a design-build tendering process for the construction of a building. the plaintiff subcontractors and the defendant were not in privity of contract, but each were linked to the other through a bid submitted by olympic construction ltd., a prime contractor. olympic’s bid was unsuccessful, and the subcontractors sued alleging, inter alia, that they were in a relationship of proximity with the defendant and were owed a duty of care originating by reason of the defendant’s “contract a” obligations to olympic that arose at the tendering stage. [70] for this court, rothstein j declined to impose a duty of care, because the plaintiffs could have arranged their affairs so as to submit a joint bid with olympic (thereby making them a party to “contract a” and entitling them to sue the defendant in contract for irregularities in the tendering process), yet had chosen not to do so. he considered that the plaintiffs’ voluntary choice to forego this contractual protection was an “overriding” proximity factor that was fatal to the claim (paras. 54-56). thus courts will not lightly impose a duty in tort to insure against pure economic loss, in circumstances where the parties could have but chose not to provide for such insurance in contract. [71] the second concern is related to the first. if the possibility of reasonably addressing risk through a contractual term, even within a chain of contracts, presents a compelling argument against allowing a plaintiff to circumvent a contractual arrangement by seeking recognition of a duty of care in tort law, it follows that where the parties have done so, this consideration weighs even more heavily against such recognition as professor stapleton explains, this particular anti-circumvention argument arises “not only [where] alternative protection by way of an arrangement with [the middle] party [was] available, but was obtained” (stapleton, at p 287 (emphasis added)). again, this court’s decision in design services is instructive: in my view, the observation of professor lewis n. klar (tort law (3rd ed. 2003), at p 201) — that the ordering of commercial relationships is usually in the bailiwick of the law of contract — is particularly apt in this type of case. to conclude that an action in tort is appropriate when commercial parties have deliberately arranged their affairs in contract would be to allow for an unjustifiable encroachment of tort law into the realm of contract. [emphasis added; para. 56.] [72] all this is not to say that contractual silence on a matter will automatically foreclose the imposition of a duty of care contractual silence on certain matters is inevitable, since it is impractical for even the most sophisticated parties to bargain about every foreseeable risk (stapleton, at p 287). our point, rather, is that, in the case of defective goods and structures, commercial parties between or among whom the product is transferred before it reaches the consumer will have had a chance to allocate risk and order their relationship via contract. and in assessing the proximity of relations among those parties ⸺ that is, in evaluating “expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved” ⸺ courts must be careful not to disrupt the allocations of risk reflected, even if only implicitly, in relevant contractual arrangements. [73] in sum, under the anns/cooper framework and its rigorous proximity analysis, the determination of whether a claim of negligent supply of shoddy goods or structures is supported by a duty of care between the plaintiff and the defendant requires consideration of “expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved”, as well as any other considerations going to whether it would be “just and fair”, having regard to the relationship between the parties, to impose a duty of care. in particular, where the parties are linked by way of contracts with a middle party that, taken together, reflect a multipartite allocation of risk, courts must be cautious about allowing parties to circumvent that allocation by way of tort claims. courts must ask: is a party using tort law so as to circumvent the strictures of a contractual arrangement? could the parties have addressed risk through a contractual term? and, did they? in our view, and as we will explain, these considerations loom large here. (ii) application [74] as indicated in our review of livent, the question of whether the parties were in a proximate relationship follows a two-step analysis accordingly, we first address the appellant’s arguments regarding an analogous category of proximity. 1. analogous category of proximity [75] the appellant argues that appellate and trial level case law support recognition of a duty of care owed by maple leaf foods to mr. sub franchisees “for economic losses arising out of negligent manufacture and supply of a dangerous product” — a duty that, as we have already explained, is grounded in the liability rule recognized in winnipeg condominium (af, at para. 51; see also para. 79) to establish that this duty is owed in its case, the appellant argues that the relationships of proximity recognized in those authorities — in particular, plas-tex, tanshaw and country style — “are analogous to [the relationship between maple leaf foods and] the franchisees” (af, at para. 51). [76] in plas-tex, as already recounted, dangerously defective resin was knowingly supplied by the defendant to the plaintiffs. the pipes exploded, necessitating repairs and causing the plaintiff to suffer significant business losses the court of appeal of alberta held that dow owed a duty “to take reasonable care not to manufacture and distribute a product that is dangerous” (plas-tex, at para. 90). [77] this is not analogous to the basis for the duty which the appellant says was owed by maple leaf foods to mr. sub franchisees. the post-delivery circumstances of plas-tex are entirely different than the circumstances of the appellant’s claim of interrupted supply. specifically, the defect in the resin created actual physical damage, such that the resulting economic losses were not, as a matter of law, pure economic loss but consequential economic loss. finally, and most significantly, the resin was not intended for human consumption ⸺ a central plank in the appellant’s posited analogous category. [78] nor is tanshaw of assistance to the appellant there, the “back alley” night club, owned by the plaintiff numbered company, held a “foam party”, an event at which bubbles were dispersed onto the dancefloor so that patrons could dance in the foam. when an altered chemical composition of the product used by the manufacturer tanshaw to produce the foam resulted in some patrons suffering physical injury, the nightclub owner successfully sued tanshaw and others for, inter alia, negligence. [79] as in plas-tex, the fact that a dangerous product was actually supplied and that it caused physical injury, albeit to third parties, tends to undermine the appellant’s position that this case is analogous. [80] further, and in our respectful view, the trial judge in tanshaw erred in her conclusion that the manufacturer owed a duty of care to the nightclub, or at least in relying upon the basis she identified for doing so. correctly noting that donoghue v. stevenson stands for the proposition that “the manufacturer or distributor of a product that is defective or unfit for its intended use and the end user of the product is a relationship of sufficient proximity to found a duty of care”, she then held that it followed that tanshaw was under an obligation to be “mindful of the interests of the back alley and its patrons” and therefore stood in sufficient proximity to both “the back alley and its patrons” and owed a “duty of care to the back alley and its patrons” (para. 148 (emphasis added)). [81] the liability rule in donoghue v stevenson, however, governs the relationship between manufacturers and the ultimate consumer who is physically injured by the manufacturer’s negligence; it does not speak to whether a manufacturer owes a duty to an intermediary for economic losses, even where those losses are alleged to arise from that same act of negligence. we say, again respectfully, that the trial judge erred by failing to conduct separate analyses of each duty alleged in that case ⸺ that is, the duty owed to the patrons, and the duty owed to the nightclub. as we have stressed (at para. 66), determining whether proximity is established requires examining all relevant factors arising from the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant ⸺ which examination may entail highly case-specific factors including expectations, representations, reliance and other considerations. in failing to do so with respect to the specific relationship between tanshaw and the night club, the trial judge effectively bootstrapped tanshaw’s liability to the night club to the duty which tanshaw owed to the patrons. [82] finally, country style is a case concerning misrepresentations made by a landlord about a commercial space leased by the franchisor who in turn leased to the plaintiff franchisee in anticipation of using the space to house a donut franchise. the landlord held out that it would build according to a specific site plan and then proceeded to make changes to the plan. the imposition of liability by the court of appeal for ontario on the landlord was simply in conformity with this court’s decisions in queen v. cognos inc., [1993] 1 scr 87, hercules and kamloops v. nielson, [1984] 2 scr. 2. it has nothing to do with, and is not remotely analogous to, the duty of care posited here to provide products fit for human consumption. [83] having concluded that proximity cannot be established by reference to a recognized category of proximate relationship, we must now conduct a full proximity analysis. 2. full proximity analysis [84] it follows ⸺ not only from cooper’s emphasis upon proximity as a distinct inquiry from foreseeability, but also from livent’s direction that proximity is to be assessed by examining the nature of the relationship itself ⸺ that the defendant’s ability to reasonably foresee injury to a plaintiff is insufficient to ground a finding of proximity we stress this, in view of the appellant’s submissions on proximity in describing maple leaf foods’ “proximate relationship with [mr sub] franchisees” (af, at p 8), it points to maple leaf foods’ knowledge, inter alia, that the franchisees “were prohibited from procuring rte meats from another supplier because of the exclusive supplier arrangement”; of the importance of product supply to the franchisees’ operations; and of the losses that would flow from an interruption of supply, including goodwill, reputation, sales and profits (af, at para. 21) such knowledge would be unsurprising, given the particulars the appellant alleges of direct communications between maple leaf foods and the franchisees to support their operations for example, maple leaf foods operated a dedicated toll free hotline available to the franchisees, and dispatched representatives to discuss with franchisees any concerns with its product (af, at para. 22). the appellant also points to evidence that maple leaf foods not only could have foreseen, but did foresee the detrimental impact of its voluntary recall of rte meats and “took direct measures to assist [the franchisees]” (af, at para. 23). [85] to the extent that these considerations are possibly relevant to the duty analysis, they go not to proximity, but to reasonable foreseeability of injury. but even when they are so considered, it bears recalling that, in livent, this court clarified that an injury or loss will be considered to be “reasonably foreseeable” only where it falls within the scope of a proximate relationship between the parties (livent, at para. 34; see also klar, at p 242) this was, the court explained, the effect of cooper at its restoration of proximity to the duty analysis cooper “signalled a shift from the anns test, which had grounded the recognition of a prima facie duty upon mere foreseeability of injury” (livent, at para. 23 (emphasis added)). henceforward, it would no longer be sufficient for the appellant to point to evidence that tends to show that maple leaf foods could have merely foreseen the economic loss sustained by mr. sub franchisees, or even that maple leaf foods’ representatives supported mr. sub in its operations, whether before or after the voluntary recall the scope of reasonable foreseeability is “far narrower” than that: “[w]hat the defendant reasonably foresees as flowing from his or her negligence depends upon the characteristics of his or her relationship with the plaintiff” (livent, at paras. 24 and 36). regard must therefore be had to whether they were in a proximate relationship. and deciding that requires examining and accounting for the nature of that relationship, which informs the types of injury that could be reasonably foreseen. in our view, the pure economic losses the appellant seeks to recover do not fall within the scope of a proximate relationship and cannot be considered a reasonably foreseeable consequence of maple leaf foods’ alleged negligence in supplying potentially contaminated rte meats. [86] here, then, we recall that the appellant is a corporation that entered into a franchise agreement with mr sub, which in turn was party to an exclusive supply agreement with maple leaf foods taken together, these agreements required the appellant, and all mr sub franchisees, to purchase only such rte meats as were manufactured by maple leaf foods the relevant terms of the franchise agreement state: 6.2 authorized products and services the franchisee acknowledges that it is in the interest of the franchisee, the franchisor and all other mr. sub restaurant franchisees that the uniform standards, methods, procedures, techniques and specifications of the system be fully adhered to by the franchisee. accordingly, the franchisee shall offer for sale from the premises only such products and services as may be authorized from time to time in writing by franchisor in the manual or otherwise. the franchisee further agrees to purchase or lease, as applicable, all products, ingredients, equipment, supplies and other items exclusively from the franchisor or from sources or suppliers approved or designated in writing by the franchisor (which sources or suppliers may include affiliates of the franchisor) at prices and charges, and upon the terms and conditions of sale in effect at the date of shipment, plus taxes and reasonable shipping and transportation charges. the franchisor will not be liable for any direct or indirect loss or damage due to any delay in delivery, or inaccurate or incomplete shipments. 6.4 group purchasing and rebates the franchisee shall have the right to participate, on the same basis as other mr sub restaurant franchisees, in any group purchasing programs for products, ingredients, equipment, supplies, services and other items which the franchisor may from time to time use, develop, sponsor or provide. in short, franchisees were contractually restricted to using and selling only products authorized by mr. sub and supplied exclusively by mr. sub or by sources approved by mr sub as to those sources, the exclusive supply agreement between maple leaf foods and mr. sub provided: product listing mr sub agrees to honor the exclusive supplier status of maple leaf foodservice on the 14 core menu items for the 3 year period − january 1, 2006 to december 31, 2008 maple leaf foodservice obligations hereunder shall be dependent upon maintaining the exclusive supply status. list of core menu items . the foregoing menu items shall be exclusively supplied by maple leaf foodservice. maple leaf foodservice will ensure that mr sub will be offered “best pricing” on any exclusive products. for the purposes hereof “best pricing” shall be determined with reference to third parties acquiring similar goods (including similar quality and mix of goods) in similar quantities, for direct re-sale by them to consumers by means of a fast food format. continued superior customer services . maple leaf foodservice will continue to provide mr sub with the following elements of superior customer service: -1-800 line available to franchisees on a national scale. -national sales representation country wide. -fast, accurate and timely handling of inquiries regarding product ingredients, handling, storage and quality. -direct franchisee contact. [87] our colleague relies on such terms to support a finding of proximity between maple leaf foods and the mr. sub franchisees (at para. 138). but a finding of proximity does not depend on the existence of certain contractual terms that make specific reference to one party or another in a multipartite commercial relationship such as this, the relevant contractual terms ought to be considered as a whole so as not to defeat the expectations of all parties as to their obligations and entitlements. here, the mr. sub franchisees’ relevant obligation to mr. sub under the franchise agreement was to purchase product only as it directed, and maple leaf foods’ relevant right as against mr. sub under the exclusive supply agreement was to be the exclusive supplier of rte meats taken together, this arrangement operated to bind the franchisees to obtain and sell only rte meats produced by maple leaf foods. [88] the appellant says that, as a result of the terms of the franchise agreement, it and the other franchisees were “vulnerable” and unable to protect themselves from maple leaf foods’ negligence “in the franchisee-franchisor context governed by a standard form franchise agreement”, it argues, it could not protect itself by negotiation, or at least not “on an equal footing” (af, at paras. 91-92). while we agree that the franchising agreement worked a “vulnerability” upon the appellant, we do not see its significance as the appellant does it is this simple: instead of operating as an independent restaurant, the appellant chose to operate its business through a franchise. in doing so, like any franchisee it secured advantages that it could not have obtained on its own, including the use of the franchisor’s trademark (and the benefit of associated goodwill), an established and proven system of operation, training, co-operative advertising and marketing, and ⸺ significantly ⸺ the benefit of the franchisor’s buying power to secure better pricing for supplies. this last benefit is precisely what mr. sub franchisees secured under art. 6.4 of the franchise agreement (“group purchasing and rebates”), which provided them with the benefit of mr sub’s group purchasing program. [89] of course, like any franchisee, the appellant also assumed certain disadvantages by operating through a franchise, all of which are typically necessary to securing the advantages. for example, the success of the system of operations and the benefit of the franchisor’s buying power depend upon maintaining a degree ⸺ and, depending upon the franchise, sometimes an exceedingly high degree ⸺ of consistency among all franchisees in all aspects of their operations operating systems must be followed, the same suppliers of products must be used, and employees must take the same training this near-total loss of control by a franchisee over its business operations, including its suppliers, is enforced by another inevitable constraint that comes with entering into a franchise arrangement, which is, in this case, the terms of the franchise agreement which bound the franchisees to those operational systems and supply arrangements its terms are not extraordinary; as the appellant says, it is a “standard form franchise agreement”. the appellant also says the franchise agreement leaves franchisees “vulnerable” to interruptions in supply caused by the negligence of suppliers, an observation echoed by our colleague (at paras. 147-151) as already indicated, we agree that it does. but this is not a basis for a tort law duty, but rather an unremarkable incident of the franchise model of business in which the franchisees operated further, such “vulnerability”, if sufficiently serious, could have been addressed by the appellant obtaining insurance ⸺ an option which, as confirmed to us at the hearing of this appeal, was not pursued. [90] a finding of proximity between mr. sub franchisees and maple leaf foods would sit uneasily with this state of affairs, linked as these parties were through mr. sub by a chain of contracts that reflected the typical arrangement between franchisee, franchisor and exclusive supplier. the appellant was not a consumer, but a commercial actor whose vulnerability was entirely the product of its choice to enter into that arrangement, and whose choice substantially informed the expectations of that relationship to which the proximity analysis must have regard. to allow the appellant to circumvent the strictures of that contractual relationship by alleging a duty of care in tort in a manner that undermines and even contradicts those strictures (in that the proposed duty would impose an obligation to supply upon maple leaf foods whereas its agreement with mr. sub imposed no such obligation) would not only undermine the stability of such arrangements, but also of the appellant’s particular arrangement, which was predicated upon an exclusive source of supply. [91] while this is sufficient for us to conclude that the mr. sub franchisees and maple leaf foods were not in a relationship of proximity, a related consideration also furnishes an answer to our colleague’s concern for vulnerability arising from the commercial arrangement linking maple leaf foods, mr. sub and its franchisees. as already mentioned, under the terms of the franchise agreement, the appellant and other mr sub franchisees did have means, albeit conditional upon obtaining mr sub’s permission, to avoid the risk of interrupted supply or to avoid actual interrupted supply where it occurred by seeking out alternative sources of supply. specifically, art. 6.2 provided: if the franchisee wishes to purchase products, ingredients, equipment or supplies from sources or suppliers other than those approved or designated in writing by the franchisor, or wishes to offer for sale products or services that have not been previously authorized in writing by the franchisor, the franchisee shall give notice to the franchisor that it is requesting the franchisor’s approval of such other source, supplier, product or service, as the case may be, and the franchisor shall give its approval, or reasons for refusing such approval, within thirty (30) days of such notice but in any event the franchisor shall have the absolute right to disapprove of any such other source, supplier, product or service. [92] it is not disputed that the appellant did not avail itself of this option for obtaining alternative supply sources, even after the listeria outbreak and the voluntary recall of rte meats (mitropoulos cross-examination, rr, at p 90). [93] we acknowledge that mr. sub retained discretion to deny any such request, but we simply cannot infer that mr. sub would likely have done so (karakatsanis j.’s reasons, at paras. 103 and 143) having been entirely released from its obligations towards maple leaf foods in september 2008 some two weeks after the recall, mr. sub was no longer under any obligation to maple leaf foods to observe any such minimum purchase requirements until 2010, when its partnership was renewed. in any event, mr. sub having itself found a new supplier, it does not seem as likely to us as it does to our colleague that mr. sub would have denied the franchisees’ request to do the same. nor would we assume that mr. sub would have exercised its discretion in a manner that would violated its obligation, under the arthur wishart act (franchise disclosure), 2000, s.o 2000, c 3, s 3(1), of fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of a franchise agreement. [94] if the vulnerability that is typical in a multipartite contractual arrangement such as this is insufficient to ground a duty of care, it is a fortiori inadequate where an available means under the terms of that arrangement for avoiding or mitigating that vulnerability was not pursued. in this regard, the appellant’s position is comparable to that of the plaintiffs in design services, whose failure to pursue the option under “contract a” for a joint venture with olympic was fatal to their tort claim. 3. novel duty of care [95] in any event, and as we have explained, the appellant cannot show that it and other mr. sub franchisees were in a relationship of proximity with maple leaf foods. that is fatal not only to its argument under winnipeg condominium, but also to the argument for recognition of a novel duty in these circumstances, since the novel duty also depends, inter alia, on the appellant showing that requisite proximate relationship with maple leaf foods. this is because, while a novel duty, being novel, starts with a blank slate, that slate is filled by applying the same anns/cooper framework that, as we have just explained, operates to preclude recovery here under the liability rule in winnipeg condominium. iv conclusion [96] we would dismiss the appeal, with costs. the reasons of wagner cj and abella, karakatsanis and kasirer jj. were delivered by karakatsanis j — i. introduction [97] this appeal asks whether franchisees, bound by their franchisor to use an exclusive supplier for products that are integral to their business, are able to recover the economic losses they suffered as a result of that supplier putting unsafe goods into the market. [98] the appellant, 1688782 ontario inc., is a former franchisee of the mr. submarine sandwich restaurant chain the franchisor, mr sub, entered into an agreement with maple leaf consumer foods inc. (together, with maple leaf foods inc., the respondents), making maple leaf the exclusive supplier of certain menu items. at the relevant time, mr sub required its franchisees to purchase certain meats exclusively from maple leaf. [99] in 2008, maple leaf issued a nation-wide recall of several products, including two used by mr. sub franchisees, after some of its products and production lines tested positive for listeria. during the recall, mr. sub was publicly associated with maple leaf and the franchisees’ businesses declined. the appellant filed and obtained certification for a class action against maple leaf on behalf of the mr. sub franchisees, alleging that the franchisees had suffered economic losses due to maple leaf’s negligence. [100] this is an appeal from a summary judgment motion to determine whether a duty of care existed between maple leaf and the mr. sub franchisees. the ultimate success of the franchisees in proving their claim in negligence is not at issue before this court. [101] i agree with brown and martin jj. that the main thrust of the franchisees’ claim does not fall within an existing category of economic loss or an established or analogous relationship of proximity. however, i would find that it is just and fair to impose a novel duty of care on maple leaf in these circumstances and would, accordingly, allow the appeal. ii. facts [102] maple leaf is a manufacturer and processor of food products, including “ready-to-eat” sliced meats and deli meats produced for national distribution in retail and food service operations in late 2005, maple leaf entered into a foodservice partnership agreement with mr. sub in which mr. sub agreed to purchase 14 core menu items, including sliced corned beef and sliced roast beef, exclusively from maple leaf until the end of 2008. mr. sub also agreed to purchase an annual minimum volume of maple leaf products. maple leaf, in turn, agreed to offer mr. sub “best pricing” on exclusive products, a signing bonus and “superior” customer service, which included a dedicated phone hotline for mr. sub franchisees and “direct franchisee contact” (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 14-15). [103] the appellant was a franchisee of mr sub and ran a family-operated location selling sandwiches and other items. in 2006, it renewed its franchise agreement with mr sub for a five-year term the franchise agreement was a standard form agreement used for all mr. sub franchisees. the agreement required the franchisees to purchase all products and ingredients “exclusively from the franchisor or from sources or suppliers approved or designated in writing by the franchisor” (ar, vol. ii, at pp. 109-10) the franchisees had the option of requesting to purchase ingredients from another source, but this was subject to mr. sub’s “absolute right to disapprove” of any proposed alternative, as well as a 30-day timeline and the franchisees paying the costs associated with mr. sub’s approval (p 110). [104] mr sub specified to the franchisees that maple leaf would be the exclusive provider of certain ready-to-eat meats for their restaurants. the franchisees purchased their meats through a distributor and thus lacked contractual privity with maple leaf. while they were linked indirectly through separate contracts, maple leaf and the franchisees had direct contact through a dedicated phone hotline to deal with product inquiries and concerns. [105] on august 16, 2008, the canadian food inspection agency (cfia) informed maple leaf that one of its products had tested positive for listeria. on august 17, a “health hazard alert” was issued by the cfia and maple leaf issued a nation- wide press release and recall of two products (neither used by the franchisees) on august 19, the cfia informed maple leaf of more positive tests for listeria on certain production lines and issued another “health hazard alert” (ar, vol. iv, at pp. 72- 75). that day, maple leaf recalled all products produced on the affected lines since june, including the roast beef and corned beef used by mr. sub. on august 23, the cfia and public health agency of canada concluded that the strain of listeria matching that in maple leaf’s products was linked to widespread illness and several deaths. [106] in the days following the expanded recall, maple leaf instructed distributors to visit mr. sub franchisee locations to remove and destroy the potentially contaminated meats. six to eight weeks passed before the roast beef and corned beef were replaced by a different supplier, with the help of maple leaf. [107] during the recall, mr. sub and other restaurants were publicly associated with maple leaf in news stories and in the cfia’s “health hazard alerts”, but mr. sub was unique among submarine sandwich restaurants for being identified as a purveyor of maple leaf products. eventually, the franchisor mr. sub and maple leaf entered into a supply and settlement agreement in which the exclusivity arrangement was relaxed in certain situations and maple leaf paid mr. sub “a one-time payment of $250,000.00 to cover, among other things, the inconvenience caused to mr. sub by the recall” (ar, vol. ii, at p 10). [108] none of the appellant’s patrons or employees were harmed by the affected products, but the appellant alleges that a significant decrease in sales and profits began during and continued after the listeria outbreak. the appellant closed its business in 2010. iii procedural history [109] the appellant commenced a class action against maple leaf on behalf of the franchisees of the other 424 mr. sub restaurants across canada. the action claims damages for disposal and destruction of the “ready-to-eat” meats; clean-up and mitigation costs; loss of past and future sales and profits, goodwill and capital value of their franchises and businesses; and special damages to dispose, destroy and replace the meats the appellant brought a motion for certification of the action as a class proceeding, while maple leaf brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the appellant’s claim on the basis that it owed no duty of care to the appellant the appellant responded seeking an order for summary judgment in its favour. [110] leitch j certified the action as a class proceeding with the appellant as the representative plaintiff (2016 onsc 4233). in these reasons, leitch j concluded that it was not plain and obvious that the claim did not fall within a recognized duty of care or that it could not meet the requirements of the test in anns v. merton london borough council, [1978] ac 728 (hl). a ontario superior court of justice, no. 60680cp (november 18, 2016), leitch j. [111] leitch j dismissed maple leaf’s motion for summary judgment and held in the franchisees’ favour (scj reasons (ar, vol. i, at p 45)). she found that maple leaf owed a duty of care to the franchisees in relation to the production, processing, sale and distribution of the meats, and that maple leaf further owed a duty of care with respect to any representations that the meats were fit for human consumption she rejected maple leaf’s argument that the franchisees’ claim was based on a narrow duty on maple leaf’s part to continuously supply its products. leitch j further found that maple leaf was under an obligation to be mindful of the franchisees’ legitimate interests and that it was reasonable, appropriate and foreseeable for consumers to avoid buying food from a restaurant whose supplier was under a recall due to problems that were not resolved for a significant period of time. b court of appeal for ontario, 2018 onca 407, 140 o.r (3d) 481, sharpe, rouleau and fairburn jja. [112] the court of appeal allowed maple leaf’s appeal with regard to the alleged duty to supply a product fit for human consumption, fairburn ja, writing for the court, held that any duty aimed at public health was owed to the franchisees’ customers, not the franchisees, and that the franchisees and maple leaf did not have the requisite proximity to ground a duty regarding the duty of care in relation to negligent misrepresentation, the court of appeal concluded that leitch j had erred in failing to consider the scope of the proximate relationship between the parties, as required under deloitte & touche v. livent inc. (receiver of), 2017 scc 63, [2017] 2 scr 855. [113] fairburn ja noted maple leaf’s acknowledgment that the franchisees had a de minimis claim for disposal, destruction and clean-up costs and that it did not contest that portion of leitch j.’s order. she therefore set aside leitch j.’s order finding a duty of care, except as it related to those costs. iv analysis [114] in these reasons, i consider one issue: did maple leaf owe a duty of care to the franchisees such that some or all of their economic losses are recoverable in tort? a recovery of economic losses in negligence [115] the franchisees do not allege that they suffered any physical injury or damage to their property due to maple leaf’s negligence their claim is thus for recovery of their “pure” economic loss. [116] historically, the common law did not allow for recovery of losses in negligence that were not consequent to physical injury or property damage. this so- called “exclusionary rule” against economic loss is often traced to cattle v. stockton waterworks (1875), l.r 10 q.b 453, in which the plaintiff contracted with a landowner to build a tunnel and then was denied recovery against a third-party defendant who negligently flooded the tunnel, thereby increasing the cost of performing the contract over time, the narrow rule established in stockton was widened and was soon said to preclude recovery of all types of pure economic loss in negligence. it was not until the house of lords decision of hedley byrne & co. ltd. v. heller & partners ltd., [1964] a.c 465, that recovery for certain forms of pure economic loss in negligence was recognized, in that case for negligent misrepresentation. [117] since hedley byrne, canadian courts have repeatedly affirmed that there is no bar or broad exclusionary rule against recovery of economic loss for negligence in canada (see, eg,. rivtow marine ltd v washington iron works, [1974] scr. 1189; agnew-surpass shoe stores ltd. v. cummer-yonge investments ltd., [1976] 2 scr 221, at p 252; bdc. ltd. v. hofstrand farms ltd., [1986] 1 scr 228, at p. 239; canadian national railway co. v. norsk pacific steamship co., [1992] 1 scr. 1021, at pp. 1046-48 and 1054, per la forest j., dissenting, and 1144-45 and 1155, per mclachlin j.; winnipeg condominium corporation no. 36 v. bird construction co., [1995] 1 scr 85, at paras. 28 and 32; d’amato v. badger, [1996] 2 scr 1071, at paras. 27 and 39; martel building ltd. v. canada, 2000 scc 60, [2000] 2 scr 860, at para 40) over the years, various tests or limitations were proposed to deal with economic loss cases, “on the theory that, left to itself, recovery for pure economic loss would extend liability in the field of negligence beyond traditional limits” (hofstrand farms, at p 235) recovery for pure economic loss in negligence soon grew to be “perceived as complicated and ever-changing” (m. c. awad and j. d. rice, “when is a negligent party liable for pure economic loss? a practical guide to an impractical area of law”, in t. archibald and m. cochrane, eds., annual review of civil litigation 2004 (2005), 253, at p 253). [118] nonetheless, this court has affirmed that, “[a]s a cause of action, claims concerning the recovery of economic loss are identical to any other claim in negligence in that the plaintiff must establish a duty, a breach, damage and causation” (martel building, at para. 35). the proper approach to assessing whether a duty of care exists is, as in all cases of negligence, to follow the two-step inquiry established in anns and adjusted in cooper v. hobart, 2001 scc 79, [2001] 3 scr 537 (see, eg,. martel building, at paras 46-47; design services ltd v canada, 2008 scc 22, [2008] 1 scr 737, at paras. 26-27; livent, at para. 16). “if foreseeability and proximity are established at the first stage, a prima facie duty of care arises” (cooper, at para. 30), and the court considers whether any residual policy considerations negate that duty at the second stage. however, where a case falls within or is analogous to a previously recognized category of proximity, and reasonable foreseeability is also established, then a prima facie duty may be found without a full analysis (para. 36). [119] while many harms may be reasonably foreseeable to someone in the defendant’s position, what is ultimately recoverable will be determined by the content of the duty, taking into account both foreseeability and proximity cooper did not, however, specify which of foreseeability and proximity must be assessed first. while this court found that assessing proximity first was helpful in cases of negligent misrepresentation because “[w]hat the defendant reasonably foresees as flowing from his or her negligence [will depend in part] upon . . . the purpose of the defendant’s undertaking” (livent, at para. 24), this will not always be the case for other types of economic loss or for other claims in negligence more generally. for example, in design services, an economic loss case, rothstein j began by assessing reasonable foreseeability and explained that “[t]he usual indication of proximity is foreseeability” (para. 49). more broadly, i am not convinced that the approach in livent must dictate the anns/cooper duty of care formula in all cases of negligence engaging economic loss. for instance, although the nature of the relationship is key to limiting the risk of indeterminate liability in negligent misrepresentation cases, in cases engaging the negligent supply of shoddy goods, the particular features of the relationship between the manufacturer or builder and their end-user may not be as pressing as the connection between the manufacturer or builder and the product they have negligently put into the marketplace. the anns/cooper analysis is meant to be responsive to different factual scenarios, and i see no reason to remove these elements of flexibility from the analysis in all cases. [120] i agree with brown and martin jj that while this court has identified specific types of economic losses in negligence, it is the duty of care — and not the category of economic loss — that dictates whether economic loss may be recoverable in negligence in a given case the case law surrounding each of the categories has helped to work through the policy considerations associated with the economic loss arising in a given category, thereby grouping the policy concerns that often arise in similar factual situations, alerting the parties and courts to those considerations and, in some cases, adopting a slightly modified analysis to account for the particular form of loss. i would emphasize, however, that since there is no longer a general bar to recovery of economic loss in negligence, the categories should not be viewed as being closed or otherwise have the effect of acting as additional hurdles for claims that meet the rigours of the anns/cooper analysis, which demands a careful consideration of the implications of allowing recovery for that economic loss. while the existing categories can act as analytical tools in the duty analysis (martel building, at para 45), the scope of allowable economic loss in canadian law is not limited to them. [121] in cases engaging a novel relationship and requiring a full anns/cooper analysis, courts should look to decided cases for guidance but should be cautious of reflexively relying on oft-repeated policy considerations as conventional wisdom without examining the specific circumstances of the case. much as not all economic loss cases are the same, these traditional policy concerns may not arise in every case (awad and rice, at p 255). for example, indeterminate liability can often be addressed by a robust stage one analysis (livent, at para 42); a plaintiff’s commercial sophistication or ability to allocate risk by contract depends on the facts of the case (see norsk, at p 1125, per la forest j., dissenting, and 1159, per mclachlin j.); and a plaintiff’s ability to obtain insurance for the particular loss at issue must be viewed realistically (p 1123). the core inquiry is the two-step analysis, responsive to the facts at hand. b existing categories of economic loss [122] i agree with brown and martin jj. that the appellant has not identified an undertaking that could form the basis for a duty to the franchisees within the category of negligent misrepresentation that encompasses the losses they are claiming. that said, i accept that, as a general proposition, an undertaking may be made concurrently to multiple recipients for different purposes i would also disagree with my colleagues that the franchise agreement between the franchisees and mr. sub necessarily restricted the franchisees’ ability to sue for negligent misrepresentation. as i will explain below, i take a different view of the contractual matrix in this case and the impact it has on the duty of care analysis. [123] with regard to the negligent supply of shoddy or unsafe goods, i would find that the nature and scope of the franchisees’ main allegations are not well-suited to this category of economic loss and that this category has limited value as an analytical tool. [124] while winnipeg condominium offers this court’s most recent discussion of economic loss arising from the negligent supply of shoddy goods and structures, i would caution against collapsing the entirety of this type of economic loss into the specific duty that was found on the facts of that case. in winnipeg condominium, the plaintiff claimed only for the costs of repair — but the absence of a claim for lost profits or other direct economic losses should not be read to preclude recovery of those losses in future cases that satisfy the anns/cooper analysis. [125] indeed, laskin j.’s dissenting reasons in rivtow, which were explicitly adopted in winnipeg condominium, at para. 36, suggest that additional economic losses may be recoverable under this class of duty. in rivtow, laskin j explained that the rationale for manufacturer’s liability, like that established in donoghue v. stevenson, [1932] ac 562 (hl), is what supports extending recovery for pure economic loss where physical injury or property damage has not yet occurred but is instead prevented (pp 1218 and 1221) laskin j would have found that the defendant, who had negligently manufactured defective cranes, was liable for the plaintiff’s economic loss from the “down time” of repairing the usually profit-generating cranes (at p 1222) and that, liability for those lost profits “being established”, the costs of the plaintiff’s repairs could also be recovered (p 1223; see also b feldthusen, “winnipeg condominium corporation no. 36 v. bird construction co.: who needs contract anymore?” (1995), 25 can. bus. lj 143, at p 145). [126] i agree with brown and martin jj. that the foundation of this class of duty is a manufacturer or builder’s duty to avoid danger towards the users of their product or inhabitants of their building. this was the driving force animating both winnipeg condominium, at paras. 12, 20-21 and 50, and laskin j.’s reasons in rivtow, at pp. 1219 and 1221-22; it was also found to significantly limit the class of plaintiffs to those who were foreseeably threatened by the dangerous product or structure. [127] as leitch j found, the contaminated maple leaf meats posed a “foreseeable real and substantial danger” to the health and safety of consumers (scj. reasons, at para. 53 (ar, vol. i, at p 58)). and, as the court of appeal noted, “there was a risk that the two core menu items supplied to the franchisees could compromise human health, given that they had been produced at the same plant as the tainted products” (para. 38). with respect to the costs of removing those potentially unsafe products incurred by the franchisees in this case, i would find that the rationale of protecting an end-user from the danger of a manufacturer’s negligence can also capture those intermediary actors who incurred economic losses in pursuit of that same goal. that is, an intermediary who incurs expenses in repairing or removing a dangerous item from the marketplace to protect the end-user, and who may be best-placed to take steps to avoid that danger, should similarly be able to recover from a negligent manufacturer. tort law should not require that the danger be passed on to the end-user before the costs of eliminating the danger can be recovered the franchisees in this case would not themselves have been directly exposed to the danger of maple leaf’s goods, but any clean-up or disposal costs that they incurred to protect consumers from the danger should be recoverable, being supported by a similar safety rationale as that in winnipeg condominium and laskin j.’s reasons in rivtow. indeed, the duty that is extant under the court of appeal’s order, uncontested by maple leaf — covering the franchisees’ clean-up and disposal costs — is supported by this logic. [128] however, while the franchisees’ costs in eliminating the danger could fall within a duty under this category of economic loss, the category does not capture the thrust of their claim. the economic losses claimed in this case flowed largely from the franchisees’ continued association with dangerous products these losses engage a different set of policy considerations that has not been worked through in the case law dealing with this category of economic loss. [129] i therefore find that the category of negligent supply of shoddy goods has little value as an analytical tool but the fact that there are differences between the franchisees’ circumstances and those in rivtow and winnipeg condominium does not erect a barrier to the franchisees establishing a duty. instead, it is more constructive to recognize that the franchisees’ claim engages novel issues that should be considered through a novel duty of care analysis. c novel duty of care [130] as discussed above, “canadian law recognizes that new categories where a duty of care is recognized may be established” by applying the analysis set out in anns and cooper (design services, at para. 26). here, maple leaf knowingly acted as an exclusive supplier of products integral to and closely associated with the franchisees’ businesses. under these circumstances, maple leaf owed the franchisees a duty to take reasonable care not to place unsafe goods into the market that could cause economic loss to the franchisees as a result of reasonable consumer response to the health risk posed by those goods. (1) stage one: prima facie duty of care (a) foreseeability [131] as mentioned, “[t]he usual indication of proximity is foreseeability” (design services, para. 49), and foreseeability can therefore be a useful starting point in assessing whether a novel duty of care exists. the reasonable foreseeability inquiry requires the court to ask whether the type of injury to the plaintiff, or to a class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs, was reasonably foreseeable to someone in the defendant’s position (rankin (rankin’s garage & sales) v. jj, 2018 scc 19, [2018] 1 scr 587, at paras 24, 26 and 53, per karakatsanis j., and 77, per brown j., dissenting) the question is thus whether someone in maple leaf’s position would reasonably have foreseen economic loss to the franchisees, or the class of plaintiffs to which they belong, as a result of their negligence. in my view, the answer is “yes”. [132] maple leaf had been in a commercial relationship with mr sub since 1989. when it entered into the 2005 food service partnership agreement as an exclusive supplier for mr sub, it knew that mr sub operated in a franchise structure the partnership agreement made multiple references to maple leaf providing its “superior” customer service to mr sub’s franchisees and maple leaf knew that it was the franchisees that would actually use the product and put it into the market for consumption. [133] importantly, maple leaf also knew about the centrality of its products to the franchisees’ business: the national account manager was aware that these meats were an integral and essential part of the franchisees’ business and that the quality of the meats supplied by maple leaf was essential to maintaining the franchisees’ goodwill and reputation indeed, the importance of such meats to the franchisees’ business is evident given that a mr. sub restaurant was primarily known as a place to purchase deli-style submarine sandwiches with ready-to-eat meats. [134] it was thus foreseeable that the franchisees would be identified as a public- facing retailer of potentially tainted meats while the meats posed a real danger to public health. i agree with leitch j that it was “reasonable, appropriate, and foreseeable for consumers to avoid buying food from a restaurant where there had been a food recall arising from problems in the plant of its meat supplier which were not ‘resolved’ for a relatively significant period of time” (scj reasons, at para. 48 (ar, vol. i, at p 56)). in my view, it was reasonably foreseeable to someone in maple leaf’s position that negligence in producing its meats would inflict economic harm on the mr sub franchisees or the class of plaintiffs to which they belong — franchisees who were required to exclusively use some of the meats for products essential to their business. (b) proximity [135] reasonable foreseeability of harm “must be supplemented by proximity” (cooper, at para. 31). in assessing proximity, the overarching question is whether the parties are in such a “‘close and directʼ relationship that it would be ‘just and fair having regard to that relationship to impose a duty of care in lawʼ” (livent, at para. 25, quoting cooper, at paras. 32 and 34; see also childs v. desormeaux, 2006 scc 18, [2006] 1 scr 643, at para. 25). the factors to assess that relationship “are diverse and depend on the circumstances of each case” (livent, at para. 29), but include the “expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved” (rankin’s garage, at para. 23, quoting cooper, at para. 34). in my view, there was a proximate relationship between maple leaf and the franchisees such that maple leaf “may be said to [have been] under an obligation to be mindful” of the franchisees’ interests (hercules managements ltd. v. ernst & young, [1997] 2 scr 165, at para. 24). [136] many products reach canadian consumers through supply chains with multiple participants, which may be far-reaching and involve little to no contact between the suppliers and sellers down the line. however, when a manufacturer knows that it is the exclusive supplier of a product that is integral to and identified with its recipient, a franchisee whose relationship with the supplier is dictated by its franchisor, the expectations and the dependency between the parties shift. [137] as discussed above, maple leaf entered into its foodservice partnership agreement with almost two decades of experience working with mr. sub, knowing that mr. sub operated in a franchise structure. by contracting with mr. sub, maple leaf also entered into a relationship with the franchisees. indeed, the central purpose of this partnership agreement was to provide franchisees with maple leaf meats. [138] various features of the partnership agreement point towards a proximate relationship between maple leaf and the franchisees. first, with maple leaf acting as mr. sub’s exclusive supplier for 14 core menu items under the agreement, mr. sub’s franchisees were bound to rely on maple leaf for a number of these meats. second, the partnership agreement required mr. sub to purchase at least 5,000,000 lbs of maple leaf product annually, and this target could only be met by having the franchisees purchase maple leaf products. the mr. sub account was large enough that some of maple leaf’s meats were delivered in boxes specifically labelled as a “mr sub” product. third, under the agreement maple leaf agreed to provide equipment support for panini grills, which maple leaf understood would be used by the franchisees in their restaurants. finally, in outlining maple leaf’s obligation to provide mr. sub with “superior” customer service, the partnership agreement made several references to supporting franchisees directly. this included a dedicated phone hotline for franchisees and “direct franchisee contact”, which would allow the franchisees to communicate their concerns and inquiries about product ingredients, handling, storage and quality with maple leaf directly in order to receive a “[f]ast, accurate and timely” response (ar, vol. ii, p 15). [139] the franchisees were clearly the actors that would be using and selling maple leaf’s products, and were at the heart of maple leaf and mr sub’s contemplation in entering into the partnership agreement and providing for direct franchisee contact. in this context, maple leaf established a close relationship with the franchisees. and, unlike other retailers of maple leaf products who may have been at liberty to carry multiple brands of ready-to-eat meats, mr. sub franchisees were bound to use maple leaf meats exclusively and in a business that centred on such meats — placing them in a particularly dependent relationship with maple leaf. the effect of this arrangement was that maple leaf, as an approved supplier, and the franchisees, bound to use that supplier through an exclusivity agreement, were in a proximate relationship. [140] my colleagues, however, suggest that proximity cannot be found between maple leaf and the franchisees because the franchisees could have foreseen and addressed their risk by contract, and in fact did. i disagree. the three-way contractual matrix between maple leaf, mr sub and the franchisees only strengthens my conclusion that there is proximity. [141] i agree that in cases involving pure economic loss, the contractual matrix linking the parties, if any, can be an important factor in finding a lack of proximity — either because the parties have already ordered their affairs in contract and are attempting to circumvent that ordering through tort law, or because the plaintiff could have, but failed to, protect itself in contract (see, eg,. norsk, at pp 1125-26, per la forest j., dissenting, and 1158-59, per mclachlin j.; bow valley husky (bermuda) ltd v saint john shipbuilding ltd., [1997] 3 scr 1210, at paras 26-27, per mclachlin j., dissenting in part, and 114-23, per iacobucci j.; martel building, at para. 106; design services, at paras. 54-56). [142] in this case, however, i see no provision within the contractual matrix contemplating the types of economic losses that the franchisees claim or suggesting that the parties had already allocated the risk of those losses. the question is “what the plaintiff has accepted as limits on [their] tort rights”, since a contractual matrix that is genuinely silent on the specific issue at hand would not preclude finding a duty of care (j. stapleton, “duty of care and economic loss: a wider agenda” (1991), 107 law q rev 249, at p 287) under the franchise agreement, mr sub was explicitly not liable to the franchisees for “any direct or indirect loss or damage due to any delay in delivery, or inaccurate or incomplete shipments” of its mandatory products (ar, vol. ii, at p 110). no provision addressed recovery for losses or damages arising from unfit or unsafe shipments. [143] the franchisees did have the option to request to purchase ingredients from another source, subject to mr. sub’s “absolute right to disapprove” within a 30-day timeline and the franchisees paying the costs for that approval process. i would note that, in light of the minimum supply requirement agreed to by mr. sub, approval of such requests would likely not have been commonplace. in any event, leitch j found that the franchisees are not claiming damages for the non-supply of maple leaf product — rather, their claim is based on a duty relating to their association with unsafe products. [144] when considering whether the franchisees were able to, and should have, contractually protected themselves from the types of economic loss they claim, a realistic approach must be taken in norsk, for example, mclachlin j considered various arguments to restrict recovery of economic loss and explained that “[t]he ‘contractual allocation of risk’ argument rests on a number of important, but questionable assumptions”, including that “all parties to a transaction share an equality of bargaining power which will result in the effective allocation of risk” (p 1159). she later noted that the terms of a contract are an important consideration in determining whether economic loss is recoverable but that “the contract may tell only part of the story between the parties” (p 1164). while la forest j dissented in the result in that case, he nevertheless agreed that “[i]nequality of bargaining power is in fact only one of a number of reasons why contract may not be a real alternative in a given case” (p 1125; see also bow valley husky, at para. 69, per mclachlin j., dissenting in part). [145] an overly formalistic appeal to protection through contract therefore risks failing to take into account the parties’ actual circumstances, including their commercial sophistication and bargaining power. there is a “rational distinction . between plaintiffs who do have reasonably available avenues of protection and those who do not” — a distinction that “is more likely to hinge on issues of bargaining power than on privity” (stapleton, at p 292 (emphasis in original); see also c. f. stychin, “the vulnerable subject of negligence law” (2012), 8 intl. j. l. context 337, at pp. 346-48) if a plaintiff’s contractual “ability” to allocate risk is illusory, relief in tort may be arbitrarily and unfairly foreclosed. thus, if the contractual allocation of risk is to be relied on to find that proximity does not exist, courts must ask: was the plaintiff actually able to allocate for this risk? [146] i would conclude that the answer to that question is clearly “no” in this case. [147] with no access to contractual privity with maple leaf, the franchisees contracted with their franchisor, mr sub importantly, “the relationship between a franchisor and franchisee is one of vulnerability for the franchisee”, stemming from a fundamental power imbalance (addison chevrolet buick gmc ltd. v. general motors of canada ltd., 2016 onca 324, 130 or (3d) 161, at para. 64). put simply, “it is unusual for a franchisee to be in the position of being equal in bargaining power to the franchisor” (shelanu inc. v. print three franchising corp. (2003), 64 or (3d) 533 (ca), at para. 66; see also 2176693 ontario ltd. v. cora franchise group inc., 2015 onca 152, 124 or (3d) 776, at paras. 38 and 56). [148] under a franchise arrangement, the franchisor grants the franchisee the right to sell, offer for sale or distribute goods or services that are associated with the franchisor given their unique and typically well-established brand or operating structure, franchisors like mr sub tend to already be in a position of power when encountering those who are seeking to operate one of their franchises, who are also often entering business for the first time (j sotos and f zaid, “status report on national franchise law project”, august 2002 (online)); f. zaid, “manitoba’s new franchises act — something old, something new — what to expect” (2013), 13 asper rev. int’l bus. & trade l 77, at p 98). this inequality has been of concern for some time, with the ontario government commissioning a report approximately 50 years ago detailing the implications of the franchisee-franchisor relationship and identifying potential areas for regulation to attenuate the effects of this inequality (see department of financial and commercial affairs, report of the minister’s committee on franchising (1971)). in light of this power imbalance, franchise legislation across most of canada now entitles franchisees to greater financial disclosure during the contracting process (including ontario’s arthur wishart act (franchise disclosure), 2000, so 2000, c 3), thereby alleviating some of the informational disparity between the franchisee and franchisor. [149] the fact remains, however, that franchisees are generally unable to negotiate more favourable terms to govern their relationship with the franchisor. the franchise agreement is usually a contract of adhesion, drafted by the stronger party and “whose main provisions are presented on a ‘take it or leave it basis’” with no prospect for negotiation (shelanu, at para. 58; see also j. c. lisus and a. ship, “restrictions on unilateral termination of franchise agreements” (2010), 49 can. bus. lj 113; s. waddams, “review essay: the problem of standard form contracts: a retreat to formalism” (2012), 53 can bus l.j 475) indeed, this court has highlighted the manner in which contracts of adhesion can exacerbate vulnerability and inequality of bargaining power in other contexts (see uber technologies inc. v. heller, 2020 scc 16, at para. 89; douez v. facebook, inc., 2017 scc 33, [2017] 1 scr 751, at paras. 52-57, per karakatsanis, wagner and gascon jj., and 98 and 114-16, per abella j). further, the power imbalance that characterizes the start of the franchisor-franchisee contractual relationship continues to affect the relationship long after franchisors demand and exercise significant control over the operation and decisions of the franchisees, and thereby deeply affect the success of their businesses (2176693 ontario ltd., at para. 38; shelanu, at para. 66). [150] these trends, well-known for decades, are borne out in this case: the appellant’s franchise agreement was a standard form agreement that was common to all mr sub franchisees and no negotiations were held when the agreement was renewed the franchisees’ vulnerability was sustained throughout their relationship with mr sub the prospect of protecting themselves by contract was essentially illusory for the franchisees and placed them in a particularly dependent and vulnerable relationship with maple leaf, their franchisor’s longstanding, exclusive business partner who supplied products integral to the identity and operation of their business. [151] in my view, the fact that this power imbalance and loss of control is widespread in the franchise context does not make it any less acute or justify dismissing it. nor does it change that the franchisees were, for all intents and purposes, unable to protect themselves from the very loss they allege the fact that there was a mutual exchange of other benefits in the franchise agreement, including a favourable pricing scheme for the franchisees, does not change that the franchise agreement was silent on the risk at issue in this case i therefore cannot interpret the franchise agreement to mean that the franchisees accepted a limit to their rights in tort for the loss at issue in this case. [152] i would therefore find that, far from negating the proximity that i have already found to exist between maple leaf and the franchisees, this contractual matrix points to a particular dependency and proximity in their relationship. in the context of an almost twenty-year relationship, maple leaf knowingly operated as an exclusive supplier to a restaurant operating as a franchise — a business arrangement in which the franchisee typically has almost no power to bargain for contractual protection, either with the supplier or the franchisor. compounding this vulnerability, the franchisees’ businesses were unusually dependent on maple leaf because mr. sub is known for selling submarine sandwiches with ready-to-eat meats this contractual matrix, the history between maple leaf and mr sub, the franchisees’ vulnerability and maple leaf’s direct line of contact with the franchisees establish that maple leaf and the franchisees were in a close and direct relationship. (c) scope of prima facie duty of care [153] the recoverable losses in this case depend on the content of the duty between maple leaf and the franchisees, taking into account both foreseeability and proximity. leitch j found that the contaminated meats posed a “foreseeable real and substantial danger” to consumer health and safety and that it was reasonably foreseeable for consumers to avoid purchasing from a restaurant where there had been a food recall arising from unresolved problems in its meat supplier’s plant the arrangement between maple leaf and the franchisees contemplated exclusive provision of safe products, a minimum purchase requirement and a close relationship and line of communication to deal with the franchisees’ product safety concerns directly instead of through the franchisor or the distributor since the proximity between maple leaf and the franchisees focused on the safety, handling and storage of specific products, so did maple leaf’s duty: there was no duty on maple leaf’s part to continuously supply its products, nor any expectation that maple leaf would take care to protect every aspect of the franchisees’ short and long-term economic success. maple leaf’s relationship of proximity to the franchisees did, however, contemplate the exclusive provision of a safe product that the parties understood to be integral to the franchisees’ operations and identity. [154] as a manufacturer, maple leaf already owed consumers the well- established duty to take care to produce safe products — a duty which in my view is aligned with its duty to the franchisees here, the exclusivity arrangement and the franchisees’ unusually heightened dependence on maple leaf products set the franchisees apart from other retailers of maple leaf products, making them particularly susceptible to consumer concerns about product safety. in the context of this close and direct relationship, maple leaf, as manufacturer, was under a duty to take reasonable care not to place unsafe goods into the market that could cause economic loss to the franchisees as a result of reasonable consumer response to the health risk posed by those goods. [155] i would therefore conclude that, subject to the other requirements of negligence being met, it is fair and just to hold maple leaf responsible for the franchisees’ direct economic consequences of being associated with unsafe maple leaf products while they posed a danger to consumer health the duty is tied to losses resulting from reasonable consumer responses to an identifiable public safety risk, so the franchisees should be able to recover losses that they experienced as a result of consumers reasonably avoiding a restaurant whose essential ingredients were potentially unsafe. in particular, maple leaf should be liable to compensate for the lost profits, sales, goodwill and capital value that the franchisees can prove were caused by reasonable consumer reaction to the risk maple leaf products posed to consumer health maple leaf’s liability should also extend to any special damages relating to clean up and disposal of the meats that the franchisees had to incur to safely handle the tainted products and mitigate the effects of maple leaf’s breach. [156] having found that maple leaf owed the franchisees a prima facie duty of care, i turn to stage two of the anns/cooper test. (2) stage two: residual policy considerations [157] in the second stage, the court considers residual policy considerations. these are not concerned with the relationship between the parties, “but with the effect of recognizing a duty of care on other legal obligations, the legal system and society more generally” (cooper, at para. 37). i do not believe that the policy considerations in this case should negate the prima facie duty of care i have concluded exists. [158] maple leaf submits that imposing a tortious duty of care in this case would have a negative impact on the canadian marketplace, in that manufacturers would be liable for the economic losses of anyone in their supply chain upon a recall and thereby risk indeterminate potential loss i disagree that this duty would so disrupt the marketplace and raise the spectre of indeterminate liability for manufacturers the value and temporal scopes of the franchisees’ damages are limited to economic losses caused by reasonably foreseeable consumer responses to an identifiable safety concern about a particular type of product during a particular period of time. in my view, such a narrowly defined duty of care would remove the time and value indeterminacy that might otherwise arise for this type of claim. and, importantly, the class indeterminacy here is virtually eliminated. the duty does not capture any down-the-line merchant of maple leaf products, but rather a branded mr. sub restaurant in a context where maple leaf contracted with mr. sub. put more generally, it captures franchisees bound to use an exclusive supplier for a product on which their business and identity is predicated. [159] maple leaf suggests that the extent of a plaintiff’s losses under a duty of care found on these facts would depend on media coverage or on how a particular product recall publicly unfolds. however, concerns about possible intervening causes or the “unusual or extreme reactions” of consumers in the face of a potentially unsafe product that are not already dealt with by the duty’s internal limits are properly considered as issues of causation or remoteness (mustapha v. culligan of canada ltd., 2008 scc 27, [2008] 2 scr 114, at para. 15). they are not convincing reasons to negate a prima facie duty of care. [160] indeed, finding a duty of care in these circumstances should not be conflated with a guarantee that every possible economic loss being claimed will survive the rigours of the remaining requirements of a negligence claim. a franchisee’s claim that its business has collapsed due to an isolated and contained instance of manufacturer negligence will be met with proper scrutiny. any award of damages will still be guided by the standard principles of negligence, such as the principle that a defendant need not place a plaintiff in a position better than its original position (athey v. leonati, [1996] 3 scr 458, at paras. 32 and 35); that the plaintiff has an obligation to mitigate its losses (janiak v. ippolito, [1985] 1 scr 146, at p 163; british columbia v. canadian forest products ltd., 2004 scc 38, [2004] 2 scr 74, at paras. 106-7); and that some losses that are factually caused by the defendant’s negligence will be “too remote to be viewed as legally caused” by the defendant’s negligence (mustapha, at para. 18). what can ultimately be proven at trial will depend on the franchisees meeting these causal, mitigation and remoteness requirements. [161] an additional policy consideration, raised by both maple leaf and the court of appeal, is the risk that imposing a duty of care will result in a chilling effect on manufacturers issuing voluntary recalls, and thus conflict with duties owed to consumers or with public health objectives more generally. i do not find this argument compelling. [162] first, food recalls are highly regulated in canada food operators are already obligated to notify the minister of agriculture and agri-food when their food presents a risk of injury to human health, and a voluntary recall may be initiated by a food operator or when the cfia requests that the company “initiate a voluntary recall” (canadian food inspection agency, how we decide to recall a food product (online); see also canadian food inspection agency, recall procedure: a guide for food businesses, last updated september 25, 2018 (online); safe food for canadians regulations, sor/2018-108, s 84) in defining the scope of the recall, the food operator must determine whether, in addition to the food that is directly affected, any other food is affected; if so, the food operator is directed by the cfia to include that food in their recall as well (canadian food inspection agency (2018)). in exceptional cases, food operators can also be subject to mandatory recalls by the minister where they are unwilling or unable to recall their product (canadian food inspection agency act, sc 1997, c 6, s 19). in light of this scheme, it is inaccurate to suggest that a manufacturer independently determines the need for, or scope of, a recall. indeed, even when a recall is voluntary, the cfia exercises oversight over the recall to “ensure that recall activities are sufficient to the risk posed to consumers” (canadian food inspection agency (2018); see also canada, report of the independent investigator into the 2008 listeriosis outbreak (online)). imposing a duty will not result in a chilling effect on voluntary recalls, nor will it result in manufacturers issuing recalls that do not fully protect the health and safety of consumers. [163] second, voluntary recalls actually help negligent manufacturers to mitigate losses caused by risky products if a negligent manufacturer declined to recall its products and obscured their potential danger, for example, and a franchisee’s customer suffered an injury or died as a result, then the manufacturer’s liability to both that customer and the franchisees for their economic losses would presumably be more extensive than its liability had it issued the recall. the notion that a duty would pull manufacturers in different directions here is not convincing. [164] as a result, none of these residual policy considerations are sufficiently persuasive to oust or negate the prima facie duty of care on maple leaf in this case. i therefore find that maple leaf owed the franchisees a duty to take reasonable care not to place unsafe goods into the market that could cause economic loss to the franchisees as a result of reasonable consumer response to the health risk posed by those goods. [165] in my view, there is minimal utility at this time in labelling the category of recovery for pure economic loss in negligence under which this duty falls. the existing categories originated from an attempt to classify cases in which courts had previously addressed the question of recovery for pure economic loss in negligence, and to consider whether certain situations “may invite different [analytical] approaches” to recovery for pure economic loss (norsk, at pp. 1048-49, per la forest j., dissenting). such an exercise is better taken retrospectively than prospectively. v conclusion [166] there was no appeal from the court of appeal’s order that the franchisees were owed a duty of care by maple leaf with respect to their claim for clean-up costs and other costs related to the disposal, destruction and replacement of ready-to-eat meats. [167] i find that maple leaf owed the franchisees a duty to take reasonable care not to place unsafe goods into the market that could cause economic loss to the franchisees as a result of reasonable consumer response to the health risk posed by those goods. the franchisees’ economic losses, including lost profits, sales, goodwill and capital value, as well as any special damages related to removing those potentially unsafe goods, may be recoverable upon proving the other requirements of their claim in negligence. [168] i would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the court of appeal, and reinstate the summary judgment order of the superior court regarding the duty of care owed by maple leaf to the franchisees, with costs throughout.
i. introduction i. introduction [1] sexual assault trials raise unique challenges in protecting the integrity of the trial and balancing the [1] les procès pour agression sexuelle posent des défis particuliers touchant la protection de l’intégrité 246 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. societal interests of both the accused and the com- plainant. parliament and the courts have responded to these challenges by setting out rules of evidence tailored to this context. du procès ainsi que la mise en balance des intérêts sociétaux de l’accusé et de la plaignante1. devant ces difficultés, le législateur et les tribunaux ont établi des règles de preuve adaptées à ce contexte. [2] parliament enacted s. 276 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, to govern the accused’s right to introduce evidence regarding the complainant’s prior sexual activity. such evidence is never admissible to support the twin myths that the complainant is less worthy of belief or more likely to have consented to the sexual activity in question. in order to respect the presumption of innocence, evidence may be adduced for other relevant purposes but must satisfy rigorous criteria to ensure it does not undermine the integrity of the trial or the complainant’s dignity and privacy. [3] the issue in this case is how these requirements apply where the crown introduces evidence relating to the complainant’s sexual activity and the accused seeks to challenge that evidence by cross- examining the complainant. [4] here, the complainant testified that she was a virgin at the time of the assault. the crown intro- duced evidence of her subsequent pregnancy and the approximate date of conception to support the com- plainant’s testimony that she was sexually assaulted by the accused. the accused denied the allegations and sought to question the complainant as to whether anyone else could have caused the pregnancy. [2] le législateur a adopté l’art. 276 du code cri­ minel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, pour régir le droit de l’accusé d’introduire une preuve portant sur le com- portement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante. une telle preuve n’est jamais admissible pour étayer les deux mythes voulant que la plaignante soit moins digne de foi ou plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité sexuelle en question. pour respecter la présomption d’innocence, une preuve peut être pré- sentée à d’autres fins pertinentes, mais doit satisfaire à des critères rigoureux pour qu’elle ne mine pas l’intégrité du procès ou la dignité et la vie privée de la plaignante. [3] il s’agit dans la présente affaire de savoir com- ment s’appliquent ces exigences lorsque le ministère public introduit une preuve relative au comportement sexuel de la plaignante et que l’accusé cherche à contester cette preuve en contre- interrogeant cette dernière. [4] en l’espèce, la plaignante a affirmé dans son té- moignage qu’elle était vierge au moment de l’agres- sion. le ministère public a introduit une preuve de sa grossesse subséquente et de la date approximative de la conception pour étayer le témoignage de la plaignante selon lequel elle avait été agressée sexuel- lement par l’accusé. ce dernier a nié les allégations et a cherché à interroger la plaignante quant à la question de savoir si quelqu’un d’autre aurait pu avoir causé la grossesse. [5] the application judge ruled that the accused was not permitted to ask whether the complainant had engaged in any other sexual activity because the accused had no evidence of “specific instances of sexual activity” — one of the requirements of [5] la juge saisie de la demande de l’accusé a statué qu’il n’était pas autorisé à demander si la plaignante avait eu toute autre activité sexuelle, parce qu’il ne disposait d’aucune preuve portant sur « des cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle » — une des 1 l’article 276 du code criminel utilise la forme masculine du mot « plaignant » pour décrire la personne qui serait victime de cette infraction. toutefois, l’agression sexuelle est une infraction hautement genrée dont la plupart des victimes sont des femmes. pour cette raison, et puisque la plaignante dans le dossier est une femme, j’utiliserai la forme féminine « plaignante » dans le présent jugement. [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 247 s. 276(2) of the criminal code. the accused was, however, permitted to cross- examine the complain- ant about her claim that she was a virgin at the time of the assault. conditions prévues au par. 276(2) du code criminel. l’accusé a toutefois été autorisé à contre- interroger la plaignante sur son affirmation selon laquelle elle était vierge au moment de l’agression. [6] i conclude that the application judge erred. the cross- examination sought to establish that the preg- nancy was caused by sexual activity other than the alleged assault. the crown- led evidence implicated a specific sexual act, namely activity capable of caus- ing pregnancy within a particular timeframe. the accused’s request satisfied the “specific instances” requirement of s. 276(2) because it was sufficiently detailed to permit the judge to apply the regime. [7] the crown clearly intended to rely on evidence of the pregnancy to establish the actus reus. the presumption of innocence requires the accused to be permitted to test such critical, corroborating physical evidence before it can be relied on to support a find- ing of guilt. given the accused’s denial of any sexual contact with the complainant, and the lack of other evidence of paternity, the ability to cross- examine the complainant was fundamental to his right to make full answer and defence. [8] nonetheless, permitting an accused to ques- tion a complainant about such matters treads on dangerous ground, raising both dignity and privacy concerns. judges must tightly control such cross- examination to minimize those risks. the accused’s right to make full answer and defence must be bal- anced with other interests protected in s 276(3). here, balancing those interests would have required any cross- examination to be narrow in scope. [9] that said, i am of the view that no miscarriage of justice occurred in this case. the cross- examination that was permitted and actually occurred allowed the defence to test the evidence with sufficient rigour. i would allow the appeal and restore the conviction. [6] je conclus que la juge saisie de la demande a commis une erreur. le contre- interrogatoire visait à établir que la grossesse avait été causée par une activité sexuelle autre que l’agression alléguée. la preuve présentée par le ministère public faisait état d’un acte sexuel en particulier, à savoir une activité capable de causer la grossesse dans un intervalle de temps déterminé. la demande de l’accusé satisfaisait à la condition relative aux « cas particuliers » visés au par. 276(2), parce qu’elle était suffisamment détaillée pour permettre à la juge d’appliquer le régime. [7] le ministère public entendait manifestement s’appuyer sur la preuve de la grossesse pour établir l’actus reus. la présomption d’innocence exige que l’accusé soit autorisé à vérifier la fiabilité de cet élé- ment de preuve matérielle corroborante si cruciale, avant que l’on puisse s’y fier pour étayer une conclu- sion de culpabilité. puisque l’accusé a nié avoir eu quelque contact sexuel que ce soit avec la plaignante, et en l’absence de toute autre preuve de paternité, la possibilité de contre- interroger la plaignante était un élément fondamental de son droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière. [8] néanmoins, permettre à un accusé d’interroger une plaignante sur de tels sujets comporte des risques qui soulèvent des préoccupations relatives tant à la dignité qu’à la vie privée. les juges doivent exer- cer un contrôle serré de tels contre- interrogatoires pour minimiser ces risques. le droit de l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière doit être mis en balance avec les autres intérêts protégés par le par 276(3). en l’espèce, la mise en balance de ces intérêts aurait exigé que tout contre- interrogatoire soit de portée restreinte. [9] cela dit, j’estime qu’il n’y a eu aucune erreur judiciaire en l’espèce. le contre- interrogatoire qui a été autorisé et qui a effectivement eu lieu a permis à la défense de vérifier la preuve avec suffisamment de rigueur. je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et de rétablir la déclaration de culpabilité. 248 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. ii background ii contexte [10] the accused and the complainant are cousins. during the canada day weekend of 2013, they went camping with several members of their extended families. at the time, rv was 20 years old and the complainant was 15. the complainant testified that rv sexually assaulted her in the early morning hours of july 1st. [10] l’accusé et la plaignante sont cousins. pendant la fin de semaine de la fête du canada de 2013, ils sont allés faire du camping avec plusieurs membres de leur famille élargie. à l’époque, rv était âgé de 20 ans et la plaignante avait 15 ans. dans son témoignage, cette dernière a affirmé que rv l’avait agressée sexuellement au petit matin du 1er juillet. [11] the complainant testified that on the families’ last night together, she played cards and hung out with her cousins. the parents in the group went to bed around 2:00 am while the complainant stayed awake with several of her cousins she said that around 4:00 am,. rv suggested the cousins go to the beach for a swim. after briefly venturing into the lake, the cousins headed back to their campsites. rv borrowed the complainant’s phone to use as a flashlight on the walk back. [12] the complainant explained that she returned to her tent, realized rv still had her phone and went to his tent to retrieve it. upon her arrival at his tent, rv told the complainant he needed to speak to her in private. he took her by the wrist and led her into a men’s washroom near the beach. [13] once inside the washroom, the complainant said rv tried to kiss her and remove her shirt, which she resisted. then he told her to lay down on the floor. she complied out of fear and he pulled down her pants and underwear as well as his own. rv. then placed himself on top of her. she believes he tried to penetrate her vagina with his penis but her memory of this moment is blank. her next memory is of rv asking her if she heard one of the cousins calling for her. after warning the complainant not to tell anyone what had happened, rv got up, put his clothes on and left. after he left, the complainant went to the women’s washroom to clean up. she said the area outside her vagina felt wet and sticky and she felt disgusted. she then returned to her tent and fell asleep. [11] selon le témoignage de la plaignante, au cours de la dernière soirée que les familles ont passée en- semble, elle jouait aux cartes en compagnie de ses cousins. les parents du groupe sont allés se coucher vers 2 h, tandis que la plaignante a continué à veiller avec plusieurs de ses cousins. elle a affirmé que, vers 4 h, rv a proposé que les cousins aillent à la plage se baigner. après une courte baignade dans le lac, les cousins sont rentrés à leurs emplacements de camping. rv a emprunté le téléphone de la plaignante afin de s’en servir comme lampe de poche pour le retour à pied. [12] la plaignante a expliqué que lorsqu’elle a re- gagné sa tente, elle s’est rendu compte que rv avait encore son téléphone et elle s’est rendue à la tente de ce dernier pour le récupérer. arrivée à la tente de rv, celui-ci lui a dit qu’il avait besoin de lui parler en privé. il l’a prise par le poignet et l’a amenée dans les toilettes des hommes près de la plage. [13] la plaignante a affirmé que lorsqu’ils se sont trouvés à l’intérieur des toilettes, rv a tenté de l’embrasser et de lui retirer sa chemise, mais qu’elle a résisté. il lui a alors dit de se coucher par terre. elle a obtempéré par peur et il a baissé son pantalon et son sous- vêtement ainsi que les siens. rv s’est ensuite placé au- dessus d’elle. elle croit qu’il a tenté de pénétrer son vagin avec son pénis, mais elle n’a aucun souvenir de ce moment. la chose suivante dont elle se souvient c’est que rv lui a demandé si elle avait entendu un des cousins l’interpeller. après avoir averti la plaignante de ne dire à personne ce qui s’était passé, rv s’est levé, il s’est rhabillé et il est parti. après son départ, la plaignante s’est rendue aux toilettes des femmes pour se laver. elle a dit que la région à l’extérieur de son vagin était mouillée et collante au toucher et qu’elle se sentait dégoûtée. elle est ensuite retournée à sa tente et s’est endormie. [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 249 [14] rv denied the allegations and the complain- ant’s account of the evening. he acknowledged being around the bonfire with the family. but, he stated, he went to bed at around the same time as the parents and had no further interaction with the complainant that evening. [14] r.v a nié les allégations de la plaignante et le récit qu’elle a fait de la soirée. il a reconnu s’être trouvé autour du feu de camp avec la famille. toutefois, selon ses dires, il s’est couché à peu près en même temps que les parents et n’a plus eu de contact avec la plaignante ce soir-là. [15] initially, the complainant did not tell any- one about the assault. in late august, she went to see a doctor, complaining of abdominal pain and nausea. when asked, she denied being sexually active. a urine test taken during a physical exam on  august  29th subsequently confirmed that she was pregnant. based on an ultrasound performed on september 18th, the doctor estimated that concep- tion had occurred at the end of june or the beginning of july. [15] initialement, la plaignante n’a parlé de l’agres- sion à personne. à la fin d’août, elle a consulté une médecin, se plaignant de douleurs abdominales et de nausées. lorsqu’on lui a posé la question, elle a nié être sexuellement active. une analyse d’urine effectuée pendant un examen physique le 29 août a confirmé par la suite qu’elle était enceinte. s’appuyant sur une échographie effectuée le 18 septembre, la mé- decin a estimé que la conception avait eu lieu à la fin de juin ou au début de juillet. [16] the doctor asked the complainant whether she had any interactions capable of causing preg- nancy around the date of conception. during this discussion, the complainant told the doctor about the incident with rv. because the complainant was underage, later that day the doctor relayed this infor- mation to the children’s aid society, which in turn contacted the police. [16] la médecin a demandé à la plaignante si elle avait eu des relations capables de causer la grossesse vers la date de la conception. au cours de cette dis- cussion, la plaignante a parlé à la médecin de l’inci- dent avec rv. parce que la plaignante était mineure, plus tard le jour même, la médecin a transmis ces renseignements à la société d’aide à l’enfance qui a, à son tour, communiqué avec la police. [17] after consulting with her doctor again on sep- tember 19th, the complainant terminated the preg- nancy on september 21st. the clinic disposed of the fetal remains that day, making a dna paternity test impossible. the police contacted the complainant the following week and took a statement from her on september 24th. the complainant told the police (and testified at trial) that she was a virgin at the time of the assault. the police charged rv with sexual assault and sexual interference. [17] après avoir consulté sa médecin de nouveau le 19 septembre, la plaignante a mis fin à la grossesse le 21 septembre. la clinique a éliminé les restes fœtaux le jour même, rendant impossible un test génétique de paternité. la police a communiqué avec la plaignante la semaine suivante et a recueilli une déclaration de sa part le 24 septembre. la plaignante a dit à la police (et dans son témoignage au pro- cès) qu’elle était vierge au moment de l’agression. la police a accusé rv d’agression sexuelle et de contacts sexuels. a the voir dire: baker j. a le voir­ dire : la juge baker [18] in light of the medical evidence about the date of conception, the crown tendered evidence of the pregnancy to support the complainant’s testi- mony that the alleged assault was the cause. during pre- trial proceedings, rv applied to question the complainant “about her prior sexual activity, with the [accused], or any other individual, that may have [18] vu la preuve médicale relative à la date de conception, le ministère public a présenté une preuve de la grossesse pour étayer le témoignage de la plai- gnante comme quoi l’agression alléguée en avait été la cause. lors des procédures préalables au procès, r.v a demandé d’interroger la plaignante [tra- duction] « au sujet de son comportement sexuel 250 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. occurred between june 1st and july 1st, 2013” (ar, vol. ii, at p 3). because the crown intended to rely on the complainant’s pregnancy as evidence of sex- ual contact with the accused, rv argued his right to make full answer and defence entitled him to in- quire into “whether any other individual could have impregnated the complainant” (ar, vol. ii, at p 4). [19] baker j. dismissed the s. 276 application. in her view, rv had failed to point to specific instances of sexual activity. instead, she found, the request was “more in the nature of a fishing expedition” (ar, vol. i, at p 15). [20] the application judge also observed that other means could be used to challenge the inference that rv caused the complainant’s pregnancy. first, the gestational age of the fetus might not align with the date of the alleged offence. she based this conclu- sion on the voir dire submissions of rv’s counsel, who suggested the date of conception was approxi- mately june 14th, 17 days prior to the assault. [21] second, rv could question the complainant on her understanding of the term “virgin” and the truthfulness of her statement that she was a virgin at the time of the alleged offence. the application judge held that questions regarding virginity do not fall within s 276. however, rv’s right to ask these limited questions did not “give the defence carte blanche to cross- examine the complainant on any sexual activity she may have undertaken in the month immediately preceding the alleged offence” (ar, vol. i, at p 15). [22] the application judge accepted that rv was not intending to rely on the cross- examination evi- dence to further the twin myths. nevertheless, the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy outweighed the “highly uncertain probative value of the proposed evidence” (ar, vol. i, at p 16). antérieur, avec [l’accusé], ou toute autre personne, qui aurait pu se produire entre le 1er juin et le 1er juil- let 2013 » (da, vol. ii, p 3). parce que le ministère public entendait s’appuyer sur la grossesse de la plaignante comme preuve d’un contact sexuel avec l’accusé, rv a plaidé que son droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière lui donnait le droit de s’enquérir sur « la question de savoir si quelqu’un d’autre avait pu mettre la plaignante enceinte » (da, vol. ii, p 4). [19] la juge baker a rejeté la demande fondée sur l’art 276. à son avis, rv n’avait pas fait état de cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle. la juge a plutôt conclu que la demande [traduction] « s’apparen- tait davantage à une recherche à l’aveuglette » (da, vol. i, p 15). [20] la juge saisie de la demande a également fait observer qu’il existait d’autres moyens de contester l’inférence selon laquelle rv avait causé la gros- sesse de la plaignante. premièrement, il est possible que l’âge fœtal ne cadre pas avec la date de l’infrac- tion alléguée. la juge en est arrivée à cette conclusion en se fondant sur les observations de l’avocat de rv. qui a affirmé, lors du voir- dire, que la conception avait eu lieu vers le 14 juin, soit 17 jours avant l’agression. [21] deuxièmement, rv pouvait interroger la plai- gnante sur le sens qu’elle donnait au mot « vierge » et sur la véracité de sa déclaration selon laquelle elle était vierge au moment de l’agression alléguée. la juge saisie de la demande a statué que les ques- tions sur la virginité ne sont pas visées par l’art 276. toutefois, le droit de rv de poser ces seules ques- tions [traduction] « ne donn[ait] pas à la défense carte blanche pour contre- interroger la plaignante sur toute activité sexuelle qu’elle pouvait avoir eu au cours du mois qui a précédé l’infraction alléguée » (da, vol. i, p 15). [22] la juge saisie de la demande a accepté que rv n’entendait pas s’appuyer sur le témoignage obtenu en contre- interrogatoire pour étayer les deux mythes. néanmoins, selon elle, la dignité de la plai- gnante et son droit à la vie privée l’emportaient sur [traduction] « la valeur probante fort incertaine du témoignage proposé » (da, vol. i, p 16). [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 251 b the trial: gee j. b le procès : le juge gee [23] after the voir dire and prior to trial, the appli- cation judge invoked s 6692 of the criminal code and the trial continued before another judge. at the outset of the trial, gee j. declined rv’s request to re- litigate the s. 276 application. he held that where a trial is continued by another judge, s 6692 does not provide for the re- consideration of pre- trial motions decided by the previous judge. in any event, he con- cluded there was no reason to re- hear the application because no change of circumstances had occurred. [24] the complainant, the complainant’s doctor and the accused testified at trial. during the doctor’s testimony, it became clear that defence counsel’s calculation of the conception date at the voir dire was wrong.1 based on the ultrasound, conception would have occurred between june 21st and july 5th, 2013. [25] the trial judge rejected rv’s account of the night in question. in assessing rv’s credibility, he considered inconsistencies in rv’s trial testimony and interview with the police, as well as his admis- sion that he had lied during both. the trial judge ultimately concluded that rv was not a credible witness and did not accept his evidence. [26] in contrast, the trial judge found the complain- ant to be “a very compelling witness” (ar, vol. i, at p. 46) whose account was detailed and precise. he accepted her testimony that prior to july 1st she had never had intercourse. he also concluded that her pregnancy was “compelling evidence supportive   . of her allegations” (ar, vol. i, at p 47). [23] après le voir- dire et avant le procès, la juge saisie de la demande a invoqué l’art 6692 du code criminel et le procès s’est poursuivi devant un autre juge. à l’ouverture du procès, le juge gee a rejeté la demande de rv de réexaminer la demande fondée sur l’art 276. le juge a statué que lorsqu’un pro- cès se poursuit devant un autre juge, l’art 6692 ne prévoit pas le réexamen des requêtes préalables au procès tranchées par le juge précédent. quoi qu’il en soit, il a conclu qu’il n’y avait aucune raison de réexaminer la demande, puisque les circonstances n’avaient pas changé. [24] la plaignante, sa médecin et l’accusé ont té- moigné au procès. pendant le témoignage de la mé- decin, il est devenu apparent que, lors du voir- dire, l’avocat de la défense s’était trompé dans son calcul de la date de conception2. d’après l’échographie, la conception se serait produite entre le 21 juin et le 5 juillet 2013. [25] le juge du procès a rejeté le récit de rv de la nuit en question. dans son évaluation de la crédibilité de l’accusé, le juge a pris en compte les incohérences dans son témoignage au procès et dans son entrevue avec la police, ainsi que son aveu comme quoi il avait menti à ces deux occasions. le juge du procès a fini par conclure que rv n’était pas un témoin crédible et il n’a pas retenu son témoignage. [26] en revanche, le juge du procès a conclu que la plaignante était [traduction] « un témoin très convaincant » (da, vol. i, p. 46) dont le récit était détaillé et précis. il a retenu son témoignage selon lequel elle n’avait jamais eu de rapports sexuels avant le 1er juillet. il a également conclu que sa grossesse était « une preuve convaincante [  ] qui appuyait ses allégations » (da, vol. i, p 47). 1 the september 18th ultrasound indicated that the complainant had been pregnant for 13 weeks, 5 days. at the voir dire, this was used to advance a conception date of june 14th. however, the doctor explained that this estimate referred not to the date of conception but to the first day of the last menstrual period, with conception occurring roughly 14 days later, plus or minus 5 to 7 days. 2 l’échographie du 18 septembre indiquait que la plaignante était enceinte depuis 13 semaines et 5 jours. lors du voir- dire, cette chronologie a été invoquée pour avancer une date de conception correspondant au 14 juin. or, la médecin a expliqué que cette estimation ne renvoyait pas à la date de conception, mais au premier jour des dernières règles, la conception s’étant produite environ 14 jours plus tard, plus ou moins 5 à 7 jours. 252 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. [27] rv was convicted of sexual interference and received a four- year custodial sentence. [27] rv a été déclaré coupable de contacts sexuels et il a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement de quatre ans. c the court of appeal: macfarland, watt and c la cour d’appel : les juges macfarland, watt paciocco jja. et paciocco [28] writing for the court of appeal for ontario, paciocco ja allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. he held that it was patently unfair for the crown to rely on the pregnancy as confirming the complain- ant’s story while preventing the accused from challeng- ing this inference. while the request to cross- examine the complainant about her sexual activity “that may have occurred between june 1st and july 1st, 2013” was “extravagant”, the accused should still have had the opportunity to ask relevant questions: 2018 onca 547, 141 or (3d) 696, at paras. 27 and 29-30. [29] paciocco ja held that s. 276(2) requires the accused to adequately identify targeted evidence and proposed lines of questioning so as to permit the application judge to perform the balancing re- quired by s 276. here, the probative value of the cross- examination was clear — it had the potential to neutralize the crown’s reliance on the pregnancy. uncertainty about whether a line of questioning will succeed does not eliminate its potential probative value. thus, the application judge erred in requiring an evidentiary foundation for the proposed cross- examination. [30] paciocco ja also concluded that the applica- tion judge had erred in characterizing the requested cross- examination as a “fishing expedition”. in his view, the proposed questioning was “responsive to an important plank in the crown’s case”, and the alternative methods of challenging the complainant’s claim of virginity did not adequately protect the ac- cused’s right to a fair trial: paras 69-84. [28] sous la plume du juge paciocco, la cour d’ap- pel de l’ontario a accueilli l’appel et a ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès. elle a statué qu’il était manifestement injuste que le ministère public s’ap- puie sur la grossesse pour confirmer le récit de la plaignante tout en empêchant l’accusé de contes- ter cette inférence. même si la demande en vue de contre- interroger la plaignante sur son comportement sexuel [traduction] « qui aurait pu se produire entre le 1er juin et le 1er juillet 2013 » était « extravagante », l’accusé aurait quand même dû avoir l’occasion de poser des questions pertinentes : 2018 onca 547, 141 or (3d) 696, par. 27 et 29-30. [29] le juge paciocco a statué que le par. 276(2) oblige l’accusé à identifier avec précision des élé- ments de preuve ciblés et les séries de questions proposées afin que le juge saisi de la demande puisse faire la mise en balance prescrite par l’art 276. en l’espèce, la valeur probante du contre- interrogatoire était évidente — celui-ci était susceptible de neutrali- ser le poids que le ministère public comptait accorder à la grossesse. l’incertitude quant au succès d’une série de questions n’élimine pas sa valeur probante éventuelle. par conséquent, la juge saisie de la de- mande avait eu tort d’exiger une preuve au soutien du contre- interrogatoire proposé. [30] le juge paciocco a conclu en outre que la juge saisie de la demande avait commis une erreur en qualifiant de « recherche à l’aveuglette » le contre- interrogatoire demandé. à son avis, l’interrogatoire proposé [traduction] « visait une assise importante de la preuve du ministère public », et les autres mé- thodes pour contester l’affirmation de virginité de la plaignante ne protégeaient pas adéquatement le droit de l’accusé à un procès équitable : par 69-84. [31] according to the court of appeal, the impact of the application judge’s errors was compounded by the trial judge’s incorrect conclusion that he was [31] selon la cour d’appel, l’effet des erreurs com- mises par la juge saisie de la demande a été aggravé par la conclusion erronée du juge du procès selon [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 253 bound by the initial s. 276 ruling. a new trial was therefore warranted because the trial judge’s refusal to reconsider the application effectively prevented future meritorious applications from being consid- ered. laquelle il était lié par la décision initiale fondée sur l’art 276. un nouveau procès était donc justifié parce que le refus du juge du procès de réexaminer la demande avait, dans les faits, empêché l’examen d’éventuelles demandes bien fondées. iii analysis iii analyse [32] the question in this case is how s. 276 oper- ates when the accused seeks to cross- examine the complainant to challenge sexual history evidence led by the crown. section 276 requires that the accused’s right to make full answer and defence be balanced with the dangers that cross- examination may pose to the complainant’s privacy and dignity and to the integrity of the trial process. this analysis applies with equal force regardless of whether the accused seeks to introduce evidence to establish a defence or to challenge inferences urged by the crown. [32] en l’espèce, la question en litige est celle de savoir comment s’applique l’art. 276 lorsque l’accusé cherche à contre- interroger la plaignante pour contes- ter une preuve de comportement sexuel antérieur présentée par le ministère public. l’article 276 exige que le droit de l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière soit mis en balance avec les risques d’atteinte que le contre- interrogatoire puisse poser à la vie privée et à la dignité de la plaignante ainsi qu’à l’intégrité du processus judiciaire. cette analyse s’ap- plique tout autant lorsque l’accusé cherche à intro- duire un élément de preuve pour établir un moyen de défense que lorsqu’il conteste des inférences mises de l’avant par le ministère public. a challenging the crown’s evidence within the a contester la preuve du ministère public en res­ limits of section 276 pectant les limites de l’art. 276 [33] testifying in a sexual assault case can be traumatizing and harmful to complainants: see e. craig, putting trials on trial: sexual assault and the failure of the legal profession (2018), at pp. 4 et seq. questions about a complainant’s sexual history are often irrelevant, serving no purpose other than supporting the “twin myths” — that a complainant’s past sexual acts make her less worthy of belief or more likely to have consented to the sexual activity in question. historically, wide- ranging and intrusive inquiries into the complainant’s sexual history were used to distort the trial process and essentially put the complainant on trial: see r v. goldfinch, 2019 scc 38, [2019] 3 scr 3, at para 33. [33] témoigner dans une affaire d’agression sexuelle peut être traumatisant et nocif pour les plaignantes : voir e. craig, putting trials on trial : sexual assault and the failure of the legal profession (2018), p. 4 et suiv. les questions portant sur le comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante sont souvent dénuées de pertinence, n’ayant aucun autre but que d’étayer les « deux mythes », à savoir que les actes sexuels antérieurs de la plaignante la rendent moins digne de foi ou plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité sexuelle en cause. historiquement, on se servait de questions générales et indiscrètes sur le comporte- ment sexuel antérieur de la plaignante pour dénaturer le procès et, en fin de compte, en faire subir un à la plaignante : voir r c. goldfinch, 2019 csc 38, [2019] 3 rcs 3, par 33. [34] in an effort to abolish “outmoded, sexist- based use of sexual conduct evidence”, parliament, in 1982, enacted a blanket ban on all evidence of a complain- ant’s prior sexual activity, subject to three limited exceptions: r v. seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577, [34] dans le but de mettre fin à « l’usage sexiste et dépassé d’utiliser des preuves concernant le com- portement sexuel », le législateur fédéral a édicté, en 1982, une interdiction générale de toute preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante, sous 254 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. at p.  625 one exception covered evidence “that rebuts evidence of the complainant’s sexual activ- ity or absence thereof that was previously adduced by the prosecution”: an act to amend the criminal code in relation to sexual offences and other of­ fences against the person and to amend certain other acts in relation thereto or in consequence thereof, sc  1980-81-82-83, c.  125, s.  246.6(1)(a) (later s 276(1)(a)). in seaboyer, the court struck down the 1982 provision as unconstitutional because it was too restrictive — it had the potential to exclude relevant evidence crucial to a fair trial: seaboyer, at p 625. the court emphasized that the relevance of all evidence, including sexual history evidence, must be assessed on a case-by- case basis: p 609. [35] in response, parliament amended s. 276, codi- fying the guidelines outlined in seaboyer: r v. dar­ rach, 2000 scc 46, [2000] 2 scr 443, at para 20. the modern version of s. 2762 seeks to preserve the integrity of the administration of justice, and the trial, by striking a balance between the rights of the accused and those of the complainant: réserve de trois exceptions limitées : r c. seaboyer, [1991] 2 rcs 577, p 625. une de ces exceptions visait la preuve « qui repousse une preuve préalable- ment présentée par la poursuite et portant sur le com- portement ou l’absence de comportement sexuel du plaignant » : loi modifiant le code criminel en ma­ tière d’infractions sexuelles et d’autres infractions contre la personne et apportant des modifications corrélatives à d’autres lois, lc 1980-81-82-83, c. 125, al 2466(1)a) (devenu l’al 276(1)a)). dans l’arrêt seaboyer, la cour a invalidé la disposition de 1982 comme étant inconstitutionnelle parce que trop restrictive — elle pouvait entraîner l’exclusion d’élé- ments de preuve pertinents, essentiels à un procès équitable : seaboyer, p 625. la cour a souligné que la pertinence de toute preuve, y compris la preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur, doit être évaluée selon chaque cas : p 609. [35] pour donner suite à l’arrêt seaboyer, le légis- lateur a modifié l’art. 276, codifiant les lignes direc- trices formulées dans cet arrêt : r c. darrach, 2000 csc 46, [2000] 2 rcs 443, par 20. la version moderne de l’art. 2763 vise à protéger l’intégrité de l’administration de la justice, et du procès, en établis- sant un juste équilibre entre les droits de l’accusé et ceux de la plaignante : 276 (1) in proceedings in respect of [various sexual of- fences], evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant 276 (1) dans les poursuites pour [diverses infractions sexuelles], la preuve de ce que le plaignant a eu une ac- tivité sexuelle avec l’accusé ou un tiers est inadmissible pour permettre de déduire du caractère sexuel de cette activité qu’il est (a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual ac- tivity that forms the subject- matter of the charge; or a) soit plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité à l’origine de l’accusation; (b) is less worthy of belief. b) soit moins digne de foi. (2) in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (1), no evidence shall be adduced by or on behalf of the accused that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the (2) dans les poursuites visées au paragraphe (1), l’accusé ou son représentant ne peut présenter de preuve de ce que le plaignant a eu une activité sexuelle autre que celle à l’origine de l’accusation sauf si le juge, le juge de la 2 on december 13, 2018, bill c-51, an act to amend the criminal code and the department of justice act and to make consequen­ tial amendments to another act, 1st sess., 42nd parl., received royal assent. this act makes minor amendments to clarify the application of s 276. although they do not apply to this case, they are not inconsistent with the analysis set out here. 3 le 13 décembre 2018, le projet de loi c-51, loi modifiant le code criminel et la loi sur le ministère de la justice et apportant des modifications corrélatives à une autre loi, 1re sess., 42e lég., a reçu la sanction royale. cette loi apporte des modifications mineures pour clarifier l’application de l’art 276. bien qu’elles ne s’appliquent pas en l’espèce, elles ne sont pas incompatibles avec l’analyse énoncée dans les présents motifs. [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 255 subject- matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any other person, unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice determines, in accordance with the proce- dures set out in sections 276.1 and 276.2, that the evidence (a) is of specific instances of sexual activity; (b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and cour provinciale ou le juge de paix décide, conformément aux articles 276.1 et 276.2, à la fois : a) que cette preuve porte sur des cas particuliers d’ac- tivité sexuelle; b) que cette preuve est en rapport avec un élément de la cause; (c) has significant probative value that is not substan- tially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. c) que le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne admi- nistration de la justice de cette preuve ne l’emporte pas sensiblement sur sa valeur probante. (3) in determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection (2), the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall take into account (3) pour décider si la preuve est admissible au titre du paragraphe (2), le juge, le juge de la cour provinciale ou le juge de paix prend en considération : (a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence; a) l’intérêt de la justice, y compris le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière; (b) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences; b) l’intérêt de la société à encourager la dénonciation des agressions sexuelles; (c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case; c) la possibilité, dans de bonnes conditions, de parve- nir, grâce à elle, à une décision juste; (d) the need to remove from the fact- finding process any discriminatory belief or bias; d) le besoin d’écarter de la procédure de recherche des faits toute opinion ou préjugé discriminatoire; (e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sen- timents of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury; e) le risque de susciter abusivement, chez le jury, des préjugés, de la sympathie ou de l’hostilité; (f) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s per- sonal dignity and right of privacy; f) le risque d’atteinte à la dignité du plaignant et à son droit à la vie privée; (g) the right of the complainant and of every individ- ual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and g) le droit du plaignant et de chacun à la sécurité de leur personne, ainsi qu’à la plénitude de la protection et du bénéfice de la loi; (h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers relevant. h) tout autre facteur qu’il estime applicable en l’es- pèce. [36] before evidence of a complainant’s sexual his- tory may be introduced under s. 276(2), the court must carefully scrutinize the potential evidence. first, the accused must set out in writing the “detailed particu- lars of the evidence that the accused seeks to adduce” [36] avant qu’une preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante puisse être introduite en application du par. 276(2), le tribunal doit l’examiner de façon minutieuse. premièrement, l’accusé doit énoncer par écrit « toutes précisions au sujet de la 256 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. and its relevance “to an issue at trial”: s 2761(2)3. if the judge is persuaded that the evidence is “capable of being admissible under subsection 276(2)”, a voir dire is held: s 2761(4)4. evidence adduced to support the twin myths is categorically barred. and, even where it has some relevance for another purpose, evidence may still be excluded if admitting it would endanger the “proper administration of justice”: s 276(2)(c). [37] in many cases, when the accused applies to adduce evidence pursuant to s. 276, they have an evidentiary basis for known sexual activity (ie, “de- tailed particulars” of “specific    sexual activity”). in this case, however, while rv maintained that other activity necessarily occurred because the com- plainant became pregnant, he had little knowledge of the particulars of that activity. he thus sought to adduce evidence of the other sexual activity by cross- examining the complainant. individuals charged with criminal offences are [38] presumed innocent until proven guilty. as a result, an accused has the right to call the evidence necessary to establish a defence and to challenge the prosecu- tion’s evidence: r v. osolin, [1993] 4 scr 595, at p 663 “full answer and defence” is a principle of fundamental justice, protected by s. 7 of the cana­ dian charter of rights and freedoms. in seaboyer, mclachlin j. explained, at p. 608: preuve en cause » et le rapport de celle-ci « avec un élément de la cause » : par 2761(2)4. si le juge est convaincu « des possibilités que la preuve en cause soit admissible [  ] au titre du paragraphe 276(2) », un voir- dire est tenu : par 2761(4)5. une preuve présentée pour étayer les deux mythes est catégori- quement interdite. qui plus est, même si la preuve revêt une certaine pertinence pour une autre fin, elle peut néanmoins être exclue si le fait de l’admettre risque d’avoir un effet préjudiciable sur la « bonne administration de la justice » : al 276(2)c). [37] dans bien des cas, lorsque l’accusé demande de présenter une preuve en application de l’art. 276, il possède une preuve au soutien d’une activité sexuelle connue (c-à-d, « toutes précisions » au sujet de « cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle »). toutefois, en l’espèce, même si rv soutenait qu’il y avait nécessairement eu un autre cas d’activité parce que la plaignante est tombée enceinte, il avait peu de connaissance des précisions au sujet de cette activité. il a donc cherché à présenter la preuve d’autres cas d’activité sexuelle en contre- interrogeant la plai- gnante. [38] les personnes accusées d’infractions crimi- nelles sont présumées innocentes jusqu’à ce que leur culpabilité soit établie. par conséquent, tout accusé a le droit de présenter les éléments de preuve qui lui permettront d’établir un moyen de défense ou de contester la preuve de la poursuite : r c. osolin, [1993] 4 rcs 595, p 663. la « défense pleine et entière » est un principe de justice fondamen- tale, protégé par l’art. 7 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. dans l’arrêt seaboyer, la juge mclachlin a expliqué ce qui suit, à la p. 608 : the right of the innocent not to be convicted is depend- ent on the right to present full answer and defence. this, in turn, depends on being able to call the evidence necessary to establish a defence and to challenge the evidence called by the prosecution. le droit de l’innocent de ne pas être déclaré coupable est lié à son droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière. il doit donc pouvoir présenter les éléments de preuve qui lui permettront d’établir sa défense ou de contester la preuve présentée par la poursuite.   .   . 3 now s 27893(2). 4 now s 27893(4). 4 maintenant le par 27893(2). 5 maintenant le par 27893(4). [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 257 in short, the denial of the right to call and challenge evi- dence is tantamount to the denial of the right to rely on a defence to which the law says one is entitled.   . bref, la dénégation du droit de présenter ou de contester une preuve équivaut à la dénégation du droit d’invoquer un moyen de défense autorisé par la loi  . [39] generally, a key element of the right to make full answer and defence is the right to cross- examine the crown’s witnesses without significant and un- warranted restraint: r v. lyttle, 2004 scc 5, [2004] 1 scr 193, at paras. 1 and 41; osolin, at pp. 664-65; seaboyer, at p 608. the right to cross- examine is protected by both ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. in certain circumstances, cross- examination may be the only way to get at the truth. the fundamental impor- tance of cross- examination is reflected in the general rule that counsel is permitted to ask any question for which they have a good faith basis — an independ- ent evidentiary foundation is not required: lyttle, at paras 46-48. [40] however, the right to cross- examine is not unlimited. as a general rule, cross- examination ques- tions must be relevant and their prejudicial effect must not outweigh their probative value: lyttle, at paras 44-45. in sexual assault cases, s. 276 specifi- cally restricts the defence’s ability to ask questions about the complainant’s sexual history. by virtue of s. 276(3), full answer and defence is only one of the factors to be considered by the trial judge; it must be balanced against the danger to the other interests protected by s 276(3). these additional limits are necessary to protect the complainant’s dignity, pri- vacy and equality interests: osolin, at p. 669; see also r v mills, [1999] 3 scr 668, at paras 61-68. they also aim to achieve important societal objectives, including encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences: s 276(3)(b). [39] généralement, un élément essentiel du droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière est le droit de contre- interroger les témoins à charge sans se voir imposer d’entraves importantes et injustifiées : r c. lyttle, 2004 csc 5, [2004] 1 rcs 193, par. 1 et 41; osolin, p. 664- 665; seaboyer, p 608. le droit de contre- interroger est protégé à la fois par l’art. 7 et par l’al. 11d) de la charte. dans certaines situations, il se peut que le contre- interrogatoire soit le seul moyen de découvrir la vérité. l’importance fonda- mentale du contre- interrogatoire est reflétée par la règle générale selon laquelle un procureur peut poser toute question, pourvu qu’il le fasse de bonne foi — l’existence d’une preuve indépendante au soutien de la question n’est pas nécessaire : lyttle, par 46-48. [40] cela dit, le droit de contre- interroger n’est pas illimité. en règle générale, les questions posées en contre- interrogatoire doivent être pertinentes et leur effet préjudiciable ne doit pas excéder leur va- leur probante : lyttle, par 44-45. dans les affaires d’agression sexuelle, l’art. 276 restreint expressé- ment la possibilité que la défense pose des ques- tions sur le comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante. suivant le paragraphe 276(3), le droit à une défense pleine et entière n’est qu’un des facteurs que le juge du procès doit prendre en considération; en effet, ce facteur doit être mis en balance avec le risque de porter atteinte aux autres droits protégés au par 276(3). ces restrictions additionnelles sont né- cessaires pour protéger les droits à la dignité, à la vie privée et à l’égalité des plaignantes : osolin, p. 669; voir aussi r c mills, [1999] 3 rcs 668, par 61-68. elles visent aussi la réalisation d’importants objectifs sociétaux soit, par exemple, celui d’encourager la dénonciation des agressions sexuelles : al 276(3)b). [41] thus, the fact that the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence requires that the com- plainant be cross- examined is not the end of the analysis. the scope of the permissible questioning must also be balanced with the danger to the other interests protected by s. 276(3), including the dignity and privacy interests of the complainant. [41] ainsi, le fait que l’accusé doit pouvoir contre- interroger la plaignante afin de présenter une défense pleine et entière ne clôt pas l’analyse. la portée de ce qu’il est permis de poser comme questions doit en outre être mise en balance avec le risque d’atteinte aux autres droits que protège le par. 276(3), notamment les droits à la dignité et à la vie privée de la plaignante. 258 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. [42] here, the crown introduced evidence of the complainant’s pregnancy and virginity to corrobo- rate her testimony that the assault occurred. in his s.  276 application, r.v sought to challenge that inference by questioning the complainant about her sexual activity from june 1st to july 1st, 2013 in order to determine “whether any other individual could have impregnated the complainant” (ar, vol. ii, at pp 3-4). [42] en l’espèce, le ministère public a introduit une preuve de la grossesse et de la virginité de la plai- gnante pour corroborer son témoignage selon lequel l’agression avait eu lieu. dans sa demande fondée sur l’art. 276, rv a exprimé vouloir contester cette in- férence en interrogeant la plaignante sur son activité sexuelle du 1er juin au 1er juillet 2013 pour détermi- ner [traduction] « si quelqu’un d’autre aurait pu mettre la plaignante enceinte » (da, vol. ii, p 3-4). [43] when the accused seeks to inquire into the complainant’s sexual history, the three subsections of s. 276 work together to achieve the provision’s objectives. [43] lorsque l’accusé veut s’enquérir du compor- tement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante, les trois paragraphes de l’art. 276 s’appliquent ensemble pour permettre la réalisation des objectifs de la disposition. [44] section 276(1) sets out an absolute bar against introducing evidence for the purpose of drawing twin- myth inferences. here, rv’s request to chal- lenge the inference that the pregnancy resulted from the alleged assault did not engage the twin myths. as such, the application judge correctly concluded that the cross- examination was not barred by s 276(1). [45] if, as in this case, evidence that the complain- ant has engaged in sexual activity is to be adduced for another purpose, it is presumptively inadmissible unless the accused satisfies s. 276(2)(a) and (b) by identifying specific instances of sexual activity, rel- evant to an issue at trial. where the accused applies to cross- examine the complainant about her sexual history to challenge crown- led evidence, the analysis will often turn on the balancing exercise mandated by s 276(2)(c). this third step involves weighing the factors set out in s. 276(3) to determine whether the probative value of the cross- examination is signifi- cant enough to substantially outweigh the dangers of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. this provision requires judges to determine the per- missible scope of cross- examination in light of the competing rights of the accused and the complainant and the other interests set out in s 276(3). where the right to full answer and defence requires some cross- examination, judges should tailor their rulings to best safeguard the other interests protected by s 276(3). [44] le paragraphe 276(1) interdit de façon absolue la présentation d’une preuve dans le but de tirer des inférences fondées sur les deux mythes. en l’espèce, la demande de rv en vue de contester l’inférence selon laquelle la grossesse résultait de l’agression alléguée ne faisait pas intervenir les deux mythes. la juge saisie de la demande a donc conclu à bon droit que le par. 276(1) n’interdisait pas le contre- interrogatoire. [45] si, comme en l’espèce, la preuve de ce que la plaignante a eu une activité sexuelle doit être présentée dans un autre but, cette preuve est présumée inadmis- sible, sauf si l’accusé satisfait aux al. 276(2)a) et b) en identifiant des cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle qui sont en rapport avec un élément de la cause. lorsque l’accusé demande à contre- interroger la plaignante sur son comportement sexuel antérieur pour contester des éléments de preuve présentés par le ministère public, l’analyse tient souvent en la mise en balance prescrite par l’al 276(2)c). cette troisième étape consiste à soupeser les facteurs énoncés au par. 276(3) pour dé- terminer si la valeur probante du contre- interrogatoire est suffisamment importante pour l’emporter sensible- ment sur les risques d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne administration de la justice. selon cette disposition, le juge doit déterminer la portée admissible du contre- interrogatoire à la lumière des droits concurrents de l’accusé et de la plaignante ainsi que des autres droits énoncés au par 276(3). lorsque le droit à une défense pleine et entière exige un certain contre- interrogatoire, le juge doit façonner sa décision pour sauvegarder du mieux qu’il le peut les autres droits que protège le par 276(3). [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 259 i now turn to the application of s. 276(2) to [46] the facts of the case. [46] je passe maintenant à l’application du par. 276(2) aux faits de l’espèce. (1) section 276(2)(a): “specific instances of sex- (1) l’alinéa 276(2)a) : « cas particuliers d’acti- ual activity” vité sexuelle » [47] broad exploratory questioning is never per- mitted under s 276. open- ended cross- examination concerning a complainant’s sexual history clearly raises the spectre of the impermissible uses of evi- dence that the provision was intended to eliminate. section 276(2)(a) requires the accused to identify “specific instances of sexual activity” to avoid un- necessary incursions into the sexual life of the com- plainant. [48] that said, the words “specific instances of sexual activity” must be read purposively and con- textually. they limit admissible evidence to discrete sexual acts, and protect against the misuse of general reputation evidence to discredit the complainant and distort the trial process: see r v. ls, 2017 onca 685, 40 cr (7th) 351, at paras 79-80. the “specific instances” requirement is buttressed by the proce- dural aspects of a s. 276 application, which require the accused to set out “detailed particulars” of the evidence to be adduced: s 2761(2). by requiring “detailed particulars”, the criminal code ensures that judges are equipped to meaningfully engage with the s. 276 analysis and that defence evidence does not take the crown or complainant by surprise: darrach, at para. 55; goldfinch, at para. 51; see also ls, at paras 82-85. [47] suivant l’article 276, il n’est jamais permis de se livrer à un interrogatoire exploratoire tous azi- muts. un contre- interrogatoire sans restriction sur le comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante évoque manifestement le spectre que posent les uti- lisations inadmissibles de la preuve que la disposi- tion vise à éliminer. l’alinéa 276(2)a) oblige donc l’accusé à identifier des « cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle » pour éviter les incursions inutiles dans la vie sexuelle de la plaignante. [48] cela dit, les mots « cas particuliers d’acti- vité sexuelle » doivent être interprétés de manière téléologique et contextuelle. ils limitent la preuve admissible à des actes sexuels distincts, et pro- tègent contre la mauvaise utilisation d’une preuve générale de réputation visant à discréditer la plai- gnante et à dénaturer le procès  : voir r c ls, 2017 onca 685, 40 cr (7th) 351, par 79-80. l’exigence des «  cas particuliers  » est renforcée par les aspects procéduraux d’une demande fon- dée sur l’art.  276, qui oblige l’accusé à énoncer « toutes précisions au sujet de la preuve en cause » : par 2761(2). en exigeant « toutes précisions », le code criminel fait en sorte que les juges sont bien outillés pour faire l’analyse qui s’impose en appli- cation de l’art. 276 et que la preuve de la défense ne prend pas le ministère public ou la plaignante par surprise : darrach, par. 55; goldfinch, par. 51; voir également ls, par 82-85. [49] section 276(2)(a) does not always require an accused to come before the court armed with names, dates and locations. as counsel for the intervener criminal lawyers’ association of ontario pointed out, requiring such details may, in some cases, be unduly intrusive, defeating one of the provision’s most important objectives. rather, as doherty ja. observed in ls and this court affirmed in goldfinch, the degree of specificity required depends on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the sexual activity that the accused seeks to adduce and the [49] l’alinéa 276(2)a) n’oblige pas toujours l’ac- cusé à se présenter devant le tribunal muni de noms, de dates et de lieux. comme l’a souligné la pro- cureure de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ as- sociation of ontario, il pourrait, dans certains cas, être indûment intrusif d’exiger de telles précisions, frustrant ainsi un des objectifs les plus importants de la disposition. comme le juge doherty de la cour d’appel l’a noté dans ls, et comme la cour l’a confirmé dans goldfinch, le degré de précision requis dépend des circonstances de l’affaire, de la nature 260 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. use to be made of that evidence: ls, at para. 83; goldfinch, at para 53. [50] here, r.v proposed to cross- examine the complainant about other sexual activity that could have caused her pregnancy, without knowing what her answers would be. because his defence was a bare denial, he obviously sought to establish that the pregnancy was the result of some other activity. is this enough to qualify as “detailed particulars” of “specific instances of sexual activity” in the circum- stances of this case? does it provide sufficient notice to the complainant and crown and equip the judge to apply s. 276? [51] the crown argues that it does not. in its view, s. 276 requires the accused to identify “concrete par- ticulars” and to provide an evidentiary basis in sup- port of a s. 276 application. the crown agreed with the application judge that rv’s request amounted to nothing more than a “fishing expedition” — pre- cisely the kind of free- ranging cross- examination s. 276 aims to prevent. in my view, the application judge erred when [52] she concluded that the accused failed to identify evidence of specific instances of sexual activity. as paciocco ja rightly noted, this requirement must be interpreted purposively and the objectives of the requirement would have been satisfied here. de l’activité sexuelle que l’accusé cherche à mettre en preuve et de l’utilisation qui sera faite de cette preuve : ls, par. 83; goldfinch, par 53. [50] en l’espèce, r.v se proposait de contre- interroger la plaignante sur une autre activité sexuelle qui aurait pu causer sa grossesse, sans connaître les réponses qu’elle donnerait. parce que sa défense consistait en une simple dénégation, il cherchait évidemment à établir que la grossesse était le résul- tat d’une autre activité. cette demande de contre- interrogatoire satisfait- elle à l’exigence de fournir « toutes précisions » au sujet de « cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle » dans les circonstances de l’es- pèce? donne-t-elle un préavis suffisant à la plai- gnante et au ministère public et outille-t-elle le juge pour l’application de l’art. 276? [51] le ministère public répond que ce n’est pas le cas. à son avis, l’art. 276 oblige l’accusé à don- ner des [traduction] « précisions concrètes » et à fournir des éléments de preuve au soutien de la demande fondée sur l’art 276. le ministère public était d’accord avec la juge saisie de la demande pour dire que ce que demandait rv n’était en fait qu’une « recherche à l’aveuglette » — précisément le type de contre- interrogatoire tous azimuts que l’art. 276 vise à empêcher. [52] à mon avis, la juge saisie de la demande a commis une erreur en concluant que l’accusé n’avait pas identifié d’éléments de preuve de cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle comme l’a fait observer à juste titre le juge paciocco, cette exi- gence doit être interprétée de manière téléologique et il a été satisfait aux objectifs de l’exigence en l’espèce. [53] rv sought to cross- examine the complain- ant on a specific instance of sexual activity — the activity that caused her pregnancy — evidence of which was introduced by the crown the preg- nancy itself demonstrated only that sexual activity capable of impregnating the complainant took place around july 1st. the existence of such activity was not speculative. but the fact of pregnancy here did not reveal exactly when or with whom that sexual activity occurred. the proposed cross- examination [53] rv a cherché à contre- interroger la plaignante sur un cas particulier d’activité sexuelle — l’activité qui a causé sa grossesse —, un élément de preuve qui a été introduit par le ministère public. tout ce que la grossesse elle- même démontrait, c’est qu’une activité sexuelle capable de mettre la plaignante enceinte s’était produite vers le 1er juillet. l’existence d’une telle activité n’avait rien d’hypothétique. toutefois, en l’espèce, le fait de la grossesse ne révélait pas exactement quand ou avec qui l’activité sexuelle [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 261 was directed at challenging the inference that rv. caused the pregnancy. [54] during oral arguments before this court, crown counsel submitted that a bare denial cannot satisfy the “specific instances” requirement. however, this submission turns the presumption of innocence on its head. the crown’s assertion that the pregnancy arose from the sexual activity that formed the subject- matter of the charge cannot prevent the accused from leading evidence to suggest that the pregnancy was caused by someone else or by some other sexual act. the presumption of innocence requires that rv be allowed to challenge the crown’s evidence that he committed a sexual assault. of course, the trier of fact may ultimately reject the accused’s denial. but, as paciocco ja emphasized, it would be unfair for the crown to rely on the complainant’s testimony that the accused caused the pregnancy while at the same time preventing the accused from challenging the complainant’s account. [55] moreover, pregnancy is evidence of sexual activity that can be situated within a particular time- frame. rv’s s. 276 application set out a specific, albeit broad, timeframe of one month. at trial, the medical evidence established a rough two- week win- dow during which conception would have occurred. in either case, the clearly identified time period, along with the specific nature of the activity — activ- ity capable of causing pregnancy — was sufficiently specific to satisfy s 276(2)(a). avait eu lieu. le contre- interrogatoire proposé visait à contester l’inférence selon laquelle rv avait causé la grossesse. [54] au cours de sa plaidoirie devant la cour, la procureure du ministère public a prétendu qu’une simple dénégation ne saurait satisfaire l’exigence des « cas particuliers ». or, cet argument renverse la présomption d’innocence. la thèse du ministère pu- blic selon laquelle la grossesse résultait de l’activité sexuelle qui faisait l’objet de l’accusation ne peut empêcher l’accusé de présenter une preuve qui laisse entendre que la grossesse a été causée par quelqu’un d’autre ou par un autre acte sexuel. la présomption d’innocence veut que rv soit autorisé à contester la preuve présentée par le ministère public selon laquelle il aurait commis une agression sexuelle. bien entendu, le juge des faits peut en définitive rejeter la dénégation de l’accusé. toutefois, comme l’a souligné le juge paciocco, il serait injuste que le ministère public s’appuie sur le témoignage de la plaignante selon lequel l’accusé a causé la grossesse tout en empêchant l’accusé de contester le récit de la plaignante. [55] qui plus est, la grossesse est la preuve d’une activité sexuelle qui peut être située dans un in- tervalle de temps déterminé. la demande de rv. fondée sur l’art. 276 faisait état d’un intervalle cir- conscrit, quoique large, d’un mois. au procès, la preuve médicale a établi une fenêtre approximative de deux semaines pendant laquelle la conception se serait produite. dans un cas comme dans l’autre, l’intervalle de temps clairement identifié ainsi que la nature précise de l’activité — une activité capable de causer la grossesse — étaient suffisamment précis pour qu’il soit satisfait à l’al 276(2)a). (2) section 276(2)(b): “relevant to an issue at (2) l’alinéa 276(2)b) : « en rapport avec un élé- trial” ment de la cause » [56] the accused’s s. 276 application must also identify the relevance of the evidence to be ad- duced. as a matter of logic, evidence tendered to rebut crown- led evidence implicating the accused will be relevant to the accused’s defence. as noted above, even in the 1982 iteration of s. 276, parlia- ment carved out an exception for evidence rebutting [56] la demande de l’accusé fondée sur l’art. 276 doit en outre préciser la pertinence de la preuve qui sera présentée. en toute logique, une preuve pré- sentée pour réfuter celle présentée par le ministère public et qui incrimine l’accusé sera pertinente pour sa défense. rappelons que même dans la version de l’art. 276 promulguée en 1982, le législateur avait 262 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. crown- led evidence of the complainant’s sexual ac- tivity or absence thereof. in seaboyer, mclachlin j. noted that the com- [57] plainant’s other sexual activity “may be relevant to explain the physical conditions on which the crown relies to establish intercourse or the use of force, such as semen, pregnancy, injury or disease”: p 614. l’heureux- dubé j., writing in dissent, agreed that where the crown contends that physical consequences such as pregnancy were caused by an assault, the de- fence may adduce sexual history evidence in rebuttal: p 682. [58] in this case, the crown suggests that because the answers to rv’s questions were unknown, the relevance of those questions was speculative. i can- not accept this proposition. the relevance of the proposed questioning was clear. the crown relied on the pregnancy as corroborating the complainant’s ac- count. regardless of her answers, the complainant’s testimony would be relevant. if she denied the ex- istence of other sexual activity, this could strengthen the crown’s case. but if other sexual activity could have occurred during the relevant time period, the probative value of the pregnancy would be signifi- cantly reduced. [59] given the clear relevance of challenging crown- led evidence, in cases like the present appeal, the outcome of the analysis will generally turn on balancing the probative value of the evidence with its potential prejudice to the complainant and the proper administration of justice. établi une exception touchant la preuve réfutant celle présentée par le ministère public du comportement sexuel de la plaignante ou de l’absence d’un tel com- portement. [57] dans l’arrêt seaboyer, la juge mclachlin a affirmé que d’autres éléments de preuve relatifs au comportement sexuel de la plaignante « peuvent servir à expliquer les faits matériels sur lesquels le ministère public se fonde pour établir l’existence de rapports sexuels ou l’usage de la force, notamment le sperme, la grossesse, les blessures ou les maladies » : p 614. la juge l’heureux- dubé, dissidente, était d’accord pour dire que lorsque le ministère public soutient que des conséquences physiques comme la grossesse ont été causées par une agression, la défense peut présenter une contre- preuve de compor- tement sexuel antérieur sur ce point : p 682. [58] en l’espèce, le ministère public prétend que parce que les réponses aux questions de rv étaient inconnues, la pertinence de ces questions était hypo- thétique. je ne peux accepter cette proposition. la pertinence des questions proposées était évidente. le ministère public s’appuyait sur la grossesse pour corroborer le récit de la plaignante. indépendamment de ses réponses, le témoignage de la plaignante serait pertinent. si elle niait l’existence d’une autre activité sexuelle, la preuve du ministère s’en trouverait ren- forcée. toutefois, si une autre activité sexuelle avait pu se produire dans l’intervalle de temps pertinent, la valeur probante de la grossesse s’en trouverait considérablement réduite. [59] puisqu’il est manifestement pertinent de con- tester la preuve présentée par le ministère public, dans des cas comme celui qui nous occupe, le résultat de l’analyse dépendra généralement de la mise en ba- lance de la valeur probante de la preuve et du risque d’effets préjudiciables pour la plaignante et pour la bonne administration de la justice. (3) section 276(2)(c): balancing competing in- (3) l’alinéa 276(2)c) : la mise en balance d’in- terests térêts divergents [60] even where proposed evidence is sufficiently specific and relevant, cross- examination about a complainant’s sexual history is only allowed if the [60] même lorsque la preuve proposée est suffisam- ment précise et pertinente, le contre- interrogatoire portant sur le comportement sexuel antérieur de la [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 263 proposed line of questioning has “significant pro- bative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice”: s.  276(2)(c). this balancing requires judges to pay careful attention to the factors listed in s. 276(3) in assessing the potential impact of the evidence on the accused, the complainant and the administration of justice. [61] the application judge appears to have con- cluded that the s. 276(3) factors also militated against granting rv’s application. at the voir dire, defence counsel suggested that the evidence indicated that conception occurred mid- june. this in itself weak- ened the crown’s inference that the pregnancy re- sulted from the  july  1st assault in addition, the application judge was of the view that rv could question the complainant about her claim of virginity without engaging s 276. accordingly, she held that the probative value of any further questions about the complainant’s sexual activity was highly uncer- tain. in her assessment, the complainant’s dignity and privacy interests outweighed the “speculative” probative value of the proposed questioning. [62] while rv did not know the answers to the questions he sought to ask, i agree with paciocco ja. that “uncertainty of result does not deprive a line of questioning of its probative value”: para 64. the ap- plication judge should not have considered the prob- ability that rv’s questioning would be successful, but rather whether the answers would be probative. because the answers had the potential to undermine or confirm important crown evidence, their proba- tive value was high. in my view, two factors related to the probative value of the evidence required that some form of cross- examination of the complainant be allowed: plaignante n’est autorisé que si « le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne administration de la jus- tice [des séries de questions proposées] ne l’em- porte pas sensiblement sur [leur] valeur probante » : al 276(2)c). cette mise en balance oblige le juge à tenir soigneusement compte des facteurs énumérés au par. 276(3) dans l’évaluation de l’effet potentiel de la preuve sur l’accusé, sur la plaignante et sur l’administration de la justice. [61] la juge saisie de la demande a apparemment conclu que les facteurs prévus au par. 276(3) mili- taient eux aussi contre la requête de rv. lors du voir- dire, le procureur de la défense a affirmé que, selon la preuve, la conception avait eu lieu à la mi- juin. cette thèse affaiblissait par le fait même l’infé- rence du ministère public selon laquelle la grossesse avait résulté de l’agression du 1er juillet. qui plus est, la juge saisie de la demande était d’avis que rv. pouvait interroger la plaignante sur son affirmation de virginité sans faire entrer en jeu l’art 276. en conséquence, elle a statué que la valeur probante de toute autre question portant sur le comportement sexuel de la plaignante était très incertaine. elle es- timait que les droits à la dignité et à la vie privée de la plaignante l’emportaient sur la valeur probante « hypothétique » des questions proposées. [62] même si rv ignorait les réponses aux ques- tions qu’il voulait poser, je suis d’accord avec le juge paciocco pour dire que [traduction] « l’in- certitude du résultat ne prive pas une série de ques- tions de sa pertinence » : par 64. la juge saisie de la demande n’aurait pas dû examiner la probabilité que l’interrogatoire de rv porte fruit; elle aurait dû plutôt se demander si les réponses allaient être probantes. parce que les réponses pouvaient éven- tuellement miner ou confirmer une preuve à charge importante, elles avaient une grande valeur probante. à mon avis, deux facteurs liés à la valeur probante de la preuve exigeaient qu’une forme quelconque de contre- interrogatoire de la plaignante soit autorisée : (a) the interests of justice, including the right of the ac- cused to make a full answer and defence; [and] a) l’intérêt de la justice, y compris le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière; [et]   .   . 264 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. (c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evi- dence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case. c) la possibilité, dans de bonnes conditions, de parvenir, grâce à elle, à une décision juste. in r v. crosby, [1995] 2 scr 912,. l’heureux- [63] dubé j. wrote that “[s]ection 276 cannot be inter- preted so as to deprive a person of a fair defence”: para. 11; see also darrach, at para. 43; seaboyer, at p 616. thus, in weighing how the accused may respond to crown- led evidence, the judge must en- sure the accused is not denied the right to make full answer and defence. [64] simply put, the more important evidence is to the defence, the more weight must be given to the rights of the accused. for example, the need to resort to questions about a complainant’s sexual history will be significantly reduced if the accused can advance a particular theory without referring to the complainant’s sexual history but in other circumstances — where challenging the crown’s evidence of the complainant’s sexual history directly implicates the accused’s ability to raise a reasonable doubt — cross- examination becomes fundamental to the accused’s ability to make full answer and de- fence and must be allowed in some form: mills, at paras. 71 and 94. [65] this is such a case. here, there was no in- dependent evidence of paternity. in light of rv’s denial, the only way he could challenge the inference urged by the crown was by cross- examining the complainant with respect to other sexual activity. in these circumstances, the complainant’s privacy must yield to cross- examination in order to avoid convicting the innocent. [63] dans l’arrêt r c. crosby, [1995] 2 rcs 912, la juge l’heureux- dubé a écrit que « [l]’article 276 ne peut être interprété de façon à priver une personne du droit à une défense équitable » : par. 11; voir aussi darrach, par. 43; seaboyer, p 616. par conséquent, en évaluant comment l’accusé peut répondre à une preuve présentée par le ministère public, le juge doit veiller à ce que l’accusé ne soit pas privé du droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière. [64] en termes simples, plus la preuve est im- portante pour la défense, plus il faut donner de poids aux droits de l’accusé. par exemple, le besoin d’avoir recours à des questions sur le comportement sexuel antérieur d’une plaignante sera considérable- ment réduit si l’accusé peut présenter sa théorie de la cause sans faire mention du comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante. toutefois, dans d’autres situations — lorsque la contestation de la preuve présentée par le ministère public du comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante a une incidence directe sur la capacité de l’accusé de soulever un doute raisonnable —, le contre- interrogatoire de- vient primordial pour la capacité de l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière et il doit être autorisé sous une forme ou une autre : mills, par. 71 et 94. [65] c’est le cas en l’espèce ici, il n’y avait aucune preuve indépendante de paternité. vu la dénégation de rv, la seule façon qu’il avait de contester l’inférence mise de l’avant par le minis- tère public était de contre- interroger la plaignante sur une autre activité sexuelle. dans cette situation, la vie privée de la plaignante doit céder le pas au contre- interrogatoire pour éviter qu’un innocent soit déclaré coupable. in addition, where the accused’s defence [66] involves challenging crown- led evidence, cross- examination assists the trier of fact in arriving at a just determination: seaboyer, at p. 609; see also s. ozkin, “balancing of interests: admissibility of prior sexual history under section 276” (2011), 57 [66] en outre, lorsque la défense de l’accusé com- prend une contestation de la preuve présentée par le ministère public, le contre- interrogatoire aide le juge des faits à parvenir à une décision juste : seaboyer, p. 609; voir aussi s. ozkin, « balancing of interests : admissibility of prior sexual history [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 265 crim. lq 327, at pp 331-32. because the window for conception overlapped with the date of the al- leged assault, the pregnancy could corroborate the complainant’s account. however, the trial judge’s ability to rely on the pregnancy depended on the extent to which he could rule  out the possibility that other sexual activity had caused it. thus, both ss.  276(3)(a) and 276(3)(c) required permitting some form of cross- examination of the complainant. [67] this does not, however, open a door to wide- ranging inquiries. the right to a fair trial does not guarantee the most favourable procedures imagina- ble: r v quesnelle, 2014 scc 46, [2014] 2 scr. 390, at para.  64; darrach, at para.  24; mills, at para 75. even where the right to a fair trial requires cross- examination of the complainant, it does not entitle an accused to pursue the most expansive cross- examination. the scope of the permissible questioning must also be determined by balancing the accused’s rights with the other rights and interests protected by s. 276(3), including: under sec tion  276  » (2011), 57 crim lq  327, p. 331- 332. parce que la fenêtre pendant laquelle la conception aurait pu se produire chevauchait la date de l’agression alléguée, la grossesse pouvait corroborer le récit de la plaignante. toutefois, la capacité du juge du procès de s’appuyer sur la gros- sesse dépendait de la mesure dans laquelle il pouvait exclure la possibilité qu’une autre activité sexuelle l’ait causée. en conséquence, les alinéas 276(3)a) et 276(3)c) exigeaient tous les deux qu’une forme quelconque de contre- interrogatoire de la plaignante soit autorisée. [67] cela n’ouvre toutefois pas la porte à des en- quêtes tous azimuts. le droit à un procès équitable ne garantit pas les procédures les plus favorables que l’on puisse imaginer : r c. quesnelle, 2014 csc  46, [2014] 2  rcs  390, par.  64; darrach, par. 24; mills, par 75. même lorsque le droit à un procès équitable exige le contre- interrogatoire de la plaignante, il ne permet pas à un accusé de mener le contre- interrogatoire le plus approfondi qui soit. il faut également déterminer la portée des questions admissibles, en soupesant les droits de l’accusé et les autres droits et intérêts que protège le par. 276(3), notamment : (f) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy; [and] f) le risque d’atteinte à la dignité du plaignant et à son droit à la vie privée; [et] (g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law. g) le droit du plaignant et de chacun à la sécurité de leur personne, ainsi qu’à la plénitude de la protection et du bénéfice de la loi. the trial judge must therefore narrow the scope of the questioning to minimize the impact on the com- plainant, while maintaining the accused’s ability to answer the charges. le juge du procès doit donc restreindre la portée des questions pour minimiser leur effet sur la plai- gnante, tout en maintenant la capacité de l’accusé de répondre aux accusations. [68] inquiries into any individual’s sexual history are highly intrusive. the threat to the complainant’s dignity and privacy is even higher when the proposed questions surround the conduct of a 15- year-old. both the length of the relevant time period and the degree of detail to be adduced impact the potential prejudice to the complainant: see, eg,. r v. nkemka, 2013 onsc 2121, at paras. 10-20 (canlii). open- ended questioning about an individual’s sexual activity, even [68] les questions sur le comportement sexuel an- térieur de tout individu sont très intrusives. la dignité et la vie privée de la plaignante sont d’autant plus me- nacées lorsque les questions proposées portent sur le comportement d’une adolescente de 15 ans. la durée de la période pertinente et le degré de détail à pré- senter ont une incidence sur le préjudice que risque de subir la plaignante : voir, p ex, r c nkemka, 2013 onsc 2121, par. 10-20 (canlii). des questions 266 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. during a particular timeframe, risks devolving into the very type of inquiry that s. 276 was intended to pre- vent. caution must be exercised where the proposed inquiry captures a broad range of sexual activity and is limited only by a specified timeframe. [69] determining the boundaries of permissible cross- examination will always be a challenging and fact- specific task in the present case, where the complainant maintained she was a virgin and had no boyfriend at the time of the assault, only limited questioning was appropriate. in other cases, more latitude may be warranted. in summary, rv’s right to make full answer [70] and defence required some means of challenging the crown’s reliance on the pregnancy. in my view, a correct balancing of the interests set out in s. 276(3) would have allowed rv to inquire into: (i) the com- plainant’s understanding of the types of sexual ac- tivity capable of causing pregnancy and (ii) whether she engaged in any such activity at the end of june and the beginning of july. however, to minimize the impact on the complainant’s privacy and dignity, that inquiry needed to be limited. as i discuss below, even when a s. 276 application is granted, the trial judge must continue to keep these interests in mind throughout the trial. ouvertes sur le comportement sexuel de quelqu’un, même si elles portent sur un intervalle de temps dé- terminé, risquent de devenir précisément le type d’en- quête que vise à empêcher l’art 276. la prudence s’impose lorsque l’enquête proposée porte sur un large éventail d’activités sexuelles et n’est limitée que par un intervalle de temps précis. [69] la détermination des limites d’un contre- interrogatoire admissible sera toujours une tâche ardue et tributaire des faits. en l’espèce, tandis que la plaignante soutenait qu’elle était vierge et qu’elle n’avait pas de copain au moment de l’agression, il fallait s’en tenir à des questions limitées. dans d’autres cas, une plus grande latitude pourrait être justifiée. [70] bref, le droit de rv à une défense pleine et entière exigeait qu’il dispose d’un moyen pour contester l’inférence relative à la grossesse sur la- quelle s’appuyait le ministère public. à mon avis, une mise en balance adéquate des intérêts énumérés au par. 276(3) aurait permis à rv de poser des ques- tions : (i) sur ce que la plaignante savait des formes d’activité sexuelle pouvant entraîner une grossesse et (ii) sur le point de savoir si elle s’était livrée à des activités de ce genre à la fin juin et au début juillet. toutefois, pour minimiser l’effet sur la vie privée et la dignité de la plaignante, il fallait que cette enquête soit limitée. comme je l’expliquerai plus loin, même si une demande fondée sur l’art. 276 est accueillie, le juge du procès doit tenir compte de ces intérêts tout au long du procès. (4) the trial judge’s gatekeeper role (4) le juge du procès et son rôle de gardien [71] this court recently emphasized the important “gatekeeper” role trial judges play in sexual assault cases: r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr. 579, at paras. 68 and 197; goldfinch, at para 75. the procedural and evidentiary context of this case illus- trates two aspects of this role: (i) the importance of remaining alive to the objectives of s. 276 as the trial unfolds by actively supervising cross- examination and adapting s. 276 rulings as necessary when new evidence comes to light; and (ii) the advantages of assessing the evidence of other sexual activity to be adduced by both the defence (as required by s. 276) [71] la cour a récemment souligné l’important rôle de « gardien » que joue le juge du procès dans les affaires d’agression sexuelle  : r c barton, 2019 csc 33, [2019] 2 rcs 579, par. 68 et 197; goldfinch, par 75. le contexte de l’espèce, sur le plan de la procédure et de la preuve, illustre deux aspects de ce rôle : (i) l’importance que le juge de- meure sensible aux objectifs de l’art. 276 pendant le déroulement du procès en supervisant activement les contre- interrogatoires et en adaptant au besoin les décisions prises en application de l’art. 276 lorsque de nouveaux éléments de preuve sont révélés; et [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 267 and the crown (in light of s. 276(1) and the common law seaboyer principles). (ii) les avantages d’évaluer la preuve d’autres activités sexuelles si elle est présentée par la défense (comme l’exige l’art. 276) ou si elle est présentée par le minis- tère public (en vertu du par. 276(1) et des principes de common law exposés dans l’arrêt seaboyer). (a) monitoring cross­ examination and re­ visiting section 276 applications throughout the trial a) surveiller les contre­ interrogatoires et réexa­ miner les demandes fondées sur l’art. 276 tout au long du procès [72] section 276 continues to operate even after an initial evidentiary ruling has been rendered. trial judges must therefore remain vigilant in ensuring the objectives of the provision are upheld as the trial unfolds. cross- examination about the complainant’s sexual history, where permitted, should be closely monitored to ensure it remains within the permissi- ble limits. and as evidence emerges, it may become necessary to re- consider prior s. 276 rulings. [73] first, where targeted cross- examination of the complainant is permitted, trial judges must strike a delicate balance between giving counsel sufficient latitude to conduct effective cross- examination and minimizing any negative impacts on the complainant and the trial process. proposed questions should be canvassed in advance and may be re- assessed based on the answers received. in certain cases, it may even be appropriate to approve specific wording: see, eg,. nkemka, at para. 18; r v. akumu, 2017 bcsc 533, at paras. 26-31 and 35-54 (canlii). [74] second, as a general rule, an order related to the conduct of trial may be varied or revoked if there is a material change of circumstances: ca rea- sons, at paras. 98- 103; see also r v. adams, [1995] 4 scr 707, at para. 30; r v calder, [1996] 1 scr 660, at para. 21; r v. la, [1997] 2 scr. 680, at para 28. as evidence emerges at trial, both the probative value and potential prejudice of pro- posed evidence may change. if a material change of circumstances occurs, either party may request that a previous evidentiary ruling be re- visited. [72] l’article 276 continue à s’appliquer, même après le prononcé de la décision initiale sur la preuve. le juge du procès doit donc continuer à veiller au respect des objectifs de la disposition tout au long du procès. le contre- interrogatoire portant sur le com- portement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante, lorsqu’il est autorisé, doit être étroitement surveillé pour qu’il respecte les limites fixées. au fur et à mesure que de nouveaux éléments de preuve ressortent, il peut en outre devenir nécessaire de réexaminer des décisions fondées sur l’art. 276 rendues antérieurement. [73] premièrement, lorsqu’un contre- interrogatoire ciblé de la plaignante est permis, le juge du procès doit établir un équilibre délicat qui consiste à donner au procureur la latitude suffisante pour mener un contre- interrogatoire efficace tout en minimisant tout effet négatif sur la plaignante et sur le processus judiciaire. les questions proposées doivent être exa- minées à l’avance et peuvent être réévaluées en fonc- tion des réponses reçues. dans certains cas, il peut même être opportun d’approuver une formulation précise : voir, p ex, nkemka, par. 18; r c. akumu, 2017 bcsc 533, par. 26-31 et 35-54 (canlii). [74] deuxièmement, en règle générale, une ordon- nance relative à l’instruction du procès peut être mo- difiée ou révoquée s’il y a un changement important des circonstances : motifs de la ca, par. 98- 103; voir également r c. adams, [1995] 4 rcs 707, par. 30; r c calder, [1996] 1 rcs 660, par. 21; r. c. la, [1997] 2 rcs 680, par 28. au fur et à mesure que des éléments de preuve ressortent au procès, tant la valeur probante que l’effet préjudiciable potentiel de la preuve proposée peuvent changer. s’il survient un changement important des circonstances, une partie peut demander qu’une décision antérieure en matière de preuve soit réexaminée. 268 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. in this case, the application judge refused [75] rv’s request to question the complainant on her sexual history. at the outset of the trial, the trial judge subsequently held that because the trial had been continued before him under s 6692 of the criminal code, the pre- trial motions could not be re- litigated and he was bound by the application judge’s s. 276 ruling. but as the court of appeal correctly stated, s 6692 does not displace the general rule that a trial judge has discretion to re- consider rulings made ear- lier in the proceedings if there is a material change of circumstances: paras. 98- 108. [76] in this case, the trial judge also observed, cor- rectly, that no material change of circumstances had occurred between the s. 276 ruling and the start of trial. nevertheless, given that the trial judge held that he could not re- consider the ruling — which included the erroneous conclusion that the proposed cross- examination did not qualify as a specific instance of sexual activity — i accept that counsel for the accused may have thought it would be futile to ap- ply for a re- consideration, even if the circumstances changed during the trial. [75] en l’espèce, la juge saisie de la demande a interdit à rv d’interroger la plaignante sur son com- portement sexuel antérieur. à l’ouverture du procès, le juge du procès a subséquemment statué que, parce que le procès s’était poursuivi devant lui en applica- tion de l’art 6692 du code criminel, les requêtes préalables ne pouvaient pas être plaidées de nouveau et qu’il était lié par la décision de la juge saisie de la demande fondée sur l’art 276. or, comme l’a affirmé à bon droit la cour d’appel, l’art 6692 n’écarte pas la règle générale selon laquelle le juge du procès a le pouvoir discrétionnaire de réexaminer les décisions prises antérieurement dans l’instance s’il y a un chan- gement important des circonstances : par. 98- 108. [76] en l’espèce, le juge du procès a également souligné, à bon droit, qu’aucun changement impor- tant des circonstances n’était survenu entre la déci- sion fondée sur l’art. 276 et l’ouverture du procès. néanmoins, comme il a statué qu’il ne pouvait pas réexaminer la décision — qui comprenait la conclu- sion erronée selon laquelle le contre- interrogatoire proposé ne satisfaisait pas à l’exigence qu’il porte sur des cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle —, je recon- nais que le procureur de l’accusé a pu penser qu’il aurait été futile de demander un réexamen, même si la situation changeait en cours de procès. indeed, the evidentiary foundation did shift [77] in this case. at the voir dire, counsel for rv sug- gested that the date of conception was approxi- mately june 14th — 17 days prior to the alleged offence. however, the doctor’s testimony at trial established that conception would have occurred between june 21st and july 5th. as the potential conception date coincided more closely with the date of the assault, the probative value of the pregnancy as evidence of the assault increased. the narrower timeframe also decreased the potential prejudice to the complainant. both are factors that would likely have provided grounds for re- considering the s. 276 ruling. [77] de fait, le fondement probatoire a effectivement changé en l’espèce. lors du voir- dire, le procureur de rv a affirmé que la date approximative de la concep- tion était le 14 juin — soit 17 jours avant l’infraction alléguée. or, le témoignage de la médecin au procès a établi que la conception aurait eu lieu entre le 21 juin et le 5 juillet. puisque la date éventuelle de conception coïncidait de façon plus étroite avec la date de l’agres- sion, la valeur probante de la grossesse comme preuve de l’agression avait augmenté. l’intervalle de temps plus court réduisait également l’effet préjudiciable éventuel pour la plaignante. ce sont là deux facteurs qui auraient vraisemblablement fourni un motif de réexamen de la décision fondée sur l’art 276. (b) the admissibility of crown evidence and the possibility of joint assessments b) l’admissibilité de la preuve du ministère pu­ blic et la possibilité d’évaluations conjointes [78] while s. 276(2) applies only to evidence “ad- duced by or on behalf of the accused”, s. 276(1) [78] bien que le par. 276(2) ne s’applique qu’à la preuve présentée par « l’accusé ou son représentant », [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 269 and the common law principles apply to crown- led evidence of a complainant’s sexual history: barton, at para 80. in seaboyer, mclachlin j. emphasized the importance of the trial judge’s gatekeeper role in ensuring that sexual history evidence “possesses probative value on an issue in the trial    [that] is not substantially outweighed by the danger of un- fair prejudice flowing from the evidence”: p 635. irrespective of which party adduces evidence of the complainant’s sexual history, the trial judge must guard against twin- myth reasoning as well as prej- udice to the complainant, the trial process and the administration of justice. [79] where, as in this case, the accused’s s. 276 ap- plication relates to crown- led evidence, it would be prudent to consider both the crown’s proposed use of the evidence and any challenges proposed by the accused at the same time. a view of how both sides intend to use the evidence would allow trial judges to more accurately assess the impact of admitting such evidence and appropriately tailor the ways in which it may be adduced. further, the crown’s decision to adduce evidence, or even to call a particular witness, is a matter of prosecutorial discretion: darrach, at para 69. if the manner in which the evidence may be challenged is clear from the outset, the crown can make an informed decision about whether the inter- ests of justice are served by adducing the evidence in the first place. le par. 276(1) et les principes de common law s’ap- pliquent à la preuve présentée par le ministère public au sujet du comportement sexuel antérieur d’une plaignante : barton, par 80. dans l’arrêt seaboyer, la juge mclachlin a souligné l’importance du rôle de gardien que joue le juge du procès en s’assurant que la preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur « pos- sède une valeur probante à l’égard d’un point en litige et [que] le danger d’effet préjudiciable de cette preuve ne l’emporte pas sensiblement sur sa valeur probante » : p 635. quelle que soit la partie qui pré- sente une preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante, il revient au juge du procès d’être sensible au raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes et au préjudice causé à la plaignante, au processus judiciaire et à l’administration de la justice. [79] dans les cas où, comme en l’espèce, la de- mande de l’accusé fondée sur l’art. 276 a trait à un élément de preuve présenté par le ministère public, il serait prudent d’examiner en même temps l’utili- sation que compte faire ce dernier de cette preuve et les contestations que l’accusé lui oppose. en sa- chant comment les deux parties entendent utiliser la preuve, le juge du procès serait en mesure d’évaluer avec plus d’exactitude l’effet qu’aurait l’admission de cette preuve et de façonner adéquatement les manières dont cette preuve peut être présentée. qui plus est, la décision du ministère public de présenter un élément de preuve, voire d’assigner un témoin en particulier, relève du pouvoir discrétionnaire du poursuivant : darrach, par 69. si la manière dont la preuve peut être contestée est connue au départ, le ministère public peut décider de manière éclairée si les intérêts de la justice sont servis en l’introduisant. [80] here, the crown introduced evidence of the complainant’s sexual history. in direct examination, the crown asked the complainant if she was a “vir- gin” at the time of the assault and when that “physical state” changed. the complainant responded that she was a virgin on july 1st and indicated that she had sexual intercourse for the first time on september 2nd. the complainant’s doctor also testified to conversa- tions regarding the complainant’s sexual activity. it is not clear on the record why the crown adduced this evidence in this way. whether these statements were admissible, as well as how the defence would [80] en l’espèce, le ministère public a présenté une preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur de la plai- gnante. en interrogatoire principal, le ministère pu- blic a demandé à la plaignante si elle était « vierge » au moment de l’agression et quand cet « état phy- sique » avait changé. la plaignante a répondu qu’elle était vierge le 1er juillet et a affirmé avoir eu un rap- port sexuel pour la première fois le 2 septembre. la médecin de la plaignante a en outre témoigné au sujet de conversations relatives à l’activité sexuelle de la plaignante. le dossier n’indique pas clairement pourquoi le ministère public a présenté cette preuve 270 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. be permitted to challenge them, should have been decided in advance. [81] whether sexual inactivity is captured by either s. 276 or the seaboyer principles is not directly at issue before this court. there is appellate authority stating that s. 276 does not prevent the complain- ant from testifying as to virginity: r v pittiman (2005), 198 ccc (3d) 308 (ont. ca), aff’d 2006 scc 9, [2006] 1 scr 381, on a different point, at para. 33; r v. brothers (1995), 169 ar 122 (ca), at paras 26-29. however, these cases also recognize that admitting evidence of virginity raises further questions, including: (i) the inferences the finder of fact may be asked to draw from the fact of the complainant’s virginity and (ii) how the accused may challenge this claim: see pittiman, at paras. 34-37; brothers, at paras 30-35. while i leave this issue for another day, i agree with paciocco ja that it would be incongruous to hold that the statement “i am a virgin” does not engage s. 276 while an answer to the contrary would clearly be a reference to sexual activity: para 79. [82] nonetheless, questions regarding when the complainant ceased to be a virgin undoubtedly fell within the ambit of s. 276 and the seaboyer prin- ciples. in this case, the crown presumably sought to confirm that the complainant had not engaged in sexual activity during the timeframe when concep- tion could have occurred. how the crown intended to adduce this evidence — and whether discussion of her activity on september 2nd, well beyond the conception timeframe, was necessary — should have been evaluated in advance and considered alongside rv’s s. 276 application. de cette façon. il aurait fallu décider à l’avance si ces déclarations étaient admissibles et comment la défense serait autorisée à les contester. [81] la question de savoir si l’inactivité sexuelle est visée par l’art. 276 ou par les principes énoncés dans l’arrêt seaboyer n’est pas directement en cause devant la cour. des cours d’appel ont affirmé que l’art. 276 n’empêche pas la plaignante de témoi- gner au sujet de sa virginité : r c. pittiman (2005), 198 ccc (3d) 308 (ca ont), conf. par 2006 csc 9, [2006] 1  rcs  381, sur un autre point, par. 33; r c brothers (1995), 169 ar 122 (ca), par 26-29. toutefois, ces affaires reconnaissent éga- lement que l’admission d’une preuve de virginité soulève d’autres questions, notamment (i) les infé- rences que le juge des faits peut être invité de tirer du fait de la virginité de la plaignante et (ii) com- ment l’accusé peut contester cette allégation : voir pittiman, par. 34-37; brothers, par 30-35. bien que je remette à plus tard l’examen de cette question, je souscris aux propos du juge paciocco selon lequel il serait incongru de statuer que la déclaration « je suis vierge » ne fait pas entrer en jeu l’art. 276, alors qu’une réponse au contraire serait manifestement une référence à une activité sexuelle : par 79. [82] dans tous les cas, les questions relatives au mo- ment où la plaignante a cessé d’être vierge tombaient toutefois indéniablement sous le coup de l’art. 276 et des principes énoncés dans l’arrêt seaboyer. en l’espèce, le ministère public cherchait présumément à confirmer que la plaignante ne s’était pas livrée à une activité sexuelle pendant la période où la conception aurait pu avoir lieu. les questions de savoir comment le ministère public entendait présenter cette preuve — et de savoir s’il était nécessaire de discuter de son activité du 2 septembre, bien après l’intervalle de conception — auraient dû être évaluées à l’avance et examinées parallèlement à la demande de rv fondée sur l’art 276. b section  686(1)(b)(iii): has a miscarriage of b sous­ alinéa 686(1)b)(iii) : y a­t­il eu erreur ju­ justice occurred? diciaire grave? [83] the application judge erred in adopting an overly restrictive approach to s.  276. asking the complainant whether she had engaged in other sexual [83] la juge saisie de la demande a commis une erreur en adoptant une approche trop restrictive à l’égard de l’art 276. demander à la plaignante si [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 271 activity that could have resulted in pregnancy during the relevant timeframe was sufficient to satisfy the “specific instances” requirement of s 276(2). some cross- examination on other possible causes of the pregnancy was warranted to safeguard rv’s ability to defend himself on the charges. further, the trial judge erred in concluding, at the outset of the trial, that he did not have the discretion to re- hear the s. 276 application. as i explained above, given the application judge’s refusal to grant the application, the evidence that emerged at trial would likely have constituted a material change of circumstances, jus- tifying a re- consideration. the effect of these errors, however, must be viewed in light of the fact that the trial judge permitted the defence to cross- examine the complainant on the issue of virginity. [84] section 686(1)(b)(iii) of the criminal code permits a court of appeal to dismiss an appeal from a conviction where “no substantial wrong or mis- carriage of justice has occurred”. in my view, rv. suffered no substantial wrong because despite these errors, the questions he was permitted to ask allowed him to adequately challenge the inference urged by the crown. elle avait eu une autre activité sexuelle qui aurait pu causer la grossesse dans l’intervalle de temps pertinent était suffisant pour satisfaire à l’exigence des « cas particuliers » du par 276(2). un certain contre- interrogatoire sur d’autres causes possibles de grossesse était justifié pour protéger la capacité de rv d’opposer une défense aux accusations. de plus, le juge du procès a commis une erreur en concluant, à l’ouverture du procès, qu’il n’avait pas le pouvoir discrétionnaire de réexaminer la demande fondée sur l’art 276. comme je l’ai expliqué précédemment, compte tenu du refus de la juge saisie de la demande d’accueillir la demande, la preuve qui est ressortie au procès aurait vraisemblablement constitué un changement important des circonstances justifiant un réexamen. il faut toutefois considérer l’effet de ces erreurs, en tenant compte du fait que le juge du procès a permis à la défense de contre- interroger la plaignante sur la question de la virginité. [84] le sous- alinéa 686(1)b)(iii) du code crimi­ nel permet à une cour d’appel de rejeter un appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité lorsqu’« aucun tort important ou aucune erreur judiciaire grave ne s’est produit ». à mon avis, rv n’a subi aucun tort im- portant, puisque, malgré les erreurs commises, les questions qu’il a été autorisé à poser lui ont permis de contester adéquatement l’inférence mise de l’avant par le ministère public. [85] the curative proviso set out in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) may be applied where there is no “reasonable possi- bility that the verdict would have been different had the error    not been made”: r v. bevan, [1993] 2  scr  599, at p.  617;  r v khan,  2001 scc 86, [2001] 3 scr 823, at para 28. applying the curative proviso is appropriate in two circumstances: (i) where the error is harmless or trivial; or (ii) where the evidence is so overwhelming that the trier of fact would inevitably convict: r v. sekhon, 2014 scc 15, [2014] 1 scr 272, at para. 53; r v. van, 2009 scc 22, [2009] 1 scr 716, at para. 34; khan, at paras 29-31. [85] la disposition réparatrice prévue au sous- al. 686(1)b)(iii) ne s’applique que lorsqu’il n’existe aucune « possibilité raisonnable que le verdict eût été différent en l’absence de l’erreur » : r c. bevan, [1993] 2 rcs 599, p. 617; r c. khan, 2001 csc 86, [2001] 3 rcs 823, par 28. l’ap plication de la disposition réparatrice convient dans deux situa- tions : (i) l’erreur est inoffensive ou négligeable; ou (ii) la preuve est à ce point accablante que le juge des faits conclurait forcément à la culpabilité : r c. sekhon, 2014 csc 15, [2014] 1 rcs 272, par. 53; r c. van, 2009 csc 22, [2009] 1 rcs 716, par. 34; khan, par 29-31. [86] cross- examination is undoubtedly a key ele- ment of the right to make full answer and defence. this court has held that sometimes “there will be no other way to expose falsehood, to rectify error, [86] le contre- interrogatoire est sans contredit un élément clé du droit à une défense pleine et entière. la cour a déclaré que, parfois, « il n’existe en effet aucun autre moyen de mettre au jour des faussetés, de 272 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. to correct distortion or to elicit vital information that would otherwise remain forever concealed”: lyttle, at para. 1 (emphasis in original); see also osolin, at p.  663. thus, as a general rule, counsel “may pursue any hypothesis that is honestly advanced on the strength of reasonable inference, experience or intuition”: lyttle, at para 48. because it is difficult to predict what lines of questioning counsel might pursue and what evidence may have emerged had cross- examination been permitted, a failure to allow relevant cross- examination will almost always be grounds for a new trial: r v. shearing, 2002 scc 58, [2002] 3 scr 33, at para. 151; crosby, at para. 20; osolin, at pp 674-75. [87] the key question at this stage is whether the errors in this case prevented rv from making full answer and defence. more specifically, is it clear that rv was able to adequately challenge the infer- ence that the pregnancy confirmed his participation in the assault? here, the court of appeal did not specifically address the scope of the permissible cross- examination. however, it held that whatever cross- examination occurred was “not a fair substi- tute for the cross- examination that should have been allowed”: para 91. i disagree in this case  — where the pro- [88] posed cross- examination involved the conduct of a 15- year-old who testified she was a virgin — wide- ranging questions would have been inappropriate. instead, the circumstances of this case warranted tightly controlled questioning of the complainant. rv’s right to make full answer and defence enti- tled him to test whether someone else could have caused the complainant’s pregnancy. as discussed above, a correct balancing of the interests set out in s. 276(3) would have allowed rv to make limited inquiries into: (i) the complainant’s understanding of the types of sexual activity capable of causing pregnancy and (ii) whether she engaged in any such activity at the end of june and the beginning of july. as i shall explain, the defence was allowed to do so — despite the errors in the s. 276 ruling. rectifier une erreur, de corriger une distorsion ou de découvrir un renseignement essentiel qui, autrement, resterait dissimulé à jamais » : lyttle, par. 1 (souli- gné dans l’original); voir aussi osolin, p 663. par conséquent, en règle générale, un procureur « peut soulever toute hypothèse qu’il avance honnêtement sur la foi d’inférences raisonnables, de son expé- rience ou de son intuition » : lyttle, par 48. parce qu’il est difficile de savoir quelles questions l’avocat aurait posées et quelle preuve serait ressortie si un contre- interrogatoire avait été autorisé, le défaut de permettre un contre- interrogatoire pertinent justifiera presque toujours la tenue d’un nouveau procès : r c. shearing, 2002 csc 58, [2002] 3 rcs 33, par. 151; crosby, par. 20; osolin, p. 674- 675. [87] la question clé à ce stade est de savoir si les erreurs commises en l’espèce ont empêché rv de présenter une défense pleine et entière. plus précisé- ment, est-il clair que rv a été capable de contester l’inférence selon laquelle la grossesse confirmait sa participation à l’agression? en l’espèce, la cour d’appel n’a pas expressément traité de la portée de ce qui aurait été un contre- interrogatoire admissible. elle a toutefois statué que le contre- interrogatoire qui a effectivement eu lieu [traduction] « n’était pas un substitut adéquat [à celui] qui aurait dû être autorisé » : par 91. [88] je ne suis pas d’accord. en l’espèce — où le contre- interrogatoire proposé portait sur le comporte- ment d’une jeune de 15 ans qui a dit être vierge — des questions tous azimuts auraient été inappropriées. les circonstances de l’espèce justifiaient plutôt un inter- rogatoire de la plaignante rigoureusement contrôlé. le droit de rv à une défense pleine et entière l’au- torisait à vérifier si quelqu’un d’autre aurait pu avoir mis la plaignante enceinte. je le répète, une mise en balance adéquate des intérêts énoncés au par. 276(3) aurait permis à rv de poser des questions limitées : (i) sur ce que la plaignante savait des formes d’activité sexuelle pouvant entraîner une grossesse et (ii) sur le point de savoir si elle s’était livrée à des activités de ce genre à la fin juin et au début juillet. comme je vais l’expliquer, la défense a été autorisée à poser ces questions, malgré les erreurs entachant la décision fondée sur l’art 276. [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 273 [89] before this court, counsel for rv advanced the theory that the complainant had engaged in such sexual activity with her boyfriend during june or july. afraid of the potential repercussions once her family found out she was pregnant, the complainant fabricated the story about the assault. counsel argued a new trial is required because rv was unable to pursue this theory at trial and it is impossible to know whether this strategy would have succeeded. [90] i remain unpersuaded. having reviewed the trial transcripts in light of the questioning that actu- ally occurred as well as that suggested by counsel, i am satisfied that the accused was not precluded from adequately testing the evidence in this case. [91] first, the application judge’s ruling permitted rv to ask the complainant about her understanding of “virginity” and to challenge whether she was tell- ing the truth about being sexually inactive. [92] defence counsel asked the complainant about her understanding of the types of sexual activity capable of causing pregnancy. he asked, “you knew that sexual intercourse could lead to pregnancy” and “if there was contact between the male genitals and the female genitals, sexual intercourse didn’t have to occur, but you could become    pregnant from that type of sexual conduct”? the complainant responded affirmatively to both questions (ar, vol. v, at pp 26-27). [89] devant la cour, l’avocat de rv a exposé la théorie selon laquelle la plaignante s’était livrée à une activité sexuelle de ce genre avec son copain en juin ou juillet. craignant les répercussions pou- vant s’ensuivre une fois que sa famille découvrirait qu’elle était enceinte, la plaignante avait inventé l’histoire de l’agression. le procureur de rv a sou- tenu qu’un nouveau procès s’impose, puisque rv. n’a pas été en mesure de faire valoir cette théorie au procès et qu’il est impossible de savoir si cette stratégie aurait porté fruit. [90] je ne suis toujours pas convaincue. ayant examiné les transcriptions du procès à la lumière des questions qui ont effectivement été posées et des questions qui auraient pu être posées selon son procureur, je suis convaincue que l’accusé n’a pas été empêché de vérifier adéquatement la preuve en l’espèce. [91] premièrement, la décision de la juge saisie de la demande permettait à rv de demander à la plaignante ce qu’elle entendait par la « virginité » et si elle avait dit la vérité en affirmant qu’elle était sexuellement inactive. [92] le procureur de la défense a interrogé la plai- gnante à propos de ce qu’elle savait des formes d’ac- tivité sexuelle susceptibles d’entraîner une grossesse. il lui a demandé, [traduction] « vous saviez que des rapports sexuels pouvaient entraîner une gros- sesse » et que « s’il y a eu contact entre les organes génitaux de l’homme et ceux de la femme, il n’était pas nécessaire que des rapports sexuels surviennent, mais vous pouviez devenir [  ] enceinte après avoir eu ce genre de comportement sexuel »? la plaignante a répondu aux deux questions par l’affirmative (da, vol. v, p 26-27). [93] the complainant consistently maintained (to her doctor, the police and the court) that she was both a virgin and not sexually active prior to sep- tember 2013. in challenging this evidence, defence counsel asked about her definition of “virginity” and “sexual activity”. among a number of questions on these issues, he asked, “your knowledge    of virginity is somebody who hasn’t had actual full sexual intercourse” and she replied, “yes” (ar, [93] la plaignante a constamment affirmé (à sa médecin, à la police et au tribunal) qu’elle était à la fois vierge et sexuellement inactive avant sep- tembre 2013. pour mettre ce témoignage à l’épreuve, le procureur de la défense lui a demandé ce qu’elle entendait par « virginité » et « activité sexuelle ». parmi les questions qu’il lui a posées sur ces points, il lui a demandé, [traduction] « votre connaissance [  ] de la virginité est celle d’une personne qui n’a 274 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. vol. v, at p 28). at another point in her testimony, the complainant broadly defined “sexual activity” so as to include even the touching of genitals. counsel also challenged the complainant’s statement to her doctor during the following exchange: pas eu de rapports sexuels complets », ce à quoi elle a répondu « oui » (da, vol. v, p 28). à un autre moment de son témoignage, la plaignante a défini largement l’« activité sexuelle » comme englobant même le fait de toucher les organes génitaux. le procureur a également contesté, lors de l’échange suivant, ce que la plaignante a dit à sa médecin : [traduction] q. and, [the doctor] asked you, specifically, if you had q. et, [la médecin] vous a demandé explicitement si vous been having sexual activities? vous étiez livrée à des activités sexuelles? a. yes, she did. q. and, you said, no? a. yeah. r. oui, elle l’a fait. q. et, vous avez dit non? r. ouais. q. and, that wasn’t accurate, what you’re telling the court q. et ce n’était pas exact, ce que vous dites au tribunal est is true? a. i’m sorry. vrai? r. pardon. q. when you told the doctor you were having sexual activity, that was, wasn’t accurate? q. quand vous avez mentionné au médecin que vous vous adonniez à des activités sexuelles, ce n’était pas exact? a. but, that was true, because i wasn’t having sexual r. mais c’était vrai, parce que je n’ai pas eu d’activité activity before september 2nd. sexuelle avant le 2 septembre. q. well, but the incident itself is a form of sexual activity, q. bien, mais l’incident est en soi une forme d’activité wouldn’t you agree? sexuelle, n’êtes- vous pas d’accord? a. yes, but, at that time, i, i hadn’t told anyone, so i r. oui, mais à ce moment-là, je ne l’avais dit à personne, didn’t   . donc je n’ai pas   . q. you didn’t want to tell her? q. vous ne vouliez pas le lui dire? a. i, i didn’t. i felt super uncomfortable. r. je, je ne voulais pas. j’étais super mal à l’aise. q. okay. and, so, you said, no, even though you, in your mind, you probably knew that this had happened, right? it didn’t go away, you   . q. d’accord. et donc, vous avez dit « non », même si vous, dans votre esprit, vous saviez probablement que c’était arrivé, n’est-ce pas? ce n’est pas disparu, vous   . a. yes, and   . r. oui et   . q    were thinking about it? q    vous y songiez? a. yeah. r. ouais. [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v la juge karakatsanis 275 q. but, when you talked to the doctor on the 22nd of august, the first day, i take it, that when she asked that, i guess you just said, no, because you didn’t want to tell her? q. mais, lorsque vous avez parlé à la médecin le 22 août, le premier jour, si je ne m’abuse, quand elle vous a demandé cela, je suppose que vous avez dit « non », parce que vous ne vouliez pas le lui dire? a. yes, and because i also wasn’t sure if it had occurred r. oui, et parce que je n’étais pas certaine si ça s’était exactly that day, or if it didn’t. passé exactement ce jour-là, ou non. q. okay. but, contact of the nature that you’ve described is a form of sexual activity, you’d agree? q. d’accord. mais, le genre de contact dont vous avez parlé est une forme d’activité sexuelle, n’êtes- vous pas d’accord? a. yeah. r. ouais. (ar, vol. v, at pp. 37-38 (emphasis added)) (da, vol. v, p. 37-38 (je souligne)) [94] at no point did the trial judge prevent defence counsel from further exploring the complainant’s definition of “virginity” or what she meant when she told her doctor she was not sexually active prior to september 2nd. [95] during cross- examination, the complainant was also questioned about when she met her boy- friend. she testified that she “met up with him, i think, after july, and we officially started dating on december 26th”. defence counsel challenged this testimony, suggesting she was “hanging out with him in july and august”. the complainant responded, “[a]t the end of july, beginning of august” (ar, vol. v, at pp 15-17). defence counsel chose not to press her further on this point. [96] in short, nothing in the record, apart from speculation, suggests that the 15- year-old complain- ant was sexually active or even had a romantic part- ner at any time relevant to challenging the pregnancy evidence, despite cross- examination on both issues. as such, i am persuaded that the scope of permissible cross- examination would not have been any broader than the questioning that actually occurred. [94] le juge du procès n’a jamais empêché le pro- cureur de la défense d’interroger plus à fond la plai- gnante sur ce qu’elle entendait par « virginité » ou ce qu’elle voulait dire quand elle a mentionné à sa médecin qu’elle n’était pas sexuellement active avant le 2 septembre. [95] pendant le contre- interrogatoire, la plaignante s’est également fait interroger sur le moment où elle avait rencontré son copain. elle a affirmé [traduc- tion] « l’avoir rencontré, je crois, après juillet, et nous avons officiellement commencé à sortir en- semble le 26 décembre ». le procureur de la défense a contesté ce témoignage, en suggérant qu’elle [tra- duction] « le fréquentait en juillet et en août ». la plaignante a répondu « [à] la fin juillet, début août » (da, vol. v, p 15-17). le procureur de la défense a décidé de ne pas l’interroger davantage sur ce point. [96] bref, rien dans le dossier, mis à part des con- jectures, n’indique que la plaignante âgée de 15 ans était sexuellement active, ni même qu’elle avait un amoureux à quelque moment que ce soit qui serait pertinent pour contester la preuve de la grossesse, et ce, malgré un contre- interrogatoire sur ces deux questions. je suis donc convaincue que la portée d’un contre- interrogatoire admissible n’aurait pas été plus large que l’interrogatoire qui a effectivement eu lieu. [97] second, the s. 276 ruling did not prevent de- fence counsel from advancing the theory that the complainant lied to protect her relationship with her [97] deuxièmement, la décision rendue en appli- cation de l’art. 276 n’a pas empêché le procureur de la défense de faire valoir la théorie suivant laquelle 276 r v r.v karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. boyfriend. counsel asked the complainant to confirm that she told the police in september 2013 that she had a boyfriend she “really, really” liked, which she did. counsel also asked whether the complainant’s mother had threatened to kick her out of the house if she ever became pregnant — the complainant ac- knowledged that she had. counsel further suggested that the complainant wanted to hide the assault and pregnancy so she did not “look bad” to her family — the complainant agreed she had thought about this. [98] i acknowledge that this cross- examination may have been less effective because counsel could not ask the final question: “i put to you that it’s ac- tually your boyfriend that you were having sex with in july”. however, the implication of the questions asked at trial was clear and the trial judge could have considered the possibility of a motive to lie. indeed, before this court, counsel for rv candidly admitted that nothing prevented the defence from further probing the complainant’s testimony about when she began seeing her boyfriend or her motive to lie. accordingly, it cannot be said that any error with respect to s. 276 prevented the accused from making this argument. la plaignante avait menti pour protéger sa relation avec son copain. le procureur a demandé à la plai- gnante de confirmer avoir dit aux policiers en sep- tembre 2013 qu’elle avait un copain qu’elle aimait [traduction] « vraiment beaucoup », ce qu’elle a fait. le procureur a également demandé à la plai- gnante si sa mère l’avait menacée de l’expulser du foyer si jamais elle devenait enceinte : la plaignante a reconnu que sa mère l’avait fait. le procureur a en outre suggéré que la plaignante voulait dissimu- ler l’agression et la grossesse pour éviter de « mal paraître » aux yeux de sa famille; la plaignante a convenu qu’elle y avait songé. [98] je reconnais que ce contre- interrogatoire a pu être moins efficace parce que l’avocat n’a pas pu po- ser la dernière question : « je vous suggère que c’est en fait avec votre copain que vous aviez des rapports sexuels en juillet ». toutefois, ce que laissent croire les questions posées au procès était limpide et il était loisible au juge du procès d’envisager la possibilité d’un mobile pour mentir. d’ailleurs, devant la cour, le procureur de rv a admis candidement que rien n’empêchait la défense d’examiner de manière plus approfondie le témoignage de la plaignante quant au moment où elle a commencé à fréquenter son copain ou à son mobile pour mentir. en conséquence, on ne peut pas dire qu’une erreur à l’égard de l’art. 276 a empêché l’accusé de faire valoir cet argument. iv conclusion iv conclusion [99] for these reasons, i conclude that neither the application judge’s interpretive error with respect to s. 276(2)(a) nor the trial judge’s conclusion that he was bound by the previous s. 276 ruling prevented rv from making full answer and defence at trial. on the facts of this case, the errors are harmless and there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the errors not been made. rv suffered no substantial wrong as a result of these errors. [99] pour ces motifs, je conclus que ni l’erreur d’interprétation de la juge saisie de la demande à l’égard de l’al. 276(2)a) ni la conclusion du juge du procès selon laquelle il était lié par la décision fondée sur l’art. 276 rendue antérieurement n’ont empêché rv de présenter une défense pleine et entière au procès. eu égard aux faits de l’espèce, les erreurs sont anodines et il n’existe aucune possibilité rai- sonnable que le verdict ait été différent en l’absence des erreurs. rv n’a subi aucun tort important du fait des erreurs. i would allow the appeal and restore rv’s [100] conviction. [100] je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et de rétablir la déclaration de culpabilité de rv. [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v les juges brown et rowe 277 the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par [101] brown and rowe jj. (dissenting) — this is the third appeal decided in recent weeks, along with r v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr 579, and r v. goldfinch, 2019 scc 38, [2019] 3 scr 3, where the court is called upon to interpret the pur- pose, scope, and application of s. 276 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c c-46. sexual offence trials are unique among criminal trials in canada (af, at p 1). evidence of a complainant’s sexual history is inadmissible where it is tendered by the accused, unless and until the accused meets the admissibility criteria set out in s 276(2). in barton and goldfinch, the court explained [102] how the admissibility criteria operates where the accused seeks to lead evidence of a complainant’s sexual history at trial. this appeal, however, turns on how to apply the admissibility criteria where the crown leads evidence of a complainant’s sexual his- tory, and the accused seeks to challenge that evidence through relevant cross- examination. we stress that, in this appeal, the crown was not merely introduc- ing evidence of the complainant’s sexual history for the purposes of providing “background”, or as the necessary link to explain a series of events, but as a central plank of the case incriminating rv. [101] les juges brown et rowe (dissidents) — il s’agit du troisième pourvoi tranché en quelques semaines, parallèlement aux arrêts r c. barton, 2019 csc 33, [2019] 2 rcs 579, et r c. goldfinch, 2019 csc 38, [2019] 3 rcs 3, dans le cadre duquel la cour doit interpréter l’objet, la portée et l’applica- tion de l’art. 276 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c c-46. les procès pour infractions d’ordre sexuel sont uniques parmi les procès criminels au canada (ma, p 1). la preuve concernant le comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante est inadmissible lorsqu’elle est présentée par l’accusé, sauf si ce- lui-ci respecte les critères d’admissibilité énoncés au par 276(2). [102] dans les arrêts barton et goldfinch, la cour a expliqué de quelle façon s’appliquent les critères d’admissibilité lorsque l’accusé cherche à présenter une preuve concernant le comportement sexuel anté- rieur de la plaignante au procès. le présent pourvoi porte plutôt sur l’application des critères d’admissi- bilité lorsque le ministère public présente une preuve concernant le comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante, et que l’accusé cherche à contester cette preuve au moyen d’un contre- interrogatoire per- tinent nous tenons à souligner que dans le pré- sent pourvoi, le ministère public ne présentait pas une preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante simplement pour fournir une « mise en contexte », ou comme lien nécessaire pour expliquer une série d’événements; il la présentait plutôt comme l’élément central du dossier de preuve incriminant rv. [103] the crown’s position is that the admissibility criteria remains the same for the accused, regardless of who elicits the evidence. the application judge adopted the crown’s position. in her s. 276 ruling, the application judge found that rv could not pur- sue certain lines of inquiry because he did not know, in advance of cross­ examination, what the complain- ant’s evidence would be. rv could not, therefore, establish “specific instances of sexual activity” as she interpreted s 276(2). his proposed inquiries were nothing more than a “fishing expedition” into the [103] le ministère public plaide que les critères d’admissibilité sont les mêmes pour l’accusé, sans égard à la personne qui obtient la preuve. la juge saisie de la demande a adopté cette position. dans sa décision fondée sur l’art. 276, elle a conclu que rv ne pouvait pas poser certaines questions parce qu’il ne connaissait pas, au préalable, les réponses que donnerait la plaignante. par conséquent, rv. ne pouvait pas établir de « cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle » au sens où il faut entendre le par 276(2). les pistes d’investigation qu’il se proposait de suivre 278 r v r.v brown and rowe jj. [2019] 3 scr. complainant’s sexual history, and the probative value was “speculative” at best (ar, vol. i, at pp 15-16). at trial, the trial judge held that he lacked the juris- diction under s 6692 of the criminal code to revisit the application judge’s ruling. [104] we are all agreed that the application judge misapplied the admissibility criteria under s. 276 and further, that the trial judge erred in holding that he had no jurisdiction to reconsider the s. 276 ruling in light of the evidence adduced by the crown. what di- vides us is not the proper application of the admissi- bility criteria under s. 276(2) in these circumstances, where we are in agreement with the majority, but the appropriate remedy for the errors of the application and trial judges. [105] the majority finds that, notwithstanding the erroneous s. 276 ruling, any impact on trial fairness was of no moment because rv managed to effec- tively conduct the cross- examination that the ruling restricted. while the application judge adopted an “overly restrictive approach” to cross- examination, the majority would not order a new trial since “the scope of permissible cross- examination would not have been any broader than the questioning that actu- ally occurred” and “nothing in the record, apart from speculation, suggests that the 15- year-old complain- ant was sexually active or even had a romantic part- ner at any time relevant to challenging the pregnancy evidence, despite cross- examination on both issues” (paras. 83 and 96). the majority therefore invokes the curative proviso (s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the criminal code) to restore rv’s conviction. n’étaient rien de plus qu’une [traduction] « re- cherche à l’aveuglette » dans le comportement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante, et la valeur probante de ces éléments de preuve était tout au plus « conjecturale » (da, vol. i, p 15-16). au procès, le juge a conclu que l’art 6692 du code criminel ne lui conférait pas compétence pour réexaminer la décision de la juge saisie de la demande. [104] nous sommes tous d’avis que la juge saisie de la demande a mal appliqué les critères d’admis- sibilité énoncés à l’art. 276 et que, en outre, le juge du procès a commis une erreur en concluant qu’il n’avait pas compétence pour réexaminer la décision fondée sur l’art. 276 à la lumière de la preuve présen- tée par le ministère public. ce qui nous divise n’est pas l’application correcte des critères d’admissibilité prévus au par. 276(2) dans les présentes circons- tances — au sujet de laquelle nous sommes d’accord avec les juges majoritaires —, mais concerne la ré- paration adéquate des erreurs de la juge saisie de la demande et du juge du procès. [105] les juges majoritaires concluent que, mal- gré la décision erronée fondée sur l’art. 276, l’effet éventuel de cette erreur sur l’équité du procès a été sans importance, parce que rv a réussi à mener le contre- interrogatoire que la décision l’empêchait de mener. même si la juge saisie de la demande a adopté une « approche trop restrictive » du contre- interrogatoire, les juges majoritaires sont d’avis de ne pas ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès, puisque « la portée d’un contre- interrogatoire admissible n’aurait pas été plus large que l’interrogatoire qui a effectivement eu lieu » et « rien dans le dossier, mis à part des conjectures, n’indique que la plaignante âgée de 15 ans était sexuellement active, ni même qu’elle avait un amoureux à quelque moment que ce soit qui serait pertinent pour contester la preuve de la grossesse, et ce, malgré un contre- interrogatoire sur ces deux questions » (par. 83 et 96). les juges majoritaires invoquent donc la disposition réparatrice (sous-al. 686(1)b)(iii) du code criminel) pour réta- blir la déclaration de culpabilité de rv. [106] we cannot agree. the errors in this case were not “harmless” or “minor”. nor was the evidence overwhelming. indeed, one may get the impression [106] nous ne sommes pas d’accord. les erreurs commises en l’espèce n’étaient pas « inoffensives » ou « négligeables ». la preuve n’était pas non plus [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v les juges brown et rowe 279 after reading the majority’s reasons that all rv was deprived of was the ability to ask two additional in- terrogatories (para 88). but this is not so. while the immediate effect of the ruling was to prohibit rv. from cross- examining the complainant on the legiti­ mate theory that a different person was the cause of the complainant’s pregnancy, rv was deprived of much more than simply the opportunity to ask two additional interrogatories, or hear certain responses. he was denied an entire process of questioning. this had reverberating effects on all aspects of his defence that render the majority’s parsing of the transcript highly unpersuasive. quite simply, as we cannot know what a witness will say in cross- examination, none of us can know the nature of the evidence rv. may have elicited but for the erroneous s. 276 ruling. and that is what divides us. accablante. de fait, on pourrait avoir l’impression, à la lecture des motifs des juges majoritaires, que rv n’a été privé que de la capacité de poser deux questions supplémentaires (par 88). mais il n’en est rien. bien que l’effet immédiat de la décision était d’interdire à rv de contre- interroger la plaignante concernant la théorie légitime selon laquelle une autre personne était la cause de sa grossesse, rv a été privé de bien plus que de la simple possibilité de poser deux questions supplémentaires, ou d’entendre certaines réponses. il a été privé d’un processus com­ plet d’interrogatoire. cette privation a eu des effets qui se sont répercutés sur tous les aspects de sa dé- fense et qui rendent très peu convaincante l’analyse que font les juges majoritaires de la transcription. dit simplement, puisqu’il est impossible de savoir ce que dira un témoin lors d’un contre- interrogatoire, aucun de nous ne peut connaître la nature de la preuve qu’aurait pu obtenir rv, n’eût été la décision erro- née fondée sur l’art 276. voilà ce qui nous divise. i the curative proviso i la disposition réparatrice [107] we are mindful of the following general prin- ciples concerning the proviso. it is the crown who must show that a conviction should stand despite a finding that there was an error of law. and as this court has repeatedly held, the proviso can only be invoked where there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the error not been made (see r v. sekhon, 2014 scc 15, [2014] 1 scr 272;. r v. sarrazin, 2011 scc 54, [2011] 3 scr 505, at para. 24; r v. van, 2009 scc 22, [2009] 1 scr 716, at paras 34-36). [107] nous sommes conscients des principes géné- raux suivants concernant la disposition réparatrice. il incombe au ministère public de démontrer qu’il y a lieu de maintenir une déclaration de culpabilité en dépit d’une conclusion selon laquelle il y a eu une erreur judiciaire. de plus, comme la cour l’a décidé à maintes reprises, la disposition réparatrice ne peut être invoquée que s’il n’existe aucune possibilité rai- sonnable que le verdict eût été différent en l’absence de l’erreur (voir r c. sekhon, 2014 csc 15, [2014] 1 rcs 272;. r c. sarrazin, 2011 csc 54, [2011] 3 rcs 505, par. 24; r c. van, 2009 csc 22, [2009] 1 rcs 716, par 34-36). [108] unsurprisingly, then, the curative proviso is rarely (successfully) invoked, and applies where, and only where, the error is minor or harmless, or the evidence is overwhelming. these are, moreo- ver, separate and distinct preconditions to the ap- plication of the proviso; “the seriousness of a trial judge’s error(s) is not balanced against the strength of the crown’s case” (r v. brown, 2018 onca 481, 361 ccc (3d) 510, at para. 77, citing sarrazin, at paras 22-28). in either circumstance, it is a high bar for the crown to meet. we have repeatedly refused [108] il n’est donc pas surprenant que la disposi- tion réparatrice soit rarement invoquée (avec succès) et qu’elle s’applique si, et uniquement si, l’erreur est négligeable ou inoffensive, ou lorsque la preuve est accablante. il existe, en outre, des conditions préalables séparées et distinctes à l’application de la disposition; [traduction] « la gravité des er- reurs du juge du procès n’est pas mise en balance avec la solidité de la preuve du ministère public » (r c. brown, 2018 onca 481, 361 ccc (3d) 510, par. 77, citant sarrazin, par 22-28). dans un 280 r v r.v brown and rowe jj. [2019] 3 scr. to lower the bar, even upon express invitation to do so, as was before us in sarrazin. [109] here, no party argues that the evidence is overwhelming. the application of the proviso there- fore turns on whether the erroneous s. 276 ruling was so minor or harmless that it could not have had an impact on the verdict. it is often difficult for an appellate court to [110] speculate about how cross- examination might have affected the fact- finding process, had it not been un- duly restricted. this is especially so where the crown relies on circumstantial evidence (see lebel j. dis- senting, but not on this point, in sekhon, at para. 88), as it did here with the evidence of pregnancy. and where (as here) a case involves not a single error at first instance, but multiple errors, the cumulative impact is assessed to determine whether such errors can truly be said to be minor or harmless (see brown, at para. 75, citing r v. bomberry, 2010 onca 542, 267 oac 235, at para. 79; r v. hill, 2015 onca 616, 339 oac 90, at para 102). cas comme dans l’autre, il s’agit d’un critère rigou- reux auquel le ministère public doit satisfaire. nous avons refusé à maintes reprises de l’assouplir, même lorsque nous avons été expressément invités à le faire, comme dans l’affaire sarrazin. [109] en l’espèce, personne ne plaide que la preuve est accablante. l’application de la disposition répa- ratrice dépend donc de la question de savoir si la décision erronée fondée sur l’art. 276 était à ce point négligeable ou inoffensive qu’elle n’a pu avoir un impact sur le verdict. il est souvent difficile pour une cour d’ap- [110] pel de conjecturer sur la manière dont un contre- interrogatoire aurait pu avoir une incidence sur le processus de recherche des faits s’il n’avait pas été indûment restreint. cela est particulièrement le cas lorsque le ministère public s’appuie sur une preuve circonstancielle (voir les motifs du juge lebel, dis- sident, mais non sur ce point, dans sekhon, par. 88), comme il l’a fait en l’espèce en ce qui concerne la preuve de grossesse. en outre, lorsque l’affaire (comme en l’espèce) porte non pas sur une seule erreur en première instance, mais sur de multiples erreurs, l’effet cumulatif est évalué afin d’établir si de telles erreurs peuvent véritablement être quali- fiées de négligeables ou d’inoffensives (voir brown, par. 75, citant r c. bomberry, 2010 onca 542, 267 oac 235, par. 79; r c. hill, 2015 onca 616, 339 oac 90, par 102). [111] the high bar on the proviso’s use strongly affirms the need to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice system from the risk of wrongful conviction. this risk looms large where there has been improper interference with the right of cross- examination, as the right to test the crown’s evidence through relevant cross- examination is guaranteed by both the common law and the canadian charter of rights and freedoms as a core element of the right to make full answer and defence (see r v. osolin, [1993] 4 scr 595, at pp. 611-12; r v. levogiannis, [1993] 4 scr 475;. r v. ns, 2012 scc 72, [2012] 3 scr 726, at para. 24; r v. schmaltz, 2015 abca 4, 593 ar 76, at para. 18; regina v. white (1976), 1 alta. lr (2d) 292, at p 299). if an accused’s right to test the crown’s evidence is irremediably impaired [111] le critère rigoureux auquel il faut satisfaire pour appliquer la disposition réparatrice confirme avec vigueur le besoin de protéger l’intégrité du sys- tème de justice criminelle contre le risque d’une dé- claration de culpabilité injustifiée. ce risque occupe une place importante lorsqu’il y a eu une entrave indue au droit de contre- interroger un témoin, puisque le droit de vérifier la preuve du ministère public au moyen d’un contre- interrogatoire pertinent est garanti à la fois par la common law et par la charte cana­ dienne des droits et libertés en tant qu’élément essen- tiel du droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière (voir r c. osolin, [1993] 4 rcs 595, p. 611- 612; r. c. levogiannis, [1993] 4 rcs 475;. r c. ns, 2012 csc 72, [2012] 3 rcs 726, par. 24; r c. schmaltz, 2015 abca 4, 593 ar 76, par. 18; regina c. white [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v les juges brown et rowe 281 through an inability to challenge a crucial part of the case against them, it will be inappropriate to invoke or apply the proviso (r v. lyttle, 2004 scc 5, [2004] 1 scr 193, at paras. 69-70, citing r v. anandmalik (1984), 6 oac 143, at p. 144; r v. wallick (1990), 69 man. r. (2d) 310, at p. 311; see also r v. borden, 2017 nsca 45, 349 ccc (3d) 162, at para 215). (1976), 1 alta. lr (2d) 292, p 299). si l’incapacité de contester une partie cruciale de la preuve présentée contre lui a eu pour effet de porter irrémédiablement atteinte au droit de l’accusé de vérifier la preuve du ministère public, il sera inopportun d’invoquer ou d’appliquer la disposition réparatrice (r c. lyttle, 2004 csc 5, [2004] 1 rcs 193, par. 69-70, citant r c. anandmalik (1984), 6 oac 143, p. 144; r c. wallick (1990), 69 man. r. (2d) 310, p. 311; voir éga- lement r c. borden, 2017 nsca 45, 349 ccc (3d) 162, par 215). ii the importance of cross- examination to a fair ii l’importance du contre- interrogatoire pour trial l’équité d’un procès [112] as a general rule, an accused has the right of cross- examination in the fullest and widest sense of the word as long as that right is not abused (see lyttle, at paras. 44 and 70). and we stress that this is not a case about an abusive cross- examination. while we share the majority’s concern that this area of cross- examination can fall into abuse if it is not tightly controlled by all actors in the courtroom (see also binnie j. in r v. shearing, 2002 scc 58, [2002] 3 scr 33, at paras. 121-22), here we all agree with paciocco ja:. rv’s proposed cross- examination of the complainant as to the cause of the pregnancy pertained to evidence that was relevant and had sig- nificant probative value that was not outweighed by substantial prejudice under s. 276 (2018 onca 547, 141 or (3d) 696). [112] en règle générale, l’accusé a le droit de contre- interroger les témoins, et ce, au sens le plus complet et le plus large du terme, pourvu qu’il n’abuse pas de ce droit (voir lyttle, par. 44 et 70). nous insistons pour dire que la présente affaire n’en est pas une où il est question d’un contre- interrogatoire abusif. même si, à l’instar de nos collègues majoritaires, nous re- connaissons qu’un contre- interrogatoire en pareille matière risque de devenir abusif s’il n’est pas rigou- reusement contrôlé par tous les acteurs dans la salle d’audience (voir également les motifs du juge binnie dans r c shearing, 2002 csc 58, [2002] 3 rcs 33, par. 121- 122), ici, nous sommes tous d’accord avec le juge paciocco pour dire que le contre- interrogatoire de la plaignante que se proposait de faire rv quant à la cause de la grossesse avait trait à une preuve qui était pertinente et dont le risque d’effet préjudiciable grave ne l’emportait pas sur sa valeur probante im- portante, comme l’exige l’art. 276 (2018 onca 547, 141 or (3d) 696). [113] we turn first to the majority’s treatment of the cross- examination that actually did occur in this case. we disagree entirely as to whether meaningful cross- examination occurred, so as to support the conclusion that nothing would have changed had rv been able to pursue the inquiries the s. 276 ruling restricted. this appears to resurrect the very error that we all agree the application judge made (majority reasons, at para. 62, adopting court of appeal reasons, at para. 64): equating the probative value of cross- examination with its probability of success in eliciting the evidence sought (or equating [113] nous nous penchons d’abord sur l’analyse que font les juges majoritaires quant au contre- interrogatoire qui a effectivement été mené en l’es- pèce. nous sommes entièrement en désaccord sur la question de savoir si un contre- interrogatoire utile a eu lieu, de telle sorte que serait étayée la conclusion selon laquelle rien n’aurait changé si rv avait pu poser les questions qu’il a été empêché de poser par la décision fondée sur l’art 276. cela semble faire renaître l’erreur qu’à commise, à notre avis unanime, la juge saisie de la demande (motifs des juges majoritaires, par. 62, adoptant les motifs de 282 r v r.v brown and rowe jj. [2019] 3 scr. the right of cross- examination with “the certainty of result”). but this view of cross- examination reduces it to nothing more than a checklist of topics, where the relevance of questioning is contingent on the examiner’s ability to know, in advance, the responses of the opposing witness. and this impoverished view of cross- examination has long ago been rejected by this court. [114] we therefore do not accept that rv was denied merely the ability to ask two additional ques- tions, or hear two further responses, as the majority suggests. rather, he was denied an entire process of questioning. this denial impacted all aspects of his defence at trial in ways that cannot be accounted for by the majority’s strained parsing of the transcript. as we will explain, cross- examination is an organic pro- cess — each answer potentially affecting the cross- examiner’s bearing — rather than a (mechanistic) checklist of topics, and, as such, none of us can know whether a properly designed cross- examination cul- minating in a series of questions (which, again, we all agree should have been permitted) would have elicited evidence favourable to rv’s case. cross- examination, after all, is not canvassed in torpor. la cour d’appel, par. 64) : soit assimiler la valeur probante du contre- interrogatoire à la probabilité qu’il permette d’obtenir la preuve recherchée (ou assimiler le droit au contre- interrogatoire à «  la certitude du résultat »). or, cette façon de voir le contre- interrogatoire le réduit à rien de plus qu’une liste de sujets et fait dépendre la pertinence des questions de la capacité de la personne qui interroge de connaître, à l’avance, les réponses du témoin de la partie adverse. en outre, cette approche ap- pauvrie du contre- interrogatoire a été rejetée par la cour il y a longtemps. [114] nous ne pouvons donc pas accepter que rv. a uniquement été empêché de poser deux questions supplémentaires, ou d’entendre deux réponses de plus, comme le suggèrent nos collègues majoritaires. il a plutôt été privé du processus complet d’interro- gatoire. cette privation a eu une incidence sur tous les aspects de sa défense au procès d’une façon qui ne peut pas être prise en compte dans l’analyse mi- nutieuse inadéquate de la transcription que font nos collègues. comme nous l’expliquerons, le contre- interrogatoire est un processus dynamique — chaque réponse étant susceptible d’avoir une incidence sur la direction que poursuit celui qui interroge — plutôt qu’une liste (figée) de sujets et, en conséquence, au- cun de nous ne peut savoir si un contre- interrogatoire conçu adéquatement se terminant par une série de questions (qui, encore une fois, auraient dû être per- mises selon notre avis unanime) aurait mis en lu- mière des éléments de preuve favorables à la défense de rv. après tout, il n’est pas possible de mener machinalement un contre- interrogatoire. [115] of even more fundamental concern to us is that the majority’s reasoning is inconsistent with how this court has (traditionally) regarded the effects of improper interference with the right of cross- examination on the fairness of a criminal trial. the leading decision of this court is lyttle. although dis- tinguishable on its facts and not a case involving the application of s. 276, the legal issue in lyttle — the effect an improperly constrained cross- examination has on the fairness of an accused’s trial — bears striking similarity to the case at bar. we therefore recount the reasoning in that case at some length, focusing on two of its foremost principles that bear [115] ce qui constitue une préoccupation encore plus fondamentale pour nous, c’est que le raisonne- ment des juges majoritaires est incompatible avec l’analyse que la cour a faite (traditionnellement) des effets d’une intervention inadmissible à l’égard du droit à un contre- interrogatoire sur l’équité d’un procès criminel. l’arrêt de principe de la cour à cet égard est l’arrêt lyttle. bien qu’il soit possible d’établir une distinction entre l’espèce et les faits de l’affaire lyttle et qu’il n’était pas question dans cette affaire de l’application de l’art. 276, la question de droit traitée dans cet arrêt — soit l’effet qu’a un contre- interrogatoire indûment restreint sur l’équité [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v les juges brown et rowe 283 on the question of whether to invoke the curative proviso in this appeal: (1) a manifestly constrained cross- examination has a prejudicial impact on an accused’s ability to control his or her defence and on the fairness of their trial; and (2) an accused’s fair trial rights include not just the fact of cross- examination, but also control over the rhythm of cross- examination. in lyttle, the victim was found severely beaten. [116] he told police that this was the result of a dispute over a gold chain. police did not believe him, speculating that he was more likely beaten up as a result of a drug debt gone bad. but the victim denied this, and police came around to his account that it occurred over a gold chain. at trial, mr. lyttle’s counsel was prohib- ited from putting suggestions to crown witnesses that the beating occurred over the initial police theory, a drug debt gone bad, which would have been excul- patory evidence favouring mr. lyttle, unless counsel intended to prove the factual basis for the suggestion. she was unable to do so, absent cross­ examination of crown witnesses, and mr. lyttle was convicted in the beating of the victim. du procès d’un accusé — comporte des similitudes frappantes avec la présente affaire. nous reprenons donc passablement en détail le raisonnement énoncé dans cet arrêt. nous le faisons en mettant l’accent sur deux des principes fondamentaux qu’il énonce et qui concernent la question de savoir s’il faut invoquer la disposition réparatrice dans le présent pourvoi : (1) un contre- interrogatoire qui a été manifestement restreint a un effet préjudiciable sur la capacité de l’accusé de contrôler sa défense et sur l’équité de son procès; et (2) les droits de l’accusé lui garantissant un procès équitable comprennent non seulement le fait qu’il y ait un contre- interrogatoire, mais aussi le contrôle sur le rythme de celui-ci. [116] dans lyttle, la victime a été retrouvée sauva- gement battue. elle a dit aux policiers qu’elle avait été battue à la suite d’un différend à propos d’une chaîne en or. les policiers ne l’ont pas crue, conjecturant qu’elle avait plus vraisemblablement été battue à pro- pos d’une dette de drogue qui avait mal tourné. la vic- time a toutefois nié cette thèse et les policiers ont fini par admettre son récit selon lequel l’agression avait eu lieu à propos d’une chaîne en or. au procès, on a interdit à l’avocate de m. lyttle de soumettre aux té- moins à charge l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’agression s’était produite conformément à la thèse de départ des policiers — à savoir une dette de drogue qui avait mal tourné — qui aurait constitué une preuve disculpatoire favorable à m. lyttle, à moins qu’elle eût l’intention de prouver les faits sur lesquels l’hypothèse s’ap- puyait. elle a été incapable de le faire, faute d’avoir contre­ interrogé les témoins à charge, et m. lyttle a été déclaré coupable d’avoir battu la victime. [117] before this court, the legal issue was whether an accused person must have a good faith basis, or a stricter, evidentiary foundation, to cross- examine a crown witness on a particular matter at issue. in other words, is an accused person limited to ques- tioning witnesses on matters that can be confirmed through other means? this court answered in the negative. it was found that a question can be put to a witness in cross- examination regarding matters that need not be proved independently, provided that the examiner has a good faith basis for putting the question to the witness. it was observed that it is not uncommon for an examiner to believe what is in [117] devant la cour, la question de droit était celle de savoir si l’accusé devait être de bonne foi, ou s’il lui fallait des éléments de preuve plus rigou- reux au soutien du contre- interrogatoire, pour contre- interroger un témoin à charge sur un point particulier en cause. autrement dit, il s’agissait de savoir si l’ac- cusé est limité à interroger les témoins uniquement sur des points qui peuvent être confirmés par d’autres moyens. la cour a répondu par la négative. elle a conclu qu’il est possible de contre- interroger un témoin sur des points qui n’ont pas besoin d’être prouvés indépendamment, pourvu que celui qui inter- roge soit de bonne foi lorsqu’il pose ses questions au 284 r v r.v brown and rowe jj. [2019] 3 scr. fact true, without being able to prove it other than by cross­ examination. the risk is that if the examiner gets a denial or some answer that does not suit them, the answer stands against them in evidence (fox v. general medical council, [1960] 1 wlr 1017, at p. 1023, per lord radcliffe, cited in lyttle, at para 49). [118] this court went on to conclude that the trial judge had improperly interfered with mr. lyttle’s right to cross- examine the crown witnesses, having placed unwarranted conditions on legitimate lines of questioning. on whether to invoke the curative pro- viso, the court had little difficulty finding that a sub- stantial wrong occurred and an unfair trial resulted, even though nothing on the record suggested that the beating occurred over a drug debt gone bad. further, the evidence against mr. lyttle was compelling: the victim had identified mr. lyttle as his “unmasked” attacker in a photographic line-up. nevertheless, the court chose not to invoke the proviso, for rea- sons — and it is this point that the majority does not answer — that a manifestly constrained cross- examination strikes at the heart of the accused’s abil- ity to control his or her defence and on the fairness of their trial, and that, where fair trial rights have been infringed, the appeal should run its natural course. témoin. la cour a fait remarquer qu’il n’est pas inha- bituel que celui qui interroge prête foi à un fait qui est effectivement vrai, sans qu’il soit capable d’en faire la preuve autrement que par un contre­ interrogatoire. il court toutefois le risque qu’une dénégation ou une réponse qui ne lui convient pas joue contre lui pour ce qu’elle vaut (fox c. general medical council, [1960] 1 wlr 1017, p. 1023, motifs du lord radcliffe, cité dans lyttle, par 49). [118] la cour a ensuite conclu que le juge du pro- cès avait limité irrégulièrement le droit de m. lyttle de contre- interroger les témoins à charge, ayant su- bordonné des séries de questions légitimes à des conditions injustifiées. sur la question de l’oppor- tunité d’invoquer la disposition réparatrice, la cour a conclu sans difficulté qu’un tort important avait été causé et qu’un procès inéquitable en avait ré- sulté, même si rien dans le dossier n’indiquait que l’agression avait eu lieu à propos d’une dette de drogue qui avait mal tourné. de plus, la preuve contre m. lyttle était convaincante : la victime avait identi- fié m. lyttle comme son agresseur « non masqué » lors d’une séance d’identification photographique. néanmoins, la cour a choisi de ne pas invoquer la disposition, au motif — et c’est à cet élément que les juges majoritaires ne répondent pas — qu’un contre- interrogatoire manifestement restreint porte directe- ment atteinte à la capacité de l’accusé de contrôler sa défense ainsi qu’à l’équité de son procès, et que lorsqu’il y a eu atteinte aux droits à un procès équi- table, l’appel devrait suivre son cours normal. [119] we pull from lyttle that: [119] nous retenons ce qui suit de l’arrêt lyttle : cross- examination may often be futile and sometimes prove fatal, but it remains nonetheless a faithful friend in the pursuit of justice and an indispensable ally in the search for truth. at times, there will be no other way to expose falsehood, to rectify error, to correct distortion or to elicit vital information that would otherwise remain forever concealed. bien que le contre- interrogatoire puisse souvent s’avé- rer futile et parfois se révéler fatal, il demeure néanmoins un ami fidèle dans la poursuite de la justice ainsi qu’un allié indispensable dans la recherche de la vérité. dans cer- tains cas, il n’existe en effet aucun autre moyen de mettre au jour des faussetés, de rectifier une erreur, de corriger une distorsion ou de découvrir un renseignement essentiel qui, autrement, resterait dissimulé à jamais. that is why the right of an accused to cross- examine witnesses for the prosecution — without significant and unwarranted constraint — is an essential component of the right to make full answer and defence. [emphasis in original; paras 1-2]. voilà pourquoi le droit de l’accusé de contre- interroger les témoins à charge — sans se voir imposer d’entraves importantes et injustifiées  —  est un élément essentiel du droit à une défense pleine et entière. [souligné dans l’original; par 1-2] [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v les juges brown et rowe 285 put simply, meaningful cross- examination cannot be undertaken if its scope is manifestly constrained. [120] but lyttle also draws attention to the rhythm of cross- examination as an essential aspect of an accused’s fair trial rights, and not just the fact of cross- examination. again, cross- examination is not so much a series of questions as a process of ques­ tioning. recall that in lyttle, the same argument was made by the court of appeal for ontario as the ma- jority makes here: while the trial judge wrongly inter- fered with the cross- examination of crown witnesses, counsel effectively got to ask the questions anyway. but this line of reasoning was rejected at this court where it was noted that, regardless of the fact that the evidence prohibited through cross- examination was effectively canvassed in direct examination of the witnesses, the ruling had an intimidating effect on defence counsel, disrupted the rhythm of her cross- examination, and placed conditions on a legitimate line of questioning (paras. 3 and 71). further, unduly restricting mr. lyttle’s cross- examination had down- stream effects on the fairness of the trial, as mr. lyttle had to call crown witnesses as his own, and therefore gave up his right to address the jury last. [121] the court’s reasoning reflects the fact that cross- examination is an organic process that cannot be considered in isolated pieces. it consists of more than a single question or series of questions. indeed, it typically consists of a process of questioning in which skilled counsel seek to elicit things that are not immediately apparent that, within strict bounds, tests the credibility of a witness. the rhythm of cross- examination involves putting careful questions to a witness that are designed to explore bit by bit the nature and extent of that witness’s knowledge. cross- examination is effective only where it is permitted to proceed step by step towards the ultimate point, where the cross- examiner can pose the final question (or questions), knowing by that time what the an- swer(s) will be, having regard to the earlier evidence elicited (see g d e. adair, on trial: advocacy skills, laws and practice (2nd ed. 2004), at p 333). pour dire les choses simplement, il n’est pas possible de mener un contre- interrogatoire utile si sa portée est manifestement restreinte. [120] cela dit, l’arrêt lyttle met aussi en lumière la question du rythme du contre- interrogatoire et af- firme qu’il s’agit d’un aspect essentiel des droits de l’accusé à un procès équitable, qui ne se limitent pas à la tenue d’un contre- interrogatoire. encore une fois, un contre- interrogatoire n’est pas tant une série de questions qu’un processus d’interrogatoire. il ne faut pas oublier que dans lyttle, la cour d’appel de l’on- tario avait appliqué le même argument que celui que font valoir nos collègues majoritaires en l’espèce : soit que même si le juge du procès a entravé à tort le contre- interrogatoire des témoins à charge, l’avocate a pu poser les questions. or, la cour a rejeté ce raisonne- ment lorsqu’elle a fait remarquer que, indépendam- ment du fait que des éléments de preuve interdits en contre- interrogatoire ont effectivement été examinés en interrogatoire principal, la décision a eu un effet inhibiteur sur l’avocate de la défense, a perturbé le rythme de son contre- interrogatoire et a subordonné une série de questions légitime à des conditions (par. 3 et 71). qui plus est, le fait de restreindre indûment le contre- interrogatoire de m. lyttle a eu des effets en aval sur l’équité du procès, puisqu’il a dû appeler des témoins à charge comme témoins à décharge, renon- çant ainsi à son droit de s’adresser au jury en dernier. [121] le raisonnement de la cour tient compte du fait que le contre- interrogatoire est un processus dy- namique, qui ne saurait être examiné par bribes iso- lées. il ne se limite donc pas à une seule question ou série de questions. de fait, il consiste généralement en un processus d’interrogatoire par lequel l’avocat compétent cherche à obtenir des choses qui ne sont pas immédiatement apparentes et qui, à l’intérieur de balises strictes, permet de vérifier la crédibilité d’un témoin. le rythme d’un contre- interrogatoire consiste à poser à un témoin des questions judi- cieuses conçues pour explorer, peu à peu, la nature et l’étendue de la connaissance de ce témoin. un contre- interrogatoire n’est efficace que s’il peut se dérouler étape par étape vers le point ultime où celui qui contre- interroge peut poser la question ultime (ou les questions ultimes), sachant à ce moment-là quelle sera sa réponse (ou quelles seront ses réponses), 286 r v r.v brown and rowe jj. [2019] 3 scr. this means that, when cross- examination is unduly constrained, the effects on the fairness of the trial will often reverberate beyond, and cannot be fully appre- ciated by parsing, the particular words in a transcript. in other words, effective cross- examination [122] does not depend merely on what is asked, but also how it is asked. to repeat, in pursuing cross- examination, skilled counsel engage the witness in a process that culminates in a final inquiry, where the answers to all of the previous inquiries, taken together, reveal the examiner’s theory or point. it is only after all of the ev- idence has been elicited following cross- examination that facts can be found and credibility assessments can be made. it flows logically that where the examiner knows from the outset that a particular line of inquiry cannot be explored, this will necessarily have an im- pact on the rhythm of the cross- examination, and the examiner is likely to adjust the main theory or point of their cross- examination as a result. that was likely the case here. [123] it is for this reason that cross- examination cannot be unduly restricted. it is not sufficient for the examiner to get 90 percent of the way through a line of questioning. that 90 percent may have no purpose or relevance at all if the examiner cannot get to the final 10 percent. relatedly, only being able to ask a single question, or a final 10 percent, without being able to first lay out the foundation, cannot be said to fulfill an accused’s constitutionally protected right of cross- examination either. safeguarding sufficient control over the rhythm of cross- examination ensures we do not imprison a person in his or her privileges and call it the charter (we borrow from the language of frankfurter j., in adams v. united states ex rel. mccann, 317 us 269 (1942), at p 280). compte tenu des éléments de preuve obtenus anté- rieurement (voir g d e. adair, on trial : advocacy skills, laws and practice (2e éd. 2004), p 333). cela signifie que, lorsque le contre- interrogatoire est indûment restreint, les effets sur l’équité du procès se répercutent souvent au- delà des mots précis qui figurent dans la transcription et ne peuvent être plei- nement pris en compte lors de l’analyse de ces mots. [122] autrement dit, l’efficacité d’un contre- interrogatoire ne dépend pas uniquement du contenu des questions posées au témoin, mais aussi de la ma­ nière dont elles lui sont posées. nous le répétons, en menant un contre- interrogatoire, l’avocat compétent engage le témoin dans un processus qui aboutit à une ultime question, où les réponses à toutes les ques- tions déjà posées, prises ensemble, révèlent la thèse ou l’élément que veut établir celui qui interroge. ce n’est qu’après que tous les éléments de preuve ont été obtenus par suite du contre- interrogatoire que les faits peuvent être constatés et les évaluations de la crédibilité peuvent être menées à bien. il s’ensuit logiquement que lorsque celui qui interroge sait d’emblée qu’il ne peut pas poser certaines questions, cela a nécessairement une incidence sur le rythme du contre- interrogatoire. il est en outre probable que celui qui interroge ajuste en conséquence la thèse ou l’élément principal qu’il entend établir par son contre- interrogatoire. c’est vrai- semblablement ce qui s’est produit en l’espèce. [123] c’est pour cette raison que le contre- interrogatoire ne peut pas être indûment restreint. il ne suffit pas que celui qui interroge obtienne 90 p. 100 de ce qu’il cherche en posant une série de questions. il est possible que ces 90 p. 100 n’aient aucune raison d’être ou pertinence si celui qui interroge ne parvient pas à obtenir les derniers 10 p 100. dans le même ordre d’idées, on ne saurait prétendre que l’accusé qui n’a pu poser qu’une seule question, c’est-à-dire les derniers 10 p. 100, sans avoir pu d’abord établir le fondement factuel pertinent, s’est vu respecter son droit protégé par la constitution de contre- interroger le témoin. en ga- rantissant que celui qui interroge conserve un contrôle suffisant du rythme du contre- interrogatoire, on évite d’enchaîner une personne à ses privilèges et de qualifier cela de charte (nous empruntons les propos tenus par le juge frankfurter dans adams c. united states ex rel. mccann, 317 us 269 (1942), p 280). [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v les juges brown et rowe 287 [124] but we wish to make clear that a cross- examination that is not unduly restricted does not mean a cross- examination that is boundless, and nothing in lyttle or in our s. 276 jurisprudence sug- gests otherwise. lyttle makes clear that the examiner must have a good faith basis for putting questions to a crown witness and, as the majority notes, parlia- ment has specifically legislated limits on question- ing related to a complainant’s sexual history into the criminal code. while, therefore, trial judges always ensure that counsel “[are] not merely tak- ing a random shot at a reputation imprudently ex- posed or asking a groundless question to waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box” (lyttle, at para. 51, citing from michelson v. united states, 335 us 469 (1948), at p. 481), cross- examination is even more narrowly constrained by the evidentiary corral built by the admissibility criteria in s. 276(2); inferences that, by operation of s. 276(1), will never be relevant; and by the common law principles enun- ciated in r v. seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577. when an examiner exceeds those bounds created by s. 276 or the common law, the examiner is no longer asking questions in good faith, and therefore any evidence elicited as a result of those inquiries is inadmissible and should be immediately disregarded. [124] nous souhaitons toutefois énoncer clairement qu’un contre- interrogatoire qui n’est pas indûment restreint ne consiste pas en un contre- interrogatoire illimité, et que rien dans l’arrêt lyttle ou dans la jurisprudence de la cour sur l’art. 276 ne suggère le contraire. l’arrêt lyttle affirme sans contredit que l’avocat qui contre- interroge un témoin à charge doit agir de bonne foi lorsqu’il pose ses questions. d’ail- leurs, comme le font remarquer nos collègues majo- ritaires, le législateur a expressément prévu dans le code criminel des limites aux questions qui peuvent être posées sur le comportement sexuel antérieur d’une plaignante. même si le juge du procès doit donc toujours s’assurer que [traduction] « l’avocat ne se contente pas simplement d’attaquer à l’aveu- glette une réputation imprudemment compromise ou de poser une question non fondée afin de lancer une insinuation injustifiée à l’intention des jurés » (lyttle, par. 51, citant michelson c. united states, 335 us 469 (1948), p. 481), le contre- interrogatoire est encore plus restreint par la barrière en matière de preuve érigée par les critères d’admissibilité pré- vus au par. 276(2); par les inférences qui, du fait du par. 276(1), ne seront jamais pertinentes; et par les principes de common law énoncés dans r c. seaboyer, [1991] 2 rcs 577. lorsque celui qui interroge dépasse ces limites fixées par l’art. 276 ou par la common law, il n’est plus de bonne foi et tout élément de preuve obtenu par suite de ses questions est donc inadmissible et doit être immédiatement rejeté. [125] but in the case at bar, we repeat: the pro- posed inquiries would not have contravened s. 276 or the common law principles from seaboyer and there was a good faith basis for putting the questions to the complainant. while, therefore, we agree that, “the circumstances of this case warranted tightly controlled questioning of the complainant” (major- ity reasons, at para. 88), our point of disagreement is this: the questioning that did occur at rv’s trial was not a fair substitute for what the erroneous ruling restricted. the majority’s whittling down of any error to a deprivation of two interrogatories represents in our respectful view an unfortunate obfuscation of this court’s previously clear emphasis on the im- portance of an accused person exercising sufficient control and rhythm over the entire cross- examination [125] cela dit, rappelons que, en l’espèce, les questions proposées n’auraient pas contrevenu à l’art. 276 ou aux principes de common law énoncés dans l’arrêt seaboyer et que les questions posées à la plaignante l’ont été de bonne foi. nous conve- nons certes que « [l]es circonstances de l’espèce justifiaient [  ] un interrogatoire de la plaignante rigoureusement contrôlé » (motifs des juges majo- ritaires, par 88). notre point de discorde est donc le suivant : l’interrogatoire qui a eu lieu lors du procès de rv n’était pas un substitut adéquat pour ce qu’a interdit la décision erronée. le fait que, selon nos collègues, toute erreur se réduise à une restriction empêchant rv de poser deux questions représente à notre avis un regrettable faux- fuyant de l’accent que la cour avait clairement mis sur l’importance 288 r v r.v brown and rowe jj. [2019] 3 scr. strategy, from the lines of inquiry chosen to the order in which questions are asked. all of this was cast aside in rv’s trial when he was prevented from putting to the complainant a series of questions that we all agree should have been permitted. qu’un accusé exerce un contrôle suffisant sur le rythme de l’ensemble du contre- interrogatoire et sur les pistes d’interrogatoire choisies, jusqu’à l’ordre dans lequel les questions sont posées. tout cela a été mis de côté lors du procès de rv lorsqu’il n’a pu poser à la plaignante une série de questions qui, nous en convenons unanimement, auraient dû être permises. iii the restriction on cross- examination was not iii la restriction du contre- interrogatoire n’était pas a minor or harmless error une erreur négligeable ou inoffensive [126] the foregoing explains why we cannot ac- cept that there was meaningful cross- examination so as to support the majority’s conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict could have been different had the errors in this case not been made. it follows that the error in the s. 276 ruling cannot be said to be “minor” or “harmless” when, as submitted by the criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, at its core it allowed the crown to claim for itself the right to adduce evidence of a pregnancy as incriminatory of the accused, while insisting that the accused should be barred by the language of s. 276(2) from challenging the very evidence relied on by the crown (if,. criminal lawyers’ associa- tion of ontario, at p 7). [126] dans les paragraphes qui précèdent, nous avons expliqué les raisons pour lesquelles nous ne pouvons accepter qu’il y aurait eu un contre- interrogatoire utile, ce qui étayerait la conclusion de nos collègues voulant qu’il n’y ait aucune possi- bilité raisonnable que le verdict aurait été différent si les erreurs commises en l’espèce ne l’avaient pas été. il s’ensuit que l’erreur commise dans la décision fondée sur l’art. 276 ne peut être décrite comme étant «  négligeable  » ou «  inoffensive  » dans la mesure où, comme l’a plaidé la criminal lawyers’association of ontario, essentiellement, cette décision permettait au ministère public de revendiquer pour lui- même le droit de présenter la preuve de la grossesse comme incriminant l’accusé, tout en insistant pour que l’accusé soit empêché, aux termes du par. 276(2), de contester cette même preuve sur laquelle se fondait le ministère public (mi,. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, p 7). [127] it does not follow that rv coming close to what he would have been allowed to ask following a proper s. 276 ruling means that the error did not meaningfully impact his actual trial. such an ap- plication can only water down the proviso, because it strains common sense for an appellate court to conclude that it knows with certainty what evidence would have been adduced, or what effects such evi- dence would have had on the trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses, had no such errors been made at trial. none of us can confidently say whether, had rv been able to effectively challenge the cause of the pregnancy, he would have elicited something that was sufficient to raise a doubt. this illustrates the importance of cross- examination: it is sometimes the [127] ce n’est pas parce que rv est presque par- venu à poser les questions qu’il aurait été autorisé à poser si la décision fondée sur l’art. 276 avait été juste que l’erreur n’a pas eu une incidence signifi- cative sur le procès qu’il a effectivement subi. une telle application a forcément pour effet d’affaiblir la disposition réparatrice, parce que ce serait faire preuve de naïveté pour une cour d’appel de conclure qu’elle sait avec certitude quelle preuve aurait été obtenue, ou quels effets cette preuve aurait eus sur l’évaluation des témoins par le juge du procès, si de telles erreurs n’avaient pas été commises au procès. nul ne peut affirmer en toute confiance savoir si, dans l’hypothèse où rv avait pu contester effi- cacement la cause de la grossesse, il aurait obtenu [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v les juges brown et rowe 289 only way to elicit evidence that is often not apparent at the outset. [128] the erroneous s. 276 ruling had ricochet effects. as paciocco ja noted (ca reasons, at para. 122), the trial judge’s error in believing he could not re- visit the s. 276 ruling rendered future meritorious applications to reconsider futile, which likely would have had an intimidating effect on de- fence counsel’s ability to respond effectively (see lyttle, at para. 7) as evidence was elicited during the trial that required a reconsideration of the ruling. we accept paciocco ja’s assessment (at para. 110) that counsel was functionally powerless to do any- thing about it. we note that, invariably, rv would have pursued a different trial strategy had he been permitted to directly challenge the evidence led by the crown. for instance, rv’s decision to testify in this case would likely have been impacted by the ruling. had rv been able to pursue the inquiries prohibited by the ruling, he may not have testified at all. there are simply too many variables that flowed from the erroneous s. 276 ruling for an appellate court to comfortably invoke the proviso. quelque chose qui aurait suffi pour soulever un doute. cela illustre l’importance du contre- interrogatoire : il s’agit parfois de la seule façon d’obtenir des élé- ments de preuve qui, dans bien des cas, ne sont pas du tout apparents au départ. [128] la décision erronée fondée sur l’art. 276 a eu un effet domino. comme l’a fait remarquer le juge paciocco (motifs de la ca, par. 122), l’erreur du juge du procès de croire qu’il ne pouvait pas revenir sur la décision fondée sur l’art. 276 a rendu futiles de futures demandes fondées de réexamen. cela a probablement eu un effet intimidant sur la capacité de l’avocat de la défense de répondre efficacement (voir lyttle, par. 7), puisque des éléments de preuve présentés au procès exigeaient que la décision fasse l’objet d’un nouvel examen nous souscrivons à l’évaluation du juge paciocco (par. 110) selon la- quelle l’avocat était fonctionnellement impuissant à agir à cet égard. nous constatons que rv aurait immanquablement poursuivi une autre stratégie au procès si on lui avait permis de contester directe- ment la preuve présentée par le ministère public. par exemple, la décision de la juge a vraisemblablement eu une incidence sur la décision de rv de témoigner au procès. s’il avait pu poser les questions interdites par la décision de la juge, il est possible qu’il n’eût pas témoigné du tout. il y a tout simplement trop de variables qui ont découlé de la décision erronée fondée sur l’art. 276 pour qu’une cour d’appel puisse aisément invoquer la disposition réparatrice. [129] overall, the majority’s parsing of the tran- script, and its reduction of any errors to a mere limit on rv’s ability to ask two particular interrogato- ries, provide little comfort. the majority effectively treats rv’s trial as if it was error- free, which it certainly was not. the application judge misapplied all three statutory criteria under s.  276(2).5 and to repeat, her ruling deprived rv of his right to proceed step by step through the process of cross- [129] dans l’ensemble, l’analyse de la transcription par les juges majoritaires, et le fait qu’ils aient réduit toute erreur à une simple limite à la capacité de rv. de poser deux questions précises, ne procurent que bien peu de réconfort. dans les faits, ils traitent le procès de rv comme s’il n’avait comporté aucune erreur, ce qui n’a certainement pas été le cas. la juge saisie de la demande a mal appliqué les trois critères prévus au par 276(2)6. nous le répétons, sa décision 5 we note that on december 13, 2018, s. 276(2) was amended to include a fourth admissibility criteria: evidence of a complainant’s sexual history cannot be adduced by the accused for the purposes of drawing on inferences prohibited by s 276(1). moving forward, judges considering an application by the accused to adduce sexual history evidence must consider whether the accused has met all four criteria for admissibility under s 276(2). 6 nous précisons que, le 13 décembre 2018, le par. 276(2) a été mo- difié pour qu’y soit inclus un quatrième critère d’admissibilité : la preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur d’un plaignant ne peut être présentée par l’accusé pour que soient tirées les inférences interdites par le par 276(1). depuis, le juge saisi d’une demande de l’accusé en vue de la présentation d’une preuve d’un comportement sexuel antérieur doit se demander si l’accusé a satisfait aux quatre critères d’admissibilité énumérés au par 276(2). 290 r v r.v brown and rowe jj. [2019] 3 scr. examination leading to the final question (or ques- tions). a privé rv de son droit de procéder étape par étape tout au long du processus de contre- interrogatoire menant à la question ou aux questions ultimes. [130] the majority sees no harm in any of this, since other lines of questioning could have been pursued (para 92). but, and with respect, the fruit- fulness of such other lines of questioning was contin- gent on the possibility that those lines of questioning might culminate in questions that could undermine the probative value of the pregnancy. and the appli- cation judge’s erroneous s. 276 ruling foreclosed this possibility, meaning that rv’s cross- examination strategy would still have had to be adjusted accord- ingly. the point is that, but for the application judge’s errors, rv’s entire cross- examination may well have been different. [130] nos collègues majoritaires ne voient rien de mal à tout cela, car d’autres pistes d’investigation auraient pu être suivies (par 92). soit dit en tout res- pect, la fécondité de ces autres pistes d’investigation dépendait de la possibilité qu’elles puissent aboutir à des questions susceptibles de miner la valeur pro- bante de la grossesse. or, la décision erronée de la juge saisie de la demande fondée sur l’art. 276 élimi­ nait cette possibilité, ce qui signifie que rv aurait là aussi ajusté sa stratégie de contre- interrogatoire en conséquence. en fait, sans les erreurs de la juge saisie de la demande, il est fort possible que rv eût mené un contre- interrogatoire complètement différent. iv the relevance of the evidentiary record to the iv la pertinence du dossier de preuve pour l’appli- application of the proviso cation de la disposition réparatrice [131] this brings us to the majority’s treatment of the evidentiary record, where the majority says, not- withstanding the restriction on cross- examination, we do know what evidence rv would have elic- ited, based on evidence elicited when trial coun- sel “skirt[ed] the [s. 276] ruling” (ca reasons, at para. 91), and suggested to the complainant that she was not a virgin at the time of the alleged assault. we note parenthetically, as paciocco ja observed, that trial counsel was restricted from probing her answers or engaging in any other interrogatories based on her responses. nonetheless, the majority would apply the proviso because, in its view, this shows that there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different but for the application judge’s errors. [132] we have several objections to this approach. [131] cela nous mène à l’analyse du dossier de preuve que font nos collègues majoritaires : selon eux, malgré la restriction du contre- interrogatoire, nous savons bel et bien ce que rv aurait pu obtenir comme preuve en fonction de celle obtenue lorsque l’avocat de première instance [traduction] «  a contourné la décision [fondée sur l’art. 276] » (motifs de la ca, par. 91) et a laissé entendre à la plaignante qu’elle n’était pas vierge au moment de l’agression alléguée. nous notons au passage que, comme l’a fait remarquer le juge paciocco, l’avocat au procès n’avait pas le droit de sonder ses réponses ou de po- ser d’autres questions en fonction des réponses de la plaignante. nos collègues appliqueraient néanmoins la disposition réparatrice parce que, selon eux, cela démontre qu’il n’y a aucune possibilité raisonnable que le verdict ait été différent sans les erreurs de la juge saisie de la demande. [132] nous opposons plusieurs objections à cette approche. [133] first, we question the majority’s choice to invoke the proviso on the basis of evidence that was inadmissible in rv’s trial (given the erroneous s. 276 ruling) and ought to have been immediately disregarded by the trial judge. it is trite to observe [133] premièrement, nous sommes sceptiques de- vant le choix des juges majoritaires d’invoquer la dis- position réparatrice sur le fondement d’une preuve qui était inadmissible au procès de rv (compte tenu de la décision erronée fondée sur l’art. 276) et qui aurait [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v les juges brown et rowe 291 that where the law clearly prohibits a line of cross- examination, lawyers should understand that they are not to cross- examine a witness in that area of evidence (see e. craig, “the ethical obligations of defence counsel in sexual assault cases” (2014), 51 osgoode hall lj 427, at p. 456, fn 147). the majority’s treatment of this evidence is particularly troubling in the context of a sexual assault trial which, as it rightly notes, presents “unique challenges” to the administration of justice and requires that question- ing of complainants be “tightly controlled” (paras. 1 and 88). indeed, the court’s posture towards counsel “skirting” rulings that they disagree with in a similar fashion should be one of discouragement, not encour- agement.6 our concern is with the practical effect of relying on evidence adduced in contravention of the s. 276 ruling, with no admonition of counsel for “skirting” in the first place. using evidence obtained in contravention of a s. 276 ruling to support the in- vocation of the proviso may well have the unintended consequence of encouraging bad behaviour. it may signal to counsel that there are incentives to playing fast and loose with rulings they disagree with, since the evidence elicited thereby may be used by appel- late courts in their favour. the result is, in this case, particularly troubling, as paciocco ja noted (ca. reasons, at para. 91), since rv’s counsel had no means to probe the complainant’s answers and never actually asked the series of questions all of us agree should have been permitted. 6 a. woolley, understanding lawyers’ ethics in canada (2nd ed. 2016), at p. 403: “a lawyer should cross- examine witnesses within the rules established by the law of evidence” (emphasis added); craig, at p. 430: “defence counsel are ethically obliged to restrict their carriage of a sexual assault case (including the evidence they seek to admit, the lines of examination and cross- examination they pursue, and the closing arguments they submit) to conduct that supports findings of facts within the bounds of law” (emphasis added). dû être rejetée sur-le- champ par le juge du procès. il va sans dire que lorsque la loi interdit clairement une avenue de contre- interrogatoire, les avocats devraient comprendre qu’ils ne peuvent pas contre- interroger un témoin dans ce domaine de preuve (voir e. craig, « the ethical obligations of defence counsel in sexual assault cases » (2014), 51 osgoode hall lj 427, p. 456, note en bas de page 147). le traite- ment de cette preuve par nos collègues est particuliè- rement troublant dans le contexte d’un procès pour agression sexuelle qui, comme ils le font remarquer à juste titre, pose des « défis particuliers » pour l’admi- nistration de la justice et exige que les interrogatoires des plaignantes soient « rigoureusement contrôlé[s] » (par. 1 et 88). en effet, la position de la cour à l’égard des avocats qui « contournent » des décisions avec lesquelles ils ne sont pas d’accord — comme l’a fait l’avocat en l’espèce — devrait en être une de décou- ragement et non d’encouragement7. notre préoccu- pation porte sur l’effet pratique découlant du fait de se fonder sur une preuve présentée en violation de la décision fondée sur l’art. 276, sans même que l’avocat qui a « contourné » la décision ne reçoive d’avertis- sement. le recours à une preuve obtenue en violation d’une décision fondée sur l’art. 276 afin d’étayer l’application de la disposition réparatrice pourrait bien avoir la conséquence non souhaitée d’encoura- ger les comportements fautifs. cela pourrait donner l’impression aux avocats qu’il peut être avantageux de prendre des libertés à l’égard des décisions avec lesquelles ils ne sont pas d’accord, puisque la preuve obtenue de cette façon peut être utilisée par les cours d’appel en leur faveur. en l’espèce, cela mène à un ré- sultat particulièrement troublant, comme l’a souligné le juge paciocco (motifs de la ca, par. 91), puisque l’avocat de rv n’a eu aucun moyen d’évaluer les réponses de la plaignante et n’a jamais dans les faits posé les questions qui, selon notre avis unanime, auraient dû être permises. 7 a. woolley, understanding lawyers’ ethics in canada (2e éd. 2016), p.  403  : [traduction] «  un avocat devrait contre- interroger les témoins dans le respect des règles du droit de la preuve » (nous soulignons); craig, p. 430 : [traduction] « les avocats de la défense ont l’obligation éthique de restreindre leurs questions dans le contexte d’une affaire d’agression sexuelle (y compris la preuve qu’ils veulent admettre, les questions à examiner et le contre- interrogatoire qu’ils mènent, ainsi que les conclusions finales qu’ils présentent) à la conduite qui étaye les conclusions de fait dans les limites permises par le droit » (nous soulignons). 292 r v r.v brown and rowe jj. [2019] 3 scr. [134] secondly, we note that the majority’s reli- ance on the record appears to resurrect an approach to the curative proviso that this court rejected in sar­ razin. there, the court considered whether to adopt an “holistic approach” to the proviso, according to which it could be applied where “an appellate court is satisfied that the evidence of guilt is very strong, although not quite overwhelming, and the legal er- ror or errors, though not insignificant, are highly unlikely to have affected the result” (r v. sarrazin, 2010 onca 577, 268 oac 200, at fn. 13 (em- phasis in original), cited by this court in sarrazin, at para 16). but such an approach was rejected as a watering down of the proviso. the strength of the crown’s case cannot counterbalance the effect of an error that is neither minor nor harmless. put an- other way, unless the evidence against the accused is overwhelming, its strength is effectively irrelevant to the application of the proviso. appellate courts may therefore not straddle the branches of the pro- viso, which the majority’s conclusion appears to do. rather, the harmless error branch focuses on whether the appellate court can confidently conclude that the legal error did not impact the verdict. in our view, this certainty is unavailable. [134] deuxièmement, notons que, en se fondant sur le dossier comme ils le font, nos collègues semblent revenir à une approche de la disposition réparatrice que la cour a rejetée dans sarrazin. dans cette affaire, la cour s’est demandé s’il y avait lieu d’adopter une [traduction] « approche […] globale » à l’égard de la disposition en question, une approche selon laquelle elle pourrait être appliquée lorsqu’« une cour d’appel est convaincue que la preuve de la culpabi- lité est très forte, bien qu’elle ne soit pas accablante, et qu’il est fort peu probable qu’une ou des erreurs de droit, bien qu’elles ne soient pas inoffensives, aient influé sur le résultat » (r c. sarrazin, 2010 onca 577, 268 oac 200, note en bas de page 13 (en italique dans l’original), cité par la cour dans sarrazin, par 16). or, une telle approche a été rejetée parce qu’on lui reprochait de diluer la disposition réparatrice. la solidité de la preuve du ministère pu- blic ne peut contrebalancer l’effet d’une erreur qui n’est ni négligeable ni inoffensive. autrement dit, à moins que la preuve contre l’accusé soit accablante, sa solidité n’est pas pertinente dans les faits pour l’ap- plication de la disposition réparatrice. par conséquent, les cours d’appel ne doivent pas mêler les éléments de la disposition réparatrice, comme semble le faire la conclusion de nos collègues majoritaires. l’élément relatif à l’erreur inoffensive porte principalement sur la question de savoir si une cour d’appel peut conclure sans craindre de se tromper que l’erreur judiciaire n’a pas eu d’incidence sur le verdict. à notre avis, il n’est pas possible d’avoir cette certitude. [135] thirdly, the misapplication of s. 276 was compounded by the trial judge’s reliance on the preg- nancy as corroborative in finding that rv was guilty. this was in error because the trial judge essentially convicted rv on evidence that he was unable to challenge. this is distinct from the trial judge’s cred- ibility findings, with which we take no issue: the complainant was credible, and rv was not. but the probative value of the pregnancy cannot be disentan- gled from the credibility assessments. for example, had rv been able to pursue the cross- examination that we all agree he was entitled to pursue, he may have chosen not to testify at all. in that case, the trial judge would not have been able to make any nega- tive findings about rv’s credibility, irrespective of whether rv’s cross- examination elicited evidence [135] troisièmement, l’application erronée de l’art. 276 a été aggravée par le fait que le juge du procès s’est fondé sur la grossesse comme corrobo- rant la conclusion selon laquelle rv était coupable. il s’agissait là d’une erreur parce que le juge du pro- cès a essentiellement déclaré rv coupable sur une preuve que celui-ci a été incapable de contester. cette erreur est distincte des conclusions du juge du procès quant à la crédibilité, conclusions que nous ne remet- tons pas en question : la plaignante était crédible et rv ne l’était pas. toutefois, la valeur probante de la grossesse ne peut être dissociée des évaluations de la crédibilité. par exemple, si rv avait pu mener le contre- interrogatoire qu’il avait le droit de me- ner, comme nous en convenons tous, il aurait peut- être choisi de ne pas témoigner du tout. dans cette [2019] 3 rcs. r c r.v les juges brown et rowe 293 helpful to his defence. again, there are simply too many variables that flowed from the erroneous s. 276 ruling for an appellate court to comfortably invoke the proviso on this evidentiary record. [136] finally, and moving forward, the majority’s approach to the application of the proviso appears to turn the proviso on its head. its reasons suggest that, in the face of a legal error, a new trial should only be ordered if the appellate court can be certain that the trial would have gone differently. however, where there has been a legal error, the default is to order a new trial; the proviso allows a departure from this default rule only in very narrow circumstances. indeed, a reviewing court must order a new trial un- less it is satisfied that the result could not have been different absent the legal error. hypothèse, le juge du procès n’aurait pas été capable de tirer de conclusions négatives sur la crédibilité de rv, et ce, que son contre- interrogatoire de la plaignante ait ou non permis d’obtenir des éléments de preuve utiles à sa défense. encore une fois, il y a tout simplement trop de variables qui ont découlé de la décision erronée fondée sur l’art. 276 pour qu’une cour d’appel puisse aisément invoquer la disposition réparatrice sur le fondement du dossier de preuve en l’espèce. [136] enfin, l’approche de nos collègues à l’égard de l’application de la disposition réparatrice semble dénaturer celle-ci. leurs motifs laissent entendre que, en présence d’une erreur judiciaire, un nouveau procès devrait être ordonné seulement si la cour d’appel est certaine que l’issue du procès aurait été différente. or, lorsqu’il y a eu erreur judiciaire, la tenue d’un nouveau procès est ordonnée par défaut; la disposition réparatrice permet une dérogation à cette règle seulement dans des circonstances très précises. de fait, la cour de révision doit ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès sauf si elle est convaincue que le résultat n’aurait pas pu être différent sans l’erreur judiciaire. v conclusion v conclusion [137] given the interests the proviso protects, we cannot invoke it here. the errors were neither minor nor harmless. they were significant. the cumulative effect deprived rv not so much of the right to ask particular questions, or hear particular responses, as the majority finds, but to engage in a process of questioning, protected by both the charter and the common law. [137] vu les intérêts que protège la disposition réparatrice, nous ne pouvons pas l’invoquer en l’es- pèce. les erreurs n’étaient ni négligeables ni inof- fensives. elles étaient graves. l’effet cumulatif de ces erreurs a privé rv non pas tant du droit de poser des questions en particulier ou d’entendre des réponses en particulier, comme le concluent les juges majoritaires, mais de celui de mener un processus d’interrogatoire, protégé à la fois par la charte et par la common law. [138] the right to present one’s case cannot, con- stitutionally, be curtailed in the absence of an assur- ance that the curtailment is clearly justified by even stronger contrary considerations (see seaboyer, at pp 620-21). this takes on even greater importance when the evidence of the complainant and accused person are diametrically opposed in every material respect, leaving credibility as the central issue at trial (see r v. crosby, [1995] 2 scr 912, at para 12). [138] le droit de toute personne d’exposer sa cause ne peut, sur le plan constitutionnel, être restreint sans une garantie que cette restriction est clairement justifiée par des considérations contraires encore plus importantes (voir seaboyer, p. 620- 621). cela est d’autant plus important lorsque la version de la plaignante et celle de l’accusé sont diamétralement opposées sur tous les points importants et que la crédibilité est donc l’élément central du procès (voir 294 r v r.v brown and rowe jj. [2019] 3 scr. the truth is that none of us know what evidence rv. may have elicited had a proper s. 276 ruling been made in advance of trial. [139] this is, after all, what divides us. cross- examination, being the primary vehicle through which rv could make full answer and defence, was re- stricted in a manner not consistent with the purpose behind s 276. as a result, rv was denied a fair trial. we would dismiss the appeal and affirm the court of appeal’s order that a new trial be directed. r c. crosby, [1995] 2 rcs 912, par 12). la vérité est qu’aucun d’entre nous ne sait quelle preuve rv. aurait obtenue si une décision appropriée fondée sur l’art. 276 avait été prise avant le procès. [139] en somme, c’est ce qui nous divise. le contre- interrogatoire — qui était le principal moyen par lequel rv pouvait présenter une défense pleine et entière — a été restreint d’une manière qui n’est pas conforme à l’objet qui sous- tend l’art 276. par conséquent, rv s’est vu privé d’un procès équi- table. nous sommes d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi et de confirmer la décision de la cour d’appel d’ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès. appeal allowed, brown and rowe jj. dissenting. pourvoi accueilli, les juges brown et rowe sont dissidents. procureur de l’appelante : procureure générale ontario, toronto. de l’ontario, toronto. procureurs de l’intimé : dawe & dineen, toronto; toronto; addario law group, toronto. addario law group, toronto. association of canada: allen/mcmillan litigation counsel, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana­ dienne contre la violence : allen/mcmillan litigation counsel, vancouver. yers’ association of ontario:  henein hutchison, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association of ontario : henein hutchison, toronto.
[1] this case concerns a common law rule (the “anti-deprivation rule”) that operates to prevent contracts from frustrating statutory insolvency schemes. chandos construction ltd (“chandos”) entered into a construction contract (“subcontract”) with capital steel inc. (“capital steel”). a provision of the subcontract would award chandos a sum of money in the event of capital steel’s bankruptcy, which later occurred this case deals with whether that provision was invalid by virtue of the anti-deprivation rule. [2] i conclude that it is, essentially for the reasons of the majority of the court of appeal of alberta. accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. i. facts [3] chandos, a general construction contractor, entered into the subcontract with capital steel, a subcontractor. the value of the subcontract was $1,373,30047. the provision at issue is in clause vii q, one of the “conditions” of the subcontract: q subcontractor ceases operation in the event the subcontractor commits any act of insolvency, bankruptcy, winding up or other distribution of assets, or permits a receiver of the subcontractor’s business to be appointed, or ceases to carry on business or closes down its operations, then in any of such events: (a) this subcontract agreement shall be suspended but may be reinstated and continued if the contractor, the liquidator or trustee of the subcontractor and the surety, if any, so agree if no agreement is reached, the subcontractor shall be considered to be in default and the contractor may give written notice of default to the subcontractor and immediately proceed to complete the work by other means as deemed appropriate by the contractor, and (b) any cost to the contractor arising from the suspension of this subcontract agreement or the completion of the work by the contractor, plus a reasonable allowance for overhead and profit, will be payable by the subcontractor and or his sureties, and (c) the contractor is entitled to withhold up to 20% of the within subcontract agreement price until such time as all warranty and or guarantee periods which are the responsibility of the subcontractor have expired and, (d) the subcontractor shall forfeit 10% of the within subcontract agreement price to the contractor as a fee for the inconvenience of completing the work using alternate means and/or for monitoring the work during the warranty period. (a. r., at p 157) [4] this clause provides four consequences that follow from the insolvency, bankruptcy, or cease of business of capital steel. first, clause vii q(a) provides that the subcontract will be suspended and can only be continued if the trustee in bankruptcy and chandos agree. second, clause vii q(b) provides that capital steel will pay chandos “any cost . . arising from the suspension” of the subcontract or from chandos having to complete the work, plus a “reasonable allowance for overhead and profit” third, clause vii q(c) allows chandos to withhold certain funds from capital steel until the warranty and guarantee periods run out fourth, clause vii q(d) provides that capital steel will pay chandos 10 percent of the subcontract price “as a fee for the inconvenience and/or for monitoring the work”. [5] when capital steel filed an assignment in bankruptcy prior to completing its subcontract with chandos, deloitte restructuring inc. was appointed as its trustee in bankruptcy at the time, chandos owed capital steel $149,618.39 under the subcontract. chandos argued that it was entitled to set off $22,800  the costs it had incurred to complete capital steel’s work  such that it would owe capital steel only $126,818.39 ($149,618.39 less $22,800). in so arguing, chandos did not have to rely on clause vii q as it could rely on the ordinary common law rules relating to damages for breach of contract and the law of set-off, which persists in bankruptcy under s 97(3) of the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3 (“bia”). [6] chandos argued that it was also entitled to set off the amount triggered by the bankruptcy according to clause vii q(d), under which capital steel forfeits 10 percent of the subcontract price in the event of insolvency. the subcontract price was $1,373,300.47, so, by its terms, clause vii q(d) created a debt owed by capital steel to chandos of $137,33005. if clause vii q(d) applied, it would mean chandos had a $10,511.66 claim provable in bankruptcy proceedings rather than a debt to capital steel of $126,81839. [7] faced with these arguments, the trustee applied for advice and directions from the court of queen’s bench as to whether clause vii q(d) was valid. ii. judgments below [8] the application judge found the provision to be valid (alta qb,. edmonton, 242169632, 17 march 2017). he concluded that, so long as the provision was not an attempt to avoid the effect of bankruptcy laws, the anti-deprivation rule does not prevent contracting parties from agreeing that upon the insolvency of one party, the other party can make a liquidated damages claim he found that, in this case, chandos had not attempted to avoid the effect of bankruptcy laws he also found that the provision was a (valid) liquidated damages clause, not an (invalid) penalty clause. [9] on appeal, the majority of the court of appeal reversed the decision, finding the provision invalid (2019 abca 32, 438 dlr (4th) 195). [10] as rowbotham ja, for the majority, explained, whether a provision is a liquidated damages clause or a penalty clause is a separate and distinct analysis from whether the provision violates the anti-deprivation rule. a provision can be invalid if it violates either the anti-deprivation rule or the penalty clause rule. [11] justice rowbotham’s reasons proceeded in three stages first, she identified the long history of the anti-deprivation rule in canadian jurisprudence. second, she found that the rule has not been eliminated by either subsequent decisions or by statutory amendments. finally, she determined that the content of the rule should remain as articulated in the canadian jurisprudence rather than adopt the approach taken by the united kingdom supreme court in belmont park investments pty ltd v bny corporate trustee services ltd., [2011] uksc 38, [2012] 1 ac. 383 (“belmont park”, earlier know as “perpetual trustee”). [12] as rowbotham j.a explained, the common law has two distinct rules that both invalidate contracts that affect the distribution of proceeds in bankruptcy, although they had earlier been combined under the moniker of a “fraud upon the bankruptcy law”. the rules do not stand on their own, but rather exist to give effect to an implicit prohibition in bankruptcy legislation first, the pari passu rule forbids contractual provisions that would allow certain creditors to receive more than their fair share it does not matter whether the provision is triggered by insolvency or bankruptcy, so long as it would alter the scheme of distribution after proceedings begin second, the anti-deprivation rule prevents parties from agreeing to remove property from a bankrupt’s estate that would otherwise have vested in the trustee. it invalidates provisions that are “engaged by a debtor’s insolvency and remove value from the debtor’s estate to the prejudice of creditors” (para 32) put another way, although both rules concern creditors receiving an appropriately-sized slice of the proverbial pie, the anti-deprivation rule relates to the size of the pie and the pari passu rule relates to the slicing of the pie, whatever size it may be (see r goode, “perpetual trustee and flip clauses in swap transactions” (2011), 127 lqr 1, at p. 4). [13] justice rowbotham concluded that both rules have been applied in canadian jurisprudence she cited a.n bail co v gingras, [1982] 2 scr 475, at para 23, as an application of the pari passu rule, and the following cases as examples of the application of the anti-deprivation rule: canadian imperial bank of commerce v. bramalea inc. (1995), 33 o.r (3d) 692 (“bramalea”); in re hoskins and hawkey, insolvents (1887), 1 oar 379; re wetmore, [1924] 4 dlr 66 (nbsc (app div.)); westerman (bankrupt), re, 1998 abqb 946, 234 ar 371, rev’d on other grounds 1999 abqb 708, 275 a.r 114; re knechtel furniture ltd. (1985), 56 cbr (ns) 258 (ont. sc);. re frechette (1982), 138 dlr (3d) 61 (que sup ct.); aircell communications inc. (trustee of) v. bell mobility cellular inc., 2013 onca 95, 14 cbr (6th) 276, at paras 10-12; hgc v ieso, 2019 onsc 259, at para. 100 (canlii); 1183882 alberta ltd v valin industrial mill installations ltd., 2012 abca 62, 522 ar 285 (per mcdonald ja, dissenting). [14] justice rowbotham identified no cases where the anti-deprivation rule had been eliminated she considered coopérants, mutual life insurance society (liquidator of) v. dubois, [1996] 1 scr 900 (“coopérants”), because, even though it involved a contractual provision triggered by liquidation, this court did not discuss the anti-deprivation rule she noted, however, that there was no evidence the provision at issue prejudiced creditors, so the anti-deprivation rule would not have been engaged. [15] justice rowbotham also found that no statutory changes had eliminated the anti-deprivation rule, either explicitly or by negative implication, as when parliament occupies the field. the only changes that might arguably be relevant were to the bia. they, however, addressed a different problem than that addressed by the anti-deprivation rule: whereas the anti-deprivation rule protects creditors, the changes in question protect debtors. [16] one such change came when parliament enacted ss. 65.1 and 66.34 of the bia. these sections invalidate contractual provisions triggered by insolvency in both commercial and consumer restructurings parliament’s focus was on ensuring that debtors have time necessary to restructure their affairs. there was no suggestion that these sections were meant to affect the anti-deprivation rule, which is aimed at protecting the interest of creditors. [17] similarly, when parliament enacted s 84.2 of the bia, it intended to protect consumer debtors from the deleterious consequences of provisions that trigger upon bankruptcy, not to protect one creditor from a debtor’s contract with another creditor. [18] justice rowbotham concluded that in none of these instances did parliament intend to occupy the field and eliminate the anti-deprivation. [19] next, rowbotham j.a considered whether to follow the u.k supreme court’s approach to the anti-deprivation rule in belmont in belmont, the uk. supreme court concluded that the anti-deprivation rule does not apply to “bona fide commercial transactions which do not have as their predominant purpose, or one of their main purposes, the deprivation of the property of one of the parties on bankruptcy” (para. 104). [20] justice rowbotham declined to follow belmont she noted that this purpose-based test was contrary to the effects-based test applied by canadian courts, and that this new test had been criticized by british legal scholars as defeating the purpose of the anti-deprivation rule. she further noted that a party who might become insolvent has no incentive to resist a clause that directs property out of its estate upon insolvency, since, upon that event, the insolvent party will no longer have an interest in that property. [21] finally, rowbotham ja applied the common law anti-deprivation rule to clause vii q(d). she determined that this clause triggered upon insolvency and that giving effect to it would remove value from the debtor’s estate to the prejudice of creditors. the clause was therefore invalid. [22] justice wakeling dissented in his view, the anti-deprivation rule has never existed in canadian common law or, if it did, it ceased to exist after amendments to the bia and the companies’ creditors arrangement act, rsc 1985, c. c-36, in 2009. even if it did exist, he would have adopted the purpose-based test from belmont these conclusions were advanced by chandos before this court. justice wakeling also would have reformulated the penalty rule given my conclusions as to the anti-deprivation rule, i do not address the penalty rule. iii. issues on appeal [23] on appeal before us, chandos alleges the majority at the court of appeal made five errors, by: a) emphasizing bankruptcy law over contract law; b) failing to abandon the classic penalty rule of contract law; c) finding an anti-deprivation rule exists at common law; d) applying an effects-based anti-deprivation rule; and e) failing to consider the effect of set off. [24] the first issue is readily dealt with: contract law and bankruptcy law work together, in this instance through the operation of the anti-deprivation rule. the second issue can also be disposed of summarily: if the provision is invalid for one reason (the anti-deprivation rule in bankruptcy law), it does not matter whether it is or is not invalid for another (the penalty rule in contract law) i will discuss the other issues below. iv the existence of the common law anti-deprivation rule [25] as to the existence of the anti-deprivation rule, i see no error in rowbotham ja’s consideration of this issue, in that the rule has existed in canadian common law and has not been eliminated by either this court or parliament. [26] justice rowbotham correctly found that there has been support for the anti-deprivation rule in the decisions to which she referred; i would add watson v. mason (1876), 22 gr. 574 (uc. ch.) and hobbs v. the ontario loan and debenture company (1890), 18 scr 483, at p 502 (per strong j.), even if hobbs is from a period in canadian history where no federal bankruptcy legislation existed (r j. wood, bankruptcy and insolvency law (2nd ed. 2015), at pp. 33-35). [27] no decision of this court has eliminated the anti-deprivation rule. coopérants, as rowbotham ja stated, was not an anti-deprivation case as there was no deprivation (coopérants, at paras. 43-44). [28] nor has parliament eliminated the anti-deprivation rule as rowbotham ja observed, parliament did not implement ss. 65.1, 66.34, or 84.2 of the bia so as to eliminate the anti-deprivation rule: the anti-deprivation rule protects third party creditors, whereas parliament’s changes were directed toward protecting debtors (see bill c-22: clause by clause analysis, cl. 87, s 65.1 and cl. 89, s 66.34, reproduced in the attorney general of canada’s book of authorities, at tab 4; standing senate committee on banking, trade and commerce, debtors and creditors sharing the burden: a review of the bankruptcy and insolvency act and the companies’ creditors arrangement act (2003), at pp. 74-75). this goal of protecting the debtor is relevant only where the debtor persists after the proceedings conclude. it is common for the debtor to persist after a restructuring or after the bankruptcy of a natural person it is uncommon for the debtor to persist after a corporate bankruptcy as, typically, no assets remain for the corporation after all creditors are paid. [29] moreover, as the intervenor attorney general of canada submitted, parliament’s actions are better understood as gradually codifying limited parts of the common law rather than seeking to oust all related common law as this court has repeatedly observed, parliament is presumed to intend not to change the existing common law unless it does so clearly and unambiguously (parry sound (district) social services administration board v. opseu,. local 324, 2003 scc 42, [2003] 2 scr 157, at para. 39; heritage capital corp. v. equitable trust co., 2016 scc 19, [2016] 1 scr 306, at paras. 29-30). [30] indeed, the most relevant statutory provision in the bia is not s 65.1, s 66.34, or s 84.2, but rather s 71 as this court recognized in royal bank of canada v. north american life assurance co., [1996] 1 scr 325, s 71 provides that the property of a bankrupt to “passes to and vests in the trustee” (para. 44). this helps maximize the “global recovery for all creditors” in accordance with the priorities set out in the bia (alberta (attorney general) v moloney, 2015 scc 51, [2015] 3 scr 327, at para 33; see also husky oil operations ltd v. minister of national revenue, [1995] 3 scr 453, at paras 7-9) the anti-deprivation rule renders void contractual provisions that would prevent property from passing to the trustee and thus frustrate s 71 and the scheme of the bia. this maximizes the assets that are available for the trustee to pass to creditors. v the content of the anti-deprivation rule [31] as bramalea described, the anti-deprivation rule renders void contractual provisions that, upon insolvency, remove value that would otherwise have been available to an insolvent person’s creditors from their reach. this test has two parts: first, the relevant clause must be triggered by an event of insolvency or bankruptcy; and second, the effect of the clause must be to remove value from the insolvent’s estate. this has been rightly called an effects-based test. [32] chandos submits that this court should change the anti-deprivation rule to follow belmont and adopt a purpose-based test. as noted above, belmont held that the english anti-deprivation rule does not invalidate provisions of “bona fide commercial transactions which do not have as their predominant purpose, or one of their main purposes, the deprivation of the property of one of the parties on bankruptcy”. chandos says we should follow this reasoning because upholding bona fide commercial agreements would strike the best balance of public policy considerations and contribute to commercial certainty it also submits that the side- effects of such a rule would not be so deleterious, as unsecured creditors tend to receive little in bankruptcy; as well, courts would be able to tell who had inserted provisions that remove value from the debtor’s estate for bona fide commercial reasons. none of these reasons holds water. [33] the goal of public policy, in this instance, is not decided by the common law; rather, that policy has been established in the legislation what is left to the common law is the choice of means that best gives effect to the statutory scheme adopted by parliament thus, once a court ascertains that parliament intended, by virtue of s 71, that all of the bankrupt’s property is to be collected in the trustee, it is not for the court to substitute a competing goal that would give rise to a different result in this, i agree with professor worthington that “[a]ny avoidance, whether intentional or inevitable, is surely a fraud on the statute” (“good faith, flawed assets and the emasculation of the uk anti-deprivation rule” (2012), 75 mlr 112, at p. 121). [34] in addition, i would disagree that adopting a purpose-based test would create commercial certainty to the contrary, applying such a test would require courts to determine the intention of contracting parties long after the fact and it would detract from the efficient administration of corporate bankruptcies parties cannot know at the time of contracting whether a court, possibly years later, will find their contract had been entered into for bona fide commercial reasons. this will give rise to uncertainty at the time of contracting. [35] the effects-based rule, as it stands, is clear courts (and commercial parties) do not need to look to anything other than the trigger for the clause and its effect the effect of a clause can be far more readily determined in the event of bankruptcy than the intention of contracting parties. an effects-based approach also provides parties with the confidence that contractual agreements, absent a provision providing for the withdrawal of assets upon bankruptcy or insolvency, will generally be upheld maintaining an effects-based test is also consistent with the existing effects-based test recognized in gingras, at p 487, for the pari passu rule founded on s 141 of the bia (previously s 112 of the bankruptcy act, rsc 1970, c. b-3), as well as the effects-based test set out in ss. 65.1, 66.34 and 84.2 of the bia. these tests should remain consistent to prevent duplicative proceedings and avoid arcane disputes over whether the pari passu rule or the anti-deprivation rule is engaged by a particular provision. although it is often easy to tell that a provision would affect the amount a creditor will receive, determining whether this is because it deprives the estate of value (thus violating the anti-deprivation rule) or because it reallocates the estate among creditors (thus violating the pari passu rule) depends on the precise machinery of law, disputes over such intricacies can be avoided if both rules apply an effects-based test. [36] moreover, an intention-based test would encourage parties who can plausibly pretend to have bona fide intentions to create a preference over other creditors by inserting such clauses parties will often be able to state some commercial rationale for provisions altering contractual rights in the event of a counterparty’s insolvency, such as guarding against the risk of the counterparty’s non-performance an intention-based test would render the rule ineffectual, save in the most flagrant cases of deliberate circumvention of insolvency law this would threaten to undermine the statutory scheme of the bia. [37] reliance on general principles of contractual freedom to support an intention-based test is no less misplaced as noted in bhasin v. hrynew, 2014 scc 71, [2014] 3 scr 494, at para. 70, the common law of contract “generally places great weight on the freedom of contracting parties to pursue their individual self- interest” but, by definition, an assignment in bankruptcy strips the insolvent party of their interest. as rowbotham ja observed, a party who might become insolvent has no incentive to resist a clause that deprives their estate of value upon bankruptcy. parties do not negotiate with a view to protecting the interests of their creditors in the event of their bankruptcy. the costs of accepting the clause are borne solely by the unsecured creditors of the insolvent company (who are without a seat at the bargaining table) while the benefits are enjoyed only by the company while it is solvent. [38] finally, while it may be true that unsecured creditors tend to receive relatively little now, the effect of a purpose-based rule is that they would receive less. [39] overall, chandos has not shown us good reason to adopt a purpose-based test in my view, adopting the purpose-based test would create “new and greater difficulties” of the sort cautioned against in watkins v. olafson, [1989] 2 scr 750, at p 762 as recognized in bhasin, at para 40, although a change to the canadian common law may be appropriate when it creates greater certainty and coherence, it is not when the change would foster uncertainty and incoherence. [40] all that said, we should recognize that there are nuances with the anti- deprivation rule as it stands for example, contractual provisions that eliminate property from the estate, but do not eliminate value, may not offend the anti- deprivation rule (see belmont, at para 160, per lord mance; borland’s trustee v. steel brothers & co limited, [1901] 1 ch 279; see also coopérants) nor do provisions whose effect is triggered by an event other than insolvency or bankruptcy. moreover, the anti-deprivation rule is not offended when commercial parties protect themselves against a contracting counterparty’s insolvency by taking security, acquiring insurance, or requiring a third-party guarantee. [41] in sum, the court of appeal was correct to consider whether the effect of the contractual provision was to deprive the estate of assets upon bankruptcy rather than whether the intention of the contracting parties was commercially reasonable. vi application and the effect of set-off [42] this brings us to chandos’ final argument concerning the effect of set-off on the application of the anti-deprivation rule in this case. set-off is given statutory approval in s 97(3) of the bia: (3) the law of set-off or compensation applies to all claims made against the estate of the bankrupt and also to all actions instituted by the trustee for the recovery of debts due to the bankrupt in the same manner and to the same extent as if the bankrupt were plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, except in so far as any claim for set-off or compensation is affected by the provisions of this act respecting frauds or fraudulent preferences. as this court described in husky oil, at para. 3, s 97(3) incorporates the provincial law of set-off (and the related civil law concept of compensation) into the federal bankruptcy regime. set-off is a defence to the payment of a debt. the effect of set-off is to allow a creditor who happens to be also a debtor to recover ahead of their priority. [43] the bia’s affirmation of set-off and the anti-deprivation rule are not incompatible while set-off reduces the value of assets that are transferred to the trustee for redistribution, it is applicable only to enforceable debts or claims (see, eg,. holt v telford, [1987] 2 scr 193, at pp 204-6) the anti-deprivation rule makes deprivations triggered by insolvency unenforceable the combination means that set-off applies to debts owed by the bankrupt that were not triggered by the bankruptcy. [44] the case at bar is quite different. the chapeau of clause vii q provides that the clause triggers “[i]n the event [capital steel] commits any act of insolvency, bankruptcy, winding up or other distribution of assets” since, here, the clause was triggered by bankruptcy, the threshold for considering the anti-deprivation rule had been met.1 clause vii q(d) itself provides the deprivation: “[capital steel] shall forfeit 10% of the within subcontract agreement price to [chandos] as a fee” the 1 whether clause vii q (d) would have been enforceable if capital steel had stopped operations in other circumstances is not before us and not relevant here (aircell, at para. 12). effect of this provision is to create a debt from capital steel to chandos that would not exist but for the insolvency. it is this “debt” created by clause vii q(d) because of the insolvency that chandos seeks to “set off” against the amount it owed to capital steel. one can hardly imagine a more direct and blatant violation of the anti- deprivation rule. [45] accordingly, i conclude that clause vii q(d) violates the anti-deprivation rule and is thus void. vii conclusion [46] i would dismiss the appeal with costs throughout. the following are the reasons delivered by côté j — i. introduction [47] i have had the advantage of reading the reasons of my colleague, rowe j., and there is much with which i agree in them in particular, i agree that the anti- deprivation rule has a longstanding and strong jurisprudential footing in canadian law and that it has not been eliminated by this court or through legislation however, i write to express a different view on a point of law which is central to the outcome of this appeal in short, my view is that the anti-deprivation rule should not apply to transactions or contractual provisions which serve a bona fide commercial purpose. i reach this conclusion essentially for three reasons. [48] first, my reading of the jurisprudence is that courts applying the anti- deprivation rule in canada have not been content to rest their reasons for decision merely on a finding that the effect of a transaction or contractual provision was to deprive a bankrupt’s estate of value. as i explain below, canadian courts have looked past the effects of the arrangement and inquired into the presence or absence of a bona fide commercial purpose behind the deprivation. [49] second, there is a principled legal basis for retaining a bona fide commercial purpose test. the anti-deprivation rule has its origins in the common law public policy against agreements entered into for the unlawful purpose of defrauding or otherwise injuring third parties unlike the related pari passu rule, the anti- deprivation rule should not be regarded as arising from an implied prohibition in the bankruptcy and insolvency act, rsc 1985, c. b-3 (“bia”). thus, the different legal bases of the two rules explain why the pari passu rule operates regardless of the parties’ intentions while the anti-deprivation rule takes into account the parties’ bona fide commercial purposes. [50] third, as a matter of public policy, the considerations cited in support of an effects-based test are not sufficient to override the otherwise strong countervailing public interest in the enforcement of contracts. a purely effects-based test gives too little weight to freedom of contract, party autonomy, and the “elbow-room” which the common law traditionally accords for the aggressive pursuit of self-interest: see ai. enterprises ltd v bram enterprises ltd., 2014 scc 12, [2014] 1 scr 177, at para. 31. in addition, parliament has occupied much of the ground formerly covered by the common law such that there is a reduced need for a general anti-deprivation rule. indeed, the many statutory protections already in place to safeguard the interests of creditors undermine any perceived policy need to expand the reach of the anti- deprivation rule for that purpose. [51] therefore, like wakeling ja, dissenting in the court of appeal below, i would hold that the anti-deprivation rule does not apply to transactions or contractual provisions which serve a bona fide commercial purpose as the chambers judge (alta qb,. edmonton 24-2169632, march 17, 2017, ar, at pp. 9-10) and the court of appeal (2019 abca 32, 438 dlr (4th) 195, at paras. 55 and 394-97) were unanimous in finding a bona fide commercial purpose behind the contractual provision at issue, i would allow the appeal and restore the order made at first instance. ii background [52] my colleague provides a helpful summary of the essential facts in his reasons, and i am content to rely on it. i will therefore only highlight a few important aspects of the contractual relationships in this case. [53] the appellant, chandos construction ltd., hired capital steel inc to perform important structural steel subcontract work on a condominium project in st. albert, alberta (“subcontract”) the appeal revolves around whether clause vii q(d) (“clause q(d)”) of the subcontract offends the anti-deprivation rule. clause q(d) is reproduced in my colleague’s reasons capital steel also provided a guarantee by which it agreed to repair and make good any defect in its work and all resulting damages that might appear as a result of any improper work: clause iii, “guarantee”, ar, at p 155 in addition, clause vii g of the subcontract required capital steel to indemnify chandos and hold it harmless “from any and all claims, costs, liabilities and causes of action” and for “any loss or damage” caused to chandos or the owner of the condominium project by capital steel or any of capital steel’s subcontractors, employees, agents, licensees, and permitees in carrying out the subcontract. the same indemnity also applied between capital steel and the owner. [54] the stipulated price contract between chandos and the owner-developer, boudreau developments ltd., required chandos to be “as fully responsible to the owner for acts and omissions” of its subcontractors as it was for “acts and omissions of persons directly employed by” it: clause gc 3713 (emphasis in original). chandos also agreed that it would promptly correct defects or deficiencies in the work which appeared during the warranty period at its own expense: clause gc 1234. as well, chandos was obliged to correct or pay for damage resulting from such corrections: clause gc 1235. iii. issues [55] the focus of these reasons is whether the anti-deprivation rule applies regardless of the parties’ bona fide commercial purposes. [56] another issue raised by the parties is whether clause q(d) is a valid liquidated damages provision or an unenforceable penalty clause the chambers judge, justice nielsen, concluded that the clause was a valid liquidated damages provision. that finding was not disturbed on appeal, and i do not see any extricable error of law which would justify appellate interference with it. i therefore decline to address this issue further. iv analysis a. the anti-deprivation rule does not apply where a transaction or contractual provision serves a bona fide commercial purpose [57] before embarking upon an analysis of whether the jurisprudence on the anti-deprivation rule has traditionally included a purpose element, i find it useful to clearly state what i mean by a “bona fide commercial purpose”. [58] the inquiry i propose is primarily objective and centres around the presence or absence of a legitimate commercial basis for a transaction or contractual provision an objective approach dovetails with the approach taken in another important and related area of commercial law, the interpretation of contracts, where “the goal of the exercise is to ascertain the objective intent of the parties”: sattva capital corp. v. creston moly corp., 2014 scc 53, [2014] 2 scr 633, at para. 49. it also parallels this court’s approach to ascertaining the purpose behind commercial transactions in tax characterization cases as this court stated in symes v canada, [1993] 4 scr 695, at p 736: as in other areas of law where purpose or intention behind actions is to be ascertained, it must not be supposed that in responding to this question, courts will be guided only by a taxpayer’s statements, ex post facto or otherwise, as to the subjective purpose of a particular expenditure courts will, instead, look for objective manifestations of purpose, and purpose is ultimately a question of fact to be decided with due regard for all of the circumstances. see also ludco enterprises ltd. v. canada, 2001 scc 62, [2001] 2 scr 1082, at para. 54. [59] obviously, evidence of a lack of subjective good faith is relevant to such an inquiry; however, positive assertions of good faith, while relevant, are not determinative courts applying the anti-deprivation rule should (and do) have due regard to the parties’ objective manifestations of purpose in the case of the anti- deprivation rule, the primary means by which the parties objectively manifest their intentions is through the terms of the contractual agreements by which they bind themselves therefore, careful regard should be had to the terms of the contractual arrangements which are said to offend the anti-deprivation rule. [60] i add that the leading english authority on the anti-deprivation rule also employs a similar approach to determining the purpose behind the transaction or contractual provision at issue: belmont park investments pty. ltd. v. bny corporate trustee services ltd., [2011] uksc 38, [2012] 1 a.c 383, at paras. 74-79, per lord collins; and para. 151, per lord mance. [61] with this understanding in hand, i now turn to consider, as an empirical question, whether courts applying the anti-deprivation rule inquire into the presence or absence of such a purpose. (1) courts applying the anti-deprivation rule inquire into the existence of a bona fide commercial purpose [62] as canadian courts considering the anti-deprivation rule have often had recourse to english jurisprudence on the rule, i begin by briefly looking at whether the english jurisprudence has traditionally included a bona fide commercial purpose test i then turn to a more thorough consideration of the canadian jurisprudence to determine whether canadian courts inquire into the presence or absence of a bona fide commercial purpose when applying the anti-deprivation rule. (a) english jurisprudence [63] i do not intend to undertake an extended review of the english anti- deprivation rule in these reasons. the united kingdom supreme court recently did so in belmont, and i cannot hope to add much of value to the thorough analysis offered in that decision i will therefore confine my general comments on the english jurisprudence to belmont. [64] the respondent, deloitte restructuring inc., argues that belmont “shifted” the english common law from an effects-based test to a purpose-based test for the anti-deprivation rule (rf, at para. 115). however, in my view, belmont recognized that a purpose requirement has always been an element of the english anti- deprivation rule lord collins undertook an extensive review of the english jurisprudence on the anti-deprivation rule: paras. 58-73 he found that, “where the rule has been applied, it has been an almost invariably expressed element that the party seeking to take advantage of the deprivation was intending to evade the bankruptcy rules”: para. 75 further, in the english authorities “where the either . . . or anti-deprivation rule was held not to apply, good faith and the commercial sense of the transaction have been important factors”: para. 77 lord collins was thus able to conclude that the english jurisprudence reflected “an impressive body of opinion from some of the most distinguished judges that, in the case of the anti-deprivation rule, a deliberate intention to evade the insolvency laws is required”: para. 78; see also paras. 152-53, per lord mance. [65] i find lord collins’s review of the english jurisprudence, as well as the conclusions of law he drew from it, to be authoritative characterizations of the english position on the anti-deprivation rule. i therefore cannot accept that belmont’s recognition of a purpose requirement for the anti-deprivation rule was as novel as deloitte suggests. further, as i demonstrate below, the canadian jurisprudence on the anti-deprivation rule also supports the conclusion that a purpose requirement is not a novel feature of the anti-deprivation rule. (b) canadian jurisprudence (i) supreme court of canada jurisprudence [66] while this appeal gives this court its first opportunity to fully consider and apply the anti-deprivation rule, in three previous decisions the court either commented in obiter on this area of the law or considered contractual arrangements which would have been subject to the anti-deprivation rule or the pari passu rule had the contracts in question been governed by the common law on my reading, this court’s jurisprudence favours a bona fide commercial purpose test for the anti- deprivation rule. [67] this court had an opportunity to comment in obiter on the fraud upon the bankruptcy laws principle in hobbs v the ontario loan and debenture company (1890), 18 scr 483 a mortgage provided that the mortgagees leased the mortgaged property to the mortgagor and that the rent was equal to the principal payments under the mortgage. the issue was whether the rights created by the lease were enforceable as against a third party execution creditor. [68] chief justice ritchie (taschereau j., as he then was, concurring) concluded that a sham lease in a mortgage which is not intended to create a bona fide landlord-tenant relationship is void as against assignees in bankruptcy: pp. 486-89. justice strong, as he then was (fournier j., concurring) agreed: pp. 502-3 and 507. however, they disagreed as to the result. chief justice ritchie found that there was a bona fide arrangement because there was no bankruptcy law in force, whereas strong j found that there was not such an arrangement because the principle has wider application outside of bankruptcy: pp. 485-87 and 508-9. [69] the authorities on which ritchie cj and strong j relied were based on the english fraud upon the bankruptcy laws principle chief justice ritchie relied heavily upon the decision of the english court of appeal in ex parte voisey (1882), 21 ch. d 442 (ca), quoting the reasons of lord brett, at pp. 459 and 461: . . . the only way in which it can cease to be a bona fide contract is if it was not intended to be acted upon between the parties at all, and was only a device to evade the bankruptcy laws that would not be what is ordinarily called a fraud, but it would be what is called a fraud upon the bankruptcy laws, that is, an attempt to evade the bankruptcy laws in case of a bankruptcy now that attempted evasion, that want of bona fides with regard to the bankruptcy laws, must exist, if at all, at the moment when the contract is made . . . . the question is whether there was a real honest stipulation between the parties, intended to be acted upon whether there should be a bankruptcy or not, or whether it was a stipulation which they intended to be acted upon only for the purpose of defeating the bankruptcy law. [70] justice strong also relied on ex parte williams (1877), 7 ch d 138 (ca), the ratio decidendi of which he described as being that “any provision by a debtor that in the event of his becoming bankrupt or insolvent there shall be a different distribution of his effects from that which the law provides is void”: p 502. while noting that williams was of limited value due to the lack of bankruptcy legislation in canada, strong j went on to comment favourably upon the english cases which followed it, including voisey. he described the law established by those authorities as being that, if it appears that the tenancy for which a mortgage provides is not intended by the parties to be a bona fide agreement, and is instead a sham or pretence, then such a lease is “void . . . as against the assignees in bankruptcy”: p 503 justice strong adopted these principles, adding that they must have a wider application beyond the bankruptcy context in order to protect third parties more generally. [71] the separate opinion of patterson j is also noteworthy because he stated that the enforceability of the tenancy between the mortgagor and a third party depended in part on the “bona fides of the transaction”: p 543. he noted that the bona fides of a transaction “has usually been tested in england in the light of the bankruptcy law”, and, while canada did not have a bankruptcy law at that time, it did “not therefore follow that the intention with which the lease is made is to be disregarded”: p 543. [72] in my view, the reasons of ritchie c.j and strong and patterson jj. indicate this court’s nearly unanimous obiter approval both of the existence of a general fraud upon the bankruptcy laws principle, even if it could not be applied at the time, and of a bona fide commercial purpose test corresponding to that principle. [73] this court addressed a set of circumstances resembling those governed by the common law anti-deprivation rule in coopérants, mutual life insurance society (liquidator of) v. dubois, [1996] 1 scr 900. mr. dubois and coopérants were the undivided co-owners of two immovables situated in laval, quebec their interests in the immovables were governed by two agreements in which they waived the right to demand a partition of the immovables for 35 years. each agreement also provided that, in the event that one of the parties applied to a court for the appointment of a liquidator for the party’s property, that party’s interest in the immovable in question had to be sold to the counterparty. if the parties did not agree on the price, the defaulting party’s interest would be sold to the counterparty at 75 percent of its fair market value, which was to be determined without regard to the fact that the immovable was held in undivided co-ownership subsequently, coopérants applied to a court for the appointment of a liquidator due to insolvency, and mr. dubois sought to rely on the forced sale clause in their agreements. [74] this court held that the liquidator was bound by the clause because there was no evidence that the contractual method for determining the sale price resulted in a price which was less than fair market value, nor was there any evidence that the clause gave mr. dubois an “unjust preference”: para. 41. [75] i caution against overreliance on coopérants for the purposes of ascertaining the content of a common law rule the agreements at issue were governed by the civil code of lower canada, not the common law, and the court’s comments regarding the enforceability of the clause in question were directed at how a court should exercise its discretion under what is now the winding-up and restructuring act, rsc 1985, c. w-11 nonetheless, coopérants is significant for having recognized the importance of enforcing arrangements which reflect a bona fide commercial purpose the court noted that the clause at issue created an obligation to sell a unique, non-fungible and indivisible property in which mr. dubois, as co-owner, had a specific interest the court also observed that the agreements in which the clause was found included reciprocal obligations between the co-owners, which called for ongoing performance. this court stated that “[i]t is advisable to respect such contracts and ensure that they are as stable as possible”: para. 38 thus, this court acknowledged that the clause at issue served a bona fide commercial purpose which the law should strive to uphold, even if doing so granted a degree of preference over other creditors. [76] finally, this court addressed a set of circumstances resembling those governed by the pari passu rule in an. bail co. v. gingras, [1982] 2 scr 475. a contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor authorized the general contractor to pay the subcontractor’s suppliers directly in order to discharge obligations arising out of a construction project the subcontractor entered into bankruptcy proceedings and the general contractor made use of the provision in question to pay one of the subcontractor’s suppliers, which was a creditor of the subcontractor this court held that in the bankruptcy context such arrangements could not be used to supplant the pari passu distribution scheme in the bia. this was so notwithstanding the general contractor’s good faith. [77] gingras is consistent with the english approach to the pari passu rule. the house of lords held in british eagle international airlines ltd. v. cie nationale air france, [1975] 1 wlr 758 (hl), that the pari passu rule applies where the effect of a contract is that a bankrupt’s assets would be distributed to the bankrupt’s creditors otherwise than in accordance with the bankruptcy laws, notwithstanding the parties’ legitimate commercial purposes however, as i explain in detail below, it does not follow that the anti-deprivation rule must adopt a similar effects-based test. certainly, the united kingdom supreme court did not regard british eagle as precluding it from holding that the english anti-deprivation rule includes a bona fide commercial purpose element: belmont therefore, i do not view gingras as undermining the existence of a bona fide commercial purpose test for the anti- deprivation rule. [78] in summary, hobbs and coopérants include significant obiter dicta which are suggestive of a bona fide commercial purpose test for the common law anti-deprivation rule. gingras neither contradicts those obiter dicta nor departs from the law of england as stated in belmont and british eagle therefore, i am of the view that this court’s jurisprudence favours a bona fide commercial purpose test for the anti-deprivation rule — though, to be clear, this court has not previously bound itself as a matter of stare decisis in this regard. my empirical inquiry must, therefore, live or die on the jurisprudence of the courts that have actually applied the common law anti-deprivation rule. (ii) superior court and appellate jurisprudence [79] on my reading of the jurisprudence, courts applying the anti-deprivation rule in canada have not been content to rest their reasons for decision merely on a finding that the effect of a transaction or contractual provision was to deprive a bankrupt’s estate of value. as i explain below, courts have looked past the effects of the arrangement and inquired into the presence or absence of a bona fide commercial purpose behind the deprivation. in the minority of cases where this discussion has not occurred, the absence of a bona fide commercial purpose has been readily inferable from the circumstances these observations lead me to conclude that a bona fide commercial purpose element has a strong jurisprudential footing in canadian law. [80] the ontario court of appeal, in in re hoskins and hawkey, insolvents (1877), 1 oar 379 (ca), applied the anti-deprivation rule to a lease which provided that upon the insolvency of the tenant, the current year’s rent and the succeeding year’s rent would be due and payable the landlord argued that the additional year’s rent was intended as compensation for his loss of a tenant. if the test the court of appeal applied had been focused solely on the effects of the provision, it would not have had to address this argument. nonetheless, it did. the court rejected the landlord’s argument, noting that it was “discredited by the circumstance that a surrender by a tenant, who had become insolvent, imports advantage rather than loss” for the landlord: p 384 at p 385, the court quoted with approval the decision of lord chancellor redesdale in murphy, a bankrupt (1803), 1 ch. 44, at p 49, which has often been cited in canada: the question is, whether a person can be admitted to prove as a creditor, on the foundation of an instrument contrived for the purpose of defeating the effect of the bankrupt laws; where the only ground of the claim is an instrument executed for the purpose of giving a right against creditors, which would not exist against the bankrupt if he were solvent all the cases in england have held this to be a fraud upon the bankrupt laws, which cannot be supported . . . [emphasis added.] [81] applying murphy, the court of appeal concluded that the provision stipulating the payment of an additional year’s rent to the landlord was invalid in essence, the court found that there was no legitimate commercial purpose for the landlord to receive what would effectively be a gratuitous payment of an additional year’s worth of rent long after the tenancy had come to an end. [82] the same court of appeal applied the anti-deprivation rule to void an agreement in watson v. mason (1876), 22 gr. 574 (uc. ch). a partnership and the creditors of an insolvent business entered into an arrangement which permitted the partnership to purchase the assets of the business, with the stipulation that, upon the insolvency of the partnership, the partnership would then owe the creditors the balance of the business’s unpaid debt. justice burton (as he then was) held that there was no authority to support the validity of an agreement “where the only ground of the claim is an instrument executed for the purpose of giving a right against creditors”: p 588 (emphasis added). justice patterson (then a member of the court of appeal) noted there was no evidence that the partnership had paid a discounted price on the assets in exchange for this quid pro quo and burton ja was of the view that the partnership had paid the full value of the assets, rendering the contingent debt obligation essentially gratuitous when i consider these comments in conjunction with the various judges’ approving citations of english authorities referring to intention or purpose (pp. 583-84, for example), i take the court to have found that there was no legitimate commercial interest in conjuring the insolvent business’s debt into existence upon the insolvency of the partnership after the partnership had already agreed to pay the creditors the full value of the goods which had belonged to the business. [83] the anti-deprivation rule was also applied by meyer j in re frechette (1982), 138 dlr (3d) 61 (que sup ct.) the bankrupt was a shareholder in a private company the shareholders’ agreement provided for a right of first refusal should a shareholder voluntarily wish to dispose of his shares to a third party, and also included a right to purchase the shares of any shareholder who became bankrupt. the agreement further provided that the price to be paid on the forced sale of a bankrupt’s shares was to be 80 percent of the price which would otherwise be paid if the shares were sold voluntarily through the right of first refusal. [84] justice meyer concluded that the provision requiring the sale of a bankrupt shareholder’s shares for 80 percent of their value was contrary to public policy because it granted the shareholders a special reduction in the price to be paid for those shares. if the standard he was applying had looked only to the effects of the provision on bankruptcy, he could have ended his analysis there. however, he went on to consider the shareholders’ purpose in entering into the arrangement. [85] while meyer j accepted that the discount of 20 percent might have been agreed upon in good faith, he considered that it was essentially a gratuitous benefit granted by the shareholders to one another. indeed, he analogized it to a “gift”: p 69. he observed that there “was no evidence before the court as to the existence of any consideration for such a reduction, other than a desire to confer a benefit on one’s fellow shareholders in the event of one’s bankruptcy”: para. 20. in effect, this was a finding that there was no objectively ascertainable commercial interest behind the provision a desire to give gifts to friends is plainly not a legitimate commercial interest which the law should protect over the interests of third party creditors in bankruptcy finally, i note that meyer j quoted and followed an english decision, borland’s trustee v steel brothers & co., limited, [1901] 1 ch 279, the significance of which i examine below when discussing another canadian decision. [86] justice saunders considered the anti-deprivation rule in re knechtel furniture ltd (1985), 56 cbr (ns) 258 (ont sc). the bankrupt, knechtel furniture, had an employee pension plan that had been wound up on the company’s bankruptcy with a surplus of $471,300, after all the beneficiaries had been fully paid in accordance with the terms of the plan the plan stated that in the event of its termination, any surplus would be paid over to the company, provided, however, that, in the event that the company had become bankrupt or insolvent, the surplus would be allocated to the beneficiaries the company’s trustee in bankruptcy argued that the provision entitling the beneficiaries to the funds was contrary to public policy. [87] the beneficiaries argued that the provision had not been inserted to defeat the bankrupt’s creditors they submitted that its purpose was to provide additional benefits to employees who would probably suffer great hardship if the plan were to be wound up after the company became bankrupt in other words, they argued that the provision had a bona fide commercial purpose justice saunders rejected this argument, not because he regarded it as irrelevant to his analysis, but rather because he found it “difficult to see why the hardship would necessarily be any less if the plan had been terminated when knechtel was solvent”: p 264. in other words, he did not accept that there was a legitimate commercial interest in giving the beneficiaries what would amount to gratuitous pension benefits. he observed that the beneficiaries had already been paid their benefits in full under the plan, and that, if the plan had been terminated while the company was solvent, the beneficiaries would have had no entitlement to the surplus as enforcing the provision would redirect funds which would otherwise have gone into the bankrupt’s estate, the provision was contrary to public policy. [88] the anti-deprivation rule was also considered by blair j (as he then was) in canadian imperial bank of commerce v. bramalea inc. (1995), 33 or (3d) 692 (cj (gen. div)). bramalea and the canadian imperial bank of commerce were in a partnership formed to develop and operate a shopping mall a clause in their partnership agreement provided that, in the event of the insolvency of one of the partners, the solvent partner could purchase the insolvent partner’s interest at the lesser of book value or fair market value bramalea entered into bankruptcy proceedings, and the bank sought to exercise its right under the partnership agreement. the book value of bramalea’s interest was estimated at $200,000, and the evidence suggested that the fair market value might exceed the book value by as much as $2 million to $3 million. thus, the clause would have given the bank a rather staggering discount on the value of bramalea’s partnership interest justice blair neither expressly accepted nor rejected these figures for the fair market valuation, but he did find that the difference in price was “more than minimal”: p 694. [89] justice blair stated that it was “clear from the provisions of the partnership agreement itself that the parties had contemplated a transfer to one of the partners of the other partner’s partnership interest, solely in the event of insolvency of the latter, at a price which was less than what could be obtained for that interest on the market”: p 695 although he was at pains to point out that there was no suggestion of a fraudulent or dishonest intent in this case, he also observed that the parties had intended to sell an asset at an undervalue. as a result, he found that the clause was contrary to public policy thus, while blair j did not expressly discuss whether there was an absence of an objective commercial purpose, he clearly did engage in a search for an objective purpose. [90] in addition, i take blair j.’s statement that the rule encompasses “fraud in the effect” as meaning no more than that a subjective intent to defraud the bankrupt’s creditors does not have to be shown in order for the anti-deprivation rule to apply: p 694 in belmont, lord mance explained that references in the jurisprudence to “fraud” of the bankruptcy law are not references to fraud “in a strict sense” or to “morally opprobrious” conduct: para. 151 lord brett also made this point clear at p 459 of voisey. thus, a showing of subjective dishonesty or deceit is unnecessary. however, lord mance, at para. 151 of belmont, and lord brett, at p 461 of voisey, both held that the anti-deprivation rule requires an assessment of whether there was a legitimate purpose behind a transaction i see nothing contradictory in holding that deceit, dishonesty, or impropriety need not be shown, while also holding that the anti- deprivation rule does not apply to transactions or contractual provisions which serve a bona fide commercial purpose i therefore do not see blair j.’s comments regarding “fraud in the effect” as inconsistent with the view i put forward. [91] further, blair j., at p 695, like meyer j in frechette, at p 68, quoted directly from the english case of borland, in which farwell j stated the following in the context of a share purchase agreement: if i came to the conclusion that there was any provision in these articles compelling persons to sell their shares in the event of bankruptcy at something less than the price that they would otherwise obtain, such a provision would be repugnant to the bankruptcy law . . . . [p 291] this leaves open the question, however, of whether the repugnancy would arise because the provision would amount to a deprivation “in effect”, notwithstanding the parties’ bona fide intentions, or whether the sale at an undervalue would undermine the parties’ claim that they had drafted the provision so as to serve legitimate commercial interests. i think the latter view reflects the better reading of farwell j.’s reasons in borland, to which i now turn. [92] mr. borland was a shareholder in a private company which carried on business in burma the company’s articles of association provided that each of the shareholders was “entitled to continue to hold the shares then held by him or any of them until he should die or voluntarily transfer the same or become bankrupt”: p 281. mr. borland was adjudicated bankrupt, the company attempted to force the sale of his shares, and the trustee of his estate resisted the sale, arguing that the provision was a fraud upon the bankruptcy laws. [93] justice farwell found that the forced sale provision in the articles of association was not contrary to public policy he found that the provision had been inserted bona fide and constituted a “fair agreement for the purpose of the business of the company”: p 291. justice farwell observed that the shares were difficult to value because they came with a number of restrictive clauses that made it “impossible to find a market value” he added that the price offered by the company likely represented the fair value of the shares, given that they were essentially incapable of valuation the same share price applied to all shareholders and applied for sales of shares outside of bankruptcy as well as in bankruptcy. [94] it was in this context that farwell j made the statement quoted by blair j. in bramalea. however, given farwell j.’s observation that the shares were essentially impossible to value, his conclusion that the anti-deprivation rule did not apply depended more on his view that the arrangement was a bona fide commercial agreement than it did on establishing a fixed principle that the absence of evidence of a deprivation was determinative of the rule’s application: see a. ho, “the treatment of ipso facto clauses in canada” (2015), 61 mcgill lj 139, at p 161. therefore, to the extent that the courts in bramalea and frechette followed borland, either they did so on a mistaken view of what it stands for, or (and i prefer this view) implicit in their reasons is the notion that the anti-deprivation rule does not apply to bona fide commercial agreements. [95] the ontario court of appeal relied on bramalea to invalidate a contractual provision in aircell communications inc (trustee of) v bell mobility cellular inc., 2013 onca 95, 14 cbr (6th) 276. aircell and bell were parties to an independent dealer agreement which provided that bell could terminate the agreement on notice if aircell defaulted on its payments to bell for purchases of inventory it further provided that, should the agreement be terminated for specified reasons, bell’s obligations to pay commissions “shall cease immediately”: para. 8. owing to financial difficulties, aircell defaulted on its payments and then entered into bankruptcy proceedings it owed bell $64,000 for inventory, and bell retained $188,981 worth of commissions it owed to aircell as bell was entitled to set-off under the bia, aircell’s trustee brought an action against bell to recover only the difference between the commissions retained by bell and the amounts which aircell owed to bell. the court of appeal found that the clause at issue provided “a windfall to . . . bell”: para. 12. applying bramalea, it held that the clause was unenforceable as contrary to public policy. [96] the court of appeal described the test from bramalea as being essentially effects-based. however, as indicated by my analysis of bramalea above, that is an oversimplification of blair j.’s reasons. further, and i admit that the court did not discuss the case on this basis, it is implicit in the court’s description of the effect of the clause as a “windfall” that the clause was offensive not only because it deprived aircell’s estate of value, but also because there was no legitimate commercial basis in bankruptcy for bell to withhold payments which were in excess of the debt it was owed by aircell. i therefore do not view aircell as inconsistent with my approach. [97] the anti-deprivation rule was considered by registrar quinn in westerman (bankrupt), re, 1998 abqb 946, 234 ar 371, rev’d on other grounds 1999 abqb 708, 275 ar 114. the bankrupt was a party to a partnership agreement which provided that a bankrupt partner could be expelled from the partnership and the partnership would then be obliged to pay that partner only 50 percent of his capital account. registrar quinn found that allowing the partnership to take 50 percent of the bankrupt’s capital account would grant it an unjust preference, as any losses incurred by the partnership as a result of the expulsion of the bankrupt partner were “purely speculative”. he therefore concluded that the partnership was not entitled to retain the funds as registrar quinn did not address the commercial purpose behind the provision, it does not appear that any commercial purpose was offered as the provision was to the effect that the partner’s capital account could be settled at a 50 percent discount in the event of bankruptcy, an objective commercial purpose is not readily apparent. i therefore do not view westerman as authority against my reading of the jurisprudence. [98] in his reasons, registrar quinn expressed the view that coopérants was at odds with bramalea, knetchel, and frechette. however, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, the golden thread weaving its way through the tapestry of the canadian jurisprudence is the presence or absence of an objective commercial purpose behind the agreements under review in coopérants, there was such a purpose, whereas in bramalea, knetchel, and frechette, there was not moreover, the analyses in coopérants, bramalea, knetchel, and frechette went past the question of whether the provisions in question had the effect of removing assets from the debtors’ estates and extended to the legitimacy of the intentions behind them. this is also true of hoskins and, arguably, of watson, as well meanwhile, the more recent authorities applying the rule in which the parties’ purposes are not expressly discussed — westerman and aircell — do not detract from my reading of the jurisprudence because they do not show any intent to break with past precedent and because an absence of a legitimate commercial purpose is discernable on the facts of those cases. [99] in the weight of lower court cases in which the anti-deprivation rule was addressed, the rule has been found not to apply where the provision in question has a bona fide commercial purpose. when i consider this jurisprudence in light of hobbs and coopérants, i am led to the conclusion that a bona fide commercial purpose element has a strong jurisprudential footing in canadian law i therefore cannot accept my colleague’s position that a bona fide commercial purpose test would amount to a change to the existing law: rowe j.’s reasons, at paras. 32 and 39. with respect, it is my colleague’s adoption of a purely effects-based test which represents a break with the past. to declare that an absence of a bona fide commercial purpose is required in order to apply the anti-deprivation rule is to discover the law as it has always been — as it has been handed down to us in the reasoned opinions of the jurists who preceded us. [100] of course, the law could be incrementally developed away from this position. courts may adapt the common law where they deem it necessary to keep the law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of society: see r v. salituro, [1991] 3 scr 654 in my view, when courts consider whether to introduce such innovations to the common law, they should base their decision making on sound legal principles and compelling considerations of public policy. thus, i now turn to consider whether there is a principled legal basis for distinguishing between the pari passu rule, with its effects-based test, and the anti-deprivation rule, with its traditionally purpose-based test. (2) there is a principled legal basis for distinguishing between the anti- deprivation rule and the pari passu rule [101] one of the reasons my colleague cites in favour of an effects-based test for the anti-deprivation rule is that it would be consistent with the test for the pari passu rule: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 35. in my view, however, there is a principled legal basis upon which to distinguish the two rules: the anti-deprivation rule is based on a common law public policy, whereas the pari passu rule is based on an implied statutory prohibition in the bia. [102] the anti-deprivation rule and the pari passu rule form part of a more general and longstanding doctrine in the common law to the effect that an agreement that is contrary to public policy may be struck down as unenforceable: s. m. waddams, the law of contracts (7th ed. 2017), at para. 562. this public policy doctrine has at least two branches: (1) common law public policy; and (2) statutory public policy: waddams, at para. 566. the common law branch concerns agreements struck down on the basis of a judicial apprehension of a public policy interest which outweighs the general public interest in the enforcement of contracts: eg,. shafron v. krg insurance brokers (western) inc., 2009 scc 6, [2009] 1 scr 157, at paras. 15-20. the statutory branch concerns agreements struck down because they are expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute: transport north american express inc. v. new solutions financial corp., 2004 scc 7, [2004] 1 scr 249, at paras. 20-26. on my reading of the jurisprudence, the anti-deprivation rule falls under the common law branch of the public policy doctrine, which includes a policy against agreements entered into for the purpose of defrauding or otherwise injuring third parties i rest this conclusion on the following two observations about the jurisprudence. [103] my first observation relates to the rule’s origins the early english authorities which underpin the canadian anti-deprivation rule routinely described the agreements at issue as fraudulent, dishonest or evasive: see belmont, at paras. 74-79, per lord collins; ho, at pp. 151-52; r. j. wood, “direct payment clauses and the fraud upon the bankruptcy law principle: re horizon earthworks ltd. (bankrupt)” (2014), 52 alta. lr 171, at p 175. lord chancellor eldon held that a term “adopted with the express object of taking the case out of reach of the bankrupt laws” was “a direct fraud upon the bankrupt laws” in higinbotham v. holme (1812), 19 ves. jr. 88, 34 e.r 451, at p 453 justice vaughan williams held that an agreement that a debtor’s interest in property would determine upon their bankruptcy was “evidence of an intention to defraud [their] creditors” in in re stephenson, [1897] 1 qb 638, at p 640 vice chancellor wood stated that “no one can be allowed to derive benefit from a contract that is in fraud of the bankrupt laws” in whitmore v. mason (1861), 2 j & h 204, 70 e.r 1031, at p 1035 lord james described the contractual arrangement which he found void as “a clear attempt to evade the operation of the bankruptcy laws” in ex parte mackay (1873), lr 8 ch. app. 643, p 647; see also voisey¸ per brett l.j and murphy, per redesdale lc, both quoted above the earliest canadian decisions, hobbs, hoskins, and watson, are to similar effect. [104] the reasoning employed by these courts appears to have turned on their apprehension that the arrangements at issue were aimed at an unlawful purpose which approximated fraud, not on a finding that they were impliedly prohibited by statute. the early common law courts applying the rule needed to analogize the public policy ground upon which they based their decisions to an established category, and the comparatively less sophisticated insolvency legislation in force at the time did not provide a basis for invalidating such contracts in my view, this is why the jurisprudence is replete with references to “fraud” and similar terminology. [105] my next observation relates to the mode of reasoning in anti-deprivation rule decisions. if the anti-deprivation rule were based on an implied prohibition in the relevant bankruptcy statute, one would expect both the english and the canadian authorities to turn on an appreciation of parliament’s legislative intent as embodied in the wording of the relevant statute: see j d mccamus, the law of contracts (2nd ed 2012), at pp. 457 and 486 however, on my reading of those authorities, courts considering the application of the anti-deprivation rule have routinely recited the principles and policies articulated in prior authorities with little or no regard for the wording of the relevant statute in force. thus, the rule is more in the nature of a judicially-apprehended public policy than an implied prohibition in the various insolvency statutes which have been enacted and revised throughout the centuries of the rule’s trans-atlantic existence. in this regard, it should be recalled that this court adopted the early english authorities and then extended their reach to cases outside of the bankruptcy context in hobbs, notwithstanding the fact that there was no bankruptcy legislation in force in canada at the time to me, this suggests that the public policy is judicially derived. [106] my view, based on these two observations, is that the anti-deprivation rule falls under the common law branch of the public policy doctrine, which includes a policy against agreements entered into for the purpose of defrauding or otherwise injuring third parties: see mccamus, at p 456; elford v elford (1922), 64 scr. 125; campbell river lumber co. v. mckinnon (1922), 64 scr 396; zimmerman v letkeman, [1978] 1 scr 1097. [107] my colleague appears to take the view that the anti-deprivation rule falls under the statutory branch of the public policy doctrine: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 30. with respect, however, the provision on which my colleague relies, s 71 of the bia, is far from clear in this regard. under s 71, a bankrupt ceases to have any capacity to dispose of or otherwise deal with their property only when a bankruptcy order is made or an assignment into bankruptcy is filed it is not clear from its wording that this provision has any effect on the validity of an agreement entered into before that time this ambiguity is particularly apparent in relation to agreements which qualify the bankrupt’s interest in an asset from the outset, as is the case with condition q of the subcontract. it is a well-established principle that the bia does not grant a trustee any greater interest in a bankrupt’s property than that enjoyed by the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy: giffen (re), [1998] 1 scr 91, at para. 50; lefebvre (trustee of), 2004 scc 63, [2004] 3 scr 326, at para. 37; flintoft v. royal bank of canada, [1964] scr 631, at p 634 the trustee “steps into the shoes” of the bankrupt and takes the bankrupt’s property “warts and all”: saulnier v. royal bank of canada, 2008 scc 58, [2008] 3 scr 166, at para. 50. with respect, my colleague breaks with this principle by, in effect, holding that s 71 converts the bankrupt’s qualified interest in an asset into an absolute or unqualified interest in the hands of the trustee. although the common law may restrict parties’ freedom to qualify a party’s interest in the event of insolvency, there is nothing in the wording of s 71 which purports to do so. [108] nor is the picture made any clearer when one considers the statutory context, which includes numerous provisions indicating that arm’s length bona fide commercial transactions — even transfers of assets at an undervalue — are valid as against the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate: bia, ss. 95(1), 96(1), 97(1) and 99(1). thus, it would appear that parliament’s objective of maximizing “global recovery for all creditors” was not intended to be achieved at the expense of all bona fide agreements which may stand in the way of that goal: alberta (attorney general) v. moloney, 2015 scc 51, [2015] 3 scr 327, at para. 33. at the very least, then, s 71 is ambiguous. [109] courts applying the statutory branch of the public policy doctrine “should be slow to imply the statutory prohibition of contracts, and should do so only when the implication is quite clear”: st. john shipping corp. v. joseph rank ltd., [1957] 1 q.b 267, at p 289 to approach the matter otherwise would introduce significant uncertainty into commercial affairs given the enormous body of statute law in force in modern times indeed, the modern approach to the statutory branch of the public policy doctrine has been to relax the rigidity of the classical doctrine by permitting the enforcement of contracts in appropriate cases even where they contravene the provisions of a statute: still v mnr (ca), [1998] 1 f.c 549, at para. 37; transport north american, at paras. 19-26 therefore, the better approach, in my opinion, is to treat the anti-deprivation rule as falling under the common law branch of the public policy doctrine rather than adopting a strained interpretation of s 71 of the bia. [110] in contrast with s 71, the pari passu provision in the bia, s 141, establishes a very clear bright-line rule that “all claims proved in a bankruptcy shall be paid rateably”: s 141 this was the provision on which this court rested its decision in gingras, and it is substantially similar to s 302 of the companies act, 1948 (uk), 11 & 12 geo. 6, c 38, on which lord cross relied in british eagle. this clear and straightforward statutory language readily supports a conclusion that parliament intended to prohibit a debtor from contracting with creditors for a different distribution of the debtor’s assets in bankruptcy than that provided for in s 141. thus, the pari passu rule falls under the statutory branch of the public policy doctrine. [111] in sum, the reason behind the different tests for the pari passu rule and the anti-deprivation rule lies in the difference in the juridical character of the two rules. the pari passu rule is based on an implied prohibition in the bia that operates regardless of the parties’ intentions, whereas the anti-deprivation rule has its origins in the common law public policy against agreements entered into for an unlawful purpose: see still, at para. 22 there is therefore a principled legal basis for maintaining different tests for the two rules. [112] it remains to be considered, however, whether sufficient policy considerations can be mustered to justify departing from the anti-deprivation rule’s objective purpose test. (3) the weight of public policy considerations favours the bona fide commercial purpose test over the effects-based test [113] the anti-deprivation rule’s common law character does not preclude it from operating in tandem with the bia in support of parliament’s statutory objectives. although the common law and statutory branches of the public policy doctrine are distinct, they are not watertight compartments it is prudent for courts applying the common law branch to take into account the policies embodied in legislation as a reflection of society’s public policy concerns: waddams, at para. 566. therefore, the anti-deprivation rule’s common law character does not preclude a court from taking into account parliament’s objective of maximizing global recovery for all creditors when considering how to formulate the anti-deprivation rule what it does mean, however, is that parliament’s objectives must be weighed against the other policy interests protected by the common law when considering how best to formulate the rule. [114] it may appear that my colleague and i differ on this point however, in my view, our differences in approach flow from our disagreement about the legal nature of the anti-deprivation rule: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 33 if i shared my colleague’s view that the anti-deprivation rule should be understood as an implied statutory prohibition, then i would have no hesitation in agreeing that the inquiry should be more narrowly focused on selecting the test that best gives effect to parliament’s legislative intent. however, i see the anti-deprivation rule as a judicially derived public policy and, as a result, my approach is informed by parliament’s policy objectives as well as by the other interests and values protected by the common law. [115] freedom of contract is the general rule, and it can be displaced only by an “overriding public policy . . . that outweighs the very strong public interest in the enforcement of contracts”: tercon contractors ltd v british columbia (transportation and highways), 2010 scc 4, [2010] 1 scr 69, at para. 123, per binnie j., dissenting, but not on this point. therefore, i see the policy issue as being whether the effects-based test put forward by my colleague or the bona fide commercial purpose test confirmed, in my view, by the existing jurisprudence most accurately reflects the point at which the public policy furthered by the anti- deprivation rule outweighs the public interest in the enforcement of contracts. in my judgment, that point is reached only where there is no legitimate and objectively ascertainable commercial purpose for the deprivation in bankruptcy. [116] the common law “places great weight on the freedom of contracting parties to pursue their individual self-interest”: bhasin v hrynew, 2014 scc 71, [2014] 3 scr 494, at para. 70 the common law even accepts that “a party may sometimes cause loss to another . . . in the legitimate pursuit of economic self- interest”: para. 70 in my view, a purely effects-based test gives too little weight to freedom of contract, party autonomy, and the “elbow-room” which the common law traditionally accords for the aggressive pursuit of self-interest: see ai. enterprises, at para. 31, quoting c. sappideen and p. vines, eds., fleming’s the law of torts (10th ed. 2011), at para. 30120. on the other hand, adopting a purely subjective test may create significant uncertainty by introducing a vague standard which unduly restricts the scope of the anti-deprivation rule. a subjective purpose test would place too little weight on parliament’s objective of maximizing global recovery for all creditors. that is why, in my opinion, the middle path of following the objective bona fide commercial purpose test is the best way to balance freedom of contract, the interests of third party creditors, and commercial certainty. [117] my colleague fears that a purpose-based test would render the anti- deprivation rule ineffective because the rule would apply only in the clearest of cases: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 36. however, as i demonstrated in my discussion of the canadian jurisprudence, there is not a single canadian decision applying the anti- deprivation rule in which an absence of a bona fide commercial purpose could not be discerned from the objective circumstances in the record. indeed, the majority of the courts applying the rule have, in fact, inquired into the objective purpose behind the transaction or contractual provision in question rather than simply resting their decision on its effects i therefore do not agree that retaining the objective purpose element would “threaten to undermine the statutory scheme of the bia”: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 36 further, this court’s jurisprudence establishes that the public policy doctrine “should be invoked only in clear cases”: in re estate of charles millar, deceased, [1938] scr 1, at p 7, quoting fender v st. john-mildmay, [1938] a.c 1, at p 12 a more restricted scope for the anti-deprivation rule is therefore in keeping with this court’s jurisprudence on the public policy doctrine. it is also in line with the modern trend in the english cases, which has been to restrict rather than to broaden the scope of the anti-deprivation rule: lomas v jfb firth rixson inc., [2010] ewhc 3372 (ch.), [2011] 2 bclc 120, at para. 96, aff’d [2012] ewca civ. 419, [2012] 2 all er (comm.) 1076. [118] my colleague also argues that an effects-based test is consistent with the american-style ipso facto provisions in the bia: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 35. these ipso facto provisions state that no one may terminate or amend, or claim an accelerated payment or forfeiture of the term under, any agreement by reason only of a person’s insolvency: bia, ss. 84.2 (individual bankruptcies), 65.1 (corporate proposals) and 66.34 (consumer proposals) i do not regard these ipso facto provisions as analogous to an effects-based test because they apply to contractual terms that are triggered on insolvency, regardless of the terms’ effects the test applied by these provisions is more aptly characterized as trigger-based, not effects- based in addition, as rowe j observes, the statutory ipso facto provisions were enacted for a purpose different than that served by the anti-deprivation rule: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 28 the ipso facto provisions are aimed at protecting debtors; the anti-deprivation rule, by contrast, protects creditors i therefore do not view the statutory ipso facto provisions as relevant statements of public policy on the matter at hand. [119] if regard is to be had to parliament’s policies enacted in the bia, then this court should take notice of parliament’s policy of upholding the validity of arm’s length bona fide commercial transactions that have the effect of giving one creditor a preference over another or of depriving the bankrupt’s estate of value: ss. 95(1)(a), 96(1) and 97(3) in addition, “good faith” continues to play a role in upholding the validity of protected transactions, which occur after the date of the initial bankruptcy event: ss. 97(1) and s 99(1). in my view, these provisions reflect parliament’s policy preference for upholding the validity of bona fide commercial arrangements, even when they have the effect of reducing the pool of assets available to a debtor’s creditors in bankruptcy indeed, it would be a “significant departure from [the] bankruptcy principle to void transactions with a valid commercial purpose based on a mechanical application of a broad principle”, such as the effects-based test favoured by my colleague: m. grottenthaler and e. pillon, “financial products and the anti- forfeiture principle” (2012), 1 j. insolvency inst. canada 139. in this regard, i agree with my colleague that courts should pay close attention to the policies which parliament has enacted through legislation and should not develop the common law in a way that would create “new and greater difficulties”: rowe j.’s reasons, at paras. 33 and 39, quoting watkins v olafson, [1989] 2 scr 750, at p 762. however, it is the adoption of an effects-based test in lieu of the traditional purpose- based test that offends these principles in this appeal. [120] my colleague also states that a purpose-based test gives rise to uncertainty at the time of contracting because parties cannot know if a court will accept their bona fide commercial reasons: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 34. however, given that the bona fide commercial purpose test is objective, purpose is discernable from the objective circumstances at the time of contract formation and can thus be determined just as readily as effects can under the effects-based test. therefore, either standard provides the same measure of clarity in addition, certainty in commercial affairs is typically better served by giving effect to, rather than invalidating, contracts which were freely entered into, particularly when they serve commercial purposes and are not directed at an unlawful objective. [121] i also do not share my colleague’s view that applying a bona fide commercial purpose test would require a significantly more onerous analysis of the parties’ intentions than that entailed by an effects-based test: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 34. an objective assessment of purpose is inescapable on either standard. like the purpose-based test, ascertaining the effects of a provision when applying an effects-based test would require an interpretation of the impugned contractual arrangement. the interpretation of a contract requires an objective assessment of the parties’ intentions: sattva, at para. 49 in addition, a test which requires a court to assess the parties’ bona fides is not new in the realm of commercial law, especially in light of this court’s recognition of a general organizing principle of good faith performance in the common law of contract: bhasin, at para. 33. [122] finally, my colleague argues that the anti-deprivation rule should involve an effects-based test in order to better protect the interests of creditors, because debtors are not properly incentivized to protect their creditors’ interests when dealing with third parties: rowe j.’s reasons, at para. 37 however, one must take into account the full range of options available to creditors to protect their rights for example, the canadian business corporations act, rsc 1985, c. c-44, includes in s 241 what this court has described as a “broad oppression remedy” which provides a “mechanism for creditors to protect their interests from the prejudicial conduct of directors”: peoples department stores inc. (trustee of) v. wise, 2004 scc 68, [2004] 3 scr 461, at para. 51; see also paras. 48-50 i view the oppression remedy, the directors’ duty of care, the various anti-avoidance provisions in the bia and in provincial statutes and the ability of creditors to bargain for contractual protections as alleviating any perceived need to extend the reach of the anti-deprivation rule. [123] in conclusion, i am not persuaded that the policy considerations raised by my colleague are sufficient to override the otherwise strong countervailing public interest in the enforcement of contracts there is a strong jurisprudential basis for concluding that the anti-deprivation rule has always included a bona fide commercial purpose element in canada, and there is a principled legal basis for maintaining this distinct feature of the anti-deprivation rule as compared to the pari passu rule i would therefore hold that the anti-deprivation rule does not apply to transactions or contractual provisions which serve a legitimate and objectively ascertainable commercial purpose. b paragraph (d) of condition q furthers a bona fide commercial purpose [124] nielsen j found that clause q(d) was a genuine pre-estimate of damages. he noted that chandos would incur administration and management costs as a result of capital steel’s bankruptcy and that it was at risk for future liabilities of capital steel. he added that the clause was not an attempt to contract out of the bankruptcy laws he thus found that clause q(d) served a bona fide commercial purpose that finding was not disturbed on appeal, as the court of appeal was unanimous in its view that clause q(d) serves “legitimate commercial interests”: paras. 55 and 394-97. the application of the anti-deprivation rule in this appeal could therefore be dealt with on the basis of the standard of review. [125] however, deloitte urges a different interpretation of the subcontract, which, if persuasive, may call into question nielsen j.’s finding of fact deloitte argues that clause q(d) grants chandos a sum which is essentially gratuitous or duplicative because clause q(b) completely covers all costs to chandos arising from capital steel’s bankruptcy thus, it argues, the 10 percent fee arising from clause q(d) is in addition to the full indemnity of chandos arising from clause q(b). [126] one problem deloitte faces is that the interpretation of a contract is generally considered to be a question of mixed fact and law reviewable on the palpable and overriding error standard: sattva, at para. 50; heritage capital corp. v. equitable trust co., 2016 scc 19, [2016] 1 scr 306, at paras. 21-24. there is an exception which permits correctness review where the contract at issue is “a standard form contract, the interpretation at issue is of precedential value, and there is no meaningful factual matrix . . . to assist in the interpretation process”: ledcor construction ltd v northbridge indemnity insurance co., 2016 scc 37, [2016] 2 scr 23, at para. 24 while we are told that the subcontract is a standard form contract, it is not suggested that it is widely used throughout the construction industry or that the interpretation of clause vii q is of precedential value it is therefore unclear that the interpretation of the subcontract falls within the ledcor exception. i express no firm conclusion on the matter, however, because assuming, without deciding, that the interpretation of the subcontract could be reviewed on the correctness standard, i am not persuaded by the interpretation of clause vii q urged upon this court by deloitte. (1) clause vii q does not permit double recovery [127] the overriding concern when interpreting a contract is to determine the objective intent of the parties and the scope of their understanding the court must “read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract”: sattva, at para. 47. [128] clause q(b) provides that chandos may recover from capital steel “any cost . . . arising from the suspension of this subcontract agreement or the completion of the work by the contractor, plus a reasonable allowance for overhead and profit”. on its face, this appears to be a very broad basis for recovery. however, clause q(d), the clause at issue, adds some ambiguity, because it provides that capital steel “shall forfeit 10% of the within subcontract agreement price to the contractor as a fee for the inconvenience of completing the work using alternate means and/or for monitoring the work during the warranty period.” it might be assumed that the specific matters mentioned in clause q(d) would also fall under the general term in clause q(b) does condition q, then, permit chandos to, in effect, double recover against capital steel? i answer this question in the negative, for three reasons. [129] first, it is apparent from the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the words that clause q(b) applies to different matters than clause q(d) the focus of clause q(b) is on the cost to chandos of completing capital steel’s unfinished structural steel work. by contrast, clause q(d) applies after the work is completed as a fee for, among other things, chandos having to monitor capital steel’s work during the warranty period. as well, clause q(b) applies to the cost to chandos arising from the suspension of the subcontract, whereas clause q(d) covers the inconvenience to chandos specifically of completing the work using alternate means, which would require the reallocation by chandos of significant administrative and managerial resources as well as the reallocation of the risks assumed under the subcontract (eg. condition g, “indemnity”). thus, the matters covered by clause q(d) may be difficult to quantify in monetary terms, and so the parties agreed beforehand on a figure for them, while leaving clause q(b) to cover the more direct and quantifiable costs. [130] second, if the grammatical and ordinary meaning does not resolve the matter, then there is an apparent conflict between clause q(b) and clause q(d). “[w]here there is an apparent conflict between a general term and a specific term, the terms may be reconciled by taking the parties to have intended the scope of the general term to not extend to the subject-matter of the specific term”: bg checo international ltd. v. british columbia hydro and power authority, [1993] 1 scr. 12, at p 24; douez v. facebook, inc., 2017 scc 33, [2017] 1 scr 751, at para. 46. thus, the general grounds for recovery listed in clause q(b) should not be read as extending to the specific matters in clause q(d), that is, “the inconvenience of completing the work using alternate means” and “monitoring the work during the warranty period”. [131] third, a court may deviate from the plain meaning of the words if a literal interpretation of the contractual language would lead to a commercially unrealistic or absurd result: consolidated-bathurst export ltd v mutual boiler and machinery insurance co., [1980] 1 scr 888, at p 901 in my view, permitting double recovery under clause q(b) would be commercially impractical and unrealistic. therefore, clause q(b) should be read so as to avoid such an absurdity. [132] for these reasons, i disagree with the interpretation of condition q advanced by deloitte. the 10 percent fee arising under clause q(d) is not duplicative of the amounts which may accrue under clause q(b) nielsen j.’s finding that clause q(d) furthers a bona fide commercial purpose is, as a result, left unimpeached. nonetheless, it is worth briefly exploring the objective commercial basis for the provision to show why it is important that the law give effect to such a clause. (2) paragraph (d) of condition q advances a legitimate and objectively ascertainable commercial interest [133] in my view, it is significant that the subcontract included ongoing obligations on the part of capital steel that were unperformed at the time of its bankruptcy the bankruptcy of a party with an unperformed or ongoing obligation under a contract is likely to necessitate a commercial rearrangement of rights in order to protect the legitimate interests of the counterparty because the party’s bankruptcy is likely to undermine the counterparty’s assurance of ongoing performance or to change the risk allocation under the contract: grottenthaler and pillon; see also lomas (2010), at paras. 108-10; lomas (2012), at paras. 88-91 there are therefore ample legitimate commercial reasons for rearranging contractual rights in such circumstances. [134] an important element of the subcontract is that it created a general contractor-subcontractor relationship between two parties in the construction industry the construction industry generally operates in a pyramid-like structure, with the owner or developer at the top of the pyramid, a general contractor or contractors one level down, subcontractors under them, and possibly further sub- subcontractors: j. westeinde, “construction is ‘risky business’” (1988), 29 clr. 119. generally, payment flows down the pyramid once the work has been completed. thus, the insolvency of a subcontractor during the construction of a project can have major ramifications up and down the pyramid structure, causing costly delays and fundamentally altering the allocation of risk created by the web of contractual relationships involved. [135] capital steel had significant unperformed obligations under the subcontract at the time of its bankruptcy. it had agreed to “repair and make good any defect in its work and all resulting damages that might appear as the result of any improper work or defective materials” it furnished: clause iii the operative period for this guarantee corresponded to the period specified in the stipulated price contract, which was one year from the date of substantial performance: clause gc 1231. however, capital steel’s bankruptcy occurred before it had even completed its own work under the subcontract, let alone before the date of substantial performance of the entirety of the project therefore, the subcontract was still executory at the time of its bankruptcy. [136] in this case, capital steel’s bankruptcy exposed chandos to significant risks under the stipulated price contract in it, chandos had agreed to be “as fully responsible to the owner for acts and omissions” of capital steel, or a replacement subcontractor, as it was for “acts and omissions of persons directly employed by” it: clause gc 3713 (emphasis in original) chandos had also agreed that it would promptly correct defects or deficiencies in the work which appeared during the warranty period at its own expense: clause gc 1234. as well, chandos was required to correct or pay for damage resulting from such corrections: clause gc 1235. owing to its bankruptcy, capital steel was not available to monitor or correct its work during the warranty period. chandos therefore had to do so or face liability to the owner under the stipulated price contract thus, a fee for monitoring the work during the warranty period is legitimate. [137] a general contractor’s role is essentially to oversee and coordinate the construction of a project by various subcontractors according to a set schedule. it is evident that a subcontractor’s bankruptcy during the construction of the project would require the general contractor to redirect significant administrative and management resources in order to respond, for example by seeking a substitute subcontractor willing to complete a job already partially performed by another company the general contractor would also incur administrative and management costs from mitigating the fallout up and down the pyramid undoubtedly, costly delays would ensue as well thus, a fee for the inconvenience of completing the work using alternate means is also legitimate. [138] as to the quantum of the fee, 10 percent of the subcontract price, nielsen j found as a fact that this was a genuine pre-estimate of damages, and i am content to rely on this finding: ar, at pp. 9-10 in my view, this amount is not extravagant in light of the importance of the structural steel work to the project, the stipulated price contract’s total value of $56,852,453.45, and the fact that the risks reallocated to chandos by capital steel’s bankruptcy were likely difficult to state in monetary terms i do not see in clause q(d) any intent on the part of chandos or capital steel to avoid the operation of bankruptcy laws or to prejudice capital steel’s creditors. there is, therefore, a bona fide commercial purpose behind clause q(d). v conclusion [139] as clause q(d) furthers a bona fide commercial purpose, i would dispose of this appeal by holding that provisions of this kind do not offend the anti- deprivation rule i therefore conclude that clause q(d) is enforceable against the trustee of capital steel’s estate in bankruptcy. as a result, i would allow the appeal and restore the original order made at first instance.
i. introduction la juge martin — i. introduction [1] under the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“code”), anyone who is discharged, pleads guilty to, or is found guilty of an offence under the code or the controlled drugs and substances act, sc 1996, c. 19 (“cdsa”), is required to pay monies to the state as a “mandatory victim surcharge”. the amount is set by law and is owed for each and every summary conviction or indictable offence. the surcharge is intended to fund government programs designed to assist victims of crime. the surcharge applies regard- less of the severity of the crime, the characteristics of the offender, or the effects of the crime on the victim. [1] selon ce que prévoit le code criminel, lrc. 1985, c. c-46, quiconque est absous, plaide cou- pable ou est condamné à l’égard d’une infraction prévue dans le code criminel ou la loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances, lc 1996, c. 19 (« lrcdas »), doit verser à l’état une somme d’argent à titre de « suramende compensatoire obli- gatoire ». cette somme, dont le montant est fixé par la loi, est exigible relativement à chaque infrac- tion punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire ou par mise en accusation. la suramende a pour objet de financer des programmes gouvernementaux d’aide aux victimes d’actes crimi- nels. elle s’applique quels que soient la gravité de l’acte criminel, les caractéristiques du contrevenant ou les effets de l’acte criminel sur la victime. 612 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. [2] judges must impose a surcharge in every case — they have no discretion to waive this surcharge and cannot decrease it. its imposition can only be appealed when the amounts imposed exceed the minimum mandated amount. once the surcharge is levied, an individual remains indebted to the state until the amount is paid in full, although a court may, on application, give the offender more time to pay. [3] many of the people involved in our criminal justice system are poor, live with addiction or other mental health issues, and are otherwise disadvan- taged or marginalized. when unable to pay the vic- tim surcharge, they face what becomes, realistically, an indeterminate sentence. as long as they cannot pay, they may be taken into police custody, impris- oned for default, prevented from seeking a pardon, and targeted by collection agencies. in effect, not only are impecunious offenders treated far more harshly than those with access to the requisite funds, their inability to pay this part of their debt to society may further contribute to their disadvantage and stigmatization. [4] these appeals are concerned with whether the mandatory victim surcharge is consistent with ss. 7 and 12 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (“charter”) and, if not, whether that in- consistency can be justified under s. 1 of the charter. i conclude that the mandatory surcharge amounts to, and operates as, a constitutionally impermissible form of cruel and unusual punishment. consequently, s. 737 of the code violates s. 12 of the charter and cannot be saved under s 1. given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to address s 7. [2] les juges sont tenus d’infliger une suramende compensatoire dans tous les cas; ils n’ont pas le pou- voir discrétionnaire d’en exempter le contrevenant, et ne peuvent pas non plus en réduire le montant. son prononcé ne peut faire l’objet d’un appel que lorsque le montant infligé est supérieur au montant minimum prévu. dès lors que la suramende lui est infligée, l’intéressé reste débiteur de l’état jusqu’à ce que le montant soit payé en entier, bien que le tri- bunal puisse, sur demande, accorder au contrevenant un délai de paiement prolongé. [3] parmi les personnes qui ont des démêlés avec le système de justice criminelle, nombreuses sont celles qui sont pauvres, qui éprouvent des problèmes de dépendance ou d’autres problèmes de santé mentale ou qui sont autrement défavorisées ou marginali- sées. lorsque ces personnes sont dans l’incapacité de payer la suramende compensatoire, celle-ci devient véritablement une peine d’une durée indéterminée. tant qu’elles ne sont pas en mesure de payer, ces personnes risquent d’être mises sous garde policière, emprisonnées pour défaut de paiement, empêchées de demander le pardon et ciblées par des agences de recouvrement. de fait, non seulement les contreve- nants impécunieux sont- ils traités bien plus durement que ceux qui ont accès aux ressources financières requises, mais leur incapacité à s’acquitter de cette partie de leur dette envers la société risque d’ajouter au désavantage et à la stigmatisation qu’ils subissent. [4] les présents pourvois portent sur la question de savoir si la suramende compensatoire obligatoire est compatible avec les art. 7 et 12 de la charte ca- nadienne des droits et libertés (« charte ») et, dans la négative, si cette incompatibilité peut être justifiée en vertu de l’article premier de la charte. j’arrive à la conclusion que la suramende obligatoire constitue une forme de peine cruelle et inusitée inadmissible sur le plan constitutionnel. par conséquent, l’art. 737 du code criminel contrevient à l’art. 12 de la charte, et ne peut être sauvegardé par application de l’article premier. vu cette conclusion, il n’est pas nécessaire d’aborder l’art 7. i would allow the appeals and declare s. 737 [5] invalid, with immediate effect. [5] je suis d’avis d’accueillir les pourvois et de déclarer invalide l’art. 737, avec effet immédiat. [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 613 [6] the reasons that follow are divided into five main parts. the first provides a legislative back- ground to the mandatory victim surcharge the second provides the factual matrices and judicial histories for the cases under appeal. the third section articulates the issues at hand. the fourth section is the analytical one and includes the analysis for ss. 12 and 1 of the charter as well as the analysis of the appropriate remedy in this case. the fifth section provides a conclusion for the reasons. [6] les motifs qui suivent se divisent en cinq par- ties principales : la première présente l’historique législatif de la suramende compensatoire obligatoire; la deuxième expose le cadre factuel et l’historique judiciaire des décisions portées en appel; la troi- sième énonce les questions en litige; la quatrième comprend l’analyse relative à l’art. 12 et à l’article premier de la charte, ainsi que l’analyse de la répa- ration appropriée en l’espèce; et la dernière apporte la conclusion des motifs. ii legislative background ii historique législatif [7] the victim surcharge, formerly known as the victim fine surcharge, was first introduced into the code in 1988. former s 7279(1) of the code stated that the court, at sentencing, “shall, in addition to any other punishment imposed on the offender, or- der the offender to pay a victim fine surcharge”: rsc 1985, c. 23 (4th supp.), s 6. at the time, the amount payable was 15 percent of any fine imposed or such lesser amount as may be prescribed by reg- ulation. the base amounts have changed through the years. since october 2013, the amount of the sur- charge is 30 percent of any fine imposed, or, where no fine is imposed, $100 for every summary con- viction count and $200 for every indictable count: ss. 737(1) and 737(2) of the code. [7] la suramende compensatoire a été introduite dans le code criminel en 1988. l’ancien par 7279(1) du code criminel disposait que le tribunal, au mo- ment de la détermination de la peine, était « tenu en plus de toute autre peine déjà infligée au contre- venant, d’ordonner que le contrevenant verse une suramende compensatoire » : lrc 1985, c. 23 (4e suppl.), art 6. à l’époque, la somme à verser équi- valait à 15 % de l’amende infligée, ou à tout autre montant inférieur prescrit par règlement. les mon- tants d’origine ont été modifiés au fil des ans. ainsi, depuis octobre 2013, le montant de la suramende représente 30 % de l’amende infligée ou, si aucune amende n’est infligée, 100 $ pour chacune des in- fractions punissables sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire et 200 $ pour chacune des infractions punissables sur déclaration de culpabilité par mise en accusation : par. 737(1) et 737(2) du code criminel. [8] the surcharge is levied “for the purposes of providing such assistance to victims of offences as the lieutenant governor in council of the province in which the surcharge is imposed may direct from time to time”: s. 737(7) of the code. [8] les suramendes ainsi prélevées sont « affectées à l’aide aux victimes d’actes criminels en confor- mité avec les instructions du lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil de la province où elles sont infligées » : par. 737(7) du code criminel. [9] in 1988, offenders could avoid the imposition of the surcharge by satisfying the court that “un- due hardship to the offender or the dependants of the offender would result”: (4th supp.), s. 6, intro- ducing s 7279(2). this undue hardship exception was maintained until october 2013, when amend- ments to the code eliminated this judicial discretion: increasing offenders’ accountability for victims act, sc 2013, c. 11 (“2013 amendments”). under [9] en 1988, les contrevenants pouvaient éviter de se voir condamner à une suramende en convainquant le tribunal que « cela [leur] causerait — ou causerait aux personnes à [leur] charge — un préjudice injus- tifié » : (4e suppl.), art. 6, qui crée le par 7279(2). cette exemption en cas de préjudice injustifié a été maintenue jusqu’en octobre 2013, lorsque des mo- difications au code criminel ont éliminé le pou- voir discrétionnaire judiciaire à cet égard : loi sur 614 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. the current provisions, the sentencing judge retains discretion to increase the amount of the surcharge where appropriate, but not to decrease the amount or to waive the surcharge for any reason: s. 737(3) of the code. [10] subsection 737(9) incorporates most of the enforcement mechanisms for other types of fines set out under ss. 734 to 7348. these include the imposition of a deemed period of imprisonment to be calculated in accordance with a specified formula: ss. 734(4) and 734(5). they also include suspending the debtor’s licenses and permits and committing the offender for non- payment without reasonable excuse: ss 7345 and 7347. section 737(9) also adopts s. 736, which allows provinces to establish fine option programs to allow some offenders to do compensatory work in lieu of paying their fines. [11] the imposition of the surcharge cannot be ap- pealed, unless the sentencing judge ordered the pay- ment of more than the statutory minimum: ss. 687(1) and 822(1) of the code. la responsabilisation des contrevenants à l’égard des victimes, lc 2013, c. 11 (« modifications de 2013 »). aux termes des dispositions actuelles, le juge de la peine conserve le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’augmenter le montant de la suramende lorsqu’il le juge approprié, mais il ne peut en réduire le montant ni dispenser le contrevenant de son paiement pour quelque raison que ce soit : par. 737(3) du code criminel. [10] le paragraphe 737(9), quant à lui, intègre la plupart des mesures d’exécution des autres types d’amendes prévues aux art. 734 à 7348. ces me- sures comprennent notamment la période d’empri- sonnement réputée infligée calculée conformément à la formule précisée : par. 734(4) et 734(5). elles prévoient aussi la suspension des licences et permis du débiteur et l’incarcération du contrevenant pour non- paiement sans excuse raisonnable : art 7345 et 7347. le paragraphe 737(9) intègre également l’art. 736, qui donne aux provinces la possibilité d’établir des programmes facultatifs de paiement d’une amende, lesquels permettent à des contreve- nants de réaliser des travaux compensatoires en lieu et place des amendes qui leur ont été infligées. [11] il n’est pas possible d’interjeter appel du pro- noncé d’une suramende, à moins que le juge de la peine n’ait ordonné le paiement d’un montant supé- rieur au minimum prévu par la loi : par. 687(1) et 822(1) du code criminel. iii facts and judicial history iii faits et historique judiciaire in these appeals, seven individuals appeal the [12] rulings from four different applications to challenge the constitutionality of s. 737 of the code. [12] en l’espèce, sept  personnes se pourvoient contre les décisions rendues dans quatre affaires différentes afin de contester la constitutionnalité de l’art. 737 du code criminel. [13] alex boudreault’s application was heard in quebec. he challenged the provision under s. 12 of the charter. the other six appellants brought their applications in ontario. edward tinker, kelly judge, michael bondoc and wesley james mead, heard to- gether, challenged the provision under ss. 7 and 12. garrett eckstein and daniel larocque, in separate applications, challenged the provision under s 12. while they had mixed results before their sentencing [13] dans le cadre de sa demande instruite au québec, alex boudreault a contesté l’art. 737 en se fondant sur l’art. 12 de la charte. quant aux six autres appelants, ils ont présenté leurs demandes aux tribunaux de l’ontario. edward tinker, kelly judge, michael bondoc et wesley james mead, qui ont été entendus ensemble, ont contesté cette même disposition sur le fondement des art. 7 et 12. enfin, garrett eckstein et daniel larocque ont contesté [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 615 judges, the respective courts of appeal rejected the appellants’ constitutional challenges. [14] in what follows, i will set out the facts and decisions below for each of these four cases before turning to the legal analysis that applies to all of them. la disposition en invoquant l’art. 12 dans deux de- mandes distinctes. si les appelants ont eu des succès mitigés devant les juges de la peine, les cours d’appel respectives ont cependant rejeté leur contestation constitutionnelle. [14] dans les paragraphes qui suivent, je rendrai compte des faits et des décisions des juridictions inférieures se rapportant à chacune de ces quatre af- faires, pour ensuite entreprendre l’analyse juridique applicable à l’ensemble d’entre elles. a quebec a québec (1) court of quebec (1) cour du québec (a) alex boudreault, 2015 qccq 8504 a) alex boudreault, 2015 qccq 8504 [15] alex boudreault was 21 years old at the date of sentencing. he had no high school education, having quit school at age 15. he had never held a steady job and he had had no income for almost two years. the most serious crimes for which he was sentenced were committed at a time when he was homeless, unemployed, and addicted to marijuana. [16] mr. boudreault pleaded guilty on septem- ber 23, 2013 to four summary charges of breach of probation. four months later, he also pleaded guilty to seven counts of breaking and entering, one count of attempted breaking and entering, one count of sale of stolen goods, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. he argued that the mandatory victim surcharge con- stituted a s. 12 violation either in his own case or in the case of a reasonable hypothetical offender. the sentencing judge determined that he could exercise his discretion with regard to infractions that occurred before the 2013 amendments. as such, he reduced the surcharge from $4,000 to $1,400. being of the opinion that the $1,400 did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, he dismissed mr. boudreault’s arguments and imposed the surcharge. [15] au moment du prononcé de la peine, alex boudreault était âgé de 21 ans. ayant abandonné l’école à l’âge de 15 ans, il ne possédait aucun di- plôme d’études secondaires. il n’avait jamais occupé d’emploi stable, et n’avait gagné aucun revenu de- puis près de deux ans. les infractions les plus graves pour lesquelles il avait été condamné avaient été commises durant une période où il était sans domi- cile fixe, sans emploi et dépendant de la marijuana. [16] le 23 septembre 2013, m. boudreault a plaidé coupable à quatre infractions sommaires de man- quement à des ordonnances de probation. quatre mois plus tard, il a également plaidé coupable à sept chefs d’accusation d’introduction par effraction, à un chef de tentative d’introduction par effraction, à un chef de recel, à un chef de voies de fait armées et à un chef de possession d’une arme prohibée. monsieur boudreault a fait valoir que la suramende compensatoire obligatoire constitue une violation de l’art. 12, que ce soit à l’égard de sa propre situation ou à l’égard de la situation hypothétique raisonnable d’un autre contrevenant. s’estimant autorisé à exer- cer son pouvoir discrétionnaire à l’égard des infrac- tions commises avant les modifications de 2013, le juge de la peine a fait passer de 4 000 $ à 1 400 $ le montant total de la suramende. puis, estimant que la suramende compensatoire de 1 400 $ ne constituait pas une peine cruelle et inusitée, il a rejeté les argu- ments de m. boudreault et lui a infligé la suramende. 616 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. (2) quebec court of appeal, 2016 qcca 1907, (2) cour d’appel du québec, 2016 qcca 1907 343 ccc (3d) 131 [17] mainville and schrager jja dismissed the appeal, but for separate reasons mainville  ja. opined that the various provisions that give impecu- nious offenders time to pay and that limit the state’s collection options leave the surcharge in compliance with s. 12: para 135. schrager ja, concurring, found that the jurisprudence of this court led to the conclusion that s. 12’s high bar could not apply to a non- carceral sentence. [18] chief justice duval hesler would have al- lowed the appeal and struck down s. 737 for non- compliance with s. 12 of the charter: paras 29-30. since the now- obligatory surcharge applies to every infraction under the code, the chief justice rea- soned, a careful examination of possible hypothetical scenarios was required in order to assess the law’s effects: paras 5-6. for the chief justice, the most compelling hypothetical scenario was based on the appellant’s own circumstances. had he committed all of his crimes after the 2013 amendments to s. 737, he would have owed a surcharge of $4,000. had the crown chosen to proceed by way of indictment for all of his offences, the surcharge would have risen to $4,600. in her view, imposing an additional punish- ment of $4,600 on a person whose total annual in- come is $4,800 is incompatible with human dignity: para 109. she concluded that    such a surcharge would be clearly and grossly dispro- portionate. in the best of cases, such a surcharge would translate into monthly payments made over the course of six years, five and half weeks of full- time work, or 50 days of imprisonment — in addition to the 36 months of impris- onment already imposed. [emphasis deleted; para 124] [17] les juges mainville et schrager ont rejeté l’appel, quoique pour des motifs distincts. ainsi, le juge mainville s’est dit d’avis que les diverses dispositions permettant qu’un délai de paiement supplémentaire soit accordé aux contrevenants im- pécunieux, ainsi que celles qui limitent les options de recouvrement s’offrant à l’état, font en sorte que la suramende compensatoire est compatible avec l’art. 12 : par. 135 (canlii). souscrivant à ces motifs, le juge schrager a estimé que la jurisprudence de notre cour portait à conclure que le critère exigeant pour qu’une violation de l’art. 12 soit établie ne peut s’appliquer à une peine substitutive à l’incarcération. [18] la juge en chef duval hesler aurait, pour sa part, accueilli l’appel et invalidé l’art. 737, au motif que celui-ci est incompatible avec l’art. 12 de la charte : par 29-30. suivant son raisonnement, dans la mesure où la suramende, désormais obli- gatoire, s’applique à toutes les infractions du code criminel, il est nécessaire de procéder à un examen minutieux de situations hypothétiques raisonnables pour pouvoir évaluer les effets de la loi : par 5-6. selon la juge en chef, la situation hypothétique la plus convaincante était celle propre à l’appelant. si toutes les infractions de l’appelant avaient été com- mises après les modifications apportées à l’art. 737 en 2013, l’appelant aurait eu à payer une suramende de 4 000 $. par ailleurs, si la couronne avait choisi de procéder par voie de mise en accusation pour toutes les infractions commises par l’appelant, le montant de la suramende aurait grimpé à 4 600 $. or à ses yeux, le fait d’infliger une peine addition- nelle de 4 600 $ à une personne dont le revenu total annuel est de 4 800 $ n’est pas compatible avec la dignité humaine : par 109. la juge en chef a tiré la conclusion suivante :    une telle suramende serait nettement et exagérément disproportionnée. dans la meilleure des hypothèses, elle se traduirait par des paiements mensuels étalés sur 6 ans, ou encore 5 semaines et demie de travail à temps plein, ou encore 50 jours d’emprisonnement en sus des 36 mois d’emprisonnement déjà imposés [soulignement dans l’original omis; par 124] [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 617 [19] the chief justice did not agree with mainville ja that the provision is saved by the fact that truly impecunious offenders can escape prison time in the event of default. she held, rather, that such a system can effectively extend the sentence of an impecunious person indefinitely, as that person is repeatedly detained and brought before a judge to of- fer up excuses for why they cannot pay. this routine of committal hearings will quickly become grossly disproportionate: que. ca reasons at paras 105-6. [20] having determined that s. 737, without the judicial discretion that used to exist in the repealed s. 737(5), violated the appellant’s s. 12 right, the chief justice turned to s. 1 of the charter. she found that s. 1 could not save the surcharge, since where it will never be paid, there is no rational connection between the imposition of the surcharge and the objectives that it seeks to achieve, namely to en- courage the accountability of offenders and finance victim support services: para 130. further, the chief justice found that a sentence that violates s. 12 of the charter because it is grossly disproportionate cannot pass the minimal impairment and proportionality analysis under s. 1: para 131. [19] la juge en chef a déclaré ne pas se ranger à l’avis du juge mainville selon lequel la disposition en cause est sauvegardée par le fait que les contrevenants véritablement impécunieux peuvent échapper à une peine d’emprisonnement en cas de défaut de paiement. elle a soutenu qu’au contraire, un tel régime pouvait, dans les faits, avoir comme conséquence de prolonger indéfiniment la peine d’une personne ainsi démunie, parce que celle-ci serait, à répétition, détenue et amenée devant un juge afin de justifier son incapacité de payer. de telles audiences d’incarcération systématiques pren- draient vite un caractère exagérément disproportionné : motifs de la ca du québec, par. 105- 106. [20] ayant déterminé que, en l’absence de la dis- crétion judiciaire autrefois conférée par le par. 737(5) désormais abrogé, l’art. 737 porte atteinte aux droits de l’appelant protégés par l’art. 12, la juge en chef s’est penchée sur l’application de l’article premier de la charte. elle a conclu que celui-ci ne permet pas de sauvegarder la suramende, car si celle-ci n’est jamais payée, il n’y a aucun lien rationnel entre le prononcé de la suramende et les objectifs qu’elle vise, soit ac- croître la responsabilisation des contrevenants et fi- nancer les services de soutien aux victimes : par 130. de plus, la juge en chef a conclu que la peine qui contrevient à l’art. 12 de la charte en raison de son caractère exagérément disproportionné ne peut satis- faire au critère de l’atteinte minimale et de la propor- tionnalité en application de l’article premier : par 131. b ontario b ontario (1) ontario court of justice and superior court (1) instances devant la cour de justice et la cour of justice proceedings supérieure de justice de l’ontario (a) edward tinker, kelly judge, michael bondoc and wesley james mead, 2014 oncj 208, 120  or  (3d) 784; 2015 onsc 2284, 20 cr (7th) 174 a) edward tinker, kelly judge, michael bondoc et wesley james mead, 2014 oncj 208, 120 or (3d) 784; 2015 onsc 2284, 20 cr. (7th) 174 [21] edward tinker was 55 years old at the time of sentencing. his income, totalling $1,200 per month, came from canada pension plan and workers’ compensation benefits. he had no savings. after his rent and costs of medication, mr. tinker was left with $170 per month to pay for food, clothing, utilities, and incidentals. he pleaded guilty to one [21] au moment du prononcé de la peine, edward tinker avait 55 ans. son revenu mensuel total, qui s’élevait à 1 200 $, provenait de prestations du régime de pensions du canada et d’indemnités pour accident du travail. il n’avait pas d’économies. après paie- ment de son loyer et de ses médicaments, il restait à m. tinker 170 $ par mois pour régler les coûts de sa 618 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. count of uttering threats and one count of breach of probation. he was sentenced to 26 days, to be served intermittently, followed by 2 years’ probation. he faced a $200 victim surcharge. [22] kelly judge was 51 years old at sentencing. she was legally blind and a recovering alcoholic who also suffered from depression and bipolar dis- order. her monthly income was $831 from canada pension plan disability benefits. her rent of $800 per month left her with $31 per month for other expenses. ms. judge pleaded guilty to assault and one count of uttering threats. she was sentenced to a suspended sentence and 18 months’ probation, plus a victim surcharge of $200. [23] michael bondoc was, at the date of sentenc- ing, 24 years old and unemployed. he pleaded guilty to two counts of breach of probation for which he was sentenced to 33 days in custody in addition to the 27 he had already spent in detention. he faced a $200 victim surcharge. [24] wesley james mead was 46 years old at the date of sentencing. he struggled with mental illness and supported his spouse and child through ontario disability support program benefits mr.  mead pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public, one count of assault, and one count of assault resisting arrest. he was sentenced to a suspended sentence and probation for a period of 18 months, plus a $300 surcharge. nourriture, de ses vêtements et des services publics et pour assumer ses dépenses accessoires. il a plaidé coupable à un chef d’accusation d’avoir proféré des menaces et à un chef d’accusation de manquement à des conditions de probation. monsieur tinker a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement de 26 jours à purger de façon discontinue, suivie d’une période de probation de 2 ans. il était donc passible d’une suramende compensatoire de 200 $. [22] kelly judge était âgée de 51 ans au moment du prononcé de la peine. aveugle au sens de la loi, elle était également une ancienne alcoolique et souf- frait de dépression et de trouble bipolaire. son revenu mensuel, qui consistait en des prestations d’invalidité du régime de pensions du canada, était de 831 $. déduction faite de son loyer mensuel de 800 $, il ne lui restait que 31 $ par mois pour ses autres dépenses. madame judge a plaidé coupable à des accusations de voies de fait et à un chef d’accusation d’avoir proféré des menaces. elle a été condamnée à une période d’emprisonnement avec sursis ainsi qu’à 18 mois de probation, ce à quoi s’ajoutait une suramende de 200 $. [23] au moment du prononcé de la peine, michael bondoc était âgé de 24 ans et sans emploi. il a plaidé coupable à deux chefs d’accusation de manque- ment à des conditions de probation, pour lesquels il a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement de 33 jours, à laquelle s’ajoutent les 27 jours déjà passés en détention. il était passible d’une suramende de 200 $. [24] wesley james mead avait 46 ans au moment du prononcé de la peine. il avait des problèmes de santé mentale et subvenait aux besoins de son épouse et de son enfant grâce à des prestations du programme onta- rien de soutien aux personnes handicapées. monsieur mead a plaidé coupable à un chef d’accusation de port d’arme dans un dessein dangereux pour la paix pu- blique, à un chef de voies de fait et à un chef de voies de fait dans l’intention de résister à une arrestation. il a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis, de même qu’à 18 mois de probation, auxquels s’ajoutait une suramende de 300 $. [25] all four of these appellants challenged s. 737 of the code on the basis of ss. 7, 12, and 15 of the [25] les quatre appelants qui précèdent ont tous contesté la validité de l’art. 737 du code criminel [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 619 charter. only their ss. 7 and 12 claims were argued before this court. beninger j. for the ontario court of justice found that the mandatory victim surcharge infringed s. 7 by arbitrarily and disproportionately violating the offenders’ security of the person. this violation was not saved by s 1. that holding was overturned on appeal to the superior court, per glass j., who determined that neither s. 7 nor s. 12 were violated by the surcharge. en se fondant sur les art. 7, 12 et 15 de la charte. seules les contestations fondées sur les art. 7 et 12 de la charte ont été débattues devant la cour. le juge beninger, de la cour de justice de l’ontario, a conclu que la suramende compensatoire obligatoire viole l’art. 7 en portant atteinte, de façon arbitraire et disproportionnée, au droit des contrevenants à la sé- curité de leur personne. il a conclu que cette atteinte ne peut être sauvegardée par application de l’article premier de la charte. cette décision a été infirmée lors de l’appel interjeté devant la cour supérieure de justice; le juge glass a établi que la suramende ne viole ni l’art. 7 ni l’art. 12 de la charte. (b) garrett eckstein, 2015 oncj 222, [2015] b) garrett eckstein, 2015 oncj 222, [2015] oj. no. 1869 (ql) oj. no. 1869 (ql) [26] garrett eckstein was 19 years old and unem- ployed at the time of sentencing. he pleaded guilty to the offences of robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and breach of probation. the crown pro- ceeded by indictment on all charges. consequently, in addition to a sentence of 8 months’ incarceration and 18 months’ probation, the sentencing judge was obliged to impose a $600 mandatory surcharge. [27] mr. eckstein argued that, if not in his own case, the victim surcharge violates the s. 12 right of a reasonable hypothetical offender like the one in r v. michael, 2014 oncj 360, 121 or (3d) 244. michael, which declared the surcharge to be inappli- cable because it constituted cruel and unusual pun- ishment, had been decided a few months previously by eckstein’s sentencing judge, paciocco j. between that case and the sentencing of mr. eckstein, the ontario superior court rendered its decision in tinker. as set out above, that decision found no vi- olation of s 7. paciocco j. made clear that if tinker were only persuasive authority, he would not have followed it. however, as it was binding on him, he rejected the constitutional challenge and imposed the victim surcharge. [26] garrett eckstein avait 19 ans et était sans em- ploi au moment du prononcé de la peine. il a plaidé coupable à des infractions de vol qualifié, de complot en vue de commettre un vol qualifié et de manque- ment aux conditions de probation. la couronne a procédé par voie de mise en accusation relativement à toutes ces infractions. en conséquence, en plus d’une peine de 8 mois d’incarcération assortie de 18 mois de probation, le juge de la peine était tenu d’infliger à m. eckstein une suramende obligatoire de 600 $. [27] monsieur eckstein a soutenu que, si ce n’est que pour ce qui le concerne, la suramende compen- satoire viole le droit que garantit l’art. 12 aux contre- venants dans une situation hypothétique raisonnable comme celui en cause dans r c. michael, 2014 oncj 360, 121 or (3d) 244. la décision michael — où la suramende compensatoire avait été déclarée inappli- cable au motif qu’elle constituait une peine cruelle et inusitée — avait été rendue quelques mois plus tôt par le juge chargé de déterminer la peine de m. eckstein, le juge paciocco. or, entre la décision michael et le prononcé de la peine de m. eckstein, la cour supé- rieure de justice de l’ontario a rendu sa décision dans tinker, où elle concluait à l’absence de violation de l’art 7. le juge paciocco a indiqué clairement que si la décision tinker n’avait été qu’un précédent ayant une certaine force persuasive, il ne s’y serait pas conformé. cependant, puisqu’il était lié par cette décision, il a rejeté la contestation constitutionnelle et infligé la suramende compensatoire. 620 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. (c) daniel larocque, 2014 oncj 428; 2015 c) daniel larocque, 2014 oncj 428; 2015 onsc 5407 onsc 5407 [28] daniel larocque was 22 years old at the time of sentencing. he lived in extreme poverty, suffered from addiction, and had serious mental health is- sues. he was placed with a children’s aid society as a child and had abused alcohol and drugs since he was a teenager. he had never had a full- time job. he paid for his food and housing with disability benefits, leaving him with $136 per month for all other expenses. [29] he pleaded guilty to seven counts: two counts of mischief, three counts of assault, one count of uttering threats, and one count of possession. he was, therefore, subject to a victim surcharge of $700, which he argued constituted a violation of s. 12 of the charter. legault j. determined that the s. 12 violation was made out and could not be justified under s 1. [30] on appeal to the ontario superior court, lacelle j. allowed the appeal, holding that the sen- tencing judge had erred in finding a s. 12 breach. lacelle j. also reasoned that the sentencing judge had erred in law by speculating on mr. larocque’s future circumstances, contrary to this court’s holding in r. v. wu, 2003 scc 73, [2003] 3 scr 530. [28] daniel larocque était âgé de 22 ans au mo- ment du prononcé de la peine. il vivait dans une extrême pauvreté et souffrait de dépendances et de graves problèmes de santé mentale. enfant, il avait été placé sous les soins d’une société d’aide à l’en- fance, et il consommait de l’alcool et des drogues de façon abusive depuis son adolescence. il n’avait jamais occupé un emploi à temps plein. une fois sa nourriture et son logement payés à l’aide des pres- tations d’invalidité qu’il touchait, il lui restait 136 $ par mois pour toutes ses autres dépenses. [29] m. larocque a plaidé coupable à sept chefs d’accusation, soit deux chefs de méfait, trois chefs de voies de fait, un chef d’avoir proféré des menaces et un chef de possession de stupéfiants. il était donc passible d’une suramende compensatoire de 700 $, qui constitue, selon ses allégations, une violation de l’art. 12 de la charte. le juge legault a statué que la violation de l’art. 12 de la charte avait été établie, et qu’elle ne pouvait se justifier au regard de l’article premier. [30] saisie de l’appel interjeté devant la cour supé- rieure de l’ontario, la juge lacelle a accueilli ce der- nier, estimant que le juge de la peine avait eu tort de conclure à l’existence d’une violation de l’art 12. de l’avis de la juge lacelle, le juge de la peine avait éga- lement commis une erreur de droit en se livrant à des conjectures sur la situation future de m. larocque, contrairement aux conclusions de notre cour dans l’arrêt r c. wu, 2003 csc 73, [2003] 3 rcs 530. (2) ontario court of appeal, 2017 onca 552, (2) cour d’appel de l’ontario, 2017 onca 552, 136 or (3d) 718 136 or (3d) 755 [31] this is the decision for all three appeals from ontario. the court concluded that the victim sur- charge regime is constitutional and does not violate s. 7 or s. 12 of the charter. [31] il s’agit de la décision relative aux trois appels provenant de l’ontario. la cour d’appel a conclu que le régime de la suramende compensatoire est constitutionnel, et qu’il ne viole ni l’art. 7 ni l’art. 12 de la charte. [32] pardu ja began by outlining the legislative safeguards that, in her view, limit the effects of the surcharge: (1) offenders can apply for extensions of [32] la juge pardu a d’abord exposé les garanties législatives qui, à son avis, limitent les conséquences de la suramende : (1) le contrevenant peut demander [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 621 time to pay; (2) provided an offender has such an extension he or she will not be found in default; and (3) according to s 7347 of the code, even in the event of default, an offender who lacks the means to pay cannot be sentenced to jail at a committal hearing. [33] the court then turned to s 7. it held that al- though the liberty interest is engaged because of- fenders may be compelled to appear at a committal hearing, the deprivation of liberty is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. pardu ja. held that the law is not overbroad because there is a rational connection between compelling even impe- cunious offenders to appear at a committal hearing and the purpose of holding offenders accountable to victims of crime. she also held it is not grossly disproportionate because the regime’s laudable goals outweigh the comparatively minimal effect on the liberty interest. [34] pardu ja went on to reject the s. 12 claim. she acknowledged that imposing a fine on the of- fenders would be disproportionate. relying on r v. pham (2002), 167 ccc (3d) 570 (ont. ca), how- ever, she held that any negative effects are attenuated by the legislative safeguards set out above. if dispro- portionate, the law is not grossly disproportionate. des prorogations du délai de paiement; (2) pourvu qu’une telle prorogation lui ait été accordée, le con- trevenant ne sera pas en situation de défaut; et (3) se- lon l’art 7347 du code criminel, même en cas de défaut, le contrevenant qui n’a pas les moyens de payer ne peut être condamné à l’emprisonnement à l’issue d’une audience relative à l’incarcération. [33] la cour d’appel s’est ensuite penchée sur l’art 7. elle a conclu que, bien que le droit à la liberté des contrevenants soit effectivement en jeu parce que ceux-ci pourraient être contraints de comparaître à une audience relative à l’incarcération, pareille privation de liberté est conforme aux principes de justice fondamentale. la juge pardu a en effet conclu que la disposition visée n’a pas une portée excessive parce qu’il existe un lien rationnel entre le fait de contraindre un contrevenant, même impécunieux, à comparaître à une audience relative à l’incarcération et l’objectif de tenir les contrevenants responsables envers les victimes d’actes criminels. elle a ajouté que cette disposition n’est pas exagérément dispro- portionnée, puisque les objectifs louables du régime de la suramende l’emportent sur les effets relative- ment minimes de celui-ci sur le droit à la liberté. [34] la juge pardu a ensuite rejeté la contestation fondée sur l’art 12. elle a reconnu que l’infliction d’une amende aux contrevenants serait dispropor- tionnée néanmoins, s’appuyant sur l’arrêt r c. pham (2002), 167 ccc (3d) 570 (ca. ont.), elle a conclu que les effets négatifs se trouvent atténués par les garanties législatives mentionnées précédem- ment. si la disposition en cause est disproportionnée, elle ne l’est pas de façon exagérée. iv issues iv questions en litige [35] these appeals raise the following issues: 1 does the mandatory victim surcharge set out in s. 737 of the code violate s. 12 of the charter? 2 does the mandatory victim surcharge set out in s. 737 of the code violate s. 7 of the charter? [35] les présents pourvois soulèvent les questions suivantes : 1 la suramende compensatoire obligatoire prévue à l’art. 737 du code criminel viole-t-elle l’art. 12 de la charte? 2 la suramende compensatoire obligatoire prévue à l’art. 737 du code criminel viole-t-elle l’art. 7 de la charte? 622 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. 3. if either s. 12 or s. 7 is violated, is the surcharge saved under s. 1 of the charter? 4. if it cannot be saved, what is the appropriate remedy? 3 s’il y a violation de l’art. 12 ou de l’art. 7, la dis- position prévoyant la suramende peut- elle être sauvegardée par application de l’article premier de la charte? 4 si la disposition prévoyant la suramende ne peut être sauvegardée, quelle réparation convient-il d’accorder? v analysis v analyse [36] for the reasons that follow, the mandatory victim surcharge constitutes punishment, engaging s. 12 of the charter. i conclude that the imposition and enforcement of the surcharge on the poorest indi- viduals among us result in cruel and unusual punish- ment. consequently, s. 737 of the code violates s. 12 and cannot be saved under s 1. given this holding, i do not need to consider whether s. 7 is infringed. [36] pour les motifs qui suivent, la suramende com- pensatoire obligatoire constitue une peine, ce qui fait intervenir l’art. 12 de la charte. je conclus que l’infliction de la suramende aux personnes les plus dé- munies d’entre nous et l’exécution de celle-ci donnent lieu à une peine cruelle et inusitée. en conséquence, l’art. 737 du code criminel viole l’art. 12 et ne peut être sauvegardé par l’application de l’article premier. compte tenu de cette conclusion, je n’ai pas à exami- ner s’il y a eu violation de l’art 7. a section 12 a article 12 (1) section 12 is engaged — the victim sur- (1) l’article 12 s’applique — la suramende com- charge is punishment pensatoire constitue une peine [37] the respondents do not dispute that s. 12 is en- gaged. they acknowledge that if the victim surcharge is not punishment, it is at least a form of “treatment”. nonetheless, in my view, it is worth clarifying that the victim surcharge constitutes punishment. [38] the meaning of punishment has been explored in some detail in this court’s jurisprudence on ss. 11(h) and 11(i) of the charter: see eg. r v. wigglesworth, [1987] 2 scr 541;. r v. rodgers, 2006 scc 15, [2006] 1 scr 554;. canada (attorney general) v. whaling, 2014 scc 20, [2014] 1 scr 392;. r v. krj, 2016 scc 31, [2016] 1 scr 906. the appel- lants and certain interveners argue forcefully that the test from this jurisprudence should also apply in the s. 12 context. i agree that punishment should be de- fined consistently across ss. 11 and 12 of the charter. [37] les intimés ne contestent pas qu’en l’espèce, l’art. 12 s’applique. ils reconnaissent que, si la sur- amende compensatoire n’est pas une peine, elle constitue à tout le moins une forme de « traitement ». toutefois, il me paraît important de préciser que la suramende compensatoire est une peine. [38] la question de ce qui constitue une peine a été abordée en détail dans la jurisprudence de la cour portant sur les al. 11h) et 11i) de la charte : voir p ex r c. wigglesworth, [1987] 2 rcs 541;. r c. rodgers, 2006 csc 15, [2006] 1 rcs 554;. canada (procureur général) c. whaling, 2014 csc 20, [2014] 1 rcs 392;. r c. krj, 2016 csc 31, [2016] 1 rcs 906. les appelants et certains intervenants soutiennent fermement que le critère défini dans cette jurisprudence devrait également s’appliquer dans le contexte de l’art 12. je conviens que la peine devrait recevoir la même acception aux art. 11 et 12 de la charte. [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 623 [39] the most recent articulation of the test for punishment requires the claimant to show that the state action “(1)    is a consequence of conviction that forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular offence, and either (2)    is imposed in further- ance of the purpose and principles of sentencing, or (3)    has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty or security interests”: krj, at para 41. [40] this test is clearly met in this case. the sur- charge flows directly and automatically from convic- tion. a consequence that parliament itself describes as punishment will form part of the arsenal of sanc- tions. here, s. 737(1) itself sets out that the victim surcharge must apply “in addition to any other pun- ishment imposed on the offender”. a plain reading of the words “in addition to”, “other” and “punishment” indicates that parliament intended to create a further punishment that would apply in addition to any other punishment. [41] not only does s. 737(9) generally equate the terms “fine” and “surcharge,” the victim surcharge functions in substance like a fine — a paradigmatic form of punitive sanction: wigglesworth, at p 561. it is difficult to understand how a fine could be an established punishment, but a 30 percent manda- tory addition to any “fine” could be something else. section 716 of the code defines a fine as “a pecuni- ary penalty or other sum of money” that “does not include restitution”. the victim surcharge is clearly a pecuniary penalty that is not restitution even though the programs funded by the surcharge may indirectly benefit victims. the surcharge does not require the offender to pay a specific victim in proportion to damage caused. rather, every offender must pay a set amount to the state. its purpose is also to sanction offenders by depriving them of their funds. [39] suivant sa dernière formulation, le critère per- mettant d’assimiler une mesure à une peine exige du demandeur qu’il démontre que la mesure de l’état : « (1) [  ] est une conséquence d’une déclaration de culpabilité qui fait partie des sanctions dont est pas- sible un accusé pour une infraction donnée et (2) soit elle est conforme à l’objectif et aux principes de la détermination de la peine, (3) soit elle a une grande incidence sur le droit du contrevenant à la liberté ou à la sécurité » : krj, par 41. [40] ce critère est manifestement respecté en l’es- pèce. la suramende découle directement et auto- matiquement de la déclaration de culpabilité. une conséquence que le législateur lui- même qualifie de peine fera partie des sanctions dont est passible un accusé. dans le cas qui nous occupe, le par. 737(1) lui- même précise que la suramende compensatoire doit s’appliquer au contrevenant « en plus de toute autre peine qui lui est infligée ». lus selon leur sens ordinaire, les termes « en plus de », « autre » et « peine » dénotent que le législateur avait l’intention de créer une peine supplémentaire qui s’ajouterait à toute autre peine. [41] non seulement le par. 737(9) assimile de fa- çon générale les termes « amende » et « suramende », mais la suramende compensatoire fonctionne, pour l’essentiel, comme une amende — une forme pa- radigmatique de sanction punitive : wigglesworth, p 561. étant donné qu’il est établi qu’une amende constitue une peine, il est difficile de saisir comment l’ajout obligatoire d’un montant représentant 30 % de toute amende pourrait en être autrement. selon la définition prévue à l’art. 716 du code criminel, l’« amende » s’entend d’une « [p]eine pécuniaire ou autre somme d’argent, à l’exclusion du dédomma- gement ». la suramende compensatoire est sans nul doute une sanction pécuniaire qui ne constitue pas un dédommagement, même si les victimes peuvent bénéficier indirectement des programmes financés au moyen de la suramende. la suramende n’exige pas du contrevenant qu’il verse à une victime en particulier un montant proportionnel au préjudice causé : chaque contrevenant doit plutôt payer à l’état un montant fixe. elle a également pour objet de sanc- tionner les contrevenants en les privant de sommes d’argent. 624 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. [42] regarding the other two branches of the test, by the respondents’ own admission, the victim sur- charge is intended to further the purpose and princi- ples of sentencing. the ontario crown submits that one objective of the victim surcharge is “increasing offenders’ accountability to victims and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders”: rf,. attorney general of ontario, at para.  41 irrespective of whether the surcharge can actually accomplish this goal in respect of impecunious offenders, the goal falls squarely within the purpose of sentencing set out in s. 718(f) of the code: “to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community”. [43] the above is enough to meet this court’s test for punishment. nonetheless, as set out in more de- tail below, the victim surcharge also has a significant impact on the liberty, security, equality, and dignity of those subject to its application. [42] en ce qui a trait aux deux autres volets du cri- tère, de l’aveu même des intimés, la suramende com- pensatoire vise à faciliter la réalisation de l’objectif du prononcé des peines et l’application des principes de celui-ci. la procureure générale de l’ontario, quant à elle, fait valoir que l’un des objectifs de la suramende compensatoire est d’[traduction] « accroître la responsabilisation des contrevenants à l’égard des victimes et de susciter chez eux une prise de conscience de leurs responsabilités » : mi, procu- reure générale de l’ontario, par 41. sans égard à la question de savoir si la suramende peut véritablement permettre la réalisation de cet objectif à l’égard des contrevenants impécunieux, celui-ci cadre parfaite- ment avec l’objectif du prononcé des peines, énoncé en ces termes à l’al. 718f) du code criminel : « sus- citer la conscience de leurs responsabilités chez les délinquants, notamment par la reconnaissance du tort qu’ils ont causé aux victimes ou à la collectivité ». [43] les éléments qui précèdent sont suffisants pour satisfaire au critère établi par la cour permettant d’assimiler une mesure à une peine. cela étant dit, comme je l’exposerai plus en détail ci- dessous, la suramende compensatoire a également une incidence importante sur la liberté, la sécurité, l’égalité et la dignité des personnes assujetties à son application. in short, applying the test from krj to the [44] text, objectives, and effects of the victim surcharge regime leads to the inexorable conclusion that it constitutes punishment. [44] en résumé, l’application du critère défini dans krj au libellé, aux objectifs et aux effets du régime de la suramende compensatoire mène inexorable- ment à la conclusion que celle-ci constitue une peine. (2) section 12 is infringed — the victim sur- charge is cruel and unusual (2) il y a violation de l’art. 12 — la suramende compensatoire est une peine cruelle et inu sitée [45] since the victim surcharge constitutes a form of punishment, the next step is to determine whether that punishment is cruel and unusual. as this court has stated many times, demonstrating a breach of s. 12 of the charter is “a high bar”: r v. lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr 130, at para 24. the impugned punishment must be more than merely disproportionate or excessive. rather, “[i]t must be ‘so excessive as to outrage standards of decency’ and ‘abhorrent or intolerable’ to society”: lloyd, at para. 24, citing r v. morrisey, 2000 scc 39, [2000] 2 scr 90, at para. 26; see also r v. ferguson, 2008 [45] puisque la suramende compensatoire est une forme de peine, la prochaine étape consiste à établir s’il s’agit d’une peine cruelle et inusitée. ainsi que la cour l’a affirmé à maintes reprises, la « barre [est] haute » lorsqu’il s’agit de démontrer l’existence d’une violation de l’art. 12 de la charte : r c. lloyd, 2016 csc 13, [2016] 1 rcs 130, par 24. la peine contestée ne peut être simplement disproportionnée ou excessive : « elle doit être “excessive au point de ne pas être compatible avec la dignité humaine”, en plus d’être “odieuse ou intolérable” pour la so- ciété » : lloyd, par. 24, citant r c. morrisey, 2000 [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 625 scc 6, [2008] 1 scr 96, at para 14. it is only on “rare and unique occasions” that a sentence will in- fringe s. 12, as the test is “very properly stringent and demanding”: steele v. mountain institution, [1990] 2 scr 1385, at p 1417. [46] where a mandatory minimum sentence is challenged, this court has set out a two- step inquiry for determining whether that sentence is grossly disproportionate. first, a court must determine what would constitute a proportionate sentence for the offence according to the principles of sentencing in the code. second, a court must ask whether the mandatory punishment is grossly disproportionate when compared to the fit sentence for either the claimant or for a reasonable hypothetical offender: see r v. nur, 2015 scc 15, [2015] 1 scr 773, at paras. 46 and 77. [47] the present appeals do not involve a typical mandatory minimum sentence for a specific offence. rather, they concern the imposition of a universal punishment that is added without exception to all offences, and for each and every offence, to the other punishment imposed at sentencing. despite these dif- ferences, nur requires us to address, in these appeals, the following ultimate question: does the victim sur- charge render the sentences of either the appellants or a reasonable hypothetical offender grossly dispro- portionate based on its overall impact and effects? csc 39, [2000] 2 rcs 90, par. 26; voir aussi r c. ferguson, 2008 csc 6, [2008] 1 rcs 96, par 14. il ne sera décidé que « très rarement » qu’une peine contrevient à l’art. 12, puisque le critère permettant d’en juger « est à bon droit strict et exigeant » : steele c. établissement mountain, [1990] 2 rcs 1385, p 1417. [46] pour le cas où une peine minimale obli- gatoire est contestée, la cour a mis au point une méthode d’analyse en deux étapes permettant d’éta- blir si la peine est exagérément disproportionnée. premièrement, le tribunal doit déterminer ce qui constituerait une peine proportionnée à l’infraction en fonction des principes de détermination de la peine prévus dans le code criminel. deuxièmement, il doit chercher à savoir si la peine obligatoire est exagé- rément disproportionnée par rapport à la peine juste pour le demandeur ou pour un autre contrevenant placé dans une situation hypothétique raisonnable : voir r c. nur, 2015 csc 15, [2015] 1 rcs 773, par. 46 et 77. [47] les présents pourvois ne portent pas sur une peine minimale obligatoire type infligée pour une infraction donnée; il est plutôt question d’une peine universelle qui est infligée, sans exception, pour toutes les infractions — et pour chacune des infrac- tions — qui s’ajoute à l’autre peine infligée lors du prononcé de la peine. malgré ces différences, l’arrêt nur commande que nous répondions, en définitive, à la question suivante : en raison de l’ensemble de ses effets, la suramende compensatoire rend- elle exagérément disproportionnée la peine infligée aux appelants ou à un contrevenant dans une situation hypothétique raisonnable? [48] in answering that question in previous de- cisions, this court has taken into consideration, among other things, whether the punishment is necessary to achieve a valid penal purpose, the ef- fects of the punishment on the actual or a hypothet- ical offender, whether the punishment is founded on recognized sentencing principles, and whether there are valid alternatives to the punishment: r. v. smith, [1987] 1 scr 1045, at p. 1072; r v. goltz, [1991] 3 scr 485, at p. 500; ont. ca reasons, at para 130. these possible considerations help us [48] lorsqu’elle a répondu à cette question dans des arrêts antérieurs, la cour s’est notamment de- mandé si la peine est nécessaire pour atteindre un ob- jectif pénal régulier; quels sont les effets de la peine sur le contrevenant en cause ou sur un contrevenant hypothétique; si la peine repose sur des principes reconnus en matière de détermination de la peine; et s’il existe des solutions de rechange valables à la peine : r c. smith, [1987] 1 rcs 1045, p. 1072; r c. goltz, [1991] 3 rcs 485, p. 500; motifs de la ca. ont., par 130. ces considérations possibles 626 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. address the ultimate question, but are not required parts of a rigid test. nor is any one determinative of the outcome: r v. latimer, 2001 scc 1, [2001] 1 scr 3, at para 75. while not explicitly labelled as such, the first three of these elements underpinned this court’s analysis in nur (at para. 83) and lloyd (at paras 26-33). i find some of them useful to con- sider in these appeals as well. in smith, the court mentioned another possible consideration: the ex- istence of valid alternatives to the punishment. this consideration has provided less guidance to courts at the breach stage of the analysis and is often treated by this court as part of the s. 1 analysis under the minimal impairment branch of r v. oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103. i propose to follow that trend below. nous aident à nous prononcer sur l’ultime question à trancher, mais elles ne font pas partie d’un critère rigide. aucune d’elles ne sera, à elle seule, détermi- nante quant à l’issue : r c. latimer, 2001 csc 1, [2001] 1 rcs 3, par 75. même si elles n’ont pas été explicitement présentées en tant que telles, les trois premières considérations susmentionnées sous- tendaient l’analyse de la cour dans les arrêts nur (par. 83) et lloyd (par 26-33). j’estime que certaines d’entre elles sont utiles pour les fins de notre analyse en l’espèce. dans l’arrêt smith, la cour a mentionné un autre élément pouvant éventuellement être pris en compte, soit l’existence de solutions de rechange valables à la peine. cet élément fournit moins de pré- cision aux tribunaux à l’étape de la détermination de l’existence d’une violation, et il a souvent été traité par la cour dans le cadre de l’analyse fondée sur l’article premier, sous le volet de l’atteinte minimale du test de l’arrêt r c. oakes, [1986] 1 rcs 103. je propose plus loin de suivre cette tendance. (a) choosing a representative offender a) le choix d’un contrevenant représentatif [49] this court’s decision in nur instructs that the analysis of gross disproportionality should first assess the individual or individuals before the court. if the sentence is not grossly disproportionate in their case, the court must then ask whether the effects on a reasonable hypothetical offender are grossly dis- proportionate: para 77. [50] of the four appeals, the appellants in bou- dreault and larocque argued that, in their own particular circumstances, the effects of the victim surcharge are grossly disproportionate. as set out above, mr. boudreault lives in poverty. at the time of sentencing he was homeless, unemployed, and addicted to marijuana. he has never had a steady income and, given that he did not complete high school, his earning potential is likely very low. he faced a surcharge of $1,400. il découle de l’arrêt nur de la cour que le [49] tribunal, lors de l’analyse du caractère exagérément disproportionné d’une peine, devrait d’abord exami- ner le cas des personnes accusées. si la peine infligée n’est pas exagérément disproportionnée en ce qui les concerne, le tribunal devra alors se demander si les effets de cette même peine seraient exagérément dis- proportionnés dans le cas hypothétique raisonnable d’un autre contrevenant : par 77. [50] parmi les quatre pourvois, les appelants dans les affaires boudreault et larocque ont soutenu que, dans leur situation particulière, la suramende com- pensatoire a des effets exagérément disproportionnés. comme je l’ai précisé précédemment, m. boudreault vit dans la pauvreté. au moment du prononcé de la peine, il était sans domicile fixe et sans emploi et souffrait d’une dépendance à la marijuana. il n’a jamais disposé d’un revenu stable et, compte tenu du fait qu’il n’a pas terminé son secondaire, son potentiel salarial est vraisemblablement très faible. il était passible d’une suramende de 1 400 $. [51] mr. larocque has lived a life of considerable hardship. he grew up in the care of the children’s aid [51] la vie de m. larocque a été emplie de diffi- cultés considérables. il a grandi sous la protection de [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 627 society and today suffers from serious drug addiction and mental illness. he has also been deeply impecu- nious. he has only disability benefits that leave him with $136 per month once he has paid for food and housing. he faced a surcharge of $700. in eckstein, on the other hand, the appellant did [52] not argue that the victim surcharge would be grossly disproportionate in his case. instead, he relied on a reasonable hypothetical offender, which was based on the actual individual before the court in michael. in that case, paciocco j. found that mr. michael is an inuit man from iqaluit who lived in ottawa. he was homeless and lived on a street allowance of $250 per month. he often used that money to buy alcohol, to which he was addicted. he was convicted of multiple simple assaults, mischief damaging property, and breaches of probation. he faced a victim surcharge of $900: michael, at paras 36-46. [53] the tinker appellants restricted their sub- missions to s. 7 and relied on the submissions of the other appellants on s 12. i would note, however, that these appellants too lived in serious poverty and faced some combination of addiction, mental illness, and disability. [54] when examined together, the circumstances of the actual appellants, mr. boudreault and mr. la- rocque, and the reasonable hypothetical offender, mr. michael, reveal striking similarities. all live in serious poverty. all have precarious housing sit- uations. all struggle with addiction in addition, mr. larocque and mr. michael grew up under child protection and have physical disabilities. mr. michael is indigenous. la société d’aide à l’enfance et, aujourd’hui, il souffre de graves problèmes de toxicomanie et de santé men- tale. il a également été profondément impécunieux. il ne peut compter que sur des prestations d’invalidité, dont il ne lui reste que 136 $ par mois une fois qu’il a payé sa nourriture et son logement. il était quant à lui passible d’une suramende de 700 $. [52] dans l’affaire eckstein, en revanche, l’appe- lant n’a pas fait valoir que la suramende compen- satoire serait exagérément disproportionnée dans son cas. il a plutôt invoqué la situation hypothé- tique raisonnable d’un autre contrevenant, qui se fondait sur celle de l’accusé dans l’affaire michael. dans sa décision, le juge paciocco a constaté que m. michael était un inuit originaire d’iqaluit qui vivait à ottawa. sans domicile fixe, il touchait une allocation pour personnes itinérantes de 250 $ par mois. il utilisait souvent cet argent pour s’acheter de l’alcool, substance dont il était dépendant. il a été reconnu coupable de multiples voies de fait simples, de méfaits pour avoir endommagé des biens et de manquement aux conditions de probation. il était passible d’une suramende compensatoire de 900 $ : michael, par 36-46. [53] les appelants tinker ont présenté des argu- ments portant uniquement sur l’art.  7, et se sont appuyés sur les arguments des autres appelants concernant l’art 12. je tiens à souligner, toutefois, que les appelants tinker vivaient eux aussi dans une grande pauvreté et qu’ils étaient aux prises avec di- vers problèmes de toxicomanie, de maladie mentale et d’incapacité. [54] lorsqu’on les examine ensemble, les situations respectives des appelants en cause, mm. boudreault et larocque, et la situation hypothétique raisonnable d’un autre contrevenant, m. michael, révèlent des ressemblances frappantes. tous vivent dans une grande pauvreté. tous sont dans une situation pré- caire en matière de logement. tous sont aux prises avec des problèmes de dépendance de surcroît, mm. larocque et michael ont tous les deux grandi sous la protection de sociétés d’aide à l’enfance, en plus d’avoir des incapacités physiques. m. michael est autochtone. 628 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. [55] without a doubt, offenders with some or all of these characteristics appear with staggering reg- ularity in our provincial courts. given this reality, referring to “hypotheticals” in this case is some- what of a misnomer. the “reasonable hypothetical” offender urged on this court is mr. michael; not a fabrication, but a real person. in some other cases, the hypotheticals proposed are not living examples, but are the products of reasonably foreseeable ap- plications of the law: of analyzing who might suffer what consequences as the result of a challenged pro- vision. in this case, mr. michael’s circumstances are “hypothetical” only in the sense that he is not before the court as an appellant. however, his personal circumstances are representative of many of those who are subject to this mandatory surcharge, or, as paciocco j. stated, “mr. michael is an exemplar of the tragedy of aboriginal offenders that plays itself out on a daily basis in our criminal courts”: michael, at para 46. the reality that mr. michael was in fact before a court establishes the reasonableness of using his characteristics and his case to measure the consti- tutionality of the mandatory surcharge. in my view, when we look at these overwhelming similarities, it is not necessary to begin with the actual appellants and then consider a proposed reasonable hypotheti- cal. rather, all can be analyzed together, as follows. il ne fait aucun doute que des contrevenants [55] présentant quelques- unes ou la totalité de ces ca- ractéristiques comparaissent avec une régularité ef- farante devant nos tribunaux provinciaux. ainsi, il n’est pas tout à fait approprié, en l’espèce, de parler de « situations hypothétiques ». la « situation hypo- thétique raisonnable » que l’on fait valoir devant la cour n’a pas été créée de toutes pièces : il s’agit de la situation d’une vraie personne, m michael. dans d’autres cas, les situations hypothétiques proposées ne sont pas des exemples de personnes réelles, mais sont le fruit d’applications raisonnablement prévi- sibles de la disposition. il s’agit alors de concevoir quelles personnes seraient susceptibles de subir les conséquences d’une disposition attaquée, et en quoi consisteraient ces conséquences. en l’espèce, la si- tuation de m. michael est « hypothétique » unique- ment dans la mesure où celui-ci ne se trouve pas devant la cour en tant qu’appelant. cependant, ses circonstances personnelles sont représentatives de celles de nombreux autres contrevenants passibles d’une suramende obligatoire, ou, pour reprendre les propos du juge paciocco : [traduction] « monsieur michael est l’illustration même de la tragédie des contrevenants autochtones qui se déroule quotidien- nement devant nos cours de juridiction pénale » : michael, par 46. le fait que m. michael ait bel et bien comparu devant un tribunal démontre le carac- tère raisonnable d’un recours à ses caractéristiques et circonstances personnelles pour évaluer la constitu- tionnalité de la suramende obligatoire. à mon sens, lorsque l’on constate de telles ressemblances frap- pantes, il n’est pas nécessaire d’analyser d’abord la situation des appelants en cause pour ensuite exami- ner une situation hypothétique raisonnable proposée; ces situations peuvent être analysées ensemble, de la manière suivante. (b) the fit sentence for the representative offenders would not include the surcharge b) la peine juste pour les contrevenants repré- sentatifs ne comprendrait pas la suramende [56] at this stage of the analysis, the question is what a fit sentence would be for the representative offenders according to the general principles of sen- tencing, in the absence of the impugned provision: nur, at paras. 46 and 77. in other words, it asks what sentencing judges would impose if they retained their discretion to consider the individual circumstances [56] à ce stade-ci de l’analyse, il faut détermi- ner ce qui, en fonction des principes généraux de détermination de la peine mais à l’exclusion de la disposition contestée, constituerait une peine juste pour les contrevenants représentatifs : nur, par. 46 et 77. autrement dit, il faut se demander quelle peine prononceraient les juges chargés de la détermination [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 629 of the offenders and the nature of their offences: smith, at p 1073. in nur, this part of the analysis required determining the fit sentence that would have been imposed instead of a mandatory minimum. analogously, the question here is whether a judge who had the discretion to do so would impose the surcharge. [57] like the ontario court of appeal, i conclude that the sentencing judges for mr. larocque, mr. bou- dreault, and mr. michael would not have imposed the surcharge unless required to do so by s. 737 of the code: para 132. fit and proportionate sentences would not include a surcharge that sentencing judges rightly concluded would cause undue hardship for offenders as impecunious as these. [58] this is because sentencing is first and fore- most an individualized exercise, which balances the various goals of sentencing, while taking into ac- count the particular circumstances of the offender as well as the nature and number of his or her crimes. when sentencing, the crucial issue on the surcharge is whether or not the particular individuals before the courts are able to pay, and in this case they are not. in a constitutional context, the court is also called upon to consider the rights of particular individuals who may be affected by this punishment in a way that is grossly disproportionate, understanding that people have varied life situations and many are im- pecunious, impoverished, ill, disabled, addicted and/ or otherwise disadvantaged. given this focus, it is less important that other individuals who are differ- entially situated may be able to pay, that some other fines set by law may be higher or that the amount of the surcharge depends on the number of offences committed. de celle-ci s’ils disposaient toujours du pouvoir dis- crétionnaire de prendre en considération les circons- tances personnelles des contrevenants ainsi que la nature de leurs infractions : smith, p 1073. dans l’arrêt nur, cette partie de l’analyse supposait de déterminer la peine juste qui aurait été infligée en lieu et place de la peine minimale obligatoire prévue. par analogie, la question à trancher, en l’espèce, est celle de savoir si un juge investi d’un pouvoir discrétion- naire en ce sens infligerait la suramende. [57] à l’instar de la cour d’appel de l’ontario, je conclus que les juges appelés à déterminer les peines respectives de mm. larocque, boudreault et michael n’auraient pas infligé la suramende s’ils n’y avaient pas été tenus par l’art. 737 du code cri- minel : par 132. des peines justes et proportionnées ne comprendraient pas une suramende qui, selon la conclusion tirée à juste titre par les juges de la peine, causerait un fardeau injustifié à des contrevenants aussi démunis que ceux-ci. [58] il en est ainsi parce que la détermination de la peine est d’abord et avant tout un processus indivi- dualisé, qui met en balance les divers objectifs de la détermination de la peine, tout en tenant compte des circonstances particulières du contrevenant ainsi que de la nature et du nombre des actes criminels qu’il a commis. lors de la détermination de la peine, la question fondamentale concernant la suramende est celle de savoir si les personnes précises se trouvant devant les tribunaux sont en mesure de la payer, et dans le cas qui nous occupe, elles ne le sont pas. dans un contexte constitutionnel, le tribunal est aussi appelé à prendre en considération les droits de personnes pré- cises pouvant être touchées par cette sanction d’une façon exagérément disproportionnée, en partant de l’idée que les gens ont diverses situations de vie, cer- tains étant impécunieux, démunis, malades, atteints d’une incapacité ou d’une dépendance ou autrement désavantagés. dans cette optique, il importe peu que d’autres personnes ayant une situation différente soient capables de payer, que d’autres amendes prévues par la loi soient plus lourdes ou que le montant de la su- ramende dépende du nombre d’infractions commises. [59] the remaining question, then, is whether the mandatory additional punishment of the victim il reste donc à décider si la peine addition- [59] nelle obligatoire qu’est la suramende compensatoire 630 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. surcharge leads to a grossly disproportionate sen- tence for the offenders at issue. conduit à une peine exagérément disproportionnée pour les contrevenants en l’espèce. (c) for certain appellants and the reasonable hypothetical offender, the victim surcharge is grossly disproportionate [60] i acknowledge that the victim surcharge is not grossly disproportionate in all cases. for many canadians, the addition of the surcharge would not render a sentence grossly disproportionate. for an individual with adequate financial capacity, an addi- tional financial punishment of a few hundred dollars per offence could hardly be called grossly dispro- portionate. [61] for offenders like mr. boudreault, mr. la- rocque, and mr. michael, however, the story is very different: the actual imposition, operation, and ef- fects of the mandatory surcharge, when combined, create a grossly disproportionate punishment in their cases, i conclude that although it advances a valid penal purpose, the mandatory victim surcharge regime creates egregious effects and fundamentally disregards proportionality in sentencing. c) pour certains appelants et pour le contre- venant dans une situation hypothétique rai- sonnable, la suramende compensatoire est exagérément disproportionnée [60] je reconnais que la suramende compensatoire n’est pas exagérément disproportionnée dans tous les cas. pour de nombreux canadiens, l’ajout de la suramende ne rendrait pas leur peine exagérément disproportionnée. pour les personnes ayant une ca- pacité financière adéquate, une sanction pécuniaire additionnelle de quelques centaines de dollars par infraction pourrait difficilement être qualifiée d’exa- gérément disproportionnée. [61] toutefois, pour des contrevenants tels que mm. boudreault, larocque et michael, il en va tout autrement; dans leur cas, l’infliction, le fonction- nement et les effets de la suramende obligatoire, lorsque combinés, créent une peine exagérément dis- proportionnée. en ce qui concerne ces contrevenants, je conclus que, bien qu’il vise la réalisation d’un objectif pénal régulier, le régime de la suramende compensatoire obligatoire entraîne des conséquences inacceptables et ignore complètement le principe de la proportionnalité de la peine. (i) valid penal purpose (i) objectif pénal régulier [62] the respondents advance two justificatory objectives for the surcharge: (1) raising funds for victim support services, and (2) increasing offenders’ accountability to both individual victims of crime and to the community generally. i accept that these are valid penal purposes. that the state provide sup- port services to victims of crime is a laudable goal and that offenders contribute funds to that goal is a defensible choice. indeed, instilling a sense of ac- countability in offenders and encouraging acknowl- edgement of harm done to victims or the community are among the objectives of sentencing set out in s. 718 of the code. [62] pour justifier la suramende, les intimés font valoir deux de ses objectifs, à savoir : (1) recueillir des fonds pour les services de soutien aux victimes, et (2) accroître la responsabilisation des contrevenants, tant envers les victimes d’actes criminels qu’envers la collectivité en général. j’admets qu’il s’agit d’ob- jectifs pénaux réguliers. le fait que l’état fournisse des services de soutien aux victimes d’actes cri- minels est un objectif louable, et faire en sorte que les contrevenants contribuent financièrement à son atteinte est un choix qui se défend. de fait, susciter chez les contrevenants un sentiment de responsabilité et les inciter à reconnaître le tort causé aux victimes ou à la collectivité sont des objectifs du prononcé des peines qui comptent parmi ceux énoncés à l’art. 718 du code criminel. [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 631 [63] however, in the case of offenders like mr. bou- dreault, mr. larocque, and mr. michael, these ob- jectives are not likely to be realized. regarding the first objective, no funds can be raised from individ- uals who have none to spare: que. ca reasons, at para. 130 (per duval hesler cjq). furthermore, as i will elaborate below in my description of the effects of the surcharge, the enforcement of the surcharge against impecunious or impoverished offenders places a significant burden not only on these individ- uals, but on our courts and penal institutions as well. these measures are likely to cost the government much more than it could ever recoup from this group of offenders and to add to the strain of an already overburdened criminal justice system: r v. cloud, 2014 qccq 464, 8 cr (7th) 364, at para. 17; r v. jordan, 2016 scc 27, [2016] 1 scr 631. [64] turning to the second objective, the ontario court of appeal held that the surcharge goes “some way towards achieving the valid penal purpose of holding offenders accountable”: para 142. in my view, however, accountability is best achieved when offenders serve fair, proportionate, and definite sen- tences. as will be discussed in more detail below, the victim surcharge forces people to endure the possibility of an indeterminate sanction. imposing a sentence that sets an offender up for failure and prevents them from paying their full debt to society is hardly a means to ensure accountability. [63] toutefois, dans le cas de contrevenants tels que mm. boudreault, larocque et michael, ces objectifs sont peu susceptibles d’être atteints. en ce qui concerne le premier objectif, il n’est pas possible d’obtenir de l’argent de la part de personnes qui en sont dépour- vues : motifs de la ca. qc, par. 130 (la juge en chef duval hesler). qui plus est, comme je l’expliquerai plus loin dans la description des effets de la suramende, l’exécution de celle-ci à l’encontre de contrevenants impécunieux ou démunis impose un lourd fardeau non seulement à ces personnes, mais aussi à nos tribunaux et nos établissements pénitentiaires. en effet, les me- sures d’exécution de la suramende risquent de coûter bien plus d’argent au gouvernement qu’il ne pourra jamais en récupérer auprès de ce type de contrevenants, et d’ajouter aux pressions qui s’exercent sur le système de justice criminelle déjà surchargé : r c. cloud, 2014 qccq 464, 8 cr (7th) 364, par. 17; r c. jordan, 2016 csc 27, [2016] 1 rcs 631. [64] pour ce qui est du deuxième objectif, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a déclaré que la suramende « contribue jusqu’à un certain point à favoriser l’at- teinte de l’objectif pénal valable d’obliger les contre- venants à rendre des comptes » : par 142. à mon avis, toutefois, la meilleure façon de parvenir à une telle responsabilisation est de faire en sorte que les contrevenants purgent des peines justes, proportion- nées et d’une durée déterminée. comme je l’expose- rai en détail plus loin, la suramende compensatoire contraint les gens à vivre avec la possibilité que la sanction soit d’une durée indéterminée. or l’inflic- tion d’une peine qui voue le contrevenant à l’échec tout en l’empêchant de s’acquitter complètement de sa dette envers la société n’est guère une façon d’assurer sa responsabilisation. (ii) effects (ii) effets [65] the surcharge regime causes four interrelated harms to offenders like mr. larocque, mr. bou dreault, and mr michael. these are (1) the disproportionate fi- nancial consequences suffered by the indigent, (2) the threat of detention and/or imprisonment, (3) the threat of provincial collections efforts, and (4) the enforce- ment of de facto indefinite criminal sanctions. [65] le régime de la suramende entraîne, pour des contrevenants comme mm. larocque, boudreault et michael, quatre préjudices interreliés, soit : (1) les conséquences financières disproportionnées subies par les personnes indigentes; (2) la menace de dé- tention ou d’emprisonnement; (3) le risque d’être la cible de mesures de recouvrement prises par une province, et (4) l’application de sanctions pénales qui ont de facto une durée indéfinie. 632 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. 1 disproportionate financial consequences 1 conséquences financières disproportionnées [66] first, judges imposing the victim surcharge can exercise no discretion in the event that the of- fender is unable to pay. this creates deeply dis- proportionate effects for those who are the most impoverished among us. take mr. michael as an example. he had a monthly income of $250 and, in addition to his sentence, faced a surcharge of $900. while a $900 debt may sound relatively modest to some, it is a crushing sum for someone like mr. mi- chael, representing, as it does, nearly four months of his income. the effects of the same surcharge will be experienced differently by those who are differently situated. [67] a full understanding of the adverse effects of the surcharge is fostered by asking what the equiva- lent levy of four months’ salary would be for others in canada. looking purely at income, without regard to overall financial status, for someone earning the median income in canada at 2015 levels ($70,336), an equivalent fine, calibrated to that income, would be more than $23,000 (statistics canada, house- hold income in canada: key results from the 2016 census, september 13, 2017 (online)). for those earning more than the national median income, the equivalent fine could be several times greater. while these fines are exorbitant, they could still leave these higher earners with the likely ability to pay for the basic necessities of life. the same cannot be said of the representative appellants whose basic living costs are closer to or exceed their income. as the chief justice of the quebec court of appeal observed in her reasons, at para. 109, a fine that deprives a person of this much of their livelihood “is excessive to the point of being incompatible with human dignity”. indeed, it can only be described as grossly dispro- portionate. [66] premièrement, les juges qui infligent la sura- mende compensatoire ne disposent d’aucun pouvoir discrétionnaire dans le cas où le contrevenant est incapable de payer, ce qui occasionne des effets ex- trêmement disproportionnés pour les plus pauvres d’entre nous. prenons l’exemple de m michael. son revenu mensuel était de 250 $ et, en plus de la peine à laquelle il a été condamné, il était passible d’une suramende de 900 $. si une dette de 900 $ peut pa- raître relativement modeste aux yeux de certains, il s’agit d’une somme écrasante pour quelqu’un comme m. michael : elle représente pour lui près de quatre mois de revenu. des gens se trouvant dans une situa- tion différente vivront de manière tout aussi différente les effets d’une suramende du même montant. [67] pour bien saisir les effets négatifs de la su- ramende, il est utile de se demander ce que repré- senterait l’équivalent d’une ponction de quatre mois de salaire pour d’autres personnes au canada. si on examine uniquement le revenu sans tenir compte de la situation financière globale, pour quelqu’un qui gagne le revenu médian au canada selon les ni- veaux de 2015 (70 336 $), une amende équivalente, rajustée en fonction de ce revenu, atteindrait plus de 23 000 $ (statistique canada, le revenu des ménages au canada : faits saillants du recensement de 2016, 13 septembre 2017 (en ligne)). pour les personnes qui gagnent un revenu supérieur au revenu médian au canada, l’amende équivalente pourrait être beaucoup plus élevée. or, malgré le montant exorbitant que cela représente, de telles personnes à revenus élevés seraient probablement encore en mesure de subvenir à leurs besoins essentiels. on ne peut cependant en dire autant des appelants représentatifs, pour lesquels les frais de subsistance de base se rapprochent du mon- tant de leurs revenus, ou l’excèdent. comme l’a fait observer la juge en chef de la cour d’appel du québec dans ses motifs, au par. 109, une amende qui prive à ce point une personne de ses moyens de subsistance « est excessive au point de ne pas être compatible avec la dignité humaine ». de fait, la suramende ne peut être qualifiée que d’exagérément disproportionnée. [68] moreover, these severe punishments will be shouldered by offenders like mr.  boudreault, [68] qui plus est, de telles peines sévères seront in- fligées à des contrevenants comme mm. boudreault, [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 633 mr. la rocque, and mr. michael regardless of the extent of their moral culpability. not infrequently, criminal acts are not committed by dangerous of- fenders, but rather by desperate, addicted, and mar- ginalized individuals: see eg. michael, at para 46. the surcharge must be imposed even if an offender’s moral culpability was so low that the sentencing judge decided that they ought to be absolutely or conditionally discharged: s. 737(1) of the code. the surcharge is also imposed in cases where the offences are committed against the administration of justice — crimes that some would consider “victimless” — such as breaches of probation or being illegally at large. that such a severe financial punishment could be imposed in such cases only deepens the depth and degree of disproportion. larocque et michael, quel que soit le degré de leur culpabilité morale. il n’est pas rare que des actes criminels soient commis non pas par de dangereux délinquants, mais par des individus désespérés, toxicomanes et marginalisés : voir p ex michael, par 46. la suramende doit être infligée même si le degré de culpabilité morale du contrevenant était si faible que le juge de la peine a décidé que celui-ci devait faire l’objet d’une absolution inconditionnelle ou sous conditions : par. 737(1) du code criminel. la suramende est également infligée dans les cas où des infractions contre l’administration de la justice sont commises — des actes criminels que certains peuvent considérer « sans victime » —, par exemple le manquement à des conditions de probation ou le fait d’être illégalement en liberté. qu’une sanction financière aussi lourde puisse être infligée dans des cas semblables ne fait qu’aggraver la disproportion. 2 threat of imprisonment or detention 2 menace d’emprisonnement ou de détention [69] second, the surcharge is more than a debt owed to the state. as far as impecunious offenders not being incarcerated for non- payment, i recog- nize that s 7347(1)(b) prohibits the issuance of a committal warrant where the offender has a rea- sonable excuse. pursuant to this court’s decision in wu, inability to pay constitutes a reasonable excuse. however, offenders who are poor, homeless, and addicted will live with the threat of incarceration, and it is reasonably likely that they will spend at least some time in detention as a result of the surcharge. the threat of prison for non- payment of the sur- charge is made black and white for offenders when they are sentenced. in ontario, when the surcharge is imposed, offenders receive a form created by the province entitled “fine order/victim surcharge”. the form sets out the amount owing and the mo- dalities of payment. almost half of the front of the form is dedicated to threatening the offender with imprisonment if he or she fails to pay the amount; the form includes space for the court to calculate the amount of time to be served in default. [69] deuxièmement, la suramende représente da- vantage qu’une dette envers l’état. pour ce qui est de l’argument selon lequel les contrevenants im- pécunieux ne peuvent être incarcérés pour cause de non- paiement, je concède que l’al 7347(1)b) interdit qu’un mandat d’incarcération soit délivré lorsque le contrevenant a une excuse raisonnable. conformément à l’arrêt wu de la cour, l’incapacité de payer est une excuse raisonnable. cependant, les contrevenants qui sont pauvres, sans domicile fixe et qui souffrent de dépendances vivront avec la menace d’être incarcérés, et il est raisonnablement probable qu’ils passeront au moins un certain temps en déten- tion en conséquence de la suramende. lors du pro- noncé de leur peine, les contrevenants sont clairement avisés qu’ils risquent l’emprisonnement en cas de non- paiement de la suramende. en ontario, lorsque la suramende est infligée, les contrevenants reçoivent un formulaire créé par la province et intitulé : [tra- duction] « ordonnance de paiement d’une amende/ suramende compensatoire ». le formulaire précise le montant dû et les modalités de paiement. sur près de la moitié du recto du formulaire, le contrevenant est menacé d’emprisonnement s’il omet de payer le montant, et un espace est prévu sur le formulaire pour que le tribunal calcule la période d’incarcération à purger pour défaut de paiement. 634 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. [70] beyond the threat of prison, it is reasonably likely that these offenders will be detained for at least a short time if they default on the surcharge. in the event of default, the court must hold a commit- tal hearing. a police officer may arrest and detain an offender if the officer is convinced that this is necessary in order to ensure his attendance at the hearing: ss. 495 and 734.7(3) of the code. since the risk of non- attendance may be higher for individ- uals who live on the street and/or who suffer from serious addiction, many of whom may have multiple prior convictions for non- attendance at court, there is a reasonable likelihood that they will be detained pending their committal hearings. detention is also more likely where people have prior convictions for non- attendance at court. people who are poor, have unstable housing and/or transportation issues and suffer from addictions or other disabilities face dif- ficulties attending court and often have accumulated numerous such prior convictions. eventually proving a person has a reasonable excuse at the conclusion of the committal hearing, however, does nothing to prevent individuals from being detained in advance of that hearing. [71] once at those hearings, it may be difficult for judges to draw the line between an inability to pay and a refusal to pay. we need only look at the decisions below in these appeals to understand that judges will address this issue differently. while some judges focussed more on the appellants’ overall cir- cumstances, one judge held that where an offender does not set aside money, “the individual becomes the author of their own misfortune when they come to the end of the period given to pay the surcharge”: tinker, ont. scj, at para 41. given the inability to predict whether a particular person can prove a rea- sonable excuse, it is not correct, in my view, to argue that impoverished offenders do not live under at least a threat of imprisonment. while the stress caused by the threat of jail may not, on its own, create gross dis- proportionality, i reject the respondents’ contention that the stress caused by the surcharge is the same [70] au- delà de la menace d’emprisonnement, il est raisonnablement probable que ces contrevenants soient détenus pendant au moins une brève période s’ils font défaut de payer la suramende. en cas de dé- faut de paiement, le tribunal doit tenir une audience sur l’incarcération. un policier peut arrêter un contre- venant et le détenir s’il estime que cela est nécessaire pour assurer sa présence à l’audience : art. 495 et par 7347(3) du code criminel. étant donné que le risque de non- comparution peut être plus élevé chez ceux qui vivent dans la rue ou qui souffrent de graves problèmes de dépendance — dont bon nombre sont susceptibles d’avoir déjà été condamnés à plusieurs reprises pour non- comparution devant le tribunal —, il existe une probabilité raisonnable que ces contrevenants soient détenus en attendant l’audience relative à leur incarcération. la détention est aussi plus probable lorsque les gens ont déjà été déclarés coupables de non- comparution devant le tribunal. les gens qui sont pauvres, qui n’ont pas de logement stable ou qui ont de la difficulté à se dépla- cer et qui souffrent de dépendances ou d’autres inca- pacités font face à de nombreux obstacles lorsqu’il est question de comparaître en cour, et ont souvent déjà fait l’objet de nombreuses condamnations de la sorte. cependant, le fait de prouver, à l’audience relative à l’incarcération, que la personne a une ex- cuse raisonnable n’est d’aucun effet pour ce qui est d’empêcher sa détention avant une telle audience. [71] lors de la tenue de telles audiences, il pour- rait être difficile pour les juges de tracer la ligne de démarcation entre l’incapacité de payer et le refus de payer. il suffit de jeter un coup d’œil aux décisions des tribunaux inférieurs en l’espèce pour comprendre que les juges aborderont cette question de différentes manières. si certains juges ont insisté davantage sur l’ensemble des circonstances des appelants, l’un d’eux a déclaré qu’un contrevenant qui n’aura pas mis d’argent de côté [traduction] « sera l’artisan de son propre malheur lorsqu’arrivera la fin du délai consenti pour payer la suramende » : tinker, csj. ont., par 41. puisque nul ne peut prédire si une per- sonne en particulier arrivera à établir qu’elle a une excuse raisonnable, il n’est pas juste, à mon avis, de prétendre que les contrevenants démunis ne vivent pas au moins sous la menace d’un emprisonnement. s’il est vrai que le stress causé par le risque d’être [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 635 as that caused by any other debt. most debts do not raise even the possibility of jail; this one does in two separate and compounding ways — detention before committal hearings and imprisonment if found in default. the stress that this might cause contributes to the disproportionality of the surcharge. in addition to pointing out that the scheme [72] does not allow truly impecunious offenders to be imprisoned on default, the respondents make two counterarguments in relation to potential impris- onment. first, they argue that where an offender is unable to pay, they can avoid imprisonment by working off the fine through participation in a fine option program. the obvious problem with this pur- ported solution is that fine option programs are not available in all provinces. notably, there is no fine option program in ontario, so none of the appellants from ontario had this possibility. more to the point, however, even in jurisdictions where a fine option program is available, it is not a realistic option for all offenders, whether due to serious mental illness, disability, or age. incarcéré ne peut, à lui seul, créer une disproportion exagérée, je rejette la prétention des intimés voulant que le stress causé par la suramende soit le même que celui causé par toute autre dette. la plupart des dettes ne font même pas naître la possibilité d’un emprisonnement, alors que la dette dont il est ques- tion en l’espèce le fait de deux façons distinctes et cumulatives : la détention préalable à l’audience relative à l’incarcération et l’emprisonnement en cas de défaut de paiement. le stress susceptible de découler de cette situation contribue au caractère disproportionné de la suramende. [72] en plus de signaler que le régime ne permet pas que des contrevenants véritablement impécunieux soient emprisonnés en cas de défaut de paiement, les intimés avancent deux contre- arguments en ce qui a trait à l’éventualité d’un emprisonnement. d’une part, ils soutiennent que le contrevenant qui serait dans l’incapacité de payer pourra éviter l’incarcéra- tion en s’acquittant de sa dette au moyen de travaux effectués à titre de participant à un programme fa- cultatif de paiement d’une amende. cette soi- disant solution pose un problème évident, à savoir que de tels programmes ne sont pas offerts dans toutes les provinces. l’ontario, par exemple, n’en compte au- cun, de sorte qu’aucun des appelants provenant de l’ontario n’a pu se prévaloir d’une telle option. plus important encore, même dans les provinces où un programme facultatif de paiement d’une amende est offert, il ne s’agit pas d’une option réaliste pour tous les contrevenants, que ce soit en raison de graves problèmes de santé mentale, d’une incapacité ou de l’âge. [73] the respondents also argue that the threat of incarceration is significantly mitigated because offenders can apply for an extension in the time to pay (s 7343) and the scheme does not allow truly impecunious offenders to be imprisoned even in the event of default. this possibility, however, offers impecunious offenders little, if any, relief. while the crown characterizes an application for extension of time as a routine administrative matter, preparing and filing a written application to a court is daunting for many, especially for someone living on the street. in addition, this is a task for which a person cannot obtain state- funded legal counsel. even if such an [73] les intimés soutiennent également que la menace d’incarcération est grandement atténuée par le fait que les contrevenants peuvent demander une prorogation du délai de paiement de la sura- mende compensatoire (art 7343), et que le régime de la suramende ne permet pas l’emprisonnement de contrevenants véritablement impécunieux, même s’ils sont en défaut de paiement. toutefois, cette possibilité n’offre que peu d’aide, voire aucune, aux contrevenants impécunieux. bien que la couronne décrive la demande de prorogation du délai comme une mesure administrative de routine, la préparation et le dépôt d’une demande écrite auprès du tribunal 636 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. offender manages to receive an extension of time, for reasons explored in more detail below, it is difficult to see how the extension does anything other than prolong the punishment. constituent une tâche colossale pour plusieurs, par- ticulièrement pour une personne qui vit dans la rue. de plus, il ne s’agit pas d’une tâche pour laquelle une personne peut obtenir des services juridiques financés par l’état. même si le contrevenant parvient à obtenir une prolongation du délai, pour les raisons que j’exposerai plus en détail ci- après, il est difficile de voir de quelle façon la prolongation pourrait faire quoi que ce soit d’autre que de prolonger la peine. 3 provincial collection efforts 3 mesures de recouvrement prises par une pro- [74] third, offenders may find themselves targeted by collections efforts endorsed by their province of residence. the funds raised from the surcharge go to the lieutenant governor in council of the province in which the offence was committed and provinces are tasked with the enforcement of those surcharges. while the code does not speak to collection, it is a direct and known consequence of the surcharge it mandates. in terms of what actually occurs, trial judges have noted with concern that responsibil- ity for the collection of these funds is sometimes delegated to private collection agencies. there is no evidence that these private agencies hold off on trying to collect funds from those who are unable to pay: see eg. michael, at para 72. [75] while not directly applicable to the appellants or mr. michael, i would also note that the inter- vener pivot legal society suggested that offenders in british columbia may have their wages and even so- cial assistance payments retained by the province in order to collect the amount of the victim surcharge. vince [74] troisièmement, les contrevenants peuvent être ciblés par des mesures de recouvrement avali- sées par leur province de résidence. l’argent perçu est versé au lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil de la province où l’infraction a été commise, et il revient aux provinces d’assurer l’exécution des suramendes. bien que le code criminel n’aborde pas le recouvre- ment, celui-ci est une conséquence directe et connue de la suramende dont il commande l’application. concernant ce qui se passe réellement, les juges du procès se sont dits préoccupés par le fait que la responsabilité de percevoir les fonds est parfois déléguée à des agences de recouvrement du secteur privé. rien n’indique que ces agences privées re- noncent à leurs efforts de recouvrement à l’encontre de ceux qui n’ont pas les moyens de payer : voir p ex michael, par 72. [75] par ailleurs, bien que cela ne s’applique pas directement aux cas des appelants en l’espèce ou à celui de m. michael, je tiens également à souligner que la pivot legal society, ayant ici qualité d’inter- venante, a indiqué qu’en colombie- britannique, le gouvernement provincial peut retenir le salaire, et même les prestations d’aide sociale des contreve- nants, afin de recouvrer le montant de la suramende compensatoire. 4 de facto indefinite sentences 4 peines ayant de facto une durée indéfinie [76] finally, the ultimate effect of the surcharge is that it creates a de facto indefinite criminal sanction for some offenders. in numerous sentencing deci- sions involving the surcharge, judges have found that there is no foreseeable chance that the offender will [76] en dernier lieu, la suramende a pour effet ultime de créer une sanction pénale ayant de facto une durée indéfinie pour certains contrevenants. dans de nombreuses décisions relatives à la peine où il était question de la suramende, les juges ont [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 637 be able to pay the surcharge: michael, at para. 65; cloud (cq), at para. 15; r v. barinecutt, 2015 bcpc 189, 337  crr  (2d) 1, at para.  34; r v. bateman, 2015 bcsc 2071, at para. 40 (canlii); r. v. flaro, 2014 oncj 2, 7 cr (7th) 151, at para. 47; r v. shaqu, [2014] oj. no. 2426 (ont. cj) (ql), at para 83. the respondents argue that it is not open to sentencing judges to make such a finding. this argu- ment again relies on wu, in which this court held that “[i]t is wrong to assume    that the circumstances of the offender at the date of the sentencing will necessarily continue into the future”: para 31. wu, however, must be read in its specific context. most importantly, it did not involve a charter challenge. where a violation of the charter is alleged, finders of fact are required in the course of the constitutional inquiry to determine the foreseeable effects of the law on affected individuals. the object of the consti- tutional inquiry is the validity of the impugned law, while the object of the sentencing inquiry is cardinal proportionality within the bounds of parliamentary intent. accordingly, wu does not stand for the prop- osition that the possibility of extensions of time to pay will automatically immunize any mandatory fine from constitutional challenge, or that an offender’s ability to pay the surcharge cannot form part of an assessment of whether there has been a breach of the offender’s rights. given that the debt endures until paid, the inquiry into the constitutional validity of the surcharge may include an assessment of whether payment can or will likely be possible in the future. conclu que le contrevenant ne pourrait être en me- sure de payer la suramende dans un avenir prévi- sible : michael, par. 65; cloud (cq), par. 15; r. c. barinecutt, 2015 bcpc 189, 337 crr (2d) 1, par. 34; r c. bateman, 2015 bcsc 2071, par. 40 (canlii); r c. flaro, 2014 oncj 2, 7 cr (7th) 151, par. 47; r c. shaqu, [2014] oj. no 2426 (cj. ont.) (ql), par 83. les intimés soutiennent que les juges de la peine ne peuvent pas tirer une telle conclusion. cet argument trouve encore une fois son fondement dans l’arrêt wu, dans lequel la cour a déclaré qu’« [o]n aurait tort de supposer [  ] que la situation du délinquant à la date de la détermination de la peine demeurera nécessairement inchangée dans le futur » : par 31. toutefois, l’arrêt wu doit être interprété dans le contexte des faits qui lui sont propres. plus important encore, cette affaire n’avait pas trait à une contestation fondée sur la charte. lorsqu’une violation de la charte est alléguée, les juges des faits, en procédant à l’analyse relative à la constitutionnalité, doivent déterminer les effets prévisibles qu’aura la disposition sur les personnes visées. l’analyse relative à la constitutionnalité vise à établir la validité de la disposition contestée, tandis que l’examen portant sur la détermination de la peine vise à établir si le critère cardinal de la proportion- nalité est respecté, conformément à l’intention du législateur. en conséquence, l’arrêt wu n’étaye pas la thèse voulant que la possibilité d’obtenir des proro- gations du délai de paiement mette automatiquement toute amende obligatoire à l’abri d’une contestation de sa constitutionnalité, ou celle selon laquelle la capacité du contrevenant de payer la suramende ne peut être prise en compte dans le cadre d’un examen visant à déterminer s’il y a eu atteinte aux droits du contrevenant. étant donné qu’une telle dette subsiste jusqu’à ce qu’elle soit réglée, l’analyse du caractère constitutionnel de la suramende peut notamment porter sur la question de savoir si le paiement est pos- sible, ou s’il peut vraisemblablement l’être à l’avenir. [77] in my view, in the specific circumstances of some offenders, the inference that the offender will not be able to pay the surcharge may be the only reasonable one. some offenders are grappling with severe addiction and mental illness. while the hope is always that these individuals will undertake success- ful treatment for these issues, the experience is often [77] à mon sens, eu égard aux circonstances par- ticulières de certains contrevenants, la conclusion selon laquelle ils seront incapables de payer la sura- mende pourrait bien être la seule conclusion raison- nable. certains contrevenants sont aux prises avec de graves problèmes de dépendance et de santé mentale. bien que l’on espère toujours que ces personnes 638 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. that such treatment does not occur or is not immedi- ately successful. other offenders have a permanent disability or are of such an age that the prospect of a significant increase in income is unrealistic. for all of these offenders, the effect of the victim surcharge is that they must live with a criminal sanction that they are unable to acquit for the foreseeable future, if ever. these offenders face repeated appearances before a court to explain their inability to pay the surcharge — even if that inability is rooted in mental illness or physical disability. this ritual, which will continue indefinitely, operates less like debt collection and more like public shaming. [78] on a related point, an offender will not be able to seek a record suspension until such time as: (1) the surcharge has been paid in full or jail time for default has been served (see criminal records act, rsc 1985, c. c-47, s. 4) and (2) the necessary re- cord suspension fee is paid. requiring both payments before a record suspension is even available adds to the gross disproportionality imposed on impecunious offenders. nor does the possibility of applying for a conditional pardon (s. 748) or a remission order (s 7481), which have strict conditions and are dis- cretionary, alter the real life impacts of the surcharge. suivront un traitement qui s’avérera efficace pour venir à bout de tels problèmes, l’expérience nous enseigne que, bien souvent, pareil traitement n’a pas lieu ou n’est pas immédiatement couronné de succès. d’autres contrevenants sont atteints d’une incapacité permanente, ou ont atteint un âge tel qu’il n’est pas réaliste de s’attendre à ce que leur revenu augmente de façon significative. pour l’ensemble de ces contre- venants, la suramende compensatoire a pour effet de les contraindre à vivre avec une sanction pénale dont ils ne pourront se libérer dans un avenir prévisible, voire jamais. ils s’exposent en outre à devoir compa- raître à répétition devant le tribunal pour justifier leur incapacité à payer la suramende, même si celle-ci est attribuable à des troubles mentaux ou à une incapa- cité physique. ce rituel, qui continuera de se produire indéfiniment, a moins pour effet de recouvrer une dette que d’humilier publiquement les intéressés. [78] dans la même veine, le contrevenant ne pourra présenter une demande de suspension de son casier judiciaire tant que : (1) la suramende n’aura pas été payée en entier ou que la peine d’emprisonnement pour défaut de paiement n’aura pas été purgée (voir la loi sur le casier judiciaire, lrc 1985, c. c-47, art. 4) et (2) que les frais nécessaires à la suspension du casier n’auront pas été payés. le fait d’exiger que les deux paiements soient faits avant que la sus- pension du casier soit même possible ajoute à la disproportion exagérée imposée aux contrevenants impécunieux. la possibilité de demander un pardon conditionnel (art. 748) ou une ordonnance portant remise (art 7481), qui comportent tous les deux des conditions strictes et qui sont discrétionnaires, ne modifie pas non plus les conséquences concrètes de la suramende sur la vie de ces personnes. [79] the inability of offenders to repay their full debt to society and to apply for reintegration and forgiveness strikes at the very foundations of our criminal justice system. sentencing in a free and democratic society is based on the idea that offend- ers will face a proportionate sentence given their personal circumstances and the severity of the crime. criminal sanctions are meant to end: r v. demers, 2004 scc 46, [2004] 2 scr 489, at paras. 53 and 55. indeterminate sentences are reserved for the most dangerous offenders. imposing them in addition to [79] l’incapacité des contrevenants de s’acquitter entièrement de leur dette envers la société, d’obtenir la réinsertion sociale et de demander pardon va à l’encontre des fondements mêmes de notre système de justice pénale. dans une société libre et démo- cratique, la détermination de la peine repose sur l’idée que les contrevenants recevront une peine pro- portionnée, qui tient compte de leurs circonstances particulières et de la gravité du crime commis. les sanctions pénales sont censées avoir une fin : r c. demers, 2004 csc 46, [2004] 2 rcs 489, par. 53 [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 639 an otherwise short- term sentence flouts these fun- damental principles and is grossly disproportionate. et 55. les peines d’une durée indéterminée sont ré- servées aux délinquants les plus dangereux, et leur application en supplément à une peine par ailleurs de courte durée bafoue ces principes fondamentaux et est exagérément disproportionné. (iii) recognized sentencing principles (iii) les principes reconnus en matière de déter- i acknowledge the link between the objectives [80] of the victim surcharge regime and the objective of promoting responsibility in offenders set out in s. 718(f) of the code. while this objective may be relevant, it does not “sanitize a sentence against gross disproportionality”: nur, at para 45. [81] the problem with the victim surcharge regime is that it elevates this one objective above all other sentencing principles. most obviously, it ignores the “fundamental principle” of proportionality set out in s 7181 of the code. relatedly, it does not allow sentencing judges to consider mitigating factors or to look to the appropriate sentences received by other offenders in similar circumstances: see michael, at para 91. [82] moreover, it utterly ignores the objective of rehabilitation: s. 718(d) of the code. rehabilitation must be designed with the specific offender in mind and is best advanced by appropriate treatment and/ or punishment aimed at reintegration and future success. in my view, an insurmountable criminal sanction does little or nothing to foster this objective. mination de la peine [80] je reconnais l’existence d’un lien entre les objectifs du régime de la suramende compensatoire et l’objectif qui consiste à susciter la conscience de leurs responsabilités chez les délinquants, énoncé à l’al. 718f) du code criminel. bien que cet objectif puisse être pertinent, il « ne saurait empêcher la disproportion totale » : nur, par 45. [81] le problème que pose le régime de la sura- mende compensatoire est qu’il élève ce seul objectif au- dessus de tous les autres principes de détermi- nation de la peine. qui plus est, il ne tient manifes- tement pas compte du « principe fondamental » de proportionnalité de la peine énoncé à l’art 7181 du code criminel. de même, le régime de la suramende ne permet pas aux juges chargés de déterminer la peine de prendre en considération les circonstances atténuantes ou de prendre connaissance des peines appropriées infligées à d’autres contrevenants dans des circonstances semblables : voir michael, par 91. [82] de surcroît, le régime de la suramende com- pensatoire fait complètement abstraction de l’objec- tif de réinsertion sociale : al. 718d) du code criminel. les initiatives favorisant la réinsertion sociale doivent être conçues en tenant compte du cas particulier de chaque contrevenant; ainsi, un traitement adapté ou une peine visant la réintégration du contrevenant à la société ainsi que sa réussite future représente le meilleur moyen d’atteindre cet objectif. à mon avis, une sanction pénale insurmontable ne favorise guère la réalisation de celui-ci. [83] finally, the surcharge also undermines parlia- ment’s intention to ameliorate the serious problem of overrepresentation of indigenous peoples in prison: s 7182(e) of the code. this court has recognized the need to adapt criminal sentencing given “the tragic history of the treatment of aboriginal peoples [83] enfin, la suramende mine également l’inten- tion du législateur de remédier au grave problème de la surreprésentation des autochtones au sein de la population carcérale : al 7182e) du code crimi- nel. la cour a déjà reconnu la nécessité d’adapter la détermination de la peine en matière criminelle 640 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. within the canadian criminal justice system”: r v. gladue, [1999] 1 scr 688, at para 34. as a result, any criminal sanction that falls disproportionately on the marginalized and vulnerable will likely fall dis- proportionately on indigenous peoples: r v. ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1 scr 433, at paras. 61-62 and 77. just as indigenous peoples remain over- represented in canada’s prisons, so may we expect them to be overrepresented at committal hearings for defaulting on a surcharge order. compte tenu de « l’histoire tragique du traitement des autochtones au sein du système canadien de justice pénale » : r c. gladue, [1999] 1 rcs 688, par 34. dans ce contexte, toute sanction pénale infligée de façon disproportionnée aux personnes marginalisées et vulnérables risque d’être infligée de manière dis- proportionnée aux autochtones : r c. ipeelee, 2012 csc 13, [2012] 1 rcs 433, par. 61-62 et 77. tout comme les autochtones demeurent surreprésentés dans les prisons du canada, nous pouvons nous at- tendre à ce qu’ils soient également surreprésentés aux audiences relatives à l’incarcération tenues en raison d’un manquement à une ordonnance de paie- ment de la suramende. [84] the respondents counter these concerns over a marked departure from normal sentencing principles with four arguments. i have not been convinced by any of them. [84] les intimés opposent quatre arguments à ces inquiétudes liées au fait que l’on déroge de façon marquée aux principes habituels de détermination de la peine. aucun d’entre eux ne m’a convaincue. [85] first, they contend that since the victim sur- charge increases according to the number of separate offences committed by an offender, it is consistent with s.  718.1 however, a fundamental principle of sentencing is cardinal proportionality, which is different from mathematical predictability. this ar- gument confuses adding with analysis and ignores the simple fact that the code and the cdsa catalogue a broad spectrum of offences, from the compara- tively innocuous to the most egregious. indeed, it is tantamount to saying that an offender convicted of five counts of mischief deserves a more serious sentence than someone convicted of one count of murder. according to the principles of sentencing, such a result is absurd and, yet, it is what the victim surcharge requires. [85] premièrement, les intimés font valoir qu’étant donné que le montant de la suramende compensa- toire augmente en fonction du nombre d’infractions distinctes commises par le contrevenant, elle est conforme à l’art 7181. toutefois, parmi les prin- cipes fondamentaux de détermination de la peine figure la règle cardinale de la proportionnalité, qui diffère de la prévisibilité mathématique. cet argu- ment confond l’ajout et l’analyse et ignore le simple fait que le code criminel et la lrcdas prévoient un vaste éventail d’infractions, qui vont de l’infrac- tion relativement inoffensive à l’infraction la plus odieuse. de fait, cela revient à dire qu’un contre- venant déclaré coupable de cinq chefs d’accusation de méfait mérite une peine plus lourde qu’une per- sonne reconnue coupable d’un chef d’accusation de meurtre. selon les principes de détermination de la peine, un tel résultat est absurde; pourtant, c’est ce qu’exige la suramende compensatoire. [86] if anything, the cumulative charge-by- charge basis on which the victim surcharge is imposed in- creases the likelihood that it will disproportionately harm offenders who are impoverished, addicted, and homeless. these circumstances will often bring them into conflict with the law: michael, at para 1. this re- ality alone will result in higher total amounts owing. furthermore, any conditions attached to discharge or [86] à dire vrai, le fait que la suramende soit in- fligée de façon cumulative pour chaque infraction commise augmente la probabilité qu’elle ait un effet préjudiciable disproportionné sur les contrevenants démunis, toxicomanes et sans domicile fixe. bien souvent, ces circonstances feront en sorte qu’ils se retrouveront en contravention de la loi : michael, par 1. cette réalité, à elle seule, donnera lieu à des [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 641 probation for these offenders would likely include a prohibition against consuming alcohol and drugs. it is lawful to place an addicted offender under such a condition: s 7321(3)(c) of the code; r v. shoker, 2006 scc 44, [2006] 2 scr 399, at para 17. how- ever, addiction is not cured merely by threatening state sanction. as the yukon legal services society argued, people suffering from addiction routinely accumulate numerous breaches without causing se- rious harm to anyone. if their addiction does not im- prove during their probationary period, the amount of victim surcharges for breaches imposed over that period could be in the thousands of dollars: see also michael, para. 87, footnote 18. in this way, for in- dividuals like mr. boudreault, mr. larocque, and mr. michael, the cumulative charge-by- charge nature of the scheme does not reduce disproportionality, but may in fact exacerbate it. [87] what is more, that the surcharge attaches to each offence will often put impecunious offenders, who are more likely to be self- represented, at an ad- ditional disadvantage. the surcharge is levied based on two main variables: the number of charges and the type of offence (summary or indictable). both varia- bles are subject to prosecutorial discretion. defence counsel often work with prosecutors to minimize the number of charges and to proceed by summary conviction instead of indictment for hybrid offences. unrepresented people, who often plead guilty to all offences charged, may not know that they may negotiate the terms of their plea. sommes exigibles encore plus élevées. en outre, dans le cas de ces contrevenants, les conditions rat- tachées à une ordonnance d’absolution ou de proba- tion prévoiraient vraisemblablement une interdiction de consommer des drogues et de l’alcool. le tri- bunal peut légalement assujettir un contrevenant toxicomane à une telle condition : al 7321(3)c) du code criminel; r c. shoker, 2006 csc 44, [2006] 2 rcs 399, par 17. cependant, la toxicomanie ne se guérit pas par la simple menace d’une sanction de l’état. comme l’a fait valoir la société d’aide juridique du yukon, les personnes qui souffrent de dépendances cumulent généralement de nombreuses infractions, sans pour autant causer de dommages importants à quiconque. si leurs problèmes de dé- pendance ne se résorbent pas au cours de leur période de probation, le montant des suramendes compen- satoires infligées pour des infractions commises du- rant cette période pourrait atteindre des milliers de dollars : voir également michael, par. 87, note en bas de page 18. de cette manière, pour des personnes comme mm. boudreault, larocque et michael, la nature cumulative de la suramende pourrait aggraver les effets disproportionnés au lieu de les diminuer. [87] de surcroît, le fait qu’une suramende se rat- tache à chacune des infractions commises fera gé- néralement subir aux contrevenants impécunieux — lesquels sont plus susceptibles de ne pas être repré- sentés par un avocat — un désavantage supplémen- taire. la suramende est établie en fonction de deux variables principales : le nombre d’accusations et le type d’infraction (punissable sur déclaration de culpa- bilité par procédure sommaire ou par voie de mise en accusation). ces deux variables sont assujetties au pouvoir discrétionnaire du poursuivant. les avocats de la défense collaborent couramment avec les pro- cureurs dans le but de réduire au minimum le nombre d’accusations et de procéder par voie sommaire plutôt que par mise en accusation dans le cas des infractions mixtes. les personnes non représentées, qui souvent plaident coupables à toutes les infractions qui leur sont imputées, pourraient ne pas savoir qu’elles ont la possibilité de négocier leur plaidoyer. [88] second, the respondents argue that judges can maintain proportionality through creative sentencing options. they urge that, following r v. cloud, 2016 [88] deuxièmement, les intimés font valoir que les juges peuvent recourir à des solutions créatives en matière de détermination de la peine afin d’assurer la 642 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. qcca 567, 28 cr (7th) 310, judges must take the victim surcharge into account when crafting a total sentence that is fit and proportionate: paras. 73 and 75. still, in other provinces, trial judges interpreted parliament’s statement that the surcharge was to be imposed “in addition to any other punishment” by first determining what a fit and proportionate sentence would be, and then adding the surcharge at the end of the sentencing decision, when dealing with any corollary orders. under this interpretation, there would be a greater disproportion because the surcharge would always be an “add-on” to what was already determined to be the proportionate sen- tence. the approach of the quebec court of appeal sought a way to reduce that disproportion and respect cardinal proportionality by building the mandatory surcharge into the overall sentence, when possible. in my view, it is not necessary to decide [89] whether the mandatory surcharge is an add-on at the end of sentencing or a platform that cannot be lowered, which must be built into the sentence. even accepting that cloud (que. ca) is the preferable approach, the mandatory imposition of the surcharge still leads to gross disproportion. reducing some other part of the sentence may minimize dispropor- tion, but it cannot eliminate the specific and extensive harms caused by the surcharge. when the source of a problem is a fixed and mandatory penalty, the harms caused by it cannot be fully remedied while leaving it in place. further, such a reduction is impossible in the case of a discharge or a mandatory minimum sentence. the severe punishment that the victim sur- charge imposes on some offenders cannot be called proportionate in any way to an offence that merits a discharge and in some circumstances, like the ones at hand, the imposition of the victim surcharge would amount to gross disproportionality. proportionnalité. ils insistent sur le fait que, suivant l’arrêt r c. cloud, 2016 qcca 567, 28 cr (7th) 310, les juges doivent tenir compte de la suramende compensatoire au moment de déterminer la peine to- tale qui est juste et proportionnée : par. 73 et 75. tou- tefois, dans d’autres provinces, les juges du procès ont interprété l’énoncé du parlement selon lequel la suramende doit être infligée « en plus de toute autre peine » comme signifiant qu’ils devaient d’abord éta- blir quelle serait la peine juste et proportionnée, pour ensuite ajouter la suramende une fois la décision relative à la peine prise, lorsque des ordonnances accessoires sont demandées. selon cette interpré- tation, la disproportion serait encore plus marquée parce que la suramende serait toujours un « ajout » à la peine proportionnée déjà établie. la démarche de la cour d’appel du québec visait à réduire cette disproportion et à respecter le principe cardinal de la proportionnalité en intégrant la suramende obliga- toire à la peine globale, dans la mesure du possible. [89] à mon avis, il n’est pas nécessaire de décider si la suramende obligatoire est un ajout à la peine établie ou une plateforme ne pouvant être abaissée, qui doit être intégrée à la peine. même si l’on accepte qu’il soit préférable de recourir à la démarche adop- tée dans cloud (ca. qc), l’infliction obligatoire de la suramende donne toujours lieu à une disproportion exagérée. réduire un autre élément de la peine pour- rait permettre d’atténuer cette disproportion, mais cela ne peut éliminer les préjudices particuliers et considérables causés par la suramende. lorsqu’un problème prend sa source dans une peine fixe et obligatoire, on ne pourra remédier entièrement aux préjudices en découlant si celle-ci est maintenue en place. de plus, une telle réduction de la peine est im- possible dans le cas d’une absolution ou d’une peine minimale obligatoire. le châtiment sévère qu’inflige la suramende compensatoire à certains contrevenants ne saurait en aucun cas être qualifié de proportionnel à une infraction susceptible de donner lieu à une ab- solution et dans certaines situations, comme celles en l’espèce, l’infliction d’une suramende compensatoire équivaudrait à une disproportion exagérée. [90] thus, even if judges must, as the quebec court of appeal held, take the victim surcharge into con- sideration when sentencing, in some circumstances [90] en conséquence, même si les juges doivent, comme l’a conclu la cour d’appel du québec, prendre en considération la suramende compensatoire au [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 643 they will be unable to impose a proportionate sen- tence and, in other cases, judges will be forced to impose grossly disproportionate sentences because of the victim surcharge. judicial attempts to lessen the disproportion may be salutary, but they cannot insulate a grossly disproportionate punishment from constitutional review. in cloud, the quebec court of appeal acknowledged, at para. 74, that “the leg- islative choice gives rise to difficulties that could be discussed in another context”. the constitutional challenge before this court is precisely that context. [91] once again, then, the respondents’ argument, if helpful in some cases, provides little assistance to the offenders with whom we are most concerned in these appeals. in these cases, the effects of the impo- sition and enforcement of the surcharge on the rep- resentative appellants are grossly disproportionate. [92] third, the respondents say that judges could impose a nominal fine, which would have the effect of reducing the amount of the surcharge. since the surcharge is 30 percent of any fine, a nominal fine of, say, one dollar, would reduce the surcharge from $100 to 30 cents. this interpretation of s. 737 risks obscuring the objective of the provision. where a fine would be an appropriate part of a fit sentence before the imposition of the surcharge, it would be open to the sentencing judge to take the surcharge into account in establishing the fine to be imposed. however, to impose a nominal fine for the sole pur- pose of lowering the amount of the surcharge is to ignore the legislature’s intent that the surcharge, in its full amount, would apply in all cases as a man- datory punishment: cloud (que. ca), at para 65. ultimately, it is more principled for this court to either strike down the victim surcharge as unconsti- tutional, or to uphold its constitutionality and require judges to impose it in all cases as parliament clearly intended. moment de déterminer la peine à infliger, dans cer- taines situations, ils ne seront pas en mesure d’in- fliger une peine proportionnée et dans d’autres, ils seront contraints d’infliger des peines exagérément disproportionnées en raison de la suramende com- pensatoire. les efforts déployés par les tribunaux pour réduire la disproportion peuvent être bénéfiques, mais ils ne peuvent protéger une peine exagérément disproportionnée d’un contrôle constitutionnel. dans cloud, la cour d’appel du québec a reconnu, au par. 74, que « le choix législatif soulève des difficul- tés dont on pourrait discuter dans un autre contexte ». la contestation constitutionnelle devant la cour est précisément ce contexte. [91] encore une fois, l’argument des intimés, si utile qu’il puisse être dans certains cas, n’est donc pas d’un grand secours pour les contrevenants dont nous nous soucions en l’espèce. dans les cas qui nous occupent, les effets de l’infliction et de l’exécu- tion de la suramende sur les appelants représentatifs sont exagérément disproportionnés. [92] troisièmement, les intimés soutiennent que les juges peuvent infliger une amende d’un montant minime, qui aurait pour effet de réduire le montant de la suramende. étant donné que la suramende repré- sente 30 % du montant de toute amende infligée, une amende symbolique d’un dollar, par exemple, rédui- rait la suramende en la faisant passer de 100 dollars à 30 cents. une telle interprétation de l’art. 737 risque d’occulter l’objectif de cette disposition. dans le cas où une amende constituerait un élément approprié d’une peine juste déterminée avant l’infliction de la suramende, le juge de la peine aurait la possibilité de tenir compte de la suramende au moment d’établir le montant de l’amende à infliger. toutefois, infliger une amende d’un montant minime à seule fin de ré- duire le montant de la suramende revient à faire fi de l’intention du législateur, à savoir que la suramende, dans sa totalité, s’applique à titre de peine obligatoire dans tous les cas : cloud (ca. qc), par 65. en défi- nitive, pour que la cour respecte les principes établis, il lui faut soit invalider la suramende compensatoire pour cause d’inconstitutionnalité, soit confirmer sa constitutionnalité et exiger des juges qu’ils l’infligent dans tous les cas, conformément à l’intention mani- feste du législateur. 644 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. [93] finally, the respondents, much like the on- tario court of appeal, at paras. 138-40, also point to pham, a case in which a mandatory fine much larger than the victim surcharge was challenged con- stitutionally, but was held not to violate s. 12 of the charter. in that case, the offenders faced a fine of $154,000 under the excise act, rsc 1985, c. e-14, for possession of 1,200 kilograms of contraband tobacco. in my view, the mandatory fine in pham is easily distinguished from the victim surcharge. in that case, the amount of the fine was tightly linked to the specific offence. an economic offence, in which the accused possessed illegal goods of value, is bal- anced with an economic punishment. the goal is to recoup the state’s lost tax revenue. as goudge ja. put it in pham, “the most important consideration in the s. 12 analysis is the direct connection between the quantity of the illegal substance possessed and the size of the fine”: para 19. the victim surcharge, by contrast, is a blanket financial penalty that applies to everyone no matter the offence at issue. a court must impose it regardless of whether there was economic gain and regardless of whether there was even harm to an individual victim. the utter lack of proportion in this pure levy requires a very different s. 12 anal- ysis from the one that was at play in pham. [93] finalement, les intimés, tout comme la cour d’appel de l’ontario, aux par. 138- 140, renvoient également à la décision pham. dans cette décision, la constitutionnalité d’une amende obligatoire d’un montant bien plus élevé que celui de la suramende compensatoire était mise en question, mais il a été conclu que l’amende en question ne contrevenait pas à l’art. 12 de la charte. les contrevenants avaient été condamnés à payer une amende de 154 000 $ aux termes de la loi sur l’accise, lrc  1985, c. e-14, pour avoir été en possession de 1 200 kg de tabac de contrebande. à mon avis, l’amende obligatoire en litige dans pham peut facilement être distinguée de la suramende compensatoire. dans cette affaire, le montant de l’amende était étroite- ment lié à l’infraction précise. une infraction éco- nomique, qui impliquait la possession par l’accusé de marchandises illicites de valeur, est compensée par une sanction économique, dont l’objectif est de recouvrer la perte de recettes fiscales subie par l’état comme l’a déclaré le juge goudge dans pham, [traduction] « le facteur le plus important dans l’analyse fondée sur l’art. 12 est le lien direct entre la quantité de substance illégale en posses- sion du délinquant et le montant de l’amende » : par 19. la suramende compensatoire, en revanche, est une sanction pécuniaire qui s’applique de façon universelle, quelle que soit l’infraction en cause. le tribunal est tenu de l’infliger, sans se soucier de la question de savoir si des gains économiques ont été réalisés ou si des torts ont même été causés à une victime. le manque flagrant de proportionnalité de ce pur prélèvement commande une analyse fondée sur l’art. 12 qui diffère fortement de celle applicable dans l’affaire pham. (iv) conclusion on gross disproportionality (iv) conclusion quant au caractère exagérément disproportionné [94] i conclude that the victim surcharge scheme, although intended to achieve a valid penal pur- pose, violates s.  12 in the case of offenders like mr. boudreault, mr. larocque, and mr michael. it leaves sentencing judges with no choice. they must impose the surcharge in every case. they cannot consider the most marginalized offenders’ inability to pay, the likelihood that they will face a repeated deprivation of liberty for committal hearings, or the [94] je conclus que, bien qu’il vise l’atteinte d’un objectif pénal régulier, le régime de la suramende compensatoire viole l’art. 12 dans le cas de contreve- nants tels que mm. boudreault, larocque et michael. il ne laisse aucun choix aux juges chargés de la déter- mination de la peine. ceux-ci doivent infliger la su- ramende dans tous les cas. ils ne peuvent prendre en considération l’incapacité de payer des contrevenants les plus marginalisés, ni la probabilité que ceux-ci [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 645 indefinite nature of the punishment. they cannot apply the fundamental principles of sentencing, seek to foster rehabilitation in appropriate cases, or adjust the sentence for indigenous offenders. to return to the ultimate question in these appeals, the impact and effects of the surcharge, taken together, create circumstances that are grossly disproportionate, out- rage the standards of decency, and are both abhorrent and intolerable. put differently, they are cruel and unusual, and, therefore, violate s 12. subissent des privations de liberté à répétition dans le cadre des audiences relatives à l’incarcération, ni la nature indéterminée de la peine. ils ne peuvent appliquer les principes fondamentaux de détermina- tion de la peine, chercher à favoriser la réinsertion sociale des contrevenants dans les cas qui s’y prêtent ou adapter la peine aux contrevenants autochtones. pour revenir à la question fondamentale en l’espèce, les effets de la suramende, lorsque combinés, créent des circonstances exagérément disproportionnées, sont incompatibles avec la dignité humaine et sont à la fois odieux et intolérables. en d’autres termes, ils sont cruels et inusités, et violent en conséquence l’art 12. b section 7 b l’article 7 [95] given my conclusion on s. 12, it is not nec- essary to address whether the victim surcharge is a violation of s 7. [95] compte tenu de ma conclusion concernant l’art. 12, je n’ai pas à examiner si la suramende com- pensatoire viole l’art 7. c section 1 c l’article premier in many cases where a charter breach has [96] been established, the state seeks to justify the in- fringement under s. 1 of the charter. in such cases, it must articulate a pressing and substantial objective and must demonstrate that the impugned law is pro- portional to that objective. proportionality requires that (1) the means adopted are rationally connected to the objective; (2) the law is minimally impairing of the right; and (3) the salutary effects outweigh the deleterious effects of the law: oakes; nur, at para 111. [96] dans de nombreuses affaires où une violation de la charte a été établie, l’état s’attache à justifier cette violation en vertu de l’article premier de la charte. en pareils cas, il doit établir un objectif réel et urgent et démontrer que la mesure législa- tive attaquée est proportionnelle à cet objectif. le critère de la proportionnalité exige : (1) qu’il existe un lien rationnel entre la mesure choisie et l’objectif en question; (2) que cette mesure porte le moins possible atteinte au droit en question; et (3) que les effets bénéfiques de la mesure l’emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables : oakes; nur, par 111. [97] in this case, the respondents did not put for- ward any argument or evidence to justify the man- datory surcharge if found to breach charter rights. it is, therefore, unnecessary and unwise to engage in a s. 1 analysis, especially considering that only in exceedingly rare cases can a s. 12 infringement be justified under s. 1: nur, at para 111. indeed, it seems clear that the mandatory surcharge is not mini- mally impairing of the s. 12 right because parliament had open to it multiple valid alternatives to achieve its aims, most obviously by granting judges residual discretion to waive the surcharge in some cases. [97] en l’espèce, les intimés n’ont présenté aucun argument ni aucun élément de preuve qui puisse jus- tifier la suramende compensatoire, advenant qu’elle soit jugée porter atteinte aux droits protégés par la charte. par conséquent, il serait aussi inutile que peu judicieux d’entreprendre une analyse fondée sur l’article premier, surtout compte tenu du fait qu’une atteinte à l’art. 12 ne pourra se justifier en vertu de l’article premier que dans de très rares cas : nur, par 111. en réalité, il semble clair que la suramende obligatoire ne porte pas atteinte de façon minimale au droit garanti par l’art. 12, étant donné que de 646 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. consequently, the mandatory surcharge is not jus- tified under s 1. multiples autres solutions valables s’offraient au lé- gislateur pour lui permettre d’atteindre ses objectifs, dont la plus évidente consistait à accorder aux juges le pouvoir discrétionnaire résiduel de dispenser le contrevenant de la suramende dans certains cas. en conséquence, l’infliction de la suramende compen- satoire obligatoire ne peut se justifier au regard de l’article premier. d remedy d la réparation (1) invalid with immediate effect (1) invalidité avec effet immédiat i would declare s. 737 to be of no force and [98] effect immediately, pursuant to s. 52(1) of the con- stitution act, 1982. i reject the respondent federal crown’s argument that this court ought to suspend its declaration of invalidity for a period of 6 to 12 months in order to give parliament time to adopt conforming legislation. the respondents have not met the high standard of showing that a declaration with immediate effect would pose a danger to the public or imperil the rule of law: schachter v. can- ada, [1992] 2 scr 679; reference re manitoba lan guage rights, [1985] 1 scr 721; canada (at- torney gen eral) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at para 167. rather, in my opinion, a suspended declaration in this case would simply cause more offenders to be subject to cruel and un- usual punishment. i also reject the argument, advanced by the [99] tinker appellants, the attorney general of ontario, and (in the alternative) mr. eckstein, that this court simply ought to read back in the judicial discretion to waive the surcharge that was abrogated in 2013. this is the wrong approach in this case for two reasons. [98] je suis d’avis de déclarer l’art. 737 immé- diatement inopérant, suivant le par. 52(1) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982. je rejette l’argument de la couronne fédérale intimée, selon lequel la cour devrait suspendre la prise d’effet de sa déclaration d’invalidité constitutionnelle pour une période de six à douze mois afin de donner au législateur le temps d’adopter des dispositions législatives conformes. les intimés n’ont pas satisfait à la norme rigoureuse qui exige de démontrer qu’une déclaration d’inva- lidité avec effet immédiat présenterait un danger pour le public ou compromettrait la primauté du droit : schachter c. canada, [1992] 2 rcs 679; renvoi relatif aux droits linguistiques au manitoba, [1985] 1 rcs 721; canada (procureur général) c. bedford, 2013 csc 72, [2013] 3 rcs 1101, par 167. j’estime au contraire qu’en l’espèce, la suspension de l’effet de la déclaration ne fera qu’as- sujettir un plus grand nombre de contrevenants à une peine cruelle et inusitée. [99] je rejette également la thèse, avancée par les appelants tinker, la procureure générale de l’ontario et (subsidiairement) m. eckstein, suivant laquelle la cour devrait simplement rétablir dans la loi le pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire d’accorder une dispense de la suramende, pouvoir qui a été supprimé en 2013. ce n’est pas la bonne approche à adopter en l’espèce, et ce, pour deux raisons. [100] first, in 2013, parliament clearly expressed its desire to eliminate judicial discretion to waive the surcharge. in relation to mandatory minimum sen- tences, this court held that parliament is presumed to intentionally remove any discretion to order a [100] d’abord, en 2013, le législateur a clairement exprimé sa volonté d’éliminer le pouvoir discré- tionnaire judiciaire d’accorder une dispense de la suramende. en ce qui a trait aux peines minimales obligatoires, la cour a statué qu’il faut présumer [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 647 sentence that is less than the mandatory minimum: ferguson, at para 54. for this reason, constitutional exemptions from unconstitutional mandatory min- imum sentences are considered a highly intrusive remedy: ferguson, at paras. 50-51; r v. seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577, at p 628. the same logic mili- tates against this court reading the terms of the prior discretion back into s. 737 today. [101] the second reason why reading in is an inap- propriate remedy in the instant case is that parliament ought to be free to consider how best to revise the im- position as well as the enforcement of the surcharge. section 737 is invalid by reason of all of its effects, from mandatory imposition on a charge-by- charge basis through committal hearings, threats of impris- onment, and the denial of rehabilitation. because of this, a number of possible legislative options, that do not replicate the previous provision, are open to parliament to bring s. 737 into compliance with s 12. [102] for example, at the time of writing, legisla- tion is before parliament that would amend s 737. without commenting on the constitutional validity of those proposed amendments, i note that the gov- ernment has proposed restoring judicial discretion to waive the imposition of the surcharge, but on terms different than those of the former s 737(5). parliament chose another route and will likely assess whether further revisions are necessary in light of this decision. que le législateur a intentionnellement supprimé le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’infliger une peine infé- rieure à la peine minimale prévue : ferguson, par 54. pour cette raison, les exemptions constitutionnelles relativement à l’application de peines minimales obligatoires inconstitutionnelles sont considérées comme une réparation qui représente un grave em- piétement : ferguson, par. 50-51; r c. seaboyer, [1991] 2 rcs 577, p 628. la même logique milite contre l’idée que la cour rétablisse, dans l’actuel art. 737, l’ancien libellé qui accordait le pouvoir discrétionnaire visé. [101] la seconde raison pour laquelle le rétablis- sement du pouvoir discrétionnaire d’accorder une dispense de la suramende n’est pas une réparation convenable en l’espèce est que le législateur de- vrait être libre de déterminer la meilleure façon de modifier le régime d’infliction et d’exécution de la suramende. l’article 737 est invalide en raison de l’ensemble de ses effets, qui vont de l’infliction obligatoire de la suramende de façon cumulative pour chaque infraction commise aux audiences re- latives à l’incarcération, en passant par les menaces d’emprisonnement et le déni du droit à la réinsertion. en conséquence, plusieurs solutions législatives, qui ne reproduisent pas l’ancienne disposition, s’offrent au législateur pour lui permettre de rendre l’art. 737 conforme à l’art 12. [102] par exemple, au moment de la rédaction des présents motifs, le parlement est saisi d’un projet de loi visant à modifier l’art 737. sans me prononcer sur la validité constitutionnelle des modifications proposées, je ferai observer que le gouvernement envisage de rétablir le pouvoir discrétionnaire ju- diciaire d’accorder une dispense de la suramende, mais selon des conditions qui diffèrent de celles de l’ancien libellé du par 737(5). le législateur a choisi un autre moyen, et il évaluera probablement s’il y a lieu d’apporter des modifications additionnelles à la lumière du présent jugement. (2) remedial options for offenders no longer (2) les réparations possibles pour les contreve- “in the system” nants qui n’ont plus d’affaire « en cours » [103] for the appellants before this court, the above declaration will invalidate the surcharge [103] en ce qui concerne les appelants en l’es- pèce, la déclaration prononcée plus tôt invalidera la 648 r v boudreault martin j. [2018] 3 scr. from the date of the 2013 amendments: canada (attorney general) v. hislop, 2007 scc 10, [2007] 1 scr 429, at para 82. for other individuals who are still “within the judicial system” an appeal from their sentence on constitutional grounds may lie. these individuals include those who challenged the constitutionality of the surcharge at sentencing and whose appeals are pending, whose rights of appeal have not yet elapsed, or who may be granted an extension of time to appeal based on the criteria that normally apply in such cases: r v. thomas, [1990] 1 scr 713, at p 716. [104] however, my conclusion on the invalidity of s. 737 is of little help to individuals already subject to surcharge amounts that they cannot pay and are attached to sentences that they can no longer chal- lenge. in thomas, this court concluded that a person with no remaining recourse to challenge a conviction cannot re- open their file if the applicable offence provisions are later declared unconstitutional. [105] the reason for that ruling is that, in gen- eral, declarations of invalidity have only prospec- tive effects with regard to non- parties: schachter, at p 720. moreover, as a general rule, court orders are protected from challenge by the doctrine of res judicata — one of the pillars of the rule of law in canadian society — even when the legislation on which they are based is later invalidated: reference re manitoba language rights, at p. 757; r v. sarson, [1996] 2 scr 223, at para 26. suramende à compter de la date des modifications de 2013 : canada (procureur général) c. hislop, 2007 csc 10, [2007] 1 rcs 429, par 82. quant aux autres personnes qui ont toujours une affaire « en cours », ils pourront faire appel de leur peine pour des motifs constitutionnels. les personnes con- cernées sont notamment celles qui ont contesté la constitutionnalité de la suramende au moment du prononcé de la peine et dont les appels sont en ins- tance, celles dont le délai d’appel n’est pas encore expiré, ou encore celles qui pourraient se voir ac- corder une prorogation du délai d’appel selon les critères qui s’appliquent normalement dans de tels cas : r c. thomas, [1990] 1 rcs 713, p 716. [104] toutefois, ma conclusion relative à l’inva- lidité de l’art. 737 n’aide guère les personnes déjà assujetties à des suramendes qu’elles ne peuvent payer et qui se rattachent à des peines qu’elles ne peuvent plus contester. dans l’arrêt thomas, la cour a conclu que la personne qui a épuisé tous les recours possibles pour contester sa déclaration de culpabi- lité ne peut rouvrir son dossier si les dispositions applicables concernant l’infraction sont par la suite déclarées inconstitutionnelles. [105] cette conclusion s’explique par le fait qu’en règle générale, les déclarations d’invalidité valent uni- quement pour l’avenir en ce qui concerne les personnes qui ne sont pas parties à l’action : schachter, p 720. qui plus est, les ordonnances judiciaires sont géné- ralement à l’abri d’une contestation par application de la doctrine de l’autorité de la chose jugée — l’un des piliers de la primauté du droit dans notre société — même dans le cas où la disposition législative sur laquelle elles se fondent est invalidée par la suite : renvoi relatif aux droits linguistiques au manitoba, p. 757; r c. sarson, [1996] 2 rcs 223, par 26. [106] however, the rule of law will also not suffer the continued infliction of cruel and unusual punish- ment that cannot be justified in a free and democratic society. the mandatory victim surcharge violates s. 12 when it is imposed and when it is enforced. each time a convicted person shows up to court or is arrested and brought to court to provide an update on their financial status, the presiding judge is, in effect, confirming the operation of the victim surcharge. [106] cependant, la primauté du droit ne saurait permettre non plus l’infliction continue d’une peine cruelle et inusitée qui ne peut se justifier dans une société libre et démocratique. la suramende com- pensatoire obligatoire viole l’art. 12, aussi bien lors de son infliction que lors de son exécution. chaque fois qu’une personne déclarée coupable se présente devant le tribunal, ou est arrêtée et amenée devant le tribunal pour faire le point sur sa situation financière, [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge martin 649 that confirmation is contrary to the court’s finding in this case. similarly, each appearance sets in mo- tion an additional period of uncertainty, which is, again, contrary to this court’s finding in this case. at each appearance, the presiding court is put in the position of having to affirm the very elements of the law that render it cruel and unusual punishment. the offender placed in this position will also remain una- ble to seek a record suspension, even if the surcharge represents their only outstanding debt to society. [107] the fact that, at any moment in the cycle of enforcement, the current state of affairs may consti- tute a s. 12 violation means that res judicata ought not operate to bar an application for relief from that state of affairs. as this court found in r v. gamble, [1988] 2 scr 595, at p. 630, a “continuing current violation” of a charter-protected interest could give rise to a successful application for a charter remedy, even where the violation began with a valid order that is legally unassailable. [108] the difficulty is in determining what the remedy for this ongoing violation ought to be. only the tinker appellants and the intervener the criminal lawyers’ association addressed in their pleadings the need for a specific constitutional remedy for the individuals described above. without the benefit of more robust submissions from the parties on this issue, it would be inappropriate to grant a remedy for a class of individuals who are not parties to this litigation. le juge qui préside l’audience se trouve, dans les faits, à confirmer l’application de la suramende compensatoire. une telle confirmation est contraire à la décision de la cour en l’espèce. de la même façon, chaque comparution marque le début d’une autre période d’incertitude, ce qui est encore une fois contraire à la conclusion de la cour en l’espèce. lors de chaque comparution, le juge qui préside l’audience se retrouve contraint à entériner les élé- ments mêmes de la disposition qui font d’elle une peine cruelle et inusitée. en outre, le contrevenant dans cette position demeurera dans l’incapacité de présenter une demande de suspension de son casier, même si la suramende représente la seule dette qu’il lui reste envers la société. [107] le fait que la situation en cours puisse constituer une violation de l’art. 12 tout au long du cycle d’exécution de la suramende implique que l’autorité de la chose jugée ne saurait jouer de ma- nière à interdire la présentation de demandes visant à faire cesser cette situation. comme l’a déjà précisé la cour dans l’arrêt r c. gamble, [1988] 2 rcs 595, p. 630, les tribunaux sont susceptibles d’accueillir une demande de réparation fondée sur la charte dans une situation où il y a « actuellement violation continue » d’un droit protégé par la charte, même si l’atteinte tire ses origines d’une ordonnance valide et inattaquable au plan juridique. [108] la difficulté réside dans le fait de déterminer la mesure de réparation qu’il convient d’accorder relativement à cette atteinte continue. seuls les ap- pelants tinker et l’intervenante la criminal lawyers’ association ont abordé, dans leurs plaidoiries, la nécessité d’une réparation constitutionnelle précise pour les personnes décrites précédemment. sans le bénéfice d’arguments plus solides de la part des par- ties relativement à cette question, il serait inapproprié d’accorder une réparation à un groupe de personnes qui ne sont pas parties au présent litige. [109] though unable to order a specific remedy for this class of offenders, i would note that a va- riety of possible remedies exist private parties may be able to seek relief in the courts, notably by recourse to s.  24(1) of the charter government and parliament also have options to attend to their [109] bien que je ne sois pas en mesure d’or- donner une réparation précise pour cette catégorie de contrevenants, je tiens à souligner qu’il existe toute une variété de réparations possibles. les par- ticuliers pourraient être en mesure de s’adresser aux tribunaux pour demander réparation, notamment en 650 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. responsibility to ensure that charter rights are pro- tected. the government could proceed administra- tively, while parliament may act to bring a modified and charter-compliant version of s. 737 back into the code and to resolve the outstanding charter concerns identified here. invoquant le par. 24(1) de la charte. le gouverne- ment et le législateur disposent aussi d’options qui leur permettront de s’acquitter de leurs responsabili- tés en matière de protection des droits garantis par la charte. le gouvernement pourrait procéder par voie administrative, pendant que le législateur mettrait au point une version de l’art. 737 du code criminel qui soit conforme à la charte et prendrait des mesures pour remédier aux préoccupations liées à la charte soulevées en l’espèce. vi conclusion vi conclusion [110] ultimately, for both several of the appel- lants and the reasonable hypothetical offender, the mandatory victim surcharge is unmoored from its legitimate objectives. judges are forced to impose a one- size-fits- all punishment which does not take into account the individual’s ability to pay. in this context, the resulting indeterminate punishment re- sults in a grossly disproportionate public shaming of disadvantaged offenders. it is what most canadians would call an abhorrent and intolerable punishment. put simply, in our free and democratic society, it is cruel and it is unusual. i conclude, therefore, that the victim sur- [111] charge violates s. 12 of the charter. it cannot be justified under s 1. i would allow the appeals. [110] en dernière analyse, tant en ce qui concerne plusieurs des appelants en l’espèce qu’en ce qui concerne un contrevenant placé dans une situation hypothétique raisonnable, rien ne rattache la sura- mende compensatoire obligatoire aux objectifs légi- times qu’elle poursuit. les juges se voient contraints de prononcer une peine universelle qui fait abstrac- tion de la capacité de payer des intéressés. dans ce contexte, la peine d’une durée indéterminée qui en découle conduit à une humiliation publique exagé- rément disproportionnée des contrevenants défavo- risés. il s’agit là de ce que la plupart des canadiens considéreraient comme une peine odieuse et intolé- rable. en termes clairs, dans notre société libre et dé- mocratique, il s’agit d’une peine cruelle et inusitée. [111] par conséquent, je conclus que la suramende compensatoire viole l’art. 12 de la charte, et que cette violation ne peut être justifiée au regard de l’ar- ticle premier. je suis d’avis d’accueillir les pourvois. the reasons of côté and rowe jj. were delivered version française des motifs des juges côté et by rowe rendus par côté j. (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i. introduction i. introduction [112] section 737 of the criminal code, rsc. 1985, c. c-46, requires that individuals who are con- victed or discharged of offences under that statute, or under the controlled drugs and substances act, sc 1996, c. 19 (“cdsa”), pay a minimum amount of money to the state as a “victim surcharge”. at is- sue in these appeals is whether this provision violates [112] l’article 737 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, prévoit qu’une personne condamnée ou ab- soute à l’égard d’une infraction prévue par cette loi ou par la loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances, lc 1996, c. 19 (« lrcdas »), est tenue de verser une somme d’argent minimale à l’état à titre de « suramende compensatoire ». la [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 651 ss. 7 and 12 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms in a manner that cannot be justified under s 1. [113] my colleague, martin  j., concludes that s. 737 of the criminal code violates the constitu- tional right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, as set out in s. 12 of the charter, and that this violation cannot be saved by s 1. she would therefore declare the impugned provision invalid with immediate effect pursuant to s. 52(1) of the constitution act, 1982. since she allows the appeals on this basis, my colleague finds it unnecessary to address the s. 7 argument advanced by several of the appellants. [114] i respectfully disagree. while i accept that the mandatory imposition of the victim surcharge may have a particularly negative impact on impe- cunious offenders, i cannot accept that it amounts to treatment or punishment that is truly “cruel and unusual”, as that phrase has been interpreted in this court’s jurisprudence. moreover, i am of the view that the impugned provision does not deprive im- pecunious offenders of their security of the person, and that any deprivation of liberty that may result from the application of s. 737 of the criminal code accords with the principles of fundamental justice. for these reasons, i discern no violation of either ss. 12 or 7 of the charter, and i would dismiss the appeals accordingly. question en litige dans les présents pourvois est celle de savoir si cette disposition contrevient aux art. 7 et 12 de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés d’une manière qui ne peut se justifier au regard de l’article premier. [113] ma collègue la juge martin conclut que l’art. 737 du code criminel viole le droit consti- tutionnel à la protection contre les peines cruelles et inusitées conféré par l’art. 12 de la charte, et que cette violation ne peut être justifiée au regard de l’article premier. par conséquent, elle déclare la disposition contestée invalide avec effet immédiat en application du par. 52(1) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982. étant donné qu’elle accueille les pourvois pour ces motifs, ma collègue considère qu’il n’est pas nécessaire d’examiner l’argument fondé sur l’art. 7 invoqué par plusieurs des appelants. [114] avec égards, je suis en désaccord. bien que j’accepte que l’imposition obligatoire d’une sura- mende compensatoire puisse avoir une incidence particulièrement négative sur des contrevenants im- pécunieux, je ne peux accepter que la suramende équivaut à un traitement ou une peine véritablement « cruel et inusité » selon la définition donnée à ces termes dans la jurisprudence de notre cour. de plus, je suis d’avis que la disposition contestée ne porte pas atteinte à la sécurité des contrevenants impé- cunieux, et que toute privation de liberté pouvant découler de l’application de l’art. 737 du code cri- minel est conforme aux principes de justice fonda- mentale. pour ces motifs, je ne vois aucune violation de l’art. 12 ou de l’art. 7 de la charte et je rejetterais donc les pourvois. ii overview of the victim surcharge regime ii aperçu du régime de la suramende compensa- toire [115] section 737(1) of the criminal code pro- vides that “[a]n offender who is convicted, or dis- charged under section 730, of an offence under [that] act or the [cdsa] shall pay a victim surcharge, in addition to any other punishment imposed on the offender”. subsection (2) sets out the framework for calculating the minimum amount of the surcharge: 30 percent of any fine that is imposed for a given offence, or if no fine is imposed by the sentencing [115] le paragraphe 737(1) du code criminel pré- voit que « [d]ans le cas où il est condamné — ou absous aux termes de l’article 730 — à l’égard d’une infraction prévue à la présente loi ou à la [lrcdas], le contrevenant est tenu de verser une suramende compensatoire, en plus de toute autre peine qui lui est infligée ». le paragraphe (2) établit le cadre per- mettant de calculer le montant minimal de la sura- mende compensatoire : 30 % de l’amende imposée 652 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. judge, $100 for each offence punishable by summary conviction and $200 for each offence punishable by indictment. pursuant to subs. (3), however, the court has the authority to order that an offender pay a victim surcharge exceeding these minimums if it “considers it appropriate in the circumstances and is satisfied that the offender is able to pay the higher amount”. all amounts collected in victim surcharges are to be applied for the purpose of providing such assistance to victims of crimes as the lieutenant governor in council of the province in which the surcharge is imposed may direct from time to time (s 737(7)). [116] prior to 2013, the court had the discretion to exempt an offender from the requirement to pay the surcharge if “the offender establishe[d] to the satisfaction of the court that undue hardship to the offender or the dependants of the offender would result from the payment of the victim surcharge” (s. 737(5), since repealed). the passage of the in- creasing offenders’ accountability for victims act, sc 2013, c. 11 (“ioava”), among other things, did away with this partial discretion — thus making the surcharge mandatory in all cases. [117] the time within which an offender will be required to pay a victim surcharge is established by the lieutenant governor in council of the province in which the surcharge is imposed (s 737(4)). in quebec, the victim surcharge is due 45 days after the date on which it was imposed, or if a fine is imposed, on the date the fine is due (see: time limit to pay the victim surcharge, oc 154- 2016, 2016 go ii, at p 1335). in ontario, an offender has 30 days to pay a surcharge in respect of a summary conviction of- fence and 60 days in respect of an indictable offence, starting the day on which the surcharge is first im- posed (see: oc 2173/99). extensions are available, however: ss. 737(9) and 734.3 of the criminal code provide that the court may change any term of its order except the amount of the surcharge, on appli- cation by or on behalf of an offender. section 737(8) requires that an offender be given written notice of the amount of the victim surcharge, the manner in which it is to be paid, the time by which it must be pour une infraction donnée, ou si le juge de la peine n’impose aucune amende, 100 $ pour chaque in- fraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire et 200 $ pour chaque infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par mise en accusation. en vertu du par. 737(3), le tribunal peut cependant, « s’il estime que les circonstances le jus- tifient et s’il est convaincu que le contrevenant a la capacité de payer », ordonner à celui-ci de verser une suramende compensatoire supérieure aux minimums susmentionnés. toutes les sommes ainsi recueillies sont affectées à l’aide aux victimes d’actes criminels en conformité avec les instructions du lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil de la province où les sura- mendes compensatoires sont infligées (par 737(7)). [116] avant 2013, le tribunal pouvait exempter un contrevenant de l’obligation de payer la suramende si ce dernier « démontr[ait] que cela lui causerait — ou causerait aux personnes à sa charge — un pré- judice injustifié » (par. 737(5), maintenant abrogé). l’adoption de la loi sur la responsabilisation des contrevenants à l’égard des victimes, lc 2013, c. 11 (« lrcv ») a notamment supprimé ce pouvoir discrétionnaire partiel, rendant ainsi obligatoire dans tous les cas l’imposition de la suramende. [117] le délai dont dispose un contrevenant pour payer la suramende compensatoire est établi par le lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil de la province où la suramende est imposée (par 737(4)). au qué- bec, la suramende compensatoire est exigible dans les 45 jours suivant la date de son imposition ou, si une amende est imposée, à la date d’échéance de paiement de l’amende (voir : date d’échéance de paiement d’une suramende compensatoire, dé- cret 154- 2016, 2016 go ii, p 1637). en ontario, un contrevenant dispose de 30 jours pour payer la sura- mende découlant d’une déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire, et de 60 jours si la suramende est imposée à l’égard d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par mise en accusation, à partir du jour où la suramende est imposée (voir : décret 2173/99). il est toutefois possible d’obtenir des prorogations de délai : en vertu du par. 737(9) et de l’art 7343 du code criminel, le tribunal peut modifier une condition de l’ordonnance autre que le [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 653 paid, and the procedure for applying for a change in the terms of the order in accordance with s 7343. [118] section 737(9) incorporates into the oper- ation of the victim surcharge regime most of the enforcement provisions applicable to the payment of fines: ss. 734(3) to (7), 734.3, 734.5, 734.7, 734.8 and 736 of the criminal code. these provisions give the state a number of tools to compel payment by offenders who are “in default” — that is, who fail to pay the surcharge in full by the prescribed time (s 734(3)). for example, a province may refuse to issue or renew, or may suspend, any licence or permit in relation to a defaulting offender until any outstand- ing surcharge is paid in full (s 7345(a)). montant de la suramende si le contrevenant ou toute autre personne agissant pour son compte en fait la demande. le paragraphe 737(8) exige que le tribunal donne au contrevenant un avis écrit du montant de la suramende compensatoire, des modalités du paie- ment, de l’échéance du paiement et de la procédure à suivre pour présenter une demande visant à modifier les conditions de l’ordonnance, en conformité avec l’art 7343. [118] le paragraphe 737(9) incorpore au régime de la suramende compensatoire la plupart des dis- positions d’exécution applicables au paiement des amendes  : les par.  734(3) à (7) et les art.  734.3, 734.5, 734.7, 734.8 et 736 du code criminel. ces dispositions confèrent à l’état un certain nombre d’outils pour exiger le paiement des contrevenants « en défaut » — c’est-à-dire qui ne se sont pas ac- quittés intégralement du paiement de la suramende à la date prévue (par 734(3)). par exemple, dans le cas d’un contrevenant en défaut, une province peut refuser de délivrer ou de renouveler une li- cence ou un permis, ou peut les suspendre, jusqu’au paiement intégral de la suramende compensatoire (al 7345a)). [119] one important enforcement tool that is not incorporated into the victim surcharge regime (by s. 737(9)) is the procedure for civil enforcement set out in s 7346 of the criminal code. what this effectively means is that an unpaid surcharge cannot be entered as a civil judgment against a defaulting offender. [119] un outil important d’exécution de la loi n’est toutefois pas incorporé au régime de la suramende compensatoire (au moyen du par. 737(9)) : il s’agit de la procédure d’exécution civile prévue à l’art 7346 du code criminel. concrètement, cela signifie qu’une suramende impayée ne peut être inscrite comme juge- ment civil à l’encontre d’un contrevenant en défaut. [120] conversely, imprisonment is a possible con- sequence of non- payment. section 734(4) provides that “a term of imprisonment    shall be deemed to be imposed” upon an offender who defaults in paying the surcharge. however, the court’s authority to commit an offender to jail for non- payment is cir- cumscribed by s 7347(1): the crown must establish both that suspending or refusing to issue or renew a licence (pursuant to s 7345) is inappropriate in the circumstances and that the offender has refused to pay or otherwise discharge the surcharge “without reasonable excuse”. as this court explained in r v. wu, 2003 scc 73, [2003] 3 scr 530, at para. 61, both of these elements must be present before a [120] à l’inverse, l’emprisonnement est une consé- quence possible du non- paiement d’une suramende. le paragraphe 734(4) prévoit qu’« [e]st réputée in- fligée [  ] [une] période d’emprisonnement » au contrevenant qui fait défaut de payer la suramende. toutefois, le pouvoir du tribunal de faire incarcérer un contrevenant pour défaut de paiement est limité par le par 7347(1) : la couronne doit établir que la suspension d’une licence ou le refus de délivrer ou de renouveler une licence (en vertu de l’art 7345) est inapproprié dans les circonstances et que le contreve- nant a refusé de payer la suramende ou de s’en acquit- ter autrement « sans excuse raisonnable ». comme l’a expliqué la cour dans r c. wu, 2003 csc 73, [2003] 654 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. defaulting offender can be committed, despite the use of the word “or” at the end of s 7347(1)(b)(i). [121] if the court issues a warrant for the committal of a defaulting offender, the term of imprisonment is to be set at the lesser of (a) the number of days that corresponds to the outstanding amount of the surcharge (plus the costs and charges associated with committing and conveying the defaulter to prison), divided by eight times the minimum hourly wage in the applicable province at the time of default, and (b)  the maximum term of imprisonment that the court could itself impose upon conviction for the underlying offences (s 734(5)). [122] pursuant to s. 736, a province may choose to establish a “fine option program”, through which offenders may discharge amounts owing under s. 737 by earning credits for work performed during a pe- riod not greater than two years. at the time of hear- ing, only some provinces (including quebec, but not ontario) had established such a program. [123] the ontario court of appeal, in its reasons in r v. tinker, 2017 onca 552, 136 or (3d) 718 (“ontario court of appeal reasons”), identified, at para. 86, two purposes of the victim surcharge regime and of the removal of discretion in 2013: (1) (2) to rectify some of the harm done by criminal ac- tivity by raising funds for public services devoted to assisting victims of crime; and to hold offenders accountable to victims of crimes and to the community by requiring a contribution by them to these funds at the time of sentencing. 3 rcs 530, par. 61, ces deux éléments doivent être présents pour que le tribunal puisse ordonner l’incar- cération du contrevenant en défaut, malgré l’emploi de la conjonction « ou » à l’al 7347(1)b). [121] si le tribunal délivre un mandat d’incarcé- ration à l’endroit d’un contrevenant en défaut, la période d’emprisonnement qui s’applique est la plus courte des périodes suivantes : a) le nombre de jours qui correspond au montant impayé de la suramende (et des frais et dépens de l’envoi et de la conduite en prison de la personne en défaut de paiement), divisé par huit fois le taux horaire du salaire minimum en vigueur dans la province au moment du défaut, et b) la période d’emprisonnement maximale que le tri- bunal peut infliger pour les infractions sous- jacentes (par 734(5)). [122] en vertu de l’art. 736, une province peut dé- cider d’établir un programme proposant un « mode facultatif de paiement d’une amende » permettant aux contrevenants de s’acquitter de sommes dues aux termes de l’art. 737 par acquisition de crédits grâce à des travaux réalisés sur une période maximale de deux ans. au moment de l’audience, certaines pro- vinces seulement (dont le québec, mais non l’onta- rio) avaient mis sur pied un tel programme. [123] dans ses motifs de la décision r c. tinker, 2017 onca 552, 136 or (3d) 755 (« motifs de la cour d’appel de l’ontario »), la cour d’appel de l’ontario a identifié, au par. 86, deux objectifs du régime de la suramende compensatoire et a rappelé la suppression du pouvoir discrétionnaire en 2013 : (1) (2) réparer, dans une certaine mesure, le tort causé par les activités criminelles en collectant des fonds pour les services publics qui assistent les victimes d’actes criminels; rendre les contrevenants responsables envers les victimes d’actes criminels et la collectivité en exigeant qu’ils contribuent à ces fonds lors de la détermination de la peine. none of the parties dispute this characterization of the regime’s purposes (see: af (tinker et al.), at para. 35; af (boudreault), at para. 31; rf,. attorney aucune des parties ne conteste cette description des objectifs du régime (voir : ma (tinker et autres), par. 35; ma (boudreault), par. 31; mi, procureure [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 655 general of quebec (boudreault), at para. 15; rf,. attorney general of ontario (tinker et al., eckstein and larocque), at para 41). i therefore agree with my colleague that this is the proper way to view the purposes of the victim surcharge and of the 2013 iaova amendments (martin j. reasons, at para 62). générale du québec (boudreault), par.  15; mi, procureure générale de l’ontario (tinker et autres, eckstein et larocque), par 41). par conséquent, à l’instar de ma collègue, je considère que cet énoncé décrit correctement les objectifs de la suramende compensatoire et des modifications apportées à la lrcv en 2013 (motifs de la juge martin, par 62). iii analysis: section 12 iii analyse : art. 12 [124] section  12 of the charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”. to make out a violation of s. 12, a claimant must estab- lish two things: first, that the state measure at issue constitutes “treatment or punishment”; and second, that the treatment or punishment in question is “cruel and unusual”. [124] l’article  12 de la charte dispose que  : « [c]ha cun a droit à la protection contre tous trai- tements ou peines cruels et inusités ». pour établir qu’il y a eu violation de l’art. 12, le demandeur doit démontrer deux choses : premièrement, que la me- sure prise par l’état constitue un « traitement ou une peine » et, deuxièmement, que ce traitement ou cette peine est « cruel et inusité ». [125] the respondents accept that s. 12 is engaged in these circumstances, since the victim surcharge is, at a minimum, a “treatment”. i agree with my colleague that the victim surcharge constitutes a punishment under s. 12, pursuant to the test set out in r v. krj, 2016 scc 31, [2016] 1 scr 906 (martin j. reasons, at para 44). section 12 is there- fore engaged. [126] this court has recognized that treatment or punishment will rise to the level of being cruel and unusual where it “is so excessive as to outrage standards of decency” (r v. smith, [1987] 1 scr. 1045, at p. 1072, citing miller v. the queen, [1977] 2 scr 680, p 688). in r v. nur, 2015 scc 15, [2015] 1 scr 773, mclachlin cj explained that a sentence will offend s. 12 only where it is “grossly disproportionate to the punishment that is appropri- ate, having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender” (para 39). it is therefore not sufficient that a sentence be “merely excessive”; to be cruel and unusual, it must be dis- proportionate to the point of being “abhorrent or intolerable”, such that it is incompatible with human dignity (r v. lloyd, 2016 scc 13, [2016] 1 scr. 130, at para. 24; smith, at p. 1072; r v. morrisey, 2000 scc 39, [2000] 2 scr 90, at para 26). [125] les intimés admettent que l’art. 12 s’ap- plique dans ces circonstances, étant donné que la suramende compensatoire est, à tout le moins, un « traitement ». à l’instar de ma collègue, je suis d’avis que la suramende compensatoire constitue une peine pour l’application de l’art. 12, conformé- ment au critère énoncé dans r c. krj, 2016 csc 31, [2016] 1 rcs 906 (motifs de la juge martin, par 44). l’article 12 est donc en cause. [126] la cour a reconnu que le traitement ou la peine sera qualifié de cruel ou inusité s’il « est ex- cessi[f] au point de ne pas être compatible avec la dignité humaine » (r c. smith, [1987] 1 rcs 1045, p. 1072, citant miller c. la reine, [1977] 2 rcs. 680, p 688). dans r c. nur, 2015 csc 15, [2015] 1 rcs 773, la juge en chef mclachlin a expliqué qu’une peine ne contrevient à l’art. 12 que si elle est « totalement disproportionnée à celle qui convient eu égard à la nature de l’infraction et à la situation du délinquant » (par 39). par conséquent, il n’est pas suffisant qu’une peine soit « simplement excessive »; pour être cruelle et inusitée, elle doit être « odieuse ou intolérable », de sorte qu’elle est incompatible avec la dignité humaine (r c. lloyd, 2016 csc 13, [2016] 1 rcs 130, par. 24; smith, p. 1072; r c. morrisey, 2000 csc 39, [2000] 2 rcs 90, par 26). 656 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [127] the standard for what constitutes cruel and unusual treatment or punishment must necessarily be high. as stated by cory j. in steele v. mountain institution, [1990] 2 scr 1385, at p. 1417: [127] la norme permettant de déterminer ce qui constitue un traitement ou une peine cruel et inusité doit nécessairement être élevée. comme l’a déclaré le juge cory dans steele c. établissement mountain, [1990] 2 rcs 1385, p. 1417 : it will only be on rare and unique occasions that a court will find a sentence so grossly disproportionate that it violates the provisions of s. 12 of the charter. the test for determining whether a sentence is disproportionately long is very properly stringent and demanding. a lesser test would tend to trivialize the charter. il arrivera très rarement qu’une cour de justice conclue qu’une peine est si exagérément disproportionnée qu’elle viole les dispositions de l’art. 12 de la charte. le critère qui sert à déterminer si une peine est beaucoup trop longue est à bon droit strict et exigeant. un critère moindre ten- drait à banaliser la charte. the stringency of this test is evidenced by the fact that, to date, there have been only three occasions on which this court has found that specific mandatory minimum jail sentences violate s. 12 (smith, nur and lloyd). with respect to treatments or punishments relating to property rights, the newfoundland court of appeal had the following to say in r v. lambe, 2000 nfca 23, 73 crr (2d) 273, at para. 69: if it is only in “rare and unique” occasions that s. 12 can be invoked in respect of sentences affecting the personal liberties and freedoms of an [individual,] the protection of which is the essential reason for the charter’s existence, then it appears eminently reasonable that the occasions for bringing fines and forfeitures under s. 12’s umbrella will be even more exceptional. in nur, where the issue was the constitution- [128] ality of a three- year mandatory minimum custodial sentence for the unlawful possession of a loaded or readily loaded prohibited or restricted firearm con- trary to s. 95(1) of the criminal code, this court es- tablished a two- step inquiry for determining whether a statutory provision that prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence violates s. 12 (para 46). first, the court must determine what would constitute a fit and proportionate sentence for the offender, taking into account his or her circumstances as well as the nature of the offence. second, the court must con- sider whether the mandatory minimum sentence is grossly disproportionate to what would otherwise be a fit sentence. le fait que notre cour a conclu à trois occasions seulement que des dispositions précises relatives à des peines obligatoires d’emprisonnement minimales contrevenaient à l’art. 12 (smith, nur et lloyd) té- moigne de la rigueur du critère. en ce qui concerne les traitements et peines relatifs à des droits de pro- priété, la cour d’appel de terre- neuve a formulé la remarque suivante dans r c. lambe, 2000 nfca 23, 73 crr (2d) 273, par. 69 : [traduction] si ce n’est qu’en de « très rares » situations que l’art. 12 peut être invoqué à l’égard de peines portant atteinte aux libertés personnelles — la protection de telles libertés ayant motivé essentiellement l’adoption de la charte —, il semble éminemment raisonnable d’affirmer que les situations où des amendes et des confiscations peuvent être contestées avec succès en vertu de l’art. 12 seront encore plus exceptionnelles. [128] dans nur, où le litige portait sur la consti- tutionnalité d’une peine minimale obligatoire d’em- prisonnement de trois ans pour la possession illégale d’une arme à feu prohibée ou à autorisation res- treinte, chargée ou prête à l’être (infraction prévue au par. 95(1) du code criminel), la cour a établi une analyse en deux étapes pour déterminer si une disposition légale qui prévoit une peine minimale obligatoire viole l’art. 12 (par 46). premièrement, le tribunal doit déterminer ce qui constituerait une peine juste et proportionnée pour le contrevenant, en tenant compte de sa situation personnelle ainsi que de la nature de l’infraction. deuxièmement, le tribunal doit décider si la peine minimale obligatoire est totalement disproportionnée à la peine qui serait par ailleurs juste. [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 657 [129] a court undertaking an inquiry under the framework set out in nur need not limit itself to the individual(s) bringing the s. 12 challenge; it may also look to “other reasonably foreseeable situations where the impugned law may apply” to determine whether the requisite gross disproportionality would exist in such cases (nur, at para 58). any hypothet- icals considered in this respect must nevertheless be reasonable, such that “far- fetched or marginally imaginable cases” cannot factor into the analysis (r. v. goltz, [1991] 3 scr 485, at p 505-6). simply put, the court’s approach to reasonable hypotheticals “must be grounded in common sense and experi- ence” so that the reach of the law and its reasonably foreseeable impact can properly be understood (nur, at para. 75; see also para 61). [130] section 737 requires that courts impose a minimum victim surcharge on all offenders who are convicted or discharged of offences under the criminal code or the cdsa, regardless of the nature of the offence or the offender’s financial means. because it necessarily forms part of an offender’s sentence, the surcharge can therefore be treated as a type of mandatory minimum for the purpose of this analysis. [131] for this reason, i agree with my colleague that the ultimate question in these appeals is whether the victim surcharge renders a sentence grossly dis- proportionate based on its overall impact and effects, either for the appellants before this court or for a hy- pothetical offender (martin j. reasons, at para 47). a a fit and proportionate sentence, either for the individual appellants or for a hypothetical impecunious offender, would most likely not include a victim surcharge [129] le tribunal qui entreprend une analyse se- lon le cadre énoncé dans nur n’est pas tenu de se limiter à la situation de la personne qui soulève une contestation fondée sur l’art 12. il peut aussi exa- miner « toute autre situation raisonnablement prévi- sible à laquelle la disposition pourrait s’appliquer » pour décider si la disproportion totale requise serait présente dans ces cas (nur, par 58). les situations hypothétiques ainsi examinées doivent néanmoins être raisonnables, de sorte que celles qui sont « in- vraisemblables ou difficilement imaginables » ne peuvent être prises en compte dans l’analyse (r c. goltz, [1991] 3 rcs 485, p. 505- 506). autrement dit, l’examen des situations hypothétiques raison- nables par le tribunal « doit avoir pour assises le bon sens et l’expérience » de façon à ce que la portée de la loi et ses conséquences raisonnablement prévi- sibles puissent être correctement comprises (nur, par. 75; voir aussi par 61). [130] l’article 737 exige que les tribunaux im- posent une suramende compensatoire minimale à tous les contrevenants qui sont déclarés coupables ou absous d’une infraction prévue au code criminel ou à la lrcdas, peu importe la nature de l’infraction ou les moyens financiers du contrevenant. comme cette suramende fait nécessairement partie de la peine du contrevenant, elle peut être considérée comme un type de minimum obligatoire pour les besoins de l’analyse. [131] pour cette raison, je souscris à l’opinion de ma collègue selon laquelle la question fondamentale dans les présents pourvois est de décider si, eu égard à l’ensemble de ses effets, la suramende compen- satoire rend la peine totalement disproportionnée, que ce soit à l’égard des appelants ou de tout autre contrevenant hypothétique (motifs de la juge martin, par 47). a une peine juste et proportionnée, que ce soit pour les appelants individuels ou tout autre con- trevenant hypothétique impécunieux, n’inclurait probablement pas une suramende compensa- toire [132] for many offenders, a victim surcharge of either $100 or $200 per offence may form part of a [132] pour bien des contrevenants, une sura- mende de 100 ou 200 $ par infraction peut faire 658 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. fit and proportionate sentence. the two objectives of the victim surcharge — to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and to raise revenues for victim services — are closely related to two of the purposes of sentencing recognized under s. 718(e) and (f) of the criminal code. it is therefore incum- bent on sentencing judges to consider the surcharge and the impact of the payment obligation on the offender in order to craft a sentence that is consistent with the principles of proportionality and totality (see: r v. cloud, 2016 qcca 567, 28 cr (7th) 310, at para 75). for those who do not have the means to pay, the court can account for the effect of the surcharge by adjusting other components of the sentence (for example, by reducing the length of a term of imprisonment or the amount of a fine) to ensure that the sentence is altogether fit and ap- propriate in the circumstances. in other words, the surcharge need not be added on top of an already proportionate sentence; rather, it should form part of such a proportionate sentence. [133] i would also pause at this juncture to note that s. 737(2) sets out the minimum amounts that must be imposed by way of a victim surcharge. it is therefore open to judges, in crafting an appropriate sentence, to order that the offender pay a higher amount where appropriate. in r v. mikhail, 2015 oncj 469, for example, the sentencing judge im- posed a victim surcharge of $2,000 for each of the four counts of robbery of which the offender had been convicted (for a total of $8,000), after taking into account the offender’s income, cost of living, prospects for rehabilitation, and work ethic (para. 34 (canlii); see also: r v. bao, 2018 oncj 136, at paras. 20 and 22 (canlii); and r v. willett, 2017 abpc 68, at paras. 87-92 (canlii)). partie d’une peine juste et proportionnée. les deux objectifs de la suramende compensatoire — promou- voir la conscience de leurs responsabilités chez les contrevenants et recueillir des fonds pour les services offerts aux victimes — sont intimement liés aux ob- jectifs du prononcé des peines énoncés aux al. 718e) et f) du code criminel. il incombe par conséquent aux juges chargés de la détermination de la peine de tenir compte de la suramende et de l’incidence qu’elle aura sur le contrevenant afin de façonner une peine qui sera conforme aux principes de la propor- tionnalité et de la totalité (voir : r c. cloud, 2016 qcca 567, 28 cr (7th) 310, par 75). pour ceux qui n’ont pas les moyens de payer, le tribunal peut tenir compte de l’effet de la suramende en modulant d’autres éléments de la peine (par exemple, en rédui- sant la durée de l’emprisonnement ou le montant de l’amende) pour faire en sorte que la peine soit juste et appropriée dans les circonstances. en d’autres termes, la suramende n’a pas à être ajoutée à une peine déjà proportionnée; elle devrait plutôt faire partie d’une telle peine proportionnée. [133] j’ouvre ici une parenthèse pour faire remar- quer que le par. 737(2) prévoit les montants mini- maux qui doivent être imposés à titre de suramende compensatoire. par conséquent, les juges, en dé- terminant la peine appropriée, peuvent prévoir une suramende plus élevée s’ils le jugent approprié. par exemple, dans r c. mikhail, 2015 oncj 469, le juge a imposé une suramende compensatoire de 2000 $ à l’égard de chacun des quatre chefs de vol quali- fié dont le contrevenant a été déclaré coupable (ce qui représente un total de 8000 $), après avoir tenu compte des revenus du contrevenant, de ses frais de subsistance, de ses possibilités de réadaptation et de son éthique de travail (par. 34 (canlii); voir aussi : r c. bao, 2018 oncj 136, par. 20 et 22 (canlii); r c. willett, 2017 abpc 68, par. 87-92 (canlii)). [134] however, some offenders who live below the poverty line cannot reasonably be expected to pay even the minimum surcharge amounts without undue hardship and personal sacrifice. among these offenders are several of the appellants in the present cases. for example, mr. boudreault was unemployed and homeless when he committed the offences of which he was convicted (which related to breaking [134] toutefois, on ne peut raisonnablement s’at- tendre à ce que certains contrevenants vivant sous le seuil de la pauvreté paient ne serait-ce que les montants minimaux de la suramende sans éprouver de difficultés excessives et sans faire de sacrifices personnels plusieurs des appelants en l’espèce font partie de cette catégorie de contrevenants. par exemple, m. boudreault était sans emploi et sans [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 659 and entering), and the sentencing judge found that he had committed them in order to feed himself and to satisfy his marijuana dependence. the evi- dence indicated that his only source of income was a government aid payment of $400 per month (r v. boudreault, 2016 qcca 1907, 343 ccc (3d) 131, at para. 107 (“quebec court of appeal reasons”)). mr.  boudreault had not completed high school, and his earning prospects were limited. similarly, mr. larocque was impecunious, drug- dependent, and suffered from mental health issues at the time of sentencing. he had never had a full- time job, and his housing and food expenses were paid directly from his disability benefits. he used the remaining amount — somewhere between $71 and $136 per month — to pay his other living expenses.1 there is nothing to suggest that their respective circumstances have since changed. [135] as my colleague points out, many of these characteristics are shared by the other appellants (martin j. reasons, at paras 53-54). mr. tinker, ms.  judge, mr.  bondoc, mr.  mead (collectively, the “tinker appellants”), and mr. eckstein have low monthly incomes derived from social assistance. several of them suffer from physical and cognitive disabilities, live in precarious housing, and were given relatively modest sentences for the offences of which they were convicted. the same is true of mr. michael, the reasonable hypothetical offender put to this court by mr. eckstein (see: martin j. reasons, at para. 52, and r v. michael, 2014 oncj 360, 121 or (3d) 244). abri lorsqu’il a commis les infractions dont il a été déclaré coupable (lesquelles avaient trait à des in- troductions par effraction), et le juge a conclu qu’il avait commis ces infractions pour pouvoir se nour- rir et assouvir sa dépendance à la marijuana. selon la preuve, son unique source de revenus était des prestations d’aide gouvernementale mensuelles de 400 $ (r c. boudreault, 2016 qcca 1907, par. 107 (canlii) (« motifs de la cour d’appel du québec »)). m. boudreault n’a pas terminé ses études secondaires et ses perspectives en matière de revenus étaient li- mitées. de même, m. larocque était impécunieux, toxicomane et avait des problèmes de santé mentale au moment du prononcé de sa peine. il n’avait jamais eu un travail à temps plein et ses frais de logement et de nourriture étaient directement payés à partir de ses prestations d’invalidité. il se servait de la somme restante — entre 71 et 136 $ par mois — pour ses autres dépenses courantes1. rien n’indique que les situations respectives de ces appelants aient changé. [135] comme le souligne ma collègue, les autres appelants présentent de nombreuses caractéristiques semblables à celles de ces contrevenants (motifs de la juge martin, par 53-54). m. tinker, mme judge, m. bondoc, m. mead (collectivement, les « appe- lants tinker ») et m. eckstein ont de faibles revenus mensuels, provenant de prestations d’aide sociale. plusieurs d’entre eux souffrent de handicaps phy- siques et cognitifs, ont un logement précaire et ont été condamnés à des peines relativement modestes pour les infractions dont ils ont été déclarés cou- pables. la même chose vaut pour m. michael, le contrevenant se trouvant dans une situation hypo- thétique raisonnable évoqué par m. eckstein (voir : motifs de la juge martin, par. 52, et r c. michael, 2014 oncj 360, 121 or (3d) 244). [136] for the individuals before this court, and for mr. michael, i therefore accept that a fit and proportionate sentence would not include the sur- charge (see: rf. ontario (tinker et al., eckstein [136] j’accepte par conséquent que, pour les ap- pelants comme pour m. michael, une peine juste et proportionnée ne comprendrait pas une suramende (voir : mi, procureure générale de l’ontario (tinker 1 the sentencing judge found that, after paying for his lodging and food, mr. larocque had $136 per month available to him for his personal expenses (see: r v. larocque, 2014 oncj 428, at para. 30 (canlii)). however, mr. larocque’s affidavit indicates that that this figure is only $71 (see: ar (larocque), tab 9, at paras. 10-14; see also: r v. larocque, 2015 onsc 5407, at para. 5 (canlii)). 1 le juge a conclu qu’il restait à m. larocque, après les paiements relatifs au logement et à la nourriture, 136 $ par mois pour ses dépenses personnelles (voir : r c. larocque, 2014 oncj 428, par. 30 (canlii)). toutefois, l’affidavit de m. larocque indique que ce montant s’élève à seulement 71 $ (voir : da (larocque), onglet 9, par. 10-14; voir aussi : r c. larocque, 2015 cson 5407, par. 5 (canlii)). 660 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. and larocque), at para 38). this is consistent with some of the decisions below: the judge sentenc- ing mr. boudreault waived the surcharge for the offences committed before the 2013 amendments to s 737 (r v. boudreault, 2015 qccq 8504, at para. 55 (canlii)), and the ontario court of justice in tinker would have exercised the same discretion for each of the tinker appellants if it had been possi- ble to do so (2014 oncj 208, 120 or (3d) 784, at para. 12; see also ontario court of appeal reasons, at para 132). indeed, if the surcharge were treated like a fine under s. 734 of the criminal code, it could be imposed only if the crown established that the offender had the ability to pay it (see: s 734(2)). in cases where the offender was impecunious, the crown would be unable to do so. [137] that said, i would note that the obligation to pay a $100 or $200 surcharge for each conviction is not exorbitant in and of itself, and many canadians would not find payment to be particularly onerous. in fact, these amounts are considerably lower than the $1,000 minimum fine that attaches to a first con- viction for impaired driving (criminal code, ss. 253 and 255(1)(a)(i)), or the $1,000 minimum fine for failing to file a tax return under the income tax act, rsc 1985, c. 1 (5th supp.), ss. 238, 239 and 243. similarly, a number of provincial offences carry with them mandatory minimum fines that can be quite hefty; in ontario, for example, the minimum fine for driving without insurance is $5,000 (compulsory automobile insurance act, rso 1990, c c25, s. 2(3); see: rf,. attorney general of ontario (tinker et al., eckstein and larocque), at para 32). although some offenders — including several of the appellants in this case — have been ordered to pay relatively significant amounts in surcharges, this is attributable to the fact that they committed numerous offences, particularly in cases where the crown proceeded by indictment. the total amount that an offender must pay in surcharges depends both on how many offences were committed and on whether those of- fences were punishable by indictment or by summary conviction. that some offenders commit a number of serious offences, and therefore incur higher amounts et autres, eckstein et larocque), par 38). cette con- clusion est conforme à certaines décisions des cours d’instance inférieure : le juge qui a prononcé la peine de m. boudreault l’a dispensé du paiement de la suramende pour les infractions commises avant les modifications apportées à l’art. 737 en 2013 (r c. boudreault, 2015 qccq 8504, par. 55 (canlii)), et dans tinker, la cour de justice de l’ontario aurait exercé de la même façon son pouvoir discrétion- naire à l’égard de chacun des appelants tinker si elle avait pu le faire (2014 oncj 208, 120 or (3d) 791, par. 12; voir aussi : motifs de la cour d’ap- pel de l’ontario, par 132). en fait, si la suramende était traitée comme une amende visée à l’art. 734 du code criminel, elle ne pourrait être infligée que si la couronne établit que le contrevenant a la capacité de la payer (voir : par 734(2)). dans les cas où le contrevenant est impécunieux, la couronne ne serait pas en mesure de le faire. [137] cela étant dit, je tiens à faire remarquer que l’obligation de payer une suramende de 100 ou 200 $ pour chaque déclaration de culpabilité n’est pas en soi exorbitante, et que de nombreux canadiens ne trouveraient pas ce paiement particulièrement oné- reux. en fait, ces montants sont considérablement in- férieurs à l’amende minimale de 1000 $ prévue pour une première déclaration de culpabilité de conduite avec facultés affaiblies (code criminel, art. 253 et sous-al. 255(1)a)(i)), ou à l’amende minimale de 1000 $ prévue pour le défaut de présenter une décla- ration de revenus conformément à la loi de l’impôt sur le revenu, lrc 1985, c 1 (5e suppl), art. 238, 239 et 243. de même, plusieurs infractions provin- ciales entraînent des amendes minimales obligatoires qui peuvent être très lourdes, comme l’amende mi- nimale de 5000 $ en ontario pour la conduite d’un véhicule non assuré (loi sur l’assurance- automobile obligatoire, lro 1990, c c25, par. 2(3); voir : mi, procureure générale de l’ontario (tinker et autres, eckstein et larocque), par 32). bien que certains contrevenants — dont plusieurs des appe- lants en l’espèce — aient été condamnés à payer des suramendes relativement élevées, cela est attribuable au fait qu’ils ont commis de nombreuses infractions, particulièrement dans des affaires où la couronne a procédé par voie de mise en accusation. le montant total qu’un contrevenant doit payer en suramendes [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 661 by way of surcharges, cannot on its own be determi- native of our conclusion as to whether or not s. 737 of the criminal code violates s. 12 of the charter. b in cases where the mandatory victim surcharge would render an impecunious offender’s sen- tence disproportionate, it nevertheless does not rise to the level of being grossly dispro- portionate [138] i agree with my colleague that the mandatory imposition of the victim surcharge may have nega- tive effects for some impecunious offenders — par- ticularly those who might spend the rest of their lives with the surcharge hanging over their heads. the surcharge can represent a significant portion of an impecunious offender’s already meager income, meaning that the payment obligation cannot be sat- isfied without significant hardship. while some dis- proportionality may result, this alone is not sufficient under the s. 12 analysis; the victim surcharge can be characterized as cruel and unusual only if the effects it produces are grossly disproportionate. dépend à la fois du nombre d’infractions commises et de la question de savoir si ces infractions sont punissables sur acte d’accusation ou sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire. le fait que certains contrevenants aient commis plusieurs in- fractions graves, et qu’ils seraient donc condamnés à des suramendes plus élevées, ne peut en soi être déterminant quant à la question de savoir si l’art. 737 du code criminel contrevient à l’art. 12 de la charte. b une suramende compensatoire obligatoire qui rendrait disproportionnée la peine imposée à un contrevenant impécunieux ne rendrait pas pour autant cette peine totalement disproportionnée [138] à l’instar de ma collègue, je suis d’avis que le prononcé obligatoire d’une suramende compen- satoire peut avoir des effets négatifs sur certains contrevenants impécunieux — particulièrement ceux qui sont susceptibles d’avoir une suramende qui pèse sur eux pour le reste de leur vie. le montant de la su- ramende peut représenter une partie importante des maigres revenus d’un contrevenant impécunieux, ce qui a pour conséquence qu’il ne pourra s’acquitter de son obligation de paiement sans connaître de grandes difficultés. s’il est vrai qu’une certaine disproportion peut en découler, celle-ci n’est pas suffisante à elle seule au regard de l’analyse relative à l’art. 12; la suramende compensatoire ne peut être qualifiée de cruelle et inusitée que si les effets qu’elle produit sont totalement disproportionnés. [139] in my respectful view, this high bar has not been met in the present case. i base my conclusion on six interrelated considerations, which i will ex- amine in turn. [139] à mon humble avis, ce critère exigeant n’est pas respecté en l’espèce. je fonde ma conclusion sur six considérations interreliées, dont je traiterai successivement. (1) impecunious offenders can avoid the nega- tive consequences associated with failing to pay a victim surcharge either by participat- ing in a fine option program or by seeking extensions of time to pay (1) les contrevenants impécunieux peuvent évi- ter les conséquences négatives associées au défaut de payer une suramende compensa- toire en participant à un programme facultatif de paiement d’une amende ou en sollicitant une prorogation du délai de paiement [140] as indicated above, an offender who fails to pay the victim surcharge within the allotted time may become subject to certain enforcement measures [140] comme il a déjà été mentionné, le contreve- nant qui omet de payer la suramende compensatoire dans le délai prévu s’expose à certaines mesures 662 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. available to the state under the “fines and forfeiture” division of the criminal code, which has been in- corporated into the victim surcharge regime by s 737(9). section 734.5 provides that a defaulting offender can be prevented by the province in which the surcharge was imposed from participating in certain licensed activities. in addition, ss. 734(4) and 734.7(1) contemplate the possibility that some defaulting offenders may be imprisoned for non- payment in certain instances. [141] that said, offenders with unpaid surcharges can avoid these enforcement measures in one of two ways. first, they may earn credits toward the payment of the surcharge by participating in a provincial fine option program established under s 736. second, given that not all provinces have implemented such programs, offenders can also avoid defaulting simply by seeking extensions of time to pay. [142] a court’s authority to extend the time an offender has to pay a surcharge is conferred by ss 7343 and 737(9) of the criminal code. together, they authorize a court, or a person designated by that court, to “change any term of the order except the amount of the [victim surcharge]” (s. 737(9)) on application by or on behalf of an offender. d’exécution dont l’état peut se prévaloir; ces mesures figurent à la section « amendes et confiscations » du code criminel et sont incorporées au régime de la suramende compensatoire par le par 737(9). selon l’art 7345, la province dans laquelle la suramende a été imposée peut empêcher le contrevenant en défaut de participer à certaines activités qui nécessitent une licence. les paragraphes 734(4) et 734.7(1) prévoient quant à eux la possibilité que certains contrevenants en défaut soient emprisonnés pour non- paiement dans certaines circonstances. [141] cela dit, les contrevenants qui n’ont pas payé la suramende à laquelle ils ont été condamnés peuvent éviter la prise de ces mesures d’exécution de l’une des deux façons suivantes. premièrement, ils peuvent acquérir des crédits pour payer la suramende en participant à un programme facultatif de paie- ment d’une amende établi conformément à l’art 736. deuxièmement, étant donné que toutes les provinces n’ont pas mis en œuvre de tels programmes, les contrevenants peuvent aussi éviter de se trouver en défaut simplement en sollicitant une prorogation du délai de paiement. [142] le pouvoir du tribunal de proroger le délai dont dispose le contrevenant pour payer la suramende est conféré par l’art 7343 et le par. 737(9) du code criminel. ensemble, ils autorisent le tribunal ou la personne désignée par celui-ci à « modifier une condi- tion de l’ordonnance autre que le montant de [la sura- mende compensatoire] » (par. 737(9)), sur demande présentée par le contrevenant ou pour son compte. [143] both the ontario court of appeal and the quebec court of appeal correctly noted that of- fenders who are unable to pay the surcharge by the date stipulated in their payment orders are entitled to reasonable extensions of time. the ontario court of appeal stated that “if an impoverished offender ap- plies to the court to extend the time to pay a surcharge to which he or she is subject, the court must give the offender reasonable time to pay” (para. 58 (empha- sis in original); see also: quebec court of appeal reasons, at para. 188, per mainville ja). this is consistent with this court’s decision in wu, where justice binnie stated that an offender who “does not have the means to pay immediately    should [143] la cour d’appel de l’ontario et la cour d’ap- pel du québec ont toutes deux souligné à juste titre que les contrevenants qui sont incapables de payer la suramende à la date prévue dans leur ordonnance de paiement ont droit à une prorogation de délai rai- sonnable. la cour d’appel de l’ontario a affirmé ce qui suit : « [d]ans le cas où un contrevenant démuni demande à la cour de prolonger le délai de paiement d’une suramende qui lui a été imposée, la cour doit accorder au contrevenant un délai raisonnable pour payer » (par. 58 (en italique dans l’original); voir aussi : motifs de la cour d’appel du québec, par. 188, le juge mainville). cette conclusion est conforme à l’arrêt wu rendu par la cour, où le juge binnie a écrit [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 663 be given time to pay” and that the length of the ex- tension “should be what is reasonable in all circum- stances” (para. 31; see also r v. lavigne, 2006 scc 10, [2006] 1 scr 392, at para 47). [144] a careful reading of the applicable provi- sions makes clear that the court has a broad power to vary an order requiring the payment of a victim surcharge. first, the statute imposes no restrictions on the number of extensions an offender can seek over a given period. this means that an impecunious offender whose financial situation does not improve can conceivably avoid defaulting throughout his or her lifetime by routinely seeking extensions by doing so, he or she will never become subject to the enforcement mechanisms set out in ss 7345 and 7347. [145] second, there is no limit to the possible length of an extension. indeed, wu makes clear that the time an offender is given to pay a fine or a sur- charge must be “reasonable in all the circumstances” (para 31). there is thus nothing in the statute that would prevent a judge from granting a particularly long extension where it appears unlikely that an offender’s impecuniosity will change in the fore- seeable future. in r v. ridley, 2017 onsc 4672, for example, the sentencing judge imposed the min- imum surcharge for each of the nine offences of which mr. ridley had been convicted (for a total of $900) — but nevertheless extended the time to pay to account for the fact that he was employed in a relatively low- paying job and had also been ordered to pay restitution installments of not less than $100 per month as part of his sentence. because it was not reasonable to expect mr. ridley to be in a position to pay the surcharge before 2050, a 33- year extension was granted (para. 9 (canlii)). que si le contrevenant « n’a [  ] pas les moyens de payer sa dette immédiatement, le tribunal doit lui accorder un délai pour l’acquitter », et que la durée de la prorogation « devrait être établi[e] selon ce qui est raisonnable eu égard à toutes les circonstances » (par. 31; voir aussi r c. lavigne, 2006 csc 10, [2006] 1 rcs 392, par 47). [144] il ressort d’une lecture attentive des disposi- tions applicables que le tribunal est investi d’un large pouvoir lui permettant de modifier une ordonnance qui requiert le paiement d’une suramende compen- satoire. premièrement, la loi ne limite pas le nombre de prorogations que le contrevenant peut solliciter au cours d’une période donnée. par conséquent, le contrevenant impécunieux dont la situation finan- cière ne s’améliore pas pourrait, en théorie, éviter toute sa vie d’être en défaut en demandant réguliè- rement des prorogations. de cette façon, il ne ferait jamais l’objet des mécanismes d’exécution énoncés aux par 7345 et 7347. [145] deuxièmement, la loi ne prévoit aucune limite à la durée possible d’une prorogation. en fait, l’arrêt wu précise que le délai donné au contrevenant pour payer l’amende ou la suramende doit être « raison- nable eu égard à toutes les circonstances » (par 31). par conséquent, rien dans la loi n’empêcherait un juge d’accorder une prorogation particulièrement longue lorsqu’il semble improbable que la situation financière précaire du contrevenant s’améliore dans un avenir prévisible. par exemple, dans r c. ridley, 2017 onsc 4672, le juge a imposé à m. ridley la su- ramende minimale pour chacune des neuf infractions dont ce dernier avait été déclaré coupable (ce qui re- présente un total de 900 $) — mais a néanmoins pro- rogé le délai de paiement, étant donné que m. ridley avait un emploi à revenus relativement modestes et que la peine prévoyait aussi comme dédommagement qu’il devait verser des montants mensuels minimaux de 100 $. comme il n’était pas raisonnable de s’at- tendre à ce que m. ridley soit en mesure de payer la suramende avant 2050, le tribunal lui a accordé une prorogation de 33 ans (par. 9 (canlii)). [146] third, extensions may be granted either be- fore or after the offender defaults. what this means is that, at the sentencing hearing, the judge can extend [146] troisièmement, les prorogations peuvent être accordées avant ou après le défaut de paiement du contrevenant, ce qui signifie que le juge peut, lors de 664 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. the time to pay beyond the timelines established by the lieutenant governor in council in the applicable province (as was the case, for example, in ridley). extensions can likewise be granted to an offender af- ter the prescribed deadline for payment has passed, in which case the offender will no longer be in default. [147] given the wording of the applicable criminal code provisions, i also agree with the ontario court of appeal that “[o]btaining an extension should not be onerous or procedurally difficult” (para 58). in- deed, s 7343 says that an application for an exten- sion may be brought either by an offender or by some other person on his or her behalf — which would include his or her lawyer, a family member, a friend, or a support person. similarly, such an application may be adjudicated either by the court that imposes the surcharge or by “a person designated    by that court”. [148] furthermore, s. 737(8) requires that offend- ers be informed in writing of (among other things) the procedure for applying for an extension of time to pay in accordance with s 7343. this ensures that they are not left in the dark as to how to obtain such extensions. [149] these criminal code provisions therefore encourage both flexibility and accessibility in the process for seeking extensions. to the extent that a province establishes procedures that are complex to the point of being inaccessible for many offenders, this cannot be attributed to the impugned criminal code provisions themselves but rather to the manner in which that province implements these procedural rules and requirements. [150] in short, offenders can avoid enforcement measures under ss 7345 and 734.7 of the criminal code, either by participating in a fine option program or by periodically seeking extensions from the court so as never to fall into default, or to be relieved of their default. l’audience relative à la détermination de la peine, pro- roger le délai de paiement au- delà des délais établis par le lieutenant- gouverneur en conseil de la province en cause (comme cela a été fait dans ridley). de même, une prorogation de délai peut être accordée au contre- venant après l’expiration du délai prescrit, auquel cas le contrevenant en question ne sera plus en défaut. [147] étant donné le libellé des dispositions ap- plicables du code criminel, je conviens aussi avec la cour d’appel de l’ontario que l’obtention d’une « prorogation ne doit pas être une procédure exigeante ou difficile » (par 58). en fait, selon l’art 7343, une demande de prorogation de délai peut être présentée par le contrevenant ou par toute autre personne agis- sant pour son compte. cette personne pourrait être, par exemple, l’avocat du contrevenant, un membre de sa famille, un ami ou une personne qui lui fournit du soutien. de la même façon, une telle demande peut être tranchée par le tribunal qui impose la suramende ou par « la personne désignée [  ] par celui-ci ». [148] en outre, le par. 737(8) exige que les contre- venants reçoivent un avis écrit établissant, notam- ment, la procédure à suivre pour présenter une demande de prorogation du délai de paiement en conformité avec l’art 7343. de cette façon, ils ne sont pas laissés dans l’ignorance quant à la façon d’obtenir de telles prorogations. [149] par conséquent, ces dispositions du code cri- minel assurent la souplesse du processus de demande de prorogation de délai et en favorisent l’accessibi- lité. dans la mesure où une province met en place des procédures qui sont complexes au point de devenir inaccessibles pour de nombreux contrevenants, cette inaccessibilité n’est pas attribuable aux dispositions contestées du code criminel, mais plutôt à la façon dont la province met en œuvre ces règles et exigences procédurales. [150] en bref, les contrevenants peuvent éviter les mesures d’exécution visées aux art.  734.5 et 734.7 du code criminel soit en participant à un pro- gramme proposant un mode facultatif de paiement d’une amende, soit en demandant périodiquement au tribunal des prorogations de délai pour ne jamais se trouver en défaut ou pour être relevé d’un défaut. [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 665 (2) impecunious offenders who are in default will never be imprisoned for their inability to pay the surcharge (2) les contrevenants impécunieux en défaut ne seront jamais emprisonnés en raison de leur incapacité à payer la suramende in her reasons, my colleague rightly observes [151] that only a few provinces have established fine op- tion programs and that, in any event, participation therein “is not a realistic option for all offenders, whether due to serious mental illness, disability, or age” (para 72). she also says that, for many offend- ers, the task of “preparing and filing a written appli- cation to a court is daunting”, especially since it “is a task for which a person cannot obtain state- funded legal counsel” (para 73). while these difficulties do not flow from the law itself (since s. 737 of the criminal code is not the source of this), i accept that some offenders may in practice be unable to seek an extension. [152] however, and even if an offender does not (or is unable to) participate in a fine option program or obtain an extension of time to pay, the court cannot commit the offender to jail for defaulting if the rea- son he or she failed to pay the surcharge within the allotted time was a lack of means, notwithstanding the fact that a term of imprisonment, determined in accordance with s. 734(5), is “deemed” to be imposed on such an offender under s 734(4). recognizing this is absolutely crucial for the purposes of this appeal, and it bears reiterating in simple terms: a default- ing offender cannot actually be imprisoned under s. 737 — that is, his or her liberty will not be taken away — merely because of poverty. this is consistent with s 7347(1), which reads as follows: [151] dans ses motifs, ma collègue fait observer à juste titre que seules quelques provinces ont mis sur pied un programme facultatif de paiement d’une amende et que, de toute manière, il est possible que la participation à de tels programmes ne soit pas « une option réaliste pour tous les contrevenants, que ce soit en raison de graves problèmes de santé mentale, d’un handicap ou de l’âge » (par 72). elle ajoute que, pour de nombreux contrevenants, « la préparation et le dépôt d’une demande écrite auprès du tribunal consti- tuent une tâche colossale », d’autant plus qu’il « ne s’agit pas d’une tâche pour laquelle une personne peut obtenir des services juridiques financés par l’état » (par 73). bien que ces difficultés ne découlent pas de la loi en soi (puisque l’art. 737 du code criminel n’est pas à l’origine de cette situation), je reconnais que certains contrevenants peuvent, en pratique, être incapables de solliciter une prorogation de délai. [152] toutefois, et même si le contrevenant ne participe pas (ou est incapable de participer) à un programme facultatif de paiement d’une amende ou n’obtient pas (ou ne peut obtenir) une prorogation du délai de paiement, le tribunal ne peut le faire incarcérer en raison de son défaut si ce dernier n’a pas payé la suramende dans le délai imparti en raison d’un manque de moyens, malgré le fait qu’une pé- riode d’emprisonnement, déterminée conformément au par. 734(5), est « réputée » imposée à de tels contrevenants en vertu du par 734(4). il est absolu- ment crucial de reconnaître ce principe en l’espèce et il convient de le répéter, en des termes simples : un contrevenant en défaut ne peut être emprisonné en application de l’art. 737 — c’est-à-dire que sa liberté ne peut lui être enlevée — simplement en raison de sa pauvreté. cet énoncé est conforme au par 7347(1), libellé comme suit : where time has been allowed for payment of a fine, the court shall not issue a warrant of committal in default of payment of the fine lorsqu’un délai de paiement a été accordé, l’émission d’un mandat d’incarcération par le tribunal à défaut du paiement de l’amende est subordonnée aux conditions suivantes : (a) until the expiration of the time allowed for payment of the fine in full; and a) le délai accordé pour le paiement intégral de l’amende est expiré; 666 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. (b) unless the court is satisfied (i) that the mechanisms provided by sections 734.5 and 734.6 are not appropriate in the circumstances, or (ii) that the offender has, without reasonable ex- cuse, refused to pay the fine or discharge it under section 736. [153] although the disjunctive “or” is used at the end of subpara. (1)(b)(i), this court’s decision in wu clarifies that the elements listed in subparas. (i) and (ii) must both be present before a warrant can be issued for the committal of a defaulting offender. as a result, a court can only order the imprisonment of an offender who actively refuses to pay or discharge the surcharge “without reasonable excuse”. this evidently excludes offenders who do not pay simply because they are too poor; these offenders cannot be described as actively “refusing”. in chaussé v. r., 2016 qcca 568, justice vauclair explained that [translation] “[t]he refusal to pay contemplated by paragraph 734.7(1)(b) cr c implies the making of a choice and, in principle, impecuniosity does not leave any choice” (para. 69 (canlii)). [154] the result is therefore that impecunious of- fenders who do not (or cannot) avoid defaulting will still not be committed to jail as long as their failure to pay can be attributed to their lack of means. in this respect, however, my colleague says that “it may be difficult for judges to draw the line between an inability to pay and a refusal to pay” (para 71). with respect, the fact that judges might misapply the law to a particular set of facts cannot render the victim surcharge provisions unconstitutional, particularly since there is no suggestion that s 7347 establishes an overly vague standard that cannot properly be applied by trial judges. and to the extent that there is a perceived need for guidance on exactly where to draw the line between inability and refusal, it falls on this court to make clear to lower courts that offenders need not sacrifice their basic neces- sities in order to pay the surcharge (see: michael, at para. 74; r v. flaro, 2014 oncj 2, 7 cr (7th) 151). this is why the statute provides that only indi- viduals who actually have the means to pay, and for b) le tribunal est convaincu que l’application des ar- ticles 734.5 et 734.6 n’est pas justifiée dans les circons- tances ou que le délinquant a, sans excuse raisonnable, refusé de payer l’amende ou de s’en acquitter en appli- cation de l’article 736. [153] malgré l’emploi de la conjonction « ou », à l’al. b), la cour a clarifié dans wu que les deux conditions mentionnées à cet alinéa doivent être présentes pour qu’un mandat d’incarcération puisse être délivré à l’égard d’un contrevenant en défaut de paiement. par conséquent, le tribunal peut unique- ment ordonner l’emprisonnement d’un contrevenant qui refuse activement, « sans excuse raisonnable », de payer la suramende ou de s’en acquitter. cela exclut de toute évidence les contrevenants qui ne paient pas l’amende simplement parce qu’ils sont trop pauvres; on ne peut dire de ceux-ci qu’ils « re- fusent » activement de payer. dans chaussé c. r., 2016 qcca 568, le juge vauclair a expliqué que « [l]e refus dont il est question à l’alinéa 734.7(1)b) ccr implique l’exercice d’un choix et, en principe, l’indigence n’en laisse aucun » (par. 69 (canlii)). [154] en conséquence, les contrevenants impé- cunieux qui ne peuvent éviter d’être en défaut de payer ne seront néanmoins pas incarcérés tant que leur défaut de payer est attribuable à leur manque de moyens. or, ma collègue écrit à cet égard qu’il « pourrait être difficile pour les juges de tracer la ligne de démarcation entre l’incapacité de payer et le refus de payer » (par 71). avec égards, j’es- time que le fait que les juges puissent mal appliquer la loi à un ensemble donné de faits ne peut rendre inconstitutionnelles les dispositions relatives à la suramende compensatoire, d’autant plus que rien n’indique que l’art 7347 établit une norme trop vague qui ne peut pas être correctement appliquée par les juges du procès. en outre, dans la mesure où des lignes directrices paraissent nécessaires pour savoir où exactement tracer la ligne entre l’incapa- cité et le refus, il appartient à la cour d’expliquer clairement aux cours d’instances inférieures que les contrevenants n’ont pas à sacrifier leurs besoins essentiels pour payer la suramende (voir : michael, [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 667 whom non- payment is a deliberate choice, risk being committed to jail (see: s 7347(1), as interpreted in wu, at para. 61, and in chaussé, at para 69). judges must therefore determine whether genuine poverty is the reason for non- payment; if it is, they cannot issue a warrant of committal, and must instead grant an extension to the defaulting offender. [155] in its intervener factum, pivot legal society states that “[british columbia]’s judges routinely sentence impoverished offenders to incarceration in immediate default of surcharge payment” (para 3). this is apparently done in an effort to relieve of- fenders of the obligation to pay the surcharge with- out any practical consequences, since the term of imprisonment for non- payment is typically served concurrently with a prison sentence already imposed. such a practice, however, is clearly inconsistent with the principles emerging from wu, namely that an offender who cannot pay immediately must be given time to pay, and that effectively substituting a finan- cial deprivation with a deprivation of liberty thwarts parliament’s intention. “an offender’s inability to pay is precisely the reason why time is allowed, not a reason why it should be altogether denied” (wu, at para 33). par. 74; r c. flaro, 2014 oncj 2, 7 cr (7th) 151). c’est pour cette raison que la loi prévoit que seuls ceux qui, ayant véritablement les moyens de payer, choisissent délibérément de ne pas payer, risquent d’être incarcérés (voir : par 7347(1), interprété dans wu, par. 61, et dans chaussé, par 69). les juges doivent donc décider si la véritable pauvreté est la cause du défaut de paiement; dans l’affirmative, ils ne peuvent décerner de mandat d’incarcération et doivent plutôt accorder une prorogation de délai au contrevenant en défaut. [155] dans son mémoire, la pivot legal soci ety, ayant ici qualité d’intervenante, fait observer que [tra- duction] « les juges de la [colombie- britannique] condamnent couramment des contrevenants démunis à des peines d’emprisonnement dès qu’ils font défaut de payer une suramende » (par 3). ils le feraient apparem- ment pour libérer les contrevenants de l’obligation de payer la suramende, sans que cela n’entraîne de consé- quences concrètes puisque la peine d’emprisonnement pour non- paiement est habituellement purgée concur- remment avec une peine d’emprisonnement déjà im- posée. toutefois, une telle pratique va manifestement à l’encontre des principes qui se dégagent de l’arrêt wu, notamment celui portant qu’il faut accorder du temps à un contrevenant qui ne peut pas payer immédiatement, et que le remplacement d’une privation financière par une privation de liberté contrecarre l’intention du lé- gislateur. « l’incapacité de payer constitue le motif précis pour lequel on accorde un délai de paiement au délinquant, et non un motif de lui refuser purement et simplement tout délai » (wu, par 33). [156] to summarize this point, i can do no better than to reaffirm what this court held in wu: “[g]en- uine inability to pay a fine” — or in this case, a sur- charge — “is not a proper basis for imprisonment” (para. 3; see also para 61). [156] en résumé, je ne peux faire mieux que répéter ce que notre cour a déclaré dans wu : « l’incapacité réelle de payer une amende » — ou une suramende comme en l’espèce — « n’est pas un motif valable d’emprisonnement » (par. 3; voir aussi par 61). (3) for the purpose of compelled attendance at a committal hearing, the applicable criminal code provisions seek to ensure minimal interference with a defaulting offender’s physical liberty (3) en ce qui concerne la comparution forcée à l’audience sur l’incarcération, les dispositions applicables du code criminel visent à faire en sorte qu’il soit porté le moins possible atteinte à la liberté physique du contrevenant en défaut [157] an offender in default can be imprisoned only if, at the conclusion of a committal hearing, [157] le contrevenant en défaut peut seulement être emprisonné si, au terme de l’audience portant 668 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. the crown has proven that each of the elements in s 7347(1) is present. section 734.7(3) of the criminal code, which is incorporated into the vic- tim surcharge regime by s. 737(9), provides that a defaulting offender may be compelled to attend a committal hearing in accordance with the provisions of parts xvi and xviii. [158] most of the parties submit that defaulting offenders would typically be compelled to attend their committal hearings through either a summons or a warrant of arrest issued under s.  507 of the criminal code. it should be noted that s. 507(4) requires a justice to compel attendance by way of a summons — which constitutes a lesser deprivation of liberty — unless there are “reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary in the public interest to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused”. such necessity might exist, for example, where a default- ing offender does not have a fixed address for service of a summons. sur cette question, la couronne a prouvé l’existence de chacun des éléments prévus au par 7347(1). le paragraphe 734.7(3) du code criminel, incorporé au régime de la suramende compensatoire par le par. 737(9), prévoit qu’un contrevenant en défaut peut être contraint à comparaître à l’audience sur l’incarcération conformément aux dispositions des parties xvi et xviii. [158] la plupart des parties soutiennent que les contrevenants en défaut seront généralement con- traints de comparaître à leur audience relative à l’incarcération au moyen d’une sommation ou d’un mandat d’arrestation, conformément à l’art. 507 du code criminel. il convient de faire remarquer que le par. 507(4) exige que le juge de paix contraigne le contrevenant à être présent en délivrant une som- mation contre lui — ce qui entraîne une privation de liberté moindre — à moins qu’il n’existe « des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’il est nécessaire, dans l’in- térêt public, de décerner un mandat pour l’arresta- tion du prévenu ». cela pourrait être nécessaire, par exemple, lorsque le contrevenant en défaut n’a pas d’adresse fixe à laquelle il peut recevoir signification d’une sommation. [159] moreover, a justice issuing a warrant in accordance with this provision is permitted to au- thorize the release of the defaulting offender from custody after arrest “by making an endorsement on the warrant” (s 507(6)). where the arrest warrant is so endorsed, an officer in charge may release the de- faulting offender after he or she has been taken into custody, in accordance with s. 499 of the criminal code. [159] il est par ailleurs loisible au juge de paix qui délivre un mandat conformément à la disposi- tion susmentionnée d’autoriser la mise en liberté du contrevenant en défaut après son arrestation « en ins- crivant sur le mandat un visa » (par 507(6)). lorsque le mandat d’arrestation fait ainsi l’objet d’un visa, le fonctionnaire responsable peut, en vertu de l’art. 499 du code criminel, mettre en liberté le contrevenant en défaut qui a été mis sous garde. [160] the ontario court of appeal also suggested the possibility that a defaulting offender could be arrested without a warrant under s. 495(1) of the criminal code (para 113). assuming (without de- ciding) that warrantless arrest can properly be used as a means to compel attendance in these circum- stances, i note that this can occur only if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that it is in the public interest to arrest the person and that the person will fail to attend court (in accordance with s 495(2)). in determining whether arrest is in the public interest, the peace officer must consider [160] la cour d’appel de l’ontario a aussi évo- qué la possibilité qu’un contrevenant en défaut soit arrêté sans mandat en application du par. 495(1) du code criminel (par.  113). à supposer qu’une ar- restation sans mandat puisse être effectuée à bon droit pour contraindre un contrevenant à comparaître dans de telles circonstances (mais sans trancher la question), je souligne que cela est uniquement pos- sible si l’agent de la paix a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’il est dans l’intérêt public d’arrêter la personne et que cette personne ne se présentera pas devant le tribunal (conformément au par 495(2)). [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 669 whether arrest is necessary to establish the identity of the person, to secure or preserve evidence, or to prevent the continuation of the offence or the com- mission of future offences. given that non- payment of a victim surcharge is not an offence, it is difficult to imagine instances where the public interest would justify the warrantless arrest of a defaulting offender pending a committal hearing. moreover, the deten- tion of a person arrested without a warrant can con- tinue only if there are reasonable grounds to believe that continued detention is in the public interest or will serve the purpose of ensuring attendance at court (see: ss. 497 and 498 of the criminal code). [161] if a defaulting offender is arrested and not released, s. 503(1) of the criminal code requires that he or she be taken before a justice within 24 hours, or otherwise as soon as possible. at this stage, the justice will hold a hearing to determine whether the offender should be released pending the committal hearing, in accordance with s. 515 of the criminal code. in the intervening time, both the arresting officer and the officer in charge have the authority to release the arrestee either with or without conditions under s 503. pour déterminer si l’arrestation est dans l’intérêt public, l’agent de la paix doit chercher à savoir si l’arrestation est nécessaire pour identifier la per- sonne, recueillir ou conserver une preuve, ou pour empêcher que l’infraction se poursuive ou que de nouvelles infractions soient commises comme le non- paiement d’une suramende compensatoire n’est pas une infraction, il est difficile d’imaginer les cas où l’intérêt public justifierait l’arrestation sans mandat d’un contrevenant en défaut, en attendant l’audience sur l’incarcération. en outre, la déten- tion d’une personne arrêtée sans mandat ne peut se poursuivre que si l’agent de la paix a des motifs raisonnables de croire que la détention continue est dans l’intérêt public ou servira à garantir la présence de l’intéressé devant le tribunal (voir : art. 497 et 498 du code criminel). [161] si un contrevenant en défaut est arrêté et n’est pas remis en liberté, le par. 503(1) du code criminel exige qu’il soit conduit devant un juge de paix dans un délai de 24 heures ou autrement le plus tôt possible. à cette étape, le juge de paix tiendra une audience pour établir si le contrevenant devrait être mis en liberté en attendant l’audience sur l’incarcé- ration, conformément à l’art. 515 du code criminel. dans l’intervalle, tant l’agent de la paix qui a procédé à l’arrestation que le fonctionnaire responsable ont le pouvoir de mettre en liberté la personne arrêtée et d’assortir cette mise en liberté de conditions confor- mément à l’art 503. [162] at the committal hearing,2 the crown bears the burden of demonstrating that continued interim detention is justified — and if it fails to discharge this burden, the justice will be obliged to release the defaulting offender. section 515(10) sets out the three grounds on which detention can be justified: (a) to ensure attendance, (b) to protect public safety, and (c) to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. i observe that these factors would not typically weigh in favour of detention pending a defaulting offender’s committal hearing, since failure to pay a victim surcharge is not an offence. in any event, this court in r v. antic, 2017 scc 27, [2017] [162] à l’audience relative à l’incarcération2, si la couronne ne s’acquitte pas du fardeau qui lui incombe de démontrer que la détention provisoire continue est justifiée, le juge de paix se verra obligé de mettre en liberté le contrevenant en défaut. le paragraphe 515(10) énonce les trois cas susceptibles de justifier une détention : a) assurer la présence du contrevenant au tribunal, b) protéger la sécurité du public et c) ne pas miner la confiance du public envers l’administration de la justice. je remarque que ces facteurs ne justifient généralement pas une détention en attendant l’audience sur l’incarcéra- tion d’un contrevenant en défaut, étant donné que 2 i would note that there does not seem to be anything in the statute to prevent the presiding justice from granting an extension to the offender at this s. 503 hearing. 2 je signale que rien dans la loi ne semble empêcher le juge de paix présidant l’audience d’accorder une prorogation de délai au contrevenant lors de l’audience visée à l’art 503. 670 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. 1 scr 509, affirmed that “an unconditional release on an undertaking is the default position when grant- ing release” (para 67). [163] together, these provisions indicate that the likelihood of an impecunious offender being arrested and detained pending a committal hearing is low; continued detention is reserved for those instances where it is necessary to ensure that the accused will attend to explain the reason for non- payment. furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that impecunious offenders are in fact be- ing detained unnecessarily pending their committal hearings on a routine basis. [164] where service of a summons is proved or a promise to appear has been confirmed and the of- fender still fails to attend court, or where a summons cannot be served because the offender is evading ser- vice, a justice may issue an arrest warrant (s. 512(2) of the criminal code) — and again, may authorize the offender’s release after arrest by making an en- dorsement on the warrant under s 507(6). as a final point, the attorney general of ontario has indicated that a committal hearing can take place ex parte, but only if the defaulting offender consents or is found to have absconded, as provided for in ss. 537 and 544 of the criminal code (hearing transcript, day 2, p 60). l’omission de payer une suramende ne constitue pas une infraction. quoi qu’il en soit, dans r c. antic, 2017 csc 27, [2017] 1 rcs 509, la cour a affirmé que la « mise en liberté inconditionnelle sur remise d’une promesse constitue la solution par défaut à adopter lorsqu’il s’agit d’accorder une mise en liberté » (par 67). [163] il ressort de la lecture conjointe de ces dispo- sitions que la probabilité qu’un contrevenant impé- cunieux soit arrêté et détenu en attendant l’audience sur l’incarcération est faible; la détention continue est réservée aux cas où cela est nécessaire pour assu- rer la comparution du prévenu afin qu’il explique la raison de son défaut de paiement. de plus, le dossier ne contient aucune preuve qui donne à penser que les contrevenants impécunieux sont en fait couramment détenus inutilement en attendant l’audience sur leur incarcération. [164] lorsque la signification d’une sommation est prouvée ou qu’une promesse de comparaître a été confirmée et que le contrevenant omet tout de même d’être présent au tribunal, ou si une sommation ne peut être signifiée parce que le contrevenant se sous- trait à la signification, le juge de paix peut décerner un mandat d’arrestation (par. 512(2) du code crimi- nel) — et, encore une fois, autoriser la mise en liberté du contrevenant après son arrestation en inscrivant un visa sur le mandat conformément au par 507(6). enfin, la procureure générale de l’ontario a indiqué qu’une audience sur l’incarcération peut se dérouler ex parte, mais seulement si le contrevenant en défaut y consent ou s’il est conclu que le contrevenant en défaut s’est esquivé, comme le prévoient les art. 537 et 544 du code criminel (transcription de l’audience, jour 2, p 60). [165] compelled attendance at a committal hear- ing will necessarily deprive a defaulting offender of his or her liberty interest to some degree (see: ontario court of appeal reasons, at para 70). as the foregoing indicates, however, the scheme is de- signed to protect such an offender from pre- hearing detention except where there is a substantial rea- son for it (see: r e. salhany, canadian criminal procedure (6th ed. (loose- leaf)), at para 360). this serves to minimize the deleterious effects of the [165] obliger un contrevenant en défaut à être présent à une audience relative à l’incarcération le prive nécessairement, jusqu’à un certain point, de son droit à la liberté (voir : motifs de la cour d’ap- pel de l’ontario, par 70). toutefois, comme nous l’avons vu, le régime a pour but de soustraire de tels contrevenants à la détention avant l’audience, sauf lorsqu’une telle détention est justifiée par un motif valable (voir : r e salhany,. canadian criminal procedure (6e éd. (feuilles mobiles)), par 360), ce [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 671 operation of the victim surcharge regime for offend- ers who are in default. qui réduit au minimum les effets préjudiciables de l’application du régime de la suramende compensa- toire aux contrevenants qui sont en défaut de paie- ment. (4) civil enforcement mechanisms cannot be used to collect outstanding amounts owing in victim surcharges (4) les mesures d’exécution civile ne peuvent être mises en œuvre pour percevoir des sommes dues à titre de suramendes compensatoires [166] while the enforcement mechanisms set out in ss 7345 and 734.7 of the criminal code can be exercised against defaulting offenders, civil en- forcement under s 7346 is not available, since the latter provision is not incorporated into the victim surcharge regime by s. 737(9) or otherwise. what this means is that the attorney general of canada or of a province lacks the statutory authority to enter as a judgment in a civil court any amounts owing by way of surcharges — and hence that civil remedies cannot be exercised as a means of recovering unpaid surcharges from offenders. this feature distinguishes the surcharge from regular fines; while an unpaid fine can attract the same financial consequences as an ordinary debt, an unpaid surcharge cannot. [167] i would also note that some provinces have adopted the practice of employing collection efforts (whether internal to government or external) against defaulting offenders. such a practice, however, is neither required nor authorized by the criminal code. it is therefore not an effect of the impugned surcharge provisions. [166] bien que les mesures d’exécution énoncées aux art 7345 et 734.7 du code criminel puissent être entreprises à l’égard des contrevenants en défaut, celles de nature civile visées à l’art 7346 ne peuvent pas l’être, puisque cette dernière disposition n’est pas incorporée au régime de la suramende compensatoire par le par. 737(9) ou autrement. cela signifie que le procureur général du canada ou d’une province n’a pas le pouvoir statutaire pour faire inscrire les sommes dues à titre de suramendes devant un tribu- nal civil — et donc que des recours civils ne peuvent être exercés pour recouvrer auprès des contrevenants des suramendes non payées. cette caractéristique distingue la suramende de l’amende ordinaire : alors qu’une amende non payée peut entraîner les mêmes conséquences financières qu’une dette ordinaire, une suramende non payée ne le peut pas. [167] je tiens également à ajouter que certaines provinces ont adopté la pratique de mettre en œuvre des procédures de recouvrement des montants en souffrance (que ce soit par l’entremise d’agences internes ou externes du gouvernement) auprès de contrevenants en défaut. une telle pratique n’est toutefois ni requise ni autorisée par le code criminel, et elle ne constitue donc pas un effet des dispositions contestées relatives aux suramendes. (5) there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the stress caused by the mandatory application of the victim surcharge to impe- cunious offenders is severe enough to make the punishment imposed under section 737 “cruel and unusual” (5) la preuve est insuffisante pour conclure que le stress causé par l’imposition obligatoire de la suramende compensatoire à des contre- venants impécunieux est grave au point de rendre la peine visée à l’art. 737 « cruelle et inusitée » [168] several of the appellants also submit that the inability to pay a victim surcharge, and the con- sequences of non- payment, cause stress to impe- cunious offenders and that this contributes to the [168] plusieurs appelants soutiennent aussi que l’incapacité de payer une suramende compensatoire, et les conséquences d’un non- paiement, causent du stress aux contrevenants impécunieux, lequel stress 672 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. disproportionality of the surcharge i  agree that some degree of stress will likely arise in these cir- cumstances. indeed, we should expect that all pun- ishments — including the victim surcharge — will be stressful for the persons subject to them. many individuals will likewise find the obligation to pay ordinary debts stressful. for the purposes of s. 12 of the charter, however, the key question is whether the psychological stress associated with the inability to pay a surcharge is so severe that it makes the im- position of the surcharge on impecunious offenders cruel and unusual. [169] in my respectful view, there is nothing in the record to suggest that this is so. in its written submissions, the attorney general of ontario ob- serves that the appellants have not adduced any evidence to support the existence of severe stress associated with the threat or possibility of imprison- ment — and adds, in this respect, that any such stress would not be caused by s. 737, “which does not truly threaten imprisonment for those who cannot pay” (rf,. attorney general of ontario (tinker et al., eckstein and larocque), at para 63)3. similarly, there is no evidence that impecunious offenders forego spending on the necessaries of life to pay the sur- charge (thereby compromising their health, welfare and safety), that non- payment attracts a significant degree of social stigma, or that the requirement to pay the surcharge has significant negative effects on rehabilitation (rf,. attorney general of ontario (tinker et al., eckstein and larocque), at para 63). none of the first instance courts in tinker, eckstein or boudreault made any such factual findings, and the summary conviction appeals court in larocque specifically held that “[t]here was no evidence to support the    findings [of the sentencing judge in that case] that the victim surcharge, if left unpaid as expected, would create an ongoing stress for the accused such as to render it cruel and unusual pun- ishment” (para 76). contribue à la disproportion de la suramende je suis d’accord pour dire que de telles circonstances entraînent vraisemblablement un certain degré de stress. en fait, on devrait s’attendre à ce que toutes les peines — y compris la suramende compensatoire — soient stressantes pour les personnes qui en font l’objet. de même, de nombreux individus trouvent stressante l’obligation de payer des dettes ordinaires. pour l’application de l’art. 12 de la charte, la ques- tion centrale est cependant de savoir si le stress psychologique associé à l’incapacité de payer une suramende est grave au point de rendre cruelle et inusitée l’imposition d’une suramende à des contre- venants impécunieux. [169] à mon humble avis, rien dans le dossier ne tend à indiquer que tel est le cas. dans son mémoire, la procureure générale de l’ontario fait observer que les appelants n’ont présenté aucune preuve de l’existence d’un stress sévère associé à la menace ou à la possibilité d’un emprisonnement — et ajoute, à cet égard, qu’un tel stress ne serait pas causé par l’art. 737, [traduction] « qui ne menace pas véri- tablement d’emprisonnement ceux qui ne peuvent pas payer » (mi, procureure générale de l’ontario (tinker et autres, eckstein et larocque), par 63)3. de même, rien ne prouve que les contrevenants impé- cunieux renoncent à subvenir à leurs besoins essen- tiels pour payer la suramende (compromettant ainsi leur santé, leur bien- être et leur sécurité), que le non- paiement entraîne un grave stigmate social, ou que la nécessité de payer la suramende a des effets négatifs importants sur leur réadaptation (mi, procureure générale de l’ontario (tinker et autres, eckstein et larocque), par 63). aucune des cours de première instance dans tinker, eckstein ou boudreault n’a tiré de telles conclusions factuelles, et le tribunal d’appel en matière de poursuites sommaires a ex- pressément conclu, dans larocque, qu’il « n’y avait aucune preuve étayant la conclusion du juge selon laquelle si la [suramende compensatoire] n’est pas payée, comme prévu, cela créerait un stress continu pour l’accusé au point que la suramende constituerait une peine cruelle et inusitée » (par 76). 3 it would nevertheless be prudent for sentencing judges to advise offenders that they cannot be committed to jail for non- payment if they are genuinely unable to pay, in order to dispel any mis- conceptions that might exist in this regard. 3 il serait néanmoins prudent que les juges de la peine avisent les contrevenants qu’ils ne peuvent pas être incarcérés pour défaut de paiement s’ils sont véritablement incapables de payer, en vue de dissiper toute idée fausse qu’ils pourraient avoir à cet égard. [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 673 [170] although there is no dispute that the victim surcharge will most probably produce psychological stress for some impecunious offenders that would not be felt by offenders with greater financial means, there must be a factual basis for concluding that this stress is severe enough to support a s. 12 charter violation. with respect, neither the record before this court, nor common sense, provides a sufficient basis for such a conclusion (see: larocque (ont. scj), at paras. 72-76; see also kahkewistahaw first nation v. taypotat, 2015 scc 30, [2015] 2 scr 548, at para 34). as explained by justice cory in mackay v. manitoba, [1989] 2 scr 357, at pp. 361-62: charter cases will frequently be concerned with con- cepts and principles that are of fundamental importance to canadian society. for example, issues pertaining to freedom of religion, freedom of expression and the right to life, liberty and the security of the individual will have to be considered by the courts. decisions on these issues must be carefully considered as they will profoundly affect the lives of canadians and all residents of canada. in light of the importance and the impact that these decisions may have in the future, the courts have every right to expect and indeed to insist upon the careful preparation and presenta- tion of a factual basis in most charter cases. the relevant facts put forward may cover a wide spectrum dealing with scientific, social, economic and political aspects. often expert opinion as to the future impact of the impugned leg- islation and the result of the possible decisions pertaining to it may be of great assistance to the courts. charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum. to attempt to do so would trivialize the charter and inevitably result in ill- considered opinions. the presentation of facts is not    a mere technicality; rather, it is essential to a proper consideration of charter issues    charter decisions cannot be based upon the unsupported hypotheses of enthusiastic counsel. [170] bien que nul ne conteste que la suramende compensatoire causera fort probablement chez cer- tains contrevenants impécunieux un stress psycho- logique que ne ressentiraient pas des contrevenants ayant de meilleurs moyens financiers, la conclusion portant que ce stress est sévère au point d’entraîner une violation de l’art. 12 de la charte doit reposer sur un fondement factuel. en toute déférence, ni le dossier dont dispose la cour ni le bon sens ne four- nissent un fondement suffisant pour tirer une telle conclusion (voir : larocque (csj. ont.), par. 72-76; voir aussi  : première nation de kahkewistahaw c. taypotat, 2015 csc 30, [2015] 2 rcs 548, par.  34) comme l’a expliqué le juge cory dans mackay c. manitoba, [1989] 2 rcs 357, p. 361- 362 : les affaires relatives à la charte porteront fréquem- ment sur des concepts et des principes d’une importance fondamentale pour la société canadienne. par exemple, les tribunaux seront appelés à examiner des questions relatives à la liberté de religion, à la liberté d’expres- sion et au droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de la personne. les décisions sur ces questions doivent être soigneusement pesées car elles auront des incidences profondes sur la vie des canadiens et de tous les rési- dents du canada. compte tenu de l’importance et des répercussions que ces décisions peuvent avoir à l’avenir, les tribunaux sont tout à fait en droit de s’attendre et même d’exiger que l’on prépare et présente soigneuse- ment un fondement factuel dans la plupart des affaires relatives à la charte. les faits pertinents présentés peu- vent toucher une grande variété de domaines et traiter d’aspects scientifiques, sociaux, économiques et poli- tiques. il est souvent très utile pour les tribunaux de con- naître l’opinion d’experts sur les répercussions futures de la loi contestée et le résultat des décisions possibles la concernant. les décisions relatives à la charte ne doivent pas être rendues dans un vide factuel. essayer de le faire banali- serait la charte et produirait inévitablement des opinions mal motivées. la présentation des faits n’est pas [  ] une simple formalité; au contraire, elle est essentielle à un bon examen des questions relatives à la charte. [  ]. les décisions relatives à la charte ne peuvent pas être fondées sur des hypothèses non étayées qui ont été formulées par des avocats enthousiastes. 674 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. (6) the fact that the victim surcharge might in some cases frustrate attempts at reha- bilitation and reintegration does not make the punishment imposed under section 737 cruel and unusual (6) le fait que la suramende compensatoire puisse dans certains cas faire obstacle aux tentatives de réadaptation et de réinsertion so- ciale ne rend pas la peine prévue à l’art. 737 cruelle et inusitée [171] as a final point, it is said that the manda- tory imposition of the victim surcharge impedes the rehabilitation and reintegration of impecunious offenders, since their inability to pay can keep them tethered to the criminal justice system indefinitely and prevent them from seeking a pardon. [172] rehabilitation is undoubtedly an important principle in the criminal code’s sentencing regime (see: s 718(d)). however, it is not the only one. and while the victim surcharge does not necessar- ily promote efforts at rehabilitation (because it is aimed at different sentencing objectives), the same can be said about other criminal sanctions that have been imposed on the appellants in these cases, and that continue to be imposed on impecunious per- sons daily. this point was made by the summary conviction appeals court in larocque, at para. 95: [w]hat was at issue in michael and another case con- cerning the constitutionality of the victim surcharge, r. v. cloud, 2014 qcqc 464, was the cruel and unusual nature of the victim surcharge, when in both instances, these offenders were placed on lengthy probation orders as part of their sentences. the impact of that order for an offender like mr. michael, who as described in michael engages largely in nuisance type behaviour, is significant: any time he commits an offence while bound by that order, he will in all likelihood be sentenced to further imprison- ment than otherwise warranted by his conduct because he will have violated a court order and hence face sentencing for that offence too. arguably, every month an offender like [mr. larocque] or offenders like mr. michael and mr. cloud are on probation creates a real prospect of further incarceration, on the assumption accepted in those cases in considering the victim surcharge, that is, that their circumstances will not change. this assumption must then hold for the circumstances leading to their offending behaviour, rendering the prospect of further incarceration as a result of the probation order a live one. the prospect of further incarceration is surely more psychologically [171] comme dernier point, certains font valoir que le prononcé obligatoire d’une suramende com- pensatoire entrave la réadaptation et la réinsertion sociale des contrevenants impécunieux, étant donné que leur incapacité de payer peut les garder indéfi- niment captifs du système de justice pénale et les empêcher d’obtenir un pardon. [172] la réadaptation est sans aucun doute un prin- cipe important du régime de détermination de la peine du code criminel (voir : al 718d)). cependant, ce n’est pas le seul. certes, l’imposition de la sura- mende compensatoire ne favorise pas nécessairement la réadaptation (parce qu’elle vise différents objectifs de détermination de la peine), mais on pourrait en dire autant des autres sanctions pénales qui ont été imposées aux appelants dans les présentes affaires, et qui continuent d’être imposées chaque jour à des personnes impécunieuses. c’est ce qu’a fait remar- quer le tribunal d’appel en matière de poursuites sommaires dans larocque, par. 95 : [l]a question en litige dans l’affaire michael et dans un autre cas portant sur la constitutionnalité de la sac, r c. cloud, 2014 qcqc 464, 8 cr (7th) 364, était la nature cruelle et inusitée de la sac, alors que dans les deux cas, les délinquants avaient fait l’objet d’ordonnances de probation de longue durée dans le cadre de leurs peines. l’impact de cette ordonnance pour un délinquant comme m. michael, qui, comme il est décrit dans la décision michael, a un com- portement en grande partie nuisible, est important : chaque fois qu’il commet une infraction alors qu’il est lié par une ordonnance, il fera l’objet d’une peine d’emprisonnement plus longue que celle que justifierait son comportement, parce qu’il aura violé une ordonnance judiciaire et devra donc aussi faire face à une peine liée à cette violation. on peut soutenir que chaque mois qu’un délinquant comme l’appelant ou comme [m. larocque] se trouve en probation, cela crée une possibilité réelle qu’il fera l’objet d’une plus longue peine d’emprisonnement, si l’on se fonde sur la présomption acceptée dans ces cas examinant la constitu- tionnalité de la sac, que leurs circonstances ne changeront pas. cette présomption doit donc être valable pour les circonstances ayant conduit au comportement illégal, ce [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 675 stressful than the consequences which may flow from the imposition of the victim surcharge. and yet lengthy pro- bation orders are nevertheless imposed on these offenders and others like them to comply with legal principles and precedents, notwithstanding the stress that may result to the offender. [173] i would add this. if the principles by which courts sentence offenders in canada are premised on the notion that individuals generally have the capacity to move beyond their criminal past and improve their lives for the better, and if rehabilita- tion is a fundamental purpose of sentencing, then it is counterproductive for courts to treat some impe- cunious offenders as being incapable of ever lifting themselves out of a cycle of poverty and criminality by finding that they will never be able to pay the surcharge (see, for example, quebec court of appeal reasons, at para. 205, per mainville ja). while it is likely that some will face great difficulty in doing so, justice binnie in wu directed canadian courts not simply to accept that “the circumstances of the offender at the date of sentencing will necessarily continue into the future” (para 31). not only are findings to this effect pessimistic in nature, but they also undermine the very basis for the principle of rehabilitation. [174] it seems correct to say that the non- payment of a victim surcharge renders a person ineligible to seek a record suspension under s.  4(1) of the criminal records act, rsc 1985, c c-47. that provision states that an offender may apply for a record suspension only if a certain period of time “has elapsed after the expiration according to law of any sentence”. the term “sentence” presumably captures the payment of a victim surcharge (see: m. a. law, the federal victim surcharge: the 2013 amendments and their implementation in nine ju- risdictions (2016) (online), at p. 37, cited in the if,. attorney general of alberta, at p 70). qui rend très réelle la perspective d’une incarcération plus longue dans le cadre de l’ordonnance de probation. la perspective d’une incarcération plus longue est sûrement plus stressante psychologiquement que les conséquences de l’imposition d’une sac. et pourtant, des ordonnances de probation de longue durée sont imposées à ces délinquants et à d’autres délinquants comme eux afin de se conformer aux principes juridiques et aux précédents, malgré le stress qui pourrait en résulter pour le délinquant. [173] j’ajouterais ceci. si les principes guidant les tribunaux quant à l’imposition de peines aux contrevenants au canada reposent sur la prémisse que les gens ont tous, en général, la capacité de s’af- franchir d’un passé criminel et d’améliorer leur vie, et si la réadaptation est un objectif fondamental de la détermination de la peine, il est contre- productif que les tribunaux traitent certains contrevenants im- pécunieux comme étant incapables à tout jamais de se sortir d’un cycle de pauvreté et de criminalité en concluant qu’ils ne seront jamais capables de payer la suramende (voir, par exemple, les motifs de la cour d’appel du québec, par. 205, le juge mainville). bien que certains contrevenants éprouveront pro- bablement de grandes difficultés à s’en sortir, dans wu, le juge binnie a donné la directive aux tribunaux canadiens de ne pas simplement accepter que « la si- tuation du délinquant à la date de la détermination de la peine demeurera nécessairement inchangée dans le futur » (par 31). non seulement de telles conclu- sions sont pessimistes, mais elles sapent également le fondement même du principe de la réadaptation. [174] il semble juste d’affirmer que le non- paiement d’une suramende compensatoire rend la personne en défaut inadmissible à demander la suspension de son casier aux termes du par. 4(1) de la loi sur le casier judiciaire, lrc 1985, c c-47. selon cette disposition, un contrevenant peut présenter une de- mande de suspension de son casier seulement si une certaine « période consécutive à l’expiration légale de la peine [s’est] écoulée ». on peut présumer que le mot « peine » s’étend au paiement d’une suramende compensatoire (voir : m. a. law, la suramende com- pensatoire fédérale : les modifications de 2013 et leur mise en œuvre dans neuf administrations (2016) (en ligne), p. 41, document cité dans le mi du pro- cureur général de l’alberta, p 70). 676 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. it must be noted, however, that the criminal [175] code authorizes the governor in council to grant conditional pardons (s. 748) and to order the remis- sion of fines and other pecuniary penalties (s 7481) through the royal prerogative of mercy. although a conditional pardon will not be granted unless, among other things, there is “substantial evidence of un- due hardship, out of proportion to the nature of the offence and more severe than for other individu- als in similar situations” (parole board of canada, royal prerogative of mercy ministerial guidelines, october 2014 (online), p. 7), such a pardon never- theless has the same effect as a record suspension under the criminal records act. a remission order does not have that same effect, but instead eliminates the obligation to pay a victim surcharge — and thus allows an otherwise eligible offender to apply for a record suspension under s. 3(1) of the criminal records act. [176] therefore, even though conditional pardons and remission orders are not perfect alternatives, an offender who is ineligible for a traditional record sus- pension due solely to the inability to pay the victim surcharge is not left without recourse. [177] moreover, an application to the parole board for a record suspension costs $631 — a fee that the parole board will not waive, even for impecunious applicants (canada, got a question about your appli- cation?, last updated november 15, 2018 (online)). in addition to this fee, individuals applying for a record suspension under the criminal records act are responsible for paying any costs associated with obtaining fingerprints, a copy of their criminal re- cord, police checks, and the court documents that are required (got a question about your application?). for offenders whose sole barrier to seeking a record suspension is an outstanding victim surcharge, the fees associated with making such an application may be more onerous than paying the surcharge itself. indeed, the cost of the application on its own exceeds the minimum surcharge that would be imposed on il convient cependant de noter que le gou- [175] verneur en conseil peut, en vertu du code criminel, se prévaloir de la prérogative royale de clémence pour accorder des pardons conditionnels (art. 748) et ordonner la remise d’amendes et d’autres pénalités pécuniaires (art 7481). bien qu’un pardon condi- tionnel ne soit accordé que si, notamment, il y a une « preuve substantielle d’un châtiment trop sévère qui serait disproportionné par rapport à la nature et à la gravité de l’infraction et serait plus sévère que pour d’autres personnes dans une situation semblable » (commission des libérations conditionnelles du ca- nada, directives ministérielles sur la prérogative royale de clémence, octobre 2014 (en ligne), p. 7), un tel pardon a néanmoins le même effet qu’une suspen- sion de casier judiciaire accordée en vertu de la loi sur le casier judiciaire. un décret de remise n’a pas cet effet, mais élimine plutôt l’obligation de payer une suramende compensatoire — et permet ainsi à un contrevenant par ailleurs admissible de présenter une demande de suspension de casier judiciaire en vertu du par. 3(1) de la loi sur le casier judiciaire. [176] par conséquent, même si les pardons condi- tionnels et les décrets de remise ne constituent pas des solutions de rechange parfaites, les contrevenants qui ne sont pas admissibles à une suspension de dossier traditionnelle en raison uniquement de leur incapacité de payer la suramende compensatoire ne sont pas sans recours. [177] qui plus est, une demande de suspension de casier présentée à la commission des libérations conditionnelles du canada coûte 631 $ — frais aux- quels ne renoncera pas la commission des libérations conditionnelles, même pour des demandeurs impé- cunieux (canada, vous avez une question au sujet de votre demande?, dernière mise à jour le 15 no- vembre 2018 (en ligne)). en plus de ces frais, les individus qui présentent une demande de suspension de casier en vertu de la loi sur le casier judiciaire sont tenus de payer tous les frais liés à la prise des empreintes digitales, à l’obtention d’une copie de leur casier judiciaire, aux vérifications policières ainsi qu’aux documents judiciaires requis (vous avez une question au sujet de votre demande?). pour les contre- venants dont le seul obstacle à la présentation d’une demande de suspension de casier est une suramende [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 677 an individual who was found guilty of six summary conviction offences or three indictable offences. [178] although the victim surcharge may not be particularly conducive to attempts by some offenders to achieve rehabilitation and reintegration into soci- ety, my view is that this alone is not sufficient to meet the high bar for establishing a s. 12 charter violation. c section 737 therefore does not impose cruel and unusual punishment either on the offend- ers before this court or on the reasonable hy- pothetical offender compensatoire non payée, les frais associés à la pré- sentation d’une telle demande peuvent être plus élevés que la suramende elle- même. en fait, le coût de la demande, à lui seul, est supérieur au montant minimal de la suramende qui serait imposée à une personne qui a été déclarée coupable de six infractions punissables sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité ou de trois infractions punissables par mise en accusation. [178] quoique la suramende compensatoire ne fa- vorise peut- être pas particulièrement les tentatives de réadaptation et de réinsertion sociale de certains contrevenants, je suis d’avis que cela n’est pas suf- fisant pour satisfaire au critère rigoureux permettant d’établir qu’il y a eu violation de l’art. 12 de la charte. c la suramende prévue à l’art. 737 ne constitue donc pas une peine cruelle et inusitée, que ce soit à l’égard des contrevenants dans les pré- sents pourvois ou de contrevenants dans une situation hypothétique raisonnable [179] there is no dispute that the surcharge will create some degree of hardship for offenders. as a punishment, this is to be expected. i also accept that impecunious offenders may experience such hardship in more acute ways. for many, it may be years before they will be in a position to pay off the surcharge, and not without a substantial degree of sacrifice and hardship. others may never be in a position to make payment in full within their lifetimes, given the unfor- tunate state of their financial circumstances or health. [179] nul ne conteste que la suramende, comme toute peine, entraînera certaines difficultés pour les contrevenants. je reconnais aussi que ces difficultés peuvent être plus importantes dans le cas des contre- venants impécunieux. pour bon nombre d’entre eux, il faudra peut- être des années avant qu’ils ne réussissent à s’acquitter de la suramende, non sans difficultés et sacrifices considérables. d’autres, en raison de l’état de leur situation financière ou de leur santé, ne réus- siront jamais à payer intégralement leur suramende. [180] for these offenders, the effects of the sur- charge are, at a minimum, “frustrating”; the attorney general of ontario conceded as much during the oral hearing. whether the positive aspects of the victim surcharge outweigh the negative effects it may pro- duce is debatable — indeed, s. 737 is currently the subject of debate in parliament (bill c-75, an act to amend the criminal code, the youth criminal justice act and other acts and to make consequen- tial amendments to other acts, 1st sess., 42nd parl., 2018, s 304). [180] pour ces contrevenants, les effets de la su- ramende sont à tout le moins [traduction] « frus- trants », comme l’a concédé la procureure générale de l’ontario à l’audience. la question de savoir si les aspects positifs de la suramende compensatoire l’emportent sur ses aspects négatifs est discutable — l’art. 737 fait d’ailleurs actuellement l’objet d’un dé- bat au parlement (projet de loi c-75, loi modifiant le code criminel, la loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents et d’autres lois et apportant des modifications corrélatives à certaines lois, 1re sess., 42e lég., 2018, art 304). [181] what matters under the s. 12 analysis, how- ever, is whether the negative effects associated with [181] toutefois, ce qui importe pour l’analyse re- lative à l’art. 12 est de savoir si les effets négatifs 678 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. the mandatory victim surcharge rise to the level of gross disproportionality in relation to impecunious offenders. can it be said that these effects are “ab- horrent”, “intolerable”, or “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency”? [182] in my view, the answer is no. while i accept that a proportionate sentence for impecunious of- fenders would not include a victim surcharge, there are a number of components to the regime set out in s. 737 of the criminal code that attenuate the par- ticularly severe impact the surcharge may have on an offender who is simply not able to pay. in particular, as explained above: • offenders who are unable to pay the surcharge within the prescribed time will not be subject to the enforcement mechanisms set out in ss 7345 and 734.7 if they either participate in a fine op- tion program or seek an extension of time to pay. once an extension is granted — and it must be granted if the offender cannot pay by the pre- scribed time due to a lack of means — then the offender will no longer be in default. • an offender will not be imprisoned if he or she defaults due to poverty only offenders who have the means to pay, but who choose not to, risk being imprisoned following a committal hearing. • while it is possible that a defaulting offender might be detained for some period of time ahead of a committal hearing, the scheme for compel- ling attendance set out in part xvi of the crim- inal code ensures that a deprivation of liberty in these circumstances will occur only where it is necessary in the public interest. such cases will likely be very rare, especially given that non- payment is not a criminal offence. associés à la suramende compensatoire obligatoire atteignent le niveau requis pour qu’il y ait dispropor- tion totale à l’égard des contrevenants impécunieux. peut-on qualifier ces effets d’« odieu[x] », d’« into- lérable[s] » ou d’« excessi[fs] au point de ne pas être compatible[s] avec la dignité humaine »? [182] à mon avis, la réponse est non. bien que je reconnaisse qu’une peine proportionnée pour des contrevenants impécunieux n’inclurait pas une su- ramende, un certain nombre d’éléments du régime énoncé à l’art. 737 du code criminel atténuent les conséquences particulièrement lourdes que la sura- mende pourrait avoir sur un contrevenant qui n’a tout simplement pas les moyens de payer. en particulier, comme il a été expliqué précédemment : • les contrevenants incapables de payer la sura- mende dans le délai prescrit ne seront pas assujettis aux mécanismes d’exécution prévus aux art 7345 et 734.7 s’ils participent à un programme faculta- tif de paiement d’une amende ou s’ils sollicitent une prorogation du délai de paiement. dès lors qu’une prorogation est accordée — et elle doit être accordée si le contrevenant ne peut pas, faute de moyens, payer la suramende dans le délai im- parti —, le contrevenant ne sera plus en défaut. • un contrevenant ne sera pas emprisonné s’il se trouve en défaut en raison de pauvreté. seuls les contrevenants qui ont les moyens de payer, mais qui choisissent de ne pas le faire, risquent d’être emprisonnés à la suite de l’audience relative à leur incarcération. • même s’il est possible qu’un contrevenant en dé- faut soit détenu pendant un certain temps avant l’audience relative à l’incarcération, les mesures concernant la comparution obligatoire prévues à la partie xvi du code criminel prévoient que la privation de liberté dans de telles situations n’aura lieu que dans le cas où il est nécessaire et dans l’intérêt public de le faire. de tels cas se présenteront sans doute rarement, d’autant plus qu’un défaut de paiement ne constitue pas une infraction criminelle. • a province cannot enter an unpaid surcharge order as a civil judgment. therefore, an offender who defaults in paying a surcharge will not face • une province ne peut pas faire inscrire une su- ramende impayée comme jugement civil. par conséquent, le contrevenant qui est en défaut [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 679 the same financial consequences as an offender who defaults in paying a fine — or, indeed, in paying any ordinary debt. de payer la suramende ne subira pas les mêmes conséquences financières que le contrevenant qui est en défaut de payer un autre type d’amende — ou, en fait, qui est en défaut de payer toute créance ordinaire. • there is insufficient evidence to support the proposition that the inability to pay a surcharge causes psychological stress severe enough to make the punishment imposed under s. 737 cruel and unusual. • la preuve est insuffisante pour étayer la propo- sition selon laquelle l’incapacité d’un contreve- nant de payer une suramende lui cause un stress psychologique sévère au point de rendre la peine prévue à l’art. 737 cruelle et inusitée. • the victim surcharge does not interfere with the rehabilitation of impecunious offenders to such a degree that it amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. • la suramende compensatoire ne compromet pas la réadaptation des contrevenants impécunieux au point de constituer une peine cruelle et inu- sitée. in smith, this court identified several forms [183] of treatments and punishments that will always vi- olate s. 12: the lash, the lobotomisation of certain dangerous offenders, and the castration of sexual offenders (pp 1073-74). similarly, in nur and lloyd, certain mandatory minimum custodial sentences were considered to be grossly disproportionate and were therefore struck down as cruel and unusual. bearing in mind the considerations listed above, my view is that the requirement that all offenders pay a sur- charge of only $100 or $200 per offence — a sur- charge which cannot be enforced against the liberty or property of an offender who is simply too poor to pay — does not rise to this level. i would also point out that a finding of unconstitutionality with respect to the victim surcharge may have the effect of calling into question the constitutionality of other mandatory fines imposed on offenders who may or may not have the means to pay. as observed by schrager ja in his reasons in the quebec court of appeal reasons, at para. 227): [183] dans smith, la cour a identifié plusieurs formes de traitements et peines qui violeront toujours l’art. 12 : la peine de fouet, la lobotomie de certains criminels dangereux et la castration d’auteurs de crimes sexuels (p. 1073- 1074). de façon similaire, dans nur et lloyd, certaines peines minimales obli- gatoires d’emprisonnement ont été jugées totalement disproportionnées et ont par conséquent été inva- lidées parce qu’elles étaient cruelles et inusitées. gardant à l’esprit ces considérations, j’estime que l’exigence que tous les contrevenants paient une suramende de seulement 100 ou 200 $ par infraction — suramende dont on ne peut forcer le paiement en portant atteinte à la liberté ou aux biens du contre- venant qui est simplement trop pauvre pour la payer — ne donne pas lieu à tel résultat. j’ajouterais que la déclaration d’inconstitutionnalité de la suramende compensatoire est susceptible d’avoir pour effet la remise en question de la constitutionnalité d’autres amendes obligatoires imposées à des contrevenants qui peuvent, ou non, avoir les moyens de payer. comme l’a fait observer le juge schrager dans les motifs de la cour d’appel du québec, par. 227 :    minimum sentences are not per se contrary to sec- tion 12 of the charter. however, the reasoning of those who would rule the minimum victim surcharge as cruel and unusual might well lead to the result that all minimum fines are cruel and unusual by the mere fact that many offenders are poor. such a result would in my view usurp the role of parliament in determining policy in criminal sentencing matters.    une peine minimale ne contrevient pas en soi à l’article 12 de la charte. pourtant, il se peut que l’analyse préconisée par ceux qui considèrent la suramende compensatoire minimale comme étant cruelle et inusitée mène au résultat que toute amende minimale soit cruelle et inusitée pour la seule raison qu’il existe plusieurs contrevenants impécunieux. à mon avis, un tel résultat usurpe le rôle du parlement d’élaborer la politique en matière de détermination de la peine. 680 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [184] given the foregoing, i therefore disagree with my colleague that the appellants have met the high burden of establishing that s. 737 of the crim- inal code infringes s. 12 in respect of impecunious offenders — either the individuals before this court, or the reasonable hypothetical. [184] compte tenu de ce qui précède, je ne partage pas l’opinion de ma collègue selon laquelle les appe- lants se sont acquittés du lourd fardeau d’établir que l’art. 737 du code criminel constitue une violation de l’art. 12 à l’égard des contrevenants impécunieux — que ce soient les appelants en l’espèce ou des contre- venants dans une situation hypothétique raisonnable. iv analysis: section 7 iv analyse : art. 7 [185] i turn now to the question of whether s. 737 of the criminal code violates s. 7 of the charter, which reads as follows: [185] j’examine maintenant la question de savoir si l’art. 737 du code criminel viole l’art. 7 de la charte, lequel est libellé comme suit : everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu’en conformité avec les principes de justice fondamentale. [186] in order to make out a s. 7 violation, a claim- ant must therefore establish two things: first, that the impugned law or state action deprives him or her of the right to life, liberty or security of the person; and second, that any such deprivation does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice (carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para. 55; canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at para 57). [186] pour démontrer qu’il y a eu violation de l’art. 7, le demandeur doit établir deux choses : pre- mièrement, que la disposition législative ou la me- sure prise par l’état qui est contestée porte atteinte à son droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne et, deuxièmement, que cette privation n’est pas conforme aux principes de justice fonda- mentale (carter c canada (procureur général), 2015 csc 5, [2015] 1 rcs 331, par. 55; canada (procureur général) c. bedford, 2013 csc 72, [2013] 3 rcs 1101, par 57). [187] the tinker appellants say that this is the case for s. 737 of the criminal code. in their submission, the mandatory victim surcharge deprives them of their right to liberty and security of the person in a manner that is overbroad and thus contrary to s. 7 of the charter. [187] les appelants tinker affirment que tel est précisément le cas de l’art. 737 du code criminel. ils font valoir que l’imposition de la suramende com- pensatoire les prive du droit à la liberté et à la sécurité de leur personne d’une manière qui est excessive et donc contraire à l’art. 7 de la charte. a only the tinker appellants’ liberty interest is engaged, insofar as defaulting offenders can be compelled to attend a committal hearing; the victim surcharge regime does not engage their security of the person interest a seul le droit à la liberté des appelants tinker est en cause, dans la mesure où les contrevenants en défaut peuvent être contraints de comparaître à l’audience sur l’incarcération; le régime de la suramende compensatoire ne met pas en jeu le droit à la sécurité de leur personne [188] the tinker appellants submit that the opera- tion of s. 737 of the criminal code engages the right to liberty in two ways. [188] les appelants tinker soutiennent que l’appli- cation de l’art. 737 du code criminel met en cause de deux façons leur droit à la liberté. [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 681 [189] their first argument on this point is that the availability of imprisonment as a consequence of non- payment (pursuant to ss. 734(4) and 734.7) can deprive impecunious offenders of their physi- cal liberty. this submission can be easily rejected: as explained at length above, offenders will not be imprisoned if they fail to pay the surcharge because they are financially unable to do so. [190] second, the tinker appellants submit that impecunious offenders who are in default of payment will suffer a deprivation of their physical liberty if and when they are compelled to attend a committal hearing. the ontario court of appeal held that “the possibility of being compelled to appear at a commit- tal hearing”, whether by the issuance of a summons or by pre- hearing arrest and detention, “deprives the tinker appellants of liberty” (para.  70). the respondent attorney general of ontario concedes this at paras. 74 and 82 of her written submissions. i agree, and would therefore conclude that s. 737 of the criminal code engages the tinker appellants’ liberty interest only insofar as non- payment of the victim surcharge triggers the possibility of being compelled to attend a committal hearing. [189] tout d’abord, ils avancent que la possibilité que des contrevenants impécunieux soient emprison- nés en raison d’un non- paiement (en application du par. 734(4) et de l’art 7347) peut donner lieu à une privation de leur liberté physique. cette prétention peut facilement être écartée : comme je l’ai déjà expliqué en détail, les contrevenants ne seront pas emprisonnés s’ils omettent de payer la suramende parce qu’ils en sont financièrement incapables. [190] les appelants tinker font ensuite valoir que les contrevenants impécunieux en défaut de paie- ment seront privés de leur liberté physique s’ils sont contraints de comparaître à l’audience sur l’incar- cération. la cour d’appel de l’ontario a statué que « la possibilité d’être tenu de comparaître à une au- dience sur l’incarcération », que ce soit au moyen de la remise d’une sommation ou d’une arrestation et d’une détention avant l’audience, « prive les appe- lants tinker de leur liberté » (par 70). la procureure générale de l’ontario, intimée devant la cour, le concède aux par. 74 et 82 de son mémoire. je partage son point de vue, et je conclurais donc que l’art. 737 du code criminel met en jeu le droit à la liberté des appelants tinker, uniquement dans la mesure où le non- paiement de la suramende compensatoire donne ouverture à la possibilité que les contrevenants soient contraints de comparaître à leur audience sur l’incarcération. [191] however, i cannot accept the tinker appel- lants’ submission that the impugned provision en- gages their security interest due to the stress caused by: (a) having a significant fine imposed, which the person has no ability to pay; (b) being threatened with imprisonment for non- payment; (c) having to request extensions of time in order to avoid being arrested or imprisoned; and (d) knowing that one will have to continue making such requests on an ongoing basis in order to remain out of prison (af (tinker et al.), at para 27). [191] je ne puis toutefois souscrire à la prétention des appelants tinker selon laquelle la disposition contestée met en jeu leur droit à la sécurité en raison du stress causé par a) l’imposition d’une amende im- portante qu’ils sont incapables de payer, b) la menace d’emprisonnement pour cause de non- paiement, c) la nécessité de demander des prorogations de délai pour éviter l’arrestation ou l’emprisonnement et d) le fait que le contrevenant en défaut devra continuer de présenter régulièrement de telles requêtes pour ne pas être emprisonné (ma (tinker et autres), par 27). [192] state- imposed psychological stress may amount to interference with the right to security of the person, but only where it has “a serious and pro- found effect on a person’s psychological integrity” (new brunswick (minister of health and community services) v. g (j), [1999] 3 scr 46, at para. 60; [192] le stress psychologique causé par l’état peut équivaloir à une atteinte au droit à la sécurité de la personne, mais seulement lorsqu’il entraîne « des répercussions graves et profondes sur l’inté- grité psychologique d’une personne » (nouveau- brunswick (ministre de la santé et des services 682 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. blencoe v. british columbia (human rights com- mission), 2000 scc 44, [2000] 2  scr  307, at para 57). as observed by lamer cj in g (j): communautaires) c g.  (j.), [1999] 3 rcs 46, par. 60; blencoe c. colombie- britannique (human rights commission), 2000 csc 44, [2000] 2 rcs. 307, par 57). comme l’a fait observer le juge en chef lamer dans g (j) :. it is clear that the right to security of the person does not protect the individual from the ordinary stresses and anxi- eties that a person of reasonable sensibility would suffer as a result of government action. if the right were interpreted with such broad sweep, countless government initiatives could be challenged on the ground that they infringe the right to security of the person, massively expanding the scope of judicial review, and, in the process, trivializing what it means for a right to be constitutionally protected. [para. 59] il est manifeste que le droit à la sécurité de la personne ne protège pas l’individu contre les tensions et les angoisses ordinaires qu’une personne ayant une sensibilité raison- nable éprouverait par suite d’un acte gouvernemental. si le droit était interprété de manière aussi large, d’in- nombrables initiatives gouvernementales pourraient être contestées au motif qu’elles violent le droit à la sécurité de la personne, ce qui élargirait considérablement l’étendue du contrôle judiciaire, et partant, banaliserait la protection constitutionnelle des droits. [par. 59] [193] accepting that the mandatory imposition of the surcharge can conceivably be stressful for some offenders of modest means, the question for the purpose of s. 7 is whether the stress felt by such offenders is serious enough to engage their security interest. as observed by mclachlin cj and major j. in chaoulli v. quebec (attorney general), 2005 scc 35, [2005] 1 scr 791, “[t]he task of the courts, on s. 7 issues as on others, is to evaluate the issue in the light, not just of common sense or theory, but of the evidence” (para 150). this is consistent with the perspective adopted by the tinker appellants themselves: “the question is not whether the sur- charge may have some theoretical impact from an objective perspective; the question is whether it is having a real impact from a subjective perspective of the actual indigent persons who are being forced to pay” (af (tinker et al.), at para 47). [193] si l’on accepte que l’imposition d’une su- ramende obligatoire peut fort bien causer du stress à certains contrevenants disposant de moyens mo- destes, la question qui se pose au regard de l’art. 7 est de savoir si le stress ressenti à ce titre par de tels contrevenants est suffisamment important pour mettre en jeu le droit à la sécurité de leur personne. comme l’ont fait observer la juge en chef mclachlin et le juge major dans chaoulli c. québec (procu- reur général), 2005 csc 35, [2005] 1 rcs 791, « [p]our trancher les questions relatives à l’art. 7, les tribunaux doivent, comme pour toute autre question, procéder à une évaluation fondée sur la preuve et non seulement sur le bon sens ou des théories » (par 150). cet énoncé correspond à la thèse défendue par les appelants tinker eux- mêmes : [traduction] « il ne s’agit pas de savoir si la suramende peut avoir des conséquences théoriques d’un point de vue objectif, mais si la suramende a des conséquences concrètes du point de vue subjectif des personnes indigentes réelles qui sont forcées de la payer » (ma (tinker et autres), par 47). [194] respectfully, neither common sense nor the evidence provides a basis on which i can con- clude that the actual stress that impecunious offend- ers may experience as a result of having to pay a surcharge — albeit in circumstances where non- payment due to poverty will not result in a depriva- tion of either liberty or property — is serious enough that it exceeds the requisite threshold (see: blencoe, [194] avec égards, ni le bon sens ni la preuve ne me permettent de conclure que le stress réel que pourraient subir les contrevenants impécunieux en raison de l’obligation de payer la suramende — bien qu’il s’agisse d’une situation où le non- paiement at- tribuable à la pauvreté ne les privera ni de leur liberté ni de leurs biens — est grave au point d’excéder le seuil requis (voir : blencoe, par. 57; g (j), par 59). [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 683 at para. 57; g(j), at para 59). my view is thus that the tinker appellants have not demonstrated that s. 7 is engaged due to the stress that may be associated with the imposition of the surcharge. je considère donc que les appelants tinker n’ont pas démontré que l’art. 7 s’applique en raison du stress pouvant être associé à l’imposition de la suramende. b the deprivation of liberty associated with being compelled to attend a committal hearing accords with the principles of fundamental justice b la privation de liberté associée au fait d’être contraint de comparaître à l’audience sur l’in- carcération est conforme aux principes de jus- tice fondamentale [195] the next stage in the s. 7 framework requires the court to determine whether the deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person accords with the principles of fundamental justice. the principle of fundamental justice identified by the tinker ap- pellants is overbreadth, which deals with instances where the effect of a law on a person’s right to life, liberty and security is rationally connected to the law’s purpose in some respects, but not all (bedford, at paras. 101 and 112-13). such a law will be un- constitutional to the extent that it overreaches in its effects, in that it deprives some persons of their right to life, liberty and security of the person in a manner unconnected to its objective in some, though not all, respects. [196] this is key. for a law to be unconstitutional under s. 7 based on the overbreadth principle, it is not enough to simply say that there is an absence of any rational connection between the law’s purpose and some of its general effects. in other words, a law is not overbroad just because its scope is broader than necessary to carry out its purpose. to succeed on this basis, a claimant must instead establish that the law interferes with the right to life, liberty or security of the person in some ways that are unconnected to its objective (carter, at para 85). what matters, there- fore, is the relationship between the law’s purpose and the manner in which it deprives a person of life, liberty or security. [195] le cadre de l’analyse relative à l’art. 7 exige, comme prochaine étape, que le tribunal établisse si l’atteinte à la vie, à la liberté ou à la sécurité de la personne est conforme aux principes de justice fonda- mentale. le principe de justice fondamentale invoqué par les appelants tinker est celui selon lequel les lois ne doivent pas avoir une portée excessive; il vise les cas où l’effet de la disposition sur le droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité d’une personne a un lien ra- tionnel avec l’objet de la disposition à certains égards, mais pas tous (bedford, par. 101 et 112- 113). une telle disposition législative sera inconstitutionnelle dans la mesure où ses effets ont une portée excessive, au point où elle prive certaines personnes de leur droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité d’une manière étrangère à son objectif à certains égards, mais pas tous. [196] il s’agit là de l’élément crucial. pour qu’une disposition législative soit inconstitutionnelle au re- gard de l’art. 7 en application du principe de la portée excessive, il ne suffit pas de dire qu’il y a absence de lien rationnel entre un objectif donné de la dispo- sition législative et certains de ses effets généraux. autrement dit, une disposition n’a pas une portée excessive uniquement parce que celle-ci est plus large que nécessaire pour réaliser son objectif. pour qu’un demandeur ait gain de cause sur ce fondement, il doit plutôt établir que la disposition en cause porte atteinte au droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne d’une façon qui n’a aucun rapport avec son objet (carter, par 85). ce qui compte est donc le lien entre l’objet de la disposition et la façon dont celle-ci porte atteinte à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité d’une personne. [197] having found that s. 737 of the criminal code interferes with an offender’s liberty interest, but only to the extent that the offender can be compelled [197] comme j’ai conclu que l’art. 737 du code criminel porte atteinte au droit à la liberté du contre- venant, mais seulement dans la mesure où ce dernier 684 r v boudreault côté j. [2018] 3 scr. to attend a committal hearing after defaulting, the question is therefore whether this deprivation of lib- erty is rationally connected to the purpose underlying the impugned provision in cases involving offenders who simply lack the means to pay. does that depri- vation of liberty go further than necessary to achieve the law’s purpose, such that it is overbroad in relation to the impecunious tinker appellants? [198] i agree with the ontario court of appeal that this question should be answered in the neg- ative: “[t]he end result of a committal hearing is not to collect on an outstanding surcharge payment but to determine whether a warrant for the default- ing offender’s committal should be issued by in- quiring into the offender’s excuse for refusing to pay” (para 104). it is therefore necessary to compel a defaulting offender to attend a committal hear- ing — which will necessarily entail some deprivation of personal liberty — in order to determine whether the offender has the funds to pay the victim surcharge and to give him or her an opportunity to explain (or provide a “reasonable excuse” for) non- payment. by requiring the offender to account to the state in this fashion, the process can also serve “as a reminder of the offender’s accountability to victims of crime” (ontario court of appeal reasons, at para 103). [199] my conclusion is, therefore, that the depri- vation of liberty associated with committal hearings under s. 737 is not overbroad in relation to impecu- nious offenders; it has at least some rational connec- tion to the dual purposes of the surcharge regime, both for offenders who have refused to pay without reasonable excuse and for those who have not paid simply due to poverty. for this reason, i discern no violation of s 7. peut être contraint de comparaître à une audience sur l’incarcération en raison de son défaut, la question qui se pose alors est de savoir si cette atteinte à la liberté a un lien rationnel avec l’objectif sous- jacent de la disposition contestée dans des affaires visant des contrevenants qui n’ont tout simplement pas les moyens de payer. une telle atteinte à la liberté va-t-elle au- delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour réaliser l’objectif de la loi, de sorte qu’elle a une portée ex- cessive à l’égard des appelants impécunieux tinker? [198] comme la cour d’appel de l’ontario, je suis d’avis qu’il convient de répondre à cette question par la négative : « [l]a raison d’être de l’audience d’incarcération n’est pas de percevoir une suramende impayée, mais de décider s’il y a lieu de délivrer un mandat d’incarcération contre le contrevenant en défaut après avoir examiné l’excuse qu’il invoque pour refuser de payer » (par 104). par conséquent, il est nécessaire de contraindre le contrevenant en défaut à comparaître à l’audience sur l’incarcération — ce qui donnera nécessairement lieu à une certaine privation de sa liberté individuelle — pour établir s’il a les moyens de payer la suramende compensatoire et pour qu’il ait l’occasion d’expliquer son défaut de paiement (ou de fournir une « excuse raisonnable »). l’obligation du contrevenant de rendre compte de cette façon à l’état sert aussi de rappel « aux contre- venants qu’ils doivent rendre des comptes aux vic- times de leurs actes criminels » (motifs de la cour d’appel de l’ontario, par 103). [199] partant, je conclus que la privation de liberté associée aux audiences sur l’incarcération en appli- cation de l’art. 737 n’est pas excessive à l’égard des contrevenants impécunieux; elle comporte au moins un certain lien rationnel avec le double objectif du régime de la suramende, tant pour les contrevenants qui ont refusé de payer sans excuse raisonnable, que pour les contrevenants qui n’ont pas payé simple- ment pour cause de pauvreté. pour cette raison, je ne vois aucune violation de l’art 7. v conclusion v conclusion [200] having found that s. 737 of the criminal code does not violate the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment (s. 12 of the [200] comme j’ai conclu que l’art. 737 du code criminel ne viole ni la protection constitutionnelle contre les peines cruelles et inusitées (art. 12 de la [2018] 3 rcs. r c boudreault la juge côté 685 charter) or the right not to be deprived of life, lib- erty and security of the person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice (s. 7 of the charter), i am of the view that the appeals should be dismissed. therefore, i dissent. charte), ni ne viole le droit à la protection contre les atteintes à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne qu’en conformité avec les principes de jus- tice fondamentale (art. 7 de la charte), je suis d’avis que les pourvois devraient être rejetés. j’inscris par conséquent ma dissidence. appeals allowed, côté and rowe jj. dissenting. pourvois accueillis, les juges côté et rowe sont dissidents. procureur de l’appelant alex boudreault (37427) : aide juridique de mont réal, mont réal. aide juridique de mont réal, mont réal. judge, michael bondoc and wesley mead (37774): doucette santoro furgiuele, toronto; legal aid on- tario, toronto. procureurs des appelants edward tinker, kelly judge, michael bondoc et wesley mead (37774) : doucette santoro furgiuele, toronto; aide juridique ontario, toronto. solicitors for the appellant garrett eckstein procureurs de l’appelant garrett eckstein (37782): foord & associates, ottawa. (37782) : foord & associates, ottawa. solicitors for the appellant daniel larocque (37783):  société professionnelle yves jubinville, l’orignal. procureurs de l’appelant daniel larocque (37783) : société professionnelle yves jubinville, l’orignal. solicitor for the respondent her majesty the queen (37427):  director of criminal and penal prosecutions, trois- rivières. procureur de l’intimée sa majesté la reine (37427) : directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales, trois- rivières. of quebec (37427): attorney general of quebec, mont réal and québec. procureur de l’intimée la procureure générale du québec (37427) : procureure générale du québec, mont réal et québec. solicitor for the respondent her majesty the queen (37774 and 37782) and the attorney general of ontario (37783): attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intimée sa majesté la reine (37774 et 37782) et la procureure générale de l’on- tario (37783) : procureure générale de l’ontario, toronto. solicitor for the respondent her majesty the queen (37783): public prosecution service of can- ada, ottawa. procureur de l’intimée sa majesté la reine (37783) : service des poursuites pénales du canada, ottawa. of alberta (37427): attorney general of alberta, edmonton. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général de l’alberta (37427) : procureur général de l’al- berta, edmonton. colour of change and the income security advocacy procureur des intervenants colour of poverty – colour of change et le centre d’action pour la 686 r v boudreault [2018] 3 scr. centre (37427, 37774, 37782 and 37783): income security advocacy centre, toronto. sécurité du revenu (37427, 37774, 37782 et 37783) : centre d’action pour la sécurité du revenu, toronto. civil liberties association (37427): hunter litigation chambers, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante association des li- bertés civiles de la colombie- britannique (37427) : hunter litigation chambers, vancouver. services inc. (37427 and 37774): aboriginal legal services inc., toronto. procureur de l’intervenante aboriginal legal services inc. (37427 et 37774) : aboriginal legal services inc., toronto. liberties association (37427, 37774, 37782 and 37783): borden ladner gervais, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana- dienne des libertés civiles (37427, 37774, 37782 et 37783) : borden ladner gervais, toronto. ety (37427): rosenberg kosakoski, vancouver; pivot legal society, vancouver. procureurs de l’intervenante pivot legal society (37427) : rosenberg kosakoski, vancouver; pivot legal society, vancouver. vices society (37427 and 37774): tutshi law centre, whitehorse. procureur de l’intervenante la société d’aide juridique du yukon (37427 et 37774) : tutshi law centre, whitehorse. of quebec (37774): attorney general of quebec, québec and mont réal. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné- rale du québec (37774) : procureure générale du québec, québec et mont réal. yers’ association of ontario (37774): goldblatt part- ners, toronto; rusonik, o’connor, robbins, ross, gorham & angelini, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association of ontario (37774) : goldblatt part- ners, toronto; rusonik, o’connor, robbins, ross, gorham & angelini, toronto.
[1] the general rule against collateral attacks on court orders is well- established: with limited ex- ceptions, an order issued by a court must be obeyed unless it is set aside in a proceeding taken for that [1] la règle générale interdisant les contestations incidentes des ordonnances judiciaires est bien éta- blie : sauf rares exceptions, une ordonnance rendue par un tribunal doit être respectée, à moins qu’elle ne [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 419 purpose. the rule has been consistently applied to prevent a person from attacking the validity of a court order when defending against a criminal charge stemming from its breach in r v consolidated maybrun mines ltd., [1998] 1 scr 706, and in the companion case, r v. al klippert ltd., [1998] 1 scr 737, this court developed a distinct ap- proach for determining whether a person who is charged criminally with breaching an administrative order can collaterally attack that order. in those deci- sions, the persons seeking to challenge the adminis- trative orders did not allege that the orders infringed their rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. [2] this appeal requires us to revisit the maybrun framework in the context of a long- term offender, who has been charged criminally for having breached the residency condition imposed on him by the parole board of canada (“parole board”) under a long- term supervision order (“ltso”). in particular, we are re- quired to decide whether, in defending that charge, it was open to the appellant, spencer dean bird, to col- laterally attack the validity of the residency condition on the basis that it contravened his charter rights. soit annulée à l’issue d’une instance introduite à cette fin. la règle a constamment été appliquée afin d’em- pêcher une personne de contester la validité d’une ordonnance judiciaire lorsqu’elle se défend d’une accusation criminelle découlant de la contraven- tion à l’ordonnance. dans l’arrêt r c. consolidated maybrun mines ltd., [1998] 1 rcs 706, et dans l’arrêt connexe r c. al klippert ltd., [1998] 1 rcs. 737, la cour a élaboré une approche distincte pour dé- terminer si une personne accusée au criminel d’avoir contrevenu à une ordonnance administrative peut contester cette ordonnance de manière incidente. dans ces affaires, ceux qui cherchaient à contester les ordonnances administratives n’ont pas allégué que ces dernières portaient atteinte à leurs droits garantis par la charte canadienne des droits et libertés. [2] le présent pourvoi requiert que nous réexa- minions le cadre énoncé dans l’arrêt maybrun dans le contexte d’une ordonnance visant un délinquant à contrôler, accusé au criminel d’avoir contrevenu à l’assignation à résidence à laquelle il avait été contraint par la commission des libérations condi- tionnelles du canada (« commission ») aux termes d’une ordonnance de surveillance de longue durée (« osld »). plus particulièrement, nous devons dé- cider si l’appelant, m. spencer dean bird, pouvait, en défense à cette accusation, contester incidemment la validité de l’assignation à résidence au motif que celle-ci contrevenait aux droits que lui garantit la charte. [3] mr. bird was found to be a long- term offender and received a sentence comprised of a prison term and a period of long- term supervision in the commu- nity. based in part on mr. bird’s lengthy history of violence and numerous failed conditional releases, the parole board imposed a residency condition as part of mr. bird’s ltso. this condition required that he reside at a community correctional centre, community residential facility or other residential facility approved by the correctional service of canada (“csc”). csc placed mr. bird in oskana centre, a community correctional centre. less than a month after his long- term supervision commenced, mr.  bird left oskana centre and did not return. he was eventually apprehended and charged un- der s 7533(1) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, [3] m. bird, déclaré délinquant à contrôler, a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement suivie d’une période de surveillance de longue durée dans la collectivité. s’appuyant notamment sur le lourd passé de m. bird en matière de violence ainsi que sur ses nombreuses libérations conditionnelles infruc- tueuses, la commission a assorti son osld d’une assignation à résidence. cette condition obligeait m. bird à demeurer dans un centre correctionnel communautaire, un centre résidentiel communau- taire ou tout autre établissement résidentiel approuvé par le service correctionnel du canada (« scc »). ce dernier a placé m. bird au centre oskana, un centre correctionnel communautaire. moins d’un mois après le début de sa surveillance de longue du- rée, m. bird a quitté le centre et n’y est pas retourné. 420 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. c. c-46, with having breached the residency condi- tion of his ltso. [4] mr. bird defended the charge at trial on the basis that the residency condition of his ltso was not within the parole board’s statutory authority and violated his s. 7 charter rights. the trial judge ac- cepted this argument and acquitted mr. bird, finding that the residency condition was invalid. on appeal, the court of appeal for saskatchewan rejected this finding. in its view, the trial judge impermissibly per- mitted mr. bird to collaterally attack the residency condition. the court of appeal set aside mr. bird’s acquittal, entered a conviction on the charge under s 7533(1) and remitted the matter to the provincial court of saskatchewan for sentencing. mr. bird now appeals to this court. he renews his s. 7 charter attack on the residency condition. additionally, he raises for the first time that the condition violates his charter rights under ss. 9 and 11(h). [5] for reasons that follow, i agree with the court of appeal that mr. bird was not permitted to collat- erally attack the residency condition of his ltso. in view of that, i find it unnecessary to address the various charter arguments he has raised in support of his position that the residency condition is invalid. accordingly, i would dismiss the appeal. il a par la suite été arrêté et accusé de ne pas s’être conformé à l’assignation à résidence prévue dans l’osld à laquelle il était assujetti, une infraction dé- crite au par 7533(1) du code criminel, lrc 1985, c c-46. [4] lors du procès, m. bird s’est défendu contre l’accusation dont il faisait l’objet, en alléguant que l’assignation à résidence prévue dans son osld ne relevait pas de la compétence conférée par la loi à la commission et que cette condition contrevenait à ses droits garantis par l’art. 7 de la charte. le juge de première instance a fait droit à cet argument et a acquitté m. bird, en concluant que l’assignation à résidence était invalide. en appel, la cour d’appel de la saskatchewan a rejeté cette conclusion. selon elle, le juge de première instance avait commis une erreur en permettant à m. bird de contester incidemment l’assignation à résidence. la cour d’appel a annulé l’acquittement de m. bird, inscrit une déclaration de culpabilité à l’égard de l’accusation fondée sur le par 7533(1) et renvoyé l’affaire à la cour pro- vinciale de la saskatchewan pour détermination de la peine. m. bird se pourvoit maintenant devant la cour. il conteste de nouveau l’assignation à rési- dence sur le fondement de l’art. 7 de la charte. il soutient en outre pour la première fois que cette as- signation contrevient aux droits que lui garantissent l’art. 9 et l’al. 11h) de la charte. [5] pour les motifs qui suivent, je conviens avec la cour d’appel que m. bird ne pouvait pas contester incidemment l’assignation à résidence prévue dans l’osld prononcée contre lui. cela étant, j’estime qu’il n’est pas nécessaire d’examiner les divers ar- guments fondés sur la charte qu’il a soulevés pour démontrer l’invalidité de l’assignation à résidence. par conséquent, je suis d’avis de rejeter l’appel. ii facts ii faits [6] mr. bird has a lengthy criminal history dating back to 1983. his criminal record consists of approx- imately 63 convictions, including 12 convictions for violent offences. [6] m. bird a un long passé criminel qui remonte à 1983. il a été déclaré coupable d’environ 63 infrac- tions, dont 12 avec violence. [7] on may 27, 2005, following mr. bird’s con- victions for assault with a weapon and theft under [7] le 27 mai 2005, après que m. bird a été jugé coupable d’agression armée et de vol de moins de [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 421 $5,000, judge ferris of the provincial court of saskatchewan found him to be a long- term offender under s 7531(3) of the criminal code. he sentenced mr. bird to 54 months of imprisonment to be fol- lowed by a 5- year period of long- term supervision. over the course of this sentence, mr. bird was placed on statutory release three times. on each occasion, his release was suspended for violating conditions, re- offending or allegedly re- offending. mr. bird was eventually released on his long- term supervision order on june 21, 2013. three days later, he was arrested and charged with possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, for which he eventually received a 12- month sentence. [8] csc prepared an “assessment for decision” dated april  28, 2014, which assessed mr.  bird’s statutory release plans in respect of the 12- month sentence he received on the weapon conviction. mr. bird’s plan was to return to ahtahkakoop first nation and live with his brother. csc found that this plan was not sufficient to manage the risk mr. bird posed to the community, noting that mr. bird had a “well established pattern of violence” and was “una- ble to abide by imposed conditions for any length of time” (ar, vol. ii, at p 77). csc determined that if a residency condition was not imposed, mr. bird would “present an undue risk to society” (ibid). accordingly, csc recommended that mr. bird reside at a community correctional centre or a community residential facility for the duration of his statutory release and for the first 180 days of his long- term supervision. 5 000 $, le juge ferris de la cour provinciale de la saskatchewan l’a déclaré délinquant à contrôler en vertu du par 7531(3) du code criminel. il a infligé à m. bird une peine d’emprisonnement de 54 mois devant être suivie d’une période de surveillance de longue durée de 5 ans. pendant qu’il purgeait sa peine, m. bird a fait l’objet d’une libération d’of- fice à trois reprises. chaque fois, sa libération a été suspendue pour violation des conditions, récidive ou récidive alléguée. le 21 juin 2013, m. bird a été libéré conformément aux conditions de son osld. trois jours plus tard, il a été arrêté et accusé de pos- session d’une arme dans un dessein dangereux, in- fraction pour laquelle il a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement de 12 mois. [8] le scc a préparé une « évaluation en vue d’une décision », datée du 28 avril 2014, dans la- quelle il évaluait les projets de libération d’office de m. bird relativement à la peine de 12 mois qui lui avait été infligée à la suite de sa condamnation pour possession d’une arme. m. bird avait comme projet de retourner au sein de la première nation ahtahkakoop et d’y vivre avec son frère. le scc a conclu que ce projet ne limiterait pas suffisamment le risque que m. bird posait pour la collectivité, soulignant que ce dernier avait [traduction] « des tendances bien établies en matière de violence » et qu’il était « incapable de se conformer aux condi- tions qui lui étaient infligées pour quelque période que ce soit » (da, vol. ii, p 77). le scc a jugé que, sans l’imposition d’une assignation à résidence, m. bird « présenterait un risque inacceptable pour la société » (ibid). il a donc recommandé que m. bird réside dans un centre correctionnel communautaire ou dans un centre résidentiel communautaire pen- dant toute la durée de sa libération d’office, ainsi que pendant les 180 premiers jours de sa période de surveillance de longue durée. [9] in its pre- release decision dated july 15, 2014, the parole board took up csc’s recommendation and imposed a condition that mr. bird reside at a community correctional centre, community resi- dential facility or other residential facility (such as a private home placement) approved by csc for the first 180 days of his long- term supervision. this condition was imposed pursuant to s 1341(2) of the [9] dans sa décision datée du 15 juillet 2014 an- térieure à la libération, la commission a adopté la recommandation du scc et elle a assigné m. bird à résidence dans un centre correctionnel commu- nautaire, un centre résidentiel communautaire ou un autre établissement résidentiel communau- taire (par exemple, une maison privée) approuvé par le scc, pendant les 180 premiers jours de sa 422 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. corrections and conditional release act, sc 1992, c. 20 (“ccra”), which permits the parole board to “establish conditions for the long term supervision of the offender that it considers reasonable and nec- essary in order to protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of the of- fender”. echoing csc’s concerns, the parole board reasoned that the residency condition was reasonable and necessary based on mr. bird’s “lengthy history of violence causing physical harm” and his “inability to abide by the conditions that [were] imposed” on his conditional releases (ar, vol. ii, at p 69). the parole board concluded that it was “satisfied that [mr. bird would] require the structure and super- vision that only can be provided by a community correctional centre/community residential centre. therefore, residency is imposed for 180 days” (ibid). [10] the parole board conveyed its reasons for de- cision to mr. bird under a cover letter dated july 24, 2014. the letter expressly advised mr. bird that he could apply to the board to be relieved of any of the conditions of his ltso: you may apply to the parole board of canada to be re- lieved of any of your conditions or request that the board vary the terms of any of your conditions of long term supervision order. upon receipt of your application and an updated report from your parole officer, with whom you should discuss your request, your file will be referred to the board for voting and subsequently you will be ad- vised of the outcome. to ensure that your request receives complete consideration, please fully document the reasons for your request. [emphasis added.] surveillance de longue durée. cette condition a été imposée en vertu du par 1341(2) de la loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, lc 1992, c. 20 (« lscmlsc »), qui per- met à la commission d’« imposer au délinquant les conditions de surveillance qu’elle juge raisonnables et nécessaires pour protéger la société et favoriser la réinsertion sociale du délinquant ». faisant écho aux préoccupations soulevées par le scc, la commission a jugé que l’assignation à résidence était raisonnable et nécessaire, compte tenu du [traduction] « lourd passé [de m. bird] en matière de violence occasion- nant des préjudices corporels » et de son « incapacité à se conformer aux conditions qui lui étaient impo- sées » lors de ses libérations conditionnelles (da, vol. ii, p 69). la commission a conclu en précisant qu’elle était « convaincue que [m. bird aurait] besoin de la structure et de la surveillance que seuls peuvent lui offrir un centre correctionnel communautaire ou un centre résidentiel communautaire par consé- quent, l’assignation à résidence est imposée pour une période de 180 jours » (ibid). [10] la commission a transmis les motifs de sa décision à m. bird avec une lettre d’accompagne- ment datée du 24 juillet 2014. cette lettre l’avisait expressément qu’il pouvait présenter une demande à la commission s’il souhaitait être soustrait à l’une ou l’autre des conditions prévues dans l’osld dont il était l’objet : [traduction] vous pouvez présenter une demande à la commission des libérations conditionnelles du ca- nada en vue d’être soustrait à l’une ou l’autre de vos conditions, ou pour lui demander de modifier l’une ou l’autre des conditions de l’ordonnance de surveillance de longue durée dont vous faites l’objet. dès réception de votre demande et d’un rapport à jour de votre agent de libération conditionnelle, avec qui vous devriez dis- cuter de votre demande, votre dossier sera transmis à la commission qui tiendra un vote. par la suite, vous serez informé du résultat du processus en question. afin que votre demande puisse faire l’objet d’un examen complet, veuillez préciser les raisons qui la motivent. [je souligne.] (ar, vol. ii, at p. 67) (da, vol. ii, p. 67) [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 423 [11] on mr. bird’s statutory release date of august 14, 2014, he was transported to oskana centre where he lived until his warrant expiry date of january 7, 2015, at which time his ltso commenced. that same day, mr. bird signed a long- term supervision certificate prepared by csc, which spelled out the special condi- tions of his long- term supervision, including a direction that he report to oskana centre. the certificate also included an acknowledgement, signed by mr. bird, that violating a condition of his long- term supervision without lawful excuse was an offence under s 7533(1) of the criminal code. [12] oskana centre is a community correctional centre, also known as a halfway house. it has es- tablished various conditions for persons who reside there, two of which include a nighttime curfew and a requirement that residents return to oskana centre from 11:00 am to 1:00 pm. mr. bird was expected to comply with those conditions. [11] le 14 août 2014, date de sa libération d’of- fice, m. bird a été transporté au centre oskana, où il a vécu jusqu’au 7 janvier 2015, date à laquelle son mandat a expiré et où son osld a pris effet. le même jour, m. bird a signé un certificat de surveil- lance de longue durée préparé par le scc, qui énon- çait les conditions particulières de sa surveillance de longue durée, notamment qu’il devait se présenter au centre oskana. le certificat comprenait aussi une reconnaissance, signée par m. bird, selon laquelle la violation d’une condition de sa surveillance de longue durée sans excuse légitime constituerait une infraction aux termes du par 7533(1) du code cri­ minel. [12] le centre oskana, qui est un centre correction- nel communautaire, sert aussi de maison de transi- tion. il impose diverses conditions à ses résidents, dont les deux suivantes : respecter le couvre- feu et être de retour au centre entre 11 h et 13 h. m. bird devait se conformer à ces conditions. [13] on january 28, 2015, mr. bird left oskana centre and did not return. the following day he was charged with breaching the residency condition of his ltso under s 7533(1) of the criminal code. he remained at large for more than two months until april 16, 2015, when the police located him and placed him under arrest. [13] le 28 janvier 2015, m. bird a quitté le centre oskana et il n’y est pas retourné. le jour suivant, il a été accusé d’avoir enfreint l’assignation à rési- dence prévue dans son osld, l’infraction décrite au par 7533(1) du code criminel. il a été en fuite pendant plus de deux mois, jusqu’à ce que, le 16 avril 2015, des policiers le repèrent et l’arrêtent. iii judgments below iii décisions des juridictions d’instances infé- rieures a provincial court of saskatchewan, 2016 skpc 28, 352 crr (2d) 248 (henning prov. ct. j.) a cour provinciale de la saskatchewan, 2016 skpc 28, 352 crr (2d) 248 (le juge henning) [14] at his trial for breaching the residency condi- tion of his ltso, mr. bird argued that the residency condition exceeded the parole board’s statutory au- thority and violated his s. 7 charter rights. [14] lors de son procès pour violation de l’assigna- tion à résidence prévue dans son osld, m. bird a fait valoir que cette condition outrepassait la compé- tence que la loi confère à la commission et qu’elle portait atteinte à ses droits protégés par l’art. 7 de la charte. [15] the trial judge initially considered whether, in defending against the charge of breaching the residency condition, mr. bird could mount a collat- eral attack on the parole board’s decision to impose [15] le juge de première instance s’est d’abord demandé si, pour se défendre contre l’accusation d’avoir contrevenu à l’assignation à résidence, m. bird pouvait contester incidemment la décision 424 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. it. applying the framework set out in maybrun and klippert, the trial judge determined that mr. bird could collaterally attack the order of the parole board. [16] the trial judge then considered whether the residency condition was valid. he found that the decision of the parole board to impose the resi- dency condition had the effect of placing mr. bird in oskana centre, a penal institution. in his view, such a condition was not authorized under the ccra for ltsos and it amounted to a significant breach of mr. bird’s rights under s. 7 of the charter. given his conclusion that the residency condition was uncon- stitutional, he concluded that mr. bird could not be convicted of breaching it. accordingly, he dismissed the charge against mr bird. de la commission de lui avoir imposé cette condi- tion. après avoir appliqué le cadre d’analyse établi dans les arrêts maybrun et klippert, le juge a conclu que m. bird pouvait effectivement contester inci- demment l’ordonnance de la commission. [16] le juge du procès s’est ensuite demandé si l’assignation à résidence était valide. il a conclu que la décision de la commission d’imposer cette condition avait eu pour effet de placer m. bird au centre oskana, un établissement carcéral. or, selon lui, non seulement la lscmlsc ne permet pas d’im- poser une telle condition dans le cadre d’une osld, mais cette condition constituait une atteinte impor- tante aux droits garantis à m. bird par l’art. 7 de la charte. étant donné sa conclusion que l’assignation à résidence était inconstitutionnelle, le juge a conclu que m. bird ne pouvait pas être déclaré coupable de l’avoir enfreinte. par conséquent, il a rejeté l’accu- sation qui pesait sur ce dernier. b court of appeal for saskatchewan, 2017 skca 32, 348  ccc  (3d) 43 (richards c.j and ottenbreit and whitmore jja). b cour d’appel de la saskatchewan, 2017 skca 32, 348 ccc (3d) 43 (le juge en chef richards et les juges ottenbreit et whitmore) [17] on appeal, the crown argued that the trial judge erred in permitting a collateral attack on the parole board’s decision to impose a residency con- dition, and he further erred in determining that the residency condition violated s. 7 of the charter. [18] chief justice richards, writing for a unani- mous court, allowed the appeal. in his view, the trial judge erred in permitting a collateral attack on the residency condition imposed by the parole board. considering the framework set out in maybrun and klippert and its focus on legislative intent, the court of appeal concluded that it was not the intention of parliament to permit collateral attacks on conditions imposed on ltsos by the parole board. [17] en appel, le ministère public a soutenu que le juge de première instance avait commis une erreur en permettant la contestation incidente de la déci- sion de la commission d’imposer une assignation à résidence et en concluant, par ailleurs, que cette assignation contrevenait à l’art. 7 de la charte. [18] le juge en chef richards, au nom des juges unanimes, a accueilli l’appel. à son avis, le juge de première instance a eu tort de permettre la contesta- tion incidente de l’assignation à résidence imposée par la commission. se fondant sur le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans les arrêts maybrun et klippert et tenant compte de l’importance accordée dans ce cadre à l’intention du législateur, la cour d’appel a conclu que ce dernier n’avait pas l’intention d’autoriser les contestations incidentes des conditions d’une osld imposées par la commission. [19] chief justice richards noted that allowing offenders to “breach first, challenge later” would tend to frustrate the purposes of the long- term su- pervision regime (para 57). he further observed [19] pour le juge en chef richards, permettre aux délinquants de « contrevenir d’abord, pour en- suite contester » tendrait à contrecarrer l’objet du régime de surveillance de longue durée (par 57). [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 425 that the federal court has exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over parole board decisions and that an offender may ask the parole board to vary or re- move any condition. although a substantial penalty could be imposed for breaching an ltso, richards cj concluded that parliament did not intend for of- fenders to take issue with conditions of their ltsos by breaching them. it followed that the trial judge erred in permitting mr. bird to collaterally attack the parole board’s order. in light of this conclusion, he found it unnecessary to address whether the res- idency condition violated mr. bird’s s. 7 charter rights. in the result, he set aside mr. bird’s acquittal, entered a conviction on the charge under s 7533(1) of the criminal code and remitted the matter to the provincial court for sentencing. en outre, selon lui, la cour fédérale dispose d’un pouvoir de surveillance exclusif des décisions de la commission et un délinquant peut demander à cette dernière de modifier ou d’annuler toute condition. même si la violation d’une osld est passible d’une peine sévère, le juge en chef richards a conclu que le législateur n’avait pas l’intention de permettre aux délinquants de s’opposer aux conditions de leur osld en ne s’y conformant pas il s’ensuit que le juge de première instance a commis une erreur en permettant à m. bird de contester incidemment l’ordonnance rendue par la commission. compte tenu de cette conclusion, il a jugé inutile d’examiner si l’assignation à résidence portait atteinte aux droits de m. bird protégés par l’art. 7 de la charte. il a donc annulé l’acquittement de m. bird, inscrit une déclaration de culpabilité à l’égard de l’accusation portée en vertu du par 7533(1) du code criminel et renvoyé l’affaire à la cour provinciale pour détermi- nation de la peine. iv issue iv question en litige [20] in my view, this appeal raises a single issue: can mr. bird collaterally attack the residency con- dition imposed by the parole board on his ltso in defending against a criminal charge of having breached that condition? because i would answer this question in the negative, i find it unnecessary to address mr. bird’s argument that the residency condition violates his charter rights. [20] je suis d’avis que le présent appel soulève une seule question : m. bird peut-il contester incidem- ment l’assignation à résidence dont la commission a assorti son osld pour se défendre d’une accusation criminelle d’avoir enfreint l’assignation en question? comme je répondrais à cette question par la négative, j’estime qu’il n’est pas nécessaire que j’examine l’argument de m. bird selon lequel l’assignation à résidence porte atteinte à ses droits garantis par la charte. v analysis v analyse a general principles regarding collateral attacks a principes généraux en matière de contestations incidentes [21] a collateral attack is an attack on an order “made in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation or nullification of the order” (wilson v. the queen, [1983] 2 scr 594, at p. 599; canada (attorney general) v. telezone inc., 2010 scc 62, [2010] 3 scr 585, at para 60). this court has recognized a general rule against collateral attacks on court orders: with limited exceptions, an order issued by a court must be obeyed unless [21] une contestation incidente est une attaque faite à l’encontre d’une ordonnance « dans le cadre de procédures autres que celles visant précisément à obtenir l’infirmation, la modification ou l’annulation de l’ordonnance » (wilson c. la reine, [1983] 2 rcs 594, p. 599; canada (procureur général) c. telezone inc., 2010 csc 62, [2010] 3 rcs 585, par 60). la cour a reconnu l’existence d’une règle générale interdisant les contestations incidentes des 426 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. it is set aside in a proceeding taken for that pur- pose (maybrun, at paras. 2-3; r v. litchfield, [1993] 4 scr 333, at p. 349; garland v. consumers’ gas co., 2004 scc 25, [2004] 1 scr 629, at para 71). in maybrun, the court held that a different analysis was warranted for collateral attacks on adminis- trative orders. as i will explain, however, similar principles underlie both approaches. ordonnances judiciaires : sauf rares exceptions, une ordonnance rendue par une cour doit être respectée, à moins qu’elle soit annulée à l’issue d’une ins- tance introduite à cette fin (maybrun, par. 2-3; r c. litchfield, [1993] 4 rcs 333, p. 349; garland c. consumers’ gas co., 2004 csc 25, [2004] 1 rcs. 629, par 71). dans l’arrêt maybrun, la cour a jugé qu’une analyse différente était justifiée dans les cas de contestations incidentes d’ordonnances adminis- tratives. or, comme je l’expliquerai, les deux ap- proches s’appuient sur des principes similaires. (1) collateral attacks on court orders (1) contestation incidente des ordonnances judi- [22] there is a powerful rationale for the general rule precluding collateral attacks on court orders:    the rule seeks to maintain the rule of law and to pre- serve the repute of the administration of justice. to allow parties to govern their affairs according to their perception of matters such as the jurisdiction of the court issuing the order would result in uncertainty. further, “the orderly and functional administration of justice” requires that court orders be considered final and binding unless they are reversed on appeal    . ciaires [22] la règle générale interdisant la contestation incidente des ordonnances judiciaires repose sur un raisonnement solide : la règle [  ] vise à maintenir la primauté du droit et à préserver la considération dont jouit l’administration de la justice. l’incertitude résulterait si on permettait aux par- ties de gérer leurs affaires suivant la perception qu’ils ont de questions comme la compétence du tribunal qui rend l’ordonnance. de plus, [traduction] « l’administration ordonnée et pratique de la justice » exige que les ordon- nances judiciaires soient considérées comme définitives et ayant force exécutoire à moins d’être annulées en appel   . (maybrun, at para. 2, quoting litchfield, at p. 349) (maybrun, par. 2, citant litchfield, p. 349) as this court noted in maybrun, the rule against col- lateral attacks on court orders has been consistently applied in criminal proceedings where the charge in- volves an alleged breach of a court order (maybrun, at para. 3, citing r v. domm (1996), 31 or (3d) 540 (ca), at p. 547, leave to appeal refused, [1997] 2 scr viii). the rule has also been applied where the accused alleges that the court order is uncon- stitutional. in domm, doherty ja, writing for the ontario court of appeal, held that “[e]ven orders that are constitutionally unsound must be complied with unless set aside in a proceeding taken for that purpose” (p 549). as this court explained in canada (human rights commission) v. canadian liberty net, [1998] 1 scr 626, “[i]f people are free to ignore court orders because they believe that their foundation is unconstitutional, anarchy cannot be comme la cour l’a noté dans l’arrêt maybrun, la règle interdisant la contestation incidente des or- donnances judiciaires est appliquée systématique- ment dans les instances criminelles où l’accusation concerne la violation alléguée d’une ordonnance ju- diciaire (maybrun, par. 3, citant r c. domm (1996), 31  or  (3d) 540  (ca), p.  547, autorisation de pourvoi refusée, [1997] 2 rcs viii). cette règle est aussi appliquée dans les cas où l’accusé allègue que l’ordonnance judiciaire est inconstitutionnelle. dans l’arrêt domm, le juge doherty, s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel de l’ontario, a statué que [traduction] « [m]ême les ordonnances in- constitutionnelles doivent être respectées, à moins qu’elles soient annulées à l’issue d’une instance in- troduite à cette fin » (p 549). comme la cour l’a expliqué dans l’arrêt canada (commission des droits [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 427 far behind. the citizens’ safeguard is in seeking to have illegal orders set aside through the legal process, not in disobeying them” (para. 51, citing mclachlin j. (as she then was), in canada (human rights commission) v. taylor, [1990] 3 scr 892, at p 974). [23] the doctrine of collateral attack, however, recognizes that people must have an effective means to challenge court orders, particularly when those orders are alleged to violate constitutional rights. in domm, doherty ja clarified that “where con- stitutional rights are implicated, the court must be particularly concerned about the availability of an effective remedy apart from collateral attack when considering whether” to allow a collateral attack (p 552). where a collateral attack is the only way to effectively challenge a court order, a collateral attack will be permitted (see domm, at pp 553-54). [24] in sum, two principles underlie the approach to collateral attacks on court orders: (1) the impor- tance of maintaining the rule of law and preserv- ing the repute of the administration of justice; and (2) ensuring that individuals have an effective means to challenge court orders, particularly when these orders are challenged on the basis that they are not charter compliant. as i will explain, the maybrun framework accounts for these principles in the ad- ministrative context. de la personne) c. canadian liberty net, [1998] 1 rcs 626, « [s]’il est permis de désobéir aux or- donnances judiciaires parce qu’on croit que leur fon- dement est inconstitutionnel, on va vers l’anarchie. le recours des citoyens est non pas de désobéir aux ordonnances illégales mais [de] demander en justice leur annulation » (par. 51, citant les propos de la juge mclachlin (plus tard juge en chef) dans l’arrêt canada (commission des droits de la personne) c. taylor, [1990] 3 rcs 892, p 974). [23] cependant, la règle relative à la contestation incidente reconnait que les justiciables doivent dis- poser d’un moyen efficace pour contester les ordon- nances judiciaires, surtout lorsqu’il est allégué que ces ordonnances contreviennent aux droits garan- tis par la constitution. dans l’arrêt domm, le juge doherty a précisé que, [traduction] « lorsque des droits constitutionnels sont en jeu, le tribunal doit se soucier particulièrement de l’existence ou non d’un recours efficace autre que la contestation in- cidente, lorsqu’il examine » s’il y a lieu d’autoriser cette dernière (p 552). ainsi, lorsque la contestation incidente est le seul moyen efficace de contester une ordonnance judiciaire, elle est permise (domm, p 553-554). [24] bref, deux principes sous- tendent l’approche adoptée à l’égard des contestations incidentes des ordonnances judiciaires : (1) l’importance de main- tenir la primauté du droit et de préserver la consi- dération dont jouit l’administration de la justice, et (2) l’importance que les justiciables disposent de moyens efficaces pour contester les ordonnances judiciaires, surtout si elles sont contestées au motif qu’elles ne sont pas conformes à la charte. comme je l’expliquerai, le cadre exposé dans l’arrêt maybrun tient compte de ces principes dans le contexte ad- ministratif. (2) collateral attacks on administrative orders (2) contestation incidente des ordonnances ad- ministratives in maybrun, the court held that a different [25] framework was warranted for collateral attacks on administrative orders, given the major differences that exist between court orders and administra- tive orders in relation to their legal nature and the [25] dans l’arrêt maybrun, la cour a statué qu’il est justifié d’appliquer un cadre d’analyse différent à l’examen des contestations incidentes des ordon- nances administratives, compte tenu des différences importantes entre ce type d’ordonnances et les 428 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. institutions that issue them (para 4). maybrun clar- ified that the question of whether a person charged with breaching an administrative order can collater- ally attack the validity of the order is determined by focussing on the legislature’s intention. the court must inquire into whether the legislature intended to permit collateral attacks on the order, or intended instead that a person should challenge the order by way of other review mechanisms. [26] in focussing on the legislature’s intention, the maybrun framework balances two principles: (1) ensuring that the legislature’s decision to assign decision- making powers to administrative bodies is not undermined and (2) ensuring that individuals have an effective means available to them to chal- lenge administrative orders (maybrun at para. 44; see also b. bilson, “lying in wait for justice: collateral attacks on administrative and regulatory orders” (1998), 12 cjalp 289, at pp 291-94). [27] focussed as it is on the legislature’s intention as to the appropriate forum for challenging an admin- istrative order, the maybrun framework respects the legislature’s choice to assign decision- making pow- ers to administrative bodies. the court in maybrun emphasized that administrative structures play an important role in the organization of a wide range of activities in modern society (paras. 26 and 43). to maintain the authority of these administrative bodies, the legislature may establish internal mechanisms with the intention that people will challenge admin- istrative orders by way of these mechanisms or other appropriate forums, rather than by mounting a collat- eral attack on them (maybrun, at para 27). maybrun recognized that if a person were entirely free to ig- nore these established procedures for challenging the order and could breach the order and wait for criminal charges to be laid before challenging it, this would risk discrediting the authority of administra- tive bodies that issue such orders and undermine the effectiveness of administrative regimes (para 42). ordonnances judiciaires, notamment quant à leur nature juridique et aux institutions qui les rendent (par 4). selon l’arrêt maybrun, pour décider si la personne accusée d’avoir enfreint une ordonnance administrative peut contester incidemment la validité de celle-ci, il faut avant tout s’intéresser à l’intention du législateur. le tribunal doit se demander si ce dernier avait l’intention de permettre la contestation incidente de l’ordonnance, ou s’il avait plutôt l’inten- tion que la personne visée par l’ordonnance puisse la contester au moyen d’autres mécanismes d’examen. [26] vu le poids donné à l’intention du législateur, le cadre d’analyse de l’arrêt maybrun met deux exi- gences en balance : (1) veiller à ce que la décision du législateur de conférer des pouvoirs décisionnels à des organismes administratifs ne soit pas contrecar- rée, et (2) veiller à ce que les justiciables disposent d’un moyen efficace de contester les ordonnances ad- ministratives (maybrun, par. 44; voir aussi b. bilson, « lying in wait for justice : collateral attacks on administrative and regulatory orders » (1998), 12 cjalp 289, p 291-294). [27] compte tenu de l’importance qu’il accorde à l’intention du législateur quant au forum approprié pour contester une ordonnance administrative, le cadre d’analyse de l’arrêt maybrun respecte le choix du législateur de conférer des pouvoirs décisionnels à des organismes administratifs. dans cet arrêt, la cour a d’ailleurs souligné que ces organismes jouent un rôle important dans l’organisation d’un vaste éventail d’activités de la société moderne (par. 26 et 43). afin de préserver l’autorité de ces organismes administra- tifs, le législateur peut créer des mécanismes internes, dans l’intention qu’ils serviront, tout comme d’autres forums appropriés, à contester les ordonnances ad- ministratives en lieu et place des contestations inci- dentes dans le cadre de procès criminels (maybrun, par 27). la cour a reconnu, dans l’arrêt maybrun, que si une personne pouvait totalement ignorer les procédures ainsi établies pour contester une ordon- nance et contrevenir à l’ordonnance, puis attendre que des accusations criminelles soient portées contre elle avant de la contester, cela risquerait de discréditer l’autorité des organismes administratifs qui rendent de telles ordonnances, en plus de miner l’efficacité des régimes administratifs (par 42). [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 429 in addition, permitting collateral attacks [28] would result in increased recourse to criminal sanc- tions by the state (para 42). if individuals object to administrative orders only after having breached them, the state will need to resort to criminal charges and sanctions to secure compliance. as the court in maybrun warned, “[r]ather than promoting co- operation and conciliation, which are among the basic objectives of such administrative mechanisms, this would result in a hardening of relations between governments and citizens” (ibid). furthermore, al- lowing collateral attacks on administrative orders could undermine the legislature’s intention to draw on the expertise and experience of certain decision- makers. as the court noted in maybrun, permitting individuals to circumvent administrative tribunals or other appropriate forums and transfer the debate to the judicial arena could lead the courts to rule on matters they are not best suited to decide (para 43). [29] that said, in focussing on the legislature’s intention as to the appropriate forum, the maybrun framework also stresses that individuals must have an effective means to challenge administrative or- ders. the court in maybrun noted that the rule of law requires “that the government exercises its powers within the limits prescribed by law or that appro- priate remedies are available for citizens to assert their rights”, especially where penal sanctions are in- volved (paras. 25 and 44). accordingly, “it must   . be presumed that the legislature did not intend to deprive citizens affected by government actions of an adequate opportunity to raise the validity of the order” (para 46). where there is no mechanism or forum for challenging the validity of the adminis- trative order effectively, it must be inferred that the intention of the legislature is to permit a collateral attack (paras. 44 and 46). [28] en outre, si les contestations incidentes étaient permises, l’état recourrait davantage aux sanctions pénales (par 42). en effet, si les personnes en cause s’opposaient aux ordonnances administratives dont elles sont l’objet seulement après y avoir contre- venu, l’état serait tenu de recourir aux accusations et aux peines pénales afin d’en assurer le respect. la cour a fait la mise en garde suivante dans l’arrêt maybrun : « [p]lutôt que de favoriser la collabora- tion et la conciliation, qui sont parmi les objectifs essentiels de tels mécanismes administratifs, cela mènerait à un durcissement des rapports entre l’ad- ministration et les citoyens » (ibid). qui plus est, permettre la contestation incidente des ordonnances administratives pourrait contrecarrer l’intention du législateur de s’en remettre à l’expertise et à l’expé- rience de certains décideurs. comme l’a fait remar- quer la cour dans l’arrêt maybrun, en permettant de court- circuiter les tribunaux administratifs, ou tout autre forum approprié, et de transporter le débat dans l’arène judiciaire, nous risquerions d’amener les tribunaux à se prononcer sur des questions qu’ils ne sont pas les mieux placés pour trancher (par 43). [29] cela dit, le cadre d’analyse dégagé dans l’arrêt maybrun, tout en mettant l’accent sur l’intention du législateur quant au forum approprié, accorde une grande importance à l’existence d’un moyen efficace de contester les ordonnances administratives. en ef- fet, la cour a souligné dans cet arrêt que la primauté du droit exige que « l’administration exerce ses pou- voirs dans les limites prescrites par la loi ou encore que les citoyens disposent de recours appropriés leur permettant de faire valoir leurs droits », en particulier lorsque des sanctions pénales sont en jeu (par. 25 et 44). par conséquent, « on doit [  ] présumer que le législateur n’a pas eu pour intention de priver les citoyens affectés par les actes de l’administration d’une possibilité adéquate de soulever l’invalidité d’une ordonnance » (par 46). lorsqu’il n’existe pas de mécanisme ou de forum pour contester de façon efficace la validité de l’ordonnance administrative en cause, il faut en conclure que le législateur a souhaité permettre la contestation incidente (par. 44 et 46). [30] in view of this, i respectfully disagree with mr. bird’s argument that “[l]egislative intent would trump charter rights” under the maybrun framework [30] compte tenu de ce qui précède, je m’inscris en faux contre la prétention de m. bird selon la- quelle, suivant le cadre établi dans l’arrêt maybrun, 430 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. (af, at para 57). mr. bird asserts that maybrun’s focus on the legislature’s intent “may be used to override   . charter rights. where constitutionally protected rights are in issue, parliament’s intention may not be sufficiently determinative of the issue of whether a collateral attack should be permitted” (para 57). maybrun specifically recognizes that the legislature intends for individuals to have an oppor- tunity to effectively assert their rights. in the charter context, this means that the person challenging the order must be able to receive an effective remedy that will vindicate his or her charter rights (see r v. 974649 ontario inc., 2001 scc 81, [2001] 3 scr 575, at para. 19; doucet­ boudreau v. nova scotia (minister of education), 2003 scc 62, [2003] 3 scr 3, at paras. 25 and 55; henry v. british columbia (attorney general), 2015 scc 24, [2015] 2 scr 214, at para 64). where no such remedies are available, it must be inferred that the intention of the legislature is to permit a collateral attack. i would further observe that where an effective [31] forum or mechanism is available for challenging an order, and a person takes issue with the order only after breaching it, he or she has not been denied the ability to fully defend against the charge if a col- lateral attack is refused. this is because the person had the opportunity to challenge the validity of the order through other means but failed to do so (see maybrun, at paras 60-61). [traduction] « [l]’intention du législateur l’empor- terait sur les droits protégés par la charte » (ma, par.  57) selon m.  bird, l’importance accordée à l’intention du législateur dans l’arrêt maybrun « pourrait servir à supplanter [  ] les droits garan- tis par la charte. lorsque des droits protégés par la constitution sont en jeu, l’intention du législateur pourrait bien ne pas être suffisamment précise pour déterminer si une contestation incidente devrait être permise » (par 57). l’arrêt maybrun reconnaît ex- pressément que le législateur entend donner aux individus la possibilité de faire valoir leurs droits de façon efficace. dans le contexte de la charte, cela signifie que la personne qui conteste l’ordonnance doit pouvoir disposer d’un recours efficace qui lui permettra de faire valoir ses droits protégés par la charte (voir r c. 974649 ontario inc., 2001 csc 81, [2001] 3 rcs 575, par. 19; doucet­ boudreau c. nouvelle­ écosse (ministre de l’éducation), 2003 csc 62, [2003] 3 rcs 3, par. 25 et 55; henry c. colombie­ britannique (procureur général), 2015 csc 24, [2015] 2 rcs 214, par 64). à défaut d’un tel recours, il faut conclure que le législateur entendait permettre la contestation incidente. [31] j’aimerais ajouter que la personne qui béné­ ficie d’un forum ou d’un mécanisme pour contes- ter une ordonnance, et qui conteste cette dernière uniquement après y avoir contrevenu, n’aura pas été privée de la possibilité de se défendre plei- nement contre l’accusation portée contre elle si cette contestation incidente est refusée il en est ainsi parce que, même si la personne ne s’en est pas prévalue, elle disposait d’autres moyens pour contester la validité de l’ordonnance (maybrun, par 60-61). [32] to determine the legislator’s intention as to the appropriate forum for challenging the validity of an administrative order, maybrun identifies five non- exhaustive factors that may be considered by a court: (1) the wording of the statute under the au- thority of which the order was issued; (2) the pur- pose of the legislation; (3) the existence of a right of appeal; (4) the kind of collateral attack in light of the expertise or raison d’être of the administrative appeal tribunal; and (5) the penalty on a conviction for failing to comply with the order (maybrun, at [32] s’agissant de déterminer l’intention du lé- gislateur quant au forum approprié pour contester la validité d’une ordonnance administrative, l’ar- rêt maybrun énumère cinq facteurs non exhaus- tifs qui peuvent être pris en considération par un tribunal : (1) les termes de la loi dont découle le pouvoir de rendre l’ordonnance; (2) l’objectif de la loi; (3) l’existence d’un droit d’appel; (4) la nature de la contestation incidente, eu égard à l’expertise et à la raison d’être de l’instance administrative d’appel, et (5) la sanction imposable pour défaut [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 431 paras. 45-49; klippert, at para 13). the factors are “not independent and absolute criteria, but important clues, among others, for determining the legislature’s intention” (maybrun, at para 46). b applying the maybrun framework to the case at hand: the five factors (1) factor one: the wording of the statute under the authority of which the order was issued; and (2) factor two: the purpose of the legislation d’avoir respecté l’ordonnance (maybrun, par. 45-49; klippert, par 13). ces facteurs « ne représentent pas des critères autonomes et absolus, mais plutôt des indices importants, parmi d’autres, permettant de cerner l’intention législative » (maybrun, par 46). b application à la présente espèce du cadre d’ana­ lyse énoncé dans l’arrêt maybrun : les cinq fac­ teurs (1) premier facteur : les termes de la loi dont découle le pouvoir de rendre l’ordonnance; et (2) deuxième facteur : l’objectif de la loi [33] i begin with the first two factors, “the wording of the statute under the authority of which the order was issued” and “the purpose of the legislation”. [33] je vais commencer par les deux premiers fac- teurs, soit « les termes de la loi dont découle le pouvoir de rendre l’ordonnance » et « l’objectif de la loi ». [34] the parole board imposed the residency con- dition on mr. bird’s ltso pursuant to s 1341(2) of the ccra, which permits the parole board to “establish conditions for the long- term supervision of the offender that it considers reasonable and nec- essary in order to protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of the of- fender”. an ltso is a form of conditional release governed by the ccra: r v. ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1 scr 433, at para 47. the sentencing court establishes only the length of an ltso (ibid., at para 44). the specific conditions of long- term supervision are a combination of what the ccra prescribes and what the parole board orders pursuant to its authority under s 1341(2) of the ccra (ca. reasons, at para 22). [34] la commission a prévu l’assignation à résidence dans l’osld de m.  bird en vertu du par.  134.1(2) de la lscmlsc, qui lui permet d’« imposer au délinquant les conditions de sur- veillance qu’elle juge raisonnables et nécessaires pour protéger la société et favoriser la réinser- tion sociale du délinquant ». une osld est une forme de mise en liberté sous condition régie par la lscmlsc : r c. ipeelee, 2012 csc 13, [2012] 1 rcs 433, par 47. le tribunal chargé de la dé- termination de la peine établit uniquement la durée de l’osld (ibid., par 44). les conditions précises de la surveillance de longue durée sont une combi- naison de ce que prescrit la lscmlsc et de ce que la commission ordonne en vertu du pouvoir que lui confère le par 1341(2) de la lscmlsc (motifs de la cour d’appel, par 22). [35] long- term supervision applies to two excep- tional groups of offenders: long- term offenders and dangerous offenders. both groups pose an elevated risk to the community (r v. steele, 2014 scc 61, [2014] 3 scr 138, at para 28). a court can desig- nate an offender as a long- term offender where the offender has been convicted of an offence for which a sentence of two years or more is appropriate, there is a substantial risk that the offender will reoffend and there is a reasonable possibility of eventual control of that risk in the community (s 7531(1) of the [35] la surveillance de longue durée s’applique à deux groupes exceptionnels de délinquants : les délinquants à contrôler et les délinquants dange- reux. ceux qui appartiennent à ces deux groupes présentent un risque élevé pour la collectivité (r c. steele, 2014 csc 61, [2014] 3 rcs 138, par 28). le tribunal peut déclarer que le délinquant est un délinquant à contrôler s’il y a lieu de lui imposer une peine minimale d’emprisonnement de deux ans pour l’infraction dont il a été déclaré coupable, que s’il présente un risque élevé de récidive et s’il existe une 432 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. criminal code; ipeelee, at para 44). if a court finds an offender to be a long- term offender, the court must impose a term of imprisonment and order that the offender be subject to a period of long- term super- vision: s 7531(3) of the criminal code. [36] dangerous offenders are offenders who have been convicted of a serious personal injury offence and whose “past conduct and patterns of behaviour show that they constitute a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well- being of other persons (s. 753(1)(a)), or that their failure to control sexual impulses means that they are likely to cause injury, pain or other evil to other persons (s. 753(1)(b))” (steele, at para. 28; see also r v. boutilier, 2017 scc 64, [2017] 2 scr 936, at paras 16-18). a sentencing court may, on finding an offender to be a dangerous offender, decide to impose a term of im- prisonment and a period of long- term supervision in- stead of an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment if the court determines that long- term supervision will adequately protect the public against the risk the dangerous offender poses (s. 753(4) and (4.1); steele, at para 31). in ipeelee, this court recognized two specific [37] objectives of long- term supervision: (1) to protect the public from the risk of re- offence by long- term and dangerous offenders; and (2) to rehabilitate these offenders and reintegrate them into the community (para 48). an ltso controls the risk to public safety posed by long- term and dangerous offenders in the community, which is why the breach of an ltso is deemed to be a more serious offence than the breach of a probation order (ipeelee, at paras. 53- 54). as g r. clewley, p g. mcdermott and r e. young note in sentencing: the practitioner’s guide (loose- leaf): “[t]he breach of a long- term supervision order is taken very seriously, because by definition the offenders on these orders have committed vio- lent and/or sexual offences and pose some risk to the community” (p 13-57). under s 7533(1) of the criminal code, the breach of a condition of an possibilité réelle que ce risque puisse être maîtrisé au sein de la collectivité (code criminel, par 7531(1);. ipeelee, par 44). s’il déclare que le délinquant est un délinquant à contrôler, le tribunal doit lui infliger une peine d’emprisonnement et ordonner qu’il soit soumis à une surveillance de longue durée : code criminel, par 7531(3). [36] un délinquant dangereux est une personne qui a été déclarée coupable de sévices graves à la personne et dont «  [l]es actes et [l]es comporte- ments antérieurs démontrent qu’elle constitue un danger pour la vie, la sécurité ou le bien- être phy- sique ou mental de qui que ce soit (al. 753(1)a)) », ou dont « [l’]incapacité à contrôler ses impulsions sexuelles laisse prévoir qu’elle causera vraisembla- blement des sévices ou d’autres maux à d’autres personnes (al.  753(1)b))  » (steele, par.  28; voir aussi r c. boutilier, 2017 csc 64, [2017] 2 rcs. 936, par 16-18). le tribunal chargé de la détermi- nation de la peine peut, s’il déclare qu’un délin- quant est un délinquant dangereux, décider de lui infliger une peine d’emprisonnement ainsi qu’une période de surveillance de longue durée plutôt qu’une peine d’emprisonnement d’une durée in- déterminée, s’il juge que la surveillance de longue durée protégera suffisamment le public du risque posé par ce délinquant (par. 753(4) et (4.1); steele, par 31). [37] dans l’arrêt ipeelee, la cour a reconnu deux objectifs particuliers de la surveillance de longue durée : (1) la protection du public contre le risque de récidive posé par les délinquants à contrôler et les délinquants dangereux, et (2) la réadaptation et la réinsertion sociale de ces délinquants (par 48). l’osld contrôle le risque que présentent pour la sécurité du public les délinquants à contrôler et les délinquants dangereux lorsqu’ils se trouvent dans la collectivité, ce qui explique pourquoi la violation d’une osld est réputée être une infraction plus grave que la violation d’une ordonnance de pro- bation (ipeelee, par 53-54). comme le soulignent g r clewley,. p g mcdermott et r e young dans l’ouvrage sentencing  : the practitioner’s guide (feuilles mobiles) : [traduction] « [l]a violation d’une ordonnance de surveillance de longue durée est prise très au sérieux, parce que, par définition, [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 433 ltso is an indictable offence punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to 10 years. [38] in my view, it would undermine the purposes of long- term supervision if offenders were allowed to take a “breach first, challenge later” approach to the conditions of their ltsos. the conditions of an ltso are imposed to reduce to an acceptable level the elevated risk posed by long- term offenders and dangerous offenders in the community. when offenders breach these conditions, they expose the public to this risk. bearing this in mind, i find it hard to conceive that parliament could have intended to permit long- term and dangerous offenders to take a “breach first, challenge later” approach to their ltso conditions, thereby exposing the community to the very dangers those conditions were intended to ad- dress. moreover, breaches are likely to be antithetical to the offender’s rehabilitation, given that conditions are imposed, at least in part, to facilitate the offend- er’s successful reintegration into the community. in sum, permitting a “breach first, challenge later” approach in this context undermines not only the community’s interests, but also those of the offender. this outcome is inconsistent with the objectives of the long- term supervision regime and, to that extent, strongly indicates that parliament did not intend to permit collateral attacks. les délinquants visés par ces ordonnances ont com- mis des infractions violentes ou d’ordre sexuel, et présentent un certain risque pour la collectivité » (p 13-57). selon le par 7533(1) du code criminel, le défaut de se conformer à une condition d’une osld est un acte criminel passible d’un empri- sonnement maximal de 10 ans. [38] selon moi, permettre aux délinquants d’adop- ter une approche qui consisterait à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester » les conditions de l’osld minerait l’objet de la surveillance de longue durée. assortir une osld de conditions vise à ré- duire à un niveau acceptable le risque élevé que pré- sentent les délinquants à contrôler et les délinquants dangereux pour la collectivité. lorsqu’un délinquant enfreint une de ces conditions, il expose le public à ce risque. j’ai donc de la difficulté à concevoir que le parlement aurait pu avoir l’intention de permettre aux délinquants à contrôler et aux délinquants dange- reux d’adopter l’approche qui consiste à « contreve- nir d’abord, pour ensuite contester » relativement aux conditions d’une osld, exposant ainsi la collectivité aux dangers mêmes auxquels ces conditions étaient destinées à faire face. qui plus est, la contravention aux conditions par le délinquant est vraisemblable- ment antithétique à sa réadaptation parce qu’elles lui ont été imposées, du moins en partie, pour faciliter sa réinsertion dans la collectivité. en somme, le fait de permettre l’approche qui consiste à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester » dans ce contexte saperait non seulement les intérêts de la collectivité, mais aussi ceux du délinquant. ce résultat est incom- patible avec les objectifs du régime de surveillance de longue durée et, dans cette mesure, indique clai- rement que le parlement n’avait pas l’intention de permettre les contestations incidentes. [39] mr. bird rebuffs the concern that permitting collateral attacks in this context will place the com- munity at risk. in his view, it “strains credulity to assume that an offender would be willing to gamble up to ten years of his or her life by breaching a con- dition instead of taking the easier step of applying to vary it” (af, at para 32). but that is effectively what mr. bird did in this case: instead of “taking the easier step” of applying to vary his residency condi- tion, he challenged that condition only after having [39] m. bird nie qu’en permettant les contesta- tions incidentes dans le présent contexte, la col- lectivité sera exposée à un risque. selon lui, il est [traduction] « difficile d’imaginer qu’un délin- quant soit prêt à risquer jusqu’à dix ans de sa vie en violant une condition, plutôt que d’opter pour la voie plus simple et de demander qu’elle soit modi- fiée » (ma, par 32). or, c’est précisément ce que m. bird a fait en l’espèce : plutôt que « d’opter pour la voie plus simple » en demandant la modification 434 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. beached it. to be clear, i do not suggest that in taking a “breach first, challenge later” approach, mr. bird surveyed his options and made a deliberate and tac- tical choice to challenge his residency condition by breaching it, viewing that course of action as the most advantageous. rather, i am simply focussing on mr. bird’s actions, which speak for themselves: he challenged his residency condition only after having breached it. the question before this court is not why he took this course of action, but rather whether parliament intended that he be permitted to do so. [40] after leaving oskana centre, mr. bird was at large and unsupervised in the community for over two months. it should be recalled that the parole board was satisfied that, based on mr. bird’s “lengthy history of violence causing physical harm to [his] victims”, his “use of weapons during the commission of many of [his] offences” and his “numerous failed releases” (ar, vol. ii, at p. 69), mr. bird required the structure and supervision of a community cor- rectional centre or community residential centre. in breaching the residency condition of his ltso, mr. bird exposed the public to a risk of violent re- offence that the parole board deemed unacceptable. de son assignation à résidence, il a contesté cette dernière seulement après y avoir dérogé. pour être clair, je ne suggère pas qu’en adoptant l’approche qui consiste à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester », m. bird a examiné ses options et a fait le choix délibéré et tactique de contester son assi- gnation à résidence en y contrevenant, considérant cette façon de faire comme la plus avantageuse. je me concentre plutôt sur les actions de m. bird, qui parlent d’elles même : il n’a contesté son assignation à résidence qu’après y avoir dérogé. la question que doit trancher la cour n’est pas celle de savoir pourquoi il a adopté cette ligne de conduite, mais plutôt si le parlement avait l’intention de l’autoriser à le faire. [40] après avoir quitté le centre oskana, m. bird a été en liberté sans surveillance dans la collecti- vité, et ce pendant plus de deux mois. il convient de rappeler que, selon la commission, compte tenu du [traduction] « lourd passé [de m. bird] en matière de violence occasionnant des préjudices corporels à ses victimes », de son « utilisation d’armes lors de la commission d’un grand nombre des infractions qu’il a commises », et de ses « nombreuses libéra- tions infructueuses » (da, vol. ii, p. 69), m. bird avait besoin de la structure et de la surveillance que peuvent offrir un centre correctionnel communau- taire ou un centre résidentiel communautaire. en contrevenant à l’assignation à résidence prévue dans son osld, m. bird a exposé le public à un risque de récidive violente, risque que la commission a jugé inacceptable. i would also point out that mr. bird breached [41] his residency condition a second time. after the trial judge acquitted mr. bird of breaching the residency condition of his ltso on february 19, 2016, the trial judge did not quash or vary the residency condition (trial reasons, at para 41). the residency condition remained unchanged and accordingly, mr. bird was returned to oskana centre to finish the remainder of his residency condition. on or about march 18, 2016, mr. bird left oskana centre again, in breach of his residency condition. he was arrested on april 11, 2016, when the police were dispatched to a residence regarding a report of a disturbance. the police ob- served a woman in the residence who appeared to [41] j’aimerais aussi souligner que m. bird a en- freint son assignation à résidence à une autre reprise. après qu’il eut acquitté m. bird d’avoir contrevenu à l’assignation à résidence prévue dans l’osld dont il était l’objet, le 19 février 2016, le juge de pre- mière instance n’a ni annulé ni modifié l’assignation en question (motifs de première instance, par 41). ainsi, m. bird est retourné au centre oskana pour y terminer son assignation à résidence. le ou vers le 18 mars 2016, m. bird a de nouveau quitté le centre oskana, contrevenant ainsi une fois de plus à l’assi- gnation en question. il a été arrêté le 11 avril 2016, lorsque des policiers ont été appelés à une résidence où du tapage avait été signalé. les policiers y ont vu [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 435 be crying and entered the residence to check on her welfare, where they found and arrested mr bird. in my view, it is plain and obvious that allow- [42] ing offenders like mr. bird to object to conditions of their ltsos by taking a “breach first, challenge later” approach puts the community at risk and may compromise the offender’s rehabilitation. moreover, it could have the detrimental effect of reducing the availability of long- term supervision for danger- ous offenders, thus further undermining the objec- tives of the long- term supervision regime. as this court stated in r v. johnson, 2003 scc 46, [2003] 2 scr 357, long- term supervision is designed to protect society from the threat that the offender cur- rently poses without having to resort to “the blunt instrument of indeterminate detention” (para 32). as noted above, a court may order that a dangerous offender receive a specified term of imprisonment combined with long- term supervision instead of an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment (steele, at para 31). this, however, will occur only if the court is satisfied that long- term supervision will ad- equately protect the public against the risk posed by the dangerous offender (steele, at para 28). if dangerous offenders are permitted to take a “breach first, challenge later” approach to the conditions of their ltsos, sentencing courts may become con- cerned about the manageability of dangerous offend- ers within the community, which in turn could lead to the imposition of more indeterminate sentences of imprisonment. in my view, then, the first two factors of the [43] maybrun framework — the wording of the statute under which the order was issued and the purpose of the legislation — strongly indicate that parliament did not intend for long- term and dangerous offenders to take issue with residency conditions of long- term supervision through collateral attacks. une femme qui semblait en pleurs et ils sont entrés pour s’enquérir de son bien- être. c’est alors qu’ils y ont trouvé m. bird et l’ont arrêté. [42] selon moi, il est évident que de permettre à des délinquants comme m. bird de s’opposer aux conditions de leur osld en recourant à la straté- gie consistant à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester » expose la collectivité à un risque et peut compromettre leur réadaptation. cela pourrait éga- lement avoir l’inconvénient de réduire l’accès pour les délinquants dangereux à la surveillance de longue durée, ce qui minerait encore plus les objectifs de ce régime. comme la cour l’a affirmé dans l’arrêt r c. johnson, 2003 csc 46, [2003] 2 rcs 357, la surveillance de longue durée vise à protéger la société de la menace que les délinquants présentent actuellement, et ce, sans recourir à « la mesure ra- dicale qu’est la peine de détention d’une durée in- déterminée » (par 32). comme je l’ai mentionné, le tribunal peut condamner les délinquants dangereux à une peine d’emprisonnement d’une durée détermi- née, combinée à une surveillance de longue durée, plutôt qu’à une peine d’emprisonnement d’une durée indéterminée (steele, par 31). cependant, le tribunal ne le fera que s’il est convaincu que la surveillance de longue durée protégera adéquatement le public du risque que pose ce type de délinquants (steele, par 28). si ces derniers pouvaient adopter relative- ment aux conditions de leur osld l’approche qui consiste à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contes- ter », les tribunaux chargés de la détermination de la peine pourraient en venir à douter de la capacité de gérer les délinquants dangereux dans la collecti- vité, ce qui pourrait entraîner l’imposition d’un plus grand nombre de peines d’emprisonnement à durée indéterminée. [43] selon moi, les deux premiers facteurs du cadre d’analyse établi dans l’arrêt maybrun — les termes de la loi dont découle le pouvoir de rendre l’or- donnance et l’objectif de la loi — suggèrent donc fortement que le législateur n’avait pas l’intention que les délinquants à contrôler et les délinquants dangereux puissent s’opposer à l’assignation à rési- dence de la surveillance de longue durée au moyen d’une contestation incidente. 436 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. (3) factor three: the existence of a right of (3) troisième facteur  : l’existence d’un droit appeal d’appel i turn now to the third maybrun factor, “the [44] existence of a right of appeal”. in my view, this factor permits a court to consider not only the existence of a right of appeal to an administrative appeal tribunal, but also the existence of other effective mechanisms or forums for challenging the order at issue. [45] the court of appeal noted and the parties conceded that there is no right of appeal under the ccra from a decision of the parole board con- cerning the conditions of an ltso (ca reasons, at para 52). i approach this matter on that basis. [46] mr.  bird points out that in maybrun and klippert, there was a right of appeal to an admin- istrative appeal tribunal given that there is no right of appeal to the appeal division of the parole board, mr. bird argues that the third maybrun fac- tor has “little, if any, application in this case” (af, at para 34). however, it must be remembered that the focus under the maybrun framework is on “the legislature’s intention as to the appropriate forum for raising the validity of an administrative order” (para 52). as indicated, maybrun was careful to state that the listed factors were not “absolute criteria, but important clues, among others, for determining the legislature’s intention” (para 46). likewise, in klippert, the court emphasized that “[t]he deter- mination of legislative intent is never a mechanical act, and an inflexible formula cannot be applied in carrying it out” (para 14). in certain administrative contexts, the legislature may intend for people to challenge the validity of an administrative order by means other than an appeal to an administrative tri- bunal. therefore, in my view, a court can consider other review mechanisms or forums under this factor. [44] je passe maintenant au troisième facteur énoncé dans l’arrêt maybrun, soit celui relatif à « l’existence d’un droit d’appel ». selon moi, ce facteur permet au tribunal de tenir compte non seu- lement de l’existence d’un droit d’appel auprès d’un tribunal administratif d’appel, mais aussi de l’exis- tence d’autres mécanismes efficaces ou forums pour contester l’ordonnance en cause. [45] la cour d’appel a mentionné, et les parties ont admis, que la lscmlsc ne prévoit pas de droit d’appel de la décision de la commission en ce qui a trait aux conditions dont est assortie une osld (motifs de la cour d’appel, par 52). c’est sous cet angle que j’examinerai la question. [46] m.  bird fait valoir que, dans les affaires maybrun et klippert, il existait un droit d’appel devant un tribunal administratif d’appel. puisqu’il n’existe pas de droit d’appel devant la section d’appel de la commission, il prétend que le troisième facteur de l’arrêt maybrun a [traduction] « peu d’application en l’espèce, voir aucune » (ma, par 34). cependant, on doit se rappeler que le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans l’arrêt maybrun met l’accent sur « l’intention législa- tive quant au forum approprié pour soulever la validité d’une ordonnance administrative » (par 52). comme je l’ai mentionné, la cour a pris soin d’y préciser que les facteurs énumérés n’étaient pas des « critères [  ] absolus, mais plutôt des indices importants, parmi d’autres, permettant de cerner l’intention législative » (par 46). de même, dans l’arrêt klippert, la cour a souligné que « [l]a recherche de l’intention législative n’est jamais un acte mécanique et on ne saurait pour y parvenir recourir à quelque formule rigide » (par 14). dans certains contextes administratifs, le législateur peut vouloir que la personne en cause soit en mesure de contester la validité d’une ordonnance adminis- trative autrement qu’en interjetant appel devant un tribunal administratif. j’estime donc que, selon ce facteur, le tribunal peut tenir compte de l’existence d’autres mécanismes ou forums d’examen. [47] that being said, these review mechanisms or forums must permit the person to assert his or her [47] cela étant dit, ces mécanismes ou forums d’examen doivent permettre à la personne de faire [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 437 rights and challenge the administrative order effec- tively. as indicated, under the maybrun framework, it must be presumed that the legislature intends citi- zens affected by government actions to have “an ad- equate opportunity to raise the validity of the order” (para 46). to provide an effective means of challeng- ing an administrative order, the review mechanisms must give the person access to an effective remedy. this is particularly important when a person alleges that the administrative order violates his or her con- stitutional rights. as noted, a person must always have access to an effective remedy that will vindicate his or her charter rights. [48] before this court, mr. bird asserts that the residency condition in his case infringed his rights under ss. 7, 9 and/or 11(h) of the charter. he ar- gues that because a community correctional cen- tre meets the definition of a penitentiary under the ccra, the residency condition is not authorized under s 1341(2) of the ccra and is inconsistent with the objectives of long- term supervision. he maintains that the purpose of long- term supervision is to release people into the community, not to a penitentiary (see transcript, at p 23). [49] to the extent that mr. bird seeks to rely on the charter as a basis for challenging the residency condition, the record indicates that he had at least two and possibly three viable options open to him. first, mr. bird could have written to the parole board to ask it to vary or remove the condition. second, he could have applied for judicial review in the federal court (although, as i will explain, this may not have provided an effective remedy). and third, he could have applied to the provincial superior court for ha­ beas corpus. i therefore respectfully disagree with the assertion by the intervener aboriginal legal services inc. that mr. bird “had virtually no means to challenge the decision to any body anywhere” (if, at para 30). taken collectively, these mecha- nisms provided mr. bird with an effective means to challenge the residency condition. valoir ses droits et de contester efficacement l’ordon- nance administrative. tel que je l’ai mentionné, sui- vant le cadre d’analyse établi dans l’arrêt maybrun, il faut présumer que le législateur a l’intention que les citoyens touchés par les mesures gouvernemen- tales disposent « d’une possibilité adéquate de faire valoir l’invalidité d’une ordonnance » (par 46). pour constituer un tel moyen, les mécanismes d’examen doivent donner accès à un recours efficace. cela est particulièrement important lorsque la personne allègue que l’ordonnance administrative viole ses droits protégés par la constitution. rappelons que le justiciable en cause doit toujours avoir accès à un recours efficace qui lui permette de faire valoir ses droits protégés par la charte. [48] devant la cour, m. bird fait valoir que l’as- signation à résidence en cause portait atteinte à ses droits garantis par les art. 7 et 9, ainsi que par l’al. 11h) de la charte. il prétend que, parce qu’un centre cor- rectionnel communautaire répond à la définition de « pénitencier » au sens de la lscmlsc, l’assigna- tion à résidence ne peut être imposée en vertu du par 1341(2) de la lscmlsc, et n’est pas compatible avec les objectifs de la surveillance de longue durée. il soutient que l’objectif de la surveillance de longue du- rée est de relâcher les délinquants dans la collectivité, et non dans un pénitencier (voir la transcription, p 23). [49] dans la mesure où m. bird se fonde sur la charte pour contester l’assignation à résidence, je précise que, selon le dossier, il disposait d’au moins deux, voire de trois, solutions de rechange viables. premièrement, m. bird aurait pu écrire à la commission pour lui demander de modifier ou d’annuler l’assignation. deuxièmement, il aurait pu présenter une demande de contrôle judiciaire à la cour fédérale (quoique, comme j’expliquerai, ce re- cours aurait pu s’avérer inefficace). troisièmement, il aurait pu présenter une demande d’habeas corpus devant la cour supérieure provinciale. par conséquent, je ne peux souscrire à l’affirmation de l’intervenant aboriginal legal services inc., selon laquelle m. bird [traduction] « n’avait pratiquement aucun moyen de contester la décision devant qui que ce soit et où que ce soit » (mi, par 30). considérés ensemble, ces mécanismes offraient à m. bird un moyen efficace de contester l’assignation à résidence. 438 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. (a) writing to the parole board a) lettre à la commission [50] mr.  bird could have written to the parole board and requested that his residency condition be varied or removed. under s 1341(4) of the ccra, the parole board can remove or vary any condition of long- term supervision. mr. bird was expressly ad- vised of this opportunity in writing before his long- term supervision came into effect. in the cover letter sent to mr. bird on july 24, 2014, which attached the parole board’s reasons for its decision to impose the residency condition, the parole board stated that: you may apply to the parole board of canada to be re- lieved of any of your conditions or request that the board vary the terms of any of your conditions of long term supervision order. upon receipt of your application and an updated report from your parole officer, with whom you should discuss your request, your file will be referred to the board for voting and subsequently you will be ad- vised of the outcome. to ensure that your request receives complete consideration, please fully document the reasons for your request. [emphasis added.] [50] m. bird aurait pu écrire à la commission et lui demander que l’assignation à résidence qu’on lui avait imposée soit modifiée ou annulée. en ef- fet, en vertu du par 1341(4) de la lscmlsc, la commission peut modifier ou annuler toute condi- tion dont est assortie la surveillance de longue durée. m. bird a été expressément avisé par écrit de cette possibilité avant l’entrée en vigueur de sa surveil- lance de longue durée. dans la lettre de présentation datée du 24 juillet 2014 qui a été transmise à m. bird, et à laquelle étaient joints ses motifs à l’appui de sa décision d’imposer l’assignation à résidence, la commission a écrit ceci : [traduction] vous pouvez présenter une demande à la com mis sion des libérations conditionnelles du ca- nada en vue d’être soustrait à l’une ou l’autre de vos conditions, ou pour lui demander de modifier l’une ou l’autre des conditions de l’ordonnance de surveillance de longue durée dont vous faites l’objet. dès réception de votre demande et d’un rapport à jour de votre agent de libération conditionnelle, avec qui vous devriez dis- cuter de votre demande, votre dossier sera transmis à la commission qui tiendra un vote. par la suite, vous serez informé du résultat du processus en question. afin que votre demande puisse faire l’objet d’un examen complet, veuillez préciser les raisons qui la motivent. [je souligne.] (ar, vol. ii, at p. 67) (da, vol. ii, p. 67) [51] this letter gave mr. bird ample notice of the residency condition — more than five months — be- fore his ltso came into effect on january 7, 2015. during those five months, he could have written to the parole board and requested that the parole board vary or remove the condition so that he would not be placed in a community correctional centre. [51] cette lettre donnait à m. bird un avis ample- ment suffisant de l’assignation à résidence puisqu’elle précédait de plus de cinq mois la date d’entrée en vigueur de son osld, soit le 7 janvier 2015. au cours de ces cinq mois, il aurait pu écrire à la commission pour lui demander de modifier ou d’annuler la condi- tion, de sorte qu’il ne soit pas placé dans un centre correctionnel communautaire. [52] mr. bird does not contest that the parole board must exercise its statutory authority in conformity with the charter and has jurisdiction to consider charter issues and grant an appropriate remedy. in r v. conway, 2010 scc 22, [2010] 1 scr 765, this court stated that “administrative tribunals with the power to decide questions of law, and from whom [52] m. bird ne conteste pas que la commission doit exercer le pouvoir que lui confère la loi en conformité avec la charte et qu’elle a compétence pour examiner des questions relatives à la charte et accorder des réparations appropriées à cet égard. dans l’arrêt r c. conway, 2010 csc 22, [2010] 1 rcs 765, la cour a déclaré qu’un « tribunal [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 439 constitutional jurisdiction has not been clearly with- drawn, have the authority to resolve constitutional questions that are linked to matters properly before them” (para 78). this includes charter issues and charter remedies (ibid., at para 81). it is clear that the parole board has the power [53] to decide questions of law. for example, s. 147(1) of the ccra provides that an offender may appeal a decision of the parole board to the appeal division on the ground that the parole board, in making its decision, “failed to observe a principle of funda- mental justice” or “made an error of law”. this lan- guage indicates that the parole board has the power to decide legal questions (see conway, at para. 84, citing nova scotia (workers’ compensation board) v. martin, 2003 scc 54, [2003] 2 scr 504; see also quebec (attorney general) v. quebec (human rights tribunal), 2004 scc 40, [2004] 2 scr 223, and mooring v. canada (national parole board), [1996] 1 scr 75, at para 89). in addition, there is nothing in the ccra that indicates that parliament intended to withdraw charter jurisdiction from the scope of the parole board’s mandate. in the wake of conway, i  am satisfied that the parole board has the jurisdiction to decide charter issues and grant charter remedies and is therefore a court of competent jurisdiction under s. 24(1) of the charter (para 22). administratif possédant le pouvoir de trancher des questions de droit et dont la compétence constitu- tionnelle n’est pas clairement écartée peut résoudre une question constitutionnelle se rapportant à une affaire dont il est régulièrement saisi » (par 78). cela comprend les questions liées à la charte et les réparations fondées sur cette dernière (ibid., par 81). il ne fait aucun doute que la commission a [53] le pouvoir de trancher des questions de droit. à titre d’exemple, le par. 147(1) de la lscmlsc prévoit qu’un délinquant visé par une décision de la com- mission peut interjeter appel auprès de la section d’appel au motif que la commission, en rendant sa décision, « a violé un principe de justice fondamen- tale » ou « a commis une erreur de droit ». ce libellé démontre que la commission a le pouvoir de trancher des questions de droit (voir conway, par. 84, citant nouvelle­ écosse (workers’ compensation board) c. martin, 2003 csc 54, [2003] 2 rcs 504; voir aussi québec (procureur général) c. québec (tribu­ nal des droits de la personne), 2004 csc 40, [2004] 2 rcs 223, et mooring c. canada (commission nationale des libérations conditionnelles), [1996] 1 rcs 75, par 89). en outre, rien dans la lscmlsc n’indique que le législateur avait l’intention de sous- traire l’application de la charte à la compétence de la commission. dans la foulée de l’arrêt conway, je conclus donc que la commission a compétence pour trancher des questions relatives à la charte et accorder des réparations fondées sur celle-ci, et qu’il s’agit donc d’un tribunal compétent au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’application du par. 24(1) de la charte (par 22). i acknowledge that in mooring, this court [54] decided that the parole board was not a court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the charter (para 32). in that decision, the court found that the parole board did not have the authority under its statutory scheme to grant this remedy (paras 25-29). in my view, mooring did not decide whether the parole board could award charter remedies generally. as this court explained in conway, the threshold ques- tion is whether the tribunal has the jurisdiction to award charter remedies generally and is therefore [54] je reconnais que, dans l’arrêt mooring, la cour a jugé que la commission n’était pas un tribu- nal compétent pour écarter des éléments de preuve en application du par. 24(2) de la charte (par 32). dans cet arrêt, la cour a en effet conclu que la loi constituant la commission ne donnait pas à celle-ci compétence pour accorder cette réparation (par. 25- 29). selon moi, l’arrêt mooring n’a toutefois pas décidé si la commission pouvait, de façon géné- rale, accorder des réparations fondées sur la charte. comme la cour l’a expliqué dans l’arrêt conway, il faut commencer par déterminer si le tribunal a, 440 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. a court of competent jurisdiction (paras. 22 and 81). if the tribunal does have the jurisdiction to award charter remedies generally, the remaining ques- tion is whether the tribunal can grant the particular remedy sought, given the relevant statutory scheme (para 82). as such, this court’s decision in mooring does not prevent a determination that the parole board can grant other charter remedies. whether, in light of conway, mooring remains good law is best left for another day. [55] in sum, there is nothing to indicate that mr. bird could not have written to the parole board and requested that it reconsider its original decision on the basis that it did not comply with the charter. it was open to the parole board to grant an appro- priate remedy to mr. bird by varying or removing the residency condition. i accept that, in doing so, mr. bird would be asking the same body that made the decision to reconsider it, which is not the same as a right of appeal to a body which is independent from the original decision- maker, such as an administra- tive appeal tribunal, as was the case in maybrun and klippert. in those decisions, the court specifically noted that the relevant statutory schemes provided a right of appeal to an independent specialized tribunal (see maybrun, at para. 56; klippert, at para 17). but, as i will explain, mr. bird could have applied for ha­ beas corpus in a provincial superior court. he could also have applied for judicial review in the federal court, subject to the concerns discussed below. de façon générale, une telle compétence et s’il est, en conséquence, un tribunal compétent (par. 22 et 81). si tel est le cas, il faut ensuite se demander s’il peut accorder la réparation précise demandée eu égard au régime législatif applicable (par 82). ainsi, l’arrêt mooring n’empêche pas de conclure que la commission peut accorder d’autres réparations fon- dées sur la charte. cela dit, il est préférable d’at- tendre une autre occasion pour trancher la question de savoir si, à la lumière de l’arrêt conway, l’arrêt mooring est toujours valide en droit. [55] bref, rien ne donne à penser que m.  bird ne pouvait pas écrire à la commission pour lui de- mander de réexaminer sa décision initiale, au motif que celle-ci n’était pas conforme à la charte. la commission aurait pu lui accorder une réparation appropriée, en modifiant ou en annulant l’assigna- tion à résidence. je reconnais que, en agissant ainsi, m. bird aurait demandé à l’organisme qui a rendu la décision de la réexaminer, ce qui n’est pas équivalent à l’exercice d’un droit d’appel devant un organisme indépendant du décideur initial, tel qu’un tribunal administratif d’appel, comme c’était le cas dans les arrêts maybrun et klippert. certes, dans ces arrêts, la cour a expressément mentionné que les régimes législatifs applicables prévoyaient un droit d’appel devant un tribunal spécialisé indépendant (maybrun, par. 56; klippert, par 17). toutefois, comme je l’ex- pliquerai, m. bird aurait pu présenter une demande d’habeas corpus devant une cour supérieure pro- vinciale. il aurait aussi pu présenter une demande de contrôle judiciaire à la cour fédérale, sous ré- serve des préoccupations abordées dans les lignes qui suivent. (b) applying for judicial review in the federal b) demande de contrôle judiciaire devant la court cour fédérale [56] under s.  18(1) of the federal courts act, rsc 1985, c. f-7, the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction to issue, inter alia, a writ of certiorari or grant declaratory relief against a federal board, com- mission or tribunal, which includes the parole board. such relief may be granted on charter grounds. that said, two of the interveners assert that judicial review in the federal court may not have offered timely relief to mr bird. in addition, counsel for mr. bird [56] le paragraphe 18(1) de la loi sur les cours fédérales, lrc 1985, c. f-7, confère à la cour fé- dérale la compétence exclusive pour, entre autres, décerner un bref de certioriari ou rendre un jugement déclaratoire contre tout office fédéral, ce qui com- prend la commission. une telle réparation peut être accordée pour des motifs fondés sur la charte. cela dit, deux des intervenants affirment qu’un contrôle judiciaire devant la cour fédérale n’aurait peut- être [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 441 and the david asper centre for constitutional rights (“david asper centre”) raise concerns about the ac- cessibility of judicial review proceedings to mr bird. [57] the interveners, the david asper centre and the canadian civil liberties association, argue that by the time mr. bird’s challenge would have been heard by the federal court, his residency condition may have expired, thereby rendering the issue moot. [58] in addition, counsel for mr.  bird and the david asper centre raise concerns about the acces- sibility of judicial review proceedings in the federal court to individuals like mr. bird who would need to initiate proceedings while being incarcerated, or at best having been recently released on statutory release. counsel for mr. bird points out that mr. bird has spent close to the last decade in prison and was not likely to have the financial resources necessary to hire counsel for potentially lengthy judicial re- view proceedings. if mr. bird had to represent him- self, the david asper centre submits that federal court procedure would pose particular challenges for him. citing bielby ja’s decision in dg v. bowden institution (warden), 2016 abca 52, 612 ar 231, the david asper center asserts that “knowledge of the [federal court] rules is likely to be limited   . given the comparative rarity with which individu- als engage with the federal court system” (if, at para 24). [59] in my view, counsel for mr. bird and the in- terveners raise realistic concerns about the timeli- ness and accessibility of relief in the federal court. when someone’s liberty is at stake, efficiency and timeliness take on greater significance. as such, it is important that there be a mechanism available that affords sufficiently swift and accessible relief for those deprived of their liberty. on the record before us, i cannot say with certainty that judicial review would have offered such relief to mr bird. pas permis à m. bird d’obtenir réparation en temps opportun. en outre, les avocats de m. bird et du david asper centre for constitutional rights (« david asper centre ») ont des réserves quant à la possibilité pour m. bird de se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire. [57] le david asper centre et l’association cana- dienne des libertés civiles — qui ont qualité d’inter- venants dans la présente affaire — prétendent que, au moment où la contestation de m. bird aurait été instruite par la cour fédérale, son assignation à rési- dence aurait pu être expirée; la question serait donc devenue théorique. [58] les avocats de m. bird et du david asper centre ont aussi des réserves quant à l’accès au contrôle judiciaire en cour fédérale pour les per- sonnes qui, comme m. bird, auraient à introduire leur demande tout en étant incarcérées, ou, dans le meilleur des cas, peu après la date de leur libé- ration d’office. l’avocat de m. bird souligne que son client a passé presque la totalité de la dernière décennie en prison et qu’il est peu probable qu’il dispose des ressources financières nécessaires pour embaucher un avocat qui le représenterait dans un contrôle judiciaire potentiellement long. le david asper centre fait valoir que, si m. bird devait assurer sa propre défense, la procédure de la cour fédérale lui occasionnerait des difficultés particulières. citant la juge bielby dans l’arrêt dg c. bowden institution (warden), 2016 abca 52, 612 ar 231, le david asper centre fait valoir que [traduction]  «  sa connaissance des règles [des cours fédérales] est vraisemblablement limitée [  ] étant donné qu’il est relativement rare que des individus aient affaire au système des cours fédérales » (mi, par 24). [59] selon moi, les avocats de m. bird et des in- tervenants soulèvent des préoccupations réalistes à propos de l’accessibilité et de la rapidité du recours de- vant la cour fédérale. lorsque la liberté d’un individu est en jeu, l’accessibilité et la rapidité sont d’autant plus importantes. or, il importe qu’il existe un méca- nisme qui procure un recours suffisamment accessible et rapide pour ceux qui sont privés de leur liberté. à la lumière du dossier porté à notre connaissance, je ne suis pas en mesure d’affirmer qu’un contrôle judiciaire aurait constitué un tel recours pour m bird. 442 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. [60] that said, i would point out that mr. bird received notice of the parole board’s decision to im- pose the residency condition more than five months before his long- term supervision commenced, which would have given him a considerable amount of time in which to initiate judicial review proceedings. i also note that under r. 8(1) of the federal courts rules, sor/98-106, mr. bird could have moved for an expedited proceeding. however, if that motion were to have been denied, which is perhaps unlikely given the pressing liberty interest at stake, the re- ality remains that a decision by the federal court might not have been released before the majority, if not all, of mr. bird’s residency condition had been completed (see may v. ferndale institution, 2005 scc 82, [2005] 3 scr 809, at para. 69; bowden, at para 43). [61] while much of this is speculative, i cannot reject mr. bird’s concerns out of hand. in view of this, parliament may wish to consider whether the procedures in place governing judicial review ap- plications could be modified to provide more timely and accessible relief. this would be of benefit to both persons challenging conditions that restrict their liberty, as well as persons challenging conditions that do not restrict their liberty — perhaps more so as regards the latter. fortunately, the remedy of habeas corpus was available to mr. bird, and it provided a swift and efficient mechanism for challenging the residency condition at issue here, which restricted his liberty — unconstitutionally, in his view. i turn to that remedy now. [60] cela dit, je souligne que m. bird a été avisé de la décision de la commission d’imposer l’assigna- tion à résidence plus de cinq mois avant le début de sa surveillance de longue durée, ce qui lui donnait beaucoup de temps pour se pourvoir en contrôle ju- diciaire. je fais aussi remarquer que m. bird aurait pu, en application du par. 8(1) des règles des cours fédérales, dors/98-106, présenter une requête pour accélérer la procédure. cela dit, il est vrai que si une telle requête avait été rejetée — ce qui est possible- ment improbable compte tenu de l’enjeu urgent de la liberté en cause —, la décision de la cour fédérale aurait pu ne pas être rendue avant que la période de validité de l’assignation à résidence imposée à m. bird soit en grande partie, voire totalement, écou- lée (voir may c. établissement ferndale, 2005 csc 82, [2005] 3 rcs 809, par. 69; bowden, par 43). [61] bien qu’il s’agisse en grande partie de spécu- lations, je ne peux rejeter d’emblée les préoccupa- tions de m bird. dans cette optique, le parlement voudra peut- être examiner si les procédures en place régissant les demandes de contrôle judiciaire pour- raient être modifiées afin qu’elles offrent un recours plus rapide et plus accessible. cela profiterait à la fois aux personnes qui contestent les conditions qui restreignent leur liberté et à celles qui contestent les conditions qui n’ont pas un tel effet — peut- être davantage en ce qui concerne ces dernières. heureusement pour lui, m. bird aurait pu recourir à l’habeas corpus, un mécanisme rapide et efficace pour contester l’assignation à résidence en cause, qui restreignait sa liberté —, et ce de façon incons- titutionnelle selon lui. j’en viens maintenant à ce recours. (c) applying for habeas corpus c) demande d’habeas corpus [62] although mr. bird did not have a right of appeal from the parole board’s decision to an inde- pendent administrative tribunal, applying for habeas corpus in a provincial superior court would have given him the opportunity to ask for speedy relief from an independent body. habeas corpus, which has been called the “great writ of liberty” (see may, at para. 19), is a remedy designed to provide “swift access to justice for those who have been unlaw- fully deprived of their liberty” (mission institution [62] même si m. bird ne disposait pas du droit d’interjeter appel de la décision de la commission devant un tribunal administratif indépendant, il au- rait pu présenter une demande d’habeas corpus de- vant une cour supérieure provinciale pour que cette instance indépendante lui accorde rapidement une mesure de redressement. l’habeas corpus, qui a été qualifié de « grand bref de la liberté » (may, par. 19), est un recours conçu pour donner « un accès rapide à la justice pour les personnes illégalement privées [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 443 v khela, 2014 scc 24, [2014] 1 scr 502, at para 3). once the applicant shows a deprivation of liberty and some basis for concluding that the deten- tion is unlawful, the court will issue a writ of habeas corpus, which requires the detaining authorities to demonstrate at a hearing that the detention is justified (ibid., at para 41). generally, courts give priority to habeas corpus applications as they are deemed ur- gent (brown v. canada (public safety), 2018 onca 14, 420 dlr (4th) 124, at para. 20), and a hearing of a habeas corpus application can be obtained more rapidly than a hearing of a judicial review applica- tion in the federal court (may, at para. 69; khela, at para. 46; ogiamien v. ontario (community safety and correctional services), 2017 onca 839, 55 imm. lr (4th) 220, at para 18). as this court noted in may, habeas corpus is a crucial remedy in pursuit of ss. 7 and 9 rights under the charter (para 22). given the long history of this remedy, its central role in safeguarding against unlawful deprivations of lib- erty, and the fact that it is enshrined in s. 10(c) of the charter, parliament would clearly have been aware of habeas corpus and its availability to challenge residency conditions that are not charter compliant and thereby unlawfully deprive long- term offenders of their liberty. [63] there is nothing in the record to indicate that mr. bird would have been unable to apply for habeas corpus. the essence of mr.  bird’s constitutional argument is that he had been deprived of liberty unlawfully by the parole board’s order, which in its effect led to his residence at oskana centre. no issue was taken with the fact that mr. bird’s residency condition amounted to a deprivation of liberty: see r v. miller, [1985] 2 scr 613, at p. 637; may, at para 76. moreover, this court has recognized that habeas corpus is a remedy particularly well- suited for individuals in mr. bird’s situation, who may be self- represented, “the quick resolution of    issues” afforded by habeas corpus is important “if counsel is acting pro bono or on limited legal aid funding or if the prisoner is representing himself” (may, at para 69). habeas corpus is more accessible to de leur liberté » (établissement de mission c. khela, 2014 csc 24, [2014] 1 rcs 502, par 3). dès que le demandeur démontre qu’il a été privé de sa liberté et qu’il existe quelque fondement que ce soit permettant de conclure à l’illégalité de la déten- tion, le tribunal décerne le bref d’habeas corpus, obligeant ainsi les autorités carcérales à démontrer le bien- fondé de la détention lors d’une audience (ibid., par 41). règle générale, les tribunaux traitent les demandes d’habeas corpus en priorité, car elles sont réputées être urgentes (brown c. canada (pub­ lic safety), 2018 onca 14, 420 dlr (4th) 124, par. 20), et l’audition de ces demandes se tient plus rapidement que celle d’une demande de contrôle judiciaire en cour fédérale (may, par. 69; khela, par. 46; ogiamien c. ontario (community safety and correctional services), 2017 onca 839, 55 imm. lr (4th) 220, par 18). comme la cour l’a noté dans l’arrêt may, l’habeas corpus est un recours essentiel pour la protection des droits protégés par les art. 7 et 9 de la charte (par 22). compte tenu de la longue histoire de ce recours, de son rôle central dans la protection contre les privations illégales de liberté et du fait qu’il a été intégré à l’al. 10c) de la charte, le législateur était certainement au courant de son existence et du fait qu’il peut servir à contester des assignations à résidence au motif qu’elles ne sont pas conformes à la charte et que, de ce fait, elles privent illégalement des délinquants à contrôler de leur liberté. [63] rien au dossier ne permet de croire que m. bird aurait été incapable de présenter une de- mande d’habeas corpus. selon l’essentiel de l’ar- gument constitutionnel de m. bird, l’ordonnance de la commission l’assignant à résidence au centre oskana le privait illégalement de sa liberté, une pri- vation que nul ne conteste : r c. miller, [1985] 2 rcs 613, p. 637; may, par 76. en outre, la cour a reconnu que l’habeas corpus convenait particuliè- rement aux personnes dans la situation de m. bird, qui sont susceptibles de se défendre seules, puisque le « règlement rapide des questions litigieuses [que permet l’habeas corpus] » est important « lorsque les avocats agissent bénévolement ou sont rémuné- rés au tarif restreint de l’aide juridique, ou [lorsque] le détenu se représente lui- même » (may, par 69). l’habeas corpus est plus accessible que le contrôle 444 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. self- represented litigants than judicial review in the federal court, as it provides access to local proce- dures “upon which [self- represented litigants] may more readily obtain some type of legal assistance and advice” (bowden, at para 40). [64] furthermore, there is no evidence that a pro- vincial superior court would have declined its juris- diction to hear mr. bird’s application. may clarified that as a governing rule, a provincial superior court has the jurisdiction to hear an application for habeas corpus, despite the fact that alternative remedies are available in the federal court (para. 50; khela, at para 42). as this court noted in may, “as a matter of principle, a provincial superior court should exercise its jurisdiction when it is requested to do so. habeas corpus jurisdiction should not be declined merely be- cause another alternative remedy exists” (para 44). [65] the court in may stated that provincial su- perior courts should decline jurisdiction to hear ha­ beas corpus applications in only two very limited circumstances (para. 50; khela, at para 42). first, habeas corpus cannot be used to challenge the legal- ity of a conviction (may, at para 36). second, where parliament has put in place “a complete, comprehen- sive and expert statutory scheme which provides for a review at least as broad as that available by way of habeas corpus and no less advantageous”, provincial superior courts should decline jurisdiction (may, at paras. 40 and 63; khela, at para. 42; ogiamien, at para 13). judiciaire en cour fédérale pour les parties qui se défendent seules, car il donne accès aux procédures locales [traduction] « à l’égard desquelles [ces parties] peuvent plus facilement obtenir une certaine forme d’aide et de conseils juridiques » (bowden, par 40). [64] en outre, rien ne donne à penser qu’une cour supérieure provinciale aurait refusé d’exercer sa compétence pour entendre la demande de m bird. l’arrêt may précise qu’il est un principe directeur voulant qu’une cour supérieure provinciale ait com- pétence pour instruire une demande d’habeas cor­ pus, même si d’autres recours peuvent être exercés en cour fédérale (par. 50; khela, par 42). comme la cour l’a déclaré dans l’arrêt may, « [e]n principe, une cour supérieure provinciale devrait exercer sa compétence lorsqu’on le lui demande. elle ne de- vrait pas refuser d’exercer sa compétence en matière d’habeas corpus simplement parce qu’il existe une autre voie de recours » (par 44). [65] dans l’arrêt may, la cour a déclaré que les cours supérieures provinciales ne devraient refuser d’exercer leur compétence en matière d’habeas cor­ pus que dans deux cas bien précis (par. 50; khela, par. 42) : premièrement, lorsqu’il est question de contester la légalité d’une déclaration de culpabilité (may, par. 36); deuxièmement, lorsque le législateur a mis en place « un régime complet, exhaustif et spécialisé prévoyant une procédure d’examen au moins aussi large et aussi avantageuse que celle de l’habeas corpus » (may, par. 40 et 63; khela, par. 42; ogiamien, par 13). [66] in the circumstances of this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that there was a mechanism which provided a form of review as ad- vantageous as habeas corpus. while mr. bird accepts that he could have written to the parole board to ask it to reconsider its original decision, this would not have enabled him to seek relief from an independent body (see may, at para 62). furthermore, this court in may and khela set out five factors that militate in favour of a provincial superior court hearing a habeas corpus application, despite the availability of judicial review in the federal court. four of these [66] dans les circonstances de la présente affaire, rien au dossier n’indique qu’il existait un mécanisme aussi avantageux que l’habeas corpus pour offrir une forme de contrôle. m. bird reconnait qu’il aurait pu écrire à la commission pour lui demander de réexa- miner sa décision originale, mais il ne se serait alors pas adressé à un organisme indépendant pour obtenir réparation (voir may, par 62). en outre, dans les ar- rêts may et khela, la cour a énoncé cinq facteurs qui militent pour l’instruction de la demande d’habeas corpus par une cour supérieure provinciale, mal- gré la disponibilité du recours en contrôle judiciaire [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 445 five factors are relevant to this case. first, a hearing of a habeas corpus application in a superior court can be obtained more rapidly than a hearing of a judicial review application in the federal court (may, at para. 69; khela, at para 46). second, mr. bird would have greater local access to a provincial superior court than to the federal court (may, at para. 70; khela, at para. 47; ogiamien, at para 18). third, superior courts are “eminently familiar with the ap- plication of charter principles”, which are directly at issue when a person claims to have been unlawfully deprived of liberty (khela, at para. 45; see also may, at para 68). fourth, unlike judicial review, habeas corpus is non- discretionary: a court must issue a writ of habeas corpus where the applicant has shown a deprivation of liberty and raised a legitimate basis on which to question the legality of the detention (may, at para. 71; khela, at para. 48; ogiamien, at para 18). [67] for these reasons, it is difficult to conceive of a remedy better suited to mr. bird’s circumstances than habeas corpus, designed as it is to provide swift and easily accessible relief to persons challenging a deprivation of their liberty. moreover, given the force of the first two maybrun factors, which strongly in- dicate that parliament did not intend to permit long- term offenders to launch collateral attacks against their ltso conditions in criminal proceedings, if effective alternative mechanisms or forums exist, then it is axiomatic that parliament would have in- tended that those alternatives be used, rather than permitting a collateral attack in criminal proceed- ings. to reason otherwise and to adopt the narrower approach advocated by my colleague would be to assume parliament’s ignorance of these effective alternatives — which, in the case of habeas corpus, is particularly difficult to imagine since the writ has existed for centuries (see may, at para. 19) and is enshrined in s. 10(c) of the charter — or, if aware of them, that parliament intended for some unknown reason that they not be used. i am not persuaded that either assumption is justified. devant la cour fédérale. quatre de ces cinq facteurs sont pertinents en l’espèce. premièrement, l’audition d’une demande d’habeas corpus devant une cour su- périeure peut être obtenue plus rapidement que celle d’une telle demande de contrôle judiciaire (may, par. 69; khela, par 46). deuxièmement, m. bird aurait eu plus facilement accès à la cour supérieure provinciale de sa région qu’à la cour fédérale (may, par. 70; khela, par. 47; ogiamen, par 18). troisiè- mement, les cours supérieures « connaissent fort bien l’application des principes et des valeurs de la charte » qui sont directement mis en cause lors- qu’une personne prétend avoir été illégalement pri- vée de sa liberté (khela, par. 45; voir également may, par 68). quatrièmement, contrairement au contrôle judiciaire, le recours à l’habeas corpus n’est pas dis- crétionnaire : le tribunal doit accorder le bref d’ha­ beas corpus dès lors que le demandeur prouve qu’il y a eu privation de liberté et qu’il soulève quelque fondement légitime que ce soit pour remettre en question la légalité de la détention (may, par. 71; khela, par. 48; ogiamien, par 18). [67] pour ces motifs, il est difficile de concevoir un recours mieux adapté à la situation de m. bird que celui en habeas corpus, puisqu’il est conçu pour as- surer à ceux qui contestent la privation de leur liberté un recours rapide et facilement accessible. en outre, compte tenu de la force des deux premiers facteurs énoncés dans maybrun, qui donne fortement à penser que le législateur n’avait pas l’intention d’autoriser les délinquants à contrôler à contester incidemment les conditions fixées par les osld prononcées au terme de procédures criminelles s’il existe des mé- canismes ou des forums de rechange efficaces, il va de soi que le législateur aurait voulu que ces solu- tions soient utilisées, plutôt que de permettre une contestation incidente dans le cadre de procédures criminelles. raisonner autrement reviendrait à sup- poser que le parlement ne connaît pas ces solutions de rechange efficaces — ce qui est particulièrement difficile à concevoir dans le cas de l’habeas corpus puisque ce bref existe depuis des siècles (voir may, par. 19) et est enchâssé dans l’al. 10c) de la charte — ou, s’il en a connaissance, qu’il avait l’intention, pour une raison inconnue, qu’elles ne soient pas utilisées. je ne suis pas persuadé que l’une ou l’autre de ces hypothèses soit fondée. 446 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. [68] my colleague, however, rejects the notion that the availability of habeas corpus is relevant to the maybrun analysis in this case. while she takes the position that reconsideration by the parole board represents an inadequate mechanism for challeng- ing mr. bird’s residency condition, she does not dispute that habeas corpus remained available to mr bird. yet she rejects the relevance of habeas corpus as an available alternative because, in her view, parliament presumably intended that collateral attacks in criminal proceedings would be permitted despite the availability of habeas corpus, thereby enabling the accused to take a “breach first, challenge later” approach. [69] respectfully, i  cannot agree in my view, where an administrative process is inadequate (which i do not accept is necessarily the case here), but an effective alternative such as habeas corpus — which, as indicated, is a remedy parliament would have undoubtedly been aware of — is readily available, there is no compelling reason to assume that parlia- ment would have intended that a collateral attack in a criminal proceeding would provide an appropri- ate forum for challenging the order in question. in fact, the more plausible supposition is the opposite. moreover, in my view, where the administrative pro- cess put in place by parliament is inadequate (as my colleague contends), a person deprived of their lib- erty could hardly be faulted for disregarding that in- adequate process and seeking habeas corpus instead. [70] as a further basis for concluding that the avail- ability of habeas corpus is irrelevant to the maybrun analysis in this case, my colleague relies on the fact that habeas corpus would not be available as a means of challenging ltso conditions that do not restrict the long- term offender’s liberty (see martin j.’s rea- sons, at para 135). [68] ma collègue ne reconnait toutefois pas la per- tinence de la possibilité d’intenter un recours en habeas corpus dans le contexte de l’analyse prescrite par maybrun en l’espèce. même si elle se dit d’avis que le réexamen par la commission ne serait pas un mécanisme approprié pour contester l’assignation à résidence imposée à m. bird, et si elle ne remet pas en question le fait que m. bird pouvait recourir à l’habeas corpus, elle rejette la pertinence de ce dernier recours comme solution de rechange parce que, selon elle, le législateur aurait présumément eu l’intention de permettre les contestations incidentes dans le cadre de procédures criminelles, même si le délinquant peut recourir à l’habeas corpus, ouvrant ainsi la voie à l’approche qui consiste à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester ». [69] soit dit en tout respect, je ne peux souscrire à ce point de vue. à mon avis, lorsqu’un processus administratif ne convient pas (ce qui, selon moi, n’est pas nécessairement le cas dans le présent dossier), mais que le justiciable peut recourir à une solution de rechange efficace comme l’habeas corpus — un re- cours dont, je le répète, le législateur avait sans aucun doute connaissance —, rien ne justifie de manière convaincante de tenir pour acquis que le législateur avait l’intention qu’une contestation incidente dans le cadre d’une procédure criminelle constitue un fo- rum approprié pour contester l’ordonnance en ques- tion. en fait, l’inverse est plus plausible. de plus, à mon avis, lorsque le processus administratif mis en place par le législateur comporte des lacunes (comme le soutient ma collègue), il ne conviendrait guère de reprocher à une personne privée de sa liberté de « ne pas tenir compte » de ce processus inadéquat et de plutôt présenter une demande d’habeas corpus. [70] pour justifier sa conclusion selon laquelle la possibilité de recourir à l’habeas corpus n’est pas pertinente pour procéder à l’analyse maybrun en l’espèce, ma collègue se fonde également sur le fait qu’il ne serait pas possible de recourir à cette procé- dure pour contester les conditions de l’osld qui ne restreignent pas la liberté du délinquant à contrôler (voir les motifs de la juge martin, par 135). [71] again, i cannot agree with my colleague’s approach. in my respectful view, the proper framing [71] là encore, je ne peux souscrire à l’approche préconisée par ma collègue. selon moi, à cette étape [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 447 of the question to be answered at this stage of the analysis is whether there are effective alternative mechanisms or forums, apart from a collateral at- tack in criminal proceedings, for challenging the particular ltso condition in dispute — here, one that restricts the long- term offender’s liberty. this framing is important because it focuses the inquiry on the particular condition in dispute, rather than casting the inquiry so broadly as to encompass other types of conditions that are not being challenged. how the analysis would differ where the condition at issue does not involve a restriction of liberty may be a legitimate question, but it is not before us and is best left for another day. in sum, the record in this case indicates that [72] even if judicial review in the federal court would not have provided mr. bird with an effective rem- edy, writing to the parole board and/or applying for habeas corpus would have offered effective relief to mr bird. in my view, these mechanisms, con- sidered together, constitute an effective means to challenge the order. as a first step, mr. bird could have simply written to the parole board and asked it to vary or remove the residency condition. he could also have applied for judicial review in the federal court. however, if judicial review was not accessible to mr. bird and/or if mr. bird had wanted quicker relief, he could have applied for habeas corpus in a provincial superior court, a remedy that offers sim- plified procedures that promote greater accessibility by self- represented litigants and persons with limited means. de l’analyse, la bonne formulation de la question en litige consisterait à se demander s’il existe des mé- canismes ou forums de rechange efficaces, hormis la contestation incidente dans le cadre de procédures criminelles, pour contester la condition particulière de l’osld en litige — soit, ici, une condition qui restreint la liberté du délinquant à contrôler. cette formulation est importante parce qu’elle concentre l’enquête sur la condition particulière en litige, plu- tôt que de l’élargir au point où elle englobe d’autres types de conditions qui ne sont pas contestées. la façon dont l’analyse différerait si la condition en cause ne comportait pas de restriction de liberté peut être une question légitime, mais nous n’en sommes pas saisis et il est préférable de la reporter à une occasion ultérieure. [72] en résumé, le dossier en l’espèce tend à in- diquer que, pour m. bird, se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire devant la cour fédérale n’était peut- être pas un recours efficace, mais écrire à la commission ou présenter une demande d’habeas corpus lui au- rait permis d’obtenir une réparation efficace. je suis d’avis que ces mécanismes constituent, ensemble, un moyen efficace de contester l’ordonnance. en premier lieu, m. bird aurait pu simplement écrire à la commission pour lui demander de modifier ou d’annuler l’assignation à résidence. il aurait aussi pu présenter une demande de contrôle judiciaire à la cour fédérale. cependant, s’il n’avait pu se pourvoir en contrôle judiciaire, ou s’il avait voulu obtenir plus rapidement réparation, m. bird aurait pu présenter une demande d’habeas corpus à une cour supérieure provinciale, un recours dont les procédures sont sim- plifiées et qui favorise donc l’accessibilité à la justice pour les parties qui se représentent elles- mêmes et pour celles dont les moyens sont limités. [73] as an aside, i note that maybrun held that the legislature must have intended to permit a collateral attack if it is the only effective way to challenge an administrative order. however, in this case, a collat- eral attack would not appear to be an effective means to challenge the order at issue. in oral submissions, the crown asserted that when a person breaches a residency condition, a warrant of suspension will be issued and the person will be brought back into custody (transcript, at p 78). if a charge is laid for [73] soit dit en passant, je note que, selon la con- clusion de l’arrêt maybrun, le législateur doit avoir eu l’intention de permettre la contestation incidente s’il s’agit du seul moyen efficace pour contester une ordonnance administrative. or, dans la présente affaire, la contestation incidente ne semble pas cons- tituer un tel moyen. dans sa plaidoirie orale, le mi- nistère public a fait valoir que, lorsqu’une personne contrevient à une assignation à résidence, un mandat de suspension est délivré et la personne est renvoyée 448 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. breaching the order, the offender will likely be held in custody pending his or her trial (ibid). the crown asserted that after a bail hearing, a preliminary hear- ing, the serving of notice of a constitutional question and the eventual trial, the likelihood is that many months will have passed since the breach of the condition (ibid). indeed, that is exactly what hap- pened to mr. bird in this case: mr. bird left oskana centre in breach of his residency condition and was arrested more than two months later. he was kept in custody until the date of his trial for a period of approximately 10 months (trial reasons, at para 4). as the trial judge noted, that period of time in cus- tody greatly exceeded the residence time that was required in oskana centre (ibid). this indicates that parliament did not intend for mr. bird to object to his residency condition by collaterally attacking it. in my view, then, the third maybrun factor [74] indicates an intention by parliament not to permit individuals like mr. bird to collaterally attack resi- dency conditions, but rather for the offender to write to the parole board and/or, if judicial review in the federal court would not provide an effective remedy, apply for habeas corpus. (4) factor four: the kind of collateral attack in light of the expertise or raison d’être of the administrative appeal tribunal [75] the fourth maybrun factor is “the kind of collateral attack in light of the expertise or raison d’être of the administrative appeal tribunal”. in my view, this factor also permits a court to consider the nature of the collateral attack in light of the expertise or raison d’être of other mechanisms or forums for challenging the order. en détention (transcription, p 78). si une accusation est portée pour violation de l’ordonnance, le délin- quant est vraisemblablement maintenu en détention pendant son procès (ibid). le ministère public a plaidé que, après l’enquête sur remise en liberté provisoire, l’enquête préliminaire, la signification de l’avis de question constitutionnelle ainsi que le procès subséquent, de nombreux mois se seront vraisemblablement écoulés depuis la violation de la condition (ibid). en fait, c’est exactement ce qui s’est produit pour m. bird en l’espèce : il a quitté le centre oskana, contrevenant ainsi à son assigna- tion à résidence, et il a été arrêté plus de deux mois plus tard. il a été maintenu en détention jusqu’à la date de son procès, soit pendant une période d’en- viron 10 mois (motifs de première instance, par 4). comme le juge de première instance l’a souligné, cette période de détention était nettement supérieure à la période durant laquelle il avait été contraint à ré- sider au centre oskana (ibid). le législateur n’avait donc pas l’intention que m. bird s’oppose à son as- signation à résidence en la contestant incidemment. [74] selon moi, il s’ensuit que le troisième facteur de l’arrêt maybrun témoigne de l’intention du législateur de ne pas permettre que des individus dans la situation de m. bird contestent incidemment leur assignation à résidence. il entendait plutôt que le délinquant écrive à la commission ou, dans l’éventualité où le contrôle judiciaire en cour fédérale n’est pas un recours effi- cace, qu’il présente une demande d’habeas corpus. (4) quatrième facteur : la nature de la contesta- tion incidente eu égard à l’expertise de l’ins- tance administrative d’appel et à sa raison d’être [75] le quatrième facteur dégagé dans l’arrêt maybrun est « la nature de la contestation [incidente] eu égard à l’expertise de l’instance [administrative] d’appel et de sa raison d’être ». selon moi, ce facteur permet aussi au tribunal de tenir compte de la nature de la contestation incidente eu égard à l’expertise du décideur et à la raison d’être d’autres mécanismes ou forums pour contester l’ordonnance. in maybrun, the court explained that the [76] fourth factor examines whether the nature of the [76] dans l’arrêt maybrun, la cour a expliqué que ce quatrième facteur vise à déterminer si la nature de [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 449 collateral attack involves considerations that fall within the expertise of the tribunal or which the tri- bunal was established by the legislature to address. the court noted that where the nature of a collateral attack “requires the consideration of factors that fall within the specific expertise of an administrative appeal tribunal, this is a strong indication that the legislature wanted that tribunal to decide the question rather than a court of penal jurisdiction” (para 50). [77] counsel for mr. bird maintains that this factor is not relevant in this case, as mr. bird has no right of appeal to an administrative tribunal. respectfully, i disagree. a court is not limited to considering only the expertise or raison d’être of an administrative appeal tribunal. the maybrun framework focuses on the intention of parliament as to the appropriate forum for challenging the order, which may include a review mechanism other than an administrative ap- peal tribunal. it follows that a court may consider the nature of the collateral attack in relation to the exper- tise or raison d’être of other forums or mechanisms. where the nature of the collateral attack involves considerations that fall squarely within the expertise or raison d’être of a particular administrative body or other forum, this may be taken as an indication that parliament wanted that body to decide the question, as opposed to permitting a collateral attack. la contestation incidente fait appel à des considéra- tions qui relèvent de l’expertise du tribunal ou à des questions pour lesquelles le tribunal a été créé par le législateur. la cour a fait remarquer que, lorsque la nature d’une contestation incidente « amène à tenir compte d’éléments qui relèvent de l’expertise particulière d’une instance administrative d’appel, on disposera d’un indice solide pour conclure que le législateur souhaitait que la question soit tranchée par cette instance et non par une cour de juridiction pénale » (par 50). [77] l’avocat de m. bird soutient que ce facteur n’est pas pertinent en l’espèce, car son client ne dispose pas d’un droit d’appel devant un tribunal administratif. soit dit en tout respect, je ne suis pas d’accord. le tribunal n’est pas tenu de limiter son examen à la question de l’expertise et de la raison d’être d’une instance administrative d’appel le cadre énoncé dans l’arrêt maybrun met l’accent sur l’intention du législateur quant au forum approprié pour contester l’ordonnance, qui peut comprendre un mécanisme d’examen autre qu’une instance ad- ministrative d’appel. il s’ensuit que le tribunal peut se pencher sur la nature de la contestation incidente en tenant compte de l’expertise et de la raison d’être d’autres forums et mécanismes. lorsque la nature de la contestation incidente fait appel à des consi- dérations qui relèvent clairement de l’expertise et de la raison d’être d’un organisme administratif ou d’un autre forum en particulier, on peut considérer qu’il s’agit d’un indice que le législateur souhaitait que cet organisme tranche la question, plutôt que de permettre une contestation incidente. in the instant case, s 1341(2) of the ccra [78] gives the parole board broad discretionary power to impose whichever conditions on long- term supervi- sion it deems “reasonable and necessary in order to protect society and to facilitate the successful inte- gration of the offender into society”. as the federal court of appeal noted in normandin v canada (attorney general), 2005 fca 345, [2006] 2 fcr. 112, s 1341(2) demonstrates “parliament’s intention to rely on the expertise and experience of the board” in determining which conditions are needed in an ltso to achieve the balance between public safety and the successful reintegration of the offender [78] en l’espèce, le par 1341(2) de la lscmlsc confère à la commission un vaste pouvoir discré- tionnaire d’imposer les conditions de surveillance de longue durée qu’elle juge « raisonnables et né- cessaires pour protéger la société et favoriser la ré- insertion sociale du délinquant ». comme l’a fait remarquer la cour d’appel fédérale dans l’arrêt nor­ mandin c. canada (procureur général), 2005 caf 345, [2006] 2 rcf 112, le par 1341(2) témoigne de « l’intention du législateur de s’en remettre à l’expertise et à l’expérience de la commission » pour déterminer les conditions dont il convient d’as- sortir l’osld afin de maintenir l’équilibre entre la 450 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. (para 46). it follows from this that if mr. bird asked the parole board to reconsider its decision to impose the residency condition, the parole board would con- sider matters that fall squarely within its expertise. [79] the fact that mr. bird’s challenge to the res- idency condition raises constitutional issues does not mean that it raises considerations foreign to the parole board’s experience and expertise. as this court observed in conway, “expert tribunals should play a primary role in the determination of charter issues falling within their specialized jurisdiction” (para 21). [80] the issues raised by mr. bird’s challenge fall squarely within the expertise of the parole board. these issues would also not be unfamiliar to the federal court or to provincial superior courts hearing habeas corpus applications. in my view, this factor indicates a legislative intention to have mr. bird re- sort to these mechanisms — and against permitting a collateral attack in the criminal trial process. sécurité du public et la réinsertion réussie du délin- quant (par 46). en conséquence, si m. bird avait demandé à la commission de réexaminer sa décision d’imposer l’assignation à résidence, la commission se serait penchée sur des questions qui relèvent clai- rement de son expertise. [79] ce n’est pas parce que la contestation de m. bird quant à son assignation à résidence sou- lève des questions constitutionnelles qu’elle soulève des questions ne relevant pas de l’expérience et de l’expertise de la commission. comme la cour l’a noté dans l’arrêt conway, « les tribunaux spécialisés devaient [  ] jouer un rôle de premier plan dans le règlement des questions liées à la charte et relevant de leur compétence particulière » (par 21). [80] les questions soulevées par la contestation de m. bird relèvent clairement de l’expertise de la commission ces questions n’échapperaient pas non plus à l’expertise de la cour fédérale ou des cours supérieures provinciales qui instruisent des demandes d’habeas corpus. selon moi, ce facteur témoigne de l’intention du législateur que m. bird s’en remette à ces mécanismes et que la contesta- tion incidente ne soit pas autorisée dans le cadre du processus pénal. (5) factor five: the penalty on a conviction for failing to comply with the order (5) cinquième facteur : la sanction imposable pour défaut d’avoir respecté l’ordonnance i now turn to the final maybrun factor, the [81] “penalty on a conviction for failing to comply with the order”. the penalty for breaching a condition of an ltso is significant as indicated, under s 7533(1) of the criminal code, an offender who, without reasonable excuse, breaches an ltso is guilty of an indictable offence which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to 10 years. mr. bird argues that the penalty on conviction in this case “is the most significant factor and should indeed be determinative in this case” (af, at para 59). [81] j’examinerai maintenant le dernier facteur énoncé dans l’arrêt maybrun, soit « la sanction im- posable pour défaut d’avoir respecté l’ordonnance ». la sanction imposable en cas de manquement à une condition d’une osld est lourde. comme je l’ai mentionné, le par 7533(1) du code criminel pré- voit que le délinquant qui, sans excuse raisonnable, contrevient à une osld est coupable d’un acte cri- minel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de 10 ans. m. bird prétend que la sanction imposable en l’espèce [traduction] « est le facteur le plus important et qu’il devrait en fait être déterminant dans la présente affaire » (ma, par 59). [82] i acknowledge that the potential penalty for breaching an ltso is substantial. if i were to consider it in isolation, i would be hard pressed to [82] je reconnais que la sanction dont est passible la personne qui contrevient à une osld est lourde. si je devais tenir compte de ce facteur de manière [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird le juge moldaver 451 ascribe to parliament an intention that an offender could be convicted of breaching an ltso without having an opportunity, during the criminal trial, to challenge the validity of the condition (ca reasons, at para 56). in maybrun, where the court deter- mined that a collateral attack was not permitted, the penalty on conviction was a fine, and the court spe- cifically noted that imprisonment was not an option (para 63). however, i disagree with mr. bird that this factor is determinative. as i will explain, when the penalty provision is viewed not in isolation, but in conjunction with the other maybrun factors, it is clear to me that it is not decisive of parliament’s intention. isolée, j’aurais de la difficulté à attribuer au légis- lateur l’intention qu’un délinquant puisse être re- connu coupable d’avoir contrevenu à une osld sans avoir eu la possibilité, lors du procès au criminel, de contester la validité de la condition (motifs de la cour d’appel, par 56). dans l’arrêt maybrun, où la cour a conclu que la contestation incidente n’était pas permise, la sanction imposable était une amende, et non pas l’emprisonnement comme la cour l’a expressément souligné (par 63). je ne souscris tou- tefois pas à la proposition de m. bird selon laquelle ce facteur est déterminant. comme je l’expliquerai, si j’examine la disposition pénale non pas de manière isolée, mais conjointement avec les autres facteurs cernés dans l’arrêt maybrun, il me semble évident qu’elle n’est pas déterminante quant à l’intention du législateur. (6) weighing the maybrun factors (6) pondération des facteurs énoncés dans l’arrêt [83] with the exception of the final maybrun fac- tor, the other factors strongly indicate that parliament did not intend to permit collateral attacks in circum- stances like those existing in this case. allowing dangerous and long- term offenders to take a “breach first, challenge later” approach to their residency conditions would expose the community to an unac- ceptable level of risk and compromise the offender’s rehabilitative prospects. maybrun [83] les facteurs énoncés dans l’arrêt maybrun, hormis le dernier, donnent fortement à penser que le législateur n’avait pas l’intention de permettre les contestations incidentes dans des circonstances comme celles qui nous occupent. permettre à des délinquants dangereux et à des délinquants à contrô- ler d’adopter l’approche qui consiste à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester » pour s’opposer à leur assignation à résidence exposerait la collectivité à un risque inacceptable en plus de compromettre les chances de réhabilitation du délinquant. [84] furthermore, the record indicates that there were mechanisms available to mr. bird that would have provided him with an effective means to chal- lenge the residency condition. even if judicial review in the federal court would not have been effective, mr. bird had two other avenues open to him: he could have written to the parole board, which has expertise and experience establishing conditions of long- term supervision, and/or applied for habeas corpus in a provincial superior court. in such cir- cumstances, mr. bird was not denied the ability to fully defend against the charge of breaching the res- idency condition, because he had the opportunity to challenge the parole board’s order through these mechanisms. [84] en outre, il appert du dossier qu’il existait des mécanismes qui auraient permis à m. bird de contes- ter efficacement l’assignation à résidence. même si le contrôle judiciaire en cour fédérale n’était pas un recours efficace, deux autres possibilités s’offraient à m. bird : il aurait pu écrire à la commission, experte et expérimentée dans l’établissement de conditions de surveillance de longue durée, ou présenter une demande d’habeas corpus devant une cour supé- rieure provinciale. dans les circonstances, puisqu’il pouvait contester l’ordonnance de la commission en recourant à ces mécanismes, m. bird n’a pas été privé de la possibilité de se défendre pleinement contre l’accusation d’avoir enfreint l’assignation à résidence. 452 r v bird moldaver j. [2019] 1 scr. [85] although mr. bird faced a substantial pen- alty on conviction — a term of imprisonment — for breaching the residency condition, this penalty does not, in my view, tip the scale in favour of mr. bird’s contention that parliament intended that he be per- mitted to collaterally attack the parole board’s or- der. given that permitting a “breach first, challenge later” approach in this context would pose a real risk to public safety and that effective review mech- anisms were available to mr. bird, i am satisfied that parliament did not intend that mr. bird should be able to circumvent these mechanisms and in- stead, challenge the residency condition only after breaching it. accordingly, i am of the opinion that the court of appeal correctly held that parliament did not intend to permit long- term and dangerous offenders to collaterally attack residency conditions of their ltsos. rather, parliament intended that these offenders would ask the parole board to vary or remove the condition and/or, if judicial review in the federal court would not provide an effective remedy, apply for habeas corpus. [86] in light of this conclusion, it is not necessary to consider mr. bird’s argument that the residency condition in this case infringed his ss. 7, 9 and/or 11(h) charter rights. [85] même si m. bird était passible d’une sanc- tion sévère — une peine d’emprisonnement — en cas de contravention à son assignation à résidence, j’estime que cette sanction n’a pas pour effet de faire pencher la balance pour sa prétention que le lé- gislateur avait l’intention de lui permettre de contes- ter incidemment l’ordonnance de la commission. puisqu’autoriser le recours à l’approche qui consiste à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester » dans le présent contexte poserait un véritable risque pour la sécurité du public, et puisque m. bird avait à sa disposition des mécanismes d’examen efficaces, je conclus que le législateur n’avait pas l’intention qu’il puisse contourner ces mécanismes et ainsi contester l’assignation à résidence uniquement après y avoir contrevenu. en conséquence, je crois que la cour d’appel a eu raison de statuer que le législateur n’avait pas l’intention de permettre aux délinquants à contrôler et aux délinquants dange- reux de contester incidemment les assignations à résidence dont est assortie leur osld. le législa- teur avait plutôt l’intention que ces délinquants de- mandent à la commission de modifier ou d’annuler l’assignation ou, dans l’éventualité où le contrôle judiciaire en cour fédérale ne constitue pas un re- cours efficace, qu’ils présentent une demande d’ha­ beas corpus. [86] compte tenu de cette conclusion, il n’est pas nécessaire que j’examine l’argument de m. bird se- lon lequel, dans sa situation, l’assignation à résidence portait atteinte à ses droits protégés par les art. 7 et 9 ainsi que par l’al. 11h) de la charte. vi disposition vi dispositif [87] the court of appeal did not err in holding that mr. bird was not allowed to collaterally attack the residency condition of his ltso. the court of ap- peal properly set aside mr. bird’s acquittal, entered a conviction on the charge of breaching the ltso un- der s 7533(1) of the criminal code and remitted the matter to the provincial court of saskatchewan for sentencing. accordingly, i would dismiss the appeal. [87] la cour d’appel n’a pas commis d’erreur en concluant que m.  bird n’était pas autorisé à contester incidemment l’assignation à résidence prévue dans son osld. elle a annulé à bon droit l’acquittement de m. bird, inscrit une déclaration de culpabilité à l’égard de l’accusation d’avoir contrevenu à l’osld aux termes du par 7533(1) du code criminel, et renvoyé l’affaire à la cour provinciale de la saskatchewan pour détermina- tion de la peine. en conséquence, je suis d’avis de rejeter l’appel. [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 453 the reasons of karakatsanis, gascon and version française des motifs des juges martin jj. were delivered by karakatsanis, gascon et martin rendus par martin j. — i. introduction la juge martin — i. introduction [88] significant consequences attach to being de- clared a long- term offender under s 7531(3) of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c c-46. one conse- quence is the operation of s 7533, which subjects a long- term offender to up to 10  years in prison for breaching any of the conditions attached to the applicable long- term supervision order (“ltso”). these conditions are set in part by the parole board of canada (“board”) and in part by s. 161(1) of the corrections and conditional release regulations, sor/92-602. they apply once an offender’s carceral sentence and parole have expired and can be wide- ranging and touch diverse aspects of the offender’s life. the ltso at issue in this case prohibits spencer dean bird from associating with certain people, being at specified places, possessing or consuming alcohol or drugs, and living anywhere not approved by the correctional service of canada (“csc”) for a 180- day period. this last condition is at issue in this matter. [89] mr. bird was charged under s 7533 with breaching the residency condition of his ltso. this appeal asks whether he should be permitted to chal- lenge the constitutionality of that condition as his defence at his criminal trial, even though he took no proactive steps to properly challenge the condition when it was imposed. should what is known as a “collateral attack” on the residency condition set by the board be permitted in the criminal proceedings? having admitted the elements of the offence and raised no other defences, mr. bird’s constitutional challenge represents his only prospect of acquittal. [88] d’importantes conséquences se rattachent au fait d’être déclaré délinquant à contrôler en applica- tion du par 7531(3) du code criminel, lrc 1985, c c-46. l’une de ces conséquences est l’application de l’art 7533, qui rend le délinquant à contrôler passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de 10 ans s’il contrevient à l’une ou l’autre des conditions de l’ordonnance de surveillance de longue durée (« osld ») dont il fait l’objet. ces conditions sont établies en partie par la commission des libérations conditionnelles du canada (« commission ») et en partie par le par. 161(1) du règlement sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, dors/92-602. elles s’appliquent après l’expiration de la peine d’emprisonnement et de la libération conditionnelle du délinquant et peuvent avoir une vaste portée de même que concerner divers aspects de la vie du délinquant. l’osld en cause en l’espèce interdit à spencer dean bird de fréquenter certaines personnes, de se trouver dans certains endroits, de posséder ou de consommer de l’alcool ou des dro- gues et de résider dans un lieu qui n’est pas approuvé par le service correctionnel du canada (« scc ») pendant une période de 180 jours. la présente affaire porte sur cette dernière condition. [89] m.  bird a été accusé, en application de l’art.  753.3, d’avoir contrevenu à l’assignation à résidence prévue dans son osld. il s’agit ici de déterminer s’il devrait pouvoir contester la consti- tutionnalité de cette condition comme moyen de défense dans le cadre de son procès criminel, même s’il n’a pris aucune mesure proactive pour s’oppo- ser à condition en question au moment où elle a été imposée. devrait-on permettre ce que l’on appelle la « contestation incidente » des assignations à ré- sidence imposées par la commission dans le cadre d’instances criminelles? m. bird ayant admis les élé- ments de l’infraction et n’ayant invoqué aucun autre moyen de défense, la contestation constitutionnelle représente sa seule perspective d’acquittement. 454 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. i agree with the majority that our primary task [90] in this matter is to apply the framework for assess- ing the viability of collateral attacks set out in r v. consolidated maybrun mines ltd., [1998] 1 scr. 706, and r v. al klippert ltd., [1998] 1 scr 737. this framework is aimed at determining the relevant legislature’s intention as to the appropriate forum for adjudicating the validity of the challenged order (maybrun, at paras. 19, 38, 44, 46 and 52; klippert, at para 13). the key question is whether the relevant legislature prescribed a particular forum for chal- lenging the order under attack (maybrun, at para. 46; see also klippert, at para 20). there are five factors that guide this assessment (maybrun, at paras. 45 and 51-52, and klippert, at paras 13-14). [91] i reach a different conclusion, however, on how those factors apply in this case. i conclude that two of the factors — whether an administrative appeal is available and the penalty upon conviction for the breach — overwhelmingly weigh against finding that parliament intended for an “attack” like mr. bird’s to be barred in these circumstances. i agree with the trial judge that mr. bird should have been permitted to attack the residency requirement on constitutional grounds as his defence at trial. indeed, it is difficult to imagine in what circumstances the maybrun fac- tors might permit a collateral attack if not in these. i do not accept that permitting mr. bird’s challenge at trial would somehow condone or invite a “breach first, challenge later” approach to ltso conditions. i conclude that mr. bird ought not be barred from raising his constitutional arguments because he failed to challenge his residency condition through one of the three imperfect avenues that the majority finds were open to him. [90] comme les juges majoritaires, j’estime que notre tâche première en l’espèce consiste à appli- quer le cadre d’analyse servant à évaluer la viabilité des contestations incidentes énoncé dans les arrêts r c consolidated maybrun mines ltd., [1998] 1 rcs 706, et r c. al klippert ltd., [1998] 1 rcs 737. ce cadre d’analyse vise à déterminer quelle était l’intention du législateur quant au forum où il convient de juger de la validité d’une ordon- nance contestée (maybrun, par. 19, 38, 44, 46 et 52; klippert, par 13). la question clé est celle de savoir si le législateur compétent a prescrit qu’il faille contester une ordonnance devant un forum en particulier (maybrun, par. 46; voir aussi klippert, par.  20) cinq facteurs guident l’appréciation de cette question (maybrun, par. 45 et 51-52; klippert, par 13-14). [91] j’arrive toutefois à une conclusion différente de celle tirée par mon collègue sur la façon dont ces facteurs s’appliquent en l’espèce. selon moi, deux d’entre eux — soit ceux relatifs à l’existence d’un droit d’appel devant une instance administrative et à la sanction imposable pour défaut de se conformer — militent très largement contre la conclusion voulant que le législateur ait eu l’intention d’empêcher une « contestation » comme celle de m. bird dans les circonstances de l’espèce. je souscris à la position du juge du procès selon laquelle m. bird aurait dû pouvoir contester l’assignation à résidence pour des motifs d’ordre constitutionnel comme moyen de défense à son procès. en effet, il est difficile d’ima- giner dans quelles circonstances les facteurs énoncés dans l’arrêt maybrun donneraient ouverture à une contestation incidente si ce n’est dans celles de l’es- pèce. je ne peux accepter que le fait de permettre la contestation de m. bird équivaudrait en quelque sorte à tolérer ou à encourager la stratégie consis- tant à « contrevenir d’abord [aux conditions d’une osld], pour ensuite [les] contester ». je conclus que m. bird ne devrait pas être empêché de faire valoir ses arguments constitutionnels parce qu’il n’a pas contesté son assignation à résidence au moyen d’un des trois recours imparfaits dont il disposait selon les juges majoritaires. [92] mr. bird alleges the residency condition in- fringes his rights under ss. 7, 9 and 11(h) of the [92] m. bird prétend que l’assignation à résidence porte atteinte aux droits que lui garantissent les [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 455 ca nadian charter of rights and freedoms in the courts below, mr. bird advanced only his s. 7 claim. the crown opposes this court adjudicating mr. bird’s ss. 9 and 11(h) claims. mr. bird has not persuaded me that this court should exercise its ex- ceptional discretion to entertain new charter claims on appeal. as such, i address only his s. 7 claim. while i conclude that mr. bird should have had the opportunity to advance this charter claim, i find that it is not made out. [93] therefore, although i would allow mr. bird to challenge the constitutionality of his residency condition, i would dismiss the appeal. art. 7 et 9 ainsi que l’al. 11h) de la charte cana­ dienne des droits et libertés. devant les tribunaux d’instances inférieures, m. bird n’a fait valoir que sa prétention fondée sur l’art 7. le ministère pu- blic s’oppose à ce que la cour statue quant à ses prétentions fondées sur l’art. 9 et l’al 11h). m. bird ne m’a pas convaincue que la cour devrait exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire exceptionnel d’exami- ner en appel de nouvelles prétentions fondées sur la charte. en conséquence, je n’examinerai que sa prétention fondée sur l’art 7. bien que je conclue que m. bird aurait dû pouvoir faire valoir cette pré- tention fondée sur la charte, j’estime que celle-ci n’est pas établie. [93] par conséquent, bien que je sois d’avis de permettre à m. bird de contester la constitution- nalité de son assignation à résidence, je rejetterais le pourvoi. ii background ii faits [94] on may 27, 2005, mr.  bird was declared a long- term offender upon being convicted of as- sault. consequently, in addition and subsequent to a 54- month carceral component, his sentence included 5 years of supervision in the community. [95] mr. bird’s statutory release from prison did not occur until august 14, 2014, as he had been convicted of other offences in the interim. on the day of his release, he was transferred from a federal institution (prison) in alberta to oskana community correctional centre in regina, where csc had placed him for his statutory release period. [94] le 27 mai 2005, m. bird a été déclaré délin- quant à contrôler après avoir été jugé coupable de voies de fait. sa peine comportait donc, en plus d’un emprisonnement d’une durée de 54 mois et consé- cutivement à celui-ci, une surveillance d’une durée de 5 ans au sein de la collectivité. [95] la libération d’office de m. bird n’a eu lieu que le 14 août 2014, car il avait été déclaré coupable d’autres infractions dans l’intervalle. le jour de sa libération, il a été transféré d’un établissement fé- déral (soit une prison) en alberta au centre correc- tionnel communautaire oskana à regina (« centre oskana »), où le scc avait choisi de le placer pen- dant sa période de libération d’office. [96] this period expired on january  7, 2015. mr. bird’s period of long- term supervision began that same day. [96] cette période a pris fin le 7 janvier 2015. la période de surveillance de longue durée de m. bird a débuté le même jour. in anticipation of the commencement of [97] mr. bird’s long- term supervision, the board devel- oped the conditions that would attach to his ltso. in doing so, the board considered mr. bird’s correc- tions file as well as an assessment provided by csc. [97] en prévision du début de la surveillance de longue durée de m. bird, la commission a élaboré les conditions dont serait assortie l’osld dont il faisait l’objet. ce faisant, la commission a pris en considération le dossier correctionnel de m. bird ainsi qu’une évaluation fournie par le scc. 456 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. [98] the board included a residency condition in the ltso. the board ordered that mr. bird must: [98] la commission a assorti l’osld d’une as- signation à résidence. elle a prescrit à m. bird de : [r]eside at a community correctional centre or a commu- nity residential facility or other residential facility (such as private home placement) approved by the correctional service of canada, for a period of 180 days. [traduction] [r]ésider dans un centre correctionnel com- munautaire, un centre résidentiel communautaire ou un autre établissement résidentiel (p ex une maison privée) approuvé par le service correctionnel du canada, pendant une période de 180 jours. (ar, at p. 64) (da, p. 64) [99] the board grounded this condition in mr. bird’s specific circumstances, including his history of vio- lence, substance abuse, and failure to comply con- victions. the board concluded that “[mr. bird] will require the structure and supervision that only can be provided by a community correctional centre/commu- nity residential centre”. the board’s decision was also informed by csc’s opinion that allowing mr. bird to live with his family, which he had proposed, would likely give him access to alcohol and put him at risk of re- offending. [100] csc approved oskana centre for mr. bird’s 180- day residency condition under the ltso. as set out above, mr. bird was already at oskana centre, serving out his carceral sentence on statutory release. therefore, his living arrangements did not change when he became subject to his ltso. in other words, mr. bird was ordered to remain where he was for 180 days, despite his change in status. [101] oskana centre is a community- based resi- dential facility — or, more specifically, a “commu- nity correctional centre”, as it is owned and operated by csc. it houses individuals subject to state super- vision, including individuals on parole, out of prison on temporary absences, and on statutory release. [99] la commission a fait reposer cette condition sur la situation particulière de m. bird, notamment ses antécédents de violence, ses problèmes de toxi- comanie et ses déclarations de culpabilité pour défaut de se conformer. la commission a conclu que [tra- duction] « [m. bird] aura besoin de la structure et de la surveillance que seuls peuvent lui offrir un centre correctionnel communautaire ou un centre résidentiel communautaire ». elle a également fondé sa décision sur l’avis du scc selon lequel le fait de permettre à m. bird de vivre avec sa famille, comme il l’avait proposé, lui donnerait vraisemblablement accès à de l’alcool et l’exposerait à un risque de récidive. [100] le scc a approuvé le choix du centre oskana pour la mise en œuvre de l’assignation à rési- dence d’une durée de 180 jours prévue dans l’osld. comme je l’ai indiqué précédemment, m. bird s’y trouvait déjà, puisqu’il y purgeait le reste de sa peine d’emprisonnement en liberté d’office. ces conditions de logement n’ont donc pas changé lorsqu’il est devenu assujetti à son osld. autrement dit, on a ordonné à m. bird de rester pendant 180 jours là où il était, en dépit du changement de son statut. [101] le centre oskana est un établissement ré- sidentiel communautaire ou, plus précisément, un « centre correctionnel communautaire », car il appar- tient au scc et est administré par celui-ci. il héberge des personnes qui font l’objet d’une surveillance de l’état, y compris certaines qui bénéficient d’une libé- ration conditionnelle, et d’autres qui sont absentes de la prison parce qu’elles bénéficient d’une permission de sortir ou sont en liberté d’office. [102] all residents at oskana centre are subject to a set of standard rules. the crown conceded in [102] tous les résidents du centre oskana doivent respecter un ensemble de règles usuelles dans [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 457 the agreed statement of facts entered at trial that mr. bird’s status as a long- term offender — someone who had already completed his carceral sentence — did not exempt him from the standard rules. the record on appeal does not include descriptions of day-to- day conditions at oskana centre. the parties agree, however, that mr. bird was subject to a cur- few rule. this involved a night curfew as well as a requirement that residents be at oskana centre from 11:00 am to 1:00 pm. l’exposé conjoint des faits déposé au procès, le mi- nistère public a reconnu que le statut de délinquant à contrôler de m. bird — quelqu’un qui avait déjà purgé sa peine d’emprisonnement — ne le sous- trayait pas aux règles usuelles. le dossier d’appel ne contient pas de descriptions des conditions courantes au centre oskana, mais les parties conviennent que m. bird devait respecter un couvre- feu, ce qui com- portait des heures de rentrée le soir et une obligation de se trouver au centre oskana de 11 h à 13 h. [103] on january 28, 2015, mr. bird left oskana centre and did not return. police arrested him on april 16, 2015 in regina and charged him under s 7533(1) for failing to comply with the residency condition of his ltso. at trial, mr. bird was ac- quitted; the judge permitted mr. bird’s collateral attack and accepted his s. 7 charter challenge to the residency condition. on appeal, the court held that the judge had erred in permitting mr. bird’s collateral attack, and mr. bird was convicted. [103] le 28 janvier 2015, m. bird a quitté le centre oskana et n’y est pas retourné. les policiers l’ont arrêté le 16 avril 2015 à regina et l’ont accusé, en ap- plication du par 7533(1), de ne pas s’être conformé à l’assignation à résidence prévue dans l’osld en cause. au procès, m. bird a été acquitté; le juge a permis la contestation incidente de m. bird et a fait droit à son argument fondé sur l’art. 7 de la charte selon lequel l’assignation à résidence était incons- titutionnelle. en appel, la cour a conclu que le juge avait eu tort de permettre la contestation incidente de m. bird, et celui-ci a été déclaré coupable. iii analysis iii analyse a collateral attack a contestation incidente [104] a central tension animates cases of collateral attack — the tension between an accused person’s right to challenge an administrative order alleged to be invalid, and the legislature’s choice to have certain matters assessed by administrative bodies, and not by courts (maybrun, at para 42). this tension informs the interpretive exercise itself; when considering legislative intent, the trial judge must presume “that the legislature did not intend to deprive a person to whom an order is directed of an opportunity to assert his or her rights” (maybrun, at para 52). [104] une tension fondamentale règne dans les affaires de contestation incidente — soit la tension entre le droit de la personne accusée de contester une ordonnance administrative qui serait invalide et le choix du législateur de faire examiner certaines ques- tions par des organismes administratifs, et non par les tribunaux (maybrun, par 42). cette tension est le fondement de l’exercice d’interprétation même. en effet, lorsqu’il examine l’intention du législateur, le juge du procès doit présumer « que [ce dernier] n’a pas voulu priver une personne visée par une ordon- nance de l’opportunité de faire valoir ses droits » (maybrun, par 52). [105] the five factors that can assist a trial judge’s assessment of a collateral attack are: (1) the wording of the statute from which the power to issue the order derives; (2) the purpose of the legislation; (3) the availability of an appeal; (4) the nature of the attack given the appeal tribunal’s expertise or raison d’être; [105] les cinq facteurs qui peuvent aider le juge du procès à évaluer le bien- fondé d’une contestation incidente sont les suivants : (1) les termes de la loi dont découle le pouvoir de rendre l’ordonnance; (2) l’objectif de la loi; (3) l’existence d’un droit d’appel; (4) la nature de la contestation, eu égard à 458 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. and (5) the penalty on a conviction for failing to com- ply with the order (maybrun, at paras. 45 and 51-52; klippert, at paras 13-14). as noted in klippert, at paras. 13-14, these factors are not to be taken as a strict test but instead “might be helpful to consider” and “are not necessarily exhaustive but rather consti- tute various indicia which might be of assistance in determining the legislature’s intention”. this means that this is not a scorecard assessment. the trial judge may find that one factor dictates the outcome. [106] for the first time, this appeal provides this court with the opportunity to apply maybrun to a collateral attack that puts the defendant’s charter rights in issue in light of the very real possibility of imprisonment. in neither maybrun nor klippert did the defendants attack administrative orders on charter grounds. nor were the defendants in those cases facing potential jail time for their breaches, let alone the possibility of 10 years in prison. in my view, these key facets of mr. bird’s case are critical to its assessment. when these constitutional and carceral dimensions are examined, i conclude that factors (3) and (5) in particular — whether an administrative appeal is available and the penalty on a conviction for failing to comply with the order — reveal that parliament did not intend to bar mr. bird’s ability to challenge the constitutional validity of a condition whose breach carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. l’expertise et à la raison d’être de l’instance d’ap- pel; et (5) la sanction imposable pour défaut d’avoir respecté l’ordonnance (maybrun, par. 45 et 51-52; klippert, par 13-14). comme la cour l’a souligné aux par. 13 et 14 de l’arrêt klippert, ces facteurs ne doivent pas être considérés comme un test strict, bien qu’il « [puisse] être utile de [les] considérer », et ils « ne sont pas nécessairement exhaustifs mais constituent plutôt divers indices susceptibles de nous aider à cerner l’intention du législateur ». cela signi- fie qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une appréciation de facteurs selon une carte de pointage. le juge du procès peut conclure qu’un seul facteur dicte l’issue de la cause. [106] le présent pourvoi donne pour la première fois à la cour l’occasion d’appliquer l’arrêt maybrun à une contestation incidente qui met en cause les droits que la charte garantit au défendeur compte tenu de la possibilité très réelle d’emprisonnement. ni dans maybrun ni dans klippert les défendeurs n’ont- ils contesté les ordonnances administratives pour des motifs fondés sur la charte. dans ces affaires, le défaut de se conformer des défendeurs ne les exposait pas non plus à une peine de prison, encore moins à la possibilité d’un emprisonnement de 10 ans. à mon avis, ces aspects clés de la cause de m. bird sont es- sentiels à son appréciation. lorsque l’on examine ces dimensions constitutionnelle et carcérale, je conclus que les facteurs 3 et 5 en particulier — soit la question de l’existence d’un droit d’appel devant une instance administrative et celle de la sanction imposable pour défaut d’avoir respecté l’ordonnance — révèlent que le législateur n’a pas voulu priver m. bird de la pos- sibilité de contester la validité constitutionnelle d’une condition dont la violation le rend passible d’une peine maximale de 10 ans d’emprisonnement. (1) wording and purpose of the legislation (1) libellé et objet de la loi (facteurs 1 et 2) (factors (1) and (2)) [107] i agree with the majority that the broad au- thority conferred on the parole board by s 1341(2) of the corrections and conditional release act, sc 1992, c. 20 (“ccra”), militates against collat- eral attacks on the board’s ltso decisions. [107] je conviens avec les juges majoritaires que le vaste pouvoir que confère le par 1341(2) de la loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, lc 1992, c. 20 (« lscmlsc »), à la commission milite contre les contestations inci- dentes des osld qu’elle rend. [108] however, i disagree that it is at odds with the purpose of the long- term offender regime to permit [108] toutefois, je n’adhère pas à la thèse se- lon laquelle le fait d’autoriser m. bird à contester [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 459 mr. bird’s collateral attack. in particular, i impute no strategic motivation to mr. bird’s breach of his resi- dency condition and i reject the notion that allowing mr. bird to advance his constitutional challenge will inspire or perpetuate a “breach first, challenge later” attitude among long- term offenders. the implication that mr. bird’s decision to leave oskana centre was a deliberate choice to “breach first, challenge later” is not supported by the record, and this court is not in a position to speculate about mr. bird’s reason- ing and motives at the time he left oskana centre. the facts are simply that mr. bird did not challenge his residency condition when it was imposed, left oskana centre, was arrested, charged, and held in custody for approximately 10 months awaiting trial on the charge of breaching his residency condition. his constitutional challenge to that condition was put forward as his defence to a charge that carried a possible sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. in that regard, mr. bird is like many accused persons who challenge the constitutionality of state action only after they have been charged. in my view, the manner in which this court [109] conceives of mr. bird’s departure from oskana cen- tre has a critical impact on the maybrun analysis. framing mr. bird’s conduct as “breaching first, chal- lenging later” shifts the focus from whether par- liament intended to allow long- term offenders to challenge ltso conditions when charged with their breach, which is the correct question, to whether parliament intended to permit ltso breaches com- mitted for the purpose of challenging the conditions breached. of course parliament would not intend to make collateral attacks available to those who flout their conditions in order to challenge them. incidemment l’osld est incompatible avec l’objet du régime applicable aux délinquants à contrôler. plus particulièrement, je n’impute aucun objectif stratégique à l’omission de m. bird de se conformer à son assignation à résidence et je rejette la notion que de l’autoriser à présenter une contestation constitu- tionnelle inciterait ou encouragerait les délinquants à contrôler à « contrevenir d’abord [à l’osld dont ils font l’objet], pour ensuite [la] contester ». l’inférence que la décision de m. bird de quitter le centre oskana constituait un choix délibéré de « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester » n’est pas étayée par le dossier, et la cour ne peut pas se livrer à des conjectures sur le raisonnement et les motifs qui étaient les siens au moment où il a quitté le centre oskana. les faits sont simplement les suivants : m. bird n’a pas contesté son assignation à résidence au moment où elle lui a été imposée; ensuite, il a quitté le centre oskana avant d’être arrêté, accusé et maintenu en détention durant environ 10 mois en attendant de subir un procès re- lativement à l’accusation d’avoir contrevenu à son assignation à résidence. l’inconstitutionnalité de cette assignation a été invoquée comme moyen de défense contre une accusation pouvant entraîner une peine de 10 ans d’emprisonnement. à cet égard, m. bird est dans la même situation qu’un grand nombre de per- sonnes qui contestent la constitutionnalité d’un acte de l’état seulement après qu’elles ont été accusées. [109] à mon avis, la manière dont la cour conçoit le départ de m. bird du centre oskana a une in- cidence cruciale sur l’analyse prescrite par l’arrêt maybrun. dire que la conduite de m. bird a consisté à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester » met l’accent sur la question de savoir si le législa- teur a voulu permettre les contraventions aux osld commises dans le but de contester les conditions enfreintes plutôt que sur celle de savoir si le légis- lateur a voulu permettre aux délinquants à contrôler de contester les conditions de leur osld lorsqu’ils sont accusés d’y avoir contrevenu, la question qu’il convient de se poser le législateur ne peut évi- demment pas avoir eu l’intention de permettre les contestations incidentes pour ceux qui font fi de leurs conditions dans le but de les contester. it is crucial to recognize that it is breaches [110] of residency conditions, and not collateral attacks il est crucial de reconnaître que ce sont les [110] contraventions aux assignations à résidence, et non 460 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. on those conditions, that pose a risk to society. this court ought not equate permitting mr. bird’s de- fence with perpetuating the dangers associated with breaches of ltso residency conditions. anyone sub- ject to an ltso residency condition can breach that condition and put the community at risk — whether or not that person is diligently pursuing the appro- priate avenues for challenging that condition, and whether or not that person ultimately attempts to challenge that condition in response to a criminal charge. just as this court cannot make assumptions about mr. bird’s rationale for leaving oskana centre, it cannot presume that allowing mr. bird to challenge the constitutionality of his residency condition will motivate other long- term offenders to “breach first, challenge later”. [111] finally, it must not be overlooked that an offender who breaches an ltso condition risks up to 10 years’ imprisonment for that breach, as well as a period of pre- trial custody. (as noted above, mr. bird’s pre- trial custody lasted 10 months, a pe- riod notably longer than the 180 days he was ordered to reside at oskana centre.) it is difficult to imagine that a long- term offender would assume these risks because of the prospect of challenging the residency condition at a later stage. les contestations incidentes de ces conditions, qui présentent un risque pour la société. la cour ne doit pas confondre le fait d’autoriser m. bird à se pré- valoir d’un moyen de défense avec la perpétuation des dangers liés aux contraventions aux assignations à résidence dont sont assorties les osld. toute personne assujettie à une assignation à résidence prévue dans une osld peut enfreindre cette as- signation et exposer la collectivité à un risque — que cette personne utilise diligemment ou non les recours appropriés pour contester cette condition, et qu’elle finisse ou non par tenter de la contester à l’encontre d’une accusation criminelle. tout comme la cour ne peut pas émettre d’hypothèse quant à la raison pour laquelle m. bird a quitté le centre oskana, elle ne peut tenir pour acquis que le fait d’autoriser m. bird à contester la constitutionnalité de son assignation à résidence motiverait d’autres délinquants à contrôler à « contrevenir d’abord, pour ensuite contester ». [111] enfin, il ne faut pas oublier que le délinquant qui enfreint une condition énoncée dans une osld est passible d’une peine maximale de 10 ans d’em- prisonnement pour cette infraction, de même que d’une période de détention avant le procès. (comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, la détention avant le procès de m. bird a duré 10 mois, une période nettement plus longue que celle de 180 jours à laquelle il avait été assigné à résider au centre oskana). il est diffi- cile d’imaginer qu’un délinquant à contrôler puisse prendre de tels risques en raison de l’éventualité d’une contestation de l’assignation à résidence à une étape ultérieure. (2) availability of an appeal (factor (3)) (2) existence d’un droit d’appel (facteur 3) [112] the majority concludes that mr. bird had three available options for challenging the residency condition. he could have asked the board to recon- sider the order that enabled his placement at a com- munity correctional centre like oskana centre; he could have applied for judicial review of the board’s order in federal court; and he could have made an application for habeas corpus. the majority con- cludes that, “these mechanisms, considered together, constitute an effective means” to challenge the ad- ministrative order, and thus evince legislative intent [112] les juges majoritaires estiment que m. bird disposait de trois avenues de contestation de l’as- signation à résidence. il aurait pu demander à la commission de réexaminer l’ordonnance ayant permis son placement dans un centre correctionnel communautaire comme le centre oskana, présenter une demande de contrôle judiciaire de l’ordonnance de la commission à la cour fédérale et présenter une demande d’habeas corpus. les juges majoritaires es- timent que « ces mécanismes constituent, ensemble, un moyen efficace  » de contester l’ordonnance [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 461 to bar a collateral attack like mr. bird’s (majority reasons, at para 72). [113] i am not convinced that these options, ei- ther individually or in concert, provide effective re- course for adjudicating mr. bird’s charter claims to the point of illustrating a legislative intent to bar mr. bird from arguing that the condition for which he faces a criminal charge is unconstitutional. my explanation follows. administrative, et témoignent donc d’une intention du législateur d’empêcher une contestation incidente comme celle de m. bird (motifs des juges majori- taires, par 72). [113] je ne suis pas convaincue que ces avenues offrent, ensemble ou séparément, un moyen efficace de statuer sur les prétentions de m. bird fondées sur la charte au point d’illustrer une intention du législateur de l’empêcher de faire valoir que la condi- tion pour laquelle il fait l’objet d’une accusation criminelle est inconstitutionnelle. voici comment j’explique mon point de vue. (a) writing to the parole board a) écrire à la commission des libérations con­ i begin with the possibility of internal review. [114] the residency condition in question was set by the board pursuant to s 1341 of the ccra. although there is an appeal division of the board, the parties agree that the statute provides no recourse to that body for long- term offenders who wish to challenge their ltso conditions. in maybrun and klippert, the defendants had [115] recourse to have the orders they were challenging reviewed by an appeal tribunal established precisely for the purpose. those tribunals, by virtue of their enabling statutes, could issue a wide range of reme- dies, were distinct from the original decision- maker, and were governed by carefully crafted procedures and defined routes for further review. it was clear in each of those cases that law- makers intended those subject to qualifying administrative orders to pursue challenges via the specified administrative appeal structure. ditionnelles j’aborde d’abord la possibilité d’un exa- [114] men interne l’assignation à résidence en cause en l’espèce a été prescrite par la commission en vertu de l’art 1341 de la lscmlsc. bien que la commission soit dotée d’une section d’appel, les parties conviennent que la loi ne prévoit pas de re- cours devant elle pour les délinquants à contrôler qui souhaitent contester les conditions de leur osld. [115] dans les arrêts maybrun et klippert, les dé- fendeurs disposaient d’un recours leur permettant de faire examiner les ordonnances contestées par des tribunaux d’appel créés précisément à cette fin. en vertu de leur loi habilitante, ces tribunaux pou- vaient accorder une vaste gamme de réparations, et ils étaient distincts du décideur initial, en plus d’être régis par des procédures soigneusement élaborées et par des moyens définis ouvrant la voie à un nouvel examen. il était manifeste dans chacune de ces af- faires que le législateur voulait inciter les personnes visées par des ordonnances administratives à faire valoir leurs contestations dans le cadre du processus d’appel administratif précisé. [116] in lieu of any comparable appeal process, individuals like mr. bird are limited to applying to the board to have their ltso conditions removed or varied under s 1341(4) of the ccra. in contrast to the appeal tribunals in maybrun and klippert, the board cannot issue a wide range of remedies, is not distinct from the original decision- maker, and [116] ne disposant de rien de comparable, les per- sonnes comme m. bird ne peuvent que présenter une demande à la commission en vue de faire annuler ou modifier les conditions de leur osld en vertu du par 1341(4) de la lscmlsc. contrairement aux tribunaux d’appel en cause dans les arrêts maybrun et klippert, la commission ne peut pas accorder 462 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. does not form part of a specified appeal structure. mr. bird’s option was to ask the board to reconsider its own residency condition. [117] as the majority notes, the board notified mr. bird of this possibility in a letter just over five months before his ltso came into effect. he was advised: you may apply to the parole board of canada to be re- lieved of any of your conditions or request that the board vary the terms of any of your conditions of long term supervision order. upon receipt of your application and an updated report from your parole officer, with whom you should discuss your request, your file will be referred to the board for voting and subsequently you will be ad- vised of the outcome. to ensure that your request receives complete consideration, please fully document the reasons for your request. une vaste gamme de réparations, n’est pas distincte du décideur initial et n’opère pas dans le cadre d’un processus d’appel précisé. m. bird n’avait d’autres choix que de demander à la commission de réexami- ner l’assignation à résidence qu’elle avait elle­ même ordonnée. [117] comme le soulignent les juges majoritaires, la commission a avisé m. bird de cette possibilité dans une lettre un peu plus de cinq mois avant l’en- trée en vigueur de l’osld dont il fait l’objet. on lui a donné l’avis qui suit : [traduction] vous pouvez présenter une demande à la commission des libérations conditionnelles du canada en vue d’être soustrait à l’une ou l’autre de vos conditions, ou pour lui demander de modifier l’une ou l’autre des condi- tions de l’ordonnance de surveillance de longue durée dont vous faites l’objet. dès réception de votre demande et d’un rapport à jour de votre agent de libération conditionnelle, avec qui vous devriez discuter de votre demande, votre dossier sera transmis à la commission qui tiendra un vote. par la suite, vous serez informé du résultat du processus en question. afin que votre demande puisse faire l’objet d’un examen complet, veuillez préciser les raisons qui la motivent. (ar, vol. ii, at p. 67) (da, vol. ii, p. 67) [118] discretionary conditions can be imposed by the board under s 1341(2) of the ccra where the board “considers” them to be “reasonable and nec- essary in order to protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of the offender”. as per the letter mr. bird received, and given the wording of s 1341, a reconsideration of the im- pugned residency condition under s 1341(4) would entail members of the board voting on whether they still considered the condition to be reasonable and necessary to protect society and facilitate reintegra- tion. the letter mr. bird received also reveals that the members’ votes would be informed by mr. bird’s application and an updated report from his parole officer. [118] en vertu du par 1341(2) de la lscmlsc, la commission peut imposer des conditions discré- tionnaires si elle « juge » qu’elles sont « raisonnables et nécessaires pour protéger la société et favoriser la réinsertion sociale du délinquant ». comme l’indique la lettre qu’a reçue m. bird, et compte tenu du libellé de l’art 1341, un réexamen de l’assignation à rési- dence contestée en vertu du par 1341(4) supposerait la tenue d’un vote des membres de la commission pour déterminer s’ils jugent toujours la condition raisonnable et nécessaire pour protéger la société et favoriser la réinsertion sociale. la lettre qu’a reçue m. bird indique également que le vote des membres reposerait sur la demande de m. bird et sur un rap- port à jour de son agent de libération conditionnelle. [119] the question before us is whether the pos- sibility for reconsideration under s 1341(4) of the ccra indicates parliament’s intention that mr. bird’s charter defence at trial be barred. it is inadequate to [119] la question dont nous sommes saisis en l’espèce est celle de savoir si la possibilité qu’un réexamen soit mené en vertu du par 1341(4) de la lscmlsc indique une intention du législateur [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 463 conclude as much simply because reconsideration by the board is possible; it must provide an effective av- enue for adjudicating mr. bird’s claim and providing a suitable remedy. while i agree with the majority that s 1341(4) offers some recourse to someone like mr. bird, i disagree that it is effective to the point of signalling legislative intent to have charter claims adjudicated exclusively by a vote of the members of the board upon a request for reconsideration. i come to this conclusion for the following three reasons. [120] first, the simplicity of the board’s recon- sideration process — a paper application followed by a vote — does not lend itself to the adjudication of potentially complex constitutional questions. by virtue of the decision being made by vote, it seems that mr. bird would not receive anything resembling a set of reasons explaining the success or failure of the charter claim. further, as i have already noted, it is agreed before this court that parliament declined to allow claims like mr. bird’s to be considered by the appeal division of the board, even after a recon- sideration under s 1341(4) occurs. d’empêcher m. bird de présenter à son procès un moyen de défense fondée sur la charte. on ne sau- rait tirer une telle conclusion simplement parce la commission peut procéder à un réexamen; cette possibilité doit offrir un moyen efficace de statuer sur la prétention de m. bird et d’accorder une répa- ration adéquate. bien que je convienne avec les juges majoritaires que le par 1341(4) offre un certain recours à une personne dans la situation de m. bird, je ne crois pas qu’il s’agisse d’un recours efficace au point d’indiquer une intention du législateur de faire en sorte que les demandes fondées sur la charte soient tranchées exclusivement au moyen d’un vote des membres de la commission dans le cadre d’une demande de réexamen. je tire cette conclusion pour les trois raisons suivantes. [120] premièrement, la simplicité du processus de réexamen mené par la commission — une de- mande papier suivie d’un vote — ne se prête pas à la résolution de questions constitutionnelles qui peuvent être complexes. puisque la décision serait prise par un vote, il semble que m. bird ne rece- vrait rien qui ressemble à des motifs expliquant le succès ou l’échec de sa contestation fondée sur la charte. de plus, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, les parties ont convenu devant la cour que le législateur n’a pas voulu permettre l’examen des prétentions comme celles de m. bird par la section d’appel de la commission, même après un réexamen mené en vertu du par 1341(4). [121] second, it is not clear how the board is intended to take charter claims into account. the board’s scope for setting conditions as part of an ltso is limited to the question of whether a given condition is reasonable and necessary to protect society and facilitate reintegration. assuming that board members correctly identify and consider the relevant charter considerations when voting on the reasonableness and necessity of an impugned con- dition, the ccra provides no guidance on how such charter considerations must be assessed against the factors relating to protecting society and reintegra- tion. if mr. bird’s circumstances at oskana centre constituted an arbitrary detention, for example, how would this weigh in the board’s reconsideration if there were other significant public safety and societal [121] deuxièmement, on ne sait pas de quelle ma- nière la commission est censée prendre en compte les prétentions fondées sur la charte. sa compétence pour établir les conditions dont il convient d’assortir une osld se limite à l’examen du caractère raison- nable et nécessaire de celles-ci pour protéger la so- ciété et favoriser la réinsertion sociale du délinquant. supposons que les membres de la commission cernent et examinent correctement les considérations pertinentes relatives à la charte lorsqu’ils votent sur ce caractère d’une condition contestée, la lscmlsc n’indique pas comment ces considérations relatives à la charte doivent être évaluées par rapport aux facteurs ayant trait à la protection de la société et à la réinsertion sociale. si, par exemple, la situation de m. bird au centre oskana constituait une détention 464 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. reintegration concerns at play? would board mem- bers simply need to consider mr. bird’s claim? or would a formal analysis under s. 9 of the charter be required? given the process is by vote, it would in any event be impossible to discern which approach had been followed. [122] while the board might be equipped to con- sider questions of law and make orders that respect the charter, that alone does not in my view prove legislative intent to confine charter claims like mr.  bird’s to adjudication by the board. to find otherwise would be to categorically tip the balance in favour of barring collateral attacks in all cases where the administrative body is capable of deciding questions of law, even if there is no indication in the enabling statute that the legislature intended for that body to be the only body which could deal with the questions at issue. such a categorical conclusion is particularly troublesome where, as here, mr. bird alleges that the administrative body misinterpreted its own authority under the enabling statute when it imposed the impugned condition in the first place. here, a reconsideration by the board would not be a review on a question of law by an independent body, like an appeal, but a reconsideration by the board of its own decision on constitutional grounds. arbitraire quel poids cela aurait-il dans le réexamen de la commission si d’autres préoccupations im- portantes sur le plan de la sécurité publique et de la réinsertion sociale étaient en jeu? les membres de la commission pourraient- ils simplement examiner la prétention de m. bird? ou faudrait-il qu’ils pro- cèdent à une analyse formelle fondée sur l’art. 9 de la charte? puisqu’il s’agit d’un processus de vote, il serait de toute façon impossible de savoir quelle méthode aurait été adoptée. [122] certes, la commission pourrait examiner des questions de droit et rendre des ordonnances qui respectent la charte; cet élément à lui seul n’établit toutefois pas, selon moi, une intention du législateur de confiner la présentation des demandes fondées sur la charte comme celles de m. bird à la commission. conclure autrement reviendrait à faire catégorique- ment pencher la balance du côté de l’interdiction des contestations incidentes dans tous les cas où l’organisme administratif est en mesure de trancher des questions de droit, même si sa loi habilitante ne contient aucune disposition indiquant que le légis- lateur a voulu que cet organisme soit le seul habilité à statuer sur les questions en litige. une conclusion aussi catégorique serait particulièrement troublante dans les cas où, comme en l’espèce, m. bird soutient que l’organisme administratif a mal interprété le pouvoir que lui confère sa loi habilitante lorsqu’il a imposé la condition contestée au départ. en l’es- pèce, un réexamen par la commission constituerait non pas un examen d’une question de droit par un organisme indépendant, comme en appel, mais un réexamen par la commission de sa propre décision pour des motifs constitutionnels. [123] third, it is not apparent that the board would receive the requisite information to properly adjudi- cate charter claims in the course of a reconsider- ation. in reading s 1341 and the board’s letter to mr. bird together, it is clear that the parole officer’s report plays a key role in the reconsideration process. in all likelihood, the officer’s report will not be pre- pared with a view to presenting all facts necessary to assist the board with its evaluation of a charter claim raised by the offender. rather, it is likely to focus on questions of safety, conduct and reinte- gration. in my view, this underlines the factual and [123] troisièmement, il ne semble pas que la com- mission recevrait les renseignements nécessaires pour statuer correctement quant aux prétentions fon- dées sur la charte dans le cadre d’un réexamen. en effet, il ressort clairement de la lecture con jointe de l’art 1341 et de la lettre qu’a envoyée la commis- sion à m. bird que le rapport de l’agent de libération conditionnelle joue un rôle clé dans le processus de réexamen. selon toute vraisemblance, ce rap- port ne vise pas à présenter tous les faits nécessaires pour aider la commission dans son appréciation de la prétention fondée sur la charte que soulève [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 465 case- specific nature of the question before the board when faced with an application for reconsideration under s 1341(4). that factual inquiry is distinct from the more substantive legal questions posed by charter claims. [124] for those reasons, i conclude that parliament did not intend the internal review process to be an adequate proxy for an appeal process designed to address charter claims like mr. bird’s to the exclu- sion of courts. my conclusion in this regard brings into sharp focus the detrimental impact on mr. bird’s ability to make full answer and defence if he is barred from challenging the constitutionality of the order he is charged with breaching (maybrun, at para 61). [125] i note here that, while the board is clearly equipped to consider the subject matter of mr. bird’s claim (the ltso residency condition) under s 1341, for the reasons just stated i am not convinced that its raison d’être under s 1341(4) is to adjudicate complex charter claims. accordingly, i would not give the same weight to factor (4) of the maybrun framework that the majority does. le délinquant. il risque plutôt de porter principa- lement sur des questions de sécurité, de conduite et de réinsertion. à mon avis, cela fait ressortir le caractère factuel et particulier de la question soumise à la commission lorsqu’il s’agit d’une demande de réexamen présentée en application du par 1341(4). or, cet examen factuel diffère de l’examen des ques- tions juridiques ayant trait davantage au fond que soulèvent les demandes fondées sur la charte. [124] pour ces motifs, je conclus que le législateur n’a pas voulu que le processus d’examen interne tienne lieu de substitut adéquat à un processus d’ap- pel permettant de statuer sur les prétentions fondées sur la charte comme celles de m. bird à l’exclusion de l’examen mené par des tribunaux. ma conclusion à cet égard met clairement en évidence l’effet pré- judiciable sur la capacité de m. bird de se défendre de façon pleine et entière s’il ne peut pas contester la constitutionnalité de l’ordonnance à laquelle il est accusé d’avoir contrevenu (maybrun, par 61). [125] je souligne ici que, bien que la commission ait clairement compétence pour examiner l’objet de la demande de m. bird (l’assignation à résidence dont est assortie l’osld) en vertu de l’art 1341, je ne suis pas convaincue, pour les motifs que je viens d’énon- cer, que sa raison d’être au titre du par 1341(4) est de statuer sur des demandes complexes fondées sur la charte. par conséquent, je n’accorderais pas au facteur 4 du cadre d’analyse énoncé dans maybrun le même poids que lui accordent les juges majoritaires. (b) applying for judicial review in the federal b) présenter une demande de contrôle judiciaire court à la cour fédérale [126] the crown submits, and the majority ac- cepts, that mr. bird had access, albeit imperfect, to judicial review by the federal court. had mr. bird asked the board to reconsider the residency condi- tion and been dissatisfied with the board’s response, he could have sought judicial review by the federal court pursuant to ss. 18 and 18.1 of the federal courts act, rsc 1985, c f-7. he could also have sought judicial review of the original ltso resi- dency condition itself. [126] le ministère public soutient, et les juges majoritaires en conviennent, que m. bird avait accès, quoique d’une manière imparfaite, à un contrôle judiciaire par la cour fédérale. en effet, si m. bird avait demandé à la commission de réexaminer l’as- signation à résidence et avait été insatisfait de la réponse de celle-ci, suivant les art. 18 et 18.1 de la loi sur les cours fédérales, lrc 1985, c. f-7, il aurait pu demander un contrôle judiciaire par la cour fédérale. il aurait également pu demander le contrôle judiciaire de l’assignation à résidence de l’osld initiale elle- même. 466 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. i agree with the majority that even if mr. bird [127] had followed all of the appropriate steps to apply for judicial review, “the reality remains that a de- cision by the federal court might not have been released before the majority, if not all, of mr. bird’s residency condition had been completed” (major- ity reasons, at para. 60; see also may v. ferndale institution, 2005 scc 82, [2005] 3 scr 809, at para. 69; normandin v. canada (attorney general), 2005 fca 345, [2006] 2 fcr 112, at para 2). this reality ultimately undermines the effectiveness of that recourse. even though a reviewing court is com- petent to consider whether an administrative order is charter-compliant, if an ordered period of what is determined to be unlawful detention has expired, the adequacy of any available remedies likely falls short. [128] i add this. i agree with mr. bird and certain interveners that it is questionable that someone in mr. bird’s circumstances would have the resources to secure counsel or the capacity to be self- represented for the purpose of navigating the judicial review process mr.  bird received no notification from the board about the possibility of judicial review. mr. bird only obtained counsel in his criminal pro- ceedings once a judge determined that his case was complex and raised important constitutional ques- tions; no such opportunity is likely to have been available to mr. bird on judicial review. [127] je suis d’accord avec les juges majoritaires pour dire que, même si m. bird avait suivi toutes les étapes appropriées en vue de présenter une demande de contrôle judiciaire, « la décision de la cour fédé- rale aurait pu ne pas être rendue avant que la période de validité de l’assignation à résidence imposée à m. bird soit en grande partie, voire totalement, écou- lée » (motifs des juges majoritaires, par. 60; voir aussi may c. établissement ferndale, 2005 csc 82, [2005] 3 rcs 809, par. 69; normandin c. canada (procureur général), 2005 caf 345, [2006] 2 rcf. 112, par 2). en fin de compte, cette réalité mine l’efficacité de ce recours. de fait, même si une cour de révision a compétence pour examiner la question de la conformité d’une ordonnance administrative à la charte, si la période ordonnée de ce qui est jugé constituer une détention illégale est expirée, le caractère adéquat des recours disponibles est vrai- semblablement insuffisant. [128] j’ajouterai ceci. comme m. bird et certains intervenants, j’estime que l’on peut douter de la ca- pacité financière d’une personne dans la situation de m. bird de retenir les services d’un avocat ou de sa capacité d’agir pour son propre compte afin de navi- guer dans le processus de contrôle judiciaire. m. bird n’a reçu aucun avis de la part de la commission au sujet de la possibilité d’un contrôle judiciaire. il a par ailleurs obtenu les services d’un avocat dans le cadre de son procès criminel seulement après que le juge eut décidé que son affaire était complexe et sou- levait des questions constitutionnelles importantes. or, m. bird n’aurait vraisemblablement pas eu cette chance dans le cadre d’un contrôle judiciaire. [129] these considerations raise important ac- cess to justice concerns. moreover, they illustrate the key distinction between a legislature laying out a clear, internal statutory avenue of appeal (as in maybrun and klippert) versus simply expecting in- dividuals to navigate the judicial review process alone. a clear statutory appeal process indicates a legislature’s intention to have matters adjudicated by the designated body or bodies, according to spe- cific, cognizable steps. by contrast, the absence of such an appeal process leads to no such conclusion. for these reasons, i conclude that the availability of judicial review evinces no specific intention on the [129] ces considérations soulèvent d’importantes préoccupations sur le plan de l’accès à la justice. elles illustrent en outre la distinction fondamentale entre l’énoncé clair par le législateur d’un moyen d’appel interne (comme dans les affaires maybrun et klippert) et le fait de simplement s’attendre à ce que les personnes naviguent seules dans le processus de contrôle judiciaire. un processus d’appel clairement prévu par la loi révèle une intention du législateur de faire trancher les questions par l’organisme ou les organismes désignés, selon des étapes précises et reconnues. en revanche, l’absence d’un tel processus d’appel ne permet pas de tirer pareille conclusion. [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 467 part of parliament to bar constitutional challenges like mr bird’s. pour ces motifs, je conclus que la disponibilité du recours en contrôle judiciaire ne témoigne d’au- cune intention précise du législateur d’empêcher les contestations constitutionnelles comme celle de m bird. (c) applying for habeas corpus c) présenter une demande d’habeas corpus [130] finally, the crown suggests, and the majority accepts, that the availability of habeas corpus out- side of the ccra carries significant weight in the analysis. i disagree. even accepting the majority’s assumptions that parliament can be taken to know of habeas corpus and that it would have been available to mr. bird does not lead me to the conclusion that the ccra demonstrates an intent to bar mr. bird’s challenge to his residency condition at trial or to prescribe habeas corpus as the forum for raising that challenge. [131] the independent availability of habeas cor­ pus outside of the ccra simply cannot demonstrate that, through the ccra, parliament has “set up a complete procedure, independent of any right to ap- ply to a superior court for review” (maybrun, at para. 57 (emphasis added)), or “set up internal mech- anisms and establish[ed] appropriate forums to ena- ble    individuals to assert their rights” (maybrun, at para 27). had parliament set up such an effective procedure or mechanism within the ccra, it may well have weighed against allowing mr. bird to raise his constitutional challenge to his ltso condition at trial. however, as set out above, no such effec- tive internal procedure or mechanism exists here to qualify as the only prescribed forum for raising that challenge. [130] enfin, le ministère public soutient, et les juges majoritaires en conviennent, que la possibilité d’intenter un recours en habeas corpus à l’extérieur du cadre de la lscmlsc revêt beaucoup d’impor- tance dans l’analyse. je ne suis pas d’accord. même si je retenais les présomptions des juges majori- taires selon lesquelles le législateur peut être réputé connaître le recours en habeas corpus et m. bird aurait pu s’en prévaloir, cela ne m’amènerait pas à conclure que la lscmlsc témoigne de l’intention d’empêcher m. bird de contester son assignation à résidence au procès ou de prévoir que l’habeas corpus constitue le mécanisme indiqué pour cette contestation. [131] la possibilité distincte d’intenter un re- cours en habeas corpus à l’extérieur du cadre de la lscmlsc ne démontre tout simplement pas que, par le truchement de cette loi, le législateur a « [mis] en place une procédure complète, indépendante du droit éventuel de recourir à la révision en cour supé- rieure » (maybrun, par. 57 (je souligne)), ou « [mis] en place des mécanismes internes et [prévu] des forums appropriés pour permettre [aux] personnes de faire valoir leurs droits » dans ce contexte (maybrun, par 27). si le législateur avait mis en place une pro- cédure ou un mécanisme efficace de ce genre dans la lscmlsc, cela aurait fort bien pu militer contre le fait de permettre à m. bird de contester la consti- tutionnalité de la condition de son osld durant son procès. or, comme je l’ai expliqué précédemment, la lscmlsc ne prévoit aucun mécanisme ou procé- dure efficace susceptible d’être la seule voie prescrite pour présenter cette contestation. in this vein, it is noteworthy that both a chal- [132] lenge to an ltso residency condition in a criminal trial and an application for habeas corpus represent external challenges to the condition; like the long- term offender who challenges his or her residency [132] dans la même veine, il importe de signaler que tant la contestation dans le cadre d’un procès criminel d’une assignation à résidence prévue dans une osld qu’une demande d’habeas corpus consti- tuent des contestations externes de la condition. à 468 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. condition in the course of a criminal trial, the long- term offender who pursues habeas corpus in lieu of reconsideration by the board also disregards the “administrative appeal process” contemplated by the ccra. given that bringing an application for habeas corpus and challenging an ltso condition at trial both represent deviations from the ccra process, i do not see how the former can serve as persuasive evidence that the ccra intends to bar the latter. [133] the fact that long- term offenders subject to residency conditions can avail themselves of one avenue of recourse outside the legislative scheme (namely habeas corpus) says nothing about whether they can also avail themselves of another (namely challenges in the course of criminal trials). because the ccra does not prescribe a specific forum for raising constitutional challenges to ltso conditions, my view is that both habeas corpus and challenge at trial are available to mr bird. to this end, this court’s comment in maybrun bears repeating:    it must, inter alia, be presumed that the legislature did not intend to deprive citizens affected by government actions of an adequate opportunity to raise the validity of the order. the interpretation process must, therefore, determine not whether a person can challenge the validity of an order that affects his or her rights, but whether the law prescribes a specific forum for doing so. [emphasis added; para. 46; see also para 52] l’image du délinquant à contrôler qui conteste dans le cadre d’un procès criminel l’assignation à résidence à laquelle il est assujetti, le délinquant à contrôler qui intente un recours en habeas corpus, plutôt que de solliciter un réexamen par la commission, ne tient pas compte non plus du « processus d’appel administratif » envisagé par la lscmlsc. puisque la présentation d’une demande d’habeas corpus et la contestation d’une condition de l’osld durant le procès constituent des dérogations à la procédure établie par la lscmlsc, je ne vois pas en quoi la première démontre de manière convaincante que cette loi vise à empêcher la seconde. [133] le fait que les délinquants à contrôler as- sujettis à des assignations à résidence peuvent se prévaloir d’un recours distinct de celui prévu dans le régime législatif (à savoir l’habeas corpus) ne dit pas s’ils peuvent également se prévaloir d’un autre recours (à savoir la contestation au cours d’un procès criminel). comme la lscmlsc ne prescrit pas le recours à un forum en particulier pour contester les conditions dont sont assorties les osld sur le plan constitutionnel, je suis d’avis que m. bird pouvait non seulement intenter un recours en habeas corpus, mais aussi contester l’assignation à résidence dans le cadre du procès intenté contre lui. à cette fin, il convient de répéter les propos tenus par la cour dans maybrun :    on doit, notamment, présumer que le législateur n’a pas eu pour intention de priver les citoyens affectés par les actes de l’administration d’une possibilité adéquate de faire valoir l’invalidité d’une ordonnance. la démarche interprétative doit donc viser à déterminer non pas si une personne peut ou non soulever la validité d’une ordon- nance qui affecte ses droits, mais plutôt si la loi prescrit un forum particulier à cette fin. [je souligne; par. 46; voir aussi par 52] [134] this brings me to a second and more funda- mental concern. according to the majority, whenever an administrative order puts an individual’s physical liberty at stake, habeas corpus will be available. if the availability of habeas corpus is itself permitted to stand in the way of a challenge to the validity of the order at trial, it is difficult to imagine when, if ever, accused persons will be able to challenge at trial the [134] cela m’amène à la seconde préoccupation, plus fondamentale selon les juges majoritaires, chaque fois qu’une ordonnance administrative met en jeu la liberté physique d’une personne, il est possible d’intenter un recours en habeas corpus. si l’on permet que cette avenue fasse échec à la contestation de la validité de l’ordonnance durant le procès, il est difficile, très difficile, d’imaginer [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 469 liberty- restricting administrative orders imposed on them. in my view, allowing the existence of habeas corpus to foreclose challenges at trial involves much too limited an approach to the maybrun framework, which is aimed, in a larger and more nuanced way, at determining legislative intent. parliament should not be taken as precluding all accused persons from chal- lenging the liberty- restricting administrative condi- tions imposed on them simply because they missed an earlier opportunity to challenge their conditions through habeas corpus applications. [135] further, and relatedly, factoring habeas cor­ pus into the maybrun analysis in the manner sug- gested by the majority has the following paradoxical implication: the less the impugned order impacts the offender’s physical liberty, the more likely the collateral attack will be permitted; the more the im- pugned order impacts the offender’s physical liberty, the less likely the collateral attack will be permitted. if, for instance, mr. bird breached an order that did not impact his physical liberty — a prohibition on associating with specific individuals or groups, for example — and wished to challenge that order at his criminal trial for its breach, habeas corpus would not be available as a factor standing in the way of his challenge. absent clear legislative direction, i am not prepared to assume that parliament intended for those subject to orders that impose physical con- straints to face a stronger barrier to challenging those orders than others. [136] finally, i  note that the access to justice considerations discussed above (at paras. 128-29) equally undercut the suggestion that habeas corpus is the designated forum for challenging ltso con- ditions. it is questionable whether, without access to counsel, mr. bird would have known of the availa- bility of habeas corpus, let alone how to pursue it. quand l’accusé pourra s’opposer, lors du procès, aux ordonnances administratives qui restreignent sa liberté. à mon avis, laisser l’existence du recours en habeas corpus faire obstacle aux contestations lors du procès constitue une interprétation trop res- trictive du cadre d’analyse énoncé dans maybrun, qui vise, d’une manière plus large et plus nuancée, à déterminer l’intention du législateur. il ne faut pas considérer que le législateur interdit à tous les accusés de s’opposer aux conditions administra- tives restrictives de liberté qui leur sont imposées tout simplement parce qu’ils ont raté auparavant l’occasion de contester ces conditions par voie de demandes d’habeas corpus. [135] en outre, et dans le même ordre d’idées, tenir compte de l’habeas corpus dans le cadre de l’analyse fondée sur l’arrêt maybrun comme le sug- gèrent les juges majoritaires a l’effet paradoxal sui- vant : moins l’ordonnance contestée a d’incidence sur la liberté physique du délinquant, plus il y a de chances que la contestation incidente soit per­ mise; plus l’ordonnance contestée a d’incidence sur la liberté physique du délinquant, moins il y a de chances que la contestation incidente soit permise. si, par exemple, m. bird avait contrevenu à une or- donnance n’ayant eu aucune incidence sur sa liberté physique — une interdiction de fréquenter certaines personnes ou certains groupes, par exemple — et souhaitait contester cette ordonnance lors de son procès criminel, le recours en habeas corpus ne pour- rait pas faire obstacle à sa contestation. en l’absence d’une indication légale claire, je ne suis pas disposée à tenir pour acquis que le législateur a voulu que les personnes faisant l’objet d’ordonnances imposant des contraintes physiques aient plus de difficultés à contester ces ordonnances qu’autrui. [136] enfin, je note que les considérations relatives à l’accès à la justice dont il a été question précé- demment (par. 128-129) militent également contre la suggestion selon laquelle l’habeas corpus est le recours désigné pour contester les conditions d’une osld. d’ailleurs, il est permis de se demander si, sans accès à un avocat, m. bird aurait été au courant de l’existence de l’habeas corpus, et plus encore de la façon d’intenter ce recours. 470 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. [137] the crown has pointed to no other viable option for mr. bird to challenge his residency condi- tion. in my view, the three options offered by the ma- jority do not indicate parliament’s intention to have mr. bird’s charter claim adjudicated exclusively outside of the criminal process. i also conclude that it is inappropriate to suggest that insufficient individ- ual options might become effective when pursued in tandem. even if mr. bird had sought internal review, applied for judicial review, and made an application for habeas corpus, one has no bearing on the others; the adequacy of one route is not bolstered by the existence of another. [138] the question is not whether there were op- tions available to mr bird. there were. the question is whether it can be said that parliament prescribed any one of them as the particular forum for raising a constitutional challenge to an ltso condition. in my view, parliament did not. [137] le ministère public n’a fait état d’aucune autre avenue viable permettant à m. bird de contes- ter son assignation à résidence. à mon avis, les trois avenues mentionnées par les juges majoritaires n’indiquent pas que le législateur avait l’intention de faire trancher la demande fondée sur la charte de m. bird exclusivement en dehors du processus criminel. je conclus également qu’il ne convient pas de laisser entendre que des recours insuffisants individuellement peuvent devenir efficaces lorsqu’ils sont exercés conjointement. même si m. bird avait demandé un examen interne et présenté une demande de contrôle judiciaire en plus d’une demande d’ha­ beas corpus, l’un n’a aucune incidence sur les autres; le caractère adéquat d’un recours n’est nullement renforcé par l’existence d’un autre. il ne s’agit pas de savoir si m. bird disposait [138] de plusieurs recours. c’était bel et bien le cas. la question est de savoir si l’on peut dire que le légis- lateur a prescrit l’un ou l’autre d’entre eux comme étant le forum particulier pour contester la constitu- tionnalité d’une condition prévue dans l’osld. à mon avis, le législateur ne l’a pas fait. (3) penalty on a conviction (factor (5)) (3) sanction imposable (facteur 5) [139] the majority and the courts below all rec- ognize the severity of the penalty upon a conviction under s 7533 of the criminal code: up to 10 years’ imprisonment. it is important to reiterate that bar- ring mr. bird’s attack on the constitutionality of the condition is to deny his defence at trial where he is facing a lengthy period of imprisonment. [139] les juges majoritaires et les tribunaux d’ins- tances inférieures reconnaissent tous la sévérité de la sanction prévue à l’art 7533 du code criminel : une peine maximale de 10 ans d’emprisonnement. il importe de rappeler qu’en empêchant m. bird de contester la constitutionnalité de la condition, on le prive de son moyen de défense à un procès dans le cadre duquel il encourt une lourde peine d’empri- sonnement. [140] the general rule against collateral attacks flows from rule of law and administration of justice considerations — namely, that it is improper to by- pass adjudicative processes established by the legis- lature. however, when criminal defences are barred in the face of severe sanctions, separate aspects of the rule of law and the administration of justice are clearly invoked. in particular, the rule of law instructs us to avoid outcomes predicated on legal errors and dictated purely by process, and to turn our minds to the repute of the administration of justice (r v. [140] la règle générale interdisant les contesta- tions incidentes découle de considérations relatives à la primauté du droit et à l’administration de la jus- tice — à savoir qu’il ne convient pas de contourner les processus décisionnels établis par le législateur. or, lorsque des moyens de défense en matière crimi- nelle ne peuvent être présentés à l’encontre de sanc- tions sévères, des aspects différents de la primauté du droit et de l’administration de la justice peuvent clai- rement être en jeu. plus particulièrement, le principe de la primauté du droit nous enseigne qu’il faut éviter [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 471 litchfield, [1993] 4 scr 333, at pp 349-50). this must be especially so where any potential error — for example convicting someone for breaching an invalid order — results in imprisonment. in my view, the trial judge’s task in a case such as this is to ask whether full answer and defence considerations and fair trial rights, which here arise in the face of seri- ous criminal sanctions, outweigh rigid adherence to administrative structures, particularly where those structures are limited. in this vein, the words of the us. supreme court in mckart v. united states, 395 us 185 (1969), at p. 197, are apt: first of all, it is well to remember that use of the [rule barring challenges to administrative orders] in criminal cases can be exceedingly harsh. the defendant is often stripped of his only defense; he must go to jail without having any judicial review of an assertedly invalid order. this deprivation of judicial review occurs not when the affected person is affirmatively asking for assistance from the courts but when the government is attempting to im- pose criminal sanctions on him. such a result should not be tolerated unless the interests underlying the    rule clearly outweigh the severe burden imposed upon the registrant if he is denied judicial review. les résultats fondés sur des erreurs de droit et dictés uniquement par le processus, et prêter attention à la considération dont jouit l’administration de la justice (r c. litchfield, [1993] 4 rcs 333, p 349-350). cela est d’autant plus vrai lorsque l’erreur qui peut être commise — par exemple, déclarer quelqu’un coupable d’avoir contrevenu à une ordonnance inva- lide — entraîne un emprisonnement. à mon avis, la tâche du juge du procès dans un cas comme celui qui nous occupe est de se demander si les considérations relatives à la défense pleine et entière et au droit à un procès équitable — qui entrent en jeu en l’es- pèce dans le contexte de possibles lourdes sanctions criminelles — l’emportent sur le respect rigoureux des structures administratives, surtout lorsque ces structures sont limitées. dans le même esprit, les propos qu’a tenus la cour suprême des états- unis dans mckart c. united states, 395 us 185 (1969), p. 197, sont pertinents : [traduction] tout d’abord, il ne faut pas oublier que l’application de la [règle interdisant la contestation des ordonnances administratives] dans les affaires criminelles peut être trop sévère. le défendeur est souvent dépouillé de son seul moyen de défense; il doit aller en prison sans avoir eu accès au contrôle judiciaire d’une ordonnance censément invalide. cette privation de contrôle judiciaire se produit non pas lorsque la personne visée demande affirmativement l’aide des tribunaux, mais bien lorsque le gouvernement tente de lui imposer des sanctions cri- minelles. un tel résultat ne doit pas être toléré, à moins que les intérêts qui sous- tendent la [  ] règle l’emportent clairement sur le lourd fardeau imposé à l’inscrit si on lui refuse le contrôle judiciaire. [141] mr. bird could be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison if he is convicted. as set out above, his challenge to his residency requirement is the only defence he advanced. he could go to jail for a sig- nificant period of time without ever having the basis for that sentence — the residency condition — re- viewed by a court for constitutional validity. while i ultimately conclude that mr. bird’s charter claim is not made out in this case, in my view the prospect of someone in a situation like mr. bird’s mounting a meritorious charter claim, yet being ineligible for a corresponding remedy because of the forum in which the claim was advanced, is an affront to both the administration of justice and the accused’s [141] s’il est déclaré coupable, m. bird est pas- sible de 10 ans d’emprisonnement. je le répète, la contestation de son assignation à résidence consti- tue son unique moyen de défense. il pourrait être emprisonné pendant une longue période sans que la validité constitutionnelle du fondement de cette peine — l’assignation à résidence — n’ait jamais été examinée par un tribunal. bien que je conclue en définitive que la prétention de m. bird fondée sur la charte n’est pas établie en l’espèce, l’idée qu’une personne se trouvant dans la même situation que lui qui présente une demande fondée sur la charte méritant d’être instruite puisse quand même ne pas être admissible à une réparation correspondante en 472 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. charter­protected right to make full answer and defence. [142] i conclude that this factor weighs heavily in favour of finding that parliament could not have intended a claim like mr. bird’s to be barred in these circumstances. raison du forum dans lequel la demande a été pré- sentée constitue, à mon avis, un affront à la fois à l’administration de la justice et au droit de l’accusé protégé par la charte de présenter une défense pleine et entière. [142] j’estime que ce facteur milite fortement pour la conclusion selon laquelle le législateur ne peut avoir eu l’intention d’interdire la présentation d’une demande comme celle de m. bird dans les circons- tances de l’espèce. (4) conclusion on collateral attack (4) conclusion sur la contestation incidente [143] i agree with the majority that the words and purpose of the relevant provisions of the ccra indi- cate a broad and discretionary public safety mandate for the parole board in its supervision of long- term offenders. that purpose suggests that parliament in- tended long- term offenders to be the responsibility of the board. however, when the other maybrun factors are considered, i am unable to conclude that the stat- ute indicates legislative intent to provide an effective avenue for recourse to mr. bird to the extent that his defence at trial should be barred. i conclude that the maybrun factors, considered together, indicate that parliament cannot have intended to bar mr. bird’s constitutional challenge to this ltso condition. the crown has not pointed to any other factors outside of the maybrun framework to support its response in this appeal. therefore, i find that mr. bird should be allowed to raise his defence at this time and in this forum. [143] je conviens avec les juges majoritaires que le libellé et l’objet des dispositions pertinentes de la lscmlsc indiquent qu’un vaste mandat de sécurité publique discrétionnaire a été confié à la commission des libérations conditionnelles dans le cadre de sa surveillance des délinquants à contrôler. cet objet permet de penser que le législateur a voulu que la commission ait la responsabilité des délinquants à contrôler. toutefois, en prenant en considération les autres facteurs énoncés dans maybrun, je ne puis conclure que la loi indique une intention du législa- teur d’offrir à m. bird une voie de recours efficace au point que l’on doive empêcher la présentation de sa défense au procès. j’estime que les facteurs énoncés dans maybrun, examinés ensemble, indiquent que le législateur ne peut avoir voulu faire obstacle à la contestation constitutionnelle que m. bird oppose à cette condition de son osld. le ministère public n’a fait état d’aucun autre facteur en dehors du cadre d’analyse établi dans maybrun qui puisse étayer sa prétention dans le présent pourvoi. je conclus donc que m. bird doit être autorisé à faire valoir son moyen de défense à ce moment-ci et devant le présent forum. b charter arguments b arguments fondés sur la charte (1) preliminary matter: new charter arguments raised on appeal (1) question préliminaire : nouveaux arguments fondés sur la charte soulevés en appel [144] at trial and in response to the crown’s appeal before the saskatchewan court of appeal, mr. bird alleged that the residency order infringed his right to liberty under s. 7 of the charter. [144] au procès et en réponse à l’appel interjeté par le ministère public devant la cour d’appel de la saskatchewan, m. bird a fait valoir que l’ordonnance d’assignation à résidence portait atteinte au droit à la liberté que lui garantit l’art. 7 de la charte. [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 473 [145] by way of a notice of constitutional ques- tion before this court, mr. bird additionally raised claims under both ss. 9 and 11(h) of the charter. under these provisions, he argued that his residency condition is unauthorized by s 1341(2) of the ccra and therefore constitutes an arbitrary detention (s. 9) and an additional carceral sentence frustrating his expectation of liberty (s 11(h)). [145] au moyen d’un avis de question constitution- nelle déposé devant la cour, m. bird a en outre soulevé des prétentions fondées sur l’art. 9 et l’al. 11h) de la charte. en se fondant sur ces dispositions, il a soutenu que son assignation à résidence n’est pas autorisée par le par 1341(2) de la lscmlsc et qu’elle constitue par conséquent une détention arbitraire (art. 9) et une peine d’emprisonnement supplémentaire portant atteinte à son attente légitime en matière de liberté (al 11h)). [146] while this court has the discretion to hear new constitutional arguments on appeal, this dis- cretion “should only be exercised exceptionally and never unless the challenger shows that doing so causes no prejudice to the parties” (guindon v. can­ ada, 2015 scc 41, [2015] 3 scr 3, at para 23). the court must take into account “all of the circum- stances, including the state of the record, fairness to all parties, the importance of having the issue resolved by this court, its suitability for decision and the broader interests of the administration of justice” (guindon, at para 20). [146] bien que la cour ait bel et bien le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’examiner de nouveaux arguments constitutionnels en appel, elle ne doit l’exercer « qu’à titre exceptionnel et jamais sans que le plaideur ne dé- montre que les parties n’en subiront pas un préjudice » (guindon c. canada, 2015 csc 41, [2015] 3 rcs 3, par 23). la cour doit tenir compte de « l’ensemble des circonstances, dont la teneur du dossier, l’équité envers toutes les parties, l’importance que la question soit résolue par la cour, le fait que l’affaire se prête ou non à une décision et les intérêts de l’administration de la justice en général » (guindon, par 20). [147] mr. bird has not demonstrated that this is one of those “rare cases” that warrants this court’s consideration of new constitutional arguments on ap- peal (guindon, at para 37). while the crown and the attorneys general of canada and ontario made sub- missions regarding all of mr. bird’s charter claims, the crown argued that it would not be proper to consider the new claims, despite any overlap between them and mr. bird’s original s. 7 claim. i am unable to determine whether the parties were prejudiced in the presentation of their cases by mr. bird’s failure to advance his ss. 9 and 11(h) claims at first instance. further, i find that it would be unwise to proceed without the benefit of a record on mr. bird’s ss. 9 and 11(h) claims. as such, i consider only mr. bird’s s. 7 claim. [147] m.  bird n’a pas démontré qu’il s’agit de l’un des cas « rare[s] » où la cour examine en appel des arguments nouveaux de nature constitutionnelle (guindon, par 37). même si le ministère public et les procureurs généraux du canada et de l’ontario ont présenté des observations au sujet de l’ensemble des prétentions de m. bird fondées sur la charte, le ministère public soutient qu’il ne conviendrait pas d’examiner les nouvelles prétentions, malgré le che- vauchement qu’il peut y avoir entre celles-ci et la prétention initiale de m. bird fondée sur l’art 7. je ne suis pas en mesure de savoir si l’omission de m. bird de faire valoir dès le départ ses prétentions fondées sur l’art. 9 et sur l’al. 11h) a causé un préjudice aux parties dans la présentation de leur cause. de plus, j’estime qu’il serait imprudent de procéder sans dis- poser d’un dossier relatif aux prétentions de m. bird fondées sur l’art. 9 et sur l’al 11h). je me pencherai donc uniquement sur sa prétention fondée sur l’art 7. (2) section 7 (2) article 7 [148] before this court, mr. bird claims that his residency condition represents an arbitrary infringe- ment of his right to liberty under s. 7 of the charter. [148] devant la cour, m. bird soutient que son assignation à résidence constitue une atteinte ar- bitraire au droit à la liberté que lui garantit l’art. 7 474 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. (mr. bird challenges only the constitutionality of his residency condition, and not the constitutionality of any applicable statutory provisions.) in essence, mr. bird argues that his residency condition is ar- bitrary because it is contrary to the purpose of the long- term offender regime: to manage the release offenders back into the community. he places great emphasis on oskana centre’s status as a “peniten- tiary” under the ccra, arguing that he should not be required to serve as an inmate in a “penitentiary” after the expiry of his carceral sentence. he says that a contextual interpretation of s 1341 of the ccra demonstrates that parliament did not contemplate residency in “penitentiaries” for long- term offenders. de la charte (il conteste seulement la constitu- tionnalité de cette assignation, et non la constitu- tionnalité des dispositions législatives applicables.) essentiellement, il fait valoir que son assignation à résidence est arbitraire parce qu’elle est contraire à l’objectif du régime applicable aux délinquants à contrôler : veiller à la mise en liberté des délinquants dans la collectivité. il insiste beaucoup sur le statut de « pénitencier » au sens de la lscmlsc du centre oskana, affirmant qu’il ne devrait pas avoir à être détenu dans un « pénitencier » après l’expiration de sa peine d’emprisonnement. pour lui, une interpré- tation contextuelle de l’art 1341 de la lscmlsc démontre que le législateur n’a pas voulu que les délinquants à contrôler puissent être assignés à rési- dence dans des « pénitenciers ». [149] the crown concedes that mr. bird’s resi- dency condition engages his liberty interest under s. 7 of the charter. as such, the only question is whether the residency condition is arbitrary in re- spect of the purpose of s 1341(2) of the ccra and the long- term offender regime generally. an infringement of liberty will be arbitrary in a manner that infringes s. 7 of the charter where it bears no rational connection to the purpose of the governing law (canada (attorney general) v. bedford, 2013 scc 72, [2013] 3 scr 1101, at para. 111; carter v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 5, [2015] 1 scr 331, at para 83). as arbitrariness requires no connection between the purpose of the law and its impugned effects, it will generally be difficult for a claimant to establish (bedford, at para 119). [149] le ministère public reconnaît que l’assi- gnation à résidence de m. bird met en jeu le droit à la liberté que lui garantit l’art. 7 de la charte. il ne reste donc qu’à savoir si cette assignation est arbitraire eu égard à l’objet du par 1341(2) de la lscmlsc et du régime des délinquants à contrô- ler en général. l’atteinte à la liberté est arbitraire d’une manière qui enfreint l’art. 7 de la charte si elle n’a aucun lien rationnel avec l’objet de la loi applicable (canada (procureur général) c. bedford, 2013 csc 72, [2013] 3 rcs 1101, par. 111; carter c. canada (procureur général), 2015 csc 5, [2015] 1 rcs 331, par 83). comme le caractère arbitraire n’existe qu’en l’absence de lien entre l’objet de la loi et ses effets allégués, il est généralement difficile pour le demandeur de l’établir (bedford, par 119). [150] the question before us is essentially one of statutory interpretation. accordingly, our task is to assess the scope of s 1341(2) in light of its text, context, and purpose (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27). we must ask whether s 1341(2) empowers the board to require mr. bird to “[r]eside at a community correctional centre   . approved by the correctional service of canada, for a period of 180 days”. is such a requirement “reason- able and necessary in order to protect society and to facilitate    successful reintegration into society”? [150] la question que nous sommes appelés à trancher en est essentiellement une d’interprétation des lois. en effet, nous devons apprécier la portée du par 1341(2) à la lumière de son libellé, de son contexte et de son objet (rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27). nous devons nous de- mander si le par 1341(2) habilite la commission à obliger m. bird à [traduction] « [r]ésider dans un centre correctionnel communautaire [  ] approuvé par le service correctionnel du canada, pendant une période de 180 jours ». s’agit-il d’une condition « raisonnable [  ] et nécessaire [  ] pour protéger la société et favoriser la réinsertion sociale »? [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 475 (a) section  134.1(2) and the purpose of the a) le paragraphe 134.1(2) et l’objet du régime long­ term offender regime des délinquants à contrôler [151] long- term supervision is a form of “ex- ceptional” sentence “reserved for individuals who pose an ongoing threat to the public and accordingly merit enhanced sentences on preventive grounds” (r v. steele, 2014 scc 61, [2014] 3 scr 138, at para 1). an offender is not declared a long- term offender lightly; among other things, the sentencing court must be satisfied that there is a substantial risk that the offender will reoffend (criminal code, s 7531(1)(b)). in r v. lm, 2008 scc 31, [2008] 2 scr 163, at para. 46, this court held that the spe- cific objective of long- term supervision is “to ensure that the offender does not reoffend and to protect the public during a period of supervised reintegration into that society” (see also r v. ipeelee, 2012 scc 13, [2012] 1 scr 433, at para 48). rehabilitation is a critical component of an offender’s reintegration (ipeelee, at paras. 48 and 50). [151] la surveillance de longue durée est une forme de peine « exceptionnell[e] » qui est « réser- vé[e] aux délinquants qui font peser sur la société une menace permanente de nature à justifier, à titre préventif, une peine plus sévère  » (r c steele, 2014 csc 61, [2014] 3 rcs 138, par.  1) on ne déclare pas quelqu’un délinquant à contrôler à la légère; le tribunal chargé de la détermination de la peine doit notamment être convaincu que le délinquant risque vraisemblablement de récidiver (code criminel, al 7531(1)b)). au paragraphe 46 de l’arrêt r c. lm, 2008 csc 31, [2008] 2 rcs. 163, la cour a conclu que la surveillance de longue durée vise précisément «  la prévention contre la récidive et la protection du public au cours d’une période de réinsertion sociale contrôlée  »  (voir aussi r c. ipeelee, 2012 csc 13, [2012] 1 rcs. 433, par 48). la réadaptation est un élément es- sentiel de la réinsertion du délinquant (ipeelee, par. 48 et 50). [152] these purposes are reflected in the language of s 1341(2) of the ccra, which states: [152] ces objectifs se reflètent dans le libellé du par 1341(2) de la lscmlsc, qui prévoit ceci : the board may establish conditions for the long- term supervision of the offender that it considers reasonable and necessary in order to protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of the offender. la commission peut imposer au délinquant les condi- tions de surveillance qu’elle juge raisonnables et néces- saires pour protéger la société et favoriser la réinsertion sociale du délinquant. [153] these purposes are also reflected in s. 100 of the ccra, which applies to long- term offenders by virtue of s 991. section 100 sets out the overarching purpose of conditional release — of which long- term supervision is a form: [153] ces objectifs se reflètent également dans l’art. 100 de la lscmlsc, qui s’applique aux dé- linquants à contrôler aux termes de l’art.  991. l’article 100 énonce l’objectif général de la mise en liberté sous condition — qui peut notamment prendre la forme d’une surveillance de longue durée : the purpose of conditional release is to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by means of decisions on the timing and conditions of release that will best facilitate the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community as law- abiding citizens. la mise en liberté sous condition vise à contribuer au maintien d’une société juste, paisible et sûre en favorisant, par la prise de décisions appropriées quant au moment et aux conditions de leur mise en liberté, la réadaptation et la réinsertion sociale des délinquants en tant que citoyens respectueux des lois. [154] in light of the above, it is not accurate to say, as mr. bird does, that the purpose of long- term [154] compte tenu de ce qui précède, il est faux de prétendre, comme le fait m. bird, que la surveillance 476 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. supervision is the release of offenders into the com- munity. rather, long- term supervision is designed to facilitate the controlled or supervised community re­ entry of offenders who have been found to pose a risk to society. de longue durée vise la mise en liberté des délin- quants dans la collectivité. elle vise plutôt à favoriser le retour contrôlé ou surveillé dans la société des délinquants dont on juge qu’ils constituent un risque pour la société. [155] although sentencing courts are responsible for declaring individuals long- term offenders under s 7531(3) of the criminal code, the management of those offenders and the establishment of ltsos and attendant conditions are the responsibility of the board (s 7532(1)). in this regard, the board is governed by the relevant provisions of the ccra — most notably s 1341. [156] the text of s 1341(2), excerpted above, explicitly grants the board broad discretion to set ltso conditions. this discretion is limited only by the requirement that the conditions must aim at protecting society or facilitating the long- term of- fender’s reintegration into society. it is for the board to determine what it considers to be reasonable and necessary to meet those objectives. on its own, the text of the provision strongly supports the conclusion that the board is authorized to impose residency requirements. [157] moreover, and more crucially, the purposes of the long- term offender regime are best achieved by interpreting s 1341(2) as authorizing the board to order residency where it deems fit, including in a community- based residential facility such as oskana centre. it goes without saying that requiring a long- term offender to spend a transitional period within a facility like oskana centre enables increased super- vision, which in turn contributes to protecting society and facilitating effective reintegration. an interpre- tation of s 1341(2) which limits the availability of transitional facilities would hinder the effectiveness of efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate long- term offenders. supervision for the purpose of protecting the public and facilitating reintegration into society is a careful and case- specific exercise. as stated in ipeelee, at para. 43, ltsos were designed to “sup- plement the all-or- nothing alternatives of definite or [155] s’il incombe aux tribunaux chargés de la dé- termination de la peine de déclarer les individus dé- linquants à contrôler en application du par 7531(3) du code criminel, l’encadrement de ces délinquants et l’établissement des osld ainsi que des conditions connexes relèvent de la commission (par 7532(1)). à cet égard, cette dernière est régie par les disposi- tions pertinentes de la lscmlsc — plus particuliè- rement l’art 1341. [156] le libellé du par 1341(2), reproduit précé- demment, investit expressément la commission d’un large pouvoir discrétionnaire d’établir les conditions dont sont assorties les osld. ce pouvoir discré- tionnaire est limité uniquement par l’exigence selon laquelle les conditions doivent viser à protéger la société ou à favoriser la réinsertion sociale du dé- linquant à contrôler. c’est à la commission qu’il incombe de déterminer ce qu’elle juge raisonnable et nécessaire pour atteindre ces objectifs. le libellé de la disposition étaye fortement, à lui seul, la conclu- sion selon laquelle la commission est autorisée à imposer des assignations à résidence. [157] en outre, et cet aspect est encore plus crucial, le meilleur moyen d’atteindre les objectifs du ré- gime applicable aux délinquants à contrôler consiste à interpréter le par 1341(2) comme autorisant la commission à ordonner l’assignation à résidence où bon lui semble, y compris dans un établissement résidentiel communautaire comme le centre oskana. il va sans dire que le fait d’obliger un délinquant à contrôler à passer une période de transition dans un établissement comme ce centre permet une surveil- lance accrue, laquelle permet à son tour de protéger la société et de favoriser une réinsertion efficace. une interprétation du par 1341(2) qui aurait pour effet de limiter l’éventail des établissements de transition nuirait à l’efficacité des efforts déployés pour assu- rer la réadaptation et la réinsertion des délinquants à contrôler. le choix de la surveillance qui vise à protéger le public et à favoriser la réinsertion sociale [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 477 indefinite detention”. section 134.1(2) must be read in a manner consistent with this intent. constitue un exercice au cas par cas auquel il faut se livrer avec minutie. comme l’a affirmé la cour au par. 43 de l’arrêt ipeelee, les osld ont été conçus pour « compléter les solutions du tout ou rien que représentaient la détention à durée déterminée et la détention à durée indéterminée ». il faut donc interpréter le par 1341(2) conformément à cette intention. (b) the significance of oskana centre being a b) l’importance de la qualité de « pénitencier » “penitentiary” under the ccra du centre oskana au sens de la lscmlsc [158] mr. bird argues that because community cor- rectional centres like oskana centre fall within the definition of “penitentiary” in s. 2 of the ccra, long- term offenders cannot be ordered to reside in them. framed differently, mr. bird essentially submits that his mandated presence at oskana centre under his ltso amounts to an impermissible (and therefore arbitrary) extension of his carceral sentence. i am unable to agree with this submission. [159] for the purposes of the ccra, “penitentiary” encompasses all facilities that are “operated, perma- nently or temporarily, by the [csc] for the care and custody of inmates” (s 2). in practical terms, and based on the record before us, this means that “peni- tentiary” captures two categories of facilities: (1) fed- eral “institutions” operated by csc, which includes what are colloquially known as “prisons” or “pen- itentiaries”, and (2) those “community- based resi- dential facilities” that are operated by csc. (these include what are commonly called “halfway houses” and other forms of placements.) “community cor- rectional centres”, like oskana centre, fall into the second category; accordingly, they are “penitentia- ries” under the ccra. community- based residential facilities that are operated by contractors are known as “community residential facilities”; these are not “penitentiaries”. [158] selon m. bird, puisque les centres correc- tionnels communautaires comme le centre oskana sont visés par la définition de « pénitencier » énoncée à l’art. 2 de la lscmlsc, on ne peut ordonner aux délinquants à contrôler d’y résider. autrement dit, m. bird soutient essentiellement que sa présence obligatoire au centre oskana en application de son osld équivaut à une prolongation inadmissible (et donc arbitraire) de sa peine d’emprisonnement. je ne puis souscrire à cet argument. [159] pour l’application de la lscmlsc, le terme « pénitencier » vise tous les établissements qui sont « administré[s] à titre permanent ou temporaire par le [scc] pour la prise en charge et la garde des dé- tenus » (art 2). concrètement, et compte tenu du dossier dont nous disposons, cela signifie que le terme « pénitencier » vise deux catégories d’éta- blissements : (1) les « établissements » fédéraux administrés par le scc, qui comprennent ce que l’on appelle familièrement les « prisons » ou les « péniten- ciers », et (2) les « établissements résidentiels com- munautaires » qui sont administrés par le scc. (ces établissements comprennent ce que l’on appelle com- munément les « maisons de transition » et d’autres formes de placements.) les « centres correctionnels communautaires », comme le centre oskana, ap- partiennent à la deuxième catégorie; ce sont donc des « pénitenciers » au sens de la lscmlsc. les établissements résidentiels communautaires qui sont administrés par des entrepreneurs sont connus sous le nom de « centres résidentiels communautaires » et ce ne sont pas des « pénitenciers ». [160] as per csc’s commissioner’s directive 706, “classification of institutions”, made under [160] selon la directive du commissaire no 706, «  classification des établissements  » du scc, 478 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. the authority of s. 98 of the ccra, community cor- rectional centres like oskana centre are federally operated community- based residential facil- it[ies] that provid[e] a structured living environment with 24- hour supervision, programs, and interventions for the purpose of safely reintegrating offenders into the commu- nity. these facilities, which may also have an enhanced programming component, accommodate offenders under federal jurisdiction who have been released to the com- munity on unescorted temporary absences, day parole, full parole, work releases, statutory release, as well as those subject to long- term supervision orders. [161] while mr. bird is correct to note that oskana centre falls within the definition of “penitentiary” in s. 2 of the ccra, i do not accept the significance he places on this classification. as set out above, “penitentiary” is broadly defined to include facilities which do not conform with the colloquial concept of “penitentiaries”. there is nothing in the text or context of the ccra to suggest that csc- operated community- based residential facilities can only house inmates serving carceral sentences; indeed, as discussed further below, parliament expressly contemplated that long- term offenders could reside at (any) community- based residential facilities where required to limit risks (s 1351). if long- term offenders were not permitted [162] to live anywhere deemed a “penitentiary” under the statute, the board’s capacity to tailor conditions to the specific needs of the long- term offender with an eye to public safety and rehabilitation would be severely limited. adoptée en vertu de l’art. 98 de la lscmlsc, les centres correctionnels communautaires comme le centre oskana sont [des] établissement[s] résidentiel[s] communautaire[s] qu’administre le gouvernement fédéral et qui offre[nt] un milieu de vie structuré avec surveillance 24 heures sur 24 ainsi que des programmes et des interventions en vue de ré- insérer les délinquants dans la collectivité en toute sécurité. ces établissements, qui peuvent également offrir des pro- grammes enrichis, accueillent des délinquants sous respon- sabilité fédérale libérés dans la collectivité aux termes d’une permission de sortir sans escorte, d’une semi- liberté, d’une libération conditionnelle totale, d’un placement à l’extérieur ou d’une libération d’office, ainsi que des délinquants visés par une ordonnance de surveillance de longue durée. [161] bien que m. bird souligne avec raison que le centre oskana est visé par la définition de « pé- nitencier » énoncée à l’art. 2 de la lscmlsc, je ne puis souscrire à l’importance qu’il accorde à cette qualification. comme je l’ai indiqué précédemment, le terme « pénitencier » est défini largement de façon à viser des établissements qui ne correspondent pas à la notion familière de « pénitenciers ». rien dans le libellé ou le contexte de la lscmlsc n’indique que les établissements résidentiels communautaires administrés par le scc peuvent uniquement héberger des détenus purgeant une peine d’emprisonnement; d’ailleurs, comme nous le verrons plus loin, le légis- lateur a expressément envisagé que les délinquants à contrôler pourraient résider dans (tout) établissement résidentiel communautaire lorsque cela s’avère né- cessaire pour limiter les risques (art 1351). [162] si les délinquants à contrôler ne pouvaient pas vivre dans un endroit réputé constituer un « pénitencier » au sens de la loi, la capacité de la commission d’élaborer des conditions adaptées aux besoins particuliers de chaque délinquant à contrôler en tenant compte de la sécurité publique et de la réa- daptation serait considérablement restreinte. [163] finally, i do not see a principled basis for concluding that long- term offenders like mr. bird can be ordered to reside in community residential fa- cilities operated by contractors, but not community- based residential facilities operated by csc (such as community correctional centres) because of a [163] enfin, je ne vois aucune raison logique de conclure que l’on peut ordonner aux délinquants à contrôler comme m.  bird de résider dans des centres résidentiels communautaires administrés par des entrepreneurs, mais pas dans des établis- sements résidentiels communautaires administrés [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 479 definitional distinction (the latter, unlike the former, constituting “penitentiaries” under the ccra). the fact that some community- based residential facilities can technically be called “penitentiaries” under the ccra has no bearing on their availability for long- term offenders at the discretion of the board under s 1341(2). par le scc, en raison d’une distinction d’ordre dé- finitionnel (puisque les derniers, contrairement aux premiers, constituent des « pénitenciers » au sens de la lscmlsc). le fait que certains établissements résidentiels communautaires puissent technique- ment être qualifiés de « pénitenciers » au sens de la lscmlsc n’a aucune incidence sur leur capacité d’héberger des délinquants à contrôler si c’est ce type d’hébergement que prescrit la commission en vertu du par 1341(2). (c) contextual interpretation of section 134.1(2) c) l’interprétation contextuelle du par 1341(2) [164] finally, mr. bird argues that a contextual interpretation of s 1341(2) demonstrates that the board does not have the authority to order residency in community correctional centres under that pro- vision. [164] enfin, m. bird soutient qu’une interpréta- tion contextuelle du par 1341(2) démontre que la commission n’a pas le pouvoir, en vertu de cette disposition, d’ordonner que des délinquants résident dans des centres correctionnels communautaires. [165] first, mr. bird distinguishes s 1341, which does not expressly contemplate residence in a com- munity correctional centre for long- term offenders, from ss. 133(4) to 133(4.2), which do in the case of parolees, inmates on unescorted temporary absences, and those subject to statutory release. referring to that distinction, mr. bird submits that parliament chose to exempt long- term offenders from having to reside in community correctional centres. the explanation for this distinction, in mr. bird’s view, is that an offender governed by s. 133 has yet to complete his or her sentence, while an ltso only begins once the offender’s carceral sentence has ex- pired. increased restrictions — such as a requirement to reside in a community correctional centre — are justifiable for those still serving sentences. [165] d’abord, m. bird fait une distinction entre l’art 1341, qui ne prévoit pas expressément la rési- dence dans un centre correctionnel communautaire pour les délinquants à contrôler, et les par. 133(4) à (4.2), qui le font dans le cas des délinquants en liberté conditionnelle, des détenus bénéficiant d’une permis- sion de sortir sans escorte et de ceux bénéficiant d’une libération d’office. s’appuyant sur cette distinction, m. bird soutient que le législateur a choisi de dis- penser les délinquants à contrôler de l’obligation de résider dans des centres correctionnels communau- taires. selon m. bird, cette distinction s’explique par le fait que le délinquant visé par l’art. 133 n’a pas fini de purger sa peine, tandis que l’osld ne s’applique qu’après l’expiration de la peine d’emprisonnement du délinquant. des contraintes accrues — comme l’obligation de résider dans un centre correctionnel communautaire — sont justifiables pour ceux qui n’ont pas fini de purger leur peine. [166] i  disagree that the distinction between ss 1341 and 133 sheds light on the scope of the board’s discretion under s 1342(1) in the manner urged by mr bird. sections 133(4) and 133(4.1) serve a clear purpose in the context of s. 133; they clarify the circumstances in which ordinary offenders on parole, temporary absence or statutory release can be placed in community- based residential fa- cilities, including community correctional centres [166] à mon avis, cette distinction entre les art.  134.1 et 133 ne permet pas d’interpréter la portée du pouvoir discrétionnaire que confère le par 1342(1) à la commission comme le propose m bird. les paragraphes 133(4) et (4.1) répondent à un objectif clair dans le contexte de l’art. 133; ils précisent les circonstances dans lesquelles les délin- quants ordinaires bénéficiant d’une libération condi- tionnelle, d’une permission de sortir sans escorte ou 480 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. (s 133(42)). in particular, they clarify that the board (or releasing authority’s) jurisdiction to impose res- idency is more limited for offenders on statutory re- lease than it is for offenders on parole or unescorted temporary absence. parliament’s choice to treat dif- ferent categories of offenders serving carceral sen- tences differently (with respect to residency) under s. 133 has no bearing on the availability of residency requirements for long- term offenders under s 1341. in addition, i agree with the federal court of [167] appeal’s decision in normandin, at paras. 33-38, that mr. bird’s reading of ss. 133 and 134.1 would result in ordinary offenders with a low risk of recidivism being subject to residency conditions like mr. bird’s, while those declared long- term offenders — who by definition pose a high risk of recidivism — being subject to less state control. this interpretation is at odds with the purpose of the long- term offender regime and the broad discretion afforded the board under s 1341(2) to set conditions with an eye to public safety and facilitating reintegration. [168] i add this. if mr.  bird’s interpretation of the distinction between ss. 133 and 134.1 were ac- cepted, the implication would be that conditions which are explicitly contemplated in other parts of the statute — such as limitations on drug and alcohol use in s. 133(3) — would be impermissible under s 1341(2). given the purpose of s 1341(2) and the long- term offender regime, it would be absurd to interpret s 1341(2) as prohibiting conditions related to drugs and alcohol for long- term offenders whose risk of recidivism is tied to those substances. d’une libération d’office peuvent être placés dans des établissements résidentiels communautaires, y compris des centres correctionnels communautaires (par 133(42)). plus particulièrement, ils précisent que la compétence de la commission (ou de l’auto- rité compétente) pour imposer une assignation à rési- dence est beaucoup plus limitée pour les délinquants bénéficiant d’une libération d’office que pour ceux bénéficiant d’une libération conditionnelle ou d’une permission de sortir sans escorte. or, le choix du lé- gislateur d’accorder, suivant l’art. 133, un traitement distinct pour différentes catégories de délinquants purgeant une peine d’emprisonnement (en ce qui concerne la résidence) n’a aucune incidence sur la possibilité d’assigner les délinquants à contrôler à résidence sous le régime de l’art 1341. [167] de plus, je souscris à la conclusion tirée par la cour d’appel fédérale aux par. 33-38 de l’arrêt normandin, selon laquelle l’interprétation que donne m. bird aux art. 133 et 134.1 permettrait que les délin- quants ordinaires présentant un faible risque de réci- dive fassent l’objet d’assignations à résidence comme celle de m. bird, mais que ceux déclarés délinquants à contrôler — qui, par définition, présentent un risque de récidive élevé — fassent l’objet d’un contrôle moins strict de la part de l’état. cette interprétation va à l’encontre de l’objectif du régime applicable aux dé- linquants à contrôler et du large pouvoir discrétion- naire que confère le par 1341(2) à la commission d’établir des conditions en tenant compte de la sécurité publique et de la facilitation de la réinsertion. [168] j’ajouterai ceci s’il fallait que l’inter- prétation que donne m. bird à la distinction entre l’art. 133 et l’art 1341 soit retenue, cela voudrait dire que les conditions qui sont expressément pré- vues ailleurs dans la loi — comme celles portant sur la consommation de drogues ou d’alcool prévues au par.  133(3)  — ne seraient pas admissibles au titre du par 1341(2). or, compte tenu de l’objet du par 1341(2) et de celui du régime applicable aux délinquants à contrôler, il serait absurde d’interpré- ter le par 1341(2) de telle sorte qu’il interdise les conditions relatives aux drogues et à l’alcool pour les délinquants à contrôler dont le risque de récidive est lié à la consommation de ces substances. [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 481 [169] second, mr. bird points to ss 1351(1)(c) and 135.1(2), which give the board the authority to commit a long- term offender to 90  days in a community- based residential facility if that offender breaches a condition of his or her ltso or if the board is “satisfied that it is necessary and reason- able” to prevent such a breach. he argues that this provision must be taken as outlining the only circum- stances in which a long- term offender can be ordered to reside in community- based residential facilities. he adds that the prescribed 90- day period should be taken as indicative of what parliament deems to be an appropriate tenure for a long- term offender within a community- based residential facility. [170] this argument is unconvincing. sec tion 134.1 addresses the board’s task of establishing conditions attached to an ltso. the focus of s 1351(1)(c) is different. that section confers a distinct power on “[a] member of the board or a person designated” in critical or emergency situations in which a long- term offender has breached, or is likely to breach, an ltso condition or put society at risk. in such situations, one of the specified individuals may, by warrant, authorize the commitment of an offender to a community- based residential facility, a mental health facility, or custody. this power to move a long- term offender on short notice into one of these places says nothing about where the long- term offender may properly have been located under s 1341(2) prior to the s 1351(1) move. [169] ensuite, m. bird fait état de l’al 1351(1)c) et du par 1351(2), qui habilitent la commission à ordonner l’internement d’un délinquant à contrôler pendant 90 jours dans un établissement résidentiel communautaire lorsque ce délinquant enfreint une condition de son osld ou si la commission est « convaincu[e] qu’il est raisonnable et nécessaire » de le faire pour empêcher une telle infraction. il fait valoir que cette disposition doit être interprétée comme énonçant les seules circonstances où l’on peut ordonner à un délinquant à contrôler de résider dans un établissement résidentiel communautaire. il ajoute que la période prescrite de 90 jours doit être considérée comme une indication de ce que le législateur juge approprié quant à la durée de l’assi- gnation à résidence d’un délinquant à contrôler dans un établissement résidentiel communautaire. [170] cet argument n’est pas convaincant. l’ar- ticle 134.1 traite de la tâche de la commission qui consiste à établir les conditions dont est assortie une osld. l’objet de l’al 1351(1)c) est différent. en effet, cette disposition confère un pouvoir distinct à « un membre de la commission ou [à] la personne [  ] désign[ée] » dans des situations critiques ou urgentes où un délinquant à contrôler a enfreint, ou risque d’enfreindre, une condition de son osld ou présente un risque pour la société. dans ces si- tuations, une des personnes mentionnées peut, par mandat, ordonner l’internement du délinquant dans un établissement résidentiel communautaire ou un établissement psychiatrique, ou son incarcération. ce pouvoir de déplacer avec peu de préavis le délin- quant à contrôler dans l’un de ces endroits ne dit rien au sujet de l’endroit où ce dernier pouvait à juste titre se trouver selon le par 1341(2) avant le déplacement effectué en vertu du par 1351(1). in other words, to the extent that ss 1341(2) [171] and 135.1 overlap in addressing the power to place a long- term offender in a community- based resi- dential facility, there is no conflict between these provisions. as stated in normandin, at para. 61, “the limited applicability of section 135.1 contrasts with the much broader power to set conditions of su- pervision under subsection 1341(2)”. where two provisions overlap but do not conflict, it is presumed that both are to be given full effect in accordance [171] en d’autres termes, dans la mesure où le par 1341(2) et l’art 1351 se chevauchent en ce qui concerne le pouvoir de placer un délinquant à contrô- ler dans un établissement résidentiel communautaire, il n’y a pas de conflit entre ces dispositions. comme l’a précisé la cour au par. 61 de l’arrêt normandin, « le pouvoir d’application restreinte de l’article 135.1 s’oppose à celui beaucoup plus large de fixer des condi- tions de surveillance prévu au paragraphe 1341(2) ». lorsque deux dispositions se chevauchent sans entrer 482 r v bird martin j. [2019] 1 scr. with their terms unless there is evidence that one was intended to be an exhaustive account of the ap- plicable law (thibodeau v. air canada, 2014 scc 67, [2014] 3 scr 340, at para 98). there is no indication that s 1351 was intended to exhaust the circumstances in which a long- term offender can be placed in a community- based residential facility; by its own wording, s 1351 is limited to certain par- ticular circumstances, which circumstances might call for placement in a community- based residential facility or a mental health facility or custody. the wording and apparent purpose of s 1351 do not detract from the board’s ability to set residency con- ditions under its broad s 1341(2) authority. [172] i  also conclude that there is nothing in s 1351 to suggest that parliament intended for a long- term offender’s residency in a community cor- rectional centre to be limited to 90 days as a gen- eral matter. the 90- day period refers specifically to the period of risk or emergency contemplated by s 1351(1)(c) itself. it is consistent with the urgent and warrant- driven basis for the provision that the prescribed period be limited. [173] i conclude that the text, context, and purpose of s 1341(2) confirm that the board is empowered to set residency conditions like the one imposed on mr. bird where they are reasonable and necessary to achieve the objects of the long- term offender regime. the residency condition in this case was informed by mr. bird’s specific circumstances, as described in his lengthy corrections record and the assessment pro- vided by csc. given those circumstances — which include a significant history of failures to comply, substance abuse, and a long criminal record — and the purpose of s 1341(2) in the context of the long- term offender regime, mr. bird’s residency condition is not arbitrary under s. 7 of the charter. en conflit, on présume qu’il y a lieu de donner plei- nement effet aux deux dispositions conformément à leur libellé, à moins d’une preuve qu’une des dispo- sitions visait à énoncer de manière exhaustive le droit applicable (thibodeau c. air canada, 2014 csc 67, [2014] 3 rcs 340, par 98). rien n’indique que l’art 1351 visait à énoncer de façon exhaustive les circonstances dans lesquelles un délinquant à contrô- ler peut être placé dans un établissement résidentiel communautaire; de par son propre libellé, l’applica- tion de l’art 1351 se limite à certaines circonstances particulières, qui peuvent commander un placement dans un établissement résidentiel communautaire ou un établissement psychiatrique, ou une incarcération. le libellé et l’objet manifeste de l’art 1351 n’altèrent en rien la capacité de la commission d’ordonner des assignations à résidence en vertu du large pouvoir dont l’investit le par 1341(2). [172] je conclus également que rien dans l’art 1351 ne donne à penser que le législateur a voulu limiter à 90 jours de façon générale la durée de la résidence d’un délinquant à contrôler dans un centre correc- tionnel communautaire. la période de 90 jours se rapporte précisément à la situation de risque ou d’ur- gence que vise l’al 1351(1)c) lui- même. il convient au caractère urgent de la situation visée par la dispo- sition et au fait qu’elle exige un mandat que la période prescrite soit limitée. [173] ainsi, selon moi, le libellé, le contexte et l’ob- jet du par 1341(2) confirment que la commission est habilitée à ordonner des assignations à résidence comme celle qu’elle a imposée à m. bird lorsqu’elles sont raisonnables et nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs du régime applicable aux délinquants à contrôler. l’assignation à résidence imposée en l’es- pèce reposait sur la situation particulière de m. bird, telle qu’elle est décrite dans son lourd dossier cor- rectionnel et dans l’évaluation fournie par le scc. compte tenu de cette situation  — qui comporte d’importants antécédents en matière de défaut de se conformer, des problèmes de toxicomanie et un ca- sier judiciaire chargé — et de l’objet du par 1341(2) dans le contexte du régime applicable aux délin- quants à contrôler, l’assignation à résidence impo- sée à m. bird n’est pas arbitraire au sens où il faut l’entendre pour l’application de l’art. 7 de la charte. [2019] 1 rcs. r c bird la juge martin 483 iv conclusion iv conclusion [174] i agree with the trial judge that mr. bird’s constitutional challenge to his ltso residency con- dition should have been permitted at his trial for breach of that condition. nevertheless, once permit- ted, i conclude that mr. bird’s claim under s. 7 of the charter fails. mr. bird admits the elements of the offence under s 7533. therefore, i would dismiss mr. bird’s appeal and uphold his conviction. the parties do not seek costs. [174] je suis d’accord avec le juge du procès pour dire qu’on aurait dû permettre à m. bird de contes- ter la constitutionnalité de l’assignation à résidence prévue dans son osld dans le cadre du procès qu’il a subi pour avoir contrevenu à cette condition. cela dit, une fois cette contestation permise, je conclus que la prétention de m. bird fondée sur l’art. 7 de la charte ne tient pas. m. bird admet les éléments de l’infraction décrite à l’art 7533. par conséquent, je suis d’avis de rejeter son pourvoi et de confirmer la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée contre lui. les parties ne réclament aucuns dépens. appeal dismissed. pourvoi rejeté. assistance for saskatoon inner city inc., saskatoon; greenspan humphrey weinstein, toronto. procureurs de l’appelant : community legal as­ sistance for saskatoon inner city inc., saskatoon; greenspan humphrey weinstein, toronto. procureur de l’intimée : procureur général de la saskatchewan, regina. saskatchewan, regina. of canada: attorney general of canada, winnipeg. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné­ ral du canada  :  procureur général du canada, winnipeg. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné­ rale de l’ontario : procureure générale de l’ontario, toronto. gal services inc.: aboriginal legal services inc., toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante aboriginal legal services inc. : aboriginal legal services inc., to­ ronto. tre for constitutional rights: breese davies law, to­ ronto; david asper centre for constitutional rights, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenant david asper centre for constitutional rights : breese davies law, to­ ronto; david asper centre for constitutional rights, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association cana­ liberties association: imk, mont réal. dienne des libertés civiles : imk, mont réal.
i. introduction le juge brown — i. introduction [1] i have read the carefully crafted reasons of my colleague gascon j., in which he provides a thorough and comprehensive review of the facts and the judi- cial history. i will therefore limit myself here to a few words on the context of the two appeals before the court. in his re- amended motion for authorization to institute a class action and to be a representative plaintiff dated may 8, 2015 (“application”), arc, at pp. 96- 111, and aro, vol. i, at pp. 89- 104, the [1] j’ai pris connaissance des motifs rédigés avec soin par mon collègue le juge gascon; il y dresse un portrait rigoureux et exhaustif des faits et de l’histo- rique judiciaire. je vais donc me contenter ici de rap- peler brièvement le contexte des deux pourvois dont nous sommes saisis. par sa requête réamendée pour autorisation d’exercer un recours collectif et pour être représentant datée du 8 mai 2015 (« demande »), dac, p. 96- 111, et dao, vol. i, p. 89- 104, l’intimé brown j. | le juge brown [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 853 respondent, jj, applies for authorization to institute a class action on behalf of all1 victims of sexual assaults that are alleged to have been committed in various institutions in quebec since 1940 by brothers and fathers who were members of the religious com- munity known as the congregation of holy cross. as defendants, j.j has designated the appellant province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix (“congregation”) — which is at present the legal person whose objects are to organize, admin- ister and maintain that religious community — and the appellant oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal (“oratory”) — which is an institution in which jj. alleges he was sexually assaulted as a child and that is or was at the time of the events controlled by the religious community known as the congregation of holy cross. the appellants vehemently object to the granting of authorization to institute a class action against them. [2] the congregation argues that it was consti- tuted a corporation only in 2008 and that it cannot be held liable for acts that are for the most part al- leged to have been committed before it was incor- porated. it suggests that jj should instead have sued corporation jean- brillant — a legal person that existed at the time of the events as “les frères de sainte- croix”, but that today reports no estab- lishments or employees and does not have as its ob- jects to organize, administer and maintain a religious congregation. the oratory, for its part, submits that it has no connection with the religious community known as the congregation of holy cross. it claims to be a distinct entity whose sole mission is to oper- ate and maintain that place of worship. in addition, both the appellants are of the view that, in any event, jj’s personal action is irreparably forfeit as a result of art 29261 para. 2 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”). jj sollicite l’autorisation d’exercer une action col- lective au nom de toutes1 les victimes d’agressions sexuelles qui, depuis 1940, auraient été commises au québec dans divers établissements par des frères et des pères membres de la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix. à titre de parties défenderesses, jj désigne l’appe- lante la province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix (« congrégation ») — qui est la per- sonne morale ayant aujourd’hui pour objets d’organi- ser, d’administrer et de maintenir cette communauté religieuse — et l’appelant l’oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal (« oratoire ») — qui est un établisse- ment dans lequel jj aurait personnellement subi des agressions sexuelles durant son enfance et qui est ou était à l’époque des faits contrôlé par la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix. les appelants s’opposent farouche- ment à l’octroi de l’autorisation d’exercer une action collective contre eux. [2] la congrégation fait valoir que, comme elle n’a été constituée en personne morale qu’en 2008, elle ne saurait être tenue responsable d’actes qui, pour la plupart, auraient été commis avant sa constitution. la congrégation suggère que jj aurait plutôt dû poursuivre la corporation jean- brillant — une per- sonne morale qui existait à l’époque des faits sous le nom « les frères de sainte- croix », mais qui ne fait aujourd’hui état d’aucun établissement ni d’au- cun employé, et qui n’a pas pour objets d’organiser, d’administrer et de maintenir une congrégation reli- gieuse. pour sa part, l’oratoire prétend n’avoir aucun lien avec la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix. il soutient être une entité distincte ayant comme seule mission d’ex- ploiter et d’entretenir ce lieu de culte. par ailleurs, les deux appelants sont d’avis que l’action personnelle de jj est de toute façon irrémédiablement déchue en raison de l’art 29261 al. 2 du code civil du québec (« ccq »). [3] the quebec superior court refused to author- ize the institution of the class action against the two appellants, but a majority of the quebec court of [3] la cour supérieure du québec a refusé d’auto- riser l’exercice de l’action collective contre les deux appelants, mais la majorité de la cour d’appel du 1 with the exception of victims covered by another class action that 1 à l’exception des victimes visées par un autre recours collectif has since been settled. qui a depuis fait l’objet d’un règlement. 854 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. appeal reversed that judgment. the dissenting court of appeal judge agreed with authorizing the class action against the congregation, but not against the oratory. québec a infirmé ce jugement. la juge dissidente en cour d’appel s’est dite d’accord pour autoriser l’exer- cice de l’action collective contre la congrégation, mais non contre l’oratoire. [4] i am in complete agreement with the anal- ysis of my colleague gascon j. on the subject of art 29261 ccq, and in particular with his con- clusion that the second paragraph of that article does not, as the appellants argue, create a term for forfei- ture (délai de déchéance). i also concur in his pro- posal that the congregation’s appeal be dismissed. with great respect, however, i cannot agree with his conclusion regarding the oratory. in my opinion, the judgment in which the superior court denied authorization to institute a class action against both the congregation and the oratory is tainted by nu- merous errors, of fact and of law, in relation to all the conditions set out in art. 575 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501 (“ccp”), formerly art. 1003 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-25. it was therefore open to the court of appeal to intervene and to substitute its own assessment with regard to those conditions for that of the superior court judge. [5] with respect, i see nothing that would justify this court in reversing the court of appeal’s decision to authorize the institution of a class action against both the congregation and the oratory. the con- nection between the congregation and the oratory is so close — jj’s allegations and the exhibits filed in support of the application against both these en- tities are in fact largely identical — that, respect- fully, the result proposed by the dissenting court of appeal judge is not really convincing. similarly, the superior court judge’s assertion that the applica- tion is [translation] “practically silent regarding involvement on the oratory’s part” is, again with respect, incorrect, and clearly does not suffice to dis- pose of the proposed class action against the oratory: 2015 qccs 3583, at para. 137 (canlii). the main allegations in the application, set out in paras 333 to 3.38, are written in the plural (“the respondents”) and therefore apply to the oratory as much as to the congregation. the two appeals should accordingly be dismissed, with costs to jj. [4] je partage entièrement l’analyse de mon col- lègue le juge gascon portant sur l’art 29261 ccq, en particulier sa conclusion selon laquelle le se- cond alinéa de cet article ne crée aucun délai de déchéance, contrairement à ce que prétendent les appelants. je souscris également à ses motifs suggé- rant le rejet du pourvoi de la congrégation. soit dit en tout respect, cependant, je ne peux me rallier à sa conclusion au sujet de l’oratoire. en effet, je suis d’avis que le jugement de la cour supérieure refusant d’autoriser l’exercice de l’action collective contre la congrégation et contre l’oratoire est entaché de nombreuses erreurs, de fait et de droit, et ce, à l’égard de toutes les conditions énoncées à l’art. 575 du code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501 (« cpc »), auparavant l’art. 1003 du code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-25. la cour d’appel pouvait dès lors intervenir et substituer sa propre appréciation de ces conditions à celle du juge de la cour supérieure. [5] avec égards, je ne vois aucune raison qui jus- tifierait notre cour d’infirmer la décision de la cour d’appel d’autoriser l’exercice de l’action collective contre la congrégation et contre l’oratoire. en fait, le lien entre la congrégation et l’oratoire est à ce point étroit — les allégations de jj et les pièces présentées au soutien de la demande à l’encontre de ces deux entités étant de fait largement identiques — que le résultat suggéré par la juge dissidente en cour d’appel n’est pas, soit dit en tout respect, tout à fait convaincant. de même, l’affirmation du juge de la cour supérieure selon laquelle la demande serait « pratiquement silencieuse à l’égard de l’implica- tion de l’oratoire » est, soit dit encore en tout res- pect, inexacte, et ne suffit certainement pas à écarter l’action collective projetée contre l’oratoire : 2015 qccs 3583, par. 137 (canlii). les allégations prin- cipales de la demande figurant aux par 333 à 3.38 sont rédigées au pluriel (« les intimés ») et visent par conséquent autant l’oratoire que la congrégation. les deux pourvois devraient donc être rejetés, avec dépens en faveur de jj. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 855 ii analysis ii analyse [6] article  571 para.  1 ccp  defines the class action as a procedural means enabling a person who is a member of a class of persons to sue, without a mandate, on behalf of all the members of the class and to represent the class. this procedural vehicle has several objectives, namely to facilitate access to justice, to modify harmful behaviour and to con- serve judicial resources: hollick v. toronto (city), 2001 scc 68, [2001] 3  scr  158, at para.  15; western canadian shopping centres inc. v. dutton, 2001 scc 46, [2001] 2 scr 534, at paras. 27-29; vivendi canada inc. v. dell’aniello, 2014 scc 1, [2014] 1 scr 3, at para 1. prior authorization of a court is required for a person to institute a class ac- tion: art. 574 para. 1 ccp. in disposing of an appli- cation for authorization of this nature, the court must assess the four conditions set out in art 575 ccp, which reads as follows: [6] l’article 571 al 1 cpc définit l’action collec- tive comme étant le moyen procédural qui permet à une personne d’agir en demande, sans mandat, pour le compte de tous les membres d’un groupe dont elle fait partie et de le représenter. ce véhicule procédural poursuit plusieurs objectifs, à savoir faciliter l’accès à la justice, modifier des comportements préjudiciables et économiser les ressources judiciaires : hollick c. toronto (ville), 2001 csc 68, [2001] 3 rcs 158, par. 15; western canadian shopping centres inc. c. dutton, 2001 csc 46, [2001] 2 rcs 534, par. 27-29; vivendi canada inc. c. dell’aniello, 2014 csc 1, [2014] 1 rcs 3, par 1. une personne ne peut exercer l’action collective qu’avec l’autorisation préalable du tribunal : art. 574 al. 1 cpc. lorsqu’il décide du sort d’une telle demande d’autorisation, le tribunal doit éva- luer les quatre conditions prévues à l’art 575 cpc, lequel est rédigé comme suit : 575 the court authorizes the class action and appoints the class member it designates as representative plaintiff if it is of the opinion that 575 le tribunal autorise l’exercice de l’action collective et attribue le statut de représentant au membre qu’il dé- signe s’il est d’avis que : (1) the claims of the members of the class raise iden- 1° les demandes des membres soulèvent des questions tical, similar or related issues of law or fact; de droit ou de fait identiques, similaires ou connexes; (2) the facts alleged appear to justify the conclusions 2° les faits allégués paraissent justifier les conclusions sought; recherchées; (3) the composition of the class makes it difficult or impracticable to apply the rules for mandates to take part in judicial proceedings on behalf of others or for consoli- dation of proceedings; and 3° la composition du groupe rend difficile ou peu pra- tique l’application des règles sur le mandat d’ester en jus- tice pour le compte d’autrui ou sur la jonction d’instance; (4) the class member appointed as representative plain- tiff is in a position to properly represent the class members. 4° le membre auquel il entend attribuer le statut de représentant est en mesure d’assurer une représentation adéquate des membres. [7] at the authorization stage, the court plays a “screening” role: infineon technologies ag v. option consommateurs, 2013 scc 59, [2013] 3 scr 600, at paras. 59 and 65; vivendi, at para 37. it must simply ensure that the applicant meets the condi- tions of art 575 ccp if the conditions are met, the class action must be authorized. the superior court will consider the merits of the case later. this means that, in determining whether the conditions [7] à l’étape de l’autorisation, le tribunal exerce un « rôle de filtrage » : infineon technologies ag c. option consommateurs, 2013 csc 59, [2013] 3 rcs 600, par. 59 et 65; vivendi, par 37. il doit simplement s’assurer que le demandeur satisfait aux conditions énoncées à l’art 575 cpc. dans l’affirma- tive, l’exercice de l’action collective doit être autorisé. la cour supérieure procédera plus tard à l’examen du fond du litige. ainsi, lorsqu’il vérifie si les conditions 856 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. of art 575 ccp are met at the authorization stage, the judge is ruling on a purely procedural question. the judge must not deal with the merits of the case, as they are to be considered only after the applica- tion for authorization has been granted: infineon, at para. 68; vivendi, at para. 37; marcotte v. longueuil (city), 2009 scc 43, [2009] 3 scr 65, at para 22. prévues à l’art 575 cpc sont respectées au stade de l’autorisation, le juge tranche une question purement procédurale. il ne doit pas se pencher sur le fond du litige, étape qui s’amorce seulement après l’octroi de la demande d’autorisation : infineon, par. 68; vivendi, par. 37; marcotte c. longueuil (ville), 2009 csc 43, [2009] 3 rcs 65, par 22. [8] the court has given “a broad interpretation and application to the requirements for authorization [of the institution of a class action], and ‘the tenor of the jurisprudence clearly favours easier access to the class action as a vehicle for achieving the twin goals of deterrence and victim compensation’”: bank of montreal v. marcotte, 2014 scc 55, [2014] 2 scr 725, at para. 43, quoting infineon, at para. 60; see also marcotte v. longueuil, at para 22. in other words, the class action is not an [translation] “ex- ceptional remedy” that must be interpreted narrowly: tremaine v. ah. robins canada inc., [1990] rdj. 500 (ca); see also comité d’environnement de la baie inc. v. société d’électrolyse et de chimie alcan ltée, [1990] rjq 655 (ca). on the contrary, it is [translation] “an ordinary remedy whose purpose is to foster social justice”: harmegnies v. toyota canada inc., 2008 qcca 380, at para. 29 (canlii); see also bisaillon v. concordia univer sity, 2006 scc 19, [2006] 1 scr 666, at para. 16; pharmascience inc. v. option consommateurs, 2005 qcca 437, at para. 20 (canlii); trottier v. canadian malar tic mine, 2018 qcca 1075, at paras. 35-36 (canlii). there are those who consider that [translation] “the class action is highly appropriate in sexual abuse cases, given the great vulnerability of the victims”: l. langevin and n. des rosiers, with the collabora- tion of m-p nadeau,. l’indemnisation des victimes de violence sexuelle et conjugale (2nd ed. 2012), at p. 370; see also, on this point, rumley v. british columbia, 2001 scc 69, [2001] 3 scr 184, at para. 39; griffith v. winter, 2002 bcsc 1219, 23 cpc (5th) 336, at para. 38, aff’d 2003 bcca 367, 15 bclr (4th) 390. [8] la cour privilégie « une interprétation et une application larges des critères d’autorisation [de l’exercice de l’action collective] et “la jurisprudence a clairement voulu faciliter l’exercice des [actions collectives] comme moyen d’atteindre le double objectif de la dissuasion et de l’indemnisation des victimes” » : banque de montréal c. marcotte, 2014 csc 55, [2014] 2 rcs 725, par. 43, citant infineon, par. 60; voir aussi marcotte c. longueuil, par 22. autrement dit, l’action collective n’est pas un « re- cours exceptionnel » commandant une interpréta- tion restrictive : tremaine c. ah. ro bins canada inc., [1990] rdj 500 (ca); voir aussi comité d’environnement de la baie inc. c. société d’élec- trolyse et de chimie alcan ltée, [1990] rjq 655 (ca). au contraire, il s’agit d’« un remède ordinaire qui vise à favoriser une meilleure justice sociale » : harmegnies c. toyota canada inc., 2008 qcca 380, par. 29 (canlii); voir aussi bisaillon c. université concordia, 2006 csc 19, [2006] 1 rcs 666, par. 16; pharmascience inc. c. option consommateurs, 2005 qcca 437, [2005] rjq 1367, par. 20 (canlii); trottier c. canadian malartic mine, 2018 qcca 1075, par. 35-36 (canlii). certains considèrent que « [l’action collective] est très approprié[e] dans les cas de sévices sexuels, étant donné la grande vul- nérabilité des victimes » : l. langevin et n. des rosiers, avec la collaboration de m.-p nadeau, l’in demnisation des victimes de violence sexuelle et conjugale (2e éd. 2012), p. 370; voir également, en ce sens, rumley c. colombie- britannique, 2001 csc 69, [2001] 3 rcs 184, par. 39; griffith c. winter, 2002 bcsc 1219, 23 cpc (5th) 336, par. 38, conf. par 2003 bcca 367, 15 bclr (4th) 390. [9] in ruling on the oratory’s appeal, there are two questions that must be answered. the first is whether the court of appeal’s intervention in the superior court judge’s decision was justified. the second, which arises only if the court of appeal is found to [9] pour trancher le pourvoi de l’oratoire, il faut répondre à deux questions. la première est celle de savoir si l’intervention de la cour d’appel à l’égard de la décision du juge de la cour supérieure était justifiée. la deuxième — qui ne se pose que si l’on [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 857 have been justified in intervening and in substituting its own assessment with respect to the conditions of art 575 ccp for that of the superior court judge, is whether the court of appeal’s decision to authorize the class action against both the congregation and the oratory is itself tainted by an error that justifies a review by this court. a was the court of appeal’s intervention in the superior court judge’s decision justified? [10] the court of appeal’s “power to intervene   . is limited” when it hears an appeal from a deci- sion on an application for authorization to institute a class action, which means that “it must show def- erence to the motion judge’s decision”: vivendi, at para 34. it is well established that the assessment of whether the conditions for authorization are met entails the exercise of a discretion: harmegnies, at paras 20-24. the court of appeal “will therefore intervene    only if the motion judge erred in law or if the judge’s assessment with respect to the criteria of art. [575] ccp is clearly wrong”: vivendi, at para 34. moreover, “[i]f the motion judge errs in law or if his or her assessment with respect to any crite- rion of art. [575] ccp is clearly wrong, the court of appeal can substitute its own assessment, but only for that criterion and not for the others”: vivendi, at para. 35; see also sofio v. organisme canadien de réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobi- lières (ocrcvm), 2015 qcca 1820, at para. 17 (canlii); sibiga v. fido solutions inc., 2016 qcca 1299, at paras. 32-35 (canlii); charles v. boiron canada inc., 2016 qcca 1716, at para. 37 (canlii); belmamoun v. brossard (ville), 2017 qcca 102, 68 mplr (5th) 46, at para 70. conclut que la cour d’appel était justifiée d’interve- nir et de substituer son appréciation des conditions énoncées à l’art 575 cpc à celle du juge de la cour supérieure — consiste à se demander si la décision de la cour d’appel autorisant l’exercice de l’action collective contre la congrégation et contre l’oratoire est elle- même entachée d’une quelconque erreur révisable par notre cour. a l’intervention de la cour d’appel à l’égard de la décision du juge de la cour supérieure était- elle justifiée? [10] lorsqu’elle siège en appel d’une décision por- tant sur une demande sollicitant l’autorisation d’exer- cer une action collective, la cour d’appel « ne détient qu’un pouvoir limité d’intervention »; ainsi, « elle doit faire preuve de déférence envers la décision du juge d’autorisation » : vivendi, par 34. il est en effet bien établi que l’appréciation du respect des condi- tions d’autorisation implique l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire : harmegnies, par 20-24. en consé- quence, la cour d’appel « n’interviendra [  ] que si le juge d’autorisation a commis une erreur de droit ou si son appréciation des critères énoncés à l’art. [575] cpc est manifestement non fondée » : vivendi, par 34. en outre, « en présence d’une erreur de droit ou d’une appréciation manifestement non fondée de la part du juge d’autorisation à l’égard d’un critère prévu à l’art. [575] cpc, la cour d’appel peut uni- quement substituer son appréciation pour ce critère et non pour les autres » : vivendi, par. 35; voir aussi sofio c. organisme canadien de réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobilières (ocrcvm), 2015 qcca 1820, par. 17 (canlii); sibiga c. fido solutions inc., 2016 qcca 1299, par. 32-35 (canlii); charles c. boiron canada inc., 2016 qcca 1716, par. 37 (canlii); belmamoun c. brossard (ville), 2017 qcca 102, 68 mplr (5th) 46, par 70. [11] it should be noted, however, that while it is true that the court of appeal’s power to intervene in a decision on an application for authorization to institute a class action is limited, so too is the appli- cation judge’s role: [11] toutefois, s’il est vrai que le pouvoir d’inter- vention de la cour d’appel à l’égard d’une décision portant sur une demande d’autorisation d’exercer une action collective est limité, il convient de souligner que le rôle du juge de l’autorisation l’est tout autant : while the compass for appellate intervention is in- deed limited, so too is the role of the motion judge. in [traduction] bien que le champ d’intervention en ap- pel soit effectivement limité, le rôle du juge de l’autorisation 858 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. clear terms, particularly since its decision in infineon, the supreme court has repeatedly emphasized that the judge’s function at the authorization stage is only one of filtering out untenable claims. the [supreme] court stressed that the law does not impose an onerous burden on the person seeking authorization. “he or she need only establish a ‘prima facie case’ or an ‘arguable case’”, wrote lebel and wagner jj. in vivendi, specifying that a motion judge “must not deal with the merits of the case, as they are to be considered only after the motion for authorization is granted”. l’est tout autant. en termes clairs, particulièrement depuis sa décision dans l’affaire infineon, la cour suprême a maintes fois réitéré que la fonction du juge à l’étape de l’autorisation consiste uniquement à écarter les demandes insoutenables. la cour [suprême] a affirmé que la loi n’impose pas un fardeau onéreux à la personne qui demande l’autorisation : « [le demandeur] doit uniquement démontrer l’existence d’une “apparence sérieuse de droit”, d’une “cause défen- dable” », ont écrit les juges lebel et wagner dans l’arrêt vivendi, précisant que le juge de l’autorisation « ne doit pas se pencher sur le fond du litige, étape qui s’ouvre seulement après l’octroi de la requête en autorisation ». since infineon, [the] court [of appeal] has consistently relied upon this standard, invoking it when authorization has been wrongly denied because too high a burden was imposed. depuis l’arrêt infineon, [la cour d’appel] s’est constam- ment appuyée sur cette norme, l’invoquant lorsque l’auto- risation a à tort été refusée parce qu’un fardeau trop lourd avait été imposé. (sibiga, at paras. 34-35) (sibiga, par. 34-35) [12] thus, a judge who oversteps the bounds of his or her screening role at the authorization stage, and in so doing imposes an excessive evidentiary threshold requirement on the applicant or considers the merits of the case, makes an error of law warranting the court of appeal’s intervention: vivendi, at paras. 4 and 37; infineon, at paras. 40 and 68; marcotte v. longueuil, at para. 22; see also sibiga, at paras. 71 and 80; masella v. td bank financial group, 2016 qcca 24, at para. 9 (canlii). in the case at bar, the superior court judge’s [13] reasons in support of his conclusion denying author- ization to institute a class action against the oratory were particularly brief: paras 128-38. aside from his comments casting doubt on the fact that only the oratory was being sued together with the con- gregation whereas, in his view, logic would instead have dictated either that all the institutions where members of the class are alleged to have been sex- ually assaulted should be sued or that none of them should be — an argument to which i will return be- low — the judge merely stated that [translation] “the reasons that justify denying the action against the congregation    are the same as the ones that apply to the action against the oratory”: para. 138 (emphasis added). with respect, it therefore seems somewhat incongruous to conclude, as gascon j. does, that the court of appeal’s intervention was [12] ainsi, le juge qui, au stade de l’autorisation, outrepasse son rôle de filtrage et, ce faisant, impose au demandeur un seuil de preuve trop élevé ou se penche sur le fond du différend, commet une erreur de droit justifiant l’intervention de la cour d’appel : vivendi, par. 4 et 37; infineon, par. 40 et 68; marcotte c. longueuil, par. 22; voir aussi sibiga, par. 71 et 80; masella c. td bank financial group, 2016 qcca 24, par. 9 (canlii). [13] en l’espèce, les motifs exposés par le juge de la cour supérieure au soutien de sa conclusion refusant d’autoriser l’exercice de l’action collective contre l’oratoire sont des plus brefs : par. 128- 138. en effet, outre ses remarques mettant en question le fait que seul l’oratoire soit poursuivi aux côtés de la congrégation alors que, selon lui, la logique aurait plutôt commandé, ou bien que toutes les ins- titutions où des membres du groupe auraient subi des agressions sexuelles soient poursuivies, ou bien qu’aucune institution ne le soit — un argument sur lequel je reviendrai —, le juge se contente d’affir- mer que « les motifs justifiant le rejet du recours contre la congrégation [  ] sont les mêmes que ceux justifiant le recours contre l’oratoire » : par. 138 (je souligne). soit dit en tout respect, il paraît dès lors un peu incohérent de conclure, comme le fait le juge gascon, que la cour d’appel était justifiée [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 859 justified with regard to the proposed class action against the congregation, but that that court was not justified in intervening with regard to the contem- plated class action against the oratory. d’intervenir à l’égard de l’action collective proje- tée contre la congrégation, mais qu’elle n’était pas justifiée de le faire à l’égard de l’action collective envisagée contre l’oratoire. [14] that being said, it is useful to review some of the errors made by the superior court judge that justified the court of appeal’s intervention. i note that the superior court judge found that none of the conditions of art 575 ccp were met, whereas the court of appeal concluded to the contrary, that all of them were. in this court, the oratory is challenging only the conclusions that jj meets the conditions of commonality of issues (art 575(1) ccp) and suffi- ciency of the alleged facts (art 575(2) ccp). the oratory is also arguing that a “forfeiture” of jj’s per- sonal action affects his ability to obtain the status of a representative plaintiff who is capable of properly representing the class members (art 575(4) ccp):. afo, at para 114. on the other hand, counsel for the oratory expressly confirmed at the hearing of the appeal that his client would not be challenging the conclusion that jj meets the composition of the class condition (art. 575(3)  ccp). although the oratory’s challenge to jj’s status as representative plaintiff for the class members is based solely on arguments relating to the supposed “forfeiture” of his personal action, i find it worthwhile to discuss the superior court judge’s errors in relation to this condition as well as to the other two conditions at issue in this court, given that the judge’s own rea- sons suggest that the errors he made with respect to the condition of status as representative plaintiff affected his analysis regarding the other conditions. he stated that the circumstances of the case before him [translation] “highlight the fact that the var- ious conditions set out in [art 575 ccp] are not watertight compartments” and that, as a result, “the reasons why [the application had to] fail with respect to one of the requirements also justif[ied] dismiss- ing it in relation to another”: para. 22, quoting del guidice v. honda canada inc., 2007 qcca 922, [2007] rjq 1496, at para. 40; see also para 23. [14] cela dit, j’estime utile de passer en revue certaines des erreurs qu’a commises le juge de la cour supérieure, et qui justifiaient l’intervention de la cour d’appel. il convient de rappeler que le juge de la cour supérieure a conclu qu’aucune des conditions énoncées à l’art 575 cpc n’était res- pectée, alors que la cour d’appel a au contraire jugé que toutes les conditions l’étaient. en appel devant notre cour, l’oratoire conteste seulement le respect par jj des conditions relatives au caractère com- mun des questions (art 575(1) cpc) et au carac- tère suffisant des faits allégués (art 575(2) cpc). l’oratoire prétend également que la « déchéance » de l’action personnelle de jj affecte sa capacité d’obtenir le statut de représentant apte à assurer une représentation adéquate des membres du groupe (art 575(4) cpc) : mao, par 114. lors de l’au- dition du pourvoi, le procureur de l’oratoire a par ailleurs expressément confirmé qu’il renonçait à contester le respect par jj de la condition relative à la composition du groupe (art 575(3) cpc). bien que la contestation par l’oratoire du statut de jj. comme représentant des membres du groupe se li- mite à des arguments sur la prétendue « déchéance » de l’action personnelle de jj, je considère qu’il est nécessaire de souligner les erreurs du juge de la cour supérieure à l’égard de cette condition et des deux autres qui sont contestées devant nous, puisqu’il ressort des motifs mêmes du juge de la cour supérieure que les erreurs qu’il a commises sur la condition relative au statut de représentant ont affecté son analyse des autres conditions. en effet, le juge de la cour supérieure a affirmé que les circons- tances de l’affaire dont il était saisi « mett[aient] en relief l’absence de cloisonnement étanche entre les diverses conditions fixées par [l’art 575 cpc] », de sorte que « les raisons pour lesquelles [la de- mande] dev[ait] échouer quant à une des exigences justifi[aient] aussi son rejet sous un autre rapport » : par. 22, citant del guidice c. honda canada inc., 2007 qcca 922, [2007] rjq 1496, par. 40; voir aussi par 23. 860 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. (1) intervention of the court of appeal with regard to the condition of commonality of issues (article 575(1) ccp) (1) l’intervention de la cour d’appel à l’égard de la condition relative au caractère commun des questions (art 575(1) cpc) [15] the superior court judge noted that several issues raised by the proposed class action, such as those related to prescription and to the existence of damages or of a causal connection, [translation] “will have to be analyzed individually, which means that they cannot be the subject of common questions of law or of fact”: para 127. the court of appeal rightly found that this factor could not in and of itself justify dismissing the application for authori- zation: [translation] “it is quite possible that the determination of common issues does not lead to the complete resolution of the case, but that it results instead in small trials at the stage of the individual settlement of the claims, which does not preclude a class action suit” (2017 qcca 1460, at para. 55 (canlii), quoting collectif de défense des droits de la montérégie (cddm) v. centre hospitalier régional du suroît du centre de santé et de services sociaux du suroît, 2011 qcca 826, at para. 23 (canlii), quoted with approval in vivendi, at para. 42; see also sibiga, at paras. 115, 123 and 128). [16] the superior court judge also stressed that there were differences between the situations of the class members, given that [translation] “there could be an indeterminate number of places where wrongful acts are alleged to have been committed”: para 120. in addition, he stated that “[a]ll the other cases of the same nature in which authorization to institute a class action was granted    concerned a single institution in which acts had allegedly been committed by one or more well- identified persons”: para. 119 (emphasis added). as the judge himself noted at para. 119 (fn 39) of his reasons, however, there is at least one exception in cornellier v. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2011 qccs 6670 (“cornellier”), the superior court authorized the institution of a class action in a case that concerned sexual abuse, by members of the congregation, of students who had attended collège notre- dame, collège saint- césaire and école notre- dame de pohénégamook. [15] le juge de la cour supérieure a souligné que plusieurs questions soulevées par l’action collective projetée — telles les questions relatives à la pres- cription et à l’existence de dommages ou d’un lien de causalité — « devront être analysées individuel- lement, de sorte qu’elles ne peuvent faire l’objet de questions de droit ou de faits communes » : par 127. la cour d’appel a estimé à juste titre que ce facteur ne pouvait en soi justifier le rejet de la demande d’au- torisation : « il est fort possible que la détermination des questions communes ne constitue pas une réso- lution complète du litige, mais qu’elle donne plutôt lieu à des petits procès à l’étape du règlement indivi- duel des réclamations [ce qui] ne fait pas obstacle à [une action collective] » (2017 qcca 1460, par. 55 (canlii), citant collectif de défense des droits de la montérégie (cddm) c. centre hospitalier régional du suroît du centre de santé et de services sociaux du suroît, 2011 qcca 826, par. 23 (canlii), cité avec approbation dans vivendi, par. 42; voir aussi sibiga, par. 115, 123 et 128). [16] le juge de la cour supérieure a également insisté sur les différences que présentent les situa- tions des membres du groupe, étant donné le fait qu’« il existe potentiellement un nombre indéterminé d’endroits où des gestes fautifs auraient été posés » : par 120. il a aussi mentionné que, « [d]ans tous les autres dossiers de même nature pour lesquels l’autorisation d’exercer un recours collectif a été accordée [  ], il s’agissait d’une seule et même ins- titution dans laquelle les actes reprochés avaient été posés par une ou des personnes bien identifiées » : par. 119 (je souligne). toutefois, comme le signale le juge lui- même, au par. 119 (note 39) de ses mo- tifs, il existe au moins une exception. par exemple, dans l’affaire cornellier c. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2011 qccs 6670 (« affaire cornellier »), la cour supérieure a autorisé l’exercice d’un recours collectif dans un cas où le litige concernait des sévices sexuels commis par des membres de la congrégation sur des étudiants ayant fréquenté le collège notre- dame, le collège saint- césaire et l’école notre- dame de pohénégamook. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 861 [17] but the court of appeal stressed that the congregation was being sued [translation] “not because of the establishments [it] operate[s], but because the assailants are members of the congre- gation”: para. 64; see also para 97. as the court of appeal pointed out, “[t]he idea of an independent establishment, in the sense of a distinct enterprise, that the judge accepted does not reflect the con- gregation’s reality”, as its members, depending on their assignments, “could probably move from one establishment to another quite informally”: para. 63; see, for example, exhibit r-8 (“table of victims”), arc, at pp. 151-52, regarding the situations of brother brunelle, who was assigned in succession to orphelinat saint- joseph and école artisanale notre- dame-des- monts, and brother bernard, who was assigned first to the oratory and then to an es- tablishment in waterville. it should be mentioned in this regard that the congregation reports having nearly 20 establishments in quebec: see exhibits r-1 (amended), information statement for the congre- gation in the enterprise register (2015), and r-1.2, information statement for the congregation in the enterprise register (2014), arc, at pp. 135-36 and 147-48. [18] however, all the class members were alleg- edly assaulted by members of the congregation, re- gardless of the places where the assaults are alleged to have occurred. these members of the congrega- tion necessarily engaged in their activities with chil- dren with the consent or under the authority of the congregation’s officers (ca reasons, at para. 57); jj alleges that the congregation is an institute of consecrated life that is subject to canon law (pa- ras 339 and 3.40 of the application); regarding the authority of the superior of a religious institute over the institute’s members, see paras 3401 to 3.47 of the application; see also exhibits r-6, t p doyle,. canon law: what is it? (2006) (“doyle article (2006)”), aro, vol. ii, at p. 87, and r-7, excerpts from the code of canon law (french version only), canons 1395 and 1717, aro, vol. ii, at pp. 89-93; finally, see by analogy john doe v. bennett, 2004 scc 17, [2004] 1 scr 436, at paras. 21 and 27-28; bazley v. curry, [1999] 2 scr 534, at paras. 44 and 46; m. h. ogilvie, religious institutions and the law in canada (4th ed. 2017), at pp. 226 and 320. [17] pour sa part, la cour d’appel a plutôt souligné que la congrégation est poursuivie « non pas en raison des établissements [qu’elle] exploit[e], mais bien parce que les agresseurs sont des membres de la congrégation » : par. 64; voir aussi par 97. en effet, comme l’a indiqué la cour d’appel, « [l’]idée d’établissement autonome, dans le sens — d’entre- prise distincte —, telle que retenue par le juge ne correspond pas à la réalité de la congrégation », dont les membres, au gré de leurs assignations, « étaient vraisemblablement susceptibles de passer d’un établissement à l’autre sans autre formalité » : par. 63; voir, par exemple, à la pièce r-8 (« tableau des victimes »), dac, p. 151- 152, la situation du frère brunelle assigné successivement à l’orphelinat saint- joseph et à l’école artisanale notre- dame-des- monts, et celle du frère bernard assigné d’abord à l’oratoire, puis à l’établissement de waterville. il im- porte à cet égard de mentionner que la congrégation fait état de près d’une vingtaine d’établissements au québec : voir les pièces r-1 (amendée), état des renseignements de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2015), et r-1.2, état des renseigne- ments de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2014), dac, p. 135- 136 et 147- 148. [18] cependant, tous les membres du groupe au- raient été agressés par des membres de la congréga- tion, et ce, peu importe les endroits où les agressions seraient survenues. or, ces mêmes membres de la congrégation exerçaient nécessairement leurs ac- tivités auprès d’enfants avec le consentement ou sous l’autorité des dirigeants de la congrégation (motifs de la ca, par. 57); de fait, jj allègue que la congrégation est un institut de vie consacrée assujetti au droit canon (par 339 et 3.40 de la demande); au sujet de l’autorité du supérieur d’un institut religieux sur ses membres, voir par 3401 à 3.47 de la de- mande; voir aussi les pièces r-6, t. p. doyle, canon law : what is it? (2006) (« article doyle (2006) »), dao, vol. ii, p. 87, et r-7, extraits du code de droit canonique, canons 1395 et 1717, dao, vol. ii, p. 89-93; voir, enfin, par analogie, untel c. bennett, 2004 csc 17, [2004] 1 rcs 436, par. 21 et 27-28; bazley c. curry, [1999] 2 rcs 534, par. 44 et 46; m. h. ogilvie, religious institutions and the law in canada (4e éd. 2017), p. 226 et 320. il en résulte que tous les membres du groupe ont un intérêt certain à 862 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. this means that all the class members clearly have an interest in having at least one common question decided, one “that would serve to advance the resolu- tion of the litigation with respect to all the members of the group, and that would not play an insignif- icant role in the outcome of the case” (vivendi, at para. 60), that is, the question of the congregation’s liability for the alleged assaults on children by some of its members who were engaging in activities with those children with the consent or under the author- ity of the congregation’s officers. [19] the main issue here concerns liability based on a direct fault of the congregation (or, more sim- ply, its direct liability) for alleged “systemic” negli- gence in relation to alleged assaults on children by its members. the court of appeal concluded in this regard that [translation] “the questions inherent in the issue of direct liability of the [congregation] are on their own capable of clearly advancing the case toward a resolution of the litigation”: para. 67 (emphasis added); see also para 106. it should in fact be noted that all the common issues identified by jj. that were authorized by the court of appeal actually related to the question whether the congregation was negligent toward the victims of assaults alleg- edly committed by its members. jj alleges that the congregation [translation] “allowed [its] mem- bers    to sexually abuse minor children in pub- lic schools, in orphanages, at the oratory    and in other places”: para 333 of the application. the congregation also allegedly “subjected the victims to mental, religious and psychological duress by discouraging them from reporting the sexual abuse by [its] members”: para 334 of the application. jj. further alleges that the congregation “[was] aware of the sexual abuse by [its] members    but never- theless hushed it up”: para 335 of the application. jj adds that the congregation “knowingly and con- sciously chose to ignore the issue of sexual abuse of minor children by [its] members”: para 336 of the application. ce que soit tranchée au moins une question commune « qui ferait progresser le règlement du litige pour l’ensemble des membres du groupe et qui ne joue- rait pas un rôle négligeable quant au sort du litige » (vivendi, par. 60), soit la question de la responsabilité de la congrégation à l’égard du fait que certains de ses membres, qui ont exercé des activités auprès d’enfants avec le consentement ou sous l’autorité des dirigeants de la congrégation, auraient commis des agressions sur ces enfants. [19] il est surtout question ici de la responsabilité découlant de la faute directe (ou, plus simplement, de la responsabilité directe) de la congrégation fon- dée sur une prétendue négligence « systémique » à l’égard des agressions qui auraient été commises par ses membres sur des enfants. la cour d’appel a d’ailleurs conclu que « les questions inhérentes à la responsabilité directe [de la congrégation] sont à elles seules capables de faire progresser nettement le recours vers un règlement du litige » : par. 67 (je souligne); voir aussi par 106. il y a effectivement lieu de souligner que toutes les questions communes identifiées par jj — et autorisées par la cour d’ap- pel — portent en réalité sur la question de savoir si la congrégation a fait preuve de négligence envers les victimes des agressions qui auraient été commises par ses membres. jj allègue que la congrégation « [a] permis que des abus sexuels soient perpétrés à l’encontre d’enfants mineurs par [s]es membres [  ] dans des écoles publiques, des orphelinats, à l’ora- toire [  ], ou dans d’autres lieux » : par 333 de la demande. la congrégation aurait aussi « exercé une contrainte morale, religieuse et psychologique sur les victimes, en les incitant à ne pas dénoncer les abus sexuels commis par [s]es membres » : par 334 de la demande. jj allègue en outre que la congrégation « étai[t] au courant des abus sexuels perpétrés par [s]es membres [  ] et [qu’elle] les [a] néanmoins étouffés » : par 335 de la demande. jj ajoute que la congrégation aurait « sciemment et consciem- ment choisi d’ignorer la problématique des abus sexuels commis sur des enfants mineurs par [s]es membres » : par 336 de la demande. in sum, the court of appeal was right to inter- [20] vene in the superior court’s judgment, because the [20] en somme, la cour d’appel est intervenue à juste titre à l’égard du jugement de première instance, [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 863 application judge had erred in law regarding the main components of art 575(1) ccp by emphasizing the differences between the class members that related to the fact that the assaults had allegedly been com- mitted in [translation] “an indeterminate number of places” (para. 120) rather than acknowledging that there was at least one common question stemming from the fact that all the class members were al- leged to be victims of members of the congregation: vivendi, at para 60. étant donné que le juge de la cour supérieure a com- mis une erreur de droit relativement aux compo- santes principales de l’art 575(1) cpc lorsqu’il a insisté sur les différences entre les membres du groupe découlant du fait que les agressions auraient été commises dans « un nombre indéterminé d’en- droits » (par. 120), au lieu de reconnaître l’existence d’au moins une question commune découlant du fait que tous les membres du groupe auraient été victimes de membres de la congrégation : vivendi, par 60. (2) intervention of the court of appeal with regard to the condition of sufficiency of the alleged facts (article 575(2) ccp) (2) l’intervention de la cour d’appel à l’égard de la condition relative au caractère suffisant des faits allégués (art 575(2) cpc) [21] the superior court judge was essentially of the view that no [translation] “specific, tangible facts” were alleged in the application in support of jj’s claim that the congregation knew about the assaults on children allegedly committed by its members: para. 103; see also para 105. the judge discounted exhibit r-3, m. benkert and t p doyle,. religious duress and its impact on victims of clergy sexual abuse, november 27, 2008 (“benkert and doyle article (2008)”), aro, vol. ii, at pp. 33-71, and the doyle article (2006) on the basis that they were “opinion papers”: paras 108-9. he also found that the information in exhibit r-4, dvd of the radio- canada program enquête,  september  30, 2010 (“dvd of the enquête program”), “[was]   . of no assistance for the purposes of this proceed- ing”: para 111. in addition, he attributed little — indeed no — probative value to the table of victims, particularly because jj’s counsel were involved in preparing it, and even stated that “it cannot be assumed at this stage that the people listed in [the table of victims] are in fact victims of members of [the congregation] as opposed to victims of other religious communities”: para 57. [21] pour l’essentiel, le juge de la cour supérieure a estimé qu’il n’y avait pas, dans la demande, de « faits précis et palpables » allégués au soutien de la prétention de jj suivant laquelle la congrégation avait connaissance des agressions qui auraient été commises par ses membres sur des enfants : par. 103; voir aussi par 105. le juge a écarté la pièce r-3, m. benkert et t. p. doyle, religious duress and its impact on victims of clergy sexual abuse, 27 no- vembre 2008 (« article benkert et doyle (2008) »), dao, vol. ii, p. 33-71, et l’article doyle (2006), car ils constituaient selon lui « des documents d’opi- nion » : par. 108- 109. il a également conclu que les informations contenues dans la pièce r-4, dvd de l’émission enquête de radio- canada, 30 sep- tembre  2010 («  dvd de l’émission enquête  ») « [n’étaient] [  ] d’aucune utilité pour les fins du présent recours » : par 111. de plus, il a accordé peu de valeur probante — voire aucune — au tableau des victimes, en raison notamment de la participation des procureurs de jj à sa préparation; il a même affirmé qu’« on ne peut tenir pour acquis, au présent stade, que les personnes mentionnées [au tableau des vic- times] sont véritablement des victimes des membres de [la congrégation] par opposition à des victimes d’autres communautés religieuses » : par 57. [22] with respect, the superior court judge clearly overstepped the bounds of his screening role by con- sidering the merits of the case at the authorization stage: vivendi, at paras. 4 and 37; infineon, at pa- ras. 40 and 68; marcotte v. longueuil, at para. 22; sibiga, at paras. 71 and 80. a judge who rules at the [22] avec égards, le juge de la cour supérieure a manifestement outrepassé son rôle de filtrage en se penchant, au stade de l’autorisation, sur le fond du différend : vivendi, par. 4 et 37; infineon, par. 40 et 68; marcotte c. longueuil, par. 22; sibiga, par. 71 et 80. en effet, le juge qui, au stade de l’autorisation, 864 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. authorization stage on the probative value of evidence presented in support of the application or who, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, refuses to take it into consideration makes an error of law war- ranting the court of appeal’s intervention: sibiga, at paras. 84-86; lambert (gestion peggy) v. écolait ltée, 2016 qcca 659, at para. 32 (canlii). for example, in charles, the court of appeal concluded that the judge had [translation] “clearly depart[ed] from his role and the large and liberal approach he was required to take” in choosing “to exclude from the evidence information from filed scientific articles on the basis that they had been written to discredit ho- meopathy in general and that, as a result, they lacked credibility”: para. 47; see also para. 17 (“the superior court judge [erred in discounting three scientific ar- ticles on the basis that they were too general, and in] considering at length the evidence before him, which he should have assumed to be true at this stage”); see also belmamoun, at paras. 81-83; baulne v. bélanger, 2016 qccs 5387, at para. 53 (canlii). [23] the court of appeal was therefore right to state in the case at bar that the superior court judge had [translation] “unduly limit[ed] the signifi- cance of [the table of victims] by ruling on its pro- bative value”: para 79. it was also right to point out that the judge should, at the authorization stage, have assumed the fact that all the alleged assailants listed in the table of victims were members of the congregation to be true, and that he had been wrong to speculate that the alleged assailants could have belonged to another religious community: para 80. if the “arguable case” standard is applied to the table of victims, as the court of appeal did, that exhibit does set out “specific, tangible” facts that in themselves support jj’s claim that the congregation knew about the alleged assaults on children by its members. se prononce sur la valeur probante de la preuve pré- sentée au soutien de la demande ou, en l’absence de circonstance exceptionnelle, refuse de la prendre en considération, commet une erreur de droit justifiant l’intervention de la cour d’appel : sibiga, par. 84-86; lambert (gestion peggy) c. écolait ltée, 2016 qcca 659, par.  32 (canlii) par exemple, dans l’arrêt charles, la cour d’appel a conclu que le juge s’était « écart[é] carrément de son rôle et de l’approche large et libérale qu’il se devait de suivre », lorsqu’il a choisi « d’exclure de la preuve les éléments éma- nant des articles scientifiques déposés parce qu’ils visaient à discréditer l’homéopathie en général, et qu’en cela ils devenaient peu crédibles » : par. 47; voir aussi par. 17 (« le juge de la cour supérieure a [erré lorsqu’il a écarté trois articles scientifiques, car trop généraux, et lorsqu’il a] longuement consi- déré la preuve qui lui était présentée et qu’il devait, à ce stade, tenir pour avérée »); voir, également, belmamoun, par. 81-83; baulne c. bélanger, 2016 qccs 5387, par. 53 (canlii). [23] c’est donc à bon droit, en l’espèce, que la cour d’appel a souligné que le juge de la cour supérieure avait « limit[é] indûment la portée [du tableau des victimes] en se prononçant sur sa force probante » : par 79. la cour d’appel a également eu raison de souligner qu’il fallait tenir pour avéré, au stade de l’autorisation, le fait que tous les agres- seurs présumés dénoncés au tableau des victimes sont des membres de la congrégation, et que le juge de la cour supérieure avait à tort émis l’hypothèse que les agresseurs présumés pouvaient faire partie d’une autre communauté religieuse : par 80. or, le tableau des victimes, pour peu qu’on lui applique la norme de la « cause défendable », comme l’a fait la cour d’appel, expose des faits « précis et palpables » qui soutiennent en eux- mêmes la prétention de jj. selon laquelle la congrégation avait connaissance des agressions qui auraient été commises par ses membres sur des enfants. [24] the table of victims lists 41 victims who were allegedly assaulted by close to 30 members of the congregation over a period of more than 40 years in more than 20 institutions. some of the alleged assailants were in positions of authority within the congregation, as they held the title of brother [24] en effet, le tableau des victimes énumère qua- rante et une victimes, qui auraient été agressées par près d’une trentaine de membres de la congrégation, au cours d’une période de plus de quarante ans, dans plus d’une vingtaine d’établissements. certains des agresseurs présumés étaient en situation d’autorité [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 865 superior; see also, on the list of alleged assailants, the principal of école ste- brigide, who was a mem- ber of the congregation, and superior dl. i agree with the court of appeal’s conclusion that the com- bination of all these pieces of evidence — the num- ber of assaults reported in the table of victims, the number of religious members involved, the length of the period covered by the reports and the number of places where assaults allegedly occurred — sup- ports an argument, at the authorization stage, that it might be possible at the trial on the merits to draw from them an inference that the congregation knew or could not have been unaware that some of its members were assaulting children: ca reasons, at paras. 59-60 and 83-86. indeed, at the authorization stage, the judge must pay particular attention not only to the alleged facts but also to any inferences or presumptions of fact or law that may stem from them and can serve to establish the existence of an [translation] “arguable case”: l. chamberland, ed., le grand collectif: code de procédure civile — commentaires et annotations (2nd ed.  2017), at p. 2480; see, for example, sibiga, at paras. 91-93; société québécoise de gestion collective des droits de reproduction (copibec) v. université laval, 2017 qcca 199, at para. 75 (canlii). i therefore also agree with the court of ap- [25] peal’s conclusion that [translation] “the simple prima facie evidence that close to 30 members of the congregation — fathers and brothers, including some who held the title of brother superior (and were therefore in positions of authority) — sexu- ally abused minor children over a significant period of time is indicative of the probable existence of a modus operandi on the assailants’ part”: para 83. in other words, jj’s claim that the congregation knew about the assaults on children by its members must be considered in light of “concrete”, “specific” or “tangible” facts drawn from the table of victims: au sein de la congrégation, puisqu’ils portaient le titre de frère supérieur; voir aussi, parmi l’énu- mération des agresseurs présumés, le directeur de l’école ste- brigide, membre de la congrégation, et le supérieur dl. je fais mienne la conclusion de la cour d’appel selon laquelle le cumul de tous ces élé- ments — c’est-à-dire le nombre d’agressions dénon- cées au tableau des victimes, le nombre de religieux impliqués, l’importance de la période couverte par les dénonciations et le nombre d’endroits où seraient survenues les agressions — fait en sorte qu’il est possible de soutenir, au stade de l’autorisation, qu’il y aurait lieu lors de l’audition de l’action sur le fond d’en tirer l’inférence que la congrégation savait ou ne pouvait ignorer que certains de ses membres se li- vraient à des agressions sur des enfants : motifs de la ca, par. 59-60 et 83-86. de fait, au stade de l’auto- risation, le juge doit prêter une attention particulière, non seulement aux faits allégués, mais aussi aux inférences ou présomptions de fait ou de droit qui sont susceptibles d’en découler et qui peuvent servir à établir l’existence d’une « cause défendable » : l. chamberland, dir., le grand collectif : code de procédure civile — commentaires et annotations (2e éd. 2017), p. 2480; voir, par exemple, sibiga, par. 91-93; société québécoise de gestion collective des droits de reproduction (copibec) c. université laval, 2017 qcca 199, par. 75 (canlii). [25] en conséquence, je partage également la conclusion de la cour d’appel portant que « la simple preuve prima facie selon laquelle près d’une tren- taine de membres de la congrégation, des pères et des frères dont certains portaient le titre de frère supérieur (donc en autorité), se sont adonnés à des sé- vices sexuels sur des enfants mineurs sur une période de temps importante, dénote l’existence probable d’un modus operandi chez les agresseurs » : par 83. en d’autres termes, la prétention de jj voulant que la congrégation ait eu connaissance des agressions commises par ses membres sur des enfants doit être examinée à la lumière des faits « concrets », « pré- cis » ou « palpables » qui se dégagent du tableau des victimes : [translation] in sum, the allegations relating to knowledge on the congregation’s part were, when the evi- dence discussed above is taken into account in conjunction en somme, les allégations portant sur la connaissance de la congrégation, lorsqu’on prend en compte les élé- ments de preuve ci- devant relatés auxquels s’ajoute la 866 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. with the hierarchy characteristic of traditional religious organizations, sufficient to show an arguable case with respect to the second condition of article  575  ccp. [emphasis added.] hiérarchie caractérisant les organisations religieuses tra- ditionnelles, étaient suffisantes pour démontrer une cause défendable au regard de la seconde condition de l’ar- ticle 575 cpc [je souligne.] (ca reasons, at para. 86) (motifs de la ca, par. 86) [26] in addition, the superior court judge should not, in light of the benkert and doyle article (2008), which had been presented to him, have attached so much importance to the failure, in the application itself, to allege “concrete”, “specific” or “tangible” facts in support of jj’s claim that the congregation had known about the assaults on children by its mem- bers. but the judge refused to consider the content of a scientific article of that nature. the refusal to do so was an error, as i explained above, because the article contained evidence that was relevant to this case: on this point, see ca reasons, at paras 88-90. thus, it explains that mental duress resulting from the re- lationship of authority between the priest and the child is often the reason sexual abuse is not reported: see aro, vol. ii, at pp. 40 and 60. and jj in fact alleges in this case that he never spoke about being assaulted as a child until 2011: paras 318 to 3.20 of the application. it goes without saying that he of course did not report the assaults at the time of the events. yet a failure to report at the time of the events can itself be the reason why there are no “concrete”, “specific” or “tangible” facts on which to base an allegation that the officers in question knew about the assaults. (for example, in bennett, the victims’ claim that the bishops responsible for supervising the abusive priest knew about the sexual abuse was sup- ported by the fact that reports had been made at the time of the events: paras. 1 and 8.) nevertheless, that does not mean that such knowledge does not really exist or cannot be inferred from other evidence. the benkert and doyle article (2008) also supports the allegation made at para 334 of the application that the congregation was able to [translation] “sub- jec[t] the victims to mental, religious and psycholog- ical duress by discouraging them from reporting the sexual abuse by [its] members”: see aro, vol. ii, at pp. 60 and 62-63. [26] en outre, le juge de la cour supérieure n’au- rait pas dû, à la lumière de l’article benkert et doyle (2008) qui lui a été présenté, accorder une si grande importance à l’absence, dans la demande elle- même, de faits « concrets », « précis » ou « palpables » allégués au soutien de la prétention de jj selon laquelle la congrégation avait connaissance des agressions commises par ses membres sur des en- fants. or, le juge a refusé de considérer le contenu d’un tel article scientifique ce refus constituait une erreur, comme je l’ai déjà indiqué, puisqu’il s’agissait d’une preuve pertinente en l’espèce : voir, à ce sujet, les motifs de la ca, par 88-90. en effet, suivant l’article en cause, une contrainte morale, provenant de la relation d’autorité entre le prêtre et l’enfant, est souvent la cause de l’absence de dénonciation des abus sexuels subis : voir dao, vol. ii, p. 40 et 60. justement, dans la présente af- faire, j.j allègue n’avoir jamais parlé, jusqu’en 2011, des agressions dont il aurait été victime durant son enfance : par 318 à 3.20 de la demande. il va sans dire qu’il ne les a évidemment pas dénoncées à l’époque des faits. or, l’absence de dénonciations à l’époque des faits peut elle- même être la cause de l’absence de faits «  concrets  », «  précis  » ou «  palpables  » sur lesquels asseoir une allégation de connaissance des agressions par les dirigeants concernés. (par exemple, dans bennett, la prétention des victimes relatives à la connaissance des abus sexuels par les évêques chargés de la surveillance du prêtre agresseur pouvaient s’appuyer sur l’existence de dénonciations à l’époque des faits : par. 1 et 8.) toutefois, cela ne veut pas dire qu’une telle connais- sance n’existe pas réellement ou ne peut être inférée d’autres éléments. l’article benkert et doyle (2008) appuie également l’allégation formulée au par 334 de la demande selon laquelle la congrégation a pu « exerc[er] une contrainte morale, religieuse et psychologique sur les victimes, en les incitant à ne pas dénoncer les abus sexuels commis par [s]es membres » : voir dao, vol. ii, p. 60 et 62-63. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 867 [27] finally, the superior court judge clearly erred in finding that the dvd of the enquête program was irrelevant on the basis that the information in it was [translation] “of no assistance for the purposes of this proceeding”: para 111. it is true that the dvd refers at length to sexual assaults committed at collège notre- dame, which were the subject of a settlement in cornellier; see also cornellier v. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2013 qccs 3385. however, the dvd is not limited to those assaults. rather, it supports the claim of a general knowledge of sexual abuse and a refusal to act on the part of the congregation’s officers. there is evidence to that effect that specifically sup- ports the allegation made in para 335 of the applica- tion that the congregation’s officers [translation] “were aware of the sexual abuse by [its] members   . but nevertheless hushed it up”, and it comes from a former brother of the congregation, wk, who per- sonally knew about several sexual assaults and about his community’s inaction. this former brother stated unequivocally that the congregation’s inaction re- garding the sexual abuse of children was not confined to collège notre- dame and that the congregation’s officers knew that abuse was also occurring at other places where religious members were engaging in activities with children (minute 21 of the dvd); victims who attended institutions other than collège notre- dame were also mentioned at minute 24 of the dvd ([translation] “in one or another of the institutions managed by holy cross”). in sum, the dvd attests to the systemic nature of sexual abuse by members of the congregation in various institutions. [27] enfin, le juge de la cour supérieure a mani- festement fait erreur lorsqu’il a déclaré non perti- nent le dvd de l’émission enquête, au motif que les informations qu’il dévoile n’étaient, selon lui, « d’aucune utilité pour les fins du présent recours » : par 111. il est vrai que le dvd traite longuement des agressions sexuelles commises au collège notre- dame — lesquelles ont fait l’objet d’un règlement dans l’affaire cornellier; voir aussi cornellier c. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2013 qccs 3385. toutefois, le dvd ne se limite pas à ces agressions. il étaye plutôt la connais- sance générale des abus sexuels et le refus d’agir des dirigeants de la congrégation. une telle preuve sou- tient spécifiquement l’allégation énoncée au par 335 de la demande selon laquelle les dirigeants de la congrégation « étaient au courant des abus sexuels perpétrés par [s]es membres [  ] et les ont néan- moins étouffés », et elle émane d’un ancien frère de la congrégation, wk, qui possède une connaissance personnelle de plusieurs abus sexuels et de l’inac- tion de sa communauté. cet ancien frère affirme sans équivoque que l’inaction de la congrégation à l’égard des abus sexuels commis sur des enfants ne se limite pas au seul collège notre- dame, et que les dirigeants de la congrégation savaient que des abus étaient commis également dans d’autres lieux où les religieux exerçaient des activités auprès d’enfants : minute 21 du dvd; il est également question des victimes ayant fréquenté d’autres établissements que le collège notre- dame à la minute 24 du dvd (« dans l’un ou l’autre des établissements gérés par les sainte- croix »). en somme, le dvd fait état du caractère systémique des abus sexuels commis par des membres de la congrégation au sein de divers établissements. [28] the dvd of the enquête program also reveals that brother ch was allegedly protected by the congregation even though more than one child had accused him of sexual abuse. (on the protection of- fered to assailants by the officers of religious organ- izations, see the benkert and doyle article (2008), aro, vol. ii, at pp. 39 and 70.) brother ch is mentioned in the table of victims in association with acts he is alleged to have committed against victim b.l at école côte- des-neiges and/or the oratory. the senior officer of the congregation who [28] le dvd de l’émission enquête révèle éga- lement que le frère ch aurait été protégé par la congrégation, bien que plus d’un enfant l’ait dé- noncé, lui reprochant des abus sexuels. (au sujet de la protection dont peuvent bénéficier les agresseurs de la part des dirigeants d’organisations religieuses, voir l’article benkert et doyle (2008), dao, vol. ii, p. 39 et 70.) le nom du frère ch figure dans le tableau des victimes, en lien avec des gestes qu’il aurait commis à l’endroit de la victime bl à l’école côte- des-neiges et/ou à l’oratoire. le haut dirigeant 868 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. is alleged to have protected brother ch by keeping silent about ch’s alleged sexual abuse is none other than cs, who is a director of the congregation and of corporation jean- brillant: information state- ments for the congregation in the enterprise register (2015) and (2014) and information statement for corporation jean- brillant in the enterprise register (2014), arc, at pp. 134, 141 and 146. thus, the dvd supports the allegation that at least one senior officer of the congregation may have had actual knowledge of the alleged sexual abuse by one of the assailants who is expressly identified in the table of victims. the court of appeal was therefore right to stress that the dvd was relevant at the authorization stage and therefore should not have been discounted by the superior court judge: para 93. de la congrégation qui aurait protégé le frère ch. en passant sous silence les abus sexuels qui auraient été commis par ce dernier est nul autre que cs, lequel est administrateur de la congrégation et de la corporation jean- brillant : état des renseigne- ments de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2015) et (2014) et état des renseignements de la corporation jean- brillant au registre des entreprises (2014), dac, p. 134, 141 et 146. en conséquence, le dvd étaye l’allégation selon laquelle au moins un haut dirigeant de la congrégation avait potentielle- ment une connaissance réelle des abus sexuels qui auraient été commis par l’un des agresseurs expres- sément identifiés dans le tableau des victimes. c’est donc à bon droit que la cour d’appel a souligné que le dvd était pertinent au stade de l’autorisation, et que, pour cette raison, il n’aurait pas dû être écarté par le juge de la cour supérieure : par 93. (3) intervention of the court of appeal with regard to the condition of jj’s. status as representative plaintiff for the class mem- bers (article 575(4) ccp) (3) l’intervention de la cour d’appel à l’égard de la condition relative au statut de jj. comme représentant des membres du groupe (art. 575(4) cpc) [29] the superior court judge found that jj did not have [translation] “the competence needed to properly represent the class members”: para 29. in his opinion, jj had not personally taken any steps to verify, for example, the institutions where assaults were alleged to have taken place and the number of people in the proposed class: para 31. the judge also noted that the application for authorization had been initiated by jj’s lawyers: para 31. in addition, jj. wished to remain anonymous and to minimize pos- sible contacts with other class members: paras. 33 and 35. because jj’s role did not involve “more than simply being a figurehead”, he was not an ap- propriate representative plaintiff: paras. 28 and 34. [29] le juge de la cour supérieure a conclu que jj n’avait pas « la compétence pour assurer une représentation adéquate des membres du groupe » : par 29. il lui a reproché de n’avoir effectué per- sonnellement aucune démarche afin de vérifier, par exemple, les établissements où des agressions se- raient survenues, ainsi que le nombre de personnes visées par le groupe projeté  : par.  31 le juge a également souligné que la demande d’autorisation avait été introduite à l’initiative des avocats de jj : par 31. en outre, ce dernier souhaitait demeurer ano- nyme et réduire au minimum les contacts possibles avec les autres membres du groupe : par. 33 et 35. comme le rôle de jj n’allait pas « au- delà de la simple figuration », celui-ci n’était pas un représen- tant adéquat : par. 28 et 34. [30] in making this finding, the superior court judge relied heavily on two judgments on motions that have since been set aside by the court of appeal: sibiga v. fido solutions inc., 2014 qccs 3235, and charles v. boiron canada inc., 2015 qccs 312. although the superior court judge cannot be faulted for relying on those two judgments, given that he [30] pour arriver à cette conclusion, le juge de la cour supérieure s’est fortement appuyé sur deux juge- ments de première instance qui ont été subséquemment infirmés par la cour d’appel : sibiga c. fido solutions inc., 2014 qccs 3235, et charles c. boiron canada inc., 2015 qccs 312. bien que l’on ne puisse repro- cher au juge de la cour supérieure de s’être appuyé [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 869 did not at the time of his ruling have the benefit of the court of appeal’s decisions reversing them, his analysis with respect to the condition of jj’s status as representative plaintiff must nonetheless be reviewed on appeal in light of those recent de- cisions, as the dissenting court of appeal judge in fact recognized: para 138. thus, the superior court judge clearly erred in concluding that the leading role played by jj’s lawyers in bringing the application for authorization was inconsistent with jj’s status as representative plaintiff for the members of the proposed class: sibiga, at paras. 101-2; charles, at paras 53-56. sur ces deux jugements de première instance, puisqu’il n’avait pas le bénéfice des arrêts de la cour d’appel les infirmant lorsqu’il s’est prononcé, son analyse de la condition relative au statut de jj comme représentant devait néanmoins être revue en appel à la lumière de ces arrêts récents, comme l’a d’ailleurs reconnu la juge dissidente en cour d’appel : par 138. ainsi, le juge de la cour supérieure a clairement fait erreur en concluant que le rôle de premier plan joué par les avocats de jj dans l’introduction de la demande d’autorisation était incompatible avec le statut de ce dernier comme représentant des membres du groupe projeté : sibiga, par. 101- 102; charles, par 53-56. [31] the superior court judge did, however, have the benefit of the principles from lévesque v. vidéo- tron, senc, 2015 qcca 205, in which the court of appeal had stated that the application judge had erred in faulting the applicant for failing to try to identify other members of the class or determine how many of them there might be; see also martel v. kia canada inc., 2015 qcca 1033, at para. 29 (canlii), another case in which the court of appeal tempered the applicant’s duty to investigate. these same criti- cisms should therefore not have been levelled against jj. this error also influenced the superior court judge’s analysis with respect to other conditions such as that of the composition of the class set out in art 575(3) ccp, since he also expressed the opin- ion, in discussing that condition, that [translation] “the lack of any information together with jj’s fail- ure to investigate or to take any steps whatsoever” meant “that the statement in [para 41 of the appli- cation] regarding the possible number of victims” was only an “inference” or “hearsay”: para 73. the judge stated that “deficiencies in an investigation by a representative plaintiff” could “be fatal where meeting the condition set out in [art 575(3) ccp] is at issue”: para 74. he had in fact indicated that he would begin with the analysis concerning the condition of jj’s status as representative plaintiff, because the reasons why jj’s application failed with respect to that condition also justified dismissing it on other grounds: paras 22-23. [31] le juge de la cour supérieure a cependant pu profiter des enseignements de l’arrêt lévesque c. vidéotron, senc, 2015 qcca 205, dans lequel la cour d’appel a précisé que le juge de l’autorisa- tion avait à tort reproché au demandeur de n’avoir cherché ni à identifier d’autres membres du groupe ni à cerner leur nombre potentiel; voir également l’arrêt martel c. kia canada inc., 2015 qcca 1033, par. 29 (canlii), où la cour d’appel a là aussi tem- péré le devoir d’enquête imposé au demandeur. ces mêmes reproches n’auraient donc pas dû être adres- sés à jj. cette erreur s’est d’ailleurs répercutée sur l’analyse par le premier juge d’autres conditions, telle celle relative à la composition du groupe énon- cée à l’art 575(3) cpc, puisque le juge y a de nouveau souligné, à l’égard de cette condition, que « l’absence totale d’informations, d’enquête ou de quelque démarche que ce soit par jj » faisait en sorte, selon lui, « que l’affirmation mentionnée [au par 41 de la demande] quant au nombre potentiel de victimes » n’était qu’une « inférence » ou du « ouï- dire » : par 73. pour le juge, en effet, « les carences d’une enquête menée par un représentant » pouvaient « être fatale[s] quant au respect de la condition énon- cée à [l’art 575(3) cpc] » : par 74. le juge avait de fait indiqué qu’il analyserait en premier la condition relative au statut de jj comme représentant, car les raisons pour lesquelles la demande de jj échouait quant à cette condition justifiaient aussi le rejet de celle-ci sous d’autres rapports : par 22-23. [32] thus, the court of appeal was amply justi- fied in intervening with regard to the condition of jj’s status as representative plaintiff. as the court [32] la cour d’appel était dès lors largement justi- fiée d’intervenir à l’égard de la condition relative au statut de jj comme représentant. comme l’a souligné 870 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. of appeal noted, at para. 104, three criteria must be considered in deciding whether an applicant should be granted this status. the applicant must show (a) an interest in the suit, (b) competence and (c) an absence of conflict with the class members (p-c lafond,. le recours collectif comme voie d’accès à la justice pour les consommateurs (1996), at p. 419; infineon, at para. 149; union des consommateurs v. air can ada, 2014 qcca 523, at para. 82 (canlii)). these three criteria are to be interpreted “liberally”, which means that “[n]o proposed representative should be excluded unless his or her interest or competence is such that the case could not possibly proceed fairly”: infineon, at para 149. in my view, the court of appeal was right to find, at para. 108, that jj met the legal requirements. the court of appeal was also right to point out that it is perfectly normal in this type of class action for sexual assault victims, including the representative plaintiff, to take advantage of the right to anonymity and for contact with members to be maintained pri- marily through the representative plaintiff’s lawyers: para. 105, quoting a v. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 34, at paras. 71 and 79 (canlii). la cour d’appel, au par. 104, trois critères doivent être considérés pour décider de ce statut. le demandeur doit démontrer : a) l’intérêt à poursuivre; b) la compé- tence; et c) l’absence de conflit avec les membres du groupe (p-c. lafond, le recours collectif comme voie d’accès à la justice pour les consommateurs (1996), p. 419; infineon, par. 149; union des consommateurs c. air canada, 2014 qcca 523, par. 82 (canlii)). il y a lieu d’interpréter ces trois critères « de façon libérale »; ainsi, « [a]ucun représentant proposé ne de- vrait être exclu, à moins que ses intérêts ou sa compé- tence ne soient tels qu’il serait impossible que l’affaire survive équitablement » : infineon, par 149. à mon avis, c’est à bon droit que la cour d’appel a conclu, au par. 108, que jj satisfaisait aux exigences de la loi. la cour d’appel pouvait aussi à juste titre souli- gner qu’il est tout à fait normal dans ce type d’action collective que les victimes d’agressions sexuelles, y compris le représentant, bénéficient du droit à l’ano- nymat, et que les contacts avec les membres se fassent principalement par l’entremise des avocats du repré- sentant : par. 105, citant a c. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 34, par. 71 et 79 (canlii). (4) conclusion on the court of appeal’s inter- (4) conclusion sur l’intervention de la cour vention d’appel [33] there is no doubt that the superior court judge made numerous errors, of fact and of law, with respect to all the conditions of art 575 ccp several of his errors, such as failing to identify at least one issue common to all the class members — namely the issue of the congregation’s “systemic” negligence regard- ing assaults on children allegedly committed by its members — or discounting the dvd of the enquête program and the table of victims, necessarily influ- enced his decision to deny the institution of the class action against the oratory. what is more, the superior court judge stated — and this is worth repeating — that [translation] “[t]he reasons that justify deny- ing the action against the congregation    are the same as the ones that apply to the action against the oratory”: para. 138 (emphasis added). [33] il ne fait aucun doute que le juge de la cour supérieure a commis de nombreuses erreurs, de fait et de droit, et ce, relativement à toutes les conditions énoncées à l’art 575 cpc. plusieurs des erreurs du juge, par exemple le fait qu’il n’a pas su cerner au moins une question commune à tous les membres du groupe — en l’occurrence la question de la négli- gence « systémique » de la congrégation à l’égard des agressions qui auraient été commises par ses membres sur des enfants — ou encore le fait qu’il a écarté le dvd de l’émission enquête et le tableau des victimes, ont nécessairement influencé sa décision de refuser l’exercice de l’action collective contre l’ora- toire. le juge de la cour supérieure — il convient de le répéter — a d’ailleurs affirmé que « les motifs justifiant le rejet du recours contre la congrégation [  ] sont les mêmes que ceux justifiant le recours contre l’oratoire » : par. 138 (je souligne). [34] given the numerous errors made by the su- perior court judge with respect to all the conditions [34] étant donné les nombreuses erreurs du juge de la cour supérieure relativement à toutes les conditions [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 871 of art 575 ccp, the court of appeal was clearly right to “substitute its own assessment” for that of the application judge with respect to all the con- ditions: vivendi, at para 35. it must now be asked whether the court of appeal’s decision to authorize the institution of the class action against both the congregation and the oratory is itself tainted by an error that justifies a review by this court. énoncées à l’art 575 cpc, la cour d’appel était clai- rement justifiée de « substituer son appréciation » à celle du premier juge, et ce, à l’égard de toutes ces conditions : vivendi, par 35. il convient maintenant de se demander si la décision de la cour d’appel autorisant l’exercice de l’action collective contre la congrégation et contre l’oratoire est elle- même entachée d’une quel- conque erreur révisable par notre cour. b is the court of appeal’s decision to authorize the institution of the class action against both the congregation and the oratory tainted by an error that justifies a review? b la décision de la cour d’appel autorisant l’exer- cice de l’action collective contre la congréga- tion et contre l’oratoire est- elle entachée d’une erreur révisable? [35] before i discuss the conditions of common- ality of issues and sufficiency of the alleged facts, which as i mentioned above are the only ones at issue in the oratory’s appeal (aside from its argu- ments concerning the supposed “forfeiture” of jj’s personal action that, it is argued, affects his status as an appropriate representative plaintiff for the class members), a few words about the “connection” be- tween the oratory and the congregation are in order. i will conclude my analysis by addressing the fact that only the oratory is being sued together with the congregation. [35] avant d’examiner les conditions du caractère commun des questions et du caractère suffisant des faits allégués, conditions qui, je le rappelle, sont les seuls points que conteste l’oratoire (outre ses arguments portant sur la prétendue « déchéance » de l’action personnelle de jj qui affecterait le sta- tut de ce dernier comme représentant adéquat des membres du groupe), il y a lieu de traiter briève- ment de la question du « lien » entre l’oratoire et la congrégation. je terminerai mon analyse en exa- minant le fait que seul l’oratoire soit poursuivi aux côtés de la congrégation. (1) “connection” between the oratory and the (1) le « lien » entre l’oratoire et la congrégation congregation [36] at the hearing in this court, the oratory dis- puted the existence of any “connection” between it and the congregation. but it is important to recall the court of appeal’s finding that the oratory’s af- fairs [translation] “were managed in whole or in part by the congregation’s members”: para. 111; see also paras. 14, 22 and 64. moreover, the dissent- ing court of appeal judge did not dispute “[t]he   . fact that the oratory is managed by members of the congregation”: para 137. she merely questioned the legal consequence that fact might have. in my opinion, the oratory has not shown how the court of appeal’s finding on this point is tainted by an error that justifies a review. [36] lors de l’audience devant notre cour, l’ora- toire a contesté l’existence de tout « lien » entre lui et la congrégation. toutefois, il convient de rappeler la conclusion de la cour d’appel selon laquelle les affaires de l’oratoire « sont administrées en partie ou en totalité par les membres de la congrégation » : par. 111; voir aussi par. 14, 22 et 64. d’ailleurs, la juge dissidente en cour d’appel n’a pas elle non plus nié « [l]e [  ] fait que l’oratoire est administré par des membres de la congrégation » : par 137. elle a seulement contesté la conséquence juridique suscep- tible de découler de ce fait. à mon avis, l’oratoire n’a pas démontré en quoi la conclusion de la cour d’ap- pel à cet égard serait entachée d’une erreur révisable. [37] in his application, jj alleges that the con- gregation founded the oratory: para 33. the act to incorporate “st. joseph’s oratory of mount royal”, [37] dans sa demande, jj allègue que la congré- gation a fondé l’oratoire : par 33. il joint à sa de- mande la loi constituant en corporation l’oratoire 872 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. sq 1916, c. 90 (“1916 act”), is attached to the application, and the following excerpt from that act — from its preamble in particular — confirms his allegation: saint- joseph du mont- royal, sq 1916, c. 90 (« loi de 1916 »), dont les passages reproduits ci- dessous, en particulier le préambule de cette loi, confirment son allégation : whereas the reverend georges dion of the city of montreal, the reverend elphège hébert of the town of st. laurent, the reverend absalon renaud of the city of montreal, and messrs. alfred bessette and augustin leroy, both of the city of montreal, in religion respec- tively brother andré and brother marie- auguste, all five members of the congregation of the holy cross, have by their petition represented that a chapel dedicated to the devotion of st. joseph has been established and maintained for many years past on the slope of mount royal in the city of montreal, and that the faithful have been in the habit of frequenting it in large numbers; that in order to assure the permanent maintenance of the said chapel and to allow the extension of its sphere of action, it is expedient to incorporate the petitioners for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining the said chapel and thereby promoting the roman catholic faith and the welfare of souls by the propagation of the devotion to st. joseph; attendu que le révérend george dion, de la cité de montréal, le révérend elphège hébert, de la ville de saint- laurent, le révérend absalon renaud, de la cité de mont- réal, et mm. alfred bessette et augustin leroy, tous deux de la cité de montréal, en religion respectivement frère andré et frère marie- auguste, tous cinq membres de la congrégation de sainte- croix, ont par leur pétition représenté : qu’une chapelle, dédiée à la dévotion de saint- joseph, a été établie et maintenue depuis plusieurs années sur le flanc du mont- royal, dans la cité de montréal, et que les fidèles ont pris pour habitude de la visiter en grand nombre; que pour assurer en permanence le maintien de ladite chapelle et permettre d’agrandir son champ d’action, il convient de constituer en corporation les pétitionnaires, dans le but d’acquérir et maintenir ladite chapelle et dé- velopper par là la foi catholique et le bien des âmes par la propagation de la dévotion à saint- joseph;   .   . whereas the petitioners have prayed that an act for the purpose aforesaid be passed; and whereas it is expedient to grant their prayer; attendu que les pétitionnaires ont demandé l’adoption d’une loi à l’effet susdit, et qu’il convient de faire droit à leur demande; therefore his majesty, with the advice and consent of the legislative council and of the legislative assembly of quebec, enacts as follows: a ces causes, sa majesté, de l’avis et du consente- ment du conseil législatif et de l’assemblée législative de québec, décrète ce qui suit : 1. the said reverend georges dion, reverend elphège hébert, reverend absalon renaud, brother andré and brother marie- auguste, and all persons who hereafter associate themselves with them, and their successors, are and shall be constituted a corporation for the purpose of promoting the roman catholic faith and the welfare of souls by the propagation of the devotion to saint joseph under the name of “st. joseph’s oratory of mount royal.” 1 lesdits révérend george dion, révérend elphège hébert, révérend absalon renaud, frère andré et frère marie- auguste et toutes autres personnes qui, par la suite, s’associeront à eux, de même que leurs successeurs sont et seront constitués en corporation dans le but de promou- voir la foi catholique romaine et le bien des âmes par la propagation de la dévotion à saint- joseph sous le nom de “l’oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal.” furthermore, the following comments are made at the very beginning of the dvd of the enquête pro- gram: [translation] “holy cross officers knew very well what was happening”, and “[t]his scandal broke at a time when the pope was about to canonize the most illustrious of the community’s members, brother andré, the builder of st. joseph’s oratory” il est de plus mentionné, au tout début du dvd de l’émission enquête, que « les dirigeants des sainte- croix savaient très bien ce qui se passait » et que « [c]e scandale éclate alors que le pape s’apprête à canoniser le plus illustre des membres de cette com- munauté, le frère andré, le bâtisseur de l’oratoire saint- joseph » (je souligne). il y est aussi question [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 873 (emphasis added). a little later, the speaker also refers to a “wealthy, influential and prestigious con- gregation” whose members “built a monument, st. joseph’s oratory, and    will [soon] have among them a saint, brother andré”. un peu plus loin d’une « congrégation riche, influente et prestigieuse », dont les membres « ont bâti un monument, l’oratoire saint- joseph et [  ] auront [bientôt] un saint parmi eux, le frère andré ». [38] as well, s. 2 of the 1916 act provided that the oratory’s affairs were to be managed by five directors, all of them members of the congregation: [38] en outre, l’art. 2 de la loi de 1916 précise que les affaires de l’oratoire sont administrées par cinq directeurs qui sont tous membres de la congré gation : 2.  the affairs of the corporation shall be managed by five directors, who shall be chosen from amongst its members who are at the same time members of the con- gregation of the holy cross, at a general meeting held for that purpose. [39] in 1974, the oratory was continued under the religious corporations act, sq 1971, c. 75 (now the religious corporations act, cqlr, c. c-71): see exhibit r-2, information statement for the oratory in the enterprise register (2013), aro, vol. ii, at p 23. for the entire period before 1974, however, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the oratory was not governed by the 1916 act. and all the assaults allegedly committed at the oratory that are reported in the table of victims are in fact dated earlier than 1974, when the oratory’s affairs were, according to the evidence submitted at this stage, managed entirely by members of the congregation. 2. les affaires de la corporation seront administrées par cinq directeurs choisis parmi ses membres, qui sont en même temps membres de la congrégation de sainte- croix, à une assemblée générale tenue à cette fin. [39] en 1974, l’existence de l’oratoire a été conti- nuée sous le régime de la loi des corporations re- ligieuses, lq 1971, c. 75 (maintenant la loi sur les corporations religieuses, rlrq, c. c-71) : voir pièce r-2, état des renseignements de l’oratoire au registre des entreprises (2013), dao, vol. ii, p 23. pour toute la période antérieure à 1974, cependant, il n’y a au dossier aucune raison de croire que l’ora- toire n’était pas régi par la loi de 1916. justement, toutes les agressions qui auraient été commises à l’oratoire et qui sont dénoncées au tableau des vic- times sont antérieures à 1974, alors que les affaires de l’oratoire étaient, selon la preuve présentée à ce stade-ci, administrées en totalité par des membres de la congrégation. [40] as for the period after 1974, it is true that in the information statement for the oratory in the enter- prise register from 2013, the oratory reported having nine directors — not five or seven2 as the 1916 act would have it — and it is unclear whether they were all members of the congregation.3 nevertheless, as of the date in question, one of the oratory’s directors, [40] pour ce qui est de la période postérieure à 1974, il est vrai que, selon l’état des renseignements de l’oratoire au registre des entreprises (2013), l’oratoire fait état de neuf administrateurs — et non de cinq ou sept2 comme le veut la loi de 1916 — dont on ne sait pas s’ils sont tous des membres de la congrégation3. à la date susmentionnée, néanmoins, 2 section 4 of the 1916 act provides that “[t]he term of office of the directors [and] their number, not less than three or more than seven    may be fixed from time to time by by- law passed by the members of the corporation at a general meeting specially called for that purpose”. 3 among these nine directors, there are two whose reported personal addresses corresponded to the addresses of establishments of the congregation: see information statement for the oratory in the enterprise register (2013), aro, vol. ii, at p. 24, and information statements for the congregation in the enterprise register (2015) and (2014), arc, at pp. 135-36 and 147-48. 2 l’article 4 de la loi de 1916 prévoit que « [l]e terme d’office des directeurs [  ], leur nombre, de trois au moins et de sept au plus [  ] peuvent être fixés de temps à autre par règlement adopté par les membres de la corporation, à une assemblée générale spécialement convoquée dans ce but ». 3 parmi ces neuf administrateurs, il y en a deux dont l’adresse personnelle déclarée correspond à celle d’établissements de la congrégation : voir état des renseignements de l’oratoire au registre des entreprises (2013), dao, vol. ii, p. 24, et état des renseignements de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2015) et (2014), dac, p. 135- 136 et 147- 148. 874 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. ld, was also a director of the congregation and of corporation jean- brillant: see aro, vol. ii, at p. 24; information statements for the congregation in the enterprise register (2015) and (2014) and in- formation statement for corporation jean- brillant in the enterprise register (2014), arc, at pp. 134, 141 and 146. what is more, maison sainte- croix, one of the establishments reported by the congregation, was located at the same address as the oratory (one of the congregation’s directors in fact resided there): information statements for the congregation in the enterprise register (2015) and (2014), arc, at pp. 134, 136, 146 and 148. the congregation also used certain names in quebec that were associated with the oratory, such as “le grand saint- joseph”, “maison frère- andré”, “résidence alfred- bessette” and “maison saint- joseph”: information statements for the congregation in the enterprise register (2015) and (2014), arc, at pp. 137-38 and 149-50. [41] the oratory will still, should it wish to do so, be able to raise a defence at the trial on the merits in order to deny the existence of any “connection” be- tween it and the congregation, but it is not appropri- ate to consider possible defences in this regard at the authorization stage: sibiga, at para. 83; brown v. b2b trust, 2012 qcca 900, at para. 40 (canlii); see also carrier v. québec (procureur général), 2011 qcca 1231, at para. 37 (canlii). moreover, if it appears that a distinction needs to be drawn between assaults allegedly committed at the oratory before 1974 and those allegedly committed after that, the trial judge can, “even on [his or her] own initiative, modify or divide the class at any time”: art. 588 para 2 ccp4 l’un des administrateurs de l’oratoire, ld, était également administrateur de la congrégation et de la corporation jean- brillant : voir dao, vol. ii, p. 24; état des renseignements de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2015) et (2014) et état des renseignements de la corporation jean- brillant au registre des entreprises (2014), dac, p. 134, 141 et 146. la maison sainte- croix, soit l’un des établisse- ments déclarés par la congrégation, est de plus située à la même adresse que l’oratoire (l’un des adminis- trateurs de la congrégation y est d’ailleurs domici- lié) : état des renseignements de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2015) et (2014), dac, p. 134, 136, 146 et 148. la congrégation utilise aussi au québec certains noms associés à l’oratoire, par exemple « le grand saint- joseph », « maison frère- andré  », «  résidence alfred- bessette  » et « maison saint- joseph » : état des renseignements de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2015) et (2014), dac, p. 137- 138 et 149- 150. [41] lors de l’audition de l’action sur le fond, l’ora- toire pourra toujours, s’il le souhaite, présenter une défense afin de nier l’existence de tout « lien » entre lui et la congrégation, mais il n’y a pas lieu, au stade de l’autorisation, de considérer les moyens de dé- fense qui pourraient être soulevés à cet égard : sibiga, par. 83; brown c. b2b trust, 2012 qcca 900, par. 40 (canlii); voir aussi carrier c. québec (procureur général), 2011 qcca 1231, [2011] rjq 1346, par 37. en outre, s’il apparaissait qu’une distinction s’impose entre les agressions qui auraient été com- mises à l’oratoire avant 1974 et celles qui l’auraient été après cette date, le juge du fond pourrait « en tout temps et même d’office, modifier ou scinder le groupe » : art. 588 al 2 cpc4 [42] finally, if any doubt remains at this stage as to the existence of a “connection” between the oratory and the congregation in light of the parties’ con- tradictory submissions on this point, the applicant, jj, should in principle be given the benefit of the doubt: lambert (gestion peggy), at para. 38 ([trans- lation] “should the application judge be so unfor- tunate as to be faced with contradictory facts, he or [42] enfin, s’il subsistait un doute à ce stade-ci sur l’existence d’un « lien » entre l’oratoire et la congrégation à la lumière des prétentions contra- dictoires des parties sur ce point, il devrait en prin- cipe bénéficier au demandeur jj :. lambert (gestion peggy), par. 38 (« si, par malheur, le juge de l’autori- sation se retrouve devant des faits contradictoires, il doit faire prévaloir le principe général qui est de tenir 4 it should be noted that jj’s application covers the entire [trans- lation] “period from 1940 to a final judgment”: sup. ct. reasons, at para 2. 4 il importe de rappeler que la demande de jj couvre toute « la période de 1940 à jugement final » : motifs de la cs, par 2. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 875 she must favour the general principle that the facts in the motion for authorization must be assumed to be true unless they seem implausible or clearly wrong”); harmegnies, at para. 46 ([translation] “the appli- cant must be given the benefit of the doubt”); sibiga, at para. 51 (“courts should err on the side of caution and authorise the action where there is doubt as to whether the standard has been met”); charles, at para. 43; see also per gascon j. (then of the superior court) in adams v. banque amex du canada, 2006 qccs 5358, at para. 23 (canlii) ([translation] “any doubt must be resolved in favour of the appli- cants, that is, in favour of authorizing the action”); s. e. finn, l’action collective au québec (2016), at p. 53; p-c. lafond, le recours collectif, le rôle du juge et sa conception de la justice: impact et évolu- tion (2006), at pp 115-16. this cautious approach is justified by the principle that merely being named as a defendant in a class action does not in and of itself constitute irreparable harm, since the trial judge will still have free rein to dismiss the action after hearing all the evidence: [translation] contrary to the position taken by compa- nies and their counsel, the authorization of a class action does not impair the respondent’s rights, “since authorizing an action is not the same as deciding it”. defendants will have the opportunity to assert their rights fully at the trial on the merits, as in any other action. a judgment on au- thorization is merely a preliminary decision that could be varied at the trial, or even before, and does not prejudge the final outcome of the litigation. pour avérés ceux de la requête pour autorisation, sauf s’ils apparaissent invraisemblables ou manifestement inexacts »); harmegnies, par. 46 (« le bénéfice du doute doit profiter au requérant »); sibiga, par. 51 ([traduction] « les tribunaux devraient pécher par excès de prudence et autoriser l’action en cas de doute quant au respect de la norme »); charles, par. 43; voir aussi les propos du juge gascon (alors à la cour supérieure) dans adams c. banque amex du canada, 2006 qccs 5358, par. 23 (canlii) (« tout doute doit bénéficier aux requérants, c’est-à-dire en faveur de l’autorisation du recours »); s. e. finn, l’action collective au québec (2016), p. 53; p-c. lafond, le recours collectif, le rôle du juge et sa conception de la justice : impact et évolution (2006), p. 115- 116. cette approche marquée par la prudence est justifiée par le principe voulant que le seul fait d’être désigné défendeur à une action collective ne constitue pas en soi un préjudice irréparable, puisque le juge du fond conserve toute la latitude requise afin de rejeter l’ac- tion sur la foi de toute la preuve entendue : contrairement au discours entretenu par les entreprises et leurs procureurs, l’autorisation d’un recours collectif ne porte pas atteinte aux droits de la partie intimée, « puisque, autoriser le recours n’est pas décider du recours ». la par- tie défenderesse aura l’occasion de faire valoir pleinement ses droits lors de l’audition au mérite, comme dans toute autre action en justice. le jugement sur l’autorisation ne constitue qu’une décision préliminaire susceptible d’être modifiée au cours du procès, voire avant, et qui ne préjuge pas du résultat de la contestation finale. (lafond (2006), at pp. 116-17) (lafond (2006), p. 116- 117) (2) condition of commonality of issues (arti- (2) la condition relative au caractère commun cle 575(1) ccp) des questions (art 575(1) cpc) (a) applicable law a) le droit applicable [43] article 575(1) ccp provides that the insti- tution of a class action cannot be authorized unless the court finds that “the claims of the members of the class raise identical, similar or related issues of law or fact”. this is the condition of “commonality”, which “applies not only in quebec law, but also in that of all the common law provinces of canada”: [43] l’article 575(1) cpc précise que l’exercice d’une action collective ne peut être autorisé que si le tribunal conclut que « les demandes des membres soulèvent des questions de droit ou de fait identiques, similaires ou connexes ». il s’agit de la condition de la « communauté de questions », qui est « requis[e] non seulement par le droit québécois, mais aussi 876 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. vivendi, at para 38. the court studied the condition of “commonality” in depth in vivendi. it stressed that the test that applies in quebec law appears to be less stringent than the one that is applied in the common law provinces, because the phrase “identical, similar or related issues of law or fact” used by the quebec legislature does not align perfectly with the expres- sion “common issues” or with the “common issue” condition of the common law provinces: vivendi, at paras 52-53. [44] moreover, it can be seen from the quebec courts’ interpretation of art 575(1) ccp that their “approach to the commonality requirement has of- ten been broader and more flexible than the one taken in the common law provinces”, as “[they] pro- pose a flexible approach to the common interest that must exist among the [class]’s members”: vivendi, at para.  54, citing lafond (1996), at p.  408; see also paras 56-58. in infineon, the court added that “[t]here is no requirement of a fundamental identity of the individual claims of the proposed [class]’s members”, given that, “[a]t the authorization stage, the threshold requirement for common questions is low”: para 72. thus, “even a single identical, simi- lar or related question of law would be sufficient to meet the common questions requirement    pro- vided that it is significant enough to affect the out- come of the class action”: infineon, at para 72. in addition, “[translation] [t]he fact that the sit- uations of all members of the [class] are not per- fectly identical does not mean that the [class] does not exist or is not uniform”: infineon, at para. 73, quoting guilbert v. vacances sans frontière ltée, [1991] rdj 513 (ca). nor, as a result of bank of montreal v. marcotte, is it necessary for each mem- ber of the class to have a personal cause of action against each of the defendants. jj is therefore right that the fact that not all the class members have a personal cause of action against the oratory is no bar to authorizing the institution of a class action against it: rfo, at para 52. par celui de toutes les provinces de common law canadiennes » : vivendi, par 38. la cour a étudié en profondeur la condition de la « communauté de ques- tions » dans vivendi. elle a souligné que l’analyse applicable en droit québécois paraît moins exigeante que celle appliquée dans les provinces de common law, car l’expression « questions de droit ou de fait identiques, similaires ou connexes » utilisée par le législateur québécois ne coïncide pas parfaitement avec l’expression « questions communes » ou la condition de la « question commune » des provinces de common law : vivendi, par 52-53. [44] de plus, l’interprétation que donnent les tribu- naux québécois de l’art 575(1) cpc témoigne de l’application par ceux-ci d’une « approche souvent plus large et plus flexible que celle des tribunaux des provinces de common law en ce qui concerne le critère de la communauté de questions »; en effet, « les tribunaux québécois proposent une conception souple de l’intérêt commun qui doit lier les membres du groupe » : vivendi, par. 54, citant lafond (1996), p. 408; voir aussi par 56-58. dans infineon, la cour a également souligné qu’« [i]l n’est pas nécessaire [  ] que les demandes individuelles des membres du groupe proposé soient fondamentalement iden- tiques les unes aux autres », étant donné que « [l]e seuil nécessaire pour établir l’existence des questions communes à l’étape de l’autorisation est peu élevé » : par 72. ainsi, « même la présence d’une seule ques- tion de droit identique, similaire ou connexe serait suffisante pour satisfaire à l’exigence de la question commune [  ] pourvu que son importance soit sus- ceptible d’influencer le sort [de l’action collective] » : infineon, par 72. en outre, « [l]e fait que tous les membres du groupe ne sont pas dans des situations parfaitement identiques, ne prive pas celui-ci de son existence ou de sa cohérence » : infineon, par. 73, citant guilbert c. vacances sans frontière ltée, [1991] rdj 513 (ca). depuis l’arrêt banque de montréal c. marcotte, il n’est pas non plus nécessaire que chaque membre du groupe possède une cause d’action personnelle contre chacun des défendeurs. jj a donc raison de prétendre que le fait que les membres du groupe n’aient pas tous une cause d’ac- tion personnelle contre l’oratoire ne constitue pas un obstacle à l’autorisation de l’exercice de l’action collective contre celui-ci : mio, par 52. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 877 (b) application of the law to the facts of the b) l’application du droit aux faits de l’espèce case in vivendi, the court stated, citing dutton and [45] rumley, that “a question will be considered common if it can serve to advance the resolution of every class member’s claim”: para. 46 (emphasis added). the oratory’s challenge with respect to the condition of “commonality” is essentially based on this passage from vivendi (afo, at para. 65 (fn 73)), as it ar- gues that the court of appeal has not shown how the answer to any question relevant to the action against it would in any way advance the action of the class members who have no connection with the oratory: afo, at para 59. [46] i cannot agree with the oratory, and this is so even if i were to assume that its strict interpretation of the court’s statement in vivendi is correct. [47] first, it is not entirely accurate to state, as the oratory does in its factum (at para. 75), that there can be no common issue that connects the oratory to a victim of an alleged assault by a member of the congregation at a place other than the oratory. on the contrary, the table of victims shows that there may in fact be victims of assaults allegedly commit- ted by members of the congregation at places other than the oratory whose assailants are also alleged to have assaulted victims at the oratory. for exam- ple, the name of brother bernard is associated with the institution in waterville (1951-52) and with the oratory (1958-60): table of victims; ca reasons, at para 112. it should also be noted that jj is not the only class member with a personal cause of action against the oratory. there are four other victims who have come forward at this point who also claim to have been assaulted at the oratory: table of victims; ca reasons, at para 112. [45] dans vivendi, se référant aux arrêts dutton et rumley, la cour a affirmé qu’« une question sera considérée comme commune si elle permet de faire progresser le règlement de la réclamation de chacun des membres du groupe » : par. 46 (je souligne). la contestation de l’oratoire relative à la condition de la « communauté de questions » se fonde essentiel- lement sur ce passage de l’arrêt vivendi : mao, par. 65 (note 73). en effet, l’oratoire prétend que la cour d’appel n’a pas démontré en quoi la réponse à quelque question qui soit pertinente à l’action contre l’oratoire fera avancer, de quelque façon que ce soit, l’action des membres du groupe qui n’ont aucun lien avec l’oratoire : mao, par 59. [46] je ne saurais partager l’avis de l’oratoire, même en supposant que l’interprétation stricte qu’il suggère des propos de la cour dans vivendi soit correcte. [47] premièrement, il n’est pas tout à fait exact d’affirmer, comme le fait l’oratoire dans son mé- moire (par. 75), qu’aucune question commune ne peut lier l’oratoire à une personne victime d’une agression qui aurait été commise par un membre de la congrégation dans un autre lieu que l’oratoire. au contraire, selon le tableau des victimes, il est pos- sible que certaines victimes d’agressions qui auraient été commises par des membres de la congrégation dans un autre lieu que l’oratoire partagent un ou des agresseurs communs avec les victimes qui au- raient été agressées à l’oratoire. par exemple, le nom du frère bernard est associé à l’établissement de waterville (1951- 1952) et à celui de l’oratoire (1958- 1960) : tableau des victimes; motifs de la ca, par 112. il faut aussi souligner que jj n’est pas le seul membre du groupe ayant une cause d’ac- tion personnelle contre l’oratoire. quatre autres vic- times se sont manifestées à ce stade-ci et prétendent elles aussi avoir subi des agressions à l’oratoire : tableau des victimes; motifs de la ca, par 112. [48] second, jj’s personal cause of action against the oratory is primarily based on it being directly liable for assaults allegedly committed at the oratory [48] deuxièmement, la cause d’action personnelle de jj contre l’oratoire repose surtout sur la respon- sabilité directe de ce dernier à l’égard des agressions 878 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. (and not on liability for the act of another person). as i have already mentioned, all the common issues identified by jj that were authorized by the court of appeal actually related to the question whether the oratory and the congregation were negligent toward sexual assault victims. jj alleges that the oratory [translation] “allowed members of the congrega- tion    to sexually abuse minor children    at the oratory”: para 333 of the application. the oratory also allegedly “subjected the victims to mental, re- ligious and psychological duress by discouraging them from reporting the sexual abuse by members of the congregation”: para 334 of the application. jj. further alleges that the oratory “[was] aware of the sexual abuse by members of the congregation    but nevertheless hushed it up”: para 335 of the applica- tion. lastly, he adds that the oratory “knowingly and consciously chose to ignore the issue of sexual abuse of minor children by members of the congregation”: para 336 of the application. [49] one might ask what it means, for a legal per- son such as the oratory, “to be aware” of the alleged sexual abuse of children, to “knowingly and con- sciously choose to ignore” that abuse, or to “hush it up”. the answer is simple, as this can mean only one thing: the oratory’s directors were aware of the alleged sexual abuse of children, and the oratory’s directors are alleged to have knowingly and con- sciously chosen to ignore that abuse or to hush it up. as j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers and b. moore explain: qui auraient été commises à l’oratoire (et non sur la responsabilité du fait d’autrui). je signale une fois de plus que toutes les questions communes identifiées par jj — et autorisées par la cour d’appel — portent en réalité sur la question de savoir si l’oratoire et la congrégation ont fait preuve de négligence envers les victimes d’agressions sexuelles. en effet, jj al- lègue que l’oratoire « [a] permis que des abus sexuels soient perpétrés à l’encontre d’enfants mineurs par des membres de la congrégation [  ] à l’oratoire » : par 333 de la demande. l’oratoire aurait également « exercé une contrainte morale, religieuse et psy- chologique sur les victimes, en les incitant à ne pas dénoncer les abus sexuels commis par des membres de la congrégation » : par 334 de la demande. jj. allègue en outre que l’oratoire « étai[t] au courant des abus sexuels perpétrés par les membres de la congrégation [  ] et les [a] néanmoins étouffés » : par 335 de la demande. enfin, il ajoute que l’oratoire aurait « sciemment et consciemment choisi d’ignorer la problématique des abus sexuels commis sur des en- fants mineurs par des membres de la congrégation » : par 336 de la demande. [49] il est permis de se demander ce que signifie, dans le cas d’une personne morale comme l’ora- toire, le fait « d’être au courant » des abus sexuels qui auraient été perpétrés sur des enfants, de « sciem- ment et consciemment choisir d’ignorer » ces abus, ou encore de les « étouffer ». la réponse est simple, cela ne peut signifier qu’une chose : les adminis- trateurs de l’oratoire étaient au courant des abus sexuels qui auraient été perpétrés sur des enfants, les administrateurs de l’oratoire auraient sciemment et consciemment choisi d’ignorer ces abus, ou de les étouffer. comme l’expliquent les auteurs j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers et b. moore : [translation] because a legal person does not have a will of its own and therefore has no sense of judgment, one might ask whether it can be held liable independently of the individual liability of its representatives or of the natural persons who make it up or run it. in civil law, un- like in the criminal law, no distinction is drawn between natural persons and legal persons where the accountability for fault is concerned. in principle, therefore, given what is said in articles 300 and 1457 cc, a legal person can be held directly liable if the wrongful act that caused damage was committed by one of its governing organs acting la personne morale n’ayant pas de volonté propre, et n’étant donc pas douée de discernement, on peut se demander si elle peut être tenue responsable, indépen- damment de la responsabilité individuelle de ses repré- sentants ou des personnes physiques qui la composent ou la dirigent. le droit civil, contrairement au droit pénal, ne fait aucune distinction entre personnes physiques et personnes morales quant à l’imputabilité de la faute. en principe donc, étant donné les termes des articles 300 et 1457 cc, une personne morale peut être directement tenue responsable, si l’acte fautif qui a causé le dommage [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 879 within the scope of its duties, or by a person for whom it is responsible by law. in practice, however, it is more common for a legal person to be sued as a principal for a wrongful act committed by one of its agents, employees or servants. the courts have on many occasions recognized the principle of extracontractual liability of legal persons. provient d’un de ses organes de direction, agissant dans le cadre de ses fonctions, ou d’une personne dont elle est responsable en vertu de la loi. en pratique, il est toutefois plus fréquent de voir la personne morale poursuivie à titre de commettant pour l’acte fautif commis par l’un de ses agents, employés ou préposés. la jurisprudence a maintes fois reconnu le principe de la responsabilité extracontrac- tuelle des personnes morales. with the provisions of the civil code, it can now be asked which organs of a legal person can give rise to direct extracontractual liability. a principle appears to emerge from article 311 cc. a director, first of all, is, as provided for in article 321 cc, considered to be a mandatary, which means that, under articles 2160 and 2164 cc, the legal person is liable for his or her acts, but probably on the basis of liability for the act of another person. as for the board of directors, it may also directly expose the legal person to liability, given that it manages the affairs of the legal person and exercises all the powers necessary for that purpose on the legal person’s behalf (art 335 cc). however, it seems harder to imagine that the legal person would be exposed to direct liability for an act resulting from a general meeting (arts. 345 et seq. cc) [emphasis added.] avec les dispositions du code civil, on peut désor- mais se demander quels sont les organes de celles-ci qui peuvent entraîner une responsabilité extracontractuelle directe. un principe paraît se dégager de l’article 311 cc. l’administrateur, tout d’abord, est, aux termes de l’ar- ticle 321 cc, considéré comme un mandataire, et donc, au sens des articles 2160 et 2164 cc, engage la respon- sabilité de la personne morale, mais probablement au titre de la responsabilité pour le fait d’autrui. le conseil d’administration, lui, peut aussi engager directement la responsabilité de la personne morale, puisqu’il gère ses affaires et exerce en son nom tous les pouvoirs néces- saires (art 335 cc). il semble, par contre, plus difficile d’envisager que la responsabilité directe de la personne morale soit engagée par l’acte de l’assemblée des membres (art 345 et s cc) [je souligne.] (la responsabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at nos. 1-118 and 1-119) (la responsabilité civile (8e éd. 2014), nos 1-118 et 1-119) [50] thus, the allegations relating to direct liability of the oratory actually concern allegedly wrong- ful conduct on its directors’ part. as the court of appeal noted, at para. 111, [translation] “[the oratory’s] affairs were managed in whole or in part by the congregation’s members” (see also paras. 14, 22 and 64). in other words, the allegations relating to direct liability of the oratory are actually allegations relating to faults of members of the congregation, and more specifically, allegations relating to faults of members of the congregation acting as directors of the oratory, who are alleged to have failed to put a stop to the sexual abuse or, worse, to have covered it up. the question of faults allegedly committed by the congregation’s members is undeniably one that is common to all the members of the class. this means that, contrary to what the oratory argues, any finding of direct liability of the oratory — because it would be a finding of faults of members of the congregation acting as directors of the oratory — will advance the action of each member of the class, particularly [50] par conséquent, les allégations relatives à la responsabilité directe de l’oratoire visent en réalité la conduite prétendument fautive de ses adminis- trateurs. or, comme l’a noté la cour d’appel, au par. 111, « les affaires [de l’oratoire] sont adminis- trées en partie ou en totalité par les membres de la congrégation » (voir aussi par. 14, 22 et 64). autre- ment dit, les allégations relatives à la responsabilité directe de l’oratoire sont en réalité des allégations relatives à la faute de membres de la congrégation — et, plus précisément, des allégations relatives à la faute de membres de la congrégation agissant à titre d’administrateurs de l’oratoire, qui auraient négligé de faire cesser les abus sexuels ou, pire, les auraient camouflés. or, la question des fautes qui auraient été commises par les membres de la congrégation est incontestablement une question commune à tous les membres du groupe. ainsi, contrairement à ce que prétend l’oratoire, toute conclusion portant sur la res- ponsabilité directe de l’oratoire — puisqu’il s’agira d’une conclusion portant sur la faute de membres de 880 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. in that it will tend to establish the existence of “sys- temic” negligence within the congregation in rela- tion to the alleged sexual abuse of children. [51] this reasoning might not apply in a case con- cerning business corporations or legal persons of some other type. but the question does not need to be addressed in the context of these appeals, as the oratory and the congregation are not business corporations, but special legal persons. the ora- tory is “a group of persons who form a religious body”: definition of “church”, s. 1(c) of the religious corporations act; see information statement for the oratory in the enterprise register (2013), aro, vol. ii, at p 23. and the congregation is “a group of religious who are members of a religious com- munity”: definition of “congregation”, s. 1(a) of the religious corporations act; see exhibit r-1, infor- mation statement for the congregation in the enter- prise register (2009), and information statements for the congregation in the enterprise register (2015) and (2014), arc, at pp. 130, 133 and 145. as the court of appeal pointed out, traditional religious organizations are essentially characterized by strong solidarity among their members as a result [trans- lation] “[of] the temporal and spiritual hierarchical relationship that inevitably exists between a religious member and his or her religious community”: ca. reasons, at para. 57; see also the doyle article (2006); excerpts from the code of canon law; bennett, at paras. 21 and 27-28; bazley, at paras. 44 and 46; ogilvie, at pp. 226 and 320. la congrégation agissant à titre d’administrateurs de l’oratoire — fera avancer l’action de chacun des membres du groupe, notamment en ce qu’elle tendra à établir l’existence d’une négligence « systémique » au sein de la congrégation à l’égard des abus sexuels qui auraient été commis sur des enfants. [51] ce raisonnement ne vaudrait peut- être pas s’il était question de sociétés par actions ou d’un autre type de personnes morales. mais il n’y a pas lieu d’aborder la question dans le cadre des pré- sents pourvois, étant donné que l’oratoire et la con- grégation ne sont pas des sociétés par actions; ce sont au contraire des personnes morales particulières. l’oratoire est « un ensemble de personnes formant une société religieuse » : définition d’« église », art. 1c) de la loi sur les corporations religieuses; voir état des renseignements de l’oratoire au re- gistre des entreprises (2013), dao, vol. ii, p 23. la congrégation est quant à elle « un ensemble de reli- gieux faisant partie d’une communauté religieuse » : définition de « congrégation », art. 1a) de la loi sur les corporations religieuses; voir pièce r-1, état des renseignements de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2009) et état des renseignements de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2015) et (2014), dac, p. 130, 133 et 145. or, comme l’a sou- ligné la cour d’appel, les organisations religieuses traditionnelles se caractérisent essentiellement par une très grande solidarité entre les membres du fait « de la relation hiérarchique temporelle et spirituelle qui unit inévitablement le religieux à sa communauté religieuse » : motifs de la ca, par. 57; voir aussi l’article doyle (2006); extraits du code de droit canonique; bennett, par. 21 et 27-28; bazley, par. 44 et 46; ogilvie, p. 226 et 320. [52] under the 1916 act, it was the oratory’s five founding “petitioners” — “all five members of the congregation of the holy cross” — together with “all persons who hereafter associate themselves with them, and their successors”, who were constituted a corporation under the name of “st. joseph’s oratory of mount royal”. these excerpts from the 1916 act suggest that those members of the religious com- munity known as the congregation of holy cross were themselves, and in that capacity, constituted a corporation under the name of “st. joseph’s oratory [52] en vertu de la loi de 1916, ce sont d’ailleurs les cinq « pétitionnaires » fondateurs de l’oratoire — « tous cinq membres de la congrégation de sainte- croix » — ainsi que « toutes autres personnes qui, par la suite, s’associeront à eux, de même que leurs successeurs » qui sont constitués en corporation sous le nom d’« oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal ». ces passages de la loi de 1916 suggèrent que ces membres de la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix sont eux- mêmes et à ce titre constitués en corporation sous [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 881 of mount royal”. in this sense, the oratory is simply one of the faces of the religious community known as the congregation of holy cross, and it was con- stituted a corporation in 1916, at a time when (a) the religious corporations act was not yet in force (see sq 1971, c. 75) and (b) the religious community known as the congregation of holy cross as a whole was, according to the evidence presented at this stage, not yet carrying on its activities in any form of unified religious corporation: see an act to incorporate les religieux de ste. croix, sq 1935, c. 152; an act to amend the charter of les religieux de sainte- croix, sq 1947, c. 121; an act to incorporate les frères de sainte- croix, sq 1947, c 122. [53] moreover, it can be seen from the scheme of the religious corporations act as a whole that in the case of a “congregation”, that is, a “group of re- ligious who are members of a religious community” (s. 1(a)), there can only be one “corporation whose objects are to organize, administer and manage a congregation”: s 14. the letters patent of such a corporation may thus provide that the corporation’s affairs “shall be administered by the person exercis- ing the function of superior of the congregation or any equivalent function”: s 81. in addition, s. 13 of the act provides that “[a]ny member of a corporation whose objects are to organize, administer and main- tain a congregation may agree to devote his activities gratuitously to the service of the corporation and undertake to transfer to it all salary, remuneration or other advantages which are the result of his work, as long as he remains a member of the corporation”. under the act, a corporation like this also has powers over the congregation’s members that are incon- sistent with the existence of more than one “cor- poration whose objects are to organize, administer and maintain a congregation”. for example, s. 14 of the religious corporations act provides that such a corporation “shall represent its members and may, in its name but for their benefit, and with their consent, except in cases where it is impossible to obtain it, exercise their civil rights respecting the property they may own or acquire”. similarly, s 141 provides that “[w]here no protection mandate is given    the cor- poration whose objects are to organize, administer le nom d’« oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal ». en ce sens, l’oratoire n’est que l’un des visages de la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix, et il a été constitué en corporation en 1916 à une époque où a) la loi sur les corporations religieuses n’était pas encore entrée en vigueur (voir lq 1971, c. 75), et b) selon la preuve présentée à ce stade-ci, la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix dans son ensemble n’exerçait pas encore ses activités sous quelque forme que ce soit de corporation reli- gieuse unifiée : voir loi constituant en corporation les religieux de sainte- croix, sq 1935, c. 152; loi modifiant la charte de les religieux de sainte- croix, sq 1947, c. 121; loi constituant en corporation les frères de sainte- croix, sq 1947, c 122. [53] en outre, l’économie de l’ensemble de la loi sur les corporations religieuses révèle que, dans le cas d’une « congrégation », c’est-à-dire un « en- semble de religieux faisant partie d’une communauté religieuse » (art. 1a)), il ne peut y avoir qu’une « cor- poration ayant pour objets d’organiser, d’administrer et de maintenir une congrégation » : art 14. ainsi, les lettres patentes d’une telle corporation peuvent prévoir que les affaires de la corporation « sont ad- ministrées par la personne exerçant la fonction de supérieur de la congrégation ou toute fonction équi- valente » : art 81. de plus, l’art. 13 de la loi précise que « [t]out membre d’une corporation ayant pour objets d’organiser, d’administrer et de maintenir une congrégation peut convenir de mettre gratui- tement ses activités au service de la corporation et s’engager à lui céder tout salaire, rémunération ou autres avantages qui sont le fruit de son travail, aussi longtemps qu’il demeure membre de la corpora- tion ». la loi reconnaît en outre à une corporation de ce genre, en ce qui concerne les membres de la congrégation, des pouvoirs qui sont incompatibles avec l’existence de plus d’une « corporation ayant pour objets d’organiser, d’administrer et de mainte- nir une congrégation ». par exemple, l’art. 14 de la loi sur les corporations religieuses indique qu’une telle corporation « représente ses membres et peut, en son nom mais pour leur bénéfice et avec leur consentement, sauf dans les cas où il est impos- sible de l’obtenir, exercer leurs droits civils pour les biens qu’ils peuvent posséder ou acquérir ». de 882 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. and maintain the congregation shall have the man- date and responsibility to fully ensure the care and administer the property of the member for as long as the member remains a member of the congregation”. in short, the religious corporations act con- [54] firms that the members of the religious community known as the congregation of holy cross who worked at the oratory as officiating priests (like father ber- nard, who allegedly assaulted jj) or as directors may have remained closely connected with the congre- gation. with respect, i cannot accept my colleague gascon j.’s assertion that the oratory was not “under the control” of the religious community known as the congregation of holy cross: gascon j.’s reasons, at para 180. the oratory was clearly under the congre- gation’s control, not only because all of the oratory’s directors were members of the congregation at the time of the events, but also because [translation] “[of] the temporal and spiritual hierarchical rela- tionship that inevitably exists between a religious member and his or her religious community” and the privileges (enjoyment of services provided gratu- itously, transfer of salary, remuneration or any other advantages, etc.) and extraordinary powers (exercise of civil rights, protection mandate or mandate to ad- minister property, etc.) the congregation may have had in relation to its members. même, l’art 141 prévoit qu’« [e]n l’absence d’un mandat de protection [  ], la corporation qui a pour objets d’organiser, d’administrer et de maintenir la congrégation a mandat et est chargée d’assurer plei- nement les soins ainsi que l’administration des biens du membre aussi longtemps qu’il demeure membre de la congrégation ». [54] en somme, la loi sur les corporations reli- gieuses confirme qu’il est possible que les membres de la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix qui œuvraient au sein de l’oratoire à titre de prêtres officiants (tel le père bernard qui aurait agressé jj) ou à titre d’administrateurs demeuraient étroitement liés à la congrégation. soit dit en tout respect, je ne puis souscrire à l’affirmation de mon collègue le juge gascon suggérant que l’oratoire n’était pas « sous la gouverne » de la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix : motifs du juge gascon, par 180. l’oratoire était clairement sous la gouverne de la congrégation non seulement en raison du fait que tous les administrateurs de l’oratoire étaient à l’époque des faits membres de la congrégation, mais aussi en raison « de la rela- tion hiérarchique temporelle et spirituelle qui unit inévitablement le religieux à sa communauté reli- gieuse » et des privilèges (jouissance des services à titre gratuit, cession du salaire, de la rémunération ou de tous autres avantages, etc.) et pouvoirs ex- traordinaires (exercice des droits civils, mandat de protection ou d’administration des biens, etc.) dont la congrégation était possiblement titulaire à l’égard de ses membres. [55] i will say no more in these reasons about the complex concepts of religious “organizations” or “corporations, “church” and “congregation”. a court may of course decide a pure question of law at the authorization stage if the outcome of the proposed class action depends on its doing so, and to some extent the court must also interpret the legislation to determine whether the proposed class action is “frivolous” or “clearly wrong” in law: carrier, at para. 37; trudel v. banque toronto- dominion, 2007 qcca 413, at para. 3 (canlii); fortier v. meubles léon ltée, 2014 qcca 195, at paras. 89-91 (canlii); toure v. brault & martineau inc., 2014 qcca 1577, [55] je n’en dirai pas davantage en l’espèce sur ces notions complexes d’« organisations » ou de « cor- porations » religieuses, d’« église » ou de « congré- gation ». certes, le tribunal peut trancher une pure question de droit au stade de l’autorisation si le sort de l’action collective projetée en dépend; dans une cer- taine mesure, il doit aussi nécessairement interpréter la loi afin de déterminer si l’action collective projetée est « frivole » ou « manifestement non fondée » en droit : carrier, par. 37; trudel c. banque toronto- dominion, 2007 qcca 413, par. 3 (canlii); fortier c. meubles léon ltée, 2014 qcca 195, par. 89-91 (canlii); toure c. brault & martineau inc., 2014 qcca 1577, [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 883 at para. 38 (canlii); lambert v. whirlpool canada, lp, 2015 qcca 433, at para. 12 (canlii); groupe d’action d’investisseurs dans biosyntech v. tsang, 2016 qcca 1923, at para. 33 (canlii); finn (2016), at p 170. aside from such situations, however, it is in principle not appropriate at the authorization stage for the court to “make any determination as to the merits in law of the conclusions, in light of the facts alleged”: comité régional des usagers des transports en commun de québec v. quebec urban community transit commission, [1981] 1 scr 424, at p. 429; nadon v. anjou (ville), [1994] rjq 1823 (ca), at pp. 1827-28; infineon, at para 60. in the instant case, it is enough to note that the issue of direct liability of the congregation for alleged sexual abuse of children by its members is difficult to distinguish from the issue of direct liability of the oratory, which is but one of many faces of the congregation, for the same alleged sexual abuse of children by members of the same religious community. even if these issues are not “identical    issues of law or fact”, they are cer- tainly at least “similar” or “related” issues within the meaning of art. 575(1) ccp. as the court of appeal explained in comité d’environnement de la baie:   . article 1003(a) [now art. 575(1)] does not require that all of the questions of law or of fact in the claims of the members be identical or similar or related. nor does the article even require that the majority of these questions be identical or similar or related. from the text of the article, it is sufficient if the claims of the members raise some questions of law or of fact that are sufficiently similar or sufficiently related to justify a class action. [emphasis in original; p 659] par. 38 (canlii); lambert c. whirlpool canada, lp, 2015 qcca 433, par. 12 (canlii); groupe d’action d’investisseurs dans biosyntech c. tsang, 2016 qcca 1923, par. 33 (canlii); finn (2016), p 170. toutefois, outre ces situations, il n’y a en principe pas lieu pour le tribunal, au stade de l’autorisation, de « se pronon- cer sur le bien- fondé en droit des conclusions en re- gard des faits allégués » : comité régional des usagers des transports en commun de québec c. commission des transports de la communauté urbaine de québec, [1981] 1 rcs 424, p. 429; nadon c. anjou (ville), [1994] rjq 1823 (ca), p. 1827- 1828; infineon, par 60. en l’espèce, il suffit de constater que la ques- tion de la responsabilité directe de la congrégation à l’égard des abus sexuels qui auraient été commis par ses membres sur des enfants est difficilement distin- guable de la question de la responsabilité directe de l’oratoire — lequel n’est que l’un des multiples vi- sages de la congrégation — à l’égard des mêmes abus sexuels qui auraient été commis par les membres de la même communauté religieuse sur des enfants. dans la mesure où il ne s’agit pas de « questions de droit ou de fait identiques », il s’agit certainement à tout le moins de questions « similaires » ou « connexes » visées à l’art. 575(1) cpc. comme l’a expliqué la cour d’appel dans l’arrêt comité d’environnement de la baie : [traduction]    l’alinéa 1003a) [maintenant l’art. 575(1)] n’exige pas que toutes les questions de droit ou de fait soulevées par les réclamations des membres soient iden- tiques, similaires ou connexes. il n’exige même pas que ces questions soient en majorité identiques, similaires ou connexes. d’après le texte de cette disposition, il suffit que les réclamations des membres soulèvent certaines questions de droit ou de fait suffisamment similaires ou suffisamment connexes pour justifier un recours collectif. [en italique dans l’original; p 659] (3) condition of sufficiency of the alleged facts (3) la condition relative au caractère suffisant (article 575(2) ccp) des faits allégués (art 575(2) cpc) (a) applicable law a) le droit applicable [56] article 575(2) ccp provides that the facts alleged in the application must “appear to justify” the conclusions being sought. this condition, which was not included in the original bill on class ac- tions, was added in response to pressure from certain [56] l’article 575(2)  cpc précise que les faits allégués dans la demande doivent « para[ître] jus- tifier » les conclusions recherchées. cette condi- tion, qui ne figurait pas dans le projet de loi initial sur le recours collectif, fut introduite par suite des 884 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. companies [translation] “that feared it would give rise to a significant volume of frivolous actions”: v. aimar, “l’autorisation de l’action collective: rai- sons d’être, application et changements à venir”, in c. piché, ed., the class action effect (2018), 149, at p. 156 (emphasis added); p-c. lafond, “le recours collectif: entre la commodité procédurale et la justice sociale” (1998-99), 29 rdus 4, at p 24. it is now well established that at the authorization stage, the role of the judge is to screen out only those applica- tions which are “frivolous”, “clearly unfounded” or “untenable”: sibiga, at paras. 34 (“the judge’s func- tion at the authorization stage is only one of filtering out untenable claims” (emphasis added)), 52 (“[a] motion judge should only weed out class actions that are frivolous or have no prospect of success” (emphasis added)) and 78 (“it was enough to show that the appellant’s claim was not a frivolous one and that, at trial, she would have an arguable case to make on behalf of the class” (emphasis added)); see also charles, at para. 70; lafond (2006), at pp. 112 ([translation] “the purpose of [art 575(2) ccp] is first, ‘to immediately eliminate actions that are prima facie frivolous’ and, second, to ‘dispose in the same way of actions that, although not frivolous, are clearly unfounded’”) and 116 (“the authorization stage exists solely to screen out applications that are frivolous or clearly unfounded in fact or in law, as the legislature originally intended”); see also fortier, at para. 70; oubliés du viaduc de la montée monette v. consultants sm inc., 2015 qccs 3308, at para. 42 (canlii). as this court explained in infineon, “the court’s role is merely to filter out frivolous motions”, which it does “to ensure that parties are not being subjected unnecessarily to litigation in which they must defend against untenable claims”: para. 61 (em- phasis added); see also paras. 125 (“a judge hearing a motion for authorization is responsible for weeding out frivolous cases”) and 150 (“the purpose of the authorization stage is merely to screen out frivolous claims”). pressions de certaines entreprises « qui redoutaient l’apparition d’un volume significatif de recours frivoles » : v. aimar, « l’autorisation de l’action collective : raisons d’être, application et change- ments à venir », dans c. piché, dir., l’effet de l’ac- tion collective (2018), 149, p.  156 (je souligne); p-c. lafond, « le recours collectif : entre la com- modité procédurale et la justice sociale » (1998- 1999), 29 rdus 4, p 24. il est désormais bien établi qu’au stade de l’autorisation, le rôle du juge consiste à écarter seulement les demandes «  fri- voles », « manifestement mal fondées » ou « in- soutenables » : sibiga, par. 34 ([traduction] « la fonction du juge à l’étape de l’autorisation consiste uniquement à écarter les demandes insoutenables » (je souligne)), 52 (« [l]e juge de la demande doit écarter uniquement les actions collectives qui sont frivoles ou ne présentent aucune chance de suc- cès  » (je souligne)) et 78 («  il était suffisant de démontrer que la demande de l’appelante n’était pas frivole et que, au procès, cette dernière aurait une cause défendable à présenter au nom du groupe » (je souligne)); voir aussi l’arrêt charles, par. 70; lafond (2006), p. 112 (« [l’art 575(2) cpc] vise premièrement à “faire immédiatement tomber les recours frivoles à leur face même”; en second lieu, il cherche à “réserver le même sort aux recours qui, sans être frivoles, sont manifestement mal fon- dés” ») et 116 (« l’étape de l’autorisation n’existe que pour écarter les demandes frivoles ou manifes- tement mal fondées en fait ou en droit, comme le souhaitait initialement le législateur »); voir égale- ment l’affaire fortier, par. 70; oubliés du viaduc de la montée monette c. consultants sm inc., 2015 qccs 3308, par. 42 (canlii). comme l’a expliqué notre cour dans infineon, « le tribunal, dans sa fonc- tion de filtrage, écarte simplement les demandes frivoles », et ce, afin « de s’assurer que des parties ne soient pas inutilement assujetties à des litiges dans lesquels elles doivent se défendre contre des demandes insoutenables » : par. 61 (je souligne); voir aussi par. 125 (« le juge saisi de la requête en autorisation se trouve investi du rôle d’écarter les causes frivoles ») et 150 (« l’étape de l’autorisation vise uniquement à écarter les demandes frivoles »). [57] this position was strengthened by the statu- tory amendments of 2003: an act to reform the code [57] une telle position a été renforcée par les modifications législatives de 2003  : loi portant [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 885 of civil procedure, sq 2002, c. 7, s 150. at that time, the legislature abolished the requirement that an affidavit be filed in support of the application, as a result of which the applicant had had to submit to examination as a deponent at the authorization stage. in addition, the defendant may now only con- test the application orally, and the judge may allow relevant evidence to be submitted at the hearing: infineon, at para. 66; see also r. wagner, “how the class action has evolved to become the procedural tool it is today”, in c. piché, ed., the class action effect (2018), 273, at p. 282; ministère de la justice, commentaires de la ministre de la justice: code de procédure civile, chapitre c-25.01 (2015), at p. 419 ([translation] “[article 574] preserves the rule in the existing law established by the act to reform the code of civil procedure    which requires that the application be contested orally and which allows relevant evidence to be submitted at this stage only with the court’s authorization. that amendment was essentially intended to limit proceedings for the au- thorization of a class action, which had grown ‘out of proportion’ over the years, to such an extent that the trial could be considered to take place at the stage of the application for authorization rather than on the action itself”). as the court of appeal explained in sibiga, at para. 50: “the purpose of those amend- ments [by the quebec legislature in 2003] ‘was to ensure that the authorization stage be used to fil- ter out only the most frivolous and unsubstantiated claims and to ensure that the authorization process was not being used by judges to render pre- emptive decisions on the merits’”, quoting e. yiannakis and n. boudreau, “‘paradise lost’? rethinking quebec’s reputation as a haven for class actions” (2014), 9 can. class action rev. 385, at p. 392 (emphasis added). réforme du code de procédure civile, lq 2002, c. 7, art 150. en effet, le législateur a alors sup- primé l’obligation de produire un affidavit au soutien de la demande, exigence qui soumettait le demandeur, en tant qu’affiant, à un interrogatoire à l’étape de l’autorisation. de plus, le défendeur ne peut dorénavant contester la demande que de vive voix et le juge peut, lors de l’audience, permettre la présentation d’une preuve appropriée : infineon, par.  66; voir aussi r. wagner, «  comment l’ac- tion collective est devenue la procédure qu’elle est aujourd’hui », dans c. piché, dir., l’effet de l’ac- tion collective (2018), 273, p. 282; ministère de la justice, commentaires de la ministre de la justice : code de procédure civile, chapitre c-25.01 (2015), p. 419 (« [l’article 574] maintient la règle du droit actuel adoptée par la loi portant réforme du code de procédure civile [  ], qui impose la contestation orale de la demande et, à cette étape, ne permet la présentation d’une preuve appropriée que si le tribunal l’autorise. cette modification visait essen- tiellement à limiter les débats sur l’autorisation de l’action collective, qui, au fil des années, avaient pris “des proportions démesurées”, de telle sorte que l’on pouvait considérer que le procès avait lieu à l’étape de la demande d’autorisation plutôt que sur l’action elle- même »). comme l’a expliqué la cour d’appel dans l’arrêt sibiga, par.  50  : [tra- duction] « l’objet de ces modifications [appor- tées par le législateur québécois en 2003] “était de faire en sorte que l’étape de l’autorisation serve à écarter uniquement les demandes les plus frivoles et les moins étayées, et qu’elle ne soit pas utilisée par les juges pour rendre des décisions anticipées sur le fond” », citant e. yiannakis et n. boudreau, « “paradise lost”? rethinking quebec’s reputation as a haven for class actions » (2014), 9 rev. can. recours collectifs 385, p. 392 (je souligne). [58] the applicant’s burden at the authorization stage is simply to establish an “arguable case” in light of the facts and the applicable law: infineon, at paras. 65 and 67; see also vivendi, at para. 37; marcotte v. longueuil, at para 23. this is a “low threshold”: infineon, at para 66. the applicant need establish only a mere “possibility” of succeeding on the merits, as not even a “realistic” or “reason- able” possibility is required: infineon, at paras. 80, [58] le fardeau qui incombe au demandeur au stade de l’autorisation consiste simplement à établir l’existence d’une « cause défendable » eu égard aux faits et au droit applicable : infineon, par. 65 et 67; voir aussi vivendi, par. 37; marcotte c. longueuil, par 23. il s’agit d’un « seuil peu élevé » : infineon, par.  66 en effet, le demandeur n’a qu’à établir une simple «  possibilité  » d’avoir gain de cause sur le fond, pas même une possibilité « réaliste » 886 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. 100, 101, 130, 136 and 144; charles, at para. 70; theratechnologies inc. v. 121851 canada inc., 2015 scc 18, [2015] 2 scr 106, at paras. 19, 35, 36 and 38; asselin v. desjardins cabinet de services financiers inc., 2017 qcca 1673, at paras. 29-31 (canlii). the legal threshold requirement under art 575(2) ccp is a simple burden of “demon- stration” that the proposed “legal syllogism” is tenable: pharmascience inc., at para. 25; martin v. société telus communications, 2010 qcca 2376, at para.  32 (canlii); infineon, at para.  61. as i pointed out above, it is in principle not appropriate at the authorization stage for the court to make any determination as to the merits in law of the conclusions in light of the facts being alleged. it is enough that the application not be “frivolous” or “clearly wrong” in law, or in other words, the applicant must establish “a good colour of right”: guimond v quebec (attorney general), [1996] 3 scr 347, at paras.  9-11; berdah v.  nolisair in ternational inc., [1991] rdj  417 (ca), at pp. 420-21, per brossard ja;. infineon, at para 63. as for the evidentiary threshold requirement under art 575(2) ccp, it is more helpful to define it on the basis of what it is not. first, the applicant is not required to establish an arguable case in accord- ance with the civil standard of proof on a balance of probabilities, as the evidentiary threshold for establishing an arguable case falls “comfortably below” that standard: infineon, at para.  127; see also paras. 65, 89 and 94. second, he or she is not, unlike an applicant elsewhere in canada, required to show that the claim has a “sufficient basis in fact”: infineon, at para 128. ou «  raisonnable  »  : infineon, par.  80, 100, 101, 130, 136 et 144; charles, par.  70; theratech- nologies inc c.  121851 canada inc., 2015 csc 18, [2015] 2 rcs 106, par.  19, 35, 36 et 38; asselin c desjardins cabinet de services finan- ciers inc., 2017 qcca 1673, par. 29-31 (canlii). le seuil légal prévu à l’art.  575(2) cpc est un simple fardeau de « démonstration » du caractère soutenable du « syllogisme juridique » proposé : pharmascience inc., par.  25; martin c société telus communications, 2010 qcca 2376, par. 32 (canlii); infineon, par 61. tel que je l’ai signalé précédemment, il n’y a en principe pas lieu pour le tribunal, au stade de l’autorisation, de se prononcer sur le bien- fondé en droit des conclusions au regard des faits allégués. il suffit que la demande ne soit ni « frivole » ni « manifestement non fondée » en droit; en d’autres termes, le demandeur doit établir « une apparence sérieuse de droit » ou encore un « droit d’action qui paraisse sérieux » : guimond c québec (procureur général), [1996] 3 rcs. 347, par.  9-11; berdah c nolisair international inc., [1991] rdj 417 (ca), p. 420- 421, le juge brossard; infineon, par 63. le seuil de preuve prévu à l’art. 575(2) cpc est quant à lui plus utilement défini par ce qu’il n’est pas. premièrement, le de- mandeur n’est pas tenu d’établir l’existence d’une cause défendable selon la norme de preuve appli- cable en droit civil, soit celle de la prépondérance des probabilités; en fait, le seuil de preuve requis pour établir l’existence d’une cause défendable est « beaucoup moins exigeant » : infineon, par. 127; voir aussi par. 65, 89 et 94. deuxième ment, il n’est pas nécessaire, contrairement à ce qui est exigé ailleurs au canada, que le demandeur démontre que sa demande repose sur un « fondement factuel suffisant » : infineon, par 128. [59] furthermore, at the authorization stage, the facts alleged in the application are assumed to be true, so long as the allegations of fact are sufficiently precise: sibiga, at para. 52; infineon, at para. 67; harmegnies, at para.  44; regroupement des ci- toyens contre la pollution v. alex couture inc., 2007 qcca 565, [2007] rjq 859, at para. 32; charles, at para. 43; toure, at para. 38; fortier, at para 69. where allegations of fact are “vague”, “general” or “imprecise”, they are necessarily more akin to [59] en outre, à l’étape de l’autorisation, les faits allégués dans la demande sont tenus pour avérés, pourvu que les allégations de fait soient suffisam- ment précises : sibiga, par. 52; infineon, par. 67; harmegnies, par. 44; regroupement des citoyens contre la pollution c. alex couture inc., 2007 qcca 565, [2007] rjq 859, par. 32; charles, par. 43; toure, par. 38; fortier, par 69. lorsque des allé- gations de fait sont « vagues », « générales » ou « imprécises », elles se rapprochent nécessairement [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 887 opinion or speculation, and it may therefore be dif- ficult to assume them to be true, in which case they must absolutely “be accompanied by some evidence to form an arguable case”: infineon, at para 134. it is in fact strongly suggested in infineon, at para. 134 (if not explicitly, then at least implicitly), that “bare alle- gations”, although “insufficient to meet the threshold requirement of an arguable case” (emphasis added), can be supplemented by “some evidence” that — “limited though it may be” — must accompany the application in order “to form an arguable case”. [60] thus, one of the natural corollaries of in- fineon is that, while what is “vague”, “general” or “imprecise” does depend on the context, it also depends on the evidence adduced in support of the application: see, to the same effect, finn (2016), at p.  170 ([translation] “[t]he judge must not merely review the content of the pleading but must also endeavour to consider it in its context”); see also, by analogy, halvorson v british columbia (medical services commission), 2010 bcca 267, 4 bclr (5th) 292, at para. 23 (“to hold plaintiffs strictly at the certification stage to their pleadings and arguments as they were initially formulated would in many cases defeat the objects of the act — judicial economy, access to justice, and behaviour modification”); markson v. mbna canada bank, 2007 onca 334, 85 or (3d) 321, at para 30. it is in fact possible for the evidence submitted in support of the application to contain “concrete”, “specific” or “tangible” facts that could be used to establish an arguable case even though the al- legations in the application seem to be “vague”, “general” or “imprecise”. and it is well estab- lished that a court that must determine whether an applicant has discharged his or her burden of showing an “arguable case” must consider the al- legations in the application for authorization in light of all the documentary evidence, sworn state- ments and transcripts in the record: s. e. finn, ed., manuel de l’action collective (2017), at p. 16, cit- ing option consommateurs v. bell mobilité, 2008 qcca 2201, at para. 30 (canlii); d. ferland and b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (5th ed. 2015), vol. 2, at no. 2-1615; masella, at davantage de l’opinion ou de l’hypothèse, et elles peuvent donc difficilement être tenues pour avérées; elles doivent alors absolument « être accompagnées d’une certaine preuve afin d’établir une cause défen- dable » : infineon, par 134. de fait, l’arrêt infineon suggère fortement au par. 134 (sinon explicitement, du moins implicitement) que de « simples alléga- tions » — bien qu’« insuffisantes pour satisfaire à la condition préliminaire d’établir une cause défen- dable » (je souligne) — peuvent être complétées par une « certaine preuve » qui — « aussi limitée qu’elle puisse être » — doit accompagner la demande « afin d’établir une cause défendable ». [60] ainsi, l’un des corollaires naturels de l’arrêt infineon est que ce qui est « vague », « général » ou « imprécis » dépend certes du contexte mais aussi de la preuve présentée au soutien de la demande : voir, au même effet, finn (2016), p. 170 (« [a]u-delà d’une lecture textuelle de la procédure, le juge doit aussi se prêter à une lecture contextuelle de celle-ci »); voir aussi, par analogie, halvorson c. british co- lumbia (medical services commission), 2010 bcca 267, 4 bclr (5th) 292, par. 23 ([traduction] « obliger les demandeurs, au stade de l’autorisation, à s’en tenir strictement à leurs actes de procédure et au texte de leur argumentation, tels qu’ils ont été formulés initialement, contrecarrerait dans bien des cas la réalisation des objectifs de la loi — l’écono- mie des ressources judiciaires, l’accès à la justice et la modification des comportements »); markson c. mbna canada bank, 2007 onca 334, 85 or (3d) 321, par 30. de fait, il est possible que la preuve pré- sentée au soutien de la demande contienne des faits « concrets », « précis » ou « palpables », lesquels sont susceptibles d’établir l’existence d’une cause défendable, et ce, en dépit du caractère apparemment « vague », « général » ou « imprécis » des alléga- tions de la demande. il est d’ailleurs bien établi que le tribunal appelé à décider si le demandeur s’est acquitté du fardeau qui lui incombe, à savoir dé- montrer l’existence d’une « cause défendable », doit étudier les allégations de la demande d’autorisation à la lumière de l’ensemble des éléments de preuve documentaire, déclarations sous serment ou trans- criptions déposés au dossier : s. e. finn, dir., manuel de l’action collective (2017), p. 16, citant option consommateurs c. bell mobilité, 2008 qcca 2201, 888 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. para 8. for example, the court of appeal wrote the following in comité d’environnement de la baie: it is certainly true, as the judge observes, that appel- lant’s allegations are very vague and imprecise as to the factual basis of respondent’s responsibility for the dam- ages suffered by the residents. in its motion, appellant simply alleges that the damages have been caused by re- spondent’s [[translation] “fault, negligence and lack of care    ”]. some additional detail is provided, however, in exhibit p-3, and particulars may, in due course, be ordered by the court if they are required. vague as appellant’s allegations may be, however, they do assert that the damage has been caused to the residents in question by air pollution emanating from respondent’s port operations and they do allege respondent’s fault and negligence. at this stage of the proceedings, i believe this is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of article 1003(b) that the facts alleged seem to justify the authorization of a class action. it is important to bear in mind that the judge hearing a motion under article 1003 for authorization to institute a class action is not called upon to decide that the action is well founded or that it will succeed. the only purpose of the hearing, at that stage, is to determine whether or not the conditions set out in sub- paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) have been met. if the conditions are met, the authorization should be granted and the class action should be allowed to proceed even if the claims may involve difficult problems of proof or serious legal questions as to liability. while the judge, on a motion for authorization, must be careful to screen out cases which are obviously frivolous or which do not meet the requirements of article 1003, it is not his role to determine the merits of the claim. at that stage, he need only decide whether the facts alleged in the motion for authorization “seem to justify” a class action as required by article 1003(b). [emphasis added; pp 660-61] par. 30 (canlii); d. ferland et b. emery, précis de procédure civile du québec (5e éd. 2015), vol. 2, n° 2-1615; masella, par 8. par exemple, dans l’arrêt comité d’environnement de la baie, la cour d’appel s’est exprimée comme suit : [traduction] il est certainement vrai, comme le fait remarquer le juge, que les allégations de l’appelante sont très vagues et imprécises quant au fondement factuel de la responsabilité de l’intimée à l’égard du préjudice subi par les résidents. dans sa requête, l’appelante allègue simple- ment que le préjudice a été causé par la « faute, négligence et incurie [  ] » de l’intimée. certains détails additionnels figurent toutefois dans la pièce p-3, et le tribunal peut, en temps opportun, ordonner que des précisions soient fournies si elles sont requises. cependant, aussi vagues que puissent être les alléga- tions de l’appelante, elles avancent effectivement que le préjudice été causé aux résidents en question par la pol- lution atmosphérique émanant des opérations portuaires de l’intimée, et elles invoquent la faute et la négligence de l’intimée. à ce stade-ci de l’instance, je considère que cela suffit pour satisfaire à la condition prévue à l’alinéa 1003b) qui exige que les faits allégués paraissent justifier l’octroi de l’autorisation d’exercer un recours collectif. il importe de garder à l’esprit que le juge qui entend une demande présentée en vertu de l’article 1003 en vue d’obtenir l’autorisation d’exercer un recours collectif n’est pas appelé à décider si le recours est bien fondé ou s’il sera accueilli. à ce stade, l’audience a pour seul but de déter- miner si les conditions énoncées aux alinéas a), b), c) et d) sont respectées ou non. si elles le sont, le tribunal doit accorder l’autorisation et laisser le recours collectif suivre son cours, même si les demandes sont susceptibles de présenter de difficiles problèmes de preuve ou de soulever de sérieuses questions de droit quant à la responsabilité. bien que le juge saisi d’une demande d’autorisation doive s’appliquer soigneusement, dans l’exercice de sa fonction de filtrage, à écarter les demandes qui sont mani- festement frivoles ou qui ne satisfont pas aux conditions de l’article 1003, il n’a pas pour rôle de décider du bien- fondé de la réclamation. à ce stade, il est uniquement tenu de décider si les faits allégués dans la demande d’autorisation « paraissent justifier » l’exercice d’un recours collectif, comme l’exige l’alinéa 1003b). [je souligne; p. 660- 661.] in harmegnies, in contrast, there was no evidence of harm other than a [translation] “vague, general dans harmegnies, au contraire, il n’y avait aucune preuve de préjudice, autre qu’une « allégation vague, [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 889 and imprecise allegation”: para 44. the applicant had come to court “empty- handed, asking the judge to conclude that, because there was fault, there was also necessarily damage”: harmegnies, at para. 44; see on this point infineon, at para 129. générale et imprécise » : par 44. en effet, le deman- deur était arrivé « les mains vides en demandant au juge parce qu’il y a eu faute, de conclure qu’il y a aussi nécessairement eu un préjudice causé » : har- megnies, par. 44; voir, à ce sujet, infineon, par 129. [61] in sum, this court has held unequivocally that the threshold requirement, both legal and evidentiary, under art 575(2) ccp is “a low one” (infineon, at paras. 59, 66, 72, 94, 124 and 137; vi vendi, at para. 72); in other words, the applicant’s burden at the authorization stage is not “onerous” (infineon, at paras. 33, 61, 110, 126, 129 and 130). it is clear from infineon and vivendi, and from a consistent line of subsequent decisions in which the court of appeal has faithfully followed, interpreted and ap- plied them, that a “frivolous”, “manifestly improper” or “untenable” application does not meet this “low” threshold and must therefore be “reject[ed] entirely”: infineon, at paras. 61-62, quoting comité régional des usagers, at p 429. i wish to be clear here — and i say this with great respect — that it does not seem to me to be entirely accurate to say, as côté j. does at para. 203 of her reasons, that her “disagreement” with gascon j. essentially concerns the “applica- tion” of the criterion applicable to the condition set out in art 575(2) ccp to the case at bar, and not the “interpretation” of that criterion. côté j. is of the view that screening out frivolous or clearly un- founded applications is not the “criterion adopted by the legislature”, but only “one of the purposes of the authorization process” (para. 206 (emphasis in orig- inal)), whereas gascon j. states quite clearly — and rightly — that it “is sufficient” that jj’s application be “neither untenable nor frivolous” (para 163). [61] en somme, la jurisprudence de notre cour établit sans équivoque que l’exigence relative au seuil légal et au seuil de preuve prévus à l’art 575(2) cpc. est « peu élevé[e] » : infineon, par. 59, 66, 72, 94, 124 et 137; vivendi, par. 72; autrement dit, le fardeau du demandeur n’est ni « lourd » ni « onéreux » au stade de l’autorisation : infineon, par. 33, 61, 110, 126, 129 et 130. il ressort des arrêts infineon et vivendi, ainsi que de la jurisprudence constante de la cour d’appel qui les a depuis fidèlement suivis, interprétés et ap- pliqués, qu’une demande « frivole », « manifestement mal fondée » ou encore « insoutenable » ne satisfait pas à ce seuil « peu élevé » et doit par conséquent être « écart[é]e d’emblée » : infineon, par. 61-62, citant comité régional des usagers, p 429. je tiens à préciser ici — et cela dit avec égards pour l’opinion contraire — qu’il ne me semble pas tout à fait exact d’affirmer, comme le fait la juge côté au par. 203 de ses motifs, que son « différend » avec le juge gascon porte essentiellement sur l’« application » à l’espèce du critère applicable à la condition prévue à l’art 575(2) cpc, et non sur son « interprétation ». la juge côté estime qu’écarter les demandes frivoles ou manifestement mal fondées ne constitue pas le « critère retenu par le législateur » mais seulement « l’un des objectifs du processus d’autorisation » (par. 206 (en italique dans l’original)), alors que le juge gascon énonce plutôt de façon claire — et cor- recte selon moi — qu’il « suffit » que la demande de jj ne soit « ni insoutenable, ni frivole » (par 163). [62] despite what certain jurists would prefer (see, for example, whirlpool canada v. gaudette, 2018 qcca 1206, at para. 29 (canlii) (in obiter); c. marseille, “le danger d’abaisser le seuil d’autori- sation en matière d’actions collectives — perspectives d’un avocat de la défense”, in c. piché, ed., the class action effect (2018), 247, at pp. 252-53), it is in my opinion not advisable for this court to [transla- tion] “reinforce” the authorization process or other- wise “revisit” its decisions in infineon and vivendi, which, i would add, can be said to have been endorsed [62] malgré les souhaits exprimés en ce sens par certains juristes (voir, par exemple, whirlpool ca nada c. gaudette, 2018 qcca 1206, par. 29 (canlii) (en obiter); c. marseille, « le danger d’abaisser le seuil d’autorisation en matière d’actions collectives — perspectives d’un avocat de la défense », dans c. piché, dir., l’effet de l’action collective (2018), 247, p. 252- 253), il n’est selon moi pas opportun que notre cour « renforce » le processus d’autorisation ou autrement « révise » ses arrêts infineon et vivendi, dont il est par ailleurs possible de dire qu’ils ont été 890 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. by the quebec legislature when the new ccp came into force on january 1, 2016 (see commentaires de la ministre de la justice, at p. 420: [translation] “[article 575] restates    the former law”). i agree with my colleague côté j., however, that the burden of establishing an “arguable case”, although not a heavy one, “does exist”, and “the applicant must meet it”: côté j.’s reasons, at para. 205, citing sofio, at para 24. this means that the authorization process must not be reduced to “a mere formality”: côté j.’s reasons, at para 206. but i agree with the court of appeal that in the instant case, jj has met the evi- dentiary and the legal threshold requirements under art 575(2) ccp, as i will now show. entérinés par le législateur québécois lors de l’entrée en vigueur du nouveau cpc le 1er janvier 2016 (voir commentaires de la ministre de la justice, p. 420 : « [l’article 575] reprend [  ] le droit antérieur »). je conviens cependant avec ma collègue la juge côté que le fardeau d’établir une « cause défendable » — quoique peu élevé — « existe » et « doit être franchi par le demandeur » : motifs de la juge côté, par. 205, se référant à sofio, par 24. ainsi, il faut éviter de réduire le processus d’autorisation à « une simple for- malité » : motifs de la juge côté, par 206. toutefois, à l’instar de la cour d’appel, je suis d’avis que jj. a satisfait en l’espèce au seuil de preuve et au seuil légal prévus à l’art 575(2) cpc, comme je m’ap- prête à le démontrer. (b) application of the law to the facts of the b) l’application du droit aux faits de l’espèce case [63] in this case, the oratory submits that it can- not be held liable solely because it owns a place where assaults are alleged to have been committed: afo, at paras 107-10. however, this reflects a misunderstanding of jj’s allegations against the oratory. as this court put it in infineon, at para. 80, jj’s “allegations    must be fully and well under- stood”. contrary to what the dissenting court of appeal judge suggested on this point (at paras. 128, 132 and 136), jj’s personal cause of action against the oratory is not based on a supposed “absolute” (ie, no- fault) liability arising solely from the fact that the oratory is the owner of a place where sex- ual assaults were allegedly committed. rather, it is based on liability for the oratory’s direct fault in relation to assaults allegedly committed at that place. such a cause of action necessarily implies that the oratory’s directors are alleged to have committed a fault attributable to the oratory by failing to put a stop to the sexual abuse or, worse, by covering it up. in sexual abuse cases, direct fault can, moreover, take different forms: breach of a duty to report or to protect, or failure to do what was needed to prevent or put a stop to the abuse (see, inter alia, langevin and des rosiers, at pp. 165- 208). in the case at bar, the relevant allegations are set out at paras 333 to 3.38 of the application. the dissenting court of appeal judge characterized them as [translation] “general (and non- factual) accusations”: para 134. [63] dans le cas qui nous intéresse, l’oratoire pré- tend que sa responsabilité ne saurait être engagée du seul fait qu’il est le propriétaire d’un lieu où des agressions auraient été commises : mao, par. 107- 110. cependant, il s’agit là d’une mauvaise com- préhension des allégations de jj visant l’oratoire. pour reprendre l’expression employée par notre cour dans infineon, par. 80 : « il importe [  ] de par- faitement bien comprendre les allégations » de jj. contrairement à ce que suggère à cet égard la juge dissidente en cour d’appel (par. 128, 132 et 136), la cause d’action personnelle de jj contre l’oratoire n’est pas fondée sur une prétendue responsabilité « absolue » (c-à-d, sans faute) découlant du seul fait que l’oratoire est le propriétaire d’un lieu où des agressions auraient été commises. la cause d’action personnelle de jj contre l’oratoire repose plutôt sur la responsabilité découlant de la faute directe de ce dernier à l’égard des agressions qui auraient été com- mises dans ce lieu. une telle cause d’action implique nécessairement que les administrateurs de l’oratoire auraient commis une faute imputable à celui-ci en négligeant de faire cesser les abus sexuels ou, pire, en les camouflant. en matière d’abus sexuels, la faute directe est d’ailleurs susceptible de revêtir diverses formes : manquement à un devoir de dénonciation ou de protection, ou encore omission de prendre les mesures qui s’imposent afin de prévenir ou de faire cesser les abus (voir, notamment, langevin et [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 891 i understand that it could be tempting to conclude that the allegations in jj’s application are vague, general or imprecise: see, for example, alex couture, at paras 31-32. [64] however, the seeming vagueness, generality or imprecision of the allegations must be assessed in light of the context of jj’s application and the evidence presented in support of it. that context involves incidents that occurred many years ago, when jj was still a child. as i mentioned above, the fact that nothing was reported at the time of the events explains, at least in part, why no “concrete”, “specific” or “tangible” allegations of fact are made in the application itself in support of jj’s argument that the oratory knew about the alleged sexual as- saults on children. what is more, the allegations of fault against the oratory are not being made “in the abstract”: they are grounded in the underlying factual framework, which consists of allegations that multi- ple victims were sexually assaulted at the oratory on a regular basis over a period of many years. this in itself is “suspect”, and makes it “possible” that there is a fault that can be attributed to the oratory. sexual assault has always been a fault that automatically causes serious injury: langevin and des rosiers, at p. 166; centre de la communauté sourde du mont- réal métropolitain v. institut raymond- dewar, 2012 qccs 1146, at paras. 75-76 (canlii). in addition, jj’s seemingly general allegations against the oratory are supported in the case at bar by “some evidence” within the meaning of infineon: para 134. des rosiers, p. 165- 208). en l’espèce, les alléga- tions pertinentes figurent aux par 333 à 3.38 de la demande. la juge dissidente en cour d’appel les a qualifiées de « reproches d’ordre générique (et non factuels) » : par 134. je comprends qu’il puisse être tentant de conclure que les allégations de la demande de jj sont vagues, générales ou imprécises : voir, par exemple, alex couture, par 31-32. [64] toutefois, le caractère apparemment vague, général ou imprécis des allégations doit être apprécié à la lumière du contexte entourant la demande de jj. et de la preuve présentée au soutien de celle-ci. le contexte est celui d’événements survenus il y a de nombreuses années alors que jj n’était encore qu’un enfant. comme je l’ai souligné précédemment, l’ab- sence de dénonciations à l’époque des faits explique, du moins en partie, l’absence, dans la demande elle- même, d’allégations de faits « concrets », « précis » ou « palpables » invoqués au soutien de la prétention de jj selon laquelle l’oratoire avait connaissance des agressions sexuelles qui auraient été commises sur des enfants. les allégations de faute visant l’oratoire ne sont d’ailleurs pas formulées « dans l’abstrait » : elles s’appuient sur la trame factuelle sous- jacente, laquelle consiste en des allégations d’agressions sexuelles qui auraient été commises régulièrement à l’oratoire sur une période de plusieurs années et sur plusieurs victimes, ce qui en soi est « suspect » et rend « possible » l’existence d’une faute imputable à l’oratoire. les agressions sexuelles ont d’ailleurs tou- jours été des fautes automatiquement constitutives de préjudices graves : langevin et des rosiers, p. 166; centre de la communauté sourde du montréal mé- tropolitain c. institut raymond- dewar, 2012 qccs 1146, par. 75-76 (canlii). de plus, les allégations ap- paremment générales de jj visant l’oratoire trouvent en l’espèce appui dans une « certaine preuve » au sens de l’arrêt infineon : par 134. [65] let me explain. [65] je m’explique. [66] the oratory is not only the owner of a “pre- eminent place of worship    associate[d] with the congregation”: gascon j.’s reasons, at para 177. it is true that, according to the preamble to the 1916 act, the oratory was incorporated “to assure the permanent maintenance of the [chapel known as [66] l’oratoire n’est pas seulement le propriétaire d’un « lieu de culte prééminent associé à la congré- gation » : motifs du juge gascon, par 177. il est vrai que, selon le préambule de la loi de 1916, l’oratoire a été constitué « pour assurer en permanence le main- tien de [la chapelle existant sous le nom d’oratoire 892 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. st. joseph’s oratory] and to allow the extension of its sphere of action”: aro, vol. ii, at p 29. however, s. 1 of that act clearly provides that the oratory was also incorporated “for the purpose of promoting the roman catholic faith and the welfare of souls by the propagation of the devotion to saint joseph”; see also the preamble to the 1916 act. as i mentioned above, the information statement for the oratory in the enterprise register from 2013 indicates that the oratory is a “church” within the meaning of s. 1(c) of the religious corporations act, that is, a “group of persons who form a religious body”: see aro, vol. ii, at p 23. and s 5b of the 1916 act provides that the oratory may “[a]ppear before the courts, and prosecute or defend any action or proceeding”. section 5d. adds that the oratory may also “[a]ccept, acquire and hold    for the purposes and use of the corporation, moveable and immoveable property”, while s. 7 provides that rents and revenues from its immovable property must be spent “in the accom- plishment of religious, charitable and educational works”. in considering similar provisions in bennett, this court categorically rejected the argument that the powers and activities of an episcopal corporation are confined “to holding property”: para 9. saint- joseph] et permettre d’agrandir son champ d’action » : dao, vol. ii, p 29. toutefois, l’art. 1 de cette loi précise bien que l’oratoire a également été constitué « dans le but de promouvoir la foi catho- lique romaine et le bien des âmes par la propagation de la dévotion à saint- joseph »; voir aussi le préam- bule de la loi de 1916. de fait, comme je l’ai signalé plus tôt, selon l’état des renseignements de l’ora- toire au registre des entreprises (2013), l’oratoire est une « église » au sens de l’art. 1c) de la loi sur les corporations religieuses, c’est-à-dire un « ensemble de personnes formant une société religieuse » : voir dao, vol. ii, p 23. de plus, l’art 5b de la loi de 1916 prévoit que l’oratoire peut « [e]ster en justice et poursuivre, ou contester toute action ou procé- dure ». en vertu de l’art 5d, l’oratoire peut égale- ment « [a]ccepter, acquérir et posséder [  ] pour les fins et l’usage de la corporation, des biens meubles et des immeubles » et, selon l’art. 7, les loyers et re- venus de ses immeubles doivent être dépensés « pour l’accomplissement d’œuvres religieuses, de charité et d’éducation ». interprétant des dispositions similaires dans l’arrêt bennett, notre cour a catégoriquement rejeté la prétention selon laquelle les pouvoirs et activités d’une corporation épiscopale se limiteraient « aux opérations concernant ses biens » : par 9. [67] the organization and management of masses are, without a doubt, “religious    works” (s. 7 of the 1916 act) of central importance for which the oratory, as a “church”, was responsible in ac- cordance with its mission of “promoting the roman catholic faith and the welfare of souls by the prop- agation of the devotion to saint joseph” (preamble to and s. 1 of the 1916 act): [67] l’organisation et la gestion des messes sont, à n’en pas douter, des « œuvres religieuses » (art. 7 de la loi de 1916) d’une importance centrale, dont l’oratoire, en tant qu’« église », avait la responsa- bilité conformément à sa mission « de promouvoir la foi catholique romaine et le bien des âmes par la propagation de la dévotion à saint- joseph » (préam- bule et art. 1 de la loi de 1916) : catholic theology and culture is firmly structured around the belief that the mass, or eucharist, is the only accept- able sacrifice to god, having replaced all forms of sacrifice that preceded it. the notion of sacrifice presumes a belief that there remains a need for intercession and advocacy before god. the mass is the center of catholicism. the priest is essential to the mass for without the priest there can be no mass and without the mass, there could be no catholicism     [emphasis added.] (benkert and doyle article (2008), aro, vol. ii, at p. 44) [traduction] la théologie et la culture catholiques sont fermement structurées autour de la croyance selon laquelle la messe, ou l’eucharistie, est le seul sacrifice acceptable pour dieu, ayant remplacé toutes les formes de sacrifice qui l’ont précédée. la notion de sacrifice présuppose la croyance qu’il continue d’exister un besoin d’intercession et de représentation auprès de dieu. la messe est l’élément central du catholicisme. le prêtre est essentiel à la messe, car, sans le prêtre, il ne saurait y avoir de messe et, sans la messe, il ne saurait y avoir de catholicisme    [je souligne.] (article benkert et doyle (2008), dao, vol. ii, p. 44) [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 893 [68] jj served mass at the oratory: para 312 of the application. he was allegedly assaulted there by [translation] “father bernard, a member of the congregation    who had an office at [the] oratory [and] frequently asked jj to go into his office for confession after serving mass”: para 314 of the application. although father bernard did not engage in his activities with children “under the authority”5 of the oratory, he necessarily did so with the con- sent of the oratory, which had made him one of the essential players in one of the central activities — mass — for which the oratory was responsible and had also made an office on its property available to him so that he could [translation] “confess” the altar boys: rfo, at para 12. with respect, it is absolutely impossible for me to find at this stage that an argument that the oratory may have breached its duty to protect its altar boys, who were allegedly assaulted at the oratory in the course of activities for which the oratory was responsible, is “frivo- lous”, “clearly unfounded” or “untenable”. “some evidence” has in fact been presented at this stage that fully supports the argument that the oratory, or more specifically its directors, knew or ought to have known about the assaults on children that are alleged to have been committed at the oratory by members of the congregation in the course of activities for which the oratory was responsible, given that at the time of the events, the oratory’s directors were themselves all members of the congregation. [68] jj servait la messe à l’oratoire : par 312 de la demande. il aurait été agressé à cet endroit par « [l]e père bernard, un membre de la congrégation [  ] ayant son bureau à l’oratoire [  ], [qui] lui de- mandait souvent d’aller dans son bureau pour se faire confesser, après avoir servi la messe » : par 314 de la demande. s’il n’exerçait pas ses activités au- près d’enfants « sous l’autorité »5 de l’oratoire, le père bernard les exerçait toutefois nécessairement avec le consentement de l’oratoire, qui avait fait du père bernard l’un des acteurs essentiels de l’une des activités centrales — la messe — dont l’oratoire avait la responsabilité; l’oratoire avait aussi mis à la disposition du père bernard un bureau sur sa pro- priété afin qu’il puisse « confesser » les servants de messe : mio, par 12. avec égards pour l’opinion contraire, je refuse catégoriquement de conclure qu’il est « frivole », « manifestement non fondé » ou encore « insoutenable » de prétendre, à ce stade-ci, que l’oratoire a pu manquer à son obligation d’assu- rer la sécurité de ses servants de messe, qui auraient subi des agressions à l’oratoire à l’occasion d’acti- vités dont l’oratoire avait la responsabilité. en effet, à la lumière d’une « certaine preuve » présentée à ce stade, il est tout à fait possible de soutenir que l’oratoire, ou plus précisément ses administrateurs, savaient ou auraient dû savoir que des agressions étaient supposément commises à l’oratoire sur des enfants par des membres de la congrégation, et ce, à l’occasion d’activités dont l’oratoire avait la res- ponsabilité, puisqu’à l’époque des faits, les admi- nistrateurs de l’oratoire étaient eux- mêmes tous des membres de la congrégation. [69] as i explained above, the table of victims sets out [translation] “specific, tangible” facts that in themselves support jj’s claim that the congregation knew about the alleged assaults on children by its members. there are several pieces of evidence, in- cluding the number of assaults reported in the ta- ble of victims, the number of religious members [69] or, ainsi que je l’ai déjà expliqué, le tableau des victimes expose des faits « précis et palpables » qui soutiennent en eux- mêmes la prétention de jj. selon laquelle la congrégation avait connaissance des agressions qui auraient été commises par ses membres sur des enfants. en effet, le cumul de plu- sieurs éléments — y compris le nombre d’agressions 5 as i will explain briefly below, at para. 76, however, i do not completely rule out the possibility that the trial judge will find the oratory liable for the act of another person in what could be likened to a liability based on a subordinate/principal relationship. contrary to the comments of both the dissenting court of appeal judge and my colleague gascon j., it is in fact alleged that the oratory was the “principal” of father bernard: para 338 of the application. 5 comme je l’expliquerai brièvement plus loin, au par. 76 de mes motifs, je n’exclus cependant pas entièrement la possibilité que le juge du fond retienne, à l’encontre de l’oratoire, une respon- sabilité du fait d’autrui assimilable à une responsabilité découlant d’une relation préposé/commettant. en effet, contrairement à ce qu’affirment la juge dissidente en cour d’appel et mon collègue le juge gascon, il est allégué que l’oratoire était le « commettant » du père bernard : par 338 de la demande. 894 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. involved and the length of the period covered by the reports of abuse, that, in combination, support an argument, at the authorization stage, that it might be possible at the trial on the merits to draw from them an inference that the congregation knew or could not have been unaware that some of its members were assaulting children: ca reasons, at paras. 59-60 and 83-86. regarding, more specifically, what mem- bers of the congregation acting as directors of the oratory knew, it should be reiterated that five vic- tims who have already come forward allege that they were assaulted at the oratory, over a period of nearly twelve years, by three or four members of the congregation (father bernard, brother ch and/ or brother hamelin, and father brault). as well, it should be borne in mind that other victims could come forward in the course of the proceedings: [translation]    if a class action is to be brought against an institution attended by multiple persons for acts com- mitted over a long period of time, it seems to us that the possibly high number of potential victims, although un- known at the beginning of the proceedings, fully justifies the bringing of a class action. it may well be that only one victim comes forward and that this victim decides to bring a class action in his or her own name and on behalf of all the other victims. if a teacher or a priest assaulted the victim over a period of one year, and if he worked at the institution for several years, is it not logical to con- clude that other children may have suffered the same fate? it matters little in our opinion whether 5, 10, 50 or 100 victims join the class action once it has been authorized. even though this number cannot be determined at the outset, a class action should be authorized in order to make justice more accessible to victims of sexual violence, who already have to overcome great difficulties in bringing their individual actions. some canadian courts have even found that the class action can help the victims, who are particularly vulnerable. dénoncées au tableau des victimes, le nombre de religieux impliqués et l’importance de la période couverte par les dénonciations — fait en sorte qu’il est possible de soutenir, au stade de l’autorisation, qu’il y aurait lieu lors de l’audition de l’action sur le fond d’en tirer l’inférence que la congrégation savait ou ne pouvait ignorer que certains de ses membres se livraient à des agressions sur des enfants : motifs de la ca, par. 59-60 et 83-86. en ce qui concerne plus spécifiquement la connaissance des membres de la congrégation agissant à titre d’administrateurs de l’oratoire, il convient de rappeler que cinq victimes se sont déjà manifestées et allèguent avoir été agres- sées à l’oratoire, sur une période de près de douze ans, par trois ou quatre membres de la congrégation (le père bernard, le frère ch et/ou le frère hamelin, et le père brault). il ne faut pas non plus écarter la possibilité que d’autres victimes se manifestent au cours des procédures :    si le recours collectif est dirigé contre un établis- sement, fréquenté par plusieurs personnes et pour des gestes posés sur une longue période de temps, il nous apparaît que le nombre possiblement élevé de victimes potentielles, bien qu’inconnu au début des procédures, justifie pleinement l’exercice d’un recours collectif. il se peut qu’une seule victime se manifeste, et qu’elle dé- cide d’exercer un recours collectif en son nom et celui de toutes les autres victimes. si un enseignant ou un prêtre l’a agressée pendant un an, et qu’il a œuvré auprès de l’éta- blissement pendant quelques années, n’est-il pas logique de conclure que d’autres enfants ont pu subir le même sort? il importe peu à notre avis que cinq, dix, cinquante ou cent victimes se joignent au recours collectif une fois qu’il est autorisé. bien qu’au départ, ce nombre ne puisse être déterminé, le recours collectif devrait être autorisé pour favoriser l’accessibilité à la justice aux victimes de violence sexuelle, qui doivent déjà surmonter d’énormes difficultés dans l’exercice de leurs recours individuels. d’ailleurs, certains tribunaux canadiens ont même conclu que le recours collectif est susceptible d’aider les victimes, qui sont particulièrement vulnérables. (langevin and des rosiers, at p. 369) (langevin et des rosiers, p. 369) [70] i must stress here that in order to succeed in his action, jj does not need to prove that the oratory, or more specifically its directors, had ac- tual or subjective knowledge of the assaults that are [70] j’insiste ici sur le fait qu’il n’est pas nécessaire à la réussite de l’action de jj que celui-ci prouve que l’oratoire, ou plus précisément ses administrateurs, avaient une connaissance réelle ou subjective des [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 895 alleged to have been committed at the oratory. civil fault under art 1457 ccq [translation] “is the difference between the agent’s conduct and the ab- stract, objective conduct of a person who is reasona- ble, prudent and diligent”: st. lawrence cement inc. v. barrette, 2008 scc 64, [2008] 3 scr 392, at para. 21, quoting j-l. baudouin and p. deslauriers, la responsabilité civile (7th ed. 2007), vol. i, at p. 171 (emphasis added). because jj’s allegations, like the table of victims, show that what is at issue in the instant case is not a single event or an isolated incident, but alleged assaults on multiple victims at the oratory on a regular basis over a period of many years, it is entirely possible that the trial judge will conclude that the oratory, or more specifically its directors, ought to have known about the assaults that are alleged to have been committed at the oratory, and that the directors were negligent in not putting a stop to them: religious institutions have been found to be in breach of a duty to take reasonable care in tort where they have failed to establish proper supervision and rules of appropriate conduct, failed to investigate complaints, and failed to offer counselling; the institution need not have actual knowledge about any employees, volunteers or alleged incidents, rather need only have or ought to have in con- templation the potential for improper conduct in relation to vulnerable persons. [emphasis added.] agressions qui auraient été commises à l’oratoire. en effet, la faute civile visée à l’art 1457 ccq « est constituée par l’écart séparant le comportement de l’agent de celui du type abstrait et objectif de la per- sonne raisonnable, prudente et diligente » : ciment du saint- laurent inc c barrette, 2008 csc 64, [2008] 3 rcs 392, par. 21, citant j-l. baudouin et p. deslauriers, la responsabilité civile (7e éd. 2007), vol. i, p. 171 (je souligne). puisque les allégations de jj, tout comme le tableau des victimes, révèlent qu’il n’est pas question en l’espèce d’un incident unique ou d’un fait isolé — mais bien plutôt d’agres- sions qui auraient été commises régulièrement à l’oratoire sur une période de plusieurs années et à l’endroit de plusieurs victimes —, il est tout à fait possible que le juge du fond arrive à la conclusion que l’oratoire, ou plus précisément ses administra- teurs, auraient dû savoir que des agressions étaient supposément commises à l’oratoire, et qu’ils ont été négligents en ne les faisant pas cesser : [traduction] des institutions religieuses ont été jugées responsables, en vertu du droit de la responsabilité dé- lictuelle, d’avoir manqué à leur obligation de diligence raisonnable en omettant d’exercer une supervision adé- quate et d’établir des règles de conduite appropriées, en omettant d’enquêter sur des plaintes et en omettant d’offrir du counseling; il n’est pas nécessaire que l’institution ait réellement eu connaissance de quelque allégation concer- nant des employés, des bénévoles ou des incidents, il suffit plutôt simplement qu’elle ait prévu — ou aurait dû prévoir — qu’il existait un risque de conduite inappropriée en lien avec des personnes vulnérables. [je souligne.] (ogilvie, at p. 335) (ogilvie, p. 335) [71] furthermore, as i explained above, the dvd of the enquête program attests to the systemic na- ture of the alleged sexual abuse by members of the congregation in various institutions. it also supports the claim that the congregation’s officers knew about the sexual abuse that is alleged to have occurred at other places in addition to collège notre- dame (at minute 24, as i mentioned above, a speaker refers to [translation] “one or another of the institu- tions managed by holy cross”). the fact that the dvd does not explicitly mention the oratory — apart from a statement at the very beginning that the congregation founded the oratory — is not a bar to [71] en outre, comme je l’ai expliqué plus haut, le dvd de l’émission enquête fait état du caractère sys- témique des abus sexuels qui auraient été commis par des membres de la congrégation dans divers établisse- ments. il étaye également la prétention selon laquelle les dirigeants de la congrégation savaient que des abus sexuels étaient supposément commis dans d’autres lieux en plus du collège notre- dame (minute 24, où figure, je le rappelle, la mention « l’un ou l’autre des établissements gérés par les sainte- croix »). le fait que le dvd ne mentionne pas explicitement l’ora- toire — sauf au tout début où il est précisé que la congrégation a fondé l’oratoire — ne constitue pas 896 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. authorizing the institution of a class action against it. in infineon, the court held, for example, that the in- stitution of a class action could be authorized on the basis of documents that showed that the appellants had participated in a price- fixing scheme with global repercussions, even though none of those documents expressly mentioned illegal activities in quebec: see inter alia paras. 92 and 134. [72] in short, jj’s “legal syllogism” in relation to the oratory can be summarized as follows. the oratory is not solely an owner, and jj’s personal cause of action against the oratory is not based solely on the fact that the oratory is the owner of a place where assaults allegedly occurred. rather, his per- sonal cause of action against the oratory is founded on the oratory’s direct liability for assaults that are alleged to have been committed at that place by a member of the congregation whom the oratory had made one of the essential players in one of the central activities for which the oratory was respon- sible. in addition, the oratory, or more specifically its directors, knew or ought to have known about the assaults on children that are alleged to have been committed at that place by members of the con- gregation, given that at the time of the events, the oratory’s directors were themselves all members of the congregation. in other words, the congregation is hidden behind the oratory, and this is definitely something that may be taken into consideration in law in order to impute direct liability to the oratory: un empêchement dirimant à l’octroi de l’autorisation d’exercer l’action collective contre lui. par exemple, dans infineon, la cour a reconnu que l’exercice d’une action collective pouvait être autorisé sur la base de documents démontrant que les appelantes avaient participé à un complot de fixation des prix ayant des répercussions mondiales, bien qu’aucun de ces docu- ments ne faisait expressément état d’activités illégales au québec : voir notamment par. 92 et 134. [72] en somme, le « syllogisme juridique » de jj. visant l’oratoire peut être résumé ainsi. l’oratoire n’est pas seulement un propriétaire, et la cause d’ac- tion personnelle de jj contre l’oratoire n’est pas fondée sur le seul fait que l’oratoire est le propriétaire d’un lieu où des agressions auraient été commises. la cause d’action personnelle de jj contre l’oratoire est plutôt fondée sur la responsabilité directe de ce dernier à l’égard des agressions qui auraient été com- mises dans ce lieu, par un membre de la congrégation dont l’oratoire avait fait l’un des acteurs essentiels de l’une des activités centrales dont l’oratoire avait la responsabilité. en outre, l’oratoire, ou plus préci- sément ses administrateurs, savaient ou auraient dû savoir que des agressions étaient supposément com- mises à l’oratoire sur des enfants par des membres de la congrégation, puisqu’à l’époque des faits, les administrateurs de l’oratoire étaient eux- mêmes tous des membres de la congrégation. autrement dit, der- rière l’oratoire, se cache la congrégation, et l’on peut tout à fait en tenir compte en droit afin d’imputer une responsabilité directe à l’oratoire : a corporation is certainly a person, but a very obedient person, slavishly doing all that its directors wish it to do. la société est une personne, certes, mais une personne très obéissante, qui fait servilement tout ce que ses admi- nistrateurs lui disent de faire. when determining whether a corporation has directly or indirectly committed fraud or failed to comply with its statutory or contractual obligations, reality is taken into account: there is no veil which prevents the identity of the true authors of the decision to take action from being deter- mined. this is why most statutory penal provisions make directors and officers who participated in the corporate decision personally liable for the resultant act or omission. in criminal and penal law the courts have developed the alter ego doctrine which we will examine in chapter 26. lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer si une société a com- mis directement ou indirectement un dol, une fraude ou si elle s’est soustraite à ses obligations statutaires ou contractuelles, on tient compte de cette réalité : il n’y a pas de « voile » qui empêche de rechercher l’identité des véritables auteurs de la décision de poser un tel geste. c’est pourquoi la plupart des dispositions pénales des lois rendent les administrateurs et dirigeants ayant participé à la décision corporative personnellement responsables de l’acte ou de l’omission qui en découle. c’est pourquoi, en droit criminel et pénal, les tribunaux ont élaboré la doctrine de l’alter ego dont nous traitons au chapitre 26. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 897 in the same way, in civil obligations, when determining the existence of fraudulent or malicious intent instigated either by the corporation, someone acting in concert with it or under its instructions, there is no “veil” to prevent a court from going to the source of the intention, by tak- ing into consideration the identity and motives of those who made the decision in question and the relationships between them, and attributing the intention, motives and relationships to one or more corporations controlled by them. [emphasis added.] (p. martel, business corporations in canada: legal and practical aspects (loose- leaf), at p. 1-67) [73] in this sense, i am in complete agreement with the court of appeal that [translation] “all the allegations and evidence that can apply to the con- gregation can also apply to the oratory”: para 113. with respect, it seems to me that the reasons of my colleague gascon j., who would authorize the insti- tution of a class action against the congregation but not against the oratory, have certain inherent contra- dictions. the “various exhibits” on which the court of appeal relied in authorizing the institution of a class action against both the congregation and the oratory concern both these entities: gascon j.’s rea- sons, at para. 159; see also para. 173 of his reasons, in which he enumerates the evidence filed in support of jj’s application against both these entities. like corporation jean- brillant and the congregation, the oratory and the congregation also have one or more “officers in common” as well as having establish- ments at the same addresses: gascon j.’s reasons, at para 160. the court of appeal did not lift the cor- porate veil of the oratory either; it merely noted that the oratory’s affairs [translation] “were managed in whole or in part by the congregation’s members” (para. 111; see also paras. 14, 22 and 64) and that it could be maintained, at the authorization stage, that the oratory should be held liable for assaults alleg- edly committed at the oratory, given the “context specific to the facts of this case”: gascon j.’s reasons, at para 162. de la même manière, en matière d’obligations civiles, lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer l’existence d’une intention frauduleuse ou malicieuse soit de la part de la société, soit de celle de personnes agissant de concert avec elle ou selon ses instructions, aucun « voile » n’empêche un tri- bunal d’aller à la source de cette intention, en considérant l’identité et les motivations des personnes qui ont effec- tivement pris la décision visée, ainsi que les liens qui les relient, et en attribuant cette intention, ces motivations et ces liens à la ou aux sociétés contrôlées par ces personnes. [je souligne.] (p. martel, la société par actions au québec, vol. i, les aspects juridiques (feuilles mobiles), par. 1-224 à 1-226) [73] en ce sens, je suis entièrement d’accord avec la cour d’appel pour dire que « tous les éléments oppo- sables à la congrégation le sont également à l’égard de l’oratoire » : par 113. soit dit en tout respect, il me semble que les motifs de mon collègue le juge gascon, qui souhaite autoriser l’exercice de l’action collective contre la congrégation, mais non contre l’oratoire, comportent certaines contradictions inhérentes. les « diverses pièces » sur lesquelles la cour d’appel s’est fondée afin d’autoriser l’exercice de l’action collective contre la congrégation et contre l’oratoire visent ces deux entités : motifs du juge gascon, par. 159; voir aussi par. 173 de ses motifs, où il énumère les éléments de preuve déposés au soutien de la demande de jj à l’encontre de ces deux entités. tout comme la corporation jean- brillant et la congrégation, l’ora- toire et la congrégation partagent aussi un ou des « dirigeants communs » ainsi que des établissements situés aux mêmes adresses : motifs du juge gascon, par 160. la cour d’appel n’a pas non plus soulevé le voile de la personnalité morale de l’oratoire; elle a simplement souligné que les affaires de l’oratoire « [étaient] administrées en partie ou en totalité par les membres de la congrégation » (par. 111; voir aussi par. 14, 22 et 64), et qu’il était possible de soutenir, au stade de l’autorisation, que l’oratoire devait être tenu responsable à l’égard des agressions qui auraient été commises à l’oratoire, vu le « contexte propre aux faits de l’espèce » : motifs du juge gascon, par 162. [74] my colleague gascon j. tries to show how jj’s cause of action against the oratory differs in nature or in its validity from his cause of action [74] mon collègue le juge gascon s’efforce de démontrer en quoi la cause d’action de jj contre l’oratoire différerait, en nature ou en valeur, de sa 898 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. against the congregation. with respect, i do not find his arguments convincing. in my view, we must in- stead recognize that the allegations made against the oratory and those made against the congregation in jj’s application and the exhibits filed in support of it simply cannot be distinguished in any way that would be legally relevant. cause d’action contre la congrégation. avec égards, ses motifs ne me convainquent pas. à mon avis, il faut plutôt reconnaître que les allégations formulées contre l’oratoire et contre la congrégation dans la demande de jj et les pièces déposées au soutien de celle-ci ne peuvent tout simplement pas être distin- guées de quelque façon pertinente que ce soit sur le plan juridique. [75] when all is said and done, the difference my colleague sees between the oratory and the con- gregation is based solely on the fact (a) that the alle- gations in the application with respect to canon law mention the congregation only and (b) that the dvd of the enquête program does not specifically refer to the assaults allegedly committed by members of the congregation at the oratory (reasons of gascon j., at para. 175; see also para 172). [75] en définitive, selon mon collègue, la diffé- rence entre l’oratoire et la congrégation tiendrait au seul fait que : a) les allégations de la demande qui portent sur le droit canon visent uniquement la congrégation; et b) le dvd de l’émission en- quête ne porte pas spécifiquement sur les agressions qui auraient été commises par des membres de la congrégation à l’oratoire (motifs du juge gascon, par. 175; voir aussi par 172). [76] however, although the allegations in the ap- plication with respect to canon law do refer only to the congregation, this does not justify the different outcome my colleague arrives at in the oratory’s case. those allegations are in fact relevant even to the oratory, given that they relate to the authority of officers of the religious community known as the congregation of holy cross over its members. not only were the directors of the oratory all members of the congregation, but some of them may even have been officers of the congregation, and therefore in positions of authority (and able to exercise control) over the members of the congregation who worked at the oratory or engaged in activities with children there: information statement for the oratory in the enterprise register (2013), aro, vol. ii, at p. 24; information statements for the congregation in the enterprise register (2015) and (2014) and information statement for corporation jean- brillant in the enter- prise register (2014), arc, at pp. 134, 141 and 146. [76] pourtant, bien qu’elles visent uniquement la congrégation, les allégations de la demande qui portent sur le droit canon ne justifient pas le résultat différent auquel parvient mon collègue en ce qui concerne l’oratoire. en fait, ces allégations sont pertinentes même en ce qui concerne l’oratoire, puisqu’elles portent sur l’autorité des dirigeants de la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix à l’égard de ses membres. or, non seulement les administrateurs de l’oratoire étaient- ils tous des membres de la congré- gation, mais certains d’entre eux étaient même pos- siblement des dirigeants de la congrégation, donc en situation d’autorité (et en mesure d’exercer un pouvoir de contrôle) à l’égard des membres de la congrégation qui œuvraient à l’oratoire ou y exer- çaient des activités auprès d’enfants : état des ren- seignements de l’oratoire au registre des entreprises (2013), dao, vol. ii, p. 24; état des renseignements de la congrégation au registre des entreprises (2015) et (2014) et état des renseignements de la corpora- tion jean- brillant au registre des entreprises (2014), dac, p. 134, 141 et 146. [77] similarly, while it is true that the dvd of the enquête program does not specifically refer to the assaults allegedly committed by members of the congregation at the oratory, it should be borne in mind that, as i mentioned above, the dvd does [77] de même, s’il est vrai que le dvd de l’émis- sion enquête ne porte pas spécifiquement sur les agressions qui auraient été commises par des membres de la congrégation à l’oratoire, il convient de signaler qu’il y est toutefois question — tel que [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 899 refer to assaults allegedly committed in [transla- tion] “one or another of the institutions managed by holy cross”. my colleague adopts, on the one hand, but without saying so clearly, the assessment of the superior court judge, who erroneously con- cluded that the dvd is [translation] “of no assis- tance for the purposes of this proceeding [against the congregation]” (para. 111) on the basis that it deals at length with sexual assaults committed at collège notre- dame. but on the other hand, my colleague also rejects the superior court judge’s assessment on this same point, as he expresses the opinion that the dvd reinforces jj’s cause of ac- tion against the congregation, but not against the oratory: gascon j.’s reasons, at para 176. with re- spect, it must, on the contrary, be concluded that, if the dvd of the enquête program is of any assistance for the purposes of authorization of the institution of the proposed class action — and like my colleague, i am effectively of the view that it is — the reason is that it supports jj’s “legal syllogism” to the effect that the congregation and the various institutions it controls or that it controlled at the time of the events (such as collège notre- dame or the oratory) are liable for the alleged sexual abuse of children by members of the congregation. [78] in fact, if it were absolutely necessary to en- gage, as my colleague does, in an exercise of com- paring the relative strengths of jj’s causes of action against the oratory and against the congregation, it seems to me that i would have to find that jj has a sounder cause of action against the oratory than against the congregation (ie, against the appel- lant “province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix”). as my colleague rightly points out at para. 162 of his reasons, “the congregation’s corpo- rate structure” will have to be reviewed exhaustively “at trial”, where the question of the basis on which the congregation can be held liable for acts allegedly committed before it was incorporated will of course come up again. moreover, my colleague côté j. con- cludes that this flaw in jj’s cause of action against the congregation is so clear as to justify not author- izing the institution of the class action against that entity. although i do not agree with my colleague’s conclusion in this regard, i would point out here that je l’ai indiqué précédemment — des agressions qui auraient été commises dans « l’un ou l’autre des établissements gérés par les sainte- croix ». d’une part, mon collègue reprend sans le dire clairement la critique formulée par le juge de la cour supérieure, qui a erronément conclu que le dvd de l’émission enquête n’était « d’aucune utilité pour les fins du présent recours [contre la congrégation] » (par. 111) puisqu’il traite longuement des agressions sexuelles commises au collège notre- dame. d’autre part, mon collègue rejette aussi la critique du juge de la cour supérieure sur ce même point, se disant d’avis que le dvd de l’émission enquête renforce la cause d’action de jj contre la congrégation, mais non contre l’oratoire : motifs du juge gascon, par 176. avec égards, il faut au contraire conclure que, si le dvd de l’émission enquête est d’une quelconque utilité pour les besoins de l’autorisation de l’exercice de l’action collective projetée — et, à l’instar de mon collègue, je suis effectivement d’avis qu’il l’est —, c’est parce qu’il appuie le « syllogisme juridique » de jj selon lequel la congrégation ainsi que les divers établissements qu’elle contrôle ou contrôlait à l’époque des faits (comme le collège notre- dame ou l’oratoire) sont responsables des abus sexuels qui auraient été commis par des membres de la con- grégation sur des enfants. [78] en fait, s’il était absolument nécessaire de pro- céder, comme le fait mon collègue, à un exercice de comparaison de la force relative des causes d’action de jj contre l’oratoire et contre la congréga tion, il faudrait, me semble-t-il, conclure que la cause d’ac- tion de jj contre l’oratoire est plus solide que sa cause d’action contre la congrégation (c-à-d, contre l’appelante la « province canadienne de la congréga- tion de sainte- croix »). en effet, comme le souligne à juste titre mon collègue au par. 162 de ses motifs, « la structure corporative de la congrégation » devra être examinée de manière exhaustive « au procès », procès dans le cadre duquel ressurgira certainement la question de savoir à quel titre la congrégation peut être tenue responsable d’actes qui auraient été commis avant sa constitution. ma collègue la juge côté conclut d’ailleurs que cette faiblesse de la cause d’action de jj contre la congrégation est à ce point manifeste qu’elle justifie de ne pas autoriser l’exer- cice de l’action collective contre cette entité. bien 900 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. jj’s cause of action against the oratory has no such flaw. the oratory, which is one of the many faces of the religious community known as the congregation of holy cross, was incorporated in 1916 and there- fore existed at the time of the events. it is entirely possible that the trial judge will conclude that no le- gal principle would justify holding the congregation liable for acts allegedly committed before it was incorporated, and that conclusion would be fatal to the claims for compensation of jj and other victims of sexual assaults that are alleged to have been com- mitted at the oratory if, as my colleague gascon j. suggests, the institution of the class action against the latter entity were not authorized. que je ne partage aucunement la conclusion de ma collègue à cet égard, je tiens à souligner ici que la cause d’action de jj contre l’oratoire ne souffre pas d’une faiblesse similaire. l’oratoire, qui est l’un des multiples visages de la communauté religieuse connue sous le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix, a été constitué en corporation en 1916 et il existait donc à l’époque des faits. il est tout à fait possible que le juge du fond conclue qu’aucune théorie juri- dique ne justifie de tenir la congrégation responsable d’actes qui auraient été commis avant la constitu- tion de celle-ci, conclusion qui serait fatale à la de- mande d’indemnisation de jj et des autres victimes d’agressions sexuelles qui auraient été commises à l’oratoire si, comme le suggère mon collègue le juge gascon, l’exercice de l’action collective contre cette entité n’était pas autorisé. [79] in concluding on the condition of sufficiency of the alleged facts, i will simply reiterate that, if any doubt remains on the issue of whether the ev- identiary and the legal threshold requirements un- der art 575(2) ccp are met, the applicant, jj, should in principle be given the benefit of that doubt: ca reasons, at para. 78; see also harmegnies, at para. 46; charles, at para. 43; adams, at para. 23; finn (2016), at p. 53; lafond (2006), at pp 115-16. as kasirer ja of the quebec court of appeal so aptly put it in sibiga, which was rendered in 2016, at para. 51, “courts should err on the side of caution and authorise the action where there is doubt as to whether the standard has been met”. [79] en terminant sur la condition relative au carac- tère suffisant des faits allégués, je me contenterais de réitérer que, s’il subsistait un doute sur la question de savoir s’il a été satisfait au seuil de preuve et au seuil légal prévus à l’art 575(2) cpc, ce doute devrait en principe bénéficier au demandeur jj : motifs de la ca, par. 78; voir aussi harmegnies, par. 46; charles, par. 43; adams, par. 23; finn (2016), p. 53; lafond (2006), p. 115- 116. comme l’a si bien ex- primé le juge kasirer de la cour d’appel du québec dans l’arrêt sibiga rendu en 2016, au par. 51 : [tra- duction] « les tribunaux devraient pécher par excès de prudence et autoriser l’action en cas de doute quant au respect de la norme ». (4) fact that only the oratory is being sued (4) le fait que seul l’oratoire soit poursuivi aux together with the congregation côtés de la congrégation [80] finally, the oratory submits that jj’s action against it is inconsistent, as no other owner of a place where assaults were allegedly committed by members of the congregation is being sued. my col- league gascon j. seems to agree with this argument (at para. 177), just as the dissenting court of appeal judge (at para. 130) and the superior court judge (at paras. 129-35) did before him. with respect, this proposition seems to me to have no basis in law. the fact that other defendants could possibly have been sued but were not cannot release the oratory from its liability for assaults allegedly committed at the [80] enfin, l’oratoire plaide que l’action de jj à son endroit est incohérente, car aucun autre proprié- taire de lieu où des agressions auraient été commises par des membres de la congrégation n’est poursuivi. mon collègue le juge gascon semble souscrire à cet argument (par. 177), tout comme l’avaient fait avant lui la juge dissidente en cour d’appel (par. 130) et le juge de la cour supérieure (par. 129- 135). avec égards, une telle proposition me semble dépourvue de fondement juridique. le fait que d’autres défen- deurs auraient peut- être pu être poursuivis mais ne l’ont pas été ne saurait soustraire l’oratoire à sa [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge brown 901 oratory. moreover, in extracontractual civil liability,6 the obligation to make reparation for injury is soli- dary: art 1526 ccq. the creditor’s action therefore need not be instituted against all the co- debtors, as the creditor may, on the contrary, “apply    to any one of the co- debtors at his option”: art 1528 ccq. in any event, the finding of liability being [81] sought in the oratory’s case is not based solely on its being the owner of a place where assaults were allegedly committed. rather, jj’s personal cause of action against the oratory is based on liability for the oratory’s own direct fault, and in this respect, the fact that the oratory was controlled by members of the congregation at the time of the events is relevant. at the hearing on may 6, 2015 before the superior court judge, counsel for jj explained that [trans- lation] “[t]he oratory is being sued essentially because the oratory is clearly under the control of holy cross”: oral argument of mr. gareau dated may 6, 2015, aro, vol. i, at p 157. the record does not show whether other potential defendants were controlled in the same way by members of the congregation at the time of the events.7 école notre- dame-des- neiges, for example, where jj. also alleges that he was assaulted, was at the time of the events run by the commission des écoles catho- liques de montréal, not by the congregation: oral argument of mr. gareau dated may 6, 2015, aro, vol. i, at p 158. responsabilité à l’égard des agressions qui auraient été commises à l’oratoire. d’ailleurs, en matière de responsabilité civile extracontractuelle6, l’obligation de réparer le préjudice est solidaire : art 1526 ccq. le créancier n’est par conséquent pas obligé d’exer- cer son action contre tous ses codébiteurs; il peut au contraire « s’adresser [  ] à celui des codébiteurs qu’il choisit » : art 1528 ccq. [81] quoi qu’il en soit, la responsabilité de l’ora- toire n’est pas recherchée seulement à titre de pro- priétaire d’un lieu où des agressions auraient été commises la cause d’action personnelle de jj. contre l’oratoire est plutôt fondée sur la respon- sabilité découlant de la faute directe de ce dernier et, à cet égard, le fait que l’oratoire était contrôlé par des membres de la congrégation à l’époque des faits est pertinent. lors de l’audience du 6 mai 2015 devant le juge de la cour supérieure, le procureur de jj expliquait d’ailleurs que « [l]’oratoire est visé essentiellement parce que l’oratoire est claire- ment sous la gouverne des sainte- croix » : plaidoirie de me gareau en date du 6 mai 2015, dao, vol. i, p 157. le dossier ne révèle pas si d’autres défen- deurs potentiels étaient à l’époque des faits contrôlés de la sorte par des membres de la congrégation7. par exemple, l’école notre- dame-des- neiges, où jj allègue aussi avoir subi des agressions, relevait à l’époque des faits de la commission des écoles catholiques de montréal, et non de la congrégation : plaidoirie de me  gareau en date du 6  mai  2015, dao, vol. i, p 158. [82] moreover, contrary to the assertions of the oratory, the dissenting court of appeal judge and the superior court judge, the fact that only the oratory is being sued together with the congregation at the authorization stage is in my view consistent with the fact that [translation] “it is the individual situation of the appointed person that must be considered at [82] de plus, contrairement à ce qu’affirment l’oratoire ainsi que la juge dissidente en cour d’ap- pel et le juge de la cour supérieure, le fait que seul l’oratoire soit poursuivi aux côtés de la congréga- tion au stade de l’autorisation m’apparaît cohérent avec le fait que « c’est la situation individuelle de la personne désignée qui doit être examinée à ce 6 jj’s action is [translation] “[a]n action in extracontractual civil liability and in punitive damages”: para. 2 of the application. 7 at the hearing on may 6, 2015 before the judge of the superior court, counsel for jj, answering a question from the judge as to whether other institutions had been founded or were controlled by the congregation, stated: [translation] “it’s possible, your honour, i couldn’t say yes or no” (oral argument of mr. gareau dated may 6, 2015, aro, vol. i, at p 156). 6 l’action de jj est « [u]ne action en responsabilité civile extra- contractuelle et en dommages- intérêts punitifs » : par. 2 de la demande. 7 lors de l’audience du 6 mai 2015 devant le juge de la cour supérieure, en réponse à une question du juge lui demandant si d’autres établissements avaient été fondés ou étaient contrôlés par la congrégation, le procureur de jj a dit : « c’est possible, monsieur le juge, je peux pas vous dire oui ou non » (plaidoirie de me gareau en date du 6 mai 2015, dao, vol. i, p 156). 902 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j brown j. [2019] 2 scr. this stage of the proceeding” in determining whether the condition of sufficiency of the alleged facts is met: option consommateurs v. merck & co. inc., 2013 qcca 57, at paras. 20 and 24 (canlii); sofio, at para. 10; option consommateurs v. fédération des caisses desjardins du québec, 2010 qcca 1416, at para. 9 (canlii); lambert (gestion peggy), at para 28. in the instant case, the “appointed person” is jj, and he has a personal cause of action only against the oratory and against the congregation — and not against other potential defendants. it should be noted on this point that jj’s initial application (before it was amended), which is dated october 30, 2013 and was filed on november 21, 2013, predates this court’s judgment in bank of montreal v. mar- cotte, which was rendered on september 19, 2014. it was not until then that it was clearly established in quebec law that the representative plaintiff is not required to have a personal cause of action against each defendant: bank of montreal v. marcotte, at paras. 37-47, rejecting the position adopted in bou- chard v. agropur coopérative, 2006 qcca 1342, [2006] rjq 2349, and option consommateurs v. novopharm ltd., 2008 qcca 949, [2008] rjq. 1350; see, on this point, sibiga, at paras 37-40. in other words, given the state of the law that applied in quebec when jj filed his initial application, it was not clear that a representative plaintiff could institute a class action against multiple defendants if he or she did not have a personal cause of action against each of them. in my opinion, it would be unfair today to penalize jj for choosing to sue only the defendants against which he has a personal cause of action, given that in doing so, he was simply complying with the law as it stood at the time when he filed his application. i would conclude by point- ing out that the situation in the case at bar is hardly any different from the one in cornellier, in which only collège notre- dame was sued together with the congregation even though the case concerned sexual abuse, by members of the congregation, of children who had attended collège notre- dame, collège saint- césaire and école notre- dame de pohénégamook. stade du recours » lorsqu’on se demande s’il est satisfait à la condition relative au caractère suffi- sant des faits allégués : option consommateurs c. merck & co. inc., 2013 qcca 57, par. 20 et 24 (canlii); sofio, par. 10; option consommateurs c. fédération des caisses desjardins du québec, 2010 qcca 1416, par.  9 (canlii); lambert (gestion peggy), par 28. en l’espèce, la « personne dési- gnée » est jj, et ce dernier dispose d’une cause d’action personnelle seulement contre l’oratoire et contre la congrégation — et non contre d’autres défendeurs potentiels il y a lieu de souligner à cet égard que la demande initiale de j.j (avant qu’elle ne soit amendée), qui est datée du 30 oc- tobre 2013 et a été déposée le 21 novembre 2013, est antérieure à l’arrêt de notre cour banque de montréal c. marcotte, lequel fut rendu le 19 sep- tembre  2014 or, ce n’est que depuis cette date qu’il est clairement établi en droit québécois que le représentant n’est pas tenu de disposer d’une cause d’action personnelle contre chaque défen- deur : banque de montréal c. marcotte, par. 37-47, rejetant la thèse retenue dans les arrêts bouchard c. agropur coopérative, 2006 qcca 1342, [2006] rjq 2349, et option consommateurs c. novo- pharm ltd., 2008 qcca 949, [2008] rjq 1350; voir, à ce sujet, sibiga, par 37-40. autrement dit, suivant l’état du droit qui était applicable au qué- bec à l’époque où jj a déposé sa demande initiale, il n’était pas certain que le représentant pouvait exercer un recours collectif contre de multiples défendeurs s’il ne disposait pas lui- même d’une cause d’action personnelle contre chacun d’eux. à mon avis, il serait injuste d’opposer aujourd’hui à jj le fait qu’il ait choisi de poursuivre seulement les défendeurs contre lesquels il possède une cause d’action personnelle, alors qu’en agissant ainsi, il ne faisait que se conformer à l’état du droit existant au moment où il a déposé sa demande. je termine- rais en soulignant que la situation en l’espèce n’est guère différente de l’affaire cornellier, où seul le collège notre- dame était poursuivi aux côtés de la congrégation, alors que le litige concernait des sévices sexuels commis par des membres de la congrégation sur des étudiants ayant fréquenté le collège notre- dame, le collège saint- césaire et l’école notre- dame de pohénégamook. gascon j | le juge gascon [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 903 iii conclusion iii conclusion [83] i would dismiss both appeals with costs to jj. [83] je rejetterais les deux pourvois, avec dépens en faveur de jj. english version of the reasons of wagner cj and les motifs du juge en chef wagner et des juges gascon and rowe jj. delivered by gascon et rowe ont été rendus par gascon j. (dissenting in part) — le juge gascon (dissident en partie) — i overview i aperçu [84] this appeal concerns an action that victims seek to bring for damages for bodily injury resulting from their having been sexually abused by members of a religious community several decades ago. in quebec, as elsewhere in canada, such actions some- times raise delicate questions with respect to the applicable prescriptive period and to the appropriate procedural vehicle. those questions are central to this appeal. [84] ce pourvoi porte sur le recours que souhaitent intenter des victimes en réparation du préjudice cor- porel causé par des abus sexuels commis à leur en- droit par des membres d’une communauté religieuse il y a plusieurs décennies. au québec, comme ail- leurs au canada, de tels recours soulèvent parfois des questions délicates en matière de prescription applicable et de véhicule procédural approprié. ces questions sont au cœur du présent pourvoi. [85] in 2013, the respondent, jj, applied for au- thorization to institute a class action against the ap- pellants, province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix (“congregation”) and oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal (“oratory”). he alleged that he had been sexually abused by two members, since deceased, of the congregation. the assaults were alleged to have taken place more than 50 years ago when he was attending notre- dame-des- neiges el- ementary school and when he was an altar boy at the oratory. [85] en 2013, l’intimé, jj, demande l’autorisa- tion d’exercer une action collective contre les ap- pelants, la province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix (« congrégation ») et l’oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal (« oratoire »). il al- lègue que deux membres aujourd’hui décédés de la congréga tion auraient abusé sexuellement de lui. ces agressions seraient survenues il y a plus de 50 ans. elles se seraient produites, d’une part, alors qu’il fréquentait l’école primaire notre- dame-des- neiges et, d’autre part, alors qu’il était servant de messe à l’oratoire. [86] the class covered by jj’s application for authorization is vast. it is described as including all natural persons residing in quebec who were sexu- ally abused by members of the congregation in any educational institution, residence or summer camp or any other place in quebec, including the oratory. the class excludes any persons covered by a similar action previously instituted against the congregation in which a settlement was reached. jj alleged that the appellants had been negligent in failing to act to put a stop to the abuse despite being aware of it. he explained that he had decided to bring his action after [86] la demande d’autorisation de jj vise un vaste groupe. ce groupe est décrit comme incluant toutes les personnes physiques résidant au québec qui ont subi des sévices sexuels de la part de membres de la congrégation dans tout établissement d’enseigne- ment, résidence, camp d’été ou tout autre endroit situé au québec, dont l’oratoire. le groupe exclut les personnes visées par un recours similaire intenté auparavant contre la congrégation et qui a fait l’objet d’un règlement. jj reproche aux appelants d’avoir fait preuve de négligence en omettant d’agir pour faire cesser les abus, et ce, malgré le fait qu’ils en 904 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. viewing a report on a systemic problem of sexual abuse in the congregation in 2011. [87] the superior court dismissed the application for authorization to institute the class action on the basis that it met none of the conditions provided for in the code of civil procedure. the court of appeal set aside that judgment. it unanimously authorized the class action against the congregation, and a ma- jority authorized the class action against the oratory. both the congregation and the oratory appeal to this court. they both argue, first, that jj’s action is clearly prescribed on the basis of a term for forfeiture (délai de déchéance) that now applies, pursuant to the second paragraph of art 29261 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”), in a case in which the alleged assailants have died. the congregation further sub- mits that there is no legal relationship between jj. and itself, given that it was constituted only in 2008, well after the alleged acts. finally, the oratory argues that the allegations in jj’s application for authori- zation are insufficient to support a cause of action in civil liability against it. in its view, the action cannot apply to it solely because certain of the alleged acts occurred on its property. [88] i would dismiss the congregation’s appeal but would allow that of the oratory. first, jj’s remedy is in my view neither forfeit nor clearly prescribed. the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq contin- ues the rules with respect to prescription that applied before the legislature enacted it in 2013. it does not establish a term for forfeiture. moreover, the starting point for the period provided for in that paragraph is when the victim becomes aware that the injury suf- fered is attributable to the assault. in any event, that paragraph does not apply to an action that, like this one, does not involve the successions of the authors of the alleged acts. avaient connaissance. il explique avoir décidé d’in- tenter son recours après le visionnement, en 2011, d’un reportage sur l’existence d’un problème sys- témique d’abus sexuels au sein de la congrégation. [87] la cour supérieure a rejeté la demande d’auto- risation d’exercer l’action collective au motif qu’elle ne satisfaisait à aucune des conditions prescrites au code de procédure civile. la cour d’appel a infirmé ce jugement. elle a, à l’unanimité, autorisé l’action collective contre la congrégation et, à la majorité, celle contre l’oratoire. tant la congrégation que l’oratoire se pourvoient devant notre cour. d’abord, toutes deux prétendent que le recours de jj est ma- nifestement prescrit en raison du délai de déchéance qu’édicterait dorénavant l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 du code civil du québec (« ccq ») en cas de décès des agresseurs concernés. ensuite, la congrégation soutient qu’il n’existe aucun lien de droit entre jj et elle puisqu’elle n’a été constituée qu’en 2008, bien après les actes reprochés. enfin, l’oratoire plaide que les allégations figurant dans la demande d’au- torisation de jj sont insuffisantes pour étayer une cause d’action en responsabilité civile contre elle. l’oratoire estime qu’il ne saurait être visé par le recours du seul fait que certains des actes allégués seraient survenus sur sa propriété. [88] je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi de la con- grégation mais d’accueillir celui de l’oratoire. dans un premier temps, le recours de jj n’est selon moi ni déchu ni manifestement prescrit. l’alinéa 2 de l’art 29261 ccq maintient le régime de la pres- cription qui existait avant l’adoption de cette dispo- sition par le législateur en 2013. cet alinéa n’édicte pas un délai de déchéance. en outre, c’est la prise de connaissance par la victime que son préjudice est attribuable à l’agression subie qui constitue le point de départ du délai prévu à cet alinéa. à tous égards, cet alinéa ne s’applique pas à un recours qui, comme ici, n’implique pas la succession des auteurs des actes reprochés. [89] second, i find that the class action against the congregation should not be dismissed at the stage of the application for authorization. the purpose of jj’s action is to establish the congregation’s liabil- ity for acts of members of its religious community. [89] dans un deuxième temps, je considère qu’il n’y a pas lieu de rejeter l’action collective contre la congrégation au stade de la demande d’autorisation. le recours de jj vise à établir la responsabilité de la congrégation pour les gestes commis par des [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 905 it would be premature to deny the institution of the class action on the basis that the congregation is not the entity that existed at the time of the alleged acts. the congregation’s argument based on there being no legal relationship between jj and itself does not alone suffice to justify characterizing the application as frivolous or untenable. membres de sa communauté religieuse. il serait pré- maturé de refuser l’exercice de l’action collective au motif que la congrégation n’est pas l’entité qui existait au moment des actes allégués. l’argument de la congrégation fondé sur l’inexistence d’un lien de droit entre jj et elle ne permet pas à lui seul de qualifier la demande de frivole ou d’insoutenable. [90] the opposite is true where the class action against the oratory is concerned, however. in its case, i find that, when all is said and done, jj’s application contains only vague and general allega- tions that are limited to identifying the oratory as a place where some of the alleged abuse occurred. at the stage of the authorization of a class action, the applicant must show that he or she has an arguable case in light of the facts and the applicable law. but given the allegations in jj’s application and the exhibits filed in support of it, the application sets out no specific fact that might support a cause of action in civil liability against the oratory for the abuse in question on the basis either of its own direct fault or of the act of another person. that being the case, the conclusions of the application judge on this point should be restored. [90] il en va par contre autrement de l’action col- lective visant l’oratoire. en ce qui concerne cette entité, je considère que la demande de jj ne contient en définitive que des allégations vagues et géné- rales, qui se limitent à identifier l’oratoire comme étant un lieu où certains des abus allégués se seraient produits. au stade de l’autorisation d’une action collective, le demandeur doit démontrer l’existence d’une cause défendable au regard des faits et du droit applicable. or, sur la foi des allégations ou des pièces à son soutien, la demande de jj ne fait état d’aucun fait précis qui permette d’étayer une cause d’action en responsabilité civile contre l’oratoire pour les abus décrits, que ce soit pour sa faute directe ou pour le fait d’autrui. cela étant, il y a lieu de ré- tablir les conclusions du juge de première instance sur ce point. ii background ii contexte [91] jj attended notre- dame-des- neiges elemen- tary school in montréal from 1951 to 1955. he al- leges that for almost two years, brother soumis, one of his teachers and a member of the congregation, sexually assaulted him once or twice a week by mas- turbating him in his office during detentions. at that time, jj’s family resided in housing belonging to the religious community that was located near the ora- tory. because of the proximity of his residence, jj. would often go to the oratory to serve mass. during those same years, father bernard, another member of the congregation, allegedly invited jj a number of times to go to his office in the oratory after mass for confession. on those occasions, he, too, is alleged to have sexually abused jj by masturbating him. brother soumis and father bernard, the men who assaulted jj, died in november 2004 and january 2001, respectively. [91] de 1951 à 1955, jj fréquente l’école primaire notre- dame-des- neiges à montréal. selon jj, pen- dant près de deux ans, le frère soumis, l’un de ses professeurs et un membre de la congrégation, l’au- rait agressé sexuellement à une fréquence d’une à deux fois par semaine, en le masturbant dans son bureau lors de retenues scolaires. à cette époque, la famille de jj réside dans un logement qui appar- tient à la communauté religieuse et est situé près de l’oratoire. en raison de la proximité de sa résidence, jj se retrouve souvent à cet endroit pour y servir la messe. durant ces mêmes années, le père bernard, un autre membre de la congrégation, l’aurait invité à plusieurs reprises à venir se confesser dans son bureau à l’oratoire après la messe. à ces occasions, il aurait lui aussi abusé sexuellement de jj en le masturbant. les agresseurs de jj, le frère soumis et le père bernard, sont décédés respectivement en novembre 2004 et en janvier 2001. 906 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. [92] jj alleges that he kept silent about the as- saults for several decades. he adds that they had a profound effect on him, both sexually and emo- tionally. he states in particular that he had many nightmares after these incidents and had flashbacks to them, and that he did not have children because he feared that what had happened to him would also happen to them. in 2011, jj saw a report, broadcast on a public affairs program, on the subject of sexual assaults by members of the congregation on minors who were pupils of collège notre- dame du sacré- cœur, an institution located close to both notre- dame-des- neiges school and the oratory. at that point, jj opened up to his spouse for the first time about those traumatic incidents from his childhood. j.j allègue avoir gardé le silence sur ces [92] agressions pendant plusieurs décennies. celles-ci auraient, dit-il, profondément affecté sa vie sexuelle et émotionnelle. jj affirme notamment avoir fait de nombreux cauchemars à la suite de ces événements, avoir eu des flash- back de ceux-ci, et ne pas avoir eu d’enfants de peur que ce qu’il avait subi ne se reproduise avec eux. en 2011, jj visionne un repor- tage diffusé dans le cadre d’une émission d’affaires publiques portant sur des agressions sexuelles com- mises par des membres de la congrégation sur des mineurs pendant qu’ils étudiaient au collège notre- dame du sacré- cœur. cet établissement est situé à proximité tant de l’école notre- dame-des- neiges que de l’oratoire. jj s’ouvre alors pour la première fois à sa conjointe sur ces événements traumatisants survenus durant son enfance. [93] two years later, in november 2013, jj filed his application for authorization to institute a class action in civil liability against the congregation and the oratory on the basis both of their direct fault and of the act of another person. he described the class covered by his action as follows: [93] deux ans plus tard, en novembre 2013, jj. dépose sa demande d’autorisation en vue d’exercer une action collective en responsabilité civile contre la congrégation et l’oratoire, tant pour leur faute directe que pour le fait d’autrui. il décrit ainsi le groupe visé par son recours : [translation] all natural persons residing in quebec who were sexually abused by members of the province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix in any educational institution, residence or summer camp or any other place in quebec, as well as at the oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal, with the exception of persons who attended collège notre- dame du sacré- cœur during the period from september 1, 1950 to july 1, 2001, collège de saint- césaire during the period from september 1, 1950 to july 1, 1991, and notre- dame de pohénégamook school during the period from january 1, 1959 to december 31, 1964. toutes les personnes physiques résidant au québec, qui ont subi des sévices sexuels de la part de membres de la province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix, dans tout établissement d’enseignement, résidence, camp d’été ou tout autre endroit situé au québec, ainsi qu’à l’oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal, à l’exception des personnes ayant fréquenté le collège notre- dame du sacré- cœur durant la période du 1er septembre 1950 au 1er juillet 2001, le collège de saint- césaire durant la période du 1er septembre 1950 au 1er juillet 1991, et l’école notre- dame de pohénégamook durant la période du 1er janvier 1959 au 31 décembre 1964. (re- amended motion for authorization to institute a class action and to be a representative plaintiff (“re- amended motion”), at para. 1) (requête réamendée pour autorisation d’exercer un recours collectif et pour être représentant (« requête réamendée »), par. 1) [94] in his application, jj alleged that the appel- lants had not only failed to act to put a stop to sexual abuse by members of the congregation, but had also discouraged victims from denouncing the abuse and had covered it up. he submitted that the appel- lants were liable for the abuse, given that they had had control over their members’ activities, but had [94] dans sa demande, jj reproche aux appe- lants non seulement de ne pas avoir agi pour faire cesser les abus sexuels commis par les membres de la congrégation, mais également d’avoir incité les victimes à ne pas dénoncer ces abus et d’avoir camouflé ceux-ci. il soutient que les appelants sont responsables des abus commis, puisqu’ils exerçaient [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 907 nevertheless allowed the abuse to continue. he also alleged that the appellants were liable as principals of the religious community’s brothers and fathers. un pouvoir de contrôle sur les activités de leurs membres et ont néanmoins permis que ces abus se poursuivent. il reproche également aux appelants d’être responsables à titre de commettants des frères et des pères de la communauté religieuse. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire a quebec superior court (2015 qccs 3583) a cour supérieure du québec (2015 qccs 3583) [95] the application judge denied jj’s application for authorization to institute a class action. he found that none of the four conditions set out in art. 575 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501 (“ccp”), were met.8 it can be seen from his reasons that he did not consider the question whether the remedy was forfeit or prescribed under the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq. in the view of the majority of the court of appeal, he did not do so be- cause this ground involved a contentious issue of fact as to whether it had been impossible for jj to act. [95] le juge de première instance rejette la de- mande d’autorisation d’exercer une action collective déposée par jj. il est d’avis qu’aucune des quatre conditions prescrites à l’art. 575 du code de pro- cédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501 (« cpc »), n’est remplie8. la lecture de ses motifs révèle qu’il n’exa- mine pas la question de savoir si le recours est déchu ou prescrit en vertu de l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq. selon la majorité de la cour d’appel, il ne l’aurait pas fait, parce que ce moyen comportait une ques- tion de fait litigieuse relativement à l’impossibilité d’agir de jj. [96] the application judge began by determining that jj had not shown that the contemplated action raised identical, similar or related issues of law or fact: art 575(1) ccp in the judge’s opinion, the application concerned an indeterminate number of places and assailants, which meant that the applica- ble legal analysis would have to be repeated and that the facts specific to each of the situations would have to be assessed differently for each party. [96] le premier juge décide d’abord que jj n’a pas démontré que l’action envisagée soulevait des questions de faits ou de droit identiques, similaires ou connexes : art 575(1) cpc. selon le juge, la demande vise un nombre indéterminé d’endroits et d’agresseurs, ce qui nécessiterait une répétition de l’analyse juridique applicable ainsi qu’une appré- ciation différente des faits propres à chacune des situations, et ce, pour chaque partie concernée. [97] the judge then pointed out that the applica- tion set out no facts that explained why the action was being brought against the congregation and the oratory, nor did it set out any facts that supported the conclusion that these institutions had committed a fault against the members of the proposed class: art 575(2) ccp more specifically, he noted that the congregation had been constituted only in january 2008, many years after the alleged events. as for the oratory, the judge added that apart from the [97] le juge souligne ensuite que la demande ne fait état d’aucun fait expliquant pourquoi la con- grégation et l’oratoire sont visés par le recours, non plus que des faits étayant la conclusion selon laquelle ils auraient commis une faute contre les membres du groupe proposé : art 575(2) cpc. plus parti- culièrement, le juge note que la congrégation n’a été constituée qu’en janvier 2008, de nombreuses années après les faits reprochés. pour ce qui est de l’oratoire, le juge ajoute qu’hormis la description 8 although the application judge’s judgment was rendered under the former code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25, i will, like the quebec court of appeal, be referring solely to the corresponding provisions of the new code of civil procedure, which essentially restate the former law. 8 bien que le jugement de première instance ait été rendu sous l’empire de l’ancien code de procédure civile, rlrq, c. c-25, à l’instar de la cour d’appel du québec, je me réfère uniquement aux dispositions correspondantes du nouveau code de procédure civile qui reprennent pour l’essentiel le droit antérieur. 908 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. description of his assault in that place of worship, jj was alleging no fact that might lead to a conclu- sion that it had committed a fault. the judge stated that the application was [translation] “practically silent regarding involvement on the oratory’s part”: para 137. de son agression dans ce lieu de culte, jj n’allègue aucun fait permettant de conclure que cette entité aurait commis une faute. le juge précise que la de- mande est « pratiquement silencieuse à l’égard de l’implication de l’oratoire » : par 137. [98] regarding the condition with respect to the composition of the class (art 575(3) ccp), the application judge found that the definition of the proposed class was too vague. in his view, it ap- plied to many assailants who may have acted at an indeterminate number of places over a long period. finally, the judge expressed the opinion that jj had not shown that he was in a position to properly rep- resent the contemplated class: art 575(4) ccp the judge referred to, among other things, jj’s failure to show initiative in the initial stages of the action and his preference to minimize his contacts with the other members of the class. [98] sur la condition relative à la composition du groupe (art 575(3) cpc), le juge de première ins- tance estime que la définition du groupe proposé est trop vague. à ses yeux, elle vise plusieurs agresseurs ayant potentiellement agi dans un nombre indéter- miné d’endroits sur une longue période de temps. enfin, le juge se dit d’avis que jj n’a pas su démon- trer qu’il serait en mesure d’assurer une représenta- tion adéquate du groupe envisagé : art 575(4) cpc. il retient entre autres l’absence d’initiative manifes- tée par ce dernier dans les démarches initiales du recours et le fait qu’il préfère réduire au minimum ses contacts avec les autres membres du groupe. b quebec court of appeal (2017 qcca 1460) b cour d’appel du québec (2017 qcca 1460) [99] the court of appeal unanimously allowed jj’s appeal against the congregation and authorized the institution of the class action against it. but the court was divided on the action against the oratory, which the majority authorized. [99] la cour d’appel accueille à l’unanimité l’ap- pel de jj contre la congrégation et autorise l’exer- cice de l’action collective contre celle-ci. la cour se divise cependant sur le recours visant l’oratoire, qu’elle autorise à la majorité. in the majority’s view, the application judge [100] had erred by adopting an overly restrictive interpre- tation of the conditions of art 575 ccp and by isolating them from the specific context of the case. on the first of those conditions, the majority con- cluded that jj had established at least one common issue that would favour the resolution of the litiga- tion in a not- insignificant manner, namely the fact that the hierarchical structure and the relationship of subordination between the religious community and its members were relevant to the decision with respect to liability on the part of the congregation and of the oratory. [100] les juges majoritaires estiment que le juge de première instance a fait erreur en interprétant trop res- trictivement les conditions prévues à l’art 575 cpc, et en les isolant du contexte particulier de l’affaire. sur la première condition de l’article, ils concluent que jj a établi au moins une question commune qui favorisera de manière non négligeable le règlement du litige, soit le fait que la structure hiérarchique et le lien de préposition entre la communauté religieuse et ses membres sont pertinents pour statuer sur la responsabilité de la congrégation et de l’oratoire. [101] the majority were also of the opinion that jj’s allegations and the exhibits filed in support of them justified the conclusions he was seeking of direct liability and liability for the act of another per- son: art 575(2) ccp they added that the proposed [101] les juges majoritaires sont également d’avis que les allégations de jj et les pièces déposées à leur soutien supportent les conclusions de responsabilité directe et de responsabilité pour le fait d’autrui re- cherchées : art 575(2) cpc. ils ajoutent que l’action [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 909 class action concerned members of a readily deter- minable religious community and that it would be premature to terminate the action solely because the congregation was not the entity that existed at the time of the alleged events. the majority noted in this regard that the application judge had erred in limiting the significance of a table identifying the al- leged victims, the institutions they had attended, the periods in which they had attended those institutions and the names of their assailants. on the subject of the oratory, the majority stated that the allegations and the exhibits filed in support of them justified a presumption that a close connection existed between the oratory, on the one hand, and the congregation and its members, on the other. it followed that the alleged facts and the evidence that could apply to the congregation could also apply to the oratory for the purposes of authorization. collective projetée vise les membres d’une commu- nauté religieuse facilement déterminable et qu’il serait prématuré de mettre fin au recours pour la seule raison que la congrégation n’était pas l’entité exis- tante au moment des faits reprochés. ils soulignent à cet égard que le juge de première instance a commis une erreur en limitant la portée d’un tableau identi- fiant les victimes présumées, l’établissement qu’elles ont fréquenté, la période de fréquentation et le nom de leurs agresseurs. en ce qui concerne l’oratoire, les juges majoritaires précisent que les allégations et les pièces déposées à leur soutien permettent de pré- sumer l’existence du lien étroit existant entre celui-ci et la congrégation et ses membres. il s’ensuit que les éléments opposables à la congrégation le sont également à l’endroit de l’oratoire pour les besoins de l’autorisation. [102] as for the third condition with respect to the composition of the class, the majority concluded that the table of victims sufficed at this stage to justify the broad composition being sought. finally, they noted that the application judge had adopted an overly restrictive interpretation of the fourth condition, the purpose of which was to ensure that jj was in a po- sition to properly represent the class members. jj’s commitment to the institution of the action satisfied the minimum threshold for acting as a representative plaintiff. [102] relativement à la troisième condition, qui porte sur la composition du groupe, les juges majo- ritaires concluent que le tableau des victimes suffit à cette étape pour justifier la large composition recher- chée. enfin, ils soulignent que le juge de première instance a adopté une interprétation trop restrictive de la quatrième condition qui vise à s’assurer que jj est en mesure de représenter adéquatement les membres du groupe. l’engagement de jj dans l’exercice du recours satisfait au seuil minimal requis pour agir à titre de représentant. [103] in closing, the majority held that it would not be appropriate to rule definitively on the submission based on the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq. to the effect that the remedy was forfeit. in their view, that argument was a defence that would require an analysis of the evidence and would have to be con- sidered at the trial on the merits. they found that it was not possible to conclude at the stage of the authorization that jj’s action was unquestionably prescribed. [103] en terminant, les juges majoritaires concluent qu’il ne serait pas opportun de se prononcer de façon définitive sur la déchéance du recours soulevée sur la base de l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq. selon eux, cet argument est un moyen de défense qui requiert une analyse de la preuve et dont le bien- fondé doit être jugé lors de l’audience sur le fond. au stade de l’autorisation, ils estiment qu’il n’est pas possible de conclure que le recours de jj est incontestablement prescrit. [104] the dissenting judge, although concurring with the majority that the class action should be authorized against the congregation, would have dismissed the appeal in respect of the oratory. on that point, she agreed with the application judge that the application for authorization was based only on [104] tout en souscrivant à l’opinion de la majo- rité sur l’opportunité d’autoriser l’action collective contre la congrégation, la juge dissidente aurait pour sa part rejeté l’appel en ce qui concerne l’oratoire. sur ce point, elle partage l’avis du juge de première instance selon lequel la demande d’autorisation ne 910 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. vague and general allegations that set out no fact that would justify finding the oratory liable. in the dissenting judge’s view, merely alleging that sex- ual assaults had occurred on the oratory’s premises could not suffice to expose it to civil liability either for its own fault or as principal. this led her to find that the minimum threshold requirement for author- izing a class action had not been met. repose que sur des allégations vagues et générales, qui ne font état d’aucun fait permettant d’étayer la responsabilité de l’oratoire. selon la juge dissidente, le seul fait d’alléguer que des agressions sexuelles auraient eu lieu sur le site de l’oratoire ne saurait être suffisant pour mettre en cause la responsabilité civile de celui-ci, que ce soit pour sa propre faute ou à titre de commettant. dans ce contexte, elle estime que le seuil minimal requis pour autoriser une action collective n’est pas atteint. iv issues iv questions en litige in this court, the appellants confine them- [105] selves to three arguments. the main argument relates to prescription and is common to the two appel- lants. they submit that the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq establishes a term for forfeiture and not a simple prescriptive period. in other words, jj’s remedy is forfeit because his proceeding was instituted more than three years after the deaths of the men who allegedly assaulted him. it would be impossible for jj to seek a personal remedy, which means that he does not have an arguable case and cannot act as a representative plaintiff for the pur- poses of the proposed class action. [106] the appellants’ other two arguments concern very specific aspects of the class action as a proce- dural vehicle. the congregation submits that there is no legal relationship between jj and itself and that the condition of art 575(2) ccp is therefore not met. as for the oratory, it argues that the facts alleged by jj do not suffice to justify any cause of action in civil liability against it and that, as a result, the condition of art 575(2) ccp is not met in this regard either. the oratory adds that a commonality of issues has not been established with respect to it, which means that, in its case, the condition of art 575(1) ccp is also not met. [105] devant notre cour, les appelants se limitent à trois arguments. leur argument principal porte sur la prescription applicable et il est commun aux deux appelants. selon eux, l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq. édicte un délai de déchéance et non un simple dé- lai de prescription. ainsi, le recours de jj serait déchu, car intenté plus de trois ans après le décès de ses prétendus agresseurs. puisque jj ne pouvait entreprendre un recours personnel, il ne possède pas de cause défendable et il ne peut agir à titre de représentant pour l’action collective projetée. [106] les deux autres arguments des appelants portent sur des aspects bien circonscrits du véhicule procédural que constitue l’action collective. d’un côté, la congrégation soulève qu’il y a absence de lien de droit entre jj et elle, de telle sorte que la condition de l’art 575(2) cpc n’est pas remplie pour cette raison. de l’autre côté, l’oratoire sou- tient que les faits allégués de jj sont insuffisants pour soutenir une quelconque cause d’action en responsabilité civile à son endroit, et qu’en consé- quence la condition prévue à l’art 575(2) cpc s’en trouve là aussi non respectée. l’oratoire ajoute que la communauté de questions n’est pas établie en ce qui la concerne : pour elle, la condition de l’art 575(1) cpc n’est donc pas remplie non plus. [107] in this court, the appellants do not con- test the conclusions of the majority of the court of appeal on the other aspects of the conditions set out in art 575 ccp i thus find it unnecessary to discuss them further in these reasons. [107] les appelants ne contestent pas devant nous les conclusions de la majorité de la cour d’appel sur les autres aspects des conditions que prescrit l’art. 575 cpc. par conséquent, j’estime inutile de m’y attarder plus longuement dans les présents motifs. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 911 v analysis v analyse a conditions for authorization and standard for intervention by a court of appeal in respect of a class action a les conditions d’autorisation et la norme d’in- tervention d’une cour d’appel en matière d’ac- tion collective [108] article 575 ccp sets out the four condi- tions that must all be met for the institution of a class action to be authorized. in infineon technolo- gies ag v. option consommateurs, 2013 scc 59, [2013] 3 scr 600, and vivendi canada inc. v. dell’aniello, 2014 scc 1, [2014] 1 scr 3, this court stated and reaffirmed the principles that must guide the court hearing the application for authoriza- tion in its analysis with respect to these conditions. those principles are not at issue in the case at bar. i will review them briefly here, however. [108] l’article 575 cpc énonce les quatre condi- tions qui doivent être réunies pour que l’exercice d’une action collective soit autorisé. dans les arrêts infineon technologies ag c. option consommateurs, 2013 csc 59, [2013] 3 rcs 600, et vivendi ca- nada inc. c. dell’aniello, 2014 csc 1, [2014] 1 rcs 3, notre cour a précisé et réaffirmé les prin- cipes qui doivent guider le tribunal de l’autorisation dans l’analyse de ces conditions. personne ne remet ces principes en question en l’espèce. il convient toutefois de les rappeler brièvement. [109] at the authorization stage, the court’s role is to screen applications: infineon, at paras. 59 and 65; vivendi, at para 37. the court must ensure that the applicant meets both the evidentiary and the legal threshold requirements of the conditions set out in art 575 ccp, but must also bear in mind that the evidentiary threshold that must be met in order to determine whether each of those conditions is satis- fied is a low one at this preliminary stage: infineon, at paras. 57 and 59. the court’s decision is proce- dural in nature; the conditions for authorization must be interpreted and applied broadly (infineon, at pa- ras. 59-60 and 66; vivendi, at para 37). at this stage, the facts alleged in the application for authorization are assumed to be true: infineon, at para 67. the ap- plicant’s burden is one of demonstration and not the burden of proof that would generally apply in private law matters, that is, on a balance of probabilities: infineon, at para 61. it will suffice for the applicant to show an arguable case in light of the facts and the applicable law: infineon, at paras. 61-67; vivendi, at para 37. as this court observed in infineon, various expressions have been used for this burden over the years, as it has, for example, been described as being to establish, in english, “a good colour of right” or “a prima facie case” and, in french, “une apparence sérieuse de droit”: paras 62-67. in short, the pur- pose of the court’s screening exercise is to filter out frivolous applications and to ensure that parties are not being forced to defend against untenable claims: [109] au stade de l’autorisation, le tribunal exerce un rôle de filtrage : infineon, par. 59 et 65; vivendi, par 37. il doit s’assurer que le demandeur satisfait aux exigences tant du seuil de preuve que du seuil légal requis aux termes des conditions prévues à l’art 575 cpc, tout en gardant à l’esprit que le seuil de preuve devant être atteint afin de déterminer si chacune des conditions énoncées a été remplie est peu élevé à cette étape préliminaire : infineon, par.  57 et 59 il s’agit d’une décision de nature procédurale; une interprétation et une application larges des conditions d’autorisation doivent être fa- vorisées : infineon, par. 59-60 et 66; vivendi, par 37. à cette étape, les faits allégués dans la demande d’autorisation sont tenus pour avérés  : infineon, par 67. le fardeau qui incombe au demandeur en est un de démonstration, et non de preuve géné- ralement retenu en droit privé, à savoir suivant la balance des probabilités : infineon, par 61. il suffit que le demandeur démontre l’existence d’une cause défendable eu égard aux faits et au droit applicable : infineon, par. 61-67; vivendi, par 37. comme le souligne notre cour dans infineon, diverses expres- sions ont été utilisées au fil des ans pour énoncer ce fardeau, qui a par exemple été décrit en fran- çais comme consistant à établir « une apparence sérieuse de droit », et en anglais « a good colour of right » ou « a prima facie case » : par 62-67. l’exercice de filtrage auquel se livre le tribunal vise en somme à écarter les demandes frivoles et à 912 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. infineon, at para. 61; vivendi, at para 37. if the court concludes that the applicant meets the conditions of art 575 ccp, it must then authorize the class action: vivendi, at para 37. s’assurer que des parties ne soient pas obligées de se défendre contre des demandes insoutenables : infineon, par.  61; vivendi, par.  37 si le tribunal en vient à la conclusion que le demandeur satisfait aux conditions énumérées à l’art 575 cpc, il doit alors autoriser l’exercice de l’action collective  : vivendi, par 37. [110] that being said, although the applicant’s burden is not onerous and what must be met is a minimum threshold, the fact remains that the allega- tions of fact in the application cannot be confined to generalities. for an arguable case to be established, more than vague, general or imprecise allegations are required: infineon, at para 67. [110] cela dit, si le fardeau du demandeur est peu onéreux et que le seuil reste minimal, il n’en demeure pas moins que les allégations de faits contenues à la demande ne peuvent se borner à des généralités. pour établir une cause défendable, il faut davantage que des allégations vagues, générales ou imprécises : infineon, par 67. [111] in addition to these principles, it should be mentioned that an appellate court must show defer- ence to the application judge’s findings with respect to these conditions: vivendi, at para 34. a court hearing an application for authorization to institute a class ac- tion has a significant discretion: vivendi, at para 33. as can be seen from the words of art 575 ccp, the court is to authorize the class action “if it is of the opinion that” the enumerated conditions are met. it is well established that an appellate court may not intervene and substitute its own analysis for that of the application judge unless the judge erred in law or his or her assessment with respect to one of the con- ditions of art 575 ccp is clearly wrong: vivendi, at para. 34; infineon, at para 40. however, as this court explained in vivendi, the fact that an appellate court has identified such an error with respect to one condi- tion does not give it “carte blanche” to reconsider all the other conditions that must be met; in such a case, the appellate court can substitute its own assessment for that condition only (para 35). [111] ces principes posés, il convient aussi de rappeler qu’une cour d’appel doit faire preuve de déférence envers les conclusions du juge de l’au- torisation sur ces conditions : vivendi, par 34. le tribunal saisi d’une demande sollicitant l’autorisation d’exercer une action collective dispose en effet d’un pouvoir d’appréciation important : vivendi, par 33. comme l’indique le libellé de l’art 575 cpc, le tribunal autorise l’exercice de l’action collective « s’il est d’avis que » les conditions énumérées sont remplies. il est acquis qu’une cour d’appel ne pourra intervenir et substituer son analyse à celle du juge d’autorisation que si ce dernier a commis une erreur de droit ou si son appréciation d’une des conditions énoncées à l’art 575 cpc est manifestement non fondée : vivendi, par. 34; infineon, par 40. dans vivendi, notre cour précise que le fait pour une cour d’appel de relever une telle erreur à l’égard d’une condition ne lui donne toutefois pas « carte blanche » pour réévaluer toutes les autres conditions auxquelles il doit être satisfait; dans un tel cas, la cour d’appel ne peut substituer son appréciation que pour cette condition uniquement : par 35. b scheme of article 29261 ccq. b le régime de l’art 29261 ccq. [112] the central question raised by the appellants in this court concerns the nature, starting point and scope of the three- year period provided for in the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq. this article is new law. enacted in 2013, it deals with the appli- cable period for instituting an action for damages for [112] la question centrale que les appelants sou- lèvent devant notre cour concerne la nature, le point de départ et la portée du délai de trois ans prévu à l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 . ccq. cet article de droit nouveau, adopté en 2013, traite du délai applicable pour intenter une action en réparation du préjudice [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 913 bodily injury resulting, as in the instant case, from sexual assault (“a sexual aggression”): corporel résultant, comme en l’espèce, d’une agres- sion à caractère sexuel : an action for damages for bodily injury resulting from an act which could constitute a criminal offence is prescribed by 10 years from the date the victim becomes aware that the injury suffered is attributable to that act. however, the prescriptive period is 30 years if the injury results from a sexual aggression, violent behaviour suffered during childhood, or the violent behaviour of a spouse or former spouse. l’action en réparation du préjudice corporel résultant d’un acte pouvant constituer une infraction criminelle se prescrit par 10 ans à compter du jour où la victime a connaissance que son préjudice est attribuable à cet acte. ce délai est toutefois de 30 ans si le préjudice résulte d’une agression à caractère sexuel, de la violence subie pendant l’enfance, ou de la violence d’un conjoint ou d’un ancien conjoint. if the victim or the author of the act dies, the prescrip- tive period, if not already expired, is reduced to three years and runs from the date of death. en cas de décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte, le délai applicable, s’il n’est pas déjà écoulé, est ramené à trois ans et il court à compter du décès. [113] the appellants submit in this regard that the second paragraph establishes a term for forfeiture rather than a prescriptive period. in their opinion, such a term cannot be interrupted or suspended. it begins to run on the date of death of the victim or the author of the alleged act, not on the date the victim becomes aware that his or her injury is attributable to the act, as provided for in the first paragraph. the appellants further argue that this 3-year term replaces the 10- and 30- year prescriptive periods provided for in the first paragraph for any action resulting from an act which could constitute a criminal offence, re- gardless of whether it involves the succession of the author of that act. because jj’s action was brought more than three years after the deaths of his two alleged assailants, therefore, his right of action was irreparably forfeit. the appellants conclude that the courts below erred in law in not dismissing the action on this basis. they should immediately, indeed of their own motion, have declared the remedy to be forfeit: art 2878 ccq. [113] à ce chapitre, les appelants soutiennent que l’al. 2 prévoit un délai de déchéance, et non un délai de prescription. un tel délai ne serait pas susceptible d’interruption ou de suspension. il commencerait à courir à compter du décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte reproché, et non à compter du jour où la victime prend connaissance que son préjudice est attribuable à l’acte comme le précise l’al 1. en outre, ce délai de 3 ans remplacerait les délais de prescription de 10 et 30 ans de l’al. 1 à l’égard de tous les recours découlant de l’acte pouvant constituer une infraction criminelle, qu’ils impliquent ou non la succession de l’auteur de cet acte. or, puisque le recours de jj a été intenté plus de trois ans après le décès de ses deux prétendus agresseurs, son droit d’action serait irrémédiablement déchu. les juridic- tions inférieures auraient erré en droit en ne rejetant pas le recours sur cette base. elles auraient dû pro- noncer immédiatement, voire d’office, la déchéance du recours : art 2878 ccq. [114] the superior court did not discuss this issue, and the parties made submissions on this point only in oral argument in the court of appeal. that court deferred argument on this issue to the trial on the merits, noting that although the prescription theory was arguable, jj’s action was not clearly prescribed on the face of the record. in this court, all the parties agree that the nature, starting point and scope of the period provided for in the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq need to be clarified at the stage of authorization of the class action in order, among [114] la cour supérieure n’a pas traité de cette question et les parties n’ont débattu ce point que durant les plaidoiries orales devant la cour d’appel. cette dernière a reporté le débat sur cette question à l’audition au fond du litige, notant que si la thèse de la prescription était défendable, le recours de jj. n’était pas manifestement prescrit à la simple lecture du dossier. devant notre cour, toutes les parties esti- ment que la nature, le point de départ et la portée du délai prévu à l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq doivent être clarifiés au stade de l’autorisation de l’action 914 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. other things, to determine whether it is a term that results in forfeiture of the remedy. collective afin notamment de déterminer s’il s’agit d’un délai emportant la déchéance du recours. [115] in my view, the appellants’ argument must fail. the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq does not create a term for forfeiture. article 29261 ccq. is in its entirety an integral part of the scheme of pre- scription, and the second paragraph is no exception to that. the article provides for periods the lengths of which of course vary on the basis of certain con- ditions, namely the type of act in question and the death of the victim or the author of the act. however, the date the victim becomes aware that his or her injury is attributable to the act in question constitutes the starting point of each of the periods provided for in art 29261 ccq, including that of the second paragraph. finally, the reduction of the length of the period to three years that is provided for in the second paragraph applies only to actions concerning the succession of the victim or of the author of the act, and not to those involving third parties whose liability is sought for their own fault or for the act or omission of another person. [116] in this case, the result of the deaths of the men who allegedly assaulted jj was neither that his remedy against the congregation and the oratory was forfeit nor that his action against them was clearly prescribed. the starting point of the appli- cable period was the time when jj became aware of the connection between the assaults and his in- jury, not the date of death of brother soumis or father bernard. exactly when he became aware of the connection and how this might have affected the applicable prescriptive period will be determined at the trial on the merits. at the authorization stage, despite the fact that the alleged acts occurred more than 30 years ago, jj’s allegation that he did not become aware of that connection until 2011 must be assumed to be true. given that jj’s action does not appear to be prescribed on the face of the re- cord, the court of appeal was right to conclude that this question should be answered definitively at trial jj’s cause of action against the appellants cannot be characterized as frivolous or untenable on this ground alone. [115] à mon avis, la thèse des appelants doit être écartée. l’alinéa 2 de l’art 29261 ccq n’édicte pas un délai de déchéance. l’article 29261 ccq. dans son entièreté fait partie intégrante du régime de la prescription et l’al. 2 n’y fait pas exception. cet article prévoit des délais dont la durée varie certes selon certaines conditions à savoir le type d’acte concerné et la survenance du décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte. toutefois, la prise de connais- sance par la victime du fait que son préjudice est attribuable à l’acte visé constitue le point de départ de chacun des délais énoncés à l’art 29261 ccq, y compris celui de l’al 2. enfin, la réduction à trois ans, à l’al. 2, de la durée du délai prévu ne s’applique qu’aux recours visant la succession de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte, et non à ceux visant des tiers dont la responsabilité est recherchée pour leur propre faute ou pour le fait d’autrui. [116] en l’espèce, le décès des prétendus agres- seurs de jj ne rend ni déchu ni manifestement pres- crit son recours contre la congrégation et l’oratoire. c’est le moment de la prise de connaissance par jj. du lien entre les agressions et le préjudice qu’il subit qui constitue le point de départ du délai applicable, non pas la date du décès du frère soumis ou du père bernard. ce moment précis et son possible impact, le cas échéant, sur le délai de prescription applicable seront déterminés lors de l’audience sur le fond du litige. au stade de l’autorisation, bien que les actes reprochés remontent à plus de 30 ans, nous devons tenir pour avérée l’allégation de jj voulant qu’il n’ait pris connaissance de ce lien qu’en 2011. le recours de ce dernier ne paraissant pas prescrit à la simple lecture du dossier, la cour d’appel a eu raison de conclure que cette question devra être tranchée de façon définitive au procès. la cause d’action de jj. contre les appelants ne peut être qualifiée de frivole ou d’insoutenable pour ce seul motif. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 915 (1) nature and starting point of the period pro- vided for in the second paragraph of arti- cle 29261 ccq. [117] the first paragraph of art 29261 ccq. provides that an action for damages for bodily injury resulting from an act which could constitute a crim- inal offence is prescribed by 10 years. that period becomes 30 years if the injury results from, among others, sexual assault or having suffered from violent behaviour during one’s childhood. these periods of 10 and 30 years begin running on the dates the victims become aware that their injuries are attrib- utable to the acts in question. it is well established, and is not at issue, that these periods are prescriptive periods. [118] the french version of the second paragraph provides that if the victim or the author of the act dies, “le délai applicable    est ramené à trois ans    à compter du décès” (the english version reads “the prescriptive period    is reduced to three years    from the date of death”), provided that the period has not already expired. jj submits that this period, like the ones provided for in the first para- graph, is a prescriptive period. the appellants argue that it is instead a term for forfeiture that is distinct from the periods provided for in the first paragraph. (1) la nature et le point de départ du délai énoncé à l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq. [117] l’alinéa 1 de l’art 29261 ccq prévoit que l’action en réparation du préjudice corporel qui résulte d’un acte pouvant constituer une infraction criminelle se prescrit par 10 ans. ce délai passe à 30 ans si le préjudice résulte, entre autres, d’une agression à caractère sexuel ou de la violence subie pendant l’enfance. ces délais de 10 et 30 ans com- mencent à courir à compter du jour où la victime a connaissance que son préjudice est attribuable à ces actes. il est acquis et non contesté que ces délais sont des délais de prescription. [118] l’alinéa 2 précise pour sa part qu’en cas de décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte, le « délai applicable [  ] est ramené à trois ans [  ] à compter du décès », dans la mesure où il n’est pas déjà écoulé. pour jj, il s’agit là d’un délai de pres- cription, comme c’est le cas de ceux prévus à l’al 1. pour les appelants, il s’agirait plutôt d’un délai de déchéance, qui se distingue des délais énoncés au premier alinéa. (a) origins of article 29261 ccq. a) l’origine de l’art 29261 ccq. [119] the quebec legislature enacted art 29261. ccq in 2013 in the context of the act to amend the crime victims compensation act, the act to pro- mote good citizenship and certain provisions of the civil code concerning prescription, sq 2013, c. 8 (“act 8”). the purpose of that legislation was to fa- cilitate access to civil justice for victims of acts that could constitute criminal offences by, in particular, amending certain rules with respect to prescription in cases involving such acts. before art 29261 was enacted, the existing general scheme of prescription applied in such situations. the applicable prescrip- tive period was the general law period of three years (art 2925 ccq), while art 2904 ccq enabled a person to argue for the suspension of prescription on the basis that it had been impossible to act. [119] le législateur québécois a adopté l’art 29261. ccq en 2013, dans le cadre de la loi modifiant la loi sur l’indemnisation des victimes d’actes crimi- nels, la loi visant à favoriser le civisme et certaines dispositions du code civil relatives à la prescrip- tion, lq 2013, c. 8 (« loi 8 »). l’objectif de cette loi était de faciliter l’accès à la justice civile aux personnes victimes d’actes pouvant constituer une infraction criminelle, en modifiant particulièrement certaines règles relatives à la prescription dans ces cas précis. avant l’adoption de cet article, le régime général de la prescription s’appliquait dans de telles situations. la prescription applicable était celle de droit commun de trois ans (art 2925 ccq), tandis que l’art 2904 ccq permettait de soulever une impossibilité d’agir en vue d’obtenir la suspension de la prescription. 916 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. [120] relying on, among other things, the princi- ples laid down by this court in m (k) v. m (h), [1992] 3 scr 6, the quebec legislature stated that it was aware that the general scheme of prescription, and in particular the general law prescriptive period, did not make it possible to account for the experi- ences of sexual assault victims and for the specific nature of their injuries. such individuals typically had to overcome significant psychological obstacles before they were able to bring civil proceedings and, what is more, the injury related to the assault could sometimes take years to emerge or to be associated with the assault. often required, in order to counter claims of prescription raised against them, to argue that it had been impossible for them to act, victims then found themselves having to undergo a “trial within a trial” just to prove that they had not been in a position to bring an action before that time. these obstacles discouraged many victims from turning to the civil justice system in order to obtain damages for their injuries. the legislature wanted, among other things, to minimize these “trial within a trial” situ- ations: national assembly, standing committee on institutions, “étude détaillée du projet de loi no 22 — loi modifiant la loi sur l’indemnisation des vic- times d’actes criminels”, journal des débats, vol. 43, no. 47, 1st sess., 40th leg., may 7, 2013, at p. 5; see also f. levesque and c-e. wagner- lapierre, “la réforme de la prescription civile en matière d’infrac- tion criminelle: une occasion manquée pour les vic- times de préjudice corporel” (2015), 49 rjtum. 685, at p 710. [120] prenant appui entre autres sur les enseigne- ments de notre cour dans l’arrêt m (k) c. m (h), [1992] 3 rcs 6, le législateur québécois se disait conscient du fait que le régime général de la prescrip- tion et notamment la prescription de droit commun ne permettait pas de prendre acte de l’expérience vé- cue par les victimes d’agressions sexuelles et de la spécificité de leur préjudice. en effet, ces personnes font typiquement face à des obstacles psychologiques importants avant d’être en mesure d’entreprendre un recours civil, sans compter que le préjudice lié à l’agression peut parfois prendre des années avant de se manifester ou d’être associé à l’agression. souvent obligées de plaider l’impossibilité d’agir pour réfuter les arguments de prescription qu’on leur opposait, les victimes se trouvaient dès lors forcées de subir un « procès dans le procès » dans le seul but de prouver que, jusqu’alors, elles n’avaient pas été en mesure d’in- tenter un recours. ces obstacles décourageaient plu- sieurs victimes de se tourner vers le système de justice civile afin d’obtenir réparation pour préjudice subi. le législateur voulait entre autres réduire au minimum ces occurrences de « procès dans le procès » : assemblée nationale, commission permanente des institutions, « étude détaillée du projet de loi no 22 — loi modi- fiant la loi sur l’indemnisation des victimes d’actes criminels », journal des débats, vol. 43, nº 47, 1re sess., 40e lég., 7 mai 2013, p. 5; voir aussi f. levesque et c-e. wagner- lapierre, « la réforme de la prescription civile en matière d’infraction criminelle : une occasion manquée pour les victimes de préjudice corporel » (2015), 49 rjtum 685, p 710. [121] to limit these difficulties, therefore, act 8 was enacted to modify the application of prescrip- tion to such actions in three ways. first, prescrip- tion would no longer run against minors in such situations: art 2905 ccq. second, the prescrip- tive periods applicable to such actions would be extended from 3 years to 10 or 30 years: first para. of art 29261 ccq. third, the prescriptive period would now run only from the time when the victim became aware of the connection between the assault and his or her injury: first para. of art 29261 ccq. [121] aussi, afin d’atténuer ces difficultés, la loi 8 a donc modifié le régime de la prescription applicable à de tels recours, et ce, sous trois aspects. d’abord, la prescription ne court dorénavant plus contre les mineurs dans ces situations : art 2905 ccq. en- suite, les délais de prescription applicables à ces recours passent de 3 ans à 10 ou 30 ans : al. 1 de l’art 29261 ccq. enfin, le délai de prescription ne court désormais qu’à partir du moment où la vic- time a connaissance du lien entre l’agression et son préjudice : al. 1 de l’art 29261 ccq. [122] since the enactment of act 8, no “trial within a trial” has been necessary, in sexual assault mat- ters for example, before a person reaches the age [122] depuis l’adoption de la loi 8, en matière d’agression à caractère sexuel par exemple, aucun « procès dans le procès » n’est dorénavant nécessaire [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 917 of 48. prescription no longer runs against minors in such cases; it therefore began to run, at the earliest, when the applicant attained the age of majority. it is only where the victim did not bring an action within 30 years of the date he or she attained the age of majority, or of the date of the assault, that it will be possible to raise the issue of when the victim be- came aware of the connection mentioned above and, where applicable, the further issue of whether it was impossible to act that could justify the suspension of prescription. act 8 constitutes a continuation of the existing scheme of prescription. as remedial legis- lation, it in fact enhances the former law in order to facilitate access to justice for victims of the acts to which it applies. avant qu’une personne n’atteigne l’âge de 48 ans. en effet, la prescription ne court plus contre les mineurs dans de tels cas; elle débute donc au plus tôt au moment où le demandeur atteint la majorité. c’est uniquement dans les cas où la victime n’a pas intenté un recours dans le délai de 30 ans à compter de sa majorité ou de la date de l’agression que pourra se soulever la question de la prise de connaissance du lien mentionné plus tôt et, éventuellement, celle de l’impossibilité d’agir qui pourrait justifier la suspen- sion du délai de prescription. la loi 8 s’inscrit dans la continuité du régime existant de la prescription. loi remédiatrice, elle vient en somme bonifier le droit antérieur afin de faciliter l’accès à la justice aux victimes des actes visés. (b) terms for forfeiture in quebec civil law b) les délais de déchéance en droit civil québé- [123] the appellants argue that the second par- agraph of art 29261 ccq must be interpreted differently. in their view, if the author of the act (or the victim) dies, this paragraph is instead a coun- terweight to the legislature’s intention to favour access to justice for victims of the acts to which it applies by extending the prescriptive periods. they submit that the death of the author of the act (or the victim) raises public interests as a result of which such situations must not be dealt with in the same way as the other situations to which the first paragraph of art 29261 . ccq applies. the appellants advance two reasons in support of their argument. first, they stress that the death of one of the principal protagonists implies that it is that person’s succession that must now institute or participate in the action. but the existence of a pre- scriptive period of 10 or 30 years — starting at the time the victim becomes aware of the connection between his or her injury and the assault — would introduce a serious degree of instability into the administration of successions. second, they insist that should the author of the act or the victim (or even both of them) die, one of the principal pro- tagonists (if not both of them) will then no longer be able to testify. given the absence of testimony from the persons who were directly involved, the integrity of the adversarial process would therefore be compromised, which would have an adverse cois [123] les appelants soutiennent que l’al.  2 de l’art 29261 ccq doit être interprété différem- ment. en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’acte (ou de la victime), cet alinéa serait plutôt un contrepoids à la volonté du législateur de favoriser l’accès à la justice pour les victimes des actes visés en allon- geant les délais de prescription. selon eux, le décès de l’auteur de l’acte (ou de la victime) soulève des intérêts d’ordre public qui requièrent que ce genre de situations soient traitées distinctement des autres situations visées par l’al. 1 de l’art 29261 ccq. ils avancent deux raisons à l’appui de leur prétention. premièrement, ils soulignent que le décès d’un des protagonistes principaux implique que c’est la suc- cession de cette personne qui devra dorénavant entre- prendre sinon prendre part au recours. or, l’existence d’un délai de prescription de 10 ou 30 ans — qui débuterait à partir du moment où la victime prend connaissance du lien entre son préjudice et l’agres- sion — introduirait un grave état d’instabilité dans l’administration des successions. deuxièmement, ils insistent sur le fait qu’en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’acte ou de la victime (ou même des deux), un des protagonistes principaux (sinon les deux) ne peut alors plus témoigner. en conséquence, vu l’absence du témoignage des personnes directement concer- nées, l’intégrité du processus contradictoire serait compromise, ce qui nuirait à la recherche de la vérité. pour les appelants, l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq. 918 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. effect on the search for truth. for the appellants, the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq represents a response to these concerns in that it departs from the scheme of prescription and limits the applicable period should one of the principal protagonists die to an invariable term of three years that cannot be interrupted or suspended and does not depend on when the victim became aware of the connection between his or her injury and the alleged act. [124] in the appellants’ opinion, the second para- graph has all the characteristics of a term for forfei- ture. in addition to protecting higher public interests (stability of successions and the search for truth), the term begins to run upon the occurrence of a spe- cific event that is predetermined and frozen in time (the death). moreover, it is typically shorter than the period that would otherwise apply. the appellants conclude from this that the second paragraph sets out a term for forfeiture that represents an excep- tion to the general scheme of prescription and to the mechanisms otherwise provided for in the article’s first paragraph. viendrait répondre à ces préoccupations en dérogeant au régime de la prescription et en restreignant le délai applicable à une durée immuable de trois ans en cas de décès d’un des protagonistes principaux, sans possibilité d’interruption ou de suspension de ce délai et sans égard à la connaissance par la victime du lien entre son préjudice et l’acte reproché. [124] selon les appelants, l’al. 2 comporte tous les éléments caractéristiques d’un délai de déchéance. en plus de protéger des intérêts supérieurs d’ordre public (la stabilité des successions et la recherche de la vé- rité), le délai prévu débute à compter d’un événement précis, prédéterminé et figé dans le temps (le décès). en outre, ce délai serait typiquement plus court que le délai autrement applicable. ils en concluent que l’al. 2 édicte un délai de déchéance qui fait exception au régime général de la prescription et aux mécanismes que met par ailleurs en place le premier alinéa de la disposition. [125] i disagree. it is well established in quebec civil law that the forfeiture of a remedy cannot be presumed: j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obli- gations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at no. 1117; c. gervais, la prescription (2009), at pp. 3 et seq.; j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers and b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at no 1-1297. indeed, art 2878 ccq says so ex- plicitly, as it states that forfeiture results only where expressly provided for in a text. and the quebec academic literature confirms that, where there is a doubt or ambiguity as to whether a specified period that results in a debtor’s discharge constitutes a term for forfeiture, it must be interpreted as a prescriptive period: baudouin, jobin and vézina, at no 1117. [125] je suis en désaccord. en droit civil québé- cois, il est acquis que la déchéance d’un recours ne se présume pas : j-l. baudouin et p-g. jobin, les obligations (7e éd. 2013), par p-g. jobin et n. vézina, nº 1117; c. gervais, la prescription (2009), p. 3 et suiv.; j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers et b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8e éd. 2014), nº 1-1297. c’est ce qu’énonce d’ailleurs expressément l’art 2878 ccq, qui précise que la déchéance doit résulter d’un texte exprès. en cas de doute ou d’ambiguïté quant à savoir s’il s’agit ou non d’un délai de déchéance, la doctrine québécoise confirme du reste que les délais édictés entraînant la libération d’un débiteur doivent alors être interprétés comme étant des délais de prescrip- tion : baudouin, jobin et vézina, nº 1117. [126] thus, while it is agreed that the word “for- feiture” need not be used explicitly in order for a period to be characterized as a term for forfeiture, a conclusion that the general scheme of prescription does not apply nonetheless requires clear, precise and unambiguous language: baudouin, jobin and vézina, at no. 1117; roussel v. créations marcel therrien inc., 2011 qcca 496, [2011] rjq 555, [126] ainsi, bien que l’on reconnaisse qu’il n’est pas obligatoire que le terme « déchéance » soit expli- citement employé afin qu’un délai puisse être qualifié de tel, il faut néanmoins des termes clairs, précis et non ambigus pour conclure que le régime général de la prescription ne s’applique pas : baudouin, jobin et vézina, nº 1117; roussel c. créations marcel ther- rien inc., 2011 qcca 496, [2011] rjq 555, par. 45 [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 919 at paras. 45 et seq.; global credit & collection inc. v. rolland, 2011 qcca 2278, [2012] rjq 12, at para. 31; équipement industriel robert inc. v. 9061- 2110 québec inc., 2004 canlii 10729 (que. ca), at para 40. i would add that in heritage capital corp. v. equitable trust co., 2016 scc 19, [2016] 1 scr 306, this court reiterated the well- established principle that the legislature is assumed not to have intended to change an existing scheme unless it has done so clearly and unambiguously: para 29. et suiv.; global credit & collection inc. c. rolland, 2011 qcca 2278, [2012] rjq 12, par. 31; équipe- ment industriel robert inc. c 9061- 2110 québec inc., 2004 canlii 10729 (ca. qc), par 40. en outre, dans l’arrêt heritage capital corp. c. équitable, cie de fiducie, 2016 csc 19, [2016] 1 rcs 306, notre cour a réitéré le principe bien établi voulant que le législateur soit présumé ne pas avoir eu l’intention de modifier un régime existant à moins de l’avoir fait de façon claire et non ambiguë : par 29. [127] neither the words of the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq nor its context or its underlying objectives lead to the conclusion that the quebec legislature intended clearly, precisely and unam- biguously to depart from the legal rule that existed before the enactment of act 8 by replacing it with a term for forfeiture that will apply should the author of the act die. i will say from the outset that there is no support for the appellants’ position on this point in either the academic literature or the case law. the following discussion will show why this is so. [127] ni le texte de l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq, ni le contexte dans lequel il s’inscrit, pas plus que les objectifs qui le sous- tendent ne permettent de conclure que le législateur québécois a eu l’intention claire, précise et non ambiguë d’écarter le régime juridique qui existait avant l’adoption de la loi 8 pour le remplacer par un délai de déchéance en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’acte. je précise d’entrée de jeu qu’il n’existe d’ailleurs aucune source doc- trinale ou jurisprudentielle appuyant la position des appelants sur ce point. l’analyse qui suit permet de comprendre pourquoi. (c) words and context of the second paragraph c) le texte et le contexte de l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 of article 29261 ccq. ccq. [128] the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq. contains neither an express term nor clear, precise and unambiguous language suggesting that the leg- islature intended to establish a term for forfeiture that would apply should the victim or the author of the act die. in fact, this provision contains no express and unequivocal language relating to forfeiture. on the contrary, the french version of the second para- graph refers to the prescriptive periods in question in the first paragraph by means of the words “le délai applicable    est ramené”, while the term “pre- scriptive period” itself is used in the english version. [128] l’alinéa 2 de l’art 29261 ccq ne contient ni terme exprès, ni mention claire, précise et non ambiguë suggérant que le législateur entendait établir un délai de déchéance en cas de décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte. en effet, cette disposition ne contient aucune expression qui renvoie de fa- çon explicite et non équivoque à la déchéance. bien au contraire, la version française de l’al. 2 renvoie aux délais de prescription mentionnés à l’al. 1 par l’emploi des mots « le délai applicable [  ] est ramené », tandis que la version anglaise utilise les termes « prescriptive period ». [129] the appellants argue in this respect that the shortness of the period provided for in the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq is in fact in itself characteristic of a term for forfeiture. this argu- ment does not withstand scrutiny. not only does this characteristic not represent clear, precise and unambiguous language suggesting an intention on the legislature’s part to provide for a term for [129] les appelants avancent à cet égard que la brièveté du délai énoncé à l’al. 2 de l’art 29261. ccq serait justement caractéristique en soi d’un délai de déchéance. cet argument ne résiste pas à l’analyse. non seulement cette caractéristique ne représente pas une mention claire, précise et non ambiguë d’une intention du législateur de prévoir un délai de déchéance, mais la proposition voulant 920 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. forfeiture, but the proposition that a three- year period is intrinsically short is in my view erroneous. by “reduc[ing]” the period in question to three years in the second paragraph, the legislature has simply restored the general law period that applies under art 2925 ccq. to argue that a period that corre- sponds to the general law prescriptive period is so short as to constitute a clear, precise and unambigu- ous indication that the legislature intended to depart from the application of the scheme of prescription by establishing a term for forfeiture quite simply does not hold water. [130] the explanatory notes for act 8 — the legis- lation by which art 29261 was enacted — confirm this interpretation. they refer exclusively to prescrip- tion and do not mention any “term for forfeiture” whatsoever. they even refer expressly to prescription in discussing the second paragraph: in addition, this act amends the civil code by extend- ing the prescriptive period from three years to ten years in cases of civil liability where the act causing bodily injury could constitute a criminal offence. the prescriptive period is of 30 years when the injury results from a sexual ag- gression, violent behaviour suffered during childhood, or the violent behaviour of a spouse or former spouse. if the victim or the author of the act dies, the prescriptive period is reduced to three years and runs from the date of death. this act states the time from which the prescriptive period in such cases runs by setting it clearly, not from the time of the criminal act, but from the time the victim becomes aware that the injury suffered is attributable to that act. the prescriptive period applicable to these same actions does not run against a minor or a person of full age under curatorship or tutorship. [emphasis added.] qu’un délai de trois ans soit intrinsèquement court est à mon avis erronée. en « ramen[ant] » à trois ans le délai fixé à l’al. 2, le législateur rétablit simplement le délai de droit commun qui s’applique aux termes de l’art 2925 ccq. soutenir qu’un délai qui cor- respond à la prescription de droit commun soit court au point de constituer un indice clair, précis et non ambigu de l’intention du législateur d’écarter l’ap- plication du régime de la prescription et d’établir un délai de déchéance ne tient simplement pas la route. [130] les notes explicatives qui accompagnent la loi 8, texte qui a établi l’art 29261, confirment la teneur de cette interprétation. ces notes renvoient ex- clusivement au régime de la prescription, sans jamais faire état d’un quelconque délai dit de déchéance. elles mentionnent même expressément le régime de la prescription lorsqu’elles traitent de l’al. 2 : la loi modifie par ailleurs le code civil en portant de trois à dix ans le délai de prescription applicable aux actions en responsabilité civile lorsqu’un acte causant un préjudice corporel peut constituer une infraction crimi- nelle. la loi prévoit que ce délai est de 30 ans lorsque ce préjudice résulte d’une agression à caractère sexuel, de la violence subie pendant l’enfance ou de la violence d’un conjoint ou d’un ancien conjoint. en cas de décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte criminel, le délai de pres- cription est ramené à trois ans et court à compter du décès. la loi précise également le point de départ de la pres- cription applicable à de telles actions en le fixant clai- rement, non pas au moment de l’acte criminel, mais au moment où la victime a connaissance que son préjudice est attribuable à cet acte. elle prévoit aussi que la prescription applicable à ces mêmes actions ne court pas, dorénavant, contre les mineurs ou les majeurs en curatelle ou en tutelle. [je souligne.] [131] i would add that the consequential amend- ments to art 2905 ccq enacted by act 8 — amend- ments pursuant to which prescription no longer runs against minors in such situations — are consistent with this. in the same explanatory notes, the legis- lature stressed that “[t]he prescriptive period appli- cable to these same actions does not run against a minor or a person of full age under curatorship or [131] j’ajoute que les modifications corrélatives apportées par la loi 8 à l’art 2905 ccq, modi- fications suivant lesquelles la prescription ne court plus contre les mineurs dans ces situations, vont également dans ce sens. en effet, toujours dans ces notes explicatives, le législateur souligne que « la prescription applicable à ces mêmes actions ne court pas, dorénavant, contre les mineurs ou les majeurs [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 921 tutorship”. in the words “these same actions”, the legislature was referring indistinctly to all actions to which art 29261 ccq applies. if the appellants’ argument were accepted, the effect would be that should the author of the act die, the term for forfeiture would start running even if the victim is still a minor. yet such an interpretation would directly contradict the words of art 2905 ccq. it clearly cannot be argued that the legislature, which took the trouble to amend that article in order to provide that prescription never runs against a minor with respect to remedies he or she may have against any person, intended to impose, under the same act 8, an invariable term for forfeiture that applies should the author of the act die. [132] lastly, it should be mentioned that the leg- islature added art 29261 at a specific place within the framework of the ccq. it introduced this ar- ticle into book eight on prescription and the title concerning “extinctive prescription”. as this court noted in dell computer corp v. union des consom- mateurs, 2007 scc 34, [2007] 2 scr 801, “it cannot be assumed that    the provisions of the civil code of québec [were placed] in one title or another indiscriminately or without a concern for coherence”: para 15. the structure of the ccq is one indication of the legislature’s intention regard- ing the meaning to be given to a particular provi- sion: p-a. côté, in collaboration with s. beaulac and m. devinat, the interpretation of legislation in canada (4th ed. 2011), at p 328. to say that the leg- islature intended to introduce a term for forfeiture at this place would be to contradict these principles of interpretation established by this court. to this date, no quebec court has interpreted any of the periods that — like the ones in art 29261 ccq — are provided for in the title on “extinctive prescription” as resulting in forfeiture of a remedy. en curatelle ou en tutelle ». lorsqu’il parle de « ces mêmes actions », le législateur vise tous les recours qui relèvent de l’art 29261 ccq indistinctement. d’ailleurs, si on retenait la thèse des appelants, cela impliquerait qu’en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’acte, le délai de déchéance commencerait à courir, et ce, même si la victime est toujours mineure. or, une telle interprétation irait directement à l’encontre du libellé de l’art 2905 ccq. on ne peut certes soutenir que le législateur, qui a pris la peine de modifier cet article pour préciser que la prescription ne court jamais contre le mineur à l’égard de recours qu’il peut avoir contre quiconque, a voulu imposer, dans le cadre de la même loi 8, un délai de déchéance immuable en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’acte. [132] enfin, il importe de noter que le législateur a ajouté l’art 29261 à un endroit précis dans l’ar- chitecture du ccq. il l’a introduit dans le livre huitième de la prescription, sous le titre « de la prescription extinctive ». comme notre cour le sou- ligne dans l’arrêt dell computer corp. c. union des consommateurs, 2007 csc 34, [2007] 2 rcs 801, « [i]l ne saurait [  ] être question de tenir pour acquis que les dispositions du code civil du québec ont été placées dans un titre ou dans un autre de fa- çon éparse et sans souci de cohérence » : par 15. la structure du ccq constitue un indice de l’intention du législateur sur le sens à donner à une disposition particulière : p-a. côté, avec la collaboration de s. beaulac et m. devinat, interprétation des lois (4e éd. 2009), par. 1161- 1162. affirmer que le lé- gislateur entendait introduire un délai de déchéance à cet endroit défierait ces principes d’interprétation établis par notre cour. aucun tribunal québécois n’a à ce jour interprété l’un ou l’autre des délais qui, comme l’art 29261 ccq, se retrouvent au titre « de la prescription extinctive » comme entraînant la déchéance d’un recours. (d) objectives of act 8 and consequences of the d) les objectifs de la loi 8 et les conséquences appellants’ argument de la thèse des appelants [133] nor do the objectives underlying act 8 pro- vide a more clear, precise and unambiguous indica- tion that the legislature intended to establish a term for forfeiture in the second paragraph. i would note here that, in the course of the parliamentary debate, [133] l’examen des objectifs qui sous- tendent la loi 8 ne révèle guère davantage d’indice clair, précis et non ambigu de l’intention du législateur d’édic- ter un délai de déchéance à l’al 2. je rappelle ici que, lors des débats parlementaires, le ministre de 922 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. the minister of justice acknowledged that the pur- pose of the amendments to the book on prescrip- tion was to codify this court’s decision in m (k) v. m (h):. journal des débats, at p 3. in that case, la forest j. had cautioned legislatures against the injustices that statutes of limitations may cause by allowing sexual abusers to go on with their lives without liability and granting them repose while the victims continue to suffer the consequences of the abusers’ actions and remain psychologically unable to act: pp. 35-38 and 48. to find that the effect of the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq is to establish a term for forfeiture would clearly frustrate this objective. this is eloquently illustrated by the consequences that would flow from the interpretation proposed by the appellants. la justice a reconnu que les modifications apportées au livre de la prescription visent à codifier l’arrêt m (k) c. m (h) de notre cour : journal des dé- bats, p 3. dans cette affaire, le juge la forest met d’ailleurs les législateurs en garde contre les injus- tices que peuvent créer les lois sur la prescription en permettant aux auteurs d’abus sexuels d’échapper à toute responsabilité et de jouir de la tranquillité d’esprit alors que la victime continue de subir les conséquences de leurs actes et demeure sous le joug d’une incapacité psychologique : p. 35-38 et 48. considérer que l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq a pour effet d’édicter un délai de déchéance irait résolument à l’encontre de cet objectif. les conséquences qu’en- traînerait l’interprétation que proposent les appelants l’illustrent avec éloquence. if the second paragraph established a term [134] for forfeiture as the appellants argue, a victim whose assailant died could thus no longer submit that it had been impossible for him or her to act, given that such a term cannot be suspended or interrupted. yet before act 8 came into force, it was well established that all actions for damages for bodily injury were subject to the general law prescriptive period (art 2925 ccq) regardless of whether one of the parties had died. that period could be suspended if it had been im- possible for the victim to act: art 2904 ccq. it would be contrary to the very purpose of remedial legislation to change existing law in such a way as to lessen the protection it provides. moreover, in the interpretation of legislation, it must be assumed that the legislature did not intend to change existing law unless it used clear and unambiguous language to that effect: heritage capital. [135] in a similar vein, if the second paragraph es- tablished a term for forfeiture, the victim would have a maximum of three years from the date the author of the act died to institute an action, even if the injury had not yet appeared. in order to accept the appellants’ position, it would therefore have to be concluded that the legislature’s intention was to change the existing law and that a victim’s remedy may now be forfeit before it even arises. to find that the second paragraph creates a term for forfeiture would thus have consequences that are illogical or even absurd. [134] si l’alinéa 2 édictait un délai de déchéance, comme le prétendent les appelants, les victimes dont l’agresseur est décédé ne pourraient ainsi plus sou- lever l’impossibilité d’agir puisque la déchéance ne souffre ni suspension, ni interruption. pourtant, avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi 8, il était acquis que les recours en réparation du préjudice corporel — sans égard au décès d’une des parties — étaient tous as- sujettis au délai de prescription de droit commun : art 2925 ccq. ce délai pouvait être suspendu si la victime se trouvait dans l’impossibilité d’agir : art 2904 ccq. il serait contraire à l’objet même d’une loi remédiatrice de modifier le droit existant en amoindrissant la protection qu’offre celui-ci. sans compter qu’en matière d’interprétation, on ne peut présumer que le législateur a voulu modifier le droit existant, en l’absence d’expression claire et non am- biguë de ce dernier à cet effet : heritage capital. [135] de même, si le délai de l’al. 2 en était un de déchéance, la victime disposerait alors d’un maxi- mum de trois ans à compter du décès de l’auteur de l’acte pour intenter son recours, et ce, même si le préjudice ne s’est pas encore manifesté. suivant la position des appelants, il faudrait donc conclure que l’intention du législateur était de modifier le droit antérieur et que le recours d’une victime peut doré- navant être déchu avant même d’être né. considérer que l’al. 2 institue un délai de déchéance mènerait ainsi à des conséquences illogiques, voire absurdes. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 923 [136] but that is not all. section 13 of act 8, which is a transitional provision, states that “[t]he prescrip- tive periods provided for in article 29261    apply to existing juridical situations taking into account the time already elapsed” and that “[t]he provisions of [that] article    concerning the starting point of pre- scriptive periods are declaratory”. if the appellants’ argument were accepted, the death of the victim or the author of the act would be the starting point of an invariable term for forfeiture under the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq. given that under the aforementioned s. 13, the periods and their starting point are of immediate application, the necessary conclusion would be that if a victim’s assailant died before act 8 was enacted, his or her right of action would be retroactively forfeit three years after the assailant’s death, even if the victim’s action was not prescribed before that act came into force. [137] when all is said and done, the appellants are arguing that the legislature intended an action for damages for bodily injury that is attributable to an act which could constitute a criminal offence to be subject to stricter and more stringent rules than an action for damages for an injury that is not attribut- able to such an act. they submit that, if the debtor or creditor of an obligation has died, an action for damages for bodily injury that is not attributable to a criminal offence is subject to the general law pe- riod, which can be interrupted or suspended and the starting point of which is the day the injury appeared: art 2926 ccq. in contrast, an action for damages for bodily injury that is attributable to a criminal offence is in their view subject to a three- year term for forfeiture that cannot be interrupted or suspended and whose starting point, which is declaratory ac- cording to the transitional provisions of act 8, is the death of the victim or the assailant. and they argue that this is the case even if the victim’s cause of action has not yet arisen, the victim’s injury has not appeared or it is impossible for the victim to act. such an interpretation of the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq simply cannot be reconciled with the legislature’s objective in enacting act 8, namely to encourage judicial proceedings by facilitating access to justice for victims of the acts to which the paragraph applies. [136] ce n’est pas tout. dans ses dispositions tran- sitoires, l’art. 13 de la loi 8 prévoit que « [l]es délais de prescription prévus à l’art 29261 [  ] sont ap- plicables aux situations juridiques en cours en tenant compte du temps déjà écoulé » et que « [l]es disposi- tions de [cet] article [  ] qui concernent le point de départ du délai de prescription sont déclaratoires ». or, si l’on adoptait la thèse des appelants, le décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte constituerait le point de départ d’un délai de déchéance immuable à l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq. compte tenu de l’art. 13 susmen- tionné, aux termes duquel les délais et leur point de départ sont d’application immédiate, il faudrait alors conclure que les victimes dont l’agresseur est décédé avant l’adoption de la loi 8 seraient rétroactivement déchues de leur droit d’action trois ans après le décès de cet agresseur, et ce, même si leur recours n’était pas prescrit avant l’entrée en vigueur de cette loi. [137] en somme, pour les appelants, le législateur aurait eu l’intention d’astreindre les actions en répara- tion du préjudice corporel attribuable à des actes sus- ceptibles de constituer une infraction criminelle à un régime plus restrictif et plus sévère que les actions en réparation d’un préjudice qui ne serait pas attribuable à de tels actes. en cas de décès de la personne débitrice ou créancière de l’obligation, l’action en réparation d’un préjudice corporel qui ne serait pas attribuable à une infraction criminelle serait en effet sujette au délai de droit commun, délai qui serait susceptible d’interruption et de suspension, et dont le point de départ serait le jour de la manifestation du préjudice : art 2926 ccq. à l’opposé, l’action en réparation d’un préjudice corporel attribuable à une infraction criminelle serait assujettie à un délai de déchéance de trois ans, non susceptible d’interruption ou de sus- pension, et dont le point de départ, qui est déclaratoire suivant les dispositions transitoires de la loi 8, serait le décès de la victime ou de l’agresseur. ce serait au surplus le cas même si la cause d’action de la victime n’est pas encore née, que son préjudice n’est pas ap- paru ou qu’elle est dans l’impossibilité d’agir. une telle lecture de l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq est tout simplement inconciliable avec l’objectif que pour- suivait le législateur en adoptant la loi 8, à savoir encourager les recours devant les tribunaux judiciaires en facilitant l’accès à la justice aux victimes d’actes visés par cette disposition. 924 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. (e) starting point of the period provided for in e) le point de départ du délai de l’al. 2 the second paragraph [138] against this backdrop, i am not persuaded by the appellants’ argument that there is an inconsist- ency between, on the one hand, the objective of fa- cilitating access to justice for assault victims and, on the other hand, the reduction of the applicable period to three years under the second paragraph. it is true that the second paragraph reflects the legislature’s concern with what happens if the victim or the au- thor of the act dies. and the amendments that affect the lengths of the periods and the starting point for prescription provided for in the first paragraph may indeed entail a risk that the death of one of the parties will create more uncertainty for heirs, creditors or third parties as regards the extent of their rights in the property of the succession: journal des débats, at pp 7-9. furthermore, the passage of time, which can be considerable given the periods specified in the first paragraph, may affect the integrity of the testimonial evidence and, as a result, the adversarial process that supports the truth- seeking goal on which our justice system is based in a case in which a key player is no longer there to testify: journal des débats, at p 9. [139] it is true that, to address these concerns, the legislature chose to reduce the length of the applica- ble period in a situation in which one of the parties dies. but it cannot be inferred from this that the legislature intended that period to become a term for forfeiture. the second paragraph merely reduces the length of the period provided for in the first par- agraph, but does not change its starting point, which remains the date the victim becomes aware of the connection between his or her injury and the alleged act. [138] dans ce contexte, j’estime peu convaincant l’argument des appelants selon lequel il y aurait incohérence entre, d’une part, l’objectif consistant à faciliter l’accès à la justice pour les victimes d’agres- sion et, d’autre part, la réduction à trois ans du délai applicable à l’al 2. il est vrai que l’al. 2 témoigne d’une préoccupation du législateur à l’égard des cas où il y a décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte. les modifications affectant la durée des délais et le point de départ de la prescription que prévoit l’al. 1 peuvent en effet entraîner le risque que le décès d’une des parties accroisse l’état d’incertitude qui pèse sur les héritiers, les créanciers ou les tiers quant à l’étendue de leurs droits sur les biens de la succession : journal des débats, p 7-9. en outre, le passage du temps — période qui peut être substan- tielle compte tenu des délais prévus à l’al. 1 — peut affecter l’intégrité de la preuve testimoniale et donc du processus contradictoire qui anime l’objectif de recherche de la vérité à la base de notre système de justice, dans les cas où un acteur central au débat n’est plus là pour témoigner : journal des débats, p 9. [139] il est vrai que, pour répondre à ces préoccu- pations, le législateur a choisi de réduire la durée du délai applicable aux situations où l’une des parties décède. mais on ne saurait en inférer que, ce faisant, il a voulu faire de ce délai un délai de déchéance. l’alinéa 2 ne fait que réduire la durée du délai prévu à l’al. 1, non son point de départ, lequel demeure la prise de connaissance par la victime du lien entre son préjudice et l’acte reproché. [140] for victims of acts which could constitute criminal offences, the modification of the scheme of prescription that resulted from the enactment of art 29261 ccq is an objective improvement over the situation that existed before then, including in circumstances in which the second paragraph ap- plies. the period now runs only from the date the victim becomes aware of the connection between his or her injury and the assault, rather than from [140] la modification apportée au régime de la pres- cription par l’adoption de l’art 29261. ccq consti- tue un avantage objectif pour les victimes d’actes susceptibles de constituer une infraction criminelle par rapport à la situation qui existait antérieurement, y compris dans les circonstances qui déclenchent l’ap- plication de l’al 2. désormais, le délai ne commence à courir qu’au moment où la victime prend connais- sance du lien entre son préjudice et l’agression, plutôt [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 925 the date of the assault itself. the explanatory notes for act 8 are helpful in this regard, too. they refer to the time from which the period runs in the sin- gular: “the time from which the prescriptive period in such cases runs [is set] not from the time of the criminal act, but from the time the victim becomes aware that the injury suffered is attributable to that act”. the legislature used the words “such cases” to refer to all actions for damages for bodily injury caused by an act which could constitute a criminal offence without distinguishing between situations to which the second paragraph applies (where one of the principal protagonists dies) and those to which the first paragraph  applies (where both principal protagonists are living). qu’au moment même de l’agression. les notes ex- plicatives de la loi 8 sont encore une fois utiles à ce sujet. elles traitent du point de départ au singulier : « le point de départ de la prescription applicable à de telles actions [est fixé] non pas au moment de l’acte criminel, mais au moment où la victime a connais- sance que son préjudice est attribuable à cet acte ». lorsqu’il parle « de telles actions », le législateur vise toutes les actions en réparation d’un préjudice corpo- rel causé par un acte pouvant constituer une infraction criminelle, sans faire de distinction entre les situations qui déclenchent l’application de l’al. 2 (lorsqu’un des protagonistes principaux décède) et celles auxquelles s’applique l’al. 1 (lorsque les deux protagonistes prin- cipaux sont vivants). [141] the effect of the words “runs from the date of death” in the second paragraph is simply to cause the period provided for in that paragraph to apply instead of the one provided for in the first paragraph, not to establish a new starting point that differs from the one under the first paragraph. on the date when one of the parties dies, the applicable period for institut- ing an action, if it is already running, is “reduced” to three years. if, therefore, as of the date of death, less than 3 years is left in the 10- or 30- year prescriptive period under the first paragraph, the time remaining in that period does not change. if, however, the pre- scriptive period has not begun to run, the victim can- not rely on the 10- or 30- year period once he or she becomes aware of the connection between the assault and the injury, but must institute an action within a maximum of 3 years from that same starting point. [141] l’expression « court à compter du décès » figurant à l’al. 2 a simplement pour effet de déclen- cher l’application du délai prévu à cet alinéa au lieu de celui énoncé à l’al. 1, et non d’établir un nouveau point de départ, distinct de celui prévu au premier alinéa. le jour où l’une des parties décède, le délai applicable pour intenter un recours est « ramené » à trois ans s’il courait déjà. ainsi, s’il restait moins de trois ans à courir à la prescription décennale ou trentenaire de l’al. 1 au moment du décès, la période restante du délai de prescription demeure inchangée. mais si le délai n’avait pas commencé à courir, la victime ne pourra se prévaloir du délai de 10 ou 30 ans lorsqu’elle prendra connaissance du lien entre l’agression et son préjudice : elle devra intenter son recours dans un délai maximal de 3 ans à compter de ce même point de départ. it is clear from the record of the legislative [142] debate that this is what this provision must be un- derstood to mean. that record shows that the sec- ond paragraph does not introduce a new period: the death simply changes the period provided for in the first paragraph by reducing it to three years. in commenting on the use of the word “reduced” in the second paragraph, the then minister of justice in fact stressed the importance of using it so as not to [translation] “give the impression that this is a new period    but it’s not a new period, it’s the period that’s reduced”: journal des débats, at p. 13 (emphasis added). in short, the length of the pe- riod changes when a party dies, but its starting point [142] les débats législatifs pertinents confirment que c’est là le sens qu’il convient de donner à cette disposition. ils indiquent que l’al. 2 n’introduit pas un nouveau délai : le décès modifie simplement le délai de l’al. 1 en le réduisant à trois ans. dans ses propos sur l’utilisation du terme « ramené » à l’al. 2, le ministre de la justice de l’époque insiste justement sur l’importance de ce mot, dont la présence vise à ne pas « donner l’impression que c’est un nouveau délai [  ] alors que ce n’est pas un nouveau délai, c’est le délai qui est ramené » : journal des débats, p. 13 (je souligne). bref, si la durée du délai est modifiée en cas de décès, son point de départ demeure inchangé; c’est la prise de connaissance par la victime du lien 926 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. remains the same; it is still the victim’s becoming aware of the connection between his or her injury and the assault, and nothing else, that starts the clock ticking for prescription. [143] the fact that the second paragraph applies if the victim dies as well as if the author of the act dies does not alter this interpretation of the applicable period. the objective of facilitating access to justice for victims of criminal offences by recognizing the psychological difficulties they face may be achieved in a different way where an action is instituted by the victim’s succession. it is not the succession as such that suffered the trauma and consequences of the assault. the succession generally does not have to overcome psychological obstacles as significant as those faced by the victim before being able to bring proceedings. from this perspective, the fact that the circumstances in which the second para- graph applies include the victim’s death as well as that of the author of the act does not diminish the objective of facilitating access to justice for victims of the acts to which the paragraph applies. it simply reflects the legislature’s concern to ensure a proper balancing of the interests affected by the lengthy pre- scriptive period that applies to an action for damages for bodily injury resulting from an act which could constitute a criminal offence. in contrast to what the appellants suggest, this, too, does not constitute a clear, precise and unambiguous indication that the legislature intended to adopt an invariable term for forfeiture where the victim or the author of the act dies; quite the contrary. entre son préjudice et l’agression qui continue de déclencher le chronomètre de la prescription, rien d’autre. [143] l’inclusion du décès de la victime sur le même pied que celui de l’auteur de l’acte à l’al. 2 ne change rien à cette interprétation du délai applicable. l’objectif qui consiste à faciliter l’accès à la justice aux victimes d’infractions criminelles en reconnais- sant les difficultés psychologiques auxquelles elles font face se réalise différemment lorsque c’est la succession de la victime qui entreprend le recours. ce n’est pas la succession en tant que telle qui a subi le traumatisme de l’agression et ses consé- quences. de fait, elle n’a généralement pas à sur- monter d’obstacles psychologiques aussi importants que la victime avant d’être en mesure d’entreprendre un recours. en ce sens, le fait d’inclure le décès de la victime, à l’instar de celui de l’auteur de l’acte, dans les circonstances qui déclenchent l’application de l’al. 2 n’affaiblit en rien l’objectif consistant à faciliter l’accès à la justice aux victimes des actes visés. il témoigne simplement du souci du législa- teur d’assurer la mise en balance adéquate des in- térêts que soulève la longue prescription appliquée aux recours en réparation du préjudice corporel ré- sultant d’un acte pouvant constituer une infraction criminelle. à l’inverse de ce que suggèrent les ap- pelants, encore là il ne s’agit pas d’un quelconque signe clair, précis et non ambigu que le législateur a eu l’intention d’adopter un délai de déchéance im- muable en cas de décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte, bien au contraire. [144] i would add the following on the starting point of the period provided for in the second par- agraph. because what that paragraph establishes is not a term for forfeiture but a prescriptive period, the reference to the death of the victim or the author of the act cannot be interpreted as providing for a starting point that is different from the one provided for in the first paragraph. it bears repeating that s. 13 of act 8 states that the provisions concerning the starting point of the prescriptive periods provided for in art.  2926.1  ccq are declaratory. where legislation is declaratory, the presumption against construing it retrospectively is inapplicable: côté, [144] j’ajouterai ceci sur le point de départ du délai de l’al 2. puisque ce deuxième alinéa n’édicte pas un délai de déchéance mais bien un délai de prescription, la mention du décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte ne saurait être interprétée comme établissant un point de départ distinct de celui prévu au premier alinéa. en effet, il faut rappeler ici que l’art. 13 de la loi 8 prévoit que les dispositions relatives au point de départ du délai de prescription de l’art 29261 ccq. sont déclaratoires. lorsqu’une loi est déclaratoire, la présomption contre l’interprétation rétroactive n’est alors pas applicable : côté, par. 1878; w. f. craies, craies on statute law (7e éd. 1971), par s g g. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 927 at p. 561; w f. craies, craies on statute law (7th ed. 1971), by s g g edgar, at p 395. this court has described the effect of declaratory legislation as follows: “the legislation in question is deemed to have always included this provision. thus, the inter- pretation so declared is taken to have always been the law”: régie des rentes du québec v. canada bread company ltd., 2013 scc 46, [2013] 3 scr 125, at para 28. this means that the legislation can ap- ply to events that occurred before it was enacted: côté, at p. 561; craies, at p. 395; western minerals ltd. v. gaumont, [1953] 1 scr 345, at p. 370; gravel v. city of st- léonard, [1978] 1 scr 660;. chambre des notaires du québec v. haltrecht, [1992] rjq 947 (ca). the fact that the article in question introduces a new rule changes nothing: if the legisla- ture states expressly that the provision is declaratory, this cannot be ignored (canada bread company, at paras. 27-28; p. roubier, le droit transitoire: conflits des lois dans le temps (2nd ed. 1993), at p 248). if under the second paragraph the death of the [145] victim or the author of the act were to constitute the starting point of the three- year prescriptive period, that different starting point from the one provided for in the first paragraph would then have to apply to existing situations. in practice, this would mean that the right of action of a victim whose assailant died more than three years before act 8 came into force would be extinguished retroactively. and because the date the victim became aware of the connection between the assault and his or her injury would be the starting point of the periods provided for in the first paragraph only, that date would be of no assistance to victims for the purpose of suspending or interrupting the applicable prescriptive period should the author of the act die. such an outcome would in my view be incompatible with the objectives of remedial legislation that is ac- tually intended to benefit victims of acts which could constitute criminal offences. i am of the opinion that an interpretation to the effect that the second para- graph does not establish a different starting point for the applicable prescriptive period from the one pro- vided for in the first paragraph is more consistent with the words and the context of the provision as a whole, and also makes it possible to avert that outcome: kent v. the king, [1924] scr 388, at p. 397; banque de nouvelle- écosse v. cohen, 1999 canlii 13720 edgar, p 395. notre cour a d’ailleurs déjà qualifié l’effet d’une loi déclaratoire : celle-ci fait « en sorte que ce texte de loi est réputé avoir toujours inclus cette disposition. cette interprétation est donc consi- dérée comme ayant toujours été la loi » : régie des rentes du québec c. canada bread company ltd., 2013 csc 46, [2013] 3 rcs 125, par 28. son appli- cation peut ainsi s’étendre à des faits survenus avant son édiction : côté, par. 1878- 1880; craies, p. 395; western minerals ltd. c. gaumont, [1953] 1 rcs. 345, p. 370; gravel c. cité de st- léonard, [1978] 1 rcs 660; chambre des notaires du québec c. haltrecht, [1992] rjq 947 (ca). le fait que l’ar- ticle en cause introduit une règle nouvelle n’y change rien : lorsque le législateur prévoit explicitement que la disposition est déclaratoire, on ne peut pas en faire abstraction : canada bread company, par. 27-28; p. roubier, le droit transitoire : conflits des lois dans le temps (2e éd. 1993), p 248. [145] or, si le décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte prévu à l’al. 2 devait constituer le point de départ du délai de prescription de trois ans, ce point de départ distinct de celui énoncé à l’al.  1 devrait alors s’appliquer aux situations en cours. concrètement, cela impliquerait que le droit d’action des victimes dont les agresseurs sont décédés plus de trois ans avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi 8 serait ainsi éteint rétroactivement. et puisque la prise de connaissance par la victime du lien entre l’agression et son préjudice ne constituerait le point de départ que des délais prévus à l’al. 1 uniquement, cette prise de connaissance ne serait d’aucun secours aux victimes pour suspendre ou interrompre le délai de prescription applicable en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’acte. ce résultat serait à mon avis incompatible avec les objectifs d’une loi remédiatrice qui vise justement à venir en aide aux victimes d’actes pou- vant constituer une infraction criminelle. j’estime que l’interprétation selon laquelle l’al. 2 n’établit pas, en ce qui concerne le délai de prescription ap- plicable, un point de départ qui soit distinct de celui prévu à l’al. 1 s’harmonise mieux avec le texte et le contexte de la disposition dans son ensemble, et per- met d’éviter un tel résultat : kent c. the king, [1924] rcs 388, p. 397; banque de nouvelle- écosse c. cohen, 1999 canlii 13720 (ca. qc), p. 11-12; 928 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. (que. ca), at pp. 11-12; québec (commission de la construction) v. gastier inc., 1998 canlii 13132 (que. ca), at pp. 9-12; côté, at pp. 197 and 547-48; r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at pp 807-8. québec (commission de la construction) c. gastier inc., 1998 canlii 13132 (ca. qc), p. 9-12; côté, par. 713 et 1821- 1823; r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6e éd. 2014), p. 807- 808. [146] in sum, the words of the second paragraph, its context and its underlying objectives all lead to the conclusion that the intention was to establish a prescriptive period just like the periods provided for in the first paragraph. the effect of the second paragraph is to shorten the periods established in the first paragraph should the victim or the author of the act die. the death of one of these people is simply a condition that changes the length of the period, not its starting point, in the same way that the type of act determines the length of the period that applies under the first paragraph. it is when the victim becomes aware of the connection between the assault and the injury that the periods provided for in the first and second paragraphs start to run. and none of them is a term for forfeiture. [146] somme toute, que ce soit au regard de son libellé, du contexte dans lequel il s’inscrit ou des objectifs qui le sous- tendent, une conclusion s’im- pose : l’al. 2 se veut un délai de prescription au même titre que les délais de l’al 1. l’alinéa 2 a pour effet de réduire la durée des délais prévus à l’al. 1 en cas de décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte. le décès d’une de ces personnes est simplement une condition qui modifie la durée du délai et non son point de départ, tout comme le type d’acte en cause détermine la durée du délai applicable aux termes de l’al 1. c’est à compter du moment où la victime prend connaissance du lien entre l’agression et le préjudice que les délais prévus aux al. 1 et 2 com- mencent à courir. dans tous les cas, ce ne sont pas des délais de déchéance. (2) scope of the second paragraph (2) la portée de l’al. 2 [147] the appellants’ final argument concerns the very scope of the second paragraph. they submit that the death of the victim or of the author of the act changes the prescriptive period applicable to all actions, of any kind, that result from the act com- mitted by the author. thus, the death of the author of the act reduces in the same way the length of the prescriptive period applicable to actions against third parties for their own fault or for the act or omission of another person. if an action against the author of the act becomes prescribed as a result of the author’s death, then there ceases to be any basis for an action against such third parties as well. in short, in the instant case, even if the second paragraph does not establish a term for forfeiture, jj’s action against the congregation and the oratory is, in all respects, prescribed by 3 years, not 30 years, from the date he became aware of the connection between the assaults and the injury resulting from them. [147] les appelants soulèvent en dernier lieu un argument qui touche cette fois à la portée même de l’al 2. ils soutiennent que le décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte modifierait le délai de prescrip- tion applicable pour tous les recours qui découlent de l’acte commis par l’auteur, quels qu’ils soient. ainsi, le décès de l’auteur de l’acte réduirait de la même manière la durée du délai de prescription applicable au recours contre les tiers pour leur propre faute ou pour le fait d’autrui. si le recours contre l’auteur de l’acte devenait prescrit en raison de son décès, le fondement du recours contre de tels tiers disparaî- trait donc lui aussi. bref, en l’espèce, même si l’al. 2 n’édicte pas un délai de déchéance, le recours de jj contre la congrégation et l’oratoire serait à tous égards prescrit 3 ans, et non 30 ans, à compter de la prise de connaissance par jj du lien entre les agres- sions qu’il a subies et le préjudice qui en a découlé. [148] this argument does not provide any greater support for a conclusion that jj’s action is now pre- scribed. as i mentioned above, the exact time when [148] cet argument ne permet pas davantage de conclure que le recours de jj est maintenant pres- crit ici encore, le moment précis de la prise de [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 929 jj became aware of that connection will be shown by the evidence on the merits of the case. the same is true of the question whether it was impossible for him to act that might be raised in this regard. moreover, in my view, this paragraph quite simply does not have such a scope. here, too, the appellants’ interpretation is inconsistent with the legislature’s objective in enacting act 8. the reduction of the prescriptive period provided for in the second para- graph applies only in relation to the succession of the victim or to that of the author of the act. connaissance de ce lien par jj reste tributaire de la preuve sur le fond du litige. il en va de même de la question de l’impossibilité d’agir qui pourrait se soulever à ce chapitre. en outre, j’estime que cet alinéa n’a tout simplement pas une telle por- tée. l’interprétation des appelants serait là encore incompatible avec l’objectif que poursuivait le lé- gislateur en adoptant la loi 8. c’est uniquement à l’égard de la succession de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte que s’applique la réduction de délai prévue à l’al 2. [149] article 2926.1  ccq establishes the pre- scriptive periods that apply to actions for damages for bodily injury resulting from specific acts. it does not create rules of liability separate from the general rules set out in arts. 1457 and 1463 ccq, in book five on obligations. actions for damages for a single injury must not be confused. the author of an act and a third party, including a principal, each have a distinct obligation to the victim, and the purpose of the remedies available to the victim is to make rep- aration for the injury caused by the breach of those distinct obligations. under the general rules of civil liability, the victim’s remedy against a third party who is liable for his or her own fault is not dependent on the direct remedy against the author of the act that may have given rise to that fault. similarly, a principal’s liability for the act or omission of his or her subordinate does not depend on survival of the direct remedy against the subordinate. [150] of course, the issue generally does not arise under arts. 1457 and 1463 ccq, given that the gen- eral law prescriptive period then applies in all cases: art 2925 ccq. as a general rule, the period appli- cable to such actions begins to run at the same time; the injury is common and, under art 2926 ccq, prescription runs from the day the injury appears. but under both art. 2926 and art 29261 ccq, the prin- ciple remains the same: prescription is determined for each action individually. [149] l’article 29261 ccq édicte la prescription applicable aux recours en réparation du préjudice corporel résultant de certains actes précis. cette dis- position ne crée pas un régime de responsabilité distinct des régimes généraux prévus aux art. 1457 et 1463 ccq du livre cinquième des obligations. les recours en réparation d’un même préjudice ne doivent pas être confondus. l’auteur de l’acte et les tiers, dont le commettant, ont chacun une obligation distincte envers la victime, et les recours qui sont ouverts à la victime visent à réparer le préjudice causé par la violation de ces obligations distinctes. sous le régime général de la responsabilité civile, le recours de la victime contre un tiers dont la respon- sabilité est engagée pour sa propre faute ne dépend pas du recours direct contre l’auteur de l’acte qui peut être à l’origine de cette faute. de même, la responsabilité d’un commettant pour le fait de son préposé ne dépend pas de la survie du recours direct contre ce dernier. [150] bien sûr, la question ne se pose généralement pas dans le cadre de l’application des art. 1457 et 1463 ccq, puisque la prescription de droit com- mun s’applique alors dans tous les cas : art. 2925 ccq. en règle générale, le délai applicable à ces recours commence à courir au même moment; le préjudice est commun et l’art 2926 ccq fait dé- buter la prescription au moment de son apparition. mais le principe demeure le même, que l’on applique l’art 2926 ccq ou l’art 29261 ccq : la pres- cription s’apprécie pour chaque recours individuel- lement. in my view, the appellants’ argument re- [151] flects a conceptual confusion between, first, the rules [151] à mon avis, l’argument des appelants té- moigne d’une confusion conceptuelle entre, d’une 930 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. with respect to obligations that govern the actions to which art 29261 ccq applies and, second, the prescriptive period applicable to such actions. the fact that the victim’s action against the author of the act may be prescribed as a result of the author’s death does not mean that there ceases to be any basis for an action against third parties for their own fault or for the act or omission of another person. the liability of third parties or principals against whom proceedings are brought is distinct from that of the author of the act even if the resulting injury is common. part, le régime des obligations qui encadre les re- cours visés par l’art 29261 ccq et, d’autre part, le délai de prescription applicable à ces recours. le fait que le recours de la victime contre l’auteur de l’acte puisse être prescrit en raison de son décès n’entraîne pas la disparition du fondement du recours de la vic- time contre des tiers pour leur propre faute ou pour le fait d’autrui. ces tiers ou ces commettants sont alors poursuivis sur la base d’une responsabilité distincte de celle de l’auteur de l’acte, même si le préjudice causé est commun. [152] in reducing the prescriptive period to three years under the second paragraph of art.  2926.1 ccq if the victim or the author of the act dies, the legislature was concerned solely with actions involving the succession of the author of the alleged act or that of the victim. the appellants’ argument that the victim no longer has any action against a third party for that party’s own fault once the action against the author of the act becomes prescribed would not only be contrary to act 8’s objective of facilitating access to justice for assault victims, but is also not supported by the objectives of the second paragraph themselves. if the intention were that the victim’s action against living third parties be pre- scribed, that would do nothing to ensure the stabil- ity of successions, because no succession would be involved in such a situation. nor would it prevent evidence from becoming stale, protect the integrity of the adversarial process or safeguard the search for truth, given that the parties concerned are present to testify. on the other hand, concluding that the victim’s action against living third parties — against another living person who had also assaulted the victim, for example — is prescribed because the victim’s action against the succession of the author of the act is prescribed would clearly frustrate the purpose of facilitating access to civil justice for as- sault victims. such a conclusion would allow parties who may be at fault to go on with their lives without liability and grant them repose on the sole basis that the author of the act has died. [152] lorsque le législateur précise, à l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq, qu’en cas de décès de la vic- time ou de l’auteur de l’acte, le délai de prescrip- tion est ramené à trois ans, il ne vise que les recours qui mettent en cause la succession de l’auteur de l’acte reproché ou celle de la victime, sans plus. la prétention des appelants selon laquelle la pres- cription du recours contre l’auteur de l’acte a pour effet d’anéantir le recours de la victime contre un tiers pour une faute propre à ce dernier serait non seulement contraire à l’objectif de la loi 8 qui consiste à faciliter l’accès à la justice aux victimes d’agressions, mais elle ne trouve pas non plus de justification dans les objectifs propres à l’al. 2 en tant que tels en effet, vouloir rendre prescrit le recours de la victime contre des tiers existants n’assurerait en rien la stabilité des successions, puisqu’aucune succession n’est alors en cause. cela ne permettrait pas non plus de contrer la pé- remption de la preuve et de protéger l’intégrité du processus contradictoire et la recherche de vérité, étant donné que les parties concernées sont pré- sentes pour témoigner par contre, conclure que la prescription du recours contre la succession de l’auteur de l’acte entraîne aussi la prescription du recours de la victime contre des tiers existants, par exemple contre un deuxième agresseur vivant pour le même acte, s’inscrit résolument à l’encontre de l’objectif visant à faciliter l’accès à la justice civile aux victimes d’agressions une telle conclusion permettrait à des parties potentiellement fautives d’échapper à toute responsabilité et de jouir de la tranquillité d’esprit au seul motif que l’auteur de l’acte est décédé. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 931 [153] on this point, too, the record of the legis- lative debate confirms the legislature’s intention. when the bill that led to the enactment of act 8 was introduced, the minister of justice made that intention clear: [153] les débats législatifs pertinents confirment ici aussi l’intention du législateur. lors de la présen- tation du projet de loi qui a mené à l’adoption de la loi 8, le ministre de la justice a indiqué en termes clairs quelle était cette intention : [translation] and finally it is provided, to prevent actions involving successions, while… that is, to limit actions involving successions, it is provided that the period is reduced to three years where the victim or the person who caused the injury dies, and that it runs from the date of death. [emphasis added.] et finalement on prévoit, pour éviter des recours qui impliquent des successions, là, pendant… enfin, de fa- çon à encadrer les recours impliquant les successions, on prévoit qu’en cas de décès de la victime ou de l’auteur du préjudice le délai est ramené à trois ans et qu’il court à partir de ce décès. [je souligne.] (journal des débats, at p. 3) (journal des débats, p. 3) the comments of the member who introduced the amendments relating to prescription and the ccq. were along the same lines: les propos du député qui a introduit les amende- ments relatifs à la prescription et au ccq vont dans le même sens : [translation] the purpose of the amendment is to pro- vide for a limit so that, at some point in time, successions will no longer have to manage anything    . ce que l’amendement vise à faire, c’est de prévoir une limite où, à un moment donné, les successions n’auront plus à gérer quelque chose   .   .   . that question is not at all… and it is not at all my aim or my intention, in any way whatsoever, to minimize or un- dermine this essential work that must be done with respect to victims. it was solely in the context of discussing a suit involving a succession     [emphasis added.] cette question-là n’est pas du tout… et ce n’est pas du tout mon propos ni mon intention, de quelque façon que ce soit, de minimiser ou nuire à ce travail essentiel qu’on doit faire à l’égard des victimes, là. c’est uniquement dans le contexte où on parle d’une poursuite à l’égard d’une succession    [je souligne.] (journal des débats, at pp. 8-9) (journal des débats, p. 8-9) [154] the second paragraph applies only to actions involving the succession of the victim or of the au- thor of the act, not to all actions that relate directly or indirectly to the fault committed by the author. the legislature did not intend the second paragraph to apply to an action against a third party that still ex- ists for its own fault or for the act of another person. the fact that there may be different periods for such actions simply shows that the legislature intended to protect the rights of victims of criminal offences who are especially vulnerable and to balance that objective against the importance of protecting the stability of successions in a limited number of cases. [154] l’alinéa 2 est opposable seulement aux re- cours visant la succession de la victime ou celle de l’auteur de l’acte, et non à tous les recours qui sou- lèvent directement ou indirectement la faute de l’au- teur. le législateur n’a pas eu l’intention de rendre l’al. 2 opposable aux recours entrepris contre un tiers toujours existant pour sa propre faute ou pour le fait d’autrui. le fait que des délais différents puissent s’appliquer à de tels recours témoigne simplement de la volonté du législateur de protéger les droits des victimes d’infractions criminelles particulièrement vulnérables et d’établir un juste équilibre entre cet objectif et l’importance de protéger la stabilité des successions dans des cas limités. 932 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. (3) conclusion on the second paragraph of ar- (3) conclusion sur l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq. ticle 29261 ccq. [155] to summarize, one of the legislature’s ob- jectives in enacting act 8 was to help sexual assault victims by facilitating their access to justice. to that end, the legislature lengthened the prescriptive pe- riods and changed the point at which they started to run. the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq. was an integral part of that reform. nothing in the words of that paragraph, in its context or in its un- derlying objectives indicates clearly, precisely and unambiguously that the legislature intended, should the author of the act die, to impose a term for for- feiture or to provide for a starting point other than the date the victim becomes aware of the connection between the act in question and the injury he or she has sustained as a result of it. the reduction in the length of the applicable period that is provided for in that paragraph does not apply to an action like the one instituted by jj against liable parties other than the succession of the author of the act. that being the case, jj’s remedy is not forfeit, let alone clearly prescribed, on the face of the application; there is no reason to refuse to authorize the class action on this basis. [155] je résume. l’objectif du législateur en adop- tant la loi 8 était notamment de venir en aide aux victimes d’agressions à caractère sexuel en leur facilitant l’accès à la justice. pour ce faire, il a al- longé les délais de prescription et modifié le point de départ à compter duquel ces délais commencent à courir. l’alinéa 2 de l’art 29261 ccq fait partie intégrante de cette réforme. rien dans le texte de cet alinéa, dans le contexte de cette disposition et dans les objectifs qui la sous- tendent ne permet de soute- nir de manière claire, précise et non ambiguë qu’en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’acte, le législateur avait l’intention d’imposer un délai de déchéance ou d’établir un point de départ autre que la prise de connaissance par la victime du lien entre l’acte visé et le préjudice qui en découle pour elle. la réduc- tion de la durée du délai applicable que prévoit cet alinéa ne vise pas un recours tel celui intenté par jj contre des responsables autres que la succession de l’auteur de l’acte. cela étant, le recours de jj. n’est pas, à la simple lecture de la demande, déchu et encore moins manifestement prescrit; il n’y a pas lieu de refuser d’autoriser l’action collective pour ces raisons. c class action against the congregation c l’action collective contre la congrégation [156] in addition to this main argument based on the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq, the con- gregation submits that there is no legal relationship between jj and itself. it argues that it cannot be held liable for faults allegedly committed in connection with incidents that occurred before it was consti- tuted in 2008, and that the court of appeal erred in substituting its own analysis on this point for that of the application judge, who had held that the colour of right condition set out in art 575(2) ccp was not satisfied. [156] outre cet argument principal fondé sur l’al. 2 de l’art 29261 ccq, la congrégation avance qu’il n’existe pas de lien de droit entre jj et elle. la congrégation soutient qu’elle ne peut être tenue responsable pour des fautes qui auraient été com- mises en lien avec des événements survenus avant sa constitution en 2008. elle prétend que la cour d’appel a fait erreur en substituant son analyse à celle du juge de première instance sur ce point. ce dernier avait statué que la condition de l’apparence de droit prévue à l’art 575(2) cpc n’était pas respectée. in my view, the court of appeal was correct [157] in holding unanimously that the application judge had applied the condition set out in art 575(2) ccp. too strictly in his analysis regarding the existence of a legal relationship. given the allegations and the exhibits filed in support of them, his assessment with [157] à mon avis, la cour d’appel a eu raison de conclure à l’unanimité que le juge de première instance a appliqué de manière trop stricte la condition énoncée à l’art 575(2) cpc dans l’analyse du lien de droit. à ce chapitre, compte tenu des allégations formulées et des pièces déposées à leur soutien, son appréciation [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 933 respect to this condition was clearly wrong in light of the principles developed by this court. de cette condition était manifestement non fondée au regard des enseignements de notre cour. [158] it is important to note that the congrega tion is not challenging the court of appeal’s other con- clusions to the effect that the allegations in the ap- plication support a cause of action in liability on the basis of a direct fault it is alleged to have committed, and of the act of another person. the congregation argues only that there is no legal relationship between jj and itself. on this specific point, the application judge based his analysis on two exhibits filed by jj: the information statement for the congregation in the enterprise register and a table of alleged victims showing the institutions they attended, the periods in which they attended them and the names of those who assaulted them (sup ct reasons, at paras. 91-92 (canlii); ca reasons, at para. 28 (canlii)). he found that jj had not established an arguable case against the congregation, because all of the alleged sexual abuse had occurred before it was constituted in 2008: paras 91-92. [158] il importe de rappeler que la congrégation ne remet pas en question les autres conclusions de la cour d’appel selon lesquelles les allégations de la demande étayent une cause d’action en responsa- bilité pour une faute directe qu’elle aurait commise et pour le fait d’autrui. la congrégation limite son argument à la seule inexistence d’un lien de droit avec jj. sur ce point précis, le juge de première instance fonde son analyse sur deux pièces déposées par jj : l’état de renseignements de la congrégation au registre des entreprises et un tableau de présumées victimes faisant état de l’établissement fréquenté par celles-ci, de la période de fréquentation et du nom de leurs agresseurs : motifs de la cs, par. 91-92 (canlii); motifs de la ca, par. 28 (canlii). le juge conclut que jj n’a pas établi l’existence d’une cause défendable contre la congrégation, puisque tous les abus sexuels reprochés seraient survenus avant la constitution de cette dernière en 2008 : par 91-92. [159] i agree with the court of appeal that, on the contrary, the allegations and the exhibits filed in support of them by jj, when considered as a whole, establish at the very least an arguable case against the congregation as regards the legal relationship in question. i also agree that, by determining the probative value of those various exhibits, the appli- cation judge overstepped the bounds of his screening role: ca reasons, at para. 79; sup ct reasons, at paras 56-57. [159] je partage l’avis de la cour d’appel voulant qu’au contraire, considérées dans leur ensemble, les allégations et les pièces déposées à leur soutien par jj établissent à tout le moins l’existence d’une cause défendable contre la congrégation quant à ce lien de droit. je suis aussi d’accord pour conclure qu’en se prononçant sur la valeur probante de ces diverses pièces, le juge de première instance a outre- passé son rôle de filtrage : motifs de la ca, par. 79; motifs de la cs, par 56-57. [160] the court of appeal properly noted that, in addition to the exhibits relied on by the application judge, jj had filed the information statement for corporation jean- brillant in the enterprise register. that exhibit shows that, at the time of the alleged incidents, the members of the holy cross (sainte- croix) religious community were represented by a corporation known as “les frères de sainte- croix”. that corporation was constituted in 1947 and con- tinued in 2008, when its name was changed to “cor- poration jean- brillant”. the information statement for the congregation indicates that it was constituted in 2008. however, as the court of appeal noted, a number of the congregation’s establishments have [160] en plus des pièces sur lesquelles s’appuie le juge de première instance, la cour d’appel a raison de souligner que jj a également déposé l’état de renseignements de la corporation jean- brillant au registre des entreprises. cette pièce révèle que les membres de la communauté religieuse de sainte- croix étaient représentés par une société connue sous le nom des « frères de sainte- croix » au mo- ment des faits allégués. constituée en 1947, cette société a fait l’objet d’une continuation en 2008, puis elle a adopté la dénomination sociale de la « cor- poration jean- brillant ». l’état de renseignements de la congrégation indique quant à lui que cette dernière a été constituée en 2008. or, comme le note 934 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. used the appellation “sainte- croix” in one form or another over the years in such names as “congréga- tion de sainte- croix”, “la province canadienne des frères de sainte- croix”, “la province canadienne des pères de sainte- croix”, “les frères de sainte- croix” and “les pères de sainte- croix”. the in- formation statements also show that corporation jean- brillant and the congregation have six officers in common and have the same domicile. [161] in his application, jj seeks a finding that the congregation is liable for sexual abuse by members of the holy cross religious community. it can be seen from the table of alleged victims that all of the alleged assailants were brothers or fathers belonging to that community. according to the congregation’s information statement, its principal sector of ac- tivity is precisely the organization, administration and maintenance of a religious congregation. as the court of appeal noted, the congregation has not argued that those alleged assailants might have been part of a religious community other than the one it represents: para 80. [162] the congregation’s argument that the court of appeal essentially lifted the corporate veil in order to authorize the class action is not persuasive. this case concerns a fact situation in which two entities constituted under the religious corporations act, cqlr, c. c-71, corporation jean- brillant and the congregation, both represent the members of the same religious community. it was in this context specific to the facts of this case that the court of appeal made a point of stating that a full review of the congregation’s corporate structure would have to be conducted at trial in light of a situation that it had rightly found to be confused. at no time did the court of appeal suggest that lifting the corporate veil is justified or necessary in the instant case. as it properly noted, it will be for the parties to address the congregation’s corporate structure at the trial on the merits and to make whatever complete submissions they consider appropriate at that time: para 77. la cour d’appel, plusieurs des établissements de la congrégation ont adopté la dénomination « sainte- croix » sous une forme ou une autre au fil des ans, par exemple en utilisant les termes « congrégation de sainte- croix », « la province canadienne des frères de sainte- croix », « la province canadienne des pères de sainte- croix », « les frères de sainte- croix » ou « les pères de sainte- croix ». les états de renseignements précisent en outre que la cor- poration jean- brillant et la congrégation ont six dirigeants communs et le même domicile. [161] dans sa demande, jj recherche comme con- clusion la responsabilité de la congrégation pour des abus sexuels commis par les membres de la commu- nauté religieuse de sainte- croix. à ce sujet, le tableau des présumées victimes révèle que tous les prétendus agresseurs sont des frères ou pères membres de cette communauté. selon l’état de renseignements de la congrégation, son secteur d’activité principal est pré- cisément l’organisation, l’administration et le main- tien d’une congrégation religieuse. comme la cour d’appel le relève, la congrégation n’a pas avancé que ces prétendus agresseurs pouvaient faire partie d’une communauté religieuse autre que celle qu’elle repré- sente : par 80. [162] l’argument de la congrégation selon lequel la cour d’appel aurait en quelque sorte levé le voile de la personnalité juridique pour autoriser l’exercice de l’action collective ne convainc pas. nous sommes en présence d’une situation factuelle où deux en- tités constituées sous la loi sur les corporations religieuses, rlrq, c. c-71, la corporation jean- brillant et la congrégation, représentent toutes deux les membres de la même communauté religieuse. c’est dans ce contexte propre aux faits de l’espèce que la cour d’appel prend le soin de préciser que l’examen complet de la structure corporative de la congrégation devra se faire au procès, vu l’existence d’une situation qu’elle estime à juste titre embrouil- lée. elle ne suggère à aucun moment que la levée du voile de la personnalité juridique est justifiée ou nécessaire en l’espèce. comme elle l’indique avec justesse, il appartiendra aux parties de débattre de la structure corporative de la congrégation lors de l’audience au fond et de présenter les arguments complets qu’ils jugeront alors appropriés : par 77. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 935 [163] at the authorization stage, jj has to estab- lish only that he has an arguable case in light of the alleged facts and the applicable law. i agree with the court of appeal that this criterion is satisfied on the issue of the alleged legal relationship between the congregation and jj. in light of the allegations and the exhibits filed in support of them, the application for authorization is neither untenable nor frivolous. that is sufficient. [164] i would add that the congregation’s argu- ment on this particular point is surprising. as can be seen above, jj’s proceeding is not the only such proceeding brought against the congregation by victims of sexual abuse in connection with incidents that occurred before it was constituted. another ap- plication for authorization to institute a class action was filed with the superior court in 2009 in re- lation to alleged sexual abuse, by members of the congregation, of minors who had attended three educational institutions between the 1950s and 2001. before the application for authorization was heard, the parties entered into a settlement agreement under which the congregation agreed to take up the interest of other entities, including corporation jean- brillant, in relation to their acts and undertook to pay a sub- stantial maximum amount to the class members. [165] on proceeding with the application for au- thorization to institute a class action for the purpose of approving the settlement agreement, the superior court considered the conditions for authorization, including colour of right: cornellier  v province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2011 qccs 6670, at paras. 9-24 (canlii). in its judgment, it found that all of those conditions were satisfied and that the institution of the class action could therefore be authorized for the purpose of approving the settle- ment. in a second judgment, it then homologated the liquidation of the compensation process: cornellier v. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2013 qccs 3385. [163] au stade de l’autorisation, jj n’a qu’à éta- blir l’existence d’une cause défendable eu égard aux faits allégués et au droit applicable. tout comme la cour d’appel, j’estime que ce critère est respecté sur la question du lien de droit allégué entre la con- grégation et lui. à la lumière des allégations et des pièces déposées à leur soutien, la demande d’auto- risation n’est ni insoutenable, ni frivole. cela suffit. [164] j’ajouterai que l’argument présenté par la congrégation sur ce point précis étonne. le recours de jj n’est pas, je le rappelle, l’unique recours du genre dirigé contre la congrégation par des vic- times de sévices sexuels en lien avec des événe- ments survenus avant sa constitution. en 2009, une autre demande sollicitant l’autorisation d’exercer une action collective a été déposée devant la cour supérieure relativement à des sévices sexuels qu’au- raient commis des membres de la congrégation à l’endroit de mineurs ayant fréquenté trois institu- tions scolaires entre les années 1950 et 2001. avant l’audition de la demande d’autorisation, les parties ont conclu un règlement. dans le cadre de ce règle- ment, la congrégation a accepté de prendre fait et cause pour les gestes d’autres entités, notamment la corporation jean- brillant, et elle s’est engagée à verser aux membres du groupe un montant maximal substantiel. [165] saisie de la demande d’autorisation d’exer- cer une action collective aux fins d’approbation du règlement, la cour supérieure s’est prononcée sur les conditions d’autorisation, notamment sur ce- lui de l’apparence de droit : cornellier c. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2011 qccs 6670, par. 9-24 (canlii). dans son jugement, la cour supérieure a conclu que toutes les conditions d’autorisation étaient respectées, ce qui lui a per- mis d’autoriser l’exercice de l’action collective aux fins d’approbation du règlement intervenu. par la suite, dans un second jugement, la cour supérieure a homologué la liquidation du processus d’indem- nisation : cornellier c. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2013 qccs 3385. [166] the fact that the congregation chose, in the settlement agreement in that case, to take up the [166] n’est pas déterminant ici le fait que, dans l’accord constatant le règlement, la congrégation a 936 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. interest of corporation jean- brillant [translation] “without prejudice and without any admission” of its own liability is not determinative in the instant case. it does not diminish the relevance of the appli- cation judge’s conclusions — in a context that was analogous in every respect to the one in the case at bar — to the effect that the conditions for authoriza- tion, including colour of right, were satisfied: ca. reasons, at para 76. the congregation would like the courts to look the other way and ignore this reality despite those past judgments of the superior court. once again, this seems to me to be very far from being a cause of action that is frivolous, untenable or not arguable. choisi de prendre fait et cause pour la corporation jean- brillant « sans préjudice et sans admission » quant à sa responsabilité dans cette autre affaire. cela n’enlève aucune pertinence aux conclusions du juge de l’autorisation portant que les conditions d’auto- risation, dont celle de l’apparence de droit, étaient respectées, et ce, dans un contexte en tous points analogue à celui qui existe en l’espèce : motifs de la ca, par 76. la congrégation voudrait que, malgré ces jugements passés de la cour supérieure, les tribu- naux détournent leur regard et ignorent cette réalité. tout cela me semble encore une fois fort loin d’une cause d’action frivole, insoutenable ou indéfendable. d class action against the oratory d l’action collective contre l’oratoire [167] jj’s case against the oratory raises a set of problems in relation to the class action as a pro- cedural vehicle that are distinct from the ones that apply to the congregation. and the court of appeal was divided on this issue. [167] sur l’aspect du véhicule procédural que cons- titue l’action collective, le recours de jj contre l’ora- toire soulève une problématique distincte de celle qui touche la congrégation. la cour d’appel s’est d’ailleurs divisée sur cette question. [168] the oratory argues that the facts alleged in jj’s application do not support a cause of action in liability on the basis of direct fault or of the act of an- other person and that, in light of the allegations and the exhibits filed in support of them, he is seeking to have the oratory held liable solely because some of the sexual abuse by members of the congregation is alleged to have occurred on premises owned by the oratory. the oratory submits that such allegations do not in themselves justify the conclusions being sought against it, which means that the condition of art 575(2) ccp is not met. [168] l’oratoire soutient que les faits allégués dans la demande de jj n’étayent pas une cause d’action en responsabilité pour faute directe ou pour le fait d’autrui. sur la foi des allégations et des pièces dépo- sées à leur soutien, jj chercherait à faire reconnaître la responsabilité de l’oratoire uniquement au motif que certains abus sexuels commis par des membres de la congrégation se seraient produits dans des lieux dont l’oratoire est propriétaire. de telles allégations ne justifieraient pas en soi les conclusions formulées contre l’oratoire, si bien que la condition prévue à l’art 575(2) cpc ne serait pas respectée. [169] in their discussion on jj’s action against the oratory, the majority of the court of appeal ex- pressed the view that, at the authorization stage, the allegations in the application and the exhibits filed in support of them made it [translation] “easy to presume that a close connection” existed between the congregation, the oratory and the members of the religious community in question: para 112. and because of this close connection that could in their opinion be presumed to exist, the majority concluded that, at this stage, any allegation or evidence that could apply to the congregation could therefore also [169] dans leur analyse propre au recours de jj. visant l’oratoire, les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont estimé qu’au stade de l’autorisation, les allégations de la demande et les pièces déposées à leur soutien permettaient de « facilement présumer du lien étroit » entre la congrégation, l’oratoire et les membres de la communauté religieuse qui nous occupe : par 112. et, en raison de ce lien étroit dont ils disent pouvoir présumer l’existence, ils ont conclu qu’à ce stade tous les éléments opposables à la congrégation étaient en conséquence également opposables à l’oratoire : par 113. de son côté, la [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 937 apply to the oratory: para 113. the dissenting judge was of the view that the application contained no allegation that could support the oratory’s liability for its own direct fault or for a fault committed by one of its subordinates: paras 128-37. juge dissidente s’est dite d’avis que la demande ne contenait aucune allégation susceptible d’étayer la responsabilité de l’oratoire pour sa faute directe ou pour une faute commise par l’un de ses préposés : par. 128- 137. [170] i agree with the dissenting court of appeal judge. the allegations in jj’s application and the exhibits filed in support of them do not support a cause of action in liability against the oratory, an entity distinct from the congregation, whether on the basis of its own direct fault or of the act of another person. in the oratory’s case, there are no facts, either alleged or found in the exhibits, that support a rigorous deductive reasoning that involves more than mere assumptions and speculation. when all is said and done, jj has done nothing more than identify a physical place belonging to the oratory (father bernard’s office) as the place at which some of the alleged assaults occurred. in my view, that is not enough. in light of this conclusion, the effect of which is that the condition of art 575(2) ccp is not met, and although i disagree with the application judge’s view that the shortcomings of jj’s action against the oratory also apply to his action against the congregation, i find that the court of appeal was not justified in intervening on this issue. the superior court’s conclusion on dismissing the action against the oratory should therefore be restored. as a result, it is not necessary to consider the oratory’s other argument concerning the commonality of is- sues: art 575(1) ccp if any one of the conditions of art 575 ccp is not met, the action must be dismissed. [170] je partage l’avis de la juge dissidente en cour d’appel. les allégations figurant dans la de- mande de jj et les pièces déposées à leur soutien n’étayent pas l’existence d’une cause d’action en responsabilité contre l’oratoire, une entité distincte de la congrégation, tant sur la base d’une faute di- recte de sa part que sur la base du fait d’autrui. pour l’oratoire, il n’y a pas de faits allégués ou d’assise factuelle dans les pièces appuyant un raisonnement déductif rigoureux qui aille au- delà de simples sup- positions ou de spéculations. en définitive, jj se limite à désigner un lieu physique appartenant à l’oratoire (le bureau du père bernard) comme étant un endroit où se seraient produites certaines des agressions alléguées, sans plus. je considère que cela est insuffisant. vu cette conclusion qui fait échec au respect de la condition de l’art 575(2) cpc, et quoique je ne partage pas l’opinion du juge de l’autorisation voulant que le recours de jj contre la congrégation souffre des mêmes lacunes que celui visant l’oratoire, j’estime que l’intervention de la cour d’appel sur cette question n’était pas justifiée. il y a donc lieu de rétablir la conclusion de la cour supérieure quant au rejet du recours en ce qui touche l’oratoire. cela étant, il ne m’est pas nécessaire de traiter de l’autre argument de l’oratoire, celui portant sur la communauté de questions : art 575(1) cpc. si une des conditions de l’art 575 cpc n’est pas res- pectée, cela suffit pour entraîner le rejet du recours. [171] although this court stated in infineon and in vivendi that the evidentiary threshold requirement is low at the stage of authorizing a class action, there is nonetheless a minimum threshold, and it must be met. to discharge the burden of establishing an argu- able case, an applicant must allege specific, tangible facts that support his or her cause of action and the le- gal syllogism being proposed. as this court pointed out in infineon, even though this threshold require- ment is “a relatively low bar”, the fact remains that, to meet it, “mere assertions are insufficient without some form of factual underpinning”: para 134. and [171] bien que notre cour ait indiqué dans les arrêts infineon et vivendi que le seuil de preuve re- quis au stade de l’autorisation d’une action collec- tive est peu élevé, ce seuil minimal demeure et il doit être franchi. pour s’acquitter de son fardeau, lequel consiste à établir l’existence d’une cause dé- fendable, le demandeur doit alléguer des faits pré- cis et palpables qui soutiennent sa cause d’action et appuient le syllogisme juridique qu’il propose. comme l’a souligné notre cour dans infineon, même si cette condition préliminaire est « relativement peu exigeante », il n’en reste pas moins que, pour y 938 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. while the exhibits filed in support of the assertions in the application can be relied on to show that there is an arguable case, the allegations must not merely be vague, general and imprecise: paras. 67, 94 and 134. in a civil liability context, this means that the applicant must allege facts that are sufficient and provide a certain factual underpinning that shows how it can be argued that a fault has been committed or that liability has arisen: infineon, at para 80. that is what is lacking in jj’s action against the oratory. [172] i note that the issue of the sufficiency of the allegations concerns the oratory only. the court of appeal clearly came to the unanimous conclusion that jj has an arguable case against the congrega- tion, and that conclusion was not challenged in this court (except on the narrow question of the exist- ence of a legal relationship, which i have already discussed and rejected). in its analysis, the court of appeal referred to a number of allegations and exhibits in arriving at its conclusion with respect to the congregation, but those allegations and exhibits include no reference to the oratory’s actions. for example, jj relies on principles of canon law in support of his action, but he details his allegations of fault in this regard in relation to the congregation only, and not to the oratory. as for the public affairs program report that is central to the allegations of jj’s action, it focused on acts of the congregation and its members, and not of the oratory. satisfaire, « de simples affirmations sont insuffisantes sans quelque forme d’assise factuelle » : par 134. et s’il est loisible de s’appuyer sur les pièces dé- posées au soutien des affirmations de la demande pour démontrer l’existence d’une cause défendable, encore faut-il que les allégations ne demeurent pas simplement vagues, générales et imprécises : par. 67, 94 et 134. en matière de responsabilité civile, cela implique que le demandeur doit alléguer des faits suffisants et fournir une certaine assise factuelle dé- montrant en quoi il peut soutenir qu’une faute a été commise ou qu’une responsabilité est engagée : infineon, par 80. ce sont ces faits et cette assise qui font défaut dans le cas du recours de jj visant l’oratoire. [172] je précise que cette question du caractère suffisant des allégations concerne seulement l’ora- toire la cour d’appel a certes conclu unanime- ment à l’existence d’une cause défendable contre la congrégation, et cette conclusion n’est pas remise en question devant notre cour (hormis sur l’aspect limité du lien de droit dont j’ai déjà traité et que j’ai écarté). ainsi, dans son analyse, la cour d’appel s’est référée à plusieurs allégations et pièces pour conclure comme elle l’a fait à l’endroit de la congrégation, mais ces allégations et pièces ne contiennent au- cune mention des gestes de l’oratoire. par exemple, sur les principes de droit canon que jj invoque pour appuyer son recours, il particularise ses allé- gations de faute à ce chapitre en ne mentionnant que la congrégation, et non l’oratoire. quant au reportage diffusé dans le cadre de l’émission d’af- faires publiques, qui reste un élément névralgique des allégations du recours de jj, il est consacré aux gestes de la congrégation et de ses membres, et non à ceux de l’oratoire. [173] as the dissenting court of appeal judge indicated quite bluntly, it must be understood that in this case, regardless of any effort that might be expended to try to make up for the shortcomings of jj’s application, it ultimately says little in this re- gard. in addition, the only exhibits he filed in support of the allegations are extremely limited. they can be summed up as follows: (1) the information state- ments in the enterprise register for the congregation, corporation jean- brillant and the oratory, and the [173] tel que l’indique en termes assez sévères la juge dissidente en cour d’appel, il faut bien com- prendre qu’ici, peu importe les efforts que l’on puisse déployer pour tenter de suppléer à ses lacunes, la demande de jj en dit en définitive fort peu. les seules pièces qu’il dépose au soutien des allégations sont en outre des plus limitées. elles se résument à ceci : (1) les états de renseignements au registre des entreprises à l’égard de la congrégation, de la corporation jean- brillant et de l’oratoire et la loi [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 939 oratory’s private incorporating statute; (2) a table of alleged victims; (3) two general documents relating to canon law; (4) a general article (in which neither of the appellants is named) on the impact of duress exerted by clergy members to discourage victims from reporting their assailants; and (5) the 2011 pub- lic affairs program report that led to the proceeding. and that is all. privée constitutive de l’oratoire; (2) un tableau des présumées victimes; (3) deux documents généraux portant sur le droit canon; (4) un article général (qui ne vise nommément aucun des appelants) sur l’im- pact de la contrainte exercée par des membres du clergé pour inciter des victimes à ne pas dénoncer leurs agresseurs; et (5) le reportage diffusé dans le cadre de l’émission d’affaires publiques de 2011 qui est à l’origine du recours. rien d’autre. [174] as a result, in the allegations set out in the application and the exhibits filed in support of them that concern the direct fault alleged against the or- atory, jj confines himself to generalities, without providing any details. the following are the relevant paragraphs of the application: [174] aussi, dans les allégations de la demande et les pièces déposées à leur soutien qui concernent la faute directe reprochée à l’oratoire, jj ne s’en tient qu’à des généralités, qu’il ne détaille d’aucune manière. je reproduis ci- après les paragraphes per- tinents de la demande : [translation] 3.33 the respondents allowed members of the con- gregation of holy cross to sexually abuse mi- nor children in public schools, in orphanages, at st. joseph’s oratory and in other places; 3.34 the respondents subjected the victims to mental, religious and psychological duress by discour- aging them from reporting the sexual abuse by members of the congregation of holy cross; 3.33 les intimés ont permis que des abus sexuels soient perpétrés à l’encontre d’enfants mineurs par des membres de la congrégation de sainte- croix et ce, que ce soit dans des écoles publiques, des orphelinats, à l’oratoire saint- joseph, ou dans d’autres lieux; 3.34 les intimés ont exercé une contrainte morale, religieuse et psychologique sur les victimes, en les incitant à ne pas dénoncer les abus sexuels commis par des membres de la congrégation de sainte- croix; 3341. to illustrate the impact of this type of duress, we are filing an article by marianne benkert and thomas p. doyle entitled “religious duress and its impact on victims of clergy sexual abuse”, which was published on november 27, 2008 (filed as exhibit r-3); 3341. à titre d’illustration de l’impact de ce type de contrainte nous produisons l’article de marianne benkert et thomas p. doyle, intitulé « religious duress and its impact on victims of clergy sexual abuse », publié le 27 novembre 2008 et commu- niqué comme pièce r-3; 3.35 the respondents were aware of the sexual abuse by members of the congregation of holy cross    but nevertheless hushed it up, to the detriment of the minor children who were the victims of that abuse; 3.35 les intimés étaient au courant des abus sexuels perpétrés par les membres de la congrégation de sainte- croix (…) et les ont néanmoins étouffés, au détriment des enfants mineurs qui en ont été victimes; 3351. to illustrate these practices, we are filing the ac- count given by a former brother on the enquête program broadcast on september 30, 2010 (filed as exhibit r-4); 3351. à titre d’illustration de ces manœuvres nous pro- duisons le témoignage d’un ancien frère, diffusé le 30 septembre 2010 dans le cadre de l’émis- sion enquête, communiquée comme pièce r-4; 940 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. 3.36 the respondents knowingly and consciously chose to ignore the issue of sexual abuse of minor chil- dren by members of the congregation of holy cross; 3.36 les intimés ont sciemment et consciemment choisi d’ignorer la problématique des abus sexuels com- mis sur des enfants mineurs par des membres de la congrégation de sainte- croix; 3.37 by covering up those sexual assaults, the respond- ents placed their own interests above those of the minor children, in violation of their mental, spiritual and physical integrity, which justifies an award of punitive damages to the applicant and the members of the class described in paragraph 1 of this application; 3.37 en camouflant ces agressions sexuelles, les in- timés ont placé leurs intérêts au- dessus de ceux des enfants mineurs, en violation de leur intégrité morale, spirituelle et physique, ce qui justifie l’oc- troi de dommages- intérêts punitifs au requérant et aux membres du groupe décrit au paragraphe 1 des présentes; 3.38 as principals, the respondents are liable for the sexual abuse, by members of the congregation of holy cross, of the applicant and the members of the class described in paragraph 1 of this applica- tion; [emphasis in original.] [175] as the dissenting court of appeal judge ob- served, these are general and non- factual accusations. these allegations consist essentially of conclusions of fact without any factual underpinning, of legal ar- guments, or of opinions. in the oratory’s case, unlike that of the congregation, no other allegation in the application (such as those relating to canon law) and none of the exhibits filed in support of the allegations (such as the television report that led to the proceed- ing) lend credence to these general comments. they are general allegations that quite simply do not con- tain the level of detail that one would expect of allega- tions forming the basis for an action in civil liability. more importantly, they have no factual underpinning. 3.38 à titre de commettant, les intimés sont respon- sables des sévices sexuels commis par les membres de la congrégation de sainte- croix à l’égard du requérant et des membres du groupe décrit au pa- ragraphe 1 des présentes; [en caractères gras dans l’original.] [175] comme la juge dissidente en cour d’appel le souligne, ce sont là des reproches d’ordre générique et non factuel. ces allégations constituent en quelque sorte des conclusions de fait, sans assise factuelle, des argumentations juridiques ou des opinions. à la différence du recours visant la congrégation, en ce qui concerne l’oratoire, aucune autre allégation de la demande (telles celles portant sur le droit ca- non) et aucune des pièces déposées à leur soutien (tel le reportage télévisé à l’origine du recours) ne vient étayer ces généralités. ce sont des allégations génériques, qui ne contiennent simplement pas le degré de détail attendu pour fonder un recours en responsabilité civile. bien plus, l’assise factuelle de ces allégations est inexistante. [176] thus, neither the application nor the exhibits explain how these allegations can apply against the oratory. there are no facts, either alleged or found in the exhibits, that illustrate how the oratory’s acts or omissions allowed the assaults to occur or facil- itated them. nor are there any facts, either alleged or found in the exhibits, that support the allegation that a representative or employee of the oratory tried to conceal the assaults. jj refers in this regard to the general article mentioned above on the impact of duress exerted by clergy members to discourage victims from reporting their assailants. however, the article in question does not mention the oratory. [176] ainsi, ni la demande ni les pièces n’expli- quent en quoi ces allégations sont opposables ou applicables à l’oratoire. aucun fait allégué ou dé- coulant des pièces déposées n’illustre en quoi les actions ou omissions de l’oratoire auraient permis ou favorisé la survenance des agressions. aucun fait al- légué ou découlant des pièces déposées n’appuie non plus l’allégation selon laquelle un représentant ou un employé de l’oratoire aurait tenté de dissimuler ces agressions. jj se réfère à cet égard à l’article général déjà mentionné, qui traite de l’impact des contraintes exercées par des membres du clergé pour inciter des victimes à ne pas dénoncer leurs agresseurs. or, cet [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 941 likewise, the television report on which jj relies to show that the oratory knew about the alleged assaults concerned only the congregation and its members. in this regard, the fact that the oratory is a monument built by the congregation’s members or that brother andré is associated with it adds nothing that can support the syllogism needed to substantiate the direct fault alleged against the oratory. [177] the table of victims to which jj refers also sheds little light on this issue. that table is limited to identifying various institutions as places where brothers and fathers belonging to the congregation allegedly committed assaults. this does not support the claim that the oratory committed a fault. i note that the congregation is itself being sued for the acts allegedly committed by its members on premises be- longing to those institutions, including the oratory. what is more, the oratory is the only one of the identified institutions that jj is suing directly. it may be the pre- eminent place of worship that some people associate with the congregation, but that is certainly not a sufficient basis for taking a different approach to the analysis with respect to the legal syllogism jj must establish. the applicant must establish an arguable case against each of the entities being sued. although the conditions for authorization, including the one set out in art 575(2) ccp, must be inter- preted flexibly and applied broadly, a court cannot go so far as to presume the existence of an element that is essential to the establishment of an arguable case. article ne mentionne pas l’oratoire. de même, le re- portage télévisé sur lequel s’appuie jj pour illustrer la connaissance qu’avait l’oratoire des agressions alléguées ne concerne que la congrégation et ses membres. sous ce rapport, que l’oratoire soit un mo- nument bâti par des membres de la congrégation, ou que le frère andré soit associé à l’oratoire, n’ajoute rien qui puisse étayer le syllogisme requis à l’appui de la faute directe reprochée à l’oratoire. [177] le tableau des victimes dont fait état jj. apporte également peu d’éclairage au débat à ce chapitre. ce tableau se limite à désigner diverses institutions comme étant des lieux où des frères et pères membres de la congrégation auraient commis des agressions. cela n’étaye pas la prétention selon laquelle une faute aurait été commise par l’oratoire. je rappelle que la congrégation est elle- même pour- suivie pour les actes de ses membres qui se seraient produits dans des lieux appartenant à ces institutions, dont l’oratoire. l’oratoire est d’ailleurs le seul des établissements désignés qui soit visé directement par le recours de jj. bien qu’il puisse représenter aux yeux de certains le lieu de culte prééminent associé à la congrégation, cela est certes insuffisant pour trai- ter différemment l’analyse du syllogisme juridique auquel jj est astreint. il incombe au demandeur d’établir l’existence d’une cause défendable contre chacune des entités qu’il poursuit. l’interprétation souple et l’application large des conditions d’auto- risation, dont celle de l’art 575(2) cpc, ne vont pas jusqu’à permettre de présumer l’existence d’un élément essentiel à la démonstration d’une cause défendable. [178] nor does jj’s argument that any allega- tion made or evidence adduced against the con- gregation can also apply to the oratory because the congregation, [translation] “through some of its members, helped found the [oratory]” establish the necessary legal syllogism in this case: para 33 of the re- amended motion. section 2 of the oratory’s incorporating statute simply provides that its affairs are to be managed by five members of the congre- gation of the holy cross: an act to incorporate “st. joseph’s oratory of mount royal”, sq 1916, c 90. the fact that the congregation is a religious community or that the oratory is a religious society [178] l’allégation de jj voulant qu’il soit possible d’opposer à l’oratoire tous les éléments reprochés à la congrégation, puisque cette dernière « a, par le biais de certains de ses membres, contribué à fon- der [l’oratoire] » n’établit guère plus le syllogisme juridique requis en l’espèce : par 33 de la requête réamendée. l’article 2 de la loi constitutive de l’ora- toire prévoit simplement que les affaires de cette dernière seront administrées par cinq membres de la congrégation de sainte- croix : loi constituant en corporation l’oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal, sq 1916, c 90. le fait que la congrégation soit une communauté religieuse ou que l’oratoire soit une 942 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. does not mean that the analysis regarding this alle- gation and this section can be dealt with differently for purposes of the application of the condition set out in art 575(2) ccp. société religieuse ne permet pas d’analyser cette al- légation et cette disposition d’une manière différente pour les besoins de l’application de la condition de l’art 575(2) cpc. [179] on the basis of this allegation and this ex- hibit, the majority of the court of appeal emphasized that the oratory’s affairs were managed in whole or in part by members of the congregation: paras. 22 and 111. this was what led the majority to conclude that, at the authorization stage, it was [translation] “easy to presume that a close connection exists be- tween the congregation, the oratory and the reli- gious concerned”: para 112. [179] sur la foi de cette allégation et de cette pièce, les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel soulignent que les affaires de l’oratoire étaient administrées en partie ou en totalité par des membres de la con- grégation : par. 22 et 111. c’est ce qui les amène à conclure que l’on peut, au stade de l’autorisation, « facilement présumer du lien étroit qui existe entre la congrégation, l’oratoire et les religieux concer- nés » : par 112. [180] with respect, i am of the view that the major- ity of the court of appeal could not find an arguable case against the oratory on such a tenuous basis. section 2 indicates only that members of the holy cross religious community are to sit on the oratory’s board of directors. unless something is read into the allegations in the application or into the exhibits filed in support of them that is not in fact there, there is no indication that the oratory is actually under the control of members of the religious community. and even if that were the case, it would not be sufficient in itself to establish an arguable case with respect to the oratory’s liability absent specific and tangible allegations of negligence on the oratory’s part or of the existence of a relationship of subordination between it and the members of that religious com- munity. the dissenting judge aptly said the following in this regard: [translation] nor can the mere fact that the oratory is managed by members of the congregation establish any fault committed by the oratory against those who were sexually assaulted by members of the congregation. the oratory rightly argues that it is a separate entity whose mission is to operate and maintain that place of wor- ship. it cannot be liable for the actions of members of the congregation over whom it has no authority. [para. 137] [180] soit dit en tout respect, je suis d’avis que les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ne pou- vaient conclure à l’existence d’une cause défendable à l’égard de l’oratoire sur un fondement aussi ténu. cet article 2 indique seulement que des membres de la communauté religieuse de sainte- croix doivent siéger sur le conseil d’administration de l’oratoire. à moins de lire dans les allégations de la demande ou dans les pièces déposées à leur soutien ce qui ne s’y trouve pas, rien n’indique que l’oratoire est réellement sous la gouverne de membres de la com- munauté religieuse. et même si c’était le cas, cela ne serait pas suffisant en soi pour établir l’existence d’une cause défendable fondée sur la responsabilité de l’oratoire en l’absence d’allégations précises et palpables de négligence de la part de l’oratoire ou de l’existence d’un lien de préposition entre ce dernier et les membres de cette communauté religieuse. la juge dissidente souligne avec justesse ce qui suit à ce sujet : le seul fait que l’oratoire est administré par des mem- bres de la congrégation ne permet pas davantage d’établir quelque faute de sa part à l’endroit des victimes d’agressions sexuelles commises par des membres de la congrégation. l’oratoire soutient d’ailleurs avec raison qu’elle est une entité distincte avec pour mission d’opérer et d’entretenir ce lieu de culte. sa responsabilité ne peut être engagée pour les agissements des membres de la congrégation sur lesquels elle n’a pas autorité [par 137] [181] i agree. this cannot be a sufficient basis for imputing to the oratory all of the faults raised against [181] je souscris à ces propos. cela ne peut suf- fire à imputer à l’oratoire l’entièreté des fautes [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 943 the congregation in those allegations. i myself do not believe that it can be asserted on so limited a basis that the congregation lies hidden behind the oratory or that the oratory is a component of the religious community to such an extent that whatever jj attributes to the congregation can be imputed to the oratory. nor, i would add, is it the case that, because the congregation might have to answer for its members’ acts and because certain of its members were or are directors of the oratory, it can be con- cluded that what applies to the congregation applies equally to the oratory. i fail to see the logic behind this deductive reasoning. [182] in this regard, i note that even if the allega- tions in jj’s application with respect to canon law and to the television report that led to the proceeding can justify the existence of a cause of action on the basis of direct liability against the congregation in that they support the argument that the congrega- tion’s officers knew or should have known about the alleged abuse, nothing to that effect can be found in relation to the oratory. instead, we are left to our own devices and can only speculate as to the basis on which it would be directly liable. this is the exact opposite of what an applicant must do at the stage of authorization of a class action, as he or she must present a legal syllogism that constitutes [translation] “rigorous deductive reasoning that presupposes no implied extraneous proposition”: a v. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394, at para. 31 (canlii). reprochées à la congrégation dans ces allégations. pour ma part, je ne crois pas que l’on puisse affir- mer, sur la foi de si peu, que derrière l’oratoire se cache la congrégation ou que l’oratoire constitue l’un des aspects de la communauté religieuse au point de pouvoir lui imputer ce que jj reproche à la congrégation. j’ajouterai que ce n’est pas non plus parce que la congrégation pourrait devoir répondre des gestes de ses membres, et parce que certains de ses membres ont été ou sont des administrateurs de l’oratoire, que l’on peut de ce fait conclure que ce qui s’applique à la congrégation s’applique tout autant à l’oratoire. le lien logique qui appuierait ce raisonnement déductif m’échappe. [182] à cet égard, je note que si les allégations de la demande de jj qui porte sur le droit canon et le reportage télévisé à l’origine du recours peuvent étayer l’existence d’une cause d’action en respon- sabilité directe contre la congrégation en ce qu’ils appuient l’argument que les dirigeants de la congré- gation connaissaient ou auraient dû connaître les abus allégués, on ne retrouve rien de tel en ce qui concerne l’oratoire. nous sommes plutôt laissés à nous- mêmes et contraints à des conjectures sur ce qui pourrait engager sa responsabilité directe. c’est précisément l’inverse de ce qui est attendu du demandeur au stade de l’autorisation d’une action collective, celui-ci devant présenter un syllogisme juridique qui constitue un « raisonnement déductif rigoureux, qui ne suppose aucune proposition étran- gère sous- entendue » : a c. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394, par. 31 (canlii). [183] jj is also asking the courts to find that the oratory is liable, as principal, for the alleged sexual abuse by members of the congregation. to support the legal syllogism required in order to justify a finding of liability for the act of another person, he had to allege, at a minimum, that members of the congregation were subordinates of the oratory who had committed faults in the performance of their duties: art 1463 ccq. a subordinate is a person who acts for and under the direction of another: baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no 1-844. one of the elements that are essential to the establish- ment of such a form of liability is the existence of a relationship of subordination between the principal [183] jj demande également aux tribunaux de conclure à la responsabilité de l’oratoire, à titre de commettante, pour les abus sexuels qui auraient été commis par des membres de la congrégation. pour étayer le syllogisme juridique requis afin de pouvoir soutenir l’existence d’une responsabilité pour le fait d’autrui, il devait à tout le moins alléguer que des membres de la congrégation étaient des préposés de l’oratoire ayant commis des fautes dans l’exécution de leurs fonctions : art 1463 ccq. est un préposé celui qui agit pour le compte d’un autre, sous sa di- rection : baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 1-844. l’un des éléments essentiels à l’établissement d’une telle forme de responsabilité est l’existence d’un lien 944 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j gascon j. [2019] 2 scr. and the subordinate it is accepted that the most important criterion to be met for the purpose of this determination is control, supervision and direction by the principal in relation to the subordinate and his or her activities: baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no 1-844. there is quite simply no factual support for such a determination either in jj’s allegations or in the exhibits filed in support of them. [184] paragraphs 3.11 to 3.17 of the application are the only ones that deal directly with the oratory. in them, jj alleges only that he was sexually abused by father bernard, a member of the congregation, in the priest’s office on the oratory’s property. the mere fact that an office was made available to a member of the congregation on premises belong- ing to the oratory does not lead to the conclusion that the oratory was the principal in relation to that member. it is important not to confuse the physical location with the legal relationship that is essential to finding that a relationship of principal and subor- dinate exists. as the dissenting judge rightly noted, no employee of the oratory is identified in jj’s application as having been involved in or having caused the alleged sexual abuse. as well, jj stated in his examination that he had nothing to say against the chaplain who had been in charge of the altar boys in the oratory’s chapel. i would add that none of the exhibits that have been filed provide a form of factual underpinning from this point of view either. de préposition entre le préposé et le commettant. le critère prépondérant qui est reconnu à cet égard et permet d’appuyer cette détermination est celui du contrôle, de la surveillance et de la direction par le commettant du préposé et des activités qu’il exécute : baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 1-844. or, ce support factuel est simplement inexistant, tant dans les allégations de jj que dans les pièces déposées à leur soutien. [184] aux paragraphes 3.11 à 3.17 de la demande, les seuls qui traitent directement de l’oratoire, jj se contente d’alléguer avoir subi des abus sexuels de la part du père bernard, un membre de la congrégation, dans le bureau de ce dernier qui se trouvait dans la propriété de l’oratoire. le simple fait qu’un bu- reau soit mis à la disposition d’un membre de la congrégation dans des lieux qui appartiennent à l’oratoire ne mène pas à la conclusion que cette dernière entité était le commettant de ce membre. il importe de ne pas confondre le lieu physique et le lien de droit essentiel à la constatation d’une relation commettant- préposé. la juge dissidente le note avec à-propos : aucun employé de l’oratoire n’est iden- tifié dans la demande de jj comme étant en cause ou à l’origine des sévices sexuels reprochés. lors de son interrogatoire, jj mentionne d’ailleurs n’avoir rien à reprocher à l’aumônier responsable des ser- vants de messe à la chapelle de l’oratoire. j’ajouterai qu’aucune des pièces déposées ne fournit non plus une quelconque assise factuelle à ce point de vue. [185] as this court noted in marcotte v. longueuil (city), 2009 scc 43, [2009] 3 scr 65,. quebec civil procedure is primarily statute- based, and the procedure for class actions is no exception: para 18. under art 575(2) ccp, every applicant is required to allege facts that appear to justify the conclusions being sought. where this condition is not met, the court must refuse to authorize a class action. if the proposed class action against the oratory were au- thorized on the basis of the allegations made in jj’s application and the limited exhibits he presented in this regard, the effect would be to lower the mini- mum threshold discussed by this court in infineon and vivendi to almost nothing, so much so that the condition set out in art 575(2) ccp would become irrelevant. the obligation to make more than vague, [185] comme notre cour le souligne dans l’arrêt marcotte c. longueuil (ville), 2009 csc 43, [2009] 3 rcs 65, la loi constitue la source première de la procédure civile du québec, et l’action collec- tive n’y fait pas exception : par 18. aux termes de l’art 575(2) cpc, tout demandeur est tenu d’al- léguer des faits qui paraissent justifier les conclu- sions recherchées. lorsque cette condition n’est pas remplie, l’exercice d’une action collective doit être refusé. autoriser l’action collective projetée contre l’oratoire sur la foi des allégations formulées dans la demande de jj et des pièces limitées qu’il présente à cet égard réduirait à bien peu le seuil minimal dont fait état notre cour dans les arrêts infineon et vivendi, au point de rendre futile la condition prévue à l’art 575(2) cpc. l’obligation d’avancer [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j le juge gascon 945 general or imprecise allegations remains, and it must retain its full meaning and significance. davantage que des allégations vagues, générales ou imprécises demeure, et elle doit conserver tout son sens et sa portée. in this regard, jj cites the quebec court of [186] appeal’s decision in asselin v. desjardins cabinet de services financiers inc., 2017 qcca 1673, and argues that an unduly literal interpretation is inap- propriate and that it is instead necessary to [trans- lation] “read between the lines” of his application: para. 33 (canlii). the passages from asselin on which jj relies do not have the meaning he would give them. although, as this court held in infineon and vivendi, the conditions for authorization, in- cluding the sufficiency of the alleged facts — which are assumed to be true — must be interpreted and applied broadly, where allegations are vague, general and imprecise, a judge can neither presume the exist- ence of something that they do not contain nor infer something that could have been included in them. [186] à ce chapitre, jj invoque l’arrêt de la cour d’appel du québec asselin c. desjardins cabinet de services financiers inc., 2017 qcca 1673, et plaide qu’il faut non pas faire preuve d’un littéralisme in- justifié mais plutôt « lire entre les lignes » de sa demande : par. 33 (canlii). les passages de l’arrêt asselin sur lesquels s’appuie jj n’ont pas le sens qu’il souhaite leur donner. si, aux termes des arrêts infineon et vivendi, il faut interpréter et appliquer avec largesse les conditions d’autorisation, dont celle relative au caractère suffisant des faits allégués — lesquels sont tenus pour avérés —, des allégations qui ne restent que vagues, générales et imprécises ne permettent pas aux juges de présumer l’existence de ce qui ne s’y trouve pas, pas plus que d’inférer ce qui aurait pu y avoir été écrit. vi conclusion vi conclusion [187] the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq. does not depart from the rules of prescription or establish a term for forfeiture. the starting point for the periods provided for in both paragraphs of art 29261 ccq is the date the victim becomes aware of the connection between the act in question and his or her injury. if the author of the act dies, the reduction of the period provided for in the second paragraph does not apply to an action against a third party that still exists for that party’s own fault or for the act or omission of another person. at the author- ization stage, jj’s application for a class action is therefore neither forfeit nor clearly prescribed. [187] l’alinéa 2 de l’art 29261 ccq ne déroge pas au régime de la prescription et n’édicte pas un délai de déchéance. le point de départ des différents délais prévus aux deux alinéas de l’art 29261 ccq. est le jour où la victime prend connaissance du lien entre l’acte visé et son préjudice. en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’acte, la réduction de délai prévue à l’al. 2 n’est pas opposable aux recours visant un tiers toujours existant pour sa propre faute ou pour le fait d’autrui. au stade de l’autorisation, la demande d’action collective de jj n’est par conséquent ni déchue ni manifestement prescrite. [188] given that the court of appeal was justified in intervening because of the application judge’s overly restrictive interpretation of the conditions for authorization, including with respect to the alleged existence of a legal relationship between jj and the congregation, i would dismiss the congregation’s appeal with costs throughout. [188] puisque la cour d’appel était justifiée d’in- tervenir devant l’interprétation trop restrictive des conditions d’autorisation par le juge de première instance, y compris sur l’existence alléguée d’un lien de droit entre jj et la congrégation, je rejette- rais l’appel de la congrégation, avec dépens devant toutes les cours. [189] however, despite the generous approach ad- vocated by this court to the conditions for authoriz- ing a class action, the vague, general and imprecise [189] par contre, en dépit de l’approche généreuse préconisée par notre cour à l’égard des conditions d’autorisation en matière d’action collective, les côté j | la juge côté 946 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. allegations in jj’s application are not sufficient to establish an arguable case against the oratory. i would therefore allow the oratory’s appeal and dismiss the application for authorization against it, without costs given that it has waived them. allégations vagues, générales et imprécises de la demande de jj ne suffisent pas à établir l’existence d’une cause défendable à l’encontre de l’oratoire. j’accueillerais donc l’appel de l’oratoire et je rejet- terais la demande d’autorisation contre cette entité, sans dépens vu sa renonciation à les réclamer. english version of the reasons delivered by les motifs suivants ont été rendus par côté j. (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i overview i aperçu [190] the respondent, jj, proposes to institute a class action against the appellants, province cana- dienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix (“province canadienne”) and oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal (“oratory”), based on sexual aggressions com- mitted against him and other victims while they were children. in my reasons, to avoid any confusion, i will use the term “province canadienne” rather than “congregation” in order to clearly distinguish the appellant province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix — the legal entity against which the application for authorization was brought — from the religious community known as the congrégation de sainte- croix (congregation of holy cross). [191] the proposed class action is broad in scope: a time span of nearly 80 years, 20 or so different institutions and about 40 victims who have allegedly already come forward. to institute a class action, the respondent first had to obtain authorization from a court. the purpose of the authorization stage is, in part, to ensure that the courts, and of course defend- ants, are not forced to devote substantial resources to actions that are often unwieldy and complex, some- times ill- conceived and ultimately untenable. in the present case, the application judge refused to author- ize the class action, but the court of appeal set aside that decision and granted authorization. [190] l’intimé, jj, propose d’intenter une action collective contre les appelants, la province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix (« province cana- dienne ») et l’oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal (« oratoire »), pour des agressions à caractère sexuel commises envers lui et d’autres victimes pendant leur enfance. dans mes motifs, pour éviter toute confusion, je vais utiliser le terme la « province canadienne », plutôt que « congrégation », afin de bien distinguer l’appelante « province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix » — l’entité juridique visée par la de- mande d’autorisation — de la communauté religieuse qui porte le nom de congrégation de sainte- croix. [191] l’action collective envisagée est de grande ampleur : une période de près de 80 ans, une ving- taine d’établissements différents, une quarantaine de victimes qui se seraient déjà manifestées. pour procéder par voie d’action collective, l’intimé devait d’abord obtenir l’autorisation du tribunal. cette étape d’autorisation permet notamment d’éviter que les tri- bunaux, et bien sûr les parties défenderesses, soient forcés de consacrer des ressources considérables à des actions souvent lourdes et complexes, par- fois mal ficelées et, en bout de ligne, insoutenables. en l’espèce, le juge de première instance a refusé d’autoriser l’exercice de l’action collective, mais la cour d’appel a infirmé cette décision et a accordé l’autorisation. [192] i agree with my colleague gascon j. that the oratory’s appeal should be allowed. like him, i am of the view that the allegations in the application for authorization are too vague, general and imprecise [192] je suis d’accord avec mon collègue le juge gascon pour accueillir l’appel de l’oratoire. comme lui, j’estime que les allégations de la demande d’auto- risation sont trop vagues, générales et imprécises pour [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 947 to form the basis for an arguable case and thus sat- isfy the condition in art. 575(2) of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501 (“ccp”). at the very least, the application judge’s determinations in this regard were not clearly wrong, such that the court of appeal’s intervention was unwarranted. i note that my colleague brown j. seems to fault the application judge for the brevity of his reasons with respect to the oratory (para 13). however, it is difficult to criticize the judge for being succinct given the almost com- plete absence of specific allegations concerning the oratory in the application for authorization. like the application judge, i point out that the application is [translation] “practically silent regarding involve- ment on the oratory’s part” (2015 qccs 3583, at para. 137 (canlii)). as illustrated by my colleague gascon j.’s reasons, the insufficiency of the facts alleged is in itself dispositive of the oratory’s appeal. [193] that being said, i would, unlike my col- leagues, allow province canadienne’s appeal. in my opinion, its second ground of appeal has merit: jj. has not shown that there is any legal relationship between province canadienne and himself. in fact, the evidence adduced by the respondent indicates that province canadienne, as a legal person, did not exist at the time of the alleged events. the basis on which it might be found liable cannot be inferred from any of the allegations. in the circumstances, it was certainly open to the application judge to con- clude that there was no arguable case. with respect, the court of appeal overstepped its role by basing its intervention on speculation and assumptions that had no foundation in the allegations set out in the application or, for that matter, in the evidence filed in support of it. the application judge’s decision should therefore be restored. as in the case of the oratory, the class action should not have been authorized against province canadienne. servir de fondement à une cause défendable et ainsi satisfaire à la condition de l’art. 575(2) du code de pro- cédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501 (« cpc »). à tout le moins, l’appréciation du juge d’autorisation à cet égard n’était pas manifestement non fondée, de sorte que l’intervention de la cour d’appel n’était pas justifiée. je note que mon collègue le juge brown semble reprocher au juge d’autorisation la brièveté de ses motifs concer- nant l’oratoire (par 13). or, on peut difficilement critiquer le juge de s’être exprimé succinctement vu la quasi- absence d’allégations spécifiques à l’égard de l’oratoire dans la demande d’autorisation. à l’instar du juge d’autorisation, je constate que la demande est « pratiquement silencieuse à l’égard de l’implication de l’oratoire » (2015 qccs 3583, par. 137 (canlii)). comme l’illustrent les motifs de mon collègue le juge gascon, l’insuffisance des faits allégués permet à elle seule de trancher le pourvoi de l’oratoire. [193] cela dit, à la différence de mes collègues, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi de la province canadienne. j’estime que son deuxième moyen d’ap- pel est bien fondé : jj n’a pas fait la démonstration de l’existence d’un lien de droit entre la province canadienne et lui. en effet, selon la preuve présentée par l’intimé, la province canadienne, en tant que personne morale, n’existait pas au moment où les faits allégués se seraient produits. aucune allégation ne permet d’inférer à quel titre sa responsabilité pourrait être engagée dans les circonstances, le juge d’autorisation pouvait certainement conclure à l’absence d’une cause défendable. avec égards, la cour d’appel a outrepassé son rôle en fondant son intervention sur des conjectures et des hypothèses qui ne trouvent aucune assise dans les allégations de la demande, ni d’ailleurs dans la preuve à son soutien. le jugement de première instance doit par conséquent être rétabli. tout comme pour l’oratoire, l’exercice de l’action collective ne devait pas être autorisé contre la province canadienne. [194] however, i cannot fully accept the appel- lants’ position on their first ground of appeal, as it is not clear that jj’s right of action is forfeited or prescribed under the second paragraph of art 29261 of the civil code of québec (“ccq”). whether the period introduced by that paragraph is a term for for- feiture (délai de déchéance) or a prescriptive period, [194] je ne peux toutefois souscrire entièrement à la position des appelants en ce qui a trait à leur pre- mier moyen d’appel. en effet, il n’est pas clair que le droit d’action de jj soit déchu ou prescrit en vertu du deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 du code civil du québec (« ccq »). que cet alinéa introduise un délai de déchéance ou un délai de prescription, 948 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. it would have begun to run only from the coming into force of the provision, not retroactively from the date of death of jj’s alleged aggressors. it would indeed be unlikely that the legislature intended, without say- ing so clearly, to suddenly extinguish the right of ac- tion of a victim whose aggressor had died more than three years before the legislation came into force but whose remedy was not yet prescribed at that time. [195] that being said, and with respect, i am not entirely in agreement with the majority’s interpre- tation of art 29261 ccq. i will therefore make some comments on this subject in order to prompt the legislature to clarify its intention. essentially, my view is that the death of the author of the act or the victim marks the starting point of the period set out in the second paragraph. it is not simply an event that shortens the period applicable under the first paragraph. this conclusion is dictated by the wording of the second paragraph, which states that the period “runs from the date of death”. however, the appellants have not persuaded me that the leg- islature expressly provided for the forfeiture of any action for damages for bodily injury resulting from sexual aggression a maximum of three years after the death of the author of the act or the victim. the period in question therefore remains governed by the general rules of prescription, which means that it can, subject to certain limitations, be suspended or interrupted. moreover, this shortened period applies to all actions arising from sexual aggression, whether the action is brought against the author of the alleged act or against a third party. this interpretation makes it possible to achieve one of the legislature’s objec- tives, that is, to avoid the erosion of evidence in order to maintain the integrity of the adversarial process. ce délai n’aurait commencé à courir qu’au moment de l’entrée en vigueur de la disposition, et non ré- troactivement au moment du décès des agresseurs allégués de jj. il serait en effet invraisemblable que le législateur ait eu l’intention, sans l’exprimer clai- rement, d’anéantir brusquement le droit d’action de la victime dont l’agresseur est décédé plus de trois ans avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi, mais dont le recours n’était pas encore prescrit à ce moment. [195] cela étant, et avec égards, je ne partage pas entièrement l’interprétation que donne la majorité de l’art 29261 ccq. je formulerai donc certaines remarques à ce sujet afin d’inciter le législateur à clarifier son intention. en bref, le décès de l’auteur de l’acte ou de la victime marque à mon avis le point de départ du délai énoncé au deuxième alinéa. il ne constitue pas simplement un événement qui abrège le délai applicable en vertu du premier alinéa. cette conclusion s’impose à la lumière du texte, lequel précise que le délai « court à compter du décès ». les appelants ne m’ont cependant pas convaincue que le législateur a expressément prévu la déchéance de toute action en réparation du préjudice corporel résultant d’une agression à caractère sexuel dans un délai d’au plus trois ans après le décès de l’auteur de l’acte ou de la victime. le délai en question demeure donc sujet aux règles générales de la prescription, si bien qu’il peut, sous certaines réserves, faire l’objet d’une suspension ou d’une interruption. de plus, ce délai abrégé s’applique à toutes les actions résultant d’une agression à caractère sexuel, que l’action soit dirigée contre l’auteur de l’acte reproché ou contre un tiers. cette interprétation permet la réalisation de l’un des objectifs visés par le législateur, soit éviter l’érosion de la preuve afin de préserver l’intégrité du processus contradictoire. in summary, i will essentially deal with two [196] issues: (i) the absence of allegations concerning the legal relationship between jj and province cana- dienne; and (ii) the nature, starting point, scope and temporal effect of the period set out in the second paragraph of art 29261 . ccq. first, however, i will expand on a few points relating to the scheme for authorizing a class action, and specifically the condition of sufficiency of the facts alleged set out in art 575(2) ccp. [196] en résumé, je traiterai essentiellement de deux questions : (i) l’absence d’allégations quant au lien de droit entre jj et la province canadienne; de même que (ii) la nature, le point de départ, la portée et l’effet dans le temps du délai mentionné au deu- xième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq. mais d’abord, j’apporterai quelques précisions concernant le régime d’autorisation de l’exercice d’une action collective, et plus particulièrement la condition de la suffisance des faits allégués prévue à l’art 575(2) cpc. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 949 ii analysis ii analyse a process for authorizing a class action a le processus d’autorisation de l’exercice d’une action collective (1) general principles (1) les principes généraux [197] the new code of civil procedure describes the class action as a “special procedur[e]”. what is unique about this procedural vehicle is that it enables a person who is a member of a class of persons to sue, without a mandate, on behalf of all the members of the class (art 571 ccp); this is an exception to the rule that no one may plead for another person (art 23 ccp). moreover, a class action pursues not only the objective of facilitating access to jus- tice in order to compensate victims, but also that of bringing about socioeconomic changes by pun- ishing certain behaviour that is considered harmful (see s. finn, recours singulier et collectif: redéfinir le recours collectif comme procédure particulière (2011), at pp. 44-49 and 169-71; vivendi canada inc v. dell’aniello, 2014 scc 1, [2014] 1 scr 3, at para 1). in many respects, a class action “takes place outside the framework of the traditional duel between a single plaintiff and a single defendant” (canada post corp v. lépine, 2009 scc 16, [2009] 1 scr 549, at para 42). [198] because of the “special” nature of a class action, the legislature has provided that such an ac- tion may not be instituted without prior authoriza- tion from a court (art 574 ccp). authorization is granted if the application meets four cumulative conditions relating to (i) commonality, (ii) the suf- ficiency of the facts alleged, (iii) the composition of the class and (iv) the applicant’s ability to properly represent the class members (art 575 ccp). [197] le nouveau code de procédure civile qualifie l’action collective de « voi[e] procédural[e] particu- lièr[e] ». ce véhicule procédural a ceci de singulier qu’il permet à une personne d’agir en demande, sans mandat, pour le compte de tous les membres d’un groupe dont elle fait partie (art 571 cpc), ce qui déroge à la règle selon laquelle nul ne peut plaider pour autrui (art 23 cpc). en outre, l’action col- lective poursuit non seulement l’objectif de faciliter l’accès à la justice en vue de compenser les victimes mais aussi celui d’entraîner des changements socio- économiques en sanctionnant certains comporte- ments jugés préjudiciables (voir s. finn, recours singulier et collectif : redéfinir le recours collec- tif comme procédure particulière (2011), p. 44-49 et 169- 171; vivendi canada inc. c. dell’aniello, 2014 csc 1, [2014] 1 rcs 3, par 1). à plusieurs égards, l’action collective « dépasse le cadre du duel traditionnel entre un demandeur et un défendeur » (société canadienne des postes c. lépine, 2009 csc 16, [2009] 1 rcs 549, par 42). [198] en raison de la nature « particulière » de l’action collective, le législateur a prévu qu’un de- mandeur ne puisse emprunter cette voie qu’avec l’autorisation préalable du tribunal (art 574 cpc). cette autorisation est accordée si la demande satisfait à quatre conditions cumulatives qui se rapportent à (i) la communauté des questions, à (ii) la suffisance des faits allégués, à (iii) la composition du groupe et à (iv) la capacité du demandeur d’assurer une re- présentation adéquate des membres (art 575 cpc). [199] this court has favoured a flexible and gener- ous interpretation of the conditions for authorization of a class action (infineon technologies ag v. option consommateurs, 2013 scc 59, [2013] 3 scr 600, at para. 60; marcotte v. longueuil (city), 2009 scc 43, [2009] 3 scr 65, at para 22). this approach is justified to some extent by the access to justice objective that underlies class actions. however, the [199] la jurisprudence de la cour favorise une interprétation souple et généreuse des conditions d’autorisation de l’exercice d’une action collective (infineon technologies ag c. option consomma- teurs, 2013 csc 59, [2013] 3 rcs 600, par. 60; marcotte c. longueuil (ville), 2009 csc 43, [2009] 3 rcs 65, par 22). l’objectif d’accès à la jus- tice qui sous- tend l’action collective justifie, dans 950 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. authorization mechanism must not be reduced to a mere formality. the conditions for authorization continue to play an important role, including by ensuring that class actions actually benefit litigants and do not impose a disproportionate burden on the judicial system. this is aptly stated by s e. finn:    it is difficult to understand how judicial economy would be served if courts were to favour an almost pro forma approach to authorization applications. an author- ized class action does not dissolve into the ether; it pro- ceeds to the merits. and if the class action proceeds to the merits with significant defects, it will be up to the judge of first instance to contend with those defects over a period of years, unless the case is settled, discontinued, or annulled. une certaine mesure, cette approche. cependant, le mécanisme d’autorisation ne doit pas être réduit à une simple formalité. les conditions d’autorisation continuent de jouer un rôle important, notamment en assurant que l’action collective profite véritablement aux justiciables et n’impose pas un fardeau dispro- portionné au système judiciaire. l’auteur s e. finn l’exprime avec justesse : [traduction]    il est difficile d’imaginer comment l’ob- jectif d’économie des ressources judiciaires pourrait être favorisé si les tribunaux privilégiaient une approche pour ainsi dire pro forma à l’égard des demandes d’autorisation. une fois autorisée, une action collective ne se dissout pas dans l’éther; elle suit son cours et est entendue sur le fond. et, si cette action collective est affectée de défauts importants, c’est le juge de première instance qui sera aux prises avec ces défauts pendant des années, à moins que l’action ne soit réglée, abandonnée ou annulée. (class actions in québec: notes for non- residents (2nd ed. 2018), at p. 87) (class actions in québec : notes for non- residents (2e éd. 2018), p. 87) [200] it is helpful to recall the objectives of the authorization process: to protect the interests of po- tential class members who would otherwise have no say in the litigation; to prevent defendants from being forced to invest significant resources to contest large- scale, time- consuming actions that have only a slight chance of success; and, finally, to prevent such actions from monopolizing the judicial system to the detriment of other litigants’ actions (see, eg,. v. aimar, “l’autorisation de l’action collective: rai- sons d’être, application et changements à venir”, in c. piché, ed., the class action effect (2018), 149, at pp. 151-57; c. marseille, “le danger d’abaisser le seuil d’autorisation en matière d’actions collec- tives — perspectives d’un avocat de la défense”, in c. piché, ed., the class action effect (2018), 247, at pp. 253-56, citing p-c. lafond, le recours collectif comme voie d’accès à la justice pour les consomma- teurs (1996), at p. 349; sofio v. organisme canadien de réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobi- lières (ocrcvm), 2015 qcca 1820, at para. 26 (canlii); bouchard v. agropur coopérative, 2006 qcca 1342, [2006] rjq 2349, at para. 39; mar- seille, at p. 258; d. jutras, “à propos de l’opportunité du recours collectif”, in colloque sur les recours [200] il est utile de rappeler les objectifs du pro- cessus d’autorisation : protéger les intérêts des mem - bres potentiels qui autrement n’auraient pas voix au chapitre; éviter que les parties défenderesses soient forcées d’investir des ressources importantes pour contester des actions d’envergure et de longue ha- leine, qui ne présentent pourtant que de très minces chances de succès; et finalement empêcher que de telles actions accaparent l’appareil judiciaire au détriment des recours d’autres justiciables (voir, p ex,. v. aimar, « l’autorisation de l’action collec- tive : raisons d’être, application et changements à venir », dans c. piché, dir., l’effet de l’action col- lective (2018), 149, p. 151- 157; c. marseille, « le danger d’abaisser le seuil d’autorisation en matière d’actions collectives — perspectives d’un avocat de la défense », dans c. piché, dir., l’effet de l’ac- tion collective (2018), 247, p. 253- 256, citant p-c. lafond, le recours collectif comme voie d’accès à la justice pour les consommateurs (1996), p. 349; sofio c organisme canadien de réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobilières (ocrcvm), 2015 qcca 1820, par. 26 (canlii); bouchard c. agropur coopérative, 2006 qcca 1342, [2006] rjq 2349, par. 39; marseille, p. 258; d. jutras, [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 951 collectifs 2007 (2007), 7, at p 28). these objectives have not lost any of their relevance. [201] under the code of civil procedure, the appli- cant bears the burden of showing that the application meets the conditions for authorization. i disagree with the statement made by my colleague brown j. — and also by the court of appeal — that any “doubt” in this regard must be resolved in favour of the applicant (pa- ras. 42 and 79). that principle amounts to reversing the burden that the legislature has chosen to impose on the applicant (see a. durocher and c. mar seille, “autorisation d’exercer une action collective”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — procédure civile ii (loose- leaf), by p-c. lafond, ed., fasc. 21, at para 33). it is true that the conditions must be applied flexibly, but authorization must be denied if the judge is not satisfied that they are met. of course, denial of authorization does not prevent the applicant, or any other victim, from asserting his or her rights individually. [202] finally, it must be remembered that art. 575 ccp confers “significant discretion” on the judge who has to determine whether the conditions for authorization are met (vivendi, at para 33). judges of first instance are in the best position to perform this task. they are also the ones who will have to manage the class action once it is authorized. an appellate court must therefore defer to the judge’s findings and intervene only if the judge erred in law or if the judge’s assessment of one of the con- ditions is “clearly wrong” (ibid., at para 34). it is not enough for the appellate court to note its disa- greement with the application of any of the criteria. unless it identifies an actual error of law, it must explain exactly how the judge’s assessment is clearly wrong. otherwise, it will only pay lip service to “deference”. furthermore, the fact that an appellate court identifies an error in relation to one condition does not authorize it to reassess all of the conditions (ibid., at para 35). «  à propos de l’opportunité du recours collec- tif », dans colloque sur les recours collectifs 2007 (2007), 7, p 28). ces objectifs n’ont rien perdu de leur pertinence. [201] en vertu du code de procédure civile, il incombe au demandeur de démontrer que sa de- mande satisfait aux conditions d’autorisation je suis en désaccord avec mon collègue le juge brown lorsqu’il écrit — tout comme la cour d’appel d’ail- leurs — qu’un « doute » à cet égard doit jouer en faveur du demandeur (par. 42 et 79). ce principe équivaut à renverser le fardeau que le législateur a choisi d’imposer au demandeur (voir a. durocher et c. marseille, « autorisation d’exercer une action col- lective », dans jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — procédure civile ii (feuilles mobiles), par p-c. lafond, dir., fasc. 21, par 33). les condi- tions doivent certes être appliquées avec souplesse, mais si le juge n’est pas convaincu que celles-ci sont respectées, l’autorisation doit être refusée. bien entendu, le refus de l’autorisation n’empêche pas le demandeur, ni toute autre victime, de faire valoir ses droits à titre individuel. [202] enfin, il convient de rappeler que l’art. 575 cpc confère un « pouvoir d’appréciation impor- tant » au juge appelé à déterminer si les conditions d’autorisation sont réunies (vivendi, par 33). les juges de première instance sont les mieux placés pour accomplir cette tâche. ce sont d’ailleurs eux qui devront composer avec l’action collective une fois celle-ci autorisée. les juridictions d’appel doivent par conséquent faire montre de déférence à l’égard de leurs conclusions et n’intervenir qu’en présence d’une erreur de droit ou d’une appréciation « mani- festement non fondée » de l’une des conditions (ibid., par 34). il ne suffit pas à la juridiction d’appel de constater son désaccord quant à l’application de l’un ou l’autre des critères. à défaut d’identifier une véri- table erreur de droit, elle doit expliquer précisément en quoi l’erreur d’appréciation du juge est évidente. autrement, il ne s’agirait que d’une « déférence » de façade. de surcroît, le fait de déceler une erreur à l’égard d’une condition n’autorise pas les juridic- tions d’appel à apprécier à nouveau l’ensemble des conditions (ibid., par 35). 952 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. (2) sufficiency of the facts alleged (2) la suffisance des faits allégués [203] province canadienne’s appeal is based on the condition of sufficiency of the facts alleged set out in art 575(2) ccp i am substantially in agreement with my colleague gascon j.’s interpretation of the applicable criterion (paras. 108-11, 171, 182 and 185-86). essentially, our disagreement lies in the application of that criterion with respect to province canadienne. while i believe that his discussion prop- erly summarizes this court’s case law, i would elab- orate on certain points in order to clearly explain my position on province canadienne’s appeal and to respond to some of the propositions made by my colleague brown j. [204] under art 575(2) ccp, the judge must ensure that “the facts alleged appear to justify the conclusions sought”. this condition is assessed in light of the individual cause of action of the ap- plicant (or, as the case may be, the designated per- son) (sofio, at para. 10; option consommateurs v. fédération des caisses desjardins du québec, 2010 qcca 1416, at para. 9 (canlii)). a class action is not a patchwork quilt: a judicial application cannot be based on the fault committed against one po- tential member combined with the injury suffered by another. as the majority of this court noted in bou malhab  v diffusion métromédia cmr inc., 2011 scc 9, [2011] 1 scr 214, at para. 52, “[a] class action can succeed only if each claim it covers, taken individually, could serve as a basis for court proceedings”. although at the authorization stage the facts alleged with respect to members other than the applicant are relevant, and indeed necessary, to establish the composition of the class (arts. 574 and 575(3) ccp), they are not sufficient on their own to show that the conclusions sought are justified within the meaning of art 575(2) ccp. [203] le pourvoi de la province canadienne repose sur la condition de la suffisance des faits allégués prévue à l’art 575(2) cpc. je suis largement en accord avec l’interprétation que mon collègue le juge gascon fait du critère applicable (par. 108- 111, 171, 182 et 185- 186). notre différend porte essentielle- ment sur son application à l’égard de la province canadienne. même si je suis d’avis que l’exposé du juge gascon résume bien la jurisprudence de la cour, je me permettrai d’apporter certaines précisions afin d’expliquer clairement ma position quant au pourvoi de la province canadienne, ainsi que pour répondre à certaines des propositions de mon collègue le juge brown. [204] en vertu de l’art 575(2) cpc, le juge doit s’assurer que « les faits allégués paraissent justifier les conclusions recherchées ». cette condition s’ap- précie à la lumière de la cause d’action individuelle du demandeur (ou, le cas échéant, de la personne désignée) (sofio, par. 10; option consommateurs c. fédération des caisses desjardins du québec, 2010 qcca 1416, par. 9 (canlii)). l’action collective n’est pas une courtepointe : on ne peut former une demande en justice en combinant la faute commise à l’encontre d’un membre potentiel avec le préjudice subi par un autre. comme le souligne la majorité de la cour dans bou malhab c. diffusion métromé- dia cmr inc., 2011 csc 9, [2011] 1 rcs 214, par. 52, « [l]e recours collectif ne pourra réussir que si chacune des réclamations prises individuellement justifiait le recours aux tribunaux ». à l’étape de l’autorisation, les faits allégués qui se rapportent à d’autres membres que le demandeur sont perti- nents, voire nécessaires, pour établir la composition du groupe (art. 574 et 575(3)  cpc), mais ils ne suffisent pas en eux- mêmes à démontrer que les conclusions recherchées sont justifiées au sens de l’art 575(2) cpc. [205] this court has held that the applicant must allege sufficient facts to establish an “arguable case”, that is, a “good colour of right” (vivendi, at para. 37; infineon, at paras. 65 and 67; longueuil (city), at para. 23; comité régional des usagers des transports en commun de québec v. quebec urban community [205] selon la jurisprudence de la cour, le deman- deur doit alléguer des faits suffisants pour démontrer l’existence d’une « cause défendable », c’est-à-dire à une « apparence sérieuse de droit » (vivendi, par. 37; infineon, par. 65 et 67; longueuil (ville), par. 23; co- mité régional des usagers des transports en commun [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 953 transit commission, [1981] 1 scr 424, at p 429). it is true that this threshold is “a low one” (infineon, at para. 59), but it does exist, and the applicant must meet it (sofio, at para 24). [206] in this regard, i agree with my colleague gascon  j (at para.  185) that the courts must be careful not to lower the “relatively low standard” described by the court in infineon (at para. 89) and to make it a mere formality. in particular, it should be remembered that the application judge’s role is not limited to screening out frivolous or clearly unfounded applications. screening out such applica- tions is certainly one of the purposes of the author- ization process, but this is not the criterion adopted by the legislature (see infineon, at paras. 61 and 65). arti cle 575 ccp states that a judge authorizes a class action only if the facts alleged appear to justify the conclusions sought and, of course, if the other conditions are met (vivendi, at para 37). the burden on the applicant is therefore more onerous than sim- ply establishing that the application is not frivolous or clearly unfounded (see p-c. lafond, le recours collectif, le rôle du juge et sa conception de la jus- tice: impact et évolution (2006), at pp 133-34). in my view, these two criteria must not be confused. the legislature expressly adopted the concept of a frivolous or clearly unfounded pleading in the provisions under which sanctions are imposed for abuse of procedure (art 51 ccp), but not at the stage of authorizing a class action. this legislative choice must be respected. de québec c. commission des transports de la com- munauté urbaine de québec, [1981] 1 rcs 424, p 429). ce seuil est certes « peu élevé » (infineon, par. 59), mais il existe, et il doit être franchi par le demandeur (sofio, par 24). [206] à ce chapitre, tout comme mon collègue le juge gascon (au par. 185), je suis d’avis que les tribunaux doivent se garder d’abaisser la « norme relativement peu exigeante » décrite par la cour dans infineon (au par. 89) et d’en faire une simple formalité. notamment, il convient de rappeler que le rôle du juge d’autorisation ne se limite pas à filtrer les demandes frivoles ou manifestement mal fondées. écarter de telles demandes constitue certes l’un des objectifs du processus d’autorisation, mais il ne s’agit pas du critère retenu par le législateur (voir infineon, par. 61 et 65). l’article 575 cpc précise que le juge autorise l’action collective uniquement si les conclu- sions recherchées paraissent justifiées au regard des faits allégués et si, bien sûr, les autres conditions sont remplies (vivendi, par 37). le fardeau du demandeur est donc plus exigeant et ne consiste pas simplement à établir que sa demande n’est pas frivole ou mani- festement mal fondée (voir p-c. lafond, le recours collectif, le rôle du juge et sa conception de la jus- tice : impact et évolution (2006), p. 133- 134). à mon sens, il faut éviter de confondre ces deux critères. le législateur a expressément adopté la notion d’acte de procédure frivole ou manifestement mal fondé dans le cadre des dispositions visant à sanctionner les abus de procédure (art 51 cpc), mais non au stade de l’autorisation de l’exercice d’une action collective. ce choix législatif doit être respecté. [207] to clear up any ambiguity, i note that my interpretation of art.  575(2) ccp  is entirely in keeping with the principles laid down in infineon. in my opinion, a selective reading of that judgment must be avoided. it is true, as my colleague brown j. notes (at para. 56), that this court stated in infineon that a court’s role is “merely to filter out frivolous motions”, but we cannot disregard the end of the same sentence, where this court stated that a court must “grant those that meet the evidentiary and le- gal threshold requirements of art. 1003” of the for- mer code of civil procedure, cqlr, c. c-25 (now art 575 ccp) (para 61). on this point, the court [207] afin de dissiper toute ambiguïté, je précise que mon interprétation de l’art 575(2) cpc est tout à fait fidèle aux enseignements d’infineon. je suis d’avis qu’il faut éviter de faire une lecture sé- lective de cet arrêt. il est vrai, comme le souligne mon collègue le juge brown (au par. 56), que la cour y indique que le tribunal « écarte simplement les demandes frivoles », mais la fin de cette même phrase, où la cour précise que le tribunal « autorise celles qui satisfont aux exigences relatives au seuil de preuve et au seuil légal prévus à l’art. 1003 » de l’ancien code de procédure civile, rlrq, c. c-25 (maintenant l’art 575 cpc), ne peut être ignorée 954 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. in infineon referred to comité régional des usagers des transports en commun de québec, in which it was stated that an application judge must “reject entirely any frivolous or manifestly improper action, and authorize only those in which the facts alleged disclose a good colour of right” (p. 429, cited in infineon, at para. 62 (emphasis added)). therefore, while a court must of course screen out frivolous or clearly unfounded applications from the outset, the criterion applicable to the condition set out in art 575(2) ccp is separate and, above all, more stringent. at the risk of repeating myself, the bur- den on the applicant is to show an “arguable case”, which is equivalent to a good colour of right, a prima facie case or, in french, “une apparence sérieuse de droit” (infineon, at paras. 64-65, citing, among others, longueuil (city), at para 23). this is also how my colleague gascon j. defines the applicable criterion (para 109). [208] for an application to establish an “argua- ble case”, and thus for the conclusions sought to appear to be justified, the application judge must be able to infer the proposed legal syllogism from the facts alleged (see, eg,. pharmascience inc. v. option consommateurs, 2005 qcca 437, [2005] rjq 1367, at paras. 29 and 35; option consomma- teurs v. bell mobilité, 2008 qcca 2201, at para. 36 (canlii); union des consommateurs v. bell canada, 2012 qcca 1287, [2012] rjq 1243, at para 88). the legal syllogism must be [translation] “clear, complete and rigorous” (s e. finn, l’action collec- tive au québec (2016), at p. 173), because even at the authorization stage, “the class action mechanism cannot be used to make up for the absence of one of the constituent elements of the cause of action” (bou malhab, at para 52). as professor lafond writes, [translation] “since legal arguments are not as- sumed to be correct, they need to be demonstrated in order to show the soundness of the legal syllo- gism” (lafond (2006), at p. 132 (emphasis added)). provencher j. provided an excellent summary of the applicable law in a v. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394: (par.  61). à cet égard, l’arrêt infineon renvoie à comité régional des usagers des transports en com- mun de québec, où la cour énonce que le juge d’au- torisation « écarte d’emblée tout recours frivole ou manifestement mal fondé et n’autorise que ceux où les faits allégués dévoilent une apparence sérieuse de droit » (p. 429, cité dans infineon, par. 62 (je souligne)). ainsi, bien que le tribunal doive bien sûr filtrer d’entrée de jeu les demandes frivoles ou manifestement non fondées, le critère applicable à la condition prévue à l’art 575(2) cpc est distinct et, surtout, plus exigeant. au risque de me répéter, le fardeau du demandeur consiste à démontrer l’exis- tence d’une « cause défendable », ce qui correspond à une apparence sérieuse de droit ou, en anglais, aux expressions « good colour of right » et « prima facie case » (infineon, par. 64-65, citant notamment longueuil (ville), par 23). c’est également ainsi que mon collègue le juge gascon définit le critère applicable (par 109). [208] pour qu’une demande présente une « cause défendable », et donc que les conclusions recher- chées paraissent justifiées, le juge d’autorisation doit être en mesure d’inférer le syllogisme juridique avancé des faits allégués (voir, p ex, pharmascience inc. c. option consommateurs, 2005 qcca 437, [2005] rjq 1367, par. 29 et 35; option consom- mateurs c. bell mobilité, 2008 qcca 2201, par. 36 (canlii); union des consommateurs c. bell canada, 2012 qcca 1287, [2012] rjq 1243, par 88). ce syllogisme juridique doit être « clair, complet et rigoureux » (s e. finn, l’action collective au québec (2016), p 173). en effet, même à l’étape de l’autorisation, « on ne peut s’autoriser du méca- nisme du recours collectif pour suppléer à l’absence d’un des éléments constitutifs du droit d’action » (bou malhab, par 52). comme l’écrit le professeur lafond, « puisque l’argumentation juridique n’est pas tenue pour exacte, elle doit faire l’objet d’une démonstration, afin de mettre au jour la justesse du syllogisme juridique » (lafond (2006), p. 132 (je souligne)). à cet égard, le juge provencher résume parfaitement le droit applicable dans a c. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394 : [translation] the courts have determined that the legal syllogism proposed by an applicant must be clear les tribunaux ont déterminé que le syllogisme juri- dique proposé par un requérant doit apparaître clairement, [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 955 and must not involve vague possibilities, inferences or assumptions. it must constitute rigorous deductive reason- ing that presupposes no implied extraneous proposition. [emphasis added; para. 31 (canlii).] sans vague possibilité, inférence ou hypothèse. il doit constituer un raisonnement déductif rigoureux, qui ne suppose aucune proposition étrangère sous- entendue. [je souligne; par. 31 (canlii).] [209] consideration of the legal syllogism some- times requires the court to decide a pure question of law at the authorization stage (trudel v. banque toronto- dominion, 2007 qcca 413, at paras. 2-3 (canlii); toure v. brault & martineau inc., 2014 qcca 1577, at para. 42 (canlii); lambert v. whirl- pool canada, lp, 2015 qcca 433, at para.  12 (canlii); groupe d’action d’investisseurs dans biosyntech v. tsang, 2016 qcca 1923, at para. 33 (canlii); fortier v. meubles léon ltée, 2014 qcca 195, at paras. 89-91 (canlii); for an example, see also infineon, at paras 107-17). where such a ques- tion can be decided without weighing the evidence and where the outcome of the case depends on it, i believe that it is very much in the interests of jus- tice — and consistent with the guiding principle of proportionality — for the court to deal with the question at the authorization stage. otherwise, it would be necessary to wait for an exception to dis- miss to be raised on the merits after the class action is authorized, which would result in a needless waste of resources and effort, both for the parties and for the judicial system (see finn, l’action collective au québec, at p 170). this is in fact the reason for which, in the instant case, the court is ruling on the interpretation of art 29261 ccq at this stage. [209] l’examen du syllogisme juridique oblige par- fois le tribunal à trancher une pure question de droit dès l’étape de l’autorisation (trudel c. banque toronto- dominion, 2007 qcca 413, par. 2-3 (canlii); toure c. brault & martineau inc., 2014 qcca 1577, par. 42 (canlii); lambert c. whirlpool canada, lp, 2015 qcca 433, par. 12 (canlii); groupe d’action d’inves- tisseurs dans biosyntech c. tsang, 2016 qcca 1923, par. 33 (canlii); fortier c. meubles léon ltée, 2014 qcca 195, par. 89-91 (canlii); en guise d’exemple, voir aussi infineon, par. 107- 117). lorsque répondre à une telle question ne requiert aucune appréciation de la preuve et que le sort du litige en dépend, il me semble tout à fait dans l’intérêt de la justice — et conforme au principe directeur de la proportionnalité — que le tribunal s’en saisisse dès l’étape de l’autorisation. dans le cas contraire, il faudrait attendre qu’un moyen d’ir- recevabilité soit exercé au fond, après l’autorisation, ce qui entraînerait un gaspillage inutile de ressources et d’efforts, tant pour les parties que pour l’appareil judiciaire (voir finn, l’action collective au québec, p 170). c’est d’ailleurs ce qui justifie, en l’espèce, que la cour se prononce à ce stade sur l’interprétation de l’art 29261 ccq. [210] in assessing the legal syllogism in light of the facts alleged, the application judge must refrain from weighing the evidence and thereby intruding into the sphere of the trial judge (infineon, at para 68). the facts alleged are, in principle, assumed to be true as long as they are sufficiently specific and concrete to make it possible for the defendants to know the allegations against them and for the court to assess the quality of the legal syllogism (see infineon, at para. 67; toure, at para. 38; sibiga v. fido solutions inc., 2016 qcca 1299, at para. 52 (canlii)). how- ever, facts that are clearly contradicted by reliable ev- idence cannot be assumed to be true (bell mobilité, at para. 38; charles v. boiron canada inc., 2016 qcca 1716, at para. 43 (canlii); finn, class actions in québec: notes for non- residents, at p 21). [210] en évaluant le syllogisme juridique à la lu- mière des faits allégués, le juge d’autorisation doit s’abstenir d’apprécier la preuve et, par le fait même, de s’immiscer dans le domaine du juge du procès (infineon, par 68). les faits allégués sont en principe tenus pour avérés, à condition d’être suffisamment précis et concrets pour permettre aux parties défen- deresses de savoir ce qu’on leur reproche et au tri- bunal d’apprécier la qualité du syllogisme juridique (voir infineon, par. 67; toure, par. 38; sibiga c. fido solutions inc., 2016 qcca 1299, par. 52 (canlii)). des faits clairement contredits par une preuve fiable ne sauraient toutefois être tenus pour avérés (bell mobilité, par. 38; charles c. boiron canada inc., 2016 qcca 1716, par. 43 (canlii); finn, class actions in québec : notes for non- residents, p 21). 956 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. [211] moreover, vague, general or imprecise allega- tions — as well as mere statements of a legal nature, opinions or assumptions — cannot suffice to establish an “arguable case” (infineon, at paras. 67 and 127; bell mobilité, at paras. 37-38; finn, class actions in québec: notes for non- residents, at p 21). as this court stated in infineon, “mere assertions are insuf- ficient without some form of factual underpinning” (para 134). it is true that the evidence adduced at the authorization stage can sometimes compensate for a lack of precision in the facts alleged, but no evidence can cure the absence of specific factual allegations re- garding an essential element of the cause of action. in this regard, to the extent that my colleague brown j.’s reasons suggest that the evidence adduced could, on its own, establish an arguable case even though the application for authorization contains only very vague, general and imprecise allegations, i disagree. the actual wording of art 575(2) ccp indicates that authorization must be based on the “facts alleged”. this means that the applicant cannot simply make generic assertions like “the respondent committed a fault that caused an injury”, adduce some evidence and then leave it to the judge to sift through the ev- idence to find the elements required to establish an arguable case. [212] in addition, the application judge should not rely on mere speculation to make up for the shortcomings of a poorly crafted application. i agree with my colleague gascon j. that where allegations are vague, general or imprecise, “a judge can neither presume the existence of something that they do not contain nor infer something that could have been included in them” (para 186). in my view, it is not the application judge’s role to [translation] “read between the lines” of the pleading, as bich ja put it in asselin v. desjardins cabinet de services finan- ciers inc., 2017 qcca 1673, at para. 33 (canlii). the judge should unquestionably avoid an overly strict and literal reading of the application, but should nonetheless confine himself or herself to the facts actually alleged in the application, without trying to complete them (see finn, class actions in québec: notes for non- residents, at p. 86; see also sofio, [211] de plus, des allégations vagues, générales ou imprécises — tout comme de simples énoncés de na- ture juridique, des opinions ou des hypothèses — ne peuvent suffire à démontrer l’existence d’une « cause défendable » (infineon, par. 67 et 127; bell mobilité, par. 37-38; finn, class actions in québec : notes for non- residents, p 21). comme l’a dit la cour dans infineon, « de simples affirmations sont insuffisantes sans quelque forme d’assise factuelle » (par 134). il est vrai que la preuve présentée à l’étape de l’autori- sation peut parfois suppléer au manque de précision des faits allégués, mais aucune preuve ne peut remé- dier à l’absence d’allégations factuelles spécifiques quant à un élément essentiel de la cause d’action. à cet égard, je suis en désaccord avec mon collègue le juge brown dans la mesure où ses motifs laissent en- tendre que la preuve présentée pourrait en elle- même démontrer l’existence d’une cause défendable, et ce, alors que la demande d’autorisation ne contient que des allégations des plus vagues, générales et impré- cises. selon les termes mêmes de l’art 575(2) cpc, l’autorisation doit reposer sur les « faits allégués ». le demandeur ne peut donc se contenter de formuler des affirmations génériques telles que « le défendeur a commis une faute ayant causé un préjudice », de présenter quelques éléments de preuve et de lais- ser au juge la tâche de fouiller lui- même dans cette preuve afin d’y trouver les éléments nécessaires dé- montrant l’existence d’une cause défendable. [212] qui plus est, le juge d’autorisation ne de- vrait pas s’appuyer sur de simples conjectures pour combler les lacunes d’une demande mal ficelée. je suis d’accord avec mon collègue le juge gascon pour dire que des allégations vagues, générales ou im- précises « ne permettent pas aux juges de présumer l’existence de ce qui ne s’y trouve pas, pas plus que d’inférer ce qui aurait pu y avoir été écrit » (par 186). à mon avis, il n’appartient pas au juge d’autorisa- tion de « lire entre les lignes » de la procédure, pour reprendre la formule de la juge bich dans asselin c. desjardins cabinet de services financiers inc., 2017 qcca 1673, par. 33 (canlii). sans conteste, le juge doit éviter de faire une lecture excessivement rigou- reuse et littérale de la demande, mais il doit néan- moins s’en tenir aux faits qui y sont effectivement allégués, sans chercher à les compléter (voir finn, class actions in québec : notes for non- residents, [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 957 at para 25). in saying this, i am not, of course, ex- pressing any opinion on the merits of the decision in asselin, which is still the subject of an application for leave to appeal to this court. [213] i will conclude on the interpretation of art. 575(2) ccp simply by adding that — con- trary to what is suggested by the court of appeal’s reasons — the applicable criterion for determining whether the condition has been met does not vary depending on the specific context of the case (see paras. 18, 48, 52 and 92 (canlii)). in each case, the facts alleged must disclose an arguable case that rests on a clear, complete and rigorous legal syllogism. at most, the application judge must be mindful of the evidentiary difficulties that some cases present at the authorization stage, that is, prior to pre- trial examinations and the disclosure of evidence. p. 86; voir aussi sofio, par 25). en faisant ce com- mentaire, il va de soi que je n’exprime aucune opi- nion sur le bien- fondé de la décision asselin, laquelle fait encore l’objet d’une demande d’autorisation d’appel devant notre cour. [213] je conclurai sur l’interprétation de l’art. 575(2) cpc en ajoutant simplement que — contrai- rement à ce que suggèrent les motifs de la cour d’appel — le critère applicable permettant de dé- terminer si la condition a été remplie ne varie pas en fonction du contexte particulier de l’affaire (voir par. 18, 48, 52 et 92 (canlii)). dans tous les cas, les faits allégués doivent révéler une cause défendable reposant sur un syllogisme juridique clair, complet et rigoureux. tout au plus, le juge d’autorisation doit se montrer sensible aux difficultés de preuve que sou- lèvent certaines affaires à l’étape de l’autorisation, c’est-à-dire avant la tenue d’interrogatoires préa- lables et la communication d’éléments de preuve. b absence of an arguable case against province b l’absence d’une cause défendable à l’encontre canadienne de la province canadienne [214] with all due respect for my colleagues’ con- trary view, i fail to see how the application judge’s assessment of the sufficiency of the facts alleged (art 575(2) ccp) was “clearly wrong” in relation to province canadienne. on the basis of the applica- tion and supporting exhibits, it was certainly open to the judge to conclude, as he did, that the facts alleged disclosed no cause of action — no legal re- lationship — between jj and province canadienne. this is, in fact, the inevitable conclusion, unless of course one “presume[s] the existence of something that they do not contain” or “infer[s] something that could have been included in them”, as my colleague gascon j. states in relation to the oratory (para 186). in my view, the court of appeal erred in reversing the application judge’s decision and in trying itself to remedy, on the basis of pure speculation, the obvious shortcomings of the application for authorization. [214] avec égards pour l’opinion contraire for- mulée par mes collègues, je ne vois pas en quoi l’appréciation par le juge d’autorisation de la suf- fisance des faits allégués (art 575(2) cpc) était « manifestement non fondée » en ce qui concerne la province canadienne. à la lecture de la demande et des pièces à son soutien, le juge pouvait certainement conclure, comme il l’a fait, que les faits allégués ne révèlent aucune cause d’action — aucun lien de droit — entre jj et la province canadienne. en fait, c’est la conclusion qui s’impose, à moins bien sûr de « présumer l’existence de ce qui ne s’y trouve pas » ou « d’inférer ce qui aurait pu y avoir été écrit » pour citer la formule que mon collègue le juge gascon em- ploie à l’égard de l’oratoire (par 186). à mon avis, la cour d’appel a fait erreur en infirmant la décision du juge d’autorisation et en cherchant à combler elle- même, sur la base de pures conjectures, les lacunes évidentes de la demande d’autorisation. [215] the application judge began by properly noting that [translation] “[i]t is a basic rule that a person instituting an action must sue the right person in order to have any hope of success” (para 88). he [215] le juge d’autorisation a d’abord noté avec justesse que « [p]our espérer obtenir gain de cause [  ], une règle de base impose à celui qui intente le re- cours de s’assurer de poursuivre la bonne personne » 958 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. then found that the respondent had not shown that his application complied with this principle and that, as a result, the conclusions sought against province ca- nadienne did not appear to be justified (paras 89-98). the application judge’s conclusions regarding the absence of a legal relationship were based not on an improper assessment of the probative value of the exhibits filed, but rather on the insufficiency of the facts alleged and on reliable, uncontradicted evidence adduced by the respondent himself. in my view, there was no error in the judge’s approach or reasoning, at least on this point. (par 88). il a par la suite conclu que l’intimé n’avait pas démontré que sa demande respectait ce prin- cipe et que, de ce fait, les conclusions recherchées à l’encontre de la province canadienne ne paraissaient pas justifiées (par 89-98). les conclusions du juge d’autorisation quant à l’absence de lien de droit ne reposent pas sur une appréciation inappropriée de la valeur probante des pièces au dossier, mais sur l’in- suffisance des faits allégués et sur une preuve fiable, non contredite, et présentée par l’intimé lui- même. à mon avis, la démarche et le raisonnement du juge ne sont entachés, du moins sur ce point, d’aucune erreur. [216] the respondent’s allegations against prov- ince canadienne relate to events that date back to the 1950s. specifically, jj alleges that two members of province canadienne aggressed him repeatedly between 1951 and 1955, while he was a student at the notre- dame-des- neiges school and an altar boy at the oratory. as well, the list of potential victims filed by the respondent refers to sexual aggressions that allegedly occurred in the 1940s. according to the allegations, province canadienne was aware at the time that some of its members were committing such acts and knowingly ignored them and covered them up. [216] l’intimé reproche à la province canadienne des faits qui remonteraient aux années 50. de façon plus particulière, jj allègue que deux membres de la province canadienne l’ont agressé à répétition alors qu’il fréquentait l’école notre- dame-des- neiges et qu’il était servant de messe à l’oratoire, entre 1951 et 1955. par ailleurs, la liste de victimes potentielles produite par l’intimé fait état d’agressions à caractère sexuel qui seraient survenues dans les années 40. selon les allégations, la province canadienne avait connaissance à l’époque que certains de ses membres commettaient de tels actes, et les aurait sciemment ignorés et camouflés. [217] but as the application judge noted, the evi- dence adduced by the respondent himself clearly es- tablishes that province canadienne, as a distinct legal person, did not exist at the time of the alleged events. it was constituted on january 1, 2008 under the reli- gious corporations act, cqlr, c. c-71 (“rca”), and has not been amalgamated or continued. these uncontested facts appear in the information state- ment for a legal person found in the enterprise regis- ter, to which the application for authorization refers directly (para 31). the incidents related to jj’s per- sonal action — the only ones relevant to establishing an arguable case under art 575(2) ccp — therefore allegedly occurred half a century before province canadienne was constituted. what is more, jj’s two alleged aggressors died in 2001 and 2004 and thus were never members of province canadienne. fi- nally, the list of potential victims refers to incidents that allegedly occurred no later than the 1980s. [217] or, comme l’a fait remarquer le juge d’auto- risation, la preuve présentée par l’intimé lui- même établit clairement que la province canadienne, en tant que personne morale distincte, n’existait pas au mo- ment des faits allégués. la province canadienne a été constituée le 1er janvier 2008 en vertu de la loi sur les corporations religieuses, rlrq, c. c-71 (« lcr »), et n’a fait l’objet d’aucune fusion ou continuation. ces faits non contestés figurent à l’état des renseignements sur une personne morale au registre des entreprises, auquel réfère directement la demande d’autorisation (par 31). les événements qui se rapportent à l’action personnelle de jj — les seuls qui sont pertinents pour établir l’existence d’une cause défendable au sens de l’art 575(2) cpc — seraient donc survenus un demi- siècle avant la constitution de la province canadienne. de plus, les deux agresseurs allégués de jj sont décédés en 2001 et 2004, et n’ont donc jamais été membres de la province canadienne. enfin, la liste des victimes potentielles renvoie à des événements qui seraient survenus au plus tard dans les années 80. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 959 [218] even if the facts are assumed to be true and the evidence adduced is considered, the application for authorization does not indicate the basis on which province canadienne could be liable — whether for its own fault or for that of another person — for acts or omissions that occurred before it was constituted. the legal syllogism is flawed or clearly incomplete, if not absent. there are two possibilities: either jj. sued the wrong defendant, or he failed to allege cer- tain facts that were essential to establishing the basis for his cause of action. in either case, the application judge had no choice but to conclude, as he did, that the respondent had not met his burden of demonstrat- ing an arguable case under art 575(2) ccp. [219] on this point, the court of appeal’s de- cision does not show that the application judge’s assessment was clearly wrong; quite the contrary. the court of appeal justified its intervention by stating that, even though province canadienne was constituted in 2008, it was merely the instrument of a religious community that had itself existed at the time of the alleged acts (paras 72-73). the court of appeal assumed that, at that time, this community had acted through another legal person, corporation jean- brillant, which had been consti- tuted on may 10, 1947 (para 73). essentially, the court of appeal conflated a religious community having no juridical personality with two distinct legal persons, province canadienne and corpora- tion jean- brillant. it seems to have assumed that, from a legal standpoint, they were a single entity, without regard for the applicable rules concerning legal persons. thus, in 2008, the officers of the religious community purportedly [translation] “decided on a de facto basis to abandon corpora- tion jean- brillant and to be constituted under the name province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix” (para 75). according to the court of appeal, that decision to [translation] “do business using a different legal personality from the one that had served as its flagship until then” could not make the “delictual nature of its fault” cease to exist (para. 72 (emphasis in original)). in my view, these mere speculative statements can- not, on their own, establish the basis for a cause [218] même en tenant les faits pour avérés et en prenant en compte la preuve présentée, la demande d’autorisation ne fait pas voir à quel titre la province canadienne pourrait être responsable — soit pour sa propre faute soit pour celle d’autrui — d’actes ou d’omissions antérieurs à sa constitution. le syllo- gisme juridique est vicié ou encore manifestement incomplet, sinon absent. de deux choses l’une : ou bien jj a poursuivi la mauvaise partie défenderesse, ou bien il a omis d’alléguer certains faits essentiels pour établir le fondement de sa cause d’action. dans les deux cas, le juge d’autorisation n’avait d’autre choix que de conclure, comme il l’a fait, que l’intimé ne s’est pas acquitté du fardeau qui lui incombait de démontrer l’existence d’une cause défendable au sens de l’art 575(2) cpc. [219] sur ce point, la décision de la cour d’appel ne démontre nullement que l’appréciation du juge d’autorisation était manifestement non fondée, bien au contraire. la cour d’appel a justifié son interven- tion en affirmant que, bien que constituée en 2008, la province canadienne n’est que l’instrument d’une communauté religieuse qui, elle, existait à l’époque des gestes reprochés (par 72-73). la cour d’ap- pel tient pour acquis que cette communauté agissait alors par l’entremise d’une autre personne morale, la corporation jean- brillant, dont la constitution remonte au 10 mai 1947 (par 73). somme toute, la cour d’appel fait l’amalgame entre, d’une part, une communauté religieuse sans personnalité juridique et, d’autre part, deux personnes morales distinctes, la province canadienne et la corporation jean- brillant. la cour d’appel semble présumer qu’il s’agit, sur le plan juridique, d’une seule et même entité, et ce, sans égard aux règles applicables en ce qui a trait aux per- sonnes morales. ainsi, les dirigeants de la commu- nauté religieuse auraient, en 2008, « décidé de facto d’abandonner la corporation jean- brillant pour se constituer sous le nom de la province canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix » (par 75). selon la cour d’appel, cette décision de « faire affaire sous le couvert d’une personnalité morale différente de celle qui lui avait jusque-là servi de vaisseau amiral » ne peut faire disparaître la « nature délictuelle de sa faute » (par. 72 (en italique dans l’original)). je suis d’avis que ces simples affirmations relevant de l’hypothèse ne permettent pas à elles seules d’établir 960 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. of action against province canadienne, even at the authorization stage. [220] to begin with, province canadienne is a le- gal person. as a result, the ccq recognizes it as possessing a distinct juridical personality, including in relation to its members (arts. 298 and 309), and as having its own patrimony (art 302). the rca. sets out the rules applicable to the constitution and operation of a religious corporation and states that part iii of the companies act, cqlr, c. c-38, also applies, with the necessary modifications, to such a corporation. the information statement in the enter- prise register indicates that the objects of province canadienne are to organize, administer and maintain a religious congregation, which are the objects re- ferred to in s. 2 of the rca. in s. 1 of that statute, the word “congregation” is defined as a group of religious who are members of a religious community. [221] further, the fact that province canadienne has a religious mission does not allow its juridical personality to be disregarded. i acknowledge that the evidence tends to show that province canadienne is one of the legal vehicles of a religious community, the holy cross community, and that the history of that community dates back to well before 2008 (see, eg, the report broadcast on the enquête program and the act to incorporate “st. joseph’s oratory of mount royal”, sq 1916, c. 90, which refers to the “congregation of the holy cross”). however, such a connection to the holy cross community would not make province canadienne liable per se for acts and omissions committed before it was constituted by members of that community or by other legal entities that may have been connected to that com- munity. in addition, s. 16 of the rca specifically establishes a continuance mechanism by which a religious corporation can succeed a corporation that has been dissolved and thus become seized with that corporation’s rights, property and obligations. section 8 of the rca also refers to the amalgama- tion provisions of the companies act, which provide for the transfer of debts, contracts, liabilities and du- ties to a new amalgamated entity (s 18(6)). finally, le fondement d’une cause d’action à l’encontre de la province canadienne, et ce, même au stade de l’autorisation. [220] d’abord, la province canadienne est une personne morale. à ce titre, le ccq lui recon- naît une personnalité juridique distincte, y compris vis-à-vis ses membres (art. 298 et 309), ainsi qu’un patrimoine qui lui est propre (art 302). la lcr. prévoit les règles applicables à la constitution et au fonctionnement d’une corporation religieuse, et précise que la partie iii de la loi sur les compa- gnies, rlrq, c. c-38, s’applique également à cette corporation, avec les adaptations nécessaires. l’état des renseignements figurant au registre des entre- prises indique que la province canadienne a pour objets d’organiser, d’administrer et de maintenir une congrégation religieuse, ce qui correspond aux objets mentionnés à l’art. 2 de la lcr. à l’article 1 de cette loi, le mot « congrégation » est défini comme étant un ensemble de religieux faisant partie d’une communauté religieuse. [221] ensuite, la mission religieuse de la province canadienne ne permet pas de faire abstraction de sa personnalité juridique. je reconnais que la preuve tend à démontrer que la province canadienne consti- tue l’un des véhicules juridiques d’une communauté religieuse, celle de sainte- croix, et que l’histoire de cette communauté commence bien avant 2008 (voir, p ex, le reportage de l’émission enquête et la loi constituant en corporation l’oratoire saint- joseph du mont-royal, sq 1916, c. 90, laquelle mentionne la « congrégation de sainte- croix »). un tel lien avec la communauté de sainte- croix ne rendrait cepen- dant pas la province canadienne responsable en soi des actes et omissions commis antérieurement à sa constitution par des membres de cette communauté, ou par d’autres entités juridiques qui pourraient avoir été liées à celle-ci. l’article 16 lcr établit d’ailleurs expressément un mécanisme de continuation en vertu duquel une corporation religieuse peut succéder à une corporation qui fait l’objet d’une dissolution et ainsi devenir responsable des droits, biens et obli- gations de cette dernière. l’article 8 lcr renvoie aussi aux dispositions sur les fusions de la loi sur les compagnies, lesquelles prévoient le transfert des dettes et obligations à une nouvelle entité fusionnée [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 961 s. 2 of the rca contemplates the possibility that a single religious community will constitute a number of distinct and autonomous corporations for various purposes, without the corporations having the same juridical personality or the same patrimony (see, by analogy, a v. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394, at para 37). (art 18(6)). enfin, l’art 2 lcr envisage la possi- bilité qu’une même communauté religieuse puisse constituer, à différentes fins, diverses corporations distinctes et autonomes, sans pour autant que ces cor- porations partagent la même personnalité juridique et le même patrimoine (voir, par analogie, a c. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394, par 37). [222] the application for authorization contains no allegation from which it might be inferred that province canadienne is the product of a continuance or of an amalgamation with an entity that could itself be liable for the acts or omissions alleged against province canadienne by the respondent. in fact, as i have mentioned, there is reliable, uncontested evi- dence that clearly suggests the contrary. to sum up, the mere fact that province canadienne was consti- tuted under the rca — as opposed, for example, to the business corporations act, cqlr, c s-311 — does not make it responsible for the debts, contracts, liabilities and duties of other entities that may have been connected to the holy cross religious com- munity in the past. on this point, i disagree with brown j. insofar as he suggests that the juridical personality of religious corporations differs in nature from that of legal persons with secular purposes (para 51). [223] as for the court of appeal’s statement that the holy cross religious community decided [trans- lation] “on a de facto basis to abandon” corporation jean- brillant (para. 75), this is merely an assumption that has no basis whatsoever in the facts alleged in the application or, for that matter, in the exhibits filed in support of it. i note that the application for authorization says practically nothing about the ap- pellants’ corporate identity — apart from three very general statements (paras 31-33) — and nothing at all about their possible connections with other enti- ties. this is surprising and, in my view, illustrates the shortcomings of the proposed class action. by way of comparison, the amended application for authoriza- tion in a v. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394, another case dealing with sexual aggression allega- tions involving religious institutions, contained 25 detailed allegations concerning the corporate history of the community concerned. [222] la demande d’autorisation ne contient au- cune allégation permettant d’inférer que la province canadienne serait issue d’une continuation ou d’une fusion avec une entité qui, elle, pourrait être res- ponsable des actes ou omissions que l’intimé lui reproche. de fait, comme je l’ai mentionné précé- demment, une preuve fiable et non contestée indique clairement le contraire. en somme, le simple fait que la province canadienne ait été constituée en vertu de la lcr — plutôt, par exemple, qu’en vertu de la loi sur les sociétés par actions, rlrq, c s-311 — ne la rend pas responsable des dettes et obligations d’autres entités qui pourraient avoir été liées par le passé à la communauté religieuse de sainte- croix. à cet égard, je suis en désaccord avec le juge brown dans la mesure où ce dernier suggère que la person- nalité juridique des corporations religieuses diffère en nature de celle des personnes morales qui pour- suivent des fins séculières (par 51). [223] quant à l’affirmation de la cour d’appel selon laquelle la communauté religieuse de sainte- croix aurait décidé «  de facto d’abandonner » la corporation jean- brillant (par. 75), il ne s’agit que d’une hypothèse que n’appuient aucunement les faits allégués dans la demande, ni d’ailleurs les pièces pro- duites au soutien de celle-ci. je note que la demande d’autorisation ne dit pratiquement rien au sujet de l’identité corporative des appelants — si ce n’est trois énoncés des plus généraux (par 31-33) — et absolument rien au sujet de leurs liens potentiels avec d’autres entités. cela surprend et illustre, selon moi, les lacunes de l’action collective proposée. en guise de comparaison, la demande d’autorisation modifiée dans le dossier a c. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394, une autre affaire portant sur des allégations d’agressions à caractère sexuel impli- quant des institutions religieuses, comprenait 25 al- légations détaillées sur l’historique corporatif de la communauté en cause. 962 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. in the present case, the application itself [224] states nothing about corporation jean- brillant and obviously includes no factual allegations concerning its corporate history and its connections with prov- ince canadienne. the only references to corporation jean- brillant in the record are found in an infor- mation statement from the enterprise register. that document indicates that corporation jean- brillant was constituted in 1947, that its purposes are religion and teaching, that it used the name “les frères de sainte- croix” until january 7, 2008 and that it still existed when the application for authorization was filed in november 2013. moreover, on september 3, 2014, it had the same address and some of the same directors as province canadienne. as a whole, this evidence undeniably suggests that the two corpo- rations are connected not only with each other, but also more broadly with the holy cross religious community. however, there is nothing to indicate that the religious community abandoned corporation jean- brillant and that all that remains of that corpo- ration is an empty shell. in this respect, the court of appeal’s reasoning does not involve “more than mere assumptions and speculation”, as my colleague gascon j. puts it (para 170). [225] what is more, even if it is assumed that province canadienne and corporation jean- brillant were in fact alter egos — which would presuppose that one had no “separate directing mind”, to the point of being the “puppet” of the other  — this alone would be insufficient to disregard their distinct juridical personalities and treat them as a single person (p. martel, in collaboration with g a. lebel and l. martel, la corporation sans but lucratif au québec (loose- leaf), at pp. 3-24 and 3-25). in this sense, the fact that the two corporations may have been constituted by the same members or by the same religious community would not in itself be of any legal consequence. the same is true of the “aban- donment” of one in favour of the other. moreover, contrary to what brown j.’s reasons suggest, the number of employees or establishments of these cor- porations would not in itself demonstrate abandon- ment (para 2). paul martel accurately summarizes [224] en l’espèce, la demande elle- même ne dit mot de la corporation jean- brillant, et ne comporte évidemment aucune allégation de fait concernant son historique corporatif et ses liens avec la pro- vince canadienne. les seules mentions au dossier se rapportant à la corporation jean- brillant pro- viennent d’un état des renseignements figurant au registre des entreprises. ce document nous apprend que la corporation jean- brillant a été constituée en 1947, qu’elle a pour fins la religion et l’enseigne- ment, qu’elle a utilisé le nom « les frères de sainte- croix » jusqu’au 7 janvier 2008 et qu’elle existait toujours au moment où la demande d’autorisation a été présentée, en novembre 2013. de plus, en date du 3 septembre 2014, la corporation jean- brillant partageait la même adresse que la province cana- dienne, de même que certains administrateurs. en- semble, ces éléments suggèrent indéniablement que les deux corporations entretiennent des liens, non seulement entre elles, mais aussi, plus largement, avec la communauté religieuse de sainte- croix. cependant, rien n’indique que la communauté re- ligieuse a délaissé la corporation jean- brillant et qu’il ne reste plus de celle-ci qu’une coquille vide. ici, le raisonnement de la cour d’appel ne va pas « au- delà de simples suppositions ou de spécula- tions », pour reprendre l’expression de mon collègue le juge gascon (par 170). [225] qui plus est, même en présumant que la province canadienne et la corporation jean- brillant étaient en fait des alter ego — ce qui supposerait que l’une n’a aucune « identité pensante distincte », à tel point qu’elle n’est que la « marionnette » de l’autre — ce simple fait serait insuffisant, en lui- même, pour faire abstraction de leur personnalité juridique distincte et les traiter comme une seule et même personne (p. martel, avec la collaboration de g. a. lebel et l. martel, la corporation sans but lu- cratif au québec (feuilles mobiles), p. 3-24 et 3-25). en ce sens, le fait que les deux corporations puissent être constituées par les mêmes membres ou encore par la même communauté religieuse n’aurait en soi aucune incidence juridique. il en est de même de l’« abandon » de l’une au profit de l’autre. d’ailleurs, contrairement à ce que suggèrent les motifs du juge brown, le nombre d’employés ou d’établissements de ces corporations ne démontrerait pas en lui- même [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 963 the exceptional circumstances in which the corpo- rate veil can be lifted under art 317 ccq: [translation] article 317 [ccq] states that the fraud, abuse of right or contravention of public order must be “dissembled” by the juridical personality of the legal person, which involves an element of secrecy, conceal- ment, scheming or manipulation by the person or persons wishing to invoke that personality. un abandon (par 2). l’auteur paul martel résume bien les circonstances exceptionnelles qui per- mettent la levée du « voile corporatif » en vertu de l’art 317 ccq :. il faut, précise l’article 317 [ccq], que la fraude, l’abus de droit ou la contravention à l’ordre public soit « masquée » par la personnalité juridique de la personne morale, ce qui implique un élément de cachotterie, de dissimulation, de manigance ou de manipulation de la part de la ou des personnes qui veulent invoquer cette personnalité. (la corporation sans but lucratif au québec, at p. 3-24) (la corporation sans but lucratif au québec, p. 3-24) nothing is wrong in and of itself with a corporation being an alter ego. the corporate veil may be lifted only when the alter ego is used for the prohibited purposes set out in article 317. case law confirms that, in the absence of fraud, the identity of a corporation, even as an alter ego, will be respected. il n’y a en soi rien de mal à ce qu’une société soit un alter ego. ce n’est que si elle est utilisée aux fins répréhen- sibles énoncées à l’article 317 que le « voile corporatif » peut être soulevé. la jurisprudence est à l’effet qu’en l’absence de fraude, l’identité corporative d’une société, même alter ego, sera respectée. (business corporations in canada: legal and practi cal aspects (loose- leaf), at pp. 1-97 and 1-98; see also, for example, domaine de l’orée des bois la plaine inc v. garon, 2012 qcca 269, at para. 9 (canlii); lanoue v. brasserie labatt ltée, 1999 canlii 13784 (que. ca), at pp. 9-12; coutu v. québec (commission des droits de la personne), 1998 canlii 13100 (ca), at pp 14-18) (la société par actions au québec, vol. 1, les aspects juridiques (feuilles mobiles), par. 1-290; voir aussi, p ex,. domaine de l’orée des bois la plaine inc. c. garon, 2012 qcca 269, par. 9 (canlii); lanoue c. brasserie labatt ltée, 1999 canlii 13784 (ca. qc), p. 9-12; coutu c. québec (commission des droits de la personne), 1998 canlii 13100 (ca), p 14-18) [226] in this regard, i cannot agree with my col- league gascon j. that “[a]t no time” did the court of appeal suggest “that lifting the corporate veil is justified or necessary in the instant case” (para 162). in my view, this is precisely what it suggested by stating that the religious community’s decision to [translation] “do business using a different legal personality” could not make its fault “cease to exist”. it goes without saying that the fault does not cease to exist. but for the liability of one legal entity to be imputed to another, their juridical personalities must in fact be disregarded. [226] à ce chapitre, je ne puis souscrire aux propos de mon collègue le juge gascon lorsqu’il écrit que la cour d’appel ne suggère « à aucun moment que la le- vée du voile de la personnalité juridique est justifiée ou nécessaire en l’espèce » (par 162). à mon sens, c’est précisément ce qu’elle laisse entendre en affir- mant que la décision de la communauté religieuse de « faire affaire sous le couvert d’une personnalité mo- rale différente » ne peut faire « disparaître » sa faute. que la faute ne disparaisse pas, cela va de soi. mais pour imputer la responsabilité d’une entité juridique à une autre, il faut effectivement faire abstraction de leur personnalité juridique. [227] in the case at bar, however, jj is simply not alleging any fact relating to fraud, abuse of right or contravention of public order that could possibly jus- tify disregarding or ignoring province canadienne’s [227] or, en l’espèce, jj n’allègue tout simple- ment aucun fait se rapportant à la fraude, à l’abus de droit ou à la contravention à l’ordre public, qui pour- rait éventuellement justifier d’écarter ou d’ignorer 964 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. juridical personality in this way and conflating its patrimony with that of other entities that may be connected with the holy cross religious community, including corporation jean- brillant. even if it is as- sumed that the evidence adduced at the authorization stage can in principle compensate for the absence of allegations, which it obviously cannot, the exhibits filed in the instant case do not support such a legal syllogism based on the lifting of the corporate veil. [228] i would also note that it is by no means clear that the respondent could have relied on art. 317 ccq to establish a cause of action against prov- ince canadienne, even if his pleading is assumed to contain allegations of fraud, abuse of right or con- travention of public order. article 317 ccq is not an independent source of civil liability. according to one interpretation, this provision simply serves to preserve the legal relationship with the persons that are truly liable when they try to evade liability by hiding behind the corporate veil of a legal person (see, eg,. martel, business corporations in canada, at pp. 1-85 and 1-86; r. crête and s. rousseau, droit des sociétés par actions (3rd ed.  2011), at paras. 244-46; j. turgeon, “le code civil du qué- bec, les personnes morales, l’article 317 ccq et la levée de l’immunité des administrateurs, des di- rigeants et des actionnaires” (2005), 65  r du b. 115, at pp.  139-43) in the case at bar, however, province canadienne could not have taken part in the alleged acts and omissions and, for this reason, be liable for them, given that it did not exist at the relevant time. but there is no need for me to make a definitive ruling on the scope of art 317 ccq in light of my conclusion that the facts alleged in the application clearly do not meet the requirements of that article and therefore cannot provide any basis for relying on it. ainsi la personnalité juridique de la province ca- nadienne afin d’assimiler son patrimoine à celui d’autres entités possiblement liées à la communauté religieuse de sainte- croix, dont la corporation jean- brillant. même en supposant que la preuve présentée au stade de l’autorisation puisse en principe suppléer à l’absence d’allégations, ce qui n’est évidemment pas le cas, les pièces au dossier ne permettent aucu- nement de soutenir, en l’espèce, un tel syllogisme juridique fondé sur la levée du « voile corporatif ». [228] je précise par ailleurs qu’il est loin d’être clair que l’intimé aurait pu faire appel à l’art. 317 ccq pour établir une cause d’action à l’encontre de la province canadienne, à supposer même que sa procédure contienne des allégations de fraude, d’abus de droit ou de contravention à l’ordre public. l’article 317 ccq ne constitue pas une source au- tonome de responsabilité civile. selon une certaine interprétation, cette disposition permet simplement de préserver le lien de droit avec les personnes véri- tablement responsables, lorsque celles-ci cherchent à éluder leur responsabilité en se réfugiant derrière le « voile corporatif » d’une personne morale (voir, p ex, martel,. la société par actions au québec, par. 1-275 à 1-277.1; r. crête et s. rousseau, droit des sociétés par actions (3e éd. 2011), par. 244- 246; j. turgeon, « le code civil du québec, les personnes morales, l’article 317 ccq et la levée de l’immu- nité des administrateurs, des dirigeants et des ac- tionnaires » (2005), 65 r du b. 115, p. 139- 143). or, dans le cas qui nous occupe, la province canadienne ne pourrait avoir pris part aux actes et omissions reprochés et, de ce fait, en être responsable, étant donné qu’elle n’existait pas à l’époque pertinente. je n’ai cependant pas à me prononcer de manière définitive sur la portée de l’art 317 ccq, vu ma conclusion portant que les faits allégués à la demande ne satisfont manifestement pas à ses conditions d’ap- plication et ne pourraient donc en aucun cas y donner ouverture. [229] before concluding on this point, i will make one last comment regarding the court of appeal’s statement that the juridical personality of province canadienne raises only a [translation] “poten- tial enforcement problem” (para 78). with respect, because of the fact that province canadienne has a [229] avant de conclure sur ce point, je ferai un dernier commentaire quant à l’affirmation de la cour d’appel selon laquelle la personnalité juridique de la province canadienne ne soulève qu’un « éventuel problème d’exécution » (par 78). avec égards, du fait qu’elle possède une personnalité juridique distincte, [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 965 distinct juridical personality, it is not liable for acts or omissions that occurred before it was constituted and, as a result, it cannot be ordered to make repara- tion for the alleged injury. an enforcement problem could have arisen if the respondent had instituted an action against a legal entity that existed at the time of the events but had since divested itself of its assets. in such a case, paulian actions could, for example, have been considered. however, that is not the situ- ation before us. la province canadienne n’est pas responsable pour des actes ou des omissions antérieurs à sa constitu- tion, et elle ne peut donc être condamnée à réparer le préjudice allégué. un problème d’exécution aurait pu se poser si l’intimé avait intenté une action contre une entité juridique existante à l’époque des faits, mais qui se serait depuis départie de ses actifs. dans un tel cas, des actions en inopposabilité auraient par exemple pu être envisagées. ce n’est cependant pas la situation à laquelle nous sommes confrontés. [230] the courts have reiterated on numerous oc- casions that a class action cannot be authorized in relation to a defendant solely on the basis of its close connections with other entities (see, eg,. a v. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394, at paras. 37-55; option consommateurs v. fédération des caisses desjardins du québec, at paras. 23-32; deraspe v. zinc électrolytique du canada ltée, 2014 qccs 1182, at paras. 85- 108 (canlii), aff’d 2014 qcca 2266, at paras. 6-8 (canlii), leave to appeal refused, [2015] 2 scr vi; labranche v. énergie éolienne des moulins, sec, 2016 qccs 1479, at paras. 82-98 (canlii), application for leave to appeal dismissed, 2016 qcca 1879). the outcome should be the same in the present case, especially since the facts alleged in the application for authorization do not indicate any connections between province canadienne and other entities that may be connected with the holy cross religious community — with the notable ex- ception of the oratory, of course. [231] contrary to what is suggested by the court of appeal’s reasons (at para. 77), we are not dealing with a complex corporate structure involving a [transla- tion] “confused” factual situation. if this had been the case, it would have been necessary to leave it to the trial judge to determine the specific liability of each of the related entities after thoroughly reviewing the evidence (see, eg,. option consommateurs v. lg chem ltd., 2017 qccs 3569, at para. 22 (canlii)). however, that is not what is at issue here. if there is any confusion in the instant case, it is simply because the facts alleged do not make it possible to infer from the application a clear, complete and rigorous legal syllogism capable of meeting the low threshold ap- plicable at the authorization stage. [230] les tribunaux ont maintes fois réitéré qu’une action collective ne peut être autorisée à l’égard d’une partie défenderesse sur la seule base de ses liens étroits avec d’autres entités (voir, p ex,. a c. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 5394, par. 37-55; option consommateurs c. fédération des caisses desjardins du québec, par. 23-32; deraspe c. zinc électrolytique du canada ltée, 2014 qccs 1182, par. 85- 108 (canlii), conf. par 2014 qcca 2266, par.  6-8 (canlii), autorisation d’appel refusée, [2015] 2 rcs vi; labranche c. énergie éolienne des moulins, sec, 2016 qccs 1479, par. 82-98 (canlii), demande de permission d’appel rejetée, 2016 qcca 1879). le résultat devrait être le même en l’espèce, d’autant plus que les faits allégués dans la demande d’autorisation ne font aucunement état de liens entre la province canadienne et d’autres entités possiblement liées à la communauté religieuse de sainte- croix — à l’exception notable de l’oratoire, bien entendu. [231] contrairement à ce que suggèrent les motifs de la cour d’appel (au par. 77), nous ne sommes pas en présence d’une structure corporative complexe dont la situation serait « embrouillée » sur le plan factuel. si c’eût été le cas, il aurait été nécessaire de laisser au juge du fond le soin de départager la responsabilité précise des entités liées après un exa- men approfondi de la preuve (voir, p ex, option. consommateurs c. lg chem ltd., 2017 qccs 3569, par. 22 (canlii)). ce n’est cependant pas ce dont il est question dans la présente affaire. en l’espèce, si brouillard il y a, c’est simplement parce que les faits allégués ne permettent pas d’inférer de la demande un syllogisme juridique clair, complet et rigoureux qui puisse satisfaire au seuil peu élevé devant être franchi au stade de l’autorisation. 966 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. [232] furthermore, i attach little legal significance to province canadienne’s decision to [translation] “take up the defence of other entities (including corporation jean- brillant) for their actions” in an- other case relating to sexual aggressions (cornellier v. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2013 qccs 3385, at para. 4 (canlii) (em- phasis added)). first of all, the settlement reached in that case was clearly entered into “without prejudice and without any admission” of liability by province canadienne (ibid). that settlement also suggests that, if faults were committed, [translation] “other entities” than province canadienne are liable for them, as the application judge noted (paras 97-98). at most, i acknowledge that the settlement reached in cornellier tends to confirm the closeness between province canadienne and other entities connected with the holy cross community. but relying on this fact alone to authorize the class action would have an obvious pernicious effect: it would discourage any person from taking up another’s defence for fear that the courts would later use this as a pretext for dis- regarding the person’s distinct juridical personality. [233] similarly, the fact that the superior court authorized the class action against province cana- dienne in cornellier, solely for the purposes of the settlement (cornellier v. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2011 qccs 6670, at para. 5 (canlii)), does not establish that there is a legal relationship between j.j and province canadienne. first, by definition, generally, an au- thorization judgment contains no findings of fact or of mixed fact and law against the defendants (l. chamberland, ed., le grand collectif: code de procédure civile — commentaires et annotations (2nd ed. 2017), at p 2468). it simply reflects a dis- cretionary assessment of the conditions for authori- zation in light of the application as filed. as a result, such a judgment does not limit a court’s discretion in a subsequent case. second, in cornellier specifically, the application for authorization was not contested. in view of the settlement that had been reached, the application judge simply stated, essentially as a matter of form, that [translation] “[t]he court is [232] du reste, je n’accorde guère d’importance, sur le plan juridique, à la décision de province ca- nadienne de « prendre fait et cause pour les faits et gestes d’autres entités (à savoir notamment la corporation jean- brillant) » dans une autre affaire portant sur des agressions à caractère sexuel (cor- nellier c. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2013 qccs 3385, par. 4 (canlii) (je sou- ligne)). d’une part, le règlement intervenu dans cette affaire a évidemment été conclu « sans préjudice et sans admission » de responsabilité de la part de la province canadienne (ibid). d’autre part, ce règle- ment donne à penser que, si des fautes ont été com- mises, ce sont d’« autres entités » que la province canadienne qui en sont responsables, comme l’a d’ailleurs noté le juge d’autorisation (par 97-98). tout au plus, je reconnais que le règlement intervenu dans cornellier tend à confirmer la proximité entre la province canadienne et d’autres entités liées à la communauté de sainte- croix. mais s’appuyer sur ce simple fait pour autoriser l’action collective aurait un effet pernicieux évident : dissuader toute personne de prendre fait et cause pour une autre, par crainte que les tribunaux y voient par la suite un prétexte pour faire abstraction de sa personnalité juridique distincte. [233] de même, le fait que la cour supérieure ait autorisé l’action collective contre la province cana- dienne dans l’affaire cornellier, aux seules fins du règlement (cornellier c. province canadienne de la congrégation de ste- croix, 2011 qccs 6670, par. 5 (canlii)), ne permet pas d’établir l’existence d’un lien de droit entre jj et la province canadienne. d’abord, de manière générale, un jugement d’auto- risation ne contient par définition aucune conclusion de fait ni aucune conclusion mixte de fait et de droit à l’encontre des parties défenderesses (l. chamber- land, dir., le grand collectif : code de procédure civile — commentaires et annotations (2e éd. 2017), p 2468). il ne reflète qu’une appréciation discré- tionnaire des conditions d’autorisation à la lumière de la demande telle qu’elle a été présentée. un tel jugement ne restreint donc aucunement la marge d’appréciation du tribunal dans une affaire subsé- quente. ensuite, dans l’affaire cornellier plus par- ticulièrement, la demande d’autorisation n’était pas contestée. compte tenu du règlement intervenu, le [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 967 of the opinion that the legal syllogism proposed in the action is sound and discloses the requisite colour of right” (para 17). an “analysis” as laconic as that could not be binding on the application judge in the present case. [234] in sum, it is my view that the facts alleged in the application, even when supported by the evidence adduced, do not make it possible to infer a clear, complete and rigorous legal syllogism that could engage the liability of province canadienne. the re- spondent has simply not demonstrated the existence of the legal relationship that is essential to his cause of action or, consequently, an arguable case. at the very least, i do not see how the application judge’s assessment in this regard was clearly wrong. [235] i therefore conclude that the court of ap- peal’s intervention was unwarranted and that the ap- plication judge’s decision dismissing the application for authorization in relation to province canadienne should be restored, just as in relation to the oratory. in light of this conclusion, i find it unnecessary to decide in this appeal whether the facts alleged by the respondent with respect to direct fault or the act or omission of another person would otherwise have been sufficient if he had been able to establish a legal relationship between himself and province canadienne (or if the action had been brought against another legal entity). juge d’autorisation s’en est tenu à affirmer, essentiel- lement pour la forme, que « [l]e tribunal est d’avis que le syllogisme juridique que propose le recours est sérieux et qu’il présente l’apparence de droit exigée » (par 17). une « analyse » aussi laconique ne saurait lier le juge d’autorisation dans la présente affaire. [234] somme toute, je suis d’avis que les faits allégués à la demande, même appuyés par la preuve présentée, ne permettent pas d’inférer un syllogisme juridique clair, complet et rigoureux qui permettrait de mettre en cause la responsabilité de la province canadienne. l’intimé n’a simplement pas démontré l’existence du lien de droit essentiel à sa cause d’ac- tion ni, par le fait même, d’une cause défendable. à tout le moins, je ne vois pas en quoi l’appréciation du juge d’autorisation à cet égard est manifestement non fondée. [235] j’en conclus donc que l’intervention de la cour d’appel était injustifiée, et qu’il y a lieu de rétablir le jugement de première instance rejetant la demande d’autorisation visant la province cana- dienne, tout comme celle visant l’oratoire d’ailleurs. en raison de cette conclusion, il me paraît inutile de décider, dans le cadre du présent pourvoi, si les faits allégués par l’intimé quant à la faute directe ou le fait d’autrui auraient autrement été suffisants s’il était parvenu à établir l’existence d’un lien de droit entre lui et la province canadienne (ou si l’action avait été dirigée contre une autre entité juridique). [236] finally, with regard to the oratory, i have, of course, read my colleague brown j.’s reasons concerning some of the other conditions for authori- zation in art 575 ccp. i do not consider it useful to respond to those reasons. however, my silence does not mean that i agree with them. [236] enfin, en ce qui a trait à l’oratoire, j’ai évi- demment pris connaissance des motifs exposés par mon collègue le juge brown quant à certaines autres conditions d’autorisation de l’art 575 cpc. il ne me paraît pas opportun d’y répondre. mon silence ne signifie cependant pas que j’y souscris. c period provided for in the second paragraph of c le délai prévu au deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261. article 29261 ccq. ccq. [237] with respect to the grounds of appeal based on the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq, it is my view that the meaning of this provision is not nearly as clear as the majority’s reasons suggest. on [237] quant aux moyens d’appel fondés sur le deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq, je suis d’avis que la signification de cette disposition est loin d’être aussi limpide que l’opinion de la majorité le laisse 968 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. this point, i think it will be useful to indicate where my interpretation differs from that of the majority, if only to prompt the legislature to clarify its intention as regards the periods applicable to actions arising from sexual aggression. in particular, i will discuss the following points: entendre. sur ce point, j’estime utile d’indiquer là où ma lecture diffère de celle de la majorité, ne serait-ce que pour inciter le législateur à clarifier son intention quant aux délais applicables aux actions résultant d’une agression à caractère sexuel. je traiterai no- tamment des points suivants : (i) while i entertain doubts about whether a term for forfeiture has been created, i am of the view that the death of the victim or the author of the act is a starting point that differs from the one provided for in the first paragraph. (i) bien que j’entretienne un doute quant à savoir si un délai de déchéance a été créé, j’estime que le décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte constitue un point de départ distinct de celui prévu au premier alinéa. (ii) the period provided for in the second paragraph can still be suspended, except as a result of lack of awareness of the connection between the al- leged act and the injury suffered. (ii) le délai prévu au deuxième alinéa demeure sus- ceptible de suspension, sauf pour cause d’igno- rance du lien entre l’acte reproché et le préjudice subi. (iii) in my opinion, the shortened period provided for in the second paragraph applies to all the actions concerned, whether they are brought against the author of the act, his or her succession or a third party. (iii) je suis d’avis que le délai abrégé prévu au deu- xième alinéa est opposable à toutes les actions concernées, que celles-ci soient dirigées contre l’auteur de l’acte, contre sa succession ou contre un tiers. (iv) the period provided for in the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq, whether it is a prescriptive period or a term for forfeiture, would not have extinguished the respondent’s right of action retroactively. (iv) que le délai prévu au deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261. ccq en soit un de prescription ou de déchéance, il n’aurait pas éteint rétroacti- vement le droit d’action de l’intimé. (1) starting point and nature of the period pro- (1) le point de départ et la nature du délai prévu vided for in the second paragraph au deuxième alinéa [238] article 29261 ccq, particularly its second paragraph, raises a number of interpretative difficul- ties. i agree with the appellants that there are certain indicia that, in the second paragraph, the legislature provides for the forfeiture of any action for damages for bodily injury resulting from sexual aggression a maximum of three years after the death of the author of the act or the victim. in my view, however, if this was the legislature’s intention, it did not express it in a sufficiently precise, clear and unambiguous manner, and for this reason, the doubt should be resolved in favour of the applicant. subject to one exception which i will explain below, it should be concluded that the period under the second para- graph is a prescriptive period to which the general rules on suspension and interruption apply. [238] l’article  2926.1  ccq, particulièrement son deuxième alinéa, soulève plusieurs difficultés d’interprétation. je conviens avec les appelants que certains indices tendent à indiquer que le législateur y prévoit la déchéance de toute action en réparation du préjudice corporel résultant d’une agression à caractère sexuel, au plus trois ans après le décès de l’auteur de l’acte ou de la victime. toutefois, j’estime que si c’était là l’intention du législateur, il ne l’a pas exprimée de façon suffisamment précise, claire et non ambiguë et, pour cette raison, le doute devrait favoriser le demandeur. sous réserve d’une exception que j’expliquerai plus loin, il faudrait en conclure qu’il s’agit d’un délai de prescription assujetti aux règles générales de la suspension et de l’interruption. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 969 [239] before i deal more specifically with the in- terpretation of the second paragraph of art 29261. ccq, it will be helpful to look at the rationale for extinctive prescription and forfeiture in quebec civil law and at the distinctions between the two concepts. [239] avant d’aborder de façon plus particulière l’interprétation du deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261. ccq, il convient de traiter de la raison d’être de la prescription extinctive et de la déchéance en droit civil québécois, et des distinctions entre ces deux notions. (a) extinctive prescription and forfeiture in a) la prescription extinctive et la déchéance que bec law en droit québécois [240] article 2921 ccq defines extinctive pre- scription as “a means of extinguishing a right owing to its non- use or of pleading a peremptory excep- tion to an action”. article 2878 ccq, for its part, formally recognizes the concept of forfeiture of a remedy, but without defining it. briefly, forfeiture presupposes the existence of a strict time limit that cannot be extended under any circumstances. there- fore, unlike prescription, a term for forfeiture cannot be suspended or interrupted. a court must, of its own motion, declare a remedy forfeited, and forfeiture cannot be waived by the parties (see, eg,. alexan- dre v. dufour, [2005] rjq 1 (ca), at para. 31; pierre- louis v. québec (ville de), 2008 qcca 1687, [2008] rjq 2063, at para. 39, citing ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), at p. 1838; f. levesque, “renou- veau doctrinal en droit de la prescription” (2011), 52 c. de d. 315, at p 327). in addition, the expiry of such a time limit necessarily precludes the right of action from being exercised because it extinguishes the claim itself, such that its holder can no longer even raise it as an exception (see, eg,. andreou v. agence du revenu du québec, 2018 qcca 695, at para. 10 (canlii); roussel v. créations marcel therrien inc., 2011 qcca 496, [2011] rjq 555, at para. 47, citing j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obligations (6th ed. 2005), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at para 1086). [240] l’article 2921 ccq définit la prescription extinctive comme étant « un moyen d’éteindre un droit par non- usage ou d’opposer une fin de non- recevoir à une action ». l’article 2878 ccq, pour sa part, reconnaît formellement la notion de déchéance d’un recours, sans toutefois la définir. en résumé, la déchéance suppose l’existence d’un délai de ri- gueur qui ne peut être prolongé, quoi qu’il arrive. ainsi, contrairement à la prescription, le délai de déchéance n’est pas susceptible de suspension ni d’interruption. le tribunal doit déclarer d’office la dé- chéance du recours et les parties ne peuvent y renon- cer (voir, p ex,. alexandre c. dufour, [2005] rjq. 1 (ca), par. 31; pierre- louis c. québec (ville de), 2008 qcca 1687, [2008] rjq 2063, par. 39, citant ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, t. ii, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), p. 1838; f. levesque, « renouveau doctrinal en droit de la prescription » (2011), 52 c de d 315, p 327). en outre, l’expi- ration d’un tel délai fait nécessairement obstacle à l’exercice du droit d’action, parce qu’elle anéantit le droit de créance en tant que tel, de sorte que son titulaire ne peut même plus l’invoquer par voie d’ex- ception (voir, p ex, andreou c. agence du revenu du québec, 2018 qcca 695, par. 10 (canlii); roussel c. créations marcel therrien inc., 2011 qcca 496, [2011] rjq 555, par. 47, citant j-l baudouin et p-g. jobin, les obligations (6e éd. 2005), par p-g. jobin et n. vézina, par 1086). [241] at first glance, extinctive prescription and forfeiture seem to have the same objectives (see pierre- louis v. québec (ville de), at para. 41, citing baudouin and jobin, at para. 1086; see also global credit & collection inc. v. rolland, 2011 qcca 2278, [2012] rjq 12, at para 26). for example, prescription is designed to “introduce security into [241] de prime abord, la prescription extinctive et la déchéance semblent partager les mêmes objectifs (voir pierre- louis c. québec (ville de), par. 41; ci- tant baudouin et jobin, par. 1086; voir aussi global credit & collection inc. c. rolland, 2011 qcca 2278, [2012] rjq 12, par 26). la prescription vise par exemple à « introduire la sécurité dans les 970 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. legal relations” and to permit [translation] “a consolidation of the rights of the parties and those of third parties”, which helps to maintain the vitality of economic exchanges (see gauthier v. beaumont, [1998] 2 scr 3, at para. 48; pellerin savitz llp v. guindon, 2017 scc 29, [2017] 1 scr 575, at para. 10; j-l. baudouin and p-g. jobin, les obli- gations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g. jobin and n. vézina, at para 1113). prescription also promotes the fair- ness of trials by preventing the erosion of evidence that is essential to the ultimate aim of civil proceed- ings: to seek and to ascertain the truth (gauthier, at para. 48; see also imperial oil v. jacques, 2014 scc 66, [2014] 3 scr 287, at para 24). these various objectives relating to the stability of legal relations and the integrity of the adversarial process are nec- essarily capable of underlying not only prescriptive periods, but also certain terms for forfeiture. [242] however, this does not mean that the ob- jectives of extinctive prescription and forfeiture are exactly the same. in my view, the fundamental dif- ference between the two types of periods lies in the fact that prescription is based first and foremost on [translation] “the idea of sanctioning failure to act by a person who has a right to exercise” (j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers and b. moore, la respon- sabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at para. 1-1320; see also guindon, at para. 10; gauthier, at paras. 48 and 67; h. mazeaud et al., leçons de droit civil (8th ed. 1991), t. ii, vol. i, obligations: théorie géné- rale, at pp 1207-8). it follows that mechanisms like suspension and interruption mitigate the rigours of prescription. where a delay does not result from the plaintiff’s lack of diligence — because the plaintiff was, for example, unable to act or to waive the exer- cise of his or her right — the objectives relating to the stability of legal relations and the integrity of the adversarial process will yield to another public pol- icy concern: access to justice (gauthier, at para 67). relations juridiques » et à « consolider le[s] droit[s] des parties et des tiers », ce qui contribuerait à pré- server la vitalité des échanges économiques (voir gauthier c. beaumont, [1998] 2 rcs 3, par. 48; pellerin savitz sencrl c. guindon, 2017 csc 29, [2017] 1 rcs 575, par. 10; j-l. baudouin et p-g. jobin, les obligations (7e éd. 2013), par p-g. jobin et n. vézina, par 1113). la prescription favorise également la tenue d’un procès juste et équitable en évitant l’érosion d’éléments de preuve essentiels à la finalité ultime de l’instance civile : la recherche et la découverte de la vérité (gauthier, par. 48; voir aussi pétrolière impériale c. jacques, 2014 csc 66, [2014] 3 rcs 287, par 24). ces différents objectifs liés à la stabilité des relations juridiques et à l’intégrité du processus contradictoire sont néces- sairement susceptibles de sous- tendre non seulement les délais de prescription, mais aussi certains délais de déchéance. [242] ce constat ne signifie pas cependant que la prescription extinctive et la déchéance partagent exactement les mêmes objectifs. à mon avis, la dif- férence fondamentale entre ces deux types de délai réside dans le fait que la prescription repose d’abord et avant tout sur « l’idée d’une sanction de l’inaction de celui qui a un droit à exercer » (j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers et b. moore, la responsabilité ci- vile (8e éd. 2014), par. 1-1320; voir aussi guindon, par.  10; gauthier, par.  48 et 67; h mazeaud et autres, leçons de droit civil (8e éd. 1991), t. ii, vol. i, obligations : théorie générale, p. 1207- 1208). il s’ensuit que des mécanismes comme la suspension et l’interruption viennent atténuer les rigueurs de la prescription. en effet, si le retard ne résulte pas d’un manque de diligence du demandeur, ce dernier étant par exemple incapable d’agir ou de renon- cer à l’exercice de son droit, les objectifs liés à la stabilité des relations juridiques et à l’intégrité du processus contradictoire cèdent le pas à une autre préoccupation d’intérêt public : l’accès à la justice (gauthier, par 67). [243] by contrast, forfeiture is not based on lack of diligence by the holder of the right. according to french authors planiol and ripert, a term for forfei- ture, unlike a prescriptive period, is not intended to [translation] “sanction negligence”, but is meant [243] à la différence de la prescription extinctive, la déchéance n’est pas tributaire du manque de dili- gence du titulaire du droit. selon les auteurs français planiol et ripert, contrairement au délai de prescrip- tion, un délai de déchéance n’a pas pour objectif [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 971 to “quickly put an end, for all purposes, to the pos- sibility of performing” a particular act (m. planiol and g. ripert, traité pratique de droit civil fran- çais (2nd ed. 1954), at p. 819, cited, for example, in global credit & collection inc., at para. 28; see also andreou, at para. 11; mazeaud et al., at p 1208). its effect on the right in question is therefore absolute. [244] forfeiture is exceptional in nature: it auto- matically entails the loss of a right even though its holder has done nothing wrong. this is no doubt why the legislature enacted an interpretative provision, the second paragraph of art. 2878  ccq, which states that “forfeiture is never presumed; it results only where expressly provided for in a text” (see j. mccann, prescriptions extinctives et fins de non- recevoir (2011), at p 107). as the court of appeal wrote in global credit & collection inc., [transla- tion] “[a]lthough the courts do not require that the word ‘forfeiture’ be used in a provision establishing a time period, it must nonetheless be apparent from the wording that the legislature’s intention is to create a term for forfeiture, as reflected in precise, clear and unambiguous language” (para. 31 (emphasis added)). i agree. although no set formula is neces- sary, a term for forfeiture can be found to exist only where the legislature has spoken in a precise, clear and unambiguous manner. where there is any doubt about the nature of a period, it must be concluded that the period is one of extinctive prescription, and the general rules of prescription set out in the civil code will apply. de « sanctionner la négligence » mais de « mettre fin rapidement, en tout état de cause, à la possibi- lité d’accomplir » un acte déterminé (m. planiol et g. ripert, traité pratique de droit civil français (2e éd. 1954), p. 819, cité notamment dans global credit & collection inc., par. 28; voir aussi andreou, par. 11; mazeaud et autres, p 1208). son effet sur le droit en cause est donc absolu. [244] la déchéance a un caractère exceptionnel : elle entraîne d’office la perte d’un droit sans que son titulaire n’ait quoi que ce soit à se reprocher. c’est sans doute pourquoi le législateur a prévu, au deuxième alinéa de l’art 2878 ccq, une dispo- sition interprétative précisant que la « déchéance ne se présume pas; elle résulte d’un texte exprès » (voir j. mccann, prescriptions extinctives et fins de non- recevoir (2011), p 107). comme l’a écrit la cour d’appel dans global credit & collection inc., « [b]ien que la jurisprudence n’exige pas que le texte de l’article édictant un délai contienne le terme “déchéance”, il faut tout de même qu’il ressorte nettement du texte que l’intention du législateur est d’en faire un tel délai, ce qui se manifeste par une mention précise, claire et non ambiguë » (par. 31 (je souligne)). je partage cet avis. quoiqu’aucune for- mule sacramentelle ne soit requise, il faut conclure à l’existence d’un délai de déchéance uniquement lorsque le législateur s’est exprimé de manière pré- cise, claire et non ambiguë. en cas de doute quant à la nature d’un délai, il faudra conclure à l’énoncé d’un délai de prescription extinctive, et les règles générales de la prescription prévues au code civil trouveront application. (b) second paragraph of article 29261 ccq. b) le deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq. [245] in my view, the appellants have established that the death marks a different starting point for the three- year period in addition to providing at least one strong indication that the legislature intended to introduce a term for forfeiture in the second par- agraph of art 29261 ccq. [245] à mon sens, les appelants ont établi que le décès marque un point de départ distinct du délai de trois ans, en plus de constituer au moins un indice sérieux qui suggère que le législateur entendait in- troduire un délai de déchéance au deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq. [246] before i consider the wording, context and purpose of the second paragraph of art 29261. ccq. (see rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr. 27, at para. 21; interpretation act, cqlr, c. i-16, [246] avant d’examiner le libellé, le contexte et l’objet du deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq. (voir rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs. 27, par. 21; loi d’interprétation, rlrq, c. i-16, 972 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. ss. 41 and 41.1), it will be helpful to reproduce the entirety of that article enacted in 2013: art. 41 et 41.1), il est utile de reproduire dans son entièreté le texte de cet article adopté en 2013 : an action for damages for bodily injury resulting from an act which could constitute a criminal offence is prescribed by 10 years from the date the victim becomes aware that the injury suffered is attributable to that act. however, the prescriptive period is 30 years if the injury results from a sexual aggression, violent behaviour suffered during childhood, or the violent behaviour of a spouse or former spouse. l’action en réparation du préjudice corporel résultant d’un acte pouvant constituer une infraction criminelle se prescrit par 10 ans à compter du jour où la victime a connaissance que son préjudice est attribuable à cet acte. ce délai est toutefois de 30 ans si le préjudice résulte d’une agression à caractère sexuel, de la violence subie pendant l’enfance, ou de la violence d’un conjoint ou d’un ancien conjoint. if the victim or the author of the act dies, the prescrip- tive period, if not already expired, is reduced to three years and runs from the date of death. en cas de décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte, le délai applicable, s’il n’est pas déjà écoulé, est ramené à trois ans et il court à compter du décès. [247] i will not repeat my colleague’s explanation of the origins of this provision, the context in which it was enacted or the mechanics of the provision. i will simply note that the first paragraph has the effect of, first, expressly codifying the judge- made rule that prescription does not run against a victim of sexual aggression who is not aware of the connection between that act and the injury suffered and, sec- ond, lengthening the prescriptive period to 30 years. however, the second paragraph provides for a three- year period that runs from the date of death of the victim or the author of the act. that is the period at issue in this case. [247] je ne reprendrai pas les explications de mon collègue quant à l’origine, au contexte d’adoption et à la mécanique de cette disposition. je rappellerai simplement que le premier alinéa a pour effet, d’une part, de codifier explicitement la règle jurispruden- tielle selon laquelle la prescription ne court pas à l’encontre d’une victime d’agression à caractère sexuel qui n’a pas connaissance du lien entre cet acte et le préjudice subi et, d’autre part, d’allonger le délai de prescription à 30 ans. le deuxième alinéa prévoit cependant un délai de trois ans qui court à compter du décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte. c’est ce délai qui fait l’objet du présent débat. in my view, the death of the victim or the [248] author of the act marks a starting point that differs from the one provided for in the first paragraph. this interpretation seems to be dictated by the wording of the second paragraph, which states that the shortened period “runs from the date of death”. the wording is clear and explicit on this point. as a result, i cannot agree with my colleague that “it is still the victim’s becoming aware of the connection between his or her injury and the assault, and nothing else, that starts the clock ticking for prescription” (gascon j.’s reasons, at para 142). [248] je suis d’avis que le décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte marque un point de départ distinct de celui prévu au premier alinéa. cette interprétation semble s’imposer à la lecture du libellé du deuxième alinéa, lequel précise que le délai abrégé « court à compter du décès ». à cet égard, le texte est clair et explicite. je ne peux donc souscrire à l’affirmation de mon collègue selon laquelle « c’est la prise de connaissance par la victime du lien entre son pré- judice et l’agression qui continue de déclencher le chronomètre de la prescription, rien d’autre » (motifs du juge gascon, par 142). it cannot be found from the wording of the [249] second paragraph that the death simply has the effect of shortening the 10- or 30- year period provided for in the first paragraph. in the first paragraph, the legislature uses the words “is prescribed    from the date the victim becomes aware   ”. in the second [249] le texte du deuxième alinéa ne permet pas de considérer que le moment du décès a simplement pour effet de déclencher l’abrégement du délai de 30 ans ou 10 ans prévu au premier alinéa. au pre- mier alinéa, le législateur emploie la formulation « se prescrit [  ] à compter du jour où la victime a [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 973 paragraph, it states that the period “runs from the date of death”. these expressions are equivalent, and they both indicate the starting point for prescription. in the neighbouring provisions in the title on extinctive prescription, the legislature in fact uses the words “runs from” several times to indicate the starting point for prescription (see, eg, arts. 2926, 2927 and 2932 ccq). it is a well- established principle of in- terpretation that words used by the legislature are pre- sumed to have the same meaning throughout the same statute (schwartz v. canada, [1996] 1 scr 254, at para 61). i see no reason to disregard this presump- tion of consistency, especially where the words in question appear in provisions that relate to the same area of the law and are found in the same title of the civil code. in particular, the fact that the explanatory notes for the bill refer to only one starting point — the one under the first paragraph — is, in my view, not sufficient to give the words “from the date of death” anything other than their usual meaning. connaissance    ». au deuxième alinéa, il indique que le délai « court à compter du décès ». ces ex- pressions sont équivalentes et marquent toutes deux le point de départ de la prescription. dans les dis- positions voisines du titre « de la prescription ex- tinctive », le législateur utilise d’ailleurs à plusieurs reprises la formulation « court à compter de » pour marquer le point de départ de la prescription (voir p ex, art 2926, 2927 et 2932 ccq). selon un principe d’interprétation bien établi, les termes em- ployés par le législateur sont présumés avoir le même sens dans chacune des dispositions d’une même loi (schwartz c. canada, [1996] 1 rcs 254, par 61). je ne vois aucune raison d’écarter cette présomption de cohérence, à plus forte raison lorsque les termes en question apparaissent dans des dispositions qui portent sur le même domaine de droit et figurent sous le même titre du code civil. plus particulièrement, le fait que les notes explicatives du projet de loi ne mentionnent qu’un seul point de départ — celui du premier alinéa — me paraît insuffisant pour donner aux termes « à compter du décès » autre chose que leur sens habituel. [250] i also note that the few decisions and aca- demic texts discussing art 29261 ccq have gen- erally treated the second paragraph as establishing a different starting point (see, eg,. proulx v. des- biens, 2014 qccs 4117, at para. 18 (canlii); a v. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 34, at para. 42 (canlii); g. cotnam, “chronique — la prescrip- tion en matière d’actes criminels et d’agressions sexuelles: la question est- elle réellement close?”, repères, march 2014, at p. 3 (available online in la référence); s. fortier- dumais, “la prescription”, in collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2018- 2019, vol. 5, responsabilité (2018), 251, at p 268). this is hardly surprising: this interpretation is the one dictated by the wording of the provision. [250] je souligne d’ailleurs que les quelques déci- sions et textes de doctrine qui traitent de l’art 29261. ccq considèrent en général que le deuxième alinéa fixe un point de départ distinct (voir, p ex, proulx c. desbiens, 2014 qccs 4117, par. 18 (canlii); a c. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 34, par. 42 (canlii); g. cotnam, « chronique — la prescrip- tion en matière d’actes criminels et d’agressions sexuelles : la question est- elle réellement close? », repères, mars 2014, p. 3 (accessible en ligne dans la référence); s. fortier- dumais, « la prescription », dans collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2018- 2019, vol. 5, responsabilité (2018), 251, p 268). cela n’est guère surprenant : c’est l’in- terprétation qui s’impose à la lecture du texte. [251] this interpretation is also the one that i con- sider the most coherent. if the death was not a new starting point but simply had the effect of shorten- ing the period, an action by the victim’s succession might be imprescriptible in some circumstances. this would be the case, for example, where the suc- cession is aware of the aggression — and therefore of the right of action — but the victim, before dying, [251] c’est aussi l’interprétation qui me paraît la plus cohérente. si le décès ne constituait pas un nou- veau point de départ, mais déclenchait simplement l’abrégement du délai, l’action de la succession de la victime pourrait dans certaines circonstances être imprescriptible. ce serait notamment le cas où la succession est au courant de l’agression — et donc du droit d’action  —  sans que la victime n’ait eu 974 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. was not aware that the injury he or she suffered was attributable to that act. my colleague’s logic suggests that, in such a case, the victim’s succession could, in principle, bring an action and argue that the victim was never able to make the connection between the aggression and the injury due to his or her psycho- logical state. as a result, prescription would never have begun to run, nor could it ever begin to run. there is nothing to indicate that this was what the legislature intended. as the minister responsible for the bill observed during the parliamentary debate, [translation] “this is a huge step away from the current situation, without going as far as impre- scriptibility” (quebec, national assembly, standing committee on institutions, “étude détaillée du projet de loi n° 22 — loi modifiant la loi sur l’indemni- sation des victimes d’actes criminels”, journal des débats, vol. 43, no. 47, 1st sess., 40th leg., may 7, 2013 (“étude détaillée”), at pp. 20 and 32 (emphasis added); see also e. lambert, “commentaire sur l’ar- ticle 29261 ccq”, in commentaires sur le code civil du québec (dcq) (2014), at para 575). connaissance, avant son décès, que son préjudice est attribuable à cet acte. dans un tel cas, si l’on suit la logique de mon collègue, la succession de la victime pourrait en principe prendre action tout en plaidant que la victime elle- même n’était jamais parvenue, en raison de son état psychologique, à faire le lien entre l’agression et le préjudice. le compte à rebours du délai de prescription n’aurait donc jamais été déclen- ché, et ne pourrait jamais l’être. rien n’indique que le législateur avait une telle intention. comme l’a fait remarquer le ministre responsable du projet de loi au cours des débats parlementaires, « on fait un énorme pas par rapport à la situation actuelle, sans aller à l’im- prescriptibilité » (assemblée nationale du québec, commission permanente des institutions, « étude détaillée du projet de loi n° 22 — loi modifiant la loi sur l’indemnisation des victimes d’actes crimi- nels », journal des débats, vol. 43, no 47, 1re sess., 40e lég., 7 mai 2013 (« étude détaillée »), p. 20 et 32 (je souligne); voir aussi e. lambert, « commentaire sur l’article 29261 ccq », dans commentaires sur le code civil du québec (dcq) (2014), par 575). [252] in my view, the solution the legislature seems to have chosen is a three- year period that runs from the date of death of the victim or the author of the act, regardless of whether, before that date, the victim made the connection between the act and the injury suffered. however, if the 30- year period provided for in the first paragraph has already begun to run, that period is simply “reduced” to 3 years (or less, depending on how much time has already passed). [252] à mon sens, le législateur semble avoir choisi comme solution de prévoir un délai de trois ans qui court à compter du décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte, et ce, que la victime ait préalablement fait ou non le lien entre l’acte et le préjudice subi. si, toutefois, le délai de 30 ans prévu au premier alinéa avait déjà commencé à courir, ce délai est simplement « ramené » à trois ans (ou moins, selon le temps déjà écoulé). [253] i agree with the appellants that the wording of the second paragraph provides at least one strong indication of forfeiture. the period that is reduced to three years is linked to a specific, objective fact that is fixed in time, namely the death of the victim or the author of the act (see levesque, at p 325). that event is in itself unrelated to the basis of the victim’s right of action and to the victim’s inability to make the connection between the alleged act and the injury suffered. in this sense, the wording tends to indicate that the period in question, unlike a period of extinctive prescription, is not intended to sanction the victim’s negligence (see andreou, at para 11). indeed, in a v. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 34, provencher j. noted — without ruling definitively [253] je suis d’accord avec les appelants pour dire que le texte du deuxième alinéa contient au moins un indice sérieux de déchéance. en effet, le délai ramené à trois ans se rattache à un fait objectif, pré- cis et figé dans le temps, en l’occurrence le décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte (voir levesque, p 325). cet événement est en lui- même indépendant du fondement du droit d’action de la victime et de son incapacité à faire le lien entre l’acte reproché et le préjudice subi. en ce sens, le texte tend à indiquer que, contrairement à un délai de prescription extinc- tive, le délai en question ne vise pas à sanctionner la négligence de la victime (voir andreou, par 11). dans a c. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 34, le juge provencher note d’ailleurs — sans toutefois [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 975 on the question — that the period established by the second paragraph seems to apply regardless of the victim’s situation: se prononcer définitivement sur la question — que le délai fixé au deuxième alinéa semble s’appliquer sans égard à la situation de la victime : [translation] here, the wording of article 2926.1 para 2 ccq seems to leave little room for any analysis of the victim’s situation where the aggressor has been deceased for more than three years. if the person who committed the sexual aggression dies, the applicable pe- riod is reduced to three years and runs from the date of death. [emphasis added; para 41] [254] it is interesting to draw a parallel with the similar rule in common law. this court has affirmed that the discoverability rule does not apply “when the limitation period is explicitly linked by the governing legislation to a fixed event unrelated to the injured party’s knowledge or the basis of the cause of action” (ryan v. moore, 2005 scc 38, [2005] 2 scr 53, at para. 24 (emphasis added)). [255] it is true that, in quebec civil law, the fact that a period is linked to a date of death is not in itself a definite indication of forfeiture. as the respondent points out, art 2928 ccq states that “[a]n applica- tion by a surviving spouse to have the compensatory allowance determined is prescribed by one year from the death of his spouse”. the commentaires du mi- nistre de la justice (p. 1837) confirm — as do the actual words of the provision, for that matter — that this is a prescriptive period. ici, le texte de l’article 2926.1 al 2 ccq, semble lais- ser peu de place à une quelconque analyse de la situation d’une victime dans le contexte où son agresseur est décédé depuis plus de trois ans. en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’agression sexuelle, le délai applicable est ramené à trois ans et il court à compter du décès. [je souligne; par 41] [254] il est intéressant de faire un parallèle avec la règle apparentée en common law. la cour a confirmé que la règle de la possibilité de découvrir le dommage (« discoverability rule ») ne trouve pas application « dans les cas où la loi applicable lie expressément le délai de prescription à un événement déterminé qui n’a rien à voir avec le moment où la partie lésée en prend connaissance ou avec le fondement de la cause d’action » (ryan c. moore, 2005 csc 38, [2005] 2 rcs 53, par. 24 (je souligne)). [255] certes, en droit civil québécois, le rattache- ment d’un délai au moment du décès n’est pas en soi une indication certaine de déchéance. comme le fait observer l’intimé, l’art 2928 ccq précise que « [l]a demande du conjoint survivant pour faire établir la prestation compensatoire se prescrit par un an à compter du décès de son conjoint ». les commentaires du ministre de la justice (p. 1837) confirment — tout comme le libellé même de la disposition, du reste — qu’il s’agit là d’un délai de prescription. [256] nonetheless, if the wording of the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq provided no indi- cation that the legislature intended to establish a prescriptive period, i would be inclined to think that the link to the date of death — that is, to a specific, objective fact that is fixed in time and unrelated to the basis of the victim’s right of action and to the victim’s inability to make the connection between the alleged act and the injury suffered — constitutes a sufficient reference to forfeiture. [256] néanmoins, si le texte du deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq ne contenait aucune indication de l’intention du législateur d’instaurer un délai de prescription, je serais portée à croire que le rattache- ment au moment du décès — c’est-à-dire à un fait objectif, précis et figé dans le temps, sans lien avec le fondement du droit d’action de la victime et avec son incapacité à faire lien entre l’acte reproché et le préjudice subi — constitue une mention suffisante de déchéance. [257] however, given the wording of the second paragraph, it is difficult to argue that it makes no [257] cependant, à la lecture du texte du deu- xième alinéa, il est difficile de soutenir que celui-ci 976 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. reference to prescription. i note, as my colleague does, that the french version refers to the “délai applicable”, which is the 10- or 30- year prescriptive period under the first paragraph. the english ver- sion is even more explicit: “the prescriptive period, if not already expired, is reduced to three years”. these textual indicia are perhaps not conclusive, since it could still be argued that the nature of the applicable period changes from the date of death, but at the very least they create some ambiguity. moreover, i agree with my colleague that it is not irrelevant that the provision in question is in the title concerning extinctive prescription in the book on prescription (see levesque, at p 324). although that book includes art 2878 ccq, which sets out the rule on the forfeiture of a remedy, the appellants have identified no other term for forfeiture in that book. in short, even though in some respects the wording of the second paragraph suggests a term for forfei- ture, it cannot be concluded from either the wording or the context of that provision that the legislature expressed an intention to create such a term in a sufficiently precise, clear and unambiguous manner. [258] as for the purpose of the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq, the inclusion of a shortened pe- riod that runs from the date of death of the victim or the author of the act is consistent with the general objectives of prescription and forfeiture: first, to ensure the stability of legal relations — particularly successions — and second, to promote the fairness of trials by preventing the erosion of essential evidence. the legislature’s choice to impose a shortened period where the victim dies, and not only where the author of the act dies, shows that these issues were of great importance to it. ne renvoie aucunement à la prescription. en effet, comme mon collègue, je constate que la version française renvoie au « délai applicable », lequel cor- respond au délai de prescription de 10 ans ou 30 ans du premier alinéa. la version anglaise est encore plus explicite : « the prescriptive period, if not already expired, is reduced to three years ». ces indices textuels ne sont peut- être pas décisifs, puisqu’il de- meure possible de soutenir que le délai applicable change de nature à compter du décès, mais il en résulte à tout le moins une certaine ambiguïté. de plus, je conviens avec mon collègue qu’il n’est pas sans pertinence que la disposition en cause se situe sous le titre « de la prescription extinctive » du livre de la prescription (voir levesque, p 324). en effet, quoique l’art 2878 ccq énonçant la règle en matière de déchéance d’un recours figure dans ce livre, les appelants n’identifient aucun autre délai de déchéance qui y aurait été inclus. en somme, même si le libellé du deuxième alinéa suggère à certains égards l’existence d’un délai de déchéance, ni le texte ni le contexte de cette disposition ne permettent de conclure que le législateur a exprimé de façon suffi- samment précise, claire et non ambiguë l’intention de créer un délai de cette nature. [258] en ce qui concerne l’objet du deuxième ali- néa de l’art 29261 ccq, l’inclusion d’un délai abrégé à compter du décès de la victime ou de l’au- teur de l’acte rejoint les objectifs généraux de la prescription et de la déchéance : d’une part, assurer la stabilité des rapports juridiques — plus particuliè- rement des successions — et, d’autre part, favoriser la tenue d’un procès juste et équitable en évitant l’érosion des éléments de preuve essentiels. le choix d’imposer un délai abrégé en cas de décès de la vic- time, et non seulement en cas de décès de l’auteur de l’acte, montre bien que ces enjeux revêtaient une grande importance pour le législateur. [259] in fact, it is clear from the parliamentary re- cord that the legislature was concerned that lengthen- ing the periods to 30 years would result in uncertainty for heirs, [translation] “battles between succes- sions” and evidentiary difficulties (see, for example, étude détaillée, at pp 7-9). although parliamentary debates have only limited weight in the interpretation of legislation (see, eg,. rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. [259] il ressort d’ailleurs clairement des travaux parlementaires que le législateur était préoccupé par le fait que l’allongement des délais à 30 ans al- lait causer de l’incertitude aux héritiers, causer des « batailles de succession » et poser des difficultés en matière de preuve (voir notamment étude dé- taillée, p 7-9). bien que les débats parlementaires n’aient qu’un poids limité en matière d’interprétation [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 977 (re), at para. 35; canadian national railway co. v. canada (attorney general), 2014 scc 40, [2014] 2 scr 135, at para. 47), they are nonetheless rel- evant in identifying the purpose of a provision. in the instant case, the following exchange between the minister responsible for the bill and two members of the official opposition is particularly instructive: législative (voir, p ex, rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), par. 35; compagnie des chemins de fer natio- naux du canada c. canada (procureur général), 2014 csc 40, [2014] 2  rcs  135, par.  47), ils constituent néanmoins un élément pertinent afin de cerner l’objet d’une disposition. en l’espèce, cet échange entre le ministre responsable du projet de loi et deux députés de l’opposition officielle est par- ticulièrement révélateur : [translation] mr. st- arnaud: well, on the last point, my under- standing is that the aim was to prevent it from being a battle between successions at some point. at some point, we say: yes, the succession of either person can take ac- tion, but at some point, we wanted to draw a line at some point, so we wouldn’t end up at some point with battles between successions over events. so that was kind of the idea, to limit such. m. st- arnaud : bien, sur le dernier point, là, ma com- préhension, c’est qu’on voulait éviter qu’à un moment donné ce soient des batailles de succession. à un moment donné, on dit : oui, là, la succession de l’un ou de l’autre peut agir, mais, à un moment donné, on a voulu mettre une ligne, à un moment donné, pour ne pas qu’à un moment donné on se retrouve avec des batailles de succession pour des événements… alors, c’était un peu l’idée, là, de limiter ces… ms. st- pierre: but i have a quick question about that. if it’s the author of the act and. let’s take the cases that have really made headlines, sex crimes in the catho- lic church. and the author of the act has been dead for 10 years. the victim has nonetheless been the victim of a crime. and at that point, if it has been more than three years since the aggressor or, well, the person who commit- ted the crime died, this means that there is no more remedy, yet that victim is just as injured as another victim whose aggressor is still alive. mme st- pierre : mais j’ai une petite question à ça. si c’est l’auteur de l’acte et que… prenons les cas qui ont fait vraiment la manchette, des crimes sexuels dans l’église catholique. et l’auteur de l’acte est mort depuis 10 ans. la victime a quand même été victime d’un acte criminel. et, à ce moment-là, si ça fait plus de trois ans que l’agresseur ou, enfin, la personne qui a commis le crime est morte, ça veut dire qu’il n’y a plus aucun recours, et cette victime-là est autant blessée qu’une autre victime dont l’auteur est encore en vie. the chair (mr. therrien): minister. le président (m. therrien) : m le ministre. mr. st- arnaud: well, that is a good question. in my understanding, it was indeed to limit. a remedy is still. a remedy is available, it’s available for three years. but the goal was to draw a line at some point. in fact, the period is reduced to the one currently in the code. it’s currently three years in the code. m. st- arnaud : bien, c’est une bonne question. ma compréhension, c’était effectivement de limiter… le re- cours est quand même… le recours est possible, il est possible pendant trois ans. mais, à un moment donné, l’objectif était de tirer une ligne. en fait, on le ramène au délai qui est actuellement au code, là. actuellement, au code, c’est trois ans, là.   .   . mr. st- arnaud: if a crime has been committed, pre- scription does not run. it begins to run once the person is 18 years old. it runs, without any need for specific proof, for a period of 20 or perhaps 30 years, and after that it may continue. there may still be a remedy, as long as it’s shown that the victim has just become aware m. st- arnaud : s’il y a un acte criminel qui a été com- mis, la prescription ne court pas. elle commence à courir à partir de l’âge de 18 ans. elle court, sans qu’on ait à faire une preuve particulière, pour une période de 20 ou peut- être de 30 ans, et après ça elle peut continuer… on peut quand même avoir un recours, mais dans la mesure où on démontre 978 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. of the injury suffered and that the causal connection can be proved. qu’on vient de prendre conscience du préjudice qu’on a subi et qu’on est capable de faire la preuve du lien de causalité. if the aggressor dies, a remedy is still available, but only. if the aggressor dies when the person is 45 years old, well, a remedy is still available, but then we say, at some point, three years later, i was going to say the book is closed, but a line is drawn at some point. in other words, the period is reduced to the prescriptive period currently in the code. at present — it’s important to keep this in mind — the period for this type of remedy is three years in all circumstances. si l’agresseur décède, le recours est toujours possible, mais il n’est possible qu’à… si l’agresseur décède alors que la personne a 45 ans, bien là le recours est toujours possible, mais là on dit, à un moment donné, trois ans plus tard, j’allais dire, on ferme les livres, là, mais on tire une ligne à un moment donné. c’est-à-dire qu’on le ramène au délai de prescription qui est actuellement celui qui existe au code. présentement, là — c’est important qu’on se le dise — le délai pour ce genre de recours, il est de trois ans en toutes circonstances.   .   . mr. ouimet (fabre):   . of course, we must not lose sight of one thing. in the case of death, there is someone who no longer participates in the trial and whose perspec- tive is now missing. that person’s version of the facts is no longer available, and this has the potential. care must be taken not to assume that the person making a claim is entitled to compensation, because this makes the entire trial pointless. so there must be rules that provide for rem- edies but that don’t result in an automatic award against the person being sued. i would therefore urge caution. it is important not to devise a system in which it is clear that the person making a claim is entitled to compensation, because we can very well resume we won’t go to the trouble of amending the code of civil procedure, as the minister said, we will cast it aside. so care must be taken. m. ouimet (fabre) :   . évidemment, il ne faut pas perdre de vue une chose, là. quand on parle de décès, il y a quelqu’un qui ne participe plus au procès, là, et donc on n’a plus l’éclairage, on n’a plus la version des faits de cette personne-là, et ça a un potentiel… il faut faire attention de ne pas présumer que la personne qui réclame a droit au dédommagement, parce que ça, c’est tout le procès qui est inutile, là. alors, il faut mettre en place des règles qui vont permettre des recours, mais qui ne vont pas faire en sorte que la personne poursuivie est automatiquement condamnée, là. donc, je nous invite à la prudence. il ne faut pas imaginer un système où il est clair que la personne qui réclame a droit à un dédommagement, parce qu’on peut bien reprendre… on ne se donnera pas la peine de modifier le code de procédure civile, comme le ministre a dit, on va le mettre de côté. alors, il faut faire attention. (étude détaillée, at pp. 7-8; in this regard, see a v. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 34, at para. 42; lambert (2014), at para 595) (étude détaillée, p. 7-8; voir, à ce sujet, a c. frères du sacré- cœur, 2017 qccs 34, par. 42; lambert (2014), par 595) [260] it therefore seems that the legislature was seeking a compromise between objectives that were largely contradictory: facilitating access to justice for victims, certainly, but at the same time ensur- ing that [translation] “a line is drawn at some point”, as the then minister of justice put it. clearly, the legislature intended to lengthen the prescriptive periods generally while ensuring that the heirs of the author of the act would not have to face legal proceedings years or even decades after the author’s death, despite the difficulty of adducing any evidence in defence. [260] il semble donc que le législateur cherchait à trouver un compromis entre des objectifs largement contradictoires : favoriser l’accès à la justice pour les victimes, assurément, mais en même temps « tire[r] une ligne à un moment donné  », pour reprendre la formule du ministre de la justice de l’époque. manifestement, le législateur entendait, de manière générale, allonger les délais de prescription, tout en évitant par ailleurs aux héritiers de l’auteur de l’acte de devoir faire face à une action en justice des années, voire des décennies, après le décès de celui-ci, malgré la difficulté pour eux d’opposer une quelconque preuve en défense. [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 979 [261] with respect, the majority’s interpretation of the second paragraph of art 29261 . ccq is difficult to reconcile with these objectives. it is true that, after three years at most following the death of the victim or the author of the act, it would become necessary for the plaintiff to prove when the victim became aware of the connection between the alleged act and the injury suffered. but this does not amount to “drawing a line”, given that actions might still be brought decades later. indeed, frédéric levesque and claudie- émilie wagner- lapierre are of the view that such an interpretation [translation] “seems to make the second paragraph completely pointless, when its purpose is in fact to prevent the possibility that a person will be sued for wrongful acts com- mitted a long time ago by a deceased ancestor” (“la réforme de la prescription civile en matière d’infrac- tion criminelle: une occasion manquée pour les vic- times de préjudice corporel” (2015), 49 rjtum. 685, at pp. 700- 701). i would not go so far as to say that the majority’s interpretation deprives the second paragraph of any effect, but it can hardly be said that the majority’s interpretation truly makes it possible to achieve what appear to be the legislature’s objec- tives, that is, ensuring the stability of successions and the integrity of the adversarial process. [262] in my view, the wording, context and pur- pose of art 29261 ccq suggest rather that the period established by the second paragraph runs from the date of death of either the victim or the author of the act, even if the victim did not yet make the connection between the alleged act and the injury suffered. in other words, the death marks a different starting point, which is substituted for the one in the first paragraph, that is, the date the victim becomes aware that the injury suffered is attributable to the alleged act. [261] avec égards, l’interprétation que donne la majorité du deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq. est difficilement conciliable avec ces derniers ob- jectifs. certes, au plus trois ans après le décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte, il deviendrait nécessaire pour le demandeur de prouver le moment de la prise de connaissance du lien entre l’acte re- proché et le préjudice subi. mais cela n’équivaut pas à « tirer une ligne », sachant que des actions pour- raient toujours être exercées des décennies plus tard. les auteurs frédéric levesque et claudie- émilie wagner- lapierre estiment d’ailleurs qu’une telle interprétation « semble rendre l’alinéa deux com- plètement inutile, alors qu’il a justement pour but d’éviter qu’une personne puisse être poursuivie pour des gestes répréhensibles posés il y a longtemps par leurs ancêtres décédés » (« la réforme de la pres- cription civile en matière d’infraction criminelle : une occasion manquée pour les victimes de préjudice corporel » (2015), 49 rjtum 685, p. 700- 701). pour ma part, je n’irais pas jusqu’à dire que l’inter- prétation de la majorité prive le deuxième alinéa de tout effet, mais on peut difficilement soutenir que cette interprétation permet véritablement la réali- sation des objectifs qui semblent être visés par le législateur, soit d’assurer la stabilité des successions, de même que l’intégrité du processus contradictoire. [262] à mon avis, le texte, le contexte et l’objet de l’art 29261 ccq donnent plutôt à penser que le délai fixé au deuxième alinéa court à compter du dé- cès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte, et ce, même si la victime n’a pas encore fait le lien entre l’acte reproché et le préjudice subi. en d’autres termes, le décès marque un point de départ distinct, lequel se substitue à celui du premier alinéa, qui correspond au moment où la victime prend connaissance que son préjudice est attribuable à l’acte reproché. [263] however, despite certain indicia to this ef- fect, i am not prepared to conclude that the legis- lature necessarily intended to establish a term for forfeiture. first, its concerns about the stability of legal relations, particularly successions, and the preservation of evidence are not uniquely associ- ated with forfeiture. as i mentioned above, the same concerns underlie prescription. second, as a result [263] cependant, malgré le fait que certains in- dices convergent dans cette direction, je ne suis pas prête à en tirer la conclusion que le législateur enten- dait nécessairement édicter un délai de déchéance. d’une part, les préoccupations du législateur pour la stabilité des rapports juridiques, notamment des successions, et la préservation de la preuve ne sont pas le propre de la déchéance. comme nous l’avons 980 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. of the requirement codified in art 2878 ccq that forfeiture be “expressly provided for in a text”, the purpose of a provision, however clear it may be, cannot on its own support a finding of forfeiture. for the reasons already given, i have doubts about whether there is such express language. ultimately, if the legislature believes that the objectives relating to the stability of successions and the preservation of evidence must take precedence in all circumstances, it is for the legislature to provide for this expressly. vu plus haut, ces mêmes préoccupations sous- tendent la prescription. d’autre part, en raison de l’exigence d’un « texte exprès », codifiée à l’art 2878 ccq, l’objet d’une disposition, aussi évident soit-il, ne peut justifier à lui seul de conclure à la déchéance. pour les raisons déjà énoncées, j’entretiens un doute sur la présence d’une telle mention expresse. au final, si le législateur considère que les objectifs liés à la stabilité des successions et à la préservation de la preuve doivent avoir préséance en toutes circons- tances, il lui incombe de le prévoir expressément. (2) suspension of the period provided for in the (2) la suspension du délai prévu au deuxième second paragraph alinéa [264] absent an express provision to the contrary, the general provisions dealing with the suspension of prescription — including the provision on impossibil- ity in fact to act (art 2904 ccq) and the provisions concerning minors and protected persons of full age (art 2905 ccq) — apply to the period provided for in the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq. indeed, in proulx v. desbiens, a sexual aggression case in which the author of the alleged act had died, the quebec superior court relied on art 2904 ccq. to suspend the period provided for in the second par- agraph of art 29261 ccq: [264] en l’absence d’un texte exprès à l’effet con- traire, les dispositions générales portant sur la sus- pension de la prescription — notamment celle sur l’impossibilité en fait d’agir (art 2904 ccq) et celles à l’égard des mineurs et des majeurs protégés (art 2905 ccq) — s’appliquent au délai prévu au deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq. dans proulx c. desbiens, une affaire d’agression à ca- ractère sexuel où l’auteur de l’acte reproché était décédé, la cour supérieure du québec a d’ailleurs fait appel à l’art 2904 ccq pour suspendre le délai prévu au deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq : [translation] the court notes that the second par- agraph of the article deals only with the start of the pre- scriptive period and make no reference to any change to the other principles affecting prescription, including arti- cle 2904. thus, there seems to be no textual justification for excluding them. [emphasis added; para 18]. le tribunal note que le deuxième paragraphe de l’ar- ticle ne traite que du début de la période prescriptive et ne fait aucune référence à une modification des autres prin- cipes affectant la prescription, y compris l’article 2904. il ne semble donc pas y avoir de justification textuelle pour les écarter. [je souligne; par 18] [265] with regard more specifically to impossibil- ity in fact to act, the period established by the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq may be suspended if, for example, the victim is in a state of unconscious- ness, is unaware of and could not reasonably have known of the aggressor’s identity or death, or is in a psychological state of fear caused by the aggressor’s fault (see, eg,. gauthier, at para.  67; baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at para. 1-1332; c. gervais, la prescription (2009), at pp 159-66). in each case, the plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities that it was impossible, and not simply difficult, for him or her to act in a timely manner (catudal v. [265] en ce qui concerne plus particulièrement l’impossibilité en fait d’agir, le délai fixé au deu- xième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq pourrait, à titre d’exemples, être suspendu si la victime est dans un état d’inconscience, si elle ignore l’identité de son agresseur ou le décès de ce dernier et ne pouvait rai- sonnablement connaître ces faits, ou encore si elle se trouve dans un état de crainte psychologique causée par la faute de son agresseur (voir, p ex, gauthier, par. 67; baudouin, deslauriers et moore, par. 1-1332; c. gervais, la prescription (2009), p.  159- 166). dans tous les cas, il appartient au demandeur de faire la preuve, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 981 borduas, 2006 qcca 1090, [2006] rjq 2052, at para. 72; gervais, at p. 160; mccann, at pp 156-57). [266] however, given that the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq sets a different starting point for prescription, separate from the one established by the first paragraph, it seems to me that lack of awareness of the connection between the alleged act and the injury suffered cannot suspend the period provided for in the second paragraph. the opposite interpre- tation would frustrate the legislature’s intention that the period run from the date of death, and no longer from the date the victim becomes aware of the con- nection. the plaintiff could essentially bypass the starting point expressly provided for in the second paragraph by arguing that lack of awareness of the connection was the reason why it was impossible in fact to act within the meaning of art 2904 ccq. [267] the legislature must be considered  — it seems — to have specified that lack of awareness of the connection between a sexual aggression and the injury suffered is not, strictly speaking, a cause of impossibility in fact to act and therefore does not suspend prescription; rather, it is relevant to the start- ing point for prescription. in so doing, the legislature ended a longstanding judicial and academic debate (in this regard, see pl v. jl, 2011 qcca 1233, [2011] rjq 1274, at paras. 36-66; c (s) v. arche- vêque catholique romain de québec, 2009 qcca 1349, 326 dlr (4th) 196, at paras. 72 and 133-38; christensen v. roman catholic archbishop of qué- bec, 2010 scc 44, [2010] 2 scr 694, at para. 2; baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at para. 1-1320; mccann, at pp. 130 and 144; gervais, at pp. 107-10 and 155; levesque, at p 322). up to that point, it had been unclear whether that lack of awareness of one of the essential elements of the right of action meant that the starting point for prescription was postponed to the date the victim became aware of the connection, rather than being the date of the aggres- sion or the day the injury appeared for the first time (art. 2880 para. 2 and art 2926 ccq), or whether that lack of awareness instead amounted to impos- sibility in fact to act that suspended the prescriptive period (art 2904 ccq). the first paragraph of qu’il lui était impossible, et non pas simplement diffi- cile, d’agir en temps utile (catudal c. borduas, 2006 qcca 1090, [2006] rjq 2052, par. 72; gervais, p. 160; mccann, p. 156- 157). [266] toutefois, compte tenu du fait que le deu- xième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq prévoit un point de départ distinct de la prescription, indépendant de celui fixé au premier alinéa, il m’apparaît que l’igno- rance du lien entre l’acte reproché et le préjudice subi ne peut constituer une cause de suspension du délai prévu au deuxième alinéa. l’interprétation contraire ferait échec à l’intention du législateur de faire courir le délai à compter du décès, et non plus à compter de la prise de connaissance du lien. le demandeur pour- rait en quelque sorte contourner le point de départ prévu expressément au deuxième alinéa en invoquant l’ignorance du lien comme cause d’impossibilité en fait d’agir au sens de l’art 2904 ccq. il faut — semble-t-il — considérer que le [267] législateur est venu préciser que l’ignorance du lien entre une agression à caractère sexuel et le préju- dice subi ne constitue pas à proprement parler une cause d’impossibilité en fait d’agir, et donc de sus- pension de la prescription, mais relève plutôt du point de départ de la prescription ce faisant, le législateur a mis fin à un débat jurisprudentiel et doctrinal de longue date (voir, à ce sujet, pl c. jl, 2011 qcca 1233, [2011] rjq 1274, par. 36-66; sc c. archevêque catholique romain de québec, 2009 qcca 1349, [2009] rjq 1970, par. 72 et 133- 138; christensen c. archevêque catholique ro- main de québec, 2010 csc 44, [2010] 2 rcs 694, par. 2; baudouin, deslauriers et moore, par. 1-1320; mccann, p. 130 et 144; gervais, p. 107- 110 et 155; levesque, p 322). auparavant, on ne pouvait en ef- fet dire avec certitude si cette ignorance de l’un des éléments essentiels du droit d’action signifiait que le point de départ de la prescription était repoussé jusqu’à la prise de connaissance du lien au lieu de correspondre au moment de l’agression ou de la première manifestation du préjudice (art. 2880 al. 2 et art 2926 ccq), ou si cette ignorance consti- tuait plutôt une impossibilité en fait d’agir qui venait suspendre le délai (art 2904 ccq). le premier alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq règle la question en 982 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. art 29261 ccq settles the matter by making the date the victim becomes aware of the connection a starting point for prescription. this is the declara- tory, or interpretative, effect of the first paragraph of art 29261 ccq, as provided for in s. 13 of the act to amend the crime victims compensation act, the act to promote good citizenship and certain pro- visions of the civil code concerning prescription, sq 2013, c. 8 (“amending act”) (on this point, see also the explanatory notes for that act). faisant du moment de la prise de connaissance du lien un point de départ de la prescription. il s’agit là de l’effet déclaratoire, c’est-à-dire interprétatif, du premier alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq, lequel est prévu à l’art. 13 de la loi modifiant la loi sur l’in- demnisation des victimes d’actes criminels, la loi visant à favoriser le civisme et certaines dispositions du code civil relatives à la prescription, lq 2013, c. 8 (« loi modificatrice ») (voir aussi à ce sujet les notes explicatives de cette même loi). [268] as a matter of consistency, if awareness of the connection between the alleged act and the injury suffered is what marks the starting point for prescrip- tion in the cases provided for in the first paragraph of art 29261 ccq, then lack of awareness of that connection does not constitute impossibility in fact to act under art 2904 ccq and thus can no longer have the effect of suspending prescription. in other words, by codifying awareness of the connection as the starting point for prescription, the legislature at the same time excluded it from the scope of im- possibility in fact to act. as i have said, however, the other causes of impossibility in fact to act un- der art 2904 ccq can still be raised, as i am not persuaded that the legislature expressed itself in a sufficiently precise, clear and unambiguous manner to create a term for forfeiture. the circumstances in which an action arising from sexual aggression can be brought more than three years after the death of the victim or the author of the act are therefore circumscribed considerably, but not eliminated com- pletely. [268] en toute cohérence, si la prise de connais- sance du lien entre l’acte reproché et le préjudice subi marque le point de départ de la prescription dans les cas prévus au premier alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq, l’ignorance de ce même lien ne constitue pas une impossibilité en fait d’agir visée à l’art 2904 ccq. et ne peut donc plus avoir pour effet de suspendre la prescription. en d’autres termes, en codifiant la prise de connaissance du lien en tant que point de départ de la prescription, le législateur se trouve du même coup à l’exclure du champ d’application de l’impos- sibilité en fait d’agir. cependant, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, les autres causes d’impossibilité en fait d’agir visées à l’art 2904 ccq peuvent toujours être soulevées, puisque je ne suis pas convaincue que le législateur se soit exprimé de façon assez précise, claire et non ambiguë pour créer un délai de déchéance. les circonstances permettant l’exercice d’une action résultant d’une agression à caractère sexuel plus de trois ans après le décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte sont ainsi circonscrites d’une manière appréciable, sans pour autant être entière- ment éliminées. [269] i readily acknowledge that this interpretation is not entirely satisfactory. for instance, a victim could rely on the suspension provided for in art. 2904 ccq if he or she were able to prove psychological fear, which is a form of impossibility in fact to act, but not if the victim’s psychological state prevented him or her from becoming aware of the connection between the aggression and the injury suffered, be- cause that lack of awareness of an element of civil liability would be relevant to the starting point for prescription but not to the suspension of prescrip- tion. however, in my view, a different interpretation would require rewriting part of the provision and [269] je reconnais d’emblée que cette interpréta- tion n’est pas entièrement satisfaisante. ainsi, une victime pourrait se prévaloir de la suspension prévue à l’art.  2904  ccq si elle parvient à prouver la crainte psychologique, une forme d’impossibilité en fait d’agir, mais non si son état psychologique l’empêchait de prendre conscience du lien entre l’agression et le préjudice subi, du fait que cette ignorance d’un élément de la responsabilité civile relèverait du point de départ de la prescription, et non de la suspension. j’estime cependant que, pour arriver à une autre interprétation, il faut réécrire en partie la disposition, et faire abstraction des tensions [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 983 disregarding the inherent tension between the legis- lature’s objectives. it seems to me that the legislature proposed a compromise, no doubt an imperfect one, to address the unique problems raised by actions arising from sexual aggression, which are often insti- tuted many years after the fact. if this interpretation seems unduly harsh toward victims or if, on the con- trary, the legislature did in fact intend to introduce a term for forfeiture, as the appellants argue, i would urge it to step in and clarify its intention. inhérentes entre les objectifs poursuivis par le lé- gislateur. il m’apparaît que le législateur a proposé un compromis, sans doute imparfait, qui vise à ré- pondre aux difficultés uniques soulevées par les actions résultant d’une agression à caractère sexuel, lesquelles sont souvent intentées de longues années après les faits. si cette interprétation paraît trop ri- goureuse à l’égard des victimes ou, au contraire, si le législateur entendait bel et bien introduire un délai de déchéance, comme le soutiennent les appelants, j’inviterais le législateur à intervenir afin de clarifier son intention. (3) scope of the second paragraph (3) la portée du deuxième alinéa [270] finally, unlike the majority, i am not pre- pared to conclude that the shortened period under the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq applies only to an action against the author of the act. the word- ing of the provision draws no distinction between the author of the act and third parties who might also be liable for their own fault or for the act or omission of another person. [270] finalement, contrairement à la majorité, je ne suis pas disposée à conclure que le délai abrégé du deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq n’est op- posable qu’à l’encontre d’une action contre l’auteur de l’acte. le texte de la disposition ne fait pas de distinction entre ce dernier et des tiers qui pourraient également être responsables pour leur propre faute ou le fait d’autrui. [271] in my view, there is only one period (30 years or 3 years, as the case may be) for all actions for damages for bodily injury resulting from sexual ag- gression. the second paragraph provides that the “prescriptive period” for such actions is reduced to three years and runs from the date of death of the victim or the author of the act. my colleague’s interpretation essentially has the effect of adding the words “in relation to the succession of the author of the act” to the second paragraph. [271] à mon sens, il n’y a qu’un seul délai (de 30 ans ou 3 ans, selon le cas) pour toutes les ac- tions en réparation du préjudice corporel résultant d’une agression à caractère sexuel. en effet, le deu- xième alinéa prévoit que le « délai applicable » à de telles actions est ramené à trois ans et court à compter du décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte. l’interprétation de mon collègue a en quelque sorte pour effet d’ajouter les termes « à l’égard de la succession de l’auteur de l’acte » au libellé du deuxième alinéa. [272] the legislature is, of course, free to establish periods that differ according to the identity of the parties, but no such intention is reflected in the word- ing of art 29261 ccq. in this context, it must be assumed that the legislature did not intend to impose, for example, different periods for the direct fault of the author of the act and for liability for the act or omission of another person. like the appellants, i am also of the view that the legislature would have spo- ken more clearly if it had intended to deprive certain parties of the right to implead other solidary debtors (art 1529 ccq) by establishing different periods. [272] bien que le législateur soit évidemment libre de fixer des délais différents selon l’identité des parties, cette intention ne ressort aucunement du libellé de l’art 29261 ccq. dans ce contexte, il faut présumer que le législateur n’a pas souhaité im- poser, par exemple, des délais distincts pour la faute directe de l’auteur de l’acte et pour la responsabilité en raison du fait d’autrui. comme les appelants, j’estime aussi que législateur se serait exprimé plus clairement s’il avait eu l’intention de priver cer- taines parties, sur la base de délais distincts, du droit d’appeler au procès les autres débiteurs solidaires 984 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. indeed, my colleague gascon j. points this out in his reasons (at para. 125): the legislature is assumed not to have intended to depart from general legal prin- ciples unless it has expressed that intention clearly (see p-a. côté, in collaboration with s. beaulac and m. devinat, the interpretation of legislation in canada (4th ed. 2011), at pp 538-41). [273] to conclude otherwise would be to disre- gard one of the objectives of the second paragraph. i agree that the objective of preserving the stability of successions is not relevant where an action is brought against a legal person, as in the present case. however, my colleague acknowledges that the pro- vision also seeks to preserve the value of evidence by ensuring, as far as possible, that there is some proximity in time to the alleged aggression. this objective is relevant in relation to all defendants, since the plaintiff will always be required to prove the aggression (before establishing, for example, that a third party is at fault or is liable for the act or omission of another person). it is true that ev- identiary difficulties may arise from the moment the victim or the author of the act dies, since the testimony of these individuals is generally central in cases involving sexual aggression. nevertheless, the more time that passes, the more difficult it becomes to compensate for the absence of one of the main witnesses. louise langevin clearly explains the im- portance of prescription in ensuring the integrity of the adversarial process: [translation]    prescriptive periods seek to limit the erosive effect of time on memory and on the value of evidence. for example, evidence, including evidence in corroboration, may disappear over the years, or witnesses may die. prescriptive periods help to prevent such situa- tions and thus improve the administration of justice   . the defendant must therefore be notified as soon as pos- sible if he or she is being sued. finally, the defendant may be surprised by the plaintiff’s late action and may not have retained any evidence    . (art 1529 ccq). mon collègue le juge gascon le rappelle d’ailleurs dans ses motifs (au par. 125) : le législateur est présumé ne pas avoir eu l’intention de déroger aux principes généraux du droit à moins d’en avoir manifesté clairement l’intention (voir p-a. côté, avec la collaboration de s. beaulac et m. devinat, interprétation des lois (4e éd. 2009), par. 1793- 1803). [273] conclure autrement signifie faire abstrac- tion de l’un des objectifs du deuxième alinéa. j’en conviens, l’objectif de préserver la stabilité des suc- cessions est sans pertinence lorsque l’action vise une personne morale, comme c’est le cas en l’espèce. mais mon collègue reconnaît pour sa part que la disposition a aussi pour but de préserver la valeur des éléments de preuve en assurant, dans la mesure du possible, une certaine proximité temporelle avec l’agression alléguée. cet objectif demeure pertinent à l’égard de tous les défendeurs, puisque le demandeur devra dans tous les cas faire la preuve de l’agression (avant d’établir, par exemple, la faute d’un tiers ou sa responsabilité pour le fait d’autrui). certes, des difficultés de preuve sont susceptibles de se poser dès le décès de la victime ou de l’auteur de l’acte, puisque leur témoignage est généralement central en matière d’agressions à caractère sexuel. néanmoins, plus le temps passe, plus il devient ardu de suppléer à l’absence de l’un des principaux témoins. l’auteure louise langevin explique bien l’importance de la prescription afin d’assurer l’intégrité du processus contradictoire :    les délais de prescription tentent de limiter l’effet érosif du temps sur la mémoire et sur la valeur des élé- ments de preuve. ainsi, des éléments de preuve, entre autres ceux apportés en corroboration, peuvent dispa- raître avec les années, ou des témoins peuvent décéder. ces délais concourent à éviter ces situations et assurent donc une meilleure administration de la justice. [  ]. le défendeur doit donc être averti dans les meilleurs délais s’il fait l’objet d’une poursuite. enfin, le défendeur peut être surpris par l’action tardive du demandeur et il ne se serait pas ménagé de preuve   . (“suspension de la prescription extinctive: à l’im- possible nul n’est tenu” (1996), 56 r du b. 265, at p. 271) (« suspension de la prescription extinctive : à l’im- possible nul n’est tenu » (1996), 56 r du b. 265, p. 271) [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 985 in short, the second paragraph of art 29261 [274] ccq applies to all actions for damages for bodily injury resulting from sexual aggression. its purpose is to address the legislature’s concerns about the preservation of evidence and, more broadly, the in- tegrity of the adversarial process. however, as i have explained, victims (or their successions) are still entitled to prove that it was impossible in fact for them to act, although this cannot be done by relying on lack of awareness of the connection between the alleged act and the injury. [274] en somme, le deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261. ccq s’applique à l’égard de toutes les actions en réparation du préjudice corporel résultant d’une agres- sion à caractère sexuel. cette mesure vise à répondre aux préoccupations du législateur en ce qui concerne la préservation de la preuve et, plus largement, l’in- tégrité du processus contradictoire. comme je l’ai expliqué, les victimes (ou leur succession) conservent cependant le droit d’apporter la preuve de leur impos- sibilité en fait d’agir, preuve qui ne pourrait toutefois reposer sur l’ignorance du lien entre l’acte reproché et le préjudice. (4) temporal effect of the starting point set on (4) l’effet dans le temps du point de départ fixé the date of death au moment du décès [275] in the case at bar, the appellants have been unable to persuade me that jj’s right of action was necessarily extinguished with the deaths of his al- leged aggressors in 2001 and 2004. it is important to remember that the introduction of a new period, in cases where it would already be expired before even taking effect, would be considered to have retroactive effect if the application of the new legislation resulted in the extinction of an existing right of action (p-a. côté and d. jutras, le droit transitoire civil: sources annotées (loose- leaf), at para 2192). however, the legislature is presumed not to have intended to deprive any person of such a right simply by changing the period applicable to an action (angus v. sun alliance insurance co., [1988] 2 scr 256, at pp 265-67). such an intention must be clearly expressed (british columbia v. imperial tobacco canada ltd., 2005 scc 49, [2005] 2 scr 473, at para. 71; tran v. canada (public safety and emergency preparedness), 2017 scc 50, [2017] 2 scr 289, at paras 48-49). this is not the case here. [275] en l’espèce, les appelants n’ont pas su me convaincre que le droit d’action de jj est nécessaire- ment éteint depuis le décès de ses agresseurs allégués, en 2001 et 2004. il importe de rappeler que l’intro- duction d’un nouveau délai, dans les cas où ce dernier serait déjà expiré avant même son entrée en vigueur, serait considérée comme ayant un effet rétroactif si l’application de la loi nouvelle entraînait l’extinction d’un droit d’action existant (p-a. côté et d. jutras, le droit transitoire civil : sources annotées (feuilles mobiles), par 2192). or, il est présumé que le lé- gislateur n’entendait pas priver quiconque d’un tel droit simplement en modifiant le délai applicable à la demande en justice (angus c. sun alliance compagnie d’assurance, [1988] 2 rcs 256, p. 265- 267). une intention de cette nature doit être exprimée clairement (colombie- britannique c. imperial tobacco canada ltée, 2005 csc 49, [2005] 2 rcs 473, par. 71; tran c. canada (sécurité publique et protection civile), 2017 csc 50, [2017] 2 rcs 289, par 48-49). ce n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. in my view, s. 13 of the amending act gives [276] retroactive effect only to the starting point for prescrip- tion provided for in the first paragraph of art 29261. ccq, that is, the date the victim becomes aware of the connection between the alleged act and the injury suffered. only the first paragraph of this provision applies to the time before it came into force. in con- trast, the starting point under the second paragraph, the date of death, does not have retroactive effect, regardless of whether the period is a term for forfeiture [276] selon moi, l’art. 13 de la loi modificatrice confère uniquement un effet rétroactif au point de départ de la prescription prévu au premier alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq, c’est-à-dire au jour de la prise de connaissance du lien entre l’acte reproché et le préjudice subi. seul le premier alinéa de cette disposition s’applique à la période antérieure à son entrée de vigueur. à l’inverse, le point de départ fixé au moment du décès par le deuxième alinéa n’a pas d’effet rétroactif, et ce, que le délai en soit un de 986 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. or a prescriptive period. for ease of reference, i will reproduce s. 13: déchéance ou de prescription. par souci de commo- dité, il convient de reproduire l’art. 13 : the prescriptive periods provided for in article 2926.1 of the civil code, enacted by section 7, apply to existing juridical situations taking into account the time already elapsed. les délais de prescription prévus à l’article 2926.1 du code civil, édicté par l’article 7 de la présente loi, sont applicables aux situations juridiques en cours en tenant compte du temps déjà écoulé. the provisions of article  2926.1 of the civil code concerning the starting point of prescriptive periods are declaratory. les dispositions de ce même article 2926.1 du code civil qui concernent le point de départ du délai de pres- cription sont déclaratoires. [277] first of all, the amending act specifically mentions only prescription and contains no transi- tional provision that could apply to the starting point of a term for forfeiture. absent such a provision, it should be assumed that the legislature did not intend, if it had introduced a term for forfeiture, to retroac- tively eliminate a right of action that existed when the act came into force (see banque de nouvelle- écosse v. cohen, 1999 canlii 13720 (que. ca), at pp. 11-12; québec (commission de la construc- tion) v. gastier inc. 1998 canlii 13132 (que. ca), at pp. 9-12; côté, at p. 197; r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6th ed. 2014), at pp 807-8). [277] d’une part, la loi modificatrice ne mentionne expressément que la prescription et ne contient au- cune disposition transitoire pouvant s’appliquer au point de départ d’un délai de déchéance. en l’ab- sence d’une telle disposition, il faudrait présumer que le législateur ne souhaitait pas, s’il avait introduit un délai de déchéance, faire disparaître rétroactivement un droit d’action existant au moment de l’entrée en vigueur de la loi (voir banque de nouvelle- écosse c. cohen, 1999 canlii 13720 (ca. qc), p. 11-12; québec (commission de la construction) c. gastier inc., 1998 canlii 13132 (ca. qc), p. 9-12; côté, par. 713; r. sullivan, sullivan on the construction of statutes (6e éd. 2014), p. 807- 808). [278] the same is also true if the second para- graph of art 29261 ccq simply provides for a prescriptive period. in my view, s. 13 of the amend- ing act does not give it any retroactive effect, be- cause the new starting point set on the date of death is not declaratory in nature. the legislature did not clearly express an intention to give retroactive ef- fect to every starting point for prescription provided for in the amending act. rather, it stated that the provisions in question are “declaratory”. the terms “declaratory” and “retroactive” are not synonymous. indeed, s. 50 of the interpretation act distinguishes them, at least implicitly (see also gravel v. city of st- léonard, [1978] 1 scr 660, at p 667). [278] il en est de même, d’autre part, si le deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq prévoit simplement un délai de prescription. à mon avis, l’art. 13 de la loi modificatrice ne lui attribue aucun effet rétroactif, parce que le nouveau point de départ fixé au moment du décès n’est pas de nature déclaratoire. en effet, le législateur n’a pas exprimé clairement l’intention de conférer un effet rétroactif à tout point de départ de la prescription prévu par la loi modificatrice. il a plutôt indiqué que les dispositions en cause sont « déclaratoires ». or, les termes « déclaratoire » et « rétroactif » ne sont pas synonymes. l’article 50 de la loi d’interprétation les distingue d’ailleurs, du moins implicitement (voir aussi gravel c. cité de st- léonard, [1978] 1 rcs 660, p 667). [279] by definition, a declaratory provision (some- times called an “interpretative” provision) is meant to settle or clarify the meaning or effect of existing law (see régie des rentes du québec v. canada bread company ltd., 2013 scc 46, [2013] 3 scr 125, at paras. 26-27; western minerals ltd v. gaumont, [279] par définition, une disposition déclaratoire (parfois appelée « interprétative » ou « déclarative ») vise à fixer ou à préciser le sens ou la portée d’une règle de droit existante (voir régie des rentes du québec c. canada bread company ltd., 2013 csc 46, [2013] 3 rcs 125, par. 26-27; western minerals [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 987 [1953] 1 scr 345, at pp. 367-68; côté, at p. 551; sullivan, at pp. 745 and 777; p. roubier, le droit tran- sitoire: conflits des lois dans le temps (2nd ed. 1993), at p. 245; j. ghestin and g. goubeaux, traité de droit civil: introduction générale (3rd ed. 1990), at para. 349; w f. craies, craies on legislation: a practitioners’ guide to the nature, process, effect and interpretation of legislation (11th ed. 2017), by d. greenberg, at para 181). in enacting a declar- atory provision, the legislature is, in a sense, per- forming a judicial function by interpreting its own legislation or the common law (see côté, at p 562). the reason why a statute that is declaratory in nature generally has retroactive effect is because the inter- pretation it imposes is deemed to have always been an integral part of the law in question (canada bread company ltd., at para. 28; côté, at p. 561; sullivan, at p. 682; ghestin and goubeaux, at paras 350-52). this is why, as stated in the classic text craies on statute law, “[w]here an act is in its nature declar- atory, the presumption against construing it retro- spectively is inapplicable” (w f. craies, craies on statute law (7th ed. 1971), by s g g. edgar, at p. 395, cited in côté, at p. 561 (emphasis added)). it therefore appears from the academic literature that the presumption against retroactivity will be rebutted only where the statute is “in its nature” declaratory. in other words, a declaratory provision has retroac- tive effect insofar as it interprets existing law in the way that a judicial decision would — sometimes by altering its meaning or effect. however, it is still necessary that there be existing law to interpret. ltd. c. gaumont, [1953] 1 rcs 345, p. 367- 368; côté, par. 1834; sullivan, p. 745 et 777; p. roubier, le droit transitoire : conflits des lois dans le temps (2e éd. 1993), p. 245; j. ghestin et g. goubeaux, traité de droit civil : introduction générale (3e éd. 1990), par. 349; w. f. craies, craies on legislation : a practitioners’ guide to the nature, process, effect and interpretation of legislation (11e éd. 2017), par d. greenberg, par 181). en adoptant une disposition déclaratoire, le législateur se trouve en quelque sorte à exercer une fonction judiciaire, en interprétant ses propres lois ou la common law (voir côté, par 1883). si une loi de nature déclaratoire a généralement un effet rétroactif, c’est parce que l’interprétation qu’elle impose est réputée avoir toujours fait partie intégrante de la règle de droit visée (canada bread company ltd., par. 28; côté, par. 1878- 1880; sullivan, p. 682; ghestin et goubeaux, par. 350- 352). c’est en ce sens que, selon l’ouvrage classique craies on statute law, [traduction] « [l]orsqu’une loi est de par sa nature déclaratoire, la présomption contre l’interprétation rétroactive n’est pas applicable » (w. f. craies, craies on statute law (7e éd. 1971), par s. g. g. edgar, p. 395, cité dans côté, par. 1878 (je souligne)). en conséquence, d’après la doctrine, il appert que la présomption de non- rétroactivité n’est repoussée que si la loi est déclaratoire « de par sa nature » même. en d’autres termes, une disposition déclaratoire a un effet rétroactif dans la mesure où elle vient interpréter, comme le ferait une décision judiciaire, une règle de droit antérieure — y compris parfois en en altérant le sens ou la portée. encore faut-il toutefois qu’il y ait une règle antérieure à interpréter. in the instant case, the provision setting [280] the starting point on the date of death can hardly be characterized as “declaratory” given that it is entirely new law that is not meant to settle or clar- ify existing law until the second paragraph  of art 29261. ccq came into force, death was, of course, never a starting point for prescription in actions arising from sexual aggression. by compar- ison, the first paragraph simply confirms a judicial interpretation that made awareness of the connection between the alleged act and the injury suffered the starting point for the prescriptive period. only this starting point is meant to be “declaratory” under s. 13 of the amending act and, in my view, only this [280] en l’espèce, la disposition établissant le point de départ au moment du décès peut difficilement être qualifiée de « déclaratoire », puisqu’il s’agit d’une toute nouvelle règle qui ne vise aucunement à fixer ou à préciser le droit existant. à l’évidence, le décès n’avait jamais marqué, jusqu’à l’entrée en vigueur du deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq, un point de départ de la prescription à l’égard des actions résultant d’une agression à caractère sexuel. le premier alinéa, par comparaison, vient simplement confirmer une certaine interprétation jurisprudentielle qui faisait de la prise de connaissance du lien entre l’acte reproché et le préjudice subi le point de départ du délai de prescription. seul ce point de départ se 988 l’oratoire saint- joseph v j.j côté j. [2019] 2 scr. starting point was intended by the legislature to have retroactive effect. if there is any doubt in this regard, the inter- [281] pretation that limits the scope of provisions that are explicitly retroactive or declaratory is to be preferred: “[y]ou ought not to give a larger retrospective power to a section, even in an act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective, than you can plainly see the legislature meant” (reid  v. reid (1886), 31 ch d 402, per bowen lj, at p. 409, cited in kent v. the king, [1924] scr 388, at p. 397; côté, at pp. 547-48 (emphasis added)). in other words, even where the presumption against retroactivity is expressly excluded, a second principle requires that the retroactive effect of provisions be narrowly construed. these two principles of statutory inter- pretation are closely related, of course, but they are nevertheless distinct. veut « déclaratoire » au sens de l’art. 13 de la loi mo- dificatrice et, à mon avis, c’est à lui uniquement que le législateur entendait conférer un effet rétroactif. [281] s’il existe un quelconque doute à ce sujet, il faut privilégier l’interprétation qui restreint la portée des dispositions explicitement rétroactives ou décla- ratoires : [traduction] « [i]l ne faut pas donner à un article une portée rétroactive plus considérable que celle que le législateur a manifestement voulu lui donner, même dans une loi conçue pour avoir, dans une certaine mesure, un effet rétroactif » (reid c. reid (1886), 31 ch. d. 402, le juge bowen, p. 409, cité dans kent c. the king, [1924] rcs 388, p. 397; côté, par. 1821- 1823 (je souligne)). autrement dit, même lorsque la présomption de non- rétroactivité est expressément écartée, un second principe veut que l’effet rétroactif des dispositions soit interprété restrictivement. quoique ces deux principes d’inter- prétation législative soient bien sûr étroitement liés, ils sont néanmoins distincts. [282] in the case at bar, it is clear that s. 13 of the amending act gives retroactive effect to the starting point provided for in the first paragraph, which is in its nature declaratory, but the same is not true of the new starting point established by the second paragraph. in any event, it would be unlikely that the legislature intended, without saying so more clearly, to suddenly and irrevocably extinguish the right of action of victims whose aggressors had died more than three years before the amending act came into force. [282] en l’espèce, il est manifeste que l’art. 13 de la loi modificatrice attribue un effet rétroactif au point de départ prévu au premier alinéa, lequel est déclaratoire de par sa nature même, mais il n’en va pas de même du nouveau point de départ établi par le deuxième alinéa. du reste, il serait invraisem- blable que le législateur ait eu l’intention, sans s’en exprimer plus clairement, d’éteindre subitement et irrémédiablement le droit d’action des victimes dont les agresseurs sont décédés plus de trois ans avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi modificatrice. [283] accordingly, regardless of whether the period under the second paragraph of art 29261 ccq is a term for forfeiture or a prescriptive period, it would not have begun to run, in relation to existing jurid- ical situations, before the coming into force of the amending act. this interpretation is consistent with the transitional rule proposed by roubier where a change is made to the starting point for prescription (p. 301); the quebec legislature in fact drew on that rule in enacting s. 6 of the act respecting the imple- mentation of the reform of the civil code, cqlr, c. ccq- 1992 (see côté, at pp. 197, 201 and 208-9; côté and jutras, at paras 2192 and 2193). under this interpretation, the introduction of a new starting [283] en conséquence, que le délai du deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq en soit un de déchéance ou de prescription, il n’aurait pas commencé à courir, dans le cas des situations juridiques en cours, avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi modificatrice. cette inter- prétation correspond à la règle de droit transitoire pro- posée par l’auteur roubier en cas de modification du point de départ de la prescription (p. 301); règle qui a d’ailleurs servi d’inspiration au législateur québécois au moment de l’adoption de la loi sur l’application de la réforme du code civil, rlrq, c. ccq- 1992, art. 6 (voir côté, par. 713, 725- 727 et 758- 759; côté et jutras, par 2192 et 2193). suivant cette interpré- tation, l’introduction d’un nouveau point de départ [2019] 2 rcs. l’oratoire saint- joseph c j.j la juge côté 989 point set on the date of death would not affect jj’s right of action in the instant case. fixé au moment du décès n’aurait pas d’incidence, en l’espèce, sur le droit d’action de jj. [284] in concluding on this point, i would note that the majority’s interpretation of the second par- agraph of art 29261 ccq is based in part on the premise that any other approach would have the effect of suddenly extinguishing the remedy of jj. and other potential victims in the same situation (gascon j.’s reasons, at paras. 136 and 145). this is simply not the case. [284] en concluant sur ce point, je ferais remar- quer que l’interprétation du deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261. ccq retenue par la majorité repose notamment sur la prémisse selon laquelle toute autre approche reviendrait à anéantir soudainement le re- cours de jj et des autres victimes potentielles dans la même situation (motifs du juge gascon, par. 136 et 145). ce n’est tout simplement pas le cas. iii conclusion iii conclusion [285] in the result, i agree with province cana- dienne and the oratory that the court of appeal’s intervention was unwarranted with respect to the condition of sufficiency of the facts alleged set out in art 575(2) ccp the application judge’s deci- sion dismissing the application for authorization to institute a class action should therefore be restored in relation to both province canadienne and the oratory. [285] en définitive, je conviens avec la province canadienne et l’oratoire que l’intervention de la cour d’appel était injustifiée en ce qui a trait à la condition de la suffisance des faits allégués suivant l’art 575(2) cpc. le jugement de première instance rejetant la demande d’autorisation d’exercer une action collective doit donc être rétabli, tant à l’égard de la province canadienne que de l’oratoire. [286] however, the appellants have not persuaded me that the period established by the second para- graph of art 29261 ccq is a term for forfeiture, although i am of the view that the provision makes the date of death the starting point for prescription and that its scope is not limited to the author of the act. [286] cependant, les appelants ne m’ont pas con- vaincue que le délai établi par le deuxième alinéa de l’art 29261 ccq en est un de déchéance, bien que j’estime par ailleurs que cette disposition fixe au mo- ment du décès le point de départ de la prescription, et que sa portée ne se limite pas à l’auteur de l’acte. [287] for these reasons, i would allow the appeal of province canadienne and the oratory, without costs given that they have waived them. [287] pour les motifs qui précèdent, j’accueillerais l’appel de la province canadienne et de l’oratoire, sans dépens vu leur renonciation à les réclamer. appeals dismissed with costs, wagner cj and gascon and rowe jj. dissenting in part and côté j. dissenting. pourvois rejetés avec dépens, le juge en chef wagner et les juges gascon et rowe sont dissi- dents en partie et la juge côté est dissidente. saint- joseph du mont- royal: de grandpré chait, montréal. procureurs de l’appelant/intervenant l’oratoire saint- joseph du mont- royal : de grandpré chait, montréal. canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix: fasken martineau dumoulin, montréal. procureurs de l’appelante/intervenante la pro- vince canadienne de la congrégation de sainte- croix : fasken martineau dumoulin, montréal. montréal; arsenault, lemieux, montréal; gareau avocat, montréal. procureurs de l’intimé : kugler kandestin, mont- réal; arsenault, lemieux, montréal; gareau avocat, montréal.
[1] karakatsanis j. — this appeal arises in liti- gation that implicates the relationship between two branches of the state. it requires this court to bal- ance several constitutional imperatives relating to the administration of justice and the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judi- cial branches of the state: the fi nancial dimension of judicial independence; the shared responsibility of the executive and legislature to make decisions about public money; and the public interest in ensur- ing the executive can conduct its internal business in confi dence. [1] la juge karakatsanis — le présent pourvoi découle d’un litige mettant en jeu les rapports qui existent entre deux des branches de l’état. il requiert que notre cour mette en balance plusieurs impératifs constitutionnels liés à l’administration de la justice et à la séparation des pouvoirs exécutif, législatif et judiciaire de l’état : la dimension fi nancière de l’indépendance judiciaire, la responsabilité que par- tagent l’exécutif et le législatif quant à la prise de décisions concernant les deniers publics et l’intérêt public à ce que l’exécutif puisse mener ses affaires internes confi dentiellement. [2] this appeal, along with its companion appeal, nova scotia (attorney general) v judges of the provincial court and family court of nova scotia, 2020 scc 21, [2020] 2 scr 556, asks whether a cabinet submission concerning a government’s response to a judicial compensation commission’s recommendations is properly part of the record on a judicial review of the government’s response. if so, the further issue arises whether the attorney general of british columbia should nevertheless be permitted to refuse to produce the submission on grounds of public interest immunity. [2] comme le pourvoi connexe nouvelle- écosse (procureur général) c judges of the provincial court and family court of nova scotia, 2020 csc 21, [2020] 2 rcs 556, le présent pourvoi porte sur la question de savoir si un mémoire au cabinet concernant une réponse d’un gouvernement aux re- commandations d’une commission d’examen de la rémunération des juges peut faire partie du dossier en cas de contrôle judiciaire de cette réponse. dans l’affi rmative, il faudra ensuite déterminer si, pour des motifs liés à l’immunité d’intérêt public, également parfois appelée exception d’intérêt public, le pro- cureur général de la colombie- britannique devrait malgré tout pouvoir refuser de produire le mémoire. [3] the british columbia courts found that the confi dential cabinet document requested by the provincial court judges’ association of british columbia was relevant and not protected by public interest immunity, and ordered that the attorney general produce it. [3] après avoir conclu que le document confi dentiel du cabinet réclamé par la provincial court judges’ association of british columbia (association) était pertinent et non protégé par l’immunité d’intérêt public, les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique ont ordonné au procureur général de le produire. [4] in my view, they were wrong to do so. [4] selon moi, ils ont eu tort de le faire. [5] in its judicial independence case law, this court has consistently sought to strike a balance between several competing constitutional considerations by establishing a unique process for setting judicial re- muneration, backed up by a focused, yet robust form of judicial review described in bodner v. alberta, [5] dans sa jurisprudence relative à l’indépen- dance judiciaire, la cour a constamment cherché à établir un juste équilibre entre plusieurs consi- dérations constitutionnelles opposées en créant un mécanisme unique pour fi xer la rémunération des juges. pour soutenir ce mécanisme, la cour a établi, 516 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. 2005 scc 44, [2005] 2 scr 286.1 in resolving this appeal, the rules of evidence and production must be applied in a manner that refl ects the unique features of the limited review described in bodner, and respects both judicial independence and the con- fi dentiality of cabinet decision making. [6] for the reasons that follow, where a party seek- ing bodner review requests that the government pro- duce a document relating to cabinet deliberations, it must fi rst establish that there is some basis to believe that the document may contain evidence which tends to show that the government failed to meet one of the requirements described in bodner. only then would the government be required to produce the docu- ment for judicial inspection. if the document does in fact provide some evidence which tends to show that the government’s response does not comply with the constitutional requirements, the court can then determine whether its production is barred by public interest immunity or another rule of evidence invoked by the government. dans l’arrêt bodner c. alberta, 2005 csc 44, [2005] 2 rcs 2861, une forme de contrôle judiciaire à la fois circonscrite et rigoureuse. pour trancher le présent pourvoi, la cour doit appliquer les règles en matière de preuve et de production de manière à tenir compte des caractéristiques uniques du contrôle limité décrit dans l’arrêt bodner et à respecter aussi bien le principe de l’indépendance judiciaire que celui de la confi dentialité du processus décisionnel du cabinet. [6] pour les motifs qui suivent, lorsqu’une partie qui sollicite un contrôle de type bodner réclame la production, par le gouvernement, d’un document se rapportant aux délibérations du cabinet, elle doit d’abord établir qu’il existe des raisons de croire que le document pourrait contenir des éléments de preuve tendant à démontrer que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une des exigences de l’analyse établie dans l’arrêt bodner. c’est seulement après que cette démonstration a été faite que le gouvernement est tenu de produire le document en vue de sa consulta- tion par un juge. si le document fournit effectivement des éléments de preuve tendant à démontrer que la réponse du gouvernement ne respecte pas les exi- gences constitutionnelles, le tribunal peut alors déci- der si l’immunité d’intérêt public ou une autre règle de preuve invoquée par le gouvernement s’applique de manière à empêcher la production. [7] public interest immunity requires a careful balancing between the competing public interests in confi dentiality and disclosure. since there will be a strong public interest in keeping a document con- cerning cabinet deliberations confi dential, it must be outweighed by a still stronger public interest to warrant the document’s disclosure. in the bodner context, the strength of the public interest in dis- closure will often depend on the importance of the [7] l’immunité d’intérêt public nécessite de mettre soigneusement en balance des intérêts opposés du public : d’une part, l’intérêt à ce que la confi dentialité des renseignements soit protégée et, d’autre part, l’intérêt à ce que ceux-ci soient divulgués. l’intérêt du public à ce qu’un document relatif aux délibéra- tions du cabinet demeure confi dentiel étant impor- tant, il doit être supplanté par un intérêt du public encore plus important à ce qu’il soit divulgué. dans 1 provincial court judges’ assn of new brunswick v new brunswick (minister of justice); ontario judges’ assn. v. ontario (management board); bodner v. alberta; conférence des juges du québec v. quebec (attorney general); minc v. quebec (attorney general), 2005 scc 44, [2005] 2 scr 286 (bodner). 1 assoc. des juges de la cour provinciale du nouveau- brunswick c. nouveau- brunswick (ministre de la justice); assoc. des juges de l’ontario c. ontario (conseil de gestion); bodner c. alberta; conférence des juges du québec c. québec (procureur général); minc c. québec (procureur général), 2005 csc 44, [2005] 2 rcs 286 (bodner). [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 517 document to determining the issues before the court in the bodner review. [8] here, the provincial court judges’ association did not meet the threshold necessary to compel production of a confi dential cabinet document for judicial inspection. while this is not a high bar, it is not met simply by showing that the government considered the cabinet document before making its response. i would allow the appeal and quash the order for production of the cabinet submission. le cadre d’un contrôle de type bodner, le poids à accorder à l’intérêt du public à ce que le document soit divulgué dépend souvent de l’importance du document visé pour que le tribunal de révision puisse trancher les questions dont il est saisi. [8] en l’espèce, l’association n’a pas fait la dé- monstration préliminaire requise pour qu’un juge ordonne la production d’un document confi dentiel du cabinet afi n de le consulter. bien que cette exigence ne soit pas élevée, on ne peut y satisfaire simplement en montrant que le gouvernement a tenu compte du document du cabinet avant de donner sa réponse. je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi et d’annuler l’ordonnance de production du mémoire au cabinet. i background i contexte a judicial compensation act, sbc 2003, c. 59 a judicial compensation act, sbc 2003, c. 59 in the reference re remuneration of judges [9] of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1997] 3 scr 3 (provincial judges reference), this court set out the constitutional baseline for mak- ing changes to judicial remuneration. the judicial compensation act implements that baseline in british columbia. [10] the judicial compensation act provides for the appointment of a triennial judicial compensation commission to make recommendations about the remuneration, allowances and benefi ts of provincial judges and judicial justices: ss. 2 and 5(1). the com- mission must consider a prescribed set of factors and may consider other factors, provided it justifi es their relevance: s. 5(5), (5.1) and (52). the commission communicates its recommendations in a fi nal report to the attorney general: s 5(3)2 [9] dans le renvoi relatif à la rémunération des juges de la cour provinciale de l’île-du- prince- édouard, [1997] 3 rcs 3 (renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale), la cour a énoncé les exigences constitutionnelles de base devant servir de référence pour modifi er le traitement des juges. c’est la loi intitulée judicial compensation act qui met en œuvre ces exigences de base en colombie- britannique. [10] la judicial compensation act prévoit la no- mination d’une commission triennale chargée de formuler des recommandations au sujet de la rému- nération, des indemnités et des avantages consentis aux juges provinciaux et aux juges de paix judi- ciaires : art. 2 et par 5(1). à cette fi n, la commission doit tenir compte d’un en semble de facteurs prescrits par la loi, et peut aussi prendre en considération d’autres facteurs, à condition de démontrer leur perti- nence : par. 5(5), (5.1) et (52). la commission com- munique ensuite ses recommandations au procureur général dans un rapport fi nal : par 5(3)2. 2 the attorney general is the minister responsible for the judicial compensation act designated by oc 213/2017, appendix b; see also attorney general act, rsbc 1996, c. 22, s. 2(j); constitution act, rsbc 1996, c. 66, s 10(3). 2 le procureur général est le ministre responsable de la judicial compensation act en vertu du décret 213/2017, ann. b; voir aussi la attorney general act, rsbc 1996, c. 22, al. 2(j); constitution act, rsbc 1996, c. 66, par 10(3). 518 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. [11] upon receipt of the commission’s report, the attorney general must then lay the report before the legislative assembly of british columbia within a statutory timeline: s 6(1). the attorney general must also advise the assembly that if it does not reject the commission’s recommendations within a statutory timeline, the recommendations will go into effect: s. 6(1) and (3). the assembly can then pass a resolution rejecting one or more recommendations and set judicial remuneration, allowances and ben- efi ts: s 6(2). the resolution has binding legal effect: ss. 6(4) and 8(1). [11] après réception du rapport de la commission, le procureur général le dépose auprès de l’assem- blée législative de la colombie- britannique dans le délai prescrit par la loi : par 6(1). il avise égale- ment l’assemblée législative que, faute par elle de rejeter les recommandations dans le délai prévu par la loi, celles-ci entreront en vigueur : par. 6(1) et (3). l’assemblée législative peut alors adopter une résolution rejetant l’une ou plusieurs des recomman- dations, puis fi xer la rémunération, les indemnités et les avantages des juges : par 6(2). cette résolution a un effet juridique obligatoire : par. 6(4) et 8(1). b judicial compensation commission’s rec om- men da tions and government’s response in october 2016, the judicial compensation [12] commission submitted its fi nal report to the attorney general and made recommendations for the 2017- 20 period. the commission recommended an 8.2 per- cent increase in the salary of provincial judges in 2017-18 and a 1.5 percent increase in both 2018-19 and 2019-20.3 the commission also recommended that the provincial court judges’ association be re- imbursed for the entirety of its costs of participating in the commission process. [13] at some point after the commission submitted its report, the attorney general made a submission to cabinet concerning the commission’s recommenda- tions and the government’s response. the cabinet submission is not in the record before this court and was not put before the courts below. moreover, there is no evidence in the record about what the submis- sion might contain. b recommandations de la commission d’examen de la rémunération des juges et réponse du gou- vernement [12] en octobre 2016, la commission d’examen de la rémunération des juges a remis son rapport fi nal au procureur général et formulé ses recommanda- tions pour la période 2017-2020. elle recommandait d’augmenter le salaire des juges provinciaux de 8,2 p 100 pour l’année 2017-2018, et de 1,5 p 100 pour les années 2018-2019 et 2019-20203. la commission recommandait également que l’association soit rem- boursée pour la totalité des frais qu’elle avait engagés pour sa participation au mécanisme d’examen par la commission. [13] quelque temps après le dépôt du rapport par la commission, le procureur général a soumis un mémoire au cabinet relatif aux recommandations de la commission et à la réponse du gouvernement. ce mémoire au cabinet ne fi gure pas dans le dossier dont notre cour est saisie, pas plus qu’il n’a été pro- duit devant les juridictions d’instances infé rieures. qui plus est, rien dans le dossier ne peut nous ren- seigner sur son contenu. [14] having laid the commission’s report before the legislative assembly in september 2017, the attorney general tabled the government’s proposed [14] après avoir déposé le rapport de la commis- sion à l’assemblée législative en septembre 2017, le procureur général a déposé le mois suivant, soit 3 the baseline salary used by the commission in making its rec- ommendations was $244,112 for the 2016-17 fi scal year, but the legislative assembly later retrospectively increased the salary for 2016-17 by 3.4 percent to $252,290, thereby reducing the effect of the increase recommended by the commission for the 2017-20 period. 3 le salaire de base utilisé par la commission aux fi ns de ses recom- mandations s’établissait à 244 112 $ pour l’exercice fi nancier 2016-2017. cependant, par la suite, l’assemblée législative a appliqué au salaire de base de 2016-2017 une hausse rétroactive de 3,4 p 100, le portant ainsi à 252 290 $, ce qui a eu pour consé- quence d’atténuer les effets de l’augmentation recommandée par la commission pour la période 2017-2020. [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 519 response to the commission’s report in october 2017. the attorney general did not table the cabinet sub- mission and there is no indication in the record that any member of the legislative assembly other than those serving in cabinet was aware of the contents of the submission. en octobre 2017, la proposition de réponse du gou- vernement à ce rapport. il n’a cependant pas déposé le mémoire au cabinet, et rien dans le dossier ne porte à croire que quiconque siégeant à l’assemblée législative, en dehors des membres du cabinet, était au courant de son contenu. [15] the attorney general moved to pass a reso- lution rejecting the commission’s recommended in- crease in the salary of provincial judges and adopting a 3.8 percent increase in 2017-18 and a 1.5 percent increase in both 2018-19 and 2019-20.4 the attorney general also proposed reducing the recommended reimbursement for the provincial court judges’ association’s costs of participating in the commis- sion process from approximately $93,000 to about $66,000 in accordance with the formula established by s 71 of the judicial compensation act. with the support of government and opposition members, the legislative assembly passed the resolution. [16] the provincial court judges’ association petitioned for judicial review of the legislative assembly’s resolution. among other things, the provincial court judges’ association asked to have the resolution quashed and sought a declaration that the government’s response and the resolution were inconsistent with the judicial compensation act and with the constitutional principle of judicial in- dependence. [17] in anticipation of the hearing of their peti- tion on the merits, the provincial court judges’ association asked the attorney general to produce the cabinet submission relied on in preparing the government’s response. the attorney general re- fused, so the association sought an order to require the attorney general to produce the submission: see supreme court civil rules, bc. reg. 168/2009, r 22-1(4)(c). [15] le procureur général a proposé l’adoption d’une résolution visant le rejet de l’augmentation salariale des juges provinciaux recommandée par la commission, ainsi que l’approbation d’une hausse de 3,8 p 100 en 2017-2018 et de 1,5 p 100 pour les années 2018-2019 et 2019-20204. le procureur général a également proposé de réduire le montant que la commission recommandait d’accorder à l’as- sociation à titre de remboursement pour les coûts associés à sa participation au mécanisme d’examen par la commission de quelque 93 000 $ à environ 66 000 $, suivant la formule établie à l’art 71 de la judicial compensation act. avec l’appui des députés du gouvernement et de l’opposition, l’assemblée législative a adopté la résolution. [16] l’association a demandé que cette résolution de l’assemblée législative fasse l’objet d’un contrôle judiciaire dans le cadre duquel elle a notamment sollicité l’annulation de la résolution de même qu’un jugement déclaratoire portant que la réponse du gou- vernement et la résolution étaient incompatibles avec la judicial compensation act et avec le principe constitutionnel de l’indépendance judiciaire. [17] en prévision de l’instruction de cette demande sur le fond, l’association a demandé au procureur général de produire le mémoire au cabinet pris en compte par le gouvernement au moment de préparer sa réponse. le procureur général a refusé. l’asso- ciation a donc sollicité une ordonnance obligeant celui-ci à produire le document : voir supreme court civil rules, bc. reg. 168/2009, al 22-1(4)(c). 4 the retrospective salary increase for 2016-17 similarly reduces the effect of the increase adopted by the legislative assembly for the 2017-20 period. 4 l’augmentation salariale rétrospective pour la période 2016-2017 réduit de la même façon l’effet de l’augmentation adoptée par l’assemblée législative pour la période 2017-2020. 520 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. ii procedural history ii historique des procédures a supreme court of british columbia, 2018 bcsc a cour suprême de la colombie- britannique, 1193 (master muir) 2018 bcsc 1193 (la protonotaire muir) [18] the provincial court judges’ association’s motion was initially heard by a supreme court of british columbia master. the master noted that the attorney general did not contest that the govern- ment’s response was informed by a detailed submis- sion to cabinet: para. 9 (canlii). [18] la requête de l’association a d’abord été ins- truite par une protonotaire de la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique. la protonotaire a relevé que le procureur général n’avait pas contesté que la réponse du gouvernement s’appuyait sur un mémoire détaillé au cabinet : par. 9 (canlii). [19] turning to relevance, while acknowledging that the government had not referred to or relied on the submission to cabinet in making its decision, the master concluded that the submission was relevant to the bodner review and specifi cally to whether the government relied on a reasonable factual founda- tion in developing its response to the commission’s recommendation, and whether its response demon- strates meaningful engagement with the commission process: paras. 9 and 18-21. [20] regarding public interest immunity, the master explained that the attorney general did not provide any specifi c evidence of harm that would result from the production of the cabinet submission: para 23. the importance of review of the government’s re- sponse and the need for transparency outweighed the public interest in its remaining confi dential: paras. 23 and 27. the master ordered the attorney general to produce the cabinet submission: para 28. b supreme court of british columbia, 2018 bcsc 1390, 19 bclr (6th) 168 (hinkson cjsc) [19] sur la question de la pertinence, la protono- taire a reconnu que le gouvernement n’avait ni sou- levé la question du mémoire au cabinet ni ne s’était fondé sur ce document pour prendre sa décision. elle a tout de même conclu que celui-ci était pertinent aux fi ns du contrôle de type bodner, particulièrement en ce qui a trait aux questions de savoir si le gouverne- ment s’était appuyé sur un fondement factuel raison- nable pour élaborer sa réponse aux recommandations de la commission, et si sa réponse démontrait qu’il avait participé sérieusement au mécanisme d’examen de la commission : par. 9 et 18-21. [20] sur la question de l’immunité d’intérêt public, la protonotaire a expliqué que le procureur général n’avait présenté aucun élément de preuve particu- lier pour démontrer qu’un préjudice résulterait de la production du mémoire au cabinet : par 23. selon elle, l’importance de soumettre la réponse du gou- vernement à un contrôle judiciaire et la nécessité d’assurer la transparence du processus l’emportaient sur l’intérêt du public à ce que le document demeure confi dentiel : par. 23 et 27. la protonotaire a donc ordonné au procureur général de produire le mémoire au cabinet : par 28. b cour suprême de la colombie- britannique, 2018 bcsc 1390, 19 bclr (6th) 168 (le juge en chef hinkson) [21] the supreme court of british columbia dis- missed the appeal from the master’s decision. like the master, the court did not examine the cabinet submission: para 45. [21] la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique a rejeté l’appel formé à l’encontre de la décision de la protonotaire. tout comme cette dernière, elle n’a pas examiné le mémoire au cabinet : par 45. [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 521 [22] hinkson cjsc found no error in the mas- ter’s conclusion that the cabinet submission was relevant, agreeing that the submission was relevant to the issue whether the government respected the commission process such that the overall objectives of the process were achieved: paras 34-35. [23] the court found no error in the master’s con- clusion that public interest immunity did not apply based on the factors identifi ed in carey v. ontario, [1986] 2 scr 637. the court emphasized that the submission related to the subject matter of the litiga- tion and that the attorney general did not offer in any evidence that any particular harm would fl ow from disclosure: para 46. [22] le juge en chef hinkson n’a décelé aucune erreur dans la conclusion de la protonotaire selon la- quelle le mémoire au cabinet était pertinent, conve- nant avec elle que le document était de fait pertinent quant à la question de savoir si le gouvernement avait respecté le mécanisme d’examen par la commission et qu’il avait donc été satisfait aux objectifs généraux du recours à une commission : par 34-35. [23] la cour a en outre conclu que la protonotaire n’avait pas commis d’erreur en décidant que, selon les facteurs énoncés dans l’arrêt carey c. ontario, [1986] 2 rcs 637, l’immunité d’intérêt public ne s’appliquait pas. la cour a souligné que le mémoire avait trait à l’objet du litige, et que le procureur général n’avait présenté aucun élément de preuve indiquant que la divulgation causerait un préjudice particulier : par 46. c court of appeal for british columbia, 2018 bcca 394, 19 bclr (6th) 188 (bauman cjbc,. harris and dickson jja). c cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique, 2018 bcca 394, 19 bclr (6th) 188 (le juge en chef bauman et les juges harris et dickson) [24] the court of appeal for british columbia dismissed the attorney general’s further appeal from the supreme court’s decision. writing for the court of appeal, bauman cjbc explained that although the legislative assembly is the decision- maker un- der the judicial compensation act, the attorney general prepares the government’s draft response for approval by cabinet before presenting it to the legislative assembly: para 9. cabinet is thus di- rectly involved in the decision- making process. [24] la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a rejeté le pourvoi subséquent du procureur géné- ral interjeté à l’encontre de la décision de la cour suprême de la province. s’exprimant au nom de la cour d’appel, le juge en chef bauman a expliqué que, bien que l’assemblée législative soit l’instance décisionnelle selon la judicial compensation act, c’est le procureur général qui prépare l’ébauche de réponse du gouvernement à soumettre au cabinet pour approbation avant qu’il ne la présente à l’as- semblée législative : par 9. le cabinet participe donc directement au processus décisionnel. [25] the court of appeal concluded that the cabinet submission was necessarily relevant given that it informed the government’s response to the commission’s recommendations: paras. 9 and 16. since cabinet was “a primary actor in the impugned ‘government response’   , the cabinet submission is clearly ‘evidence which was before the admin- istrative decision- maker’” and should be included in the record on judicial review: para.  19, quot- ing stonechild, re, 2007 skca 74, 304 sask. r. 1, cited as hartwig v. saskatchewan (commission of inquiry), at para 33. the court of appeal also [25] la cour d’appel a conclu que le mémoire au cabinet était nécessairement pertinent, puisqu’il avait inspiré la réponse du gouvernement aux recom- mandations de la commission : par. 9 et 16. dans la me sure où le cabinet [traduction] « a joué un rôle de premier plan dans la “réponse du gouverne- ment” contestée [  ], le mémoire au cabinet est assurément “un élément de preuve dont était saisi le décideur administratif” » et devrait dès lors faire partie du dossier du contrôle judiciaire : par. 19, citant stonechild, re, 2007 skca 74, 304 sask. r 1, sous le nom de hartwig c saskatchewan 522 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. affi rmed hinkson cjsc’s analysis on public inter- est immunity: para 22. (commission of inquiry), par 33. la cour d’appel a également confi rmé le bien- fondé de l’analyse du juge en chef hinkson relative à l’immunité d’intérêt public : par 22. iii issues iii questions en litige [26] this appeal raises two issues: (a) whether the cabinet submission in this case should form part of the record on bodner review and (b) whether the cabinet submission is protected by public interest immunity. [26] le présent pourvoi soulève deux questions : a)  le mémoire au cabinet en cause en l’espèce devrait-il faire partie du dossier aux fi ns du contrôle de type bodner? et, b) le mémoire au cabinet est-il protégé par l’immunité d’intérêt public? iv analysis iv analyse a judicial independence and the nature of bodner a indépendance judiciaire et nature du contrôle review de type bodner [27] this appeal arises in the context of review of a government’s response to a judicial compensation commission’s recommendations. such review aims to safeguard judicial independence. [28] the constitutional principle of judicial inde- pendence fl ows from the recital in the preamble to the constitution act, 1867 that our country is to have a “constitution similar in principle to that of the united kingdom”, ss. 96 to 101 of the constitution act, 1867, s. 11(d) of the ca na dian charter of rights and freedoms and s. 42(1)(d) of the constitution act, 1982: beauregard v. can ada, [1986] 2 scr 56, at pp. 72-73; provincial judges reference, at paras. 84 and 105-9; reference re supreme court act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 scc 21, [2014] 1 scr 433, at para. 94; conférence des juges de paix magistrats du québec v. quebec (attorney general), 2016 scc 39, [2016] 2 scr 116, at para 31. [27] le présent pourvoi survient dans le contexte du contrôle judiciaire de la réponse donnée par un gouvernement aux recommandations d’une commis- sion d’examen de la rémunération des juges. un tel contrôle vise à protéger l’indépendance judiciaire. [28] le principe constitutionnel de l’indépendance judiciaire prend sa source dans l’énoncé du préam- bule de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 selon lequel le ca nada doit se doter d’une « constitution reposant sur les mêmes principes que celle du royaume- uni », dans les art. 96 à 101 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, dans l’al. 11d) de la charte ca na dienne des droits et libertés et dans l’al. 42(1)d) de la loi constitutionnelle de 1982 : beauregard c. ca nada, [1986] 2 rcs 56, p. 72-73; renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par. 84 et 105-109; renvoi relatif à la loi sur la cour suprême, art. 5 et 6, 2014 csc 21, [2014] 1 rcs 433, par. 94; conférence des juges de paix magistrats du québec c. québec (procureure générale), 2016 csc 39, [2016] 2 rcs 116, par 31. [29] these provisions and the broader principle of judicial independence serve not only to protect the separation of powers between the branches of the state and thus, the integrity of our constitutional structure, but also to promote public confi dence in the administration of justice: ell v. alberta, 2003 scc 35, [2003] 1 scr 857, at paras. 21-23; conférence [29] ces dispositions, de même que le principe plus large de l’indépendance judiciaire, visent non seulement à protéger la séparation des pouvoirs entre les branches de l’état et donc l’intégrité de notre structure constitutionnelle, mais aussi à favoriser la confi ance du public dans l’administration de la jus- tice : ell c. alberta, 2003 csc 35, [2003] 1 rcs. [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 523 des juges de paix magistrats, at para 31. they are fundamental to the rule of law and to democracy in can ada. 857, par. 21-23; conférence des juges de paix magis- trats, par 31. ce sont des éléments fondamentaux de la primauté du droit et de la démocratie au ca nada. [30] the overarching principle of judicial inde- pendence applies to all courts, whether of civil or criminal jurisdiction and whether their judges are appointed by federal, provincial or territorial au- thorities: provincial judges reference, at para. 106; ell, at paras. 21-24; conférence des juges de paix magistrats, at para 32. [31] the three core characteristics of judicial in- dependence are security of tenure, fi nancial security and administrative independence: provincial judges reference, at para 118. the characteristic at issue in this appeal — fi nancial security — in turn has three components, “which all fl ow from the constitutional imperative that    the relationship between the ju- diciary and the other branches of government be de- politicized”: para. 131 (emphasis in original). first, absent a “dire and exceptional fi nancial emergency precipitated by unusual circumstances”, a govern- ment cannot change judicial remuneration param- eters without fi rst seeking the recommendations of an independent body, a “commission”: paras. 133 and 137. (government can, depending on the context, mean the executive, legislature or legislative assem- bly.) second, judges cannot engage in negotiations with the government over remuneration: para 134. finally, judicial remuneration cannot fall below the basic minimum level required for the offi ce of a judge: para 135. [32] more specifi cally, this appeal concerns the fi rst component of fi nancial security: the conven- ing of a judicial compensation commission to make recommendations concerning judicial remuneration. the commission charged with making such rec- ommendations must be independent, effective and objective: provincial judges reference, at para 133. [30] le principe primordial de l’indépendance de la magistrature s’applique à tous les tribunaux judi- ciaires, qu’ils soient de juridiction civile ou pénale, et que les juges qui les président soient nommés par des autorités fédérales, provinciales ou territo- riales : renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provin- ciale, par. 106; ell, par. 21-24; conférence des juges de paix magistrats, par 32. [31] les trois caractéristiques centrales de l’indé- pendance judiciaire sont l’inamovibilité, la sécurité fi nancière et l’indépendance administrative : renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par 118. celle que met en jeu le présent pourvoi — la sécurité fi nancière — comporte à son tour trois éléments, « qui découlent tous de l’impératif constitutionnel qui veut que [  ] les rapports entre le judiciaire et les deux autres pouvoirs de l’état soient dépo- litisés » : par. 131 (soulignement dans l’original). premièrement, sauf en cas de «  crise fi nancière exceptionnellement grave provoquée par des cir- constances extraordinaires », un gouvernement ne peut pas modifi er les paramètres de la rémunéra- tion des juges sans s’être d’abord enquis des re- commandations d’un organisme indépendant, une « commission » : par. 133 et 137. (le terme « gou- vernement » peut, selon le contexte, s’entendre de l’exécutif, de la législature ou de l’assemblée législative.) deuxièmement, les juges ne peuvent pas entre prendre de négociations avec le gouver- nement concernant leur rémunération  : par.  134. troisièmement, la rémunération des juges ne peut se situer en deçà du minimum requis par la charge de juge : par 135. [32] plus précisément, le présent pourvoi porte sur le premier élément de la sécurité fi nancière : la convocation d’une commission d’examen de la rémunération des juges qui est chargée de formuler des recommandations au sujet de cette rémunération. la commission ainsi mandatée doit être à la fois indépendante, effi cace et objective : renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par 133. 524 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. [33] the effectiveness requirement means that the commission must be regularly convened, that no changes can be made to remuneration until the com- mission submits its report and that “the reports of the commission must have a meaningful effect on the determination of judicial salaries”: provincial judges reference, at paras. 174-75 and 179; see also bodner, at para 29. [33] le critère de l’effi cacité suppose que la com- mission soit convoquée régulièrement, qu’aucun changement ne soit apporté à la rémunération en cause avant qu’elle n’ait déposé son rapport et que « [s]es rapports [aient] un effet concret sur la déter- mination des traitements des juges » : renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par. 174-175 et 179; voir aussi bodner, par 29. [34] to ensure that the commission’s recommen- dations have a meaningful effect, the government must formally respond to the commission’s report: provincial judges reference, at para. 179; bodner, at para 22. because of the executive and legisla- ture’s shared constitutional responsibility to make decisions about the expenditure of public money,5 the commission’s recommendations are not binding (unless the legislature so provides). the government must, however, give specifi c reasons justifying any departure from the recommendations: provincial judges reference, at para. 180; bodner, at paras. 18 and 20-21; conférence des juges de paix magistrats, at para 35. [35] to hold a government to its constitutional obligations in jurisdictions where a commission’s recommendations are not binding, the government’s response to the commission’s recommendations is subject to what this court described in bodner as a “limited form of judicial review”: paras. 29 and 42. the standard of justifi cation to uphold the govern- ment’s response is that of “rationality”: provincial judges reference, at paras. 183-84; mackin v. new brunswick (minister of finance), 2002 scc 13, [2002] 1 scr 405, at para. 57; bodner, at para 29. both the standard of justifi cation and the test used to measure the government’s response against that standard are “deferential”: bodner, at paras. 30, 40 and 43. both the fact that the government remains ultimately responsible for setting judicial compensa- tion and the fact that the nature of a bodner review is [34] de façon à garantir que les recommandations de la commission aient un effet concret, le gouver- nement est tenu de répondre formellement au rapport où elles sont formulées : renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par. 179; bodner, par 22. étant donnée la responsabilité constitutionnelle que partagent l’exécutif et le législatif quant à la prise de décisions concernant les deniers publics5, les recommandations de la commission n’ont pas force obligatoire (à moins d’indications en ce sens par la législature). le gouvernement doit toute fois indiquer les motifs précis justifi ant sa décision de s’écarter de quelque façon que ce soit des recommandations : renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par. 180; bodner, par. 18 et 20-21; conférence des juges de paix magistrats, par 35. [35] pour veiller à ce que le gouvernement res- pecte ses obligations constitutionnelles là où les re- commandations d’une commission n’ont pas force obligatoire, sa réponse à ces recommandations est soumise à ce que notre cour a décrit, dans bodner, comme une « forme limitée de contrôle judiciaire » : par. 29 et 42. pour être jugée valide, la réponse du gouvernement doit respecter la norme de justifi ca- tion dite de la « rationalité » : renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par. 183-184; mackin c nouveau- brunswick (ministre des finances), 2002 csc 13, [2002] 1 rcs 405, par. 57; bodner, par 29. cette norme de justifi cation, tout comme l’analyse à effectuer pour évaluer la réponse du gou- vernement à l’aune de celle-ci, commande la « rete- nue » : bodner, par. 30, 40 et 43. tant le fait que le gouvernement reste ultimement responsable de fi xer 5 see constitution act, 1867, ss. 54, 90 to 92, 100 to 102, 106 and 5 voir la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, art. 54, 90 à 92, 100 à 102, 126. 106 et 126. [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 525 limited serve to balance the constitutional interests at stake. [36] building on the approach established by the provincial judges reference, in bodner, at para. 31, this court set out a three- part test for determining whether a government’s decision to depart from a commission’s recommendation meets the rational- ity standard: la rémunération des membres de la magistrature que le fait qu’un contrôle de type bodner est limité servent à mettre en balance les intérêts constitution- nels en jeu. [36] prenant comme point de départ l’approche établie par le renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour pro- vinciale, la cour, au par. 31 de l’arrêt bodner, a défi ni une analyse en trois étapes permettant de déterminer si la décision d’un gouvernement de s’écarter des recommandations d’une commission satisfait à la norme de la rationalité : (1) has the government articulated a legitimate rea- son for departing from the commission’s recom- mendations? (1) le gouvernement a-t-il justifi é par un motif légi- time sa décision de s’écarter des recommanda- tions de la commission? (2) do the government’s reasons rely upon a reason- (2) les motifs invoqués par le gouvernement ont- ils able factual foundation? and un fondement factuel raisonnable? (3) viewed globally, has the commission process been respected and have the purposes of the commission — preserving judicial independ- ence and depoliticizing the setting of judicial remuneration — been achieved? [37] under the fi rst two parts of the test, the focus is on the reasons given by government for departing from the commission’s recommendations: bodner, at paras. 32-33 and 36. the government “must re- spond to the [commission’s] recommendations” by “giv[ing] legitimate reasons for departing from or varying them”: paras 23-24. the reasons must “show that the commission’s recommendations have been taken into account and must be based on [a rea- sonable factual foundation] and sound reasoning”: paras 25-26. the reasons must also “articulat[e] the grounds for rejection or variation”, “reveal a consideration of the judicial offi ce and an intention to deal with it appropriately”, “preclude any sug- gestion of attempting to manipulate the judiciary” and “refl ect the underlying public interest in having a commission process, being the depoliticization of the remuneration process and the need to preserve judicial independence”: para 25. (3) dans l’en semble, le mécanisme d’examen par une commission a-t-il été respecté et les ob- jectifs du recours à une commission, à savoir préserver l’indépendance de la magistrature et dépolitiser la fi xation de la rémunération des juges, ont- ils été atteints? [37] les deux premières étapes de l’analyse portent sur les motifs invoqués par un gouvernement pour justifi er de s’être écarté des recommandations d’une commission : bodner, par. 32-33 et 36. la réponse du gouvernement doit « porter sur les recommandations [de la commission] » et « justifi er par des motifs légitimes sa décision de les modifi er ou de ne pas les suivre » : par 23-24. les motifs doivent « révéler que les recommandations ont été prises en compte [en plus de s’appuyer sur un fondement factuel rai- sonnable] et un raisonnement solide » : par 25-26. les motifs doivent en outre « indiquer les raisons du rejet ou de la modifi cation » et « démontrer qu’on a procédé à un examen des fonctions judiciaires et qu’on a l’intention de prendre les me sures qui s’imposent », tout en ne « donn[ant pas] à penser qu’on cherche à manipuler la magistrature ». enfi n, les motifs doivent « refl éter l’intérêt du public à ce qu’il y ait recours à une commission, mécanisme qui garantit la dépolitisation de l’examen de la rémuné- ration et permet de préserver l’indépendance de la magistrature » : par 25. 526 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. [38] the third part of the bodner test looks to whether the government has respected the commis- sion process and, more broadly, whether the purposes of that process have been achieved: paras. 30-31, 38 and 43. this new part of the test was added by this court in an effort to achieve the “unfulfi lled” hopes this court had in the provincial judges reference of depoliticizing the process of setting judicial remuner- ation and thereby preserving judicial independence: paras. 10-12 and 31. the third step in the bodner test requires the court to take a global perspective and ask whether the government demonstrated respect for the judicial offi ce by engaging meaningfully with the commission process: see paras. 25, 31 and 38. [39] however, this addition in bodner was not intended to transform the analysis into a probing review of the process through which the govern- ment developed its response, whether it took place within the executive, the legislature or both. as a result, i cannot agree with the provincial court judges’ association that references to the “totality” or “whole of the process” in bodner, at para. 38, were meant to expand the scope of review such that the cabinet decision- making process must necessarily be scrutinized in every case. [40] there is no doubt that the provincial judges reference and bodner require that the review- ing court focus on the government’s response. in bodner itself, this court looked at the alberta, new brunswick and ontario governments’ responses to commission recommendations to determine whether the third part of the bodner test had been met: paras. 83, 100 and 130-31. that said, the third part of the bodner test is not necessarily limited to consideration of the government’s public reasons. [38] la troisième étape de l’analyse établie par l’arrêt bodner vise à déterminer si le gouvernement a respecté le mécanisme d’examen par une commis- sion et, plus globalement, si les objectifs du recours à ce mécanisme ont été atteints : par. 30-31, 38 et 43. la cour a ajouté cette étape à l’analyse afi n de satis- faire à ses espoirs exprimés dans le renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale qui « ne [s’étaient] pas réalisés ». ceux-ci consistaient à dépolitiser le pro- cessus de fi xation de la rémunération des membres de la magistrature et à ainsi préserver l’indépendance judiciaire : par. 10-12 et 31. la troisième étape en question exige que le tribunal examine la question dans son en semble et se demande si le gouvernement en cause a fait preuve de respect envers les fonctions judiciaires en participant sérieusement au mécanisme d’examen par une commission : voir les par. 25, 31 et 38. [39] toute fois, cet ajout dans l’arrêt bodner n’était pas censé transformer l’analyse en un examen poussé de la démarche par laquelle le gouvernement a éla- boré sa réponse, que cette démarche se soit déroulée au sein de l’exécutif, de la législature ou des deux. par conséquent, je ne saurais souscrire à l’opinion de l’association selon laquelle les termes « en semble » ou « dans son en semble », qui fi gurent au par. 38 de l’arrêt bodner, avaient pour but d’étendre la por- tée du contrôle judiciaire au point où le processus décisionnel du cabinet doit être systématiquement analysé en profondeur. il n’y a aucun doute que le renvoi relatif aux [40] juges de la cour provinciale et l’arrêt bodner obligent le tribunal saisi du contrôle judiciaire à se concentrer sur la réponse du gouvernement. dans l’arrêt bodner lui- même, la cour a examiné les réponses des gou- vernements de l’alberta, du nouveau- brunswick et de l’ontario aux recommandations de commissions pour déterminer s’il avait été satisfait à la troisième étape de l’analyse qu’elle venait d’établir : par. 83, 100 et 130-131. cela dit, cette étape ne se limite pas nécessairement à un examen des motifs invoqués publiquement par le gouvernement. [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 527 [41] moreover, this does not mean that the govern- ment can hide behind reasons that conceal an im- proper or colourable purpose. the provincial judges reference and bodner cannot be interpreted to mean that as long as the government’s public reasons are facially legitimate and appear grounded in a rea- sonable factual foundation, the government could provide reasons that were not given in good faith. indeed, it is implicit in the third part of the bodner test itself that, presented with evidence that the gov- ernment’s response is rooted in an improper or col- ourable purpose and has accordingly fallen short of the constitutional benchmark set in this court’s jurisprudence, the reviewing court cannot simply accept the government’s formal response without further inquiry. [42] this is nothing new. in beauregard, at p. 77, this court made clear that “[i]f there were any hint that a federal law dealing with [the fi xing of salaries and pensions of superior court judges] was enacted for an improper or colourable purpose, or if there was discriminatory treatment of judges vis-à-vis other citizens, then serious issues relating to judicial in- dependence would arise and the law might well be held to be ultra vires s. 100 of the constitution act, 1867” (emphasis added). this is true of all judges to whom the constitutional principle of judicial inde- pendence applies: see provincial judges reference, at paras. 145 and 165. [41] de plus, cela ne signifi e pas que le gouver- nement peut se cacher derrière des motifs qui dis- simulent un objectif illégitime ou déguisé (aussi parfois qualifi é dans la jurisprudence de la cour de « malhonnête ou spécieux »). il faut se garder d’interpréter le renvoi relatif à la rémunération des juges et l’arrêt bodner comme s’ils signifi aient que, dans la me sure où les motifs invoqués publique- ment par le gouvernement sont légitimes à première vue et semblent s’appuyer sur un fondement factuel raisonnable, le gouvernement pourrait fournir des motifs de mauvaise foi. en effet, il ressort implicite- ment de la troisième étape même de l’analyse établie par l’arrêt bodner que, saisi d’éléments de preuve démontrant que la réponse d’un gouvernement visait un objectif illégitime ou déguisé et ne satisfait donc pas aux exigences constitutionnelles établies par la jurisprudence de la cour, le tribunal de révision ne peut se contenter d’accepter la réponse formelle du gouvernement sans pousser son examen plus loin. [42] rien de cela n’est nouveau dans l’arrêt beauregard, p. 77, la cour a énoncé clairement que « [s]’il y avait un indice qu’une loi fédérale traitant [de la fi xation des salaires et du régime de retraite des juges des cours supérieures] avait été adoptée dans un but malhonnête ou spécieux, ou si les juges étaient traités d’une manière discriminatoire par rapport aux autres citoyens, de graves questions se poseraient alors concernant l’indépendance judiciaire et la loi en question pourrait très bien être jugée ultra vires de l’art. 100 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 » (je souligne). cette conclusion s’applique à l’égard de tous les juges visés par le principe constitutionnel de l’indépendance judiciaire : voir le renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par. 145 et 165. [43] considerations of legitimacy and respect for the process  — and conversely, considerations of impropriety or colourability — permeate the en- tire bodner analysis. indeed, in bodner, which con- cerned the remuneration of provincially- appointed judges, this court considered whether the reasons given by the alberta, new brunswick, ontario and quebec governments were “based on purely political considerations”, “reveal political or discriminatory motivations” or “evidence any improper political [43] des considérations relatives à la légitimité du mécanisme et au respect qui lui est dû — et in- versement des considérations relatives au caractère illégitime ou déguisé du véritable objectif du gou- vernement — imprègnent l’en semble de l’analyse établie par l’arrêt bodner. en effet, dans ce der- nier, qui portait sur la rémunération des juges nom- més par les provinces, la cour s’est demandé si les motifs donnés par les gouvernements de l’alberta, du nouveau- brunswick, de l’ontario et du québec 528 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. purpose or intent to manipulate or infl uence the ju- diciary”: paras. 66, 96 and 159; see also paras. 68 and 123. [44] reasons that reveal an improper or colour- able purpose would fail the fi rst step of the bodner test which requires that a government articulate a legitimate reason for departing from a commission’s recommendations. similarly, in reviewing whether a government had relied on a reasonable factual foun- dation, this court acknowledged the possibility that the government might also rely on “affi davits con- taining evidence of good faith and commitment to the process, such as information relating to the gov- ernment’s study of the impact of the commission’s recommendations”: bodner, at para 36. finally, a government’s conduct and the adequacy of its re- sponse are also directly engaged in the third part of the bodner test, which looks to whether the govern- ment has respected the commission process and, more broadly, whether the purposes of that process have been achieved. étaient « dictés par des considérations purement poli- tiques », « révél[aient] qu’ils [étaient] dictés par des considérations politiques ou discriminatoires » ou « dénot[aient] l’existence d’un objectif poli tique illégitime [ou d’]une intention de manipuler ou d’in- fl uencer la magistrature » : par. 66, 96 et 159; voir aussi par. 68 et 123. [44] des motifs qui révèlent un objectif illégitime ou déguisé échoueraient à la première étape de l’ana- lyse établie par l’arrêt bodner qui exige que le gou- vernement fournisse un motif légitime pour s’écarter des recommandations d’une commission. de même, lorsqu’elle a examiné si un gouvernement s’était ap- puyé sur un fondement factuel raisonnable, la cour a reconnu la possibilité qu’il se soit peut- être appuyé sur des « affi davits contenant des preuves de la bonne foi et de l’engagement à l’égard du mécanisme, par exemple, des renseignements sur l’étude gouver- nementale de l’impact des recommandations de la commission » : bodner, par 36. enfi n, la conduite du gouvernement et l’à-propos de sa réponse sont également directement en cause à la troisième étape de l’analyse établie par l’arrêt bodner, qui porte sur la question de savoir si le gouvernement a fait preuve de respect envers le mécanisme d’examen par une commission et, plus globalement, si les objectifs du recours à ce mécanisme ont été atteints. [45] thus, even if a government’s public reasons appear to satisfy the requirements of bodner, the government’s response remains subject to challenge on the basis that it is grounded in an improper or colourable purpose. [45] ainsi, même si les motifs invoqués publique- ment par le gouvernement semblent satisfaire aux exigences défi nies dans l’arrêt bodner, sa réponse peut tout de même être contestée sur le fondement qu’elle s’appuie sur un objectif illégitime ou déguisé. in bodner, this court underscored that “[t]he [46] limited nature of judicial review [of the govern- ment’s response] dictates the choice of remedies. the remedies must be consistent with the role of the reviewing court and the purpose of the commission process”: para 42. in my view, the limited nature of bodner review, the role of the reviewing court and the purpose of the process also have implications for the evidence considered by the reviewing court. [46] dans l’arrêt bodner, la cour a souligné que « [l]es limites du contrôle judiciaire [de la réponse du gouvernement] dictent le choix des réparations. celles-ci doivent rester conciliables avec le rôle du tribunal saisi du contrôle judiciaire et avec l’objec- tif du recours à une commission » : par 42. à mon avis, la nature limitée du contrôle judiciaire de type bodner, le rôle du tribunal de révision et l’objet du mécanisme ont également une incidence sur les élé- ments de preuve qui seront examinés par le tribunal de révision. [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 529 b evidence on bodner review b la preuve dans le cadre d’un contrôle de type [47] the limited nature of bodner review implies that the record for this type of review is narrower than it would be on ordinary judicial review. it also means that relevance must be assessed in relation to the specifi c issues that are the focus of the court’s inquiry on bodner review: the legitimacy of the rea- sons given by government, the reasonableness of the factual foundation relied on by government, and the respect for the commission process by government such that the objectives of the process have been achieved. further, since bodner review tends to op- pose two branches of the state, special considerations arise where the party seeking bodner review requests the production of a confi dential cabinet document. as i detail below, those considerations require that the party seeking production establish that there is some basis to believe that the document may contain evidence which tends to show that the government failed to meet a requirement described in this court’s jurisprudence, including bodner. only then will the reviewing court examine the document to determine whether it should be produced. bodner [47] la portée limitée d’un contrôle de type bodner suppose que le dossier constitué aux fi ns de cette procédure soit plus restreint qu’il ne le serait dans le cas d’un contrôle judiciaire habituel. elle suppose également qu’il faut évaluer la pertinence de chaque élément du dossier au regard des questions précises au cœur de l’analyse du tribunal saisi d’une demande de contrôle de ce type, à savoir : la légitimité des motifs avancés par le gouvernement, le caractère raisonnable du fondement factuel sur lequel il s’est appuyé et son respect du mécanisme d’examen par une commission de manière à assurer l’atteinte des objectifs du recours à une commission. de plus, dans la me sure où un contrôle de type bodner tend à opposer deux des branches de l’état, des considé- rations particulières entrent en jeu lorsque la partie qui sollicite un tel contrôle demande la production d’un document confi dentiel du cabinet. comme je l’exposerai plus en détail ci- après, ces considérations obligent la partie qui demande la production d’un tel document d’établir qu’il existe des raisons de croire que le document peut contenir des éléments de preuve tendant à démontrer que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une exigence décrite dans la jurispru- dence de la cour et notamment dans l’arrêt bodner. ce n’est qu’une fois cette démonstration faite que le tribunal de révision examine le document pour décider s’il devrait être produit. (1) scope of the record on bodner review (1) portée du dossier dans le cadre d’un contrôle de type bodner [48] like the court of appeal, the provincial court judges’ association invokes the rule that the record on judicial review generally includes any evidence that was before the decision- maker, subject to limited exceptions that either add to or subtract from the record. according to the provincial court judges’ association, since the submission was put before cabinet and since cabinet approved the resolution introduced by the attorney general and ultimately passed by the legislative assembly, the cabinet sub- mission was part of the evidence before the decision- maker and is thus relevant to the judicial review. the [48] à l’instar de la cour d’appel, l’association invoque la règle voulant que le dossier relatif au contrôle judiciaire soit normalement constitué de tout élément de preuve dont disposait le décideur, sous réserve de quelques exceptions restreintes sus- ceptibles d’ajouter ou de retrancher certains éléments du dossier. selon l’association, dans la me sure où le mémoire a été déposé auprès du cabinet et où celui-ci a appuyé la résolution d’abord présentée par le procureur général, puis adoptée par l’assem- blée législative, ce mémoire faisait partie de la preuve portée à la connaissance du décideur, si bien 530 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. provincial court judges’ association argues that the submission must therefore be included in the record on judicial review. [49] the attorney general argues that the decision- maker was the legislative assembly, not cabinet, so the cabinet submission was not before the decision- maker and therefore should not be included in the record. more fundamentally, the attorney general rejects the suggestion that the administrative law notion of the record on judicial review applies in this context. [50] with respect to the identifi cation of the for- mal decision- maker, neither the provincial judges reference nor bodner prescribes that a particular institution must make the decision to respond to a commission’s recommendations. in some cases, it may be clear that only a single institution is in- volved, but in a jurisdiction like british columbia where both the executive and legislative assembly play a substantive role, it would be artifi cial to focus solely on the legislative assembly’s part and ignore the executive’s involvement. indeed, in this case the executive’s proposed reasons for departing from the commission’s recommendations were incorpo- rated by reference into the resolution passed by the legislative assembly. qu’il est pertinent aux fi ns du contrôle judiciaire. l’association soutient que le mémoire doit donc faire partie du dossier constitué en vue du contrôle judiciaire. [49] le procureur général soutient que c’est l’as- semblée législative qui a été le décideur en l’espèce, et non le cabinet, si bien que le mémoire à ce dernier n’était pas devant le décideur et ne devrait donc pas faire partie du dossier. de manière plus fondamen- tale, le procureur général rejette l’argument selon lequel la notion du dossier à présenter en contrôle judiciaire, une notion de droit administratif, s’ap- plique dans le présent contexte. [50] pour ce qui est de savoir qui, offi ciellement, a agi comme décideur en l’espèce, ni le renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale ni l’arrêt bodner ne prévoient qu’il incombe à un organe plutôt qu’à un autre de décider de la réponse à donner aux recom- mandations d’une commission. dans certains cas, il peut être évident qu’un seul décideur est inter- venu. cependant, dans un contexte comme celui de la colombie- britannique, où l’exécutif aussi bien que l’assemblée législative jouent un rôle majeur, il serait artifi ciel de se concentrer uniquement sur la participation de cette dernière en faisant abstraction de celle de l’exécutif. d’ailleurs, en l’espèce, la justi- fi cation qu’avait proposée celui-ci pour s’écarter des recommandations de la commission fut entérinée au moyen d’un renvoi dans une résolution adoptée par l’assemblée législative. [51] more importantly, in my view, the provincial judges reference and bodner describe a unique form of review distinct from judicial review in the ordi- nary administrative law sense. in contrast to judicial review, bodner review is available even when the decision- maker is the legislature (or any part of the legislature): see reference re can ada assistance plan (bc), [1991] 2 scr 525, at p. 558; wells v. newfoundland, [1999] 3 scr 199, at para 59. further, the grounds for a bodner review are nar- rower than those for a usual judicial review. the bodner grounds centre on the legitimacy and suf- fi ciency of a government’s reasons for departing from a commission’s recommendations, whether the [51] plus important encore, à mon sens, le renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale et l’arrêt bodner défi nissent une forme unique de contrôle, qui se distingue du contrôle judiciaire au sens où on l’entend normalement en droit administratif. contrairement au contrôle judiciaire habituel, celui de type bodner peut être mené même lorsque le déci- deur est la législature (ou un de ses éléments) : voir le renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du ca nada (c-b), [1991] 2 rcs 525, p. 558; wells c. terre- neuve, [1999] 3 rcs 199, par 59. en outre, les motifs donnant ouverture à un contrôle de type bodner sont plus limités que ceux qui peuvent donner ouverture à un contrôle judiciaire habituel. [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 531 government has respected the commission process more generally and whether the objectives of the process have been achieved. in the usual context of judicial review, the [52] record generally consists of the evidence that was before the decision- maker: see delios v. can ada (attorney general), 2015 fca 117, 100 admin. lr. (5th) 301, at para. 42; sobeys west inc. v. college of pharmacists of british columbia, 2016 bcca 41, 80 bclr (5th) 243, at para 52. however, the rule that the record generally consists of the evidence that was before the decision- maker cannot be automati- cally transposed into the limited context of bodner review. [53] the record on bodner review necessarily in- cludes any submissions made to the commission by the government, judges and others; the commission’s report, including its recommendations; and the gov- ernment’s response to the recommendations, which, as the provincial judges reference recognized, at para. 180, may take different forms depending on which institution is charged with responding. ainsi, dans le premier cas, les motifs sont axés sur la légitimité et sur la question du caractère suffi sant des raisons invoquées par un gouvernement pour justifi er sa décision de s’écarter des recommandations d’une commission, de même que sur la question de savoir si le gouvernement a plus généralement respecté le mécanisme d’examen par une commission et si les objectifs du recours à ce mécanisme ont été atteints. [52] habituellement, en contexte de contrôle judi- ciaire, le dossier est constitué des éléments de preuve dont disposait le décideur : voir delios c. ca nada (procureur général), 2015 caf 117, 100 admin. lr (5th) 301, par. 42; sobeys west inc. c. college of pharmacists of british columbia, 2016 bcca 41, 80 bclr (5th) 243, par 52. cette règle ne saurait toute fois être automatiquement transposée au contexte limité d’un contrôle de type bodner. [53] le dossier relatif à un contrôle de type bodner renferme nécessairement les éléments suivants : toute position ayant été exposée devant la commission par le gouvernement, les juges et les autres intervenants; le rapport de la commission, y compris ses recom- mandations; et la réponse du gouvernement à ces recommandations qui, comme la cour l’a reconnu au par. 180 du renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, peut prendre différentes formes selon l’organe qui est chargé de répondre. [54] as bodner itself acknowledged, the record may also include certain forms of additional evidence put in by the government: paras. 27 and 36. the government may be permitted to “provid[e] details [concerning the factual foundation of its response], in the form of affi davits, relating to economic and actuarial data and calculations” and “affi davits con- taining evidence of good faith and commitment to the process, such as information relating to the gov- ernment’s study of the impact of the commission’s recommendations”: para. 36; see also paras. 63-64 and 103 but the government cannot use the ad- ditional evidence to “advance reasons other than those mentioned in its response” or to cure defects [54] ainsi que la cour l’a reconnu dans l’arrêt bodner lui- même, le dossier peut également inclure certaines formes d’éléments de preuve additionnels présentés par le gouvernement : par. 27 et 36. en effet, afi n de préciser davantage le fondement factuel de sa réponse, le gouvernement peut être autorisé à « fourni[r], sous forme d’affi davits, des détails sur des données et calculs économiques et actuariels » ainsi que des « affi davits contenant des preuves de la bonne foi et de l’engagement à l’égard du méca- nisme, par exemple, des renseignements sur l’étude gouvernementale de l’impact des recommandations de la commission » : par. 36; voir aussi par. 63-64 et 103. cependant, le gouvernement ne peut pas se 532 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. in the factual foundation it relied on in its response: paras. 27 and 36. [55] although the point was not made explicitly in bodner, the party seeking bodner review, which will usually be the judges whose remuneration is at stake, can also put in certain forms of additional evidence relevant to the issues the reviewing court must de- cide. the party seeking review can, for example, seek to introduce evidence to counter relevant evidence put in by a government. it may put in evidence aimed at calling into question the reasonableness of the factual foundation relied on by the government, the government’s lack of meaningful engagement with or respect for the commission process or whether the government’s response was grounded in an improper or colourable purpose. to those ends, the party seek- ing review can ask that the government produce evidence in its possession. for the government’s part, provided it respects the rule against supplementing its reasons and bolstering their factual foundation, it can respond with additional evidence of its own to re- fute the allegations made by the party seeking review. servir d’éléments de preuve additionnels pour « invo- quer d’autres motifs que ceux mentionnés dans sa réponse » ou pour corriger d’éventuelles défi ciences dans le fondement factuel sur lequel il l’a fait repo- ser : par. 27 et 36. [55] même si ce point n’a pas été soulevé expres- sément dans l’arrêt bodner, la partie qui sollicite un contrôle du type qui y est décrit — c’est-à-dire généralement les juges dont la rémunération est en jeu — peut également soumettre certains éléments de preuve additionnels pertinents quant aux questions dont doit décider le tribunal saisi du contrôle. la par- tie qui sollicite un contrôle peut, par exemple, cher- cher à présenter des éléments de preuve pour contrer une preuve pertinente présentée par le gouvernement. elle peut présenter des éléments qui visent à mettre en question le caractère raisonnable du fondement factuel sur lequel s’est appuyé le gouvernement, le manque de participation concrète ou de respect dont ce dernier a fait preuve envers le mécanisme d’exa- men par une commission, ou encore le fait que la réponse du gouvernement était fondée sur un objectif illégitime ou déguisé. à cette fi n, elle peut demander à ce que le gouvernement produise des éléments de preuve en sa possession. le gouvernement, pour sa part, à condition qu’il respecte la règle interdisant qu’il étoffe ses motifs ou leur fondement factuel, peut répondre au moyen d’éléments de preuve addi- tionnels pour réfuter les allégations formulées par la partie qui sollicite le contrôle. (2) relevance of evidence to a bodner review (2) pertinence de la preuve aux fi ns d’un contrôle de type bodner [56] the attorney general contends that the british columbia courts were wrong to conclude that the cabinet submission is relevant to the bodner review sought by the provincial court judges’ association. the attorneys general of can ada and of several prov- inces intervened to make similar submissions. [56] le procureur général soutient que les tribu- naux de la province ont eu tort de conclure que le mémoire au cabinet est pertinent aux fi ns du contrôle de type bodner recherché par l’association. les procureurs généraux du ca nada et de plusieurs pro- vinces sont intervenus pour présenter des arguments semblables. [57] evidence is relevant when it has “some ten- dency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the proposition for which it is advanced more [57] la preuve est pertinente [traduction] «  lorsque, selon la logique et l’expérience humaine, elle tend d’une façon quelconque à rendre la thèse [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 533 likely than that proposition would be in the absence of that evidence”: r v. white, 2011 scc 13, [2011] 1 scr 433, at para. 36, quoting d. m. paciocco and l. stuesser, the law of evidence (5th ed. 2008), at p 31. put another way, [translation] “a fact is relevant, in particular, if it is a fact in issue, if it contributes to rationally proving a fact in issue or if its purpose is to help the court assess the probative value of testimony”: j-c. royer and c. piché, la preuve civile (5th ed. 2016), at para 215. qu’elle appuie plus vraisemblable qu’elle ne le paraî- trait sans elle » : r c. white, 2011 csc 13, [2011] 1 rcs 433, par. 36, citant d. m. paciocco et l. stuesser, the law of evidence (5e éd. 2008), p 31. autrement dit, « un fait est notamment pertinent s’il s’agit d’un fait en litige, s’il contribue à prouver d’une façon rationnelle un fait en litige ou s’il a pour but d’aider le tribunal à apprécier la force probante d’un témoignage  »  : j.-c royer et c piché, la preuve civile (5e éd. 2016), par 215. [58] evidence is thus relevant to a proceeding when it relates to a fact that is in issue in the proceed- ing. the pleadings, which must be read generously and in light of the governing law, defi ne what is in issue: see lax kw’alaams indian band v. can ada (attorney general), 2011 scc 56, [2011] 3 scr. 535, at para 41. [58] ainsi, c’est lorsqu’elle se rapporte à un fait en litige dans une instance que la preuve est pertinente au débat. les actes de procédure, qui doivent être lus de manière libérale et à la lumière du droit appli- cable, défi nissent ce qui est en litige : voir bande indienne des lax kw’alaams c. ca nada (procureur général), 2011 csc 56, [2011] 3 rcs 535, par 41. [59] generally, what is in issue in a bodner review is whether a government failed to meet its constitu- tional obligations fl owing from the principle of judi- cial independence in its response to a commission’s recommendations. the relevance of any proposed additional evidence must therefore be tested in rela- tion to the issues that the court must determine on bodner review. [60] to be relevant, the proposed evidence must contain something that tends to establish a fact con- cerning one of the steps of the test established in bodner. for instance, if the party seeking bodner review contests the reasonableness of the factual foundation relied on by a government, the proposed evidence must either tend to support or undermine the reasonableness of that foundation. likewise, if the party seeking bodner review alleges disrespect for the commission process or that the government’s response is grounded in an improper or colourable purpose, the proposed evidence must either tend to establish the legitimacy of the government’s response or its illegitimacy. finally, if the government intro- duces evidence of its good faith and commitment to the process, the applicant’s proposed evidence may be tendered to undermine that evidence: see, eg,. provincial court judges’ assn. of british columbia [59] en général, dans un contrôle de type bodner, la question qui se pose est celle de savoir si, dans sa réponse aux recommandations d’une commission, un gouvernement a manqué à ses obligations consti- tutionnelles qui découlent du principe de l’indépen- dance judiciaire. la pertinence de tout élément de preuve additionnel proposé doit donc être analysée au regard des questions que devra trancher le tribunal saisi du dossier. [60] pour être pertinents, les éléments de preuve proposés doivent contenir des renseignements qui tendent à démontrer un fait qui est en lien avec une des étapes de l’analyse établie par l’arrêt bodner. par exemple, si la partie qui sollicite le contrôle conteste le caractère raisonnable du fondement factuel sur lequel un gouvernement s’est appuyé pour formuler sa réponse, les éléments de preuve proposés doivent tendre soit à confi rmer soit à mettre en doute le ca- ractère raisonnable de ce fondement. de la même façon, si la partie qui demande un contrôle de type bodner allègue que le mécanisme d’examen par la commission n’a pas été respecté ou que la réponse du gouvernement est fondée sur un objectif illégi- time ou déguisé, les éléments de preuve proposés doivent tendre à établir la légitimité de la réponse du gouvernement ou, au contraire, son illégitimité. finalement, si le gouvernement présente des éléments 534 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. v. british columbia (attorney general), 2012 bcsc 1022, 39 admin. lr (5th) 130. [61] however, as i will explain, the requirement of relevance alone — even as it pertains to the lim- ited set of issues properly considered on a bodner review — fails to adequately protect the competing constitutional imperatives that arise when a party seeking bodner review requests production of a con- fi dential cabinet document. prouvant sa bonne foi et son engagement à l’égard du processus, le demandeur peut présenter en retour des éléments de preuve pour miner cette preuve : voir, p ex,. provincial court judges’ assn. of british columbia c. british columbia (attorney general), 2012 bcsc 1022, 39 admin. lr (5th) 130. [61] toute fois, comme je l’expliquerai, l’exigence de la pertinence à elle seule — même lorsque la preuve a trait à l’en semble limité de questions qu’il y a lieu d’examiner dans le contexte d’un contrôle de type bodner — ne protège pas adéquatement les impératifs constitutionnels opposés qui entrent en jeu lorsqu’une partie sollicitant le contrôle demande la production d’un document confi dentiel du cabinet. (3) confi dential cabinet documents in the bodner context (3) documents confi dentiels du cabinet dans le contexte d’un contrôle de type bodner [62] since a bodner review often concerns deci- sions in which cabinet plays a part, a party seeking review may request the production of a confi dential cabinet document as additional evidence to show that the government’s response does not meet the applicable constitutional requirements. although the normal course would be for the judge to consider a description of the proposed evidence or examine it to determine whether it is relevant to the bodner review, special considerations arise when the party seeking bodner review asks the government to pro- duce a document related to cabinet deliberation and decision making. [62] dans la me sure où un contrôle de type bodner vise souvent des décisions dans lesquelles le cabinet a joué un rôle, la partie qui entend exercer ce type de recours pourrait demander la production d’un docu- ment confi dentiel du cabinet à titre d’élément de preuve additionnel pour démontrer que la réponse du gouvernement ne satisfait pas aux exigences consti- tutionnelles applicables. s’il est vrai que, normale- ment, le juge prend en considération une description des éléments de preuve proposés ou en examine le contenu pour déterminer s’ils sont pertinents aux fi ns du contrôle de type bodner, des considérations particulières entrent en jeu lorsqu’il est question de la production par le gouvernement d’un document se rapportant aux délibérations et au processus déci- sionnel du cabinet. [63] unlike an action or an application for judicial review brought against the government by a private party, a bodner review usually opposes two different branches of the state — the judiciary and the execu- tive — as parties in the application. in the provincial judges reference, at para. 7, lamer cj underscored that while litigation is always “a very serious busi- ness”, “it is even more serious [where it ensues] between two primary organs of our constitutional system — the executive and the judiciary — which both serve important and interdependent roles in the administration of justice”. such litigation may prove [63] contrairement à une action ou à une demande de contrôle judiciaire présentée contre le gouver- nement par une partie privée, un contrôle de type bodner oppose généralement deux branches dif- férentes de l’état — le judiciaire et l’exécutif — comme parties à l’instance. dans le renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par. 7, le juge en chef lamer a souligné que, s’il est vrai qu’un litige est toujours « une démarche très sérieuse », elle « est d’autant plus sérieuse du fait que les litiges opposent deux organes fondamentaux de notre régime consti- tutionnel — l’exécutif et le judiciaire — qui jouent [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 535 necessary to hold the government to its constitutional obligations in jurisdictions where the commission’s recommendations have not been made binding. bodner review is the mechanism for ensuring that the government respects the commission process and for safeguarding the public confi dence in the administra- tion of justice that process serves to protect. [64] but as this court warned in can ada (auditor general) v. can ada (minister of energy, mines and resources), [1989] 2 scr 49, at pp. 89, 97-98, 103 and 109, the outcome of an action brought by one branch of the state against another can effectively alter the separation of powers. such proceedings call for special prudence to keep courts from overstep- ping the bounds of the judicial role. [65] ca na dian constitutional law has long recog- nized that sovereign power in this country is divided not only between parliament and the provincial leg- islatures, but also among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state: fraser v. public service staff relations board, [1985] 2 scr 455, at pp. 469-70; new brunswick broadcasting co. v. nova scotia (speaker of the house of assembly), [1993] 1 scr 319, at p. 389; doucet- boudreau v. nova scotia (minister of education), 2003 scc 62, [2003] 3 scr 3, at para 33. although there are limited areas of overlap, the branches play fundamentally distinct roles and have accordingly developed different core competencies: provincial judges reference, at para. 139; ontario v. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 scc 43, [2013] 3 scr 3, at para 29. tous deux des rôles importants et interdépendants en matière d’administration de la justice ». de tels litiges peuvent s’avérer nécessaires pour obliger le gouvernement à respecter ses obligations constitu- tionnelles dans les juridictions où les recommanda- tions d’une commission n’ont pas force obligatoire. le contrôle de type bodner est le mécanisme qui vise à garantir que les gouvernements respectent le mécanisme d’examen par une commission et qui préserve la confi ance du public dans l’administration de la justice que ce mécanisme vise à protéger. [64] cela dit, dans l’affaire ca nada (vérifi cateur général) c. ca nada (ministre de l’énergie, des mines et des ressources), [1989] 2 rcs 49, p. 89, 97-98, 103 et 109, la cour a déjà formulé une mise en garde toujours pertinente au sujet du fait que l’issue d’une action intentée par une branche de l’état contre une autre peut avoir pour effet concret d’altérer la sépa- ration des pouvoirs. des procédures de cette nature commandent une prudence toute particulière, car il faut veiller à ce que les tribunaux n’outrepassent pas leur fonction judiciaire. [65] le droit constitutionnel canadien reconnaît depuis longtemps que le pouvoir souverain, en ce pays, se divise non seulement entre le parlement et les législatures, mais aussi entre les branches exé- cutive, législative et judiciaire de l’état : fraser c. commission des relations de travail dans la fonction publique, [1985] 2 rcs 455, p.  469-470; new brunswick broadcasting co c nouvelle- écosse (président de l’assemblée législative), [1993] 1 rcs 319, p. 389; doucet- boudreau c. nouvelle- écosse (ministre de l’éducation), 2003 csc 62, [2003] 3 rcs 3, par 33. malgré l’existence de che- vauchements limités dans certaines matières, les trois branches de l’état remplissent des fonctions fon- damentalement différentes et ont acquis, en consé- quence, des compétences es sen tielles dis tinctes : renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par. 139; ontario c. criminal lawyers’ association of ontario, 2013 csc 43, [2013] 3 rcs 3, par 29. [66] as this court underscored in criminal lawyers’ association, at para.  29, “each branch will be unable to fulfi ll its role if it is unduly in- terfered with by the others”. several doctrines work [66] ainsi que la cour l’a souligné dans l’arrêt criminal lawyers’ association, par. 29, « un pouvoir ne peut jouer son rôle lorsqu’un autre empiète indû- ment sur lui ». plusieurs doctrines jouent de manière 536 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. to prevent undue interference, including the se- crecy afforded judicial deliberations (mackeigan v. hickman, [1989] 2 scr 796), and the recognition of the privileges, powers and immunities enjoyed by the senate, the house of commons and the legisla- tive assemblies: constitution act, 1867, preamble and s. 18; new brunswick broadcasting co.; can- ada (house of commons) v. vaid, 2005 scc 30, [2005] 1 scr 667; chagnon v syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du québec, 2018 scc 39, [2018] 2 scr 687. these doctrines are a corollary to the separation of powers because they help to protect each branch’s ability to perform its constitutionally- assigned functions. [67] the executive, too, benefi ts from a degree of protection against undue interference. deliberations among ministers of the crown are protected by the constitutional convention of cabinet confi dential- ity. constitutional conventions do not have direct legal effect: reference re resolution to amend the constitution, [1981] 1 scr 753, at pp. 880-83; reference re secession of quebec, [1998] 2 scr. 217, at para 98. however, as i will explain in greater detail, the common law respects the confi dentiality convention and affords the executive public interest immunity over deliberations among ministers of the crown: see carey; babcock v. can ada (attorney general), 2002 scc 57, [2002] 3 scr 3, at paras. 18-19 and 60. [68] where the executive plays a role in formu- lating a government’s response to a judicial com- pensation commission’s recommendations, cabinet will generally determine the position taken by the executive. ministers’ deliberations concerning their appreciation of the recommendations and how the government should respond will usually be protected by cabinet confi dentiality. à empêcher les ingérences indues, notamment celle assurant le caractère secret des délibérations judi- ciaires (mackeigan c. hickman, [1989] 2 rcs. 796), ainsi que celles relatives à la reconnaissance des privilèges, pouvoirs et immunités dont jouissent le sénat, la chambre des communes et les assem- blées législatives : loi constitutionnelle de 1867, préambule et art. 18; new brunswick broadcasting co.; ca nada (chambre des communes) c. vaid, 2005 csc 30, [2005] 1 rcs 667; chagnon c. syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du québec, 2018 csc 39, [2018] 2 rcs 687. ces doctrines sont un corolaire à la séparation des pouvoirs parce qu’elles contribuent à protéger la capacité de chaque branche de s’acquitter des fonctions qui lui sont attribuées par la constitution. [67] le pouvoir exécutif bénéfi cie lui aussi d’un certain degré de protection contre les ingérences indues. les délibérations entre ministres sont ainsi protégées par la convention constitutionnelle relative à la confi dentialité des délibérations du cabinet. notons que les conventions constitutionnelles n’ont pas d’effet juridique direct : renvoi : résolution pour modifi er la constitution, [1981] 1 rcs 753, p. 880-883; renvoi relatif à la sécession du québec, [1998] 2 rcs 217, par 98. toute fois, comme je l’expliquerai plus amplement, la common law res- pecte cette convention relative à la confi dentialité et offre à l’exécutif une immunité d’intérêt public à l’égard des délibérations entre ministres : voir carey; babcock c. ca nada (procureur général), 2002 csc 57, [2002] 3 rcs 3, par. 18-19 et 60. [68] lorsque l’exécutif joue un rôle dans la for- mulation de la réponse d’un gouvernement aux re- commandations d’une commission d’examen de la rémunération des juges, le cabinet détermine géné- ralement la position qu’adopte l’exécutif. les dis- cussions entre ministres au sujet de la façon dont ils perçoivent les recommandations et de la réponse que le gouvernement devrait y donner sont normalement protégées par la confi dentialité des délibérations du cabinet. [69] a document refl ecting on cabinet delibera- tions concerning a government’s response may well [69] il se peut très bien qu’un document qui rend compte des délibérations du cabinet à propos de [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 537 be relevant, even if only to negate the claim that the government failed to meet its constitutional obliga- tions. if the government sought to have the docu- ment admitted in support of an affi davit speaking to its good faith and its commitment to the process of the sort described in bodner, at para. 36, the docu- ment would undoubtedly be considered relevant. it is diffi cult, then, to see why the same should not also be true where the party seeking bodner review looks to have the document admitted to challenge the government’s claims of good faith and commitment to the process or to raise the question whether the government acted for legitimate reasons or with an improper or colourable purpose. [70] thus, if relevance were the sole consideration, confi dential cabinet documents would routinely be part of the record in every bodner review. for ex- ample, the cabinet document would either tend to lend credence to the contention that a government’s response failed to meet its constitutional require- ments — or tend to refute that contention. in my view, something more than relevance is needed to strike the appropriate balance between respecting cabinet confi dentiality and maintaining the overall integrity of bodner review. la réponse d’un gouvernement soit pertinent, ne serait-ce que pour réfuter l’allégation que celui-ci a manqué à ses obligations constitutionnelles. si le gouvernement cherchait à faire admettre le document à l’appui d’un affi davit tendant à établir sa bonne foi et son engagement à l’égard du mécanisme du genre décrit au par. 36 de l’arrêt bodner, le document serait sans aucun doute jugé pertinent. par conséquent, il est diffi cile de concevoir comment il n’en irait pas de même lorsqu’une partie qui sollicite le contrôle de type bodner cherche à faire admettre le document pour contester les allégations de bonne foi et d’enga- gement à l’égard du mécanisme mises de l’avant par le gouvernement ou pour soulever la question de la légitimité des motifs de l’action du gouvernement ou celle du caractère illégitime ou déguisé de son but. [70] en conséquence, si la pertinence était le seul critère déterminant, les documents confi dentiels du cabinet feraient systématiquement partie des dos- siers de contrôles de type bodner. par exemple, le document du cabinet pourrait soit tendre à étayer la prétention que la réponse d’un gouvernement n’a pas respecté les exigences constitutionnelles qui s’y appliquent, soit tendre à réfuter cette prétention. selon moi, il faut quelque chose de plus que la per- tinence pour établir le juste équilibre entre le respect de la confi dentialité des délibérations du cabinet et le maintien de l’intégrité dans son en semble du contrôle de type bodner. [71] as i have said, bodner review generally op- poses two branches of the state: the members of the judiciary challenging the government’s response and the attorney general defending it. where the response is the product of the legislature or a col- laboration between the executive and legislature, the interests of the three branches may, whether directly or indirectly, be at stake. yet, given our constitutional structure, a member of the judiciary will also nec- essarily be charged with hearing and determining the application for bodner review: see provincial judges reference, at para. 180; bodner, at para 29. owing to the doctrine of necessity, this is so even if the judge charged with hearing the application is directly affected by the commission’s recommenda- tions and the government’s response: see reference [71] comme je l’ai évoqué précédemment, un contrôle de type bodner met généralement en op- position deux branches de l’état : les membres de la magistrature contestent la réponse du gouverne- ment et le procureur général la défend. lorsque la réponse émane de la législature ou d’une collabo- ration entre elle et l’exécutif, les intérêts des trois branches peuvent être en jeu, que ce soit directement ou indirectement. or, compte tenu de la structure constitutionnelle de notre état, un membre de la magistrature sera également nécessairement appelé à entendre la demande de contrôle de type bodner et à la trancher : voir le renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par. 180; bodner, par 29. du fait de la doctrine de la nécessité, il en est ainsi même si le juge saisi de la demande est directement touché 538 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. re remuneration of judges of the provincial court of prince edward island, [1998] 1 scr 3, at para 5. [72] routine judicial inspection of a confi dential cabinet document would reveal to a member of the judiciary the content of cabinet deliberations. although any inspection of a confi dential cabinet document undermines cabinet confi dentiality to some extent, judicial inspection of a document that concerns cabinet deliberations about the judiciary would undermine it more signifi cantly. that is es- pecially so where the judge is directly affected by the response resulting from those deliberations. as with adjudication of the bodner review itself, judicial inspection is appropriate in this context only where it is strictly necessary. in my view, these special considerations [73] should be accommodated at two distinct stages. [74] first, a threshold showing is required. [75] before the reviewing court can examine the document, the party seeking bodner review must fi rst establish that there is some basis to believe that the cabinet document in question may contain evidence which tends to show that the government failed to meet a requirement described in bodner. [76] this threshold is met if the party seeking re- view can show that there is reason to believe that the cabinet document may contain something that would undermine the validity of the government response. this requires the party seeking review to point to something in the record, including otherwise admissible evidence, that supports its view that the document may tend to show that the government response failed to meet one or more parts of the test established in bodner. par les recommandations de la commission et par la réponse du gouvernement : voir le renvoi relatif à la rémunération des juges de la cour provinciale de l’île-du- prince- édouard, [1998] 1 rcs 3, par 5. [72] une consultation systématique d’un document confi dentiel du cabinet par un juge révèlerait à un membre de la magistrature la teneur des délibérations du cabinet. même si toute consultation d’un docu- ment confi dentiel du cabinet mine la confi dentialité des délibérations du cabinet dans une certaine me- sure, celle menée par un juge d’un document qui porte sur les délibérations du cabinet relativement à la magistrature la minerait encore plus. cela est d’autant plus vrai lorsque le juge est directement touché par la réponse résultant de ces délibérations. comme lorsqu’il est question de trancher un contrôle de type bodner lui- même, la consultation du docu- ment par un juge est appropriée dans ce contexte, uniquement lorsqu’elle est strictement nécessaire. [73] à mon avis, ces considérations particulières devraient être prises en compte à deux étapes diffé- rentes. [74] en premier lieu, une démonstration prélimi- naire est nécessaire. [75] ainsi, avant que le juge saisi du contrôle de type bodner puisse examiner le document, la partie qui le demande doit établir qu’il existe des raisons de croire que le document du cabinet en question peut contenir des éléments de preuve tendant à démontrer que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une exigence décrite dans l’arrêt bodner. [76] cette démonstration préliminaire est faite si la partie qui sollicite le contrôle parvient à établir qu’il existe des raisons de croire que le document du cabinet peut contenir des renseignements suscep- tibles de miner la validité de la réponse du gouverne- ment. cette exigence oblige la partie demandant le contrôle à faire ressortir du dossier quelque chose — y compris des éléments de preuve autrement admis- sibles — qui étaye sa prétention selon laquelle le document peut tendre à démontrer que la réponse du gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une ou à plusieurs des étapes de l’analyse établie par l’arrêt bodner. [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 539 [77] meeting this threshold does not require the party to have knowledge or information about the content of the cabinet submission. nor does it re- quire that the party point to something in the record that explicitly refers to the cabinet submission or its contents. it would be unfair to require the party to establish the contents of a confi dential document: see, in the public interest immunity context, carey, at p 678. [78] the party can, however, rely on additional evidence and the rest of the record, including sub- missions to the commission, to support its conten- tion that the threshold is met. for instance, the party might point to statements made by ministers or others that suggest that the government’s response may have been grounded in reasons other than those formally expressed, that the government may have relied on a fl awed or incomplete factual foundation or that the government may have shown disrespect for the commission process. the party may also be able to rely on additional evidence introduced by the government that suggests that a document concern- ing cabinet deliberations may disclose reliance on improper purpose. but it is not enough to simply say that the document was before the executive in its capacity as decision- maker or that it would provide additional background or context for the reviewing court. if the party seeking review makes the requisite [79] showing — that there is some basis to believe that the document may contain evidence which tends to show that the government failed to meet one of the requirements described in bodner — the government must produce it for the court’s examination. [77] pour satisfaire à cette exigence, la partie n’a pas à avoir connaissance de la teneur du mémoire au cabinet ou à détenir des renseignements à son sujet. elle n’a pas non plus à mettre en évidence un élément du dossier qui fait explicitement référence au mémoire en cause ou à son contenu. en effet, il serait injuste d’exiger que la partie fasse la preuve de la teneur d’un document confi dentiel : voir, dans le contexte de l’immunité d’intérêt public, carey, p 678. [78] en revanche, la partie peut se fonder sur des éléments de preuve additionnels et sur le reste du dossier — y compris les mémoires présentés à la commission — au soutien de sa prétention qu’il a été satisfait à l’exigence d’une démonstration préli- minaire. à titre d’ exemple, elle pourra s’appuyer sur des déclarations de ministres ou d’autres per sonnes qui donnent à penser que la réponse du gouverne- ment était possiblement fondée sur d’autres motifs que ceux exprimés offi ciellement, que le gouverne- ment s’est peut- être appuyé sur un fondement factuel défi cient ou lacunaire, ou qu’il a pu faire preuve d’un manque de respect envers le mécanisme d’examen par une commission. la partie peut aussi être en me sure de s’appuyer sur d’autres éléments de preuve produits par le gouvernement qui suggèrent qu’un document portant sur les délibérations du cabinet pourrait révéler que la réponse a été fondée sur un objectif illégitime. il ne suffi t toute fois pas d’affi rmer que l’exécutif, à titre de décideur, disposait du docu- ment, ou que celui-ci apporterait au tribunal de révi- sion des renseignements contextuels additionnels. [79] si la partie qui demande le contrôle effectue la démonstration requise  — à savoir qu’il existe des raisons de croire que le document peut contenir des éléments de preuve tendant à démontrer que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une des exigences décrites dans l’arrêt bodner —, le gouvernement devra produire le document en question aux fi ns d’un examen par le tribunal. [80] second, the reviewing court must then exam- ine the document in private to determine whether it, in fact, provides some evidence which tends to show that the government failed to meet one of the parts of the test mandated in bodner. in other words, the [80] en deuxième lieu, le tribunal de révision doit examiner le document en privé pour déterminer si, de fait, il fournit des éléments de preuve qui tendent à démontrer que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à l’une ou l’autre des étapes de l’analyse établie par 540 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. document must, taken with the record as a whole and in light of the applicant’s theory of the case, be of assistance in challenging the legitimacy of the gov- ernment’s reasons, the reasonableness of the factual foundation it relied on, the respect the government has shown the commission process or whether the objectives of the process have been achieved. it may suggest that the government response was based upon an improper or colourable purpose. to be clear, the cogency of the evidence need not be considered at this stage of the analysis. [81] even if the document meets this test, produc- tion of the document remains subject to any other rule of evidence that bars its disclosure, such as solicitor- client privilege (which was raised in the courts below in the companion appeal) or public interest immunity (which was raised in this court in both appeals). l’arrêt bodner. en d’autres termes, le document doit, considéré conjointement avec le dossier pris dans son en semble et à la lumière de la théorie de la cause du demandeur, se révéler utile pour attaquer la légiti- mité des motifs invoqués par le gouvernement, ou encore pour mettre en doute le caractère raisonnable du fondement factuel sur lequel il s’est appuyé, le respect dont le gouvernement a fait preuve envers le mécanisme d’examen par une commission ou l’atteinte des objectifs du recours à ce mécanisme. le document peut suggérer que la réponse du gou- vernement se fondait sur un objectif illégitime ou déguisé. cependant, la valeur probante de l’élément de preuve en cause n’a pas à être prise en compte à cette étape de l’analyse. [81] même si le document satisfait à ce critère, sa production demeure assujettie à toute autre règle de preuve empêchant sa divulgation, notamment celles relatives au secret professionnel de l’avocat (qui a été soulevé devant les juridictions d’instances inférieures dans le pourvoi connexe) ou à l’immunité d’intérêt public (qui a été soulevée devant notre cour dans les deux pourvois). [82] the provincial court judges’ association submits that bodner review is meaningless without the production of confi dential cabinet documents to illuminate the true reasons for the government’s response, which may differ from its publicly- articulated reasons. the provincial court judges’ association says that without an understanding of the actual basis on which the decision rests, the re- viewing court will be unable to determine whether the government’s response satisfi es constitutional requirements. [82] l’association plaide qu’un contrôle de type bodner est dépourvu de signifi cation en l’absence de documents confi dentiels du cabinet pour mettre en lumière les véritables motifs qui sous- tendent la réponse du gouvernement, et qui peuvent différer de ceux invoqués publiquement. selon elle, à défaut d’un moyen de comprendre le véritable fondement sur lequel s’appuie la décision, le tribunal de révision ne sera pas en me sure de déterminer si la réponse du gouvernement satisfait aux exigences constitu- tionnelles. i do not agree that bodner review is ineffec- [83] tive without any relevant cabinet submission being included in the record. though necessarily limited in scope, bodner review is a robust form of review. the test requires that the government justify a de- parture from the commission’s recommendations. the government must give legitimate and rational reasons for doing so and sound reasoning must be supported by a reasonable factual foundation. the government’s response must demonstrate respect for the judicial offi ce, for judicial independence, and for [83] je ne suis pas d’accord pour dire qu’un contrôle de type bodner est ineffi cace si aucun mémoire au cabinet pertinent ne fi gure dans le dossier. en effet, même si sa portée est nécessairement limitée, ce type de contrôle est rigoureux. l’analyse requiert que le gouvernement justifi e de s’écarter des recommanda- tions d’une commission. le gouvernement est tenu d’invoquer à cette fi n des motifs légitimes et ration- nels qui doivent découler d’un raisonnement solide et doivent reposer sur un fondement factuel raison- nable. la réponse du gouvernement doit également [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 541 the commission process; as well, the broader objec- tives of the process must be achieved. [84] thus, the party seeking bodner review may well be able to make a strong case for overturning a government’s response based on the public rea- sons given by the government. the party seeking bodner review may also rely on additional admis- sible evidence to make their case, such as statements made by ministers or others, including more general statements made outside the commission process, about judges or their remuneration, and historical patterns, including the government’s responses to past commission recommendations. those forms of evidence might well support the contention that the government relied on an illegitimate reason for departing from the commission’s recommendations or that its response does not “reveal a consideration of the judicial offi ce and an intention to deal with it appropriately”. they might also support the conten- tion that the government did not show appropriate respect for the underlying public interest in judicial independence and in having an effective commission process. dénoter du respect envers les fonctions judiciaires, l’indépendance de la magistrature et le mécanisme d’examen par une commission, mais il faut en outre qu’il ait été satisfait aux objectifs plus larges du recours à ce mécanisme. [84] ainsi, la partie qui sollicite un contrôle de type bodner peut fort bien disposer d’arguments solides en faveur de l’annulation de la réponse d’un gouvernement à partir des motifs que celui-ci a invo- qués publiquement. la partie en question peut aussi s’appuyer sur des éléments de preuve additionnels admissibles pour établir le bien- fondé de sa préten- tion, par exemple les déclarations de ministres ou d’autres acteurs — notamment des propos d’ordre plus général tenus en dehors du mécanisme d’exa- men par la commission — au sujet des juges ou de leur rémunération, ou encore certains types de ten- dances historiques, y compris les réponses du gou- vernement aux recommandations de commissions antérieures. de tels éléments de preuve peuvent fort bien étayer l’allégation voulant que la décision d’un gouvernement de s’écarter des recommandations d’une commission s’appuie sur des motifs illégi- times, ou que sa réponse ne « démontr[e pas] un examen des fonctions judiciaires et qu’on a l’inten- tion de prendre les me sures qui s’imposent ». ces éléments peuvent également appuyer l’affi rmation selon laquelle le gouvernement n’a pas fait montre du respect voulu envers l’intérêt du public sous- jacent relatif à l’indépendance judiciaire et à ce que le recours à une commission soit effi cace. [85] i underscore that it is never enough for the government to simply repeat the submissions it made to the commission: bodner, at para 23. that does not justify a departure from the commission’s recom- mendations. similarly, a government that consist- ently rejects a commission’s recommendations will put in question whether it is respecting the commis- sion process and, as a result, whether the process is achieving its objectives. although across- the- board salary increases or reductions that affect judges have been found to meet the rationality standard, a govern- ment that does not take into account the distinctive nature of judicial offi ce and treats judges simply as a class of civil servant will fail to engage with the principle of judicial independence: provincial judges [85] je souligne qu’il ne suffi t jamais que le gou- vernement se borne à répéter les observations qu’il a présentées devant une commission : bodner, par 23. cela ne saurait justifi er qu’il se soit écarté des recom- mandations de cette dernière. de la même façon, un gouvernement qui rejette systématiquement les recommandations d’une commission soulève un doute quant à son respect envers le recours au mécanisme d’examen par une commission, et, en conséquence, quant à l’atteinte des objectifs d’un tel recours. même s’il a été jugé que des augmentations ou des réductions de salaire généralisées qui touchent les juges satisfont à la norme de la rationalité, un gouvernement qui ne tient pas compte du carac- tère distinctif de la charge judiciaire et qui traite la 542 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. reference, at paras. 143, 157 and 184; bodner, at para 25. more rarely, the level of remuneration itself may call the government’s response into question: see provincial judges reference, at para 135. [86] a government response that does not mean- ingfully engage with the commission process and its recommendations risks failing the bodner test. as bodner, at para. 31, makes clear, the reviewing court must ultimately be satisfi ed that the objectives of the commission process — namely, depoliticizing decisions about judicial remuneration and preserving judicial independence — have been met. [87] to summarize, the object of bodner review is the government’s response to the commission’s recommendations, which will generally consist of the government’s decision to depart from the com- mission’s recommendations and the reasons given for that decision. the submissions to the commis- sion, the commission’s recommendations, and the government’s response accordingly form the core of the record on bodner review. certain forms of ad- ditional evidence are admissible if they are relevant to determining whether any part of the bodner test has been met, including whether the government’s response is grounded in an improper or colourable purpose. however, where a party seeking bodner review requests the production of a confi dential cabinet document, the party must fi rst establish there is some basis to believe that the document may contain evidence which tends to show that the government failed to meet a requirement described in bodner. only then will the reviewing court examine the document in private to determine whether it, in fact, provides some evidence which tends to show that the government failed to meet its constitutional obligations. if the document does provide such evi- dence, the court must then determine whether any magistrature comme une simple catégorie de fonc- tionnaires perd de vue le principe de l’indépendance judiciaire : renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour pro- vinciale, par. 143, 157 et 184; bodner, par 25. dans des cas plus rares, c’est le niveau de rémunération lui- même qui peut faire douter de la validité de la réponse du gouvernement : voir le renvoi relatif aux juges de la cour provinciale, par 135. [86] au demeurant, une réponse d’un gouverne- ment qui ne démontre pas un engagement sérieux à l’égard du mécanisme d’examen par une commission et des recommandations de celle-ci risque de ne pas satisfaire aux exigences énoncées dans l’arrêt bodner. comme l’affi rme clairement cet arrêt, au par. 31, le tribunal de révision doit en défi nitive être convaincu que les objectifs du recours à une commis- sion — c’est-à-dire la dépolitisation des décisions concernant la rémunération des juges et la préserva- tion de l’indépendance judiciaire — ont été atteints. [87] bref, le contrôle de type bodner concerne la réponse d’un gouvernement aux recommandations d’une commission — qui consistera généralement en une décision de ce gouvernement de s’écarter des recommandations en question — et les motifs invoqués pour justifi er cette décision. les mémoires présentés à la commission, les recommandations de cette dernière et la réponse du gouvernement consti- tuent donc l’essence du dossier constitué en vue du contrôle de type bodner. certains types d’éléments de preuve additionnels sont admissibles s’ils sont pertinents pour déterminer s’il a été satisfait à l’une ou l’autre des étapes de l’analyse établie par l’arrêt bodner, y compris pour savoir si la réponse du gou- vernement est fondée sur un objectif illégitime ou déguisé. cependant, lorsqu’une partie qui sollicite un contrôle de type bodner demande la production d’un document confi dentiel du cabinet, elle doit d’abord établir qu’il y a des raisons de croire que ce document contient des éléments de preuve qui tendent à démontrer que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une des exigences décrites dans l’arrêt bodner. ce n’est qu’une fois cette démonstration faite que le tribunal de révision examine le document en privé pour déterminer si, de fait, il fournit une [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 543 other rule of evidence, such as public interest im- munity, bars its production. preuve qui tend à démontrer que le gouvernement a failli à ses obligations constitutionnelles. si c’est le cas, le tribunal doit alors décider si une autre règle de preuve, comme l’immunité d’intérêt public, en empêche la production. (4) application (4) application [88] since the provincial court judges’ association seeks production of a confi dential cabinet submis- sion, the fi rst issue is whether it has made the requi- site threshold showing. [88] en l’espèce, dans la me sure où l’association demande la production d’un mémoire au cabinet confi dentiel, il faut décider en premier lieu si elle a fait la démonstration préliminaire requise. [89] the provincial court judges’ association points to prior litigation involving judicial remu- neration in which the attorney general produced a cabinet submission concerning the government’s response to a commission’s recommendations: see provincial court judges’ association of british columbia v. british columbia (attorney general). the supreme court of british columbia in that case found that the submission revealed an “inappropriate emphasis” on the need to maintain a link between judicial salaries and public sector salaries: para 81. the provincial court judges’ association argues that this history makes the cabinet submission in the present case relevant to resolve the issue of whether the government engaged with and showed respect for the commission process. [90] i am not persuaded. the case relied on by the provincial court judges’ association was decided nearly a decade ago. it does not follow that because a cabinet submission revealed that the government relied on an inappropriate consideration 10 years ago, it may have relied on a like consideration in the present case. indeed, the government would be expected to learn from its past mistakes. something more would be required for there to be reason to believe that the submission may contain evidence that would tend to show that the government failed to meet a requirement described in bodner. [89] l’association invoque un précédent ayant mis en cause la rémunération des juges, dans le cadre duquel le procureur général avait produit un mémoire au cabinet qui traitait de la réponse du gou- vernement aux recommandations de la commission : voir provincial court judges’ association of british columbia c. british columbia (attorney general). dans cette affaire, la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique a conclu que le mémoire en question révélait que l’on avait accordé une [traduction] « importance indue » à la nécessité d’assurer un lien entre les traitements des juges et ceux des employés du secteur public : par 81. selon ce qu’avance l’as- sociation, il ressort de ce précédent que le mémoire au cabinet, en l’espèce, est un élément pertinent pour résoudre la question de savoir si le gouvernement est engagé et a fait preuve de respect à l’égard du mécanisme d’examen par la commission. [90] je ne suis pas convaincue la cause invo- quée par l’association a été jugée il y a presque une décennie. il ne s’ensuit pas que, parce qu’un mémoire au cabinet a révélé que le gouvernement avait fondé sa décision sur une considération illégi- time il y a 10 ans, il pourrait aujourd’hui s’être fondé en l’espèce sur une considération de même nature. en effet, on peut s’attendre à ce que le gouverne- ment ait appris de ses erreurs passées. il faut donc davantage pour conclure à l’existence de raisons de croire que le mémoire est susceptible de contenir des éléments de preuve qui tendraient à démontrer que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une exigence décrite dans l’arrêt bodner. 544 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. [91] although it is not determinative, i note that neither the executive nor the legislative assembly put the cabinet submission in issue. neither the gov- ernment’s response nor the legislative assembly’s resolution refers to the cabinet submission. nor, in contrast with the affi davit fi led in a past round of liti- gation opposing the attorney general and provincial court judges’ association, is there any reference to the cabinet submission in the affi davit fi led in support of the attorney general’s response to the petition for review. nor is there anything on the face of the record that indicates the cabinet submission may contain some evidence which tends to show that the government failed to meet a constitutional requirement. in my view, the provincial court judges’ [92] association has failed to make the requisite showing. it has not provided any evidence or pointed to any circumstances that suggest that the cabinet submis- sion may indicate that the government did not meet the standard required by bodner. it was therefore not necessary for the attorney general to produce the document for examination by this court. [93] this would effectively dispose of this appeal. it is therefore unnecessary in this case to de- [94] termine whether public interest immunity would oth- erwise apply so as to permit the attorney general to refuse to produce the cabinet submission. however, since the parties and interveners in both appeals have made extensive submissions about the law of public interest immunity, i will examine how public interest immunity applies to confi dential cabinet documents sought in a bodner review and why, in my view, it is not necessary to revisit this court’s public interest immunity doctrine as it applies in this context. [91] bien que ce ne soit pas déterminant, je signale que ni l’exécutif ni l’assemblée législative n’ont soulevé la question du mémoire au cabinet. et, à l’instar de la résolution de l’assemblée législative, la réponse du gouvernement ne fait pas davantage mention de ce document. en outre, à la différence de l’affi davit produit dans le cadre d’une série de litiges antérieurs ayant opposé le procureur général et l’association, celui présenté en l’espèce au soutien de la réponse du procureur général à la demande de contrôle judiciaire ne fait aucune référence au mé- moire au cabinet. rien non plus à la face même du dossier n’indique que ce mémoire pourrait contenir des éléments de preuve qui tendraient à démontrer que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une exigence constitutionnelle. [92] à mon avis, l’association n’a pas fait la dé- monstration préliminaire requise. elle n’a fourni aucun élément de preuve ni signalé aucune circons- tance donnant des raisons de croire que le mémoire au cabinet tendrait à démontrer que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à la norme fi xée par l’arrêt bodner. il n’était donc pas nécessaire que le procureur général produise le document en vue de son examen par la cour. [93] voilà qui serait suffi sant pour trancher le pré- sent pourvoi. il est donc inutile, en l’espèce, de décider si [94] l’immunité d’intérêt public s’appliquerait par ailleurs de sorte que le procureur général pourrait refuser de produire le mémoire au cabinet. toute fois, puisque les parties et les intervenants dans les deux pourvois connexes dont la cour est saisie ont présenté des observations détaillées à propos du droit relatif à l’immunité d’intérêt public, j’examinerai de quelle façon celle-ci s’applique aux documents confi den- tiels du cabinet visés dans le contexte d’un contrôle de type bodner, et pour quelles raisons, à mon avis, il n’est pas nécessaire de réexaminer la doctrine de l’immunité d’intérêt public telle qu’elle s’applique dans le contexte en question. c public interest immunity c immunité d’intérêt public [95] there is a strong public interest in maintaining the confi dentiality of deliberations among ministers il est manifestement dans l’intérêt du public [95] de maintenir la confi dentialité des délibérations [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 545 of the crown: carey, at pp. 647 and 656-59; babcock, at paras 18-19. as a matter of constitutional con- vention, cabinet deliberations are confi dential: n d’ombrain, “cabinet secrecy” (2004), 47 ca- na dian public administration 332, at pp 334-35. federal ministers swear an oath as privy counsellors to “honestly and truly declare [their] mind and [their] opinion” and to “keep secret all matters   . secretly treated of” in cabinet: see c. forcese and a. freeman, the laws of government: the legal foundations of ca na dian democracy (2nd ed. 2011), at p 352. provincial and territorial ministers swear a similar oath as executive counsellors. [96] ministers enjoy freedom to express their views in cabinet deliberations, but are expected to publicly defend cabinet’s decision, even where it differs from their views: see a. heard, ca na dian constitutional conventions: the marriage of law & politics (2nd ed. 2014), at pp. 106-7; d’ombrain, at p 335. the confi dentiality of cabinet delibera- tions helps ensure that they are candid and frank and that what are often diffi cult decisions and hard- won compromises can be reached without undue external interference: see forcese and freeman, at p. 352; d’ombrain, at p 335. if cabinet deliberations were made public, ministers could be criticized for publicly defending a policy inconsistent with their private views, which would risk distracting ministers and undermining public confi dence in government. entre ministres : carey, p. 647 et 656-659; babcock, par 18-19. selon la convention constitutionnelle, les délibérations du cabinet sont confi dentielles : n d’ombrain, «  cabinet secrecy  » (2004), 47 administration publique du ca nada 332, p. 334- 335. les ministres fédéraux prêtent serment, comme conseillers privés, [traduction] «  [d’]exprimer [  ] honnêtement et en toute vérité, [leur] sentiment et [leur] opinion » et de « [tenir] secret [  ] tout ce dont il sera traité secrètement » durant les réunions du cabinet : voir c. forcese et a. freeman, the laws of government : the legal foundations of canadian democracy (2e éd. 2011), p 352. les ministres des provinces et des territoires prêtent un serment sem- blable à titre de conseillers exécutifs. [96] les ministres jouissent de la liberté d’exprimer leurs opinions durant les délibérations du cabinet, mais on s’attend à ce qu’ils défendent publiquement la décision du cabinet, même si elle diffère de celles qu’ils auraient prises  : voir a heard, canadian constitutional conventions : the marriage of law & politics (2e éd. 2014), p. 106-107; d’ombrain, p 335. la confi dentialité des délibérations du cabinet aide à faire en sorte que les ministres s’expriment en toute transparence et franchise et qu’ils puissent parvenir sans ingérence externe indue à des décisions souvent diffi ciles et à des compromis durement acquis : voir forcese et freeman, p. 352; d’ombrain, p 335. si les délibérations du cabinet étaient rendues publiques, des ministres pourraient être critiqués pour avoir défendu publiquement une politique incompatible avec leurs propres opinions, ce qui risquerait de dis- traire les ministres et de miner la confi ance du public dans le gouvernement. [97] grounded in constitutional convention as much as in practical considerations, this confi denti- ality applies whether those deliberations take place in formal meetings of the queen’s privy council for can ada,6 or a province or territory’s executive council, or in meetings of cabinet or of commit- tees composed of ministers, such as treasury board. the confi dentiality extends not only to records of [97] ancré dans une convention constitutionnelle autant que dans des considérations d’ordre pratique, ce principe de confi dentialité s’applique, que les déli- bérations en question se déroulent dans le cadre de réunions offi cielles du conseil privé de la reine pour le ca nada6 ou du conseil exécutif d’une province ou d’un territoire, ou encore dans le contexte de réu- nions du cabinet ou de comités formés de ministres, 6 although the queen’s privy council for can ada established by s. 11 of the constitution act, 1867, includes members who are not ministers of the crown, confi dentiality also extends to its proceedings. 6 bien que le conseil privé de la reine pour le ca nada, établi par l’art. 11 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867, comprend des membres autres que les ministres, le principe de confi dentialité s’applique également à ses délibérations. 546 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. cabinet deliberations, but also to documents that re- fl ect on the content of those deliberations: babcock, at para 18. tel le conseil du trésor. le principe de confi dentia- lité s’étend aux procès- verbaux des délibérations du cabinet, mais aussi aux documents faisant état de la teneur de ces délibérations : babcock, par 18. [98] the common law protects the confi dential- ity of cabinet deliberations through the doctrine of public interest immunity: babcock, at para 60. public interest immunity forms part of federal com- mon law and the common law of each province and territory: see babcock, at paras. 19, 23 and 26. as with any common law rule, parliament or a leg- islature may limit or do away with public interest immunity, provided it clearly expresses its intention to do so: commission des droits de la personne v. attorney general of can ada, [1982] 1 scr 215, at p. 228; babcock, at para. 20; see, more generally, r v. dlw, 2016 scc 22, [2016] 1 scr 402, at para 217 [98] la common law protège la confi dentialité des délibérations du cabinet grâce à la doctrine de l’immunité d’intérêt public : babcock, par 60. cette immunité fait partie de la common law fédérale, mais aussi de celle de chaque province et territoire : voir babcock, par. 19, 23 et 26. cela dit, comme pour toute autre règle de common law, le législateur fédé- ral ou provincial peut restreindre ou écarter l’immu- nité d’intérêt public, pourvu qu’il exprime clairement son intention en ce sens : commission des droits de la per sonne c. procureur général du ca nada, [1982] 1 rcs 215, p. 228; babcock, par. 20; voir, de façon plus générale, r c. dlw, 2016 csc 22, [2016] 1 rcs 402, par 217. in smallwood v. sparling, [1982] 2 scr. [99] 686, and in carey, this court rejected absolute crown privilege and instead recognized a qualifi ed public interest immunity. public interest immunity prevents the disclosure of a document where the court is satisfi ed that the public interest in keep- ing the document confi dential outweighs the public interest in its disclosure: see carey, at pp. 653-54 and 670; babcock, at para. 19; see also bisaillon v. keable, [1983] 2 scr 60, at p 978 [99] dans l’affaire smallwood c. sparling, [1982] 2 rcs 686, tout comme dans l’arrêt carey, la cour a rejeté l’idée d’un privilège de la couronne qui serait absolu. elle a plutôt reconnu l’existence d’une immunité restreinte d’intérêt public. cette dernière empêche la divulgation d’un document lorsque le tri- bunal est convaincu que l’intérêt du public à ce qu’un document demeure confi dentiel l’emporte sur l’inté- rêt du public à ce qu’il soit divulgué : voir carey, p. 653-654 et 670; babcock, par. 19; voir également bisaillon c. keable, [1983] 2 rcs 60, p 978. 7 provincial legislatures have generally preserved public interest immunity: see, eg,. code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501, art. 283; crown liability and proceedings act, 2019, so 2019, c. 7, sch. 17, s. 13(2); crown proceeding act, rsbc 1996, c. 89, s. 9; proceedings against the crown act, rsns 1989, c. 360, s 11. by contrast, parliament has partially displaced public interest immunity in ss. 37 to 39 of the can ada evidence act, rsc 1985, c. c-5: see babcock, at paras. 21 et seq.; r v. ahmad, 2011 scc 6, [2011] 1 scr 110. 8 the same considerations generally apply to testimony. however, ministers and former ministers serving as members of the senate, house of commons or a legislative assembly benefi t from a lim- ited form of testimonial immunity as a matter of parliamentary privilege: see vaid at para. 29; ainsworth lumber co. v. can ada (attorney general), 2003 bcca 239, 14 bclr (4th) 302; telezone inc. v. can ada (attorney general) (2004), 69 or (3d) 161 (ca). 7 les législatures ont généralement maintenu l’immunité d’intérêt public : voir, p ex,. code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501, art. 283; loi de 2019 sur la responsabilité de la couronne et les instances l’intéressant, lo 2019, c. 7, ann. 17, par. 13(2); crown proceeding act, rsbc 1996, c. 89, art. 9; proceedings against the crown act, rsns 1989, c. 360, art 11. en revanche, le parlement a partiellement modifi é cette immunité d’intérêt public aux art. 37 à 39 de la loi sur la preuve au ca nada, lrc 1985, c. c-5 : voir babcock, par. 21 et suiv.; r c. ahmad, 2011 csc 6, [2011] 1 rcs 110. 8 les mêmes considérations s’appliquent généralement aux témoi- gnages. toute fois, les ministres, actuels et anciens, qui siègent comme membres du sénat, de la chambre des communes ou d’une assemblée législative bénéficient d’une forme limitée d’immunité testimoniale qui relève du privilège parlementaire : voir vaid, par. 29; ainsworth lumber co. c. ca nada (attorney general), 2003 bcca 239, 14 bclr (4th) 302; telezone inc. c. ca nada (attorney general) (2004), 69 or (3d) 161 (ca). [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 547 [100] although this court rejected claims of ab- solute crown privilege in smallwood and carey, it did not “accord the individual an automatic right to discovery of sensitive and confi dential documents held by the state”: michaud v. quebec (attorney general), [1996] 3 scr 3, at para 54. smallwood and carey thus require a careful balancing of the competing public interests in confi dentiality and disclosure: see babcock, at para. 19; r v. barros, 2011 scc 51, [2011] 3 scr 368, at para 35. these competing public interests must be weighed with reference to a specifi c document in the context of a particular proceeding. in carey, at pp. 670-73, this court described [101] the main factors relevant to balancing the public in- terests in confi dentiality and disclosure of documents concerning public decision making, including at the cabinet level: [100] cela dit, même si dans les arrêts smallwood et carey elle a rejeté des revendications de privilège absolu de la couronne, la cour n’a pas pour autant « accord[é] à l’individu un droit automatique à la communication de documents confi dentiels et de nature délicate en la possession de l’état » : michaud c. québec (procureur général), [1996] 3 rcs 3, par 54. les arrêts smallwood et carey ont établi la nécessité de mettre soigneusement en balance les intérêts opposés du public, soit, d’une part, l’inté- rêt à ce que la confi dentialité des renseignements soit protégée et, d’autre part, celui à ce qu’ils soient divulgués : voir babcock, par. 19; r c. barros, 2011 csc 51, [2011] 3 rcs 368, par 35. ces intérêts opposés du public doivent être évalués en fonction d’un document précis, dans le cadre d’une instance donnée. [101] dans l’arrêt carey, p. 670-673, la cour a décrit dans les termes qui suivent les principaux facteurs pertinents pour l’exercice de mise en balance des intérêts opposés du public quant à la confi denti- alité et à la divulgation de documents ayant trait au processus décisionnel d’un pouvoir public, y compris au niveau du cabinet : (1) the level of the “decision- making process”; (1) le palier du « processus décisionnel »; (2) the “nature of the policy concerned”; (2) la « nature de la politique en question »; (3) the “particular contents of the documents”; (3) la « teneur précise des documents »; (4) the timing of disclosure; (4) le moment où sera divulgué le document; (5) the “importance of producing the documents in the interests of the administration of justice”; and (6) whether the party seeking the production of the documents “alleges unconscionable behaviour on the part of the government”. (5) l’« importance qu’il y a à produire les documents dans l’intérêt de l’administration de la justice »; (6) la question de savoir si la partie qui cherche à obtenir la production des documents « allègue une conduite peu scrupuleuse de la part du gou- vernement ». [102] although public interest immunity may be raised by any party or by the reviewing court itself, the government has the burden of establishing that a document should not be disclosed because of pub- lic interest immunity: carey, at pp. 653 and 678. the government should put in a detailed affi davit [102] bien que l’immunité d’intérêt public puisse être soulevée par n’importe laquelle des parties ou par le tribunal de révision lui- même, c’est au gouvernement qu’il incombe d’établir qu’un docu- ment est visé par cette immunité et qu’il ne devrait donc pas être divulgué : carey, p. 653 et 678. le 548 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. to support its claim of public interest immunity: pp 653-54. [103] as a general rule, when it is clear to the re- viewing court, based on a government’s submissions, that public interest immunity applies to a document, it need not inspect the document: carey, at pp. 671 and 681. if, however, the court has doubts about whether public interest immunity applies, the court should inspect the document in private to resolve its doubts: pp.  674 and 681; see also somerville v. scottish ministers, [2007] ukhl 44, [2007] 1 wlr 2734, at paras.  156 and 204; al rawi v. security service, [2011] uksc 34, [2012] 1 ac. 531, at para 145. indeed, even if the court is per- suaded that public interest immunity does not apply, the court should nevertheless inspect the document in private to ensure that it does not inadvertently order the disclosure of a document which should in fact remain confi dential: see conway v. rimmer, [1968] ac 910 (hl), at p 971. if, having inspected the document, the court concludes that the contents, or any part of the contents, are not protected by public interest immunity, the court can order production accordingly. gouvernement doit présenter un affi davit détaillé pour appuyer sa prétention relative à l’immunité d’intérêt public : p 653-654. [103] en règle générale, lorsqu’il est manifeste pour le tribunal de révision, compte tenu des observa- tions présentées par un gouvernement, que l’immu- nité d’intérêt public s’applique à un document, nul n’est besoin pour lui de le consulter : carey, p. 671 et 681. si, toute fois, le tribunal a des doutes quant à savoir si cette immunité s’applique, il consulte le document en privé pour dissiper tout doute à cet égard : p. 674 et 681; voir aussi somerville c. scottish ministers, [2007] ukhl 44, [2007] 1 wlr 2734, par. 156 et 204; al rawi c. security service, [2011] uksc 34, [2012] 1 ac 531, par 145. de fait, même s’il est convaincu que l’immunité d’intérêt public ne s’applique pas, le tribunal consulte tout de même le document en privé pour s’assurer de ne pas ordon- ner par mégarde la divulgation d’un document qui devrait en réalité rester confi dentiel : voir conway c. rimmer, [1968] ac 910 (hl), p 971. si, après avoir consulté le document, le tribunal conclut que son contenu, ou une partie de son contenu, n’est pas protégé par l’immunité d’intérêt public, il peut en conséquence en ordonner la production. (1) public interest immunity in the context of (1) immunité d’intérêt public dans le contexte bodner review d’un contrôle de type bodner [104] as noted in carey, the determination of pub- lic interest immunity often requires the reviewing court to examine the document in question. since in the bodner context the court will generally have ex- amined the document to determine whether it should otherwise be part of the record, the document will usually already be before the court. [104] comme l’a précisé l’arrêt carey, le tribu- nal de révision a souvent à examiner le document visé pour pouvoir se prononcer sur la question de l’immunité d’intérêt public. puisque généralement, dans le contexte d’un contrôle de type bodner, le tribunal a déjà examiné le document pour décider s’il devrait par ailleurs faire partie du dossier, il en sera habituellement déjà saisi. [105] accordingly, the court must, looking to the factors identifi ed in carey and any other pertinent factors, determine whether the public interest in the cabinet document’s disclosure outweighs the pub- lic interest in its remaining confi dential. in such a context, at least three carey factors — the level of decision- making process to which the document relates, the nature of the policy on which the docu- ment bears and the contents of the document — will [105] en conséquence, le tribunal doit alors, en tenant compte des facteurs énoncés dans l’arrêt carey et de tout autre facteur pertinent, déterminer si l’intérêt du public à ce que le document du cabinet soit divulgué l’emporte sur celui à ce qu’il demeure confi dentiel. en pareilles circonstances, au moins trois des facteurs énoncés dans l’arrêt carey — le palier du processus décisionnel auquel le document se rapporte, la nature de la politique sur laquelle [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 549 often weigh in favour of keeping the document con- fi dential. [106] aside from decisions made by the queen or her representatives, the cabinet decision- making process is the highest level of decision making within the executive: see carey, at p. 670; reference re can- ada assistance plan (bc), at pp 546-47. [107] as the british columbia courts acknowl- edged in the present case, judicial remuneration is an important and sensitive area of public policy, implicating not only the use of public money, but also the administration of justice and ultimately, judicial independence. the british columbia courts did not fi nd this to be a factor weighing in favour of continued confi dentiality: bcsc reasons, at para. 42; ca reasons, at para. 22; for similar state- ments by the nova scotia courts in the proceedings that gave rise to the companion appeal, see also nova scotia provincial judges’ association v. nova scotia (attorney general), 2018 nssc 13, 409 crr (2d) 117, at para. 144; nova scotia (attorney general) v. judges of the provincial court and family court of nova scotia, 2018 nsca 83, 429 dlr (4th) 359, at paras 44-46. i cannot agree with such an ap- proach. as this court explained in carey, at pp. 671- 72, the nature of the policy on which the document bears may weigh in favour of continued confi denti- ality to varying degrees depending on its sensitivity and signifi cance. a government’s decision about how to respond to a judicial compensation commission’s recommendations concerns not merely a matter of implementation, but involves the “formulation of policy on a broad basis”: see carey, at p. 672; see also newfoundland (treasury board) v. nape, 2004 scc 66, [2004] 3 scr 381, at para 58. that said, as i explain below, when the policy concerns a constitutional requirement relating to the justice system, and, thus, the administration of justice, as is the case in the bodner context, this may also weigh in favour of disclosure. porte le document et la teneur du document — jouent bien souvent en faveur du maintien de la confi denti- alité du document. [106] exception faite des décisions émanant de la reine ou de ses représentants, le processus déci- sionnel du cabinet se situe au plus haut échelon décisionnel du pouvoir exécutif : voir carey, p. 670; renvoi relatif au régime d’assistance publique du ca nada (c-b), p 546-547. [107] comme l’ont reconnu les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique dans la présente cause, la rémunération des juges est un domaine de politique publique important et sensible, qui touche non seu- lement à l’utilisation des deniers publics, mais égale- ment à l’administration de la justice et, ultimement, à l’indépendance judiciaire les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique n’ont pas conclu qu’il s’agit d’un facteur qui pèse en faveur de la préservation de la confi dentialité : motifs de la cs. c-b, par. 42; motifs de la ca, par. 22; pour des affi rmations au même effet par les tribunaux de nouvelle- écosse dans les procédures qui ont donné lieu au pourvoi connexe, voir aussi nova scotia provincial judges’ association c. nova scotia (attorney general), 2018 nssc 13, 409 crr (2d) 117, par. 144; nova scotia (attorney general) c. judges of the provincial court and family court of nova scotia, 2018 nsca 83, 429 dlr (4th) 359, par 44-46. je ne peux sous- crire à une telle approche. comme la cour l’a expli- qué dans l’arrêt carey, p. 671-672, la nature de la politique sur laquelle porte le document peut militer en faveur de la préservation de la confi dentialité à des degrés divers selon sa sensibilité et son impor- tance. la décision d’un gouvernement à propos de la réponse à donner aux recommandations d’une commission d’examen de la rémunération des juges ne concerne pas simplement une question de mise en œuvre, mais consiste en la « création d’une politique au sens large » : voir carey, p. 672; voir aussi terre- neuve (conseil du trésor) c. nape, 2004 csc 66, [2004] 3 rcs 381, par 58. cela dit, comme je l’explique ci- après, lorsque la politique concerne une exigence constitutionnelle en lien avec le système judiciaire et, par conséquent, avec l’administration de la justice comme c’est le cas dans le contexte bodner, cela peut aussi militer en faveur de la divulgation. 550 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. [108] the contents of a document concerning cabinet deliberations may well refl ect the views of individual ministers of the crown and reveal disagreement among ministers. cabinet documents may also reveal considerations that were put before cabinet. as a result, their contents will frequently be highly sensitive: see babcock, at para 18. [108] la teneur d’un document concernant les déli- bérations du cabinet peut fort bien rendre compte des opinions de certains ministres et révéler des désaccords entre eux. les documents du cabinet peuvent en outre révéler des considérations portées à l’attention du cabinet. en conséquence, leur contenu est souvent très sensible : voir babcock, par 18. [109] depending on the contents of the document, the timing may also weigh in favour of keeping the document confi dential. a document that sim- ply reveals that cabinet made a decision to reject a recommendation made by a judicial compensation commission will bear little confi dentiality once that decision is publicly announced. by contrast, minis- ters can rightly expect that a document that weighs several different possible responses to the commis- sion’s recommendations and proposes a particular re- sponse will remain confi dential for some prolonged time even after the decision is publicly announced. [110] in this case, the british columbia courts ap- pear to have treated the government’s failure to assert a specifi c harm that would result from the cabinet submission’s disclosure as being conclusive of the need for disclosure: see master reasons, at para. 23; bcsc reasons, at para.  46; c.a reasons, at para 22. [109] selon la teneur du document, le moment où ce dernier serait divulgué peut également jouer en faveur du maintien de sa confi dentialité. ainsi, un document qui révèle uniquement que le cabinet a pris la décision de rejeter une des recommanda- tions formulées par une commission d’examen de la rémunération des juges ne revêt guère un carac- tère confi dentiel une fois cette décision annoncée publiquement. en revanche, les ministres peuvent à bon droit s’attendre à ce qu’un document qui fait état de plusieurs réponses différentes possibles aux recommandations de la commission et de leur éva- luation, pour n’en retenir qu’une seule, demeure confi dentiel pendant une période prolongée, même après l’annonce publique de la décision. [110] en l’espèce, les tribunaux de la colombie- britannique semblent avoir considéré que le défaut du gouvernement d’avoir invoqué un préjudice par- ticulier susceptible de résulter de la divulgation du mémoire au cabinet est décisif quant à la nécessité de le divulguer : voir les motifs de la protonotaire, par. 23; les motifs de la cs. c-b, par. 46; les motifs de la ca, par 22. [111] because of the strong public interest in cabinet confi dentiality, the disclosure of a cabinet document undermines that confi dentiality and is, at least to some degree, harmful. as carey recog- nized, certain cabinet documents may, owing to their contents, raise additional concerns, as might be the case where they relate to defence or national security or refer to specifi c points of disagreement among ministers. it will often be helpful to the court for the government to be as specifi c as possible in raising the potential for such harm: pp. 653-54 and 671. but the government’s failure to identify some specifi c harm resulting from a confi dential cabinet document’s disclosure does not automatically mean the document must be disclosed. the focus must [111] vu l’intérêt important du public à ce que la confi dentialité des délibérations du cabinet soit maintenue, la divulgation d’un document du cabinet mine cette confi dentialité, et elle est, au moins dans une certaine me sure, préjudiciable. comme la cour l’a reconnu dans l’arrêt carey, certains documents du cabinet peuvent, en raison de leur teneur, soulever des préoccupations supplémentaires, par exemple lorsqu’ils se rapportent à la défense ou à la sécu- rité nationale, ou lorsqu’ils font référence à certains points précis de désaccord entre certains ministres. souvent, il est utile pour le tribunal que le gouver- nement justifi e de la façon la plus détaillée pos- sible sa prétention relative au risque que survienne un tel préjudice : p. 653-654 et 671. cependant, le [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 551 remain on whether the public interest in the docu- ment’s disclosure outweighs the public interest in its remaining confi dential. [112] given the strong public interest in keeping documents concerning cabinet deliberations confi - dential, a strong countervailing public interest will usually be necessary to justify their disclosure. the strength of the public interest in disclosure will often turn on the interests of the administration of justice, a factor identifi ed in carey. [113] the notion of the “interests of the adminis- tration of justice” undoubtedly encompasses a broad set of considerations: see carey, at pp. 647-48 and 671. two stand out in the bodner context: “   the importance of the case and the need or desirability of producing the documents to ensure that [the case]    can be adequately and fairly presented” (carey, at p 671). in the companion case, the nova scotia court [114] of appeal concluded that disclosure of the report is in the public interest because the government knew its response to the commission’s recommendations would be subject to review and because the review would focus on matters vital to the administration of justice and to the relationship between two branches of government: paras 44-46. défaut du gouvernement de faire état d’un préjudice particulier susceptible de résulter de la divulgation d’un document confi dentiel du cabinet ne signi- fi e pas automatiquement que le document doit être divulgué. le tribunal doit toujours chercher à savoir avant tout si l’intérêt du public à ce que le document soit divulgué l’emporte sur celui à ce qu’il demeure confi dentiel. [112] par ailleurs, du fait de cet intérêt important du public à garder confi dentiels les documents rela- tifs aux délibérations du cabinet, une autre forme d’intérêt du public tout aussi important sera néces- saire pour faire contrepoids et justifi er leur divulga- tion. l’importance de l’intérêt du public à ce que le document soit divulgué tiendra souvent à l’intérêt de l’administration de la justice, un facteur par ailleurs relevé dans l’arrêt carey. [113] à n’en pas douter, la notion d’« intérêt de l’administration de la justice » embrasse un vaste éventail de considérations : voir carey, p. 647-648 et 671. deux d’ entre elles, cependant, se démarquent dans le contexte d’un contrôle de type bodner, à savoir : «    l’importance de la cause et la néces- sité ou l’opportunité de produire les documents afi n qu’elle puisse être plaidée d’une manière adéquate et équitable » (carey, p 671). [114] dans le pourvoi connexe, la cour d’appel de la nouvelle- écosse a conclu que la divulgation du rapport en cause est dans l’intérêt du public dans la me sure où le gouvernement savait que sa réponse aux recommandations de la commission ferait l’objet d’un contrôle judiciaire, et où ce contrôle porte- rait principalement sur des questions essentielles à l’administration de la justice et aux rapports existant entre deux des branches du gouvernement : par. 44- 46. [115] these considerations cut both ways. al- though there is no doubt that bodner reviews are of great importance, the fact that a party seeks produc- tion of a relevant confi dential cabinet document in the context of a bodner review is not itself a general basis for disclosure. such an approach would effec- tively trump the public interest in the confi dentiality of cabinet deliberations in every bodner review. [115] ces considérations peuvent cependant jouer dans les deux sens. en effet, même s’il ne fait aucun doute que les contrôles de type bodner sont d’une grande importance, le fait qu’une des parties réclame la production d’un document confi dentiel du cabinet pertinent dans le cadre d’un tel contrôle ne saurait, en soi, servir de fondement général à la divulga- tion. une telle approche se traduirait concrètement, 552 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. it would also confl ate the importance of the issues canvassed on such a review with the importance of the evidence provided by the cabinet document to the disposition of those issues. in the bodner context, the reviewing court’s [116] analysis of the factors bearing on the public interest in disclosure must necessarily be informed by its conclusion on the nature and probative value of the evidence. a document may provide some evidence that the government failed to meet one of the parts of the bodner test, but the importance of the evidence may vary widely. when considering the interests of the administration of justice, the focus must therefore remain on the degree to which the document bears on what is at issue in the litigation. [117] a document may contain information not otherwise available such that its exclusion from evi- dence would undermine the court’s ability to adjudi- cate the issues on their merits: see carey, at pp. 654 and 673; commonwealth v. northern land council (1993), 176 clr 604 (hca), at p 619. a docu- ment that tends to establish that the government set out to provide misleading public reasons for its response to the commission’s recommendations; that the government relied on a fundamentally fl awed factual foundation; that the government acted with an improper or colourable purpose; or that the gov- ernment was indifferent or disrespectful towards the commission process will be highly probative. such a document bears so directly — and so determi- nately — on the issues that the reviewing court needs to resolve on bodner review that to exclude the docu- ment would be contrary to the interests of the admin- istration of justice: see air can ada v. secretary of state for trade, [1983] 2 ac 394 (hl), at p 435. given the important constitutional interests at stake, the public interest in disclosure would almost cer- tainly outweigh the public interest in the document’s remaining confi dential. excluding such a document à chaque contrôle de ce type, par une mise en échec de l’intérêt du public à ce que les délibérations du cabinet demeurent confi dentielles. elle reviendrait aussi à confondre l’importance des questions à exa- miner dans un tel contrôle avec l’importance de la preuve apportée par le document du cabinet pour y répondre. [116] dans le contexte d’un contrôle de type bodner, l’analyse par le tribunal de révision des facteurs pouvant avoir une incidence sur l’intérêt du public à ce que le document soit divulgué doit néces- sairement être inspirée par sa conclusion au sujet de la nature et de la valeur probante du document visé. de fait, un document peut fournir certains éléments de preuve que le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une des étapes de l’analyse établie par l’arrêt bodner. toute fois, l’importance de tels éléments de preuve peut varier considérablement. au moment d’exami- ner la question de l’intérêt de l’administration de la justice, le tribunal doit donc se concentrer sur la me sure dans laquelle le document a un rapport avec les questions en litige. [117] il se peut aussi qu’un document renferme des renseignements dont le tribunal ne pourrait autrement prendre connaissance, de telle sorte que son exclu- sion de la preuve nuirait à la capacité du tribunal de trancher au fond les questions en litige : voir carey, p.  654 et 673; commonwealth c northern land council (1993), 176 clr 604 (hca), p 619. le document qui tend à établir que le gouvernement a décidé de fournir publiquement des motifs trompeurs pour justifi er sa réponse aux recommandations de la commission, qu’il s’est appuyé sur un fondement factuel comportant des lacunes fondamentales, qu’il a agi pour atteindre un objectif illégitime ou déguisé, ou qu’il s’est montré indifférent ou irrespectueux envers le recours au mécanisme d’examen par une commission aura ainsi une grande valeur probante. un tel document porte si directement — et de ma- nière si déterminante — sur les questions à trancher par le tribunal de révision dans le cadre d’un contrôle de type bodner que son exclusion serait contraire à l’intérêt de l’administration de la justice : voir air ca nada c. secretary of state for trade, [1983] 2 ac 394 (hl), p 435. compte tenu des importants intérêts constitutionnels en jeu, il est pratiquement [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association la juge karakatsanis 553 from evidence would keep the court from fulfi lling its judicial role, jeopardize public confi dence in the administration of justice, and ultimately threaten the rule of law. in such cases, where the probative value of the document is high, the public interest immunity analysis will lead to the same result as the production analysis set out above. [118] by contrast, the public interest immunity analysis may lead to a different result for a cabinet document that supports the contention that the gov- ernment failed to meet one of its constitutional re- quirements, but whose impact on the bodner review would be limited. the probative value of such evi- dence might not weigh heavily enough to warrant disclosure, especially if there were strong public interest in its remaining confi dential. but such a document’s exclusion from the record could hardly keep the reviewing court from adjudicating the issues on their merits. the public interest in disclosure of such a cabinet document would thus not outweigh the public interest in its remaining confi dential. [119] as a general matter, the notion of “uncon- scionable behaviour” referred to in carey, at p. 673, will only be pertinent in a limited set of cases. this factor is superadded to more general considerations involving the administration of justice. the conduct in question must be “harsh” or “improper”; though it need not be criminal, it must nevertheless be of a similar degree of seriousness: p 673. in the bodner context, this factor does little work independent from the factor relating to the interests of the adminis- tration of justice. the harshness or impropriety of the government’s conduct would be canvassed in assessing whether the government acted with an improper or colourable purpose. a document that demonstrates unconscionable behaviour on the gov- ernment’s part would tend to establish its failure to meet its constitutional requirements in a highly pro- bative manner and, for that reason, the public interest certain que l’intérêt du public à ce que le document soit divulgué l’emportera sur celui à ce qu’il demeure confi dentiel. qui plus est, écarter un tel document de la preuve empêcherait le tribunal de remplir sa fonc- tion judiciaire, en plus de mettre en péril la confi ance du public dans l’administration de la justice et, ulti- mement, de menacer la primauté du droit. dans de tels cas, lorsque la valeur probante du document est forte, l’analyse de l’immunité d’intérêt public mène au même résultat que l’analyse de l’opportunité de la production énoncée précédemment. [118] en revanche, l’analyse de l’immunité d’inté- rêt public peut mener à un résultat différent s’il est question d’un document du cabinet qui étaye la prétention selon laquelle le gouvernement n’a pas satisfait à une des exigences constitutionnelles aux- quelles il doit satisfaire, mais dont l’incidence sur un contrôle de type bodner serait limitée. il se pourrait que la valeur probante de cette preuve soit trop faible pour justifi er une divulgation, surtout s’il existe un intérêt important du public à ce que le document demeure confi dentiel. cela dit, le fait d’exclure ce genre de document du dossier peut diffi cilement empêcher le tribunal de révision de trancher au fond les questions en litige. l’intérêt du public à ce qu’un tel document du cabinet soit divulgué ne l’emporte- rait donc pas sur celui à ce qu’il reste confi dentiel. [119] généralement parlant, la notion de « conduite peu scrupuleuse » dont il était question dans la dé- cision carey, p. 673, n’est pertinente que dans un nombre limité de cas. ce facteur se surajoute en réalité à des considérations plus générales liées à l’administration de la justice. pour être pertinente, la conduite en question doit être « sévère » ou « abu- sive » et, sans pour autant être criminelle, elle doit avoir un degré de gravité comparable : p 673. dans le contexte d’un contrôle de type bodner, pareil fac- teur joue un rôle très limité indépendamment du facteur relatif aux intérêts de l’administration de justice. le caractère sévère ou abusif de la conduite du gouvernement est examiné au moment d’évaluer s’il avait un objectif illégitime ou déguisé. un docu- ment qui démontre une conduite peu scrupuleuse de la part du gouvernement tendra à établir de façon très probante qu’il n’a pas satisfait aux exigences 554 bc (ag) v prov. court judges’ association karakatsanis j. [2020] 2 scr. in its disclosure would almost certainly outweigh the public interest in its remaining confi dential. [120] accordingly, i disagree with the sugges- tion of the attorney general of british columbia and other attorneys general that this court’s public interest immunity case law results in routine, almost inevitable, disclosure of confi dential cabinet docu- ments, and should thus be revisited. properly applied in the bodner context, public interest immunity re- quires a careful balancing of the public interests in confi dentiality and disclosure. since the public inter- est in the confi dentiality of documents concerning cabinet deliberations is often particularly strong, the public interest in their disclosure will usually need to be stronger still to warrant their disclosure. constitutionnelles auxquelles il doit satisfaire; c’est pourquoi, dans un tel cas, l’intérêt du public à ce que le document soit divulgué l’emporte presque assurément sur celui à ce qu’il demeure confi dentiel. [120] par conséquent, je ne souscris pas à l’ar- gument du procureur général de la colombie- britannique et des autres procureurs généraux selon lequel la jurisprudence de la cour en matière d’im- munité d’intérêt public donne lieu à une divulgation systématique, voire presque inévitable, des docu- ments confi dentiels du cabinet, et qu’elle devrait par conséquent être réexaminée par la cour. appliquée correctement dans le cadre d’un contrôle de type bodner, l’immunité d’intérêt public exige de mettre soigneusement en balance les intérêts du public à l’égard de la confi dentialité et de la divulgation. dans la me sure où l’intérêt du public à ce que les docu- ments se rapportant aux délibérations du cabinet demeurent confi dentiels est souvent important, celui à ce qu’ils soient divulgués doit habituellement l’être encore davantage pour que leur divulgation soit jus- tifi ée. v disposition v dispositif [121] i would allow the appeal without costs and quash the master’s order for production of the cabinet submission. the provincial court judges’ association’s petition can now be adjudicated on its merits without consideration of the cabinet submis- sion. [121] je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi sans dépens et d’annuler l’ordonnance de production du mémoire au cabinet rendue par la protonotaire. la demande de la provincial court judges’ association peut maintenant être tranchée sur le fond sans tenir compte du mémoire au cabinet. appeal allowed without costs. pourvoi accueilli sans dépens. solicitors for the appellant: gudmundseth procureurs de l’appelant  : gudmundseth mickelson, vancouver. mickelson, vancouver. solicitors for the respondent: arvay finlay, procureurs de l’intimée : arvay finlay, vancouver. vancouver. of can ada: attorney general of can ada, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur général du ca nada : procureur général du ca nada, toronto. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’ontario : procureur général de l’ontario, toronto. [2020] 2 rcs. c-b (pg) c prov. court judges’ association 555 of quebec: attorney general of quebec, québec. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné- rale du québec : procureure générale du québec, québec. of saskatchewan: attorney general of saskatchewan, regina. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de la saskatchewan : procureur général de la saskatchewan, regina. of alberta: attorney general of alberta, edmonton. procureur de l’intervenant le procureur géné- ral de l’alberta : procureur général de l’alberta, edmonton. perior courts judges association: norton rose fulbright can ada, montréal. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association ca na- dienne des juges des cours supérieures : norton rose fulbright ca nada, montréal. association: borden ladner gervais, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association du barreau canadien : borden ladner gervais, toronto. ciation of provincial court judges: goldblatt partners, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association ca na- dienne des juges des cours provinciales : goldblatt partners, toronto. solicitors for the intervener the ca na dian taxpayers federation: mccarthy tétrault, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante la fédération ca- na dienne des contribuables : mccarthy tétrault, toronto. liberties association: paliare roland rosenberg rothstein, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante l’association ca- na dienne des libertés civiles  : paliare roland rosenberg rothstein, toronto.
[1] this appeal involves a contest between two innocent parties, both of whom claim an entitlement to the proceeds of a life insurance policy. [1] le présent pourvoi concerne un litige entre deux parties innocentes, qui soutiennent toutes deux avoir droit au produit d’une police d’assurance- vie. [2] the appellant, michelle constance moore (“michelle”), and the owner of the policy, lawrence anthony moore (“lawrence”), were former spouses. they entered into a contractual agreement pursuant to which michelle would pay all of the policy’s pre- miums and, in exchange, lawrence would maintain michelle as the sole beneficiary thereunder — and she would therefore be entitled to receive the pro- ceeds of the policy upon lawrence’s death. while michelle held up her end of the bargain, lawrence did not. shortly after assuming his contractual ob- ligation, and unbeknownst to michelle, lawrence designated his new common law spouse — the re- spondent, risa lorraine sweet (“risa”) — as the ir‑ revocable beneficiary of the policy. when lawrence passed away several years later, the proceeds were payable to risa and not to michelle. [3] should these proceeds be impressed with a con- structive trust in michelle’s favour? a majority of the ontario court of appeal found that they should not. i disagree; in my view, risa was enriched, michelle was correspondingly deprived, and both the enrich- ment and the deprivation occurred in the absence of a juristic reason. in these circumstances, a remedial constructive trust should be imposed for michelle’s benefit. i would therefore allow the appeal. [2] l’appelante, michelle  constance moore («  michelle  »), et le propriétaire de la police, lawrence anthony moore (« lawrence »), étaient mariés. ils ont conclu une entente contractuelle aux termes de laquelle michelle paierait toutes les primes de la police et, en échange, lawrence maintiendrait sa désignation comme seule bénéficiaire et elle au- rait par le fait même droit au produit de la police au décès de lawrence. bien que michelle ait respecté sa part du marché, lawrence ne l’a pas fait. en effet, peu de temps après avoir conclu cette entente, et à l’insu de michelle, lawrence a désigné sa nouvelle conjointe de fait — l’intimée, risa lorraine sweet (« risa ») — à titre de bénéficiaire irrévocable de la police. lorsque lawrence est décédé plusieurs années plus tard, le produit de la police était payable à risa, et non à michelle. [3] le produit de la police devrait-il faire l’ob- jet d’une fiducie par interprétation en faveur de michelle? les juges majoritaires de la cour d’ap- pel de l’ontario ont conclu que non. je ne suis pas d’accord; à mon avis, risa s’est enrichie, michelle a subi un appauvrissement correspondant, et tant l’enrichissement que l’appauvrissement ont eu lieu en l’absence d’un motif juridique dans les cir- constances, il convient d’imposer une fiducie par interprétation en faveur de michelle, à titre de ré- paration. par conséquent, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi. [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 313 ii context ii contexte [4] michelle and lawrence were married in 1979. together, they had three children. in october 1985, lawrence purchased a term life insurance policy from canadian general life insurance company, the predecessor of rbc life insurance company (“insurance company”). he purchased this policy, with a coverage amount of $250,000, and initially designated michelle as the beneficiary — but not as an irrevocable beneficiary. the annual premium of $507.50 was paid out of the couple’s joint bank account until 2000. [4] michelle et lawrence se sont mariés en 1979 et ont eu trois enfants. en octobre 1985, lawrence a souscrit une police d’assurance- vie temporaire auprès de la compagnie d’assurance- vie canadienne géné- rale, le prédécesseur de la compagnie d’assurance- vie rbc (« compagnie d’assurance »). il a souscrit cette assurance- vie avec une couverture de 250 000 $. il a désigné au départ michelle comme seule bénéfi- ciaire, mais non à titre irrévocable. la prime annuelle de 507,50 $ a été payée à même le compte bancaire conjoint du couple jusqu’en 2000. [5] in december 1999, michelle and lawrence separated shortly thereafter, they entered into an oral agreement (“oral agreement”) whereby michelle “would pay the premiums and be enti- tled to the proceeds of the policy on [lawrence’s] death” (superior court decision, 2015 onsc 3914, at para. 13 (canlii)). the effect of this agreement was therefore to require that michelle remain des- ignated as the sole beneficiary of lawrence’s life insurance policy. [5] en décembre 1999, michelle et lawrence se sont séparés. peu après, ils ont conclu une entente verbale (« entente verbale ») aux termes de laquelle michelle [traduction] «  paierait les primes et aurait droit au produit de la police au décès de [lawrence] » (décision de la cour supérieure, 2015 onsc 3914, par. 13 (canlii)). cette entente vi- sait donc à faire en sorte que michelle demeure la seule bénéficiaire de la police d’assurance- vie de lawrence. in the summer of 2000, lawrence began cohab- [6] iting with risa. they remained common law spouses and lived in risa’s apartment until lawrence’s death 13 years later. [6] à l’été 2000, lawrence a commencé à cohabi- ter avec risa. ils sont demeurés conjoints de fait et ont vécu dans l’appartement de risa jusqu’au décès de lawrence 13 ans plus tard. [7] on september 21, 2000, lawrence executed a change of beneficiary form designating risa as the irrevocable beneficiary of the policy. risa testified that lawrence did so because he did not want her to worry about how she would pay the rent or buy medication, and wanted to make sure that she would be able to continue living in the building where she had resided for the preceding 40 years. [7] le 21 septembre 2000, lawrence a signé un formulaire de changement de bénéficiaire et a dé- signé risa comme bénéficiaire irrévocable de la police. selon risa, lawrence a effectué ce change- ment parce qu’il ne voulait pas qu’elle craigne de ne pas être en mesure de payer le loyer ou d’acheter des médicaments, et voulait s’assurer qu’elle puisse continuer à vivre dans l’immeuble où elle avait ha- bité les 40 années précédentes. [8] the change in beneficiary designation was made through, and after consultation with, lawrence’s in- surance broker, who also happened to be michelle’s brother-in- law. the new designation was recorded by the insurance company on september 25, 2000. although lawrence did not change the benefi- ciary designation surreptitiously, he did not advise [8] lawrence a effectué le changement de bé- néficiaire par l’entremise de son courtier d’assu- rance, après l’avoir consulté. ce dernier est aussi le beau- frère de michelle. la nouvelle désignation a été consignée par la compagnie d’assurance le 25 septembre 2000. bien que lawrence n’ait pas effectué le changement de bénéficiaire furtivement, 314 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. michelle that she was no longer named as benefi- ciary.1 il n’a pas avisé michelle qu’elle n’était plus désignée bénéficiaire1. [9] michelle and lawrence entered into a formal separation agreement in may 2002. this agreement dealt with a number of issues as between them, but was silent as to the policy and anything related to it. they finalized their divorce on october 3, 2003. [9] michelle et lawrence ont conclu un accord de séparation formel en mai 2002. cet accord portait sur plusieurs questions qui les concernaient, mais était muet sur la police et sur tout élément connexe. ils ont finalisé leur divorce le 3 octobre 2003. [10] pursuant to her obligation under the oral agreement, and without knowing that lawrence had named risa as the irrevocable beneficiary, michelle continued to pay all of the premiums on the policy until lawrence’s death. by then, a total of $30,535.64 had been paid on account of premiums; about $7,000 had been paid since 2000. [10] conformément à son obligation assumée aux termes de l’entente verbale, et sans savoir que lawrence avait nommé risa comme bénéficiaire irrévocable, michelle a continué de payer toutes les primes de la police jusqu’au décès de lawrence. à ce moment-là, un total de 30 535,64 $ avait été versé à titre de primes, dont environ 7 000 $ avaient été versés depuis 2000. [11] lawrence died on june 20, 2013. his estate had no significant assets. [11] lawrence est décédé le 20 juin 2013. sa suc- cession n’avait aucun actif important. [12] michelle was advised by the insurance com- pany that she was not the designated beneficiary of the policy on july 5, 2013, around two weeks after lawrence’s death. on february 12, 2014, michelle commenced an application seeking the opinion, ad- vice and direction of the ontario superior court of justice as to her entitlement to the proceeds of the policy. pursuant to a court order dated decem- ber 19, 2013, the insurance company paid the pro- ceeds of the policy into court pending the resolution of the dispute. [12] michelle fut avisée par la compagnie d’assu- rance qu’elle n’était pas la bénéficiaire désignée de la police le 5 juillet 2013, environ deux semaines après le décès de lawrence. le 12 février 2014, michelle déposait une requête visant à obtenir l’avis, les conseils et les directives de la cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario quant à son droit au produit de la police. conformément à une ordonnance de la cour datée du 19 décembre 2013, la compagnie d’assu- rance a consigné le produit de la police au tribunal, en attendant le règlement du litige. [13] part v of the insurance act, rso 1990, c i8, sets out a comprehensive scheme that governs the rights and obligations of parties to a life insur- ance policy. it applies to all life insurance contracts “[d]espite any agreement, condition or stipulation to the contrary” (s. 172(1)), which means that the parties cannot contract out of its provisions. [13] la partie  v de la loi sur les assurances, lro 1990, c i8, instaure un régime exhaustif qui régit les droits et obligations des parties à une police d’assurance- vie. elle s’applique à tous les contrats d’assurance- vie « [m]algré toute convention, condition ou stipulation contraire » (par. 172(1)), ce qui empêche les parties de se soustraire par contrat à ses dispositions. [14] of particular relevance for the purposes of this appeal are the provisions of the insurance act [14] les dispositions de la loi sur les assurances qui traitent de la désignation des bénéficiaires sont 1 there is no dispute between the parties that the oral agreement was entered into sometime prior to the date on which lawrence designated risa as irrevocable beneficiary (transcript, at pp 6-7). 1 les parties ne contestent pas que l’entente orale a été conclue quelque temps avant la date à laquelle lawrence a désigné risa comme bénéficiaire irrévocable  (transcription de l’audience, p 6-7). [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 315 that deal with the designation of beneficiaries. a “beneficiary” of a life insurance policy is defined as “a person, other than the insured or the insured’s per- sonal representative, to whom or for whose benefit insurance money is made payable in a contract or by a declaration” (s 171(1)). a beneficiary designation therefore identifies the intended recipient of the pro- ceeds under the life insurance policy upon the death of the insured person, in accordance with the terms of the policy. particulièrement pertinentes en l’espèce. le « béné- ficiaire » d’une police d’assurance- vie s’entend de la « [p]ersonne, à l’exception de l’assuré ou de son représentant personnel, à laquelle ou au bénéfice de laquelle des sommes assurées sont payables dans un contrat ou par une déclaration » (par 171(1)). la désignation permet donc d’identifier le récipien- daire voulu du produit de la police d’assurance- vie au décès de la personne assurée, conformément aux modalités de cette police. [15] part v of the insurance act recognizes two types of beneficiary designations: those that are rev‑ ocable and those that are irrevocable. a revocable beneficiary designation is one that can be altered or revoked by the insured without the beneficiary’s knowledge or consent (s. 190(1) and (2)). an irrev- ocable beneficiary designation, by contrast, can be altered or revoked only if the designated beneficiary consents (s 191(1)). when a valid irrevocable ben- eficiary designation is made, s. 191 of the insurance act makes clear that the insurance money ceases to be subject to the control of the insured, is not subject to the claims of the insured’s creditors and does not form part of the insured’s estate. [16] it is clear that the interest of an irrevocable beneficiary is afforded much more protection than that of a revocable beneficiary; the former has a “statutory right to remain as the named beneficiary entitled to receive the insurance moneys unless he or she consents to being removed” (court of appeal decision, 2017 onca 182, 134 or (3d) 721, at para.  82). the legislation contemplates only one situation where insurance money can be clawed back from a beneficiary, regardless of whether his or her designation is irrevocable: to satisfy a support claim brought by a dependant against the estate of the now- deceased insured person (succession law reform act, rso 1990, c s26, ss. 58 and 72(1)(f)). no such claim has been brought in this case. [15] la partie v de la loi sur les assurances re- connaît deux types de désignations de bénéficiaire : celles qui sont révocables et celles qui sont irré‑ vocables la désignation d’un bénéficiaire révo- cable peut être modifiée ou révoquée par l’assuré à l’insu du bénéficiaire ou sans son consentement (par. 190(1) et (2)). la désignation d’un bénéficiaire irrévocable, à l’inverse, ne peut être modifiée ou révoquée qu’avec le consentement du bénéficiaire (par 191(1)). lorsque la désignation valide d’un bénéficiaire irrévocable est effectuée, l’art. 191 de la loi sur les assurances indique clairement que les sommes assurées cessent d’être sous le contrôle de l’assuré, ne peuvent être réclamées par les créanciers de l’assuré et ne font pas partie de la succession de l’assuré. [16] il est évident qu’une protection beaucoup plus grande est accordée à un bénéficiaire irrévocable qu’à un bénéficiaire révocable; le premier a un [tra- duction] « droit statutaire de demeurer le bénéfi- ciaire désigné ayant droit de recevoir les sommes assurées à moins de consentir à ce que sa désigna- tion soit révoquée » (décision de la cour d’appel, 2017 onca 182, 134 or (3d) 721, par 82). la loi prévoit seulement un cas où les sommes assurées peuvent être réclamées d’un bénéficiaire, peu importe si sa désignation est irrévocable : pour se conformer à une demande d’aliments présentée par une per- sonne à charge contre la succession de la personne assurée maintenant décédée (loi portant réforme du droit des successions, lro 1990, c s26, art. 58 et al 72(1)f)). aucune demande de cette nature n’a été présentée en l’espèce. [17] part v of the insurance act also deals with the assignment of a life insurance policy. a life insurance [17] la partie v de la loi sur les assurances traite également de la cession d’une police d’assurance- vie. 316 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. contract entails a promise by the insurer “to pay the contractual benefit when the insured event occurs” (norwood on life insurance law in canada (3rd ed. 2002), by d. norwood and j. p. weir, at p 359). it can therefore be understood as creating a chose in action against the insurer, which is transferrable from one person to another through the mechanism of an assignment. the statute provides that where the assignee gives written notice of the assignment to the insurer, he or she assumes all of the assignor’s rights and interests in the policy. pursuant to s. 200(1)(b) of the insurance act, however, an assignee’s interest in the policy will not have priority over that of an irrev- ocable beneficiary who was designated prior to the time the assignee gave notice to the insurer — unless the irrevocable beneficiary consents to the assign- ment and surrenders his or her interest in the policy. un contrat d’assurance- vie implique une promesse de la part de l’assureur [traduction] « de payer le bénéfice contractuel lorsque se produit l’événement assuré » (norwood on life insurance law in canada (3e éd. 2002), par d. norwood et j p weir, p 359). on peut donc considérer qu’il crée une chose non possessoire contre l’assureur, qui est transférable d’une personne à une autre par le mécanisme d’une cession. la loi prévoit que lorsque le cessionnaire donne un avis écrit de la cession à l’assureur, le pre- mier assume tous les droits et intérêts du cédant dans la police. toutefois, conformément à l’al. 200(1)b) de la loi sur les assurances, l’intérêt d’un cessionnaire dans la police n’aura pas priorité sur celui du bénéfi- ciaire irrévocable qui a été désigné avant le moment où le cessionnaire a donné avis à l’assureur — à moins que le bénéficiaire irrévocable ne consente à la cession et renonce à son intérêt dans la police. [18] the relevant provisions of the insurance act read as follows: [18] les dispositions applicables de la loi sur les assurances sont rédigées comme suit : 190 (1) subject to subsection (4),2 an insured may in a contract or by a declaration designate the insured, the insured’s personal representative or a beneficiary as one to whom or for whose benefit insurance money is to be payable. 190 (1) sous réserve du paragraphe (4)2, l’assuré peut, dans un contrat ou par une déclaration, se désigner lui- même ou désigner son représentant personnel ou un bé- néficiaire comme personne à laquelle ou au bénéfice de laquelle les sommes assurées doivent être versées. (2) subject to section 191, the insured may from time to time alter or revoke the designation by a declaration. (2) sous réserve de l’article 191, l’assuré peut modifier ou révoquer la désignation par une déclaration.   .   . 191 (1) an insured may in a contract, or by a declaration other than a declaration that is part of a will, filed with the insurer at its head or principal office in canada during the lifetime of the person whose life is insured, designate a beneficiary irrevocably, and in that event the insured, while the beneficiary is living, may not alter or revoke the designation without the consent of the beneficiary and the insurance money is not subject to the control of the in- sured, is not subject to the claims of the insured’s creditor and does not form part of the insured’s estate. 191 (1) l’assuré peut, dans le contrat ou par une décla- ration, autre qu’une déclaration faisant partie d’un testa- ment, déposée au siège social ou au bureau principal au canada de l’assureur, du vivant de la personne sur la tête de qui repose l’assurance, désigner un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable. dans ce cas, l’assuré ne peut, tant que le bé- néficiaire est en vie, ni modifier ni révoquer la désignation sans le consentement de celui-ci; les sommes assurées ne sont sous le contrôle ni de l’assuré ni de ses créanciers, ne peuvent être réclamées par les créanciers de l’assuré et ne font pas partie de sa succession. (2) where the insured purports to designate a beneficiary irrevocably in a will or in a declaration that is not filed (2) lorsque l’assuré prétend désigner un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable dans un testament ou une déclaration qui 2 the exception in subs. (4) does not apply in the circumstances of 2 l’exception prévue au par. (4) ne s’applique pas dans les circons- this case. tances de l’espèce. [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 317 as provided in subsection (1), the designation has the same effect as if the insured had not purported to make it irrevocable. ne sont pas déposés conformément au paragraphe (1), la désignation a le même effet que si l’assuré n’avait pas prétendu la rendre irrévocable. 200 (1) where an assignee of a contract gives notice in writing of the assignment to the insurer at its head or principal office in canada, the assignee has priority of interest as against, 200 (1) le cessionnaire d’un contrat qui donne avis écrit de la cession à l’assureur à son siège social ou à son bureau principal au canada est titulaire d’un intérêt qui a priorité sur celui : (a) any assignee other than one who gave notice ear- lier in like manner; and (b) a beneficiary other than one designated irrev- ocably as provided in section 191 prior to the time the assignee gave notice to the insurer of the assignment in the manner prescribed in this subsection. a) b) d’un cessionnaire, sauf de celui qui a donné un avis antérieur identique; d’un bénéficiaire, sauf de celui qui a été désigné à titre irrévocable de la façon prévue à l’article 191, avant la date à laquelle le cessionnaire a avisé l’assureur de la cession de la façon prescrite au présent paragraphe. (2) where a contract is assigned as security, the rights of a beneficiary under the contract are affected only to the extent necessary to give effect to the rights and interests of the assignee. (2) la cession en garantie d’un contrat ne porte atteinte aux droits donnés au bénéficiaire par le contrat que dans la mesure nécessaire pour donner effet aux droits et aux intérêts du cessionnaire. (3) where a contract is assigned unconditionally and otherwise than as security, the assignee has all the rights and interests given to the insured by the contract and by this part and shall be deemed to be the insured. (3) lorsqu’un contrat est cédé sans condition et autrement qu’en garantie, le cessionnaire est titulaire de tous les droits et intérêts donnés à l’assuré par le contrat et par la présente partie, et est réputé être l’assuré.   .   . iii decisions below iii décisions des juridictions inférieures a ontario superior court of justice (wilton‑ siegel j.) a cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario (le juge — 2015 onsc 3914 wilton‑ siegel) — 2015 onsc 3914 [19] the application judge, wilton- siegel j., held that risa had been unjustly enriched at michelle’s expense, and therefore impressed the proceeds of the policy with a constructive trust in michelle’s favour. he began his reasons by addressing a prelim- inary matter: the oral agreement that lawrence and michelle had entered into during their separation. he held that michelle and lawrence “each had an equitable interest in the proceeds of the policy from the time that it was taken out” and that the oral agreement had effectively resulted in the “equitable assignment to [michelle] of [lawrence’s] equitable interest in the proceeds in return for [michelle’s] agreement to pay the premiums on the policy” (para. 17) (canlii). according to the application [19] le juge de première instance, le juge wilton- siegel, a conclu que risa s’était enrichie sans cause au détriment de michelle, et il a par conséquent assujetti le produit de la police à une fiducie par in- terprétation en faveur de michelle. dans ses motifs, il s’est d’abord penché sur une question préliminaire : l’entente verbale conclue entre lawrence et michelle pendant leur séparation. il a conclu que michelle et lawrence [traduction] « avaient chacun un intérêt en equity dans le produit de la police dès le moment où celle-ci a été souscrite » et que l’entente verbale avait effectivement emporté la « cession en equity à [michelle] de l’intérêt en equity de [lawrence] dans le produit, en échange du consentement de [michelle] à payer les primes de la police » (par. 17) 318 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. judge, this equitable interest “took the form of a right to determine the beneficiary of the policy” (para 18). [20] the application judge then turned to michelle’s unjust enrichment claim he found that the first two elements of the cause of action in unjust en- richment — an enrichment of the defendant and a corresponding deprivation suffered by the plain- tiff — were easily met in this case: risa had been enriched by virtue of her valid designation as ir- revocable beneficiary, and michelle had suffered a corresponding deprivation to the extent that she paid the premiums and to the extent that the pro- ceeds had been payable to risa “notwithstanding the prior equitable assignment of such proceeds to her” (para 27). with respect to the third and final element — the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment — the application judge held that risa’s designation as beneficiary under the policy did not constitute a juristic reason that entitled her to retain the proceeds in the particular circumstances of this case (para.  46). this was because risa’s entitle- ment to the proceeds would not have been possible if michelle had not performed her obligations under the oral agreement, and because the oral agreement itself amounted to an equitable assignment of the proceeds to michelle (para 48). (canlii). selon le juge de première instance, cet intérêt en equity « a pris la forme d’un droit de dé- terminer le bénéficiaire de la police » (par 18). [20] le juge de première instance s’est ensuite penché sur l’action pour enrichissement sans cause de michelle. il a conclu que les deux premiers élé- ments constitutifs de l’action pour enrichissement sans cause — l’enrichissement du défendeur et l’ap- pauvrissement correspondant subi par le deman- deur — étaient aisément satisfaits en l’espèce : risa a été enrichie en raison de sa désignation valide comme bénéficiaire irrévocable, et michelle a subi un appauvrissement correspondant dans la mesure où elle avait payé les primes mais le produit revenait à risa, [traduction] « malgré que le produit lui eût été antérieurement cédé en equity » (par 27). quant au troisième et dernier élément — l’absence d’un motif juridique justifiant l’enrichissement — le juge de première instance a conclu que la désignation de risa à titre de bénéficiaire de la police ne constituait pas un motif juridique lui donnant le droit de conser- ver le produit dans les circonstances particulières de l’espèce (par 46). il en était ainsi parce que le droit de risa au produit n’aurait pas été possible si michelle n’avait pas exécuté ses obligations prévues par l’entente verbale, et parce que l’entente verbale elle- même équivalait à une cession en equity du produit à michelle (par 48). b ontario court of appeal (strathy cjo and blair  ja,. lauwers  j.a dissenting)  —  2017 onca 182, 134 or (3d) 721 b cour d’appel de l’ontario (le juge en chef strathy et le juge blair, le juge lauwers étant dissident) — 2017 onca 182, 134 or (3d) 721 [21] the ontario court of appeal allowed risa’s appeal and set aside the judgment of the application judge. it ordered that the $7,000 michelle had paid in premiums between 2000 and 2013 be paid out of court to her and that the balance of the insurance proceeds be paid to risa. [21] la cour d’appel de l’ontario a accueilli l’appel de risa et a infirmé le jugement du juge de première instance. elle a ordonné que la somme de 7 000 $ versée par michelle en primes entre les années 2000 et 2013 soit retirée du greffe du tribunal et lui soit remboursée, et que le solde du produit de l’assurance soit versé à risa. (1) majority reasons (1) les motifs des juges majoritaires [22] writing for himself and for strathy cjo,. blair ja held that it was not open to the application judge to find that the oral agreement amounted to an equitable assignment, since the doctrine of equitable [22] s’exprimant en son nom et en celui du juge en chef strathy, le juge blair a conclu qu’il n’était pas loisible au juge de première instance de conclure que l’entente verbale était assimilable à une cession [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 319 assignment had not been placed in issue by the par- ties before him. en equity, puisque les parties n’avaient pas soulevé la question de la cession en equity devant lui. [23] turning to michelle’s unjust enrichment claim, blair ja accepted the application judge’s finding that risa was enriched. he found it unnec- essary to resolve the issue of whether the corre- sponding deprivation element had been made out as he found there was a juristic reason justifying the receipt by risa of the proceeds. specifically, blair ja held that the application judge had erred in his approach to the juristic reason element of the unjust enrichment framework — first, by failing to recognize the significance of risa’s designation as an irrevocable beneficiary, and second, by failing to apply the two- stage analysis mandated by this court in garland v. consumers’ gas co., 2004 scc 25, [2004] 1 scr 629. in blair ja’s view, “the ex- istence of the statutory regime relating to revocable and irrevocable beneficiaries    falls into an existing recognized category of juristic reason”, constituting “both a disposition of law and a statutory obligation” (para 99). [24] blair ja declined to decide whether a con- structive trust can be imposed only to remedy unjust enrichment and wrongful acts or can also be based on the more elastic concept of “good conscience”. he took the position that there was nothing in the circumstances of this case that put it in some “good conscience” category beyond what was captured by unjust enrichment and wrongful act. [23] se penchant sur le recours pour enrichisse- ment sans cause de michelle, le juge blair a retenu la conclusion du juge de première instance que risa s’était enrichie. il a jugé inutile de régler la question de savoir si l’élément de l’appauvrissement corres- pondant avait été établi, car il a conclu à la présence d’un motif juridique justifiant la réception du produit par risa. plus précisément, il a statué que le juge de première instance avait mal abordé l’élément du motif juridique du cadre d’analyse de l’enrichisse- ment sans cause — premièrement, en omettant de reconnaître l’importance de la désignation de risa comme bénéficiaire irrévocable, et, deuxièmement, en omettant de mener l’analyse à deux volets exigée par notre cour dans l’arrêt garland c. consumers’ gas co., 2004 csc 25, [2004] 1 rcs 629. selon le juge blair, [traduction] « l’existence du régime législatif sur les bénéficiaires révocables et irrévo- cables [  ] appartient à une catégorie existante re- connue de motif juridique », puisqu’il constitue « à la fois une disposition légale et une obligation créée par la loi » (par 99). [24] le juge blair a refusé de décider si une fidu- cie par interprétation ne peut être imposée que pour remédier à un enrichissement sans cause et à une conduite fautive, ou si elle peut également se fonder sur la notion plus souple de la « conscience ». il a estimé que rien dans les circonstances ne permettait de classer la présente affaire dans une quelconque catégorie de la « conscience » au- delà du cadre de l’enrichissement sans cause et de la conduite fautive. (2) dissenting reasons (2) motifs du juge dissident in dissent, lauwers ja agreed with the ma- [25] jority that the application judge had erred in relying on the equitable assignment doctrine. however, he disagreed with the majority as to the disposition of michelle’s unjust enrichment claim and the propriety of imposing a constructive trust over the proceeds in these circumstances. he would therefore have dismissed the appeal. [25] dissident, le juge lauwers s’est dit en accord avec les juges majoritaires pour dire que le juge de première instance avait commis une erreur en s’appuyant sur la doctrine de la cession en equity. toutefois, il n’était pas d’accord avec eux quant à l’issue de l’action pour enrichissement sans cause de michelle et à l’opportunité d’imposer une fiducie par interprétation sur le produit de l’assurance dans ces circonstances. il aurait par conséquent rejeté l’appel. 320 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [26] lauwers ja began by considering this court’s decision in soulos v. korkontzilas, [1997] 2 scr. 217, and held that it leaves open four routes by which a constructive trust may be imposed: (1) as a remedy for unjust enrichment; (2) for wrongful acts; (3) in circumstances where its availability has long been recognized; and (4) otherwise where good conscience requires it. according to lauwers ja, in relation to the fourth route, the soulos court anticipated that the law of remedial trusts would continue to develop in a way that accommodates the changing needs and mores of society. [27] on the issue of unjust enrichment, lauwers ja. concluded that michelle had made out each of the requisite elements and that a constructive trust ought therefore to be imposed over the proceeds in her fa- vour. with respect to the corresponding deprivation element, he rejected the submission that michelle’s financial contribution was the correct measure of her deprivation, and instead found that the asset for which she had paid and of which she stood deprived was the full payout of the life insurance proceeds — not just the amount she had paid in premiums. [28] lauwers ja also rejected the proposition that the applicable insurance act provisions provided a juristic reason for risa’s retention of the proceeds. in his view, michelle’s entitlement to the insurance proceeds as against risa was neither precluded nor affected by the operation of the insurance act. he also held that a juristic reason could not be found based on the parties’ reasonable expectations or pub- lic policy considerations. [29] finally, regarding to the imposition of a con- structive trust, lauwers ja considered a number of other cases that involved disappointed beneficiaries. noting that these cases fit awkwardly under the un- just enrichment rubric, he observed that: [26] le juge lauwers a commencé par examiner l’arrêt soulos c. korkontzilas, [1997] 2 rcs 217, de notre cour, et a conclu qu’il ouvre quatre voies par lesquelles une fiducie par interprétation peut être imposée : (1) à titre de réparation pour remédier à l’enrichissement sans cause; (2) pour remédier aux conduites fautives; (3) dans des circonstances où la possibilité d’y recourir a été reconnue depuis long- temps; et (4) dans les autres cas où la conscience l’exige. selon le juge lauwers, pour ce qui est de la quatrième voie, la cour saisie de l’affaire soulos s’attendait à ce que le droit relatif aux fiducies par in- terprétation continue d’évoluer d’une façon qui répond aux nécessités et aux mœurs changeantes de la société. [27] en ce qui concerne la question de l’enrichisse- ment sans cause, le juge lauwers a conclu que michelle avait établi chacun des éléments requis, et qu’une fi- ducie par interprétation devait en conséquence être imposée sur le produit de la police en sa faveur. pour ce qui est de l’appauvrissement correspondant, il a rejeté l’argument selon lequel la contribution financière de michelle est le bon mode de calcul de son appauvris- sement. il a plutôt conclu que l’actif pour lequel elle avait payé et dont elle a été privée correspondait à l’intégralité du produit de l’assurance- vie — et non seulement à la somme qu’elle avait payée en primes. [28] le juge lauwers a également rejeté la propo- sition selon laquelle les dispositions applicables de la loi sur les assurances donnent à risa un motif juridique de conserver le produit de la police. à son avis, l’application de la loi sur les assurances ne faisait pas obstacle au droit de michelle au produit contre risa ni n’influait sur ce droit. il a également conclu qu’aucun motif juridique ne pouvait être éta- bli sur la foi des attentes raisonnables des parties ou de considérations d’intérêt public. [29] enfin, en ce qui a trait à l’imposition d’une fiducie par interprétation, le juge lauwers a examiné plusieurs autres décisions qui portent sur des bénéfi- ciaires déçus. soulignant que ces décisions cadrent mal avec la notion d’enrichissement sans cause, il a fait remarquer que :    the disappointed beneficiary cases are perhaps bet- ter understood as a genus of cases in which a constructive [traduction]    il est peut- être plus juste d’affirmer que la jurisprudence en matière de bénéficiaires déçus forme [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 321 trust can be imposed via the third route in soulos — cir- cumstances where the availability of a trust has previously been recognized — and the fourth route — where good conscience otherwise demands it, quite independent of unjust enrichment. [para. 276] un ensemble de décisions dans lesquelles une fiducie par interprétation peut être imposée par application du troisième critère de l’arrêt soulos — les circonstances où la possibilité de recourir à une fiducie a été antérieurement reconnue — et du quatrième critère — lorsque la conscience l’exige, indépendamment de l’enrichissement sans cause. [par. 276] iv issues iv questions en litige [30] the issues in this case are as follows: [30] les questions en litige sont les suivantes : a has michelle made out a claim in unjust enrich- ment by establishing: a michelle a-t-elle démontré le bien- fondé d’une action pour enrichissement sans cause en éta- blissant : (1) risa’s enrichment and her own corresponding (1) l’enrichissement de risa et son propre appau- deprivation; and vrissement correspondant; (2) the absence of any juristic reason for risa’s en- richment at her expense? (2) l’absence de motif juridique justifiant l’enrichis- sement de risa aux dépens de michelle? b if so, is a constructive trust the appropriate rem- edy? v analysis in the present case, michelle requests that the [31] insurance proceeds be impressed with a constructive trust in her favour. the primary basis on which she seeks this remedy is unjust enrichment. in the alter- native, she submits that the circumstances of her case provide a separate good conscience basis upon which a court may impose a constructive trust. [32] a constructive trust is a vehicle of equity through which one person is required by operation of law — regardless of any intention — to hold certain property for the benefit of another (waters’ law of trusts in canada (4th ed. 2012), by d w m waters,. m. r. gillen and l. d. smith, at p 478). in canada, it is understood primarily as a remedy, which may be imposed at a court’s discretion where good conscience so requires. as mclachlin j. (as she then was) noted in soulos: b dans l’affirmative, l’imposition d’une fiducie par interprétation constitue-t-elle la réparation indiquée? v analyse [31] en l’espèce, michelle demande que le produit de l’assurance fasse l’objet d’une fiducie par inter- prétation en sa faveur. elle sollicite cette réparation principalement sur la base de l’enrichissement sans cause. à titre subsidiaire, elle soutient que dans les circonstances, la conscience constitue un fondement distinct qui permet au tribunal d’imposer une fiducie par interprétation. [32] la fiducie par interprétation est le moyen en equity par lequel une personne est tenue par effet de la loi — indépendamment de toute intention — de détenir certains biens au profit d’une autre personne (waters’ law of trusts in canada (4e  éd.  2012), par d w m waters,. m r gillen et l d smith, p 478). au canada, elle est principalement considé- rée comme une réparation, qui peut être imposée à la discrétion de la cour lorsque la conscience l’exige. comme l’a fait remarquer la juge mclachlin (plus tard juge en chef) dans soulos : .  .  .  under the broad umbrella of good conscience, constructive trusts are recognized both for wrongful acts    au nom de la conscience, l’application de la fidu- cie par interprétation est reconnue au canada tant pour 322 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. like fraud and breach of duty of loyalty, as well as to remedy unjust enrichment and corresponding depriva- tion    within these two broad categories, there is room for the law of constructive trust to develop and for greater precision to be attained, as time and experience may dic- tate. [emphasis added; para 43] [33] what is therefore crucial to recognize is that a proper equitable basis must exist before the courts will impress certain property with a remedial con- structive trust. the cause of action in unjust enrich- ment may provide one such basis, so long as the plaintiff can also establish that a monetary award is insufficient and that there is a link between his or her contributions and the disputed property (peter v. beblow, [1993] 1 scr 980, at p. 997; kerr v. baranow, 2011 scc 10, [2011] 1 scr 269, at paras 50-51). absent this, a plaintiff seeking the im- position of a remedial constructive trust must point to some other basis on which this remedy can be imposed, like breach of fiduciary duty.3 sanctionner des conduites fautives tels la fraude et le manquement à un devoir de loyauté que pour remédier à l’enrichissement sans cause et à un appauvrissement correspondant. [  ]. dans le cadre de ces deux grandes catégories les règles de droit relatives à la fiducie par in- terprétation pourront évoluer et se préciser au fil des ans et selon les cas qui pourront se présenter. [je souligne; par 43] [33] par conséquent, il faut absolument recon- naître que, pour que les tribunaux puissent assujettir certains biens à une fiducie par interprétation, il doit y avoir un motif valable en equity. l’action pour enrichissement sans cause peut constituer un tel motif, pour autant que le demandeur puisse égale- ment établir qu’une réparation pécuniaire ne suffit pas et qu’il existe un lien entre ses contributions et le bien en litige (peter c. beblow, [1993] 1 rcs. 980, p. 997; kerr c. baranow, 2011 csc 10, [2011] 1 rcs 269, par 50-51). à défaut, le demandeur qui sollicite l’imposition d’une fiducie par inter- prétation à titre de réparation doit invoquer une autre raison pour laquelle cette réparation peut être imposée, comme un manquement à une obligation fiduciaire3. i now turn to consider michelle’s claim in [34] unjust enrichment. [34] je me penche maintenant sur l’action pour enrichissement sans cause de michelle. a unjust enrichment a l’enrichissement sans cause [35] broadly speaking, the doctrine of unjust en- richment applies when a defendant receives a benefit from a plaintiff in circumstances where it would be “against all conscience” for him or her to re- tain that benefit. where this is found to be the case, the defendant will be obliged to restore that bene- fit to the plaintiff. as recognized by mclachlin j. in peel (regional municipality) v. canada, [1992] 3 scr 762, at p. 788, “at the heart of the doctrine of unjust enrichment    lies the notion of restora- tion of a benefit which justice does not permit one to retain.” [35] de manière générale, la doctrine de l’enrichis- sement sans cause s’applique lorsqu’un défendeur reçoit un avantage du demandeur dans des circons- tances où il serait « contraire à la bonne conscience » pour lui de conserver cet avantage. lorsque le tri- bunal conclut en ce sens, le défendeur est obligé de restituer cet avantage au demandeur. comme l’a reconnu la juge mclachlin dans l’arrêt peel (muni‑ cipalité régionale) c. canada, [1992] 3 rcs 762, p. 788, « [a]u cœur de la doctrine de l’enrichissement sans cause [  ] se trouve la notion de la restitution d’un avantage que la justice ne permet pas au béné- ficiaire de conserver. » 3 whether the availability of a remedial constructive trust is limited to cases involving unjust enrichment or wrongful acts need not be decided in the present case (see para 95). 3 il n’est pas nécessaire en l’espèce de décider si une fiducie par interprétation peut être imposée en guise de réparation seulement en cas d’enrichissement sans cause ou de conduite fautive (voir par 95). [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 323 [36] historically, restitution was available to plain- tiffs whose cases fit into certain recognized “cate- gories of recovery” — including where a plaintiff conferred a benefit on a defendant by mistake, under compulsion, out of necessity, as a result of a failed or ineffective transaction, or at the defendant’s re- quest (peel, at p. 789; kerr, at para 31). although these discrete categories exist independently of one another, they are each premised on the existence of some injustice in permitting the defendant to retain the benefit that he or she received at the plaintiff’s expense. [37] in the latter half of the 20th century, courts be- gan to recognize the common principles underlying these discrete categories and, on this basis, developed “a framework that can explain all obligations arising from unjust enrichment” (l. smith, “demystifying juristic reasons” (2007), 45 can. bus. lj 281, at p. 281; see also rathwell v. rathwell, [1978] 2 scr. 436, and murdoch v. murdoch, [1975] 1 scr 423, per laskin  j., dissenting) under this principled framework, a plaintiff will succeed on the cause of action in unjust enrichment if he or she can show: (a) that the defendant was enriched; (b) that the plain- tiff suffered a corresponding deprivation; and (c) that the defendant’s enrichment and the plaintiff’s corre- sponding deprivation occurred in the absence of a ju- ristic reason (pettkus v. becker, [1980] 2 scr 834, at p. 848; garland, at para. 30; kerr, at paras 30-45). while the principled unjust enrichment framework and the categories coexist (kerr, at paras. 31-32), the parties in this case made submissions only under the principled unjust enrichment framework. these reasons proceed on this basis. [36] historiquement, la restitution pouvait être accordée aux demandeurs dont les cas s’inscrivaient dans certaines « catégories de recouvrement » re- connues — notamment les cas où le demandeur a conféré un avantage au défendeur par erreur, sous la contrainte, par nécessité, par suite d’une opération manquée ou non consommée, ou à la demande du défendeur (peel, p. 789; kerr, par 31). même si ces catégories distinctes existent indépendamment les unes des autres, elles reposent chacune sur l’exis- tence d’une quelconque injustice en permettant au défendeur de conserver l’avantage qu’il avait reçu au détriment du demandeur. [37] dans la dernière moitié du vingtième siècle, les tribunaux ont commencé à reconnaître les principes communs qui sous- tendent ces catégo- ries distinctes et, sur ce fondement, ils ont élaboré [traduction] « un cadre qui peut expliquer toutes les obligations découlant de l’enrichissement sans cause » (l. smith, « demystifying juristic reasons » (2007), 45 rev. can. dr. comm. 281, p. 281; voir également rathwell c. rathwell, [1978] 2 rcs. 436, et murdoch c. murdoch, [1975] 1 rcs 423, le juge laskin, dissident). selon ce cadre d’analyse rationnel, le demandeur aura gain de cause dans son action pour enrichissement sans cause s’il peut démontrer : a) que le défendeur s’est enrichi; b) que le demandeur a subi un appauvrissement corres- pondant; et c) que l’enrichissement du défendeur et l’appauvrissement correspondant du demandeur ont eu lieu en l’absence d’un motif juridique (pettkus c. becker, [1980] 2 rcs 834, p. 848; garland, par. 30; kerr, par 30-45). bien que le cadre d’ana- lyse rationnel de l’enrichissement sans cause et les catégories coexistent (kerr, par. 31-32), les parties en l’espèce n’ont présenté des observations qu’au titre du premier. les présents motifs sont rédigés sur cette base. [38] this principled approach to unjust enrich- ment is a flexible one that allows courts to identify circumstances where justice and fairness require one party to restore a benefit to another. recovery is therefore not restricted to cases that fit within the categories under which the retention of a conferred benefit was traditionally considered unjust (kerr, [38] cette approche rationnelle en matière d’enri- chissement sans cause est souple et permet aux tribu- naux de préciser dans quelles circonstances la justice et l’équité exigent qu’une partie restitue un avantage à une autre. le recouvrement ne se fait donc pas uni- quement dans les cas qui s’inscrivent dans les catégo- ries par lesquelles on considérait traditionnellement 324 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. at para 32). as observed by mclachlin j. in peel (at p. 788): the tri- partite principle of general application which this court has recognized as the basis of the cause of action for unjust enrichment is thus seen to have grown out of the traditional categories of recovery. it is informed by them. it is capable, however, of going beyond them, allowing the law to develop in a flexible way as required to meet changing perceptions of justice. [39] justice and fairness are at the core of the dis- pute between michelle and risa, both of whom are innocent parties. moreover, and to complicate mat- ters, resolution of this dispute requires this court to consider the elements of an unjust enrichment claim as they apply in a context that involves sev- eral parties. pursuant to her oral agreement with lawrence, michelle paid around $7,000 in premiums to the insurance company between 2000 and 2013 in exchange for the right to remain named as bene- ficiary of the policy. when lawrence passed away, however, the insurance proceeds (which totalled $250,000) were payable by the insurance company not to michelle, but to risa — the person whom lawrence had subsequently named the irrevocable beneficiary, contrary to the contractual obligation he owed to michelle. the result of this arrangement was that risa’s enrichment was significantly greater than michelle’s out-of- pocket loss. moreover, risa was entitled to receive the proceeds from the insurance company by virtue of her designation as irrevoca- ble beneficiary, pursuant to ss. 190 and 191 of the insurance act. [40] these unusual circumstances raise two dis- tinct questions respecting the law of unjust enrich- ment. first, what is the proper measure of michelle’s deprivation, and in what sense does it “correspond” to risa’s gain? second, does the legislative frame- work at issue provide a juristic reason for risa’s enrichment and michelle’s corresponding depriva- tion — and if not, can such a juristic reason be found on some other basis? i will deal with each of these questions in turn. comme injuste la conservation de l’avantage ainsi reçu (kerr, par 32). comme l’a fait remarquer la juge mclachlin dans peel (p. 788) : l’on constate donc que le principe d’application gé- nérale à trois volets reconnu par notre cour comme le fondement de l’action pour enrichissement sans cause procède des catégories traditionnelles de recouvrement. ces catégories constituent l’essence du principe, quoique celui-ci puisse les déborder de manière à ce que le droit puisse évoluer avec la souplesse qui s’impose pour tenir compte des perceptions changeantes de la justice. [39] la justice et l’équité sont au cœur du litige opposant michelle à risa, deux parties innocentes. de plus, et pour compliquer les choses, le règlement de ce litige oblige la cour à examiner les éléments d’une action pour enrichissement sans cause qui s’ap- pliquent dans un contexte faisant intervenir plusieurs parties. conformément à son entente verbale avec lawrence, michelle a versé environ 7 000 $ en primes à la compagnie d’assurance entre 2000 et 2013, en échange du droit de demeurer la bénéficiaire désignée de la police. toutefois, lorsque lawrence est décédé, le produit de l’assurance (qui totalisait 250 000 $) de- vait être versé par la compagnie d’assurance non pas à michelle, mais à risa — la personne que lawrence avait subséquemment désignée comme bénéficiaire irrévocable, contrairement à l’obligation contractuelle qu’il avait envers michelle. ainsi, l’enrichissement de risa s’est avéré beaucoup plus important que la perte des sommes déboursées par michelle. de plus, risa avait le droit de recevoir le produit de la police de la part de la compagnie d’assurance puisqu’elle était désignée comme bénéficiaire irrévocable, conformé- ment aux art. 190 et 191 de la loi sur les assurances. [40] ces circonstances inhabituelles soulèvent deux questions distinctes à l’égard du droit de l’en- richissement sans cause. premièrement, quelle est la juste mesure de l’appauvrissement de michelle, et dans quel sens « correspond »-il au gain de risa? deuxièmement, le cadre législatif applicable four- nit-il un motif juridique justifiant l’enrichissement de risa et l’appauvrissement correspondant de michelle — et, dans la négative, peut-on établir un motif juri- dique sur un autre fondement? je me pencherai sur chacune de ces questions à tour de rôle. [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 325 (1) risa’s enrichment and michelle’s corre spond - (1) l’enrichissement de risa et l’appauvrisse- ing deprivation ment correspondant de michelle [41] the first two elements of the cause of action in unjust enrichment require an enrichment of the defendant and a corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff. these two elements are closely related; a straightforward economic approach is taken to both of them, with moral and policy considerations in- stead coming into play at the juristic reason stage of the analysis (kerr, at para. 37; garland, at para 31). to establish that the defendant was enriched and the plaintiff correspondingly deprived, it must be shown that something of value — a “tangible ben- efit” — passed from the latter to the former (kerr, at para. 38; garland, at para. 31; peel, at p. 790; pacific national investments ltd. v. victoria (city), 2004 scc 75, [2004] 3 scr 575, at para 15). this court has described the enrichment and detriment elements as being “the same thing from different perspectives” (professional institute of the public service of canada v. canada (attorney general), 2012 scc 71, [2012] 3 scr 660 (“pipsc”), at para. 151) and thus as being “essentially two sides of the same coin” (peter, at p 1012). [41] les deux premiers éléments de l’action pour enrichissement sans cause requièrent l’enrichissement du défendeur et l’appauvrissement correspondant du demandeur. ces deux éléments sont étroitement liés; ils font tous deux l’objet d’une analyse économique simple, et les considérations de morale et de principe entrent en jeu plutôt à l’étape de l’analyse portant sur le motif juridique (kerr, par. 37; garland, par 31). pour établir que le défendeur s’est enrichi et que le demandeur a subi un appauvrissement correspondant, il faut démontrer que quelque chose de valeur — un « avantage tangible » — est passé du dernier au pre- mier (kerr, par. 38; garland, par. 31; peel, p. 790; pacific national investments ltd. c. victoria (ville), 2004 csc 75, [2004] 3 rcs 575, par 15). la cour a dit des éléments d’enrichissement et d’appauvrisse- ment qu’ils rendent compte « du même phénomène, mais sous des angles différents » (institut profession‑ nel de la fonction publique du canada c. canada (procureur général), 2012 csc 71, [2012] 3 rcs. 660 (« ipfpc »), par. 151), et qu’ils sont donc « es- sentiellement comme les deux côtés d’une pièce de monnaie » (peter, p 1012). [42] the parties in the present case do not dispute the fact that risa was enriched to the full extent of the $250,000 by virtue of her right to receive the insurance proceeds as the designated irrevocable beneficiary. the application judge found as much (at para. 27), and this finding is not contested on appeal. [42] les parties en l’espèce ne contestent pas que risa s’est enrichie à hauteur de 250 000 $ grâce à son droit de recevoir le produit de l’assurance à titre de bénéficiaire irrévocable. le juge de première instance a conclu en ce sens (par. 27), et cette conclu- sion n’est pas contestée dans le présent pourvoi. in addition to an enrichment of the defendant, [43] a plaintiff asserting an unjust enrichment claim must also establish that he or she suffered a corresponding deprivation. according to professor mcinnes, this el- ement serves the purpose of identifying the plaintiff as the person with standing to seek restitution against an unjustly enriched defendant (m. mcinnes, the canadian law of unjust enrichment and restitution (2014), at p. 149; see also peel, at pp. 789-90, and kleinwort benson ltd. v. birmingham city council, [1997] qb 380 (ca), at pp. 393 and 400). even if a defendant’s retention of a benefit can be said to be unjust, a plaintiff has no right to recover against that defendant if he or she suffered no loss at all, or [43] outre l’enrichissement du défendeur, le de- mandeur qui plaide l’enrichissement sans cause doit aussi établir qu’il a subi un appauvrissement corres- pondant. selon le professeur mcinnes, cet élément sert à expliquer que le demandeur est la personne ayant qualité pour demander la restitution contre un défendeur qui s’est enrichi sans cause (m. mcinnes, the canadian law of unjust enrichment and res‑ titution (2014), p. 149; voir également peel, p. 789- 790, et kleinwort benson ltd. c. birmingham city council, [1997] qb 380 (ca), p. 393 et 400). même si la conservation de l’avantage par le défen- deur peut être qualifiée d’injuste, le demandeur n’a aucun droit de recouvrement contre ce défendeur 326 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. suffered a loss wholly unrelated to the defendant’s gain. instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the loss he or she incurred corresponds to the defendant’s gain, in the sense that there is some causal connec- tion between the two (pettkus, at p 852). put simply, the transaction that enriched the defendant must also have caused the plaintiff’s impoverishment, such that the defendant can be said to have been enriched at the plaintiff’s expense (p d . maddaugh and j d. mccamus, the law of restitution (loose- leaf ed.), at p 3-24). while the nature of the correspondence between such gain and loss may vary from case to case, this correspondence is what grounds the plain- tiff’s entitlement to restitution as against an unjustly enriched defendant. professor mcinnes explains that “the canadian conception of a ‘corresponding dep- rivation’ rightly emphasizes the crucial connection between the defendant’s gain and the plaintiff’s loss” (the canadian law of unjust enrichment and res‑ titution, at p 149). s’il n’a subi aucune perte, ou s’il a subi une perte qui n’a rien à voir avec le gain du défendeur. en fait, le demandeur doit démontrer que la perte qu’il a subie correspond au gain du défendeur, en ce qu’il existe un certain lien de causalité entre les deux (pettkus, p 852). en clair, l’opération qui a permis au défendeur de s’enrichir doit également avoir causé l’appauvrissement du demandeur, ce qui permet d’af- firmer que le défendeur s’est enrichi au détriment du demandeur (p d maddaugh et j d mccamus,. the law of restitution (éd feuilles mobiles), p 3-24). bien que la nature de la correspondance entre ce gain et la perte puisse varier d’un cas à l’autre, cette cor- respondance sert de fondement au droit du deman- deur de demander la restitution contre le défendeur qui s’est enrichi sans cause. le professeur mcinnes explique que [traduction] « la conception cana- dienne d’un “appauvrissement correspondant” met en relief à juste titre le lien crucial entre le gain du défendeur et la perte du demandeur » (the canadian law of unjust enrichment and restitution, p 149). [44] the authorities on this point make clear that the measure of the plaintiff’s deprivation is not lim- ited to the plaintiff’s out-of- pocket expenditures or to the benefit taken directly from him or her. rather, the concept of “loss” also captures a benefit that was never in the plaintiff’s possession but that the court finds would have accrued for his or her benefit had it not been received by the defendant instead (cita‑ del general assurance co. v. lloyds bank canada, [1997] 3 scr 805, at para 30). this makes sense because in either case, the result is the same: the de- fendant becomes richer in circumstances where the plaintiff becomes poorer. as was succinctly articu- lated by la forest j. in lac minerals ltd. v. interna‑ tional corona resources ltd., [1989] 2 scr 574, at pp. 669-70: [44] les autorités sur ce point indiquent clairement que la mesure de l’appauvrissement du demandeur ne se limite pas à ses dépenses, ni à l’avantage qui lui a été pris directement. en fait, le concept de « perte » englobe également l’avantage qui n’a jamais été en la possession du demandeur mais qui, selon le tribunal, lui serait revenu s’il n’avait pas plutôt été remis au défendeur (citadelle (la), cie d’assurances géné‑ rales c. banque lloyds du canada, [1997] 3 rcs. 805, par 30). cette interprétation est logique parce que, dans un cas comme dans l’autre, le résultat est le même : le défendeur s’enrichit dans une situation où le demandeur s’appauvrit. tel que l’a énoncé succinctement le juge la forest dans lac minerals ltd. c. international corona resources ltd., [1989] 2 rcs 574, p. 669- 670 : when one talks of restitution, one normally talks of giving back to someone something that has been taken from them (a restitutionary proprietary award), or its equivalent value (a personal restitutionary award). as the court of appeal noted in this case, [the respondent] never in fact owned the [disputed] property, and so it cannot be “given back” to them. however, there are concurrent findings below that but for its interception by [the appellant], [the respondent] would have acquired the property. in air canada    , at lorsqu’on parle de restitution, on parle généralement de rendre à autrui ce qu’on lui a pris (restitution du bien) ou l’équivalent de sa valeur (indemnisation). comme l’a souligné la cour d’appel en l’espèce, [l’intimée] n’ayant en fait jamais été propriétaire du bien- fonds [en cause], celui-ci ne peut lui être « rendu ». toutefois, les deux juridictions inférieures ont conclu que si [l’appelante] ne l’avait pas intercepté, [l’intimée] aurait acquis ce bien- fonds. dans l’arrêt air canada [  ], à la p. 1203, j’ai dit [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 327 pp. 1202-03, i said that the function of the law of restitu- tion “is to ensure that where a plaintiff has been deprived of wealth that is either in his possession or would have accrued for his benefit, it is restored to him. the meas- ure of restitutionary recovery is the gain the [defendant] made at the [plaintiff’s] expense.” (emphasis added.) in my view the fact that [the respondent in this case] never owned the property should not preclude it from the pur- suing a restitutionary claim: see birks, an introduction to the law of restitution, at pp 133-39 [the appellant] has therefore been enriched at the expense of [the respondent]. [emphasis in original.] que le droit en matière de restitution « sert plutôt à garantir que, dans le cas où un demandeur a été privé d’une richesse qu’il avait en sa possession ou qui lui revenait, cette ri- chesse lui sera rendue. en l’espèce, le recouvrement pour fins de restitution est égal au gain réalisé par la [défende- resse] aux dépens de la [demanderesse]. » (je souligne.) à mon avis, le fait que [l’intimée en l’espèce] n’ait jamais été propriétaire du bien- fonds ne devrait pas l’empêcher de demander la restitution : voir birks, an introduction to the law of restitution, aux pp. 133 à 139. [l’appelante] s’est donc enrichie aux dépens de [l’intimée]. [soulignement dans l’original.] while lac minerals turned largely on the defend- ant’s breach of confidence and breach of fiduciary duty, the above comments were made in the context of la forest j.’s analysis of the tripartite unjust en- richment framework as it was applied in that case. my view is thus that these comments are applicable to the analysis in the present case. bien que l’arrêt lac minerals porte en grande partie sur l’abus de confiance et le manquement à une obli- gation fiduciaire de la part de la défenderesse, le juge la forest a fait les remarques qui précèdent dans le contexte de son analyse du cadre à trois volets de l’enrichissement sans cause tel qu’il a été appliqué dans cette affaire. j’estime donc que ces remarques sont applicables à l’analyse en l’espèce. [45] the foregoing also indicates that the cor- responding deprivation element does not require that the disputed benefit be conferred directly by the plaintiff on the defendant (see mcinnes, the canadian law of unjust enrichment and restitution, at p. 155, but also see pp. 156-83; maddaugh and mccamus, the law of restitution, at p 35-1). this understanding of the correspondence between loss and gain has also been accepted under quebec’s civilian approach to the law of unjust enrichment: [45] le passage précité indique aussi que l’élément d’appauvrissement correspondant ne requiert pas l’octroi direct, par le demandeur au défendeur, de l’avantage en litige (voir mcinnes, the canadian law of unjust enrichment and restitution, p. 155, mais aussi les p. 156- 183; maddaugh et mccamus, the law of restitution, p 35-1). cette conception de la correspondance entre la perte et le gain a éga- lement été reconnue dans l’approche civiliste du québec en droit de l’enrichissement sans cause : the theory of unjustified enrichment does not require that the enrichment pass directly from the property of the impoverished to that of the enriched party    . the impoverished party looks to the one who profited from its impoverishment. it is then for the enriched party to find a legal justification for its enrichment. la théorie de l’enrichissement injustifié n’exige pas que l’enrichissement passe directement du patrimoine de l’ap- pauvri à celui de l’enrichi. [  ]. l’appauvri recherche à qui son appauvrissement a profité. c’est à l’enrichi qu’il incombe alors de trouver une justification juridique de son enrichissement. (cie immobilière viger ltée v. lauréat giguère inc., [1977] 2  scr  67, at p.  79; see also lacroix v. valois, [1990] 2 scr 1259, at pp 1278-79) (cie immobilière viger ltée c lauréat  giguère inc., [1977] 2 rcs 67, p. 79; voir aussi lacroix c. valois, [1990] 2 rcs 1259, p. 1278- 1279.) [46] taking a straightforward economic approach to the enrichment and corresponding deprivation elements of the unjust enrichment framework, i am of the view that michelle stands deprived of the right to receive the entirety of the policy proceeds (for a [46] après avoir abordé les éléments de l’enri- chissement et de l’appauvrissement correspondant selon l’analyse économique simple, je suis d’avis que michelle est privée du droit de recevoir l’in- tégralité du produit de la police (d’une valeur de 328 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. value of $250,000) and that the necessary corre- spondence exists between this deprivation and risa’s gain. with respect to the extent of michelle’s depri- vation, my view is that the quantification of her loss should not be limited to her out-of- pocket expendi- tures — that is, the $7,000 she paid in premiums between 2000 and 2013. pursuant to her contractual obligation, she made those payments over the course of 13 years in exchange for the right to receive the policy proceeds from the insurance company upon lawrence’s death. in breach of his contractual obli- gation, however, lawrence instead transferred that right to risa. had lawrence held up his end of the bargain with michelle, rather than designating risa irrevocably, the right to payment of the policy pro- ceeds would have accrued to michelle. at the end of the day, therefore, what michelle lost is not only the amount she paid in premiums. she stands deprived of the very thing for which she paid — that is, the right to claim the $250,000 in proceeds. [47] to be clear, therefore, michelle’s entitlement under the oral agreement is what makes it such that she was deprived of the full value of the insurance payout. in other cases where the plaintiff has some general belief that the insured ought to have named him or her as the designated beneficiary, but other- wise has no legal or equitable right to be treated as the proper recipient of the insurance money, it will likely be impossible to find either that the right to receive that insurance money was ever held by the plaintiff or that it would have accrued to him or her. in such cases, the properly designated beneficiary is not enriched at the expense of a plaintiff who had no claim to the insurance money in the first place — the result being that the plaintiff will not have suffered a corresponding deprivation to the full extent of the insurance proceeds (love v. love, 2013 skca 31, 359 dlr (4th) 504, at para 42). 250 000 $), et qu’il y a la correspondance nécessaire entre cet appauvrissement et le gain de risa. quant à l’étendue de l’appauvrissement de michelle, je suis d’avis que la quantification de sa perte ne de- vrait pas se limiter à ses débours  — c’est-à-dire la somme de 7 000 $ qu’elle a versée en primes entre 2000 et 2013. conformément à son obligation contractuelle, elle a effectué ces paiements durant 13 ans en échange du droit de recevoir le produit de la police de la compagnie d’assurance au décès de lawrence. toutefois, lawrence a plutôt conféré ce droit à risa, faisant ainsi défaut de respecter son obligation contractuelle. si lawrence avait respecté sa part du marché avec michelle plutôt que de dési- gner risa à titre de bénéficiaire irrévocable, le droit au versement du produit de la police serait revenu à michelle. au final, cependant, michelle a non seu- lement perdu la somme qu’elle a versée en primes. elle a été privée de la chose même pour laquelle elle a payé, c’est-à-dire le droit de réclamer la somme de 250 000 $ en produit d’assurance. [47] donc, pour être clair, c’est en raison du droit conféré par l’entente verbale à michelle qu’elle a été privée de la pleine valeur du produit de l’assurance. dans d’autres cas où le demandeur croyait en géné- ral que l’assuré aurait dû le désigner bénéficiaire, mais qu’il ne pouvait pas par ailleurs, en droit ou en equity, être considéré comme le bénéficiaire des sommes assurées, il sera vraisemblablement impos- sible de conclure que le demandeur a joui à quelque moment que ce soit du droit de toucher ces sommes ou qu’elles lui revenaient. dans de tels cas, le béné- ficiaire désigné à bon droit ne s’enrichit pas aux dé- pens d’un demandeur qui n’avait pas droit à l’origine aux sommes assurées, d’où le fait que le demandeur n’aura pas subi d’appauvrissement correspondant équivalant à la totalité du produit de l’assurance (love c. love, 2013 skca 31, 359 dlr (4th) 504, par 42). [48] my colleagues, gascon and rowe jj., ap- proach michelle’s loss differently. they take the position that unjust enrichment cannot be invoked by a claimant to protect his or her “contractual ex- pectations against innocent third parties” (para 104). while they agree that the canadian principle against unjust enrichment operates where a plaintiff has lost [48] mes collègues les juges gascon et rowe abordent différemment la perte de michelle. ils sont d’avis qu’un demandeur ne peut invoquer le principe de l’enrichissement sans cause pour « [protéger ses] attentes contractuelles [  ] contre des tiers inno- cents » (par 104). bien qu’ils conviennent que le prin- cipe de droit canadien interdisant l’enrichissement [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 329 wealth that was either in his or her possession or that would have accrued for his or her benefit, they take the position that “awards for expected property have generally been where there was a breach of an equi- table duty”, and they distinguish that situation from cases where the plaintiff held “a valid contractual ex- pectation” of receiving certain property (para 104). sans cause s’applique lorsqu’un demandeur a perdu une richesse qu’il avait en sa possession ou qui lui revenait, ils soutiennent que « le bien attendu a gé- néralement été restitué lorsqu’il y avait manquement à un devoir en equity » et ont distingué la présente situation du cas où le demandeur avait « une attente contractuelle valable » de recevoir un bien (par 104). [49] my view is that it is not useful, in the con- text of unjust enrichment, to distinguish between expectations based on a contractual obligation and expectations where there was a breach of an equita- ble duty (see my colleagues’ reasons, at para 104). rather, a robust approach to the corresponding dep- rivation element focuses simply on what the plaintiff actually lost — that is, property that was in his or her possession or that would have accrued for his or her benefit — and on whether that loss corresponds to the defendant’s enrichment, such that we can say that the latter was enriched at the expense of the for- mer. as was observed by professors maddaugh and mccamus in the law of restitution, one source of difficulty in these kinds of disappointed beneficiary cases is a rigid application of the “corresponding deprivation” or “expense” element as if it requires that the benefit in the defendant’s hands must have been transferred from, or constitute an out-of- pocket expense of, the plain- tiff    [r]estitution of benefits received from third parties may well provide a basis for recovery. in this particular context, the benefit received can, in any event, normally be described as having been received at the plaintiff’s expense in the sense that, but for the mistaken failure to implement the arrangements in question, the benefit would have been received by the plaintiff. [emphasis added; p 35-21]. i agree. in this case, given the fact that michelle held up her end of the bargain, kept the policy alive by paying the premiums, did not predecease lawrence, and still did not get what she actually contracted for, it seems artificial to suggest that her loss was anything less than the right to receive the entirety of the insurance proceeds. [49] à mon avis, il n’est pas utile, dans le contexte de l’enrichissement sans cause, de distinguer les attentes fondées sur une obligation contractuelle des attentes en cas de manquement à un devoir en equity (voir les motifs de mes collègues, par 104). la dé- marche rigoureuse qui s’applique à l’élément de l’ap- pauvrissement correspondant met plutôt l’accent sur la perte réelle du demandeur — c’est-à-dire le bien qu’il avait en sa possession ou qui lui revenait — et sur la question de savoir si cette perte correspond à l’enrichissement du défendeur, de sorte qu’il soit possible d’affirmer que ce dernier s’est enrichi au détriment du premier. comme l’ont fait remarquer les professeurs maddaugh et mccamus dans leur ouvrage the law of restitution, ce qui rend difficile ce genre d’affaires mettant en jeu des bénéficiaires déçus, c’est entre autres [traduction] l’application rigide de l’élément de « l’ap- pauvrissement correspondant » ou du « détriment » comme s’il fallait que l’avantage reçu par le défendeur ait été transféré du demandeur ou corresponde aux dépenses engagées par le demandeur. [  ] [l]a restitution d’un avantage reçu d’un tiers peut fort bien servir de fondement au recouvrement. dans le contexte qui nous occupe, on peut normalement dire que l’avantage a de toute manière été reçu au détriment du demandeur, en ce sens que, n’eût été l’omission à tort de mettre en œuvre l’arrangement en question, le demandeur aurait reçu l’avantage. [je sou- ligne; p 35-21]. je suis d’accord. en l’espèce, vu le fait que michelle a respecté sa part du marché, qu’elle a maintenu la police en vigueur en payant les primes, qu’elle n’est pas décédée avant lawrence et, malgré tout, qu’elle n’a pas reçu ce qui était prévu en fait dans le contrat, il paraît artificiel de prétendre que sa perte était autre que le droit de recevoir la totalité du produit de l’as- surance. 330 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [50] from this perspective, it is equally clear that risa’s enrichment came at michelle’s expense. it is not only that michelle’s payment of the premi- ums made risa’s enrichment possible — something which the application judge found to be the case: “the change of designation, and [risa’s] later receipt of the proceeds of the policy, would not have been possible but for [michelle’s] performance of her obligations under the agreement” (para 48). what is more significant is that risa’s designation gave her the statutory right to receive the insurance proceeds, the necessary implication being that michelle would have no such right despite the fact that she had a con- tractual entitlement, by virtue of the agreement with lawrence, to remain named as beneficiary. because risa received the benefit that otherwise would have accrued to michelle, the requisite correspondence exists: the former was enriched at the expense of the latter. [51] my colleagues also dispute this proposition. they say that any deprivation suffered by michelle is attributable to the fact that she lacks the practical ability to recover anything against lawrence’s in- solvent estate. the result, in their view, is that what risa received — a statutory entitlement to the pro- ceeds — is different than what michelle lost — which they characterize as the ability to enforce her con- tractual rights against lawrence’s estate (para 111). again, i disagree; since risa was given the very thing that michelle had contracted to receive and was oth‑ erwise entitled to receive (given that she held up her end of the bargain), it seems evident to me that risa was enriched at michelle’s expense. to be clear, it is not simply that risa gained a benefit with a value equal to the amount of michelle’s deprivation. rather, what risa gained is the precise benefit that michelle lost: the right to receive the proceeds of lawrence’s life insurance policy. i would also add that the in- solvency of lawrence’s estate simply means that michelle would be unable to recover the value of her loss by bringing an action against lawrence’s estate in breach of contract; it does not affect her ability to bring an unjust enrichment claim against risa. the fact that a plaintiff has a contractual claim against one defendant does not preclude the plaintiff from ad- vancing his or her case by asserting a separate cause [50] vu sous cet angle, il est tout aussi clair que risa s’est enrichie au détriment de michelle. pre- mièrement, le paiement des primes par michelle a non seulement permis à risa de s’enrichir — un fait reconnu par le juge de première instance : [tra- duction] « le changement de désignation et la ré- ception ultérieure du produit de la police par [risa] n’auraient pas été possibles si [michelle] n’avait pas exécuté ses obligations prévues dans l’entente » (par 48). fait plus important encore, la désigna- tion de risa comme bénéficiaire lui a donné le droit statutaire de recevoir le produit de l’assurance, ce qui laisse nécessairement entendre que michelle n’y avait pas droit en vertu de la loi en dépit du fait qu’elle disposait d’un droit contractuel, découlant de l’entente conclue avec lawrence, de demeurer désignée comme bénéficiaire. puisque risa a reçu le bénéfice qui aurait autrement été conféré à michelle, la correspondance requise existe : la première s’est enrichie au détriment de la seconde. [51] mes collègues contestent aussi cette propo- sition. ils affirment que tout appauvrissement de michelle est attribuable au fait qu’il lui est impos- sible, sur le plan pratique, de recouvrer quoi que ce soit de la succession insolvable de lawrence. par conséquent, selon eux, ce que risa a reçu — un droit reconnu par la loi au produit — diffère de l’ap- pauvrissement de michelle — ce qu’ils caractérisent comme la capacité d’exercer ses droits contractuels à l’encontre de la succession de lawrence (par 111). encore une fois, je ne suis pas d’accord; puisque risa a reçu précisément ce que michelle devait re- cevoir en vertu du contrat et ce à quoi elle avait par ailleurs droit (étant donné qu’elle a respecté sa part du marché), il me semble évident que risa s’est en- richie au détriment de michelle. en clair, ce n’est pas simplement que risa a obtenu un avantage de valeur équivalent à l’appauvrissement de michelle. c’est plutôt que risa a obtenu précisément ce que michelle a perdu : le droit au versement du produit de la po- lice d’assurance- vie de lawrence. j’ajouterais aussi que l’insolvabilité de la succession de lawrence se traduit simplement par l’impossibilité pour michelle de recouvrer sa perte en intentant une action en vio- lation de contrat contre la succession de lawrence, mais cela ne l’empêche pas de présenter une action pour enrichissement sans cause contre risa. le fait [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 331 of action against another defendant if it appears most advantageous (central trust co. v. rafuse, [1986] 2 scr 147, at p 206). [52] i would therefore conclude that the requisite enrichment and corresponding deprivation are both present in this case. the payability of the insurance proceeds by the insurance company for risa’s bene- fit did in fact impoverish michelle “to the full extent of the insurance payout in [risa’s] favour” (court of appeal decision, at para. 208 (lauwers ja, dis- senting)). in light of this, the court of appeal’s order — [53] which was made on the consent of the parties, and which requires that $7,000 of the proceeds be paid to michelle and that the balance be paid to risa — can- not be upheld on a principled basis. if there is a juristic reason for risa’s retention of the insurance money, then michelle’s claim will necessarily fail and risa will be entitled to the full $250,000. if there is no such juristic reason, however, then michelle’s unjust enrichment claim will succeed and she will be entitled to a restitutionary remedy totalling that amount. que le demandeur ait une réclamation contractuelle contre un défendeur ne l’empêche pas de faire valoir sa cause au moyen d’une cause d’action distincte contre un autre défendeur, si cette façon de faire lui paraît plus avantageuse (central trust co. c. rafuse, [1986] 2 rcs 147, p 206). [52] je suis donc d’avis de conclure que les élé- ments requis de l’enrichissement et de l’appauvris- sement correspondant sont tous deux présents en l’espèce. la faculté de la compagnie d’assurance de payer le produit de l’assurance au profit de risa a effectivement appauvri michelle [traduction] « à hauteur du produit de l’assurance payable en faveur de [risa] » (décision de la cour d’appel, par. 208 (le juge lauwers, dissident)). [53] à la lumière de ces constatations, l’ordon- nance de la cour d’appel — qui a été rendue sur consentement des parties et exige que la somme de 7 000 $ du produit soit versée à michelle et que le solde soit versé à risa — ne peut être confirmée sur le fondement de principes. si l’existence d’un motif juridique permettant à risa de conserver les sommes assurées est établie, michelle sera forcément débou- tée de son action et risa aura droit à l’intégralité des 250 000 $. en l’absence d’un tel motif juridique, toutefois, l’action pour enrichissement sans cause de michelle sera accueillie, et elle aura droit à la restitution de cette somme. (2) absence of any juristic reason (2) absence d’un motif juridique [54] having established an enrichment and a cor- responding deprivation, michelle must still show that there is no justification in law or equity for the fact that risa was enriched at her expense in order to succeed in her claim. as observed by cromwell j. in kerr (at para. 40): [54] ayant établi un enrichissement et un ap- pauvrissement correspondant, michelle doit tout de même démontrer, pour avoir gain de cause, que l’enrichissement de risa à son détriment n’est pas justifié par un motif en droit ou en equity. comme l’a fait remarquer le juge cromwell dans l’arrêt kerr (par. 40) : the third element of an unjust enrichment claim is that the benefit and corresponding detriment must have occurred without a juristic reason. to put it simply, this means that there is no reason in law or justice for the de- fendant’s retention of the benefit conferred by the plaintiff, making its retention “unjust” in the circumstances of the case     [emphasis added.] le troisième élément d’une action pour enrichisse- ment injustifié est qu’il doit y avoir eu un avantage et un appauvrissement correspondant sans motif juridique. en somme, ni le droit ni les exigences de la justice ne per- mettent au défendeur de conserver l’avantage conféré par le demandeur, rendant la conservation de l’avantage « in- juste » dans les circonstances de l’affaire    [je souligne.] 332 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [55] this understanding of juristic reason is cru- cial for the purposes of the present appeal. the third element of the cause of action in unjust enrichment is essentially concerned with the justification for the defendant’s retention of the benefit conferred on him or her at the plaintiff’s expense — or, to put it differently, with whether there is a juristic reason for the transaction that resulted in both the defend- ant’s enrichment and the plaintiff’s corresponding deprivation. if there is, then the defendant will be justified in keeping or retaining the benefit received at the plaintiff’s expense, and the plaintiff’s claim will fail accordingly. at its core, the doctrine of un- just enrichment is fundamentally concerned with reversing transfers of benefits that occur without any legal or equitable basis. as mclachlin j. stated in peter (at p. 990), “it is at this stage that the court must consider whether the enrichment and detriment, morally neutral in themselves, are ‘unjust’.” in garland, this court shed light on exactly [56] what must be shown under the juristic reason element of the unjust enrichment analysis — and in particu- lar, on whether this third element requires that cases be decided by “finding a ‘juristic reason’ for a de- fendant’s enrichment” or instead by “asking whether the plaintiff has a positive reason for demanding res- titution” (para. 41, citing garland v. consumers’ gas co. (2001), 57 or (3d) 127 (ca), at para 105). in an effort to eliminate the uncertainty between these competing approaches, iacobucci j. formulated a juristic reason analysis that proceeds in two stages. [55] cette interprétation du motif juridique est cruciale pour les besoins du présent pourvoi. le troi- sième élément de l’action pour enrichissement sans cause s’attache fondamentalement à la justification du fait que le défendeur a conservé l’avantage qui lui a été conféré aux dépens du demandeur ou, autre- ment dit, à la question de savoir si un motif juridique justifie l’opération ayant entraîné l’enrichissement du défendeur et l’appauvrissement correspondant du demandeur. s’il existe un tel motif juridique, le défendeur sera justifié de conserver l’avantage reçu au détriment du demandeur, et ce dernier sera conséquemment débouté de son action. la doctrine de l’enrichissement sans cause consiste fondamen- talement à annuler le transfert d’un avantage qui a eu lieu sans motif en droit ou en equity. comme l’a mentionné la juge mclachlin dans peter (p. 990), « [c]’est à cette étape que le tribunal doit vérifier si l’enrichissement et le désavantage, moralement neutres en soi, sont “injustes”. » [56] dans l’arrêt garland, la cour a jeté un éclai- rage sur ce qu’il faut démontrer au juste pour satis- faire à l’élément du motif juridique de l’analyse de l’enrichissement sans cause — et, en particulier, au sujet de la question de savoir si ce troisième élément exige que les litiges soient tranchés [traduction] « en concluant à l’existence d’un “motif juridique” justifiant l’enrichissement du défendeur », ou plutôt « en se demandant si le demandeur avait une rai- son concrète d’exiger la restitution » (par. 41, citant garland c. consumers’ gas co. (2001), 57 or (3d) 127 (ca), par 105). afin d’éliminer l’incertitude entre ces deux approches opposées, le juge iacobucci a formulé une analyse du motif juridique qui com- porte deux étapes. [57] the first stage requires the plaintiff to demon- strate that the defendant’s retention of the benefit at the plaintiff’s expense cannot be justified on the basis of any of the “established” categories of juristic reasons: a contract, a disposition of law, a donative intent, and other valid common law, equitable or statutory obligations (garland, at para. 44; kerr, at para 41). if any of these categories applies, the analysis ends; the plaintiff’s claim must fail because the defendant will be justified in retaining the dis- puted benefit. for example, a plaintiff will be denied [57] à la première étape, le demandeur doit dé- montrer qu’aucune des catégories « établies » de mo- tifs juridiques ne justifie que le défendeur conserve l’avantage au détriment du demandeur : le contrat, la disposition légale, l’intention libérale et les autres obligations valides imposées par la common law, l’equity ou la loi (garland, par. 44; kerr, par 41). si l’une ou l’autre de ces catégories s’applique, l’ana- lyse prend fin; l’action du demandeur est forcément vouée à l’échec puisque le défendeur sera justifié de conserver l’avantage contesté. par exemple, le [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 333 recovery in circumstances where he or she conferred a benefit on a defendant by way of gift, since there is nothing unjust about a defendant retaining a gift of money that was made to him or her by (and that resulted in the corresponding deprivation of) the plaintiff. in this way, these established categories limit the subjectivity and discretion inherent in the unjust enrichment analysis and help to delineate the boundaries of this cause of action (garland, at para 43). demandeur n’aura pas droit au recouvrement dans le cas où il a conféré un avantage au défendeur sous la forme d’un don, puisqu’il n’y a rien d’injuste pour le défendeur à conserver une somme d’argent qui lui a été donnée par le demandeur (et qui a ainsi entraîné l’appauvrissement correspondant de) ce dernier. ces catégories établies limitent de cette manière la sub- jectivité et le pouvoir discrétionnaire inhérents à l’analyse de l’enrichissement sans cause et aident à établir les limites de la cause d’action (garland, par 43). [58] if the plaintiff successfully demonstrates that none of the established categories of juristic reasons applies, then he or she has established a prima facie case and the analysis proceeds to the second stage. at this stage, the defendant has an opportunity to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case by showing that there is some residual reason to deny recovery (garland, at para 45). the de facto burden of proof falls on the defendant to show why the enrichment should be retained. in determining whether this may be the case, the court should have regard to two considera- tions: the parties’ reasonable expectations and public policy (garland, at para. 46; kerr, at para 43). [58] si le demandeur parvient à démontrer qu’au- cune des catégories établies de motifs juridiques ne s’applique, il aura alors établi une preuve prima facie et le tribunal passe alors à la deuxième étape de l’analyse. à ce stade, le défendeur a l’occasion de réfuter la preuve prima facie du demandeur en démontrant qu’il existe un autre motif de refuser le recouvrement (garland, par 45). le défendeur a l’obligation de facto de démontrer pourquoi il de- vrait conserver ce dont il s’est enrichi. pour décider si cela est possible, le tribunal doit tenir compte de deux facteurs : les attentes raisonnables des parties et l’intérêt public (garland, par. 46; kerr, par 43). [59] this two- stage approach to juristic reason was designed to strike a balance between the need for predictability and stability on the one hand, and the importance of applying the doctrine of unjust enrichment flexibly, and in a manner that reflects our evolving perception of justice, on the other. [59] cette analyse en deux étapes du motif juri- dique a été conçue pour établir un équilibre entre le besoin de prévisibilité et de stabilité, d’une part, et l’importance d’appliquer la doctrine de l’enrichis- sement sans cause avec souplesse et compte tenu de notre perception changeante de la justice, d’autre part. (a) first stage — none of the established cate‑ gories applies in these circumstances a) première étape — aucune des catégories éta‑ blies ne s’applique dans les circonstances [60] the first stage of the garland framework asks whether a juristic reason from an established cate- gory operates to deny recovery. michelle submits that none of these categories applies in the circum- stances of this case. risa takes the position that the insurance act required the proceeds of the policy to be paid exclusively to her as the validly designated beneficiary, such that the applicable legislation con- stitutes a juristic reason to deny the recovery sought by michelle. [60] suivant la première étape du cadre établi dans l’arrêt garland, il faut se demander si un motif juri- dique appartenant à une catégorie établie justifie de refuser le recouvrement. michelle soutient qu’au- cune de ces catégories ne s’applique dans les cir- constances de l’espèce. pour sa part, risa est d’avis que la loi sur les assurances exigeait que le produit de la police lui soit versé exclusivement en tant que bénéficiaire validement désignée, de sorte que la loi applicable constitue un motif juridique de refuser le recouvrement demandé par michelle. 334 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [61] the main issue at this stage of the analysis is therefore whether a beneficiary designation made pursuant to ss. 190(1) and 191(1) of the insurance act — which, when coupled with lawrence’s in- surance policy, makes it clear that risa is the one to whom the insurance proceeds are payable — pro- vides a juristic reason for risa to retain those pro- ceeds in light of michelle’s claim to the money. put differently, the question can be framed as follows: is there any aspect of this statutory framework that justifies the fact that risa was enriched at michelle’s expense? if so, michelle’s claim will necessarily fail. [62] my colleagues dispute this proposition. in their view, it is sufficient to show that there is some juristic reason for the fact that the defendant was enriched, and there is thus no need to demonstrate that the enrichment and the corresponding depriva‑ tion occurred without a juristic reason. with respect, this proposition is at odds with the clear guidance provided by this court in kerr (para. 40, reproduced at para. 54 of these reasons) and disregards the work already done by the recognized categories of juristic reasons identified in garland. each of these cate- gories points to a relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant that justifies the fact that a ben- efit passed from the former to the latter. to focus exclusively on the reason why the defendant was enriched is to ignore this key aspect of the law of unjust enrichment. [61] la question principale à cette étape de l’ana- lyse est donc de savoir si la désignation du bénéfi- ciaire effectuée conformément aux par. 190(1) et 191(1) de la loi sur les assurances — laquelle, com- binée à la police d’assurance de lawrence, révèle clairement que c’est à risa que revient le produit de la police d’assurance — établit un motif juri- dique permettant à risa de conserver ce produit étant donné la réclamation de michelle. autrement dit, la question peut être formulée comme suit : y a-t-il un aspect de ce cadre législatif qui justifie le fait que risa s’est enrichie au détriment de michelle? dans l’affirmative, l’action de michelle sera forcément rejetée. [62] mes collègues sont en désaccord avec cette pro- position. à leur avis, il suffit de démontrer qu’il existe un motif juridique quelconque justifiant l’enrichisse- ment du défendeur, et qu’il n’est donc pas nécessaire de démontrer que l’enrichissement et l’appauvrisse‑ ment correspondant sont survenus sans motif juri- dique. avec égards, cette proposition va à l’encontre des directives claires données par la cour dans kerr (par. 40, reproduit au par. 54 des présents motifs) et ignore l’impact des catégories reconnues de motifs juridiques énoncées dans l’arrêt garland. chacune de ces catégories démontre une relation entre le de- mandeur et le défendeur qui justifie que l’avantage ait été transféré du premier au deuxième. se concentrer exclusivement sur le motif de l’enrichissement du défendeur, c’est faire abstraction de cet élément im- portant du droit relatif à l’enrichissement sans cause. [63] two categories of juristic reasons might be said to apply in the circumstances of this case: dis- position of law and statutory obligations. disposition of law is a broad category that applies in various circumstances, including “where the enrichment of the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense is required by law, such as where a valid statute denies recovery” (kerr, at para. 41 (emphasis added)). the statutory obligations category operates in a substantially sim- ilar manner, precluding recovery where a legislative enactment expressly or implicitly mandates a trans- fer of wealth from the plaintiff to the defendant. although there is undoubtedly a degree of overlap between these two distinct categories, what matters for the purposes of this appeal is that a plaintiff’s [63] deux catégories de motifs juridiques peuvent s’appliquer dans les circonstances de l’espèce : la disposition légale et l’obligation imposée par la loi. la disposition légale est une catégorie générale qui entre en jeu dans diverses circonstances, y compris dans « les cas où la loi prescrit l’enrichissement du défendeur au détriment du demandeur, comme lors- qu’une loi valide empêche le recouvrement » (kerr, par. 41 (je souligne)). la catégorie des obligations imposées par la loi opère sensiblement de la même façon, en interdisant le recouvrement lorsqu’un texte de loi prescrit expressément ou implicitement le transfert de richesse du demandeur au défendeur. bien qu’il y ait indubitablement un degré de che- vauchement entre ces deux catégories distinctes, [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 335 claim will necessarily fail if a legislative enactment provides a reason for the enrichment and correspond- ing deprivation, so as to preclude recovery in unjust enrichment. as professors maddaugh and mccamus note in the law of restitution: ce qui importe pour les besoins du présent pourvoi est que l’action du demandeur sera nécessairement rejetée si un texte de loi prévoit un motif pour l’en- richissement et l’appauvrissement correspondant, faisant ainsi obstacle au recouvrement en cas d’en- richissement sans cause. comme le signalent les professeurs maddaugh et mccamus dans the law of restitution :    it is perhaps self- evident that an unjust enrichment will not be established in any case where enrichment of the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense is required by law. the payment of validly imposed taxes may be considered unjust by some but their payment gives rise to no resti- tutionary right of recovery. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted; p 3-28] [traduction]    cela va peut- être de soi que l’enrichis- sement sans cause ne sera pas établi dans tous les cas où la loi prescrit l’enrichissement du défendeur au détriment du demandeur. le paiement de taxes validement imposées peut être considéré comme injuste par certains, mais leur paiement ne donne pas droit au recouvrement. [je sou- ligne; notes en bas de page omises; p 3-28] [64] the jurisprudence provides ample support for this proposition. among the issues in reference re goods and services tax, [1992] 2 scr 445 (“gst reference”), was whether suppliers registered under the excise tax act, rsc 1985, c. e-15, that incurred costs in collecting the goods and services tax on behalf of the federal government could re- cover those costs from the government on the basis of restitution. for a majority of this court, lamer cj. answered this question in the negative: under the gst act the expenses involved in collecting and remitting the gst are borne by registered suppli- ers. this certainly constitutes a burden to these suppliers and a benefit to the federal government. however, this is precisely the burden contemplated by statute. hence, a juridical reason for the retention of the benefit by the federal government exists unless the statute itself is ultra vires. [emphasis added; p 477] [64] la jurisprudence étaye amplement cette proposition. parmi les questions soulevées dans le renvoi relatif à la taxe sur les produits et services, [1992] 2 rcs 445 (« renvoi sur la tps »), il y avait celle de savoir si les fournisseurs inscrits aux termes de la loi sur la taxe d’accise, lrc 1985, c. e-15, qui engagent des dépenses pour percevoir la taxe sur les produits et services au nom du gouverne- ment fédéral peuvent recouvrer ces dépenses auprès de ce dernier sous forme de restitution. s’exprimant au nom des juges majoritaires de la cour, le juge en chef  lamer a répondu à cette question par la négative : aux termes de la loi sur la tps, les dépenses engagées pour la perception et la remise de la tps incombent aux fournisseurs inscrits. cette situation représente certaine- ment un fardeau pour ces fournisseurs et un avantage pour le gouvernement fédéral. toutefois, il s’agit précisément du fardeau que prévoit la loi. il existe donc un motif ju- ridique pour que le gouvernement fédéral conserve cet avantage à moins que les dispositions elles- mêmes ne soient ultra vires. [je souligne; p 477] [65] a similar issue arose in gladstone v. canada (attorney general), 2005 scc 21, [2005] 1 scr. 325. in that case, the respondents were charged under the fisheries act, rsc 1970, c. f-14, for harvest- ing and attempting to sell large quantities of herring spawn. the department of fisheries and oceans seized and sold the herring spawn, and the appellant crown in right of canada held the proceeds pending [65] une question semblable a été soulevée dans gladstone c. canada (procureur général), 2005 csc 21, [2005] 1 rcs 325. dans cette affaire, les inti- més ont été accusés, en vertu de la loi sur les pêches, lrc 1970, c. f-14, d’avoir récolté et tenté de vendre de grandes quantités de rogue de hareng. le ministère des pêches et des océans a saisi et vendu la rogue de hareng, et l’appelante, la couronne du chef du 336 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. the outcome of the proceedings. the proceedings were eventually stayed and the net proceeds paid to the respondents. because the crown refused to pay interest or any other additional amount, however, the respondents sought restitution in the amount of $132,000, on the ground that the crown had been un- justly enriched by its retention of the proceeds during the time of seizure. writing for a unanimous court, major j. denied that claim on the following basis: here, parliament has enacted a statutory regime to reg- ulate the commercial fishery. it has provided an extensive framework dealing with the seizure and return of things seized. this regime specifically provides for the return of any fish, thing, or proceeds realized. this was followed. interest or some other additional amount might have been gratuitously included, but it was not. the validity of the fisheries act was not, nor could have been, successfully challenged. therefore, the act provides a juristic reason for any incidental enrichment which may have occurred in its operation. as a result, the unjust enrichment claim fails. [para. 22] canada, a retenu le produit de la vente en attendant l’issue du litige. les procédures ont finalement été suspendues, et le produit net de la vente a été versé aux intimés. toutefois, comme la couronne a refusé de payer les intérêts ou toute autre somme additionnelle, les intimés ont demandé la restitution de 132 000 $, au motif que la couronne s’était enrichie sans cause en conservant le produit de la vente pendant la durée de la saisie. s’exprimant au nom de la cour à l’una- nimité, le juge major a rejeté cette demande pour les motifs suivants : en l’espèce, le législateur a adopté des dispositions régissant la pêche commerciale. il a établi un régime com- plet qui traite de la saisie et de la restitution des objets saisis. ce régime prescrit expressément la restitution du poisson, des objets ou du produit de leur vente, et il a été appliqué. des intérêts ou quelque autre montant addition- nel auraient pu être accordés à titre gracieux, mais cela n’a pas été fait. la validité de la loi sur les pêches n’a pas été contestée avec succès et n’aurait pas pu l’être non plus. par conséquent, la loi constitue un motif juridique justifiant tout enrichissement accessoire qui peut s’être produit dans le cadre de son application. il s’ensuit que la demande fondée sur l’enrichissement injuste échoue. [par. 22] in short, it was major j.’s position that the statutory regime, by specifying what had to be returned, made it clear that anything falling outside of the specified categories was to be retained by the crown. in other words, the fisheries act stipulated that, in certain circumstances, a benefit would be retained by the crown. bref, selon le juge major, il était clair que, puisque le régime législatif précisait ce qui devait être res- titué, tout ce qui n’était pas visé par les catégories énoncées pouvait être conservé par la couronne. autrement dit, la loi sur les pêches prévoyait que la couronne conserverait un avantage dans certaines situations. [66] these cases are examples of situations where a statute precluded recovery on the basis of unjust enrichment. it is to be noted that in each case, re- covery was denied because the legislation in ques- tion expressly or implicitly required the transfer of wealth between the plaintiff and the defendant and therefore justified the defendant’s retention of the benefit received at the plaintiff’s expense. it is in this way that the applicable legislation can be understood as “denying” or “barring” recovery in restitution and therefore as supplying a juristic reason for the defendant’s retention of the benefit. [66] ces décisions illustrent des cas où la loi a empê- ché le recouvrement fondé sur l’enrichissement sans cause. il convient de souligner que dans chacun des cas, le recouvrement a été refusé parce que la loi en cause exigeait expressément ou implicitement le trans- fert de richesse entre le demandeur et le défendeur, et justifiait par conséquent que le défendeur conserve l’avantage qu’il avait reçu au détriment du demandeur. ainsi, la loi applicable peut être interprétée comme « refusant » ou « interdisant » le recouvrement par voie de restitution, et constitue ainsi un motif juridique justifiant le fait que le défendeur conserve l’avantage. [67] what, then, should we make of ss. 190(1) and 191(1) of the insurance act? the former permits the [67] que devrait-on alors penser des par. 190(1) et 191(1) de la loi sur les assurances? le premier [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 337 insured to identify the person to whom or for whose benefit the insurance money is payable when the insured passes away. coupled with the insurance contract, it directs the insurer to pay the proceeds to the person so designated. the latter provides that such a designation may be made irrevocably. [68] given the fact that a statute will preclude re- covery for unjust enrichment where it requires (either explicitly or by necessary implication) that the de- fendant be enriched to the detriment of the plaintiff, the provisions of the insurance act may therefore provide a juristic reason for the beneficiary’s en- richment vis-à-vis any corresponding deprivation that may have been suffered by the insurer at the time the insurance money is eventually paid out. for this reason, an unjust enrichment claim brought by the insurer against the designated beneficiary (revocable or irrevocable) would necessarily fail at this stage; the rights and obligations that exist in that context — both statutory and contractual — justify the beneficiary’s enrichment at the insurer’s expense (saskatchewan crop insurance corp. v. deck, 2008 skca 21, 307 sask. r. 206, at paras 47-54). [69] a valid beneficiary designation under the in‑ surance act has also been found to constitute a ju- ristic reason that defeats a third party’s claim for the entirety of the death benefit in circumstances where that party paid some of the premiums under the er- roneous belief that he or she was the named bene- ficiary. in richardson (estate trustee of) v. mew, 2009 onca 403, 96 or (3d) 65, the deceased had maintained his first wife as the designated benefi- ciary under a life insurance policy. his second wife, who did not have a contractual right to be named as beneficiary, wrongly believed that he had executed a change of beneficiary designation in her favour, and paid some of the policy premiums — initially from a joint bank account she shared with the deceased and later from her own bank account. she sought the imposition of a constructive trust in her favour over the policy proceeds, arguing that there was no juristic reason for the first wife’s enrichment. even accepting that the second wife could be said to have suffered a corresponding deprivation, the ontario court of permet à l’assuré d’identifier la personne à qui les sommes assurées devront être versées au décès de l’assuré et, conjugué au contrat d’assurance, il en- joint à l’assureur de verser le produit à la personne ainsi désignée. le paragraphe 191(1), quant à lui, dispose que cette désignation peut être faite de ma- nière irrévocable. [68] puisqu’une loi interdira le recouvrement pour enrichissement sans cause lorsqu’elle exige (soit en termes exprès, soit par déduction nécessaire) que le défendeur se soit enrichi au détriment du deman- deur, les dispositions de la loi sur les assurances peuvent donc constituer un motif juridique justifiant l’enrichissement du défendeur vis-à-vis de tout ap- pauvrissement correspondant que l’assureur pouvait avoir subi au moment où les sommes assurées sont finalement versées. pour cette raison, toute action pour enrichissement sans cause intentée par l’as- sureur contre le bénéficiaire désigné (révocable ou irrévocable) serait forcément rejetée à ce stade-ci; les droits et obligations statutaires et contractuels qui existent dans ce contexte justifient l’enrichis- sement du bénéficiaire au détriment de l’assureur (saskatchewan crop insurance corp. c. deck, 2008 skca 21, 307 sask. r. 206, par 47-54). [69] la désignation valide d’un bénéficiaire en vertu de la loi sur les assurances a également été jugée comme étant un motif juridique qui fait obs- tacle au droit d’un tiers à l’intégralité de la prestation de décès dans des situations où ce tiers a payé une partie des primes en croyant à tort qu’il ou elle était le bénéficiaire désigné. dans richardson (estate trustee of) c. mew, 2009 onca 403, 96 or (3d) 65, le défunt avait maintenu la désignation de sa première épouse comme bénéficiaire d’une police d’assurance- vie. sa deuxième épouse, qui n’avait pas de droit contractuel d’être nommée bénéficiaire, croyait à tort qu’il avait effectué un changement de bénéficiaire en sa faveur, et elle a payé une partie des primes de la police d’abord à partir d’un compte de banque qu’elle partageait avec le défunt et, ensuite, à même son propre compte de banque. elle a demandé l’imposition d’une fiducie par interprétation en sa faveur sur le produit de la police d’assurance, soute- nant qu’aucun motif juridique ne justifiait l’enrichis- sement de la première épouse. même en acceptant 338 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. appeal upheld the motion judge’s finding that a valid beneficiary designation under the insurance act amounted to a juristic reason that defeated the second wife’s claim for the insurance money that was payable to the first wife. i would observe that the claimant in that case sought a constructive trust over the entire death benefit, and not merely the return of any payments made on the basis of her erroneous belief; the court of appeal did not decide whether she would be entitled to the return of those payments, and that question is not before us today. [70] at issue in this case, however, is whether a designation made pursuant to ss. 190(1) and 191(1) of the insurance act provides any reason in law or justice for risa to retain the disputed benefit not- withstanding michelle’s prior contractual right to remain named as beneficiary and therefore to receive the policy proceeds. in other words, does the statute preclude recovery for a plaintiff, like michelle, who stands deprived of the benefit of the insurance pol- icy in circumstances such as these? in my view, it does not. nothing in the insurance act can be read as ousting the common law or equitable rights that persons other than the designated beneficiary may have in policy proceeds. as this court explained in rawluk v. rawluk, [1990] 1 scr 70, at p. 90, the “legislature is presumed not to depart from prevailing law ‘without expressing its intentions to do so with irresistible clearness’” (see also gendron v. supply and services union of the public service alliance of canada, local 50057, [1990] 1 scr 1298). in kba canada inc. v. 3s printers inc., 2014 bcca 117, 59 bclr (5th) 273, for example, the british columbia court of appeal found that the personal property security act, rsbc 1996, c. 359, pro- vided a “complete set of priority rules” that was “de- signed to replace convoluted common law, equitable and statutory rules that beset personal property secu- rity law with complexity and uncertainty” (paras. 27 and 21, citing bank of montreal v. innovation credit union, 2010 scc 47, [2010] 3 scr 3). in those circumstances, there was no “room for priorities to be determined on the basis of common law or que la deuxième épouse ait pu subir un appauvris- sement correspondant, la cour d’appel de l’onta- rio a confirmé la conclusion du premier juge selon laquelle la désignation valide d’un bénéficiaire en vertu de la loi sur les assurances constituait un motif juridique qui faisait obstacle au droit de la deuxième épouse d’obtenir les sommes assurées payables à la première épouse du défunt. je tiens à faire remarquer que la demanderesse dans cette affaire réclamait une fiducie par interprétation sur toute la prestation de décès, et non seulement le remboursement de tout paiement effectué sur la base de sa croyance erronée; la cour d’appel n’a pas décidé si elle aurait droit au remboursement de ces paiements, et nous ne sommes pas saisis de cette question aujourd’hui. [70] or, il s’agit en l’espèce de savoir si une dési- gnation effectuée conformément aux par. 190(1) et 191(1) de la loi sur les assurances fournit un motif en droit ou en justice permettant à risa de conserver la prestation en litige malgré le droit contractuel anté- rieur de michelle de demeurer la bénéficiaire désignée et, par conséquent, de recevoir le produit de la police d’assurance. autrement dit, la loi empêche-t-elle le recouvrement dans le cas d’un demandeur qui, comme michelle, est privé de l’avantage de la police d’assu- rance dans des circonstances comme celles de l’es- pèce? à mon sens, la réponse est négative. rien dans la loi sur les assurances ne peut être considéré comme excluant les droits que peuvent avoir, en common law ou en equity, d’autres personnes que le bénéficiaire dé- signé sur le produit de la police d’assurance. comme l’a expliqué notre cour dans rawluk c. rawluk, [1990] 1 rcs 70, p. 90, le « législateur est présumé ne pas s’écarter du droit existant “sans exprimer de façon in- contestablement claire son intention de le faire” » (voir aussi gendron c. syndicat des approvisionnements et services de l’alliance de la fonction publique du canada, section locale 50057, [1990] 1 rcs 1298). dans kba canada inc c.  3s printers inc., 2014 bcca 117, 59 bclr (5th) 273, par exemple, la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a jugé que la personal property security act, rsbc 1996, c. 359, prévoyait un [traduction] « ensemble complet de règles déterminant l’ordre de priorité » « conçues pour remplacer les règles alambiquées issues de la common law, de l’equity et de la loi qui font régner la com- plexité et l’incertitude en droit des sûretés mobilières » [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 339 equitable principles” (para 22). by contrast, while the insurance act provides the mechanism by which beneficiaries can be designated and therefore become statutorily entitled to receive policy proceeds, no part of the insurance act operates with the necessary “irresistible clearness” to preclude the existence of contractual or equitable rights in those insurance proceeds once they have been paid to the named beneficiary. [71] the reasoning put forward by mckinlay j. (as she then was) of the ontario high court of justice in shannon v. shannon (1985), 50 or (2d) 456, is particularly instructive in this regard. like michelle, the plaintiff in shannon was the former spouse of an insured person who had contractually agreed to maintain the plaintiff as the sole beneficiary of the life insurance policy in his name and “not to revoke such beneficiary designation at any time in the fu- ture” (p 458). shortly thereafter, and in breach of his contractual obligation, the insured person surrepti- tiously changed the beneficiary designation in favour of his niece and nephew. he passed away several years later, and when the plaintiff discovered the change in beneficiary designation, she commenced an action asserting her entitlement to the proceeds of her former spouse’s insurance policy. mckinlay j. found in her favour and made the following obser- vations (at p. 461): it would appear from s. 167(2) [ie the predecessor of s. 190(2) of the insurance act] that the insured may at any time before the filing of an irrevocable declaration alter or revoke an existing designation by way of a declaration. the position of the defendant is that this is precisely what the insured did, and that any finding of the court of a trust in favour of the plaintiff would have the effect of the court’s attempting to overrule a clear statutory provision. (par. 27 et 21, citant banque de mont réal c. innovation credit union, 2010 csc 47, [2010] 3 rcs 3). dans ces circonstances, il n’était pas « possible d’établir les priorités en fonction des principes de la common law ou de l’equity » (par 22). inversement, bien que la loi sur les assurances prévoie le mécanisme de désigna- tion des bénéficiaires et que ces derniers aient par le fait même droit au versement du produit de la police d’assurance, aucune partie de cette loi ne s’applique avec la « clarté incontestable » voulue pour exclure l’existence de droits contractuels ou en equity à ce produit d’assurance une fois que celui-ci a été versé au bénéficiaire désigné. [71] le raisonnement formulé par la juge mckinlay (plus tard juge de la cour d’appel de l’ontario) de la haute cour de justice de l’ontario dans shannon c. shannon (1985), 50 or (2d) 456, est particulière- ment instructif à cet égard. à l’instar de michelle, la demanderesse dans shannon était l’ancienne épouse d’un assuré qui avait accepté par contrat de la nommer à titre de seule bénéficiaire de la police d’assurance- vie en son nom, et [traduction] « de ne jamais révoquer cette désignation dans le futur » (p 458). peu de temps après, et en contravention de son obli- gation contractuelle, l’assuré a furtivement changé la désignation du bénéficiaire en faveur de sa nièce et de son neveu. il est décédé plusieurs années plus tard, et lorsque la demanderesse a découvert le changement de désignation, elle a intenté une action dans laquelle elle invoquait son droit au produit de l’assurance- vie de son ancien époux. la juge mckinlay a conclu en sa faveur et a formulé les observations suivantes (p. 461) : [traduction] il semble ressortir du par. 167(2) [le prédécesseur du par. 190(2) de la loi sur les assurances] que l’assuré peut en tout temps avant le dépôt d’une dé- claration irrévocable modifier ou révoquer une désignation existante par voie de déclaration. les défendeurs sont d’avis que c’est précisément ce que l’assuré a fait, et que toute conclusion de la cour à l’égard d’une fiducie en faveur de la demanderesse don- nerait à penser que la cour tente d’annuler une disposition législative claire. but the insurance act provides a statutory framework for the protection of the insured, the insurer and beneficiaries; or, la loi sur les assurances fournit un cadre législatif visant à protéger l’assuré, l’assureur et les bénéficiaires; 340 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. equity imposes duties of conscience on parties based on their relationship and dealings one with another outside the purview of the statute. when he concluded the separation agreement with his wife, the deceased bound himself to maintain the policy in good standing, which he did; he also bound himself to maintain it for the benefit of his wife, which he did not. [emphasis added.] [72] shannon therefore supports the proposition that while the insurance act may provide for the beneficiary’s entitlement to payment of the proceeds, it “does not specifically preclude the existence of rights outside its provisions” (p 461). similarly, in chanowski v. bauer, 2010 mcba 96, 258 man. r. (2d) 244, the manitoba court of appeal recog- nized that courts have readily accepted that con- tractual rights to policy proceeds may operate to the detriment of named beneficiaries: l’equity impose des obligations de conscience aux parties sur le fondement de leur relation et de leurs rapports les unes avec les autres qui ne relèvent pas du champ d’appli- cation de la loi. lorsqu’il a conclu l’entente de séparation avec sa femme, le défunt s’est engagé à maintenir la police en vigueur, ce qu’il a fait; il s’est également engagé à la maintenir en vigueur au bénéfice de sa femme, ce qu’il n’a pas fait. [je souligne.] [72] la décision shannon étaye donc la propo- sition que, même si la loi sur les assurances peut conférer au bénéficiaire le droit au versement du pro- duit de l’assurance, elle [traduction] « n’écarte pas expressément l’existence de droits qui ne relèvent pas de ses dispositions » (p 461). de même, dans chanowski c. bauer, 2010 mcba 96, 258 man. r. (2d) 244, la cour d’appel du manitoba a admis que les tribunaux reconnaissent volontiers que les droits contractuels au produit d’une police d’assu- rance peuvent s’exercer au détriment des bénéfi- ciaires désignés : generally, the courts have imposed remedial construc- tive trusts in factual circumstances where the deceased has breached an agreement regarding life insurance benefits. these have arisen most commonly in cases where the husband executed a separation agreement promising to retain his former wife as the beneficiary of his life insur- ance policy and, in contravention of that promise, before his death, the deceased changed the designation of his beneficiary to that of his present wife or another family member. [para. 39] [traduction] en général, les tribunaux imposent des fiducies par interprétation à titre de réparation dans des circonstances factuelles où le défunt n’a pas respecté une entente concernant les prestations d’assurance- vie. cela se produit la plupart du temps dans des cas où le mari a signé un accord de séparation par lequel il promettait de garder son ex- femme comme bénéficiaire de sa police d’assurance- vie et il a rompu sa promesse avant sa mort en désignant comme bénéficiaire son épouse actuelle ou un autre membre de la famille. [par. 39] [73] accepting that contractual rights to claim pol- icy proceeds can exist outside of the insurance act, can an irrevocable designation under the insurance act nonetheless constitute a juristic reason for michelle’s deprivation? in my view, it cannot. this is because the applicable statutory provisions do not require, either expressly or implicitly, that a benefi- ciary keep the proceeds as against a plaintiff, in an unjust enrichment claim, who stands deprived of his or her prior contractual entitlement to claim such proceeds upon the insured’s death. by not ousting prior contractual or equitable rights that third parties may have in such proceeds, the insurance act allows an irrevocable beneficiary to take insurance money that may be subject to prior rights and therefore does not give such a beneficiary any absolute entitlement [73] si l’on tient pour acquis que des droits con trac- tuels de réclamer le produit d’une police d’assurance peuvent exister hors de la loi sur les assurances, une désignation irrévocable au sens de cette loi peut- elle constituer néanmoins un motif juridique justifiant l’appauvrissement de michelle? à mon avis, la ré- ponse est non. il en est ainsi parce que les dispositions statutaires applicables n’exigent ni expressément ni implicitement qu’un bénéficiaire conserve le produit à l’encontre d’un demandeur ayant intenté une action pour enrichissement sans cause qui est privé de son droit contractuel antérieur de réclamer ce produit à la mort de l’assuré. en n’écartant pas les droits anté- rieurs qui pourraient avoir été accordés par contrat ou en equity à des tiers sur ce produit, la loi sur les assu‑ rances permet au bénéficiaire irrévocable de recevoir [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 341 to that money (shannon, at p 461). put simply, the statute required that the insurance company pay risa, but it did not give risa a right to keep the proceeds as against michelle, whose contract with lawrence specifically provided that she would pay all of the premiums exclusively for her own benefit. neither by direct reference nor by necessary impli- cation does the statute either (a) foreclose a third party who stands deprived of his or her contractual entitlement to claim insurance proceeds by success- fully asserting an unjust enrichment claim against the designated beneficiary — whether revocable or irrevocable — or (b) preclude the imposition of a constructive trust in circumstances such as these (see central guaranty trust co. v. dixdale mortgage investment corp. (1994), 24 or (3d) 506 (ca); see also kba canada). [74] on this basis, the applicable insurance act provisions are distinguishable from other legisla- tive enactments that have been found to preclude recovery, such as valid statutory provisions requir- ing the payment of taxes to the government (see gst reference, at pp. 476-77; zaidan group ltd. v. london (city) (1990), 71 or (2d) 65 (ca), at p. 69, aff’d [1991] 3 scr 593). in that context, the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim must fail because the legislation permits the defendant to be enriched even when the plaintiff suffers a corresponding dep- rivation. the same cannot be said about the statutory framework at issue in this case, however; there is nothing in the insurance act that justifies the fact that michelle, who is contractually entitled to claim the policy proceeds, is nevertheless deprived of this entitlement for risa’s benefit. [75] moreover, in my view, the fact that shannon was decided prior to soulos and garland is of no moment (court of appeal decision, at paras. 84 and 89). while those cases add to our understanding of the law on constructive trusts and unjust enrichment, they do not in any way undermine the holding in shannon with respect to the effect of the insurance act in circumstances such as these. les sommes assurées qui peuvent être visées par des droits antérieurs, mais elle ne confère donc pas à ce bénéficiaire un droit absolu à ces sommes (shannon, p 461). en clair, la loi obligeait la compagnie d’assu- rance à payer risa, mais elle ne conférait pas à cette dernière le droit de conserver le produit à l’encontre de michelle, dont le contrat avec lawrence prévoit en termes exprès qu’elle paierait toutes les primes pour son seul bénéfice. que ce soit par mention directe ou par déduction nécessaire, la loi a) n’empêche pas le tiers privé de son droit contractuel de réclamer le produit de l’assurance en faisant valoir avec succès une allégation d’enrichissement sans cause contre le bénéficiaire désigné — à titre révocable ou irrévo- cable — ni b) n’interdit d’imposer une fiducie par interprétation dans des circonstances comme celles de l’espèce (voir central guaranty trust co. c. dixdale mortgage investment corp. (1994), 24 or (3d) 506 (ca); voir aussi kba canada). [74] c’est pourquoi les dispositions applicables de la loi sur les assurances se distinguent d’autres textes de loi qui, selon les tribunaux, empêchent le recouvrement, comme les dispositions statutaires valides exigeant le paiement de taxes au gouverne- ment (voir renvoi sur la tps, p. 476- 477; zaidan group ltd. c. london (city) (1990), 71 or (2d) 65 (ca), p. 69, conf. par [1991] 3 rcs 593). dans ce contexte, l’action pour enrichissement sans cause du demandeur doit échouer parce que la loi permet au défendeur de s’enrichir même si le demandeur subit un appauvrissement correspondant. on ne peut tou- tefois en dire autant du cadre législatif en cause dans la présente affaire; rien dans la loi sur les assurances ne justifie le fait que michelle, qui a le droit contrac- tuel de réclamer le produit de la police d’assurance, soit néanmoins privée de ce droit au profit de risa. [75] qui plus est, le fait que la décision shannon a été rendue avant les arrêts soulos et garland m’ap- paraît sans importance (décision de la cour d’appel, par.  84 et 89) bien que ces arrêts nous aident à comprendre le droit en matière de fiducie par in- terprétation et d’enrichissement sans cause, ils ne minent d’aucune manière la conclusion tirée dans shannon concernant l’effet de la loi sur les assu‑ rances dans des circonstances comme celles de la présente affaire. 342 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. [76] the majority below came to the opposite con- clusion on this issue. having considered the legis- lative regime governing beneficiary designations in ontario, blair ja held that the insurance act framework “lean[s] heavily in favour of payment of the proceeds of life insurance policies to those named as irrevocable beneficiaries, whereas it continues to recognize the right of an insured, at any time prior to such a designation, to alter or revoke a beneficiary who does not fall into that category” (para 83). on this basis, he concluded that the legislative regime under which risa had been designated as the ir- revocable beneficiary of lawrence’s life insurance policy supplied a juristic reason for her receipt of the proceeds, since it constituted both a disposition of law and a statutory obligation (para 99). [77] with respect, i disagree with two aspects of blair ja’s reasons. first, he framed the issue as being whether the applicable insurance act provi- sions, pursuant to which risa had been designated as irrevocable beneficiary, provided a juristic reason for her receipt of the insurance proceeds (paras. 26(iii) and 83). this, in my view, is the wrong perspective from which to approach this third stage of the unjust enrichment analysis. as stated above, the authorities indicate that the court’s inquiry should focus not only on why the defendant received the benefit, but also on whether the statute gives the defendant the right to retain the benefit against a correspondingly deprived plaintiff — in this case, whether the insurance act extinguishes an unjust enrichment claim brought by a plaintiff at whose expense the named beneficiary was enriched (gst reference, at p. 477; kerr, at para 31). and given the view expressed earlier in these reasons, it seems to me that the insurance act does not. [76] les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel sont parvenus à la conclusion contraire sur cette ques- tion. ayant examiné le régime législatif régissant les désignations de bénéficiaire en ontario, le juge blair a conclu que le cadre de la loi sur les assu‑ rances [traduction] « penche fortement en faveur du versement du produit de polices d’assurance- vie aux personnes désignées bénéficiaires irrévocables, alors qu’il continue également à reconnaître le droit de l’assuré, en tout temps avant une telle désigna- tion, de modifier ou de révoquer la désignation du bénéficiaire qui n’appartient pas à cette catégorie » (par 83). il a conclu sur ce fondement que le régime législatif en vertu duquel risa a été désignée béné- ficiaire irrévocable de la police d’assurance- vie de lawrence fournissait un motif juridique lui permet- tant de recevoir le produit, car il constituait à la fois une disposition légale et une obligation statutaire (par 99). [77] avec égards, je ne souscris pas à deux aspects des motifs du juge blair. premièrement, il a estimé que la question en litige était celle de savoir si les dispositions applicables de la loi sur les assurances, en vertu desquelles risa avait été désignée bénéfi- ciaire irrévocable, constituaient un motif juridique permettant à risa de recevoir le produit de l’assu- rance (par. 26(iii) et 83). à mon avis, ce n’est pas la bonne façon d’aborder la troisième étape de l’ana- lyse de l’enrichissement sans cause. comme je l’ai déjà dit, les sources indiquent que le tribunal devrait concentrer son examen non seulement sur la raison pour laquelle le défendeur a reçu l’avantage, mais également sur la question de savoir si la loi donne au défendeur le droit de conserver cet avantage à l’en- contre du demandeur privé en conséquence. en l’es- pèce, la loi sur les assurances éteint- elle la demande fondée sur l’enrichissement sans cause présentée par le demandeur au détriment duquel le bénéficiaire dé- signé s’est enrichi (renvoi sur la tps, p. 477; kerr, par. 31)? compte tenu du point de vue exprimé plus tôt dans les présents motifs, je suis d’avis que la loi sur les assurances ne le fait pas. [78] second, blair ja placed a significant degree of emphasis on the distinction between revocable and irrevocable beneficiaries, and on the certainty and predictability associated with the statutory regime [78] deuxièmement, le juge blair a accordé beau- coup d’importance à la distinction entre les bénéfi- ciaires révocables et les bénéficiaires irrévocables, ainsi qu’à la certitude et à la prévisibilité associées [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 343 governing irrevocable designations. while it is clear that an irrevocably designated beneficiary has a “stat- utory right to remain as the named beneficiary” and is therefore “entitled to receive the insurance mon- eys unless he or she consents to being removed” (para. 82), i am still not persuaded that s. 191 of the insurance act can be interpreted as barring the pos- sibility of restitution to a third party who establishes that this irrevocable beneficiary cannot, in good con- science, retain those monies in the face of that third party’s unjust enrichment claim. to borrow the words of professors maddaugh and mccamus, “the fact that the insurer is directed by statute, implicitly if not directly, to pay the insurance monies to the ir- revocable beneficiary, does not preclude recovery by the other intended beneficiary where retention of the monies by the irrevocable beneficiary would consti- tute an unjust enrichment” (the law of restitution, at p 35-16). therefore, the fact that risa was des- ignated pursuant to s. 191(1) of the insurance act, as opposed to s. 190(1), does not assist her against michelle in the circumstances of this case. [79] i would also observe that the majority below declined to “go so far as to say that the designa- tion of a beneficiary as an irrevocable beneficiary under the insurance act invariably trumps a prior claimant” (para. 91), but nevertheless found that it did in this case. it is with this latter statement that i would disagree; as outlined above, my view is that the statutory scheme does not prevent a claimant with a prior contractual entitlement from succeeding in unjust enrichment against the designated beneficiary. au régime statutaire régissant les désignations à titre irrévocable. bien qu’il ne fasse aucun doute qu’un bénéficiaire désigné à titre irrévocable a un [tra- duction] « droit prévu par la loi de demeurer le bénéficiaire désigné », et a donc « droit aux sommes assurées à moins de consentir à la révocation de sa désignation » (par. 82), je ne suis toujours pas convaincue que l’art. 191 de la loi sur les assu‑ rances puisse être interprété comme interdisant la restitution à un tiers qui établit que ce bénéficiaire irrévocable ne peut, en toute conscience, conserver ces sommes malgré l’action pour enrichissement sans cause de ce tiers. pour reprendre les termes des professeurs maddaugh et mccamus, [traduction] « le fait que l’assureur est obligé en vertu de la loi, implicitement, si ce n’est directement, de verser les sommes assurées au bénéficiaire irrévocable n’em- pêche pas le recouvrement par le premier bénéficiaire lorsque la conservation des sommes par le bénéfi- ciaire irrévocable constituerait un enrichissement sans cause » (the law of restitution, p 35-16). par conséquent, le fait que risa a été désignée confor- mément au par. 191(1) de la loi sur les assurances, par opposition au par. 190(1), ne lui est d’aucun secours contre michelle dans les circonstances de la présente affaire. [79] je ferais également remarquer que les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel ont refusé d’[tra- duction] « aller jusqu’à dire que la désignation d’un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable en vertu de la loi sur les assurances l’emporte toujours contre un deman- deur antérieur » (par. 91), mais ils ont néanmoins conclu que cette loi l’emportait sur le demandeur antérieur en l’espèce. c’est avec cette dernière af- firmation que je suis en désaccord; comme je l’ai dit précédemment, je suis d’avis que le régime statutaire n’empêche pas le demandeur ayant un droit contrac- tuel antérieur d’avoir gain de cause dans une action pour enrichissement sans cause contre le bénéficiaire désigné. [80] my colleagues take the position that the insurance act provides a juristic reason for risa’s enrichment because it specifically provides that the proceeds, once paid to the irrevocable beneficiary, are immune from attack by the insured’s credi- tors. they say that because “michelle’s rights are [80] mes collègues sont d’avis que la loi sur les assurances fournit un motif juridique pour l’enrichis- sement de risa, parce qu’elle prévoit précisément que, dès qu’il est versé au bénéficiaire irrévocable, le produit est à l’abri des réclamations des créanciers de l’assuré. ils soutiennent que, puisque « les droits 344 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. contractual in nature, she is a creditor of lawrence’s estate and thus, by the provisions of the insurance act, has no claim to the proceeds” (para 122). while there is no dispute that michelle may have a claim against lawrence’s estate, my view is that she is also a person at whose expense risa has been en- riched — and therefore a plaintiff with standing to claim against risa in unjust enrichment. and while the insurance act specifically precludes claims by creditors suing on the basis of some obligation owed by the insured’s estate, it does not state “with irresistible clearness” that a claim in unjust en‑ richment — ie a claim based on a different cause of action  —  brought by a plaintiff who also has a contractual entitlement to claim the insurance proceeds must necessarily fail as against the named beneficiary. de michelle sont de nature contractuelle, cela fait d’elle une créancière de la succession de lawrence et elle n’a donc pas droit au produit suivant la loi sur les assurances » (par 122). bien qu’il ne soit pas contesté que michelle a peut- être un droit d’action contre la succession de lawrence, à mon avis elle est aussi une personne au détriment de laquelle risa s’est enrichie — et elle a donc la qualité requise pour intenter une action pour enrichissement sans cause contre risa. par ailleurs, bien que la loi sur les assu‑ rances empêche expressément les créanciers d’inten- ter des poursuites sur le fondement d’une obligation de la succession de l’assuré, elle ne dispose pas « de façon incontestablement claire » qu’une action pour enrichissement sans cause — c-à-d fondée sur une autre cause d’action — intentée contre le bénéficiaire désigné par un demandeur qui a également le droit contractuel de réclamer le produit de l’assurance doit nécessairement échouer. [81] for all of the foregoing reasons, i would echo the conclusion arrived at by lauwers ja, dissenting in the court below, that “[michelle’s] entitlement to the insurance proceeds as against [risa] is nei- ther precluded nor affected by the operation of the insurance act”, with the result that this case “falls outside the category of disposition of law as a juristic reason to permit [risa] to retain the life insurance proceeds” (para 229). [81] pour tous les motifs qui précèdent, je fais mienne la conclusion à laquelle est parvenu le juge lauwers, dissident en cour d’appel : [traduction] « [l]’application de la loi sur les assurances ne fait aucunement obstacle au droit de [michelle] au pro- duit de l’assurance réclamé par [risa], ni n’influe sur ce droit », de sorte qu’en l’espèce, la loi « ne consti- tue pas une disposition légale permettant à [risa] de conserver le produit de l’assurance- vie » (par 229). [82] since there is no suggestion that any other established category of juristic reason would apply in these circumstances, my conclusion at this first stage is that michelle has made out a prima facie case. [82] personne n’ayant laissé entendre qu’une autre catégorie établie de motif juridique s’appliquerait dans les circonstances, je conclus à ce premier stade que michelle a établi une preuve prima facie. (b) second stage — policy reasons militate in b) deuxième étape — les considérations d’in‑ favour of michelle térêt public militent en faveur de michelle [83] the second stage of the juristic reason analy- sis affords the defendant an opportunity to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case by establishing that there is some residual reason to deny recovery. at this stage, various other considerations come into play, like the parties’ reasonable expectations and moral and policy- based arguments — including considerations relating to the way in which the parties organized their rela- tionship (garland, at paras. 45-46; pacific national investments, at para. 25; kerr, at paras 44-45). [83] la deuxième étape de l’analyse du motif ju- ridique donne au défendeur l’occasion de réfuter la preuve prima facie du demandeur en établissant qu’il existe un motif résiduel de refuser le recouvrement. à ce stade, divers autres facteurs entrent en jeu, comme les attentes raisonnables des parties et les arguments de morale et d’intérêt public — y com- pris les facteurs relatifs à la façon dont les parties structurent leur relation (garland, par. 45-46; pacific national investments, par. 25; kerr, par 44-45). [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 345 it is clear that both parties expected to receive [84] the proceeds of the life insurance policy. pursuant to the oral agreement, michelle had a contractual right to remain designated as beneficiary so long as she continued to pay the premiums and kept the policy alive for the duration of lawrence’s life. although she could have better safeguarded her interests by requiring lawrence to designate her irrevoca- bly, her expectation with respect to the insurance money — rooted in the oral agreement — is clearly reasonable and legitimate. il est clair que les deux parties s’attendaient [84] à toucher le produit de la police d’assurance- vie. d’après l’entente verbale, michelle avait un droit contractuel de demeurer désignée comme bénéfi- ciaire tant qu’elle continuait de payer les primes et maintenait la police en vigueur durant la vie de lawrence. certes, elle aurait pu mieux protéger ses intérêts en obligeant lawrence à la désigner à titre irrévocable, mais ses attentes à l’égard des sommes assurées — découlant de l’entente verbale — sont manifestement raisonnables et légitimes. [85] risa, by contrast, expected to receive the in- surance money upon lawrence’s death by virtue of the fact that she had been validly designated as irrevocable beneficiary. because risa was desig- nated after lawrence and michelle entered into the oral agreement, however, i am of the view that her expectation cannot take precedence over michelle’s prior contractual right to remain named as bene- ficiary, regardless of whether risa knew that this was actually the case. to echo the findings of the application judge: [85] risa, en revanche, s’attendait à recevoir les sommes assurées au décès de lawrence du fait qu’elle avait été validement désignée comme béné- ficiaire irrévocable. or, comme elle a été désignée après que lawrence et michelle eurent conclu l’en- tente verbale, je suis d’avis que l’attente de risa ne peut l’emporter sur le droit contractuel antérieur de michelle de demeurer la bénéficiaire désignée, peu importe si risa savait que michelle l’était en fait. pour reprendre les conclusions du juge de première instance : while there is no evidence that [risa] knew that [michelle] was paying the premiums on the policy, she was aware that [lawrence] was not in a position to do so. she says that she believed that [lawrence’s] brother was paying the premiums, but there is nothing in the record regarding the brother’s motivation or intentions that would make [risa’s] belief in such action reasonable. [para. 49] [traduction] même si rien n’indique que [risa] savait que [michelle] payait les primes de la police, elle savait que [lawrence] n’était pas en mesure de le faire. elle affirme qu’elle croyait que le frère [de lawrence] payait les primes, mais il n’y a rien au dossier concernant la motivation ou l’intention du frère qui rendrait raisonnable cette croyance de [risa]. [par. 49] [86] moreover, i am not persuaded that the oral na- ture of the agreement between michelle and lawrence undermines michelle’s expectation or serves as a public policy reason that favours risa’s retention of the proceeds. the legal force of unwritten agreements has long been recognized by common law courts. and while “kitchen table agreements” may in some cases result in situations where parties neither understand nor intend the legal significance of their agreement, this is not such a case; the parties do not dispute the finding that michelle and lawrence did in fact have an oral agreement that the former would pay the premiums on the policy and, in exchange, would be entitled to the proceeds of the policy upon the latter’s death (superior court decision, at para. 17; court of appeal decision, at para 22). indeed, the existence of [86] de plus, je ne suis pas convaincue que la na- ture orale de l’entente entre michelle et lawrence mine les attentes de michelle, ou sert de considé- rations d’intérêt public favorisant la conservation du produit par risa. la force juridique des ententes non écrites est reconnue depuis longtemps par les tribunaux de common law. et bien que les ententes privées puissent dans certains cas donner lieu à des situations où les parties ne comprennent pas la si- gnification juridique de leur entente ou ne voulaient pas lui donner une telle signification, ce n’est pas le cas en l’espèce; les parties ne contestent pas la conclusion selon laquelle michelle et lawrence ont bel et bien conclu une entente verbale, aux termes de laquelle la première paierait les primes de la police et, en échange, aurait droit au produit de la police 346 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. the oral agreement is quite clearly corroborated by michelle’s payment of the premiums following her separation from lawrence. au décès du dernier (décision de la cour supérieure, par. 17; décision de la cour d’appel, par 22). en fait, l’existence de l’entente verbale est clairement corroborée par le fait que michelle a payé les primes à la suite de sa séparation d’avec lawrence. [87] as a final point, it appears to me that the re- sidual considerations that arise at this stage of the garland analysis favour michelle, given that her contribution towards the payment of the premiums actually kept the insurance policy alive and made risa’s entitlement to receive the proceeds upon lawrence’s death possible. furthermore, it would be bad policy to ignore the fact that michelle was effec- tively tricked by lawrence into paying the premiums of a policy for the benefit of some other person of his choosing. [87] en dernier lieu, il me semble que les facteurs résiduels soulevés à cette étape de l’analyse établie dans l’arrêt garland militent en faveur de michelle, puisque sa contribution au paiement des primes a effectivement permis de maintenir la police d’assu- rance en vigueur et rendu possible le droit de risa de recevoir le produit au décès de lawrence. qui plus est, il serait déplorable de négliger le fait que lawrence a amené michelle par la ruse à payer les primes de la police au bénéfice d’une autre personne de son choix. [88] for the foregoing reasons, i would conclude that risa has not met the burden of rebutting michelle’s prima facie case. it follows, therefore, that michelle has made out each of the requisite elements of the cause of action in unjust enrichment. [88] pour les motifs qui précèdent, je suis d’avis de conclure que risa ne s’est pas acquittée du fardeau de réfuter la preuve prima facie de michelle. par conséquent, michelle a établi chacun des éléments requis de l’action pour enrichissement sans cause. b appropriate remedy: imposition of a construc‑ b la réparation appropriée : l’imposition d’une tive trust fiducie par interprétation [89] the remedy for unjust enrichment is restitu- tionary in nature and can take one of two forms: per- sonal or proprietary. a personal remedy is essentially a debt or a monetary obligation — ie an order to pay damages — that may be enforced by the plain- tiff against the defendant (sorochan v. sorochan, [1986] 2 scr 38, at p 47). in most cases, this remedy will be sufficient to achieve restitution, and it can therefore be viewed as the “default” remedy for unjust enrichment (lac minerals, at p. 678; kerr, at para 46). [89] pour remédier à l’enrichissement sans cause, le tribunal accorde une restitution qui peut prendre deux formes : une réparation personnelle ou une réparation fondée sur le droit de propriété. la réparation person- nelle est essentiellement une dette ou une obligation pécuniaire — p ex des dommages- intérêts — dont l’exécution peut être réclamée par le demandeur contre le défendeur (sorochan c. sorochan, [1986] 2 rcs 38, p 47). dans la plupart des cas, cette ré- paration sera suffisante pour parvenir à la restitution, et elle peut donc être considérée comme la réparation « par défaut » pour remédier à l’enrichissement sans cause (lac minerals, p. 678; kerr, par 46). [90] in certain cases, however, a plaintiff may be awarded a remedy of a proprietary nature — that is, an entitlement “to enforce rights against a particular piece of property” (mcinnes, the canadian law of unjust enrichment and restitution, at p 1295). the most pervasive and important proprietary remedy for unjust enrichment is the constructive trust — a [90] dans certains cas, toutefois, le tribunal peut accorder au demandeur une réparation fondée sur le droit de propriété, c’est-à-dire la possibilité [tra- duction] « de faire respecter ses droits à l’égard d’un bien en particulier » (mcinnes, the canadian law of unjust enrichment and restitution, p 1295). la réparation fondée sur le droit de propriété la plus [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet la juge côté 347 remedy which, according to dickson j. (as he then was), répandue et la plus importante pour remédier à l’en- richissement sans cause est la fiducie par interpré- tation — une réparation qui, selon le juge dickson (plus tard juge en chef), is imposed without reference to intention to create a trust, and its purpose is to remedy a result otherwise unjust. it is a broad and flexible equitable tool which permits courts to gauge all the circumstances of the case, including the respective contributions of the parties, and to determine beneficial entitlement. est imposé[e] indépendamment de l’intention de créer une fiducie, et son but est de remédier à un résultat autrement injuste. c’est un outil général, souple et juste qui permet aux tribunaux d’apprécier toutes les circonstances de l’es- pèce, y compris les contributions respectives des parties, et de déterminer le droit de propriété véritable. (pettkus, at pp. 843-44) (pettkus, p. 843- 844) [91] while the constructive trust is a powerful re- medial tool, it is not available in all circumstances where a plaintiff establishes his or her claim in unjust enrichment. rather, courts will impress the disputed property with a constructive trust only if the plaintiff can establish two things: first, that a personal remedy would be inadequate; and second, that the plaintiff’s contribution that founds the action is linked or caus- ally connected to the property over which a con- structive trust is claimed (pipsc, at para. 149; kerr, at paras. 50-51; peter, at p 988). and even where the court finds that a constructive trust would be an appropriate remedy, it will be imposed only to the extent of the plaintiff’s proportionate contribution (direct or indirect) to the acquisition, preservation, maintenance or improvement of the property (kerr, at para. 51; peter, at pp 997-98). [92] the application judge concluded that michelle had established an entitlement to the entirety of the proceeds of the life insurance policy on the basis of unjust enrichment, and he accordingly ordered that risa held those proceeds on constructive trust for michelle (para 52). he specifically found that michelle had demonstrated a “clear ‘link or causal connection’ between her contributions and the pro- ceeds of the policy that continued for the entire du- ration of the policy” (para 50). [91] bien que la fiducie par interprétation soit un puissant outil de réparation, on ne peut l’accorder dans toutes les circonstances où le demandeur établit le bien- fondé de son allégation d’enrichissement sans cause. en fait, les tribunaux n’assujettiront le bien contesté à une fiducie par interprétation que si le demandeur peut établir deux choses : premièrement, qu’une réparation personnelle serait insuffisante; et deuxièmement, que la contribution du demandeur à la base de l’action a un lien ou un rapport de cau- salité avec le bien qui serait grevé d’une fiducie par interprétation (ipfpc, par. 149; kerr, par. 50-51; peter, p 988). et même lorsque le tribunal estime qu’une fiducie par interprétation serait une réparation convenable, elle ne sera imposée que dans la mesure de la contribution proportionnelle du demandeur (directe ou indirecte) à l’acquisition, la conservation, l’entretien ou l’amélioration du bien (kerr, par. 51; peter, p. 997- 998). [92] le juge de première instance a conclu que michelle avait établi avoir droit à l’intégralité du produit de la police d’assurance- vie sur le fondement de l’enrichissement sans cause, et, par conséquent, il a ordonné à risa de détenir ce produit en fiducie par interprétation pour le compte de michelle (par 52). il a précisément conclu que michelle avait démontré [traduction] « un “lien ou un rapport de causalité” clair entre ses contributions, qui ont continué pendant toute la durée de la police, et le produit de la police » (par 50). [93] while my analysis of michelle’s right to recover for unjust enrichment differs from that of [93] même si mon analyse du droit de michelle au recouvrement pour remédier à l’enrichissement sans 348 moore v sweet côté j. [2018] 3 scr. the application judge, i see no reason to disturb his conclusion regarding the propriety of a remedial constructive trust in these circumstances. ordinarily, a monetary award would be adequate in cases where the property at stake is money. in the present case, however, the disputed insurance money has been paid into court and is readily available to be impressed with a constructive trust. furthermore, ordering that the money be paid out of court to risa, and then requiring michelle to enforce the judgment against risa personally, would unnecessarily complicate the process through which michelle can obtain the relief to which she is entitled. it would also create a risk that the money might be spent or accessed by other creditors in the interim. [94] moreover, the application judge found that michelle’s payment of the premiums was causally connected to the maintenance of the policy under which risa was enriched. because each of michelle’s payments kept the policy alive, and given that risa’s right as designated beneficiary necessarily deprived michelle of her contractual entitlement to receive the entirety of the insurance proceeds, i would impose a constructive trust to the full extent of those proceeds in michelle’s favour. [95] this disposition of the appeal renders it un- necessary to determine whether this court’s decision in soulos should be interpreted as precluding the availability of a remedial constructive trust beyond cases involving unjust enrichment or wrongful acts like breach of fiduciary duty. similarly, the extent to which this court’s decision in soulos may have incorporated the “traditional english institutional trusts” into the remedial constructive trust framework is beyond the scope of this appeal. while recognizing that these remain open questions, i am of the view that they are best left for another day. cause diffère de celle du juge de première instance, je ne vois aucune raison de modifier sa conclusion concernant l’à-propos d’imposer une fiducie par in- terprétation dans les circonstances. habituellement, l’octroi d’une réparation pécuniaire conviendrait dans les cas où le bien en jeu est de l’argent. or, en l’espèce, le produit d’assurance en litige a été déposé au greffe du tribunal et il est facile de lui imposer une fiducie par interprétation. en outre, si l’on or- donne que l’argent consigné au tribunal soit versé à risa, puis que michelle fasse exécuter le jugement à l’encontre de risa en personne, cela compliquerait inutilement le processus permettant à michelle d’ob- tenir la réparation à laquelle elle a droit. cela ferait naître aussi le risque que l’argent soit dépensé ou pris entre- temps par d’autres créanciers. [94] de plus, le juge de première instance a conclu que le paiement des primes par michelle avait un lien de causalité avec le maintien en vigueur de la po- lice en vertu de laquelle risa s’est enrichie. puisque chacun de ces versements a permis de maintenir la police en vigueur et que le droit de risa en tant que bénéficiaire désignée a forcément privé michelle de son droit contractuel de toucher l’intégralité du produit de l’assurance, je suis d’avis d’imposer une fiducie par interprétation à hauteur du produit en faveur de michelle. [95] le pourvoi étant ainsi tranché, point n’est besoin de décider si l’arrêt soulos de notre cour devrait être interprété comme interdisant le recours à la fiducie par interprétation, outre les cas d’enrichis- sement sans cause et de conduites fautives, comme le manquement à une obligation fiduciaire. de même, la mesure dans laquelle notre cour aurait incorporé, dans soulos, les « fiducies institutionnelles anglaises traditionnelles » au cadre d’analyse des fiducies par interprétation imposées en guise de réparation dé- borde la portée du présent pourvoi. ces questions demeurent certes en suspens, mais j’estime qu’il vaudra mieux les étudier à une autre occasion. vi conclusion vi conclusion [96] i would therefore allow the appeal without costs and order that the proceeds of the policy, with accrued interest, be impressed with a constructive [96] par conséquent, je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi sans frais et d’ordonner l’imposition d’une fiducie par interprétation en faveur de michelle sur [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 349 trust in favour of michelle and accordingly be paid out of court for her benefit. le produit de la police d’assurance, ainsi que les intérêts accumulés, et, par conséquent, le retrait de ces sommes du greffe du tribunal et leur versement au bénéfice de michelle. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par gascon and rowe jj. (dissenting) — les juges gascon et rowe (dissidents) — i. introduction i. introduction [97] this appeal is, without question, a difficult one. michelle and risa are both innocent victims of lawrence’s breach of contract and they equally invite substantial sympathy. michelle paid approx- imately $7,000 to keep alive an insurance policy on the promise she would receive the proceeds if lawrence died within its term. risa cared for and supported lawrence for 13 years and expected, as ir- revocable beneficiary, that she would receive support should he die. with lawrence’s broken promise now discovered, michelle claims a constructive trust over the proceeds on the basis of unjust enrichment or “good conscience”, while risa insists her irrevocable beneficiary designation is unassailable. it is an unfortunate reality that a person’s [98] death is sometimes accompanied by uncertainty and conflict over the wealth that has been left behind. the resulting litigation can tie up funds that the deceased intended to support loved ones for a significant pe- riod of time, adding financial hardship to personal tragedy. in an attempt to ensure that life insurance proceeds could be free from such strife, the ontario legislator empowered life insurance policy holders to designate an “irrevocable beneficiary” (insurance act, rso 1990, c i8, s 191(1)). such a desig- nation ensures that the policy proceeds could be disbursed free from claims against the estate, giving certainty to insured, insurer, and beneficiary alike. this provision should be given full effect. [97] le présent pourvoi est sans aucun doute diffi- cile à trancher. michelle et risa sont deux victimes innocentes de la rupture de contrat de lawrence et elles méritent beaucoup de sympathie. michelle a versé environ 7 000 $ pour garder en vigueur une police d’assurance moyennant la promesse qu’elle toucherait le produit si lawrence mourait pendant la durée de la police. risa s’est occupée de lawrence et l’a soutenu durant 13 ans et elle s’attendait, en tant que bénéficiaire irrévocable, à toucher ce pro- duit s’il mourait. la promesse trahie de lawrence ayant été mise au jour, michelle réclame l’imposition d’une fiducie par interprétation sur le produit en in- voquant l’enrichissement sans cause ou la « bonne conscience », alors que risa insiste pour dire que sa désignation en tant que bénéficiaire irrévocable est inattaquable. [98] malheureusement, le décès d’une personne s’accompagne parfois d’incertitude et de conflit au sujet du patrimoine laissé par le défunt. le litige qui en découle peut entraîner pendant longtemps le blocage de fonds que le défunt comptait utiliser pour soutenir les êtres qui lui sont chers, ce qui ajoute des difficultés financières à la tragédie. afin de soustraire le produit d’une police d’assurance- vie à pareille querelle, le législateur ontarien a ha- bilité les titulaires d’une police d’assurance- vie à désigner un « bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable » (loi sur les assurances, lro 1990, c i8, par 191(1)). une telle désignation assure que le versement du produit de la police puisse être effectué à l’abri des réclamations visant la succession, ce qui confère une certitude tant à l’assuré qu’à l’assureur et au bénéficiaire. il y a lieu de donner pleinement effet à cette disposition. 350 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. [99] there is no basis to impose a constructive trust in the circumstances of this case. we agree with blair ja of the ontario court of appeal that michelle has not established that a “good conscience” constructive trust should be imposed (2017 onca 182, 134 or (3d) 721). we rely on his reasons to dispose of this ground of appeal. we also agree that michelle has failed to establish a claim in unjust enrichment. on this issue, we respectfully part ways with the majority of this court on whether unjust enrichment can be made out on these facts. michelle has only asserted contractual rights to the proceeds and has not established a proprietary or equitable in- terest in the proceeds themselves. in our view, there is no correlative deprivation between michelle’s failed contractual expectations and risa’s enrichment. in addition, the insurance act provides clear juristic reason for any enrichment risa could have received through michelle’s loss as a creditor of lawrence’s insolvent estate. opening up irrevocable beneficiary designations to challenges by an insured’s creditors risks a recipe for litigation — a situation the legislator clearly intended to avoid. as such, for the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeal. il n’y a aucune raison d’imposer une fiducie [99] par interprétation dans les circonstances de la pré- sente affaire. nous convenons avec le juge blair, de la cour d’appel de l’ontario, que michelle n’a pas établi la nécessité d’imposer une fiducie par interprétation fondée sur la « bonne conscience » (2017 onca 182, 134 or (3d) 721). nous nous appuyons sur ses motifs pour trancher ce moyen d’appel. nous convenons en outre que michelle n’a pas établi le bien- fondé d’une action pour enrichis- sement sans cause. à cet égard, nous nous dissocions des juges majoritaires de la cour sur la question de savoir s’il est possible de démontrer l’enrichissement sans cause au vu des faits de l’espèce. michelle n’a fait que revendiquer des droits contractuels au pro- duit et n’a pas prouvé qu’elle détenait un intérêt propriétal ou en equity dans le produit lui- même. à notre avis, il n’y a aucun appauvrissement corréla- tif entre les attentes contractuelles non réalisées de michelle et l’enrichissement de risa. en outre, la loi sur les assurances fournit un motif juridique clair à l’appui de tout enrichissement dont aurait bénéficié risa par le biais de la perte subie par michelle en tant que créancière de la succession insolvable de lawrence exposer les désignations irrévocables de bénéficiaires aux contestations des créanciers de l’assuré risque de constituer une recette parfaite pour entraîner des litiges, une situation que le législateur souhaitait manifestement éviter. ainsi, pour les mo- tifs qui suivent, nous sommes d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. ii analysis ii analyse a characterizing michelle’s claim a le droit d’action de michelle [100] the majority of the ontario court of appeal was correct in characterizing michelle’s claim as being that she had a contract with lawrence for the policy proceeds and that she was using this contract to be entitled to restitution of the funds on the prin- ciple of unjust enrichment. according to michelle’s affidavit, the contract was to ensure that she would be “entitled to receive the policy benefits” in ex- change for paying the premiums (ar, at p 138). however, it is difficult to see how the contract she has put into evidence creates a proprietary right in the proceeds. simply being named as a beneficiary [100] les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel de l’ontario ont eu raison de dire, en parlant du droit d’action de michelle, qu’elle avait conclu un contrat avec lawrence afin d’obtenir le produit de la police et qu’elle se servait de ce contrat pour avoir droit à la restitution des fonds sur la base du principe de l’enrichissement sans cause. d’après l’affidavit de michelle, le contrat visait à faire en sorte qu’elle ait le [traduction] « droit de toucher le produit de la police » en échange du paiement des primes (da, p 138). il est cependant difficile de voir en quoi le contrat qu’elle a déposé en preuve donne [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 351 does not give one a right in the proceeds before the death of the insured. the right to claim the proceeds only crystalizes upon the insured’s death. further, as a revocable beneficiary, michelle had no right to contest the redesignation outside of a claim against lawrence for breach of contract. thus, at the time of lawrence’s death, the only rights that michelle possessed in relation to the life insurance contract were her contractual rights. [101] on different pleadings and a more developed record, michelle may have been able to establish that the contract gave her a proprietary interest in the proceeds through an equitable assignment of lawrence’s chose in action. the ontario court of appeal correctly found that this avenue was never properly put to the application judge, and michelle has not otherwise pursued this line of argument. it follows that, with only contractual rights asserted, michelle cannot be understood to have a proprietary right in the proceeds. rather, her agreement with lawrence must be understood as limited to a contrac- tual right to be maintained the named beneficiary of the policy while she paid the premiums. if lawrence had died while she was designated as a beneficiary, michelle would consequently receive the proceeds, but the contract itself cannot be seen to give michelle a right in the proceeds themselves. [102] of course, lawrence breached his contrac- tual obligations by redesignating risa as an irrevo- cable beneficiary, entitling her to the policy proceeds on his death. while michelle would have a claim against lawrence’s estate for breach of contract, the estate’s lack of assets has rendered any such recourse fruitless. instead, michelle’s claim before this court is to reverse the purported unjust enrichment of risa, an innocent beneficiary of lawrence’s breach of contract. naissance à un droit de propriété sur le produit. le simple fait d’être désigné bénéficiaire ne donne pas droit au produit avant la mort de l’assuré. le droit de réclamer le produit ne se matérialise qu’au décès de l’assuré. de plus, à titre de bénéficiaire révocable, michelle n’avait pas le droit de contester la nouvelle désignation, si ce n’est en poursuivant lawrence pour rupture de contrat. par conséquent, les seuls droits que possédait michelle à l’égard du contrat d’assurance- vie lorsque lawrence est décédé étaient ses droits contractuels. [101] si elle avait présenté des demandes diffé- rentes et un dossier plus étoffé, michelle aurait peut- être été en mesure d’établir que le contrat lui accordait un intérêt propriétal dans le produit par le truchement d’une cession en equity de la chose non possessoire de lawrence. la cour d’appel de l’ontario a conclu à juste titre que cette voie de recours n’avait jamais été régulièrement portée à l’attention du juge de pre- mière instance, et michelle n’a pas non plus défendu cette thèse. on ne peut donc considérer qu’en invo- quant seulement des droits contractuels, michelle a un droit de propriété sur le produit. son entente avec lawrence ne doit plutôt être comprise que comme le droit contractuel de rester la bénéficiaire désignée de la police pendant qu’elle en paie les primes. si lawrence était mort alors qu’elle était désignée béné- ficiaire, michelle aurait ainsi touché le produit, mais le contrat lui- même ne peut conférer à michelle un droit sur le produit en soi. [102] bien sûr, lawrence a contrevenu à ses obli- gations contractuelles en désignant risa bénéficiaire irrévocable, ce qui a permis à cette dernière de tou- cher le produit de la police lors du décès de lawrence. même si michelle avait un droit d’action contre la succession de lawrence pour rupture de contrat, l’in- suffisance d’actifs dans la succession a rendu tout recours inutile. le pourvoi formé par michelle devant notre cour a plutôt pour objet d’annuler le prétendu enrichissement sans cause de risa, une bénéficiaire innocente de la rupture de contrat de lawrence. [103] risa has argued that unjust enrichment should not be a vehicle for protecting expectation interests in a valid contract. indeed, the availability of unjust enrichment for indirect claims against the [103] risa a fait valoir que l’enrichissement sans cause ne devrait pas servir à protéger les attentes envers un contrat valide. en fait, la possibilité d’in- voquer l’enrichissement sans cause afin de poursuivre 352 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. innocent beneficiaries of a breach of contract is a matter of significant academic controversy. professor birks, while a general proponent of the availability of indirect claims, has posited that there is a general rule against “leap- frogging” out of an initially valid contract through unjust enrichment (p. birks, unjust enrichment (2nd ed. 2005), at p 90). one reason he suggests for this rule is that a contracting party “must not wriggle round the risk of insolvency” inherent in contractual relations (p 90). professor burrows also recognizes such a rule, given the logical difficulty of establishing a causal link between the claimant’s deprivation and the defendant’s benefit (a. burrows, the law of restitution (3rd ed. 2011), at pp 70-71). in a similar vein, professor virgo has identified a “privity principle” to unjust enrichment that means indirect recipients of a benefit will generally not be liable for restitution (g. virgo, the principles of the law of restitution (3rd ed. 2015), at p 105). the leading text on restitution from lord goff and professor jones, by contrast, suggests that there is no such general prohibition and that causation can be made out on a simple “but for” causation anal- ysis (goff & jones: the law of unjust enrichment (9th ed. 2016), by c. mitchell, p. mitchell and s. watterson, at pp. 77 and 176). yet, they also caution that courts should be hesitant to make such awards where they would have the effect of undermining an insolvency regime or avoid the contractual allocation of risk (p 77). indirectement les bénéficiaires innocents d’une rup- ture de contrat suscite une grande controverse chez les universitaires. le professeur birks, bien que gé- néralement favorable à la possibilité d’exercer des re- cours indirects, a opiné qu’une règle générale interdit de se soustraire à un contrat validement formé par la voie de l’enrichissement sans cause (p. birks, unjust enrichment (2e éd. 2005), p 90). il prétend que cette règle existe notamment parce qu’une partie contrac- tante [traduction] « ne doit pas esquiver le risque d’insolvabilité » inhérent aux rapports contractuels (p 90). le professeur burrows reconnaît lui aussi l’existence de cette règle, vu la difficulté logique d’établir un lien de causalité entre l’appauvrisse- ment du requérant et l’enrichissement du défendeur (a. burrows, the law of restitution (3e éd. 2011), p 70-71). dans la même veine, le professeur virgo a relevé un « principe de lien contractuel » applicable à l’enrichissement sans cause voulant que les bénéfi- ciaires indirects d’un avantage ne soient généralement pas tenus de le restituer (g. virgo, the principles of the law of restitution (3e éd. 2015), p 105). en re- vanche, l’ouvrage de référence de lord goff et du pro- fesseur jones sur la restitution tend à indiquer qu’il n’y a aucune interdiction générale de cette nature et que le lien de causalité peut être établi à l’aide d’une simple analyse du « facteur déterminant » (goff & jones : the law of unjust enrichment (9e éd. 2016), par. c. mitchell, p mitchell et s watterson, p. 77 et 176). ils précisent pourtant que les tribunaux de- vraient hésiter à octroyer de telles réparations lorsque celles-ci auraient pour effet de saper un régime d’in- solvabilité ou d’éviter la répartition du risque prévue au contrat (p 77). [104] there is sparse canadian authority on this matter, and we see no support for the view that un- just enrichment protects an individual’s contractual expectations against innocent third parties. certainly, this court has recognized that the law of restitution ensures that where a plaintiff has been deprived of wealth that is either in their possession or would have accrued for their benefit, it is restored to them (air canada v. british columbia, [1989] 1 scr 1161, at pp 1202-3). however, restitution awards for ex- pected property have generally been where there was a breach of an equitable duty by a defendant (lac minerals ltd. v. international corona resources ltd., [104] les sources canadiennes en la matière sont rares et nous ne voyons rien qui étaye l’opinion selon laquelle le principe de l’enrichissement sans cause protège les attentes contractuelles d’une personne contre des tiers innocents. bien entendu, notre cour a reconnu que le droit de la restitution garantit que, dans le cas où un demandeur a été privé d’une richesse qu’il avait en sa possession ou qui lui revenait, cette richesse lui sera rendue (air canada c. colombie‑ britannique, [1989] 1 rcs 1161, p. 1202- 1203). toutefois, le bien attendu a généralement été restitué lorsqu’un défendeur avait manqué à un devoir en equity (lac minerals ltd. c. international corona [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 353 [1989] 2 scr 574, at pp 668-70). in these cases, a defendant, through some wrongdoing, intercepts the property otherwise destined for the plaintiff. in the words of lac minerals: “but for [the defendant’s] interception”, the plaintiff “would have acquired the property” (p 669). critically, the plaintiff has no recourse against the third party. its only claim is to the very thing in the defendant’s hands. in our view, this is distinguishable from where the plaintiff holds a valid contractual expectation vis-à-vis the third party (here, lawrence) that they would receive property, but that expectation was frustrated by an insolvency that prevents full compensation for a breach of contract. our takeaway from lac minerals is encapsulated concisely by professor mcinnes’ views on expected property awards: resources ltd., [1989] 2 rcs 574, p. 668- 670). dans ces affaires, le défendeur, par un quelconque acte répréhensible, intercepte le bien autrement destiné au demandeur. pour reprendre les termes employés dans lac minerals, « si [la défenderesse] ne l’avait pas intercepté », la demanderesse « aurait acquis ce bien- fonds » (p 669). ce qui est d’une importance capitale, c’est que le demandeur n’a aucun recours contre le tiers. son seul droit d’action vise la chose même qui se trouve entre les mains du défendeur. à notre avis, il y a lieu de distinguer cette situation du cas où la demanderesse a une attente contractuelle valable vis-à-vis le tiers (en l’occurrence lawrence) suivant laquelle elle recevrait un bien, mais cette at- tente ne s’est pas réalisée en raison d’une insolvabilité qui empêche l’indemnisation complète du dommage causé par la rupture de contrat. les enseignements que nous tirons de l’arrêt lac minerals sont résumés par les remarques du professeur mcinnes sur l’octroi du bien attendu : the plaintiff is entitled to demand receipt of a benefit which, as a matter of legal certainty, would have been obtained from a third party, but for the defendant’s inter- vention. the situation will be much different, however, if relief is available merely because the defendant realized a gain through the non- wrongful exploitation of an earning opportunity. [emphasis added.] [traduction] le demandeur a le droit d’exiger la récep- tion d’un avantage qui, sous l’angle de la sécurité juri- dique, aurait été obtenu d’un tiers, n’eût été l’intervention du défendeur. la situation est cependant très différente s’il est possible d’accorder réparation simplement parce que le défendeur a réalisé un gain en profitant d’une occasion sans commettre d’acte répréhensible. [nous soulignons.] (m. mcinnes, the canadian law of unjust enrich‑ ment and restitution (2014), at p. 179) (m. mcinnes, the canadian law of unjust enrich‑ ment and restitution (2014), p. 179) to allow plaintiffs to wield contractual expectations against innocent third parties risks “drift[ing] danger- ously away from reversing unjustified transfers and toward stripping non- wrongful profits” (mcinnes, at p 183). si l’on permet aux demandeurs d’imposer des at- tentes contractuelles à des tiers innocents, on risque de « passer dangereusement de l’annulation de trans- ferts injustifiés au dépouillement de profits non ré- préhensibles » (mcinnes, p 183). [105] michelle has raised a number of so- called “disappointed beneficiary” cases in support of her claim. while many of these involved such indirect claims for unjust enrichment, none support using unjust enrichment to indirectly enforce a failed con- tractual expectation to receive policy proceeds. in many of these cases, the insured was alleged to have intended to redesignate the beneficiary but failed to do so before they died (see, eg,. love v. love, 2013 skca 31, 359 dlr (4th) 504, at para. 10; holowa [105] michelle a évoqué plusieurs cas dits de « bé- néficiaires déçus » à l’appui de son recours. même si bon nombre de ces cas concernaient de tels recours in- directs pour enrichissement sans cause, aucun d’entre eux ne justifie d’utiliser le principe de l’enrichisse- ment sans cause pour exécuter indirectement une at- tente contractuelle non réalisée dans le but de toucher le produit d’une police. dans un grand nombre de ces cas, on a prétendu que l’assuré comptait désigner un nouveau bénéficiaire, mais qu’il ne l’avait pas fait 354 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. estate v. stell‑ holowa, 2011 abqb 23, 330 dlr. (4th) 693, at para. 14; richardson (estate trustee of) v. mew, 2009 onca 403, 96 or (3d) 65, at para. 18; roberts v. martindale (1998), 55 bclr. (3d) 63 (ca), at para 17). where courts have made awards for unjust enrichment, it has been where the defendant renounced their right to any benefit (holowa, at paras. 23 and 25; roberts, at para 26). in our view, the defendant’s renunciation of rights to the proceeds render these cases distinguishable and of little assistance. [106] more germane to this appeal are cases where the insured redesignated the beneficiary in breach of an equitable or legal obligation (see, eg,. milne estate v. milne, 2014 bcsc 2112, 54 rfl (7th) 328, at para. 3; ladner v. wolfson, 2011 bcca 370, 24 bclr (5th) 43, at para. 3; schorlemer estate v. schorlemer (2006), 29 etr (3d) 181 (ont. scj), at para. 5; steeves v. steeves (1995), 168 nbr (2d) 226 (qb), at para. 29; gregory v. gregory (1994), 92 bclr (2d) 133 (ca);. shannon v. shannon (1985), 50 or (2d) 456 (hc)). in these cases, courts have generally awarded the proceeds where the insured was found to have been bound by an eq- uitable obligation or where the insured’s rights were otherwise held in trust for the plaintiff’s benefit. for instance, in schorlemer the insured had designated the defendant as the beneficiary in breach of a writ- ten separation agreement, and the ontario superior court of justice found that the insured’s rights were held in trust for the plaintiff. similarly, in gregory, milne and steeves, where the insured redesignated the beneficiary in breach of a court order, the court order was found to have imposed a trusteeship on the insured for the benefit of the plaintiff. shannon did involve a broken contractual agreement; however, as we detail below, we understand mckinlay j.’s reasons as most consistent with having found that the written separation agreement itself created a trust. regardless, the serious issues with enforcing con- tractual rights through unjust enrichment were not given consideration in shannon. avant de mourir (voir, p ex,. love c. love, 2013 skca 31, 359 dlr (4th) 504, par. 10; holowa estate c. stell‑ holowa, 2011 abqb 23, 330 dlr (4th) 693, par. 14; richardson (estate trustee of) c. mew, 2009 onca 403, 96 or (3d) 65, par. 18; roberts c. martindale (1998), 55 bclr (3d) 63 (ca), par 17). les tribunaux ont accordé des réparations pour enrichissement sans cause lorsque le défendeur avait renoncé à son droit à quelque avantage que ce soit (holowa, par. 23 et 25; roberts, par 26). nous estimons qu’il convient de distinguer ces cas où le défendeur a renoncé à son droit au produit et qu’ils sont par conséquent peu utiles. [106] les cas qui s’apparentent davantage au pré- sent pourvoi sont ceux où l’assuré a changé de béné- ficiaire en contravention d’une obligation en equity ou en common law (voir, p ex,. milne estate c. milne, 2014 bcsc 2112, 54 rfl (7th) 328, par. 3; lad‑ ner c. wolfson, 2011 bcca 370, 24 bclr (5th) 43, par. 3; schorlemer estate c. schorlemer (2006), 29 etr (3d) 181 (csj. ont.), par. 5; steeves c. steeves (1995), 168 nbr (2d) 226 (br), par. 29; gregory c. gregory (1994), 92 bclr (2d) 133 (ca);. shannon c. shannon (1985), 50 or (2d) 456 (hc)). dans ces affaires, les tribunaux ont générale- ment accordé le produit lorsqu’ils ont conclu que l’as- suré était lié par une obligation en equity ou lorsque les droits de l’assuré étaient par ailleurs détenus en fiducie au profit du demandeur. par exemple, dans schorlemer, l’assuré avait désigné la défenderesse à titre de bénéficiaire en contravention d’un accord écrit de séparation, et la cour supérieure de justice de l’ontario a conclu que les droits de l’assuré étaient détenus en fiducie au profit de la demanderesse. de même, dans gregory, milne et steeves, des affaires où l’assuré a changé de bénéficiaire en violation d’une ordonnance judiciaire, on a jugé que celle-ci avait imposé une mise en tutelle à l’assuré au profit de la demanderesse. l’affaire shannon portait bel et bien sur un accord contractuel rompu; par contre, comme nous l’expliquons en détail ci- dessous, les motifs de la juge mckinlay nous semblent plutôt compatibles avec la conclusion selon laquelle l’accord écrit de séparation a créé en soi une fiducie. quoi qu’il en soit, les questions sérieuses que pose l’exercice de droits contractuels par la voie de l’enrichissement sans cause n’ont pas été prises en compte dans shannon. [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 355 [107] as such, the present appeal presents this court with difficult questions about both the nature of how a transfer of wealth is measured in unjust enrichment and how such claims should be treated in the juristic reason analysis. to be clear, we do not wish to make any general statements regarding so- called “leap- frogging” cases. but in applying the facts of this case, as pled and proven, to the current law of unjust enrichment, we remain unconvinced that michelle is entitled to a constructive trust for the whole of the proceeds. [107] ainsi, notre cour est appelée en l’espèce à trancher des questions épineuses à propos de la façon dont un transfert de richesse est mesuré en matière d’enrichissement sans cause et du traitement qu’il convient de réserver aux réclamations qui en découlent dans l’analyse du motif juridique. soyons clairs, nous ne voulons faire aucune remarque générale au sujet des affaires dites d’« esquive ». mais lorsqu’on applique les faits plaidés et établis de l’espèce au droit actuel de l’enrichissement sans cause, nous ne pouvons nous convaincre que michelle a droit à l’imposition d’une fiducie par interprétation sur l’ensemble du produit. b corresponding deprivation b appauvrissement correspondant [108] in an action for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show that they suffered a corresponding dep- rivation. to establish a corresponding deprivation, there must be a transfer of wealth on a straightfor- ward economic basis (garland v. consumers’ gas co., 2004 scc 25, [2004] 1 scr 629, at para. 35; peter v. beblow, [1993] 1 scr 980, at p 990). while the clearest examples of such transfers are where there is payment and receipt of money (eg. garland, air canada), it can also be made out to the extent of the plaintiff’s expenditure for the de- fendant’s benefit (eg. peter) or where the defendant has received property destined for the plaintiff but for their wrongdoing (eg. lac minerals). in these types of cases, the issue of correspondence may pass without comment, but the importance of this structure must be kept firmly in mind when examin- ing other cases where the nexus between the plain- tiff and defendant is less obvious. whatever factual matrix gives rise to an apparent transfer of wealth from the plaintiff to the defendant, it is crucial that a defendant’s enrichment in fact corresponds to the plaintiff’s deprivation. as explained by this court in professional institute of the public service of canada v. canada (attorney general), 2012 scc 71, [2012] 3 scr 660, “the enrichment and detri- ment elements are the same thing from different per- spectives” (para 151). enrichment and deprivation are “essentially two sides of the same coin” (peter, at p 1012). [108] dans une action pour enrichissement sans cause, le demandeur doit prouver qu’il a subi un ap- pauvrissement correspondant. cette démonstration requiert un transfert de richesse selon une analyse économique simple (garland c. consumers’ gas co., 2004 csc 25, [2004] 1 rcs 629, par. 35; peter c. beblow, [1993] 1 rcs 980, p 990). bien que les exemples les plus patents de transferts de ce genre se produisent dans les cas où il y a paiement et réception d’une somme d’argent (comme dans garland et air canada), l’appauvrissement correspondant peut être établi dans la mesure où le demandeur a engagé une dépense au profit du défendeur (comme dans peter) ou lorsque le défendeur a reçu un bien destiné au demandeur mais dans le but de commettre un délit (comme dans lac minerals). dans ce type d’affaire, la question de la correspondance peut se passer de commentaire, mais il faut bien garder en tête l’impor- tance de ce cadre au moment d’examiner d’autres cas où le lien entre le demandeur et le défendeur est moins évident. quel que soit le contexte factuel à l’origine d’un transfert apparent de richesse du demandeur au défendeur, il est crucial que l’enrichissement du défendeur corresponde dans les faits à l’appauvrisse- ment du demandeur. comme l’explique notre cour dans institut professionnel de la fonction publique du canada c. canada (procureur général), 2012 csc 71, [2012] 3 rcs 660, « les éléments d’enri- chissement et d’appauvrissement rendent compte du même phénomène, mais sous des angles différents » (par 151). l’enrichissement et l’appauvrissement sont « essentiellement comme les deux côtés d’une pièce de monnaie » (peter, p 1012). 356 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. [109] the importance of the bilateral nature of un- just enrichment is highlighted by the fact that, unlike for many other causes of action, unjust enrichment will permit a plaintiff to recover from a defendant without any wrongdoing on the latter’s part. for example, a defendant will be liable to return to the plaintiff any payments made to them by mistake. where liability attaches to the defendant without any wrongdoing, the normative basis for such liability is strictly limited. as professor smith explains: strict liability in unjust enrichment depends on both a material gain to the defendant and a material loss to the plaintiff. moreover, the loss and the gain must be two sides of the same coin; there must always be a transfer of wealth from plaintiff to defendant. only in this way can we justify liability through a one- sided normative flaw in the transaction   . mere causal connection between plaintiff and defendant is not enough — any more than it is in negligence — because it does not carry enough normative force. [109] l’importance que revêt le caractère bilatéral de l’enrichissement sans cause ressort du fait que, contrairement à bien d’autres causes d’action, l’en- richissement sans cause permet au demandeur de recouvrer quelque chose du défendeur sans que ce dernier n’ait commis quelque faute que ce soit. par exemple, le défendeur doit restituer au demandeur tout paiement qui lui a été versé par erreur. lorsque la responsabilité du défendeur est engagée en l’ab- sence d’une faute de sa part, le fondement normatif de cette responsabilité est strictement limité. comme l’explique le professeur smith : [traduction] la responsabilité stricte en matière d’enri- chissement sans cause dépend à la fois d’un gain matériel du défendeur et d’une perte matérielle du demandeur. en outre, la perte et le gain doivent être deux côtés de la même médaille; il doit toujours y avoir un transfert de richesse du demandeur au défendeur. ce n’est qu’ainsi que nous pouvons justifier la responsabilité au moyen d’une faille normative chez une partie à l’opération. [  ]. un simple lien de causalité entre le demandeur et le défendeur ne suffit pas, pas plus que dans une action pour négligence, car il n’a pas une force normative suffisante. (“restitution: the heart of corrective justice” (2001), 79 tex. l. rev. 2115, at p. 2156) (« restitution : the heart of corrective justice » (2001), 79 tex. l. rev. 2115, p. 2156) the correspondence between the deprivation and the enrichment, while seemingly formalistic, is funda- mental. proper correspondence, professor mcinnes notes, “is th[e] connection between the parties — a plus and a minus as obverse manifestations of the same event — that uniquely identifies the plaintiff as the proper person to seek restitution” (p 149). bien que formaliste en apparence, la correspondance entre l’appauvrissement et l’enrichissement est fon- damentale. selon le professeur mcinnes, une corres- pondance appropriée [traduction] « s’entend du lien entre les parties — un plus et un moins en tant que manifestations contraires du même fait — qui identifie seulement le demandeur comme la personne pouvant réclamer la restitution » (p 149). [110] the logic that permits recovery in the cir- cumstances of unjust enrichment also conditions the measurement of any restitution. the defendant cannot be required to “return” to the plaintiff more than what they have received, even if the plaintiff suffered a loss greater than the defendant’s gain. as an innocent party, there is no basis to require the defendant to return anything more. inversely, the plaintiff cannot collect more from the defendant than they have lost. it does not matter that the defendant benefited more than the plaintiff lost. the plain- tiff only has standing in respect of losses they have [110] la logique qui permet le recouvrement dans un cas d’enrichissement sans cause dicte aussi l’am- pleur de toute restitution. le défendeur ne peut être tenu de « restituer » au demandeur davantage que ce qu’il a reçu même si le demandeur a subi une perte plus grande que le gain du défendeur. il n’y a aucune raison d’obliger le défendeur, une partie innocente, à restituer quoi que ce soit de plus. inversement, le demandeur ne peut pas recouvrer du défendeur plus que ce qu’il a perdu. il importe peu que le gain du défendeur excède la perte du demandeur. ce dernier n’a qualité que pour se faire indemniser des pertes [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 357 suffered. liability for unjust enrichment is limited to “the lesser of the two amounts, the enrichment or the impoverishment” (cie immobilière viger ltée v. lauréat giguère inc., [1977] 2 scr 67, at p. 77, cited in mciness, at p 183). qu’il a subies. la responsabilité pour enrichisse- ment sans cause se limite à « la moindre des deux sommes, l’enrichissement ou l’appauvrissement » (cie immobilière viger ltée c. lauréat giguère inc., [1977] 2 rcs 67, p. 77, cité dans mciness, p 183). [111] it is sufficiently clear that but for michelle’s payments, the policy would have lapsed, and but for lawrence’s breach of contract, she would have been the beneficiary at the time of his death. but, in our view, these facts are not enough to establish that the deprivation and the enrichment are corresponding. risa’s enrichment was not at the expense of michelle. this is best illustrated by a hypothetical: suppose that lawrence’s estate was solvent. in that case, risa would have retained her enrichment — the insurance proceeds — and michelle would have suffered no deprivation, as she would hold a cause of action for breach of contract that is worth the equivalent of the proceeds. how can there then be correspondence if the enrichment and the deprivation could, in theory, co- exist? risa’s enrichment is not at the expense of michelle because risa’s enrichment is not dependent on michelle’s deprivation. what risa received (a statutory entitlement to proceeds) is different from michelle’s deprivation (the inability to enforce her contractual rights) — they are not “two sides of the same coin”. it is not enough for michelle’s impov- erishment to be equal to risa’s gain — they must be “necessarily equal” such that it is a “zero- sum game” (l. d. smith, “three- party restitution: a critique of birks’s theory of interceptive subtraction” (1991), 11 oxford j. leg. stud. 481, at pp. 482-83 (emphasis added)). [111] il est suffisamment clair que, n’eût été les paiements de michelle, la police d’assurance se se- rait éteinte et que, n’eût été la rupture de contrat de lawrence, elle aurait été la bénéficiaire au moment de son décès. nous estimons cependant que ces faits ne suffisent pas à établir que l’appauvrissement et l’enrichissement correspondent. risa ne s’est pas enrichie aux dépens de michelle. une hypothèse l’illustre fort bien : supposons que la succession de lawrence était solvable. dans ce cas, risa aurait conservé son enrichissement — le produit de l’assu- rance — et michelle n’aurait subi aucun appauvris- sement, car elle détiendrait alors une cause d’action pour rupture de contrat dont la valeur équivaut à celle du produit. comment peut-il alors y avoir corres- pondance si l’enrichissement et l’appauvrissement peuvent coexister en théorie? risa ne s’enrichit pas aux dépens de michelle parce que son enrichissement n’est pas tributaire de l’appauvrissement de cette der- nière. ce que risa a reçu (un droit reconnu par la loi au produit) diffère de l’appauvrissement de michelle (l’incapacité d’exercer ses droits contractuels); ce ne sont pas « deux côtés de la même médaille ». il ne suffit pas que l’appauvrissement de michelle équivaille au gain de risa; ils doivent être [tra- duction] « forcément égaux », de sorte qu’il s’agit d’un « jeu à somme nulle » (l d smith, « three- party restitution : a critique of birks’s theory of interceptive subtraction » (1991), 11 oxford j. leg. stud. 481, p. 482- 483 (nous soulignons)). [112] in this regard, we note that the majority seeks to establish a correspondence between risa’s en- richment and michelle’s deprivation on the basis that michelle’s contributions to the premium pay- ments kept the policy alive. but the fact that michelle preserved the policy does not inform whether her deprivation corresponds to risa’s enrichment. and even if michelle’s premium payments could generate sufficient correspondence, michelle’s deprivation should be limited to the extent of her contributions, not to her contractual expectations. her deprivation [112] à cet égard, nous constatons que les juges majoritaires cherchent à établir une correspondance entre l’enrichissement de risa et l’appauvrissement de michelle au motif que les contributions de michelle aux paiements de prime ont gardé la police en vigueur. le fait que michelle a préservé la police n’indique toutefois pas si son appauvrissement correspond à l’enrichissement de risa. et même si les paiements de prime versés par michelle pouvaient donner lieu à une correspondance suffisante, son appauvrissement de- vrait se limiter au montant de ses contributions, et non 358 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. is not measured by the value of the agreement that motivated her to pay the premiums. this princi- ple is illustrated in this court’s decision in pacific national investments ltd. v. victoria (city), 2004 scc 75, [2004] 3 scr 575. in that case, the ap- pellant sought to uphold an unjust enrichment claim against the city of victoria for improvements it had made to public works pursuant to an agreement with the latter. the respondent city rezoned the appellant’s development mid- project, which, the appellant ar- gued, undermined the reason for having made the improvements. the fact that the appellant performed the work as a result of an agreement did not change the measure of the appellant’s deprivation. the ap- pellant’s measure of restitution was not its expected profits under the agreement but rather only the cost of performing the work, which was effectively given gratuitously to the respondent. as such, even on the majority’s understanding of correspondence, michelle’s claim should be limited to the return of the premium payments. à ses attentes contractuelles. son appauvrissement ne se mesure pas en fonction de la valeur de l’entente qui l’a incitée à payer les primes. ce principe se dégage de l’arrêt pacific national investments ltd. c. victoria (ville), 2004 csc 75, [2004] 3 rcs 575. dans cette affaire, l’appelante avait cherché à faire maintenir une action pour enrichissement sans cause intentée contre la ville de victoria pour des améliorations qu’elle avait apportées à des ouvrages publics conformément à un accord conclu avec cette dernière. la ville intimée avait modifié le zonage du projet de l’appelante à mi- parcours des travaux, ce qui, soutenait l’appe- lante, avait sapé la raison d’être des améliorations. le fait que l’appelante avait exécuté les travaux en application de leur accord n’a pas changé la portée de l’appauvrissement qu’elle a subi. la restitution à laquelle a eu droit l’appelante équivalait non pas aux profits qu’elle prévoyait réaliser grâce à l’accord, mais uniquement au coût de l’exécution des travaux qui avaient effectivement été réalisés gratuitement pour le compte de l’intimée. par conséquent, même d’après la conception qu’ont les juges majoritaires de la correspondance, michelle ne devrait avoir droit qu’au remboursement des paiements de prime. [113] on our view of the matter, michelle has not established a corresponding deprivation between risa’s entitlement to the policy proceeds and her failed contractual expectation to be named benefi- ciary. as risa has admitted liability for the approxi- mately $7,000 in policy premiums, there is no need for us to consider whether michelle would have been able to properly establish a corresponding depriva- tion for that amount. [113] selon nous, michelle n’a pas établi un ap- pauvrissement corrélatif entre le droit de risa au produit de la police et son attente contractuelle non réalisée suivant laquelle elle serait nommée béné- ficiaire. puisque risa a admis sa responsabilité à l’égard des quelques 7 000 $ payés en primes d’assu- rance, nous n’avons pas à nous demander si michelle aurait été en mesure d’établir convenablement un appauvrissement correspondant de ce montant. c juristic reason c motif juridique [114] even if a corresponding deprivation is as- sumed, we do not come to the conclusion that risa was unjustly enriched at michelle’s expense. this is because there is a juristic reason for risa’s enrich- ment: the provisions of the insurance act. [114] même si l’on tient pour acquise l’existence d’un appauvrissement correspondant, nous ne pou- vons conclure que risa s’est enrichie sans cause aux dépens de michelle. il en est ainsi parce qu’un motif juridique justifie l’enrichissement de risa : les dispositions de la loi sur les assurances. in garland, this court made a choice as to [115] the threshold for when a transfer of wealth should be reversed. prior to garland, canadian courts had either followed this court’s direction in rathwell v. [115] dans garland, notre cour a fixé le critère indiquant dans quelles circonstances il y a lieu d’an- nuler un transfert de richesse. avant cet arrêt, les tribunaux canadiens avaient soit suivi les directives [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 359 rathwell, [1978] 2 scr 436, which prescribed a juristic reasons approach, or they applied the english approach, searching for an unjust factor to reverse an impugned transfer of wealth (garland, at pa- ras 40-41). faced with this division, iacobucci j. affirmed the “distinctive canadian approach” to ju- ristic unjust enrichment (para 42). along with his clear preference for the juristic reason approach, iacobucci j. was responsive to the criticisms of it. recognizing the difficulty of proving a negative — the absence of any juristic reason for a defendant’s enrichment — iacobucci j. formulated a two- stage approach to juristic reasons. at the first stage of the analysis, the plaintiff must show the absence of a juristic reason from a closed list of established categories. these include a disposition of law and a statutory obligation, among others. if the plaintiff establishes that there is no juristic reason from one of the established categories, there is a prima facie case for restitution. at the second stage of the anal- ysis, the defendant may rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating that there is some other reason to deny recovery. while courts should look to “all of the circumstances of the transaction” in order to determine whether recovery should be denied, they are to have regard to two factors: “   the reasonable expectations of the parties and public policy consid- erations” (paras 45-46). données par notre cour dans rathwell c. rathwell, [1978] 2 rcs 436, qui suggérait une approche axée sur le motif juridique, soit adopté l’approche anglaise, qui consistait à chercher un élément « sans cause » pour annuler un transfert de richesse contesté (garland, par 40-41). en présence de cette diver- gence d’opinions, le juge iacobucci a confirmé la « façon proprement canadienne d’interpréter » le motif juridique en matière d’enrichissement sans cause (par 42). en plus d’afficher clairement une préférence pour la conception du motif juridique, le juge iacobucci a répondu aux critiques dont elle est l’objet. reconnaissant qu’il est difficile de prouver un fait négatif — l’absence de motif juridique jus- tifiant l’enrichissement d’un défendeur —, le juge iacobucci a formulé une analyse en deux temps des motifs juridiques. au premier stade de l’analyse, le demandeur doit prouver l’absence de motif juri- dique à partir d’une liste exhaustive de catégories établies, notamment une disposition législative et une obligation légale. si le demandeur établit qu’il n’y a aucun motif juridique appartenant à l’une de ces catégories, il aura démontré qu’à première vue, la chose en litige doit lui être restituée. au second stade de l’analyse, le défendeur peut réfuter la preuve prima facie en démontrant qu’il existe un autre motif de refuser le recouvrement. même s’ils devraient examiner « toutes les circonstances de l’opération » afin de décider s’il convient de refuser le recouvre- ment, les tribunaux doivent tenir compte de deux facteurs : «    les attentes raisonnables des parties et les considérations d’intérêt public » (par 45-46). [116] while the test is intended to be flexible and have the capacity to accommodate “changing per- ceptions of justice” (garland, at para. 43; peel (re‑ gional municipality) v. canada, [1992] 3 scr 762, at p. 788), it must be borne in mind that what prompted this articulation of the test was the need “to ensure that the juristic reason analysis was not ‘purely sub- jective’, thereby building into the unjust enrichment analysis an unacceptable ‘immeasureable judicial dis- cretion’ that would permit ‘case by case “palm tree” justice’” (kerr v. baranow, 2011 scc 10, [2011] 1 scr 269, at para. 43, citing garland, at para 40). as such, the reasonable expectations of the parties and public policy considerations must only be taken into account at the second stage of the analysis, provided [116] bien que le test se veuille souple et suscep- tible de tenir compte des « perceptions changeantes de la justice » (garland, par. 43, peel (municipalité régionale) c. canada, [1992] 3 rcs 762, p. 788), il importe de se rappeler que ce qui était à l’origine de cette formulation du test, c’était le besoin « d’éviter que l’analyse du motif juridique soit “purement sub- jecti[ve]”, ajoutant à l’analyse de l’enrichissement injustifié un “pouvoir discrétionnaire incommen- surable” inacceptable qui allait permettre le “cas par cas” » (kerr c. baranow, 2011 csc 10, [2011] 1 rcs 269, par. 43, citant garland, par 40). les attentes raisonnables des parties et les considéra- tions d’intérêt public ne doivent donc être prises en compte qu’au second stade de l’analyse, pourvu que 360 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. that no established juristic reason is found (kerr, at paras 44-45). simply put, if an established category of juristic reason applies, the analysis ends and the claim for unjust enrichment fails. reasonable expectations and public policy cannot oust an established category of juristic reason where it is found to apply. [117] the unique circumstances of michelle’s res- titutionary claim — being an indirect claim involving third parties — demands a sharper examination of the object of the juristic reason. that is, a juristic rea- son for what? the majority suggests at various points that a juristic reason must simultaneously provide a reason for the defendant’s enrichment, and a reason why that enrichment must occur at the expense of the plaintiff. it is this approach that appears to lead the majority to place great weight on the distinction between the receipt and retention of a benefit. we remain unconvinced this is a helpful tack to take. rather, we would simply say that a juristic reason need only provide reason for the defendant’s enrich- ment, as has been consistently stated in past jurispru- dence (kerr, at para. 32; garland, at para. 30; soulos v. korkontzilas, [1997] 2 scr 217, at para. 66; pettkus v. becker, [1980] 2 scr 834, at p 848). [118] one can readily see how this important as- pect of juristic reason can be easily overlooked and has been largely unaddressed. in the paradigmatic cases of unjust enrichment where only two parties are involved, and a transfer is made directly between them, the questions of enrichment and impoverish- ment may be one and the same. for example, if a transfer occurs by way of a gift from the plaintiff to the defendant, the plaintiff’s donative intent is both a juristic reason for the defendant’s retention of the wealth, and a reason for the defendant’s enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff. after all, it was the plaintiff who intended the gift from their assets. in our view, the fact that in many cases the juristic rea- son for the defendant’s enrichment simultaneously explains why that enrichment occurs at the expense of the plaintiff does not render this a requirement of the test for unjust enrichment. l’on ne constate aucun motif juridique établi (kerr, par 44-45). pour dire les choses simplement, si une catégorie établie de motif juridique s’applique, l’ana- lyse prend fin et l’action fondée sur l’enrichissement sans cause est rejetée. les attentes raisonnables et l’intérêt public ne sauraient écarter une catégorie établie de motif juridique lorsqu’on conclut à son application. [117] les circonstances propres à la demande de restitution de michelle, une demande visant indirecte- ment des tiers, exige une étude plus poussée de l’objet du motif juridique. c’est-à-dire, un motif juridique justifiant quoi? les juges majoritaires laissent en- tendre à divers endroits qu’un motif juridique doit à la fois justifier l’enrichissement du défendeur et indiquer pourquoi cet enrichissement doit se faire aux dépens du demandeur. c’est cette approche qui semble avoir mené les juges majoritaires à attacher une grande importance à la distinction entre la réception et la conservation d’un avantage. nous ne pouvons nous convaincre de l’utilité d’entreprendre cette tâche. nous estimons plutôt suffisant de dire qu’un motif juridique doit uniquement justifier l’enrichissement du défendeur, comme cela a été constamment repris dans la jurisprudence (kerr, par. 32; garland, par. 30; soulos c. korkontzilas, [1997] 2 rcs 217, par. 66; pettkus c. becker, [1980] 2 rcs 834, p 848). [118] l’on peut aisément comprendre pourquoi cet aspect important du motif juridique peut être facilement négligé et laissé pour compte en bonne partie. dans les cas paradigmatiques d’enrichisse- ment sans cause où il y a seulement deux parties et le transfert se fait directement entre elles, les questions d’enrichissement et d’appauvrissement ne font bien souvent qu’une. par exemple, si le transfert prend la forme d’un don du demandeur au défendeur, l’inten- tion de donner du demandeur est à la fois un motif juridique justifiant la conservation de la richesse par le défendeur et un motif justifiant l’enrichissement du défendeur aux dépens du demandeur. après tout, c’est le demandeur qui voulait faire le don à même ses actifs. à notre avis, le fait que, dans bien des cas, le motif juridique justifiant l’enrichissement du dé- fendeur explique aussi pourquoi cet enrichissement se produit au détriment du demandeur n’en fait pas une exigence du test applicable. [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 361 [119] the situation is of course very different where multiple parties are involved and wealth is not transferred directly from one to another. in these cases, despite there being a reason that explains why each person is entitled to a particular thing and why another no longer is, it will be near impossible to find an explanation that can simultaneously capture both. the following example, while not a case of un- just enrichment, is instructive. a person who is given a car could sell it to another, who bears no relation to the original donor. the donor and purchaser are in effect legal strangers. in these situations, demand- ing a reason that simultaneously explains why the purchaser is entitled to the car and why the donor is no longer entitled to it imposes an impossible burden. simply put, the reason the purchaser has the car is not the same reason the donor doesn’t. the legal relationships of these individuals are mediated through other legal frameworks and actors and are not amenable to a single explanation. if the unjust enrichment analysis requires that juristic reasons have this kind of explanatory power, plaintiffs will almost always be successful in proving their absence in cases involving multiple parties and indirect trans- fers of wealth. [119] la situation est évidemment fort différente lorsque plusieurs parties sont concernées et que la richesse n’est pas transférée directement de l’une à l’autre. dans les cas de ce genre, même s’il existe une raison expliquant pourquoi chacun a droit à une chose en particulier et pourquoi une autre personne n’y a plus droit, il sera pratiquement impossible de trouver une explication qui vise les deux scénarios à la fois. bien qu’il ne s’agisse pas d’un cas d’enrichis- sement sans cause, l’exemple qui suit est instructif. la personne qui reçoit une voiture pourrait la vendre à quelqu’un d’autre qui n’a aucun lien avec le do- nateur initial. le donateur et l’acquéreur sont en fait des étrangers aux yeux de la loi. dans ces situations, exiger la présence d’un motif qui explique en même temps pourquoi l’acquéreur a droit à la voiture et pourquoi le donateur n’y a plus droit revient à im- poser un fardeau impossible. pour dire les choses simplement, la raison pour laquelle l’acquéreur a la voiture n’est tout simplement pas la même pour la- quelle le donateur ne l’a pas. les rapports juridiques entre ces personnes s’opèrent par l’intermédiaire d’autres cadres juridiques et acteurs et ne se prêtent pas à une seule explication. si l’analyse de l’enrichis- sement sans cause requiert que les motifs juridiques aient ce genre de pouvoir explicatif, les demandeurs parviendront presque toujours à prouver leur absence dans les cas mettant en cause plusieurs parties et des transferts indirects de richesse. (1) the insurance act establishes a juristic rea- son for risa’s enrichment (1) la loi sur les assurances établit un motif juridique justifiant l’enrichissement de risa [120] in this case, the issue at the first stage of the analysis is whether a beneficiary designation made pursuant to ss. 190(1) and 191(1) of the insurance act provides a juristic reason for risa’s receipt and retention of the insurance proceeds. arriving at an answer to this question requires an examination of the provisions of the insurance act and the legal re- lationships surrounding the (alleged) transfer. in our view, not only does the insurance act — in conjunc- tion with the deceased’s policy — specifically direct the payment of the proceeds to risa, but it expressly contemplates doing so even in light of the very kind of claim advanced by michelle. [120] en l’espèce, la question qui se pose au pre- mier stade de l’analyse est de savoir si une désigna- tion de bénéficiaire faite en vertu des par. 190(1) et 191(1) de la loi sur les assurances fournit un motif juridique permettant à risa de recevoir et de conserver le produit de l’assurance. pour répondre à cette question, il faut examiner les dispositions de la loi sur les assurances et les rapports juridiques entourant le transfert (allégué). à notre avis, non seulement la loi sur les assurances — conjuguée à la police d’assurance du défunt — prescrit expli- citement le versement du produit à risa, mais elle le prévoit expressément malgré le type même de réclamation présenté par michelle. 362 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. [121] section 191(1) of the insurance act provides that an insured may designate an irrevocable ben- eficiary under a life insurance policy, and thereby provide special protections to that beneficiary. from the moment an irrevocable beneficiary is designated, they have a right in the policy itself: the insurance money is not subject to the control of the insured or to the claims of his or her creditors and the ben- eficiary must consent to any subsequent changes to beneficiary designation. as it is undisputed that risa was the validly designated irrevocable beneficiary of the policy, risa is entitled to the proceeds free of all of the claims of lawrence’s creditors. simply put, the direction of this comprehensive statutory scheme, in conjunction with the deceased’s policy, constitutes a juristic reason for risa’s enrichment (chanowski v. bauer, 2010 mbca 96, 258 man. r. (2d) 244; richardson; love). [122] the fact that michelle had an agreement with lawrence for the proceeds of the policy does not undermine the presence of this juristic reason. as michelle’s rights are contractual in nature, she is a creditor of lawrence’s estate and thus, by the provisions of the insurance act, has no claim to the proceeds. indeed, the insurance act explicitly protects irrevocable beneficiaries from the claims of the deceased’s creditors. section 191(1) provides that where an insured designates an irrevocable ben- eficiary, the insurance money “is not subject to the control of the insured, is not subject to the claims of the insured’s creditor and does not form part of the insured’s estate”. thus, contrary to the suggestion of the majority, the insurance act does, with irre- sistible clarity, “preclude the existence of contrac- tual    rights in those insurance proceeds” (majority reasons, at para. 70 (emphasis added)). the french version of s. 191(1) of the act is equally clear stating that the proceeds “ne peuvent être réclamées par les créanciers de l’assuré et ne font pas partie de sa succession”. [121] selon le par. 191(1) de la loi sur les as‑ surances, l’assuré peut désigner un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable dans une police d’assurance- vie et lui accorder ainsi une protection spéciale. à partir du moment où elle est ainsi désignée, la personne en question a un droit sur la police elle- même : le produit de l’assurance n’est pas sous l’emprise de l’assuré ni ne peut être réclamé par ses créanciers et le bénéficiaire doit consentir à tout changement sub- séquent de désignation d’un bénéficiaire. puisqu’il est admis que risa était la bénéficiaire validement désignée à titre irrévocable de la police, elle a droit au produit à l’abri de toutes les réclamations des créanciers de lawrence. en somme, la directive de ce régime légal exhaustif, conjuguée à la police d’as- surance du défunt, constitue un motif juridique justi- fiant l’enrichissement de risa (chanowski c. bauer, 2010 mbca 96, 258 man. r. (2d) 244; richardson; love). [122] le fait que michelle a conclu une entente avec lawrence en vue de toucher le produit de la police ne compromet pas l’existence de ce motif juridique. comme les droits de michelle sont de nature contractuelle, cela fait d’elle une créancière de la succession de lawrence et elle n’a donc pas droit au produit suivant la loi sur les assurances. en effet, la loi sur les assurances met explicitement les bénéficiaires irrévocables à l’abri des réclamations des créanciers du défunt. la version anglaise du par. 191(1) dispose que, quand l’assuré désigne un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable, le produit de l’assu- rance « is not subject to the control of the insured, is not subject to the claims of the insured’s creditor and does not form part of the insured’s estate ». donc, contrairement à ce que suggèrent les juges majoritaires, la loi sur les assurances « exclu[t] l’existence de droits contractuels [  ] [au] produit d’assurance » avec une clarté incontestable (motifs de la majorité, par. 70 (nous soulignons). la version française du par. 191(1) de la loi est tout aussi claire, indiquant que les sommes assurées « ne peuvent être réclamées par les créanciers de l’assuré et ne font pas partie de sa succession ». [123] the insurance act’s legislative history fur- ther supports risa’s retention of the insurance pro- ceeds notwithstanding michelle’s claim. this history [123] l’historique de la loi sur les assurances étaye lui aussi le droit de risa de conserver le produit de l’assurance malgré la réclamation de michelle. [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 363 illustrates that the provisions of the insurance act were designed to protect the interests of beneficiaries in retaining the proceeds, and provide no basis what- soever for a person paying the premiums to assume she would have any claim to the eventual proceeds. from the earliest days, the purpose of insurance statutes was in large part to securely provide for an insured’s beneficiaries. in 1865, the then province of canada (which included what is now ontario) passed legislation enabling any person to enter into a contract to insure his life for the benefit of his wife and children, with the proceeds free from the claims of any of their creditors (an act to secure to wives and children the benefit of assurances on the lives of their husbands and parents, s. prov. c. 1865, 29 vict., c. 17, ss. 3 and 5). subsequently in 1884, as outlined in risa’s factum, “the legislation permitted a class of beneficiaries who were close family mem- bers of the insured (later known as ‘preferred bene- ficiaries’) to enforce the contract and to sue in their own right. this was effected by means of a statutory trust in favour of the preferred beneficiaries” (rf, at para. 73; see also an act to secure to wives and children the benefit of life insurance, so 1884, c. 20, s. 5; e h. mcvitty, a commentary on the life insurance laws of canada (1962), at p 36). subsequent versions of the insurance statutes in the province also provided protection to “beneficiaries for value”, people who gave valuable consideration to the insured in exchange for designation as the beneficiary (the insurance act, rso 1960, c 190). however, even under this regime, beneficiaries for value were only protected if a written description of the designation had been made (ss. 164(1) and 165). cet historique révèle que les dispositions de la loi sur les assurances visaient à protéger le droit des bé- néficiaires de conserver le produit et ne permettaient aucunement au payeur des primes de supposer qu’il aurait droit à l’éventuel produit. au tout début, les lois sur les assurances visaient en grande partie à s’assurer que le produit serve à subvenir aux besoins des bénéficiaires d’un assuré. en 1865, ce qui était à l’époque la province du canada (laquelle englobait ce qui est aujourd’hui l’ontario) a adopté une loi permettant à toute personne de conclure un contrat pour assurer sa vie au bénéfice de sa femme et de ses enfants et mettre le produit à l’abri des réclamations de tous ses créanciers (acte pour assurer aux femmes et aux enfants le bénéfice des assurances sur la vie de leurs maris et parents, s. prov. c. 1865, 29 vict., c. 17, art. 3 et 5). plus tard, en 1884, comme le sou- ligne le mémoire de risa, [traduction] « la loi a permis à un groupe de bénéficiaires qui étaient des proches parents de l’assuré (appelés subséquemment les “bénéficiaires privilégiés”) d’obtenir l’exécution du contrat et d’ester en justice en leur nom. elle l’a fait au moyen d’une fiducie légale en faveur des béné- ficiaires privilégiés » (mi, par. 73; voir aussi an act to secure to wives and children the benefit of life insurance, so 1884, c. 20, art. 5; e. h. mcvitty, a commentary on the life insurance laws of canada (1962), p 36). les versions subséquentes des lois de la province sur les assurances offraient également une protection aux « bénéficiaires à titre onéreux », soit des gens qui donnaient une contrepartie à l’as- suré en échange de leur désignation en qualité de bé- néficiaires (the insurance act, rso 1960, c 190). cependant, même sous ce régime, les bénéficiaires à titre onéreux n’étaient protégés que si une description écrite de la désignation avait été faite (par. 164(1) et art 165). in 1962, significant principled changes were [124] made to the insurance act, including the abolition of statutory trusts and beneficiaries for value (mcvitty, at pp. 36-39 and 137-38). rather than protect bene- ficiaries’ interests by means of a statutory trust, the modern insurance act provided revocable benefi- ciaries with a statutory cause of action to enforce insurance contracts for their own benefit against the insurer (insurance act, s 195). the modern insur‑ ance act also “shifted the regime away from granting [124] en 1962, de grands changements de prin- cipe ont été apportés à la insurance act, notamment l’abolition des fiducies légales et du statut de bénéfi- ciaire à titre onéreux (mcvitty, p. 36-39 et 137- 138). au lieu de défendre les intérêts des bénéficiaires au moyen d’une fiducie légale, la insurance act mo- derne reconnaissait aux bénéficiaires révocables une cause d’action leur permettant de faire exécuter à leur profit des contrats d’assurance contre l’assureur (insurance act, art 195). la insurance act moderne 364 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. beneficiaries any control or proprietary interests in the proceeds. the sole exceptions were those bene- ficiaries validly designated by the insured as irrev- ocable beneficiaries — a status newly introduced in 1962 — and valid assignees” (rf, at para 75). these changes to the insurance scheme in ontario represent the legislature’s continued intention to pro- tect beneficiaries from the claims of the insured’s creditors, and to underline that a beneficiary’s entitle- ment to the proceeds is not undermined by her status as a “mere volunteer”. a beneficiary is not more or less entitled on the basis of her contribution to the policy’s premiums. the insurance act is deliberately indifferent to the source of the premium payments, and renders the actions of the payers irrelevant as far as the beneficiaries are concerned. [125] of course, beneficiaries who pay the premi- ums are not left completely vulnerable by the act. these beneficiaries — like any beneficiary — can secure their priority over the insurance proceeds by requesting either designation as the irrevocable bene- ficiary of a policy, or requesting an assignment of the policy. this allows a promisee to protect themselves from the risk of contractual breach. absent these steps, there are no guarantees for beneficiaries who pay premiums: the insurance act is explicitly and deliberately indifferent to the source of the premium payments. a également [traduction] « modifié le régime de manière à enlever aux bénéficiaires tout contrôle ou intérêt propriétal sur le produit. les seules excep- tions étaient les bénéficiaires valablement désignés par l’assuré à titre irrévocable — un statut créé en 1962 — et les cessionnaires en règle » (mi, par 75). ces changements au régime d’assurance ontarien témoignent de l’intention continue de la législature de mettre les bénéficiaires à l’abri des réclamations des créanciers de l’assuré et de souligner que le droit du bénéficiaire au produit n’est pas compromis par son statut de « simple volontaire ». un bénéficiaire n’a pas plus ou moins droit au produit du fait de sa contribution aux primes de la police d’assurance. la loi sur les assurances fait délibérément abstraction de la source des paiements de prime et fait perdre toute pertinence aux gestes des payeurs en ce qui concerne les bénéficiaires. [125] bien entendu, les bénéficiaires qui paient les primes ne sont pas laissés sans protection au- cune par la loi. ces bénéficiaires — comme tout autre bénéficiaire — peuvent avoir priorité sur le produit de l’assurance en demandant d’être désignés bénéficiaires d’une police à titre irrévocable ou en requérant la cession de la police. cela permet au destinataire d’une promesse de se protéger contre le risque d’inexécution de contrat. faute de telles me- sures, il n’y a aucune garantie pour les bénéficiaires qui paient des primes : la loi sur les assurances fait explicitement et délibérément abstraction de la source des paiements de prime. [126] consistent with the scheme, courts have de- clined to order restitution of insurance proceeds where plaintiffs pay the policy premiums under the mis- taken belief that they are the named beneficiary. in richardson, a plaintiff disputed the payment of her husband’s insurance policy proceeds to his former wife, the defendant, who had remained the named beneficiary on the policy. the plaintiff argued that she had paid the premiums of the policy under the mistaken belief that she was in fact the named bene- ficiary, and therefore, that the defendant was unjustly enriched by the retention of the proceeds. the ontario court of appeal upheld the motion judge’s decision denying the plaintiff’s claim in unjust enrichment. the plaintiff’s contribution to the premium payments did [126] conformément au régime, les tribunaux ont refusé d’ordonner la restitution du produit de l’as- surance lorsque le demandeur paie les primes de la police en croyant à tort qu’il a été nommé bénéfi- ciaire. dans richardson, la demanderesse contestait le versement du produit de la police d’assurance contractée par son mari à son ex- femme, la défen- deresse, qui était restée la bénéficiaire désignée de la police. la demanderesse a fait valoir qu’elle avait payé les primes de la police en croyant erronément qu’elle était en fait la bénéficiaire désignée et, donc, que la défenderesse s’était injustement enrichie en conservant le produit. la cour d’appel de l’ontario a confirmé la décision du juge saisi de la requête de rejeter l’action de la demanderesse fondée sur [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 365 not render the defendant’s enrichment unjust. there was a juristic reason for her enrichment: the designa- tion of the defendant as the beneficiary of the policy. [127] if we were to impose on juristic reasons a requirement that they explain simultaneously a defendant’s enrichment and a plaintiff’s loss, it is unclear to us how the insurance act could then ever constitute a juristic reason in a third- party dispute relating to insurance proceeds. if plaintiffs can es- tablish some correspondence in relation to a portion of the proceeds — eg through mistaken premium payments — the insurance act will likely never bar their claim to unjust enrichment. in our view, this is an especially troubling result in respect of the legisla- tive history of the insurance act; it would undermine a deliberate legislative choice to divorce entitlement to the proceeds from the payment of the premiums. [128] on the basis of this view of juristic reason, the majority disagrees that the insurance act con- stitutes a juristic reason in this case. on their view, this is because the insurance act does not explicitly oust the prior contractual claims of third parties to the policy proceeds. they rely on the ontario high court of justice’s decision in shannon, finding that it supports the proposition “that while the insurance act may provide for the beneficiary’s entitlement to payment of the proceeds, it ‘does not specifically pre- clude the existence of rights outside its provisions’”, including contractual entitlements such as michelle’s (majority reasons, at para 72). l’enrichissement sans cause. la contribution de la demanderesse aux paiements de prime n’a pas rendu injustifié l’enrichissement de la défenderesse. un motif juridique justifiait son enrichissement : sa dé- signation à titre de bénéficiaire de la police. [127] si nous devions imposer aux motifs juri- diques l’exigence qu’ils expliquent simultanément l’enrichissement du défendeur et la perte du deman- deur, nous concevons mal comment la loi sur les assurances pourrait alors constituer un motif juri- dique dans quelque litige portant sur le produit d’une assurance et impliquant un tiers. si les demandeurs peuvent établir une correspondance quelconque rela- tivement à une partie du produit — p ex au moyen du versement par erreur de primes —, la loi sur les assurances ne fera probablement jamais obstacle à leur demande fondée sur l’enrichissement sans cause. ce résultat nous paraît particulièrement trou- blant au regard de l’historique de cette loi; il contre- carrerait le choix délibéré du législateur de séparer le droit au produit du paiement des primes. [128] se fondant sur cette conception du motif juridique, les juges majoritaires n’estiment pas que la loi sur les assurances puisse constituer pareil motif en l’espèce. à leur avis, il en est ainsi parce que la loi sur les assurances n’écarte pas explicitement les droits d’action contractuels antérieurs de tiers sur le produit de la police d’assurance. ils se fondent sur la décision de la haute cour de justice de l’ontario dans shannon et concluent qu’elle étaye la proposi- tion « que, même si la loi sur les assurances peut conférer au bénéficiaire le droit au versement du pro- duit de l’assurance, elle [traduction] “n’écarte pas expressément l’existence de droits qui ne relèvent pas de ses dispositions”  », notamment les droits contractuels comme ceux de michelle (motifs de la majorité, par 72). [129] we agree with blair ja, that it is unclear what proposition shannon actually supports. in that case, the plaintiff argued that the provisions of the separation agreement became impressed with a trust, and that the designation of other beneficiaries in breach of that agreement constituted a disposition of trust property. we would note that the only way the designation of another beneficiary could constitute a [129] nous convenons avec le juge blair qu’on ne sait pas avec certitude quelle proposition est ap- puyée par la décision shannon. dans cette affaire, la demanderesse a soutenu qu’une fiducie avait été im- posée sur l’accord de séparation et que la désignation d’autres bénéficiaires en violation de l’accord consti- tuait une aliénation de biens en fiducie. signalons que la désignation d’un autre bénéficiaire ne peut 366 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. disposition of trust property is if the trust arose at the time the agreement was concluded. justice mckinlay explained that it would be unjust for the “plaintiff’s clear rights under an agreement with her husband for good consideration [to] be taken away in favour of a niece and nephew who have given no consideration for those rights” (p 461). she found that the pro- ceeds of the insurance policy were impressed with a trust in favour of the plaintiff. she did not specify whether the trust was intentional (constituted at the time of formation) or constructive (remedial). to the extent the reasons suggest that the designation of beneficiaries according to the insurance act does not constitute a juristic reason because the beneficiaries are mere volunteers, we reject this argument. the very purpose of the insurance act is to distribute the policy proceeds to beneficiaries because of their designation as such, irrespective of their contribution directly to premiums or to the insured. instead, shannon and the jurisprudence that [130] has followed can be understood to support the prop- osition that on the facts of a given case a separation agreement can be found to create either a trust over, or an equitable obligation in, the insurance proceeds. indeed, this is the proposition for which shannon is consistently cited in fraser v fraser (1995), 9 etr (2d) 136, the british columbia supreme court, citing shannon, found that “the covenant to maintain the beneficiary in the separation agreement is tantamount to an irrevocable designation of the beneficiary under the provisions of the insurance act” (para 18). in ontario teachers’ pension plan board v. ontario (superintendent of financial ser‑ vices) (2004), 70 or (3d) 61, the ontario court of appeal found that pre- retirement death benefits in a vested ontario teachers’ pension plan were validly assigned to a former spouse of the plan member under a separation agreement and that “a subsequent spouse who marries after a valid assignment of a pre- retirement death benefit to a former spouse should not reasonably expect to receive the already- assigned interest” (para. 62 (emphasis added)). in snider v. mallon, 2011 onsc 4522, 3 rfl (7th) 228, the ontario superior court, citing shannon, declared that “[i]t is therefore a well settled principle that constituer une aliénation de biens en fiducie que si la fiducie a pris naissance au moment de la conclusion de l’accord. la juge mckinlay a expliqué qu’il serait injuste que les [traduction] « droits clairement accordés à la demanderesse par un accord conclu avec son mari pour une contrepartie valable lui soient enlevés en faveur d’une nièce et d’un neveu qui n’ont donné aucune contrepartie pour ces droits » (p 461). selon elle, une fiducie était imposée en faveur de la demanderesse sur le produit de la police d’assurance. elle n’a pas précisé s’il s’agissait d’une fiducie dé- libérée (constituée au moment de sa création) ou par interprétation (réparatrice). dans la mesure où les motifs laissent entendre que la désignation de bénéficiaires conformément à la loi sur les assu‑ rances ne constitue pas un motif juridique parce que les bénéficiaires sont de simples volontaires, nous rejetons cet argument. l’objet même de cette loi est de remettre le produit de la police aux bénéficiaires en raison de leur désignation à ce titre, sans égard à leur contribution directe aux primes ou à l’assuré. [130] on peut considérer plutôt que shannon et la jurisprudence qui l’a suivie étayent la proposition selon laquelle, au vu des faits d’une affaire donnée, une entente de séparation peut donner naissance soit à une fiducie, soit à une obligation en equity sur le produit de l’assurance. en effet, c’est la proposition à l’appui de laquelle shannon est couramment citée. dans fraser c. fraser (1995), 9 etr (2d) 136, la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique, citant shannon, a conclu que [traduction] « la conven- tion visant à maintenir le bénéficiaire désigné dans l’accord de séparation équivaut à une désignation à titre irrévocable selon les dispositions de la loi sur les assurances » (par 18). dans ontario teachers’ pension plan board c. ontario (superintendent of financial services) (2004), 70 or (3d) 61, la cour d’appel de l’ontario a jugé que, dans le cadre d’une pension acquise aux termes du régime de retraite des enseignants de l’ontario, les prestations de dé- cès avant la retraite avaient été valablement cédées à un ancien conjoint du participant au régime par suite d’un accord de séparation et que [traduc- tion] « la personne qui se marie après la cession valide d’une prestation de décès avant la retraite à un ex- conjoint ne devrait pas raisonnablement s’at- tendre à recevoir l’intérêt déjà cédé » (par. 62 (nous [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 367 an undertaking in a separation agreement creates a trust interest which will operate to protect the ben- eficiary should the undertaking party fail to honour his or her commitment” (para 13). so too in bielny v. dzwiekowski, [2002] ilr ¶i-4018 (ont. scj), where the court found that the “law relating to the ir- revocable designations of beneficiaries in separation agreements has been settled for some time” (para. 8), aff’d [2002] oj. no. 508 (ql) (ca). unlike these cases, michelle’s interest in the policy does not arise from the contract itself, but from its breach. [131] therefore, we do not take shannon to be authority for the proposition that a prior agreement to be designated the beneficiary of an insurance policy, without more, is sufficient to undermine the opera- tion of an established juristic reason. a contractual entitlement is insufficient to create this kind of inter- est in the policy or its proceeds. this principle is il- lustrated in milne: prior to passing away, a deceased, in breach of an order from a family law proceeding, changed the beneficiary designation from the plain- tiff, his former spouse, to his current spouse. the former spouse argued that as a result of the breach of the order, which she likened to a contract in the family law context, she was entitled to the proceeds. the court found that while she was not entitled to the proceeds, she was entitled to damages for the contractual breach in the amount of the proceeds. while this case differs from the present appeal in that the estate’s solvency was not in issue, it is nonethe- less instructive. similarly, in kang v. kang estate, 2002 bcca 696, 44 ccli (3d) 52, the appellant claimed that her husband promised to name her as the designated beneficiary on his life insurance policy if she came with him to canada. she accompanied her husband to canada, but he retained his sister as the designated beneficiary under his policy of life insur- ance. the court of appeal rejected the appellant’s claims, distinguishing the case from others in which “trial judges have imposed a constructive trust to remedy a husband’s breach of fiduciary duty owed to his wife after separation” flowing from the covenant soulignons)). dans snider c. mallon, 2011 onsc 4522, 3 rfl (7th) 228, la cour supérieure de l’on- tario, citant shannon, a déclaré que [traduction] « [c]’est donc un principe bien établi qu’un engage- ment pris dans un accord de séparation crée un droit fiduciaire qui protégera le bénéficiaire si l’auteur de l’engagement ne respecte pas celui-ci » (par 13). il en va de même dans bielny c. dzwiekowski, [2002] ilr ¶i-4018 (csj. ont.), où le tribunal a conclu que le [traduction] « droit relatif à la désignation de bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable dans des accords de séparation est établi depuis un certain temps » (par. 8), conf. par [2002] oj. no. 508 (ql) (ca). contrairement aux cas susmentionnés, l’intérêt de michelle dans la police d’assurance découle non pas du contrat en soi, mais de la violation de celui-ci. [131] nous ne sommes donc pas d’avis que la dé- cision shannon appuie la thèse selon laquelle une entente antérieure visant à désigner le bénéficiaire d’une police d’assurance suffit en soi à compromettre l’application d’un motif juridique établi. un droit contractuel est insuffisant pour faire naître ce genre d’intérêt dans la police ou son produit. la décision milne illustre ce principe : avant de mourir, le dé- funt, en violation d’une ordonnance rendue dans une instance en matière familiale, a remplacé la deman- deresse, son ex- conjointe, par sa conjointe actuelle à titre de bénéficiaire désignée. l’ex- conjointe a sou- tenu que, par suite de la violation de l’ordonnance, qu’elle a assimilée à un contrat en droit de la famille, elle avait droit au produit. la cour a jugé que, même si elle n’avait pas droit au produit, elle avait droit à des dommages- intérêts correspondant au produit pour la rupture du contrat. bien que cette affaire se distingue du présent pourvoi en ce que la solvabilité de la succession n’était pas en cause, elle est néan- moins instructive. de même, dans kang c. kang estate, 2002 bcca 696, 44 ccli (3d) 52, l’ap- pelante a prétendu que son mari lui avait promis de la désigner bénéficiaire de sa police d’assurance- vie si elle venait avec lui au canada. elle a accompagné son mari au canada, mais il a gardé sa sœur à titre de bénéficiaire désignée de sa police d’assurance- vie. la cour d’appel a rejeté les prétentions de l’appelante et distingué l’affaire d’autres cas où [traduction] « le juge de première instance a imposé une fiducie par interprétation pour remédier au manquement du mari 368 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. in a separation agreement (para 9). on its own, the agreement was not sufficient to give the plaintiff any entitlement to the proceeds, and ground a claim in unjust enrichment. [132] the majority attaches significance to the fact that michelle specifically contracted for the proceeds of the policy. she continued to pay the policy’s pre- miums on this basis. put another way, in the view of the majority, michelle is not an ordinary creditor of lawrence’s estate; rather, she is in a special position vis-à-vis the policy proceeds. respectfully, we can- not agree that this changes the nature of michelle’s claim to the policy proceeds. in immunizing bene- ficiaries from the claims of the insured’s creditors, the insurance act does not distinguish between types of creditors. creditors of the insured’s estate simply do not have a claim to the insurance proceeds. there is no basis to carve out a special class of creditor who would be exempt from the clear wording of the insurance act. bearing in mind the history of the relevant provisions of the insurance act and their clarity, neither michelle’s contributions to the policy, nor her contract with lawrence are sufficient to take her outside the comprehensive scheme and grant her special and preferred status. à l’obligation fiduciaire qu’il avait envers sa femme après la séparation », une obligation qui découle de la convention figurant dans un accord de séparation (par 9). l’entente ne suffisait pas en soi pour accor- der à la demanderesse quelque droit que ce soit sur le produit et fonder une action pour enrichissement sans cause. [132] les juges majoritaires attachent de l’impor- tance au fait que michelle avait conclu un contrat lui conférant explicitement le produit de la police. elle a continué de payer les primes de la police pour cette raison. autrement dit, selon la majorité, michelle n’est pas une créancière ordinaire de la succession de lawrence; elle se trouve plutôt dans une situation particulière vis-à-vis le produit de la police. avec égards, nous ne pouvons convenir que cela modifie la nature du droit de michelle au produit de la police. en mettant les bénéficiaires à l’abri des réclamations des créanciers de l’assuré, la loi sur les assurances ne fait aucune distinction entre les différents types de créanciers. les créanciers de la succession de l’assuré n’ont tout simplement pas droit au produit de l’assurance. rien ne justifie d’établir une catégorie spéciale de créancier qui serait soustraite au texte clair de la loi sur les assurances. compte tenu de l’historique des dispositions applicables de cette loi et de leur clarté, ni les contributions de michelle à la police, ni son contrat avec lawrence ne suffisent pour l’exclure de ce régime exhaustif et lui accorder un statut particulier et privilégié. [133] that being said, we do not dispute blair ja’s statement that the “designation of a beneficiary as an irrevocable beneficiary under the insurance act [does not] invariably trum[p] a prior claimant” (para 91). whether the insurance act fails to trump a prior claimant depends on the character of that prior claim. where by some agreement, or otherwise, the insured has “placed the policy or its proceeds beyond his or her ability to deal with them, and, therefore, beyond his or her ability to make the purported irrevoca- ble designation”, the insurance act will not consti- tute a juristic reason for a beneficiary’s enrichment (para 91). for example, if a claimant successfully established the existence of a trust over the policy or its proceeds prior to the designation of an irrevocable beneficiary, her beneficial or proprietary interest in [133] cela dit, nous ne nous inscrivons pas en faux contre l’affirmation du juge blair selon laquelle la [traduction] « désignation d’un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable en vertu de la loi sur les assu‑ rances [ne] l’emporte [pas] toujours sur le détenteur d’une créance antérieure » (par 91). la réponse à la question de savoir si cette loi ne l’emporte pas sur le détenteur d’une créance antérieure dépend du caractère de cette créance. lorsque, par une entente quelconque ou un autre moyen, l’assuré a « placé la police ou le produit de celle-ci hors de son emprise et, par conséquent, hors de sa faculté de faire la prétendue désignation irrévocable », la loi sur les assurances ne constitue pas un motif juridique jus- tifiant l’enrichissement d’un bénéficiaire (par 91). par exemple, si une demanderesse parvient à établir [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 369 the policy would have prevented the insured from designating an irrevocable beneficiary. any such designation would be invalid. in those circumstances the insurance act could not constitute a juristic rea- son for a defendant’s enrichment. [134] but in the normal course, a contract between two parties does not at the time of the contract for- mation, be it for legal or equitable reason, prevent a promisor from dealing with the property that is the subject matter of the contract. in ladner estate, re, 2004 bcca 366, 40 bclr (4th) 298, the british columbia court of appeal considered the appropri- ate remedy for the deceased’s breach of his covenants in a separation agreement to pay permanent spousal support to the appellant, and to maintain insurance to secure payment of that support. instead of acting in accordance with the agreement, the deceased made the insurance proceeds of his policies payable to his estate, and thus available for estate administration costs, and vulnerable to the claims of unsecured cred- itors. the appellant argued that contract law does not permit a party (or their estate) to gain an advantage from wrongful conduct. the court of appeal was unpersuaded, finding that a promisor’s wrongdoing “does not confer a property right or priority on the other party to the contract” (para 23). [135] this is indeed reflected in the reasons of the majority, which acknowledge that in the regular course, michelle could pursue a remedy for breach of contract against lawrence’s estate. it is only because lawrence’s estate has no significant assets to satisfy an order for payment that any claim is being made to the insurance proceeds. as such, even on their view, michelle’s interest specifically in the policy proceeds does not crystallize until lawrence’s death, that is, long after lawrence designated risa as the irrevo- cable beneficiary. thus, contrary to lauwers ja’s dissenting reasons at the court below, the agree- ment did not place the policy or its proceeds beyond lawrence’s ability to deal with them. qu’une fiducie a été imposée sur la police ou son produit avant la désignation d’un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable, son intérêt bénéficiaire ou propriétal dans la police aurait empêché l’assuré de désigner un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable. toute désignation de ce genre serait invalide. dans les circonstances, la loi sur les assurances ne saurait constituer un motif juridique justifiant l’enrichissement d’un défendeur. [134] mais en temps normal, un contrat conclu entre deux parties n’empêche pas le promettant, que ce soit pour un motif en droit ou en equity, de dispo- ser du bien visé par le contrat. dans ladner estate, re, 2004 bcca 366, 40 bclr (4th) 298, la cour d’appel de la colombie- britannique a examiné la réparation qu’il convient d’accorder pour la violation par le défunt des engagements qu’il avait pris dans un accord de séparation de verser en permanence à l’appelante une pension alimentaire et de garder en vigueur une police d’assurance pour garantir le paiement de ces aliments. au lieu de respecter l’ac- cord, le défunt avait fait en sorte que le produit de ses polices d’assurance soit payable à sa succession et puisse donc servir à acquitter les frais d’administra- tion de la succession et être exposé aux réclamations des créanciers non garantis. l’appelante avait sou- tenu que le droit des contrats ne permettait pas à une partie (ou à sa succession) de tirer profit d’une in- conduite. la cour d’appel n’en a pas été convaincue, jugeant que le comportement fautif d’un promettant [traduction] « ne confère pas un droit de propriété ou une priorité à l’autre partie au contrat » (par 23). [135] c’est en effet ce qui se dégage des motifs des juges majoritaires, qui reconnaissent qu’en temps nor- mal, michelle pourrait exercer un recours pour rupture de contrat contre la succession de lawrence. c’est uniquement parce que la succession de lawrence ne dispose pas d’éléments d’actif importants suscep- tibles de respecter une ordonnance de paiement que le produit de l’assurance est réclamé. ainsi, même selon eux, l’intérêt de michelle dans le produit de la police ne se réalise qu’à la mort de lawrence, soit bien après que lawrence eut désigné risa bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable. donc, contrairement à ce qu’in- diquent les motifs dissidents du juge lauwers, de la cour d’appel, l’entente n’empêchait pas lawrence de disposer de la police ou de son produit. 370 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. [136] we note that the thrust of the cases on which michelle seeks to rely for her position recognize either explicitly or implicitly that unjust enrichment is available only where there is some proprietary or equitable entitlement to the insurance proceeds. in steeves, the new brunswick queen’s bench found that the insured “held the inchoate proceeds of the insurance policy in the event of his death in trust for the plaintiff” (para 36). in schorlemer, the ontario superior court of justice summarized the relevant legal principles as follows: “   where an insured is obligated under a separation agreement to designate the other party or their children as a beneficiary, that agreement will prevent the designation of an- other person as beneficiary   ” (para 48). these cases confirm, in our view, that a claim in unjust enrichment for the proceeds of a life insurance policy cannot be rooted in a mere contractual entitlement. [137] still, the majority does not accept that the insurance act’s clear bar of creditor claims against beneficiaries is sufficient to oust michelle’s claim against risa. while acknowledging that michelle’s breach of contract claim renders her a creditor of lawrence’s estate, they nonetheless insist that this has no bearing on a potential claim in unjust enrich- ment. respectfully, we cannot agree. framed in ei- ther contract or unjust enrichment, michelle has not shown a proprietary or equitable entitlement to the proceeds. michelle relies on her rights as a contrac- tual creditor to anchor a claim in unjust enrichment. in our view, the insurance act explicitly ousts claims of this character. [136] nous constatons que l’essentiel de la jurispru- dence que michelle cherche à invoquer à l’appui de sa position reconnaît explicitement ou implicitement qu’un recours pour enrichissement sans cause ne peut être intenté que s’il existe un droit propriétal ou en equity sur le produit de l’assurance. dans steeves, la cour du banc de la reine du nouveau- brunswick a estimé que l’assuré [traduction] « détenait le produit non réalisé de la police d’assurance en fidu- cie pour la demanderesse au cas où il décéderait » (par 36). dans schorlemer, la cour supérieure de jus- tice de l’ontario a résumé en ces termes les principes juridiques pertinents : [traduction] «    l’accord de séparation qui oblige l’assuré à désigner l’autre partie ou leurs enfants à titre de bénéficiaires empêche la désignation d’une autre personne à ce titre    » (par 48). à notre avis, cette jurisprudence confirme qu’une action pour enrichissement sans cause visant à toucher le produit d’une police d’assurance- vie ne peut se fonder sur un simple droit contractuel. [137] malgré cela, les juges majoritaires n’ac- ceptent pas que l’interdiction claire, dans la loi sur les assurances, des réclamations des créanciers à l’encontre des bénéficiaires suffit pour écarter la demande de michelle contre risa. ils reconnaissent certes que la réclamation de michelle pour violation de contrat fait d’elle une créancière de la succession de lawrence, mais ils insistent néanmoins pour dire que cela n’a aucune incidence sur une réclamation potentielle pour enrichissement sans cause. soit dit en tout respect, nous ne sommes pas d’accord. que ce soit en droit des contrats ou sur la foi des prin- cipes de l’enrichissement sans cause, michelle n’a pas démontré l’existence d’un droit de propriété ou en equity sur le produit. elle s’appuie sur ses droits en tant que créancière contractuelle pour ancrer une demande fondée sur l’enrichissement sans cause. nous estimons que la loi sur les assurances écarte explicitement les réclamations de cette nature. in sum, we consider that the insurance act [138] reflects a deliberate policy choice to channel the insurance proceeds directly to the designated benefi- ciary free from any and all creditor claims. the act is a juristic reason for the transfer to risa. the relevant jurisprudence, including shannon, does not dislodge or undercut the clear statutory language. instead, the [138] en somme, nous considérons que la loi sur les assurances témoigne de la décision de principe délibérée de verser le produit de l’assurance direc- tement au bénéficiaire désigné et de le soustraire à toute réclamation d’un créancier. la loi est un motif juridique justifiant le transfert à risa. la jurispru- dence applicable, y compris la décision shannon, [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 371 cases confirm that, absent some proprietary or equi- table entitlement to the insurance proceeds, creditors cannot use unjust enrichment claims to undermine the insurance act and an insured’s valid designation. (2) policy considerations weigh against allow- ing michelle’s claim for unjust enrichment [139] even if the insurance act, on its own, did not establish a juristic reason for risa’s enrichment, we add that the policy considerations at the second stage of the juristic reason analysis would nevertheless favour the denial of restitution to michelle. [140] the legislature’s choice for intended benefi- ciaries to receive the proceeds is rooted in the sound policy considerations underpinning that choice. es- tate distributions are subject to frequent disputes, leading to lengthy and expensive litigation. tying up insurance proceeds in litigation can create immense hardship for beneficiaries, many of whom stare at financial instability without support from their now- deceased spouse. where there is a significant delay between an insured’s death and the receipt of the insurance proceeds, designated beneficiaries may struggle to take care of household expenses or meet basic needs. such is the case with risa. n’écarte ni n’affaiblit le libellé clair de la loi. en fait, les décisions confirment qu’à défaut d’un quel- conque droit de propriété ou en equity sur le produit de l’assurance, les créanciers ne peuvent utiliser des réclamations fondées sur l’enrichissement sans cause pour saper la loi sur les assurances et la désignation valide faite par l’assuré. (2) les considérations de politique générale mi- litent contre la décision d’accueillir l’action de michelle pour enrichissement sans cause [139] même si la loi sur les assurances, en soi, n’établissait pas un motif juridique justifiant l’enri- chissement de risa, nous ajoutons que les considé- rations de politique générale intervenant au second stade de l’analyse du motif juridique favoriseraient néanmoins le refus de restituer le produit à michelle. [140] la décision de la législature de faire en sorte que les bénéficiaires désignés touchent le produit prend sa source dans les solides considérations de politique générale qui sous- tendent ce choix la liquidation d’une succession engendre souvent des litiges et donne lieu à des poursuites longues et coû- teuses. le blocage du produit de l’assurance lors d’une action en justice peut occasionner d’énormes difficultés aux bénéficiaires, dont un grand nombre sont en proie à l’instabilité financière sans le soutien de leur conjoint maintenant décédé. lorsqu’il y a un délai considérable entre la mort d’un assuré et la réception du produit de l’assurance, les bénéfi- ciaires désignés peuvent avoir du mal à s’occuper des dépenses ménagères ou à répondre à des besoins essentiels. tel est le cas de risa. [141] the insurance act is structured in large part to minimize these hardships. irrevocable beneficiary designations are meant to provide the insured and beneficiary alike with the certainty that the insurance proceeds will be received in a timely manner free of creditor claims. as per s. 196(1) of the insurance act, “where a beneficiary is designated, the insurance money, from the time of the happening of the event upon which the insurance money becomes payable, is not part of the estate of the insured and is not sub- ject to the claims of the creditors of the insured.” the insurance act provides even greater protection of the [141] la loi sur les assurances est conçue en grande partie pour réduire au minimum ces difficultés. la dé- signation d’un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable a pour objet de donner à l’assuré tout comme au bénéficiaire la certitude que le produit de l’assurance sera tou- ché en temps opportun à l’abri des réclamations des créanciers. aux termes du par. 196(1) de la loi sur les assurances, « [l]orsqu’un bénéficiaire est désigné, les sommes assurées ne font pas partie de la succes- sion de l’assuré et ne peuvent être réclamées par les créanciers de l’assuré, dès la survenance de l’événe- ment qui rend les sommes assurées exigibles. » cette 372 moore v sweet gascon and rowe jj. [2018] 3 scr. policy and proceeds where an irrevocable beneficiary is designated. in that case, from the moment such a designation is made, the policy and its proceeds are not subject to the claims of any of the insured’s creditors and are immune from any attempted redes- ignations. the inability of creditors and the insured to access or control the policy proceeds provides certainty to the insured and beneficiary that the latter will be provided the support that they were intended to have. [142] at the expense of the above considerations, the majority seems to stress the insurance act’s in- terest in certainty for insurers, but not the insured or their chosen beneficiaries. the insurance act pur- portedly outlines who should receive the proceeds, but not who should retain them. michelle makes the same argument. while it is true that the insur- ance scheme benefits when insurers can identify with certainty the person who is entitled to receive a policy’s proceeds, the provisions of the insurance act go beyond this. if the interests protected by the beneficiary provisions were principally those of the insurers, there would be no need for the proceeds to be free from creditor claims, or to bypass the in- sured’s estate. a statute could achieve certainty for the insurer by merely directing that the proceeds be paid to the insured’s estate, to be distributed accord- ing to the insured’s testamentary dispositions. the function of these provisions is not merely to ensure that a beneficiary receive the proceeds, and they should not be treated as such. loi prévoit une protection encore plus grande de la police et de son produit en cas de désignation d’un bénéficiaire à titre irrévocable. dès qu’une telle dé- signation est faite, la police et son produit échappent aux réclamations de l’un ou l’autre des créanciers de l’assuré et sont à l’abri de toute tentative de nouvelle désignation. l’impossibilité pour les créanciers et l’assuré d’obtenir le produit de la police ou d’avoir une emprise sur celui-ci offre à l’assuré et au béné- ficiaire la certitude que ce dernier recevra le soutien qu’il était censé avoir. [142] c’est au détriment des considérations sus- mentionnées que les juges majoritaires semblent in- sister sur l’intérêt de la loi sur les assurances à offrir une certitude aux assureurs, mais non aux assurés ou aux bénéficiaires de leur choix. la loi sur les assu‑ rances est censée indiquer qui doit toucher le pro- duit, mais non qui doit le conserver. michelle avance le même argument. certes, le régime d’assurance en sort gagnant quand les assureurs peuvent identifier avec certitude la personne qui a droit au produit de la police, mais les dispositions de la loi sur les assu‑ rances vont plus loin. si les intérêts protégés par les dispositions applicables aux bénéficiaires étaient en majeure partie ceux des assureurs, il ne serait pas né- cessaire de protéger le produit des réclamations des créanciers ou de contourner la succession de l’assuré. une loi pourrait garantir la certitude de l’assureur en disposant simplement que le produit doit être versé à la succession de l’assuré et réparti selon ses dispositions testamentaires. ces dispositions n’ont pas simplement pour fonction de faire en sorte que le bénéficiaire touche le produit, et elles ne doivent pas être considérées comme telles. [143] in fact, if risa only has a right to receive but not retain the proceeds, it would seem to follow that all insurance proceeds would be subject to the claims of creditors, contrary to the express wording of the provisions. as such, if one were to accept — which we do not — that there is a principled basis to distinguish between creditors like michelle and other creditors of an insured’s estate, insurance proceeds would still end up being the subject of disputes and litigation. various creditors would argue that they, too, have preferred status that should exempt them from the operation of the insurance act. regardless [143] en fait, si risa a seulement le droit de tou- cher le produit, et non de le conserver, il semblerait que tous les produits d’assurance soient exposés aux réclamations des créanciers, contrairement aux termes exprès des dispositions. partant, si l’on ac- ceptait — ce que nous ne faisons pas — qu’il y a une raison de principe de distinguer les créanciers comme michelle des autres créanciers de la suc- cession d’un assuré, le produit de l’assurance fini- rait tout de même par être l’objet de différends et de poursuites en justice. divers créanciers feraient valoir qu’ils ont eux aussi un statut privilégié qui [2018] 3 rcs. moore c sweet les juges gascon et rowe 373 of whether these creditors would ultimately be suc- cessful in their claims for unjust enrichment, the result reached by the majority invites them to none- theless attempt to collect on the insured’s policy proceeds and tie up the proceeds in potentially pro- tracted and expensive litigation, contrary to the in- tention of the insurance act. even worse, this could leave designated beneficiaries vulnerable not just to creditors, but also to those who have sustained the policy for any period. beneficiaries and insureds will thus be denied the certainty that the insurance act would otherwise provide. devrait les soustraire à l’application de la loi sur les assurances. que les actions de tels créanciers pour enrichissement sans cause soient finalement accueillies ou non, le résultat auquel parviennent les juges majoritaires les incite néanmoins à tenter de piger dans le produit de la police de l’assuré et de bloquer le produit lors de poursuites qui risquent de s’avérer longues et coûteuses, contrairement à l’objet de la loi sur les assurances. pire encore, cela pour- rait laisser les bénéficiaires désignés à la merci non seulement des créanciers, mais aussi des personnes qui ont maintenu la police d’assurance en vigueur pour quelque période que ce soit. les bénéficiaires et les assurés se verront par conséquent privés de la certitude qu’offre par ailleurs cette loi. iii conclusion iii conclusion [144] death is sometimes accompanied by much uncertainty and strife. to the extent that it is possible, the insurance act moderates such uncertainty by creating a comprehensive regime for all those in- volved in a life insurance contract. notwithstanding our view that there is no corresponding deprivation of michelle, there is also a juristic reason for the transfer to risa; we would not attenuate the sensible regime put forward by the legislature. as michelle’s claim of unjust enrichment is not made out, we would dismiss the appeal. [144] la mort s’accompagne parfois d’énormé- ment d’incertitude et de querelles. la loi sur les assurances atténue autant que possible cette incer- titude en instaurant un régime complet pour toutes les parties à un contrat d’assurance- vie. nonobstant notre opinion selon laquelle michelle ne subit aucun appauvrissement correspondant, le transfert à risa est également justifié par un motif juridique; nous estimons inopportun d’atténuer le régime judicieux mis de l’avant par la législature. puisque michelle n’a pas établi le bien- fondé de son allégation d’enri- chissement sans cause, nous rejetterions le pourvoi. appeal allowed, gascon and rowe jj. dissent‑ pourvoi accueilli, les juges gascon et rowe sont ing. dissidents. procureurs de l’appelante : hull & hull, toronto. procureurs de l’intimée : torys, toronto.
[1] karakatsanis  j.  — our system of justice strives to protect the ability of triers of fact to get at [1] la juge karakatsanis  — notre système de justice vise à protéger la capacité des juges des 16 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. the truth. in cases of sexual assault, evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual history — if relied upon to suggest that the complainant was more likely to have consented to the sexual activity in question or is generally less worthy of belief — undermines this truth- seeking function and threatens the equality, privacy and security rights of complainants. in 1992, parliament enacted s. 276 of the crim­ [2] inal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, to protect trials from these harms. nearly 30 years later, the inves- tigation and prosecution of sexual assault contin- ues to be plagued by myths. one such myth is that sexual assault is a crime committed by persons who are strangers to their targets. in fact, in 2016- 2017, statistics canada found that over 80 percent of re- ported sexual assaults occurred between people who knew one another in some way.1 in other words, most complainants will have some kind of relationship with the accused. this case requires the court to re- view the balance between, on the one hand, admitting evidence of a sexual relationship that may be funda- mental to making full answer and defence, and on the other, protecting complainants and the integrity of the trial process from prejudicial reasoning. [3] here, the accused sought to introduce evidence that he and the complainant were “friends with bene- fits”, a sexual relationship. he argued that the sexual nature of the relationship provided important context without which the jury would be left with the arti- ficial impression that he and the complainant had a platonic relationship, rendering consent improbable. 1 statistics canada, police­ reported sexual assaults in canada before and after #metoo, 2016 and 2017 (2018). faits de découvrir la vérité. dans les cas d’agression sexuelle, la preuve concernant le passé sexuel de la plaignante1 — si elle est invoquée pour suggérer que celle-ci était plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’acti- vité sexuelle en cause ou encore qu’elle est générale- ment moins digne de foi — compromet cette fonction de recherche de la vérité et menace les droits à l’éga- lité, à la vie privée et à la sécurité des plaignantes. [2] en 1992, le parlement a adopté l’art. 276 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, afin de protéger les procès de ces dangers. près de 30 ans plus tard, les enquêtes et les poursuites relatives aux agressions sexuelles continuent d’être marquées par des mythes. selon l’un d’eux, la victime d’une agression sexuelle ne connaît pas son agresseur. en fait, en 2016- 2017, statistique canada a révélé que plus de 80 p. 100 des agressions sexuelles déclarées se produisent entre des personnes qui se connaissent d’une façon ou d’une autre2. autrement dit, la plupart des plai- gnantes ont un certain type de relation avec l’accusé. dans le présent pourvoi, la cour doit se livrer à un examen portant sur l’équilibre qu’il faut établir entre, d’une part, l’admission d’une preuve d’une relation à caractère sexuel qui peut s’avérer fondamentale pour que l’accusé puisse présenter une défense pleine et entière et, d’autre part, la protection des plaignantes et de l’intégrité du processus judiciaire contre un raisonnement préjudiciable. [3] en l’espèce, l’accusé a cherché à présenter des éléments de preuve établissant que la plaignante et lui étaient [traduction] « amis- amants » (« friends with benefits »), ce qui constitue une relation à caractère sexuel. il a fait valoir que le caractère sexuel de la relation fournissait une mise en contexte importante sans laquelle le jury aurait la fausse impression que la plaignante et lui entretenaient une relation platonique, ce qui aurait rendu le consentement improbable. 1 l’article 276 du code criminel utilise la forme masculine du mot « plaignant » pour décrire la personne qui serait victime de cette infraction. toutefois, comme je l’explique plus loin, l’agression sexuelle est une infraction hautement genrée dont la plupart des victimes sont des femmes. pour cette raison, et puisque la plaignante dans le dossier est une femme, j’utiliserai la forme féminine « plaignante » dans le présent jugement. 2 statistique canada, les agressions sexuelles déclarées par la police au canada avant et après le mouvement #moiaussi, 2016 et 2017 (2018). [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 17 [4] to be admissible, relationship evidence that im- plies sexual activity must satisfy the requirements of s. 276 of the criminal code. in my view, the evidence here did not meet those requirements. introducing ev- idence of the sexual nature of the relationship served no purpose other than to support the inference that because the complainant had consented in the past, she was more likely to have consented on the night in question. it was therefore barred by s 276(1). nor could it satisfy the conditions of admissibility under s 276(2). while the sexual aspect of the relationship was evidence of “specific instances of sexual activ- ity”, it was not “relevant to an issue at trial”. [5] a s. 276 application requires the accused to positively identify a use of the proposed evidence that does not invoke twin- myth reasoning. in other words, relevance is the key which unlocks the evidentiary bar, allowing a judge to consider the s. 276(3) factors and to decide whether to admit the evidence. bare assertions that such evidence will be relevant to con- text, narrative or credibility cannot satisfy s 276. the evidence in this case should not have been admitted and a new trial is required. i would dismiss the appeal. [4] pour être admissible, la preuve d’une relation qui suppose des activités sexuelles doit satisfaire aux exigences de l’art. 276 du code criminel. selon moi, la preuve en l’espèce ne satisfaisait pas à ces exigences. la présentation d’une preuve du caractère sexuel de la relation ne servait qu’à étayer l’infé- rence selon laquelle la plaignante était plus suscep- tible d’avoir consenti à une activité sexuelle le soir en question parce qu’elle y avait consenti dans le passé. la preuve était donc inadmissible suivant le par 276(1). elle ne répondait pas non plus aux conditions d’admissibilité du par 276(2). bien que la preuve du caractère sexuel de la relation fût une preuve portant sur des « cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle », elle n’était pas « en rapport avec un élé- ment de la cause ». [5] une demande fondée sur l’art. 276 exige que l’accusé indique expressément une utilisation de la preuve apportée qui ne fait pas appel au raisonne- ment fondé sur les deux mythes. autrement dit, la pertinence est la clé qui permet de lever l’obstacle en matière de preuve, ce qui fait en sorte que le juge peut prendre en compte les facteurs énumérés au par. 276(3) et décider s’il y a lieu d’admettre la preuve. pour satisfaire aux exigences de l’art. 276, il ne suffit pas de simplement affirmer que la preuve a un lien avec le contexte, le récit ou la crédibilité. la preuve en l’espèce n’aurait pas dû être admise et un nouveau procès est nécessaire. je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. i facts i faits [6] mr. goldfinch and the complainant met, dated and lived together for seven or eight months, after which the complainant ended the relationship. at some point during the ensuing months, the two re- sumed contact. although they each described the relationship in various ways, both ultimately agreed that their relationship could be described as “friends with benefits”. [6] m. goldfinch et la plaignante se sont rencon- trés, se sont fréquentés et ont vécu ensemble pendant sept ou huit mois, après quoi la plaignante a mis fin à la relation. au cours des mois qui ont suivi, ils ont repris contact. bien que chacun ait décrit leur relation de diverses manières, les deux ont finale- ment convenu qu’ils pouvaient la qualifier de relation [traduction] d’« amis- amants ». [7] on the evening of may 28, 2014, the com- plainant called goldfinch, who then drove to the complainant’s house, picked her up, and brought her back to his place. goldfinch testified that she had called him a few days earlier asking for “birthday [7] le soir du 28 mai 2014, la plaignante a téléphoné à m. goldfinch, qui s’est ensuite rendu chez elle en voiture, puis l’a ramenée chez lui. m. gold finch a témoigné qu’elle l’avait appelé quelques jours plus tôt pour lui demander du [traduction] « sexe pour 18 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. sex”, something the complainant couldn’t remem- ber if she had done. goldfinch stated that he did not “100 percent” expect to have sex that evening, “but that was our routine” (ar, vol. iii, at p 228). in his view, this was a “typical evening” in that the complainant “would call in the middle of the night, want to come over, and we’d end up going to bed together” (ar, vol. iii, at p 201). [8] goldfinch lived in the basement of a small, older home which he shared with a roommate. after arriving at the house, goldfinch and the complainant shared drinks and conversation with the roommate while watching television. goldfinch testified that, during this time, he mouthed “i’m going to fuck you” to the complainant. he says she responded with a smile. the complainant couldn’t remember whether this exchange had occurred, but acknowledged that it might have. [9] a few minutes later, goldfinch invited the com- plainant to go downstairs. the complainant testified that she told goldfinch “nothing was going to hap- pen”, meaning that she did not wish to have sex. goldfinch denies ever hearing this. [10] downstairs, the two sat on a couch together. at some point, they shared a consensual kiss. after the kiss, goldfinch suggested that they go to bed. son anniversaire », ce que la plaignante n’était pas ca- pable de se rappeler avoir fait ou non. m. goldfinch a indiqué qu’il ne s’attendait pas « totalement » à avoir une relation sexuelle ce soir-là, « mais c’était ce qu’ils faisaient habituellement » (da, vol. iii, p 228). selon lui, il s’agissait d’une « soirée typique », en ce sens que la plaignante « appelait au milieu de la nuit, voulait venir faire un tour et on finissait par coucher ensemble » (da, vol. iii, p 201). [8] m. goldfinch habitait au sous- sol d’une vieille petite maison qu’il partageait avec un colocataire. après leur arrivée à la maison, m. goldfinch et la plaignante ont bu de l’alcool et discuté avec le colo- cataire, tout en regardant la télévision. m. goldfinch a témoigné que, durant cette période, il a articulé en silence à la plaignante [traduction] « je vais te baiser ». il a affirmé qu’elle lui avait répondu par un sourire. la plaignante ne pouvait pas se rappeler si cet échange s’était produit, mais a reconnu que c’était possible. [9] quelques minutes plus tard, m.  goldfinch a invité la plaignante à descendre au sous- sol. la plaignante a témoigné qu’elle avait dit à m. gold- finch qu’il n’allait [traduction] « rien se passer », c’est-à-dire qu’elle ne souhaitait pas avoir de relation sexuelle. m. goldfinch nie avoir entendu ces paroles. [10] au sous- sol, les deux se sont assis ensemble sur un canapé. à un certain moment, ils se sont embrassés de façon consensuelle. après le baiser, m. goldfinch a proposé qu’ils aillent au lit. [11] from this point on, the two accounts of the evening diverged radically. [11] à partir de ce moment, les deux récits de la soirée divergent radicalement. [12] according to goldfinch, after the consensual kiss, he followed the complainant into his bedroom where they each removed their own clothes. he and the complainant then discussed which side of the bed they wished to sleep on. following this discussion, the two engaged in consensual foreplay and brief intercourse. he fell asleep and, hours later, she woke him up complaining that he had struck her on the head in his sleep. he was annoyed, told her to leave and called a taxi using her phone. [12] selon m. goldfinch, après le baiser consen- suel, il a suivi la plaignante dans sa chambre à lui, où chacun s’est déshabillé. ils ont ensuite eu une discussion concernant le côté du lit où chacun voulait se coucher. après cette discussion et à la suite de pré- liminaires consensuels, ils ont eu une brève relation sexuelle. m. goldfinch s’est endormi et, quelques heures plus tard, la plaignante l’a réveillé pour se plaindre qu’il l’avait frappée à la tête pendant son sommeil. agacé, il lui a dit de partir, puis a appelé un taxi avec le téléphone de la plaignante. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 19 [13] the complainant testified that she responded to goldfinch’s invitation by telling him she did not want to have sex. he then grabbed her arm and dragged her into the bedroom. she explained that goldfinch’s demeanour changed, “[j]ust like something snapped” (ar, vol. ii, at p. 88), and she felt scared. she re- moved her clothes because he told her to. he pushed her onto the bed, struck her in the face, pushed her shoulder so hard that she believed her arm was bro- ken, and told her “he was going to have [her], just like everyone else” (ar, vol. ii, at p 91). following the assault, she dressed and called a taxi from her cell phone. she called the police shortly after she arrived back at her home. both the responding officer and a forensics officer who met the complainant at the hos- pital confirmed swelling on her left cheek and elbow. [13] la plaignante a témoigné avoir répondu à l’invitation de m. goldfinch en lui disant qu’elle ne voulait pas avoir de relation sexuelle. il lui a alors saisi le bras et l’a entraînée dans la chambre. elle a expliqué que le comportement de m. goldfinch a changé, [traduction] « [c]omme si quelque chose s’était brisé » (da, vol. ii, p. 88), et qu’elle avait eu peur. elle s’est déshabillée parce qu’il lui a dit de le faire. il l’a poussée sur le lit, l’a frappée au visage, a poussé son épaule si fort qu’elle a cru que son bras s’était cassé et lui a dit qu’« il allait [l’]avoir, comme tous les autres » (da, vol. ii, p 91). après l’agression, elle s’est habillée et a appelé un taxi avec son cellulaire. elle a appelé la police peu après son retour chez elle. l’agent qui a répondu à l’appel et l’agent en criminalistique qui a rencontré la plai- gnante à l’hôpital ont confirmé que sa joue et son coude gauches étaient enflés. ii history of the proceedings ii historique judiciaire a the voir dire, pentelechuk j. — court of queen’s bench of alberta, 140600008q1, january 23, 2017 a voir­ dire, la juge pentelechuk — cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta, 140600008q1, 23 jan­ vier 2017 [14] the defence requested a voir dire to deter- mine if evidence that the complainant and goldfinch were “friends with benefits” was admissible under s. 276 of the criminal code, submitting that it was highly artificial to describe the relationship without reference to sexual activity. counsel advanced that goldfinch did not intend to rely on twin- myth in- ferences, but failed to identify any other inference or relevant use beyond “context”. the crown was willing to adduce evidence that the two knew each other for four to five years, dated and lived together for seven to eight months, and then broke up. the crown was also prepared to adduce evidence that the two remained friends and that the complainant would occasionally come to goldfinch’s house and stay overnight. [14] la défense a demandé la tenue d’un voir- dire pour que le tribunal établisse si la preuve que la plaignante et m. goldfinch étaient des « amis- amants » était admissible au titre de l’art. 276 du code criminel, faisant valoir qu’il était fort artificiel de décrire la relation sans mentionner les activités sexuelles. la procureure a affirmé que m. goldfinch n’avait pas l’intention de s’appuyer sur des infé- rences fondées sur les deux mythes, mais elle n’a indiqué aucune autre inférence ou utilisation per- tinente de la preuve, mise à part celle visant à éta- blir le « contexte ». la couronne était disposée à présenter une preuve selon laquelle la plaignante et m. goldfinch se connaissaient depuis quatre à cinq ans, qu’ils s’étaient fréquentés et avaient vécu ensemble pendant sept à huit mois, et qu’ils avaient ensuite rompu. la couronne était également prête à présenter une preuve indiquant qu’ils étaient restés amis et que la plaignante allait parfois chez m. goldfinch et y passait la nuit. [15] the trial judge accepted that “friends with benefits” meant that “they were friends who    from [15] la juge du procès a reconnu que des [tra- duction] « amis- amants » sont « des amis qui [  ] 20 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. time to time got together to have sex” (ar, vol. i, at p 10). she agreed that keeping this evidence from the jury would lend an element of artificiality to the proceedings and harm goldfinch’s right to make full answer and defence. she concluded this “rel- atively benign” evidence would not “prejudice the complainant’s personal dignity, right to privacy, or personal security” if admitted in this limited form. se rencontrent à l’occasion pour avoir des relations sexuelles » (da, vol. i, p 10). elle a convenu que de ne pas présenter cette preuve au jury conférerait un élément d’artificialité à l’instance et porterait atteinte au droit de m. goldfinch à une défense pleine et en- tière. elle a conclu que cette preuve « relativement inoffensive » ne « porterait pas atteinte à la dignité, au droit à la vie privée ou à la sécurité de la plai- gnante » si elle était admise sous cette forme limitée. b the trial, pentelechuk j. — court of queen’s bench of alberta, 140600008q1, february 9, 2017 b procès, la juge pentelechuk — cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta, 140600008q1, 9 fé­ vrier 2017 [16] the trial unfolded before a jury over four days in february 2017. [16] le procès, qui a duré quatre jours, s’est dé- roulé devant jury en février 2017. [17] before examining the complainant, crown counsel sought clarification regarding the permis- sible scope of questioning with respect to previous sexual activity, noting that she would not have led this evidence had the s. 276 application not been granted. the trial judge stated that she had envi- sioned that the “contextual information” identified in the voir dire would be reduced to an agreed state- ment of facts. but, because the parties had not done so, the trial judge reiterated her expectation that any questioning would be “extremely limited”, following “fairly narrow confines for the purposes of context and to simply let the jury know the nature of the relationship” (ar, vol. ii, at p 53). [18] during direct examination, the complainant initially denied that she and goldfinch were ever “more than just friends” following their breakup. shortly thereafter, however, she admitted that she had been to goldfinch’s bedroom to have sex on “various” dates for “quite awhile [sic]” after the relationship ended (ar, vol. ii, at p 81). [17] avant d’interroger la plaignante, la procureure de la couronne a demandé des précisions quant à la portée permise des questions concernant les activités sexuelles antérieures, et a souligné qu’elle n’aurait pas présenté cette preuve si la demande fondée sur l’art. 276 n’avait pas été accueillie. la juge du procès a indiqué que selon ce qu’elle avait prévu, les [tra- duction] « renseignements contextuels » identifiés lors du voir- dire se résumeraient à un exposé conjoint des faits. toutefois, comme les parties n’en avaient pas présenté, la juge du procès a rappelé qu’elle s’at- tendait à ce que les questions soient « extrêmement limitées », qu’elles respectent « des limites assez étroites à des fins de mise en contexte et qu’elles visent simplement à informer le jury de la nature de la relation » (da, vol. ii, p 53). [18] durant l’interrogatoire principal, la plaignante a d’abord nié que m. goldfinch et elle avaient déjà été [traduction] « plus que juste des amis » après leur rupture peu après, cependant, elle a admis qu’elle était allée dans la chambre de m. goldfinch pour avoir des relations sexuelles à « diverses » dates, pendant « un bon bout de temps » après la fin de leur relation (da, vol. ii, p 81). [19] before the cross- examination began, coun- sel for goldfinch also sought clarification regard- ing the permissible scope of questioning. the trial judge agreed that the crown had opened the eviden- tiary door and gave the defence permission to ask [19] avant le début du contre- interrogatoire, l’avo- cate de m. goldfinch a également demandé des pré- cisions sur la portée permise des questions. la juge du procès a convenu que la couronne avait ouvert la porte à des questions relatives à la preuve, et a donc [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 21 questions regarding “the number of times, the time frame relative to the relationship proper breaking up, and the last occasion prior to these alleged offences” (ar, vol. ii, at p 112). during cross- examination, when defence counsel suggested the two had slept together “dozens of times”, the complainant esti- mated they had slept together 15 times following the breakup. [20] following the complainant’s testimony, the trial judge gave this limiting instruction to the jury: permis à la défense de poser des questions concer- nant [traduction] « le nombre de fois, la période visée par rapport à la véritable rupture et la der- nière relation avant les infractions reprochées » (da, vol. ii, p. 112) pendant le contre- interrogatoire, lorsque l’avocate de la défense a suggéré qu’ils avaient couché ensemble des « dizaines de fois », la plaignante a estimé qu’ils avaient couché ensemble 15 fois après la rupture. [20] à la suite du témoignage de la plaignante, la juge du procès a donné au jury la directive restrictive suivante : you have heard evidence that [the complainant] and mr. goldfinch dated and then briefly lived together. at some point after that relationship ended, [the complainant] and mr. goldfinch did on occasion get together and have sexual relations. this evidence provides you with some context for their relationship, but you must not use this evidence to help you decide that because [the complain- ant] and mr. goldfinch had sexual relations in the past, that [the complainant] is more likely to have consented to mr. — consented to what mr. goldfinch is alleged to have done on may 29th, 2014, and you must also not use that evidence to help you decide that because [the complainant] and mr. goldfinch had sexual relations in the past that she is less believable or reliable as a witness in this case, all right? thank you. [traduction] vous avez entendu des témoignages selon lesquels [la plaignante] et m. goldfinch se sont fréquentés et ont brièvement vécu ensemble. quelque temps après la fin de cette relation, [la plaignante] et m. goldfinch se sont revus à l’occasion et ont eu des relations sexuelles. cette preuve donne un certain contexte à leur relation; toutefois, elle ne doit pas vous amener à conclure que, parce que [la plaignante] et m. goldfinch ont eu des relations sexuelles dans le passé, [la plaignante] est plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à m. — consenti à ce que m. goldfinch aurait fait le 29 mai 2014, et vous ne devez pas non plus vous servir de cette preuve pour conclure que, parce que [la plaignante] et m. goldfinch ont eu des relations sexuelles dans le passé, elle est un témoin moins crédible ou moins fiable dans la présente affaire, d’accord? merci. (ar, vol. ii, at p. 148) (da, vol. ii, p. 148) [21] goldfinch repeatedly testified — both in- chief and in cross- examination — to the frequency of his previous sexual interactions with the complainant, characterizing the evening as “typical” or “routine”, indicating he had “had her many times”, and stating that “when we’re together, [sex] was expected, i guess, from both of us” (ar, vol. iii, at pp. 203 and 227). [21] m. goldfinch a maintes fois fait état — au- tant lors de l’interrogatoire principal que du contre- interrogatoire — de la fréquence de ses rapports sexuels antérieurs avec la plaignante, qualifiant la soirée de [traduction] « typique » ou d’« habi- tuelle », indiquant qu’il « l’avait eue à plusieurs re- prises » et déclarant : « lorsque nous étions ensemble, nous nous attendions à [du sexe], tous les deux, je pense » (da, vol. iii, p. 203 et 227). [22] during her final jury charge, the trial judge gave extensive instructions regarding consent, high- lighting that consent must be contemporaneous and concerns only the subjective state of mind of the com- plainant. she reiterated the same limiting instruction she had given mid- trial, clarifying that while the jury could not use the evidence of sexual activity to infer [22] lors de son exposé final au jury, la juge du procès a donné des directives détaillées sur la notion de consentement, soulignant que celui-ci doit être concomitant et qu’il ne s’attache qu’à l’état d’esprit subjectif de la plaignante. elle a réitéré la même directive restrictive qu’elle avait donnée au cours du procès, précisant que, bien que le jury ne puisse pas 22 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. that the complainant was less believable or reliable, it could consider any contradictions regarding the na- ture of the relationship in assessing the complainant’s general credibility. utiliser la preuve concernant les activités sexuelles pour inférer que la plaignante était moins crédible ou moins fiable, il pouvait tenir compte de toute contra- diction quant à la nature de la relation pour évaluer la crédibilité générale de la plaignante. [23] the jury found goldfinch not guilty of sexual assault. [23] le jury a déclaré m. goldfinch non coupable d’agression sexuelle. c the alberta court of appeal, mcdonald and strekaf jja,. berger ja. dissenting — 2018 abca 240, 48 cr (7th) 22 c cour d’appel de l’alberta, les juges mcdonald et strekaf; le juge berger, dissident — 2018 abca 240, 48 cr (7th) 22 [24] the crown appealed goldfinch’s acquittal on a question of law pursuant to s. 676(1)(a) of the criminal code. section 276.5 of the criminal code provides that a determination respecting the admissi- bility of sexual activity evidence is a question of law. the majority, mcdonald and strekaf jja, charac- terized the crown’s appeal as follows: the crown appellant submits that the trial judge erred in law by admitting the evidence, pursuant to section 276 of the criminal code, of the prior sexual relationship be- tween [goldfinch] and the complainant. [para. 14] [25] the majority held that finding evidence pro- vides “context” is insufficient to demonstrate relevance for the purposes of s 276(2). thus, they concluded that the trial judge failed to connect the relationship evidence to any issue relevant to goldfinch’s defence. the majority also rejected the argument that the ev- idence was relevant to goldfinch’s credibility or as “context”. in their view, permitting the defence to lead evidence of previous sexual activity to prevent the jury from concluding that consent was unlikely was no different from admitting that same evidence to establish that the complainant was more likely to consent. given the admissions the crown had been willing to make, there was no risk that the jury would be misled into thinking goldfinch and the complainant were strangers. the only inferences to be drawn from the evidence of prior sexual activity could be those relying on the twin myths. in the majority’s view, limiting instructions could not cure the fact that the jury had heard inadmissible evidence for which there [24] la couronne a porté en appel le verdict d’ac- quittement de m.  goldfinch sur une question de droit en vertu de l’al. 676(1)a) du code criminel. l’article 276.5 du code criminel prévoit que l’admis- sibilité d’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle est une question de droit. voici comment les juges majoritaires, les juges mcdonald et strekaf, ont qua- lifié l’appel intenté par la couronne : [traduction] la couronne, appelante en l’espèce, soutient que la juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit en admettant, au titre de l’art. 276 du code criminel, la preuve d’une relation antérieure à caractère sexuel entre [m. goldfinch] et la plaignante. [par. 14] [25] les juges majoritaires ont conclu que le fait que la preuve fournisse une [traduction] « mise en contexte » ne suffit pas pour démontrer qu’elle est en rapport avec un élément de la cause pour l’application du par.  276(2) ils ont donc conclu que la juge du procès n’avait pas cerné de lien entre la preuve de la relation et tout élément utile pour la défense de m goldfinch. les juges majoritaires ont aussi rejeté l’argument selon lequel la preuve était pertinente pour établir la crédibilité de m. goldfinch ou pour une « mise en contexte ». à leur avis, il n’y avait aucune différence entre permettre à la défense de présenter une preuve concernant des activités sexuelles antérieures de la plaignante pour éviter que le jury conclue que celle-ci était peu susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité à l’origine de l’accusa- tion, et admettre cette même preuve pour établir que la plaignante était plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à une telle activité. compte tenu des faits que la couronne était prête à admettre, il n’y avait aucun [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 23 was no permissible use. they allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. [26] berger ja, writing in dissent, accepted that the evidence was not adduced to support the twin myths. he found that the trial judge had properly exercised her discretion in admitting what she char- acterized as “relatively benign” evidence in order to preclude misapprehensions on the part of the jury. in his view, goldfinch’s right to make full answer and defence required a “candid revelation of the true na- ture of the relationship” (para 67). for berger ja, it was better to trust the jury to rely on the limiting instructions mandated for evidence admitted under s. 276 than to leave the jury to speculate on what lay beneath crown admissions for which no such instructions would be required. risque que le jury soit amené à croire, à tort, que m. goldfinch et la plaignante ne se connaissaient pas. les seules inférences pouvant être tirées de la preuve concernant des activités sexuelles antérieures de la plaignante étaient celles reposant sur les deux mythes. de l’avis des juges majoritaires, des direc- tives restrictives ne pouvaient pas remédier au fait que le jury avait entendu une preuve inadmissible pour laquelle aucune utilisation n’était permise. ils ont accueilli l’appel et ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès. [26] le juge berger, dissident, a reconnu que la preuve n’avait pas été présentée à l’appui des deux mythes. il a conclu que la juge du procès avait correc- tement exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire en admet- tant une preuve qu’elle a qualifiée de « relativement inoffensive » afin d’éviter les interprétations erronées de la part du jury. à son avis, le droit de m. goldfinch à une défense pleine et entière exigeait que [traduc- tion] « la véritable nature de la relation soit révé- lée » (par 67). pour lui, il était préférable de croire que le jury s’appuierait sur les directives restrictives imposées à l’égard de la preuve admise au titre de l’art. 276 plutôt que de laisser celui-ci conjecturer sur ce qui se cachait derrière les faits admis par la couronne, pour lesquels aucune directive n’aurait été nécessaire. iii analysis iii analyse [27] this case asks whether evidence of a rela- tionship with an implicit sexual component engages s. 276 of the criminal code and, if so, when such evidence may be admitted. [27] en l’espèce, il s’agit d’établir si la preuve d’une relation ayant une composante sexuelle im- plicite fait intervenir l’art. 276 du code criminel et, le cas échéant, dans quelles circonstances une telle preuve peut être admise. a section 276: text, history and objectives a article 276 : libellé, historique et objectifs [28] section 2762 balances a number of trial fair- ness considerations, seeking to exclude evidence known to distort the fact- finding process while pro- [28] l’article 2763 met en balance diverses consi- dérations liées à l’équité du procès; il vise à exclure les éléments de preuve connus pour fausser le pro- 2 on december 13, 2018, bill c-51, an act to amend the criminal code and the department of justice act and to make conse­ quential amendments to another act, 1st sess., 42nd parl., 2018, received royal assent. this act makes minor amendments to “clarify” the application of s 276. they do not apply to the case at bar. nor do they affect the analysis in this case. 3 le 13 décembre 2018, le projet de loi c-51, la loi modifiant le code criminel et la loi sur le ministère de la justice et apportant des modifications corrélatives à une autre loi, 1re sess., 42e lég., 2018, a reçu la sanction royale. cette loi apporte des modifications mineures visant à « clarifier » l’application de l’art 276. ces modifications ne s’appliquent pas en l’espèce, et n’ont aucune incidence sur l’analyse dans la présente affaire. 24 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. tecting the rights of both the accused and the com- plainant: cessus de détermination des faits, tout en protégeant les droits de l’accusé et de la plaignante : 276 (1) in proceedings in respect of [various sexual of- fences], evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant 276 (1) dans les poursuites pour [diverses infractions d’ordre sexuel], la preuve de ce que le plaignant a eu une activité sexuelle avec l’accusé ou un tiers est inadmissible pour permettre de déduire du caractère sexuel de cette activité qu’il est : (a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual ac- tivity that forms the subject- matter of the charge; or a) soit plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité à l’origine de l’accusation; (b) is less worthy of belief. b) soit moins digne de foi. (2) in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (1), no evidence shall be adduced by or on behalf of the accused that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject- matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any other person, unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice determines, in accordance with the proce- dures set out in sections 276.1 and 276.2, that the evidence (a) is of specific instances of sexual activity; (b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and (2) dans les poursuites visées au paragraphe (1), l’accusé ou son représentant ne peut présenter de preuve de ce que le plaignant a eu une activité sexuelle autre que celle à l’origine de l’accusation sauf si le juge, le juge de la cour provinciale ou le juge de paix décide, conformément aux articles 276.1 et 276.2, à la fois : a) que cette preuve porte sur des cas particuliers d’ac- tivité sexuelle; b) que cette preuve est en rapport avec un élément de la cause; (c) has significant probative value that is not substan- tially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. c) que le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne admi- nistration de la justice de cette preuve ne l’emporte pas sensiblement sur sa valeur probante. (3) in determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection (2), the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall take into account (3) pour décider si la preuve est admissible au titre du paragraphe (2), le juge, le juge de la cour provinciale ou le juge de paix prend en considération : (a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence; a) l’intérêt de la justice, y compris le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière; (b) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences; b) l’intérêt de la société à encourager la dénonciation des agressions sexuelles; (c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case; c) la possibilité, dans de bonnes conditions, de parve- nir, grâce à elle, à une décision juste; (d) the need to remove from the fact- finding process any discriminatory belief or bias; d) le besoin d’écarter de la procédure de recherche des faits toute opinion ou préjugé discriminatoire; [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 25 (e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sen- timents of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury; e) le risque de susciter abusivement, chez le jury, des préjugés, de la sympathie ou de l’hostilité; (f) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s per- sonal dignity and right of privacy; f) le risque d’atteinte à la dignité du plaignant et à son droit à la vie privée; (g) the right of the complainant and of every individ- ual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and g) le droit du plaignant et de chacun à la sécurité de leur personne, ainsi qu’à la plénitude de la protection et du bénéfice de la loi; (h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers relevant. h) tout autre facteur qu’il estime applicable en l’es- pèce. [29] section  11(d) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms guarantees the right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal”. this guarantee includes the accused’s right to make full answer and defence, itself crucial to ensuring that the innocent are not convicted (r v. mills, [1999] 3 scr 668, at pa- ras. 69 and 76). [29] l’alinéa 11d) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés garantit à l’accusé le droit « d’être présumé innocent tant qu’il n’est pas déclaré cou- pable, conformément à la loi, par un tribunal indé- pendant et impartial à l’issue d’un procès public et équitable ». cette garantie comprend le droit de l’ac- cusé à une défense pleine et entière, lequel est crucial pour éviter qu’un innocent ne soit déclaré coupable (r c. mills, [1999] 3 rcs 668, par. 69 et 76). [30] for this reason, the law of criminal evidence begins with the general principle that all relevant and material evidence is admissible. the right to a fair trial does not, however, guarantee the most favour- able procedures imaginable: the accused’s right to make full answer and defence is not automatically breached whenever relevant evidence is excluded (r v. quesnelle, 2014 scc 46, [2014] 2 scr 390, at para. 64; r v. darrach, 2000 scc 46, [2000] 2 scr 443, at para. 24; mills, at para 75). a fair trial also requires that no party be allowed to distort the process by producing irrelevant or prejudicial evidence (darrach, at para 24). [30] pour cette raison, le principe général selon lequel toute preuve pertinente et substantielle est admissible constitue le fondement du droit de la preuve en matière criminelle. le droit à un procès équitable ne garantit toutefois pas les procédures les plus favorables que l’on puisse imaginer : il n’y a pas automatiquement atteinte au droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière lorsqu’une preuve pertinente est exclue (r c. quesnelle, 2014 csc 46, [2014] 2 rcs 390, par. 64; r c. darrach, 2000 csc 46, [2000] 2 rcs 443, par. 24; mills, par 75). un procès équitable exige également qu’aucune par- tie ne puisse dénaturer le processus en produisant des éléments de preuve non pertinents ou préjudiciables (darrach, par 24). [31] a person’s general character and past behav- iour provide context for understanding specific events (r v. handy, 2002 scc 56, [2002] 2 scr 908, at para 39). however, such evidence often draws on pejorative or judgmental generalizations (d. m. paciocco and l. stuesser, the law of evidence (7th ed. 2015), at p 54). this is problematic because “[b]ad character is not an offence known to the law” (handy, at para 72). our legal system neither punishes nor [31] la moralité générale d’une personne et son comportement antérieur fournissent le contexte né- cessaire à la compréhension de certains événements (r c. handy, 2002 csc 56, [2002] 2 rcs 908, par 39). or, une telle preuve repose souvent sur des généralisations fondées sur un préjugé ou un jugement de valeur (d m paciocco et l. stuesser, the law of evidence (7e éd. 2015), p 54). cela pose problème, car la « mauvaise moralité n’est pas une 26 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. protects people on the basis of lifestyle, character or reputation. to protect against propensity reasoning, trial judges must balance the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effects. infraction en droit » (handy, par 72). notre système juridique ne punit ni ne protège les gens en fonction de leur style de vie, de leur moralité ou de leur ré- putation. le juge du procès doit mettre en balance la valeur probante d’une telle preuve et ses effets préjudiciables afin de protéger le procès contre le raisonnement fondé sur la propension. [32] as a general rule, evidence led by the defence is excluded only where the potential prejudice sub­ stantially outweighs its probative value (r v. grant, 2015 scc 9, [2015] 1 scr 475, at para. 19; r v. seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577, at p 611). moreover, because only the accused is being judged at trial, ex- clusionary rules generally do not prevent the accused from adducing evidence of another person’s bad character (paciocco and stuesser, at p 98). [32] en règle générale, la preuve présentée par la défense ne sera écartée que si son effet préjudiciable potentiel l’emporte sensiblement sur sa valeur pro- bante (r c. grant, 2015 csc 9, [2015] 1 rcs 475, par. 19; r c. seaboyer, [1991] 2 rcs 577, p 611). de plus, comme seul l’accusé est jugé au procès, les règles d’exclusion ne l’empêchent généralement pas de présenter une preuve de la mauvaise moralité d’une autre personne (paciocco et stuesser, p 98). [33] historically, no limits were placed on the de- fence’s ability to adduce evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual activities. such evidence was routinely used to malign “the character of the complainant, distort the trial process, and undermine the abil- ity of the criminal justice system to effectively and fairly try sexual allegations” (r v. ls, 2017 onca 685, 354 ccc (3d) 71, at para 79). subjecting the complainant to humiliating or prolonged examina- tion and exploiting assumptions about “communica- tion, dress, revenge, marriage, prior sexual history, therapy, lack of resistance and delayed disclosure” was commonplace (d. m. tanovich, “‘whack’ no more: infusing equality into the ethics of defence lawyering in sexual assault cases” (2015), 45 ottawa l. rev. 495, at pp 498-99)3. these tactics shifted the focus away from the accused and essen- tially put the complainant on trial. [33] dans le passé, aucune limite ne restreignait la capacité de la défense à présenter une preuve concernant des activités sexuelles antérieures de la plaignante. une telle preuve était couramment utilisée pour attaquer [traduction] « la moralité de la plaignante, dénaturer le processus judiciaire et miner la capacité du système de justice criminelle à juger efficacement et équitablement des alléga- tions d’ordre sexuel » (r c. ls, 2017 onca 685, 354  ccc  (3d) 71, par.  79) il était courant de soumettre la plaignante à un interrogatoire humiliant ou prolongé et de recourir à des idées reçues portant sur [traduction] «  la communication, la tenue vestimentaire, la vengeance, le mariage, le passé sexuel, la thérapie, l’absence de résistance et la di- vulgation tardive » (d m tanovich, « “whack” no more : infusing equality into the ethics of defence lawyering in sexual assault cases » (2015), 45 rd. ottawa 495, p. 498- 4994). ces stratégies di- rigeaient l’attention ailleurs que sur l’accusé et faisaient essentiellement subir un procès à la plai­ gnante. [34] in 1982, parliament enacted a blanket ex- clusion of all evidence of sexual activity, subject to [34] en 1982, le parlement a adopté des disposi- tions prévoyant l’exclusion générale de toute preuve 3 r v. shearing, 2002 scc 58, [2002] 3 scr 33, at para. 173, and mills, at para. 90, take up this phrase coined by cristin schmitz in “‘whack’ sex assault complainant at preliminary inquiry” published in the lawyers weekly, vol. 8, no. 5, in may 1988. 4 r c. shearing, 2002 csc 58, [2002] 3  rcs  33, par.  173, et mills, par. 90, reprennent cette expression que mme cristin schmitz a utilisée pour la première fois en ce sens dans son article « “whack” sex assault complainant at preliminary inquiry » publié dans the lawyers weekly, vol. 8, no 5, en mai 1988. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 27 limited exceptions. the provisions were intended to counter the twin myths that women with sexual ex- perience are more likely to consent to sexual activity or are less worthy of belief. because sexual assault was highly gendered and underreported, parliament also sought to encourage the reporting of sexual crimes (seaboyer, at p. 606, per mclachlin j., and pp. 648-50, per l’heureux- dubé j., dissenting in part). in seaboyer, this court struck down that blan- [35] ket exclusion, holding that parliament had cast the net too wide, impairing the accused’s right to a fair trial. improperly excluded evidence critical to the defence included evidence going to: (i) honest but mistaken belief in consent, (ii) bias or motive to fabricate on the part of the complainant, (iii) phys- ical conditions establishing the use of force, and (iv) evidence of a consistent modus operandi such as threatening to accuse someone of rape as a means of extortion (seaboyer, at pp 613-16). [36] parliament responded to this court’s ruling in seaboyer by essentially codifying the case’s princi- ples in s. 276 of the criminal code because “at trials of sexual offences, evidence of the complainant’s sexual history is rarely relevant and    its admission should be subject to particular scrutiny” (preamble, bill c-49, an act to amend the criminal code (sexual assault), 3rd sess., 34th parl., 1992). parliament’s recent amendments — reaffirming the exclusion of evidence relying on the twin myths — reinforce the provision’s continued importance. concernant une activité sexuelle, sous réserve d’ex- ceptions limitées. ces dispositions visaient à contre- carrer les deux mythes selon lesquels les femmes ayant de l’expérience sexuelle seraient plus suscep- tibles de consentir à une activité sexuelle ou qu’elles seraient moins dignes de foi. comme les agressions sexuelles étaient étroitement liées au genre et lar- gement sous- dénoncées, le parlement a également cherché à encourager la dénonciation des crimes sexuels (seaboyer, p. 606, la juge mclachlin, et p. 648- 650, la juge l’heureux- dubé, dissidente en partie). [35] dans seaboyer, la cour a annulé cette exclu- sion générale, concluant que le parlement avait ratissé trop large, portant ainsi atteinte au droit de l’accusé à un procès équitable. les éléments de preuve écartés à tort qui étaient essentiels à la défense comprenaient ceux se rapportant à : (i) une croyance sincère mais erronée au consentement; (ii) un préjugé ou un mo- tif de fabrication d’une preuve par la plaignante; (iii) des faits matériels établissant l’usage de la force; et (iv) un modus operandi constant, par exemple le fait de menacer d’accuser une personne de viol afin de l’extorquer (seaboyer, p. 613- 616). [36] le parlement a donné suite à la décision de la cour dans l’arrêt seaboyer en codifiant en grande partie les principes de cet arrêt à l’art. 276 du code criminel parce que « lors des procès pour infraction d’ordre sexuel, la preuve relative au comportement sexuel antérieur du plaignant est rarement pertinente et [  ] son admission devrait être examinée avec précaution » (préambule, projet de loi c-49, loi mo­ difiant le code criminel (agression sexuelle), 3e sess., 34e lég., 1992). les récentes modifications adoptées par le parlement — qui confirment l’exclusion d’élé- ments de preuve fondés sur les deux mythes — ren- forcent l’importance que revêt toujours la disposition. [37] the mischief parliament sought to address in enacting s. 276 remains with us today. sexual assault is still among the most highly gendered and underre- ported crimes (j. desrosiers and g. beausoleil- allard, l’agression sexuelle en droit canadien (2nd ed. 2017), at pp 41-42). even hard- fought battles to stop sexual assault in the workplace remain ongoing (compare, eg,. k. lippel, “conceptualising violence at work [37] la situation préjudiciable à laquelle le par le- ment a voulu remédier en adoptant l’art. 276 est tou- jours d’actualité. les agressions sexuelles comptent encore parmi les crimes les plus genrés et les moins dénoncés (j.  desrosiers et g.  beausoleil- allard, l’agression sexuelle en droit canadien (2e éd. 2017), p 41-42). même les luttes acharnées visant à mettre fin aux agressions sexuelles en milieu de travail sont 28 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. through a gender lens: regulation and strategies for prevention and redress” (2018), 1 u of oxhrh j 142, and c. backhouse, “sexual harassment: a feminist phrase that transformed the workplace” (2012), 24 cjwl 275). as time passes, our un- derstanding of the profound impact sexual violence can have on a victim’s physical and mental health only deepens. parliament enacted s. 276 to address concrete social prejudices that affect trial fairness as well as the concrete harms caused to the victims of sexual assault. throughout their lives, survivors may experience a constellation of physical and psycholog- ical symptoms including: high rates of depression; anxiety, sleep, panic and eating disorders; substance dependence; self- harm and suicidal behaviour.4 a re- cent department of justice study estimated the costs of sexual assault at approximately $4.8 billion in 2009, an astonishing $4.6 billion of which related to survi- vors’ medical costs, lost productivity (due in large part to mental health disability), and costs from pain and suffering.5 the harm caused by sexual assault, and society’s biased reactions to that harm, are not relics of a bygone victorian era. toujours en cours (comparons, par exemple, k. lip- pel, « conceptualising violence at work through a gender lens : regulation and strategies for pre- vention and redress » (2018), 1 u of oxhrh j 142, et c. backhouse, « sexual harassment : a feminist phrase that transformed the workplace » (2012), 24 rdf 275). avec le temps, nous comprenons de mieux en mieux les répercussions profondes que la violence sexuelle peut avoir sur la santé physique et mentale d’une victime. le parlement a adopté l’art. 276 pour s’attaquer aux préjugés sociaux réels qui nuisent à l’équité du procès ainsi qu’aux préju- dices réels que subissent les victimes d’agression sexuelle. tout au long de leur vie, celles-ci peuvent souffrir d’une multitude de symptômes physiques et psychologiques : dépression (dans une forte pro- portion); troubles d’anxiété, troubles du sommeil, crises de panique et troubles alimentaires; toxico- manie; troubles d’automutilation et comportements suicidaires5. selon une récente étude menée par le ministère de la justice, on estime que les agressions sexuelles ont coûté environ 4,8 milliards de dollars en 2009, dont une part stupéfiante de 4,6 milliards de dollars est liée aux frais médicaux, à la perte de pro- ductivité (largement attribuable à une incapacité pour des raisons de santé mentale) et aux coûts des souf- frances et douleurs des victimes6. le préjudice causé par une agression sexuelle, ainsi que les réactions tendancieuses de la société à l’égard de ce préjudice, ne sont pas des reliques d’une ère victorienne révolue. it is against this backdrop that s. 276 must be [38] interpreted and applied. [38] c’est dans ce contexte que l’art. 276 doit être interprété et appliqué. b examining relationship evidence under sec­ b l’examen de la preuve de la relation sous le tion 276 régime de l’art. 276 [39] section 276 protects the integrity of the trial process by striking a balance between the dignity and privacy of complainants and the right of accused [39] l’article 276 protège l’intégrité du processus judiciaire en établissant un équilibre entre la dignité et le droit à la vie privée des plaignantes et le droit 4 see, eg,. department of justice, research and statistics division, health impacts of violent victimization on women and their children (2012); k-l. miller, “you can’t stop the bell from ringing.” protean, unpredictable, and persisting: the victim impact statement in the context of sexually assaulted women (2015). 5 department of justice, research and statistics division, an estimation of the economic impact of violent victimization in canada, 2009 (2014). 5 voir, p ex, ministère de la justice, division de la recherche et de la statistique, la victimisation avec violence : répercussions sur la santé des femmes et des enfants (2012); k-l. miller, « you can’t stop the bell from ringing. » protean, unpredictable, and persisting : the victim impact statement in the context of sexually assaulted women (2015). 6 ministère de la justice, division de la recherche et de la statis- tique, estimation de l’incidence économique des crimes violents au canada en 2009 (2014). [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 29 persons to make full answer and defence. this ap- peal asks us to examine that balance as it concerns evidence of a relationship from which sexual activity can reasonably be inferred. [40] as gonthier j. explained in darrach, s. 276 is “designed to exclude irrelevant information and only that relevant information that is more prejudicial to the administration of justice than it is probative” (para 43). sections 276(1) and (2) operate together to achieve this objective. first, s. 276(1) sets out an absolute bar against introducing evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual activity for the purpose of drawing twin- myth inferences. where an accused seeks to introduce such evidence for some other purpose, that evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless the accused satisfies s 276(2). to do so, the accused must identify the evidence and its purpose with sufficient precision to allow the judge to apply s. 276(2) and weigh the factors set out in s 276(3). [41] i proceed by first considering when such evi- dence engages s 276(1). i then address two require- ments of s. 276(2) which require particular attention in this case: des accusés à une défense pleine et entière. dans le présent pourvoi, nous sommes appelés à examiner cet équilibre en ce qui a trait à la preuve d’une rela- tion de laquelle on peut raisonnablement inférer qu’il y a eu des activités sexuelles. [40] comme l’a expliqué le juge gonthier dans l’arrêt darrach, l’art. 276 « vise à exclure les rensei- gnements non pertinents et [  ] les renseignements pertinents dont l’effet préjudiciable sur la bonne administration de la justice l’emporte sur leur valeur probante » (par 43). les paragraphes 276(1) et (2) s’appliquent ensemble pour atteindre cet objectif. premièrement, le par. 276(1) interdit de façon abso- lue la présentation d’une preuve concernant une ac- tivité sexuelle antérieure de la plaignante dans le but de tirer des inférences fondées sur les deux mythes. lorsqu’un accusé cherche à présenter une preuve de cette nature à une autre fin, celle-ci est présumée inadmissible à moins que l’accusé ne satisfasse aux exigences du par 276(2). pour ce faire, l’accusé doit indiquer la preuve et la fin à laquelle elle sera utilisée avec suffisamment de précision pour permettre au juge d’appliquer le par. 276(2) et de soupeser les facteurs énoncés au par 276(3). [41] je commencerai par me demander quels sont les cas où la preuve fait intervenir le par 276(1). je me pencherai ensuite sur les deux exigences du par. 276(2) qui nécessitent une attention particulière en l’espèce : (a) is the evidence of “specific instances of sexual a) la preuve porte-t-elle sur des « cas particuliers activity”? and d’activité sexuelle »? (b) what qualifies evidence as “relevant to an issue b) qu’est-ce qui constitue une preuve qui « est en at trial”? rapport avec un élément de la cause »? (1) section 276(1) (1) paragraphe 276(1) [42] turning to the first question, evidence of a relationship that implies sexual activity clearly en- gages s 276(1). [42] en ce qui concerne la première question, la preuve d’une relation qui suppose des activités sexuelles fait manifestement intervenir le par 276(1). [43] section 276(1) bars evidence of a complain- ant’s previous sexual activity tendered to support the twin myths such evidence is “not probative of consent or credibility and can severely distort the trial process” (darrach, at para 33). in barring [43] le paragraphe 276(1) interdit la présentation d’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle anté- rieure de la plaignante pour étayer les deux mythes. une telle preuve n’est « pas probant[e] quant au consentement ou à la crédibilité, et [elle] peu[t] 30 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. such inferences, the provision affirms the equality and dignity rights of complainants and aims to en- courage reporting of sexual assault (bill c-49). the risk that evidence of a relationship which implies sexual activity may be used to support twin- myth reasoning is clear. [44] consider the first myth: that a complainant’s prior sexual activity may support an inference of con- sent in a particular instance. rejection of this myth — and its link to relationships — is intimately connected to the modern understanding of consent. until 1983, the fact that an accused was married to a complainant was sufficient to legitimize sexual assault; indeed, rape was defined as non- consensual sexual inter- course between a man and “a female person who is not his wife” (criminal code, rsc 1970, c. c-34, s 143). today, an accused may no longer argue that consent was implied by a relationship: contempora- neous, affirmatively communicated consent must be given for each and every sexual act (r v. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 scr 330;. r v. ja, 2011 scc 28, [2011] 2 scr 440, at paras. 34 and 47; r v. hutchinson, 2014 scc 19, [2014] 1 scr 346, at para. 27; r. v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr 579, at paras 90-94). today, not only does no mean no, but only yes means yes. nothing less than positive affir- mation is required. dénaturer gravement le procès » (darrach, par 33). en interdisant de telles inférences, la disposition confirme les droits à l’égalité et à la dignité des plai- gnantes et vise à encourager la dénonciation des agressions sexuelles (projet de loi c-49). le risque que la preuve d’une relation supposant des activités sexuelles soit utilisée pour étayer un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes est évident. [44] prenons le premier mythe, selon lequel une activité sexuelle antérieure de la plaignante peut permettre d’inférer qu’elle a donné son consente- ment dans un cas précis. le rejet de ce mythe — et de son lien avec les relations — est étroitement lié à la compréhension moderne du consentement. jusqu’en 1983, le fait que l’accusé soit marié à la plaignante suffisait à rendre légitime une agression sexuelle; d’ailleurs, le viol était défini comme une relation sexuelle non consensuelle entre une per- sonne du sexe masculin et « une personne du sexe féminin qui n’est pas son épouse » (code criminel, src 1970, c. c-34, art 143). aujourd’hui, l’accusé ne peut plus faire valoir que le consentement était im- plicite compte tenu de la relation : chaque acte sexuel doit faire l’objet d’un consentement concomitant et communiqué (r c. ewanchuk, [1999] 1 rcs. 330; r c. ja, 2011 csc 28, [2011] 2 rcs 440, par. 34 et 47; r c. hutchinson, 2014 csc 19, [2014] 1 rcs 346, par. 27; r c. barton, 2019 csc 33, [2019] 2 rcs 579, par 90-94). aujourd’hui, non veut dire non, et seul oui veut dire oui. il ne faut rien de moins qu’une manifestation positive. [45] consider also the second myth: that previous sexual activity renders a complainant less worthy of belief or, by extension, of full protection of the law (barton, at para. 201, per moldaver j. and, at paras. 222 and 231, per abella and karakatsanis jj). before this court, goldfinch advanced that so- cial mores have changed such that being “unchaste” no longer discredits a complainant. however, this court has held that the second myth is not limited to attitudes towards “unchaste” women (darrach, at para 33). moreover, while sexual activity generally carries less stigma than it once did, complainants continue to be treated as less deserving of belief based on their previous sexual conduct. the no- tion that some complainants “invite” assault and, by [45] prenons également le second mythe, soit l’idée selon laquelle une activité sexuelle antérieure rend la plaignante moins digne de foi ou, par ex- tension, moins digne de la plénitude de la protec- tion de la loi (barton, par. 201, le juge moldaver, et par. 222 et 231, les juges abella et karakatsanis). devant notre cour, m. goldfinch a affirmé que les mœurs sociales ont changé, si bien que le fait d’être [traduction] « non chastes » ne discrédite plus les plaignantes. cependant, la cour a statué que le second mythe ne se limite pas aux attitudes à l’égard des femmes « non chastes » (darrach, par 33). de plus, s’il est vrai que les activités sexuelles suscitent généralement moins de réprobation qu’autrefois, les plaignantes continuent d’être traitées comme si [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 31 inference, do not deserve protection persists both inside and outside our courtrooms (r v. barton, 2017 abca 216, 354 ccc (3d) 245, at para. 128, cited in barton, at para. 201, per moldaver j. and, at para. 231, per abella and karakatsanis jj.; see also e. craig, putting trials on trial: sexual assault and the failure of the legal profession (2018), at pp. 32 et seq). this is implicit in the continued strug- gle to exclude inaccurate assumptions about what constitutes “typical” or “unusual” activity within a given relationship (see, eg,. e. craig, “section 276 misconstrued: the failure to properly interpret and apply canada’s rape shield provisions” (2016), 94 can. bar rev. 45, at p. 69; m. randall, “sexual assault in spousal relationships, ‘continuous con- sent’, and the law: honest but mistaken judicial beliefs” (2008), 32 man. lj 144;. c. boyle, “sex- ual assault as foreplay: does ewanchuk apply to spouses?” (2004), 20 cr (6th) 359). finally, the suggestion that sexual assault is less harmful to those who are sexually active or in relationships is simply wrong (see, eg,. j. koshan, “marriage and advance consent to sex: a feminist judgment in r v ja” (2016), 6:6 oñati socio­ legal series 1377 (online), at pp. 1387 and 1391). [46] even “relatively benign” relationship evi- dence must be scrutinized and handled with care. if the accused cannot point to a relevant use of the evidence other than the twin myths, mere assurances that evidence will not be used for those purposes are insufficient. this case highlights the dangers of accepting such assurances. elles étaient moins dignes de foi en raison de leur comportement sexuel antérieur. l’idée selon laquelle certaines plaignantes « incitent » à l’agression et, par inférence, ne méritent pas d’être protégées persiste tant à l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur de nos tribunaux (r. c. barton, 2017 abca 216, 354 ccc (3d) 245, par. 128, cité dans barton, par. 201, le juge moldaver, et par. 231, les juges abella et karakatsanis; voir aussi e. craig, putting trials on trial : sexual as­ sault and the failure of the legal profession (2018), p. 32 et suiv). cela ressort implicitement de la lutte constante qui est menée en vue de l’exclusion des idées reçues inexactes au sujet de ce qui constitue une activité « typique » ou « inhabituelle » dans le cadre d’une relation donnée (voir, p ex,. e. craig, « section 276 misconstrued : the failure to properly interpret and apply canada’s rape shield provi- sions » (2016), 94 r du b can. 45, p. 69; m. randall, « sexual assault in spousal relationships, “continu- ous consent”, and the law : honest but mistaken judicial beliefs » (2008), 32 man lj 144;. c. boyle, « sexual assault as foreplay : does ewanchuk apply to spouses? » (2004), 20 cr (6th) 359). enfin, la thèse voulant que l’agression sexuelle soit moins préjudiciable à celles qui sont actives sexuellement ou qui entretiennent des relations est tout simplement erronée (voir, p ex, j. koshan, « marriage and ad- vance consent to sex : a feminist judgment in r v ja » (2016), 6:6 oñati socio­legal series 1377 (en ligne), p. 1387 et 1391). [46] même la preuve « relativement inoffensive » d’une relation doit être examinée attentivement et utilisée avec prudence. si l’accusé ne peut indiquer aucune utilisation pertinente de la preuve autre que celle visant à étayer les deux mythes, la simple assu- rance que cette preuve ne sera pas utilisée à ces fins ne suffit pas. la présente affaire met en évidence les dangers que présente le fait de s’appuyer sur pareille assurance. [47] in this case, the obvious implication of the evidence of an ongoing sexual relationship was that because the complainant had consented to sex with goldfinch in the past, in similar circumstances, it was more likely she had consented on the night in question. as i set out in the sections that follow, the difficulty here was not that goldfinch and the [47] dans le cas qui nous occupe, la preuve de la relation à caractère sexuel continue visait manifes- tement à établir que parce que la plaignante avait consenti dans le passé à avoir des rapports sexuels avec m.  goldfinch dans des circonstances sem- blables, il était plus probable qu’elle ait consenti à avoir un rapport sexuel avec lui le soir en question. 32 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. complainant had a relationship, but that goldfinch could point to no relevant use for evidence of the sexual nature of the relationship. such an approach misapprehends the nature of consent and is barred by s 276(1). comme je l’indique dans les sections qui suivent, la difficulté en l’espèce n’était pas liée au fait que m. goldfinch et la plaignante entretenaient une rela- tion, mais plutôt au fait que m. goldfinch ne pouvait indiquer aucune utilisation pertinente de la preuve du caractère sexuel de la relation. une telle approche résulte d’une compréhension erronée de la nature du consentement et est interdite par le par 276(1). (2) section 276(2) (2) paragraphe 276(2) [48] taken as a whole, s. 276 seeks to protect the privacy of complainants, encourage the reporting of sexual offences and exclude evidence which fu- els propensity reasoning. in pursuit of these goals, s. 276(2) presumptively bars evidence of the com- plainant’s previous sexual activity. [48] dans son ensemble, l’art. 276 vise à protéger le droit à la vie privée des plaignantes, à encourager la dénonciation des infractions sexuelles et à exclure les éléments de preuve qui alimentent le raisonne- ment fondé sur la propension. dans la poursuite de ces objectifs, le par. 276(2) établit une présomption d’inadmissibilité de la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle antérieure de la plaignante. [49] however, in certain circumstances, the ac- cused’s right to make full answer and defence requires that such evidence be admitted. under s. 276(2), the accused must demonstrate that the evidence: [49] cependant, dans certaines circonstances, le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière exige qu’une telle preuve soit admise. conformément au par. 276(2), l’accusé doit démontrer : (a) is of specific instances of sexual activity; (b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and a) que cette preuve porte sur des cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle; b) que cette preuve est en rapport avec un élément de la cause; (c) has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper ad- ministration of justice. c) que le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne admi- nistration de la justice de cette preuve ne l’emporte pas sensiblement sur sa valeur probante. [50] in determining whether these criteria are met, s. 276(3) requires judges to consider a number of fac- tors. these include the accused’s right to make full answer and defence, the need to remove discrimina- tory beliefs or biases from the fact- finding process, potential prejudice to the complainant’s dignity and privacy, and the right of every individual to the full protection and benefit of the law. [50] pour décider s’il est satisfait à ces critères, le juge doit, comme l’exige le par. 276(3), prendre en considération un certain nombre de facteurs, qui comprennent notamment le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière, la nécessité d’écarter du processus de détermination des faits les opinions ou préjugés discriminatoires, le risque d’atteinte à la dignité de la plaignante et à son droit à la vie privée et le droit de chacun à la plénitude de la protection et du bénéfice de la loi. [51] bare assertions that such evidence will be rele- vant to context, narrative or credibility cannot satisfy [51] il ne suffit pas de simplement affirmer que la preuve a un lien avec le contexte, le récit [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 33 s 276(2). a s. 276 application must provide “detailed particulars” which will allow a judge to meaningfully engage with the tests set out at s. 276(2) and (3). the accused must propose a use of the evidence that does not invoke twin- myth reasoning. these requirements are key to preserving the integrity of the trial by en- suring twin- myth reasoning masquerading as “con- text” or “narrative” does not ambush the proceedings. ou la crédibilité pour satisfaire aux exigences du par 276(2). une demande fondée sur l’art. 276 doit « énonce[r] toutes précisions », ce qui permettra au juge d’appliquer de manière significative les critères énoncés aux par. 276(2) et (3). l’accusé doit propo- ser une utilisation de la preuve qui ne fait pas appel à un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes. ces exi- gences sont essentielles pour préserver l’intégrité du procès en faisant en sorte qu’un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes, sous le couvert du « contexte » ou du « récit », ne vienne pas embrouiller le proces- sus judiciaire. (a) section 276(2)(a): specific instances of sex­ a) alinéa 276(2)a) : cas particuliers d’activité ual activity sexuelle [52] goldfinch suggests that relationship evidence is difficult to situate in s. 276(2) because it does not constitute “specific instances of sexual activity” (see also r v. rodney, 2008 canlii 5114 (ont. scj);. r v. arc, [2002] oj. no. 5364 (ql) (scj)). this position fails to recognize the purposes of the provision. [52] m. goldfinch avance que la preuve de la re- lation est difficile à situer dans le par. 276(2) parce qu’elle ne constitue pas des « cas particuliers d’acti- vité sexuelle » (voir aussi r c. rodney, 2008 canlii 5114 (csj. ont.); r c. arc, [2002] oj. no. 5364 (ql) (csj)). cette position ne tient pas compte des objets de la disposition. [53] the words “specific instances of sexual activ- ity” must be read in light of the scheme and broader purposes of s 276. the requirement that evidence be “specific” prevents aimless or sweeping inquiries into the complainant’s sexual history. the accused must point to identifiable activity, but the degree of specificity required in a particular case will de- pend on the nature of the evidence, how the accused intends to use it, and its potential to prejudice the proper administration of justice. as doherty ja. noted in ls, specificity is required so that judges may apply the scheme in a way that effectively pro- tects the rights of the complainant and ensures trial fairness. a purposive interpretation thus calls for evidence that is sufficiently specific to support a fully informed analysis, allowing the judge to cir- cumscribe what evidence may be adduced and how it may be used. [53] l’expression «  cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle » doit être interprétée à la lumière du ré- gime de l’art. 276 et de ses objectifs plus larges. l’exigence voulant que la preuve se rapporte à des cas « particuliers » empêche les questions inutiles ou d’une grande portée concernant le passé sexuel de la plaignante. l’accusé doit faire état d’une activité identifiable, mais le degré de particularité requis dans une affaire donnée dépendra de la nature de la preuve, de la façon dont l’accusé entend l’utiliser et de la pos- sibilité qu’elle ait un effet préjudiciable sur la bonne administration de la justice. comme l’a souligné le juge doherty dans ls, la précision est nécessaire pour que les juges soient en mesure d’appliquer le régime d’une manière qui protège efficacement les droits de la plaignante et assure l’équité du procès. une interprétation téléologique commande donc une preuve qui soit suffisamment particularisée pour sou- tenir une analyse bien éclairée, ce qui permettrait au juge de déterminer quelle preuve peut être produite et de quelle façon elle peut être utilisée. [54] evidence of a relationship that implies sexual activity, such as “friends with benefits”, as defined [54] la preuve de la relation supposant des activi- tés sexuelles, comme une relation d’« amis- amants », 34 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. by the accused here, inherently encompasses spe- cific instances of sexual activity. requiring further details would unnecessarily invade the complain- ant’s privacy, defeating an important objective of the provision. i agree with the statement in ls that specifying the parties to the relationship, the nature of that relationship and the relevant time period sat- isfies the purposes of trial fairness (para 83). those criteria are met in this case. telle que définie par l’accusé en l’espèce, com- prend nécessairement des cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle. exiger plus de détails porterait inutilement atteinte au droit à la vie privée de la plaignante, ce qui contrecarrerait un objectif important de la disposition. je souscris à l’énoncé dans ls selon lequel le fait de préciser les parties à la relation, la nature de cette relation et la période pertinente atteint l’objectif d’assurer l’équité du procès (par 83). il est clairement satisfait à ces critères en l’espèce. (b) section 276(2)(b): relevance to an issue at b) alinéa 276(2)b) : rapport avec un élément de trial la cause [55] turning to the second requirement, the impor- tance of relevance to an issue at trial is highlighted by the procedural safeguards inherent in the s. 276 regime. section 276.1(2) requires the accused to set out, in writing, the “detailed particulars” of the evi- dence to be adduced as well as the “relevance of th[e] evidence to an issue at trial”. the application judge must be satisfied that the evidence is capable of being admitted under s. 276(2) before ordering a voir dire (s 2761(4)(c)). judges who admit such evidence must also provide written reasons identifying the relevance of the evidence admitted (s 2762(3)(c))6. these procedural requirements reflect the fact that sexual assault prosecutions require heightened atten- tion to the general principle that no party should be allowed to distort the process by producing irrelevant evidence (darrach, at paras. 24 and 37). [55] en ce qui concerne la deuxième exigence, les garanties procédurales inhérentes au régime de l’art. 276 font ressortir l’importance que la preuve ait un rapport avec un élément de la cause. le para- graphe 276.1(2) exige que l’accusé énonce, par écrit, toutes les « précisions » au sujet de la preuve qu’il veut présenter ainsi que le « rapport de celle-ci avec un élément de la cause ». le juge saisi de la demande doit être convaincu que la preuve en cause est sus- ceptible d’être admise au titre du par. 276(2) avant d’ordonner la tenue d’un voir- dire (par 2761(4)). le juge qui admet une telle preuve doit également fournir des motifs écrits précisant la façon dont la preuve admise est en rapport avec un élément de la cause (al 2762(3)c)7). ces exigences procédurales témoignent du fait que les poursuites pour agression sexuelle nécessitent que l’on accorde une attention accrue à la règle générale selon laquelle il ne saurait être permis à une partie de dénaturer le processus en produisant des éléments de preuve non pertinents (darrach, par. 24 et 37). [56] it goes without saying that the “relevant is- sue” cannot be one of the twin myths prohibited by s 276(1)7. neither will generic references to the credibility of the accused or the complainant suffice. credibility is an issue that pervades most trials, and “[e]vidence of prior sexual activity will rarely be relevant to support a denial that sexual activity took place or to establish consent” (darrach, at para. 58; see also handy, at paras 115-16). arguments for [56] il va sans dire que le «  rapport  » entre la preuve et un élément de la cause ne peut être l’un des deux mythes interdits par le par 276(1)8. les al- lusions générales à la crédibilité de l’accusé ou de la plaignante ne suffisent pas non plus. la crédibilité est un élément omniprésent dans la plupart des procès, et « [l]a preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur sera rarement pertinente pour appuyer une dénégation que l’activité sexuelle a eu lieu ou pour établir le 6 now s 27894(4)(c). 7 this has been made explicit in the december 2018 amendments. 7 maintenant l’al 27894(4)c). 8 les modifications apportées en décembre 2018 ont rendu cette règle explicite. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 35 relevance must be scrutinized to ensure “context” is not simply a disguised myth. [57] that said, a relationship may provide relevant context quite apart from any sexual activity. where the relationship is defined as including sexual ac- tivity, as the trial judge held “friends with benefits” was here, it is critical that the relevance of the sexual nature of the relationship to an issue at trial be iden- tified with precision. [58] at the voir dire, goldfinch described rele- vance in general terms: the evidence was necessary for “context” or to prevent “faulty impressions”. he was not merely concerned with dispelling the notion that he and the complainant were strangers: he specifically sought to introduce the sexual nature of the relationship. the trial judge was clearly alive to the possibility that this could be used to support the twin myths. in the end, however, the trial judge concluded that the evidence was relevant because it put the relationship “in proper context”. in com- ing to this conclusion, she relied on r v. strickland (2007), 45 cr (6th) 183 (ont. scj). in that case, the trial judge reasoned that the probative value of “contextual” relationship evidence did not support an inference of “an increased likelihood of consent” but rather could dispel an inference of “the unlikelihood of consent” (para 35). consentement » (darrach, par. 58; voir aussi handy, par. 115- 116). il faut examiner minutieusement les arguments en faveur de la pertinence de la preuve afin de s’assurer que le « contexte » ne constitue pas simplement un mythe déguisé. [57] cela dit, la relation peut constituer un élément contextuel pertinent, indépendamment de toute acti- vité sexuelle. lorsque la relation est décrite comme comportant des activités sexuelles, comme c’était le cas de la relation d’« amis- amants » en l’espèce selon la juge du procès, il est essentiel que le rapport entre le caractère sexuel de la relation et un élément de la cause soit énoncé avec précision. [58] lors du voir- dire, m. goldfinch a cherché à établir un rapport général avec la cause : la preuve était nécessaire pour donner du [traduction] « con- texte » ou dissiper toute « fausse impression ». il ne se préoccupait pas seulement d’écarter l’idée selon laquelle lui et la plaignante étaient des étrangers : il visait précisément à présenter en preuve le carac- tère sexuel de la relation. la juge du procès était manifestement consciente de la possibilité que ces éléments de preuve soient utilisés pour étayer les deux mythes. toutefois, la juge du procès a fina- lement conclu que la preuve était pertinente parce qu’elle situait la relation [traduction] « dans le bon contexte ». pour parvenir à cette conclusion, elle s’est fondée sur la décision r c. strickland (2007), 45 cr (6th) 183 (csj. ont). dans cette décision, le juge du procès a conclu que la valeur probante de la preuve « contextuelle » de la relation n’étayait pas l’inférence selon laquelle il était [traduction] « plus probable qu’il y ait eu consentement », mais pouvait plutôt réfuter l’inférence selon laquelle il était « improbable qu’il y ait eu consentement » (par 35). [59] with respect, that is a distinction without a difference. three paragraphs from strickland illus- trate why: [59] soit dit en tout respect, il s’agit d’une distinc- tion vide de sens. les trois paragraphes suivants de la décision strickland montrent pourquoi : it can be said that, as a general rule, people do not have sexual intercourse with complete strangers. generally speaking, sexual partners are involved in a relationship of some sort   . what does matter is that, at some point, each partner has made an assessment of the other, and decided [traduction] on peut dire que, en règle générale, les gens n’ont pas des rapports sexuels avec de parfaits étrangers. de façon générale, les partenaires sexuels entre- tiennent une certaine forme de relation. [  ]. ce qui importe, c’est que, à un moment donné, chaque partenaire s’est fait 36 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. that that person is a suitable person with whom to share this most intimate human experience. une opinion sur l’autre et a décidé qu’il voulait vivre cette expérience humaine des plus intimes avec cette personne. it is the fact that such a decision was made in the past by the complainant that is relevant   . it is this fact that makes it at least somewhat more probable that a complain- ant would consent to having sex with a man with whom she had an existing sexual relationship, than if no such relationship existed at all. c’est le fait que la plaignante ait pris une telle décision par le passé qui est pertinent. [  ]. c’est ce qui rend au moins un peu plus probable que la plaignante ait consenti à avoir des rapports sexuels avec un homme avec lequel elle entretenait déjà une relation de nature sexuelle, qu’elle consente à de tels rapports avec cet homme s’il n’existait aucune relation entre elle et lui.   .   . to restate in the language of darrach, the inference of an increased likelihood of consent does not flow from the sexual nature of the activity, but rather from the ex- istence of a relationship in which that activity took place. [paras. 27-28 and 30] pour paraphraser l’arrêt darrach, l’inférence selon laquelle il est plus probable qu’il y ait eu consentement ne découle pas du caractère sexuel de l’activité, mais plutôt de l’existence d’une relation dans le cadre de laquelle a eu lieu cette activité. [par. 27-28 et 30] [60] it is difficult to conceive of a more clear in- stance of twin- myth reasoning than the proposition that because the complainant had “at some point” consented to be intimate with the accused, it was “more probable” that she would have done so again. [61] moreover, while the case law provides exam- ples of how evidence of previous sexual activity be- tween an accused and a complainant may be relevant to an issue at trial, none of them apply here. [62] prior sexual activity may be particularly rel- evant to a defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent (seaboyer, at pp. 613-16; darrach, at para. 59; barton, at paras. 91 et seq). however, an honest but mistaken belief cannot sim- ply rest upon evidence that a person consented at “some point” in the past: that would be twin- myth reasoning. by definition, the defence must rely upon evidence of how the complainant previously commu- nicated consent so that the accused can adequately support a belief that consent was expressed. here, the trial judge properly instructed the jury not to rely on the “friends with benefits” evidence in evaluating the defence of honest but mistaken belief. [60] j’ai peine à imaginer un exemple plus clair d’un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes que la thèse voulant que, parce que la plaignante avait [tra- duction] « à un moment donné » consenti à avoir des rapports intimes avec l’accusé, il était « plus probable » qu’elle y consente de nouveau. [61] de plus, même si la jurisprudence offre des exemples de la façon dont la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle antérieure entre un accusé et une plaignante peut être en rapport avec un élément de la cause, aucun de ceux-ci ne s’applique en l’espèce. [62] une activité sexuelle antérieure peut être par- ticulièrement pertinente dans le cas d’une défense de croyance sincère mais erronée au consentement com- muniqué (seaboyer, p. 613- 616; darrach, par. 59; barton, par. 91 et suiv). cependant, la croyance sin- cère mais erronée ne peut pas simplement reposer sur la preuve que la personne a donné son consentement à un « moment donné » dans le passé : il s’agirait d’un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes. par définition, la défense doit se fonder sur une preuve de la façon dont la plaignante a antérieurement com- muniqué son consentement pour que l’accusé puisse adéquatement étayer sa croyance à un consentement exprimé. en l’espèce, la juge du procès a eu raison d’indiquer aux jurés de ne pas se fonder sur la preuve concernant la relation d’« amis- amants » pour ap- précier la défense de croyance sincère mais erronée. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 37 [63] evidence of a sexual relationship may also be relevant when complainants have offered inconsistent statements regarding the very existence of a sexual relationship with the accused (see, eg,. r v. harris (1997), 118 ccc (3d) 498 (ont. ca);. r v. te­ mertzoglou (2002), 11 cr (6th) 179 (ont. scj)). there were no such contradictory statements from the complainant in the record at the time of the voir dire and goldfinch did not proceed on this basis. [64] to the extent that goldfinch sought to establish a pattern of behaviour, the “pattern” here was hardly distinctive; it would not be admissible as similar fact evidence (handy, at paras. 82, 127 and 131). as i have noted, the limited admissibility of similar fact evidence protects the truth- seeking function of the trial by excluding evidence that is overly prejudicial to the accused. by imposing the same evidentiary standard under s. 276, neither the accused nor the complainant is denied equal protection of the law on the basis of lifestyle, character or reputation (craig, “section 276 misconstrued”, at p 71). [65] finally, goldfinch submits that the sexual aspect of a relationship may be relevant to the co- herence of the accused’s narrative, and by extension, credibility. there will, of course, be circumstances in which context will be relevant for the jury to properly understand and assess the evidence. that assessment, however, must be free of twin- myth reasoning. gen- eral arguments that the sexual nature of a relationship is relevant to context, narrative or credibility will not suffice to bring the evidence within the purview of s 276(2). [66] that goldfinch points to only two cases in which evidence was admitted as necessary “con- text” illustrates the rarity of such circumstances (temertzoglou; r v. m (m) (1999), 29 cr (5th) 85 (ont. scj)). in both of these cases, the evidence admitted was fundamental to the coherence of the defence narrative. it was not merely helpful context. this was not the case here. [63] la preuve d’une relation à caractère sexuel peut également être pertinente lorsque la plaignante a fait des déclarations contradictoires concernant l’existence même d’une telle relation avec l’accusé (voir, p ex,. r c. harris (1997), 118 ccc (3d) 498 (ca. ont.); r c. temertzoglou (2002), 11 cr (6th) 179 (csj. ont)). dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, il n’y avait aucune déclaration contradictoire de la plaignante dans le dossier au moment du voir- dire et m. goldfinch ne s’est pas fondé sur un tel argument. [64] dans la mesure où m. goldfinch cherchait à établir l’existence d’un mode de comportement, le « mode » en l’espèce n’était guère distinctif; il ne serait pas admissible à titre de preuve de faits similaires (handy, par. 82, 127 et 131). comme je l’ai souligné, l’admissibilité limitée de la preuve de faits similaires protège la fonction de recherche de la vérité du procès par l’exclusion des éléments de preuve qui sont trop préjudiciables à l’accusé. en imposant la même norme de preuve, l’art. 276 fait en sorte que ni l’accusé ni la plaignante ne sont privés de la protection de la loi en raison de leur mode de vie, de leur moralité ou de leur réputation (craig, « section 276 misconstrued », p 71). [65] enfin, m.  goldfinch affirme que l’aspect sexuel d’une relation peut être pertinent pour la co- hérence du récit de l’accusé, et par extension, pour sa crédibilité. il peut certes y avoir des circonstances où le contexte sera pertinent pour permettre au jury de bien comprendre et apprécier la preuve, mais cette appréciation ne doit pas reposer sur un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes. des arguments généraux selon lesquels le caractère sexuel de la relation a un lien avec le contexte, le récit ou la crédibilité ne suffiront pas à rendre la preuve admissible sous le régime du par 276(2). [66] le fait que m. goldfinch ne cite que deux dé- cisions dans lesquelles la preuve a été admise à titre de « contexte » nécessaire témoigne de la rareté de ce type de circonstances (temertzoglou; r c. m (m) (1999), 29 cr (5th) 85 (csj. ont)). dans ces deux décisions, la preuve admise était fondamen- tale pour la cohérence du récit de la défense; elle ne constituait pas simplement un élément contextuel utile. ce n’était pas le cas en l’espèce. 38 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. [67] before this court, goldfinch sought to articu- late specific issues which made the sexual nature of the relationship critical to his defence. he advanced that his narrative would be inherently improbable if the jury did not know he and the complainant were “friends with benefits”. among other things, he argued that the evidence was relevant to the ju- ry’s assessment of the complainant’s call suggesting goldfinch owed her “birthday sex” as well as to his testimony that the complainant smiled when he mouthed “i’m going to fuck you”. [68] in my view, there is nothing about goldfinch’s testimony that casts him in an unfavourable light or renders his narrative untenable or utterly improbable absent the information that the two were “friends with benefits”. the complainant’s request for “birth- day sex” does not reflect on goldfinch’s character or behaviour. as well, her reaction to his comment was a smile — hardly an indication that this behaviour was beyond the pale of their relationship. tellingly, the complainant did not deny the call, goldfinch’s comment or the smile. [67] devant la cour, m.  goldfinch a tenté de formuler les questions précises qui faisaient en sorte que le caractère sexuel de sa relation avec la plaignante était un élément essentiel de sa défense. il a fait valoir que son récit serait intrinsèquement improbable si le jury ne savait pas que la plaignante et lui entretenaient une relation d’« amis- amants ». notamment, il a soutenu que la preuve était perti- nente pour l’appréciation par le jury de l’appel que lui avait fait la plaignante afin de lui dire qu’il lui devait du « sexe pour son anniversaire » ainsi que de son témoignage selon lequel la plaignante avait souri quand il avait articulé en silence « je vais te baiser ». [68] à mon avis, aucun élément du témoignage de m. goldfinch ne le présente sous un mauvais jour ou ne rend son récit indéfendable ou complètement improbable si on ne sait pas que la plaignante et lui entretenaient une relation d’« amis- amants ». le fait que la plaignante ait demandé du « sexe pour son an- niversaire » n’a aucune incidence sur la moralité ou le comportement de m goldfinch. en outre, celle-ci a répondu à son commentaire par un sourire — ce qui n’indique guère que ce comportement était inac- ceptable dans le cadre de leur relation. qui plus est, la plaignante n’a pas nié avoir fait l’appel, ni le fait que m. goldfinch ait dit ce commentaire, ni le fait qu’elle lui avait souri. (c) section 276(2)(c): balancing probative value and prejudice to the proper administration of justice c) alinéa 276(2)c) : la mise en balance de la valeur probante et de l’effet préjudiciable à la bonne administration de la justice [69] the final step in the s. 276 analysis requires judges to balance the probative value of proposed evidence against the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice, taking into account the factors set out in s 276(3). both considerations must receive heightened attention as “[the test]   . serves to direct judges to the serious ramifications of the use of evidence of prior sexual activity for all parties” (darrach, at para 40). balancing the s. 276(3) factors ultimately depends on the nature of the evidence being adduced and the factual matrix of the case. it will depend, in part, on how important the evidence is to the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. for example, the relative value [69] la dernière étape de l’analyse fondée sur l’art. 276 exige que le juge mette en balance la valeur probante de la preuve proposée et le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne administration de la justice, compte tenu des facteurs énoncés au par 276(3). ces deux considérations requièrent une attention accrue car « [le critère] [  ] sert à indiquer aux juges les graves conséquences de l’utilisation de la preuve du comportement sexuel antérieur sur toutes les parties dans ces affaires » (darrach, par 40). la mise en balance des facteurs énoncés au par. 276(3) dépend ultimement de la nature de la preuve qui est produite et du fondement factuel de l’affaire. elle dépend, en partie, de l’importance de la preuve eu [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch la juge karakatsanis 39 of sexual history evidence will be significantly re- duced if the accused can advance a particular theory without referring to that history. in contrast, where that evidence directly implicates the accused’s ability to raise a reasonable doubt, the evidence is obvi- ously fundamental to full answer and defence (mills, at paras. 71 and 94). this was not the case here: goldfinch’s right to full answer and defence would not have been compromised by excluding the sexual nature of the relationship. [70] indeed, having found that the “friends with benefits” evidence was not relevant to an issue at trial, it follows that it has no probative value. the evidence was relevant only to suggest that the com- plainant was more likely to have consented because she had done so in the past. thus the evidence went only to the twin myths which, as gonthier j. held in darrach, are “not probative of consent or credibility and can severely distort the trial process” (para 33). égard au droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière. par exemple, la valeur relative de la preuve concernant le passé sexuel sera considérablement ré- duite si l’accusé peut défendre une thèse donnée sans faire état de ce passé. en revanche, lorsque la preuve implique directement la capacité de l’accusé de sou- lever un doute raisonnable, il est évident que cette preuve devient un élément fondamental de la défense pleine et entière (mills, par. 71 et 94). ce n’était pas le cas en l’espèce : le droit de m. goldfinch à une défense pleine et entière n’aurait pas été compromis par l’exclusion de la preuve du caractère sexuel de la relation. [70] de fait, ayant conclu que la preuve de la rela- tion d’« amis- amants » n’était pas en rapport avec un élément de la cause, je conclus également qu’elle n’a pas de valeur probante. cette preuve n’était pertinente que pour laisser entendre que la plaignante était plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité sexuelle parce qu’elle l’avait fait dans le passé. par conséquent, la preuve ne servait qu’à alimenter les deux mythes qui, comme l’a affirmé le juge gonthier dans darrach, ne sont « pas probants quant au consentement ou à la crédibilité, et [  ] peuvent dénaturer gravement le procès » (par 33). c r v. graveline, 2006 scc 16, [2006] 1 scr. c r c. graveline, 2006 csc 16, [2006] 1 rcs. 609 609 [71] the improper admission of relationship ev- idence from which sexual activity may be inferred risks infecting a trial with the precise prejudicial assumptions s. 276 is designed to weed out. [71] l’admission irrégulière de la preuve d’une relation de laquelle on peut inférer qu’il y a eu des activités sexuelles risque de vicier le procès en intro- duisant les idées reçues préjudiciables que l’art. 276 vise justement à écarter. [72] in the case at bar, the “context” laid out be- fore the jury was clearly infected with twin- myth reasoning. the jury should not have been privy to particulars regarding the frequency of the sexual contact or goldfinch’s testimony characterizing the evening as “typical” or “routine”. that evidence clearly engages twin- myth reasoning by suggesting that because the complainant had “typically” con- sented to sex with goldfinch in the past, she was more likely to have done so on this “routine” occa- sion. admitting that evidence was a reversible error of law which might reasonably be thought to have [72] dans la présente affaire, la preuve du « con- texte » présentée au jury était manifestement viciée par un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes. le jury n’aurait pas dû être au courant des détails concernant la fréquence des rapports sexuels ou du témoignage de m. goldfinch caractérisant la soirée d’« habituelle » ou de « typique ». cette preuve invoque manifestement un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes, car elle laisse entendre que parce que la plaignante avait « habituellement » consenti à avoir des rapports sexuels avec m. goldfinch par le passé, elle était plus susceptible d’avoir consenti 40 r v goldfinch karakatsanis j. [2019] 3 scr. had a material bearing on the acquittal (graveline, at para 14). à un tel rapport lors de cette soirée «  typique  ». l’admission de cette preuve constituait une erreur de droit justifiant l’annulation de la décision, et on peut raisonnablement penser que cette erreur a eu une incidence significative sur le verdict d’acquitte- ment (graveline, par 14). d final comments d dernières observations [73] evidence of sexual relationships must be han- dled with care in sexual assault trials. [74] where a trial judge is concerned that the jury may improperly speculate about past sexual activ- ity, it may be helpful to give an instruction speci- fying that the jury will not hear any evidence about whether the relationship included a sexual aspect. the instruction should explain that the details of previous sexual interactions are simply not relevant to the determination of whether the complainant consented to the act in question. no means no, and only yes means yes: even in the context of an estab- lished relationship, even part way through a sexual encounter, and even if the act is one the complainant has routinely consented to in the past. giving such an instruction would both reinforce the principles which guide a proper analysis of consent and mitigate the risk that jurors will rely on their own conceptions of what sexual activity is “typical” in a given rela- tionship. [73] la preuve d’une relation à caractère sexuel doit être utilisée avec prudence lors d’un procès pour agression sexuelle. [74] lorsque le juge du procès craint que les jurés puissent conjecturer à tort sur une activité sexuelle antérieure de la plaignante, il peut être utile de leur donner une directive précisant qu’ils n’entendront aucun témoignage quant à savoir si la relation com- prenait un aspect sexuel. dans sa directive, le juge du procès devrait expliquer que les détails des rapports sexuels antérieurs ne sont tout simplement pas per- tinents pour la décision de savoir si la plaignante a consenti à l’acte en question. non veut dire non, et seul oui veut dire oui : même dans le contexte d’une relation établie, même au beau milieu d’un rapport sexuel, et même si l’acte en question en est un auquel la plaignante a régulièrement consenti dans le passé. le fait de donner une telle directive permettrait à la fois de renforcer les principes qui régissent l’analyse adéquate du consentement et de réduire le risque que les jurés se fondent sur leurs propres conceptions de ce qui constitue une activité sexuelle « typique » dans une relation donnée. [75] how evidence is to be adduced may also im- pact trial fairness. much of the evidence that ulti- mately came out in this case was adduced during the crown’s examination of the complainant and, to a lesser degree, its cross- examination of gold- finch. this requires two observations. first, i note that crown counsel would not have adduced this evidence but for the s. 276 application, which i have concluded should not have been granted. while the parties did not have the benefit of this court’s recent holding in barton, i would reiterate that crown- led evidence of prior sexual activity must be governed by the principles set out in s. 276(1) and seaboyer (barton, at paras. 68, 80 and 197). second, proper [75] comment la preuve doit être présentée peut également avoir une incidence sur l’équité du pro- cès. une grande partie de la preuve qui a finalement été présentée en l’espèce l’a été lors de l’interroga- toire de la plaignante par la couronne et, dans une moindre mesure, lors du contre- interrogatoire de m. goldfinch par celle-ci. deux observations s’im- posent à ce sujet. d’abord, je note que la procureure de la couronne n’aurait pas présenté cette preuve si ce n’était de la demande fondée sur l’art. 276 qui, comme je l’ai conclu, n’aurait pas dû être accueil- lie. bien que les parties n’aient pas bénéficié de la décision récente de notre cour dans barton, je tiens à réitérer que la preuve présentée par la couronne [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 41 management of evidence which falls within the scope of the s. 276 regime requires vigilance from all trial participants, but especially trial judges — the ultimate evidentiary gatekeepers. leading evidence through an agreed statement of facts, as the trial judge suggested here, is one way to do so. concernant une activité sexuelle antérieure doit être régie par les principes énoncés au par.  276(1) et dans l’arrêt seaboyer (barton, par. 68, 80 et 197). ensuite, les différents participants à un procès, mais plus particulièrement les juges du procès — les gar- diens ultimes de la preuve — doivent faire preuve de vigilance pour assurer le traitement approprié de la preuve qui relève de l’art 276. la présentation de la preuve au moyen d’un exposé conjoint des faits, comme l’a proposé la juge du procès en l’espèce, constitue une façon de le faire. [76] i would dismiss the appeal. [76] je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. the reasons of moldaver and rowe jj. were de- version française des motifs des juges moldaver livered by moldaver j. — i overview et rowe rendus par le juge moldaver — i aperçu [77] this case raises the difficult yet important issue of whether — and if so, to what extent — ev- idence of an ongoing sexual relationship between the accused and the complainant is admissible in a sexual assault trial. [78] the complainant in this case alleges that on may 28, 2014, the appellant, patrick john goldfinch, sexually assaulted her in his home. the incident resulted in mr. goldfinch being charged with both assault and sexual assault. mr. goldfinch maintained his innocence, claiming that the sexual activity in question was consensual. [77] le présent pourvoi soulève la question dif- ficile, mais importante, de savoir si  — et le cas échéant, dans quelle mesure — la preuve d’une re- lation continue à caractère sexuel entre l’accusé et la plaignante est admissible dans un procès pour agression sexuelle. [78] la plaignante en l’espèce soutient que, le 28 mai 2014, l’appelant, patrick john goldfinch, l’a agressée sexuellement alors qu’ils étaient chez lui. par suite de cet incident, m. goldfinch a été accusé à la fois de voies de fait et d’agression sexuelle. m. goldfinch clame son innocence, af- firmant que l’activité sexuelle en question était consensuelle. [79] at trial, mr. goldfinch applied under s 2761 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46 (“code”),8 to adduce evidence that at the time of the alleged sexual assault, he and the complainant were in a “friends with benefits” relationship that involved occasional sex. the crown opposed the admission of this evi- dence. following a voir dire, the trial judge ruled that the evidence was admissible for the dual purposes of providing context to the events in question and [79] au procès, m.  goldfinch s’est fondé sur l’art 2761 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46 (« code »9) pour demander l’autorisation de pré- senter une preuve établissant qu’au moment de l’agression sexuelle reprochée, la plaignante et lui entretenaient une relation [traduction] « amis- amants » qui comportait des relations sexuelles occa- sionnelles. la cou ronne s’est opposée à l’admission de cette preuve. à l’issue d’un voir- dire, la juge 8 all section number references are to the code. 9 toutes les dispositions citées sont des dispositions du code. 42 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. avoiding an erroneous misapprehension on the part of the jury that mr. goldfinch and the complainant were platonic friends. the trial ended with the jury acquit- ting mr. goldfinch of both assault and sexual assault. [80] the crown appealed mr. goldfinch’s acquit- tals to the alberta court of appeal. a majority of that court overturned the acquittals, holding that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the nature of mr. goldfinch’s relationship with the complainant — “friends with benefits” — at the time of the alleged assault. in the majority’s view, this evidence was in- admissible because it did nothing more than advance one of the twin myths prohibited by s. 276(1) — namely, that the complainant was more likely to have consented on the night in question because she had previously engaged in sex with mr goldfinch. justice berger dissented. in his view, the impugned evidence was admissible under s. 276(2) because it was integral to mr. goldfinch’s ability to make full answer and defence. mr. goldfinch now appeals to this court as of right. [81] the s. 276 regime is sometimes viewed as a zero- sum game pitting the rights of the complainant against those of the accused. but in my respectful view, this is a mischaracterization. the s. 276 regime is designed to respect and preserve the rights of both complainants and accused persons by excluding evi- dence which would undermine the legitimacy of our criminal justice system and inhibit the search for truth, while allowing for the admission of evidence which would enhance the legitimacy of our criminal justice system and promote the search for truth. in this way, the regime seeks to promote the integrity of the trial process as a whole — a concept that is essential to the public’s faith in the criminal justice system. du procès a conclu que la preuve était admissible d’une part afin de permettre une mise en contexte des événements en cause, et d’autre part afin d’éviter que le jury croit, en raison d’une interprétation erronée, que m. goldfinch et la plaignante entretenaient une relation platonique. à la fin du procès, le jury a ac- quitté m. goldfinch des accusations de voies de fait et d’agression sexuelle. [80] la couronne a interjeté appel des acquitte- ments de m. goldfinch à la cour d’appel de l’al- berta. les juges majoritaires de cette cour ont infirmé les acquittements, statuant que la juge du procès avait commis une erreur en admettant la preuve re- lative au caractère de la relation que m. goldfinch entretenait avec la plaignante — « amis- amants » — au moment de l’agression reprochée. selon les juges majoritaires, cette preuve était inadmissible parce qu’elle ne faisait qu’étayer l’un des deux mythes qu’interdit le par. 276(1) — à savoir que la plai- gnante était plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité sexuelle le soir en question parce qu’elle avait déjà eu des relations sexuelles avec m. gold- finch. le juge berger était dissident. à son avis, la preuve en cause était admissible en application du par. 276(2) parce qu’elle était essentielle à la capa- cité de m. goldfinch de présenter une défense pleine et entière. m. goldfinch se pourvoit maintenant de plein droit devant notre cour. [81] le régime établi par l’art. 276 est parfois con- sidéré comme un jeu à somme nulle opposant les droits de la plaignante à ceux de l’accusé. or, il s’agit à mon avis d’une caractérisation erronée. le régime établi par l’art. 276 vise à assurer le respect et la protection des droits des plaignantes aussi bien que ceux des accusés, en excluant des éléments de preuve susceptibles de compromettre la légitimité de notre système de justice criminelle et d’entraver la recherche de la vérité, tout en permettant la pré- sentation d’éléments de preuve qui renforceraient la légitimité de notre système de justice criminelle et favoriseraient la recherche de la vérité. de cette façon, le régime vise à promouvoir l’intégrité du procès dans son ensemble — un concept essentiel à la confiance du public dans le système de justice criminelle. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 43 in pursuing this objective, the s. 276 regime [82] operates in a step-by- step manner. from the accused’s initial application under s 2761 to the final limiting instruction required by s 2764, the s. 276 regime es- tablishes a rigorous, multistep process through which sexual activity evidence adduced by or on behalf of the accused must be carefully vetted and winnowed down to its essentials. to make its way into evidence at trial, such evidence must withstand careful scrutiny at each stage of the process. [83] as i will explain, for sexual activity evidence to be admitted under s. 276(2), the accused must demonstrate, at a minimum, that the evidence goes to a legitimate aspect of his defence and is integral to his ability to make full answer and defence. this requires that the accused be able to identify specific facts or issues relating to his defence that can be properly understood and resolved by the trier of fact only if reference is made to the sexual activity evidence in question. further, to the extent sexual activity evidence is ultimately admitted, the trial judge must explain to the jury, in clear and precise terms, the uses for which the evidence may — and may not — be used. finally, all trial participants — including the trial judge, crown and defence counsel, and witnesses — must hew to the specific, legitimate purpose for which the evidence has been admitted, without expanding the scope of the ruling or using the admissible evidence for inadmissible purposes. this is essential to preserving not only the rights of the accused and the complainant, but also the integ- rity of the trial process as a whole. [82] en vue de l’atteinte de cet objectif, le régime de l’art. 276 fonctionne par étapes. de la demande initiale de l’accusé fondée sur l’art 2761 jusqu’aux directives restrictives qu’exige l’art 2764, le régime de l’art. 276 établit un processus strict à plusieurs étapes au cours duquel la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle présentée par l’accusé ou son repré- sentant doit être soigneusement examinée et ramenée à l’essentiel. pour pouvoir être présentée au procès, une telle preuve doit résister à un examen minutieux à chaque étape du processus. [83] comme je vais l’expliquer, pour que la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle soit admise en appli- cation du par. 276(2), l’accusé doit au moins démon- trer que cette preuve s’attache à un aspect légitime de sa défense et qu’elle est essentielle à sa capacité de présenter une défense pleine et entière. pour cela, l’accusé doit pouvoir cerner les questions ou faits précis liés à sa défense que le juge des faits ne pour- rait résoudre ou comprendre adéquatement que s’il est fait référence à la preuve en cause concernant une activité sexuelle. par ailleurs, dans la mesure où la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle est finalement admise, le juge du procès doit expliquer au jury, en termes clairs et précis, les fins auxquelles celle-ci peut — et ne peut pas — être utilisée. enfin, tous les participants au procès — y compris le juge, les avocats de la poursuite et de la défense, et les té- moins — doivent s’en tenir à la fin précise et légitime pour laquelle la preuve a été admise, sans élargir la portée de la décision ou utiliser la preuve admissible à des fins inadmissibles. cela est essentiel non seu- lement pour protéger les droits de l’accusé et de la plaignante, mais aussi pour préserver l’intégrité du procès dans son ensemble. [84] in the case at hand, for reasons that follow, i am respectfully of the view that the trial judge erred in admitting the “friends with benefits” ev- idence under s.  276, having particular regard to the manifest deficiencies in mr.  goldfinch’s ap- plication to introduce this evidence. furthermore, the improper admission of this evidence for the broad purpose of providing “context” led to a sig- nificant and highly prejudicial broadening of the sexual activity evidence at trial. this, in my view, might reasonably have had a material bearing on [84] dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, et pour les motifs qui suivent, j’estime avec égards que la juge du procès a commis une erreur en admettant la preuve de la relation « amis- amants » en appli- cation de l’art. 276, compte tenu notamment des lacunes évidentes dans la demande d’autorisation de m.  goldfinch visant la présentation de cette preuve. qui plus est, l’admission injustifiée de cet élément de preuve à des fins générales de mise en « contexte » a mené à un élargissement important et hautement préjudiciable de la preuve concernant 44 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. mr.  goldfinch’s acquittal i would therefore dis- miss the appeal. une activité sexuelle présentée au procès, ce qui, à mon avis, pourrait raisonnablement avoir eu une incidence significative sur le verdict d’acquittement de m goldfinch. je rejetterais donc le pourvoi. ii facts and decisions below ii faits et décisions des juridictions inférieures [85] my colleague justice karakatsanis has sum- marized the facts and decisions below in her reasons, and i see no need to replicate her work. i will there- fore proceed directly to the issues on appeal. [85] ma collègue la juge karakatsanis résume les faits et les décisions des juridictions inférieures dans ses motifs, et je ne vois pas la nécessité de les exposer à mon tour. je passerai donc directement aux ques- tions soulevées dans le présent pourvoi. iii issues iii questions en litige [86] this appeal raises two issues: [86] le présent pourvoi soulève deux questions : (1) did the trial judge err in admitting under s. 276 evidence of the sexual nature of mr. goldfinch’s relationship with the complainant at the time of the alleged sexual assault? (2) if so, could this error reasonably be thought to have had a material bearing on mr. goldfinch’s acquittal such that a new trial is warranted? (1) la juge du procès a-t-elle commis une erreur en admettant en vertu de l’art. 276 la preuve relative au caractère sexuel de la relation qu’entrete- naient m. goldfinch et la plaignante au moment où l’agression sexuelle aurait été commise? (2) dans l’affirmative, peut-on raisonnablement pen- ser que cette erreur a eu une incidence significative sur le verdict d’acquittement de m. goldfinch, de sorte que la tenue d’un nouveau procès est justi- fiée? iv analysis iv analyse [87] before commencing my analysis, i would point out that my colleague karakatsanis j. and i align on many if not most of the core principles governing the s. 276 regime. the main point that separates us is that while my colleague concludes that the sexual activity evidence in question — the existence of a “friends with benefits” relationship — is categorically barred from being admitted under s. 276, i take a more nuanced approach. in particular, as i will explain at paras. 121- 125 of these reasons, i would leave open the question of whether the presid- ing judge at the new trial might, if presented with a properly framed s 2761 application, admit the evi- dence after applying the test and weighing the factors set out in s. 276(2) and (3). having foreshadowed these points, i turn to my analysis. [87] avant de commencer mon analyse, j’aimerais souligner que ma collègue la juge karakatsanis et moi- même nous entendons sur plusieurs, voire la plupart, des principes essentiels régissant le régime établi par l’art 276. le principal point qui nous divise est que ma collègue conclut que la preuve en question concer- nant une activité sexuelle — l’existence d’une relation « amis- amants » — ne peut absolument pas être ad- mise sous le régime de l’art. 276, alors que j’adopte une approche plus nuancée. plus particulièrement, comme je l’explique aux par. 121- 125 des présents motifs, je ne trancherais pas la question de savoir si le juge qui préside l’audience lors du nouveau procès, dans le cas où une demande dûment formulée confor- mément à l’art 2761 lui est présentée, admettrait la preuve après avoir appliqué le critère et soupesé les facteurs énoncés aux par. 276(2) et (3). ces précisions étant apportées, je procéderai maintenant à l’analyse. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 45 a overview of the section 276 regime9 a aperçu du régime établi par l’art. 27610 [88] section 276 of the code governs the admis- sibility of evidence of the complainant’s sexual ac- tivity other than that which forms the subject- matter of the charge. in these reasons, i will refer to such evidence simply as “sexual activity evidence”.10 as i will explain, the various components of the s. 276 regime work in harmony to root out stereotypical and discriminatory reasoning and preserve the integrity of the trial process. [88] l’article 276 du code régit l’admissibilité de la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle de la plaignante autre que celle à l’origine de l’accusation en cause. dans les présents motifs, je désignerai simplement cette preuve sous le nom de « preuve concernant une activité sexuelle »11. comme je vais l’expliquer, les différents éléments du régime établi par l’art. 276 s’harmonisent de façon à écarter tout raisonnement stéréotypé et discriminatoire et à pré- server l’intégrité du procès. [89] section 276(1) reads: [89] le paragraphe 276(1) se lit comme suit : evidence of complainant’s sexual activity preuve concernant le comportement sexuel du plai- gnant 276 (1) in proceedings in respect of an offence under sec- tion 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 170, 171, 172, 173, 271, 272 or 273, evi- dence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant 276 (1) dans les poursuites pour une infraction prévue aux articles 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155 ou 159, aux para- graphes 160(2) ou (3) ou aux articles 170, 171, 172, 173, 271, 272 ou 273, la preuve de ce que le plaignant a eu une activité sexuelle avec l’accusé ou un tiers est inadmissible pour permettre de déduire du caractère sexuel de cette activité qu’il est : (a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual ac- tivity that forms the subject-matter of the charge; or a) soit plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité à l’origine de l’accusation; (b) is less worthy of belief. b) soit moins digne de foi. [90] stated succinctly, this provision prohibits the use of sexual activity evidence to support one of the twin myths identified by this court in r v. seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577. in doing so, it gives effect to the principle that these myths “are simply not relevant at trial” and “can severely distort the trial process” (r v. darrach, 2000 scc 46, [2000] 2 scr 443, at para 33). accordingly, if the sole purpose for which sexual activity evidence is being proffered is [90] en résumé, cette disposition interdit l’utilisa- tion d’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle à l’appui de l’un des deux mythes décrits par notre cour dans l’arrêt r c. seaboyer, [1991] 2 rcs 577. ce faisant, elle donne effet au principe selon lequel ces mythes « ne sont simplement pas pertinents au procès » et « peuvent dénaturer gravement le procès » (r c. darrach, 2000 csc 46, [2000] 2 rcs 443, par 33). par conséquent, si la preuve concernant une 9 on december 13, 2018, various amendments to the s. 276 regime came into force. these reasons deal with the s. 276 regime as it existed before that date. 10 this type of evidence is often referred to as “prior sexual history evidence”. however, i will use the phrase “sexual activity evi- dence” in these reasons to reflect the fact that such evidence can also relate to sexual activity that is ongoing or takes place after the alleged offence. 10 le 13 décembre 2018, diverses modifications au régime établi par l’art. 276 sont entrées en vigueur les présents motifs portent sur le régime établi par l’art. 276 tel qu’il existait avant cette date. 11 ce type de preuve est souvent appelée « preuve concernant un comportement sexuel antérieur » cependant, j’utiliserai l’ex- pression « preuve concernant une activité sexuelle » dans les présents motifs afin de rendre compte du fait qu’une telle preuve peut également viser une activité sexuelle dans le cadre d’une relation en cours au moment de l’infraction alléguée ou une activité sexuelle postérieure à celle-ci. 46 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. to support either of the twin myths, it will be ruled inadmissible under s. 276(1) — it is as simple as that. [91] but that does not mean sexual activity ev- idence will always be ruled inadmissible. where the accused can identify a legitimate purpose for introducing the evidence — one that does not in- volve twin- myth reasoning — admission remains a possibility. in this regard, s. 276(2) provides that while sexual activity evidence adduced by or on behalf of the accused is presumptively inadmissible, regardless of the purpose for which it is proffered, such evidence may be admitted where it satisfies a three- part test: activité sexuelle n’est présentée que pour étayer l’un des deux mythes, elle sera jugée inadmissible en ap- plication du par. 276(1) — c’est aussi simple que cela. [91] toutefois, cela ne veut pas dire que la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle sera toujours jugée inadmissible. si l’accusé peut indiquer une fin légi- time justifiant la présentation de la preuve — une qui ne repose pas sur un raisonnement fondé les deux mythes — il est possible que celle-ci soit admise. à cet égard, le par. 276(2) dispose que, bien que la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle présentée par l’accusé ou son représentant soit présumée inadmis- sible, peu importe la fin à laquelle elle est présentée, elle peut être admise si elle respecte le test en trois volets suivant : conditions for admissibility conditions de l’admissibilité 276 (2) in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (1), no evidence shall be adduced by or on behalf of the accused that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject- matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any other person, unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice determines, in accordance with the proce- dures set out in sections 276.1 and 276.2, that the evidence (a) is of specific instances of sexual activity; (b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and 276 (2) dans les poursuites visées au paragraphe (1), l’accusé ou son représentant ne peut présenter de preuve de ce que le plaignant a eu une activité sexuelle autre que celle à l’origine de l’accusation sauf si le juge, le juge de la cour provinciale ou le juge de paix décide, conformément aux articles 276.1 et 276.2, à la fois : a) que cette preuve porte sur des cas particuliers d’ac- tivité sexuelle; b) que cette preuve est en rapport avec un élément de la cause; (c) has significant probative value that is not substan- tially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. c) que le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne admi- nistration de la justice de cette preuve ne l’emporte pas sensiblement sur sa valeur probante. [92] in undertaking the analysis required by s. 276(2), the trial judge tasked with making a ruling on admis- sibility must take into account the factors listed in s. 276(3): [92] lorsqu’il procède à l’analyse que commande le par. 276(2), le juge du procès à qui il incombe de décider de l’admissibilité de la preuve doit prendre en considération les facteurs énumérés au par. 276(3) : (a) the interests of justice, including the right of the ac- cused to make a full answer and defence; a) l’intérêt de la justice, y compris le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière; (b) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sex- ual assault offences; b) l’intérêt de la société à encourager la dénonciation des agressions sexuelles; [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 47 (c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evi- dence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case; c) la possibilité, dans de bonnes conditions, de parvenir, grâce à elle, à une décision juste; (d) the need to remove from the fact- finding process any discriminatory belief or bias; d) le besoin d’écarter de la procédure de recherche des faits toute opinion ou préjugé discriminatoire; (e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse senti- ments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury; e) le risque de susciter abusivement, chez le jury, des préjugés, de la sympathie ou de l’hostilité; (f) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy; f) le risque d’atteinte à la dignité du plaignant et à son droit à la vie privée; (g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and g) le droit du plaignant et de chacun à la sécurité de leur personne, ainsi qu’à la plénitude de la protection et du bénéfice de la loi; (h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers relevant. h) tout autre facteur qu’il estime applicable en l’espèce. [93] thus, sexual activity evidence adduced by or on behalf of the accused that could potentially implicate one of the twin myths may nonetheless be admitted for a separate, legitimate purpose where it satisfies the test set out in s. 276(2) and (3). [94] but before sexual activity evidence can be admitted under s. 276(2), the accused must file an application under s 2761. this application must be made in writing and must set out (a) “detailed particulars of the evidence that the accused seeks to adduce” and (b) “the relevance of that evidence to an issue at trial” (s 2761(2)). where the judge is satis- fied that (a) the application was made in accordance with s 2761(2), (b) certain filing requirements have been met, and (c) the evidence sought to be adduced is capable of being admissible under s. 276(2), then he or she shall hold a voir dire — held outside the presence of the jury and the public — to determine whether the evidence is admissible under s. 276(2) (s 2761(4)). however, if the judge is not satisfied that each of these three requirements has been met (eg, the written application is deficient), then he or she may dismiss the application without more. thus, for example, where a written application un- der s 2761 does not satisfy the judge that the evi- dence sought to be adduced is relevant to an issue at trial, it can be dismissed without holding a voir [93] par conséquent, toute preuve concernant une activité sexuelle présentée par l’accusé ou son repré- sentant qui est susceptible d’être liée à l’un des deux mythes pourrait néanmoins être admise si elle vise une fin distincte et légitime qui satisfait au critère énoncé aux par. 276(2) et (3). [94] or, avant qu’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle puisse être admise au titre du par. 276(2), l’ac- cusé doit déposer une demande fondée sur l’art 2761. cette demande doit être formulée par écrit et énoncer a) « toutes précisions au sujet de la preuve en cause » et b) « le rapport de celle-ci avec un élément de la cause » (par 2761(2)). une fois convaincu a) que la demande a été établie conformément au par 2761(2), b) que certaines exigences en matière de dépôt ont été respectées, et c) qu’il y a des possibilités que la preuve en cause soit admissible en application du par. 276(2), le juge tient un voir- dire — duquel sont exclus le jury et le public — afin de décider de l’admissibilité de la preuve en application du par. 276(2) (par 2761(4)). toutefois, si le juge n’est pas convaincu que cha- cune de ces trois exigences est respectée (p ex, la demande écrite présente des lacunes), il peut tout simplement rejeter la demande. par exemple, si une demande écrite fondée sur l’art 2761 ne convainc pas le juge que la preuve que l’accusé cherche à pré- senter est en rapport avec un élément de la cause, le juge peut la rejeter sans tenir de voir- dire. bien que 48 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. dire. while the parties in this case have not focused their submissions on the s 2761 requirements, these requirements, and the consequences for failing to meet them, should be kept in mind going forward. les parties en l’espèce n’aient pas axé leurs observa- tions sur les exigences de l’art 2761, il convient de garder à l’esprit ces exigences et les conséquences de leur non- respect. [95] if the accused’s written application survives scrutiny, then the process moves to the voir dire stage and the court’s attention shifts to s 276(2). in my view, to satisfy the relevance requirement under s. 276(2)(b), the accused must demonstrate that the evidence goes to a legitimate aspect of his defence and is integral to his ability to make full answer and defence. this requires that the accused be able to identify specific facts or issues relating to his defence that can be properly understood and resolved by the trier of fact only if reference is made to the sexual activity evidence in question. in articulating these specific facts or issues, simply citing the need to provide greater “context” or a fuller “narrative” will not suffice. indeed, if this were enough to justify the admission of sexual activity evidence, then the s. 276 regime would be reduced to a mere statutory speed bump along the way to admission. [96] furthermore, the requirement that the evi- dence be “integral” to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence means that even if the evi- dence can be linked to specific facts or issues relating to the accused’s defence, admission is not guaran- teed. there may be cases in which the evidence, while relevant to specific facts or issues relating to the accused’s defence, bears only marginally on it. in such cases, the trial judge may, in his or her discre- tion, exclude the evidence on the basis that counter- vailing considerations, such as the need to protect the privacy rights and dignity of the complainant, out- weigh the tenuous connection the evidence has to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence. [95] si la demande écrite de l’accusé résiste à l’examen, l’instance passe alors à l’étape du voir- dire et l’attention du tribunal se dirige vers le par 276(2). à mon avis, pour satisfaire au critère de la pertinence au titre de l’al. 276(2)b), l’accusé doit démontrer que cette preuve s’attache à un aspect légitime de sa défense et qu’elle est essentielle à sa capacité de présenter une défense pleine et entière. pour cela, l’accusé doit pouvoir cerner les questions ou faits précis liés à sa défense que le juge des faits ne pour- rait résoudre ou comprendre adéquatement que s’il est fait référence à la preuve en cause concernant une activité sexuelle. au moment de formuler ces ques- tions ou faits précis, l’accusé ne pourra se contenter de faire valoir la nécessité d’une mise en « contexte » plus générale ou d’un « récit » plus détaillé. en fait, si un tel argument suffisait pour justifier l’admis- sion d’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle, alors le régime établi par l’art. 276 ne serait rien de plus qu’un dos d’âne législatif sur le chemin de l’admission. [96] par ailleurs, l’exigence voulant que la preuve soit « essentielle » à la capacité de l’accusé de pré- senter une défense pleine et entière signifie que, même s’il est possible de rattacher la preuve à des questions ou faits précis liés à la défense de l’accusé, son admission n’est pas garantie. il peut y avoir des cas où la preuve, bien qu’elle soit en rapport avec des questions ou faits précis liés à la défense de l’accusé, n’a que peu d’incidence sur celle-ci. en pareils cas, le juge du procès peut, à sa discrétion, exclure la preuve au motif que des considérations faisant contrepoids, telles que la nécessité de protéger le droit à la vie privée et la dignité de la plaignante, l’emportent sur le lien ténu qui existe entre la preuve et la capacité de l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière. [97] with these points in mind, when applying this regime, trial judges must take a careful, rigorous approach — one that recognizes and protects against the risks that accompany sexual activity evidence. the statutory requirements set out in s. 276(2) are [97] gardant ces points à l’esprit, j’estime que lorsqu’il applique ce régime, le juge du procès doit adopter une approche prudente et rigoureuse — une approche qui tient compte des risques allant de pair avec la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle et qui [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 49 designed to ensure that any admissible sexual activity evidence is limited in scope and that its legitimate purpose is identified and weighed against counter- vailing considerations. a careful application of these requirements is essential to the integrity of the trial process. [98] the integrity of the trial process can be fur- ther protected by adopting certain best practices for communicating general relationship evidence, such as the kind sought to be adduced in this case, af- ter an admissibility ruling has been made. as the attorney general of ontario (“ago”) suggested in its intervener submissions before this court, where general relationship evidence is ruled admissible under s. 276(2), the parties should reduce that evi- dence to a clear and concise agreed statement of facts prior to trial. this statement would ensure that the evidence elicited at trial does not stray beyond the parameters of the trial judge’s ruling. alternatively, the trial judge has the discretion to permit crown and defence counsel to lead the complainant and the accused respectively through an accurate description of their relationship. these simple, prudent practices can go a long way to ensuring the scope of sexual activity evidence elicited at trial goes no further than necessary, thereby safeguarding the privacy rights and dignity of the complainant, preserving the in- tegrity of the trial process, and promoting the search for truth. assure une protection contre de tels risques. les exi- gences énoncées au par. 276(2) visent à ce que toute preuve admissible concernant une activité sexuelle ait une portée limitée et que la fin légitime qu’elle vise soit précisée et soupesée au regard de considé- rations faisant contrepoids. l’application conscien- cieuse de ces exigences est essentielle à l’intégrité du procès. [98] l’intégrité du procès peut également être pro- tégée par l’adoption de certaines pratiques exem- plaires relatives à la communication de la preuve générale d’une relation, comme celle que l’accusé cherche à présenter en l’espèce, une fois que la déci- sion concernant l’admissibilité a été rendue. comme la procureure générale de l’ontario (« pgo ») l’a suggéré dans les observations qu’elle a présentées à notre cour en sa qualité d’intervenante, lorsque la preuve générale d’une relation est jugée admissible en application du par. 276(2), les parties devraient la présenter avant le procès sous la forme d’un ex- posé conjoint des faits clair et concis. grâce à cet exposé, la preuve obtenue au procès ne s’écarterait pas des paramètres établis par le juge du procès dans sa décision. par ailleurs, le juge du procès peut, à sa discrétion, permettre aux avocats de la poursuite et de la défense d’amener la plaignante et l’accusé à donner, respectivement, une description précise de leur relation. ces pratiques simples et prudentes peuvent grandement contribuer à ce que la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle obtenue au procès se limite à ce qui est nécessaire, ce qui protège le droit à la vie privée et la dignité de la plaignante, préserve l’intégrité du procès et favorise la recherche de la vérité. [99] furthermore, where sexual activity evidence has been ruled admissible under s. 276(2), all trial participants — including the trial judge, crown and defence counsel, and witnesses — must hew to the specific, legitimate purpose for which the evidence has been admitted, without expanding the scope of the ruling or using the admissible evidence for inad- missible purposes. any new bases for admissibility that emerge during the course of the trial should be the subject of a fresh s. 276 application. and when sexual activity evidence is ultimately elicited at trial, it should be followed swiftly by a mid- trial limiting [99] de plus, lorsqu’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle est jugée admissible en application du par. 276(2), tous les participants au procès — y compris le juge, les avocats de la poursuite et de la défense, et les témoins — doivent s’en tenir à la fin précise et légitime pour laquelle la preuve a été ad- mise, sans élargir la portée de la décision ou utiliser la preuve admissible à des fins inadmissibles. tout nouveau motif militant en faveur de l’admissibi- lité soulevé pendant le procès devrait faire l’objet d’une nouvelle demande fondée sur l’art 276. et lorsqu’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle 50 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. instruction to the jury that identifies both the permis- sible and impermissible uses of the evidence. this instruction should be reinforced by a final jury in- struction. in short, everyone must get crystal clear — and remain crystal clear — about why the evidence is being admitted. [100] with these principles in mind, i will now consider whether the trial judge in this case erred in admitting the “friends with benefits” evidence under s 276. est finalement présentée au procès, elle doit être ra- pidement suivie d’une directive restrictive en cours de procès indiquant au jury les utilisations qu’il peut ou non en faire. cette directive devrait être confirmée par les directives finales au jury. bref, tout le monde doit comprendre de façon parfaitement claire — et en tout temps — pourquoi la preuve est admise. [100] en gardant ces principes à l’esprit, j’exa- minerai maintenant la question de savoir si la juge du procès a, en l’espèce, commis une erreur en ad- mettant la preuve de la relation « amis- amants » en application de l’art 276. b application of section 276 b application de l’art. 276 [101] the determination of whether sexual activity evidence is admissible under s. 276 raises a ques- tion of law (see s 2765). a ruling on this matter is therefore reviewable on a standard of correctness. to determine whether the trial judge erred in this case, we must consider the facts as known to her at the time of the voir dire. in his affidavit filed in support of his appli- [102] cation under s 2761,. mr. goldfinch stated that after their breakup, he and the complainant would “get together at [his] residence    to have sexual inter- course”. he also noted that they “both referred to this relationship as a ‘friend’s [sic] with benefits’ ar- rangement” (ar, vol. i, at p 5). at the s 2762 voir dire, mr. goldfinch argued that evidence of the sexual nature of their relationship was necessary to “provide proper context” and “to avoid leaving the jury with the erroneous impression that after the complainant and [he] ceased living together they maintained a purely platonic friendship” (ar, vol. i, at p 5). [101] la décision quant à l’admissibilité d’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle en appli- cation de l’art. 276 soulève une question de droit (voir l’art 2765). toute décision sur le sujet est donc susceptible de contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. pour établir si la juge du procès a commis une erreur en l’espèce, nous devons examiner les faits dont elle avait connaissance au moment du voir- dire. [102] dans l’affidavit qu’il a déposé à l’appui de sa demande fondée sur l’art 2761,. m. goldfinch a dé- claré qu’après leur rupture, la plaignante et lui [tra- duction] « se rencontraient chez lui [  ] pour avoir des relations sexuelles ». il a également mentionné qu’ils « qualifiaient tous deux cette relation d’entente “amis- amants” » (da, vol. i, p 5). lors du voir- dire tenu en application de l’art 2762,. m. goldfinch a soutenu que la preuve du caractère sexuel de la relation qu’il entretenait avec la plaignante était né- cessaire pour que cette relation soit placée « dans le bon contexte » et « pour éviter que le jury ait la fausse impression que, après la fin de leur cohabitation, la plaignante et [lui] avaient entretenu une relation d’amitié purement platonique » (da, vol. i, p 5). in conducting the s 2762 voir dire,11 the trial [103] judge was required to first consider s. 276(1) and then ask whether, in light of the bases for admission [103] lors du voir- dire mené en application de l’art 276212, la juge du procès devait d’abord exami- ner le par. 276(1) et se demander ensuite si, à la lu- 11 as will become apparent, i consider it doubtful that mr. gold- finch’s application would have met the relevance test under s 2761 (see para. 94 above). but that issue was not raised on appeal. 12 comme je l’expliquerai plus loin, je doute que la demande de m. goldfinch aurait satisfait au critère de la pertinence prévu à l’art 2761 (voir par 94). cette question n’a toutefois pas été soulevée en appel. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 51 set out in mr. goldfinch’s application, the proposed evidence satisfied the three requirements set out in s. 276(2), taking into account the factors listed in s 276(3). i will consider and apply these provisions in turn, keeping in mind that the analysis must re- main fixed at the time of the voir dire. [104] before commencing this analysis, i note that the relationship evidence sought to be adduced in this case — evidence of a “friends with benefits” relation- ship involving occasional sex — directly implicates sexual activity and is therefore subject to the s. 276 regime. whether general evidence of categories of relationships that may or may not involve sexual activity — such as marriage, dating, etc. — might also engage s. 276 is not before the court. i would therefore leave that issue for another day. that said, without finally deciding the matter, i am inclined to the view that such evidence would not, without more, engage s. 276, as it does not amount to “evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity” (s. 276(1) and (2)). of course, if the accused were to seek to go into details about the relationship re- vealing that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity — for example, evidence that the accused and the complainant were in a spousal relationship involving regular sex (see r v. ls, 2017 onca 685, 40 cr (7th) 351) — then that evidence would have to pass through the s. 276 filter. mière des motifs en vue de l’admission énoncés dans la demande de m. goldfinch, la preuve que ce dernier cherchait à présenter respectait les trois exigences du par. 276(2), eu égard aux facteurs du par 276(3). j’examinerai et appliquerai ces dispositions tour à tour, tout en gardant à l’esprit que l’analyse doit se limiter aux faits connus à la date du voir- dire. [104] avant de commencer mon analyse, je cons- tate que la preuve de la relation que l’accusé cherche à présenter en l’espèce — la preuve d’une relation « amis- amants » comportant des relations sexuelles occasionnelles — implique directement des activités sexuelles et est donc assujettie au régime établi par l’art 276. la cour n’est pas appelée à trancher la question de savoir si la preuve générale de certains types de relations qui peuvent ou non comporter des activités sexuelles — comme le mariage, les fréquentations, etc. — est aussi susceptible de faire intervenir l’art 276. il vaut mieux remettre l’examen de cette question à une autre occasion. cela dit, sans trancher l’affaire de façon définitive, je suis porté à croire qu’une telle preuve ne ferait pas, sans plus, intervenir l’art. 276, puisqu’elle n’équivaut pas à une « preuve de ce que le plaignant a eu une activité sexuelle » (par. 276(1) et (2)). évidemment, si l’ac- cusé cherchait à entrer dans les détails concernant la relation, lesquels révèleraient que la plaignante a eu une activité sexuelle — par exemple, une preuve établissant que l’accusé et la plaignante étaient unis par une relation conjugale comportant des relations sexuelles régulières (voir r c. ls, 2017 onca 685, 40 cr (7th) 351) — la preuve devrait passer par le filtre de l’art 276. (1) section 276(1) (1) paragraphe 276(1) [105] as indicated, under s. 276(1), sexual activity evidence cannot be admitted to support the inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of the activity, the complainant was more likely to have consented to the sexual activity forming the subject- matter of the charge or is less worthy of belief. [105] tel qu’il est indiqué précédemment, aux termes du par. 276(1), la preuve concernant une acti- vité sexuelle est inadmissible pour permettre d’inférer du caractère sexuel de cette activité que la plaignante était plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité sexuelle à l’origine de l’accusation ou qu’elle est moins digne de foi. [106] in this case, as i have explained, mr. gold- finch sought to tender evidence that at the time of the alleged sexual assault, he and the complainant [106] dans l’affaire qui nous occupe, comme je l’ai expliqué, m. goldfinch a demandé l’autorisation de présenter une preuve établissant que, à l’époque 52 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. maintained a “friends with benefits” relationship that involved occasional sex. on its face, this evidence could potentially be used to support the first of the twin myths — the myth that because the complainant consented to have sex with mr. goldfinch in the past, she was more likely to have consented to the sexual activity forming the subject- matter of the sexual assault charge. however, s. 276(1) takes this poten- tial use off the table. as such, unless mr. goldfinch could point to some legitimate use of the sexual activity evidence that would justify admission, that evidence was inadmissible. to determine whether a legitimate use justifying admission existed, we must turn to s 276(2). de l’agression sexuelle reprochée, la plaignante et lui entretenaient une relation « amis- amants » com- portant des relations sexuelles occasionnelles. à pre- mière vue, cette preuve pourrait servir à étayer le premier des deux mythes — celui voulant que, parce que la plaignante a déjà consenti à avoir des relations sexuelles avec m. goldfinch, elle était plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité sexuelle à l’origine de l’accusation d’agression sexuelle. or, le par. 276(1) écarte cette utilisation potentielle. ainsi, à moins que m. goldfinch ait pu indiquer une utilisation légitime de la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle qui justi- fierait son admission, celle-ci était inadmissible. pour établir si une utilisation légitime justifiait l’admission de la preuve, nous devons examiner le par 276(2). (2) section 276(2) (2) paragraphe 276(2) [107] section 276(2) provides that in order to be admissible, sexual activity evidence must: (a) be of specific instances of sexual activity; (b) be relevant to an issue at trial; and (c) possess significant pro- bative value that substantially outweighs the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. i will consider and apply these requirements in turn. [107] le paragraphe 276(2) dispose que, pour être admissible, la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle doit  : a)  porter sur des cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle; b) être en rapport avec un élément de la cause; et c) avoir une valeur probante qui l’emporte sensi- blement sur le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne administration de la justice. j’examinerai et appliquerai chacune de ces exigences à tour de rôle. (a) specific instances of sexual activity a) cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle [108] the first requirement of s. 276(2) is that the evidence “be of specific instances of sexual activity”. in ls, the ontario court of appeal consid- [109] ered whether “relationship evidence” could satisfy s. 276(2)(a)’s specificity requirement. in that case, the complainant and the accused were in a spousal relationship. the complainant alleged that the ac- cused sexually assaulted her. the accused applied to introduce evidence of the nature of his relationship with the complainant under s 276. the affidavit filed in support of his application stated that he and the complainant “were together as a couple for the entire year of 2009” and that they had an “active sex life for that year” in which they “had sex on a regular basis” (para 53). [108] le paragraphe 276(2) exige en premier lieu que la preuve « porte sur des cas particuliers d’acti- vité sexuelle ». [109] dans l’arrêt ls, la cour d’appel de l’ontario s’est demandé si la « preuve d’une relation » pouvait satisfaire à l’exigence relative aux cas particuliers de l’al 276(2)a). dans cette affaire, la plaignante et l’accusé vivaient dans une relation conjugale. la plai- gnante soutenait que l’accusé l’avait agressée sexuelle- ment. l’accusé a demandé l’autorisation de présenter une preuve établissant la nature de la relation qu’il en- tretenait avec la plaignante en vertu de l’art 276. dans l’affidavit déposé à l’appui de sa demande, il a dé- claré que la plaignante et lui [traduction] « avaient formé un couple pendant toute l’année 2009 » et que « pendant cette année, ils avaient eu une vie sexuelle active », c’est-à-dire qu’ils « avaient eu régulièrement des relations sexuelles » (par 53). [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 53 justice doherty, writing for a unanimous [110] panel, held that despite the absence of specific fea- tures of the sexual activity or individualized instances of sexual activity in the accused’s affidavit, the evi- dence nonetheless satisfied the “specific instances” requirement under s 276(2)(a). he reasoned that the content of the “specific instances” requirement is linked to the nature of the evidence sought to be adduced. where the accused seeks to introduce evi- dence of an individual instance of sexual activity, he must identify that instance with specificity. by con- trast, where the accused seeks to introduce general evidence that describes the nature of the relation- ship between the accused and the complainant, “the specificity requirement speaks to factors relevant to identifying the relationship and its nature and not to details of specific sexual encounters” (para 83). these factors will include “the parties to the relation- ship, the relevant time period, and the nature of the relationship” (para 83). [110] le juge doherty, s’exprimant au nom d’une formation unanime, a conclu que, même si l’affi- davit de l’accusé ne faisait mention d’aucune ca- ractéristique particulière de l’activité sexuelle ou de cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle, la preuve ré- pondait quand même à l’exigence voulant qu’elle porte sur des « cas particuliers » comme le prévoit l’al 276(2)a). selon lui, le contenu de cette exigence est lié à la nature de la preuve que l’accusé cherche à présenter. lorsque celui-ci cherche à présenter la preuve d’un cas particulier d’activité sexuelle, il doit décrire ce cas avec précision. par contre, lorsque l’accusé cherche à présenter une preuve générale qui décrit la nature de la relation entre lui et la plai- gnante, [traduction] « l’exigence relative aux cas particuliers renvoie aux facteurs permettant de définir la relation et sa nature et non aux détails des rapports sexuels particuliers » (par 83). ces facteurs com- prennent notamment « les parties à la relation, la pé- riode pertinente et la nature de la relation » (par 83). i would adopt doherty ja’s interpretation [111] of s. 276(2)(a) insofar as it relates to evidence of the nature of the relationship between the complainant and the accused before, at the time of, and after the sexual activity forming the subject- matter of the charge. [111] je ferais mienne l’interprétation que donne le juge doherty à l’al. 276(2)a) dans la mesure où elle s’applique à la preuve établissant la nature de la relation qu’entretenaient la plaignante et l’accusé avant, pendant et après l’activité sexuelle à l’origine de l’accusation. [112] here, mr. goldfinch’s affidavit specified the parties to the relationship (himself and the com- plainant), the relevant time period (subsequent to their breakup in 2012 until the alleged sexual assault in may 2014), and the nature of the relationship (“friends with benefits”). therefore, the trial judge was correct in her conclusion that mr. goldfinch dis- charged the requirement under s. 276(2)(a) that the evidence be of specific instances of sexual activity. [112] en l’espèce, l’affidavit de m. goldfinch pré- cisait qui étaient les parties à la relation (lui- même et la plaignante), la période pertinente (de leur rupture en 2012 jusqu’à l’agression sexuelle qui aurait eu lieu en mai 2014) et la nature de la relation (« amis- amants »). par conséquent, la juge du procès a eu raison de conclure que m. goldfinch avait satisfait à l’exigence de démontrer que la preuve portait sur des cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle comme le prévoit l’al 276(2)a). (b) relevant to an issue at trial b) rapport avec un élément de la cause [113] the second requirement of s. 276(2) is that the evidence be “relevant to an issue at trial”. to fulfill this requirement, the accused must “establish a connection between the complainant’s sexual history and the accused’s defence” (darrach, at para 56). [113] le paragraphe 276(2) exige en second lieu que la preuve soit « en rapport avec un élément de la cause ». pour satisfaire à cette exigence, l’accusé doit «  établir l’existence d’un lien entre le com- portement sexuel antérieur de la plaignante et le moyen de défense invoqué par l’accusé » (darrach, par 56). 54 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. [114] here, mr. goldfinch argued that the thresh- old for relevance was met because the “friends with benefits” evidence: (1) was necessary to avoid an er- roneous misapprehension on the part of the jury that he and the complainant were platonic friends at the time of the alleged sexual assault; and (2) provided “context” to the issues at trial. i will consider each argument in turn. [114] en l’espèce, m. goldfinch soutient que le cri- tère de la pertinence est respecté parce que la preuve de la relation « amis- amants » : (1) était nécessaire pour éviter que le jury croit, en raison d’une interpré- tation erronée, que la plaignante et lui entretenaient une relation platonique au moment de l’agression sexuelle reprochée; et (2) mettait en « contexte » les éléments de la cause. je vais examiner chacun de ces arguments tour à tour. [115] by way of background, at the voir dire stage, crown counsel proposed a statement of facts that did not include the existence of a “friends with ben- efits” relationship between mr. goldfinch and the complainant. instead, the proposed statement of facts stated that mr. goldfinch and the complainant had previously been in a romantic relationship for seven or eight months, during which time they lived together. it further stated that they were friends at the time of the events in question and the complainant sometimes spent the night at mr. goldfinch’s residence. [115] à titre indicatif, la procureure de la couronne, lors du voir- dire, a présenté un exposé des faits qui ne faisait pas mention de l’existence d’une relation « amis- amants » entre m. goldfinch et la plaignante. il y était plutôt mentionné que m. goldfinch et la plaignante avaient entretenu une relation amoureuse pendant sept ou huit mois et qu’à cette époque, ils vivaient ensemble. il y était également mentionné qu’ils étaient amis au moment des événements en cause et que la plaignante passait parfois la nuit chez m goldfinch. [116] the problem with the first rationale advanced by mr. goldfinch is that it does not explain why it would be necessary to correct any potential “mis- apprehension” as to the sexual nature of his rela- tionship with the complainant. a judge reviewing mr. goldfinch’s application might legitimately con- clude that the “friends with benefits” evidence was being proffered solely to inform the jury that the two were occasionally engaging in sexual intercourse during the relevant time frame, and to potentially support the impermissible inference that it was more likely that the complainant consented on the night in question. if this was the sole reason for which the defence sought to correct the supposed “misap- prehension”, then the evidence was inadmissible by virtue of s 276(1). assuming, however, that there may have been a legitimate reason to correct any potential “misapprehension” on the part of the jury, mr. goldfinch’s application did not identify one. [116] le problème que pose la première justifica- tion avancée par m. goldfinch est qu’il n’explique pas pourquoi il serait nécessaire que soit corrigée toute « interprétation erronée » éventuelle quant au caractère sexuel de sa relation avec la plaignante. un juge qui examine la demande de m. goldfinch pour- rait en toute légitimité conclure que la preuve de la re- lation « amis- amants » a été présentée seulement pour informer le jury que, pendant la période pertinente, l’accusé et la plaignante avaient occasionnellement eu des relations sexuelles, et pour possiblement étayer l’inférence interdite que la plaignante était plus sus- ceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité sexuelle le soir en question. s’il s’agit de l’unique raison pour laquelle la défense cherchait à corriger la soi- disant « inter- prétation erronée », il s’ensuit que la preuve était inadmissible en application du par 276(1). à sup- poser, cependant, qu’il puisse y avoir eu une raison légitime pour laquelle toute « interprétation erronée » éventuelle de la part du jury aurait dû être corrigée, la demande de m. goldfinch n’en mentionnait aucune. [117] as for the second rationale, mr. goldfinch argued that the sexual activity evidence was relevant to his defence because it provided “context” to the events that formed the subject- matter of the sexual [117] comme seconde justification, m. goldfinch a fait valoir que la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle était pertinente pour assurer sa défense parce qu’elle mettait en « contexte » l’activité à l’origine de [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 55 assault charge. the trial judge described the exist- ence of an ongoing sexual relationship between the complainant and mr. goldfinch as a “background piece of evidence” that the jurors could use when as- sessing the conflicting direct evidence “as to whether or not the complainant did consent to the events in question” (ar, vol. i, at p 9). l’accusation d’agression sexuelle. la juge du procès a qualifié l’existence de la relation continue à caractère sexuel entre la plaignante et m. goldfinch [traduc- tion] d’« élément de preuve contextuel » que les jurés pouvaient utiliser pour évaluer les éléments de preuve directs et contradictoires portant sur « la question de savoir si la plaignante avait consenti à l’activité en cause » (da, vol. i, p 9). in my view, this line of reasoning paints with [118] too broad a brushstroke. while it is true in every case that the existence of a “friends with benefits” relationship between the complainant and the ac- cused provides “context” to the events at issue, nei- ther mr. goldfinch’s vaguely drafted affidavit nor his arguments at the voir dire stage specified the precise inference he wanted the jury to draw from that “context”. put differently, he failed to identify a specific, legitimate purpose for putting the “friends with benefits” evidence before the jury — he did not link the evidence to specific facts or issues relating to his defence that could be properly understood and resolved only if reference could be made to the “friends with benefits” evidence. [118] selon moi, ce raisonnement ratisse trop large. bien qu’il soit vrai dans tous les cas que l’existence d’une relation « amis- amants » entre la plaignante et l’accusé mette en « contexte » les événements en cause, en l’espèce, ni l’affidavit de m. goldfinch, rédigé en termes vagues, ni les arguments qu’il a fait valoir à l’étape du voir- dire n’indiquaient l’in- férence précise qu’il souhaitait que le jury tire de ce « contexte ». autrement dit, il a omis d’invoquer une fin légitime précise pour laquelle il voulait présenter la preuve de la relation « amis- amants » au jury — il n’a établi aucun lien entre la preuve et des questions ou faits précis liés à sa défense dont la compréhension ou la résolution nécessitait qu’il soit fait référence à la preuve de la relation « amis- amants ». [119] where sexual activity evidence is concerned, the failure to identify the explicit link between the evidence and specific facts or issues relating to the accused’s defence can result in twin- myth reasoning slipping into the courtroom in the guise of “context”. for example, there is a risk that sexual activity evi- dence may be used, whether consciously or not, to “contextualize” a complainant’s testimony that she did not consent to the sexual activity in question through twin- myth reasoning: because the complain- ant consented in the past (the “context”), it is more likely that she consented this time as well. this is, of course, precisely the sort of stereotypical reason- ing s. 276(1) sought to banish from the courtroom. yet without a clear and precise identification of the specific purpose for which sexual activity evidence is sought to be introduced, this sort of reasoning can all too easily infiltrate the courtroom through the trojan horse of “context”. [119] lorsqu’il est question d’une preuve concer- nant une activité sexuelle, l’omission de préciser le lien explicite entre la preuve et des questions ou faits précis liés à la défense de l’accusé peut aboutir à un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes qui se glisserait dans la salle d’audience en tant qu’élé- ment de « contexte ». à titre d’exemple, il existe un risque que la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle soit utilisée, consciemment ou non, pour « mettre en contexte » le témoignage d’une plaignante selon lequel elle n’a pas consenti à l’activité sexuelle en cause au moyen d’un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes : comme la plaignante a consenti à une telle activité par le passé (le « contexte »), elle est plus susceptible d’y avoir consenti cette fois-ci. il s’agit, à l’évidence, précisément du type de raisonnement stéréotypé que le par. 276(1) est censé bannir des salles d’audience. or, sans indication claire et précise concernant la fin particulière pour laquelle une partie cherche à présenter une preuve concernant une acti- vité sexuelle, ce type de raisonnement peut beaucoup trop facilement s’introduire dans les salles d’audience en utilisant le « contexte » comme cheval de troie. 56 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. in sum, the “context” rationale offered by [120] mr. goldfinch was insufficient to satisfy s 276(2)(b). in my respectful view, any conclusion to the contrary would open the door to the admission of sexual ac- tivity evidence in every case where the complainant and the accused were in a previous or ongoing sexual relationship, so long as the accused cites the need for greater “context” in his application. this cannot have been parliament’s intent. the words “context” and “narrative” do not, in my view, offer the accused a means of bypassing the measured analysis required by s 276. [121] thus, the key flaw in mr. goldfinch’s ap- plication was his failure to identify specific facts or issues relating to his defence that could be properly understood and resolved by the trier of fact only if reference was made to the “friends with benefits” evidence. some discussion of what i mean by “spe- cific facts or issues relating to [the accused’s] de- fence” may prove helpful. as i will develop, without reaching any final decision on the matter, i note that in this case there was at least one specific issue that mr. goldfinch could have referred to in his applica- tion that might have properly supported admission of the “friends with benefits” evidence: the jury’s assessment of mr.  goldfinch’s testimony that he mouthed the words “i’m going to fuck you” to the complainant shortly before they went downstairs. in discussing this example below, i should not be taken as foreclosing the possibility that additional facts or issues relating to mr. goldfinch’s defence may be identified at the new trial that might support the admission of the “friends with benefits” evidence. [122] when explaining the events leading up to the sexual activity forming the basis of the sexual assault charge, mr. goldfinch testified as follows: [120] en bref, la justification liée au « contexte » invoquée par m. goldfinch était insuffisante pour sa- tisfaire à l’exigence de l’al 276(2)b). à mon humble avis, toute conclusion contraire ouvrirait la porte à l’admission d’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle dans tous les cas où la plaignante et l’accusé ont, ou ont eu, une relation à caractère sexuel, pour autant que l’accusé invoque dans sa demande la né- cessité de fournir plus de « contexte ». le législateur ne peut avoir voulu un tel résultat. j’estime que les mots « contexte » et « récit » ne doivent pas donner à l’accusé un moyen de contourner l’analyse attentive qu’exige l’art 276. [121] par conséquent, le principal problème de la demande de m. goldfinch tenait au fait qu’il n’a pas invoqué de questions ou faits précis liés à sa défense que le juge des faits aurait pu résoudre ou comprendre adéquatement que s’il était fait réfé- rence à la preuve de la relation « amis- amants ». il peut être utile d’examiner plus attentivement ce que j’entends par « questions ou faits précis liés à la défense [de l’accusé] ». comme je vais l’expliquer, sans trancher définitivement la question, je constate que, dans la présente affaire, il y avait au moins une question précise que m. goldfinch aurait pu mentionner dans sa demande et qui était susceptible de justifier adéquatement l’admission de la preuve concernant la relation « amis- amants » : l’appré- ciation par le jury de son témoignage concernant le fait qu’il aurait articulé en silence à l’intention de la plaignante les mots « je vais te baiser » peu de temps avant qu’ils descendent au sous- sol. il ne doit pas être inféré de l’examen que je vais maintenant faire de cet exemple que j’empêche la possibilité que des faits ou questions supplémentaires liés à la défense de m. goldfinch soient invoqués, lors du nouveau procès, à l’appui de l’admission de la preuve concer- nant la relation « amis- amants ». [122] voici ce que m. goldfinch a déclaré lors- qu’il a expliqué les événements ayant mené à l’acti- vité sexuelle à l’origine de l’accusation d’agression sexuelle : well, we went downstairs, [the complainant] and i. i had asked her to come downstairs with me. prior to that, we were talking and joking around and everything, getting [traduction] eh bien, nous sommes allés au sous- sol, [la plaignante] et moi. je l’avais invitée à descendre au sous- sol avec moi. avant cela, nous parlions et faisions des [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 57 along very well upstairs    and i kind of mouthed to her i’m going to fuck you. and she smiled, gave me a little cute smile back. blagues et ainsi de suite; pendant que nous étions à l’étage, nous nous entendions très bien […] et je lui ai comme dit à voix basse « je vais te baiser ». et elle a souri, elle m’a fait un joli petit sourire. (ar, vol. iii, at p. 198) (da, vol. iii, p. 198) [123] evidence that the complainant and mr. gold- finch were in a “friends with benefits” relationship at the time of these events may have provided necessary context to aid the jury in assessing mr. goldfinch’s testimony that he mouthed the words “i’m going to fuck you” to the complainant. if the jury lacked the knowledge that the two were in a sexual relationship at the time, this statement by mr. goldfinch might have seemed bizarre or even menacing. furthermore, mr. goldfinch’s testimony that he made this state- ment to the complainant may itself have seemed implausible. in this way, withholding the “friends with benefits” evidence from the jury could have led them to make an adverse credibility determi- nation against mr. goldfinch that they otherwise would not have made. a jury’s determination of which witnesses to find credible is a holistic exercise that involves assessing the plausibility and coher- ence of a given witness’s testimony throughout the course of the trial. withholding the sexual nature of mr. goldfinch’s relationship with the complainant could have had an adverse impact on the jury’s as- sessment of mr. goldfinch’s credibility, potentially infringing upon his right to make full answer and defence. [123] la preuve que la plaignante et m. goldfinch entretenaient une relation « amis- amants » au mo- ment où ces événements se sont produits aurait peut- être fourni le contexte nécessaire pour aider le jury à évaluer le témoignage de m. goldfinch selon lequel il a articulé en silence, à l’intention de la plaignante, les mots « je vais te baiser ». si le jury ne savait pas que la plaignante et m. goldfinch entretenaient une relation à caractère sexuel à l’époque, cette déclaration de m. goldfinch aurait pu leur sembler bizarre et même menaçante. de plus, son témoi- gnage concernant le fait qu’il se soit ainsi adressé à la plaignante aurait pu en lui- même paraître in- vraisemblable. de cette façon, le fait de priver le jury de la preuve concernant la relation «  amis- amants » aurait été susceptible de l’amener à tirer une conclusion défavorable concernant la crédibilité de m. goldfinch qu’il n’aurait pas autrement tirée. la décision du jury quant à savoir si un témoin est crédible est une démarche globale qui repose sur l’évaluation de la vraisemblance et de la cohérence du témoignage du témoin concerné tout au long du procès. le fait de priver le jury de la preuve relative au caractère sexuel de la relation de m. goldfinch avec la plaignante aurait été susceptible d’avoir une incidence négative sur son évaluation de la crédibi- lité de m. goldfinch, ce qui aurait potentiellement porté atteinte à son droit à une défense pleine et entière. [124] to be clear, however, just as generic refer- ences to “context” or “narrative” will not suffice to justify the admission of sexual activity evidence under s. 276(2), bare invocations of “credibility” will not be enough credibility is a key issue in almost every sexual assault trial — the centrality of credibility assessments does not, however, allow the accused to bypass the rigours of s 276. instead, where credibility is concerned, the accused must identify specific facts or issues that require reference to the sexual activity evidence to be understood and [124] précisons toutefois qu’il ne suffit pas de mentionner de façon générale le « contexte » ou le « récit » pour justifier l’admission d’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle en application du par. 276(2), et invoquer simplement la « crédibi- lité » ne suffit pas non plus. la crédibilité est un enjeu clé dans presque tous les procès pour agression sexuelle — cependant, l’importance de l’apprécia- tion de la crédibilité ne permet pas que l’accusé contourne les exigences de l’art 276. de fait, lorsque la crédibilité est en jeu, l’accusé doit faire mention 58 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. that could have a material impact on a credibility assessment. [125] returning to the case at hand, mr. goldfinch might have been able to establish a legitimate link between the “friends with benefits” evidence and his credibility by pointing to the need to enable the jury to properly assess his testimony that he mouthed the words “i’m going to fuck you” to the complainant. had mr. goldfinch referenced this aspect of his an- ticipated testimony in his s. 276 application, the trial judge would have been better equipped to engage in the balancing exercise required by s. 276(2) and (3). indeed, she may have properly determined that the “friends with benefits” evidence was admissible for the narrow purpose of allowing the jury to assess mr. goldfinch’s testimony on this point. she may have further found that the impact on the complain- ant’s privacy rights and dignity would be limited, as the bare fact that mr. goldfinch and the complainant were in a “friends with benefits” relationship at the time of the alleged sexual assault would be unlikely to unduly arouse the jury’s sentiments and would not require a sweeping and prejudicial inquiry into the complainant’s sexual history. she may have also determined that admission of the evidence was nec- essary to ensure mr. goldfinch’s right to make full answer and defence. des questions ou faits précis dont la compréhension nécessite qu’il soit fait référence à la preuve concer- nant une activité sexuelle et qui sont susceptibles d’avoir une incidence importante sur l’évaluation de la crédibilité. [125] dans la présente affaire, m. goldfinch aurait peut- être été en mesure d’établir un lien légitime entre la preuve concernant la relation « amis- amants » et sa crédibilité en faisant ressortir la nécessité de per- mettre au jury d’évaluer adéquatement son témoi- gnage selon lequel il avait articulé en silence les mots « je vais te baiser » à l’intention de la plaignante. si m. goldfinch avait fait mention de cet aspect du témoignage qu’il entendait livrer dans sa demande fondée sur l’art. 276, la juge du procès aurait été plus en mesure d’effectuer la mise en balance qu’exigent les par. 276(2) et (3). de fait, elle aurait pu conclure à juste titre que la preuve concernant la relation « amis- amants » était admissible à seule fin de permettre au jury d’apprécier le témoignage de m. goldfinch sur ce point. elle aurait aussi pu conclure que l’incidence sur le droit à la vie privée et la dignité de la plaignante aurait été peu importante, étant donné que le simple fait que m. goldfinch et la plaignante étaient dans une relation « amis- amants » au moment de l’agression sexuelle reprochée était peu susceptible de susciter abusivement des sentiments négatifs chez le jury et ne nécessiterait pas une enquête exhaustive et préju- diciable concernant le passé sexuel de la plaignante. peut- être aurait- elle aussi conclu que l’admission de la preuve était nécessaire pour assurer à m. goldfinch le respect de son droit à une défense pleine et entière. [126] be that as it may, the fact remains that in this case the “friends with benefits” evidence was admit- ted for a different — and much broader — purpose. it was ushered into the courtroom under the broad banner of “context”, without any identification of the specific facts or issues relating to mr. goldfinch’s defence that required reference to this “context” to be properly understood and resolved. in short, mr. goldfinch’s application lacked the specificity and precision required to justify admission of the evidence in question. [126] quoi qu’il en soit, il n’en demeure pas moins que, en l’espèce, la preuve concernant la relation « amis- amants » a été admise à une autre fin — beau- coup plus générale. elle a été introduite dans la salle d’audience à titre général de « contexte » sans être associée à des questions ou faits précis concernant la défense de m. goldfinch dont la compréhension ou la résolution adéquate nécessitait une mise en « contexte ». en bref, la demande de m. goldfinch n’était pas suffisamment ciblée et précise pour jus- tifier l’admission de la preuve en question. [127] for these reasons, i conclude that mr. gold- finch’s s. 276 application did not satisfy the “relevant [127] pour ces motifs, je conclus que la demande présentée par m.  goldfinch sur le fondement de [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 59 to an issue at trial” requirement under s 276(2)(b). accordingly, it ought to have been denied. l’art. 276 ne satisfaisait pas à l’exigence que la preuve soit « en rapport avec un élément de la cause » énon- cée à l’al 276(2)b). elle aurait donc dû être rejetée. (c) probative value versus potential prejudicial c) valeur probante par opposition au risque effect d’effet préjudiciable [128] the third requirement of s. 276(2) is that the evidence have “significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. as this court explained in darrach, “[t]he requirement of ‘significant probative value’ serves to exclude evidence of trifling relevance that, even though not used to support the two forbidden inferences, would still endanger the ‘proper administration of justice’” (para 41). [128] en troisième lieu, le par. 276(2) exige « que le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne adminis- tration de la justice de [la] preuve ne l’emporte pas sensiblement sur sa valeur probante ». comme l’a expliqué notre cour dans darrach, « [l]’exigence que la preuve ait une “valeur probante” sert à exclure les éléments de preuve peu pertinents qui, même s’ils ne sont pas utilisés pour étayer les deux déductions interdites, compromettraient néanmoins la “bonne administration de la justice” » (par 41). [129] evidence that is not relevant under s. 276(2)(b) is necessarily incapable of possessing any probative value, as the concept of probative value presupposes that the evidence bears on a relevant issue. thus, given my conclusion that the sexual activity evidence in this case was not relevant to an issue at trial based on the application presented to the trial judge, i con- clude that the evidence was incapable of satisfying the third requirement under s 276(2). [130] that said, in the interest of providing further guidance, i will briefly explain why the lack of spec- ificity in mr. goldfinch’s application also adversely impacted the trial judge’s ability to balance the pro- bative value of the evidence against its potential prejudicial effect as required by s 276(2)(c). [129] une preuve qui n’est pas en rapport avec un élément de la cause selon l’al. 276(2)b) est nécessai- rement dénuée de toute valeur probante, étant donné que le concept de la valeur probante suppose que la preuve se rapporte à un élément de la cause. ainsi, vu ma conclusion selon laquelle, eu égard à la demande soumise à la juge du procès, la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle présentée en l’espèce n’était pas en rapport avec un élément de la cause, je conclus que cette preuve ne respectait pas la troisième exi- gence énoncée au par 276(2). [130] cela dit, dans le but de donner des direc- tives plus complètes, je vais brièvement expliquer pourquoi le manque de précision de la demande de m. goldfinch a aussi nui à la capacité de la juge du procès de mettre en balance la valeur probante de la preuve et le risque d’effet préjudiciable comme l’exige l’al 276(2)c). [131] to enable the trial judge to properly assess whether sexual activity evidence sought to be ad- duced has significant probative value that substan- tially outweighs its potential prejudicial effect, the accused must situate the evidence within the par- ticular factual matrix of the case at hand. it is only through awareness of specific facts or issues that require the admission of the evidence that the trial judge can determine whether the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice presented by [131] pour permettre au juge du procès de répondre adéquatement à la question de savoir si la valeur pro- bante de la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle que l’accusé cherche à présenter l’emporte sensi- blement sur le risque d’effet préjudiciable, l’accusé doit situer la preuve dans le cadre factuel particulier de l’affaire. ce n’est qu’en ayant connaissance des questions ou faits précis nécessitant l’admission de la preuve que le juge du procès pourra établir si le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne administration 60 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. the evidence is outweighed by its probative value. the trial judge tasked with performing this balancing exercise will not be aided by generic references to “context”, “narrative”, or potential “misapprehen- sions”; more is needed. [132] this conclusion is underscored by the fact that the trial judge must consider a number of fac- tors under s. 276(3) when making a determination under s 276(2). these factors are specific in nature and require that the trial judge be in a position to evaluate the precise impact that the exclusion of the evidence would have on the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence. the accused must provide the trial judge with the necessary tools to perform this inquiry, including a precise and clearly articulated connection between the sexual activity evidence and specific facts or issues relating to his defence. unfortunately, that was not done here. de la justice que pose la preuve en question l’emporte sur sa valeur probante. une mention générale du « contexte », du « récit » ou d’éventuelles « inter- prétations erronées » n’aidera pas le juge du procès à s’acquitter de la tâche d’effectuer cette opération de mise en balance; il faut plus. [132] cette conclusion est mise en évidence par le fait que le juge du procès doit examiner plusieurs facteurs en application du par. 276(3) lorsqu’il prend une décision sur le fondement du par 276(2). ces facteurs sont de nature particulière et ils exigent que le juge du procès soit en mesure d’évaluer l’in- cidence précise que l’exclusion de la preuve aurait sur la capacité de l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière. l’accusé doit mettre à la disposition du juge du procès les outils nécessaires pour procé- der à cette vérification et, notamment, lui indiquer quel est le lien particulier — clairement formulé — entre la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle et les questions ou faits précis liés à sa défense. malheu- reusement, cela n’a pas été fait en l’espèce. (d) conclusion on admissibility d) conclusion sur l’admissibilité [133] for these reasons, although mr. goldfinch’s application satisfied the “specific instances of sexual activity” requirement under s. 276(2)(a), it satisfied neither the relevance requirement under s. 276(2)(b) nor the balancing exercise required by s 276(2)(c). as such, it was a legal error for the trial judge to admit the sexual activity evidence under s 276(2). [133] pour les motifs exposés ci- dessus, bien que la demande de m. goldfinch respectait le critère re- latif aux « cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle » prévu à l’al. 276(2)a), elle ne satisfaisait pas à l’exigence de pertinence énoncée à l’al. 276(2)b), et ne passait pas non plus le test de mise en balance qu’exige l’al 276(2)c). la juge du procès a donc commis une erreur de droit en admettant la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle sur le fondement du par 276(2). [134] in light of this conclusion, it becomes nec- essary to consider whether the trial judge’s error warrants a new trial. [134] compte tenu de cette conclusion, il devient nécessaire de se demander si l’erreur commise par la juge du procès justifie la tenue d’un nouveau procès. c whether a new trial is warranted c la tenue d’un nouveau procès est­ elle justifiée? [135] under the test articulated in r v. graveline, 2006 scc 16, [2006] 1 scr 609, an acquittal will be overturned only where the crown can demonstrate that the trial judge made a legal error that “might reasonably be thought, in the concrete reality of the case at hand, to have had a material bearing on the acquittal” (para 14). for reasons that follow, i am [135] suivant le critère énoncé dans r c. graveline, 2006 csc 16, [2006] 1 rcs 609, un acquittement sera annulé seulement si la couronne peut établir « qu’il [est] raisonnable de penser, compte tenu des faits concrets de l’affaire, que l’erreur [de droit] (ou les erreurs [de droit]) du premier juge ont eu une in- cidence significative sur le verdict d’acquittement » [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 61 satisfied that the improper admission of the “friends with benefits” evidence meets this test. (par 14). pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis con- vaincu que l’admission irrégulière de la preuve con- cernant la relation « amis- amants » satisfait à ce critère. (1) the trial judge’s limiting instructions (1) les directives restrictives de la juge du procès [136] an important feature of the s. 276 regime is its requirement of mandatory limiting instructions. section 276.4 provides that where sexual activity evidence is admitted pursuant to s. 276(2), “the judge shall instruct the jury as to the uses that the jury may and may not make of that evidence”. in this case, while the judge’s limiting instructions cautioned the jury not to use the evidence of the sexual nature of mr. goldfinch’s relationship with the complainant to support either of the twin myths, the instructions did not identify any permissible use of this evidence. the trial judge’s final instruction to the jury on this point was as follows: [136] l’obligation de donner des directives restric- tives est une caractéristique importante du régime établi par l’art 276. l’article 276.4 prévoit que lors- qu’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle est admise en application du par. 276(2), « le juge doit donner des instructions au jury quant à l’utilisation que celui-ci peut faire ou non de la preuve ». en l’espèce, bien que la juge du procès ait donné des directives restrictives au jury l’informant de ne pas utiliser la preuve concernant le caractère sexuel de la relation de m. goldfinch avec la plaignante pour étayer l’un ou l’autre des deux mythes, celles-ci ne faisaient état d’aucune utilisation permise de la preuve. voici la directive finale que la juge du procès a donnée au jury sur ce point : you heard some evidence that mr. goldfinch and [the complainant] had dated, briefly lived together, and con- tinued to have sexual relations on occasion in 2014. this evidence provides you with some context for their rela- tionship. you must not use this evidence, however, to help you decide or infer that, because of the sexual nature of their relationship, [the complainant] is more likely to have con[s]ented to sexual intercourse with mr. goldfinch on may 29th, 2014   . further, you must not use the evidence of their relationship to help you decide or infer that [the complainant] is less believable or reliable as a witness in this case    . [traduction] vous avez entendu des témoignages selon lesquels m. goldfinch et [la plaignante] se sont fréquentés puis ont brièvement vécu ensemble et qu’ils ont continué d’avoir des relations sexuelles à l’occasion en 2014. la preuve donne un certain contexte à leur relation. toutefois, elle ne doit pas vous amener à conclure ou à inférer qu’en raison du caractère sexuel de leur relation, [la plaignante] est plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à avoir une relation sexuelle avec m. goldfinch le 29 mai 2014. [  ]. vous ne devez pas non plus vous servir de cette preuve pour conclure ou inférer que [la plaignante] est un témoin moins crédible ou moins fiable dans la présente affaire   . (ar, vol. i, at p. 37) (da, vol. i, p. 37) [137] this instruction successfully identified the twin myths and cautioned the jury not to rely on them. however, the trial judge’s statement that the evidence provided the jury with “some context for their relationship” was insufficient. the instruction did not identify any specific use to which the jury could properly put the evidence. as a result, the jury was left in the dark about how they could use the evidence. [137] cette directive fait correctement état des deux mythes et met le jury en garde de ne pas se fon- der sur ceux-ci. toutefois, la déclaration de la juge du procès selon laquelle la preuve donnait au jury [traduction] « un certain contexte à [la] relation [entre la plaignante et l’accusé] » est insuffisante. la directive ne mentionne aucune fin précise pour laquelle le jury pourrait à juste titre utiliser la preuve. par conséquent, le jury a été laissé dans l’ignorance quant à la façon dont il pouvait utiliser la preuve en question. 62 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. (2) other sexual activity evidence adduced at (2) autres éléments de preuve concernant une trial activité sexuelle présentés au procès [138] as indicated, the trial judge’s instructions to the jury failed to identify specific facts or issues to which the sexual activity evidence related. moreover, compounding the risk of forbidden reasoning based on discriminatory generalizations, the trial judge ad- mitted evidence of the complainant’s sexual activity going beyond the scope of her initial s. 276 ruling. i note at the outset of this discussion that both [139] the crown and defence were responsible for adduc- ing sexual activity evidence that went beyond the scope of the trial judge’s ruling. in my view, the fact that both defence and crown counsel strayed beyond the boundaries of the judge’s ruling further illustrates the insufficiency of that initial ruling. because the judge admitted the “friends with benefits” evidence under the broad banner of “context”, the parties were left without any clear guidance on what other pieces of sexual activity evidence might be admissible un- der this broad banner. they may well have thought that the door had been swung wide open on sexual activity evidence because all such evidence would provide “context” to the events at issue in a general sense. therefore, the overbreadth and irrelevance of the sexual activity evidence adduced at trial should serve as a cautionary tale of what can go wrong when the s. 276 regime is not properly observed. [138] comme nous l’avons vu, les directives de la juge du procès ne faisaient pas mention de questions ou faits précis auxquels se rapportait la preuve concer- nant une activité sexuelle. de plus, la juge du procès a admis une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle de la plaignante qui débordait le cadre de sa décision initiale rendue au titre de l’art. 276, ce qui a augmenté le risque que le jury adopte un raisonnement défendu fondé sur des généralisations discriminatoires. il convient, à cette étape de l’analyse, de [139] souligner que tant la couronne que la défense ont présenté des éléments de preuve concernant une ac- tivité sexuelle qui allaient au- delà de la décision de la juge du procès. selon moi, le fait que l’avocate de la défense et la procureure de la couronne aient outre- passé les limites de la décision de la juge témoigne en outre du caractère insuffisant de ladite décision. étant donné que la juge du procès a admis la preuve concernant la relation « amis- amants » à titre général de « contexte », les parties ont été laissées sans di- rectives claires quant à savoir quels autres éléments de preuve concernant une activité sexuelle étaient susceptibles d’être admis à ce titre. elles auraient fort bien pu penser que la porte était grande ouverte à tout élément de preuve concernant une activité sexuelle étant donné que tout élément de preuve de cette nature mettrait « en contexte » les événements en cause de manière générale. par conséquent, la portée excessive et l’absence de pertinence de la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle présentée au procès devraient servir d’exemple édifiant du déra- page susceptible de se produire lorsque le régime de l’art. 276 n’est pas correctement appliqué. [140] at trial, both the complainant and mr. gold- finch were questioned about sexual activity that went beyond the scope of the s. 276 ruling. the trial judge initially determined that the only evidence which was admissible under s. 276(2) was the fact that the complainant and mr. goldfinch were in a “friends with benefits” relationship. however, at trial, defence counsel cross- examined the complainant about how many times she had sex with mr. goldfinch follow- ing their breakup. this directly contravened one of [140] au procès, tant la plaignante que m. gold- finch ont eu à répondre à des questions sur des acti- vités sexuelles qui allaient au- delà de la portée de la décision rendue en application de l’art 276. la juge du procès a d’abord conclu que la seule preuve qui était admissible en vertu du par. 276(2) était celle portant sur le fait que la plaignante et m. gold finch avaient une relation « amis- amants ». toutefois, au procès, l’avocate de la défense a demandé à la plai- gnante, en contre- interrogatoire, combien de fois elle [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 63 the bases for the trial judge’s ruling — namely, that any prejudice to the complainant’s privacy rights and dignity would be minimal because she would not be asked about the “particulars of    her sexual history with [mr. goldfinch]” (ar, vol. i, at p 11). that the complainant was ultimately asked about such particulars on cross- examination constituted a signif- icant infringement on her privacy rights and dignity. [141] furthermore, defence counsel asked the com- plainant about “other partners” she may have had at the time she and mr. goldfinch were in a “friends with benefits” relationship (ar, vol. ii, at p 119). she testified that she had a sexual partner other than mr. goldfinch at the time. this evidence ran a serious risk of distorting the jury’s fact- finding process by inviting stereotypical reasoning about women and consent, such as the myth that women who are “un- chaste” are more likely to consent. i note that the defence did not apply to have the trial judge revisit her initial s. 276 ruling before eliciting this evidence. as such, the evidence was not the subject of a limiting instruction. [142] the crown also strayed beyond the bounds of the trial judge’s ruling. it is true that the crown is not subject to the procedural requirements of ss 2761 and 276.2, which apply only where the ac­ cused seeks to adduce evidence of the complainant’s other sexual activity. however, the crown is subject to s. 276(1)’s prohibition on twin myth reasoning and must also abide by the common law principles articulated by this court in seaboyer. indeed, in r. v. barton, 2019 scc 33, [2019] 2 scr 579, this court stated that trial judges should determine the admissibility of crown- led prior sexual activity evi- dence through a voir dire prior to trial, applying this court’s guidance in seaboyer (barton, at para 80). avait eu des relations sexuelles avec m. goldfinch après leur rupture. cela contrevenait directement à l’un des fondements de la décision de la juge du procès — à savoir que toute atteinte au droit à la vie privée de la plaignante et à sa dignité serait minime étant donné qu’on ne lui poserait pas de questions sur les [traduction] « détails de [  ] ses activités sexuelles antérieures avec [m. gold finch] » (da, vol. i, p 11). le fait que la plaignante se soit ultime- ment fait poser des questions en contre- interrogatoire sur de tels détails constitue une importante atteinte à sa vie privée et à sa dignité. [141] qui plus est, l’avocate de la défense a demandé à la plaignante si elle avait [traduction] d’« autres partenaires » à l’époque où elle et m. gold finch en- tretenaient une relation « amis- amants » (da, vol. ii, p 119). elle a déclaré qu’elle avait à l’époque un par- tenaire sexuel autre que m goldfinch. cette preuve ris- quait fortement de dénaturer le processus de recherche des faits mené par le jury en ouvrant la porte à un raisonnement fondé sur des stéréotypes concernant les femmes et le consentement, comme le mythe voulant que les femmes « non chastes » soient plus susceptibles de consentir à une relation sexuelle. je note que la dé- fense n’a pas demandé à la juge du procès de revoir sa décision initiale rendue au titre de l’art. 276 avant de chercher à obtenir cet élément de preuve, de sorte que celui-ci ne faisait pas l’objet d’une directive restrictive. [142] la couronne a aussi outrepassé les limites de la décision de la juge du procès. il est vrai qu’elle n’est pas assujettie aux exigences procédurales des art.  276.1 et  276.2, qui s’appliquent seulement lorsque l’accusé cherche à présenter des éléments de preuve portant sur d’autres activités sexuelles de la plaignante. toutefois, la couronne est assujettie à l’interdiction prévue au par. 276(1) portant sur le rai- sonnement fondé sur les deux mythes et elle doit aussi se conformer aux principes de common law formulés par notre cour dans l’arrêt seaboyer. d’ailleurs, dans r c barton, 2019 csc 33, [2019] 2 rcs 579, notre cour a déclaré que le juge du procès doit se prononcer sur l’admissibilité de la preuve concernant un comportement sexuel antérieur présentée par la couronne lors d’un voir- dire tenu avant le procès, conformément aux enseignements énoncés par la cour dans l’arrêt seaboyer (barton, par 80). 64 r v goldfinch moldaver j. [2019] 3 scr. [143] no such procedure was observed here. dur- ing direct examination of the complainant, crown counsel elicited testimony that made reference to the complainant’s other sexual partner. further, in the crown’s cross- examination of mr. goldfinch, coun- sel led mr. goldfinch to provide details of his sexual “routine” with the complainant — namely, that they would generally have sex when the complainant stayed over at his house. this was prejudicial infor- mation about other instances of sexual activity by the complainant and should have been the subject of its own voir dire and ruling. [144] for reasons of procedural fairness, the fact that the crown strayed beyond the bounds of the trial judge’s ruling and elicited additional sexual activity evidence that was not the subject of a voir dire clearly cannot be used as a basis for setting aside mr. goldfinch’s acquittal. put simply, the crown cannot be permitted to benefit from its own missteps. nevertheless, much of the improper evidence was led by the defence. this resulted from the erroneous admission of the “friends with benefits” evidence under the broad banner of “context”. in these circum- stances, the public interest in a trial that is conducted properly according to the law and the need to protect the integrity of the justice system militate in favour of a new trial (see r v. morrison, 2019 scc 15, [2019] 2 scr 3, at para 142). [143] cette procédure n’a pas été suivie en l’es- pèce. au cours de l’interrogatoire principal de la plaignante, la procureure de la couronne a obtenu un témoignage dans lequel il était question de l’autre partenaire sexuel de la plaignante. en outre, au cours du contre- interrogatoire de m. goldfinch par la cou- ronne, m. goldfinch a été amené à donner des détails sur sa [traduction] « routine » sexuelle avec la plaignante — à savoir que, la plupart du temps, ils avaient des relations sexuelles lorsque la plaignante passait la nuit chez lui. il s’agissait de renseigne- ments préjudiciables se rapportant à d’autres cas d’activités sexuelles de la plaignante qui auraient dû faire l’objet de leur propre voir- dire et de leur propre décision. [144] pour des raisons d’équité procédurale, le fait que la couronne a dépassé les limites de la décision de la juge du procès et qu’elle a obtenu des preuves additionnelles relatives à des activités sexuelles qui ne faisaient pas l’objet d’un voir- dire ne peut manifes- tement pas servir à justifier l’annulation de l’acquit- tement de m goldfinch. autrement dit, la couronne ne peut bénéficier de ses propres impairs. néanmoins, une grande partie de la preuve irrégulière a été pré- sentée par la défense, ce qui découle de l’admission erronée de la preuve de la relation « amis- amants » qui a été présentée à titre général de « contexte ». dans de telles situations, l’intérêt du public à ce que le procès se déroule adéquatement conformément à la loi et la nécessité de protéger l’intégrité du sys- tème de justice militent en faveur de la tenue d’un nouveau procès (voir r c. morrison, 2019 csc 15, [2019] 2 rcs 3, par 142). [145] i would add that, as the ago points out, vetting sexual activity evidence advanced by either crown or defence before trial will have the salutary effect of focusing all parties on the legitimate use of such evidence. this approach will also “establish the parameters of any sexual relationship evidence that the crown seeks to adduce” and trigger de- fence counsel to bring a separate application under s. 276(2) if they wish to elicit evidence going beyond the scope of that proposed by the crown (if, at para 14). the failure to do so here led to the unnec- essary and inappropriate admission of sexual activity evidence that went beyond the trial judge’s s. 276 j’ajouterais que, comme le souligne la [145] pgo le fait de passer au crible, avant le procès, la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle — qu’elle soit invoquée par la couronne ou la défense — aura l’effet bénéfique d’attirer l’attention de toutes les parties sur l’utilisation légitime de cette preuve. en outre, cette approche [traduction] « établira les paramètres de toute preuve de relation à caractère sexuel que la couronne veut présenter » et amènera l’avocat de la défense à présenter une demande distincte au titre du par.  276(2) s’il souhaite ob- tenir des éléments de preuve allant au- delà de la portée de la preuve proposée par la couronne (mi, [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge moldaver 65 ruling. this evidence came in without first having been vetted, and it was never the subject of its own limiting instruction. this was a serious error. [146] to be clear, i make no final determination as to whether any evidence going beyond the bare fact that mr. goldfinch and the complainant were “friends with benefits” at the time of the alleged sex- ual assault might ultimately be found admissible at a new trial where it is subject to proper vetting. here, i simply point out the overbreadth of the sexual activ- ity evidence elicited at trial as a means of illustrating the adverse impact that an improper admissibility determination under s. 276 can have on the integrity of the trial process. this case serves as a powerful illustration of how a trial can go off the rails where sexual activity evidence is admitted without being anchored to a specific, legitimate purpose. without this anchor, the trial may drift into unsafe waters, as occurred in this case. and while the trial judge in this case made an effort to mitigate the situation, the damage was already done — mr. goldfinch’s appli- cation should not have been allowed in the first place. par 14). l’omission de le faire en l’espèce a mené à l’admission non nécessaire et inappropriée d’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle outrepas- sant la décision de la juge du procès fondée sur l’art 276. cette preuve a été introduite sans avoir d’abord été examinée et elle n’a jamais fait l’objet d’une directive restrictive il s’agit d’une erreur grave. il convient de préciser que je ne me pro- [146] nonce pas de façon définitive sur la question de sa- voir si une preuve allant au- delà du simple fait que m. goldfinch et la plaignante étaient des « amis- amants  » au moment de l’agression sexuelle en cause pourrait ultimement être jugée admissible lors d’un nouveau procès au cours duquel elle sera assu- jettie à un examen approprié. en l’espèce, je m’en tiens à signaler la portée excessive de la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle recueillie lors du procès dans le but d’illustrer l’incidence négative sur l’intégrité du procès que peut avoir une décision inappropriée quant à l’admissibilité sous le régime de l’art 276. la présente affaire illustre avec force comment un procès peut dérailler lorsqu’une preuve concernant une activité sexuelle est admise sans être associée à une fin précise et légitime. sans ce point d’ancrage, le procès peut se retrouver en eaux troubles, comme cela s’est produit en l’espèce. bien que la juge du procès en l’espèce se soit efforcée de remédier à la situation, le dommage avait déjà été fait; la demande de m. goldfinch n’aurait jamais dû être accueillie. [147] in conclusion, the errors at trial stemmed directly from the trial judge’s improper s. 276 ruling, which allowed for the admission of sexual activ- ity evidence under the broad banner of “context”. grounded in this ruling, the trial judge’s flawed limiting instructions failed to delineate how the sex- ual activity evidence was capable of assisting the jury to resolve specific facts or issues relating to mr. goldfinch’s defence. this flawed instruction’s distorting effect was compounded when additional sexual activity evidence was admitted at trial which was not the subject of its own admissibility deter- mination or limiting instruction. the cumulative impact of these errors, in my view, can reasona- bly be thought to have had a material bearing on [147] en conclusion, les erreurs commises au procès découlaient directement de la décision inap- propriée, rendue par la juge du procès au titre de l’art. 276, qui permettait l’admission de la preuve concernant une activité sexuelle à titre général de «  contexte  » les directives restrictives erronées de la juge du procès, qui reposaient sur cette déci- sion, n’énonçaient pas comment la preuve concer- nant une activité sexuelle pouvait aider le jury à résoudre les questions ou faits précis liés à la défense de m goldfinch. l’effet dénaturant de cette direc- tive erronée s’est aggravé lorsqu’une autre preuve concernant une activité sexuelle, n’ayant pas fait l’objet d’une décision distincte quant à son admis- sibilité ni d’une directive restrictive, a été admise au 66 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. mr. goldfinch’s acquittal. accordingly, i agree with the court of appeal that a new trial should be or- dered. procès. j’estime qu’on peut raisonnablement penser que l’effet cumulatif de ces erreurs a eu une inci- dence significative sur le verdict d’acquittement de m goldfinch. par conséquent, je conviens avec la cour d’appel qu’un nouveau procès doit être or- donné. v conclusion v conclusion [148] in the result, i would dismiss the appeal. [148] par conséquent, je suis d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi. the following are the reasons delivered by version française des motifs rendus par brown j. (dissenting) — le juge brown (dissident) — i. introduction i. introduction [149] patrick goldfinch appeals, as of right, from the decision of a majority of the court of appeal of alberta setting aside his acquittals and order- ing a new trial. the issue to be decided is whether the trial judge committed reversible error in admit- ting evidence under s. 276 of the criminal code, rsc 1985, c. c-46, that the complainant and ap- pellant were “friends with benefits”.12 [149] patrick goldfinch interjette appel, de plein droit, d’une décision des juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel de l’alberta annulant ses acquittements et ordonnant la tenue d’un nouveau procès. la ques- tion à trancher est celle de savoir si la juge du procès a commis une erreur donnant lieu à révision de sa décision en admettant, en application de l’art. 276 du code criminel, lrc 1985, c. c-46, une preuve tendant à démontrer que la plaignante et l’appelant étaient des « amis- amants »13. [150] before the jury, the complainant testified that she was sexually assaulted after the appellant would not take “no” for an answer. her evidence was that she called the appellant to come over to his residence. after watching television together with the appellant’s roommate, she and the appellant went downstairs to his living quarters. she told him that “nothing was going to happen” (ar, vol. ii, at p. 87), meaning there would be no sexual activity. after she did not join him in his bedroom, he got angry, dragged her into the bedroom, pushed her onto [150] devant le jury, la plaignante a déclaré qu’elle avait été victime d’agression sexuelle après que l’ap- pelant a refusé de se faire dire « non ». elle a expliqué qu’elle avait téléphoné à l’appelant pour proposer qu’elle se rende chez lui. après avoir regardé la télé- vision avec l’appelant et le colocataire de ce dernier, elle est descendue avec l’appelant à l’étage infé- rieur où il logeait. elle lui a dit qu’il [traduction] « n’allait rien se passer » (da, vol. ii, p. 87), en ce sens qu’il n’y aurait pas d’activité sexuelle. après qu’elle a refusé d’aller le rejoindre dans sa chambre, 12 the term is defined by the oxford english dictionary as “a friend with whom one has an occasional and casual sexual relationship” (online). the origin of the concept is unclear, but the term appears to originate in a lyric by alanis morissette in “head over feet” (1995): “you’re the best list’ner that i’ve ever met. you’re my best friend, best friend with benefits.” 13 l’équivalent anglais du terme, soit « friends with benefits », est défini par l’oxford english dictionary qui décrit ceux qui entre- tiennent ce type de relation comme des [traduction] « ami[s] avec [lesquels] on a des relations sexuelles occasionnelles et sans attaches » (en ligne). l’origine du concept est nébuleuse, mais le terme lui- même semble avoir été utilisé pour la première fois dans la chanson d’alanis morissette, head over feet (1995) : « you’re the best list’ner that i’ve ever met. you’re my best friend, best friend with benefits. » [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 67 the bed, hit her face, and had sex with her while she repeatedly told him to stop. [151] the appellant, on the other hand, testified that the complainant had called him to ask if she could come over because he owed her “birthday sex”. he picked her up and they drove back to his residence where they watched television and drank beer with his roommate. at some point, the appel- lant mouthed at her “i’m going to fuck you” (ar, vol. iii, at p. 198), after which the two walked down- stairs together to his living quarters. he eventually followed her into his bedroom, where she got un- dressed before he did. they discussed which side of the bed she would sleep on to avoid “hot flashes” that happen when she sleeps on one particular side of his bed. they had sex and fell asleep. he awoke to find her angry at him for hitting her in the face sometime while he was asleep. he became annoyed, and told her to leave. [152] in closing submissions to the jury, the ap- pellant emphasized 11 aspects of the complainant’s evidence that, in his view, exposed inconsistencies in her testimony sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt. none of these submissions referred to the relation- ship. rather, it was the crown that relied on the re- lationship. its theory was that, because they were in a sexual relationship, “mr. goldfinch was expecting sex from [the complainant] that day. that’s the only reason he went to pick her up. when he found out that he was not going to get it, he snapped” (ar, vol. iii, at p 286). [153] the trial judge would twice instruct the jury that the relationship provided context for how the appellant and complainant knew each other, but it could not be used to infer that, because they were in a relationship, the complainant was more likely to consent on this occasion, or that the complainant’s account was less believable overall. l’appelant s’est mis en colère, l’a traînée jusqu’à la chambre, l’a poussée sur le lit, l’a frappée au visage et a eu des rapports sexuels avec elle pendant qu’elle lui répétait d’arrêter. [151] l’appelant a toutefois donné une autre ver- sion des faits. la plaignante l’aurait appelé, lui de- mandant si elle pouvait aller chez lui parce qu’il lui devait [traduction] « du sexe pour son anniver- saire ». il est passé la prendre et ils sont revenus chez lui, où ils ont regardé la télévision et ont bu de la bière avec son colocataire. à un moment donné, l’ap- pelant lui a dit : [traduction] « je vais te baiser » (da, vol. iii, p. 198), ce après quoi ils sont descen- dus tous les deux dans son logement. il l’a finalement suivie dans sa chambre où elle s’est déshabillée avant lui. ils ont discuté de quel côté du lit elle allait dormir pour éviter les « bouffées de chaleur » auxquelles elle est sujette lorsqu’elle dort d’un certain côté de son lit. ils ont eu des relations sexuelles et se sont endormis. à son réveil, il a constaté qu’elle était en colère parce qu’il l’avait frappée au visage pendant son sommeil. il s’est énervé et lui a dit de partir. [152] dans son exposé final au jury, l’appelant a insisté sur 11 aspects du témoignage de la plaignante qui, selon lui, mettaient en lumière certaines incohé- rences de sa version des faits suffisantes pour soule- ver un doute raisonnable. aucune de ces observations ne traitait de la relation entre eux. c’est plutôt le mi- nistère public qui s’est fondé sur cette relation. selon sa théorie, parce qu’ils entretenaient une relation de nature sexuelle, [traduction] « m. goldfinch s’attendait à avoir une relation sexuelle [avec la plai- gnante] ce jour-là. c’est la seule raison pour laquelle il est allé la chercher. lorsqu’il a réalisé que ce ne se- rait pas le cas, il s’est énervé » (da, vol. iii, p 286). [153] la juge du procès a expliqué à deux reprises aux jurés que la relation donnait le contexte des fré- quentations de l’appelant et de la plaignante, mais qu’elle ne pouvait pas être utilisée pour en déduire, parce qu’ils entretenaient une relation, que la plai- gnante était plus susceptible d’avoir donné son consen- tement durant la soirée en cause, ou que sa version des faits était dans l’ensemble moins crédible. [154] the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. [154] le jury a rendu un verdict d’acquittement. 68 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. i have read carefully the reasons of the ma- [155] jority. i agree that this appeal turns on how to balance the admissibility of evidence of a relationship that may be a necessary link in making full answer and defence with ensuring triers of fact do not use the existence of a relationship to engage in prohibited reasoning. and while i agree with much of the ma- jority’s overview of s. 276 of the criminal code, we disagree on its application to this evidentiary re- cord. the majority reasons that the relationship was simply not relevant to any issue before the jury, and therefore engaged the prohibited line of reasoning that “because the complainant had consented to sex with goldfinch in the past, in similar circumstances, it was more likely she had consented on the night in question” (para 47). [156] this appeal therefore presents three issues: (1) does the ordinary meaning of “friends with ben- efits” invariably lead the trier of fact to engage in reasoning prohibited by s. 276(1); (2) was the nature of their relationship relevant to any issue before the jury under s. 276(2)(b); and (3) should a new trial be ordered in the event the trial judge erred? [157] these are difficult questions that go to the heart of s 276. my view is that the trial judge ap- plied the correct legal principles in her evidentiary ruling. the majority sees it differently, describing the “clea[r] infect[ion]” of the context laid out before the jury with twin- myth reasoning, making the jury “privy to particulars” that it should not have known about (para 72). while the majority reasons that this must have been caused by an error in the evidentiary ruling before trial, as i see it, the responsibility for any “infection” during this trial lies not in the trial judge’s ruling, but rather at the feet of the crown, who must live with its choices. [155] j’ai lu attentivement les motifs de mes col- lègues majoritaires. je suis d’accord pour dire que le présent pourvoi concerne la façon de trouver un équi- libre entre, d’une part, l’admissibilité de la preuve d’une relation — preuve qui peut s’avérer nécessaire pour protéger le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière — et, d’autre part, le besoin de garantir que les juges des faits n’appliquent aucun raisonnement inter- dit fondé sur une relation. si, par ailleurs, je souscris à l’essentiel de l’analyse de l’art. 276 du code criminel des juges majoritaires, nous divergeons d’opinion quant à son application à la preuve produite en l’espèce. selon mes collègues majoritaires, la relation n’était tout sim- plement pas pertinente pour trancher les questions dont le jury était saisi. la preuve à ce sujet menait donc au raisonnement interdit selon lequel « parce que la plai- gnante avait consenti dans le passé à avoir des rapports sexuels avec m. goldfinch dans des circonstances sem- blables, il était plus probable qu’elle ait consenti à avoir un rapport sexuel avec lui le soir en question » (par 47). [156] le pourvoi soulève donc trois questions : (1) le sens courant de l’expression « amis- amants » mène-t-il invariablement les juges des faits à adopter un raisonnement interdit aux termes du par. 276(1); (2) la nature de la relation qu’entretenaient l’appelant et la plaignante était- elle pertinente, comme l’exige l’al. 276(2)b), pour trancher les questions soulevées devant le jury; et (3) faut-il ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès advenant le cas où la juge du procès a commis une erreur? [157] il s’agit de questions difficiles à trancher qui concernent l’essence même de l’art 276. selon moi, la juge du procès a appliqué les bons principes de droit pour statuer sur l’admissibilité de la preuve. les juges majoritaires voient les choses différemment et décrivent la preuve du contexte présentée au jury comme étant « manifestement viciée » par un rai- sonnement fondé sur les deux mythes, ce qui aurait permis au jury d’« être au courant d[e] détails » dont il n’aurait pas dû avoir connaissance (par 72). les juges majoritaires sont d’avis que cela a dû être causé par une erreur dans la décision sur la preuve rendue avant le procès. j’estime pour ma part que ce n’est pas la décision de la juge du procès qui, en l’espèce, est à l’origine du « vic[e] », mais bien le ministère public, qui doit assumer ses choix. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 69 i would answer the legal questions as fol- [158] lows. first, i say that evidence of a “friends with benefits” relationship will, in certain cases, and without engaging in prohibited lines of reasoning, explain to a jury how two people know each other, consistent with how other relationships are presented to juries. i agree with the majority that relationship evidence, without proper scrutiny under s. 276 and sufficient limiting instructions, can trigger triers of fact to engage in prohibited lines of reasoning. but i do not accept the majority’s solution to this problem, which would treat evidence of certain relationships (for example, “married”, “dating”, or “boyfriend- girlfriend”), each of which might also suggest previ- ous sexual activity, differently in the s. 276 analysis based on how the particular relationship’s sexual features, real or imagined, are reasonably perceived. i prefer the trial judge’s evidentiary ruling, which treated the relationship between the appellant and the complainant consistently with other relationships in society. the jury could be told about the existence and nature of the relationship, but could not be told about its particularities or the frequency of sexual relations. the jury was then instructed twice on the permissible use of the evidence (to provide context for how the appellant and the complainant knew each other) and its impermissible uses (to suggest that, because they were friends with benefits, the com- plainant was more likely to consent on this occasion, or was less worthy of belief overall). [158] voici comment je réponds aux questions de droit soulevées par le présent pourvoi. tout d’abord, selon moi, la preuve d’une relation « amis- amants » peut, dans certains cas, et sans mener à des raisonne- ments interdits, expliquer à un jury le contexte des fréquentations de deux personnes, comme le fait la preuve d’autres types de relations présentées à des jurys. je conviens avec les juges majoritaires que la preuve concernant la relation, sans examen fondé sur l’art. 276 et sans directives restrictives suffisantes, peut mener les juges des faits à adopter un raisonnement interdit. je n’accepte toutefois pas la solution que proposent mes collègues majoritaires pour répondre à ce problème, une solution qui traite différemment la preuve de certaines relations (par exemple, celles de gens « mariés », qui « sortent ensemble » ou qui sont « copain- copine »), qui peuvent toutes également sug- gérer des activités sexuelles antérieures, dans l’analyse fondée sur l’art. 276, en fonction de la façon dont les caractéristiques de nature sexuelle de la relation, qu’elles soient réelles ou imaginaires, sont raisonna- blement perçues. je préfère la décision concernant la preuve de la juge de première instance, qui a traité la relation entre l’appelant et la plaignante de la même manière que les autres relations que peuvent entrete- nir des individus. le jury pouvait donc être informé de l’existence et de la nature de la relation, mais non de ses particularités ou de la fréquence des relations sexuelles. le jury a par ailleurs reçu des directives à deux reprises sur l’utilisation permise de la preuve (soit donner le contexte des fréquentations de l’appe- lant et de la plaignante) et sur ses utilisations interdites (pour suggérer que, parce qu’ils étaient amis- amants, la plaignante était plus susceptible de consentir à cette occasion, ou était moins digne de foi dans l’ensemble). [159] secondly, the trial judge’s evidentiary ruling was consistent with the proposition that the existence of a relationship between the complainant and the accused may be admitted as relevant, but strictly where its absence would leave the trier of fact with a distorted representation of the circumstances sur- rounding the incident. the trial judge concluded this was such a circumstance. while the majority disa- grees, and finds nothing in the appellant’s evidence that rendered his narrative “untenable” or “utterly improbable” (para. 68) absent reference to the re- lationship, it is hard to find fault in the trial judge’s [159] ensuite, j’estime que la décision relative à la preuve rendue par la juge de première instance était compatible avec la proposition selon laquelle l’exis- tence d’une relation entre la plaignante et l’accusé pouvait être admise au motif qu’elle était pertinente, mais uniquement si le défaut de produire cette preuve donnait aux juges des faits une image déformée des circonstances entourant la perpétration de l’acte re- proché. la juge du procès a conclu qu’on avait effecti- vement affaire à une telle situation. bien que les juges majoritaires ne soient pas d’accord — et concluent que rien dans la preuve présentée par l’appelant n’a 70 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. determination on this point when the crown itself took a similar position — specifically, that admitting evidence of the relationship was necessary to prevent distortion. the crown’s objection was merely to the form, rather than the substance, of the appellant’s description of the relationship. [160] i am not persuaded the trial judge commit- ted an error in law sufficient to ground a crown appeal from acquittal. this leads to my third point of departure from the majority. ordering a new trial is unfair, given the following considerations: the crown’s theory of the case against the appellant drew directly from the sexual nature of this relation- ship; the “infection” to which the majority refers was largely as a result of a contravention by crown counsel of the terms of the trial judge’s evidentiary ruling; and, a successful crown appeal from acquittal on this record inevitably lowers the bar which the crown must overcome to show that a legal error had a material bearing on the acquittal so as to se- cure a new trial. how, after all, can the admission of this evidence be said to have had a material bearing on the acquittals, when the crown was relying on the selfsame evidence to prove its case? the crown was perfectly content in this case to refer, rely and ultimately weaponize the sexual past between the appellant and the complainant, until the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. only then did the crown on appeal take the position that the sexual nature of the relationship must have led the jury to engage in prohibited reasoning — and that, notwithstanding the crown’s reliance on the sexual nature of that relationship, the appellant should not have been able to answer it. this is fundamentally unfair. rendu sa version des faits « indéfendable » ou « com- plètement improbable » (par. 68) sans référence à la relation —, il est difficile de trouver quoi que ce soit à redire à la conclusion de la juge du procès à cet égard, dès lors que le ministère public lui- même a adopté une position semblable — soit plus précisément, celle de faire valoir qu’il était nécessaire d’admettre la preuve concernant la relation pour éviter de défor- mer les faits. l’objection du ministère public portait uniquement sur la forme et non sur le fond de la description que l’appelant avait donnée de la relation. [160] je ne suis pas convaincu que la juge du pro- cès a commis une erreur de droit suffisamment grave pour justifier un appel par le ministère public d’un verdict d’acquittement. voilà qui m’amène au troi- sième point de divergence entre ma position et celle de mes collègues majoritaires. ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès serait injuste, et ce, pour les raisons suivantes : la théorie de la cause du ministère public contre l’appelant est tirée directement de la nature sexuelle de la relation en cause en l’espèce; le « vic[e] » auquel réfèrent les juges majoritaires découlait pour une large part de la contravention par l’avocate du ministère public des conditions prescrites par la décision de la juge du procès sur la preuve; et, un appel victorieux du ministère public de l’acquittement à la lumière du dossier en l’espèce abaisse inévitablement la barre qu’il doit franchir pour démontrer qu’une erreur de droit a eu une inci- dence telle sur l’acquittement qu’elle justifie la tenue d’un nouveau procès. après tout, comment prétendre que l’admission de cette preuve a eu une incidence importante au point d’entraîner les acquittements, puisque le ministère public s’est fondé précisément sur les éléments de preuve en question pour étayer sa thèse? en l’espèce, le ministère public était parfaite- ment à l’aise de référer au passé sexuel de l’appelant et de la plaignante, de se fonder sur lui et ultimement de s’en servir comme argument, jusqu’à ce que le jury rende un verdict d’acquittement. ce n’est qu’à ce moment que le ministère public, en appel, a sou- tenu que la nature sexuelle de la relation doit avoir mené le jury à adopter un raisonnement interdit — et que, en dépit du fait que le ministère public s’est fondé sur la nature sexuelle de cette relation, l’appe­ lant n’aurait pas dû pouvoir répondre à cet argument. cette position est fondamentalement injuste. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 71 [161] these are the points that divide us. the jury rendered its verdict after being properly instructed on how to do so. i would allow the appeal and restore the acquittals. [161] voilà les éléments qui nous divisent. le jury a rendu son verdict après avoir reçu de bonnes direc- tives sur la façon d’y parvenir. je suis d’avis d’ac- cueillir l’appel et de rétablir les acquittements. ii the voir dire decision — court of queen’s bench of alberta, 140600008q1, january 23, 2017 ii la décision sur le voir- dire — cour du banc de la reine de l’alberta, 140600008q1, 23 jan- vier 2017 [162] before the trial, the appellant applied under s 2761 of the criminal code to adduce evidence that he and the complainant were friends with bene- fits, in order to dispel any erroneous impression that the jury might be under that he had sexualized an otherwise platonic friendship, or, to avoid mislead- ing the jury into believing that they were complete strangers. the crown objected, saying that friends with benefits would trigger prohibited twin myth rea- soning in the jury. it did agree, however, that the jury would need some context to dispel the notion that the appellant and the complainant were strangers. to be clear, the crown’s objection was not to the injection of context, or, more broadly, to relationship evidence that insinuates past sexual activity, but to the term “friends with benefits”. the crown’s solution was to tell the jury that they dated for seven to eight months, broke up, then reconnected; and that, on occasion, the complainant would visit the appellant’s residence late in the evening and leave the following morning. [162] avant le procès, l’appelant a présenté une demande en application de l’art 2761 du code cri­ minel pour être autorisé à produire une preuve ten- dant à démontrer que la plaignante et lui étaient des amis- amants. il voulait ainsi dissiper dans l’esprit des jurés toute fausse impression qu’il aurait sexua- lisé une amitié par ailleurs platonique, ou éviter de les induire en erreur en les amenant à croire qu’ils étaient de parfaits inconnus. le ministère public s’est opposé à cette demande en faisant valoir que le terme « amis- amants » inciterait les jurés à adopter un raisonnement interdit fondé sur les deux mythes. le ministère public a toutefois convenu que le jury aurait besoin de connaître un peu le contexte pour écarter l’idée que l’appelant et la plaignante ne se connaissaient pas. je tiens à préciser que l’objec- tion du ministère public ne portait pas sur la mise en contexte ou, plus largement, sur les éléments de preuve concernant la relation qui insinuaient que les parties avaient eu des activités sexuelles dans le passé, mais sur le terme « amis- amants ». le minis- tère public a proposé comme solution d’expliquer au jury qu’ils étaient sortis ensemble pendant sept ou huit mois, qu’ils avaient rompu, puis qu’ils s’étaient réconciliés et que, à l’occasion, la plaignante se ren- dait chez l’appelant tard le soir et repartait le lende- main matin. i stress that it was the crown’s position that [163] it would not offend s. 276 or undermine the interests it is intended to protect for the jury to be told that the complainant would occasionally “visit” the ap- pellant — a former boyfriend with whom she had re- connected — late in the evening, and that she would leave only the following morning. [163] j’insiste sur le fait que le ministère public était d’avis qu’on ne porterait pas atteinte à l’art. 276 ou aux droits que cet article vise à protéger si l’on disait aux jurés que la plaignante « rendait visite » à l’occasion à l’appelant — un ancien petit ami avec qui elle avait repris contact — tard le soir, et qu’elle ne repartait que le lendemain matin. [164] the trial judge considered the competing positions. she directly addressed the prejudice that [164] la juge du procès a examiné les positions opposées. elle a traité directement du préjudice que 72 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. could flow to the complainant if the jury drew certain (prohibited) inferences from the nature of the rela- tionship. she queried defence counsel during the voir dire: “what is the safeguard then to prevent    one of the twin myths that because she consented to the [friends] with benefits relationship one, two, 10 or 20 times before that she is likely to have consented on this occasion. what is the protection if this evidence is    permitted?” (ar, vol. ii, at p 14). in her evidentiary ruling, the trial judge agreed [165] that without some context for how the appellant and the complainant knew each other, the appellant could not make full answer and defence. bearing in mind that his credibility would be the central issue at trial, the jury could not properly assess (or indeed might well misconceive) the plausibility of his version of events were it prevented from understanding how the appellant and the complainant knew each other, or were it to simply assume they were strangers because no party had raised the issue of how they knew each other. pourrait subir la plaignante si le jury tirait certaines conclusions (interdites) en raison du caractère de la relation. elle a posé la question suivante à l’avo- cate de la défense lors du voir- dire : [traduction] « quelles sont les mesures de protection prévues pour empêcher [  ] l’un des deux mythes suivant lequel, comme elle a donné son consentement à cette relation amis- amants une fois, deux fois, 10 fois ou 20 fois auparavant, elle est susceptible d’avoir consenti lors de la soirée en cause ici. de quel genre de protection parle-t-on si l’on admet cette preuve? » (da, vol. ii, p 14). [165] dans sa décision relative à la preuve, la juge du procès a convenu que, sans donner d’indications quant au contexte des fréquentations de la plaignante et de l’appelant, ce dernier ne serait pas en mesure de présenter une défense pleine et entière. puisque la crédibilité de l’appelant serait la question centrale au procès, les jurés ne pourraient évaluer correcte- ment — ou pourraient même fort bien mal interpré- ter — la vraisemblance de la version des faits de l’appelant s’ils ne pouvaient être mis au courant du contexte de ses fréquentations avec la plaignante ou s’ils devaient simplement tenir pour acquis que les deux protagonistes étaient des inconnus parce que personne n’avait soulevé la question de la nature de leur relation. [166] admitting evidence of the relationship would be no different than admitting evidence that an ac- cused and a complainant were “married”, “dating”, or “boyfriend- girlfriend”. the point being, the trial judge believed the jury ought to be told how they knew each other in order to avoid misinterpreting things the appellant said or did as having arisen out of the blue (ar, vol. i, at p 6). as she viewed the matter, keeping the existence of the relationship from the jury would leave a level of “artificiality” in the appellant’s evidence, and would prevent him from being able to make full answer and defence. [166] l’admission de la preuve de cette relation n’est guère différente de l’admission en preuve du fait qu’un accusé et une plaignante étaient « mariés », « sortaient ensemble » ou étaient « copain- copine ». l’essentiel est que la juge du procès estimait qu’il fallait que les jurés connaissent la nature de leur re- lation pour éviter qu’ils pensent à tort que les gestes et les paroles de l’appelant étaient surgis de nulle part (da, vol. i, p 6). selon elle, cacher l’existence de la relation aux jurés rendrait la preuve de l’appe- lant quelque peu « artificielle » et l’empêcherait de présenter une défense pleine et entière. [167] following a thorough examination of the relevant factors under s. 276(2) and (3), the trial judge chose to admit the friends with benefits evi- dence, rather than the crown’s proposed account of former lovers, who had reconnected to have adult sleepovers. as the majority notes, the trial judge [167] après un examen approfondi des facteurs applicables énoncés aux par. 276(2) et 276(3), la juge du procès a décidé d’admettre la preuve concernant la relation amis- amants plutôt que la formulation proposée par le ministère public qui parlait d’anciens amants qui avaient repris contact pour avoir des nuits [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 73 remained very much alive to how a reference to the relationship could be misused to engage in prohibited lines of reasoning in relation to the complainant and her evidence. and she could not have been clearer in directing to the parties that, while evidence could be led about the relationship between the appellant and the complainant, no evidence was to be led about the relationship’s particularities (“the specific sex- ual acts [the complainant] and the accused engaged in”), or frequency (“the number of times they had sexual relations after they ceased living together”) (ar, vol. i, at p 10). and once again when, on the morning of trial, crown counsel sought clarification about the scope of the evidentiary ruling, the trial judge reiterated that no evidence was to be led about particularities or frequency of the relationship.13 all counsel acknowledged they understood. intimes adultes comme l’ont souligné les juges majoritaires, la juge du procès demeurait toutefois très consciente que les mots employés pour parler de la relation pouvaient être utilisés à mauvais escient pour se livrer à un raisonnement interdit relativement à la plaignante et à son témoignage. elle n’aurait d’ailleurs pu être plus claire lorsqu’elle a expliqué aux parties que, même si elles pouvaient présenter des éléments de preuve sur la nature de la relation qu’entretenaient l’appelant et la plaignante, elles ne pouvaient présenter aucune preuve concernant les détails de cette relation ([traduction] « les activi- tés sexuelles précises auxquelles [la plaignante] et l’accusé s’étaient livrés ») ou la fréquence de leurs rencontres (« le nombre de relations sexuelles qu’ils ont eues après avoir cessé de faire vie commune ») (da, vol. i, p 10). en outre, je le répète, lorsque le matin du procès, l’avocate du ministère public a demandé des éclaircissements au sujet de la portée de la décision relative à la preuve, la juge du procès a réitéré qu’aucune preuve ne devait être présen- tée quant aux particularités ou à la fréquence des rapports sexuels14. toutes les avocates ont reconnu qu’elles avaient compris ces directives. iii the trial — court of queen’s bench of alberta, iii le procès — cour du banc de la reine de l’al- 140600008q1, february 9, 2017 berta, 140600008q1, 9 février 2017 [168] at trial, the complainant initially testified that, at the time of the assault, she was “just friends” with the appellant, that at no time since their formal relationship ended were they anything more than “friends” (ar, vol. ii, at p. 77), and that she and the appellant “weren’t speaking” in the months leading up to the alleged assault (ar, vol. ii, at pp 77-78). almost immediately after that, however, and still in chief, she testified that she and the appellant previ- ously had sex in his bedroom. crown counsel asked whether this occurred while they used to date, and [168] au procès, la plaignante a d’abord expliqué que, au moment de l’agression, elle et l’appelant étaient [traduction] « juste des amis » et que, à aucun moment depuis qu’ils avaient cessé d’être en couple, ils n’avaient été autre chose que de « simples amis » (da, vol. ii, p 77). elle a ajouté qu’elle et l’appelant « ne se parlaient plus » durant les mois ayant précédé la présumée agression sexuelle (da, vol. ii, p 77-78). presque immédiatement après cette déclaration, et toujours lors de son interrogatoire principal, elle a toutefois expliqué qu’elle avait déjà 13 strictly speaking, the crown is not “bound” by a s 2761 ruling, since evidence proffered by the crown is not “adduced by or on behalf of the accused”. the crown adheres to the principles set out in r v. seaboyer, [1991] 2 scr 577, in relation to the common law rules of evidence in sexual prosecutions. this distinction is immaterial in this appeal. the crown understood it could not lead evidence that contravened the evidentiary ruling. 14 strictement parlant, le ministère public n’est pas « lié » par une décision fondée sur l’art 2761, puisque la preuve qu’il présente n’est pas présentée par « l’accusé ou son représentant ». le ministère public adhère aux principes énoncés dans l’arrêt r. c. seaboyer, [1991] 2 rcs 577, en ce qui a trait aux règles de preuve de la common law applicables dans le cadre de poursuites en matière sexuelle. cette distinction est sans importance dans le présent pourvoi. le ministère public comprenait qu’il ne pouvait pas produire d’éléments de preuve qui contrevenaient à la décision relative à la preuve. 74 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. the complainant answered that it occurred after they had broken up. crown counsel then went one step further — contrary to the trial judge’s clear and re- peated instructions — and asked whether they had sex on a single occasion or on “various” occasions after they had broken up, and when was the last time she had sex with the appellant. the complainant confirmed that they had sex on “various” occasions after they ceased living together. eu des relations sexuelles avec l’appelant dans la chambre de ce dernier. l’avocate du ministère pu- blic lui a demandé si ces relations remontaient à l’époque où ils sortaient ensemble et la plaignante a répondu qu’elles avaient eu lieu après leur rupture. l’avocate du ministère public est allée encore un peu plus loin — en contravention des directives claires et répétées de la juge du procès — et lui a demandé s’ils avaient eu des rapports sexuels à une seule occasion ou à « diverses » occasions après leur rupture et à quand remontait leur dernière relation sexuelle. la plaignante a confirmé qu’ils avaient eu des rapports sexuels à « diverses » occasions après qu’ils ont cessé de vivre ensemble. [169] in light of this evidence adduced from the complainant by the crown, the trial judge at the conclusion of examination-in- chief notified coun- sel that following the complainant’s testimony she would provide a mid- trial limiting instruction to the jury warning against impermissible uses of evidence that refers to the complainant’s sexual activity. after canvassing the text of the proposed instruction with counsel, and following the complainant’s evidence, the trial judge gave the following mid- trial instruc- tion: [169] à la lumière des explications données par la plaignante au ministère public, à la fin de l’interroga- toire principal, la juge du procès a informé les avocates que, à la suite du témoignage de la plaignante, elle donnerait des directives restrictives de mi- procès pour mettre les jurés en garde contre les utilisations inter- dites d’éléments de preuve mentionnant les activités sexuelles de la plaignante. après avoir convenu avec les avocates du texte de la directive proposée et à la suite du témoignage de la plaignante, la juge du procès a donné la directive suivante au milieu du procès : the court:   . you have heard evidence that [the complainant] and mr. goldfinch dated and then briefly lived together. at some point after that relationship ended, [the complainant] and mr. goldfinch did on occasion get together and have sexual relations. this evidence provides you with some context for their relationship, but you must not use this evidence to help you decide that because [the complain- ant] and mr. goldfinch had sexual relations in the past, that [the complainant] is more likely to have consented to mr. — consented to what mr. goldfinch is alleged to have done on may 29th, 2014, and you must also not use that evidence to help you decide that because [the complainant] and mr. goldfinch had sexual relations in the past that she is less believable or reliable as a witness in this case, all right? thank you. [traduction] la cour :   . vous avez entendu un témoignage selon lequel [la plai- gnante] et m. goldfinch sont sortis ensemble et ont briè- vement vécu ensemble. après la fin de cette relation, [la plaignante] et m. goldfinch se sont revus à l’occasion et ont eu des relations sexuelles. cette preuve vous four- nit un certain contexte au sujet de leur relation. vous ne devez toutefois pas vous servir de cette preuve pour vous aider à décider que, parce que [la plaignante] et m. goldfinch avaient eu des relations sexuelles dans le passé, il est plus probable que [la plaignante] ait consenti à ce que m. — consenti à ce que m. goldfinch aurait fait le 29 mai 2014, et vous ne devez pas non plus utiliser cette preuve pour vous aider à décider que, parce que [la plaignante] et m. goldfinch avaient eu des relations sexuelles dans le passé, [la plaignante] est moins crédible ou moins digne de foi comme témoin dans la présente affaire. d’accord? je vous remercie. (ar, vol. ii, at p. 148) (da, vol. ii, p. 148) [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 75 i have already summarized the pertinent as- [170] pects of the appellant’s evidence. in his closing sub- missions to the jury, the following pieces of evidence formed the central planks of his case: [170] j’ai déjà résumé les aspects pertinents du témoignage de l’appelant. les éléments de preuve suivants constituaient les aspects essentiels de la thèse qu’il a exposée au jury dans ses observations finales : [ms. hatch] i’m going to ask you to consider 11 im- portant items, and i’m going to list them first for you. and there may be other items that you find important as well, and obviously you will consider those. i would like you though to consider these 11 items carefully. [traduction] [me hatch] je vais maintenant attirer votre attention sur 11 éléments importants. je vais commencer par vous les énumérer les uns à la suite des autres. il se peut qu’il y ait d’autres éléments que vous trouviez également im- portants et, de toute évidence, vous allez également en tenir compte. j’aimerais toutefois que vous examiniez attentivement les 11 éléments suivants : number 1, the phone in the bedroom. numéro 1, le téléphone qui se trouvait dans la chambre. secondly, wanting mr. goldfinch off the computer. deuxièmement, le fait qu’elle insistait pour que m. gold- finch laisse l’ordinateur. thirdly, the timing, and i’m going to comment more on each of these in a few minutes. troisièmement, la chronologie des événements; je vais revenir sur chacun de ces aspects dans quelques minutes. the fourth item is the absence of any evidence of any injury to the complainant’s genitals. le quatrième élément est l’absence de preuve de blessures aux organes génitaux de la plaignante. number 5, the glasses being undamaged. numéro 5, l’absence de dommage aux lunettes. number 6 is the kiss. numéro 6, le baiser. number 7, phoning the cab. numéro 7, l’appel d’un taxi. number 8, being worried that he’d lost everything. numéro 8, le fait que m. goldfinch craignait avoir tout perdu. number 9, testimony that he may have been flaccid through- out. numéro 9, la crainte de m. goldfinch d’avoir été flasque pendant tout ce temps. and number 10, extensive lack of recall. et numéro 10 : l’incapacité de se souvenir de beaucoup de faits. lastly, number 11, all hell broke loose. there was yelling. it was loud. and i’m going to invite you to look closely at each of those items. enfin, numéro 11, tout s’est mis à basculer. il y a eu des cris, des hurlements. je vais vous inviter à examiner atten- tivement chacun de ces éléments de preuve. (ar, vol. iii, at p. 275) (da, vol. iii, p. 275) 76 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. in contrast, the crown advanced the follow- [171] ing theory to the jury: [171] en revanche, le ministère public a avancé la thèse suivante devant le jury : [traduction] [crown] the crown’s submission is that mr. goldfinch was expecting sex from [the complainant] that day. that’s the only reason he went to pick her up. when he found out that he was not going to get it, he snapped. [ministère public] selon le ministère public, m. gold- finch s’attendait à avoir des relations sexuelles avec [la plai- gnante] ce jour-là. c’est la seule raison pour laquelle il est passé la prendre chez elle. lorsqu’il a découvert qu’il n’allait pas obtenir ce qu’il voulait, il a pété les plombs. (ar, vol. iii, at p. 286) (da, vol. iii, p. 286) the crown elaborated on this theory at the outset of its closing submissions by telling the jury: le ministère public a développé sa thèse à l’ouver- ture de ses observations finales en expliquant ce qui suit au jury : [crown] in this case, you heard [the complainant], a 54- year-old woman, tell you that she was sexually as- saulted. she and mr. goldfinch dated for seven or eight months. they lived together. she ended the relationship. her evidence on those points is uncontradicted. she told you that she called him. he picked her up. she was open to the possibility of having sex with him. when the offer was made to accompany mr. goldfinch downstairs, she knew what that really meant, and she made it clear that she would come downstairs but that there would be no sex. [traduction] [ministère public] en l’espèce, vous avez entendu [la plaignante], une femme âgée de 54  ans, vous dire qu’elle avait été agressée sexuellement. elle et m. gold- finch sont sortis ensemble pendant sept ou huit mois. ils ont vécu ensemble. elle a mis fin à la relation. le témoignage qu’elle a donné sur ces éléments n’a pas été contredit. elle vous a dit que c’était elle qui avait appelé m goldfinch il est passé la prendre chez elle. elle était ouverte à la possibilité d’avoir des relations sexuelles avec lui. lorsque m. goldfinch l’a invitée à le suivre à l’étage inférieur, elle savait ce que cela voulait vraiment dire, et elle lui a bien fait comprendre qu’elle le suivrait en bas, mais qu’il n’y aurait pas de relation sexuelle. (ar, vol. iii, at p. 283) (da, vol. iii, p. 283) in her final charge to the jury, the trial judge [172] instructed: [172] dans son exposé final aux jurés, la juge du procès a donné les directives suivantes : [traduction] [the court] finally, i wish to talk to you about the ev- idence you heard of the prior sexual relationship between mr. goldfinch and [the complainant]. you heard some evidence that mr. goldfinch and [the complainant] had dated, briefly lived together, and continued to have sexual relations on occasion in 2014. this evidence provides you with some context for their relationship. you must not use this evidence, however, to help you decide or infer that, because of the sexual nature of their relationship, [the complainant] is more likely to have [consented] to sexual [la cour] enfin, je tiens à vous parler du témoignage que vous avez entendu au sujet des relations sexuelles antérieures qu’ont eues m. goldfinch et [la plaignante]. vous avez entendu des éléments de preuve suivant lesquels m. goldfinch et [la plaignante] étaient sortis ensemble, avaient vécu brièvement ensemble et avaient continué à avoir des relations sexuelles à l’occasion en 2014. ces élé- ments de preuve vous expliquent un peu le contexte de leur relation. vous ne devez toutefois pas utiliser ces éléments de preuve pour vous aider à décider ou à conclure que, en [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 77 intercourse with mr. goldfinch on may 29th, 2014. the fact that they had sexual relations in the past or the extent of their sexual relations is irrelevant to the issue of consent on this particular occasion. our law requires that consent be given to sexual activity on each and every occasion. further, you must not use the evidence of their relationship to help you decide or infer that [the complainant] is less believable or reliable as a witness in this case, but you may consider any contradictions in her evidence about the nature of their relationship in assessing credibility, as you would with any witness. raison du caractère sexuel de leur relation, [la plaignante] est plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à avoir des relations sexuelles avec m. goldfinch le 29 mai 2014. le fait qu’ils ont eu des relations sexuelles dans le passé ou la fréquence de leurs relations sexuelles ne sont pas des éléments perti- nents pour répondre à la question du consentement à cette occasion précise. notre droit exige que le consentement à une activité sexuelle soit donné chaque fois. de plus, vous ne devez pas utiliser les éléments de preuve concernant leur relation pour vous aider à décider ou à conclure que [la plaignante] est moins crédible ou moins digne de foi comme témoin dans cette cause-ci, mais vous pouvez tenir compte de toute contradiction que vous rele- vez dans son témoignage quant à la nature de sa relation avec m. goldfinch pour évaluer sa crédibilité, comme vous le feriez pour tout autre témoin. (ar, vol. iii, at p. 362) (da, vol. iii, p. 362) [173] the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. [173] le jury a rendu un verdict d’acquittement. iv the appeal — 2018 abca 240, 48 cr (7th). iv l’appel — 2018 abca 240, 48 cr (7th) 22 22 [174] the crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing the jury to hear that the appel- lant and complainant were friends with benefits, because it was used to advance inferences that were prohibited under s. 276(1) of the criminal code — specifically, that the complainant was more likely to consent to the sexual activity with the appellant, or that she was less worthy of belief overall. a ma- jority at the court of appeal of alberta agreed, and ordered a new trial (at paras. 1-55), with berger ja. dissenting. the relationship evidence had no relevant purpose other than to engage in prohibited reasoning, and its admission ran afoul of s 276(1). [174] le ministère public a interjeté appel de ce verdict en faisant valoir que la juge du procès avait commis une erreur en permettant aux jurés d’en- tendre que l’appelant et la plaignante étaient des amis- amants, puisque cet élément de preuve a servi à tirer des conclusions interdites par le par. 276(1) du code criminel — en l’occurrence, que la plaignante était plus susceptible de consentir à avoir des rap- ports sexuels avec l’appelant ou qu’elle était moins digne de foi dans l’ensemble. les juges majoritaires de la cour d’appel de l’alberta ont abondé dans le sens du ministère public et ont ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès (par. 1-55), le juge berger était dissident. les éléments de preuve relatifs à la relation n’avaient d’autre but pertinent que de se livrer à un raisonnement interdit et leur admission en preuve allait à l’encontre du par 276(1). v analysis v analyse [175] in order to appeal from an acquittal, the crown must demonstrate that the trial judge erred on a point of law. the legal question before us is, there- fore, whether the trial judge erred in law because [175] pour pouvoir interjeter appel d’un verdict d’acquittement, le ministère public doit démontrer que le juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit. la question qui nous est soumise est par conséquent 78 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. some legal principle precludes relationship evidence, namely “friends with benefits” evidence, from being admitted in these circumstances. any alleged errors reduce to this: either the trial judge erred, as the ordinary meaning of “friends with benefits” invaria- bly leads the jury to engage in prohibited reasoning under s. 276(1), or she erred because the evidence that they were “friends with benefits” was simply not relevant to any issue at trial under s 276(2)(b). [176] with respect for those holding contrary views, no such errors are shown here. celle de savoir si la juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit, étant donné qu’un principe de droit empêche dans ces circonstances d’admettre la preuve concernant la relation, en l’occurrence celle concer- nant la relation « amis- amants ». toute erreur allé- guée se réduit à ceci : soit la juge du procès a commis une erreur, puisque le sens courant de l’expression «  amis- amants  » mène invariablement le jury à adopter un raisonnement interdit par le par. 276(1), soit elle a commis une erreur parce que la preuve qu’ils entretenaient une relation « amis- amants » n’était tout simplement pas pertinente pour trancher les questions soulevées au procès comme l’exige l’al 276(2)b). [176] en toute déférence pour les tenants de l’opi- nion contraire, j’estime qu’aucune erreur de ce genre n’a été démontrée en l’espèce. a the trial judge did not err in permitting the evidence to filter through section 276(1) a la juge du procès n’a pas commis d’erreur en au­ torisant que la preuve passe le test du par. 276(1) [177] evidence that an accused and a complain- ant are in a friends with benefits relationship, with- out more, does not solely derive its relevance in a criminal trial from lines of reasoning prohibited by s 276(1). but this is exactly what the majority finds: the obvious implication of friends with benefits is that the parties are in a relationship understandable only by reference to its sexual features. the evidence, then, is seen as denoting to the jury nothing more than a relationship characterized by (and only by) a repeated pattern of sexual activity; the allure of twin myth reasoning becomes irresistible. [177] la question de la pertinence de la preuve qu’un accusé et une plaignante entretiennent une relation amis- amants, sans plus, ne découle pas uni- quement, dans le cadre d’un procès criminel, des raisonnements interdits par le par 276(1). c’est tou- tefois exactement la conclusion à laquelle en arrivent mes collègues dans leur décision majoritaire : ce qui est manifestement implicite, selon eux, relativement aux amis- amants, c’est que les parties entretiennent une relation qui ne s’explique qu’en référence à son caractère sexuel. la preuve est donc perçue comme n’indiquant au jury rien de plus qu’une relation ca- ractérisée par un schéma répété d’activités sexuelles (et par rien d’autre); l’attrait d’un raisonnement fondé sur les deux mythes devient irrésistible. [178] respectfully, i do not share this starting premise. while i agree that the jury could draw from prohibited lines of reasoning in these circumstances, the test for exclusion under s. 276(1) is not satisfied merely where a jury could draw such inferences. the risk that the jury might erroneously infer consent from evidence of the nature of a relationship is a realistic danger in all relationship evidence — which, i note, the majority does not categorically exclude under s 276(1). rather, the test for exclusion under [178] soit dit en tout respect, je ne souscris pas à cette prémisse. bien que je convienne que le jury pourrait tirer des conclusions de raisonnements inter- dits dans de telles circonstances, il n’est pas satisfait au test d’exclusion prévu au par. 276(1) simplement parce qu’un jury pourrait tirer de telles conclusions. le risque que le jury puisse tirer par erreur la conclu- sion qu’il y a eu consentement à partir de la preuve de la nature d’une relation constitue un danger réa- liste, quel que soit le type de relation — ce que, je [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 79 s. 276(1) is whether the evidence solely derives its relevance from prohibited lines of reasoning. [179] in other words, s. 276(1) categorically ex- cludes evidence of other sexual activity where its relevance is premised on one or both of the twin myths. but that is only part of the inquiry. the anal- yses under ss. 276(1) and 276(2) are not isolated from each other. rather, they apply together since s. 276(2) creates a presumption of inadmissibility, making all evidence of the complainant’s sexual history inadmissible unless it is (a) of a sufficient specificity for the interests underlying s. 276 to be properly weighed, (b) relevant to an issue at trial that does not draw its relevance from prohibited lines of reasoning under s. 276(1),14 and (c) of sig- nificant probative value that is not substantially out- weighed by its prejudicial effect (r v. ls, 2017 onca 685, 40  cr  (7th) 351, at paras.  82-83; e. craig, “section 276 misconstrued: the failure to properly interpret and apply canada’s rape shield provisions” (2016), 94 can. bar rev. 45, at p 53). if the evidence cannot meet each of these statutory criteria under s. 276(2), it is inadmissible. in practice, therefore, the voir dire judge [180] should determine whether the evidence is of spe- cific instances of sexual activity, is relevant to an identifiable issue at trial that does not draw from prohibited lines of reasoning set out in s. 276(1), and has significant probative value that is not outweighed by substantial prejudice. le souligne, les juges majoritaires n’excluent pas ca- tégoriquement dans leur application du par 276(1). le test d’exclusion prévu à cette disposition consiste plutôt à se demander si la preuve ne tire sa pertinence que des raisonnements interdits. [179] autrement dit, le par. 276(1) exclut catégo- riquement la preuve d’activités sexuelles autres que celle en cause lorsque la pertinence de cette preuve repose sur l’un ou l’autre des deux mythes ou sur les deux. il ne s’agit toutefois là que d’une partie de l’examen. les analyses prescrites par les par. 276(1) et 276(2) ne sont pas isolées l’une de l’autre. ces dis- positions s’appliquent plutôt conjointement, puisque le par. 276(2) crée une présomption d’inadmissibilité qui fait que toute preuve concernant les antécédents sexuels de la plaignante est inadmissible en preuve à moins : a) qu’elle renferme suffisamment de détails pour permettre au juge d’évaluer correctement les facteurs visés à l’art. 276; b) qu’elle soit en rapport avec un élément de la cause dont la pertinence ne repose pas sur un des raisonnements interdits par le par. 276(1)15 et c) que le risque d’effet préjudi- ciable de la preuve ne l’emporte pas sensiblement sur sa valeur probante (r c. ls, 2017 onca 685, 40 cr (7th) 351, par. 82-83; e. craig, « section 276 misconstrued : the failure to properly interpret and apply canada’s rape shield provisions » (2016), 94 r du b can. 45, p 53). si la preuve ne peut sa- tisfaire à chacun de ces critères prévus au par. 276(2), elle est irrecevable. [180] en pratique, le juge chargé du voir- dire doit donc décider si la preuve porte sur des cas particu- liers d’activités sexuelles, si elle est en rapport avec une question identifiable en cause au procès qui ne découle pas des raisonnements interdits décrits au par. 276(1), et si un effet préjudiciable important de la présentation de la preuve ne l’emporte pas sur sa valeur probante importante. [181] to be clear, however, and to repeat: the test for exclusion under s. 276(1) is whether the evi- dence derives its relevance solely from twin myth [181] pour que mes propos soient bien clairs, je le répète : le test d’exclusion prévu au par. 276(1) consiste donc à se demander si la pertinence de la 14 parliament has clarified this by amending s. 276(2)(a) of the criminal code to state that evidence of other sexual activity cannot be adduced for the purpose of supporting an inference described in s 276(1). 15 le législateur a clarifié cela en modifiant l’al. 276(2)a) du code criminel pour qu’il prévoie maintenant que la preuve d’une autre activité sexuelle ne peut pas être présentée afin de permettre les déductions visées au par 276(1). 80 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. reasoning. section 276(1) does not operate to exclude evidence which merely “engages” (majority reasons, at para. 42) twin myth reasoning. were “engagement” the test for categorical exclusion under s. 276(1), it would risk exclusion of all relationship evidence, or at least all evidence of relationships which also involve sexual activity, since that, too, would con- ceivably “engage” twin myth reasoning. rather, re- lationship evidence will typically be filtered via the inquiry contemplated by s. 276(2)(b), being whether, in this case, the relationship evidence is relevant to an identifiable issue at trial. [182] the heart of the crown’s appeal is that “friends with benefits” is too “sexual” in its ordinary meaning, and therefore solely derives its relevance from prohibited lines of reasoning such that it is cat- egorically excluded under s 276(1). but the crown does not explain why evidence of the relationship which this term denotes is objectionable, while ev- idence of other relationships which regularly pass through the filter of s. 276(1), and yet which might also suggest previous sexual activity — for example, “married”, “dating”, or “boyfriend- girlfriend”, or, for that matter, the crown’s preferred relationship description in this case of former lovers who enjoy adult sleepovers — is not. [183] the trial judge reasoned, entirely correctly in my view, that canadian jurors understand that rela- tionships come in many forms. and, in any event, she made the jury aware of the permissible purpose for which the evidence of this relationship was admitted (to explain how the appellant and the complainant knew each other), and of the impermissible infer- ences they could not draw from its use in popular imagination. preuve découle uniquement des raisonnements fon- dés sur les deux mythes. cette disposition n’a pas pour effet d’exclure une preuve qui ne fait qu’« in- tervenir » (motifs des juges majoritaires, par. 42) ces raisonnements. si l’« intervention » était le test pour catégoriquement exclure la preuve en applica- tion du par. 276(1), cela risquerait d’exclure toute preuve relative à des relations, ou à tout le moins toute preuve de relations qui comportent une di- mension sexuelle, puisqu’il est concevable que cela puisse aussi faire intervenir les raisonnements fondés sur les deux mythes. la preuve de relations sera typiquement plutôt filtrée en fonction de l’examen prévu à l’al. 276(2)b), soit en se demandant si, dans le cas en cause, la preuve de la relation est pertinente à une question identifiable lors du procès. [182] la thèse du ministère public s’articule es- sentiellement autour de l’idée que le terme « amis- amants » a une connotation trop « sexuelle » dans son sens courant, et que la preuve à l’égard d’une relation de ce type tire donc sa pertinence unique­ ment des raisonnements interdits, de telle sorte qu’elle est catégoriquement exclue aux termes du par 276(1). le ministère public n’explique toute- fois pas en quoi la preuve concernant la relation qu’évoque cette expression est condamnable, tan- dis que la preuve d’autres types de relations qui passent régulièrement le filtre du par.  276(1) et qui pourraient malgré tout également suggérer des antécédents sexuels — par exemple, celles qu’en- tretiennent des individus qui sont « mariés », qui « sortent ensemble » ou qui sont « copain- copine », ou, d’ailleurs, la description qu’a préconisé le mi- nistère public dans la présente affaire, soit celle d’ex- amants qui aiment passer des nuits intimes adultes — n’est pas répréhensible. [183] la juge du procès a expliqué, tout à fait cor- rectement à mon avis, que les jurés canadiens savent bien qu’il existe divers types de relations. en tout état de cause, elle leur a aussi fait comprendre dans quel but permis la preuve de cette relation était admise — en l’occurrence, pour expliquer le contexte des fré- quentations de l’appelant et de la plaignante — et elle leur a expliqué les conclusions interdites qu’ils ne pouvaient pas tirer de cette expression au sens qu’elle évoque dans l’imaginaire collectif. [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 81 it follows that the foundation of the major- [184] ity’s test for admitting relationship evidence under s. 276(1) is that some relationships have aspects which transcend sexual intimacy, while other rela- tionships (which also involve sexual activity) can be understood only through the lens of that sexual activity. the majority reduces the relationship in this case to its most carnal features, and leaves it to trial judges, moving forward, to determine whether the sexual features, real or imagined, of the particular relationship term before them would likely be used to engage in prohibited lines of reasoning. but, and i say this respectfully, this posture is unprincipled and rests on assumptions about relationships that i do not share. at the risk of stating the obvious, even relationships that involve sexual activity, but which lack the expectation or even desire of a more formal relationship such as marriage or common law partnership, can be about much more than the sexual activity. at the very least, evidence of such relation- ships will give important context to the non- sexual interactions between the parties to the relationship, which may be (as it is here) necessary to making full answer and defence. [185] the majority sweeps these concerns aside. instead, we are left only with the undesirable effect of the majority’s reasons, being their creation of legally significant distinctions in this area of law between the “right” kind of relationship with sex- ual aspects (ie, monogamous and stable) and the “wrong” kind of relationship with sexual aspects (friends with benefits, ie, casual or occasional) (see u. khan, “hot for kink, bothered by the law: bdsm and the right to autonomy” (summer 2006), 41:2 law matters 17; l. a. rosenbury, “friends with benefits?” (2007), 106 mich. l. rev. 189, at pp 207-8). [184] ainsi, le fondement du test énoncé par les juges majoritaires pour juger de l’admissibilité de la preuve de relations en application du par. 276(1) est que certaines relations comportent des aspects qui transcendent l’intimité sexuelle, alors que d’autres relations (qui comportent également une dimen- sion sexuelle) ne peuvent être comprises que dans l’optique de cette activité sexuelle dans ce cas, les juges majoritaires réduisent la relation à ses caractéristiques les plus charnelles, et laissent aux juges de première instance le soin de déterminer, à l’avenir, si les caractéristiques sexuelles, réelles ou imaginaires, de la relation dont ils traitent sont susceptibles d’être utilisées à des fins de raisonne- ments interdits. or, et je le dis en tout respect, cette posture n’est pas fondée sur des principes et repose sur des hypothèses que je ne partage pas concer- nant certaines relations. au risque d’énoncer une évidence, même les relations qui comportent des activités sexuelles, mais qui ne supposent pas d’at- tentes quant à une union plus formelle ou même le désir d’établir une telle union, comme le mariage ou l’union de fait, ne se résument pas aux rapports sexuels. à tout le moins, la preuve présentée au sujet de ces relations fournira un contexte important au sujet des interactions non sexuelles entre les partenaires, ce qui peut être nécessaire — comme en l’espèce — pour garantir le droit à une défense pleine et entière. [185] les juges majoritaires négligent ces préoccu- pations. il ne nous reste plus que l’effet indésirable de leurs motifs, soit la création de distinctions im- portantes sur le plan juridique dans ce domaine du droit entre le « bon » type de relations comportant des aspects sexuels (c-à-d celles monogames et stables) et le « mauvais » type de relations compor- tant des aspects sexuels (soit celles de type « amis- amants », c-à-d les relations occasionnelles ou sans attaches) (voir u. khan, « hot for kink, bothered by the law : bdsm and the right to autonomy » (été 2006), 41:2 law matters 17; l a rosen bury, «  friends with benefits?  » (2007), 106 mich.  l. rev. 189, p. 207- 208). [186] in the result, those who live outside the scope of relationships privileged by the majority (ie, those who live in relationships which are neither [186] ainsi, ceux qui entretiennent des relations d’un type autre que celles privilégiées par les juges majoritaires (c-à-d ceux qui entretiennent 82 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. monogamous nor quasi- marital), are sacrificed, so to speak, to “majoritarian sexual morality” (e. craig, “capacity to consent to sexual risk” (2014), 17 new crim. l. rev. 103; j. sealy- harrington, “tied hands? a doctrinal and policy argument for the validity of advance consent” (2014), 18 can. crim. l. rev. 119, at p 145). the majority may not find it troubling to privilege, in a way that goes to the heart of the ability to make full answer and defence, certain kinds of relationships over others, but i do, and i respectfully decline to follow my colleagues through this moral thicket. [187] further, the majority effectively reads out crucial parts of the common law from seaboyer gov- erning how trial judges should approach defence ev- idence (see also r v. grant, 2015 scc 9, [2015] 1 scr 475, at para. 19) and resurrects the approach to evidence — specifically, of creating pre- determined categories of admissibility — which this court re- jected in seaboyer. and finally, this approach down- plays the text and purpose of statutory provisions like s 2764, which recognizes that evidence may be admissible for certain purposes yet inadmissible for other purposes, and makes a limiting instruction mandatory where any evidence of other sexual activ- ity is introduced, even if it only refers to other sexual activity indirectly or implicitly, to cure prejudice and to warn the jury of the impermissible uses of that evidence. des relations qui ne sont ni monogames ni quasi- maritales) sont pour ainsi dire sacrifiés au profit de la [traduction] « moralité sexuelle de la ma- jorité » (e. craig, « capacity to consent to sexual risk » (2014), 17 new crim. l. rev. 103; j. sealy- harrington, « tied hands? a doctrinal and policy argument for the validity of advance consent » (2014), 18  rcdp 119, p.  145) les juges ma- joritaires peuvent ne pas trouver troublant de pri- vilégier certains types de relations par rapport à d’autres, et ce, d’une manière qui heurte de plein fouet la capacité de présenter une défense pleine et entière, mais j’estime pour ma part que ce l’est, et je refuse de m’engager à leur suite dans un tel dédale moral. [187] en outre, l’approche préconisée par les juges majoritaires ignore des pans cruciaux des règles de common law établies dans l’arrêt seaboyer, qui ré- gissent la manière dont le juge du procès doit aborder la preuve de la défense (voir également r c grant, 2015 csc 9, [2015] 1 rcs 475, par. 19) et redonne vie à une approche de la preuve — en l’occurrence celle consistant à créer des catégories préétablies d’admissibilité — que la cour a rejetée dans l’arrêt seaboyer. enfin, cette approche réduit la portée du texte et l’objet de dispositions législatives comme l’art 2764 qui reconnaît qu’une preuve peut être admissible à certaines fins, mais non à d’autres, et qui oblige le juge à donner des directives restric- tives au jury lorsqu’une preuve d’antécédents sexuels est présentée, même si cette preuve ne mentionne qu’indirectement ou implicitement les antécédents sexuels en question, pour réparer le préjudice causé et pour mettre le jury en garde contre les utilisations interdites de cette preuve. [188] here, the evidentiary ruling was crystal clear: the jury could be told the basic fact that the appellant and the complainant were “friends with benefits”, but could not be told about any details, including the frequency of sexual activity. the jury was instructed twice on the permissible use of the evidence (to provide context for how the appel- lant and the complainant knew each other) and its impermissible uses (to suggest that, because they were friends with benefits, the complainant was more likely to consent on this occasion, or was less [188] en l’espèce, la décision relative à la preuve était limpide : il était possible de dire au jury le fait élémentaire que l’appelant et la plaignante étaient des « amis- amants », mais pas les détails, quels qu’ils soient, de cette relation, y compris la fréquence de leurs activités sexuelles. à deux reprises, le jury a reçu des directives quant à l’utilisation permise de la preuve (soit pour fournir le contexte des fréquen- tations de l’appelant et de la plaignante) et sur ses utilisations interdites (soit pour suggérer que, parce qu’ils étaient amis- amants, la plaignante était plus [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 83 worthy of belief overall). i therefore cannot agree with the majority that the evidence should not have filtered through s 276(1). b the trial judge did not err in her relevance determination under section 276(2)(b) [189] turning to s. 276(2)(b), the majority finds nothing in the appellant’s evidence which, absent the information that he and the complainant were friends with benefits, casts him in a particularly un- favourable light, or which would render his narrative “untenable” or “utterly improbable”. on this basis, the majority finds the trial judge’s determination that the nature of the relationship was relevant to the appellant’s ability to make full answer and defence to constitute reversible error. [190] on this point, i cannot find fault with the principles relied on by the trial judge which led her to that conclusion. section 276(2)’s evidentiary filter recognizes the relevance of evidence of a relation- ship between the complainant and the accused and therefore allows it to be admitted, but only where its absence would prevent the accused from making full answer and defence, by leaving the trier of fact with a distorted representation of the circumstances surrounding the incident (see r v. harris (1997), 118 ccc (3d) 498 (ont. ca);. r v. m (m) (1999), 29 cr (5th) 85 (ont. scj);. r v. temertzoglou (2002), 11 cr (6th) 179 (ont. scj);. r v. blea, [2005] oj. no. 4191 (ql) (scj);. r v. aa, 2009 abqb 602, 618 ar 137;. r v. provo, 2018 oncj 474, 48 cr (7th) 1; see also craig, “section 276 misconstrued”, at p 75). the trial judge concluded this was such a circumstance. and, i repeat: the crown was substantially of the same view. its ob- jection was not to the admissibility of evidence of the relationship, but to the label. indeed, the crown’s position has remained consistent that the nature of the relationship is not in dispute (ar, vol. ii, at p. 40; rfca, at para. 6; rf, at para. 8): a former susceptible de consentir à cette occasion, ou qu’elle était moins digne de foi dans l’ensemble). je ne peux donc pas souscrire à l’opinion des juges majoritaires selon laquelle la preuve n’aurait pas dû passer le test du par 276(1). b la juge du procès n’a pas commis d’erreur dans sa détermination de la pertinence en application de l’al. 276(2)b) [189] se penchant ensuite sur l’al. 276(2)b), les juges majoritaires ne trouvent rien dans la preuve de l’appelant qui, outre le fait que ce dernier et la plaignante entretenaient une relation amis- amants, jette une lumière particulièrement défavorable sur lui, ou rendrait sa version des faits « indéfendable » ou «  complètement improbable  » sur ce fonde- ment, ils concluent que la décision de la juge du procès que la nature de la relation était pertinente pour garantir le droit de l’appelant à une défense pleine et entière constitue une erreur donnant lieu à révision. [190] sur cette question, je ne puis rien reprocher à la juge du procès pour ce qui est des principes sur lesquels elle s’est fondée pour tirer cette conclusion. le filtre de la preuve prévu au par. 276(2) reconnaît la pertinence d’une preuve concernant la relation qu’entretiennent la plaignante et l’accusé et permet donc son admission, mais uniquement si le défaut d’y avoir accès empêcherait l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière et donnerait aux juges des faits une image déformée des circonstances en- tourant la perpétration de l’acte reproché (voir r c. harris (1997), 118 ccc (3d) 498 (ca. ont.); r c. m (m) (1999), 29 cr (5th) 85 (csj ont);. r c. temertzoglou (2002), 11 cr (6th) 179 (csj. ont.); r c. blea, [2005] oj. no. 4191 (ql) (csj);. r c. aa, 2009 abqb 602, 618 ar 137;. r c provo, 2018 oncj 474, 48 cr (7th) 1; voir également craig, « section 276 misconstrued », p 75). la juge du procès a conclu que tel était le cas en l’espèce. en outre, je le répète, le ministère public était essentiel­ lement du même avis. son objection ne portait pas sur l’admissibilité de la preuve concernant la rela- tion, mais sur le terme employé. d’ailleurs, l’avocate du ministère public a constamment affirmé que la 84 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. relationship — now a friendship — that, from time to time, involves sexual activity. [191] preventing distortion was necessary for the jury to assess the credibility of the appellant’s ev- idence, which was the most relevant and material issue with which the jury would have had to grapple. indeed, it went to what sopinka j. (albeit in dissent) once described as “the most fundamental rule of the game” (r v. w(d), [1991] 1 scr 742, at p. 750; see also l a. silver, “the wd revolution” (2018), 41 man. lj 307), since it went to this accused’s capacity to raise a reasonable doubt on the strength of his own evidence. it is difficult to conceive of evidence of greater probative value than evidence that is essential to an accused’s ability to make full answer and defence. this is particularly so where, as here, the evidence of the complainant and the accused are diametrically opposed in every material respect, leaving credibility the most important issue at trial (r v. crosby, [1995] 2 scr 912, at para. 12, per l’heureux- dubé j.; see also r v. nyznik, 2017 onsc 4392, 40 cr (7th) 241, at paras 15-16). [192] the majority gestures to these principles, but ultimately finds that this jury gained nothing of value by knowing the appellant and the complainant were in a relationship. it in no way assisted them as it weighed the plausibility of the appellant’s account, as it could have only been used to advance imper- missible lines of reasoning. nature de la relation en l’espèce n’était pas en litige (da, vol. ii, p. 40; maca, par. 6; mi, par. 8), et qu’il s’agissait d’une ancienne relation, muée en amitié depuis, dans le cadre de laquelle les parties avaient, à l’occasion, des relations sexuelles. [191] il fallait empêcher que le jury ait une image déformée des faits pour garantir qu’il soit en mesure d’évaluer la crédibilité du témoignage de l’appelant, la question la plus importante et la plus pertinente soumise à son appréciation. d’ailleurs, cette ques- tion concernait ce que le juge sopinka — quoiqu’en dissidence — a déjà qualifié de « règle la plus fonda- mentale du système » (r c. w(d), [1991] 1 rcs. 742, p. 750; voir également l a silver, « the wd revolution » (2018), 41 man. lj 307), car elle concerne la capacité de l’accusé en l’espèce de sou- lever un doute raisonnable en s’appuyant sur son propre témoignage. il est difficile de concevoir une preuve qui aurait une valeur probante plus grande que celle qui est essentielle pour permettre à l’accusé de présenter une défense pleine et entière. cela est d’autant plus vrai lorsque, comme en l’espèce, le témoignage de la plaignante et celui de l’accusé sont diamétralement opposés sur chaque point important, de sorte que la question de leur crédibilité est la plus importante à trancher au procès (r c. crosby, [1995] 2 rcs 912, par. 12, la juge l’heureux- dubé; voir également r c. nyznik, 2017 onsc 4392, 40 cr. (7th) 241, par 15-16). [192] les juges majoritaires font allusion à ces principes, mais finissent par conclure que les jurés n’ont rien appris d’utile en se faisant dire que l’ap- pelant et la plaignante entretenaient une relation. selon mes collègues, ce fait ne les a nullement aidés à évaluer la vraisemblance du récit de l’appelant, car il n’aurait pu être utilisé que pour tenir un raisonne- ment interdit. [193] i am afraid i see the matter quite differently. to deny the appellant the ability to point to his re- lationship would in these circumstances disable the jury from meaningfully performing its central func- tion of finding facts and seeking out the truth. how else, for example, could the jury properly assess his explanation for why he went over to the complain- ant’s residence to pick her up that evening (he owed [193] je constate à regret que je vois les choses tout à fait différemment. nier à l’appelant la ca- pacité de parler de sa relation avec la plaignante revient dans ces circonstances à priver les jurés de leur capacité de remplir véritablement leur mission principale, soit celle de constater les faits et de rechercher la vérité. sinon, comment, par exemple, le jury pourrait-il correctement évaluer les raisons [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 85 her “birthday sex”)? or his mouthing, unprompted, at her “i’m going to fuck you” in the presence of his roommate? or their bickering about which side of the bed she would sleep on to avoid “hot flashes”? or his knowledge of her hot flashes? or that the hot flashes occurred when she was on a certain side of his bed? [194] to prohibit the appellant from explaining these statements, or this knowledge, by testifying that he was in a relationship with the complainant, is to force him to tell an incomplete story — a story which includes an account of the act but no expla- nation for how he and the complainant “got there”, and why he said what he said, and why he did what he did. more particularly, without this evidence, his actions (including his words and gestures) will have appeared to have arisen out of nowhere, creating a completely misleading impression on the jury. his right to make full answer and defence would be reduced to painting a picture of himself as (at best) crude and reckless, or (at worst) predatory. [195] ultimately, the majority suggests that the trial judge would not have erred had she simply ac- cepted the crown’s proposed language of former lovers, who, from time to time, had adult sleepovers. but it is far from clear that this is an improvement over “friends with benefits”, and indeed in my view it would appear more likely to invite prurient and speculative inferences. and, as berger ja noted in his dissent in the court below, the crown’s language would not have been necessarily accompanied by either of the two limiting instructions the trial judge gave at this trial. the jury’s collective mind would truly be left to wander. instead, the trial judge con- cluded that allowing the jury to hear about the ex- istence of a relationship, without hearing evidence about its particularities or frequency, prevented the appellant’s evidence from being considered through a distorted lens and ensured the appellant’s right to make full answer and defence was preserved. i find données par l’appelant pour justifier qu’il soit allé chercher la plaignante chez elle pour la ramener chez lui ce soir-là (il lui devait [traduction] « du sexe pour son anniversaire »)? ou le fait qu’il lui a dit spontanément « je vais te baiser », en présence de son colocataire? ou leur querelle quant au côté du lit où elle dormirait pour éviter ses « bouffées de chaleur »? ou le fait qu’il était au courant de ses bouffées de chaleur? ou qu’elle avait des bouf- fées de chaleur lorsqu’elle dormait d’un certain côté du lit? [194] interdire à l’appelant d’expliquer ces décla- rations, ou comment il était au courant de ces faits, en affirmant qu’il fréquentait la plaignante, revient à le forcer à raconter une histoire incomplète, qui comprend un récit de l’acte reproché, mais aucune explication quant à la façon dont la plaignante et lui « en sont arrivés là » et à la raison pour laquelle il a dit ce qu’il a dit et a fait ce qu’il a fait. plus particulièrement, sans cette preuve, ses actes — y compris ses paroles et ses gestes — semblent avoir surgi de nulle part et créent dans l’esprit des jurés une impression qui les déroutera complètement. son droit à une défense pleine et entière est limité à un point tel qu’il en est réduit à se dépeindre, au mieux, comme un être insensible et insouciant ou, au pire, comme un prédateur. [195] en définitive, les juges majoritaires sug- gèrent que la juge du procès n’aurait pas commis d’erreur si elle avait simplement accepté la descrip- tion de la relation proposée par le ministère public, soit celle d’ex- amants qui, à l’occasion, se voyaient pour passer des nuits intimes adultes. il est toutefois loin d’être clair que cette description est préférable au terme « amis- amants » puisque, en fait, à mon avis, elle semble plus susceptible d’inciter à faire des inférences audacieuses et spéculatives. en outre, comme le juge berger de la cour d’appel l’a souligné dans sa dissidence, le terme utilisé par le ministère public n’allait pas nécessairement être accompagné de l’une ou l’autre des deux directives restrictives énoncées par la juge de première instance durant le procès. les jurés, collectivement, seraient donc vé- ritablement laissés dans le doute. la juge du procès a plutôt conclu que le fait de permettre que le jury entende parler de l’existence d’une relation, sans 86 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. nothing in the trial judge’s relevance assessment that constitutes reversible error. c a new trial is procedurally unfair and lowers the graveline standard [196] my third point of departure relates to fairness. i observe that it was the crown’s cross- examination of the appellant which directly put the sexual nature of his relationship with the complainant at issue. and it was the crown who suggested that he had sexually assaulted her because they hadn’t had sex recently. and it was the crown who suggested that they had a “tumultuous relationship” marked with many argu- ments and her being upset with him but returning to him eventually. the difference, however, is that the crown leaned into the existence of the relationship in order to advance a theory that, because they were in a sexual relationship, the jury should find that he expected sex and was angry when she refused. at the same time, however, the crown insisted that the appellant be prohibited from rebutting that theory, if his evidence would in any way indirectly reveal to the jury that the complainant had engaged in the same sexual activity that the crown pointed to in support of its own theory. this is, as i have already observed, fundamentally unfair. autre preuve sur ses particularités ou la fréquence des contacts, permettait d’éviter que le témoignage de l’appelant puisse être examiné à travers un prisme déformé et garantissait à l’appelant son droit de pré- senter une défense pleine et entière. je ne vois rien dans l’évaluation de la pertinence menée par la juge du procès qui constitue une erreur donnant lieu à révision. c la tenue d’un nouveau procès est injuste sur le plan procédural et abaisse la norme établie par graveline [196] la troisième divergence entre mon point de vue et celui de mes collègues concerne l’équité. je constate que c’est le contre- interrogatoire de l’ap- pelant par le ministère public qui a directement mis en cause la nature sexuelle de la relation qu’entrete- naient l’appelant et la plaignante. c’est également le ministère public qui a laissé entendre que l’appelant avait agressé sexuellement cette dernière parce qu’ils n’avaient pas eu de relation sexuelle récemment avant l’acte reproché. et c’est le ministère public qui a suggéré qu’ils avaient une « relation tumultueuse » caractérisée par de nombreuses disputes et par le fait qu’elle se mettait en colère contre lui, mais qu’elle finissait toujours par revenir vers lui. la différence, toutefois, réside dans le fait que le ministère public a tablé sur l’existence de la relation pour défendre une théorie selon laquelle, parce qu’ils avaient des rapports sexuels dans le cadre de leur relation, le jury devait conclure que l’appelant s’attendait à des rapports sexuels et était en colère parce qu’elle avait refusé ses avances. le ministère public a toutefois également insisté pour qu’on empêche l’appelant de réfuter cette thèse si son témoignage devait de quelque façon que ce soit révéler indirectement au jury que la plaignante avait eu le même type d’activi­ tés sexuelles que celui allégué par le ministère public à l’appui de sa propre thèse. cette approche, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, est fondamentalement injuste. [197] what also strikes me as fundamentally un- fair is the majority’s characterization of the effects of the evidentiary ruling, in particular because the evidentiary ruling would not have revealed any di- rect evidence of other sexual activity (which is a critical consideration in the balancing mandated by [197] la caractérisation qu’effectuent mes collè- gues majoritaires des effets de la décision relative à la preuve me paraît aussi fondamentalement injuste. c’est le cas notamment parce que la décision relative à la preuve n’aurait pas dévoilé de preuve directe d’autres activités sexuelles — ce qui constitue un [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 87 s. 276), had not the crown chosen to pursue a line of questioning that directly contravened it. the ruling, it must be remembered, should have had the effect of only indirectly or incidentally revealing the com- plainant’s other sexual activity, because no evidence could be elicited about “the specific sexual acts [the complainant] and the accused engaged in”, or “the number of times they had sexual relations after they ceased living together” (ar, vol. i, at p 10). the s. 276 regime recognizes that differing degrees of prejudice will flow from certain types of sexual his- tory evidence over others. a trial judge assesses the extent to which sexual history evidence will risk leading the jury in this case to draw prohibited infer- ences. this is a core feature of the discretion afforded to trial judges by s 276 (r v. darrach, 2000 scc 46, [2000] 2 scr 443, at paras. 19, 30, 36 and 71). [198] the majority provides a helpful guide for trial judges on the exercise of discretion (paras. 74-75): where a trial judge is concerned about the jury im- properly speculating on past sexual activity, the trial judge should clearly explain to the jury that they will not hear any evidence about whether the rela- tionship included a sexual aspect; the jury must be instructed that no means no and that consent in the past in no way implies or assumes consent in the future; and if relationship evidence is admissible, it should be adduced through an agreed statement of facts, to minimize the need for examination and cross- examination. facteur déterminant pour la recherche de l’équilibre exigée par l’art. 276 — si le ministère public n’avait pas décidé de poser des questions qui contrevenaient directement à cette disposition. on se souviendra que la décision en question n’aurait dû avoir pour effet que de révéler indirectement ou accessoirement les anté- cédents sexuels de la plaignante, car aucune preuve ne pouvait être présentée sur [traduction] « les ac- tivités sexuelles précises auxquelles [la plaignante] et l’accusé s’étaient livrés » ou sur « le nombre de relations sexuelles qu’ils ont eues après avoir cessé de faire vie commune » (da, vol. i, p 10). le régime créé par l’art. 276 reconnaît que les divers types de preuve d’antécédents sexuels peuvent donner lieu à divers degrés de préjudice. il appartient au juge du procès de décider dans quelle mesure la preuve d’antécédents sexuels risque d’inciter le jury à tirer des conclusions interdites dans la cause dont il est saisi. il s’agit là d’une caractéristique essentielle du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré aux juges du procès par l’art 276 (r c. darrach, 2000 csc 46, [2000] 2 rcs 443, par. 19, 30, 36 et 71). [198] les juges majoritaires proposent un guide utile aux juges du procès pour l’exercice de leur pou- voir discrétionnaire (par. 74-75) : lorsque le juge du procès craint que les jurés ne spéculent indûment sur les antécédents sexuels de la plaignante, il doit leur expliquer clairement qu’ils n’entendront aucun témoi- gnage sur une éventuelle composante sexuelle de la relation; il doit leur expliquer que « non, c’est non » et que le consentement donné dans le passé n’implique ni ne suppose d’aucune façon que ce même consente- ment sera donné à l’avenir; et si une preuve concernant la relation est admissible, elle doit être présentée dans un exposé conjoint des faits pour minimiser le besoin de mener un interrogatoire et un contre- interrogatoire. [199] and yet, each of these principles was ob- served by the trial judge in her evidentiary ruling, her conversations with counsel, her cautions to the jury, and her final instructions. it was the crown’s deci- sion not to adduce this evidence through an agreed statement of facts (as suggested by the trial judge) and the crown’s later contravention of the eviden- tiary ruling (which had the effect of introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury), that caused the problems at trial which the majority [199] en l’espèce, la juge du procès a respecté chacun de ces principes dans sa décision relative à la preuve, lors des échanges qu’elle a eus avec les avocats, dans les mises en garde qu’elle a servies aux jurés, ainsi que dans ses directives finales. c’est la décision du ministère public de ne pas présenter cette preuve au moyen d’un exposé conjoint des faits — comme l’avait suggéré la juge du procès — et le fait que le ministère public a par la suite contrevenu à la décision relative à la preuve — soumettant ainsi 88 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. now, remarkably, lays at the feet of the trial judge. this strikes me as a wholly unacceptable basis for a successful crown appeal from an acquittal. [200] that crown counsel’s caution in seeking clar- ification of the ruling (which is to be commended) did not prevent a contravention of that same ruling is demonstrative of a problem of application arising from the delicate balancing mandated by s. 276 (see d. stuart, “twin myth hypotheses in rape shield laws are too rigid and darrach is unclear” (2009), 64 cr (6th) 74, at pp 75-76). what is agreed to in advance can go off the rails when the witness takes the stand. the majority identifies this as such a case, but then resolves the problem of application in favour of the crown. this is unfortunate, because the trial judge’s evidentiary ruling, as well as her numerous interventions in the trial, were faithful to (and not a departure from) the principles articulated in seaboyer and darrach. she applied the correct legal principles: such relationship evidence will be relevant where the accused would otherwise be prevented from mak- ing full answer and defence, and the features of the evidence only indirectly or incidentally reveal the complainant’s other sexual activity. in such a circum- stance, full answer and defence cannot be achieved by confining accused persons to saying what happened and not allowing them to explain how, or why, or to produce any corroborating evidence. the significant probative value of such evidence would outweigh any prejudicial effect (particularly when accompanied, as it was here, by an appropriate limiting instruction), and the proper balance under s. 276 would be struck. à l’appréciation des jurés une preuve par ailleurs inadmissible — qui sont à l’origine des problèmes survenus lors du procès, que les juges majoritaires imputent maintenant, étonnamment, à la juge du procès. il s’agit là à mon sens d’un motif totalement inacceptable pour faire droit à l’appel d’un verdict d’acquittement interjeté par le ministère public. [200] la prudence dont a fait preuve l’avocate du ministère public en réclamant des éclaircissements au sujet de la décision — prudence dont on doit la féliciter — ne l’a pas empêchée d’y contreve- nir. cela témoigne d’un problème d’application qui s’explique par l’équilibre délicat exigé par l’art. 276 (voir d. stuart, « twin myth hypotheses in rape shield laws are too rigid and darrach is unclear » (2009), 64 cr (6th) 74, p 75-76). ce dont il a été convenu à l’avance peut dérailler lorsque le témoin se présente à la barre. les juges majoritaires estiment eux aussi que c’est ce qui s’est passé en l’espèce, mais ils règlent ensuite le problème d’application en faveur du ministère public. voilà qui est regrettable, parce que la décision de la juge du procès relative à la preuve, ainsi que ses nombreuses interventions au procès, étaient fidèles aux principes énoncés dans les arrêts seaboyer et darrach et n’y dérogeaient pas. la juge du procès a appliqué les bons principes juri- diques : une preuve comme celle en cause ici concer- nant la relation est pertinente lorsque l’accusé est, sans elle, empêché de présenter une défense pleine et entière et lorsque ses caractéristiques ne révèlent qu’indirectement ou accessoirement les antécédents sexuels de la plaignante. en pareil cas, le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière ne peut pas lui être assuré s’il n’est autorisé qu’à raconter que ce qui s’est passé et non à expliquer comment ni pourquoi les faits se sont produits ou à soumettre des preuves corroborantes. la grande valeur probante d’une telle preuve devrait l’emporter sur le risque qu’elle ait un effet préjudiciable (particulièrement lorsqu’elle est accompagnée, comme en l’espèce, d’une directive restrictive appropriée), de sorte que le juste équilibre visé par l’art. 276 serait atteint. [201] finally, the majority’s approach relieves the crown of its high burden of demonstrating that a legal error had a material bearing on the jury’s verdict (see r v. graveline, 2006 scc 16, [2006] [201] enfin, l’approche préconisée par les juges majoritaires épargne au ministère public de s’acquit- ter du lourd fardeau qui lui incombe de démontrer qu’une erreur de droit a eu une incidence significative [2019] 3 rcs. r c goldfinch le juge brown 89 1 scr 609). while the majority reasons that the re- lationship evidence tendered in this case would have had a material bearing on the acquittals, this does not account for the fact that the relationship evidence was relied on by the crown against the appellant. and again, it was the crown, and not the appellant, who contravened the evidentiary ruling and explored both the details (the location of previous sexual activ- ity), and the frequency of the sexual activity. sur le verdict du jury (voir l’arrêt r c. graveline, 2006 csc 16, [2006] 1 rcs 609). en dépit du point de vue de mes collègues majoritaires selon lequel la preuve concernant la relation présentée en l’espèce aurait eu une incidence importante dans la décision de prononcer des acquittements, cela ne tient pas compte du fait que c’est le ministère public qui s’est fondé sur cette preuve contre l’appelant. de plus, je le répète, c’est le ministère public, et non l’appelant, qui a dérogé à la décision relative à la preuve et qui a exploré les détails de la relation (le lieu de leur relation sexuelle précédente), et la fréquence de leurs relations sexuelles. [202] as watt ja observed in r v. luciano, 2011 onca 89, 273 oac 273: [202] comme le juge watt l’a noté dans l’arrêt r. c. luciano, 2011 onca 89, 273 oac 273 :. it is worth reminder that the appeal of the attorney general is from the acquittal, not the admissibility ruling that is said to constitute an error in law. what is required is a demonstration of a legal error (in the admissibility ruling) and a nexus between the legal error and the ver- dict rendered (an acquittal). the authorities teach that acquittals are not to be overturned lightly. [emphasis in original; para 260]. here, the crown has not established a sufficient nexus between the legal error and the verdict ren- dered. again, i ask, how can the admission of this evidence be said to have had a material bearing on the acquittals, when the crown was relying on the selfsame evidence to prove its case? the graveline standard is not met on this record. i say respectfully that the majority’s position undesirably waters down the graveline standard in remitting this matter for a new trial. [traduction] il convient de se rappeler que l’appel interjeté par le procureur général porte sur le verdict d’ac­ quittement et non sur la décision concernant l’admissibi- lité qui constituerait une erreur de droit. ainsi, il lui faut démontrer qu’une erreur de droit a été commise (dans la décision portant sur l’admissibilité) et qu’il existe un lien entre cette erreur et le verdict qui a été rendu (en l’occur- rence un acquittement). la jurisprudence nous enseigne qu’on ne doit pas annuler un acquittement à la légère. [en italique dans l’original; par 260]. en l’espèce, le ministère public n’a pas démontré l’existence d’un lien suffisant entre l’erreur de droit qui aurait été commise et le verdict qui a été rendu. je repose la question : comment peut-on prétendre que l’admission des éléments de preuve en cause a eu une incidence importante dans la décision de pronon- cer les acquittements lorsque le ministère public se fondait sur les éléments de preuve en question pour étayer sa thèse? si l’on se fie au dossier dans la pré- sente affaire, il n’a pas été satisfait à la norme établie par graveline. soit dit en tout respect, je soutiens que la décision de mes collègues majoritaires d’ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès dans la présente affaire dilue indûment cette norme établie par graveline. vi conclusion vi conclusion [203] ultimately, i agree with the trial judge’s chain of reasoning under s 276. making full an- swer and defence includes being allowed to tell a story that is complete and coherent by drawing from [203] en fin de compte, je souscris au raisonnement de la juge du procès relatif à l’art 276. le droit à une défense pleine et entière suppose le droit d’être autorisé à donner une version des faits complète et cohérente en 90 r v goldfinch brown j. [2019] 3 scr. relevant evidence whose probative value outweighs its prejudicial effects. this cannot be achieved by confining accused persons to saying what happened and not allowing them to explain how, or why, or to produce any corroborating evidence. [204] recognizing this, the trial judge in my view deftly managed a circumstance made difficult not only by the subject matter of the evidence, but by the crown having exceeded the scope of the eviden- tiary ruling in her examination of the complainant. her decision to admit this highly probative evidence for the limited purpose of allowing jurors to assess the plausibility of the appellant’s account of what happened was faithful to seaboyer (at p. 609) and to s 276. and, her careful instruction to the jury regard- ing that limited purpose was sufficient to address any prejudicial effect arising. jurors are “[not] morons, completely devoid of intelligence”, but are “con- scientious”, “anxious to perform their duties”, and would not “be forgetful of instructions” (w(d), at p. 761, per cory j., citing r v. lane and ross (1969), 6 crns 273 (ont. sc) (emphasis deleted); see also r v. corbett, [1988] 1 scr 670, at pp. 695-96, per dickson cj). [205] this jury rendered its verdict, having been properly instructed on how to do so. i would allow the appeal and restore the acquittals. se servant d’éléments de preuve pertinents dont la va- leur probante l’emporte sur leurs effets préjudiciables. on ne peut y parvenir en obligeant l’accusé à ne relater que ce qui s’est passé et en ne l’autorisant ni à expli- quer comment et pourquoi les faits se sont déroulés, ni à produire des éléments de preuve corroborante. [204] reconnaissant cet état de fait, j’estime que la juge du procès a habilement géré une situation rendue difficile non seulement par l’objet de la preuve, mais aussi par le fait que le ministère public, dans son in- terrogatoire de la plaignante, a débordé du cadre établi par la décision relative à la preuve qu’elle avait rendue. cette décision d’admettre une preuve qui avait une grande valeur probante dans le but limité de permettre au jury d’évaluer la plausibilité de la version des faits de l’appelant était fidèle à l’arrêt seaboyer (p. 609) et à l’art 276. en outre, les directives minutieuses qu’elle a données aux jurés au sujet de cet objectif limité suffi- saient pour tenir compte de tout effet préjudiciable que cette preuve pouvait comporter. les jurés « [ne] sont [pas] des crétins, tout à fait dénués d’intelligence », ils sont plutôt « consciencieux[,] ils veulent remplir leur devoir de jurés » et ils « sont peu susceptibles d’oublier des directives » (w(d), p. 761, le juge cory, citant r c. lane and ross (1969), 6 crns 273 (cs. ont.) (sou- lignement omis); voir également r c. corbett, [1988] 1 rcs 670, p. 695- 696, le juge en chef dickson). [205] le jury a rendu son verdict après avoir reçu des directives appropriées sur la façon de s’y prendre. j’accueillerais le pourvoi et je rétablirais les acquit- tements. appeal dismissed, brown j. dissenting. pourvoi rejeté, le juge brown est dissident. procureur de l’appelant : deborah hatch law, edmonton. edmonton. procureur de l’intimée : procureur général de alberta, edmonton. l’alberta, edmonton. of ontario: attorney general of ontario, toronto. procureur de l’intervenante la procureure géné­ rale de l’ontario : procureure générale de l’ontario, toronto. yers’ association of ontario: addario law group, toronto; daniel brown law, toronto. procureurs de l’intervenante criminal lawyers’ association of ontario : addario law group, to­ ronto; daniel brown law, toronto.
[1] this appeal illustrates the apparent confl ict that sometimes exists between two core principles of extracontractual liability in quebec civil law. the fi rst of these principles is that of full compensation for injury. the second is the principle that, unless an exception applies, a person is liable for reparation only of injuries caused by his or her own fault. [2] the civil code of québec (“ccq” or “code”) establishes a scheme that strikes a balance between these principles. article 1457 of the code provides for full compensation for injury caused by a fault. article 1525 para. 1 provides that solidarity between debtors is not presumed. articles 1480 and 1526 set out the circumstances in which there is a solidary obligation to make reparation for injury caused by an extracontractual fault.1 the code thus lays down the general principle that a person is liable only for damage he or she causes, but qualifi es this principle to favour full compensation of a victim who suf- fers a single injury as a result of extracontractual faults committed by two or more persons. however, because solidarity represents a deviation from the general principle, it must be applied strictly (see d.  lluelles and b.  moore, droit des obligations (2nd ed. 2012), at no 2581). [1] ce pourvoi illustre la tension apparente qui existe parfois entre deux principes centraux de la responsabilité extracontractuelle en droit civil qué- bécois. d’une part, le principe voulant que l’indem- nisation du préjudice soit intégrale. d’autre part, celui voulant que, sauf exception, une personne ne soit tenue de réparer que le seul préjudice qu’elle a causé par sa faute. [2] le code civil du québec (« ccq » ou « code ») établit un régime qui assure l’équilibre entre ces principes. à l’article 1457, il prévoit l’indemnisation intégrale du préjudice causé par la faute. à l’ar- ticle 1525 al. 1, il édicte que la solidarité entre débi- teurs ne se présume pas. aux articles 1480 et 1526, il précise les circonstances où l’obligation de réparer le préjudice est solidaire en cas de fautes extracontrac- tuelles1. le code consacre ainsi le principe général suivant lequel une personne est uniquement respon- sable du dommage qu’elle cause, mais il en atténue la rigueur afi n de favoriser l’indemnisation intégrale de la victime quand celle-ci subit un préjudice unique en raison des fautes extracontractuelles de plusieurs personnes. en revanche, puisque la solidarité déroge au principe général, elle est, en conséquence, d’ap- plication stricte (voir d. lluelles et b. moore, droit des obligations (2e éd. 2012), nº 2581). [3] the central issue in this appeal requires the application of these principles. it may be summed [3] le problème au cœur du présent pourvoi met en jeu l’application de ces principes. il se résume à 1 i note that art 1480 ccq also applies in contractual matters (n. vézina, “cas d’exonération et partage de responsabilité en matière contractuelle”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et responsabilité civile (loose- leaf), vol. 1, by p-c lafond, ed., fasc. 31, at para. 42; see, for example, larouche v. simard, 2009 qccs 529, [2009] rjq 768). some authors suggest that art 1480 ccq could therefore apply in a case involving both contractual and extracontractual faults (j-l baudouin,. p. deslauriers and b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at no. 1-58; v. karim, les obligations (4th ed. 2015), vol. 1, at paras. 3456 and 3460-70). that question does not arise in this appeal, however. 1 je note que l’art 1480 ccq est également applicable en matière contractuelle (n. vézina, « cas d’exonération et partage de res- ponsabilité en matière contractuelle », dans jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et responsabilité civile (feuilles mobiles), vol. 1, par p-c. lafond, dir., fasc. 31, par. 42; voir par exemple larouche c. simard, 2009 qccs 529, [2009] rjq 768). certains auteurs suggèrent que l’art 1480 ccq. pourrait par conséquent s’appliquer en cas de fautes contractuelles et extracontractuelles (j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers et b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8e éd. 2014), nº 1-58; v. karim, les obligations (4e éd. 2015), vol. 1, par. 3456 et 3460-3470). cette question ne se soulève toutefois pas dans le cadre de ce pourvoi. [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 115 up as follows: to what extent can a rioter who has caused property damage be held solidarily liable to the victim for damage done to the same property by other rioters? ceci : dans quelle mesure un émeutier donné peut-il être tenu solidairement responsable envers la victime des dommages causés par les autres émeutiers au même bien que lui? [4] i agree with the court of appeal and the court of québec that the facts of these cases do not support the application of the articles of the code that pro- vide for solidarity in cases of extracontractual fault. the evidence is such that it is possible to determine what specifi c damage to the victim’s property was caused by each of the identifi ed rioters. that being the case, this legislative scheme cannot be circum- vented by imposing liability in solidum in this con- text either. the appeal must therefore be dismissed. [4] tout comme la cour d’appel et la cour du québec, je considère que les faits de l’espèce ne justifi ent pas l’application des articles du code qui prévoient la solidarité en matière de fautes extra- contractuelles. en effet, la preuve permet de circons- crire le dommage précis qui a été causé aux biens de la victime par chacun des émeutiers identifi és. cela étant, il n’est guère plus possible de contourner ce régime législatif et d’imposer une responsabilité in solidum dans ce contexte. l’appel doit donc être rejeté. ii facts ii contexte factuel [5] hockey is a tradition that is of particular signifi cance in mont réal every spring when the canadiens are in the playoffs, the city’s mood varies with the success or failure of its team. on the night of april 21, 2008, the canadiens were playing the boston bruins. the rivalry between the two teams is legendary. excitement was at a fever pitch. it was the seventh game of the series, and the teams were tied. when the canadiens won the game and elimi- nated their archrivals, the jubilant crowd went out to celebrate downtown. the spontaneous gathering was initially festive, but unfortunately turned into a riot as the evening progressed. numerous acts of mischief were committed over a period of more than three hours. these included the vandalizing of 15 patrol cars belonging to the police department of the ap- pellant, ville de mont réal (“city”). nine of the cars were total losses; the other six required major repairs. [5] le hockey est une tradition qui revêt une importance toute particulière à mont réal. chaque printemps où les canadiens participent aux séries éliminatoires, la ville vibre au rythme de son équipe. le soir du 21 avril 2008, les canadiens affrontent les bruins de boston. la rivalité qui oppose ces équipes est légendaire. la fébrilité est à son comble. c’est la septième partie de la série et les deux équipes sont à égalité. quand les canadiens l’emportent et éliminent leurs grands rivaux, la foule en liesse sort célébrer au centre- ville. d’abord festif, le rassem- blement spontané se transforme malheureusement en émeute au fi l de la soirée. de nombreux méfaits sont commis, et ce, pendant plus de trois heures. entre autres, 15 autos- patrouilles du service de po- lice de l’appelante, la ville de mont réal (« ville »), sont vandalisées. neuf d’entre elles constituent des pertes totales; six autres nécessitent des réparations importantes. [6] the police investigation, helped in particular by photographs and videos, led to the identifi cation and arrest of a number of rioters, including about 20 people who had damaged or destroyed several of the city’s patrol cars. the city decided to institute one civil action per vehicle, with the exception of one action relating to two vehicles that had been damaged by two individuals acting in concert. in each action, it grouped together all the identifi ed rioters who had [6] grâce notamment à des images photo et vidéo, l’enquête policière permet d’identifi er et d’arrêter un certain nombre d’émeutiers. parmi eux, on trouve une vingtaine de personnes qui ont endommagé ou détruit plusieurs des autos- patrouilles de la ville. cette dernière décide alors d’intenter un recours civil pour chaque véhicule, à l’exception d’un re- cours visant deux véhicules endommagés par deux individus agissant de concert. dans chaque action, 116 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. done damage to the vehicle or vehicles in question. it sought to have the defendants in each case held soli- darily liable for the whole of the damage done to the specifi c patrol car and to its equipment, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the wrongful act each of them had committed. la ville regroupe tous les émeutiers identifi és qui ont endommagé le ou les véhicules visés. peu importe la nature ou la gravité du geste fautif de chacun des défendeurs, elle recherche une condamnation soli- daire pour l’ensemble des dommages causés à l’auto- patrouille concernée et à son équipement. [7] the rioters’ faults were varied and involved several different types of mischief against the ve- hicles, from kicking a door to arson. some of them were committed at the start of the riot, while others were committed a few hours later. except in a few isolated cases, the defendants acted spontaneously and independently and did not know one another. [7] les fautes des émeutiers varient et appar- tiennent à une large gamme de méfaits. elles vont du coup de pied dans la portière d’un véhicule à l’incendie criminel de celui-ci. certaines fautes sont commises au début de l’émeute, d’autres quelques heures plus tard. à l’exception de quelques cas iso- lés, les défendeurs agissent de façon spontanée et indépendante les uns des autres, et ils ne se con- naissent pas. iii judicial history iii historique judiciaire a court of québec (2014  qccq  4902, 2014 qccq 4915, 2014 qccq 4916, 2014 qccq 4919, 2014 qccq 4920 and 2014 qccq 4921 (collectively “qccq”)) a cour du québec (2014  qccq  4902, 2014 qccq 4915, 2014 qccq 4916, 2014 qccq 4919, 2014 qccq 4920 et 2014 qccq 4921 (collectivement « qccq »)) [8] judge coutlée heard all 10 of the city’s actions. in a fi rst case, he dismissed the city’s claim for lack of evidence (2014 qccq 4922). in three others, he found that the defendants had committed a common fault and ordered them solidarily to pay an amount corresponding to the whole of the damage done to the patrol car or cars in question. in two of those three cases, the defendants had acted together to, among other things, set fi re to a vehicle (2014 qccq 4917; 2014 qccq 4918). in the third, the two defendants had acted together to shatter the windows of two patrol cars (2014 qccq 4923). in all three cases, each of the defendants was also ordered to pay pu- nitive damages. [8] le juge coutlée est saisi des 10 actions inten- tées par la ville. dans un premier dossier, il rejette la réclamation de la ville faute de preuve (2014 qccq 4922). dans trois autres, il conclut que les défendeurs ont commis une faute commune et les condamne so- lidairement à payer une somme correspondant à la totalité des dommages causés aux autos- patrouilles visées. dans deux de ces trois dossiers, les défen- deurs ont notamment incendié ensemble un véhi- cule (2014 qccq 4917; 2014 qccq 4918). dans le troisième, les deux défendeurs ont, de concert, fracassé les vitres de deux autos- patrouilles (2014 qccq 4923). dans ces trois dossiers, chacun des défendeurs a également été condamné au paiement de dommages- intérêts punitifs. [9] this appeal concerns the other six cases, in which the judge ordered each defendant to make reparation for the specifi c damage caused by his own acts. however, the judge declined to fi nd the defendants in each action solidarily liable, with the exception of two defendants who had acted together to set fi re to a patrol car. he rejected the city’s ar- gument that the defendants had jointly taken part in [9] les six autres dossiers font l’objet du présent pourvoi. dans ceux-ci, le juge condamne chaque défendeur à réparer le dommage précis causé par ses propres actes. il refuse cependant de condamner solidairement les défendeurs à chaque action, à l’ex- ception de deux d’entre eux qui ont mis ensemble le feu à une auto- patrouille. le juge rejette la prétention de la ville voulant que les défendeurs aient participé [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 117 a wrongful act and were therefore solidarily liable under art 1480 ccq. he found that the evidence made it possible to specifi cally identify each indi- vidual who had caused the various injuries at issue and that this barred the application of that article. he added that for there to be a common venture, there must be a clear intention to engage in one, whereas these cases involved spontaneous acts by individuals who, for the most part, did not know one another and had not acted simultaneously. à un fait collectif fautif et soient solidairement res- ponsables en vertu de l’art 1480 ccq. il conclut que la preuve permet d’identifi er précisément chaque auteur des divers préjudices en cause et qu’il y a donc lieu d’écarter l’application de cet article. selon le juge, pour qu’il y ait aventure commune, il est en outre nécessaire d’établir l’existence d’une intention claire en ce sens. or, il s’agit ici d’actes spontanés d’individus qui, pour la plupart, ne se connaissent pas et n’agissent pas en même temps. [10] the judge therefore identified the distinct damage caused by each fault in order to determine the fair compensation each defendant would have to pay the city. in view of the seriousness of all the wrongful acts committed during the riot, he also ordered each defendant to pay punitive damages. [10] le juge procède par conséquent à la détermi- nation du dommage distinct causé par chaque faute afi n d’établir la juste compensation que chaque défendeur devra verser à la ville. devant la gravité de l’ensemble des gestes fautifs posés au cours de l’émeute, il condamne également chacun des défendeurs au paiement de dommages- intérêts pu- nitifs. b quebec court of appeal (2016 qcca 1022) b cour d’appel du québec (2016 qcca 1022) [11] the city appealed the six judgments of the court of québec in which the defendants had not all been found solidarily liable. in its appeal, the city limited the issue to the application of solidarity; fault and the quantifi cation of the injury were not raised. in a unanimous decision, the court of appeal affi rmed the trial court’s judgments. [11] la ville interjette appel des six jugements de la cour du québec qui ne condamnent pas solidai- rement tous les défendeurs. elle limite la question en appel à l’application de la solidarité; les fautes et la quantifi cation du préjudice ne sont pas remises en cause. dans un arrêt unanime, la cour d’appel confi rme les jugements de première instance. [12] the court of appeal began by reiterating that solidarity is not presumed and that it may be imposed in cases of extracontractual fault only where this is provided for by law. after reviewing the princi- ples developed by the courts in the context of the civil code of lower canada (“cclc” or “former code”), the court of appeal concluded that [trans- lation] “the courts imposed solidarity only where a single injury had resulted from [separate] faults or where it was impossible to determine which fault had caused which injury or which portion of the injury” (para. 37 (canlii)). in the current code, all the legislature did was to codify the existing case law on extracontractual solidarity. [12] d’entrée de jeu, la cour d’appel rappelle que la solidarité ne se présume pas et que, en matière de fautes extracontractuelles, elle ne peut être imposée que lorsque la loi le prévoit. après avoir passé en re- vue les principes jurisprudentiels développés sous le régime du code civil du bas- canada (« ccb-c » ou « ancien code »), la cour d’appel conclut que « les tribunaux n’ont imposé la solidarité que lors- qu’un seul dommage a résulté de [  ] fautes [dis- tinctes] ou qu’il n’était pas possible de déterminer quelle faute avait causé quel dommage ou fraction du dommage » (par. 37 (canlii)). or, dans le code actuel, le législateur s’est limité à codifi er la juris- prudence antérieure sur la solidarité en matière ex- tracontractuelle. [13] articles 1480 and 1526 ccq apply only in cases involving a single injury. the court of appeal [13] pour que s’appliquent les art.  1480  et 1526 ccq, il faut être en présence d’un préjudice 118 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. stressed that quebec’s civil liability system does not have a punitive purpose. both the wording of art 1480 ccq and the spirit of the system indi- cate that this article imposes solidarity only where it is impossible to determine which fault caused the damage. unique. la cour d’appel souligne que le régime qué- bécois de la responsabilité civile ne vise pas un ob- jectif punitif. tant le libellé de l’art 1480 ccq que l’esprit du régime indiquent que cet article n’impose la solidarité que dans le cas où il est impossible de déterminer quelle faute a causé le dommage. [14] because the evidence made it possible to link each fault to specifi c damage that represented only a portion of the city’s injury, the court of appeal up- held the trial judge’s conclusion that the defendants should not be held solidarily liable for the whole of the damage done to a given patrol car during the riot. it also dismissed the incidental appeals of certain defendants against the award of punitive damages. [14] comme la preuve permet de rattacher chacune des fautes à un dommage spécifi que ne représentant qu’une fraction du préjudice subi par la ville, la cour d’appel confi rme la conclusion du premier juge portant qu’il n’y a pas lieu de tenir les défendeurs solidairement responsables de l’entièreté des dom- mages causés pendant l’émeute à l’auto- patrouille concernée. en outre, la cour rejette l’appel incident formé par certains défendeurs à l’encontre de l’octroi de dommages- intérêts punitifs. iv issues iv questions en litige [15] all things considered, the city’s appeal raises three questions: [15] le pourvoi de la ville soulève en défi nitive trois questions : 1. 2. are the respondents solidarily liable for the whole of the damage done to a patrol car during the riot because they jointly took part in a wrongful act within the meaning of art 1480 ccq?. did the respondents commit a common fault or contributory faults as a result of which they are solidarily liable under art 1526 ccq? 1. 2. les intimés sont- ils solidairement respon- sables de la totalité des dommages causés à une auto- patrouille pendant l’émeute en raison de leur participation à un fait collectif fautif au sens de l’art 1480 ccq?. les intimés ont- ils commis une faute com- mune ou des fautes contributoires qui les rendent solidairement responsables au sens de l’art 1526 ccq? 3. are the respondents liable in solidum? 3. les intimés sont- ils responsables in solidum? [16] i note that the respondents did not fi le an incidental appeal to contest the award of punitive damages. only the issue of solidarity was argued in this court. [16] je souligne que les intimés n’ont pas formé d’appel incident pour contester l’octroi des dommages- intérêts punitifs. seule la question de la solidarité fait l’objet du débat devant nous. v analysis v analyse in quebec civil law, solidarity is not pre- [17] sumed (art. 1525 para 1 ccq;. j-l. baudouin and p-g jobin,. les obligations (7th ed. 2013), by p-g jobin and n. vézina, at no. 612; m. cumyn, “responsibility for another’s debt: suretyship, solidarity, and imperfect delegation” (2010), 55 [17] la solidarité ne se présume pas en droit civil québécois (art. 1525 al 1 ccq;. j-l. baudouin et p-g. jobin, les obligations (7e éd. 2013), par p-g. jobin et n. vézina, no 612; m. cumyn, « respon- sibility for another’s debt : suretyship, solidarity, and imperfect delegation » (2010), 55 rd. mcgill [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 119 mcgill lj 211, at p 215). as the court of ap- peal mentioned, in cases of extracontractual fault, solidarity exists only where it is provided for by law. to succeed, the city must therefore show that the respondents’ faults come within the scope of art. 1480 or art 1526 ccq. in my view, they do not. furthermore, the concept of liability in solidum does not apply in a situation like this one involving a number of faults that are all extracontractual. the three questions must accordingly be answered in the negative. 211, p 215). comme le mentionne la cour d’appel, en matière de fautes extracontractuelles, il n’y a solidarité que lorsque la loi le prévoit. pour avoir gain de cause, la ville doit donc démontrer que les fautes des intimés relèvent du champ d’application de l’art. 1480 ou de l’art 1526 ccq. je suis d’avis que ce n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. en outre, dans une situation impliquant comme ici plusieurs fautes, toutes extracontractuelles, le concept de responsabi- lité in solidum est inapplicable. les trois questions qui se soulèvent commandent par conséquent une réponse négative. a article 1480 ccq. a l’article 1480 ccq. [18] article 1480 ccq reads as follows:2 [18] l’article 1480 ccq est rédigé ainsi2 : 1480 where several persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act which has resulted in injury or have com- mitted separate faults each of which may have caused the injury, and where it is impossible to determine, in either case, which of them actually caused it, they are solidarily liable for reparation thereof. [19] two conditions must be met for this article to apply. first, it must be impossible to determine which person actually caused the injury. second, there must have been either “join[t participation] in a wrongful act which has resulted in injury” or “separate faults each of which may have caused the injury”. neither of these conditions is met here. the solidary liability being claimed by the city on this basis has not been established. 1480 lorsque plusieurs personnes ont participé à un fait collectif fautif qui entraîne un préjudice ou qu’elles ont commis des fautes distinctes dont chacune est susceptible d’avoir causé le préjudice, sans qu’il soit possible, dans l’un ou l’autre cas, de déterminer laquelle l’a effectivement causé, elles sont tenues solidairement à la réparation du préjudice. [19] deux conditions doivent être réunies pour que cet article trouve application. premièrement, il faut qu’il soit impossible de déterminer quelle personne a effectivement causé le préjudice. deuxièmement, il faut qu’il y ait soit « un fait collectif fautif qui entraîne un préjudice », soit « des fautes distinctes dont chacune est susceptible d’avoir causé le préju- dice ». aucune de ces conditions n’est remplie ici. la responsabilité solidaire qu’invoque la ville sur cette base n’est pas établie. (1) impossibility of determining who commit- (1) l’impossibilité de déterminer qui est l’auteur ted the fault that caused the injury de la faute ayant causé le préjudice [20] article  1480  ccq imposes solidarity in two specifi c situations: “[w]here several persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act which has resulted in injury” and where “several persons   . have committed separate faults each of which may have caused the injury”. [20] l’article  1480  ccq impose la solidarité dans deux situations précises : « [l]orsque plusieurs personnes ont participé à un fait collectif fautif qui entraîne un préjudice » et lorsqu’« elles ont commis des fautes distinctes dont chacune est susceptible d’avoir causé le préjudice ». 2 minor amendments were made to the english version of the article in 2014, 2015 and 2016, but they are of no consequence to this appeal. 2 la version anglaise de l’article a été légèrement modifi ée en 2014, 2015 et 2016. ces modifi cations sont toutefois sans conséquence pour le présent pourvoi. 120 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. [21] both at trial and in the court of appeal, the city argued that the requirement, set out at the end of art 1480 ccq, that it be impossible to determine which of the people involved caused the injury ap- plies only in the second situation, that is, where there are separate faults. in this court, the city shifted the focus of its argument to the characterization of the respondents’ fault and the injury it had suffered. the two conditions that must be met for art 1480 ccq. to apply are cumulative, however. they cannot be disregarded. therefore, even where two or more persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act, whatever it may have been, the article will not apply if it is possible to determine who actually caused the injury. [21] tant en première instance que devant la cour d’appel, la ville a soutenu que la condition, pré- vue à l’art 1480 ccq in fi ne, exigeant qu’il soit impossible de déterminer laquelle des personnes impliquées a causé le préjudice n’est applicable que dans la deuxième éventualité, soit en cas de fautes distinctes. devant notre cour, la ville a recentré son argumentation sur la qualifi cation de la faute des intimés et du préjudice subi. cependant, les deux conditions d’application de l’art 1480 ccq restent cumulatives. l’on ne peut en faire abstraction. ainsi, même en présence d’un fait collectif fautif, quel qu’il soit, la possibilité de déterminer qui a effectivement causé le préjudice fera échec à l’application de cet article. [22] under the modern approach to statutory in- terpretation, it is well established that “the words of an act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoni- ously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of parliament” (canada (at- torney general) v. thouin, 2017 scc 46, [2017] 2 scr 184, at para. 26, quoting rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, in turn quoting e a driedger,. construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87). in addition, the quebec legislature has provided that statutes must generally receive such fair, large and liberal construction as will ensure that they are coherent, that their provi- sions have meaningful effect and that their objects are attained (interpretation act, cqlr, c. i-16, ss. 41 and 411). [23] the judges of the courts below held that the words “dans l’un ou l’autre cas” in the french version of art 1480 ccq (“in either case” in the english version) indicate that the article imposes solidarity only where it is impossible to determine who committed the fault that caused the injury and that this is true in both of the situations in which this article applies. i agree that this is the interpretation that is most consistent with the words of the article as well as with the scheme and object of the statute and the intention of the legislature. [22] selon la méthode moderne d’interprétation législative, il est acquis qu’[traduction] « il faut lire les termes d’une loi dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’har- monise avec l’[économie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur » (canada (procureur général) c. thouin, 2017 csc 46, [2017] 2 rcs. 184, par. 26, citant rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27, par. 21, qui cite e. a. driedger, construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p 87). le législateur québécois précise du reste que les lois doivent généralement recevoir une interprétation large et libérale, qui assure la cohérence, l’effet utile de leurs dispositions ainsi que l’accomplissement de leur objet (loi d’interprétation, rlrq, c. i-16, art. 41 et 411). [23] les juges des juridictions inférieures ont affi rmé qu’en raison de la présence de la locution « dans l’un ou l’autre cas » à l’art 1480 ccq, cette disposition n’impose la solidarité que lorsqu’il est impossible de déterminer l’auteur de la faute ayant causé le préjudice, et ce, dans les deux situations visées par cet article. je suis d’accord pour dire qu’il s’agit là de l’interprétation la plus fi dèle au libellé de l’article ainsi qu’à l’économie de la loi, à son objet et à l’intention du législateur. [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 121 (a) wording of article 1480 ccq. a) le libellé de l’art 1480 ccq. [24] the issue of interpretation that arises with respect to the words of art 1480 ccq is whether the phrase “dans l’un ou l’autre cas” in the french version refers to both the concept of joint participa- tion in a wrongful act (“fait collectif fautif”) and that of separate faults (“fautes distinctes”), or only to the concept of separate faults. [25] the fi rst proposition refl ects the most natural reading of the french version of the article. however, from a grammatical standpoint, the french wording may leave some room for doubt. according to the offi ce québécois de la langue française, the phrase “l’un ou l’autre” indicates [translation] “a choice between two or more things” (banque de dépannage linguistique, april 2018 (online)).3 in theory, there- fore, these words could relate only to the situation in which there are a number of separate faults. [26] as the court of appeal observed, however, the english version of art 1480 ccq is unequivocal. the phrase “in either case” conveys a choice between only two things, not between an indefi nite number of things (canadian oxford dictionary (2nd ed. 2004), by k.  barber, “either”; gage canadian diction- ary (rev. and exp. ed. 1997), by g d de wolf et al., “either”; guide to canadian english usage (2nd ed. 2007), by m. fee and j. mcalpine, “either    or, neither    nor”). the english version there- fore excludes the possibility that the requirement that it be impossible to identify the person who commit- ted the fault that caused the injury applies only to the situation in which there are separate faults, the number of which is indeterminate. [24] sur l’interprétation textuelle de l’art. 1480 ccq, la question qui se pose consiste à déterminer si la locution « dans l’un ou l’autre cas » renvoie aux notions de « fait collectif fautif » et de « fautes distinctes », ou uniquement à celle de « fautes dis- tinctes ». [25] la première proposition correspond à la lecture la plus naturelle de la version française de l’article. d’un point de vue grammatical, le libellé français de l’article peut toutefois laisser subsister un doute. selon l’offi ce québécois de la langue fran- çaise, la locution « l’un ou l’autre » marque en effet « un choix entre deux éléments ou plus » (banque de dépannage linguistique, avril 2018 (en ligne))3. en théorie, cette locution pourrait ainsi renvoyer uniquement à la situation où il y a plusieurs fautes distinctes. [26] cependant, comme le fait remarquer la cour d’appel, la version anglaise de l’art 1480 ccq. ne laisse place à aucune équivoque. on y retrouve la locution « in either case » qui exprime un choix entre seulement deux éléments par opposition à une pluralité indéfinie d’éléments (canadian oxford dictionary (2e éd. 2004), par k. barber, « either »; gage canadian dictionary (éd rév. et aug. 1997), par g. d de wolf et autres, « either »; guide to canadian english usage (2e éd. 2007), par m. fee et j. mcalpine, « either    or, neither    nor »). la version anglaise exclut donc la possibilité que la condition exigeant qu’il soit impossible d’identifi er l’auteur de la faute ayant causé préjudice se rattache exclusivement à la notion de « fautes distinctes », lesquelles sont en nombre indéterminé. [27] the english and french versions of quebec statutes are equally authoritative (charter of the [27] les versions anglaise et française des lois québécoises ont la même valeur juridique (charte 3 i note that, according to the multidictionnaire de la langue fran- çaise, the phrase “l’un ou l’autre” means [translation] “only one of two” (m-é de villers (5th ed. 2009), see table on the word “un”, at p. 1639 (emphasis added)). because the only example given in that dictionary does not refl ect the structure of the sen- tence in art 1480 ccq,. i consider the banque de dépannage linguistique of the offi ce québécois de la langue française to be more complete on this specifi c point. 3 je précise que le multidictionnaire de la langue française énonce pour sa part que la locution « l’un ou l’autre » signifi e « [u]n seul des deux » (m-é de villers (5e éd. 2009), voir tableau « un », p. 1639 (je souligne)). puisque ce dictionnaire se limite à un exemple qui ne correspond pas à la structure de l’art 1480 ccq, j’estime que la banque de dépannage linguistique de l’offi ce québécois de la langue française est plus complète sur ce point précis. 122 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. french language, cqlr, c. c-11, s. 7(3), consist- ently with s. 133 of the constitution act, 1867; see doré v. verdun (city), [1997] 2 scr 862, at p 879). here, the english version of art 1480 ccq does not confl ict with the french version; rather, it con- fi rms the most natural reading of the french words. it follows that the only possible interpretation is that the words “dans l’un ou l’autre cas” link that requirement to both the scenarios contemplated in art 1480 ccq, that is, both that of joint partici- pation in a wrongful act and that of separate faults. de la langue française, rlrq, c. c-11, par. 7(3), conformément à l’art. 133 de la loi constitution- nelle de 1867; voir doré c. verdun (ville), [1997] 2 rcs 862, p 879). ici, la version anglaise de l’art 1480 ccq ne contredit pas la version fran- çaise; elle confi rme plutôt la lecture la plus naturelle du texte de celle-ci. il s’ensuit que la seule interpréta- tion possible est que la locution « dans l’un ou l’autre cas » rattache cette exigence aux deux cas de fi gure énoncés à l’art 1480 ccq, soit le fait collectif fautif et les fautes distinctes. [28] this interpretation is also the one that is most consistent with the scheme and object of the statute and with the intention of the legislature. [28] de surcroît, il s’agit de l’interprétation la plus conforme à l’économie de la loi, à son objet et à l’intention du législateur. (b) scheme and object of the statute and inten- b) l’économie de la loi, son objet et l’intention tion of the legislature du législateur [29] the general civil liability framework set out in art 1457 ccq is based on the concept of fault. unless an exception applies, a person is accord- ingly liable to pay compensation only for damage caused by his or her own fault (j-l . baudouin, p. deslauriers and b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at no. 1-161; p. deschamps, “faute personnelle”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et responsabilité civile (loose- leaf), vol. 1, by p-c lafond, ed., fasc. 17, at para 96). [29] le régime général de responsabilité civile établi à l’art 1457 ccq est fondé sur le concept de faute. sauf exception, une personne n’est en consé- quence tenue de compenser que le seul dommage qu’elle a causé par sa propre faute (j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers et b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8e éd. 2014), nº 1-161; p. deschamps, « faute per- sonnelle », dans jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et responsabilité civile (feuilles mobiles), vol.  1, par p.-c lafond, dir., fasc. 17, par 96). [30] it is consistent with the scheme of our civil liability system to interpret art 1480 ccq such that, in every case, solidarity can be imposed only if it is impossible to identify the person who committed the fault that caused the injury. to limit this outcome to cases involving separate faults, while excluding those involving joint participation in wrongful acts from the scope of this provision, would place the provision in confl ict with the central role of causation in the scheme of extracontractual liability established by the code. [30] interpréter l’art 1480 ccq d’une manière qui a pour effet d’exiger, dans tous les cas, qu’il soit impossible d’identifi er l’auteur de la faute ayant causé le préjudice pour que la solidarité puisse être imposée est conforme à l’économie de notre système de responsabilité civile. limiter cette éventualité aux seuls cas de fautes distinctes, et exclure les cas de fait collectif fautif de la portée de cette disposition, mettrait celle-ci en porte-à-faux avec le rôle central du lien de causalité dans le régime de responsabilité extracontractuelle établi par le code. [31] it was in the name of fairness that the legis- lature chose not to leave a victim without recourse where two or more persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act or have committed separate faults and it is impossible to determine who committed [31] c’est par souci d’équité que le législateur choisit de ne pas laisser les victimes sans recours en cas de fait collectif fautif ou de fautes dis- tinctes quand il est impossible de déterminer qui est l’auteur de la faute ayant effectivement causé le [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 123 the fault that actually caused the injury (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no. 1-725; l. khoury, “lien de causalité”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et responsa- bilité civile (loose- leaf), vol. 1, by p-c lafond, ed., fasc. 21, at para 32). as the minister of justice mentioned, art 1480 ccq resolves the problem of apportionment of liability among those who are at fault (ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol. i, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), at p 906). he added that, in the cases contemplated in art 1480 ccq, the rule of solidarity applies [translation] “to protect the victim, because, in the circumstances, the victim is unable to establish a causal connection between the injury he or she suffered and the causal fault” (ibid). the legislature has thus ensured that the victim does not bear the consequences of evidentiary diffi culties that can be attributed to the situation in which he or she has been placed by the persons who committed the faults (see also p. deschamps, “cas d’exonération et partage de responsabilité en matière extracontractuelle”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et responsabilité civile (loose- leaf), vol. 1, by p-c lafond, ed., fasc. 22, at para. 15; khoury, at para 32). préjudice (baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 1-725; l. khoury, « lien de causalité », dans jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et responsabilité civile (feuilles mobiles), vol. 1, par p-c. lafond, dir., fasc. 21, par 32). comme le men- tionne le ministre de la justice, l’art 1480 ccq. règle le problème du partage de la responsabilité entre les auteurs des fautes (ministère de la jus- tice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, t. i, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), p 906). le ministre ajoute que la règle de la solidarité s’impose dans les cas d’application de l’art 1480 ccq « pour assurer la protection de la victime car celle-ci ne peut, dans les circonstances, établir le lien de causalité entre le préjudice qu’elle a subi et la faute causale » (ibid). de cette façon, le législateur s’assure que la victime ne subit pas les conséquences de diffi cultés de preuve imputables à la situation dans laquelle les auteurs des fautes l’ont placée (voir aussi p. deschamps, « cas d’exonération et partage de responsabilité en matière extracontrac- tuelle », dans jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et responsabilité civile (feuilles mobiles), vol.  1, par p.-c lafond, dir., fasc. 22, par. 15; khoury, par 32). [32] where it can be shown which fault caused which injury, however, there is no indication that the legislature had any intention of deviating from the general principle of civil liability that a person is liable for reparation only of injuries caused by his or her own fault. [32] par contre, quand il est possible de démontrer que telle faute a causé tel préjudice, rien n’indique une quelconque intention du législateur de vouloir déroger au principe général de la responsabilité civile voulant qu’une personne ne soit tenue de réparer que le seul préjudice qu’elle a causé par sa faute. [33] indeed, in cases of extracontractual liabil- ity, it cannot be said that the requirement provided for in art 1480 ccq that it be impossible to de- termine who committed the fault that caused the injury does not apply in situations involving joint participation in wrongful acts. if that were the case, it would have been redundant for the legislature to seek by means of that article to impose solidarity on those who jointly take part in such an act. that is already provided for in art 1526 ccq, according to which “[t]he obligation to make reparation for injury caused to another through the fault of two [33] de fait, en matière de responsabilité extra- contractuelle, on ne saurait affi rmer que la condi- tion prévue à l’art 1480 ccq, exigeant qu’il soit impossible de déterminer qui est l’auteur de la faute ayant causé le préjudice, ne s’applique pas aux si- tuations de « fait collectif fautif ». si c’était le cas, il serait alors redondant pour le législateur de vouloir imposer la solidarité entre les participants à un fait collectif fautif par le biais de cet article. cela est en effet déjà prévu à l’art 1526 ccq, lequel édicte que « [l]’obligation de réparer le préjudice causé à autrui par la faute de deux personnes ou plus est 124 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. or more persons is solidary where the obligation is extra- contractual.” solidaire, lorsque cette obligation est extracontrac- tuelle. » [34] the purpose of art 1480 ccq is instead to impose solidary liability on two or more persons for the whole of the injury in situations in which, because of evidentiary diffi culties, the application of the general principles of extracontractual liability would not result in solidarity (see simard v. lavoie, 2005 canlii 48674 (que. sup. ct.), at paras 8-10). article 1480 ccq thus has the effect, where the conditions for its application are met, of shifting the burden of proof with respect to causation (st- jean v. mercier, 2002 scc 15, [2002] 1 scr 491, at para. 118; khoury, at para 32). in other words, the article relieves the victim of the burden of proving which person actually caused an injury where it is impossible for him or her to do so. this is an adap- tation of the burden of proof in respect of causation — as a constituent element of civil liability — that is justifi ed by necessity. [34] l’article 1480 ccq vise plutôt à imputer solidairement à plusieurs personnes la responsabilité de la totalité du préjudice dans des situations où, en raison de diffi cultés de preuve, il n’y aurait pas eu so- lidarité suivant l’application des principes généraux de la responsabilité extracontractuelle (voir simard c. lavoie, 2005 canlii 48674 (cs. qc), par 8-10). l’article 1480 ccq a ainsi pour effet, quand ses conditions d’application sont remplies, d’opérer un renversement du fardeau de la preuve pour ce qui est de la causalité (st- jean c. mercier, 2002 csc 15, [2002] 1 rcs 491, par. 118; khoury, par 32). autrement dit, cet article épargne à la victime le fardeau de prouver quelle personne est véritablement l’auteur de son préjudice lorsqu’elle est placée dans un cas de fi gure où cette preuve est impossible. il s’agit d’une modulation du fardeau de preuve relatif au lien causal — en tant qu’élément constitutif de la responsabilité civile — qui est justifi ée par un état de nécessité. [35] to some, the essence of art 1480 ccq thus boils down to the creation of a sort of [translation] “presumption of solidarity” to the effect that each person who commits a fault is liable for the whole of the injury suffered (larouche v. simard, 2009 qccs 529, [2009] rjq 768, at para. 200; see also v. karim, les obligations (4th ed. 2015), vol. 1, at para. 3456; baudouin and jobin, at no 615). [35] pour certains, l’essence de l’art 1480 ccq. se résume à créer, en quelque sorte, une « présomp- tion de solidarité » suivant laquelle chaque personne fautive est tenue responsable de la totalité du pré- judice subi (larouche c. simard, 2009 qccs 529, [2009] rjq 768, par. 200; voir aussi v. karim, les obligations (4e éd. 2015), vol. 1, par. 3456; baudouin et jobin, no 615). [36] one thing is clear, however. the liability pro- vided for in art 1480 ccq favours compensation of the victim. this objective is readily understand- able in cases in which fault is established but it is impossible to prove a causal connection between the fault and the injury suffered by the victim. but it is hard to justify imposing liability for the whole of the injury where the evidence shows that a given fault caused only part of the injury or where it would have been possible for the victim to adduce such evidence. [36] une chose reste claire toutefois. la respon- sabilité prévue à l’art 1480 ccq favorise l’in- demnisation de la victime. cet objectif se comprend aisément lorsque la faute est démontrée, mais qu’il est impossible de prouver le lien causal entre celle-ci et le préjudice subi par la victime. par contre, im- poser la responsabilité à l’égard de l’entièreté du préjudice se justifi e diffi cilement lorsque la preuve démontre qu’une faute n’a causé qu’une partie du préjudice subi ou lorsqu’il aurait été possible pour la victime de présenter une telle preuve. [37] the legislative history supports this interpre- tation of art 1480 ccq. at the time of the reform of the former code, quebec’s civil code revision [37] l’historique législatif appuie cette interpréta- tion de l’art 1480 ccq. au moment de la réforme de l’ancien code, l’offi ce de révision du code civil [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 125 offi ce proposed an earlier version of the article that did not include either the concept of joint participa- tion in a wrongful act or the words “in either case” (committee on the law of obligations, report on obligations (1975), at pp 376-79). the addition of the concept of joint participation in a wrongful act coincided with the addition of the words “in either case”, which suggests that the legislature intended both situations contemplated in art 1480 ccq, that of joint participation in such an act and that of separate faults, to be subject to the requirement that it be impossible to identify the person who caused the injury. [38] in summary, the wording of art 1480 ccq, the scheme and object of the statute, and the legis- lature’s intention all suggest that this article applies only where it is impossible to identify the person who committed the fault that caused the injury. moreover, this interpretation has been adopted by the commentators, by this court in st- jean, and by the quebec courts (code civil du québec: annota- tions — commentaires 2017-2018 (2nd ed. 2017), by b. moore, ed., et al., at p. 1258; baudouin and jobin, at no. 617; f. levesque, l’obligation in solidum en droit privé québécois (2010), at p. 235; khoury, at para. 32; n. vézina and l. langevin, “les modalités de l’obligation”, in collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2017-2018, vol. 6, obligations et contrats (2017), 115, at p. 125 (footnote 84); st- jean, at paras. 118-20; lavoie, at paras. 9 and 15; assurances générales des caisses desjardins inc v. morissette, [2005] rra 1273 (cq), at paras. 37- 39). no commentator or court has supported the in- terpretation proposed by the city in the courts below. proposait en effet une version antérieure de cet article dont étaient absentes à la fois la notion de « fait col- lectif fautif » et les mots « dans l’un ou l’autre cas » (comité du droit des obligations, rapport sur les obligations (1975), p 375-378). l’ajout de la notion de fait collectif fautif coïncide avec l’ajout des mots « dans l’un ou l’autre cas ». cela indique que le légis- lateur a voulu assujettir les deux éventualités prévues à l’art 1480 ccq — soit le fait collectif fautif et les fautes distinctes — à la condition exigeant qu’il soit impossible d’identifi er l’auteur du préjudice. [38] en somme, tant le libellé de l’art 1480 ccq. que l’économie de la loi, son objet et l’intention du législateur indiquent que cet article ne s’applique que dans les cas où il est impossible d’identifi er l’auteur de la faute ayant causé le préjudice. il s’agit du reste de l’interprétation retenue par la doctrine, par notre cour dans l’arrêt st- jean, ainsi que par les tribunaux québécois (code civil du québec : anno- tations — commentaires 2017-2018 (2e éd. 2017), par b. moore, dir., et autres, p. 1258; baudouin et jobin, no 617; f. levesque, l’obligation in solidum en droit privé québécois (2010), p. 235; khoury, par. 32; n. vézina et l. langevin, « les modalités de l’obligation », dans collection de droit de l’école du barreau du québec 2017-2018, vol. 6, obliga- tions et contrats (2017), 115, p. 125 (note en bas de page 84); st- jean, par. 118-120; lavoie, par. 9 et 15; assurances générales des caisses desjardins inc. c. morissette, [2005] rra 1273 (cq), par 37-39). aucune doctrine ni jurisprudence n’appuient l’autre interprétation proposée par la ville devant les juri- dictions inférieures. (c) application to the instant cases c) l’application aux présents dossiers [39] in these cases, the trial judge found that the evidence made it possible to link each of the faults committed by the respondents to a specifi c injury. this fi nding is amply supported by the evidence that was considered in each case. it is therefore not appropriate to hold the respondents solidarily liable under art 1480 ccq for the whole of the dam- age done to a particular patrol car during the riot. article 1480 does not justify holding a defendant [39] en l’espèce, le juge de première instance a conclu que la preuve permet de rattacher chacune des fautes commises par les intimés à un préjudice précis. dans chaque dossier, la preuve analysée sup- porte amplement cette conclusion. par conséquent, il n’y a pas lieu de tenir les intimés solidairement responsables, aux termes de l’art 1480 ccq, de la totalité des dommages causés pendant l’émeute à l’auto- patrouille qui les concerne. cet article ne 126 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. liable for damage that is known not to have been caused by his or her fault on the basis that the victim cannot identify the person who caused the damage in question. it is of course unfortunate that the person who committed a fault sometimes cannot be found. but in quebec civil law, such a situation does not in itself justify imposing additional liability on persons who committed separate faults that, according to the evidence accepted by the trier of fact, caused separate injuries. permet pas d’imposer à un défendeur la responsa- bilité d’un dommage que l’on sait ne pas avoir été causé par sa faute au motif que la victime ne peut retrouver l’auteur de ce dommage. il est certes dé- plorable que l’auteur d’une faute demeure parfois introuvable. toutefois, en droit civil québécois, une telle situation ne justifi e pas en soi d’imposer une responsabilité additionnelle aux auteurs de fautes distinctes qui, selon la preuve retenue par le juge d’instance, ont causé des préjudices distincts. [40] what the city does in its submissions is ef- fectively to challenge the trial judge’s fi nding on the causal connection between the various faults that were committed and the injury each of them caused. in each of the cases, however, his thorough analysis of the evidence linked each respondent’s wrongful act to the injury it had directly caused, namely the partial destruction of the patrol car in question. the trial judge found no causal connection between those wrongful acts and the total destruction of the vehicle, the injury for which the city was seeking compensa- tion. in his analysis, he also made a point of stating that the fact that the rioters had encouraged one an- other had not contributed to or caused the aggregate injury complained of by the city. [41] whether a causal connection exists is a ques- tion of fact that is not open to review by an appellate court unless a palpable and overriding error has been made in answering it (benhaim v. st- germain, 2016 scc 48, [2016] 2 scr 352, at para. 36; st- jean, at paras 104-5). the city has failed to establish such an error. when all is said and done, what it is asking is that we substitute our assessment of the evidence for that of the trial judge. doing so would be consistent neither with the law in this regard nor with this court’s role. [40] en réalité, par son argumentation, la ville remet en question la conclusion du premier juge sur le lien de causalité entre les diverses fautes commises et le préjudice qu’elles ont respectivement causé. pourtant, dans son analyse fouillée de la preuve, le juge rattache dans tous les cas le geste fautif de cha- cun des intimés au préjudice direct qu’il a causé, soit la destruction partielle de l’auto- patrouille concer- née. le juge estime qu’il n’existe pas de lien causal entre ces gestes fautifs et la destruction totale du véhicule, soit le préjudice à l’égard duquel la ville réclame compensation. le juge prend en outre le soin de préciser, dans le cadre de son analyse, que les encouragements entre émeutiers n’ont pas contribué au préjudice global dont la ville se plaint, ni causé ce préjudice. [41] l’existence ou non du lien de causalité est une question de fait qui ne peut être révisée par un tribunal d’appel en l’absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante à cet égard (benhaim c. st- germain, 2016 csc 48, [2016] 2 rcs 352, par. 36; st- jean, par 104-105). la ville n’a pas su établir une telle erreur. en défi nitive, elle nous invite à substituer notre évaluation de la preuve à celle du juge des procès. cela n’est ni permis par l’état du droit sur la question, ni notre rôle en la matière. (2) joint participation in a wrongful act that (2) le fait collectif fautif qui entraîne le préju- resulted in injury dice [42] for art 1480 ccq to apply, the city there- fore had to establish that it was impossible to deter- mine who had committed the fault that caused the injury at issue, which was not the case here. it also had to show that the respondents had jointly taken [42] pour que l’art 1480 ccq trouve application, la ville devait donc démontrer qu’il était impossible de déterminer qui est l’auteur de la faute ayant causé le préjudice reproché, ce qui n’est pas le cas ici. la ville devait également démontrer que les intimés [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 127 part in a wrongful act that resulted in the injury or had committed separate faults each of which may have caused that same injury. on this point, the city submits that the respondents jointly took part in a wrongful act by taking part in the riot or in the whole of the acts that allegedly caused the total loss of each patrol car. [43] on the subject of this second condition for the application of art 1480 ccq, the trial judge con- cluded from his assessment of the evidence that the facts did not support a fi nding of joint participation in a wrongful act. i wish to make it clear here that the trial judge did not merely hold that the riot as a whole did not constitute joint participation in a wrongful act. his analysis also focused on the fact that the defendants did not have a common intention for the acts of vandalism they committed against each of the patrol cars in question in the 10 cases before him. and this was in fact the very question he had to answer, given the city’s election to bring a separate action for each damaged patrol car. here again, his determination on the issue of joint participation in a wrongful act is not open to review absent a palpable and overriding error on his part. a simple difference of opinion about the assessment of the evidence does not suffi ce. [44] on balance, the trial judge found that the riot was not the cause, but the occasion, of the injury. he added that the common venture alleged by the city had not been established given the absence of a clear intention or a plot to commit mischief. the city has not satisfi ed me that he erred in this fi nding. its arguments refl ect an incorrect analysis of the judicial precedents on the common venture concept and a misunderstanding of the concept of joint par- ticipation in a wrongful act to which art 1480 ccq. now applies. avaient soit participé à un fait collectif fautif ayant entraîné le préjudice, soit commis des fautes dis- tinctes dont chacune était susceptible d’avoir causé ce même préjudice. à ce chapitre, la ville soutient que les intimés auraient participé à un fait collectif fautif par leur implication dans l’émeute ou dans l’ensemble des actes qui auraient causé la perte totale de chaque auto- patrouille. [43] or, relativement à cette deuxième condition d’application de l’art 1480 ccq, le juge de pre- mière instance conclut de son évaluation de la preuve que les faits n’appuient pas l’existence d’un fait collectif fautif. je précise sur ce point que le juge ne se contente pas de décider que l’émeute dans son ensemble ne constitue pas un fait collectif fautif. son analyse porte tout autant sur l’absence d’intention commune des défendeurs à l’égard des actes de van- dalisme commis sur chacune des autos- patrouilles visées par les 10 dossiers dont il est saisi. il s’agit du reste de la question même qu’il devait trancher, en raison du choix de la ville d’entreprendre un recours distinct pour chaque auto- patrouille endommagée. encore là, son évaluation de l’existence d’un fait collectif fautif ne saurait être remise en question en l’absence d’une erreur manifeste et déterminante de sa part. une simple divergence d’opinions sur l’évaluation de la preuve ne suffi t pas. [44] tout bien considéré, le premier juge conclut que l’émeute n’est pas la cause, mais l’occasion du préjudice subi. il ajoute que l’aventure commune alléguée par la ville n’a pas été établie vu l’absence d’intention claire de commettre un méfait ou de concertation à cet effet. la ville ne me convainc pas qu’il fait erreur à cet égard. les arguments qu’elle avance témoignent d’une mauvaise analyse de la portée de la jurisprudence antérieure sur la notion d’aventure commune et d’une compréhension er- ronée de la notion de fait collectif fautif que vise dorénavant l’art 1480 ccq. (a) extracontractual solidarity under the civil code of lower canada and the “common venture” concept a) la solidarité en matière extracontractuelle sous le code civil du bas- canada et la notion d’« aventure commune » [45] the current scheme of extracontractual sol- idarity set out in arts. 1480 and 1526 ccq is a [45] le régime actuel de solidarité en matière ex- tracontractuelle établi aux art. 1480 et 1526 ccq. 128 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. codifi cation of rules developed by the courts under the former code (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no. 1-680; levesque, at p. 196; court of appeal’s reasons, at para 38). article 1106 cclc pro- vided only that “[t]he obligation arising from the common offence or quasi- offence of two or more persons is joint and several”, but the courts none- theless interpreted the article broadly to include in its scope situations in which different persons had committed a number of separate offences or quasi- offences that had all contributed to the same injury (martel v. hôtel- dieu st- vallier, [1969] scr 745;. grand trunk railway co. of canada v. mcdonald (1918), 57 scr 268). thus, the courts went beyond common, contributory and simultaneous faults to extend the application of the article to situations involving what they referred to as a [translation] “common venture” (court of appeal’s reasons, at paras 29-35). [46] the effect of those decisions that expanded the scope of art 1106 cclc was that the “common venture” concept could also serve as a basis for the courts to fi nd defendants jointly and severally liable. such a fi nding was imperative in situations involving extracontractual fault where, fi rst, a court identifi ed an intention, even a tacit one, to take part in the wrongful “common venture” and, second, the acts alleged against the defendants had caused a single injury that might be impossible to connect in whole or in part with the fault of one defendant in particular. the city is relying heavily on those decisions, which in fact do not really assist it here. a brief review of the decisions in question helps clarify the actual scope of the principles developed in this regard under the former scheme. se veut une codifi cation de règles jurisprudentielles développées en application de l’ancien code (bau- douin, deslauriers et moore, nº 1-680; levesque, p. 196; décision de la cour d’appel, par 38). l’ar- ticle 1106 ccb-c prévoyait en effet uniquement ce qui suit : « l’obligation résultant d’un délit ou quasi- délit commis par deux personnes ou plus est solidaire. » malgré cela, les tribunaux ont interprété largement cet article et inclus dans son champ d’ap- plication les situations impliquant plusieurs délits ou quasi- délits distincts, commis par des personnes différentes et ayant tous contribué au même préjudice (martel c. hôtel- dieu st- vallier, [1969] rcs 745;. grand trunk railway co. of canada c. mcdonald (1918), 57 rcs 268). ainsi, en plus des fautes communes, contributoires et simultanées, les tribu- naux ont élargi l’application de cet article à des situa- tions qu’ils ont qualifi ées d’« aventure commune » (décision de la cour d’appel, par 29-35). [46] en vertu de cette jurisprudence ayant élargi la portée de l’art 1106 ccb-c, la notion d’« aventure commune » permettait également aux tribunaux de conclure à l’existence de responsabilité solidaire. une telle conclusion s’imposait dans des situations de fautes extracontractuelles où, d’une part, les tribu- naux pouvaient dégager la présence d’une intention, même tacite, de participer à l’« aventure commune » fautive et où, d’autre part, les actes reprochés aux défendeurs causaient un préjudice unique, parfois impossible à rattacher en tout ou en partie à la faute de l’un d’eux en particulier. la ville s’appuie for- tement sur ces décisions qui, pour tout dire, ne la servent pas vraiment en l’espèce. une brève revue de cette jurisprudence permet de bien saisir la por- tée réelle des principes développés à ce sujet sous l’ancien régime. [47] first, in d’allaire v. trépanier, [1961] cs 619 (que.), the superior court found that the fact that a child had [translation] “actively [taken] part” in a “risky common venture”, that of children throwing stones at one another, was suffi cient to make all the participants jointly and severally liable (p. 620) even though the evidence made it possible to identify the child who had thrown the stone that actually broke the victim’s teeth. [47] tout d’abord, dans d’allaire c. trépanier, [1961] cs 619 (qc), la cour supérieure a conclu que le fait qu’un enfant avait « pris une part active » dans «  une aventure commune risquée  », soit se lancer mutuellement des cailloux entre enfants, était suffi sant pour établir la responsabilité solidaire de tous les participants (p. 620), et ce, bien que la preuve ait permis d’identifi er l’enfant ayant lancé la pierre qui avait cassé les dents de la victime. [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 129 [48] then, in gagné v. monzerolle, [1967] br 899 (que.) (summary), the court of appeal found that a car race was a [translation] “common enterprise” and held that the two drivers who had taken part in it were jointly and severally liable for the death of the victim, with whom they had collided almost simulta- neously. rejecting one defendant’s argument that his car had merely grazed the victim’s vehicle, the court of appeal concluded that “regardless    of whether the death was caused by the fi rst or the second im- pact, [this defendant] is partly responsible” (p 899). [48] par la suite, dans gagné c. monzerolle, [1967] br 899 (qc) (résumé), considérant qu’une course de voitures constituait une « commune entreprise », la cour d’appel a tenu les deux chauffeurs y ayant participé solidairement responsables de la mort de la victime qu’ils avaient heurtée presque simulta- nément. rejetant l’argument d’un des défendeurs qui prétendait n’avoir que frôlé le véhicule de la victime, la cour en est arrivée à la conclusion qu’« il import[ait] peu [  ] que la mort ait été causée par le premier ou le second choc, [ce défendeur ayant] sa part de responsabilité » (p 899). [49] next, in laxton v. sylvestre, [1972] cs 297 (que.), aff’d [1975] ca 648 (que.), the superior court characterized a fi ght between two children who had been trying to grab hold of a needle as a [trans- lation] “collective fault” (p. 299) and found that they were jointly and severally liable even though it was known which child had been holding the needle at the time a third child was stabbed in the eye. [49] par ailleurs, dans laxton c. sylvestre, [1972] cs 297 (qc), conf. par [1975] ca 648 (qc), la cour supérieure a qualifi é de « faute collective » une dispute entre deux enfants qui tentaient de s’emparer d’une aiguille (p. 299), et conclu à leur responsabilité solidaire, en dépit du fait que l’on savait qui tenait l’aiguille au moment où l’œil d’un troisième enfant avait été crevé. [50] as well, in massignani v. veilleux, [1987] rl 247 (que.), an argument between four hunters resulted in two of them being shot either by the other two or by one of the other two. the court of appeal concluded that, [translation] “even if it is assumed that only one of the two appellants fi red the shot or two shots that injured the respondents, the appellants must be found to be jointly and severally liable    . they took part in a common venture that was un- lawful, extremely careless and dangerous” (p 253). [50] dans massignani c. veilleux, [1987] rl 247 (qc), cette fois, à la suite d’une querelle entre quatre chasseurs, deux d’entre eux avaient été blessés par balle soit par deux autres soit par l’un de ceux-ci. la cour d’appel a conclu ainsi : «    même en assumant qu’un seul des deux appelants a tiré le ou les deux coups de feu qui ont blessé les intimés, leur responsabilité solidaire doit être retenue [  ]. les deux appelants se sont engagés dans une aventure commune, illégale, singulièrement imprudente et dangereuse » (p 253). in royale du canada, cie d’assurance  v. [51] légaré, [1991] rjq  91, a case in which a fire started by two children had accidentally spread to a shopping centre, the superior court characterized [translation] “a common act” in which the chil- dren had actively taken part as an “ill- fated venture” (p 95). it accordingly found that they were jointly and severally liable. [51] dans royale du canada, cie d’assurance c. légaré, [1991] rjq 91, une affaire dans laquelle deux enfants avaient allumé un feu qui s’était in- volontairement propagé à un centre commercial, la cour supérieure a qualifi é d’« aventure malheu- reuse » « le fait commun » auquel avaient participé activement ces enfants (p 95). elle a en conséquence retenu leur responsabilité solidaire. [52] finally, in dumont v desjardins, [1994] rra 459 (que. sup. ct.), two children had been shooting at a third child for fun with a pellet gun when the other child suffered an eye injury. although the evidence showed which of the two children had [52] finalement, dans dumont c. desjardins, [1994] rra 459 (cs. qc), deux enfants qui s’amusaient à tirer sur un troisième avec une carabine à plomb l’avaient blessé à l’œil. bien que la preuve ait révélé lequel des deux enfants avait tiré, le juge a lui aussi 130 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. fi red the shot, the judge in that case, too, stated that the [translation] “ill- fated venture” had been “a common act of the two children” (p. 470) and found that they were jointly and severally liable. [53] in each of the above cases, it was established that there was an intention, often tacit, to take part in the wrongful “common venture”. regardless of whether the context was that of children’s games (d’allaire, dumont), fi ghts (laxton, massignani), a car race (gagné) or the starting of a fi re (légaré), the courts found in effect that the defendants had had a common intention to jointly take part in the act that had caused the injury. in addition, the acts alleged against the defendants in those cases had all resulted in a single, easily identifi able injury. [54] it is true that, in all the cases in question ex- cept massignani, the evidence also showed on a balance of probabilities which person had committed the specifi c act that caused the injury. yet this did not preclude the imposition of joint and several liability. however, as the court of appeal rightly observed in the cases at bar, the courts had under the former code applied this “common venture” concept to impose joint and several liability, even where the circumstances generally supported a fi nding of com- mon fault or contributory faults. at the time, there was no need to clearly distinguish the concepts of common venture, common fault and contributory faults, because a single article, art 1106 cclc, applied without distinction to all these possibilities.4 it is therefore important to approach the principles enunciated in those cases with caution, and not to read into the decisions something that was not said. affi rmé dans cette affaire que l’« aventure malheu- reuse » était « le fait commun des deux enfants » (p. 470) et il a conclu à leur responsabilité solidaire. [53] dans chacune de ces affaires, l’existence d’une intention, souvent tacite, de participer à l’« aventure commune » fautive avait été établie. que ce soit dans le cas des jeux d’enfants (d’allaire, dumont), des querelles (laxton, massignani), de la course de voitures (gagné) ou du feu qui avait été allumé (légaré), les tribunaux avaient effectivement décelé une intention commune de la part des défendeurs de participer à l’acte collectif ayant causé le préjudice. en outre, les actes reprochés aux défendeurs dans ces affaires avaient tous entraîné un préjudice unique aisément identifi able. [54] il est vrai que, dans toutes ces affaires, sauf massignani, la preuve révélait aussi quelle personne avait posé le geste précis ayant causé le préjudice se- lon la prépondérance des probabilités. cette consta- tation ne faisait pas échec pour autant à l’imputation d’une responsabilité solidaire. cependant, comme le mentionne avec justesse la cour d’appel en l’espèce, sous le régime de l’ancien code, les tribunaux ont eu recours à cette notion d’« aventure commune » afi n de conclure à la responsabilité solidaire, et ce, même dans des cas où les circonstances permettaient généralement de conclure à l’existence d’une faute commune ou de fautes contributoires. en effet, à cette époque, il n’était pas nécessaire d’établir une distinction claire entre ces divers concepts d’aventure commune, de faute commune ou de fautes contribu- toires, puisqu’un seul article, l’art 1106 ccb-c, s’appliquait indistinctement à tous ces cas de fi gure4. il faut donc aborder avec prudence les enseignements de cette jurisprudence et ne pas lire dans ces déci- sions ce qu’elles ne disent pas. 4 and as can be seen, the terminology used at the time was fl uid: the courts used the terms “common venture”, “common enterprise”, “common act” and “collective fault” interchangeably. 4 on constate d’ailleurs la fl uidité de la terminologie à l’époque : les tribunaux utilisaient de façon interchangeable les termes « aventure commune », « commune entreprise », « fait commun » ou « faute collective ». [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 131 (b) solidarity under the current code for jointly b) la solidarité sous le régime du code actuel taking part in a wrongful act en cas de fait collectif fautif (i) relationship between article 1106 cclc. (i) la relation entre l’art 1106 ccb-c et les and articles 1480 and 1526 ccq. art. 1480 et 1526 ccq. [55] two articles of the current code provide for solidary liability in cases of extracontractual fault. the fi rst, art 1480 ccq, concerns, in part, joint participation in wrongful acts. the common inten- tion and single injury requirements remain, but for the provision to apply, proof that it is impossible to determine who committed the fault that caused the injury is now required. [55] dans le code actuel, deux articles encadrent la responsabilité solidaire en matière de fautes ex- tracontractuelles. le premier, l’art 1480 ccq, vise notamment le fait collectif fautif. l’exigence rela- tive à l’existence d’une intention commune et d’un préjudice unique demeure, mais l’application de la disposition requiert dorénavant la preuve de l’im- possibilité de déterminer l’auteur de la faute ayant causé le préjudice. [56] unlike art. 1106 of the former code, art. 1480 of the new code now expressly provides that a court may not impose solidary liability on persons who have jointly taken part in a wrongful act unless it is impossible to determine which of them actually caused the injury. this requirement is not inherent in the concept of joint participation in a wrongful act, but in light of the article’s wording, it must none- theless now be met in order to justify a fi nding of solidary liability against persons who have jointly taken part in such an act. [56] contrairement à l’art. 1106 de l’ancien code, l’art. 1480 du nouveau code exige désormais expres- sément qu’il soit impossible de déterminer lequel des participants à un fait collectif fautif a effectivement causé le préjudice pour que le tribunal puisse les condamner solidairement. cette exigence ne fait pas partie intégrante de la notion de « fait collectif fau- tif », mais en raison du libellé de la disposition, elle est néanmoins essentielle pour justifi er dorénavant la condamnation solidaire des participants à un fait collectif fautif. [57] the second article, art 1526 ccq, con- cerns a common fault or contributory faults that, here again, caused a single injury (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at nos. 1-720 to 1-722; code civil du québec: annotations — commentaires 2017-2018, at p. 1287; lluelles and moore, at no 2578). it should be mentioned in this regard that art 1526 ccq. imposes solidarity on persons who have committed a common fault or contributory faults even where the evidence shows which person committed the fault that actually caused the injury. thus, it is un- der art 1526 ccq, not under art 1480 ccq, that solidary liability can now be imposed on those who commit common or contributory faults, for which the courts formerly sometimes used the ex- pression “common venture”. of the various cases discussed in the preceding section, massignani is therefore the only one that would likely be covered by art 1480 ccq. the others (d’allaire, gagné, [57] le second, l’art 1526 ccq, vise les fautes communes ou contributoires qui elles aussi causent un préjudice unique (baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nos 1-720 à 1-722; code civil du québec : annotations — commentaires 2017-2018, p. 1287; lluelles et moore, nº 2578). à ce propos, il convient de souligner que l’art 1526 ccq prévoit la solidarité des auteurs d’une faute commune ou de fautes contributoires, et ce, même si la preuve révèle quelle personne a commis la faute qui a effectivement causé le préju- dice. c’est donc en vertu de l’art 1526 ccq que l’on obtient aujourd’hui la condamnation solidaire des auteurs de fautes communes ou contributoires, situations que la jurisprudence antérieure qualifi ait parfois d’« aventures communes », et non par l’en- tremise de l’art 1480 ccq. ainsi, parmi les diverses décisions discutées dans la section précédente, seule l’affaire massignani serait vraisemblablement visée par l’art 1480 ccq. les autres (d’allaire, gagné, 132 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. laxton, légaré and dumont) would now most likely fall within the scope of art 1526 ccq. it follows that, although the current legislative [58] provisions governing extracontractual solidarity do codify the pre- existing case law, it would be wrong to say that all the decisions in which the term “com- mon venture” was used would now automatically fall within the scope of art 1480 ccq. that term was formerly employed in a variety of situations that must now be characterized in different ways. laxton, légaré et dumont) tomberaient fort proba- blement aujourd’hui dans le champ d’application de l’art 1526 ccq. il s’ensuit que, si les dispositions législatives [58] actuelles régissant la solidarité en matière extra- contractuelle codifi ent la jurisprudence antérieure, il serait erroné d’affi rmer que toutes les décisions dans lesquelles était utilisé le terme « aventure com- mune » relèveraient automatiquement aujourd’hui du champ d’application de l’art 1480 ccq. cette terminologie était utilisée antérieurement dans dif- férentes situations qui nécessitent maintenant des qualifi cations distinctes. (ii) case law on joint participation in a wrongful (ii) la jurisprudence en matière de fait collectif act under article 1480 ccq. fautif en vertu de l’art 1480 ccq. [59] that being said, as the trial judge pointed out, [translation] “there are not many cases on the sub- ject of joint participation in a wrongful act” (qccq, at para. 16 (canlii)). neither in its factum nor at the hearing did the city refer us to any decision rendered since the current code came into force that supports its argument characterizing the respondents’ faults as joint participation in a wrongful act. it is easy to understand why, given that the few cases decided under the current code in which courts have found persons who had jointly taken part in wrongful acts to be solidarily liable in an extracontractual context are distinguishable from this appeal. like the persons who had jointly taken part in the wrongful acts at is- sue in the cases decided under the former code, those who had done so in each of the cases decided under the current code shared a common, albeit sometimes tacit, intention, a factor that is sorely lacking in the instant cases. [60] for example, in valois v. giguère, 2006 qccs 1272, the superior court relied on art 1480 ccq. to fi nd three defendants solidarily liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of blows struck by one of them. the plaintiff was not able to identify his assailant from among the three defendants, all of whom admitted taking part in the same fi ght but denied striking the critical blow (paras. 49, 57 and 59 (canlii)). [59] cela dit, comme le fait remarquer le juge de première instance, « la jurisprudence en matière de “fait collectif fautif” n’abonde pas » (qccq, par. 16 (canlii)). de fait, tant dans son mémoire qu’à l’au- dience, la ville ne nous renvoie à aucune décision postérieure à l’entrée en vigueur du code actuel au soutien de son argument qualifi ant les fautes des in- timés de fait collectif fautif. il est aisé de comprendre pourquoi. le contexte des rares décisions rendues sous le régime du code actuel dans lesquelles les tribunaux ont condamné solidairement les auteurs d’un fait collectif fautif en matière extracontractuelle se distinguent de celui du présent pourvoi. en effet, tout comme ceux en cause dans les décisions rendues en vertu de l’ancien code, les participants au fait collectif fautif dans chacune de ces affaires décidées en vertu du code actuel partageaient une intention commune, parfois tacite, facteur qui fait cruellement défaut en l’espèce. [60] par exemple, dans valois c. giguère, 2006 qccs 1272, la cour supérieure s’est appuyée sur l’art.  1480  ccq pour déclarer trois défendeurs solidairement responsables des blessures subies par le demandeur en raison des coups assénés par l’un d’entre eux. le demandeur n’était pas en mesure d’identifi er son agresseur parmi les trois défendeurs, lesquels reconnaissaient avoir participé à la même bagarre, mais niaient tous avoir donné le coup fati- dique (par. 49, 57 et 59 (canlii)). [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 133 [61] similarly, in bamboukian v. karamanoukian, 2014 qcca 2093, the court of appeal affi rmed a decision in which the superior court had imposed solidary liability on the defendants, who had been involved in two assaults committed a few hours apart for the purpose of settling a personal score. even though the assaults had been committed by differ- ent persons, it was impossible to specifi cally link the injuries to one of the assaults, and the evidence showed that the two incidents were closely related (paras. 4-5 (canlii)). [61] de même, dans bamboukian c karama- noukian, 2014 qcca 2093, la cour d’appel a con- fi rmé une décision de la cour supérieure retenant la responsabilité solidaire des défendeurs impliqués dans deux agressions qui avaient eu lieu à quelques heures d’intervalle pour régler un compte personnel. même si les agressions avaient été le fait de per- sonnes différentes, il était impossible de rattacher les blessures à une agression en particulier et les deux événements étaient étroitement liés selon la preuve (par. 4-5 (canlii)). [62] finally, in roy v privé, 2017 qccs 986, the superior court held a defendant liable for the whole of the injuries caused to the plaintiff, who had been attacked simultaneously by two people, each of whom had struck him (paras. 69-70 (canlii)). [62] enfi n, dans roy c. privé, 2017 qccs 986, la cour supérieure a tenu un défendeur responsable de l’ensemble des blessures causées au demandeur, qui avait été attaqué en même temps par deux per- sonnes lui ayant chacune asséné un coup (par. 69-70 (canlii)). (iii) common intention requirement (iii) la nécessaire existence d’une intention com- [63] as the above decisions show, the existence of a common intention is required for the concept of joint participation in a wrongful act in the con- text of the new scheme of art 1480 ccq, just as it was for the common venture concept in that of the former scheme. this intention may be tacit, of course, but at the very least, the defendant must have been aware of the acts or omissions that con- stituted the wrongful act and must have intended to take part in them. like the other constituent ele- ments of civil liability, a common intention must be proved on a balance of probabilities (arts. 2803 and 2804 ccq). it can often be inferred — in accord- ance with the rule governing presumptions of fact set out in art 2849 ccq — from the very fact of taking part in the impugned acts. mune [63] comme en témoignent ces décisions, au même titre que la notion d’aventure commune sous l’ancien régime, la notion de fait collectif fautif prévue sous le nouveau régime de l’art.  1480  ccq requiert l’existence d’une intention commune. celle-ci peut certes être tacite, mais il faut à tout le moins que le défendeur ait eu connaissance des faits ou omissions ayant constitué le fait collectif fautif et ait entendu y participer. comme les autres éléments constitutifs de la responsabilité civile, cette intention commune doit être prouvée selon la prépondérance des probabili- tés (art. 2803 et 2804 ccq). souvent, elle pourra s’inférer du fait même de la participation aux actes reprochés, selon la règle qui régit les présomptions de fait de l’art 2849 ccq. [64] in determining whether there was a common intention, a court should avoid defi ning the wrong- ful act so broadly that the common intention no longer bears any relation to reality. for example, in assurances générales des caisses desjardins inc., the court of québec declined to apply art 1480 ccq. and to fi nd two defendants solidarily liable for an in- jury caused by arson. the defendants had robbed an apartment together, but one of them had on his own [64] pour déterminer si cette intention commune existe, le tribunal doit par ailleurs éviter de défi nir trop largement le fait collectif fautif, d’une façon qui priverait l’intention commune de toute réalité. par exemple, dans assurances générales des caisses desjardins inc., la cour du québec a refusé d’ap- pliquer l’art 1480 ccq et de déclarer deux défen- deurs solidairement responsables du préjudice causé par un incendie criminel. les défendeurs avaient 134 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. set fi re to the building. the court of québec found that the [translation] “wrongful act committed jointly by [the two defendants] was the robbery, not the fi re” (para 37). it accordingly declined to impose solidary liability on the other defendant, who had “not take[n] part in or consent[ed] to this specifi c wrongful act” (ibid). in this regard, the concept of joint partici- [65] pation in a wrongful act under art 1480 ccq is comparable to the “concerted action” concept of the common law (see fullowka v. pinkerton’s of canada ltd., 2010 scc 5, [2010] 1 scr 132, at para 154). the british columbia supreme court in fact con- sidered the joint and several liability of rioters in a context very similar to the one at issue in this appeal in icbc v. stanley cup rioters, 2016 bcsc 1108, a recent case to which the city refers in its factum. the spontaneous riot in question in that case had also occurred following a playoff hockey game, this time in vancouver, and had resulted in acts of vandalism against a number of cars. [66] in that case, the plaintiff insurance corporation asked that all the identifi ed rioters be held jointly liable for the whole of the damage done during the riot to all the vehicles insured by it. in the alterna- tive, it asked that the rioters who had contributed to the damage done to each individual vehicle be held jointly liable. after fi nding that the fi rst conclusion was too broad to be granted, the british columbia supreme court accepted the second, but only where the facts showed that rioters had taken part in a con- certed action in relation to a specifi c vehicle. thus, where rioters had joined forces to fl ip a car over or had otherwise acted in concert with other individuals who were vandalizing a vehicle at the same time as them, the court held them jointly liable. commis ensemble un vol dans un logement, mais un seul d’entre eux avait mis le feu à l’immeuble. la cour du québec a considéré que le « fait collectif fautif commis par [les deux défendeurs], c’[était] le vol, non l’incendie » (par 37). par conséquent, il a refusé de condamner solidairement l’autre défen- deur, qui n’avait « pas participé ni consenti à cet acte fautif précis » (ibid). [65] la notion de « fait collectif fautif » énoncée à l’art 1480 ccq se compare du reste à la notion d’« action concertée » (« concerted action ») de la common law (voir fullowka c pinkerton’s of canada ltd., 2010 csc 5, [2010] 1 rcs 132, par 154). dans icbc c. stanley cup rioters, 2016 bcsc 1108, décision récente dont la ville fait état dans son mémoire, la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique s’est d’ailleurs prononcée sur la ques- tion de la responsabilité solidaire d’émeutiers dans un contexte très similaire à celui qui nous occupe. l’émeute spontanée qui était au cœur du débat s’était elle aussi déroulée à la suite d’un match de hockey des séries éliminatoires, à vancouver dans ce cas-là, et elle avait donné lieu à des actes de vandalisme contre plusieurs voitures. [66] dans cette affaire, la société d’assurance de- manderesse sollicitait la condamnation solidaire de tous les émeutiers identifi és, et ce, à l’égard de tous les dommages causés pendant l’émeute à l’ensemble des véhicules qu’elle assurait. subsidiairement, elle demandait la condamnation solidaire des émeutiers qui avaient participé aux dommages causés à chaque véhicule. après avoir conclu que la première conclu- sion recherchée était trop large pour y faire droit, la cour suprême de la colombie- britannique a ac- cueilli la seconde, mais uniquement lorsque les faits démontraient que les émeutiers avaient participé à une action concertée au regard d’un véhicule particu- lier. elle a en conséquence condamné solidairement des émeutiers qui avaient uni leurs forces pour ren- verser une voiture ou autrement agi de concert avec d’autres personnes qui vandalisaient un véhicule en même temps qu’eux. [67] the trial judge who decided the cases at bar likewise imposed solidary liability on rioters who had acted together to set fi re to an individual vehicle [67] en l’espèce, le juge d’instance a lui aussi condamné solidairement des émeutiers qui, ensemble, avaient incendié un véhicule (2014 qccq 4921, [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 135 (2014 qccq 4921, at paras. 98-105 (canlii); 2014 qccq 4917, at paras. 51-58 (canlii); 2014 qccq 4918, at paras. 59-68 (canlii)), or had shattered a vehicle’s windows (2014 qccq 4923, at paras. 58- 62 (canlii)). in each of those cases, the defendants actually had a common intention to do damage to the patrol car in question. however, the trial judge found those rioters solidarily liable under art 1526 ccq. — not art 1480 ccq — because there was no un- certainty about the identities of the persons who had committed the fault that caused the injury. par. 98-105 (canlii); 2014 qccq 4917, par. 51-58 (canlii); 2014 qccq 4918, par. 59-68 (canlii)), ou en avaient fracassé les vitres (2014 qccq 4923, par. 58-62 (canlii)). dans ces cas-là, il y avait effec- tivement eu une intention commune de la part des dé- fendeurs d’endommager l’auto- patrouille ciblée. le juge d’instance a toutefois condamné solidairement ces émeutiers sur la base de l’art 1526 ccq — et non de l’art 1480 ccq —, vu l’absence d’incerti- tude quant à l’identité des personnes ayant commis la faute qui avait causé le préjudice. (c) application of the relevant principles to the c) l’application des principes pertinents aux instant cases présents dossiers [68] as the trial judge concluded, the specific circumstances of the cases at issue in this appeal simply do not show that the respondents acted with a common intention, either express or tacit. there is no doubt that groups formed in the course of the riot. but the trial judge held in analyzing the evi- dence that this was not true where the respondents were concerned. with a few exceptions, which the judge rightly dealt with differently, the respondents did not know and were never in contact with one another, and their acts were committed at different times during the riot without the knowledge of the other respondents. here again, these are fi ndings of fact that are not open to review on appeal unless a palpable and overriding error was made in making them (housen v. nikolaisen, 2002 scc 33, [2002] 2 scr 235, at para 10). they are valid regardless of whether the wrongful act was participation in the riot or participation in the total destruction of a vehi- cle. from either standpoint, the faults committed by the respondents did not amount to joint participation in a wrongful act if the respondents had no common intention or their faults did not cause a single injury. [68] comme a conclu le juge d’instance, les cir- constances particulières des dossiers en cause dans ce pourvoi ne démontrent tout simplement pas que les intimés ont agi dans une intention commune, ex- presse ou tacite. il ne fait pas de doute que certains groupes se sont formés au cours de l’émeute. le premier juge a toutefois conclu de son analyse de la preuve que ce n’était pas le cas des intimés. sauf rares exceptions, que le juge a à juste titre traitées différemment, les intimés ne se connaissaient pas, n’ont jamais été en communication et ont agi à des moments différents au cours de l’émeute, sans que les autres intimés en aient connaissance. il s’agit encore une fois de conclusions de fait, qui ne peuvent être révisées en appel en l’absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante à cet égard (housen c. nikolaisen, 2002 csc 33, [2002] 2 rcs 235, par 10). ces conclusions demeurent valides, peu importe que le fait collectif fautif soit la participation à l’émeute ou la participation à la destruction totale d’un véhicule. considérées sous un angle ou sous l’autre, les fautes commises par les intimés ne s’inscrivent pas dans un fait collectif fautif en l’absence d’intention commune de la part de ces derniers ou de préjudice unique causé par leurs fautes. [69] it is true that, as the court of appeal indicated in bamboukian, the participants need not have acted simultaneously for a court to fi nd that they jointly took part in a wrongful act. be that as it may, the plaintiff must be able to prove, at the very least, the existence of a tacit common intention. the city has not shown that the judge made a palpable and [69] bien sûr, comme le rappelle la cour d’appel dans bamboukian, il n’est pas nécessaire que les participants aient agi en même temps pour qu’un tri- bunal puisse conclure à l’existence d’un fait collectif fautif. le demandeur doit néanmoins être en mesure de prouver, à tout le moins, l’existence d’une inten- tion commune tacite. or, la ville n’a pas démontré 136 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. overriding error in fi nding that the rioters who had contributed to the damage done to a given patrol car at various times during the riot did not have such an intention. [70] it follows that, for two compelling reasons, the respondents cannot be found solidarily liable under art 1480 ccq. first, it is possible to establish a causal connection between each of the respondents’ faults and a specifi c injury. second, the faults of the respondents involved in each of the actions instituted by the city did not constitute joint participation in a wrongful act given that the respondents in question did not have a common intention. having said that, i wish to be clear that art 1478 ccq and art. 328 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501, have no impact on this analysis. they apply where, after a fi nding of solidarity has been made, liability must be apportioned among persons who caused a single injury. the trial judge and the court of appeal were right not to take them into account here. que le juge a commis une erreur manifeste et déter- minante en concluant à l’absence d’une telle inten- tion commune entre les émeutiers qui ont participé aux dommages causés à une auto- patrouille à divers moments au cours de l’émeute. [70] il s’ensuit qu’ici, l’art 1480 ccq ne per- met pas de conclure à la responsabilité solidaire des intimés, et ce, pour deux raisons décisives. premièrement, il est possible d’établir un lien de causalité entre les fautes des intimés et un préjudice précis. deuxièmement, les fautes des intimés dans chacune des actions intentées par la ville ne consti- tuent pas un fait collectif fautif en l’absence d’in- tention commune de la part des intimés. cela étant, je précise que les art 1478 ccq et 328 du code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501, n’ont aucun impact sur la présente analyse. ces dispositions s’ap- pliquent là où il est nécessaire, une fois la solidarité établie, de partager la responsabilité entre les auteurs d’un même préjudice. le juge de première instance et les juges de la cour d’appel ont eu raison de ne pas en tenir compte ici. b article 1526 ccq. b l’article 1526 ccq. [71] the city further argues that, if the respondents cannot be found solidarily liable under art. 1480 ccq, they can be under art 1526 ccq: [71] dans la mesure où la responsabilité solidaire des intimés ne découlerait pas de l’art 1480 ccq, la ville soutient ensuite qu’elle prendrait alors sa source dans l’art 1526 ccq : 1526 the obligation to make reparation for injury caused to another through the fault of two or more persons is solidary where the obligation is extra- contractual. 1526 l’obligation de réparer le préjudice causé à autrui par la faute de deux personnes ou plus est solidaire, lorsque cette obligation est extracontractuelle. [72] for this article to apply, the fault of two or more persons must have caused a single injury. this fault may be a common fault or may consist of con- tributory faults. on this point, the city argues that the mutual encouragement on the rioters’ part con- tributed to the aggregate injury it suffered, that is, the total destruction of the patrol cars. in the city’s opinion, the courts below erred in law in character- izing the injury, which must be assessed as a whole rather than being split into separate portions. [72] pour que cet article trouve application, la faute de deux personnes ou plus doit avoir causé un préju- dice unique. il peut s’agir d’une faute commune ou de fautes contributoires. à cet égard, la ville avance que les encouragements mutuels des émeutiers au- raient contribué au préjudice global subi, soit la des- truction totale des autos- patrouilles. selon elle, les cours inférieures ont commis une erreur de droit dans la qualifi cation du préjudice subi, lequel doit être évalué de façon globale plutôt que fractionnée. in my view, the city is mistaken. although its [73] argument is purportedly one of an alleged error of [73] j’estime que la ville se méprend. sous le cou- vert d’une prétendue erreur de droit au titre de la [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 137 law in characterizing the injury, what it is really seek- ing is, here again, to have this court revisit the trial judge’s fi ndings of fact on the injury actually caused by each of the respondents’ faults. in so doing, the city is also disregarding the trial judge’s fi ndings of fact to the effect that the respondents’ faults were separate. given that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error that would taint his fi nding that a single injury did not result from the respondents’ separate faults, there is no reason to intervene. qualifi cation du préjudice subi, cet argument invite lui aussi en défi nitive notre cour à réévaluer les conclusions factuelles du juge d’instance au sujet du préjudice effectivement causé par chacune des fautes des intimés. ce faisant, la ville fait en outre abstraction des conclusions de fait du juge d’instance portant que les fautes des intimés sont distinctes. or, en l’absence d’erreur manifeste et déterminante qui entacherait la conclusion du premier juge selon laquelle il n’existe pas de préjudice unique découlant des fautes distinctes des intimés, il n’y a pas lieu d’intervenir. (1) no single injury (1) l’absence d’unicité du préjudice [74] article 1526 ccq provides for solidarity in the case of persons who have, by committing a com- mon fault or contributory faults, caused one and the same injury to another person (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at nos. 1-720 to 1-722; code civil du québec: annotations — commentaires 2017-2018, at p. 1287; lluelles and moore, at no 2578). it is of the very essence of extracontractual solidarity that the debtors be obligated to the creditor for “the same thing” (art 1523 ccq;. lluelles and moore, at no. 2577; see also m. tancelin, des obligations en droit mixte du québec (7th ed. 2009), at no 1388). the injury contemplated in art 1526 ccq is there- fore subject to the requirement that there be a single injury. [75] in the instant cases, the trial judge determined that there was no causal connection between each respondent’s participation in the riot and the total destruction of the patrol cars. rather, he found that there were many distinct and identifi able injuries, each caused by a fault that was just as distinct and identifi able, and that he linked to a particular rioter. he assessed the precise damage caused by the re- spondents’ faults and determined the amount of the award against each of them on that basis. in the case of defendants hunter and côté béliveau, for exam- ple, he found that the video evidence made it possible to determine exactly what damage was caused by each of their respective wrongful acts (2014 qccq 4916, at paras. 56-67 (canlii)). this constitutes a clear distinction between the case of those defend- ants and that of defendants gauchier and casimir, in [74] l’article 1526 ccq prévoit la solidarité des personnes qui ont causé un même et unique préju- dice à autrui par leur faute commune ou leurs fautes contributoires (baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nºs 1-720 à 1-722; code civil du québec : annota- tions — commentaires 2017-2018, p. 1287; lluelles et moore, nº 2578). il est de l’essence même de la solidarité en matière extracontractuelle que les dé- biteurs soient obligés à « une même chose » envers le créancier (art 1523 ccq;. lluelles et moore, nº 2577; voir aussi m. tancelin, des obligations en droit mixte du québec (7e éd. 2009), no 1388). le préjudice visé par l’art 1526 ccq est donc assujetti à la condition d’unicité. [75] en l’espèce, le premier juge a déterminé qu’il n’y avait pas de lien de causalité entre la participa- tion de chacun des intimés à l’émeute et la destruc- tion totale des autos- patrouilles. il a plutôt conclu à l’existence d’une multitude de préjudices distincts et identifi ables, chacun d’eux ayant été causé par une faute tout aussi distincte et identifi able qu’il a rattachée à un émeutier particulier. il a évalué le dommage précis causé par ces fautes des intimés et établi le montant de la condamnation de chacun en conséquence. par exemple, dans le cas des défen- deurs hunter et côté béliveau, il a estimé que la preuve vidéo permettait de déterminer le dommage précis causé par chacun de leurs actes fautifs res- pectifs (2014 qccq 4916, par. 56-67 (canlii)). ce constat constitue une différence déterminante entre le cas de ces défendeurs et celui des défendeurs 138 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. which the only conclusion he could draw from the police offi cer’s report and testimony was that the lat- ter were indistinctly responsible for the whole of the damage done to the patrol cars (2014 qccq 4923, at paras 55-62). the fact that there was a single injury caused by the common fault of these defendants thus justifi ed their being held solidarily liable. [76] at the risk of repeating myself, the question whether there is a causal connection between a fault and damage is one of fact, and the city has not iden- tifi ed a palpable and overriding error made by the trial judge in this regard. this court recently noted that in such cases, “given its position at the second level of appeal, this court’s role is not to reassess the fi ndings of fact of a judge at the trial level that an appellate court has not questioned: ‘   the principle of non- intervention “is all the stronger in the face of concurrent fi ndings of both courts below”   ’” (que- bec (director of criminal and penal prosecutions) v. jodoin, 2017 scc 26, [2017] 1 scr 478, at para. 51, quoting st- jean, at para. 45, in turn quoting ontario (attorney general) v. bear island founda- tion, [1991] 2 scr 570, at p 574). the trial judge did not fi nd a suffi cient causal connection that gave rise to liability, that is, a “logical, direct and imme- diate” connection, between each of the faults and the whole of the damage done to a given vehicle (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no. 1-683; quebec (commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. bombardier inc. (bombardier aerospace training center), 2015 scc 39, [2015] 2 scr 789, at para. 50; hinse v. canada (attorney general), 2015 scc 35, [2015] 2 scr 621, at para 132). at most, the respondents’ faults con- tributed to the context in which the patrol cars were subsequently destroyed. the cause of the damage must be distinguished from the circumstances or the occasion of the damage (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no. 1-687; dallaire v. paul- émile martel inc., [1989] 2 scr 419, at p. 427; mont réal (ville) v. tarquini, [2001] rjq 1405 (ca), at p 1427). gauchier et casimir, où la seule conclusion qu’il pouvait tirer du rapport et du témoignage du policier était que ces derniers étaient indistinctement res- ponsables de l’ensemble des dommages causés aux autos- patrouilles (2014 qccq 4923, par 55-62). l’unicité du préjudice causé par la faute commune de ces défendeurs a en conséquence justifi é leur condamnation solidaire. [76] au risque de me répéter, l’existence ou non d’un lien de causalité entre une faute et un dommage est une question factuelle et la ville n’a pas démontré d’erreur manifeste et déterminante du premier juge à cet égard. notre cour a récemment rappelé que, dans de tels cas, « comme deuxième palier d’ap- pel, [notre] rôle n’est pas de réévaluer les constats de faits des juges d’instance que les cours d’appel n’ont pas remis en question : “   le principe de non- intervention ‘a d’autant plus de force en pré- sence de conclusions concourantes des deux cours d’instance inférieure’   ” » (québec (directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales) c. jodoin, 2017 csc 26, [2017] 1  rcs  478, par.  51, citant st- jean, par. 45, qui cite ontario (procureur général) c. bear island foundation, [1991] 2 rcs 570, p 574-575). le premier juge n’a pas trouvé de lien causal générateur de responsabilité suffi sant — soit un lien « logique, direc[t] et immédia[t] » — entre chacune des fautes et la totalité des dommages cau- sés à un véhicule (baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 1-683; québec (commission des droits de la per- sonne et des droits de la jeunesse) c. bombardier inc. (bombardier aéronautique centre de forma- tion), 2015 csc 39, [2015] 2 rcs 789, par. 50; hinse c. canada (procureur général), 2015 csc 35, [2015] 2 rcs 621, par 132). les fautes des inti- més ont, tout au plus, contribué au contexte dans le- quel la destruction subséquente des autos- patrouilles est survenue. or, il convient de distinguer la cause du dommage, d’une part, des circonstances ou de l’occasion de celui-ci d’autre part (baudouin, des- lauriers et moore, nº 1-687; dallaire c. paul- émile martel inc., [1989] 2  rcs  419, p.  427; mont- réal (ville) c. tarquini, [2001] rjq 1405 (ca), p 1427). [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 139 (2) trial judge’s analysis on the issue of punitive (2) l’analyse du juge d’instance relative aux damages dommages- intérêts punitifs [77] nevertheless, the city argues that the trial judge found that the respondents’ acts had caused the whole of the injury for which it seeks to be compen- sated. in support of this argument, it focuses on one sentence from the judge’s discussion on the issue of punitive damages. in the course of that discussion, the judge noted that the events of april 21, 2008 were [translation] “[a] spontaneous reaction fuelled by shouts of encouragement that prodded each new person to do something worse” (2014 qccq 4921, at para. 83 (emphasis added)). he went on to strongly condemn the widespread destruction that had occurred. the city concludes from this that the encouragement in itself constituted a fault that had, in addition to each rioter’s specifi c wrongful acts, contributed to the aggregate damage done to the patrol cars. [78] with respect, i fi nd that the city is disregard- ing part of what the trial judge said, although his reasons are in fact clear on this point. in his discus- sion regarding causation, the judge expressly stated that [translation] “[i]n this case, there is no causal connection between participation in the riot and the damage done to the police vehicles” (qccq, at para 45). where there is no legally suffi cient causal connection between an act, even a wrongful one, and damage, the act does not give rise to liability under art 1457 ccq. this means that participation in the riot, despite being blameworthy, cannot in itself be viewed as a contributory fault giving rise to liability for the whole of the damage done during the riot. [77] malgré ce qui précède, la ville plaide que le juge d’instance a reconnu que les gestes des intimés ont causé le préjudice total dont elle veut être in- demnisée. pour appuyer son argument, elle insiste sur une phrase tirée de l’analyse du juge relative aux dommages- intérêts punitifs. dans le contexte de cette analyse, le juge note que les événements du 21 avril 2008 constituaient « [u]ne réaction sponta- née, alimentée par des encouragements qui poussent le prochain à faire pire » (2014 qccq 4921, par. 83 (je souligne)). il poursuit en condamnant vigoureu- sement le saccage généralisé qui a eu lieu. la ville en conclut que ces encouragements constitueraient en soi une faute ayant contribué, au- delà des gestes fautifs précis de chaque émeutier, au dommage glo- bal causé aux autos- patrouilles. [78] avec égards, j’estime que la ville fait une lecture tronquée des motifs du premier juge, qui sont pourtant clairs sur la question. dans son analyse du lien de causalité, le juge indique en effet expressé- ment qu’« [e]n l’espèce, il n’y a pas de lien causal entre la participation à l’émeute et les dommages subis aux véhicules de police » (qccq, par 45). or, un acte, même fautif, qui n’est pas rattaché à un dommage par un lien de causalité juridiquement suffi sant n’est pas générateur de responsabilité aux termes de l’art 1457 ccq. aussi, malgré le carac- tère répréhensible de ce geste, on ne peut considérer que la participation à l’émeute constitue en soi une faute contributoire dont découlerait une responsabi- lité pour l’ensemble des dommages causés à cette occasion. [79] moreover, the context of the judge’s discussion on punitive damages was quite different from that of his discussion on causation. under art 1621 ccq, he had to assess punitive damages so as to fulfi ll their preventive purpose, and he had to do so in light of all the relevant circumstances. in these cases, the circumstances in question included the unlawful conduct being denounced, the gratuitous vandalism that had been committed and the general disapproval of such acts. the judge certainly considered all these [79] l’analyse du juge portant sur les dommages- intérêts punitifs s’inscrit d’ailleurs dans un tout autre contexte que celui de la détermination du lien de causalité. selon l’art 1621 ccq, il doit évaluer ces dommages pour assurer leur fonction préventive. pour ce faire, il doit les apprécier en tenant compte de toutes les circonstances pertinentes. constituent de telles circonstances, dans les cas qui nous occupent, le comportement illicite décrié, le contexte du van- dalisme gratuit qui a été perpétré et la réprobation 140 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. circumstances in assessing the punitive damages, which are not in issue in this appeal. yet he nev- ertheless held that there was no causal connection between participation in the riot and the aggregate damage done to the patrol cars.5 [80] on this point, i note that, while it is true that a fault that is not causally connected to the damage in question cannot ground an obligation to make reparation for the injury, it can nonetheless form the basis for an award of punitive damages. punitive damages are not subject to the compensatory logic of the civil liability system. nor does it really matter if a trial judge characterizes the fault on which an award of compensatory damages is based differently than the conduct that grounds an award of punitive damages. in de montigny v. brossard (succession), 2010 scc 51, [2010] 3 scr 64, this court put an end to a longstanding judicial difference of opin- ion and held that punitive damages are autonomous in nature (paras. 40-46; baudouin, deslauriers and moore, no. 1-388; s. grammond, “un nouveau dé- part pour les dommages- intérêts punitifs” (2012), 42 rgd 105, at pp. 109-10; see also richard v. time inc., 2012 scc 8, [2012] 1 scr 265, at pa- ras 144-47). punitive damages can thus be awarded in relation to a fault even if compensatory damages have not been awarded in respect of it. générale dont sont l’objet les agissements de ce genre. le juge a certes retenu l’ensemble de ces cir- constances pour évaluer les dommages- intérêts pu- nitifs, qui ne sont pas remis en question devant nous. malgré tout, il a néanmoins statué qu’il n’y avait pas de lien de causalité entre la participation à l’émeute et le dommage global causé aux autos- patrouilles5. [80] je rappelle à ce sujet que si une faute qu’aucun lien de causalité ne rattache au dommage invoqué ne peut fonder une obligation de réparer le préjudice, elle peut néanmoins justifi er l’octroi de dommages- intérêts punitifs. en effet, de tels dommages- intérêts n’obéissent pas à la logique compensatoire du régime de responsabilité civile. il importe d’ailleurs peu que le juge de première instance qualifi e différemment la faute qui justifi e l’octroi des dommages- intérêts compensatoires du comportement qui justifi e l’oc- troi des dommages- intérêts punitifs. dans l’arrêt de montigny c. brossard (succession), 2010 csc 51, [2010] 3 rcs 64, notre cour a mis fi n à une longue controverse jurisprudentielle et consacré le caractère autonome des dommages- intérêts puni- tifs (par. 40-46; baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nº 1-388; s. grammond, « un nouveau départ pour les dommages- intérêts punitifs » (2012), 42 rgd 105, p. 109-110; voir aussi richard c. time inc., 2012 csc 8, [2012] 1 rcs 265, par 144-147). des dommages- intérêts de cette nature peuvent ainsi être octroyés même en l’absence d’une condamnation à payer des dommages- intérêts compensatoires en relation avec la faute qui les concerne. (3) respondents’ separate faults (3) les fautes distinctes des intimés [81] finally, the trial judge was right in law in char- acterizing the respondents’ faults as separate faults rather than as common or contributory faults. for it to be possible to characterize faults as a “common fault” or “contributory faults”, and for them to lead to the application of art 1526 ccq, they must have caused or contributed to a single injury (baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at nos.  1-720 to 1-721; code civil du québec: annotations — commentaires [81] enfi n, le juge de première instance s’est bien dirigé en droit en qualifi ant les fautes des intimés non pas de fautes communes ou de fautes contri- butoires mais plutôt de fautes distinctes. en effet, des fautes doivent avoir causé ou contribué à causer un préjudice unique pour qu’il soit possible de les qualifi er de « faute commune » ou « fautes contri- butoires » et pour qu’elles entraînent l’application de l’art.  1526  ccq (baudouin, deslauriers et 5 i leave it to the reader to judge whether my intention here is to place what the trial judge said in its context or whether, as my colleague maintains (at para. 116), i am instead suggesting that certain of his conclusions be disregarded. 5 je laisse au lecteur le soin d’apprécier si mon propos situe dans son contexte la teneur de l’analyse du premier juge ou si je suggère plutôt d’ignorer certaines de ses conclusions comme le soutient ma collègue (par 116). [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 141 2017-2018, at p 1287). these cases do not involve such faults. [82] from this perspective, the city’s assertion that the respondents’ fault consists in their taking part in the total destruction of a patrol car during the riot refl ects an error in its reasoning. to say that the fault lies in taking part in the total destruction of a vehicle is to characterize the fault not on the basis of the impugned act, but by taking the fi nal injury suffered by the victim as the starting point. this approach of retrospectively characterizing the fault solely on the basis of the injury the victim suffered as a result of a series of wrongful acts is inappropriate, as it disregards a central element of extracontractual liability: causation. by logical extension, it would be possible to recharacterize every one of a series of faults that injure a single victim. it would then suffi ce to say that the fault consists in taking part in the aggregate injury suffered by the victim. but such an approach would be contrary to the requirement under art 1457 ccq that causation be established. [83] in summary, the trial judge did not make a palpable and overriding error in fi nding that there was no causal connection between the respondents’ faults and the whole of the damage done to each patrol car. the city cannot take his remarks about punitive damages out of context and use them to contradict his clear fi nding that there was no causal connection. in the end, given the fi nding of fact that each of the faults had caused a specifi c injury, it was inevitable that the faults would be characterized as being successive and separate. article 1526 ccq. is therefore inapplicable. moore, nos 1-720 à 1-721; code civil du québec : annotations — commentaires 2017-2018, p 1287). nous ne sommes pas en présence de telles fautes ici. [82] sous ce rapport, l’affi rmation de la ville selon laquelle la faute des intimés est le fait d’avoir participé à la destruction totale d’une auto- patrouille dans le cadre de l’émeute traduit une erreur de raisonnement. affi rmer que la faute réside dans la participation à la destruction totale du véhicule revient à qualifi er la faute non pas en fonction de l’acte reproché, mais en prenant comme point de départ le préjudice fi nal subi par la victime. cette qualifi cation rétrospective de la faute, exclusivement sur la base du préjudice subi par la victime à la suite d’une série d’actes fautifs, ne constitue pas une approche appropriée, car elle se trouve à faire abstraction d’un élément central de la responsabilité extracontractuelle : le lien de causalité. suivant cette logique, il serait possible de requalifi er toutes les fautes successives qui portent préjudice à une même victime. il suffi rait alors d’affi rmer que la faute est la participation au préjudice global subi par la victime. or, une telle approche serait contraire à la condition exigeant l’établissement du lien de causalité requis par l’art 1457 ccq. [83] somme toute, le juge de première instance n’a pas commis d’erreur manifeste et déterminante en concluant à l’absence de lien de causalité entre les fautes des intimés et la totalité des dommages causés à chaque auto- patrouille. la ville ne peut pas utiliser hors contexte les commentaires de ce dernier relativement aux dommages- intérêts punitifs afi n de contredire sa conclusion claire concernant cette absence de lien causal. au fi nal, vu la conclu- sion factuelle portant que chacune des fautes avait causé un préjudice précis, il était inévitable que les fautes soient qualifi ées de successives et distinctes. l’article 1526 ccq est dès lors inapplicable. c obligation in solidum c l’obligation in solidum [84] the city’s fi nal argument is that the respond- ents are liable to it in solidum. the city did not make this argument in the courts below, but raised it for the fi rst time in this court. i cannot accept this last- ditch proposition. [84] la ville soutient en dernier lieu que les inti- més seraient responsables in solidum envers elle. la ville n’a pas invoqué cet argument devant les juri- dictions inférieures. elle le soulève pour la première fois devant notre cour. je ne peux souscrire à cette proposition de dernier ressort. 142 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. in the civil law, the obligation in solidum is [85] a judicial creation that, though distinct from sol- idarity, has the same fundamental effects as it. in circumstances in which such an obligation exists, one of its effects is to allow a creditor to seek to obtain the full amount of an award from any one of the debtors (baudouin and jobin, at no.  618; prévost- masson v. general trust of canada, 2001 scc 87, [2001] 3 scr 882, at para 29). so far, the circumstances in which the authors and the courts have agreed on the applicability of liability in solidum have been very different from those of the instant cases (see vézina and langevin, at p 129). these circumstances have, for example, involved liability of two parties for a single injury caused by both contractual and extracontractual faults (gilles e néron communication marketing inc. v. chambre des notaires du québec, 2004 scc 53, [2004] 3 scr 95, at para. 79; dostie v. sabourin, [2000] rjq 1026 (ca), at para. 72), liability for abnormal neighbourhood annoyances (homans v. gestion paroi inc., 2017 qcca 480, at paras. 161- 64 (canlii)) and liability for non- performance of separate contracts (prévost- masson, at para 33). however, neither the academic literature nor the case law includes cases or examples in which the principles related to the obligation in solidum have been applied to faults that are, as in the instant cases, exclusively extracontractual. [86] the reason for this is obvious. unlike in cases involving separate contractual faults or faults that are both contractual and extracontractual, the sol- idarity of debtors who have committed extracon- tractual faults is governed by a complete legislative framework set out in arts. 1480 and 1526 ccq. (see vézina and langevin, at p 129). in solomon v. québec (procureur général), 2008 qcca 1832, [2008] rjq 2127, the court of appeal in fact relied on the comprehensive nature of the solidarity scheme created by these two articles in cases of extracon- tractual fault to conclude that the debtors’ solidarity did not extend to punitive damages (paras 192-95)6 [85] en droit civil, l’obligation in solidum est une création jurisprudentielle qui, bien que distincte de la solidarité, en reproduit les effets fondamentaux. dans les circonstances où elle trouve application, elle permet notamment à un créancier de s’adresser indifféremment à l’un ou l’autre de ses débiteurs pour obtenir la condamnation recherchée pour le tout (bau- douin et jobin, no 618; prévost- masson c. trust gé- néral du canada, 2001 csc 87, [2001] 3 rcs 882, par 29). jusqu’à maintenant, la doctrine et la jurispru- dence ont reconnu l’application de la responsabilité in solidum dans des circonstances fort différentes de celles qui nous occupent (voir vézina et langevin, p 129). représentent de telles circonstances, par exemple, la responsabilité des coauteurs d’un pré- judice unique causé par des fautes contractuelles et extracontractuelles (gilles e. néron communication marketing inc. c. chambre des notaires du québec, 2004 csc 53, [2004] 3 rcs 95, par. 79; dostie c. sabourin, [2000] rjq 1026 (ca), par. 72), la res- ponsabilité découlant d’inconvénients anormaux de voisinage (homans c. gestion paroi inc., 2017 qcca 480, par. 161-164 (canlii)), ou encore la responsa- bilité résultant de l’inexécution de contrats distincts (prévost- masson, par 33). par contre, ni la doctrine ni la jurisprudence ne font état de cas ou d’exemples où l’on aurait appliqué les principes de l’obligation in solidum en matière de fautes exclusivement extra- contractuelles comme en l’espèce. [86] cela peut s’expliquer aisément. en effet, con- trairement aux situations qui mettent en cause des fautes contractuelles distinctes ou des fautes à la fois contractuelles et extracontractuelles, le législateur a établi aux art. 1480 et 1526 ccq un cadre légis- latif complet pour régir la solidarité des débiteurs qui ont commis des fautes extracontractuelles (voir vézina et langevin, p 129). dans l’arrêt solomon c. québec (procureur général), 2008 qcca 1832, [2008] rjq 2127, le caractère exhaustif du régime de solidarité établi par ces deux articles en cas de fautes extracontractuelles a d’ailleurs guidé la cour d’appel dans sa conclusion selon laquelle la soli- darité des débiteurs ne s’étend pas aux dommages- intérêts punitifs (par 192-195)6. 6 this court resolved the confl ict in the case law on this point in cinar corp. v. robinson, 2013 scc 73, [2013] 3 scr 1168, in which it endorsed the reasoning and result in solomon (para 124). 6 notre cour a tranché le confl it jurisprudentiel à ce sujet dans cinar corp. c. robinson, 2013 csc 73, [2013] 3 rcs 1168, où elle a entériné le raisonnement et le résultat de l’arrêt solomon (par 124). [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi le juge gascon 143 [87] the cases at bar concern extracontractual faults, and the conditions for the application of arts. 1480 and 1526 ccq are not met. in this con- text, it is not appropriate to circumvent the compre- hensive legislative scheme governing solidarity in cases of extracontractual fault and to seek to obtain similar effects by way of liability in solidum. this judge- made solution is intended to apply in situations that the legislature has not expressly contemplated, not to bypass existing legislative mechanisms that are subject to conditions a creditor is unable to meet. [88] in any event, the obligation in solidum is of no assistance to the city in these cases, since it does not resolve the central problem with the city’s ar- gument, namely the absence of a causal connection between each fault committed by the respondents and the aggregate damage done to a given patrol car during the riot. as one author aptly puts it, [trans- lation] “[f]or several debtors to have an obligation in solidum, one essential and fundamental require- ment must always be met: there must be a connection between each debtor individually and the whole of the debt or injury. if    it is possible to identify each person’s share, the obligation in solidum must not be applied” (levesque, at p. 128 (emphasis in original)). as in cases of legislative solidarity, there can be no liability in solidum among defendants who have caused separate injuries (vézina and lan- gevin, at p. 129; 2855-0523 québec inc. v. ivanhoé cambridge inc., 2014 qcca 124, 45 rpr (5th) 64, at para. 20; fonds d’assurance responsabilité professionnelle du barreau du québec v. gariépy, 2005 qcca 60, [2005] rjq 409, at paras 20-30). ici, nous sommes en présence de fautes ex- [87] tracontractuelles et les conditions d’application des art. 1480 et 1526 ccq ne sont pas réunies. dans un tel contexte, il ne convient pas de contourner le régime législatif exhaustif qui encadre la solidarité en matière de fautes extracontractuelles et de cher- cher à obtenir des effets similaires au moyen de la responsabilité in solidum. cette solution d’origine jurisprudentielle vise à répondre à des situations que le législateur n’a pas expressément envisagées, non à contourner les mécanismes qu’il a autrement établis et qui comportent des conditions d’application aux- quelles un créancier n’est pas en mesure de satisfaire. [88] à tout événement, l’obligation in solidum n’est d’aucun secours pour la ville en l’espèce, car elle ne corrige pas le problème central de son argu- mentation, soit l’absence de lien de causalité entre chaque faute des intimés et le dommage global causé à l’auto- patrouille concernée pendant l’émeute. ainsi que l’exprime avec justesse un auteur, « [p]our qu’il existe une obligation in solidum entre plusieurs dé- biteurs, il faut toujours retrouver le critère essentiel et fondamental : un lien entre chaque débiteur pris isolément et l’intégralité de la dette ou du préju- dice. s’il est possible d’identifi er la part de chacun [  ] il ne faut pas appliquer l’obligation in solidum » (levesque, p. 128 (soulignement dans l’original)). en effet, tout comme dans les cas de solidarité de source législative, il ne peut y avoir de responsabi- lité in solidum entre des défendeurs qui ont causé des préjudices distincts (vézina et langevin, p. 129; 2855-0523 québec inc. c. ivanhoé cambridge inc., 2014 qcca 124, 45 rpr (5th) 64, par. 20; fonds d’assurance responsabilité professionnelle du bar- reau du québec c. gariépy, 2005 qcca 60, [2005] rjq 409, par 20-30). vi conclusion vi conclusion [89] in short, no matter what approach is taken, the respondents cannot be found solidarily liable in the circumstances of the cases at bar. the requirements of arts. 1480 and 1526 ccq are not met, and the obligation in solidum cannot be used to circumvent the comprehensive legislative scheme governing sol- idarity in cases of extracontractual fault in quebec civil law. [89] bref, peu importe la façon dont on aborde la situation, les circonstances de l’espèce ne donnent pas ouverture à une condamnation solidaire des in- timés. les conditions des art. 1480 et 1526 ccq. ne sont pas satisfaites et l’obligation in solidum ne permet pas de contourner le régime législatif ex- haustif qui régit la solidarité en matière de fautes extracontractuelles en droit civil québécois. 144 mont réal (ville) v lonardi gascon j. [2018] 2 scr. [90] what the city is really seeking is to have all the identifi ed rioters who did damage to one of its patrol cars during the riot found solidarily liable even though their actions did not all contribute to the aggregate injury for which it is seeking compen- sation. not only is this claim wrong in law, but it would also lead to absurd results. the wrongful acts committed by the rioters were quite dissimilar, both in nature and in seriousness, and were also separated in time from and unrelated to one another. to grant the city’s claim would be to assign the same legal consequences to arson committed against a vehicle by a masked outside agitator as to a kick at the same vehicle by a tipsy fan three hours earlier. in a context in which it would in all likelihood [91] be impossible to bring a recursory action against other rioters whom the evidence did not make it possible to identify, imposing solidarity would thus amount to placing a rioter who kicked a car door in a fi t of pique in a position in which he could face fi nancial liability in the order of tens of thousands of dollars. such an act is of course blameworthy and unacceptable, there is no doubt about that. however, a fi nding of solidary liability cannot be justifi ed by equating this person with an unidentifi ed rioter who set fi re to the vehicle more than two hours later. the conclusion sought by the city strikes me as extremely unfair. full reparation of the injury — not full compensation of the victim — is indeed a funda- mental principle of quebec civil law. but imposing solidarity on rioters who caused separate injuries would be a radical departure from the principle that a person is liable for reparation only of injuries caused by his or her own fault. the fact that a victim suffered several injuries in the course of an incident does not justify making an exception to that principle. [90] à vrai dire, la ville tente d’obtenir une con- damnation solidaire contre tous les émeutiers identi- fi és qui ont endommagé une de ses autos- patrouilles durant l’émeute, et ce, malgré le fait que leurs gestes n’aient pas tous contribué au préjudice global pour lequel elle réclame compensation. cette demande est non seulement mal fondée en droit, mais elle mènerait en outre à des résultats absurdes. en effet, les gestes fautifs des émeutiers sont de nature et de gravité hautement dissemblables, en plus d’être séparés dans le temps et non liés entre eux. or, faire droit à la ré- clamation de la ville aurait pour effet d’attribuer les mêmes conséquences juridiques à l’incendie criminel d’un véhicule par un casseur professionnel masqué qu’au coup de pied donné sur ce même véhicule par un partisan éméché trois heures plus tôt. [91] dans un contexte où l’exercice d’un recours récursoire contre les autres émeutiers que la preuve recueillie n’a pas permis d’identifi er serait selon toute vraisemblance illusoire, conclure à la solidarité reviendrait ainsi à faire peser sur un émeutier qui a donné par dépit un coup de pied sur une portière un risque de responsabilité fi nancière pouvant s’éle- ver à plusieurs dizaines de milliers de dollars. un tel geste est certes répréhensible et inacceptable, c’est indiscutable. cependant, on ne saurait justifi er de conclure à la responsabilité solidaire de cette personne en l’assimilant à l’émeutier inconnu qui aurait mis le feu au véhicule plusieurs heures plus tard. conclure dans le sens recherché par la ville me semblerait singulièrement injuste. la réparation intégrale du préjudice — et non de la victime — est assurément un principe fondamental du droit ci- vil québécois. mais imposer la solidarité entre des émeutiers qui ont causé des préjudices distincts dé- rogerait radicalement au principe voulant qu’une personne ne soit tenue responsable de réparer que le seul préjudice que cause sa propre faute. le fait qu’une victime ait subi une pluralité de préjudices au cours d’un événement ne permet pas de faire exception à ce principe. [92] the court of québec and the court of appeal limited the consequences of the respondents’ faults on the basis that there was no causal connection between those faults and the whole of the injury claimed by the city in doing so, they made no [92] la cour du québec et la cour d’appel ont limité les conséquences des fautes des intimés en l’absence de lien de causalité entre celles-ci et le préjudice total réclamé par la ville. ce faisant, elles n’ont commis ni erreur de droit ni erreur de fait [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 145 error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact. i would dismiss the city’s appeal with costs in each of the six instant cases. manifeste et déterminante. je rejetterais l’appel de la ville avec dépens dans chacun des six dossiers concernés. english version of the reasons delivered by les motifs suivants ont été rendus par côté j. (dissenting) — la juge côté (dissidente) — i. introduction i. introduction [93] my colleague gascon j. frames the central issue in this appeal as follows: “to what extent can a rioter who has caused property damage be held solidarily liable to the victim for damage done to the same property by other rioters?” (para 3). in my view, rioters who act together to do damage to property must be held solidarily liable for the whole of the injury suffered by the victim in respect of that property. [93] mon collègue le juge gascon énonce comme suit la question au cœur du présent pourvoi : « dans quelle mesure un émeutier donné peut-il être tenu so- lidairement responsable envers la victime des dom- mages causés par les autres émeutiers au même bien que lui? » (par 3). je suis d’avis que des émeutiers qui endommagent ensemble un même bien doivent être tenus solidairement responsables de l’entièreté du préjudice subi par la victime quant à ce bien. [94] in an extracontractual context, persons who have committed faults are solidarily liable for repa- ration of an injury they have caused in the following circumstances: 1480 where several persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act which has resulted in injury or have com- mitted separate faults each of which may have caused the injury, and where it is impossible to determine, in either case, which of them actually caused it, they are solidarily liable for reparation thereof. [94] en matière extracontractuelle, les fautifs sont solidairement tenus de réparer le préjudice qu’ils causent dans les circonstances suivantes : 1480 lorsque plusieurs personnes ont participé à un fait collectif fautif qui entraîne un préjudice ou qu’elles ont commis des fautes distinctes dont chacune est susceptible d’avoir causé le préjudice, sans qu’il soit possible, dans l’un ou l’autre cas, de déterminer laquelle l’a effectivement causé, elles sont tenues solidairement à la réparation du préjudice. 1526 the obligation to make reparation for injury caused to another through the fault of two or more persons is solidary where the obligation is extra- contractual. 1526 l’obligation de réparer le préjudice causé à autrui par la faute de deux personnes ou plus est solidaire, lorsque cette obligation est extracontractuelle. (civil code of québec (“ccq”)) (code civil du québec (« ccq »)). in my opinion, the facts in the cases at bar [95] supported a fi nding that the respondents are solidar- ily liable. in the circumstances, the conduct of all the individuals who took part in the destruction of a given patrol car constituted joint participation in a wrongful act. their conduct ultimately led to the total loss of the vehicle, and these individuals are therefore solidarily liable for reparation of that injury under art 1480 ccq. [95] à mon avis, les faits en l’espèce justifi aient de conclure à la responsabilité solidaire des intimés. en effet, dans les circonstances, la conduite des indi- vidus qui ont participé à la destruction d’une même auto- patrouille constituait un fait collectif fautif. cette conduite a ultimement entraîné la perte totale du véhicule et, en conséquence, ces individus sont tenus solidairement à la réparation de ce préjudice aux termes de l’art 1480 ccq. 146 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. if, however, as my colleague concludes, the [96] individuals in question cannot be found solidarily liable on that basis under art 1480 ccq, then it must be found that the combined conduct of these various individuals constituted a common fault, a type of fault that also leads to a fi nding of solidary liability, but under art 1526 ccq instead. [97] under the civil code of lower canada, the courts did not hesitate to impose joint and several li- ability on a group of persons at fault who had caused injury. they arrived at that conclusion even where the member of the group who had caused the injury could be identifi ed on a balance of probabilities, as they considered that it was, fi rst and foremost, the dangerous conduct of the group that had caused the injury and, therefore, that the members of the group had all contributed to it. that case law has since been codifi ed in the civil code of québec. thus, regard- less of whether art. 1480 or art. 1526 is applied, the respondents must be found solidarily liable in respect of a given vandalized patrol car. [96] si, toutefois, conformément à la conclusion de mon collègue, une telle responsabilité solidaire ne peut être imposée à ces individus en vertu de l’art 1480 ccq, il faut alors conclure que l’en- semble des conduites respectives de ces individus constituent une faute commune, faute qui entraîne elle aussi une condamnation solidaire, cette fois, en application de l’art 1526 ccq. [97] sous le régime du code civil du bas- canada, les tribunaux n’hésitaient pas à condamner solidaire- ment un groupe de fautifs ayant causé un préjudice. ils arrivaient à cette conclusion même si une preuve prépondérante permettait d’identifi er le membre du groupe qui avait causé le préjudice. en effet, les tribunaux considéraient que c’était d’abord et avant tout la conduite dangereuse du groupe qui était la cause du préjudice subi et, donc, que les membres de ce groupe y avaient tous contribué. cette juris- prudence a depuis été codifi ée par le code civil du québec. ainsi, que l’on applique l’art. 1480 ou en- core l’art. 1526, la condamnation solidaire des in- timés s’impose quant à une même auto- patrouille vandalisée. ii issues ii questions en litige [98] this appeal raises three questions that must, in my view, be answered as follows: [98] le présent pourvoi soulève trois questions auxquelles il faut, à mon avis, répondre comme suit : (1) are the respondents solidarily liable for the whole of the damage done to a patrol car during the riot because they jointly took part in a wrongful act within the meaning of art 1480 ccq? (1) yes. the respondents who participated in the destruction of a given patrol car jointly took part in a wrongful act and are solidarily liable for reparation of the whole of the damage that was done. (2) if the answer to the fi rst question is no, did the respondents commit a common fault or contributory faults as a result of which they are solidarily liable under art 1526 ccq? (2) les intimés sont- ils solidairement respon- sables de la totalité des dommages causés à une auto- patrouille pendant l’émeute en raison de leur participation à un fait collectif fautif au sens de l’art 1480 ccq?. oui les intimés ayant participé à la des- truction d’une même auto- patrouille ont pris part à un fait collectif fautif et sont tenus so- lidairement à la réparation de la totalité des dommages causés. si la réponse à la première question est né- gative, les intimés ont- ils commis une faute commune ou des fautes contributoires qui les rendent solidairement responsables au sens de l’art 1526 ccq?. if the answer to the fi rst question is no, it must be concluded that the respondents are si l’on répond par la négative à la première question, il faut nécessairement conclure que [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 147 solidarily liable under art 1526 ccq be- cause they committed a common fault or con- tributory faults in relation to a given patrol car. les intimés sont solidairement responsables au sens de l’art 1526 ccq, puisqu’ils ont com- mis une faute commune ou des fautes contri- butoires quant à une même auto- patrouille. (3) are the respondents liable in solidum? (3) les intimés sont- ils responsables in solidum? no. the concept of liability in solidum is not applicable in a situation involving a number of faults that are all extracontractual in nature. non. le concept de responsabilité in solidum ne s’applique pas dans une situation où il y a eu plusieurs fautes, toutes extracontrac- tuelles. iii analysis iii analyse a article 1480 ccq. a l’article 1480 ccq. [99] article  1480  ccq provides for solidary liability where several persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act that has resulted in injury. in my view, these conditions are met where, as in these cases, several persons gather around a patrol car, strike it in ways that cause various damage and encourage others to do the same until the vehicle is completely destroyed. [99] l’article 1480 ccq prévoit qu’il y a res- ponsabilité solidaire lorsque plusieurs personnes ont participé à un fait collectif fautif qui entraîne un préjudice. je suis d’avis que toutes ces conditions sont réunies dans les cas où, comme en l’espèce, plusieurs personnes se regroupent autour d’une auto- patrouille, lui donnent des coups causant différents dommages, et encouragent les autres à faire de même jusqu’à ce que le véhicule soit complètement détruit. (1) respondents jointly took part in a wrongful (1) les intimés ont participé à un fait collectif act that resulted in injury fautif qui a entraîné un préjudice [100] the trial judge in these cases found that the respondents had not jointly taken part in a wrong- ful act given that they had not had a clear intention and had not plotted with one another. in his view, art 1480 ccq was therefore inapplicable: [100] en l’espèce, le juge de première instance a conclu que les intimés n’avaient pas participé à un fait collectif fautif vu l’absence d’intention claire ou de concertation entre eux. selon lui, l’art 1480 ccq. n’est donc pas applicable : [translation] the city alleges a common venture. a common venture requires a clear intention, a plot to com- mit mischief. in the instant case, the evidence shows that the acts were spontaneous (although no less blameworthy) and had not been planned by the persons who committed them, who often did not know one another. according to the evidence, the evening was festive and actually had a family- friendly ambience. it was not until later in the evening that things got out of hand. la ville allègue l’aventure commune. pour qu’il y ait aventure commune, il faut qu’il y ait une intention claire, une concertation à commettre un méfait. dans le cas qui nous occupe, la preuve révèle qu’il s’agit d’actes sponta- nés (qui sont tout autant répréhensibles) qui n’étaient pas planifi és par leurs auteurs qui, souvent, ne se connaissaient pas. selon la preuve, la soirée était festive, voire familiale. ce n’est que plus tard dans la soirée que les choses ont dégénéré. the court concludes that in this case, although the images may be shocking, the evidence shows that there was no collusion or common intention. in short, there was no common venture among the defendants. le tribunal en arrive à la conclusion que dans le pré- sent dossier, bien que les images puissent choquer, la preuve démontre qu’il n’y avait pas de collusion ni d’in- tention commune. en somme, il n’y avait pas d’aventure commune entre les défendeurs. 148 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. (2014 qccq 4902, 2014 qccq 4915, 2014 qccq 4916, 2014 qccq 4919, 2014 qccq 4920 and 2014 qccq 4921 (collectively, “qccq”), at pa- ras. 47-48 (canlii) (emphasis added).) (2014 qccq 4902, 2014 qccq 4915, 2014 qccq 4916, 2014 qccq 4919, 2014 qccq 4920 et 2014 qccq 4921 (collectivement « qccq »), par. 47-48 (canlii) (je souligne).) in my opinion, the trial judge erred in law in [101] reaching that conclusion. [101] à mon avis, cette conclusion est entachée d’une erreur de droit. [102] article 1480 is new law. it codifi ed the case law from before the civil code of québec came into force.7 it is therefore necessary to look to that case law in order to properly defi ne the concept of joint participation in a wrongful act and thus to determine the scope of this article. it is clear from the case law in question that it is not necessary, in order to fi nd the respondents solidarily liable, to establish that they had a clear intention to commit mischief or had plotted to do so. [102] l’article 1480 est une disposition de droit nouveau, qui a codifi é la jurisprudence applicable avant l’entrée en vigueur du code civil du québec7. il convient donc de se tourner vers cette jurisprudence pour défi nir adéquatement la notion de fait collectif fautif et ainsi cerner le champ d’application de cette disposition. or, cette jurisprudence indique claire- ment qu’il n’est pas nécessaire, pour que les intimés puissent être condamnés solidairement, d’établir qu’ils avaient l’intention claire de commettre un méfait ou qu’ils s’étaient concertés en vue de le faire. [103] when the civil code of lower canada was in force, the courts often relied on the concept of “collective fault” or that of “common venture” in order to fi nd that members of a group were jointly and severally liable. francine drouin- barakett and pierre- gabriel jobin8 correctly summarized the courts’ view of the scope of these concepts:9 [103] à l’époque du code civil du bas- canada, les tribunaux s’appuyaient couramment sur les concepts de « faute collective » ou d’« aventure commune » pour retenir la responsabilité solidaire des membres d’un groupe. les auteurs francine drouin- barakett et pierre- gabriel jobin8 résument bien la portée que les tribunaux accordaient à ces concepts9 : [translation]    these hypothetical cases involving an express prior agreement in the nature of a plot are not the only forms of collective fault. it is instead in cases in which there is no such agreement that the appropriate use of this concept can prove invaluable.    ces hypothèses d’ententes préalables expresses qui participent de la nature du complot ne sont pas les seules manifestations de la faute collective. c’est plutôt dans les hypothèses contraires que s’avère précieuse l’utilisation appropriée de cette faute. the courts recognize that collective fault may apply in a dangerous situation resulting from a spontaneous activity   . les tribunaux admettent l’application de la faute col- lective à des situations dangereuses résultant d’un mou- vement spontané  .   .   . 7 j-l baudouin,. p. deslauriers and b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at no 1-680. see also massignani v. veilleux, [1987] rra 541 (que. ca). 8 f. drouin- barakett and p-g jobin, “la faute collective dans l’équipe de professionnels” (1978), 56 can. bar rev. 49, at p 66. 9 according to frédéric levesque, the defi nition proposed by drouin- barakett and jobin was precisely what inspired the legis- lature to include joint participation in a wrongful act in the civil code of québec (l’obligation in solidum en droit privé québécois (2010), at p 219). 7 j-l. baudouin, p. deslauriers et b. moore, la responsabilité civile (8e éd. 2014), n° 1-680. voir également massignani c. veilleux, [1987] rra 541 (ca. qc). 8 f. drouin- barakett et p-g. jobin, « la faute collective dans l’équipe de professionnels » (1978), 56 r du b can. 49, p 66. 9 selon l’auteur frédéric levesque, c’est précisément la défi nition proposée par les auteurs drouin- barakett et jobin qui a inspiré le législateur à inclure le fait collectif fautif au code civil du québec (l’obligation in solidum en droit privé québécois (2010), p 219). [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 149 presence at the scene of the act that is the immediate cause of the damage is not conclusive. a person may have helped prepare the act and then slipped away at the last minute. another person might join the instigators in an act that is already under way. the actions of participants who contribute to the creation of a dangerous situation may be identical or different. finally, collective fault can exist in the case of purely spontaneous conduct as well as in that of conduct resulting from a plot. in all these scenarios, liability for collective fault will attach to all those — and only those — whose attitudes are connected with and inseparable from the damage, with the exception of fault by pure omission, about which some doubt remains, but which should also be included where the person at fault was in a position to intercede. [emphasis added.] [104] this defi nition was entirely consistent with the case law under the civil code of lower canada. the courts did not hesitate to impose joint and sev- eral liability on a group of persons who had acted spontaneously, but whose actions or attitudes were connected with and inseparable from the damage the victim had suffered. for example, in gagné v. monzerolle, [1967] br 899 (summary), the quebec court of appeal held that two drivers who had spon- taneously participated in an impromptu car race were jointly and severally liable on the basis that the race had been a [translation] “common enterprise”. drouin- barakett and jobin also referred to french law and to a case in which the cour de cassation had imposed solidary liability on a group of hunters who had acted spontaneously in what the court described as a moment of euphoria.10 la présence sur les lieux du fait qui a causé immédia- tement le dommage n’est pas déterminante. on peut avoir contribué à la préparation de ce fait et s’être éclipsé au dernier moment. on peut en cours d’opération se joindre à des instigateurs. les participants peuvent contribuer à créer la situation dangereuse par des gestes identiques ou différents. enfi n, la faute collective existe aussi bien dans un comportement purement spontané que dans celui qui a fait l’objet d’une concertation. dans toutes les hypo- thèses, la responsabilité pour faute collective s’attachera à tous ceux — et uniquement à ceux — dont les attitudes sont reliées par la connexité et leur caractère inséparable vis-à-vis le dommage, réserve faite de la faute par pure omission sur laquelle un doute subsiste mais qui devrait aussi être admise quand son auteur était en mesure d’in- tervenir. [je souligne]. [104] cette défi nition est en tout point conforme à la jurisprudence fondée sur le code civil du bas- canada. en effet, les tribunaux n’hésitaient pas à condamner solidairement un groupe de personnes ayant agi spontanément, mais dont les actions ou at- titudes sont reliées par une connexité et leur caractère inséparable avec le dommage subi par la victime. à titre d’exemple, dans l’affaire gagné c. monzerolle, [1967] br 899 (résumé), la cour d’appel du québec a condamné solidairement deux automobilistes ayant participé spontanément à une course improvisée, au motif qu’il s’agissait d’une « commune entreprise ». les auteurs drouin- barakett et jobin se réfèrent également au droit français et à un arrêt de la cour de cassation dans lequel celle-ci a retenu la respon- sabilité solidaire d’un groupe de chasseurs ayant agi dans un mouvement spontané, qu’elle a qualifi é de moment d’euphorie10. [105] it is thus possible, in cases involving spon- taneous acts, to fi nd that a collective fault has been committed even though the group did not plan its actions in advance or expressly agree to them. in my opinion, this means that the trial judge erred in law in respect of the defi nition of joint participation in a wrongful act in stating that [translation] “[a] common venture requires a clear intention, a plot to commit mischief” (qccq, at para 47). moreover, this error is confi rmed by the facts on which he based his fi nding that the respondents had not jointly taken [105] il est donc possible de conclure à l’exis- tence d’une faute collective en cas d’actes sponta- nés, sans qu’il y ait eu planifi cation préalable des actions du groupe ou accord exprès à leur égard. ainsi, à mon avis, l’énoncé suivant du juge de pre- mière instance comporte une erreur de droit quant à la défi nition de fait collectif fautif : « pour qu’il y ait aventure commune, il faut qu’il y ait une inten- tion claire, une concertation à commettre un mé- fait » (qccq, par 47). les faits sur lesquels il se fonde pour conclure à l’absence d’un fait collectif 10 p 66. 10 p 66. 150 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. part in a wrongful act. the trial judge’s fi nding of fact that “the acts were spontaneous    and had not been planned by the persons who committed them, who often did not know one another” (qccq, at para. 47), cannot suffi ce to justify a fi nding that the respondents did not jointly take part in a wrongful act in the instant cases. fautif confi rment d’ailleurs cette erreur. en effet, les conclusions de fait du juge de première instance selon lesquelles « il s’agi[ssait] d’actes spontanés [  ] qui n’étaient pas planifi és par leurs auteurs qui, souvent, ne se connaissaient pas » (qccq, par. 47) ne sauraient suffi re pour écarter l’existence d’un fait collectif fautif en l’espèce. [106] in his reasons, the trial judge sought to re- solve the following issue with respect to the appli- cation of art 1480 ccq: [106] dans ses motifs, le juge de première instance cherche à répondre à la question suivante concernant l’application de l’art 1480 ccq : [translation] the court agreed with the parties that this judgment will have two parts. in the fi rst, the court will determine whether the riot of april 21, 2008 con- stituted joint participation in an act, in which case the defendants will be solidarily liable (1480 ccq). le tribunal a convenu avec les parties que le présent jugement comporterait deux parties. la première consiste à déterminer si la manifestation du 21 avril 2008 constitue un « fait collectif », ce qui entrainerait la solidarité entre les défendeurs (1480 ccq). (qccq, at para. 14 (emphasis added).) (qccq, par. 14 (je souligne).) [107] i agree with the trial judge that the riot of april 21, 2008, viewed as a whole, cannot constitute joint participation in a wrongful act. a riot involving hundreds of people that occurs on many streets of downtown mont réal is an event that is simply too vast for there to be a suffi cient nexus between the actions of all the participants. every person who committed a fault that night could not be found sol- idarily liable for the whole of the damage. [107] je partage l’avis du premier juge suivant le- quel, considérée dans son ensemble, la manifestation du 21 avril 2008 ne saurait constituer un fait collectif fautif. en effet, une émeute regroupant des centaines de personnes et se déroulant dans plusieurs rues du centre- ville de mont réal est un événement tout sim- plement trop vaste pour qu’il existe une connexité suffi sante entre les actions de tous les participants. toutes les personnes qui ont commis une faute ce soir-là ne sauraient être condamnées solidairement pour l’ensemble des dommages causés. [108] in fact, it was precisely to avoid such a result that the barreau du québec recommended adding the word “fautif” (wrongful) to art 1480 ccq at the time of the reform of the civil law: [108] en fait, c’est précisément pour éviter un tel résultat que le barreau du québec a recommandé l’ajout du terme « fautif » à l’art 1480 ccq lors de la réforme du droit civil : [translation] the barreau fi rst suggested that the word fautif be added after the expression fait collectif [before the word “act” in the english version] in clause 1538 of the bill (art 1480 ccq). the purpose of this clarifi cation was to avoid having “every representative at an activity that is in itself legitimate (eg legal strike, demonstration) be liable for an injury caused by a small group of persons”.11 le barreau a tout d’abord suggéré l’addition du terme fau- tif à la suite de l’expression fait collectif à l’article 1538 du projet (art 1480 ccq). la précision a pour but d’éviter que « tous les représentants à une activité en soi légitime (ex. : grève légale, manifestation, etc.) soient responsables du préjudice causé par un noyau de personnes »11. [109] this does not mean that wrongful acts in which smaller groups jointly took part during the [109] cela ne signifi e toutefois pas qu’il soit im- possible d’identifi er un fait collectif fautif commis 11 levesque, at p. 222 (footnote omitted). 11 levesque, p. 222 (note en bas de page omise). [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 151 riot cannot be identifi ed, though. but the trial judge did not decide this issue. i repeat that he was instead seeking to determine [translation] “whether the riot of april 21, 2008 constituted joint participation in an act” (qccq, at para 14). thus, in the fi rst sec- tion of his reasons, which was an integral part of his decisions in all the cases before him, he established that the riot of april 21, 2008 had not constituted joint participation in a wrongful act. par des groupes plus restreints au cours de l’émeute. or, le juge de première instance n’a pas tranché cette question. je rappelle qu’il cherchait plutôt à détermi- ner « si la manifestation du 21 avril 2008 constitue un “fait collectif” » (qccq, par 14). ainsi, dans la première section de ses motifs, laquelle est partie intégrante de sa décision dans tous les dossiers dont il était saisi, il établit que l’émeute du 21 avril 2008 ne constitue pas un fait collectif fautif. [110] in the second section of the reasons, which was specifi c to each individual case, he merely stated that the question of joint participation in a wrongful act had already been decided (see, for example, 2014 qccq 4921, at para. 56 (canlii)). in my view, he left open the question whether each group of re- spondents who had done damage to a given vehicle had jointly taken part in a wrongful act as a result of which those respondents were solidarily liable. [111] small groups of individuals did in fact form on the night of the riot. each of those groups attacked a single patrol car until it was completely destroyed. given the individual conduct of the persons who did damage to the same property together with the bandwagon atmosphere that resulted, there is no doubt that their actions, whose ultimate purpose was, collectively, to destroy a single patrol car, were connected. though the acts were not identical and were not always committed at exactly the same time, they were a series of related acts that were committed in the same place within a short period of time and in relation to the same property. [110] dans la seconde section du jugement, propre à chaque dossier, il se contente d’affi rmer que la ques- tion du fait collectif fautif a déjà été décidée (voir, par exemple, 2014 qccq 4921, par. 56 (canlii)). la question de savoir si chaque groupe d’intimés ayant endommagé le même véhicule a participé à un fait collectif fautif entraînant la responsabilité solidaire de ces intimés est, à mon avis, demeurée en suspens. [111] en fait, lors de cette soirée d’émeute, des groupes restreints d’individus se sont effectivement formés. chacun de ces groupes s’est acharné sur une même auto- patrouille jusqu’à ce qu’elle soit complètement détruite. la conduite individuelle des personnes ayant endommagé un même bien, conju- guée à l’atmosphère d’entraînement ainsi créée, dé- montre un lien de connexité indéniable entre leurs actions qui visaient ultimement, ensemble, à dé- truire une même auto- patrouille. sans être des actes identiques commis exactement au même moment, il s’agit d’une série d’actions connexes, commises au même endroit, à l’intérieur d’un court laps de temps et visant un même bien. [112] my colleague states that, in the cases decided under both the civil code of québec and the civil code of lower canada, the persons who had jointly taken part in a wrongful act had “shared a com- mon, albeit sometimes tacit, intention, a factor that is sorely lacking in the instant cases” (para 59). yet the cases he cites (at paras. 47 et seq.) concerned groups whose tacit intention was established on the basis of their having participated in a dangerous activity that had resulted in injury. in most of those cases, there had been no prior agreement between or preparation by the members of the group. i need only cite the ex- ample of the drivers who spontaneously participated [112] mon collègue affi rme que, dans les déci- sions rendues tant en vertu du code civil du québec que du code civil du bas- canada, les participants à un fait collectif fautif « partageaient une intention commune, parfois tacite, facteur qui fait cruellement défaut en l’espèce » (par 59). pourtant, les jugements dont il fait état (aux par. 47 et suiv.) concernent des groupes dont l’intention tacite est établie par la par- ticipation à une activité dangereuse qui entraîne un préjudice. la plupart de ces dossiers ne révélaient l’existence d’aucune entente entre les membres du groupe ou de préparation préalable de leur part. qu’il suffi se de mentionner l’exemple de la participation 152 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. in an impromptu car race (gagné) or that of the group of children throwing stones for fun (d’allaire v. trépanier, [1961] cs 619 (que)). therefore, as regards the intention that must be shared by persons who jointly take part in a wrongful act, the cases in question are fully applicable to the instant cases, in which groups of persons participated spontaneously in the destruction of vehicles. spontanée à une course de voitures improvisée (gagné), ou celui du groupe d’enfants qui s’amu- saient à lancer des pierres (d’allaire c. trépanier, [1961] cs 619 (qc)). en conséquence, en ce qui a trait à la question de l’intention que doivent partager les participants au fait collectif fautif, ces décisions sont tout à fait applicables à notre dossier, où un groupe de personnes participent spontanément à la destruction d’un véhicule. [113] i accordingly conclude that the persons who participated in the destruction of a given patrol car jointly took part in a wrongful act. moreover, their joint participation in a wrongful act resulted in in- jury: the total loss of the patrol car. as the city ar- gues: [113] j’arrive donc à la conclusion que les per- sonnes ayant participé à la destruction d’une même auto- patrouille ont pris part à un fait collectif fautif. de plus, ce fait collectif fautif a entraîné un préju- dice : la perte totale de l’auto- patrouille. comme le soutient la ville : [translation] the respondents could not have been una- ware that if they jointly took part in vandalizing a vehicle, it would in the end be completely destroyed, given that a riot was under way and that they themselves were the rioters. in this case, there is an inextricable and very close connection between each respondent’s actions and the whole of the damage suffered by the appellant in respect of each vehicle. les intimés ne pouvaient ignorer qu’en participant col- lectivement au saccage d’un véhicule, ce dernier fi nirait par être complètement détruit, alors qu’une émeute est en cours et qu’ils en sont eux- mêmes les acteurs. dans ce cas, il existe une relation indissociable et de grande proximité entre chacun des gestes des intimés et la totalité des dommages subis par l’appelante pour chaque véhicule. (af, at para. 90) (ma, par. 90) [114] unlike my colleague, who states that the city’s argument results from “disregarding part of what the trial judge said” (para. 78), i am of the view that the trial judge’s fi ndings of fact support the city’s argument in this regard. the trial judge described the events as follows: [translation] “collective de- struction for no reason. a jubilant crowd that smashed everything in its path for fun. a spontaneous reaction fuelled by shouts of encouragement that prodded each new person to do something worse” (2014 qccq 4915, at para. 68 (canlii) (emphasis added)). and he added the following: “if one considers the de- fendants’ active participation in the riot, the acts of vandalism that were committed, the shouts of encour- agement to other rioters to commit acts of mischief against police vehicles, all against a backdrop of unappeasable violence, these facts make this event unique” (2014 qccq 4915, at para 72). [114] contrairement à mon collègue, qui affi rme que l’argument de la ville découle d’une « lecture tronquée des motifs du premier juge » (par. 78), je suis d’avis que les conclusions de fait du juge de pre- mière instance appuient cet argument de la ville. en effet, ce dernier a décrit en ces termes les événements qui ont eu lieu : « un saccage collectif sans raison. une foule en liesse qui brise tout sur son passage pour le plaisir. une réaction spontanée, alimentée par des encouragements qui poussent le prochain à faire pire » (2014 qccq 4915, par. 68 (canlii) (je souligne)). de plus, le juge de première instance note que « lorsque l’on considère la participation active des défendeurs à l’émeute, les gestes de saccage posés, les encouragements aux autres manifestants à commettre des méfaits sur les véhicules de police, tout cela sur un fond de violence inapaisable, [ils] font en sorte de rendre cet évènement unique » (2014 qccq 4915, par 72). [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 153 it is not a matter here of questioning the [115] trial judge’s fi ndings that the riot as a whole was not a common venture and that there was no causal connection between the riot as a whole and the de- struction of the various vehicles. but in my view, the trial judge erred in law in defi ning joint participation in a wrongful act. his fi ndings of fact lead to the conclusion that the respondents jointly took part in wrongful acts during the riot and that each of the acts they took part in resulted in the destruction of a patrol car. all in all, those fi ndings were suffi cient to hold the respondents solidarily liable for reparation of the whole of that injury, and it was therefore unnecessary to identify separate faults within this collective fault and link each one to a portion of the damage done by the group. [116] my colleague seems to suggest that certain of the trial judge’s fi ndings should be disregarded on the basis that he made them in the section of his reasons on punitive damages (para 78). i do not agree with my colleague on this point: regardless of whether the trial judge’s fi ndings of fact were relied on in discussing compensatory damages or in discussing punitive damages, they can very well be relevant to both of these separate issues and they remain the same no matter what issue is being discussed and which section of the reasons they are found in. [117] on the subject of punitive damages, my col- league notes at para. 80 of his reasons that, “[i]n de montigny v. brossard (succession), 2010 scc 51, [2010] 3 scr 64, this court put an end to a longstanding judicial difference of opinion and held that punitive damages are autonomous in nature”. in my view, that comment is not necessary to dispose of this appeal, since punitive damages are not at issue here. i would add that i am not convinced that de montigny actually put an end to any disagreement about whether punitive damages are autonomous in nature. il ne s’agit pas ici de remettre en question les [115] conclusions du juge de première instance portant que l’émeute dans son ensemble ne constituait pas une aventure commune, et qu’il n’existait pas de lien de causalité entre l’émeute dans son ensemble et la des- truction des différents véhicules donnés. toutefois, j’estime que le juge de première instance a commis une erreur de droit dans sa défi nition de « fait col- lectif fautif ». en effet, ses conclusions de fait per- mettent de conclure que les intimés ont participé à des faits collectifs fautifs dans le cours de l’émeute, et que chacun de ces faits collectifs a entraîné la destruction d’une auto- patrouille. globalement, ces conclusions de fait étaient suffi santes pour condam- ner solidairement les intimés à réparer l’entièreté de ce préjudice, et il était dès lors inutile de s’attarder à identifi er des fautes distinctes à l’intérieur de cette faute collective et à les relier à une fraction du dom- mage causé par le groupe. [116] mon collègue semble suggérer de faire abs- traction de certaines conclusions du juge de première instance en affi rmant qu’elles se trouvent dans la sec- tion de son analyse portant sur les dommages- intérêts punitifs (par 78). je ne partage pas ses vues à cet égard, car peu importe qu’elles servent à l’analyse des dommages- intérêts compensatoires ou à celle des dommages- intérêts punitifs, les conclusions de fait du juge de première instance peuvent très bien être pertinentes pour répondre à ces deux questions distinctes, et demeurent les mêmes, indépendamment de la question analysée et de la section où elles se retrouvent dans l’analyse. [117] au sujet des dommages- intérêts punitifs, mon collègue note, au par. 80 de ses motifs, que « [d]ans l’arrêt de montigny c. brossard (succession), 2010 csc 51, [2010] 3 rcs 64, notre cour a mis fi n à une longue controverse jurisprudentielle et consacré le caractère autonome des dommages- intérêts puni- tifs ». je considère que ces observations ne sont pas nécessaires pour trancher le présent pourvoi, puisque les dommages- intérêts punitifs ne font pas l’objet de celui-ci. en outre, j’ajouterais que je ne suis pas convaincue que l’arrêt de montigny a effectivement mis fi n à toute controverse quant au caractère auto- nome ou non des dommages- intérêts punitifs. 154 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. (2) impossibility of determining the cause of (2) l’impossibilité de déterminer la cause du the injury préjudice [118] according to my colleague gascon j., in ad- dition to the conditions set out above, it must, before a group of persons may be found solidarily liable under art 1480 ccq, “be impossible to determine which person actually caused the injury” (para 19). while he acknowledges that this requirement does not fl ow from the concept of joint participation in a wrongful act or that of a common venture, my colleague expresses the view that, in light of that arti- cle’s wording, it must nonetheless be met (para 56). [119] there are many examples of cases decided in the context of the civil code of lower canada in which the members of a group that had taken part in a common venture were held jointly and severally liable even though it had been shown on a balance of probabilities which person had actually caused the injury (d’allaire; gagné; laxton v. sylvestre, [1972] cs 297 (que.), aff’d [1975] ca 648 (que.); du- mont v. desjardins, [1994] rra 459 (que. sup. ct)). logically, the same conclusion applies even where it is possible to identify a member of the group who directly caused a portion of the injury. this is because it is the collective fault that is agreed to be the source of the injury regardless of which person directly caused the injury. this is the very case law the legislature codifi ed in enacting arts. 1480 and 1526 ccq. [118] selon mon collègue le juge gascon, en plus des conditions énoncées à la section précédente, il faudrait « qu’il soit impossible de déterminer quelle personne a effectivement causé le préjudice » pour qu’un groupe de personnes puissent être condam- nées solidairement sur la base de l’art 1480 ccq. (par 19). même s’il reconnaît que cette exigence ne découle pas des notions de fait collectif fautif ou d’aventure commune, mon collègue est d’avis qu’elle est néanmoins essentielle en raison du libellé de la disposition susmentionnée (par 56). [119] la jurisprudence fondée sur le code civil du bas- canada comporte de nombreux exemples de cas où les membres d’un groupe ayant pris part à une aventure commune ont été tenus solidairement responsables, et ce, même si la preuve démontrait de manière prépondérante quelle personne avait ef- fectivement causé le préjudice (d’allaire; gagné; laxton c sylvestre, [1972] cs  297  (qc), conf. par [1975] ca 648 (qc);. dumont c. desjardins, [1994] rra 459 (cs. qc)). en toute logique, cette même conclusion s’impose même dans le cas où il est possible d’identifi er un membre du groupe qui a directement causé une fraction du préjudice. il en est ainsi puisqu’il est admis que c’est la faute collective qui entraîne le préjudice, peu importe l’identité de la personne ayant causé directement ce préjudice. or, c’est précisément cette jurisprudence que le législateur a codifi ée en adoptant les art. 1480 et 1526 ccq. [120] in my opinion, there is no indication that the legislature intended to add another requirement to the concept of joint participation in a wrongful act, as defi ned by the courts, when it codifi ed that concept in the civil code of québec. i agree with the city that the words “sans qu’il soit possible, dans l’un ou l’autre cas, de déterminer laquelle l’a effectivement causé” (“where it is impossible to determine, in ei- ther case, which of them actually caused it”) in the french version of art 1480 ccq apply only to the second part of that article with respect to separate faults. as the court of appeal stated in the cases at bar, [translation] “[i]t may be possible to read [120] à mon avis, rien n’indique que le législateur ait souhaité ajouter une exigence supplémentaire au concept jurisprudentiel de fait collectif fautif lorsqu’il a incorporé celui-ci dans le code civil du québec. en effet, tout comme la ville, je considère que les mots « sans qu’il soit possible, dans l’un ou l’autre cas, de déterminer laquelle l’a effecti- vement causé  » ne s’appliquent qu’à la seconde partie de l’art 1480 ccq concernant les fautes distinctes. comme l’a indiqué la cour d’appel en l’espèce, « [l]a version française, compte tenu de sa syntaxe, peut possiblement être lue de [cette] fa- çon » (2016 qcca 1022, par. 59 (canlii)). de plus, [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 155 the french version in [this] manner    in light of its syntax” (2016 qcca 1022, at para. 59 (canlii)). moreover, unlike my colleague, i am of the view that the english version does not confl ict with this interpretation: contrairement à mon collègue, j’estime que la ver- sion anglaise ne contredit pas cette interprétation : 1480 where several persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act which has resulted in injury or have com- mitted separate faults each of which may have caused the injury, and where it is impossible to determine, in either case, which of them actually caused it, they are solidarily liable for reparation thereof. 1480 where several persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act which has resulted in injury or have com- mitted separate faults each of which may have caused the injury, and where it is impossible to determine, in either case, which of them actually caused it, they are solidarily liable for reparation thereof. [121] this provision can be read as follows: “where several persons    have committed separate faults each of which may have caused the injury, and where it is impossible to determine, in either case, which of them actually caused it   ”. this means that when a court applies the fi rst part of the article, a fi nding that “several persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act which has resulted in injury” or, in french, that “plusieurs personnes ont participé à un fait collectif fautif qui entraîne un préjudice” will suffi ce for it to fi nd the participants solidarily liable for reparation of the injury. [121] cette disposition peut être lue comme suit : « where several persons [  ] have committed sepa- rate faults each of which may have caused the injury, and where it is impossible to determine, in either case, which of them actually caused it    ». à la première partie de l’article, il suffi t donc de conclure que « plusieurs personnes ont participé à un fait col- lectif fautif qui entraîne un préjudice », ou en anglais que « several persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act which has resulted in injury », pour condamner solidairement les participants à la répa- ration du préjudice. [122] this interpretation is consistent with the scheme and object of the legislation. the civil li- ability scheme is based on the concept of fault. in the case of joint participation in a wrongful act, the members of a group are found solidarily liable be- cause it is their collective fault that is considered to be the cause of the injury. a case that can be cited to illustrate this is massignani v. veilleux, [1987] rra 541 (que.), at pp. 543-44, in which the court of appeal endorsed the remarks of albert mayrand12 (later a judge of that court) concerning the common venture concept: [translation] in my view, even if it is assumed that only one of the two appellants fi red the shot or two shots that injured the respondents, the appellants must be found to be jointly and severally liable in the circumstances of this case. [122] cette interprétation est conforme à l’éco- nomie et l’objet de la loi. en effet, le régime de responsabilité civile est fondé sur le concept de faute. or, dans le cas d’un fait collectif fautif, les membres d’un groupe sont tenus solidairement responsables, étant donné que c’est leur faute collective qui est considérée comme la cause du préjudice. à cet effet, il est possible de se référer à l’arrêt de la cour d’ap- pel massignani c. veilleux, [1987] rra 541 (qc), p. 543-544, dans lequel elle cite avec approbation les propos de l’auteur albert mayrand12 (plus tard juge à la cour d’appel du québec) au sujet de la notion d’aventure commune : à mon avis, même en assumant qu’un seul des deux appelants a tiré le ou les deux coups de feu qui ont blessé les intimés, leur responsabilité solidaire doit être retenue, compte tenu des circonstances de l’espèce. 12 a. mayrand, “l’énigme des fautes simultanées” (1958), 18 r du 12 a. mayrand, « l’énigme des fautes simultanées » (1958), 18 r. b. 1, at p 16. du b. 1, p 16. 156 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. they took part in a common venture that was unlawful, extremely careless and dangerous. les deux appelants se sont engagés dans une aventure commune, illégale, singulièrement imprudente et dange- reuse.   .   . on this point, i endorse mr. mayrand’s observations: ici, je fais miennes les considérations de me mayrand : where hunters are alleged to have been careless in hunt- ing, the fault on which the action is based is not the shots fi red by each of them, one of which injured the victim, but their common carelessness, which created a dangerous situation. the shots are nothing more than the foreseeable result of conduct that was already wrongful, the fi nal phase of a careless activity. for the members of the group to be jointly and severally liable, it is not necessary that the careless enterprise have been conducted in its entirety by all of them; it is enough that all of them participated in it to some degree. if they took part in a battue in the woods without fi rst deciding on a plan and agreeing on safety measures, they are collectively guilty of carelessness. carelessness in a hunting expedition is not as direct a fault as the shot that injured the victim. is it a legal cause of the accident? this takes us back to the question of adequate causation referred to above. it is our view that, in many circumstances, the shot that injured the victim is a normal and foreseeable result of a fault of omission and of the careless behaviour of all the hunters. this wrongful behaviour is therefore — to use the accepted jargon — the causa causans, not merely a sine qua non, of the damage. carelessness in the hunt increased the risk that damage would occur. in some circumstances, it is reasonable to think that, without this collective carelessness, the shots would not have been fi red. [emphasis added; footnote omitted.] quand on reproche aux chasseurs une imprudence dans la conduite de la chasse, la faute qui fait la base de l’action n’est pas le coup de feu tiré par chacun d’eux et dont l’un a blessé la victime, mais bien l’imprudence commune des chasseurs qui a créé une situation dangereuse. les coups de feu ne sont plus ici que la suite prévisible d’une conduite déjà fautive, la phase ultime d’une activité im- prudente. pour qu’il y ait solidarité, on n’exige pas que l’entreprise imprudente ait été exécutée entièrement par tous les membres du groupe; il suffi t que tous y aient par- ticipé dans une certaine mesure. s’ils ont participé à une battue en forêt sans avoir préalablement arrêté un plan et sans avoir convenu de certaines mesures de sécurité, ils ont commis une imprudence collective. la poursuite imprudente d’une expédition de chasse n’est pas une faute aussi directe que le coup de feu qui a blessé la victime. est-ce une cause juridique de l’accident? ceci nous ramène à la question déjà soulevée de la causalité adéquate. pour notre part, nous estimons que dans bien des circonstances le coup de feu qui a blessé la victime est une suite normale et prévisible d’une faute d’abstention et du comportement imprudent de tous les chasseurs. ce com- portement fautif serait donc — pour employer un jargon admis — une causa causans, non pas une simple condition sine qua non, du dommage. la poursuite imprudente de la chasse a accru les risques de réalisation du dommage et, dans certaines circonstances, il est raisonnable de penser que, sans cette imprudence collective, les coups de feu n’au- raient pas été tirés. [je souligne; note en bas de page omise.] [123] my colleague gascon j. cites a passage from the commentaries of the minister of justice on the reform of the civil code of québec in support of his position: [123] mon collègue le juge gascon rappelle un passage des commentaires du ministre de la justice portant sur la réforme du code civil du québec pour appuyer sa position : as the minister of justice mentioned, art 1480 ccq. resolves the problem of apportionment of liability among those who are at fault (ministère de la justice, commen- taires du ministre de la justice, vol. i, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), at p 906). he added that, in the cases contemplated in art 1480 ccq, the rule of solidarity applies [translation] “to protect the comme le mentionne le ministre de la justice, l’art. 1480 ccq règle le problème du partage de la responsabi- lité entre les auteurs des fautes (ministère de la justice, commentaires du ministre de la justice, t. i, le code civil du québec — un mouvement de société (1993), p 906). le ministre ajoute que la règle de la solidarité s’impose dans les cas d’application de l’art 1480 ccq « pour assurer [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 157 victim, because, in the circumstances, the victim is unable to establish a causal connection between the injury he or she suffered and the causal fault” (ibid). the legislature has thus ensured that the victim does not bear the conse- quences of evidentiary diffi culties that can be attributed to the situation in which he or she has been placed by the persons who committed the faults (see also p. deschamps, “cas d’exonération et partage de responsabilité en matière extracontractuelle”, in jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et responsabilité civile (loose- leaf), vol. 1, by p-c lafond, ed., fasc. 22, at para. 15; khoury, at para 32) [para. 31] [124] in the cases at bar, contrary to what my col- league says (at para. 39), the respondents are not being held solidarily liable solely on the basis that the victim cannot identify the person who caused the damage (or a portion of the damage). rather, it is important to protect the victim, because, in the circumstances, the victim is unable to establish a causal connection between a fault — other than the joint participation in a wrongful act — and the total loss of a patrol car. first of all, the evidence does not in every case establish the exact sequence of events where two or more respondents acted simultaneously to do damage to a given vehicle. as well, it is impos- sible to establish the exact moment when a vehicle became a total loss or the condition a vehicle was in when it was set on fi re. finally, the greater the num- ber of harmful acts, the harder it is to distinguish the damage caused by each individual. [125] it is obvious that even if all the persons who had committed faults could be identifi ed, the court would still be confronted with a serious evidentiary issue in that it would be unable to attribute each share of the partitioned injury to those individuals. in such circumstances, why should the group of individuals who jointly took part in the wrongful act be favoured over the innocent victim? the exact opposite is suggested by arts. 1480 and 1526 ccq. as my colleague notes, “[t]he legislature has    en- sured that the victim does not bear the consequences of evidentiary diffi culties that can be attributed to the situation in which he or she has been placed by the persons who committed the faults” (para 31). la protection de la victime car celle-ci ne peut, dans les circonstances, établir le lien de causalité entre le préjudice qu’elle a subi et la faute causale » (ibid). de cette façon, le législateur s’assure que la victime ne subit pas les consé- quences de diffi cultés de preuve imputables à la situation dans laquelle les auteurs des fautes l’ont placée (voir aussi p. deschamps, « cas d’exonération et partage de responsa- bilité en matière extracontractuelle », dans jurisclasseur québec — collection droit civil — obligations et respon- sabilité civile (feuilles mobiles), vol. 1, par p-c. lafond, dir., fasc. 22, par. 15; khoury, par 32) [par. 31] [124] en l’espèce, contrairement à ce qu’affi rme mon collègue (par.  39), on ne condamne pas les intimés solidairement au seul motif que la victime ne peut retrouver l’auteur du dommage (ou d’une fraction du dommage). il importe plutôt d’assurer la protection de la victime, car celle-ci ne pourrait, dans les circonstances, établir un lien de causalité entre une faute — autre que le fait collectif fautif — et la perte totale d’une auto- patrouille. d’une part, la preuve ne permet pas dans tous les cas d’établir la séquence exacte des actes commis pendant que plu- sieurs intimés endommageaient simultanément un même véhicule. d’autre part, il n’est pas non plus possible d’établir à quel moment le véhicule est de- venu une perte totale, ou dans quel état il se trouvait lorsqu’il a été incendié. finalement, plus les actes dommageables s’accumulent, plus il devient diffi cile d’individualiser les dommages causés par chacun. [125] il est évident que même si tous les fautifs pouvaient être identifi és, le tribunal serait tout de même confronté à un important problème de preuve en ce qu’il ne pourrait attribuer chaque part du pré- judice scindé à ces individus. dans de telles cir- constances, pourquoi devrait-on favoriser le groupe d’individus ayant participé au fait collectif fautif, plutôt que l’innocente victime? les articles 1480 et 1526 ccq nous indiquent précisément le contraire. comme le souligne mon collègue, « le législateur s’assure que la victime ne subit pas les conséquences de diffi cultés de preuve imputables à la situation dans laquelle les auteurs des fautes l’ont placée » (par 31). [126] one example drawn from this appeal clearly shows how grossly unfair it would be to the victim [126] un exemple tiré du présent pourvoi est très révélateur quant à l’injustice fl agrante que subirait 158 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. not to impose solidary liability. in case number 2014 qccq 4919, the city claimed $20,707.53 for the total destruction of patrol car 21-15, which had been vandalized and set on fi re during the riot. the trial judge found seven individuals liable in respect of that vehicle: la victime en l’absence de condamnation solidaire. dans le dossier 2014 qccq 4919, la ville réclame la somme de 20 707,53 $ pour la destruction totale de l’auto- patrouille 21-15, qui a été saccagée et incen- diée lors de l’émeute. le juge de première instance retient la responsabilité de sept individus à l’égard de cette auto- patrouille : (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) defendant favreau courtemanche admit- ted that he had [translation] “kicked the grill of the vehicle    a few times” (para. 83 (canlii)). he was ordered to pay $400 in compensatory damages. (2) defendant iden [translation] “admitted that he had thrown a metal garbage can at the front fender    [and] that he had climbed onto the hood, thereby denting it slightly” (para 124). he was ordered to pay $1,000 in compensatory damages. (3) defendant bradshaw [translation] “admit- ted that he had climbed onto and jumped on the hood of the vehicle, thereby denting it” (para 147). he was ordered to pay $700 in compensatory damages. (4) defendant primeau kicked the car several times. the trial judge stressed the follow- ing with respect to the defendant’s attitude: [translation] “the video clips clearly show the defendant encouraging the crowd to do damage to the vehicle. a few times, the de- fendant is heard shouting ‘come on’ while waving his arms as a sign of encouragement. that attitude will certainly affect the amount awarded as punitive damages” (para 60). the defendant therefore “not only took part in the riot, he encouraged those around him to com- mit acts of mischief against police vehicle 21-15” (para 78). in doing so, he incited the crowd to do damage to the vehicle (para 79). mr. primeau also admitted that he was still present at the scene and saw the individual who set fi re to the vehicle. he was ordered to pay $900 in compensatory damages. le défendeur favreau courtemanche admet avoir donné « quelques coups de pieds dans la calandre du véhicule » (par. 83 (canlii)). il est condamné à payer 400 $ en dommages- intérêts compensatoires. le défendeur iden « admet avoir lancé une poubelle de métal sur l’aile avant [  ], être monté sur le capot et avoir ainsi causé un léger enfoncement de celui-ci » (par 124). il est condamné à payer 1 000 $ en dommages- intérêts compensatoires. le défendeur bradshaw « admet être monté et avoir sauté sur le capot du véhicule, et avoir ainsi causé un enfoncement de celui-ci  » (par 147). il est condamné à payer 700 $ en dommages- intérêts compensatoires. le défendeur primeau a donné plusieurs coups de pied sur l’auto- patrouille. le juge de première instance souligne ce qui suit au sujet de l’attitude du défendeur : « sur les extraits vidéo, on voit clairement le défen- deur encourager la foule à commettre des dommages au véhicule. on entend à quelques reprises le défendeur crier “come on”, les bras dans les airs en signe d’encouragement. cette attitude aura sûrement une infl uence quant à la somme allouée à titre de dommages punitifs  » (par.  60) le défendeur a donc « non seulement particip[é] à cette émeute, il a encouragé son entourage à commettre des méfaits contre le véhicule de police 21- 15 » (par 78). ces encouragements ont incité la foule présente à endommager le véhicule (par 79). m. primeau a d’ailleurs admis qu’il se trouvait toujours sur les lieux et a aperçu l’individu qui a incendié le véhicule. il est condamné à payer 900  $ en dommages- intérêts compensatoires. [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 159 (5) (6) (5) defendant nega jumped [translation] “with both feet on the hood of vehicle 21-15 and kicked at the windshield, which he broke. finally, he picked up a metal garbage can and hit police car 21-15 many times, to say noth- ing of the many times he gleefully kicked the body of the vehicle” (para 110). the police report also notes that, [translation] “[i]n each interval between acts of mischief, the accused got the crowd worked up by shouting and throwing bottles and rocks” (reproduced in ar, vol. v, pp. 952-54, at p 954). he was ordered to pay $2,000 in compensatory damages. (6) defendant davin [translation] “jumped on the hood, on the roof of vehicle 21-15. he smashed the headlights and roof lights and threw beer bottles at the vehicle’s windows. he also attacked an individual who tried to reason with him, hitting him in the head with a bottle” (para 134). according to the police report, mr. davin stated that it was his friends who had set fi re to the vehicle. he even added that “given the chance, he would start all over again and that, had he been given the oppor- tunity to do so, he would have set the vehicle on fi re” (para 135). he was ordered to pay $2,000 in compensatory damages. (7) defendant chaperon helped another individ- ual light a piece of cardboard that he himself then placed in the vehicle, which was set on fi re. he was ordered to pay $4,000 in com- pensatory damages. (7) le défendeur nega a sauté « à pieds joints, sur le capot du véhicule 21-15, donnant des coups de pied dans le pare- brise, qu’il brisa. finalement, il attrape une poubelle en métal et donne de nombreux coups sur la voiture de police 21-15, et ce, sans compter les nom- breux coups de pied distribués allègrement sur la carrosserie du véhicule » (par 110). le rap- port de police signale également qu’« [e]ntre chaque épisode de méfaits, l’accusé agitait la foule en criant et en lançant des bouteilles et des roches » (reproduit au da, vol. v, p. 952- 954, p 954). il est condamné à payer 2 000 $ en dommages- intérêts compensatoires. le défendeur davin «  saute sur le capot, sur le toit du véhicule 21-15. il fracasse les phares, les gyrophares et lance des bouteilles de bière dans les vitres du véhicule. il s’en prend aussi à un citoyen, qui tente de le rai- sonner, en lui donnant un coup de bouteille sur la tête » (par 134). selon le rapport de police, m. davin aurait affi rmé que ce sont ces amis qui ont incendié le véhicule. il ajoute même que « si l’occasion lui est donnée, il recommencera et que si l’opportunité lui avait été donnée, il aurait mis le feu au véhicule » (par 135). il est condamné à payer 2 000 $ en dommages- intérêts compensatoires. le défendeur chaperon a aidé un autre in- dividu à allumer un morceau de carton qu’il a ensuite lui- même déposé dans le véhicule qui a été incendié. il est condamné à payer 4  000  $ en dommages- intérêts compensa- toires. [127] in the case in question, the city was thus able to identify seven individuals who had taken part in the destruction of the patrol car. it was also able to identify the person who had started the fi re. as a result of the vandalism, the vehicle was completely destroyed and the city incurred a loss of $20,70753. however, it is receiving only $11,000 in compensa- tory damages. rather than imposing solidary liability on the members of the group who had jointly partic- ipated in this wrongful act, the trial judge identifi ed separate faults within the wrongful act and linked each of them to a portion of the damage done by the [127] dans cette affaire, la ville a donc réussi à identifi er sept individus ayant participé à la destruc- tion de l’auto- patrouille. elle est également parvenue à identifi er le responsable de l’incendie. le résultat de ce saccage est que l’auto- patrouille est entiè- rement détruite et que la ville a subi une perte de 20 707,53 $. elle ne reçoit toutefois que 11 000 $ en dommages- intérêts compensatoires. en effet, au lieu de condamner solidairement les membres du groupe ayant participé à ce fait collectif fautif, le juge de première instance a identifi é des fautes distinctes à l’intérieur du fait collectif fautif, et il les a reliées à 160 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. group. in the case of the respondent who had set fi re to the patrol car, the judge noted that the vehicle was already in bad shape by the time it was set on fi re, as it had been completely wrecked. he accordingly assessed the damage at $4,000. [128] when all is said and done, it is the innocent victim that is left with a loss of $9,707.53 for which it has not been compensated. this is precisely the type of injustice that art 1480 ccq is intended to remedy. on this point, allow me to reiterate that, as my colleague points out, the legislature’s intention was to “ensur[e] that the victim does not bear the conse- quences of evidentiary diffi culties that can be attrib- uted to the situation in which he or she has been placed by the persons who committed the faults” (para 31). [129] before concluding on this question, i wish to add one thing: under the civil code of lower canada, a court could fi nd a defendant jointly and severally liable even if it was possible to identify separate faults within a collective fault and to link them to portions of the damage done by the group. this is still true today. in the instant cases, therefore, the trial judge should have found the defendants sol- idarily liable even though it was possible, in some of the cases, to link individual faults to portions of the damage. that does not bar such a fi nding given that the persons in question had jointly taken part in a wrongful act that resulted in injury. once a fi nding of solidarity has been made, art 1478 ccq requires that the seriousness of the faults committed by the defendants who have been found solidarily liable be assessed in order to apportion liability among them:13 une fraction du dommage causé par le groupe. pour ce qui est de l’intimé qui a incendié le véhicule, le juge a souligné que l’auto- patrouille était déjà dans un piteux état au moment de l’incendie, puisqu’elle avait été complètement saccagée. il a donc évalué le dommage à 4 000 $. [128] en définitive, c’est la victime innocente qui se retrouve avec une perte non compensée de 9 707,53 $. il s’agit là précisément du type d’injustice que l’art 1480 ccq cherche à corriger. à cet égard, rappelons encore une fois que, comme l’a souligné mon collègue, l’intention du législateur est de « s’as- sure[r] que la victime ne subi[sse] pas les conséquences de diffi cultés de preuve imputables à la situation dans laquelle les auteurs des fautes l’ont placée » (par 31). [129] avant de conclure sur cette question, je désire ajouter ceci : sous le régime du code civil du bas- canada, un tribunal pouvait conclure à la solidarité, même dans les cas où il était possible d’identifi er des fautes distinctes au sein d’une faute collective et de les relier à une fraction du dommage causé par le groupe. c’est toujours le cas aujourd’hui. en l’espèce, le juge de première instance aurait donc dû condamner solidairement les défendeurs même si, dans certains cas, des fautes individuelles pouvaient être liées à une fraction du dommage. cela n’empêche pas une condamnation solidaire lorsque ces personnes ont participé à un fait collectif fautif ayant entrainé un pré- judice. une fois la solidarité établie, l’art 1478 ccq. commande d’évaluer la gravité des fautes commises par les défendeurs tenus solidairement responsables afi n de partager la responsabilité entre eux13 : 1478 where an injury has been caused by several per- sons, liability is shared by them in proportion to the seri- ousness of the fault of each.14 1478 lorsque le préjudice est causé par plusieurs per- sonnes, la responsabilité se partage entre elles en propor- tion de la gravité de leur faute respective14.   .   . 13 baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at no 1-721. 14 it should be noted that art. 328 of the code of civil procedure, cqlr, c c-2501, provides: “a judgment rendered against a party must be capable of being executed. a judgment awarding damages must liquidate the damages; a judgment fi nding persons solidarily liable for injury must, if the evidence permits, determine the share of each of those persons in the award as between them only.” 13 baudouin, deslauriers et moore, no 1-721. 14 il est à noter que l’art. 328 du code de procédure civile, rlrq, c c-2501, prévoit ce qui suit : « le jugement qui porte condam- nation doit être susceptible d’exécution. ainsi, la condamnation à des dommages- intérêts en contient la liquidation et la condam- nation solidaire contre les auteurs d’un préjudice détermine, pour valoir entre eux seulement, la part de chacun dans la condamna- tion si la preuve permet de l’établir. » [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 161 this means that the identifi cation of individual faults and the determination of their nature and serious- ness are relevant only to the apportionment of liabil- ity among the persons who jointly took part in the wrongful act and do not affect the question whether those persons are solidarily liable to the victim. l’identifi cation de fautes individuelles et la déter- mination de leur nature et gravité ne sont donc per- tinentes que pour partager la responsabilité entre les personnes qui ont participé au fait collectif fautif et n’ont pas d’impact quant à leur responsabilité soli- daire vis-à-vis la victime. [130] i accordingly conclude that art 1480 ccq. applies in these cases. in my view, this interpretation is consistent with the wording of the article, with the legislature’s intention to codify the earlier case law and with the scheme and object of the legisla- tion (canada (attorney general) v. thouin, 2017 scc 46, [2017] 2 scr 184, at para. 26, quoting rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 scr 27, at para. 21, in turn quoting e a driedger,. construction of statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p 87). [130] je conclus donc que l’art 1480 ccq s’ap- plique en l’espèce. selon moi, cette interprétation est compatible avec le libellé de l’article, l’inten- tion du législateur de codifi er la jurisprudence anté- rieure ainsi que l’esprit et l’objet de la loi (canada (procureur général) c. thouin, 2017 csc 46, [2017] 2 rcs 184, par. 26, citant rizzo & rizzo shoes ltd. (re), [1998] 1 rcs 27, par. 21, qui cite e. a. driedger, construction of statutes (2e éd. 1983), p 87). b article 1526 ccq. b l’article 1526 ccq. [131] in my opinion, the legislature did not intend to make the application of art 1480 ccq subject to the requirement that it be impossible to determine the identity of the person who caused the injury. but even if that were the case, the requirement in question would not affect the outcome of this appeal. [131] à mon avis, le législateur n’avait pas l’in- tention d’exiger qu’il soit impossible de déterminer l’identité de la personne qui a causé le préjudice pour que l’art 1480 ccq s’applique. toutefois, même si c’était le cas, cette exigence n’aurait aucun impact sur l’issue du présent pourvoi. [132] my colleague states that in such a case, it is on art 1526 ccq that a plaintiff would have to rely in order to have persons who have jointly taken part in a wrongful act — a situation the courts formerly characterized as a “common venture” — found solidarily liable. therefore, even if i accepted gascon  j.’s interpretation of art.  1480  ccq,. i would still conclude that the respondents must be found solidarily liable under art 1526 ccq for the whole of the damage done to a given patrol car: [132] selon mon collègue, dans une telle éven- tualité, ce serait en invoquant l’art.  1526  ccq. qu’un demandeur obtiendrait la condamnation solidaire des auteurs d’un fait collectif fautif, si- tuation que la jurisprudence antérieure qualifi ait d’« aventure commune ». ainsi, même en accep- tant l’interprétation que donne le juge gascon de l’art 1480 ccq, j’arriverais tout de même à la conclusion que les intimés doivent, par l’effet de l’art 1526 ccq, être tenus solidairement respon- sables de l’entièreté des dommages causés à une même auto- patrouille : 1526 the obligation to make reparation for injury caused to another through the fault of two or more persons is solidary where the obligation is extra- contractual. 1526 l’obligation de réparer le préjudice causé à autrui par la faute de deux personnes ou plus est solidaire, lorsque cette obligation est extracontractuelle. [133] under this article, two or more persons who have through their fault caused a single injury have a solidary obligation to make reparation for that [133] suivant cette disposition, lorsque plusieurs personnes fautives ont causé un préjudice unique, ces personnes ont solidairement l’obligation de réparer 162 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. injury.15 in the instant cases, the trial judge found that the respondents had committed separate faults and that those faults could not be linked to a single injury. in my view, that fi nding fl owed directly from the error of law he made in defi ning joint participa- tion in a wrongful act. [134] because the trial judge concluded that the respondents had not jointly taken part in a wrongful act, he was unable to establish a causal connection with the injury suffered by the city, that is, the total loss of the patrol car in question. he instead found that there were a number of individual faults, each of which had caused a portion of the damage. unlike him, i fi nd that the respondents committed a common fault that resulted in the total loss of each vehicle. in light of my discussion in the preceding sections, it was the wrongful act in which the respondents jointly took part that was the direct cause of the destruction of each of the vehicles, and it therefore stands to reason that the respondents are solidarily liable under art 1526 ccq. [135] furthermore, the trial judge’s analysis re- garding the application of art 1526 ccq leads to inconsistent outcomes that cannot be ignored. for example, in case number 2014 qccq 4923, which is not at issue in this appeal, he found the two defendants gauchier and casimir — cousins who had thrown things at patrol cars 44-3 and 30-5 and shattered the cars’ windows — solidarily liable under art 1526 ccq. he concluded that, [translation] “[b]ecause this was a single fault committed by two people in relation to two vehicles, the defendants are solidarily liable” (para. 61 (canlii)). ce préjudice15. en l’espèce, le juge de première ins- tance a conclu que les intimés avaient commis des fautes distinctes et que ces fautes ne pouvaient être rattachées à un préjudice unique. or, à mon avis, cette conclusion découle directement de l’erreur de droit qu’a commise le juge de première instance en défi nissant le fait collectif fautif. [134] comme le juge de première instance a conclu qu’il n’existait aucun fait collectif fautif, il n’a pu établir de lien de causalité avec le préjudice subi par la ville, soit la perte totale de l’auto- patrouille concernée. il a plutôt jugé qu’il y avait eu plusieurs fautes individuelles, chacune ayant causé une fraction du dommage. contrairement à lui, j’estime que les in- timés ont commis une faute commune qui a entraîné la perte totale de chaque véhicule. en effet, suivant l’analyse que j’ai exposée aux sections précédentes, c’est le fait collectif fautif des intimés qui a directe- ment causé la destruction des différents véhicules et il va donc de soi que les intimés sont solidairement responsables sur la base de l’art 1526 ccq. [135] par ailleurs, l’analyse réalisée par le juge de première instance pour l’application de l’art. 1526 ccq mène à des résultats contradictoires qu’on ne peut ignorer. à titre d’exemple, dans le dossier 2014 qccq 4923, lequel n’est pas visé par le pré- sent pourvoi, le juge a condamné solidairement les deux défendeurs gauchier et casimir en vertu de l’art 1526 ccq, en l’occurrence deux cousins qui ont lancé des objets sur les autos- patrouilles 44-3 et 30-5 et fracassé les vitres de ces véhicules. il a conclu ainsi : « puisqu’il s’agit de la même faute commise sur deux véhicules par deux auteurs, les défendeurs sont donc solidairement responsables » (par. 61 (canlii)). [136] in a second, very similar case (2014 qccq 4916), which is at issue in this appeal, the two defendants in question were roommates who had gone downtown together. the trial judge found that mr. côté béliveau had [translation] “thr[own] rocks at the vehicle, breaking the front and rear [136] dans un second dossier tout à fait similaire (2014 qccq 4916), lequel est visé par le présent pourvoi, les deux défendeurs en cause sont des colocataires qui se rendaient ensemble au centre- ville le juge de première instance conclut que m. côté béliveau « jette des pierres sur le véhicule, 15 baudouin, deslauriers and moore, at nos. 1-720 to 1-722; d. lluelles and b. moore, droit des obligations (2nd ed. 2012), at no 2578. 15 baudouin, deslauriers et moore, nos 1-720 à 1-722; d. lluelles et b. moore, droit des obligations (2e éd. 2012), nº 2578. [2018] 2 rcs. mont réal (ville) c lonardi la juge côté 163 windows” and “tried, with the help of other rioters, to tear off the front passenger- side door of [the] vehi- cle” (para. 56 (canlii) (emphasis added)). mr. côté béliveau fi led neither a defence nor an estimate of the damage he had allegedly caused. the trial judge therefore awarded $2,500 in damages. mr. hunter had also taken part in the destruction of the vehicle at the same time. he admitted in particular to throwing a rock that had broken the vehicle’s rear window — for which mr. côté béliveau was also found li- able. he also admitted that he had “tried to tear off the front (passenger- side) door of the police vehi- cle” (para. 58) — again damage for which mr. côté béliveau was also found liable. the trial judge found that the value of the rear window was $300, but that mr. hunter’s liability was limited to 50 percent of that amount on the basis that he “was not the only one to throw things at the windows” (para 61). as for the door and the other damage that had been done, the trial judge simply awarded an amount without evidence as to the cost of the damage. [137] according to my colleague, the case of de- fendants côté béliveau and hunter must be dis- tinguished from that of defendants gauchier and casimir (2014 qccq 4923) on the basis that, in his opinion, it was possible in the case of mr. hunter and mr. côté béliveau to determine exactly what damage had been caused by each of the defendants (para 75). unlike my colleague, however, i do not believe that in fi nding that mr. hunter was liable to the extent of 50 percent of the value of the windows he broke, the trial judge identifi ed the precise damage caused by the defendants. in my view, he instead assessed mr. hunter’s liability on the basis of the serious- ness of the fault the defendant had committed, as he could not determine the exact extent of the damage. it is impossible to establish that a given individual broke exactly 50 percent of a window. the victim ultimately fi nds itself with a broken window that must be replaced. that is a single injury in which a number of individuals took part, and those individ- uals must therefore be found solidarily liable. the same is true where the front (passenger- side) door of the patrol car is concerned. in the end, the patrol car was completely destroyed. that, too, is a single cassant les vitres avant et arrière » et « tente d’ar- racher avec l’aide d’autres manifestants la portière avant, côté passager du véhicule » (par. 56 (canlii) (je souligne)). ce dernier ne produit aucune défense ni estimation des dommages qu’il aurait causés. le juge de première instance les arbitre donc à 2 500 $. au même moment, m. hunter participait également au saccage du véhicule. il admet avoir lancé une pierre cassant notamment la vitre arrière du véhi- cule — pour laquelle m. côté béliveau a lui aussi été trouvé responsable. il admet également avoir « tenté d’arracher la portière avant (côté passager) du véhicule de police » (par. 58) — encore une fois un dommage pour lequel m. côté béliveau a aussi été trouvé responsable. or, le juge de première instance conclut que la valeur de la vitre arrière est de 300 $ mais que m. hunter n’est responsable qu’à 50 pour 100 puisqu’il « n’a pas été le seul à lanc[er] des objets dans les vitres » (par 61). en ce qui a trait à la portière et aux autres dommages causés, le juge de première instance en arbitre tout simplement le montant sans avoir de preuve quant à la quotité de ces dommages. [137] mon collègue affi rme que l’on doit distin- guer le dossier des défendeurs côté béliveau et hunter de celui des défendeurs gauchier et casimir (2014 qccq 4923), puisque selon lui, dans le dos- sier de m. hunter et m. côté béliveau, il est possible d’identifi er le dommage précis causé par chacun des défendeurs (par 75). or, contrairement à mon collègue, je ne crois pas que le juge de première ins- tance, en concluant que m. hunter était responsable à hauteur de 50 pour 100 de la valeur des fenêtres qu’il a brisées, a identifi é le dommage précis causé par les défendeurs. à mon avis, il a plutôt arbitré la responsabilité de m. hunter en fonction de la gravité de la faute commise, puisqu’il ne pouvait établir précisément le dommage. en effet, on ne peut éta- blir précisément qu’un individu a fracassé 50 pour 100 d’une fenêtre. au fi nal, la victime se retrouve avec une fenêtre fracassée qui doit être remplacée. il s’agit là d’un préjudice unique auquel plusieurs personnes ont participé et celles-ci doivent donc être condamnées solidairement. il en va de même de la portière avant (côté passager) de l’auto- patrouille. ultimement, l’auto- patrouille a été entièrement dé- truite. il s’agit, là aussi, d’un préjudice unique pour 164 mont réal (ville) v lonardi côté j. [2018] 2 scr. injury for which the defendants should be found solidarily liable. lequel les défendeurs doivent être tenus solidaire- ment responsables. [138] finally, i would also note with respect to the case of the defendants côté béliveau and hunter that it cannot be said, as my colleague does, that “[w]ith a few exceptions, which the judge rightly dealt with differently, the respondents did not know and were never in contact with one another, and their acts were committed at different times during the riot without the knowledge of the other respondents” (para 68). the evidence unquestionably shows the opposite to be true, yet the trial judge did not deal with their situation differently. [138] enfi n, je note également que, dans le dossier des défendeurs côté béliveau et hunter, on ne saurait affi rmer, comme le fait mon collègue, que « [s]auf rares exceptions, que le juge a à juste titre traitées différemment, les intimés ne se connaissaient pas, n’ont jamais été en communication et ont agi à des moments différents au cours de l’émeute, sans que les autres intimés en aient connaissance » (par 68). la preuve démontre sans contredit le contraire. le juge de première instance n’a pourtant pas traité leur situation différemment. iv conclusion iv conclusion i conclude that the respondents who dam- [139] aged a given patrol car during the riot jointly took part in a wrongful act and must be held solidarily liable for the whole of the damage done to the vehicle in question. in my view, they should be found soli- darily liable under art 1480 ccq or, alternatively, for the same reasons, under art 1526 ccq. i would therefore allow the appeal. [139] j’arrive à la conclusion que les intimés qui ont endommagé une même auto- patrouille dans le cours de l’émeute ont participé à un fait collectif fau- tif et doivent être tenus solidairement responsables de l’ensemble des dommages causés à ce véhicule. je suis d’avis que leur responsabilité solidaire doit être retenue en vertu de l’art 1480 ccq ou sub- sidiairement, pour les mêmes raisons, en vertu de l’art 1526 ccq. j’accueillerais donc le pourvoi. appeal dismissed with costs, côté j. dissenting. pourvoi rejeté avec dépens, la juge côté est dis- sidente. procureurs de l’appelante : gagnier guay biron, mont réal. mont réal. jonathan franco and maxime favreau courte- manche: avocats laval, laval. procureurs des intimés davide lonardi, jonathan franco et maxime favreau courtemanche : avocats laval, laval. solicitor for the respondent jean- françois procureur de l’intimé jean- françois hunter : aide hunter: aide juridique de mont réal, mont réal. juridique de mont réal, mont réal. procureurs de l’intimé jean- philippe forest munguia: de minico petit guarnieri, mont réal. munguia : de minico petit guarnieri, mont réal. procureurs de l’intimé éric primeau : louise desautels, mont réal. desautels, mont réal.